CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND GIVEN IN 1 89 1 BY HENRY WILLIAMS SAGE Cornell University Library F 2235.P34 1903 The Independence of the South American r 3 1924 021 102 961 The original of tliis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31 924021 1 02961 The Independence of The South-American Republics A STUDY IN RECOGNITION AND FOREIGN POLICY By Frederic L. Paxson FELLOW IN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA FERRIS, & LEACH, 29-31 North Seventh Street 1903 Copyriglit, 1903, by Frederic L. Paxson. Mve Mmdred copies of this book were printed at Philadelphia in July, 190S. PREFACE The great subject of South- American history has been so little exploited that it must be approached -with modesty and care, for it is not to be expected that initial studies will, either in breadth or in inten- sity, reach its confines. Its bibliography has not been worked out. Facts of biography are difficult to obtain, and materials relating to it have not yet been systematically collected or sifted. Yet, if the character of the South American repub- lics is to be understood, and if they are to be dealt with by the other nations of the world in a rational and honest manner, it is necessary that their history be narrated and considered. With their antecedents before us, certain conditions now prevalent in the Latin republics are, if not justified, at least explained. From a careful examiaation of these antecedents it may not be impossible to arrive at the causes of the evil conditions, which will be the first step towards correcting them. 6 South- American Independence This little book is a study in a single period and a single phase. For the greater part it is based upon unpublished original manuscripts; while none of its material, printed or not, has hitherto been used to any considerable extent. Some care has been taken to make the sources here used more available for future students. I have the honor to acknowledge my great indebt- edness to my masters, Albert Bushnell Hart and John Bach McMaster, and to Hubert Hall, Pendle- ton King and Charles Francis Adams, who gave me their time and care that I might reach the archives in their charge. Fbedeeic L. Paxson. Philadelphia, July 25th,, 190S. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Doctrine of recognition 17 Xeutrality in seventeenth century IS Theory of classical writers 19 Neutrality in American revolution 20 Saas Deane and France 20 Instructions of Deane 21 American theory of recognition 22 Policy of France 23 Motive of Louis XVI. in I'ecognition 24 The French treaties 25 French intervention, not recognition 26 The Dutch recognition 27 Mission of William Lee 2S Holland declares war on England 2fi Value of French and Dutch precedents 30 The Swedish recognition 32 Recognition by Spain 33 Recognition by Pi-ussia Si The French revolution 35 Conduct of Gouverneur Morris 36 Attitude of British minister in Paris 3G Morris remains in Paris 38 8 South- American Independence New French government and Morris 39 Disinterested situation of United States 40 Washington recognizes the French government 41 War between England and France 42 The proclamation of neutrality, April 22nd, 1793 43 Influence of American precedents _ii Chapter I. The South American. Wars of Liberation Spanish colonial system 45 Colonial population 46 San Martin, Bolivar and Miranda 47 Miranda's filibustering expedition 47 Popham's attack on Buenos Ayres 48 Whiteloeke expedition fails 49 Spanish-American revolts, Buenos Ayres 50 Chile, New Granada and Venezuela 51 Growth of English trade 52 Effect of foreign commerce on South America 53 Situation of Buenos Ayres 54 Turbulence in Buenos Ayres 55 Declaration of independence 56 San Martin at Mendoza 57 Chile and the brothers Carrera 58 Growth of San Martin's army 59 He moves across at Uspallata 60 Chacabuca and Talca 61 Maypu and the independence of Chile 62 Table of Contents 9 Preparations to invade Peru 62 Arrival of Lord Cochrane 63 Capture of Valdavia 64 Liberating squadron leaves Chile 65 Pledges of San Martin 66 The work of Arenales 67 La Serna replaces Pezuela as viceroy 68 Spanish forces evacuate Lima 68 Independence of Peru declared 69 San Martin assumes Protectorship 70 His disputes with Cochrane 70 Beinforcement and evacuation of Callao 72 San Martin goes to Guayaquil 73 Torre Tagle and Monteagudo 73 Meeting of Bolivar and San Martin 74 San Martin abdicates and retires 75 Beginning of career of Bolivar 76 Surrender of Miranda to Spain 77 Geography of Venezuela and Xew Granada 77 Bolivar in Xew Granada 78 The -War to the Death" 79 Bolivar becomes Dictator 79 Spain sends out Morillo in 1815 80 He re-takes Xew Granada 81 Bolivar erects capital at Angostura 82 The Foreign I.egions 83 Campaign of 1819 83 Tunja and Boyaca 84 Union of Venezuela and Xew Granada S-i Armistice of 1820 85 10 8 ouihr American Independence Bolivar ends armistice of Truxillo 87 Constituent congress at Cticuta 87 Battle of Carabobo, June 2'4th, 1821 ^ 88 Capital moved to Santa P6 de Bogota 88 Meeting of liberating armies in Ecuador 89 Sucre wins at Bompono and Piehincha 90 The meeting at Guayaquil 91 Ecuador annexed to Colombia 92 Spanish victory at lea 92 Revolt at Lima 93 Bolivar summoned to Peru 94 Eive-Aguero deposed 94 Bolivar enters Lima, September 1st, 1823 95 Spanish strength in Upper Peru 96 Quarrels between Olaneta and Canterae 96 Bolivar becomes Dictator of Peru 97 He marches inland 98 Spanish forces defeated at Junin 98 And at Ayacueho 99 Miller finishes work at Potosi 100 Independence of Bolivia 101 Bolivar returns to Colombia 101 Chaptbk II. The SoutTi-American Policy of the United States Traditional attitude of the United States 102 Sympathy with filibusters 103 Petition of the Miranda men 104 Randolph's theory of recognition 105 Table of Contents 11 The Poinsett mission 106 Instructions of Poinsett 107 Other agents in South America 109 Status of the agents in South America Ill Nature of their reports 112 Mendez and Thompson in United States 113 Protests of de Onis 114 Flaws in United States neutrality laws 115 South American privateers 116 Public opinion in 1816 117 Forsyth introduces new neutrality act 118 Further news from South America 119 Poinsett offered a second mission 120 The three commissioners sail 121 Their instructions 121 Beginning of factious opposition 124 Newspaper rumors in summer of 1817 125 Letters of Lautaro 126 Reply of Pliocion 126 Attitude of Monroe and Adams 127 Nature of the opposition 127 Monroe transmits correspondence 128 Clay's great speech 129 Debate on his motion 131 Eeply of Forsyth 132 Reports of South American commissioners 132 Superficial and discordant character 133 Their evidence as to political instability 134 Clay's attitude in session of 1818-1819 135 Delicate relations with Spain 136 12 South- American Independence of May 9th, 1820 137 Clay brings up his motion 138 It passes in the House 139 Session of 1820-1821 139 Triumph of Clay 142 Its barren nature 143 Position of Adams in the cabinet 144 His letter to Alex. H. Everett 144 Jealousy of Spain - 147 Adams and the European powers 148 Adams' theory of neutrality 149 He foresees the British policy 150 Embarrassments caused by agents ISl Aguirre and the privateers 152 Devereux, Worthington and Halsey 153 Yielding policy of Monroe 154 Courts of Europe sounded 154 Action at Aix-Ia-Chapelle 155 American policy of inaction 156 Question of the exequaturs 157 Instructions of January 1st, 1819 158 Influence of the Florida negotiations 159 Recognition postponed for two years 160 Difficulties of Adams's position 161 Forbes's mission to Buenos Ayres 162 His instructions 163 Buenos Ayres in 1820 164 His treatment and attitude 165 Rivadavia, Garcia and reform 166 Victories of San Martin and Bolivar 167 Table of Contents 13 Successes of 1821 Igg De facto independence achieved 169 Adams prepares for recognition 170 Message of March 8th, 1822 171 Its cahu reception 173 Attitude of the newspapers 174 Comment of the Journal des Dihats 175 Recognition 177 Chapter III. , TJie British Relations with South America Two phases of British attitude 178 Policy after 1811 179 Liverpool ministry and commercial demands ISO Popular sympathy in Great Britain 181 Agitation for recognition begins 182 Weapons of the opposition 183 Services of British officers in South America 184 Proclamations by the Regent 185 Inadequacy of neutrality laws 186 New foreign enlistment act 186 Tierney and Mackintosh oppose 187 Attitude of ministry 188 Petitions from merchants 189 Effect of the new act 190 Spain seeks intervention 191 Interests of the allied powers 191 Aix-la-Chapelle I'J^ 14 South- American Independence The Si-ianish expedition of 1818-1819 193 Eevolution of 1820 194 Invasion of Spain by France 194 British policy at Congress of Verona 195 Lushington and the commercial demands 190 Reports of the American commissioners 197 England and the American recognition 198 Growing importance of question with Canning 199 Zea circular 199 Renewed demands by merchants 200 And by Commons 201 Canning opposes French intervention in "Spain 202 He determines to keep France out of America 203 Mission of Mackie to Mexico 204 Fall of Cadiz and action by Canning s:05 Polignac-Canning conference, October 9th, 1823 206 Instructions to new consuls and commissioners 207 Special instructions for Mexico 211 Motive of Canning in sending consuls 214 Allies fail to act on South America 214 Canning's move wins 215 Speech from the Throne, February 3d, 1824 216 Sources of information on South America 217 Difficulties with Mackie in Mexico 218 Diificulties with Hervey, O'Gorman and Ward 218 The treaty of Morier and Ward 219 Hamilton and the Colombian Commission 221 Ordered to re-peruse his instructions 222 Campbell's reports 223 Parish and Buenos Ayres 224 Table of Contents 15 Debate in Parliament, February, 1824 224 Polignae memorandum revealed 225 Lansdowne moves for recognition 225 Great speech of Sir James Mackintosh, June 15th, 1824 . . 226 His analysis of theory of recognition 227 Reception of Parish at Buenos Ayres 231 His work satisfies Canning 232 His report of June 25th, 1824 232 Canning's instructions to Parish, August 23d, 1824 233 Parish acts slowly upon them 230 Address of the Government of Buenos Ayres to the Con- gress 238 Xew Fundamental Law for Buenos Ayres 240 Parish signs a treaty, February 2nd, 1825 240 Canning determines to recognize the republics 241 Spain once more refuses mediation 242 Canning announces recognition to Spain 243 Reply of Spain 244 Reception of British recognition by Europe 246 Protest of Esterhazy, for Vienna 247 Protest of Lieven, for Petersburg 248 Protest of Maltzahn, for Berlin 249 Summary of British policy 250 Opening of diplomatic relations 251 Bibliography Foreign office sources 253 State Department sources 253 Adams archives 254 Poinsett papers 254 Literature on recognition 255 List of titles of printed books 255-264 INTRODUCTION Among tlie doctrines of international law which, can hardly be said to have existed previous to the war of the American revolution, is that of recogni- tion. It is true that in some few cases before ITTG a new State had come into existence. Thus the United l^etherlands had won their independence of Spain in the sixteenth century, to have it recognized by the powers of Europe in the seventeenth; thus Switzerland had broken off from the dominions of the Hapsburgs and maintained her separate exist- ence; thus Portugal had established itself as an inde- pendent monarchy at the expense of Spain. It is true also that in some cases a successful revolution had erected a new and illegitimate government. In the most notable of these Cromwell had established .the principle that internal changes do not affect the identity of a State, and had compelled his royal neigh- bors to extend to him every courtesy that the ex- pelled Stuarts could have demanded. But in none of these cases was there a discussion of a theory of recognition by which a community of people, upon 18 South-American Independence attaining a defined territory, togetker with an inde- pendent government, permanently organized, has a right to demand treatment as a State by the pre-exist- ent nations of the world. The absence of any well-developed theory of neu- trality before the United States came into existence to render that service, prevented the establishment of a theory of recognition, for this latter is strictly de- pendent upon the former. The wars of the seven- teenth and eighteenth centuries were generally Euro- pean in their scope. No nation strong enough to make its impartiality respected had been able to re- main neutral; while the petty States, if only for the sake of protection, were forced to seek alliance with one side or another. So it happened that when new States came into existence their recognition depend- ed solely on the physical strength of their friends. Eecognition by general European treaty at the end of a general European war could have no authority as a precedent in developing an abstract theory upon the subject. Before a doctrine of recognition could be evolved there must be created a background of neutrality. The right of a State to participate in or abstain from a war must be freely admitted. Upon this condition alone could a newly-bom State receive the theoret- Introduction 19 ical treatment that would help to establish the condi- tions upon which such an organism has a right to be acknowledged, and would have a tendency to remove recognition from the oppcfrtunist realm of interna- tional politics to set it up as a permanent doctrine of international law. Previous to the American revolution there were no neutrals, although there existed the foundations for a superstructure of neutrality. The classical writers on international law, from Grotius, with his idea that neutrality consists in not denying to one belligerent a right conceded to the other, to Vattel, who would not allow the neutral State to render aid to either party, all fail to understand the doctrine as it is understood to-day. The series of sixteenth and seventeenth century treaties, specifying that the contracting States shall not aid the enemy of each other in time of war, shows how far neutrality was from being looked upon as a regular and probable condition. Usage of nations as revealed by the wars of the eighteenth century shows a general disregard of what are the commonplaces of neutral obligation to-day. As there had been no neutrals before 1776, so in the wars of the American revolution no neutrals were created. France and Spain, during the period 20 South- American Independence of their professed neutrality, were systematically ren- dering aid to one of the contestants. The far-famed Armed Ifeutrality of 1780 was nothiag more than an alliance that introduced another party into the general war. The recognition of the independence of the United States by Franc© was only the step that marked the advance of Louis XVI. from a state of overt hostility to one of open war. The great aim of American diplomacy during the early years of the revolution was to secure sufficient aid from Europe to bring the war to a successful ter- mination. France, as the hereditary enemy of Eng- land, was the first resort. Thither in the spring of 1776 Silas Deane was sent, ostensibly as an India merchant to gratify his curiosity, actually to beg Vergennes to supply arms to his country and to pledge her commerce in return. Already France was hinting that no aid could be expected of her while the colonies remained colonies, and assuring the Americans that they had " the same protection and liberty as all other EngHsh to resort to France to ex- port thence merchandise, arms and munitions of war." ^ " That as to independency," wrote Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, describing 1 Bumas to Com. of Secret Corresp., Wharton, Reoolwtwnary Dip- lomatic Correspondence of the XTniled States, II., 91. Introduction 21 an interview -with the French. Minister and the words of the latter, " it was an event in the womb of time, and it would be highly improper from him to say anything on that subject until it had actually taken place." ^ Great Britain feared, as the United States hoped for, a Trench intervention in the war, and as- sisted Lord Stormont in his protests against the un- friendly acts of the French Government. In the mind of the Americans, recognition was far from being an act of neutrality. Between it and par- ticipation on the side of England was a condition to which their commissioners were instructed to lead the powers of Europe if the latter could not be prevailed upon to take up the American cause. " You shall en- deavor ... to obtain from them a recognition of our independency and sovereignty, and to conclude treaties of peace, amity and commerce. ... If that cannot be effected, you shall to the utmost of your power prevent their taking part with Great Britain in the war which his Britannic majesty prosecutes against us, or entering into offensive alliances vfith that king." ' The value of an instance of recognition as a pre- iDeane to Committee, Angast 18, 1776, Wharton, II., 112. • Committee to Franklin, Deane and Lee, October 16, 1776, Wharton, II., 172. 22 South-American Independence cedent depends upon its non-partisan character. It " is a matter, which, from its nature precludes any equivalent whatsoever; — either there is a reason for it, and it ought to be demanded as a right, or it can- not be asked for, and to grant extraordinary conces- sions as the price of obtaining it, is to give them merely in return for the name, and to change the substance for the shadow." ^ But this view of the subject had not been taken in 1776. The United States had no hesitation in offering a price for what they truly considered an effective service, though it was concealed under the name of recognition. " As the other princes of Europe," ran the note of the three commissioners making their seductive offer to Vei^niies, " are lending or hiring their troops to Britain against America, it is apprehended that France may, if she thinks fit, afford our inde- pendent States the same kind of aid, without giving England any first cause of complaint. . . . " l^orth America now offers to Erauce and Spain her amity and commerce. She is also ready to guar- anty in the firmest manner to those nations all her present possessions in the West Indies, as well as those they shall acquire from the enemy in a war that 1 Forbes to Garcia, December 6, 1824 ; enclosed in Parish to Planta, February 18, 1825, F(yreign Office MSS. Introduction 23 may be consequential of such assistance as she re- quests. The interests of the three nations are the same. The opportunity of cementing them and of securing all the advantages of that commerce, which in time mil be immense, now presents itseK. If neglected, it may never again return; and we cannot help suggesting that a considerable delay may be at- tended with fatal consequences." ^ The interest of the Erench government in the prosperity of the American cause was slight. There was in France a popular feeling that wished the in- surgents well, but the motive inspiring the ministry to action was that of hostility to England rather than anxiety for a republican member of the family of nations. Accordingly the French court resisted the popularity of Franklin and confined itself to ren- dering a surreptitious assistance to the rebels until the progress of the war forced upon it a change of policy. The surrender of Burgoyne was the deter- mining event in this change. Both Vergennes and Frankhn realized the proba- bility of British overtures for peace when the news of the surrender reached Paris on 4th December, 1777. The commissioners at once addressed a new 'January 5, 177?, Wharton, II., 245. 24 South- American Independence demand for recognition to the French court and were accorded a meeting on 12th December. " On signifying to the ministry," they described the con- ference, " the importance it might be of at this junc- ture — ^when probably Britain would be making some propositions of accommodation — ^that the Congress should be informed explicitly what might be expect- ed from France and Spain, M. Gerard, one of the sec- retaries, came yesterday to inform us, by order of the king, that after long and full consideration of our affairs and propositions in council it was decided, and his majesty was determined, to acknowledge our independence, and make a treaty with us of amity and commerce." ^ Louis XVI. himself recorded the motive that inspired this step. He wrote to Charles HI. of Spain on the 8th of January, 1778,^ of the policy he had followed during the three pre- ceding years: " The destruction of the army of Bur- goyne and the straitened condition of Howe have to- tally changed the face of things. America is tri- umphant, and England cast down, but the latter has still a great unbroken maritime force, and the hope of forming a benej£cial alliance with her Colonies, the impossibility of their being subdued by arms being 1 December 18, 1777, Wharton, II., 452. •Wharton, II., 467. Introduction 25 now demonstrated. All the English, parties agree on this point. Lord North has himself announced, in full Parliament, a plan of pacification for the first session, and all sides are assiduously employed upon it." Even King Louis did not yet know the extent of the " political somersault " which Lord North would turn when he introduced his measure in February. " Thus," his letter contiaued, " it is the same to us whether this minister, or any other, be in power. From different motives they join against us, and do not forget our bad offices. They will fall upon us in as great strength as if the war had not existed. This being understood, and our grievances against England notorious, I have thought, after taking the advice of my council . . . and having consulted upon the propositions which the insurgents make, that it was just and necessary to begin to treat with them to prevent their reunion with the mother country." According to the resolution of the king " to pre- vent their reunion with the mother country," treaties of alliance and commerce were signed at Paris on 6th February, 1778. In these is found the first rec- ognition of the United States as independent. Ln the words of the French ambassador, as he announced these treaties to the Court of St. James, there is an 26 South-American Independence insolence so colossal as to be almost admirable. " In making this eonmmnication to the Court of London, the King is firmly persuaded, that it will find in it fresh Proofs of His Majesty's constant and sincere Dispositions for Peace; and that His Britannic Maj- esty, animated by the same Sentiments, will equally avoid every Thing that may interrupt their Har- mony; and that He will take, in particular, effectual Measures to hinder the Commerce of His Majesty's Subjects with the United States of North America from being disturbed, and to cause to be observed in this Respect, the Usages received between trading Nations, and the Rules that may be deemed subsist- ing between the Crowns of France and Great Brit- ain." ^ But nothing was clearer in the minds of all concerned than that this recognition was an act of war, that the colonies, in spite of their declaration, were not in fact independent, and that it was the in- terest of France rather than regard for any rights of the insurgents that inspired the act. " I knew very well," wrote a French ambassador from Madrid, a few years later, " that one could not count on the gratitude of the United States, but that, however, repeated and recent favors formed ties which it 1 Commons' Journals, XXXVI., 832. Introduction 2Y would be at least difficult to break suddenly, and especially at the very period of their enjoyment." ^ The second formal recognition of the United States came from Holland, and is to be viewed less as an intervention like that of France than as an ef- fort to get in ahead of England and secure a share of American commerce. ISTews of the successful ter- mination of the Yorktown campaign and of the im- minence of peace negotiations had reached Holland before she could induce herself to act. From the beginning of the war the Dutch had watched with envious eyes the break-up of the Brit- ish Empire. I^eutrality was their policy, enjoined upon them by many treaties with England, but an opportunity for the extension of commerce was not to be lightly disregarded. " I find they have the greatest inclination to serve us," wrote William Car- michael from Amsterdam, '' and at the same time themselves, for no people see their interests clearer." '' But the events of the early years of the war were not such as to tempt a peace-loving nation to take up the cause of the Americans. Guided by " their fears that we shall be subdued," ^ the Dutch avoided giving Great Britain cause for offense. 1 Montmorin to Vergennes, March 30, 1782, Wharton, V., 287. He is writing of later efforts to prevent a peace. » Carmichael to Committee, November 2, 1776, Wharton, II., 185. 28 South- American Independence Among the peripatetic agents appointed by Con- gress to tlie courts of Europe was William Lee, wko was commissioned in tKe summer of 1777 to Vienna and Berlin.^ Proceeding to the latter post, in spite of the protests of the Prussian minister ia the fall of 1778, he was stopped by the outbreak of war be- tween Prussia and Austria. He retired to Frank- fort to await its outcome, and there amused himself by negotiating a treaty, unauthorized on his side and unconstitutional on theirs, with the pensionary and burgomasters of Amsterdam.'' It was an unfortunate transaction. His fellow commissioners at Paris snubbed him well for the assumption of authority; * and the draft of the treaty captured at a later time among the papers of Henry Laurens * was made a casus belli by the English, notwithstanding every ef- fort by the Dutch to disavow ' it. Holland, in spite of herseK, was driven into the war. " You say the Dutch are disturbed," commented John Adams upon the blustering tactics of Sir Joseph Yorke, the British Minister at Amsterdam. " Do you wonder at it? They have been kicked by the 1 President of Congress to W. Lee, July 1, 1777, Wharton, II., 359. ' W. Lee to Com. For. Af., September 12, 1778, Wharton, II., 715. 'Commissioners to W. Lee, September 26, 1778, Wharton, II., 744. 'Dana to Jonathan Jackson, November 11, 1780, Wharton, IV., 151. 5 Manifesto of States-General, November, 27, 1780, Wharton, IV., 310. Introduction 29 English as no reasonable man would kick a dog. They have been whipped by them as no sober postilion would whip a hackney-coach horse." ^ On 12th March, 1781, the Dutch declared war on England, but even yet they refused to receive a let- ter from John Adams in his new official character of MLoister Plenipotentiary.^ It was not until the end of the year, when the news of the surrender of Com- wallis had reached them, that the provinces began to instruct their delegates in favor of a recognition. Then, in one day, five million guilders were sub- scribed to be lent to Erance for the use of the United States,* and the cumbrous diplomatic machinery of the States General was put in motion. " If it was in any other country," wrote Adams, on 14th Janu- ary, 1782, " I should conclude from all appearances that an alliance with America and France at least would be finished in a few weeks; but I have been here long enough to know the nation better. The constitution of government is so complicated and so whimsical a thing, and the temper and character of the nation so peculiar, that this is considered every- where as the most difficult embassy in Europe. But at present it is more so than ever; the nation is more ^ Adams to W. Lee, March 21, 1780, Wharton, III., 564. •Adams to President of Congress, May 7, 1781, Wharton, IV., 401. ' Damas to President of Congress, January 7, 1782, Wharton, V., 86. 30 South- American Independence divided than usual, and they are afraid of every- body." ^ And so he might well be content to be ac- corded his formal reception by the Prince of Orange on 22d April." On the twenty-third the French min- ister at Amsterdam gave a banquet to the diplomatic corps in honor of their new member. The treaty was concluded on October 8th. But the ministry of IN'orth had fallen, and British agents were at Paris discussing with Franklin the terms of peace before Holland had ventured upon her recognition. The value of a precedent in recognition, it has been said, depends on its non-partisan character. It also depends to a considerable degree upon the atti- tude of the mother country. For it is only before the mother country has brought herself to acknowl- edge the independence of her former territory that there can be any question as to the propriety of the recognition. Between the time of the declaration of independence, which in the case of the United States was 4th July, 1776, and the recognition of the same by the parent State, which in the same case occurred at the signature of the preliminary articles on 30th November, 1782, the third power in granting rec- ognition must consider two things; the fact of inde- 1 Adams to President of Congress, January 14, 1782, Wharton, V., 100. » Adams to Livingston, April 22, 1782, Wharton, V., 320. Introduction 31 pendence and the nature of its relations -with the belligerents. If the former of these does not mani- festly exist, and in the case under discussion it did _not, none can question the right, in a moral way, of the mother country to consider the recognition as premature and an act of war. Thus the recognition by France and in a less degree that by Holland, for she refrained from acting until Britain had shown her own hand, were interventions dictated by self- interest of one form or another. If the interests of the third power are of such a nature as not to be af- fected by the struggle, she is not likely to be led into a premature recognition, or into any recogni- tion, until the mother country by her own action has renounced her pretension to sovereignty over the new State by acknowledging its independence. Cases of recognition will have great value in estab- lishing the international law upon the subject only when the mother country delays this renunciation be- yond a reasonable time, so that third powers feel that they must recognize the fact of independence in jus- tice to themselves and to the new State. No valuable precedent in recognition occurred dur- ing the American revolution, or could have occurred, for Great Britain acted promptly herseK and ac- knowledged the independence of her former colonies 32 South- American Independence at a time when the fact of their independence was not a matter beyond dispute, and when her own hopes were in no means destroyed, in spite of her loss of a considerable army. 'No recognition before 30th November, 1782, could have been other than an in- tervention; none after that time can be considered as of importance save as an indication of European policy and commercial necessity. Before the admin- istration of Washington began, only three other Eu- ropean States had seen fit to open formal and regular relations with the United States, and only two of them concluded treaties. Sweden made a treaty of amity and commerce with the United States on the 3d of April, 1783. It was the first time, so the King took credit to himself, that an European power had soKcited the friendship of the United States. There is reason to believe that the enormous prestige of Dr. Franklin was an inspir- ation that accentuated his majesty's desire for com- mercial relations. Upon his general instructions Franklin entered readily upon the negotiations pro- posed by the Swedish ambassador, and before he had coiicluded them his special instructions for this treaty had arrived. He signed the final draft in al- most the very words of the project, and at the end of Introduction 33 the proceedings was complimented by a request for " young Mr. Franldin " as ambassador/ The Spanish negotiations, long and tedious in their course, failed to terminate in a treaty within the period under consideration, although the opening of diplomatic relations was not deferred long after the recognition by England. Arthur Lee, Franklin and Jay were at various times during the war conmmis- sioned to the court of Spain, but they could accomp- lish iio open result. Spain advanced more or less material assistance to the colonies, but two reasons seem to have kept her from a formal recognition. The principle of independence was none too popular in a country with enormous colonial possessions of her own, while the demand of the United States for free navigation of the Mississippi to its mouth was not to be admitted by a king who needed the whole Gulf of Mexico for himself. Even the offer made near the end of the war, to relinquish the demand for the free navigation, failed to induce Spain to treat. It was not until after the peace preliminaries with England had been signed that the Spanish minister in Paris told Jay that Spain was ready to receive the latter in form. Even then a treaty was not to be had for more than a decade. 