(Jnrn^U Ham ^rljcol IGtbtarg 
 
Cornell University Library 
 KF 5599.N62 1917 
 
 V.1 
 
 The law of eminent domain; a treatise on 
 
 3 1924 020 025 882 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924020025882 
 
THE LAW 
 
 OF 
 
 EMINENT DOMAIN 
 
 A Treatise on the Principles Which Affect 
 the Taking of Property for 
 the Public Use 
 
 By 
 PHILIP NICHOLS 
 
 Formerly Assistant Corporation Counsel of the City of Boston 
 
 Author of " The Law of Land Damages in Massachusetts." "The Power 
 
 of Eminent Domain" and "Taxation in Massachusetts" 
 
 In Two Volumes 
 
 VOLUME I 
 
 A L B A N Y, N. Y. 
 
 MATTHEW BENDER & COMPANY 
 
 Incorporated 
 
 1917 
 
Copyright, 1909 
 By Matthew Bender & Company 
 
 Copyright, 1917 
 
 By Matthew Bender & Company 
 
 Incorporated 
 
 J. B. LYON COMPANY 
 
 PRINTERS AND ELECTROTYPERS 
 
 ALBANY, N. Y. 
 
PREFACE TO SECOND EDITIO 
 
 Eight years ago the author of this work issued a volume 
 of some four hundred and twenty-two pages devoted to a 
 discussion of the constitutional limitations upon the power 
 of eminent domain, and while he has had no cause to com- 
 plain of the manner in which his work was received by the 
 critics of the various law reviews, or of the consideration 
 which has been given to his opinions and conclusions by 
 the courts of last resort of many of the states, and while 
 it is doubtless true that a large proportion of the cases 
 arising out of the attempted exercise of the power of 
 eminent domain which reach the courts of last resort in- 
 volve questions of constitutional law, yet it must be con- 
 ceded that in the ordinary eminent domain case such as the 
 average attorney encounters in his practice, which involves 
 merely questions as to the measure of compensation and 
 the proper procedure to be employed, the volume in ques- 
 tion was of no service whatever. The demand upon the 
 author to extend the scope of his work so as to cover all 
 phases of the law of eminent domain has been sufficiently 
 insistent to induce him to attempt the task, and the present 
 treatise is the result. 
 
 There are subjects included in the law of eminent domain 
 which, although no constitutional question is involved, 
 depend so far upon the application of general principles 
 of law that to discuss them in a work intended for use 
 throughout the United States encounters no insuperable 
 difficulties on account of the multiplicity of jurisdictions in 
 which they are applicable. Procedure is however a diffi- 
 cult subject to handle in a work of this character, since it 
 is entirely statutory, and no two states have the same 
 statutes and a single state frequently has entirely different 
 systems for condemnation for different purposes or by 
 different municipalities. To cite decisions without setting 
 
 [iii] 
 
iv Preface. 
 
 out the statutes to which they apply would be misleading, 
 but to set out all the statutes of the different states would 
 be obviously impossible. The author has devoted five 
 chapters to procedure, but has attempted to confine himself 
 to principles of general application in a considerable group 
 of states rather than to cite indiscriminately a vast mass of 
 unrelated cases construing the varying statutory procedure 
 of the different states. 
 
 By producing a work upon a topic already specifically 
 covered not only by text books of standard authority but 
 by exhaustive articles in encyclopedias of recent date the 
 author does not impliedly disparage the soundness or 
 thoroughness of the treatment of his subj^ect by others ; but 
 it is undoubtedly the fact that so many cases involving 
 directly or indirectly the law of .eminent domain are hidden 
 away in the reports in such a manner as to escape discovery 
 unless the case itself is read from beginning to end that 
 no treatment of the law of eminent domain as a whole how- 
 ever carefully prepared is or ever can be complete. So 
 also an author in active practice who has specialized upon 
 the topic treated in his own book is bound to have 
 unearthed cases in preparing a brief or an opinion which 
 the most careful text writer, in the limited time which he 
 can devote to each narrow point, may well have overlooked. 
 In view of the fact that of the approximately twenty thou- 
 sand citations in this work over one-third are to cases which 
 have never previously been cited in a text book upon this 
 subject, the present work cannot be wholly without value, 
 merely as a digest. The author has moreover to a limited 
 extent ventured to discuss the fundamental principles upon 
 which the disputed points in the law of eminent domain 
 depend, and even if his own conceptions are unsound they 
 may at least be of the interest which attaches itself to the 
 unusual in that they have been formed from the point of 
 view of one who believes that the rights of the public should 
 receive as much consideration from the courts as the rights 
 of the individual owner of property. 
 
 The responsibility of an author who issues a text book 
 
Peeface. V 
 
 upon a subject with which the average jurist is as unfa- 
 miliar as he is with eminent domain is a grave one. The 
 general practitioner, whether at the bar or on the bench, 
 confronted with a problem in an unfamiliar field, must often 
 fall back upon the most available text book, and the errors 
 of the text writer are frequently perpetuated in the opinions 
 of the court. The author has often been appalled to find 
 his own opinions of the law as set forth in his earlier writ- 
 ings, parts.of which were completed when he was fresh from 
 the law school, cited as authoritative by the highest courts 
 of states within which he has never set foot. But grave as 
 is this responsibility, graver still is that of the writer who 
 in any way contributes to the downfall of our once vener- 
 ated system of constitutional government. If the author 
 of this work has contributed in the slightest degree to the 
 conception that what has tended to bring that system into 
 popular disfavor is the distortion of its essential features, 
 and that when it has been left in the form devised by the 
 founders of the republic the evils which threaten its con- 
 tinued existence have never appeared, the time and labor 
 expended upon this work will not have been wholly wasted. 
 
 PHILIP NICHOLS. 
 Boston, Massachusetts. 
 February first, 1917. 
 
PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION. 
 
 The scope of this work is limited to the fundamental 
 principles which underlie the power of eminent domain, 
 define its extent and restrict its exercise; in other words, 
 it is a treatise on that branch of constitutional law which 
 relates to the taking of private property for the public use. 
 This may seem a narrow field; but it has been suggested 
 by the most eminent authorities that the text-book of the 
 present day (excepting elementary works on the one hand 
 and monumental treatises on the other) should confine 
 itself to a narrow field, to a subdivision of one of the recog- 
 nized branches of the law. The present work follows this 
 suggestion and seeks to justify its existence by discussing 
 a subject to which, it is believed, no other entire volume has 
 previously been devoted, although, of course, it has been 
 treated at length in works both on Eminent Domain and on 
 Constitutional Law. The study of eminent domain natu- 
 rally divides itself into two parts, principles and procedure, 
 and in producing a work intended for use throughout the 
 United States the choice is not difficult. The procedure in 
 eminent domain differs so widely throughout the United 
 States, depending as it does entirely upon local statutes, 
 that the decisions of one State are of little value in con- 
 sidering similar questions arising in a different State, and 
 depending upon different statutory provisions; but the 
 decisions bearing upon the broad constitutional limitations 
 which restrict the power of eminent domain throughout the 
 United States carry as much weight from one end of the 
 country to the other as they are entitled to by the standing 
 of the court which pronounces them and the soundness of 
 its reasoning. 
 
 [vii] 
 
viii Peeface. 
 
 Nevertheless, in these days of cyclopedias and digests, 
 national in scope, few text-books are of real value unless 
 the text serves as more than a series of convenient pegs 
 upon which to hang no matter how exhaustive a citation 
 of authorities. The text-writer must attempt a coherent 
 framework, must indulge in some reasoning and may even 
 express his own opinion of ' ' what the law ought to be. ' ' 
 No subject Isetter lends itself to ■such treatment than con- 
 stitutional law, and none will more repay careful study by 
 all persons interested in the preservation of their own insti- 
 tutions. On the one hand we see the Constitution and its 
 most conscientious expounders bitterly denounced by well- 
 meaning men of many different views, who agree only in 
 decrying " judicial usurpation " when the supreme law of 
 the land is held to stand in the way of their schemes for 
 bettering humanity at the expense of those safeguards 
 against class legislation and interference with individual 
 liberty which have made this country what it is to-day; 
 on the other hand, we find that in many of those common- 
 wealths which are called, not without reason, most progress- 
 ive, the courts have assumed or been granted the power to 
 supervise every legislative enactment, and with a veto 
 which really forbids brand what seems to them merely 
 unwise or unfair as unconstitutional. Between these ex- 
 tremes lies the true function of a written Constitution; 
 and it cannot but gratify any earnest student of constitu- 
 tional principles to note how steadfastly many of our courts 
 have adhered to the ancient doctrines, how carefully they 
 have restrained themselves from encroaching upon the 
 prerogatives of the Legislature and how firmly they have 
 extended their protection to the unpopular few when their 
 fundamental rights have been threatened with violation by 
 unconstitutional legislation passed in compliance with the 
 outcry of the unthinking many. 
 
 This book was compiled during eleven years' service in 
 the Law Department of the city of Boston. During that 
 
Peeface. ix 
 
 period many of the questions discussed in the text arose 
 to be considered in actual practice, and much of the ma- 
 terial of the notes was gathered by Ihe author for his own 
 use in meeting them. In spare moments the book has been 
 completed and put into the form of a text-book, and the 
 author trusts that it may be of some service to the pro- 
 fession. The citations on points directly within the scope 
 of the work have been intended to be exhaustive, but on 
 matters only incidental to the main subject the author has 
 contented himself with referring to one or two leading cases 
 or to a text-book of recognized standing. Extracts from opin- 
 ions of the courts and abstracts of decided cases have not 
 been interjected with much frequency, but to make the work 
 of as much service as possible to attorneys who do not have 
 access to a complete law library, citations have been made 
 to the principal series of unofficial reports and selected 
 cases as well as to the official reports. 
 
 PHILIP NICHOLS. 
 Boston, Mass., April 13, 1909. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 VOLUME I. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 The Origin of the Power, and the Causes of Its Gradual, Suboedina- 
 TiON TO THE Rights of Private Property. tage 
 
 Seo. 1. Eminent Domain defined 1 
 
 2. Early history of Eminent Domain in European countries 4 
 
 3. Eminent Domain in the American colonies 13 
 
 4. The term " Eminent Domain " 22 
 
 5. The power of Parliament absolute 25 
 
 6. The British constitution 26 
 
 7. Sovereign powers of the states 27 
 
 8. The restrictions upon tie powers of the representatives 
 
 of the people 28 
 
 9. TTie change of the attitude of the public toward the bill 
 
 of rights 31 ■ 
 
 10. The three canons of constitutional government 34 
 
 11. The disregard of the presumption in favor of the validity 
 
 of an act of the legislature 35 
 
 12. The extension of the scope of the bill of rights 38 
 
 13. The rise and fall of the independent judiciary 40 
 
 14. The effect of the loss of an independent judiciary upon 
 
 the power of Eminent Domain 45 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Nature and Characteristics of the Power. 
 
 Sec. 15. Eminent Domain distinguished from other governmental 
 
 powers 48 
 
 16. The necessity of keeping in mind the distinction between 
 
 Eminent Domain and other governmental powers .... 56 
 
 17. Eminent Domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and even 
 
 of self-government 58 
 
 18. Eminent Domain is based upon sovereignty and not upon 
 
 the ultimate ownership of the soil 60 
 
 19. The power to authorize the exercise of Eminent Domain 
 
 is ordinarily in the legislature 63 
 
 20. What property is subject to Eminent Domain 65 
 
 [xi] 
 
xii Table of Contents. 
 
 FAGB 
 
 Sec. 21. Nature of the title created by Eminent Domain — whether 
 
 original or derivative 70 
 
 22. The power of Eminent Domain is inalienable 74 
 
 CHAPTER in. 
 
 Limitations upon the Powee of Eminent Domain. 
 
 Sec. 23. Constitutional limitations — the speeifle provision 80 
 
 24. Constitutional limitations — the due process clause 81 
 
 25. Other constitutional limitations 86 
 
 26. Treatment of constitutional questions 88 
 
 27. Who may raise objections to the constitutionality of an 
 
 attempted exercise of eminent domain 90 
 
 28. Taking of property situated in another state 92 
 
 29. Taking of property for the use of another state 96 
 
 30. Taking by a state of property within the control or juris- 
 
 diction of the United States 98 
 
 31. Obstruction of navigable waters by a state 100 
 
 32. Interference by a state with interstate commerce 103 
 
 33. Violation by a state of rights secured by a treaty 105 
 
 34. Taiiiig of property for the use of the United States. . . . 106 
 
 35. Taking of property by authority of the United States by 
 
 corporations engaged in interstate commerce 110 
 
 36. Taking of the property of a state by authority of the 
 
 United States 112 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 The Public Use — Genebal Principles. 
 
 Sec. 37. The basis of the rule that property cannot be taken 
 
 except for the public use 114 
 
 38. Provisions of the state constitutions extending the uses 
 
 for which property may be taken 122 
 
 39. Provisions of the federal constitution 126 
 
 40. Difficulty in defining " Public Use " 128 
 
 41. Historical development 133 
 
 42. Other considerations affecting the meaning of "Public 
 
 Use " 135 
 
 43. Variation in local conditions 137 
 
 44. The three classes of public improvements for which Emi- 
 
 nent Domain may be exercised 138 
 
 45. The true meaning of " Public Use " 140 
 
 46. Number participating in or benefiting by the use 140 
 
 47. Character of party exercising the power 143 
 
 48. Incidental private benefit 146 
 
Table of Contents. xiii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sec. 49. Disposal of surplus for private use 149 
 
 50. Uses neither public nor private 151 
 
 51. Aid from other branches of the law 152 
 
 52. Primarily a legislative, ultimately a judicial, question. . . 154 
 
 53. Government buildings 158 
 
 54. Public health and safety 160 
 
 55. Aesthetic purposes 161 
 
 56. Parks 163 
 
 57. Public recreation 164 
 
 58. Restrictions imposed for artistic reasons 166 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 The Public Use — Public Service. 
 
 Sec. 59. What constitutes a public service 168 
 
 60. Uses incidental to public service 170 
 
 61. Public highways 172 
 
 62. Purposes incidental to public ways 177 
 
 63. Taking of remnants — excess takings 177 
 
 64. Wien the discontinuance of a highway must be for the 
 
 public use 182 
 
 65. Steam railroads 184 
 
 66. Uses incidental to the construction and operation of rail- 
 
 roads 188 
 
 67. Spur tracks 191 
 
 68. Street railways 195 
 
 69. Traffic and transportation by water 197 
 
 70. Public water supply 200 
 
 71. Artificial light 203 
 
 72. Generation and distribution of power 205 
 
 73. Pipe lines for conveying natural gas and petroleum 209 
 
 74. Teleg^raph and telephone lines 210 
 
 75. Public education — schools, colleges and libraries 211 
 
 76. Public cemeteries 212 
 
 77. Common sewers 213 
 
 78. Goods delivered without the aid of a franchise 214 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 The Public Use — Aid to Private Enterprise. 
 
 Sec. 79. Direct aid to private enterprise unconstitutional 217 
 
 80. Factories, stores and farms 218 
 
 81. Magnitude of the enterprise does not make the use public 220 
 
 82. Exceptions based on historical grounds or on abnormal 
 
 local conditions 222 
 
xiv Table of Contents. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sec. 83. The Mill Acts 224 
 
 84. Mills — the Massachusetts doctrine 228 
 
 85. Private roads 234 
 
 86. Drainage of swamps and lowlands 237 
 
 87. Drainage of swamps to abate a nuisance 238 
 
 88. Compulsory joint drainage under the police power 240 
 
 89. Reclamation of wet land as a public use 242 
 
 90. Levees and sea walls 246 
 
 91. Irrigation of arid lands , 247 
 
 92. Mines and mining 252 
 
 93. Lumbering and log driving '• • 257 
 
 94. Clearing a doubtful title 259 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 What Constitutes a Taking. 
 
 Sec. 95. Scope of the prohibition against taking without compen- 
 sation 261 
 
 96. Taking of property at time of war or other calamity. . . 263 
 
 97. Taking under the power of taxation 265 
 
 98. The requirement of personal services 270 
 
 99. Taking of property un^er the police power — regulations 
 
 affecting the public health, morals or safety 271 
 
 100. Police r^ulations not affecting the public health, morals 
 
 or safety 276 
 
 101. Regulations which are really the taking of an easement 
 
 by Eminent Domain 279 
 
 102. Actual appropriation a taking, even if for public health, 
 
 morals or safety 282 
 
 103. Fines and forfeitures 283 
 
 104. Destruction of property to abate a nuisance 284 
 
 105. Legislation aimed to prevent the tieing up of productive 
 
 property ' 288 
 
 106. Subjection to police regulations as result of a taking. . . 290 
 
 107. Taking by Eminent Domain defined 291 
 
 108. Damaging property not necessarily a taking 293 
 
 109. The fallacy of the argument that a damaging is a taking 297 
 
 110. The question whether a damaging is a taking no longer 
 
 open 304 
 
 111. Erection of permanent structures upon private land 
 
 without formal condemnation 307 
 
 112. Entry for a temporary purpose 309 
 
 113. Covering land with earth, sewage or water 311 
 
 114. Pollution of the air — smells — noises 316 
 
Table op Contents. xv 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Seo. 115. Deprivation of access — discontinuance of streets and 
 
 other public works 319 
 
 116. Discontinuance or change of use when betterments have 
 
 been assessed 327 
 
 117. Authorization of nuisances 334 
 
 CHAPTER VIll. 
 
 What Constitutes Property. 
 
 Sec. 118. "Property" includes every interest in the thing takeii. 336 
 
 119. Estates successive in time — leasehold interests 337 
 
 120. Interests in real estate not successive in time 343 
 
 121. Easements and profits 346 
 
 122. Liens and mortgages 353 
 
 123. Franchises 357 
 
 124. Good-will 366 
 
 125. Knowledge, labor and offices 368 
 
 126. Property of public service corporations 370 
 
 127. Rails, pipes and wires in public highways 373 
 
 128. Rights in existing crossings 384 
 
 129. Property of charitable corporations 389 
 
 130. Property of a state 389 
 
 131. Twofold character of municipal corporations 390 
 
 132. Property of municipal corporations — streets 394 
 
 133. Property of municipal corporations other than streets. . 398 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 The Taking of Waters — Riparian Rights. 
 
 Sec. 134. Riparian rights are property 404 
 
 135. The distinction between public and private waters 407 
 
 136. Streams and bodies of water classilied 411 
 
 137. Public waters are held by the state in trust for the people. 413 
 
 138. The public rights do not extend above high water mark. . 415 
 
 139. The public right of navigation 419 
 
 140. The right of access to the channel 424 
 
 141. Limitations upon the right of access 427 
 
 142. Riparian owners' other rights 430 
 
 143. Diversion of water 432 
 
 144. The doctrine of prior appropriation 436 
 
 145. Riparian rights of a municipal corporation 438 
 
 146. Pollution by a municipal sewer system 441 
 
 147. Prohibition of the exercise of the riparian right of rea- 
 
 sonable pollution 448 
 
 148. Wharves and wharfage rights 453 
 
 149. Authorized structures in public waters 458 
 
xvi Table of Contents. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 The Extent of the Interest Taken foe the Publio Use. 
 
 Sec. 150. The public ordinarily holds an easement only 461 
 
 151. Wlat is meant by " additional servitude " 463 
 
 152. Exercise of the public easement causing direct injury 
 
 outside the limits of the land taken. 465 
 
 153. Limitation of the use of adjacent land by the establish- 
 
 ment of the public easement 468 
 
 154. A highway an easement «. 469 
 
 155. Urban and rural servitudes 474 
 
 156. Right of the owner of the fee to make use of the space 
 
 within the limits of a highway 476 
 
 157. Ownership of the earth and minerals within the limits 
 
 of a highway 482 
 
 158. Ownership of the trees and herbage in a public highway. 485 
 
 159. Rights of the abutter when the fee is in the public. . . . 488 
 
 160. Origin of the doctrine of the abutters' easements 491 
 
 161. Nature and extent of the abutters' easements 503 
 
 162. Change of grade of a public highway 507 
 
 163. Extent of the right of the public to change the grade of 
 
 a public way without compensation to the owners of 
 
 abutting property 513 
 
 164. The right of the public to reserve the whole or part of a 
 
 highway for special forms of travel 517 
 
 165. Structures obstructing the highway, the ultimate object 
 
 of which is to make general travel more convenient. 518 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Additional Servitudes upon Land Taken foe Highway Purposes. 
 
 Sec. 166. Vehicles of unusual character — stands in the highway. 520 
 
 167. Steam railroads ia public highways 522 
 
 168. Steam railroads iu public highways — miscellaneous 
 
 points 531 
 
 169. Steam railroads crossing public highways 534 
 
 170. Street railways of the earlier types 536 
 
 171. Electric street railways 540 
 
 172. Street railways in country roads 544 
 
 173. Interurban electric railways 545 
 
 174. Street railways carrying merchandise 548 
 
 175. Projecting rails and reserved spaces 550 
 
 176. Street railways — viaducts, feed wires, increased traffic, 
 
 change of system 552 
 
 177. Special damage to adjoining premises 553 
 
 178. Elevated railways 555 
 
Table of Contents. xvii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sec. 179. The New York elevated railway cases 557 
 
 180. Elevated railways in other jurisdictions 561 
 
 181. Subways 564 
 
 182. Subterranean pipes 569 
 
 183. Sewers and drains 570 
 
 184. Water pipes and gas pipes 572 
 
 185. Overhead wires 575 
 
 186. Telegraph and telephone lines 576 
 
 187. Electric light lines 582 
 
 188. Buildings and other structures in public highways. . . . 585 
 
 189. Exercise of the highway easement causing direct injury 
 
 to land outside the limits of the way 589 
 
 190. The measure of damages for an additional servitude. . 591 
 
 191. Elements of damage in the case of an additional servitude 594 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Additional Servitudes upon Land Taken fob Pubposes Other than 
 
 HlGHV^ATS. 
 
 Sec. 192. The estate of a railroad company in its location 599 
 
 193. Change of grade — additional tracks 602 
 
 194. Buildings and other structures upon railroad locations. . 604 
 
 195. The ownership of timber, materials and minerals upon a 
 
 railroad location 608 
 
 196. Exercise of the railroad easement causing direct injury to 
 
 land outside the limits of the railroad location 610 
 
 197. Canals and turnpikes 612 
 
 198. Telegraph lines 613 
 
 199. Drains and sewers 614 
 
 200. The right of flowage 614 
 
 201. Public water supply 615 
 
 202. Parks, public buildings and other public uses 617 
 
 203. Change of the public easement 618 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 The Constitutional Right to Compensation. 
 
 Sec. 204. The basis of the right to compensation 621 
 
 205. Compensation must be in money 625 
 
 206. The right to compensation must be unconditional 627 
 
 207. Effect of failure to provide compensation 628 
 
 208. Just compensation is what the owner has lost, not what 
 
 the condemning party has gained 630 
 
 209. Compensation need not be paid in advance 631 
 
 210. When property is taken by the public 635 
 
 ii 
 
xviii Table of Contents. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sec. 211. When property is taken by a private corporation 638 
 
 212. Special constitutional provisions 639 
 
 213. Application of the special constitutional provisions. . . . 642 
 
 214. Compensation in advance not required when no prop- 
 
 erty is taken '. 645 
 
 215. Possibility of denial of liability 648 
 
 216. Interest 649 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 Valuation of Property Taken foe PubiiIC Use. 
 
 Sec. 217. Market value the measure of compensation 658 
 
 218. Ascertainment of the market value of real estate 663 
 
 219. Market value is based on the most advantageous use of 
 
 the property 665 
 
 220. Special availability for public use as an element of value. 671 
 
 221. Appreciation in value from the improvement itself. . . . 675 
 
 222. Compensation when the property is not marketable. . . . 677 
 
 223. Valuation of the plant of a public service corporation. . 679 
 
 224. Effect of impending destruction upon market value. .. . 688 
 
 225. When the full market value of the land must be paid 
 
 for the taking of an easement 688 
 
 226. Vegetable growth and mineral deposits 692 
 
 227. Buildings upon land taken for public use 693 
 
 228. Fixtures and personal property 696 
 
 229. Destruction of business conducted upon the land taken. 698 
 
 230. Improvements made by condemnor prior to a valid taking 701 
 
 231. Effect of diversity of interests upon the total com- 
 
 pensation 707 
 
 232. Leased property — rights of landlord and tenant against 
 
 each other 710 
 
 233. Measure of tenant's compensation 714 
 
 234. Buildings and fixtures upon leased land 716 
 
 235. Mutual restrictions 719 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 VOLUME II. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 Compensation When Part of a Tract is Taken. page 
 
 Sec. 236. Just compensation includes damages to remaining land. 721 
 
 237. Measure of damages when part of a tract is taken 723 
 
 238. Elements of damage which are recoverable 729 
 
 239. Elements of damage which are not/ recoverable 736 
 
 240. Injury to other separate parcels of the same owner. .. . 737 
 
 241. What constitutes a separate parcel 739 
 
 242. Compensation when part of the location of a public 
 
 service corporation is taken 746 
 
 243. Measure of damages when a highway is laid out across a 
 
 railroad 746 
 
 244. Measure of damages when one railroad is laid out across 
 
 another 753 
 
 245. Measure of damages when a telegraph line is laid out 
 
 along a railroad location 755 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 The Set-off of Benefits. 
 Sec. 246. A public improvement sometimes benefits the remaining 
 
 land 760 
 
 247. What constitutes a benefit in the legal sense 762 
 
 248. The different classes of benefits 764 
 
 249. The distinction between general and special benefits. . . . 765 
 
 250. Difference in market value the original test 771 
 
 251. The rule that special benefits only may be set off, but 
 
 that they may be set off from the entire compensation. 774 
 
 252. The rule that benefits cannot be set off from the value 
 
 of the land taken 777 
 
 253. The merits of the foregoing rule 778 
 
 254. Special constitutional provisions 783 
 
 255. Set off of benefits compared with special assessments. . 784 
 
 256. Set-off from the damages when no property is taken. . . . 788 
 
 257. United States 790 
 
 258. Alabama 791 
 
 259. Arizona 792 
 
 fxixl 
 
XX Table of Contents. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sec. 260. Arkansas 793 
 
 261. California 793 
 
 262. Colorado 794 
 
 263. Connecticut 794 
 
 264. Delaware 794 
 
 265. District of Columbia 795 
 
 266. Florida 795 
 
 267. Georgia 795 
 
 268. Idaho ^. 795 
 
 269. Illinois *. 796 
 
 270. Indiana 797 
 
 271. Iowa 798 
 
 272. Kansas 798 
 
 273. Kentucky 799 
 
 274. Louisiana 800 
 
 275. Maine 800 
 
 276. Maryland 800 
 
 277. Massachusetts 801 
 
 278. Michigan 803 
 
 279. Miimesota 803 
 
 280. Mississippi 803 
 
 281. Missouri 804 
 
 282. Montana 805 
 
 283. Nebraska 805 
 
 284. Nevada 805 
 
 285. New Hampshire 806 
 
 286. New Jersey 806 
 
 287. New Mexico 807 
 
 288. New York 807 
 
 289. North Carolina 808 
 
 290. North Dakota 808 
 
 291. Ohio 809 
 
 292. Oklahoma 810 
 
 293. Oregon 810 
 
 294. Pennsylvania 810 
 
 295. Rhode Island 811 
 
 296. South Carolina 811 
 
 297. South Dakota 811 
 
 298. Tennessee 812 
 
 299. Texas 812 
 
 300. Utah 813 
 
 301. Vermont 813 
 
 302. Virginia 813 
 
 303. "Washington 814 
 
Table of Contents. xxi 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sec. 304. West Virginia 81* 
 
 305. Wiseonsin 815 
 
 306. Wyoming 815 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 Damages When no Propeett is Taken. 
 Sec. 307. The growth of the conception that damage from public 
 
 improvements should be paid for 816 
 
 308. Compensation under the English statutes for land "in- 
 
 juriously affected" — the Lands Clauses Act 818 
 
 309. Compensation for damage to land under the Massachu- 
 
 setts statutes 822 
 
 310. The differences between the English and the Massachu- 
 
 setts rules 842 
 
 311. The adoption of the " damage clause " in the state con- 
 
 stitutions 844 
 
 312. What constitutes damage in the constitutional sense. .. . 845 
 
 313. The interpretation of the " damage clause " compared 
 
 with that of the Lands Clauses Act 853 
 
 314. The different classes of damage 854 
 
 315. Direct injury to property 855 
 
 316. Legalized nuisances or quasi-nuisances 856 
 
 317. Injury from the construction and operation of a steam 
 
 railroad upon its own location 861 
 
 318. The private rights of an abutting owner ia a public way. 865 
 
 319. Change of the grade of a public way 866 
 
 320. Special damage from change of grade 871 
 
 321. Measure of damages for change of grade 875 
 
 322. Interference with access from abutting property to a 
 
 public way 877 
 
 323. Interference with passage along a public way 881 
 
 324. Use of a public way for other than highway purposes . . . 889 
 
 325. Street railways and other legitimate street uses 891 
 
 326. Injuriously affecting the flow of a watercourse 893 
 
 327. The measure of damages 895 
 
 CHAPTER XVin. 
 Dub Process oe Law. 
 
 Sec. 328. The procedure must not be arbitrary, unjust or unfair. . 897 
 
 329. The principle of the separation of powers 898 
 
 330. Whether the taking of property by Eminent Domain is 
 
 necessarily a judicial function 899 
 
 331. Interference by the legislature with judicial proceedings. 903 
 
xxii Table of Contents. 
 
 FAGB 
 
 Sec. 332. The right to a hearing upon the question of damages. . 905 
 
 333. The right to a hearing upon the question of necessity. . . 907 
 
 334. Application of the rule that necessity is not a judicial 
 
 question 912 
 
 335. Special constitutional and statutory provisions 922 
 
 336. Of what the owner is entitled to notice 924 
 
 337. What constitutes notice 929 
 
 338. Effect of insufficiency or lack of notice 935 
 
 339. The right to trial by jury 937 
 
 340. "What constitutes trial by jury 943 
 
 341. The tribunal when a jury is not required 945 
 
 342. The right to have the extent of the taking appear on the 
 
 record 949 
 
 343. The right to immunity from costs 951 
 
 344. Statutes of limitations 956 
 
 345. The equal protection of the laws 960 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 Constitutional, Rights of the Condemnor. 
 Seo. 346. Legislative control over the difEerent classes of corpora- 
 tions 962 
 
 347. Compulsory exercise of Eminent Domain 963 
 
 348. Compensation greater than actual damage 965 
 
 349. Change in the rule of damages 967 
 
 350. Rights in respect to procedure 970 
 
 351. Taking of property acquired by Eminent Domain for a 
 
 different public use 972 
 
 - 352. Property already devoted to the public use cannot be 
 
 taken for the same use 974 
 
 353. Taking an existing plant for municipal ownership 978 
 
 354. Forfeiture or revocation of charter 979 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 AuTHOEiTT TO Exercise Eminent Domain. 
 
 Sec. 355. Grant of authority 981 
 
 356. Assignment of the power by the party to whom it has 
 
 been granted 984 
 
 357. Exhaustion of authority by a single exercise 985 
 
 358. Authority to exercise Eminent Domain construed strictly. 987 
 
 359. Construction of grant of authority to municipal corpora- 
 
 tions 990 
 
 360. Construction of grant of authority to public service cor- 
 
 porations 992 
 
Table of Contents. xxiii 
 
 FAOB 
 
 Sec. 361. Authority to take land already in public use 995 
 
 362. Additional consistent easement may be imposed 1003 
 
 363. Authority inferred from necessity 1005 
 
 364. What use protects land from subsequent taking 1006 
 
 365. Authority to take land under navigable waters lOlO 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 Procedure. 
 
 Sec. 366. Procedure a matter of local practice 1012 
 
 367. The two distinct methods of taking land for public use . . 1013 
 
 368. The practice in England 1013 
 
 369. Taking by administrative order 1015 
 
 370. Taking by judicial decree 1016 
 
 371. Judicial method generally adopted — recognized by the 
 
 federal authorities 1017 
 
 372. Reasons for the prevalence of the judicial method 1018 
 
 373. Judicial method unconsciously abandoned 1021 
 
 374. Proceedings are at law, not equity. Persons assessable 
 
 caimot appear 1022 
 
 375. Whether the statute authorizing a taking must prescribe 
 
 the procedure ' 1023 
 
 376. Attempt to purchase not a prerequisite 1025 
 
 377. Attempt to purchase a necessary preliminary in some 
 
 jurisdictions 1026 
 
 378. What constitutes an attempt to purchase 1028 
 
 379. Waiver of attempt to purchase 1029 
 
 380. Purchase when owner is under disability 1030 
 
 381. Taking when owner is under disability 1031 
 
 382. Venue of proceedings 1032 
 
 383. Venue when land lies in more than one county 1034 
 
 384. Eederal courts — takings for federal purposes 1035 
 
 385. Procedure in condemnation for federal purposes 1037 
 
 386. Federal courts — takings in violation of the federal con- 
 
 stitution 1038 
 
 387. Jurisdiction of federal courts — diverse citizenship 1039 
 
 388. Several parties — separable controversies 1042 
 
 389. Venue in federal courts 1043 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 Condemnation by Administrative Order. 
 
 SEa 390. Laying out of public works by administrative order 1045 
 
 391. Impartiality of the board — unlawful inducements 1048 
 
 392. Adjudication of the validity of the taking 1049 
 
 393. Certainty of description — takings by acts in pais... . 1054 
 
xxiv Table of Contents. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sec. 394. Effect of insufficiency of description 1055 
 
 395. Preliminary award of damages 1056 
 
 396. Petition for a jury to revise tbe award 1059 
 
 CHAPTER XXTTI. 
 
 Condemnation by Judicial Proceedings. 
 
 Sec. 397. Petition for condemnation by judicial proceedings. ..... 1064 
 
 398. Allegations showing right to condemn 1065 
 
 399. Description of the land sought to be taken 1068 
 
 400. Description when water rights are taken 1070 
 
 401. Description when land taken is already in public use. . . . 1072 
 
 402. Effect of insufficiency of description — amendment of 
 
 petition 1072 
 
 403. Designation of parties respondent 1074 
 
 404. Effect of failure to designate parties coirectly 1075 
 
 405. Service of process 1076 
 
 406. Insufficiency of service cured by appearance 1078 
 
 407. Necessity of pleadings by respondent 1080 
 
 408. Adjudication of the right to condemn 1081 
 
 409. Defenses — lack of valid franchise from municipal au- 
 
 thorities 1083 
 
 410. Defenses — ultra vires — lack of authority 1085 
 
 411. Defenses — ^invalidity of petitioner's charter — de facto 
 
 corporations 1086 
 
 412. Defenses — impugning motives of legislature or city 
 
 council 1088 
 
 413. Defenses — investigating menlbership and impugning 
 
 motives of a private corporation 1090 
 
 414. Defenses — impracticability and lack of necessity 1092 
 
 415. Appeal from adjudication of right to condemn 1093 
 
 416. Writ of prohibition not a substitute for appeal 1095 
 
 417. When the right to discontinue the proceedings expires. . 1096 
 
 418. Discontinuance of proceedings bars new attempt to take 
 
 the same land 1102 
 
 419. Abandonment of proceedings 1104 
 
 420. Xlompensation for the discontinuance or abandonment of 
 
 the proceedings 1105 
 
 421. Setting aside award as against the evidence 1109 
 
 422. Nature and effect of a judgment in Eminent Domain 
 
 proceedings 1113 
 
 423. Appeal on questions of law to court of last resort 1115 
 
 424. Writ of certiorari to review Eminent Domain proceed- 
 
 ings 1116 
 
 425. Collateral impeachment of a judgment in Eminent 
 
 Domain proceedings 1119 
 
Table of Contents. xxv 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 The Assessment op Damages. 
 
 Sed. 426. Preliminary award by commissioners ll'SA 
 
 427. Setting aside award for misconduct of commissioners. . . 1126 
 
 428. Proof of ownership — practice when title is in dispute . . 1128 
 
 429. Proof of ownership — when possession is sufficient.... 1132 
 
 430. Proof of ownership in actions at common law "1135 
 
 431. Award to be disregarded on appeal 1136 
 
 432. Burden of proof — right to open and close. 1138 
 
 433. Right of jury to use its own knowledge. 1140 
 
 434. View of the premises by the jury 1142 
 
 435. The view as evidence 1143 
 
 436. Damages assessed as of the date of the taking 1146 
 
 437. When the compensation is assessed before the taking. . . . 1149 
 
 438. When the taking is illegal 1150 
 
 439. Owner at the time of the taking entitled to the compen-- 
 
 sation 1151 
 
 440. Sale pending condemnation proceedings 1154 
 
 441. Lease of property afEected by a taking 1156 
 
 442. Death of owner during proceedings 1159 
 
 443. Sale while unlawful structure is standing on the land. . . 1160 
 
 CHAPTER XXV. 
 Evidence. 
 
 Sbo. 444. Applicability to Eminent Domain proceedings of the gen- 
 eral rules of evidence 1166 
 
 445. Evidence of value 1168 
 
 446. Actual income as a test of value 1171 
 
 447. Evidence of the cost of the improvements on the land . . . 1174 
 
 448. Expert and opinion evidence of value 1175 
 
 449. The value of expert evidence 1179 
 
 450. Knowledge of local market value required 1180 
 
 451. Opinion of value must relate to the date of the taking. . . 1184 
 
 452. Administrative rules in regard to opinion evidence 1185 
 
 453. Examination and cross-examination of experts 1188 
 
 454. Sales of and offers for the property itself 1191 
 
 455. Sales of similar lands 1196 
 
 456. Forced sales, settlements and offers 1199 
 
 457. The degree of similarity, and of proximity in place and 
 
 time, required to make sales of other lands admissible. 1202 
 
 458. Admissibility of the assessors' valuation 1207 
 
 459. Admissions by the owner of low market value 1210 
 
 460. Evidence of damage — cost of restoration 1212 
 
 461. Opinion evidence of damage 1213 
 
xxvi Table of Contents. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sec. 462. Qualifleations necessary for opinion evidence of damage. 1217 
 
 463. Evidence of the damage actually inflicted 1220 
 
 464. Evidence of value after the damage has been inflicted. . . 1224 
 
 CHAPTER XXVI. 
 
 Rei^edies for Injury to Land by the Construction op Pubuo 
 
 Improvements. 
 
 SEa 465. Action at law upon the award 1227 
 
 466. Equitable remedy against the award 1230 
 
 467. Compelling payment of award by mandamus 1230 
 
 468. Exclusiveness of the statutory remedy 1232 
 
 469. The remedy when the proceedings are defective or the 
 
 taking or injury unlawful 1242 
 
 470. The remedy for negligent injury 1248 
 
 471. Liability for the acts of independent contractors 1251 
 
 472. Injunction against unlawful taking or damage under 
 
 color of Eminent Domain 1253 
 
 473. Proceedings to recover possession of property wrong- 
 
 fully taken under color of Eminent Domain — writ of 
 entry and ejectment 1261 
 
 474. Loss of the right to recover possession of property 
 
 wrongfully taken under color of Eminent Domain .... 1264 
 
 475. Affirmative acts constituting a waiver of the right to 
 
 recover possession ' 1268 
 
 476. Releases and contracts to claim no damages 1270 
 
 477. Waiver of compensation or damages 1273 
 
 478. The assessment of past and future damages in one pro- 
 
 ceeding when the taking is not in accordance with law. 1276 
 
 479. Remedy against the successor of the corporation inflict- 
 
 ing the injury 1284 
 
 CHAPTER XXVII. 
 LiABiiiiTY OP Municipal Corporations for Injury to Real Estate 
 
 Arising Out op the Construction op Public Improvements. 
 Sec. 480. What constitutes a municipal corporation 1287 
 
 481. The distinction between municipal corporations and- mere 
 
 territorial subdivisions 1290 
 
 482. The liability of corporations in actions of tort 1291 
 
 483. A mere territorial subdivision not liable in tort 1296 
 
 484. The liability in tort of the different grades of territorial 
 
 corporations 1299 
 
 485. The distinction between the acts of a municipal corpora- 
 
 tion and the acts of its officers and agents 1304 
 
Table of Contents. xxvii 
 
 PACE 
 
 Sec. 486. The application of the doctrine of respondeat superior to 
 
 municipal corporations 1305 
 
 487. Liability of a municipal corporation for its own acts. . . . 1312 
 
 488. Political questions not for the courts 1314 
 
 489. The corporation itself constructs public works 1317 
 
 490. Injuries inflicted under legislative authority 1321 
 
 491. Failure to construct public improvements 1323 
 
 492. Constructing public works of inadequate size 1327 
 
 493. Inadequacy arising after the completion of the work. . . . 1330 
 
 494. Adoption of an improper plan 1332 
 
 495. Liability for ultra vires acts 1339 
 
 496. Injury by the construction and alteration of highways. . 1347 
 
 497. Injury by surface water 1351 
 
 498. Injury by the obstruction of watercourses 1367 
 
 499. Injury by the construction of sewers 1373 
 
 500. Injury by the construction of waterworks 1381 
 
 501. Synopsis of municipal liability for injury to real estate. 1383 
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 Liability op Private Corporations foe Injury to Real Estate 
 
 Arising Out of the Construction op Public Improvements. 
 Sec. 502. Remedy against a private corporation for non-negligent 
 
 or necessary injury when the statute provides none. . . 1385 
 
 503. Injury by the construction, operation and alteration of 
 
 railroads 1389 
 
 504. Remedy for an additional servitude upon a public high- 
 
 way 1394 
 
 505. Remedy of an abutter who does not own the fee for use 
 
 of the highway for other than highway purposes 1397 
 
 506. Remedy of an abutter for the occupation of the highway 
 
 by a public service corporation without authority of 
 
 law 1399 
 
 507. Synopsis of liability of private corporations for injury 
 
 to real estate arising out of the construction of public 
 
 improvements 1401 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 Discontinuance and Abandonment. 
 
 Sec. 508. Power to discontinue or abandon public works 1403 
 
 509. Discontinuance or abandonment of highways and other 
 
 public works by a municipal corporation 1406 
 
 510. Abandonment of the location of a private corporation. . 1411 
 
 511. The right to sell or levy upon public works 1414 
 
 512. The effect of abandonment or discontinuance 1418 
 
TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References are to pages.] 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] 
 
 A PAGE 
 
 Abbott V. Cottage City, 143 Mass. 521 767, 769 
 
 Abbott V. Frost, 185 Mass. 398 71 
 
 Abbott V. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 83 Mo. 271 1392 
 
 Abbott V. Mills, 3 Vt. 521 491 
 
 Abbott V. Milwaukee, etc., Traction Co., 126 Wis. 634 546, , 592 
 
 Abbott V. New York, etc., K. R. Co., 145 Mass. 450 9S, 984, 985 
 
 Abbott V. Stewartstown, 47 N. H. 228 622 
 
 Abendroth v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 122 N. Y. 1..498, 558, 596, 1275, 1397, 13991 
 
 Abercrombie v. Kansas City, 149 Mo. App. 539 1239 
 
 Abernathy v. South, etc., R. R. Co., 159 N. C. 340 651, 1155 
 
 Ableman v. J3ooth, 21 How. 523 109 
 
 Abies V. Southern Ry. Co., 164 Ala. 356 885, 886 
 
 Abney v. Texarkana, etc., R. R. Co., 100 La. 446 80O, 1110 
 
 Abraham v. Oregon, etc., R. R. Co., 37 Ore. 495 605 
 
 Abrey v. Park Commissioners, 95 Mich. 181 506 
 
 Abston V. Waldon Academy, 118 Tenn. 24 1306 
 
 Ackerman v. True, 175 A'. Y. 353 183 
 
 Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. American Cement Plaster Co., 167 S. W. 183. 464 
 
 Acton V. York County, 77 Me. 128 1069 
 
 Adams, Matter of, 141 N. Y. 297 351 
 
 Adams v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 39 Minn. 286. .320, 497, 505, 506, 530, 532 
 
 597 
 
 Adams v. Emerson, 6 Pick. 57 483, 484, 485 
 
 Adams v. Fletcher, 17 R. I. 137 479 
 
 Adams v. Harrington, 114 Ind. 66 174 
 
 Adams v. Hastings, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 260 594, 595 
 
 Adams v. Milwaukee, 144 Wis. 371 285 
 
 Adams v. Oklahoma City, 2 Okla. 519 508, 871 
 
 Adams v. Pease, 2 Conn. 481 408, 409 
 
 Adams v. Saratoga, etc., R. R. Co., 11 Barb. 414 565 
 
 Adams v. St. Johnsbury, etc., R. R. Co., 57 Vt. 240. .634, 651, 654, 763, 813 
 
 1282 
 
 Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675 1306 
 
 Adams v. Wiscasset Bank, 1 (xreenl. 361 1418 
 
 Adams v. Woburn, 174 Fed. 192 1040, 1043 
 
 Adams County v. Quincy, 130 111. 566 51 
 
 Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185 366 
 
 Adden v. White Mountains, etc., R. R. Co., 55 N. H. 413. . .733, 767, 770, 806 
 Adirondack R. R. Co. v. New York, 176 U. S. 335 912 
 
 iii Ixxix] 
 
XXX Table of Cases. 
 
 (Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Mtnsi Mills V. Brookline, 127 Mass. 69 440, 838, 842, 1033, 1035 
 
 jEtna Mills v. Waltham, 126 Mass. 422.. 440, 839, 842, 1028, 1052, 1056, 1071 
 
 1246 
 
 Aggs V. Schaekelford County, 85 Tex. 145 355 
 
 Ahearn v. Middlesex County, 182 Mass. 518 1051, 1057 
 
 Aioher v. Denver, 10 Colo. Ap<p. 413 303, 1353 
 
 Ainea v. New Mexico, etc., R. R. Co., 13 Ariz. 320 959 
 
 Aitken v. Wells Eiver, 70 Vt. 308 4, 264, 1308 
 
 Aken v. Farfrey, 35 Wis. 249 1228 
 
 Akers v. Philadelphia, 4 Phila. 56 1228, 1229 
 
 Akin V. Riley County, 36 Kan. 170 936, 1079 
 
 Akron v. Chamberlain Co., 34 Ohio St. 328 510 
 
 Akron v. Huber, 78 Ohio St. 372 510 
 
 Akron v. McComb, 18 Ohio St. 229 1235 
 
 Akron, etc., Ry. Co. v. Keck, 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 57 542 
 
 Alabama Central R. R. Co. v. Musgrove, 169 Ala. 424 665, 667, 721, 723 
 
 739, 743, 744 
 
 Alabama, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bloom, 71 Miss. 247 878 
 
 Alabama, etc., R. R. Co. v. Burkett, 42 Ala. 83. . .599, 690, 736, 762, 791, 1214 
 
 Alabama, etc., R. R. Co. v. Collier, 112 Ala. 681 525 
 
 Alabama, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kenney, 39 Ala. 307 65, 972 
 
 Alabama, etc., R. R. Co. v. Turner, 95 Miss. 594 887 
 
 Alabama Midland R. R. Co. v. Newton, 94 Ala. 443 1095, 1104 
 
 4.1abama Power Co. v. Mt. Vernon Cotton Co., 186 Ala. 622 208 
 
 alaska, etc.. Terminal Co. v. Copper River, etc., Ry. Co., 3 Alaska 343 . . 1258 
 
 Albany, Ex parte, 23 Wend. 277 1118 
 
 Albany v. Cunliff, 2 N. Y. 165 1341 
 
 Albany v. Sikes, 94 Ga. 30 856 
 
 Albany Northern R. R. Co. v. Brownell, 24 -\. Y. 345 372, 747, 752, 998 
 
 Albany St., In re, 11 Wend. 149 116, 120, 178, 914, 916 
 
 Albany St., In re, 6 Abb. Pr. 273 933, 1078 
 
 Albert Lea v. Nielson, 80 Minn. 101 614, 620, 1419 
 
 Alberts v. Muskegon, 146 Mich. 210 1308 
 
 Albi Mercantile Co. v. Denver, 54 Colo. 474 1421 
 
 Albion River R. R. Co. v. Hesser, 84 Cal. 43i5 703, 705 
 
 Albright v. Cedar Rapids, etc.. Light Co., 133 Iowa 644 611 
 
 Albright v. Sussex County Lake & Park Commission, 71 N. I. L. 303. .67, 116 
 
 133, 142, 1,5.3, KiO, 233, 911, 915 
 
 Albritten v. Huntsville, 60 Ala. 486 1809 
 
 Albuquerque v. G-arcia, 17 N. M. 445 . 997, lOOl 
 
 Albuquerque Land, etc., Co. v. Guitierrez, 10 N. M. 177 3, 989 
 
 Alden v. Minneapolis, 24 Minn. 254 1352 
 
 Aldis v. Union El. Ry. Co., 203 111. 567 563, 647, 890, 1398 
 
 Aldrich v. Metropolitan, etc., R. R. Co., 195 111. 456. .317, 851, 863, 885, 891 
 
 Aldrich v. Cheshire R. R. Co., 21 N. H. 359 611, 1235, 1392 
 
 Aldrich v. Drury, 8 R. 1. 554 601, 608 
 
 Aldrich v. Lynn, 153 Mass. 53 1280 
 
 Aldrich v. Paine, 106 Iowa 461 308, 1376 
 
 Aldrich v. Providence, 12 R. 1. 241 ' 872 
 
Table of Cases. xxxi 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Aldrioh v. Providence, 15 R. I. 613 952 
 
 Aldricli V. Tripp, 11 R. I. 141 ISIO 
 
 Aldridge v. Board of Education, 15 Okla. 354 704, 707 
 
 Aldridge v. School District, 10 Okl. 694 925, 936, 1077, 1264 
 
 Aldridge v. IMscumbia, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Stew. & P. 199 63, 84, 114, 13il 
 
 184, 913, 982 
 
 Aldworth v. Lynn, 153 Ma;ss. 53 839, 1250, 1277, 1381 
 
 Aledo Terminal Ry. Co. v. Butler, 246 111. 406 1196, 1203 
 
 Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill 383 59, 982 
 
 Alexander v. Bennett, flO N. Y. 204 898 
 
 Alexander v. Denver, 51 Colo. 140 787, 794 
 
 Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 247 508 
 
 Alexander v. Plattsmouth, 30 Neb. 117 353 
 
 Alexander v. United States, 39 Ct. CI. 383 310, 341 
 
 Alexander, etc., Co., v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 182 Ala. 516 1409 
 
 Alexandria, etc., R. K. Co. v. Alexandria, etc., R. E. Co., 75 Va. 780. . 64 
 
 997, 1000 
 
 Alexandria, etc., R. R. Co. v. Faunce, 31 (Jratt. 761 339, 711 
 
 Alexian Bros. v. Oshkosh, 9'5 Wis. 221 667, 670 
 
 Alfalfa Irrigation District v. Collins, 46 Neb. 411 250 
 
 Alfred Phosphate Co. v. Duck River Phosphate 'Co., 120 Tenn. 260. . .253, 2S6 
 
 Alger V. Boston, 168 Mass. 516 952 
 
 Aliso Water Co. v. Baker, 95 Cal. 268 1071 
 
 Allegheny v. Black's Heirs, 99 Pa. 153 768 
 
 Allegheny v. Gibson, 90 Pa. 397 , 1329 
 
 Allen V. Boston, 137 Maes. 319 696, 709, 1135 
 
 Allen V. Boston, 159 Mass. 324 479, 836, 1375, 1379 
 
 Allen V. Charlestown, 109 Mass. 243 766, 767, 768, 802 
 
 Allen V. Chicago, 176 111. 113 1074, 1120 
 
 Allen V. Chippewa Falls, 52 Wis. 530 1332, 1353 
 
 Allen V. Clausen, 114 Wis. 244 1401 
 
 Allen V. Commonwealth, 188 Mass. 59 368 
 
 Allen V. Decatur, 23 111. 332 1295, 1317 
 
 Allen V. Detroit, 167 Mich. 464 282, 349^ 
 
 Allen V. Drew, 44 Vt. 174 4 
 
 Allen V. Farnsworth, 5 Yerg. 189 60 
 
 Allen V. Gardner, 147 Mass. 452 832 
 
 Allen V. Jay, 60 Me. 124 219 
 
 Allen V. Jersey City, 53 N. J. L. 522 999 
 
 Allen V. Jones, 47 Ind. 438 988, 991 
 
 Allen V. Providence, etc., R. R. Co., 4 R. I. 457 1155 
 
 Allen V. Stevens, 29 N. J. L. 356 239 
 
 Allen V. Wilmington, etc., R. R. Co., 102- N. C. 381 1235 
 
 Allen & Currey Mfg. Co. v. Shreveport Waterworks Co., 113 La. 1091 1329 
 
 AUender v. Wilmington, 7 Pen. 48 1409 
 
 Allentown v. Kramer, 73 Pa. 406 1319 
 
 Allison V. Cash, 143 Ky. 679 285 
 
 Alloway v. Mashville, 88 Tenn. 510 6S1, 656, 660, 672, 1140 
 
 AUston's Lessee v. Saunders, 1 Bay 30 1408 
 
xxxii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] FAGB 
 
 Almand v. Rockdale County, 78 Ga. 199 94S 
 
 Almy V. Ctureh, 18 R. I. 182 1410 
 
 Alstad V. Sim, 15 N. D. 629 1121 
 
 Alton V. Columbia, 145 Mo. App. 182 874 
 
 Alton V. Illinois Transportation Co., 12i 111. 38 1415, 1417 
 
 Alton, etc., K. R. Co. v. Carpenter, 14 111. 190 '. . . 796 
 
 Alton, etc., R. R. Co. v. Vandalia R. R. Co., 271 111. 558 1027 
 
 Amador Queen Mining Co. v. Dewitt, 73 Cal. 482 253 
 
 Ambury v. Conner, 3 Oomst. 511 91 
 
 Amee v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 212 Mass. 421 1411, 1413, 1419 
 
 American Bank Note Co. v. New York El. Ry. Co., 129 N. Y. 252. .561, 693 
 
 597, 1129, 1281 
 
 American Cannel Coal Co. v. Huntingbury, etc., R. R. Co., 130' Ind. 98. . 1126 
 
 American Ice Co. v. New York, WS N. Y. 673 456 
 
 American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47 259 
 
 American Primitive Methodist Society v. Brooklyn El. Ry. Co., 46 Hun 
 
 530 559 
 
 American Frint Works v. Lawrence, 21 N. J. L. 248 3 
 
 American Print Works v. Lawrence, 23 N. J. L. 590 264 
 
 American States Security Co. v. Milwaukee, etc., E. R. Co., 139 Wis. 
 
 199 724, 1196 
 
 American: Steel Dredge Works v. Putnam County Commissioners, 170 
 
 Ind. 571 396 
 
 American Steel Dredge Works v. Putnam County Commissioners, 84 N. 
 
 E. 19 .■ 396 
 
 American Tel., etc., Co. v. Pearce, 71 Md. 535 576, 581, 607, 621, 756 
 
 American Tel., etc., Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 202- Mo. 656. . .672, 756 
 
 918, 1004 
 
 American Unitarian Assn. v. Commonwealth, 193 Mass. 470. . .167, 763, 981 
 
 1051, 1052 
 
 Americus v. Eldridge, 64 Ga. 524 1328, 1353, 1371 
 
 Americus v. Perry, 114 Ga. 871 301, 399 
 
 Ameru Township v. Reading Turnpike Co., 2 Lane. Law. R. 75 1001 
 
 Ames V. Lake Superior, etc., R. R. Co., 2'1 Minn. 24 940, 946 
 
 Ametrauo v. Downs, 170 N. Y. 388 1159 
 
 Amory v. Melrose, 162 Mass. 556 1176, 1181, 1203, 1205 
 
 Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Head, 56 N. H. 386 227 
 
 Amsterdam Water Comtrfissioners, Re, 96 N. Y. 351 616, 989 
 
 Ancell V. Southern Illinois, etc.. Bridge Co., 223 Mo. 209 67, 1032 
 
 Anderson, In re, 178 N. Y. 416 508 
 
 Anderson v. Bain, 120 Ind. 254 870 
 
 Anderson v. Bement, 13 Ind. App. 248 484 
 
 Anderson, v. Caldwell, 91 Ind. 451 940 
 
 Anderson v. Cincinnati Southern Ry. Co., 86 Ky. 44 460 
 
 Anderson v. Columbus, 14 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 180 1395 
 
 Anderson v. Fleming, 160 Ind. 597 1252 
 
 Anderson v. Fuller, 51 Fla. 380 303, 379 
 
 Anderson v. Hamilton County Commissioners, 12 Ohio St. 635 1256 
 
 Anderson v. Harvey, 10 Grat. 386 1254 
 
Table of Cases. xxxiii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAQH 
 
 Anderson v. Kerns Drainage Co., 14 Ind. 199 240, 244 
 
 Anderson v. Knox, 20 Ala. 156 1192 
 
 Anderson v. Pemberton, 89 Mo. 61 343, 1074, 1075 
 
 Anderson v. Smith-Powers Logging Co., 71 Ore. 276 236, 257 
 
 Anderson v. Turbeville, 6 Coldw. 150 63, 156, 173, 915, 925, 927, 941 
 
 Anderson v. Wharton County, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 116 768 
 
 Anderton v. Milwaukee, 82 Wis. 279 87, 961 
 
 AndJover v. Essex County OommisBioners, 5 Gray 393 1069 
 
 Andover v. Oxford County Commissioners, 86 Me. 185 948 
 
 Andover v. Sutton, 12 Mete. 182 397 
 
 Andover, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. Middlesex County Commissioners, 18 Pick. 
 
 486 941, 944 
 
 Andreas v. Gas, etc., Co. of Bergen Coimty, ©1 N. J. Eq. 69. 584 
 
 Andrews v. Delhi, etc., Tel. Co., 64 Aipp. Div. 618 577 
 
 Andrews v. Delhi, etc., Tel. Co., 36 Misc. 23 577 
 
 Andrews v. Nantasket Beach R. B,. Co., 152 Mass. 506 343, 1134 
 
 Andrews v. Steele City, 2 Nelbr Unoff. 676 1360 
 
 Andrue v. Bay Creek K. E. Co., 60 N. J. L. IQ 11061 
 
 Ann Arbor R. R. Co. v. Beach, 110' Mich. 209 1118 
 
 Annable v. Montgomery County Commissioners, 34 Ind. App. 72. ..161, 282 
 
 286, 318 
 
 Anne Arundel County v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468 1309 
 
 Anniston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Jacksonville, etc., R R. Co., 82 Ala-. 297 . . 972, 990 
 
 1000 
 
 Anthony v. Adams, 1 Mete. 284 177, 1295, 1342 
 
 Anthony v. South Kingston, 13 R. I. 129 947 
 
 Anthony Shoe Co. v. West Jersey R. R. Co., 57 N. J. Eq. 607 1400 
 
 Anthony St., In re, 20 Wend. 618 1099, 1100 
 
 Apex Transportation Co. v. Garbade, 32 Ore. SS8'. . 117, 145, 157, 188, 257, 9.14 
 
 Appel V. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 34 B. D. 306 890, 1283, 1286 
 
 Appleby v. Buffalo, 221' U. S. 524 86 
 
 Appleby v. Buffalo, 189 N. Y. 163 86 
 
 Appleton v. Newton, 178 Mass. 276 70, 906, 914, 925, 927, 932, 934 
 
 Appleton V. New York, 148 N. Y. Supp. 8.70 352 
 
 Appleton Water Works Co. v. RaiTlroad Commission, 154 Wis. 121 . . 662, 683 
 
 684, 685, 686, 687, £154 
 
 Arbenz v. Wheeling, etc., R. R. Co., 33 W. Va. 1 394, 525, 13951 
 
 Arbrush v. Oakdale, 28 Minn. 61 803 
 
 Archer v. Levee Inspectors, 128 Ffed. 75 943 
 
 Archer v. Salinas City, 93 Cal. 43 1408 
 
 Archer v. United States, 47 Ct. CI. 248 721 
 
 Argent v. The Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's 1293 
 
 Arimond v. Green Bay Co., 31 Wis. 316 409 
 
 Arkadelphia v. Windham, 49 Ark. 139 1307 
 
 Arkansas, etc., R. R. Co. v. Smith, 71 Ark. 189 731 
 
 Arkansas, etc., Ry. Co. v. Witt, 19 Okla. 262 731, 1112 
 
 Arkansas Valley R. R. Co. v. Benson, 26 Okla. 306 890., 891 
 
 Arkansas Valley R. R. Co. v. Bullen, 31 Okla. 36 619, 1420 
 
 Armendiaz v. Stillman, 54 Tex. 623 93 
 
xxxiv Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Armington v. Bamet, 15 Vt. 745 68, 173, 185, 973> 978 
 
 Armitage, Ex parte, Ambl. 248 8, 1406 
 
 Armour Packing Co. v. Snyder, 84 Fed. 136 '. 285 
 
 Armstrong v. St. Louis, 69 Mo. 309 1245, 1263, 1264 
 
 Armstrong v. St. Paul, 30 Minn. 290 515 
 
 Arndt v. Cullinan, 132 Ala. 540 1374, 1375 
 
 Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 930 
 
 Arnett v. State, 168 Ind. 180 , 391, 399 
 
 Arnold v. CkDvington, etc.. Bridge Co., 62 Ky. 372 174, 644, 983, 1150 
 
 Arnold v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 55 N. Y. 661 347 
 
 Arnold v. Stanford, 113 Ky. 852 1341, 1342 
 
 Arnsperger v. Crawford, 101 Md. 247 116, 120, 129, 236 
 
 Arthur v. Ohootaw County Commissioners, 43 Okla. 174. . .60, 914, 916, 92:1 
 
 Arundel v. McCulloch, 10 Mass. 70 1010, 1368 
 
 Asbury v. Albemarle, 162 N. C. 247 401 
 
 Aacher v. South Shore Traction Co., 144 App. Div. 234 1256, 1261, 1281 
 
 Asbbrook v. Commonwealth, 1 Busli 139 273 
 
 Ashby V. Eastern R. R. Co., 5 Met. 368 336, 341, 696, 733, 825 
 
 Ashby V. Juneau, 174 Fed. 737 990 
 
 Ashby V. White, 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 185 82,1| 
 
 Asher v. Hutchinson Water, etc., Co., 66 Kan. 496 326, 381, 383 
 
 Asher v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 87 Ky. 391 799 
 
 AsheviUe Commissioners v. Johnston, 71 N. C. 398 773, 808 
 
 Ashland, etc., St. Ry. Co., v. Faulkner, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 156 541, 554, 892 
 
 Ashland St. Ry. Co. v. Ashland, 78 Wis. 271 378 
 
 Ashley v. Burt County, 73 Nebr. 159 1272 
 
 Ashley v. Little Rock, 56 Ark. 391 1282 
 
 Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296 13il8, 1336, 1358, 1378 
 
 Ashokan Dam, In re, 190 Fed. 413 671 
 
 Ashuelot R. R. Co. v. Elliot, 52 N. H. 3i87 372 
 
 Ashuelot R. R. Co. v. Elliot, 58 N". H. 451 372 
 
 Askew V. Hale, 54 Ala. 639 1299 
 
 Aspinwall v. Boston, 191 Mass. 441 1057, 1271, 1272 
 
 Aspinwall v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 41 Wis. 474 707 
 
 Astor V. Dickey, 142 N. Y. Supp. 776 870 
 
 Astor V. New York, 62 N. Y. 580 1126 
 
 Aawell V. Scranton, 175 Pa. 173 767, 768, 769, 789, 810 
 
 Atchison v. Challis, 9 Kan. 603 1354 
 
 Atchison, etd., R. R. Co. v. Blackshire, 10 Kan. 477 762 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Boemer, 34 iNTelb. 240 743, 1244 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Davidson, 52 Kan. 739 596 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Eldridge, 41 Okla. 463 1250 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Garside, 10 Kan. 552 527 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gough, 29 Kan. 94 , .730, 73S, 741, 745, 1034 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hammer, 22 Kan. 763 610, 1392 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 67 Kan. 569 . . 988 
 
 996, 1000, lOOT 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Lyon, 24 Kan. 745 737, 9.53 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Osage County Commissioners, 48 Kan. 576 . . 7491 
 
Table of Cases. xxxv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. K. Co. v. Patch, 28 Kan. 470 1419 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Plant, 24 Neb. 127 650, 953 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Richter, 148 Pac. 478 653, 704 
 
 Atchison, etc., R". R. Co. v. Schneider, 127 111. 144 697, 699, 1110 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Weaver, 10 Kan. 344 1239, 1244 
 
 Atchison St. Ry. Co. v. Missouri, etc., R. R. Co., 31 Kan. 661 382 
 
 Atchison St. Ry. Co. v. Nave, 38 Kan. 744 1084, 1400 
 
 Athens Terminal Co. v. Athens Foundry, etc., \Vorks, 129 Ga. 393. . .395, 1398 
 
 Atherton v. Essex Junction, 83 Vt. 218 267 
 
 Atkins V. Boston, 188 Mass. 77 786, 803 
 
 Atkins V. Randolph, 31 Vt. 226 403 
 
 Atkinson v. Marietta R. R. Co., 15 -Ohio St. 21 984, 1087 
 
 Atkinson v. Washington Irrigation Co., 44 Wash. 75 344 
 
 Atlanta v. CaUaway, 137 Ga. 495 345, 1156 
 
 Atlanta v. Central R. R., etc., Co., 53 Ga. 120 795, 996, 997, lOOl 
 
 Atlanta v. Green, 67 Ga. 386 790, 795, 867 
 
 Atlanta v. HolUday, 96 Ga. 546 487 
 
 Atlanta v. Hunnicutt, 95 Ga. 138 1244, 1248, 1282 
 
 Atlanta v. Jones, 135 Ga. 376 4«2, 1411, 1413, 1419 
 
 Atlanta v. Warnock, 91 Ga. 210 1313, 13'74, 1379 
 
 Atlanta, etc., R. R. Co. v. Atlanta, etc., R. R. Co., 125 Ga. 529 52& 
 
 Atlanta, etc., R. R. Co. v. Barker, 105 Ga. 534 1269 
 
 Atlanta, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bradley, 141 Ga. 740 194 
 
 Atlanta, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kimberly, 87 Ga. 161 12S2 
 
 Atlanta, etc., R. R. Co., v. Southern Ry. Co., 153 Fed. 122 1411, 1413 
 
 Atlanta Terra Cotta Co. v. Georgia, etc., R. R. Co., 132 Ga. 537 601, 659, 
 
 692, 693, 1095, 1255, 1259 
 
 Atlanta University v. Atlanta, 93 Ga. 468 972 
 
 Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co. v. Campbell, 4 Ohio St. 583 1175 
 
 Atlantic, etc., R, R. Co. v. Cumberland County Commissioners, 51 Me. 
 
 36 970 
 
 Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co. v. Fuller, 48 Ga. 423 1282 
 
 Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kirkland, 129 Ga. 552 989 
 
 Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co. v. Koblentz, 21 Ohio St. 334 651, 654 
 
 Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co. v. McKnight, 125 Ga. 328 890 
 
 Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co. v. Penny, 119 Ga. 479. . .907, 911, 916, 917, 919, 920 
 
 Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 120 Ga. 268 613, 756 
 
 757, 768 
 
 Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co. v. Robbins, 35 Ohio St. 531 1246 
 
 Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co. v. St. Louis, 3 Mo. App. 315 9«7 
 
 Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co. v. State, 42 Fla. 358 374 
 
 Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co. v. SuUivant, 5 Ohio St. 276 1087 
 
 Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 6 Biss. 158 370,581, 607 
 
 Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160 995 
 
 Attorney-Greneral v. Boston, 123 Mass. 460 1230 
 
 Attorney-General v. Chandos Land & Building Society, 74 J. P. 40 I74 
 
 Attorney-General v. Delaware, etc., R. R. Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 1 363, 409 
 
 Attorney-General v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400 117, 149, 205 
 
 Attorney-General v. Gee, L. R., 10 Eq. 131 449 
 
xxxvi Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Attorney-General v. Grand Eapids, 176 Mloh. 503 445 
 
 Attorney^General v. Haverhill Gas Light Co., 215 Mass. 394 144 
 
 Attorney-General v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co., 133 Mass. 361 616, 838 
 
 Attorney-General v. Jochim, 99 Mieh. 568 369 
 
 Attorney-Oeneral v. Leeds, L. K., & Ch. 583 446 
 
 Attorney-General v. Metropolitan K. R. Co. ( 1894 ) , 1 Q. B. 384 863 
 
 Attorney-General v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., 125 Mass. 515 537 
 
 Attorney-General v. Old Colony R. R. Co., Ii60 Mass. 62 634, 638, 1113 
 
 Attorney-General v. Revere Copper Co., IS& Mass. 444 1408, 1415 
 
 Attorney-General v. Stevens, 1 Saxton Oh. 369 lOlQi, 1011 
 
 Attorney-General v. Sullivan, 163 Mass. 446 1289 
 
 Attorney-General v. Tomline, 12 Ch. D. 2:14 6 
 
 Attorney-General v. West Wisconsin Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 496 1404 
 
 Attorney-General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476 162, 163, 166, 276, 281' 
 
 Attorney St., In re Closing, 162 N. Y. App. Div. 469 888 
 
 Attwood V. Bangor, 83 Me. 583 442 
 
 Atwater v. Trustees of Canandaigua, 124 JST. Y. 602 SOS, 314 
 
 Atwater v. Woodbridge, 6 Conn. 223 1418 
 
 Atwood V. Biddeford, 99 Me. 78 1342 
 
 Auburn v. Union Water Power Co., 90i Me. 675 433 
 
 Auburn Bank v. Roberts, 44 N. Y. 192 355 
 
 Auditor v. Grise, 20 Ark. 540 1232 
 
 Auditor General v. Crane, 152 Mich. 94 1120 
 
 Augusta V. Bunim, 93 Ga. 68 1409 
 
 Augusta V. Georgia R. R., etc., Co., 98 Ga. 161 972, 996, 1001 
 
 Augusta V. Mackey, 113 Ga. 64 1342 
 
 Augusta V. Marks, 50 Ga. 612 795 
 
 Augusta V. Schrameck, 96 Ga. 426 790, 795, 867, 875, 877, 895, 1213 
 
 Augusta Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 358, 364 
 
 Aurora v. Elgin, etc., Traction Co., 227 111. 485 645 
 
 Aurora v. Fox, 78 Ind. 1 483, 515 
 
 Aurora v. Pulfer, 56 111. 270 1326, 1348 
 
 Aurora v. Reed, 57 111. 2» 1317, 1355, 1357 
 
 Aurora Agricultural, etc., Society v. Paddock, 80 111. 263 1413 
 
 Aurora, etc., R. R. Co. v. Harvey, 178 111. 477 924 
 
 Austin V. Augusta Terminal Ry. Co., 108 Ga. 671 846, 847, 850, 862, 863 
 
 Austin V. Detroit, etc., Ry. Co., 134 Mich. 149 514, 542, 645, 554 
 
 Austin V. Helms, 65 N. C. 560 1126 
 
 Austin V. IvTalle, 102 Tex. 536 4, 51 
 
 Austin V. Rutland R. R. Co., 45 Vt. 215 338 
 
 Austin V. Searing, 16 N. Y. 1 12 364 
 
 Austin V. Tonka Bay, 130 Minn. 359 647 
 
 Austin V. University of Pennsylvania, 1 Yeates 260i 32 
 
 Avenue between Fort Washington and Haven avenues. In re, 153 App. 
 
 Div. 164 349 
 
 Avenue C, In re, 151 App. Div. 83 875, 1112, 1145 
 
 Avenue D, In re, 200 IST. Y. 536 281 
 
 Averill v. Boston, 193 Mass. 488 1057, 1228, 1229 
 
Table or Cases. xxxvii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAOE 
 
 Avery v. Fox, 1 Abb. 246 197 
 
 Avery v. Van Deusen, 5 Pick. 582 801 
 
 jVvery v. MaxweU, 4 N. H. 36 485, 487 
 
 Avery v. Police Jury of Iberville, 12 La. Ann. 554 , 923 
 
 Avery v. Vermont Electric Co., 7'5 Vt. 235-. .117, 130, 169, 196, 209, 228, 232 
 
 Avondale v. McFarland, 101 Ala. 381 856, 876, 1355 
 
 Ayres v. Richards, 38 Mich. 214 237, 929 
 
 B 
 
 Babbage v. Powers, 130 N. Y. 281 481 
 
 Babcock v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 107 Wis. 280 1155, 1162, 1283 
 
 Babcoek v. Western R. R. Corp., 9 Met. 56i3 610, 826, 1392 
 
 Babson v. Rockport, 101 Mass. 93 521 
 
 Backus V. Detroit, 49 Mich. 110 441 
 
 Backus V. Fort St. Union Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557 . . . . 631, 639, 938, 945 
 
 Backus V. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19 68, 174, 940, 973, 978 
 
 Bacon v. Boston, 154 Mass. 100 303, 317, 335, 836, 837, 842, 1314, 1318 
 
 Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311 272 
 
 Bacot, Ex parte, 36 S. C. 125 193 
 
 Badgely v. Hamilton County, 1 Disney 316 1244 
 
 Badger v. Boston, 130 Mass. 170 842 
 
 Bagley v. Wallace, 16 Serg. & R. 245 140® 
 
 Bagnall v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 642 873 
 
 Baier v. Schermerhorn, 96 Wis. 372 885 
 
 Bailey v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 182 Mass. 537 828, 843, 844, 880', 881 
 
 895, 89® 
 
 Bailey v. Clinton, 88 S. C. 118 811, 991 
 
 Bailey v. Culver, 84 Mo. 531 323 
 
 Bailey v. De Crespigny, L. R., 4 Q. B. 180 349, 70O, 711 
 
 Bailey v. Fulton County, 111 Ga. 313 1300 
 
 Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill 531 1310 
 
 Bailey v. New York, 2 Denio 433 1295 
 
 Bailey v. Osborn, 80 N. J. L. 333 345, 1156 
 
 Bailey v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Harr. 389. . .413, 420, 460, 940, 967 
 
 Bailey v. Sweeney, 64 ISI. H. 29(6 608 
 
 Bailey v. Wobum, 126 Mass. 416 1056 
 
 Baiubridge v. Postmaster-Ceneral, ( 1906) 1 K. B. 178 1298 
 
 Bainbridge v. Sherlock, 29 Ind. 364 416 
 
 Baines v. Janesville, 100 Wis. 369 1405 
 
 Baines v. Marshiield, etc., Ry. Co., 62 Ore. 810 228J 
 
 Baird v. Rice, 63 Pa. 489 1405 
 
 Baker v. Akron, 145 Iowa 485 1318, 1369, 1360 
 
 Baker v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 183 Mass. 178 564, 727, 789, 801 
 
 802, 840, 841, 844, 8961 
 
 Baker v. Braman, 6 Hill 47 91, 236, 1052, 122S, 1229, 1246 
 
 Baker v. Fall River, 187 Mass. 53 521 
 
 Baker v. Grand Rapids, 142 Mich. 687 215 
 
 Baker v. Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co., 36 Mo. 543 123S 
 
 Baker v. Johnson, 2 Hill 242 95O 
 
xxxviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Baker v. McGlurg, 198 111. 28 717 
 
 Baker v. Normal, 81 111. 108 487 
 
 Baker v. Pennsylvania R. K. Co., 236 Pa. 479 732, 741, 1217 
 
 Baker v. Runnels, 12 Me. 235 '. 1061 
 
 Baker v. Selma St. R. R. Co., 135 Ala. 552 541 
 
 Baker v. Shepherd, 24 N. H. 208 485, 487 
 
 Baker v. State, 63 Misc. 549 338 
 
 Balch V. Detroit, 109 Mich. 253 ■: . . . 1231 
 
 Baloh V. Essex County Commissioners, 103 Mass. 106 213, 1030, 1050 
 
 Baldwin v. Bangor, 36 Me. 518 916 
 
 Baldwin v. Ohio Township, 70 Kan. 102 1362 
 
 Baldwin v. San Antonio, 126 S. W. 596 650, 655 
 
 Baldwin v. Trimble, 85 Md. 396 1407, 1410 
 
 Bales V. Wichita, etc., R. R. Co., 92 Kan. 771 335, 714, 715, 717 
 
 Ball V. Herbert, 3 T.' R. 255 415 
 
 Ball V. Keokuk, etc., Ry. Co., 74 Iowa 132 798, 1178 
 
 BaU V. Maysville, etc., R. R. Co., 102 Ky. 486 524, 1286 
 
 Ball V. Slack, 2 Whart. 508' 424 
 
 Ball V. Taeoma, 9 Wash. 592- 1275 
 
 Ballantine v. Kearney, 52 N. J. L. 338 988 
 
 Balliet v. Commonwealth, 17 Pa. 509 67 
 
 Ballou V. Ballou, 78 N. Y. 325 1159 
 
 Baltimore v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 84 Md. 1 536 
 
 Baltimore v. Baltimore, etc.. Steamboat Co., 104 Md. 585 456, 722 
 
 Baltimore v. Brengle, 116 Md. 342 183 
 
 Baltimore v. Cowen, 88 Md. 447 370, 747, 750 
 
 Baltimore v. Fairfield Improvement Co., 87 Md. 352 1313 
 
 Baltimore v. Garrett, 120 Md. 608 722", 723, 728, 785, SOO, 877 
 
 Baltimore v. Hook, 62 Md. 371 282 
 
 Baltimore v. Johnson, 123 Md. 320 722, 723, 725 
 
 Baltimore v. Latrobe, 101 Md. 621 342, 710, 714 
 
 Baltimore v. Little Sisters of the Poor, 56 Md. 400 932, 933, 1078 
 
 Baltimore -v, Megary, 122 Md. 20 764, 800, 1144 
 
 Baltimore v. Merryman, 86 Md. 584 314 
 
 Baltimore v. Musgrave, 48 Md. 272 1101, 1106, 1107 
 
 Baltimore v. O'Donnell, 53 Md. llOi 1252 
 
 Baltimore v. Bark Land Corporation, 126 Md. 358 630 
 
 Baltimore v. Reitz, 50 Md. 574 398 
 
 Baltimore v. Rice, 73 Md. 307 338, 340 
 
 Baltimore v. Rowe, 107 Md. 704 1409 
 
 Baltimore v. Smith, etc.. Brick Co., 80 Md. 458 1192, 1196 
 
 Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376 36, 391, 399, 400 
 
 Baltimore Belt R. R. Co. v. Baltzell, 75 Md. 94 928, 935, 940, 1078 
 
 Baltimore Belt E. R. Co. v. Sattler, 162 Md. 595 1214j 
 
 Baltimore Comity Water, etc., Co. v. Dubreuil, 105 Md. 424 474, 672 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bouvier, 70 N. J. Eq. 171 707 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Boyd, 63 Md. 325 1247 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Boyd, 67 Md. 32 1322 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Compton, 2 Gill 20 1102 
 
I Table of Cases. xxxix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 aif iii Volume I, 721-14:^2 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Baltimore, etc., E. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U S. 317 319 
 
 865, 1387 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 2 App. D. C. 519 528 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Jackson County Commissioners, 156 Ind. 
 
 260 1004 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 59 Ind. 247 1216 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 59 Ind. 4S0 1216 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. \ . Koontz, 104 U. S. 5, 12 95 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Lansing, 52 Ind. 229 722, 735 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Magruder, 34 Md. 79 610, 1392 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 395 970, 1101, 1104 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. North, 103 Ind. 4»6 1001 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 17 W. Va. 812 60 
 
 7.), 902, 911, 919, 921, 927, 929, 948, 982, 1004, 1008, 1019, 1081 
 
 Baltimore; etc., R. R. Co. v. Quillen, 34 Ind. App. 330 ^. 611, 1392 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Reaney, 42 Md. 71 567, 595 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Springer, 9 Sadler 534 763 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. State, 159 Ind. 510 70, 937 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. State, 45 Md. 611 160 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Strauss, 37 Md. 237 532, 1396 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Thompson, 10 Ind. 761 338 
 
 Baltimore, etc., Tel. Co. v. Morgan's,, etc., Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 883 1004 
 
 Baltimore, etc., Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 24 Fed. 319 S&5 
 
 Baltimore Turnpike, In re, 5 Bin. 481 1126 
 
 Baltimore, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 81 Md. 247 ... 2 
 
 Baltimore, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. Union Ry. 'Co., 35 Md. 224 68, 973, 999 
 
 Baltzeger v. Carolina Midland R. R. Co., 54 S. C. 242 611, 1392 
 
 Bamise v. JSIorthern Pacific R. R. Co., 205 Fed. 328 1264 
 
 Bancroft v. Cambridge, 126 Mass. 438 239, 1148 
 
 Bangor v. County Commissioners, 30 Me. 270 1050 
 
 Bangor, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 60 Me 285 954 
 
 Bangor, etc., R. R. Co. v. McCbmb, 60 Me. 290 63, 651, 659, 732, 733 
 
 Bangor Township v. Bay City Traction, etc., 'Co., 147 Mioh. 165 398 
 
 Banigan v. Worcester, 30 Fed. 392 94 
 
 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 , 95 
 
 Bank of California v. San Francisco, 142 Cal. 276 366 
 
 Bank of Columbia v. Okley, 4 Wheat. 236 83 
 
 Bankers' Investing Co., In re, 141 'App. Div. 591 655 
 
 Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa 540 115, 173, 236, 913 
 
 Banning v. Southern R. R., 7 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 560 743 
 
 Banse v. Clark, 69 Minn. 53 1273 
 
 Barber v. Andover, 8 N. H. 398 997, 1001 
 
 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 53 
 
 Barbour County Court v. Hall, 51 W. Va. 269 1099, 1104. 
 
 Barclay v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa. 503 477 
 
 Barclay v. Howell, 6 Pet. 498 469, 485, 1419 
 
 Barclay v. Pickles, 38 Mo. 143 712 
 
 Bardstown, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. Nelson County, 117 Ky. 674 682 
 
 Barfield v. Gleason; 111 Ky. 491 547 
 
xl Table of Gases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAOK 
 
 Barfield v. Louisville, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1102 647 
 
 Barger v. Hickory, 130 N. C. 550 1343 
 
 Barker v. Taunton, 119 Mass. 392 1226, 1274 
 
 Barlow V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 23 Iowa 276 1412 
 
 Barnard v. Ohicago, 270 111. 27 568, 893 
 
 Barnard v. Great Western R. R. Co., S6"L. T. 798 82ft 
 
 Barnard v. Shirley, 151 Ind. 160 449 
 
 Barnes v. district of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540 1309 
 
 Barnes v. jGrafton, 61 W. Va. 4«8 868 
 
 Barnes v. Midland R. R. Terminal Co., 193i N. Y. 378 426, 455 
 
 Barnes v. Racine, 4 Wis. 454 1010 
 
 Barnes v. Springfield, 4 Allen 488 1024 
 
 Barnett v. Johnson, 15 N. J. Eq. 481 494 
 
 Barnett v. St. Anthony, etc., Co., 33 Minn. 265 1186 
 
 Barnett v. State, 15 Ala. 829 935, 10761 
 
 Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324 406, 477 
 
 Barnum- v. Minnesota Transfer R. R. Co., 33 Minn-. 365 885 
 
 Barr v. Flynn, 20 Mo. App. 385 237 
 
 Barr v. New Brunswick, 67 Fed. 402 147, 175 
 
 Barr v. Omaha, 42 Nebr. 341 789, 806, 806 
 
 Barr v. Oskaloosa, 45 Iowa 276 322, 527, 879 
 
 Barrall v. Quick, 111 Ky. 22 734, 953, 1140 
 
 Barrall v. Quick, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2392 953 
 
 Barre, etc., R. R. Co. v. Montpelier, etc., R. R. Co., 61 Vt. 1 193, 997 
 
 lODB, 1008, 1009 
 
 Barre I'unipike v. Appleton, 2 Pick. 430 937, 1079 
 
 Barre Water Co., In re, 62 Vt. 27 117, 120, 129, 202, 32« 
 
 Barre Water Co. v. Carnes, 65 Vt. 626 439 
 
 Barree v. Cape Girardeau, 197 Mo. 382 1310 
 
 Barrett v. Metcalfe, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 247 434 
 
 Barrett v. Mobile, 129 Ala. 179 1346 
 
 Barrett v. Palmer, 135 N. Y. 336 99 
 
 Barrington's Case, 8 Rep. 138a i 818 
 
 Barrington v. Neuse River Ferry Co., 69 N. C. 165 199' 
 
 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 .80, 12B, 294 
 
 Barron v. Baltimore, 2 Am. Jur. 203 294, 42S 
 
 liarron v. Detroit, 94 Mich. 601 1310, 1335 
 
 Barron v. Memphis-, 113 Tenn. 89 315, 419, 1319 
 
 Barrows v. Sycamore, 150 lU. 588 588, 1313, 1317 
 
 Barry v. Lowell, 8 Allen 127 1352 
 
 Barsaloux v. Chicago, 245 111. 598 541 
 
 Bartleson- v. Minneapolis, 33 Minn. 468 1104 
 
 Bartlett v. Bangor, 67 Me. 460 174, 351 
 
 Bartlett v. Columbus, 101 Ga. 300 1342 
 
 Bartlow v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 243 111. 332 708 
 
 Barton v. Edwards, 179 S. W. 364 636, 640 
 
 Bartram v. Sharon, 71 Conn. 686 1307 
 
 Bashor v. Bowman, 180 S. W. 326 235 
 
 V. Elliott, 105 Ind. 517 177 
 
Table of Cases. xli 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Bass V. Fort Wayne, 121 Ind. 389 918, 92Q 
 
 Bass V. Metropolitan, etc., R. R. Co., 53 U. S. App. 542 25, 719, 1254, 1260 
 
 Bass V. Roanoke Navigation, etc., Co., Ill N. C. 439 612 
 
 Bateman v. Bluck, 18 Q. B. 870 174! 
 
 Bates V. Boston Klevated Ry. Co., 187 Mass. 328 355, 356, SeO, 841, 1148 
 
 1153, 11561 
 
 Bates V. Ray, 102 Mass. 458 1034 
 
 Bates V. Rutland, 62 Vt. 178 1308 
 
 Bates V. Westborough, 151 Mass. 174 1339, 1374 
 
 Bates V. Weymouth Iron Co., 8 Cush. 54S 230' 
 
 Battelle v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 211 Mass. 442 600, 601 
 
 Battery v. Ouxbury, 23 Vt. 714 1406 
 
 Battle Creek, etc., R. R. Co. v. Tiffany, 99 Mich. 471 1002 
 
 Battles V. Braintree, 14 Vt. 348 1228 
 
 Baughman v. Heinselman, 180 111. 251 177 
 
 Bauman v. Detroit, 58 Mich. 444 1325, 1348 
 
 Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548 281, 654, 721, 762, 775, 781, 791, 903 
 
 939, 1097 
 
 Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100 Ind. 575 275 
 
 Baxendale v. McMurray, L. R., 2 Ch. 790 4521 
 
 Baxter v. Nashville, etc.. Turnpike Co., 10 Lea 488 1417 
 
 Baxter v. Turnpike Co., 22 Vt. US 483 
 
 Baya v. Lake City, 44 Fla. 491 125S 
 
 Bayard v. Hargrove, 45 G'a. 343 1419 
 
 Bayard v. Singleton, 1 Martin 42 32 
 
 Baychester Ave., Matter of, 120 App. Div. 393 69$ 
 
 Bay City Gas Light Co. v. Industrial Works, 28 Mich. 182 456 
 
 Baynes, In re, 140 App. Div. 735 508 
 
 Bay St. Louis v. Hancock County, 80 Miss. 364 1410 
 
 Bay State Brick Co. v. Foster, 115 Mass. 431 477 
 
 Beach- v. Haynes, 12 Vt. 15 1415 
 
 Beacon v. Pittaburg, etc., R. R. Co., 1 Pa. Dist. Ct. 618 609 
 
 Beadles v. Fry, 14 Okla. 428 1416 
 
 Beadles v. Smyaer, 17 Okla. 162 1416 
 
 Beale v. Boston, 166 Mass. 53 352, 678, 1175, 1189 
 
 Beals V. Brookline, 174 Mass. 1 1352 
 
 Bear v. Allentown, 148 Pa. 80 1328 
 
 Beard v. Kansas City, 96 Kan. 102 1357 
 
 Beardslfee v. Dodge, 143 N. Y. 161 11-18 
 
 Beardslee v. French, 7 Conn. 125 1407 
 
 Beardsley v. Honesdale, etc.. Road Co., 5 Clark 306 963 
 
 Beardsley v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 142 N. Y. 173 606 
 
 Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 368 1418 
 
 Bear Gulth Placer Mining Co. v. Walsh, 198 Fed. 351 706 
 
 Beasley v. Aberdeen, etc., R. R. Co., 147 N. C. 362 1239, 1265 
 
 Beasley v. Texas, etc., R. R. Co., 191 U. S. 492 365 
 
 • Beatrice v. Leary, 45 Nebr. 149 1318, 1355, 1372 
 
 Beattie v. Carolina Central R. R. Co., 108 N. C. 425 1412 
 
 Beatty v. United States, 203 Fed. 620 939 
 
xlii Table of Capes. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Beaufort County Commissioners v. Bonner, 153 N. C 622, 623, 941 
 
 989, 901, 992 
 
 Beaver v. Harrisonburg, 156 Pa. 547 1272 
 
 Beck V. Biggars, 66 Ark. 292. 946 
 
 Beck V. Pennsylvania, etc., R. R. Co., 148 Pa. 271 723, 724, 12il7 
 
 Becker v. La Crosse, 99 Wis. 414 1341 
 
 Becker v. Philadelphia, etc., K. R. Co., 177 Pa. 252 367, 697, 699 
 
 Beckerle v. Danbury, 80 Conn. 124 434 
 
 Beckett v. Midland R. R. Co., L. R. 3 O. P. 82 820 
 
 Beckman v. Kreamer, 43 111. 447 ^ 431 
 
 Beckman v. Lincoln, etc., R. R. Co., 79 Nebr. 89 145 
 
 Beckman v. Lincoln, etc., R. R. Co., 85 Nebr. 238 733, 734, 1276 
 
 Bedell v. Long Island R. R. Co., 44 N. Y. 367 1183 
 
 Bedford v. United States, 192' U. S. 217 302, 415 
 
 Bedford v. Willard, 133 Ind. 562 1409 
 
 Bedford Quarries Co. v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 175 Ind. 303 192, 256 
 
 Beebe v. Scheidt, 13 Ohio St. 406 1121 
 
 Beekman v. Jackson County, 18 Ore. 283 766, 810, 1126 
 
 Beekman v. Saratoga, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. 45 3, 61, 71, 78, 170 
 
 185, 941, 983, 984 
 
 Beeks v. Dickinson County, 181 Iowa 244. . . , 1307 
 
 Beel V. Cincinnati, 80 Ohio St. 1 1308 
 
 Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 215 361, 989 
 
 Beidler v. Sanitary District, 211 111. 628 283, 422, 435, 453, 456, 878 
 
 Belcher's Sugar Refining Co. v. St. Louis Elevator Co., 82 Mo. 121 169 
 
 Belcher's Sugar Refining Co. v. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co., 101 Mo. 192 618 
 
 1085 
 
 Belding v. Archer, 131 N. C. 287 1196 
 
 Belfast, Appellant, 53 Me. 431 1024 
 
 Belfast Academy v. Salmond, 11 Me. 109 262, 935, 973, 10O7, 1078 
 
 Bell V. Boston, 101 Mass. 906 77, 1271, 1272 
 
 Bell V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 74 Iowa 343 730 
 
 Bell V. Mattoon Waterworks Co., 245 111. 544 151, 911, 916, 1413, 1419 
 
 Bell V. Newton, 183 Mass. 481 1271 
 
 Bell V. Prouty, 43 Vt. 299 233 
 
 Bellaire v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 156 U. S. 117 1043 
 
 Bellaire, etc., Ry. Co. v. Bellaire, 7 Ohio Dec. 607 997, 1001 
 
 Bell County v. Flint, 91 S. W. 329 1251 
 
 Belle Fourche Valley R. R. Co. v. Belle Fourche Land & Cattle Co., 28 
 
 S. D. 289 667, 670 
 
 Bellenot v. Richmond, 108 Va. 314 1410 
 
 Belleville v. Hallowell, 41 Kan. 192 1422 
 
 Belleville v. St. Clair County Turnpike Co., 234 111. 428 280, 355 
 
 Belleville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gregory, 15 111. 20 985 
 
 Bellingham Bay etc., R. R. Co. v. Loose, 2 Wash. 60O 1239, 1244 
 
 Bellingham Bay, etc., R. R. Co. v. Strand, 14 Wash. 144 651, 704, 1102 
 
 1114, 1129 
 
 Belmont v. New England Brick Co., 190 Mass. 442 278 
 
 Bellona Company's Case, 3 Bland 442 973 
 
Table of Cases. xliii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Bell Tel. Co. v. Belleville, etc., Co., 12 Ont. 571 382 
 
 Bell Tel. Co. v. Parker, 187 N. Y. 299 950 
 
 Bembe v. Anne Arundel County, 94 Md. 321 886 
 
 Bemis v. Guirl Drainage Co., 182 Ind. 36 913, 923, 927 
 
 Bemis v. Springfield, 122 Mass. 110 832 
 
 Benden v. Nashua, 17 N. H. 477 1357 
 
 Benedict V. (Joit, 3 Barb. 459 174 
 
 Benedict v. Heineberg, 43 Vt. 231 1418 
 
 Benedict v. State, 120 N. Y. 228 1273 
 
 Benham v. Dunbar, 103 Mass. 365 1196, 1204, 1205 
 
 Benjamin v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 42 Mich 628 101, 258 
 
 Benjamin v. Storr, L. E., 9 C. P. 400 491, 883 
 
 Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 134 N. Y. 156 303, 1321 
 
 Bennet v. Worcester County Commissioners, 4 Gray 359 958 
 
 Bennett v. Clemence, 6 Allen 10 1405, 1406 
 
 Bennett v. Kroth, 37 Kan. 235 271, 248 
 
 Bennett v. Marion, 106 Iowa 628 659, 911, 913, 916, 918, 919, 920, 921 
 
 982, 1081, 
 
 Bennett v. Marion, 119 Iowa 473 445 
 
 Bennett v. Woody, 137 Mo. 377 762 
 
 Benninghoff v. Palisade, 48 Colo. 64 1169 
 
 Bensel, In re, 206 fed. 369 671, 1041 
 
 Bensel, In re, 140 App. Div. 806 700 
 
 Bensel, In re, 144 App. Div. 751 341 
 
 Bensel, In re, 151 App. Div. 451 723 
 
 Bensel, In re, 152 App. Div. 499 1112 
 
 Bensel, In re, 158 App. Div. 41 693 
 
 Bensel, In re, 142 N. Y. Supp. 982 660 
 
 Bensley v. Mountain Lake Water Co., 13 Cal. 306 638, llO'l, 1104, 1255 
 
 1259 
 
 Benson v. Great Barrington Fire District, 183 Mass. 590 838, 839, 1235 
 
 1241, 1304 
 
 Benson v. Hoboken, 33 N. J. L. 280 482 
 
 Benson v. Morrow, 61 Mo. 345 409 
 
 Benson v. New York, 10 Barb. 223 30, 223, 225, 392, 401 
 
 Benson v. Wilmington, 9 Houst. 359 1364 
 
 Bent V. Kmery, 173 Mass. 495 303, 309 
 
 Bentley v. Atlanta, 92 Ga. 623 874 
 
 Benton v. Brookline, 151 Mass. 250 676, 785, 802, 1181, 1186, 1222 
 
 Bentonville R. R. Co. v. Baker, 45 Ark. 252 731, 1238, 1392 
 
 Bentonville R. R. Co. v. Stroud, 45 Ark. 278 1080, 1081, 1129 
 
 Bergen Neck Ry. Co. v. Point Breeze, etc., Co., 57 N. J. L. 163 742 
 
 Bergman v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 21 Minn. 533 1102, 1106 
 
 Bernard v. Brewer, 2 Wash. 76 937, 1079 
 
 Berrien Springs Wa.ter Power Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 133 Mich. 48 116 
 
 149, 207, 225 
 
 Berry-Horn Coal Co. v. Scruggs-McClure Coal Co., 62 Mo. App, 93 587 
 
 Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509 25, 31 
 
 Berwyn v. Berglund, 255 111. 498 213,214, 982 
 
xliv Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Tolnme II.] PAGE 
 
 Besemaji v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 50 2Sr. J. L. 235 303, 317 
 
 Betbam v. PhiladelpMa, 196 Pa. 302 1343 
 
 Betts V. Lee, 5 Johns 348 702 
 
 Beveridge v. Lewis, 137 Cal. 619 114, 145, 625, 766, 767, 770, 79?, 961 
 
 963, 1092 
 
 Beverly Road, In re, 131 App. Div. 208 350, 351, 1155 
 
 Bevier v. Dillingham, 18 Wis. 529 1023 
 
 Bevis V. Vanceburg Tel. Co., 121 Ky. 177 578 
 
 Beynton v. Brandywine, etc., R. R. Co., 39 Ind. 129 1126 
 
 Bibb V. Montjoy, 2 Bibb. 1 225 
 
 Bibb County v. Harris, 71 Ga. 250' 990 
 
 Bibber White Co. v. White River Valley El. Ry. Co., Ill Fed. 36 1228 
 
 Bicknell v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 161 Mass. 428 1411, 1419 
 
 Biekford v. Hyde Park, 173 Mass. 552 732, 836, 843, 855 
 
 Biddle v. Hussman, 23 Mo. 597 335, 712 
 
 Biddle v. Wayne Waterworks Co., 190 Pa. 94 921 
 
 Bidelman v. State, 110 N. Y. 233 397 
 
 Bienville Water Co. v. Mobile, 175 U. S. 109 361 
 
 Big Beaver Creek Corporation v. Beaver County, 37 Pa. Super. Ct. 250. . 697 
 
 Bigelow V. Balerino, 111 Cal. 559 879 
 
 Bigelow V. Cambridge, etc.. Turnpike Corp., 7 Mass. 202 1058, 122S 
 
 Bigelow V. Dra/per, 6 N. D. 152 66, 116, 156, 434, 914, 919, 924, 1144 
 
 Bigelow V. Mississippi Central, etc, R. R. Co., 2 Head 624 1026, 1027 
 
 Bigelow V. Springfield, 178 Mo. App. 463 262, 1345 
 
 Bigelow V. Union Freight R. R., 187 Mass. 478 828, 1233 
 
 Bigelow V. West Wisconsin R. R. Co., 27 Wis. 478 740 
 
 Bigelow V. Whitcomb, 72 N. H. 473 485 
 
 Bigelow V. Worcester, 169 Mass. 390 832 
 
 Bigelow Carpet Co. v. Clinton, 108 Mass. 70 709, 1135 
 
 Bigham Bros. v. Port Arthur Dock, etc., Co., 100 Tex. 192 422 
 
 Big Lost River Irrigation Co. v. Davidson, 21 Idaho 160 1/089, 1114 
 
 Big Sandy Ry. Co. v. Dils, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 952 799 
 
 Billings Sugar Co. v. Fish, 40 Mont. 256 116, 137, 243 
 
 Bill Posting Sign Co. v. Atlantic City, 71 N. J. L. 72 277 
 
 Billsborrow v. Pierce, 112 Minn. 336 1256 
 
 Binney's Case, 2 Bland Ch. 99 988, 1415 
 
 Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51 358, 359, 361, 363 
 
 Bird V. Great Eastern Ry. Co., 34 L. J. C. P. 396 340, 353 
 
 Bird V. Wilmington, etc., R. R. Co., 8 Rich. Eq. 46 622, 989, 994 
 
 Birdsall v. Cary, 66 How. Pr. 358 198 
 
 Birge v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 65 Iowa 440 1244 
 
 Birkenhead v. London, etc., R. R. Co., 15 Q. B. D. 572 819 
 
 Birmingham v. Kennedy, 63 So.^770 789, 792 
 
 Birmingham v. Land, 137 Ala. 538 445 
 
 Birmingham v. Rumsey, 63 Ala. 352 1416 
 
 Birmingham Belt R. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 150 Ala. 610 533, 553, 1154 
 
 Birmingham, etc.. Power Co. v. Moran, 151 Ala. 187 1400 
 
 Birmingham, etc.. Power Co. v. Oden, 146 Ada. 495 792 
 
 Birmingham, etc.. Power Co. v. Smyer, 181 Ala. 121 554, 892 
 
Table op Cases. xlv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Birmingham, etc., R. E. Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. K. Co., 152 Ala. 422 . . 344 
 
 996, 1002, 1074 
 
 Birmingham, etc., St. Ry. Co. v. Birmingham St. Ry. Co., 79 Ala. 465 .. . 363 
 
 Birmingham Mineral R. R. Co. v. Smith, 89 Ala. 305 1207, 1209 
 
 Birmingham R. R., etc., Co. v. Birmingham Traction Co., 128 Ala. 110. . 1099 
 
 Birmingham Traction Co. v. Birmingham Ry. 'Co., 119 Ala. 137 541 
 
 BischoflF V. New York El. Ry. Co., 138 N. Y. 257 504, 561, 593, 597, 790 
 
 808 
 
 Biscoe V. Great Eastern R. R. Co., L. R. 19 Eq. 636 819 
 
 Bishop V. Mayor of Macon, 7 Ga. 20O 688 
 
 Bishop V. New Haven, 82 Conn. 51 650, 653 
 
 Bishop V. North Adams Fire District, 167 Mass. 364 572, 839, 842, 1304 
 
 Bissell V. Collins, 28 Mich. 277 483 
 
 Bissell V. Kankakee, 64 111. 249 219 
 
 Bissell V. Olson, 26 N. D. 60 418 
 
 Bittenhaus v. Johnston, 92 Wis. 588 415 
 
 Black V. Baltimore, 50 Md. 235 1107, 1318 
 
 Black V. Baltimore, 56 Md. 333 1107 
 
 Black V. Columbia, 19 S. C. 412 1329 
 
 Black V. Delaware, etc., Canal Co., 2.4 N. J. Eq. 455 69, 973 
 
 Black River Improvement Co. v. La Crosse Booming, etc., Co., 54 Wis. 
 
