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Cornell University Library 
 UD157 .A76 1897 
 
 Extracts from an Infantry captain's jour 
 
 olin 
 
 3 1924 030 750 354 
 
VLb 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tiiis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030750354 
 
INTERNATIONAL SERIES 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 MAJOR ARTHUR L. WAGNER, 
 
 Assistant Adjutant-General. U. S. Army; late Instructor in Art of War at the 
 U. S. Inlantry and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 
 
 RXTRAGXS 
 
 An Infantry Captain's Journal 
 
 OR 
 
 THE TRIAL OP A METHOD FOR EFFECTIVELY TRAINING A 
 COMPANY IN SKIRMISHING AND OUTPOST DUTY, 
 IN A LIMITED TIME, AND UNDER UNFA- 
 VORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
 
 GENERAI. VON ARNIM, 
 
 Of the German Army. 
 Translated by Lt.-General C.J. East, C. B. 
 
 No. S- 
 
 KANSAS CITY, MO : 
 HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUBLISHING CO., 
 1014-1016 Wyandotte Street. 
 
 LONDON; 
 
 W. H. ALLEN & CO., (Limited), 
 
 K Waterloo Place, S. W. 
 
 Publishers to the India OfpiCe. 
 
 I 
 
 9 
 
A. I M ^^4' 
 
PREFACE. ^, 
 
 General von Arnim's essentially practical work, which 
 is now presented for the first time to American readers, has 
 been favorably known for some years in Europe. It fur- 
 nishes an interesting picture of the business-like nature of 
 the company instruction in the German army, where mili- 
 tary efficiency is the foundation of national existence; and it 
 is believed that its appearance here is opportune, now that 
 there is a general healthy tendency in our service to replace 
 perfunctory "barrack square drills", with practical exercises 
 in tactics in the true sense of the term. 
 
 Incidentally the work shows us that even in the Ger- 
 man army captains are unable to have always the full 
 strength of their companies present for drills, and that some 
 of the heart-burning annoyances of our own company com- 
 manders are felt in an army where the captains are 
 given a degree of initiative unknown to our lown. It 
 should be the endeavor of a company commander — and, 
 indeed, of every officer — not to wait for an ideal condi- 
 tion of affairs in military instruction, but to make the best 
 of things as they are, and to economize time and utilize 
 means in the way so effectively employed by the German 
 captain, who now holds the well-earned rank of general of 
 infantry. 
 
 It is deeply to be regretted that our company com- 
 manders are in a. great degree deprived of the liberty of 
 action enjoyed by the German captains. It is the fond 
 dream of our best soldiers, that a time may yet come when 
 our captains may be required to show results, not methods — 
 ends, not means — and that they may be given fuller control 
 
4 PREFACE. 
 
 of the training of their companies, instead of being, as is 
 sometimes the case, hampered and reduced to the con- 
 dition of lieutenants bv the constant interference of post 
 commanders. 
 
 The thanks of the editor are due and are gratefully ten- 
 dered to General East, the translator, and Captain H. (lar- 
 bett,R.lS'.,th(' editor of the JoiniuiJ of tlic Royal United Scrrice 
 Institution fin which the translation first appeared), for per- 
 mission courteously given to include this work in the Interna- 
 tional Series. The commands in the text are those in use in 
 the British service, it not being deemed best to alter the text 
 of the distinguished soldier to whom we are indebted for 
 the English translation. 
 War Department, 
 
 ^^'ashington, D. C, 
 May 2:!, 1897. 
 
FIRST PART. 
 
 Measures of Safety on the March and Skirmishing. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 2Ctli April. 18 — . To the end of June, when the inspec- 
 tion of the regiment takes place, there are nine complete weeks 
 for sldrmiabiug and outpost drill! 
 
 How man,y days for drill ? 
 
 Every ninth day the battalion is on guard, consequently 
 out of nine days seven only remain available for other duties; 
 therefore, in nine weeks, there are forty-nine days. Then, if 
 in addition seven or eight Sundays are struck off, there re- 
 main in nine weeks, forty-one days for a certainty; these 
 forty-one days may be divided as follows: — 
 
 For rifle practice, two mornings a week. 
 
 Eighteen mornings subtracted from forty-one, there re- 
 main twenty-three. 
 
 Nine mornings for battalion drill, taken from twenty- 
 three, there remain fourteen. 
 
 Pour or live days more must be taken off for fatigue and 
 other duties, and allowance must also be made for bad 
 weather, f^te days, and exceptional occurrences. 
 
 In short, I shall do well to base my plan upon (the fact 
 that I cannot reckon upon having the entire compaily availa- 
 ble for minor maneuvers for more than eight mornings dur- 
 ing the nine weeks. 
 
 Of these eight mornings, four at least muist be kept for 
 outpost drill, with two detadhments, one opposed to the 
 other; there remain, then, but four mornings for the details 
 
6 E.rlracts fraiii an Infantry Captain's Jminiul. 
 
 of the attack formation over broken ground, and for ad- 
 \ ance and rear guai-ds*. etc.. on the march. 
 
 If I succeed in economizing yet anotlier morning in May 
 (by carrying out rifle practice, once in the iiiorn'iiiji and thi-ee 
 times in the evening, instead of firing twice in the morning 
 and twice in the eveningi. T could add it to those devoted to 
 preliminary drills; if it be in June. I shall add it to the 
 minor nianieuvt'is. 
 
 If I calculati' hoir oftin. besides doing outpost duty and 
 advanced ^niards. etc.. it will be possible to practice the 
 attack fonnatiou itver broken ground, it becomes evident 
 that I must take advantage of every minute, and that I mu»t 
 cxecu'te, as mucli as p(i.ssible, several things at tihe same 
 time; alsn tliat the tliefny of tlir crcniinj on the drill whicih 
 has taken ))la(c in the day must Ik- carried out in such a 
 practical manner as to In- of almost as much benefit as a 
 repetition of the same drill. 
 
 I know what is re(iuire<l at the inspection: 
 
 1st. &*killful and prudent conduct oif dcta<'lied men and 
 patrols : 
 
 {(I) In examining a certain extent of gi ound. 
 
 (I) In Sf'ckiii;! for and (observing an adversary. 
 
 (c) In retiring before an enemy. 
 
 (fZ) In transmitting intelligence. 
 
 lid. The proper instru'cd:ion of sentr-ies in their duties, 
 and that they should know how to act and how to transmit 
 intelligence, aiiording to the different events which may 
 happen ; 
 
 3d. An intelligent orrnpation of a jjosition by one or 
 more groups, either for defense or attarl- ; manner of reinforc- 
 ing the position, well by prolonging the line as by 
 strengthening it; defenses or works to be executed on the 
 position with spades, or by any other means, in lorder to be 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 7 
 
 able 'to deliver an eft'eotive fire as mu'ch as possible from un- 
 der cover ; the different wiays of flrittg, the manner of direct- 
 ing fire and its use at different distances (judging dis- 
 tance] ; reports to be sent from the line of fire; 
 
 4th. The attack, properly so called, comprising the com- 
 ing into action of the supports in close order for firing vol- 
 leys; case of an attack repulsed; voluntary retirement (both 
 when it is a question of retiring without being seen, and 
 wihen it is necessary to retire successively and yield before a 
 laist decisive shock) ; 
 
 A forced retireoQent after a decisive action, retreat 
 through a defile until arrival at a suitable position ; 
 
 A front attack (the same in open ground) and a flank 
 iittack; movement to the fnont hy rushes and the manner oi 
 firinlg at the enemy; the assault; the concentric attack; the 
 steps to be taken to hold the position that has been carried, 
 and the pursuit 'Of the enemy. 
 
 I certainly cannot ask less ; for it is evident thiat all this 
 is necessary, even indispensable, for tlie instruction of tiie 
 men. 
 
 But can I answer for really instructing the greater part 
 of the company in all these things? 
 
 As chiefs of patrols, I can only think of training selected 
 men, who are particularlyi I intelligent, two men a year in 
 each squad; as regards any more, it would be labor lost. 
 
 As regards other duties, it is on the contrary necessary 
 t:hat each man individually should practice them; every man 
 should at least be drilled in tihe attack formation on broken 
 ground, and have learnt the details of outpost duty. 
 
 I must manage some afternoons for preliminary drills in 
 the neighborhood of the barracks ! 
 
 Fortunately, I have'already often drilled the recruits to 
 place themselves under cover ; when the company has been 
 
8 E.rtracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 out miircMng, I have had them taug-ht by tlie older soldiei'S 
 to pay attention to the rules for advanced guards and flank- 
 ers, etc.. how to occupy a position, to approacb it for attack, 
 and I have caused them specially to be shown how to set 
 about placing outposts and sentries. These preparatory 
 drills, and also the theoretical instrtiction 'carefully impanted 
 by tlic cifliccrs during the winter, mow stand me in good 
 stead; I should not have believed that tlie time for practi- 
 citlchUl would be so cluscly limited!* 
 
 *I havf alrciiily Icirut one thiiii;. Formerly it appeared to me im- 
 liiissilile even to be ncurlji rcMily, lor ray iOval was, to endue each man 
 with Hhr m-ccssary sUillt'ulnoas so that he migiti't know hiow to act on 
 ricru sort of broken grouuil and under every eircum'stanee of a fight. 
 
 Only after ha\ing taken a comprethiensive and clear wersv of the 
 requlivuu'ijts of urtire serviee oooild I hope to becoime ma-i'ter of the 
 whole subject, and to caiTy out what Is most nveessary, and to lead up 
 to whS/t is most desiraible. 
 
 Everytfhing now poiuts out to me this task: to make the various 
 oocui-rcncrs of active service so clear to each non-commissioned officer, 
 and to each man. that he may know how to act correctly under simi- 
 lar (•ircumstau<cs. 
 
 And as on ax?tive service the imlividual cannot act according to 
 his discretion, but has pither a special task to perform or as part of a 
 frrciif wliole must act accordin;; to tivdevs. it therefore follows, that In 
 the simple taskswhich can fallto the lot of a company, it is onlyneces- 
 sary to point to the man how he should intelligently and thought- 
 fully carry out the orders communicated to him, and to the non- 
 coinmissioiiei] officer ivluit orders he should tmpart. 
 
 This latter a,ppears most difficult, a/lthough it is simplified by the 
 fact, that the orders which have to be imparted by non-eommissioaied 
 officers are not of many kinds, as they generally only refer to a defi- 
 nite position, movement, and manner of firing of the detachment; and 
 it appears allowaljle in these simple circumstances to accustom non- 
 commissioned officers and men to definite commands, or, at all events, 
 to practice the non-commissioned officers in giving easily understood 
 short orders; by this means I gain the great advantage, that after the 
 indiviiliml has learnt to move with his group, to take cover, and to 
 avail himself of cover when firing, I need only occupy myself with 
 the conduct of the whole detachment, and still the individual man 
 will be exercised at the same time. 
 
 The old drill prinfiple, by which so much is effected, comes in 
 good stead here, namely, thart: all detail forms tihe grooindwork, but 
 that this must be taught and controlled by non-commissioned officers; 
 whereas the special ohjeet of the e.rercise in detail, the correct execu- 
 tion of the orders given in a large detachment, must be superin- 
 tended by the chief of the oomipiany, in order that he may oorrectly 
 ^ppreciarte wlietfher the trtalning o<f his men ihiajs made the necessary 
 progress as regards discipline, skill, steadiness, and endurance. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. Q 
 
 I must, itherefore, before all things, make the non-commissioned 
 officers leam ftihe detail of skdrandshing and outpost duty correctly, 
 and see tbat they are able to lead; for this purpose I would specially 
 make use of the period after the maneuvers, during which the educa- 
 tional personnel must always be especially trained. Besides, I bave 
 already remarked that it is by no means difficult for a non-commis- 
 sioned officer to learn how to lead if, as a rule, only such situations arc 
 made to occur as are probable in active service, and when he under- 
 stands the intentions of his leader. 
 
 Artificial situations be can never understand, and therefore woulil 
 not, as a rule, eompreihend the special views of his leader in such a 
 case,— equally difficult will it be for him to carry out commands 
 wlnieh hiave no oiject, because he does not understand them. Oaro 
 shtrald therefore be taien to avoid toth, if an exact general working 
 together be aimed at. 
 
 2- 
 
10 
 
 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. \\ 
 
 FIRST EXERCISE. 
 
 5tli May, 18 — (see Plate Pig. 1). — The company was un- 
 der arms at half-past six, the men iri drill order, and one 
 packet of cartridges per squad — 70 men on parade. Besides 
 men permanently detached, there were absent — wO'rkmen, 
 -artisans, orderlies, the company clerk, and the cooks; the 
 sergeant took part in the drill, commanding a section, and 
 bis reports, etc., had to be made out by the clerk. 
 
 The six squads formed three divisions of two sections 
 ■each. From the commencement two men per squad in their 
 second year and two in their first yearwere selectedfor train- 
 ing in the duties of chief men of patrols. Amongst the small 
 number of men in their third year of service, not one was fit 
 for these duties. It was decided that the soldiers so selected 
 should be exercised as much as possible in all the practical 
 details of field service. 
 
 The commanders of divisions placed in front the men of 
 
 the second or of the first class in firing ; the commanders of 
 
 squaids (or of sections) did the same as regards the best shots 
 
 in the third class. 
 
 General Idea. 
 
 The company is to advance by Meerheim as far as the 
 neighboring height, and is to take up a position there against 
 an enemy coming from Fiihlingen (the second village). Hos- 
 tile patrols have shown them'selves during the night near 
 Meerheim. 
 
 Disposition. — One division as an advanced guard on tihe 
 high road ; the village of Meerheim to be carefully examined ; 
 lateral patrols to be sent to the farms lying to the side. . The 
 two other divisions to follow the advanced guard closely in 
 vorder to share in the instructions which may be given to 
 
12 Extracts from an IiTfantry Cat^taiii's Journal. 
 
 detached men and groups; the division conMiiandexs lo keep 
 them informed on this subject, and in the same way to ex- 
 plain to them all that passes under their eyes. 
 
 Object of the Exercise. 
 
 1st. The instruction and the conduct of detached men 
 and of tin- advanced guard when marching to the front, in 
 the neigl)li()rhood of an enemj^, over a country which does not 
 permit of seeing to any distance; 
 
 I'd. < 'onduct to be followed when the appearance of the 
 supposed enemy is announced at a great distance; 
 
 :!d. Conduct to be followed if the enemy (supposed) 
 again retires. 
 
 E.reeution. — The division commander is named for the 
 head of the advanced guard: a non-commissioned oflfleer in 
 command, with two flies and one man forms the link be- 
 tween the head and the advanced guard. 
 
 One file besides was detacljed to the right, and another 
 to the left, as flankers. 
 
 Two ciHiimanders were named beforehand for the lateral 
 patrols, whicli might become necessary on the right arid the 
 left. All these men ste]iped out to the flanks; the remain- 
 der were united in one section, forming an advanced guard, 
 under the command of the senior non-commissioned oflficer. 
 
 Tnstrurlirina for the Detached Men. — From the head of 
 the advanced guard two men advance on the right atong the 
 high road, two men on the left, and passing quickly through 
 the village, go as far as the outskirts. 
 
 If, when there, they can discover nothing of the enemy, 
 tbey must go on to the heights, whence they will be able to 
 observe the whole of the environs. 
 
 The flankers advance on the right and left along the out- 
 skirts of the village, keeping up a communication with the 
 head as much as possible. 
 
Extracts ■from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 13 
 
 It is useiesis to require a minute examination of the 
 farms, since at the most only a hostile patrol oould be hidden 
 there.* But on all the lateral roads the detaohed men, be- 
 fore going further, must thoroughly observe if tlhere is any- 
 thing suspicious along them. 
 
 Commencement of the Advance. — ^"Detached men, quick 
 march I" The four men of the head moved quickly forward, 
 the non-commissioned officer near- them and on' that side 
 where he could best see the surrounding country. 
 
 The flankers remained at first behind, as they could not 
 be started until later, on account of cultivated fields. But 
 they were shown the points on wihich they would have 
 moved, if they had really been on active service. 
 
 The man entrusted with keeping up the communica- 
 tions followed only when the leadjing men had advanced 
 from 80 to 100 yards ; the division commander m'oved on lat 
 the isame time, on one side of the road. 
 
 After another hundred yards, the advanJced guard 
 marched ofE in file from the right: the commander kept 
 slightly in front, so as never to lose sight 'of the division oom- 
 mander, in order to be able rapidly to understand his signs 
 or orders, and to conform to them as quickly as possible. 
 
 In the village a road led to the right, towards an isolated 
 farm. 
 
 As soon as he perceived it, the division comimander cried 
 out to the rear, "A patrol to the right to visit the farm." 
 
 The commander of the advanced guard caused the com- 
 mander 'of the patrol, who had been selected ibef orehand, to 
 
 *It is only necessary to minutely eramine farms in three cases: — 
 
 1st. If the detachment which is advancing is very weak, so 
 much so thait it would be iniconvenienced even by a small hostile 
 amtousoade. 
 
 2d. "\^'hen an attack ou a village only succeeds after a long 
 fight 'through farm ibuildings. 
 
 3d. If the presence of hostile partisans or franc-tireurs in an 
 enemy's country demands special precautions. 
 
J4 Extracts from an Infantru Captain's Jotiniul. i 
 
 advance rapidly witli two nieu up to the division tonmiander, 
 Tbe latter said to him, "N'isit the farm, then return to the 
 advanced guard! Fire oil a rifle and send intellijiencc 
 quickly, should you learn anything of the enemy!"* 
 
 yrirs from the Left Fliviikers. — Before the head had 
 reach. 'il the further boundary wf the village, I caused t1ie fol- 
 lowing report to be sent to the commander of the advanced 
 guard by the left flankers:— "i^ro/» the left flankers: A de- 
 tachment of the enemy, of the strength of about a di\4sion, 
 1,000 jiaces distant, is marching on the village!" 
 
 ('oiididt of the Vitin-hvd Men untl of the Advaneed Qnn.rd 
 on thh Report. — Order for the head: "Push forward quickly 
 to the ciitrancc of the village." 
 
 Order for the udvaneed (juurd: "Double, to the last farm 
 near the entrance, and get under cover." It follows, as a 
 matter of course, that the main body followed at the double, 
 without special orders to this eft'ect being necessary. 
 
 The commander of the first division, on the principle 
 that he should always be at the most important point, in 
 order to make there the necessary arrangements, has moved 
 rapidly to the enti-ance of the village with the bead. 
 
 On the right there was a hedge, oh the left a farm with 
 walls, and an open line of fire to the front. 
 
 "The advanced guard to get under cover behind the 
 wall." Two leading men of the head were on the left near 
 the wall, and two near the hi^dge. 
 
 As soon as the flankers saw that the advanced men occu- 
 pied the boundary, they alsio moved th«re rapidly and tooli 
 position under cover. The lateral patrol was still at the 
 farm to the right. 
 
 The march of the advanced guard up to the wall liad not 
 
 *In this ease, as at the most an enemy's patrol would be on the 
 flank, the advance men can continue quietly to advance, wifliout 
 waiting for the result of the visit to the farm. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. | 15 
 
 been carefully carried out ; they would 'bave been pencedved 
 at a distance, whereas, if the men 'had run.in a ist'Ooping posi- 
 tion for the last 20 yards up to the wall, they might have 
 arrived in the new posiition without having been seen in the 
 very least. 
 
 As I attach greait importance to the observance of these 
 precautiomary measures, I caused the movement to be recom- 
 menced in presence of the remainder of the company' 
 
 From the last farm but one, up to the wall, which was 
 about 3 feet high, a very limited oipen ispace had to be tra- 
 versed. By using the ditch of the road, the advance guard, 
 by stooping down, and by follo^wing in file one after the 
 other, could advantee up to the wall, and thence, equally 
 stooping, could have run to take cover behind the wall. 
 
 At the saime time, with another detachmenrt, I showed 
 how, by advancing successively file by file over the open 
 space ,up to the wall, the enemy is left quite undecided as to 
 the strength of the occupation, supposing even he had seen 
 that the wall was occupied. 
 
 I them informed the com^pany that I admitted the enemy 
 was i-etiring and disappearing behind the height. 
 
 Furtlver advance mid relief of the division on advamced 
 gua/rd: "The 2d division as advanced guard to follow the 
 enemy — the 1st division to assemble !" 
 
 Owing to the cultivated fields, it was only possible to 
 advance along the high road, ooinsequenitly the commander 
 
 *It is necessary from the beginning to check the tendency of the 
 men to expose themselves uselessly when taking up a position. It 
 is only quite exceptionally, in order to make the eneany believe in 
 greater force than one really has availaibl'e, Mhast it is advantageous to 
 sihofw to the enemy as many 'men as possible at different points when 
 taking up a position; but then special orders must be given for this par- 
 ticular object. 
 
 fThe manner in which an advanced guard should behave in the 
 neighborhood of an enemy was also practiced; that is to say, instead 
 of a head, a skirmishing detachment was sent out. 
 
25 Extracts from an Infantry Captains Journal. 
 
 of the '2d division found it necessary to give the order— "The 
 1st section in sldrmisbiug order in ftle, on the right side of 
 tlie road; the file on tlie left, iu the left ditch! The 3d sec- 
 tion to form the advanced guard, and to march right in front 
 iu fik', well closed up!" The new advanced guard allowed 
 t h(- 1st section to move to a suflicient distance in front. Dur- 
 ing this time, the commander of the 1st diwsion sent rapidly 
 to his detached men the order to rejoin the company on the 
 high road. 
 
 Then the first division joined on in rear of the third, 
 without waiting fori(s detached men, and ort these joining, 
 took up its proper order of march. The leading section hav- 
 ing arrived at a little elevation on the road, where it was 
 possible to see around for a good distaiuc, I caused it to send 
 out a head so as to instruct the men in this duty. 
 
 The section commander selected immediately two files, 
 which were detached to the right and left of the road,* and 
 one man charged with keeping up the communications. The 
 others remained halted until the advan/oed guard joined 
 them; and then, whilst continuing his advance, the com- 
 mander of the advanced guard made them take their places 
 in the ranks. 
 
 In the proximit \- of the height mentioned in the disposi- 
 tion, the ground became practicable on the rigiht-hand side; 
 a small cof>se was in front on the right of the higb igrounid ; 
 a farm about 500 yards to the side. 
 
 The commander of the advanced guard caused the right 
 file of the head to ascend the lieight rapidly until a view over 
 it could be obtained; and w"hilst the advanced guard took 
 
 *A head of four mm nt Uaxt lias the advantage of not being 
 obliged to stop before every patrol T\':hich might show itself. There- 
 fore with large bodies of troops, even in peace time, a head of three 
 men only should be avoided. In war a head of three men only 
 would hardly ever be employed, except when cavalry is in advance of 
 the infantry. 
 
Ewtracts -from an Infantry Captain's Journal. , 17 
 
 cover at the foot of the height, he seat baok fhe following 
 report : 
 
 "From the advanced guwrd: We liave arrived at the 
 height indicated in the order} notihing can be seen of the 
 enemy." 
 
 Instruction of the Non-commissioned Officers and of the Com- 
 pany in the steps to 6e Taken by the Detached M&n 
 for the Safety of the Company during a Halt. 
 
 The company having approiaohed the advanced guard, 
 I caused the division and section comimanders to advance tO' 
 the crest of the risiing ground, and I explained tfliat I 
 approved of the position's taken by the head of the advanced 
 guard, but remarked that the same would not be sufficient 
 for the safety of the company, if it were initended to halt 
 longer at this place. 
 
 In such a case, the commander lof the advanced guard 
 should immaediately, without waiting for orders, make his 
 arrangements. The interference of any senior officer would 
 not then be justified, except in the case where false or insuffi- 
 cient precautions were taken. I therefore asked what fur- 
 ther steps in the matter would be necessary. 
 
 "An outposit must be esitablished," was the reply I 
 received. 
 
 I remarked that the advanced guard could be consid- 
 ered as an outpost, but that it was not necessary to post sen- 
 tries according to the regulations. The two men: of the head 
 were sufficient for the moment, on the edge of the height; 
 other measures of safety should be entrusted to patrols sent 
 to the points whicli could not be seen from the position we 
 were in — one patrol to examine the copse as far as the side 
 farthest off, and to remain there ; another towards the farm 
 on the right, and to return after visiting it. As regards the 
 
18 Extracts from an Infantry Vapidin's Journal. 
 
 detiiohed men who were to remain ui posWioii, a relief nnvst 
 be told off from the advanced guard; anus were tlliem piled. 
 
 I tben made all the coiiiiiany come near, and I explained 
 to the men what measures of safety it would be necessary to 
 take, in the event oi having to remain for some hours at the 
 same place, in the neighborhood of the enemy. 
 
 I also showed how the patrol in the little copse, with the 
 two leading men, should have gone in such a manner tbait 
 the man on the right and the other on the left would be aible 
 to sec beyond the edge of it, whilst the man whose duty it 
 was to keep up the communiiation, remaining behind and 
 between, would have endeavored not to lose sight ol the two 
 in advance. As soon as the wood had been traversed, they 
 would place themselves at the further edge, so as to obtain 
 a view in ('vcvy direction. 
 
 The patrol sent to the farm should have sent two men 
 to visit it, whilst thethird remained in observation outside. 
 Even a small hostile i)atrol may jirove annoying to a detach- 
 ment ^\hich is rrfitinf/, by causing a false alarm; it is there- 
 fare advisable, in order to rest qiikth/, to make quite sure of 
 tJie immediate n'eighborhood. 
 
 After visiting the farm, the patrol could have returned, 
 as tlie ground in front is sufficiently under the observation 
 oi' the patrol at the copse. 
 
 I did not, however, <ause to be carried out what I had 
 just explained; but I advau'ced over the height with the com- 
 I/any, and after having brought in the detached men,, I 
 caused it to front in the opposite direction (that is to say, 
 facing the village of Meerheim) in rear of th'is height, and 
 I then piled arms in order to commence a new drill. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. ]9 
 
 Continuation of the Exercise. 
 
 It was half -past 8. 
 
 General Idea. — The following idea was coimimuni'cated to 
 the company as forming the basis for the continuation of the 
 exercise : 
 
 The company is sent forward on the main road as far 
 as the height (in a contrary sense to the oiriginal direction), 
 in order to occupy this height and defend it against an 
 attack supposed to come from village M. 
 
 Ohject of the Exercise. — 1st. Details regarding the occu- 
 paMon of a height. 
 
 2d. Preparations for defense. 
 
 3id. Execution of the defense, as regards the manner 
 in which each man of the group sihiould oonduict himself; 
 measures regarding detached men, and thie employment of 
 supports. 
 
 ,4th. Manner of advancing from the position and fol- 
 lowing an enemy that has been repulsed. 
 
 One man has been placed on the main road at 200 paces, 
 and another at 300 paces from the highest point, wirth the 
 order to remain alternately standing and kneeling, or lying 
 down, and to flre in the direction of the rising ground. 
 
 Dispositions for Occupation of the Position. — "The first 
 division occupies, with one group, the slope of the height to 
 the right so as to bring a fire on the road ; with a second 
 gronp it occupies tflie left of tihe crest, the file of the left wing 
 being detached to the copse to watch the flank on that side. 
 The support is placed behind the crest, to the left of the 
 road." 
 
 Practice of Details in Occupation. — First of all the two 
 groups have been practiced in taking up their positions ; the 
 others assist at this operation as spectators. 
 
 Right Oroup. — The commander has had to choose 
 
2[) E-TtmcU from an Infanfrv Captain s Journal. 
 
 promptly the most favoiiible direotion for moving his group 
 up to the position under cover, and he has given the order 
 "In file, from the left" (because on the right the ground 
 offered less shelter) ; he then mov<^d to the head of his group 
 rapidly but stooping, and led it in tliis manner as far as the 
 jxisition to be occupied. 
 
 Then, at the command: "Halt!— front fo,rm," every one 
 forms line, stooping down, and then lies down. All those 
 who find They have not a clear line of fire in front o* them 
 are directed to advance on their Ivands and knees as far as 
 necessary to aiv(- them a clear view in front, and to place 
 tlieiuselves so that they can fire well, either lying down or 
 kn(H'lin^. 
 
 To make a rest for the rifle, tlie swmil bayonet should 
 not lie used, but a rest should be rapidly made with ti spade, 
 if that be practicable. 
 
 The commander of the group has superintended^ the 
 positions taken. Somie files have had to be moved back on 
 their hands and knees, sufficiently far to be a)ble under cover 
 to fire kneeling. Some knelt on both knees; but this was 
 only aliiiwed when for both knee and foot there was an even 
 and firm supporl on the ground. When, on the contrary, 
 the giiound sloped, the men knelt on the right knee and 
 rested the elbow on the left. 
 
 When it had been ascertained that the ro'ad was 
 brought well under fire from the right side, iihe right file 
 was sent on the other side of this road.* 
 
 The men were then practiced in aiming at the s.oldier 
 who had remained placed at 200 paces in front of them, and 
 
 ♦Every commander of a group should, when tihe necessity arises, 
 himself establish his detachment according to these instructions. To 
 divide his group into two parts, on the rlgbt and left of the road, 
 would be a famlt, since by so doing he would not maintain the control 
 of his group. 'If it were necessary to occupy more strongly the op- 
 posite side of the road, a special group ought to be placed there. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 21 
 
 an inspection was then miade, to see wheHher by tbeir aim- 
 ing, their shots would have been good against this man, 
 either standing, lineeling, or lying down. 
 
 This commander of the group had now to practice his 
 men in this position — in individual firing (the best shoits 
 only firing at the man standing at 300 yards); slow firing 
 (at 200 paces an occasional shot as the man placed at that 
 distance sliowed himself more to one or wther of those fir- 
 ing); volley firing (at 300 paces, supposing a strong line to 
 be showing itself at that distance); and rapid firing (at 200 
 paces, in the same hypothesis). 
 
 For firing of the first three descriptions, attention 
 should be given to see that the man firing keeps under cover 
 whilst loading; but he should not do so when firing rapidly, 
 so as to be able to load more quickly; however, even in rapad 
 firing no shots should be fired precipitately. 
 
 Left Group. — The same operation was afterwards exe- 
 cuted by the group of the left wing, which, as in advancing 
 it was completely covered by the height in front, was moved 
 forward by the command, "Advanced in skirmishing order 
 and occupy the height:." 
 
 Here, also, every man was supervised in his manner of 
 kneeling, and was instruoted to stoop as much as possible 
 in loading; the different sorts of firing were also practiced. 
 
 Instructions for the File on the Left ^\'ing. — The flile on 
 the left wing was instructed, before moving off to the copse, 
 to place itself under cover at a point which wonld allow of 
 a good observaition of the neighborhood (to the left and in 
 front); and it received the order to notify by voice the 
 commander of the group of everything noteworthy which it 
 might observe, until the fir-ing commenced, and to notify 
 by sending a man as soon as the groiup opened fire. 
 
 It should never lose communication with its group; 
 
22 E.rtructs from an Infantry Captain's Juiirnal. 
 
 consequentlv it would have to retire with it, sliould a retire- 
 ment take place. 
 
 Belief of the 1st hi/ the 2d Division. — Tlie isec'ond division 
 was then ordered to ii^lieve the advanced grou]>s, and to 
 execute the movement as the flrst division had done. This 
 latter remained lying down until the approach of the sec- 
 ond ilivision. and then the comraandier of the section on 
 the right gave the caution: "No. 1 Section [the men then 
 looked toT^'ards him] retire, keeping under cover." The 
 (■(Hiuiiander -himself retired, atooping down, but quickly; 
 the men crept to the rear, the rifle in the right hand, until, 
 stooping down or standing up, they were safe from fire; the 
 order was then given: "("lose on the right;'" ''Half nght 
 turn,'' and the same again when the support had been 
 cleared, and then, "Halt, front." 
 
 In the same manner the left group has been brought 
 in, closing on thart: flank nearest the support. 
 
 2. Preparatory Details for the Defanse. Hiiuill \oll&ys 
 by the 3d and 1st Divisions. — The support w^us then prac- 
 ticed in marching to the front, to fire volleys; iit being flrat 
 of all explained to the commanders that they should give 
 the orders, "Halt, fire a volley, at — yards, ready," at the ■ 
 moment when the support, although still partially under 
 cover, or as much so as possible, should have in front a clear 
 fleld for its Are. Order to the men firing, "RapM flTinig." 
 
 Then the following order was given: "The third divis- 
 ion on to the road to fire volle,\s." The commander then 
 ordered: "Double march — 'half right turn — front turn — 
 halt — 'kneel down." The commander of the division, after 
 this last order given in front, assured himself, before passing 
 to the rear to give the next order, that the front of fire was 
 
E-j-tracts from an Infantry Captain's Journul. 23 
 
 clear; once behind the center of the divisions lie added: "At 
 300 yards ! ready ! present." 
 
 The men having failed to make ready, present, and bring 
 down their arms with calmness and precision, the division 
 was again led to the rear and again moved to the front, when 
 the firing was repeated. The following caution was then 
 given : "The first division to the left, near the crest to fire 
 volleys !" 
 
 This was carried out in the same way; but after having 
 ordered "Halt," the chief of the division perceived that all 
 the men could not fire over the crest. Therefore, instead of 
 ordering: "Kneel down," whilst passing to the rear, he gave 
 the order: "Left wing two paces to the front, march!" and 
 after this movement had been executed, "At 300 yards — 
 readj' — present." After some volleys had been fired, I or- 
 dered: "Supports, cease firing! retire."* "Skirmishers, 
 slow firing." 
 
 The division leaders gave the following orders: "Slope 
 arms, right about turn, quick march." In this movement, 
 the commanders of divisions remained standing behind their 
 divisions so that the center file had to make room for them 
 to pass to the front of their division. 
 
 They then continued with the commands, "Half right 
 (left) turn — rear turn — halt — front — stand-at-ease!" 
 
 One of the supports had to traverse la gnound broken 
 with holes; it was allowed to pass round this, but on condi- 
 
 *0n service such an order given by a company commander would 
 be difficult to understand. So loing as there is no convenient signal 
 flor ordering the cease fire, each division comimander must himself 
 cause it to cease, as soon as he is sure that another volley would be of 
 no use; otherwise, it woiuld be necessary to give up the advantage of 
 acting against two points with the supports. Sometimes, also, one 
 sees supports marched close up the line of fire to fire volleys. This 
 is a mistaike. After the action ihas cammenced an advance by small 
 supports only is allowable; large ones must have been movea up be- 
 forehand 
 
24 Extracts from an Iitfaittru Captain's JotirneJ. 
 
 tion of closing on to the file of direotion immediately after 
 passing the obsracle; no one was allowed to remain behind. 
 
 At this time, a section of old soldiers was sent out to 
 mark the enemy — eacli file represented a section. This sec- 
 tion was sent to the rear on the road (towards Meerlieini) 
 with the order to take position quite beyond the range of fire. 
 
 Insinict'wns for the Skeletoi) Eitcini/. — At the signal "Ad- 
 vance," the sc( tion of the enemy is to advance to the atlack. 
 file by tile (racli file representing a, section) along the high 
 road; at the signal "H'alt," the most advanced file should 
 immediately take position under cover, commence firing, and 
 be successively reinforced by the others in rear. Other sig- 
 nals were also determined upon for the subsequent move- 
 ments. At tile signal "Advance slowly," they were to 
 advance file b\' file; at the signal "Advance quickly," all 
 were ro move to the front by sncc(\ssive rushes; at the signal 
 "Half light,'" or "Half left," some files were to be thrown to 
 the right or the left, behind cover. 
 
 I secretly advised the chief to detacli, before the signal 
 to advance against the pofiition. a file towards the farm, which 
 has been referred to; this file was to move thence towaiils 
 the copse, the left wing of the i>osition for the opposing side. 
 
 It was then ordered: "I'd division assemble behind the 
 position, leaving behind a posit of obserTaition !" 
 
 The commander of the division at once selected a man to 
 remain lying down on the height, as much under cover as 
 possible, at the place where he could best see in all direc- 
 tions, and ordered, "Groups 20 paces to the rear! Assemble 
 on the center." 
 
 It was explained that it would be a fault to deploy regu- 
 larly as skirmishers, as long as the enemy was not yet in 
 sight; only everything ought to be prepared in such a way 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Jownal. 25 
 
 that at the first sign the position could be at onice taken up 
 without noise and without the enemy's knowledge. 
 
 Supposing the ground on the side lof the adversary too 
 difficult to be observed, a patrol should be sent to the front 
 to give notice by firing, of the approach of the enemy, after 
 which the patrol should retire behind one lOf the flanks of the 
 position. 
 
 Then the 2d division was united to the support and the 
 3d division advanced to its place. It relieved the look-out 
 sentry under cover, and received the order to take posi- 
 tion on the approach of the enemy, as has been already 
 explained.* 
 
 3. Defense against an attack by a skeleton enemy. — I now 
 gave tiie signal "Advance," and as soon as the look-out senti- 
 nel shouted to his officer: "A detachment of the enemy on 
 the road! — at 300 paces," the latter ordered, "Ist section to 
 the right, 2d to the left, in position!" 
 
 The non-oommisioned officers and men of the 3d 
 division had paid careful attention to what had previously 
 taken place; the position was at once properly taken up, a 
 few men only were corrected by the non-commissioned offi- 
 cers quickly and in a low tone. As the enemy gained ground 
 to the front, file by file, as had been ordered, the chief of the 
 division gave the order when the leading file arrived at from 
 400 to 500 paces : ''Individual firing at 400 yards!" I imme- 
 diately ordered the firing to cease, and I reminded the chief 
 of the division that fire should not be opened beyond 300 
 yards, except on an object of considerable dimensions. Dur- 
 ing this time, the enemy had arrived with two files (repre- 
 
 *It would have been bertter to have done only witih this division 
 what had been done before, and to have put off the real defense 
 against the slieleton enemy to anothei- day, in order not to do too 
 much at a time, and to risli causing some confus.ion. But so little 
 time is availalble for these exercises, that it is necesfary to do as 
 many as possible on the sarae day. 
 
26 Extracts from an Infantry Caiitnin's Journal. 
 
 senting two sections) at 300 paces; then the commander of 
 the division ordered : "Rapid firing." I, in the same manner, 
 preven'ted this description of fire being emiployed, as rapid 
 firing must not be abused; it was I'eplaced by independent 
 firing (firing by ranlvs). At the signal "Halt" (for the eucuiy), 
 the files of the enemy quickly took position, sheltering them- 
 selves as much as possible. 
 
 The chief of the di\M'sioii was thus led at once to order. 
 "("case firing," because the enemy no longer presented a fa- 
 vorable mark. He then gave the order: "Fire slowly," and 
 they then fired only on the men who showed themselves 
 eithiT in the line of skirmishers or behind it. 
 
 The soldiers appearing excited by the noise of firirug, 
 some no longer getting under cover to reload, othens hurry- 
 ing too much, so as to be ready to fire as soon as their rifle 
 was loaded, I reminded them, "they ought to load completely 
 under cover and then awail , whilst keejiing a sharp look-'out, 
 a favorable moment for firing." 
 
 At the signal "Half left" (for the enemy), some files 
 threw tliemselves on to the left side of the high road. 
 
 The skirmisliers kejil a sliarp look-out — ^about half of 
 them were able to fire before the enemy got under cover in 
 his new position, and those who had not been able to fire 
 brought (heir liflcs down, as the cnnimand to fire slowly wa>s 
 still in force. 
 
 All of a sudden, the file detached to the left sent the fol- 
 lowing report: "A section of the enemy (represented by one 
 file) is approaching the fai-m on the left." 
 
 Order: "A section of the 2d division to occupy the wood 
 on the side of the farm!" , 
 
 The chief of the di\ision at once ordered a section to 
 move rapidly and under cover as far as the margin of the 
 wood, so as to occupy it. 
 
Extracts from an Infdutri) Captain's Journal. 27 
 
 Tbe commander of the named section gave the com- 
 mand : "Left turn, quick march !" Aaprived at a place which 
 oould not be traversed without being seen, he ordered: "Dou- 
 ble march!'' (If there had been time, it would have been 
 more advisable to traverse this space at the double, file by 
 file, as in this manner the enemy would not have been able 
 to ascertain the strength of the section.) 
 
 Once at the edge of the little wood, the chief of the sec- 
 tion gave the following order: "Halt, get into poisition!" The 
 men then took up proper intervals and placed themselves so 
 as to have a free range of fire in front, without being quite 
 at the edge. 
 
 The commander of the M division at the same time 
 ordered the file of the left wing to fire to the left on the sec- 
 , tion of the enemy, as soon as it attacked the little wood. 
 
 Signal (for the enemy) : "Advance quickly." ^he ene- 
 my's skirmishers ran forward for 200 or 300 paces, and then 
 threw themselves again on the ground. 
 
 The chiefs of groups (without waiting for the order of the 
 commander of the divisions) gave the command: "Rapid 
 firing," and as soon as the enemy had got under cover, "Cease 
 firing! Fire slowly." 
 
 At the same time I gave the following caution: "A 
 support of the enemy advancing rapidly on the high road is 
 visible at 500 paces"; and I ordered: "The 1st division on 
 to the high road to fire volleys!" The commander of the 
 division immediately ordered, "Double march — half right 
 turn — halt — front — at 400 yards ready — present!" 
 
 Care was taken that the men loaded and aimed strictly 
 according to order. 
 
 In the meantime the chiefs of groups had called out to 
 the files nearest to them, "Fire on the support! — at 400 
 yards."' 
 
23 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 I then j;;ivc tbe order: "The rear section of the 2(1 
 divisiou get under cover behind the center and fire a volley 
 as skirmishers:" The chief of the division promptly ordered: 
 "Double march— half left turn— halt— front— lie down." 
 The men lay down behind the height and then crept forward 
 sufficiently to be able to fire over it. 
 
 I then gave the signal to the enemy, "Advance quickly." 
 
 The cliicfs of (/roiiji.s commanded, "Ka])id firing." 
 
 The chief of the 1st (lirislnii, "Steady aim — ^i)resent — 
 load." 
 
 The chief of the 2(1 (liri»ion, "Fire a volley! at — yards — 
 ready — present — load." 
 
 1 moved rapidly to the 1st division. "Tlie 1st division 
 will charge." 
 
 The chief of the division, passing througii the center, 
 moved to the front, raised his sword and gave the order, 
 "Fix bayonets, chargel" The neighboring files of skirmish- 
 ers who would not have been able to fire joined on to the 
 attack. 
 
 After tiring a fmv shots, Ihe skeleton enemy rapidly re- 
 tired before this attack. The chief of the division wanted 
 to pursue. I caused the halt to be sounded and I pointed 
 i)ut thai every advance from a position should only be pushed 
 to a short distance, and that it was necessary to be satisfied 
 with firing on the retreating enemy, until an order to con- 
 tinue the pursuit be received.* 
 
 *Short advances from a defensive position are only allowable 
 when tihe enemy has no longer any initact supports ready at band, 
 with which at once to oppose sucli an advance. Tlie practice of an 
 advance fi-om a defensive position was only here made in order to 
 allow of a thorooig-h understanding of the suljjtct, as trcops oug'ht 
 to be exercised in it when acting on the defensive. It is imperative, 
 however, to point out forcibly that not only great losses may be oc- 
 casioned by the untimely and injudicious advance of small detach- 
 ments from a good defensive position, tout also tihat the position it- 
 self may be lost. Such an advance must eithtr have a definite ob- 
 ject (as, for instance, the re-occupation of some point in front, or, as 
 was invariably the case with the Frenoh, in order to hide the re- 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 29 
 
 But in order to show, in finishing, how the pursuit 
 should be undertaken after an attack had been repulsed, the 
 first division received the order to follow the enemy, as soon 
 as he was out of range. The commander wished to push a 
 few men in advance; I did not allow Mm to do so. 
 
 One section, deployed on the road, was directed to pur- 
 sue the enemy quickly, and to take position for opening fire, 
 as soo'U as the enemy's rear-guard sihowed signs of coming 
 to a halt. 
 
 A patrol was detached towards the farm on the left, 
 where the tile of the enemy had comimitted the fault of not 
 commencing its retreat soon enougih ; the remainder of the 
 division followed, the leading section in file, at about 150 
 paces distance. The rest of the company received the order 
 to follow this advanced guard at the usual distance. 
 
 The chiefs of divisions promptly brought their divisions 
 near the road, in column of sections by the left, and com- 
 menced immediately their march in proper order. During 
 the march the detached men soon joined their divisions. 
 
 treat, a short, vigorous advance was made by the rear guard, which 
 drove back the foremiosit line of the sliirmdshers and caused the 
 assailant to act on the defensive, and thus obtained breathing-time 
 for those aibout to retreat :^see the 4th exercise: measures for retir- 
 ing under the enemy's fire) — or the advance must be caused by some 
 decided opportunity for attack given by the assailant, or by some 
 weakness shown by him; for instance, in the present case, when the 
 support of the assailant was brought forward into the very heaviest 
 flre, and consequently the defender was able to attack him under 
 decided advantage. 
 
 The distances of 300 paces (240 metres) and 600 paces (480 
 metres) should be frequently measured by eye, and should be paced 
 over different ground and under various lights, so that non-com- 
 missioned officers and men may be practiced to a thorough knowl- 
 edge of these distances, for they are the extreme limits of flre against 
 individual skirmishers (240 metres) and against small bodies in close 
 order (480 metres). The man who has a well-practiced eye for 
 both these distances will only err slightly at intermediate distances; 
 it facilitates, therefore, judging distance practice. It is, neverthe- 
 less, necessary with recruits to begin judging distance at short dis- 
 tances (80 metres). I _; 
 
3Q Ejctnicix fium «» Iiifaiitri/ t\iptain's Jniniial. 
 
 When they were all in proper order of march, I ordered the 
 halt to be sounded. 
 
 The enemy had stopjied and taken position; llie pursu- 
 ing seition halted in front of him, and the cliief of the divi- 
 siiin sent at once the advanced guard to reinforce it. The 
 company halted and took cover. I appTOved the independ- 
 ent decision of the commander of the tii'st division, for he 
 had cdnii-ived the very just idea of at once compellinig the 
 enemy, with sutlii lent forces, (o further retreat. 
 
 I tlicn j;avi' the signal for assembling and formed the 
 comiiau\ near the section representing tlie enemy, in the 
 same order as wIkmi starting; rilles wvvr unloaded and arni.^ 
 piled. 
 
 As regards all the latter part of the exercise, which in- 
 deed was nothing else than an cxniise on broiken ground 
 against a skeleton enemy, I must acknowledge that three 
 times as much time would have l)een necessary for me to 
 execute all as I wished, if 1 had not already, during the time 
 the company was at di'ill on the laige parade ground, taken 
 ad\auiage of the inecjualities of ground to accustom the 
 divisidns to enter s(^parately into line, rapidly and skilllfully, 
 during the confusion of an offensive and defensive action. 
 
 I had also, the preceding day, prepared the non-com- 
 missioned officers as to the instruction I intended to carry 
 out, and had told them what orders they would have to give 
 and to what points they would have to pay attention. 
 
 I had also accustomed myself to command in a precise 
 manner, and I had trained the subordinate commanders to 
 understand my intentions and to execute them rapidly. 
 
 It was 11 o'clock. To practice judging distance whilst 
 going home, I sent in advance one division on the road; this 
 division was to count its paces, to leave a man at every 100 
 paces, and to face the detachment at 300 paces with the 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Jowrnal. 31 
 
 remainder of one of its sections, and at 600 paces witli the 
 remainder of the other. Attention was directed to special 
 marks visible at the different distances; then the division 
 ■sent to the front gradually re-formed itsdlf ; and afterwards, 
 the distances to different objects were judged and the paces 
 counted along the road. 
 
32 
 
 E.rtracts from an Infantnj Caiituiii's Journal. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 33 
 
 SECOND EXERCISE. 
 
 The lof May, 18 — (see JFig. 2). Working Day. — Of 
 
 the company, there only remained the non-eommissioned offi- 
 cers, the lance corporals, and in each squad the 4 men who 
 were to be trained as chiefs of patrols. 
 
 Departure at half -past 6; 3 sections of 8 men each were 
 formed; each section received a packet of cartridges, and 
 the detachment moved towards a suburb, whentee several 
 roads led into the country. 
 
 At the end of the suburb were several isolated houses, 
 and at somewhat regular distances, farms surrounded with 
 gardens, hedges, and walls. Near the roads was some 
 building ground, with foundations dug, heaps of tiles, etc. 
 The roads led to a neighboring village N, behind which 
 there is a windmill. 
 
 The object of the exercise was to teach detached men 
 the conduct to be followed in patrolling one against the other, 
 more especially in simple cases, such -as the.following: 
 
 1st. March to the front one against the other until meet- 
 ing, especially to accustom detached men to keep up a com- 
 munication with one another, in a country where it was not 
 possible to see to any distance. 
 
 2d. Conduct to be followed, in case of a shot being fired 
 as a signal at any point, to show that an advancing eoaemy 
 had been met. 
 
 3d. Manner of announcing what has been seen, whilst 
 continuing afterwards to keep a look out. 
 
 4th. Retreat executed by detached men in such a man- 
 ner that they gradually and entirely disappear. 
 
 5th. Pursuit of the enemy's detached men as far as a 
 limit determined on. 
 
34 E-i-trarty from an Infantry Captain'x Journal. 
 
 (Uh. Cessation of the pursuit, as much as possible with- 
 out the enemy iPt'iceiviiig it, and return to the original 
 position. 
 
 I)ispositl-o)i, Ditiichment A.—M the point X, a non-com- 
 niissioued officer A was left with \i\ men and some young 
 non-commissioned officers and lance corporals; he was given 
 Thi' following instnittions: 
 
 '•At 7 o'clock, precisely, the detachment will advance 
 in the direction of the village X, through the sutourb, take 
 Iiosirion on the further outskirt of it, and thus cover the 
 jilacing of outposts (sujiposed) at the points of exit of the 
 suburb. 
 
 "If the detachment be prevented from advancing, by 
 any force of the enemy, it will occupy the exit of the suburb." 
 
 Jlfidchmriit B. — With the other non-commissioned offi- 
 cers, lance corporals, and 8 men, I advanced on the road 
 which leads diii-ctly to X, as far as the farm Y; and after 
 liaviiig halted the detachment and made it face towards the 
 suburb, I gave to the non-commissioned officer B the follow- 
 ing instructions: 
 
 "I will suppose that you ai-e a, reconnoitering patrol, 
 s(-n't beyond the village X, in the direction of the siibui'b. 
 Arrived at the farm Y, you leairn that patrols of the enemy 
 liave already shown themselves in the suburb. It is neces- 
 sary for you to obtain more detailed smd precise informa- 
 tiom regarding the force and intentions of the enemy." 
 