1 Wharton, V., 512 ; VI., 133, 163, 276, 483. 34 South- American Independence Frederick the Great, ruling in Prussia during the revolution, showed some solicitude for American com- merce at an early period in the war, and amused him- self with the American envoys throughout its length. But there was too little to be gained for him to com- promise his country by a recognition, so he fought off the persistent attacks of the Lee's until the war was over. Then, on the model of the Swedish treaty, he allowed John Adams to negotiate a treaty with Prussia. Many of its articles revealed a "platonic philosophy " ^ that would scarcely have been admit- ted between two countries having any considerable intercourse. Thus, by the end of 1785, the United States had formal diplomatic relations with six States of Europe, France, Holland, Great Britain, Sweden, Spain and Prussia. In one case the recognition had marked a renunciation of sovereignty. In three more, subse- quent to this renunciation, it had indicated only a general friendly feeling now free to act. And, in two cases, it had come as an intervention, with differing^ degrees of flagrancy. In no case had there been any consideration of the question already asked, — whether there is a time in a revolution when the re- volting people has a right to demand, or a neutral a 1 Adams to Thulemeier, February 13, 1785, Adams, TFbrfa.VIII., 225. Introduction 35 rigkt to accord, a recognition in spite of the hostile attitude of the mother country. As has been seen, the nature of the American revolution was such that that question could not have arisen. Some light was destined to be thrown upon the question, however, by the policy of the new republic whose own recogni- tion has now been considered. The most serious diplomatic problem that had yet presented itself to the administration of George Washington arose when the French revolution passed from the municipal stage into the international. The events of 1792, bringing down upon France the wrath of Europe, aroused in the United States a feeling of sympathy that might well have influenced a govern- ment to make more of its treaty obligations to the distressed country than the Washington government showed itself disposed to do. But Washington was profoundly impressed with the need of the United States for a long period of uneventful development. As the wars broke out he saw clearly how little they had to offer the United States and how greatly they would check her growth if she allowed herself to become involved in them. Eealizing these dangers, he had little difficulty in convincing himseK that the obligations of the treaty of 1778, with France, did not apply to the conditions 36 South-American Independence of 1792, and that the duties of tKe United States coincided with, her interests in prescribing a policy of strict neutrality. While the French republic was coming into exist- ence, in the autumn of 1792, diplomats were decid- ■ ing, as their interests prompted them, how it should be greeted. Upon Gouvemeur Morris, minister plen- ipotentiary from the United States, more than his share of the responsibility fell, for his distance from Philadelphia and his lack of specific instructions applicable to the events of the tenth of August forced him to frame his policy for himseK. " You will observe, sir," he commented upon those events, " that matters are now brought to a simple question _ between an absolute monarchy and a republic: for all middle terms are done away." ^ As representing a republican government, Morris could not well take offense at the adoption of a similar government by France; nor could he proclaim a neu- trality similar to that of Britain. The minister of the latter power demanded his passports on 20th August, presenting at the same time a threatening note to the effect " that Britain has determined on a strict neutrality, that she means to preserve it. and I Morris to Jefferson, August 16, 1792, American State Papers Foreign Relations, I., 333. Introduction 37 therefore as his letters of credence are to the king, now dethroned, he had best come away. To this is subjoined a hope that nothing will happen to the King or his family, because that would excite the indignation of all Europe. This despatch turned into plain English, is, shortly, that the British court resent what is already done, and will make war immediately, if the treatment of the King be such as to call for, or to justify, measures of extremity." ^ The other courts of Europe, fearful with England of the effect of French pronimciamentos in the name of liberty, also withdrew their ministers from Paris, leaving Morris to constitute the whole diplomatic corps. On the last day of the year Lord Grenville formally refused to accredit the minister of the French republic. " You are not ignorant," he wrote to Chauvelin, " that since the unhappy events of the 10th of August, the king has thought proper to sus- pend all official communication with France. You are yourseM no otherwise accredited to the king, than in the name of his most christian majesty. The proposition of receiving a minister accredited by any other authority or power in France, would be a new question, which, whenever it should occur, the king would have the right to decide according to the inter- 1 Morris to Jefferson, August 22, 1792, A. S. P., I., 336. 38 South- American Independence ests of his subjects, his own dignity, and the regard which he owes to his allies, and the general system of Europe. I am therefore to inform you, sir, that I acknowledge you in no other public character than that of minister from his most christian majesty, and that consequently you cannot be admitted to treat with the king's ministers in the quality, and under the form stated in your note." ^ The attitude which Morris determined to take was the opposite of this of England. He remained in Paris, and continued his relations with the ministry of Foreign Affairs with as little interruption as the course of events would allow. He remained, as he wrote home, " because, in the admitted case that my letters of credence are to the monarchy, and not to the republic of France, it becomes a matter of indif- ference whether I remain in this country, or go to England, during the time which may be needful to obtain your orders, or to produce a settlement of affairs here. Going hence, however, would look like taking part against the late revolution, and I am not only unauthorized in this respect, but I am bound to suppose that, if the great majority of the nation adhere to the new form, the United States will ap- prove thereof, because, in the first place, we have no 1 GrenviUe to Chauvelin, December 31, 1792, Armual Register, 1793, 116. Introduction 39 right to prescribe to this country the gOTemment they shall adopt, and next, because the basis of our own constitution is the indefeasible right of the peo- ple to establish it." ^ The new French government itself almost drove Morris to leave Paris. Without specific instructions he declined to pay the instalments on the American debt to the republic as they came due, and a letter of Le Brun, insisting strongly on the identity of France, whatever her domestic form, induced him to demand his passports. This action evoked an explanatory note from the French minister, so that the demand was withdrawn. " As to my personal opinions," wrote Morris, consenting to remain, " they are unim- portant in an afFair so serious, but you may be per- suaded that I have never doubted the right which every people have of forming, to themselves, such government as they please." " He was much relieved when Jefferson, on learning of the suspension of the French constitution, wrote him instructions that approved his actions. " During the time of this sus- pension, and while no legitimate government exists, we apprehend that we cannot continue the payments of our debt to France, because there is no one author- » Morris to Jefferson, August 22, 1792, A. S. P., I., 336. 'Morris to Le Brun, September 17, 1792, A. S. P., I., 340. 40 South-American Independence ized to receive it and to give us an unobjectionable acquittal." Until further orders Morris was directed to suspend payments, witb the understanding that " this suspension [shall not] be continued one mo- ment after we can see our way clear out of the diffi- culty into which their situation has thrown us." ^ The situation and interests of the United States were such that in this crisis she was enabled to fulfil in their strictness both the letter and the spirit of the law . And where the indistinct law of neutrality was silent, she guided her actions by logical reason- ing, based upon the broad principles of honest impar- tiality and the consent of the governed. The conduct of Morris received the support of the administration. His new instructions, when they came, authorized him to continue the course he had started upon. " It accords with our principles," wrote Jefferson, statinir the law of recogTiition of governments as it has come to be accepted to-day, " to acknowledge any Govern- ment to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared'^ The late Govern- ment was of this kind, and was accordingly acknowl- edged by all the branches of ours; so any alteration of it which shall be made by the will of the nation, substantially declared, will doubtless be acknowl- > Jefferson to Morris, October 15, 1792, Jefferson's Works, III., 476. Introduction 41 edged in like manner. Witk such a Government, every hind of business may be done." ^ The situation was such as has been insisted upon as essential for the development of a precedent in recognition : there was a change of government, the effect of it was being contested, a neutral party with no interest in a termi- nation in either direction acted as seemed to it rea- sonable and right. It is well for the development of international law when the interest of States guides them into logical paths rather than selfish ones. " The President receives, with great satisfaction," wrote Jefferson to the French minister in Philadel- phia, acknowledging his notification of the change of government, " this attention of the Executive Coun- cil and the desire they have manifested of making known to us the resolution entered into by the National Convention, even before a definite regula- tion of their new establishment could take place. Be assured. Sir, that the Government and the citizens of the United States view with the most sincere pleasure every advance of your nation towards its happiness, an object essentially connected with its liberty, and they consider the union of principles and pursuits 'Jefferson to Morris, November 7, 1792, Jefferson's Works, III. 488-490. 42 South- American Independence between our two countries as a link which, binds still closer their interests and affections." ^ The actual outbreak of war between France and England, in 1793, brought to this attitude of neu- trality the supreme test. France was at once the traditional friend of the United States, and the expo- nent of a governmental system that could not fail to command the warmest admiration in America. She had rendered to the struggling States, fifteen years before, an assistance that at a later date in the war had become decisive; and it was by no means clear that the bond whereby she pledged her assistance did not entitle her to the aid of the United States in her own crisis. To resist a popular distrust of England, a sympathy with France and the obligation of the treaty of 1778 was no easy task. By rather close reasoning on the changed situations in Europe, and the obligations of treaties, reinforced by a profound realization of the need of peace to the United States, Washington was led to take for his country an epoch- making attitude. Simimoning his cabinet to meet him,^ the Presi- dent hurried from Mt. Yemon to Philadelphia when 1 Jefferson to Ternant, February 23, 1793, Jefferson's Works, III., 518. » Circular to Cabinet, April 12, 1793, Sparks, Writings of Wash- ington, X., 336. Introduction 43 news of the outbreak of the war reached him. To his advisers he propounded a series of thirteen per- tinent questions on neutrality and the French treaties/ and with their approval, on 22d April, 1Y93, issued a proclamation that " has had greater influence in moulding international law than any sin- gle document of the last hundred years." ^ With the brief neutrality proclamation as a text, Jefferson, in his later correspondence with Genet, formulated " against France," and against his own inclination, it might be added, " broad principles of neutrality, to which time has added nothing." * A year later these principles of international law, now for the first time laid down with authority, were enacted with fitting pains and penalties into a statute by the Congress of the United States. This prompt recognition of the French republic, accompanied by a more thorough-going neutrality than had yet been seen, marks the entrance into European diplomacy of a new power, in whose guid- ance principles distinctly different from those of Europe would predominate. It may be conjectured that the development of international law since 1793 ' Sparks, Writings, X., 533. •Foster, Century of American Diplomacy, 154. ' Keddaway, Monroe Doctrine, 15. 44 South- American Independence has been influenced more by this power than by any other, just because of the isolation of interests that forced it into a neutral attitude, from which it could act freely, as a logical international theory might dic- tate. From the action of the United States regard- ing the French governments, for the Directorate, the Consulate and the Empire were severally acknowl- edged as the Republic had been, and the French wars, it might be guessed with considerable accuracy what would be its action when the next great case for recognition should arise — ^when the American colo- nies of His Catholic Majesty should be driven by a Castilian stupidity, even greater than an eighteenth- century English stupidity, into a war for independ- ence. CHAPTEE I. THE SOUTH AMEEIOAN WARS OF LIBEEATION Tke enterprise of tlie inhabitants of Spain's four American viceroyalties displayed itseK in systematic and consistent smuggling rather than in any form of opposition to Spanish rule as such. Exploitation and repression were the essential features of the Spanish colonial system. If Buenos Ayres proved to be a competitor to the Spanish merchants, her olive trees must come down and her vines must come up by the roots, for it was clearly understood that Spain was to be protected, and that colonies existed only for the benefit of the mother country. It is hard to see how such a system could have been carried out honestly, or, if this were possible, how it could have been en- dured. But the administrators of Spain made the colonial system a means for recuperating distressed fortimes, while the colonists utilized the cupidity of their rulers to develop an extensive, illicit and profit- able foreign commerce. ISTo community of interest could well exist in the population of the Spanish-American colonies. Ex- cepting their American residence, and common de- 46 South- American Independence pendence on a motker country, there are few gener- alizations that can be made regarding the people liv- ing in the sonthem Americas. Some families were Castilian, were insolently proud of their birth in the peninsula, and looked to a speedy return to civiliza- tion and Spain. At the other end of the social scale were negroes and Indians of unmixed blood. Be- tween these was an immense population made up of Creoles on the one hand, and on the other of various degrees of mestizos and mulattos, for the Spanish settlers in America had amalgamated with the native and lower races as only peoples of Latin blood have done.^ Caste and class flourished in Latin- America, and gave a clear promise of permanence to Spanish dominion which was the one unifying principle on the continent. Without the assistance of Spain no other common fact could come to exist, and no dan- gerous spirit of revolution could prevail without some other common facts. South America, strange as it may seem, in spite of centuries of misgovemment and blindness on the part of the mother country, was patriotic during those early years of the last century, when patriotism was almost the only asset of the Spanish peoples. The colonial system had been atrocious, but, keeping 1 Mathison, 390 et seq. Wars of Liberation 47 those at the bottom of the social scale in dense ignor- ance, and allowing those at the top to enrich them- selves by illicit means, it had been successful. The history of 1806 and 1807 proves this with reasonable conclusiveness. Three great names stand forth in the history of South American liberation. To Jose de San Martin and Simon Bolivar belongs the credit of accomplish- ing the emancipation; to Francesco de Miranda that of inaugurating the movement. The first liberator, Miranda, was a man of good family, a native of Caracas, in Venezuela, and a wanderer of much expe- rience. Bom in 1754, he had fought in the Ameri- can revolution with the French allies, and had there formed the resolution to repeat the process in his own land. Years of travel over all of Europe, broken into by service at the head of a French repubhcan brigade, and by visits to London and conferences with British and American statesmen, had confirmed the resolu- tion, and it was only a change in the conditions of Europe that kept Pitt from backing a filibustering expedition under his leadership in 1798. Another change of conditions brought the object of his ambi- tions within his reach, and in February, 1806, the " Leander " sailed from 'New York, under one Mar- 48 South- American Independence tin,^ wko at sea turned into Miranda, tke leader of a revolutionary expedition against Venezuela. After touching at a port of San Domingo, the " Leander " proceeded to the north coast of Venezuela, where a Spanish force drove it hack. But Lord Cochrane, from the West Indian station, was induced to convoy the expedition to an easy landing in the neighborhood of Coro, whence he convoyed it once more to Trini- dad and safety a few days later. The days at Coro had been spent in vigorous revolutionary propagand- ism, to no effect. The one thing essential to a revolu- tion was lacking — the people of Venezuela would not revolt.^ ^ The experience of Miranda with an apathetic and timorous population was duplicated in the same year by the experience of another filibustering expedition, this time directed against the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres. While the British ministry was considering the plans of Miranda, in 1804, Sir Home Riggs Pop- ham had been designated as commander of a possible British contingent, and had been placed in communi- 1 Annals of Congress, 11 C. 1, 257. 'Colom., Account, II., 302-313; Ann. Reg., 1806, 239-241; 3 A. S. P., 256-258; 6 Am. Hist. Rev., 508-530; Annals, 11 C. 1, 257-315; Latan^, 21-29. * Miranda, 110. Wars of Liberation 49 cation with the South. American adventurer/ Thus Popham had come to consider the possibilities of South American independence. And when the capture of Cape Colony, in January, 1806, left him free to act with his fleet, he listened to the tales of the captain of an American merchantman, borrowed Lord Beres- f ord and twelve hundred men, and sailed west to free Montevideo and Buenos Ayres from the Spanish tyranny under which they groaned, and to open to British merchants their valuable commerce.^ The Spanish viceroy was so hopelessly incompetent that Buenos Ayres fell before Beresford's handful of troops, in July. But the groaning and oppressed peo- ple united under the lead of a French officer in the Spanish service, Liniers, and shortly made Beresford and his soldiers prisoners of war.' So successful was their resistance that when General Whitelocke arrived with nine thousand reinforcements, and a commission as civil governor of the province, he was forced to give up hostilities and return to England to be court-martialed and cashiered.* Thus the attempts to revolutionize South America iCastlereagh, Corresp., VII., 288. 'Ibid.,'Vn., 302 ; see Proc's in Wilcocke, 356 ; Sloane, in Am. H. Jiev., IV., 449-453. * Andrews, I., 34. *Castaereagh,Co»Tesp.,VlI., 314; cf. Latang, 29-31, and D-ic.Nat.Siog. 50 South- American Independence under British, auspices proved to be premature. With all their grievances the colonists were not yet pre- pared for independence. And when at last the first step was taken that led to the ultimate separation, the motive was not love of freedom, but a patriotic desire to maintain Spanish authority in Spanish colonies. When Napoleon established his brother on the throne of Spain he gave the signal for the erection of patriotic juntas throughout the peninsula. The in- habitants of Spanish-America were no less deter- mined than those of Ferdinand's European posses- sions not to submit to French rule. With some fric- tion ^ caused by the desire of the regency of Cadiz to rule the colonies as well as Spain, they took matters into their own hands and set up independent local governments in the name of Ferdinand. At Buenos Ayres the viceroy Cisneros met with opposition from the minute of his arrival, in May, 1809." A year later he was deposed by a movement inspired by a writer of pamphlets, Moreno, who became the soul of the new " junta gubemative " that succeeded him.^ Valparaiso followed the example of Buenos Ayres, in 1 Colom., Account, II., 320. 2Rengger, Introd., XIV. 'Miller, I., 59. Wars of Liberation 51 July, 1810, deposed the president Carrasco, and turned the municipal cabildo into a patriotic junta.^ Santiago did the same in September, and with a re- markable unanimity Chile determined no longer to form a captain-generalcy under the viceroy of Peru, and met in her first free congress in the spring of 1811.^ In the northern viceroyalty of New Granada, Quito had set up the first junta in August, 1809.* Caracas joined in the movement six months later, and abolished slavery, in addition to proclaiming Ferdi- nand and forming a federative government for Vene- zuela.* Bogota acted in similar manner in July, fol- lowing this in December, 1810, with a congress and a " Republic of Oundinamarca " to be ruled by a president and vice-president in the name of the old King of Spain.' And on 5th July, 1811, the first motion of independence of Spain was adopted by the Congress of Venezuela. ° The widespread popular feeling which showed itself in the movements here described was founded on loyalty to Spain. '^ Many of the leaders of the day were individually in favor of a complete independ- 1 Stevenson, III., 176. ' Miller, I., 105. ' Bep. Col., 45-49. * Schryver, 13 ; Elliot, I., 14. ' Moses, Const. Col, 11. 8 Sep. Col, 51, 52 ; Present State, 29 ; Bolet-Paranza, 223. 'Walton, 100-107. 52 South- American Independence ence, but there was as yet no public opinion to sup- port tbem. Even so much as had been attained was soon lost, as throughout the greater part of South America the popular governments were suppressed, with varying degrees of difficulty. But the fact of independence was established. Although in name Spain continued to rule the Americas for several years to come, her rule had now ceased to be effec- tual, and the principle of commercial restriction upon which her colonial policy was founded ceased to be operative. The great English trade which cam.e at once into existence made the restoration of the old system more impossible every day, and gave strength to the real movements for political independence which at once began. The overthrow of Ferdinand in Spain had established the economic independence of the colonies. The overthrow of Spanish rule in America is the result of two simultaneous movements which origi- nated in local disturbances in Venezuela and Buenos Ayres, which spread gradually northward and south- ward along the western coast of the continent devel- oping leaders as they advanced, and which finally united within the limits of the present republic of Ecuador, to continue the advance together into the heights of upper Peru, until the attainment of a com- Wars of Liberation 53 plete and perfect independence. The name of Simon Bolivar, who was the spirit of the northern move- ment, is better known than that of San Martin, who accomplished a greater work in the southern half of the continent. When economic independence was forced upon the Spanish provinces, about the year 1810, and their ports were opened more widely than ever before to foreign commerce, there began an invasion of capital and commercial adventurers that had a permanent influence on the history of the colonies.^ There had always been much foreign commerce in spite of Span- ish colonial system, but it had paid a heavy unofficial tax, and the goods were distributed through Spanish hands. Now began the establishment of commercial houses in the large cities and the permanent invest- ment of foreign capital, which was mostly English. It was not long before those houses and this capital were forced into politics, and, owing their life to the existence of an illegal condition, they necessarily fought to maintain that condition and enlisted heart- ily in the cause of independence. The materials are not yet collected to show how far Spanish- American iudependence was due to the Liverpool and Manches- 1 A Five Tear^ Residence in Buenos Ayres, P. 33-35, etc. ; Colom., Account, I., LXXX. ; WUcooke, Preface. 54 South-American Independence ter merchants, but such as are available seem to show that commercial pressure was the great influ- ence in keeping the patriots patriotic. Particularly was this true in the chief port of entry for the south- em pi'ovinces, Buenos Ayres. The i%mta gubernative, which was set up in Buenos Ayres on the 25th of May, 1810, was the beginning of an independent regime that has endured in that territory, in one form or another, from that day to this. It was a doubtful period of political instability that followed the erection of this government for ten years ,or more. War was almost constant on three parts of the frontier: Artigas dominated in the city of Montevideo, and declined to submit to the author- ity of Buenos Ayres; Dr. Francia shut himself up iu the city of Paraguay and maintained a permanent embargo on the inhabitants of the province under his control; and on the northern frontier of the viceroy- alty the Spanish forces from upper Peru were con- stant in their depredations. Meanwhile, within the frontiers thus harassed, partisan politics was doing its worst, and between the rivalries of revolutionary chieftains and the jeal- ousies existing between the rural districts and the city of Buenos Ayres the province had little domestic Wars of Liberation 55 stability.^ Moreno, who led the attack on the vice- roy Cisneros, in 1810, dominating the junta that suc- ceeded him, seems to have been an honest man and too severe for his time.^ He died while on a forced mission to England. Saavedra, who drove hiTn out, was himself forced to leave abruptly before the end of 1811. And after an interregnum of several months Juan Martin Pueyrredon arrived from the army and took command at Buenos Ayres.^ In the last month of 1813 the position of Supreme Director was estab- lished, to be filled for the first time by Gervasio An- tonio de Posadas. He was followed by General Al- vear,* later the victim of another revolution, suc- ceeded by Alvarez, pro tempore, and by Pueyrredon, who was chosen Supreme Director in March, 1816, by the Congress of Tucuman.^ Throughout this period of strife Buenos Ayres was in an anomalous condition. She had revolted in the name of Ferdinand Vll. She did not issue any decla- ration of independence imtil 1816. Spain was main- taining that her own sway was still unbroken: " the Laws of the Indias (which are still in force) do not 'Buenos Ayres, An Account, 9 etseq. 2 Miller, I., 60 et seq. ; Pazos, 49. » Bland, in Annah, 15 C. 1, 2146. *Halsey to Sec. State, May 5, 1815, S. D. MSS. 5 Bland, 2149. 56 South- American Independence permit any Foreign Vessel to approacli or carry on commerce with " ^ the port of Buenos Ayres. Yet when the British Foreign Office sent a consul to that city the junta declined to grant him an exequatur, be- cause in his commission the independence of Buenos Ayres was not acknowledged. The congress that met at Tucuman in 1816 ended this uncertainty. By this time negotiations entered into for the estabhshment of a Spanish prince on the throne of Buenos Ayres had failed because of the unalterable determination of Spain, after the restoration, to reconquer the colo- nies." So the representatives of the United Provinces of Eio de la Plata declared their independence at Tucuman on July 9th, 1816, and issued a manifesto of causes on the 25th of the following month.' The series of military successes that was destined to lead to South American independence began at Tucu- man in the fall of 1812, and at Salta on February 20th, 1813.* In these battles the Spanish forces from upper Peru were driven back as they crossed the frontier of Buenos Ayres, and at the latter the roy- alist general Tristan was decisively defeated by the patriot Belgrano. But on the 1st of October, of the » F. 0. MSS. » Parish, 75, 386. 'Annals, 15 C. 1, 1877, 2045; Ann. Reg., 1816 [159] ; iJ.Q. A., 30. *165 N. Am. Rev., 556; Miller, I., 76. Wars of Liberation 57 same year, the royalists, violating their parole given after Salta, destroyed Belgrano's army at Vilcapujio. This was a distinct service to the patriots, for it placed in command of the remnants of Belgrano's force Jose de San Martin, just returned from tAventy years of honorable service in the Spanish armies to aid his countrymen in their fight. San Martin recognized at once the futility of at- tacking Spain in the mountains of upper Peru, vsdth more than four hundred leagues of impassable roads between his army and his base of supplies.^ He con- ceived the idea of forcing Spain to defend her own base at lima and Callao, and to this purpose elabo- rated a plan for an invasion of Chile, a capture of Valparaiso, and a combined military and naval attack on the capital of Peru. To this end he willingly gave up the command of his northern army to General Alvear, taking for himself, in September, 1814, the governorship of the backwoods province of Cuyo, Mendoza the capital, at the eastern end of the TJspal- lata pass over the Andes.^ A popular revolt had occurred in Chile a short time after the overthrow of the viceroy at Buenos iSchinidtmeyer,132;B.A. to Tucuman 328 leagues ; to Salta 415 leagues. »Latan«, 37, 38; Cadcleugh, I., 293-297. 58 South- American Independence Ayres, the cabildo of Valparaiso advancing tke pre- text that the captain-general could not save the prov- ince for Ferdinand. Following a common line of de- velopment this revolt ripened into a popular congress in June, 1811, only to fall in I>ecember of the same year before " the unprincipled ambition " of three gifted brothers Carrera. Encouraged by the fac- tions so soon developed in Chile, the viceroy of Peru seized the opportunity to send down an army in the early months of 1813. The OhUenos at once put aside their strife, met the invaders, and under the leadership, first of Jose Miguel Carrera, and then of Bernardo O'Higgins, extorted a truce at Talca on the 5th of May, 1814. By this truce the existing order in Chile was acknowledged. The truce was the signal for the renewal of partisan strife between O'Higgins and the Carreras, who had been forced to surrender to him the command of the patriot army. But once more they came to a forced reconciliation, when the news arrived that the viceroy repudiated the truce of Talca, and that General Osorio was on his way south with another royalist army. The patriots were hope- lessly weakened by their domestic strife, however, so that a decisive victory at Eancagua, on 1st October, 1814, marked a complete restoration of Spanish Wars of Liberation 59 authority in Chile.^ O'Higgins and a few of his offi- cers escaped from the wreck of their army, crossed the Andes, and placed themselves under the com- mand of San Martin, the new governor at Mendoza.^ San Martin settled down at Mendoza with a hand- ful of recruits — ^the number is stated at 160 — and a great plan. In a few weeks he was joined by another handful of Chilenos, who escaped destruction at Ean- cagua. Then he began the long task of building up a weak province, collecting and organizing an army, and educating the authorities of Buenos Ayres in the strategic necessities of the war. From the city he had chosen for his capital it was only a short journey to the coast cities of Chile. But the passage of the Andes was considered impossible for an army, and few stratagems were needed to close the eyes of the Spanish forces to the possibility of danger from this side. His long experience in the Spanish army had given San Martin a thorough knowledge of the art of war. To this were added a character that inspired confi- dence, and a greater amount of industry than was common to Latin- Americans. Kecruiting proceeded 1 Miller, I., 105-118; 3 Stevenson, 176-181 ; Graham, 16. The history of this period is based on memoirs. The public records were destroyed to keep them from the Spaniards. Graham, Jntrod., III. 2Haigh, 160. 