 659 : 304, 421, 433 
 
 Blackrock Commissioners, In re, ( 1894) 1 Ir. Rep. 156 1134 
 
 Blackshire v. Atchison, etc., R. R. Co., 13 Kan. 514 1101 
 
 Blackwell v. Old Colony R. R. 'Co., 122 Mass. 1 429, 826, 843, 1368 
 
 Blackwell v. Phiuney, 126 Mass. 458 202 
 
 Blackwell, etc., R. E. Co. v. Bebout, 19 Okla. 63 657, 1236, 1240 
 
 Blackwell, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gist, 18 Okla 516 879 
 
 Blackwell's Island Bridge Approach, In re, 198 N. Y. 84 693, 695 
 
 Blair v. Charleston, 43 W. Va. 62. .766, 767, 790, 815, 868, 872, 874, 876, 895 
 
 Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass. 136 283 
 
 Blaisdell v. Wintbrop, 118 Mass. 138 1052 
 
 Blake v. Norfolk County Commissioners, 114 Mass. 583 1048 
 
 Blake v. Rich, 34 N. H. 282 600, 609, 691 
 
 Blakely v. Chicago, etc., R. E. Co., 34 Nebr. 284 , 604 
 
 Blakely v. Delaware, etc.. Canal Co., 2 Lack. Leg. N. 59- 1001 
 
 Blakely Township v. Devine, 36 Minn. 53 1359 
 
 Blanchard v. Maysville, etc.. Turnpike Co., 1 Dana 86 1098, 1228 
 
 Bland v. Hixenbaugh, 39 Iowa 532 798 
 
 Blandburg Water Co., In re 233 Pa. 230 1094 
 
 Blane v. Klumpke, 29 Cal. 156 425 
 
 Blaney v. Salem, 160 Mass. 303 709, 1135, 1175 
 
 Blashfield v. Empire State Tel. & Tel. Co., 71 Hun. 532 577 
 
 Blazier v. Miller, 10 Hun 435 285 
 
 Bledsoe v. iStallard, 250 Mo. 154 905, 932, 1240 
 
 Bleseh v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 43 Wis. 183 1245, 1397 
 
 Blincoe v. Choctaw, etc., R. R. Co., 16 Okla. 286. . .3, 117, 660, 667, 697, 1194 
 
 '1201 
 
 Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U. S. 1 934 
 
 iv 
 
xlvi Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1+22 in Volume II.] PAOE 
 
 Bliss V. Attleborough, 20O Mass. 227 1407 
 
 BliBs V. Ball, 99 Mass. 597 485 
 
 Bliss V. Hosmer, 15 Ohio 44 66 
 
 Bliss V. Johnson, 94 N. Y. 233 481, 486 
 
 Blizzard v. Danville, 175 Pa. 479 44« 
 
 Blizzard v. Riley, 83 Ind. 300 924 
 
 Block Bounded by Avenue A, In re, 66 Misc. 488 695, 717, 1192 
 
 Block Bounded by Chauncey St., In re, 209 JN. Y. 127 1132 
 
 Blodgett V. Northv7estern El. Ry. Co., 80 Fed. 601 647. 
 
 Blood V. Nashua, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Gray 137 460, 834 
 
 Bloodgood V. Mohawk, etc., R. R. Co., 1^ Wend. 9 3, 59, 62, 116, 120, 133 
 
 146, 185, 632, 636, 908, 941, 1244 
 
 Bloomlield v. Johnston, 2 Ir. R. R., 8 C. L. 68 410 
 
 Bloomfield, etc., Nat. Gaslight Co. v. Calkins, 62 N. Y. 386 204, 474, 573 
 
 Bloomfield, etc., Nat. Gaslight Co. v. Richardson, 63 Barb. 437 210 
 
 Bloomington v. Brokaw, 77 111. 194 867 
 
 Bloomington v. Latham, 142 111. 462 786 
 
 Bloomington v. Legg, 151 111. 9 1309 
 
 Bloomington v. Miller, 84 111. 621 1081, 1114 
 
 Bloomington v. Pollock, 141 111. 346 867, 872, 968 
 
 Blue Earth County v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 2S Minn. 503 666, 732, ll5l 
 
 Bluffton V. Silver, 63 Ind. 262 517, 518 
 
 Blumb V. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 112 1252 
 
 Blunck V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 142 Iowa 146 , 731 
 
 Bly V. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 172 N. Y. 1 1158 
 
 Blyhl V. Waterville, 57 Minn. 115 1310 
 
 Boalsburg Water Co. v. State Water Co., 240 Pa. 198 917 
 
 Board of Education v. Aldridge, 13 Okla. 205. '. 928 
 
 Board of Education v. Brown, 159 Mich. 148 1111, 1145, 1168 
 
 Board of Education v. Stillwater, 13 Okla. 205 925 
 
 Board of Health of Portage v. Van Hoesen, 87 Mich. 533. .116, 129, 156, 213 
 
 Board of Park Commissioners v. Du Pont, 110 Ky. 743 913, 988 
 
 Board of Superviisors v. Magoon, 109 111. 142 1117, 1118 
 
 Board of Street Opening, Matter of, 133 N. Y. 329 973, 1006 
 
 Board of Water Supply, In re, 211 N. Y. 174 700 
 
 Board of Water Supply, In re, 73 Misc. 231 352 
 
 Board of Water Supply, In re, 74 Misc. 146 947 
 
 Board of Weter Supply, In re, 81 Misc. 19 368, 955,. 1112 
 
 Board of Water Supply, In re, 142 N. Y. Supp. 83 368 
 
 Board of Water Supply, In re, 155 N. Y. Supp. 753 1180 
 
 Board of Trade Tel. Co. v. Barnett, 107 111. 5*7 576, 580, 1397 
 
 Board of Trade Tel. Co. v. Darst, 192 111. 47 592, 598 
 
 Body V. Negley, 40 Pa. 377 91 
 
 Bogart V. Ivew York, 7 Cow. 158 1117 
 
 Bogue V. DeLong, 147 Mich. 63 948 
 
 Bogue V. Van Zandt County, 138 S. W. 1065 1251 
 
 Bohan v. Avoca, 154 Pa. 404 1360 
 
 Bohen v. Waseca, 32 Mihn. 176 1310 
 
 Bohm V. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 129 N. Y. 576 559, 790, 808, 853 
 
Table of Cases. xlviL 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Boise Valley Construction Co. v. ICroeger, 17 Idaho 384 1154, 1280 
 
 Boise Water Co. v. Boise City, 2,30 U. S. 84 1400 
 
 Bolton V. Gilleran, 105 Cal. 244 984 
 
 Bolton V. McShane, 67 Iowa 207 1255 
 
 Bonaparte v. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., Baldw. 220 30, 146, 174, 622, 939 
 
 Bond V. Pennsylvania Co., 171 111. 508 526, 633, 1395, 1398 
 
 Bonham's Case, 8 Coke 114 29 
 
 Bonsai v. Yellott, 100 Md. 481 173 
 
 Bookman v. New York El. Ry. Co., 137 N. Y. 302 769, 790, 808 
 
 Boom Co. V. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403 58, 658, 671, 918, 920, 982, 1041 
 
 Boonville v. Ormrod, 26 Mo. 193 925, 928, 1159 
 
 Boothby v. Androscoggin, etc., R. R. 'Co., 51 Me. 518 611, ISSil 
 
 Borchardt v. Wausau Boom Co., 84 Wis. 107 1388 
 
 Borden v. Atlantic Highlands, etc., Ry. Co., 33 Alt. 276 1400. 
 
 Borden v. Trespalacios Rice & Irrigation Co., 98 Tex. 494 117, 156, 170 
 
 249 
 Bordentown, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., 17 N". J. L. 314 364 
 
 Borghart v. Cedar Rapids, 126 Iowa 313 322, 879 
 
 Borgman v. Detroit, 102 Mich. 261 944 
 
 Bork V. United New Jersey R. R. and Canal Co., 70 N. J. L. 268 526, 1396 
 
 Borton v. Mangus, 93 Kan. 719 884 
 
 Borup, Matter of, 182 N. Y. 222 966, 967 
 
 Bost V. Cabarrus County, 152 N. C. 531 767, 808 
 
 Bostock V. Sams, 95 Md. 400 277 
 
 Boston V. Brookline, 156 Mass. 172 383, 1004 
 
 Boston V. Lecraiw, 17 How. 426 442 
 
 Boston V. Richardson, 13 Allen 146 486, 570, 1378 
 
 Boston V. Robbins, 121 Mass. 453 715 
 
 Boston V. Talbot, 206 Mass. 82 66, 150, 156, 157, 17S 
 
 Boston Belting Co. v. Boston, 149 Mass. 44 837, 842, 1250, 1314, 1318i 
 
 Boston Belting Co. v. Boston, 152 Mass. 307 894 
 
 Boston Belting Co. v. Boston, 183 Mass. 254 446, 844, 955, 1249, 1250, 1380 
 
 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 189. . .'. 630, 709 
 
 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 195 Mass. 338 709, 1152 
 
 Boston Electric Light Co. v. Boston Terminal Co., 184 Mass. 566. . .377, 574 
 
 835 
 
 Boston, etc., R. R. Co., Matter of, 53 N. Y. 574 997, 1002 
 
 Boston, etc., R. R. Co., Matter of, 79 N. Y. 64 999 
 
 Boston, etc., R. K. Co. v. Boston, 140 Mass. 87 998 
 
 Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cambridge, 159 Mass. 283 371, 746, 747, 749 
 
 Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cambridge, 166 Mass. 224 996, 1003 
 
 Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gilmore, 37 N. H. 410 1417 
 
 Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Greenbush, 52 N. Y. 510 372, 752 
 
 Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hunt, 210 Mass. 128 210, 469, 600, 601 
 
 Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Lowell, etc., R. R. Co., 124 Mass. 368 996, 1000 
 
 Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Middlesex County, 1 Allen 324 709, 762, 771 
 
 1135 
 
 Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Midland R. R. Co., 1 G<ray 340 987 
 
 Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 12 Cush. 605. . .457, 826, 843 
 
xlviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Boston, etc., R. K Co. v. Old' Colony, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Allen 142. .1183, 1203 
 
 Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Salem, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Gray 1 59, 66, 79, 184 
 
 358, 363, 386, 621, 628, 914, 988, 1258 
 
 Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. TurnbuU, 31 Hun 461 741 
 
 Boston, etc., R. R. Co. \. Worcester, 180 Mass. 71 385 
 
 Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. York Comity CommissionerB, 79 Me. 386 750 
 
 Boston Gas Light Co. v. Old Colony, etc., R. R. Co., 14 Allen 444 606 
 
 Boston Rolling Mills v. Cambridge, 117 Mass. 396 837, 1256, 1258, 1377 
 
 Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & Worcester R. R. Co., 23 Pick 360. . 68 
 
 71, 972, 974, 983 
 Boston & Albany R. R. Co. v. Hampden County Commissioners, 116 
 
 Mass. 73 1050 
 
 Boston & Maine R. R. v. Folsom, 46 N. H. 64 1119 
 
 Boston & Maine R. R. v. Lawrence, 2 Allen 107 1050 
 
 Boston & Roxbury Mill Corporation v. Newman, 12 Pick 467 116, 131 
 
 162, 226, 314, 615 
 
 Boteler v. Philadelphia, etc., Terminal R. R. Co., 164 Pa. 397 339, 341 
 
 Bothe V. Railway Co., 37 Ohio St. 147 1264 
 
 Bouge V. Winnitoon, 90 Nebr. 260 847, 857 
 
 Boulat V. Municipality No. 1, 5 La. Ann. 363 178 
 
 Boulton V. Crowther, 2 B. & C. 703 300 
 
 Bourdier v. Morgan's, etc., R. R. Co., 35 La. Ann. 947 1269 
 
 Bourke v. Davis, 44 Ch. D. 110 175 
 
 Bourne v. Liverpool, 32 L. J. Q. B. 15 340 
 
 Boutelle v. Minneapolis, 59 Minn. 493 366 
 
 Bouvier v. Baltimore, etc., R. R, Co., 67 N. J. L. 281 1264 
 
 Bouvier v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 69 N. J. L. 149 905 
 
 Bowden v. Derby, 97 Me. 536 1306 
 
 Bowden v. York Shore Water Co., 95 Atl. 779 161, 171, 201 
 
 Bowditoh v. Boston, 101 U. S. 16 ■ 263, 264 
 
 Bowditch v. Boston, 164 Mass. 107 67i8, 677, 1207 
 
 Bowditch V. Jackson Co., 76 N. H. 351 262 
 
 Bowe V. Scott, 233 U. S. 658 1039 
 
 Bowe V. Scott, 113 Va. 500 324 
 
 Boweu V. Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co., 17 S. C. 574 811 
 
 Bowers v. Citizens' Water Co., 162 Pa. 9 1052 
 
 Bowers v. Snyder, 66 Ind. 340 1053 
 
 Bowersox v. Seneca County, 20 Ohio St. 496 1094 
 
 Bowes V. Aberdeen, 58 Wash. 535 240 
 
 Bowker v. Wright, 54 N. J. L. 130 948 
 
 Bowley v. Mangrum, 3 Cal. App. 229 482 
 
 Bowley v. Walker, 8 Allen 21 1135, 1406 
 
 Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay 252 30 
 
 Bowman v. New Orleans, 27 La. Ann. 501 1355 
 
 Bowman V. Venice, etc., R. R. Co., 102 111. 459 902, 936, 1075, 1078 
 
 Boyce v. Missouri Pacific R. R. Co., 168 Mo. 583 1420 
 
 Boyd v. Frankfort, 117 Ky. 199 278, 283 
 
 Boyd V. Loganaport, etc.. Traction Co., 161 Ind. 587 1083, 1086, 1096 
 
 Boyd V. Nealey, 40 Pa. 377 257, 918, 984, 106€ 
 
Table of Cases. ^li^ 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volame I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Boyd V. United States, 116 U. S. 616 283 
 
 Boye V. Albert Lea, 74 Minn. 230 1343, 1344 
 
 Boyer v. Lucas, etc., Ey. Co., 97 Tex. 107 6'60 
 
 Boykin v. Shaffer, 13 La. Ann. 129 101 
 
 Boyne City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 146 Mich. 328 955, 1111, 1118 
 
 1168, 1222 
 
 Boynton v. Peterborough, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Cush. 467 1159, 1160 
 
 Brack v. Baltimore, 12© Md. 378 625, 659, 666, 671, 722 
 
 Brackett v. Common-wealtih, 2i23 Mass. iW 103, 429, 96i7, 1208, 1209 
 
 Bradbury v. Cumberland] Oounty, 5-2 Me. 27 1228 
 
 Bradbury v. Vandalia Levee, etc.. District, 236 Tex. 36 115, 244, 283 
 
 894, 1304 
 
 Bradford v. Fultz, 167 Iowa 686 884 
 
 Bradford v. McQues.ten, 182 Masa 80 456 
 
 Bradford v. Shine, 13 Fla. 3193 302 
 
 Bradley, In re, 108 Iowa 476 940 
 
 Bradley v. Appanoose Co., 106 lowia 105 140.7 
 
 Bradley v. Degnon Contracting Co., 157 App. Div. 237 S43 
 
 Bradley v. Frankfort, 99 Ind. 417 948 
 
 Bradley v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 21 Conn. 294. . .530, 611, 855, 873, 983 
 
 Bradley v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 38 Minn. 23i4 1104 
 
 Bradley v. Hiarr, 45 La. Ann. 426 115, 188, 464, 526, 534 
 
 Bra,dshaw v. Rogers', 20 Johns. 103 30, 622 
 
 Brady v. Atlantic City, 93 N. J. Eq. 440 68, 979 
 
 Brady v. Fall River, 121 Mass. 262 833, 869 
 
 Brady v. Johnson, 75 Md^ 445 141T 
 
 Brady v. Kansas City Cable Ry. Cto.., 1,11 Mo. 329 638 
 
 Bragan v. Birmingham, etc.. Power Co., 163 Ala. 93 789, 792, 1222 
 
 Brailey v. Southborough, 6 Cush. 141 835 
 
 Brainard v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 12 Gray 407 1178, 1217 
 
 Brainard v. Clapp, 10 .Cush. 6i 462, 600, 602, 608, 609 
 
 Brainard v. Connecticut River E. R. Co., 7 Cush. 506 496, 834 
 
 Brainard v. Missisquoi R. R. Co., 48 Vt. 107 619, 1420 
 
 Brainard v. Newton, 154 Mass. 265 1362 
 
 Brainerd v. Peck, 34 Vt. 496 , 994 
 
 Brainerd v. State, 74 Misc. 100 1173 
 
 Brakken v. Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Cb., 20 Minn. 41 322, 497, 530, 536- 
 
 881, 1143 
 
 Bramlett v. Greenville, 88 S. O. 110 508, 811 
 
 Bramlett v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 24 Ky. L. Rep. 180 858, 864 
 
 Branaihan v. Hotel Co., 39 Ohio St. 38® '. 522 
 
 Brand v. Multnomah County, 38 Ore. 79 514 
 
 Brand v. Union El. R. R. Co., 169 111. App. 449 S92 
 
 Brand v. Union El. R. R. Co., 238 U. S. 589 776, 797 
 
 Brand v. Union El. E. R. Co., 258 111. 133 790, 791, 796, 797 
 
 Brandenburg v. Hittel, 16 Ind. App. 224 879 
 
 Brandt v. Spokane, etc., E. E. 'Co., 78 Wasih. 214 543, 552 
 
 Branson v. Gee, 26 Ore. 462 914, 927 
 
1 Table of Cases. 
 
 (Pages 1-720 ar« in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume H.] PAGE 
 
 Brattle v. Hinckley, 7 Harvard Law Review 415 32 
 
 Brauer v. Baltimore, etc., Heating Oo., 99 Md. 367 478 
 
 Braun v. Metropolitan, etc., Ry. 'Co., 166 111. 434 699 
 
 Brayton v. Fall River, 113 Mass. 218 42l5i, 428, 442, 457, 834, 13118 
 
 1362, 1373 
 
 Brayton v. Pall River, 124 Mass. 96 981, 984 
 
 Brazell v. Seattle, 53 Wash. 180 498, 506 
 
 Breaux v. Bienvenu, 51 La. Ann. 687 988 
 
 Breen v. Pittoburg, etc., R. Co., 220 Pa. 612i 1401 
 
 Brennan v. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 280 Pa. 228 1182 
 
 Brevoort v. Detroit, 24 Mich. 322 1337 
 
 Brewer v. Boston, etc.. Railroad Co., 113 Mass. 52 828, 83a, 874, 1051 
 
 1250, 1318, 1350, 1351 
 
 Brewer v. Bowman, 9 Gra. 37 236 
 
 Brewer v. New Gloucester, 4 Mass. 219 1418 
 
 Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, 62 Me. 62 219 
 
 Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 138 76 
 
 Brewster v. Rogers Co., 169 N. Y. 73 110, 142, 257, 638, 639, 1242 
 
 Briar Creek Ry. Co. v. Kanawha Central Ry. Co., 7iO W. Va. E06 1265 
 
 Brickett v. Haverhill Aqueduct Co., 142' Mass. 394 94, 632, 633', 634, 639 
 
 Brickies v. Milwaukee, etc.. Traction Co., 134 Wis. 358. .546, 1151, 11S5, 1165 
 
 Bridal Veil Lumbering Co. v. Johnson, 25 Ore. 105 914, lOSl, 1091 
 
 Bridal Veil Lumbering Co. v. Johnson, 30 Ore. 205 47, 60, 145, 156 
 
 157, 205, 258 
 
 Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U. S. 470 102 
 
 Bridgeman v. Hardwick, &7 Vt. 653 651, 783 
 
 Bridgeport v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 36 Conn. 255 996, 998, 1000, 1002 
 
 Bridge Proprietors v. Hohoken Co., 1 Wall. 116 3©1, 363 
 
 Bridges v. Southern Ry. Co., 86 S. C. 267 341, 1155, 1162 
 
 Bridgeton v. Bridgeton, etc.. Traction Co., 62 N. J. L. 592 397 
 
 Bridgman v. St. Johnsbury, etc., R. R. Co., 58 Vt. 198 '. . . 1282 
 
 Bridwell v. Gate City Terminal Co., 127 Ga. 5210 115, 145, 187, 1028, 1080 
 
 Briegel v. PhUadelphia, 135 Pa. 451 1314 
 
 Briggs V. Cape Cod Ship Canal Co., 137 Mass. 71 1086, 1088 
 
 Briggs V. Labette County, 39 Kan. 99 696 
 
 Brigham v. Agricultural Branch R. E. Co., 1 Allen 316 987 
 
 Brigham v. Edwards, 7 Gray 3i59 310 
 
 Brigham City v. Chase, 30 Utah 410 1074 
 
 Briggs V. Lewiston, etc., Ry. Co., 79 Me. 363 471, 514, 537, 639, 994 
 
 Briggs Ave., In re, 196 N. Y. 265 , 696 
 
 Bright V. Piatt, 32 N. J. Eq. 362 355 
 
 Brightman v. Fairhaven, 7 Gray 2711 830, 834, S43 
 
 Brimfleld v. Carter, 2 Ga. 143 1408 
 
 Brimmer v. Boston, 102 Mass. 19 77, 78, 991, 1051 
 
 Brinckerhoff v. Newark, eitc, Traction Co., 66 N. J. L. 478 985 
 
 Brine v. Great Western R. E. .Co., 2 B. & S. 402 819 
 
 Brinkley v. Southern Ry. Co., 135 N. C. 654 602, 620 
 
 Brinkmeyer v. Evansville, 29 Ind. 187 1324, 1329 
 
 Brisbane v. St. Paul R. R. Co., 23 Minn. 114 428, 520, 1131 
 
Table of Cases. li 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 lu Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Brisooe v. Rudolph, 221 U. S. 547 775, 787, 791 
 
 Bristol V. Bristol, etc.. Waterworks, 23 R. I. 274 666 
 
 Bristol V. Bristol Water Oo., 85 Conn. 663 1101 
 
 Bristol V. New Chester, 3 K H. 534 30, 622 
 
 Bristol Door & Lumber Co. v. Bristol, 97 Va. 304 277 
 
 Bristow V. Oormican, 3 App. Gas. 641 410 
 
 Brittou V. Oummingtoii, 107 Mass. 34Y 521 
 
 Britton v. Dea Moines, etc., B. R. Co., 59 Iowa 540 798 
 
 Broadmoor Land Co. v. Carr, 133. Fed. 37 643 
 
 Broadmoor Land Co. v. Carr, 142 Fed. 421 1042 
 
 Broad St. Widening, 229 Pa. 184 810 
 
 Broadway 'Coal Mining Oo. v. Smith, 136 Ky. 725' 790, 953 
 
 Broadwell v. Kansas City, 75 Mo. 213 516 
 
 Brock V. Hisben, 40 Wis. 674 947 
 
 Brock V. Old 'Colony B. R. Co., 14)6 Mass. 194 932, 934 
 
 Brocket v. Ohio, etc., R. R. Co., 14 Pa. .244 67, 995 
 
 Brockhausen v. Boehland, 137 111. 547 1407 
 
 Brockville, etc.. Hydraulic Co. v. Butler, 91 Ind. 134 1273 
 
 Bronson v. Albion Tel. 'Co., 67 Nob. Ill 485, 576, 580, 581, 647, 1084, 1398 
 
 Bronson v. Wallingford, '54, Conn. 513 1317, 1361 
 
 Brook V. Horton, 68 .CW. 554 i405, 1406 
 
 Brookfield, In re, 176 N. Y. 13S 347, 615 
 
 Brookfield v. Walker, 100 Mass. 94 397 
 
 Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N. Y. 74 426, 4.35 
 
 Brooklyn, In re, 143 N. Y. 596 68.3, 914, 972, 979 
 
 Brooklyn, Matter of, 87 Hun 54 267 
 
 Brooklyn v. Meserole, 26 Wend. 132) 1023 
 
 Brooklyn v. Patchen, 8 Wend. 47 94.8 
 
 Brooklyn v. Smith, 104 lU. 429 485, 615 
 
 Brooklyn El. R. R. Co., Re, 6 App. Mv. &3i .'. 598 
 
 Brooklyn El. Ry. Co. v. Brooklyn, 37 N. Y. Supp. 560i 379 
 
 Brooklyn, etc., Ry. Co. v. Brooklyn, etc., Ry. Co., 33 Barb. 420 379 
 
 Brooklyn Park Commissioners v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234. . . .617, 918, 1405 
 
 1421 
 
 Brooklyn Union El. Ry. Co., Matter of, 105 App. Div. 93 479 
 
 Brooklyn Union El. Ry. Co., Matter of, 113 App. Div. 817 504 
 
 Brooks V. Boston, 19 Pick. 174 716, 881 
 
 Brooks V. Cedar Brook, etc., Lmprovement Co., 82 Me. 17 408, 418 
 
 Brooks V. Hubbard, 73 Vt. 122 356 
 
 Brooks V. Kirby, 19 Ala. 72 1045 
 
 Brookville, etc.. Hydraulic Co. v. Butler, 91 Ind. 134 612, 615 
 
 Broome v. New York, etc., Tel. Co., 42 N. J. Eq. 141 577 
 
 Brophy v. Atty.-Gen. of Manitoba, Manitoba App. 1895, 202 29 
 
 Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398 426 
 
 Brown v. Arkansas Central Ry. Co., 72 Ark. 456 1156 
 
 Brown v. Aaheville El. Light Co., 138 N. C. 53i3. .470, 486., 577, 580, 584, 585 
 
 Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 2127 59, 119, 778, 779, 803i, 983, 1235, 1389 
 
 Brown v. Board of Supervisors, 124 Cal. 274 880 
 
 Brown v. Brown, 50 N. H. 538 1061 
 
lii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Brown v. Calumet River Ry. Co., 125 lU. 600 661, 1086, 1189, 1210, 1211 
 
 Brown v. Oiadbourne, 31 Me. 9 408, 408 
 
 Brown v. Chicago etc., R. R. Co., 64 Neb. 62 1228 
 
 Brown v. Cincinnati, 14 Ohio 541 809 
 
 Brown v. Corey, 43 Pa. 495 1189 
 
 Brown v. Du{>lessi8, 14 La. Ann. S42 537 
 
 Brown v. Forest Water Co., 213 Pa. 440 672 
 
 Brown v. Gates, 15 W. Va. 131 1416 
 
 Brown v. Gerald, 100 Me. 351 2, 66, 115, 133, 135, 141, 157, 204, 207, 351 
 
 913, 916, 1092, 1256 
 
 Brown v. Guyandotte, 34 W. Va. 299 1308 
 
 Brown v. Kennebec Wiater District, 108 Me. 227 916, 992 
 
 Brown v. MaoFarland, 22 App. D. C. 412 953 
 
 Brown v. Merrill, 3 Chand. 46 770 
 
 Brown v. New Jersey Short Line R. R. Co., 76 N. J. L. 795 1200, 1203 
 
 Brown v. New York, 183 Fed. 888 1100 
 
 Brown v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 58 Md. 539 1120 
 
 Brown v. Powell, 25 Pa. 229 338, 1244 
 
 Brown v. Providence etc., R. R. Co., 5 Gray 35. .591, 769, 801, 1137, 1208, 1393 
 
 Brovm v. Providence, etc., R. R. Co., 12 R. 1. 238 1178 
 
 Brown v. Radnor Township El. Light Co., 208 Pa. 453 204, 584 
 
 Brown v. Rome, etc., R. R. Co., 86 Ala. 206 1030 
 
 Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222 1310 
 
 Brown v. Saai Francisco, 124 Cal. 274 893 
 
 Brown v. Scranton, 231 Pa. 593' 1189 
 
 Brown v. Seattle, 5 Wash. 35 845, 846, 868, 871, 1257, 1260 
 
 Brown v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 232 Pa. 337 .' 690 
 
 Brown v. Vinalhaven, 65 Me. 402 1807 
 
 Brown v. Watson, 47 Me. 161 886 
 
 Brown v. Weaver Power Co., 140 N. C. 333 660, 70-9, 1110, 1172 
 
 Brown v. Worcester, 13 Gray 31 1190, 1195 
 
 Brownell v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 164 Mass. 29 1404 
 
 Browning v. Springfield, 17 lU. 143 1309 
 
 Brumit v. Virginia, etc., R. R. Co., 106 Tenn. 124 596 
 
 Bruner v. Threadgill, 88 N. C. 361 1189 
 
 Brunn v. Kansas City, 216 Mo. 108 163 
 
 Brunswick v. lueker, 103 Ga. 233 1355, 1364 
 
 Brunswick, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hardey, 112 Ga. 604 886 
 
 Brunswick, etc., R. R. Co. v. McLaren, 47 Ga. 546 1200 
 
 Brunswick, etc., R. R. Co. v. Waycross, 94 Ga. 102 991 
 
 Brunswick, etc.. Water District v. Maine Water Co., 99 Me. 371 683, 684 
 
 685, 687 
 
 Brunswick Gas Co. v. United, etc.. Light Co., 85 Me. 532 1416 
 
 Brunswick Gaslight Co. v. Brunswick, 92 Me. 493 379 
 
 Brush V. Detroit, 32 Mich. 43 1075 
 
 Bryan v. Board of Education, 181 U. S. 639 326 
 
 Bryan v. Chester, 212 Pa. 259 278 
 
 Bryan v. Petty, 162 Iowa 62 884 
 
 Bryant v. Bigelow Carpet Co., 131 Mass. 491 828 
 
Table op Cases. liii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Bryant v. Logan, 56 W. Va. 141 165 
 
 Bryant v. Pittslield, 199 Mass. 530 932, 934, 950, 1054 
 
 Bryant v. Bobbins, 70 Wis. 271 241 
 
 Bryant v. St. Paul, 33 Minn. 289 1308 
 
 Buccleuch v. Metropolitan Board of Works, L. R. 5 H. L. 418 430, 820 
 
 Buchner v. Caiicago etc., R. R. Co. 56 Wis. 503 1023 
 
 Buck V. Boston, 165 Mass. 509 1170, 1190 
 
 Buck V. (xreat Barrington, 203 Mass. 372 834, 879 
 
 Buckhannon, etc., R. R. Co. v. Davis, 135 Fed. 707 1037 
 
 Bucki V. Gone, 25 Fla. 1 409 
 
 Buckingham v. Smith, 10 Ohio 296 151, 205 
 
 Buckner v. Charleston, etc., R. R. Co., 7 S. C. 325 1159 
 
 Buckwalter v. Siihool District No. 42, 65 Kan. 60a 913, 925, 927, 929 
 
 Budd V. New York, 143 U. S. 517 279 
 
 Buell V. Lockport, 3 N. Y. 197 1229 
 
 Buell V. Lockport, 8 N. Y. 55 1059, 1246 
 
 Buell V. Worcester County, 119 Mass. 372 895, 1213 
 
 Buffalo, In re, 64 N. Y. 547 1083 
 
 Buffalo, In re, 68 N. Y. 167 997, 1001, 1003, 1006 
 
 Buffalo, In re, Sheld. 408 708 
 
 Buffalo, In re, 148 App. Div. 384 617 
 
 Buffalo, In re, 20 Hun 422 1003 
 
 Buffalo, In re, 15 N. Y. Supp. 123 1089 
 
 Buffalo V. Balcom, 134 N. Y. 532 1414 
 
 Buffalo v. Chadeayne, 134 N. Y. 163 275 
 
 Buffalo V. De Groat, 148 App. Div. 412 1112 
 
 Buffalo V. Delaware, etc., R. R. Co., 190 N. Y. 84 1410 
 
 Buffalo V. Pratt, 131 N. Y. 293 352 
 
 Buffalo Bayou, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ferris, 2i6 Tex. 588 632, 638, 639, 812 
 
 Buffalo, etc., R. R. Co., In re, 32 Hun 289 1127, 1128 
 
 Buffalo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Brainard, 9 N. Y. 100 3, 914 
 
 Buffalo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hoyer, 147 App. Div. 205 543 
 
 Buffalo Grade Crossing Commissioners In re, 165 N. Y. 605 1112 
 
 Buffalo Grade Crossing Commissioners In re, 207 N. Y. 52 194, 847, 865 
 
 Buffalo Grade Crossing Commissioners In re, 209 N. Y. 139 602 
 
 Buffalo R. R. Co. v. Du Bois Traction Co., 149 Pa. 1 385 
 
 Buffum v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 4 R. I. 221 1186 
 
 Bugby, etc., Co. v. Matador, etc., Co., 26 Tex. Civ. App. 260 624 
 
 Buhl V. Fort St. Union Depot Co., 98 Mich. 596 326, 885 
 
 Bulger V. Eden, 82 Me. 352 1375, 1379 
 
 Bullard v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 178 Mass 570 321, 619 
 
 Bullard V. Saratoga Victory Mfg. Co., 77 N. Y. 525 449 
 
 Bullock V. Wilson, 2 Porter 436 409 
 
 Bulstrode v. Hall, 1 Sid. 148 407 
 
 Bumpus V. Miller, 4 Mich. 159 91 
 
 Buncombe Metallic Tel. Co. v. McGinnis, 268 111. 504 211 
 
 Bundy v. Catto, 61 111. App. 209 483 
 
 Bunyan v. Palisades Park Commissioners, 153 N. Y. iSupp. '622. .146, 164, 35S 
 
 Burbank v. Fay, 65 N. Y. 57 96 
 
liv Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Burbridge v. New Albany, etc., R. R. Co., 9 Ind. 546 338 
 
 Burch V. Hardwicke, 30 Gratt. 24 40O 
 
 Burcky v. Lake, 30 111. App. 23 1 763 
 
 Burden v. Stein, 27 Ala. 104 201, 434, 732, 1255, 1260 
 
 Burford v. Grand Rapids, 53 Mich. 98 1316 
 
 Burger v. State Female Normal School, 114 Vd. 491. . .630, 660, 663, 667, 672 
 
 Burgesa v. Clark, 13 Ired. L. 100 225, 704 
 
 Burgett V. Ntorris, 25 Ohio St. 308 904 
 
 Burgin v. Marx, 158 Ala. 633 1206 
 
 Burk V. Simonson, 104 Ind. 173 .'. 328, 1422 
 
 Burkhard v. Pennsylvania Water Co., 234 Pa. 41 1240, 1254 
 
 Burkhard v. Pennsylvania Water Co., 243 Pa. 369 1028, 1181 
 
 Burland v. Montreal, Rep. Jud. Que., 19 C. 8. 574 311 
 
 Burley v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 219 Mass. 483 1199, 1204 
 
 Burley v. United States, 102 C. C. A. 429 107, 249 
 
 Burlington v. Beasly, 94 U. S. 310 227 
 
 Burlington v. Gilbert, 31 Town 356 507, 1275 
 
 BurUngton, etc., R. R. Co. v. Colorado, etc., R. R. Co., 45 Colo. 222 1094 
 
 Burlington, etc., R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 38 Kan. 142 343, 988 
 
 Burlington, etc., R. R. Co. v. Reinhackle, 15 Neb. 279 494, 529, 596 
 
 Burlington, etc., R. R. Co. v. Sater, 1 Iowa 421 1099 
 
 Burlington, etc., R. R. Co. v. Sehluntz, 14 Neb. 241 1178 
 
 Burlington, etc., R. R. Co. v. Schweikart, 10 Colo. 178 626, 778 
 
 Burlington, etc., R. R. Co. v. White, 28 Neb. 166 692 
 
 Burmeister v. Howard, 1 Wash. Ter. 212 1420 
 
 Burne v. Stewart, 3 l>es. 466 36 
 
 Burnes v. Douglass, 23 Nev. 83 . : 1121 
 
 Burnett v. Boston, 173 Mass. 173 920 
 
 Burnett v. Commonwealth, 169 Mass. 417 66, 201 
 
 Burnett V. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 79 S. C. 462 995 
 
 Burnett v. Sacramento, 12 Oal. 76 69 
 
 Buruham v. Thompson, 35 Iowa 421 115, 134, 147 
 
 Burns, Re, 155 N. Y. 23 147, 914 
 
 Burns v. Multonomah R. R. Co., 8 Sawyer 543 925 
 
 Burr V. Leicester, 121 Mass. 241 831, 873 
 
 Burr V. Maclay Kancho Water Co., 160 Cal. 268 1266 
 
 Burrage v. Boston, 198 Mass. 580 654 
 
 Burrall v. American Tel. &. Tel. Co., 224 111. 266 576 
 
 Burridge v. Detroit, 117 Mich. 557 1310 
 
 Bnrrill v. Augusta, 78 Me. 118 1307 
 
 Burrill v. Martin, 12 Me. 345 954 
 
 Burrows v. Grays Harbor Boom Co., 44 Wash. 630 314 
 
 Burrows v. Pixley, 1 Root 362 '. 886 
 
 Burt V. Brigham, 117 Mass. 307 1<)28 
 
 Burt V. Merchants' Insurance Co., 106 Mass. 356 74, 107, 159 
 
 Burt V. Merchants' Insurance Co., 115 Mass. 1 700', 708, 1149 
 
 Burt V. Wigglesworth, 117 Mass. 302 1139 
 
 Burton Lumber Co. v. Houston, 101 S. W. 822 789, 813 
 
 Burtran v. Clark, 103 Mich. 383 773 
 
Table of Cases. Iv 
 
 1 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Bush V. Peru Bridge Co., 3 Ind. 21 360 
 
 Bush V. Portland, 19 Ore. 45 508 
 
 Bush V. Shipman, 5 111. 190 400 
 
 Bush V. Trowbridge Waterworks Co., L. R. 10 Ch. 459 819 
 
 Buahwick Ave., Matter of, 48 Barb. 9 167 
 
 Butchers Ice, etc., Co. v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 54 443, 457 
 
 Butchers' Slaughtering, etc.. Association v. Boston, 214 Mass. 254 830 
 
 Butchers' Slaughtering, etc., Assn. v. Commonwealth, 163 Mass. 386 .... 1222 
 Butchers' Slaughtering, etc., Association v. Commonwealth, 169 Mass. 103 
 
 614, 768, 801 
 Butler V. Bishop of Hereford & Cambridge College, Barnes, C. P., 350. . . 1293 
 
 Butler V. Morris County Commissioners, 42 Kan. 416 1271 
 
 Butler V. Perry, 240 U. S. 328 369 
 
 Butler V. Saginaw County, 26 Mich. 27 . .' 898 
 
 Butler V. Sewer Commissioners, 39 N. J. L. 665 625 
 
 Butler V. Thomasville, 74 Ga. 570 990 
 
 Butler County R. R. Co. v. Baxron, 173 Mo. App. 365 1130, 1131 
 
 Butman v. Newton, 179 Mass. 1 1310 
 
 Butt V. Colbert, 24 Tex. 355 416 
 
 Butte Co. V. Boydston, 64 Cal. 110 734 
 
 Butte Electric R. R. Co. v. Matthews, 34 Mont. 487 657 
 
 Butte, etc., R. R. Co. v. Montana, etc., R. R. Co., 16 Mont. 504 3, 59 
 
 116, 131, 141, 174, 191, 193, 195, 257, 1006 
 
 Butterworth-Judson Co. v. Central R. R. Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 568 347 
 
 Buttones v. Brewer, 54 Ala. 288 225 
 
 Buttrick V. Lowell, 1 Allen 172 1307, 1347 
 
 Byrd Irrigation Co. v. Smith, 1'.57 S. W. 260 626, 989 
 
 Byrd Irrigation Co. v. Smythe, 146 S. W. 1064 4, 60 
 
 Byrnes v. Cohoes, 67 N. Y. 204 1365" 
 
 Byron v. Blount, 97 III. 62 1068 
 
 c 
 
 Cabot V. Kingman, 1'66 Mass. 403 836, 856, 1250, 1252, 1379 
 
 Cadwell v. Connecticut Ry., etc., Co., 84 Conn. 40 549, 551 
 
 Cage V. Trager, 60 Miss. 56'3 : 1051, 1120 
 
 Cahill V. Baltimore, 93 Md. 233 1359 
 
 Caliill V. District of Columbia, 3 MacArthair 419 10i57, 122S, 12a? 
 
 Cahill V. Norwood Park, 149 111. 156 1110 
 
 Cairo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stevens, 73 Ind. 278 1392 
 
 Cairo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Trout, 32 Ark. 17 936, 940, 970, 1078 
 
 Cairo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Turner, 31 Ark. 494. .85, 622, 631, &3i9, 1335, 1237 
 
 Cairo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Woodyard, 226 111. 331 987 
 
 Cake v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 87 Pa. 307 997, 1000 
 
 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 30, 31 
 
 Calder v. Michigan, 218 U. S. 591 362 
 
 Oalder v. Police Jury, 44 La. Ann. 173 1256 
 
 Caldwell v. Highway 'Commisaionera, 24© 111. 366 62:5, 832, 636, 63T 
 
 Caldwell v. Seattle, 75 Wash. 565 326, 5i07, 1421 
 
 Caldwell v. State, 1 Stew. & P. 327 1 
 
Ivi Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Caledonian E. R. Co. v. Ogilvy, 2 Macq. H. L. 220 819, 822 
 
 Caledonian R. R. Co. v. Walker's Trustees, 7 App. Cas. 260 821, 822 
 
 California v. Central Pacific E. R. Co., 127 U. S. 1 Ill, 358, 1037 
 
 California Central Ry. Co. v. Hooper, 76 Cal. 404 fll8, i069 
 
 California, etc., R. R. Co. v. Prisbie, 41 Cal. 356 703 
 
 California, etc., R. E. Co. v. Mecartney, 104 'Cal. 616 1419 
 
 California, etc., E. R. Co. v. Southern Pacific, etc., R. E. Co., 67 Cal. 
 
 59 706, 734, 1067 
 
 California Pacific E. E. Co. v. Armstrong, 46 Cal. 85 706, 793 
 
 California Southern R. R. Co. v. Kimball, SI Cfel. 90 1084 
 
 Calking y. Baldwin, 6 Wend. 667 1335 
 
 Call V. Middlesex County 'OonuniBsioners, 2 Gray 232i 1152 
 
 Call V. Wilkesboro, 115 N. O. 337 914 
 
 Callanan v. Oilman, 107 N. Y. 360 477, 478 
 
 Callanan v. Port Huron, etc., R. R. Co., 61 Mich. 15 905 
 
 Callen v. Columbus Edison El. Light Co., 66 Ohio St. 166. .498, 490, 505 
 
 584, 585, 1257, 1395 
 
 Callen v. Junction City, 43 Kan. esU 267 
 
 Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 418 300, 507, 509, 512, 831, 1321, 1360 
 
 Callison v. Hedrick, 15 Gratt. 244 619 
 
 Calor Oil & Gas Co. v. Franzell, 128 Ky. 715i 210, 365, 1086, lOi^l, 1092 
 
 Calor Oir& Gas Co. v. Withers' Administrator, 14fl Ky. 480.210, 592, 607 
 
 Calumet, etc.. Dock Co. v. Morawetz, 195 111. 398 594, 597 
 
 Calumet River R. R. Co. v. Brown, 136 111. '320 364, 1131 
 
 Catumet River R. E. Co. v. Moore, 124 111. 329 669, 1171 
 
 Calwell V. Boone, 51 Iowa 687 1307, 1346, 1347 
 
 Camblos v. Philadelphia, etc., E. R. Co., 4 Fed. Cas.. 1101 ' 363 
 
 Cambria Street, Ee, 75 Pa. 357 936> 1079 
 
 Cambridge v. Middlesex County Oommisaioners, 126 Mass. 529 833, 869 
 
 Camden Interstate Ry. Co. v. Smiley, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 134 552, 878 
 
 Cameron v. lOhicago, etc., R. R. Co., 42 Minn. 75 737, 742 
 
 Cameron v. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 51' Minn. 190 692 
 
 Cameron v. Pittsburg, etc., E. R. Co., 157 Pa. 617 741 
 
 Cameron v. Washington County Supervisors, 47 Miss. 264 1256 
 
 Oamfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518 89 
 
 Campau v. Konau, 39 Mich. 362 487 
 
 Campau v. Le Blanc, 127 Mich. 179 1120 
 
 Campbell v. Fogg, 132 Ind. 1 927 
 
 Campbell v. Holt, 11'5 U. S. 680 971 
 
 Campbell v. Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co., 110 Ind. 490 1269 
 
 Campbell v. Kansas City, 102 Mo. 326 620, 1420 
 
 Oantpbell v. Metropolitan St. Ry, Co., 82 Ga. 320 637, 551, 845, 892 
 
 Canadian- Pacific Ry. Co. v. Brown Milling & Elevator iCo., 18 Ont. L. 
 
 Rep. 85 339, 343 
 
 Canadian Pacific R. R. Ca v. Moosehead Tel. Co., 106 Me. 363 370 
 
 755, 758, 1004, 1256 
 
 Canady v. Coeur D'Alene Lumber Co., 21 Idaho 77 885 
 
 Canal Oommisaioners v. Kempahall, 26 Wend. 404 436 
 
 Canal Commisioners v. People, 5 Wend. 423 410 
 
Table of Cases. Ivii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Canal, etc., E. R. Co. v. Orescent City Ey. Co., 4 La. Ann. 561 382 
 
 Canal, etc., E. E. Co., v. Crescent City, etc., E. E. Co., 44 La. Ann. 
 
 485 972, 97'6 
 
 Canastota Knife 'Co. v. Newington Tramway Co., 69 Conn. 146. .541, 546, 893 
 
 Canbom v. Belden, 51 Cal. 266 643 
 
 Cane Belt E. E. Co. v. Hughes, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 565 918, 921 
 
 Canham v. Jones, 2 Vea. & B. 218 3i66 
 
 Caranan v. St. Louis, 97 Mo. 92 885, 872 
 
 Canton v. Canton Cotton Warehouse Co., 84 Miss. 268. .386, 391, 395, 60*2 
 
 607, 999 
 
 Canton v. Shock, 6i6 Ohio St. 19 438 
 
 Canton Co. v. Baltimore, etc., E. E. .Co., 99 Ud. 202. . .1104, 1411, 1413, 1419 
 
 Canyon County v. Toole, 8 Idaho SOU 1066 
 
 Canyonville, etc., Eoad Co. v. Stephenson, 8 Ore. 2©3 1006 
 
 Cape Girardeau v. Houok, 12i9 Mo. 607 914 
 
 Cape Girardeau, etc., E. E. Co. v. Blechle, 234 Mo. 471 733, 769, 1137 
 
 1139, 1140, 1223 
 Cape Girardeau, etc., E. E. Co. v. Southern Illinois, etc., Bridge Co., 215 
 
 Mo. 286 1269 
 
 Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 13 943 
 
 Carbon Coal, etc., Co. v. Drake, 26 Kan. 345 628 
 
 Oardwell v. Amerieari Bridge Co., 113 U. S. 205 101 
 
 Caretta Ey. v. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal Co., 62 W. Va. 185 141, 145 
 
 155., 187, 193 
 
 Carl V. Sheboygan, etc., E. E. Co., 46 Wis. 625 52.7 
 
 Carli V. Stillwater, etc., E. R. Co., 16 Minn. .21601 1155 
 
 Oarli V. Stillwater St. Ey. Co., .28 Minn. 3731 456, 47!1, 537, 538, 549 
 
 570, 573, 575 
 
 Cariile v. Des Moines, etc., E. E. Co., 90 Iowa -345 1120 
 
 Carlisle Gas, etc., Co. v. Carlisle, 218 Pa. 55* 1414 
 
 Oarll V. Northport, 11 App. Div. 120 1360 
 
 Carlson v. St. Louis River Dam & Improvement Co., 73 Minn. 128 314 
 
 405, 1256, 12IS8 
 
 Carlson v. Spokane 'County Commissioners, 38 Wash. 616 1271 
 
 Carmichael v. Texarkana, 941 Fed. 561 313 
 
 Carnegie Natural Gas Co. v. Swiger, 72 W. Va. 567 141, 1067 
 
 Carolina Central E. E. Co. v. Love, 81 N. C. 434 1080 
 
 Carolina Central E. E. Co. v. McCaskill, 94 N. C. 746i 958, 1235 
 
 Carolina Central Ey. lOo. v. Phillips, 78 N. O. 49 952, 953 
 
 Oarondelet Canal Co. v. Parker, 29 La. Ann. 430 101 
 
 Carothers v. Philadelphia Co., 118 Pa. 468 204, 210 
 
 Carpenter v. Bristol County Commissioners, 21 Pick. 258 941, 945, 1062 
 
 Cari)enter v. Capital Electric Co., 178 111. 29 584 
 
 Carpenter v. Jennings, 77 111. 250 625, 796 
 
 Carpenter v. Lancaster, 250 Pa. 541 571, 572i, 573 
 
 Carpenter v. Landaff, 42 N. H. 218 768, 772, 806 
 
 Carpenter v. Mann, 17 Wis. 1.5'5 88S 
 
 Carpenter v. New York, 44 App. Div. 230 354 
 
 Carpenter v. New York, 51 App. Div. 584 354 
 
Iviii , Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Oarpenter-McNeill Investment Co. v. Spokane, 73 Wash. 232 1240 
 
 Carr v. Berkley, 145 Mass. 539 1069 
 
 Oarr v. Moore, 41 N. H. 131 1193 
 
 Carr v. JSTorthern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324 1220, 1325, 1332 
 
 Oarraher v. Revere, 182 Mass. 427 1169 
 
 Carroll v. Griffith, 117 Tenn. 500 470 
 
 Carroll v. Wisconsin Central R. R. Co., 40 Minn. 168 317, 863 
 
 Carroll St., In re, 137 App. Div. 39 351 
 
 Carrow v. Washington Toll Bridge, Phill. 1 19 360 
 
 Carson v. Blazer, 2 Bin. 476 408, 40©, 433 
 
 Carson v. Central R. R. Co., 35 Cal. 325.'. .. 5127, 537 
 
 Carson v. Genesee, 9 Idaho 244 '. . 1309 
 
 Carson v. Hartford, 48 Conn. ©8 1101, 1104, 1106 
 
 Carson v. Richmond, VIS Va. 527 9S9 
 
 Carson v. Springiield, 33 Mo. App. 280 1359 
 
 Carter v. dark, 89 Ind. 238 619 
 
 Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268 276 
 
 Carton v. Seattle, 66 Wash. 447 70, 71 
 
 Cartwright v. Liberty Tel. Co., 205 Mo. 126 486, 580 
 
 Carty v. Winooski, 78 Vt. 104 1308 
 
 Carville v. Commonwealth, 192 Mass. 5T0 353 
 
 Gary v. Daniels, 8 Mete. 466 230 
 
 Gary v. Mt. Sterling, 15 111. 320 796 
 
 Gary v. Pekin, 88 111. 154 267 
 
 Gary Bros. v. Morrison, 129 Fed. 177 5&0, 139'3 
 
 Gary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364 69, 152:, 389, 393, 910, 915, 974 
 
 Casassa v. Seattle, 75 Wash. 867 788, 790, 876, 1261 
 
 Casey v. Brooks, 1 Hill 365 885 
 
 Cash v. Whitmore, 13 La. Ann. 401 247 
 
 Cashman v. Wood, 6 Hun 520 1160 
 
 Caspary v. Portland, 19 Ore. 496 129©, 1308 
 
 Oass Farm Co. v. Detroit, 139 Mich. 318 1409 
 
 Oassel V. New York, 153 N. Y. S. 410 1252 
 
 Cassell V. Nieholasville, 134 Ky. 103 867, 876 
 
 Cassidy v. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 553 1190, 1191 
 
 Oassidy v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 141 Mass. 174 602, 827, 865, 1392 
 
 Cast Plate Manufacturers v. Meredith, 4 Durnf. & East 794 300, 508, 1236 
 
 Castle V. Bell Tel. Go., 49 App. Div. 437 578 
 
 Castle V. Berkshire County, 11 Gray 26 323, 834, 885 
 
 Castlebury v. Atlanta, 74 Ga. 164 4S6, 867 
 
 Cater v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 60 Mann. 539 471, 476, 578, 579 
 
 Catlin V. Northern Goal & Iron Co., 225 Pa. 262 667, 670 
 
 Oavanagh v. Boston, 130 Mass. 426 308, 310, 991, 1342 
 
 Cedar County v. Lammere, 73 Nebr. 744 1 133 
 
 Cedar Rapids, In re, 85 Iowa 39 163, 632, 637 
 
 Cedar Rapids, etc., R. R. Co. v. Raymond, 37 Minn. 204 606 
 
 Cedar Rapids, etc., K. R. Co. v. Ryan, 36 Minn. 546 666, 670, 740, 745 
 
 Cedar Rapids Water Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 118 Iowa 234. . 368 
 
Table of Cases. , lix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 lu Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Central Branch etc., R. R. Co. v. Andrews, 37 Kan. 162 1175, 1176, 1210 
 
 1211, 1212 
 
 Central Branch, etc., R. R. Co. v. Atchison, etc., E. R. Co., 26 Kan. 669. 919 
 
 986 
 
 Central Branch, etc., R. R. Co. v. Atchison, etc., R. R. Co., 28 Kan. 464. . 644 
 
 645, 940 
 
 Central Branch, etc., R. R. Co. v. Twine, 23 Kan. 585 529, 594, 595, 1282 
 
 Central Bridge Co. v. Lowell, 4 Gray 474 68, 973, 1244, 1256 
 
 Central Bridge Co. v. Lowell, 15 Gray 106 684 
 
 Central City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Fort Claxk, etc., R. R. Co., 81 111. 523 996 
 
 1000 
 
 Central, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kelley, 58 Ga. 107 1214 
 
 Central Georgia Power Co. v. Cornwell, 141 Ga. 643 666, 1017 
 
 Central Georgia Power Co. v. Mays, 137 Ga. 12Q 659, 662, 722 
 
 Central Georgia Power Co. v. Nolan, 135 Ga. 443 1034, 1035, 1103 
 
 Central Georgia Power Co. v. Preston, 137 Ga. 347 722, 725, 728 
 
 Centralia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Henry, 31 111. App. 456 1102 
 
 Central Iowa R. R. Co. v. Moulton, etc., R. R. Co., 57 Iowa 2'49 1411, 1413 
 
 1414 
 
 Central Land Co. v. Providence, 15 R. I. 246 811 
 
 Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Barnett, 151 Ala. 407 1214, 1216 
 
 Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Standard Fuel Supply Co., 86 S. E. 228 .. . 1265 
 Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Union Springs & Northern Railway 
 
 Co., 144 Ala. 639 187, 987, 1085, 1086 
 
 Central Qhio R. R. Co. v. Holler, 7 Ohio St. 220 626 
 
 Central Pacific R. R. Co. v. FeMman, 152 Cal. 303 189, 993 
 
 Central Pacific R. R. Co. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247 697, 1144, 1189, 1194 
 
 1196, 1198 
 
 Central Park Commissioners, In re, 63 Barb. 282 164 
 
 Central Park Commissioners, In re, 54 How. Pr. 313 1141 
 
 Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Skellie, -86 Ga. 686 1189 
 
 Central R. R. Co., Appeal of, 102 Pa. 38 936, 1077 
 
 Central R. R. Co. v. Bayonne, 51 N. J. L. 428 748 
 
 Central R. R. Co. v. Hudson Terminal Ry. Co., 46 N. J. L. 289 1050 
 
 Central R. R. Co. v. Merkel, 32 Tex. 723 1152 
 
 Central R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 31 N. J. Eq. 473 914, 916 
 
 Central Trust Co. v. Bridge, 57 Fed. 753 1286 
 
 Central Trust Co. v. Hennen, 33 C. C. A. 189 320, 347 
 
 Central Union Tel. Co. v. Columbus Grove, 28 Ohio Cir. Ct. 131 95 
 
 Central Vermont R. E. Co. v. Royalton, 58 Vt. 238 997, 999 
 
 Central Vermont R. R. Co. v. Woodstock R. R. Co., 50 Vt. 452 999 
 
 Cereghino v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 2'6 Utah 467 534 
 
 Chadwick v. Proprietors of Haverhill Bridge, 2 Dane's Abr. 686 941 
 
 Chafee v. Aiken, 57 S. C. 507 1410 
 
 Chaffee's Appeal, 56 Mich. 244 992 
 
 Chagrin Falls Plank Road Co. v. Cone, 2 Ohio St. 419 619 
 
 Chalkley v. Richmond, 88 Va. 402 I375 
 
 Challis V. Atchison, etc., R. R. Co., 16 Kan. 117 59, 600, 916, 919 
 
 Chamberlain v. Elizabethport Steam Cordage Co., 41 N. Ji Eq. 43. . .991, 992 
 
Ix Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Chamberlain v. Iowa Tel. Co., 119 Iowa 619 395 
 
 Chamberlain v. North Eastern R. R. Co., 41 S. C. 359 1415, 1419, 1421 
 
 Chamberlain v. West End, etc., R. R. Co., 2 B. & S. 605 821 
 
 Chambers v. Cleveland, etc.. Traction Co., 5 Ohio C. C. N. S. 298 533 
 
 Chambers v. Furry, 1 Yeates 167 416 
 
 Chambers v. Great Northern Power Co., 100 Minn. 214 1419 
 
 Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 515 
 
 Chambers v. South Chester, 140 Pa. 510 876, 895 
 
 Chambersburg Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Cumberland Valley R. R. Co., 240 Pa. 
 
 519 347, 349 
 
 Chamley v. Shawano, etc., Improvement do., 109 Wis. 563 1052 
 
 Champ V. Nicholas County Court, 72; W. Va. 475 1265 
 
 Champaign County v. Church, 62 Ohio St. 318 391 
 
 Champion v. Crandon, 84 Wis. 405 1333, 1353, 1357 
 
 Champion v. Sessions County Commissioners, 1 Nev. 478 1256 
 
 Champlain v. McCrea, 165 N. Y. 264 1071 
 
 Champlain Sand, etc., Co. v. State, 66 Misc. 434 421, 729 
 
 Champlain Stone, etc., Co. v. State, 142 App. Div. 94 421, 696 
 
 Champlin v. Laytin, 18 Wend. 411 352 
 
 Chandler v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co., 122 Mass. 305 1203, 1207 
 
 Chandler v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co., 125 Mass. 544 .342, 651, 666 
 
 1134, 1177 
 
 Chandler v. Morey, 195 111. 596 1155 
 
 Chapin v. Boston & Providence R. R. Co., 6 Cush. 422 1202 
 
 Chapin v. Sullivan R. R. Co., 39 N. H. 564 600, 608, 609 
 
 Chaplin v. Highway Commissioners, 129 111. 651 907, 919 
 
 Chaplin, etc.. Turnpike Road Co. v. Nelson County, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1154. 684 
 
 Chapman v. Cates, 54 N. Y. 132 636 
 
 Chapman v. New York, 110 N. Y. 273 1318 
 
 Chapman v. OShkosh, etc., R. R. Co., 33 Wis. 629 741, 815 
 
 Chapman v. Rochester, 110 N. Y. 273 445 
 
 Chapman v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 240. Mo. 592 611 
 
 Chapman v. Staunton, 246 111. 394 872, 875 
 
 Chapman v. Trinity Valley, etc., Ky. Co., 138 S. W. 440 187 
 
 Chappell V. United States, 160 U. S. 499 109, 161, 939, 1036, 1037 
 
 Cbappell V. United States, 34 Fed. 673 280 
 
 Chappell V. United States, 81 Fed. 764 1036 
 
 Charles v. Porter, 10 Met. 37 1061 
 
 Charles River Branch R. E. Co. v. Norfolk County Commissioners, 7 
 
 Gray 389 1060 
 
 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420 359, 360, 946 
 
 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 344 359, 360 
 
 Charleston v. Reed, 27 W. Va. 681 274 
 
 Charleston, etc.. Bridge Co. v. Comstock, 36 W. Va. 263. . .739, 741, 1074, 1131 
 
 Charleston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Blake, 12 Rich. L. 634 691, 811, 1140 
 
 Charleston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hughes, lOS Ga. 1 . . . 73, 338, 706, 935, 936, 1077 
 
 1130, 1265, 1281 
 
 Charleston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Leech, 33 S. C. 175 811, 1031, 1270 
 
 Charleston Nat. Gas Co. v. Lowe, 52 W. Va. 662 210 
 
Table of Cases. Ixi 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Charlestown v. Middlesex County Oommissioners, 3 Met. 202 1010, 1050 
 
 Charlestown Branch E. R. Co. v. Middlesex County Commissioners, 7 
 
 Met. 78 1147, 1152 
 
 Charlotte v. Pembroke Iron Works, 82 Me. 391 1410 
 
 Charlottesville v. Maury, 96 Va. 383 989 
 
 Charuley v. Shawano, etc.. Improvement Co., 109 Wis. 563 1246 
 
 Chase v. Aldermen of Springfield, 199 Mass. 556 1118 
 
 Chase v. Hathaway, 14 Mass. 222 924 
 
 Chase v. Jemmett, 8 Utah 231 707 
 
 Chase v. Merrimack Bank, 19 Pick. 564 1418 
 
 Chase v. Oregon City, 72 Ore. 112 1121 
 
 Chase v. Oshkosh, 81 Wis. 313 474, 486, 487 
 
 Chase v. Portland, 86 Me. 367 659, 661, 772, 789, 800 
 
 Chase v. Rutland, 47 Vt. 393 948 
 
 Chase v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 230, 619 
 
 Chase v. Worcester, 108 Mass. 60 789, 802, 877, 1213 
 
 Chatham St., In re, 191 Pa. 604 856, 868 
 
 Ohattaehoochee Valley Ry. Co. v. Bass, 9 Ga. App. 89 732, 795 
 
 Chattanooga v. Geiler, 13 Lea 611 789, 812 
 
 Chattaroi R. R. Co. v. Biggs, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 515 1137 
 
 Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. 491 267 
 
 Cheek v. Aurora, 92 Ind. 107 477, 1410 
 
 Chehalis v. Centralia, 77 Wash. 673 1009, 1073 
 
 Chelsea Dye House v. Commonwealth, 164 Mass. 350 836 
 
 Chelten Trust Co. v. Blankenburg, 241 Pa. 394 1047 
 
 Chenault v. Collins, 155 Ky. 312 323 
 
 Cheney v. Barker, 198 Mass. 356 476, 572, 574 
 
 Cherokee v. Sioux City, etc.. Town Lot Co., 52 Iowa 279 173, 952, 953 
 
 1178, 1196, 1206 
 
 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 27, 1253 
 
 Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U. S. 641 109, 631, 634, 639 
 
 Cherry v. Keyport, 52 N. J. L. 544 622 
 
 Cherry v. Lane County, 25 Ore. 487 1234 
 
 Cherry v. Rock Hill, 48 S. C. 553 324, 886 
 
 Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1 495 
 
 Chesapeaie, etc.. Canal Ca. v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Gill & J. 1 . . . 1008 
 
 Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co. v. Key, 3 Cranch C. C. 599 198, 790 
 
 Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co. v. Mason, 4 Cranch C. C. 123 910, 919 
 
 Chesapeake, etc.. Canal Co. v. Union Bank, 4 Cranch C. C. 75. . . .8, 62, 790 
 
 900, 920 
 
 Chesapeake, etc., E. E. Co. v. Blankenship, 158 Ky. 270 894, 895 
 
 Chesapeake, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bradford, 6 W. Va. 220 650, llOOi, 1101, 1114 
 
 Chesapeake, etc., E. E. Co. v. Deep Water, etc., E. E. Co., 57 W. Va. 641, 1009 
 
 Chesapeake, etc., E. E. Co. v. Gross, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1926 594, 597 
 
 Chesapeake, etc., E. R. Co. v. Halstead, 7 W. Va. 301 626 
 
 Chesapeake, etc., R. E. Co. v. May, 157 Ky. 708 855 
 
 Chesapeake, etc., R. E. Co. v. Patton, 6 W. Va. 147 626 
 
 Chesapeake, etc., R. R. Co. v. Patton, 9 W. Va. 648 970 
 
 Chesapeake, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rice, 20 Ky. L. 1930 878 
 
 V 
 
Ixii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Chesapeake, etc., R. E. Co. v. Stein, 142 Ky. 515 592 
 
 Chesapeake, etc., K. R. Co. v. Walker, 100 Va. 69 613 
 
 Chesapeake, etc., R. R. Co. v. Washington, etc., R. R. Co., 99 Va. 715 1121 
 
 Chesapeake, etc., Tel. Co. v. Baltimore, etc., Tel. Co., 66 Md. 399 994 
 
 Chesapeake, etc., Tel. Co. v. Mackenzie, 74 Md. 36 474, 576, 579, 581 
 
 592, 1256, 1395 
 
 Chesapeake Stone Co. v. Moreland, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1075 115, 128, 129 
 
 141, 142, 155, 173, 194, 256 
 
 Chesbrough v. Putnam County Commissioners, 37 Ohio St. 508 245 
 
 Cheshire v. Adams, etc., Reservoir Co.," 119 Mass. 347 397 
 
 Chestatee Pyrites Co. v. Cavenders, etc., Co., 119 Ga. 354 94, 95, 988, 995 
 
 Chester County v. Brewer, 117 Pa. 647 868, 1301 
 
 Chestnut Hill, etc., Road Co. v. Montgomery County, 228 Pa. 1 683 
 
 Chestnut Hill, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Rutter, 4 Serg. & Rawle 6 1294 
 
 Cheyney v. Atlantic City Waterworks Co., 55 N. J. L. 235 908, 916, 988 
 
 Chicago V. Baker, 86 Fed. 753 324, 887 
 
 Chicago V. Baker, 98 Fed. 830 324 
 
 Chicago V. Barbian, 80 111. 486 1101, 1104 
 
 Chicago V. Burcky, 158 III. 10'3 324, 879, 887 
 
 Chicago V. Carpenter, 201 111. 402 395 
 
 Chicago V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 166 U. S. 226 746, 747, 748, 750 
 
 751, 1080 
 
 Chicago V. Chicago League Ball Club, 196 111. 54 ^ 1329 
 
 Chicago V. Cicero, 210 111. 290. . .'. 401 
 
 Chicago V. Gage, 268 111. 232 344, 353 
 
 Chicago T. Garrity, 7 111. App. 474 338 
 
 Chicago V. Goodwillie, 208 111. 252 1100 
 
 Chicago V. Gunning System, 214 HI. 628. 277 
 
 Chicago V. Hayward, 6a HI. App. 582 1228 
 
 Chicago V. Hil-l, 124 111. 646 1129 
 
 Chicago V. Hill, 251 111. 502 988, 991 
 
 Chicago V. Hutchinson, 15 Fed. 129 1041, 1042 
 
 Chicago V. Jackson, 196 111. 496 161, 283, 867, 874 
 
 Chicago V. Lehmann, 262 111. 468 921, 1083, 1194, 120O 
 
 Chicago V. Le Moyne, 119 Fed. 662 16-1, 282, 763, 874 
 
 Chicago V. Lonergan, 196 III. 518 762, 790, 797, 874 
 
 Chicago V. McGinn, 51 111. 266 101 
 
 Chicago V. McShane, 102 111. ■ App. 239 867 
 
 Chicago V. Messier, 38 Fed. 302 1157 
 
 Chicago V. Murdock, 212 111. 9 1252 
 
 Chicago V. Norton Milling Co., 196 111. 580 482 
 
 Chicago V. Palmer, 93 111. 125 650, 654 
 
 Chicago V. Pick, 251 111. 594 344, ia74, 1-099 
 
 Chicago V. Robbins, 2 Black 418 477 
 
 Chicago V. Rothschild, 212 111. 590 377 
 
 Chicago V. Rumsey, 87 111. 348 565, 967 
 
 Chicago V. Sanitary District, 111 N. E. 491 1007 
 
 Chicago V. Seben, 165 111. 371 1369, 1374, 1376 
 
 Chicago V. Smith, 204 111. 356 382 
 
Table of Cases. Ixiii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 CJhica^ V. Spoor, 190 111. 340 763 
 
 Chicago V. Taylor, 125 U. B. 161 846, 851, 867, 874, 878 
 
 Chicago V. Thomasson, 259 111. 322 1235, 1239 
 
 Chicago V. Turner, 80 lU. 419 1344 
 
 Chicago V. Union Building Aissociation, 102 111. 379 323, 329, 885 
 
 Chicago V. Union Stock Yards, etc., Co., 164 111. 224 863 
 
 Chicago V. Walker, 251 111. 629 347 
 
 Chicago V. Webb, 102 111. App. 232 536 
 
 Chicago V. Wheeler, 25 111. 478 650, 1228, 1229 
 
 Chicago V. Wright, 69 111. 318 398 
 
 Chicago Dock, etc., Co. v. Garrity, 115 111. 155 192 
 
 Chicago, etc.. Bridge Co. v. Pacific Mutual Tel. Co., 36 Kan. 113 1255 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. K. Co., In re, 233 U. S. 211 193 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., In re, 152 Wis. 633 v 193 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ader, 110 N. E. 67 729, 730, 731, 733 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Alexander, 43i Wash. 131 668 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Appanoose County Supervisors, 182 Fed. 
 
 291 753, 755 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Adhelford, 268 111. 87 1022 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Atterbury, 156 111. 281 864 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ayres, 106 111. 511 595, 597, 851, 878 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Baker, 100 Mo. 553 734, 740, 745, 1080 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Baugh, 175 Ind. 419 190, 916, 924 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Berg, 10 111. App. 607 859 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Broquet, 47 Kan. 571 1137 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Brunson, 43 Kan. 371 740 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Buel, 56 Nebr. 205 1178 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bugbee, 184 111. 353.. 1111, 1112, 1145, 1181, 1223 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bull, 56 Neb. 20i5 650, 651 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Carey, 90 111. 514 731 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Catholic Bishop, 199 111. 525 1149 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chautauqua County Commissioners, 49 Kan. 
 
 763 749 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 86, 370, 623, 1038 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 121 111. 176 996, 1000 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 140 111. 309 748, 750 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 143 111. 641 1100 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 148 111. 479 1100, 1103 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 149 111. 457 370, 747, 1213 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 151 111. 348 996, 1001 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 183 111. 341 873 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 112 111. 589 1002, 1120 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 211 111. 352 986, 996 
 
 1000, 1007. 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago Mechanics' Institute, 239 lU. 197 189 
 
 338, 342, 716, 920, 987, 988, 993, 994, 1172 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cicero, 154 111. 656 370, 747, 748, 752, 998, 1188 
 
 Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Cicero, 157 111. 48 149, 751 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Clapp, 201 111. 418 1411, 1413, 1414, 1419 
 
Ixiv Table of Cases. 
 
 fPages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume 11.] FAGB 
 
 Ohieago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Clark, 146 S. W. 989 1413 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cram, 113 U. S. 424 1404 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Crawford County, 48 Wis. 666 605 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Darke, 148 111. 226 597, 864 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Davidson, 48 Kan. 589 670 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Dtes Moines Union Ry. Co., 165 Iowa 35 704 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Diver, 216 111. 26 1129 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Douglas County, 1 Neb. Unofif. 247. . .371, 747, 1019 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Douglas County, 134 Wis. 197 76 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Drainage Ccftnmissioners, 200 U. S. 561. . .272, 459 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Drainage Commissioners, 212 111. 103 459 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Dresel, 110 111. 89 338, 743, 744, 1173 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Dunbar, 100' 111. 110 1084 
 
 Cbicago, etc.,' R. R. Co. v. Kasley, 46 Kan. 337 1134 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Eisert, 127 Ind. 156 595, 1400 
 
 Chicago, etc., E. E. Co. v. Elliott, 108 Mo. 321 970 
 
 Chicago, etc., E. E. Co. v. Ellis, 52 Kan. 41 338 
 
 Chicago, etc., E. E. Co. v. Emery, 51 Kan. 16 799, 1206 
 
 Chicago, etc., E. R. Co. v. Englehart, 57 Nebr. 444 1154, 1263 
 
 Chicago, etc., E. R. Co. v. Englewood, etc., R. R. Co., 115 111. 375. ..753, 754 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. E. Co. v. Eubanks, 130 Mo. 270 655 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Fair Oaks, 140 Wis. 334 371, 750, 753, 755 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. First Methodist Episcopal Church, 42 C. C. A. 
 
 178 528, 1387 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ferguson, 3 Colo. App. 414 1253 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. E. Co. v. Garrett, 239 111. 297 336, 344, 346 
 
 Chicago, etc., E. R. Co. v. Gates, 120 111. 86 1097, 1102, 1104 
 
 Chicago, etc., E. E. Co. v. Glos, 239 111. 24 1130 
 
 Chicago, etc., E. R. Co. v. Goodwin, 111 111. 273 706 
 
 Chicago, etc., E. R. Co. v. Grieney, 137 111. 628 730, 733, 736 
 
 Chicago, etc., E. E. Co. v. Griesser, 48 Kan. 663 936, 1077, 1120 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. E. Co. v. Hall, 135 Ind. 91 1248, 1286 
 
 Chicago, etc., E. R. Co. v. Hazels, 26 Nebr. 364 878 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Heidenreich, 254 111. 231 1086, 1181, 1182, 1191 
 
 1192, 1196, 1200, 1203, 1204 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. E. Co. v. Hildebrand, 136 111. 467 741 
 
 Chicago, etc., E. E. Co. v. Hock, 118 111. 587 697, 944 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hogan, 105 111. App. 136 386, 602 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hopkins, 90 111. 316 740, 1080, 1129 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hough, 61 Mich. 507 741, 745, 747, 749 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 20O U. S. 561 388 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Illinois, etc., R. R. Co., 113 111. 156 77, 986 
 
 Chicago, etc., E. R. Co. v. Ives, 202' 111. 69 603 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R.^ Co. v. Joliet, etc., R. R. Co., 106 111. 388 691, 754 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Jones, 103 Ind. 386 1073 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Keith, 67 Ohio St. 279 2173, 274 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kemper, 256 Mo. 279 722, 725, 936, 946, 1076 
 
 1079, 1269 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kline, 220 111. 334 1203 
 
Table of Cases. Ixv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Caiicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Knufflce, 36 Kan. 367 606 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Lake, 71 111. 333 68, 913, 916, 972, 996, 1001 
 
 Chicago, etc., K. R. Co. v. Larsen, 19 Colo. 71 1178 
 
 Chicago, etc., K. R. Co. v. Little Tarkio Drainage District, 237 Mo. 86. 51 
 
 804 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Loeb, 118 111. 203 1282, 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Loer, 27 Ind. App. 245 1112 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Maher, 91 III. 312 1154 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Maroney, 95 111. 179 1201 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mason, 26 Ind. App. 395 737 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mason, 23 S. D. 564. ..191,660,661,693,915, 921 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mason City, 155 Iowa 99 920 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mawman, 206 111. 182 736, 1186 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. McGinnis, 79 111. 269 527 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542 99 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. McGrew, 104 Mo. 282 625, 626, 734, 741, 770 
 
 804, 944, 970 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Melville, 66 111. 329 626 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Metropolitan, etc., R. R. Co., 152 111. 519 1007 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Miller, 233 111. 508 338, 340 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Miller, 251 III. 58 73, 708, 93S, USa 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Miller, 106 Mo. 458 730, 944 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 97 Wis. 418 371, 747, 749, 750 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Milwaukee, etc., Ry. Co., 95' Wis. 561.527, 545, 549 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mines, 221 III. 448 1149, 1204 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Minneapolis, 232 U. S.»430 163, 164, 175, 198 
 
 750, 755 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Minneapolis, 115 Minn. 460 163, 164, 175, 198 
 
 Chicagb, etc., R. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 279, 387 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Morehouse, 112 Wis. 1 155, 193 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Morrison, 195 111. 271 752, 911, 1002 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Naperville, 166 111. 87 147, 752 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170,U. S. 67 964 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Nix, 137 lU. 141 732, 1178 
 
 Chicago, eU., R. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 42 Neb. 90 592, 594, 587, 896, 960 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Otoe County, 16 Wall. 667 185 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Palmer, 44 Kan. 110 736 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Pontiac, 169 111. 155 748, 913, 9il6, 1072 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Porter, 43 Minn. 527 141, 192 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Quincy, 136 111. 563i 375, 37S 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Randolph Town Site Co., 103 Mo. 451. . .1151, 1275 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. t. Reisch, 247 111. 350 708, 711, 1171 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rottgering, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1167 666, 1196, 1198 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Sanford, 23 Mich. 418 1027, 1067, 1074 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Selders, 4 Kan. App. 497 70 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Shafer, 49 Neb. 25 734, 1175 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. E. Co. v. Sheldon, 53 Kan. 169 355, 356 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Smith, 62 111. 268 185, 913 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Smith, 78 111. 96 1245 
 
Ixvi Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] FAOE 
 
 CMcago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Smith, 111 111. 363 1069 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Snyder, 120 Iowa 532 592, 607, 630, 663 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Springfield, etc., R. R. Co., 67 111. 142 626, 692 
 
 754 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Starkweather, 97 Iowa 159 9«72, 1002 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Steck, 51 Kan. 737 610, 1392 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Steel, 47 Nebr. 741 385 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stein, 75 111. 41 456 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stewart, 47 Kan. 704 1198 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Sturey, 55 Neb. 137 890 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Swan, 120 Mo. 30 932, 1070 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co! v. Thayer, 65 Wash. 402 730, 1112 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Townsdm, 45 Kan. 771 953 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. True, 62 Wash. 646 1185, 1194, 1202 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Union Investment Co., 51 Kan. 600 527 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Vaughn, 206 111. 234 706 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ward, 128 111. 349 744 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. West Chicago St. Ry. Co., 156 111. 255. .385, 637 
 
 541, 562, 1398 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Whiting, etc., St. Ry. Co., 139 Ind. 297. . .385, 541 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wiebe, 25 Nebr. 542 805 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Williams, 148 Fed. 44Z 995, 1001 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Williams, 8 Ohio Dee. Reprint 736 809 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 17 111. 123 190, 986 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wiltse, 116 111. 449 190', 913 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wood, 30 Ind. App. 650 1411 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Woodward, 47 Kan. 191 526, 799, 1214 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., v. Wysor Land Co., 163 Ind. 288 1111, 1214, 1216 
 
 Chicago Flour Co. v. Chicago, 243 111. 268 881 
 
 Chicago Office Building v. Lake St. El. Ry. Co., 87 111. App. 594. . . .5«3, 890 
 
 Chicago Southern R. R. Co. v. Nolin, 221 111. 367 734 
 
 Chicago Terminal Transfer Co. v. Preucil, 236 lU. 491 1094 
 
 Chichester v. Lethbridge, Willis 71 883 
 
 Chiesa v. Des Moines, 158 Iowa 343 338, 607 
 
 Child V. Boston, 4 Allen 41 837, 1328, 1333, 1338, 1374, 1375 
 
 Child V. New York El. Ry. Co., 89 App. Div. 598 1157 
 
 Ohilds V. Central R. R. of New Jersey, 33 N. J. L. 323 986( 
 
 Childs V. Franklin County, 128 Mass. 97 1057 
 
 Ohilds V. Nelson, 69 Wis. 125 1410 
 
 Childs V. New Haven, etc., Co., 133 Mass. 253 771, 801 
 
 Chiles V. Alton, etc.. Traction Co., 158 111. App. 508 592, 890 
 
 Chlopeck Fish Co. v. Seattle, 64 Wash. 315 421^ 
 
 Choate v. Southern Ry. Co., .143 Ala. 316 1120f 
 
 Choctaw, etc., R. R. Co. v. Castanien, 23 Okla. 735 886 
 
 Chope V. Eureka, 78 Cal. 588 1307, 1375 
 
 Christian v. Eugene, 49 Ore. 170 141(]| 
 
 Christian v. St. Louis, 127 Mo. 109 326, 879| 
 
 Christy v. St. Louis, 20 Mo. 143 67 
 
Table of Cases. Ixvii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PABB 
 
 Church, Matter of, 92 N. Y. 1 632, 638 
 
 Church V. Grand Rapids, etc., R. R. Co., 70 Ind. 161 1151 
 
 Church V. Northern Central R. R. Co., 45 Pa. 339 1031, 1119 
 
 Church V. Portland, 18 Ore. 75 393! 
 
 Churchill >'. B«ethe, 48 Neb. 87 507, 1357 
 
 Churchman \ . Martin, 54 Ind. 380 31 
 
 Church of Holy Apostles v. New York El. R. R. Co., 21 App. Div. 47 593 
 
 Cicero v. Lake Erie, etc., R. R. Co., 52 Ind. App. 29i8 9S8 
 
 CScero Lumber Co. v. Cicero, 176 111. 9 517, 518 
 
 Cincinnati v. Babb, 4 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 464 342 
 
 Cincinnati v. Coombs, 16 Ohio 181 1244 
 
 Cincinna.ti v. Evans, 5 Ohio St. 594 1408 
 
 Cincinnati v. Kemper, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 251 1228 
 
 Cincinnati v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 223 U. S. 390 27, 58, 59, 60 
 
 65, 67, 68, 923 
 
 Cincinnati v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 82 Ohio St. 466 27, 58, 59, 60 
 
 65, 67, 68 
 
 Cincinnati v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 88 Oliio St. 283 911 
 
 Cincinnati v. Penney, 21 Ohio St. 499 510, 571, 13!79 
 
 Cincinnati v. Sherike, 47 Ohio St. 217 989 
 
 Cincinnati v. Whetstone, 47 Ohio St. 196 651 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co., Re, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 269 767, 769, 809 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 13(9 Ind. 490 996, 999, 1001 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bay City, etc., R. R. Co., 106 Mich. 47'3. . 70S 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Belle Centre, 48 Ohio St. 273 1007 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Burski, 26 Ohio 0. C. 486 317 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., E. R. Co. v. Campbell, 51 Ohio St. 32i8 631 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cincinnati, ©2 Ohio St. 465 786 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Clifford, 113i Ind. 460 970, 1244 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Connersville, 218 U. S. 336 750 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Connersville, 170 Ind. 316 76, 750 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Danville, etc., Ry. Co., 75 111. 113 1072 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Longworfch, 30 Ohio St. 108 667, 670 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. McFarlandr, 22 Ind. 459 1063 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Miller, 36 Ind. App. 26 347 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Murray, 1 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 301 212, 1007 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Nettles, 77 Ga. 576 1111 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Pfitzer, 1 Prob. R. 248 660 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Simpson, 182 Ind. 693 1^75 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Troy, 68 Ohio St. 510 371, 747, 749 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wabasb R. R. Co., 162 Ind. 303 644 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. lOo. v. Wacbter, 79 Ohio St. 113 606 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., St. Ey. v. Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co., 12 Ohio C. D. 
 
 113 386 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., St. Ey. Co. v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 523 493, 637 
 
 540, 555 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., St. Ry. Co. v. Lohe, 68 Ohio St. 101 546 
 
 Cincinnati Gas Transportation Co. v. Carter, 149 Ky. 89 736. 1137 
 
Ixviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume 1, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 Cincinnati Inclined Plane Ey. Co. v. City & Suburban Telegraph Asso- 
 ciation, 48 Ohio St. 390 378, 380, 564 
 
 Cincinnati Iron Store Co. v. Cincinnati Southern E. E. Co., 29 Ohio 
 
 Cir. Ct. Eep. 719 1200 
 
 Cincinnati Southern E. E. Co. v. Haas, 42 Ohio iSt. 230 1104 
 
 Cincinnati Southern E. E. Co. v. Haas, 9 Ohio Dec. 33 1104 
 
 Citizens Coach Co. v. Hampden Horse Ey. Co., 30 N. J. Eq. 267 382, 537 
 
 Citizens Electric Light & Power Co. v. 'Sands, 95 Mich. 551 382 
 
 City, etc., E. E. Co. v. St. Mary Woolmouth, 190S, 2 K. B. 788 669 
 
 City Ey. Co. v. Citizens' Ey. Co., 166 U. S. 557 331 
 
 City Store v. San Jose-Los Qatos Interurban Ey. 'Co., 150 Oal. 277... 1400 
 
 Civil Eights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 88 
 
 Clapp V. Boston, 133 Mass. 367 341, 353 
 
 Clapp V. Herrick, 129 Mass. 292 12i50 
 
 Clapp V. Spokane, 63 Fed. 515 379 
 
 Qaremont Ey., etc., Co. v. Putney, 73' N. H. 431 9S8 
 
 Clarion Turnpike, etc., Co. v. Clarion County, 172 Pa. 243 683 
 
 Clark V. Allaman, 71 Kan. 20& 437 
 
 Clark V. Baird, 9 N. Y. 183 1175 
 
 Clark V. Cambridge, etc.. Irrigation Co., 45 Neb. 798 435 
 
 Clark V. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 70 Wis. 593 429 
 
 Clark V. Coburn, 108 Me. 26 988, 994 
 
 Clark V. Dasso, 34 Mich. 86 487 
 
 Clark V. Fry, 8 Ohio .St. 358 477 
 
 Claik V. Hannibal, etc., E. E. Co., 36 Mo. 202. 611, 1253, 1392 
 
 Clark V. Middletown-Goshen Traction Co., 10 App. Div. 354 543 
 
 Clark V. Mitchell County Commissioners, 69 Kan. 542 2i36 
 
 Clark V. Nash, 198 U. S. 361 86, 128, 137, 251, 255 
 
 Clark V. Peckham, 10 E. I. 35 426, 443, 454, 457 
 
 Clark V. Philadelphia, 171 Pa. 30 869, 899 
 
 Clark V. Portland, 62 Ore. 124 '. 98S 
 
 Clark V. Providence, 10 E. I. 437 324, 3126 
 
 Clark V. Providence, 16 E. I. 337 324, 326, 617 
 
 Clark V. Eochester, 43 Hun 271 1336 
 
 Clark V. Saybrook, 21 Conn. 313 429 
 
 Clark V. Utica, 18 Barb. 451 943, 944 
 
 Clark V. Wabash E. E. Co., 132 Iowa 11 651 
 
 Clark V. Water Commissioners, 148 N. Y. 1 959 
 
 Clark V. White, 2 Swan '540 117, 233 
 
 Clark V. Wilmington, 5 Harr. 243 1354 
 
 Clark V. Worcester, 125 Mass. 226 614, 768, 785, 801 
 
 802, 911, 919 
 
 Clarke v. Blackmar, 47 N. Y. 160 193 
 
 Clarke v. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 23 Nebr. 613 1111 
 
 Clarke v. Manchester, 56 N. H. 502 1097 
 
 Clarke v. Eichmond, 83 Va. 355 1310 
 
 Clarksville, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. Atkinson, 1 Sneed. 426 773 
 
 Clarksville, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. Montgomery County, 100 Tenn. 417 . . 360 
 
Table of Cases. l^ix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Clary v. Clary, 2 Ind. 80 1215 
 
 Clausen, etc., Brewing Co. v. Baltimore, etc., Tel. Co., 2 Am. Elect. 
 