 Xon-commissioned officer B, little accustomed as yet to 
 fulfill special missions, looked at me somewhat penplexed. 
 Inexperienced non-commissioned officers are readily in- 
 clined to believe that a trap is bedng set for them, and the 
 more difficult it apx>ears to them to deduce raipidly from the 
 instructions received anid from the given conditions of the 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 35 
 
 ground the measures necessary to be taken, fhe more they 
 think it neoessary to guess what their superiior wishes. 
 
 Instructions for Non-commissioned Officer B. — I oame to 
 liis assistance. I shawed him rapidly the only three roads 
 by which the enemy could arrive. He ought therefore to 
 send promptly patrols, each composed of a corporal and two 
 men, towards y^, y^, and y^; and these patrols, under cover 
 behind posts of observation, ought to watch tlie three roads. 
 
 The first wtiich might discover a detachment of the 
 enemy was to fire a shot as a signa,l, and to send notice of it. 
 
 He himself ought to take position a little in advance 
 with the two men remaining to him, in order to rally the 
 patrols, in case of their being forced to retire. 
 
 Non-comimissiioned officer B told off quickly the patrols, 
 indicated to them the points where they were to keep a 
 look-out, and ordered them mot to fire on the enemy's patrols 
 unless they approached too near, but to fire oil a shot as a 
 siignal, as soon as they perceived a detachment. 
 
 When I saw that I was well undensitood, I rode back 
 immediately to the detachment A, which I found already 
 on the march. 
 
 March of Detachment A to the Front. — Non-eommissioned 
 officer A had only sent forward an advance party of three 
 men, and he was himself following about fifty paces behind, 
 with the remainder of his detachment formed in column of 
 sections. 
 
 I stopped him at once. I understood that in so acting 
 he had the intention of not scattering his men; but on 
 ground which did not admit of seeing to a distamce, it is not 
 possible to escape from this inconvenience. It is quite true 
 that a patrol of the enemy appearing suddenly on the flank 
 of small detachments may well prove a danger, or at all 
 events an inconvenience. But, on the other hand, men de- 
 
36 E.rtracts from an Infantry Captain's Joiirn<il. 
 
 tached to the right and the left, provided they remain in 
 communication with the detachment or patrol to which they 
 belong, can always discover a great deal more of the enemy 
 and the ground than 'the advance men caji do. 
 
 I therefore detached two men, who were to run out to 
 the right and the left, and I myself, on account of the short 
 time we had at our disposal, gave them the following in- 
 structions: 
 
 ■■(icr on to the lateral road on the right (or the left) by 
 moving quickly along the maiin road as far as the end of the 
 suburb; and if you do not meet the enemy, continue your 
 ma.rth towards the entrance of the village N, which is in 
 front (if you, and keeping up your conuiiunication with the 
 men of the head, proceed as far as the opposite side of it. 
 
 "If you meet the enemy before arriving there, watch 
 him and send notice at once; do not fire as a siignal, unless 
 you remark the approach of a detachment of the enemy."* 
 
 The detached men had to go back to the nearest turning, 
 
 *As much as it is nn-casririi, in war, when one does not know to 
 what extent men have been instinicted in tlhis duty, to give to those 
 (li'tiiilii'd special and clear instructions on the manner in whicli 
 they are to conduct themselves, to the same extent is it desirahle 
 that it should suffice to give fihem siimply the following order: "To 
 the front, as look-cjut men to tlie right or the left (or as a patrol), 
 as far as a certain point of country (specified beforehand)." For 
 this, it is necessary to teach them the conduct to folloiw in particyular 
 cases, botli by exercising them practically and by laying weight, 
 during file time devoted to theoretical instruction, on the following 
 principles: — 
 
 1st. As long as nothing has yet been discovered regarding tlie 
 enemy: — "Look out carefully in all directions and keep in communi- 
 cation with the advanced men during the march to the front." 
 
 2(1. If the enemy be seen taking a position in the distance or 
 making a movement:— '"Make your observations under cover, and 
 then send a report." 
 
 3d. If the enemy advances: — "Fire a sihot as a sgral." 
 
 4t/h. If a patrol of the enemy be perceived in front: — "Walt under 
 cover, to see if it commences to retreat when noticing the other 
 groups advancing against it— and then follow it— or else, attack sud- 
 denly, with boldness." 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 37 
 
 SO as to be able to turn to the right and the left, towards 
 the roads indicated. 
 
 During this time, I caused the support to form' in file 
 under one of the rows of houses; I ordered a man from the 
 head to go to the right and another to the left, also under the 
 houses; the same as regards the man told off to keep up 
 the communications, with whom the non-commissioned 
 officer A was marching. The non-commissioned offlcer next 
 senior to him remained at the head of the support. After 
 a pause, I caused the head again to advance; the support was 
 only to follow after an interval of 100 paces. 
 
 Conduct of the Head and of the Advance Guard on the 
 appearance of a Man of the Enemy. — Soon the head halted — 
 at y^ a man of the enemy had been observed; the man 
 keeping up the communication showed him tO' the non-com- 
 missioned oflicer. I asked him what he thought ought to 
 be done. 
 
 Non-commissioned officer A answered that he should 
 extend his men. 
 
 I explained to Mm that by extending his men on the 
 road he would isuffer greater los.s than-if he reinforced the 
 head by two flies, which should run forward to the isolated 
 house at x^, from whence they could open flre. 
 
 He now cried out to the rear — "Two flies advance, dou- 
 ble;" and when they came near him — "Join the head at the 
 isolated house on the right; double." 
 
 Whilst they were running forward, the enemy flred a 
 shot — two men wished to halt to open flre, but this was 
 strictly forbidden them, and they were threatened with pun- 
 ishment if in future an order precisely given were not strictly 
 carried out. 
 
 \V'hen the house at x^ was occupied, the enemy quickly 
 retired to y*, and was no longer to be seen from x^. I saw 
 
3g Extracts from an Iitfiiittry Cai)taiii's Journal. 
 
 that it was onlv the caution which had been givC'U before 
 which prevented the men from following on their own 
 account. The non-commissioned officer, however, soon 
 reached them and gave the order: — "The head advance to 
 the farm on the left, other men await the support;" the sup- 
 port had conlinued its march, the commander at the head, 
 and was obserx cd close a/t hand. 
 
 Xon-coiumissioned officer A moved to the head, in order 
 to ha\ e a look-out to the front from y-. 
 
 I rode forward at the sani^ time to see how matters were 
 ii»hi<^ on, and caused the halt to be sounded, in order to ex- 
 amine what had been done (the hrst part of the exercise). 
 
 I caused all tlii' men to ass(-uible, with the excei>tion of 
 those who were detached near j^. 
 
 Instructions ny<irdiii)j irluit had taken phtcc. — I first of 
 all referred to the duty entrusted to non-commissioned officer 
 r>: I drew attention to the three roads which led into the 
 suburb, and pointed out how the three patrols had been 
 plai-ed so as to observe the streets of the suburbs, and at the 
 same time to kee]) one anollier in view. I further explained 
 how the signal shot, very appi-opriately given, had warned 
 both the patrols at y' and y' that a detachment of the enemy 
 was advanciuf;. so that they should then take care not to be 
 cut olT. \x y" the patrol should not have remained halted 
 any longer, when it had seen that the patrol on its flank had 
 withdrawn tr) y"*- It should have retired about 200 paces 
 and lain down. 
 
 I then remarked on the mission entrusted to non-com- 
 mis.sioned officer A, which consisted in advancing with pre- 
 caution but resolutely, and in not allowing himself to be 
 stopped by small patrols; especially as his object was to 
 gain the outskirt of the suburb, so as to have a good view of 
 the ground beyond. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 39 
 
 The detached men on the right and the left, who could 
 not yet be seen, ought also to have' hurried, in order to reach 
 the end of the suburb, so as to establish a coimmunication 
 between themselves and the detachment to which they 
 belonged. 
 
 Conduct of the Detached Men at the Signal Shot. — I gave 
 at the same time the necessary instructions as to the conduct 
 of detached men, should one or more shots be heard at any 
 point of the line. 
 
 Detached men ought to see and to see correctly, in order 
 to be able to send correct reports. ' If they get excited they 
 will see incorrectly or will huirry too much in sending a 
 report. 
 
 From a false anxiety about the danger of being cut off, 
 the fault is often seen in peace time, of the meh of a patrol 
 being so crowded together that three men cannot see any 
 more than one man could see. They thus expose themselves 
 to the danger of being surprised on one side, especially if 
 they are not able to overlook the ground in the neighborhood. 
 
 The- most important thing which detached men have to 
 learn is therefore — 
 
 ^Vhen advancing over ground from which it is not possi- 
 ble to see on all aides, that one or two men sihould move for- 
 ward quickly from one point of observation to another, 
 whilst the third covers them in rear against surprise. 
 
 And when halting, especially when the neighborhood of 
 the enemy is made known by a shot being fired, one man at 
 least should seek to gain a point in front or on one side 
 whence he can well see around, in preference on that side 
 where the shot has been fired. 
 
 It had, therefore, been a fault on the part of the lateral 
 patrols of non-commissioned officer A, of which nothing 
 could yet be seen, that as soon as the shot was heard they 
 did not at once seek to gain the edge of the suburb, in order 
 
40 H.iiracts from nii Iiifantri/ Cnptaiii's Journal. 
 
 Id observe the environs and to place themselves in coniniunl- 
 eation with their head. 
 
 Even the signal "Halt" should not have prevented them 
 from advancing the few paces which separated them from 
 the points whence they could see, for a jiatrol should never 
 halt at a point where it cannot see around. 
 
 I accordingly ordered a non-commissioned officer to go 
 to the main road, to properly plaee the lateral patrol 'at x", 
 and III tell them to send a report of what they might see from 
 that point. I myself would place the detaiched men of the 
 right flank. The remainder of the men were to take up their 
 position, and on the signal "To advance," would continue the 
 further movements. 
 
 l!efi)i-e I rode off I told non-ciimmissioTied officer B that 
 he should make his jirepiuatiiins foi- a further retreat, but 
 should lirst of all warn his detached men that they were to 
 send him notice of what they saw, and that they would re- 
 ceive further orders by the men who brought the messages. 
 
 I n<nv rode to the patrol at y^ and poinited out the mis- 
 take it had made, and then led it back behind same 
 slight cover at y"'; then I moved towards the detached men 
 on the right, who. at the signal "Halt," had simply remained 
 standing, without taking ((jvei' or even looking about them. 
 
 I directed them to advance sufficiently far to obtain a 
 view. They found themselves a good positioiu at x^. But, 
 as from this point they could see nothing of their head, 
 altliough they could well observe the enemy's patrols at y' 
 and y^, I asked them in what manner they would establish 
 communication with the head, and how they would send it 
 warning. 
 
 They did not know what else to propose than by a long 
 circuit to the rear. 
 
 1 thereupon showed them how, perhaps, by sending for- 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 4^ 
 
 ward a man ^o the left oomer of the farm y^, they might be 
 able to find out the position of the head, and how the short- 
 est road in war, by which to despatch messages, is through 
 gardens and farms, which in peace time must be simulated 
 by causing the messenger to walk along the 'boundaries of 
 the same. I ordered them to send a messenger and ask for 
 further orders. 
 
 Then I rode back to y^, where the two men of the head 
 (or advanced p'arty) of non-commissioned officer A had placed 
 themselves, very judiciously, at the two corners of that part 
 of the palisade facing the enemy. Non-oommissioned officer 
 A was staindinig at the corner of the house; his support at x^, 
 with its leader somewhat in front, so that he might see 
 around as much as possible. 
 
 Non-commissioned officer B had placed himself with 
 two men under cover at Y, his patrols were at y^, y*, y^. 
 
 Manner of Transmittimg Xcws. — I now gave the caution 
 that all were to send in. news and gave the signal "To 
 advance." 
 
 The man of the head on the right of the rpad came imme- 
 diately with ported arms along the road towards non- 
 commissioned officer A; a shot was fired at y*. 
 
 I at once caused "Halt" to be sounded, and called out 
 loudly enough for all the detached men to hear : 
 
 "Reports must either be shouted back from the spot oc- 
 cupied, or must be sent under cover and unseen by the 
 enemy."* 
 
 *Well-considered reports are so hnpontant, tli'ait men must be 
 practiced by every means in sendSng them. 
 
 But if in peace a report is allowed to be made when in tlie imme- 
 diate neigbibopliood of the enemy, without taking advantage of cover, 
 and only a regulation movement of the man sent with the message 
 be looked for, then in this way the men are not trained to take a 
 message intelligently, and even at maneuvers reports will cease to 
 come in, not only because the men take it easily, but also because 
 4— 
 
42 Ej'tracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 Then "Advanco." 
 
 The man of the head then remained standing and 
 shouted back, "Xon-conimissdoned oflQcer!" "Well?" 
 
 "An enemy's patrol is in front of us, behind is a detach- 
 ment, the strength of which cannot be seen; there are other 
 patrols on the right and left." 
 
 "Well, continue to look out." 
 
 The non-commissioned officer then made a sign to his 
 men to advance. I then asked if he meant to attack. 
 
 "Certainly, to take the nearest farm." 
 
 "Is there not another surer way to success?" 
 
 Tlic non-commissioned officer looked at me, and per- 
 ceived at once that the road leading to the left towards x^ 
 would offer him an advantage. He made his men at y^ turn 
 rapidly into the road to x^ and called out to the head: "If 
 the enemy retire, the head and detached men on the right are 
 to follow him to the village N. I am advancing along the 
 high road." On the road the messenger from x^ met him, 
 and gave the following message from the detached men on 
 the left: "A patrol is in front of us near the high roa;d. A 
 second patrol near a farm on the right, and behind them a 
 non-commissioned officer with apparently two men." 
 
 "AVell, I am coming to drive back the patrols on the high 
 road." 
 
 If the non-commissioned officer had been warned sooner 
 that there was only such a weak detachment in front of him, 
 he would certainly have avoided the d(5tour, and might have 
 made a direct attack. 
 
 each man remarks that he exposes himself to the fire of the enemy 
 in leaving oover, in order to carry the message. 
 
 But he who trains his men to the systematic sending of reports 
 Will easily make them undenstand how necessary it is that the news 
 furnished by patrols should be sent off at the moment the enemy is 
 met, and how it is only by this means that fresh ordeiTS can reach 
 them at the proper time. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 43 
 
 The messenger from x^, who in the meantime had ar- 
 rived in the neighborhood of j^, wished to run after the non- 
 co:mmrssioned officer, but the men of the 'head caught siigiht 
 of him in time, and cried ouit to him : 
 
 "The non-oommdssioned officer is going to attacli on the 
 high road ; we are to follow the enemy as far as N if he re- 
 tire§ before us." 
 
 Reports and Ord&is for the Detaohment of Non-commis- 
 sioned Officer B. — In the meantime I had seen that messen- 
 gers had also reached non-comanissioned officer B. They 
 could not proceed under cover, but they found themselves 
 beyond the effective flre of the enemy. 
 
 I rode thither rapidly. The man sent as a messenger 
 from y5 had already gone back with the order for the patrol 
 to retire on the nOn-commissioned officer (the ground on that 
 side being open). 
 
 The patrol at y* (the three hostile patrols, and a section 
 behind the center one on the road towards N,' had sent 
 reports) had been told that the non-commissioned officer 
 was about to retire on N, and that it would have to form 
 the rear guard. 
 
 The messenger from y^, who as far as x^ had only seen 
 a patrol on the high road, was informed that a small hosftile 
 detachment was advanicing on the direct road towards N; 
 the patrol was therefore, likewise, to move towards the non- 
 commissioned officer who was about to retire on N. 
 
 This messenger, as he was about to return to his patrol, 
 remarked, as he looked around him, attentively, the move- 
 ment of the detachment from y^ to x^. He immediately 
 cried out to non-commissioned officer B: 
 
 "Non-commissioned officer, the hostile detachment is 
 marching towards the high road." 
 
 The non-commissioned officer looked around and ob- 
 
44 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 served the same thing himself; at the same time a report of 
 it reached him from y*. 
 
 He gave at once the following order: "The right patrol 
 to retire along the high road towards the outskirts of N, and 
 to cover my right flank." 
 
 The messenger hurried back to y\ where a man had 
 remained standing on the high road behind the farm, whilst 
 the chief remained under cover further forward, in order 
 to be better able to see about him. 
 
 Retreat of the Patrol of Xon-conimissiaiicd Officer B. — 
 Non-commissioned officer B now at once commenced his re- 
 treat with his two men, without waiting for the patrol on 
 his left, so as to ajrrive in sufficient time at the exit from N. 
 The patrol followed him at the double from y^ and soon 
 joijied him. 
 
 As soon as he had gained a certain distance, the patrol 
 y^ followed him as rear guard. 
 
 At y^ the mefssenger who was returning whistled and 
 made a sign to the chief, and then communicated to him the 
 order noted above; the patrol then retired along both sides 
 of the high road. 
 
 The detached men of non-commissioned officer A, as 
 soon as they perceived the retreat, advanced quickly into 
 the abandoned positions and wished to follow further. Non- 
 commissioned officer A made his detachment double, in 
 order to gain upon the retiring detachment of non-com- 
 missioned officer B. I caused "Halt" to be sounded. The 
 detached men halted together where they were standing ; a 
 few men, however, thought of taking cover behind a house 
 or a tree. 
 
 I now, first of all, rectified the position of the rear guard 
 of non-commissioned officer B. 
 
EsDtraots from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 45 
 
 Conduct of the Rear Guard of Non-commissioned Officer B 
 during the Retreat. — I pointed out thiat in conitinuing his re- 
 treat without halting he alio wed the pursuing enemy, by 
 hurrying, to reach the farm art; Y soon enough to fire thence 
 effectively on his detachment. 
 
 To prevent this, a man should from tte first have 
 remained at y*, and have fired as soon as the enemy 
 a,ttempted to follow. The other two men should quickly 
 have taken position under cover, in order to fire in like man- 
 ner had the enemy pursued quickly. Afterwards, the first 
 man should have doubled back behind the farm, and have 
 remained there until the two others had again placed them- 
 selves at 200 metres behind this farm, or behind some rising 
 ground. 
 
 Had the retreat been conducted in this manner, the 
 enemy would not have dared to pursue so closely. 
 
 I now caused all the patrols on this side to take up their 
 former positions again, and shouted out that all were to look 
 and to observe how a patrol should retire before the enemy. 
 
 It was easy to perceive that if a man remained stand- 
 ing at y*, he would prevent the patrol at y^ from advancing 
 ait once. On the other hand, the men detached on the right 
 flank were able to arrive at y^ without being hindered, and 
 they endeavored to run even further to the front in order to 
 cut oil the rear guard. A shot from Y caused them to halt, 
 and the raian from y* having run to y^, and having also fired 
 a shot at them from that point, it was clearly evident that 
 the three men of, the rear guard, placed in good positions, 
 were fully suflficient to hold in check the five men of the 
 enemj', although naturally the farm y* would have at once 
 been occupied from y^- 
 
 I now caused the "advance" to be sounded for everyone, 
 as I saw that the rear guard considered itself so thoroughly 
 
46 Ed-tracts frmn an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 safe that it wished to remain still longer in position. I was 
 obliged to remind them tliat as a rear guard they ouight not 
 to be separated too far from their detachment. 
 
 Thej now continued their retreat as I had ordered, and 
 non-commissioned offit'er B was able to reach village X with- 
 out inconvenfence, and to take position at the exit thereof so 
 as to rally his rear guard. 
 
 CdiHhict in the Pursuit. — In the meantime non-com- 
 missioned officer A had, with his detachment, tried the 
 maneuver so frequently carried out at exercises in peace 
 time, which consisted in endeavoring by running for a long 
 distance to reach \'illage N at the same time as the detached 
 men who were retiring thither. 
 
 But the patrol of non-commissioned officer B had skill- 
 fully placed itself near the high road some 250 paces from 
 the farms previously occupied (near y^), and thus the detach- 
 ment received several shots at effective range during its ad- 
 vance, and I caused it to halt and take up position under 
 cover near the houses. I remarked to the non-commis- 
 sioned officer how disadvantageous it had been for him to 
 follow in close order this weak patrol, whereas a few files 
 sent to the outskirts of the farm would, by their fire, have 
 soon forced the three men to continue rapidly their retreat. 
 
 It was carried out in this manner. The patrol hastened 
 to reach the exit of X, always, however, leaving one man 
 standing still in the manner I had before pointed out, whilst 
 the others ran to the rear, and he followed when these latter 
 again halted. 
 
 Xon-oommis5^Loned officer B now followed, but only by 
 rushes with three files extended, whilst the remainder of the 
 support kept at a considerable distance. 
 
 The outskirts of the village X offered such favorable 
 positions to the detachment of noin-commissioned officer B 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. , 47 
 
 (as an advance could only be made by following the roads) 
 that all here came to a halt, and I gave non-commissioned 
 officer A the ordei;, as he could not know what was in the 
 village — ''Find out, by a prudent and gradual strengthening 
 of the skirmishers, whether the patrol has received a rein- 
 forcement. Only when it is ascertained that such has not 
 happened should the attack be undertaken." 
 
 Then I rode to detachment B, and ordered the non-'com- 
 missioned officer to endeavor to disappear entirely without 
 being perceived. 
 
 Disappearance of a Retreating Detachment. — He .looked 
 rapidly around, and gave the following order: — "Everyone 
 to retire, stooping down, behind the nearest corner !" Nat- 
 urally, the whole movement could be seen. I, therefore, told 
 him to send two men again, at once, as a rear guard, to the 
 place formerly occupied, in order to make the enemy believe 
 that the others had only been moved behind the comer as 
 a support. This measure completely silfficed to deceive the 
 enemy. 
 
 Non-commissioned officer B was already on his way to- 
 wards the mill, the rear guard behind the first corner — one 
 man behind the other — whilst- the -detached men of the 
 enemy were still on the lookout to ,see whether he would not 
 again suddenly appear, and they would not advance, as they 
 thought a trap was being laid for them. 
 
 It was only when non-commissioned officer A, by a sud- 
 den attack with his deta^chment, had driven back the patrol 
 opposed to him, that the detached men advanced against the 
 village, and became aware that the enemy had already aban- 
 doned it. 
 
 The former head at first advanced only as far as the 
 angle of the roads; the men detached on the right flank to 
 the other exit. 
 
48 Ej-tracis from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 I now pointed out that non-cOmimissioned officer B bad 
 committed a mistalce in not having warned his rear guard 
 patrol of his retreat. It would have been, nearly taken pris- 
 oner, if it had not quickly struck into a side road in order to 
 retire on the mill. 
 
 Information was at the same time given to non-commis- 
 sioned officer A that the village was already evacuated, and 
 he sent an order to the detached men, by those who had 
 brought the news, that they should take up a position of 
 observation on the onl skirt at the further side. With the 
 su[>port, he took up a position under cover, at the point 
 where the main roads crossed. 
 
 I remarked to him further, that in such a case in war, 
 he would at ome have to direct some men ito thoroughly ex- 
 amine the village for wounded or stragglers. 
 
 The Deta^^lnncnt A to aiiain Nctirc irithoiit heirtg Seen. — I 
 thereupon gave him the order to retire, as much as possible 
 unseen, as soon as he received news regarding the position 
 of the enemy. 
 
 With this objeot, I recommended him to call in, first of 
 all, the detached men sent out to the flank, and to cause the 
 three men of the center to fallow later, as a rear guard. 
 
 I then rode towards the mill, in order to see what could 
 be observed from then'ce. 
 
 The retreat of the detached men on the right and left 
 was naturally at once remarked and reported. As, however, 
 two men were still observed at the center exit, non-commis- 
 sioned officer B could not know for a certainty that the de- 
 tachment A had retreated. 
 
 It was only when the last two men uns.killfully 
 retreated, both together, that no doubt could longer remain. 
 
 In such a case, if it were desirable to continue the ruse, 
 then, either one man can at first run to the rear, as if he 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. . 49 
 
 wished to make a report, and somewhat later the seoond 
 can follow, dr else, if the ground per-mits of a retreat, quLte 
 under cover, then both the men should, before disappearing, 
 hide themselves once or twice and reappear, so that the 
 enemy, when they have really retired, would remain some 
 time in doubt as to whether they would, not again show 
 themselves. 
 
 I now caused the "Assembly" to be sounded, in order to 
 examine once again how these latter movements had been 
 performed, and with this I finished the exercise. 
 
 I could not help observing that, already in this simple 
 exercise, it had been shown how little non-commissioned 
 officers and men are acquainited with the conduct they should 
 follow when they have to act on their own responsibility. It 
 is, indeed, a most difficult thing, and only intelligent men 
 can be trained to it. 
 
 It is especially ianportant, 1st, to practice the non-com- 
 missioned officers in giving quickly correct and clear instruc- 
 tions to the detached men, and to remain always in commu- 
 nioatioiu with them, by means of reports, by shouting out to 
 them, and by orders given at the proper time ; 2d, to teacih 
 the detached men themselves to recognize quickly the right 
 places in which to take up position, and to remain in com- 
 munication one with the other, either by the voice or by 
 sight, and with the detachment, by sending, reports and by 
 asking for orders. 
 
 In sight of the enemy, when there is seldom time for 
 long instructions and reports, it is often necessary to aban- 
 don men to their own intelligence. The preceding examiple 
 has already shoiwn how a patroJ that was forgottem was 
 obliged by itself to find a way to retreat. If, by such oppor- 
 tunities, patrols have only gained the experience as to how 
 they can help themselves, and that, through a skillful use of 
 
50 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. , 
 
 the ground, they can generally withdraw from cuntacl with 
 the enemy, such experience is the best of lessons. 
 
 In order to brin<; about more frequently such occasions, 
 I find it only ncc<'ssary to place, on ground suitable for the 
 purjKise, some separate patrols, partly under cover, and to 
 cause small detachments to advaucc against them. In this 
 manner, leaders of patrols have the opjiortunity ol seeing 
 how they can create enibarrassnieut in an adversary, by 
 sometimes quickly withili-awing altof^cther, s(wiietinu',s by 
 mutually supjiorting one another, and sometimes by grad- 
 ually disajipeariug. In this manner, those of an initelligemt 
 luiture learn quickly the correct conduct to follow; those 
 who are less intelligent never learn it. 
 
 But were I to neglect to jiractice this kind of exercise, 
 tlie most intelligent men would not know how to help them- 
 selves if they suddenly came into the iK)«ilion of having to 
 act on their own responsibility. Only one thing them would 
 be seen — the three men of the patrol remaining as close as 
 possible to one another, and allowing themsc-lves to be ob- 
 served, even from a distance. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 51 
 
 THIRD EXERCISE (Afternoon). 
 
 The — May, afternoon. — A piece of waste building- 
 ground, with some enclosure walls, some eanth that had 
 been turned up, and some waste garden land with bushes, 
 offered an opportunity for carrying out skirmishing drill 
 for one or two hours near- the barracks. Houses with gar- 
 dens were in the neighborhood. 
 
 Detail Exercises, having for ohjcct the Movonent of iso- 
 lated groups from one position to another-. — 1. By moving in 
 File. — It appeared to me specially important to practice 
 always the leaders of groups afresh in leading their groups, 
 correctly and swiftly, by distinct orders, from one position 
 under cover to another. 
 
 When I cried out to the chief of the group, "The group 
 to advance as far as the farm," I intended that he should 
 give the order, if the ground appeared to him favorable — 
 "Advance in file, right (left) turn, double march !" and that 
 he should lead forward his group, making as much use as 
 possible of cover, as far as the point ordered, and then give 
 the order, "Hait; take position," or, according to circum- 
 stances, "Take position; left (or right)." 
 
 As for the men, it was important to teach them by this 
 order, always to place themselves quiokly in the manner 
 most advantageous for action, or to form themselves quickly 
 in line to open fire, but still to wait for the order to com- 
 mence firing. 
 
 2. By advancing in Line. — I also caused to be practiced 
 the advance in line of groups, from their position under 
 cover, on the command "Stand up — double march," but only 
 where the ground offered no cover for an advance in file, 
 or when it was supposed that they were already within 
 
[,2 Ejctracts from an Iiifantm Captain's Journal. 
 
 fffectivp range of the enemy; because, in this case, an ad- 
 vance in file would only cause delay, and consetjuently loss. 
 
 lUit I then caused the non-commissioned officer to be 
 warned beforehand to what part otf the ground he should 
 advance, or I myself gave the warning, "The groups are to 
 advance quickly 100 metres (or 50 metres, or as far as the 
 house, etc.)." I also caused to be practiced the advance by 
 single liles. as far as a certain point, on the warning, "Ad- 
 vance by files from the right (left) wing as far as the house;" 
 but I pointed out at the same time, that this conld only be 
 undertaken with success against a weak adversary, or at 
 distances exceeding 1(10 — 1200 metres, because at nearer dis- 
 tances the enemy could aim more easily at single files thain 
 at a group moving together. 
 
 I look upon it as a sjx'cial fault if the last attack — that 
 is to say, tlie actual piercing of the enemiy's ijosition — be 
 undertaken with scattered forces, instead of with all dispos- 
 able men at the same moment. 
 
 On the other hand, it mu.st be inculcated in the non- 
 commissioned offii-cis and men that it is cowardice and folly, 
 when the la.st attack is being made, to remain standing or 
 lying down in order to be able to lire. 
 
 How .1 ud<iin<i lH.stintcc should at the same time he Prac- 
 ticfd. — [n order at the same time to practice non-commis- 
 sioned ()tlic(Ms and men in correctly judging the distances 
 at which they should fire in each position, I, every time, in- 
 dicated where I understood the enemy to be. 
 
 The nnn-commissi'cmir'd otticer, after taking up a poisi- 
 tiiin, was then obliged, by turns, to order the distance and 
 manner of firing at once, or to ask the meri how tliey esiti- 
 mated the distances, and how they would have aimed. 
 
 When it was possible to count the paces, that was done, 
 and the man Who had gone forward to count them was aimed 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 53 
 
 at, in order to accustom the eye to change the manner of 
 aiming, according to the distance. 
 
 The man who was measuring the paces had to take 
 cover where the opportunity offered, in order to teach the 
 mem how to aim on a partially covered enemy; and after he 
 had been aimed at, he had to cry back how many paces he 
 had taken to that spot. 
 
 Detail Exercises for retiring from 6ne Position to another 
 in several Ways. — In iike manner, I caused the different 
 groups to be exercised in retiring from one position under 
 cover to another, and in four different ways: — 
 
 1. File by file, if the ground permits it; the flies retiring 
 singly quite unseen. In this case I es.pecially paid atten- 
 tion that the non-commissioned officer caused the retreat 
 to be made by one icing, and told off the other one as a rear 
 guard, and that the men fired a shot before moving to the 
 rear; they were then to cover themselves completely, and 
 move to the rear, also quite under cover, as far as the new 
 position previously pointed out by their leader. 
 
 2. Retreat of the group, leaving a rear guard; in which 
 case the non-oommissioned officer had only to designaite 
 those men who were to form the rear guard,* and then to 
 give the order, "Retreat quickly as far as the house (or to the 
 ditch) — double march." The rear guard should keep up its 
 fire during the movement, and on the group taking position 
 should run to the rear by itself, and take up position on one 
 flank of the group. 
 
 . 3. Rapid retreat of the entire group, under the supposi- 
 
 *It is very Ampprtanlt £or. every leader to accustom himself, he- 
 fore giving tbe order for retreat, to designate tflie rear guard, or the 
 detachment which is to remain halted, and this in such a way that 
 all the men oan hear him. A detachment which hears only the order 
 for retreat, and whiicih must then remain halted in order to cover the 
 retreat, becomes restless, and is easily led to join in the retreat. 
 6 - 
 
54 Extracts from an Infaiitrii Cai>tniii's Journal. 
 
 tion of a Hank attack, on the command, "Eear turn; double 
 march.'' At tlu' Sixnie time the men wciv enjoined not to 
 cliise togetlier when running to the rear, but when they 
 found (ovei-, to break into quick 'time, and on the order 
 "Assemble," to join on file by file where the leader of the 
 group was standing, or to fall in by files or fours to a flank 
 if the uKtveiiient was raking place oo a road. But it was im- 
 jiressed upoiu the men that all rapid retreats must be espe- 
 cially ordered, and that special aUention must be made to 
 the new command, "Itica.k into (juick tiiue," or "Fronf ttirn." 
 
 1. The execution of the order "Ketire slowly." 
 
 One of the ranks to remain standing or lying down and 
 firing, whilst the otlier ran back quickly to tlie next cover, 
 and got ready to open fire. 
 
 Every ma-n of (he first rank, as soon as he has fired, 
 should, whilst loading under cov(^r, look backrwards, and 
 should run quickly behind the second rank, and talce cover 
 in like manner. The latter would then fire, look round to 
 the I'ear for fresh cover for itself, and then run to it; and so 
 on, until the command -'Halt" oi' "Take position" be given. 
 
 This manner of retiring is advantageous when opposed 
 to a sui)erior enemy, who is gaining ground gradually to 
 the front, especially in woods, in villages, or on ground other- 
 wise broken; but it is likewise so on a plain, where the ranks 
 should run baok at most 50 metres, and then kneel down 
 a^-ain.* , , 
 
 ♦Whoever considers the manner of pracfcicing "Retire slowly" too 
 eomplicaited, can omit it. Yet it is nottiing more than a systeimatle 
 application of .tfliat same proceeding wlhleh is always fouuid to tike 
 place of itself When a body of good troops is retiring before the en- 
 emy—namely, that a portion of the men firing remains halted when 
 the retreat takes place, in order to fire yet another shot. By this 
 means the enemy is kept back from a too ardent pursuit. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 55 
 
 Exercises of Detail for reinforcing the Line of Fire. — 1 
 By moving up the Reinforcing Groups in File. — After this 
 bad been practiced alternately by different groups, I caused 
 the advance of separate groups and of entire divisions for 
 strengthening the line of fire to be carried out in a similar 
 way, and which, according to circumstances, either pro- 
 longed the line or formed offensive or defensive flanks. In 
 doing this, the groups advanced as a rule in file, the leader 
 at the head. 
 
 In reinforcing by whole divisions, practice was carried 
 on in this manner: The leader of the division gave the 
 caution (immediately after my order, "The first division to 
 prolong the line to the right (left)"), the group on the left 
 (right) wing to direct," whereupon the leader of the 'divi- 
 sion placed himself at the head of the directing group, the 
 leaders of groups in front of the center o)f their respective 
 groups, looking towards the division leader, who motioned to 
 them with his sword any necessary change of direction. The 
 leaders of groups were permitted to make use of cover on the 
 way, offering protection for their advance 'Which might be 
 available (for instance, by leading a group in file around a 
 small height or house). In the same way, also, the whole 
 division, when it had to leave cover to form in iS'kirmishinig 
 order, could advance froim the cover in file, froim one or from 
 both flanks (in half divisions), but must then, on the order 
 "Froait form," or "Halt; take position," quickly form up 
 again. On the order, "Take position," the division and 
 group leaders go at once behind their groups. The leaders 
 must also place themselves under cover, but in such a way 
 that they may see every man of their detachment, as well 
 as have a good view over the ground in front; the leader of 
 the divisions must remain stainding as much ais possible in 
 the same spot (the best point of view in the position), and 
 
56 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 where he can be seen by the leaders of the groups. He 
 ought to havi' a whistle with him, one blow of which would 
 call the attention of the whole detachment, and thereupon 
 all the group leaders should turn their eyes towards him. 
 
 On this occasion, also, I caused judging distance to be 
 practiced in a simihii- way as formerly, so that it was either 
 necessary for the group leader to command the distance 
 and description of tire, av to ask the men at what distance 
 they would aim. Naturally, pacing the distance was not 
 here necessary, but the leader who had already opened fire 
 had to indicate at what distamce he was firing. 
 
 I drew attention to the necessity of a group leader in 
 future acting in the same way, so that the detachment 
 which \\as already engaged could assiist the others as to tiie 
 correct distance. 
 
 Rrinforvciiunt of the lAnc of Fire, hi/ the Adranre of De- 
 det^ich incuts dcploi/cd in order to double the Line. — I then 
 caused reinforcing also to be practiced by an advance of de- 
 tachments deployed, which necessitated their doubling into 
 the advanced line: and this, indeed, must everywhere happen 
 when no favorable position allows the prolongation of the 
 line, or when it becomes ncnessiiry to foi'm a thieker line of 
 lire to the front. 
 
 AVlien groups were already in position with an interval 
 between them, I caused the doubling in to take place in that 
 interval if it were large enough, and the files which were 
 nearest closed a little under covei' torw^ards the wings. 
 When this could not be done, the files of the reinforcement 
 placed themselves wherever they could find room. 
 
 The distance at which the fire was to be opened was 
 indicated as previously. 
 
 The senior leader had at once to take command over the 
 whole line of fire. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal, 57 
 
 It is to be understood, that during the movement in 
 advance of the reinforcing troiops, I always insisted that 
 those who were already in the line of fire should receive 
 from their leaders the order, "Rapid firing." 
 
 Finally, I caused the supports to execute various exer- 
 cises, and I placed myself immediately behind the center of 
 the line of fire, and directed the support by the whisitle, 'the 
 voice, or by sign, in oirder to practice myself ais well as the 
 leader of the support in a mutual understanding.* 
 
 During tbis time I caused the skirmishers to look round 
 and pay attention to what was taking place. 
 
 1. Advance of the supports for firing volleys:— 
 
 On my part, a blow of the whistle to call the attention of 
 the division. Order, "For firing volleys," and a sign in the 
 
 *Tllie leading of a detaehiment may be compromised, if tlae leader 
 does not understand liow to direct the suibdivis.ons of his detach- 
 ment from a predetermined place. He must never cnauge his 
 place -witlioTit a weli-considered intention; the tfflciency of a com- 
 pany is shown wihen the smbordinaite leaders quiclily uixderstand 
 and carry out the intentions of the commander of the ccmpany. 
 Intelligent subordinate leaders who do not lose sight of the tnemy 
 guess at half a word Whajt ought to take place. Therefore it is a 
 good plan for the leader of the supports, wihen possible, so to place 
 himself tliat he may at the same time see the progress of tlie fight, 
 and the chief of iiis company. In thiis view he can place himself 
 from 20 to 30 paces from his support. It is also advisable to practice, 
 in peace time, the following means of communicating orders when 
 under flre of tiie enemy :— 
 
 1. WJien the initerval between the skirmishers and support, be- 
 comes too great for the voice of the company commander to be 
 heard, the leader of the support miis.t send forward a couple of men 
 (one bugler and one non-eoiminissioned officer or lance-corporal) aOoui 
 100 paices, there to lie down and to repeat to the commander of the 
 support the orders shouted back by the commander of the company. 
 
 2. If the line of skirmiiShars is too extended to be able to hear 
 orders or to pay attention to tihe whistle, then pass.ng of orders 
 should be practiced (for example, "Prepare for the attack"), when 
 each man at once acts as he sees the directing group act. 
 
 It is well not to despise snoh simall means of assistance, to whicli 
 a body of soldiers can be so easily aooustomed, because tihe skirmisli- 
 ers by these means only, when the leaders are on foot— and orders 
 are no longer able to be understood or carried — can still remain capa- 
 ble of being led. 
 
58 Extracts from an Infantnj Captain's Journal. , 
 
 direction in wbieh a volley should be given (tlias can also be 
 oi'deied by the voice). It then rested with the leader of the 
 siqiport to advanive towards the point desi<;-nated, either at 
 the double or in quick time. 
 
 On the command, "Halt for firing," position with a 
 jiroper fimiv of fire must always be taken, and the leader 
 should, by rapid survey whilst passing to the rear ol his 
 division, assure himself that the front is well placed, with 
 an ojicn field of fire, or, if necessary, he must coi-revt ajiy 
 faults in this resjicct. 
 
 Naturally, exail aimiiin' and tiring, according to the 
 orders given, we^re iiisisled upon. 
 
 2. "The support to retire, and take uip a rallying posi- 
 tdon," ander the siijipf>siH(iii that, although indeed the 
 enemy's attack had been at first repulsed, it was nevertheless 
 necessary to retreat. 
 
 In this case I accustcmied the division leader and the 
 division to carry out orders quickly and with jwecisiion. 
 
 Orders. — "Slojie arms, rear turn, double march." Then, 
 according to circumstances, retire (Mther in line or in file 
 from the right or left. 
 
 Ari-ived at the jiosit ion, the support turned to the front, 
 or formed up to the front, and the order was then given, 
 "Open out to skirmishing distance from the right (left) 
 wing" (or, according to circumstances, from the center), 
 whereupon the men quickly took their position at the proper 
 intervals as skimisliers. 
 
 Hereupon I ordei-eil, "The groups in advance retire oji 
 the flanks of the rallying jtosition," in order to practice the 
 leaders of jinmps to lead at once their extended groups in 
 such a manner that the front of the skirmishers posted to 
 rally them should remain free, the groups during the move- 
 ment closing either half-left (half-right) or forming in fi^le 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 59 
 
 when the ground offered proper cover, in order to take up 
 their new position by wheeling the head around, or by halt- 
 ing and fronting. 
 
 3. Aftei" the position was taken up, I supposed that it 
 was necessary to continue the retreat, and I gave the order, 
 "Tlie first division to remain as rear guard, tbe rest to retire 
 and form support," wihereupoin the leaders of the retreating 
 groups caused their sections to retire in extended order, 
 until the leader of the diviisdon gave the command, "Form 
 column of sections in retreat." After the detachment had 
 oancentrated on the section with which was the leader of the 
 division, I caused them to form front, and herewith ended 
 the exei'cise. > ! ' 
 
60 
 
 E-Ttracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 Fig 3 
 
 Linden thai 
 
 ^ili^^^** 
 
 Reference 
 
 an. I "^ halt of Aettuhed, men,, 
 bh. OcaipaUcin (/the bouneicoy 
 h- b- MocUfhcaHoris vTtich -were ntaite. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. gl 
 
 FOURTH EXERCISE. (See Fig. 3.) 
 
 A neighboring village, Lindenthal, was travensed by 
 numerous roads; on the further side of it the ground rose 
 somewhat, and on the height were several large and small 
 farms, some grouped together and some isolated, comprised 
 under, the naines of Lind and Deckstein; there were rather 
 rapid slopes towards the village and towards the south, on 
 which side flowed a brook, with a bridge (Gleueler brook). 
 
 This situation presented an opportunity to-day for ooce 
 again training detachments, when advancing, to keep up a 
 communication, and also for the defense of the boundary of 
 a village, and the conduct of a rear guard during the fight 
 and in the retreat. 
 
 It was my intentioin immediately after the advance to 
 occupy a position; then, as soon as the fight began, to 
 commence the retreat, in order at the same time to accus- 
 tom the different -detaohments to correctly work totgether 
 with their detached men and skirmishers over tolerably 
 open ground; therefore it was ruecessary to consider before- 
 hand the special instructions which should be given to the 
 detached mem. 1 reserved to myself the decision regardioig 
 the proper moment for retreat, partly because I wished to 
 practice myself in giving the requisite precise orders for such 
 a moment, and pai-tly to accustom the subordinate leaders 
 to the precise execution of such orders. 
 
 All this ought to be learnt, both for a voluntary and 
 still more for an enforced retreat before a superior enemy. 
 
 The detached men must also learn how they themselves 
 have to retire, whilst keeping up their communication with 
 the retreating detachment without, as would most often be 
 the case, special orders reacihiing them. A well-ordered 
 
52 Extrnrtu from (in Iiifaiitrji Coptnin's Joiinial. 
 
 retreat is the proof test of the training of leaders and men. 
 In this respect I consider special training in comhat of rv- 
 freat as particularly profitable. 
 
 The company fell in at half i)ast six, 7S men strong, be- 
 sides the non-commissioned officers. The divisions were 
 not formed this time in sections by squads, but esich in three 
 seel ions tkf four files, a non-commissioned ollicer or lance 
 ciirjioral with each sectiom. i'.esides, to each sectiom were 
 attached al least one i)atrol leader and one nmn trained to 
 this duty. 
 
 DisjiosHioii. — The enemy is already in considei-able 
 slreufith in the iieighborhood. The company has the order 
 lo advance lo the iliain of heights, and to occupy the further 
 boundary of Lind. The division of skirmishers go straight 
 forward on the hijih road as advanced guard: Sergesmt A, 
 with two sections of the '2d division as ttankers covering the 
 left, has to move on the height of Decksteiiron the left wing 
 of the position, resting on the bridge at the brook. The de- 
 tached men have to ke(^p up j»ro])er communication between 
 themselves; in case of ictreat, the same I'oad is to be fol- 
 lowi (1. The remaindei' of the comiiany follows the ad- 
 vanced guard. 
 
 Advance to the Front U(/(iinxt lAnd and Derl'Mi'in. — The 
 division of skirmishers took from the first section five men 
 for the head (the mlnhnirm. as alieady explained, when in the 
 immediate neighborhood of the enemy, in order that the men 
 may n()t be stopped by any patrol; one file then goes to the 
 right, and one file to the left of the road, the fifth man keejts 
 up the communication). Three men were detached to the 
 left on a small lateral road, in order to keep up communi- 
 cation at the same time with the left flankers. The, leader 
 of the head went this time on the left, the leader of the divi- 
 sion near the connecting man, the next senior non-com- 
 
Extracts from an Infnntry Captain's Jonrnal. (53 
 
 missioned officer led the advanced guard, and was bound 
 always to keep the division leader in sight. He received be- 
 forehand from the latter instru'ctions to pass the village of 
 Lind with all necessary precaution, but as quickly as possi- 
 ble, and to take up a position under cover on the further 
 boundary of it. 
 
 In order to prove if the detached men kept up a com- 
 munication, I gave the order to the leader of the division, 
 after we had gone about 1,000 paces, to cause the head to be 
 halted, whilst the advanced guard and the main body con- 
 tinued their march, in order that they might see what the 
 detached men would do. The leader of the division blew on 
 his signal whistle, the leader of the head lo'O'ked round, a 
 sign was made to him to halt, whereupon, as there was a 
 farm close to him, he called out to his men, "Quick, as 'far 
 as the farm," then ''Halt" ; he then placed himself personally 
 at the left corner of the farm, where he could see forwards 
 and to the left, in order from thence to make a sign to the 
 detached men on the left to halt in like manner. The other 
 men of the head remained on both sides of the road, so that 
 they could see both to the front and to the right. 
 
 The advanced guard wished to halt when the head did, 
 but the division leader, who had remained close to the man 
 keeping up communication, shouted out simply to the leader 
 of the advanced guard, "Continue marching until you join 
 the head," and as his command was understood, he himself 
 went to the bead, in order to see if everjijhing was going on 
 properly. 
 
 The main body continued its march at the same time 
 that the advanced guard again moved to the front, and when 
 it came nearer, the same order was called out to its leader, 
 so that, through proper communication, my order had been 
 executed by all the detachments, although I had only given 
 
g4 Estiacis from an Infaiitru CniUahrs Journal. 
 
 it to the leader of the advanced guard. I was a.ble, there- 
 fore, to ride at once to the head, so as to see how the de- 
 tached men were conducting tliemselves. 
 
 Critical Remarks on the Condiivt of the Detarhed Men.— 
 The hiteral patrol on the left, which had remained somewhat 
 behind, onl.v now made its appearance; it had missed the 
 moment for halting correctly, and was quietly continuing its 
 march to the front, when it suddenly heard the sc^-ond whis- 
 tle of the leader of tlw advanced guard, and, on looking 
 round, understood the sign made for halting. It halted just 
 where it was. but, after a pause, i lie leader of the patrol, who 
 was somewhat unskillful, having rellected, the patrol was 
 seen to plai-e itself rapidly under cover by his direction. 
 The continued adxaiice of this patrol had caused the left 
 flankers also to advance further than was necessary; but as 
 they had sent two men out to their right to keep up com- 
 munication, these quickly acted on the signal to halt, and 
 ]>asse(l it on. All were now halted, but the head of the left 
 flankers was only at 100 paces from the line of heights, which 
 was SI ill at least (iOO jjaces distant from the right wing. 
 
 I'nder the circumstances, it was a mistake on the part 
 of the head of the l(4t flank detachment, in not having at 
 once endeavored to leach the line of heights in order to be 
 able to se<' further around. I called the attention of the men 
 to the mistake committed, and I directed that, in future, 
 every detached man who might be called upon by a sign to 
 halt was at once to place himself rajiidly under cover, in 
 order to show that the sign had been understood, but that he 
 must then look round for the best point of view in his neigh- 
 borhood, and must on his own account take position there; 
 one man, at least, from each patrol must thus jjlace himself 
 in position. 
 
 I then ordered the officer to undertake the leading of 
 
Extracts from an Infaiitru Captain's Jowniil. 65 
 
 the company on tbis side, whilst 1 rode to the detachment on 
 the left. The march to the front was only to be recom- 
 menced on a sign from me that the advanced guard and de- 
 tached men had been Telieved from the first division. The 
 officer himself was to order the necessary measures for the 
 occupation of the farms on the chain of heights. 
 
 AVhen I reached the lateral detachment on the left, the 
 detached men of the division 'Of skirmishers had already in 
 the mieautime been relieved, so that I was able, after having 
 called attention to the above-noticed fault, as the result of 
 which the two men of the head were moved quickly on to the 
 line of heights, to give the signal for the general oon/tinuation 
 of the forward march. 
 
 They all put themselves in movement ; I rode at the head 
 of the left lateral detachment. 
 
 Conduct of the Head u-Jirn it arrives at a Height. — As, this 
 head was about to ascend the height in the ordinary manner, 
 1 pointed out that it was necessary to gain such a distant 
 point of observation with caution, but at the same time with 
 rapidity. The leader ought to advance sufficiently far to be 
 able to see well around him from under cover ; the other men 
 should follow more slowly, ready to fire, should the enemy 
 show at all to the side or on the front. It was so carried out. 
 Tills rapid advance of the leader at the same time caused a 
 similar rapid advance of the other detached men, who were 
 observing him. 
 
 As soon as the leader had reached the height and the 
 farm at the cross-ways, he was able, from a position under 
 cover, to overlook the open ground in front, as far as the next 
 village, B (one-half mile distant). 
 