60 South-American Independence at M'endoza with considerable rapidity; constant drilling turned the raw recruits into first-rate sol- diers; from the foreign merchants at Buenos Ayres, whose confidence had early been gained, came a sup- ply of material ^ things that made the equipment of an army possible. After two years of quiet organization the new army was ready to move, and notice to this effect was served in an indirect way on the Spanish authorities in Chile. Relying confidently on the insincerity of the native Indians, San Martin summoned them to a great conference and celebration in the fall of 1816. Here, under pledge of profound secrecy, he told the chiefs of his purpose, and marked out for them a line of march across the Andes that he had no intention of following.^ Having thus successfully misled his enemy, San Martin moved from Mendoza on the lYth of January, 1817, with a force of about 4,000 men. After a terrible journey over the Uspallata pass, four thousand feet higher than another more famous one, of St. Bernard, he descended the western slope of the Andes and fell upon the Spanish outpost at La Guar- dia, on Yth February.^ I Miller I., 88. 2 Miller, I., 89-102; Graham, 29. ' Markham, 239 ; Miller, I., 120-126. Wars of Liberation 61 Tke liberation of Chile, the second step in San Martin's plan, of which the creation of an army at Mendoza was the first, was the work of fifteen months. Osorio, who had become captain-general of Chile after his victory at Kancagua, in 1814,^ had been suspecting danger as he watched the proceedings across the mountains, and soon had an army ready to be sacrificed before the invader at Chacabuca, on February 12th.^ Two days later the liberating army entered Santiago. During the succeeding months the patriot government in Chile was erected again. A congress met to offer the Supreme Directorship, to San Martin, and then to O'Higgins, when the former refused it; while on the first day of the ensuing year the independence of Chile was proclaimed.^ Mean- while the Spanish army, in its refuge at Talcuhuana, in the south of Chile, was gathering reinforcements from Peru. Then Osorio marched * against the patriots with 8,000 men, and defeated them com- pletely at Talca, 19th March, 1818.' But this was only the dark before dawn, for the patriots, who ral- lied under San Martin and O'Higgins, melted down 1 Miller, I., 120-126. ■' 3 Stevenson, 182 ; Chile, Journal, 1-17 ; Schmidtmeyer, 351. 8 Ann. Reg., 1818, 44. » Hall, I., 58-59 ; Graham, 33 ; Miller, I., 179. * ChUe, JouTTial, 40-71, passim. 62 South- American Independence their plate and sold their jewels, and ia three weeks placed a new army in the field. On the 5th of April, 1818, the virtual independence of Chile was achieved on the plain of Maypu.^ Spain never again had any considerable force in the province. With Chile cleared of Spanish troops, and with Valparaiso at his service for a base of supplies, San Martin was ready to enter upon the next stage of his work, the liberation of Peru. From this point in his career he is no longer to be considered as a general of Buenos Ayres. He is become the Liberator, with larger plans than the home faction that appointed him can comprehend. We are not at this place con- cerned with the internecine strife that continued in Buenos Ayres regardless of his successes, or with his summons by, disobedience to, and final rupture with the Buenos Ayrean authorities. San Martin realized that extinction of Spanish power was more important than local politics, and continued on the course he had mapped out in spite of the orders and pleadings that he come home and restore peaee.^ Another period of two years elapsed between the decisive victory at Maypu and the definitive invasion of Peru. It was a period, like that at Mendoza, filled 1 Haigh, 190-239 ; Cadcleugh, II., 31. 2 February, 1820; MUler, I., 258. Wars of Liberation 63 with, reeruitiiig, organizing, drilling and educating. A series of proclamations prepared the Peruvians for their emancipation; the friendship and protection of the Liberator were promised them; while a treaty of alliance between Buenos Ayres and Chile guaranteed the independence of a new State to be erected by their joint army in Peru.^ At this time arrived in Valparaiso a most consid- erable addition to the patriot force in the person of Thomas, Lord Cochrane, later tenth Earl of Dun- donald. Cochrane, who was an energetic and able naval officer, had been thrown out of the British navy on a rather doubtful charge, and had been engaged, in 1817, by Alvarez, the Chilian agent in London,^ to go out and organize a naval force for Chile. His arrival in November, 1818, introduced at once an element of efficiency in the branch of the service on which San Martin was most dependent for success in Peru.* But it also introduced feelings of jealousy among the native officers thus superseded that well nigh wrecked the whole enterprise. An active naval warfare was at once begun against the Spanish forces, and before long reports began to 1 Graham, 481 ; 12 ^. 9 jB. Sep. Col., 100. 'Espejo, Secuerdas, 87; Stevenson, III., 414. ' Sehryver, 260. * Espejo, Beeuerda^, 55 ; Rep. Col., 109 ; Miller, I., 353. Wars of Liberation 91 Granada."^ The idea of the Liberator of a grand fed- eration of American republics, under his guidance, was one step nearer attainment. From Quito, over the mountains to Guayaquil, was the next move. San Martin's enemies say that now the Limenos were secretly begging the Liberator to- advance even to Peru and free then at once " from the Protector and the Spaniards," " and that Sucre was now hurried on to the coast to make sure that Guayaquil might not fall into Peruvian hands. Cer- tain it is that Bolivar, following up the victories of his lieiitenant, made his triumphal entry into Quito on the 16th of June; on the very day, could he but have known it, that Don Manuel Torres was in- foi-med by John Quincy Adams that the President of the United States was ready to receive bim as Charge d' AfFaires from the Eepublic of Colombia.^ The occupation of Guayaquil was peaceful. The Peru- vian division, needed at home, and no longer of use in Ecuador, was embarked on its transports in July, while the Liberator offered to lend San Martin some regiments of Colombian troops for service in Peru.* At the same time treaties of union, league and con- 1 Scln-yver, 261. » Coch., Nan-., I., 219 ; Miers, II., 80, 81. '6 J. Q. A., 23. * Espejo, Beotierdas, 57. 92 South- American Independence federation, were signed at Lima for the preservation of South. American independence and the gathering of a pan-American Congress at Panama.^ A week later a proclamation of the Liberator annexed Guaya- quil to Colombia.^ On the 26th of July, 1822, San Martin disem- barked at Guayaquil; on the 28th he left that port for CaUao.^ What occurred at themeetrag of the gen- erals, as has been seen, is not really known, but the result is clear. Up to this day there are two domi- nant forces to be considered in the war; after this day Bolivar becomes the one center of activity, and under his leadership, along the liiies mapped out by San Martin, the final blows are struck and the final peace is attained. We have no occasion here to enter into the controversy waged over the merits of these men.* The steps in the achievement of actual independence alone concern us. Had the Protector been sincere, cried his oppo- nents, who had cried loudly at his assumption of supreme authority the year before, he would not have abandoned Peru at this critical period.^ In ' July 6, 1822, 11 B. & F., 105 ; 1823, Ann. Reg., 204*, [247] . ' Espqo, Hecuerdae, 75 ; Miller, I., 304. ' Esp^o, Secuerdas, 94, et seq. * Hamilton, I., 229-239; highly favorable to BoliTar. 'Stevenson, in., 458. Wars of Liberation 93 April, Canterac, one of the ablest and boldest of Spain's generals in America, tad surprised and routed completely a whole division of the patriot army at lea. During the last two months of his pro- tectorship, San Martin worked to repair this loss, with the result that at his departure he left an army of eight thousand, under Alverado and Arenales, for the protection of the country. But the new govern- ment failed to make effective use of this force. The provisional junta kept half the army idle, and. sent the other half down to Arica, and thence up into the country, where, at Moquegua, at the beginning of the next year Canterac again destroyed a republican army.^ The Congress meanwhile busied itself with treaties of alliance and bases for constitutions.^ As the fragments of the dismembered army drifted into Lima, the Congress, with its three-headed junta, be- came unpopular, was declared unfit to govern, the army mutinied, " and the people of lima rose and deposed them, & placed a popular leader of the name of Eiva-Aguero at the head of affairs." ^ With Don Jose de la Rive-Aguero as president, the Peruvian revolution was for the first time, and last, 1 Proctor, 126-129 ; 1823, Ann. Seg., [248]. '12B.&F., 813 iSB.&F., 919 ; 10 B. & F., 666-696. » Robertson to Parish, May 7, 1823, F. 0. MSS. 94 South- American Independence in the hands of native Peruvians. Santa Cruz was put in command of the troops, and his activity was at once reflected in their higher discipline. The foreign merchants were won over to the side of the govern- ment, while Bolivar was summoned to take up the work San Martin had dropped. Sucre had already appeared in Lima as his agent. ^ In May Santa Cruz was sent to Arica with another army, to regain the ground lost by the defeat at Moquegua. Almost as he left, the army of Canterae approached Callao and occupied the capital ^ on 16th June, 1823. The Con- gress at once lost its head and prepared for instant flight. Before it left, " after much boisterous dis- cussion, Sucre was named supreme military chief, with powers little short of a dictatorship, a step im- periously demanded by the critical situation of the patriots." * With the elevation of Sucre came the practical end of the career of Eive-Aguero. He was probably the victun of Colombian intrigues that in- duced Congress to put Sucre in his place until the arrival of Bolivar. He was allowed, however, to accompany the Congress in its flight to Truxillo, where he ran an isolated course until Bolivar sup- 1 Miller, II., 57-60 ; Proctor, 129-131. ' Proctor, 148 ; Hall, Journal, II., 93 ; Miller, II.,"63, says 18th June. 3 Miller., II., 63. Wars of Liberation 95 pressed him in November.^ On the first day of Sep- tember the Liberator entered the city of Lima, and received from the welcoming people the new title of Deliverer. Early in June Santa Cruz sailed for Arica, whither Miller followed him with reinforcements in July." The march of the patriots into upper Peru was suc- cessfully accomplished. They passed by the bridge of the Inca, over the Desaguadero, on 25th July, and two weeks later entered the city of La Paz.* On 25th August they marched out from that city to defeat Valdez, who had come up against them by a long and rapid march. But soon Valdez was joined by La Sema, the viceroy, and Olaneta brought further aid to the royalists, while the patriots began an inevita- able retreat to the coast. With the royalists follow- ing, the retreat turned into a precipitate and shame- less flight. A third army had been sacrificed. Sucre had marched to support Santa Cruz after the evacua- tion of Lima by the royalists [July 17th, 1S23]. Now he returned to the capital.* The task of Bolivar, to drive the Spanish forces from their almost impregnable situation in the moun- tains of Tipper Peru, seemed great at the end of ' Proctor, 135-148. * Proctor, 160. ' Miller, II., 67. *Miller, II., 76-81. 96 South- American Independence 1823. The defeat of the army of Santa Cruz, in Sep- tember, had left them with as strong a hold as ever on Potosi, La Paz and the Desaguadero. While his own time had been frittered away in suppressing the ci-devant president, Eive-Aguero, and erecting a new Congress to continue the work of constitution mak- ing. But the Spaniards themselves came royally and unexpectedly to his assistance. Ferdiuand VII., whose heart had become constitutional in 1820, ex- perienced another change in 1823, when the Holy Allies lent him troops. The domestic troubles were reflected in the colonies. " We have pretty late ac- counts from the Interior of Peru," wrote one of the British merchants, " and they are at last, & in the least expected way truly favourable for the cause of the patriots. The Royalists have gone to Loggerheads among themselves ! Olaneta, the Commander-in-chief at Potosi, has declared for the absolute Ferdinand, and the Catholic religion, as 'twas an hundred years ago. La Sema & Canterac cry. Long live the Con- stitution, & down with .the serviles! and there seems little chance of a composition between these doughty Chiefs. Blood has already been shed in the quarrel; and the advocate of absolute power & blind obedience, & breathes nothing but vengeance & death to the Traitors & Innovators who would be- Wars of Liberation 97 tray their Country. The Patriots could have liit upon no better plan than their o^wn Enemies have done, to get rid of the whole of the latter." ^ The campaign of 1824 opened with a mutiny of patriot troops in the fortress of Callao that gave that place into the hands of the royalists and threatened serious injury to the Peruvian cause.' The Congress, startled by the sudden danger, ceased its constitu^ tional debates, " named General Bolivar dictator, and dissolved itself. Thus, at least, closing their political existence with an act of unquestionable wisdom." " With his accustomed professions of reluctance the Liberator accepted the dictatorial power and pro- ceeded to justify his possession of it. He suppressed the mutiny. " By his firmness, activity, and season- able severities, he checked further defections, and obtained the respect and entire confidence of every faithful patriot. There was a charm in the name of Bolivar, and he was looked up to as the only man capable of sa^dng the republic." . . .* Then, with the mutiny quelled, he abandoned lima to the roy- 1 John Parish Robertson & Co. to Mr. Parish of Bath, March 10, 1824, F. 0. MSS. 'Proctor, 339-347; Miller, II., 98-106; Parish to Canning, No. 11., April 25, 1824, F. 0. MSS. •Miller, II., 102; 11 B. &. F., 866. * Miller, II., 106. 98 South-American Independence alists, wlio had already obtained Callao, and marched against Canterac. From Huaraz, on the coast, and sixty leagues north of Lima, the armies of Bolivar marched up into the country. A new discipline appeared in the regiments as the result of his activity. A new spirit of content- ment prevailed, for he saw to it that the wages of the soldiers were paid to the soldiers.^ In June he crossed the Andes in three divisions,'' making long marches through the mountains that would have been impossible, perhaps, to any European armies. In Jxdy he drew near to Pasco, where Arenales had won a noted victory as he marched around Lima at San Martin's command in 1820. In August he came up to Canterac, who marched confidently to meet him. Emboldened by their recent successes, the royalists had been content to leave Valdez to struggle with Olaneta, the absolutist, in the mountains around Potosi. With some nine thousand men Canterac met the rebels on the plain of Junin, at the southern end of Lake Chinchaycocha, on the 6th of August, 1824, only to have his victory turned into an utter defeat by a despairing charge of the Peruvian lancers.' Sat- 1 MiUer, II., 113-118. 'Parish to Canning, No. 44, September 26, 1824, F. 0. MSS. ' MiHer, II., 127-135 ; with map ; Schryrer, 263. Wars of Liberation 99 isfied with the work of the campaign, Bolivar left his army to go into cantonments for the rainy season, and returned to direct in person the operations around lima. The river valleys run from the plain of Junin up into the southeast for a hundred leagues to the ancient city of Cuzco; thence in the same direction a second hundred leagues extend beyond Lake Titicaca to the city of La Paz, at its southeast comer; a third hundred, bearing somewhat more to the south, covers the distance from La Paz to Potosi and Chuquisaca. At the southern end of this long chain of valleys Olaneta and Valdez were giving a death-blow to their own cause. La Paz and Ouzco were strongholds of the royalist army. At Junin Sucre was in command of the patriots, at last victorious in Peru. Sucre failed to put his troops into cantonments as Bolivar had expected, but spent two months manoeu- vering in the valleys, and watching the armies of La Sema and Canterac. On 3d December the viceroy met the patriots and defeated them.^ On 9th Decem- ber he came up with them again half way between Ouzco and Junin. The royalists were flushed with confidence, for they already had one victory to their credit in that week. The patriots were hungry, hard- > 1825, ^»n. /J«Sf., [209]. 100 South- American Independence pressed and discouraged. But when the eighty minutes of battle on the plain of Ayacucho were over, La Sema, the viceroy, was dead, and Canterac, a prisoner, signed a capitulation for his whole army/ The war as such was ended. Gamarra, with an ad- vance guard of the patriots, entered Cuzco on Christ- mas day, with the rest of the army close behind him.^ Olaneta still held out for his master in Upper Peru. Although possessed of great mining estates, he resisted, even to the end, all overtures of the patriots to exchange his lost cause for his property. He kept up the warfare in this final stronghold of Spanish, authority against the armies of Buenos Ayres, under the veteran Arenales, and against the armies of Peru, under the English veteran Miller. For fifteen years an active state of wa,r had existed in the country between Salta and Potosi, the counti^ which San Martin had wisely despaired of conquer- ing ten years before.** On Christmas day, 1824, the patriots reached Cuzco; in March, 1825, they came to La Paz, whence Miller was sent on to end the istruggle. At the close of March Olaneta was beaten, and his own troops slew him. Miller entered Potosi, April 2oth.* ' F. 0. MSS., Suenos Ayres.Yol. 8 ; 28 Niles, 156 ; 1825, Ann. Beg., 148*. 2 Miller, II., 183. * See P. 57 ; Andrews, II., 252. 4 Miller, II., 200-210 ; Parish to Canning, No. 10, February 10, 1825 ; F. 0. MSS. ; Andrews, I., 296-298. Wars of Liberation 101 Bolivar had meanwhile re-assembled the Peruvian Congress, on 10th February, and had gone through the ceremony of resigning and accepting for another year his dictatorial authority.^ Then he had departed for a triumphal progress through the country. At Arequipa he confirmed a Congress for Upper Peru that Sucre had called; its proceedings were to be sub- ject to the action of the Peruvian Congress of 1826, while Sucre himself should be the government for the intervening year." This Congress, meeting at Chu- quisaca, later re-baptized Sucre, declared for the in- dependence of Upper Peru, on August 6th, 1825, and five days later adopted the name of the Liberator for the new republic.^ Peru and Buenos Ayres joined in confirming the independence of Bolivia in the follow- ing spring. The Spanish surrendered the port of Cal- lao on 19th January, 1826. From this port, nine months later, the Liberator sailed for Guayaquil, never to return. Prom Guayaquil he journeyed down to Bogota and re-assumed his functions as President of Colombia. ' 12 £. &F., 885 ; Schryver, 267; 1825, Ann.Reg., [211]. » Parish to Canning, No. 55. August 6, 1825 ; F. O. MSS. '12B.&F.,859-S62. CHAPTER II. THE SOUTH- AMEEICAJSr POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES Liberty and independence have always been names to conjure witb in the United States. Popular sym- pathy has always gone out to a party or a people struggHng with these as their watchwords. Yet it is rarely that the government has allowed them to blind its eyes to its international duties or interests. The wave of feeling engendered by the French revolution threatened for a time to drive the country into an active foreign alliance, but its ultimate result was only to bring about the enunciation of a system of neutral obligations that has endured to this day. The sufferings of the Greek patriots called forth the elo- quence of Henry Clay and Daniel Webster and Ed- ward Everett; called forth money by thousands from the pockets of liberty-loving citizens; but failed to move for an instant the administration from its proper course. At a later time the misery of Cuba aroused the national emotion, but an entirely differ- ent cause precipitated a war. So it was in the Soutli- American struggle for independence. Policy of the United States 103 Before the contest had really begun it had become evident that the events in South America would be watched with a more eager interest than our semi- hostile relations with Spain could explain. When it came to the issue Jefferson was unwilling to implicate the country in movements hostile to Ferdinand, but the ease with which Miranda had secured audience of the president and liis secretaries, and had won over to his enterprise prominent federal officials of New York, indicated that few were unfriendly to a South American cause as such. And when some two years after the failure of his expedition the petition of thirty-six American citizens incai-cerated in the for- tress of Carthagena came before Congress a lively in- terest in their behalf was at once called forth.^ The story told by these young filibusters, with variations, has become a familiar tale: their expedition was the prototype of innumerable later expeditions, extend- ing through the times of WiUiam Walker to the days of John D. Hart, the Three Friends and the Laurada; their career was the familiar one of great expectations veiled in alluring mystery, doubtful ex- pedients, suspicion, and utter, hopeless failure; and now they came to Congress to find friends who should urge an intervention in their behalf. I III. A. S. P., 257. 104 South- American Independence For two weeks, in the beginning of June, 1809, weeks in which the South Americans were over- throwing their viceroys and erecting juntas in the name of Ferdinand, the petition of the Miranda men was under consideration in the House of Repre- sentatives. It was accompanied by a favorable report from a special committee, and a resolution recom- mending that the President, if convinced that they were involuntarily drawn into the unlawful enter- prise, should use every effort to obtain their release/ The debate ran on for several days, reviewing laws of neutrality and relations with France and Spain, until at last the Committee of the Whole, from sympathy and the underlying conviction that Spaia had no rights in her colonies which a friend of liberty was bound to respect, passed the resolution.^ Before the House, the opposition, with John Randolph at its head, became more insistent. Here the latter con- tinued his heavy fire of sarcasm and vituperation that had already brought Pearson,. of North Carolina, to offer him his blood, imtil the sentimental inclinations of the House were in a measure overcome. He al- luded particularly to the rupture of relations with Spain, which had occurred upon the elevation of Jo- •III. A. S. P., 258; Annals, 11 C. 1, 257. 2 June 13,1809; Annals, 11 C. 1, 283. Policy of the United States 105 seph, raising for the first time the question of the recognition of the South American provinces. To accompKsh the release of the prisoners an agent must be sent to Caracas. But we cannot send this agent, declared Randolph, "without acknowledging the inde- pendence of the colonies of South America, and then involving ourselves in a war with France, or address- ing ourselves, in the first instance, to the Govern- ment of France." ^ The truly American doctrine that a premature recognition is a cause for war, was thus declared. Later in the same day, by the vote of the Speaker, the resolution was defeated.^ Two years later this tendency of the House was re- vealed in connection with the President's message. In November, 1811, Madison alluded to the interest- ing scenes " developing themselves among the great communities which occupy the southern portion of our own hemisphere." ^ The special committee to which this portion of the message was referred read the declaration of independence of Venezuela and re- ported a resolution expressing a friendly solicitude in the welfare of these communities and a readiness, when they should have become nations " by a just ex- Kiimals, 11 C. 1,306. 2 June 14, 1809; Annals, 11 C. 1, 315. ' Bichardsoii : Messages, I., 494. 106 South-American Independence ercise of their righ.ts," to unite with the executive in establishing with them such relations as might be- come necessary.^ This was an indication of the sen- timent of Congress. Evidently the sentiment might become more pronounced if events in South America should become more active. President Madison realized the significance of the movements that took place throughout South Amer- ica in 1809 and 1810. He saw clearly that they might in time call upon the United. States for political action, and that already there were commercial inter- ests to be protected and developed. As early as 1807 the State Department had been informed of the em- barrassments under which American commerce strug- gled at Buenos Ayres.^ The commerce was admitted- ly illegal, but it was tolerated, and the need of an agent to protect it was avowed. The Jefferson ad- ministration took no action in this direction, but on 28th June, 1810, Secretary Smith instructed an agent to visit South America. Joel Roberts Poinsett,^ of South Carolina, had al- I ready seen much of the world when Madison ap- ^A. S. P., in., 538 ; Annals, 12 C. 1, 427. ^ David C. De Forest to James Madison, October 4, 1807, State Dept. MSS. *Still6, in Pa. Mag. Hist. ; XII., 129, 257 ; Poinsett Papers, in Pa. Historical Society, Vol. I. Policy of the United States 107 pointed him to this new mission. Possessed of inde- pendent fortune, he had traveled over Europe, visited Siberia and the interior of Russia, and declined to enter the service of the Czar. Later he became a cen- ter of contention in Mexico and played a part in the emancipation of Greece. Now, as American agent, he journeyed into Buenos Ayres and Chile, and in the latter country led a brigade of the patriot army against the Spaniards.^ In spite of this lapse from duty — ^which went unblamed — ^he seems to have been one of the ablest and best representatives of the United States in South America. He seems not to have engaged in privateering or commerce. Some years later it is declared that there was not a single American in Buenos Ayres who was not interested in privateering. The list is quite long of improper per- sons, English and American, who were sent to South America. "■ As a crisis is approaching," ^ went Poinsett's in- structions, " which must produce great changes in the situation of Spanish America, and may dissolve alto- gether its colonial relations to Europe, and as the geo- graphical position of the United States and other ob- vious considerations give them an intimate interest in 1 Graham, Journal, 23. «K. Smith to J. R. Poinsett, June 28, 1810, State Dept. MSS. 108 South-American Independence whatever may affect the destiny of that part of the American Continent, it is our duty to turn our atten- tion to this important subject, and to take such steps not incompatible with the neutral character and hon- est policy of the United States, as the occasion ren- ders proper. With this view you have been selected to proceed without delay to Buenos Ayres, and thence, if convenient, to Lima in Peru or Santiago in Chile or both. You will make it your object whenever it may be proper, to diffuse the impression that the United States cherish the sincerest good will towards the people of South America as neighbours, as belong- ing to the same portion of the globe, and as having a mutual interest in cultivating friendly intercourse; that this disposition will exist whatever may be their internal system or European relations, with respect to which no interference of any sort is pretended; and that in the event of a political separation from the parent country and of the establishment of an in- dependent system of National Government, it will coincide with the sentiments and policy of the United States to promote the most friendly relations and the most liberal intercourse between the inhabitants of this Hemisphere, as having, all a common interest, and as lying under a common obligation to maintain Policy of the United States 109 that system of peace, justice and good will, which is the only source of happiness for nations. "■ Whilst you inculcate these as the principles and dispositions of the United States, it will be no less proper to ascertain those on the other side, not only towards the United States, but in reference to the great nations of Europe, as also to that of Brazil, and the Spanish branches of the Government there; and to the Commercial and other connections with them respectively, and generally to inquire into the State, the characteristics, intelligence and wealth of the sev- eral parties, the amount of the population, the extent and organization of the military force and the pe- cuniary resources of the country'. " The real as well as ostensible object of your mis- sion is to explain the mutual advantages of a com- merce with the United States, to promote liberal and stable regulations, and to transmit seasonable inform- ation on the subject." With these objects in view, Poinsett was given the title of Agent for Seamen and Commerce in the Port of Buenos Ayres. Ten months later Louis Godde- froy was appointed " Consul for Buenos Ayres and the ports below it on the Eiver Plate," ^ and Poinsett was raised to Consul General. " The instructions al- 1 Monroe to Goddefroy, April 30, 1811, State Dept. MSS. 110 8 authr American Independence ready given you," wrote Monroe/ " are so full that there seems to be little cause to add to them at this time. Much solicitude is felt to hear from you on all the topics to which they relate — ^the disposition shown by most of the Spanish provinces to separate from Europe and to erect themselves into independ- ent States, excites great interest here. As Inhabi- tants of the same Hemisphere, as !N"eighbors, the United States cannot be unfeeling Spectators of so important a moment [movement ?] . The destiny of these provinces must depend on themselves. Should such a revolution however take place, it cannot be doubted that our relation with them will be more in- timate, and our friendship stronger than it can be while they are colonies of any European power." For a period of six years the United States main- tained consuls or agents in South America. William R. Lowry was sent to Caracas as Poinsett was sent to Buenos Ayres.'' But the representation in Vene- zuela was not kept up as steadily as that in the south of the continent, for the patriotic movements in that region were but spasmodic in the beginning and finally succumbed to the pressure of Morillo's armies. In the south representation, like the independent gov- > Monroe to Poinsett, April 30, 1811, State Dept. MSS. 2 Smith to Lowry, November 6, 1810, Slate Dept. MSS. Policy of the United States 111 emment, was maintained steadily after 1810. The status of the American agents, however, is not en- tirely clear. There existed no intent to recognize the governments at this time, and the administration was not sure that the juntas would give public recognition to United States consulswho could not give reciprocal recognition to them.^ So Poinsett went out as an un- official but accredited agent for seamen and com- merce, with letters similar to those held by various agents in the West Indies. Yet in 1811 he was com- missioned as consul-general and a consul was appoint- ed under him, while the State Department constantly addressed him and his successors by these titles. ISTo trace has been found of an exequatur issued to any of these agents, but they speak in their despatches of being formally received.^ In March, 1812, the junta of Buenos Ayres definitely refused an exequatur to Robert Staples, British Consul, because he could not acknowledge its independence.'' Through these agents the State Department kept itseK informed on events in Spanish America. In their despatches can be found accounts of the fre- quent revolutions that made government in Buenos 1 Smith to Poinsett, August 7, 1810, State Dept. MSS. * PomseM Papers, I. » Memorandum, dated June 26, 1823, Foreign Office MSS. 112 South-American Independence Ayres a hazardous and fascinating pastime. The military events on the frontiers are told with con- siderable exactness, and original bulletins of the junta and the liberating army are frequently en- closed. At times the agents themselves played a part in the local events. Poinsett went from Buenos Ayres into Chile, there to make friends with the Carreras and fight in their armies. He returned to Buenos Ayres. just in time to escape the disasters of Eancagua that sent O'Higgins and his handful of sur- vivors to swell the forces of San Martin at Mendoza.