 Caa 210 581 
 
 Clay V. Pennoyer Creek Imp. Co., 24 Mich. 304 1027 
 
 Clay V. St. Albans, 43 W. Va. 539 13a9, 1357, 1360 
 
 Clay County v. McGregor, 171 Ind. 634 369 
 
 Clayton v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 67 Iowa 238 606 
 
 Clayton v. Gihner County Court, 58 W. Va. 253 349 
 
 Clayton v. Henderson, 103 Ky. 228 1313 
 
 Clear Creek Water iCo. v. Gladeville Improvement Co., 107 Va. 278 66 
 
 Clemens v. Connecticut, etc., Ins. Co., 184 Mo. 481 647, 872 
 
 Clemens Electric Mfg. Cb. v. Walton, 206 Mlass. 215 1416 
 
 Clement v. Cincinnati, 9 Ohio S. & C. P. 688 539 
 
 Clement v. Durgin, 5 Me. 9 91, 1271 
 
 CTements v. Philadelphia Co., 184 Pa. 28. 1404, 1422 
 
 Clendaniel v. Conrad, 3 Boyce 549 115, 170, 174, 972 
 
 Cleveland v. Augusta, 1'02 Ga. 253 385 
 
 Cleveland v. Slade, 4 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 194 70'3 
 
 Cleveland v. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 303 786 
 
 Cleveland Burial Case Co. v. Erie Ry. Co., 24 Ohio Cir. Ct. 107 531 
 
 Cleveland, etc., E. R. Co. v. Ball, 5 Ohio St. 568 738, 809 
 
 Cleveland, eitc, R. R. Co. v. Doan, 47 Ind. App. 322 599, 1244 
 
 Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co. v. Feight, 41 Ind. App. 416 385, 10«6 
 
 Cleveland, etc., R. E. Co. v. Gannon, 109 N. E. 234 732 
 
 Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hadley, 179 Ind 429 608, 722, 726, 732 
 
 Cleveland, etc., R. R. Go. v. Ohio Postal Tel. Cable Co., 68 Ohio St. 306. 371 
 
 755, 756, 757 
 
 Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co. v. Polecat Drainage Disit., 213 111. 83 129, 245 
 
 Cleveland; etc., R. R. Co. v. Prentice, 13 Ohio St. 37'3 1070 
 
 Cleveland, etc., R. R. .Co. v. Smith, 177 Ind. S24 ©06, 6109, 72l6, 730, 783 
 
 1147, 1200, 1201, 1413 
 
 Cleveland, etc., E. R. Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. 325 304, 318, fll7, 994, 995 
 
 Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co. v. Urbana, etc., Ry. Co., 26 Ohio Cir. Ct, 
 
 Rep. 180 542 
 
 Click v. Lamar County, 79 Tex. 121 959 
 
 Clifford- V. United States, 34 Ct. CI. 233 310 
 
 Cline V. Cornwall, 21 Grant 129 587 
 
 Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, etc., R. R. Co., 24 Iowa 455 392, 395, 401, 527 
 
 Clinton v. Franklin, 83 S. W. 142 308 
 
 Clinton v. Walliker, 98 Iowa 655 904 
 
 Clinton Ave., Re, 167 N". Y. 624 175 
 
 Clinton Ave., Re, 57 App. Div. 166 175 
 
 Clinton St. Police Station Site, In re, 123 N. Y. Supp. 198 660, 677, 743 
 
 1169 
 
 CTose V. Samm, 20 Iowa 503 1143 
 
 Closaen v. Herbert, 27 Vt. 728 1406 
 
 Cloth V. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 97 Ark. 86 114, 147, 155, 189, 915 
 
 Clothier v. Webster, 12 C. B. N. S. 790 819 
 
 Clough V. Unity, 18 N. H. 75 651, 1100 
 
Ixx Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PASE 
 
 Oloverdale Homes v. Cloverdale, 182 Ala. 410 469, 472, 972, 978 
 
 Clute V. Nortli Yakimia, etc., E. E. Co., 62 Wash. 581 864 
 
 Clute V. Turner, 157 Cal. 73 51 
 
 Clutter V. Davis, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 532 , 587 
 
 Coady v. Thatcher, 146 App. Div. 585 688 
 
 Ooalter v. Hunter, 4 Eand; 58 435 
 
 Coalter v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 293 874 
 
 Coate V. Memphis, etc.. Terminal Co., 120 Tenn. 525 1200 
 
 Coatsworth v. Lehigh Valley E. E. Co., 156 N. Y. 451 1395 
 
 Coatsworth v. Lehigh Valley E. E. Co., 73 Misc. 645 592, 740 
 
 Oobb V. Boston, 109 Mass. 438 '.' 6'97, 699, 1138, 1173, 1189 
 
 Cobb v. Boston, 112 Mass. 181 676, 1200 
 
 Cobb V. Davenport, 32 N. J. L. 369 410 
 
 Oobb V. Illinois, etc.. Coal Co., ©8 111. 233 1255 
 
 Oobb V. Lincoln Park Oommission«rs, 202 111. 427 426. 456 
 
 Oobb V. Portland, 55 Me. 3S1 1307 
 
 Cobb V. Saxby, ( 1914) 3 K. B. 822 498 
 
 Ooburn v. Ames, 52 Cal. 3i87 478 
 
 Coburn v. Neiw Tel. Co., 156 Ind. 90 480, 678 
 
 Cobum V. Sari Ma/teo Ooimty, 75 Fed. 520 1301 
 
 Ooburn v. Townsend, 103 Cal. 233 955 
 
 Cochran v. Miseouri, etc., E. E. Co., 94' Mo. App. 469 704 
 
 Coohran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365 288 
 
 Cochrane v. Commonwealth, 175 Mass. 299 659, 661, 678, 1183 
 
 Cochrane v. Maiden, 152 Mass. 365 1373 
 
 Codman v. Crocker, 203 Mass. 146 393, 398, 620 
 
 Oodman v. Evans, 5 Allen 308 478 
 
 Coe V. Columbus, etc., E. E. Co., 10 Ohio St. 372 1403, 1416, 1418 
 
 Ooe V. New Jersey Midland E. E. Co., 31 N. J. Eq. 146 1008 
 
 Ooffey County Commissioners v. Venard, 10 Kan. 9^ 1301 
 
 CoflSn V. Nantucket, 5 Cush. 269 264 
 
 Coffman v. GriflBn, 17 W. VsC. 178 918 
 
 Cogswell V. New York, etc., E. E. Co., 103 N. Y. 10 316, 1388 
 
 Cohasset v. Moors, 004 Mass. 173 1408, 1409 
 
 Oohen v. St. Louis, etc., K. E. Co., 34 Kan. 158 652, 703, 706, 1244, 1282 
 
 Cohen v. United States, 162 Fed. 364 428 
 
 Cohn V. Wausau Boom Co., 47 Wis. 314 416, 421 
 
 Oohoes V. Delaware, etc.. Canal Co., 7 N. Y. Supp. 885 1407 
 
 Oohoes Water Comonissioners v. Lansing, 45 N. Y. 19 1126 
 
 Coit V. Owenby-Wofford Co., 166 N. C. 136 602, 605 
 
 Oolby V. Toledo, 22 Ohio Cir. Dec. 347 ' 1121 
 
 Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Q. B. 339 , 407 
 
 Colchester v. Lawton, 1 Ves. & B. 226 1415 
 
 Ooloolough V. Milwaukee, 92 Wia. 182 304 
 
 Ooloough V. Nashville, etc., E. E. Co., 2 Head 171 338, 1236 
 
 Cole V. Boston, 181 Mass. 374 801, 802, 1189 
 
 Cole V. Drew, 44 Vt. 49 470, 486, 487 
 
 Cole V. Eastham, 133 Mass. 65 411, 431, 432, 838, 1282 
 
 Cole V. BUwood Power Co., 216 Pa. 283 340 
 
Table op Cases. Ixxi 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] FAGB 
 
 Cole T. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1 86, 2«6 
 
 Cole T. Neiwburyport, 1219 Maea. S94 1316 
 
 Oole V. St. Louis, X3& Mo. 633 789, 80S 
 
 Colegrove Wa,ter Co. v. Hollywood, 151 Oal. 42S 470 
 
 Coleman v. United States, 181 Fed. 593 314 
 
 Collamore v. Gillis, 149 Mass. 578 717 
 
 Collector, The v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 112 
 
 College Point v. Dennett, 2 Him m9 672 
 
 Collier v. Union Ry. Co., 113 Tenn. 96 188 
 
 Cdllins V. Grand Rapids, 95 Micli. 286 1275 
 
 CoUins V. Howard, 65 N. H. 190 1410 
 
 Collins V. New York Post-Graduate Medical School, 59 App. Div. 63 1306 
 
 Collina v. Philadelphia, 93 Pa. 272 1328 
 
 Collins V. Savannah, 77 Ga. 745 1325, 1348 
 
 Collina v. Waltham, 151 Mass. 196 829, 135« 
 
 Colonial City Traction Co. v. Kingston City R. E. Cto., 153 N. Y. 540. . . 1084 
 
 Colorado Central R. E. Co. v. Allen, 13 Colo. 229 1073 
 
 Colorado Central R. R. Co. v. Humphrey, 16 Colo. 34 770, 794 
 
 Colorado Eastern R. R. Co. v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 41 Fed. 293 191 
 
 192, 1007 
 
 Colorado, etc., R. R. Co. v. Croman, 16 Colo. 3»1 1129 
 
 Colorado, etc., R. R. Co. v. MoUandin, 4 Colo. 154 527 
 
 Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. v. Four Mile Ry. Co., 29 Colo. 90. ... . .1082, 1142 
 
 Colorado Midland! R. R. Co. v. Brown, 15 Colo. 193 671, 678 
 
 Colorado Southern R. R. Co. v. Boagin, 118 La. 268 920 
 
 Colorado Sprirtgs v. Stark, 57 Colo. 3S4 870, 87'8, 8S0 
 
 Colston V. St. Joseph, 106 Mo. App. 714 486 
 
 Columbia v. Melton, 85 S. C. 558 304, 13ia5 
 
 Columbia-Delaware Bridge Co. v. Geisse, 33 N. J. L. 537 850, 1125, 1167 
 
 Columbia, etc.. Rafting Co. v. Hutchinson, 56 Wash. 323 672 
 
 Columbia Heights Realty Co. v. Macfarland, 311 App. Oaa. D. C. 112. . . 1111 
 
 Columbia Heights Realty Co. v. Rudolph, 217 U. S. 547 775, 787, 791 
 
 Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 136 Ky. 570 1307 
 
 Columbus V. Columbus, 82 Wis. 3i74 391, 401 
 
 Columbus V. Hydraulic Woolen Mills Co., 33 Ind. 435 870 
 
 Oolumbuo V. Jaques, 30 Ga. 506 587 
 
 Columbus V. Penrod, 73 Ohio St. 209 1316 
 
 Columbus V. Eodgers, 10 Ala. 37 101 
 
 Columbus, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gardner, 45 Ohio St. 309 531, 1215 
 
 Columbus, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mowatt, 35 Ohio St. 284 958 
 
 Columbus, etc., R. R. Co. v. Nelson, 32 Ohio Oir. Ot. Rep. 431 ei3 
 
 Columbus, etc., R. R. Co. v. Simpson, 5 Ohio St. 251 808 
 
 Columbus, etc., R. R. Co. v. Witherow, 82 Ala. 190 1395 
 
 Columbus Gas Light Co. v. Columbus, 50 Ohio St. 65 377, 379 
 
 Columbus Waterworks Co. v. Long, 121 Ala. 245 ' .95, 97, 98, 1067 
 
 Colusa County v. Hudson, 85 Cal. 633 621, 1174 
 
 Colvill V. Fox, 51 Mont. 72 2S« 
 
 ColviU V. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 19 Minn. 283 666, 733, 741 
 
 Colville V. Judy, 73 Mo. 651 287 
 
 V 
 
iTncii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Colvin St., In re, 155 App. Div. 808 1155 
 
 Colwell V. May's, etc.. Power Co., 19 N. J. Eq. 24,5 3ll4 
 
 Oolwell V. Waterbury, 74 Conn. 5&8 1307 
 
 Comibs V. Smith, 78 Mo. 32 804 
 
 Ooramercial Electric, etc., Co. v. Tacoma, 20 Wash. 28S 1346, 1347 
 
 Commercial Telegraph Cable iCo. v. Prevost, 133 La. 47 I'lll 
 
 Oommercial Waterway Commissioners' v. Seattle Factory Sitea Co., 76 
 
 Wash. 181 814 
 
 CommiBsioners v. Kempshall, 2S Wend. 404 409 
 
 Commissioners of Highways v. Jackson, le^S 111. 17 1231, 123B 
 
 Oommiflioners of Highways v. Smith, 217 111. 25'0 1118 
 
 Commissioners of Iriland Fisheries v. Holyoke Water Power Co., 104 
 
 Mass. 446 362, 432 
 
 Commissioners of Parks v. Moesta, 91 Mioh. 149i 699', 922, 924 
 
 Commissioners of Parks v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 90 Mich. 385 . . . 998 
 
 Commissioners of Public Works, In re, 199 N. Y. 531 456, 737, 743 
 
 Commonwealth v. Alburger, 1 Whart. 439 36 
 
 Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Oush. 53 2, 31, 53', 273, 40(9, 453, 454, 456 
 
 Commonwealth v. Bearse, 132 Mass. 542 2 
 
 Commonwealth v. Blaisdell, 107 Mass. 273 477 
 
 Commonwealth v. Bond, 214 Pa. 307 382 
 
 Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 188' Mass. 348 166, 277 
 
 Commonwealth v. Boston, etc., R. R., 3 Cush. 25 948 
 
 Commonwealth v. Bostoii Terminal Co., 185 Mass. 281 390 
 
 Commonwealth v. Boston & Albany Railroad" Co., 150 Mass. 174 1406 
 
 Conunouwealth v. Cambridge, 7 Mass. 158 1406 
 
 Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 3 Mass. 268 952 
 
 Commonwealth v. Carter, 132 Mass. 12 ^5 
 
 Commonwealth v. Ca/ton, 4 Call 5 32 
 
 Commonwealth v. Chapin, 5 Pick. 199 408 
 
 Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72 99 
 
 Commonwealth v. Coombs, 2 Mass. 489 722, 724, 732, 73i5', 772, 801, 1010 
 
 Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 103 Mass. 412 1215 
 
 Commonwealth v. Eastern R. R. Co., 103 Mass. 254 362 
 
 Commonwealth v. Ellis, 11 Mass. 462 104fl, 1071, 1117 
 
 Commonwealth v. Erie, etc., R. R. Co., 27 Pa. 339 1000 
 
 Commonwealth v. Erie Railway Co., 62 Pa. 286 101 
 
 Commonwealth v. Essex Co., 13 Gray 2139 372, 432, 460 
 
 Commonwealth v. Fisher, 1 Pa. 466 32, 624 
 
 Commonwealth v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 12 Gray 180 1404 
 
 Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 164 Mass. 587 3i96, 397 
 
 Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 160 Mass. 157 415 
 
 Commonwealth v. Gloucester, 110 Mass. 491 1010 
 
 •Commonwealth v. Hartford, etc., R. R. Co., 14 Gray 379 386 
 
 Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 10 Pa. 466 1408 
 
 Commonwealth v. King, 150 Mass. 221 100 
 
 Commonwealth v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 12 Allen 75 381 
 
 Commonwealth v. McDonald, 16 Serg. & R. 330 1410 
 
 Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534 31, 369 
 
Table op Cases. Ixsiii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Commonwealth v. Moorehead, 118 Pa. 344 1408, 1410 
 
 Commonwealth v. Morrison, 197 Mass. 199 471, 521, 502 586, 587, 1396 
 
 Commonwealth v. (New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray 339 101 
 
 Commonwealth v. Newhury, 2 Pick. 51 1499 
 
 Commonwealth v. Norfolk, etc., Ey. Co., Ill Va. 59 622, &28, 9«9 
 
 Comni<mwealth v. Passmore, 1 Serg. & K. 217 478 
 
 Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 6© Pa. 41 460 
 
 Common-wealth v. Peters, 2 Mass. 125 470, 472, 625, 626, 1263 
 
 Commonwealth v. Peters, 3 Mass. 229 929 
 
 Commonwealth v. Philadelphia, etc., Ry. Cb., 214 Pa. 307 382 
 
 Commonwealth v. Pierce, 2 Dane Abr. 6®6 454 
 
 Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., 58 Pa. 26 946 
 
 Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375 391, 399 
 
 Commonwealth v. Plymouth Coal Co., 23i2 Pa. 141 3, 623 
 
 Commonwealth v. Provident Institution for Savings, 12 Allen 312 269 
 
 Commonwealth v. Sawin, 2 Pick. 547 148, 1049, 1089 
 
 Commonwealth v. Sessions of Middlesex, 9 Mass. 388 774, 802 
 
 Commonwealth v. Sessions of Norfolk, 5 Mass. 435 801 
 
 Commonwealth v. Smith, 10 Allen 448 1416, 1415 
 
 Commonwealth v. Smith, 4 Bin. 117 36 
 
 Commonwealth v. Stevens, 10 Pick. 247 996, 1003 
 
 Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562 520 
 
 Commonwealth v. Taunton, 7 Allen 309 1010 
 
 Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55 276 
 
 Commonwealth v. Tucker, 2 Pick. 44 1405 
 
 Commonwealth v. Uwchlan St. Ry. Co., 203 Pa. 608 977 
 
 Commonwealth v. Weiher, 3 Mete. 445 929, 937, 1010 1078 
 
 Commonwealth v. Westborough, 3 Mass. 406 1406 
 
 Commonwealth v. West Boston Bridge, 13 Pick. 195 996, 1001 
 
 Commonwealth v. Westchester, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 512 543 
 
 Commonwealth v. Western, 1 Pick. 136 1422 
 
 Como V. Worcester, 177 Mass. 543 83'3, 8i69 
 
 Compton V. Hankins, 90 Ala. 411 416 
 
 Compton V. Seattle, 38 Wash. 514 515 
 
 Compton V. Waco Bridge Co., 62 Tex. 715 364 
 
 Comstock V. Clearfield, etc., R. R. Co., 169 Pa. 582 732 
 
 Oonabeer v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 156 N. Y. 484 1272 1412 
 
 Coman v. Ely, 91 Minn. 127 672 
 
 Conant, Appellant, 83 Me 42 942 
 
 Conant, Appellant, 102 Me. 477 946 
 
 Concordia Cemetery Association v. Minnesota, etc., R. R. Co., 121 111. 
 
 199 1204, 120« 
 
 Concord Mfg. Co. v. Robertson, 66 N. H. 1 433, 454 
 
 Concord R. R. Co. v. Greely, 17 N. H. 47 116, 128, 13S, 185, 914 
 
 Concord R. R. Oo. v. Greely, 23 N. H. 237 1196, 1223 
 
 Cone V. Hartford, 28 Conn. 363 570, 1378 
 
 Conklin v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 154 Mass. 155 691 
 
 Connecticut College for Women v. Alexander, 85 Conn. 682 1027 
 
 Connecticut College for Women v. Calvert, 87 Conn. 421 115, 2il2 
 
Ixxiv Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Connecticut, etc., K. R. Co. v. Holton, 32 Vt. 43 609 
 
 Oonneoticut, etc.,- R. R. Co. v. St. Johnsbury, 59 Vt. 320 907, 999 
 
 Connecticut River R. R. Co. v. Clapp, 1 Cush. 559 656, 1058, 1060 
 
 Connecticut River R. R. Co. v. Franklin County Commissioners, 127 
 
 Mass. 50 628, 637, 1113 
 
 Connecting R. E., In re, 1 Leg. Gaz. Rep. 22 1061 
 
 Conner v. Manchester, 73 N. H. 233 1343 
 
 Conness v. Commonwealth, 184 Mass. 541 659, 678, 1183, 1184. 1186 
 
 Connesa v. Indiana, etc., R. R. Co., 198 111. 464 340, 744 
 
 Conniff v. San Francisco, 67 Cal. 45 314 
 
 Connolly v. Miller, 22 Nebr. 82 1181, 1182 
 
 Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 56 
 
 Connolly v. Van Wyek, 36 Misc. 746 632, 636 
 
 Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158 1370 
 
 Consolidated Channel Co. v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 51 'Cal. 269 252 
 
 Consolidated Ice Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 224 Pa. 487 338, 717 
 
 Consolidated Traction Co. v. Jordan, 36 Ind. App. 156 722, 7231 
 
 Oonsolidated Traction 'Co. v. So. Orange, etc., Traction Co., 56 N. J. 
 
 Eq. 569 379, 388 
 
 Consolidated Turnpike Co. v. Norfolk, etc., R. R. Co., 228 U. S. 326 86 
 
 1038, 1039 
 
 Constitution Wharf Co. v. Boston, 156 Ma«s. 397 443, 4.57, 836 
 
 Consumers', etc., Light Co. v. Congress Spring Co., 61 Hun 133 583 
 
 Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. American Plate Glass Co., 162 Ind. 393 . . 608 
 
 609 
 
 Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Harless, 131 Ind. 446 2, 59, 97, 209, 913 
 
 Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Huntsinger, 12 Ind. App. 285 1139 
 
 Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Huntsinger, 14 Ind. App. 155 204, 573 
 
 Contra Costa Coal Mines R. R. Co. v. Moss, 23 Cal. 323 185, 996, 1000 
 
 1006, 1073 
 
 Contra Costa Water Co. v. Van Rensselaer, 155 Fed. 140 62 
 
 Conwell V. Springfield, etc., R. R. Co., 87 111. 232 1271 
 
 Cook V. Ansonia, 66 Conn. 413 763, 794 
 
 Cook V. Boone, etc., Ry. Co., 1212 Iowa 437 741 
 
 Cook V. Burlington, 30 Iowa 94 185, 441, 524 
 
 Cook V. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 144 N. Y. 118 1172, 1175 
 
 Cooke V. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 133 Mass. 185 385 
 
 Cooke V. CoUingridge, 27 Beav. 456 366 
 
 Cook & Rathbone Co. v. Sanitary Dist., 177 111. 599 699 
 
 Cool v. Crommet, 13 Me. 250 487 
 
 Coolman v. Fleming, 82 Ind* 117 240, 1069 
 
 Coombes v. Justices of Berks, 9 App. Oas. 61 1298 
 
 Coombs, Petitioner, 127 Mass. 27'8' 259 
 
 Coomes v. Burt, 22 Pick. 422 241 
 
 Coons v. McKee's Rocks, 243 Pa. 340 877, 1176 
 
 Cooper, Matter of, 28 Hun 515 214 
 
 Cooper V. Anniston, etc., R. R. Co., 85 Ala. 106 986 
 
 Cooper V. Athens, 53 Ga. 638 1342 
 
 Cooper V. Dallas, 83 Tex. 239 868, 1319 
 
Table of Cases. Ixxv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Oooper V. Detroit, 42 Mich. 584 1405 
 
 Cooper V. Manhattan R. R. Co., 86 Hun 217 744 
 
 Cooper V. RandaJl, 59 111. 317 1216 
 
 Cooper V. Seattle, 16 Wash. 462 1253 
 
 Cooper V. Telfair, 4 I>all. 14 36 
 
 Cooper V. Williamff, 4 Ohio 2153 151, 198, 486, 462 
 
 Cooper V. Williams, 5 Ohio 39,1 66, 612 
 
 Oopeland v. Packard, 16 Pick. 217 148, 937, 1046, 1049, 1079 
 
 Oopeland v. Seattle, 33 Wash. 415 1316 
 
 Copiah County v. Lusk, 77 Miss. 136 1244 
 
 Corbin v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 461 1310, 1376 
 
 Corbin v. Wisconsin, etc., R. R. ,0o., 66 Iowa 26® 1080, 1100 
 
 Corcoran v. Benicia, 96 .Cal. 1 1354 
 
 Corey v. Wrentham, 164 Moss. 18 1098, 11.02, 1104, 1108, 1407 
 
 Corly V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 150 Mo. 457 524 
 
 Cornell- Andrews Smelting Co. v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 2l()2 Mass. 585. . 710 
 
 728, 730, 736, 828 
 Cornell-AndreWB Smelting Co. v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 209 Mass. 298. . 696 
 
 717, 728, 730 
 Oornell-Andrews Smelting Co. v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 216 Mass. 381 . . 729 
 
 730, 733, 1183 
 
 Corning v. Saginaw, 116 Mich. 74 1308 
 
 Cornwall v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 87 Ky. 72 77, 78, 988 
 
 Oorrigan v. Chicago, 144 111. 537 693, 712, 713 
 
 Oortlandt, etc., R. R. Co., Matter of, 98 N. Y. 336 746 
 
 Corwin v. Cowan, 12 Ohio St. 629 397, 612, 1420, 1422 
 
 Corwith V. Hyde Park, 14 111. App. 635 1228, 1209 
 
 Cory V. Chicago, eitc., R. R. Co., lOO Mo. 282 1069 
 
 Ooshy V. Owensboro, etc., R. R. Co., 10 Buah 288 597 
 
 OosgriflF V. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. 'Co., 15 N. D. 210 677. 581 
 
 Costellt) V. Burke, 63 Iowa 361 70, 1134 
 
 Ooster V. Albany, 43 N. Y. 399 326, 367 
 
 Coster V. New Jersey R. R. Co., 23 N. J. L. 227 600 
 
 Coster V. Tide Water Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 618 119, 141, 235 
 
 Cotes V. Davenport, 9 Iowa 287 1156, 1317 1363 
 
 Cott V. Lewiston R. R. Co., 36 N. Y. 214 733 
 
 Cotting V. Kansas City Stock Yards >Co., 183 U. S. 79 270 
 
 Cotton V. Bositon El. Ry. Co., 191 Mass. 103 1169, 1172, 11-90, 1^4, 226 
 
 Cotton V. Mississippi, etc.. Boom Co., 22 Minn. 372 268, 920 
 
 Cotton V. Pocaaset Mfg. Co., I'S Met. 429 824 
 
 Cottrell V. Rogers, 99 Tenn. 488 1194 
 
 Oottrill V. Myrick, 12 Me. 222 146, 233, 1273 
 
 Cotts V. Wheeling, etc., R. R. Co., 63 W. Va. 39 553 
 
 Coudi, Ex parte, 14 Ark. 337 1117 
 
 Coulkins V. Matthews, 5 Kan. 190 487 
 
 Covington v. Worthington, 88 Ky. 206 787 
 
 Covington, etc.. Bridge iCo. v. Magruder, 63 Ohio St. 456 59 
 
 Covington, etc., Ry. Co. v. Piel, 87 Ky. 267 644 
 
 Covington, etc.. Road lOo. v. Sanford, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 689 68 
 
Ixxvi Table of Oases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume 11.] PAOE 
 
 Covington Gas Light 'Oo. v. Covington, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 796 685 
 
 Covington Harbor Co. v. Phoenix Bridge Co., 10 Ohio Dec. Eeprint 65>7. 419 
 
 Covington Stock Yards Co. v. Keith, 13)9 U. S. 128 190 
 
 Cowan V. Glover, 3 A. K. Marsh 3<m 948 
 
 Cowan V. Penobscot E. K. Co., 44 Me. 140 970 
 
 Cowan V. Southern Ry Co., 118 Ala. 384 1269 
 
 Coward v. North Plainfield, 63 N. J. L. 61 948 
 
 Cowdrey v. Woburn, 136 Mass. 409 838, 83i9, 842, 1056 
 
 Oowell V. Thiayer, 5 Met. -253 615 
 
 Cowenhoven v: Brooklyn, 38 Barb. 9 , 1262 
 
 Cowper Essex v. Aoton Local Board, 14 App. Cas. 153 725, 739 
 
 Cox V. Louisville, etc., E. R. Co., 48 Ind. 178 526, 13i94, 13»5 
 
 Cox V. Mason City, etc., R. R. Co., 77 Iowa 20 743, 1060 
 
 Cox V. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 215 Pa. 506 367, 660, ©67, 699 
 
 810, 1171 
 
 Cox V Revelle, 125 Md. 579 78, 116, 215 
 
 Coxe V. Stajte, 144 N. Y. 396 415 
 
 Coyle V. Gray, 7 Houst. 44 401 
 
 Coyle V. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 27 
 
 Coyne v. Memphis, 118 Tenn. 651 321, 519, 559 
 
 Ctozard v. Kanawha Hardwood Co., 139 N. C. 283 119, 133, 188 
 
 207, 914 
 
 Craig V. Allegheny, 53 Pa. 477 612 
 
 Craig V. Greenwood District, 91 Ark. 274 262 
 
 Craig V. Rochester, etc., Ry. Co., 39 N. Y. 404 537, 543, 561 
 
 Cram v. Laeonia, 71 N. H. 41 324, 766, 806, 886 
 
 Crandell v. Taunton, lift Mass. 419 1262 
 
 Crane v. Camp, 12 Conn. 464 926 
 
 Crane v. Elizabeth, 36 N. J. Eq. 339 70, 3561 
 
 Cranford Paving Co. v. Baum, 97 Va. 501 1110 
 
 Cranwell v. London, L. R., 5 Exch. 284 338 
 
 Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459 493, 510 
 
 Crawford v. Frio County, 153 S. VF. 388 989, 1077 
 
 Crawford v. Topeka, 51 Kan. 756 277 
 
 Crawford Co. v. Hall, 67 Neb. 325 250, 405, 43^, 437, 438 
 
 Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325 250, 405, 435, 437, 439 
 
 Crawfordsville v. Bond, 96 Ind. 236 1359 
 
 Crawfordsville v. Broden, 130 Ind. 149 203 
 
 Creal v. Keokuk, 4 Greene 47 507, 1317, 1350 
 
 Crear v. Crossley, 40 111. 175 236 
 
 Creighton v. Water Commissioners, 143 N. C. 171 692, 709, 1169, 1173 
 
 Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 6 Rand. 245 460 
 
 Crescent Canal Co. v. Montgomery, 143 Cal. 248 1266i 
 
 Crescent Township v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., 210 Pa. 334 1008, 112! 
 
 Creston Waterworks Co. v. McGtath, 89 Iowa 502 913, 924 
 
 Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555 766, 768, 793 
 
 Crimmine v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry. Co., 87 Hun 187 1158 
 
 Crise v. Auditor, 17 Ark. 572 1120 
 
 Crocker v. Boston Electric Light Co., 180 Mass. 516 380, 383 
 
Table of Cases. Ixxvii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] FAOB 
 
 Crocker v. Coians, 37 S. C. 327 1410 
 
 Crockett v. Boston, 5 Cush. 182 1049, 1061, 1272 
 
 Crofford v. Atlanta, etc., K. R. Co., ISS Ala. 288 885 
 
 CroUey v. Minneapolis, etc., Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 541 604 
 
 Cromer v. Logansport, 38 Ind. App. 661 1365 
 
 Cromie v. Wabash, etc.. Canal Co., 71 Ind. 208 612 
 
 Crooke v. Flatbush. Waterworks Co., 29 Hun 245 572; 
 
 Crosby v. Dracut, 109 Mass. 206 1262, 1267 
 
 Crosby v. Hanover, 36 N. H. 404 6S, 92, 95, 174 
 
 Crosdale v. Cynthiana, 21 Ky. L. 86 1342 
 
 Cross V. Kansas City, 90 Mo. 13 1275 
 
 Cross V. Plymouth, 125 Mass. 557 767, 801, 802 
 
 Cross V. St. Louis, etc., E. R. Co., 77 Mo. 318 596 
 
 Crossley v. O'Brien, 24 Ind. 325 370, 747, 972 
 
 Crotona Park, In re, 142 App. Div. 665 ... . 1112, 1145, 1167, 1168, 1194, 1197 
 
 Croton Falls Dam, In re, 129 App. Div. 707 1112, 1145, 1167 
 
 Grouse v. Holnmn, 19 Ind. 38 1181 
 
 Orowell v. Beverly, 134 Mass. 98 709, 1135 
 
 Crowell V. Sonoma County, 25 Cal. 313 1300 
 
 Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86 272 
 
 Crowley v. Davi,8, 63 Cal. 460 140O 
 
 Crowley v. Uallatin County Commissioners, 14 Mont. 292 948, 1120 
 
 Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesellscbaft, 224 U. S. 290 631, 035 
 
 Cruger v. Hudson River E. E. Co., 12 N. Y. 190 937, 943, 1079 
 
 Crum V. Hargrove, 119 Ga. 471 1120 
 
 Crume v. Wilson, 104 Ind. 583 1100 
 
 Crump v. Mims, 64 N. C. 767 1407 
 
 Crystal City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Boothe, 126 S. W. 700 812 
 
 Crystal City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Label!, 126 S. W. 47 1209 
 
 Cuba v. Mississippi Cotton Oil Co., 150 Ala. 259 278 
 
 Cubbins v. Mississippi River Commission, 204 Fed. 299 314, 1264 
 
 Cudden v. Eastwick, 1 Salk. 143 1289 
 
 Culberson, etc.. Provision Co. v. Chicago, 111 111. 651 1144, 1196; 
 
 Cullen V. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 66 Conn. 211 879, 1238, 1244, 1282 
 
 Culpeper County Supervisors v. Gorrell, 20 GraAt. 484 917, 992, 1023 
 
 Cumberland v. Willison, 50 Md. 138 294, 295, 1342, 1345, 1362 
 
 Cumberland R. R. Co. v. Pine Mountain R. R. Co., 28 Ky. L. Rep. 574. . 1008 
 
 Cumberland Tel., etc., Co. v. Avrett, 120 Ky.' 34 578 
 
 Cumberland Tel., etc., Co. v. Poston, 94 Tenn. 696 580 
 
 Cumberland Tel., etc., Co. v. United Electric Ry. Co., 17 Fed. 825 994 
 
 Cumberland Tel., etc., Co. v. tfnited' Electric Ry. Co., 93 Tenn. 495. .380, 542 
 
 Cummings v. Lobsitz, 42 Okla. 704 1341 
 
 Cummins v. Des Moines, etc., R. R. Co., 63 Iowa 397 659, 743, 1129 
 
 Cummins v. Seymour, 79 Ind. 491 303, 476, 571, 1317, 1341 
 
 Cunard v. Rex, 43 Can. Sup. Ct. 88 669 
 
 Cunningham v. Macon R. R. Co., 109 U. S. 446 93 
 
 Cunningham v. Pacific R. R. Co., 61 Mo. 33 1027 
 
 Cunningham v. Ponca City, 27 Okl. 858 214 
 
 Cunningham v. Rome R. R. Co., 27 Ga. 499 606 
 
 vi 
 
Ixxviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Cunningham v. Seattle, 40 Wash. 59 1320 
 
 Cunningham v. Seattle, 42 Wash. 134 1320 
 
 Cupp V. Seneca County Commissioners, 19 Ohio St. 173 70, 932, 958 
 
 Cureton v. South Bound Ry. Co., 59 S. C. 371 341, 1239, 1283 
 
 Curran v. Boston, 151 Mass. 505 1308 
 
 Curran v. Louisville, 147 Ky. 592 619 
 
 Curran Bill Posting Co. v. Denver, 47 Colo. 221 277 
 
 Currie v. Natchez, etc., R. E. Co., 61 Miss. 726 1269 
 
 Currie v. New York Transit Co., 66 N. J. Eq. 313 600, 619 
 
 Currie v. Waverly, etc., E. E. Co., 52 N. J. L. 381 660, 672, 743 
 
 Currier v. Dartmouth College, 105 Fed. 886 1306 
 
 Currier v. Marietta, etc., E. E. Co., 11 Ohio 228 989 
 
 Curry v. Jones, 4 Del. Ch. 559 1255 
 
 Curry v. Place, 99 Mich. 524 925 
 
 Curry v. Savannah, 64 Ga. 290 141T 
 
 Curtin v. Benson, 222 U. S. 78 281 
 
 Curtin v. Nittany, etc., E. E. Co., 13S Pa. 20 735, 1178 
 
 Curtis V. Eastern E. R. Co., 14 Allen 55 826, 828, 1235, 1241 
 
 Curtis V. Eastern E. E. Co., 98 Mass. 428 \ 1241 
 
 Curtis V. Portland, 60 Me. 55 1101 
 
 Curtis V. St. Paul, etc., Ey. Co., 20 Minn. 28 733, 1217 
 
 Curtis V. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350 212 
 
 Curtiss V. Smith, 35 Conn. 156 614, 1411, 1412, 1419 
 
 Gushing v. Bedford, 125 Mass. 526 587i 
 
 Cushing V. Nantasket Beach E. E. Co., 143 Mass. 77 1168 
 
 Cushing V. Webb, 102 Me. 157 1051 
 
 Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247 303, 310 
 
 Cushwa V. Williamsport, 117 Md. 306 1410 
 
 Custer V. Dawson, 178 Mich. 367 690, 803 
 
 Gusty V. Lowell, 117 Mass. 78 1060 
 
 Cuthbert v. Kuhn, 3 Whart. 357 342, 714 
 
 Cutter V. Boston, 200 Mass. 400 349, 832, 880, 1177, 1217, 1218 
 
 Cuyahoga Eiver Power Co. v. Akron, 210 Fed. 524 434, 918 
 
 Guyler v. Rochester, 12 Wend. 165 1343 
 
 Cynthiana, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. Hutchinson, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1233 1419 
 
 D 
 
 Daggett V. Colgan, 92 Cal. 53 165 
 
 Daggy V. Green, 12 Ind. 303 94Q 
 
 Dahlman v. Milwaukee, 131 Wis. 427 615 
 
 Daigneault v. Woonsocket, 18 E. I. 378 1137 
 
 Daily v. State, 51 Ohio St. 348 486, 577 
 
 Dairy v. Iowa Central Ey. Co., 113 Iowa 716 322, 5361 
 
 Daley v. Watertown, 192 Mass. 116 1314, 1363 
 
 Dallas v. Boise, 44 Ore. 302 1204, 
 
 Dallas V. Hallock, 44 Ore. 246 3, 908, 914, 918, I066I 
 
 Dallas V. Kahn, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 19 763 
 
 l>allas County v. Dillard, 156 Ala. 354 867 
 
 Dallas County v. Plowman, 99 Tex. 809 1257 
 
Table op Cases. Isxis. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Dallas Terminal, etc., Co. v. Ardrey, 146 S. W. 616 597, 1162 
 
 Dalles Lumbering Oo. v. Urquhart, 16 Ore. 67 117, 128, 137, 195, 914 
 
 Daly, Ee, 72 A/pp. Div. 394 672 
 
 Daly V. Smith, 18 App. Div. 194 667, 670 
 
 Daly V. State, 51 Ohio St. 48 58! 
 
 Dalzell V. Davenport, 12 Iowa 437 870, 875, 121S 
 
 Damkoehler v. Milwaukee, 124 Wis. 144 515 
 
 Damon v. Ryan, 74 Wash. 138 1155 
 
 Damour v. Lyons City, 44 Icwa 276 1363, 1371 
 
 Dana v. Boston, 170 Mass 832, 873 
 
 Dana v. Boston, 176 Mass. 97 1170 
 
 Dana v. Craddock, 66 N. H. 593 441 
 
 Dana v. Eock Creek E.\ E. Co., 7 A^p. D. C. 482. 320, 321 
 
 Danaher v. Brooklyn, 119 N. Y. 241 1382 
 
 Danforth v. Grotoo Water Co., 176- Mass. 118 89-, 106S 
 
 Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178. Mass. 472 971, 1053 
 
 Daniel BaJl, The, 10 Wall. 559 100 
 
 Daniels v. Chicago, etc., K. E. Co., 35 Iowa 129 1244, 1245 
 
 Daniek v. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 41 Iowa 52 ■. .651, 704, 1151, 1263 
 
 Daniels v. Conrad, 4 Leigh 401 1195 
 
 Daniels v. Denver, 2 Colo. 69 135S 
 
 Dantzer v. Indianapolis Union E, E. Co., 141 Ind. 604 323 
 
 Danvers v. Essex County Commissioners, 2 Met. 185 948, 1045 
 
 Danville v. McAdams, 153 111. 216 1065 
 
 Danville, etc., E. E. Oo. v. MeKelvey, 1' W. N. C. 338 770 
 
 Dargan v. Carolina Cent. E. E. Co., 131 N C. 633 1235 
 
 Dargan v. Mobile, 31 Ala. 469 1307 
 
 Darien, etc., E. E. Co. v. McKay, 132 Ga. 672 1193, 1195 
 
 Darling v. Bangor, 68 Me. 108 132-7, 1331, 1339 
 
 Darling v. Blackstone Mfg. Co., 16 Gray 187 1061, 1154 
 
 Darlington v. ISIew York, 31 N. Y. 164 391 
 
 Darlington v. United States, 82 Pa. 382 108, 90S, 915, 1103 
 
 Darst V. People, 51 111. 286 ; . 284 
 
 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518' 27, 35S, 989, 392, 962, 1288 
 
 Dashner v. Mills County, 88 Iowa 401 1300 
 
 Dassler, In re, 35 Kan. 678 369 
 
 Dater v. Troy Turnpike, etc., Co., 2 Hill 629 1245 
 
 Daughters v. Riley County, 81 Kan. 548 398 
 
 Daughters of American Revolution v. Schenley, 204 Pa. 57'2 879 
 
 Davenport v. Dedham, 178 Mass. 382 832, 843 
 
 Davenport v. Hyde Park, 178 Mass. 385 8-32, 843, 872 
 
 Davenport v. Peoria Insurance Co., 17 Iowa 276 14ig 
 
 Davenport v. Stevenson, 34 Iowa 225 627 
 
 Davenport Bridge Ey. Co. v. Johnson, 188 111. 472 533, 1397, 
 
 Davenport, etc., E. E. Co. v. Renwick, 102 U. S. 180 456, 459 
 
 Davenport, etc., E. E. Co. v. Sinnet, 111 111. App. 75 743 
 
 David v. Beelman, 5 La. Ann. 545 712 
 
 David V. Portland Water Committee, 14 Ore. 98 401 
 
 Davidson v. Boston & Maine E. E., 3 Cush. 91 348, 429, 826, 843, 1367 
 
lyyy Table of Gases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Vohime I, 721-1422 IB Volume II.] PAOB 
 
 Davidson v. Hine, 151 Mich. 294 392, 399, 400 
 
 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 83, 8S, 930 
 
 Davies v. Boston, 190 Mass. 194 401 
 
 Davies v. Los Angeles, 86 Cal. 37 932 
 
 Daviea v. Saginaw County, 89 Mich. 295 1405 
 
 Davis V. Ada County, 5 Idaho 126 130O 
 
 Davis V. Kangor, etc., K. R. Co., 60 Me. 303 1061 
 
 Davis V. Charles Eiver Branch E. R. Co., 11 Cusb. 506. .344, 1074, 1196, 1201 
 
 Davis v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 46 Iowa 389 527, 633 
 
 Davis V. Crawfordville, 119 Ind. 1 •» 507, 1317, 1357, 1359, 1366' 
 
 Davis V. Des Moines, etc., R. E. Co., 155 Iowa 51 1120 
 
 Davis V. East Tennessee, etc., R. R. Co., 87 Qa. -605 790', 795, 996, 1000 
 
 Davis V. Gale, 32 Cal. 26 438 
 
 Davis V. Hampshire County Coimnissioners, 153 Mass. 218 323, S34, 843 
 
 885 
 
 Davis V. Lacrosse, etc., K. R. Co., 12 Wis. 16 355 
 
 Davis V. Memphis, etc., E. E. Co., 87 Ala. 633 1411, 1412 
 
 Davis V. Missouri Pacific R. E. Co., 119 Mo. 180 867, 871, 874 
 
 Davia v. Northwestern El. R. R. Co., 170 111. 595 1030 
 
 Davis V. Nichols, 39 lU. App. 6 1003 
 
 Davis V. Pennsylvania R. E. Co., 215 Pa. 581 1178, 1192 
 
 Davis V. Sawyer, 133 Mass. 289 334 
 
 Davis V. Silveuton, 47 Ore. 171 516 
 
 Davis V. Smith, 130 Mass. 113 173, 235 
 
 Davison v. Gill, 1 East 64 8 
 
 Davison v. Walla Wa%, 52 Wash. 453 264, 273, 274, 275, 276 
 
 Davock v. Moore, 105 Mich. 129 381, 401 
 
 Davoust V. Alameda, 149 Cal. 69 1309 
 
 Dawes v. Hawkins, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 848 1407 
 
 Dawson v. Pittsburgh, 159 Pa. 317 1218 
 
 Day V. Chambers, 62 Tex. 190 1420 
 
 Day V. Pittsburg, etc., E. E. Co., 44 Ohio St. 406 1420 
 
 Day V. Savadge, Hob. 85 30 
 
 Day V. Stetson, 8 Me. 365 192, 942, 944 
 
 . Day V. Walden, 46 Mich. 575 614, 1412 
 
 Dayton v. Bauman, 66 Ohio St. 379 786 
 
 Dayton v. Lincoln, 39 Nebr. 74 789, 806 
 
 Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80 1250, 1314, 1319 
 
 Dayton, etc.. Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 >iev. 394 63, 116, 131, 136, 154 
 
 156, 254, 907 
 
 Dayton, etc., E. E. Co. v. Lewton, 20 Ohio St. 401 634, 1288 
 
 Dean v. Ann Arbor St. Ey. Co., 93 Mich. 330 542 
 
 Deansville Cemetery Association, Re, 66 N. Y. 569 145, 213, 914, 918 
 
 Dearborn v. Boston, etc., E. E. Co., 24 N. H. 179 1250 
 
 Deaton v. Polk County, 9 Iowa 594 798, 943 
 
 Deavitt v. Washington County, 75 Vt. 156 66 
 
 De Baker v. Southern California Ey. Co., 106 Cal. 257 314, 1249, 1321 
 
 Debine v. Olney, 68 N. J. L. 284 9J 
 
 De Buol V. Freeport, etc., E. E. Co., Ill 111. 499 1066, 1171 
 
Table of Cases. Ixxxi 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 De Camp v. Dix, 159 N. Y. 436 422 
 
 De Camp T. Hibernia Underground R. E. Co., 47 N. J. L. 43 187, 256 
 
 De Castello v. Cedar Rapids, 153 N. W. 353 621 
 
 Decatur v. Randall, 87 S. E. 1036 303, M2 
 
 Decatur v. Vaughn, 233 111. 50 666 
 
 Decatur St., In re, 196 K Y. 286 351, 709 
 
 Decker v. Baltimore, etc., K. E. Co., 30 Fed. 723 Ill 
 
 Decker v. Evansville, etc., E. E. Co., 133- Ind. 493 317, 497, 506, 530, 541 
 
 555 
 
 Deems v. Baltimore, 80 Md. 164 285 
 
 Deepwater E. R. Co. v. Western Pocahontas Coal Co., 152 Fed. 824 1041 
 
 1042, 1156 
 
 Deerfield v. Arms, 17 Pick. 41- 411 
 
 Deerfield Eiver Co. v. Wilmington Power, etc., Co., 83 Vt. 548 117, 130 
 
 204, 205 
 
 Deering, Matter of, 93 N. Y. 361 377, 379 
 
 Defer v. Detroit, 67 Mich. 346 1328 
 
 De Geofroy v. Merchants Bridge Terminal Ey. Co., 179 Mo. 698 498, 499 
 
 524, 556, 564, 596, 878, 891, 960 
 
 De Gray v. New York, etc., Tel. Co., 68 N. J. L. 454 1144 
 
 De Grauer v. Long Island Electric Ey. Co., 163 N. Y. 597 550 
 
 Deisner v. Simpson, 72 Ind. 435 354 
 
 Dekalb County Tel. Co. v. Dutton, 228 111. 178 576, 579, 1255, 1395 
 
 De Kay v. North Yakima, etc., Ey. Co., 71 Wash. 648 647 
 
 Deland v. Dixon Power, etc., Co., 225 111. 212 1409 
 
 Delaney v. Boston, 2 Harr. 489 ' 409 
 
 Delaplaine v. Chicago & Northwestern Eailway Co., 42 Wis. 214. . . .426, 430 
 
 De Lauder v. Baltimore County Commissioners, 94 Md. 1 347 
 
 Delaware County's Appeal, 119 Pa. 159 646 
 
 Delaware, etc.. Canal Co. v. Whiteihall, 90 N. Y. 21 372, 752 
 
 Delaware, etc., E. E. Co. v. Burson, 61 Pa. 369 653, 1049, 1117 
 
 Delaware, etc., R. R. Co. v. Salmon, 10 Vroom 299 726 
 
 Delaware, etc., E. R. Co. v. Tobyhanna Co., 232 Pa. 76 921 
 
 Delaware, etc., E. E. 'Co. v. Wilkeabarre, etc., Ey. Co., 6 Kulp. 342. . . . 3i85 
 Delaware Eiver Transportation Co. v. Trenton, 85 N. J. L. 479. .200, 916, 921 
 
 Dell Eapids v. Irving, 7 S. O. 310 944 
 
 Dell Eapids Mercantile Co. v. Dell Eapids, 11 S. D. 116. .479, 480, 1375, 1379 
 
 Del Monte. Live Stock Co. v. Eyan, 24 Colo. App. 340 1255 
 
 De Long v. Schimmel, 58 Ind. 64 1068 
 
 Delosier v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 7 Sad. 249 613 
 
 Delphiu v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90 483, 647, 1317 
 
 De Lucca v. North Little Eock, 142 Fed. 597 302, 514, 631, 637, 647 
 
 Dement, Ex parte, 53 Ala. 389 270, 389 
 
 Dempsey v. Kipp, 61 N. Y. 567 236 
 
 •Deneen v. Unverzagt, 225 111. 378 954, 965, 1108 
 
 Denham v. Bristol County Commissioners, 108 Mass. 202 148, 175, 235 
 
 1050 
 
 Denison, etc., E. E. Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. E. Co., 96 Tex. 233 1412 
 
 Dennis v. Mdbile, etc., Ey. Co., 137 Ala. 649 323, 885 
 
Ixxxii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Dennis v. Simon, 51 Ohio St. 233 369 
 
 Denniston v. Clark, 125 Mass. 216 483 
 
 Denslow v. New Haven, etc., Co., 16 Conn. 98 1238 
 
 Dentzer v. Indianapolis Union Ry. Co., 141 Ind. 604 885 
 
 Denver v. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113 525, 789, 794, 875, 890, 895 
 
 Denver v. Boneateel, 30 Colo. 107 867 
 
 Denver v. Uapelli, 4 Colo. 25 1238, 1339, 1374 
 
 Denver v. Davis, 37 Colo. 370 1309, 1313 
 
 Denver v. trirard, 21 Colo. 447 1409 
 
 Denver v. Maurer, 47 Colo. 209' 1309, 1376 
 
 Denver v. Rogers, 46 Colo. 479 278 
 
 Denver v. Spencer, 34 Colo. 270 1309 
 
 Denver v. Verina, 8 Colo. 299 «74 
 
 Denver Circle R. R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403 527, 890 
 
 Denver, etc.. Coal Co. v. Union ■ Pacific R. R. Co., 34 Fed. 386 145 
 
 Denver, etc.. Irrigation Co. v. Colorado, etc., Ry. Co., 30 Colo. 204 . . 996, 1093 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Adkinson, 28 Okl. J 1110, 1163 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ailing, 99 U. S. 463. 1008, 1009 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Arizona, , etc., R. R. Co., 233 U. S. 601 1009, 1255 
 
 1258 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v.. Arizona, etc., R. R. Co., 16 N. M. 281 1255, 1256 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Barsaloux, 15 Colo. 290 1398 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bourne, 11 Colo. 59 1112 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Denver City Ry. Co., 2 Colo. 673 364 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Domke, 11 Colo. 247 647, 1398 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Griffith, 17 Colo. 598 666, 1080, 1150 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hannegan, 43 Colo. 122 553 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Howe, 49 Colo. 256 729,. 1143 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Lamhorn, 8 Colo. 380 1097, 1100, 1101, 1102 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Lamborn, 9 Colo. 119 1101, 1102 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mills, 59 Colo. 198 955, 1091 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Sehmitt, 11 Colo. 56 1192 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. .Stark, 16 Colo. 291 794 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. V. Stinemeyer, 59 Colo. 396 525 
 
 Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 28 Colo. 6 1263 
 
 Denver, etc.. Water Co. v. Middaugh, 12 Colo. 434 732, 1249 
 
 Denver Power, etc., Co. v. Denver, etc., Ry. Co., 30 Colo. 204. .208, 1003, 1007 
 
 Denver R. R., etc., Co., v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 34 Fed. 386 158 
 
 Depew V. Wabash, etc.. Canal Trustees, 5 Ind. 8 429 
 
 Derby v. Gallup, 5 Minn. 134 1179 
 
 Derby v. Hall, 2 Gray 236 612 
 
 Desert Water, etc., Co. v. State, 167 Cal. 147 95, 96, 170 
 
 Deshong v. New York, 176 N. Y. 475 479, 480, 481 
 
 Des Moines v. Harker, 34 Iowa 84 1408 
 
 Des Moines City R. R. Co. v. Des Moines, 151 Fed. 854 374 
 
 Des Moines City R. R. Co. v. Des Moines, 90 Iowa 770 379 
 
 Des Moines Park Commissioners' v. Diamond Ice Co., 130 Iowa 603. . . . 361 
 
 415 
 Des Moines St. Ry. Co. v. Des Moines, etc., St. Ry. Co., 73 Iowa 513. . . . 361 
 
Table of Cases. Ixxxiii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Detroit V. Beckman, 34 Mich. 125 507, 1328, 1333, 1348 
 
 Detroit v. Beecher, 75 Mich. 454 659, 922, 933, 945, 1026, 1078 
 
 Detroit v. Daly, 68 Mich. 503 779, 785i 
 
 Detroit v. Detroit, etc.. Plank B«ad Co., 43 Mieh. 148 78, 280, 338, 359 
 
 372, 376, 378 
 
 Detroit v. Detroit, etc., E. R. Co., 112 Mich. 304 1144 
 
 Detroit v. Detroit United R. R. Co., 156 Mich. 106 ,. . . 1223 
 
 Detroit v. Detroit United R. E. Co., 172 Mich. 136 542 
 
 Detroit v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 163 Mich. 229 507 
 
 Detroit v. Sauer, 69 Mich. 164 i 785 
 
 Detroit v. Schilling, 93 Mich. 429 1159 
 
 Detroit v. Wabash, etc., R. R. Co., 63 Mich. 712 788 
 
 Detroit City Ry. Co. v. Mills, 85 Mich. 634 542, 651 
 
 Detroit, etc., R. R. Co. v. Detroit, 112 Mieh. 304 749 
 
 Detroit, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gartner, 95 Mich. 318 1068 
 
 Detroit, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hall, 133 Mieh. 302 922 
 
 Detroit, etc., R. R. Co. v. Osborn, 189 U. S. 383 380, 387 
 
 Detroit, etc., R. R. Co. v. Sioux City Seed, etc., Co., 168 Mich. 668 647 
 
 Detroit Leather Specialty Co. v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 149 Mich. 
 
 588 347, 1256 
 
 Detroit Park Commissioners v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 91 Mich. 291... 749 
 Detroit Southern R. R. Co. v. Lawrence County Commissioners, 71 Ohio 
 
 St. 454 , 966 
 
 Detroit United Ry. v. Barnes Paper Co., 172 Mich. 586 196 
 
 Detroit Water Commissioners v. Lorman, 156 Mich. 608 922 
 
 De Varaigne v. Fox, 2 Blatchf. 95 912, 919, 1421 
 
 Devlin v. New York, 131 N. Y. 123 355 
 
 Devon v. Cincinnati International R. R. Co., 29 Ohio C. C. 113 1090, 1091 
 
 Dewell V. Sny Island, etc.. District, 232 III. 215 928 
 
 Dewey v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 142 N". C. 392 964 
 
 DeWitt V. Duncan, 46 Cal. 234 982 
 
 Dexter v. Boston, 176 Mass. 247 . .' 269 
 
 Diamond v. North Attleborough, 219 Mass. 587 1280 
 
 Diamond Jo Line Steamers v. Davenport, 114 Iowa 432 1006 
 
 Dice V. Sherman, 107 Va. 424 211 
 
 Dickenson v. Fitohburg, 13 Gray 546. ... . .666, 670, 801, 802, 1175, 1177, 1194 
 
 1220 
 
 Dickerman v. Duluth, 88 Minn. 288 867, 874 
 
 Dickerson v. Okolona, 98 Ark. 206 846, 867 
 
 Dickey v. Maine Tel. Co., 46 Me. 483 477 
 
 Dickey v. Tennison, 27 Mo. 373 116, 236, 928, 929 
 
 Dickinson v. Arkansasi City Improvement Co., 77 Ark. 570 1419 
 
 Dickinson v. Boston, 188 Mass. 595 1310 
 
 Dickinson v. Consolidated Traction Co., 114 Fed. 232 68 
 
 Dickinson v. New York, 92 N. Y. 584 1408 
 
 Dickinson v. Worcester, 7 Allen 19 1372 
 
 Dickinson County Commissioners v. Hogan, 39 Kan. 606 722 
 
 Diebold v. Kentucky Traction Co., 117 Ky. 146 548 
 
 Diebold Safe & Lock Co. v. Holt, 4 Okla. 479 I217 
 
Ixxxiv Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Diedrieh v. Northwestern Union Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 248 410, 426, 455, 460 
 
 1133 
 
 Diedrieh v. Northwestern, etc., R. R. Co., 47 Wis. 662 657, 1176 
 
 Dierka v. Addison, 142 111. 197 313 
 
 Dietrich v. Lincoln, etc., R. R. Co., 12 Nebr. 225 1100, 1114, 1192, 1199 
 
 Dietrich v. Lincoln, etc., R. R. Co., 13 Nebr. 361 918, 986, 987 
 
 Dietrich v. Murdoek, 42 Mo. 279 187, 706 
 
 Dillon V. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 67 Kan. 687 190, 616, 617, 1413 
 
 Dilts V. Plumville R. R. Co., 222 Pa. 516 353, 600', 609 
 
 Dimmick v. Council Bluffs, etc., R. R. Co., 58 Iowa 637 1228 
 
 Dingley v. Boston, 100 Mass. 544 66, 71, 239, 914, 919 
 
 Dingley v. Gardiner, 73 Me. 63 1235 
 
 Dinwiddie v. Roberts, 1 Greene 363 621 
 
 Diocese of Iowa v. Anamosa, 76 Iowa 538 1350 
 
 Directors of Poor v. Wrightsville, etc., R. R. Co., 7 Watts & S. 236 1062 
 
 1134 
 
 Dirnberger v. Reed, 11 Ind. 420 631, 636 
 
 Dismal Swamp R. R. Co. v. Roper Liimiber Co., 114 Va. 537 187, 1088 
 
 Distler v. Grays Harbor, etc., Ry. Co., 76 Wash. 391 1150 
 
 District of Columbia v. Cropley, 23 App. D. C. 232 442 
 
 District of Columbia v. Hess, 35 App. D. C. 38 1099 
 
 District of Columbia v. Jones, 38 App. D. C. 560 70 
 
 District of Columbia v. Moore, 5 App. D. C. 497 722 
 
 District of Columbia v. Prospect Hill Cemetery, 5 App. D. C. 497 .. . 762, 1093 
 
 Dixon V. Baker, 65 111. 518 1317, 1357, 1363, 1378 
 
 Dixon V. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 1 Maekey 78 905, 1154 
 
 Dixon V. People, 168 III. 179 271, 3«8 
 
 Doane v. Lake St. Ry. Co., 165 111. 510 562, 594, 647, 1282 
 
 Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223 56 
 
 Dodd V. Consolidated Traction Co., 57 N. J. L. 482 486 
 
 Dodd V. Hart, 8 Del. Ch. 448 925 
 
 Dodge V. Council Bluffs, 57 Iowa 560 95 
 
 Dodge V. Essex County Commissioners, 3 Met. 380 590, 735, 825, 828, 1235 
 
 1241, 1393 
 
 Dodge V. Granger, 17 R. I. 901 1308 
 
 Dodge V. Mission Township, 10i7 Fed. 827 219 
 
 Dodge V. Omaha, etc., R. R. Co., 20 Nebr. 276 355 
 
 Dodge V. Rockport, 199 Mass. 274 432, 655, 828, 843 
 
 Doe V. Georgia R. R., etc., Co., 1 Ga. 524 1244 
 
 Doe d. Hutchinson v. Manchester, etc., Ry., 14' Jl. & W. 687 1263 
 
 Dolan V. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 175 N. Y. 367 559, 963, 964 
 
 Dolfield V. Western Maryland R. R. Co., 107 Md. 584 986 
 
 Dollar Saving Fund & Trust Co. v. Bellevue, 230 Pa. 240 356, 357 
 
 Dolores, etc.. Canal Co. v. Hartman, 17 Colo. 138 951, 952, 953, 1114 
 
 Domestic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Mayor of Newark, 49 N. J. L. 344 577 
 
 Donahue v. Keystone Gas Co., 181 N. Y. 313 487, 500, 504 
 
 Donisthorpe v. Fremont, etc., R. R. iCo., 30 Nebr. 142 604 
 
 Donnaher v. State, 8 Sur. & M. 649 622 
 
 Donnelly v. Decker, 58 Wis. 461 240, 245 
 
Tabi.b of Cases. Ixxxv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 inl Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Donnelly v. Longport, 95 Alt. 740 247 
 
 Donofrio v. Seattle, 72 Wash. 178 646 
 
 Donovan v. AUert, 11 N. D. 289 470, 577, 646, 1256, 1260 
 
 Donovan v. Springfield, 125 Mass. 371 769, 789, 802, 1169, 1200 
 
 Donnell v. Greensboro, 164 N. C. 330 445 
 
 Donnelly v. Brooklyn, 121 N. Y. 9 654, 959, 1228 
 
 Donnelly v. Tripp, 12 E. I. 97 134S 
 
 Donahue v. Newburyport, 211 Mai5s. 561 521 
 
 Dooley v. Kansas City, 82 Mo. 444 992, 1344 
 
 Dooley v. Sullivan, 112 Ind. 451 1316 
 
 Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co., 9 Utah 31 321, 498, 499 
 
 505, 530, 542, 555, 893, 1399 
 
 Doon v. Natick, 171 Mass. 228 177 
 
 Doran v. Central Pacific E. E. Co., 24 Cal. 245 343 
 
 Doremus v. Paterson, 63 N. J. Eq. 605. . 445 
 
 Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen 223 51, 626, 676, 677, 694 
 
 Dorian v. East Brandywine, etc., E. E. Co., 46 Pa. 520 733 
 
 Dorman v. Jacksonville, 13 Fla. 538 306, 507, 1351 
 
 Dorrance St., In re, 4 E. I. 230 3, 945 
 
 Dorrity v. Russell, 7 Bosw. 539 1189 
 
 Dosdall V. County of Olmstead, 30 Minn. 96 1300 
 
 Dose V. Seattle, 78 Wash. 571 1240 
 
 Dotson V. Atchison, etc., E. R. Co., 81 Kan. 816 192 
 
 Doty V. American Tel., etc., Co., 123 Tenn. 329 956, 958, 994, 1026, 1027 
 
 1236, 1237 
 
 Doty V. Johnson, 84 Vt. 15 314, 1257, 1258, 1259, 1261 
 
 Doucette v. Little Falls, etc., Co., 71 Minn. 206 421 
 
 Doud V. Mason City, etc., R. E. Co., 76 Iowa 438 692, 743 
 
 Douglas V. Byrnes, 59 Fed. 23 255 
 
 Douglas V. Byrnes, 63 Fed. 16 946, 1127 
 
 Douglas V. Indianapolis, etc.. Traction Co., 37 Ind. App. 332 953 
 
 Douglass V. Boonsborough Turnpike Eoad, 22 Md. 219 613, 619 
 
 Douglass V. Montgomery, 118 Ala. 599 1406, 1420 
 
 Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge, 17 N. H. 200 101, 429 
 
 Dovey v. Plattsmouth, 52 Nebr. 642 1251 
 
 Dov? V. Electric Co., 68 N. H. 59 966 
 
 Dow V. Norris, 4 N. H. 16 36 
 
 Dowd V. American Surety Co., 69 Ore. 418 1159 
 
 Dowie V. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co., 214 111. 49 1084 
 
 Downes v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555 1306 
 
 Downing v. Mason County, 87 Ky. 208 1301 
 
 Downs V. Ansonia, 73 Conn. 33 I357 
 
 Downa v. Seattle, etc., E. R. Co., 5 Wash. 778 1239, 1244 
 
 Doyle V. Kansas City, etc., R. E. Co., 113 Mo. 280 lUO 
 
 Doyle V. Manhattan Ey. Co., 128 N. Y. 488 1215, 1223 
 
 Doyle V. Sandpoint, 18 Idaho 654 1341, 1345 
 
 Drady v. Des Moines, etc., R. R. 'Co., 57 Iowa 393 969 
 
 Drainage Commissioners v. Knox, 237 111. 148 3O8 
 
 Drainage Commissioners v. Volke, 163 HI. 243 1118 
 
Ixxxvi Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] FAOB 
 
 Drainage District No. 1 v. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co., 95 Neb. 1 1107 
 
 Drake v. Chicago, etc., K. E. Co., 63 Iowa 302 611, 1392 
 
 Drake v. Hudson Eiver R. R. Co., 7 Barb. 508 527 
 
 Drake v. Seattle, 30 Wash. 81 1252 
 
 Draper v. Mackey, 35 Ark. 497 1120 
 
 Draper v. Mayor of Fall Eiver, 185 Mass. 142 832 
 
 Drath v. Burlington, etc., E. E. Co., 15 Neb. 367 1097, 1100, 1114 
 
 Drehman v. Stifel, 41 Mo. 184 265 
 
 Drew T. Westfield, 124 Mass. 461 830, 1371 
 
 Drexler v. Braddock, 238 Pa. 376 f 1197 
 
 Driggs V. Phillips, 103 N. Y. 77 1407 
 
 Driacoll v. New Haven, 75 Conn. 92 617, 919 
 
 Driscoll V. Taunton, 160 Mass. 486 1274 
 
 Driver v. Western Union E. E. Co., 32 Wis. 569 694, 696, 815, 1106 
 
 1150, 1173 
 
 DroUinger v. Hasitirigs, etc., E. R. Co., 98 Nebr. 520 1144 
 
 Drucke v. Manhattan Ey. 'Co., 106 N. Y. 157 ' 1223 
 
 Drury v. Boston, 101 Miass. 439 ■ 1108 
 
 Drury v. Midland E. E. Cto., 127 Mass. 571 621, 634, 666, 692, 731 
 
 1152, 1154, 1193, 1284 
 
 Dubach v. Hanni^bal, etc., E. E. Co., 89 Mo. 483 1400 
 
 Du Bois, etc., Ey. Co. v. Buffalo, etc., E. E. Co., 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 401 . . 753, 755 
 
 Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 Iowa 451 470, 472, 479, 485, 486, 586 
 
 Dubuque, etc., E. E. iCo. v. Fort Dodge, etc., E. E. Co., 146 Iowa 666.. 141 
 
 Dudley v. Buffalo, 7'3 Minn. 347 '■ 1353 
 
 Dudley v. Flemingsburg, 115 Ky. 5 1316 
 
 Dudley v. Minnesota, etc., Ey. Co., 77 Iowa 412 1208 
 
 Dudley v. New Britain, 77 Conn. 322 445 
 
 Dugan V. Cedar County, 87 Neb. 689 337 
 
 Duggan V. Peabody, 187 Mass. 349 1346 
 
 Duke V. O'Bijyan, 100 Ky. 710 240, 244 
 
 Duke V. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 71 S. C. 95 95 
 
 Dulaney v. Louisville, etc., E. E. Co., 100 Ky. 628 1400 
 
 Dulauey v. Nolan County, 85 Tex. 225 778, 780, 812 
 
 Dulaney v. United Railways & Electric Co., 104 Md. 423 192, 195, 395 
 
 Dulin V. Ohio Eiver E. E. Co., 73 W. Va. 166 1265 
 
 Duluth Terminal Ey. Co., In re, 113 Minn. 459 970 
 
 Duluth Transfer Co. v. Northern Pacific E. E. Co., 51 Minn. 218 1106 
 
 Duke V. Central N. J. Tel. Co., 53 N. J. L. 341 ( 1067, 1069 
 
 Duke V. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 71 S. C. 95 995 
 
 Dunbar v. Augusta, 90 Ga. 330 284 
 
 Dunbar v. Boston, etc., E. E. Oo., 181 Mass. 383 933, 971 
 
 Dunbar v. Guardians of Ardee Union, 2 Ir. Rep. 76 1298 
 
 Dunbar v. San Francisco, 1 Cal. 355 264, 1341, 1342 
 
 Duncan v. Findlater, 6 CI. & F. 894 , 1306 
 
 Duncan v. Louisville, 8 Bush 98 1057, 1100, 1231, 1232 
 
 Duncan v. Lynchburg, 2 Va. Dec. 700 1341 
 
 Ihinean v. Nassau Electric R. R. Co., 127 App. Div. 252 543 
 
 Duncan v. Nebraska Sanitarium Benevolent Association, 92 Neb. 162. . 1306 
 
Table of Cases,. Ixxxvii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Duncan v. Terre Haute, 85 Ind. 104 346 
 
 Dunham v. Angus, 145 Cal. 165 1416 
 
 Dunham v. Hyde Park, 75 111. 371 147, 175, 916 
 
 Dunham t. New Britain, 55 Conn. 378 448 
 
 Dunhame v. Runyon, 24 N. J. L. 256 1057 
 
 Dunlap V. Pulley, 28 Iowa 469 1235 
 
 Dunlop V. Toledo, etc., R. R. Co., 50 Mich. 470 1154 
 
 Dunlop V. York Township, 16 Grant Ch. 216 354 
 
 Dunn V. Barnwell, 43 S. C. 398 '. '. 1308 
 
 Dunn V. Charleston, Harp. L. 189 60, 178, 915 
 
 Dunning v. Drain Commissioner, 44 Mich. 518 936, 1079 
 
 Dunsmore v. 'Central Iowa, R. R. Co., 72 Iowa 182 317 
 
 Du Pont V. Sanitary District, 203 111. 170 796 
 
 Dupuis V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 115 111. 97 666, 1149, 1173 
 
 Dupuis V. Fall River, 223 Mass. 73 1362 
 
 Dupy V. Wickwire, 1 D. iChip. 237 32 
 
 Durango v. Suttrell, 18 Oolo. 123 ' 1317, 1350 
 
 Durant v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. L. 309 1119 
 
 Durfee v. Peoria, etc., R. R. 'Co., 140 111. 4*35 1411 
 
 Durham v. Eno Cotton Mills, 141 N. C. 615 449 
 
 Durham v. Rigsbee, 141 N. C. 128 921, 1067 
 
 Durham, etc., R. R. Go. v. Richmond, etc., R. R. 'Co., 106 N. C. 16 1066 
 
 Durham, etc., R. R. Co. v. Trustees of Bullock 'Church, 104 N. C. 525 . . 1216 
 
 Durkee v. Jonesville, 28 Wis. 464 31, 82 
 
 Dusenbury v. Mutual Tel. Co., 11 Abb. N. C. 440 577, 638 
 
 Dwight V. City Council of Springfield, 4 Gray 107 1049, 1050, 1117 
 
 Dwight V. Hampden 'County Comjniasioners, 11 CuBh. 201 763, 118'6, 1217 
 
 Dwight V. Hayes, 150 111. 273 445, 1817 
 
 Dwight Printing Co. v. Boston, 122 Mass. 583 616 
 
 Dwyer v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 209 Mass. 419 826, 843, 835 
 
 Dyekman v. New York, 1 Seld 434 936, 1079, 1121 
 
 Dyer v. Baltimore, 140 Fed. 880 150 
 
 Dyer v. Tuskaloosa Bridge Co., 2 Port 296 2, 360, 1235 
 
 Dyer v. Wightman, 66 Pa. 427 338, 342, 711, 712, 713 
 
 Dyer County v. Chesapeake, etc., R. R. Co., 87 Tenn. 712 371, 746 
 
 E 
 
 Eaohus V. Illinois, etc., Canal, 17 111. 534 93 
 
 Bachus V. Los Angeles, 130 Gal. 492 867 
 
 Eachus V. Los Angeles, etc., Ry. Co., 103 Cal. 621 847, 851, 857, 867 
 
 872, 875, 895 
 
 Eagle V. Charing Cross R. R. Co. L. R., 2 C. P. 638 761, 864 
 
 Eakiu V. Raub, 12 Serg. & R. 345 32 
 
 Eames v. New England Worsted Co., 11 Met. 570 823, 824 
 
 Eames v. Savage, 77 Me. 212 1418 
 
 Earhart v. Cowles, 122 Iowa 194 1272 
 
 Earle v. Commonwealth, 180 Mass. 579 368, 967 
 
 Earlywine v. Topeka, etc., R., R. Co., 43 Kan. 746 609 
 
 East Alabama R. R. Co. v. Doe, 114 U. S. 340 1916, 1417 
 
Ixxxviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 East Brandywine, etc., E. R. Co. v. Ranch, 78 Pa. 454 1195, 1211 
 
 East Canada Creek Electric Light & Power Co., In re, 49 Misc. 565 204 
 
 East Chicago Co. v. East Chicago, 171 Ind. 654 326 
 
 East End St. Ey. Co. v. Doyle, 88 Tenn. 747 536, 539 
 
 Eastern Oregon Land Co. v. Willow River, etc.. Irrigation Co., 204 Fed. 
 
 516 1077 
 
 Eastern E. R. Co. v. Boston, etc., E. E., Ill Mass. 125 59, 66, 76, 370 
 
 914, 916, 973, 976, 983 
 
 Eastern Texas E. R. Co. v. Eddings, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 170 789 
 
 Eastern Texas E. E. Cto. v. Eddings, 51 Tex. Civ. A;pp. 166 812 
 
 Easthampton v. County iCommissioners, 154 Mass. 424 1007 
 
 East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 511 360, 402 
 
 East Line, etc., E. E. Co. v. State, 75 Tex. 434 1416 
 
 Eastman v. Amoskeag Mfg. Cto., 44 N. H 43 85, 1285 
 
 Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. H. 284 1308 
 
 Eastman v. Stowe, 37 Me. 86 1235 
 
 East One Hundred and. Forty-second Street, Ee, 83 App. Div. 430 348 
 
 East One Hundred and Sixty-first Street, In re, 52 Misc. 596 1001 
 
 East Pennsylvania E. E. Co., v. Hiester, 40 Pa. 53 1197 
 
 East Pennsylvania E. E. Co. v. Schollenberger, 54 Pa. 545 312 
 
 Bast Eome v. Lloyd, 124 Ga. 842 867 
 
 Bast Saginaw, etc., Co. v. East Saginaw, 13 Wall. 373 968, 969 
 
 East Saginaw Mfg. 'Oo. v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259 68 
 
 Eas.t St. Louis v. O'Flynn, 119 111. 206 323, 885 
 
 East St. Louis v. St. John, 47 111. 463 988 
 
 East St. Louis Connecting Ey. v. East St. Louis Union Ry., 108 111. 
 
 265 360 
 
 East St. Louis, etc., Ey. Co. v. Illinois State Trust Co., 248 III. 559.. 671 
 
 722, 725, 1144 
 
 East St. Louis St. Ey. Co. v. Louisville, etc., E. R. Co., 149 Fed. 159. . 385 
 
 East Shore Land Co. v. Peckham, 33 R. I. 541 022, 632, 635 
 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Burnett, 11 Lea 526 651 
 
 East Tennessee, etc., E. E. 'Co. v. Love, 3 Head 63 812 
 
 East Tennessee, etc., E. E. Co. v. Southern Telegraph Co., 112 U. S. 
 
 306 1041 
 
 East Tennessee, etc., E. E. Co. v. Telford, 69 Tenn. 293 603, 609, 958 
 
 East Tennessee, etc., E. E. Co. v. West, 89 Tenn. 293 600 
 
 East Tennessee Tel. Co. v. Knoxville St. Ry. 'Co., 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 400 380 
 
 East Tennessee Tel. Co. v. Eussellville, 106 Ky. 667 576 
 
 East Two Hundred and Twenty-second' Street, Ee, 122 X. Y. Supp. 320. 947 
 
 Eaton V. Boston, etc., E. E. Co., 51 N. H. 504 296, 312, 315 
 
 Eaton V. European, etc., E. R. Co., 59 Me. 520 252 
 
 Eaton V. Framingham, 6 Cush. 245 .- 958 
 
 Eaton V. Locke, 202 Mass. 324 835 
 
 Eaton V. Weiser, 12 Idaho 544 1309 
 
 Eatonton v. Griffith, 132 Ga. 793 63, 988, 990 
 
 Eau Claire v. Eau Claire Water Co., 137 Wis. 517 682, 683, 685 
 
 Eberhart v. Chicago, etc., R. R. 'Co., 70 111. 347 1216 
 
 Eble V. State, 77 Kan. 179 1410 
 
Table of Cases. Ixxxix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGB 
 
 Eckart v. Fort Wayne, etc., Traction Co., 181 Ind. 352 189, 196, 924, 98« 
 
 Ecorse v. Jackson, etc., E. R. 'Co., 153 Mich. 393 536 
 
 Edddngs v. Seabrook, 12 Rich L. 504 367, 699 
 
 Eddleman v. Union County Traction, etc., Co., 217 111. 409 196, 1086 
 
 Eddy .. Ohace, 140 Mass. 471 614, 1412 
 
 Eddy V. Granger, 19 R. I. 105 481 
 
 Edelmuth, In re, 202 N. Y. 602 655 
 
 Edgecombe v. Burlington, 46 Vt. 218 213 
 
 Edgecombe Road, In re, 194 N. Y. 545 651, 653 
 
 Edgerton v. Huff, 26 Ind. 35 612, 919 
 
 Edgewater Road, Re, 199 N. Y. 560 352 
 
 Edgewood R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 79 Pa. 257 117, 157, 194, 196, 253, 915 
 
 Edinburgh Street Tramways Co. v. Edinburgh (1894), A. C. 456 6'84 
 
 Edison Electric Light & Power Co. v. Blomqui&t, 185 Fed. 615 3'75 
 
 Edison, etc., Co. v. Merchants', etc., Co., 200 Pa. 209 382 
 
 Edmands v. Boston, 108 Mass. 535 70, 651, 654, 655, 696, 697, 708, 722 
 
 724, 1148, 1189, 1190 
 
 Edmison v. Lowry, 3 S. D. 77 470, 491 
 
 Edmondson v. Memphis, 108 Tenn. 857 391 
 
 Edmondson v. Moberly, 98 Mo. 526 446 
 
 Edmondson v. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., Ill Pa. 316 851, 1263 
 
 Edsall V. Jersey Shore, 220 Pa. 591 810 
 
 Edward v. Lawrenceburgh, etc., R. R. Co., 7 Ind. 711 988, 123S 
 
 Edwards v. AUouez Mining Co., 38 Mich. 46 312 
 
 Edwards v. Bruorton, 184 Mass. 529 282 
 
 Edwards v. Cheyenne, 19 Wyo. 110 117, 150, 151, 200, 201, 203, 660 
 
 667, 668, 693, 915, 917, 941, 982, 991, 1121, 1257, 1260 
 
 Edwards v. Lesneur, 32 Mo. 410 326 
 
 Edwards v. Pittsburg Junction R. R. Co., 215 Pa. 597 1400 
 
 Edwards v. Stonington Cemetery Assn., 20 Conn. 466 270 
 
 Edwards v. Thrash, 26 Okla. 472 643, 647 
 
 Edwards v. United States, 103 U. S. 471 270 
 
 Edwardsville v. Madison Coimty, 251 111. 265 2, 996, 1062 
 
 Eels V. American Tel. Co., 143 N. Y. 133. .474, 577, 579, 581, 1245, 1264, 1396 
 
 Egan V. San Francisco, 165 Cal. 576 134, 165 
 
 Egerer v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 130 N. Y. 108 .321, 596 
 
 Ehret v. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., 61 K. J. Eq. 171 476, 542, 545 
 
 Eichels v, Evansville St. Ry. Co., 78 Ind. 261 537 
 
 Eichenlaub v. St. Joseph, 113 Mo. 395. .'. 275 
 
 Eighth Avenue, In re, 77 Wash. 570 1112 
 
 Eighth School District v. Copeland, 2 Gray 414 618 
 
 Eikenberry v. Bazaar, 22 Kan. 656 1307 
 
 Eikenberry v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 166 N. W. 163 177 
 
 Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County Court, 134 U. S. 31 58 
 
 Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236 426, 463 
 
 Eklon V. Chelsea, 223 Mass. 213 960 
 
 Elbert, In re, 4 Boyce 388 UU 
 
 Elbert v. iScott, 90 Atl. 687 21, 1061, 1082, 1137 
 
 Elbert County v. Brown, 16 Ga. App. 834 630, 6/78 
 
xc Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Elberton v. Htfbbs, 121 Ga. 749 434 
 
 Elder v. Bemis, 2 Met. 599 591 
 
 Eldert v. Long Island El. R. R. Co., 28 Aipp. Div. 451 532 
 
 El Doirado v. Scruggs, 113 Ark. 239 • 443, 665 
 
 Eldorado, etc., K. E. Co. v. Everett, 226 111. 529 767, 796 
 
 Eldorado, etc., E. E. Co. v. Sims, 228 111. 9 608, 609 
 
 Eldredge v. Norfolk 'County Commissioners, 185 Mass. 186 998, 1002. 
 
 1004, 1007 
 
 Eldridge v. Bingbamton, 120 N. Y. 309 919, 1421 
 
 Eldridge v. Smith, 34 Vt. 484 190, 994 
 
 Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U. S. 452 247, 624 
 
 Electric Co. v. Dow, 166 U. S. 489 966 
 
 Electric Cijnstruction Co. v. Heffeman, 34 N. Y. St. Eep. 436 583 
 
 Eleventh Ave., In re, 81 N. Y. 436. 347, 349 
 
 Elfelt V. Stillwater St. Ey. Co., 53 Minn. 68 542 
 
 Elgin V. Eaton, 83 111. 535 769, 790, 797, 887, 875, 895 
 
 Elgin, etc., R. E. 'Co. v. Fletcher, 128 111. 619 691 
 
 Elizabethtown, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ashland, etc., St. Ry. Co., 96 Ky. 347. 385 
 
 Elizabethtown, etc., E. E. Co. v. Catlettsburg Water Co., 110 Ky. 175. 1073 
 
 Elizabetfhtown, etc., E. R. Co. v. Combs, 10 Bush 382 493, 524, 592 
 
 596, 1282 
 
 Elizabethtown, etc., E. E. Co. v. Helm, 8 Bush 681 799 
 
 Elizabethtown, etc., E. E. Co. v. Thompson, 79 Ky. 52 1114 
 
 Elizabethtown, etc., E. E. Co. v. Thompson, 1 Ky. L. Rep. 395 349 
 
 Elizabethtown, etc., R. E. 'Co. v. WaltoH, -9 Ky. L. Eep. 243 524 
 
 Elkhart v. Simonton, 71 Ind. 7 1100 
 
 Elkins v. Offhaus, 74 W. Va. 339 1410 
 
 Elkins Electric Ey. Co. v. Western Maryland E. E. Co., 108 C. C. A. 
 
 557 370, 753 
 
 Ellinghouse v Taylor, 19 Mont. 462 250, 251, 252 
 
 Elliott V. Atlantic City, 149 Fed. 849 440 
 
 Elliott V. Fairhaven, etc., Ey. Co., 32 Conn. 579 537 
 
 Elliott V. Fitchburg E. E. 'Co., 10 Cush. 191 439 
 
 Elliott V. Oil 'City, 129 Pa. 570 1359 
 
 Elliott V. Philaa-elphia, 75 Pa. 342 1308 
 
 Elliott V. Wallowa County, 57 Ore. 236 947 
 
 Ellis V. Iowa City, 29 Iowa 229 1317, 1363 
 
 Ellis V. Eock Island, etc., R. E. Co., 125 111. 82 706 
 
 Ellis V. Welch, 6 Mass. 246 338, 700, 711, 712 
 
 EUs'worth V. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 91 Iowa 386 739, 1150 
 
 Ellsworth V. Chickasaw County, 40 Iowa 571 322, 344, 1300 
 
 Ellsworth, etc., Ey. Co. v. Gates 41 Kan. 574 344 
 
 Elmhirst v. Spencer, 2 Macn. & G. 45 449 
 
 El Paso v. Hoagland, 224 111. 263 1409 
 
 Elser v. Gross Point, 228 111. 230 1317, 1359 
 
 Elster V. Springfield, 49 Ohio St. 82 176, 380 
 
 Elwood V. Bullock, 13 L. J. N. S. 330 587 
 
 Ely Ave., In re, 217 N. Y. 45 176 
 
 Elyiton Land Co. v. South, etc., E. E. Co., 95 Ala. 631 605 
 
Table of Cases. xci 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Embury ▼. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511 178, 236 
 
 Embury v. Curtis, 3 .Oomst. 511 116, 120 
 
 Emerson v. Babcock, 66 Iowa 25.7 478 
 
 Emerson v. Eldorado Ditch Co., 18 Mont. 247 984 
 
 Emerson v. Heading, 14 Vt. 279 1061 
 
 Emerson v. Somerville, 166 Ma^s. 115 340 
 
 Emery v. Boston Terminal Co., 178 Mass. 172 71, 340, 697, 1134, 1157 
 
 Emery v. Lowell, 104 Mass. 13. 136S, 1373, 1376 
 
 Emery v. Raleigh, etc., R. E. iCo., 102 N. C. 209 1350, 13fl3 
 
 Emmes v. Feeley, 132 Mass. 3i46 7.12 
 
 Emmons v. Minneapolis, etc., R.,R. Co., 41 Minn. 133 1217 
 
 Empire City Bknk, Matter of, 18 N. Y. 199 931 
 
 Emporia v. Soden, 2!'5 Kan. 5'8'8 434, 440 
 
 Enders v. Friday, 78 Nebr. 510 885 
 
 Endicott, Petitioner, 24 Pick. 339 1049, 1117, 1275 
 
 Enever v. The King, 3 Commonwealth Law Reports 969 1298 
 
 Enfield Manufacturing Co. v. Ward, 190 Mass. 314 14ai 
 
 Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford, etc., R. R. Co., 17 Conn. 40 65, 68 
 
 185, 359, 363, 364, 972, 989, 1255, 1258 
 
 Engelklng v. Spokane, 59 Wash. 446 1310 
 
 English V. Danville, 170 111. 131 517, 1337 
 
 Engstrom v. Edendale Land Co., 77 Wash. 65l8i 1264, 1268 
 
 Ennis v. Wood River Branch R. R. Co., 12 R. I. 73 1137 
 
 Enoch V. Spokane, etc., R. R. Co., 6 Wash. 393 814 
 
 Enos V. Hamilton, 27 Wis. 256 887 
 
 Ensign v. Citizens' Interurban Ry. Co., 92 Nebr. 363 1265 
 
 Ensminger v. People, 47 111. 384 416 
 
 Enterprise Lumber Co. v. Porter, 165 Ala. 579 1214 
 
 Epler V. Niman, 5 Ind. 459 946 
 
 Epling V. Dickson, 170 111. 329 951, 1286 
 
 Eppley V. Bryson City, 157 N. C. 487 991 
 
 Equitable Loan Co. v. Edwardsville, 143 Ala. 182 ai6, 1416, 1417 
 
 Erie v. Caulkins, 85 Pa. 247 1252, 1253 
 
 Erie v. Fuesa, 98 Pa. 600 1252 
 
 Erie County v. Buffalo, 63 Hun 565 1228, 1230, 12f5 
 
 Erie R. R. Co. v. Paterson, 79 N. J. L. 612 907, 925 
 
 Erie R. R. Co. v. Steward, 170 N. Y. 172 : 987 
 
 Erie R. R. Co. v. Steward 59 App. Div. 187 1094 
 
 ■ Erlanger v. Cody, 158 Ky. 625 870 
 
 Erie Tel. Co. v. Kennedy, 80 Tex. 71 577 
 
 Esberg-Gunst Cigar Co. v. Portland, 34 Ore. 282 1310, 1382 
 
 Eseanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678 101 
 
 Esch V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 72 Wis. 229 660, 661, 667, 699 
 
 Eslioh V. Mason City, etc., R. R. Co., 75 Iowa 443 ; 594 
 
 Essex V. New England Tel. Co., 239 U. S. 313 HI 
 
 Essex Park Commission, In re, 80 N. J. Eq. 1 643 
 
 Essex Public Road Board v. Skinkle, 140 U. S. 334 3M 
 
 Estabrooks v. Peterborough, etc., R. R. Co., 12 Cush. 224 828, 1250, 139i3 
 
 Ettor V. Tacoma, 228 U. S. 148 507, 904 
 
xcii Table of C-ases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Ettor V. Tacoma, 57 Wash. 50 STJ 
 
 Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137 280 
 
 Eufaula v. Simmons, 86 Ala. 515 1359 
 
 Eunice v. Louisiana Western R. R. Co., 135 La. 882 .'749, 998 
 
 Eureka Basin, etc., Co., Matter of, 96 N. Y. 42 116, 130, 169, 20Q, 221 
 
 Eustis V. Milton St. Ry. Co., 183 Mass. 586 541, 546, 552 
 
 Eutaw V. Botnick, 150 Ala. 429 789, 792 
 
 Evans, In re, 42 L. J. Ch. 357 243, 1134 
 
 Evans v. Boston, 190 Mass. 525 614, 1061 
 
 Evans v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 86 Wis.. 587 528 
 
 Evans v. Crisfield-, 122 Md. 184 87, 1235, 1240 
 
 Evans v. Erie County, 66 Pa. 222 1400 
 
 Evans v. Hoefner, 2» Mo. 141 609-, 1120 
 
 Evans v. Kankakee, 231 111. 223 13Q7 
 
 Evans v. Savannah, etc., R. R. Co., 90 Ala. 54 1154 
 
 Evansville v. Becker, 84 Ind. 325 1317, 13S3, 1334, 1355, 1358, 1371, 1372 
 
 Evansville v. State, 188 Ind. 426 392, 400 
 
 Evansville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Charlton, 6 Ind. App. 56 743, 1274 
 
 Evansville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Dick, 9 Ind. 433 621 
 
 Evansville, etc., R. R. iCo. v. Fitzpatrick, 10 Ind. 120 798, ail4 
 
 Evansville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Grady, 6 Bush 14i 1275 
 
 Evansville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Miller, 3Q Ind. 209 940, 946 
 
 Evansville, etc., R. R. Co. v. iStririger, 10 Ind. 551 1114 
 
 Evansville, etc.,'R. R. Co. v. Terre Haute, 161 Irtd. 26 903, 1093 
 
 Evansville, etc., Traction Co. v. Henderson Bridge Co., 72 C. C. A. 539 995 
 Evansville, etc.. Traction Co. v. Henderson Bridge Co., 1-34 Fed. 97a. . 92, 381 
 
 Evansville Terminal R. R. Co-, v. Herdink, 174 Ind. 537 691 
 
 Evanston v. dark, 77 111. App. 234 1228 
 
 Everett v. Fall River, 189 Mass. 513 1061, 1407 
 
 Everett v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 59 Iowa 243 659, 661, 666, 1206, 1297 
 
 Evergreen Cemetery Assn. v. Beecher, 53 Conn. 551 1066 
 
 Evergreen Cemetery ,Association v. New Haven, 43 Conn. 234. .213, 972, 996 
 
 1002, 1006 
 
 Ewell V. Greenwood, 26 Iowa 877 886 
 
 Ewen V. Philadelphia, 194 Pa. 548 1326 
 
 Ewing V. Alabama, etc., R. R. Co., 68 Miss. 551 986, 993 
 
 Ewing V. Louisville, 140 Ky. 726 .788, 800, 856, 867, 876 
 
 Excelsior JMeedle Co. v. Springfield, 221 Mass. 34" 1054 
 
 Exchange Bank Tax Cases, 21 Fed. 99 904 
 
 Eyre v. Faribault, 121 Minn. 233 1132, 1159 
 
 F 
 
 Fagan v. Chicago, 84 111. 227 619 
 
 Fair V. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 309 1328 
 
 Fairbanks v. Commonwealth, 183 Mass. 373 942 
 
 Fairbajnks v. Fitchburg, 110 Mass. 224 662 
 
 Fairbanks v. Mayor and Aldermen of Fitchburg, 132 Mass. 42 1118, 1119 
 
 Fairchild v. St. Louis, 97 Mo. 85 872, 885 
 
Table of Oases. xciu 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In: Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Fairchdld v. St. Paul, 46 Minn. 540 914, 919, 1069 
 
 Faires v. San Antonio, etc., R. E. Co., 80 Tex. 43 , 1272 
 
 Fairfield v. Salem, 213 Mass. 296 *43 
 
 Fairlawn Coal Go. v. Scraiiton, 148 Pa. 231 132a 
 
 Fales V. Easthampton, 162 Mass. 422 666 
 
 Fall V. Sutter County, 21 Cal. 237 .' 360 
 
 Fallhrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S.. 112 85, 12ilS, 127, 137 
 
 251, 252 
 Fall River Irou Works v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 5 Allen 221. . . .834, 920, 1011 
 
 Fall River Print Works v. Fall River, 110 Mass. 428 1200 
 
 Fall River R. R. Co. v. Chase, 125 Mass. 483 1058, 1061 
 
 Fa;llsbiirg Power & Manufaxituring Co. v. Alexander, 101 Va. 98 4, 117 
 
 130, 144, 156, 169, 204, 207 
 
 Falls Mfg. Co. V. Oconto River Improvement Co., 87 Wis. 134. 421 
 
 Falmouth v. Falmouth Water Co., 180 Mass. 32S 684 
 
 Fanning v. Gilliland, 37 Ore. 368 175^ 235 
 
 Farist Steel Co. v. Bridgeport, 60 Conn. 278 115, 155, 167, 198, 280, 457 
 
 1069 
 
 Farmer v. Cedar Rapids, 116 Iowa 322 507 
 
 Farmer v. Pauley, 50 Ind. "583 1068 
 
 Farmers' Irrigation Co. v. 'Cooper, 54 Colo. 402 659, 692, 693, 726,. 734 
 
 1169, 1173 
 
 Farmers' Market Co. v. Philadelphia, etc., E. R. Co., 142 Pa. 580 169 
 
 Farmville v. Walker, 101 Va. 323 218 
 
 Farnandis v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 41 Wash. 486. 711, 851, 855, 861 
 
 Faineman v. Mt. Pleasant Cemetery Ashi., 135 Ind. 344 213, 920, 1066 
 
 Famey v. Fremont, etc., R. R. Co., 23 Nebr. 465 3 
 
 Faruham v; Delaware, etc., €%nal Co., 61 Pa. 265 1087, 1235 
 
 Farnsworth v. Boston, 126 Mass. 1 3S5 
 
 Farnsworth v. Lime Rbck R. R. 06., 83 Me. 440 1028 
 
 Farnum's Petition, 51 N. H. 376 970 
 
 Farquar v. Roseburg, 18 Ore. 271 1310 
 
 Fairar v. Midland El. Ry. Co., 101 Mo. App. 140 555, 892, 893 
 
 Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147 1306 
 
 Parrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. «. 679 75 
 
 Farwell v. Boston, 180 Mass. 433 620 
 
 Farwell v. Cambridge, 11 Go-ay 413 769, 801, 802 
 
 Farwell v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 52 Nebr. 614 1168! 
 
 Pauoheux v. St. Martinville, 124 La. 959 1313 
 
 Faulk V. Missouri, etc., Ry. Co., 28 S. D. 1 960, 1151, 1276, 1386 
 
 Faulkner v. Ottawa, 4r Can. Sup. Ct. 190' 1332 
 
 Faust V. Hosford, 119 Iowa 97 1194 
 
 Faust V. Huntsville, 83 Ala. 279 644, 792 
 
 Fay V. Salem Aqueduct Co., Ill Mass. 27 433, 838 
 
 Fayetteville v. Stone, 104 Ark. 136 871 
 
 Fayettevilfe, etc., R. R. Co. v. Coombs, 51 Ark. 324 737, I216i 
 
 Fayetteville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hunt, 51 Ark. 330 740, 1081 
 
 Fayetteville St. Ry. Co. v. Aberdfeen, etc., R. R. Co., 142 N. C. 423. . 1008, 1009 
 Fearing v. Irwin, 55 N. Y. 486 326, 1405 
 
xciv Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 111 Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Pelir. V. Schuylkill Nav. Co., 69 Pa. 161 1236 
 
 Feiber v. Coyle, 3 Watts 407 613 
 
 Feiten v. Milwaukee, 47 Wis. 494 1106, 1107 
 
 Felcli V. Gilmau, 22 Vt. 38 487 
 
 Fellowes v. New Haven, 44 Conn. 240 507, 515 
 
 Fenner v. Sheldon, 11 Met. 521 834 
 
 Ferdinand Ry. Co. v. Bretz, 47 Ind. App. 642 731 
 
 , Feree v. Meily, 3 Yeats 153 19 
 
 Ferguson v. Covington, etc., Bridge Co., 10« Ky. 662 960, 1396 
 
 Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97 N. Y. 507 1179 
 
 Ferguson v. Snohomish, 8 Wash. 668 287 
 
 Fernald v. Boston, 12 Cush. 574 833, 869 
 
 Fernald v. Lewis, 6 Me. 264 1418 
 
 Fernald v. Palmer, 83 Me. 244 1229 
 
 Fernow v. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 75 Iowa 526 1419 
 
 Ferrenbach v. Turner, 86 Mo. 416 485 
 
 Ferris v. Bramble, 5 Ohio St. 109 173, 235, 643 
 
 Ferry-Leary Land Co. v. Holt, 53 Wash. 584 1257, 1260 
 
 Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659 53, 75, 276, 361 974 
 
 Fewell v. Meridian, 90 Miss. 380 1331 
 
 Field, In re, 151 App. i>iv. 931 931 
 
 Field V. Des Moines, 39 Iowa 575 264, 1342 
 
 Field V. West Orange, 36 N. J. L. 118 1365 
 
 Fifer v. Allen, 228 111. 507 342 
 
 Fifer v. Bitter, 159 Ind. 8 797 
 
 Fifield V. Close, 15 Mich. 505 112 
 
 Fifield v. Phoenix, 4 Ariz. 283 1316 
 
 Fifty Associates v. Boston, 201 Mass. 585 568, 595, 735, 770, 802, 841, 843 
 
 Finch V. Chicago, etc., R. E. Co., 46 Minn. 250 1185 
 
 Finch V. Riverside, etc., E. R. Co., 87 CaL 597 541 
 
 Fineux v. Hovenden, Cro. Eliz. 664 882 
 
 Fink v. Cleveland, etc., Ey. Co., 181 Ind. 539 863 
 
 Fink V. Newark, 40 N. J. L. 11 634, 651, 654 
 
 Fink V. Republican Valley E. E. Co., 27 Nebr. 660 1112 
 
 Finlay v. Boston, 196 Mass. 257 1130 
 
 Finn v. Providence Gas and Water Co., 99 Pa. 631 616, 694 
 
 Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624 1306 
 
 First Baptist Society v. Fall Eiver, 119 Mass. 95 651 
 
 First Church in Boston v. Boston, 14 Gray 214 1060 
 
 First National Bank v. Tyson, 133 Ala. 459 492, 893 
 
 First National Bank v. West Eiver R. R. Co., 49 Vt. 167 1097 
 
 First Parish in Gloucester v. Beach, 2 Pick. 60 1409 
 
 First Parish in Medford v. Pratt, 4 Pick. 222 1409 
 
 First Parish in Sudbury v. Jones, 8 Cush. 184 702 
 
 First Parish in Wobum v. Middlesex County, 7 Gray 106 678, 709 
 
 First Street, Matter of, 66 Mich. 42 77, 748, 749 
 
 Fischer v. Catawissa, etc., E. E. Co., 175 Pa. 554 1100, 1236 
 
 Fishback v. Woodruff, 51 Ind. 102 326 
 
 Fiahblatt v. Atlantic City, 174 Fed. 196 1041, 1043 
 
Table of Cases. xcv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 Id Volume II.] PAori 
 
 Fishblatt v. Atlantic City, 81 N. J. L. 64 991 
 
 Fisher V. Baden Gas Co., 138 Pa. 301 810 
 
 Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87 1307 
 
 Fisher v. Horicon Iron & Mfg. Co., 10 Wis. 351 134, 228 
 
 Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray 1 284 
 
 Fisher v. New Bern, 140 N. C. 506 1310 
 
 Fisher v. New York, 67 N. Y. 73 1228, 1230 
 
 Fisher v. Rochester, 6 Lans. 226 482 
 
 Fisher v. Thirkell, 21 Mich. 1 479 
 
 Fisher v. Warwick R. R. Co., 12 R. I. 287 1228 
 
 Fisher v. West Virginia, etc., R. R. Co., 30 W. Va. 366 1416 
 
 Fisk v. Springfield, 116 Mass. 88 1061 
 
 Fiske V. Chesterfield, 14 N. H. 240 651, 654 
 
 Fiske V. Framingham Mfg. Co., 12 Pick. 68 230 
 
 Fiske Wharf, etc., 'Co. v. Boston, 178 Mass. 526 839, 1314, 1318 
 
 Fiteh, Matter of, 147 N. Y. 334 1117 
 
 Fitch V. Seymour Water Co., 139 Ind. 214 1316 
 
 Fitchburg, etc., Co. v. McCloskey, 110 Pa. 43© 1223 
 
 Fitchburg R. R. Co. v. Boston & Maine R. R-, 3 Cush. 58 418 
 
 Fitchburg R. R. Co. v. Eastern R. R. Co., 6 Ailen 9S. .1062, 1111, 1112, 1113 
 
 1145 
 
 Fitchburg R. R. Co. v. Fitchburg, 121 Mass. 132 927 
 
 Fitzer v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 106 Minn. 221 889 
 
 Fitzhugh V. Chesapeake, etc., Ry. Co., 107 Va. 158 367, 697, 699 
 
 Fitzpatrick v. Montgomery, 20 Mont. 181 312 
 
 Fitzpatrick v. Warden, 157 Ky. 95 .' . . . 236 
 
 Five Tracts of Land v. United States, 41 C. C. A. 580 65, 66'9 
 
 Five Tracts of Land v. United States, 101 Fed. 661 1200 
 
 Flagg V. Bradford, 181 Mass. 315 1267 
 
 Flagg V. Concord, 222 Mass. 569 320, 616 
 
 Flagg V. Flagg, 16 Gray 175 235, 1414 . 
 
 Flagg V. Worcester, 8 Cush. 69 947 
 
 Flagg V. Worcester, 13 Gray 601 829, 1361 
 
 Flanders v. Franklin, 70 N. H. 168 1364 
 
 Fleishel v. Hightower, 62 Ga. 324 1417 
 
 Fleming v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 34 Iowa 353 737, 740, 743 
 
 Fleming V. Hull, 73 Iowa 598 ; 227, 244 
 
 Fleming v. Newport R. R. Co., 8 App. Cas. 2l65 819 
 
 Fleming v. Wilmington, etc., R. R. Co., 115 N. C. 676 1121 
 
 Flemister v. Central Georgia Power Co., 140 Ga. 511 722, 1196 
 
 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 36, 39, 88 
 
 Fletcher v. Phelps, 28 Vt. 257 409, 410 
 
 Fletcher v. Seattle, 43 Wash. 627 871 
 
 Flickinger v. Omaha Bridge Co., 98 Iowa 358 1154 
 
 Flinn v. Prairie County, 60 Ark. 204 368, 271 
 
 Flint, etc., R. R. Co. v. Detroit, etc., R. R. Co. 64 Mich. 350 .601, 753 
 
 755, 1066 
 
 Flint, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rich, 9il Mioh. 293 1419 
 
 Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Roberts, 2 Fla. 102 940 
 
xcvi Table of Cases, 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Mora V. Naney, 136 lU. 45 1417 
 
 Florence, etc., E. R. Co. v. Shepherd, 50 Kan. 438 799 
 
 Florham Park v. Madison, 78 N. J. L. 446 1009 
 
 Florida v. Galveston County, 59 S. W. 540 1301 
 
 Florida Central E. E. Co. v. Bear, 43 Ma. 319 ' 988, 1082, 1114 
 
 Florida Central E. E. Co. v. Bell, 43 Fla. 359 985 
 
 Florida, etc., E. E. Co. v. Ocala, etc., E. E. Co., 39 Fla. 30& 1405 
 
 Florida Southern E. E. Co. v. Brown, 23 Ma. 104 525, 531, 859 
 
 Florida Southern E. E. Co. V. Hill, 40 Fla. 1 1265, 1282 
 
 Flower v. Baltimore, etc., E. E. Co., 132 Pa. 524 1144 
 
 Floyd V. Eom« St. Ey. Co., 77 Ga. 614 396i 396, 537 
 
 Flynn v. Flynn, 171 Mass. 312 346 
 
 Flynn v. New York, etc., Ey. Co., 139 App. Div. 199 1281 
 
 Flynn v. Taylor, 127 N. Y. 596 478, 889 
 
 Fobes V. Eome, etc., E. E. Co., 121 N. Y. 505 504, 527, 52.9, 561 
 
 Fogg V. Nevada-Calif omia-Oregon E. E. Co., 20 Key. 429 1400 
 
 Fohl V. Sleepy Eye Lake, 80 Minn. 67 63, 914, 996, 999 
 
 Foley V. Doddridge County Court, 54 W. Va. 16 1409 
 
 Follman v. Mankato, 45 Minn. 457 1366 
 
 Folmar v. Folmar, 68 Ala. 120 946 
 
 Folmar v. Folmar, 71 Ala. 136 952, 1071 
 
 Folmshee v. Amsterdam, 142 N. Y. 118 870, 1244 
 
 Folts v. Huntley, 7 Wend. 210 711, 712 
 
 Foltz V. St. Louis, etc., E. R. Co., 60 Fed. 316 1120 
 
 Fonda v. Canal Appraisers, 1 Wend. 288 1049 
 
 Foot V. Edwards, 3 Blatchf. 310 91 
 
 Foot V. Stiles, 57 N. Y. 390 948 
 
 Foote V. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St. 408 338, 712, 713, 1235 
 
 Foote V. Metropolitan El. Ey. Co., 147 N. Y. 367 503 
 
 Forbell v. New York, 164 N. Y. 522 1381 
 
 Forbes v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 289 709, 1135 
 
 Forbes v. Orange, 85 Conn. 255i 763, 789, 794, 867, 872, 876 
 
 Forbes Street, Ee, 70 Pa. 125 i282 
 
 Forbia v. Cannon, 35 Mont. 344 1074 
 
 Ford V. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co., 14 Wis. 609 470, 527, 915, 917, 918, 1257 
 
 1277, 1395 
 
 Ford V. Metropolitan E. R. Co., 17 Q. B. D. 12 821 
 
 Ford V. Park Commissioners, 148 Iowa 1 1106, 1107 
 
 Ford V. Santa Cruz R. E. Co., 59 Cal. 290 595 
 
 Forde, Ex parte, 1 Ir. Eep. 156 1134 
 
 Fordyce v. Woman's Christian National Library Association, 79 Ark. 
 