 Report of the approach of the Enemy and Conduct then to 
 be followed. — I said to him : I supposed that he saw a strong 
 detachment of the enemy debouch from B on to the high 
 
Qg E.rlracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 road, whilst at the same time another hostile detaclmient 
 advanced alongside the brook. He himself wished at onee 
 to carry this news. I ordered him to shout it out to the rear. 
 
 He sliDuted back: "Two hostile detacliuients, each of 
 about the strength of a company, are ou the march near the 
 villagi- H." This report was passed on Seigeant A, who 
 at once ordered, "Double," and only broke into quick time 
 to ascend the height. He placed one section neair the edge of 
 the height, close to the road, as a support, whilst to the re- 
 mainder, which had continued its march, he gave the order, 
 "<)((iipy the farm; double.' He himself went to the leader 
 of the head, who slH>w<'d him the points where I had sup- 
 posed that the enemy could be seen. He at once, very prop- 
 erly, ordered the leader to cry tint quickly to the detached 
 men cm the right that a company of the euciny was ofu the 
 march frdui H, along the high road. The leader ran sutH- 
 ciently far along the cross-road for his call to be lieai-d and 
 passed on, and then returned quickly. 
 
 In the meantime. Sergeant A had examined the neigh- 
 borhood and had found out that, from the farm, the ground 
 in front could not be sufficiently brought under fire, on ac- 
 count of a hedge which descended from the other side of the 
 cross-road down the slope to the left as far as the bridge. He 
 therefoi-e ]ilaced one section near the hedge, detached his left 
 tile nearl3- as far as the bi'idge, whilst he called in the lateral 
 detachments on his right neaier to him; he moved the sup- 
 port foi-ward to the farm. I notified my approval of these 
 arrangements, and ordered him to cause the distances in 
 front, up to certain defined points, to be judged, and to hold 
 the position until he saw that the company on the high road 
 evacuated the village. 
 
 I then rode back to the company, which in the meantime, 
 in consequence of the report shouted to it, had also advanced 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 67 
 
 quickly and had occupied, with its advanced guard, the out- 
 ermost fai-ms near the high road. Thje support was placed 
 behind the nearest large farm. 
 
 Critical Remwrlcs on the Position at the Bowidary of the 
 Tillage. — In examining the position taken up, I found — 
 
 1. That the leaders had not yet called the attention of 
 the men to the distances in front. 
 
 2. That the attention of the men had not been suffi- 
 ciently called to the manner in which they should place them- 
 selves, if in war they had to occupy farms. 
 
 3. That the officer had not so placed himse-lf that 'he 
 could see the ground in front and the groups which, were ex- 
 tended, and at the same time be seen by the leader of the 
 support. 
 
 4. That the latenal patrol on the left had oertainJy ad- 
 vanced, om a side road,.as far as the boundary, but had not so 
 placed itself that a man on the left oould overlook the ground 
 as far as the detachment of sergeant A, whilst the other man 
 on the right kept the company in view. 
 
 I called the leaders of groups to the front, and drew their 
 attention to these points. 
 
 I pointed out how, on the ground in front, there were 
 some well-marked points, at effective rifle range, at 250 — 300 
 paces, as also at 500 — 600 paces. The men therefore ought 
 to be told that fire against the enemy's skirmishers should 
 only be opened when they had arrived at the first points; 
 whereas, on closed bodies of the enemy, fire should be opened 
 when they arrive at the latter points. By such matters being 
 pointed out in time to the men, their steady aiming is much 
 facilitated, and the further direction of their fire made easy. 
 
 As regarded the occupation of the farms, I oonsidered 
 it advisable that a farm should be entrusted to each group, 
 in order to avoid confusion. 
 
gy Extracts from an Infantry Cai>tuiirs Journal. 
 
 Each group leader must order the occupation of the win- 
 dows turned towards the enemy, as also wbat necessary 
 openings should be quickly made in the walls, and should 
 also take care that in case of necessity, la eooivenient passage 
 for ret reat existwi in the rear.* 
 
 The oflicer should place himself near the road, covered 
 to the front, and should look round to the rear for the farm 
 which would oiler the most advantageous rallying position 
 in case of retreat. 
 
 At ahnut l;"iO jmces to the rear, at the point of crossing of 
 the high i-oad with that road which led to the detachment 
 of sergeani A, there was such a farm, and I caused the sup- 
 jiort at first to take jiosition there, under cover; I directed 
 tlie leader of the supjiort to attend to, ami to quiclcly carry 
 out, every sign and call of the officer. 
 
 I)('fciis-c of tin' lioiiiiddri/ (i</(ii,iist <i xnppoxcd Athirli. — I 
 now sujiposed the enemy had extended sti-ong bodies of skir- 
 mishers on t'he high road, and against our left wing with a 
 support in rear beyond rifle shot. I then gave the caution: 
 "The liosl.ile skirmishers are running foi-ward to within 
 :'>0() ]iaces of us. The snpjKtrt coiutinues to advance." 
 
 ('oitiiiKnid (/hen by the Officer. — "Fire by ranks. The 
 best shots aim at the sujqiort at SOO paces." 
 
 J recommended, at the same time, the third division to 
 approach nearer to the support, and keep ready. 
 
 The possibility of such an advance, without being direct- 
 ly intended, for the puiinise of tiring volleys, or as a. rein- 
 forcement, had not been f()r(-seen by the officer, and, also, I 
 myself had not determined on any general signal for su<-h a 
 case. 
 
 If one retlecis that an order shouted to the i-ear, aftei' 
 
 ♦Tliese latter oMers naturally can only be given if the enemy 
 allows suffieieint time. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 69 
 
 the hv'mg had been alreadj- commenced, might be misunder- 
 sl ood, and that the sending of an order would talie too long, 
 there only remains then, once for all, to agree upon a signal 
 for the advance of the support, and to fix upon the manner 
 in which this movement should be carried out. A bugle call 
 would be the simplest, but it might cause misunderstanding 
 amongst the neighboring troops; there remains, then, noth- 
 ing else than the signal whistle and a predetermined sign of 
 the officer with hi® sword. It is a question whether such a 
 sign made with the sword will always at once be understO'Od 
 when the fight has already begun. Would it not, therefore, 
 be better, as already remarked on page 41, once for all, to 
 make the leader of the support responsible for the rapid 
 transmission of orders, by shouting or otherwise, along posts 
 of men previously sent out? 
 
 ^^'h'ilst these thoughts were passing through my head, 
 the officer had in the meantime simply signalled with his 
 sword to the leader of the support to advance. The latter, 
 in coinformity with what had been done at the last maneuver, 
 gave the order — "Right turn; left wheel — double march," as 
 he had been standing behind the farm with the support, and 
 could thence advance well under cover, skirting the farm 
 on one side of the road, whereas a deployed advance along 
 the road would have brought the support just in the enemy's 
 line of fire, which, on actual service, would have led to unnec- 
 essary losses, and probably to confusion. With a stronger 
 support, it would indeed have been impracticable to have led 
 all forward in file, one behind the other. It would then have 
 been necessary, either to have placed the men of each divi- 
 sion in file by half divisions, so as to have run forward on 
 both sides of the road, or else the support could ,not have 
 Sihirked the losses neoessarv to be incurred in order to remain 
 
70 Ej'tracts from au Infantry Ciu)tniii'n JonriiaJ. 
 
 in the hand of the leader. Such losses are then not to In- 
 avoided. 
 
 It had, indeed, been my intention to advance only tlie 
 third division, and, on the other band, to leave behind the 
 one section of the second division, in a good rallyinj;- position 
 to meet evenlnalities; but I did not, liowever, make any 
 chanjie. bccMuse I therefrom learnt the lesson to avoid in 
 fntuir anything comiilicated, even if it appeared of advan- 
 tage in a technical point of view. Even in peace-time a 
 movcnieut of tliis dcscrijjtion is not easily carried out; but 
 in war, in the noise and in the excitement of the fight, evciy- 
 thing wliich is complicated — be it ever so well carried out — 
 only leads to confusion. ( )ne must, therefore, guard againsi 
 doing in cveiy special case anytliing exceptional to which 
 U(m-conniiis.sione(l olliccrs and men are no't (icciistoincd. 
 
 There was, indeed, no disadvantage in tliis section hav- 
 ing- advanced at the same time. On th(^ contrary, it was then 
 j«>ssible to specially instruct the leader of the section so 
 to occupy wvlh his section the farm pointed out, that in case 
 of a i-etn^at the detachments might assemble in order behind 
 it. That the section had in conseciuence to make its 150 
 paces twice uvcv did not matter much, because appar- 
 ently there remained ample time to the chief to make his 
 arrangements. 
 
 The sup]Kii-t was at once jilaced on the boundary under 
 cover behind the farm. The section in question was in- 
 structed by me in ]»resence of the officer, and then sent to the 
 rear. I then took over the command again. The defense of 
 the boundary of the village against a supposed enemy was 
 now carried out by me. 
 
 Caution. — "Hostile skirmishers are advancing, at 250 
 jtaces distance, the supports at 520 metres." 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 71 
 
 The leajdei's of groups gave the necessary orders for 
 opening fire. 
 
 Caution. — "The skirmishers are advancing by rushes 50 
 paces at a time. , The su.jjport follows at a double, at 300 
 paces distance."' 
 
 The leaders of groups gave the command, "Eapid firing." 
 
 I added, "On the support. The best shots against the 
 enemy's skirmishers." 
 
 Then 1 ordered, "The support advance to fire volleys.'' 
 
 The Chief of the Support. — "Double march; — for firing, 
 halt." 
 
 This movement ought to be executed with rapidity and 
 precision, and as this is not quite easy, it was repeated. Then, 
 "At 300 paces ready — present — load, at 250 paces," and 
 so on. 
 
 Caution. — "The enemy's support Ihas lain down." The 
 division leader, who had just given the order, "At — paces, 
 ready," quietly commanded, "Order arms, kneel down.'' If 
 there had been a small earthwork, the support would have 
 done better to have placed itself beforehand there under 
 cover, and to have fired skirmishens' volleys. 
 
 Caution. — "The enemy's skirmishers and support are 
 advancing to the attack." 
 
 The command given in all the groups, as well as in the 
 support, "Rapid firing." 
 
 Caution. — "The enemy's attack is repulsed." 
 After the Repulsed Attack the greater part of the Company is 
 thrown as a Reinforcement towards the 
 Left Wing at Deckstein. 
 
 Command. — "The support to the rear at the double, to 
 reinforce the left wing at Deckstein." 
 
 The leader of the support, "Slope arms — rear turn — 
 double march — right turn." 
 
72 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's JnunuiL 
 
 ('(liiimand. — "The first division leaving behind a roar 
 guard to gradually. follow the support." 
 
 The Lfdilcr of the First Diriiiion. — "The third set-tion 
 forms rear guard, the tirst and second sections to retire file 
 by tilt' and asst-mble behind the rallying position." 
 
 Every tile, as had always been jirarticed before retreat- 
 ing, tired a shot and then ran back along the side of the road 
 as far as the rear of the farm, occupied l)y the section of the 
 second di\ ision, and here (lie two sections assembled. The 
 h-adcr of the division remained behind with the section of 
 the rear guard, so as to be alilr In order the time for the re- 
 treat. I warned him I would take with me two sections 
 more towards the left wing; he was to co\(-r my right tlank 
 with two sections on lln^ high road against a possible pur- 
 suit of the rneniy, and in the meautime should practice judg- 
 ing dista^ncc. 1 then rode to the rallying position, caused it 
 bo be occn]>ied by a secti(m of the tii'st division, and made the 
 other two seel ions follow the support, which now was al- 
 ready approaching at a rapid pace sergeant A's detachment. 
 
 lJcfrii.sc of Jhrkstriii lujainst a sitppo.srd Attack. — Whilst 
 riding forward 1 called out to both detaclnnents, "Tire ene- 
 my is attacking the bridge of Deckslein with strong bodies 
 ol skirmishers." 
 
 "The division of skirmishers to occupy the boundary on 
 the right opposite the left flank of the enemy. Tbe two sec- 
 tions following to go to the bridge as a support." 
 
 The leadei- of the skir-mishing division, who had formed 
 his division in sections, at once ordered: 
 
 "The leading section follow me, the others extend to the 
 rigUt in prolongation." 
 
 At an open part of the bound'ary there was a sand-pit 
 jutting out, whence the ground in front on the left flank 
 could be swept. The division leader immediately threw one 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 73 
 
 of his sections into it, and signalled to the other section to 
 take position near him. He then at once ordered, "Rapid 
 firing at 200 paces." The two sections of the first and sec- 
 ond diviisions, which were still following in close order, 
 brolce into double time towards the bridge on the command 
 of the senior non-commissioned officer. 
 
 In the meantime I had called out to Sergeant A, "The 
 enemy is attacking the bridge with overpowering forces.''' 
 Whereupon he at once extended towards the left flank, along 
 the line of the hedge, the section which was still standing 
 formed up at the farm, and gave the order, "Rapid firing." 
 
 It was my intention to practice the coimpany on this 
 occasion in a retreat under the fire of the enemy, and there- 
 fore to suppose that the enemy had not been driven back. 
 
 Arrangements for the Retreat under the Enemi/'s Fire. — In 
 OTder to gain time for the retreat at such a moment, the only 
 means to employ is a counter-attack, which will at least bring 
 the enemy temporarily to a standstill, even if it should not 
 promise any lasting success. 
 
 I therefore ordered the two sections which were formed 
 up: "To the attack — drive the enemy back over the bridge." 
 
 And immediately to the leader of the division of skir- 
 mishers the following order: "Retire quicky with the divi- 
 sion of skirmishers, and take post in a rallying position." 
 
 To both sections the order was thereupon at once given: 
 "To the attack — fix bayonets — trail arms — 'double march." 
 
 On the other hand, the leader of the division of skir- 
 mishers, of which the right wing was in front, gave the order: 
 "Left turn — double march." During the movement he looked 
 around for a point as coinvenient and as near as possible for 
 a rallying position, and such' he soon found on the slope of 
 the hill, whence, should the enemy pursue, he could bring 
 
r-^^ Ejrtiacts from an Infantrii Captain's Journal. 
 
 him under effective fli-e without, as far as appeared likely, 
 compromising his own retreat. 
 
 He directed his sections there h.v sign and voice, and 
 quickly took up position. 
 
 The attacking sections wislicd in the nieantiuie to push 
 over the bridge. I called out to them, "Halt," and then: 
 "The sui)i«)rt retire as far as the nearest farm. Skirmishers 
 fiillow slowly." 
 
 The icadci- caused them to turn to the rear, move foa- a 
 shciii distance at the double, and they then went in quick 
 time by llie shortest way, i>assing by the extended division 
 of skirmishers towards tlie farm situated in rear, at the 
 boundaries of which he at once, having i)ri)i)erly appre- 
 ciated the state of affairs, placed both section.s in jiositions 
 to rally I he otliers. 
 
 I caused the two deployed sections of Sergeant A, as 
 they were only to follow slowly (under the supposition thai 
 the enemy hail been 1eiii])orarily thrown in confusion by the 
 atta( k), to carry out their movement of retreat in the «vnie 
 manner which is practiced when the order is given — "Retire 
 slowly." 
 
 The separate ranks of the sections "had to run io the 
 rear successively, for a certain distaince, making use of un- 
 dulations of ground, and take up positions at convenient 
 jioints for opening tire, until having jiassed the division of 
 skirmishers already in position to receive them, they re- 
 ceived orders to assemble as a support behind the second 
 rallying jiosition. 
 
 A retreat on such ground had not yet been practicc-^d. 
 I could not, therefore, be surprised at its presenting a some- 
 what confused spectacle. I, accordingly, caused it to be 
 repeated, after I had pointed out that one section would 
 best carry out its retreat if it skirted the stream through the 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 75 
 
 plot of willows ; the other, on the contrary, should keep more 
 on the height and close to the di\'isi!on 'of skdrmishers. I 
 explained to the leaders of groups that after the oommand, 
 /'Ketire slowly,'' they should quickly point out to the second 
 rank the point of ground where it should halt and front. 
 Nevertheless it was necessary for them to specially point 
 out to a portion of the men how they could in the best way 
 avail themselves of the nature of the ground. 
 
 I now caused the division of skiirmishers, with its three 
 sections, to carry out the same practice, in whicih two sec- 
 tions had to retire for a certain distance along a slope of the 
 height. Here, also, it appeared that only a portion of the 
 men understood how to gain rapidly in retreat the favorable 
 point for making front against the enemy; some directed 
 themselves mechanically towards their neighbors, and then 
 found either that they had no cover or no open line of fire 
 in front. , 
 
 Repetition of the Retreat, but this time by Groups. — It 
 appeared, at any rate, that this was a useful c.rercisc in peace 
 time for the purpose of rendering individval men more skill- 
 ful. But to practice this in retreat before the enemy, very 
 cool and well-exercised men would be necessary. 
 
 Consequently a retreat by groups is more simple, espe- 
 cially if the enemy allows it to be carried out, which, how- 
 ever, is hardly to be expected of a determined and superior 
 adversary. 
 
 I therefore caused again the hedge to be oooupied by 
 the division of skirmishers, and the retreat to be carried out 
 by groups : the leader of the division was inistructed not to 
 give the comiiiand for the retreat until he had designated in a 
 loud voice the detachment which was at first to remain 
 halted. 
 
 This is very important, for before the word "Retire" is 
 
76 Eitracis from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 bciird, the detachmfut should know that it only refers to 
 a specified portion. 
 
 It appeared that it was easier to lead the f^roups at the 
 double towards points determined and designated by the 
 leaders of j^n-dujis, and then to make them froait at the eoni- 
 maad and skillfully to take up position, than it liad been be- 
 fore in the case with separate i*anks. The men had previous- 
 ly been more exercised in taking post quickly in a position 
 pointtd (Hit to them, than to choose for themselves siicli a 
 position. And one may feel indeed very well satisfied if the 
 leaders of groups and divisions understand this, and there- 
 fore I did not allow this opportunity to pass without exer- 
 cising; them in it. 
 
 After the groups had successively arrived at the flank 
 of the second rallying position — one group on the left and 
 two on the right, so that thereby the division was broken 
 up, which, however, in a retreat can seldom be avoided if 
 the ground be taken advantage of — I insisted that the 
 groups, since tliey had as yet received no special order for 
 assembling, should first t(ik<: post in the rallying position and 
 front tounrils the cnrrni/. 
 
 I then ordered Sergeant A, with his two sections, to re- 
 main halted as a rear guard, and for the renuiiuder to fall 
 in as support. In order that they should fall in quickly, 
 with as much order as possible, I directed that the cluiefs 
 should merely give the order to their groups, "Rear tiii'n," 
 and that they should cause them to retire deployed, until 
 s(>me co\er permitted them to be assembled together; then 
 Lhey were to endeavor, by the shortest road, to join the 
 group with which was the leader of the division. The latter 
 had then promptly to decide a point where front was again 
 to be made to the enemy and in what formation. 
 
 As I remarked during the movement, that the two sec- 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Jowrnal. 77 
 
 tions wliioli liad remained near the ,high road had not taken 
 part in the retreat, although they must have remarked that 
 the comjpany was retiring, and thereby their left flank had 
 become exposed, I caused the company to pile arms', and 
 during my absence to judge distance, and I then rode again 
 as far as the high road. I drew the attention of the leader 
 of the division to the fact that, in such a case, he should only 
 remain halted, if he had previously received the order to 
 hold the position as long as possible. 
 
 I showed him how, of his own accord, he should have 
 retired as much under cover as possible, along the side of 
 the road as far as a farm, which was situated at about the 
 same height as the position of the company. 
 
 I remarked, besiides, that the lateral patrol on the left 
 had at once commenced its retreat, without waiting for a 
 sipecial order to do so, and that it had then, of its own accord, 
 again taken position at about the same height as the t^^o 
 sections. 
 
 I then caused the two sections to return to the company. 
 
 Retreat of the Company under the supposition that it is 
 forced to a hasty Retreat from its Position in consequence of a 
 Flank Attack. — I then collected the leaders of divisions and 
 groups together, and said to them that hitherto I had only 
 cariiied out a retreat uoider the protection of a rear guard, 
 but it would be more difficult to maintain order in the 
 retreat if the enemy, by a successful attack, were to force 
 the whole company to retire together. 
 
 Ajs in such a case, the separate detachments could no 
 longer receive s.pecial orders, it would then be necessary for 
 each group leader to conduct his group in deployed order 
 as far as the nearest cover, and then at once front towards 
 the enemy. Should no further orders then reach him, he 
 
78 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 would hare to act in concert with the group which hap- 
 pened to be nearest to him. 
 
 It would have been mj- business during the retirement 
 to designate the detachment which should cover the retreat; 
 all the others would then only have lo think of rallying 
 under cover behind the rear gmird, at the point indicated 
 by their immediate leader 
 
 In order to practically test how, in such a case, it would 
 be most easy to jjrevent a momentarily unavoidable disorder, 
 I at once ordered the division of skirmishers to occupy the 
 right flank of the previous position, the 2d division to take 
 post at till- hedge as far as the bridge, and the 1st division 
 to fire volleys, as a ck)sed support, having placed itself near 
 the bridge. 
 
 The position ordered was ciuickly taken uj) by the sev- 
 ei-al detachments, and I also saw that the men already 
 thought for themselves .how quickly lo get under cover to 
 open fire. 
 
 I then cried out to the company : "The enemy is attack- 
 ing the bridge with one company, and with a second, coming 
 from the high road, he is attacking the right flank of the 
 position." 
 
 The leader of tJie division of skirmisbers, by a rapid 
 change of the position of his separate groups, caused front 
 to 111' formed towards th<i right flank. Evei-yone ordered: 
 "Rapid firing at 200 paces." 
 
 After a short time, I cried out: "The enemy is making 
 an attack in overwhelming numbers on the front, and on the 
 right flank — everyone retire." 
 
 It could not be avoided that the retreat should at first 
 have the appearance of disorder. The leader of the support, 
 who bad felt that he should withdraw his closely formed 
 detachment from the enemy's fire as quickly as possible. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 79 
 
 had at once ordered : "Rear turn — double march," but the 
 ground was too narrow for retiring on such a broad front — 
 so the division got heaped up into a confused mass, for in 
 such a moment it is scarcely possible to carry out an order 
 to break off, or to retire from a flank. 
 
 This I had foreseen, and had therefore already hurried 
 to the isupports and ordered: "Occupy the edge of the 
 height to cover the retreat."* 
 
 I indicated, rapidly, besides, those points which the 
 right and left wing had to occupy — and thus the support 
 divided itself quickly into a couple 'of groups sufficiently 
 well posted, which could fire in all directions. This was the 
 best means to utilize a mass of men retreating, instead of 
 allowing them to remain exposed without resistance to the 
 enemy's bullets, or to run to the rear in disorder. In the 
 meantime the tw^o retiring groups also drew together pretty 
 well on both sides. 1 called out to the second diivision, 
 which had the least space available : "The groups to retire 
 rapidly 'bo the nearest farm — move in file." 
 
 As this movement from the ftank had already been prac- 
 
 *Such an order given at such a moment to a body retiring in con- 
 fusion will certainly be difficult for the men to understand; precise 
 execution of the same, however desirable, would be impossible. 
 
 But for this there is a remedy which certainly entails a slight 
 loss of time. When, for instance, the leader quickly commands: 
 "Front turn— lie down," he gains a moment of time in order to glance 
 quicMy at t!he siituation and groomd, and can immediate'ly after- 
 wards give well-considered orders for the placing in position of the 
 detachment. If there Is not time for this, the Duomber of men "lying 
 dawn forms at all events a compact mass, whence a fire can be kept 
 up to stay the pursuit of the enemy. 
 
 It is especially advisable that Whenever a detaichinent in move- 
 ment has to take up a position, its leader sihould cause it to halt, or 
 lie down for a moment, so that his orders may be better understood 
 and more regularly earried out. The best discdplined troops when in 
 movement can only indifferently understand orders, especially if 
 their leader sihouts out sometihing from the rear. This should, as far 
 as possible, be avoided. Even the order, "Halt," or "Front," is then 
 with difficulty heard by the head. 
 
8(3 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 ticed, it was onlr necessary for the leaders of groups to move 
 quickly to their flank files and to give the order: "Kight 
 (left) turn — double march." In this manner the groups, 
 already a good deal mixed up, managed to disengage 
 themselves, as each knew the object to be gained, and 
 sa,w liis own leader. If, under such circumstances, a few 
 men joined a wrong section, with which they happened 
 then to find themselves, it did not cause any disadvantage; 
 on the contrary, it must be Ivariit that ou active service 
 many a chief will be missing, and that an orderly forming 'of 
 ranks is tmly jiossible out of reach of the enemy's fire. 
 
 The division wf skirmishers liad more space; the leader 
 caused tlicm to retire deployed, and ordered, with quick in- 
 telligence, the gcdup on his right flank to take position on 
 the edge of the height to the right, in order to cover the 
 retreat, and directed the other groups to occupy the nearest 
 farm. As s(i(in as tliese had arrived near the fai-m, they 
 bi-oke into (juick time and formed file, and were thus led into 
 their pdsitidii. 
 
 it ciMlainly must be admitted, that by such measures 
 an assailant who has fallen into some disorder can be hin- 
 dered at first from an energetic pursuit. Perhajps even 
 a retreat of the rear guard by groups might have been 
 j)()ssilile. 
 
 But as it was my intentionto exercise themen in getting 
 quickly into order from disorder, I gave the command to 
 the rear guard: "Retire quickly," even before the rallying 
 position had been completely occupied. 
 
 It had at first been possible, indeed, to carry out this 
 retreat deployed, but in the neighborhood of the farms every- 
 one had to press together on two somewhat narrow roads, 
 and I shouted out here: "Form the groups in file." The 
 leaders of groups had to decide quickly, if they should file 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 81 
 
 off to the right ov the left, according as it allowed them to 
 arrive bj the shortest way, and to leave the front of the 
 rallying position open for firing. 
 
 I then ordered the leader of the first division: "Form 
 support behind the right wing." As the groups of the divi- 
 sion of skirmishers received n'o order, they had naturally 
 to take post in the rallying position and front towards the 
 enemy. 
 
 The 1st division, which had formerly been the diviisaon 
 in support, wheiu taking up the rallying position was not 
 fully formetl in order; it could nevertheless, as it was not 
 altogether a disorderly mass, but was divided into man- 
 ageable fractions, be easily led by its group leaders to the 
 point which the leader of the division, after he had rapidly 
 loo'ked around him, pointed out to tEem as a place to assem- 
 ble. Here they were easily formed up in sections. 
 
 After 1 had put ever^'thing in order, I gave the com- 
 mand to continue the retreat : "The division of skirmishers 
 forms the rear guard; the 2d division to retire by groups; 
 the support to retreat." The leader of the division of skir- 
 mishers repeated the command for his division. The sup- 
 port put itself in motion after turning to the rear; the 
 leader of the second division ordered: "Retire by groups 
 from the right flank.!' 
 
 His group of the right flank, with the order, "Bight 
 turn," was quickly led in file by the group leader around 
 the farm and followed the support; the next group in a simi- 
 lar manner. I ordered the group on the left wing : "Leave 
 behind a patrol for protection of the flank, along the ditch." 
 Whereupon the leader of the group at once told off three 
 men and quickly instructed them that they were to protect 
 the flank, keeping at the same height as the division of skir- 
 
82 Extracts from an Infant)!/ Captain's Journal. 
 
 mishers; he then ordered for the remainder, "Retire from 
 the left flank," and followed by the shortest road. 
 
 ^N'hen all were thus in movement I directed the leader 
 of the division to order a rapid assembly of the separately 
 retreating groups on to the support, which was easily car- 
 ried out by running ti> the rear in file, and then by forming 
 in line by sections. If in this movement one of the groups 
 did not get into its proper place, this had afterwards to be 
 rectified when halting, as it could not be done on the march. 
 
 The division of skirmishers then received the order to 
 follow as rear guard. The leader designated the group of 
 the right wing as an extreme rear j^uurd, and took the two 
 others sureessively to the rear, in order with them to form 
 the main body of the rear guard. When all was in order I 
 halted them, so as to show how on such ground the extreme 
 rear guard ought to retire. 
 
 This extreme rear guard should abandon the position 
 occupied, at the double, in the same way as the patrol of the 
 left wing on the command, "Retire quickly," and at the next 
 favorable farm again form to the front and take position. 
 And in such way, without halting hinj;-, it should run back 
 from ])osition to position, so as to be ready at every move- 
 ment for resistance, in case the support of the company had 
 not yet gained a suflflcient advance. 
 
 After this had been carried out, I put an end to the 
 exercise. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 83 
 
84 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Joiirmil. 
 
 FIFTH EXERCISE. 
 
 The May, -(see Fig. 4). At about five miles from 
 
 the garrisou is the village of Diinnwald on a high road: 
 behind it a wooded plain, and also an open country, in part 
 with rising undulations and in part flat. The distance be- 
 ing ]>n'tiy far, I decided to tarry out a combined march and 
 fight. The men were in field service order, with three cart- 
 ridges. The Lompany marched olf at 6 o'clock, 74 men. 
 
 Object of the Exercise. 
 
 1. Route march; then march in the neighborhood of 
 the enemy, with precautionary measures, and examination 
 of the country, without a slceleton enemy. 
 
 '2. Recomiaissance of Diinnwald in presence of patrols 
 of the enemy. 
 
 3. Attack of a detachment of the enemy (skeleton), in 
 piKsition on the plain behind Diinnwald in the following 
 manner: 
 
 (a) In the o/jr;; countri/ by a front attack, advancing in 
 rushes, with a final attack, which will be repulsed. 
 
 (6) After having retreated into a position completely 
 under cover, a renewal of the attack by occupying the enemy 
 in front, whilst the main attack will be directed against his 
 flank. This succeeds. 
 
 4. Conduct after a successful attack. 
 
 E./rciition. 
 
 March through the town with drums beating; defiling 
 
 through the gate with shouldered arms; the drums then cease 
 
 beating, whereupon the ranks of their own accord open out, 
 
 the non-commissioned officers placed themselves at the head 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 85 
 
 and in rear; the book of the collar is unfastened; and the 
 men are allowed to smoke. The sections do not open to any 
 further distance than that taken by the ranks; the drummers 
 and buglers and the heads of .sections take up an equal, 
 light, and free step; the rifle is carried as men like, and they 
 can even make use of the sling. 
 
 At the rear a buglei- is left to give the signal "Attem- 
 tion," if a superior should come from the rear, or if it be 
 necessary to make way on the road. 
 
 After a certain distance had been marched in this 
 manner, I caused the company to divide on the right and 
 left of the high road — Si more convenient and especially less 
 stuffy way of marching, but on condition that the flies should 
 keep abreast of their pivot men. In passing through a large 
 village I caused the drums to beat; all the men had then ti> 
 slope arms and to take up the step, without, however, chang- 
 ing at all the order of march, unless it had been formally 
 ordered to do so. 
 
 It is always good not to march negligently through in- 
 habited places. 
 
 On the further side a short halt was made ; then an ad- 
 vance guard was formed, the drummers and buglers in rear 
 of the company, or with each division one bugler and one 
 drummer, the non-commissioned officers with their proper 
 sections. 
 
 As the country was at first open, the advanced guard 
 remained in column in close order. Some houses on the 
 high road were not examined ; a head was only sent forward 
 at the double when the ground began to I'ise. 
 
 Here the road was in a cutting; a man of the head there- 
 fore mounted on to tlie edge. A patrol was detached by the 
 leader of the advanced guard on his own responsibility, 
 
86 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 towards a neigbboring small wood, wbicb, after examining 
 it, bad again of its own accord to join tbe company. 
 
 A halt was made at GOO ])aces from Diinnwald; the 
 leader of the advanced guard was asked what measures of 
 si-ciiiirv be would take during tbe iialt. Tbe divisions 
 wrre tlien formed into line and arms piled after the section 
 had been fallen out, which was to mark tbe enemy. 
 
 InstntdioiiK for the t^kcJctoii Enrmy. 
 
 He is to take position behind Diinnwald fronting 
 towards the village at the small copse a. A patrol is to 
 remain conccali'd on the boundary of Diinnwald to keep a 
 lookout, but it is to retire slowly along tbe high road before 
 the advancing enemy, and send reports of tbe measures he 
 may undertake. 
 
 A bugler wWh a flag was given to the section to mark 
 tbe support. 
 
 The flag (tbe support) is only to be shown at tbe last 
 moment when the enemy makes bis aittack.* 
 
 Ailrancc a-gainst Dunnicahl. 
 
 The company was now simply entrusted with tbe duty 
 of driving tbe enemy from Diinnwald and tbe neigbboi- 
 hood, and of placing outposts beyond Diinnwald towards 
 8chlebuscb. 
 
 Disposition. — "The second division to form advanced 
 guard. A lateral patrol on tbe right towards tbe mill, but 
 to draw in again on reaching the further side of Diinnwald; 
 
 *The defender has no surer means of bringing the assailant 
 at the last moment to a stand-still than by showing suddenly Ms 
 last support at the last moment ready to open a rapid tire. Even the 
 smallest formed detachment which suddenly appears in front of an 
 extended a-ssailanit will i/mpose on this latter, sihooild he not feel to be 
 in overpowering strength. In tlhis case the defender would indeed do 
 better to wit)hdra,w before the last attacl£, and to cause Ms feuijports 
 to quickly take up a rallying position. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. §7 
 
 a left patrol towards the Klein Diinnwald for the protection 
 of the left Hank, which on! the further side of DtinnwaM 
 must endeavor to communicate with the head." 
 
 The head (two flies and a connecting man) rapidly ap- 
 proach the village along the high road, the side patrols 
 seek to gain an advance — when suddenly from the bound- 
 ary, where the enemj's patrol hiad placed himself so as not 
 to be seen, there was a shot fired. 
 
 The detached men halted, isuddenly threw themselves 
 down in the ditches of the road, and looked out. A man in 
 the village was seen to run back qui'ckly. Signals were 
 made to the lateral patrols to advance a^apidly. After it 
 had been proved that there was no enemy immediately op- 
 posed to them, and as elsewhere nothing more was seen of 
 the enemy, the head was sent forward against the village at 
 a double; it reached the nearest houses, and remained stand- 
 ing under cover for a moment in order to look around. 
 
 In tlie middle of the village, at a bend of the high road, 
 a man was again seen placed under cover. As it was not, 
 however, to be supposed that this could be anythirig else 
 than a patrol, the head received the order to run forward 
 from farm to farm and from cover to cover. 
 
 The enemy's patrol quickly retired; the head followied, 
 and at a proper distance the advanced guard and the com- 
 pany. At the further boundary of the village, the head 
 remarked two men so posted behind an elevation near the 
 road that they would bring the road leading out of the 
 village under their fire. It was nlot possible to ascertain 
 whether tliere was a hostile detachment behind them. 
 
 The leader of the advanced guard, who saw the head 
 again halt, came to meet the man bringing the following 
 message: 
 
 From the head: "200 paces in front of the boundary of 
 
^y Extracts from an Iiifaiitrii Captain's Journal. 
 
 the village a file of the enemy is posted; it cannot be ascer- 
 tained whether there is a detachment behind them."* 
 
 The leader went quickly to the exit of the village. On 
 the left, beyond the villase. a thick underwood, about 150 
 paces long, extended beside the high road; on the right, 
 at scarcely '200 paces, there was near the high road a height, 
 behind which the enemy's file was posted. Nothing was yet 
 to be seen of the lateral patrol on the right. 
 
 The leader signaled to the advanced guard to advance 
 along the left sid<' of the high road. When it arrived near 
 him. he commanded "Double," and placed himself at irts 
 head, so that by advancing under the cover of the ditches 
 of the road, he should arrive at the boundary of the wood. 
 
 Two shots were fired; the file of the enemy then disiap- 
 peared. The two men could be seen running along the aide 
 of the high road, and then, after a certain distance, again 
 throwing themselves on the ground. 
 
 At a si Jin from the leader the head ran forward towards 
 the height, as it had now become known that they had only 
 to do with the patrol before mentioned. 
 
 The advanced guard took position at the edge of the 
 wood, the leader formed the head ou the right of the road 
 where the height permitted an open view. He had freed 
 the debouch of the village for the company, but nothing 
 further was yet to be seen of the enemy. The right lateral 
 patrol was in the meantime appr6aching from the right rear, 
 and a sign was made to it to rejoin. The ground was free 
 now on both sides of the road; on the left the wood, making 
 an angle, turned towards Hornpott; somewhat further back 
 
 *When the leader of the advanced guard is near the connecting 
 man— as in such a case is always necessary, in order that he may 
 overlook the ground in front — a shout should only be sent back from 
 the head, as this is always better than sending a man with a mes- 
 sage, and this should be frequently practiced. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 89 
 
 and lying higher, at about three hundred pacf s to the side 
 of the high road, was the small copse a. Some old water- 
 oourses parallel to the road allowed a further advance under 
 cover for some hundred paces alongside the road. 
 
 Further Reconnaissance. — It evidently was necessary for 
 the advanced guard to push forward to the copse a, or to 
 reconnoiter if it were occupied. 
 
 The leader cried out to. his advanced guard, "A patrol to 
 the left along the wood towards copse a." 
 
 Scarcely had he given the order than he remarked in 
 this direction a man of his left lateral patrol who was seek- 
 ing to open communication with him. He at once recalled 
 the patrol, which was just starting, and sent a lance-corporal 
 with the mission to lead the left lateral patrol alongside the 
 woiod towards the copse. 
 
 He further ordered the right lateral patrol, which had 
 just joined, to advance as far to the front as possible on 
 the left side of the high road at the same time as the head, 
 making use of all cover and moving by rushes, and to find out 
 if the ground were occupied by the enemy. 
 
 A file of the enemy retired somewhat before this ad- 
 vance, but afterwards remained lyimg down behdnd the 
 hedge of a ditch; one man was seen to run, stooping down, 
 t:>-,vards the copse a, whence another came to meet him; 
 some heads also showed themselves in the copse. A shot 
 was fired. The detached men halted and took position. The 
 leader of the advanced guard signaled to it to move rapidly 
 to the front, and sent a man to me to report what he 
 had seen.* 
 
 I remained quite close in order to superintend the ar- 
 rangements made by the leader, but I had purposely noit in- 
 
 *Ttie immediate strengthening of tiie detached men, if they 
 coime upon a position of ttie enemy, is the best means of causing the 
 defender to sihow more, and therefore for reconnoitering the strength 
 of the troops in occupation. 
 
Missing Page 
 
Missing Page 
 
92 Extracts fmm an Infantnj Captain's Journal. 
 
 division of skirmislicrs, with a view of exercising myself lu 
 peace, not toii fi'e(iuenitly to change the itosition' I took up. 
 
 The defender had placed himself vdth mnc<h intelli- 
 gence. He showed nowhere the flag (his support), so that 
 I ((uild only ex[iect to see it suddenly opposed to me at some 
 place at the last assault. If he showed it sooner, I could 
 at once bring it under such effective fire that my attack 
 would thereby have more chauce of succeeding. / must 
 therefore endeavor to induee the eiieiiii/ to show liis support 
 before mi/ oini attaek. This could only be brought about by 
 two methods: 
 
 1. By successive forward rushes of my skirmishers. 
 
 '2. Or else in moving my support nearer to the line of 
 fire, and causing it to there lie down. 
 
 I ciinseiiuently gave the leader of the divi'Sion of skir- 
 mishers the order, "Cause the command to be passed along 
 the line of skinuisliers as fai- as ithe right wing that an ad- 
 raiiec is to he muile hi/ flirisioiis hi) rushes from the rif/ht /tiiiik.''' 
 
 I ©rdered the leader of the first division, "With the divi- 
 sion in sup])(>it, follow the division of skirmishers when 
 it advanc-es at a double, and lie down under cover bi-hind 
 the division of skirmishers." I added by way of explanation: 
 
 "I consider it of special importance that the movemeul 
 of the support should take place at the same time as that 
 of the division of skirmishers.'' 
 
 (Partly to increase the effect, and partly because thereby 
 on active service the losses would be lessened.) 
 
 I saw how my first order was passed on and how the 
 leader of the division of skirmishers was instructing his 
 men. The leader of the support also explained that on the 
 command, "Stand up, double march," all were to follow 
 the division of skirmishers; a.nd at "Lie down," to throw 
 themselve.s down under cover behind it. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 93 
 
 A short time passed (with more frequent practice these 
 pauses should always become shorter, the passing and act- 
 ing on the command from o.ne wing to another would be 
 quicker); then was heard the command of the division 
 leader of the second division, "Stand up — 50 paces — double 
 march.'' 
 
 At the same time, with the division of skirmishers, 
 "Beinforoed firing." 
 
 The second division ran forward, and lay down on the 
 order to do so, behind a favorable position. The leader of 
 the division then ordered, "At 200 paces — reinforced firing." 
 
 At the same time the leader of the division of skir- 
 mishers gave the order, "Stand up — double march," and. al- 
 most at the saane time the leader of the first division gave a 
 similar order. 
 
 The enemy opened a rapid flre, but did not yet show his 
 support. 
 
 At the edge oi a rising ground, the leader of the divi- 
 sion of skirmishers called out, "Halt — lie down — at 180 paces 
 — reinforced firing." 
 
 The support continued running for some distance, and 
 at about 50 paces behind the division of isikipmishers, the 
 leader commanded, "Lie down." If at this moment the 
 enemy's support had sboiwed itself, them all our flre would 
 have been concentrated on it. 
 
 I caused now to be passed to both wings, in a low voice, 
 "Prepare for the attack"; whereupon bayonets were quick- 
 ly fixed,* and I then ordered, in a loud voice, "To the at- 
 
 *If tlie bayonets of a whole line of fire are fixed at the >i(iiiit 
 moment, the fire will suddenly cease. It is necessary, therefore, Avhen 
 making .an attaeli, either that ttoe bayonets should be fixed when the 
 extension takes place (as on aiotive service generally happens), or 
 Pise the men must be taught that, in each file, one man must fix 
 bayonets ■wtliile the other is firing. 
 
94 Ejrtracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 tack — double march — hurrah I" The buglers mounded "The 
 advance quicklj," the drummers beat "The charjje, " the .suj) 
 port closed to the center during the advance (wheu the drum 
 was beating). 
 
 I (livected the attack towards the cojise; the flaj; then 
 showed behind an intrenchment to the side of the cojise. 
 The enemy had made his })reiKiralions for driving back the 
 attack. 
 
 CoiiiJiut to he foUdircd after (III iiiisiivci'nnfiil Atliick. — 
 I gave (he command — "Halt!" tlu'n, at once to the leader of 
 the support, "The sn]iport to form rear guard"; to the re- 
 mainder, "Ivetire slowly.'' 
 
 This oi-der had to be carried out in the same manner as 
 had been done in practice; — delivery of lire, then quickly 
 back to the nearest favorable position, and so on. 
 
 On the order of its leaider, the first division remained 
 lying where it had been halted, and opened fire as soon as 
 its frout was free. 
 
 I ordered this leader, as I passed him, to 'withdraw him- 
 self gradually from the fire of the enemy, undei' the jirotec- 
 tion of a gj-oiiji. 
 
 I gave an order to the leaders of the other two divisions 
 to cease firing, and to gradually withdraw their divisions 
 toward a hollow ravine behind the left flank, wheic they 
 would be completely under cover. The advanced guard 
 division retired sufficiently far back so as to be under cover 
 in the ravine; it then formed in file along the ravine. The 
 divisions were quickly formed ujj. 
 
 RcnricaJ of the Attack 011 anoiher Point. — My plan now was 
 to renew the attack in the manner most suitable to the form- 
 ation of the ground; that is to say, to advance from the wood 
 which stretched out as far as Hornpott, 'a.nd approached 
 quite close to the copse a. There was, indeed, a thick under- 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 95 
 
 wood, which ren'dered ithe passage of the wood difficult, but 
 I disposed the division of skirmishers in such a manner as 
 to advance quickly through the underwood, close to Horn- 
 pott, and to vigorously attack the enemy's right wing. I 
 was to occupy the enemy in front during this time, on this 
 side of the boundary. 
 
 The division of skirmishers moved ofif irapidly in file,* 
 a head close iri fromt; the second division had to detach a 
 group quickly, as far as the salient of the underwood; thie 
 rest remained as a support, in file, under cover, and near 
 the boundary. The first division had, in the meantime, 
 only allowed its left group to remain standing up, and had 
 placed the remainder together in a small hollow, to the rear 
 behind the second division. 
 
 I moved to the head. As soon as the division of skir- 
 mishers was visible on the left, I strengthened the two 
 groups which were in the first line, each with a section, 
 and, as I saw the division of skirmishers move rapidly for- 
 ward, I caused the "Advance rapidly"' to be sounded, and 
 pressed forward into the corpse, at the cry of "Hurrah!" 
 
 These movements had followed one another so rapidly 
 that the support of the enemy had still kept the same post 
 without moving, and, consequently, it was possible to roll 
 up the whole of the enemy's position from the right flank. 
 
 The enemy's skirmishers withdrew on to the position of 
 the support, and, as they also found themselves out-flanked 
 by the occupation of the further side of the copse, they were 
 obliged to retreat across the open, towards the high road. 
 
 Conduct to he folloiced after a sucessfiil Attack. — The 
 skirmishers of the difterent divisions fired at the enemy, 
 
 *On active service, when passing through a wood in the neighbor- 
 hood of the eneimy, each section leader must keep his eye well on his 
 section, so that no one may reimain behdnd. 
 
96 Extracts from an Infantry Coptaiii'.i .Iinirnul. 
 
 from the position caiiricd, aud only when (he distance of tlie 
 enemy exceeded :')()0 paei's did the first division receive an 
 order to pursue; it immediately sent forward due section 
 deployed towards the enemy, and, with the remainder, 
 moved towards the high road, and there formed in file aloiiji- 
 side the ditches. The other two divisions were collected in 
 the coi)S(', and I then caused the "Assembly" 1o be sounded 
 for everyone. 
 
 }[cd.siircs of Prrrd.tifiiiii after ii sKcrrxsfiil Att<irk. — After 
 all had been formed up, the measures were indicated which 
 should be taken if the company had now to cook. The divi- 
 sion (if skiriiiishei's w a.s told otf to take niesusures oif safely; 
 it had to place a double sentry on the left, on a height in 
 front of Hornpott; a double sentry at the bouuidary of the 
 copse, and a non-commissioned otHcer, with six men, as a 
 detached non-coiiiniissioned officer's jiost (also as examining 
 post), near the hij;ii road, where, on active sei-vice, the 
 passers-by would have to be examined. 
 
 Tlie remainder of the division of skirmishers, in close 
 order and under cover, had lo pile arms near the copse, with 
 a sentry over the arms, who, at the same time, could see 
 the three double sentries. 
 
 The two other ddvisious had to cook in the ravine, near 
 the underwood. 
 
 Observations and fritieal I'emarks. — After the sentries 
 ordered had been regularly posted, so that the recruits might 
 see how a.u outpost tak(>s position, the return march was 
 commenced, after a short rest. 
 
 • Jenerally I had remarked, with pleasure, during this 
 day's exercise, that attention to orders given, a quick appre- 
 hension and execution of the same, as also an intelligent and 
 independent understanding of the combined mov(-meii,ts, 
 were evident with everyone. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 97 
 
 Tills is oeritainly a principal condition for the proper 
 leading and working together of different fractions in the 
 scattered combats of the present day, in which cinly the 
 preliminary movements can be (Urerth/ ordered; during the 
 e.ra ittion, on the contrary, more stress must be laid on the 
 proper apprehension of signs, short orders, and for correct 
 independent decisions regarding movements which should 
 be undertaken at any particular point of the line of fire, and 
 these must therefore be specially prepared anl practiced in 
 peace-time. This, however, only promotes one essential part 
 of combat-discipline, and that, indeed, the easiest, provided 
 the non-eomndssio.ned officers possess a certain intelligence, 
 and the necessary latitude is allowed to them by their 
 superiors. 
 
 I could not, however, help seeing that, in the details of 
 execution, many faults were sitill committed, owing to h.un'\-, 
 excitement, and, 'here and there, also through a greater free- 
 dom, which leads to the despising of prescribed precautions. 
 The shortness of the available time prevented me from 
 insisting Oiu these points, as should be done, in order to prop- 
 erly educate in these matters non-commissioned officers and 
 men, and to accustom each one to the strictest discipline, 
 and when employed in skirmishing, to reflection and to 
 coolness. 
 
 In order to attain this, I had paused for a time, almost 
 at everj' moment, and especially at each occupation of a posi- 
 tion, so as to correct all mistakes in the manner of bringing 
 the rifle to the shoulder, in the use of cover, and in aiming, 
 and, I had endeavored, by repetitions, to accustom the men 
 to a correct and thoughtful execution of movements, as also 
 to a strict compliance with oirders given. 
 
 But time failed me for this; consequently my own atten- 
 tion and that of the non-conimissdoned officera was much 
 
98 Extracis from mi Infantry Caiitdiii's Journal. 
 
 more directed, during the exeitise. to the general working 
 together of tJie whole. 
 
 Only very frecpient practice makes it i)i)issilil(> to have 
 an eye which shall embrace at the same time the cvccKtian 
 of all dHails; the non-commissioned olHcer of the group must 
 here, as in all matters of detail, he the important jierson. 
 
 I tiiercfore rnllei-ted together the division and gron]i 
 leaders, jxiinted out the importance of these details, and 
 begged tlieiii in futuie t<i dii-ecl their atten'tion to lliese 
 matters, and. whearever they noticed faults, lo bring the 
 men at once to the conviction, by such remarks as "Present 
 mon- cairefuUy; make better use of cover; aim correctly, one 
 fool tieJDw the head,'" etc.. that they were iiiidcr the ci/r of 
 their leader, and that, in these matiers, less than ever should 
 they behave with carelessness or thoughtlesisness. I drew 
 the attention of the comiiaiiy. iri like iiianniM", to the faults 
 which had been committed, and told them decidedly that 
 l.liiisc who repeated them, and were reported to me by the 
 non-commissioned officei-s. would get extra drill or be pun- 
 ished. I hii]ied. however, that, by the evident gO'Od-will of 
 all, this would not be necessary, but that each man would, 
 in future, think for himself of the instructions which had 
 been given to them, once for all. 
 