^ Thence, dodging the British cruisers, he returned to the United States to be congratulated by Monroe in the name of the President on the ability, zeal and success with which he had conducted his delicate mis- sion.^ At a later day his successor, Devereux, guar- anteed a loan, that snatched the existing government from the hands of its enemies. Less successful than Poinsett, this agent was disavowed and dismissed.'' The South Americans were as eager to give in- formation as the United States to receive it. Their Directors and Dictators constantly addressed the northern President with news of victory and requests ' Halsey to Sec. State, February 11, 1815, State Dept. MSS. '' Monroe to Poinsett, July 16, 1815, Poinsett Papers, I. ' Rush to Halsey, April 21, 1817, State Dept. MSS. Policy of the United States 113 for arms, accompanied by expressions of profound friendship. At tke same time their agents appeared at Washington as well as at London. Venezuela sent Don Luis Lopez Mendez to the latter city in 1811,^ having already sent Don T. Orea to the United States in 1810.^ In 1816 the first representative from Buenos Ayres appeared at Washington -with an apol- ogy for the delay and an assurance that a declara- tion of independence would soon be passed. " In the meantime," his credentials went on,^ " our deputy near your Excellency wiU not be invested with a pub- lic character, nor will he be disposed to exceed the object of his mission, without an understanding with your Excellency and your Ministers. That these views may be exactly fulfilled, I have selected a gen- tleman who, from his personal qualities, wiU not ex- cite suspicion that he is sent by the G-ovemment in- vested with so serious and important a commission. He is Colonel Martin Thompson. -^ . . I hope your Excellency will give him full credit, and secure for him all the consideration which, in a like case, we would give and secure to the Ministers whom your Excellency may think proper to send to these prov- 1 Present State, 86. ' Awrora, October 29, 1817. ^Annals, 15 C. 1,1876. 114 South- American Independence The Spanisli minister in the United States, Don Luis de Onis, failed to view the development of these friendly, though unofficial, relations vdth equanim- ity. For six years in his informal capacity he had ■watched the growth of a sentiment in favor of South America, Arriving with credentials from the Re- gency of Cadiz, in the early days of Madison's first administration, he had been refused a reception on the ground of the uncertain character of that gov- ernment, Madison never recognized the revolution- ary and Napoleonic governments in Spain, so it was not until the restoration of Ferdinand VII. in 1815 that the Spanish minister was received in his official capacity. Thereupon the latter took up in a formal way the protests he had long been making infor- mally. The South American situation was at this time bound up with the aggressions of the United States in the Moridas and the piratical establishments in ^he Gulf of Mexico. In their broadest extent the de- mands of de Onis comprehended the complete ex- clusion of the various South American flags from the ports of the United States. To these pretensions the Secretary of State replied vrith proper dignity that the United States could pay no attention to the flags Policy of the United States 115 of vessels seeking admission to its harbors and obey- ing its laws.^ But Spain had reasonable grievances enough with- out resorting to preposterous denaands. The neutrality laws of the United States, although adequate in spirit, failed in their details to meet the situation created by the revolt of Spain's American provinces. Based upon the great proclamation of the first President, and enacted in 1794, the law con- templated wars between independent States. So far it was correct in spirit, and formulated for the first time the principles of international law upon the sub- ject. But the law was difficult of execution, for no authority was given in it for the seizure of vessels suspected of intention to violate neutrality, and its provisions did not sufficiently cover acts done by aliens within the limits of the United States. At a later day the courts discovered that services in be- half of unrecognized governments were not rmneu- tral in the eye of the law, for this contemplated only offenses in behalf of Sovereign States.^ Through these inadequacies in the law, the sympa- thies and commercial interests of the Americans had come to the support of the southern patriots. Blank ' Monroe to de Onis, January 19, 1815, Nat. Intell. , November 12, 1817. ^Gelstoni;. Hoyt, Wheaton, III., 246. Il6 South- American Independence commissions for privateers issued from the South American capitals in shoals, and from Baltimore the vessels thus equipped put out to prey upon Spanish commerce; ^ too often upon any commerce that was not armed to protect itseK. At times, with scrupu- lous regard for the dictates of neutrality, the priva- teer would go to a port in South America before com- mencing its cruise ; too often, it was enough to have cleared from Baltimore or New Orleans for such a port. And when the cruise was ended, no privateer or ship of war hesitated to put into a United States port to refit and recruit, to restore or augment its armament. The issuing of commissions within the United States, the equipment of vessels to destroy the commerce of Spain, and the augmentation of their strength, were all manifest violations of neu- trality. Against them the Spanish minister pro- tested with propriety. When the prizes of South American privateers came within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, these examined into the antecedents of the captors, and did not hesitate to restore the prize to the proper owners. But this 1 Adams to Halsey, January 22, 1818 ; Halsey to Adams, August 21, 1818, State Dept. MSS. Halsey was dismissed for dealing in such commissions. He defended himself by alluding to the notorious equipment of privateers in the United States. Policy of the United States 117 possibility of redress had little effect upon the crime. And so, through the imperfections of the law, and the prevalence of a popular sympathy that made jury convictions well-nigh impossible, the Latin- Ameri- cans made the United States a base for their naval operations with impunity. When the fourteenth Congress met, in the fall of 1816, for its last session, the question of the recogni- tion of the South American provinces did not exist. There was widespread sympathy for those provinces in their struggle, and a general, genuine interest in the events transpiring in their continent. Few would have disclaimed a hope in their ultimate independ- ence and recognition, or a feeling that there is a real American community of interest; in spite of the scornful epigram of Mr. Adams, " As to an Ameri- can system, we have it; we constitute the whole of it." ^ But no person of consequence had so much as intimated that the time was ripe for an acknowledg- ment of the independence of these States. Indeed, all the States but Buenos Ayres had been extin- guished within the past year by the triumphant armies of the restored Ferdinand. Before the end of the session the South American question had been ' J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, V., 176. 118 South- American Independence again reviewed, and the customary expressions of friendship had been once more evoked. On 14th January, 181Y, Forsyth, from the House Committee on Foreign Eelations, reported a bill ^ which came to be " called, and properly called, a bill for making peace between His Catholic Majesty and the town of Baltimore." ^ It was a revision of the neutrality act, that had been suggested by the President in a special message of 26th December.' The debate on this new neutrality act extended over the rest of the session, and did not end until the third of March. Much opposition was shovsTi to strength- ening the legislation in the interests of Spain; an act which was felt to be hostile to the rebellious colonies. Some were almost ready for a positive intervention on the side of these. Henry Clay thought the exist- ing acts went far enough, agreed that a professed neutrality must be maintained, but admitted a strong hope for the independence of the colonies. Even he was not insistent upon an immediate recognition. When the next Congress met, recognition had been made a question. ^During the winter and spring of 1817 the news 1 Annals, 14 C. 2, 477. By John Bandolph, January 24, 1817, Annals, 14 C. 2, 732. 3 Richardson, I., 582 ; Animls, 14 C. 2, 39. Policy of the United States 119 from South America indicated that affairs had taten a more hopeful appearance for the patriots. A new order seemed to have been born to Buenos Ayres, where a Congress of the provinces had come together at Tucuman, and issued, on 9th July, 1816, a decla- ration of independence in the name of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata.^ Its manifesto remind- ed the nations of the world that Buenos Ayres had maintained an uncontested independence for six years. The patriot armies too had begun to retrieve their losses. San Martin, in his province of Men- doza, had nearly completed the period of recruit- ing, and before the spring was far advanced the news reached Washington that he had broken camp, made a marvelous march across the Andes and defeated the Spanish army at Chacabuco. With more results to feed upon, popular and govern- mental interests in South America took a new life. The President determined to learn the truth about the revolution, to be ready for any event. In the House of Commons, Henry Brougham interrogated the ministrv on the subject.^ In his efforts to find a suitable agent for this mis- sion. President Monroe turned once more to Joel R. ^Annals, 15 C. 1, 1S77 ; Annual Register, 1816, [159]. « Slarch 19, ISir, Hansard, Pari. Dehatet, XXXV., 1194. 120 South-American Independence Poinsett. On April 25th, 1817, he wrote him a per- sonal note, asking him to make the trip to Buenos Ayres in a public ship, and offering him " liberal com- pensation." " The progress of the revolution in the Spanish Provinces," he wrote, " which has always been interesting to the U. States, is made much more so, by many causes, and particularly by a well- founded hope, that it will succeed." ^ But Poinsett had entered the Legislature of South Carolina and declined the appointment.^ Forced to give up this plan, the President settled upon a Commission, in- vited Osesar A. Rodney, of Delaware, and John Gra- ham to serve upon it, and departed from the capital for his tour through 'New England and the West,' leaving Eichard Rush as Secretary of State to carry out his designs. Through the months of July and August Hush labored zealously to carry out the wish of his superior, but without avail. One commis- sioner resigned. Rodney was detained at home by the illness of a son. And the secretary did not dare to send a single commissoner. As the President was out of communication with Washington for several weeks, the matter had to drop until his return in Sep- I Monroe to Poinsett, April 25, 1817, State Dept. MSS. ; the original is in Pa. Hist. Soe., Poinsett Papers, II. 2 Poinsett Papers, II. s McMaster, IV. , 377-380. Policy of the United States 121 tember. Then the business was resumed, with the result that on 4th December the frigate Congress sailed from Hampton Roads/ carrying Csesar A. Rodney, John Graham and Theodorick Bland as com- missioners, and H. M. Brackenridge as secretary." At the same time John B. Prevost was sent to Chile and Peru on a similar mission, with the additional charge to take possession of the Oregon country.' There is considerable justice in the statement that '- several " of the men chosen were known to be fanatics in the " cause of emancipation " ; * Bracken- ridge, in particular, was a " mere enthusiast " ; Judge Bland started out as one.° In the instructions to the commissioners, Richard Rush stated the policy of the United States: " The contest between Spain and the Spanish colonies in the southern parts of this continent has been, from its commencement, highly interesting, under many views, to the United States. As inhabitants of the same hemisphere, it was natural that we should feel 1 Bland's Report in Annals, 15 C. 1, 2106. ^H. M. Brackenridge: Voyage to Sout/i America, Performed by Order of the American Government. . 2 Vols., Bait., 1819. 'Rudx to Prevost, July 18, 1817 ; J. Q. Adams to Prevost, Septem- ber 29, 1817 ; State Dept. JISS. *W. F. Reddaway, Monroe Doctrine, 25. 5 J. Q. Adams, Menunrs, IV., 156-388. 122 South- American Independence a solicitude for the weKare of the colonists. It was , nevertheless our duty to maintain the neutral char- acter with impartiality and allow of no privileges of any kind to one party, which were not extended to the other. The govemmept of Spain viewing the colo- nies as in a state of rebellion, has endeavored to im- pose upon foreign powers in their intercourse with them, the conditions applicable to such a state. This pretension has not been acceded to by this govern- ment, which has considered the contest in the light of a civil war, in which the parties were equal. An entire conviction exists that the view taken on this point has been correct, and that the United States have fully satisfied every just claim of Spain. " In other respects we have been made to feel the progress of this contest. Our vessels have been seized and condemned, our citizens made captives and our lawful commerce, even at a distance from the theatre of the war, been interrupted. Acting with im- partiality towards the parties, we have endeavoured to secure from each a just return. In whatever quar- ter the authority of Spain was abrogated and an in- dependent government erected, it was essential to the security of our rights that we should enjoy its friend- ship. Spain could not impose conditions upon 1 other powers incident to complete sovereignty in Policy of the United States 123 places where she did not maintain it. On this prin- ciple the United States have sent agents into the Spanish colonies; addressed to the existing authority, whether of Spaia or of the colony, with instructions to cultivate its friendship and secure as far as prac- ticable the faithful observance of our rights. " The contest by the extension of the revolution- ary movement, and the greater stability which it appears to have acquired, becomes daily of more im- portance to the United States. It is by success that the colonies acquire new claims on other powers which it may comport neither with their interest nor duty to disregard. Several of the colonies having declared their independence and enjoyed it for some years, and the authority of Spain being shaken in others, it seems probable that, if the parties be left to themselves, the most permanent political changes wiU be effected. It therefore seems incumbent on the United States to watch the movement in its sub- sequent steps with particular attention, with a view to pursue such coui-se as a just regard for all those considerations which they are bound to respect may dictate. " Under these impressions, the President deems it a duty to obtain, in a manner more comprehen- sive than has heretofore been done, correct informa- 124 Soufh- American Independence tion of the actual state of affairs in those colo- nies. . . ." ^ By the time the commissioners bearing these in- structions sailed, in December, 1817, the whola question of recognition had assumed a new shape. It had become the subject of a factious opposition waged by Henry Clay. When Monroe became Presi- dent, the Speaker had set his heart on the position of Secretary of State, which had come to be that of heir-apparent. " In the government of the United States," said Simon Bolivar, in one of his addresses, " it has latterly been the practice to nominate the prime minister as successor to the president. !N^oth- ing can be more suitable to a republie than this method." ^ With his eye fixed upon the presidency, Clay was prepared to be disgusted and thrown into the opposition when Monroe looked over his head and recalled Adams from the Court of St. James to take the post.' He declined the portfolio of war, as he had declined it in the previous year, when Madison 1 Rush to Rodney and Graham, Jvdy 18, 1817, State Dept. MiSS. The commission sailed in December with these instructions. J. Q. Adams was then Secretary of State. ^ Address to the Congress of Bolivia, May 25, 1826, British and Foreign State Papers, XII., 865-893 ; Miller, II., 409. sSchurz; Menry Clay, I., 126, 141; McMaster, IV., 376; J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., 63. Policy of the United States 125 had offered it. The British mission was, lq his mind, no adequate substitute, and he returned to Congress eager for a subject upon which to fight. The ques- tion of the recognition of the Latin-American States that were waging such a stubborn war of liberation was an admirable theme for a romantic orator. As the friend of liberty he might force the hand of the administration, or perhaps overturn the succession at the end of Monroe's term. At any rate, he might force his enemies to appear the friends of Spain and the upholders of a heartless tyranny.^ The mutter- ings of the coming storm were heard during the recess of Congress. During the summer of 1817 news from South America occupied a prominent place in the news- papers. The progress of San Martin, in Chile, and the doings of Bolivar and his Congress of Angostura, were described in detail that grew more elaborate as the weeks advanced. In September the topic of im- mediate recognition was broached in the Richmond Enquirer. In a series of seven letters, which were iSohurz (I., 146, etseg.) thinks Clay's advocacy was due to sym- pathy and was not inspired by the desire to oppose the administration. He shows that Clay had expressed sympathy as early as 1816. There is a distinction, however, between active sympathy and a demand for immediate recognition. There is no doubt that in the former Clay was sincere. 126 South-American Independence immediately re-printed in tke National Intelligencer, " Lautaro " addressed the Hon. Henry Olay/ He traversed tlie whole subject and policy of the war of independence, concluding with a recommendation of recognition of Chile and Peru, as the most difficult of access to Spain of all her former provinces. Other writers elaborated and controverted various points of his argument. It is suspected that Mr. Adams him- self, over the name of " Phocion," entered the con- troversy in behalf of conservatism. Six weeks before the opening of Congress the editor of the Intelli- gencer announced that if the President should neglect to treat the matter adequately in his message, he was warranted in saying that it would be broached in the House of Kepresentatives, where it would form a good theme for the display of oratorical abilities.^ Monroe saw the storm coming and questioned his cabinet on the subject. An immediate recognition would remove this fertile topic from the reach of Clay. But Mr. Adams, though realizing the essen- tial rivalry between himself and the Speaker, did not hesitate to avow " my opinion that it is not now expe- dient for the President to acknowledge the Govem- ' NaMonal Intelligencer, September 30, 1817, to October 18, 1817. ' NaMonal Intelligencer, October 21, 1817. Policy of the United States 127 ment of Buenos Ayres." ^ He continued the prepa- rations begun by Mr. Rusk for sending the commis- sioners to South America, determined not to act without real knowledge of the subject. On 3d December, 1817, the day before the " Con- gress " sailed, Henry Clay rose in the House and offered an amendment instructing the Committee on the Message to inquire what was necessary to secure to the South Americans their rights as belHgerents.'' The motion was accepted without opposition. The period of factious advocacy had begun. The Secretary of State was by no means blind to the nature of the opposition. Before the first week of the session ended he wrote that Mr. Clay " had already mounted his South American great horse . . . [in his effort] to control or overthrow the Executive by swaying the House of Representa- tives," ^ and as the subsequent weeks passed he began to fear that his opponent might succeed.* Clay did not force the fighting rapidly. One of his allies called for the papers relating to the independ- ence and condition of South America on December 5th.° Three days later he himself directed the de- 1 J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., 15. ^ Annals, 15 C. 1, 401. * J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., 28. *7St"(i, IV., 61. Mnna/s, 15 C. 1, 406. 128 South- American Independence bate on AmeKa Island and Galveston to a discussion of the hostility of the administration towards the revolting provinces.^ A little later he opposed in vain an amendment to the neutrality act. At the same time, stirred up by the attitude of the opposition, if not directly inspired by its members, the South American agents in Washington, began their impor- tunities for immediate recognition.^ None of them had presented credentials justifying demands of a diplomatic nature, but now one at least offered to conclude a treaty, without instructions.^ On 25th March, 1818, the President sent to Congress a mass of correspondence on South America, together with a critical report by Adams on the demands of the agents. ■* The day before, Clay had come out with the beginning of his great speech. With the general appropriation bill under consideration, he had moved an item of eighteen thousand dollars to provide for a minister to the Provinces of Rio de la Plata." Candid members of Congress, as their recorded votes show, realized that there was no pressing need for haste in recognizing countries that had not even ^ Annals, 15 C.l, 4m. ^Aguirre to Adams, December 16, 1817; Annals, 15 C. 1, 1890. * Aguirre to Adams, January 6, 1818 ; Annals, 15 C. 1, 1897. 'Richardson, II., 32; A. 8. P., IV., 173-183. 5 J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., 67 ; Annals, 15 C. 1, 1469. Policy of the United States 129 sent m i nisters to demand it.^ Mr. Clay's devoted biographer finds in this " daring philanthropy " of his subject, better described as rancorous benevo- lence by Mr. Adams, " a law of instructions and authority for the president to act upon. It was a step — a large step in advance, not only of the coun- try and of the government, but of the whole civilized world." ^ Clay himself later discovered that it was a " course exclusively American," opposed to the course desired by the President, who contemplated a simultaneous recog-nition with European powers.' The speech was able, and seems to have been appre- ciated by the countries in whose behalf it was made. " We have learned from a gentleman who has trav- eled in South America, that the noble speeches, pro- nounced by Mr. Clay in support of his motion for the recognition of Colombian Independence, were printed and suspended in the Legislative Halls and Council Chambers of that country, and that his name was mentioned only to be blessed by the people whose cause he had so ably and so eloquently espoused.'^"^ For several hours on 25th March, 1818, Clay 1 Cf. Peck, Jacksonian Epoch, 76. ^Colton: lAfe and Times of Henry Clay, I., 216. ^Ibid., I., 225, Speech of Clay at Lexington, June 7, 1820. *Littell, The Clay Minstrel, or National Songster, 43. 130 South- American Independence urged upon the House the claims of South America.^ He was as consistent as his position at the head of a factious opposition would permit. He disclaimed a desire for war with Spain, or for a departure from the customary course of neutrality, maintaining that a mere recognition was no cause for hostilities. Yet in the same breath he urged that Spain be pressed vigorously for redress for the wrongs she had done to the United States, and that pressure be brought not by the sei2nire of the Floridas, but by a recogni- tion of her provinces. With the manifesto of the Congress of Tucuman in his hand, he drew an eloquent picture of an op- pressed people, revolting not against " a mere t heo ry of tyranny," as the North American colonies did, but against an actual tyranny of centuries, horrible, bloody and destructive. Playing on the sympathies of the House with one hand, with the other he played upon its greed, as he showed the extent of South American commerce, the value of its exports, and the deep and abiding interest of the United States therein. At the- same time he calmed the^ears of the timorous by showing that Spain was in no condition to enter into a war — ^for which he had already said she would have no just cause; that the allies had lost ' Annals, 15 C. 1, 1474-1500. Policy of the United States 131 their principle of cohesion since Waterloo ; that Eng- land, the only dangerous power of Europe, had a commercial interest in independence even greater than our own. As to recognition, he showed that the United States had already established a policy of acknowl- edging the de facto government without regard to its legitimacy. The recognition of the revolutionary governments of France, one after another, proved this conclusively. The refusal to recognize either government in Spain from 1808 to 1815 confirmed his contention. And so, he maintained, our duty to ourselves bound us to recognize the independence of la Plata, which possessed an organized government and an unmolested independence of eight years' duration. In conclusion he urged the co-ordinate right of Congress in recognition, holding it proper for either Congress or President to take the initial step. The debate on Clay's amendment continued for four days, revealing a general sympathy for the pa- triots that brought members from sick bed to speak in their behalf. The heart of the House was gener- ous, but its head leaned strongly to expediency and propriety in spite of Clay's admonition that the 182 South- American Independence former was the better guide. Even Forsyth,^ chair- man of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and de- fender of the administration, expressed a strong, hopeful interest in the colonies, opposing the amend- ment on the grounds of its impropriety, — ^for he denied the fact of independence — ^its influence on other foreign relations, and the insincerity of its origin. " Notice had been given from this city, and was now ringing through the western coimtry, that questions were to be brought in view, by whose de- cision the people would be able to discriminate be- tween those who were just and unjust to the patri- otic cause — ^between the friends and the enemies of freedom." On the 28th of March the motion was Jpst by the decisive vote of 115 to 45.^ The first session of the fifteenth Congress closed with the issue of South American recognition well before the public, and with Henry Clay pledged as its advocate. When the Congress met for its second session, the commissioners, sent ia December, 1817, had returned, and their reports were transmitted by the President. Unfortunately, no two of the com- missioners could agree iu interpreting what they saw. Bland soon had lost confidence in the patriots; then Eodney, under the influence of their secretary, 1 Annals, 15 C. 1, 1500-1522. ^ Annals, 15 C. 1, 1646. Policy of the United States 133 Brackenridge, perhaps, wrote an enthusiastic re- port, which Graham was unwilling to sign.^ Accord- ingly three reports by the commissioners were sent to Congress by the President in !N"ovember and De- cember, 1818, together with a fourth by Joel R Poinsett.^ No new facts of importance were given out in the reports of the commissioners. Traveling in a public ship and in an official capacity, the agents had caused some little flutter in South America. At Rio de Janeiro the Spanish minister had hastened to an- nounce that his master had petitioned the European allies to mediate between him and his rebellious sub- jects, and that Great Britain had responded favor- ably.^ At Buenos Ayres and Montevideo they had been received with every courtesy and honor that they would accept. On this their reports agree. But the very character of their mission made it difficult to go below the surface in the politics of South America. They were forced to accept such facts as were brought officially to their notice. Their gener- ' J. Q. Adams, Memo-irs, XV., 156, 158. * Message of November 17, 1818, and reports of Rodney and Graham, A. S. P., IV., 217-348 ; Message of December 15, 1818, and reports of Bland and Poinsett ; Annals, 15 C. 1, 2104-2316. 'Adams to Gallatin, May 19, 1818, State Bept. MSS. 134 South- American Independence alizations upon these facts varied with their preju- dices. The reports told the same story that had run in the journals for eight years. It was the story of political instability. Buenos Ayres, since the erec- tion of her junta, in 1809, had enjoyed independence of Spain, but nothing more. At no time had she pos- isessed a central government whose authority was rec- ognized throughout all the provinces of the old vice- royalty. Several times she had experienced revolu- tions. All the time she had been in danger, on her northern frontier, of attacks by the Spanish forces in upper Peru. On the east, Paraguay refused reso- lutely to deal with Buenos Ayres; while the Banda Oriental stood in continued revolt against her author- ity, under the lead of the partisan general, Artigas, and encouraged by Brazil, who claimed the province. With this condition before him, Monroe was non- committal in his message.^ He could see no prospect of a " speedy termination " of the war. He described briefly the condition of the rebellious governments. He expressed with satisfaction the conviction that the allies at Aix-la-Chapelle would confine them- selves " to the expression of their sentiments, ab- staining from the application of force." Inferen- Riohardson, II., 43, 44; J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., 166. Policy of the United States 135 tialljjthe message declared to Congress and the world " the determination of the United States to stand neutral in the great contest between Spain and her colonies till success shall decide it." ^ Henry Clay failed to return to the attack ia this session, although it would have been well for his future had he done so. Eecognition and liberation were essentially popular topics. In a way they were a manifestation of the feeling towards Spain that showed itself in popular approval of Greneral Jack- son's career ia Florida. Instead of choosing a sub- ject for opposition in which the people could be with him, Clay felt bound to attack the conduct of the " military hero." For several weeks of the session, which was the short one, he kept up the fight, to the exclusion of the safer question of recognition. To- wards the end of the session Monroe sent to Con- gress another collection of documents, bearing this time on his refusal to grant exequaturs to consuls from South America." Thereupon Clay arose and apologized for not speaking at length in favor of a recognition, pleaded illness and pressure of business as an excuse, declared that his conviction as to its pro- ^ Annual Register, 1819, P. 233. ^Annals, 15 C. 2, 911, 1606; A. S. P., FV., 412; J. Q.Adams, Memoirs, IV., 223. 136 South- American Independence priety was unskaken, and promised to return to the subject wken Congress should meet again.^ The administration was more than content not to have recognition pressed at this time. Relations with Spain were in a delicate condition; a treaty was in process of negotiotion. Determined to support the acts of Jackson and to acquire Florida, it was well not to aggravate Spain needlessly on the score of her col- onies. The treaty was signed 22d February, 1819. A revival of the recognition question in the following session well-nigh prevented its ratification by the King of Spain, and certainly postponed it. The Sixteenth Congress met to receive a message that marked an advance towards recognition.^ Mon- roe was moving as rapidly as events would allow and Adams would countenance. The latter had little confidence m the South Americans, was unwUling to allow a sentimental sympathy to compromise the gov- ernment, and argued out of the message an invitation to France and Great Britain to act with the United States in a joint recognition.' France and Russia were both exerting pressure to prevent the act. Ac- cordingly the message confined itself to a strong ex- pression of sympathy. 