 550 1306 
 
 Fork Eidge Baptist Cemetery Assn. v. Eedd, 33 W. Va. 262 213, 1066 
 
 1083 
 
 Forster v. Scott, 136 N. Y. 577 282 
 
 Forsythe v. Wilcox, 143 Ind. 144 797 
 
 Forsythe Boulevard, Matter of, 127 Mo. 417 1150 
 
 Forsythe v. Ellis, 4 J. J. Marsh. 298 621 
 
 Fort Collins, etc., Ey. Co. v. France, 41 Colo. 512 1186, 1216, 1217 
 
Table of Cases. xcvii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 515 98, 99, 110 
 
 Fort Scott, etc., R. R. Co. v. Fox, 42 ICan. 490 53t, 59S, 878, 1286 
 
 Fort Smith, etc.. Bridge District v. Scott, 103 Ark. 406 665, 668 
 
 Fort Smith School District v. Board of Improvement, 65 Ark. 343 1416 
 
 Fort St. Union Depot Co. v. Backus, 103 Mich. 556 2, 953 
 
 Fort St. Union Depot Co. v. Joniee, 83 Mich. 415 1144 
 
 Fort St. Union ]>epot Co. v. Morton, 83 Mich. 265 189 
 
 Fort Wayne v. Uoombs, 107 Ind. 75 1185, 1375 
 
 Fort Wayne v. Hamilton, 132 Ind. 487 1235, 1240, 1244, 1282, 1317, 1348 
 
 Fort Wayne v. Lake Shore, etc., ii. R. Co., 132 Ind. 558 996, 999, 1001 
 
 1415, 1421 
 Fort Wayne, etc.. Traction Co. v. Fort Wayne, etc., Ry. Co., 170 Ind. 49 
 
 U47, 1152, 1154 
 Fort Wayne Land & Improvement Co. v. Maumiee Aivenue Gravel Road 
 
 Co., 132 Ind. 80 280 
 
 Fort Worth v. Charbonneau, 166 S. W. 387 671, 1175, 1203 
 
 Fort Worth v. Crawford, 64 Tex. 202 1308 
 
 Fort Worth v. Crawford 74 Tex. 404 1314 
 
 Fort Worth v. Howard, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 537 872 
 
 Fort Worth v. Morgan, 168 S. W. 976 660 
 
 Fort Worth, etc., R. R. Co. v. Downie, 82 Tex. 383 864, 890 
 
 Fort Worth, etc., R. R. Co. v. Jennings, 76 Tex. 373 604 
 
 Fort Worth, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kelt, 4 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. 9150 120O 
 
 Fort Worth, etc., E. R. Co. v. Southwestern, etc., Tel. Co., 96 Tex. 160. . 1004 
 
 Fort Worth, etc., R. R. Co. v. Sweatt, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 543 1414 
 
 Fort Worth Ice Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 11 Tex. Civ. App. 600 92 
 
 Fort Worth Improvement District v. Fort Worth, 158 S. W. 164 419, 648 
 
 894, 997, 1003 
 
 Fort Worth Improvement District v. Weatherred, 149 S. W. 550 812 
 
 Fort Worth St. Ry. Co. v. Queen City R. R. Co., 71 Tex. 165 973 
 
 FoBgate V. Hudson, 178 Mass. 225 435, 616, 666 
 
 Foster v. Boston, 22 Pick. 33 1272 
 
 Foster v. Fowler, 60 Pa. 27 1417 
 
 Foster v. Manchester, 89 Va. 92. 1121 
 
 Foster v. Park Commissioners, 133 Mass. 321 331, 333 
 
 Foster v. St. Louis, 71 Mo. 157 1338 
 
 Foster v. Stafford National Bank, 57 Vt. 128 622, 638, 908 
 
 Foster Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, etc., R. R. Co., 20 Okla. 583 596, 878 
 
 Fountain Creek Drainage District v. Smith, 265 111. 138 614, 920 
 
 Fourth National Bank v. Commonwealth, 212 Mass. 66 1196, 1199, 1203 
 
 Foust V. Dreutlein, 237 Pa. 108 613 
 
 Fowle V. New Haven, etc., R. R. Co., 107 Mass. 352 1277, 1280 
 
 Fowle V. New Haven, etc., E. R. Co., 112 Mass 334 1250 
 
 Fowler, Re, 53 N. Y. 60 916 
 
 Fowler v. Des Moines, etc., R. R. Co., 91 Iowa 533 594, 960 
 
 Fowler v. Middlesex County Commissioners, 6 Allen 92 1178, 1193 
 
 Fowler T. Norfolk, etc., Ry. Co., 68 W. Va. 274 815, 879, 890 
 
 Fox V. Baltimore, etc., K. R. Co., 34 W.'Va. 466 339, 363, 1194, 1397 
 
 Fox V. Catherine, etc., Ry. Co., 12 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 180 542 
 
 vii 
 
xoviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Tox V. Cincinnati, 104 U. S. 783 150, 326 
 
 Fox V. Hart, 11 Ohio 414 1407 
 
 Fox V. Holcomb, 34 Mich. 298 ■- 1066 
 
 Fox V. McDonald, 101 Ala. 51 391, 399 
 
 Fox V. South Norwalk, 85 Conn. 237 867, 876 
 
 Fox V. Western Pacific R. R. Co., 31 Cal. 538 63a 
 
 Framiugham Water Co. v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 176 Mass. 404 911, 919 
 
 Frank v. Evansville, etc., R. R. Co., Ill Ind. 132 1421 
 
 Frankel v. Jackson, 30 Fed. 398 890 
 
 Frankford, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 54 Pa. 345 993 
 
 Frankfort v. Edelen, 26 Ky. L. 601 867 
 
 Frankle v. Jackson, 30 Fed. 398 527, 594, 960 
 
 Franklin v. Durgee, 71 N. H. 186 398 
 
 Franklin v. Fisk, 13 Allen 211 467, 1361 
 
 Franklin Wharf Co. v. Portland, 67 Me. 46 442, 448 
 
 Franklin Wharf Co. v. Portland, 74 Me. 268 1318 
 
 Fraser v. Jennison, 42 Mich. 206 1187 
 
 Fraser v. Mulaney, 129 Wis. 377 308, 1376 
 
 Frater v. Hamilton County, 90 Tenn. 661 320, 515, 622, 730', 1283 
 
 Frazer v. Chicago, 186 HI. 480 847, 857 
 
 Frazier v. East Tennessee Tel. Co., 115 Tenn. 416 471, 578 
 
 Freburg v. Davenport, 63 Iowa 119 1353, 1357 
 
 Frederick v. Shane, 82 Iowa 254 798 
 
 Fredericks v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 109 Pa. 50 327 
 
 Fredericks v. Pennsylvania Oanal Co., 148 Pa. 317 894 
 
 Freedle v. North Carolina R. R. Co., 49 N. C. 89 766, 808 
 
 Freedom v. Weed, 40 Me. 383 398 
 
 Freelaud v. Forest Park Reservation Commission, 82 N. J. Bq. 349 310 
 
 Freeland v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 197 Pa. 529 419, 430 
 
 Freeman v. Boston, 187 Mass. 403 956 
 
 Freeman v. Centralia, 67 Wash. 142 886 
 
 Freetown v. Bristol County, 9 Pick. 46 932, 1050, 1069, 1119 
 
 Freiday v. Sioux City, etc.. Transit Co., 92 Iowa 191 564 
 
 Fremont, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bates, 40 Neb. 381 730, 733, 1149 
 
 Fremont, etc., R. R. Co. v. Harlin, 50 Nebr. 698 1272 
 
 Fremont, etc., R. R. Co. v. Lamb, 11 Nebr. 592 1216 
 
 Fremont, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mattheis, 36 Nebr. 48 1069, 1120, 1235 
 
 Fremont, etc., R. R. Co. v. Meeker, 28 Nebr. 94 805 
 
 Fremont, etc., R. R. Co. v. Setright, 34 Nebr. 253 1156 
 
 Fremont, etc., R. R. Go. v. Whaleh, 11 Neb. 585 660, 805 
 
 French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324 269, 333, 784, 785 
 
 French v. Boston, 129 Mass. 592 1307, 1329 
 
 ■French v. Braintree Mfg. Co., 23 Pick. 216 230, 614, 1411, 1412, 1419 
 
 French v. East Orange, 49 N. J. L. 401 1053 
 
 French v. Jones, 191 Mass. 522 377, 383 
 
 French v. Lord, 69 Me. 537 346 
 
 French v. Lowell, 1T7 Mass. 363 768, 786, 801, 802 
 
 French v. Milwaukee, 49 Wis. 5'84 877 
 
 French y. Quincy, 3 Allen 9 151 
 
Table of Cases. ^cix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAOK 
 
 French v. Eobb, 67 N. J. L. 260 582, 1395 
 
 Preimd v. Biel, 193 N. Y. 662 1155 
 
 Frevert v. Finfrock, 31 Ohio St. 621 1121 
 
 Frey v. Duluth, etc., R. R. Co., 91 Wis. 309 1236 
 
 Frick C!oke Co. v. Painter, 198 Pa. 468 918 
 
 Friday v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 204 Pa. 405 1181, 1185, 1186 
 
 Friedman v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 52 Misc. 20 1161 
 
 Freidman v. Snare & Triest Co., 71 N. J. L. 605 470, 477 
 
 Friend, Re, 53 Me. 387 946 
 
 Fries v. Wew York, etc., E. R. Co., 169 N. Y. 270 559, 1158 
 
 Fries v. Southern Pennsylvania R. R., etc., Co., 85 Pa. 73 1236 
 
 Fries v. Wheeling, etc., E. R. Co., 66 Ohio St. 135 1269 
 
 Friscoville Eealty Go. v. St. Bernard, 127 La. 318 541 
 
 Fritz V. Hoibson, 14 Ch. D. 542 833 
 
 Front, etc., St. Ey. Co., In re, 1 Penn. 370 1065, 1066 
 
 Frost V. Washington County Ey Co., 96 Me. 76 429 
 
 Frostburg v. Hitdhins, 70 Md. 56 1364 
 
 Fruth V. Charleston Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456 280 
 
 Fry V. Albemarle County, 86 Va. 195 130O 
 
 Fuchs V. St. Louis, 167 Mo. 620 1375 
 
 FuUer v. Chicopee Mfg. Co., 16 Gray 46 824 
 
 Fuller V. Edings, 11 Eich. Law 239 367, 699, 1234 
 
 Fuller V. Grand Eapids, 105 Mich. 529 1253 
 
 Fuller V. Plymouth County Commissioners, 15 Pick. 81 91, 1061, 1271 
 
 Fulton V. Cummings, 132 Ind. 453 948 
 
 Fulton V. Dover, 8 Houst. 78 949 
 
 Fulton V. Methow Trading Co., 45 Wash. 136 91 
 
 Fulton V. Short Eoute Transfer Co., 85 Ky. 64Q 49*7, 524, 563, 890, 1398 
 
 Fulton County v. Amorous, 89 Ga. 614 1156 
 
 Fulton Light, etc., Co. v. State, 200 N. Y. 400 421, 422, 433, 435 
 
 Fulton Light, etc., Co. v. State, 65 MisS. 263 950 
 
 Furbish v. Kennebec County Commissioners, 93 Me. 117 1100 
 
 Furman St., In re, 17 Wend. 649 666, 807, 1216 
 
 Furness Ey. Co. v. Cumberland Co-operative Building Society, 52 L. T. 
 
 144 820 
 
 Fyfe V. Turtle Creek, 22 Pa. Super. Ct. 292 855 
 
 G 
 
 Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Fa. 254 1306 
 
 Gag© V. Judson, 111 Fed. 350 1126 
 
 Gaines v. Lunaford, 120 Ga. 3170 237 
 
 Gainesville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hall, 78 Tex. 169 846, 864, 1215, 1216, 1217 
 
 Galbraith v. Littlech, 73 111. 209 1407 
 
 Galeano v. Boston, 195 Mass. 64 710 
 
 Galena, etc., R. E. Co. v. Pound, 22 111. 399 1068, 1120 
 
 Galena Water Co. v. Galena, 74 Kan. 644 685 
 
 Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 111. 152 1288 
 
 Galveston, etc., E. R. lOo. v. Houston Electric Co., 57 Tex Civ. App. 
 
 170 386, 542 
 
c Table of Cases. 
 
 IPages a-720 are In Volume I, 721-J.422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 fialveston, etc., E. R. Co. v. Pfeuffer, 56 Tex. 66 1155 
 
 Galway v. Metropolitan El. R. R. Co., 128 N. Y. laa 960, 1266 
 
 127)6, 139,7, 1339 
 
 Gamble v. McCrady, 75 N. C. 509 325, 926, 929, 1074 
 
 Gamble V. Pettijohn, 116 Mo. 375 482, 485 
 
 GammeU v. Potter, 2 Clarke 562 , ...936, I07B 
 
 Gaimon v. Hargadon, 10 Allen 106 1352 
 
 Gano V. MSnnea/polis, etc., Ry. Oo., 114 Iowa 713 ;2, S55, 966, 988 
 
 Sanson v. Buffalo, 40 N. Y. 1 1007 
 
 Ganson v. Buffalo, 1 Eeyes 454 , 1228 
 
 Garbutt Lumber Co. v. Georgia, etc., Ey. iQa., Ill Ga. 7 115, 194 
 
 Gardner v. Brookline, 127 Mass. 35S 616, 1204 
 
 Gardner t. Essex County Commissioners, ISSi Mass. 1S9 945 
 
 Ga,rdner v. Georgia .R. R., etc., Co., 117 Ga. 522 9il3, S16; 920 
 
 986, 987, 993 
 
 Gardner v. Mobile, etc., R. R. Co., 102 Ala. 635 , .,^ 1417 
 
 Gardner v. Ntewburgb, 2 Johns. Cb. 167 30, 406, 4!35, 622, 1256, 1258 
 
 Gardner Water lOo. v. Gardner, 185 Mass. 190 146, 415 
 
 Gardiner v. Baltimore, 96 Md. 3®1 1131 
 
 Gardiner v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 9 Cusb. 1 833, 874 
 
 Gardiner v. Tisdale, 2 Wis. 253 -. 618, 1420 
 
 Gargan v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 89 Ky. 212 325, 887 
 
 Garland v. Towne, 55 N. H. 55 477 
 
 Garland Chain O). v. Rankin Borough, 226 Pa. 389 1246 
 
 Garliok v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. E. Co., 67 Ohio St. 235 1411, 1413 
 
 Garnett v. Jacksonville, etc., R. R. Co., aO Fla. 880 528, 1400 
 
 Garratt v. Canandaigua, 40 N. Y. St. 944 1330 
 
 Garraux v. Greenville, 53 S. C. *75i 304 
 
 Garrett v. Lake Roland El. Ry. Co., 79 Md. 277 303, 563, 568 
 
 Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505 763, 787, 804 
 
 Garrison v. New York, 21 Wall. 196 SOS, 1097, 1099 
 
 Garrity v. Boston, 161 Mass. 530 833, 869 
 
 Garth Lumber, etc., Co. v. Johnson, 151 Mich. 205 257 
 
 Garvey v. Long Island R. E. Co., 159 N. Y. 323 317, 1388 
 
 Garvey v. Revere, 187 Mass. 545 785, 802, 895 
 
 Gary v. Much, 94 N. E. 583 155, 183, 222, 1090 
 
 Gasaway v. Seattle, 52 Wash. 444 60, 63, 70, 71, 353, 356, 365, 991 
 
 Gaskill V. Dudley, 6 Met. 546 1418 
 
 Gaslight & Coke Co. v. New Albany, 158 Ind. 268 797 
 
 Gaston v. Gainesville, etc., Ry. Co., 120 Ga. ©16 1411, 1413 
 
 Gates City Terminal Co. v. Thrower, 136 Ga. 456 650, 677, 1137 
 
 1138, 1150, 1200 
 
 Gates V. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 53 Conn. 333 964 
 
 Gates V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 88 Iowa 518 "530, 873 
 
 Gates V. De La Mare, 142 N. Y. 307 1156 
 
 Gates V. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co., Ill Mo. 28 860 
 
 Gathman v. Chicago, 236 111. 9 1300 
 
 Gauley, etc., R. R. Co. v. Vencill, 73 W. Va. 650 1092, 1403 
 
 Gauster v. Metropolitan Electric Co., 214 Pa. 628 1388 
 
Table 05" Cases. ci 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 GaiiB & Sons Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co., 113 Mo. 308 497 
 
 SOS, 524, 8.78, 891 
 
 Gscwn TT: Wilson, 7 Oiio S. & C. P. Dec. 683 426, 456 
 
 ©ay V. Bradstreet, 49 Me. 580 lOSl 
 
 Gay V. Caldwell, Hardin 63 21 
 
 Gay V. Engebritzen, 158 Cal. 21 1252 
 
 Gay V. Gardiner, 54 Me. 477 651 
 
 Gay V. Mutual Union Tel. Co., 12 Mo. App. 485 578, 581, 893 
 
 Gay V. Wells, 7 Pick. 217 1059, 1228, 1229 
 
 Gaylord v. King, 142 Mass. 495 487 
 
 Gaylord v. Sanitary District, 204 111. 576 115, 129, 135, 169, 228, 232 
 
 Gear v. Dubuque, etc., E. E. Co., 20 Iowa 523.. 1098, 1099, 1101, 1104, 11G9 
 
 Gebhardt V. Eeeves, 75 111. 301 142D 
 
 Gedney v. Tewkabury, 3 Mass. 307 1058, 1228, 1237 
 
 Geer V. Durhflm Water Co., 127 N. 0.349.... 201 
 
 Geblen-v. Knorr, 101 Iowa 700 431 
 
 Gelof V. Morgenroth, 130 App. Div. 17 482 
 
 ■Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 WaU. 175 560 
 
 General Electric lOo. v. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 98 Fed. 907 1400 
 
 General Electric Ey. Co. v. Chioago, etc., Ey. Co., 184 111. 588 541 
 
 Genesee Chief, The, 12 How. 443 408 
 
 Genesee Fork Improvemfint Co. v. Ives, 144 Pa. 114 915 
 
 iGenet t. Brooklyn, 90 N. Y. 296 807 
 
 Genois v. St. Paul, 35 Minn. 3i30 308 
 
 Geohegan v. Union Elevated Ey. Co., 258 lU. 302 728, 1146, 1184 
 
 George v. Chester, 202 N. Y. 398.. 451 
 
 George v. 'Cheater, 59 Miac. 553 450 
 
 Ceorge v. 'Consolidated Lighting Co., 87 Vt. 41 1 265 
 
 George v. Peckham, 73 Nebr. 794 884 
 
 George's Creek Ojal Co. v. New Central Coal 'Co., 40 Md. 425 9i26 
 
 ■George Sweet Mfg. Co. v. Van Der Hoof, J37 App. Div. 492 194 
 
 Georgetown v. Aramerman, 143 Ky. 209 858 
 
 Georgetown, etc., T])axrt,ion Co. v. llulhoUand, 25 Ky. L. E. 578 541 
 
 Georgia v. Atlantic, etc., E. E. Co., 3 Woods 434 1417 
 
 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230 93 
 
 Georgia, etc., E. E. Co. v. Columbus, etc., E. E. Co., 89 Ga. 205 753 
 
 Georgia, etc., E. E. Co. v. Small, 87 Ga. 355 1150 
 
 Georgia Power Co. v. Stone, 139 Ga, 416 1171 
 
 Georgia E. E., etc., 'Co. v. Decatur, 129 Ga. 502 998 
 
 Georgia E. E., etc., Co. v. Union Point, 119 Ga. 809.3170, 747, 988, 990, 991 
 
 Geragbty v. Boston, 120 Mass. 416 833, 869 
 
 Gerdes v. Christopher, etc., Co., 124 Mo. 347 478 
 
 Gerhardt v. Eeeves, 75 111. 301 395 
 
 Gerhard v. Seekonk Eiver Bridge CommissionerB, 15 E. I. 334 326 
 
 Gerken v. Interborough Eapid Transit Co., '68 Misc. 389 561 
 
 German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U. S. 
 
 220 1328 
 
 German Savings Bank v. Dunn, 75 Misc. 251 357 
 
 Gemert v. Louisville, 155 Ky. 589 511 
 
cii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Gerrard v. Omaha, etc., K. K. Co., 14 Nebr. 270 1074 
 
 Gerst V. St. Louis, 185 Mo. 191 1252, 1318, 1379 
 
 Getz V. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 105 Pa. 547 1»3, 194, 329 
 
 Geyde v. Commissioners of Public Works, ( 1891) 2 Ch. 630 343 
 
 Giaeoni v. Astoria, 60 Ore. 12 1250, 1351 
 
 Gianfortone v. New Orleans, 61 Fed. 64 1329 
 
 Giauque v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 89 1257, 1258, 1261 
 
 Gibbons v. Missouri, etc., E. E. Co., 40 Mo. App. 146 955, 966 
 
 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 100 
 
 Gibson, In re, 28 Ont. L. Rep. 20 669 
 
 Gibson v. Oann, 28 Colo. 499 ': 913, 924 
 
 Gibson v. Fifth Avenue, etc.. Bridge lOo., 192 Fa. 55 738, 742 
 
 Gibson v. Hiintington, 38 W. Va. 177 1310 
 
 Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 283 3, 31, 185 
 
 Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269 302, 421, 423 
 
 Giesy v. Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 30® 3, 59, 63, 180 
 
 660, 908, 914, 973 
 
 Gifford Drainage District v. Shroer, 145 Ind. 572 244 
 
 Gilbert v. Corporation of Trinity House, 17 Q. B. D. 795 1298 
 
 Gilbert v. Poote (unreported, cited in 5 Barb. 474) 244 
 
 Gilbert v. Greely, etc., Ry. Co., 13 Colo. 501 «59, 8613, 885 
 
 Gilbert v. Savannah, etc., R. R. Co., 69 Ga. 396 1272 
 
 Gile V. Stevens, 13 Gray 146 692, 693 
 
 Gilfeather v. iCouncil Bluffs, 69 Iowa 310 1354 
 
 Gilkey v. Watertown, 141 Mass. 317 1051, 1069, 1407 
 
 Gill V. Scituate, 100 Mass. 200 1046 
 
 Gillard v. Cheshire Lines Committee, 32 W. R. 943 820 
 
 Gillespie v. Lincoln, 35 Nebr. 34 1308 
 
 Gillesipie v. New York, 23 Wend. 643 1157 
 
 Gillet V. Jones, 18 N. Y. 339 1235 
 
 Gillett V. 'Chester, etc., Ry. Co., 2 Pa. Dist. Ot. Rep. 450 542 
 
 Gillette v. Aurora Ry. Co.,. 228 111. 261 64, 196, 913, 921, 983, 1087 
 
 Gillham v. Madison County R. R. Co., 49 111. 484 611 
 
 Gilligan v. Providence, 11 R. I. 258 338, 339 
 
 Gillison v. Charleston, 16 W. Va. 282! 1319, 1360 
 
 Gillison v. Savannah, etc., R. E. Co., 7 S. C. 173 634, 1286 
 
 Gillmor v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 180 1308, 1320 
 
 Gilluly V. Madison, 63 Wis. 518 ' 1319, 1364 
 
 Gilman v. Contra Costa County, 8 Oal. 52 1417 
 
 Gilman v. Haverhill, 128 Mass. 36 1059 
 
 Gilman v. Laconia, 56 N. H. 130 1318, 1355, 1364 
 
 Gilman v. Milwaukee, . 55 Wis. 328 328 
 
 Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. .713 101, 429 
 
 Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black 510 266 
 
 Gilman v. Sheboygan, etc., E. R. Co., 40 Wis. 653 959, 1244, 1276 
 
 Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Oal. 229 2, 58, 65, 107, 161, 913 
 
 Gilmer v. Hunnicut, 57 S. C. 166 941 
 
 Gilmore v. DriscoU, 122 Mass. 199 568 
 
 Gilmore v. Pittsburgh, etc., E. R. Co., 104 Pa. 275 1106 
 
Table of Cases. ciii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Gilroy, Ee, 26 App. Div. 314 1173 
 
 Gilroy, Ee, 85 Hun 424 .666, 672 
 
 Gilson V. State, 5 Lea 161 1408 
 
 Gimbel v. Stolte, 59 Ind. 446 353, 354 
 
 Ginn v. Moultrie Drainage District, 188 III. 305 796 
 
 Girard Trust Co. v. Philadelphia, 248 Pa. 179 1208 
 
 Gish V. Oastner, etc.. Drainage District, 137 Iowa 711 788 
 
 Glascr v. Glenwood E. E. Co., 208 Pa. 328 145 
 
 Glass V. Basin Mining Co., 22i Mont. 151 1027 
 
 Glass V. Columbian Paper Co., Ill Va. 404 613 
 
 Glazier v. New Jersey, etc., E. E. Co., 60 N. J. L. 3S3 806 
 
 Glendenning v. Stahley, 173 Ind. 674 147, 175, 722, 723, 725, 735 
 
 737, 744, 769, 797 
 
 Glennon v. Britton, 155 111. 232 283 
 
 Glick V. Baltimore, etc., E. E. Co., 19 D. C. 412 527 
 
 Gloucester Water Supply Co. v. Gloucester, 179 Mass. 395 681, 682 
 
 685', 950, 1056, 1246 
 
 Glover \ . Boston, 14, Gray 282 949, 1054, 1069 
 
 Glover v. North StaflFordshire E. E. Co., 16 Q. B. 912 820, 819 
 
 Glover v. Powell, 10 N. J. Eq. 2ill 460 
 
 Glover v. Eemley, 62 S. C. 52 1236, 1244 
 
 Gloversville, In re, 42 Misc. 559 1004 
 
 Gluck V. Baltimore, 81 Md. 315 338, 693, 710, 711, 712, 714, 716 
 
 Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504 63 
 
 Goddard v. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co., 202 111. 362 576, 584 
 
 Goddard v. Harpswell, 84 Me. 499 1307 
 
 Goddard v. Mayor and Aldermen of Worcester, 9 Gray 88 1057 
 
 Godfrey v. Alton, 12 111. 219 441 
 
 Gold V. Vermont Central E. E. Co., 19 Vt. 478 941 
 
 Goldfield, etc.. Transportation Co. v. Old Sandstrom, etc., Mining Co., 
 
 150 Pac. 313 255, 704, 1007 
 
 Gold HiU Mining Co. v. Ish, 5 Ore. 104 24 
 
 Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Wells Improvement Commissioners L. E., 1 Oh. 
 
 349 446 
 
 Goldstein v. Conner, 212 Mass. 57 274, 278 
 
 Gonzalez v. Pensaoola, 65 Fla. 241 1241, 1351 
 
 Gooch V. Exeter, 70 N. H. 413 391, 40O 
 
 Good V. Altoona, 162 Pa. 493 445, 1319 
 
 Goodale v. Stowell, 63 S. C. 516 1273 
 
 Goodale v. Stowell, 62 S. E. 970 308 
 
 Goodin v. Cincinnati, etc., Canal Co., 18 Ohio St. 169. . .660, 667, 1265, 1276 
 
 Goodloe V. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio 500 510, 1296 
 
 Goodman v. Boston, etc., Eailroad, 63 Me. 363 954 
 
 Goodrich v. Atchison County Commissioners, 47 Kan. 355 355 
 
 Goodrich v. Detroit, 184 U. S. 432 1120 
 
 Goodrich v. Highway Commissioners, 1 Mich. 386 1118 
 
 Goodrich v. Otego, 216 N. Y. 112 346, 486, SOS, 513 
 
 Goodsell V. Lawson, 42 Md. 348 409 
 
 Goodspeed v. East Haddam Bank, 22 Conn. 530 1294 
 
civ Table oi' Oases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Folume 11.] PAGE 
 
 Goodtitle v. Alker, 1 Burr. 133 469, 472 
 
 Goodwin v. Marblehead^ 1 Allen 37 1406 
 
 Goodwin v. Milton, 25 N. H. 458 1160 
 
 Goodwin v. Thompson, 15 Lea 209 409 
 
 Goodwin v. Evans, 134 Ind. 2i62 797 
 
 Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. v. Bosifcon Terminal Co., 1716 Mass. 115'. . 7B 
 
 Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133. 75 
 
 Gordon v. Silver Creek, 197 N. Y. 509 302, 317 
 
 Gordon v. Taunton, 126 Mass. 349 462, 1313 
 
 Gordon v. Winchester, 12 Bush. 110 .^ 36J 
 
 Gorgas v. Philadelphia, etc., E. E. Co., 215 Ea. 501 660, 667, 670, 810 
 
 1143, 1170 
 
 Gorham v. New Haven, 79 Conn. 670 445, 12S4 
 
 Gorkow, Matter of, 20 Wash. 563 1186 
 
 Gorman v. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 266 Mo. 483 323, 49S 
 
 Gosa V. Milwaukee, etc.. Traction Co., 134 Wis. 369 546, 815 
 
 GoBselin v. Chicago, 103 111. 623 1419 
 
 GoBsett V. Southern Eailway Cto., 115 Tenn. 376 319:, 1388 
 
 Goszler v. Georgetown, 6 Wheat. 59S 507, 513, 516 
 
 Gottsohalk v. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 14 Neb. 550 890 
 
 Gongh, In re, ( 1904) 1 K. B. 417 671 
 
 Gough V. Bell, 22 N. J. L. 441 456 
 
 Gough V. Bell, 23 N. J. L. 624. ; 456 
 
 Gould V. Boston Duck Co., 13 Gray 442 230 
 
 Gould V. Hudson Eiver E. E. Co., 6 N. Y. 522 413, 426, 428, 456 
 
 Goulden v. Scranton, 121 Pa. 97 1319, 1370 
 
 Gouvemeur Slip, In re, 210 N. Y. 451 651, 653 
 
 Grade Crossing Commissioners, Ee, 154 N. Y. 550 1173 
 
 Grade Crossing Commissioner, Ee, 69 Misc. 23 304, 354, 948 
 
 Grade Crossing Commissioners of Buffalo, In re, 201 N. Y. 32.... 508, 514 
 
 Graded School Trustees v. Hinton, 166 N. C. 209 211 
 
 Grady v. Dnndon, 30 Ore. 333 , 925 
 
 Grafton v. St. Paul, etc., E. E. Co., 16 N. D. 313 371, 747, 749, 750 
 
 911, 916 
 
 Grafton, etc., E. E. Co. v. Foreman, 24 W. Va. 662 771, 1271 
 
 Graham v. Columbus, etc., E. E. Co., 27 Ind. 260 1239, 1245, 1263 
 
 Graham v. Connersville, etc., E. E. Co., 36 Ind. 463 703 
 
 Graham v. Pittsburg, etc., E. E. Co., 145 Pa. 504 741, 1148, 1151 
 
 Graham v. St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co., 69 Ark. 562 1411 
 
 Grand Avenue Ey. Co. v. People's Ey. Co., 132 Mo. 34 630 
 
 Grand J3oulevard, In re, 212 N. Y. 538 351 
 
 Grand Eapids v. Bennett, 106 Mich. 528 748, 749 
 
 Grand Eapids v. Grand Eapids, etc., E. E. Co., 58 Mich. 641. .922, 1026, 1214 
 
 Grand Eapids v. Luce, 92 Mich. 92 1195 
 
 Grand Eapids v. Perkins, 78 Mich. 93 1144 
 
 Grand Eapids v. Powers, 89 Mich. 94 287, 405, 408, 412, 453 
 
 Grand Eapids Booming Co. v. Jarvis, 30 Mich. 308 314, 731, 992 
 
 Grand Eapids, etc., E. E. Co. v. Alley, 34 Mich. 16 1075 
 
 Grand Eapids, etc., E. E. Co. v. Chesbro, 74 Mich. 466 730, 1O30 
 
Table of Cases. cv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 Grand Rapids, etc., R. R. Co. v. Grand, Rapids, etc., R. R. Co., 35 Mich. 
 
 265 358, 371, 753, 999 
 
 Grand Rapids, etc., E. R. Co. v. Heisel, 38 Mich. 62. . . .497, 526, 527, 528, 537 
 
 538, 547 
 
 Crand Rapids, etc., R. R. Co. v. Heisel, 47 Mich. 393 530, 1239 
 
 Grand Rapids, etc., R. R. Co. v. Horn, 41 Ind. 479 735, 798 
 
 Grand Rapids, etc., R. R. Co. v. Weiden, 69 Mich. 572 1118 
 
 Grand Rapids Electric Light & Power Co. v. Orand Rapids, etc.. Gas Co., 
 
 33 Fed. 659 365 
 
 Grand Bonde Electrical Co. v. Drake, 46 Ore. 243 208, 914 
 
 Grand Truak: Ry. Co. v. Berlin, 68 N. H. 168 1118 
 
 Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Michigan Railroad Commission, 231 U. S. 457. . 373 
 
 Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U. S. 554 358, 374 
 
 Granger v. Syracuse, 38 How. Pr. 308 807 
 
 Grant v. Davenport, 18 Iowa 179i 453 
 
 Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa. 420 1329 
 
 Grant v. Hyde Park, 67 Ohio St. 166 626, 723, 1073 
 
 Grant Park v. Trah, 218 III. 516 867 
 
 Graves v. Middletown, 137 Ind. 400 1051, 1120 
 
 Graves v. Shattuck, 35 N. H. 258 470, 485, 521 
 
 Gray v. Iowa Central Ry. Co., 129 Iowa 68 1060 
 
 Gray v. New York State Tel. Co., 92 App. Div. 89 577 
 
 Gray v. New York State Tel. Co., 41 Misc. 108. . . 577 
 
 Gray v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 81 Mo. 126 1102 
 
 Gray v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 13 Minn. 315 526 
 
 Gray v. Salt Lake City, 44 Utah 204 869, 1275 
 
 Grays Harbor Boom Co. v. Lownsdale, 54 Wash. 83 421, 660, 667, 668 
 
 952-, 1192 
 
 Gray's Harbor, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kauppinen, 53 Wash. 238 1150 
 
 Greasy Creek Mineral Co. v. Ely Jellioo Coal Co., 132 Ky. 692 192, 256 
 
 920, 987 
 
 G-reat Bend Road, In re, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 335 1001 
 
 Great Palls, etc., Co. v. Ganong, 48 Mont. 43 1009 
 
 Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney-General, 124 U. S. sai 434, 936, 1078 
 
 Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Femald, 47 N. H. 444 227 
 
 Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Garland, 25 Fed. 421 631, 635, 939 
 
 Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. United States, 16 Ct. 01. 160 671 
 
 Great Falls Power Co. v. Webb, 123 Tenn. 584 204, 208, 823 
 
 Great Western, etc., Co. v. Hawkins, 30 Ind. App. 557 169, 202, 209, 210 
 
 228, 230, 253, 1066 
 
 Greeley v. Maine Central R. R. Co., 53 Me. 200 610', 1392 
 
 Greely v. Saline County, 26 Kan. 510 396 
 
 Green v. City & Suburban Ry. Co., 78 Md. 294 514, 541, 552 
 
 Green v. Elliott, 86 Ind. 53 924 
 
 Green v. Everett, 179 Mass. 147 120O, 1208 
 
 Green v. Fall River, 113 Mass. 262 785, 801, 802, 1203, 1206, 1207 
 
 Green v. Harrison County, 61 Iowa 311 I3OO 
 
 Green v. Kleinhaus, 2 Green 472 49I 
 
 Green v. Reading, 9 Watts 383 508, 515 
 
cvi Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Green v. Reeves, 80 Ga. 805 936, 1079 
 
 Green v. South Bound R. R. Co., 112 Ga. 849 1154 
 
 Green v. State, 73 Cal. 29 303 
 
 Green v. Swift, 47 Cal. 536 '■ 315 
 
 Green Bay, etc., CaiiaJ Co. v. Kaukauua Water Power Co., 90 Wis. 370 
 
 406, 436 
 
 Greenburg v. International Trust Co., 94 Fed. 755 915, 923 
 
 Greene v. Aurora R. K. Co., 84 G. C. A. 589 525 
 
 Greene v. O'Connor, 18 R. I. 56 175 
 
 Green, etc. Navigation Co. v. Chesapeake, etc., R. E. Co., 88 Ky. 1 lOil 
 
 Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 208 Fed. 1022 457 
 
 Greenleaf- Johnson Liunber Co. v. United- States, 204 Fed. 489 4S7 
 
 Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. 480 8fl8 
 
 Greenville v. AUard, 27 S. W. 292 857 
 
 Greenville v. Mauldin, 64 S. C. 43i8 1236 
 
 Greenville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Partlow, 5 Ridh. L. 428 735, 773, 811 
 
 Greenville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Partlow, 6 Rich. L. 286 952 
 
 Greenwich v. Easton, etc., E. R. Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 217 398 
 
 Greenwood v. Summit County Commissioners, 23 Ohio St. 600 1301 
 
 Greenwood v. Union Freight R. R. Co., 105 U.iS. 13 68, 362, 372, 980 
 
 Greenwood v. Yoe, 89 S. C. 24 1254, 1257 
 
 Greenwood County Commissioners v. Kansas City., etc., E. E. Co., 46 
 
 Kan. 104 749 
 
 Gregg V. Baltimore, 56 Md. 256 178 
 
 Gregg V. Northern E. E. Co., 67 N. H. 452 68 
 
 Gregory v. Adams, 14 Gray 242 521 
 
 Gregory v. Forbes, 96 N. C. 77 454 
 
 Gregsten v. Chicago, 145 111. 451 .481, ■ 482 
 
 Greist v. Amrtiyn, 80 Cona. 280 1405, 1407 
 
 Greve v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 26 Minn: 66 704, 705 
 
 Grey v. Paterson, 58 N. J. Eq. 1 444, 1318 
 
 Grey v. Paterson, 60 N. J. Eq. 385 1256. 1258 
 
 Gridley v. Bloomington, ^S- 111. 50 481 
 
 Griffin v. Jacksonville, etc., R. E. Co., 3l3 Fla. 606 1269 
 
 Griffin v. Lawrence, 135 Mass. 365 1275 
 
 Briffin v. Sanbornton, 44 N. H. 246 491 
 
 Gfriffin v. Shreveport, etc., R. E. Co., 41 La. Ann. 808 851 
 
 Hriffin v. Southern Ry. Co., 150 N. C. 312 1396, 1397 
 
 Grimball v. Eose, T. U. P. Charlt. 175 36 
 
 Grimm v. Elkhorn Valley Drainage District, 98 Neb. 260 245, 1111 
 
 Grimshaw v. Fall Eiver, 160 Mass. 483 630, 1024 
 
 Gring V. American Pipe, etc., Co., 151 App. Div. 910 931 
 
 Griswold v. Minneapolis, etc., Ey. Co., 12 N. D. 435 1264, 1420 
 
 Griveau v. South Chicago City Ry. Co., 130 111. App. 519 863 
 
 Grove v. Greenville, etc., Ry. Co., 94 S. C. 199 625 
 
 Groff V. Bird-in-Hand Turnpike Co., 144 Pa. 621 3, 997, 1001 
 
 Grofl V. Bird-in-Hand Turnpike Co., 144 Pa. 150 1001 
 
 Groff V. Philadelphia, 150 Pa. 594 874 
 
 Grogan v. Hayward, 6 Sawyer C. C. 498 1400 
 
 Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590 392 
 
Table op Cases. cvii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Gross V. Jones, S5 Neb. 77 21, 614, 1411, 1412, 1420 
 
 Gross V. Portsmouth, 68 N. H. 266 ■ ■ 1341 
 
 Grosser v. Rochester, 148 N. Y. 235 346 
 
 Grossman v. Houston, etc., R. R. Co., 99 Tex. 641 846 
 
 Grote St., In re, 150 App. Div. 215 • • • • 654 
 
 Groton v. Hurlburt, 22 Conn. 178 948 
 
 Grover, etc., Land Co. v. Lovella, etc.. Irrigation Co., 21 Wyo. 204. . . .4, 97 
 
 98, 117, 131 
 
 Gudger v. Richmond, etc., R. R. Co., 106 N. C. 481 958 
 
 Gue V. Tide Water Canal Co., 24 How. 257 1417 
 
 Guess V. Stone Mountain Granite, etc., Co., 72 Ga. 320 736, 790, 795 
 
 Guest V. Church Hill, 90 Md. 689 1359 
 
 Guilford, In re, 85 App. Div. 207 1125, 1167 
 
 Guinn v. Iowa, etc., Ry. Co., 131 Iowa 680 651, 654 
 
 Guinn v. Ohio River R. R. Co., 46 W. Va. 151 594, 790, 815, 890, 1286 
 
 Gulf Coast IceMfg. Co. v. Bowers, 89 Miss. 58)1 582, 585 
 
 Gulf, etc., R. R. Co. v. Abney, 4 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. 414 1209 
 
 Gulf, etc., R. R. Co. v. Brugger, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 370 763 
 
 Gulf, etc., R. R. Co. v. Donahoo, 59 Tex. 128 611, 1392 
 
 Gulf, etc., R. R. iCd. v. Eddins, 60 Tex. 666 597, 598 
 
 Gulf, etc., R. R. Co. v. Fuller, 63 Tex. 467 ■ ■ 66, 766, 789, 812 
 
 Gulf, etc., R. R. Co. v. Graves, 1 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. 301 879 
 
 Gulf, etc., R. R. Co. v. Milam County, 90 Tex. 355 750 
 
 Gulf, etc., R. R. Co. v. Morris, 67 Tex. 692 • • 1416 
 
 Gulf, etc., R. R. Co. v. Poindexter, 70 Tex. 98 1239 
 
 Gulf, etc., R. R. Co. v. Southwestern, etc., Tel. Co., 18 Tex. Civ. App. 500 757 
 
 1072 
 
 Gulf, etc., R. R. Co. v. Taccjuaid, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 142 994 
 
 Gunning System v. Buffalo, 62 App. Div. 498 166, 277 
 
 Gurdon, etc., R. R. Co. v. Vaught, 97 Ark. 234 671 
 
 Gurney v. Minneapolis Union Elevator Co., 63 Minn. 70 600, 605, 1413 
 
 Gurnsey v. Edwards, 26 N. E. 224 • • 91, 355 
 
 Gurnsey v. Northern California Power Co., 160 Cal. 699 . . 470, 584, 1265, 1396 
 
 Gustaf son v. Hamm, 56 Minn. 334 534 
 
 Guthrie, etc., R. R. Co. v. Faulkner, 12 Okla. 532 767, 810 
 
 Guthrie National Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U. S. 528 966 
 
 Gutierres v. Albuquerque, etc., Co., 188 U. S. 545 249 
 
 Guttery v. Glen, 201 111. 275 ■ • • ■ 884 
 
 Gutzweller v. People, 14 111. 142 402 
 
 Guyajidot Valley R. R. Co. v. Buskirk, 57 W. Va. 417. . . .660, 667, 677, 1144 
 
 1178, 1192 
 
 Guyer v. Davenport, etc., R. R. Co., 196 111. 370 763 
 
 Guyime v. Cincinnati, 3 Oh^o 24 346 
 
 Gwinner v. Gary Connecting Railways Co., 182 Ind. 553 931, 932 
 
 H 
 
 Haag V. Vanderburg County, 60 Ind. 511 I313 
 
 Haas V. Evansville, 20 Ind. App. 482 433 
 
 Haberlil v. Boston, 190 Mass. 358 586 
 
 Haberman v. Baker, 128 N. Y. 253 142o 
 
cviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume' I, 721-1422 In Tblume II,] pAQB 
 
 Hackett v. Boston, etc., E. E. Co., 35 N. H. 390. 121& 
 
 Hackstack v. Keshena Improvement Co., 66 Wis, 439 1283 
 
 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394 ,. . .276, 278 
 
 Hadley v. Citizens' Savings Institution, 123 Mass. 301 1061 
 
 Hadlock v. Jaffrey, 75 N. H. 472 1051 
 
 Haff V. Fuller, 45 Ohio St. 495 1023 
 
 Hagaman v. Moore, 84 Ind, 496. 797, 1214 
 
 Hagar v. Brainerd, 44 Vt. 302 355, 1074 
 
 Hagar v. Eeclamation District, 111 U. S. 701 ,. 241 
 
 Hagar v. Supervisors of Yolo County, 47 Gal. 222' - , . . 24* 
 
 Hagerla v. Mississippi Eiver Power Co., 202 Fed.. 776.. 95, 96, 8i93, 971 
 
 Hagerstown v. Groh, 101 Md. 560 336, 354, 356; 
 
 Haggard v. Algona School District, 113 Iowa, 486. . .727, 741, 798, 1114^ 1209; 
 
 Hainea v. Hall, 17 Ore. 165 416 
 
 Haimea v. St Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 65 Iowa, 216 » 740, 742 
 
 Hairston v. Danville, etc., Ey. Co., 208 U. S. 598 m, 12S, 138, 194 
 
 Haislip V. Wilmington, etc, R. E. Co., 102 N. C. 376 768, 
 
 Haldeman v. Pennsylvania Central E. E. Co., 50 Pa. 425. .198, 600, 1420, 1421 
 
 Hale V. Lawrence, 21 N. J. L. 714 3, 59 
 
 Haley v. Boston, 191 Mass. 291 1308' 
 
 Haley v. Philadelphia, 68 Pa. 45 904 
 
 Haley & Lang Co. v. Huron, 153 N. W. 891 1332 
 
 Hall V. Atlanta, etc., R. R. Co., 158 Ala. 271 323, 885 
 
 Hall V. Breyfogle, 162 Ind. 494 • 1410 
 
 Hall V. Bristol, L. R. 2 C. P. 322 819, 835 
 
 Hall V. Concord, 71 N. H. 367 ■• 1308 
 
 Hall V. Crawford Co., 94 Nebr. 460 1265 
 
 Hall V. lona, 38 Mich. 493 . • 440 
 
 Hall V. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 89 Kaxi. 70- ■ 1172 
 
 Hall V. People, 57 lU. 307 ., .....632, 638 
 
 Hall V. Pickering, 40 Me. 548 ^ 1244, 1282 
 
 Hall V. Smith, 2 Bing. 156 • ■ 509 
 
 Hall V. Staples, 166 Mass. 399 1050 
 
 Hallenbeck v. Hahn, 2 Neb. 337 ■ ■ 185. 
 
 Halleran v. Bell Tel. Co., «4 App. Div.. 41 58t 
 
 Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Tra.ining School, 249 lU. 436- ... 271 
 
 Hallock V. Franklin County, 2 Met. 558 834, 1047, 1098, 1148, 1152 
 
 Hallook V. Woolsey, 2'3 Wend. 328 1228, 1229 
 
 Halsey v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 45 N". J. L. 26 • ■ 1244 
 
 Halsey v. Rapid Transit St. Ry. Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 3S0 542 
 
 Halsfcead v. Vandalia R. R. Co., 48 Ind. App. 96 ©59, 662, 1137 
 
 Ham V. McClaws, 1 Bay 93 30, 22 
 
 Ham V. Salem, 100 Mass. 350 626,, 691, 692, 1056, 1192, 1204 
 
 Ham V. Wisconsin, etc., Ry. Co., 61 Iowa 716 739, 741,, 745 
 
 Hamburger, In re, 149 N. Y. Supp. 173 351 
 
 Hamilton v. Annapolis, etc., R. R. Co., 1 Md. 553- ■ ■ ■ 1120 
 
 Hamilton v. Annapolis, etc., R. R. Co., 1 Md. Ch. 107 625 
 
 Hamilton v. Atchison, etc., Ry. Co., 95 Kan. 353 723, 1208 
 
 Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256 930 
 
Table of Cases. cix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume 11.] PAGE 
 
 HamUton v. Columbus, 52 Ga. 435 1364 
 
 Hamilton v. Manhattan R. E. Co., 26 Jones & S. 17 960 
 
 Hamilton v. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 190 Pa. 51 367, 6», 762 
 
 Hamilton Company v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632 358 
 
 Hamilton County v. Garrett, 62 Tex. 602 622, 723 
 
 Hamilton County v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109 1300 
 
 Hamilton, etc.. Traction Co. v. Hamilton, etc.. Transit Co., 69 Ohio St. 
 
 402 382, 9®7, lOOO 
 
 Hamilton, etc.. Traction Co. v. Parish, 67 Ohio St. 181 69, 323, 1421 
 
 Hamilton Gas, etc., Co. v. Hamilton, 146 U. S. 258 . . 362 
 
 Hamilton Place, In re, 67 Misc. 191 1194 
 
 Hamilton St., In re, 144 App. Div. 702 ■ • . .1155, 1156 
 
 Hamlin v. New Bedford, 143 Mass. 192. 953, 1010, 1024 
 
 Hammersley v. New York, 56 N. Y. 533 654 
 
 Hammersmith, etc., R. R. Co. v. Brand, L. R. 4 H. L. 171 821, 863 
 
 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 146 70 
 
 Hammond v. Harvard, 31 Neb. 635 ■ • 868, 872 
 
 Hammond v. Richmond County, 72 Ga. 188 • 1299 
 
 Hammond v. Shepard, 18'6 111. 235 1409 
 
 Hammond v. Worcester County Commissioners, 154 Mass. 509 323, 834 
 
 843, 885 
 
 Hamor v. Bar Harbor Water Co., 90 Me. 364. .433, 949, 950, 1055, 1071, 1244 
 
 Hamory -r. Pennsylvania, etc., R. R. Co., 222 Pa. 631 668, 670 
 
 Hampden Paint Co. v. Springfield, etc., R. R. Co., 124 Mass. 118. . .1147, 1152 
 
 Hampton v. Coffin, 4 N. H. 517 10&8, 1420 
 
 Hancock v. Boston, 1 Mete. 122 936, 1046, 1079 
 
 Hancock v. Wentworth, 5 Met. 446 • ■ 1262 
 
 Hand Gold Mining Co. v. Parker, 59 Ga. 419 253 
 
 Haney v. Gulf, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Willsom 278 • • 789 
 
 Haney v. Gulf, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. 336 532 
 
 Hanford v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 43 Minn. 104 440, 455, 456 
 
 H^ngeu V. Hachenreister, 114 N. Y. 566 1192 
 
 Hanlin v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 61 Wis. 515 528, 123« 
 
 Hannegan v. Denver & Santa Fe Railway Co., 43 Colo. 122 595, 1286 
 
 Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 15 Wall. 547 787 
 
 Hannibal v. Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co., 49 Mo. 480. .- • 996, 998, 999 
 
 Hannibal Bridge Co. v. Schaubacher, 57 Mo. 582 741 
 
 Hannibal Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 194- • 459 
 
 Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co. v. Frowein, 163 Mo. 19 1413 
 
 Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co. v. Muder, 49 Mo. 165 190, 1067 
 
 Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rowland, 29 Mo. 337 948 
 
 Hannum v. Media, etc., Ry. Co., 200 Pa. 44 528 
 
 Hanover Water Co. v. Ashland Iron Co., 84 Pa. 279 • 1208 
 
 Hanselman v. Born, 71 Kan. 573 1405 
 
 Hansen v. Hammer, 15 Wash. 315 243, 246, 927, 932 
 
 Hanson v. Proffer, 23 Idaho 705 1409 
 
 Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28 ■ ■ 119, 186 
 
 Harback v. Boston, 10 Cush. 295 200, 616, 907, 923 
 
 Harback v. Des Moines, etc., R. R. Co., 80 Iowa 593 1285 
 
ex Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume 1, 721-1422 In Volume U.] PAGE 
 
 Harding v. Board of Land and Works, 11 App. Cas. 208- • 762 
 
 Harding v. Boston, 163 Mass. 14 1253 
 
 Harding v. Funk, 8 Kan. 315 ■ 227, 799 
 
 Harding v. Goodlet, 3 Yerg. 40 61, 71, 117, 149, 225, 228 
 
 Harding v. Medway, 10 Met. 465 • 1062, 1109, 1113 
 
 Harding v. Stamford Water Co., 41 Conn. 87 434 
 
 Hardinsburg v. .Cravens, 148 Ind. 1 1255 
 
 Hardman v. Cabot, 60 W. Va. 664 476, 574 
 
 Hardy v. Brooklyn, 90 N. Y. 435 . . . • 1318, 1378 
 
 Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 250 ^ 1215 
 
 Hare v. Fort Smith, etc., R. E. Co., 104 Ark. 187 338, 341, 344, 1074 
 
 1075, 1082 
 
 Harlan, etc., Co. v. Paschall, 5 Del. Ch. 435 453 
 
 Harlem River Bridge, In re, 174 N. Y. 26 618 
 
 Harlow v. Pike, 3 Greenl. 438 1051, 1243 
 
 Harman v. Bluefield, 70 W. Va. 129 790, 872, 876, 877, 895 
 
 Harman v. Bluefield, 70 W. Va. 195 ■ 815 
 
 Harman v. Caretta Ry. Co., 61 W. Va. 356 1257, 1259, 1260 
 
 Harmon v. Chicago, 140 111. 374 101 
 
 Harmon v. Louisville, etc., K. R. Co., 87 Tenn. 614 • • 594 
 
 Harmon v. Omaha, 17 Neb. 548 868, 872 
 
 Ham v. Dadeville, lOO Ala. 199 ■ . . . 1409 
 
 Harness v. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co., 1 Md. Ch. 248 85, 622, 651 
 
 Harp V. Baraboo, 101 Wis. 368 • 1355, 1372 
 
 Harper v. Richardson, 22 Cal. 251 • 957, 1273 
 
 Harriman v. Southern R. R. Co., Ill Tenn. 538 750 
 
 Harrington v. Berkshire County Commissioners, 22 Pick. 263 .... 1047, 1098 
 
 1148, 1152, 1419 
 
 Harrington v. Harrington, 1 Met. 404 148, 1049 
 
 Harrington v. Iowa Central R. R. Co., 126 Iowa 388. .- • 1421 
 
 Harrington v. Manchester, 76 N. H. 347 1410 
 
 Harrington v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 17 Minn. 215 526, 905, 1239 
 
 Harrington v. Worcester, 183 Mass. 254 ■ 443 
 
 Harrington v. Worcester, 186 Mass. 594 444, 446, S37, 1380, 1381 
 
 Harris v. Elliott, 10 Pet. 25 469 
 
 Harris v. Lincoln, etc., R. R. Co., 91 Neb. 755 895 
 
 Harris v. Marblehead, 10 Gray 40 ■ ■ 984 
 
 Harris v. Philadelphia, 155 Pa. 76 313 
 
 Harris v. Schuylkill River, etc., R. R. Co., 141 Pa. 242 660, 1171 
 
 Harris v. Thompson, 9 Barb. 350 ■ • ■ . . 149, 228 
 
 Harris v. Woodstock, 27 Conn. 567 1128 
 
 Harrisburg v. Grange, 3 Watts. & S. 460 • • 338 
 
 Harrishurg, etc.. Road Co. v. Cumberland County, 225 Pa. 467 682, 683 
 
 Harrisburg, etc., Road Co. v. Harrisburg, etc., Ry. Co., 177 Pa. 585.... 644 
 
 973, 975 
 
 Harrison v. Augusta Factory, 73 Ga. 447 1419 
 
 Harrison v. Brown, 5 Wis. 27 • • 487 
 
 Harrison v. Denver City Tramway Co., 54 Colo. 593 847, 892 
 
 Harrison v. Dolan, 172 Mass. 395 71 
 
Table of Cases. cxi 
 
 LPages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Harrison v. Lexington, etc., R. R. Co., 9 B. Monroe 470 1419 
 
 Harrison v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 87 Tenn. 614 526 
 
 Harrison v. Mt. Auburn Cable Ey. Co., 9 Ohio S. & C. P. 805 539 
 
 Harrison v. New Orleans, 33 La. Ann. 222 • • 1316, 1344 
 
 Harrison v. New Orleans, etc., Ry. Co., 34 La. Ann. 462 527 
 
 Harrison v. Rutland (1893) 1 G. B. 142. 469 
 
 Harrison v. Sabina, 1 Ohio Cir. Dec. 30 1244 
 
 Harrison v. Sulphur Springs, 67 S. W. 515 308, 1376 
 
 Harrison St., In re, 74 Wash. 187 814 
 
 Harrold v. Americus, 142 Ga. 686 192, 526, 1255 
 
 Harrold v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 144 Ga. 199 ■ ■ 984 
 
 Harrold v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 86 S. E. 552 1255 
 
 Harshbarger v. Midland R. R. Co., 131 Ind. 177 1159 
 
 Hart V. Bassett, T. Jones 156 883 
 
 Hart V. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co., 133 Mass. 488 838 
 
 Hart V. Millsville, 125 Wis. 546 1319, 1333, 1339, 1374, 1375 
 
 Hart V. New Orleans, 12 Fed. 292 1416 
 
 Hart V. Smith, 159 Ind. 182 366 
 
 Hartford v. Maslen, 76 Conn. 599 398 
 
 Hartford Bridge Co. v. Union Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 210. 36 
 
 Hartford R. R. Co., In re, 74 Conn. 662 913 
 
 Hartford, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wagner, 73 Conn. 506 • • 986 
 
 Hartford Water Commissioners v. Manchester, 87 Conn. 193. . . .131, 145, 151 
 
 172, 200, 201, 203 227 
 
 Hartley v. Keokuk, etc., R. R. Co., 85 Iowa 455 • ■ 944, 1214 
 
 Hartman v. Pittsburg Incline Plane Co., 159 Pa. 442 886 
 
 Hartmau v. Tresise, 36 Colo. 146 115, 142, 166, 405, 409, 431 
 
 Hartman v. TuUy Pipe Line Co., 71 Hun 367 575 
 
 Hartshorn v. Burlington, etc., R. R. Co., 52 Iowa 613 • ■ 651, 740 
 
 Hartshorn v. Illinois Valley R. R. Co., 216 IJl. 392 666 
 
 Hartshorn v. Illinois Valley Traction Co., 210 III. 609 196, 994 
 
 Hartshorn v. South Reading, 3 Allen 501 ... ■ 491, 834 
 
 Hartshorn v. Worcester, 113 Mass. Ill 829, 842, 855, 867, 875, 877, 1213 
 
 Hartwell, Matter of, 2 Mich. N. P. 97 227 
 
 Harvard Branch R. R. Co. v. Rand, 8 Cush. 218 952 
 
 Harvard College v. Stearns, 15 Gray 1 ..... • 834 
 
 Harvey v. Aurora, etc., R. R. Co., 175 111. 295 536, 988 
 
 Harvey v. Georgia Southern R. R. Co., 90 Ga. 66 322, 536 1400 
 
 Harvey v. Lackawanna, etc., R. R. Co., 47 Pac. 434 810 
 
 Harvey v. Lloyd, 3 Pa. 331 257 
 
 Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts 63 32, 120, 194 
 
 Harvie v. Cammack, 6 Dana 242 416 
 
 Harwood v. Bloomington, 124 111. 48 : 780, 796 
 
 Harwood v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 487 • • 1050 
 
 Harwood v. Street Commissioners, 183 Mass. 348 269 
 
 Harwood v. West Randolph, 64 Vt. 41 672 
 
 Harwood v. West Randolph, 82 Vt. 620 1269 
 
 Haskell v. Bristol County Commissioners, 9 Gray 341 . . 937, 1046, 1056, 1078 
 
 Haskell v. Denver Tramway Co., 23 Col. 60 541 
 
cxii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume 11.] PAGE 
 
 Haskell v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 224 U. S. 217 104 
 
 Haskell v. "Sew Bedford, 108 Mass. 208 90, 442, 446, 457, 837, 1346 
 
 Haslam v. Galena, etc., R. R. Co., 64 111. 353 692 
 
 Haslett V. New Albany, etc., Ry. Co., 7 Ind. App. 603 497 
 
 Hasson v. Oil Creek, etc., R. R. Co., 8 Phila. 596 607 
 
 Hastings v. Burlington, etc., R. R. Co., 38 Iowa 316 IIOO, 1419 
 
 Hastings, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ingalls, 15 Nebr. 123 526 
 
 Hatch V. Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Ohio St. 92. . .619, 620, 730, 734, 1420 
 
 Hatch V. Hawkes, 126 Mass. 177 92, 177 
 
 Hatch V. Potta/wattomie County, 43^ Iowa 442 245 
 
 Hatch V. Vermont Central R. R. Co., 29 Vt. 49 528 
 
 Hatch V. Vermont Central R. R. Co., 28 Vt. 142. 318 
 
 Hatcher v. Toledo, etc., R. R. 'Co., 62 111. 477 1417 
 
 Hatfield v. Straus, 189 N. Y. 208 197, 220, 534 
 
 Hathaway v. Everett, 205 Mass. 246 1308 
 
 Hathaway v. Milwaukee, 132 Wis. 249. 441 
 
 Hathaway v. Yakima, etc., Co., 14 Wash. 469 1269 
 
 Hathorn v. Kelley, 86 Me. 4S7 1023 
 
 Hathom v. Stinson, 10 Me. 224 1414 
 
 Hatry v. Painesville, etc., R. R. Co., 1 Ohio D. 28i 1155 
 
 Hauge V. La Crosse, etc., Ry. Co., 148 Wis. 288 723, 728 
 
 Haven v. Essex County Commissioners, 155 Mass. 467 1189, 1190, 1204 
 
 Haverford Electric Light Co. v. Hart, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 369 584 
 
 Haverhill Bridge v. Essex Comity Commissioners, 103 Mass. 120. . . .173, 631 
 
 634, 636, 914 
 
 Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368 495 
 
 Haverstraw v. Eckerson, 192 N. Y. 54 398, 469 
 
 Hawes v. Chicago, 158 111. 6531 • • 518 
 
 Hawesville v. Hawes, 6 Bush 232 482 
 
 Hawkes v. Kennebeek, 7 Mass. 461 1418 
 
 Hawkins v. Berkshire County Commissioners, 2 Allen 254. .. .343, 834, 1134 
 
 Hawkins v. FaU River, 119 Mass. 94 1188 
 
 Hawkins v. Lawrence, 8 Blackf. 266 227 
 
 Hawkins v. Rochester, 1 Wend. 53 1100 
 
 Hawkins Point Lighthouse Case, 39 Fed. 77 420 
 
 Hawks V. Charlemont, 107 Mass. 414 1314, 1318, 1350 
 
 Hawks V. Charlemont, 110 Mass. 110 177 
 
 Hawkstone St., In re, 199 N. Y. 967 696 
 
 Hawkstone St., In re, 137 App. Div. 630 696 
 
 Hawley v. Harrall, 19 Conn. 142 91, 477, 631, 639 
 
 Hay V. Cohoes County, 3 Barb. 42 - - 228 
 
 Hay V. Commonwealth, 1S3 Mass. 294 693, 1098, 1147 
 
 Hayden v. Skillings, 78 Me. 413 608 
 
 Hayden v. State, 132 N. Y. 533 950 
 
 Hayes v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 64 Iowa 753- 650, 651, 654 
 
 Hayes v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 46 Minn. 349 322, 536, 596 
 
 Hayes v. Kosciusko County Commissioners, 59 Ind. S5& 1101 
 
 Hayes v. Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314 1320 
 
 Hayes v. Ottawa, etc., R. R. Co., 54 111. 37i3 691, 780, 796 
 
Table of Cases. cxiii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Hayford v. Bangor, 102 Me. 340 158, 212, 913, 916, 923, 991, 1118 
 
 Hays V. Risher, 32 Pa. 169 257 
 
 Hays V. Texas, etc., R. R. Co., 62 Tex. 397 1239 
 
 Hayward v. Mayor of New York, 8 Barb. 84'6 • • 161 
 
 Hazelhurst v. Baltimore, 37 Md. 199 1120 
 
 Hazelgreen v. McNabb, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 811 517, 518 
 
 Hazeltine v. Case, 46 Wis. 391 449 
 
 Hazen v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Gray 574 001, 828, 1056, 1244, 1246 
 
 Hazen v. Essex Co., 12 Cush. 475 ■ ■ 131, 154, 197, 226 
 
 Hazlehurst v. Mayes, S* Miss. 7 4»6, 497, 499, 305, 582, 583 
 
 Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U. S. 9 20, 86, 138' 231 
 
 Hfedrich v. Larson, 152 Fed. 93 131 
 
 Heady V. Vevay, etc.. Turnpike Co., 52 Ind. 117 -. 1024, 1143 
 
 Heald- v. Moore, 79 Me. 271. 1407 
 
 Healey v. New Haven, 49 Conn. 394 1238, 1244 
 
 Healey v. Newton, 119 Mass. 480 931,' 932 
 
 Health Department v. Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32 273 
 
 Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris, 33 Wlash. 490 117, 130, 15!8, 236, 257 
 
 Heard v. Brooklyn, 60 N. Y. 242 600, 62|D, 1420 
 
 Heard v. Middlesex Canal, 5 Mete. 81 825, 1152, 1233 
 
 Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 9S 1306 
 
 Heckman v. Swett, 99 Cal. 303 409 
 
 Heckman's Case, 4 Harr. 580 115, 134 
 
 fiedderich v. State, 101 Ind. 364 31 
 
 Heddleston, v. Hendricks, 52 Ohio St. 460 1410 
 
 Hedger v. Aberdeen, etc., Ry. Co., 26 S. D. 491- 600 
 
 Hedges v. West Shore R. R. Co., 150 N. Y. 150 430 
 
 Heer Dry Goods Co. v. Citizens R. R. Co., 41 Mo. App. 63 532 
 
 HefEner v. Cass and Morgan Counties. 193 111. 439 243, 245-, 391, 394, 396 
 
 Heflebower v. United States, 21 Ct. CI. 237 265 
 
 Hefner v. Northwestern Insurance Co., 123 U. S. 747 ■ 71 
 
 Heick V. -Voight, 110- Ind. 279 '. 154 
 
 Heigei v. Wichita Cbunty, 84 Tex. 392 1300 
 
 HeUbrcai v.. Sacramento County, 151 Cal. 271 ; 644 
 
 Heibnan v. Lebanon,, etc., Co., 145 Pa. 23 542 
 
 Heibnan v. Lebanon, etc., St. R. Co., 175 Pa. 188 1396 
 
 Heilseher v. Minneapolis, 46 Minn. 539 323 
 
 Heinrich v. St. Louis, 125 Mo. 424 326, 879, 1405 
 
 Heias v: Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 69 Wis. 555. 528 
 
 Helena v. Harvey, 6 Mont. 114 1066 
 
 Helena v. Hof nor, 58 Ark. 151 1400 
 
 Helena v. Eogan, 26 Mont. 452 • • 991, 1034, 1067, 1068 
 
 Helena v. Rogan, 27 Mont. 135 ■ • 1067, 1068 
 
 Helena Consolidated Water Co. v. Steele, 20 Mont. 1 401 
 
 Helena, etc.. Smelting Co. v. Lynch, 25 Mont. 497 1111, 1129, 1138 
 
 Helena Power Transmission Co. v. McLean, 38 Mont. 3S8 1201 
 
 Helena Power Transmission Co. v. Spratt, 146 Fed. 310 1043 
 
 Helena Power Transmission Co. v. Spratt, 35 Mont. 108. .95, 208, 255, 995 
 
 Helfrich v. CatonsvlHe Water Co., 74 Md. 269 .' 451 
 
 viii 
 
cxiv Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Hellen v. Medford, 188 Mass. 42 617, 625, 904, 1047, 1098, 1222, 1421 
 
 Heller v. Atchison, etc., R. R. Co., 28 Kan. 625 '. 323, 885 
 
 Heller v. Cahill, 13S Iowa 301 1407 
 
 Heller v. Sedalia, 53 Mo. 159 1308 
 
 Helm V. Grayville, 224 111. 274 92, 991 
 
 Hembling V. Big Rapids, 89 Mich. 1 1275, 1355, 1362 
 
 Hempstead v. Des Moines, 52 Iowa 303' 875 
 
 Hempstead v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 261 651, 790, 813, 872 
 
 Hench v. Pritt, 62 W. Va. 270 117, 130, 257 
 
 Henderson v. Central Passenger R. R. Co., 21 Fed. 358 1411, 1413 
 
 Henderson v. Lexington, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 703 • ■ 147, 326, 699 
 
 Henderson v. Lexington, 132 Ky. 390 887, 888, 916 
 
 Henderson v. Macfarland 33 App. D. C. 312 939 
 
 Henderson v. MoClain, 102 Ky. 402. 851, 867, 1322 
 
 Henderson v. New York Central R. R. Co., 78 N. Y. 423 526 
 
 Henderson v. O'Haloran, 114 Ky. 186 1313 
 
 Henderson v. Orange, 9 N. J. L. 71 1137 
 
 Henderson v. Sandefur, 11 Bush 550 1325, 1348 
 
 Henderson, etc., R. R. Co. v. Dickerson, 17 B. Mon. 173 799, 903, 940 
 
 Hendershott v. Ottumwa, 46 Iowa 658 ■ -516, 1318, 1350 
 
 Hendler v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 209 Pa. 256 608 
 
 Hendrick's Appeal, 103 Pa. 358 868, 872 
 
 Hendricks v. Johnson, 5 Port. 208 1101 
 
 Hendricks v. Johnson, 6 Port. 472 1101, 1244 
 
 Hendriekson v. Point Pleasant, 65 N. J. L. 535 947 
 
 Hendrix v. Southern Ry. Co., 130 Ala. 205 1265, 1275 
 
 Hendrix v. Southern Ry. Co., 162 N. C. 9. 608 
 
 Heninger v. Perry, 102 Va. 896 813 
 
 Henkel v. Detroit, 49 Mich. 249 - ■ 214, 1316 
 
 Hennegan v. Denver, etc., Ry. Co., 43 Colo. 122 933 
 
 Henniker v. Contooeook Valley R. R. Co., 29 N. H. 146 1235 
 
 Henning v. Hudson Valley R. R. Co., 90i App. Div. 492 1400 
 
 Henry v. Centralia, etc., R. R. Co., 121 111. 246. 1080, 1086 
 
 Henry v. Dubuque, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Iowa 288 599, 608, 798, 1216 
 
 Henry v. Mason City, etc., R. R. Co., 140 Iowa 201 • • 533 
 
 Henry v. San Miguel County, 41 Colo. 267 1251 
 
 Henry v. Vermont Central R. R. Co., 30 Vt. 638. 419 
 
 Henshaw v. Hunting, 1 Gray 203 1010, 1069 
 
 Henz V. Buckham, 104 Minn. 389 1117 
 
 Hepting v. New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co., 36 La. Ann. 898 497, 528, 530 
 
 Herbein v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 9 Watts. 272. 952 
 
 Herbert v. Pennsylvania E. R. Co., 43 N. J. Eq. 21 312, 322 
 
 Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & F. 507 1306 
 
 Herr v. Newark Board of Education, 82 N. J. L. 610 708, 719 
 
 Herrerra v. United States, 222 U. S. 558 265 
 
 Herrin, etc., R. R. Co. v. Nolte, 243 III. 594 722, 735, 1144 
 
 Herring v. District of Columbia, 3 Mackey 572 1355 
 
 Herring v. Gulick, 5 Hawaii 57 1235 
 
 Herrington v. Lansingburgh, 110 N. Y. 145. . . . • • 1262 
 
Table of Cases. exv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Hernnan v. East St. Louis, 58 111. App. im 763 
 
 Hershberg v. Barbourville, 142 Ky. BO 1344 
 
 Hershfield v. Rocky Mt. Bell Tel. Co., 12 Mont. 102 578 
 
 Herzog v. Cincinnati, 2 Ohio N. P. N. S. 17 .506, 533 
 
 Heskin v. Herbrandson, 21 N. D. 232 809 
 
 Hession v. Wilmington, 1 Hardesty 101 ■ 1327, 1339 
 
 Hester v. Chambers, 84 Mich. S62 947 
 
 Hester v. Detroit, 84 Mich. 450 955 
 
 Heater v. Durham Traction Co., 138 N. C. 288 517, 542, 554 
 
 Heth V. Fond du Lac, 63 Wis. 228 • 1366 
 
 Hetzel V. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 169 U. S. 26 743 
 
 Hewett V. Canton, 182 Mass. 220 833, 840, 1353 
 
 Hewett V. Western Union Tel. Co., 4 Mackay 424 578 
 
 Hewitt V. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 19 Pa. Super. Ct. 304 731 
 
 Hewitt V. Price, 204 Mo. 31 1206 
 
 Heyward v. New York, 7 N. Y. 314 '919, 1421 
 
 Heyward v. United Sta.tes, 46 Ct. CI. 484. .. ■ 313, 418, 721 
 
 Hibernia R. R. Co. v. De Camp, 47 N. J. L. 518. .6 992 
 
 Hickman, Matter of, 4 Harr. 580 234, 235 
 
 Hickman v. Kansas City, 120 Mo. 110 787, 789, 804. 805, 867 
 
 872, 876, 895, 1239, 1242, 1282, 1318, 1322 
 
 Hickok V. Hine, 23 Ohio St. 523 1010 
 
 Hickok V. Plattsburg, 41 Barb. 130 175 
 
 Hickox V. Cleveland, 8 Ohio 543 510, 941, 1235 
 
 Hicks V. Seaboard Air Line Co., 158 N. Y. 393 1318 
 
 Hicks V. Williamsport, 235 Pa. 509 1346 
 
 Hieber v. Spokane, 73 Wash. 122 812, 847, 857 
 
 Higbee v. Oamden, etc., R. R. Co., 19 N. J. Eq. 276 1400 
 
 Higbee v. Rice, 5 Mass. 344 1262 
 
 Higgins V. Chicago, 18 111. 276 1231, 1232 
 
 Higging V. Dublin, 28 L. R. Ir. 484 696 
 
 Higgins V. Flemington Water Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 538 435 
 
 Higgina v. Reynolds, 31 N. Y. 151 482. 612 
 
 Higgins V. Superior, 134 Wis. 264 1309 
 
 Higgiuson v. Nahant, 11 Allen 530 175 
 
 Higginson v. Treasurer and Schoolhouse Commissioners of Boston, 212 
 
 Mass. 583 91, 92, li63, 331, S&l, 392, 398, 399, 401, 617 
 
 906, 1003., 1274 
 
 High Bridge Lumber Co. v. United States, 16 C. C. A. 460 302, 314, 721 
 
 Higbburger v. Milford, 71 Kan. 331 888 
 
 Highland Ave. Ry. Co. v. Birmiingham Um. Ry. Co., 3 Ala. 505 379 
 
 Highland Ave. Ry. Co. v. Mathews, 99 Ala. 24 594, 595, 1282 
 
 Highland Boy Gold Mining 'Co. v. Stricklty, 28 Utah 215 117, 131, 137 
 
 156, 254 
 
 Highway Commissioners v. Clow, 15 Johns. 537 929 
 
 Highway Commissionera v. Kinahan, 240 111. 593 1406 
 
 Hihn Co. v. Santa Cruii, 170 Cal. 436 1265 
 
 Hijo V. United States, 194 U. S. 315 265 
 
 Hilbourne v. Suffolk, 120 Mass. 393 766, 767, 769, 801, 802 
 
esvi Table or Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume 1, T21-143Z in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Hildreth v. LoweU, 11 Gray 345 213, 1244 
 
 HUdrup V. Windfall City, 29 Ind. App. 592 486 
 
 Hilfinger v. State, 208 N. Y. 572 627 
 
 Hill V. Antigo Water Co., 3 Wis. K. K. Com. Rep. 623 685 
 
 HUI V. Boston, 122 Mass. 344 1291, 1298, 1304, 1418 
 
 Hill V. Charlotte, 72 N. C. 55 1316 
 
 Hill V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 38. La. Ann. 5.99 627 
 
 Hill V. Cincinnati Ry. Co., 109 Ind. 511 610, 1392 
 
 Hillv. iGlendon, etc., Co., 113 N. C. 2591 344 
 
 Hill V. Hoffman, 58 S. W. 929 887 
 
 Hill V. Kimiball, 269 111. 399 888 
 
 mil V. Mohawk, etc., R. R. Co., 7 N. Y. isa 626 
 
 HUI V. Sayles, 12 Met. 142 1243 
 
 Hill V. Tualatin Academy, 61 Ore. 190 1306 
 
 Hill V. Western Vermont R. R. Co., 32 Vt. 68 921 
 
 HOlis V. O'Keefe, 189 Mass. 139 1134 
 
 Hills V. Home Insurance Co., 129 Mass. 345 1183 
 
 Hilsdorf v. St. Louis, 45 JVto. 94. 1253, 1296, 1341 
 
 Hilton V. St. Louis, 99 Mo. 199 1152, 1154 
 
 Himmelberger-Harrison Lumber Co. v. Craig, 248 Mo. 3ii9 1409 
 
 Hinchman v. Detroit, 9 Mich- 103 1405 
 
 Hinchman v. Paterson Horse Ry. Co., 17 N. J. Eq. 75 470, 537 
 
 Hinckley, Ex parte, 8 Me. 14Q 946 
 
 Hinckley, In re, 15 Pick. 44? 970 
 
 Hinckley, Petitioner, 59 Me. 517 928 
 
 Hinckley v. Hastings, 2 Pick. 162 1068 
 
 Hinckley v. Niekerson, 117 Mass. 2113 232 
 
 Hinckley v. Seattle, 74 Wash. 101 875 
 
 Hine v. Manhattan R. R. Co., 132 N. Y. 477 1194 
 
 Hine -7. New York Elevated R. R. Co., 128 N. Y. 571 341 
 
 Hines v. Nevada City, 150 Iowa 620 1318, 1378 
 
 Hines v. Rocky Mount, 162 N. C. 409 1314 
 
 Hinghamv. Sprague, 15' Pick. 102 1414 
 
 Hingham v. United States, 161 Fed. 295 654, 729 
 
 Hingham, etc.. Bridge Co. v. Norfolk County, © AUen 353. .395,. 914, ai8, 964 
 
 Hinnershitz v. United.Traction Co., 206 Pa. 91 1396 
 
 Hire v. Kinsely, 130 Ind. 29© 7'68, 797 
 
 Hirsch v. St. Paul, 117 Minn. 476 12151, 1274 
 
 Hiss V. Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co., 52 MEf 242 53i7 
 
 Hitch V. Edgecombe CDunty Commifflionere, 13a N. C. 573 1236, 1300 
 
 Hitchcock V. Aldermen of Springfield, 121 Mass. 382 1053 
 
 Hitchcock V. Zink, 80 Neb. 29 517, 1337 
 
 Hitchins v. Trostburg, 68 Md. 100 1333, 1355, 1364 
 
 Hifctenger Fruit CO. v. Cambridge, 21 8 Mass. 220 499, 838 
 
 Hoadley v. San Francisco, 50 Cal. 265 904 
 
 Hoag V. Switzer, 61 111. 294 318 
 
 Hoagland v. Wurts, 41 N. J. L. 175 134 
 
 Hbbart v. Ford, 6 Nev. 77 343 
 
Table of Cases. cxvii 
 
 tPagee 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Habart v. Milwaukee City Ey. Co., 27' Wis. 194 498, 537, 540, 554 
 
 Hobarifc t. Plymouth County, 100 Mass. IS* 1225, 1406 
 
 Hobba V. Long Distance Tel. & Tel. Co., 147 Ala. 39i3 476, 486, 578 
 
 579, 580 
 
 Hobbs V. Nashville, etc., Ry. Co., 122 Ala. 602' 1032, 1068 
 
 Hoboken v. Pennsylvania E. E. Co., 124 U. S. 656 413, 414 
 
 Hobokea Land, etc., Co. v. Hoboken, 3© N. J. L. 540 441, 1405, 1410 
 
 Hobson V. Philadelphia, 150 Pa. 595 875 
 
 Hobson V. Philadelphia, 155 Pa. 131 517, 1337 
 
 Hockersmith v. Sullivan, 71 Wash. 244 711 
 
 Hodgdon v. Haverhill, 193 Mass. 327 1237 
 
 Hodges v. Baltimore, etc., Ey. Co., 58 Md. 603' 537 
 
 Hodges V. Seaboard, etc., R. E. Co., 88 Va. '663 526 
 
 Hodgea v. Western Union Tel. Co., 133 N. C. 225 577 
 
 Hodgins v. Bay City, 156 Mich. 687 1310 
 
 Hodkinson v. Long Island E. E. Co., 4 Ed. Ch. 411 566 
 
 HoflEman v. Muscatine, 113 lovpa 332 , 1359 
 
 Hoffman v. Philadelphia, 250 Pa. 1 655, 724 
 
 HofEman v. St. Louis, 15 Mo. 651 507 
 
 Hoffman's Appeal, 118 Pa. 512 1236 
 
 Hoggardi v. Monroe, 51 La. Ann. 683 1341 
 
 Hogsett V. Harlan County, 4 Nebr. Unoff. 309 1149 
 
 Hoke V. Henderson, 4 Dev. L. 1 270 
 
 Holbert v. St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co., 45 Iowa 23 995 
 
 Holcomb V. Moore, 4 Allen 529 1051 
 
 Holdame v. Cold Sipring, 23 Barb. 103 175 
 
 Holden v. Berkshire County Oommissioners, 7 Met. 561 1050, 1119 
 
 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 57, 83 
 
 Holladay v. Frisbie, 15 Cal. 631 1416 
 
 HoUenbeck v. Winnebago County, 95 lU. 148 1300 
 
 HoUeran v. Boston, 176 Mass. 75 .839, 1235, 1241, 1362 
 
 Holley V. Torrington, 63 Conn. 426 1238 
 
 HoUingsworth v. Dea Moines, etc., E. E. Co., 63 Iowa 443 608, 690 
 
 Hollingsworth v. Tensas, 17 Fed. 109 246, 308 
 
 HoUingsworth, etc., Co. v. Foxborough Water Supp'ly District, 165 Mass. 
 
 186 1071 
 
 HoUister v. Benediot, etc., Mfg. Co., 113 U. S. 59 1280 
 
 Hollister v. State, 9 Idaho 8 7-6, 208, 908 
 
 HoUister v. Union Co., 9 Conn. 436 .303', 418, 421 
 
 HoUman v. Platteville, 101 Wis. 94 1314 
 
 HoUoway v. Ulniversity E. E. Co., 85 N. C. 4521 1236 
 
 Holly Shelter E. E. Co. v. Newton, 133 N. C. 132 1087, 1096 
 
 Hohnan v. Townsend, 13 Met. 297 835 
 
 Holmes v. Kansas City, 209 Mo. 513 346, 643, 1256 
 
 Holmes v. Walton, N. J., unreported 32 
 
 :Holme8 v. Wilson, 10 Ad. & El. 503 '. . . 1277 
 
 . Hoist V. Savannah Electric Co., 131 Fei 931 551 
 
 Holt V. Sargent, 15 Gray 97 1407 
 
 Holt T. Somerville, 127 Mass. 408 163, 902, 914, 919, 1019 
 
exviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] FAQE 
 
 Holton V. Camilla, 134 Ga. 560 216 
 
 Holyhood Cemetery Association v. Brookline, 215 Mass. 255 671, 1110 
 
 Holyoke Water 'Co. v. Connecticut River Co., 52 Conn. 575 94, 303, 421 
 
 Holyoke Water Power Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 500 94, 227 
 
 Home Building, etc., Co. v. Roanoke, 91 Va. 52 304, 515, 848 
 
 Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422 330, 426, 502 
 
 830, &34, 843 
 
 Home of- the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430 75 
 
 Home Tel. Co. v. People's Tel., etc., Co., 125 Tenn. 270 374 
 
 Homochitto River Commissioners v. Wiifters, 29 Mss. 24 67, 421, 433 
 
 Hood V. Finch, 8 Wis. 381 926, 9'41 
 
 Hood V. Southern Ry. Co., 133 Ala. 374 1154 
 
 Hood V. United States, 46 Ct. CI. 30 302, 314, 418 
 
 Hooe V. Chicago, etc., R. R. 'Co., 98 Wis. 302 ". 1236 
 
 Hooe V. United States, 218 U. S. 322 262 
 
 Hook V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 133 Mo. 313 3i71, 747, 753, 762 
 
 Hooker v. Oummings, 20 J<Jhns. 90 431 
 
 Hooker v. Montpelier, etc., R. R. Co., 62 Vt. 47 667, 670 
 
 Hooker v. New Haven, etc., Co., 14 Conn. 146 314, 507 
 
 Hooker v. New Haven, etc., Co., 15 Conn. 3-12 198 
 
 Hooker v. Utica, etc.. Turnpike Road Co., 12 Wend. 371 1420 
 
 Hooper v. Bridgewater, 102 Mass. 512 1051, 1262 
 
 Hooper v. Savanna^i, etc., R. R. Co., 69 Ala. 529». 721, 730 
 
 Hopkins v. Clemson College, 221 U. S. 6«6 , . 1313 
 
 Hopkins v. Cravey, 85 Tex. 189 liai 
 
 Hopkins v. Florida Central R. R. Co., 9f Ga. 107 191 
 
 Hopkins v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 94 Md. 237 986 
 
 Hoquiam v. Lenhart, 96 Wash. 625 214, 1067 
 
 Hord v. Holston River R. R. Co., 122 Tenn. 39i9i 611, 1250 
 
 Horgan v. Jamestown, 32 R. I. 528 1410 
 
 Horn V. Baltimore, 30 Md. 2ll8 1341, 1342 
 
 Homaday v. State, 63 Kan. 499 982 
 
 Horner v. Beasl'ey, 105 Md. 193 1194 
 
 Horner, etc., R. R. Co., In re, 37 Pa. 333 945 
 
 Hornstein v. Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co., 51 Pa. 87 810 
 
 Horton v. Grand Haven, 24 Mich. 465 922 
 
 Horton v. Newport, 27 R. T. 283 391, 400 
 
 Horton v. Nashville, 4 Lea 39 1325, 1375 
 
 H&rton V. Squankum, etc.. Marl Co., Fed. Cas. No. 6710 154, 255 
 
 Hortsman v. iCbvington, etc., R. R. Co., 18 B. Mon. 218 611 
 
 Hofcchkiss v. Auburn, etc., R. R. Co., 3& Barb. '600 1159 
 
 Hot Springs R. R. Co. v. Williamson, 45 Ark. 429 596, 859, 878, 890 
 
 Houck V. United States, 201 Fed. «62 1120 
 
 Houck V. Wachter, 34 Md. 265 884 
 
 Houck V. Yates, 82 111. 179 409 
 
 Hougan v. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 35 Iowa 558 607, 608 
 
 Hough V. Grant Pass New Water, etc., Co., 41 Ore. 531 1185 
 
 Houghton V. Huron Copper Co., 57 Mich. 547 9^ 
 
 Housatonic, etc., R. R. Co. .v. Lee, etc., R. R. Co., 118 Mass- 391 996, 1000 
 
Table op Cases. cxix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 House V. Rochester, 15 Barb. 517 949 
 
 Houston V. Kleinecke, 20 S. W. 250 879 
 
 Houston V. Richardson, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 147 1360 
 
 Houston V. State, 98 Wis. 486 285 
 
 Houston V. Western Washington R. R. Co., 204 Pa. 324 1195, 1211 
 
 Houfiton, etc., R. R. Co. v. Dallas, 98 Tex. 396 54, 385 
 
 Houston, etc., K. R. Co. v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. 'Oj., 109 La. 581 ... 999 
 
 Houston, etc., E. R. Co. v. Odum, 53 Tex. 343 527 
 
 Hqnston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 18 Tex. Civ. App. 502. 1034 
 
 1035, 1068, 1075 
 
 Houston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Powell, 125 S'. W. 330 847, 888 
 
 Houston, etc., E. R. Co. v. Wilson, 105 S. W. 560 790, 8.13 
 
 Houston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 176 S. W. 907 1222 
 
 Houston Tap, etc., R. R. Co. v. Milburn, 34 Tex. 224 941 
 
 Houtz V. Uinta County Commissioners, 11 Wyo. 152;. : 1300 
 
 Hovey v. Mayo, 43 Me. 322 507 
 
 Hovey v. Perkins, 63 N. H. 516 1071 
 
 Howard v. Attorney-General, Transvaal L. R. 1909i 29 
 
 Howard v. Hutchinson, 10 Me. 335 929, 1045 
 
 Howard v. IngersoU, 17 Ala. 780 93 
 
 Howard v. North BridgewaAer, 16 Pick. 189 150, 1336 
 
 Howard v. Proprietors of Locka & Canals, 12 Oush. 259 1061 
 
 Howard v. Providence, 6 R. I. 514 660, 772, 811, 1186, 1200 
 
 Howard v. Schmidt, 70 Kan. 640 1120 
 
 Howard v. Taylor, 90 Aila. 241 366 
 
 Howard v. Worcester, 153 Mass. 426 1308 
 
 Howard Mills Co. v. Schwartz Lumher, etc., Co., 77 Kan. 599 115, 219 
 
 Howcott V. Warren, 7 Ired. L. 20! 1159 
 
 Howe V. Cambridge, 114 Mass. 388 941 
 
 Howe V. Lowell, 171 Mass. 575 393, 518, 572, 588, 1337 
 
 Howe V. Norman, 13 R. I. 486 989 
 
 Howe V. Ray, 113 Mass. 88 676 
 
 Howe V. West End St. R. R. Co., 167 Mass. 46 526, 541, 543, 548 
 
 Howe V. Weymouth, 148 Mass. 605 1066 
 
 Howell V. Morrisville, 212 Pa. 349 322, 879, 886 
 
 Howell V. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 221 Mass. 169 827, 865 
 
 Howes V. Crush, 131 Mass. 207 * . 232 
 
 Howland v. Westport, 172 Mass. 3i73 1]»77, 1186 
 
 Hoye V. Diehls, 78 Nebr. 77 1120 
 
 Hoyle V. Hickory, 1€4 N. C. 79 508 
 
 Hoyt V. Hudson, 27 Wis. 656 1356^ 1372 
 
 Hruska v. Minneapolis, etc., Ey. Co., 107 Minn. 98 14C0 
 
 Hubbard v. Deming, 21 Conn. 356 491 
 
 Hubbard v. Limerick Water, etc., Co., 109- Me. 248 435, 1244 
 
 Hubbard v. Spring River Power Co., 89 Kan. 446 1282 
 
 Hubbard v. Toledo, 21 Ohio St. 379 326 
 
 Hubbard v. Town, 33 Vt. 295 495 
 
 Hubbell V. Des Moines, 168 Iowa 418 307, 323, 647, 879 
 
 Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355 281 
 
cxx Tajble op Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Hubert v. Grove, 1 Esp. 148 882 
 
 Hubert v. New Orleans, 2i5 U. S. 170 14:18 
 
 Huddleston v. Eugene, 34 Ore. 343 474, 619 
 
 Huddleston v. West Bellevue, 111 Pa. 566 1360 
 
 Hudson V. Cuero Land, etc., Co., 47 Tex. S© 453 
 
 Hudson V. State, 61 Ala. 33S 1175 
 
 Hudson County v. New York Bay K. R. Co., 84 N. J. L. 354 388 
 
 Hudson, etc., Canal Co. v. New York, etc., R. E. Co, 9 Paige 323 987 
 
 Hudson, etc., E. E. Co. v. Wendel, 193 N. Y. 166 601 
 
 Hudson Eiver E. E. Co. v. Day, 54 Fed. 545 1041 
 
 Hudson Eiver Tel. Co. v. New York, 210 N. Y. 394 367 
 
 Hudson River Tel. Co. v. Watervliet Turnpike Co., 133 N. Y. 393 380 
 
 Hudson Tel. Co. v. Jersey City, 49 N. J. L. 303 374 
 
 Huesing v. Rock Island, 128 111. 465 216 
 
 Hueston v. Eaton, etc., E. E. Co., 4 Ohio St. 685 1240 
 
 Huffman v. State, 21 Ind. App. 449 573, 1396 
 
 Huffmire v. Brooklyn, 162 N. Y. 584 .442, 447, 1318 
 
 Huggins V. Hurt, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 404 1240 
 
 Hughes V. Auburn, 161 N. Y. 96 1308, 1375 
 
 Hughes V. Carl, 106 Ky. 333 267 
 
 Hughes V. Cincinnati, etc., E. U. Co., 39 Ohio St. 461 1253 
 
 Hughes V. Heiser, 1 Binn. 46i3 883, 887 
 
 Hughes V. Metropolitan, El. Ey. Co., 130 N. Y. 14 .559, 1163, 1165 
 
 Huling V. Kaw Valley R. R. Co., 130 U. S. 559 .84, 931, 932, 1120 
 
 Hull V. Baird, 73 Iowa 328 240 
 
 Hull V. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 2L Nebr. 371 1104, 1244, 1264 
 
 Hull V. Lincoln County, 62 Me. 325 173 
 
 Hull V. Westfield, 133 Mass. 433 830, 1233 
 
 Hullin V. New Orleans, 11 Rob. 97 1099, 1102, 1103 
 
 Humbird v. Jackson County, 154 U. S. 592 185 
 
 Hume V. Des Moines, 146 Iowa 624 • 1318, 1333, 1352, 1355, 1372 
 
 Humes v. Knoxville, 1 Humph. 403 508 
 
 Hummel v. Cumberland Valley E. E. Co., 175 Pa. 537 .1412, 1413 
 
 Hummelman v. Hoadley, 44 Cal. 213 904 
 
 Humphreys v. Fort Smith, etc.. Power Co., 71 Ark. 152 541 
 
 Humphreys v. Holtsinger, 3 Sneed 238 1192 
 
 Hundhauseu v. Bond, 36 Wis. 38 478 
 
 Hunkins v. Kimball, 57 Ind. 4l2 • 1150 
 
 Hunsicker v. Briscoe, 12 La. Ann. 169 691 
 
 Hunt V. Bay State Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279 703 
 
 Hunt V. Boonville, 65 Mo. 620- 1318, 1343, 1344, 1546 
 
 Hunt V. Boston, 152 Mass. 168 1204, 1207 
 
 Hunt V. Boston, 183 Mass. 30l3 • 66, 71 
 
 Hunt V. Chicago, 60 111. 183 946 
 
 Hunt V. Commonwealth, 183 Mass. 307 1010 
 
 Hunt V. Iowa Central Ry. Co., 86 Iowa 15 1249 
 
 Hunt V. Memphis Gas Light Co., 95 Tenn. 1136 1415 
 
 Hunt V. New York, etc., E. E. Co., 99 Ind. 593 1073 
 
 Hunt V. Otego, 160 App. Div. 158 868, 870, 875 
 
Table of Cases. oxxi 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Hunt V. Otego, 145 N. Y. Supp. 495 1275 
 
 Hunt V. Smith, 9 Kan. 137 621 
 
 Hunt V. Whitney, 4 Mete. 603 1099, 1102 
 
 Hunter v. Matthews, 1 Rob. 468 614, 926 
 
 Hunter v. Matthews, 12 Leigh 228 947 
 
 Hunter v. Moore, 44 Ark. 184 416 
 
 Hunter v. Newport, 5 R. I. 325 • 924 
 
 Hunting v. Curtis, 10 Iowa 152 1239 
 
 Hnntsville v. Ewing, 1161 Ala. 576 1353 
 
 Huntsville v. Goodenrath, 68 So. 676 792, 1322 
 
 Hupert V. Anderson, 35 Iowa 578 1103 
 
 Hurd V. Atchison, etc., Ey. Co., 73 Kan. 83 986 
 
 Hurd V. Rutland, etc., R. R. Co., 25 Vt. 116 609 
 
 Huron Water Works Co. v. Huron, 7 S. D. 9 401, 1415 
 
 Hurst V. Martinsburg, 80 Minn. 40 600, 1024 
 
 Hurt V. Atlanta, 100 Ga. 274 790, 795 
 
 Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 57, 83 
 
 Hussey v. Bryant, 95 Me. 49 1246 
 
 Huston V. Fort Atkinson, 56 Wis. 350 483 
 
 Huteherson v. District of Columbia, 39 App. D. C. 312 514 
 
 Hutches V. Hohokus, 82 N. J. L. 140 72S 
 
 Hutcheson v. International, etc., R. R. Co., 102 Tex. 471 533, 553 
 
 Hutchins v. Vandalia Levee, etc., Disit., 217 III. 561 '. 991 
 
 Hutchinson v. Concord, 41 Vt. 271 1316 
 
 Hutchinson v. McLaughlin, 15 Colo. 492 1031, 1032, 1130 
 
 Hutchinson v. Parkersburg, 25 W. Va. 226 868, 872, 875 
 
 Hutchinson v. Pulaski County, 11 Ky. L. R. 117 1301 
 
 Hutson V. New York, 9 N. Y. 163 1310 
 
 Hutt V. Chicago, 187 111. 145 1069 
 
 Hutton V. Indiana, etc., E. R. Co., 7 Ind. 522 595 
 
 Hutton V. Webb, 124 N. C. 749 406, 415 
 
 I 
 
 Iberia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Morgan's, etc.. Steamship Co., 129 La. 492 70 
 
 Idaho, etc., Ry. Co. v. Coey, 73 Wash. 291 724, 730, 732, 734, 735 
 
 Idaho, etc., Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference, 20 Idaho 568.678, 732, 1177, 1183 
 
 Idaho, etc., Ry. Co. v. Nagle, 184 Fed. 698 864, 878 
 
 Idaho-Iowa Lateral & Reservoir Co. v. Fisher, 27 Idaho 695 616 
 
 Idaho Springs v. Filteau, 10 Colo. 105. 1341, 1342 
 
 Illinois V. Economy Light, etc., Co., 234 U. S. 497 422 
 
 Illinois Canal Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 14 111. 314 160 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Champaign, 163 111. 524 1100 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 138 lU. 453 998, 10«6 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 141 111. 586 913, 918, 998, 10O2 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 156 111. 98 752 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 175 111. 471 415 
 
 Illinois Central E. E. 'Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 122 111. 473. .996, 1000 
 
 Illinois Central E. E. Co. v. Copiah County, 81 Miss. 685 750 
 
cxxii Table op Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.J PAGE 
 
 Illinois Central R. K. Co. v. East Sioux Falls Quarry Co., 33 S. D. 63 . . 63 
 
 117, 156, 1083 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Ferrell, 108 111. App. 659 1154, 1157 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Hasenwinkle, 232 111. 224 603, 1077 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Hoskins, 89 Miss. 730 706, 1245, 1263 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146.U. 8. 3l87 410, 455 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Lostant, 167 111. 85 1069, 1072 
 
 Illinois gentral R. R. Co. v. Mattoon, 161 111. 247-. 747, 1100 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Normal, 175 111. 562 190, 1075 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. People, 143 fil. 434 986 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. School Trustees, 2'12 111. 406 317, 846, 863 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. State, 94 Miss. 759 336 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Stewart, 265 111. 35 348, 1192 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Swalm, 83 Miss. 631 148, 750, 948, 1120 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Wolf, 95 HI. App. 74 892 
 
 Illinois, etc.. Canal Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 14 111. 314 972 
 
 Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. Elliot, 129 Ky. 121 532, 864 
 
 Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. Freeman, 210 111. 270 741 
 
 Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387 414, 415 
 
 Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mayrand, 93 111. 591 1081 
 
 Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. Switzer, 117 111. 399 729 
 
 Illinois, etc., E. E. Co. v. Turner, 194 111. 575 592, 595, 597, 890 
 
 Illinois, etc.. Savings Bank v. Chicago, 247 111. 264 470 
 
 Illinois State Trust Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 208 111. 419. .90, 9«, 983 
 
 Illinois Telegraph News Co. v. Meine, 242 111. 568 691 
 
 Illyes V. White River Light, etc., Co., 175 Ind. 118 920, 988 
 
 Imhescheid v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 171 Mass. 209 653 
 
 Imlay v. Union Branch R. R. Co., 26 Conn. 249 470, 525, 722, 1255, 1395 
 
 Imler v. Springfield, 65 Mo. 119 1250, 1318, 1353 
 
 Imperial Irrigation Co. v. Jayne, 104 Tex. 395 60, 74, 249, 250, 998, 1005 
 
 Independence and Westport Road, In re Grading of, 238 Mo. 323 945 
 
 Independent Nat. Gas Co. v. Butler Water Co., 210 Pa. 177 10O4 
 
 Independent School District v. State, 124 Minn. 271 998 
 
 Indiana v. Lake Erie, etc., Co., 83 Fed. 287 384 
 
 Indiana Central R. R. Co. v. Atkinson, 6 Ind. 149 952 
 
 Indiana Central R. R. Co. v. Hunter, 8 Ind. 74 773, 797 
 
 Indiana Central R. R. Co. v. Oakes, 20 Ind. 9 1O30 
 
 Indiana Central R. R. Co. v. State, 3 Ind. 42il 390 
 
 Indiana, etc., R. R. Co. v. Allen, 100 Ind. 409 706, 1154 
 
 Indiana, etc., R. R. Co. v. Allen, 113 Ind. 308 722, 1285 
 
 Indiana, etc., R. R. Co. v. Conness, 184 111. 178 1075 
 
 Indiana, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cook, 102 Ind. 1313 1139 
 
 Indiana, etc., R. R. Co. y. Eberle, 110 Ind. 542. .308, 506, 527, 532, 594, 595 
 
 Indiana, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rinehart, 14 Ind. App. 588 731, 1073 
 
 Indianapolis Cable St. Ey. Co. v. Citizens St. Ry. Co., 127 Ind. 369 538 
 
 Indianapolis, etc., E. R. Co. v. Branson, 172 Ind. 383 7-36 
 
 Indianapolis, etc., E' E. Co. v. Hartley, 67 111. 439 526, 1397, 1419 
 
 Indianapolis, etc., E. E. Co. v. Indianapolis, etc., E. E. Co., 33 Ind. 
 