 I. at the same time, di^cided. in order to promote the 
 practice of details, to continue special exercises, which 
 would be directed only to the manner in which a group 
 should move when under the enemy's fire, and how it should 
 jilace itself behind different descriptions of cover-, in order 
 to be able to maintain in action a regulated, steady, and 
 well-aimed fire. 
 
 Such exercises can bepracticed on the ]iarade-ground 
 or when on the march, thence to other maneuvws. Much 
 time is by no means necessary for this, but only a continued 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 99 
 
 observaijce of the same principles, anid a necessary attention 
 to the skillful and ithoughtf ul execution of everything under- 
 taken. This is troublesome work, and not so exciting for 
 leaders and subordinates as maneuvers with larger bodies; 
 but it is the only way to lead to a well grounded, thorough 
 education. Reliable and intelligent non-commissioned offi- 
 cers will also soon take interest in such control, as it ensures 
 them a great influence on the discipline of the men. 
 
100 
 
 Extracts from an liifaiitry Captain's Journal. 
 
 Fig 5 
 
 y y jyi BO 
 
 300 M 
 
 Reference 
 
 a. C Mnnfi of the amqxmyto &ie entraiohrriatt. 
 
 l.dt lateral d£taxh7njmt 
 
 Cj Ontpctt 
 
 cLd. J)etaji3iai -post fif Nen Com.* Officef 
 
 o o Waxh to the. H-nnl af1}f.e reccnnaUering paOvl 
 
 f PcUtvL N'I li Hon. Cam * (3WM«ri post ' 
 
 gg Advon£e(if4-m.aiyofi-heatein,j 
 
 hTh^Jidvcunce. o/ Z-rtuen otthjcaiemyt TightTxdeiYil 
 
 pCLbr-oi. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. IQl 
 
 SECOND PART. 
 
 Outpost Duty and Combat Maneuvers. 
 
 FIRST EXERCISE. 
 
 The — ■ of May, afternoon. — l'repa/i~atory Ea>ercise, in De- 
 tails of Outpost Duff/. — I succeeded again in May in gaining 
 another afternoon, wliich I utilized in ipracticing the rules 
 of outpost duty and in pointing out at the same time the 
 conduct to be followed by creeping (schleich) patrols. 
 
 Description of the Ground (see Fig. 5). — The large exer- 
 cise-ground furnished me with the opportunity. Although 
 this place was confined, there was, neventheless, at the 
 southeast corner, an old intrenchment, which had been 
 thrown up for practice, and along the east side in front of 
 the same, sandy ground, with Yarious small inequalities, 
 which suflficed to give at all events an idea of 'how a patrol 
 should, in the neigihtooirhoiod of the enemy, make use -of the 
 ground, so to advance as far as possible under cover. 
 
 The south side was formed by an alley, along whidh 
 were several farms. Thence from the soiuthwest, the main 
 road, on either side of which were miany farms, led directly 
 on to the exercise-ground. A second alley formed the west- 
 ern boundary and led to the shooting-ground, which, with 
 its butts, occupied nearly the wihole of the noirthern side; a 
 defined extent of ground was thus available. The high 
 butts allowed the patrols to move behind them at the north- 
 east corner of the ground, even if firing had to take place; 
 and here were fonnd ^'arious sorts of small cover as far as 
 
 9— 
 
102 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Joiirnah 
 
 the further side of the rifle-ranges, where the ground was 
 exposed to view and quite open. 
 
 The company marched off at Jialf-past -. In order to 
 make use of the time on the march, to practice olitpost duty, 
 I gave out the following instructions: 
 
 Disposition. — The enemy has shown patrols on the rifle- 
 ground; the company receives the order to take up position 
 as outpost on the exercise ground towards the rifle-ranges, 
 and lo iihtain news of the enemy. 
 
 Accoidingly the company marches towards it'hj in 
 trencliment by the shortest road (used latterly only as a 
 towing path, but well under cover) two sections of the divi 
 sion of skirmishers as the advanced guard; the remaindei 
 of this division — 1 non-commissioned officer B, 1 lance ('Or- 
 poral, and 11! men — go as left lateral flankers on the high 
 road, and establish themselves in the farms at the south- 
 west angle, as a detached noin-commissioned officer's post, 
 whilst the company forms the outpost at the intrenohment. 
 Patrols are to be sent forward as far as the further side of 
 the rifle-ground, so that they can overlook the open country. 
 A suppos(Ml enemy is marked by men with white bands. 
 
 Man-li to the Front to the Outpost Position. — The leader 
 of the division of skirmishers quickly fell out his detached 
 men. As these could only move along the roads, and only 
 obtained from time to time a m.ore open view, connecting 
 paitrols were not possible; communication had therefore to 
 be kept up by the heads looking from one to another at every 
 open spot and at every crossway. 
 
 I especially directed the attention of the non-oommis- 
 sioned ofBcer of the lateral detachment to the following mat- 
 ter. It was his business— as the company could not halt 
 without reason, during its forward march^ — to endeavor 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 108 
 
 always to keep up communication with it by his detached 
 men. 
 
 He marched off with a head of three men before him; the 
 advanced guard of the company detached five men as head. 
 For a considerable distance, any communication on the left 
 was imposisible; therefore, on active sei'vice, if one fraction 
 had come upon the enemy, the oithers could only be warned 
 of it by hearing shots fired. 
 
 Maintenance of Communication between the Detached 
 Men. — At the nearest crossway I saw a man of the head very 
 properly move to his left in the crossway, towards an angle 
 in the same, in order to get a view of the left lateral detaoh- 
 ment. He saw nothing, and ran bacik quickly to report this ; 
 the remainder of the head had continued its march. 
 
 I caused all to continue the march, but I ordered three 
 men of the last division to form a rear guard, of wihioh one 
 man was to remain in the crossway looking out, until it was 
 time for the rear guard to follow the company, as it could 
 not be known whether the left lateral detachment had as 
 yet passed to the front. 
 
 1 remained with ttes man, and I soon saw at the end of 
 the crossway a man of the left lateral detachment run 
 quickly up it and look to his right. I ordered them to shout 
 to him, ''The company is already in front," and at the same 
 time he was signaled to move on. He understood, for I 
 saw how he rapidly made the sign to move forward, and 
 then he himself quickly moved to the front. 
 
 The rear guard followed the compainy. I rode again 
 to the head. After some time the ground to the left was 
 more easily to be overlooked from an elevated position, and 
 the two left men lof the head had at once moved on to this 
 elevation. I also saw that soon afterwards the head of the 
 
104 Ej'tracis from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 left lateral detacliment ran forward to the angle of a farm 
 whence it could well see to the right. 
 
 Coiuhict of the Head irlini flic Oiitjiost fairs Positwn. — 
 Arrived at the neighborhood of the iutrenohment, I asked 
 what instructions had been yiven to the head. I received a 
 cornxt answer: "To advance as far as the intrenohmetnt ;" 
 for it would have been wrong if it had been sent forward 
 at once to the further side of the limits of the ground, for 
 tlieri- it wwnld lia\e to undertake a fresh (hitji (namely, to 
 proh'ct the iiostiiij; ol the sent i-ies), and for this a new order 
 {or iiislniciiDii) was ucicswai'N , if the chance of niisunder- 
 stajiding wcic to be avoided. 
 
 I now ordered — 'When I saw how the two foremost men 
 of the head had quickl\- run forward to the intrencbment, 
 in order to be able to see around — ^the company to halt and 
 to pile aims, whilst I rode towards the left wing. 
 
 Here the head had already entered the alley, whilst the 
 non-commissioned officer was about to smbdivide his detaioh- 
 ment under cover of a house. 1 asked the head how far it 
 was goin-, and was answered: "As far as the rifle-ground." 
 
 It evidently liad not a very clear conception of its duty, 
 for such an order could only properly be given after arriving 
 on the ground v/here the sentries had to be posted, espe- 
 cially on ground unknown. 
 
 I therefore caused the head to return again to the farm, 
 called non-commissioned ofticer ]{ to me, and told Mm as 
 a rule in future, when moving forward to take up an out- 
 post position, to advance the head only as far as the margin 
 of the ground to be occupied; then the leader should i-apidly 
 go to the head in order to examine the ground, and thereupon 
 send it to a point determined on, distant at the most from 
 SdO — 1,000 paces, as a patrol for the protection of -placing the 
 
EcBtracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 105 
 
 sentries, and he only then should proceed to diistribute and 
 post the sentries 
 
 I caused him now to send the following insbructiions to 
 the head : 
 
 "Tihe head is now to go forward as a patrol to protect the 
 placing of the sentries as far as the farther side of the rifle- 
 ground. If it meet the enemy sooner, a shot must be fired 
 at once, and a man sent with a report. If, on the con- 
 trary, nothing of the enemy is to be seen on the farther side 
 of the rifle-ground, the whole patrol is to return at once.'' 
 After 1 had further told the non-commissioned officer thai 
 I hoped on my return to Mm to find the .sentries well in- 
 structed and the detachment well acquainted with the posi- 
 tion of defense it should take up, I allowed him to pile arms 
 for a few minutes and rode back to the company, ^hich at 
 once fell in. 
 
 I told ofl" one non-oommissioned officer and six men from 
 amongst those most skillful in patrolling, to mark the en- 
 emy. 1 isecretly instructed them to proceed in close order 
 as far as behind the rifle-ground, then to fasten on quickly 
 their bandages and to retire for a certain distaiuce along the 
 road to the village N. Aifterwards they were to advance 
 as a reconnoitering patrol towards the rifle-ground, pushing 
 back weaker patrols than themselves and giving way on the 
 ooatrary to those thart were stronger. 
 
 I now caused the leader of the head to be called, and 
 directed the commander of the advanced guard to indicate 
 the new duty confided to him in such a way that the com- 
 pany oould hear. He repeated almost word for word what 
 had been told the left lateral detachment; he was, however, 
 to take only two men of the head with him, the two otheirs 
 were to again fall in. I allowed only the patrol to march 
 
 10— 
 
106 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 off after the skeleton enemy had almost reached the rifle- 
 tjroujid. 
 
 Then I directed the advanced guard to act as outpost, 
 pointed out where the other two divisions would have to be 
 posted as supports, but ordered all to observe and to listen 
 to everything that might take place near the outpost and 
 the sentries, so that they should be instructed therein. The 
 cmumander of the outpost, according to existing orders, 
 wished to march off with half of hiis men to place the sen- 
 tries; but 1 pointed out to him that this measure would only 
 be advantMyi'ous wiien an jittaick of the enemy by surprise 
 were possible, and es]>ec.ially if the number of sentries re- 
 ijuired were not yet known. In tlids case apparently only 
 one double sentry at the corner of the intrenchment and the 
 senti-,\ over the arms on the entraruce road were required. 
 Only when darkness came on would it be necessary to place a 
 double sentry to tlie ri^lit of the intrenchment, and one to 
 the left in front of the entrance to the road, witt'h an exam- 
 ination post behind. 
 
 The commander of the outpost therefore simply took 
 with him the lance corporal, whose duty it was to place the 
 sentries, tof;ether with the men for the first sentry post, to- 
 wards the point of the intrenchment, and was ajble himself 
 to see that they received proper instructions. (For several 
 sentries a special non-oommissioned officer must be entrust- 
 ed with this work, otherwise it would take too long.)* 
 
 Hooks of instruction indicate several points which m.ust 
 he explained to a sentry as fijxHal instructions (whilst he is 
 
 *Iin posting sentries it is allowable to send them forward together 
 in a radiating manner as far as certain defined limits, and then later 
 the men can receive their instmtitions, and am improvement can be 
 made in the posdtions they take up. In known ground this hastens 
 the placing of the sentries, but it should never be done- in the imme- 
 diate neigihfborihood of the enemy. 
 
 In unknown ground the following proceeding is recommended: 
 
Extracts from cm Infantry Captain's Journal. 107 
 
 supposed to know beforehand the general instructioins re- 
 garding his conduct as a sentry, as, for instance, when he 
 should send a report and when he should fire), and in peace 
 it does mot at all matter that a man's memory should be 
 somewhat overburdened, but in war and even at maneuvers, 
 another method must be practiced. 
 
 In war it is necessary that mot only the sentries, but 
 also every man on outpost duty (but especially those em- 
 ployed in patrolling), should know bow to answer the fol- 
 ing three questions : 
 
 1. What is known of the enemy? (Every report which 
 brings in something new must be communicated to each man 
 of the outpost, and returning patrols must communicate it 
 when passing to the sentries.) 
 
 2. What is known of the position of one's own out- 
 posts? {Every man must know where the neighboring de- 
 tachments are posted.) 
 
 3. Whither do the roads lead which can be seen? 
 (Names of the neighboring localities.) 
 
 In the same way every one must kmow who are his supe- 
 riors, even up to the commander of the outpost, amd where 
 the defensive position for the outpost is. Most of the men 
 will already be able to answer these questions hefore they 
 are posted as sentries — therefore, the sub-officer who has to 
 instruct the sentries will only ask these three questioms, so 
 as to see from their answers what the sentries, do not yet 
 know. AiS a fourth question might eventually be added on 
 
 the officer with a non-oommissioiied officer and some orderlies (patrol) 
 go torward at first to reconnoiter the ground the sentries are to oc- 
 cupy; he then directs the orderlies to lead the sentries to points de- 
 termined on, and they are immediately afterwards given "their in- 
 str notions. 
 
 In tihe close neight>orliood of the enemy it is naturally necessary 
 for security that several patrols, or a detaxsihment, should be pusihed 
 to the front. 
 
108 Extnicts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 active service: "What has been ordered regarding the 
 passing to and fro lof the inhabitants?'' And at might, the 
 Iiarf)le and countersign. 
 
 As I do not lilie to practice in peace what is impracti- 
 cable in war, I had prepared already, by instruction, the non- 
 cDiiiiiiissiinu'd officers and men for tliese three questions, so 
 tlxat the commander of the outpost having asked them of the 
 sentries, ascertained that everything was already Icmoiwn by 
 llu-m I'xcept the name of the place whence the approach of 
 (he enemy was to be expected. He therefore had only to 
 teach tlicm this one word. 
 
 The outj^ost was tlien subdivided, and I at once causcnl 
 attention to be paid to the sentries which would be necas- 
 .sary at night. The Mccoud and third reliefs (each of three 
 men including the sentry over the arms) ]iiled arms together; 
 the night sentries were formed with two numbers only, of 
 which each piled anus together (2 double sentries =4 men), 
 and on the left wing the last three men also piled thei.r arms 
 together as Xo. 2 patix)!. The patrols which might besides 
 become necessary must be taken from the men told off as 
 sentries, and for this pur]K>se it is better to make use of 
 those who have just been relieved. 
 
 In telling off the men it was arranged that an old soldier 
 and a young soldier were always together. Hardly was this 
 finished when a report arrived from the detached non-com- 
 missioned ofHc(n''s post regarding the arrangements he had 
 made, (f)iie double sentry and one sentry over the arras.) 
 What had been done on this side was told to the mess-nger. 
 I then ordered: 
 
 1. All messages were to be sent to me as o(miiiiandei' 
 of the outposts ou a piece of paper, written with pencil, to 
 be marked with consecutive numibers and the hour of 
 despatch. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 109 
 
 2. At the clo'se of the exercise, the commander of the 
 outposts was to make me a general report in pencil on the 
 events which had happened, together with a rongh sketch 
 of the position occupied. 
 
 (For these reports previously prepared forms are 
 very convenient, also envelopes with the time of departure 
 for important messages, which are returned to the .messen- 
 ger as a receipt.) 
 
 Besides in each division instructions had to be given 
 regarding the conduct of the outposts and of the sentries, 
 especially on the following points: 
 
 1. Observations made at a great distance (report). 
 
 2. Observation of an advancing detachment of the 
 enemy (a shot and report).* 
 
 3. In case of an attack (several shots without a 
 report). 
 
 After half an hour, it was to be supposed that darkness 
 had come on, the sentries were to be relieved and the night 
 sentries posted, under the protectio-n of a patrol sent to the 
 front. At the same time the parole and countersign 
 were to be given out and the sentries practiced in asking for 
 them, pai"tly from the returning patrols (for whom later a 
 general sign of recognition must be determined), partly from 
 the unarmed non-commissioned offiicers or men, who, coming 
 
 *I consider tbis sioHiplle instruction rnjore advantageous than tlie 
 more complica/ted one which directs that firing is only to falie place 
 when the enemy ds perceived at about 800 pajces distance. In tho 
 few cases when it would be possdtole to rewognize the enemy at suc'h 
 considerable distance (for instance, at the investment of a fortress) 
 lit would be still allowable to specially Insitruct the sentries when they 
 are to fire. In general it is always well that no "man shoud leave a post 
 an the approaoh of the enemy — consequently a sihot forms the best 
 repont, because tlhen a patrol (or a section if several sihots are heard) 
 is at once sent forward from the outpost, and thus tlie post is at once 
 reinforced and the outpost can still receive the neicessary report in 
 good time. 
 
no Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 from within and not knowing the parole, would have to be 
 talven to the guard. 
 
 After this had been done, I rode to the detached non- 
 commissioned ollicei-'s post. 
 
 On my w;iy, I saw that already from each of the patrols 
 sent to tlie front a maji was hurrying back quickly to his 
 outpost. Arrived at the detached post, I assured myself, 
 by means of the three before-mentioned questions, that the 
 double sentries were well instructed, and the non-commis- 
 sioned otHcer, who at once came forward to report himself, 
 explained on my queslioninji', liow he would occupy (be 
 farthest farm in case of a hostile attack, and what arrange- 
 ments he would have made to increase its powers of resist- 
 ance (barn«iding one of the nates on .the enemy's side, form- 
 ation of loo])holes), as also that he had already called the 
 attention of his men to the distances of certain well-marked 
 |)oiiit«. 
 
 Report and (kjuiluct of the Pairol when Opposed to the 
 Enrini/. — At tliis moment camcitlie report, "A detachment oif 
 the enemy, consisting of one non-commissioned officer and 
 six men, is in movement behind the rifle-gi'ound." 
 
 I asked whether the patrol had been remarked by the 
 enemy. Answer: "No; we had placed ourselves behind a 
 bush, and I slipped away unperceived." 
 
 "Well, (ibser\-e further, but do not go beyond the rifle- 
 ground." 
 
 I at once reminded non-commissioned officer B that 
 he should communicate this to his outposts, so that each 
 new patrol might act accordingly, and in its report would 
 have to bring to notice what change had since taken place. 
 I at the same time ordered him to report in writing on every- 
 thing that took place, as ought to be done in every outpost 
 position. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain' 8 Journal. m 
 
 Scarcely had the non-coirnnissioned officer joined his 
 detachment, when I observed that the patrol of the rifle- 
 ground withdrew rapidly for some hundred paces, fired a 
 shot, and then lay down. Immediately afterwards I saw 
 two men of the enemy advance rapidly up to the edge of the 
 rifle-grounid on our side, and take up a position of observa- 
 tion under cover. 
 
 A soldier quickly came and told me what had been 
 observed of the enemy. 1 sent 'him to the non-commissioned 
 officer, who, when the sihot w.as fired, had at once caused 
 arms to be unpdled, and who came to meet the messenger. 
 
 At the same time I saw bow the former messenger from 
 the patrol received certain instructions from the coimmander 
 of the patrol, and returned again, in order to make a report. 
 
 He reported, "A liostile detachment has advanced 
 against the rifle-ground, and forced the patrol to retreat." 
 
 At the same time a messenger came from the intrench 
 ment with the following note : "No. 1. From the outpost of 
 Sergeant N. Afternoon, 4 o'clock. Patrol No. 1 reports a 
 detachment of the enemy of 1 njon-oommissioned officer and 
 6 men moving behind the rifle-ground in the direction of 
 village N. The May, . N, Sergeant." 
 
 Apparently this report was the opposite of what had 
 just been learnt. The departure of the messengers had 
 taken place at different times, and this sboiws the import- 
 ance of indicating the hour and the minutes exactlj/, in order 
 not to be led into error. 
 
 I now asked non-commissioned officer B what sort of 
 order he was going to send this patrol. "Observe further," 
 was his reply. "Do you think that the patrol down there can 
 DOW see miore than the sentry wha is here?" "No." "Then 
 it is superfluous, and its absence weakens your detach- 
 
112 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 ment.'' Xon-commissioned officer B mow sent the mes- 
 senger back with the order for the patrol to return at once* 
 
 I then asked tlie other niessienger wliether the patrol of 
 Sergeant N had received an order. "The order to retire at 
 oiiic."' And, in fact, 1 now saw at the end of the jiaradc- 
 ground the heads of the returning patrol. 
 
 1 iu>\v ordered non-couunissioned officer B only to send 
 the next patrol to the front when nothing more aonld he 
 swn of the enemy, and then a quarter of an hour afterwards 
 liring out liis reliefs, under the supposition that (lin-kiwss 
 li;i(l coiiK' on, and I then ga\(' him the jiai-ole and (Miuiiilersign. 
 
 In the meant ime he was to instruct his men in the same 
 numner as liad been ordered for the oviliioisl, and after I he 
 reliefs were carried out he was lo ])raciice, in a similar way 
 to that previously ordered, llie asking of (he jiarole and 
 ctMmtersign. 
 
 1 then rode back to the oul])osl where Ih.e men goring on 
 sentry were just tiaking their arms, as was also jKitrol No. 2. 
 A man came from the double sentries with the repoint that, 
 apparently, a patrol of the enemy was moving towards the 
 butts. I now asked Sergeant N what instructions he would 
 give to patrol No. 2. "Drive back the enemy's patrol." 
 "But if tliere should be more there than a patrol? And, 
 moreover, would it be possible for three men approaching, 
 ronsiderably ex]>os<'d, to drive back a well-posted patrol?" 
 "No, but they can see what is standing there." "( rood; they 
 must therefore go forward as a creeping ])atrol. I will in- 
 struct them myself." 
 
 1 no'W caused the whole; detachment to approach near 
 me, in order to hear the following instructions: 
 
 *It is a very frequent fault for a patrol to remain lying in front 
 of tlie line ot outposts witlioiut an. object, simply to observe a patrol 
 of the enemy. Patrols which have fulfilled the duty with whioli in- 
 trusted must at niKe return. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. II3 
 
 Instructions for the March to the Front of the Creeping 
 Patrol.— '-The patrol is to advance towiards the butts as a 
 creeping patrol where two men of the enemy are showing, in 
 order to assure itself whether there are any more behind. In 
 this view, as it mighit at onice be seen by the enemy, it will 
 go quickly from cover to oover, up to about 300 paces from 
 Che enemy. Thenceforward two men will remain lying down 
 ready to fire, whilst the man in advance endeavors to gain 
 ground quickly, either to the side or to the front, until h« gets 
 on to the flank of the two men of the enemy, and can isee if 
 there are any more behind. Should he see noithing, he makes 
 a signal, and then first one man follows him, and then the 
 other, by rushes, so that there are always two men lying 
 down who can fire as soon as the enemy fires. Endeavors 
 must be made in this mamier to compel the two men of the 
 enemy to retreat, and then to see if anywhere behind the 
 rifie-groiund any of the enemy are still to be observed. As 
 soon as more of the enemy show, no man is ito advance fur- 
 ther, but all three must take a position under cover, observe 
 quickly what the enemy is doing, anxi retire one by one by 
 rushes out of range and in such a way that two men are al- 
 ways ready to fire if the enemy should attempt to follow. 
 Arrived beyond range, the three men continue together their 
 retreat towards the I'ight wing of the outpost and report 
 what they have seen."* 
 
 I saw from the intelligent faces of the men of the patrol 
 that they had understood me; I therefore only added that 
 creeping patrols should always act in a similar manner when 
 in presence of a patrol of the enemy which they oould not 
 
 *This detailed instruction as to the conduct of tlie patrol is to be 
 recommended when it is known that the men are not yet skillful in 
 patrolling. But when the patrollers are skillful, every word beyond 
 w'hat is necessary to explaan the mission to be fulfilled and the dis- 
 tance to which it is to advance, is superfluous. 
 11- 
 
1J4 Extracts from an Infantrij Captain's Journal. 
 
 pass imobserved, when they wished to see what might be 
 behind it. The patrol then marched off. I now caused tlie 
 reliefs to be posted and directed the men to assemble at the 
 intrenchment, in order that they might see the jvusting of 
 the relief, and the conduct of the patrol. 
 
 Mauiicr of Posting the Relief. — I directed the sentries 
 of the left flank post No. 3 to advance, and the lance- 
 corporal to ask them the three quesition®, to which, as a 
 fourth question, was added the parole and countersign. I 
 caused the two men who had just been relieved, and No. 1 
 patrol at that moment returning, to pile arms within the in- 
 treu<hment and to act as an examination post. 
 
 The non-commissioned oflicer, whose duty it was to post 
 them, marched off at tlic same time witli the other four men, 
 ]ilaeed under caver the men who were to relieve the inter- 
 mediate post, and continued wilh post No.l as much as possi- 
 ble under covei'. to the point where, according to the anstrnc- 
 tions of the commander of the outpost, he was to place them. 
 A iter be had questioned them on their instructions, he went 
 directly to post No. - and signalled tlie relief to come to him: 
 they plai-ed themselves on the righrt land left of the post, and 
 were informed by the old sentries what had, up to the present 
 time, been seen of the enemy, as well as the name of the 
 neaghboring tillage. The non-commissioned olBoer then 
 asked for the parole and countersign, and marched with the 
 relieved sentries to the outpost. 
 
 Conduct of the Creeping Patrol in Face of the. Enemy. — In 
 the meantime the creeping i>atrol had arrived within a few 
 hundred paces of the butts, and we saw how the foremost 
 man by stoopingdown availed himself of a little hollow in the 
 ground, in order to reach a small mound which lay somewhat 
 on one side. A shot was fired ; the man threw himiself down, 
 but then at once ran quickly to the mound, where he again 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 115 
 
 threw himself down. Two men of the enemy noiw showed 
 themselves. The foiremost man of the patrol remained lying 
 still for a moment, and then ran rapidly to the rear. A shot 
 was again lired ; a man of the patrol replied to it. After the 
 first man had taken position, the one who now found himself 
 nearest to the enemy ran back for a certain distance and 
 threw himself down, then the uext one, and so on ; and then 
 all three, as the enemy did not follow, were able ito continue 
 the retreat together towards post No. 1. 
 
 ChaUengimtig and Instruction on 'the Conduct to he followed 
 wJten unknown Men wish to pass the Sentry. — The sentry 
 cried out: "Halt! who comes there?" "A returning pa- 
 trol." "One man to the front." "Parole , Countersign 
 
 ." "Pass patrol ." I now asked : "What should 
 
 the sentries have done if the men had been unknown 
 to them?" 
 
 Answer: "Conduct them to the post of examination." 
 Certainly, this is what is written in the instructions on the 
 subject, but it is very diiHcult to be carried out in practice. 
 As a matter of fact, it may be impossible to send to the post 
 of examination unknown or suspected persons, who may 
 wish to pass by a post which is not on the high iway. The 
 person stopped and challenged should invariably be con- 
 ducted straight to the outpost by one man of the post, and 
 should there be more persons than one, those who are left 
 should be sharply watched by tie remaining man of the post, 
 but they should not be ordered back further from the line 
 of posts, as in that case their whereabouts would not be 
 known.* 
 
 *Only at posts which form part of the investing line of a fortress 
 can an order be to the purpose, wiiich directs that all unknown per- 
 sons, excepting bearers ot flags of tmce, be at once sent back. 
 
 I have never 'been able to convince 'myself of the advisiaibility of 
 the order which requires all unknown persons to be directed to the 
 
11(3 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Juurnal. 
 
 I therefore directed once for all: "From nirh post all 
 unknown individuals must be taken to the outpost." 
 
 This is an instruction ea.sy lo be understood, and it 
 would at the same time render unnecessary the useless 
 f.ra III illation by the jiatrol or trooji. 
 
 As the enemy did not advance farther, which, moreover, 
 would not have bt'en allowed. I told olT a noai-coinnniisisiioned 
 officer's jialriil of one non-coniiiiissioiicd dltict'r and eig'ht men 
 from the support tn drive him back behind the ritle ran<;(', 
 and to 'obtain infornuition ref^ardinj^ the iiosition of his 
 
 OUtlHISlS. 
 
 I look this opportunity of jiivi.ng instrnctioii regardins 
 till' siiccial conduct of such a rciimnoitering ]iatrol, for in 
 this matter it often liapjieus that the wrong pnweediiig is 
 followed in the field. 
 
 Iiistriictboii for (I ml Coiuhiff of ti I'ccoii imitrriiij/ fntrol. — 
 The ohjcit of a ncoiiiioitcriiif/ jialrol is always to obtain more 
 l)rccisc information of the enemy than creeping patrols have 
 been able to obtain through their being prcrcntcd by the 
 enemy's jpatrols. 
 
 lis busin(\ss is first to drirr hock these jiatrols, and sec- 
 ond to (uhaiKT farthrr against the enemy s line of outposts. 
 
 The firxt object is best attained, under the circum- 
 stances above mentioned, by a ra])id and nirloxiiif/ aiilvanice 
 against the enemy s patrols; the second, by sending forward 
 
 post of cx:iiiiination. Suspected persons aad spies can in sucGa a 
 manner see all they wish, and tben siidilenly run away. It Is, more- 
 over, difficult on ser\'ice to act up to this. On tbe otlier hand. It is 
 often necessary, as in peace-time, to let country people pa.ss the line 
 of outposts in order to carry on their daily work. Such linmane con- 
 siderations open a wide door to "espionage," which must be specially 
 avoiideid if it be wished to maintain a complete investment. If the 
 country jieople only notice that they are invariably talien to the out- 
 IK)Sts, they will not be in a hurry to let themselves be seen in the 
 neigibbophood of the same. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 117 
 
 against the enemy creeping patrols In at least tivo different 
 directions. 
 
 The reoonliioitering patrol m'oves at first forward, as a 
 line of skiriuishers, by rushes, and endeavors to gain the 
 flanks and rear of the enemy's patrols in order to compel 
 them to retreat. If this succeed, the patrol must reassemble 
 promptly at a favorable point, so that the non-commissioned 
 officer may give especial instruction for the second part of the 
 duty he has to perform. 
 
 This should, as a rule, be so arranged that three men ai'e 
 sent to the front as a creepiitg patrol against a point where 
 the enemy's flanh is supposed to be, or where it can be best 
 approached under cover, whilst the non-commissioned officer 
 with the remainder follows quickly in the direction where 
 the enemy's pa/trol has retreated, or where he supposes the 
 enemy's support to be. This point of departure should be 
 indicated as a place of assembly in case of retreat, and two 
 men may be left here, especially if it be a bridge or a defile.* 
 
 The non-commissioned officer with his men must now en- 
 deavor to learn something of the position of the enemy's sup- 
 port. The shortest way is to alurm the line of isentries by a 
 quick attack and rapid fire at a certain point, and to retire 
 quickly as soon as the enemy's support has been made to 
 show itself. The cessation of firing is, then, at the same 
 time, a caution for the first creeping patrol to withdraw 
 itself quickly in like manner, even supposing that it had seen 
 but little. Its special mission must be to see, as far as pos- 
 sible, where the isoilated sentries are posted, and whether, 
 perhaps, any part of the line of sentries could be easily sur- 
 prised and broken through. 
 
 *Aii example <xf a different manner of laicting under other circum- 
 stances is given in the explanation of "outpost and combat maneu- 
 vers of one company against another." 
 
118 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 As regards the ease just referred to, the non-commis- 
 sioned officer must at first act in a similar way as the creep- 
 ing patrol had previously done — that is to say. he must keep 
 the enemy in view by leaving some men in front, whilst the 
 others, file by file and sideways or forwards, gradually gain 
 the flanlv of the enemy. Thus the enemy would be driven 
 back beyond the further boundary of the rifle-ground, the 
 patrol would then be assembled there under cover, and three 
 men would be sent as a creeping patrol against the (sup- 
 posed) left flank of the enemy, whilst the non-commissioned 
 officer would endeavor to gain the main road towards village 
 X, with his remaining men formed as a patrol, as it must be 
 supposed that the support of the enemy would be standing 
 in the village near this high road. 
 
 Should tlie enemy show himself sooner on this side of 
 the village in some strength, the nnn-commissioned officer 
 must natui-ally retreat, but he would have fulfilled his object 
 as far as possible 
 
 I now ordered the mm-commissioned ol'ticer to march olf 
 and advance the cenii)any to the breast work to look on. To 
 make use of the time as much as possible, I direct two men 
 to at once follow the non-commissioned officer and count 
 their paces with an order for one of them to halt at 300 paces 
 (210 metres), and for the other at 600 paces (480 metres), and 
 to front towards the intrenchment, and alternately to lie 
 down, ti) kneel, and to stand up. 1 consider it very impor- 
 tant to accustom the men's eyes to these two distances as 
 often as possible, in every variety of ground, and in every 
 variety of light ; the first as a limit of effective individual fire 
 against hostile skirmishers, the second as a limit for volleys 
 and rapid firing against small masses of troops. Officers 
 and non-commissioned officers must especially make them- 
 selves certain of judging these two distances. I also decided 
 
Extracts frovi an Infantry Captain's Journal. 119 
 
 in future, when pacing a distanoe, to take long steps of one 
 metre each, in order to avoid the oalculation required to re- 
 duce paces to metres. This can be easily practiced on the 
 rifle-grou,nd by the detachments whiich are not shooting, as 
 it can also be done on the march home. 
 
 As soon as the man halted at 300 paces, I caused the 
 diTisions behind the breastwork to come up to the present, 
 and I directed thean to aim at Ms head when he kneeled down, 
 and at about two feet above him when he lay down. Division 
 and group leaders had to correct the aiming. The same at 
 600 paces. 
 
 Conduct of the Reconnoitering Patrol and of the Enemy. — 
 When the reconnoitering patrol had extended and was ad- 
 vancing by files and by rushes, I directed a pause to be made, 
 arid the men to look lom. 
 
 The four men of the enemy drew themselves back quicik- 
 ly, but took up again a position under cover at tlie farthest 
 corner of the rifle-ground. 
 
 I saw how the non-commissio.ned oflBioer very properly 
 did not continue to advance hy files' against this concentrated 
 position, which be could not approach by a flanlc miovement, 
 but caused a concentrated attack to be made by all at once, 
 and thus completely dnove back the patrol. I, then also sanv 
 how, soon ;afterwards, he detached the creeping patrol tO' the 
 right. 
 
 The tW'O men of the enemy at the other corner of the 
 rifle-gronnd must also 'have retired, for I saw a patrol ad- 
 vance in like manner from the detached non-commiiSisi'oned 
 oflScer's post. 
 
 I caused now "the assembly" to be sounded, and whilst 
 the reconnoitering patrol and the enemy were approaching 
 the intrenchment, I made some of the men pace distances 
 from the intrenchment to 300 and 600 paces, but this time in 
 
120 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 the direction of the detached non-commissioned officer's post, 
 and then to aim on them from the intrenchment. 
 
 As soon as all had assembled at the intrenchment, I gave 
 the order to move towards the non-commissioned officer's 
 jutst. I then rode qaicklj thither and I made a sign that the 
 men should remain halted; I caused them also he're to judgt' 
 distances till all were united. I now demanded from the 
 commander of the outpost the written report he had been 
 ordered In furnish on what had taken place, and I weiil rap- 
 idly through it with the non-commissioned officers, remark- 
 ing- ipu the form in wliich it had been jirrpared, and on ils 
 contents. The report of Sergeant A ran as follows: 
 
 "Afteinoon, 5 'O'clock. 
 
 "The outi)ost has taken position for the night, as shown 
 on the accompanying sketch. A patrol of t'he enemy estab- 
 lished itself on tlie rifle-ground, l)ut was (M\'eGi thence by 
 non-commissioned officer C with eight men as far as the 
 neighborhood of village N, where the enemy's outposts are 
 placed. i^cn/rant A." 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 121 
 
 SECOND EXERCISE. 
 
 The — June, morning. Introduction to and Plan for the 
 following Exercises. — It was my intention henceforth to 
 oombine outpoist duty with field maneuvers, and therefore to 
 place two detachments according to determined suppositions 
 . in opposition to one another ; to leave leaders a certain free- 
 dom in their arrangements, but myself to superintend the 
 execution in every detail, and to interfere always when any- 
 thing happened in the disposition or in the execution which 
 did not appear of advantage for instruction, or that in itself 
 was faulty. 
 
 I proposed first of all to select ground which would offer 
 to the defenders superior advantages, so as to be able thus 
 to give to the assailant a double strength — ^two divisions 
 against one. This would naturally lead the assailant to 
 make his principal attack against the flanks, and it was 
 therefore specially important for the leaders of the troops to 
 pay attention to the following points : 
 
 1. To appreciate correctly the strong and the iveak points 
 of the ground. 
 
 2. Partly to divine beforehand the intentions and meas- 
 ures of the adversary, partly to obtain Urformation of the same 
 at the proper tims by means of patrols or reconnmssance. 
 
 3. On one hand, to dispose the detachments in proper 
 order for a fight, and on the other, to secure an advantage by 
 a rapid resolution, at the decisive moment and at the decisive 
 point. 
 
 As on account of the weakness of the detachments, and 
 as especially in an open country, I should apparently be aible 
 to observe every detail of the execution, I hoped that these 
 exercises would promote the instruction of the company in 
 
122 Extracts from an Infantnj Captain's Journal. 
 
 tlie details of outi«ist duty and of combats, and at the same 
 time enable both leadeis and men to attain a higher dcijirr of 
 instruction in the following matters — 
 
 For the leaders: A quick coup d'o'il, prompt decisiim, 
 clearness, and precision in arrangements and orders. 
 
 For the men: The habit, under all circumstances, of 
 complying carefully with the forms and rcr/iilatioiis taught — 
 but not, however, to carry out any order only iiwclianivdlli/, as 
 when they ai-e standing in the ranks, but to act with am 
 iiitlcpniilnit }iii(!( rstan(li)i(/ of the object and general inlvn- 
 tion of the whole. 
 
 Tlie nilis which an iiidiriilKdl )iuiu must ahvays observe 
 when fighting are not so many: To join correctly in the 
 action of the <ironp, trhcilier haltini). inorin;/, or firing, is indeed 
 for him eni-i/tliinf/. 
 
 I should imagine that with some attention to this ahso- 
 Jiitehi iierr.sKiirji ilrlail, it would not be inijiossiible to traim 
 a man to a cei-tain mechanical skillfulness. 
 
 l*>ut the matter is different when it is necessary to 
 arouse bis indepeiidi-uf understanding, which be is called 
 upon to show as a skinnislier in ereri/ shot tbat 'he fires, by 
 correct anil thoughtfnl aiming, by firing the shot at the right 
 moment q.t the enemy, when the latter can either be easilg 
 hit las when he momentarily crposes himself, or when a 
 fnijijiort mores np into line), or when his death is of greater 
 importance (aiming at the chiefs, or at specially good marks- 
 men of the enemy, or at the supports immediateh/ preceding 
 thf decisire momeut). 
 
 It is almost impossible to always superintend these de- 
 tails, and consequently they can only be taught very imper- 
 fectly. Xeyertheless it is these which constitute the superi- 
 ority of the men's instruction when opposed to the enemy. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 123 
 
 under the supposition of an otherwise equal discipline and 
 bravery in the troops. 
 
 All, therefore, must be done that is possible, in order to 
 promote the intelligent independence ot the individual soldier; 
 and on field service this is o.uly attained when special oare 
 and attention' are devoted to it. Repeated exercises O'uly can 
 accustom the soldier to this, in suoh a way tliait at last it 
 beoomesto Mmsomething easy and to be understood of itself. 
 
 For the subordinate leaders the task is, on the other 
 hand, complicated, because they must assist in the instruc- 
 tion of the men, at the same time that they practice and 
 instruct themselves — they must themselves join generally 
 in what takes place, and must lead and control their 
 detachments. 
 
 Tio succeed in this they will find it of assistance to adhere 
 mechamcally_ to simple rules in leading — so that they need 
 never ask themselves "how" tbey are to act, nor receive 
 instructions upon the manner of acting — but the order being, 
 as it were, all ready in their hiead, as soon as "what" is to 
 be done is ordered, a glance at the ground ds enough to en- 
 able them to give the necessary commands with precision. 
 Consequently, here also the observance of defined and pre- 
 viously practiced rules, and constant exercise in the same, 
 until a mechanical skillfulnass has been acquired, form the 
 basis for every further insitruction of the leader; this is the 
 means for arriving at the end, but this is not the end itself. 
 The end is, to place the leader, whilst makiing him lightly 
 feel the imperiousness of Tules, in a position ito keep the 
 leading oif his men well under control, and to ensure the 
 prompt execution of the necessary decisions. 
 
 In accordance herewith, I drew out my plan for the 
 following maneuvers: 
 
 I required three exercises In order to practice each 
 
J24 Ejrlrarts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 division one after the otlier as outposts and in dcfcnsirc com- 
 hats. 1 required of least two cxeirises in detail, even if I 
 reilconed tliat tlie division of skirmisliers had already in the 
 preparatory e.rercises gone thi-ough what was most necessary 
 in out] Mist duty. For the other two divisions, after acting 
 as outposts, the exercises would then have to be turned into 
 maneuvers for teaching detached men how to behave when 
 manhnKj to tin- front and in attackiin/ a jxisition. 
 
 Inst.ruclion in retreat a;nd pursuit naturally formed part 
 of tlies(' maneuvers, and for this it was only necessary to 
 arraujie the exercise, so that the attack had a chance of suc- 
 ceeding one lime and not I'lie next. In order, according to 
 circunislances, to lie able m.\self to conti-ol the course of 
 events, it was necessary to give to each detachment a flag, 
 whicii was only lo be unfurled on my njieciial (vrder. For 
 lliose first exercises, an o]iru ground well undei- view was 
 advis.ilile. i>artly so as to be better able tO' see all details, 
 partly to facilitate the strict observance of i>rescribed rules. 
 Then it was absolutely necessary to carry out an exercise of 
 patiols in broken and in closed ground, in order to explain 
 the conduct lo be followed under such circumstances — and 
 at the same time to jirepare for an exercise of outjxist and 
 of combat on similar ground. 
 
 If I at the same time combined with these latter a 
 fiyltt in (I defile, I ecouoniized a day which I should have had 
 to give separately to this ex(^rcise, and I could then arrange 
 with another company for an exercise of outjiost and fight- 
 ing maneuvers, which would have to be given in the after- 
 noon by the placing of outposts by one side, and a/ttack of 
 the sa.me by the other side. And after the fight, renewed 
 placing of outposts with patrols, and sending out of small 
 reconnaissance patrols, one against the other, until night 
 time. A large reconnaissance by night, combined with a 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 125 
 
 false alarm at another point, eould well ooinflude suoh an 
 exercise. 
 
 According to the time which then remained to me, I 
 might either practice the debouching and retreat through a 
 defile under fire of the enemy and a deployment for fighting 
 on the further side of it, or 1 might, in order to test how far 
 my company was trained to act quickly in case of surprise, 
 arrange an exercise which would lead to an unexpected 
 rencontre. If the suboirdinate leaders and men could stand 
 this test, then indeed their training might be considered to 
 have had a successful result. 
 
126 
 
 Ertrnrts from an Infantry Captain's Joiirnul. 
 
 Fig 6 1 
 
 ^ ' ! 
 
 y^K ^ ;\^.^^ . 
 
 1 *-*^*-'^'-* Na..seKhercj^ }A..Ar^r^ 
 
 llMengenich / \^ '^^ 
 
 \ / ^\ \ 
 
 \ / ^^^-^ 
 
 \L M'^"""^'-^ 
 
 ^k \ ^^"""^^ 
 
 Bocklemund \^ T^j 
 
 \^ OasendorfV 
 
 Bicltendorf^^SM' 
 
 R eference 
 
 tL. (hdpost in- wood . 
 
 b. DetcLched Kon. Com.' Officers post vMK doiMe seniry 
 
 c. Adxmnee oTthe. assailant 
 
 d.d- Jv-si ejrbentwn. of akrrrra^era . 
 
 e Turranf) yruanemAntt agavmt lfilscenJ>erg. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 127 
 
 EXERCISE IN OUTPOST DUTY WITH A FIGHT. 
 
 Orders for the 1st Division. — (See Fig. 6.) 
 The division issent forwardfpom a(supposed) support at 
 Mengenich, at half-past 7, towards the neighboring wood, as 
 the left flank outpost, resting on the farm of Ntissenberg. 
 The right wing outpost (supposed) is at Bocklemiind. Five 
 cartridges, forage caps, and knapsacks. The position is 
 taken up at 8 o'clock. There is a bugler and flag with the 
 detachment. 
 
 Order for the 2d Division and the Division of Skirmishers. — 
 Lieut. N in command. 
 
 Thej' are to attack and drive back the left wing of the 
 enemy's outposts, which are between Ntissenberg and Bock- 
 lemiind. They are to march off at quarter to eight from 
 Bickendorf, where the outposts of their side (supposed) are 
 placed. Five cartridges, helmets, and knapsacks. Bugler 
 with flag. At half-past seven I was at Bickendorf, where I 
 found both divisions already posted under cover behind a 
 farm. I heard the following instructions given: 
 
 Disposition for the 2d and for the Skirmishing Divisions. — 
 The 2d division, with 1 non-ooimmissioned officer and 12 men 
 of the division of skirmishers, forming the advanced guard, is 
 to proceed to the attack on the idirect road towards Ntissen- 
 berg. The remainder of the division of .skirmishers, under 
 Sergeant A, on the road towards the wood, in order there to 
 occupy the enemy, and to prevent his sending support to 
 Ntissenberg. 
 
 The enemy's patrols are to be driven quickly back and 
 rapidly followed up. I approved of these instructions, and 
 rode over towards the wood. 
 
J28 Extracts from an Infantry Cai)tiiin's Journal. 
 
 Disjiosifion for fhc Jftf Dirision. — Here the head which 
 had jnsT arrived at the boundary of the wood (at a) had 
 halted, and was being instnuted to proceed further to the 
 front as a jtatrol towards Biekendorf, but not to fi'o beyond 
 the mill. At the same time a second patrol was sent forward 
 by Xiisseuberg towards Ossendorf. 
 
 A non-commi.ssioned otticer, with six men, was then told 
 off as a detached non-commissioned officer's post, and seni 
 towards Niisseiiher.i;. with the caution that the enemy was 
 probably posted al Bickeiidorf and Ossendorf. The rest 
 remained as an outpost in the wood, and, owing to the favor- 
 able i-onditions of the ground near the boundary, \\ith only 
 one sentry, jmsled over the ai'ms lu'ar the salient angle. 
 
 The men were at once shown the distances of L'40 and 
 4S(l meli-es on the ground (which was quite open, only cov- 
 ered on both sides of the road with tolerably high standing 
 corn); the distance of the nearest boundary of Xiisseubyrg 
 was judged at 240 metres. 
 
 The men had Ijeeu alreailN' told that the sujtjxirt was at 
 Meiigeuicli, and the out])()St of the right wing at Boekle- 
 miind (supposedi. Ir was not, therefore, necessary to give 
 .uiy further instruction to the seuti-ies. They jvossessed a 
 knowledge of the three ])i-inci])al iiuestioiis, and they also 
 knew the names of the villages. 
 
 I rode over towards Xiissenberg, where the ground im- 
 mediately behind the farm is open, but in the direction of 
 the road towards ( fsseiidorf it rises gradually for 150 paces, 
 and thus hinders the further view. 
 
 This had induced the non-commissioned officer to push 
 forward his double sentries on to the height near the road to 
 Longerich. He himself, with the remaining four men, ])y 
 permission of the owner of the farm, who also allowed the 
 paths in the garden to be used, stood behind the hedge of 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 129 
 
 Nussenberg, whence indeed he could not, on account of the 
 corn, see very far an the road towards Ossendorf, but was 
 there covered by the patrol sent to the front. His field of 
 fire from the hedge extended only about 150 paces. 
 
 Attack and Defense of ^ iissenherg. — A hurried report now 
 came from the patrol: ''A detachment of the enemy of 1^ 
 divisions is coming from the direction of Ossendorf; two 
 sections are on the march on the road from Bickendorf 
 towards the wood." 
 
 At the same time I also saw hoiw the other patrol sent 
 a report to the wood. 
 
 The non-commissioned officer commanded the patrol to 
 withdraw from before the enemy on to his rig'ht flank. Soon 
 afterwards there was a shot fired — then another — a siign 
 that the enemy was advancing. 
 
 The patrol ran to the rear, skirting the, corn, two men 
 remained still standing at a corner, in order to look about 
 them, and to fire again. Several shots were now fired by 
 the enemy — I saw, as I rode somewhat forward, that the 
 head of five men bad taken position facing the patrol, and 
 was being reinforced by the advanced guard. I saw how in 
 the hurry they were aiming badly; I made them stop at 
 once, and asked one of the skirmishers how he bad aimed. 
 He answered me tolerably correctly, and this sufQeed to 
 cause the other sldrmishers to pay more attention to their 
 shooting. They had understood what I wished. 
 
 I caused now a further advance to be made. The skir- 
 mishers of the advanced guard ran forward aboiut fifty paces, 
 as far as the corner of the cornfield, and knelt down as soon 
 as they became a\^are that the hedge of Niissenberg Avas 
 occupied. The patrol had withdrawn before them on the 
 right side of t;he hedge; a man was at once sent towards the 
 wood to make a report (verhally, because time failed for a 
 
130 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Jounwl 
 
 written repoi-n. I then heard how they shonled back from 
 the line of skirmishers: "The boundary of Niissenberg is 
 occupied by a section of the enemy." Lieutenant X ad- 
 vanced, and then gave an order to the leader of 1 lie supports 
 to move under cover of tlie high ground towards the Longe- 
 rich road, aud to atta-ck on that side.* 
 
 The division at once sent a few files as skirmis,hers in 
 advance, and followed in file. , 
 
 I saw llie double post on the height looking round fre- 
 quently in an undecided manner, aud then suddenly run be- 
 hind the hedge. This did not at all meet my approval. The 
 sculri.'s should at all events have first fired and made a 
 report. 
 