1 February 10, 1819, Annals, 15 C. 2, 1148. ^Richardson, II., 68, 59. ^ j. q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., 461. Policy of the United States 137 Clay remembered his promise of tlie last wiater and renewed his attempt to hasten the steps of the administration. During the winter of 1819-1820 the relations with Spain, already confused, became more complicated by the revolution in the peninsula and the acceptance of a new constitution by Ferdinand. The treaty had not yet been ratified. The Spanish minister had been instructed to get a pledge from Monroe that he would not recognize the colonies as a preliminary to ratifica- tion. On 9th May, 1820, the President stated the situ- ation to Congress in a temperate message.^ He trans- mitted at this time correspondence with the envoy of his Catholic Majesty over the treaty of 22d Febru- ary, 1819. He commented upon the complaints of the latter respecting the hostility of the citizens and the unfriendly policy of the government of the United States towards the subjects and dominions of Spain, maintaining that both were " utterly destitute of foundation. ... In regard to the stipulation pro- posed as the condition of the ratification of the treaty, that the United States shall abandon the right to recognize the revolutionary colonies in South America, or to form other relations with them when in their judgment it may be just and expedient so to iRichardson, 11., 70. 138 South- American Independence do, it is manifestly so repugnant to tke honor and even to the independence of the United States, that it has been impossible to discuss it." But, consider- ing the domestic troubles of Spain, he asked Con- gress, " Is this the time to make the pressure ? If the United States were governed by views of ambi- tion and aggrandizement, many strong reasons might be given in its favor; but they have no objects of that -kind to accomplish, none which are not founded in justice and which can be injured by forbearance." In conclusion, he urged Congress not to decide the ques- tion until the next session. On the 4th of April Clay had moved that it was expedient to provide outfit and salary for such min- isters to South America as the President might deem it expedient to send.^ On the 10th of May, the day after the reception of the message, he brought up his motion in the House. Clay disliked the Spanish treaty. He was unwilling to compensate Spain for the Floridas, which we must at any rate ultimately obtain. He was strongly opposed to a southwestern boundary that left Texas outside the United States. Now he seized the opportunity at once to frighten Spain into a definite refusal to ratify the obnoxious treaty, and to attack the policy of the administra- ^Arnnals, IS C.l,nSl. Policy of the United States 139 tion.* The speech, ^ contained little that was new. It was a defiance of Spain. Forgetting his maxim that recognition was no violation of neutrality, Clay re- gretted that the United States had not recognized the provinces two years before, when they really needed assistance. He urged the creation of an American system, with the United States at its center, in de- fiance of the despotisms of the Old World. And he deprecated the deference of the administration to the wishes of a Castlereagh and a IsTesselrode. To his surprise, perhaps, and certainly to the surprise of the President, his motion passed the House. ^ The next day Mr. Adams had the satisfaction of telling the French minister, de Neuville, that if Spain was vexed she had only herself to thank; that the administration contemplated no change of policy.* At the next session, second and last of the six- teenth Congress, Clay brought this motion up once more. The message of Monroe, as it referred to South America, had been short, friendly and, as usual, non-committal.^ This was Clay's last oppor- tunity, for he had declined a re-election that he might resume the practice of law and restore his private af- 1 J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, V., 108. ^ AmmU, 16 C. 1, 2223-2229. SThe vote was 80 to 75. AimaU, 16 C. 1, 2229; J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, V., 108. * J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, V., 111. SRichardson, II., 77. 140 / South-American Independence '^feirs to some sort of order. On 3d February, 1821, he moved once more the resolution that had passed in the preceding May, and asked that it be referred to the Committee of the Whole. ^ Here, three days later, he called it up to speak in its defence, a speech that has not been preserved. His colleague, Robert- son, replied.^ Kobertson discountenanced this method of forcing the hand of the President. He objected to the use of an abstract resolution of the House as an expres- sion of an overwhelming popular sentiment. Foreign affairs were the business of the executive, and in his conduct of these he should not be embarrassed. " I voted vnth my colleague last Winter, . . ." he de- clared,^ " because I was aiding him in that which was to him a splendid triumph, and one which was achieved without sacrifice of principle. I knew that he would soon leave us, (which I regret), and I was anxious that he should retire with honor and ap- plause; and, in regard to that retirement, (which I hope will be only temporary), I thought it but due to his distinguished services that his country should say to himj as Jove did to Hector, — " • Yet live, I give thee one illustrious day, One blaze of glory, ere thou fad'st away.' '^Annals,ieC.2,W29. ^Aimals,16C.2,10^. ^Aimals,16C.2,1053. Policy of the United States 141 " Sir, the vote of last Winter, by giving success to his exertions for the Patriots, did crown him with laurels. I would not wither them, or pluck one leaf from the bright wreath. I wish they may flourish and be forever green. But I cannot water them with the vote I am about to give. I hoped that the sub- ject was buried last Winter, and that it should not be resuscitated. To carry the motion can confer no additional honor on the mover; to lost it, may dimin- ish the glory of the triumph he has won. If he would be content with an abstract expression of our feelings towards the Patriots, although it is unnecessary and superfluous, (having done this before), I would vote for it, because it will speak only what I feel in com- mon with my constituents, and wiU not be liable to the principal objections which I have to the proposi- tion which he has made. And why would not such a resolution satisfy all his wishes ? Why annoy the Ex- ecutive, session after session, with our opinion and advice, when we know that he does not desire them, and will not conform to them? And why do this, too, when every legitimate and desirable object has been already achieved, and can be again effected if desired, as far as the Patriots are to be beneflted, in the manner which I have just suggested? " This motion failed in the Conmiittee of the Whole; 142 South- American Independence it was lost again when brought up in the House on February 9th.^ But Clay saw that its rejection was due to form rather than substance, and on the 10th offered a new resolution to the effect that the House joined with the people of the United States in their sympathy with the South Americans; that it was ready to support the President whenever he should think it expedient to recognize their governments.^ The question was divided on the insistence of one of the members, and the first part was carried by the overwhelming majority of 134 to 12. The second followed with 86 to 68. In the words of his eulogist, Mr. Clay " had fought and won, before the country, before the world — a pity to say, against his own gov- ernment — one of the most brilliant battles for hu- manity, and for the rights of man, which history re- cords." ^ It was a fitting end to his period of factious opposition when " the triumph of Mr. Clay was sig- nalized in the house of representatives by adopting the unusual course of appointing a special committee to wait on the president with a copy of the resolution, as a mode of advising him as [sic] a result of their action in the case. The usual mode was to transmit 1 Vote in the Committee, 86 to 79, Annals, 16 C. 2, 1055 ; Vote in the Houee, Annals, 16 C. 2, 1071. ^Annals, 16 C. 2, lOSl. ' Colton : lAfe and Times of Henry Clay, I., 239. Policy of the United States 143 a certified copy of the journals by the hand of an offi- cer of the house. But on this occasion, in considera- tion of the importance of the transaction in the cause of freedom, of the notoriety which the debates on the subject had attained, of the growing interest of the public mind, which had been raised to an excitement, and, inasmuch as the whole transaction was avowedly designed for moral effect — ^it could have been no other — ^Mr. Clay thought proper to move for this Committee, which was promptly granted, and himself, as a mover, was of course placed at the head of it." For years he had been in a sort of " quasi opposi- tion," which " the president did not think best open- ly to oppose." Mr. Monroe and his friends saw in the committee a studied insult, " but, of course, Mr. Clay performed his part with the greatest delicacy and courtesy toward the executive, though, after all that had passed, it could hardly have been very desir- able to that functionary." ^ With this session Clay retired into private life. His triumph had been a barren one. Save for em- phasizing his position and crowning his opposition, it stood for nothing. The executive, unmoved by the resolution, continued calmly on the course it had M>)lton : Life and Times of Menry Clay, I., 242, 243. 144 South- American Independence marked out for itself. Kecognition did not come a day earlier because of the advocacy of Henry Clay. Tke departure of the South American commission- ers in December, 1817, marked the commencement at once of Clay's factious opposition and of a more active policy on the part of the administration. The inclination of Monroe to yield before the threats of, the opposition was checked by John Quincy Adams. It was changed into a determination to learn the ac- tual condition of the republics and to ascertain the at- titude which the European powers would take to- wards recognition when it should come. For the ad- ministration, no less than Clay, sympathized with the struggle and contemplated recognition in the near future. The sympathy of Mr. Adams was tempered with misgivings. " The mention of Buenos Ayres," he wrote in one of his political letters,^ " brings to my mind an Article that I have lately seen in the Boston Patriot, and which I concluded was from your pen. Its tendency was to shew the inexpediency and injus- tice there would be in our taking side with the South Americans in their present struggle against Spain ! It was an excellent article, and I should be glad to 'J. Q. Adams to Alexander H. Everett, December 29, 1817; Adamt MSS., Letter book of John Quincy Adams, Private, No, 2. Policy of the United States 145 see tke same train of thought further pursued. As for example by a discussion, ... by what right we could take side ? and who in this state of civil war has constituted us the judges, which of the parties has the righteous cause ? then by an enquiry what the cause of the South Americans is, and whether it really be as their partizans here alledge the same as our own cause in the War of our Revolu- tion? Whether for instance if Buenos Ayres has formally offered to accept, the Infant Don Carlos as the absolute Monarch upon condition of being politi- cally Independent of Spain, their cause is the same as ours was ? Whether if Bolivar, being at the head of the Republic of Venezuela, has solemnly proclaimed the absolute and total emancipation of the Slaves, the cause of Venezuela is precisely the same as ours was ? Whether in short there is any other feature of iden- tity between their cause and ours, than that they are as we were Colonies fighting for Independence. In our Revolution there were two distinct Stages. In the first of which we contended for our Civil Bights and in the second for our Political Independence. The second, as we solemnly declared to the World was imposed upon us as a means of necessity after every practicable effort had been made in vain to se- cure the first. 146 South- American Independence " In South America, Civil Rights if not entirely out of the question appear to have been equally dis- regarded and trampled upon by all parties. Buenos Ayres has no constitution; and its present ruling powers are establishing only by the entire banishment of their predecessors. Venezuela though it has emancipated all its slaves has been constantly alter- nating between an absolute Military Government, a Capitulation to Spanish Authority, and Guerillas, Black and White of which every petty chief has act- ed for purposes of War and Rapine as an Independ- ent Sovereign. There is finally in South America neither unity of cause nor unity of effort as there was in our Revolution. " ITeither was our revolution disgraced by that buccaneering and piratical Spirit which has lately ap- peared among the South Americans not of their own growth, but I am sorry to say chiefly from the con- tamination of their intercourse with us. Their Pri- vateers have been for the most part fitted out and offi- cered in our Ports and manned from the Sweepings of our Streets. . . . [yet] such is the propensity of our people to sympathize with the South Ameri- cans, that no feeble exertion is now making to rouse a party in this Country against the Government of the Union, and against the President for having is- Policy of the United States 147 sued orders to put down this host of free-booters at our doors." The attitude of the Powers toward South America seemed likely to undergo a change during 1818. Mr. Adams watched it with a jealous interest. The earli- est despatches of the commissioners told how at Rio de Janeiro " the Spanish Minister, Count Casa- Flores, appears to have been so much alarmed by the suspicion that the object of the mission was the formal acknowledgment of the government of la Plata, that he thought it his duty to make to Mr. Sumter an official communication that he had re- ceived an official despatch from the Duke of San Carlos, the Spanish Ambassador at London, dated the 7th of November last, informing him, that the British Government had acceeded to the proposition made iy the Spanish Oovernment of a general mediation of the powers to obtain the pacification of South Amer- ica, the negotiation of which, it was on the point of being decided, whether it should be at London or Madrid." ^ On the receipt of this news, the Secretary of State wrote to the American minister in Paris, Albert Gal- latin, complaining of the reserve with which the Eu- ropean powers treated the United States. He regret- 1 Adams to Gallatin, May 19, 1818, State Dept. MSS. 148 South-American Independence ted at length that they had seen fit to conceal this pro- posed mediation. If its object " be any other than to promote the total independence political and com- mercial of South America, we are neither desirous of being invited to take a part in it, nor disposed to ac- cept the invitation if given. Our policy in the con- test between Spain and her colonies has been impar- tial neutrality. Is the proposed general mediation to be a departure from that line of neutrality ? K it is, which side of the contest are the allies to take ? the side of Spain ? on what principle and by what right ? As contesting parties in a civil war, the South- Ameri- cans have rights, which the other powers are bound to respect as much as the rights of Spain; and after having by an avowed neutrality, admitted the exist- ence of those rights, upon what principle of justice can the allies consider them as forfeited, or them- selves as justifiable in taJdng sides with Spain against them? " There is no discernible motive of justice or of ia- terest which can induce the allied sovereigns to in- terpose for the restoration of the Spanish colonial do- minion in South America. There is none even of poKcy; for if all the organized power of Europe is combined to maintain the authority of each Sovereign over his own people, it is hardly supposed that the Policy of the United States 149 sober senses of the allied cabinets will permit them to extend the application of this principle of union to the maintenance of colonial dominion beyond the At- lantic and the Equator. " By the usual principles of international law, the state of neutrality, recognizes the cause of both par- ties to the contest, as jii,st — ^that is, it avoids all consid- eration of the merits of the contest. But when aban- doning that neutrality, a nation takes one side, in a war of other parties, the first question to be settled is the justice of the cause to be assumed. If the Euro- pean allies are to take side with Spain, to reduce the South American colonies to submission, we trust they will make some previous enquiry into the justice of the cause they are to undertake. As neutrals we are not required to decide the question of justice. We are sure we should not find it on the side of Spain." These general principles Mr. Gallatin was in- structed to communicate informally to the French minister. He was to assure him " That it is our earn- est desire to pursue a Kne of policy, at once just to both parties in that contest, and harmonious with that of the European allies. That we must know their system, in order to shape our own measures accordingly; but that we do not want to join them in any plan of interference to restore any part of the 150 South- American Independence Spanish supremacy, in any of the South American' Provinces." ^ In the same frame of mind, and in some of the same paragraphs, Adams wrote to Richard Bush in London the following day." He conjectured wisely, in conclusion, that the British Cabinet " will soon dis- cover the great interest of Great Britain in the total Independence of South America, and will promote that event just so far as their obligations towards Spain will permit. The time is probably not far re- mote, when the acknowledgment of the South Ameri- can Independence will be an act of friendship towards Spain herseK — ^when it will be kindness to her to put an end to that seK-delusion under which she is wast- ing all the remnant of her resources, in a war, in- famous by the atrocities with which it is carried ou, and utterly hopeless of success. It may be an inter- esting object of your attention to watch the moment when this idea will become prevalent in the British Councils, and to encourage any disposition which may consequently be manifested to a more perfect concert ' of measures between the United States and Great Britain towards that end; the total Independence of the Spanish South American Provinces." . . . » Adams to Gallatin, May 19, 1818, State Dept. MSS. 2 Adams to Rush, May 20, 1818, State Dept. MSS. Policy of the United States 151 Thus in the spring of 1818 the policy of the United States was outlined in the instructions to Rush and Gallatin, and later to George W. Campbell at St. Petersburg/ It was unmistakably the policy of John Quincy Adams. It was a policy distinctly friendly to South America, Mr. Clay to the contrary, notwith- standing. It watched with considerable apprehensionj the gathering of the sovereigns at Aix-la-Chapelle; but had a well-founded suspicion that the interests of these same sovereigns would confine their activities to their own side of the Atlantic. It took such shape that the Russian minister, in the autumn, could ex- press satisfaction " to see a navy growing up on the other side of the Atlantic, that might one day act as a hallance, as he expressed himself, to that on this side." ^ From broad principles of policy Mr. Adams now had to turn his attention to the doings of agents, North and South American. The embarrassments caused to the administration by Henry Clay hardly exceeded those for which the agents of the patriots in the United States, or of the United States in the southern republics, were respon- sible. These of the agents were not confined to ses- J June 28, 1818, State Dept. MSS. *G. W. Camtibell, St. Petersburg, to Adams, October 7, 1818, State J)ept. MSS. 152 South- American Independence sions of Congress, like the former, but were peren- nial. Don Manuel Hermenegildo de Aguirre had ar- rived from Buenos Ayres in 1817, bearing a commis- sion from the Supreme Director, Pueyrredon, accred- iting him as " Agent of this Government near that of the United States of !N"orth America," and asking for him " all the protection and consideration required by his diplomatic rank and the actual state of our re- lations." ^ Once in the United States, he engaged in the patriotic work of equipping privateers. In odd moments he addressed the Secretary of State,^ to demand recognition and countenance, to complain of the injustice done his country by the neutrality acts, to explain the workings and describe the situation of his government, to emphasize the moderation of his demands, and to threaten the United States with severance of commercial relations.y Mr. Adams was not a timid man to be frightened into recognition, nor was he a weak man to be driven into hostility to the patriots by their lack of consideration. He contin- ued unmoved, though with some irritation, his friend- ly, conservative course. In the summer of 1818 he was forced to refuse compliance with the demands of ^Annals, 15 C. 1, 1879, 1880. 2 December 16, 1817 ; December 24, 1817 ; December 26, 1817 ; Decem- ber 29, 1817 ; January 6, 1818, January 16, 1818 ; Annals, 15 C. 1, 1877-1897. Policy of the United States 153 one de Forrest to be granted an exequatur as Consul- General for Buenos Ayres in the United States.^ Here he laid down the doctrine that the granting of an exequatur is a recognition. His own agents caused - him the greatest trouble. In one of the revolts in Buenos Ayres, Devereux guaranteed a loan that saved the life of the existing government. For this he was dismissed in 1817 ^ by the predecessor of Mr. Adams. His successors, Worthington and Halsey, did little better. The former, " swelling upon his agency " until he broke out " into a seK-accredited Plenipotentiary," negotiated a commercial treaty on his own responsibility.^ The latter entered into pri- vateering schemes and sent blank commissions to the United States. He was summarily removed.* On the whole, the position of the Secretary of State was not a happy one. He was the great restraining influence ; ', politicians were shouting for recognition; agents of* all sorts were embarrassing the government, and his own coReagues in the cabinet were discussing the ex- pediency of sending a naval force into southern wa- ters to encourage the insurgent states.^ 1 J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., SS. >Eush to Halsey, April 21, 1817, StMe Dept. 3ISS. s J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., 70, 88, 158. * Adams to Halsey, January 22, 1818, State Dept. MSS. 5 Slay 13, 1818, J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., 91. 154 South- American Independence President Monroe was ready to move more rapidly in the direction of recognition than was Mr. Adams. In July, 1818, he wanted to propose to England a co- operation in behalf of the South Americans. If the jouraal of Mr. Adams, which is the only authority on the poiat, can be accepted, the President was influ- enced by the eager demands of the Bichmond En- quirer, and only the arguments of the Secretary of State restrained his benevolence.^ Evidently these arguments were effective, for the proposal was not made. In its place a circular was directed to the American ministers at London, Paris and St. Peters- burg in August, asking what part these governments " will take in the dispute between Spain and her col- onies, and in what light they will view an acknowledg- ment of the Independence of the Colonies by the United States ? Whether they will view it as an act of hostility to Spain, and in case Spain should declare war against us, in consequence, whether . . . [they] will take part with her in it ? " ^ When the responses to this circular began to come in, it was clear that Mr. Adams had not misjudged the attitude of the Powers. Erom London, Eush 1 J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., 118. 2 Adams to Eush, August 15, 1818, State Dept. MSS., to Gallatin and to Campbell, August 20, 1818. Policy of the United States 155 wrote in October that a recognition would certainly meet with popular approval in England, while the ministry, although " high-toned in its aristocracy," would not be likely " to take Spain by the hand in a war against us." ^ Trance, wrote G-aUatin,^ would view a recognition with disfavor because of the pe- culiar nature of her family ties with Spain ; but she would not fight over this cause. Russia would not fight alone, was Campbell's estimate of the situation at his court.' She might uphold the rights of Spain in concert with the allies, but without them she would not move. A little later Rush * intimated that the vigorous determination of the President to have nothing to do with any scheme for coercing the col- onies had helped to decide the Court of St. James in the matter. The Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle adjourned with- out taking action acceptable to Spain. It recom- mended a mediation through the Duke of Welhng- ton,° which England accepted on the condition that in event of his failure to reconcile the combatants there should be no resort to coercion. 1 Rush to Adams, October 12, 1818, State Dept. MSS. 2 Gallatin to Adams, November 5, 1818, State Dept. MSS. 3 Campbell to Adams, December 22, 1818, State Dept. MSS. * November 20, 1818. 5 Campbell to Adams, February 18, 1819, State Dept. MSS. 156 South-American Independence But before these responses reached Washington Congress had convened, and the President once more had been forced to decide upon a policy. By this time the discordant reports of the three South American Commissioners were at hand. With the picture of political disorder revealed by these reports before his eyes, and with his mind uncertain as to the policy of the allies, Adams could have no hesitation in counselling delay. ^ A year before Monroe had thought seriously of an immediate recognition; now he seems to have agreed with his Secretary. " From the view taken of this subject," he announced, " founded on all the information that we have been able to obtain, there is good cause to be satisfied with the course heretofore pursued by the United States in regard to this contest, and to conclude that it is proper to adhere to it, especially in the present state of affairs." " The session which began in November, 1818, the second of the fifteenth Congress, is the one in which Clay built up his opposition on Florida rather than on South America. Attacking the conduct of Jack- son with all his strength, he gave the administration opportunity to pursue its own policy unhampered. 1 J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., 166. 2 Richardson, II., 44. Policy of the United States 157 Mr. Adams was obliged, however, to develop tke domestic portion of his policy to meet the demands of the South American agents. David C. De Forest from Buenos Ayres, and Don Lino de Clemente, from Venezuela, were at this time demanding recog- nition as consuls from their respective republics. The latter was not given even a hearing, for the commis- sion of a privateer, with his signature annexed, had come to the hand of the State Department.^ The former was heard in full, but his solicitations met with no success, for Adams felt, as already stated, that granting an exequatur is tantamount to a recog- nition. De Forest did not rest easily upon his re- fusal, but protested bitterly.^ The House called for papers upon the applications, and received from the Secretary a careful report that described the sins of Clemente, the unauthorized treaty of Worthington and De Forest's petition based upon it, and the weak- ness of the latter's argument that granting an exe- quatur is not a recognition.^ Although not yet ready for a recognition at the end of 1818, Monroe felt that the time for it was ^Annals, 15 C. 2, 1612; Adams to Clemente, December 16, 1818. ' De Forest to Adams, January 8, 1819, State Dept. MSS. 3^n«fflZs, 15C. 2, 544; J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., 223; Annals, 15 C. 2, 1606. 158 South- American Independence rapidly approaching. As December passed away the prospect of European intervention in behalf of Spain grew less and less. At the beginning of January, 1819, the Secretary of State was ordered to draft a new instruction to the minister in London. The doc- ument bears date the 1st of January. It was not despatched until the month was several days ad- vanced.^ The policy of the United States towards the rebel- lious provinces of Spain, wrote Adams, in substance, has been one of rigid neutrality. We have not recog- nized them as independent, nor received their con- suls, which were an equivalent act. But we have con- sidered it an obligation of our neutrality to give the parties as equal rights as possible; so we have always listened to the representations of their agents. Thus ifar our neutrality operates agaiust Spaia, as an in- evitable consequence of the nature of the struggle. With the preponderating success of one of the parties to the civil war, this condition will cease, as it has done in Mexico and seems likely soon to do ia Buenos Ayres. Spain has solicited the mediation of the al- lies to prevent this separation, but such mediation, 1 Adams to Snsh, Janimry 1, 1819, State Dept. MSS. The copy in the Adams ifSS. is endorsed as being sent 4th January by Mr. Bagot's messenger. Policij of the United States 159 as Great Britain clearly saw, wotild be a departure on their part from the line of neutrality. We are opposed to a third-party intervention of any sort. We believe " that the contest cannot and ought not to terminate otherwise than by the total Independ- ence of South America/' but we desire to do our duty by Spain and maintain the good-will of the Powers, and so have taken no decisive step as yet. Xow that we are convinced that the power of Spain can- not be restored, we desire Europe to consider how important it is that the new States should be recognized and held to their responsibilities as independent bodies. We have it in contemplation ourselves to acknowledge the government of Buenos Ayres at no remote period unless some- thing should occur to justify a further postpone- ment of the act. It would be gratifying should Eng- land see fit to adopt similar measures at the same time and in concert with the TTnited States. '" When adopted it will be a mere acknowledgment of the fact of Independence, and without deciding upon the ex- tent of their Territory, or upon their claims to sov- ereignty, in any part of the Provinces of La Plata, where it is not established and uncontested."' The unforeseen seems to have happened on the 3d of January, 1819, when it was learned that the 160 South- American Independence success of the Florida negotiations woiild. be endan- gered by a recognition.^ For more than two years, un- til tke treaty was signed and safely ratified, recogni- tion was postponed. Agitation did not cease during these two years; factious opposition did its worst; Don Manuel Torres, a new agent from Colombia, created a long series of entries in Mr. Adamses journal. There is no absolute evidence that fear of Spain was the inspiring motive of the administration's conser- vatism. But Adams ceased to worry over the attitude of Europe during these years. He announced a policy of forbearance for the time to the Russian minister.^ There is abundant proof in the correspondence wit|i Spain that recognition was a determining cause in the delay of the latter to ratify the treaty. And it is certain that recognition did not come until the winter of 1822. The message of 1819, expurgated by the Secretary of State, until it was harmless, made some slight ad- vance toward recognition. Mr. Adams felt that the less said about South America at this time the better it would be.^ Three months later he opposed in the Cabinet a tendency to grant arms to the Colombians, denouncing the scheme as dishonorable, unneutral, 1 J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., 209. 2 J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, IV., 379. ^ Memoirs, IV., 461. Policy of the United States 161 ■unconstitutional, and an act of war. At the same time, outside the Cabinet, he resisted the efforts of an " ambidexter personage," agent of Venezuela in Washington, to get himself appointed as agent of the United States to Venezuela.