 App. 337 ■ • 1000 
 
Table of Cases. cxxiii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Newsom, 54 Ind. 121 1050, 1060 
 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Smitli, 52 Ind. 428 595 
 
 Indianapolis, etc., Road Co. v. Belt Ry. Co., 110 Ind. 5 347 
 
 Indiianapolis, etc., Traction Co. v. Larrabee, 168 Ind. 2,37 736 
 
 Indianapolis, etc.. Traction Co. v. Wiles, 174 Ind. 236 626, 722, 723, 1182 
 
 1195, 1211 
 Indianapolis Northern Traction Co. v. Dunn, 37 Ind. App. 248.722, 725, 798 
 
 Indianapolis Southern R. R. Co. v. Shea, 45 Ind. App. 608 1175 
 
 Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Ripley, 175 Ind. 103 1139 
 
 Indianapolis Waterworks Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 3«4 3, 59, 66, 612 
 
 913, 919 
 
 Indiana Power Co. v. St. Joseph, etc., Power Co., 159 Ind. 42 1006 
 
 Indiana Ry. Co. v. Calvert, 168 Ind 321 376 
 
 Indiana Union Traction Co. v. Grough, 54 Ind. App. 438 541 
 
 Inferior Court Justices v. Griffin, etc.. Road Co., 9 Ga. 475 924 
 
 Ingalls V. Eastman, 61 Wash. 289 887 
 
 Inge V. Police Jury, 14 La. Ann. 117 1154 
 
 Ingleside Mfg. Co. v. Charleston Light, etc., Co., 76 S. C. 95 208 
 
 Ingraham v. Camden, etc.. Water Co., 82 Me. 335 66 
 
 Ingram v. Maine Water Co., 98 Me. 566 227, 940, 942 
 
 Inman v. Tripp, 11 R. L 520 1244, 13a9, 1360, 1365 
 
 International Bridge, etc., Co. v. McLane, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 665 704 
 
 International, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bell, 130 S. W. 634. .533, 723, 724, 769, 812 
 
 International, etc., R. R. Co. v. Benitos, 59 Tex. 326 1239, 1244, 1283 
 
 International, etc., R. E. Co. v. Boles, 161 S. W. 914 470 
 
 International, etc., R. R. Co. v. Pape, 62 Tex. 313 733 
 
 International Falls v. Minnesota, etc., Ry. Co., 117 Minn. 14 39'5 
 
 International Lumber Co. v. American Suburbs Co., 119 Minn. 77.. 1084 
 
 1085, 1400 
 
 Interstate Consolidated, etc., E. E. Co. v. Early, 46 Kan. 197 870 
 
 Initerstate Consolidated, etc., E. E. Co. v. Simpson, 45 Kan. 714 799 
 
 Iowa Lateral & Reservoir Co. v. Fisher, 27 Idaho 695 60, 74 
 
 Ipswich V. Essex County Commissioners, 10 Pick. 519 1048 
 
 Ipswich Mills V. Essex County Commissioners, 108 Mass. 363.... 1148, 1153 
 
 Iron E. E. Co. v. Ironton, 19 Ohio St. 299 199, 1007 
 
 Iron Mt. E. E. Co. v. Bingham, 87 Tenn. 522 514, 527, 5311, 1277 
 
 Irvine v. Atlantic Ave. R. R. Co., 10 App. Div. 560 140O 
 
 Irving V. Media, 194 Pa. 648 435 
 
 Irwin V. Great Southern Tel. Co., 37 La. Ann. 63 469, 578 
 
 Irwin V. Yazoo, etc., R. R. Co., 99 Miss. 394 610, 300 
 
 Island Creek R. R. Co. v. Logan, etc., Ey. Co., 70 W. Va. 98 1240, 1254 
 
 Isle of Ely, Case of the, 10 Co. Eep. 141 (6, 9 
 
 Isleta V. Tondre, 18 N. M. 38» 116, 249, 260 
 
 Isom V. Mississippi Central E. R. Co., 36 Miss. 300 762, 803, 940, 946 
 
 Israel v. Jewett, 29 Iowa 475 798 
 
 Ives V. Bast Haven, 48 Conn. 272 936, 937, 1078, 1079 
 
 Iveson V. Moore, 1 Salk. 15 821 
 
cxxiv Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 J 
 
 Jackson v. Chicago, etc., R. E. Co., 41 Fed. 656 885 
 
 Jackson v. Hathaway, 15 Johns, 447 470, 471, 1420 
 
 Jackson v. Jackson, 16 Ohio St. 163 510 
 
 Jackson V. Kiel, 13 Colo. 378 595, 878, 881 
 
 Jackson v. Lamp'hire, 3 Pet. 280 956 
 
 Jackson v. Owingsville, 121 S. W. 672 1307 
 
 Jackson v. Eutland, etc., E. E. Co. 25 Vt. 150 601 
 
 Jackson v. State, 160 App. Div. 110 697 
 
 Jackson v. State, 145 N. Y. Supp. 131 697 
 
 Jackson v. United States, 230 U. S. 1 302, 315, 419 
 
 Jackson V. Williams, 92 Miss. 301 867, 872, 991 
 
 Jackson County v. Waldo, 85 Mo. 637 804, 805 
 
 Jacksonville v. Drew, 19 Fla. 106 1252 
 
 Jacksonville v. Jacksonville E. E. Co., 67 111. 640 393 
 
 Jacksonville v. Lambert, 62 111. 519 313 
 
 Jacksonville Electric Light Co. v. Jacksonville, 36 Pla. 229 204 
 
 Jacksonville, etc., R. E. Co. v. Adams, 27 Fla. 443 936, 1076, 1263 
 
 Jacksonville, etc., E. E. Co. v. Adama, 28 Fla. «31 704, 705, 906 
 
 Jacksonville, etc., E. E. Co. v. Adams, 29 Fla. 260 1115 
 
 Jacksonville, etc., E. E. Co. v. Adams, 33 Fla. 608 943, 944 
 
 Jacksonville, etc., E. E. Co. v. Lockwood, 33 Fla. 573 594 
 
 Jacksonville, etc., E. R. Co. v. Thompson, 34 Fla. 346 532, 885 
 
 Jacksonville, etc., E. E. Co. v. Walsh, 106 111. 253 1173 
 
 Jacob V. Louisville, 9 Dana 114 768, 778, 779 
 
 Jacobs V. Allard, 43 Vt. 303 449 
 
 Jacobs V. Clearview Water Supply Co., 220 Pa. 3S» 3, 60, 117, 131, 141 
 
 155, 202 
 
 Jacobson v. Wisconsin, etc., E. R. Co. 71 Minn. 519 374 
 
 Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co. v. Brookline, 121 Mass. 5 377, 379, 831, 873 
 
 James v. Campbell, 104 U. S. 356 68 
 
 James v. San Francisco, 6 Cal. 528 1252 
 
 James v. Seattle, 57 Wash. 318. .■ 1269 
 
 James River, etc., Co. v. Thompson, 3 Gratt. 270 973 
 
 James Eiver, etc., Co. v. Turner, 9 Leigh 313 766, 813 
 
 Jamieson v. Case County, 56 Ind. 466 952 
 
 Jamieson v. Kings County Elevated' Ey. Co., 147 N. Y. 322 1283, 1224 
 
 Janes v. Eacine, 155 Wis. 1 632, 637 
 
 Janesville v. Carpenter, 77 Wis. 288 281, 407, 453 
 
 Janesville Bridge Co. v. Stoughton, 1 Pinney 667 360 
 
 Janssen v. Lanuners, 29 Wis. 88 958 
 
 Janvrin v. Poole, 181 Mass. 463 1119 
 
 Jarnecke Ditch, In re, 69 Fed. 161 1043 
 
 Jarrett Lunrber Co. v. Christopher, 65 Fla,. 379 258, 259, 525, 1282, 1283 
 
 Jarvis v. Furman, 25 Hun. 391 1189 
 
 Jayne v. Cortlandt Water Works Co., 107 App. Div. 587 572 
 
 Jaynes v. Omaha St. Ry. Co., 53 Neb. 631.... 471, 543, 555, 596, 846, 8S3 
 
Table op Cases. oxxv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Jeflers v. Annapolis, 107 Md. 268 541 
 
 Jefferson v. Chapman, 127 111. 438 1252 
 
 Jefferson v. Delachaise, 22 La. Ann. 26 1082 
 
 Jefferson, etc., E. R. Co. v. Dougherty, 40 Ind. 33 631, 635 
 
 Jefferson, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hazeur, 7 La. Ann. 182 1083 
 
 Jeffersonville, etc.,. R. R. Co. v. Esterle, 76 Ky. 667 524, 595, 596, 770 
 
 Jefferson Police Jury v. D'Heinecourt, 7 Rob. 509 621 
 
 Jeffery v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 138 Wis. 1 625, 626, 723, 728 
 
 Jeffery v. Osborne, 145 Wis. 351 679, 723, 724, 729 
 
 Jeffress v. Oreenville, 154 N. C. 490 3, 59, 173, 419, 914, 916, 927 
 
 Jeffrey v. Blue Hill Turnpike, 10 Mass. 368 1058, 1228 
 
 Jeffrey v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 138 Wis. 1 1199 
 
 Jeffries v. Swampscott, 105 Mass. 535 1055, 1069 
 
 Jenal V. Green Island Draining Co., 12 Neb. 163 116, 130, 244 
 
 Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 74 212 
 
 Jenkins v. Riggs, 100 Md. 427 1120 
 
 Jennings, Ex parte, 6 Cow. 447 406, 435, 1239 
 
 Jennings v. Van Schaick, 108 N. Y. 530 481 
 
 Jensen v. Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408 1306 
 
 Jernee v. Monmouth County Freeholders, 52 N. J. L. 553 1301 
 
 Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315 691, 1254 
 
 Jersey City v. Central R. R. Co., 40 N. J. Eq. 417 874 
 
 Jersey City v. Gardner, 33 N. J. Eq. 622 1007, 1057, 1100, 1228 
 
 Jersey City v. Morris Canal, etc., Co., 12 N. J. Eq. 547 1410 
 
 Jersey City v. Suckett, 44 N. J. L. 428 969 
 
 Jersey City, etc., Ry. Co. v. Jersey City, etc., Ry. Co., 21 N. J. Eq. 550. . 382 
 Jersey City Water Commissioners, In re, 31 N. J. L. 72.. 1098, 1099, 1100 
 
 Jessup V. LoTicke, 55 Pa. 350 1420 
 
 Jeter v. Vinton-Roanoke Water Co., 114 Va. 769 63, 66, 145, 149, 435 
 
 Jewell V. Rochester, 68 N. H. 603 1062 
 
 Jewett V. New Haven, 38 Conn. 368 1307 
 
 Joehem v. Robinson, 72 Wis. 199 478 
 
 Jockheck v. Shawnee County Commissioners, 53 Kan. 789 2, 62, 158, 921 
 
 Johanson v. Seattle, 80 Wash. 527 875 
 
 John and Cherry Sts., Re, 19 Wend. 659 365 
 
 Johnson's Case, 4 Ct. iQ. 250 310 
 
 Johnson v. Atlantic, etc., R. E. Co., 35 N. H. 569 1250, 1393 
 
 Johnson v. Boston, 130 Mass. 452 732 
 
 Johnson v. Clayton County Supervisors, 61 Iowa 89 115, 236, 1050, 1119 
 
 Johnson v. Freeport, etc., R. R. Co., Ill 111. 413 671, 1178 
 
 Johnson v. Hawthorne Ditch Co., 32 S. D. 499 1268 
 
 Johnson v. Joliet, etc., R. R. Co., 23 111. 202 S26, 928, 940 
 
 Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 61 Hun 627 1223 
 
 Johnson v. McMulIin, 3 Wyo. 237 1192 
 
 Johnson v. Parkersburg, 16 W. Va. 402 868, 968, 1319, 1322 
 
 Johnson v. Peterson, 85 Neb. 83 622, 125fi 
 
 Johnson v. Rankin, 70 N. C. 550 622 
 
 Johnson v. St. Louis, 96 0. C. A. 617 670, 571, 855 
 
 Johnson v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 32 Ark. 758 1236 
 
 ix 
 
cxxvi Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Johnson v. Somerville, 195 Mass. 37'0 1319 
 
 Johnson v. Southern Ey. Co., 71 S. C. 241 610, 1236 
 
 Johnson v. Spokane, 72 Wash. 298 1240 
 
 Johnson v. Stayton, 5 Harr. 362 884 
 
 Johnson v. Sutton, etc.. Gas Co., 1899, 1 Q. B. 217 820 
 
 Johnson v. Thompson-Houston Electric Co., 54 Hun 469 582 
 
 Johnson v. White, 26 K. I. 207 1360 
 
 Johnson v. Wyman, 9 Gray 186 1406, 1407 
 
 Johnson Avenue, In re, 198 N. Y. 505 351 
 
 Johnson City Southern K. R. Co. v. South, etc., E. R. Co., 148 N. C 53. 1093 
 
 Johnson Co. v. Philadelphia, 236 Pa. 510 1252 
 
 Johnson's Appeal, 4 Sadler 2115 210 
 
 Johnston, In re, 137 Cal. 115 395 
 
 Johnston v. Charleston, etc., Ey. Co., 71 S. C. 241 611, 1392 
 
 Johnston v. Delaware, etc., R. E. Co., 245 Pa. 338 1082, 1257 
 
 Johnston v. District of Columbia, 118 U. S. 19 1328, 1333, 1338, 1374 
 
 Johnston v. Galveston County, 85 S. W. 511 1067 
 
 Johnston v. Herkimer County Supervisors, 19 Johns. 272 1231 
 
 Johnston v. Lonsdorf, 128 Wis. 17 879 
 
 Johnston v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 60 Hun 583 1176 
 
 Johnston v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 18 R. I. 642 325, 347, 349, 350, 888, 1169 
 
 Joliet V. Harwood, 86 111. 110 1252 
 
 Joliet V. Verley, 35 111. 58 1325, 1348 
 
 Joliet, etc., R. R. Co. v. Barrows, 24 111. 562 1100 
 
 JolifF V. Muncie Electric Light Co., 181 Ind. 650 102.7, 1068 
 
 Jones V. Adams, 19 ISTev. 7» 437 
 
 Jones V. Bangor, 144 Pa. 638 869, 872, 1274 
 
 Jones V. Barclay, 2 J. J. Marsh. 76 736 
 
 Jones V. Carragan, 36 N. J. L. 52 696 
 
 Jones V. Carter, 8 Allen 431 955 
 
 Jones V. Delaware, etc., R. R. Co., 208 N. Y. 40 1256, 1259 
 
 Jones V. Erie, etc., R. E. Co., 151 Pa. 30 526, 556, 564, 594, 596, 598 
 
 863, 1178, 1179 
 
 Jones V. Erie, etc., R. R. Co., 169 Pa. 3i33 1000 
 
 Jones V. Ferro Concrete Construction Co., 154 Ky. 47 1320 
 
 Jones V. Franklin County Commissioners, 130 N. C. 451 1235, 130O 
 
 Jones V. Gillis, 75 Wash. 688 869 
 
 Jones V. Henderson, 147 N. C. 120 1250, 1351 
 
 Jones V. Keith, 37 Tex. 399 441, 619 
 
 Jones V. Mahaska County Coal Co., 47 Iowa 35 952 
 
 Jones V. Metropolitan Park Commissioners, 181 Mass. 494 333 
 
 Jones V. New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co., 70 Ala. 227 658, 704, 705 
 
 Jones V. North Georgia Electric Co., 125 Ga. 618 115, 170, 208 
 
 Jones V. Richmond, 18 Grat. 517 274, 286 
 
 Jones V. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 84 Mo. 151 1392 
 
 Jones V. Seattle, 23 Wash. 753 814 
 
 Jones V. Sewer Improvement District, 177 S. W. 888 , 443 
 
 Jones V. Tatham, 20 Pa. 398 149 
 
 Jones V. Tucker, 41 N. H. 546 1186 
 
Table of Cases. cxxvii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422. In. Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Jonea v. United States, 48 Wis. 385 314 
 
 Jones V. Van Bochove,. 103 Mich. 08 1413 
 
 Jones V. Williamsburg, 97 Va. 722 13116 
 
 Jones V. Wills Valley R. R. Co., 30 Ga. 43 774, 778, 780,. 795 
 
 Jones' HeiFs v. Barclay,. 2 J. J. Marsh. 73 1131 
 
 Jones & Co. v. Venalble, 120 Ga. 1 188, 194 
 
 Jopliil V. Southwest Mifisouri Light 'Co., 181 U. S. 150 361 
 
 Joplin Consolidated Mining Co. v. Joplin, 124 Mo. 12!> 214, 443, 902 
 
 927, 1019 
 
 Jordan v. Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312i 508, 850, 876i, 1319, 1355, 1360 
 
 Jordan v. Otis, .37 Barb. 50 175 
 
 Jordan v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 42 Minn. 172 610, 1392 
 
 Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me. 317 136, 228, 615, 907 
 
 Jourdain v. Evansville, 163 Ind. 512 272 
 
 Judd V. Hartford, 72 Conn-. 350 1295, 1374 
 
 Judson V. Winsted, 80 Conn. 384 > 1309 
 
 Julia Building Ass'n v. Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo. 258 480, 578, 580 
 
 Julien V. Woodenrall, 82' Ind. 568 608 
 
 June V. Puroell, 36 Ohio St. 366 409 
 
 Jurada v. Cambridge, 171 Mass. 144 1182, 1186 
 
 Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U. S. 297 265 
 
 Justice V. Lancaster, 20 Mo. App. 559 1275 
 
 Justice V. Nesquehoning Valley R. R. Co., 87 Pa. 28 704 
 
 Justis V. Georgia Industrial Realty Co., 109 Va. 366 346, 1090, 1121 
 
 Juvinall v. Jamesburg Drainage District, 204 111. 106 243, 303, 796, 943 
 
 944, 1376 
 
 K 
 
 Kaje V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 57 Minn. 422 596 
 
 Kakeldy v. Columbia, etc., Co., 3Y Wash. 675 633, 602, 1396 
 
 Kalama Electric, etc., Co. v. Kalama Driving Co., 48 Wash. 612 258, 406 
 
 421 
 
 Kamper v. Chicago, 215 Fed. 706 1265 
 
 Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Va. Cas. 24' 36 
 
 Kanaga v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 76 Mo. 207 1269 
 
 Kanawha Central Ry. Co. v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 72S. 975 
 
 Kanawlia, etc., R. R. Co.. v. Glen Jean, etc., R. R. Co-., 45 W. Va. 119. . 1009 
 
 Kane V. Baltimore, 15 Md. 240 116, 156-, 616 
 
 Kane v. New York El. Ry. Co., 125 N. Y. 164 469, 488, 498, 559, 592 
 
 593, 596, 597 
 
 Kanne v. Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co-., -33 Minn. 419 937, 1079 
 
 Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125 94 
 
 Kansas Central R. R. Co. v. Allen, 22- Kan. 285 599, 601, 691, 1419 
 
 Kansas Central R. R. Co. v. Allen, 24 Kan. 33 1175 
 
 Kansas Central R. R. Co. v. Jackson County Commissioners, 45 Kan. 716 
 
 370, 747, 749 
 
 Kansas City v. Bacon, 157 Mo. 450 787 
 
 Kansas City v. Brady, 52 Kan. 2.97 1345 
 
 City V. Hennegan, 152 Fed. 249 1041 
 
cxxviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Kansas City v. Hill, 80 Mo. 523 > 940, 1144 
 
 Kansas City v. Hyde, 19© Mo. 49S 116, 176, 1000 
 
 Kansas City v. Kansas City Belt R. R. Co., 102' Mo. «33 749 
 
 Kansas City v. Lemen, 57 Fed. 905 1341 
 
 Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458 65, 914 
 
 Kansas City v. St. Louis, etc.. Land- Co., 260 Mo. 366 1023 
 
 Kansas City v. Snfart, 128 Mo. 272. 944 
 
 Kansas City v. Street, 36 Mo. Apjp. 6^6 1144 
 
 Kansas City v. Vineyard, 128 Mo. 75 939 
 
 Kansas City v. Ward, 134 Mo. 172v. 163 
 
 Kansas City v. Woerislioeflfer, 219 Mo. 1 66, 1077 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Anderson, '88 Ark. 129i 658, 660, 696, 697 
 
 Kansas City, ete.j R. R. Co. v. Boles, 88 Ark. 533 695, 741 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Davis, 197 Mo. 669 9fl3 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Farrell, 76 Mo. 183 622, 730 
 
 Kaneas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Fisher, 49 Kan. 17 659, 661 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Fisher, 53 Kan. 512 936, 1077 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Interstate Lumber Co., 37 Fed. 3 1041 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 118 Mo. 599 
 
 75:3, 755, 945, »73 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 49 Kan. 19 1114 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Oo. v. Ej-egelo, 32 Kan. 1608 691, 7^4 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Lackey, 72 Miss. 8'81 15!&0, 1392 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Littler, 70 Kan. 556 742 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. louisiana Western R. R. Co., 116 La. 178 
 
 192, 754 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Merrill, 25 Kan. 421 739, 741 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Morley, 45 Mo. App. 304 379, 385 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Nelson, 193 Mo. 2fl7 1066 
 
 K-ansaia City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Norcross, 137 Mo. 415 741, H33 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. St. Joseph Terminal Co., 97 Mo. 457 999 
 
 1322, 1388 
 Kansas, City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Second St. Improvement Co., 256 Mo. 386 
 
 694, 717, 1150, 1269 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Splitlog, 45 Kan. 68 1223 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Vickroy, 46 Kan. 248 1189, 1198 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Weaver, 86 Mo. 473 338 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Weidenmann, 77 Kan. 300 666 
 
 Kansas City Independent Ave. Boulevard, In re, 128 Mo. 273 1026 
 
 Kansas, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cuykendall, 42 Kan. 234 531 
 
 Kansas, etc., R. R. Co. v. Northwestern Coal, etc., Co., lei Mo. 288. . ,. 185 
 
 187, 192, 257, 916, 918, 973, 993, 10O2, 1091 
 Kansas Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Leavenworth, etc., Bridge Co., 89 Kan. 
 
 418 722, 725, 726 
 
 Karst V. St. Paul, etc., E. E. Co., 22 Minn. 118 378 
 
 Kasohke v. Camfield, 46 Colo. 60 1139 
 
 Katzenstein v. Hartford, 89 Conn. 663 1375 
 
 Kaufman v. Pittsburg, etc., R. E. Co., 210 Pa. 440 1195 
 
 Kaufman v. Tacoma, etc., R. E. Co., 11 Wash. 632 814 
 
Table of Cases. cxxix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 Kaukaima Water Power Co. v. Green Bay, etc.. Canal Co., 142 U. S. 
 
 254 150, 197, 198, 203, 205, 1235, 1273 
 
 Kaw Valley Drainage District v. Kansas City Terminal Ey. Co., 87 
 
 Kan. 272 460 
 
 Kaw Valley Drainage District v. Metropolitan Water Co., 108 C. C. A. 
 
 393 915, 1013, 1040, 1041, 1082 
 
 Kay V. Glade Creek, etc., R. R. Co., 47 W. Va. 467 1112, 1181 
 
 Kayser v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 88 Neb. 343 723, 724 
 
 KaysviUe v. Ellison, 18 Utah 163 ... .' 267 
 
 Kean v. Elizabeth, 54 N. J. L. 462 183, 325, 330 
 
 Kean v. Elizabeth, 55 N". J. L. 387 325, 330 
 
 Kean v. Stetson, 5 Pick. 492 1010 
 
 K^rney v. Ballentine, 54 N. J. L. 194 929 
 
 Kearney v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 129 N. Y. 76 338 
 
 Kearney v. Thoemason, 25 Nebr. 147 1364 
 
 Kearney v. West Chester, 199i Pa. 392 1409 
 
 Keasy v. Louisville, 4 Dana 154 510 
 
 Keating v. Cincinnati, 38 Ohio St. 141 515, 1319, 1351 
 
 Kenton v. Godfrey, 152 N. C. 16 947 
 
 Keats V. Hugo, 15 Mass. 204 495 
 
 Keen v. Waycross, 10 Ga. 588 215 
 
 Keene v. Bristol, 26 Pa. 46 637 
 
 Keene v. Chapman, 25 Me. 126 1233, 1321 
 
 Keene v. Metropolitan El. R. R. Co., 79 Hun. 451 742 
 
 Keeney v. Eargo, 14 N. D. 423 1181 
 
 Keever v. Mankato, 113 Minn. 55 1310 
 
 Kehoe v. Rutherford, 74 N. J. L. 659 1318, 1360 
 
 Kehrer v. Richmond, 81 Va. 745 304, 508, 1357 
 
 Keil V. Ohartiers Valley 'Gas Co., 131 Pa. 466 1244 
 
 Keil V. Grays Harbor, etc., Ry. Co., 71 Wash. 163 526, 543, 1285 
 
 Keim v. Philadelphia, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. 149 371, 747 
 
 Keirns v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 173 N. Y. 642 559 
 
 Keithaburg v. Simpson, 70 111. App. 662 1371 
 
 Keithsburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Henry, 70 111. 290 733, 741, 745 
 
 Kelchner v. Kansas City; 86 Kan. 762 1172 
 
 KeUer v. Bading, 169 111. 152 356 
 
 Keller v. Corpus Christi, 50 Tex. 614 264, 1248 
 
 Keller v. Harrisburg, etc., R. R. Co., 151 Pa. 67 959 
 
 Kelley v. Green Bay, etc., R. R. Co., 80 Wis. 328 1265 
 
 Kelley v. People's National Fire Ins. Co., 262 111. 158 1208 
 
 K«lliher v. Miller, 97 Mass. 71 12O0 
 
 Kellogg V. Malin, 50 Mo. 496 600, 1420 
 
 Kellogg V. School District No. 10, 13 Okla. 285 925 
 
 Kellogg V. Union Co., 12 Conn. 7 101 
 
 Kelly V. Boston, 186 Mass. 165 1308, 1319 
 
 Kelly V. Marion, 161 Ind. 322 517, 1337 
 
 Kelly V. Minneapolis, 57 Minn. 294 514, 535 
 
 KeUy V. New York, 11 N. Y. 432 12S2 
 
cxxx Table of Cases. 
 
 [Piges 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAOH 
 
 Kelly V. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 7S 267, I28« 
 
 Kelly V. Pittsburgh, etc., R. E. Co., 28 Ind. App. 457 1331 
 
 Kelly V. Waterbury, 82 Conn. 255 1254 
 
 Kelly Nail, etc., Co., v. Lawrence Furnace Co., 46 Ohio St. 544 1407 
 
 Kelsey v. King, 32 Barb. 410 214, 571, 573, 1379 
 
 Kelton T. Tavel, 174 Ala. 25» 1096 
 
 Kemper v. Louisville, 14 Bush 22 .^ 314, 1355 
 
 Kendall v. Hardy, 208 Mass. 20 479 
 
 Kendall v. Kingston, 8 Mass. 524 36 
 
 Kendall v. Missisaquoi, etc., E. K. Co., 55 Vt. 438 959, 1282 
 
 Kendall v. Post, 8 Ore. 141 941, 123S 
 
 Kennebec Water District v. Waterville, 97 Me. 185.. 59, 155, 659, 680, 682 
 
 683, 684, 685, 688, 737, 742, 1192 
 
 Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 103 U. S. 599 634, 791 
 
 Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 11 Bias. 13 612 
 
 Kennedy v. Jones, 11 Ala. 63 441 
 
 Kennelly v. Jersey City, 57 N. J. L. 293 542, 1396 
 
 Kennett's Petition, 24 N. H. 139 318 
 
 Kenney v. Williams, 14 Barb. 629 482 
 
 Kennison v. Arlington, 144 Mass. 456 S3i9, 1056, 1071, 1244, 1246 
 
 Kennison v. Beverly, 146 Mass. 467 1364 
 
 Kenny v. Pittsburg, etc., E. E. Co., 208 Pa. 30 67 
 
 Kensington v. Wood, 10 Pa. 93 339, 1135, 1136, 1319, 1351, 1357 
 
 Kensington, etc., Turnpike Co., In re, 97 Pa. 260 1118 
 
 Kent V. Essex County Commissioners, 10 Pick. 821 1159 
 
 Kenton County Court v. Black Lick Turnpike Co., 10 Bush 529.. 996, 1000 
 
 Kentucky, etc.. Bridge Co. v. Held, 16 Ky. Law Eep. 160 1195 
 
 Kentucky Eailroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321 86 
 
 Keokuk, etc., E. E. Co. v. Donnell, 77 Iowa 221 1023 
 
 Kernan v. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 123 111. 188 1223 
 
 Kemochan v. New York Elevated Ey. Co., 128 N. Y. 559 328, 1157 
 
 Kerr, Ee, 42 Barb. 119 68 
 
 Kerr v. Brookline, 208 Mass. 190 1308 
 
 Kerr v. New Orleans, 126 Fed. 920 1416 
 
 Kerr v. South Park Commissioners, 117 U. S. 3i79 658 
 
 Kerr v. West Shore E. E. Co., 127 N. Y. 269 66, 430 
 
 Kersey v. Schuylkill Eiver, etc., E. E. Co., 133 Pa. 234 728, 1213 
 
 Kester v. Western Union Tel. Co., 108 Fed. 926 576, 581, 755 
 
 Ketcham v. New York, etc., E. E. Co., 177 N. Y. 247 559 
 
 Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 374 587 
 
 Kettle Eiver E. E. Co. v. Eastern E. E. Co., 41 Minn. 461 116, 141 
 
 192, 365 
 
 Kevil V. Princeton, 118 S. W. 363 308 
 
 Kewanee v. Otley, 204 111. 402 443, 445 
 
 Keys V. Uniontown Eadial St. Ey. Co., 236 Pa. 611 170 
 
 Keystone Bridge Co. v. Summers, 13 W. Va. 482 365 
 
 Kidder v. Oxford, 116 Mass. 165 651, 1149 
 
 Kidson v. Bangor, 99 Me. 139 105S 
 
Table of Cases. oxxxi 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Kiebler v. Holmes, 58 Mo. App. 119 1155 
 
 Kiernan v. Chicago, etc., E. R. Co. 123 111. 188 659 
 
 Kiernan v. Portland, 223 U. S. 151 65 
 
 KiHwurn City v. Southern Wisconsin Power Co., 14» Wis. 168 992 
 
 Kilbiirn v. Adams, 7 Met. 33 1409 
 
 Kile V. Yellowhead, 80 111. 208 91 
 
 Killbuck Private Road, 77 Pa. 39 23*5 
 
 Kilmer v. McDonald, 69 N. Y. 362 9(Vi 
 
 Kimball v. Alameda County, 46 Cal. 19 936, 1079 
 
 Kimball v. Bath, 38 Me. 214 507 
 
 Kimball v. Grantsville, 17 Utah 368 267, 369 
 
 Kimball v. Homan, "74 Mieh. 699 32.3, 885 
 
 Kimball v. Kennebec, etc., R. R. Co., 35 Me. 255 942,944, 1058 
 
 Kimball v. Rockland, 71 Me. 37 1057, 1228 
 
 Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 32' Utah 253 651, 653, 655, 790, 813, 868 
 
 Kimberly, etc., Co. v. Hewitt, 79 Wis. 334 632, 635 
 
 Kime v. Cass County, 71 Nebr. 677 1019, 1256, 1259, 1276 
 
 Kincaid v. Hardin County, 53 Iowa 430 1300 
 
 Kincaid v. Indiana Nat. Gas Co., 124 Ind. 577 474, 573, 1396 
 
 Kincaid v. Seattle, 74 Wa-sh. 617. .60, 516, 660, 876, 877, 895, 956, 1019, 1380 
 
 Kindred v. Philadelphia, 233 Pa. 320 1213 
 
 Kindred v. Union Pacific R. E. Co., 225 U. S. 582 1151, 1154 
 
 Kine v. Defenbaugih, 64 111. 201 944 
 
 Kinealy v. St. Louis, etc., R. E. Co., 60 Mo. 658 326 
 
 King V. Barger, 6 Com. L. E. 42 29 
 
 King V. Bower, 1 Barn & C. 585 . 270 
 
 King V. Commissioners, 4 Barn. & Adtol. 333 109S 
 
 King V. Davenport, 98 111. 305 274, 275 
 
 King V. Granger, 21 E. I. 93 1331, 1375 
 
 King V. Iowa Midland E. E. Co., 34 Iowa 458 1200 
 
 King V. Kansas City, 88 Kan. 334 1328, 1376 
 
 King V. Kent, 13 East 220 746 
 
 King V. Kerrison, 3 N. & S. 532 746 
 
 King V. Lindsay, 14 Bast 317 746 
 
 King V. Minneapolis Union R. R. Co., 32' Minn. 224 609', 1173 
 
 King V. Montague, 4 B. & C. 96 407 
 
 King ». Murphy, 12 Exoh. Ot. Rep. 401 1196 
 
 King V. Murphy, 140 Mass. 254 320 
 
 King V. >few York, 102 N. Y. 171 1152 
 
 King V. Raines, 3 Salk. 162 270 
 
 Kmg V. St. Mary's Borough, 152 Pa. 30 1319 
 
 King V. Southern Ry. Co., 119 Fed. 1017 1265 
 
 King V. United States, 59 Fed. 9 313, 418 
 
 King V. Vicksburg, etc.. Light Co., 88 Miss. 456 851, 856, 1285 
 
 Ring V. Warde, Cr. Car. 266 7, 1406 
 
 King V. Wheeler, Cas. Temp. Hardw. 99 1230 
 
 King V. Wright, 3 B. & Ad. 681 477 
 
cxxxii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are to Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 King and Queen v. Larwood, 4 Mod. 270 270 
 
 King's County Fire Insurance Co. v. Stevens, 101 N. Y. 411.324, 325, 886, 1414 
 
 King's Lake, etc.. Levee Dist. v. Jamison, 176 Mo. 577 &47, 1115 
 
 Kingsland v. Clark, 24 Mo. 24 712 
 
 Kingsland v. Union, 37 N. J. L. 268 947 
 
 Kinion v. Kansas City, etc., E. E. Co., 118 Mo. 577 343 
 
 Kinnear Mfg. Co. v. Beatty, 65 Ohio St. 264 183, 884 
 
 Kinney v. Citizens' Water and Liglit Co., 173 Ind. 2-52i 59, 196, 988, 994 
 
 Kinnie v. Bare, 68 Micli. 625 240 
 
 Kinsey v. Union Traction Co., 160 Ind.' 563 536, 545, 547, 550, 1249 
 
 Kinsman St. Ry. Co. v. Broad-way, etc., St. Ey. Co., 36 Oliio St. 239. . 973 
 
 Kipp V. Davis Daly Copper Co., 41 Moat. 509 193, 195, 259 
 
 Kippes V. Louisville, 140 Ky. 423 1307 
 
 Kirby v. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 106 Fed. 561 1041 
 
 Kirhy v. Citizens' E. E. Co., 48 Md. 168 349', 379 
 
 Kirby v. Citizens' Tel. Co., 17 S. D. 362 578, 580 
 
 Kirby v. Panhandle, etc., E. E. Co., 39 Tex. Civ. App. 252 769^ 1070 
 
 Kirby v. School Board for Harrogate, ( 1896) 1 Ch. 437 349 
 
 Kirk V. Kansas City, etc., E. E. Co., 51 La. Ann. 644 1272 
 
 Kirk Christy Co., v. American Association, 32 Ky. L. E. 1177 220^ 236 
 
 Kirkendall v. Omaha, 39 Neb. 1 767, 768 
 
 Kirkwood v. Cronin, 259 Mo. 207 116, 157, 1079 
 
 Kirkwood v. School District, 45 Colo. 368 2il2 1095 
 
 Kirn v. Cape Girardeau, etc., E. E. Co., 124 Mo. App. 271 1107 
 
 Kiser v. Logan County Commissioners, 85 Ohio St. 129 288, 460 
 
 Kishlar v. So. Pacific E. E. Co., 134 Cal. 636 317 
 
 Kittaning Academy v. Brown, 41 Pa. 269 1409 
 
 Kitsap County v. Melker, 50 Wash. 29 814 
 
 Kitsap County v. Melker, 52 Wash. 49 951, 953 
 
 Kittredge v. North Brookfield, 138 Mass. 286 185 
 
 Klages V. Philadelphia, etc., R. E. Co., 160 Pa. 368 652 
 
 Klencke v. West Homestead, 1216 Pa. 476 868 
 
 Klingler v. Bickel, 117 Pa. 326 275 
 
 Klinkener v. McKeesport, 11 Pa. 444 398 
 
 Klopp V. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 142 Iowa 474 626, 722, 723 
 
 Klosterman v. Chesapeake, etc., E. E. Co., 114 Ky. 426 594, 960 
 
 Klows V. Commonwealth, 188 Mass. 149 1184, 1186 
 
 Knapheide v. Jackson County, 215 Mo. 516 1213, 1217 
 
 Knapp v. State, 128 Minn. 194 212 
 
 Knapp, etc., Co. v. St. Louis, 153 Mo. 572 885 
 
 Knapp, etc., Co. v. St. Louis, 156 Mo. 343 886 
 
 Knapp, etc., Co. v. St. Louis Transfer Ey. Co., 126 Mo. 26 524 
 
 Knapp, etc.. Manufacturing Co. v. New York, etc., E. E. Co., 76 Conn. 
 
 311 321,464,477,525, 960 
 
 Knauft V. St. Paul, etc., E. E. Co., 22 Minn. 173 650 
 
 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Forty-second St., etc., E. Co., 176 N. Y. 408 
 
 456, 1415 
 
 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Philadelphia, 246 Pa. 84 1176 
 
 Knight V. Orim, 110 Va. 400 959 
 
Table of Cases. cxxxiii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 aro in Volume I, 721-1422 ia Volume II.] page 
 
 Enoblauch v. Minnea/polis, 56 Minn. 3-21 173 
 
 Knoll V. N«w York, etc., Ey. Co., 121 Pa. 467 355 
 
 Enostman, etc.. Furniture Co. v. Davenport, 99 Iowa 589 1363 
 
 Knotli V. Manhattan Ry. Co., 187 N. Y. 243 1265 
 
 Knoth V. Manhattan Ey. Co., 109 App. Div. 802 1281 
 
 Knowles v. Eastham, 11 Cush. 429i 1228, 1237 
 
 Knowles v. Knowles, 25 E. I. 325 1408, 1410 
 
 Knowles v. New Sweden Irrigation District, 16 Idaho 217 302 
 
 Knowles v. Pennsylvania E. E. Co., 175 Pa. 623 887 
 
 Knox V. Epsom, 56 N. H. 14 937, 1078 
 
 Knox V. Metropolitan El. Ey. Co., 58 Hun 517 959 
 
 Knox V. Pickering, 7 Greenl. 106 454 
 
 Knoxville v. Barton, 128 Tenn. 177 763, 812 
 
 KnoxviUe v. Bird, 12 Lea 121 274 
 
 Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co. 212 U. S. 1 685 
 
 Knoxville, etc.. Light Co. v. (yFallen, 130 Tenn. 270 1257 
 
 Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 200 U. S. 22 364 
 
 Koch V. Kentucky, etc.. Bridge Co., 26 Ky. L. Rep. 2.1B 530 
 
 Koch V. North Ave. Ey. Co., 75 Md. 222 541 
 
 Koch V. Williamsport Water Co., 65 Pa. 288! 1236 
 
 Koerper v. St. Paul, etc., Ey. Co., 42 Minn. 340 743 
 
 Kohl V. United States, 91 U. 9. 367 74, 97, 107, 108, 109, 158, 160, 338 
 
 982, 1017, 1022, 1024, 1036 
 
 Kohlhepp V. West Roxbury, 120 Mass. 596 1054, 1068, 1069 
 
 Konrad v. Rogers, 70 Wis. 492 1414 
 
 Koppikus V. State Capitol Commissioners, 16 Cal. 248 940, 946, 949 
 
 Kotz V. lUinois Central R. E. Co., 188 111. 576 603 
 
 Kramer v. Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co., 5 Ohio St. 140 64, 66, 809, 902 
 
 920, 936, 941, 1019 
 
 Kramer v. Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co., 1 Ohio Dee. 474 723 
 
 Kray v. Muggli, 77 Minn. 231 320 
 
 Kreigh v. Chicago, 86 111. 407 517, 619, 1336 
 
 Kremer v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 51 Minn. 15 739, 740 
 
 Krier v. Milwaukee Northern Ry. Co., 139 Wis. 207 696, 728 
 
 Kroop V. Forman, 31 Mich. 144 1082 
 
 Krueger v. Jenkins, 59 Nebr. 641 1410 
 
 Krueger v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 106 Wis. 96 577, 1257, 1395 
 
 Krug V. St. Mary's Borough, 152 Pa. 30 1371 
 
 Kucheman v. Chicago, etc., R. E. Co., 46 Iowa 366 526, 532 
 
 Kugel V. Sterling, 164 111. App. 371 847 
 
 Kuhl V. Chicago, etc., R. E. Co., 101 Wis. 42 890, 1236, 1245 
 
 Kuhn V. Epstein, 239 111. 555 1206 
 
 Kuhn V. Illinois Central R. R. Co., Ill 111. App. 323 967 
 
 Kundinger v. Saginaw, 59 Mich. 355 59, 929, 932, 947 
 
 Kunst V. West Grafton, 67 W. Va. 20 856, 1319, 1358, 1360, 1366 
 
 Kurtz V. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 155 Pac. 367 534 
 
 Kushke v. St. Paul, 45 Minn. 225 932, 933, 1078 
 
 Kyle v. Texas, etc., R. E. Co., 3 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. Sect. 436 193 
 
cxxxiv Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I. 721-1422 in Volume II.] TUSt 
 
 L 
 
 Lacey v. Oskaloosa, 143 Iowa 704 519 
 
 Lackland v. North Missouri R. R. Co., 31 Mo. ISO 524, 1405 
 
 Laconia v. Gilman, 55 N. H. 127 397 
 
 Laoour v. New York, 3 Duer 406 '. 1351 
 
 La Croix v. Fairfield County Commissioners, 50 Conn. 321 272 
 
 La Crosse City Ry. Co. v. Higbee, 107 Wis. 3S9 543 
 
 La Crosse, etc., E. E. Co. v. Seeger, 4 Wis. 268 1228 
 
 Ladd V. Boston, 151 Mass. 585 349, 719 
 
 Ladew v. Tennessee Copper Co., 218 TJ. S. 357 1044 
 
 Lafayette v. Nagle, 113 Ind. 425 875 
 
 Lafayette v. Schultz, 44 Ind. 97 1100 
 
 Lafayette v. Wortman, 107 Ind. 404 1135 
 
 Lafayette, etc., E. E. Co. v. Butner, 162 Ind. 460 63, 1093 
 
 Lafayette, etc., E. E. Co. v. Murdock, 68 Ind. 137. .598, 619, 659, 1147, 1151 
 
 Lafayette, etc., E. E. Co. v. Winslow, 66 111. 219 693 
 
 Lafayette Plank Eoad Co. v. New Albany, etc., E. R., 13 Ind. 90 68, 79 
 
 360, 972, 999 
 
 Lafferty v. Schuylkill River E. E. Co., 124 Pa. 297 632, 693, 696 
 
 Laflin v. Chicago, etc., Ey Co., 33 Fed. 415 665, 698, 770 
 
 Laguna Drainage Bistrict v. Charles Martin Co., 144 Cal. 209 245 
 
 Laguna Drainage Dist. v. Charles Martin Co., 5 Cal. App. 166 1111 
 
 La Harpe v. Elm "Tp. Gas, etc., Co., 69 Kan. 97 210- 
 
 Lahr v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 104 N. Y. 268 328, 558, 597 
 
 Laidlaw, In re, 153 App. Div. 343 1082 
 
 Laing v. United New Jersey R. R., etc., Co., 54 N. J. L. 576 . . 597, 1183 
 
 1196, 1200, 1203, 1410 
 
 Laird v. Pittsburg, 205 Pa. 1 164, 212, 620 
 
 Lajoie v. Lowell, 214 Mass. 8 1054 
 
 Lake v. Loysen, 66 Wis. 424 1060, 1071 
 
 Lake v. Virginia, etc., R. E. Co., 7 Nev. 294 363 
 
 Lake Auburn Crystal Ice Co. v. Lewiston, 109 Me. 489 431 
 
 Lake City v. Fulkerson, 122 Iowa 569 1421 
 
 Lake County Water, etc., Co. v. Walsh, 130 Ind. 32 1415 
 
 Lake Erie, etc., E. R. Co. v. Atlantic, etc., E. E. Co., 7 Ohio Dec. Eeprint 
 
 364 918 
 
 Lake Erie, etc., E. E. Co. v. Cluggish, 143 Ind. 347 385 
 
 Lake Erie, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hancock County, 63 Ohio St. 23. ... . .243, 308 
 
 753, 1376, 1381 
 
 Lake Erie, etc., E. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 132i Ind. 274 1269 
 
 Lake Erie, etc., E. E. Co. v. Kinsey, 87 Ind. 514 644, 1245 
 
 Lake Erie, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kokomo, 130 Ind. 224 952, 998 
 
 Lake Erie, etc., E. E. Co. v. Michener, 117 Ind. 465 1255 
 
 Lake Erie, etc., R. R. Co. v. Scott, 132 III. 429 734, 891 
 
 Lake Erie, etc., E. E. Co. v. Shelley, 163 Ind. 36 751 
 
 Lake Erie, etc., E. E. Co. v. Smith, 61 Fed. 885 384 
 
 Lake Erie Limestone Co., Ee, 1'88 Pa. 509 917 
 
 Lake Koen, etc., Irrigation Co. v. Klein, 63 Kan. 484 115, 137, 141, 149 
 
 155, 250, 913, 984, 1091 
 
Table of Cases. exxxv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Lake Keen, etc., Irrigation Co. v. McLain Land, etc., Co., 69 Kan. 334. . 654 
 
 Lake Mercer Water Co. v. Cowles, .31 Cal. 21.5 1008 
 
 Lake Eoland El. R. E. Co. v. Frick, 89 Md. 259 766, 789, 800, 801 
 
 Lake Roland El. R. R. Co. v. Hibernian Society, 83 Md. 420 530, 1397 
 
 Lake Eoland El. R. R. Co. v. Webster, 81 Md. 529 532 
 
 Lake Roland El. R. E. Co. v. Weir, 86 Md. 283 1200 
 
 Lake Shore, etc. E. E. Co. v. Baltimore, etc., E. R. Co., 149 111. 282. . . 986 
 
 Lake Shore, etc., E. E. Co. v. Brown, 16 Ohio C. C. 269 874 
 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. E. Co. v. Chicago, 151 111. 359 762 
 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. E. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. E. Co,, 97 111. 506. .155, 972 
 
 975, 976, 999 
 
 Lake Shore, etc., E. E. Co. v. iChicago, etc., Ry. Co., 100 111. 21 . . 671, 753, 754 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cincinnati, etc., E. E. Co., 30 Ohio St. 604 
 
 793, 754, 755, 999 
 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co. v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 8 Fed. 858 919 
 
 995, 1000 
 
 Lake Shore, etc., E. R. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 365 103 
 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co. v. WTiitney, 161 Ind. 76 474, 1407 
 
 Lakeside Mfg. Co. v. Worcester, 186 Mass. 552 1184, 1186 
 
 Lake St. El. Ry. Co. v. Brooks, 90 111. App. 173 595 
 
 Lake Superior, etc., R. R. Co. v. Grieve, 17 Minn. 322 733 
 
 Lakey Co. v. Kalamazoo, 138 Mich. 644 132fi, 1362 
 
 Lamb v. Elizabeth City, 131 N. €". 241 1240 
 
 Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio St.. 167 943, 944 
 
 Lamb v. Reclamation District, 73 Cal. 125 303, 314, 850, 894 
 
 Lamb v. Sehottler, 54 Cal. 319 1100, 1101 
 
 Lambert v. Griffin, 257 111. 152 630, 659, 663, 708 
 
 Lambert v. Norfolk, 108 Va. 259 847, 848, 851, 857 
 
 Lambert v. Owensboro Public Library, 151 Ky. 725 213 
 
 Lambeth v. Southern Power Co., 152 N. C. 371 72S, 724, 7«7, 808 
 
 Lamborn v. Bell, 18 Colo. 346 204, 1150 
 
 Lamm v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 45 Minn. 71 321, 497, 530', 593 
 
 Lampe v. San Francisco, 124 Cal. 546 1354 
 
 Lancaster v. Augusta Water District, 108 Me. 137 347, 632, 634, 636 
 
 913, 925, 927, 931, 1054, 1265 
 
 Lancaster v. Clayton, 86 Ky. 373 134 
 
 Lancaster v. Kennebec Log Driving Co., 62 Me. 272 949, 950, 1055 
 
 Lancaster Ave. Improvement Co. v. Rhoads, 116 Pa. 377 1252 
 
 Lancaster County v. Burke, 4 Pennyp. 258 768 
 
 Lancaster, etc.. Road Co. v. Columbia Tel. Co., 18 Lane. Law Rep. 161.. 756 
 
 Lance's Appeal, 55 Pa. 16 60O, 604, 605, 989 
 
 Lancey v. King County, 15 Wash. 9 107 
 
 Lancy v. Boston, 185 Mass. 219 70, 937, 959 
 
 Laney v. Boston, 186 Mass. 128 904 
 
 Land v. Wilmington, etc., R. R. Co., 107 N. C. 72 ©59 
 
 Landerbrun v. Duffy, 2 Pa. 398 311 
 
 Lane v. Boston, 125 Mass. 519 833, 869 
 
 Lane v. Concord, 70 N. H. 486 278 1314 
 
oxxxvi Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 i^ Volume II.] PAGB 
 
 Lane v. Dorman, 4 111. 238 36 
 
 Lane v. Harbor Commissioners, 70 Conn. 685 303 
 
 Lane v. Hitchcock, 14 Jolins. 213 357 
 
 Lane v. Lamke, 53 App. Div. 3i9S 487 
 
 Lanfear v. New Orleans, 4 La. Ann. 97 284 
 
 Langdon v. New York, 93 N. Y. 129 414, 456, 460 
 
 Langdon v. New York, 133 N. Y. 628 12<H) 
 
 •Lange v. Iia. Crosse, etc., Ey. Co., 118 Wis. 558 549, 1395 
 
 Langford v. Ramsey County Commissioners, 16 Minn. 375 59, 914, 92S 
 
 926, 940, 946 
 
 Langley v. Augusta, 118 Ga. 590 1317, 1346, 1378,' 1380 
 
 Lanier v. Lanier, 5 Heisk. 462 31 
 
 Lanquist v. Chicago, 200 111. 69 1193 
 
 Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 146 429, 884 
 
 Larimer County Commissioners v. Lee, 3 Col. App. 177 271, 368 
 
 Laroe v. Northampton St. Ry. Co., 189 Mass. 254 833, 840 
 
 Larsen v. Oregon R. R. Co., 19 Ore. 240 344 
 
 Larson v. Minnesota Northwestern El. Ry. Co., 154 N. W. 948 1048 
 
 Las Vegas, etc., R R. Co. v. Summerfield, 35 Nev. 229 343, 1130 
 
 Latah County v. Peterson, 3 Idaho 398 173, 235 
 
 Lathrop v. Central Iowa R. R. Co., 69 Iowa 105 1407 
 
 Latinette v. St. Louis, 120 C C. A. 638 97, 111, 982 
 
 Laughlin v. Portland, 111 Me. 486 153, 216 
 
 Laurel v. Rowell, 84 Miss. 435 325 
 
 Lavelle v. Julesburg, 48 Colo. 290 722, 725, 730,' 736, 743, 916 
 
 Lavery v. Hutchinson, 249 111. 86 346 
 
 L'awler v. Baring Boom Co., 56 Me. 445 258 
 
 Lawless v. Reese, 4 Bibb 309 925 
 
 Lawrence's Appeal, 78 Pa. 365 609 
 
 Lawrence, In re Land in, 119 Fed. 453 391, 397, 398, 1006 
 
 Lawrence v. Boston, 119 Mass. 12S 659, 661, 714, 1178, 1179, 1186 
 
 Lawrence v. Fairhaven, 5 Gray 110 830, 1314, 1318, 1370 
 
 Lawrence v. Great Northern E. R. Co., 160 Q. B. 643 819 
 
 Lawrence v. Metropolitan El. E. E. Co., 126 N. Y. 483 669 
 
 Lawrence v. Morgan's, etc.. Steamship Co., 39 La. Ann. 427 985, 993 
 
 Lawrence v. Second Municipality, 2 La. Ann. 651 651, 654 
 
 Lawrence County v. Chattaroi R. R. Co., 81 Ky. 224 397 
 
 Lawrence, etc., R. R. Co. v. Moore, 24 Kan. 323 1114 
 
 Lawrence, etc., R. E. Co. v. Ross, 40 Kan. 605 1181 
 
 Lawrence R. R. Co. v. Cobb, 35 Ohio St. 94 1136 
 
 Lawrence R. R. Co. v. O'Hara, 48 Ohio St. 343 944, 959 
 
 Lawrence Ward's Island Realty Co. v. United States, 20.9 Fed. 201 1109 
 
 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133 283, 284, 287 
 
 Lawton Rapid Transit R. R. Co. v. Lawton, 3il Okla. 458 667, 670, 1170 
 
 1173, 1188 
 
 Layman v. Beeler, 113 Ky. 221 867 
 
 Lazarus v. Morris, 212 Pa. 128 618, 1420 
 
 Leach, In re Petition of, 134 Ind. 665 30 
 
 Leader t. Moxon, 3 Wils. 461 SOS 
 
Table op Cases. cxxxvii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in, Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Leadville v. Coronado Mining Co., 29 Colo. 17 484 
 
 League Island, In re, 1 Brewst. 429 160 
 
 Leahy v. Street Commissioners, 209 Mass. 316 1046 
 
 Leak v. Selma, etc., R. E. Co., 47 Ga. 345 952 
 
 Leard v. Pennsylvania R. E. Co., 229' Pa. 473 804 
 
 Leary V. St. Joseph E. R. Co., 38 Mo. 486 1235 
 
 Leary Ave., In re, 72 Wash. 617 1023 
 
 Leavenworth v. Douglass, 59 Kan. 416 323 
 
 Leavenworth v. Duffy, 10 Kan. App. 124 874 
 
 Leavenworth County Commissioners v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479 185 
 
 Leavenworth, etc., E. E. Co. v. Curtan, 51 Kan. 432 531, 595, 878, 881 
 
 Leavenworth, etc., R. R. Co. v. Whitaker, 42 Kan. 634 1097 
 
 Leavenworth, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wilkins, 45 Kan. 674 737, 742 
 
 Lebanon v. Olcott, 1 N. H. 339 1057, 1228, 1235 
 
 Lebanon School Dist. v. Lebanon Seminary, 22. Wkly. Notes Cas. 65. . . . 389 
 
 Ledyajd v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 102 410, 416 
 
 Lee V. Childs, 140 App. Div. 699 1235, 1237, 1258 
 
 Lee V. Harris, 206 111. 428 398 
 
 Lee V. McCook, 82 Nebr. 2i6 26 
 
 Lee V. Minneapolis, 22 Minn. 13' 507, 1357 
 
 Lee V. Mound Station, 118 111. 304 1409 
 
 Lee V. Pembroke Iron Co., 57 Me. 481 314, 460, 1322 
 
 Lee V. Tebo, etc., E. R. Co., 53 Mo. 178 804 
 
 Leeds v. Richmond, 102 Ind. 372 570, 991, 1342, 1378 
 
 Leeper v. State, 103 Tenn. 500 400 
 
 Lefevre, In re, 32 Cal. 565 1131 
 
 Leffmau v. Long Island R. R. Co., 197 N. Y. 513 562, 989 
 
 Lefkowitz v. Chicago, 23S 111. 23 881 
 
 Leftwich v. Plaquemine, 14 La. Ann. 152 5W 
 
 Lehigh County v. Hoffort, 116 Pa. 119 1360 
 
 Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Chicago, 26 Fed. 415 789, 874, 875, 895, 1173 
 
 Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., In re, 78 N. J. L. 699 741 
 
 Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. Dover, etc., R. R. Co., 43 N. J. L. 528. . . . 1127 
 
 Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v Lazarus, 28 Pa. 203 733 
 
 Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. McFarlan, 43 N. J. L. 605 1236 
 
 Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. Orange Water Co., 42 N. J. Eq. 205 612 
 
 Lehmicke v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 19 Minn. 464 1181, 1201, 1217 
 
 Lehn v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 76 313 
 
 Lehigh v. Garrysburg Mfg. Co., 132 N. C. 167 194, 773 
 
 Lehigh v. Green, 62 Neb. 344 353 
 
 Leiper v. Denver, 36 Colo. 110 870 
 
 Leitzsey v. Columbia Water Power Co., 47 S. C. 464. ..982, 1236, 1239, 1276 
 
 Lemmon v. Guthrie Center, 113 Iowa 36 275 
 
 Lemon v. Newton, 134 Mass. 476 1341 
 
 Lenox v. Knox, etc., R. R. Co., 62 Me. 322 1128 
 
 Lent V. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404 899, 913, 927, 932 
 
 Lentell v. Boston, etc., St. Ry. Co., 187 Mass. 445 649 
 
 Lentell v. Boston, etc., St. Ry. Co., 202 Malss. 115 5164, 735, 737, 841 
 
 Leonard v. Sparks, 117 Mo. 103 1120 
 
cxxxviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In. Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Leroy, etc., K. Co. v. Butts, 40 Kan. 159 1210 
 
 Leroy, etc., E. K. Co. v. Hawk, 39- Kan. 638 1178 
 
 Leroy, etc., E. E. Co. v. Eosa & Packer, 40 Kan. 599 799, 1178 
 
 Leslie, Matter of Estate of, 92 Misc. 663 30 
 
 Less V. Butte, 128 Mont. 27 846, 868, 872 
 
 Lessard v. Eevere, 171 Mass. 294 1417 
 
 Levee Commissioners v. Dillard, 76 Miss. 641 948, 1178, 1182 
 
 Levee^ Commissioners v. Hendricks, 77 Miss. 483 669 
 
 Levee Commissioners v. Johnson, 66 Miss. 248 .' . . .338, 712 
 
 Levee Commissioners v. Lee, 85 Miss. 508 1111 
 
 Levee Commissioners v. Wiborn, 74 Miss. 396 .355, 356 
 
 Levee District v. Farmer, 101 Cal. 178 32a, 879 
 
 Levee Inspectors v. Crittenden, 94 Fed. 613 247, 789 
 
 Levenson v. Boston Elevated Ey. Co., 191 Mass. 75 841, 1172, 1174, 1224 
 
 Leverett v. Middle Georgia, etc., E. E. Co., 96i Ga. 385 986 
 
 Leverick v. Mobile, 110 Fed. 170 453 
 
 Levin v. New York Elevated Ey. Co., 165 N. Y. 572 1133 
 
 Levis V. Newton, 75 Fed. 8S4 203 
 
 Lewis V. Boston, 130 Mass. 339 1052, 1055, 1246, 1247 
 
 Lewis V. Darby, 166 Pa. 613 1274 
 
 Lewis V. Englewood El. E. E. Co., 223 111. 223 1208 
 
 Lewis V. Germantown, etc., E. E. Co., 39 Leg. Int. 23 984 
 
 Lewis V. New York, etc., K. E. Co., 162 N. Y. 202". 559 
 
 Lewis V Omaha, etc., Ey. Co., 158 Iowa 137 722, 725, 601 
 
 Lewis V. Portland, 25 Ore. 133 456 
 
 Lewis V. Seattle, 5 Wash. 741 763, 766, 767, 769, 814 
 
 Lewis V. Springfield, 142 Mo. App. 84 836, 876, 1360 
 
 Lewis V. Springfield Water Co., 176 Pa. 237 435 
 
 Lewis V. Weston-Super-Mare Local Board, 40 Ch. Div. 55 920 
 
 Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U. S. 82 423 
 
 Lewisburg Bridge Co. v. Union County, 232 Pa. 256 632, 637, 1236 
 
 Lewis County v. Gordon, 20 Wash. 90 241 
 
 Lewis County v. Schobey, 31 Wash. 357 1026 
 
 Lewis St., Ee, 2 Wend. 472 352 
 
 Lewiston Eoad, Ee, 8 Pa. 109 958 
 
 Lexington v. Chenault, 151 Ky. 774 876, 895 
 
 Lexington v. Hoskins, 96 Miss. 163) 1410 
 
 Lexington v. Kentucky Chautauqua Assembly, 114 Ky. 781 163 
 
 Lexington v. Thompson, 113 Ky. 540 399, 400 
 
 Lexington, etc., E. E. Co. v. Applegate, 8 Dana 289 115, 186, 492, 524 
 
 Lexington, etc., R. E. Co. v. Napier's Heirs, 160 Ky. 579 799 
 
 Lexington Print Works v. Canton, 167 Mass. 341 951, 1064 
 
 Lexington Print Works v. Canton, 171 Mass. 414 1052, 1055, 1246, 1247 
 
 1256, 1260 
 
 Leyba v. Armijo, 11 N. M. 437 1118 
 
 Libby v. Portland, 105 Me. 370 1309 
 
 Lickly V. Bishopp, 150 Mich. 256 947 
 
 Lidgerwood v. Michalek, 12 N. D. 348 991, 1065, 1067 
 
 Lieberman v. Chicago, etc., Eapid Transit R. E. Co., 141 111. 140 1149 
 
Table of Cases. cxxxix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Lieley v. Bishop, 19 Conn. 128 »84 
 
 Lien v. Norman County, 80 Minn. 58 243 
 
 Ligare v. Chicago, 139 111. 46 115, 176, 984, 988, 1010, 1090 
 
 Ligare v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 160 111. 261 671 
 
 Ligare v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 166 111. 249 661 
 
 Limburger v. San Antonio, etc., St. Ry. Co., 27 S. W. 198 893 
 
 Lincoln v. Boston, 148 Mass. 578 1307, 1316 
 
 Lincoln v. Colusa County, 28 Cal. 662 957, 1028 
 
 Lincoln v. Conunonwealth, 164 Mass. 1 476, 500, 571, 689 
 
 Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 164 Mass. 368.. 293, 303, 7'22, 72'6, 729, 739, 741 
 
 744, 1175, 1183 
 
 Lincoln v. Grant 38 Nebr. 369 1234, 1322 
 
 Lincoln County v. Brock, 37 Wash. 14 , 814 
 
 Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. New York, 210 N. Y. 34 479, 481, 566 
 
 Linden Land Co. v. Milwaukee, etc., Light Co., 107 Wis. 493 543 
 
 Lindsay v. East Bay Street Commissioners, 2 Bay 38 3 
 
 Lindsay Irrigation Co. v. Mehrtens, 97 Cal. 676 58, 154, 252 
 
 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 276 
 
 Lingwood v. Stowmarket, 11 Jur. N. S. 993 449 
 
 Linn v. Chambersburgh, 160 Pa. 511 203 
 
 Linthicum v. Ray, 9 Wall. 243 1135 
 
 Linton v. Athens, 53' Ga. 588' 267 
 
 Linwood, etc.. Levee District v. State, 181 S. W. 892 1003 
 
 Lipes V. Hand, 104 Ind. 503 767 
 
 Lippincott v. Lasher, 17 Stew. 120 522 
 
 Liskey v. Snyder, 66 W. Va. 149 1172 
 
 Litchfield v. Bond, 186 N. Y. 66 310 
 
 Litchfield v. Scituate, 136 ilaas. 39 1262 
 
 Lithgow V. Pearson, 26 Colo. App. 70 1420 
 
 Little V. Holyoke, 177 Mass. 114 1310 
 
 Little y. Madison, 49 Wis. 605 1316 
 
 Little V. May, 3 Hawks 599 936, 1079 
 
 Little Miami Elevator Co. v. Cincinnati, 30 Ohio St. 639 151, 327 
 
 Little Miami R. R. Co. v. Collett, 6 Ohio St. 182 7«6, 767 
 
 Little Miami R. R. Co. v. Dayton, 23 Ohio St. 510 973, 997, 998, 999 
 
 Little Miami R. R. Co. v. Hambleton, 40 Ohio St. 496 960, 1286 
 
 Little Miami R. R. Co. v. Naylor, 2- Ohio St. 235 528, 987 
 
 Little Miami R. R. Co. v. Whitacre, 8 Ohio St. 590 1235 
 
 Little Nestucca Road Co. v. Tillamook County, 31 Ore. 1 684, 997 
 
 - 1001, 1257 
 
 Little Rock v. Citizens St. R. R. Co., 56 Ark. 28 378 
 
 Little Rock v. Willis, 27 Ark. 572 1328 
 
 Little Rock, etc., R. R. Co. v. Allen, 41 Ark. 431 732, 733, 734 
 
 Little Rock, etc., R. R. Co. v. Allister, 68 Ark. 60O 769, 792, 1154 
 
 Little Rock, etc., R. R. Co. v. Dyer, 35 Ark. 360 1235, 1239, 1244 
 
 Little Rock, etc., R. R. Co. v. Newman, 73 Ark. 1 532, 885 
 
 Little Rock, etc., R. R. Co. v. Shelton, 45 Ark. 429 g7S 
 
 Little Rock Junction R. R. Co. v. McGehee, 41 Ark. 202 658 
 
cxl Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Little Rock Junction K. E. Co. v. WoodriiS, 49 Ark. 381 2, 61, 583, 658 
 
 661, 671, 1111, 1177, 1189 
 
 Little Tarkio Drainage District v. Richardson, 237 Mo. 49 804 
 
 Littleton v.' Berlin Mills Co., 73 N. H. 11 991, 1244, 1282 
 
 Littleton Bridge Co. v. Pike, 72 Vt. 7 1115 
 
 Livermore v. Camden County Freeholders, 29 N. J. L. 245 1301 
 
 Livermore v. Jamaica, 2'3 Vt. 362 772, 813 
 
 Livingston v. Ellis Co., 30 Tex. Civ. App. 19 285 
 
 Livingston v. Johnson County, 42 Nebr. 277 1019 
 
 Livingston v. New York, 8 Wend. 85. .,, 352, 773, 807, 941, 982 
 
 Llano County v. Scott, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 408 ' 936, 1077 
 
 Lloyd V. Fair Haven, 67 Vt. 167 696 
 
 Lloyd V. Loaring, 6 Ves. 773 364 
 
 Lloyd V. New York, 5 N. Y. 369 1310 
 
 Lloyd V. Venable, 168 N. C. 531 •. . .723, 1282 
 
 Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 30, 126,133,219,266, 963 
 
 Lobdell V. Chicago, 227 111. 218 374 
 
 Locke V. Highway Commissioner, 107 Mich. 631 947 
 
 Lockhart v. Craig St. Ry. Co., 139 Pa. 419 331, 537, 542, 543 
 
 Lock Haven Bridge Co. v. Clinton County, 157 Pa. 379 76 
 
 Lockie v. Mutual Union Tel. Co., 163 111. 401 613, 920 
 
 Lockport, etc., R. R. Co., In re, 77 N. Y. 557 1082 
 
 Lockwood V. Dover, 73 N. H. 209 445 
 
 Lockwood V. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 37 Conn. 387 441 
 
 Lockwood V. Wabash R. R. Co., 122 Mo. 86 524 
 
 Loeber v. Butte Oeneral Electric Co., 16 Mont. 1 582 
 
 Loeseh v. Koehler, 144 Ind. 278 284 
 
 Logan V. Boston El. Ry. Co., 188 Mass. 414 592, 597, 841 
 
 Logan V. State, 5 Tex. App. 306 56 
 
 Logan V. Stogsdale, 123 Ind. 372 115, 155, 236 
 
 Logansport v. McMillan, 49 Ind. 493 1216 
 
 Logansport v. Seybold, 59 Ind. 225 267 
 
 Lohman v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 174 936, 1077, 1256 
 
 Lonaconing, etc., R. R. Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 95 Md. 630. . . .541, 545 
 
 London v. Sample Lumber Co., 91 Ala. 606 1065, 1066, 1068, 1082 
 
 London v. Vanacker, 1 Ld. Raym. 496 270 
 
 London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669 30 
 
 Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373 907 
 
 Londoner v. Denver, 52 Colo. 15 .• 63, 64, 163 
 
 London, etc., R. R. Co. Re, L. R., 24 Q. B. Div. 40 864, 896 
 
 London, etc., R. R. Co. v. Truman, 11 App. Cas. 45 819 
 
 London Street Tramways Co. v. London City Council, (1894) 2 Q. B. 189. 684 
 
 Lonergan v. La Fayette St. Ry. Co., 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 273 541 
 
 Long's Appeal, 87 Pa. 114 948, 970 
 
 Long V. Birmingham, 161 Ala. 427 1307 
 
 Long V. Elberton, 109 Ga. 28 857, 1313 
 
 Long V. Fuller, 68 Pa. 170 211 
 
 Long V. Harrisburg, etc., R. R. Co., 126 Pa. 143 810 
 
Table op Cases. cxli 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Long V. Louisville, 98 Ky. 67 2, 919 
 
 Long V. Niinah, 128 Wis. 40 1329 
 
 Long V. Wilson, 119 Iowa 267 322 
 
 Longeneeker v. Wichita, etc.. Light Co., 80 Kan. 413 1400 
 
 Long Island R. E. Co., Re, 143 N. Y. 67 77 
 
 Long Island R. R. Co., Re, 6 Thomp. & C. 298 703 
 
 Long Island E. R. Co. v. Bennett, 10 Hun 91 936, 1079 
 
 Long Island R. R. Co. v. Jones, 1.51 App. Div. 407 632, 639 
 
 Long Island R. R. Co. v. Mulry, 212 N. Y. 108 959 
 
 Long Island R. E. Co. v. Sherwood, 205 jST. Y. 1 161, 189, 1083 
 
 Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685 68, 71, 146 
 
 169, 200, 623, 683, 938, 972, 979 
 
 Longmont v. Parker, 14 Colo. 386 878 
 
 Long Sault Development Co. v. Kennedy, 143 N. Y. Supp. 454. .143, 155, 208 
 
 LongwoEth V. Cincinnati, 48 Ohio St. 637 651, 1228, 1282 
 
 Loop V. Chamberlain, 17 Wis. 504 1283 
 
 Lorain Steel Co. v. Norfolk, etc., St. Ry. Co., 187 Mass. 500 376, 381 
 
 Lord V. Equitablb Life Assurance Society, 194 K. Y. 212 363, 372 
 
 Lord V. Meadville Water Co., 135 Pa. 122 435 
 
 Lorden v. Coffey, 178 Mass. 489 270 
 
 Lorence v. Ellensburg, 13 Wash. 341 1310 
 
 Lorenz v. Jacob, 63 Cal. 73 25®, 253 
 
 Lorick v. Southern Ey. Co., 87 S. C. 71 1411, 1413, 1420 
 
 Lorie v. North Chicago El. Ry. Co., 32 Fed. 270 647, 859 
 
 Lorillard v. Monroe, 11 N. Y. 392 1308 
 
 Loring v. Boston, 12 Gray 209 1407 
 
 Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18 409, 416 
 
 Los Angeles v. Gager, lO'Cal. App. 378 654 
 
 Los Angeles v. Kerckhoff, etc.. Lumber Co., 15 Cal. App. 676 662 
 
 Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 1-24 Cal. 597 616 
 
 Los Angeles Cemetery Association v. Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461 .... 1371, 1372 
 
 Los Angeles County v. Reyes, 97 Cal. 17 235, 1139 
 
 Los Angeles, etc., E. E. Co. v. Rumpp, 94 Cal. 432 1110 
 
 Los Angeles, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rumpp, 104 Cal. 20 793, 953 
 
 Lostutter v. Aurora, 126. Ind. 436 587 
 
 Lotze V. Cincinnati, 61 Ohio St. 2.72 789, 809 
 
 Lough V. Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co., 116 Iowa 31 651, 656, 741 
 
 Loughboridge v. Harris, 42 Ga. 500 30, 115, 228, 622 
 
 Loughrau v. Des Moines, 72 Iowa 382 313 
 
 Louisiana, etc.. Navigation Co. v. Jones, 113 La. 29 722 
 
 Louisiana, etc., Nav. Co. v. Jonea, 118 La. 506 659 
 
 Louisiana, etc.. Plank Koad Co. v. Pickett, 25 Mo. 535 804, 940 
 
 Louisiana, etc., R. R. Co. v. Louisiana, etc.. Navigation Co., 125 La. 
 
 756 920, 1007 
 
 Louisiana, etc., R. E. Co. v. Louisiana, etc.. Navigation Co., 127 La. 
 
 587 1411, 1413, 1419 
 
 Louisiana, etc., E. R. Co. v. Vicksburg R. R. Co., 12 La. 915 996, 1000 
 
 Louisiana Ice Mfg. Co. v. New Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 217 1410 
 
 X 
 
cxlii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] ^ page 
 
 Louisiana Land Co. v. Blakewood, 131 La. 539 309, 600, 958, 1265 
 
 Louisiana R. E., etc., Co. v. Sarpy, 125 La. 388 667, 729 
 
 Louisville v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 224 U. S. 649 358 
 
 Louisville v. Hehemann, 161 Ky. 523 1313, 1318 
 
 Louisville v. Knighton, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 1037 1318, 1328, 1331, 1358 
 
 Louisville v. O'Malley, 21 Ky. Law Eep. 873 313 
 
 Louisville v. Rolling Mill Co., 3 Bush 416 511 
 
 Louisville v. Sauter, 149 Ky. 721 511, 870, 1250, 1318, 1350 
 
 Louisville v. United States Bank, 3 B. Mon. 38 409 
 
 Louisville v. University of Louisville, "15 B. Mon. 642 392 
 
 Louisville Bagging Mfg. Co. v. Central Passenger Ry. Co., 95 Ky. 50.. 541 
 
 892 
 
 Louisville City Ry. Co. v. Central Passenger Ey. Co., 87 Ky. 223 381 
 
 Louisville City Railway Co. v. Louisville, 8 Bust 415 378 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Asher, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 815 1250 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Barrett, 91 Ky. 487 799 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. 'Co. v. Blythe, 69 Miss. 939 1031 
 
 Louisvillfe, etc., E. R. Co. v. Boney, 117 Ind. 501 1417 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Brinton, 109 Ky. 180 856, 1272 
 
 Louisville, etc., E. E. Co. v. Ohappel, Eice L. 383 117, 146, 185 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cincinnati, 76 Ohio St. 481 393, 398 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Culberson, 158 Ky. 561 855 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. I>avidson County Court, 1 Sneed 637. . .186, 266 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Dickson, 63 Miss. 380 704, 706 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Foster, 108 Ky. 7431 594, 597 
 
 Louisville, etc., E. E. Co. v. French, 100 Tenn. 209 605 
 
 Louisville, etc., E. E. Co. v. Hall, 143 Ky. 497 725, 736, 737, 799 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hennen, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 528 595 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hodge, 6 Bush 141 1392 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. E. Co. v. Hopson, 73 Miss. 773 1151 
 
 Louisville, etc., E. E. Co. v. Hove, 18 Ky. L. Eep. 521 524, 595, 597 
 
 Louisville, etc., E. E. Co. v. Hove, 47 S. W. 621 524 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Interstate R. R. Co., 108 Va. 502 374, 1257 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Louisville, 131 Ky. 108 630, 748, 750, 913 
 
 991, 992, 998, 1024 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Louisville, 122 S. W. 849 370, 748 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Louisville City Ry. Co., 2 Duv. 175 3«4, 536 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mobile, etc., R. R. Co., 12i4 Ala. 162 1400 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Morere, 116 La. 907 948 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mosely, 115 La. 758 946 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Orr, 91 Ky. 109 533, 553, 594, 960 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. People's Sit. R. R., etc., Co., 101 Ala. 331. . 1095 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 143 Ga. 331.112, 157, 756 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 68 Miss. 806 755, 1028 
 
 Louisville^ etc., R. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 191 Fed. 757 965 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ryan, 64 Miss. 399 666, 1099, 1100, 1102 
 
 1114, 1194 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Scomp, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 487 603 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Soltweddle, 116 Ind. 257 1265, 1275 
 
Table of Cases. cxliii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Louisville, etc., K. R. Co. v. State, 9 Bax. 522 1024 
 
 LouisviUe, etc., E. E. Co. v. Stephens, 96 Ky. 401 1282 
 
 Louisville, etc., E. E. Go. v. West End Heights Land Co., 135 Ga. 419. . 878 
 
 890 
 
 Louisville, etc., E. E. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 207 Fed. 1 706 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 110 N. E. 70 626 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. White Villa Club, 154 Ky. 773 722, 732 
 
 1111, 1112, 1144, 1145, 1169, 1170 
 
 LouisvUIe, etc., E. E. Co. v. Whitley County Court, 95 Ky. 215. . . .397. 996 
 
 1000 
 
 Louisville, etc., E. R. Co. v. Wilson, 105 Ky. 151 723 
 
 Louisville, etc.. Terminal Co. v. Jacobs, 1Q9 Tenn. 727 1388 
 
 LouisvUIe, etc.. Terminal Co. v. Lellyett, 114 Tenn. 368 863 
 
 Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co., 115 U. S. 683 361 
 
 Louisville Ry. Co. v. Foster, 108 Ky. 691 851, 890, 892, 893 
 
 Louisville Trust Co. v. Cincinnati, 76 Fed. 2!96 1411, 1412, 1413 
 
 Love V. Atlanta, 95 Ga. 129 1307 
 
 Love V. Raleigh, 116 N. C. 29e 1341 
 
 Lovejoy v. Isbell, 73 Conn. 368 1193 
 
 Lovett V. West Virginia Central Gas Co., 65 W. Va. 739 308, 309, 1257 
 
 1260, 1261 
 
 Low, In re, 208 N. Y. 25 962 
 
 Low, In re, 142 App. Div. 533 948, 1128 
 
 Low, In re, 124' N. Y. Supp. 1050 948 
 
 Low V. Concor* R. E. Co., 63 N. H. 557 666 
 
 Low V. Catena, etc., E. R. Co., 18 111. 324 190 
 
 Lowe V. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151 285, 286, 1320 
 
 Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U. S. 81 58 
 
 Lowe V. Omaha, 33 Neb. 587 660, 76&, 789, 805, 868, 896 
 
 Lowe V. Salt Larke City, 13 Utah 91 1310 
 
 Lowe V. Yolo County Consolidated- Water Co., 157 Cal. 503 1246 
 
 Lowell V. Boston, 111 Mass. 454 2, 55, 116, 133, 153, 218, 221 
 
 231, 241, 266, 268, 290 
 
 Lowell V. Prench, 6 Cush. 223 333 
 
 Loweli V. Middlesex County Commissioners, 152 -Mass. 372 1208 
 
 Lowell V. Proprietors of Locks and Canals, 104 Mass. 18 746 
 
 Lowell V. Shaw, 15 Me. 2-42 354 
 
 Lower v. Chicago, etc., E. R. Co., 59 Iowa 563 93S, 1070, 1078, 1090, 1091 
 
 Lower Chatham and Little Ralls, Re, 35 N. J. L. 497 63, 154 
 
 Loweree v. Newark, 38 N. J. L. 151 632, 636 
 
 Lower Kings River Reclamation District v. Phillips, 108 Cal. 306 948 
 
 Lowery v. Pekin, 186 HI. 387 339, 347, 1255, 1259 
 
 Lowndes County v. Bowie, 34 Ala. 461 631, 636, 915 
 
 Lowther v. Bridgman, 57 W. Va. 306 578 
 
 L Realty Co. v. Johnson, 92 Minn. 363 472 
 
 Lucas, In re, (1909) 1 K. B. 16 671, 676 
 
 Lucas V. Ashland- Light, etc., Co., 92 Neb. 550 154, 204, 620, 1412, 1420 
 
 Ludlow V. Detweiler, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 894 846 
 
cxliv Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.l PAGB 
 
 Ludlow V. Hudson River R. E. Co., 6 Lana 128 1391 
 
 Lumbard v. Stearns, 4 Cush. 60 170, 201 
 
 Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v. St. Paul, 82 Minn. 497 70, 356 
 
 Lundberg v. Green River Irrigation District, 119 Pa. 1039 250 
 
 Lumerate v. St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co., 149 Mo. App. 47 1154 
 
 Lumsden v. Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 485 949 
 
 Lund V. Idaho, etc., E. E. Co., 50 Wash. 574 879, 1399 
 
 Limd V. New Bedford, 121 Mass. 286 434, 839, 1051, 1055, 1244 
 
 Lundberg v. Eastern Ey. Co., 13» Wia. 161 1257, 1260, 1261 
 
 Lusby V. Kansas City, etc., E. E. Co., 73 Miss. 360 987, 988 
 
 Lutes V. Louisville, etc., E. E. Co., 158 Ky. 259 250, 342 
 
 Luther v. Buncombe County 'Commissioners, 164 N. C. 241 914, 927 
 
 936, 1046, 1079 
 
 Lutterloh v. Cedar Keys, 15 Pla. 306 586, 587 
 
 Lux V. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255 66, 114, 141, 154, 249 
 
 Luxton V. North Eiver Bridge Co., 147 U. S. 337 1094 
 
 Luxton v. North Eiver Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525 109, HI, 1037 
 
 Lydick v. State, 61 Neb. 309 1410 
 
 Lyford v. Laconia, 75 N. H. 220 212, 342, 618, 1420 
 
 Lyles V. Texas, etc., R. E. Co., 73 Tex. 95 960 
 
 Lyman v. Arnold, 5 Mason 195 612 
 
 Lyman v. Boston, 164 Mass. 99 1176, 1181, 1189, 1206 
 
 Lyman v. Burlington, 22 Vt. 131 1057 
 
 Lyman v. Edgerton, 29 Vt. 305 1308 
 
 Lyme Regis v. Henley, 3 Barn. & Ad. 77 1296 
 
 Lynch v. Forbes, 161 Mass. 302 910, 914, 916, 918, 920, 923, 985 
 
 Lynch v. Metropolitan El. Ey. Co., 129 N. Y. 274 942 
 
 Lynch v. New York, 76 N. Y. 60 1355 
 
 Lynch v. North Yakima, 37 Wash. 675 1308 
 
 Lynch v. Rutland, 66 Vt. 570 1264 
 
 Lynch v. Stone, 4 Denio 356 1235 
 
 Lynn, etc., R. R'. Co. v. Boston, etc., E. E. Co., 114 Mass. 88 377, 380 
 
 Lynnfield v. Peabody, 219 Mass. 322 404, 415, 436, 440, 1071 
 
 Lynn, Mayor of, v. Turner, 1 Cowp. 86 407, 1294 
 
 Lyon V. Fishmongers' Co., L. ,E. 1 App. Cas. 662 424, 820 
 
 Lyon V. Gormley, 53 Pa. 361 608, 609 
 
 Lyon V. Green Bay, etc., R. R. Co., 42- Wis. 538 707, 731, 1151 
 
 Lyon V. Jerome, 26 Wend. 485 984 
 
 Lyon V. McDonald, 78 Tex. 71 605, 606, 1172 
 
 Lyon County Commissioners v. Kiser, 26 Kan. 279 1052 
 
 Lyons v. Longmont, 54 Colo. 112 200, 201, 982 
 
 Lyons Cemetery Assn., In- re, 86 N. Y. Supp. 960 213 
 
 M 
 
 Mabrie v. Canal Bank, 11 La. 83 314 
 
 ilabon V. Halstead, 39 N. J. L. 640 1099 
 
 ilabry , Ex parte, 5 Tex. App. 93 56 
 
 Macey v. Metropolitan Board of Works, 33 L. J. Ch. 377 820 
 
Table of Cases. cxlv 
 
 Macfarland v. Elberson, 3a App. D. C. 81 916, 920 
 
 MaeGiimis v. Marlborough-Hudson Gas Co., 220 Mass. 675 573, 840 
 
 Mack V. Easton, etc., R. R. Co., 10 Pa. Dist. Rep. 102 1156 
 
 Macnaughton v. Commonwealth, 220 Mass. 550 1201, 1204 
 
 Macon v. Hill, 58 Ga. 595 484 
 
 Macon v. Owen, 3 Ala. 116 1104 
 
 Macon v. Wing, 113 Ga. 90 321, 878, 879 
 
 Macon, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bowen, 45 Ga. 531 1271 
 
 Madera County v. Raymond Granite Co., 130' Cal. 128 1069 
 
 Madera Irrigation Ditrsict, In re, 92 Cal. 296 147, 155, 249 
 
 Madera R. R. Co. v. Raymond Granite Co., 3 Cal. App. G6S 187, 191, 192 
 
 235, 1086, 1091 
 
 MadisioD v. Daley, 58 Fed. 751 990, 991 
 
 Madison v. Mayers, 97 Wis. 399 483 
 
 Madison v. Ross, 3 Ind. 230 1371 
 
 Madison Coimty Ry. Co. v. Gahagan, 161 N. C. 190 953 
 
 Madisonville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Ross, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 584 659, 662, 603 
 
 Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239. .86, 127 
 
 631, 639, 1041 
 
 Madson v. Spokane, etc.. Water Co., 40 Wash. 414 434, 435, 1208 
 
 Maffet V. Quine, 93 Fed. 347 1154 
 
 Magee v. Brooklyn-, 144 N. Y. 205 1155 
 
 Magee v. Overshiner, 150 Ind. 127 578, 579, 984 
 
 Magee v. Regina, 5 Can. Exch. 391 45fi 
 
 Magee Furnace Co. v. Commonwealth, 166 Mass. 480 860, 1250, 1379 
 
 Maginnis v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 112 Wis. 385 104 
 
 Magnolia v. Marshall, 39 Miss. 109 409, 416 
 
 Maguire v. Cartersville, 76 Ga. 84 1358 
 
 Mahady v. Blishwiek St. Ry. Co., 91 N. Y. 148 540, 555 
 
 Mahaffey v. Beech Creek R. R. Co., 163 Pa. 158i 810 
 
 Mahon v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 658 619 
 
 Mahoney v. Spring Valley Waterworks Co., 52 Cal. 159 911, 984 
 
 Miahoniing County v. Young, 59 Fed. 96 1405 
 
 Main v. Plymouth Comity, 223 Mass. 66 1108 
 
 Maine, etc., R. R. Co. v. Waterville, etc., Ry. Co., 80 Me. 328 381 
 
 Main St., Re, 137 Pa. 590 947 
 
 Maira v. Gallahue, 9 Grat. 94 22 
 
 Malcolm v. New York El. R. R. Co., 147- N. Y. 308 /..... 790 
 
 Mallard v. Lafayette, 5 La. Ann. 112 1106 
 
 Mallory v. Griffey, 85 Pa. 275 478 
 
 Malone v. Toledo, 28 Ohio St. 643 620, 1421 
 
 Malone v. Toledo, 34 Ohio St. 541 612, 914, 919, 958 
 
 Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390 369 
 
 Malone Waterworks Co., In re, 15 N. Y. Supp. 649 1071 
 
 Malott V. Oollinsville, etc., Ry. Co., 108 Fed. 313 546 
 
 Malvern, etc., R. R. Co. v. House, 177 S. W. 907 894 
 
 Manchester, etc., R. R. Co. v. Keene, 62 N. H. 81 1276 
 
 Manda v. Orange, 82 N. J. L. 686 670, 1170, 1196, 1203 
 
 Manderson, In re, 51 Fed. 503 126 
 
cxlvi Table op Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] page 
 
 Mangles v. Hudson County Freeholders, 55 N. J. L. 88 624, 694, 762, 773 
 
 775, 785, 806, 919 
 
 Mangum v. Todd, 42 Okla. 343 871 
 
 Manhattan Building Co. v. Seattle, 52 Wash. 226 1187, 1188 
 
 Manhattan Co., Ex parte, 22 Wend. 653 997, 1003 
 
 Manhattan Terminal Co., In re, 120 N. Y. Supp. 465 667, 6681, 1144 
 
 Manhattan E. E. Co. v. Stuyvesant, 126 N. Y. App. Div. 848 1197 
 
 Manion/ v. louisville, etc., E. E. Co'., 90 Ky. 491 1101 
 
 ■ Manistee, etc., E. E. Co. v. Fowler, 73 Mich. 217 1082 
 
 Mankato v. Willard, 13 Minn. 13 409 
 
 Manlius Highway Commissioners v. Chaffee, 1 Mich. N. P. 147 101 
 
 Manning v. Bruce, 186 Mass. 282 161, 282 
 
 Manning v. Devil's Lake, 13 N. D. 47 174 
 
 Manning v. Lowell, 130 Mass. 21 1314, 1318, 1363 
 
 Manning v. Lowell, 173 Mass. 100 692, 693, 1177, 1181, 1190, 1192, 1193 
 
 1195, 1209, 1211 
 
 Manning v. New Jersey, etc., E. E. Co., 80 N. J. L. 349 469, 603 
 
 Manning v. Shreveport, 119 La. 1044 766, 800, 867, 872, 874 
 
 Manning v. Springfield, 184 Mass. 245 1327, 1339 
 
 Mansfield v. BfeUiet, 65 Ohio St. 451 445, 1319 
 
 Mansfield v. Bristor, 76 Ohio St. 270 445, 1314, 1316 
 
 Mansfield v. Tenney, 202 Mass. 312 1277 
 
 MansfieM, etc., R. E. Co. v. Clark, 23 Mich. 519 922 
 
 Mantorville, etc.. Transfer Co. v. Slingerland, 101 Minn. 488 770 
 
 Mantz V. Maguire, 52 Mo. App. 136 1181 
 
 MaJiville v. Worcester, 138 Mass. 89 94 
 
 Mapes V. Vandalia E. R. Co., 238 III. 147 1163, 1263, 1268 
 
 Marble v. Whitney, 28 N. Y. 297 91, 1407 
 
 Marblehead v. Essex County Commissioners, 5 Gray 451 1010 
 
 March v. Portsmouth, etc., E. E. Co.^ 19 N. H. 372 947, 1192 
 
 Marcy v. Fries, 18 Kan. 355 799 
 
 Marianna, etc., E. E. Co. v. Maund, 62 Fla. 538 1162 
 
 Marietta Chair Co. v. Henderson, 121 Ga. 399 183, 470, 1024, 1404, 1405 
 
 1419, 1421 
 
 Marin County Water Co. v. Marin County, 145 Cal. 586 2 
 
 Marion v. Skillman, 127 Ind. 130 517 
 
 Mark v. State, 97 N. Y. 572 958 
 
 Mark v. West Troy, 151 N. Y. 453 441 
 
 Market St. Ey. Co. v. Central Ry. Co., 51 Cal. 383 379, 999 
 
 Markham v. Atlanta, 23 Ga. 402 507 
 
 Markham v. Brown, 37 Ga. 277 161, 282, 991 
 
 Markley v. Mineral City, 58 Ohio St. 430 219 
 
 Markowitz v. Kansas City, 125 Mo. 485 1239, 1322 
 
 Markowitz v. Pittsburg, etc., E. E. Co., 216 Pa. 535 1177 
 
 Markwardt v. Guthrie, 18 Okl. 32 445, 1319 
 
 Marlott V. CoUinsville, etc., Ry. Co., 47 C. C. A. 345 536 
 
 Marquette, etc., R. R. Co. v. Longyear, 133 Mich. 94 890, 1067, 1112 
 
 Marquette, etc., E. E. Co. v. Probate Judge, 53 Mich. 217 922, 1127, 1128 
 
 Marsden v. Cambridge, 114 Mass. 490 347, 829, 842 
 
Table op Cases. cxlvii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Marshall v. Allen, 115 S. W. 489 637, 647, 648 
 
 Marshall v. Niagara Springs Orchard Co., 22 Idaho 144 311 
 
 Marshall v. Ulleswater Steam Navigation Co., L. E. 7 Q. B. 166 410 
 
 Marshall Fishing Co. v. Hadley Falls Co., 5 Cush. 602' 95&, 1057, 1058 
 
 Marshalltown v. Forney, 61 Iowa 578 183 
 
 Martinis v. Taeoma, 66 Wash. 92 869 
 
 Marth v. Kingfisher, 22 Okla. 602 1316 
 
 Martin, Ex parte, 13 Ark. 198 2, 58, 85, 121, 621, 622, 1255, 1259 
 
 Martin v. Bliss, 5 Blackf. 35 883 
 
 Martin v. Bond Hill, 53 Ohio St. 646 789, 809 
 
 Martin v. Brooklyn, 1 Hill 545 1106, 1326, 1348 
 
 Martin v. Chicago, etc., Ky. Co., 220 111. 97 1204 
 
 Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 53 267 
 
 Martin v. Filmore County, 44 Neb. 719 768, 805 
 
 Martin v. Gainesville R. E. Co., 78 Ga. 307 313 
 
 Martin v. Gleason, 139 Mass. 451 66, 616 
 
 Martin v. London, etc., E. E. Co., L. E. 1 Eq. 145 354, 356 
 
 Martin v. Louisville, 97 Ky. 30 1405 
 
 Martin v. New York, etc., E. E. Co., 62 Conn. 331 1207 
 
 Martin v. St. Louis, 139 Mo. 2146 650 
 
 Martin v. Tyler, 4 N. D. 278 625, 628, 642, 809, 941 
 
 Martinsville, etc., E. E. Co. v. Bridges, 6 Ind. 400 1059 
 
 Mashburn v. St. Joe Improvement Co., 19 Idaho 30 417 
 
 Mason v. Boston, 163 Mass. 479 1221 
 
 Mason v. Harper's Ferry Bridge Co., 17 W. Va. 412 79, 364 
 
 Mason v. Iowa Central E. E. Co., 131 Iowa 468 1081 
 
 Mason v. Kennebec, etc., E. E. Co., 31 Me. 215 507, 730, 1235 
 
 Mason v. Lake Erie, etc., E. E. Co., 9 Biss. 239 1421 
 
 Mason v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 74 S. C. 557 1217 
 
 Mason v. Eoss, 75 N. J. Eq. 13© 1408 
 
 Mason v. Shrewsbury, etc., Ey. Co., L. E. 6 Q. B. 578 320 
 
 Mason City, etc., E. E. Co. v. Boynton, 204 U. S. 570 1018, 1041 
 
 Mason City, etc., E. E. Co. v. Kennedy, 192 Fed. 538 887 
 
 Mason City, etc., E. E. Co. v. Wolf, 148 Fed. 961 317 
 
 Masonic Temple Association v. Harris, 79 Me. 250 452 
 
 Massachusetts Central E. E. Co. v. Boston, etc., E. E. Co., 121 Mass. 
 