 1 caused halt to be sounded, and sent the sentries, unob- 
 served, again to tlieir ]iost. telling them at the same ti'uie 
 thai thoy ought not to li'ave siicli a favorable position un- 
 necessarily, but should detain the enemy as long as i)Ossible; 
 their reti-eat was in no way endangered. I then ordered the 
 advance to be sounded. It happened, in fact, tliat two sliots 
 fired quickly, one after the other, l)y tiiis jio-st br(uight the 
 whole division to a standstill, because they could noit .see in 
 what strength the height was occupied. The closed part of 
 the division threw itself at onc<' o.n the ground, thie most 
 advanced tiles wen- reinforced, and took position to open fire. 
 The most advanced non-commissioned officer had in the 
 meantime looked well around him, and now shouted back: 
 "There is only one file of the enemy," and then gav« the 
 
 *It is very important that everyttiing observed (jf the enemy 
 should lie slioiiteil Ii.-ick from the line of skirmishers. Tlie flies on the 
 flanks miu.st he sptn-ially wanied for this duty, and it is even advis- 
 aible to pass a shout to the rear if the leader himself is in the line of 
 skirmishers aud apparently sees everything. Generally in \H-.\i-f- 
 time, the lender, fully e.xposed. goes in the line of skirmisliers in 
 order himself to see everything, and does not cause reports to be 
 made to him. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 131 
 
 order, '"To the attaok — diouble march." The double post, 
 after having fired once more, ran to the rear, and, quite cor- 
 rectly, proieeeded to the left flank of its detachment.* 
 
 The non-commissioned officer, with his group of skir- 
 mishers, followed rapidly over the height, where he was im- 
 mediately received at 150 paces distance with rapid firing 
 from the hedge. I ordered him to go under cover behind 
 the height. 
 
 I now also heard firing at the wood. I saw bow a sec- 
 tion was moving thence at the double as a support towards 
 Niissenberg. During the movement the section was fired 
 upon from the road leading to Bickendorf. In the mean- 
 time. Lieutenant N had himself advanced into the line of 
 skirmishers, in order to assure himself of the strength of the 
 enemy's ipositiom. 
 
 He saw with a glance th'at at the moment the troops in 
 occupation were weak, but that a reinforcement was ap- 
 proaching. He called out quickly to his support, "Double 
 march" — and when it came somewhat nearer he also shouted 
 to the line of sldrmishers: "To the attack — doiifole march." 
 The "hurrah" caused also both sections of the division of 
 skirmishers which were on the road toOssendorf to attack at 
 the same time, and the hedge had to be -hurriedly abandoned. 
 The supporting section arrived too late, and was only able 
 quickly to take position behind the farm, s.o as to cover the 
 retreat of the others. ^Vould it not have perhaps been pos- 
 
 *It may here be brought to mind that many mistakes will be made 
 by douible .sentries whem opposed to the enemy, and therefore s;peeial 
 attention musit be paid to this maAter. 
 
 In order to impress their duty on ttoe semtrdes, it might perhaps be 
 reoommen'ded, that they be directed to aot exactly as a detached file 
 of a sliirmishing group; and in order that they may beforehand be 
 trained to act intuitively in this matter, it would be well to designate 
 such a file a dmMe sentrij. and this at the same time would simplify 
 their Instruction. 
 
132 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 sible on seivice by a quicker advance of tliis siiji]H>rt to linve 
 at once driven back the enemy, who was twice the strenf;th? 
 
 Lieutenant X, who wished to continue the attack as far 
 as the further boundary of Xiissenberg, and would thus to a 
 rcitaiu extent have passed beyond the enemy's sui))wirl — 
 which on active service, as the latter did not seize the offen- 
 sive, would probably have succeeded—received from me the 
 order to lialt, and to drive back the enemy by turning him. 
 1 wished at the same time to test how the men would get 
 into tlieir places, after naturally being somewhat confused 
 together, by an attack in a restricted siiace. 
 
 The order to hialt was at once attended to, but a tolera- 
 bly confused mass then remained without sufficient cover, 
 exposed to fire, and the leader appeared embarrassed as to 
 how he should remedy this order. I now, therefoi'e, caused 
 "halt" to be sounded and the more so as I at the same time 
 heard an "hurrah" opposite to the wood. 
 
 I now rode first of all to the wood, where the boundary 
 was still occupied by two sections in very good positi<.in; 
 against these the two sections of the division of skirmishers, 
 after ha\ing, to begin with, kept up a slow musketry fire at 
 IMIO pace.s, under cover of the corn, were now on the podnt of 
 making an assault. I decided that the attack was repulsed, 
 and I caused the leaders to come 1o Ntissenberg, in, order to 
 examine the situation of affairs on that sid(\ 
 
 Conti'iuiafioii of the AftacJx in Dispersed Order of Fif/hti^r/. 
 — Here the attack and defense were opposite to one another, 
 at from 50 to 60 paces distance; the defender, on account of 
 his smaller number, was better under cover than the assail- 
 ant, who did not find space to direct on the former an over- 
 powering fire, because he was for the greater part crowded 
 up in a heap, a state of affairs which must happen in every 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 133 
 
 village flghit if, after the boundary has been stormed, the 
 defender still holds firmly to the farms in the interior.* 
 
 I first of all showed what the assailant should always 
 do in such a case, in order to continue his attack in an orderly 
 manner, and to aroid unnecessary losses — namely, to cause 
 the disordered mass of men quickly to take cover, whilst the 
 extended skirmishers should continue their fire, making use 
 of every available shelter. 
 
 In such a moment the leader can seldom give the order 
 for this purpose to the Kliole of his men. It is therefore 
 necessary that each non-commissioned officer, and each man, 
 should know beforehand once for all that when th^y are 
 halted immediately after an attack, on account of the ap- 
 pearance of the enemy's support, the skirmishers must of 
 themselves make use of the most available cover to open fire, 
 whilsit all those who are crowded together into a heap must 
 immediately, without retreating (which would be a great 
 mistake at such a moment) throw themselves, at a sign from 
 their leader, either behind or into the nearest farm and de- 
 fend it. 
 
 Even if the mass of men in so doing be divided into two 
 
 *The occurrence of such a state of things in peace-time is, as a 
 rule, avoiclecl; but it is a necessary aind valuable prei/aration for war, 
 less for the sake of the men (who will fiorget such an exercise) than 
 for that of the officers and non-commissioned officers, who should 
 previously have thoroughly learnt how at once to act correctly at 
 such a moment. In such cases it becomes evident how important it 
 is when imparting instruction to lieep steadijy in view that the 
 complete influence of officers, and non-commissioned officers in lead- 
 ing a fight sihioiuld be secured to tihem, and that they should be prac- 
 ticed in exercising the same correctly. The view, that it is only nec- 
 essary to train the men how to act independently in such cases, must 
 with a sysftem of short service be declared a mistalce; for there is not 
 suffieienit time In wihioh tbis can ibe taught them, and the only result 
 is that they become accustomed to act in a fighit according to their 
 own judgment, because in training they have been blamed if they do 
 not of themselves at once aict correctly. Id this manner they are .sys- 
 tematically withdrawn from the control of their leaders. 
 
134 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 parts, by perhaps one leuder sigmiiij:' to this fairm and an- 
 other to that, this would cause less harm than to remain 
 irresolutely standing in a thick crowd under fire of the ene- 
 my. The second thing to do is for the leader of the detach- 
 ment to designate a subordinate commander to reinforce the 
 skirmishers with a certain number of meai, either to the 
 front or (according to an order g-iven) to turn the enemys 
 flank. 
 
 Since this reinforcing mnsl be carried out as soon us 
 liossilile. it is of no importance that the subordinate leader 
 should select his own men for this inir]iiise, but it is impor- 
 tant that he sIhhiM collect as quickly as possible under his 
 anlers as many men as dii'ecled, and proceed with them. 
 The remainder must then be jidt into order quickly by the 
 other available subordinate leaders, or be told off afresh, 
 according to circumstances, so as to be able to be eiiiploy<'d 
 if re(|uired, in proper onler. 
 
 In this special case the d^\■('llillg-lvo^s(' offered an opiior- 
 
 tunity of quickly throwimg tlie mass of men behind it; this 
 
 consisied partly of the division of skirmishers and x'lirtly of 
 
 ' the second division. Th<' skirmishers on the left and on the 
 
 right beloint,'ed iMjually to both divisions. 
 
 I first of all reviewed the position of the skirmishers, 
 and wliere a man could have better iilaced himself, I drew 
 his attention to it, an4 made him take up a better positioin.* 
 I then ordi-red the senior non-commission(Hl ofQcer who was 
 with the crowd of men to take the further measures neces- 
 sary to get the men in order, whilst the offiicer was only to 
 give him very short orders. 
 
 *This requirement, that the skirmishers when they reaah a posi- 
 tion should at once, of their own accord, imalse use in firing -of avail- 
 able cocer. must be impressed upon every man, and the time avail- 
 able for training will be sufficient for this purpose, if proper use be 
 made of it. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. J 35 
 
 The latter then ordered, "To the house; double march!" 
 whereupon the whole mass of men moved to the bouse, the 
 noin-com'missloned ofiflcers in front; and this Is very impor- 
 tant, so that the men may have them before their eyes, and 
 be able more quickly to understand their further orders. 
 
 The officer then ordered the senior non-commissioned 
 officer (or any non-commissioned officer of the right wing), 
 "Extend two sections, to envelop the left flank of the 
 enemy." 
 
 The non-cammissioned officer had now for .his part to tell 
 off quickly the nearest 10 men on that wing — "Right wing 
 section, prolong the line to the I'ight — extend!" Then agadn 
 to the n€!xt 10, "Second section, reinforce the skirmishers 
 to the right — extend!" 
 
 With the latter section he 'Mmself advanced, but he 
 might as well have advanced at once with the first section, 
 and have given another non-comimissioned officer command 
 of the next section, so that the execution lof the movemerat 
 might be hastened. 
 
 There were now only left of the mass of men about two 
 sections, which were at once formed in two ranks by the 
 other non-commissioned officers, and divided into two sec- 
 tions ; they thus remained ready as an available support. 
 
 Retreat towards the Wood. — After this had been carried 
 out, I directed the defender to put himself in retreat on the 
 wood, and gave the signal, "Advance." 
 
 The retreat towards the wood had, under the circum- 
 stances of the enemy th?reatening to turn the left wing, to be 
 carried out at the doiuble by both .sections at the same time. 
 Only a file on that wing which was posted in a particularly 
 advantageous manner received the order to remain halted 
 for a moment longer. Then the order was given ,to all, 
 "Eight about turn — double march." 
 
136 E.Ttracts from an Infantnj Captain's Journal. 
 
 About l."iO paces were ttiiis passed over at the (loublc, 
 in an oblique diieeti«n towards the boundary of tJie wood. 
 The rijilit wing section here came under fire from the Biclc- 
 endorf road, whereupon the leader ordered, "The section of 
 the right wing, front and lie dnwn; the section of the left 
 wing, retire slowly and oceu]i,v the boundary of the wood 
 facing Xiisseniberg." 
 
 The skirmishers of this latter secllDU had, as had been 
 ]nr\i()usly practiced at drill, to retire by ranks, alternately 
 halting' to fire, and then retreating further. Some files from 
 the two sections wliich were in the wood were i-apidly de- 
 tached to the boundary, to receive those retiring, and U\ey 
 thus extended beyond the wing. 
 
 Attitik of the ^Yll()lh — I at first prevented all ininiediatie 
 pursuit by the sldrmisliei's beyond the l)onndary of Ntissen- 
 berg, because an advance beyond a posiUou abandoned by 
 the enemy should never be made without oi'der. It is only 
 in the exceptional case when one is certain that the enemy 
 has no furtlier sujijion't that an advance may immediately be 
 made against Ihe new position; but also in this case a di- 
 vided ;ijdvance is an evil, and the leach^r must then order a 
 (junrrdl advance for the whole. 
 
 On the otlier liand, it is a disailvantjige in allowing an 
 enemy, who has withdrawn to a second position, time to get 
 again in order, and jierhajis to call up a support. 
 
 I therefore requested the officer to make quickly bis 
 arrangements for continuing the attack. As here, appar- 
 ently, the assault against the occupied corner of the wood 
 was not advantageous, he at once ordered both sectiomis of 
 the right wing to advance against the northwest angle of the 
 wood, to envelop the enemy's left wing. 
 
 This was carried out by groups doubling half right 
 forward. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 137 
 
 .Vs the enemy directed his lire on this pioint, the oificer 
 gave the order to the skirmishers in front, "Advance by 
 groups 50 paces at a time." 
 
 The enicmy, who now saw himself threatened by six 
 s.mall sections in front and on his flanks, whilst two sections 
 remained formed up in Nlisseniberg, began to make his prep- 
 arations for a further retreat. He was seen to detach rap- 
 idly 'a section at the double, from the interior of the thick 
 part of the wood, as a reinforcement to his left flank, and he 
 took another section along the other boundary of the wood 
 directly to Mengenich (this movement, however, could not be 
 clearly seen from Xiissenberg). 
 
 The officer now commanded, "To the attack; double 
 march I" And as bis skirmishens began to execute the order, 
 the other two sections on the Bickendorf road made the 
 attack at the same time with them against the point of the 
 wood, and thus, with refeirenoe to the situation of affairs, 
 opportunely joined in the flght. 
 
 The support with closed ranks followed likewise at the 
 double without further order, as should always hapipen in 
 such a case. 
 
 The enemy's skirmishers quickly evacuated the positdom 
 along the boundary on the side towards Mengenich, because 
 the thick underwood would have made a retreat through the 
 wood difficult. 
 
 The officer, as soon as he reached the boundary, gave at 
 once the order: "Halt!" and "Fire on the retreating enemy!" 
 Then to the leader of the two left-wing sections, which until 
 then had taken but small part in the flght, "Follow the ene- 
 my with both sections of the division of skirmiisfhers as far 
 as Mengenich" — "The other two sections to form support." 
 
 Sergeant A made the pursuing sections advance in ex- 
 tended order along the boundary, but detached two flies to 
 
138 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Joiirmil. 
 
 the right into the undei'T\ood, in order to keep up the coiii- 
 munication with the two right-wing sections. 
 
 Tliis. indeed, did not suceed, owing to the thickness of 
 the underwood; but it must be allowed that on active st-r- 
 vict- only a few men at most of the enemy might have re- 
 mained behind in the thick underwood, so that a complete 
 examination of the wood by a continuous line of skir'mishei-s 
 was not absolutely required; in fact, it a.jjjicared unadvisia- 
 ble, since in such a case tlie leading of the skirmishers would 
 no longer have been unde>r control. 
 
 I now rode (piickly over to the enemy, who had already 
 nearly rcaihed the further Imundary towards ]\Iengenich. 
 
 I called out to the leader: "T'nfnrl the flag! You have 
 receivcil from Mengenieh a company ,as riMnforcement." 
 
 The leader at once made the skirniiishej-s !halt and take 
 jMisition in the wood, but he immediately decided to take the 
 offensiAc, the more so as his position offered no advantage 
 for defense. He detaehed forthwith another section of his 
 support as a reinforcement to the left wing, so as to ensure 
 the safety of the left wing at tlie moment of meeting the 
 enemy, and then made the skirmishers advan,ce along the 
 boundary with the unfurled flag behind them. 
 
 The unfurling of the Hag had been quickly seen by the 
 skirmishers who were in pursuit, ajnd a man was at once 
 sent to the officer to report it. 
 
 The latter, of a resolute character, wished immediately 
 to advance at the double with his support in close order, 
 either to fire volleys or to the attack. 
 
 I caused "Halt" to be sounded, in order to examine the 
 position of affairs. The officer had undoubtedly, by his pre- 
 cipitation, plaxi'ed himself in a critical position, for in the 
 thick underwood attack or defense offered now small chance 
 of success against a superior enemy. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 139 
 
 This would have been avoided if, after taking the bound- 
 ary, he had caused the enemy to be followed only to the right 
 and left — ^that is to say, along the southern and noirthenn 
 boundary, by a section on each side, with the order tio ad- 
 vance as far as possible to the Conner of the wood opposite 
 Mengenich, and there to take position. Had this succeeded, 
 the officer might then, without 'risk, 'have followed with ihis 
 detachment, and afterwards, according to circumstances, 
 have taken a further decision.* 
 
 It is not ladvisable to penetrate with a weak detachment 
 on to ground which does not allow of the neigbborhood be- 
 ing seen, wittiout sending forward reconnoitering de- 
 tachments. 
 
 I now ordered the officer to retire to Bickendorf . He ait 
 once came to the proper decision to move by Ntissenberg, 
 directed his support there at once, gave the order to itlhe skir- 
 mishers to follow, and sent the same order rapidly to the 
 right wing. 
 
 Seeing that everythiing was carried out in an orderly 
 manner, I ended now the exercise. 
 
 *It may, indeed, appear questionable wtiether it would not always 
 be advisable, after having penetraited into a wood, to act in the same 
 way as the officer did on this occasion; that is to say, to follow the 
 pursuing sikirmishers at once wjitih the assembled support. 
 
 The regulation certainly prescribes an advance as far as the 
 further bounidary, and with reason, for if the enemy be pursued too 
 weakly he will agaiin take position in tih'e wood, and it will then be 
 difficult to drive him out. 
 
 T/he situaition in this case, however. Is peculiar. Tihe officer has 
 to attack the left flamk of an Oiutipost iposation, but must be convinced, 
 if he presses forward heedlessly with his weak detachment, that he 
 will oome in contact with the enemy's reinforcements. He sLould, 
 therefore, after carrying out successfully his missiion, not blindly go 
 beyond that mission, but must first convince himself by skirmishers 
 wiho follow the enemy wheither hostile supports are in the neighbor- 
 hood or not. On this account it appears especially necessary, in 
 order to prevent misundersftaiidding, that a new rule should be made 
 regarding pursoilt through a wood. 
 
140 
 
 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 Marienburg 
 
 50 too 1» 
 
 Amoldshohe fMih 
 
 Reference- ' ^ 
 
 Cb Ncn. Com '' OfFirere post sent iru e/iycULce 
 bb. Shelier trenrKes of Sergeant A' cutpost. 
 C Left lateral deOtchrrCavt of the aittuk 
 cL- Hrst posUion. Cor ihe attack 
 e PositLon a/ter the attack is repulsed 
 f. f. SecondL attack by a turnvig rnjcventent^ 
 g SeioruL posiiiorv of Nan, Com/' Of/icer S. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 141 
 
 THIRD EXERCISE. 
 
 Orders for the Second Division. 
 
 The — June, morning (see Fig. 7). — At eight o'clock the 
 second division, under Sergeant A, was posted as outpost on 
 Arnold's Height, which was to be placed in a state of defense; 
 he fronted the town, and had pushed forward a non- 
 commiissioned officer's post as far as the small wood lying in 
 front, which was to patrol towards Alteburg and the high 
 road. 
 
 Five cantridges, forage caps, knapsacks; a bugler with 
 a flag. 
 Orders for ithe First Division and the Skirmishing Dirision. 
 
 In order to protect the placing of the outposts near the 
 high road and at Alteburg in close presence of the enemy. 
 Lieutenant N received the order to advance at eight o'clock, 
 partly by the high road, partly by Alteburg, towards the 
 wood and Arnold's Height, and to drive back any weak de- 
 tachments he might meet as far as possible over the same, 
 so as to reconnodter the enemy's position. 
 
 In case of retreat, he was to retire on the supposed 
 line of outposts, which the two divisions were to occupy 
 immediately. 
 
 Object. — Object of the exercise: Besides a practice in 
 outpost and patrol duty, an enveloping attack is to be under- 
 taken against the wood which succeeds, and afterwards a 
 front attack against the height which is repulsed. 
 
 Retreat and occupation of an O'Utpost position in rear, 
 under the protection of a small detachment. Then after- 
 wards, according to the time that may be available, patrols 
 acting one against the other. 
 
J42 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 Inconvenient Occurrence. — M.v only oificer had fallen 
 sick, a stranger was attached to the company, and I did not 
 know how far he was acquainted with what I required from 
 my leaders and with my manner of acting, ('sj)ecially as re- 
 gards instruction in details. 
 
 In the morning I myself was on duty, but I hoped soon 
 after S o'clock to arrive oin the ground. As I afterwards 
 learned. Sergeant A had himself placed the outpost immedi- 
 ately on the edge of the height with a sentry over the arms 
 who could overlook the ground as far as the wood, and see 
 still further in certain parts. In order to bring the slope 
 better under tire, I wo shelter trenches were dug; the dis- 
 tances of 240 and 4so metres were marked. Non-commis- 
 sioned officer B, with 10 men, was sent forward into the 
 wi>od, and at a, near the further boundary, he i)laci'd a sen- 
 try over the arnis who could overlook the ground on both 
 sides towards the high road and towards Alteburg. A 
 patrol had been sent forward towards Alteburg with the 
 order not to proceed beyond the nearest crossway to the 
 high road, and then to return by the high road. As it met 
 the enemy before arriving there, it had retired directly on 
 the wood again at '/, and being placed in a position under 
 <over on the boundary, it protected the right flank of the 
 patrol post. 
 
 E.rample of a Fmdtif 2[anmer ,of C/jmiimmUng, caused hy 
 the Leader'.^ want of Pmetice in ;/lrinf/ I'reei.ne Ordeo's to li'm 
 Suhordhiate Jj^adcrs.—I had followed the road to Alteburg, 
 because I believed that Lieut. X, with the primcipal detach- 
 ment, would have advanced along it, as he could advanta- 
 geously do under cover. Ju.st then I heard firing in the dis- 
 tance near the high road. Rnon I saw Lieut. N standing n], 
 amongst his skirmishers, who were lying down in the ditch 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 143 
 
 of the high road, and were keeping up a fire at abbuit 260 
 metres against the detachment of non-commissioned officer 
 B. His support stood scarcely 80 paces behind him, exposed 
 on the high road in column of sections. Ajs I afterwiards 
 noticed, this happened because the officer acted on the prin- 
 ciple that nothing was to take place without his direct order. 
 Thus he had shouted back to the support, "Halt," and the- 
 leader of the support had not dared,' on his own account, to 
 give the order, "Kneel down." 
 
 At Alteburg a non-oommissioned officer was posted 
 with a section as left lateral detachment, wbo hiad received 
 only the instruction to advance on Alteburg, and to act 
 according to circumstances. He considered his detaChmernt 
 too weak to advamce further by itself until the wood had 
 been carried by Lieut. N. 
 
 I then saw Lieut. N run to the rear, to order the support 
 to double to the attack. The skirmishers began to double 
 as the support came up to them, but as on the right and left 
 of the road leading to the wood the ground was cultivated, 
 they had all to push fonvard on the road together, and the 
 support, with its leader in front, became more and more a 
 disordered mass, of which ithe rear fractions remained be- 
 hind, because with them there was no mon-commissioned 
 officer. 
 
 I no longer recognized my own men; what I had with so 
 much trouble insisted on up to the present time appeared 
 literally forgotten and lost, and only because they were led 
 in a diff!erent manner from usual. I quickly reacthed the 
 wood, whence a most effective fire was kept up on the attack- 
 ing divisions. 
 
 In order to economize cartridges, I ^made them go 
 through the motions of firing only, and as fortunately the 
 
14-1 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Joiirn-al. 
 
 bugler with the flag was with itiie detachment, I sent hiaii 
 suddenly out of the wood with the flag umfurled against the 
 assailant. 
 
 Lieut. X at once oideied "Halt" and "Rapid firing." 
 
 I ordered him to retire with the detachment. He now 
 made them right about turn and double; but it luaviug at 
 once struck him that he ought to cover himself by skir- 
 mishers, he railed out, ''The rear sectioai — front," an order 
 which was (inly partially followed, because some of the men 
 lielicvcd the hist section was referred to. 
 
 As he was now hastening to make the meu front prop- 
 erly, he failed to observe that thusc' who faa.d already fronled 
 wci'c standing with shouldered arms waiting for an order as 
 to what they sh(i\ild do. 
 
 Thus the men had no longer a mutual understanding 
 with their oflicer, because from the first he bad always 
 iVtnclhi commanded them as a body in cloise order, and had 
 nivt allowed the iion-comniissioiied officers of the skirmisliens 
 any latitude for independent action. By this means even 
 intelligent non-commissioned officers had been brought to 
 quite a passive line of action and did nothing to re-establish 
 order. 
 
 For a z"alous com]ian\- csimtnander there is nothijig 
 which can so easily put him out as when ihe sees how an 
 otherwise intelligent leader, who is equally full of zeal, and 
 with the best will in the \\ orld, so acts as to compromise the 
 instruction and intelligence of liis subordinates. 
 
 I was on the point of intervening severely, but quickly 
 thought better of it, as by so doing I should not have im- 
 proved matters. The officer, as an excuise, would have 
 thrown all the blame on the want of understanding of the 
 non-commissioned officers and men, as being incapable of 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. I45 
 
 acting without orders or of understanding tbe orders itbey 
 received.* 
 
 I therefore confined myself to giving the officer an lorder 
 to form a rear guard, and to reitire along the high road, as 
 far as behind the nearest houses. 
 
 AjS the officer wished again to command the men directly 
 what to do, I told him to entrust the same to a non- 
 commissioned officer, who would of himself- carry out what 
 was necessary. The officer then quite understood what I 
 meant; the non-commissioned officer ordered his seotion to 
 take position on the road as a rear guard, and this order the 
 men at once executed witli intelligence, because tihey now 
 understood what was required of them. 
 
 The detachment which was continuing its retreat was 
 not yet re-formed in order, and, as it is difficult to reorgan- 
 iz^e sections whiioh have turned to the rear during the march, 
 J directed the officer only to retake the proper formation 
 when under cover. It is, indeed, well to exercise the men 
 in finding, at amy moment, their correct place, but in practice 
 it is still more important to accustom them to join on, tem- 
 porarily, to the nearest section, either during or after a 
 fight, so as not to lose time in seeking for their correct place, 
 and thereby disturb the order of ithe other men. 
 
 Critical Remarks and Fresh Orders. — On the march, I 
 
 *Wlhen in the 'instruction of one's compamy it is desired to spe- 
 cially train the leaders, care must be taljen not to blame them in a 
 passionate manner before their subordinates. One can always pre- 
 suppose that they are well-intentioned, and even if this should not be 
 the case, or the leader should have the conceit of thinking he under- 
 stands as well as his superior, more in the long run will be obtained 
 by deliberate personal calmness, than by anger. The latter n&ver 
 leads to the desired resiult; the former at the least does so in most 
 cases, and then thoroughly and mot only outwardly. There are, how- 
 ever, oases when it is very difficult to maintain this calmness, and 
 therefore an intelligent subordinate must not at once think his 
 authority compromised if something in an angry tone is said to him 
 by any one. , ( ! , 1 ' 
 
 13- 
 
146 Ej'tracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 asked the oftiem- why he liad attacked in close order? "lU- 
 had wished to drive baclv the small detachment of the enemy 
 as quickly as possible.'' "But without suflflciently knowinj? 
 whether there was a support behind it or not !'' Supposing 
 even that a similar attack eould succeed on a<tive service — 
 in peace-lime, when it is necessary to practice oneself in lead- 
 ing' ones detachment, with the smallest loss, to a succivssful 
 result, and when one has to accustom the men to am oppor- 
 tune use of their anns — such a manner ol actiiifi' must, once 
 for all, lie prohibited. 
 
 "("ro now behind the nearest farm; leave two sections 
 there, with the order to move forward a^i^in towards the 
 wood only when they .see you advance with your detachanemt 
 to the attack from Alteburf;-, and you yourself ^iroceed, as 
 much under cover as possible, towards Altebur^, in order 
 to attack tlH' wood from thence or from ^Marieiiburf;- with 
 your skirmishers, advancing by rushes and enve]'0])iii<;- the 
 position." 
 
 I thus endeavored, by means of deitailed instructions, 
 without ciifirch/ suppressing the officer's initiaflive, to c^atise 
 him to carry out his leading more in accordance with my in- 
 tentions, lie was intelligent enough to quickly put himself 
 right in this matter. 
 
 The leadei of his rear guard, wheal the dejiloyed section 
 reached the road in retrea-r — as the enemy did not folloivv — 
 had left behind a head near the high road, and the remaining 
 men he had placed in file in the ditch on the other side of the 
 road. Here, all that was required was that each man fol- 
 lowed, in the best order he could, provided he moved quickly. 
 The ofQoer now directed the non-commissioned officer to re- 
 main in occupation of the nearest farm, for which purpose 
 he would place another section at his disposal, and only to 
 proceed to the attack against the wood when he saw the 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 147 
 
 officer liimself about to attack from Alteburg. He then him- 
 self went quickly to his main body, which had already 
 reached the farm, directed a non-commissioned officer to re- 
 main behind with a section, under Ihe command of the first 
 named non-commissioned officer, quickly placed in order the 
 rest of his men, and then went further back on the high road, 
 in order to turn to the right, and so to reach Alteburg as 
 ^much as possible under cover. 
 
 It was a great satisfaction to me to see how the officer 
 who had just commanded so injudiciouslj' understood now 
 how to rajpidly make correct a'ud intelligent arrangements — 
 a proof how a practical man very quickly takes a line which 
 is in accordance with common sense. 
 
 I now left him to himself, and rode over towards the 
 wood, where I had before remarked that a certain number 
 of the men had not intelligently taken advantage of cover. 
 
 Critical Remwrks on the Conduct of the Non-commissioned 
 Officer, and of the Men during the Defense. — •Non-commis- 
 sioned officer B had ailready withdrawn his men as far as 
 the sentry over the arms, but the patrol still lay on Ms right 
 flank, in observation of the section at Alteburg. I caused 
 the flag to be at once furled. I then asked if be had sent a 
 report to Sergeant A of the enemy's attack. He showed me 
 a sihort written report which he had just finished, and was 
 about to send off. It was generally sufficient, but he had 
 neglected to forward at once to Sergeant A the first news 
 of the approach of the enemy. 
 
 He had neglected, also, to make use of the time lefore 
 the attack, to prepare for the defense. The bushes only 
 partly allowed the men to kneel behind them, so as to fire 
 with the rifles up to their shoulders. 
 
 I therefore caused the extension to be again made, so 
 that the men should place themselves properly for fii-ing, 
 
148 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 by choosing suitable bushes. In tiie use of this description 
 of cover they showed themselves unpracticed. 
 
 It is generally disadvantageous to lie down behind a 
 bush, because the view would seldom then be open. As a 
 I ule, it is best to kneel doini, and to place the aa-ni on a strong 
 branch, althoug-h the bush gives no cover agaiinst bullets. 
 If time 1m^ available, it is well, at the place where an aMack 
 is probable, to dig a rifle-pit for each man, or to make a small 
 intrcuchment quite close to a bush, so as to cover tlie men as 
 much as possil)k', as well from the eye of the enemy as from 
 his bullet. 
 
 On asking the men the distance up to the high road, I 
 ascertained that the non-commissioned officer had not called 
 their attention to this point; the faulty comduct of the men 
 in their defense was thus accounted for. Great stress must 
 alirai/s he laid upon this, (inil It is a fuinl thoufihtlessncss on the 
 part of a leader if he does not make use of the time available 
 to prepare his men for an expected attack, so thnt they 
 ean at onee eommeuec irith a. ste-adi/ and u:eU-direeted fire. 
 
 Renevnl of the Attaek from the direetion of Alteburg. — In 
 the meantime Lieutenant N, as he approached Alteburg, had 
 advanced a section at the double, as advanced guard, up to 
 the section which was already posted there, and be himself 
 went to the most advanced sections. In this case his per- 
 sonal presenre was there necessary, in order to be able to 
 arrange directly his advance according to the nature of the 
 ground. Xor did it matter that the support was now rather 
 close behind ihim, as it had a position under cover; on the 
 contrary, it is an advantage, as well for the attack as for 
 the defense, when the support, either in close or open order, 
 can be placed close by. 
 
 It is otherwise, however, on open ground, if the leader of 
 the whole goes, during the preliminary operations of the 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 149 
 
 fight, to the most advanced groups, and remains with them, 
 as he thus causes the support to follow too soon and too 
 closely, and to suffer uninecessary losses, or else to extend 
 without order as skirmishers. He must therefore choose a 
 standpoint whence he can observe the enemy, and be able, at 
 the same time, to make himself understood by signs, by the 
 leader of the support, as soon as it should join in /the attack.* 
 
 From Alteburg the cultivated fields prevented a direct 
 advance against the wood; the attack had, therefore, to be 
 made from Marienburg. Only one section oould be posted 
 along the ridge of a field, so as to protect the fiank march 
 to Marienburg. 
 
 Enveloping Attack {commenced at a distance, because of 
 Cultivated Fields). — Lieutenant N gave the first section the 
 order to advance along the ridge, about 150 paces towards 
 the wood, the men singly, one behind the other. 
 
 Tlie detachment near the high road noiw also went f or- 
 
 *Attentioai cannot be drawn foraibly enicmgh to the importance of 
 the leader, in peace-time, giving proper thought as to which would be 
 the right place for him to occupy during a fight. Because, in peace- 
 time, it is so much easier to ooannnond, during a fight, froan the front 
 than from the rear, and because especially a leader likes to ascer- 
 tain for himself the position and strength of the enemy, one occa- 
 sionally sees officers looking ajbouit at the enemy's position in front 
 of their own line of skirmisihers when firing, so that they may see 
 hiow to make their arraoigeiments. 
 
 In war it Wiould also be much easier to command, if it were possi- 
 ble to find oneself immediately in front of tihe line of skirmishers, 
 when practicable, mounted, so as at all times to be seen by everyone, 
 and to be able to move rajpidly to the supiport, so as to bning it at the 
 right moment to the right place. 
 
 But one should neither accustom oneself, nor one's subordinates, 
 to what is not possible in war. Subordinate leaders who in peace- 
 time have not been allowed the smallest independence when in the 
 line of skirmi^ers, because they receive detailed orders for every- 
 thiog to be done, bcome in war too 'independent, and believe they are 
 justified in being so, if they do not see their superior, and do not 
 even know where he is stationed. When hoiwever, in peace time, the 
 latter acts on the principle of always placing himself where he caji 
 hcxt direct the separate fractions of his detachments, and at the same 
 time maintain their cohesion, then also in war will his suhordinatea 
 paj' attentioin to the general action of the whole, and not wrongly seek 
 to act independently. 
 
150 Extracis from an Infantry Captain's Jourmil. 
 
 ward, with a group deplored in the ditch; the second sec- 
 tion followed, in close order, at a proper distance. Non- 
 comniLssioned officer B had now to consider how loii^ he 
 could withstand such an inconvenient and enveloping at- 
 tack. As lotig as possible is the first answer for every leader- 
 He only ought not to allow himself to he eiif off in an ad- 
 vanced position. Consequently, he must withdraw himself 
 in time, ai ihe kist moment, with his detachment, from the 
 enveloping maneuver. 
 
 The non-commissioned officer took at once the proper 
 measures; he told off 4 men to detain the two sections on 
 the road as long as possible, and intended with the other 
 ;? men to march off to the right and reinforce the patrol. 
 
 I here drew attention to two points: 
 
 1. T^ie 4 men ought to receive a formal order to irUh- 
 dinir slowly through the wood before n superior attack, and 
 whilst doing so not to lose communication with the non- 
 commissioned officer. 
 
 2. The non-commissionedofficerought to disappearwith 
 the 3 men quite unobserved and take up a position on the 
 farther bound-ary, also unobserved, so that llie enemy might 
 remain quite in the dark as to hoir manij he had opposed to 
 him. 
 
 It was so carried out. The attack was now made in the 
 following manner: 
 
 From the high road, the most advanced group of skir- 
 mishers ran forward by rushes alongside the road about 150 
 paces, and then again lay down to open fire; the section in 
 close order at the same time doubled in file along the ditrh 
 as far as the corner of the road and there again lay down. 
 The leader, who, on account of the good position taken up by 
 the two files in the wood, could not see bow strong the 
 enemy was there, had good reasons for keeping back the 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 151 
 
 furither attack until the turaing movement from Marien- 
 burg compelled the enemy to retreat of his own accord. 
 
 The two files which already had the intention of retir- 
 ing now remained halted. 
 
 In the meantime from Marieniburg, whence the advance 
 could only be made along one road, the advance guard had 
 moved alongside the road extended in file. As soon as it 
 came under fire of the wood, it ran forward about 50 paces 
 more and again lay down ; the non-commissioned officer com- 
 manded: "Sloiw firing." 
 
 The support followed at a tolerable distance, but in 
 close order. As in such a case I consider an advance by 
 half-divisions in file on both sides of the road to be prefer- 
 able, I rode over there, after having, first of all, said to the 
 defenders of the wood that they were to disappear shortly, 
 unobserved if possible. 
 
 Lieutenant N was again in front with the first group. 
 I pointed out to him thait he could superintend just as well if 
 farther to the rear, and then he could more easily dispose of 
 his support. He himself had already felt this, as he had 
 just wished to bring up a section as a reinforpement,and had 
 been obliged to go back to give the order. He now called 
 up to the front the foremost of the tijjree sections of the sup- 
 port, which advanced at the double in file along both sides of 
 the road and lay djown on the right of the most advanced 
 groups. The distance for firing was about 160 metres ; there- 
 fore they only fired slowly — that is to say, they observed 
 when the enemy, who was well under cover, exposed him- 
 self, and then at once fired. Both sections of the support 
 had now to form themselves by groups in file on both sides 
 ai the road and to kneel down. 
 
 I Retreat of Non-commissioned Officer B wnd Gm-ryvng of the 
 Position. — Non-commissioned ofScer Bnow gave the order to 
 
2-,2 Extructs from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 retire file by file. Although endeavors were made to carry 
 this out without being observed, the movement could, never- 
 theless, be perceived, and a non-oommissioned officer cried 
 out to Lieutenant N: "The enemy is retiring.'' Whereupon 
 the latter ordered, "To the attack— double march." The 
 boundary was quickly carried, the support followed at the 
 double. The attack was similarly carried out from the side 
 of the high road at the same moment. The detachment of 
 noncommissioned officer B ran quickly to the rear, as a re- 
 treat file by file was now impracticable, but when they ar- 
 rived amongst some tall trees, I called out to the non-com- 
 missioned officer, "Retire slowly," because here the previous- 
 ly practiced manner of "slowly retiring" could be advanta- 
 geously employed — that is to say, the men could, after re- 
 maining standing singly foi- a moment behind a tree to fire, 
 quickly run behind the next favorable tree, and so on.* 
 
 The four men of the left wing came here of their own 
 accord in communication with the rest. Non-oommissioned 
 officer B commanded them to f)ccupy quickly a ruined bake- 
 house outside till' wood at X, which was favorably placed 
 for defense of the road towards Arnold's Height, along 
 which the retreat must be continued (as the fields on the 
 right and Irft of it were cultiviuted) until the remainder of 
 the men were able to retii'c further. 
 
 As this road formed, as it were, a long defile, and as at 
 about 120 paces only from the wood cover was afforded by a 
 slight elevation of the ground, to a retreating detachment, it 
 
 *It is very advisable to practice this in peace-time, because It 
 gives an opportunity for exercising the iutelUgemce of Individual men 
 in quiclvly recognizing and mailing use of cover, and at the same time 
 accustoms them to a steady retreat though in rapid movement. 
 
 \^'here there is a wood which favors such a retreat (with tall 
 trees and devoid of underwood), it should not be neglecited to prac- 
 tice all the men in this special exercise in order to accustom them to 
 tms manner of retreating— and equally so of adr/inriiu/ in pursuit. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 153 
 
 was necessar'y,as soon as thewood was vacated, to give up the 
 sLow method of retiring and to run quickly behind the eleva- 
 tion, and the four men, although their posl'tion behind the 
 bake-house was very favorable, were obliged to fallow the 
 others quickly. Non-commissioned officer B very properly 
 gave the order as soon as he reached the road: "Double 
 march — up to behind the height." 
 
 Pursuit. — In the meantime Lieutenant N had followed 
 very hastily, with the otoject of accomplishing Ms mission 
 of pressing forward to Arnold's Height as quickly as 
 possible. 
 
 Four of his groups deployed had united near the bake- 
 house, and the boundary of the wood close to the road, and 
 on both sides of the latter (there was also at that plaice the 
 section which had been detached from Alteburg, had made 
 the attack with the other groups and had pushed forward 
 througih the wood at the same level). Behind the right 
 wing one section followed in close order; behind the left, 
 three. Arrived at the boundary. Lieutenant N caused the 
 latter to wheel to the left in order to fire another volley at 
 the retreating enemy, before he found shelter behind the 
 elevation. I allowed this to be done, although against such 
 a small detachment more cartridges were expended than 
 were necessary. 
 
 But, when Lieutenant N wished to make the four ex- 
 tended groups, which had assembled on the road, continue 
 the pursuit, I prevented it, as it appeared to me a more 
 useful practice to cause the road to be considered as a regu- 
 lar defile. 
 
 Preliminary Operations [of the Attack agaimst Arnold's 
 Height. — At first only two groups were to immediately follow 
 the enemy, who had, of his own accord, continued has retreat 
 towards Arnold's Height; these were to fire on him when 
 
 14— 
 
■^r^^ Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 possible and to endeavor to gain the high giiound he had 
 abandoned. 
 
 With a view of not getting in disorder when runniuy, 
 each of these groups remained in file on one side of the road 
 ready to form line as soon as the ground permitted it. 
 
 The lateral patrols, one right and the other left, were 
 then told oti from the most intelligent men of the support, 
 which, in the meantime, had formed up under cover; theise 
 were to endeavor to advance along the ridges between the 
 fields until they could ascertain wbellier funther massed 
 detachments were posted behind Arnold's Height. 
 
 The support was 'only to advance to allacvk the heigibt 
 when it was known that there \\ere no strong detachments 
 of the enemy there, and the attack was to be made by suc- 
 cessive reinforcements of the skirmiishers, and in advanc- 
 ing by rushes. 
 
 After 1 had caused these arrangements to be made by 
 Lieutenant X, I rode over towards the height. 
 
 On the road I observLKl tliat Sergeant A was causing a 
 shelter trench to be occupied by a section. If in this case 
 he had made the men advance by creeping to the position, 
 nothing whatever would have been seen of thean, aoiid the 
 assailant would have remained unaware of the strength of 
 the detachment — an advantage of which a defender ehould 
 never lose sight, as he thereby increases the chances of 'his 
 success. i further saw how non-commissioned officer B, 
 when he arrived at the height, wished to move directly on 
 the position, but, by means of a sign made by Sergeant A at 
 the proper moment, he was induced to go round l:he bright 
 to unite there with the support. 
 
 In this manner Sergeant A had still three sections in 
 close order as support, and was in position, if he used them 
 properly in a favorable situation, to drive back a detach- 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 155 
 
 ment of ait least double Lis strengith, as the approiach up to 
 about 240 metres from the position could only be made along 
 one road ; from thence, if it were possible for the assailant 
 to deploy and to make use of some small dover for 'his fur- 
 ther adv-anoe, still he would not be able to gain the height 
 itself except by an attack on quite open ground. 
 
 When by some questions such as, "Hofw wouM he rein- 
 force his skirmishers? "VN'hen would he make use of his last 
 support?" I had convinced myself that he had as yet no 
 clear idea as to how he should make the utmost use of the 
 advantages of his position, I drew his attention to the 
 following : 
 
 1. To caution the leaders of groups that the enemy's 
 skirniisiliers should be allowed to approadh quietly to within 
 300 paces without a shot being fired, in order then to surprise 
 them before they could take cover, by a sudden and effective 
 fire by ranks. 
 
 But as soon as the enemy had throicn himself down be- 
 hind cover to fire, no further shot should be given against his 
 sheltered skirmishers; this was the way to draw 'him still 
 nearer, and then to again surprise 'him by a sudden and well- 
 aimed fire. Such a description of fire has a greater moral 
 effect than a fire continued without interruption, and in the 
 long run makes the assailant fear to again run forward from 
 cover, because he is certain he will then be at once over- 
 whelmed with bullets. Besides, the defender can, when not 
 firing, keep himsielf so under cover thiatithe assailant can do 
 him little harm with his fire.* 
 
 *I>etax;lh'meiruts in close order should never be allowed to come on 
 to within 300 paces; it is then that one feels so fully equal to them 
 as to hope by a mdden close fire to destroy them (cavalry, for instance) . 
 
 On fhe either hand, skirmishers wall be more imposed upon and 
 more haaim will be done tihem if on open groiund t(hey aire alloweid to 
 oame nearer and fire is opened upon them suddjeniy before they can 
 find cover or throw themselves dawn. 
 
 This is a good means in peace-time of practicing fire discipline 
 and calmness in a figlit. 
 
156 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 2. A group should be at once posted iiiiobscrrcd. so that 
 it can file well down the I'oad, and must rin'tMve the order to 
 direct its fire on advancing reinforceuien'ts or supports at 
 from about ■V2() metres, and againsi supports formed in close 
 order at about 4S() metres. 
 
 3. The support should keep under cover, lying dowi: 
 close behind the skirmishers i-eady to be made use of at the 
 proper moment. 
 
 4. Agaiusl the right lat<-ral jiatrol o'f the enemy (whicli 
 had already gradually a])j)r(iacth('(l llie geulle slojxes of the 
 hill by running forward from cover to cover), one file should 
 be placed under shelter with order to fire on this jtatrol, but 
 only at elfective range. Against the other jiatrol it did 
 not apftear that any sjiecial measure of ]irecaulion was 
 necessary. 
 
 Accordingly the group already posted w,as warned not 
 to lire on the enemy's skirmisliers, befon; tJhey began to 
 attack the height in fro'ut when debouching from tihe road. 
 The commander of the group was to 'Order the commence- 
 ment as well as the cessation of firing. 
 
 A second group tihrew itself unobserved into the .shelter 
 trt-noh on the right wing, whence the road for about 410 
 metres, nearly its whole length, could be brought under 
 ettective fire. 
 
 The support remained lying bcihind, completely under 
 cover, but was so close tluit in caise of necc^ssity it could, by 
 simply rising up, join in the lire.* 
 
 ConviU'iicriiiiiit of the Attack and CoikIiiH of the Defender. 
 — The two m(»st advanced groups of the assaihint, .as they 
 
 *As previously explained, there is for a defender no better means 
 of repulsing a sui)eriior front a,ttaek than to keep tlie support close 
 behJTid the line of skirmishers well under cover until the last attack, 
 and then to make a sudden employmemt oif lit wirth voUeys or rapid 
 tiring; but when a turning attack takes place at the same time, tlie 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 157 
 
 were not fired uipou, had, in the meantime, formed them- 
 selves in line right and left of the road, where they threw 
 themselves down at first under slight oover; but as here they 
 could neither themselves fire effectively nor be fired at, they 
 went further forward .against the height. 
 
 At bhis moment shots were suddenly fired; the moral 
 effect of the same was seen even at an exercise at peace-time 
 for the men at once threw themselves flat on the ground. 
 The left flank group, at the command of its leader, then ran 
 quickly behind a small elevation to ithe left front. On the 
 other hand, there remained nothing for the right group but 
 to creep somewhat to the rear again into a small hollow 
 which ofl'ered a trifling oover. 
 
 Lieutenant N had followed with the support in close 
 order 300 paces in rear, and had at the same time been fired 
 upon by the second group; he therefore at once caused his 
 men to lie down, and tihen sent at the douible two groups in 
 file on the right and left of the road, to reinforce the left 
 wing. He 'himself advanced with these groups, which dur- 
 ing their movement were under continuously heavy fire. 
 But as soon as they had thrown themselves down beliind a 
 slight cover on the left wing, the fire of the defenders sud- 
 denly ceased, and scarcely anything was to be seen of them. 
 
 In order to reach the defenders, tfiere were still nearly 
 300 paces to be traversed. 
 
 The left lateral patrol reported that nothing of the ene- 
 my was to be seen behind the height. The right one had by 
 rushes already ascended half the height following an easy 
 
 defender must certaiiily keep his supiport so far off that in case of 
 necessity it cam toe eimployed to i-eimiforce one of tlie wings, ami that 
 is the reason why a defender, when exposed to a toiming attack, 
 generally only employs Ms smpport in coviering the retreat, and this 
 is best dome, as was the ease with the Freineh, by a short counter- 
 attack, which gives breathing-time for a moment. 
 
 15— 
 
158 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 slope, but was here suddenly fired upon and bad to rellr(> 
 quickly. 
 
 Lieutenant X i-ecognized tliat an attack toad little el\aiu-e 
 of success, but he wished at least not to leave anything un- 
 tried. He theicfoi-e signed to the support to advance at the 
 double. The leader very intelligently caused it to form in 
 file by half-divisions, and thus to advance at the double on 
 both sides of the road. 
 
 Naturally it was all the time under fire, but as this fir- 
 ing forced the defender to show himself more, the latter re- 
 ceived h(vavy lire from the skirmishers of Hie assailant. In 
 the meantiuie the caution was passed to biotli wdngs of the 
 line of skirmishers, "r*repare for the atta-ck." 
 
 As soon as the support had approached to 50 paces from 
 its skiriuislicrs, Lieutenant N cried out, "Stand up — domble 
 march!'' 
 
 The defender, who in the ni(»antnme liad so jdaccd his 
 sup])orit that it ^^as only necessary foi- the men to rise to their 
 knees to be able to fire, received this attack with rapid firing. 
 The distance', \\'hen under such a fire, and with the men bur- 
 dened witli their knapsacks, was still too consideraible for 
 the assailant to pass over without drawing breath, and the 
 attack having thus of itself come to a standstill, I had to 
 declare that 1 co^nsideit'd it repulsed. The isu/pport, which 
 at the order of its leader had juist formed in line, was al- 
 ready out of breath, and certainly less in consequence of the 
 mechanical movement in running than from the excited state 
 of the men whilst doing so, wiiidh especially in jieace exer- 
 cises leads to a vei'y premature exlutuistion of their strength. 
 
 Lieutenant X ordered the support to throw itself imme- 
 diately behind the position still occupied by the skirmishers, 
 in order to cover tihe retreat. 
 
 Then he cried out to the skirmishers, "Retire slowly." 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 159 
 
 Retreat of the Assailant after the Repulsed, Attach. — I 
 quite apppoved of tilns order; to>v, if the men, on tie com- 
 mand "Retire quiclily," 'had together run to the road, they 
 would have then been heaped together in a disordered mass, 
 and the losses in action would hare toeen much greater than 
 if they had retired at once in open order, ranks firing 
 alternately. 
 
 The retreat on to the road should then hare been car- 
 iiied out sucoesisively and with regularity, as the adversary, 
 under existing circumstances, could not think oif a pursuit. 
 