^ The whole burden of I foreign policy seems to have been laid upon the broad shoulders of John Quincy Adams. To conciliate Spain and induce her to ratify a treaty forced upon him by the administration, he had to fight at once the opposition of the Speaker of the House, the preten- sions of the South Americans and the unneutral dis^ position of his own cabinet. When the President transmitted his message of 9th May, 1820, with its hard words for the demands of Spain, the first storm broke, and Clay, as has been seen, gained his first triumph. The summer of 1820 saw more agents sent to South America, charged to protest against the acts of insurgent privateers and to acquire news. Charles S. Todd went as Agent for Seamen and Commerce to Colombia. " With regard to the formal recogni- tion by the Government of the U. S. of the Kepublic of Colombia," were his instructions, " should anything be said to you, the obvious reply will be that you have not been authorized to discuss ^Memoirs, V., 45-51. 162 South- American Independence the subject. As a reason for this reserve it may be alleged that besides the actual War still waged by Spain, during which the Independence of the other party could not be acknowledged without a depart- ure from our avowed and long-established system of neutrality, the changes stiU occurring will require some lapse of time to give to the Republic that char- acter of permanency which would justify the formal acknowledgment of it by foreign powers." ^ J. B. Prevost, agent at lima, had been transferred to Buenos Ayres in 1819 on the dismissal of Halsey and Worthington; ^ but his sphere of activity covered also Chile and Peru. Uncertain as to his location, Adams commissioned John M. Forbes to Ohile or Buenos Ayres, as there should be a vacancy, in June, 1820. The instructions of Forbes are dated 5th July, 1820.' Further and more significant instructions were issued to him after the arrival of a despatch from Prevost a week later.* In these the Secretary reviewed recent upheavals in Buenos Ayres, warning Forbes, as Todd had been warned, not to discuss a recognition. Now that the old central government 1 Adams to Todd, June 5, 1820, Stcae Dept. MSS. 2 Adams to Prevost, May 3, 1819, State Dept. MSS. ^Armals, 17 C. 1, 2059 ; B. & F., IX., 370. * Adams to Forbes, July 12, 1820, State Dept. MSS. Policy of the United States 163 had been swept away, if we were " to recognize the single province of Buenos Ayres, the recognition upon reaching that city might probably find it no longer independent. " You will take occasion to remark whenever it may be proper that the Government of the United States have never intended to secure to themselves any advantage, commercial or otherwise, as an equiv- alent for acknowledging the Independence of any part of South America. They do not think it a proper subject for equivalent; and they have entire confidence that no exclusive privilege will be granted to any other nation to the prejudice of the U. S. They think themselves entitled to this, and consider it as essential to the Independence itself to be acknowledged — aware that no such privileges can be granted but by a sacrifice of the interests of the nation which grants them, they have never intended to ask them to the detriment of others, as they rely that they will not be conceded to others in detriment to them." The early despatches of Forbes show a most dis- tracted condition prevailing in Buenos Ayres in 1821. The news from Prevost, dated 30th April, 1820, was of a successful revolt against the Congress and the Supreme Director Pueyrredon. The latter, 164 South- American Independence with his faction, had been engaged in secret negotia- tions -with France and Spain, having in view the es- tablishment of a Bourbon dynasty in South America. A revolt overthrew him and started a prosecution of the leaders of his party for high treason, thus contin- uing a decade of turmoil. " Up to 1820 . . . the His- tory of these Provinces comprises little but a Series of Mihtary Operations. . . . The Successes of their Armies have been splendid and extraordinary, but a Review of their internal Government for the first ten years presents nothing but a Picture of Anarchy and Confusion." ^ This was the time when General San Martin, engaged in Chile in his large projects against Peru, disobeyed the orders of his government to return home and restore peace.^ Pueyrredon went into exile in the early part of 1820. He was succeeded in quick succession of dic- tatorships by Aguirre, known in 1^'orth America; Sarratea and Balcarce, until the affairs of the prov- inces became hopeless. As Forbes reached Rio de Janeiro on the way to his post, in September, 1820, he learned that " a kind of political Auction is to take 'Report of Woodbine Parish, June 25, 1824, Foreign Office M8S.; cf. An Account. . . of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata. . . [London, 1825] 9, 20-24. ' See above, P. 62 ; Sketch of Occurrences in Buenos Ayres, 1820, State Dept. MSS. Policy of the United States 165 place at which the rights of a distracted Country are to be struck off to the highest bidder. — ^England -will offer maritime protection and Comtmercial abundance and, notwithstanding that the most impenetrable mystery covers everything here, it is inferred from the gaiety and good hum.or of the Spanish mission that the nature of the proposals they are about to make is not without charms and hope." ^ Preceded by rumors that he bore a formal recogni- tion, Forbes was received by the local government at Buenos Ayres with distinguished honors. State coach and aide-de-camp were forced upon him; a public mansion was offered for his residence; while on the other hand, he was embarrassed by the evil rumors that he attributed to disgruntled South American agents who had returned from Washing- ton to justify their failure by attacking the United States. But Forbes could not be lured into partisan politics. He sat outside, watching the game of fac- tions, sometimes hazarding " the opinion that a per- manent and good government is very important." The government at Buenos Ayres, by the end of the year, had become a " mere military police," liv- ing a precarious existence from day to day, and await- ing the action of a Congress of the provinces assem- 1 Forbes to Adams, September 23, 1820, SKUe Dept. MSS. 166 South-American Independence bling at Cordova. It was a war between repubKcan- ism in the provinces and monarchical tendency at Buenos Ayres. The Congress gathered with true Castilian deliberation, to perform an enormous task. It " requires little short of Omnipotence," wrote Forbes, " to create order out of such utter Chaos as now exists." By the 1st of April, 1821, he was re- duced to wish for a popular general and a victorious republican army, for the country seemed " in the most utter darkness of despair and without one ray of hope." On 20th April, Good Friday, Plieyrredon landed, having returned from exile at the call of the government. In two weeks more the clouds of an- archy had broken. About 1st May, 1821, there appeared in Buenos Ayres a new journal, edited by two patriots, Bern- ardo Rivadavia and Manuel Jose Garcia, of whom the former had once been at the head of the govern- ment, while both had just returned from an extended diplomatic mission in Europe. Before the end of the month it appeared to the American agent that the party of Pueyrredon was falling into disrepute. In July the administration fell, Rivadavia came in as Minister of State^ while Garcia took the Treasury. This was the beginning of an orderly government in Buenos Ayres. Garcia at once inaugurated a policy Policy of the United States 167 " witliout exajnple in the history of the Revolution," by paying the debts of the government, and paying them in gold. Eivadavia, after some correspondence with Forbes, issued a decree recalling all privateers sailing under the flag of Buenos Ayres and revoking their commissions. At the same time glad tidings came from across the mountains. " At the moment I am writing," wrote Forbes on 2d September, " a salvo of Artillery and the most extravagant demon- strations of joy through the streets, announce the capture of lima by San Martin's besieging army. If this news be true, it puts the Seal to the Independ- ence of South America. The Spanish Eoyalty, driven from its last hope in these Provinces, and en- lightened by a Representative Government, will, I think, within six months, acknowledge their Inde- pendence." The news was true. Progress during the past months had not been conjSned to the limits of Buenos Ayres or to the leadership of Rivadavia and Garcia. We have already traced the steps of the armies of liberation. San Martin, in July, 1821, had really marched into the city of Lima, after a year's cam- paign of education in its vicinity. Bolivar had ended the truce with Morillo to defeat the royalists at Oara- bobo on 24th June. On 12th July his Congress at 168 South- American Independence Cticuta had proclaimed the permanent union of Ven- ezuela and !New Granada; while on 30th August it had proclaimed a federative constitution for the new republic. The year 1821 was marked by successes of the re- publican armies and by the erection of orderly gov- ernments in the most important of the South Amer- ican States, while on the other side of the Atlantic it seemed probable that Spain had come to her senses. The successful revolution of 1820, establishing Fer- dinand VII. as constitutional monarch, was followed by an attempt to reconcile the colonies and the mother country. It could not be foreseen that an armed intervention would overthrow the constitu- tion, while the Oortez would recall its pacific over- tures. In Mexico, on 24th August, 1821, the Spanish General O'Donoju conluded a treaty of peace on the basis of independence. Later this was disavowed; " yet his private instructions found among his pa- pers," it is said/ " clearly proved beyond a possibil- ity of doubt, that he was fully authorized to act as he did, and in the event of their Independence being declared, to make the most eligible terms he possibly 1 Mackie's Report, March 17, 1823, Foreign Office MSS. His authority- Is doubtful. Policy of the United States 169 could in favor of Old Spain. . . ." JSiorillo, too, had made a truce with his opponent, though Bolivar had terminated it before a treaty had been arranged. From Spain the news came that Mexican and Colom- bian commissioners were on hand, that they were de- manding complete independence, that the Cortez was listening to their demands and petitioning the min- istry to come to some conclusion.^ In other words, the South American provinces in 1821 had achieved their independence, and a recog- nition had become fully justifiable. The United States, relieved by the final ratification of the Span- ish treaty in February, 1821, of the necessity for si- lence, came to this conclusion as the fall and winter advanced. The seventeenth Congress met in December, 1821, Clay being out of it. With him had disappeared the ardent desire for recognition. " It has long been manifest," declared Monroe in his message, '' that it would be impossible for Spain to reduce these col- onies by force, and equally so that no conditions short of their independence would be satisfactory to them. It may therefore be presumed, and it is earnestly hoped, that the Government of Spain, guided by en- » Thomas L. L. Brent to Adams, April 10, 1821, State Dept. MSS. ; B. & F., IX., 394. 170 South-American Independence lightened and liberal councils, will find it to comport to its interests and due to its magnanimity to termin- ate this exhausting controversy on that basis. To ^ promote this result by friendly counsel with the Gov- ; emment of Spain will be the object of the Govern- ment of the United States." ^ As the weeks ran on, the despatches of Forbes con- vinced the administration that the time had come. In January Adams replied to one of the frequent de- mands of the Colombian agent that the President had the matter of recognition under consideration.^ Ten days later he wrote to Todd, who had returned from Colombia, " It is probable that the formal rec- ognition of the Republic of Colombia will ensue at no distant day." ' Before the next month was over the chief clerk of the Department of State announced to Forbes the preparation of a report and documents iu response to a call of the House. " I know not how the cat jumps in relation to this great question," he wrote, " but am apt to believe that a discretionary power will be given to the President, to acknowledge, or not, according to his views of circumstances, the sovereignty and Independence of any or all of these 1 Richardson, U., 105. 2 Adams to Torres, January 18, 1822, Arnnals, 17 C. 1, 2099. ' Adams to Todd, January 28, 1822, SUUe Dept. MSS. Policy of the United States 171 Governments. That of Buenos Ayres has given a good moral Lesson to older and long-established States, in the formal suppression of Privateering im- der its flag." * On the 8th of March, 1822, responding to a call for documents of 30th January, President Monroe recommended that the independence of the South American republics be acknowledged.^ The Presi- dent sketched briefly the long struggle of the col- onies, the sympathy of the people of the United States and the policy of neutrality that had cheeked that sympathy. Now he was compelled to conclude, from a review of the situation ia South America, " that its fate is settled, and that the Provinces which have declared their independence and are in the en- joyment of it ought to be recognised." He presumed that Spain would soon become reconciled to the sep- aration, though he admitted that he had received no recent information on the subject from Spain or from the other Powers. Some time since, it had been un- derstood that these latter were not yet prepared for recognition. " The immense space between those powers, even those which border on the Atlantic, and D. Brent to Forbes, February 19, 1822, State Bept. MSS. 'Eichardson, H., 116-118. 172 South- American Independence these Provinces makes the movement an affair of less interest and excitement to them than to us. . . . " In proposing this measure it is not contemplated to change thereby in the slightest manner our friend- ly relations with either of the parties, but to observe, in all respects, as heretofore, should the war be con- tinued, the most perfect neutrality between them. Of this friendly disposition an assurance will be given to the Government of Spain, to whom it is presumed it will be, as it ought to be, satisfactory. The meas- ure is proposed under a thorough conviction that it is in strict accord with the law of nations, that it is just and right as to the parties, and that the United States owe it to their station and character in the world, as well as to their essential interests, to adopt it. Should Congress concur iu the view herein pre- sented, they will doubtless see the propriety of mak- ing the necessary appropriations for carrying it into effect." With the departure of Henry Clay from the House of Representatives the question of recognition had fallen back to its proper place, the Department of State. In his absence there was no one whose inter- ests impelled him to make use of a generous popular sentiment to drag the foreign policy of the govern- ment into Congress. The sentiment continued to ex- Policy of the United States 173 ist, strong as ever, fed by the frequent columns of Soutt American news in the papers. But the emo- tion was humanitarian rather than political. It was felt by Adams and Monroe as keenly as by Con- gress and the people. The purely factious nature of Clay's advocacy of recognition is shown by the fact that the seventeenth Congress felt no necessity to take the matter from the hands of the President. Even after the call for documents in January, 1822, the papers paid no attention to the subject. The message of 8th March was received with calmness, though with general satisfaction. It does small credit to Clay's political wisdom that he spent four years in advocacy of an assured cause, and that for all his efForts he could not hasten by a day the ad- vance of the government in the direction whither he was urging it. The rest of the story can be quickly told: how the message was received at home; how it was received abroad; the actual steps in formal recognition. During the weeks following the 8th of March, 1822, the message, with its accompanying documents, was reprinted generally throughout the country. The information transmitted at this time was not new, and was recdved without general enthusiasm. The Aurora and the Enquirer, long the advocates of rec- 1Y4: South- American Independence ognition, did their best by it, now it had come. The former expressed its satisfaction that the President had at last done justice to the South Americans and hailed him as a benefactor of the republics.^ The Baltimore Patriot worked itself up to declare the message the most intrinsically important state paper it had seen.^ But South America had already gained its independence, so that recognition was an acknowl- edgment of a fact rather than a prop to a wavering cause. It came too late to be considered as an emo- tional appeal. The Spanish minister in Washington, I>on Joaquin de Anduaga, fired his " diplomatic blunderbuss " at the Secretary of State as soon as the message of Mon- roe reached him.' His note was of the character that was to be expected. Where is " the right of The United States," he demanded, " to sanction and de- clare legitimate a rebellion, without cause, and the event of which is not even decided ? " He denied the fact of independence, and in the language of injured, surprised innoceyice, registered a formal protest against the act of recognition, reserving to Spain all her rights in the provinces despite the act. In his re- ^ Aurora, March 11, 1822; March 12, 1822. ' Quoted in Aurora, March 15, 1822. 'Anduaga to Adams, March 9, 1822, B. & F., IX., 752. Policy of the United States 1Y5 ply of a montli later, Adams justified tke action of the executive, admitted the reservation of Spain's rights, for recognition has no effect upon existing rights, and closed the controversy.^ Ifo other Euro- pean power expressed formal disapprobation of the policy of the United States. News of the message reached Paris at a time when Europe was excited over a threat of commercial dis- crimination by Colombia. " The United States, as we write," said the Journal des Debats,^ " have prob- ably recognized the independence of the Spanish- American governments. This resolution is not sur- prising from a government which has established as a maxim of public law ' that when a province main- tains itself victoriously in independence against the mother country it has a right to demand recognition as a sovereign state.' The president of the United States would have been wise not to talk of principle, EIGHT and LAW OF nations: for suppose Boston with the five New England States should one day separate from the American Union. . . . Then England with his message in her hand could say amicably to Con- gress, * We do not vrish to change any -of our relations with the Union, but the five states east of the Hudson 1 Adams to Anduaga, AprU 9, 1822, B. & F., IX., 754. ^Journal desDebats, Api-U 17, 1822. 176 South- American Independence demand our recognition, they have beaten your armies and you are absolutely incapable of subduing them; so according to the law of nations established by yourselves, they have a right to be recognized. So we shall recognize them without injuring you. Our ambassador at Washington is instructed to assure you of our sympathy and that we act from no motive of interest.' . . . " The preliminary measures regarding the new governments have been sMKully conducted by the president of the United States. He sent agents or commissioners who after coasting slowly along South America submitted somewhat contradictory official reports. Thus the IJnited States showed their re- gard for the new governments without injuring Spain, and after three years of negotiation and pre- liminary measures came to a point where the Euro- pean situation is such that they can safely establish with their neighbors what relations they please. . . . " Is it possible that the old governments of Europe cannot keep up with the march of the prudent young republic? We hope our statesmen will find means to conciliate the interests affected by this important question." The formal steps in recognition occupied three months in the spring of 1822. The message of the Policy of the United States 177 President was referred to the Coirmiittee on Foreign Relations, -wiiich on 19th March reported resolutions vigorously sustaining the policy of the administration and instructing the Committee on Ways and Means to report a bill for the salaries of ministers to South America.^ Nine days later, after slight debate, the resolutions were adopted with but one dissenting vote.^ On 10th April the debate on the bill for the missions was commenced; ^ it was signed by the Pres- ident some three weeks later, in spite of the unpleas- ant news that the Cortez had disavowed the conces- sions to the provinces and declared that the recogni- tion of their independence by other powers would be considered as a violation of their treaties with Spain.* On the 19th of June, 1822, John Quiney Adams " presented Mr. Manuel Torres as Charge d' Affaires from the republic of Colombia to the President. This incident was chiefly interesting as being the first formal act of recognition of an independent South American Government.'' The next day the Secre- tary proposed to the President to offer the Colombian mission to Henry Clay.' 1 Annals, 17 C. 1, 1314. 'AnnaU, 17 C. 1, 1382. 3 Annals, 17 C. 1, 1518. * J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, V., 489. 5 J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, VI., 23, 26. CHAPTEK ni. THE BRITISH RELATIONS WTTH SOUTH AStEEICA There seems to have been no connection between the interests that inspired Pitt to keep in touch with Francisco de Miranda in the last years of the eigh- teenth century and the early ones of the nineteenth, that impelled Sir Home Ri^s Popham to attack the Viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres on the broad grounds of commercial advantage and injury to Spaiu, and those later interests that developed a mercantile op- position in England to embarrass the ministry as Henry Clay's political opposition embarrassed the American administration of John Quinpy Adams and his president, James Monroe. In England there is a distinct break between these periods. From an atti- tude of hostiKty to Spaiu in the earlier years. Great Britain passed through a stage of friendly protection that drove the French out of the peninsula, into an- other period of semi-hostility to the restored Ferdi- nand. During this last period, beginning roughly in 1815, the interests of Great Britain were divided. On the one hand an enormous trade with liatin- America was threatened with destruction, should Spain's col- England and South America 179 onial policy come back with Spain's king. On the other, were the poKtical interests of England in Eu- rope, the body of treaties concluded during the wars against ISTapoleon, the newly-developed policy of joint action by the Powers. With the United States rec- ognition was a question of American policy; with England it was merely one of the ramifications of European politics. At no time was the British min- istry in a position to treat it on its merits ; instead it struggled for a decade to avert action, to cherish at once the commerce with the colonies and the friendly relations with Spain. It was not until the clamorings of the merchants drowned the protests of the Bour- bons that England recognized the South American republics. Once an ally of Spain, the disposition of England to respect the rights of the former in her provinces became pronounced. In 1811 one Robert Staples was commissioned as consul to Buenos Ayres, but when the Eegency of Cadiz replied to Sir Henry WeUesley's request for an exequatur that the " Laws of the Indias " were still in force, Perceval dropped the matter and the ministries thereafter disavowed the actions of Staples in South America.^ In 1814 a 1 Foreign Office MciS. Memorandum of June 26, 1823. 180 South-American Independence treaty was entered into with Spain binding England to prevent lier subjects from furnishing " arms, am- munition, or any other warlike article to the revolted in South America." for his Britannic Majesty was " anxious that the troubles and disturbances which unfortunately prevail in the Dominions of His Cath- olic Majesty in America should entirely cease, and the Subjects of those Provinces should return to their obedience to their lawful sovereign." ^ The attitude of the Liverpool ministry was by no means favorable to colonies struggling for independ- ence. The regent was narrow and aristocratic to the last degree; later, as George IV., he followed the course that could have been expected of him. He re- membered with bitterness the day that marked the separation of her American colonies from Great Brit- ain, and with such antecedents could with difficulty bring himself to countenance the separation of her own from Spain. The force that drove him to the final recognition was commercial, with George Can- ning as its prophet. That the latter " called a new world into existence to redress the balance of the old " may well be doubted, for before he moved, an- other and a not uncertain voice had sounded from > Hansard : Debates, XXXV., 1200 ; JB.dcF.,!., Part 1, 292 ; Treaty of Madrid, July 5, 1814 ;. additional articles, August 28, 1814. England and South America 181 America. He guided his infljjgncaJ^lLe _. ^de „ of John Qiiiney Adams to jnaintaiii the new republics, not for their effect on old world polities or for the sake of the republics themselves, but that the com- merce of the British merchants might be protect_ed and increased. Recognition became a subject of agitation in Great Britain as early as in the United States, but there is in the former country no trace of a purely factious opposition iising a widespread popular emotion to em- barrass an administration. The United States had little commerce with South American ports; its sym- pathies were almost entirely sentimental. Great Brit- ain also had a feeling for what it considered a stmg- gle-for liberty, but the feeling was buttressed up by considerations of a commerce that fed and clothed the southern patriots. Feeling the depredations of Spanish and insurgent privateers. Mackintosh and Brougham could with better grace than Henry Clay demand governmental intervention in their behalf. Eleven years after their conclusion the treaties of 1814 rose to plague the Foreign Secretary, but in 1817 they constituted the foimdation of his strength. Sir Henry Brougham, professionally a member of the opposition, and in all things liberal, interrogated the members of the ministerial bench on their South 182 South- American Independence American program almost a year before the spectac- ular oratory of Henry Clay began. " The conduct "which this country followed with respect to these disputes," replied Lord Castlereagh, " was, that of adhering to a strict neutrality, and not that which the hon. and learned gentleman seemed to recom- mend — ^to assist the colonies against the native coun- try, which would be in direct contravention to the treaties between Great Britain and Spain. . . . [The] events in the river Plate. . . . must be con- sidered not as a mere South American question, but as an European question." ^ The war thus opened was continued with increas- ing energy as the English South American commerce increased in volume. The ministry fought off recog- nition until of possible evils it was the least; imtil nothing was to be gained by further conciliation of Spain; until it was convinced that the provinces were independent and possessed of responsible govern- ments. As it was hostile to the new republics, this conviction came with deliberate steps. At last the ministry yielded to the commercial influence, intensi- fied by popular sympathy, and by its recognition in- curred the disapprobation of all of Europe. 1 Hansard , XXXV., 1196. In House of Commons, March 19, 181". England and South America 183 The weapons of the opposition in England were much the same as in the United States. Speeches in House of Commons, demands of South American agents, equipment of South American armaments were all brought into use. Brougham, who had stirred up the ministry in March, 1817, returned to the attack in July in his speech on the State of the Nation. On the very day when Secretary Rush was pushing the preparations for the South American Commission, Brougham complained to the House of Commons that Great Britain had no system respect- ing that portion of the globe.^ In later months Don Bernardino Rivadavia, who was at a future time to play such a significant part in the development of Buenos Ayres, was passing through Europe, from capital to capital, making his representations and up- holding the interests of his country. When Spain asked the mediation of the powers, he assured Lord Castlereagh that Buenos Ayres respected the other nations of the world and wanted peace, hut that no peace wotild be admissible save on the basis of abso- lute separation from the mother country. Six months later he annoimced that the mediation of Great Britain would be welcome if founded on no 1 July 11, 1817, Hansard, XXXVI., 1384. 184 South- American Independence other motive than humanity. It was too late for Spain to seek to preserve her supremacy.^ The part played by British officers and men in the war of South American liberation has already been described. Lord Cochrane and General Miller are only the most notable names among those who fought with the armies of the south. Whole regiments are found with the armies of the north. The end of the Napoleonic wars, coinciding as it did with the begin- ning of the second period of the South American war, made it possible for the patriots to secure the ser- vices of many trained soldiers for their cause. Whole battalions are said to have listened to the glowing promises of Don Luis Lopez Mendez, the agent of Bolivar in England, and been mustered out of the British army only to enlist immediately for South American service. Others flocked to the support of adventurers armed with stacks of blank commissions, and sailed for Margarita on the assurance that there they would receive rank, expenses and increased re- muneration. Only too often their hopes went the way of the funds of investors in high-rated South American stocks. It was not without reason that the Prince Regent iRivadavia to Castlereagh, October 29, 1817, April 10, 1818, enclose Gallatin to Adams, April 26, 1822, State Dept. MSS. England and South America 199 tention. " It seems that the cannibals of Europe," wrote one American ex-president to another, " are going to eating one another again. A war between Eussia and Turkey is like the battle of the kite and the snake; whichever destroys the other, leaves a de- stroyer the less for the world." ^ But in the British foreign office the importance of the South American question could not be hidden or suppressed. " Every day convinces me more and more," declared Canning, " that in the present state of the world, in the present state of the Peninsula, and in the present state of this country, the American questions are out of all proportion more important to us than the European, and that if we do not seize and turn them to our advantage in time, we shall rue the loss of an opportimity never to be recov- ered." ■ The conditions upon which the Foreign Sec- retary based this opinion are patent. On 8th April, 1822, the Colombian agent ia Paris, Zea by name, Minister Plenipotentiary by title, had issued a circu- lar to the powers of Europe and asked for it a quick response.' Stating the general and well-known in- cidents of the revolution, Zea declared that Colom- 1 Jefferson to John Adams, NUes, XXIII., 247. 'Canning to Wellington, November 8, 1822, Walpole, II., 356. 