 124 .753, 754 
 
 Masters, In re (1901) 2 K. B. 84 338 
 
 Masters v. McHolland, 12 Kan. 17 175 
 
 Mather v. Chapman, 40 Conn. 382 454 
 
 Mather v. Ottawa, 114 111. 659 219 
 
 Matthews v. Kelsey, 58 Me. 56 478 
 
 Mathias v. Drain Commissioner, 49 Mich. 465 1068 
 
 Matteson v. Whaley, 20 E. I. 412 1410 
 
 Matthias v. Min-'-nolis, etc., Ey. Co., 125 Minn. 224 865 
 
 Mattingley v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 687 904 
 
 Mattlage v. New York El. Ey. Co., 17 N. Y. Supp. 536 955, 960 
 
 Mauldin v. Greenville, 64 S. C. 444 1114 
 
 Maund v. Monmouthshire Canal Co., 4 Manning & Granger, 452 1294 
 
cxlviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Maus V. Springfield, 101 Mo. 613 1310 
 
 Maust V. Pennsylvania, etc., Ry. Co., 219 Pa. 568 1265 
 
 Maxmilian v. New York, 62 N. Y. 160 1308 
 
 Maxon v. Gates, 136 Wis. 270 1105, 1205 
 
 Maxwell v. Central, etc., Tel. Co., 51 W. Va. 121 578, 893 
 
 Maxwell v. Goetschius, 40 N. J. L. 383 82 
 
 May V. Boston, 158 Mass. 21 676, 677, 1203, 1206, 1207 
 
 May v. New England R. R. Co., 171 Mass. 367 600 
 
 Mayer v. McCracken, 245 111. 551 353 
 
 Mayer v. New York, 193 N. Y. 535 . . 1239 
 
 Maynard v. Nemaha Valley Drainage District, 94 Nebr. 610 1171 
 
 Maynard v. Northampton, 157 Mass. 218 666 
 
 Mayne v. Nassau Electric Ry. Co., 136 N. Y. Supp. 375 352 
 
 Maynell v. Saltmarsh, 1 Keb. 847 , 883 
 
 Mayo V. Dover, etc.. Fire Co., 96 Me. 5'39 200, 203 
 
 Mayo v. Springfield, 136 Mass. 10 516, 1314, 1318 
 
 Mayo V. Springfield, 138 Mass. 70 177, 773, 833 
 
 Mays V. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 75 S. C. 30 94 
 
 Maysville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ball, 108 Ky. 241 1272 
 
 Maysville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Connor, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 635 596 
 
 Maysville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ingram, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 853 595, 597, 856 
 
 McAlester v. McMurray, 26 Okla. 577 647 
 
 McAndrews V. Collerd, 13 Vroom 189 1388 
 
 McAntire v. Joplin Tel. Co., 75 Mo. App. 535 486 
 
 McArthur v. Dayton, 19 Ky. L; R. 882 1364 
 
 McArthur v. Morgan, 49 Conn. 347 1092 
 
 McArthur v. Saginaw, 58 Mich. 357 1336 
 
 McAskill v. Hancock, 129 Mich. 74 1318, 1359 
 
 McAulay v. Western Vermont R. R. Co., 33 Vt. 311 643, 1265 
 
 McCafferty v. Spuyten Duyvil, etc., R. R. Co., 61 N. Y. 178 1252 
 
 McCafifrey v. Smith, 41 Hun 117 522 
 
 McCall V. Marion County, 43 Ore. 536 953, 1114 
 
 MoCall v. Saratoga Springs, 121 N. Y. 704 868 
 
 McCammon, etc.. Lumber Co. v. Trinity, etc., Ry. Co., 104 Tex. 8 307, 464 
 
 526, 647, 1257, 1395, 1398 
 
 McCandless Township Road, Re, 10 Pa. 605 948 
 
 McCann v. Clarke County, 149 Iowa 13 879 
 
 MeCann v. Johnson County Tel. Co., 69 Kan. 210 476, 578, 579 
 
 McCann v. Sierra County, 7 Cal. 121 1251 
 
 McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., 209 U. S. 349 92, 440 
 
 McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 695 92, 440 
 
 McCarthy v. St. Paul, 22 Minn. 527 876, 877, 895 
 
 McCarthy v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 148 Cal. 211 618, 988, 990 
 
 McCarthy v. Syracuse, 46 N. Y. 194 478 
 
 McCarty v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 31 Minn. 278 1272 
 
 McCaskey v. Fort Dodge, etc., Ry. Co., 154 Iowa 652 953, 955 
 
 McCauley v. Brooks, 16 Cal. 11 338 
 
 McCauley v. Weller, 12 Cal. 500 621 
 
 McChesney v. Chicago, 188 111. 423 1103 
 
Table op Cases. cxlix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 McClarren v. Jefferson iSchool Township, 169 Ind. 140' 70S, 706 
 
 McClary v. Hartwell, 25 Mich. 139 922 
 
 McClean v. Chicago, etc., Ry Co., -67 Iowa 568 526, 1188 
 
 McClellan v. Weaton, 49 W. Va. 669 481 
 
 McClenaehan v. Curwen, 3 Yeates 362 19 
 
 McCleneghan v. Omaha, etc., E. E. Co., 25 Nebr, 523 1393 
 
 McCIinton v. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 66 Pa. 404 1244 
 
 McClure v. Red Wing, 28 Minn. 186 1325, 1364, 1372 
 
 MeColgan v. Baltimore Belt R. E. Co., 85 Md. 519 1417 
 
 McCollum, Ex parte, 1 Cow. 564 36 
 
 McCombs V. Stewart, 40 Ohio St. 647 612, 1420 
 
 McConihay v. Wright, 121 U. S. 201 1421 
 
 MeCormick v. District of Columbia, 4 Mackay 396 578 
 
 McCormick v. Kansas City, etc., E. E. Co., 70 Mo. 359 611, 1392 
 
 MeCormick v. Lafeyette, 1 Ind. 48 173 
 
 McCowan v. Whiteside, 31 Ind. 23.5 884 
 
 McCoy V. Plum Bayou Levee District, 95 Ark. 345 850, 894 
 
 McCray v. JFairmont, 46 W. Va. 442 856, 876 
 
 McCray v. Manning, 22 Cal. App. 25 646 
 
 McCrea v. Port Royal R. R. Co., 3 S. C. 381 970 
 
 MeCready v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 30 Utah 1 1106 
 
 McCuUock V. North Carolina R. E. Co., 146 N. c. 316 604 
 
 MeCullough V. Brown, 41 S. C. 220 215 
 
 MoCuUough V. Campbellsport, 123 Wis. 334 50fe 
 
 MeCullough V. Mayor of Brooklyn, 23 Wend. 458 1231 
 
 MeCullough V. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 52 Minn. 12 611, 855 
 
 MeCullough T. San Francisco, 51 Cal. 418 996, 1003 
 
 MeCullough V. Wall, 4 Rich. 68 409 
 
 McCulley v. Cunningham, 96 Ala. 583 1066, 1118 
 
 McCutcheon v. Homer, 43 Mich. 483 1308 
 
 McCutcheon v. Texas, etc., Ry. Co., 118 La. 436 1154 
 
 McDade v. Chester, 117 Pa. 414 1316 
 
 McDaniel v. Columbus, 91 Ga. 462 213 
 
 McDermott v. Warren, etc., St. Ry. Co., 172 Mass. 197 541, 1059, 1229 
 
 McDevitt V. People's Nat. Gas Co., 160. Pa. 367 476, 573 
 
 McDonald v. English, 85 111. 232 491 
 
 McDonald v. Marquette Circuit Judge, 15d Mich. 367 1089 
 
 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 1306 
 
 McDonald v. Red Wing, 13 Minn. 3S 264 
 
 McDonald v. Texas, etc., E. R. Co., Posey 191 812 
 
 McDonald v. Wilson, 59 Ind. 54 1068 
 
 McDonnell v. Improvement District, 97 Ark. 334 948 
 
 McDonough v. Virginia City, 6 Nev. 90 1326, 1348 
 
 McDougald v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 162 Cal. 1 721, 723, 725 
 
 McDougle V. Clark, 7 B. Mon. 448 1412 
 
 McDowell v. Asheville, 112 N. C. 747 1239 
 
 McEachin v. Tuscaloosa, 164 Ala. 263 876 
 
 McElheny v. McKeesport, etc.. Bridge Co., 153 Pa. 108 763 
 
 McElroy v. Albany, 65 Ga. 387 I3O7 
 
cl Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 McElroy v. Kansas City, 21 Fed. 257 646, 871, 969 
 
 McElroy v. Kansas City, etc., E. R. Co., 172 Mo. 546 805 
 
 McFadden v. Jewell, 119 Iowa 331 1307 
 
 McFadden v. Johnson, 72 Pa. 335 1152, 1155 
 
 McPall V. St. Louis, 232 Mo. 716.' 522 
 
 McFarlin v. Essex Co., 10 Cush. 304 432 
 
 McGann v. Clarke County, 149 Iowa 14 322 
 
 McGann v. People, 194 111. 526 192 
 
 McGary v. Lafayette, 4 La. Ann. 440 1346 
 
 McGavock v. Omaha, 40 Nebr. 64 925, 928 
 
 McGee's Appeal, 114 Pa. 470 324, 886, 1405 
 
 MeGhee Irr. Ditch Co. v. Hudson, 85 Tex. 587 434, 435 
 
 McGoldrick v. King, 8 Can. Exch. 169 340 
 
 McGovern v. New York, 229 U. S. 363 86, 673, 709 
 
 McGovern v. New York, 195 N. Y. 573 673 
 
 McGrath v. Boston, 103 Mass. 369 340 
 
 McGrath v. Watertown, 1»1 Mass. 380 1060 
 
 McGregor v. Boyle, 34 Iowa 264 1317 
 
 McGregor v. Equitable Gas Co., 139 Pa. 230 691 
 
 McGrew v. Granite Bituminous Paving Co., 247 Mo. 549 647, 1322, 1388 
 
 MeGrew v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. Co., 230 Mo. 496 80 
 
 Mcllhinny v. Trenton, 148 Mich. 380 588 
 
 Mclntire v. State, 5 Blackf. 384 797 
 
 Mclntire v. Western North Carolina E. E. Co., 67 N. C. 278 1235 
 
 Mcintosh V. Pittsburg, 112 Fed. 705 931 
 
 Mclntyre v. El Paso County, 15 Col. App. 78 , 393 
 
 Mclntyre v. Marine, 93 Ind. 193 932 
 
 Mclntyre v. United States, 2'5 Ct. Cl. 200 314 
 
 McKee v. Hull, 69 Wis. 657 1274 
 
 McKee v. Wilmington, etc., E. E. Co., 3 Jones L. 186 364 
 
 McKeen v. Delaware Canal Co., 49 Pa. 424 431, 433 
 
 McKelvey v. Allegheny County, 238 Pa. 580 1240 
 
 McKenna v. St. Louis, etc., Ey. Co., 69 Ark. 104 920, 1263 
 
 McKenzie v. Imperial Irrigation Co., 166 S. W. 495 1028 
 
 McKeoin v. Northern Pacific R. E. Co., 45 Fed. 464 1228 
 
 McKeon v. New England E. E. Co., 199 Mass. 292. . .827, 839, 831, 842, 864 
 
 865, 1052, 1246 
 
 McKeon v. New York, etc., E. E. Co., 75 Conn. 343 161, 282, 310, 311 
 
 525, 531 
 
 McKibbim v. Ft. Smith, 35 Ark. 352 275 
 
 McKinney v. Baker, 100 Iowa 362 322 
 
 McKinney v. Monongahela Nav. Co., 14 Pa. 65 1235 
 
 McKinuey v. Nashville, 102 Tenn. 131 660, 667, 669 
 
 McKnight v. Wichita, 83 Kan. 7 659, 666, 7^9, 743 
 
 McLauchlin v. Charlotte, etc., E. E. Co., 5 Eich. 583 527 
 
 McLaughlin v. Hope, 107 Ark. 442 213, 214, 338. 443, 982, 1282, 1317 
 
 McLaughlin v. Municipality No. 2, 5 La. Ann. 904" 1102, 1107 
 
 McLean v. Brush Electric Light Co., 8 Ohio Dec. Eeprint 619 584 
 
 McLean v. District Court, 24 Idaho 441 170, 187, 1095 
 
Table of Cases. cli 
 
 [Fages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 MoLemore v. Charleston, etc., R. R. Co., Ill Tenn. 630 1420 
 
 McLendon v. Atlanta, etc., R. R. Co., 54 Ga. 293 1151, 1154 
 
 McLeod V. Savannah, etc., R. R. Co., 25 Ga. 445 363 
 
 McLeod V. South Deerfield Water Supply District, 193 Mass. 6 989 
 
 McLoud V. Selby, 10 Conn. 390 1418 
 
 McMahon v. Dubuque, 107 Iowa 62 1309 
 
 McMahon v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 827 646, 846, 1398 
 
 McManus v. Burrows, 89 Nebr. 250 1155, 1159 
 
 McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1 , 409 
 
 McManus v. McDonough, 107 III. 95 936, 943, 1079 
 
 McManus v. Weston, 164 Mass. 263 1308 
 
 MoMeekin v. Central Carolina Power Co., 80S. C. 512 204 
 
 McMicken v. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio St. 394 927 
 
 McMillan v. Noyes, 75 N. H. 258 134, 151, 204 
 
 McMillan Printing Co. v. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 216 Pa.. 504, 715, 718, 1157 
 
 McMinn v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., 147 Pa. 5 1272 
 
 McMinnville v. Howenstine, 56 Ore. 451 65 
 
 McMurray v. Baltimore, 54 Md. 103 441 
 
 McNally v. Smith, 12 Allen 453 824, 1235, 1241 
 
 MeNamara v. Commonwealth, 184 Mass. 304 855 
 
 McQuade v. Rex, 7 Can. Exch. 318 536 
 
 McQuaid v. Portland, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Ore. 237 525, 531, 596 
 
 McQuillen v. Hatton, 42 Ohio St. 202 117, 244 
 
 McQuity V. Doudna, 101 Iowa 141 71 
 
 McReynolds v. Burlington, etc., R. R. Co., 106 111. 152 736, 1140 
 
 McReynolds v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 110 Mo. 484 804 
 
 McReynolds v. Smallhouse, 8 Bush 447 101 
 
 McSweeney v. Commonwealth, 185 Mass. 371 348 
 
 McTerren v. Mount Alto R. R. Co., 2' W. N. C. 40 770 
 
 McWethy v. Aurora, etc.. Power Co., 202 111. 218 584 
 
 Meaeham v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 4 Cush. 291 763, 775, SOI, 1060, 1147 
 
 Mead v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 174 Mich. 521 48 
 
 Mead v. New Haven, 40 Conn. 72 1307 
 
 Mead v. New York El. R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. Supp. 908 905 
 
 Mead- v. Portland, 45 Ore. 1 460 
 
 Meade v. United States, 2 Ct. CI. 224 '. 67 
 
 Meares v. Wilmington, 9 Ired. L. 73 1296, 1318, 1351 
 
 Mecartney V. Chicago, 150 111. App. 275 1235 
 
 Medley v. Barry, 143 Mo. App. 641 647 
 
 Meeker v. Chicago, 96 111. App. 23 1228, 1245 
 
 Megargee v. Philadelphia, 153 Pa. 340 1333 
 
 Meginnis v. Nunamaker, 64 Pa. 374 1155 
 
 Mellen v. Western R. R. Co., 4 Gray 301 828, 1250, 1371 
 
 Mellichar v. Iowa City, 116 Iowa 390 1108 
 
 Melon St., Re, 182' Pa. 397 325, 647, 888 
 
 Melrose v. Cutter, 159 Mass. 461 614 
 
 Memphis v. Boltin, 9 Heisk. 508 660, 812 
 
 Memphis v. Hastings, 113 Tenn. 142 164, 991 
 
 Memphis v. Lenore, 6 Cold-w. 412 ' 1410 
 
dii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Memphis v. Memphis Water Co., 5 Heisk. 495 402 
 
 Memphis v. Overton, 3 Yerg. 387 416 
 
 Memphis v. Wright, 6 Yerg. 497 991 
 
 Memphis Bell Tel. Co. v. Hunt, 16 Lea 456 580 
 
 Memphis, etc., Co. v. Pikey, 142 Ind. 304 409 
 
 Memphis, etc.. Gas Co. v. Williamson, 9 Heisk. 326' 363 
 
 Memphis, etc., R. K. Co. v. Birmingham, etc., E. E. Co., 96 Ala. 571.370, 753 
 Memphis, etc., R. E. Co. v. Forest Hill Cemetery Co., 116 Tenn. 400. . . 1007 
 
 Memphis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Humphreys^ 65 Ark, 631 1411, 1412 
 
 Memphis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Payne, 37 Miss. 700 1244, 1282 
 
 Memphis, etc., R. R. v. Union R. E. Co., 116 Tenn. SOO 1007 
 
 Memphis Freight Co. v. Memphis, 4 Coldw. 419 200 
 
 Mendel v. Wheeling, 28 W. Va. 283 1329 
 
 Mendon v. Worcester County Commisioners, 2 Allen 463 1050, 1118, 1119 
 
 Meng V. Coffee, 67 Neb. 500 437 
 
 Mengell's Executors v. Molinsville Water Co., 224 Fa. 120 652 
 
 Mercantile Trust Co. v. Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co., 63 Fed. 910 365 
 
 Mercantile Trust Co. v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. E. Co., 29 Fed. 732 1275 
 
 Mercer v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., 38 Pa. 99i 396 
 
 Mercer County v. Wolff, 237 111. 74 158, 991, 1029, 1208 
 
 Mercer St., In re, 55 Wash. 116 1213 
 
 Merchants' Bank v. Cook, 4 Pick, 405 '. 1418 
 
 Merchants' Union Barb Wire Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 70 Iowa 105. 530 
 
 Meriden v. Zwalziski, 88 Conn. 427 737, 794, 1114 
 
 Meridian v. Higgins, 81 Miss. 376 766, 789, 804 
 
 Meridian v. Western Union Tel. Co., 72 Miss. 9il2 395 
 
 Merrill v. South Side Irrigation Co., 118-Cal. 426 250 
 
 Meriwether'v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472 1416 
 
 Merriam v. Brown, 128 Mass. 391 703 
 
 Merriam v. United 'States, 29 Ct. CI. 250 1389 
 
 Merrick v. Intramontaine Ey. Co., 118 N. C. 1081 536, 542, 551 
 
 Merrifield v. Lombard, 13 Allen 16 443 
 
 Merrifleld v. Worcester, 110 Mass, 216 443, 1362, 1380 
 
 Merritt Township v. Harp, 131 Mich. 174 398 
 
 Messenger v. Manhattan R. R. Co., 129' N. Y. 502 593, 598 
 
 Metallic Compression Casting Co. v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 108 Mass. 
 
 277 264 
 
 Metlar v. Middlesex County, etc.. Traction Co., 72 N. J. L. 524 988 
 
 Metier v. Easton, etc., E. R. Co., 37 N. J. L. 222 651, 952, 953, 1150 
 
 Methodist Episcopal Church v Hoboken, 33 K. J. L. 13 398 
 
 Methodist Episcopal Church v. Pennsylvania R. E. Co., 48 N. .J. Eq. 
 
 452 528, 526 
 
 Metropolitan Board of Works v. McCarthy, L. E. 7 H. L. 243 367 
 
 820, 821, 822 
 
 Metropolitan City E. R. Co. v. Chicago West Division R. R. Co., 87 111. 
 
 317 1084 
 
 Metropolitan City E. E. Co. v. Chicago, etc., E. R. Co., 87 III. 317 65 
 
 Metropolitan El. R. E. Co., In re, 12 K Y. Supp. 502 905 
 
Table of Cases. eliii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are lu Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume H.] PAOE 
 
 Metropolitan, etc., R. R. Co. \. Dickinaon, 161 111. 22 1111 
 
 Metropolitan, etc., R. R. Co. v. Eschner, 232 111. 310 341, 1131 
 
 Metropoliten, etc., R. R. Co. v. Goll, 100 111. App. 323 563, 594, 597 
 
 588, 859 
 
 Metropolitan, etc., R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 159 111. 434 740, 743 
 
 Metropolitan, etc., R. R. Co. v. Springer, 171 111. 170 309 
 
 Metropolitan, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stickney, 150 111. 362 . . 76, 767, 790, 796, 797 
 
 Metropolitan R. R. Co. v. Macfarland, 20 App. D. C. 421 964 
 
 Metropolitan R. R. Co. v. Quincy Ry. Co., 12 Allen 262 382, 976 
 
 Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. v. Walsh, 197 Mo. 392 659,'661, 1195, 1196, 1200 
 
 Metropolitan Tel., etc., Co. v. Colwell Lead Co., 67 How. Pr. 365. .677, 581 
 
 Metropolitan Transit Co., In re, 45 Hun 159 1073 
 
 Metz V. Asheville, 150 N. C. 748 1308, 1375 
 
 Metzer v. Crookston, 59 Minn. 244 .' 1359 
 
 Metzger v. Markham, 38 App. Cas. 383 161, 287 
 
 Meure v. Falconer, 10 Graitt. 12 937, 1079 
 
 Meyer v. Burlington, 52 Iowa 560 789, 798 
 
 Meyer v. Richmond, 178 U. 'S. 82 302 
 
 Meyer v. Standard Tel. Co., 122 Iowa 514 580 
 
 Meyer v. Teutopolis, 131 111. 552 651, 1404, 1405 
 
 .Meyers v. Hudson County Electric Co., 63 N. J. L. 573 582 
 
 Meyers v. St. Louis, 8 Mo. App. 266 433 
 
 Miami Coal Co. v. Wigbton, 19 Ohio St. 560 989 
 
 Michener v. Philadelphia, 118 Pa. 536 571', 1379 
 
 Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Hammond, etc., Ry. Co., 42 Ind. App. 66 . . 189 
 
 385, 541 
 
 Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Miller, 172 Mich, 201 905, 1028, 1104 
 
 Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Spring Creek Drainage District, 215 111. 
 
 501 943 
 
 Michigan, etc., R. R. Co. v. Barnes, 40 Mich. 383 354, 366 
 
 Michigan, etc., R. R. Co. v. Barnes, 44 Mich. 222 666', 947, 1167 
 
 Michigan Sugar Co. v. Dix, 124 Mich. 674 220 
 
 Micks V. Mason, 145- Mich. 212 274, 275 
 
 Middleborough v. Taunton, 203 Mass. 31 838 
 
 Middlesex Ry. Co. v. Wakefield, 103 Mass. 261 377 
 
 Middleton v. Mason City, eitc, R. R. Co., 127 Iowa 433 530 
 
 Middleton v. Presidio County, 129 S. W. 637 1121 
 
 Middletown, Matter of, 82 N. Y. 19,6 925, 926 
 
 Midland R. R. Co. v. Smith, 113 Ind. 233 1255, 1265 
 
 Midland R. R. Co. v. Smith, 125 Ind. 509i 1275 
 
 Mifflin V. Harrisburg, etc., R. R. Co., 16 Pa. 182 619, 1420 
 
 Mifflin V. Southwark Commissioners, 5 S. & R. 69 1229 
 
 Mifflin Bridge Co. v. Juniata County, 144 Pa. 365 680', 682, 683 
 
 688, 1209 
 
 Mikesell v. Durkee, 34 Kan. 509 534 
 
 Milam County v. Bateman, 54 Tex. 153 400 
 
 Milarky v. Foster, & Ore. 378 883 
 
 Milbury v. Blackstone Canal Co., 8 Pick. 473 397 
 
cliv Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Tolame II.] ' PAGE 
 
 Miles V. Worceater, 154 Mass. 511 312, 1314, 1318 
 
 Miles City v. State Board of Health, 3& Mont. 405 406, 448 
 
 Milhau V. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611 374, 1410 
 
 Military Parade Ground, Matter of, 60 N. Y. 319 1100 
 
 Millbridge, etc., Ey. Co., In re, 9i6 Me. 110 395, 541 
 
 Miller, Ex parte, 4 Mass. 565 1050, 1119 
 
 Miller v. Asheville, 112 N. C. 759 651, 654, 808 
 
 Miller v. Barnstable County Commissioners, 119 Mass. 485 1063 
 
 Miller v. Bridgewater Township Committee, 24 N. J. L. 54 1231 
 
 Miller v. Bureh, 32 Tex. 208 284 
 
 Miller v. Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co., 43 Ind. App. 340 620, 1419 
 
 Miller v. 'Corinna, 42 Minn. 391' 1405 
 
 Miller v. Detroit, etc., Ry. Co., 125 Mich. 171 486, 542, 554 
 
 Miller v. Fitcbburg, 180 Mass. 32 914 
 
 Miller v. Green Bay, etc., Co., 59 Minn. 169 533, 603, 604 
 
 Miller v. Hagerman Irrigation Co., 20 N. M. 604 435 
 
 Miller v. Hanover, etc.. Water Co., 240 Pa. 393 435, 1282 
 
 Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 840 284, 286 
 
 Miller v. Iron County, 29 Mo. 122 1300 
 
 Miller v. Jensen, 102 Minn. 391 240 
 
 Miller v. Keokuk, etc., R. E. Co., 63 Iowa 680 1249 
 
 Miller v. Kramer, 154 Iowa 523 948 
 
 Miller v. Levee Commissioners, 78 Miss. 201 1156 
 
 Miller v. Morristown, 47 N. J. Eq. 62 313, 1357 
 
 Miller v. Newport News, 101 Va. 432 I357 
 
 Miller v. New York, 109 U. S. 385 429 
 
 Miller v. Prairie du Chien, etc., E. R. Co., 34 Wis. 533 1087 
 
 Miller v. Pulaski, 109 Va. 137 141, 149, 200, 202, 204, 207, 915, 1112 
 
 Miller v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 162 Mo. 424 651 
 
 MiUer v. Southern Indiana Power Co., Ill N. E. 308 208 
 
 Miller v. State, 38 Ala. 600 1409 
 
 MiUer v. State, 124 Tenn. 293 408, 423 
 
 Miller v. Sterling, 198 111. 523 722 
 
 Miller v. Troost, 14 Minn. 365 228 
 
 Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268 265 
 
 Miller v. Webster City, 94 Iowa 162 522 
 
 Miller v. Windsor Wa,ter Co., 148 Pa. 429 435 
 
 Miller's Lessee v. Holt, 1 Overton 243 32 
 
 Miller & Lux v. Madera Canal, etc., Co., 155 Cal. 59 435, 1268 
 
 Mills V. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489 508i, 1325, 1328, 1339, 1353 
 
 Mills V. Central R. R. Co., 41 N. J. Eq. 1 69 
 
 Mills V. Pierce, 2 N. H. 9 1262 
 
 Mills V. St. Clair, 8 How. 569 360 
 
 Mills V. United States, 46 Fed. 738 302, 313, 418 
 
 Millvale v. Evergreen Ry. Co., 131 Pa. 1 396 
 
 Milwaukee v. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 94 392 
 
 Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Crawford County, 29 Wis. 116 605 
 
 Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bble, 4 Chand. 72 768, 815, 1214 
 
Table of Cases. elv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAOE 
 
 Milwaukee, etc., E. R. Co. v. Faribault, 23 Minn. 167 021, 99e, 1001 
 
 Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hart, 4 Chand. 88 815 
 
 Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., v. Milwaukee, 34 Wis. 271 605 
 
 Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Strange, 63 Wis. 178 1155, 1236 
 
 Milwaukee, etc.. Traction Co. v. Ela Co., 142 Wis. 424 1127 
 
 Milwaukee Light, etc., Co., In re, 132 Wis. 313' 10O9 
 
 Milwaukee Southern Ry. Co., In re, 124 Wis. 490 997, 1002, 1067 
 
 Milwaukee Terminal Ry. Co. v. Seattle, 86 Wash. lOa 307, 312, 647 
 
 Milwaukee Trust Co. v. Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 224 877 
 
 Mims V. Macon, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Ga. 333 2, 913, 981, 1286 
 
 Mine Hill, etc., R. R. Co. v. Zerbe, 2 Walk. 409 353 
 
 Mineral Range R. R. Co. v. Detroit, etc., Copper Co., 25 Fed. 515 1041 
 
 Minhinnah v. Haines, 29 N. J. L. 388 1057, 1232 
 
 Minneapolis v. Janney, 86 Minn. Ill 165 
 
 Minneapolis v. Wilkin, 30 Minn. 145 651, 654, 948, 1126, 1150 
 
 Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co., Matter of, 36 Minn. 481 1086 
 
 Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co., v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 116 Iowa 69. . . 1008 
 Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 116 Iowa 681.. 999 
 
 Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hartland, 85 Minn. 76 914, 996, 998, 999 
 
 Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kanne, 32 Minn. 174 939, 937, 1077, 1080 
 
 Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Manitou Forest Syndicate, 101 Minn. 132. 994 
 Minneapolis, etc., R. R. 'Co. v. Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co., 61 Minn. 
 
 502 996, 1000 
 
 Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257 373 
 
 Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Nicolin, 76 Minn. 302 191 
 
 Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Woodworth, 32 Minn. 452 955, 1104 
 
 Minneapolis, etc.. Terminal Co., Re, 38 Minn. 157 912, 921 
 
 Minneapolis, etc.. Traction Co. v. Friend'shuh, 108 Minn. 492 729 
 
 Minneapolis, etc.. Traction Co. v. Harkins, 108 Minn. 478 722, 724 
 
 727, 803 
 
 Minneapolis, etc., Traction Co. v. Searle, 208 Fed. 122 534 
 
 Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Water Commissioners, 56 Minn. 485 433 
 
 Minnesota Canal, etc., Co. v. Fall Lake Boom Co., 127 Minn. 23 151 
 
 988, 1092 
 
 Minnesota Canal, etc., Co. v. Koochiching Co., 97 Minn. 429 116, 129 
 
 149, 156, 208, 924, 1010 
 Minnesota Canal, etc., Co. v. Pratt, 101 Minn. 197. .106, 201, 983, 1011, 1085 
 
 Minnesota, etc., R. R. Co. v. Doran, 15 Minn. 230 742 
 
 Minnesota, etc., R. R. Co. v. Doran, 17 Minn. 188 771, 1139 
 
 Minnesota, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gluck, 45 Minn. 463 1190 
 
 Minnesota, etc., R. R. Co. v. McNamara, 13 Minn. 508 763 
 
 Minnetonka Lake Improvement Co., Re, 56 Minn. 513 418 
 
 Minnig's Appeal, 82 Pa. 373 1254 
 
 Minor v. New Orleans, 115 La. 301 1409, 1410 
 
 Minot V. Boston, 201 Mass. 10 657 
 
 Minot V. Cumberland County Commissioners, 28 Me. 121 1062, 1134 
 
 Minot V. Winthrop, 162 Mass. 113 268 
 
 Minzesheinier, In re 204 N. Y. 272 ^53 
 
clvi Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] pagb 
 
 Miocene Ditch Co. v. Lyng, 138 Fed. 544 106fi 
 
 Miocene Ditch Co. v. Jacobsen, 77 C. C. A. 106 94, 255, 256 
 
 Mississippi Central E. R. Co. v. Mason, 51 Miss. 234 1392 
 
 Mississippi, etc., Boom Co. v. Patterson, see' Boom Co. v. Patterson 
 
 Mississippi, etc., E. E. Co. v. Deveney, 42 Miss. 555 706, 987 
 
 Mississippi, etc., E. E. Co. v. Wooten, 36 La. Ann. 441 606 
 
 Mississippi E. E. Co. v. McDonald, 12 Heisk. 54 766, 812 
 
 Mississippi Eiver Bridge Co. v. Einz, 58 Mo. 491 666, 693 
 
 Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208 94, 445 
 
 Missouri v. Kansas City, etc., E. E. Co., 32 Fed. 722 964 
 
 Missouri, etc., R. R. Co. v. Calkins, 79 S. W. 8S2'. 317, 864 
 
 Missouri, etc., E. E. Co. v. Cambern, 66 Kan. 365 246. 
 
 Missouri, etc., E. E. Co. v. Cambern, 10 Kan. App. 581 920 
 
 Missouri, etc., E. E. Co. v. O'Connor, 51 S. W. 511 651 
 
 Missouri, etc., E. E. Co. v. Owen, 8 Kan. 27'4 651, 1133 
 
 Missouri, etc., E. E. Co. v. Eoe, 77 Kan. 224 659, 666 
 
 Missouri, etc., E. E. Co. v. Schmuck, 69 Kan. 272 609 
 
 Missouri, etc., E. E. Co. v. Schmuck, 79 Kan. 366 741 
 
 Missouri, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stehmuek, 79 Kan. 545 693 
 
 Missouri, etc., R. R. Co. v. State, 29 Okla. 640 965 
 
 Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Bradbury, 106 Mo. App. 450 1422 
 
 Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Carter, 85 Mo. 448 1033, 1074, 1075 
 
 Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Cass County, 76 Neb. 396 747, 750, 751 
 
 Missouri Pacific R. E. Co. v. Coon, 15 iNebr. 232 1185 
 
 Missouri Pacific E. E. Co. v. Bays, 15 Nebr. 224 1149 
 
 Missouri Pacific E. E. Co. v. Houseman, 41 Kan. 30O 1263 
 
 Missouri Pacific E, E. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403 86, 127 
 
 Missouri Pacific E. E. Co. v. Nebraska, 217 U. S. 193 965 
 
 Missouri Pacific E. E. Co. v. Porter, 112 Mo. 361 659, 697 
 
 Missouri Pacific E. E. Co. v. Eoberts, 187 Mo. 309 1137, 1138 
 
 Missouri Eiver Packet Co. v. Hannibal, etc., E. E. Co., 1 McCrary 281 . . 1368 
 
 Mitchell V. Bass, 26 Tex. 372 1420 
 
 Mitchell V. Bass, 33 Tex. 259 469 
 
 Mitchell V. Bridgewater, 10 Cush. 411 1272 
 
 Mitchell V. Clinton, 99 Mo. 153 1341 
 
 Mitchell V. 'Columbia, etc., Ey. Co., 223 Pa. 25 1139 
 
 Mitchell V. Franklin, etc.. Turnpike Co., 3 Humph. 456 1236 
 
 Mitchell V. Great Western R. R. Co., 35 U. C. Q. B. 148 1101 
 
 Mitchell V. Harmony, 13 How. 115 70, 265 
 
 Mitchell V. Illinois, etc., R. E. Co., 68 111. 286 944, 970 
 
 Mitchell V. Negaunee, 113 Mich. 356 203, 267 
 
 Mitchell V. Eockland, 41 Me. 363 1320, 1345 
 
 Mitchell V. Eoine, 49 Ga. 19 515 
 
 Mitchell V. Thornton, 21 Gratt. 164 813 
 
 Mitchell V. Tibbets, 17 Pick. 298 99 
 
 Mitthoff V. Carrollton, 12 La. Ann. 185 247, 624 
 
 Mix V. Lafayette, etc., E. R. Co., 67 111. 319 595 
 
 Moale V. Baltimore, 5 Md. 314 59, 145, 175, 275, 1196 
 
Table of Cases. clvii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Mobile V. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691 266 
 
 Mobile V. .Sullivan Lumber Co., 63 C. C. A. 412 456 
 
 Mobile V. Watson, 116 U. S. 280 402 
 
 Mobile, etc., R. E. Co. v. Alabama, etc., E. E. Co., 87 Ala. 501 689, 988 
 
 Mobile, etc., E. E. Co. v. Hester, 122 Ala. 249 1114 
 
 Mobile, etc., E. E. Co. v. Kamper, 8i8 Miss. 817 1420 
 
 Mobile, etc., E. E. Co. v. Louisville, etc., E. E. Co., 190 Ala. 417 370 
 
 Mobile, etc, R. E. Co. v. Louisville, etc., E. E. Co., 68 So. 905 753 
 
 Mobile, etc., E. E. Co. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 120 Ala. 21 756, 757 
 
 1004, 1072 
 
 Mobile, etc., R. R. Co. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 76 Miss. 731 365, 756 
 
 757, 758 
 
 MobUe, etc., E. E. Co. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 101 Tenn. 62.. 756, 757, 1O04 
 
 Mobile, etc., R. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 486 793, 969 
 
 Mobile Transportation Co. v. Mobile, 187 U. S. 478 409 
 
 Mobley v. Breed, 48 Ga. 44 463 
 
 Moffatt v. Denver, 37 Colo. 473 379, 565, 953 
 
 Moffittt V. Brainard, 92 Iowa 122 1405 
 
 Mohawk Bridge Co. v. Utica, etc., R. R. Co., 6 Paige 554 360, 364 
 
 Moline v. Greene, 252 111. 475 996, 1002 
 
 Molitor v. St. Paul, etc., R. E. Co., 14 Minn. 285 526 
 
 Moll V. Sanitary District, 228 111. 633 650, 661, 654 
 
 Mollandin v. Union Pacific E. E. iCo., 4 McCrary 290 878 
 
 Monagle v. Bristol County Commissioners, 8 Cush. 360 1057 
 
 Monmouth v. Gardiner, 35 Mo. 247 397 
 
 Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. .S. 177 458 
 
 Monongahela City v. Monongahela Electric Light Co., 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 529 378 
 
 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coon, 6 Pa. 379 851, 894, 967 
 
 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312 68, 110 
 
 621, 682, 791, 912, 946 
 
 Monongahela Water Co., In re, 223 Pa. 323 101, 358, 682, 685 
 
 Monroe, In re, 200 N. Y. 511 406, 411, 432 
 
 Monroe County Commissioners v. State, 156 Ind. 550 1120 
 
 .Monson, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Fuller, 15 Pick. 554 824 
 
 Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining Co., 152 U. S. 160 310 
 
 Montana R. E. Co. v. Warren, 137 U. S. 348 666, 692, 1186 
 
 Montana E. E. Co. v. Warren, 6 Mont. 275 659, 666 
 
 Montclair Military Academy v. North Jersey St. Ey. Co., 70 N. J. L. 
 
 229 542 
 
 Montclair E. E. Co. v. Benson, 36 N. J. L. 557 1201 
 
 Monteleone v. Royal Insurance Co., 47 La. Ann. 1563 274 
 
 Montgomery v. Gilmer, 33 Ala. 116 1317, 1325, 1339, 1353, 1364, 1374 
 
 Montgomery v. Hutchinson, 13 Ala. 573 287 
 
 Montgomery v. Maddox, S& Ala. 181 867 
 
 Montgomery v. Parker, 114 Ala. 118 522 
 
 Montgomery v. Portland, 190 U. S. 89 203 
 
 Montgomery v. Santa Ana, etc., Ey. Co., 104 Cal. 186 474,545,549, 890 
 
 Montgomery v. Sayre, 100 Cal. 180 1207 
 
 xi 
 
clviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAOK 
 
 Montgomery v. Townsend, 80 Ala. 489 S51, 867, 870 
 
 Montgomery v. West, 149 Ala. 311 278 
 
 Montgomery County v. Miller, 82 Ind. 572 1239 
 
 Montgomery County v. Schuylkill Bridge Co., 110 Pa. 54 682, 683 
 
 Montgomery, etc., Bank v. Tyson, 133 Ala. 459 586 
 
 Montgomery Gaslight Co. v. Montgomery, 87 Ala. 245 1316 
 
 Montgomery Southern E. R. Co. v. Sayre, 72 Ala. 443 943, 1140 
 
 Montpelier v. Bast Montpelier, 20 Vt. 12 392 
 
 Montpelier Milling Co. v. Montpelier, 19 Idaho 420 434 
 
 Montreal v. Montreal St. Ry., Appeal tjases (1912) 333 29 
 
 Moody V. Jacksonville R. R. Co., 20 Fla. 597 2, 115, 185, 621, 638 
 
 Moore v. Atlanta, 70 Ga. 611 790, 795, 867 
 
 Moore v. Boston, S Cush. 274 1056 
 
 Moore v. Camden, etc., Ry. Co., 73 N. J. L. 599 1401 
 
 Moore v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 163 N. C. 300 585 
 
 Moore v. Ferrell, 1 Ga. 7 1253 
 
 Moore v. Lancaster, 212 Pa. 642 874 
 
 Moore v. Lawrence County, 143 Ky. 448 856 
 
 Moore v. New Orleans Waterworks Co., 114 Fed. 380 375, 380, 381 
 
 Moore v. New York, 8 N. Y. 110 346 
 
 Moore v. New York El. R. R. Co., 130 N. Y. 523 593, 597, 598 
 
 Moore v. North & South Carolina Ry. Co., 94 S. C. 243 1080 
 
 Moore v. Rawson, 3 Barn. & C. 332 1411, 1413 
 
 Moore v. Roberts, 64 Wis. 538 91 
 
 Moore v. Sandown, 19 N. H. 93 948 
 
 Moore v. Sanford, 151 Mass. 285 116, 141, 147, 200, 244, 914, 1053 
 
 Moore v. Strickling, 46 W. Va. 5115 369 
 
 Moore v. Willamette Transp. Co., 7 Ore. 335 409 
 
 Moorhead v. Little Miami R. R. Co., 17 Ohio 340 987, 989 
 
 Moore Mfg. Co. v. Springfield Southwestern Ry. Co., 256 Mo. 167 524 
 
 Moore Planting Co. v. Morgan's, etc.. Steamship Co., 126 La. 840 602 
 
 Moose V. Carson, 104 N. C. 431 347, 349, 498, 879, 1410 
 
 Mootry v. Danbury, 45 Conn. 550 1317, 1369 
 
 Moran v. Gallagher, 199 Mass. 486 470, 472 
 
 Moran v. Ross, "9 Cal. 159 793, 983 
 
 Moravian Seminary v. Bethlehem, 153 Pa. 583 1108 
 
 Mordhurst v. Ft. Wayne, etc., Traction Co., 163 Ind. 268 526, 536 
 
 541, 546, 550, 551 
 
 Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 82 367 
 
 Morgan v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 39 Mich. 675 706 
 
 Morgan v. Des Moines, etc., R. R. Co., 64 Iowa 589 535 
 
 Morgan v. Des Moines, etc., R. R. Co., lia Iowa 561 1412 
 
 Morgan v. King, 35 N. Y. 454 422 
 
 Morgan v. Miller, 59 Iowa 481 1255 
 
 Morgan v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 130 N. Y. 692 1229 
 
 Morgan v. Oliver, 98 Tex. 218 . 640, 915, 925, 927, 928 
 
 Morgan v. Reading, 3 Sm. & M. 366 416 
 
 Morgan's, etc., Co. v. Bourdier, 1 McGloin, 232 936, 1075, 1076 
 
 Moritz V. St. Paul, 52 Minn. 408 356 
 
Table of Cases. dix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Morrill v. St. Anthony Water Co., 26 Minn. 222 433 
 
 Morris v. Comptroller, 54 N. J. L. 268 . . 160, 632, 635, 925, 926, 940, 946, 949 
 
 Morris v. Council Bluffs, 67 Iowa 343 STO, 1357, 1372 
 
 Morris v. Heppenheimer, 54 N. J. L. 268 160, 632, 635, 925, 926 
 
 94t), 946, 949 
 
 Morris v. Indianapolis, 177 Ind. 369 303, 507, 513, 961 
 
 Morris v. Montgomery Traction Co., 143 Ala. 246 541 
 
 Morris v. Oregon Short Line Co., 36 Utah 14 592, 879, 890 
 
 Morris v. State, 62 Tex. 728 102 
 
 Morris v. Whipple, 183 Mass. 25 477, 478 
 
 Morris v. Wisconsin Midland R. R. Co., 82 Wis. 541 311 
 
 Morris Ave., In re, 118 App. Div. 117 653 
 
 Morris Canal Co. v. State, 24 N. J. L. 62 746, 999 
 
 Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. Townsend, 24 Barb. 658 67 
 
 Morris, etc., R. R. Co. v. Blair, 9 N. J. Eq. 635 1009 
 
 Morris, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bonnell, 34 N. J. L. 474 1139 
 
 Morris, etc., R. E. Co. v. Central R. R. Co, 31 N. J. L. 205 987, 999 
 
 Morris, etc., R. R. Co. v. Newark, 10 N. J. Eq. 352 303, 524, 527 
 
 997, 1000 
 
 Morris, etc., R. R. Co. v. Newark Pass. Ry. Co., 51 N. J. Eq. 379 385 
 
 Morris, etc., R. R. Co. v. Orange, 63 N. J. L. 252 371, 747, 750 
 
 Morrissey v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., EJs Neb. 406 611, 1392 
 
 Morrison, v. Bucksport R. R. Co., 67 Me. 353 1392 
 
 Morrison v. Fairmont, etc., Traction Co., ffO W. Va. 441 815 
 
 Morrison v. Hinkson, 87 111. 587 ) 58S, 1135 
 
 Morrison v. Indianapolis, etc., Ry. Co., 166 Ind. 511 . . . .' 1083, 10S6 
 
 Morrison v. Lawrence, 98 Mass. 219 1343 
 
 Morrison v. Marquadt, 24 Iowa 35 495 
 
 Morrison v. Morey, 146 Mo. 543 246 
 
 Morrison v. Springer, 15 Iowa 304 56 
 
 Morrison v. Thistle Coal Co., 119 Iowa 705 192 
 
 Morrison v. Watson, lOll N. C. 332 1189 
 
 Morrow v. Commonwealth, 48 Pa. 305 987 
 
 Morse v. Stocker, 1 Allen 150 280 
 
 Morse v. Worcester, 13l9 Mass. 38i9 ii^, 446, 837, 1290, 1256, 1261 
 
 1380, 1381 
 
 Mortimer v. Manhattan R. R. Co., 120 N. Y. 81 341 
 
 Mortimer v. New York El. R. R. Co., 25 Jones & S. 244' 559 
 
 Mortimer v. South Wales R. R. Co., 1 E. & E. 375 819 
 
 Morton v. Moore, 15 Gray 573 477, 1410 
 
 Mosely v. York Shore Water Co., 94 Me. 83 913, 920, 985 
 
 Moses V. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 21 111. 516 527, 562 
 
 Moses V. Sanford, 11 Lea 731 699^ 
 
 Hosier v. Oregon, etc., Nav. Co., 39' Ore. 256 515, 611, 1391 
 
 Mott v. Eno, 181 N. Y. 346 981, 1421 
 
 Moulton V. Newiburyport Water Co., 137' Mass. 163 659, 666 
 
 Mound City v. Mason, 262 111. 392 1065 
 
 Mound City Land, etc., Co. v. Miller, 170 Mo. 240 241, 940 
 
 Mt. Adams, etc., Ry. Co. v. Winslow, 3 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 425 542 
 
clx Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] pagh 
 
 Mt. Carmel v. Shaw, 155 III. 37 48S, 487 
 
 Mountfort v. Hall, 1 Mass. 442 • 32 
 
 Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Mass. 509 85, 391, 3«2, Z93, 398, 40.1 
 
 Mountrail County v. Wilson, 27 N. D. 277 914, 954 
 
 Mt. Vernon Ave., In re, 193 N". Y. 658 1097 
 
 Mt. Vernon Cotton Co. v. Alabama Power Co., 24Q U. S. 30 138, 208 
 
 Mt. Vernon National Bank v. Sarlle, 129 Ind. 201 274 
 
 Mt. Washington'K. R. Co. v. Coe, 50i Fed. 637 1041 
 
 Mt. Washington Road Co., Petition of, 35 N. H. 134 85, 174, 175, 367 
 
 735, 736, 806, 914, 983 
 
 Mountz V. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 203 Pa. 128i 1052 
 
 Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 1307 
 
 Mowry v. Boston, 173 Mass. 425 676, 1147 
 
 Mowry v. Sheldon, 2 R. I. 369 1412 
 
 Moynihan v. Todd, 188 Mass. 301 1306 
 
 Myer v. Adam, 169 N. Y. 605 943 
 
 Myer v. Adam, 63 App. Div. 540 943 
 
 Myers v. Gammel, 10 Barb. 537 495 
 
 Myers v. McGavock, 39 Nebr. 843 95, 1031 
 
 Myers v. Old Mission & Whitbeck Road, 7 Iowa 315 1060 
 
 Myers v. So. Bethlehem, 149 Pa. 85 1100, 1101 
 
 Mueller v. Courtland, 117 Minn. 290 175 
 
 Mugler V. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 272 
 
 Muhle V. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 86 Tex. 459 1414 
 
 Muhlker v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 197 U. S. 544 497, 508, 519, 560, 964 
 
 Muhlker v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 173 N. Y. 549 519, 559 
 
 Mulholland v. Des Moines, etc., R. R. Co., 60 Iowa 740 530, 1282 
 
 Mull V. Indianapolis Traction Co., 169 Ind. 214 147, 197, 984 
 
 Mullen V. Lake Drummond Canal, etc., Co., 130 N. C. 496 612, 1282, 1283 
 
 Mullen V. Penobscot Log Driving Co., 90 Me. 556 421 
 
 MuUer v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 75 Wash. 631 871 
 
 Muller V. Manhattan Ry. Co., 195 N. Y. 539 1163 
 
 Muller V. Southern Pacific Branch Ry. Co., 83 Cal. 240 666, 1194 
 
 Mulligan v. Smith, 54 Cal. 206 932 
 
 Mulligan v. Strauss, 15« N. Y. Suppl. 967 201 
 
 Mullin V. Strickler, 19 Ohio St. 135 495 
 
 Mulvey v. Wagenheim, 23 Cal. App. 268 '. 1255, 1261 
 
 Munford v. Terry, 4 N. C. 308' 1235 
 
 Muncie, etc.. Traction Co. v. Hall, 173- Ind. 292 666 
 
 Muncie National Gas Co. v. Muncie, 160 Ind. 97 397, 398 
 
 Munger v. St. Paul, 57 Minn. 9 515 
 
 Munger v. Tonawanda R. R. Co., 4 Comst. 349 601 
 
 Municipality No. 2 v. New Orleans Cotton Press, 18 La. Ann. 122 431 
 
 Mimicipal Lighting Co. v. Metropolitan, etc., R. R. Co., 1 Cab. & E. 184. . 341 
 
 Munu V. Boston, 183 Mass. 421 , 320, 349, 832, 867, 873 
 
 Munn V. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 27, 28, 54, 56, 170, 279, 387, 963 
 
 Munroe v. Woburn, 220 Mass. 116 1108 
 
 Munson, Matter of, 29 Hun 325 1147 
 
 Munson v. Mallory, 36 Conn. 165 517, 1336 
 
Table of Cases. clxi 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGB 
 
 Murdock v. Beloit, etc., Ry. Ck)., 147 Wis. 100 546, 1112 
 
 Murdock v. Stickney, 8 Cush. 113 230 
 
 Murphree v. Mobile, 10* Ala. 663 HlC 
 
 Murphy v. Chicago, 29 111. 279 507, 515, 527, 1316 
 
 Murphy v. Chicago, etc., R R. Co., 66 Wash. 663 r 814, 886 
 
 Murphy v. Commonwealth, 187 Mass. 361 1135 
 
 Murphy v. Lowell, 124 Mass. 564 886 
 
 Murphy v. Lowell, 128 Mass. 396 591, 1309, 1375, 1376 
 
 Murphy v. Meridian, 103 Miss. 110 877 
 
 Murphy v. Ryan, Ir. R. 2 C. L. 143 407 
 
 Murphy v. Wilmington, 6 Houst. 345 45 
 
 Murray v. American Surety Co., 70 Fed. 341 1042 
 
 Murray v. Berkshire County Commissioners, 12 Mete. 455 619 
 
 Murray v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272 58 
 
 Murray v. Norfolk County, 149 Mass. 328 487, 1051 
 
 Murray v. Omaha, 66 Nebr. 279 1308, 1341, 1347 
 
 Murray Hill Land Co. v. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 126 Wis. 14 1129 
 
 Musanti v. State, 131 N. Y. Suppl. 20 338, 711 
 
 Muskeget Island Club v. Nantucket, 185 Mass. 30i3 659, 1177, 1181, 1186 
 
 Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 224 53, 272 
 
 N 
 
 Nagell V. Linden Ry. Co., 167 Mo. 89 542 
 
 Nahant, In re Land at, 128 Fed. 185 113, 381, 383, 392, 398, 401 
 
 Nahant v. United States, 136 Fed. 273. . . 109, 110, 113, 160, 389, 392, 396, 474 
 
 Nalle V. Austin, 85 Tex. 520 205 
 
 Nalle V. Austin, 21 S. W. 375 2i05, 1090 
 
 Names v. Highway Commissioners, 30 Mich. 490 926, 1049, 1051 
 
 1117, 1119, 1243 
 
 Narchold v. Westport, 71 Mo. App. 508 517 
 
 Nash V. Clark, 27 Utah 158 117, 131, 251, 252 
 
 Nash V. Upper Appomattox Co., 5 Gratt. 332 933, 1071, 1078 
 
 Nashua, Petitioner, 12 N. H. 42l5 947 
 
 Nashua River Paper Co. v. Commonwealth, 184 Mass. 279 830, 838, 843 
 
 Nashville v. Brown, 9 Heisk. 1 
 
 Nashville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cowardine, 11 Humph. 348 994 
 
 Nashville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hobbs, 120 Ala. 600 1068, 1263 
 
 Nashville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Karthaus, 150 Ala. 633 608 
 
 Nashville, etc., Turnpilce Co. v. Davidson County, 106 Tenn. 258 973 
 
 Natchez, etc., R. R. Co. v. Currie, 62 Miss. 506 -. . 1282 
 
 Natchitoches R. R., etc., Co. v. Henry, 109 La. 669 1112 
 
 Natick Gas Light Co. v. Natick, 175 Mass. 246 376, 378, 379, 381, 832 
 
 834, 835, 836, 843 
 
 National Bank of Commerce v. New Bedford, 175 Mass. 257 1181, 1189 
 
 National Docks, etc., R. R. Co. v. Central R. R. Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 755 193 
 
 198, 1087 
 National Docks, etc., K. R. Co. v. Easton, etc., R. R. Co., 36 N. J. L. 
 
 181 1074, 1075 
 
cLxii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PASB 
 
 National Docks, etc., R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, etc., R. R. Co., 54 N. J. 
 
 Eq. 142 655 
 
 National Docks, etc., R. R. Co. v. State, 53 N. J. L. 217 1073 
 
 National Docks, etc., R. R. Co. v. United New Jersey, etc., R. R. Co., 53 
 
 N. J. L. 217 753, 754, 755, 997, 990 
 
 National Waterworks Co. v. Kansas City, 10 C. C. A. 653 377, 379 
 
 681, 683, 685 
 
 National Waterworks Co. v. Kansas City, 20 Mo. App. 237 377, 379 
 
 Navasota v. Pearce, 46 Tex. 525 1308 
 
 Neal V. Knox, etc., R. R. Co., 61 Me. 298 1159 
 
 Neal V. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., 31 Pa. 19 987, 1097, 1098, U03, 1113 
 
 Nealley v. Bradford, 145 Mass. 561 484, 1235 
 
 Nebraska City v. Lampkin, 6 Neb. 27 507 
 
 Nebraska, etc., R. R. Co. v. Scott, 31 Neb. 571 1111 
 
 Needham v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 152 Mass. 61 397 
 
 Neeld's Road Case, 1 Pa. 363 925 
 
 Neely v. State, 4 Baxt. 175 271, 369 
 
 Neff V. Wellesley, 148 Mass. 487 1309 
 
 Nehama Valley Drainage District v. Marconnit, 90 Nebr. 514 1322, 1388 
 
 Neilson v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 58 Wis. 516 815, 1186 
 
 Neilson v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 91 Wis. 557 660 
 
 Neitzel v. Spokane International Ry. Co., 65 Wlash. 100 117, 220, 660 
 
 605, 620, 989, 1412, 1420 
 
 Nelson v. Atlanta, 138 Ga. 262 766, 767, 790, 795, 895 
 
 Nelson v. Butterfield, 21 Me. 220 1059 
 
 Nelson v. Fleming, 56 Ind. 310 198, 612, 957 
 
 Nelson v. Godfrey, 12 111. 20 481 
 
 Nelson v. Minneapolis, 1 12 Minn. 16 285 
 
 Nelson v. West Duluth, 55 Minn. 497 516 
 
 Nelson County v. Bardstown, etc.. Turnpike Co., 30 Ky. L. Rep. 1254... 1174 
 
 Nesbit V. Trumbo, 39 111. 110 115, 236 
 
 Nevada, etc., R. R. Co. v. De Lissa, 103 Mo. 125 1102 
 
 Nevins v. Fitchburg, 174 Mass". 545 837, 1377, 1318 
 
 Nevins v. Peoria, 41 111. 502 296, 302, 1252, 1317, 1358, 1367 
 
 Newark v. Hatt, 79 N. J. L. 548 887, 888 
 
 Newark v. Elliott, 5 Ohio St. 113 1414 
 
 Newark v. Watson, 56 N. J. L. 667 973 
 
 Newark, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hunt, 50 N. J. L. 308 285 
 
 Newark, etc., R. R. Co. v. Montclair, 84 N. J. L. 46 324 
 
 Newark Library Association, In re, 64 N. J. L. 217 980 
 
 Newark Lime, etc., Co. v. Newark, 15 N. J. Eq. 64 441 
 
 New Ave., In re, 67 Misc. 510 350 
 
 New Basin Canal Board v. Weston Liunber Co., 109 La. 825 1410 
 
 New Bedford v. Bristol Co. Commissioners, 9 Gray 346 1098, 1104 
 
 New Bedford R. R. Co. v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 120 Mass. 397 1285 
 
 Newbern v. Wadsworth, 151 N. C. 309 1410 
 
 New Boston, Petitioner, 49 N. H. 328 947 
 
 New Brighton v. United Presbyterian Church, 96 Pa. 331 868, 872 
 
Table of Cases. cbdii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in, Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Newburgh Turnpike Road v. Miller, 5 Johns. Ch. 101 1258 
 
 Newburyport Institution for Savings v. Brookline, 220 Mass. 300 1195 
 
 Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 86 Fed. 727 623 
 
 Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 168 Mass. 541 681, 685 
 
 Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. 25S 3, 773, 780, 787, 804 
 
 New Castle v. Lake Erie, etc., E. R. Co., 155 Ind. 18 1409 
 
 Newcastle, etc., E. R. v. Peru, etc., R. R., 3 Ind. 464 76, 360, 999 
 
 New Central Coal Co. v. George's Creek Coal, etc., Co., 37 Md. 537 193 
 
 255, 257, 914, 1082 
 
 Newcomb v. Smith, 1 Chandler 71 228 
 
 New Decatur v. Scharfenberg, 147 Ala. 367 867, 1274 
 
 Newell V. Abey, 77 Wash. 182 814, 1143 
 
 Newell V. Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co., 35 Minn. 112 526, 536, 537 
 
 539, 544, 546, 10S5 
 
 New England Hospital v. Street Commissioners, 188 Mass. 88 333 
 
 New England Tel., etc., Co. v. Boston Terminal Co., 182 Mass. 397 377 
 
 381, 471, 575, 578, 585, 835 
 
 New England Trout & Salmon Club v. Mather, 68 Vt. 338 166, 233, 419 
 
 New, etc.. Terminal Co. v. Karcher, 112 Ala. 676 525 
 
 Newgass v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 54 Ark. 140 704, 1149 
 
 New Haven v. Sargent, 38 Conn. 50 483 
 
 New Haven County v. Trinity Church, 82 Conn. 378 342, 659 
 
 New Haven, etc., Co. v. Northamipton, 102 Mass. 116 954 
 
 New Haven Water Co., In re, 86 Conn. 361 921, 929, 932, 935 
 
 New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164 75 
 
 New Jersey, etc., R. R. Co. v. Long Branch Commissioners, 39 N. J. L. 
 
 28 997, 9&8, 1000 
 
 New Jersey, etc., R. R. Co. v. Tutt, 168 Ind. 205 1151, 1188 
 
 New Jersey Midland Ry. Co. v. Van Syckle, 37 N. J. L. 496 1271 
 
 New Jersey R. R. Co., Ex parte, 16 N. J. L. 393 1117 
 
 New Jersey R. R., etc., Co. v. Suydam, 17 N. J. L. 25 1118 
 
 New Jersey Zinc, etc., Co. v. Morris Canal, etc., Co., 44 N. J. Eq. 398 
 
 455, 462 
 
 New London v. Davis, 73 N. H. 72 1405 
 
 New London, etc., R. R. Co. v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 102 Mass. 3S6 904 
 
 New Madrid County v. Phillip, 125 Mo. 61 344 
 
 Newman v. Lynchburg Investment Co., 236 U. S. 602 932, 935 
 
 Newman v. Metropolitan El. R. R. Co., 118 N. V. 618 790, 808 
 
 New Mexico R. E. Co. v. Hendricks, 6 N. M. 611 1214 
 
 New Milford Water Co. v. Watson, 75 Conn. 237 650, 961, 1095, 1139, 1154 
 
 New Odorless Sewerage Co. v. Wisdom, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 224 443, 894 
 
 New Orleans, Re, 4 Rob. 357 1100 
 
 New Orleans, Re, 20 La. Ann. 49 1099, llOO 
 
 New Orleans v. Oharouleau, 121 La. 890 284 
 
 New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644 966 
 
 New Orleans v. Great Southern Tel., etc., Co., 40 La. Ann. 41 374 
 
 New Orleans v. Kerr, 50 La. Ann. 413 I3O7 
 
 New Orleans v. Louisiana Construction Co., 140 U. S. 654 1416 
 
 New Orleans v. Magnon, 4 Martin 1 j4jq 
 
clxiv Table op Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in. Volume PI.] PAGE 
 
 New Orleans v. Manfree, 111 La. 927 1196, 1199 
 
 New Orleans v. Morris, 105 U. S. 600 1416 
 
 New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co., 142. U. S. 79 392, 402, 963 
 
 New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662 US 
 
 New Orleans, etc., R. K. Co. v. Barton, 43 La. Ann; 17-1 863 
 
 New Orleans, etc., E. E. Co. v. Brown, 64 Miss. 482 602, 608 
 
 New Orleans, etc., Co. v. Drake, 60 Miss. 621 940, 946 
 
 New Orleans, etc., E. E. Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166 402 
 
 New Orleans, etc., E. E. 'Co. v. Frederick, 46 Miss. 1 936, 1077 
 
 New Orleans, etc., E. E. Co. v. Gay, 31 La. Ann. 430 .800, 953 
 
 New Orleans, etc., E. E. Co. v. Gay, 32 La. Ann. 471 907, 911, 919 
 
 New Orleans, etc., E. E. .Co. v. Hemphill, 35 Miss. 17 70, 926 
 
 New Orleans, etc., E. E. Co. v. Lagarde, 10 La. Ann. 150 800 
 
 New Orleans, etc., E. E jCo. v. McNeely, 47 La. Ann. 1298 1080 
 
 New Orleans, etc., E. E. Co. v. Moye, 39 Miss. 374 803 
 
 New Orleans, etc., E. R. Co. v. Murrell, 34 La. Ann-. 536- 626 
 
 New Grfeans, etc., E. E. Co. v.. Murrell, 36 La. Ann. 344 730, 731 
 
 New Orleans, etc., E. E. Co. v. New Orleans, 26 La. Ann. 478 -. 392 
 
 New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co. v. Southern, etc., Tel. Co., 53 Ala. 211 210 
 
 36,5, 1004, 1075 
 
 New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650 79, 361, 363 
 
 New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage .Commission, 197 U. S. 453. . .3i77, 379 
 
 New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Hart, 40 La. Ann. 474 383 
 
 New Orleans Terminal Co. v. Tellier, 113> La. 733 188, 1092 
 
 New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S- 674 361 
 
 Newport, Petition for Highway in, 48 N. H. 433 1127 
 
 Newport v. Horton, 22 E. I. 196 31, 391, 400 
 
 Newport, etc.. Bridge Co. v. Gill, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 325 12!44, 1255 
 
 New Eeservoir, In re, 5 N. Y. 433 1141 
 
 New Rochelle Water Co., Re, 46 Hun 525 200 
 
 New Rochelle Water Co. v. Brush, 65 Hun 620 1070 
 
 New Salem, Petitioner, 6 Pick. 470 &36, 1046, 1079 
 
 New State House, In re, 19 E. I. 32& 1057 
 
 New Street in New York, In re, 215t N. Y. 109 566 
 
 Newton, Appeal of, 84 Conn. 234 737 
 
 Newton, Ee, 45 N. Y. St. Eep. 18 1173 
 
 Newton, Ee, 62 Hun 621 672 
 
 Newton v. Belger, 143 Mass. 598 277 
 
 Newton v. Manufacturers' Ey. Co., 115 Fed. 78!'l- 618, 619, 620, 1419 
 
 Newton v. Perry, 163. Mass. 319 462, 616 
 
 Newton Creek Bridge, In re, 195 N. Y. 52? 1155 
 
 New Salem v. Eagle Mill Co., 138' Mass>. 8 1277, 1410 
 
 Newton Euhher Works v. De Las Casas, 182 Mass. 436 955 
 
 New Union Tel. Co. v. Marsh, 96 App. Div. 1221 396 
 
 New Whatcom v. Fairhaven- Land Co., 24 Wash. 44)3 434 
 
 New York, In re, »9 N. Y. 569 164, 632, 634, 636, 931, 932, 1126 
 
 New York, In re, 135 N. Y. 253 130, 159, 200 1005 
 
 New York, In re, 157 N. Y. 409 183 
 
 New York, In re, 167 N. Y. 624 167 
 
Table op Cases. clxv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAOE 
 
 New York, In re, 168 N. Y. 134 426, 428 
 
 New York, In re, 168 N. Y. 254 716 
 
 New York, In re, 179 N. Y. 496 655 
 
 New York, In re, 190 N. Y. 350 787, 807 
 
 New York, In re, 192 N. Y. 539 341 
 
 New York, In re, 196. N. Y. 255 696 
 
 New York, In re, 198 N. Y. 84 693, 695, 11?4 
 
 New York, In re, 212 N. Y. 538 787, 902, 925, 9'34 
 
 New York, In re, 216 N; Y. 67 350, 441, 703 
 
 New York, In re, 217 N. Y. 1 919, 1089 
 
 New York, In re, 24 App. Biv. 7 696 
 
 New York, In re^ 30 App. Div. 5S9 741 
 
 New York, In re, 112 App. Div. 163 954 
 
 New York, In re, 120 App. Div. 700 714 
 
 New York, In re, 124 App. Div. 465 341 
 
 New York, In- re, 140 App. Div. 238 654 
 
 New York, In re, 143 App. Div. 515 807 
 
 New York, In re, 153 App. Div. 905 1144 
 
 New York, In re, 119 N. Y. Supp. 1054 691 
 
 New York, In re, 147 N. Y. Supp. 1057 919 
 
 New York, In re, 41 Misc. 134 1026 
 
 New York v. Bailey, 3 Hill 531 1382 
 
 New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio. 43i3 1250 
 
 New York v. Curran, 15 Daly 116 1155 
 
 New York v. Mapes, 6 Johns. Ch. 46 696, 1099, 1108 
 
 New York v. Sage, 239 U. S. 57 673, 674 
 
 New York v. United States Trust Co., 116 App. Div. 349 481 
 
 New York -Cable Co.. v. New York, 104 N. Y. 1 1087, 1088 
 
 New York Cement Co. v. Consiolidated, etc., Co., 178 N. Y. 167 327 
 
 New York Coal Co. v. George's Creek, etc., Coal Co., 37 Md. 537 192, 907 
 
 New York District Ey. Co., In the Matter of, 107 N. Y.. 42 566 
 
 New York Electric Lines Co. v. Empire City Subway Co., 235 U. S. 179. 374 
 
 New. York El. R. K. Co., Matter of, 44 Hun 117 656 
 
 New York, etc., Filtration Co. v. Jones, 37 App. D. C. 511 568 
 
 New York, etc., E. E. Co. In re, 60 N. Y. 116 644 
 
 New York, etc., E. E. Co., In re, 66 N. Y. 407 924 
 
 New York, etc., E. E. Co., In re, 70 N. Y. 191- 950, 1068 
 
 New York, etc., E. E. -Co., In re, 77 N. Y. 298 921 
 
 New York, etc., E. E. Co., In re, 80 N. Y. 453 1073 
 
 New York, etc., E. E. Co., In re, 94 N. Y. 207 952, 953 
 
 New York, etc., E. E.. Co., In re, 90 N. Y. 12 973, 1006, 1087 
 
 New York, etc., R. E. Co., In re, 151 App. Div. 50 630, 660, 663, 667 
 
 672, 948, 1029 
 
 New York, etc., E. R. Co., In re, 67 Barb. 426 189 
 
 New York, etc., E. E. Co., In re, 6 Hun 149 666, 740, 743 
 
 Nev4 York, etc., R. R. -Co., In re, 15 Hun 63 595 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co., In re, 20 Hun 201 IftOfi 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co., In re, 27 Hun 116 679 
 
 New York, etc., R. E. Co., In re, 27 Hun- 151 743 
 
New York, 
 
 etc., 
 
 R. 
 
 R. 
 
 New York, 
 
 etc., 
 
 E. 
 
 R. 
 
 New York, 
 
 etc., 
 
 R. 
 
 R. 
 
 New York, 
 
 etc., 
 
 R. 
 
 R. 
 
 New York, 
 
 etc., 
 
 R. 
 
 R. 
 
 clsvi Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] FA60 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co., In re, 33 Hun 148 1130 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co., In re, 35 Hun 633 697 
 
 Co., In re, 37 Hun 317 703 
 
 Co., In re, 44 Hun 194 77 
 
 Co. V. Albany Steam Trap Co., 161 App. Div. 321 
 
 697, 916 
 
 Co. V. Arnot, 27 Hun 151 743 
 
 Co. V. Bell, 28 Hun 426 744 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Benedict, 169 Mass. 262 1411, 1413, 1419 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co., v. Blanker, 178 Mass. 3861 68, 697, 699 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 36 Conn. 196 65 
 
 972, 999, IQOa, 1419 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bridgeport Traction Co., 65 Conn. 410. . . 385 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556 54, 373, 387, 964 
 
 New York, etc., E. R. Co. v. Buffalo, 200 N. Y. 113 746, 997 
 
 New York, etc., K. R. Co. v. Cambridge, 186 Mass. 249 384, 386 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Capner, 49 N. J. L. 555 371, 747 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Oentral Massachusetts Electric Co., 219 
 
 Mass. 85 386, 585 
 
 New York, etc., R. E. Co. v. Cohasset Water Co., 216 Mass-. 291 385 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. 'Co. v. Comstock, 60 Conn. 200 601 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Cio. v. Drummond, 46 N. J. Lr. 644 1002 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Fair Haven, etc., R. R. Co., 70 Conn. 610. 893 
 New York, etc., E. E. Co. v. Forty^econd St. Ey. Co., 50 Barb. 28^. . . 379 
 
 New York, etc., R. E. Co.' v. Gfennett, 37 Hun 317 H74 
 
 New York, etc., E. E. Co. v. Gunnison, 1 Hun 49©. 191 
 
 New York, etc., E. E. Co. v. Kip, 46 N. Y. 546 918, 989, 993, 994 
 
 New York, etc., E. R. Co. v. Le Tevre, 27 Hun 537 741 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Long, 69 Conn. 424 58, 916, 940, 946 
 
 New York, etc., E. E. Co. v. Matthews, 144 App. Div. 732 1.130, 1131 
 
 New York, etc., R. E. Co. v. Metropolitan Gaslight Co., 63 N. Y. 326. . 147 
 
 189, 1006 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Metropolitan Gas-Light Co., 5 Hun 201 . . 918 
 
 New York, etc., E. R. Co. v. New Haven, 81 Conn. 581 370, 666, 722 
 
 723, 747, 750, 998, 1000, 1002 
 
 New York, etc., R. E. Co. v. Offield, 77 Conn. 417 68, 154 
 
 New York, -etc., R. R. Co. v. Pierce, 35 Hun 30© 697 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rhodes, 171 Ind, 521 .' 746, 750, 751 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rochester, 127 N. Y. 591 313 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Siebrecht, 73 Misc. 219 1112 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stanley, 34 N. J. Eq. 55 1155 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stanlfey, 35 N. J. Eq. 283 651, 735 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stanley, 39 N. J. Eq. 361 526 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. TownSend, 36. Bun 630 947, 1127 
 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Untermyer, 196 N. Y. 531- 189, 691, 1111 
 
 1112, 1144, 1145, 1167 
 
 v. Waterbury, 60 Conn. 1 750 
 
 V. Welch, 143 N. Y. 411 : 95 
 
 V. Young, 33 Pa. 17.5 95, 921' 
 
 New York, 
 
 etc., 
 
 R. 
 
 R. 
 
 Co. 
 
 New York, 
 
 etc., 
 
 R. 
 
 R. 
 
 Co. 
 
 New York, 
 
 etc., 
 
 , R. 
 
 E. 
 
 Co. 
 
Table of Cases. elxvii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In. Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 New York, etc., Tel. Co. v. State, 50 N. J. L. 432 1070 
 
 New York Mining Co. v. Midland Mining Co., 99 Md. 508 192 
 
 New York Steam Co. v. Foundation Co., 195 N. Y. 43 480, 481 
 
 New York Tel. Co. v. De Noyelles Brick Co., 154 App. Div. 845 667 
 
 Ney V. Swinney, 36 Indi 454 \ 1120 
 
 Niagara, etc.. Power Co., In re. 111 App. Div. 686 204 
 
 'Niagara Falls & Whirlpool R. R. Co., Re, l(& N. Y. 375 .116, 145, 157 
 
 186, 909, 1091 
 
 J^ichols V. Ann Arbor, etc., St. Ry. Co., 87 Mich. 361 536, 539, 551, 1085 
 
 Nichols V. Boston, 98' Mass. 39 1277 
 
 Nichols V. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189 774, 794, 1237 
 
 Nichols V. Ihiluth, 40 Minn-. 389 515 
 
 Nichols V. New England Furniture Co., 100 Mich. 230 612 
 
 Nichols V. Richmond, 162 Mass. 170 834, 843, 885, 886 
 
 Nichtfls V. Salem, 14 Gray 490 987, 1046, 1078 
 
 Nichols V. Somerset, etc., R. R. Co., 43 Me. 356 303, 682, 634, 639 
 
 Nicholson v. Detroit, 120 Mioh. 246 1308 
 
 Nicholson v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 22 Conn. 74 464, 514, 525, 535 
 
 78(9, 794, 873, 1397 
 
 Nickey v. Steams- Ranchos Co., 126 Cal. 150 244 
 
 Nicks V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 84 Iowa 27 789, 798, 873 
 
 Nicolai v. Davi:s, 91 Wis. 370 1410 
 
 NicoU V. New York, etc., Tel. Co., 62 N. J. L. 733 577 
 
 Nicomen- Boom Co. v. North Shore, etc., Cb.,40 Wa^h. 315 1412 
 
 Niehaus v. Cooke, 134 Ala. 223 646 
 
 Nieman v. Detroit, etc., St. Ry. Co., 103 Mich. 256 542 
 
 Niemeyer v. Little Rock JuKction R. R. Co., 43- Ark. Ill 1086 
 
 Nix V. Thackaberry, 240 lU. 352 356 
 
 Nixon V. Marr, 190 Fed. 913 1097 
 
 Noble V. Aasen, 8 N. D. 77 991 
 
 Noble V. Richmond, 31 Gratt. 271 1310 
 
 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104 276 
 
 Noblesville Hydraulic Co. v. Evans, 163 Ind. 70O 1093 
 
 Noell V. Tennessee Eastern Power Co., 130 Tenn. 245 1066 
 
 Nolan V. Central Georgia Power Co., 134 Ga. 20a 63, 64, 204, 208 
 
 Nolan V. New Britain, 69 Conn. 668 445, 446, 452 
 
 Nolensville v. Baker, 4 Humph. 315 619 
 
 Nolinsville Turnpike Co. v. Quimby, 9 Humph. 876 1121 
 
 Noll V. Dubuque, etc., R. R. Co., 32 Iowa 66 62 
 
 Noonan v. Albany, 79 N. Y. 470 445, 1318, 1331, 1366 
 
 Norcross v. Cambridge, 166 Mass. 508 651, 654, 655 
 
 Norfleet v. Cromwell, 70 N. C. 684 131, 242 
 
 Norfolk V. Cooke, 27 Gratt. 430 409 
 
 Norfolk County Water Co. v. Wood, 1-16 Va. 142 , 149 
 
 Norfolk, etc., R. R. Co. v. Consolidated Turnpike Co., Ill Va. 131. . .707, 1114 
 
 Norfolk, etc., R. R. Co. v. Davis, 58 W. Va. 620 693 
 
 Norfolk Turnpike Co. v. Virginia, 225 U. S. 264 280 
 
 Norman v. Ince, 8 Okla. 412 1250, 1319, 1382 
 
clxviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pagea 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 lu Volume II.] PAOB 
 
 Norman v. Kentucky Columbian Exposition Board, 93 Ky. 537 165 
 
 Norman Milling, etc., Co. v. Bethurem, 41 Okla. 735 487 
 
 Norris v. Baltimore, 44 Md. 598 ' 652, 1101, 1107 
 
 Norris v. Lyon, 251 111. 457 1074 
 
 Norris v. Pueblo, 12- Colo. App. 290 343 
 
 Norris v. State, 16 Ala. 779' 1215 
 
 Norris v. Vermont Central K. E. Co., 28 Vt. 99 1272 
 
 North Alabama Traction Co. v. Hays, 184 Ala. 592 686 
 
 North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 285, 286 
 
 Northampton, In re, 158' Mass. 299 ' , 904 
 
 Northampton Bridge Case, 116 Mass. 442 964 
 
 North Avenue North, In re, 78 Wash. 482 356, 357 
 
 North Baltimore Pass. By. Co. v. North Avenue Ey. Co., 75 Md. 233 382 
 
 Northborough v. Worcester County Commissioners, 138 Mass. 263 1071 
 
 North Carolina, etc., E. E. Co. v. Carolina Central Ey. Co., 83 N. C. 489 
 
 973, 1002, 1007 
 
 North Coast E. E. Co. v. Aumiller, 61 Wash. 271 650, 654, 1099 
 
 North Coast E. E. Co. v. Gentry, 58 Wash. 82 339 
 
 North Coast E. E. Co. v. Gentry, 73 Wash. 188 644, 1099, 1101 
 
 North Coast E. E. Co. v. Hess, 56 Wash. 336 339, 354, 356, 715 
 
 North Coast E. E. Co. v. Kraft Co., 63 Wash. 250 77, 78, 697, 714 
 
 715, 717, 718 
 
 North Coast E. E. Co. v. Newman, 66 Wash. 374 1202 
 
 Northeastern (Nebraska E. E. Co. v. Frazier, 25 Nebr. 42 740, 745, 1155 
 
 Northeastern E. E. Co. v. Sineath, 8 Eieh. L. 185 1137 
 
 Northern Central E. E. Co. v. Baltimore, 46 Md. 425 746 
 
 Northern Central E. E. Co. v. Harrisburg, etc., Ey. Co., 177 Pa. 142 601 
 
 Northern Central E. E. Co. v. Oldenburg, 122. Md. 236 303, 314,1256, 1258 
 
 Northern, etc., E. E. Co. v. Holland, 117 Pa. 613 1307 
 
 Northern Light & Power Co. v. Stacker, 13 Cal. App. 404 405 
 
 Northern Missouri E. E. Co. v. Lackland, 25 Mo. 515 1097, 1100, 1108 
 
 Northern Pacific E. E. Co. v. Conconnon, 239 U. S. 382 105 
 
 Northern Pacific E. R. Co. v. Forbis, 15 Mont. 452 609, 660, 666 
 
 691, 692, 693 
 
 Northern Pacific E. E. Co. v. Georgetown, 50 Wash. 580 1104 
 
 Northern Paciiflc E. E. Co. v. Haas, 2 Wash. 37'6 970 
 
 Northern Pacific E. E. Co. v. Kreszeszewski, 17 N. D. 203 190 
 
 Northern Pacific E. E. Co. v. McAdow, 44 Mont. 547 1083 
 
 Northern Pacific E. E. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583 388, 749, 750 
 
 Northern Pacific E. E. Co. v. St. Paul, etc., E. E. Co., 3 Fed. 702 .. . 104, 643 
 
 Northern Pacific E. E. Co. v. Slade Lumber Co., 61 Wash. 196 456 
 
 Northern Pacific E. E. Co. v. Smith, 171 U. S. 260 1269, 1411 
 
 Northern Pacific E. E. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U. S. 267 105 
 
 Northern Pacific E. E. Co. v. Union Lumber Co., 76 Wash. 563 1146 
 
 Northern Pennsylvania E. E. Co. v. Davis, 26 Pa. 238 340 
 
 Northern E. E. Co. v. Concord, etc., E. E. Co., 27 N. H. 183 973, 1002 
 
 Northern E. E. Co. v. Earhart, 167 Mo. 612 604 
 
 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 112 
 
 North Hudson E. E. Co. v. Booraem, 28 N. J. Eq. 450 355, 651, 707 
 
Table of Cases. clxix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume 1, 721-1422 ia Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 North Missouri R. R. Co. v. Gott, 25 Mo. 540 920 
 
 North Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Inland Traction Co., 205 Pa. 579 .. . 385, 542 
 
 North Reading v. Middlesex County Commissioners, 7 Gray 109 1007 
 
 North River Boom Co. v. Smith, 15 Wash. 138 258 
 
 North Sterling Irrigation District v. Dickman, 59 Cr}'^ 1«'^ S-l?, f"" 
 
 North Vernon v. Voegler, 103 Ind. 314 1282, 1334 
 
 Northwestern Electric Co. v. Zimmerman, 67 Ore. 150 95 
 
 Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 2139 U. S. 486 278 
 
 Northwestern R. R. Co. v. Colclough, 89 S. C. 555 1165 
 
 Northwestern Tel. Co. v. Twin City Tel. Co., 89 -Minn. 495 382 
 
 Northwestern Tel. Exchange Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 76 Minn. 334 
 
 211, 581, 755, 756, 994 
 
 Northwestern Tel. Exchange Co. v. Anderson, 12 N. D. 585 375 
 
 Norton v. New Bedford, 166 Mass. 48 1343, 1346 
 
 Norton v. Peck, 3 Wis. 723 173 
 
 Norton v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 32 Pa. Super. Ct. 555 324 
 
 Norton- v. Studley, 17 111. 556 , 621 
 
 Norton v. Willis, 73. Me. 980 1196 
 
 Norwalk v. Blanchard, 56 Conn. 461 1173 
 
 Norwalk v. Podmore, 86 Conn. 658- 730, 992 
 
 Norwich v. Hampshire County Commissioners, 13 Pick. 60 395 
 
 Norwich v. Hubbard, 22 Conn. 58i8 355 
 
 Norwich v. Johnson, 86 Conn. 151 910, 911, 916, 982 
 
 Norwich, etc., R. R. Co. v. Worcester, 147 Mass. 518 715 
 
 Norwich Gas, etc., Co. v. Norwich, 76 Conn. 565 682, 685 
 
 Norwood V. Baker, 172 U. S. 269 269, 333, 511, 787, 1038 
 
 Norwood V. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 161 Mass. 259 54, 387, 964 
 
 Norwood, etc., R. R. Co., Matter of, 47 Hun 489 707 
 
 Nosser v. Seeley, 10 Nebr. 460 614 
 
 Nottingham v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 3 McArth. 517 527 
 
 Novich v. Trinity; etc., R. R. Co., 45 Tex. Civ. App. 664 864 
 
 Noyes v. City Council of Springfield, 116 Mass. 87 1050, 1119 
 
 Nunnemaeher v. State, 129 Wis. 190 31 
 
 Nunnamaker v. Columbia, etc., R. R. Co., 47 S. C. 485 1272 
 
 Nutt V. Mills County, 61 Iowa 754 1300 
 
 Nye V. Taunton Branch R. R. Co., 113 Mass. 277 346, 1419, 1421 
 
 
 
 Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co., 171 Cal. 392 367 
 
 Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co., 153 Pac. 705 698 
 
 Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160 1417 
 
 O'Brien v. Ball, 119 Mass. 28 713 
 
 O'Brien v. Baltimore Belt R. R. Co., 74 Md. 363 303, 527, 647 
 
 O'Brien v. Baltimore County Commissioners, 51 Md. 15 904 
 
 O'Brien v. Central Iron, etc., Co., 158 Ind. 218 325, 491, 886, 887, 888 
 
 O'Brien v. Norwich, etc., R. R. Co., 17 Conn. 372 '. . .426, 429, 884 
 
 O'Brien v. Philadelphia, 150 Pa. 589 868, 872, 968 
 
 O'Brien v. St. Paul, 25 Minn. 333 1318, 1359 
 
 O'Brien v. Schenley, etc., R. R. Co., ig^ Pa. 336 1195 
 
clxx Table op Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 ObBt v. CoveU, 93 Minn. 30 1153 
 
 Oeala v. Anderson, 58 Fla. 415 1255, 1260 
 
 Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Assn. v. Public Utility Commissioners, 82 
 
 N. J. L. 30i9 78i 905 
 
 O'Connell v. Chicago Terminal Transfer R. R. Co., 184 111. 308 526 
 
 O'Connor v. Fond du Lac, etc., R. R. Co., 52 Wis. 526 611, 1392 
 
 O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187 300, 508, 512, 513, 515 
 
 O'Connor v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 122 Cal. 681 1395 
 
 Odell V. Gulf, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Tex. Civ. App. 607 1156 
 
 O'Donnell v. Clinton, 145 Mass. 461 ... .' 1273 
 
 O'Donnell v. Syracuse, 184 N. Y. 1 1326, 1343, 1371 
 
 O'Donnell v. White, 24 R. I. 483 , 1356 
 
 Odum V. Rutledge, etc., R. R. Co., 94 Ala. 488 606 
 
 Oelsehleger v. Boston, 200 Mass. 423. 837, 1071, 1235 
 
 O'Fallon v. Daggett, 4 Mo. 343 416 
 
 Ogden V. New York, 141 App. Div. 578 310, 321 
 
 Ogden V. Pennsylvania K. E. Co., 229 Pa. 378 700 
 
 Ogden V. Philadelphia, 143 Pa. 430 968 
 
 Ogden V. Saunders, 12 Wiheat. 213 24, 88 
 
 Ogden City v. Bear Lake, etc., R. R. Co., 16 Utah 440 1415 
 
 Ogden City Ry. Co. v. Ogdei^ City, 7 Utah 207 ■. . 542 
 
 Ogontz Ave., In re, 225 Pa. 126 873 
 
 O'Hara v. Lexington, etc., R. R. Co., 1 Dana 232 2, 983 
 
 CHare v. Chicago, etc., R. K. Co., 139 111. 151 920, 1082 
 
 Ohio, etc., Ry. Co. v. Barker, 134 III. 470 1126 
 
 Ohio, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hinckle, 1 Ohio N. P. 63 191 
 
 Ohio, etc., Ry. Co. v. People, 120 111. 20O 1403 
 
 Ohio, etc., Ry. Co. v. Thillman, 143 111. 127 124«, 1387, 1393 
 
 Ohio, etc., Ry. Co. v. Wachter, 123 111. 440 1249, 1393 
 
 Ohio, etc. Road, Re, 166 Pa. 132 947 
 
 Ohio OU Co. V. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190 276 
 
 Ohio River R. R. Co. v. Harness, 24 W. Va. 511 1068 
 
 Ohio Southern R. R. Co. v. Rawlins, 4 Ohio Dec. 483 782 
 
 Ohio Southern R. R. Co. v. Snyder, 5 Ohio N. P. 461 740, 809 
 
 Ohio Valley, etc., Terminal Co. v. Kerth, 130 Ind. 314 666, 670 
 
 Oil Belt Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 259 III. 108 796 
 
 Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229 104 
 
 Oklahoma City v. McMaster, 12 Okla. 570 344 
 
 Olcott V. Fond du Lac County Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678 185 
 
 Old v. Keener, 22 Colo. 6 1214 
 
 Old Colony E. E. Co. v. Evans, 6 Gray 25 1415 
 
 Old Colony R. R. Co. v. Fall River, 147 Mass. 456 1015 
 
 Old Colony R. R. Co. v. Framingham Water Co., 153 Mass. 561 201, 1006 
 
 10O7 
 
 Old Colony E. E. Co. v. Miller, 125 Mass. 1 626, 692, 1056, 1098, 1147 
 
 Old Colony R. R. Co. v. Plymouth, 14 Gray 155 292, 336, 748, 749, 753 
 
 762, 771 
 
 Old Colony R. R. Co. v. Robinson Co., 176 Mass. 387 1189, 1205, 1206 
 
 Old Colony R. R. Co. v. Rockland, etc., St. Ry. Co., 161 Mass. 416 386 
 
Table op Cases. cilxxi 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 iu Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Omaha, 230 U. S. 100 374 
 
 Old South Association v. Boston, 212 Mass. 297 679 
 
 Old Town V. Dooley, 81 111. 225 484 
 
 Olean, Re, 135 N. Y. 341 351 
 
 O'Leary v. Pittsburg Terminal Railway Co., 210 Pa. 522 1257 
 
 Oler V. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., Ill N. E. 619 325 
 
 O'Linda v. Lothrop, 21 Pick. 292 477 
 
 dinger. In re, 160 App. Div. 96 323 
 
 Olive V. State, 86 Ala. 88 258 
 
 Oliver v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., 131 Pa. 408 1159, 1264, 1265 
 
 1268, 1276 
 
 Oliver v. Union Point, etc., K. R. Co., 83 Ga. 237 940 
 
 Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489 1309 
 
 Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 528. 115, 131, 134, 227 
 
 Olmstead v. Morris Aqueduct, 46 N. J. L. 495 201, 921 
 
 Olney v. Harvey, 50 111. 453 1417 
 
 Olney v. Wharf, 119 111. 519 514, 527 
 
 Olson V. Merrill, 42 Wis. 203 416 
 
 Olson V. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 38 Minn. 419 611, 1392 
 
 Olson V. Seattle, 30 Wash. 68i7 622, 1156 
 
 Olson Land Co. v. Alki Park Co., 63 Wash. 521 339, 712 
 
 Olympia v. Mann, 1 Wash. 389 274 
 
 Olympia, etc. Power Co., v. Harris, 58 Wash. 410 627, 692 
 
 Omaha v. Flood, 57 Neb. 124 303 
 
 Omaha v. Howell Lumber Co., 30 Nebr. 633 805 
 
 Omaha v. Jensen, 35 Nebr. 68 1252 
 
 Omaha v. Kramer, 25 Nebr. 489 846, 868, 874, 876, 895, 1214, 121G 
 
 Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U. S. 180 680, 682, 685 
 
 Omaha v. Schaller, 26 Neb. 522 766, 789 
 
 Omaha Bridge, etc., Co. v. Whitney, 68 Neb. 399 706 
 
 Omaha, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cable, etc., Ry. Co., 30 Fed. 328 364 
 
 Omaha, etc., R. R. Co. v. Doney, 3 Kan. App. 519 732 
 
 Omaha, etc., R. R. Co. v. Douglass County, 62 Nebr. 1 1186 
 
 Omaha, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gerrard, 17 Nebr. ,587 1129 
 
 Omaha, etc., R. R. Co. v. Janecek, 30 Neb. 276 317, 846, 864 
 
 Omaha, etc., R. R. Co. v. Reed, 69 Neb. 514 353 
 
 Omaha, etc., R. R. Co. v. Richards, 38 Nebr. 847 1073 
 
 Omaha, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rogers, 16 Neb. 117 596, 890 
 
 Omaha, etc., R. R. Co. v. Umstead, 17 Nebr. 45,9 um 
 
 Omaha, etc., R. R. Co. v. Walker, 17 Neb. 432 1112, 1139, 1144, 1145 
 
 Omaha Horse Ry. Co. v. Cable Tramway Co., 32 Fed. 727 846 
 
 Omaha Southern R. R. Co. v. Beeson, 36 Neb. 361 666, 670 
 
 Omaha Southern R. R. Co. v. Todd, 39 Neb. 818 730, 740, 806, 1192 
 
 Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha, 147 Fed 1 374, 401 
 
 O'Malley v. Commonwealth, 182 Mass. 196 1196, 1201, 1205 
 
 O'Neal V. Sherman, 77 Tex. 182 463, 470, 586, 588, 989 
 
 O'Neill V. Hudson County Freeholders, 41 N. J. L. 161 1099, 1101, 1104 
 
 O'Neill V. Leamer, 239 U. S. 244 127, 138, 246 
 
 O'Neill V. Leamer, 93 Neb. 786 647, 1027 
 
clxxii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume 11.] PAGK 
 
 CNeiU V. New Orleans, 30 La. Ann. 220 1309 
 
 O'Neill V. San Pedro, etc., R. K. Co., 38 Utah 475 726, 728, 733, 1250 
 
 Onset St. Ey. Co. v. Plymouth County Commissioners, 154 Mass. 395. . . 347 
 
 4»8, 526, 530, 539 
 
 Ontario Knitting Co. v. State, 205 N. Y. 409 984, 989 
 
 Opelousas, etc., E. E. Co. v. Bradford, 118 La. 506 666, 670 
 
 Opelousas, etc., E. E. Co. v. St. Landry Cotton Oil Co., 118 La. 290 1152 
 
 Opinion of the Justices, 58 Me. 5^0 219 
 
 Opinion of the Justices, 103 Me. 506 276 
 
 Opinion of the Justices, 1 Mete. 580 99 
 
 Opinion of the Justices, 150 Mass. 592 203 
 
 Opinion of the Justices, 155 Mass. 598 215 
 
 Opinion of the Justices, 182 Mass. 604 215, 266 
 
 Opirfion of the Justices, 204 Mass. 607 116, 178, 179i, 200, 222 
 
 Opinion of the Justices, 208 Mass. 603 588 
 
 Opinion of the Justices, 208 Mass. 625 588 
 
 Opinion of the Justices, 211 Mass. 624 161 
 
 Opinion of the Justices, 66 N. H. 629 372, 973, 979 
 
 Oppenheimer v. Philadelphia, etc., E. E. Co., 39 App. D. C. 253 1400 
 
 Oran v. Hoblit, 19 111. App. 259 1117 
 
 Orange v. Ellsworth, 98 App. Div. 275 1024, 1079 
 
 Orange, etc., E. E. Co. v. Craver, 32 Fla. 28 1216 
 
 Oregon •Cascade E. E. Co. v. Bailey, 3 Ore. 164 gi73, 1087 
 
 Oregon Central E. E. Co. v. Wait, 3 Ore. 91 810 
 
 Oregon, etc., E. E. Co. v. Barlow, 3 Ore. 311 731, 733, 1139, 1149, 1250 
 
 Oregon, E. E., etc., Co. v. Eastlack, 54 Ore. 196 1192, 1198, 1200 
 
 Oregon E. E., etc., Co. v. Fairchild 224 U. S. 510 965 
 
 Oregon E. E., etc., Co. v. Hosier, 14 Ore. 519 707 
 
 Oregon E. E., etc., -Co. v. Oregonian E. E. Co., 130 U. S. 1 1416 
 
 Oregon E. E., etc., Co. v. lOwsley, 3 Wash. Terr. 38 692 
 
 Oregon E. E., etc., Co. v. Taffe, 67 Ore. 102 630, 672, 743, 952, 1101 
 
 Oregon Short Line E. E. Co. v. Fox, 28 Utah 311 763, 813 
 
 Oregon Short Line E. E. Co. v. Halleck, 41 Utah 378 354 
 
 Oregon Short Line E. E. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 147 654 
 
 Oregon Short Line E. E. Co. v. Mitchell, 7 Utah 505 1150 
 
 Oregon Short Line E. E. Co. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 104 Fed. 623 1072 
 
 Oregon Short Line E. E. Co. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., Ill Fed. 82 1072 
 
 1086, 1090 
 
 Oregon ehort Line E. E. Co. v. Eussell, 27 Utah 457 1112 
 
 Oregorf-Washington E. E., etc., Co. v. Wilkinson, 188 Fed. 363. .917, 1007, 1088 
 
 O'Eeilly v. New York El. Ey. Co., 14-8 N. Y. 347 504 
 
 Orcna v. Santa Barbara, 91 Cal. 621 1409 
 
 Organ v. Memphis, etc., E. E. Co., 51 Ark. 235 634, 733, 959, 1264, 1282 
 
 Orlando v. Pragg, 31 Fla. Ill 1344, 1346 
 
 Orleans, etc. E. E. Co. v. Jefferson, etc., E. E. Co., 51 La. Ann. 1605. . .. 659 
 
 671, 1008, 1174 
 Orleans-Kenner Electric Ey. Co. v. Metairie Ridge Nursery Co., 136 La. 
 