 But the manner in which the order was carried »ut did 
 not at all meet my approval. I therefore oauised "Halt" to 
 be sounded, and assembled all the leaders of groups in the 
 center, in order to instruct them how they should proceed 
 in such a case. 
 
 Instructions on the Marnier of Executing the Retreat. — On 
 account of .the defile imm-cdiatclij in rem', nothing oould have 
 been more dangerous than for every one to run at the same 
 time towards it; it was therefore necessary, owing to the 
 want of every description of covier within efiEective rifle range 
 of the enemy, to endeavor to diminish the effects of ^his fire; in 
 this view, those who during the retreat halted to fire, should 
 kneel down quickly, or throw themselves on the ground, and, 
 after firing a shot, should as quickly rise up and run back 
 for 40 — 50 paces (behind the skirmisheris lying down nearest 
 to them), and then again front towards the enemy, and it'hrow 
 themselves down quickly to load. They were then ready to 
 fire again wlien the skirmishers in front of them in a similar 
 way ran past them. Such a manner of acting in quite open 
 ground when in the field presents no difficulty after some 
 practice in its execution, especially if, as here was the case, 
 detachments had been already posted on the wings, which 
 by their fire kept down the fire of the enemy. 
 
](50 Extracis from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 In order, in future, to arcustom tlie men to this, I de- 
 cided that heiu-efiirth. at rituiiiany drill, "retiring slowly" 
 should be praclired on the parade-jirouud in the manner 
 aUove explainrd. unless it were iilherwise si>eeiaillY ordered 
 (by yrouiis, foi' instance). It aitiieared *o me very importaul 
 that the movement of the skirmishers on the parade- ground 
 should ((inform as much as possible with the conduct they 
 ought to fdlldw in the opeu country. ' 
 
 Aflcr having at ouce caused one groui) to go through 
 line movement in (iuesli(ui, I said again tn Lieulcu;a.ul N that 
 lie was to cITecl his retrt^it t'luough tine defile, by successive 
 groujis at the donlilc. so as lo lessen the iirobabk* effects of 
 the enemyV tire, a proceeding wh.ich can naturally only be 
 carried out with regularity if the ene]n\' does not pursue. 
 I then caused the exercise to Ive omitlhued, couHueiicing 
 again from that time when the skirmislHMs received the 
 order, "Hclire slowly." 
 
 E.i-icuti(ni of tlif Ritrtdt. — This was then carried out tol- 
 ei-ably skillfully as far as the limit of the field, where Lieu- 
 tft'nant >>' made them all front, and then gave the order, "Re- 
 tire by groiijis from the righl wing, at the double on to the 
 road." 
 
 Each group successively moved to the left, douibled 
 along in rear of the skirmishers, and wheeled to the left on 
 to the road, and then continued for some 100 paces still at 
 the double; they then broke into quick time, until, in com- 
 pliance with the instructions given by Lieutenant N when 
 they passed him, they again fronted under cover behind the 
 small height. Lieutenant X remained at flrsi with the divi- 
 sion in support, and when all the groups of skirmishers had 
 passed beyond him, he ordered the leader of the support 
 to follow as rear guard, also by groups, but to make the 
 first groups take position behind the height in order to rally 
 the others. " ' 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. Ig] 
 
 He then went to the other division, which during that 
 time had re-forined, and made it retire towards the road. I 
 now causied the assembly to be sounded, and all the men to 
 come near the wood. 
 
 since it was now too late to cause outposts to be placed 
 by the retreating detachment, as I had at flnst intended, I 
 only examined with the leaders of groups the conduct they 
 would have to follow in such a case; a half -division must 
 have been left at the woiod as a protection; one division sent 
 to Alteburg, in order to establish itself as an outpost on the 
 boundary of Bayenthal; the other half -division on the road 
 as an outpost. The half-division left behind would in like 
 manner have retired on to the road, and have placed itself 
 there as support for the outpost there posted. 
 
 Conduct of a Greepvng Patrol* when Advancmg from Ar- 
 nold's Height, through the Wood. — I caused the patrol leaders ' 
 to step to the front, and ask them the questions: 
 
 "How will a creeping patrol have to act which, after 
 the wood has been abandoned by the half -division, is sent 
 forward from Arnold's Height towards the wood, in order 
 to learn where the enemy had retired? 
 
 "In what manner ought the three men to traverse the 
 wood?" 
 
 I received the answer: "In such a way as not to be seen, 
 two in front and one behind the center." 
 
 "Thro'Ugh the center of tiie wood?" I asked. 
 
 "No; one man should go along the boundary." 
 
 "But if, in the meantime, a patrol of the enemy can ap- 
 proach the wood unobserved on the other side, is there no 
 danger of being cut off?" 
 
 *In tbe United States service there is no patrol specifically desig- 
 nated as a "creeping patrol," but all small patrols move "cautiously 
 but not timidly, seeking in every way to see witliout being seen."— 
 [A. L. W.] 
 
162 Estracts from an Infantry Captain's Jonrnal. 
 
 "Xo, because the enemy s patrol could just as easily be 
 taken prisoiu^r.'' 
 
 "That is right, but dn sueh a small wotxl it is always 
 more advisable not to go through the center, but to send one 
 man along one boundai-y, and two alon;; the other, sio that 
 they can see around them on both sides at the same time." 
 
 Even if in such a case tlie^' canniit coiistaintl}' see one 
 auolhcr, ihey will nevectlick'ss mcc4 on the further bound- 
 ary, and if it conies to the \\ors.t, can always warn one an- 
 olher by a signal shot. 
 
 When the foi'ther boundary is reached, each must loolc 
 well arouud him on his own side, after placing himself under 
 loNi'r; they must then meet together, mioving also under 
 cover, and communicate what they have seen, and arra.nge 
 tlieir fui'ther proceeding. 
 
 Having determined to practice this, if possible, anoithci- 
 (lay, I now marclied off witli the conijiajiy by IMapienburg and 
 Altelmrg, -So as to exercise on this ground the divisiion of 
 Sci-geant A, which had taken but a small i>a.rt in the diay's 
 (.)pi»rations, and I caused at to advance by rushes against a 
 su]i]»ised pf)sition, in taking advantage of the nature of the 
 gi-ound. 
 
 I also caused Sergeant A, under the sujiposition of his 
 attack having succeeded, to i)ractice a pursuit of the sup- 
 posed enemy, in order to still more accustom the leadeis of 
 groups in deciding on ]iiHnii]>t resolutions and orders, and 
 the men in ]iracticing the same with calmness and order. 
 
EiEtraots from cm Infantry Captain's Journal. 163 
 
 FOURTH EXERCISE. 
 
 Exercise for Patrols. 
 
 The — June, morning (see Fig 8). — I made uise of this 
 day, which was a working day, in order to carry out a special 
 exercise in patrolling, with the available non-commissioned 
 ofliceES, lance-corporals, and men, who were to be trained for 
 this duty. I marched with this small deitachment fnom 
 Diinnwald, into the wood near Hahn" house, then alomg the 
 road towards Solmelleweide, and made them pile arms at a. 
 On the road, in order to prove the men's knowledge of find- 
 ing their way, I caused all the small side roads to be ob- 
 served and asked questions as to where they led. In the 
 same way I asiked the names of the places which caiue in 
 sight, and when opportunity offered, I explained how one or 
 another point of view might be reached without being 
 observed. 
 
 In this way 1 tried to accustom the men to acquire a 
 military eye for country. 
 
 My intention was to carry out at first the following 
 special exercises : 
 
 1. To cause a creeping patrol to creep upto an enemy's 
 sentry or patrol. 
 
 2. To make a creeping patrol creep past a sentry or 
 halted patrol of the enemy. 
 
 3. Conduct oif a pa,trol posted in front of the line of 
 sentries. 
 
 4. Retreat of a creeping patrol before a patrol of the 
 en'emy. 
 
 The clearings in the wood, the inequalities of the 
 ground, and the dhange from large trees to more or less thick 
 
Ig4 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 underwood, combined together to present a fa\(>i-aible oppor- 
 tunity for practicing all tliese things in a somewhat iv- 
 slricted spate, so that the eoujduct of earh individual man 
 could be supervised. 
 
 1. Approavli to aw Encnu/'s Snitri/ hy a CrccpiiKj Patrol. 
 — I then caused the whole of the men, with the exception of 
 two, to advance along the noad towards Schnelknveide, sufli- 
 cienlly far as to be quite out of siight, and I remained behind 
 w ith the two nu^n, in order to post them on the road, as much 
 under cover as piissible. Tihe steep slope offered an oppor- 
 tunity of jilacing thein in such a way that, whiM havinj; (he 
 wood al only 100 metres in front of them, they were still able 
 to overlook the road, aind the clearings to the right and left, 
 and to ]>lace tbcniselves lolei-ably under cover in a small 
 waterc(mrse on the slof>e. I made them stand with ordered 
 arms, but told lih<"m they might lie down a.s soon as they 
 observed anything 8usi)ici()us, and I instructed them to fire a 
 sli(»t as soDu as a patrol of the rneiuy should aj>prioa(ili sufti- 
 ciently near the boundary of the wond as to be easily hit. 
 They wcr<' to pay no attenticra to men who would look on as 
 s]>cctators. I then rode quickly after the detachment, a,nd 
 made them front towards Diinuwald, under cover near the 
 road. 
 
 I now said to three intelligent men: "I will suppose 
 them lo be sent as a creeping ])atrol from Schnelleweide in 
 the direction of Hahn house." 
 
 I then explained to tlieiii myself, how Ibey should ad- 
 vance prertty chjse up to the point indicated, the first man 
 on the right side of the road, so that he could see over the 
 height there into the wood on the right; the second man at 
 the same height on the left side of the road; the connecting 
 man about 50 metres behind, also to the right of the road, so 
 that he also could overlook the wood on the right where the 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 165 
 
 inequalities of the ground did noit i>ermit of seeing far, and 
 could at the same time see down the road. 
 
 I called the attention of the men, wiho were ooUected 
 together, to 'the fact that in ground difficult to overlook 
 creeping patrols s'hould, ais a rule, take a road as line of direc- 
 tion, and that this road must always be kept in sight by at 
 leasit one man, who, as far as possible, should not let himself 
 be seen at a distance. 
 
 I further pointed out that, on account of the increasing 
 sp^reness of the wood, the man on the left side of the road 
 would soon become visible from a distance; the patrol-leader 
 should, therefore, signal to him to go over to the right 
 side, the more so as from thence it was possible to see just 
 as far to the left. 
 
 The patrol-leader consequently whistled softly to the 
 left man and signalled him to cross over. Tlhe man ran, 
 stooping down, over the road to the patrol-leader, who told 
 hiim in a low tone to advance with caution along The road. 
 He himself moved more to tlie right, but in such a way as to 
 keep the other two in view. I now made the men who were 
 looking on advance somewhat more quickly along the left 
 side of the road, so that they could observe the conduct of 
 the patrol. 
 
 I allowed the latter to continue on its own account, al- 
 though I well saw that it was not approaehirig the boundary 
 of the wood with sufficient caution, for I perceived how the 
 double sentries completely lay down, and removed their 
 forage-caps carefully, a sign that they must have remarked 
 something of the patrol. 
 
 The latter indeed appeared to observe the sentries, but 
 in spite of this, continued to advance towards the boundary, 
 and certainly well stooping down. 
 
 A shot was now fired from the post at about 100 metres 
 
 16- 
 
166 Extiacts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 ;|i;ainsr the juitrol, whiich at once halted and threw itself 
 down. 
 
 I now assembled ail the men near the patrol on the 
 other side of the road, and also made the sentries approaeh, 
 so that they might all receive instrnetion. 
 
 I caiisi'd the [witrol to go baek to the jioint where it had 
 first seen the sentries. I said: "In advancinf; af^ainst an en- 
 emy's jiosl, irt is s\iffieient to advanet' so far as to be convinced 
 (»f its iireseiiie. Kut if the patrol-le.ader tliiinks that by 
 creeping si ill further forwaid he can discover more of the 
 enemy's juiNifion, he signs to tlie otliei' two men to liailt, and 
 creeps forward alone as much unobserved as possible." 
 
 1 now caused two other men to go to the post of the 
 double sentries, with the order to fire as soon as they saw 
 more of the advancing ])atrol than the head of a man. I 
 then caused tli<' patrol to be relieved, and directed that the 
 instructions I 'had given should be followed. 
 
 .The man who was on the road was the tirst able to see 
 the double post; he had, thei'cfore, to at once whistle softly 
 to the leader, who was on the right of hini. and tell him in a 
 low tone: "A double sentry of the enemy." 
 
 He had prudently thrown himself down on the ground, 
 in sucha \\ay that he couM only see straight before him over 
 the height. 
 
 The patrol-leadi^r now signalled to this m^an to remain 
 behind, and as he could not see sufflcdently far from the 
 point where he was, he crept forward to near the boundary, 
 until he could see the clearings not only to the front, but to 
 the right and left, in such a way that he could also have ob- 
 sers-ed any sentries wiich might have been placed on the 
 further boundary. 
 
 As no shot was fired at Mm, it was to be concluded that 
 he had remained unseen whilst making his observation and 
 in oreeping forward. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 167 
 
 I also pointed out that it would be the duty of the other 
 two men, if in the meantime any danger had threatened 
 their loader, to fire at once, so that he could immediately 
 have retired. I then ordered such a signal-shot to be fired, 
 under the supposition that a hostile patrol was approaching 
 from the left. 
 
 AVhen the shot was fired the patrol-leader came back 
 to the patrol as much under cover as possible, but quickly, 
 and they told liim ^n a low tone: "A patrol of the enemy is 
 coming from the left." 
 
 I now pointed out how the patrol was to act in order to 
 disappear from before the supposed enemy's patrol, and to 
 withdraw on to the outpost. 
 
 They would have to withdraw quickly towards the right 
 into the wood, till they could no longer be seen, then to retire 
 quickly for a certain distance, and aifterwards to again cau- 
 tiously approach the road, so as to observe if the patrol of 
 the enemy were following, and then to retire atongside the 
 road to the outpost, to make a report. It would be a mis- 
 take to reimain too long in observation of an enemy's patrol, 
 because then the report regarding it would arrive so much 
 later at the outpost. I intended, later on, to practically 
 carry out something similar. 
 
 2. A Greepimg Patrol passing in front of a Stationary 
 Patrol of the Enemy. — The detached men again fell into the 
 ranks. A new patrol was told off and sent baxik in the direc- 
 tion of Schnelleweide, with the onder to front when out of 
 sight, and there to await my instructiens. As soon as they 
 had started, I told off three men to retire in the direction of 
 Hahn house, and to advance thence again as a patrol, with 
 instruction's to place themselves as a standing patrol at the 
 clearing, and to observe the road to Schnelleweide. 
 
 I then rode off to the first patrol, and instructed it to 
 
168 E-rlracis fiom an Infantry Captahi's Journal. 
 
 advance as a civi'piiif; patrol, and to endeavor to i recii as 
 far forward as to obtain, if ])ossible, a view towards Hailin 
 hinise. They wine to know, liowever. thai the road toward.s 
 Schiielhweide was nnder observalion of the enemy. 
 
 The patrol-leader understood what I wislied, and moved 
 at iiiire in the direction Inwards the left, near Ihe jioint of 
 the wiKid at h. He told the sec<nid man to remain on his 
 risht, SI) that by looldnji through the wood he eould observe 
 as far as the mad. The third man was to follow a second 
 one at a certain distance. 
 
 The three nu'n advameil quicddy rlese to tlie boundary, 
 for they su|i|iiisiid i-orrectly that thi-re was ,no advantage in 
 rieepinj; iu this jiart of the wood, whicli was very open and 
 rlear nf underwnod, where a cree]iiiig and sbiwiy moving 
 man could be seen just as far as one moving rapidly. 
 
 I rude back ti) the detachment, and sa-w that in the 
 meantime the standing iiatrol*had so iiosted itself at a that a 
 man was l\'ing ilown at the same s]iDt where before tin- 
 double seiitryhad stood, and that the other two men, on the 
 contrary, were standing at the boundary on the other side 
 of the road behind trees. 
 
 These latter were sultici'ently attentive as to jierceive 
 the jiatrol of the enemy in the neighborhood of h, as it 
 a]i]ir()aihed the boundary. They remained standing, and 
 the ]iatriil of the enemy also, which ha;d certainly remarked 
 the three men. took up a position nnder covi^r. 
 
 lint, after a pause, they all three ran across the narrow 
 clearing to the little wood lying ojiixisite. T quickly rode 
 there, and made them return to their i)lace, and told them, 
 if they wished to endeavor further to carry out the missinn 
 
 *A jxdrfilUng post would practically be the same as a "standing 
 patrol." tliovigh "It nia.v either keep moving or remain stationary at 
 the limit of the distance to which it is ordered to patrol."— [A. L. W.l 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 169 
 
 entrusted to them, Ihe.y must leave one man beMnd, at fhe 
 boundary on this side,, in order at once to fire a shot in case 
 the enemy's patrol should endeavor to move on to their flank 
 without being seen. 
 
 The two men moving in advance must, however, proceed 
 as quickly as possible through the wood, and sihould they 
 see themselves actually cut off on one side, they would have 
 to withdraw quickly towards the opposite side. In case 
 they heard a signal-shot fired, they must abandon any fur- 
 ther attempt to carry out their mission. 
 
 They proceeded in accordance with these instructions. 
 The men of the standing patrol at first appeared irresolute 
 as to what they should do when they saw two men again 
 run over towards the wood. 8oon, however, tihey decided 
 to coinpel the two men to retire by trying to cut them off. 
 
 The third man, who had remained behind opposite 6, 
 now fired a shot as a signal, whereupon those in advance 
 returned quickly to the exterior boundary. 
 
 I drew the attention of the assembled men to the fact 
 that in such a case the duty ordered could not be carried out, 
 and would have to be put off until night-time, when it would 
 not be diflScult to creep past a patrol of the enemy, and, even 
 if discovered, to escape easily into the wood. 
 
 3. Conduct of a Patrol posted in front of the Line of 
 Sentries* — After they had all fallen in again, I considered 
 the conduct to be followed by the standing patrol. 
 
 I flrst of all drew attention to the object lof such a patrol 
 on the ground in question, because the conduct should be 
 regulated entirely in accordance with the object in view. 
 
 I pointed out how, on such ground, outposts could not 
 be sufficiently protected by sentries: for, if alomg the whole 
 boundary double sentries were posted, these would prob- 
 ably only remark too late an enemy's approach, and the 
 
 *A detaclied post or a patrolling post is here considered. — [A. L. W.] 
 
170 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 (lutpost would not bare time to take up an advantM^cous 
 position in snpixiit of the threatened sentries. It would 
 also be necessary if there were so many sentries that the 
 ouriiosls should be very sti-on;^-. A weak outpost must be 
 (■(intented to occujiy Hahn house, and to establish a double 
 sentry at the point of erossing of the roads at c, and — 
 
 (1.1 /■'(;(■ its jirdtirfidii of/ainst surprise hi/ the ciiruiji. as 
 well as — 
 
 IL'.) For rriuilsiiif/ thv ciiciiii/'s patrols — a standing pati-ol 
 of :i — 4 men, to be relie\<'d every 1' — -'I hours, should be 
 pushed forward to " 
 
 T'lK jiDJiit at (/ is a. most imjiortant ])(»st of observation. 
 
 .V man of the ]iatrol lunsl the)'efor(> remain con'sianlly 
 standin;;- tlici-c to oliserve the road and the eleariiijis on 
 cither side of it. 
 
 The other two men, on (he other hand, must jiatrol along 
 the biiiinilary as far as the i-oad at h, and one man must here 
 specially assure himself that none of the en'emy are advanc- 
 ing on this road, whicli also leads from Schnelleweidi'. 
 
 The i)receding patrol had therefore committed a fault 
 in leaving all three men standing at a, from the commence- 
 ment, and in making them all three afterwards leave the 
 point a together, in order to cut off the patrol. Two men 
 would have been sufficient for this i)ur])0se. 
 
 In order to render this at once apparent, I again jilaced 
 the patrol at o, left behind one man at the height, wihere he 
 could see farthest around, and pointed out to the other two 
 men i whilst I took the whole detachment with me) how they 
 should move within the boundary — at a brisk pace, but al- 
 ways looking towards the brush-wood lying opposite to 
 them — and how, having arrived at &, a man should move to 
 the front, as far as necessary in order to observe the road 
 leading thence to Schnelleweide, as far as possible. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 171 
 
 If tlie standing patrol oonsisted of four men, a man 
 would liave to be ileft constantly at tEis important point, the 
 other two patrolling backwands and forwards, behind the 
 •boundary f rojn a to &. 
 
 Should a patrol of the enemy be observed, they S'h.ould 
 remain hidden in front of it, so* as to lead it to approach 
 nearei", and then, if possible, cut it off. If, however, a de- 
 tachment were seen advancing, this ishould be at once sig- 
 nalled to the outposts by several shots, and a report should 
 be sent to info'rim the outpost a,s correctly as possible of the 
 strengtli and direction of march of the enemy. After hav- 
 ing fired off these shots, the remainder of the men should 
 remain halted and observe the conduct of the enemy; but if 
 attacked, thej' should withdraw quickly oca to one wing of 
 the outpoists. 
 
 I caused this latter movement to be at orioe practically 
 carried out, on the suppoisition that from 6 a detachment of 
 the enemy was observed. I caused a report to be made to 
 me, after both men had fired a siuot from under cover, and 
 then supposed that the detachment of the enemy was extend- 
 ing in the direction of a, whereupon the patrol had to quick- 
 ly assemble towards a, wiiere it fired off a few mo^re shots, 
 so as thereby to signal to the outposts the direction of the 
 enemy's attack, and then hurriedly retired. 
 
 I then caused the patrol to fall in the ranks again, and 
 told off two fresh patrols, each of three men, for the follow- 
 ing exercise: 
 
 4. Retreat of a Creeping Patrol before one of the Enemy. 
 — I sent one of these patrols back again in the direction of 
 Schnelleweide, until out of sight, and I tihen ordered patrol 
 No. 2 to retire at first to c, and then to advance from the 
 double sentry, supposed to be at that place, as a creeping 
 patrol, to reconnoiter the position at Schnelleweide. I left 
 
172 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 the remaining men beliimd at o, then vodr to th(> fii'st patrol 
 and ordered it to advance as a creepinji patrol to I'cconiioiter 
 the outposr position near Diinnwa.ld. 
 
 The three men (patrol No 1) acted at oiicc, as I had 
 tauf;ht in the first exercise, and when 1 saw that tliey well 
 nndeistniKl, 1 turned towards a. and made the men ni'ove on 
 to the height, so as 1o enable them to see as well as possible 
 (lie condui-t of the two patrols. 
 
 I'atrol Xo. i! had already ari-ived near a : one man was 
 sent to ", whilst the olher t wo remained at first at the bound- 
 ary, at about the jilace where the standing- ])atrol had 
 all'eady been posted. 
 
 At this mouient the two patrols mutu'ally observed one 
 aniothcr and look iiji position as much as possible under 
 ro\'oi'; we saw that iKjtih were undecided wltat they shiould 
 do to acrom])lisli (he duty (MitrusttMl to them. 
 
 I'atrol Xo. 1 came first to a decision — which in this case 
 «as to be i'.\])i'clo(l, as j»ati-o| X'o. 2, which was so neai- to its 
 own out]>ost, ought, as a first duty, to ]jr(n'ent patrol No. 1 
 from advancMiji farllher, and conse(iuently had to reguilate 
 its conduct on lliat of the enemy. 
 
 We saw how patrol Xo. 1, favored by the thick busiies 
 and inei|ualities of the ground, suddenly disiajijjea.red. 
 
 The leader of jiatrol Xo. l! now ran forward to the opjto- 
 site boundary to see if anything (.'ould there be discovered 
 of i)ati'ol Xo. 1. 
 
 As he saw nothing further, he signalled to the other men 
 to move to the right, as he preferred to go quite out of the 
 road of the patrol of the enemy and to continue his further 
 \^ ay to the right through the brushwood. 
 
 When they had thus moved to a certain distance, w(. 
 saw a man of patrol Xo. 1 come cautiously again to the road, 
 look around for patrol Xo. 2, and then sig'n to the others to 
 
Extracts from an, Infantry Captain's Journal. 173 
 
 advance. The whole patrol again cautiously approached 
 ' the boundary. One man remained ithere in observation, and 
 to protect the retreat, whilst tlie two others ran forward 
 through the clearing in order to reconnaiter further in the 
 direction of Hahn house. 
 
 I now caused the "Assembly" to be sounded, and ex- 
 pressed myself pleased, with the manner in which the patrols 
 had acted: Nevertheiless, patrol No. 1 might have retired 
 all together towards the right, in order to have advanced 
 along the Nut brook to reconnoiter further the enemy's out- 
 post position, this ground being particularly favorable for 
 a patrod to creep over, on account of the thick bushes along- 
 side the brook. I was obliged to finish the exercise, owing 
 to the lateness of the hour. 
 
174 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Jnnrnnl. 
 
 FIFTH EXERCISE. 
 Oiitjioxt Ihitji aiitl Fi;/hf in <i Defile. 
 
 TIic — Jnnc. moniiiii;. — Onlcr for flu Dirisioii of Skir- 
 ;//(.s7(r/-.s- (secFi^-.S). — A (Ictiiolinieut advaiicingaloing llic high 
 road from (ihidbach towards :Mulhein) hiis sent lorward its 
 oiUimsis as far as the heiglits of Schucllcwcidc, whilst it 
 bivouacs in the wood near ('hanssi'c house. 
 
 The di\ision of skirniisliers receives the orch'r 1o estab- 
 lish itself as left Hank outjiost a:t Thurn, to ()ccn]iy the line 
 of a]>i)r(iach which exisis there, anil to patrol towards Iddes- 
 feld and .Mieleiifoi-st. The eiieiiiy is exiiecfed fi'oni Dentz. 
 
 IJress: forat;e caps, marching order for field service; five 
 cartridges. 
 
 No jiatrol to lie sent forward before S o'clock. 
 
 Onltrs for the Fiisf and Sccwid Dirisioiifi. — A deliich- 
 nient from Dentz has jMished foi-ward its outiifists to the belt 
 of giiinnd. ."Merheim, Schlagliainn, fieri honse. 
 
 .\t h-alf-past S a strong reconnaissance is to be made 
 against the defiles of the Strnnder brook at Schweinheini, 
 Iddesfeld, and Thurn, since the jiatrols np to the jtresent 
 sent to those jioints have ever.\vvhei-e conn' u])Oin patrols o'f 
 the enemy. 
 
 The first and second divisions, which form the right 
 wing of the ontiiosts at Merlreim, are under the leading of 
 Lieutenant X, to advance by Mielenforst to Thurn as a" right 
 lateral detachment. 
 
 At S o'clock the outposts are to be at Merheim. Before 
 ^ o'clock no patrol is to be sent forward. At half-past s, 
 punctually, the detachment is to commence its advance. 
 
 Dress: helmets, marching order for field service; five 
 cartridges. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 175 
 
 \Vith each detaebmen-t there was a bugler with a flag. 
 
 Position of Merheim. — At 8 o'clock I was at Merheim. 
 Lieutenant N gave me at once a report, written in pencil, on 
 the position he had taken up, and had attached to it a pencil 
 sketch. 
 
 He had placed non-commissionied officer B and 9 men 
 as a patrol* troop at the scho'ol-house, with a single sentry 
 over the arms. A patrol went thence directly towards 
 Thurn. The remainder of the first division stood under 
 cover as an outpost on the eastern boundary of Merheim, 
 with a double sentry at the bridge. 
 
 This outpost had sent forward a patrol by Mielenforst 
 towards Thurn, which was to return along the same road. 
 
 The second division was posted as a supporting division 
 in Merheim, the sentry over the arms, so placed that he could 
 overlook a great part of the ground towards Iddesfeld. 
 
 Lieutenant N intended to execute his jnarch to the front, 
 so that the outpost should go forward as advanced guard by 
 Mielenforst towards Thurn through the little wood A. 
 whilst the patrol troop had to advance by the shortest road 
 towards the defile so as to keep up pommuniciation with the 
 other (suppo'sed) detachments. The second division, which 
 at first followed the advanced guard, was, according to cir- 
 cumstances, either to support it or the patrol troop in 
 attacking. 
 
 *"PatrioiuilleurtrU]pp" is a detachment of less strength than an 
 ordinary outpost or picquet, and stronger tlian a "non-commissioned 
 officer's post"; this latter generally consists only of tlie reliefs of a 
 , double sentry which is placed too far from the outpost to be relieved 
 from it. The proper translation for "patrouilleurtrupp" would per- 
 haps be '^detached ■noin-eommissioned officer's post," but as th's might 
 be confused with a "non-coiminiissioned officer's post," the German 
 term has been adhered to as closely as possible amd rendered by 
 "patrol troop." — [Note by translator.] 
 
 In the United States service a "patrouilleurtrupp" would be rep- 
 resented by a detacJied post, or a large patrolling post. — [A. L. W.] 
 
17(3 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 ('i)iiduct of the Patrols.— I now rode by the shortcsl way 
 toTliuru. OutheroadI fmuidthe imtrolof iioii cauiiuissioned 
 officer B placed uudci- cuver opposite tbe wood, .since on the 
 boundary a man of the enemy was to be seen. Tlie leaider 
 indeed had endeavored to creep forward as near to this man 
 as ]!iissible, but as the latter remained quietly standing 
 thi-ri\ the patrol did not dare to make an attack, as it neces- 
 sarily snjiposed that more of the iMiemy were behind. 
 
 I now saw two men oi the enemy retire (jnickly from 
 Mielenforst on to the boundary of the wiwd A, and there 
 take ]>i>sition under eoxcr. The i»alrol sent forward from 
 Merlieim showed itself at Mielenforst, where it was watcli- 
 iui; from a position under cover, and did n«t dare to advance 
 further over the open ground. In dayf ime, indeed, cri'cping 
 jiatriils of infantry can seldom see more of the enemy tllra.n a 
 sentry or a patrol, supjiosing that the enemy's patr-ols prop- 
 erly understand their business. 
 
 I'ositioii (if Thiirn. — In i-iding further forward I found al 
 (1. as 1 liad ex]iec(e(l, a patrol trooj) pushed forwar'd, which. 
 Ill-sides the sentry over the arms, had also six men lying 
 down near the piled arms in a hollow. From this troop a 
 jiatro] of threi^ men had been sent forward towards Mielen- 
 forst. and another of two men against Iddesleld, with the 
 iirder to retire to the boundary of the wood lon the a]tjtroach 
 of the enemy, and to remain there in observation until they 
 were either relieved or driven back by the enemy. 
 
 It was these two men whom I had jn-eviously remarked. 
 
 This unusual pushing forrwa.rd of a patrol troop ctose in 
 front of the defile was justified by the peculiar conditions of 
 the ground. From the defile itself scarcely 160 meti-es could 
 be seen' to the front. A constant look-out was therefore 
 necessary in front, and this oould be done by a patrol troop 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 177 
 
 with fcicer men .than by an 'Oiitpost, the more so as there 
 could be no question of defending this ground. 
 
 The non-eommissiioned officer had besides an order to 
 retire to the defile as much unobserved as possiible it the 
 eniemy attacked in force. 
 
 Here, just in front of the bridge, there was a row of 
 bushes by the side of the road up to about 160 metres from the 
 position of the patrol troop. At the end of these bushes, 
 near to the road, stood the double sentry of the outpjst, 
 which was itself placed at the bridge. It was not the bridge, 
 but the bushes, which would form the first position of de- 
 fense; this was an unavoidable disadvantage for the defend- 
 er, who had only a confined field of fire from the bridge. 
 The assailant, however, after he had driven back the 
 patrol /tro'op, could only advam-e on the road towards the 
 bushes and the bridge, as the fields on both sides were 
 cultivated. 
 
 The leader of the division, Sergeant A, reported himiself 
 to me when I arrived at the double sentry. He handed me 
 at the same time a report, written in pencil, on his position, 
 on which he had also shown by a rough sketch the ground 
 and the disposition of his davision. I saw by means of this 
 that there was ano/ther detached non-commissiioned officer's 
 post of six men placed on the boundary opposite Schwein-' 
 heim,in order to maintain communication with the supposed 
 outposts at Schnelleweide. Perhaps a double sen'try would 
 lia^'e been sufficient, which could have been relieved from 
 itheoutpoist. 
 
 ^Yhen I interrogated the double sentries abiout the 
 enemy, about their own position, and about the neighboring 
 localities, I found them well instructed; Sergeant A had 
 also given his men in'foirnxaition -regarding the defensive 
 position occupied, and the distance of the most important 
 
17S Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 points in front of it; lie had also told them that on active 
 si'i vice he would have dug shelter trenclics near the bushes 
 and the bridge. A man now brought a report: 
 
 Report of the Enenn/'s Advance, and (Uindnet of the 
 Patrols. — Fiom the patrol troop. — "A detachment of the ene- 
 my of about two divisions is on the march coming from Micl- 
 eufiiisr. A strong patrol is advancing in the direction of 
 
 Iddrslcld." 
 
 1 asked, "Are the jiatrols srill standing at the boundary 
 of the wood?" "They are ordered to retire only in case they 
 are attacked." 
 
 I complimented Sergeant A on the jireiise and api)ri)- 
 priati^ orders lie had given. 
 
 I then rode on to theheightb;hind which the patrol troop 
 was placed, fnmi whence I could observe the road towards 
 :Mielenf()rst, as well as that towards Iddesfeld, and thus 
 could overliidk the conduct of the patrols and of the ])atrol 
 troop. 
 
 The leader (if this latter made his men take their arms, 
 and took up a position under cover, one file a little to the 
 light, so that the men could fire well down the road to Iddes- 
 feld; the other two files close to the road to Mielenforst, so as 
 to bring this road and the boundary of the wood well under 
 fire. The non-commissiioned otticer reminded them of the 
 distance to the boundary. 
 
 Sliots were now heard on the right and on the left from 
 the patrols which had been ]»ushed forward — a sign that 
 the enemy was advancing tn attack the wood. I rode quickly 
 through the wood to the further boundary of it, and met 
 there the patrol already quickly returning. 
 
 Adraiu-c of Lieutenant X. — I saw the advanced guard of 
 Lieutenant X move to the attack in deployed order against 
 the abandoned boundary; the support, in close order, fol- 
 
Sxtraets from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 179 
 
 lowed at a quick pace at a proper di stance. Toiwards Iddes- 
 feld I saw in like mariiner the patrol of a non-oo-mmissioned 
 officer deployed as a group of skirmis'liers running forward 
 against the boundary on that side. 
 
 Lieutenant N was with the skirmishers, and made them 
 halt as soon as the boundary was ^reached. He then ordered 
 the group on the right of the road, and the other one oli the 
 left, to push forward iruto the wood as far as the opposite 
 boundary. The support was to- follow along the left of the 
 road. He himself remained on the left with the foremiost 
 group. As soon as his skirmishers appeared at the further 
 boundary they were fired upon, and quickly took up a posi- 
 tion under cover. After a rapid glance at the griound, Lieu- 
 tenant N gave the order, "At 160 metres — fire slowly." 
 
 As I remarked that some skirmjsheris did not pay atten- 
 tion to getting properly under cover, I called out, "Get under 
 cover to load" ; and 1 had the satisfaction of seeing tihat this 
 reminder was sufficient to make the men ithink of what had 
 been taught them in this respect when engaged in a fight. 
 
 I also saw 'how each man of the patrol troop, after hav- 
 ing fired, stooped down to load, so that he could not be seen, 
 and then carefully raised his head so as to seize the oppor- 
 tunity for firing his shot with advantage. I then rode to the 
 patrol troop, and asked the non-commissioned officer if he 
 meant to remain where he was. 
 
 Retreat of the Patrol Troop. — "No, I musit retire." "All 
 at once?" "Xo, file by file." "From wtoich wing?"' "Prom 
 the right." "Correct so that the left wing can fire to the la.sc 
 to cover the retreat, but each file must pre before retiring, 
 and must then stoop down as if to load, so as to deceive the 
 enemy — and then move quickly away." 
 
 The non-oommissioned officer now comimanded in a low 
 tone of voice, "Retire quickly by files from the right wing." 
 
180 Extracts from an Inlantry dtptaiii's Journal. 
 
 The first file moved in a too exposed mauner. I tlicre- 
 tore made it iclurn to its place ajiaiii, an'd s'ave the eider, 
 '■i;i till- quite under cover."' The men now moved correcMy, 
 and the non-eommissidiicd oflicev called out duiinfi the re- 
 treat. "Take position at the hnslies.'" 
 
 The tiles foUnwcd (juickly one after the other, which is 
 ni'ccssai y when opposed to a su|i(>ri(ir enemy. 
 
 Tile retreat was tiisit of all dliserved by the detachment 
 of non-ci>mmissi(Oieil otHcer H, which had advanced alnnj; 
 the road in Iddcsfdd, for here the tile of the left wing could 
 oxcrliiiik a iiortion of the i-oaid tiiwards the hushes, and had 
 at once shunted out to the uou-comniissiioned otticer: "The 
 enemy is retiriii^;." The ncm-coimnissid-ned officer quickly 
 cell vinced himself that this was the case, and ^ave the order, 
 "l>oiil)le march!" ami ran' forward ilu the atiaiiiliined right 
 wing of the eiiem.Ns ])osition. The enemy's left tiles then 
 ran hack qnickl\' together at the (H'der to do so. 
 
 OccKjiiitioii <if tlir Aliiiniloiinl /'itsiliiiii. — Lientenant N 
 now oi-dered "l^ouhle niar(di," and both gioups ran into 
 the position jiliandoned bylhe enemy, where, linwever, they 
 had to lie down because they weic fiired n\H>][ from the 
 bushes. 
 
 Sei-geant »V had, indeed, when the tiring liegan, pnitsted a 
 group at the bushes to rally the patrol trtnop. On the othei' 
 hand, he had sent back the tirst fileS (jf this troop which had 
 retreated, as a su[)port, and the whole trooj) was now assem- 
 bling on them under cover. I thi^refore c(nicluded that he 
 had the intention, which was a very ]iroper on'e, to make his 
 piiiu-ipal defense behind the brook and at the farms near the 
 bridge, although there his field of fire was cramxjed by the 
 bushes, and by some small buildings on the farther side of 
 the brook. 
 
 The ground did mot then oiler all the advantages of a 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. Igl 
 
 good position behind the defile, but it offered at least that of 
 aillowiiig a safe retreat, which was of importamce, consider- 
 ing the weakness of the detachment. 
 
 I now rode farther on, made the bugler retire into Thurrl 
 as far as behind the first bend in the road, and gave him the 
 order to unfurl the flag, and to advance as soon as Sergeant 
 A should have retired so far. He was to represent a reinforce- 
 mQnt, which at this moment bad been sent to Sergeant A 
 from the high road. 
 
 I then asked the sergeant when he should have sent 
 back to the commander of the line of outposts the news of 
 the attack. He said very correctly, "At the first report of 
 the patro:! of the approach of the two divisions of the enemy." 
 
 It would have been too late if the sergeant had wished 
 to wait before sending a report till the enemy 'had actually 
 attacked. If the fight is actually begun, such reports are 
 easily forgotten. It is hardly possible then to send a written 
 report. 
 
 . Attack and Defense of the Defile. — I now went again to 
 Lieutenant N, whose tbree groups were still posted on the 
 slope of the height and were firing against the bushes, whilst 
 the support was afthe boundary of the wood. I asked him 
 what Ms intention's were. "To attack the bushes with two 
 groups," he replied. At the same time he gave the order, 
 "The group of the left wing to remain lying dorwn, and to fire 
 rapidly, the two groups on the right to the attack." 
 
 The group leaders gave the order, "Fix bayonets — 
 stand up — doublemarch — Hurrah!" As theynow couldonly 
 run forward along the road, they f oramed a disorderly mass 
 as far as the bus;hes. There indeed the group of the enemy 
 retired, but the assailant came at onlee under the fire of the 
 men posted near the defile. I therefore caused him to halt, 
 and notified that the attack had failed. 
 
 17— 
 
182 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 The Attack is Repulsed. — Tbe groups tiad now to retire 
 quickly on to the height, wliere in the meantime the support 
 had taken position (it li'ad advanced of its o^vn artord during 
 the attack at a quiclv pact'). They were at once re-foi-med 
 heliind the support. 
 
 The reason why, in my opinion, the attaclv would lia.ve 
 failed on active service was this: the force witli whicli tlie 
 assailant made the attack was strong cnougili to drive back 
 the first group of the enemy, but arrangements had not be- 
 fore been tliought of to int-rease his strengtli at the same 
 time that the enemy's support joined in tlie action. 
 
 This precaution should not he nrglccted in an attach, and 
 it is a mistake of a leader to order an attaclv witlbout hiaving 
 beforehand made his arrangements in tlris respect. Praatice 
 and talent will accustom leaders to this jHccauitionary 
 measure. 
 
 Tlicrc were only two means of procuring more chances 
 of success for the attack : 
 
 1. Occupation of the little wood e in fpont to the right — 
 from the boundary of which the defile eouild be brought 
 under a tolerably effective fire. 
 
 li. To cause the attack of the slcirmishers to be followed 
 at a short distance by a support along the road, advancing 
 by groups in file on the right and left of it — ^in order with 
 these to sitormthe defile in conjunction with the skimniishers, 
 or (if the fire of the enemy proved too strong) foT thiem to lie 
 down in the position carried, and to keep up a fire on tbe 
 defile. 
 
 Although in peace-time the effect of fire cannot be prop- 
 erly valued, there are, nevertheless, signs, even at exercise, 
 from which it can be seen, whether an attack carried 'out 
 would in reality have been folloiwed by succe.'^s or not. 
 
 Such signs are the following: 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 183 
 
 1. When one sees thart ithe attack becomes weak, be- 
 cause the extent of ground to be traversed under the enemy's 
 fire is too great — the attack has then failed. 2. If the asisiail- 
 ant has been able to secure a certain superiority by preserv- 
 ing fresh troo'ps, partly in close order, partly as skirmishers, 
 ready to advance resolutely ag-ainst the enemy, so that this 
 latter receives a moral impression which renders bis fire 
 precipitate, and therefore ineffective. If the defender in 
 such a case has no further formed support which, he can op- 
 pose to the assailant, then the attack must be considered 
 as having succeeded. 
 
 The same result follows if, in their retreat, the advanced 
 groups of the defender partly mask the fire 'oi the others, 
 as then it is only necesisary for the assailant to press forward 
 without halting, in order to turn the unfavorajble position of 
 the defenders to his adrantiage. 
 
 The last two suppositions might be consideredas applic- 
 able to the present case. 
 
 It was only a question whether the attack would niot 
 sooner have failed, as a space of ground oi 240 metres had 
 to be traversed — this is too much for troops mot fully trained 
 and carrying a complete kit; or else they might have begun 
 in quick time, and only traversed the last 60 — 80 metres at 
 the double. 
 
 All sudh reflections, which should precede every prop- 
 erly prepared attack, especially if the circumsitances aire 
 diiBoult, appear more complicated than they really are. 
 
 It is necesisary, indeed, thiat the chief should have prac- 
 tice in ascertaining with a quick glance by what measures 
 he can secure to himiself 'the chances of success — so as then, 
 to give his orders ivithoiil hesitation, and in isuch a way that 
 each subordinate leader and, if possible, each subordinate 
 feels at onoe with him what is the important point, and 
 
184 Extracts from an Infantry Caplnin's Journal. 
 
 thus an impulse is given to a.ll for artinji correitly accorilin.ii 
 to circniustances. 
 
 I'lactice .alone develops talent; it therefore appeared 
 to me advisable not to neg-lcit the opiiortunity of carr.vinji 
 out a somewhat com])! i rated workinji together of the differ- 
 ent fractions, and no^ tosatisfv myself by simply repeatin.i; 
 the attack with increased strength. 
 
 I therefore ordered Lieutenant ><': 
 
 ]. To have the kna])s;i(ks taken oft'. 
 
 •2. To throw a gmup tlh> by tile on 1o the boundai'y of 
 the wiMid at (' (as this wmild iiave to take jilace under the fire 
 of the enem> I. 
 
 :',. To leave Ixdiind one group for tiring against the 
 buslii's. whilst the remainder, with two gmups in skirmish- 
 ing order, and two groujis behind them in file as support, 
 were to repeat the attack against the bushes, and immediate- 
 ly afterwiirds against the defile, if possible. The group left 
 behind was t^ follow ais soon as it cnuld no longei- fire. 
 
 RciK'irfil of tlir Atfdtl-. — Lieutenant^' gave the necessary 
 ordei's. Whilst the bushes were being occujiied file l)y file, 
 a little time was available for the leaders of grouj).s to give 
 the following instructions fiu- the attack: 
 
 "The grou])« in advance to gain the bushes by rajiid 
 movement, and there to o]>en fire; th(,' gT-ou])s in su]i([)nrt to 
 follow in qnicli time as far as the bushes, wh(^n either double 
 march will be ordered, or 'lie down.' The moitions of hwid- 
 ing only are to be gone through." 
 
 The execution completely answered my expectations. 
 The advanced group of the eiiVmy left its jiosition this linie 
 sooner, but it had not yet (|uite reached the defile when the 
 support of the assailants was already at the bushes. 
 
 Lieutenant X at once understood that the moment was 
 favorable for him, and gave the order forthwith, "Double 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 185 
 
 march," and with an hurrah, they all rushed as quickly as 
 possible towards the defile. 
 
 As both sides were only to go through the motions of 
 loading, it was not possible to know whether the defender 
 would have been able to fire more than one round. 
 
 Everyone, however, must have felt how the retreiart of 
 the one groiip before the energetic attack of the aisisailamt 
 must have acted disadvantageousily for the defender. 
 
 The moral effect of the attack was also increased by the 
 siiuuHa,neou-s advance oti his own account of the group 
 leader in the small wood e, with his group towards the brook, 
 against the flank of the enemy. 
 
 I therefore decided that the assailant had been success- 
 ful, but ordered the defender to retire quietly. ' 
 
 This was carried out as directed; Sergeant A quickly 
 reached and occupied a farm tO' the rear, whilst at the same 
 time a farm lying opposite to it was occupied by a detached 
 non-commissioned oflicer and six inen who arrived at this 
 moanent. 
 
 Lieutenant ^N quickly disposed his detachment in such a 
 way that two groups occupied the farms on the right and 
 left of the defile, whilst the rest assembled under cover near 
 the road as a support. 
 
 During this pause I sent forward the bugler with the 
 flag, to Sergeant A's detachment, which now, on its side, ad- 
 vanced to the attack. But as the support of Lieutenant N 
 had formed up very quickly to fire volleys, and as the sup- 
 posed support of the enemy could only advance along a nar- 
 row road, I considered the attack as repulsed, but I allowed 
 that the defenders were able to retain the position they had 
 occupied, as the bugler had placed himself behind a farm. 
 
 I now told Sergeant A that his right flank was threat- 
 ened by an enemy advancing from Schweinheim. He at 
 
J86 Ej'lracts from an Iiifautin Vuittnin's Journal. 
 
 once made tbe bugler retire unobserved, told off the jir(uii> 
 which had occupded a farm as rear suard, and gave to the 
 others the order in a low tone of voice ito retire wh.ilsil ket^p- 
 ing under cover. 
 
 t »n account of the favorable position of tlic roar guai'd 
 group, it was easy to see that some skirmishers of the ene- 
 my were retreating, but Lieutenant X thought that Sergeant 
 A wished only to form a support, and he therefore made liis 
 arrangements for i>nrsuing with two groups only, when 
 the rear guard began also its retrti;it. A well-regulated 
 retreat and pursuit now took place from farm to farm. As 
 tliis, however, only gave a pa/rtirtlly correct jiiclui'e of whiat 
 would take jflace on active service, as ni> farm could be 
 really occiijjicd, I put an end to t/he exercise, and made all 
 the men assemble at the jilace where the knapsacks had 
 been left under guard of one man. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal jgiy 
 
 SIXTH EXERCISE. 
 
 Exercises of Outposts and Combat; One Company 
 
 against the Other. 
 
 (Tlie men were previously practiced in etollengiimg as 
 
 outpoist sentries.) 
 
 Tlie — June, afternoon (see Fig. 8). — The commander of 
 the battalion' was already proposing to carry out shortly, 
 exercises of different co^mpanies, one against anoitlher. Con- 
 sequently the peniod for detailed pre'paratioin and instruc- 
 tion was to a certain extent at an end ; a;t the most I could 
 only repeat, in the neighibor'hood of the barracks, similar ex- 
 ercises to those which I had cairried out during the early 
 days of M'ay. 
 
 My calculation, therefore, had proved correct ; I had, io 
 fact, only succeeded in exercising my company to a cer- 
 tain extent in positions of outposts and combat; and, 
 although discipline and attenition during an action had in- 
 deed been so far improved, that in ordinary circumstances 
 a quick apprehension and working together with tolerable 
 calmness had been obtained, stiill I was doubtful whether, 
 in unexpected circumstances, thoughitlessness would not 
 replace reflective presence of mind, and whether, in conjunc- 
 tion with large detachments, all the details which had been 
 so carefully taught would not be forgotten by all. I was 
 especially convinoed that the nOn-commissioned officers had 
 not yet the habit of controlling efficiently these details in the 
 detachments under their oi'ders. I promised myself to 
 make greater progress in this matter next year. 
 
 I specially regretted that imstruction in swimming had, 
 on a couple of occasions, called away some of the men 
 
188 Extracts from an Iiifuntry Captain's Journal. 
 
 s(4('(ted for iiistiiiciion in jiatidl duly; I hoped, lunortlK'- 
 less, after the maneuvers, to increase the instruction in 
 patrol duty of some oHirei-s and non-roniiiiiswioned oflicers, 
 and also in wimter, on favorable days, to lie able to iiarry onl 
 patrollinj,'- out of tloois instead of instruclion in Mie rooms. 
 
 As a ]ir('|iaration for combat exercises of several cdiii- 
 panii's, one against the olhei', it was now nec(»ssiary to coiiiie 
 to an anderstanding with another coni])any. to carry out an 
 oulposl duty which should extend into the night, so as to 
 jiractically exercise the men in actini; during darkness, and 
 to acciisloni Iheni lo nio\'e on more extended ground. 
 