3^. £. December 29, 1823, Foreign Office MSS. 216 Soufhr American Independence of the United States has declared Its Sentiments upon this subject in a manner wholly consonant with the declarations previously made by this Country; going indeed beyond us, in as much as, It has actually acknowledged the Independence of the Spanish American Provinces. " A frank communication was made to the Ameri- can Minister some months ago of the course which Great Britain intended to pursue, which was no doubt reported by that Minister to his Govt, before the opening of the Session of Congress." The sending of consuls to South American ports 'was in contemplation of a recognition at no distant date. The various Commissioners were instructed to gather information upon which to justify the same; for Great Britain was now definitely committed to the policy which Canning had anticipated in 1822, when he saw in America matters of more interest to his country than in Europe. " As to any further Measures," announced the Speech from the Throne at the next session of Par- liament, " His Majesty has reserved to HimseK an unfettered Discretion, to be exercised as the Circum- stances of those Countries, and the Interests of His own People may appear to His majesty to require." ^ 1 February 3, 1824. From an original pampblet edition in Foreigii Office MSS. England and South America 217 The collection of information upon South Ameri- can conditions was attended with embarrassing com- plications ia Great Britain, as it had been six years before in the United States. In the case of the latter, the files of consular despatches were rich mines of information: the official reports of the special Com- missioners adding no new facts of consequence. But the Foreign Office had not this regular source of knowledge. Previous to the consular despatches that began to arrive in the end of 1823, the Foreign Sec- retary seems to have derived his information through a number of channels, none of which were official. The correspondence in the newspapers gave him all that was printed in America. Despatches of naval officers on duty in South American waters were turned over to him by the Admiralty in considerable numbers. South American agents in London wrote to him profusely. British commercial houses pos- sessing branches in the republics frequently sent copies of letters from their agents for his edification. In all, little of importance that occurred in those regions could have failed to reach the Foreign Office ; but in the establishment of consuls in October, 1823, is found the beginning of official channels of informa- tion. The difficulties of South American diplomacy have 218 South- American Independence been seen in a previous chapter. With an agent leading a division of the insurgent army, with, another guaranteeing an insurgent loan, with a third engag- ing in the tempting game of privateers, the neutral course of Mr. Adams had been embarrassed. Can- ning did not fail to encounter similar distractions. The agents in Mexico were particularly hard to handle. Dr. Mackie, who had gone out on an in- formal mission, in 1822, had exceeded his instruc- tions from the first. On arriving at Vera Cruz he learned that the Mexicans were at the point of con- cluding a commercial treaty with Spain, giving marked advantages to the latter. " It therefore required," he reported to Canning with compla- cency,^ " no little Address and Management to do away the proceedings which had taken place; but upon my assuring him [General Vittoria, the succes- sor of Iturbide] of the friendly disposition of Great Britain I had the satisfaction, before I left him to annull a Treaty so inimical to the Policy & Com- merce of the British Empire." The successors of Mackie, — Hervey, O'Gorman and Ward, — were of course instructed to disavow this interposition of their predecessor and apologize to the government. But they themselves were no more "willing than he 1 Mackie to Canning, July 14, 1823, Foreign Office MSS. England and South America 219 to. obey their orders. Arriving at the city of Mexico on the last day of the year/ they were able, in eighteen days, to prepare an enthusiastic report upon the condition of the country, and were ^willing to send it home in the care of Mr. Ward just as a dangerous insurrection, known by the name of Lobato, was in progress.^ To this superficiality of investigation was added a more positive offence when the head of the Commission, Mr. Lionel Hervey, repeated Dev- ereux's action, and guaranteed a loan to sustain the existing government in a crisis.^ The reproaches of the Foreign Secretary, that the report was based on a " fortnight's, or three weeks', experience," and despatched, not only " before you had allowed your- selves time to form a mature judgment," but at " a moment of publick disturbance," * were followed, as news of the loan reached London, by the imperative recall of Hervey: the vessel bringing out his succes- sor would wait to take him back.^ James Morier, the new Commissioner, went out ordered " That you are sent to ascertain the Fact of Mexican Independence, 'Hervey to Canning, No. 5, January 1, 1824, Foreign Office MSS. 2 Hervey to Canning, January 18, 1824, Foreign Office MSS. 3 Hervey to Canning, February 20, 1824, Foreign OffiJseMSS. The loan was guaranteed three weeks before. * Canning to Hervey, No. 3, April 23, 1824, Foreign Office MSS. 5 Canning to Hervey, July 20, 1824, Foreign Office MSS. 220 South- American Independence not actively to promote it ; and to form and report an Opinion of the Stability of the Government, not to prescribe its form or attempt to influence its Coun- cils." ^ But even Morier and Ward, the latter as a subordinate having retained the confidence of the Ministry, were not impervious to Mexican influence. At the beginning of the next year they were instruct- ed to conclude a treaty of commerce with Mexico : ^ in the negotiations they allowed themselves to admit into the treaty clauses radically at variance with their instructions.^ It is not tc* be expected, wrote Canning with exasperation as he rejected the whole treaty and ordered the negotiation of a new one, that we will abandon " for the sake of this new con- nexion, principles which we never have conceded, in our intercourse with other States, whether of the Old World or the New, either to considerations of friendship, or to menaces of hostility." * This investigation of the character of South American agents has carried the account somewhat beyond the limits of recognition. It reveals a ten- dency that prevailed in most of the negotiations. As 1 Canning to Morier, July 30, 1824, Foreign Office MSS. 2 Canning to Ward and Morier, January 3, 1825, Foreign Office MSS. ' Ward and Morier to Canning, No. 1, April 10,1825,i^omsr»i Office MSS. * Canning to Ward, September 9, 1825, Foreign Office MSS. England and South America 221 in the case of Adams's envoys, many of Canning's were little more than mere enthusiasts; if they were not often " fanatics in the cause of emancipation," ^ they were almost always devotees of a more selfish interest — that of British commerce. The Colombian experiences of Canning hardly rival those of his Mexican negotiations. The British Commissioners to Colombia reached Jamaica, on their way out, before the end of 1823,'' and on the 8th of the following March they were graciously received by the Vice-President, Santandar, at Bogota.' Their reception, however, was in an un- official capacity as Don Pedro Gual, Minister for Foreign Affairs, foimd himself unable to grant exequaturs to consuls who were commissioned to " provinces and dependencies " rather than to inde- pendent States.* Pour months after their arrival. Colonel Hamilton, the head of the mission, wrote a report in answer to the questions of his instructions, and announced that it expressed the unanimous opinion of the Commissioners. ° That he had never ' Beddaway, Monroe Doctrine, 26. 2 Hamilton to Canning, December 19, 1823, Foreign Office MSS. 3 Hamilton to Canning, March 9, 1824, Foreign Office MSS. ; Annual Register, 1824, [223]. * Gual to HamUton, April 14, 1824, Foreign Office MSS. 5 Hamilton to Canning, No. 7, July 5, 1824, Foreign Office MSS. 222 South- American Independence shown his instructions to his colleagues, and that he had not hesitated publicly to pledge the support of Great Britain in ease of a forcible intervention in South America, seemed to him no deviation from the line of duty. He was typical of his class of agents. Here, as in the Mexican business. Canning was angry and made little attempt to conceal his irritation. He had already received a report on Colombian condi- tions from Hurtado, the London agent. ^ ^S^ow he was forced to take other reports from Campbell, who had brought home that of Hamilton, and whose " unanimous opinion " had been pledged by his chief without liis knowledge.'' Already the Foreign Secre- tary had had Joseph Plauta, his chief subordinate, write to Hamilton, that ° " Mr. Canning desires that you will take the trouble to reperuse your Instruc- tions; and to compare them with the letters which you have written since your arrival at your place of destination; and with the language which you are represented by the Colombian Newspapers to have held at your presentation and other Publick Meet- ings. " The unsatisfactory meagreness of your written 1 Hurtado to Canning, July 16, 1824, Fm-eign Office MSS. 2 Campbell to Canning, November 6, 1824, December 10, 162i,Foreign Office MSS. » Plauta to Hamilton, August 19, 1824, Foreign Office MSS. England and South America 223 communications to this office, falls as far below what was prescribed to you on the one hand, as the vague and unmeasured terms in which you have publickly pledged the opinions and intentions of your Govt go beyond it on the other. " Both have exposed your Govt to the greatest possible inconvenience." Upon the arrival of Campbell, with his verbal accounts of the Chief Commissioner's policy, the lat- ter was censured for a second time, and by Canning himself. In words that were no less emphatic be- cause they were veiled in diplomatic phrases, he was ordered during the rest of his stay in Colombia to carry out the objects of his mission.^ From this point, so far as the Foreign Office was concerned, the Colombian negotiations progressed smoothly. It did not become necessary there, as in Mexico, actually to disavow any of the agents. In Buenos Ayres alone, the most important of the three storm-centres of Spanish America, did the agents of Great Britain carry out the wishes of the Ministry in thoroughly satisfactory manner. Here the revolution had advanced to the furthest point, here the interests of English merchants were the greatest, and so upon the course of events here 1 Canning to Hamilton, November 8, 1824, Foreign Office MSS. 224 South-American Independence British, policy depended. As the most important post in the republics, it received the ablest of the agents in the person of Woodbine Parish, later in life to become vice-president of the Royal Geographical Society, and a knight, who went out as Consul-Gen- eral at the beginning of 1824. Before Woodbine Parish had had time to send home many despatches upon the condition, of Buenos Ayres, there occurred in Parliament the last and most exhaustive debate that the subject of recogni- tion had yet received. To this day the speech of Sir James Mackintosh is the best statement of the theoi"y and nature of recognition that has been made. The announcement made in the speech from the Throne, on 3d February, 1824, that Great Britain would follow her own interests regarding South America, did not satisfy the representatives of the commercial classes, who had been preparing petitions for two years, and were now more anxious than ever for a formal recognition. Debate on the speech, be- ginning the night it was presented, was continued in Commons for two days, bringing Canning to his feet more than once to defend the Ministry against the attacks of Brougham, and to announce again the policy guiding it ; that Spain might recover her colo- England and South America 225 nies if she could, but that she must do it unaided.^ In both Houses notice was given within the next two weeks of general motions on South America in case the Ministry should so long hesitate to act.^ On 4th March, Canning proved his statements as to policy by laying before Parliament the Polignac memoran- dum of 9th October, 1823, and a correspondence with Sir William a Court, British Minister to Spain, on the subject of the South American conference, invited by Ferdinand on his second restoration in the fall of that year.^ In the House of Lords, Lansdowne, who had, a week before, shown interest in the action of Spain on Canning's last proposal of mediation,* made an elabo- rate speech in behalf of a motion for an address to the King on the expediency of a recognition.^ He thanked the Ministry for the papers of 4th March, begging at the same time for further steps and speedy ones. He proved to his complete satisfaction that the States of South America were de facto independent; that they could maintain their independence, so that 1 Haiisard, N. S., X., 90 et seq. ■■' Marquis of Lansdowne in House of Lords, February 9, 1824, Han- sard, N. S., X., 105; Sir James Mackintosh in House of Commons, February 15, 1824, Hansard, N. S., X., 15". 3 Printed in^. & F., XL, 49 et seq. ; Hansard, N. S., X., 708 et seq. *Hansard, N.S., X., 777. 5 March 15, 1824, Hansard, N. S., X., 970-992. 226 South- American Independence Spain had no prospect of recovering them; that their commerce with Britain was of exceeding great im- portance. In the year 1821, he declared, they bought from British merchants goods to the value of £3,227,- 560; in 1822 they increased their purchases; and now they consumed half as much as their neighboring republic in ]!^orth America. By comparison with the United States, he showed that once independent their purchasing capacity would be much enhanced. To him replied the Earl of Liverpool, in words that brought out a ministerial majority of 95 to 34 to veto the motion, saying " that what had been done was all that could have been done, embracing every practical advantage consistent with honor and good faith. A formal acknowledgment of independence could properly be made only by the power who claimed dominion over another; and, in a strict sense of the word, we had no right either to acknowledge or dispute their independence." ^ The Earl of Liverpool touched lightly upon a theory of recognition in his reply to Lansdowne: the subject received an exhaustive examination at the hands of Sir James Mackintosh, in the House of Commons, on 15th June, 1824. With a petition from 117 commercial houses of London in his hand ^ Annual Register, 1824, [23] ; Hansard, N. S., X., 992-1010. England and South America 227 as a text, he cleared away much, of the confusion, existing in the minds of both parties as to the mean- ing of recognition. " I must go back for a moment," he explained,^ to those elementary principles which are so grossly mis- understood. And first with respect to the term ' Eecognition,' the introduction of which into these discussions has proved the principal occasion of dark- ness and error. It is a term which is used in two senses so different from each other as to have nothing very important in common. The fixst, which is the true and legitimate sense of the word ' Recognition,' as a technical term of international law, is that in which it denotes the explicit acknowledgment of the independence of a country by a State which formerly exercised sovereignty over it. Spain has been doomed to exhibit more examples of this species of recogni- tion than any other European State, of which the most memorable cases are the acknowledgment of the independence of Portugal and Holland. This coun- try also paid the penalty of evil councils in that hour of folly and infatuation which led to a hostile separa- 1 Substance of a Speech of Sir James Mackintosh im, the House of Com/mons, Jwne 15, 18^4, on presentirig a Petition from the 3Ierchants of London for the Mecognition of the Independent States established in the CouTitries of America formerly subject to Spain. . . London, 1824, P. 5. et seq. 228 South- American Independence tion between the American colonies and their mother country. Such recognitions are renunciations of sov- ereignty. They are a surrender of the power or of the claim to govern. They are of the utmost import- ance, as quieting possession and extinguishing a foreign pretension to authority; they free a nation from the evils of a disputed sovereignty; they remove the only competitor who can with any colour of right contend against the actual Government, and they secure to a country the advantage of an undisputed independence. " But we, who are as foreign to the Spanish States in America as we are to Spain herseK, who never had any more authority over them than over her, have in this case no claims to renounce, no power to abdicate, no sovereignty to resign, no legal rights to confer. They are as independent without our acknowledg- ment of their independence as with it. !N"o act of ours can ever remove an obstacle which stands in the way of their independence, or withdraw any force which disturbs its exercise. What we have to do, is there- fore not recognition in its first and most strictly proper sense. It is not by formal stipulations or solemn declarations that we are to recognize the American States; but by measures of practical policy, which imply that we acknowledge their independ- England and South America 229 ence. Our recognition is virtual. We are called upon to treat them as independent ; to establish with them the same relations and the same intercourse which we are accustomed to maintain with other Governments; to deal with them in every respect as commonwealths entitled to admission into the great society of civilized States." Here, for the first time, Mackintosh defined recog- nition in clear and precise terms. He went on to show, as John Quincy Adams had shown six years before, that it was no violation of neutrality. " It implies no guarantee," he declared, " no alliance, no aid, no approbation of the successful revolt ; no inti- mation of an opinion concerning the justice or injus- tice of the means by which it has been accomplished. ... As a State, we can neither condemn nor justify revolutions which do not affect our safety and are not amenable to our laws. . . . The principle which requires such an intercourse is the same, whether the governments be old or new. Antiquity affords a pre- sumption of stability, which, like all other presump- tions, may and does fail in particular instances. But in itself it is nothing; and when it ceases to indicate stability, it ought to be regarded by a foreign coun- try as of no account. . . . [When] Great Britain (I hope very soon) recognises the States of Spanish 230 South- American Independence Amenca, it will not be as a concession to them, for they need no such recognition; but it will be for her own sake, to promote her own interest ; to protect the trade and navigation of her subjects; to acquire the best means of cultivating friendly relations with important countries, and of composing by inunediate negotiation those differences which might otherwise terminate in war." Erom this legal analysis of the doctrine of recog- nition, Mackintosh returned to the customary trend of South American speeches. Once more he told the history of the revolt, and described the needs of his commercial constituents. On subsequent days he presented more petitions to the House. At the last sitting of the House of Lords, for Par- liament was prorogued on the 25th of June, 1824, the Earl of Liverpool replied to an interrogation from the Marquis of Lansdowne that every attempt to bring Spain to a recognition on her own account had failed; that the government held itself ready to recognize when it should become expedient.^ During the ensuing recess the Ministry had time to meditate upon the attitude of Parliament and the reports of its South American Commissioners. Woodbine Parish, Consul-General for Buenos 'Hansard, N. S., XI., 1479. England and South America 231 Ayres, embarked on the ship Cambridge on 3d January, 1824. With him were the consuls for the region under his supervision, and in his despatch bag were the instructions of 10th October, 1823, that have already been examined, a copy of the Polignac memorandum, and three gold snuff boxes, bearing the portrait of his Majesty, George IV. The spirit of friendly conciliation that is implied by the presence of the snuff boxes has been borne out by the examina- tion of the more formal impedimenta of his mission. After a voyage of nearly three months. Parish landed in the city of Buenos Ayres. A month later, on lYth April, arrived The Countess of Chichester, the first of the line of British packets that the Admiralty had established at this time.^ The reception of the new agent was cordial, as was to be expected. Kivadavia, on the verge of retire- ment from the all-important post he had held for three years, was ready to enter into the negotiations proposed, with freedom. On the terms of a " pre- vious Recognition of the Independence of this State (which he said was a sine qua non) " wrote Parish, a few days after his arrival," " and, of Spain being placed with respect to her Commerce, upon the same 1 Forbes to Adams, March 31, 1824, State Dept. MSS. 2 April 15, 1824, Foreign Office MSS. 232 South- American Independence footing witli the Natives of the Country, they were sincerely disposed to enter into any arrangement with His Catholic Majesty's Government upon such terms as Great Britain would say were fair and reason- able." In the performance of his duty, in the collection of information. Parish was in strong contrast to the agents in Colombia and Mexico. At his request a native of the country wrote an elaborate monograph on its conditions and resources;^ his despatches are full of details upon the subjects of British interest and local politics; and not a few South American gazettes, bulletins and pamphlets were enclosed in his mail to the Foreign Office. So assiduous was he in the work of conciliation that in two months he wrote to Planta for more snuff boxes, and intimated that a few framed portraits of the king would . be highly useful.^ The report that was sent to England on 25th June, 1824, was highly favorable to the government exist- ing at Buenos Ayres. The value of the labors of Rivadavia and Garcia was as apparent to Parish now as it had been to Forbes, the American, three years ^ Ygnacio Nunez, An Account, historical, political and statistical, of the United Provimces of Rio de la Plata. . . Translated from (he Spanish, London, 1825. 2 Parish to Plauta, June 4, 1824, Foreign Offi.ce MSS. England and South America 233 before. There was no reason to believe that the new gOTemment of Las Heras, just come into existence, would prove less stable than its predecessor. The general congress, whose time of meeting was in sight, would probably complete the union of the provinces, for as yet Buenos Ayres conducted the foreign rela- tions only by tacit consent. There was no funda- mental law of union. "It is of importance to ob- serve," wrote General Alvear, their minister to the United States, then in London en route to his post, " that all the Provinces about to meet in Congress, have enjoyed for the last fourteen years, and up- wards, without interruption, their full Independence, that is to say, ever since the 25th of May, 1810." ^ Before the exhaustive report of Parish reached London, Canning was ready for the final step towards recognition, and had convinced his reluctant Ministry of its necessity. The debates of June had brought out as never before the importance of South Ameri- can trade; the reports of the London agents, of Alvear, and of Parish himself, showed in good light the character of the new republic. On 23d August, he instructed Parish once more. " Before His Majesty's Government," read the instruction, after commending Parish for his satis- ' Alvear to Canning, July 24, 1824, Foreign Office MSS. 234 South-American Independence factory despatches, " can take any decisive step for drawing closer to their relations with any of the new States of America, it is obviously necessary to ascer- tain, " 1st. That any such State has renounced finally and irrevocably all political connection with Spain. 2ndly, That it has the power as well as the will to maintain the independence which it has established; and Srdly, That the frame of its Government is such as to afford a reasonable security for the con- tinuance of its internal Peace, and for the good faith with which it would be enabled to maintain whatever relations it might contract with other Powers. " It is neither the right nor the intention of Great Britain to do anything to promote the separation of any one of the Spanish Colonies from Spain: But the fact of that Separation is an indispensable prelimi- nary to any further proceedings or inquiries; and it is not till after that fact has been decisively ascer- tained, that a question can arise as to the expediency of entering into arrangements founded upon a recog- nition of it. " The fact of Separation seems to be clearly estab- lished with respect to Buenos Ayres, by the length of time which has elapsed since its original Declaration of independence, and since a Spanish force has England and South America 235 existed in its territory; and by the absence of any- thing like a Spanish party in the State. " The competency of that State to enter into arrangements with other Countries does not appear liable to question. But there is one point upon which Your Report is not so clear as might be desired — I mean as to the power of the Government of Buenos Ayres to bind by its Stipulations with a Foreign State, all the Members of the Confederacy constitu- ting the United States of Rio de la Plata. . . . " As however the G-eneral Congress was about to assemble when Your last Despatches came away, it is to be presumed that if the requisite Authority was not already formally acknowledged it will have been clearly and definitely established long before these Instructions, and the Full Power, which accompanies them, can reach you. " The Full Power is drawn in that presumption: and would be inapplicable to any other case. " Supposing then that case to exist, and supposing the general situation of affairs at Buenos Ayres to continue as favorable, as your last Despatches de- scribe it, You will, upon receipt of this Despatch, declare to the Minister with whom you are in the habit of communicating, that His Majesty has been graciously pleased to direct to be prepared, and trans- 236 South- American Independence mitted to you, an Instrument of Full Power, author- izing you to treat with such Person, as may be duly appointed on behalf of the United States of La Plata, for the negotiation of a Treaty which shall place on a regular and permanent footing the commercial inter- course that has so long subsisted between His Maj- esty's Subjects and these States." Upon the receipt of these instructions. Parish acted with self-restraint unparalleled in South Ameri- can agents. Although in close sympathy with the patriots, and confident that their government was permanent, he obeyed his orders in the fullness of their spirit. " From my preceding despatches," he replied to Canning, on 24th October, " you will have learnt that the General Congress of the Provinces of La Plata has not yet met, and that however .united these Provinces are nominally, and to all appearances upon all General Points, they are as yet unconnected by any precisely defined National Government. " The Administration of Buenos Ayres has indeed taken the lead upon all those l^fational Points which under other Circumstances would have devolved upon a General Government; a Course in which the rest of the Provinces have unanimously acquiesced, more especially in matters connected with their For- England and South America 237 eign Relations; — ^but, the Authority so assumed, and so acqiiiesced in, does not appear to me to be suffi- ciently formal to justify me, under your Instructions, in entering with the Government of Buenos Ayres upon the very important matter entrusted to me. Under such Circumstances I have considered that I should more properly fulfil the Spirit of those In- structions, by withholding any formal Communica- tion of my being authorized to enter into a l^egotia- tion with the United Provinces of La Plata, till such time as those Provinces shall have re-installed their National Government. " I have had the less hesitation in coming to this determination, as the Meeting of the Congress, though frequently delayed, is now upon the point of taking place; and on the very morning I had the honor to receive your despatches, the first prelimi- nary meeting of the Deputies was held at the Resi- dence of the Governor of Buenos Ayres, when it was generally determined that they should commence their Public Proceedings on the 1st of January next at latest, or sooner, if possible. " Under such circumstances I trust that I shall not have erred in the Course I have adopted." Although not presenting his new credentials in an open manner, a course which Canning thoroughly 238 South- American Independence approved/ Parish informed Garcia that he possessed them, and that the erection of a national government was the one thing necessary to secure a recognition. With this condition in mind, the government of Buenos Ayres presented its report on foreign rela- tions to the General Congress in the middle of the month of December.^ While not re- miss in expressing its acknowledgments to the United States, who had " constituted Itself Guar- dian of the Field of Battle, in order to pre- vent any foreign assistance from being introduced in the aid of our Rival," the Government dwelt most at length upon the conditions of Europe. " The vac- illation of some of the great Powers of the Continent of Europe, and the malevolence which they shew towards the new Eepublics of this part of the World proceed from the forced Position to which they are reduced by a Policy inconsistent with the true state of things. Kings can have no force or Power but by those means which perfect social order affords. They are well aware of the extent and advantage of those means; but alarmed by the movements they perceive around their thrones, they are endeavouring to recover their former passive state and to preserve the ' Canning to Parish, December 28, 1824, Foreign Office 3ISS. 2 Enclosed in Pariah's No. 70, December 22, 1824, Foreign Offi<;e MSS. England and South America 239 fruitful activity of human reason. They would wish that truth and error could be united in order to strengthen their Authority. From hence has arisen that inexplicable Dogma of Legitimacy which now disturbs the Nations of ancient Europe, and for the propagation of which the Holy Alliance has created itself. It is indeed a matter of difficulty for this Alliance to acknowledge as legitimate, GoTcrnments whose Origin is not obscure and whose authority is not supported by miracles, but merely by the simple and natural Eights of l^ations. Nevertheless it can never be feared that the Soldiers of the Holy Alli- ance will come over to re-establish on this side of the Ocean the Odious Legitimacy of the Catholic King. Great Britain unfettered by the engagements of the Allies has adopted with respect to the States of America a Conduct noble and truly worthy of a Na- tion the most civilized, the most independent, and certainly the most powerful of Europe. The Solemn Recognition of the Independence of the new Repub- lics must be the Result of those Principles which she has proclaimed; and you may believe Gentlemen, that this important Event with respect to the Prov- inces of Rio de la Plata principally depends on their appearing as a National Body, and capable of main- 240 South-American Independence taining the excellent Institutions they already pos- sess." The inspired hint contained in the last sentence of the message was soon acted upon by the General Con- gress. From day to day, in expectation of what should occur, Parish held the January packet at Buenos Ayres. Then on the 24th of January, 1825, he let her sail, bearing with her to England a copy of a fundamental law of the Congress, placing in a formal manner in the hands of Buenos Ayres those powers which she had already exercised for so many years.^ Nine days later he concluded, in the terms of his instructions, a treaty of amity, commerce and navigation with the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata.^ Before the Buenos Ayrean treaty was concluded. Canning had announced the final step in recognition from the Foreign Office. Fearful of a domination of France in Spanish policy, and determined to maintain British trade, even at the cost of European hostility, Canning had persuaded his reluctant government to send consuls to South American ports in October, 1823. Thus pledged to the ultimate recognition of the provinces, the final act had become only a matter 1 Parish to Canning, No. 6, Jajiuary 24, 1825, Foreign Office MSS. ^B.&P.,XII.,29. England and South America 241 of time and means. But even Canning shared with his colleagues a reluctance to enter upon the estab- lishment of formal diplomatic relations. Once more, as the proposed conference on South America was under consideration', he gave Spain the opportunity to come to his fescue by recognizing her rebellious provinces herself. And once again he offered British mediation for the furtherance of that end. " The British government," he instructed Sir WilKam a Court, at Madrid,^ " have no desire to anticipate Spain in that recognition. On the contrary, it is on every account their wish, that his Catholic majesty should have the grace and advantage of leading the way, in that recognition, among the Powers of Europe. But the Court of Madrid must be aware, that the discretion of his majesty in this respect can- not be indefinitely bound up in that of his Catholic majesty; and that even before many months elapse, the desire now sincerely felt by the British govern- ment, to leave this precedency to Spain, may be over- borne by considerations of a more comprehensive nature, — considerations regarding not only the essen- tial interests of his majesty's subjects, but the rela- tions of the old world with the new." It has been seen that the cry for recognition was 'January 30, 1824, Hansard, N. S., X., 717. 