 968 988, 1095 
 
 Oroville, etc., E. R. Co. v. Leggett, 162 Fed. 571 1043 
 
Table of Cases. clxxiii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 la Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Orr V. Quimby, 54 N. H. 590 107, 198, 310, 632, 636, 639, 1235 
 
 Orrick School Dlst. v. Dorton, 125 Md. 439 1066, 1087 
 
 Oritz V. Hansen, 35 Colo. 100 115, 155, 251, 913, 988 
 
 Ortman v. Union Pacific Ey. Co., 32 Kan. 419 1143 
 
 Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738 93 
 
 Osborn v. Hart, 24 Wis. 89 236 
 
 Osborne v. Adams, 106 U. S. 181 227 
 
 Osborne v. Auburn Telephone Co., 189 N. Y. 393 476, 577, 579 
 
 Osborne v. Detroit, 32 Mich. 282 936, 1077 
 
 Osborne v. Knife Falls Boom Co., 32 Minn. 412 421 
 
 Osborne v. Missouri Pacific R. R. Co., 147 U. S. 248 302, 1398 
 
 Osceola v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 196 Fed. 777 77 
 
 Oswego, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cobb, 66 Ore. 587 187, 257, 989 
 
 Oswego Falls Bridge Co. v. Fish, 1 Barb. Ch. 547 360 
 
 Otis Co. V. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 201 U. S. 140 134, 138, 231 
 
 Otis Co. V. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 186 Mass. 89 134, 138, 231 
 
 Otis Elevator Co. v. Chicago, 263 111. 419 722, 847, 853, 866 
 
 Ottawa, etc., E. E. Co. v. Adolph, 41 Kan. 600 1196, 1210 
 
 Ottawa, etc., R. E. Co. v. Larson, 40 Kan. 301 303, 527, 528 
 
 Oury V. Goodwin, 3 Ariz. 255 60, 114, 249, 252 
 
 Overholser v. Oklahoma Interurban Traction Co., 20 Okla. 571 1395 
 
 Overman v. May, 36 Iowa 89 485 
 
 Overmann v. St. Paul, 39 Minn. 120 1244 
 
 Overman Silver Mining Co. v. Corcoran, 15 Nev. 147 255 
 
 Overton v. United States, 45 Ct. CI. 17 110, 624 
 
 Owen V. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 12 Wash. 313 1245 
 
 Owen County v. Morgan, 22 Ky. L. R. 923 ; 354 
 
 Owens V. Lancaster, 182 Pa. 257 446 
 
 Owens V. Missouri Pacific R. R. Co., 67 Tex. 679 1392 
 
 Owens V. Varnell, 145 S. W. 256 885 
 
 Owensboro v. Cumberland Telephone Co., 230 U. S. 58 374 
 
 Owensboro v. Hope, 128 Ky. 524 870 
 
 Owensboro, etc., K. E. Co. v. Gray, 14 Ky. L. Eep. 79 1106 
 
 Owsley V. Oregon, etc., Nav. Co., 1 Wash. 491 952 
 
 Ozark Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania Anthracite Railroad Co., 97 Ark. 495 . . . 155 
 
 187, 1»2, 256 
 
 P 
 
 Pabst Brewing Co. v. Milwaukee, 148 Wis. 582 873 
 
 Pabst Brewing Co. v. Thorley, 127 Fed. 439 481 
 
 Pacific Coast Ry. Co. v. Porter, 74 Cal. 261 793 
 
 Pacific, etc.. Navigation Co. v. Elmore Packing Co., 60 Ore. 534 626, 1140 
 
 12001, 1215 
 
 Pacific Gas, etc., Co. v. Chubb, 24 Cal. App. 265 965 
 
 Pacific Laundry Co. v. Pacific Bridge Co., 69 Ore. 306 1272 
 
 Pacific Milling, etc., Co. v. Portland, 65 Ore. 349 457 
 
 Pacific Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Irvine, 49 Fed. 113 576 
 
 Pacific Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon, etc., R. R. Co., 163 Fed. 967 1004 
 
 Pacific Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 50 Fed, 493 365 
 
 xii 
 
clxxiv Table op Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 lu Volume II.] PAOB 
 
 Pacific E. E. Co. v. Chrystal, 25 Mo. 544 804 
 
 Pacific E. E. Co. v. Seely, 45 Mo. 212 994 
 
 Pacific E. E. Co. v. V^ade, 91 Cal. 449 282 
 
 Pacific Tel., etc., Co. v. Bhleman, 166 Cal. 640 34, 85, 374, 623, 946, 965 
 
 Pack V. Chesapeake, etc., E. E. Co., 5 W. Va. 118 1023 
 
 Pack V. New York, 8 N. Y. 222 1232 
 
 Packard v. Bergen Neck E. E. Co., 54 N. J. L. 553 691, 766, 806 
 
 Packet Co. v. Sorrels, 50 Ark. 466 586 
 
 Paducah v. Allen, 111 Ky. 361 85^, 1214, 12*18, 1224 
 
 Paducah, etc., E. E. Co. v. Stovall, 12 Heisk. 1 763;, 778, 780, 812 
 
 Page V. Allen, 56 Pa. 338 gg 
 
 Page V. Baltimore, 34 Md. 558 67 
 
 Page V. Contoocook Valley E. E. Co., 21 N. H. 438 947 
 
 Page V. Kettering Waterworks Co., 8 Times L. E. 288b 820 
 
 Pagel V. County Commissioners, 17 Mont. 586 .' . 1256 
 
 Paige V. Schenectady Ey. Co., 178 N. Y. loa 470, 543 
 
 Paine v. Boston, 4 Allen 168 348, 1196, 1204 
 
 Paine v. Delhi, 116 N. Y. 225 1328 
 
 Paine v. Patrick, 3 Mod. 289 882 
 
 Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160 615, 768, 801, 1170, 1223 
 
 Paine Lumber Co. v. Oshkosh, 86 Wis. 397 282 
 
 Paine's Guardian v. Calor Oil & Gas Co., 133 Ky. 614 474, 573 
 
 Painter v. Gunderson, 123 Minn. 323 884 
 
 Painter v. St. Clair, 9« Va. 85 902, 981, 1257 
 
 Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. 479 30, 117, 132, 134, 194, 220, 234 
 
 Palatine v. Kruger, 121 111. 72 ' 474, 483 
 
 Palestine v. Siler, 22i5 111. 680 1341 
 
 Palisades Interstate Park, In re, 83 Misc. 186 954 
 
 Palmer v. Clement, 49 Mich. 45 948 
 
 Palmer v. Cuyahoga Co., 3 McLean 226 94, 101 
 
 Palmer v. Harris County, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 340 177, 917, 1110 
 
 Palmer v. Jones, 188 Mo. 163 1409 
 
 Palmer v. Larchmont Electric Co., 158 N. Y. 231 582, 583 
 
 Palmer v. Larchmont Electric Co., 6 App. Div. 12 474, 475, 476 
 
 Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Caines 307 409 
 
 Palmer v. St. Albans, 60 Vt. 427 1345 
 
 Palmer v. Silverthorn, 32 Pa. 68 478 
 
 Palmer v. State, Wright 364 274 
 
 Palmer v. Wetmore, 2 Sandf. 316 '. . 495 
 
 Palmer Co. v. Ferrill, 17 Pick. 58 801, 824, 1192 
 
 Panhandle, etc., E. E. Co. v. Kirby, 108 S. W. 498 651 
 
 Panton Turnpike Co. v. Bishop, 11 Vt. 198 619 
 
 Pappenheimer v. Metropolitan EI. Ey. Co., 128 N. Y. 436 1163, 1281 
 
 Papworth v. Milwaukee, 64 Wis. 389 479 
 
 Paquet v. Mt. Tabor St. Ey. Co., 18 Ore. 233 525, 537 
 
 Paragould v. Milner, 114 Ark. 334 793 
 
 Paret v. Bayonne, 39 N. J. L. 559 1235 
 
 Parham v. Decatur County Justices, 9 Ga. 341 30, 85, 341, 621, 622 
 
 907, 910, 913, 915, 948 
 
Table of Cases. clxxv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Paris V. Cairo, etc., Ey. Co., 248 111. 213 750, 752, 916 
 
 Paris V. Coltraine, 3 Hawks 3] 2 953 
 
 Paris V. Mason, 37 Tex. 447 812 
 
 Paris V. Tucker, lOl Tex. 9fl 949 
 
 Paris Co. v. Southwestern, etc., Co., 27 S. W. 902 382 
 
 Paris, etc., K. E. Co. v. Greimer, 84 Tex. 443 1264 
 
 Parish v. Gilmanton-, 11 N. H. 293 355 
 
 Park V. Chicago, etc., R. E. Co., 43 Iowa 636 595 
 
 Park City Yacht. Club v. Bridgeport, 85 Conn. 366 879 
 
 Park Commissioners, In re, 1 N. Y. Supp. 763 708 
 
 Park Commissioners v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228 398, 40|3 
 
 Park Commissioners v. Du Pont, 110 Ky. 743 1025 
 
 Parke v. Boston, 175 Mass. 44 95S', 1273 
 
 Parke v. Seattle, 5 Wash. 1 515, 1319 
 
 Parker v. Atchison, 46 Kan. 14 ' 789, 799, 875, 895 
 
 Parker v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Cush. 107 649, 826, 829, 833, 842, S55 
 
 861, 874, 1052, 1246 
 
 Parker v. Chestnut, 80 Ga. 12 1159 
 
 Parker v. Commonwealth, 178 Mass. 199 166, 281, 298 
 
 Parker v. Cutter Milldam Co., 20 Me. 253 42i9 
 
 Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 495 
 
 Parker v. Ft. Worth, etc., R. R. Co., 84 Tex. 333 1068, 1073 
 
 Parker v. Framingham, 8 Met. 260 301, 32'3, 835, 880, 1410, 1419 
 
 Parker v. Laredo, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 221 1375 
 
 Parker v. Lowell, 11 Gray 353 830, 1314, 1318 
 
 Parker v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., 109 Mass. 506 968 
 
 Parker v. Norfolk County, 150 Mass. 489 1104, 1407 
 
 Parker v. Simpson, 180 Mass. 334 301 
 
 Parker v. Snohomish County, 25 Wash. 544 1096 
 
 Parker v. Waycross, etc., R. R. Co., 81 Ga. 387 1253 
 
 Parks V. Boston, 8' Pick. 218 148, 1049, 1050, 1089, 1117 
 
 Parks V. Boston, 15 Pick. 198 336, 338, 651, 652, 700, 712, 1140, 1146 
 
 1147, 1148 
 
 Parks V. Hampden County, 120 Mass. 39S. 801, 802 
 
 Parks V. Northwestern University, 218' 111. 381 1306 
 
 Parks V. Wisconsin Central R. R. Co., 33 Wis. 413 734, 740, 744 
 
 Parkway, In re, 150 App. Div. 482 69<5 
 
 Parkway in Kansas City, In re, 176 S. W. 529 932, 1269 
 
 Parrish v. Yorkville, 96 S. C. 24 445, 1236, 1239, 1319 
 
 Parrott v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 127 Iowa 419 1217 
 
 Parrott v. Cincinnati, etc., R. E. Co., 10 Ohio St. 624 321, 526 
 
 Parrott v. Lawrence, 2 Dill. 332. 364 
 
 Parsell v. State, 30 N. J. L. 530 948 
 
 Parsons v. Howe, 41 Me. 218 66 
 
 Parsons v. Waterville, etc., St. Ry. Co., 101 Me. 173 541, 554 
 
 Parson's Water Co. v. Knapp, 33 Kan. 752 616 
 
 Partridge v. Arlington, 193 Mass. 530 1273 
 
 Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238 214, 915, 1003, 1067 
 
 Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, etc., Co., 72 N. J. L. 285 278 
 
clxxvi Table op Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, T21-1422 in. Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Passaic Bridge, The, 3 Wall. 782 101 
 
 Patch V. Boston, 146 Mass. 52.. 1058, 1174, 1175, 1206, 1207, 1209, 1210', 1211 
 
 Patchin v. Brooklyn, 2 Wend. 377 1142 
 
 Patchin v. Brooklyn, 8 Wend. 47 1142 
 
 Paterson v. East Jersey Water Co., 77 N". J. Eq. 588 1256, 1259 
 
 Paterson v. Jersey City, 84 N. J. L. 454 1003 
 
 Paterson v. Kearney, 84 N. J. L. 456 620, 1412, 1420 
 
 Paterson, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kamlah, 42 N. J. Eq. 93 1269 
 
 Paterson, etc., E. E. Co. v. Newark„61 N. J. L. 80 723, 725, 756 
 
 Paterson, etc., E. E. Co. v. Nutley, 72 N. J. L. 123 750 
 
 Paterson, etc., E. E. Co. v. Paterson, 72 N. J. L. 112 997, 1001 
 
 Paterson, etc., R. R. Co. v. Paterson, 81 N. J. L. 75 1002 
 
 Paterson, etc., R. R. Co. v. Paterson, 83 N. J. L. 535 10O2 
 
 Paterson Ry. Co. v. Grundy, 51 N. J. Eq. 213i 542, 543, 596 
 
 Patoka V. Hopkins, 131 Ind. 142 1359 
 
 Patrick v. Charleston, etc.. Commissioners, 4 McCord L. 541 624 
 
 Patrick v. Omaha, 1 Nebr. Unoff. 250 239 
 
 Patten v. Northern Central R. R. Co., 3i3 Pa. 426 298, 733 
 
 Patterson v. Baltimore, 124 Md. 153 722, 1138, 1144 
 
 Patterson v. Boston, 20 Pick. 159i 712 
 
 Patterson v. Boston, 23 Pick. 42'5 699 
 
 Patterson v. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 75 111. 588 647, 1400 
 
 Patterson v. Jaeger, etc., Ry. Co., 102 C. C. A. 95 730 
 
 Patterson v. Vail, 43 Iowa 142 486 
 
 Patterson v. Wollmann, 5 No. Dak. 60iS 361 
 
 Patton V. Chattanooga, I'O® Tenn. 197 578 
 
 Paul V. Carver, 24 Pa. 207 1420 
 
 Paul V. Detroit, 32 Mich. 108 395, 919, 922, 943 
 
 Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30 929 
 
 Pause V. Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92 338, 340, 367, 693, 699, 714, 715, 716, 717 
 
 846, 851, 867 
 
 Pausing v. Miamisburg, 79 Ohio St. 430 1008 
 
 Pawnee County v. Storm, 34 Nebr. 735 958 
 
 Pawtucket, etc., Grade Crossing Commission, In re, 36 R. I. 200. . .632, 635 
 
 Paxton, etc.. Land Co. v. Farmers', etc., Land Co., 45 Nebr. 884, . . .116, 141 
 
 240, 250, 914, 996 
 
 Payne v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 112 Mo. 6 303, 314 
 
 Payne v. Kansas, etc., R. R. Co., 46 Fed. 546 343, 991 
 
 Payne v. Morgan's, etc., E. E. Co., 38 La. Ann. 164 1392 
 
 Payson v. People, 175 111. 267 308, 1376 
 
 Peabody v. Boston, 220 Mass. 376 471, 480, 565, 842 
 
 Peabody v. Boston El. Ey. Co., 191 Mass. 513 693, 769, 785, 802, 841 
 
 Peabody v. Boston & Maine E. R., 3 Cush. 107 829 
 
 Peabody v. Boston & Providence R. E. Co., 181 Mass. 76. . .649, 842, 1052, 1246 
 
 Peabody v. New York, etc., R. E. Co., 187 Mass. 489 651, 833, 1192 
 
 Peabody v. United States, 231 U. S. 530 302, 351, 1280, 1389 
 
 Pearce v. Scotcher, 9 Q. B. D. 162 407 
 
 Pearce's Heirs v. Patton, 7 B. Mourse 162 288 
 
 Pearl St., Matter of, 19 Wend. 654 1179 
 
Table op Cases. clxxvii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume ir.] PAGE 
 
 Pearsall v. Eaton County, 74 Mich. 558 322, 328, 351, 879, 885, 925 
 
 Pearson v. Allen, 151 Mass. 79 834 
 
 Pearson v. Zehr, 138 111. 48 285 
 
 Peart v. Meeker, 45 La. Ann. 421 247, 624 
 
 Peavey v. Wolfborough, 37 N. H. 286 936, 1079, 1126 
 
 Peck V. Bristol, 74 Conn. 483 763 
 
 Peck V. Chicago Rys. Co., 2!70 111. 34 700, 728, 1213 
 
 Peck V. Jones, 70 Pa. 85 712 
 
 Peck V. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 101 Ind. 366 986 
 
 Peck V. Rensselaer, 8 Blackf. 308 905, 1:111 
 
 Peck V. Schenectady Ry. Co., 170 N. Y. 298 543, 561 
 
 Peck V. Superior, etc., Ry. Co. 36 Minn. 343 •. . 741 
 
 Peckham v. Lebanon, 39 Conn. 231 174 
 
 Peckham v. School District, 7 R. I. 545 211 
 
 Pecksport, etc., R. R. Co. v. West, 45 N. Y. Supp. 644 734 
 
 Pecot V. Police Jury, 41 La. Ann. 706 416 
 
 Peddicord v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 34 Md. 463 537 
 
 Peden v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 73 Iowa 328 1393 
 
 Peed V. Brenneman, 72 Ind. 288 1053, 1139 
 
 Peek V. Hampton, 115 Va. 855 • 457" 
 
 Peel T. Atlanta, 85 Ga. 138 318, 845, 847, 850, 857 
 
 Pegler v. Hyde Park, 176 Mass. 101 653, 666, 1148, 1173 
 
 Pegram v. New York El. Ry. Co., 147 N. Y. 135 1163 
 
 Peirce v. Goddard, 22: Pick. 569 70i2 
 
 Peirson v. Boston El. Ry. Co., 191 Mass. 223 659, 841, 943, 944, 1194, 1222 
 
 Pekin v. Brereton, 67 111. 477 • 867, 878, 890 
 
 Pelham Manor v. New Roohelle Water Co., 143 N. Y. 532 396, 572 
 
 Pell, Matter of, 171 N-. Y. 48 268 
 
 Pella V. Scholte, 24 Iowa 283 1409 
 
 Pelton V. East Cleveland Ry. Co., 10 Ohio S. & C. P. 545 642 
 
 Pemberton v. Dooley, 43 Mo. App. 176 479 
 
 Pembroke v. Plymouth County Commissioners, 12 Gush. 351 1046 
 
 Pemigewasset Bridge v. New Hampton, 47 N. H. 161 1115 
 
 Peninsular R. R. Co. v. Howard, 20 Mich. 18 947 
 
 Penley v. Auburn, 85 Me. 278 77, 78 
 
 Pennell v. Card, 96 Me. 392 1062 
 
 Penney v. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 507 693, 732, 735, 836, 855 
 
 Penn Gas Coal Co. v. Versailles Fuel Gas Co., 131 Pa. 532 616, 691 
 
 Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Heiss, 141 111. 35. .58, 890, 1226, 1274, 1285 
 
 Pennsburg Alley, In re 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 213 937, 1078 
 
 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, etc.. Bridge Co., 18 How. 421 102 
 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Bond, 202 111. 95 1268 
 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Chicago, 181 111. 289 522 
 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Lake Erie, etc., Ry. Co., 146 Fed. 446 385 
 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Piatt, 47 Ohio St. 366 1276 
 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, 223 Fed. 7591 1111, 1204 
 
 Pennsylvania, etc., Canal Co. v. Billings, 94 Pa. 40 613 
 
 Pennsylvania, etc., Canal Co. y. Bunnell, 81 Pa. 414 735, 810, 1197, 1214 
 
clxxviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume 11.] PAGE 
 
 Pennsylvania, etc., E. R. Co. v. Bogert. 209 Pa. 689 997, 1001 
 
 Pennsylvania, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cleary, 125 Pa. 442 345, 660, 667, 670 
 
 1170, 1194 
 
 Pennsylvania, etc., E. R. Co. v. Walsh, 124 Pa. 544 596, 879, 891 
 
 Pennsylvania, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ziemer, 124 Pa. 560 1197 
 
 Pennsylvania Insurance Co. v. Pennsylvania, etc., R. R. Co., 151 Pa. 
 
 334 V 742, 863, 886 
 
 Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47 117 
 
 , 149, 167 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 128 Pa. 509 924 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Angel, 41 N. J. Eq. 316. . .316, 5>28, 1256, 1388, 1395 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 37 Fed. 129 Ill 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co:, 60 Md. 263. . .946, 976 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Diehm, 128 Pa. 509 911, 921 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Duncan, HI Pa. 352 969 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Eby, 107 Pa. 166 338, 699 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Heister, 8 Pa. 445 1117 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Keiffer, 22 Pa. 356 1125 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Lilly Borough, 207 Pa. 180 607 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Lippincott, 116 Pa. 472 564, 847, 850, 863 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Lutheran Congregation, 53 Pa. 445 941 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Marchant, 119 Pa. 541 564, 847, 850, 863 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Miller, 132 U. S. 75 969 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Miller, 112 Pa. 34 439 
 
 Pennsylvania R. JR. Co. v. Montgomery, etc., Ry. Co., 167 Pa. 62 474 
 
 545, 1257, 1265, 1395, 1396 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. National Docks, etc., R. R. Co., 57 N. J. L. 86. . 1030 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Pittsburgh, etc.. Congregation, 53 Pa. 445... 1127 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Porter, 29 Pa. 165 1073 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Reichert, 58 Md. 261 1228 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 118 U. S. 290 1416 
 
 Pennsylvania Tel. Co. v. Hoover, 209 Pa. 555 989 
 
 Penny v. Penny, L. R. 5 Eq. 227 708 
 
 Penny, etc., R. R. Co. In re, 7 E. & B. 660 820 
 
 Penni Township Road, In re, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 453 1126 
 
 Penobscot Log Driving Co. v. West Branch, etc., Co., 99 Me. 452 1134 
 
 Peurice v. Wallis, 37 Miss. 172 246, 642, 803, 1266 
 
 Pensacola R. R. Co. v. Jackson, 21 Fla. 146 1275 
 
 Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1 112, 581 
 
 People V. Adirondack R. R. Co., 160 N. Y. 225 3, 59, 66, 76, 164, 632 
 
 635, 925, 946 
 
 People V. Albany, etc., R. R. Co., 34 N. Y. 261 1403, 1404 
 
 People V. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 117 N. Y. 160 59, 200 
 
 People V. Batchelor, 53 N. Y. 128. 186 
 
 People V. Belden, 132 App. Div. 558 947 
 
 People V. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451 1238 
 
 People V. Blake, 19 Cal. 579 940 
 
 People V. Blocki, 203 111. 363 192 
 
 People V. Board of Health, 140 N. Y. 1 286 
 
Table of Cases. clxxix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-W22 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 People V. Brighton, 20 Mich. 57 1117 
 
 People V. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419 50, 70, 807 
 
 People V. Brooklyn, 9 Barb. 535 67 
 
 People V. Buffalo, 140 N. Y. 300 904', 1229, 1231, 1232 
 
 People V. Burrall, 258 111. 509 796 
 
 People V. Burton, 65 N. Y. 452 936, 1046, 1117, 1118 
 
 People V. Calder, 89 App. Div. 503 280 
 
 People V. Canal Appraisers, 33 N. Y. 461 409, 433 
 
 People V. Chase, 165 111. 527 288 
 
 People V. Chicago, 51 111. 17 398 
 
 People V. Chicago, 261 111. 16 278 
 
 People V. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 262 111. 492 370, 388, 460 
 
 People V. Collis, 17 App. Div. 448 482 
 
 People V. Cunningham, 1 Denio 524 477 
 
 People V. Detroit Common Council, 28 Mich. 228 392 
 
 People V. Detroit, etc., R. R. Co., 79 Mich. 475 371, 622, 747, 749 
 
 People V. District Court, 11 Col. 147 253 
 
 People V. D'Oench, 11 N. Y. 359 , . 276 
 
 People V. Dolan, 126 N. Y. 166 377 
 
 People V. Drain Commissioners, 40 Mich. 745 1118 
 
 People V. Eaton, lOO Mich. 308 578 
 
 People V. Elk River Mill, etc., Co., 107 Cal. 221 406, 422, 451 
 
 People V. Erie R. R. Co., 198 N. Y. 369 984 
 
 People V. Ferris, 36 N. Y. 218 1119 
 
 People V. Fisher, 24 Wend. 215 31 
 
 People V. Fitch, 147 N. Y. 356 1057, 1059, 1232 
 
 People V. Forest Home Cemetery Co., 258 111. 36 gl3 
 
 Poeple V. Fort Wayne, etc., R. R. Co., 92 Mich. 522 542, 554, 1085 
 
 People V. Foss, 80 Mich. 559 485 
 
 People V. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244 31 
 
 People V. Gilbert, 18 Johns. 227 1408 
 
 People V. Gilon, 121 N. Y. 551 929 
 
 People V. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225 99 
 
 People V. Goodwin, 5 N. Y. 568 91 
 
 People V. Green, 64 N. Y. 606 508 
 
 People V. Green, 89 App. Div. 400 166, 278 
 
 People V. Grissman, 41 Colo. 450 288 
 
 People V. GutchesB, 48 Barb. 656 1010 
 
 People V. Haines, 49 N. Y. 587 308, 1376 
 
 People V. Haverstraw, 151 N. Y. 75 943 
 
 People V. Haverstraw, 80 Hun 385 944 
 
 People V. Hawes, 98 Cal. 648 1185 
 
 People V. Hayden, 6 Hill 359 632 
 
 People V. Henion, 64 Him 471 2i44 
 
 People V. Hennessey, 206 N. Y. 33 508, 512, 966 
 
 People V. Hennessey, 206 N. Y. 750 949 
 
 People V. Hildreth, 126 N. Y. 360 1049, 1050, 1118 
 
 People V. Holladay, 93 Cal.,241 477, 1403 
 
 People V. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471 59, 91, 97, 108, 159, 161, 471, 907 
 
clxxx Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In, Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 People V. Hurlburt, 24 Mich. 441 401 
 
 People V. Hurlburt, 131 Mich. 156 406, 460 
 
 People V. Jesaup, 28 App. Div. 524 1010 
 
 People V. Jones, 63 N. Y. 305 1046 
 
 People V. Kelly, 76 N. Y. 475 103 
 
 People V. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188 196, 396, 518, 538, 561 
 
 People V. Kingman, 24 N. Y. 559 174 
 
 People V. Kipley, 171 111. 44 369 
 
 People V. Kirk, 162 111. 138 415 
 
 People V. Kirk, 136 App. Div. 45 407, 431, 451 
 
 People V. Kniakem, 54 N. Y. 52 936, 1077 
 
 People V. La Grange, 2 Mich. 187 1231 
 
 People V. Lambier, 5 Denio 9 441 
 
 People V. Lowell, 9 Mich. 144 1231 
 
 People V. Maher, 141 N. Y. 330 477 
 
 People V. Marshall, 6 111. 673 31 
 
 People V. Michigan Southern Ky. Ck)., 3 Mich. 496 832, 635, 642, 948, 958 
 
 People V. Morris, 13 Wend. 325 30^ 402 
 
 People V. Murphy, 195 N. Y. 126 278 
 
 People V. Myring, 144 Cal. 351 1407 
 
 People V. Newell, 131 App. Div. 555 8S6 
 
 People V. New York, 198 N. Y. 439 368, 962 
 
 People V. New York, 134 App. Div. 75 1052 
 
 People v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 504 56 
 
 People V. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 156 N. Y. 570 372, 752, 1002 
 
 People V. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 45 Barb. 73 987 
 
 People V. Northern Central R. R. Co., 164 N. Y. 289 '. 989 
 
 People V. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1 363, 374 
 
 People V. Oneida County, 19 Wend. 102 318 
 
 People V. Orange, 27 Barb. 593 56 
 
 People V. Page, 39 App. Div. 110 1011 
 
 People V. Pitkin County Court, 11 Col. 147 2 
 
 People V. Pittsburgh R. R. Co., 53 Cal. 694 252 
 
 People V. Piatt, 17 Johns. 2ill 408 
 
 People V. Pope, 53 Cal. 437 1409 
 
 People V. Porter, 90 N. Y. 68 392 
 
 People V. Priest, 206 N. Y. 274 85, 282 
 
 People V. Rensselaer, etc., R. R. Co., 16 Wend. 113 101 
 
 People V. Richards, 38 Mich. 214 236 
 
 People V. Roberts, 62 111. 41 1322, 1388 
 
 People V. Rochester, 50 N. Y. 525 992 
 
 People V. St. Lawrence SupervisorB, 5 Cow. 292 1231 
 
 People V. Salem, 20 Mich. 452 53, 116, 186, 218 
 
 People V. Sandrock Realty Co., 149 App. Div. 651 514 
 
 People V. Sanitary District of Chicago, 210 111. 171 998 
 
 People V. Schuyler, 69 N. Y. 242 1121, 1232 
 
 People V. Simon, 176 111. 165 288 
 
 People V. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595 902, 914, 916, 927, 941, 945, 982, 1019 
 
 People V. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 174 N. Y. 417 679, 687 
 
Table op Cases. clxxxi 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 People V. State Water Supply Commission, 209 N. Y. 229 147 
 
 People V. Stillings, 198 N. Y. 504 508, 651 
 
 People V. Stillings, 200 N. Y. 525 967 
 
 People V. Syracuse, 63 N. Y. 291 947, 1126 
 
 People V. Syracuse, 78 N. Y. 56 1101, 1104 
 
 People V. Thayer, 63 N. Y. 348 1059, 1121, 1126 
 
 People V. Thompson, 65 How. Pr. 407 583 
 
 People V. Truckee Lumber Co., 116 Cal. 397 432 
 
 People V. Van De Carr, 178 N Y. 425 273, 274, 275 
 
 People V. Vanderbilt, 26 N. Y. 287 456 
 
 People V. Walsh, 96 111. 232 394, 517 
 
 People V. Wasson, 64 N. Y. 167 1127 
 
 People V. Wayman, 256 111. 151 1088 
 
 People V. Wells, 13 111. 102 198 
 
 People V. Wieboldt, 233 111. 572 183 
 
 People V. Williams, 145 111. 573 270 
 
 People's Ice Co. v. Davenport, 149 Mass. 322 431 
 
 People's loe Co. v. Excelsior, 44 Mich. 229 485 
 
 Peoria v. Adams, 72 111. App. 662 1374 
 
 Peoria v. Johnston, 66 111. 4i5 1406, 1409 
 
 Peoria, etc., E. R. Co. v. Barnum, 107 111. 160 1146 
 
 Peoria, etc., R. R. Co. v. Black, 58 111. 33 79«5 
 
 Peoria, etc., R. R. Co. v. Birkett, 62 111. 332 599, 734 
 
 Peoria, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bryant, 57 111. 473 1097, 1129 
 
 Peoria, etc., R. R. Co. v. Laurie, 63 111. 264 796 
 
 Peoria, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 74 111. 314 1114 
 
 Peoria, etc., R. R. Co. v. Peoria, etc., R. R. Co., 66 111. 174 1007 
 
 Peoria, etc., R. R. Co. v. Peoria, etc., R. R. Co., 105 111. 110 754 
 
 Peoria, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rice, 75 111. 339 1159 
 
 Peoria, etc., R. R. Co. v. Sawyer, 71 HI. 361 730 
 
 Peoria, etc., R. R. Co. v. Schertz, 84 111. 135 647 
 
 Peoria, etc., R. R. Co. v. Warner, 61 HI. 52 926, 928 
 
 Peoria, etc., Traction Co. v. Vance, 285 HI. 270 767, 796 
 
 Pfeoria, etc., Traction Co., v. Vance, 234 111. 36 1186 
 
 Peoria, etc.. Traction Co. v. Vance, 251 111. 263 952 
 
 Peoria Gas, etc., Co. v. Peoria Terminal R. R. Co., 146 111. 372 1144, 120O 
 
 Pepke V. Grace Hospital, 130 Mich. 493 1306 
 
 Pepper v. Union R. R. Co., 113 Tenn. 63 596 
 
 Percy Sumner Club v. Astle, 163 Fed. 1 410 
 
 Pere Marquette E. R. Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 154 Mich. 290. . 192 
 
 195 
 
 / Perionowsky v. Freeman, 4 Fost. & F. 977 1306 
 
 Perkins v. Blauth, 163 Cal. 782 1313 
 
 Perkins v. Lake Superior, etc., R. R. Co., 140 Fed. 906 1043 
 
 Perkins v. Lawrence, 136 Mass. 305 12S0, 1381 
 
 Perkins v. People, 27 Mich. 386 U94 
 
 Perkins v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 143 Mo. 513 951 
 
 Perley v. Cambridge, 220 Mass. 507 616, 702, 707 
 
 Perley v. Chandler, 6 Mass. 453 470, 471, 478, 479, 746, 1419 
 
clxxxii Table of Cases. 
 
 (Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Perley v. Georgetown, 7 Gray 464 1345 
 
 Perrin v. Oliver, 1 Minn. 202 980 
 
 Perrine v. Farr, 22 N. J. L. 356 235 
 
 Perry v. Clissold (1907), A. O. 73 343, 1133, 1134 
 
 Perry v. Houseof Refuge, 63 Md. 20 1306 
 
 Perry v. Keens, 56 N. H. 514 185 
 
 Perry v. Sherborn, 11 Gush. 388 834, 1051, 1059 
 
 Perry v. Wilson, 7 Mass. 393 2, 63, 621, 988, 992 
 
 Perry v. Worcester, 8 Gray 544... 830, 1235, 1237, 1250, 1314, 1318, 1370, 1371 
 
 Perry St., In re, 79 Misc. 290 ' 952 
 
 Perrysville, etc.. Plank Road Co. v. Ramage, 20 Pa. 95 729 
 
 Peters v. Fergus Falls', 35 Minn. 549 1370 
 
 Peters v. GrifFee, 108 Ind. 121 937, 1077 
 
 Peters v. Lindsborg, 40 Kan. 654 1346 
 
 Peters v. St. Louis, 226 Mo. 62 586, 687 
 
 Petersburg School District v. Peterson, 14 N. D. 344 667, 670, 951 
 
 Peterson v. Bean, 22r Utah 43 ' 984 
 
 Peterson v. Ferreby, 30 Iowa 327 644 
 
 Peterson v. Santa Rosa, 119 Cal. 387 445 
 
 Peterson v. Smith, 6 Wash. 163 951 
 
 Peterson v. Waltham, 150 Mass. 564 1273 
 
 Peterson v. Wilmington, 130 N. C. 76 1308 
 
 Pettibone v. Purdy, 7 Vt. 514 1420 
 
 Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Wis. 223 315, 1267, 1258, 1261, 1319, 1359 
 
 Pettingill v. Chelsea, 161 Mass. 368 1308 
 
 Pettingill v. Devin, 35 Iowa 344 ' ^ . . 1421 
 
 Pettingill v. Yonkers, 116 N. Y. 558 1310 
 
 Pettis V. Johnson, 56 Ind. 139 477 
 
 Pettis V. Providence, 11 R. I. 372 1243 
 
 Pettit V. Grand Junction, 119 Iowa 352 492, 586, 1407 
 
 Pettit V. Jamestown, etc., R. R. Co., 222 Pa. 490 611 
 
 Peyser v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 13 Daly 122 558, 596 
 
 Pfaender.v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 86 Minn. 218 1245, 1263 
 
 Pfahler, In re 150 Cal. 71 65 
 
 Pfeifer v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners, 82 N. J. Eq. 169. .318, 324 
 
 Pfeifer v. Sheboygan, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Wis. 155 1052, 1246, 1284 
 
 Pflegar v. Hastings, etc., R. R. Co., 28 Minn. 510 '. 731 
 
 Phelps V. Lake St. El. R. R. Co., 165 111. 526 562 
 
 Phelps V. Union El. R. R. Co., 166 HI. 131 562 
 
 Phifer v. Cox, 21 Ohio St. 248 470, 486, 691 
 
 Philadelphia v. Collins, 68 Pa. 106 439 
 
 Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. 320 395 
 
 Philadelphia v. Dyer, 41 Pa. 463 353 
 
 Philadelphia v. Linnard, 97 Pa. 242 1274 
 
 Philadelphia v. Miskey, 68 Pa. 49 634, 1057, 1228 
 
 Philadelphia v. Spring Garden Commissioners, 7 Pa. 348 439 
 
 Philadelphia v. Ward, 174 Pa. 45 921 
 
 Philadelphia v. Western Union Tel. Co., 11 Phila. 328 1416 
 
 Philadelphia v. Wright, 100 Pa. 235 958 
 
Table of Cases. , clxxxiii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 la Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Philadelphia Ball Club v. Philadelphia, 192 Pa. 632 367, 655, 699, 868 
 
 876, 895 
 
 Philadelphia Oay Co. v. York Clay Co., 241 Pa. 305 60 
 
 Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605 423 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., Ferry Co. v. Intercity Link R. R. Co., 74 N. J. L. 594 . . 1003 
 
 Philadelphia, etc.. Ferry Co. v. Intercity Link K. R. Co., 77 N. J. L. 616. . 367 
 
 396, 736 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., Iron Co. v. Boston, 211 Mass. 526 710 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co.'s Appeal^ 1012 Pa. 123 79, 973 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 187 Pa. 123 997, 1000 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 2 Walk. 291 991 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., Case of, 6 Whart. 25 32, 391, 396, 524 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cooper, 105 Pa. 239 1245 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Davis, 68 Md. SSI 1393 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Getz, 113 Pa. 214 714, 718 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gilson, 8 Watts 243 763 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Neshaming El. Ry. Co., 206 Pa. 343 905 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Obert, 109 Pa. 193 1134 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 9 Phila. 563 78, 752 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202 1294 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. R, Co. v. Williams, 54 Pa. 103 986, 987, 1235 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wilmington City Ry. Co., 8 Del. Ch. 134. . 541 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., St. Ry. Co.'s Petition, 203 Pa. 354 156, 965, 977 
 
 Philadelphia Parkway, In re, 250 Pa. 257 959 
 
 Phillips V. Arkansas Vailley Interurban Ry. Co., 89 Kan. 835 541, 546 
 
 Phillips V. Dunkirk, etc., R. R. Co., 78 Pa. 177 989, 1396 
 
 Phillips V. Lawrence, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 824 1407 
 
 Phillips V. Marblehead, 148 Masa. 326 1138, 1179, 1186, 1210 
 
 Phillips V. MiddJesex County Commissioners, 123 Mass. 258 1057 
 
 Phillips V. Pease, 39 Cal. 582 650 
 
 Phillips V. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 130 N. C. 513 85, 581, 607, 625, 1163 
 
 1239, 1266, 1281, 1395 
 
 Phillips V. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 131 N. C. 225 607 
 
 Phillips V. St. aair Incline Plane Co., 153 Pa. 230 1236 
 
 Phillips V. St. Clair Incline Plane Co., 166 Pa. 21 744 
 
 Phillips V. Scales Mound, 195 111. 353 666, 991 
 
 Phillips V. South Park Commissioners, 119 111. 626 650, 654 
 
 Phillips V. Tucker, 3 Met. 69 946 
 
 Phillips V. Watson, 63 Iowa 28 192, 193, 252, 256 
 
 Phillips V. Watuppa Reservoir Co., 184 Mass. 404 615 
 
 Philpot V. Tompkinsville, 148 Ky. 511 511, 870 
 
 Phinizy v. Augusta, 47 Ga. 260 1366 
 
 Phipps V. State, 69 Misc. 295 697 
 
 Phipps V. Western Maryland R. R. Co., 66 Md. 319 526 
 
 Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lincoln, 91 Nebr. 150 1316 
 
 Katt V. iCovirigton, etc.. Bridge Co., 8 Bush 31 360 
 
 Pickles V. McLellan Dry Dock Co., 38 La. Ann. 412 416 
 
 Piedmont Cotton Mills v. Georgia R. R., etc., Co., 131 6a. 143 541 
 
 Pierce v. Bangor, 105 Me. 413 946, 947, 949 
 
clxxxiv Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volum& II.] PAGE 
 
 Pierce v. Boston, 164 Mass. 92 1183, 1190^ U96, 1203, 1205, 1206, 1207 
 
 Pierce v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 141 Mass. 481 605 
 
 Pierce v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 137 Wis. 550 723, 724, 725, 1178, 1.179 
 
 Pierce v. Dart, 7 Cow. 609 887 
 
 Pierce v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75 134, 211, 473, 570, 573, 578, 839 
 
 Pierce v. Gibson County, 107 Tenn. 224. 313 
 
 Pierce v. Somersworth, 10 N. H. 369 619 
 
 Pierce v. Worcester, etc., R. R. Co., 105 Mass. 199 733, 734 
 
 Piercy v. Johnson City, 130 Tenn. 231 1283 
 
 Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436 T 495 
 
 Piers, In re, 117 App. Div. 553 717 
 
 Pike V. Chicago, 155 HI. 656 1213 
 
 Pillsbury v. Brown, 82 Me. 450 517 
 
 Pine V. New York, 185 U. S. 93 94 
 
 Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666 185 
 
 Pingery v. Cherokee, etc., R. R. Co., 78 Iowa 438 1181, 1188 
 
 Pinkerton v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 109 Mass. 527 1047, 1156 
 
 Pinkerton v. Randolph, 20O Mass. 24 1136, 1344 
 
 Pinkham v. Chelmsford, 109 Mass. 225 862, 1052, 1178 
 
 Pinkstaff v. Allison Ditch District, 213 111. 186 627, 691 
 
 Pinkum v. Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 301 612 
 
 Pinney v. Winchester, 83 Conn. 411 1282 
 
 Pioneer Tel., etc., Co. v. State, 38 Okla. 554 374 
 
 Pioneer Tel., etc., Co. v. Westenhaver, 29 Okla. 429 685, 687 
 
 Piper V. Madison, 140 Wis. 311 1310, 1382 
 
 Piper V. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 14 Kan. 568 1164 
 
 Piscataqua Bridge Co. v. New Hampshire Bridge Co., 7 N. H. 35 360, 363 
 
 622, 628, 638 
 
 Pitkin V. Springfield, 112 Mass. 509 1051, 1151 
 
 Pitman v. New York, 125 N. Y. 941 1323 
 
 Pittoek V. Central, etc., Tel. Co., 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 589 607 
 
 Pittsburgh, In re, 243 Pa. 392 1108 
 
 Pittsburgh, In re, 64 Pitts. L. J. 12« 1069 
 
 Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. 54 1296 
 
 Pittsburgh v. iScott, 1 Pa. 309 155, 173, 199, 887, 914 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., E. E. Co. v. Benwood Iron Works, 31 W. Va. 710 117 
 
 156, 193 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bruch, 102 Pa. 23 612, 620, 1420 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., R. E. Co. v. Butler, 242 Pa. 461 1002 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 10 Pa. 192 1008 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gilleland, 56 Pa. 445 1250, 1393 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Jones, 111 Pa. 204 714 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., E. E. Co. v. McCloskey, 110 Pa. 436 73S, 766, 810 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., E. E. Co. v. Noftsger, 148 Ind. 101 595 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. T. Patterson, 107 Pa. 461 1197 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Perkins, 49 Ohio St. 326 1150, 1151 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., R. E. Co. v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., 159 Pa. 331 .. . 986 
 
 1009, 1411, 1412, 1413 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., E. R. Co. v. Point Bridge Co., 165 Pa. 30 373 
 
Table of Cases. clxxxv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume 11.] PAGE 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., E. R. Co. v. Railroad OommiBsionerB, 171' Ind. 189 374 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Reich, 101 111. 157 743, 878 
 
 Pittabuxgh, etc., E. R. Co. v. Robinson, 95 Pa. 426 769, 770, 810 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., E. R. Co. v. Rose, 74 Pa. 362 626, '692 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Sanitary District, 218 III. 286 911, 913 
 
 916, 1005 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Swinney, 69 Ind. 100 659 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Swinney, 97 Ind. 586 1100, 1102, 1107 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Vance, 115 Pa. 325 660, 661, 730, 734, 1181 
 
 Pittsburgh, etc., E. E. Co. v. Wolcott 163 Ind. 399 752, 774, 916 
 
 Pittsburgh Hydro-Electric Co. v. Liston, 70 W. Va. 83 208, 917 
 
 Pittsburgh Junction E. R. Co.'s Appeal, 123 Pa. 511 989, 997, 999 
 
 1002, 1007, 1008 
 
 Pittsburgh Junction R. R. Co. v. Allegheny Valley R. R. Co., 146 Pa. 297 . . 1002 
 
 Pittsburgh Junction R. R.- Co. v. McCutcheon, 4 Sadler 245 564, 598, 890 
 
 Pittsburgh R. R. Co. v. Bentley, 88 Pa. 178 338 
 
 Pittsburgh R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. 683 619 
 
 Pitznogle v. Western Maryland R. R. Co., 119 Md. 673 236-943 
 
 Pitznogle v. Western Maryland E. E. Co., 123 Md. 667 10fl9, 1100 
 
 Placke V. Union Depot Ey. Co., 140 Mo. 634 542 
 
 Plainfield Union Water Co. v. Plainfield, 83 N. J. L. 332 973, 979, 997 
 
 Planet, etc., Financial Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 115 Mo. 613 1396 
 
 Plant V. Long Island E. E. Co., 10 Barb. 26 565, 573 
 
 Piatt V. New York, etc., E. R. Co., 26 Conn. 544 1417 
 
 Piatt V. Pennsylvania Co., 43 Ohio St. 228 609, 1282, 1291 
 
 Piatt V. Waterbury, 72 Conn. 351 444, 1317 
 
 Plattsmouth v. Boeck, 32 Nebr. 297 855 
 
 Pleasant's Appeal, 77 Pa. 356 1159 
 
 Plecker v. Rhodes, 30 Gratt. 795 174, 984 
 
 Plum V. Kansas City, 101 Mo. 525 650, 654 
 
 Plumb V. Christie, 103 Ga. 686 216 
 
 Plummer v. Sturtevant, 32 Me. 325 308, 1376 
 
 Plymouth v. Pere Marquette R. R. Co., 139 Mich. 347 749 
 
 Plymouth v. Plymouth County Commissioners, 16 Gray 341 1028, 1126 
 
 Plymouth R. R. Co. v. Colwell, 39 Pa. 337 1416, 1417, 1418 
 
 Pocautico Waterworks Co. v. Bird, 130 N. Y. 249 128, 130, 151, 156, 201 
 
 Sm, 248 
 
 Pochila V. Calvert, etc., R. R. Co., 31 Tex. Civ. App. 398. .«26, 769, 789, 813 
 
 Pocopson Road, In re, 16 Pa. 15 235 
 
 Poillon V. Gerry, 179 N. Y. 14 717 
 
 Polack V. San Francisco Orphan Asylum, 48 Cal. 490 1404, 1405 
 
 Police Commissioners v. Louisville, 3 Bush. 697 399 
 
 Police Commissioners v. Wagner, 93 Ind. 182 283 
 
 Police Jury v. Shreveport, 5 La. Ann. 661 402 
 
 Pollard V. Maddox, 28 Ala. 321 1270 
 
 Pollock V. CTeveland Ship Building Co., 56 Ohio St. 655 416 
 
 Pollock V. Louisville, 13 Bush 221 1307 
 
 Pollock V. Moore, 51 N. H. 188 1100 
 
 Pollock V. Maysville, etc., R. R. Co., 103 Ky. 84 1411, 1412 
 
clxxxvi Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in. Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Pollock V. San Francisco Orphan Asyum, 48 Cal. 490 323 
 
 Polly V. i&aratoga R. R. Ck)., 3 Barb. 449 310 
 
 Polo V. Stevens, 66 Misc. 35 632, 637 
 
 Pomeroy v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 25 Wis. 641 1155, 1162 
 
 Pomeroy v. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 14 Wis. 609 527 
 
 Pond V. Metropolitan El. Ry Co., 112 N. Y. 186. 1277, 1281 
 
 Pond V. Milford, 35 Conn. 32 946 
 
 Ponder v. Graham, 4 Fla. 23 56 
 
 Ponder v. Shannon, 54 Ga. 188 1406 
 
 Pontchartrain R. R. Co. v. Orleans Nav. Co., 15 La. Ann. 464 361 
 
 Pontiao v. Carter, 32 Mjch. 164 507, 515 
 
 Pool V. Butler, 141 Cal. 46 1101 
 
 Pool V. Simmons, 134 Oal. 621 109, 983, 1033 
 
 Pool V. Trexler, 76 N. C. 297 245 
 
 Poole V. Falls Road Electric Ry. Co., 88 Md. 533 541 
 
 Poor V. Blake, 123 Mass. 543 1024 
 
 Porter v. Durham, 98 N. C. 320 989 
 
 Porter v. International Bridge Co., 200 N. Y. 234 185, 619, 1406, 1420 
 
 Porter v. International Bridge Co., 137 N. Y. Supp. 214 1208 
 
 Porter v. Midland R. R. Co., 126 Ind. 476 526, 594 
 
 Porter v. North Missouri R. E. Co., 33 Mo. 128 524, 789, 805 
 
 Port Huron, etc., R. R. Co. v. Callanan, 61 Mich. 12 944 
 
 Port Huron, etc., Ry. Co. v. Voorheis, 50 Mich. 506 741, 743, 922, 1125 
 
 Portland v. Kamm, 6 Ore. 362 947, 1137 
 
 Portland v. Kamm, 10 Ore. 383 1217 
 
 Portland v. King, 26 Pac. 376 1167 
 
 Portland v. Lee Sam, 7 Ore. 397 996, 1106 
 
 Portland v. Van Hoesen, 87 Mich. 536 2 
 
 Portland, etc., R. R. Co. v. Deering, 78 Me. 67 750 
 
 Portland, etc., R. R. Co. v. Portland, 1,4 Ore. 188 396 
 
 Por-tland, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. Bobb, 88 Ky. 226 1066, 1072, 1086 
 
 Portland R. R., etc., Co. v. Portland, 181 Fed. 632 86, 990, 995, 1000, 1038 
 
 Portneuf Irrigating Co. v. Budge, 16 Idaho 116. .2, 58, 115, 250, 645, 913, 940 
 Portneuf-Marsh Valley Irrigation Co. v. Portneuf Irrigating Co., IS Idaho 
 
 483 659, 663, 954 
 
 Port Reading R. R. Co., In re, 75 N. J. L. 430 1107 
 
 Portsmouth Gas Light Co. v. Shanahan, 65 N. H. 233 380 
 
 Port Townaend Southern R. R. Co. v. Barbare, 46 Wash. 275. .1104, 1114, 1200 
 
 Posey V. No. Birmingham, 154 Ala. 511 1341 
 
 Post V. Hudson River Tel. Co., 76 App. Div. 621 581 
 
 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Baltimore, 79 Md. 502 389 
 
 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Chicago., etc., R. R. Co., 30 Ind. App. 654.. 983, 10O4 
 
 Pos,tal Tel. Cable Co. v. Eaton, 170 111. 513 576, 1163, 1245, 1263, 1395 
 
 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Farmville, etc., R. R. Co., 96 Va. 661 994 
 
 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Louisiana Western R. R. Co., 49 La. Ann. 1270. . 613 
 
 755, 757, 994 
 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Morgan's, etc., Steamship Co., 49 La. Ann. 58 . . 994 
 
 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Newport, 25 Ky. L. R. 635 3B9 
 
 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Norfolk, etc., R R. Co., 88 Va. 920 994 
 
Table of Cases. olxxxvii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAQB 
 
 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 211 Fed. 824 757 
 
 1080, 1139 
 
 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon, etc., R. R. Co., 104 Fed. 623 756, 757 
 
 995, 1004 
 
 Postal Tel. Cabl« Co. v. Oregon, etc., R. R. Co., Ill Fed. 842 756, 757 
 
 995, 1004 
 
 Postal Tel. Cable Co v. Oregon, etc., R. R. Co., 23 Utah 474 211, 755 
 
 756, 757, 915, 917, 918, 1004, 1035, 1072, 1087, 1091 
 
 Postal T«l. Cable Co. v. Patton, 153 Ky. 187 1070 
 
 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Peyton, 124 Ga. 746 729 
 
 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Southern R. R. Co., 169 U. S. 641 1035 
 
 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Southern R. R. Co., 89 Fed. 190 581 
 
 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 122 Fed. 156.' , 939 
 
 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Texas, etc., R. R. Co., 46 S. W. 912 1035 
 
 Post Office Site in Bronx, In re, 210 Fed. 832 650, 696, 697, 699, 954 
 
 Potlach Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769 58, 116, 131, 258, 422 
 
 Pottawatomie County Commissioners v. O'Sullivan, 17 Kan. 58 766, 773 
 
 775, 779, 799 
 
 Potter V. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 124 App. Div. 920 481 
 
 Potter V. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 54 Misc. 423 481 
 
 Potter V. Putnam, 74 Conn. 189 1060. 1061, 1128 
 
 Potter V. Saginaw Union St. Ry. Co., 83 Mich. 285 541, 1396 
 
 Potts V. Atlanta, 137 Ga. 211 982 
 
 Potts V. Atlanta, 140 Ga. 34L 722, 1137 
 
 Potts V. Minneapolis, etc., Ry. Co., 124 Minn. 413 1186 
 
 Potts V. Pennsylvania, etc., R. R. Co., 119 Pa. 278 738, 7'tO, 742 
 
 Poughkeepsie Bridge Co., In re, 108 N. Y. 483 63, 64, 989 
 
 Poulan V. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 123 Ga. 605 370, 747, 913, 998 
 
 1024, 1255 
 
 Pound V. Turck, 95 U. S. 459 101 
 
 Powell V. Carson County, 131 S. W. 335 1156 
 
 Powell V. Greensburg, 150 Ind. 148 996, 999 
 
 Powell V. Houston, etc., R. R. Co., 104 Tex. 219 701, 888 
 
 Powell V. Wytheville, 95 Va. 73 1364 
 
 Powelson v. Seattle, 87 Wash. 617 1371 
 
 Power V. Ridgway, 149 Pa. 317 1234 
 
 Power V. Savannah, etc., R. R. Co., 56 Ga. 471 1210 
 
 Power V. Watkins, 68 111. 380 1407 
 
 Powers, Re, 29 Mich. 504 922 
 
 Powers V. Bears, 12 Wis. 213 632, 637, 638, 639, 946, 948 
 
 Powers V. Bergen, 6 N. Y. 368 236 
 
 Powers V. Hazelton, etc., R. R. Co., 33 Ohio St. 429 1087 
 
 Powers V. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 47 C. C. A. 122 1306 
 
 Powers V. McKenzie, 90 Tenn. 167 1187 
 
 Prahl V. Brown County, 104 Minn. 227 1111 
 
 Prairie du Rocher v. Sehoening-Koeningsnark Milling Co., 215 111. 341 . . 639 
 
 645 
 
 Prather v. Jeffersonvllle, etc., R. R. Co., 52 Ind. 16 907, 919, 986 
 
 Prather v. Lexington, 13 B. Mon. 559 1329 
 
clxxxviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume 11.] PAQE 
 
 Pratt V. Brown, 3 Wis. 603 98, 227, 614, 983 
 
 Pratt V. Des Moines, etc., R. R. Co., 72 Iowa 249 958, 1271 
 
 Pratt V. Saline Valley R. R. Co., 130 Mo. App. 175 124a 
 
 Prentice v. Worcester, 129 Mass. 559 1134 
 
 Prentiss v. Cleveland Tel. Co., 32 Weekly Law Bull. 113 579 
 
 Prerogative, Case of the, 12 Co. Rep. 13 263, 297 
 
 Presbrey v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 103 Mass. 1 606, 692, 722, 725, 730, 737 
 
 827, 863, 1200 
 
 Prescott Irrigation Co. v. Flathera, 20 Wash. 454 250 
 
 Prescott v. Patterson, 49 Mich. 622. 92 
 
 Preston v. Cedar Rapids, 95 Iowa 61 1187, 1275 
 
 Preston v. Dubuque, etc., R. R. Co., 11 Iowa 15 608, 609 
 
 Preston v. Newton, 213 Mass. 483 1052, 1407 
 
 Preston v. Sabine, etc., R. R. Co., 70 Tex. 375 704 
 
 Prettyman v. Tazewell County Supervisors, 19 111. 406 183 
 
 Price V. Thompson, 48 Mo. 361 393 
 
 Price V. Union Drainage District, 253 111. 114 722, 723, 725 
 
 Prichard v. Morganton, 126 N. C. 908 285, 1320 
 
 Priewe v. Wisconsin, etc., Inaprovement Co., 93 Wis. 534 915 
 
 Prime v. Yonkers, 192 N. Y. 105 1373 
 
 Prinoe v. Crocker, 166 Mass. 347 90, 185, 394, 402, 499 
 
 Prince v. Quincy, 128 111. 443 1342 
 
 Princeton v. Gieske, 93 Ind. 102 1359 
 
 Prior V. Hardwick, 94 Ky. 408 1263 
 
 Pritchett v. Knox County Commissioners, 42 Ind. App. 3 303 
 
 Probasco v. Raine, 50 Ohio St. 378 31 
 
 Proctor V. Andover, 42 N. H. 348 235 
 
 Proprietors of Locks & Canals v. Lowell, 7 Gray 223 996, 1377 
 
 Proprietors of Locks & Canals v. Nashua, etc., R. R. Co., 10 Cush. 385. 827 
 
 843, 861, 863, 1250, 1393 
 Proprietors of Locks & Canals v. Nashua, etc., R. E. Co., 104 Mass. 1 . . 472 
 
 600, 605, 1262, 1411 
 Proprietors of Mills v. Braintree Water Supply Co., 149 Mass. 478 .... 460 
 
 1256, 1258, 1381 
 
 Proprietors of Mills v. Commonwealth, 164 Mass. 227 618 
 
 Proprietors of Mills v. Randolph, 157 Mass. 345 1056 
 
 Prospect Park, etc., R. R. Co. v. Williamson, 91 N. Y. 552 997, lOOl 
 
 1002, 1413 
 
 Prosser v. Wapello County, 18 Iowa 327 1175 
 
 Protzman v. Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co., 9 Ind. 467 526, 918, 1244 
 
 Prout v. Pittsfield Fire District, 154 Mass. 450 1304 
 
 Providence v. Union R. R. Co., 12 R. I. 473 382 
 
 Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514 969 
 
 Providence, etc., R. R. Co., Petitioner, 17 E. L 324 987, 989, 1006 
 
 Providence, etc., E. R. Co. v. Norwich, etc., R. R. Co., 138 Mass. 277 .. . 1006 
 
 Providence, etc. E. R. Co. v. Worcester, 156 Mass. 35 692, 693 
 
 Providence, etc.. Steamship Co. v. Fall River, 183 Mass. 535 591, 903 
 
 904, 1314, 1318 
 
Table of Cases. clxxxix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Providence, etc., Steamship C!o. v. Pall Elver, 187 Mass. 45 835, 1256 
 
 Provident Trust Co. v. Spokane, 75 Wash. 217 868 
 
 Provincetown v. Truro, 135 Mass. 263 1010 
 
 Provo Beach Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Tanner, 239 U. S. 323 86 
 
 Provolt V. Chicago, etc., R E. Co., 69 Mo. 633 1114, 1265, 1286 
 
 Provost V. New Chester Water Co., 162 Pa. 275 572 
 
 Public Highway in Bergin and Hudson Counties, Re, 22 N. J. L. 298 . . 30 
 
 622, 624 
 
 Public Parks, In re, 73 N. Y. 560 1121 
 
 Public Parks, In re, 53 Hun 280 1147 
 
 Public Road, In re, 5 Harr. 242 946 
 
 Public Service Gas Co. v. Public Utility Commissioners, 84 N. J. L. 
 
 463 685, 687 
 
 Public Works Commissioner, Matter of, 199 N. Y. 531 807 
 
 Pueblo V. Bradley, 23 Colo. App. 177 869 
 
 Pueblo V. Shutt Investment Co., 28 Col. 524 1128, 1154 
 
 Pueblo V. Strait, 20 Colo. 13 867, 870, 873, 874, 878 
 
 Pueblo, etc., E. E. Co. v. Eudd, 5 Colo. 270 794 
 
 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166 302, 312', 313, 483 
 
 Pumphrey v. Baltimore, 47 Md. 145 395 
 
 Purdy v. Waterloo, etc., Ey. Co., 154 N. W. 881 725 
 
 Purinton v. Somerset, 174 Mass. 556 607, 833, 840 
 
 Pusey V. Allegheny, 98 Pa. 522 868, 1273 
 
 Putnam v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co,, 182 Mass. 351 326, 828, 832, 843 
 
 872, 880 
 
 Putnam v. Douglas County, 6 Ore. 328 730, 773, 810 
 
 Putney Bros. Co. v. Milwaukee Light, etc., Co., 134 Wis. 379 341 
 
 Puyallup V. Lacey, 43 Wash. 110 1093 
 
 Pye V. Mankato, 36 Minn. 373 1318, 1359 
 
 Q 
 
 Quackenbush v. District of Columbia, 9 Mackey 300 1255 
 
 Quade v. Columbia, etc., Ry. Co., 233 Pa. 20 1155 
 
 Quarles v. Sparta, 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 714 917 
 
 Quayle v. Missouri, etc., Ey. Co., 63 Mo. 465 1126 
 
 Queen V. Betts, 16 Q. B. 1022 477 
 
 Queen v. Train, 2 Beat & S. 640 862 
 
 Queen Anne Boulevard, In re, 77 Wash. 91 763, 814 
 
 Quick V. Park Commissioners, 20 Ky. L. Eep. 1457 506 
 
 Quigley v. Pennsylvania, etc., E. R. Co., 121 Pa. 35 479 
 
 Quinby v. Cleveland, 191 Fed. 68 647 
 
 Quincy v. Jones, 76 111. 231 507, 513, 515 
 
 Quincy Canal v. Newcomb, 7 Meb, 276 834 
 
 Quincy, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 54 Mo. 334 1069, 1070 
 
 Quincy, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ridge, 57 Mo. 599 766, 804, 944 
 
 Quinn v. Baage, 138 Iowa 426 1410 
 
 Quinn v Paterson, 27 N. J. L. 35 508 
 
 Quirk V. Seattle, 38 Wash. 25 787 
 
 xiii 
 
cxc Table op Cases. 
 
 (Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 la Volume II.] page 
 
 R 
 
 Eaapke, etc., Co. v. Sehmoeller, etc., Co., 82 Nebr. 716 117? 
 
 Race V. Ward, 4 El. & Bl. 708 404 
 
 Race St., In re, 24 Pa. Co. Ct. 433 367 
 
 RadcliflF v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195 508, 515 
 
 Radford v. Clark, 113 Va. 199 1343 
 
 Raflferty v. Central Traction Co., 147 Pa. 579 480, 539, 954, 892 
 
 Ragan v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., Ill Mo. 456 1176 
 
 Railroad Commissioners v. Market St. Ry. Co., 132 Cal. 677 636 
 
 Rainey v. Red River, etc., R. R. Co., 99 Tex. 276 864 
 
 Rainy Lake River Boom Co. v. Rainy River Lumber Co., 162 Fed. 287. . . 92 
 
 Raleigh v. Goschen (1898), 1 Ch. 73 93 
 
 Raleigh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Davis, 21 Dev. & B. 451 62, 85, 185, 600, 632, 639 
 
 914, 919, 941, 942, 946 
 
 Raleigh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mecklenburg Mfg. Co., 166 N. C. 168 1216 
 
 Raleigh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mecklenburg Mfg. Co., 85 S E. 390.. 667, 724 732 
 
 733, 734 
 
 Raleigh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wicker, 74 N. C. 220 735, 808, 1393 
 
 Ralston v. Sharon Hill, 43 Pa. Super. Ct. 280 726 
 
 Ralston v. Weston, 46 W. Va. 544 1407, 1410 
 
 Ramsay County, In re, 93 Minn. 30 1152, 1163 
 
 Ramsden v. Manchester, etc., Ry. Co., 1 Ex. 723 566 
 
 Ranek v. Cedar Rapids, 134 Iowa 563 1152 
 
 Rand v. Boston, 164 Mass. 354 830, 856, 873 
 
 Rand v. Fort Scott, etc., R. R. Co., 50 Kan. 114 356 
 
 Rand v. Newton, 6 Allen 38 1189, 1190, 1191 
 
 Randall v. Jacksonville St. Ry. Co., 19 Fla. 409 637 
 
 Randolf v. Bloomfield, 77 Iowa 50 1318, 1378 
 
 Randolph v. Union County Freeholders, 63 N. J. L. 155 806 
 
 Raney v. Hinds County, 78 Miss. 308 856 
 
 Raney v. North Topeka Drainage District, 84 Kan. 688 651 
 
 Rankin v. Harrisonburg, 104 Va. 524 314, 406 
 
 Rankin v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 98 Fed. 479 541 
 
 Ranlet v. Concord E. E. Co., 62 N. H. 561 697, 699, 953, 1173 
 
 Ransom v. Boal, 29 Iowa 70 1417 
 
 Ransom v. Citizens Ry. Co., 104 Mo. 375 , 637 
 
 Ranson v. Sault Ste. Marie, 143 Mich. 661 321 
 
 Rapid Transit Railroad Commissioners, In re, 197 N. Y. 81 . . . .504, 566, 668 
 
 592, 595, 808, 952, 1221, 1318 
 
 Rapp V. Stratton, 41 Wash. 263 1410 
 
 Raritan v. Port Reading R. R. Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 11 999 
 
 Raritan, etc., R. R. Co. v. Delaware, etc.. Canal Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 546.. 363 
 
 Easch V. Nassau Electric E. R. Co., 198 N. Y. 385 543, 592, 597 
 
 Rassier v. Grimmer, 130 Ind. 219 797 
 
 Rathke v. Gardner, 134 Mass. 14 467 
 
 Rauenstein v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 136 N. Y. 528 514, 535 
 
 Ravenswood v. Fleming, 22 W. Va. 52 416, 427, 463 
 
 Rawson v. Prior, 57 Vt. 612, 1192 
 
Table of Cases. cxci 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Rawson v. Spencer, 113 Mass. 40 400 
 
 Rawson-Works Lumber Co. v. Richardson, 26 Idaho 37 630, 663, 954 
 
 Raymond v. Commonwealth, 192 Mass. 486 653, 933, 956, 1147 
 
 Rea V. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 229 Pa. 106 655, 1112, 1178, 1192 
 
 1197, 1198 
 
 Read v. Cambridge, 124 Mass. 527 1062 
 
 Read v. Cambridge, 126 Mass. 427 355 
 
 Readfield Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cyr, 95 Me. 287 377, 381 
 
 Reading v. Davis, 153 Pa. 360 616 
 
 Reading v. Keppleman, 61 Pa. 233 - 508 
 
 Reading, etc., R. R. Co. v. Balthaser, 119 Pa. 472 693, 770 
 
 Reading, etc., R. R. Co. v. Balthaser, 126 Pa. 1 652 
 
 Readington v. Dilley, 24 N. J. L. 209 729, 736, 948, 1125, 1167 
 
 Reagan v. Farmers'^ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 279, 680 
 
 Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492 303, 867, 872 
 
 Reckner v. Warner, 22 Ohio St. 275 944, 958, 1273 
 
 Red V. Little Rock, etc.. Electric Co., 180 S. W. 220 870 
 
 Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444 107, 200, 1256, 1260 
 
 Redell v. Moores, 63 Neb. 219 31, 391, 399, 400 
 
 Redman v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 165 644 
 
 Redmond v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 39 Minn. 248 741 
 
 Red River Bridge Co. v. Clarksville, 1 Sneed 176 978, 997, 1000 
 
 Reed v. Allegheny, 79 Pa. 300 1253 
 
 Reed v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 25 Fed. 886 650, 656 
 
 Reed v. Hanover Branch R. R. Co., 105 Mass. 303 651 
 
 Reed v. Ohio, etc., R. R. Co., 126 111. 48 666, 1066, 1081 
 
 Reed v. Winona Park Commissioners, 100 Minn. 167 618 
 
 Reed Orchard Co. v. Yolo County, 19 CaJl. App. 648 1081 
 
 Reeves v. Ferguson, 31 N. J. L. 107 270 
 
 Reeves v. Wood County, 8 Ohio St. 333 245, 308, 1376 
 
 Red River Bridge Co. v. Clarksville, 1 Sneed 176 68, 359 
 
 Regina v. Bumey, 31 L. T. (N. S.) 828 174 
 
 Regina v. Eastern Counties R. R. Co., 2 Q. B. 347 820 
 
 Regina v. Great Northern R. R. Co., 2 Q. B. D. 151 . . . : 338 
 
 Regina v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D 63 408 
 
 Regina v. London Docks Co., 5 A. & E. 163 820 
 
 Regina v. Metropolitan Board of Works, L. R. 4 Q. B. 358 820 
 
 Reichert v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 61 Ark. 491 525, 1265, 1396 
 
 Reichling v. Covington Lumber Co., 57 Wash. 225 616, 1121, 1421 
 
 Reid V. Norfolk City Ry. Co., 94 Va. 117 542, 553 
 
 Reighard v. Flinn, 189 Pa. 355 327 
 
 Reilly v. Fort Dodge, 118 Iowa 633 507 
 
 Reimold v. Moore, 2 Mich. N. P. 15 416 
 
 Reining v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 128 N. Y. 156 321, 498, 505, 512 
 
 529, 561 
 
 Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171 276, 278 
 
 Reis' Appeal, 8 Sadler 582 165 
 
 Reis V. New York, 188 N. Y. 58 326, 886 
 
 Reisner v. Atchison Union Depot Co., 27 Kan. 382 , . 655, 743, 799 
 
cxcii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are la Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Reisner v. Strong, 24 Kan. 410 1086, 1240 
 
 Reitenbaugh v. Chester Valley R. E. Co., 21 Pa. 100 929, 1067 
 
 Reitzer v. Medina Valley Irrigation Co., 153 S. W. 380 989, 1083, 1265 
 
 Eemey v. Iowa Central R. R. Co., 116 Iowa 133 620, 1419 
 
 Reno, etc.. Works v. Stevenson, 20 Nev. 269 437 
 
 Rensselaer v. Leopold, 106 Ind. 29 66, 147, 154 
 
 Rensselaer, etc., R. R. Co. v. Davis, 43 N. Y. 137 63, 911, 914, 919, 924 
 
 Renwick v. Davenport, etc., R. R. Co., 34 Iowa 353 741 
 
 Republican Valley R. R. Co. v. Fink, 18 Nebr. 82 1239, 1244, 1277 
 
 Republican Valley R. R. Co. v. Linn, 15 Nebr. 234 1214 
 
 Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493 32 
 
 Respublioa v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357 263 
 
 Ressegieu v. Sioux City, 94 Iowa 543 867, 874 
 
 Rettire v. North Yakima, 75 Wash. 143 868, 871 
 
 Reusch V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 57 Iowa 687 189 
 
 Revell V. Annapolis, 81 Md. 1 400 
 
 Revell V. Muskogee, 36 Okla. 529 660, 667 
 
 Revell V. People, 177 111. 468 '. 426, 455 
 
 Rex V. Bristol Dock Co., 12 East 429 819, 820 
 
 Rex V. Burden, 4 T. R. 778 270 
 
 Rex V. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, 11 Ot)m. 
 
 L. R. (Australia) 29 
 
 Rex V. Jones, 2 iStrange, 1146 270 
 
 Rex V. Liverpool, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Ad. & El. 650 340, 1157 
 
 Rex V. Lloyd, 1 Camp. 260. 174 
 
 Rex V. Lone, 2 Strange 920 270 
 
 Rex. V. Smith, 4 Esp. 109 587 
 
 Rex V. Ward, 4 Ad. & El. 405 477 
 
 Rex V. Wharton, Holt 499 408 
 
 Rexford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308 612, 919, 957, 958, 1421 
 
 Rexford v. Knight, 15 Bart. 627 807 
 
 Reynolds, Ex parte, 52 Ark. 330 936, 943, 944, 945, 1079 
 
 Reynolds v. Interborough Rapid Trans.it Co., 206 N. Y. 589 1420, 1421 
 
 Reynolds v. Presidio, etc., R. R. Co., 1 Cal. App. 229 554 
 
 Reynolds v. Shreveport, 13 I^a. Ann. 426 507 
 
 Reynolds v. Spears, 1 Stew. 34 988 
 
 Reynolds Heirs v. Stark County, S Ohio 204 1414 
 
 Rheiner v. Union Depot, etc., Co., 31 Minn. 289 936, 1079 
 
 Rhine v. McKinney, 53 Tex. 354 949 
 
 Rhinebeck, etc., R. R. Co., In re, 67 N. Y. 242 1097, 1101 
 
 Ehobidas v. Concord, 70 N. H. 90 1310 
 
 Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Hayden, 20 R. L 544 470, 712 
 
 Rhode Island Suburban Ry. Co., In re, 22 R. I. 457. . .117, 166, 171, 189, 196 
 
 915, 919 
 
 Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio 159 1319 
 
 Rhodes v. Durham, 165 N. C. 679 1282, 1283 
 
 Rialto Irrigating Dist. v. Brandon, 103 Oal. 384 250, 924, 1066 
 
 Rice v. Alley, 1 Sneed 51 ' 236 
 
 Rice V. Chicago, 57 111. App. 558 1155 
 
Table of Cases. exciu 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in. Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Riep V. Danville, etc., Road Co., 7 Dana 81 762, 1068 
 
 Bice V. EvansviUe, 108 Ind. 7 1328, 1339, 1374 
 
 Rice V. Ruddiman, 10 Mich. 126 453 
 
 Rice V. Worcester County, 11 Gray 283 835, 880 
 
 Rich T. Minneapolis, 37 Minn. 423 470, 484., 1252, 1318 
 
 Richards v. Buflfalo, etc., R. R. Co., 137 Pa. 524 1268, 1276' 
 
 Richards v. Cincinnati, 31, Ohio St. 506 619 
 
 Richards v. Citizens Water Supply Co., 140 App. Div. 206. .474, 475, 586, 587 
 
 Richards v. Citizens Water Supply Co., 104 N. Y. Supp. 927 573 
 
 Richards v. Des Moines Valley R. R. Co., 18 Iowa 259 1265 
 
 Richards v. Merrimack, etc., R. R. Co., 44 N. H. 127 1418 
 
 Richards v. New York, etc., .R. R. Co.. 77 Conn. 501 426, 429, 430 
 
 Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 tJ. S. 546.... 316, 317, 335, 1387 
 
 Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 37 App. D. C. 289 317 
 
 Richardson v. Bigelow, 15 Gray 154 746 
 
 Richardson v. Centerville, 137 Iowa 353 1114 
 
 Richardson v. Levee Commissioners, 68 Miss. 539 894 
 
 Richardson v. Vermont Central R. R. Co., 26 Vt. 465. .304, 514, 535, 611, 1391 
 
 Riche v. Bar Harbor Water Co., 75 Me. 91 201, 634, 913 
 
 Richland School Township v. Overmeyer, 164 Ind. 382 913, 916, 918 
 
 Richmond v. Long, 17 Gratt. 375 1320 
 
 Richmond v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 174 U. S. 761 113, 389 
 
 Richmond v. Test, 18 Ind. App. 482 303, 444 
 
 Richmond v. Thompson's Heirs, 116 Va. 178 358 
 
 Richmond v. Williams, 114 Va. 698 698, 1112 
 
 Richmond, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chamblin, 100 Va. 401 667, 730 
 
 Richmond, etc., R. R. Co. v. Humphreys, 90 Va. 425 813, 1197 
 
 Richmond, etc., R. R. Co. v. Johnston, 103 Va 997, 1001, 1002 
 
 Richmond, etc., R. R. Co. v. Louisa, etc., R. R. Co., 13 How. 71 68, 69 
 
 972, 999 
 Richmond, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. Madison County Court, 114 Ky. 351 . .682, 1111 
 
 Richmond, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. Rogers, 1 Duvall 135 360 
 
 Ricket V. Metropolitan R. R. Co., L. R. 2 H. L. 175 367, 821, 820 
 
 Riddle v. Proprietors of Locks & Canals, 7 Mass. 169.. 1293, 1294, 1297, 1304 
 
 Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368 89, 275, 280 
 
 Rider v. Stryker, 63 N. Y. 138 1047 
 
 Rider v. York Haven Water & Power Co., 251 Pa. 18 1052, 1240 
 
 Ridge Ave. Passenger Ry. Co. v. Philadelphia, 181 Pa. 592 377, 378 
 
 Ridgely v. Baltimore, 119 Md. 567 70, 943, 989, 1023 
 
 Ridgway v. Osceola, 139 Iowa 590 879 
 
 Ridley v. Seaboard, etc., R. R. Co., 124 N. C. 37 1208 
 
 Rieker v. Danville, 204 111. 191 951, 952, 967, 1107 
 
 Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, etc., Co., 157 S. W. 737 600 
 
 Rigney v. Chicago, 102 111. 64 324, 851, 867, 872, 878 
 
 Riigney v. New York Central, etc., R. R. Co., 217 N. Y. 31 514 
 
 Rigney v. Tacoma Light, etc., Co., 9 Wash. 576 435 
 
 Riley v. Camden, etc., Ry. Co., 70 N. J. L. 289 II79 
 
 Riley v. Charlestown Union Station Co., 71 S. C. 457.. 60, 117, 128, 133, 147 
 
 187, 189, 911, 917, 927*, 1091 
 
cxciv Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, T21-li22 ia Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Riley v. Greenwood, 72 S. C. 90 280 
 
 Riley v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 142; Ky. 67 192 
 
 Riley v. Lowell, 117 Mass. 77 1058 
 
 Ringle v. Hudson County Freeholders, 56 N. J. L. 661 1137 
 
 Rio Grande Ry. Co. v. Stringham, 239 U. S. 44 600 
 
 Ripkey v. Binns, 264 Mo. 405 768, 804, 806 
 
 Rippe V. Becker, 56 Minn. 100 215 
 
 Rische v. Texas Transportation Co., 2-7 Tex. Civ. App. 33 527, 536, 549 
 
 647, 890 
 
 Rising Sun, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Hamilton, 50 Ind. 580 950, 1055, 1068 
 
 Ricard v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 257 Mo. 135 960, 1269 
 
 Rivere v. Augusta, 65 Ga. 376 1318 
 
 Riverside v. McLain, 210 111. 308 393 
 
 River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, 2 App. Cas. 73 818 
 
 Rives v. Columbia, 80 Mo. App. 173 767 
 
 Road Commissioners v. Morgan, 47 Pa. 276 948 
 
 Roake v. American Tel. Co., 41 N. J. Eq. 35 579 
 
 Roanoke v. Berkowitz, 80 Va. 616 63, 919 
 
 Roanoke v. Boiling, lOH Va. 182 274 
 
 Roanoke Gas Co. v. Roanoke, 88 Va. 810 378, 379 
 
 Roanoke Investment Co. v. Kansas City, etc.^ R. R. Co., 108 Mo. 50. . . 1420 
 Roanoke Rapids Power Co. v. Roanoke Navigation, etc., Co., 159 N. C. 
 
 393 406 
 
 Roaring Springs Town-site Co. v. Paducah Tel. Co., 164 S. W. 50 578, 1087 
 
 Robb v. La, Grange, 158 111. 21 445 
 
 Robbina v. Bridgewater, 6 N. H. 524 1051, 1288, 1229 
 
 Robbina v. Chicago, 4 Wall. 657 481 
 
 Robbins v^ Lexington, 8 Cush, 292 1051 
 
 Robbins v. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 6 Wis. 610 740 
 
 Robbins v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 22 Minn. 286 659, 690 
 
 Robbins v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 24 Minn. 191 1114 
 
 Robbins v. Scranton, 217 Pa. 577 699, 769, 810 
 
 Robbins v. Western Washington R. R. Co., 31 Pitts. Leg. J. (N. S.) 181. 193 
 
 Robert v. Sadler, 104 N. Y. 229 482, 483 
 
 Roberts v. Boston, 149 Mass. 346 1188, 1189, 1190, 1196, 1201, 1207 
 
 Roberts v. Brown County Commissioners, 21 Kan. 247 762, 766, 799 
 
 Roberts v. Charing Cross, etc., R. R. Co., 87 L. T. 732 819 
 
 Roberts v. Chicago, 26 111. 249 507 
 
 Roberts v. aaremont Ry., etc., Co., 73 N. H. 121 1256 
 
 Roberta v. Detroit, 102 Mich. 64 1308 
 
 Roberts v. Louisville, 92 Ky. 95 1316 
 
 Roberts v. New York El. Ry. Co., 128 N. Y. 155 1179, 1214, 1216 
 
 Roberts v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 158 U. S. 1 1154 
 
 Roberts v. Philadelphia, 239 Pa. 339 1144, 1197, 1199 
 
 Roberts v. Seattle, 63 Wash. 573 1004 
 
 Roberts v. Sioux City, etc., R. R. Co., 73 Neb. 8 603, 606, 1120 
 
 Roberts v. Williams, 15 Ark. 43 114, 236 
 
 Robertson v. Hartenbower, 120 Iowa 410 1117 
 
 Robeson v. Pittingen-, 2 N. J. Eq. 57 494 
 
Table of Cases. cxcv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGB 
 
 Robins v. McGehee, 127 Ga. 431 1409 
 
 Robinson v. Brown, 182 Mass. 266 835 
 
 Robinson v. Evansville, 87 Ind. 344 393, 1307 
 
 Robinson v. Everett, 191 Mass. 587 837, 1330 
 
 Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40 288 
 
 Robinson v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 161 Pa. 561 1083 
 
 Robinson v. Pennsylvania R. R. Ck)., 174 Pa. 199 1073 
 
 Robinson v. Rohr, 73 Wis. 436 1308 
 
 Robinson v. Sea View R. R. Co., 169 Fed. 319 1052 
 
 Robinson v. Southern California Ry. Co., 129 Cal. 8 1263 
 
 Robinson v. Springfield Southwestern Ry. Co., 143 Mo. App. 270 891 
 
 Robinson v. Swope, 12 Bush 21 134, 234, 236 
 
 Robinson v. Vicksburg, 99 Miss. 439 867, 1274 
 
 Robinson v. West Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 72 Pa. 316 612 
 
 Roby V. New York Central, etc., R. R. Co., 142 N. Y. 177. . .1411, 1412, 1413 
 
 Rochester, Re, 137 N. Y. 243 149 
 
 Rochester, Ee, 208 N. Y. 188 946, 947 
 
 Rochester, Re, 24 App. Div. 383 879 
 
 Rochester, Re, 102 App. Div. 181 946, 1067 
 
 Rochester v. Chester, 3 N. H. 349 1179 
 
 Rochester v. Rochester R. R. Co., 182 N. Y. 99 374 
 
 Rochester v. West, 164 N. Y. 510 277 
 
 Rochester Electric Ry. Co., Re, 123 K Y. 351 1084 
 
 Rochester, etc., Iron Co. v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 24 Pa. Co. 
 
 Ct. 104 193 
 
 Rochester, etc., R. R. Co. v. Babcock, 110 N. Y. 119 10O7 
 
 Rochester, etc., R. R. Co. v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 110 N. Y. 128. . 1008 
 
 Rochester, etc., R. R. Co. v. Tolan, 116 App. Div. 696 947, 1127 
 
 Rochester Ry. Co. v. Robinson, 133 N. Y. 242 1067 
 
 Rochester Water Commissioners, In re, 66 N. Y. 413 10O4, 1007 
 
 Rochester Water Co. v. Rochester, 176 N. Y. 36 476, 572 
 
 Rochester White Lead Co. v. Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463 . . . . 1318, 1355, 1364, 1370 
 
 Rochette v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 32 Minn. 201 885 
 
 Roekafeller v. Northern Cent. Ry. Co., 212 Pa. 485 32'6 
 
 Rock County, In re, 121 Minn. 376 914, 1026, 1067 
 
 Rockford V. Mower, 259 HI. 604 982, 1089, 1137, 1138, 1144 
 
 Rockford, etc., R. R. Co. v. Shunick, 65 111. 223 1273 
 
 Rockingham County Light & Power Co. v. Hobbs, 72 N. H. 531... 116, 130 
 
 146, 156, 170, 204, 208, 211, 227 
 
 Rock Island, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gordon, 184 111. 456 730 
 
 Rock Island, etc. R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 204 111. 488 .' . S33 
 
 Rock Island, etc., R. R. Co. v. Leisy Brewing do., 174 111. 547 609 
 
 Rock Island, etc., R. R. Co. v. Lynch, 23 111. 645 946 
 
 Rockland Water Co. v. Rockland, 83 Me. 267 376, 379 
 
 •Rockland Water Co. v. Tellson, 75 Me. 170 _. 616 
 
 Rockport V. Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co., 85 Ohdo St. 73. .". 921 
 
 Rockport V. Webster, 174 Mass. 385 617, 911, 919, 923 
 
 Rockport, etc., R. R. Co. v. State, 135 S. W. 263. . .' 99, 997, 1003 
 
 Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co. v. Salt Lake City Tel. Co., 3 Am. Elect. 
 
 Cas. 3-a 542 
 
cxcvi Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Rodemacher v. Milwaukee, etc., Ry. Oo., 41 Iowa 297 969 
 
 Roebke v. Andrews, 26 Wis. 311 1135 
 
 Eoebling V. Trenton Passenger Ry. Co., 58 N. J. L. 666 542 
 
 Roebling St., In re, 143 App. Div. 513 808 
 
 Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20 Johns. 735 172, 174, 629, 1024 
 
 Rogers v. Cosgrave, 98 Nebr. 608 95, 1029 
 
 Rogers v. Keokuk, 154 U. S. 546 904 
 
 Rogers v. New London, 94 Atl. 364 789, 794 
 
 Rogers v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 183 Pa. 473 1388 
 
 Rogers v. Rogers, 7 Gow. 526 * 1232 
 
 Rogers V. St. Charles, 54 Mo. 229 787 
 
 Rogers v. St. Charles, 3 Mo. App. 41 1103 
 
 Rogers v. Sawin, 10 Gray 376 , 495 
 
 Rogers v. Venis, 137 Ind. 22ll 948 
 
 Rolens v. Hutchinson, 83 Kan. 618 614, 1255 
 
 Roll V. Augusta, 34 Ga. 326 1355 
 
 Roll V. Indianapolis, 52 Ind. 547 1375 
 
 Roller V. Holly, 176 U. S. 398 925, 930, 932, 935, 1078 
 
 Roman Catholic Church v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 207 Eed. 897 317 
 
 Rome V. Cheney, 114 Ga. 194 1375 
 
 Rome V. Omberg, 28 Ga. 46 507, 515 
 
 Rome V. Whitestown Waterworks Co., 187 N. Y. 542 202, 918 
 
 Rome, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gleason, 42 App. Div. 530 731 
 
 Eooney v. Sacramento Valley R. R. Co., 6 Cal. 638 343 
 
 Roosa V. St. Joseph, etc., R. R. Co., 114 Mo. 508 1087 
 
 Root's Case, 77 Pa. 276 776, 810 
 
 Roper V. McWhorter, 77 Va. 214 1415 
 
 Rosa V. Missouri, etc., Ry. Co., 18 Kan. 124 343 
 
 Rose V. Farmington, 196 111. 226 '. 1272 
 
 Rose V. Groves, 5 M. & G. 613 424, 428 
 
 Rose V. Miles, 4 M. & S. 101 883 
 
 Rose V. St. Charles, 49 Mo. 509 1372 
 
 Rose V. TaAinton, 119 Mass. 99 Iil99 
 
 Rosebank Ave., In re, 162 App. Div. 332 470, 998 
 
 Rosenbaum v. Meridian, etc., Ry. Co., 38 So. 321 892 
 
 Rosenstein v. Fairhaven, etc., E. R. Co., 78 Conn. 29 1185 
 
 Rosmiller v. State, 114 Wis. 169 415, 431 
 
 Ross V. Bauman, 8 App. D. C. 393 791 
 
 Ross V. Clinton, 46 Iowa 606 1317, 1355, 1359, 1363 
 
 Ross V. Davis, 97 Ind. 79 115, 142, 245, 768 
 
 Ross V. Gates, 183 Mo. 338 353 
 
 Ross V. Georgia, etc., R. R. Co., 33 S. C. 477 1236 
 
 Ross V. Madison, 1 Ind. 281 1317, 1369 
 
 Eossire v. Boston, 4 Allen 57 1208 
 
 Rost V. New Orleans, /15 La. Ann. 129 284 
 
 Rothan v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 113 Mo. 132 644, 944 
 
 Rothschild v. Chicago, 227 111. 205 147 
 
 Eothschild v. Interborough Eapid Transit Co., 162 App. Div. 532 638 
 
 Eothschild v. Interborough Eapid Transit Co., 147 N. Y. Supp. 1040.. 561 
 
 1256, 1260 
 
Table of Cases. oxovu 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Eoughton V. Atlanta, 113 Ga. 948 867, 1341, 1342 
 
 Eoumfort Co. v. Delaney, 230 Pa. 374 273 
 
 Rounds V. Bangor, 46 Me. 541 1345, 1347 
 
 Rounds V. Mumford, 2 R. I. 154 508 
 
 Eourke v. Central Masfiachusetts Electric Co., 177 Mass. 46 722, 724 
 
 Rourke V. Holmes St. Ry. Co., 221 Mo. 46 498, 564, 1204,1213 
 
 Rourke v. Holmes St. Ry. Co., 177 S. W. 1102 564, 804 
 
 Routh V. Texas Traction Co., 148 S. W. 1152 812, 1150 
 
 ■Routt County Development Co. v. Johnson, 23 Colo. App. 511 1128 
 
 Rowan's Executoirs v. Portland, 8 B. Mon. 232 163, 1409 
 
 Rowe V. Granite Bridge Co., 21 Pick. 344 408, 830, 1256, 1261, 1369 
 
 Rowe V. Portsmouth, 56 N. H. 291 1375 
 
 Rowland v. Gallatin, 75 Mo. 134 1341, 1345 
 
 Rowzee v. Pierce, 75 Miss. 846 393 
 
 Royce v. Salt Lake City, 15 Utah 401 1343, 1346 
 
 Rozell V. Anderson, 91 Ind. 591 1328 
 
 Ruck V. Williams, 27 L. J. Ex. 35 1298 
 
 Ruckert v. Grand Ave. Ry. Co., 163 Mo. 260 892 
 
 Rudderow v. Philadelphia, 166 Pa. 241 789, 810 
 
 Huddick v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 116 Mo. 25 1284 
 
 Rude V. St. Louis, 93 Mo. 408 859, 872, 885 
 
 Rude V. St. Marie, 121 Wis. 634 239 
 
 Eudel V. Los Angeles County, 118 Cal. 281 856 
 
 Rudolph V. Pennsylvania, etc., R. R. Co., 166 Pa. 430 193, 194, 1087 
 
 Rudolph V. Pennsylvania, etc., R. R. Co., 186 Pa. 541 732, 741 
 
 Ruebel, In re, 52 Misc. 604 1159 
 
 Euehl V. Voigt, 28 Wis. 153 958 
 
 Rugby Charity Trustees v. Merryweather, 11 East 375 174 
 
 Rugg V. Commercial Union Tel. Co., 66 Vt. 208 578 
 
 Ruggles V. Nantucket, 11 Cush. 433 264 
 
 Rugheimer, In re, 36 Fed. 369 1036 
 
 Rule V. Sioux County, 94 Nebr. 736 337 
 
 Rummel v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 30 N. Y. St. Rep. 235 535 
 
 Rumsey v. New York, etc.. Railroad Co., 133 N. Y. 79 426 
 
 Rumsey v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 136 N. Y. 543 428 
 
 Rundell v. Highway Commissioners, 47 Mich. 575 237 
 
 Rundle v. Delaware Canal Co., 14 How. 80 433, 460 
 
 Runner v. Keokuk, 11 Iowa 543 1049, 1050, 1117 
 
 Rusch V. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 54 Wis. 136 1245, 1283 
 
 Russell V. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 205 111. 155 551 
 
 Russell V. Horn Pond Branch R. R. Co., 4 Gray 607 1178 
 
 Russell V. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. (Dum. & East) 667 1296 
 
 Russell v. New York, 2 Denio 461 264 
 
 Russell v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 71 Ark. 451 95 
 
 Russell V. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 33 Minn. 210 77O 
 
 Russell V. Sebastian, 233 U. S. 195 374 
 
 Russell V. Tacoma, 8 Wash. 156 1308 
 
 Russell V. Turner, 62 Me. 496 IO73 
 
 Russell Mills v. Plymouth County Commissioners, 16 Gray 347 1057 
 
 1058, 1228 
 
cxcviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Rutgers v. Waddington, 1 Thayers' Cas. Const. Law 63 32 
 
 Rutherford v. Taylor, 38 Mo. 315 393 
 
 Rutherford v. Williamson, 70 W. Va. 402 872, 876, 895 
 
 Rutland v. Worcester County Commissioners, 20 Pick. 71 1046 
 
 Rutland El. Light Co. v. Marble City El. Light Co., 65 Vt. 377 380, 382 
 
 Rutland, etc.. Power Co. v. Clarendon Power Co., 86 Vt. 45... 208, 1257, 1260 
 
 Rutland, etc., R. R. Co. v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 72 Vt. 128 997, 1002 
 
 Rutz T. St. Louis, 7 Fed. 438 94 
 
 Rutz V. St. Louis, 10 Fed. 341 302 
 
 Ryan v. Boston, 118 Mass. 248 477 
 
 Ryan v. Brown, 18 Mich. 196 453, 1256, 1260 
 
 Ryan v. Hoffman, 26 Ohio St. 109 634, 1232 
 
 Ryan v. Louisville, etc., Terminal Co., 102 Tenu. Ill 117, 130, 135 
 
 . 146, 155, 148, 170, 187, 606, 915 
 
 Ryan v. Preston, 59 App. Div. 97 517, 1337 
 
 Ryan v. Weiser Valley Land & Water Co., 20 Idaho 288 309, 643 
 
 Rychlicki v. St. Louis, 98 Mo. 497 1318, 1359 
 
 Ryers, In re, 72 N. Y. 1 240, 245, 948 
 
 Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333 136, 228 
 
 Ryeraon v. Morris Canal, etc., Co., 69 N. J. L. 505 887 
 
 s 
 
 Sabin v. Vermont Central R. R. Co., 25 Vt. 363 , .591, 1393 
 
 Sacramento Southern R. R. Co., v. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408 659, 661 
 
 666, 668 
 
 Sacramento Terminal Co. v. McDougall, 19 Cal. App. 562 1150 
 
 Sacramento Valley R. R. Co. v. Mofifatt, Cal. 74 7,34 
 
 Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311 20, 21, 114, 148, 155, 225, 228, 236 
 
 Sadlier v. New York, 185 N. Y. 408 318, 508, 1356 
 
 Sage V. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 189 , 638, 1228 
 
 Sage V. New York, 154 N. Y. 61 421, 428 
 
 Saginaw County iSupervisors v. Hubinger, 137 Mich. 72 402 
 
 Saginaw, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bordner, 108 Mich. 236 191, 922 
 
 St. Albans v. Seymour, 41 Vt. 579 1159 
 
 St. Bernard, etc.. Cemetery Assn., In re, 58 Conn. 91 213 
 
 St, Charles v. Rogers, 49 Mo. 530 1049 
 
 St. Charles v. Stewart, 49 Mo. 132 1117 
 
 St. Francis Levee District v. Bodkin, 108 Tenn. 700 1416 
 
 St. Francis Levee District v. Webb, 110 C. C. A. 137 626 
 
 St. Germain 'Irrigating Co. v. Hawthorn Ditch Co., 32 S. D. 260 406, 434 
 
 St. Helena Water Co. v. Forbes, 62 Cal. 182' 114, 146, 201 
 
 St. James, etc.. Church v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 114 Md. 442 1007 
 
 St. John V. New York, 3 3osw. 483 587 
 
 St. Johnsbury, etc., R. R Co. v. Willard, 61 Vt. 134 707 
 
 St. Johnsville v. Smith, 184 N. Y. 341 703, 705, 1174 
 
 St. Johnsville v. Smith, 61 App. Div, 380 1094 
 
 St. Joseph V. Geiwitz, 148 Mo. 210 804, 926 
 
 St. Joseph V. Hamilton, 43 Mo. 282 '. 1099 
 
 St. Joseph, etc., E. R. Co. v. Callender, 13 Kan. 496 1245 
 
Table of Cases. oxcix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 St. Joseph, etc., R. R. Co. v. Orr, 8 Kan. 419 1150, 1194 
 
 St. Joseph, etc., R. R. Co. v. Shambaugh, 106 Mo. 557 970, 1087 
 
 St. Joseph Hydraulic Co. v. Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co., 109 Ind. 172 .... 1051 
 
 1120 
 St. Joseph Terminal R. R. Co. v. Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co., 94 Mo. 535 . . 1081 
 
 St. Louis. V. Bell Tel. Co., 96 Mo. 623 578 
 
 St. Louia V. Brown, 155 Mo. 545 '.116, 156, 695, 729, 916, 948, 1112 
 
 St. Louis V. Buach, 252 Mo. 209 1152, 1154 
 
 St. Louis V. Dorr, 145 Mo. 455 278, 281 
 
 St. Louis V. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217 .278, 281 
 
 St. Louis V. Frank, 78 Mo. 41 1083 
 
 St. Louis V. .Gait, 179 Mo. 8 778 
 
 St. Louis V. Glasgow, 254 Mo. 262' 1027, 1029 
 
 St. Louis V. Gleason, 89 Mo. 67 1066, 1082 
 
 St. Louis V. Gleason, 93 Mo. 33 1082 
 
 St. Louis V. Gurno, 12 Mo. 414 507 
 
 St. Louis V. Hill, 116 Mo. 527 280 
 
 St. Louis V. Koch, 169 Mo. 587 70 
 
 St. iLouis V. Lang, 131 Mo. 412 968 
 
 St. Louis V. Liessing, 190 Mo. 461 285 
 
 St. Louis V. Meintz, 107 Mo. 611 952, 955 
 
 St. Louis V. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 172 S. W. 750, 755 367 
 
 St. Louis V. Shields, 52 Mo. 351 402 
 
 St. Louis V. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92 113, 389 
 
 St. Louis County, In re Condemnation of Lands in, 124 Minn. 271 . . . 74, 998 
 
 St. Louis County Court v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175 164, 914, 918 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 39 Ark. 167 739, 792 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Aubuchon, 199 Mo. 352 643, 644, 666, 737 
 
 740, 742, 1187, 1188 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Barnes, 162. S. W. 373 1245 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Brown, 58 HI. 61 742, 763 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Belleville, 122' HI. 376 1405 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Belleville City R. R. Co., 158 HI. 390.. 1007, 1086 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. B. Faisst & Co., 99 Ark. 61 1080, 1254 
 
 1'255, 1259 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cape Girardeau Bell Tel. Co., 134 Mo. App. 
 
 406 757 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cape Girardeau, etc., R. R. Co., 126' Mo. 
 
 App. 272 1107 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Capps, 67 HI. 607 697 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Clark, 119 Mo. 357 644 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Clark, 121 Mo. 169 194, 606, 626, 655, 691 
 
 1196, 1198 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Continental Brick Co., 198 Mo. 698 768, 771 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Drummond, etc.. Investment Co., 205 Mo. 
 