 ]!esi(les, 1 had still to exercise the irliolf coiiipitiui in car- 
 rying out a s]n'cial coiiubat ex<'rcise; this, indeed, I haid done 
 in May, at the exercises against a suiii>osed or skeleton 
 enemy, but it had now to be i-epeated on broken ground, thr 
 \\liole comjiany aiting together, eiither in exercisrs pmperly 
 so called on o])en ground, or in maiien\'ers carried out in 
 conjunrtion with another company. 
 
 For outihost exercises to be carried out together, lihe 
 following arrang<'nients were 'agreed u]i'on: 
 
 Insfnictioiifi for the Northern Dctiichincnt Imy company): 
 It bivouacs at IXinniwald; outpfvsts established priiicipa.lily 
 towai'ds the south, because an advance is to hv made on the 
 following morning against Hchnelleweide. 
 
 Southern Detaehrnent : This detai-hment obtains its sii]i- 
 plies in ^Merheim, S(.-hweiniheim, and neighboring farms, anid 
 takes measures of prei-aution on the side of Diinnwald. 
 
 The choice of outpost positions was left to the com- 
 mander of each company, and neither knew beforehand whnt 
 the other would do. In the same way it 'bad been generally 
 agreed that on both sides the position of the outposts should 
 be only altered once, and that each should carry out as he 
 pleased his patrols, reconnaissance, or attack of the out- 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. Igg 
 
 posts, but that all should be finished by 12 o'clock at night 
 at the latest. Departure at half-past 2 o'clock-. 
 
 At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, I advanced from the sup- 
 posed bivouac at the north of Dunnwald, with the division 
 of skirmishers as advanced guard. 
 
 This advanced guard had the order to push forward its 
 head by the shortest road towards the mill of Dunnwald, 
 where the outpost was to be established. 
 
 A non-coimmiissioned oJificer with one section was to 
 advance as right lateral detachment througih Dunnwald as 
 far as the farther boundary, and there to establish itself as 
 a patrol troop with a fixed patrol* in the little wood near 
 Hahn house (a). 
 
 It was at first m,y intention to employ as few men as 
 possible on outpoist duty, so that two complete divisions 
 mig-ht remain available at once for a strong reconniaissance. 
 
 TJie leader of the advanced guard gave orders to the 
 head to advance along the road to Schnelleweide only as far 
 as the clearing, there to wait for further o:rders. The de- 
 tached non-commisBioned officer A was directed to place a 
 single sentry over the larms at the boundary, and to send at 
 once a patrol by Hahn house in the direction of Schnelle- 
 weide, which should first seek to open communication with 
 the outpoist on the left, and then to take a position as a fixed 
 pati'ol on the margin of the wood (from a to &),and to observe 
 both roads leading from Schnelleweide. 
 
 I at once added to these in'structrons that the fixed 
 patrol was to be relieved every hour by the patrol troop. I 
 wished particularly at thjis exercise to practice all that had 
 lately been carried out in the exercise on patrolling, in order 
 to convince myself whether the instruction had been prop- 
 erly understood. 
 
 Whilst advancing, and before the mill had been 
 '"Evidently "detached posts."— [A. L. W.] , 
 
HJO Ed-tracts from an Infantry Cnptiun's Journal. 
 
 leaehed, as the ground on the left was no longer open. I 
 sent two left-flankers towards the little ridge on the left (at 
 f} with the order to remain there (where the groiund could 
 be overlooked to the left) until they were relieved. 
 
 Di.'<l)osition of the Sitpport and Outpost. — I made the first 
 and second divisions halt at the crdss-roads [g], pile anus, 
 jthiiL' (iiie sentry over the arms, and in the meantime I went 
 to superintend the placing of the outposts. The advanced 
 guard had halted at the mill, and the leader had gone for- 
 ward with oiii- section near to the cleiiring in order to place 
 his sentrii\s. taking care not to allow himself to be seen fnoan 
 afa,r. 
 
 The head now received from him the order to patrol 
 along the boundary of the wood to the left as far as the Xut 
 brook (at h\. so that they eimld overlook the clearing, and 
 n'ot to return until they were relieved. 
 
 'I'liis I approved of, for as the ground in front of the left 
 wing did not allow an extended view, a fixed patrol would 
 lie sufficient to give timely niitice of the appiroaeh of an 
 enemy beyond the clearing, and to puisih back any of his 
 lirtjtrols which might shinv. 
 
 A double sentry (doulile post No. 1) was now placed 
 where the head had before stood, 'an!d, as the leader con- 
 vinced hiuLSelf that this, in conjunction with the fixed 
 I»atrol, wa-s sufficient iHoteetion by day, he at omioe told ofC 
 fi"om the men ^\■ho had moved to the front two patroils, to 
 whom he showed the direcbio'n that the head was taking, 
 and decided that they were to form Nos. 2 and 3 of the fixed 
 partrols, and were entrusted with a ,duty similar to that given 
 to the head. 
 
 He then returned to the outp'Ost, and sent to the little 
 bridge where the left wing detachment was the same non- 
 commissioned officer who had aceompanied post No. 1, and 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 191 
 
 had given it iiiistruetioins, so that ihe sh,ould instruct in a 
 similajr way post No. 2 ; he then told off his outpost by num- 
 bers, and No. 1 was then placed over the arms. A lance 
 corporal with four men', intended for the relief of post No. 1, 
 were sent forward as an examining troop; the remainder piled 
 arms at the mill, but each patrol separately. Tiwenty-foui- 
 men were thus told off;* nocae remained available as creep- 
 ing patrols. If these latter had been absolutely necessary, 
 then either the reliefs could only have been told off in two 
 ntimbers (each on duty for three hours), or the fixed patrol 
 after being relieved would have had to be sent forward as 
 a creeping patrol, through the wood in front as far as the 
 further boundary, thence to return by the road leaiding to 
 Schnelleweide.f 
 
 But as I intended to undertake a grand reconnaisisanice, ^ 
 creeping patrols were for the moment unnecessary. I there- 
 fore only ordered knapsacks to be takn off. 
 
 Advance of the Support to Beconnoiter. — I then rode back 
 to thesuppoi"t,and communicated to the men what was neces- 
 sary^ of our position (so that any man who might be detached 
 would know beforehand how matters stood). I told off a 
 head of one lance corporal and five men to go forward along 
 the road towards Schnelleweide until they came upon the 
 enemy; a right lateral patrol of three men to advance in 
 the wood on the right, keeping a look-out beyond the bound- 
 ary; and a non-commissioned officer's patrol of five men for 
 the protection of the left flank, to cross the railway at 
 
 ♦Nine men (or three times three) for Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of the fixed 
 patrol, twelve (or twice six) for the 'two double sentriies, Nos. I. and 
 II., and three for the sentry over the arms.^[Note by translator.] 
 
 •'It is recoimmiemded as often advantageous to tell off the several 
 patrol-leaders for the first creeping patrol, so that they can at once 
 learn the nature of the ground, and will be able later, in the darlv- 
 ness, to shiofw the way correctly to the other two men of their patrol. 
 Tttiis is ©specially reeomia ended when tlhe ground is unknown. 
 
292 El-tracts from an Infantry Captain's Joumah 
 
 another point of passage, and to keep a look-out towards 
 Tlinrn. 
 
 The remaiu(k-r were to follow in close order along the 
 road at a short distaiice from the head. A rapid advance 
 irr the detached men, and a brisk repulse of the enemy's 
 patidls, which might be met, wais ordered. 
 
 When jiassing by the mill I told the chief of the outiimsl 
 tluit on my return I would satisfy myself as to how the 
 sentries had been instructed, and would alsio inquire what 
 he intended to do in case of an attack by the enemy. The 
 head and the detached men, owing to their rapid advance, 
 siiiiii came u]>(iu a ]>at.r(il of the enemy near the Wchnellc- 
 weide road, which withdrew rapidly iritliout /iriiifi. As my 
 detached men did not delay in their advaiu-e, and very in- 
 telligently also did not fire, I could therefore hojie to com- 
 pl<4ely surprise the enemy s line of seulries. 
 
 Siir/iri-'^i' of the FjUfinifs DmihJr ScntricK In contirqitencf of 
 tJic fitiilfji ('(iiifJiict of hix PntriiL — This i-ame to ])ass. I made 
 the main body march under covei' in the wo'od as loing as 
 possible, so that I perceived the line of sentries of the enemy 
 at the railway hcforc tlict/ rem.irked my umin body — the 
 result of the enemy's jiatrol lia\ing quickly run back on to 
 the line of s^entries instead of continuously firing diii-ing its 
 retreat. The enemy's sentries soon fired some shots; but as 1 
 at once reinforced my head by a set'tion in extended order, 
 and made a general advance against the railway, I reached 
 it bef(u-e the outpost of the enemy had time to support the 
 line of sentries. 
 
 I caused pncsition to be at once taken up near the lall- 
 way, and opened fire on the outpost, which was advancing 
 along the road in close order, and towards which the patrol, 
 the sentries, and, as far as could be seen, the examining 
 troop, were all retiring together. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. lyjj 
 
 The leader of the enemy's outposts, Tisiblr very angry 
 with his detached men, perceived the impossibility of ad- 
 vancing under my fire; he therefore ordered them to lie 
 do'wn on the height near ttie high road and to open Are, 
 whilst he himself went back with his outpdst, took up a posi- 
 tioin further to the reair, and then called his detached men 
 to him. 
 
 I forbade the pursuit to be continued beyond the rail- 
 way; but at this moment I saw that my non-comuriissioned 
 officer's patrol had already advanced farther on the left, and 
 threaitened the flank of the enemy's outpost. 
 
 As I did not wisih to leave it in the lurch, I was oibliged 
 to continue the flght, which I now could do under favorable 
 co'nditions. I hoped by thjis means, at the same time, to 
 ascertain the position of tlie enemy's main bod.y. I there- 
 fore igave orders to my support to advance to the height as 
 much under cover as possible. In this, by taking advantage 
 of the ground, it succeeded almost campletely. But now I 
 saw two weak divisions of the enemy advancing from 
 Schnelleweide to the attack. 
 
 Fiyht with the Enemy's Support. — I might at once have 
 given the order to retire, isinee the object of the reconnais- 
 sance had been ob'tained. I had learnt the strength and 
 position of the outposts, had seen that the main body ^as at 
 Scihnelleweide, and could, therefore, conclude that the pas- 
 sages across the Strunder brook would also be occupied by 
 the enemy. As ^regards the right wing of the enemy's oul- 
 posts, I ought, at all events, to obtain further information 
 through my non-coimmissiioned officer's patrol. 
 
 Is^eventhelesis, I decided to await the enemy's attack, for 
 my position was favorable. The strengtih I had with me 
 could not be seen by the enemy, and the assailant would find 
 but little cover when advancing, -the more so as he appeared 
 
194 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 to bave the intention Id make an attack in close order alonj; 
 
 the road. 
 
 I therefore ordered the support to keep under cover, but 
 to be ready to fire volleys as soon as the enemy's sui]>port had 
 approached to 240 me-tres. 
 
 This w:us can-ied out a>s directed. The support knelt 
 down and lenmined (Touching- until the command was given, 
 '•Make ready— at 240 paces— aim at their heads; present — 
 
 load." 
 
 The enemy, indeed, continued his attack to within 100 
 ])a(os. but received two volleys, and after the second volley 
 •'rapid hre," so that I concluded the attack was driven ba-ck, 
 and made my men order arms. I then rode forward and 
 came to au undoi-staudiiij;- with the other coinpany com-' 
 miander that the attack was to be couisidered as h'avinfj; 
 faili'd. and we also aj^reed that 1 was not to 'interfere with 
 the retreat of his company to Hchnelleweide. When his re- 
 treat commenced, I at once ordered a non-conimissioned 
 officer to remain behind with a group as rear guard, and the 
 others to retire i-aiiidly and unobserved. I sent the same 
 order to the detached non-commissioned officer.* 
 
 Vohmkurii Rctnlii after liariiuj n-puUed the E'liciiiifs 
 Attiivk. — 1 made my men assemble in the wood quite close to 
 the road, and re-form their ranks as far as possible without 
 losing time. 
 
 I then ordered the senior non-commissi()ued officer to 
 lead the detachment back directly to the position of the fixed 
 patrol (at a). Afterwards I rode to the rear guard, and or- 
 dered it to retire unobserved, but without delay, under the 
 protection of a party left to bring up the rear. I now saw 
 
 *If in a fight it is wished to retire voluntarily, this can only be 
 axJvantageoiusly done after an attacli of the enemy has been repulsed; 
 but it moist take place immedial el ij after the re-pulse, so as to gain as 
 great an advance as possible before the enemy notices the retreat. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 195 
 
 tba,t the detached non-oomuiissioned officer's patpol had al- 
 ready retired over the railway, and that in consequence the 
 enemj- had again fronited towards us. I therefore cautioned 
 the men told off as the extreme reair of the rear guaird to 
 observe, if the enemy again advanced towards the railway, 
 at the moment when they withdrew. 
 
 As I was retiring I reflected that the enemy would 
 probably for his part take his revenge, and advance to the 
 attack against my outposts. He could do this either in the 
 direction of Hahn house, or with a st-ill better prospect of 
 success against my left wing by an advance along the Xut 
 brook. 
 
 In one or the ether case I had, on account of the weak- 
 ness of the defensive position of ^my outposts, the choice of 
 only two measures: 
 
 ■ 1. Either to allow him to push forward close to my 
 sentries, and then to drive him back by a sudden flamk at- 
 tack (with the whole support in the wood), or — 
 
 2. By occupying the boundary at those points where 
 the fixed patrols now stood, to prevent him, as far as possi- 
 ble, from traversing the cleared space. 
 
 This lattei- I could naturally only carry out if the de- 
 tachments for the defense of the boundary could be so placed 
 in readiness that they could be moved, at the proper mo- 
 ment, to occupy the threatened point. 
 
 Such a division of my force did not, indeed, appear ad- 
 Aisable, considering the extent of the position as compared 
 with the strength of my company. Xevertheless, I decided 
 on this measure, for tW'O reasons: 
 
 1. Principally as it would be better exercise for my 
 men; 
 
 2. Because it was my duty to keep the enemy at a long 
 distance from the main body (gros). 
 
1()(3 Ejrtiacts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 \Miilst making these rt4l('Ctions. I had readied the ])osi- 
 ticin of tihe fixed patrol lat a), which was on the point of beiiip 
 relii'ved. 
 
 I ((inscciuently ordered Ihe h:'adeis of the first and sec- 
 ond divisions to assenihli- their divisions at once, in the wood, 
 and cliisc hy tliar spot to malvc tliem pile anus and pay atten- 
 tion to the manner of relieveinj; the palrols. 
 
 Rilicf of till' Ft.rviJ I'dtnil tit a. — The three men lor the 
 relief were very pro])erly sent, al first, to the most ini]Mirtaut 
 poinis al (/, wlicre one man of the patrol liad comstantly lo 
 remain standing;'. Tlie relief of (lie man there jtosted was 
 carried out whilst the oilier two men of the relief remained 
 at first under cover somewhat to the rear. 
 
 As the rear j;nard now ajiinHiached quite close in its re- 
 lieal, I drew the attention of the men to tlie fact that the 
 reai-most jia.rty ongiit n^ot lo jiass the fixed patrol without 
 communicating to it what had been seen of the enemy. 
 
 This ])aj-iy rejiorled to nie (so that the patrol could, at 
 the same time, overheari: "The enemy has again taken up 
 tlie ou|])ost position on the railway." 
 
 1 asked. ."Uas lie sent a ]iatrol in pursuit?"' ''To the 
 jtresent time none has been oliserved." 
 
 OccKiHition of a Xctr Position for ihi: Oiitfio-sts. (Jiitiioxt 
 Xo. 1; Its Snitrics <uid tlirii- Orders. — I now gave the oi'der, 
 "Sergeant H, with twelve men of the first division, to take 
 position as outjiosl No. 1 in the wood, with two double sen- 
 tries, at a and h. and to nbserve both the roads leading to 
 Schnelleweide. The fixi-d jiatrol ceases to act in that (-ajiac- 
 ity, but is to advance as a creeping patrol in the wood, close 
 up to the railroad, .so as to be able to signal, as early as jtos- 
 sible, the approach of the enemy." 
 
 Xon-'Commissioned officer A was ordered to leave behind, 
 at the boundary of Diinnwald, a lance-corporal and three 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 197 
 
 men ouly (sufficient to furnish a single sentry), and, witb the 
 remaining men, to at once join Sergeant B. 
 
 Should the enemy attack, the boundary where the sen- 
 tries are posted is, flrsit of all, to be defended ; shoiuld a re- 
 treat be necessary, it is itatake place on Hahn ho'use, which is 
 also to be defended. In case of such a iretreat, the outpost 
 could reckon on a reinforcement from tihe support at the 
 mill, and the remainder of the first divdsion was specially 
 told otf for this duty, and was provisionajlly ordered to retire 
 to the mill, and to be ready to support the outpost. 
 
 If, at seven o'clock in 'the evening, the outpost has not 
 been driven back, it is to retire on to the supiporit, after hav- 
 ing instructed its two double posts to consider themselves, 
 from that moment, fixed patrols. 
 
 I made Sergeant B repeat the order, in the presence of 
 the non-commissiioned ofliicers, iSO as to see if he had under- 
 stood me, and I then directed him to make his arrangements. 
 
 I gave the following order to the leader of the second 
 ■division, Lieutenant IST: "Move under cover, with the division 
 behind the position of the fixed patrol of the left wing, as 
 ootpoist No. 2. Replace the patrol by two double posts, and 
 send out a patrol close to the railroad, to give timely notice 
 of an approach of the enemy. The outpost must also, in 
 case of attack, defend the boundary ; its retreat to be on the 
 little bridge near the left flank double sentry (at /). 
 
 "If, at seven o'clock, an attack of the enemy is no longer 
 to be expected, the outpost is to retire on to the support, 
 lea-Sling behind four men as a fixed patrol." 
 
 After having caused this lorder to be repeated to me, 
 and having asked which road Lieutenant N would follow to 
 his position (by going circuitously round the cleaning, and 
 passing near double post No. 1), and where he proposed plac- 
 ing his double sentries (No. I. at the corner of the wood at i 
 
198 Extracts from an Infantry Caiitahi's Journal. 
 
 Xo. II. at h, at the Xut brook), I ordered him to move rapidly 
 to the rear. 
 
 The remainder of the first division then jodined on to him, 
 in order also to reach the outpost at the mill as much under 
 cover as possible. 
 
 I still remained behind, in order 'to observe the arrange- 
 ments of Sergeant B, who had already given instructions to 
 the i;reei.<ing j)atrol, and sent it off; he had placed his double 
 post at a, as post Xo. II., and had sent the other double post, 
 with a lance-corporal, directly towards 1), whilst he, with the 
 remainder of his men (of whom one man only of the former 
 fixed patrol hadbeen sentwiththe orderto non-commissioned 
 officer A), retired into the wood to about the center, between 
 <i ij,nd b, iiiled arms there amongst the bushes, and pushed 
 the sentry over the arms somewhat forward, so that he 
 oould overlook the sjiaci' between a and b. An examining 
 troop would have been advantageous behind double post Xo. 
 II., but for this his detachment wa« too weak. 
 
 The special written report regarding his position I dis- 
 pensed with, but told him that I wished to be proiraptly in- 
 formed if he should learn anything new of the enemy. 
 
 I now rode back to the mill, and when passing the dou- 
 ble post, asked the men what instructions they had received. 
 I was much pleased to find that they had already been in- 
 felructed regarding the position of the enemy, and the 
 changes which had been ordered in our own disposition. 
 
 The leader of the division of skirmishers had also been 
 imformed of all that had taken place by the first division, 
 which had joined him as a reinforcement. He handed me a 
 written report of his position, which was aooompanied by a 
 sufficiently clear sketch. At the same time he told me that, 
 if the enemy attacked, he should at once advance, under 
 
Extracts from am, Infantry Captain's Journal. 199 
 
 oovei", as far as his dowble sentries ; the mill was to be placed 
 in a state of defense, and he had already instructed his men 
 regarding its occupation, should this be necesisary, and had 
 called their attention to the different distances on the sur- 
 rounding groumd. 
 
 1 fully approved of the preoautioms he had taken, and 
 told him that he was to consider himself, in the first in- 
 stance, as a support for the two outposts in front. He was, 
 in the meantime, to consider what position would be most 
 favourable to occupy during the might. 
 
 I now dismounted to await events, and also to decade on, 
 the arrangements to be made for the night. 
 
 When the next relief took place, I again rode forward. 
 
 Scarcely had 1 arrived at the double sentry when I 
 heard, to the right, in front of the line of sentries, a shot in 
 the wood, apparently from one of my patrols, which thereby 
 signalled the approach of a hostile detachment. Soon sev- 
 eral shots were fired. I knew that the enemy was attacking 
 the double sentry at a. 
 
 The post near which I found myself reported, "Several 
 shots are fining from the left wing post of outpost No. 1." 
 
 I at once sent back the order, "The support is to ad- 
 vance." The leadei* of the division of skirmishers met the 
 messenger half way, with the support. I at first made it 
 halt under cover. 
 
 In the meantime, the fire became miore lively; ,at was 
 easy to perceive that the enemy was not approaching nearer. 
 
 After a time only single shots were heard, then the fire 
 ceased altogether. In a short time a man brought a written 
 report from Sergeant B. 
 "No. 1. "Outpost No. 1. G hrs., 30 'min.. Evening. 
 
 "A hostile reoonnodtering patrol, of about 12 men, has 
 
200 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journ<i\. 
 
 attacked double sentry Xo. II., and has been driven back by 
 my outpost. A patrol is following the enemy. 
 
 "jB, Scr(/cant.'" 
 
 I perceived from this that I had been right in sending 
 forward my two outposts, as, if I had not done so, this patrol 
 would easily have pushed forward close to Hahn house, and 
 have obtained a view of my whole position. 
 
 But at night the conditions would lia\e been quite 
 otherwise. 
 
 In the darkness I could never reckon on defending my- 
 self on such an extended front; then, all that could be done 
 would be to defend the points of appui on the main roads — 
 that is to say, on the right Hahn ho'use, in the niAddle the 
 mill, on the left the little bridge. I'atrols, circulating in 
 front, would complete what further protection was lu^cessary. 
 
 I now wrote out the following order: 
 "Diinnwald Mill. (J hrs., 45 min.. Evening. 
 
 "At 7 o'clock the 1st division is to take up its position 
 for the night in the following manner: 
 
 •'Outpost (No. 1) at Hahn house, one double sentry at 
 the boundary of Diinnwald, one double sentry at the point 
 where the roads to the mill and to Schnelleweide divide. A 
 standing patrol of four men, as ordered, with hourily reliefs, 
 and the same for the sentries. 
 
 "At half-past 8 a creeping patrol is to go forward to the 
 railway to assure itself if the enemy's position remains the 
 same. Parole, — Countersign. 
 
 "Note.— At the mill : Outpost Xo. 2 (2d division), with 
 a double sentry at the clearing and a fixed patrol in the wood 
 on the left; it detaches towards the small bridge on the left 
 a patrol troop (1 non-commissioned officer and 9 men), which 
 will patrol continually with parties of two men the ground 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 201 
 
 to the left as far as the (supposed) flank outpost near the 
 Diinnwald meadow. 
 
 "The division of skirmishers is assembled in rear as a 
 support. 
 
 "The detachment of the first division, which is now with 
 the support, is to advance directly on Hahn house, and the 
 men of the division of skirmishers, which are still with out- 
 post No. 1, must be sent here all together. 
 
 "To Sergeant B." 
 
 For the leader of the second division oio written order 
 was necessary, as he was to return towards the mill at 7 
 o'clock, and could there receive verbal instructions. 
 
 It must be understood that the hourly relief of the sen- 
 tries was merely as an exercise in peace-time; iin war it 
 would have been a mistake, as the changing three times the 
 position of the outpoist would also have been one. 
 
 If I did not tell off more creeping patrols, the reason 
 was that, for protection, fixed patrols, even in front of the 
 line oif sentries, are better than creeping patrols, especially 
 if these latter are pushed far forward. The other object of 
 creeping patrols, the reconnaissance of the position of the 
 enemy, can be sutBoiently obtained by one patrol during the 
 day, one at the commencement of the night (in order to see 
 if the enemy still holds the same position, and perhaps to 
 catch sound of his parole and countersign), and a third at 
 day-dawn (in order to see if the enemy is making prepara- 
 tions to move). 
 
 If the enemy's outposts are too distant to be reached by 
 creeping patrols of infantry, fi,xed patrols can then be dis- 
 pensed with; creeping patrols should then be sent along 
 the roads by which an advance can be made, every two hours 
 (in the interval between reliefs), for a distance of about a 
 
202 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 quarter of au hour (up to some Important points), and tlu' 
 relieved sentries should do the same. 
 
 Outposts before foa-tresses which are invested often 
 learn more by safe spies and signals agreed upon than b.\ 
 creeping i)atrols. which frequentl\- only cause an unneces- 
 s:n\- musketry tire. The dispatch of a creeping patrol wiith- 
 out a clearly defined object and mission is always to be 
 ii\ elided. 
 
 Tlie order given Ici the outposts to "jiatrol diligentl}" 
 has especial reference to safety, properly so called, and 
 therefore, :is a rule, sliould be carried out by fixed patrols 
 at the most important posts (yi observation in the front, such 
 as at cross-roads, defiles, and the like. 'I'his should especial- 
 ly be done if, at the same time, sentries can be economized. 
 
 At about a quarter i)ast 7 the second division arrived 
 at the mill, and received the order to relieve the division 
 of skiriuisliers, as also to delacli to the small bridg<' 1 nou- 
 oommissioned ofScin- and D men; tlie non-commissioned offi- 
 cer was to jilace 1 sentry there over tbe arms, and to send 
 every hour a jiatrol of - men to the left as far as the \\oo(l, 
 where a sentry of tlie flank (mtpost communiLcating with 
 mine was sujiposed to be. 
 
 Near the road in the wood, at about 40 pac(?s behind 
 the double sentry, a lance-corj)oral and 4 men were jilaced 
 as e.xaniinin^ troop (and as relief of the double sentry). 
 
 The division of skirmishers retired as soon as it was 
 assembled, on to the position of the support at the cross- 
 roads (g). At nightfall I took with me some men of the out- 
 posts; in order to test the attention and the conduct of the 
 sentries of the fixed patrols. 
 
 L Challmgmg the Gentries hy a Patrol of their otcn 
 Outposts. — I crept along the road in the wood, as quietly as 
 possible, towards the nearest double i)0st, but before I mx- 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. ' 203 
 
 self saw the sentries, a man wlio had heard the mistling cried 
 out, "Halt! who goes there?" 1 caused the answer to be 
 given, "A patrol of your outpoist." 
 
 "One man to the front — halt — the parole?'' The parole 
 was correctly given. 
 
 '■'Advance nearer." As the man called to approached, 
 he was personally recognized by the sentry, and the latter 
 therefore did not ask for the countiersign, but said, "Pass 
 patrol." I satisfied myself that the sentries were .acting 
 properly, and found that the second man of the post, -^ith 
 ported arms, had stood facing outwards. When I inquired 
 the instructions they had received, I found that the sentries 
 were well informed regarding the enemy's position and the 
 direction of the roads, but not regarding the change in the 
 position of their own outposts. 
 
 I therefore sent back to the leader of the second divis- 
 ion, so that he should tell them what was necessary. 
 
 I then asked if the order had been given for one man to 
 patrol towards the next sentries, and was answered "Xo." 
 
 I found that im this case this was quite correct, as the 
 ground in front, which could not be overlooked to any dis- 
 tance, was sufficiently examined by the fixed patrols. When 
 it is not absolutely necessary, the patrolling of sentiiies must 
 be .avoided, because otherwise there remains aliways only 
 one man at the post, and in this case, when news has to be 
 sent, there is a delay. This may, however, be necessary 
 before fortresses, in order to prevent spies from creeping 
 through. 
 
 2. Challenging of, and Conduct towards, a Patrol which 
 does not know the Parole. — I now went with my men in the 
 wood to the right, towards the neighboiring double post. I 
 reached the road leading from Hahn house to Schnelleweide, 
 without being challenged, and remarked that one man of 
 
204 Extracts from an Infantt-y Captain's Journal. 
 
 the double post bad been sent forward to the height, in order 
 to overlook at the same time the clearing and the road, 
 whilst the other man stood far from him to 'the right, near 
 the side road leading to Schnelleweide. The latter chal- 
 lenged me as I approaiched nearer. I oaiused. him to be 
 answered, "Keturning patrol, which does not know the 
 parole." The sentry answered, "You must wait until a re- 
 lid' i-diiies, or a palrol." 
 
 Tliis was correct. He could not have led at once to the 
 outpost the man who had been challenged, because, by so 
 doing, the post wimld have been abandoned, amd the trwo 
 other men of my patrol w iiuld have remained without snjH'r- 
 visioH. as the scrond man of the post was too far off. This 
 shows what a mistake it is to jilace (the two men of a double 
 post far from one another, niilessit is on both sides of a road. 
 If an examining trooip had been tlieic where the roads met 
 together, the man on the right would have been unnecessary, 
 and lould han- liocn placed quite close to the one on the 
 left. 
 
 I sent back an order to Sergeant B to send forward a 
 lance-corporal and four men as an examining troop. I then 
 went in the dire<tion of the fixed patrol. Here also I was 
 properly challenged. 
 
 1 found that this jwitrol was acting very ]>r0iperly, as, of 
 the four men, one ailways remained at (i, and one at &, wMlst 
 the other two patrolled to the right and the left along the 
 clearing, until they met. 
 
 As I went somewhat farther to the right, I heard chal- 
 lenging at a. I listened; it was the returning creei)ing 
 patrol, which was allowed at once to pass through. I went 
 towards the leader, who reported to me. 
 
 Ri'ljori of the Crcrpinf/ Patrol, tof/cther iritli <in Account of 
 ■its I'roeecdiii(/-s. — "The enemy is no longer near the; railroad. 
 
E^vtracls from an Iiifiintrij Captain's Journal. 2l)5 
 
 and appears also to have abandoned Schnelleweide, as dogs 
 are not to be heard barking in thai direction." 
 
 I asked if he had not met any patrol of the enemy? 
 
 ''In front of the railway near the road, I perceived, when 
 I approached, two men of the enemy, and I therefore with- 
 drew unobserved to the right, to the nearest crossing over 
 the railwa_y, so that I myself could creep there whilst the 
 two other men remained near the wood. The crossing was 
 not occujjied, and nothing was to be seen in the neighbor- 
 hood. Everything was quiet in Schnelleweide. 
 
 "I now crept again with my two men towards the left, 
 and endeavored to reach the crossing on that side. The 
 two men of the enemy were no longer to be seen, and the 
 crossing was also free. As I had the order to advance only 
 as far as the railway, I at once commenced my retreat." 
 
 1 praised the lanoe-coiporal for his caution, and sent 
 him back to the outpost. 
 
 1 myself returned to the mill. I could only imagine 
 that the enemy had withdrawn his outpoists as far as the 
 Strunder brook, but decided to ascertain this by a special 
 reconnoitering patrol. A regular attack of the enemy'rf 
 position would have been without an object and a mistake, 
 as only a temi^orary success could be expected from it. 
 
 Sending out a Beconnoitering Patrol. — I therefore fell 
 out non-commissioned officer C with ten men of the division 
 of skirmishers. I ordered him to advance by Schnelleweide, 
 and to reconnoiiter in the direction of Thurn, in order to 
 ascertain whether the enemy had there, oppasite to my left 
 flank, a strong outpost. He was to cover his flank by a 
 patrol in Schnelleweide, and if this were attacked, he was 
 to return by the shortest way to the railroad. 
 
 I also pointed out to him that if the boundary of Thurn 
 were not occupied, he should endeavor to go as far forward 
 
206 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 as the defile, but in doing so should cover himself ou the 
 side of Iddesfeld, in order not to be cut off from Ihcre. He 
 should also follow a different road on his return than in his 
 advance, for his owu safety. 
 
 He marched otT two men as a head aibO'Ut 50 paces in 
 front. Other mi'asuri's of ju'ecauition were not at finst nec- 
 essary. Darkness and a quiet and rapid forward march are 
 sufficient for a small detachment, to enaible it to keep out 
 of sijiht af au.\ cnem.N- that may be on the flanks. In the 
 worst case the lader can be avoided by moving;- (juickly to 
 one side, and makiiif;' use of fa\()rabl(' oipportuuities of 
 jiround iu order to remain hidden for a cerlain linu'. In a 
 w ord, it is suflicieut to lie down and keep (]uiet in order not 
 to be discovered. As a precaution, it is nccesary always l<i 
 clioose another road for the return aruarch, for even two men 
 of the ("iiemy, placed in ambush on the same road, would 
 cause ureat disorder, as it would not be po'Ssible to I ell how 
 man\ of them might be there. 
 
 The written rejiort which 1 received later on, regarding 
 this reconnaissance, ran as follows: 
 
 Report of the I'rriinii(iit('riii(/ I'atrol. — "The enemy has 
 shown patrols only on this side of tlie ►Slpuuder brook. One 
 of the same lelin-d to Thuru, and in following it I ascer- 
 tained 'that the defile was not occupied, but I heard at same 
 distance behind the challenge of a sentry. A detachment 
 of the enemy advancing from Iddesfeld against Thurn oom- 
 ]ielled me to make a rapid retreat. AVhilsit iso retiring I saw 
 a rccoimoitering patrol of 'the enemy returniing, which, hoiw- 
 ever, after a few shots, disapi>eared on one side into the 
 ',\ood. A patrol sent after them saw them later on the mine 
 across the open in the direction of Thurn. — Diinnwald 
 Mill. — Time, 11 o'clock, evening. — C, non-commissioned 
 officer." 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 207 
 
 The result of the reconnaissance was so far important 
 that it could be conjcluded the enemy was posted behind the 
 Strunder brook, probably with Ms main force at Iddesfeld. 
 
 An attack with my whole company would not probably 
 have produced a different result. 
 
 Such an attack during darkness can only be lecom- 
 mended, even as am exercise in peace-time, when it is neces- 
 sary to obtain occupation by sunprise of an important point. 
 In order to increase the prospect of success, a weak detach 
 ment should then, a short time beforeband, alaini the 
 enemy by a li\ely lire on the other wing, in order to distra<>t 
 his attention, and to draw, if possible, his reinforciMiieiitu 
 to that side, whilst the company, in complete silence without 
 firing a shot, would make itself master by a quick attaick of 
 the point to be occupied, and would at once establish itself 
 there and make defensive arnangements. 
 
 Gondiut of tlw Recoimoitei-iufj Patrol. — Having asked 
 non-commissioned officer for details as to what had hap- 
 pened during his march to the front, he reported that he had 
 remained on the left slide of the road to Sehnellewelde, in 
 order to be able the more easily to get out of the way of a 
 patrol of the enemy. He had nuade his men cross the rail- 
 road one by one and stooping down, in order not to be so 
 easily remarked by a patrol ; had assembled the detachment 
 on the further side 'near the height, and had continued to 
 advance along the slopes, after he had been warned hy 
 whistle from the head that nothing of the enemy was to be 
 seen on this side of Schnelleweiilp. He had then left be- 
 hind three trustworthy men on the height, near the road to 
 Schnelleweide, with the order to signal by several shots the 
 appearamce of a detachment of the enemy towards Schnelle- 
 weide, and then so withdraw themselves along the high road 
 as far as the turning to Thurn; but, on the other hand, to 
 
208 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 kci'p tliciiKsclvcs hidden and quiet before simple patrols and 
 to let them pass. Then he himself w^ith the rest Avent 
 alonj; the dileh ot the high roiad as far as the turning lo 
 Thuru. He lau.scd the hij;h iniad to be passed a( the double, 
 lirst bv the lu-ad, then sint;ly by the other men, and had met 
 on the further side tlu' lirst ])alr()l of the entMiiv, and this 
 had quiekly retired on Thuru after tiring a shot. He fol- 
 lowt-d ((uickl.N throujih Thurn without tii'ing, but left two 
 niiMi as a preraulion on the outer boundary towards Iddes- 
 feld. -lusl as he found the delile unoccu])ie(l, and heard 
 tlu- ehalle!i;;c of a sentry, apiiareully abouit 100 paces be- 
 hind A, he «as warned by the lirini;- of several shots on his 
 rij;lit (lank that the enemy was al tacking in the diireciti'on of 
 Iddesfeld. He then, williout halting, withdrew quickly he- 
 hind the hij;h road, ordered the patrol to joiin him by jiaissing 
 over the railroad, and then, having assembled his men behind 
 
 the railroad, he re'lreatc(l through the w 1 \\ith a I'car 
 
 g(iard, and in doing so came against a i-eliirui'Ug reconiiais- 
 s.uicc of the ( nemy, before which he I'emained in hiiding on 
 one side, and only tired \\heii he remarke(l I hat it was weak. 
 It I hen quickly disapjieared. 
 
 I found his measui'cs and his ((mdiict in every way 
 \\(irlhy of ]jra.ise. In ex]ilaiia:| ion of the last oc.cuiTence 
 lelaled by him, the following, which had taken place in the 
 meantime at outpost No. 2, must be mentioned: 
 
 ^^'llen the reliefs took place at 10 o'clock, I went with 
 the fresh men, in order to see how the relief was jiosted. 
 
 I found that already they had very pi-oju-rly ag7-e(Hl 
 ui^in a sign ta low whistle) in order to avoid challenging 
 when the relief took place. At I he whisth^ the two men to 
 be relieved approached near to one another; those to relieve 
 them placed themselves on their right and left. The lance- 
 corporal in charge of the relief satisfied himself by a couple 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 209 
 
 of questions tbat the men going on duty knew what was 
 necessary regarding the enemy, the positioms of their own 
 side, and the direction of the roads, whereupon the two men 
 coming oS duty were sent as a patrol towards the neighbor- 
 ing post on the right, in order to learn if any change had 
 taken place on that side. 
 
 The men for the relief of the fixed patrol bad in the 
 meantime advanced into the wood on the left. 
 
 Att'Ucli of a Recornioitcring Patrol of the Enemy ami 
 Defeat of the sams. — But before they had reached the patrol 
 several shots were fired on the left flank, which sooii 
 a]tpeared to come nearer, .^fter a short time a messenger 
 came quickly with the report: "A detachmemt of the enemy 
 is advancing on the Nut brook." At the same time on the 
 If'ft some shots were to be heard in the far distance and 
 others nearer. The examining troop had at once advanced 
 to the sentries. Rega.rding ithe strength of the attack of the 
 enemy, the messenger could not give any further details. 
 I, therefore, at once sent an order for the division of skir- 
 mishers to advance as far as the mill. 
 
 In the meantime the relief of the fixed patrol and ten 
 men of the same had joined on to the examining troop. I 
 now ordered the leader to take position under cover near 
 the road, but in case of a superior attack to fall back on the 
 miill. 
 
 I then myself went back to the mill, where already the 
 proper measures for its occupation had been taken, and as 
 my left flank appeared to be especially threaitened, I at onc<' 
 sent ofl' a section to reinforce the patrol troop. 
 
 Soon firing began he!re also, but as it had ceased en- 
 tirelj^ in front, I decided that it co'uld not be a very strong 
 detachment, and determined to attack it nnself in flank. I 
 therefore ordered the leader of the division of skirmishers 
 
210 Extracts from an Infant-ry Captain's Journal. 
 
 to attack quickly the left wing of the eneiiij in the wood 
 witli what remained of his division, and if possilile, to cut off 
 his retreat. He advianced quickly, and turned at once to 
 the left. I accompanied him as far as the advanced 
 jiosil ion. 
 
 The firinj; on the left became soon more rapid; we re- 
 marked that the enemy was retiring. I niw ordered the 
 men of the lixed patrol to. advance quickly through the wood 
 on to the old position, and to prevent, as far as passible, the 
 retreat of the enemy on that side. In their advance they 
 i-auu' upon a patrol of the eneui.N' (]irobably ])kiced for protec 
 lion of his llanJo. which (piickly relired after tiring a few 
 shots. 1 
 
 Till' detachment of the enemy succeeded in escaping by 
 ci-ossing the Nut brook, and soon disapjieared from the view 
 of the pursueis in the gronnd on the further side, which did 
 not j)ermit of seeing to a distance. In the same way this 
 detachment later on escajied from nou-comuiissiom*d otHcer 
 ( '. All then took up again their former positions. 
 
 It was half-past 11 o'clock when I sent the order to the 
 left wing, that all were to assemble near tlie road to Schnelle- 
 weide. At the same time I gave the signal, and caused 
 the detachments to unload their arms successively as they 
 arrived. I then marched on fichnelleweide, when I caused 
 the signal for the "Assembly" to be sounded, as a sign to my 
 adversary that I was retiring. 
 
 The object of the exercise appeared to me to have been 
 as far as ]iossihle attained: since on acconnt of the miany 
 events wliich had happened, which, from being discussed 
 during instruction time, and also from being talked over 
 amongst the men themselves, would lead each of them to a 
 conviction of the following fact: that, during the night, 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 211 
 
 single men, as also complete detachments even in unfavor- 
 able positions, would bave less to disturb them than during 
 the day, provided that they do not allow themselves to be 
 surprised, and make some preparations against their be- 
 ing so. 
 
212 Extracts from an Infantru Captain's Journal. 
 
 SE^'ENTII KXKlv<MSE. 
 
 FUjht in a Defile, cujitiiixt Aiiotlier Cuiiipanii. 
 
 The — June, morning (see Fig. S). Having cunu' to an 
 undersUmdiiig \Yitli another ctinipany, which had been in- 
 s1i'iu-I(m1 in a way simihir to Ihal I have abuve pointed lOut, 
 I made use of (luc of the Idllowang davs lo undenlake, as a 
 spci-ia! exercise, a delih' eiigagciiieni, and lo jiraclice I lie 
 delMiucliIng fi-oni and relreat tlirongli tlic same, under liic 
 of an enwn y. 
 
 (1( iirral Idea. — We agieed with this \'ie\v io tlie follow- 
 ing ari-angenienls: 
 
 1. An east detachment, wiiicli wishes to advance 
 (o\\ai'di4 .Miilheim from the nordieasi, gives 'its advanced 
 guard orders lo jiroceed lowai'ds Diinnwald, and (here lo 
 place outjiosls oi)]iosile Miilheim, but to delacli a c(>mpany 
 in the direclio'D of Schuellewt'ide for observing the high road 
 Gladbach-.Miilheiui. The conipany to march off from Diinn- 
 wald at N o'clocdi. 
 
 2. P''i''()m the gariison of Miilheim one battalion is lo 
 be sent forward to reconnoiter to-morrow at 8 o'clock 
 towards Diinnwald and Schnellevveide. One coniiKiny is 
 es]iecially to go forward on the (ilad'bach high road agaijist 
 Schnellewcide. 
 
 'We agi-eed at the same time that the points of jiassage 
 over the railway should be ccmsidered as V('rilable d(^tiles; 
 further, that the company of the east detachment should be 
 allowed to march off with a flag company at 9 o'(dock, so aw 
 under all circumstances to be able to jiass over the line of 
 railway and to reach Schnellewcide. It was arranged that 
 each company should have the opportunity of debouching 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 213 
 
 from a defile in proximity to or under the fire of the enemy, 
 as also of a suooessive retreut through the defile. 
 
 The ground on both sides of the high road at Schnelle- 
 weide was cultivated, so that it could be considered as a 
 defile, from which it was only possible to proceed to the 
 attack of the passages across the railroad with precaution, 
 and after having previously occupied with the advanced 
 guard the height behind Schnelleweide. The latter task 
 fell to my company. 
 
 The division of skirmishers, under Lieutenant N, re- 
 ceived the order to go fpr-ward as advanced guard towards 
 Schnelleweide, the first and second divisions under First 
 Lieutenant A to follow at a distance of at least 300 metres. 
 One non-commissioned officer (Sergeant A), with eight uieai 
 of the firsit division, was to go along the railway as a left 
 lateral detachment, in order to keep up a communication 
 with the supposed detachment on the Diinnwald high road, 
 and to protect my left fiank. 
 
 Lieutenant N sent in advance, about 200 metres, a non- 
 commissioned officer, with five men as head, and made the 
 rest of his division follow in file on the high road.* He 
 himself was near the connecting man, the sergeant in com- 
 mand of the advanced guard, about twenty paces in front of 
 it, so as to understand better every order called out to him. 
 
 *]Tlor a divisiou at war strength soioh a fortmation in file is unsuit- 
 able, evBD if it enajbles the marcti to ibe made better under cover. A 
 long division in file is not sufficiently ready for action. It is there- 
 fore necessary either to march in sections, or, if by so doing the divi- 
 sion suffers too great a loss, and yet it is not possible to deploy it, 
 then the lialf division in front sihould be eoimpletely extended, and the 
 rear one should follow in file along the ditch of the high road. In 
 order to aoeustom division leaders to this, and to enable tJtiem to 
 judiciously maneuver strong divisions, special exercises for officers 
 are carried out, when several companies are joineiJ together so as to 
 form one carapany of war strength, and this is exercised on broken 
 ground during the autumn and winter time under tlie direction of 
 the commander of the battalion. 
 
214 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 I followed with a bugler and a lance-rorponal as orderly 
 close behind the advanced guard. 
 
 Great intervals were here required, not only on account 
 of the openness of the ground, but ailso because I could not 
 know beforehand ^^•hether it might not prove advantageous 
 to scud my main body to the attack against the railway on 
 the left of the high road (making use of the roads across the 
 fields) — and this vo\\\d not have been carried out if I haid 
 allowed the company to follow the advanced guard too 
 closely, brcausc then the whole movement would have taken 
 pliii-e under effective fire of the enemy. 
 
 It is moreover always a fault in open ground to follow 
 the advanced guard too closely. 
 
 Conduct of tin; Adranrcd (liiard on rau-hhig the EnemiJ. — 
 At about 200 metres from Schnelleweide the head halted 
 and knelt dnwn under ci)\'er. Imnu^diately afterwards I 
 heard them shout out to th(,' rear from the head, "There are 
 sentries of the enemy in Schnelleweide." I myself now also 
 remarked a man of the enemy jteeriaig out from behind a 
 house. The advanced guard at once knelt do>wn on the com- 
 mand of its leader, in the ditch of the high road. I likewise 
 made a sign to thecompany to kneel down. First Lieutenant 
 A gave the order, "Kneel down by divisions, h;ilf of each divi- 
 sion in file on the left, and half on the right of the road." 
 Whereupon the two foremost sections of each division at once 
 moved off in file to the right and knelt down, whilst the two 
 rear scctiims of each division formed file to the left, ran 
 across the road, and there likewise knelt doiwn in file on a 
 level with thedr first half-divisions. I saw also how my left 
 lateral detachment took up a position under cover close to 
 the railway, and how a man was sent to make a report. 
 The report, which reached me somewhat later, ran as 
 follows: 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 215 
 
 "A detacbraent of the enemy has occupied the boundary 
 of the wood and the passage across the railway; two sections 
 are going forward to Schnelleweide as a reinforcement." 
 
 The latter, in spite of their going fo^rward on the height 
 as much under cover as possible, could be seen from the 
 point where I was standing. 
 
 The enemy had reached the crossing over the railway 
 just at the right time, and was able at once to detach a non- 
 commissioned ofQcer with a section towards Schnelleweide, 
 where it at once tookposition under cover, andmade arrange- 
 ments for the defense. At my approach Captain B at oince 
 sent, forward two sections as a reinforcement towards 
 Schnelleweide, which were to take up position on the height 
 at in such a manner that they would bring my attack along 
 the high road under effective fire. He protected himiself 
 against my left lateral detachment by placing a section at 
 the boundary of the wood close to the railway at p; the re- 
 mainder he kept quite under cover, and until the last I re- 
 mained in uncertainty as to where he had placed his sup- 
 port. I guessed it to be near the railway, and in this I was 
 right. In the meantime Lieutenant N had called out to the 
 most advanced section of his advanced guard: "Reinforce 
 the head — to the right extend." 
 
 As on the right of the high road the field was cultivated, 
 the section was obliged to run forward in the ditch, where- 
 upon some shots were fired at it, and the men then quickly 
 threw themselves on the ground near the head. The leader 
 ■of the head at once gave the order: "jVt 200 metres — slow 
 fire." 
 
 Lieutenant N had not followed in the line of skir- 
 mishers, since he could equally well observe from the point 
 where he stood. The leader of the head now called out to 
 him : "Schnelleweide is apparently occupied by one section." 
 
216 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 He could at once have caused the (;<ime report to be passed 
 on to me, but wished to satisfy himself further about it; and 
 as lie could only do this by reinforrinj; his skirmishers, he 
 y;ave the order: "The second section extend to the left along 
 the high road." The leader of the section at once f;ave the 
 (irdcr: ''Left turn — double march," and hurried across to 
 the other side of the road, and then: "Kijiht turn — in the 
 ditch .IS far as flic head — double maicli." lie himself hur- 
 licil on in fi-diit of his ;;roup, and on arriving at the head 
 gave I lie order: "Lie down — slow Are li(M) metics." The 
 leader of I lie head had during the a<lvance of the groiiji, 
 whilst tlie t'liemy ^\as keejiing a lively fire on it, given the 
 order: "Keiiiforce lire;" and as tlie fire of the enemy again 
 beraiue weaker: "Slow tire." Lieut euantN saw Ihat during 
 the advance of the second section it was also fired upon from 
 tlie heights behind Schnelleweide. The reinforcement oi 
 I he enemy on the height which 1 had seen on horseback he 
 had not previously remarked from his lower point of view, 
 but he now called out to the leader of his supjiiirt: "Report 
 to the captain that Schnelleweiile and the heights behind it 
 arc occupied apparently with a division." He had, indeed, 
 only remarked some two scclions extended, but lie could 
 suppose thai these sections would have some sujipoi't behind 
 them. 
 
 I had remained quietly halted behind the advanced 
 guard without interfering with the arrangements of Lieu 
 tenant X, as he indeed knew that it was his busiues.s, as 
 leader of the advanced guard, by drawing up his division to 
 the attack, to force the enemy as far as possible to show his 
 strength. 
 