242 South-American Independence loud in Parliament in the spring of 1824, and how the Ministry was induced to justify its inaction in March by making public the Polignac memorandum and the a Court correspondence as showing a deter- mination to admit no European interference in the Spanish question. As the months advanced the oppo- sition became more insistent in its demands for a formal recognition. Spain, at the same time, was content to acknowledge the receipt of Canning's offer of another mediation: but she took no action. The reports of Parish meanwhile, and of the other Com- missioners, were beginning to come in with their accounts of a reasonable stability in some of the South American governments. There were two things which, in Canning's mind, were indispensable preliminaries to a recognition. The former was a promise of permanent independence. The latter was a less reasonable condition, and one which interna- tional law withdraws from the cognizance of outside powers, but which could be insisted upon in this case with impunity. He was not content that a govern- ment should exist capable of maintaining its interna- tional duties, but insisted that it should have the rare Latin- American quality of permanence. The reports of P9,rish led the Foreign Secretary to believe by England and South America 243 August that these had been attained in Buenos Ayres. And so, convinced that it was hopeless to await the co-operation of Spain, Canning conquered the preju- dices of his colleagues and his king, risking thereby the resignation of the Duke of Wellington from the cabinet, and authorized Parish to conclude a commer- cial treaty in August.'^ We do not expect Spain to be reconciled to this step, wrote Canning to George Bosanquet, at Mad- rid, on the last day of the year, but she must long have expected it, for our declarations have left no doubt that we should ultimately be called upon to take it. We have consistently informed her, and so late as 30th January last, that we should be guided by the reports of our agents and the interests of our subjects. Since then the consolidation and capacity of the republics have been advancing, commerce has increased in proportion, and Spain has once more refused to listen to our offers of mediation. We are convinced that her struggle is hopeless. Such exten- sive portions of the world should not continue longer without a recognized existence, so we have sent in- iWalpole, II., 367; cf. Report of General Alvear, June 29, 1824, enclosed in Parish to Canning, November 6, 1824, Foreign Office MSS. 244 South- American Independence structions for a treaty to Buenos Ayres, and are pre- paring them for Colombia and Mexico. The effect of the treaties when ratified ""will be a Diplomatick Recognition of the De facto Governments of those three Countries." On 3d January, 1825, the instructions for the Colombian and Mexican treaties were signed, and the determination of Great Britain was announced to the diplomatic corps in London.^ The reply of Francisco de Zea Bermudez, the Spanish Minister, to George Bosanquet, was filled with bitter complaint that Great Britain should take such action at a moment when — ^with Castilian hope- fulness — everything was favorable for a reconquest of the " rebellious subjects, who, after having per- fidiously seized upon the Government in various parts of his [Catholic majesty's] American Do- minions, now affect to consider themselves the arbi- ters of the destinies & to defend the political In- terests of those very people whom they oppress and destroy." In language of surprise and grief he cited the old treaties between England and Spain, alluded to their joint resistance to " the Usurper of the Throne of France," and the opposition of Great ' See Instructions in Foreign Office MSS. and Report of Min. For Rel. of Mexico, 1826, -B. & F., XIV., 1106. England and South America 245 Britain to " the recognition of the momentary triumph of violence over justice." Was this the time for her to cast aside her treaties and contradict these principles to " sanction the existence of some Gov- ernments de facto the offspring of Eebellion. — In- fants in strength but old in crime, supported by Am- bition, and defended by blood and Anarchy " ? The Minister made the most of the turbulence of South American republicanism, and of the factious ser- vices of the very British Commissioners on whose evidence recognition was to be accorded. He would not attempt, he said, to enumerate the times British subjects had provided the insurgents with arms in defiance of treaty stipulations. He complained that Britain's professed desire for mediation had always been based upon the inadmissible condition of inde- pendence — a charge which some one at the Foreign Office saw fit to deny on the margin of the despatch: " this is not true of any offer from 1812 to 1818." He cited brilliant, but imaginary, victories of the Roy- alist armies in Upper Peru, maintained the unswerv- ing loyalty of the majority of the South Americans, and insisted, in conclusion, that Spain would never abandon in those provinces her legitimate rights.^ To this tirade replied Canning toward the end of 'Zea to Bosanquet, January 21, 1825, Foreign Office M8S. 246 South- American Independence March, in a note to M. de los Eios, his Catholic maj- esty's minister in London.^ He declined to enter into any controversy upon the facts in the case, Spain's weakest point, for de Zea Bermudez had system- atically and blindly denied every essential fact upon which British opinion was based. Upon the theory of recognition he replied at some length in the lan- guage that Mackintosh had thrust upon him for eight years. He saw in the determination of Spain never to recc^nize the independence a complete justifica- tion for British action. " We admit," he stated in conclusion, " that no question of right is decided by our recognition of the new states of America." Four days later he enclosed a copy of his note to Bosan- quet, and hoped sincerely that Spain would let the discussion drop.^ In 1822, nearly two years before the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States saw fit to recognize the independent existence of the South American republics. Although the action was in direct opposition to the avowed policy of Europe, no Power took occasion in a formal manner to reproach 1 Canning to de los Rios, Maroh 25, 1825, Foreign Office MSS. ; Annual Register, 1825, 51.* 2 Canning to Bosanquet, March 29, 1825, Foreign Office MSS. England and South America 247 the United States for this deviation from their course. Instead, the European statesmen admitted at this early date the principle of isolation as applied to American policy, while European journals ex- pressed jealous regrets that their governments could not act in similar manner. In striking contrast to this treatment of recognition by tlie United States is the procession of diplomats to the Foreign Office in the early days of March, 1825, in protest against rec- ognition by Great Britain. Canning had entered deliberately into the course which led him to recognition. The fight he had fought in his own cabinet against an aristocratic hos- tility to the provinces must have prepared him for the treatment which his policy received when pub- licly announced. Evidently by concert, the ministers of Austria, Russia and Prussia called upon him, on the second and fourth of March, to protest in a formal manner against his action. Prince Esterhazy^ announced to the Foreign Sec- retary: " 1. That tbe Court of Vienna views with regret and disapprobation the Course adopted towards the Countries of Spanish America, as being a deviation ' SubBtance of a Communication from Prince Esterhazy, March 2, 1825, ForHgn Office MSS. 248 South- American Independence from the Principles of Legitimacy, which, guide the Politicks of the Great Powers of Europe. " 2nd. That the Court of Vienna does not pretend to erect itself into a Judge of the Interests of Great Britain, nor to decide how far those Interests might, or might not be sufficiently urgent to necessitate a step which. It could not but consider precipitate, even in that point of view. " 3d. But that it could not admit the validity of such a Plea, because, affecting as it does, in this in- stance, the rights of Spain, it might, if once admitted affect equally in some future instance the right of some other Power. " 4th. That the court of Vienna faithful to its principles would not acknowledge any of the Coun- tries of Spanish America, until the Mother Country shall have set the example." In place of the fourth article of the memorandum. Prince Esterhazy desired to substitute, " 4th. That the Court of Vienna, faithful to its principles, would not deviate from those which guided the Politicks of the Great Powers of Europe for these last ten years." The communications from the ministers of Russia and Prussia were identical in substance with that of Austria. Count lieven added ' that " History will ' Substance of a Communication from Count Lieven, March 2, 1825 Foreign Office 3ISS. England and Smith America 249 not foi^et to record that, if in Spain and in France the Cause of legitimate authority obtained an advan- tageous Triumph, if Monarchs long unfortunate, re- covered their Crowns and the Dominions of Their Ancestors, it was more especially to the British Govt that was to be attributed this memorable Reparation of the Evils caused by Revolutionary Violence. " That, applying the Maxims of a Policy so gener- ous, to the Situation of the Peninsula and of her in- surgent Colonies reciprocally, Russia could not for- bear to follow the Example which had been given by England, in those past transactions." By the time that Baron Maltzahn ^ bore to him a third message of this character, the serenity of the Foreign Secretary seems to have been disturbed. " Upon Mr. Canning's taking the liberty of asking," runs the memorandum, " how it was possible to reconcile Avith the strictness of those principles which Baron Maltzahn described as constituting the rule of the conduct of the great Powers of Europe, the will- ingness which had been manifested by some of those Great Powers, after the successes of 1814, not only to make peace with Buonaparte to the exclusion of 1 Substance of a Communication from Baron Maltzahn, Foreign Office MSS. Date uncertain. The memorandum was corrected by the Baron, March 5th, 1825. 250 South- American Independence the Bourbons, but, even after Buonaparte was out of the question, to place some other than the Bourbons on the Throne of France, and with the unqualified acknowledgment of the present King of Sweden, while the legitimate King of Sweden, who has cer- tainly not abdicated his rights, was wandering an exile over Europe. " Baron Maltzahn declared that he was not in- structed to enter into discussion upon these points; but simply to express the dissatisfaction of His Court at the steps taken by His Majesty towards the States of Spanish America." The South American policy of the British Minis- try has now been traced to its conclusion, the recogni- tion of the independence of the South American republics. It has been seen how that Ministry was in the beginning legitimist in its actions, and the center of the opposition to revolutionary tendencies in Europe; how it was legitimist in its real sympathies to the end. The progress of European wars, throw- ing the South Americans upon their own resources, enabled them to establish a freedom of commerce, meaning English commerce, that had been unknown. The restoration of the Bourbons in Spain, unenlight- ened by gleams of intelligence in the policy of Fer- dinand, forced the issue of liberation upon them. England and South America 251 And in this issue the interests of an enormous British trade, amounting to more than three millions in 1821, were involved. Reinforced by a popular sym- pathy, as in the United States, the commercial inter- ests made themselves felt in the Parliamentary oppo- sition to the Ministry, convincing Canning at length that they, rather than legitimist principles in Europe, should be the object of his solicitude. To protect them, he was forced by the threatening action of France in Spain to take the first steps in recognition, which the logic of events forced him as soon as might be, to follow to the end. He called his new world into existence because he must. Upon the details in connection with the opening of diplomatic relations with the new States, but little time need be spent. The first treaty was concluded, with Buenos Ayres, on 2d February. In approbation of his conduct, Parish was commissioned as the first Charge to the Provinces,^ and was accorded his formal recognition in that capacity on the 26th of July, 1825. The Commissioners to Colombia, forc- ing their project upon that government as the price of any treaty, signed their treaty on the 18th of April,^ and ten days later Patrick Campbell was received as 1 Canning to Parish, May 24, 1825, Foreign Office MSS. 'B. & F.; XII., 661. 252 South- American Independence Charge * The Mexican treaty, later to be rejected by Canning, was signed on 6th April by Morier and Ward, the latter being given his audience as Charge on the 21st of May.^ 1 Campbell to Canning, April 28, 1825, Foreign Office MSS. * Ward to Canning, No. 1, May 21, 1825, Foreign Office MSS. BIBLIOGRAPHY. The most important sources for the history of the South American wars of liberation, and the recogni- tion of the republics, are to be found in the archives of the British Foreign Office, at the Public Records Office in London, and in those of the State Depart- ment, in the Bureau of Indexes and Archives at Washington. The Foreign Office correspondence gen- erally is to be found classified in three files for each country. One file contains the instructions and despatches passed between the Secretary for Foreign Relations and the British Minister abroad; the second contains the notes exchanged between the former and the foreign Minister resident in London; the third contains the miscellaneous correspondence of the Foreign Office respecting the foreign country. Given the date, the name of the correspondents, and the country, and any letter can be quickly located. Until about 1835, the State Department kept two letter books, one containing all instructions issued to American ministers, and the other all notes sent to the Legations. In addition two files were kept for each country, comprising the despatches from the 254 South- American Independence American Minister, and the notes from the Legation in Washington. After this date, the consolidated letter-books were abandoned, and separate ones started for each country; so that at present the cor- respondence with each country is to be found in two letter-books and two files. The archives of the Adams family, now deposited in the building of the Massachusetts Historical Society, are rich in materials on foreign affairs. Here are to be found duplicates of most of the cor- respondence of John Quincy Adams, while Secretary of State, as well as the manuscript of his journal and the papers of his father and his son. In the library of the Historical Society of Penn- sylvania are the papers of Joel E. Poinsett, in some fourteen folio volumes. They contain not only dupli- cates of his correspondence with the State Depart- ment, but, in many cases, the originals for which search may be made in vain in Washington. While the recognition of the South American republics is discussed in all the standard works on International Law, it has not been the subject of any exhaustive study. Gibbs, in his treatise, has the rec- ognition of Confederate belligerency in primary con- sideration. The two reports made in the Fifty-fourth Congress deal mainly with the recognition of Cuba, Bibliography 255 and treat the South American cases only as prece- dents. Certain magazine articles, as well as these reports, discuss the matter with the object of deter- mining whose function it is. The history of the wars of liberation has yet to be written. They have already been the subject of a bulky Latin- American literature, but much of this is lessened in value by its partisan character and its lack of critical spirit. Little use has been made of this. The principal sources that have been used in this work are the memoirs and travels of foreigners in South America during the period under considera- tion, the English and American diplomatic cor- respondence, and the original documents to be found in the files of the latter. Bulletins of the armies, newspapers, pamphlet laws and constitutions, and the like are preserved in great numbers in the vari- ous files that have already been described. Among the most useful works that have been used are the following: Adams, C. F. The Struggle for Neutrality in America. New York, 1S71. Adams, Henky. History of the United States of America. 9 vols. New York, 1890. Adams, John. Works. 10 vols. Boston, 1853. Adams, John Quinct. Memoirs. Philadelphia, 1874-1877. (Cited as J. Q. A.) 256 South- American Independence Allison, Sib Aechibald. Lives of Lord Castlereagh and Sir Charles Stewart. 3 vols. London, 1861. Andrews, Joseph. Jovirney from Buenos Ayres, through the Provinces of Cordova, Teeuman, and Salta, to Potosi, Thence by the Deserts of Carauja to Arica, and Subse- quently, to Santiago de Chili and Coquimbo ... in the Years 1825-26. 2 vols. London, 1827. Annals or Congress. The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States. . . . Washington, Gales and Seaton. . . . Annual Register, The. London, 1758. . . . Bache, R. Notes on Colombia, taken in the Years 1822-3. With an Itinerary of the Eoute from Caracas to BogotS,; and an Appendix. By an Officer in the United States Army. Philadelphia, 1827. Bolivar, Simon. South American Independence ! The Speech of His Excellency Gen. Bolivar, on the Act of In- stallation of the Second National Congress of Venezuela, on the 15th day of February, 1819. . . . With an Accurate Account of the Proceedings on That Interesting Occasion. London, 1819. Bolivak, Simon. S. Bolivardo, Praesidi simul atque Duci ex- ercituum supremo civitatum Columbiae Australis. . . . 1822. BoNNYCASTLE, E. H. Spanish America; or a Descriptive, Historical and Geographical Account of the Dominions of Spain in the Western Hemisphere, Continental and Insu- lar. . . Philadelphia, 1819. (Contains a useful bibliography on page 441.) Brackenridge, H. M. Voyage to South America. Performed by Order of the American Government, in the Years 1817 and 1818, in the Frigate Congress. 2 vols. Baltimore, 1819. (Brackenridge was Secretary to the American Com- missioners, and a strong partisan of the South Ameri- cans.) British and Foreign State Papers. London, 1841. . . . (This coUeetion is invaluable for work in diplomatic his- tory. Cited as B. & F.) Bibliography 257 Buenos Ayhes. An Account, Historical, Political and Sta- tistical, of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata; With an Appendix Concerning the Usurpation of Monte Video by the Portuguese and Brazilian Governments. Trans- lated from the Spanish. London, 1825. (This is a semi- official account prepared at the request of the British Agent. It contains an excellent map and numerous docu- ments.) Buenos Ayhes. A Five Years' Residence in Buenos Ayres During the Years 1820 to 1825, Containing Remarks on the Country and Inhabitants, and a Visit to Colonia del Sacramento. By an Englishman. 2d ed. London, 1827. Cadcleugh, Alexander. Travels in South America Dvu-ing the Years 1819-20-21; Containing an Account of the Pres- ent State of Brazil, Buenos Ayres and Chile. 2 vols. London, 1825. Canning, George. The Speeches of the Right Honourable George Canning, with a Memoir of His Life. By R. Thierry, Esq. G vols. London, 1828. Castlereagh. Correspondence, Despatches and Other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquess of Londonderry. Edited by His Brother, Charles William Vane, Marquess of Londonderry. 12 vols. London, c. 1851. Chesterton, George Laval. A Narrative of Proceedings in Venezuela in South America, in the Years 1819 and 1820; With General Observations on the Country and People; the Character of the Republican Government, and its Leading Members, etc. ... By George Laval Chesterton, late Captain and Judge Advocate of the British Legion, Raised for the Service of the Republic of Venezuela. Lon- don, 1820. Chile. Journal of a Residence in Chile. By a Young Ameri- can, Detained in that Country During the Revolutionary Scenes of 1817-18-19. Boston, 1823. Cochrane, Charles Stewart. Journal of a Residence and Travels in Colombia During the Years 1823 and 1824. 2 vols. London, 1825. 258 South- American Independence CocHEANE, Thomas, Tenth Eael of Dundonald. The Au- tobiography of a Seaman. 2 vols. London, 1860. . Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chili, Peru and Brazil, from Spanish and Portuguese Domination. 2 vols. London, 1859. (One of the best accounts of the war, but violently prejudiced against San Martin.) Life of Thomas, Lord Cochrane, Tenth Earl of Dundonald, . . . completing "the Autobiography of a Seaman." By Thomas, Eleventh Earl of Dundonald, and H. E. Fox Bourne. 2 vols. London, 1869. Colombia. Colombia: Being a Geographical, Statistical, Agri- cultural, Commercial and Political Account of That Coun- try, Adapted for the General Reader, the Merchant, and the Colonist. IJondon, 1822. 2 vols. (Perhaps by Zea, the Colombian Agent. The book is a tract in favor of Colombian loans, and contains the documents on recogni- tion by the United States.) Colombia. Letters Written from Colombia During a Journey from Caracas to Bogota, arid Thence to Santa Martha in 1823. London, 1824. Colombia. Recollections of a Service of Three Years During the War-of-Extermination in the Republics of Venezuela and Colombia. By an Officer of the Colombian Navy. 2 vols. London, 1828. Colombia. The Recognition, the Loan and the Colonization of Colombia. London, Baldwin, Cradock & Joy, 1822. CoLTON, Calvin. The Life and Times of Heniy Clay. 2 vols. 2d ed. New York, 1846. Elliot, Jonathan. The American Diplomatic Code. . . . 2 vols. Washington, 1834. EsPEjo, D. GEK6Nisfo. Apuntes Hist6ricos sobre la Espe- dicion Libertadora del Peru, 1820. Buenos Ayres, 1867. ESPEJO, D. GbkSnimo. Recuerdos HisttTricos: San Martin y Bolivar. Entrevista de Guayaquil (1822), . . . ilustrada con dos retrados. Buenos Ayres, 1873. (An attack on Cochrane. Espejo was at Guayaquil at the time of the in- terview.) Bibliography 259 Gibes, Fbederick Watmouth. Recognition: A Chapter from the History of the North American and South American States. London, 1863. Graham, Maria. Journal of a Residence in Chile Durmg the Year 1822; and a Voyage from Chile to Brazil in 1823. London, 1824. Haokett, James. Narrative of the Expedition which Sailed from England in 1817 to Join the South American Pa- triots, Comprising Every Particular Concerned with its Formation, History and Fate; with Observations and Au- thentic Information Elucidating the Real Character of the Contest, Mode of Warfare, State of the Armies, etc. By James Hackett, First Lieutenant of the Late Venezuelan Artillery Brigade. London, 1818. Haigh, Samuel. Sketches of Buenos Ayres and Chile. Lon- don, 1829. Hall, Basil. Extracts from a Journal written on the Coasts of Chili, Peru and Mexico in the Years 1820, 1821, 1822. 2 vols. Edinburgh, 1824. (Very valuable, as the account of an outsider skilled in recording what he saw.) Hall, Francis. Colombia: Its Present State in Respect of Climate, Soil, Population, Government, Commerce, Reve- nue, Manufactures, Arts, Literature, Manners, Education and Inducements to Emigration. . . . Philadelphia, 1825. Hall, William Edward. A Treatise on International Law. 4th ed. Oxford, 1895. Hamilton, J. P. Travels Through the Interior Provinces of Colombia. By J. P. Hamilton, Late Chief Commissioner from His Britannic Majesty to the Republic of Colombia. 2 vols. London, 1827. (In spite of his official character Hamilton saw few of the things he should have seen.) Hansard, T. C. The Parliamentary Debates: Forming a Con- tinuation of the Work Entitled "The Parliamentary His- tory of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803." . . . London. T. C. Hansard. . . . Hawkshaw, John. Reminiscences of South America from Two and a Half Years' Residence in Venezuela. London, 1838. 260 Soufh-American Independence Helms, Anthony Zachabiah. Travels from Buenos Ayres by Potosi to Lima. With an Appendix Containing Cor- rect Descriptions of the Spanish Possessions in South America. 2A ed. London, 1807. HiSTOBlcus. Letters by Historicus on Some Questions of In- ternational Law. Reprinted from " The Times." London, 1863. HoLSTBiN, Gen. H. L. V. Decoudbat. Memoirs of Simon Bolivar, President Liberator of the Republic of Colombia; and of His Principal Generals; Secret History of the Revo- lution, and of the Events Which Preceded It, from 1807 to the Present Time. Boston, 1829. (As his chief -of -staff the author acquired a strong dislike to Bolivar.) Latane, John H. The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America. Baltimore, 1900. Lavaysse. a Statistical, Commercial, and Political Descrip- tion of Venezuela, Trinidad, Margarita, and Tobago. . . from the French of M. Lavaysse. . . . London, 1820. Mackintosh, Sib James. Substance of a Speech of Sir James Mackintosh, in the House of Commons, June 15, 1824, on Presenting a Petition from the Merchants of London for the Recognition of the Independent States Established in the Countries of South America Formerly Subject to Spain. London, 1824. McMaster, John Bach. A History of the People of the United States, from the Revolution to the Civil War. New York, .5 vols., 1882. . . . Markham, Clements R. A History of Peru. Chicago, 1892. Mathison, Gilbert Fabquhae. Narrative of a Visit to Brazil, Chile, Peru, and the Sandwich Islands, during the Years 1821 and 1822. . . . London, 1825. MiERP, .John. Travels in Chile and La Plata, Including Ac- counts Respecting the Geography, Geology, Statistics, Government, Finances, Agriculture, Manners, and Cus- toms, and the Mining Operations in Chile. 2 vols. Lon- don, 1826. Bibliography 261 Miller, JohiV. Memoirs of General Miller, in the Service of the Republic of Peru. By John Miller. 2 vols. London, 1S28. (These memoirs of the most successful foreign of- ficer in the service of the liberating army, form the most valuable single source on the history of the wars. The military operations are particularly well treated.) MiEANDA. The History of Don Francisco de Miranda's At- tempt to Effect a Revolution in South America, in a Series of Letters, by a. Gentleman Who Was an Officer under That General, to His Friend in the United States. To Which Are Annexed Sketches of the Life of Miranda, and Geographical Notices of Caraccas. Boston, 1808. Mitre, Baetolome. Historia de San Martin y de la Emanci- pation Sud- Americana (segun nuevos documentos). 3 vols. Buenos Ayres, 1887. MiTKE, Babtolome. The Emancipation of South America. Being a Condensed Translation by William Pilling of the History of San Martin by General Don Bartolomfi Mitre, First Constitutional President of the Argentine Republic. London, 1893. MoLLTEN, G. Travels in the Republic of Colombia, in the Years 1822 and 1823. Translated from the French. Lon- don, 1824. Monet, H. D. The United States and the Spanish-American Colonies. A Reply. ]Vor*7i Am. Rev., CLXV., 356. MoNTEAGUDO, Beenaedo. Peruvian Pamphlet; Being an Ex- position of the Administrative Labours of the Peruvian Government, from the Time of Its Formation, till the 15th of July, 1822; Presented to the Council by the Min- ister of State and Foreign Relations, ... in Conformity with a Protectoral Decree of the 18th of January. Lon- don, 1823. (As confidential agent of San Martin, Mon- teagudo was in a position to know the facts. His work is partisan in character.) Moses, Beeistaed. The Establishment of Spanish Rule in America. An Introduction to the History and Politics of Spanish America. New York, 1898. 262 South- American Independence Moses, Bernard. Political Constitution of Colonibia. Am. Acad. Polit. and Soc. Sci., III., 57. Parish, Sir Woodbine. Buenos Ayres and the Provinces of the Eio de la Plata: from Their Discovery and Conquest by the Spaniards to the Establishment of Their Political Independence. 2d ed. London, 1852. Payne, Edward John. History of European Colonies. Lon- don, 1877. Pazos, Don Vicente. Letters on the United Provinces of South America, Addressed to the Hon. Henry Clay. New York and London, 1819. DE Pkadt, Arbe. Europe and America, in 1821; with an Ex- amination of the Plan Laid before the Cortes of Spain, for the Recognition of the Independence of South Amer- ica. Translated from the French of Abb6 de Pradt by J. D. Williams. 2 vols. London, 1822. Present State. The Present State of Colombia; by an Of- ficer, late in the Colombian Service. London, 1827. Proctor, Robert. Narrative of a Journey Across the Cor- dillera of the Andes, and of a Residence in Lima, and Other Parts of Peru, in the Years 1823 and 1824. London, 1825. Renggek, J. R., AND Longchamps. The Reign of Doctor Joseph Gaspard Roderick de Francia in Paraguay; being an Account of a Six Years' Residence in That Republic, from July, 1819, to May, 1825. London, 1827. Republic of Colombia: An Account of Its Boundaries, Ex- tent . . . and History. Printed from the Article in the Seventh Edition of the Encyclopoedia Britannica. New York, 1830. Richardson, James. A Compilation of the Messages and Pa- pers of the Presidents. 1789-1897. Published by Author- ity of Congress. 10 vols. Washington, 1896. . . . Robinson, Fat. Mexico and Her Military Chieftains, from the Revolution of Hidalgo to the PreseiJl Time. Phila- delphia, 1847. Bibliography 263 ROBiKSOX, Wir.LiAJt Davis. Memoirs of the Mexican Revolu- tion: Including a Narrative of tlie Expedition of General Xavier Mina. 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1820. EoDNEY AND Gkaham. The Reports on the Present State of the United Provinces of South America. . . . London, 1819. (These discordant reports were immediately re- printed, with introduction and notes by Baldwin, Cra- dock & Joy, the London printers who issued so much of the South American literature.) ROMEEO. Spanish American Independence and the United States. Noi-tli Am. Rev., Vol. 165, Pages 70, 356, 553. (Senator Money took exception to these articles in the paper above cited. Romero, who was minister from Mex- ico, replied at length.) SCHMIDTILETEK, PETER. Travels into Chile, over the Andes, in the Years 1820 and 1821, . . . London, 1824. DE SciiRYArER, Simon. Esquisse de la Vie Bolivar. Brussels, 1899. South-American. Outline of the Revolution in Spanish America; or an Account of the Origin, Progress, and Ac- tual State of the War Carried on between Spain and Spanisl America; Containing the Principal Facts Which Have Marked the Struggle. By a South-American. New York, 1817. State or Colombia, or Reports of the Secretaries of State ot the Republic of Colombia, Presented to the First Consti- tutional Congress in the Year 1823. . . . Translated from the Official Documents. London, 1824. Stevenson, W. B. A Historical and Descriptive Narrative of a Twenty Years^ Residence in South America. 3 vols. London, 1825. Stille, Charles J. The Life and Public Services of Joel R. Poinsett. Pa. Mag. Hist, and Biog., XII., 129, 257. Thomson, James. Letters on the Moral and Religious State of South America, Written During a Residence of Nearly Seven Years in Buenos Ayres, Chile, Peru, and Colombia. London, 1827. 264 South- American Independence United States Documents, 54 Congress, 2 Session, Senate Document 56; Power to Recognize the Independence of a New Foreign State. (The Hale Report.) United States Documents, 54 Congress, 2 Session, Senate Report No. 1,160; Recognition of Cuban Independence. (The Cameron Report, from Com. For. Rel.) Walton, Wllliam. An Expos6 of the Dissensions of Span- ish America. . . . Intended as a Means to Induce the Medi- atory Interference of Great Britain. London, 1814. Wharton, Francis. A Digest of the International Law of the United States. 3 yols. 2d ed. Washington, 1887. Wharton, Francis. The Revolutionary Diplomatic Corre- spondence of the United States. 6 vols. Washington, 1889. WiLcocio:, Samuel Hull. History of the Viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres; Containing the Most Accurate Details Rel- ative to the Topography, History, Commerce, Population, Government, etc., etc., of That Valuable Colony. London, 1807.