 Carryimj out of the Attack on Schncllcircidr. during which 
 the Hii/h Road is considered as a Defile.~Bnt when the report 
 was made to me 1 sent an order by the messenger to Lieuten- 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 217 
 
 ant N, "To advance with his division by rushes to 160 metres 
 from the enemy." The messenger ran forward along the 
 ditch to Lieutenant N, but did not eommunicate to Mm the 
 order with ported arms, but kneetong down under cover 
 behind a tree: "Lieutenant, the division is to advance by 
 rushes for 160 metres." (Here it appeared that it would have 
 been better on my part to have given the order in writing, 
 because during a fight only quite short commands can be 
 passed on word for word, whils-t even such short orders a,s 
 the foregoing are repeated word for word with difficulty, 
 and thus easily give rise to misunderstanding.) Lieutenant 
 X then gave the order, "The support to extend to the left 
 and right of the high road." He himself now ran forward 
 to the skirmishers. I, at the same time, signalled to the 
 company: "Advance quickly" (by several quick movements 
 of the sword), in order to bring the company up to me. It 
 was led forward at the double in the same formation as the 
 support. 
 
 Lieutenant !N now commanded: "Advance quickly by 
 .groups from the right flank 50 paces." The leader of the 
 right wing group gave the order: "The most advanced group 
 stand up — ^double march." Tlie group had been p'racticed at 
 once to leave off firing at the first caution, so that at the 
 words "Stand up," the leader could immediately place him- 
 self at the head of the group. The leaders of the other 
 groups at the same time ordered : "Eapid fire." The groups 
 followed one another so quickly that before the one in front 
 could be ordered by its leader: "Halt! lie down! at 100 
 metres! rapid fire!" the second had already received the or- 
 der: "Stand up — double march," and the groups on the left 
 side of the high road moved in a similar manner. 
 
 During the whole movement a small support of the 
 enemy was firing volleys at my compamy from the heights, 
 
218 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 and I tliuis became aware that by a rapid continuation of my 
 attack I should overcome the defender, since the quick move- 
 ment to the front, as well as tlie division of my forces to the 
 right and left of the high road, must mucb diminish the 
 effectiveness oif the enemy's lire; whilst if I decided to keep 
 up a longer fire at the halt, I should incur the danger of his 
 gaining time to draw up reinforcements from the railway. 
 
 I therefore ordered Lieutenant A, when the company 
 had arrived near me, and thrown itself down on the ground: 
 "The first division to advance in deployed order as far as the 
 line of skirmishers at the double; as soon as the men have 
 thrown themselves down there, bayonets are to be fixed tor 
 the attack, and on my signal, 'Advaince quickly,' the houses 
 and the heights behind them are to be taken at a run ; the 
 enemy, however, is only to be followed up with musketi'y 
 fire.'"* 
 
 The division leader at once ordered: "The first divisiion 
 in deployed order — double march;" whereupon the sections 
 deployed to the right and left ran as quickly as possible 
 alonj; the road to the division of skinmlshers, and at the 
 order, "Lie down," threw themselves on the ground and 
 
 *By frequent repetition of a similar exercise the understajKliiig 
 soon becomes alive to this description of front attacks, so that the 
 commander of the division only requires the short order: "Advance 
 into the line of slcirmishers;" and he will know what he is to do. 
 
 If at this moment I had already been forward with the skirmish- 
 ers, it would have been impossible on active service to have arranged 
 such a combination for attack. All I eould then have done would 
 have been t» bring up a remforeemeat by signs to the advanced 
 skirmishers, and as soon as this had arrived to have passed to the 
 right and left the order: "Prepare for the attack," and then to gave 
 the signal: "Advance quickly;" when the support wooild, ooq Its own 
 accord, have to follow at the double. The whole movement gains, 
 however, in rapidity, if the leader has previously communicated 
 detailed orders to the supiwrt; he then hurries on in front of it, and 
 giving at the same time the signal for the attack, drives all those 
 who are advancing with hesitation before him, and with an hurrah 
 is close at hand with the support to bring matters to a decision. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 219 
 
 fixed bayonets. The skirmishers had in the meantime kept 
 up a "rapid lire.'' 
 
 I left but ish'Ort time to the first division to recover its 
 breath, but gave shortly afterwards the mgnal, "Advance 
 quickly," vi^hich signal was at once sounded by all the bu- 
 glers, whilst the leader of the second division, whom I was 
 hurrying on by sign, at once ordered, "Double march," and 
 deployed to the right and left of the road, and thus followed 
 with his division in line and the drums beating, as near as 
 possible to the other 'divisions. This beating of the drums 
 causes a visible quickening of skirmishers who are advanc- 
 ing in front ; and, in truth, there is no better means on active 
 service to give a fresh start forward to skirmishers who are 
 inclined to halt, than by rolling the drums behind them; 
 even if no support were with the drums, the moral effect 
 would be the isame. It is, therefore, a mistake to <lay down 
 as a principle that drums are only to beat in an attack when 
 the support has already reached the line of skirmiiishers. 
 This is only advisable when on the defensive and a counter- 
 attack is intended — not on the offensive. 
 
 The detachment of the enemy posted at the houses re- 
 tired rapidly before the attack, alo'ng the foo^t of the height, 
 so that the portion of the enemy posted almost entirely un- 
 der cover on the high ground could bring an effective fire to 
 l>ear on the point of exit from SchnelleWeide. The high 
 road, however, immediately behind the farms, wa,s iif a cut- 
 ting which lay as a dead angle opposite the enemy. 
 
 At one moment during the attack, the whole of the men 
 crowded together on the road, but Lieutenant N and the non- 
 commissioned oflScers who had been "practiced at this sort of 
 thing, soon moved them out of that, by signaling and calling 
 to the men to throw themselves behind the farms of Sc'hnelle- 
 
220 E.rtrarts from an Infantry Viiptain's Journal. 
 
 weide on the right and. the left, whence they could fire on 
 the retiring enemy and against the height. 
 
 Durinj; the attack, First Lieutenant A had remained in 
 front of his division, and had thus kept it in hand, and pre- 
 vented' it from getting mixed up with the division of skir- 
 mishers, which he had followed closely. Consequently, it 
 was only necessary for him to make a sign and .to give the 
 order, "Half left," in order to throw the division at once be- 
 hind the nearest farm, and lo form up again in cloise order. 
 
 He had at once very correctly perceived that the de- 
 bouching from Si^inelleweide, and the further pushing back 
 of the enemy, must be carried out in accordance with a gen- 
 eral plan, and that, therefore, my orders must be aiwaited, 
 the more so. as I was close by him, and that immediately fol- 
 lowing the division in support had arrived, and been posted 
 behind the farm.* 
 
 Ihhoni-liinf/ from Srliiicllcircidr. — The debouching of the 
 company on to the heiglils, in order to continue the attack 
 against the railway defile, had now to be considered. The 
 cutting in the high road was favurable for the further devel- 
 opment of the attack, as it allowed the right wing to be 
 ])ushed forward under co\'er, and the left wing of the enemy, 
 which was still on the heights, to be turned. 
 
 *0n active service, insteatl of such tiioug'htful and subordinate 
 conduct, it often happens, through the over-excited zeal of the leader 
 ami of a few men, that a, confused and in'egular pursuit takes place 
 beyonil the position won. It is, therefore, important to bring about 
 such situations in peace exercises, so as to accustom the leaders to 
 restrain themselves and their men from pressing forwar.l without 
 order beyond the further limit of a position won, Where they should 
 at once assemble together, as m«ch as possible under cover. This 
 will, however, only succeed when all know beforeiiand that the com- 
 pany eoimmander insists strongly on this point, and thafhe possesses 
 sufficient judgment and presence of mind to give the further nec- 
 essary orders at the proper moment. Sometimes a leader allows the 
 force at his disposal to gert out of hand through giving hurried orders 
 to separate fractions, Instead of keeping his eye on the combined 
 working together of the whole. 
 
Extracts ■from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 221 
 
 In doing this, only a very short extent of ground had to 
 be hurried across under fire. ^ 
 
 I, therefore, ordered Lieutenant N to let the left wing of 
 his division remain at the outer boundary of Sobnelleweide, 
 and to keep up a brisk flire against the heights. The right 
 wing was to advance, by groups, at the double, across the 
 road towards the ridge, and to cover the debouching of the 
 company. I ordered First Lieutenant A, as soon as the skir- 
 mishers had taken position on the ridge, to pass the exposed 
 place on the road by sections, at the double, and to take posi- 
 tion on the ridge in prolongation of the right flank. 
 
 After I had ordered this I dismounted, as I should have 
 done on active service; for a leader, as soon as a fight oomes 
 to a standstill in close proximity to the enemy, must accus- 
 tom himself to direct the combat on foot. 
 
 My orders were carried out intelligently. Each group 
 leader commanded his group (one after the other), "Double 
 march," made them halt for a moment, under cover, in the 
 cutting of the road, looked over the ledge to see where the 
 group could best be poisted, and, in reference thereto, gave 
 the order, "To take position." 
 
 First Lieutenant A ran at the head of his first section, 
 in order himself to at once ascertain the enemy's position on 
 the height, and to determine accordingly the position of his 
 other section. He made his right wing, which was favored 
 by the ground, wheel forward so as to flank the enemy's left. 
 As soo'u as his division had taken position, I ordered the sec- 
 ond divisiom to follow the first, by groups, and to form itself 
 in close order, as support, behind the right wing in tihe cut- 
 ting of the road. 
 
 I then hurried after the first division, so as to give my 
 further orders from the height, w'here I could overlook every- 
 thing. 
 
222 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 I saw how the enemy on the heijrht was ali-eady retreat- 
 ing, by groups, from the left flank, bef oi-e my tui-ning attack 
 on to the little wood q, but had caused one division to extend, 
 in a rallying position, on tihe border of this wood, opposite 
 my right wing. 
 
 Debouching of the Enemy to the Attack across the Raihcwy. 
 — Inmiediately aftei'wards I remarked that a division of the 
 eutMiiy, in close order, was passing the railway at the double, 
 an unfunled flag behind, which, after the first divisioo had 
 thrown itself under cover behind the right wing, moved fur- 
 ther towards the left wing, and there, in like manner, took 
 post under cover. 
 
 1 culled out quickly, to the second division, "Fire volleys 
 on the enemy's support." 
 
 Although the leader tolerably quickly ordered "Double 
 march," and "Halt for firing," still the movement was not 
 carried out witih sufficient intelligence, and indeed it was not 
 altogether easy to take position on tihe sloping heights, to 
 fire volleys. Before, therefore, a regular volley could be 
 fired, the support of the enemy was already under cover. 
 
 At the same time I bad remarked also that the leaders 
 of the skirmishers had not ordered the support to be fired 
 upon, and tlhat a report had not been made to me from any 
 direction, of the appearance of the support. I caused a halt 
 to be sounded and arranged with my adversary for a pause, 
 in order to repeat these different things, and aigain to prajc- 
 tice taking position on the ridge, and getting ready for open- 
 ing fire, as well as advancing for firing volleys. 
 
 On the signal "Advance" being again given, my adver- 
 sary then proposed to advance to the attack, whilst I wished 
 to retire again, through Schnelleweide, as the object of my 
 reconnaissance was accomplished. But I wisihed only to 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 223 
 
 give the order for the retreat after the signal, as well for 
 practicing myself as the men. 
 
 Remarks on the Canduct of the Skirmishers and Group- 
 Leaders of the Compamy. — In examining the position of the 
 groups, I noted whether they were well placed for the attack, 
 as also whether distances had been correctly judged, amd a 
 proper line of retreat chosen. I pointed out to the non-coon- 
 missioned officers that they should not forget, as soon as a 
 support of the enemy appeared within efifectiye range, to 
 order at once, "Mre at the support, at 200 yards," or at 
 greater distances, as might be necessary. 
 
 The appearance of the support must also, at omce, be 
 shouted out from one group leader to another, until it 
 reaches the leader of the whole. Only when the latter finds 
 himself far behind is it necessary to send a report to him. 
 
 When the second division made an aittempt to place it- 
 self more rapidly on the ridge, to flre volleys, it appeared 
 that it was too difficult for the second rank to fire through 
 the first rank, and that the rapid delivery of good valleys was 
 impossible, unless both ranks, after preparing to fire volleys, 
 should kneel down, and only stand up to give the volleys. It 
 was then only necessary to give the OTder, "Stand up" (when 
 all would have stood up at once, with their arms at the 
 ready), and, "At 200 metres, present," and so on. For load- 
 ing, all could again kneel down, under cover. 
 
 Instead of vollej-s, the delivery of rapid fire by the sup- 
 port, when in such close proximity to iJhe enemy's skirmish- 
 ers and support, is recommended. When I caused this to be 
 practiced on the same ground, it was evident how, on the 
 caution, "On to the ridge for rapid firing," the men standing 
 in close order in the cutting in the road took up position 
 much more easily for rapid firing, because the first rank at 
 
224 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 once took more interval, so as to fire better, and tbe srcoiid 
 ranlv tlius fimud a better place. 
 
 The ordering of volleys is, therefore, only to be reioni- 
 nieuded wlien they can be ordered and carried out tranquilly, 
 and where also no considerable errors can happen in the 
 jiidfiinji- of distajiee. In all other cases it is better to order 
 "Ka|)id flriut;," and to cause this to be carried out either 
 lyiiiti down or kueeliny, because then the grazing course of 
 the shuts |»r(iinist-s a better result, evi-u if the aiming be bad. 
 
 The signal "To advance" was given. The adverwiry at 
 (mce sireiigtheniMl liis lefi wing with a whole division, ap- 
 parently tc. advance to the attack against my right wing. 
 
 In all grou])s "Kajiid firing" was ordered. 
 
 h'ctniit hcfoir tlic Attack of the F.Hcmii ttiraiii/li llic Dc/ilc 
 of Sfluicllnrcidc. — I gave the order, "The second division to 
 take u]! position at the boaindary of Sohnellewei'de, as a rear 
 guard."* 
 
 The leader of the second di\isiou at once coanuiajided, 
 "The lirst and second sections lake jiosition to the right O'f 
 the road, third and fourth on the left — double march." 
 
 When my adversary perceived that I began the retreat, 
 he al once advanced rapidly, by divisions, from the left flank, 
 and, in order to lose no time, 1 imine<liafely gave the order, 
 "Uighl by groups, from the right wtng, through Schnelle- 
 weide."t 
 
 *In this oi-der I specially avoided tlhe word "retreat," b: cause, at 
 such Kiii-cra.^U-e uxarahing off, ift is easy to he heiird and carpied out by 
 thosi' fior ■vvhom it is not intended, and cunfusiun is blius caiused. 
 Even if tthis does not liappen in peace, nt does in war. 
 
 The leader of the second division did well in giving, at once, tin; 
 necessary orders to his sections, ami not immediately moving bacli 
 the irholc division, because, during a movement, orders are difficult 
 to give amd to understand. 
 
 tit would be a great mistake if the principle of giving orders to 
 sjihnnliimtc Iciirlrrs. and not to tin; men, wore carried so far that even 
 in such niomciiti; when a rapid ij-ccution is necessary, it were so 
 strictly adhered to as first to give an order to the leader, and for him 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 225 
 
 Eac;h group now, after firing another shot, doubled off 
 along the raad on the command of its leader, "Right about 
 turn ; double march.'' 
 
 First Lieutenant A called out to the first group, which 
 hurried past him, "The division will collect together behind 
 Schnelleweide." 
 
 He then caused the groups to follow one another rapid- 
 ly, and himself followed the last one, in order to arrange 
 that behind .Schnelleweide the division i^hoiuld continue its 
 retreat &n both sides of the high road by half-divisions in 
 file, so that a too favorable object of fl're should not be offered 
 to the enemy, by a retreat along the high road in close order. 
 
 The retreat in sudh a formation through a defile, which 
 is under the lire of the enemy, is always more advantageous 
 when exercising the men than a withdrawal in a dense maws. 
 I had given the order in the meantime to the leader of the 
 division of skirmisihers, "Fcillow the first division."' 
 
 He accordingly continued a rapid fire against the right 
 wing of the enemy, which had now pushed forward to the 
 high road, whilst he made the section of his right wing slight- 
 ly alter its position, and when the first division had passed 
 him, he ordered, "Retire quickly by groups from the right 
 wing"; and as each group hurried past him, "Follow the first 
 divisiom.' 
 
 1 had in the meantime examined the position of the see- 
 to repeat it. On the oomtrary, as the principal leader always bea.rs 
 the responsiUUty of ihis orders, he maist therefore give thean directly 
 to the men, whem by doing so their execution is facilitated, and his 
 men must, in like manner, be practiced, on receiving such direct 
 orders, not to tcait for the .order of the subordinate leaders; care must 
 be taken that, when orders are given to subordinate leaders, men who 
 may by chance overhear them should not carry out the same one by 
 one. 
 
 I>ull suibordinate leaders, whio cannot repeat an order given to 
 them quickly, will be the cause, by their own conduct, of orders being 
 generally given directly to their men when prompt execution is 
 required. 
 
226 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 ond division, and as the section of the division of skinuisih- 
 ers, which fioni the beginning had stood on the left wing, 
 now appeared no longer necessary where it stood, I caused 
 it at once to withdraw, aind ordered the leader of the second 
 division to retire (juicUi/ if the enemy made an overpowerimg 
 attack, but by (/roups df he did not press forward in force. 
 
 I then quickly mounted my horse, and hurried after the 
 retiring company, which was moving at a rapid pace in the 
 ditches along both sides of the ihigh road. 
 
 I ordered the first division, which was at the head, to 
 reti'-e ar the double 100 paces further, and there to take up 
 position on both sides of the high road facing towards 
 Sc-hnelleweide, so as to rally the second division. The divl 
 sion of skirimishers was to continue the retreat rapidly until 
 beyond rifle range. 
 
 The enemy, in the meantime, in consequence of the 
 good position taken up by the secomd division, remained 
 halted on the ridge to Are, and had brought up his snppoi-t, 
 the flag company, under cover, as far as the high road, so as 
 by a general attack to obtain possession of Schnelleweide. 
 The leader of the second division availed himself of the halt 
 of the enemy to at once take back two of his sections as far 
 as the opposite boundary, right and left of the road, wlience 
 tliey couild fire both on the road and on the height; and when 
 these had been placed, lie caused the rest to retire at tihe dou- 
 ble. In hurrying past, he gave the section which had re- 
 mained halted the order to fire one more shot as soon as the 
 enemy advanced against Schnelleweide, and then to follow 
 him on the rigbt and left of the 'high road. 
 
 The attack of the enemy was not long delayed, so that 
 the rear guard was oibliged to retire before the remainder of 
 the division had gained a sufficient distance. When, how- 
 ever, the skirmishers of the enemy in great crowds raai for- 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 227 
 
 ward to the boundary on this side of Schnelleweide to deliver 
 a followimg fire, they themselves came under the fire of the 
 first division, posted at about 200 metres, and were obliged 
 to seek for cover, and thus the second division was enabled 
 to withdraw unmolested behind the first. 
 
 The left lateral detachment at the same time withdrew 
 to the same distance as the company had done. 
 
 It was at first intended tha,t the exercise should end 
 here. As, however, my adversary wished also on this occa- 
 sion to practice with his company a retreat through a defile 
 under fire of the enemy, we agreed that he should again re- 
 treat over the railway, fallowed by my company, which 
 should be supposed to receive a reinforcement. 
 
 YoVwntary Retreat of the Enemy behind the Bail/way, amid 
 Renewed Advance of my Company through Schnelleweide. — Ac- 
 cordingly he at once made the arrangement that one division 
 should at first remain halted as rear guard at Schnelleweide, 
 but .should retire over the railway when I advanced to the 
 attack. He sent immediately a second division to occupy 
 the boundary of the wood on this side the railway, so as to 
 rally the rear guard, whilst the third division received the 
 order to retire directly behind the railway crossing. 
 
 When I perceived the movement and retreat of my ad- 
 versary, I at once ordered the first division to occupy 
 Schnelleweide again, and the second and skirmishing divi- 
 sions to follow quickly in close order. 
 
 As the enemy was occupied in his retreat, it appeared to 
 me more advantageous to follow with the company in close 
 order, than to cause it to advance again by half-divisions in 
 file, a formation which should only be adopted when it ap- 
 pears necessary in order to avoid great losses. 
 
 First Lieutenant A ordered, "Advance quickly by rushes 
 from the right wing along the high road"; whereupon the 
 
228 E.vlnirls from an Infuutrij Captain's Journal. 
 
 two right wing scrtious, witli their leaders at their head, at 
 once advanced along the ditches, wliilst the left «evtious 
 opened rapid fire. As the adversary at once refrir(Ml before 
 the attack, and only left one section as rear guard. First 
 Lieutenant A iuimediarely ordered the left wing sections to 
 double, whilst in the meantime Lieutenant N had de]>loyed 
 bnth divisions on the high road, and was following rapidly. 
 The enemy s rear guard withdrew quickly after firing a few 
 sJKirs. 
 
 First Lieutenant A ( ontinued the attack with his divi- 
 sion as far as Schnelle\v(-i(li', occupied the farm on the h"ft 
 side of it with both sectiims of the left wing, and on phe 
 other hand advanced the light wing as far as tihe ridge, and 
 quickly posted it there to give a following tire. 
 
 As I observed that the adversai'y had not yet reached 
 the railway ei'ossing. I gave the order to the coim])any, "Dou- 
 ble." so as, if jinssible, to In- able to give a volley at tIhe mo- 
 ment rthen the detachiuents pass(^(l the ta-oissing. As it hap- 
 pened the company arrived jusit at the right time, so that I 
 was able to give the order to the second divisio-n, whi'tih was 
 at the head, as soon as it i-e;iched the road leading to the 
 crossing, "Wheel li> the left to fire volley.s." 
 
 The di\ision leader ordered, "Left wheel — double march 
 — for firing — halt — at 300 metres — present."* 
 
 *Tihe volley \\-()ulil naturally only have caused a serioun loss to 
 the enemy's rear f;niird division, which was then iiassing thi' crossing 
 at the double by groups, If the hostile division had been in close order. 
 I am, tliereforp. of opinion that, in a retreat under tire of the ene- 
 my, the confusion and bad moral impression are increased when, 
 through mistaken care lest the troops should get out of hand, all aro 
 kept together in a crowded mass. Troops should be ordered to move 
 in sucli formation as will secure tlieui against unnecessary loss, and 
 they will then remain better in hand than if kept in clo.-e oolumn. 
 It is in humam nature that a body otf men wMc-h retires by f)rder will 
 never ran too fax; whereas, on the other hand, the man who is hur- 
 ried by fear becomes deaf and blind to orders, and shows a wonderful 
 endurance in running. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 229 
 
 I ordered the division of skirmishers on ithe other hand, 
 "Occupy the ridge in prolongatdoin of the right fla.nk." 
 Whereupon it at once took position on the ridge in right 
 extension of the first division; whilst on the caution from 
 the division leader, "Take distance from:^ the left wing group," 
 the leaders of groups quickly, as on the parade-ground, 
 placed themselves before their groups, whioh they directed 
 by sign to the proper place, and then successively gave the 
 order, "Halt — ^take position — at 200 metres — ^on the enemy's 
 skirmishers — slow fire." 
 
 In the meamtime, the attentive adversary, at the same 
 moment that he saw my support wheel to the left to fire 
 volleys, had extended the division— ^wliich had already 
 passed the crossing and taken position under cover along 
 the railway embankment — in order to give a rapid fire on my 
 support. 
 
 As I saw that another volley would in reality have had 
 but little effect, I at once ordered, "The second division, right 
 about turn — double march — get under cover," a command 
 which it was not necessarj^ for the leader of the division to 
 repeat, and the latter only commanded, as soon as the divi- 
 sio'n was under cover of the ridge, "Halt front, ' and ait once 
 looked round to see if all the arms were at the "Order"' — a 
 measure whioh, as soon as there is time, shouild never be neg- 
 lected, if a movement had been ordered immediately after 
 firing without the command to "order arms" being previous- 
 ly given. 
 
 The adveaisary had apparently given the order to the 
 division, which was still extended near the boundary of the 
 wood on the height, to retire by groups from the left wing, 
 because it was shouted out to me from the right wing, "The 
 enemy is retiring from the height," and I saw the enemy's 
 skirmishers of the left wing withdraw quickly and disappear 
 
230 Extracts from aii Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 near the railway, whilst the others still remained standing: 
 to fire, but, after doing so, followed in succession. I at once 
 ordered, "The skii-mishing division to the atitack against the 
 boundary." Then to First Lieutenant A, "Gain ground with 
 the right wing of the first division by rushes on the height." 
 Lieutenant X gave the order to his division, "Ready for the 
 attack" (an order which in heavy fire must: be rapidly passed 
 from one group to another, and tlie firing then at once 
 sldiijicd), and then, "Stand up — double march." 
 
 First Lieutenant A then gave tihe order, "The riglhit wing 
 to advance rapidly by rushes on the height." AVhereupon 
 the leader of the right wing group at once pointed ito a vslight 
 rising ground, and ordered. "Up to tihe momnd — douible 
 march," and having arrived there, "Halt — lie down — ra.pid 
 tire." Til" next uoii fiO'mmisisiOined (illiccr ordered in lilce 
 inaiuiri', "As far as the next broken ground; double march — 
 halt — lie down — rapid fire." Immediately afterwards, the 
 first n'>ii-cimiinissioned officer again ordei-cd, "T']i to the iiexl 
 mound — double march," and so ora, so that during the attack 
 by the division of skirmishers the first division kept up a 
 fire cm the enemy, who was still partly extended, and partly 
 retiring rapidly over tlie crossing (agaimist the latiter, prin- 
 cipally by the left wing of the first division, wihioh remaineid 
 halted), and at the same timf' in advancMiig toward the ci-oi-is- 
 ing the smallest inequalities of ground on the heights were 
 madi- ns(- of, in order to be able to fire on the enemy wiith the 
 smallesi ]jossihle loss, and gradually to gain sufficient 
 ground to the front to enable the divisio,n in support to fol- 
 low the skirmishers by rushes without its having to suffer 
 much from the fire of the enemy. 
 
 -Vs soon as the last skirmishers of the enemy withdrew 
 themselves from the height, I gave an order to this effect to 
 the division in support. It continued to move in line at the 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 231 
 
 double, but on the way bad to lie down under cover several 
 times, at word of command, as the enemy behind .the rail- 
 way embankment began a brisk fire on it.* 
 
 I had disimounted and hurried on in front o'f the sup- 
 porting division in order to overlook the situation of affairs, 
 as at tliis moment I could expect from the front eitlher no 
 news at aM, or else only incomplete reports regarding the 
 position of the enemy. 
 
 Whilst I was hurrying forward I remarked that Lieuten- 
 ant N, as sioon as he reached the boundary of the wood with 
 his skirmishers, and opened fire against the enemy posted be- 
 hind the embankment, very properly sent off a paitnol from 
 his right wing in the direction of the next railway orossing. 
 
 In like manner the leader of the left lateral patrol near 
 the railway, withoiut having received a ispecial order, had at 
 once, on his own aocount, again advanced against the 
 enemy's right wing, when he saw that the company renewed 
 the attack — a geneirally correct proceeding, since all lateral 
 pa;trols must act in accordance with the movements of the 
 main body. 
 
 As the enemy had placed quite close to the railway two 
 divisions in very g'ood posdtioms, so as to ibring the lapproach 
 to the crosising under most effective fire, and as probably 
 a division' in close order was placed ready for support quite 
 close under cover, it followed that a front attack would have 
 very little prospect of success, and therefore I shoiuld have 
 disposed my suppo'sed support directly towards tihe next rail- 
 way crossing on the enemy's flank, the more so as the report 
 
 *Tlh,is division, insteaxi of ninning forward in line, migM liave 
 advanced by sections in file, and have maintained an equally ready 
 fighting formation, and would thus have decreased any losses wihlcii 
 migiht have been caused. Such fonmations are of advantage when 
 it is necessary to cause detachments formed in close order to follow 
 the skirmishers in close order, as closely as possible without engaging 
 them in the flght. 
 
232 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 canit to me from the patrol, which had been sent there, that 
 it was unoccupied. With this the exticise was broiiRht to 
 an end. 
 
 General Observations. — Whilst the arms were being piled 
 I met my adrersai y. and we were both of opinion that only 
 in the combat of oiu eomiHini/ against the other, when it is 
 carried out in a natural manner, is to be found the proper 
 jircparation for active service both for the commander of 
 the company and for the company itself. 
 
 Here also the taking advantage of crcrii opportuiiiti/ of 
 the moment can be practiced; (hlails can be siu])ervised and 
 i>in]inived without the cdutrol of the irliole being lesiscned; 
 the division of the c()m]>any into thra. parts affords an (i]ip(ir- 
 tunity tor many tactical combinations, and for the varied 
 I)i-actice of the leaders, in quickly joining in with the i/cncral 
 idea cither by acting according to ])ositive orders or accord- 
 ing to general directions. 
 
 At the same time it aft'ords the best ]iractic(> for the com- 
 pany commandrr, in quickly judging a situation, in (piickly 
 arriving at a decision and issuing orders, under the condition 
 (if aviiidi-ng. as far as jiossible, unnccessHri/ losses froin tihe 
 Are (if the enemy. 
 
 \Ve also agreed that on active service it is not powsible 
 to i-eckon on precise and prompt ctHiiinunicatioin of orders 
 either to the company or to detachments of it; as a rule, the 
 noise and the excitement of a fight will 'necessiitat(^ for both 
 leaders rnd men the sUnplest formations and oi'ders, so that 
 it is necessary when exercising to give prominence to the 
 must important principles, as these must ahrai/s be -adliered 
 to; if in a fight, the control over the irJiole, and ereri/ possi- 
 bility of making use of a favorable chaece, are not to be lost. 
 
 Let us recapitulate these jtrinciples: 
 
 1. Defen-se. — Maiung full use of the time before the 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 233 
 
 attack for strengthening the position, and for making cer- 
 tain of the distances on the field of attack; controlling the 
 skirmishens' fire in the position; placing of the support as 
 near as poissiible, bnt under cover, in order either to com- 
 pletely repel the assault by its sudden larrival at the decisive 
 moment, or, in case lof an overwhelming attack, to have it 
 ready to be thrown in a favorable rallying position so as to 
 bring the retreat to a halt. 
 
 2. Attack. — Duty ai the foremost skirmdshers to gain 
 favorable points in front of the defender's position from 
 wliit^h an effective fire can be brought on the defender, and 
 from which the dispositions of the adversiary can be ascer- 
 tained as far as possible — so that it may be possible to 
 quickly and correctly arrange for carrying on tihe attack, and 
 for bringing one'is forces withont unnecessary loss as near 
 to the enemy as may be desirable for ensuring a prompt 
 result; further, preparation for the decisive moment hj a con- 
 stantly increasing fire on the enemy, and development of 
 superior shooting power against some determined point of 
 attack (on which occasion one division of the comipany, if 
 possible, must'be kept in close order, but gradually bromght 
 up closer to the enemy, making use of inequalities of ground 
 and in suitable formation); lastly, for the decisive nwment, 
 simultaneous advance and working together of all the troops 
 against a determined point, and shouting "Hurrah!" but no 
 pressing forward beyond the position of the enemy — at least, 
 not further than is necessary in order to have an open field 
 of fire agiMnst him when in retreat. 
 
 •i. Pursuit. — For pursuit a special order is always nec- 
 essary, or a new disposition. The pursuing detachment 
 must of its otcn account secure its flanks; the necessary 
 arrangements must be made with the support which fol- 
 lows for quiiokly assembling in support or for occupying vdl- 
 
234 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 ladies (!!■ woods, and, wheu nect'ssaiy. for examining and rol- 
 lecting togetlier the enemy's prisoners. 
 
 i. Retreat. — For i-a/llying the men retiring and for tell- 
 ing off a rear guard, care must be taken before the ovder to 
 retreat is given. Retreat of the men irifhoiit order, before the 
 enemy has really pressed forward into the position, is pun- 
 ishable; for a rapid ictreat an order must always be given. 
 
 If one has tlmroiighly impres«ed tliese priiiinirles on the 
 subordinate leaders and men, not only theoretieally, but at 
 every opportunity in peace-time has authoritatively dir(M'ted 
 attention to their cxci-utlon and working out, oine will at 
 least have pi-cjiared the men for active service to that exten't 
 that under all cirriimxtdiii-cs tlicy will be well in hand; and, 
 indeed, tlwit cviMi whem lumst of the leaders have faillen, 
 tihi>se remaining will know wiliat next to do until fui'tlier 
 orders are recei\('d. There remains on this subject still one 
 point for consideration. 
 
 On active service indepciideiit comibats of eamipanies 
 form an cri-f/jticni ; generally the c()mi)any commander with 
 his company forms only a siniaill \ainishing part of a great 
 %\ hole, and the f/rrater this whole the xiinpler will be tlie com- 
 bat tasks and formations for tlie small fractions, and thei'e- 
 fore the more ifiijicrflitou.s might ap])ear to many tSe train- 
 ing of the comx)any for combat in details, such as the proper 
 transmission of orders. 
 
 In lurf/c bodies of troops there are apparently onl.y two 
 things for consideration, pra<^;tice of sl-inHi.sltcrs in fire com- 
 bat on Jirol;en f/roiind, and practice of detachments in rlose 
 order, so that they should remain us lomj a.s pofmihle in suit- 
 able formation in the hand of their leaders, even under a 
 heavy fire of the enemj-. 
 
 It might be thought then, that for the training of the 
 company it would in every respect be of much less conse- 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 235 
 
 quence to practice tlie leaders in ccymmunicating special 
 orders to the skirmishei's, than in training the latter to a still 
 greater independence and circumspection in using hroken 
 ground, and in firiiuj over it. 
 
 But, on the contrary, it appears as if the leaders should 
 now, more than ever, be specially exercised in the m.anner 
 in whicih they would have to act in oirder to bring detach- 
 ments in close order with the smallest possible loss as near 
 to the enemy as possible — not to lead them to the attack in 
 close order, but at the decisive moment tO' have a considerable 
 force close hy well in hand, so that their superiority can be 
 • rendered really effectual, and that the troops may not be 
 distressed by having to hurry over too great an extent of 
 ground. 
 
 A special value h.as always been laid on this latter point 
 in the preceding pages, but it must certainly be admitted 
 that in the training of individual companies but small oppor- 
 tunities for this purpose are offered, and therefore only easy 
 tasks can be undertaken, as, for instance, the leading of divi- 
 sions at peace strength to within the fire of the enemy. Even 
 when a war company lis formed from several peace companies 
 (in the autumn a battalion has to carry out this exercise on 
 broken ground as often as possible), great difficulties will be 
 found in bringing up supports under heavy fire to within 300 
 paces of the enemy, so that they may be capable of a further 
 continuation of the attack, and at the same time remain in 
 the hand of their leader and in good breath. 
 
 The difficulty increases still more in the fight of the 
 battalion, the regiment, the brigade when the reserves have 
 to follow as near as possible to the oompanies fighting in 
 front. 
 
 A closer examination of this most important question 
 -of the dav wonld lead one beyond the limits of this work. 
 
236 Extracts fram an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 It may. however, be here pointed out that certainly at 
 the pieseut time the careful training of the compa)}!/ as such 
 is not sufficient for rendering it perfect in the conditions of 
 extensive combats. On the other hand, training under the 
 same conditions must be the basis of it, and what is prac- 
 ticed by the oompaiiy on a small scale must be carnied out 
 analogously under larger conditions — otherwise the method 
 of instruction has been wrong. 
 
 It therefore appears that a special justiftoation is re- 
 quired from the author for having in this journal laid iiiiimr- 
 taiit stress on the training of iiou-comwissioncd officers in the 
 t.ruct commuuieation of orders, whilsit at the siaime time it 
 must be allowed that in the employment of skirmishers hii 
 masses in the combart of the present day, were it attempted 
 ti) demaind from each subordinate leader that he should give 
 commaiuls to his own small detachment, the general con- 
 fusion would only be increased; indeed, it would be imprac- 
 ticable, for each mobilized company only retains a small 
 number of its officers, nbn-commissianed officers, and men, 
 and the greater nunuber cannot be exercised in any compli- 
 calc^d mechanical movements of combat. 
 
 Tims it would appear that in the method of instruction 
 given abdve, less acco'unt has been taken of what would 
 occur on active service than if the commander of the com- 
 pany had from beginning to end accustomed his men only to 
 his command, and for the rest, had left as much latitude as 
 possible to their intelligence, when they had to act on their 
 own responsibility. In fact, this is a method which must be 
 followed with all bodies of troops which receive fresh lead- 
 ers, for it naturally follows that the latter must first of all 
 make themselves intelligible in a fight to all their men be- 
 fore they consider whether each individua/1 subordinate lead- 
 er can so make himself understood. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 237 
 
 However, it is not difficult to show that such objections 
 are completely unfounded. 
 
 Let us consider simply the .course of a combat of the 
 present day. The finst deployment of skirmishers begins at 
 the latest at a distance of from 800 to 1,000 paces from the 
 enemy, generally much sooner, and therefore at a time when 
 we have njot yet a specified combat objective (for as yet the 
 posdtion of the enemy can scarcely be seen), but then we 
 only wish to gain ground to the front, and hope to succeed in 
 this with mnaller losses in an extended formation than in 
 close order. 
 
 Thus is formed a long line of skirmishers, more or less 
 connected, and under favorable circumstances, with several 
 small supports behind; and soon the tendency of the wings 
 to spreiad out to the right and left instinctively shows itself, 
 be it with the intention to outflank the enemy or to make use 
 of cover ofCered by the ground. If the skirmishers have ap- 
 proached the enemy to' within some 300 or 400 paces, they 
 then throw themselves down to fire, and at this moment they 
 are already completely out of the hand of their leaders, and 
 they show by the lateral movement of individual parties 
 suioh extensive intervals that the suppor'ts are very soon 
 obliged to extend forward into them, but only to bring about 
 an apparent general connection, without having any clear 
 object in the fight. 
 
 But this first advance receives quite a different charac- 
 ter as soon as the skirmishers have been accustomed from 
 the very commencement only to advance in accordance with 
 definite orders, and to strictly follow these orders without on 
 the way making use of cover on their own account. 
 
 Lying down at word of command, running forward by 
 rushes, the naming of a detachment of direction, the firing of a 
 few cartridges at long distances, can and must be commamded 
 
238 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 at this period of the figlit when the specdal otoject in view is 
 to form up as n^ar as possible to the riicniii for au effective 
 altdck. and one uses the formation of skirmishers only as the 
 single possible means to this end; and for this object as few 
 skirmishers as possible should be extended, in order to keep 
 fl« niiieh strength as possible available for an effective prep- 
 aration for the decisive moment. In order to proceed ac- 
 cording to the correct old tactical principles, it is in lui way 
 necessary to make use ^^f heavy columns when swarms of 
 skirmishers have become capable of being led, and have 
 been jiropcrly practiced in tactics. It may therefore be 
 said, that those companies which, by dint of the precise 
 orders of their leaders, have remained well in the hand of 
 those leaders up to within 300 or 400 paces of the enemy 
 wall likewise from thenecforward be capable lof undertaking a 
 great deal, and will still remain in the hand of their leaders, 
 even if no other orders can be understood tha.n the "signal 
 to advance" and the roll of the drum. For in close prox- 
 imity to the enemy, detachments which have followed so 
 far under one individual leading will yet further keep to- 
 gether instinctively, and jiay attention to their leaders. 
 The means of maintaining (jrcat masses of sMrmishers well 
 under control consists, then, simply in this — from the first 
 monifnt of extension, their leader, and the subordinate lead- 
 ers, must command them by defimte orders, so long as the 
 orders are capable of being communicated and understood. 
 This is the object which, knowingly or unknowingly, all 
 late publications have in view, which treat of the new re- 
 quirements of infantry tactics and training for the same. 
 Therefore, the author thinks that in the detailed method 
 he has described for obtaining this object he has kept well 
 within the bounds of truth, even if he must leave it an open 
 question whether it would be possible to lead detachments 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 239 
 
 by direct orders up to point-'blank range from the enemy. 
 In any case, everything is accomplished which can be ew- 
 pected if the men can be brought to understand this: that 
 every extension at a greater distance than 300 paces from 
 the enemy is not skirmishing, but is only a means by 
 which to approach close to the enemy with the smallest 
 possible loss; that, therefore, nothing must happen without 
 orders, and that at any moment the collecting together of 
 different divisions, or of the whole company, behind any 
 cover arrived at, may be ordered so as to organize from 
 thence an overwhelming attack against a defined point of the 
 enemy's position. 
 
 If, then, one possesses for the actual combat a good 
 number of well-trained skirmishers and subordinate lead- 
 ers, who have gained intelligence in the combined working 
 together of troops for the object ordered, it will be possible 
 to accomplish the utmost with one's men, even when the 
 leaders can only lead by their own example, and one will 
 always overcome a less well-trained adversary, even if he 
 have the same bravery and endurance, because with supe- 
 rior training the individual leading always goes hand in 
 hand. 
 
240 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Jonrnal. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 I. Sketch for exercising a companii on vcri/ broken qround. 
 (a) Preparatory exercise. 
 
 1. Occupation of a tolerably steep height by shir- 
 misliers; the support, which is placed behind the height, re- 
 ceives the order to advance to fire loUri/s. Care must be 
 taken that the support crosses the height quickly, but in 
 close order, and that it stops to fire when it can do so 
 straight to the front and over the height. The support can 
 alsd lii- close behind the line of skirnushers and receive the 
 order to fire volleys to one side against a (supposed) ad- 
 vancing enemy, in which case the movement would have 
 to take place quietly and unobserved, and the leader would 
 have to form up to the proper front for firing volleys by 
 the shortest way, and as much under cover as possible. 
 
 2. The support has to go round the height to malie 
 tihe attack against the flank of the supposed enemy. The 
 attack must be made by surprise and in perfect order, not- 
 withstanding the inequalities of the ground. 
 
 3. Rapid flank movements of the support in order to 
 gain quite under cover a specified point. (Miovements in 
 sections or in file with wheelings or formation into line ou 
 arrival at the height indicated.) 
 
 4. Advance by rushes of the slcirmishers from height 
 to height; close following of the support as much as possi- 
 ble without showing itself. At last, assault of a height — 
 on the top of it halt, and at the same time volleys with 
 blank cartridge, in order to assure oneself that order has 
 been maintained after the exciting movement. 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 241 
 
 (6) Exercises in broken ground against a skeleton or 
 supposed enemy. 
 
 Ground : A village (Htirth) lies in some boUow ground 
 witii precipitous heiglits before the points of exit of the 
 village. On the highest point of the ridge there is a farm, 
 behind it the boundary of a wood. 
 
 Order for the company: Debouch from the village to 
 take the heights on the farther side, and, if possible, to press 
 forward into the wood. 
 
 For the skeleton enemy (one section and a flag, which 
 represents a division in close order) the three following 
 periods are prescribed: 
 
 1. Weak occupation of the height which commands 
 points of exit from the village. 
 
 2. Retreat to the farm before an overwhelming and 
 turning attack, and defense of the farm. 
 
 3. The support (the flag), which was under cover near 
 the boundary of the wood, advances to the attack against 
 the wing of the enemy, which is trying to turn the farm, 
 drives him back, and thus compels the assailant to retire 
 on Htirth. (Defile retreat under protection of a rear guard.) 
 II. Exercises which com be tmdertaken when the country on 
 
 both sides of the road is cultivated, mid there is only am 
 opportunity of placing at considerable distoMces apa/rt de- 
 tachments under cover, one opposite the other. 
 (a) Placing in position of a detachment a, and judging 
 distance whilst the other detachment b marches along the 
 road up to the nearest position oifering cover, and In doing 
 so counts the paces. At 240 and at 480 metres one or two 
 men are halted. It is recommended, when counting the 
 paces, to make them so long (with the upper part of the 
 body leaning forward and the knees bent) that the number 
 of paces may agree with the number of metres. 
 
242 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 
 
 (6) The detachment 6 disappears with the exccptinn of 
 a patrol, placed under cover. The other detachment re- 
 ceives the order to march against it. Conduct of the head 
 and of the detachment at the first shot fired by this patrol. 
 The patrol is suddenly reinforced as the detachment ap- 
 proaches it by rushes. The attack is abandoned, and the 
 retreat carried out behind the position (/, where an outpost 
 is established. 
 
 Detachment h also places an outpost: creeping patrols 
 endeavor to learn the position of the adversary by try- 
 ing to advance along the hollows, as much under rover as 
 possible, against the wing of the hostile position. 
 
 (V) A reconnoitering patrol attacks the sentry on the 
 road, and is driven back by the examining troop, which has 
 taken up a position quite unperceived. 
 
 {d) One of the outposts retires, keeping as much under 
 cover as possible, to a position at .some distance, and leaves 
 its sentries standing for a specified time in order to conceal 
 the retreat. As soon as this retreat is perceived by the 
 other outjiost, it receives the order to advance with all its 
 men to reconnoiter. 
 
 III. E.ivriAwJi vliiclt ivii he currkd out on the same ground by 
 chanybiij the dinpoaition. 
 
 1 (Fig. 1). Defense of the wood and of the height facing 
 to the east (the support advances through the wood as far as 
 the boundary for firing volleys). 
 
 2. The wood is only occupied by the skeleton enemy 
 facing to the south. Attack of the company starting from 
 the high road and the farm, and pursuit through the wood. 
 
 3 (Fig. 3). At Lind and Deckstein there are patrols of 
 the skeleton enemy; that at Deckstein is reinforced as the 
 company (which this time does not advance along the high 
 
Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Journal. 243 
 
 road to tho village, but by the side road) advances to the 
 attack against Deckstein. 
 
 Execution of the attack, which at first is driven back 
 by the sudden entry into line of a support (flag); then vol- 
 untary retreat of the skeleton enemy; renewed attack, and 
 carrying of the position at Deckstein; pursuit of the enemy. 
 
 4 (Fig. 4). The small wood a is occupied by a skeleton 
 enemy facing to the north, which has a patrolin Hornpott. 
 The company coming from the north first attacks Hornpott 
 with its advanced guai-d, and deplojs then to the front and 
 flank for the attack of a; the attack succeeds. The skele- 
 ton enemy receives from the high road a reinforcement 
 (a flag) ; defense then takes place. 
 
 5 (Fig. 6). From Mengenich a single patrol troop has 
 advanced up to the point of the wood at a, and sends patrols 
 by Ntlssenberg towards Longerich (whence the enemy is 
 expected). The enemy advances to the attack along the 
 road from Longerich. When he has taken the wood he sees 
 a hostile company (a flag) which is coming from Mengenich 
 to attack him. Defense of the wood and retreat to Ntlssen- 
 berg, as soon as the first attack of the enemy has been re- 
 pulsed with all the troops available. 
 
 6 (Fig. 7). An outpost has occupied the wood fronting 
 towards Arnold's Height and Marienburg. Enveloping at- 
 tack of the same, starting from both these places. 
 
 7 (Fig. 8). Fight when meeting. 
 
 For protecting a convoy going from Gladbach to Mtil- 
 heim against an enemy expected from the south (from 
 Briick) a company receives the order to take position be- 
 yond Thurn in such a manner that the enemy may be pre- 
 vented, as long as possible, from the pushing forward across 
 the Strunder brook. 
 
244 Extracts from an Infantry Captain's Junrnul. 
 
 A company of the enemy (or a skeleton enemy) has al- 
 ready arrived with its advanced guard by the road from 
 Briick on the height of the farm of Mielenforst, with the 
 order to push reconnaissance beyond Iddesfeld toward the 
 high road, when the head of the company will have reached 
 the defile near Thurn. 
 
 (March off of both companies at the same lime: the one 
 from the defile of Thurn, the other from the bridge of 
 ]\Ii<'lcnforst. The question is as to which will succeed first^ 
 in taking a position which will at the same time command 
 the roads from Thurn to Iddesfeld, and which in conse- 
 quence can think of "the further execution of the order 
 received.) 
 
Contents 
 
 Page. 
 
 Preface 3 
 
 First Part: Measures of Safety on the March, and Exercises of 
 
 Detail in Skirmishing 5 
 
 Introduction (Division of Time) . . 5 
 
 1. Exercise: Advance against a Supposed Enemy; Occupation 
 
 of a Position and Defense against a Skeleton Enemy 
 (Pig.l) 11 
 
 2. Exercise: Training of Patrol Leaders (Fig. 2) 33 
 
 3. Exercise: Detail Exercises on Broken Ground (afternoon) 51 
 
 4. Exercise: Advance, with Measures of Precaution against 
 
 a Supposed Enemy; Occupation and Defense of a Posi- 
 tion, as also Retreat from the same, before a Supposed 
 Enemy (Fig. 8) 61 
 
 5. Exercise: March and Attack against a Skeleton Enemy; Con- 
 
 duct of the Advanced Guard when opposed to a Retreating 
 Patrol; Reconnaissance of the Enemy's position by the 
 Advanced Guard. Attack, which the first time is repulsed. 
 Renewed the second time in another manner ; it succeeds 
 (Fig- 4) 84 
 
 Second Part : Outpost Duty and Combat Maneuvers 101 
 
 1. Exercise (afternoon): Preparatory Exercises in Outpost Duty^ 
 
 and conduct of a Creeping Patrol, and of a non-commissioned 
 Officer's Patrol (Fig. 5) 101 
 
 2. Exercise : Outpost Duty and Attack of an Outpost. The lat- 
 
 ter is driven back, reinforced, the assailant then retires 
 (Fig. 6) 121 
 
 3. Exercise: Outpost Duty and Combat. A non-commissioned 
 
 Ofiicer's Post sent to the front is driven back on the Outpost; 
 the Outpost defeats the attack of a force double its strength 
 (Fig. 7) 141 
 
 4. Exercise: Exercise of Patrollers; Special conduct of Creeping 
 
 Patrols in close ground (Fig. 8) 163 
 
 5. Exercise : Placing two Outposts opposite one another with 
 
 their Patrols. Attack and Defense of a Defile (Fig. 8). 174 
 
 6. Exercise: Outpost exercise of one Company against another. 
 A great and a small Reconnaissance in daytime. Night posi- 
 tion, and sending out of Nigtt Patrols and non-commissioned 
 Officers' Patrols (Pig. 8) , 187 
 
 7. Exercise: Defile Fight of one Company against another. . . . 212 
 
 Appendix. 
 
 I. Sketch for exercising a Company on very broken ground. . . . 240 
 
 II. Exercises which can be undertaken when the country on 
 both sides of the road is cultivated, and there is only an op- 
 portunity of placing, at considerable distances apart, detach- 
 ments under cover, one opposite the other 241 
 
 III. Exercises which can be carried out on the same ground by 
 changing the dispositions 242 
 
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SHELBY AND HIS MEN; 
 
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