 167 741, 944 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Eby, 152 Mo. 606 1193 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Fayetteville, 75 Ark. 534 387, 750, 990, 998 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Foltz, 52 Fed. 627 90, 1411 
 
cc Table op Cases. 
 
 tPages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in ¥01111116 II.] PAGE 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. R. Co. v. Eort Smith, etc., Ey. Co., 104 Ark. 344 187 
 
 1091, 1255, 1260 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co. v. Fowler, 113 Mo. 458 650, 655, 943, 1033, 10«9 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co. v. Fowler, 142 Mo. 670 655, 770, 1150, 1209 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co. v. Gordon, 157 Mo. 71 742, 747 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co. v. Guswelle, 236 111. 214 1203 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co. v. Haller, 82 III. 28 996, 1000 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. E. Co. v. Hammers, 51 Kan. 127 737 
 
 St Louis, etc., E. R. Co. v. Hannibal Union Depot Co., 125 Mo. 82. . .59, 907 
 
 914, 973, 1002 
 St. Louis, etc., E. R. Co. v. Illinois Institution for Blind, 43 111. 303 . . .' . 996 
 
 998, 1002 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. R. Co. v. Kirby, 104 111. 345 735, 1173 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Knapp-Stout, etc., Co., 160 Mo. 396 300, 656 
 
 697, 699, 804, 852 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. E. Co. v. Knott, 54 Ark. 424 1253 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co. v. Lewrigbt, 113 Mo. 660 95, 951, 953, 1069 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co. v. Lindell Ey. Co., 190 Mo. 246 385, 642 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co. v. Lux, 63 111. 523 1114 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co. v. MacAdaras, 257 Mo. 448 196, 676, 1203 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. McAuliff, 43 Kan. 185 730, 733 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Memphis, etc., R. R. Co., 102 Ark. 492 996 
 
 1002 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Miller Levee Dist., 197 Fed. 815. .1235, 1237, 12S4 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co. v. Miller Levee Dist., 207 Fed. 338 302 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co. v. Mollet, 59 111. 235 731 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co. v. Nyce, 61 Kan. 394 706, 1416, 1417 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co. v. Oliver, 17 Okla. 589 651, 653, 656, 733, 734 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co. v. Petty, 57 Ark. 359 19, 114, 147, 256, 913 
 
 915, 917, 986, 987 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Pfennighausen, 104 S. W. 880 343 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. E. Co. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 173 111. 508 756, 757 
 
 758, 994, 1004, 1035, 1072, 1075 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R Co. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314 409 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Richardson, 45 Mo. 466 804 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. R. Co. v. St. Louis Stock Yards Co., 120 Mo. 541 770 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. R. Co. v. Smith, 42 Ark. 265 1191, 1192, 1193 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co. v. Southwestern, etc., Tel. Co., 121 Fed. 276.. 94 
 
 10O6 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. R. Co. v. Springfield, etc., E. R. Co., 96 111. 274 754 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. R. Co. v. Stuttgart, etc., E. E. Co., 188 Fed. 374 1254 
 
 1255 
 
 St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co. v. Teters, 68 111. 144 733, 734 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Theodore Maxfield Co., 94 Ark. 135 658, 665 
 
 670, 721, 723, 792, 1196, 1206 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Tulsa, 213 Fed. 87 1259 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wilder, 17 Kan. 239 1114, 1156 
 
 St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99 277 
 
 St. Louis Terminal Co. v. Heiger, 139 Mo. 315 1201 
 
Table of Cases. cci 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in, Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 St. Michael's P. E. Church v. Forty-second St. Ry. Co., 26 Misc. 601 643 
 
 St. Paul V. Chicago, etc., E. R. Co., 63 Minn. 330 391, 393, 395 
 
 St. Paul V. Seitz, 3 Minn. 297 1252 
 
 St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., Re, 34 Minn. 227 921, 1004, 1095 
 
 St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co. v. Covell, 2 Dak. 483 Ii25, 1167 
 
 St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co. v. Duluth, 56 Minn. 494 1325, 1360 
 
 St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co. v. Matthews, 16 Minn. 341- 1129 
 
 St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co. v. Minneapolis, 35 Minn, 141 70, 371, 747, 653 
 
 932, 998, 1235 
 
 St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co. v. Murphy, 19 Minn. 500 739, 741 
 
 St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co. v. iSchurmeir, 7 Wall. 272' 409 
 
 St. Paul Union Depot Co. v. St. Paul, 30 Minn. 359. .973, 991, 996, 1001, 1006 
 
 St. Peter v. Denison, 58 N. Y. 416 984, 1250, 1388 
 
 St. -Tammany Water Works v. New Orleans Water Works, 120 U. S. 
 
 64 358, 361 
 
 St. Vincent Female Orphan Asylum v. Troy, 76 N. Y. 108 .1405, 1410 
 
 Sala V. Pasadena, 162 Cal. 714 646, 956 
 
 Salem v. Eastern R. R. Co., 98 Mass. 431 286 
 
 Salem v. Maynes, 123 Mass. 372 274 
 
 Salem, etc.. Bridge Co. v. Essex County, 100 Mass. 282 941, 981 
 
 Salem, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. Lyme, 18 Conn. 451 79, 360 
 
 Saliotte v. King Bridge Co., 58 C. C. A. 4i66 302, 315, 418, 1321 
 
 Salisbury Land & Improvement Co. v. Commonwealth, 215 Mass. 369. . . 116 
 
 149, 154, 156, 157, 163, 165, 178 
 
 Salisbury Mills v. Forsaith, 56 N. H. 124 94 
 
 Sallden v. Little Falls, 102 Minn. 358 867, 872, 876, 877, 895, 1213 
 
 Salter v. Jonas, 39 N. J. L. 469 470 
 
 Salt Lake City v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 126 304, 630 
 
 660, 663 
 
 Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 U. S. 256 1340, 1346 
 
 Salt Lalfe City v. Salt Lake City, etc., Power Co., 24 Utah 249 208, 438 
 
 Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City, etc.. Power Co., 25 Utah 456 438 
 
 Salt Lake, etc., Co. v. Salt Lake City, 24 Utah 282 632, 639 
 
 Salt Lake, etc., R. R. Co. v. Butterfield, 150 Pac. 931- 813 
 
 Sale Lake Investment Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 148 Pac. 439. . 1283 
 
 Salzman v. New Haven, 81 Conn. 389 1353, 1364 
 
 Samish River Boom Co. v. Union Boom Co., 32 Wash. 586 4, 915, 918 
 
 919, 924, 973, 1006, 1007 
 
 Sammons v. Gloversville, 175 N. Y. 346 445 
 
 Sammons v. Gloversville, 70 N. Y. Supp. 284 313 
 
 Sams v. Port Royal, etc., R. R. Co., 15 S. C. 484 1155, 1236 
 
 San Antonio v. Grandjean, 91 Tex. 430 95, 1032 
 
 San Antonio v. Mullaly, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 596 868 
 
 San Antonio v. San Antonio St. Ey. Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App. 1 379 
 
 San Antonio v. White, 57 S. W. 858 1346 
 
 San Antonio, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ruby, 80 Tex. 172 1150 
 
 San Antonio, etc., R. R. Co. v. Southwestern, etc., Tel. Co., 93 Tex. 313 . . 95 
 
 994 
 San Antonio, etc., R. E. Co. v. Southwestern, etc., Tel. Co., 56 S. W. 
 
 301 ; 757 
 
ccii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 San Antonio, etc., R. R. Co. v. State, 79 Tex. 264 965 
 
 San Antonio, etc., St. Ry. Co. v. Limburger, 88 Tex, 79. . . ,526, 554, 542, 892 
 
 San Bernadino, etc., Ry. Co. v. Haven, 94 Cal. 489 793 
 
 Sanborn v. Enosburg Falls, 87 Vt. 479 1319 
 
 Sanborn v. People's Ice Co., 82 Minn. 43 431 
 
 Sanborn v. Rice, 129 Mass. 387 348 
 
 Sanchez v. United States, 216 U. S. 167 369 
 
 Sanderlin v. Luken, 152 N. C. 738 243 
 
 Sanderson v. Haverstick, 8 Pa. 294 486 
 
 San Diego Land, etc., Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739 86, 279 
 
 San Diego Land, etc., Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63. . .659, 671, 676, 678, 1177, 1183 
 
 San Diego Land, etc., Co. v. Neale, 88 Cal. 50 659, 951, 1171, 1181, 1182 
 
 San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego, 118 Cal. 556 279, 679, 681 
 
 Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 123 U. S. 288 101 
 
 Sandusky Portland Cement Co. v. Dixon Pure Ice Co., 22 Fed. 200 445 
 
 Sandwich v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 10 Ch. D. 707 439 
 
 Sandy v. St. Joseph, 142, Mo. App. .330 1360 
 
 Sanfleet v. Toledo, 10 Ohio Civ. Ct. Rep. 460 542 
 
 Sanford v. Tucson, 8 Ariz. 247 27, 60, 1066 
 
 San Francisco v. Calderwood, 31 Cal. 585 1408 
 
 San Francisco v. Collins, 98 Cal. 259 951 
 
 San Francisco v. Kiernan, 98 Cal. 614 698 
 
 San Francisco v. Straut, 84 Cal. 124 1409 
 
 San Francisco, etc., R. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 31 Cal. 368 58, 762, 773, 793 
 
 San Francisco, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gould. 122 Cal. 601 ' 1068, 1072 
 
 San Francisco, etc., R. R. Co. v. Leviston, 134 Cal. 412 654, 1067 
 
 San Francisco, etc., R. R. Co. v. Taylor, 86 Cal. 246 706 
 
 San Francisco, etc.. Water Co. v. Alameda Waiter Co., 36 Cal. 639 1009 
 
 San Francisco National Bank v. Dodge, 197 U. S. 70 366 
 
 Sangamon County v. Brown, 13 111. 207 953, 1273 
 
 Sanitary District v. Baumbach, 270 111. 128 659, 666, 1112, 1144 
 
 Sanitary District v. Bernstein, 175 111. 215 967, 1107 
 
 Sanitary District v. Chapin, 226 111. 499 1149, 1151 
 
 Sanitary District v. Corneau, 257 111. 93 669 
 
 Sanitary District v. Loughran, 160 IJl. 362 693 
 
 Sanitary District v. McGuirl, 86 111. App. 392 1173 
 
 Sanitary District v. Munger, 264 111. 256 344, 1022 
 
 Sanitary District v. Murphy, 261 111. 269 344 
 
 Sanitary District v. Pearce, 110 111. App. 592 1199 
 
 Sanitary District v. Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co., 216 111. 575 678, 748, 752 
 
 1074, 1129, IIS^, 1183 
 
 Sanitary District v. Ray, 199 HI. 63 955, 1249, 1317 
 
 San Joaquin, etc.. Irrigation Co. v. Stevenson, 164 Cal. 221 63, 151 
 
 249, 988, 1071, 1091, 1092 
 
 San Jose v. Reed, 65 Cal. 241 1129 
 
 San Jose, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mayne, 83 Cal. 566 955, 1207 
 
 San Luis Obispo v. Brizzolara, 100 Cal. 434 1200 
 
 San Mateo County v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631 173, 793, 918 
 
 San Pedro, etc., R. R. Co. v. Board of Education, 35 Utah 13, , .651, 653, 679 
 
Table of Cases. cciii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Santa Ana v. Brunner, 132 Cal. 234 659, 661, 913, 917, 1070 
 
 Santa Ana v. Gildmaeher, 133 Cal. 395 923 
 
 Santa Ana v. Harlin, 99 Cal. 538 666, 671, 915 
 
 Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 118 U. S. 394 962 
 
 Santa Cruz v. Enright, 95 Cal. 105 923, 990 
 
 Santa Rosa v. Fountain Water Co., 138 Cal. 579 1033 
 
 Santo V. State, 2 Iowa 165, 273 
 
 Sargent v. Machias, 65 Me. 591 1154 
 
 Sargent v. Merrimac, 196 Mass. 171 659, 671, 673, 1182, 1184, 1187 
 
 Sarle v. Arnold, 7 R. I. 582 1185 
 
 Sater v. Burlington, etc.. Road Co., 1 Iowa 386 798 
 
 Sather v. Duluth, 123 Minn. 300 867 
 
 Satterfield v. Crow, 8 B. Mon. 553 1159 
 
 Sauer v. New Yoirk, 206 U. iS. 536 514 
 
 Sauer v. New York, 180 N. Y. 27 514 
 
 Saulet V. Shepherd, 4 Wall. 602' 440 
 
 Saulsbury v. Ithaca, 94 N. Y. 27 1310 
 
 Saunders v. Bluefield, etc.. Improvement Co., 58 Fed. 133 i 94 
 
 Saunders v. Lowell, 131 Mass. 387 1052 
 
 Saunders v. Memphis, etc., R. R. Co., 101 Tenn. 206 632, 639 
 
 Savage, Ex parte, 63 Tex. Crim. App. 285 278 
 
 Savage v. Salem, 23 Ore. 381 374, 586 
 
 Savannah v. Cullens, 38 Ga. 334 1295, 1309 
 
 Savannah v. Hancock, 91 Mo. 54 158, 173, 945, 1082 
 
 Savannah v. Hartridge, 37 Ga. 113 795 
 
 Savannah v. Hoist, 132 Fed. 901 1038 
 
 Savannah v. Mulligan, 95 Ga. 323 285, 286 
 
 Savannah v. Steamboat Co. of Georgia, R. M. Charlt. 342 392 
 
 Savannah v. Wilson, 49 Ga. 476 586, 587 
 
 Savannah, etc., R. R. Co. v. Buford, 106 Ala. 303 1207 
 
 Savannah, etc., R. R. Co. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 112 Ga. 941. .920, 940, 1004 
 
 Savannah, etc., R. R. Co. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 115 Ga. 554 913, 916 
 
 Savannah, etc., R. R. Co. v. Savannah, 45 Ga. 602 395, 537 
 
 Savannah, etc., R. R. Co. v. Savannah, 96 Ga. 680 925, 928 
 
 Savannah, etc., R. R. Co. v. Williama, 133 Ga. 679 732 
 
 Savings & Trust Co. v Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 229 Pa. 484 660, 667 
 
 670, 693 
 
 Sawyer v. Alton, 4 HI. 127 369 
 
 Sawyer v. Boston, 144 Mass. 470 1060, 1196, 1201, 1205 
 
 Sawyer v. Commonwealth, 182 Mass. 245 366, 942 
 
 Sawyer v. Davis, 136 Mass. 239 317, 334, 905 
 
 Sawyer v. Landers, 56 Iowa 422 354, 358 
 
 Sawyer v. Meyer, 45 Iowa 152 323 
 
 Saxe V. Burlington, 70 Vt. 449 1343 
 
 Saxton V. New York El. R. R. Co., 139 N. Y. 320 790, 808 
 
 Sayre v. Newark, 60 N. J. Eq. 361 441 
 
 Scaee v. Wayne County, 72 Nebr. 162 723 
 
 Scaling v. Denny, 125 S. W. 361 1121 
 
 Scarritt v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 148 Mo. 676 1411, 1412, 1413 
 
cciv .Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-72C are in Volume I, 721-1422 In. Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Sceery v. Springfield, 112 Mass. 512 1346 
 
 Schaaf v. Cleveland, etc., Ey. Co., 66 Ohio St. 215 545, 549, 584 
 
 Schaller v. Omaha, 23 Nebr. 325 789, 806, 868, 872 
 
 Schechter v. Denver, etc., R. R. Co., 8 Colo. App. 25 1136 
 
 Schell V. Schuler, 194 Mass. 441 1159 
 
 Schenectady v. Furman, 145 N. Y. 482 283, 419, 422 
 
 Schilling v. Holmes, 23 Cal. 230 712 
 
 Schillinger v. United States, 24 Ct. CI. 268 1280 
 
 Schimmelmann v. Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co., 83 Ohio St. 356 325 
 
 Schmidt v. Densmore, 42 Mo. 225. .. : 984, 988, 991 
 
 Schmidt v. Milwaukee, 149 Wis. 330 738, 743, 873, 876, 895 
 
 Schmuek v. Missouri, etc., Ey. Co., 87 Kan. 153 960 
 
 Schneider, In re, 136 App. Div. 444 351 
 
 Schneider v. Detroit, 72 Mich. 240 514 
 
 Schneider v. Detroit, 135 Mich. 570 1409 
 
 Schneider v. Winkler, 74 N. J. L. 71 482 
 
 Schoff V. St. Louis, 117 Mo. 131 622 
 
 Sohoff y. Upper Connecticut River, etc., Co., 57 N. H. 110 1059 
 
 Schonhardt v. Plennsylvania R. R. Co., 216 Pa. 224 1199 
 
 School Corporation of Audrevrs v. 'Henry, 178, Ind. 1 281 
 
 School District in Norton v. Copeland, 2 Gray 414 1027 
 
 School District of Columbia v. Jones 988, 991 
 
 Schooling v. Harrisburg, 42 Ore. 494 i 1410 
 
 School St., In re, 162 App. Div. 168 952 
 
 Sohoff V. Sti Louis, 117 Mo. 131 687 
 
 Schofct, In re, 145 N. Y. Supp. 18 356 
 
 Schreiber v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 115 111. 340 1097, 1101 
 
 Schrodt V. St. Joseph, 109 Mo. App. 627 1178 
 
 Schroeder v. Detroit, 44 Mich. 387 1086 
 
 Sehroeder v. Joliet, 189 111. 48 788, 790, 796, 797, 855 
 
 Schubert, In re, 103 Minn. 442 244 
 
 Schulenburg v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 129 Mo. 455 524 
 
 Schuler v. Lincoln Board of Supervisors, 12 S. D. 460 735, 1217 
 
 Schults V. Northern Pacific Transportation Co., 50 Cal. 592 491 
 
 Schumacher v. Toberman, 56 Cal. 608 355 
 
 Schurmeier v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 10 Minn. 82 463, 526, 530 
 
 Schussler v. Hennepin County Commissioners, 67 Minn. 412 '. . . 1301 
 
 Schuster v. Sanitary District of Chicago, 177 111. 626 916, 920, 1188 
 
 Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. Farr, 4 Watts & S. 362 696, 1106, 1174 
 
 Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. Freedly, 6 Whart. 109 1173 
 
 Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. Kittera, 2 Rawle 438 953 
 
 Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. McDonough, 33 Pa. 73 1244 
 
 Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. Thobum, 7 Serg. & R. 411. . .762, 772, 810, 1173 
 
 Schuylkill River, etc., R. R. Co. v. Decker, 2 Watts 343 22 
 
 Schuylkill River, etc., R. R. Co. v. Harris, 124 Pa. 215 1137 
 
 Schuylkill River, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stocker, 128 Pa. 233 74(1, 1176 
 
 Schwede v. Heinrich Bros. Brewery Co., 29 Wash. 21 626 
 
 Scioto Valley R. R. Co. v. Lawrence, 38 Ohio St. 41 . . .494, 498, 505, 530, 1399 
 
 Scott V. Donora Southern E. E. Co., 222 Pa. 634 739, 744 
 
Table of Cases. ccv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Voiume II.] PAGE 
 
 Soott V. Dyer, 54 Cal. 430 621 
 
 Scott V. St. Paul, etc., Ry. Co., 21 Minn. 322 600 
 
 Scott T. Tampa, 62 Fla. 295 1341 
 
 Scott V. Toledo, 86 Fed. 385 623, 627, 787, 1038 
 
 Scott V. Wilson, 3 N. H. 321 409 
 
 Scott Lumber Co. v. Wolford, 62 W. Va. 555 236, 257 
 
 Scovill V. Geddings, 7 Ohio St. 211 510 
 
 Scovill V. McMahou, 62 Conn. 378 342 
 
 Scranton v. Minneapolis, 58 Minn. 437 507 
 
 Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141 420, 421, 426 
 
 Scranton v. Wheeler, 113 Mich. 565 421 
 
 Scranton, etc.. Water Co. v. Northern, etc.. Iron Co., 192 Pa. 80 68, 997 
 
 Scranton Gas, etc., Co. v. Delaware, etc., E. R. Co., 225 Pa. 182 917, 921 
 
 997, 989, 1006, 1007 
 
 Scranton Gas, etc., Co. v. Northern Coal, etc., Co., 192 Pa. 80 973 
 
 Scranton Gas, etc., Co. v. Scranton, 214 Pa. 586 379 
 
 Scrutchfield v. Choctaw, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Okla. 308 531, 535, 594, 886 
 
 Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 694 18, 21, 116, 131 
 
 156, 227, 914, 940, 983, 1256, 1260 
 
 Sea Beach Ry. Co., In re, 148 N. Y. Supp. 1080 356 
 
 Seaboard Air Line Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. E. Co., 88 S. C. 477.. . 1257 
 
 1260 
 
 Seaboard Air Line Co. v. Chamblin, 108 Va. 42 1201 
 
 Seaboard Air Line Co. v. Garrett, 85 S. C. 543 341 
 
 Seaboard Air Line Co. v. Southern Investment Co., 53 Fla. 832 525 
 
 1255, 1395 
 
 Seaboard Air Line Co. v. Wilmington, 154 N. C. 331 397 
 
 Seabright v. Central E. E. Co., 72 N. J. L. 8 1121 
 
 Seabright v. Central E. E. Co., 73 N. J. L. 625 1121 
 
 Searcy v. Clay County, 176 Mo. 493 1120 
 
 Searcy v. Yarnell, 47 Ark. 269 1414 
 
 Searl v. School Dist. No. 2, 124 U. S. 197 1041 
 
 Searl v. School Dist. No. 2, 133 U. S. 553 706 
 
 Searle v. Lackawanna, etc., E. R. Co., 33 Pa. 57 609 
 
 Searle v. Lead, 10 S. D. 312 846, 868, 1319, 1322 
 
 Sears v. Chicago, 247 111. 204 470, 479, 482 
 
 Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 257 56 
 
 Sears v. Crocker, 184 Mass. 586 480, 565 
 
 Sears v. Marshalltown St. Ry. Co., 65 Iowa 742 637 
 
 Sears v. Nahant, 215 Mass. 234 955 
 
 Sears v. Street Commissioners, 173 Mass. 350 266 
 
 Sears v. Street Commissioners, 180 Mass. 274 397, 769, 788 
 
 Sears v. Tuolumne County, 132 Cal. 167 683 
 
 Seaside, etc., El. E. E. Co., In re, 83 Hun 143 593 
 
 Seattle, In re, 52 Wash. 226 715, 1219 
 
 Seattle, In xe, 52 Wash. 290 1270 
 
 Seattle, In re, 62 Wash. 218 873 
 
 Seattle v. Atwood, 59 Wash. 112 694 
 
 Seattle v. Bugby, 2 Wash. Ter. 25 1250, 1351 
 
 xiv 
 
ccvi Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, T21-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Seattle v. Columbia, etc., Ry. Co., 6 Wash. 379 374, 378 
 
 Seattle v. McElwain, 75 Wash. 375 632, 637, 638, 871 
 
 Seattle v. Williams, 41 Wash. 366 1143 
 
 Seattle, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bellingham Bay, etc., R. R. Co., 29 Wash. 
 
 491 1002, 1006, 1117 
 
 Seattle, etc., R. R. Co. v. Corbett, 22 Wash. 189 705 
 
 Seattle, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gilchrist, 4 Wash. 509. . .731, 1191, 1196, 1203, 1217 
 
 Seattle, etc., R. R. Co. v. Laud, 81 Wash. 206 667, 1094 
 
 Seattle, etc., R. R. Co. v. Murphine, 4 Wash. 448 667, 735, 1139, 1140 
 
 Seattle, etc., R. R. Co. v. ROeder, 30 Wash. 244 693, 734, 814, 1144 
 
 1172, 1178 
 
 Seattle, etc., R. R. Co. v. State, 7 Wash. 150 924, 997, 998, 999 
 
 1010, 1011 
 
 Seattle Land, etc., Co. v. Seattle, 37 Wash. 274 1421 
 
 Seattle Transfer Co. v. Seattle, '27 Wash. 520 651 
 
 Seavey v. Seattle, 17 Wash. 361 1101 
 
 Secombe v. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 23 Wall. 108 184, 938, 1120 
 
 Second Society of Universalists v. Royal Insurance Co., 221 Mass. 518,. 1166 
 
 Second Street, Harrisburg, In re, 66 Pa. 139 654 
 
 Second St. Improvement Co. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 255 
 
 Mo. 519 1265, 1275 
 
 Secretary of State v. Charlesworth (1901), A. C. 373 1147 
 
 Secretary of the Treasury, Re Application of, 45 Fed. 396 1037 
 
 Sedgeley Ave., Re, 217 Pa. 313 869 
 
 Sedro-Wolley v. Lederle, 71 Wash. 646 694, 695 
 
 Seefeld v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 67 Wis. 96 1144 
 
 Seele v. Deering, 79 Me. 323 1341 
 
 Seeley v. Bishop, 19 Conn. 128 323, 429 
 
 Seely v. Sebastian, 4 Ore. 25 245 
 
 Sehy V. Salt Lake City, 41- Utah 535 1320 
 
 Seibel-Suessdorf, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Manufacturers Ry. Co., 230 Mo. 59... 524 
 
 Seidensparger v. Spear, 17 Me. 123 1275 
 
 Seidschlag v. Antioch, 207 111. 280 1407 
 
 Seifert v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 136 1318, 1331, 1333,1360, 1375 
 
 Seifert v. Brooks, 34 Wis. 443 922, 927 
 
 Selden v. Jacksonville, 13 Fla. 538 ; 1317 
 
 Selden v. Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558 303, 497, 505, 511, 514 
 
 Sells v. Columbus St. Ry. Co., 11. Ohio Dec. Reprint 643 526, 642 
 
 Selma, etc., R. R. Co., Ex parte, 45 Ala. 696 185 
 
 Selma, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bryant. 57 111. 473 1129 
 
 Selma, etc., R. R. Co. v. Camp, 45 Ga. 180 698, 736, 737 
 
 Selma, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gammage, 63 Ga. 604 650, 1111 
 
 Selma, etc., R. R. Co. v. Keith, 53 Ga. 178 1196 
 
 Selma, etc., R. R. Co. v. Redwine, 51 Ga. 470 650, 654, 722 
 
 Selman v. Wolfe, 27 Tex. 68 413 
 
 Selvage v. Talbott, 175 Ind. 648 272, 276 
 
 Semple v. Vicksburg, 62 Miss. 63 1310, 1375, 1376 
 
 Seneca v. Cochran, 84 S. C. 279 274 
 
 Seneca Nation v. Knight, 23 N. Y. 498 411 
 
Table op Cases. covu 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Seneca Road Co. v. Albany, etc., R. R. Co., 5 Hill 170 763 
 
 Senior v. Metropolitan R. R. Co.. 2 H. & C. 258 761 
 
 Settegast v. Houston, etc., Ry. Co., 38 Tex. Civ. App. 623 847 
 
 Seton V. New York, 130 App. Div. 148 347 
 
 Seufferle v. Macfarland, 28 App. D. C. 94 317 
 
 Seventeenth St., In re, 189 Mo. 245 IIOO 
 
 Seventeenth St., In re, 1 Wend. 262 352 
 
 Seventh Ave., In re, 59 App. Div. 175 1-155 
 
 Severns v. Cole, 38 Iowa 463 364 
 
 Sexauer v. Star Milling Co., 173 Ind. 342: 225 
 
 Sexton V. North Bridgewater, 116 Mass. 205 802, 1177, 1188, 1217 
 
 Seymour v. Carter, 2 Met. 520 1061, 1271 
 
 Seymour v. Cummins, 119 Ind. 148 1252, 1334, 1380 
 
 Seymour v. Jeffersonville, etc., R. R. Co., 126 Ind. 466 996, 1001 
 
 Shaaber v. Reading, 150 Pa. 402 '. 340, 692 
 
 Shaffer v. Reynoldsville, 44 Pa. Super. Ct. 1 1188 
 
 Shake v. Frazier, 94 Ky. 143 236 
 
 Shanfelter v. Baltimore, 80 Md. 483 1106, 1107 
 
 Shannahan v. Waterbury, 63 Conn. 420 1097, 1102, 1150 
 
 Shannon v. O'Boyle, 51 Ind. 565 1414 
 
 Shano v. Fifth Ave., etc.. Bridge Co., 189 Pa. 245 868, 876, 895 
 
 Sharett's Road, Re, 8 Pa. 89 622, 629, 1024 
 
 Sharon Ry. Co.'s Appeal, 122 Pa. 533 997, 999, lOOfi 
 
 Sharp V. Johnson, 4 Hill 92 935, 936, 989, 1077 
 
 Sharp V. United States, 191 U. S. 341 302, 668, 721, 737, 739, 742 
 
 1137, 1194 
 
 Sharp V. United States, 50 C. C. A. 597 658, 661, 726, 737 
 
 Sharpless v. Longport, 79 N. J. L. 279 165, 175 
 
 Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 31, 186, 266 
 
 Shasta Power Co. v. Walker, 149 Fed. 568 129, 169, 204, 913 
 
 Shattuck V. Stoneham Branch R. R. Co., 6 Allen 115 769, 1176, 1178 
 
 1203, 1217 
 
 Shattuck V. Wilton R. R. Co., 23 N. H. 269 655 
 
 Shaubert v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 21 Minn. 502 ^ 535 
 
 Shaughnessy v. Brockton., 207 Mass. 123 833 
 
 Shaver v. Eldred, 114 N. Y. 236 1235 
 
 Shaver v. Starrett, 4 Ohio St. 494 235 
 
 Shaw V. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 159 Mass. 597 491, 8.35 
 
 Shaw V. Charlestown, 2 Gray 107 1176 
 
 Shaw V. Charlestown, 3 Allen 538 1098 
 
 Shaw V. Crocker, 42 Cal. 435 507, 516 
 
 Shaw V. Daviess County Commissioners, 160 Ky. 422 956,1032 
 
 Shaw V. New York Elevated Ry. Co., 187 N. Y. 186 1185 
 
 Shawnee County v. Beckwith, 10 Kan. 603 485 
 
 Shawneetown V. Mason, 82 111. 337 507, 847, 856, 867, 876, 1317, 1367 
 
 Sheaff V. People, 87 El. 189 174 
 
 Shearer v. Douglas County Commissioners, 13 Kan. 145 958,959, 1273 
 
 Sheehan v. Fall River, 187 Mass. 356 339, 507, 717, 832, 843 
 
 Sheehan v. Flynn, 59 Minn. 436 1369 
 
ccviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in. Volume II.] PAGH 
 
 Sheehy v. Kansas City Cable Ry. Co., 94 Mo. 574 867, 874, 1111 
 
 Shelby v. Cleveland Mill, etc., Co., 155 N. C. 196 276, 449, 452 
 
 Shelby County v. Deprez, 87 Ind. 509 1342 
 
 Shelby County Ry. Co. v. Crawford, 235 Mo. 489 1111 
 
 Sheldon v. Boston & Albany R. R. Co., 172 Mass. 180 826, 842, 855, 861 
 
 Sheldon v. Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co., 29 Minn. 318... 743, 1080, 1081, 1187 
 
 Shelton v. Derby, 27 Conn. 414 338 
 
 Shenango, etc., R. R. Co. v. Braham, 79 Pa. 447 667 
 
 Shepard v. Manhattan R. R. Co., 117 N. Y. 442 1159 
 
 Shepardson v. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 6 Wis. 605 622 
 
 Shepard's Point Land Co. v. Atlantic Hotel Co., 132 N. C. 617 426, 454 
 
 Shepherd v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 130 U. S. 426 530 
 
 Shepherd v. Third Municipality, 6 Rob. 349 416 
 
 Sheppard v. Cowling, 127 Ala. 1 216 
 
 Sherlock v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 130 111. 403 1201 
 
 Sherlock v. Kansas City Belt Ry. Co., 142 Mo. 172. . . 192, 498, 505, 524, 534 
 
 551, 878, 1256, 1395, 1398 
 
 Sherlock v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 115 Ind. 22 959 
 
 Sherman v. Buick, 32 Cal. 241 175, 235, 913 
 
 Sherman v. McKeon, 38 N. Y. 275 92 
 
 Sherman v. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 40 Wis. 645 970 
 
 Sherman v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 30 Minn. 227 666, 1137, 1181 
 
 Sherman v. Williams, 84 Tex. 421 1416, 1417 
 
 Sherman Gas, etc., Co. v. Belden, 115 S. W. 897 1190 
 
 Shero v. Carey, 35 Minn. 423 884 
 
 Sherwood v. Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co., 94 Va. 291 , . 1403 
 
 Sherwood v. Lafayette, 109 Ind. 411 336, 354, 356 
 
 Sherwood v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 21 Minn. 122 696, 730, 743, 953 
 
 1106, 1133 
 
 Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319 371, 964 
 
 Shipley v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 34 Md. 336 800 
 
 Shipley v. Ritter, 7 Md. 408 1254 
 
 Shirk V. Carroll County Commissioners, 106 Ind. 593 396 
 
 Shirley v. Southern Ry. Co., 121 Ky. 1S7 187 
 
 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1 414, 426, 427 
 
 Shively v. Bowlby, 22 Ore. 410 426 
 
 Shoemaker v. Hatch, 13 Neb. 261 409 
 
 Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282... 62, 109, 126, 162, 155, 163, 654 
 
 655, 658, 909, 938, 949, 1099, 1111, 1141, 1144, 1167 
 
 Shoenberger v. MulhoUan, 8 Pa. 134 131, 253, 256 
 
 Sholin V. Skamania Boom Co., 66 Wash. 303 887 
 
 Sholl V. German Coal Co., 118 111. 427 58, 63, 115, 129, 157, 194, 253, 913 
 
 Shoolbred v. Charlestown, 2 Bay 63 1231 
 
 Short V. Rochester, etc., R. R. Co., 5 Sadler 196 770 
 
 Shorter v. Smith, 9 Ga. 517 68, 360 
 
 Shortle v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 130 Ind. 505 959 
 
 Shortle v. Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co., 131 Ind. 338 1274 
 
 Shrader v. Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co., 242 111. 227 867, 873 
 
 Shreveport v. McClure, 132 La. 468 474, 1111 
 
Table of Cases. ccix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Shreveport v. Youree, 114 La. 182 1142 
 
 Shreveport, etc., R. R. Co. v. HoUingsworth, 42 La. Ann. 749 651 
 
 Shreveport, etc., R. R. Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 51 La. Ann. 814. . 10O5 
 
 Shreveport Traction Co. v. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co., 119 La. 759 385 
 
 Shreveport Traction Co. v. Svara, 133 La. 900 676, 800 
 
 Shriner v. Easton, etc., Ry. Co., 205 Pa. 648 789, 810 
 
 Shurzel v. Bell Tel. Co., 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 221 579 
 
 Shurley v. Southern R. R. Co., 28 Ky. L. Rep. 154 735 
 
 Shute v. Princeton, 58 Minn. 337 1252 
 
 Sidney v. North Eastern Ry. Co., (1914) 3 K. B. 629 671 
 
 Sieferer v. St. Louis, 141 Mo. 586 1074, 1075 
 
 Sievers v. Root, 10 Cal. App. 337 867, 1255 
 
 Sievers v. San Francisco, 115 Cal. 648 1319, 1345 
 
 Siewerssen v. Harris County, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 115 1301 
 
 Sill V. Corning, 15 N. Y. 303 56 
 
 Silliman v. Gano, 90 Tex. 687 1205 
 
 Silva V. Garcia, 65 Cal. 591 936, 1076 
 
 Silver Springs, etc., R. R. Co. v. Van Ness, 45 Fla. 589 609 
 
 Silverstone v. Ham, 66 Wash. 440 71, 1155 
 
 Silvey v. Georgia Ry., etc., Co., 137 Ga. 468 892 
 
 Siman v. Rhodes, 24 Minn. 25 355 
 
 Simar r. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298 346 
 
 Sime V. Spencer, 30 Ore. 340 1257 
 
 Simmons, In re, 195 N. Y. 573 666, 672, 676, 693, 694 
 
 Simmons, In re, 206 N. Y. 577 626 
 
 Simmons, In re, 130 App. Div. 350 666, 672, 676 
 
 Simmons, In re, 117 N. Y. Supp. 64 667, 670 
 
 Simmons, In re, 127 N. Y. Supp. 940 695 
 
 Simmons, In re, 60 Misc. 204 667, 670 
 
 Simmons, In re, 68 Misc. 65 1195 
 
 Simmons v. Camden, 26 Ark. 276 507 
 
 Simmons v. Cornell, 1 R. I. 519 1410 
 
 Simmons v Mumford, 2 R. I. 172 1010 
 
 Simmons v. Passaic, 42 N. J. L. 619 624 
 
 Simmons v. Providence, 12 R. I. 8 508 
 
 Simmons v. iSt. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 184 1033, 1217 
 
 Simmons v. Toledo, 8 Ohio Civ. Ct. Rep. 535 542 
 
 Simms v. Memphis, etc., R. R. Co., 21 Heisk. 621 958 
 
 Simon v. Northrup, 27 Ore. 487 395 
 
 Simons v. Gregory, 120 Ky. 116 1300 
 
 Simons v. Mason City, etc., &. R. Co., 128 Iowa 139 1138, 120O 
 
 Simplot V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 5 McCrary 158 527 
 
 Simpson v. Kansas City, 111 Mo. 237 914, 1101, 1107 
 
 Simpson v. Whatcom, 3 Wash. 392 I344 
 
 Sims V. Chattanooga, 2 Lea 694 1410 
 
 Sims V. Frankfort, 79 Ind. 446 I4O9 
 
 Sinclair v. Bagge, 1 Nev(f Zealand Court of Appeals 50 29 
 
 6ing Lee, Ex parte, 96 Cal. 354 278 
 
OCX Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In. Volume II.] FA6B 
 
 Singleton v. Road Commissioners, 2 Nott & McC. 526 235 
 
 Sings V. Joliet, 237 III. 300 285, 286, 1346 
 
 Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700 88 
 
 Sinking Fund Commissioners v. Green, etc., Navigation Co., 79 Ky. 73. . 101 
 
 Sinks V. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 99 
 
 Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N. J. L. 129 30, 622 
 
 Sioux City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. ..R. Co., 27 Fed. 770 1009 
 
 Sioux Falls Light & Power Co. v. Coughran, 27 S. D. 443. .208, 983, 1071, 1087 
 
 Siskiyou County v. Gamlich, 110 Cal. 94 1216 
 
 Sisson V. Buena Vista County, 128 Iowa 442... 59, 63, 115, 154, 243, 245, 643 
 
 Sisson V. New Bedford, 137 Mass. 255 832 
 
 Sisson V. Stonington, 73 Conn. 348 1357 
 
 Sisters of Charity v. Morris R. R. Co., 83 N. J. L. 132 1085 
 
 Sisters of Charity v. Morris R. R. Co., 84 N. J. L. 310.. 1085, 1087, 1088, 1091 
 
 Sittler V. Custer County, 91 Neb. Ill 637, 1256, 1260 
 
 Sixth Ave. R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 72 N. Y. 330 382, 973, 976 
 
 Sixth Ave. R. R. Co. v. Metropolitan El. R. R. Co., 138 N. Y. 548 1187 
 
 Skaggs v. Martinsville, 140 Ind. 476 481 
 
 Skaneateles Waterworks Co. v. Skaneateles, 184 U. S. 354 361 
 
 Skillman v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 78 Iowa 404 21, 903, 1419 
 
 Skinner v. Hartford Bridge Co., 29 Conn. 523 91 
 
 Skinner v. Lake View Ave. Co., 57 111. 151 928 
 
 Slabaugh v. Omaha Electric Light Co., 87 Xeb. 805 485, 583 
 
 Slater v. Rawson, 6 Met. 439 1135 
 
 Slatten v. Des Moines Valley R. iR. Co., 29 Iowa 148 514, 535, 1386 
 
 Slaughter v. Meridian, etc., Ry. Co., 95 Miss. 2.51 537, 554, 596, 878, 892 
 
 Sleeper, In re, 62 N. J. Eq. 67 354 
 
 Slingerland v. International Contracting Co., 169 N. Y. 60 '..421, 428 
 
 Slingerland v. Newark, 54 N. J. L. 62 145, 151, 201, 203, 916, 982, 984 
 
 991, 992 
 
 Sloan V. Biemiller, 34 Ohio St. 492 410 
 
 Sloeum V Neptune, 68 N. J. L. 595 1050, 1117, 1119 
 
 Slocum V. State, 8 Blackf. 361 402 
 
 Sloss-Sheffield, etc., Co. v. Johnson, 147 Ala. 384 886 
 
 SmaU V. Georgia, etc., R. R. Co., 87 Ga. 602 344. 1074 
 
 Smart v. Portsmouth, etc., R. R. Co., 20 N. H. 233 1058, 1102, 1228 
 
 Smeaton v Martin, 57 Wis. 364 177 
 
 Smedley v. Irwin, 51 Pa. 445 173, 176, 630, 915, 1024 
 
 Smethurst v. Barton Square Church, 148 Mass. 261 521 
 
 Smith, Re, 9 Wash. 85 925, 932 
 
 Smith V. Alexander, 24 Ind. 454 936, 1079 
 
 Smith V. Alexander, 33 Gratt. 208 1319, 1364 
 
 Smith v. Atkins, 110 Ky. 119 416 
 
 Smith V. Atlanta, 75 Ga. 110 31J 
 
 Smith V. Atlanta, 92 Ga. 119 308, 1381 
 
 Smith V. Boston, 7 Gush. 254 325, 834, 843, 885 
 
 Smith V. Boston, 194 Mass. 31 1051 
 
 Smith V. Boston, etc., .R. R. Co., 181 N. Y. 132 514 
 
 Smith V. Brooklyn, 160 N. Y. 357 1381 
 
Table of Cases. ®oxi 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume .1, 721-1422 in Volume 11.] PAOB 
 
 Smith V. Campbell, 3 Hawks 590 942 
 
 Smith V. Central Dist., etc., Tel. Co., 2 Ohio C. C. 259 677 
 
 Smith V. Centralia, 55 Wash. 573 322, 879 
 
 Smith V. Chicago, etc., E. R. Co., 67 111. 191 1244, 1249 
 
 Smith V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 105 111. 511 919. 1027 
 
 Smith V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 86 Iowa 202 374 
 
 Smith V. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio 515 510 
 
 Smith V. Claussen Park Drainage District, 229 111. 155. . . .627, 691, 916, 926 
 
 1024, 1068 
 
 Smith V. Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co., 170 Ind. 382 189 
 
 Smith V. Commonwealth, 2'10 Mass. 259 6.59, 667, 671, 678, 678 
 
 ' Smith V. Conway, 17 N. H. 586 997, 1000 
 
 Smith y. Cumberland County Commissioners, 42 Me. 395 . 1050, 1119 
 
 Smith V. Dedham, 8 Cush. 522 835 
 
 Smith V. Denniff, 34 Mont. 20 250, 1414 
 
 Smith V. Detroit, 120 Mich. 572 1073 
 
 Smith V. East End St. Ry. Co., 87 Tenn. 626 505, 529, 537, 539 
 
 Smith V Floyd County, 85 Ga. 420 867 
 
 Smith V. Gillooly, 223 Mass. 66 1096 
 
 Smith V. Goldsboro, 121 N. C. 350 572, 583 
 
 Smith V. Gould, S9 Wis. 631 177, 1234 
 
 Smith V. Goulding, 6 Cush. 154 1271 
 
 Smith V. Hall, 103 Iowa 95 1419 
 
 Smith V. Inge, 80 Ala. 283 621 
 
 Smith V. Irish, 37 App. Div. 220 287 
 
 Smith V. Judge of the Twelfth District, 17 Cal. 547 56 
 
 Smith V. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 98 Mo. 20 596, 878 
 
 Smith V. Lincoln, 170 Mass. 488 200 
 
 Smith V. McDowell, 148 111. 51 183 
 
 Smith V. Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 446 462, 470 
 
 Smith V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 90 Kan. 757 651, («6, 799, 986, 987 
 
 Smith V. Nashville, etc., E. R. Co., 88 Tenn. 611 1155 
 
 Smith V. New Decatur, 166 Ala. 334 789, 792 
 
 Smith V. New York, 66 N. Y. 295 1375 
 
 Smith V. North Carolina E. E. Co., 68 N. C. 107 118ft 
 
 Smith V. Pennsylvania, etc., E. E. Co., 141 Pa. 68 1210 
 
 Smith V. Philadelphia, 81 Pa. 38 1310, 1382 
 
 Smith V. Rochester, 76 N. Y. 506 1341, 1344 
 
 Smith V. Rochester, 92 N. Y. 463 435 
 
 Smith V. Rome, 19 Ga. 89 484 
 
 Smith V. St. Joseph, 122 Mo. 643 789, 805, 872 
 
 Smith V. St. Paul, etc., Ry. Co., 39 Wash. 355 847, 850, 864, 886 
 
 Smith V. Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283 313, 443, 1318 
 
 Smith V. Sedalia, 244 Mo. 107 307, 443, 444 
 
 Smith V. Silverton, 71 Ore. 379 446 
 
 Smith v. Smythe, 197 N. Y. 457 174 
 
 Smith V. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 146 Cal. 164. . . .525, 529, 594, 595, 859 
 
 Smith V. State, 23 N. J. L. 712 477 
 
 Smith V. Taylor, 34 Tex. 589 70 
 
ccxii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Smith V. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 17 N. J. L. 5 1126 
 
 Smith V. Tripp, 14 R. I. 112 1236 
 
 Smith V. Vandevere, 25 N. J. L. 669 948 
 
 Smith V. Wakefield, 105 Mass, 473 1328, 1348 
 
 Smith V. Washington, 20 How. 135 300, 507, 515 
 
 Smith V. Wescott, 17 R. I. 366 401 
 
 Smith V. Wiggin, 48 N. H. 105 1262 
 
 Smith Canal, etc., Co. v. Colorado Ice, etc., Co., 34 Colo. 485 612 
 
 Smith County Commissioners v. Lahore, .37 Kan. 480 744 
 
 Smyth V. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 • 86, 279 
 
 Smyth V. Caswell, 67 Tex. 567 1186 
 
 Snedaker v. Sullivan, 4 Sneed 116 952 
 
 Snell V. Chicago, 152; U. S. 191 1416 
 
 Snider v. St. Paul, 51 Minn. 466 1308 
 
 Snively v. Washington Township, 218 Pa. 249 481 
 
 Snoufifer v. Cedar Rapids, etc., R. R. Co., 118 Iowa 237 378 
 
 Snouffer v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co,. 105 Iowa 681 1190 
 
 Snow V. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 65 Me. 230 1175, 1216 
 
 Snow V. Provincetown, 109 Mass. 123 . 833, 869, 872 
 
 Snowden v. Shelby County, 118 Tenn. 725 651, 653 
 
 Snowden v. Wilas, 19 Ind. 10 227 
 
 Snyder v. Cowan, 1'20 Mo. 389 655 
 
 Snyder v. Ft. Madison St. Ry. Co., 105 Iowa 284 541, 543 
 
 Snyder v. Foster, 77 Iowa 638 1010 
 
 Snyder v. Mt. Pulaski, 176 111. 397 481 
 
 Snyder v. Rockport, 6 Ind. 327 507 
 
 Snyder v. Western Union R. R. Co., -25 Wis. 60 723, 1217 
 
 Sohn V. Cambern, 106 Ind. 302 884 
 
 Soller V. Brown Township, 67 Mioh. 422 1119 
 
 SoUers v. iSoUers, 77 Mich. 148 432 
 
 Solten V. De Held, 2 Sim. N. S. 133 491 
 
 Somerset, etc.. Traction Co. v. Doyle, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 726 892 
 
 Somerville v. Wimbish, 7 Gratt. 205 948 
 
 Somerville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Doughty, -22 N. J. L. 495 . . 660, 666, 72,3, 730, 733 
 
 734, 1111, 1223 
 
 Sommer v. Pacific R. R. Co., 4 Mo. App. 586 959 
 
 Sonoma County v. Crozier, 11§ Cal. 680 1065 
 
 Sonora Highway Commissioners v. Carthage Supervisors, 27 111. 140. . . 1119 
 
 Soulard v. St. Louis, 36 Mo. 546 1243, 1282 
 
 Soule V. Passaic, 47 N. J. Eq. 28 1261, 1359 
 
 South Abington Road, Re, 109 Pa. 118 925, 929 
 
 South Bend v. Turner, 156 Ind. 418 1309, 1376 
 
 South Bound R. R. Co. v. Burton, 67 S. C. 315. . . .321, 526, 530, 596, 597, 598 
 
 South Buffalo Ry. Co. v. Kirkover, 176 N. Y. 301 723, 724, 727 
 
 South Carolina, etc., R. R. Co. v. American Tel., etc., Co., 65 S. C. 459 . . 755 
 
 995, 1004, 1033, 1035, 1072, 1074 
 South Carolina, etc., R. R. Co. v. Columbia, etc., R. R. Co., 13 -Rich. Eq. 
 
 339 999 
 
 South Carolina, etc.. Steamboat Co. v. Wilmington, etc., R. R. Co., 46 
 
 S. C. 327 885 
 
Table of Cases. ooxiu 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 South Carolina R. R. Co., Ex parte, 2 Rich. 434 185, 1097 
 
 South Carolina R. R. Co. v. Blake, 9 Rich. L. 228 60, 63, 911, 915, 921 
 
 South Carolina R. R. Co. v. Steiner, 44 Ga. 546 526, 530, 595, 598 
 
 South Carolina Western Ry. Co. v. Ellen, 95 S. C. 68. . ..943, 944, 970, 971 
 
 South Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 196 111. 490 1120 
 
 South Chicago R. R. Co. v. Dix, 109 111. 237 192 
 
 South Dakota Cent. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 141 Fed. 578. . 1042 
 
 South East, etc., Ry. Co. v. Evansville, etc., Ry. Co., 169 Ind. 339 385 
 
 Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. Constantine, 9 C. C. A. 359 486, 580 
 
 Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. Francis, 109 Ala. 224 469, 485, 486, 578, 580 
 
 Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nalley, 165 Fed. 263 578 
 
 Southern Boulevard R. R. Co., Matter of, 143 N. Y. 2S3 1116 
 
 Southern California Ry. Co. v. Slauson, 138 Cal. 342 1269 
 
 Southern Cotton Press & Mfg. Co. v. Galveston Wharf Co., 3 Willson 
 
 258 1137 
 
 Southern Illinois, etc., Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 Mo. 1 .... 3, 59, 95, 96, 187 
 
 983, 988, 1154 
 
 Southern Illinois, etc.. Bridge Co. v. Stone, 194 Mo. 175 804 
 
 Southern Indiana ?,y. Co. v. Indianapolis, etc., Ry. Co., 168 Ind. 360. . . 935 
 
 1009, 1077 
 
 Southern Indiana Ry. Co. v. Indianapolis, etc., Ry. Co., 87 N. E. 209.. 1008 
 
 Southern Kansas R. R. Co. v. Oklahoma City, 12 Okla. 82 67, 371, 381 
 
 622, 637, 747, 752 
 
 Southern Kansas R. R. Co. v. Showalter, 57 Kan. 688 656 
 
 Southern Kansas R. R. Co. v. Vance, 155 S. W. 696 1079, 1083, 1121 
 
 Southern Minnesota, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stoddard, 6 Minn. 150 918 
 
 Southern New England R. R. Co., In re, 94 Atl. 738 653 
 
 Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Hyatt, 132 Cal. 240 1409, 1411 
 
 Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Reed, 41 Cal. 256 525, 533, 604 
 
 Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Reis Estate Co., 15 Cal. App. 216 1109 
 
 Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. San Francisco Savings Union, 146 Cal. 
 
 290 484, 500, 599, 609, 659, 689, 690, 1169, 1182 
 
 Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Portland, 227 U. S. 559 374, 642 
 
 Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Southern California R. R. Co., Ill Cal. 
 
 221 972 
 
 Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. United States, 109 Fed. 921 1008 
 
 Southern Power Co., In re, 140 Wis. 245 117 
 
 Southern Power Co. v. White, 92 S. C. 219 1139 
 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Abies, 153 Ala. 523 323, 885 
 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Atlanta, etc., Ry. Co., Ill Ga. 679 385, 541 
 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Birmingham, etc., Ry. Co., 130 Ala. 660 644 
 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Gregg, 101 Va. 308 1286 
 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Hood, 126 Ala. 312 1265, 1275 
 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267 3, 60, 164, 660, 661, 667 
 
 671, 915, 946, 960 
 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Michaels, 126 Tenn. 702 1150 
 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Parnell, 142 Ala. 146 1194 
 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 179 U. S. 641 1094 
 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Rome, 141 Ga. 143 ggg 
 
ccxiv Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Williams, 113 Ga. 335 1191 
 
 Southern Wisconsin Power Co., Re, 140 Wis. 245 148, 195, 197 
 
 South, etc., R. R. Co. v. Davis, 185 Ala. 193 525 
 
 South, etc., R. R. Co. v. Highland Ave., etc., R. R. Co., 110 Ala. 105... 10O5 
 
 South Haven v. Van Buren Probate Judge, 140 Mich. 117 991 
 
 South Omaha v. Ruthjen, 71 Nebr. 545 805 
 
 South Park Commissioners v. Ayer, 245 111. 402 1111, 1112, 1145 
 
 South Park Commissioners v. Dunlevy, 91 111. 49 654, 666, 670, 1149 
 
 South Park Commissioners v. Todd, 112 111. 379 354 
 
 South Park Commissioners v. Ward, 248 111. 299 2, 59, 77, 647, 916, 973 
 
 Southport, etc., R. R. Co. v. Piatt Land, 133 N. C. 266 776, 808 
 
 South Twelfth St., Re, 217 Pa. 562 282 
 
 Southwark, etc., Water Co. v. Wardsworth Board of Works, (1898) 
 
 2 Ch. 603 819 
 
 Southwestern Land Co. v. Hickory, etc., Co., 18 Colo. 482 951, 952, 953 
 
 Southwest Pennsylvania Pipe Line Co. v. Directors of tho Poor, 1 Pa. 
 
 C. C. 46 10(H 
 
 Southwestern Power Co., In re, 140 Wis. 245 156 
 
 Southwestern R. R. Co. v. Southern, etc., Tel. Co., 46 Ga. 43 95, 370, 638 
 
 755, 756 
 
 South Western State Normal School, In re, 26 Pa. Super. Ct. 99 1003 
 
 Southwestern Tel. etc., Co. v. Gulf, etc., Ry. Co., 52 S. W. 106 211 
 
 Southwestern Tel. Co. v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 108 La. 691 95 
 
 Southwestern Tel., etc., Co. v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 109 La. 892. . 757, 
 
 994 
 
 Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Smithdeal, 103 Tex. 128 485, 486 577 
 
 581, 1162 
 
 Southwestern Tel., etc., Co. v. Smithdeal, 126 S. W. 942 890 
 
 Spader v New York EL R. R. Co., 3 Abb. N. C. 467 1400 
 
 Spalding v. Macomb, etc., R. R. Co., 225 111. 585 536, 549, 1395 
 
 Spangle, etc.. Canal Co.'s Appeal, 64 Pa. 387 1235 
 
 Spangler v. San Francisco, 84 Cal. 12 1355. 1364 
 
 Sparhawk v. Walpole, 20 N. H. 317 1059, li228, 1229 
 
 Sparks Mfg. Co. v. Newton, 57 N. J. Eq. 367 440 
 
 Spaulding v. Andover, 54 N. H. 38 402 
 
 Spaulding v. Arlington, 126 Mass. 492 1055, 1246, 1247 
 
 Spaulding v. Lowell, 23 Pick. 71 151 
 
 Spaulding v. Nourse, 143 Mass. 490 835, 904, 1405 
 
 Spaulding v. Peabody, 153 Mass. 129 1343 
 
 Spaulding v. Plainville, 218 Mass. 321 838, 839, 842 
 
 Spear v. Allison, 20 Pa. 200 612 
 
 Spear v. Bicknell, 5 Mass. 125 463, 470 
 
 Speck v. Kenoyer, 164 Ind. 431 173, 763, 913 
 
 Spencer v. Andrew, 82 Iowa 14 587 
 
 Spencer v. London, etc., R. R. Co., 8 Sim. 198 883 
 
 Spencer v. Mahon, 75 S. C. 232 522 
 
 Spencer v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 120 Mo. 154.... 321, 524, 789, 805, 868 
 
 878, 1216, 1217 
 
 Spencer v. Point Pleasant, etc., R. R. Co., 23 W. Va. 406 321, 502, 647 
 
 890, 1395 
 
Table of Cases. ccxv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] TAGE 
 
 Spencer v. Seaboard Air Line Co., 137 N. C. 107 3, 69 
 
 Spencer County Court v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 36 1231., 1232 
 
 Sperb V. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 137 N. Y. 155 597, 1281 
 
 Spies V. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 148 Wis. 35 656, 953, 1137 
 
 Split Rock Cable R. R. Co., Matter of, 128 N. Y. 408 116, 130, 188 
 
 Spoffiord V. Bueksport, etc., R. R. Co., 66 Me. 14 1027, 1118 
 
 Spokane v. Colby, 16 Wash. 610 577, 616 
 
 Spokane v. Spokane, etc., R. R. Co., 75. Wash. 651 145 
 
 Spokane v. Thompson, 69 Wash. 650 176, 790, 814 
 
 Spokane, etc., R. R. Co. v. Lieuallen, 3 Idaho 381 1196, 1200 
 
 Spokane Falls, etc., Ry. Co. v. Ziegler, 167 U. 8. 65 343, 342, 1133 
 
 Spokane Traction Co. v. Granath, 42 Wash. 506 814 
 
 Spokane Valley Land & Water Co. v. Jones, 53 Wash. 37 1069 
 
 Sprague v. Dorr, 185 Mass-. 10 348, 448, 452 
 
 Sprague v. Minon, 195 Mass. 58r. 427. 431 
 
 Sprague v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 122 Wis. 509 1099 
 
 Sprague v. Rhodes, 6 R. I. 56 959, 1265 
 
 Sprague v. Sea View R. R. Co., 72 Atl. 818 651 
 
 Sprague v. Tripp, 13 R. I. 38 1319, 1351 
 
 Sprague v. Waite, 17 Pick. 309 586 
 
 Sprague v. Worcester, 13 Gray 193 830, 1241 
 
 Spratt V. Helena Power Transmission Co., 35 Mont. 108 95, 249 
 
 Sprigg V. Western Tel. Co., 46 Md. 67 980 
 
 Spring V. Hyde Park, 137 Mass. 554 1345 
 
 Spring V. Williamatown, 186 Mass. 479 521 
 
 Spring City Gaslight Co. v. Pennsylvania, etc., R. R. Co., 167 Pa. 6. . . . 1184 
 
 Springer v. Chicago, 135 111. 552 790, 797, 895, 1143, 1190, 1195 
 
 Springer v. Walters, 139 111. 419 240 
 
 Springfield v. Connecticut River R. R. Co., 4 Cush. 63.. ..526, 996, 999, 1000 
 
 Springfield v. Miller, 12 Mass. 415 1414 
 
 Springfield v. Schmook, 68 Mo. 394 762, 804, 1190, 1200 
 
 Springfield v. Springfield St. Ry. Co., 182 Mass. 41 376, 394, 402 
 
 Springfield V. West Springfield Aqueduct Co., 167 Mass. 128 68.? 
 
 Springfield, etc., Insurance Co. v. Keesville, 148 N. Y. 46 1329 
 
 Springfield, etc., R. R. Co. v. Calkins, 90 Mo. 543 1181 
 
 Springfield, etc., R. R. Co. v. Henry, 44 Ark. 360 611, 1392 
 
 Springfield, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rhea, 44 Ark. 258 731, 1112, 1139, 1207 
 
 Springfield, etc., R. R. Co. v. Schweitzer, 173 Mo. App. 650 694, 698 
 
 Springfield, etc., R. R. Co. v. Turner, 68 111. 187 1114 
 
 Spring Valley Waterworks v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528 671, 907, 1083 
 
 1175, 1200 
 
 Spring Valley Waterworks v. Drinkhouse, 95 Cal. 220 643 
 
 Spring Valley Waterworks v. San Francisco, 124 Fed. 574 681 
 
 Spring Valley Waterworks v San Francisco, 22 Cal. 434 108S 
 
 Spring Valley Waterworks v. San Mateo Waterworks, 64 Cal. 123.. 921, 924 
 
 Squire v. Somerville, 120 Mass. 579 693, 1174 
 
 Stacey v. Vermont Central R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 30 1100, 1101 
 
 Stack v. East St. Louis, 85 111. 377 317, 515, 531, 1317 
 
ccxvi Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pagea 1-720 are In VolHine I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Stackhouse v. Lafayette, 26 Ind. 17 1316, 1373 
 
 Stackpole v. Healy, 16 Mass. 33 485, 487, 1419 
 
 Stadler v. Milwaukee, 34 Wis. 98 368 
 
 Stafford v. Albany, 7 Johns. 641 1103 
 
 Stafford v. Big Sandy, etc., Ky. Co., 104 Ky. 582 1111 
 
 Stafford v. Providence, 10 R. I. 567 660, 677, 1147 
 
 Stainton v. Metropolitan Board of Works, 29 L. J. Ch. 300 440 
 
 Stamford Water Co. v. Stanley, 39 Hun 434 200 
 
 Stamnes V. Milwaukee, etc., Ry. Co., 131 Wis. 85 367 
 
 Stanbury v. Exeter Corporation ( 1905) 2- K. B. 33i8 1298 
 
 Standish v. Montpelier, 71 Vt. 287 1273 
 
 Stanford v. Mangin, 30 Ga. 355 409 
 
 Stanford v. San Francisco, Ul'Cal. 198 1365 
 
 Stanford v. Worn, 27 Cal. 171 , 936, 1078 
 
 Stanley v. -Davenport, 54 Iowa 463 1344 
 
 Stauuard v. Aurora, etc., R. R. Co., 220 111. 474 1411, 1413 
 
 Stansbury v. Richmond, 116 Va.. 205 1329 
 
 Stanwood v. Maiden, 167 Mass. 17 326, 327, 366, 823, 834, 835 
 
 843, 885 
 
 'Stark V. Mansfield, 178 Mass. 76 342, 715 
 
 Stark V. MoGowen, 1 Nott & McC. 389 ■ 3, 624 
 
 Stark V. Sioux City, etc., Ry. Co., 43 Iowa 501 920 
 
 Starr v. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., 24 N". J. L. 692 526, 534 
 
 Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 641 56 
 
 Starr Buying Ground Assn. v. North Lane Cemetery Assn., 77 Conn. 83, 
 
 213, 913, 975, 1007 
 
 State V. Adams County Com*, 29 Wash. 1 173 
 
 State V. Aiken, 42 S. C. 222 216 
 
 State V. Allen, 178 Mo. 655 203 
 
 State V. Angus, 83 Conn. 137 986 
 
 State V. Anthoine, 40 Me. 435 1010 
 
 State V. Bancroft, 148 Wis. 124 117, 207, 287, 372, 460 
 
 State V. Barker, 116 Iowa 96 392, 401 
 
 State V. Beackins, 8 Blackf. 246 625 
 
 State V. Benton County Court, 60 Wash. 279 989 
 
 State V. Benton County Court, 60 Wash. 583 1257, 1269 
 
 State V. Benton County Court, 64 Wash. 594 917, 987 
 
 State V. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185 477 
 
 State V. Blend, 121 Ind. 514 391, 399 
 
 State V. Boone County, 78 Nebr. 271 997, 998 
 
 State V. Broatch, 68 Neb. 687 391, 400 
 
 State V. Bruggerman, 31 Minn. 493 642, 904 
 
 State V. Buckles, 8 Ind. App. 282 1416 
 
 State V. Carragan, 36 N. J. L. 52 , 282 
 
 State V. Centralia-Chehalis Electric Railway & Power Co., 42 Wash. 
 
 632 144, 196, 1085 
 
 State V. Central New Jersey Tel. Co., 53 N. J. L. 341 994 
 
 State V. Chapman, 69 N. J. L. 464 367 
 
 SUte T. Ohehalis County Court, 47 Wash. 397 258 
 
Table of Cases. ccxvii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PASE 
 
 State V. Ohehalis County Court, 48 Wash. 277 66, 426, 1030, 1092 
 
 State V. Chelan County Court, 36 Wash. 381 998 
 
 State V. Chelan County Court, 69 Wash. 189 164, 723 
 
 State V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 115 Minn. 51 189 
 
 State V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 25 Neb. 156 95 
 
 State V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 29 Neb. 412 750 
 
 State V. Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co., 17 Ohio St. 103 1100, 1101, 1104 
 
 State V. Clallam County Court, 68 Wash. 612 258 
 
 State V. Clarke County Court, 44 Wash. 108 741 
 
 State V. Clarke County Court, 45 Wash. 316 1004 
 
 State V. Concordia 78 Kan. 250 445 
 
 State V. Conover, 7 N. J. L. 203 947 
 
 State V. Cook, 171 Mo. 348 95 
 
 State V. Cornell, 53 Neb. 556 165 
 
 State V. Corrigan Consolidated St. Ry. Co., 85 Mo. 263 374 
 
 State V. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102 400 
 
 State V. Cowlitz County, 77 Wash. 585 60, 127, 237 
 
 State V. Culver, 65 Mo. 607 1407 
 
 State V. Dawson, 3 Hill L. 100 19, 624 
 
 State V. Dayton Traction Co., 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. 490 536 
 
 State V. Deer Lodge County, 19 Mont. 582 322, 879 
 
 State V. Delesdernier, 11 Me. 473 946 
 
 State V. Denny, 118 Ind. 449 392 
 
 State V. Des Moines, 103 Iowa 76 401 
 
 State V. Dexter, 10 R. I. 341 1405 
 
 State V. Digby, 5 Blackf. 543 763 
 
 State V. District Court, 50 Minn. 14 948 
 
 State V. District Court, 77 Minn. 248 1004 
 
 State V. District Court, 87 Minn. 149 65 
 
 State V. District Court, 87 Minn. 268 947, 953, 955 
 
 State V. District Court, 28 Mont. 528 310 
 
 State V. District Court, 34 Mont. 535 916, 920 
 
 State V. Dodge City, etc., R. R. Co., 53 Kan. 329 1403 
 
 State V. Dodge City, etc., R. R. Co., 53 Kan. 377 1416, 1417 
 
 State V. Dupaquier, 46 La. Ann. 577 285 
 
 State V. Easton, etc., R. R. Co., 36 N. J. L. 181 355 
 
 State V. Eau Claire, 40 Wis. 533 151 
 
 State V. Economy Light, etc., Co., 241 111. 290 422 
 
 State V. Edens, 85 N. C. 522 477, 522 
 
 State V. Edwards, 42 Mont. 135 392, 398 
 
 State V. Eicher, 178 S. W. 171 1264, 1286 
 
 State V. Elizabeth, 32 N. J. L. 357 933, 1078 
 
 State V. Engelmann, 106 Mo. 628 914 
 
 State V. Evans, 3 111. 208 773, 796 
 
 State v. Farmers' Irrigation District, 98 Nebr. 239 966 
 
 State V. Flad, 23 Mo. App. 185 578 
 
 State V. Fond du Lac. 42 Wis. 287 926, 932, 937 
 
 State V. Fox, 158 Ind. 126 392, 3193, 400 
 
 State V. Franklin Falls Co., 49 N. H. 240 410, 460, 14,10 
 
ocxviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 State V. Freeman, 61 Kan. 90 400 
 
 State V. French, 71 Oliio St. 186 284 
 
 State V. Fuller, 105 Me. 571 632, 634, 949 
 
 State V. Gilmanton, 9 N. H. 461 ., 410 
 
 State V. Glen, 7 Jones L. 321 85 
 
 State V. Godwin, 145 N. C. 461 1410 
 
 State V. Goldstucker, 40 Wis. 124 1049, 1117 
 
 State V. Grand Island, etc., E. E. Co., 31 Neb. 209 970 
 
 State V. Grant County Court 64 Wash. IS* 989 
 
 State T. Graves, 19 Md. 351 77, 991, 1099, 1101 
 
 State V. Gray's Harbor, etc., E. E. Co., 60 Wash. 32 67 
 
 State V. Grefe, 139 Iowa 181 301 
 
 State V. Griffin, 69 N. H. 1 3, 273, 448 
 
 State V. Grif tner, 61 Ohio St. 201 612, 1421 
 
 State V. Giiilbert, 56 Ohio St. 575 288 
 
 State V. Haben, 22 Wis. 6i60 392, 40O, 402 
 
 State V. Halifax Commissioners, 15 N. C. 345 369 
 
 State V. Hannibal, etc., Eoad Co., 138 Mo. 332 619 
 
 State V. Hanson, 80 Neb. 724 245 
 
 State V. Harland, 74 Wis. 11 1051 
 
 State V. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462 400 
 
 State V. Hazelton E. E. Co., 40 Ohio St. 504 253 
 
 State V. Henley, 98 Tenn. 665 271, 368 
 
 State V. Hennepin County Court, 42 Minn. 247 749 
 
 State V. Hilbert, 72 Wis. 184 394 
 
 State V. Hine, 59 Conn. 50 391, 400 
 
 State V. Hockett, 70 Iowa 442 56 
 
 State V. Hogue, 71 Wis. 384 981, 1121 
 
 State V. Holman, 40 Minn. 369 323 
 
 State v. Houston, 94 Neb. 445 369 
 
 State V. Hudson Tunnel Ey. Co., 38 N. J. L. 548 76 
 
 State V. Hudson Tunnel Ey. Co., 46 N. J. L. 289 1027 
 
 State V. Hug, 44 Mo. 116 1099, lll4 
 
 State V. Huggins, 47 Ind. 586 1405 
 
 State V. Humes, 34 Wash. 347 654, 1114 
 
 State V. Hunter, 38 Kan. 578 399 
 
 State V. Jack, 145 Fed. 281 1403 
 
 &tate V. Jackman, 69 N. H. 318 274 
 
 State V. Jacksonville St. Ey. Co., 29 Fla. 590 537 
 
 , State V. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 4l' Fla. 377 2, 54, 115 
 
 State V. Jersey City, 25 N. J. L. 309 937, 1079 
 
 State V. Joiner, 23 Miss. 500 1408 
 
 State V. Jones, 139 N. C. 613 632, 914, 925, 927, 941, 944, 946, 
 
 949, 1016 
 
 State V. Kansas City, 89 Mo. 34 804 
 
 State V. Keokuk, 9 Iowa 438 1099 
 
 State V. King County Court, 26 Wash. 278 351, 646 
 
 State V. King County Court, 28 Wash. 317 1094 
 
 State V. King County Court, 30 Wash. 219 893 
 
Table of Cases. coxix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 State V. King County Court, 31 Wash. 445 78 1075 
 
 State V. King County Court, 46 Wash. 916 67, 157, 187, 1O08 
 
 State \. King County Court, 50 Wash. 13 207 
 
 State V. King County Court, 52 Wash. 196 204, 20« 
 
 State V. King County Court, 54 Wash. 365 1007 
 
 State V. King County Court, 59 Wash. 598 1004 
 
 State V. King County Court, 67 Wash. 37 402 
 
 State V. King County Court, 69 Wash. 69 989, 991, 992 
 
 State T. Klickitat County Court, 70 Wash. 486 151, 169, 209 
 
 State T. Kolsem, 130 Ind. 434 391, 399 
 
 State V. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530 53 
 
 State V. Laverack, 34 N. J. L. 201 587 
 
 JState V. Lawing, 164 N. C. 492 274 
 
 State V. Leaver, 62 Wis. 387 477 
 
 State V. Leighton, 83 Me. 419 101 
 
 State V. Leon, 68 Wis. 502 1058 
 
 State V. Leslie, 30 Minn. 533 803 
 
 State V. Lewis, 42 Wash. 672 1080 
 
 State V. Lewis County Court, 60 Wash. 193 921, 1091 
 
 State V. Lewis County Court, 80 Wash. 417 70, 71, 339, 931, 1074, 1230 
 
 State V. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71 134, 165 
 
 State V. Maine, 27 Conn. 641 174, 619 
 
 State V. Maine, 69 Conn. 123 285 
 
 State V. Mansfield, 23 N. J. L. 510 190 
 
 State V. Marion County Conunissioners, 170 Ind. 59S 1405 
 
 State V. McHatton, 15 Mont. 159 644 
 
 State V. Meagher Coimty, 34 Mont. 535 189 
 
 State V. Meek, 112 Iowa 338 460 
 
 Svate V. Messenger, 27 Minn. 119 632, 636, 642, 958 
 
 State V. Miller, 48 Me. 576 283 
 
 State V. Miller, 23 N. J. L. 387 806, 1127 
 
 State V. Mills, 29 Wis. 322 1101 
 
 State V. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 549 107 
 
 State V. Milwaukee County Court, 105 Wis. 051 1316 
 
 State V. Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co., 114 Minn. 70 542 
 
 State V. Minneapolis Park Commissioners, 33 Minn. 524 1101, 1231 
 
 State V. Minnesota Park Commissioners, 100 Minn. 150 77 
 
 State V. Minnesota Transfer R. R. Co., 80 Minn. 108 77 
 
 State V. Mobile, 5 Port. 279' 587, 1405 
 
 State V. Mobile, etc., R. R. Co., 86 Miss. 172 1404 
 
 State V. Montclair, 67 N. J. L. 426 572 
 
 State V. Montclair R. R. Co., 35 N. J. L. 328 907, 1002 
 
 State V. Morris, etc., R. R. Co., 25 N. J. L. 437 9i97, 1003 
 
 State V. Morse, 50 N. H. 9 1405 
 
 State Y. Morse, 84 Vt. 387 449 
 
 State V. Mott, 61 Md. 297 278 
 
 State V. Murphy, 134 Mo. 548 .■ 58.5 
 
 State V. Neff, 52 Ohio St. 375 372, 389 
 
 State V. Nelson, 57 Wis. 147 947 
 
ccxx Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in. Volume II.] PAGB 
 
 State V. Nevada Central R. R. Co., 21 Nev. 186 1194 
 
 State V. New, 130 N. C. 731 308, 1376 
 
 State v. Newark, 27 N. J. L. 185 904 
 
 State V. Newark, 28 N. J. L. 529 997, 1001 
 
 State v. New York, etc., Tel. Co., 51 N. J. L. 83 577 
 
 State V. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 98 Minn. 429 749 
 
 State V. Noyes, 47 Me. 189 66, 68, 360, 363, 973 
 
 State T. Olympia Light & Power Co., 46 Wash. 511 197 
 
 State V. Orange, 32 N. J. L. 49 344, 925 1074 
 
 State V. Orange, 54 N. J. L. Ill 148, 911, 915 
 
 State V. Oshkosh, 84 Wis. 548 t 1049, 1117 
 
 State V. Oshkosh, etc., E. R. Co., 100 Wis. 538 1095 
 
 State V. Pacific County Court, 51 Wash. 386 200, 202 
 
 State V. Pacific County Court, 56 Wash. 214 144, 1091 
 
 State v. Pacific County Court, 65 Wash. 129 975 
 
 State V. Parkhurat, 9 N. J. L. 427 32 
 
 State T. Paterson, 61 NT. J. L. 408, 997, 1001 
 
 State V. Phipps, 4 Ind. 515 996, 1003 
 
 State V. Pierce, 52 Kan. 521 683 
 
 State V. Pierce County Court, 42 Wash. 675 193 
 
 State v. Pierce County Court, 42 Wash. 684 1119 
 
 State V. Pierce County Court, 44 Wash. 476 921, 902 
 
 State V. Pierce County Court, 53 Wash. 321 1009 
 
 State V. Pierce County Court, 86 Wash. 155 63 
 
 State V. Pierson, 37 N. J. L. 363 806 
 
 State V. Plainfield, 41 N. J. L. 138 933, 1078 
 
 State V. Polk County Commissioners, 87 Minn. 385 243, 914. 1065 
 
 State V. Portland, 74 Me. 268 1313, 1378 
 
 State V. Pottmeyer, 33 Ind. 402 615 
 
 State V. Powers, 124 Tenn. 553 243 
 
 State V. Puget Sound, etc., R. R. Co., 54 Wash. 530 667, 669 
 
 State V. Railroad Commission, 140 Wis. 145 753, 755 
 
 State V. Railroad Commissioners, 56 Conn. 308 189, 993 
 
 State V. Rayburn, 2 Okla. Crim. Rep. 413 369 
 
 State V. Reed, 38 N. H. 59 925 
 
 State V. Rich Creek, 167 Ind. 217 276 
 
 State V. Richmond, 26 N. H. 232 1051 
 
 State V. Rives, 27 N. C. 297 1421 
 
 State V. Roberts, 59 N. H. 256 432 
 
 State V. St. Louis, 145 Mo. 551 211 
 
 State V. St. Louis County Court, 34 Mo. 546 399 
 
 State V. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 35 Minn. 131 385, 387 
 
 State V. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 98 Minu. 380 371, 749, 750 
 
 State V. Salem Water Co., 5 Ohio, C. C. 58 984 
 
 State V. Sanders Coimty, 42 Mont. 105 100 
 
 State V. Sargent, 45 Conn. 358 456 
 
 State V. Savage, 65 Neb. 714 681 
 
 State V. Savannah, 1 T. U. P., Charlton 235 32, 36 
 
 State V. Schweickardt, 109 Mo. 496 398 
 
Table of Cases. ocxxi 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAQB 
 
 State V. Scott, 22 Nebr. 628 9-96 
 
 State V. Seehorn, 246 Mo. 541 1096, 1120 
 
 State V. Several Parcels of Land, 79 Neb. 638 632, 636 
 
 State V. Seymour, 36 N. J. L. 47 310 
 
 State V. Shardlow, 43 Minn. 524 749, 753, 803 
 
 State V. Shawnee County Commisaioners, 83 Kan. 109 394, 395, 949 
 
 State V. Sheboygan, 111 Wis. 23 994 
 
 State V. Sherman, 22 Ohio St. 434 95 
 
 State V. Silver Bow County Court, 48 Mont. 614 1027 
 
 State V. Skagit County Court, 78 Wash. 679 145 
 
 State V. Skagit River Tel., etc., Co. 85 Wash. 29 276 
 
 State V. Skamania County Court, 47 Wash. 166 1006 
 
 State V. Snohomish County Court, 68 Wash. 572 185, 191 
 
 State V. Snohomish County Court, 71 Wash. 84 144, 203 
 
 State V. Snook, 53 Ohio St. 521 612 
 
 State V. Southern Pacific Ey. Co., 24 Tex. 127 973 
 
 State V. Spencer, 53 Kan. 655 981 
 
 Stajte V. Spokane Coumty Court, 65 Wash. 64 620, 1192, 1200, 1420 
 
 State ». Spokane County Court, 50 Wash. 621, 158, 251, 252 
 
 State V. Spokane County Court, 62 Wash. 96 lOOO 
 
 State V. Spokane County Court, 85 Wash. 187 1101 
 
 State V. Spokane, etc., E. E. Co., 75 Wash. 651 189 
 
 State V. Staples, 157 N. C. 607 277 
 
 State V. Stewart, 74 Wis. 620 63, 911, 915, 917 
 
 State V. Still, 178 Ala. 442 „ 1079 
 
 State V. Suffield, etc., Bridge Co., 81 Conn. 56 619 
 
 State V. Suffield, etc.. Bridge Co., 82 Conn. 460 682, 684 
 
 State V. Summerville, 104 La. 74 1256 
 
 State V. Sunapee Dam Co., 70 N. H. 458 433 
 
 State V. Taylor, 224 Mo. 393 405, 902 
 
 State V. Taylor, 107 Tenn. 455 879 
 
 State V. Teipner, 36 Minn. 535 271, 368 
 
 State V. Theriault, 70 Vt. 617 406, 431, 432 
 
 State V. Thompson, 149 Wis. 488 215 
 
 State V. Thurston County Court, 42 Wash. 660 149, 207 
 
 State V. Tiedeman, 69 Mo. 306 1417 
 
 State V. Toledo, 48 Ohio St. 112 200, 210, 215 
 
 State V. Toledo, etc., Ey. Co., 24 Ohio Ct. Rep. 321 187, 193 
 
 State V. Topeka, 36 Kan. 76 50, 283 
 
 State V. Trenton, 36 N. J. L. 198 1121 
 
 State V. Trenton, 36 N. J. L. 499 925 
 
 State V. Vernon, 25 Vt. 244 1051 
 
 State V. Waite, 70 Ohio St. 149 643 
 
 State V. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437 288 
 
 State V. Whatcom County, 42 Wash. 521 173 
 
 State- V. Wheeler, 44 N. J. L. 88 448 
 
 State V. Wheeler, 141 N. C. 773' 369 
 
 State V. White River Power Co., 39 Wash. 648, 117, 129, 130, 155, 169 
 
 207, 228 
 XV 
 
Bcxxii Table op Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 State V. Whitesides, 30 B. C. 579 186 
 
 Btate V. Whitlock, 149 N. C. 542 277, 278 
 
 State V. Whitman County Court, 45 Wash. 270 997, 1002 
 
 State V. Wtethaupt, 231 Mo. 449 165, 199, 200 
 
 State V. Williams, 68 Conn. 131 391, 395 
 
 State V. Wilson, 42 Me. 9 454 
 
 State V. Withrow, 24 S. W. 638 1057, 1114 
 
 State V. Woodward, 23 Vt. 92 1415 
 
 State V. Yakima County Count, 67 Wash. 556 250 
 
 State V. Yates, 104 Me. 360 441, 472 
 
 State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. 369 75, 969 
 
 State Board of Health v. Diamond Mills Paiper Co., 63 N. J. Eq. 111. . 449 
 
 StaAe Board of Health v. Jersey City, 55 N. J. Eq. 116 313 
 
 State Highway Commissioner v. Chambersburg, etc., Turnpike Road Co., 
 
 242 Pa. 171 632, 635, 642 
 
 State Line Telephone Co. v. Ellison, 121 App. Div. 499 396 
 
 State Lunatic Hospital v. Worcester County, 1 Met. 437 1134 
 
 Staten Island E. E. Co., In re, 3 N. Y. St. Rep. 48 1090 
 
 Staten Island Rapid Transit E. R. Co., In re, 103 N. Y. 251 189 
 
 Staten Island Rapid Transit E. E. Co., In re, 41 Hun 392 427 
 
 State Park Commissioners v. Henry, 38 Minn. 266 632, 635, 914, 1100 
 
 State Reservation, Matter of, 102 N. Y. 734 632, 635 
 
 State Water Supply Commission v. Curtis, 192 N. Y. 319 637, 914, 927 
 
 Staton V. AtlaHtic Coast Line R. R. Co., 147 N. C. 428 498, 960, 1396 
 
 Staton V. Norfolk, etc., R. R. Co., Ill N. C. 278. . . .85, 302, 611, 623, 1392 
 
 Stealey v. Kansas City, 179 Mo. 400 1343 
 
 Stearns v. Barre, 73 Vt. 281 60, 912, 921, 1094 
 
 Stearns v. Richmond, 88 Va. 992 508, 515, 1319 
 
 Steel V. Emporia, 142 Ind. 397 1004 
 
 Steel V. Tanana Mines Ey. Co., 2 Alaska, 451 1255 
 
 Steele v. Madison County Commissioners, 83 Ala. 304 58, 1119 
 
 Steers v. Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 51 456 
 
 Stehr V. Mason City, etc., E. E. Co., 77 Nebr. 641 619, 887, 890, 1420 
 
 Steifel V. Metz, 2 Cincinnati Law Bull. 95 712 
 
 Stein V. Bienville Water Supply Co., 141 U. S. 67 363 
 
 Stein V. Burden, 24 Ala. 130 434, 440, 1220, 1238, 1282 
 
 Stein V. Chesapeake, etc., E. E. Co., 132 Ky. 322 497, 524, 596, 1399 
 
 Stein V. Lafayette, 6 Ind. App. 414 303 
 
 Steinhart v. Mendocino County Court, 137 Cal. 575 310, 643, 961, 963 
 
 SItephens v. Cambria, etc., R. R. Co., 242 Pa. 606 724 
 
 Stephens v. New York, etc., E. E. Co., 175 N. Y. 72 533 
 
 Stephenson v. Atchison, etc.. Power Co., 88 Kan, 794 555, 892 
 
 Sterling's Appeal, 111 Pa. 35 470, 474, 573, 1257, 1395 
 
 Stern v. Spokane, 73 Wash. 118 871 
 
 Sterritt v. Young, 14 Wyo. 146 4, 902, 925, 1019, 1079, 1257 
 
 Stetson V. Bangor, 60 Me. 313 351 
 
 Stetson V. Chicago, etc., R. E. Co., 75 111. 74 527, 551, 647 
 
 Stetson V. Faxon, 19 Pick, 147 491, 884 
 
 (Stetson V. Medford, 109 Mass 1110 
 
Table of Cases. ocxxm 
 
 tPages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Steuart v. Philadelphia County, 2 Pa. 340 1106 
 
 Stevens v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 36 ^^^ 
 
 Stevens v. Danbury, 53 Conn. 9 1101, 1104 
 
 Stevens v. Dublin, 169 S. W. 188 324 
 
 Stevens v. Duck Eiver Navigation Co., 1 Sneed 236 1100 
 
 Stevens v. Erie E. E. Co., 21 N. J. Eq. 359 1011 
 
 Stevens v. Kelley, 78 Me. 445 615 
 
 Stevens v. Middlesex Canal, 12 Mass. 466 1235 
 
 Stevens v. Middlesex Canal, 5 Met. 81 825 
 
 Stevens v. New York El. E. E. Co., 130' N. Y. 95 740 
 
 Stevens v. New York, etc., E. E. Co., 83 Conn. 603 196 
 
 Stevens v. Paterson, etc., E. E. Co., 34 N. J. L. 532 414, 426 
 
 Stevens v. Skaneateles R. E. Co., 42 Misc. 145 '. 1396 
 
 Stevens v. Worcester, 196 Mass. 45 434, 1191, 1244, 1314, 1318 
 
 Stevens v. Worcester, 219 Mass. 128 285, 435, 1062, 1165, 1244, 1314 
 
 Stevens Point Boom Co. v. Eeilly, 44 Wis. 295 992 
 
 Stewart's Appeal, 56 Pa. 513 984 
 
 Stewart v. Board of Police, 25 Miss. 479 70, 926 
 
 Stewart v. Clinton, 79 Mo. 603 1353, 1357 
 
 Stewart v. Council Bluffs, 84 Iowa 61 789, 798 
 
 Stewart v. El Paso County, 130 S. W. 590 176 
 
 Stewart v. Great Northern Railway Co., 65 Minn. 515 149, 189, 916 
 
 Stewart v. Hartman, 46 Ind. 331 , 236 
 
 Stewart v. New Orleans, 9 La. Ann. 461 1307 
 
 Stewart v. Ohio Eiver E. E. Co., 38 W. Va. 438 506, 532, 660, 661 
 
 815, 890 
 
 Stewart v. Polk County Supervisors, 30 Iowa 9 185, 266 
 
 Stewart v. Raymond E. E. Co., 7 Smed. & M. 568 355 
 
 Stickford v. St. Louis, 75 Mo. 309 875 
 
 Stickley v. Chesapeake, etc., E. R. Co., 93 Ky. 323 321, 1286 
 
 Stidger v. Rogers, 2 Ky. 52 32 
 
 Stillman v. Northern Pacific Ey. Co., 34 Minn. 420 733 
 
 Stillwater, etc., Ey. Co. v. Slade, 36 App. Div. 587 1070 
 
 Stillwater Water Co. v. Stillwater, 50 Minn. 498 376 
 
 Stith V. Louisville, etc., E. E. Co., 109 Ky. 180 856 
 
 Stock V. Boston, 149 Mass. 410 836, 1376, 1379 
 
 Stockdale v. Eio Grande Western Ry. Co., 28 Utah 201 193, 309, 318 
 
 Stocking V. Lincoln, 93 Neb. 798 872, 876, 895 
 
 Stockton V. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 32 Fed. 9 113 
 
 Stockton, etc., R. E. Co. v. Brown, 9 H. L. Cas. 240 920 
 
 Stockton V. etc., R. R. Co. v. Galgiani, 49 Cal. 139 1173 
 
 Stockton etc.. Water Board v. Kirkleatham Local Board, (1893) A. C. 
 
 444, 684 
 
 Stoddard v. Saratoga Springs, 127 N. Y. 261 1343 
 
 Stodghill V. Chicago, etc., R. E Co., 43 Iowa 26 726 
 
 Stokes V. Parker, 83 N. J. L. 183 1156 
 
 Stokes V. Upper Appomatox Co., 3 Leigh 337 , 19, 624 
 
 Stolze V. Manitowoc Terminal Co., 100 Wis. 208 1178, 1189 
 
 Stolze V. Milwaukee, etc., E. E. Co., 113 Wis. 44 654, 952, 954 
 
ccxxiv Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Stone V. Augusta, 46 Me. 127 1318, 1370 
 
 Stone V. Boston, 2 Mete. 220 936, 1046, 1076 
 
 Stone V. Cambridge, 6 Gush. 270 1069 
 
 Stone V. Commonwealth, 181 Mass. 438 693, 1169 
 
 Stone V. Fairbury, etc., E. R. Co., 68 111. 394 317, 597, 598, 736, 890 
 
 Stone V. Heath, 135 Mass. 561 285, 735, 1060 
 
 Stone V. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814 361 
 
 Stone V. New York, 25 Wend. 157 264 
 
 Stone V. Street Commissioners of Boston, 192 Mass. 297 967 
 
 Stone V. Waukegan, 205 Fed. 495 ! 1154 
 
 Stone V. Yeovil, 2 C. F. D. 99 819 
 
 Stoner v. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 229 Pa. 521 347 
 
 Stoops V. Kittanning Tel. Co., 242 Pa. 556 1155, 1236 
 
 Stork V. Philadelphia, 196 Pa. 101 1248, 1250 1319 
 
 Storm Lake v. Iowa Falls, etc., R. R. Co., 62 Iowa 218 340 
 
 Storms V. Manhattan Ry. Co. 178 N. Y. 493 349, 693, 718, 1158 
 
 Storrs V. Utica, 17 N". Y. 104 1252, 1310 
 
 Story V. New York El. Ry. Co., 9iO N. Y. 122.. 495, 511, 558, 501, 571, 
 
 573, 596, 1256, 1258, 1399 
 
 Stoudinger v. Newark, 28 N. J. Eq. 446 571, 1379 
 
 Stoughton V. Baker, 4 Mass. 522 31, 1408 
 
 Stoutemyer v. Sharp, 89 Ark. 175 884 
 
 Stowe V. Newburn, 127 Ga. 42.1 990, 1024 
 
 Stowell V. Board of Public Works, 184 Mass. 416 1051 
 
 Stowell V. Flagg, 11 Mass. 364 227, 824, 1235, 1240 
 
 Stowers v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 68 Miss. 559 576, 581, 1256, 1395 
 
 Strachan v. Brown, 39 Mioh. 168 925, 926 
 
 Strang v. Beloit, etc., R. E. Co., 16 Wis. 63.5 950 
 
 Stratford v. Greensboro, 124 N. C. 127 394 
 
 Straiten v. Great Western, etc., Ry. Co., 40 L. J. Eq. 50 1268 
 
 Stratton v. Elliott, 83 Ind. 425 619 
 
 ■Street v. New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co., 43 La. Ann. 116 735 
 
 Streyer v. Georgia, etc., R. E. Co., 90 Ga. 56 530, 1140 
 
 Strickford v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 73 N. H. 81 531, 1239 
 
 Strickland v. Pennsylvania R. E. Co., 154 Pa. 348 341 
 
 Strickler v. Colorado Springs, 16 Col. 61 405, 438 
 
 Sitrickler v. Midlands R. E. Co., 125 Ind. 412 1244, 1396 
 
 Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527 137, 195 
 
 224, 255, 256 
 
 Strock V. East Orange, 80 N. J. L. 619 1421 
 
 Strong v. Brooklyn, 68 N. Y. 1 1420 
 
 Strong V. Northwestern El. R. R. Co., 166 111. 207 562 
 
 Strother v. Calor Oil & Gas Co., 133 Ky. 614 474, 573 
 
 Struthers v. Dunkirk, etc., Ry. Co., 87 Pa. 282 918 
 
 Struthers v. Philadelphia, etc., R. E. Co., 174 Pa. 291 1181 
 
 Struve V. Eepublican Valley E. R. Co., 2 Neb. (Unoff.) 585 1412 
 
 Stuart V. Baltimore, 7 Md. 50O 310 
 
 Stuart V. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183 925 
 
 Stubbings V. Evanston, 136 111. 37 338, 712, 713, 714 
 
Table of Cases. ocxxv 
 
 [PageB 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGK 
 
 Studwell V. Halstead, 62 Misc. 330 945, 955 
 
 Sturtevant v. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 11 Wis. 63 1265 
 
 Stuttgart, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kocourek, 101 Ark. 47 721, 1111, 1216 
 
 Suburban Land Co. v. Arlington, 219 Mass. 539 1192, 1202 
 
 Suburban E. E. Co. v. Metropolitan, etc., R. E. Co., 193 111. 217. . .996, 1000 
 
 Suburban Eapid Transit Co. v. New York, 128 N. Y. 510 997, 1003 
 
 Suffield V. Hatlnaway, 44 Conn. 521 440, 484 
 
 Suffolk V. Parker, 79 Va. 660 1314 
 
 Suffolk County Tel. Co. v. Gammon, 113 App. Div. 764 1070 
 
 Suffolk, etc., E. E. Co. v. West End, etc.. Improvement Co., 137 N. C. 
 
 33 619, 620, 762, 1169, 1208, 1406, 1420 
 
 Sugar V. Munroe, 108 La. 677 134, 165 
 
 Sugar Creek, etc., E. E. Co. v. McKell, 75 Fed. 34 1041 
 
 Sugar Eefining Co. v. Jersey City, 26 N. J. Eq. 247 428 
 
 Sullivan v. Atchison, etc., E. E. Co., 251 111. 108 1406, 1419 
 
 Sullivan v. Board of Supervisors, 58 Miss. 790 996, 1001 
 
 Sullivan v. Cline, 33 Ore. 260 927 
 
 Sullivan v. Fall Eiver, 144 Mass. 579 832 
 
 Sullivan v. Lafayette County, 61 Miss. 271 803 
 
 Sullivan v. Missouri, etc., E. R. Co., 29 Tex. Civ. App. 429 667 
 
 Sullivan v. North Hudson County E. E. Co., 51 N. J. L. 518 767, 768 
 
 789, 806 
 
 Sullivan v. Tichenor, 179 111. 97 1409 
 
 Sullivan v. Webster, 16 E. I. 33 514 
 
 Sultan, etc.. Power Co. v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 31 Wash. 558 738 
 
 Summerfield v. Chicago, 197 111. 270 176, 189, 565 
 
 Summers v. Davies County Commissioners, 103 Ind. 262 1307 
 
 Summers v. Kanawha County, 26 W. Va. 159 1155 
 
 Summers v. State, 5 Tex. App. 365 271, 368 
 
 Summers v. Sullivan, 39 Mont. 42 346, 1240, 1254 
 
 Summit v. New York, etc., Tel. Co., 57 N. J. Eq. 123 396 
 
 Sumner v. Oxford County, 37 Me. 112 937, 1077 
 
 Sunbury, etc., E. E. Co. v. Hummel, 27 Pa. 99 733 
 
 Sunday v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 62 Fla. 395 677 
 
 Supervisors v. Wisconsin Central R. E. Co., 121 Mass. 460 185 
 
 Surocco V. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 264 
 
 Susquehanna Canal Co. v. Bonham, 9 Watts & S. 27 1416, 1417 
 
 Susquehanna Depot v. Simmons, 112 Pa. 384 1316 
 
 Sussex v. Strader, 3 Harr, 108 1308 
 
 Sutherland v. Jackson, 32 Me. 80 491 
 
 Sutter v. Milwaukee Board of Fire Underwiters, 161 Wis. 615 1289 
 
 Sutter County v. Nicols, 152 Cal. 688 115, 253, 397, 405 
 
 Sutter County v. Tisdale, 136 Cal. 474 1120 
 
 Sutton V. Clarke, 6 Taunt. 29 509 
 
 Sutton V. Louisville, 5 Dana 28 790 
 
 Sutton V. Mentzer, 154 Iowa 1 322, 879, 1410 
 
 Sutton V. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 211 Pa. 554 986 
 
 Sutton V. Snohomish, 11 Wash, 24 ISIO 
 
ccxxvi Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGB 
 
 Sutton's Heirs v. Louisville, 5 Dana 28 778 
 
 Sverven v. Thompson, 110 Minn. 484 119,3 
 
 Swain v. Morris, 93 Ark. 362, 278 
 
 Swain v. Boston Elevated K. R. Co., 188 Mass. 405 737, 840 
 
 Swain v. Pemigewasset Power Co., 76 N. H. 498 435, 660, 8-94, 895 
 
 Swan V. Middlesex County, 101 Mass. 173 II77, 1190, 1217, 1290 
 
 Swan V. Williams, 2 Mich. 427 59, 60, 116, 186, 914, 922, 928 
 
 Swanson v. Keokuk, etc., R. R. Co., 116 Iowa 304 1192 
 
 Sweek v. Jorgensen, 33 Ore. 270 1121 
 
 Sweeney v. Board of Land & Wlorks, 4 Vict. L. E. 440 1298 
 
 Sweeney v. Montana Central E. R. Co., 25 Mont. 543 1196 
 
 Sweeney v. Shakespeare, 42 La. Ann. 614 416 
 
 Sweet V. Boston, 186 Mass. 79 70, 959, 1032 
 
 Sweet V. Buffalo, etc., R. E. Co., 79 N. Y. 293 198, 919,' 1421 
 
 Sweet V. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380 161, 239, 283, 624, 631, 636, 919 
 
 Sweet V. Syracuse, 129 N. Y. 335! 404 
 
 Sweet Mfg. Co. v. Van Der Hoof, 137 App. Div. 492 498 
 
 Swenson v. Hallock, 95 Minn. 161 803 
 
 Sweet V. Sprague, 55 Me. 190 287 
 
 Swift V. Newport News, 105 Va. 108 788, 790, 814, 868, 876, 895, 968 
 
 1217, 1319, 1322 
 
 Swindon Waterworks Co. v. Wilks Canal L. E., 7 H. L. 697 ' 440 
 
 Swineford v. Franklin Coimty, 73 Mo. 279 1301 
 
 Swinhart v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 207 Mo. 423 1399 
 
 Swinney v. Ft. Wayne, etc., R. R. Co., 59 Ind. 205 145, 1026 
 
 Switzer v. Harrisonburg, 104 Va. 533 1342 
 
 Swope V. Seattle, 36 Wash. 113 1187 
 
 Symonds v. Cincinnati, 14 Ohio 147 773, 778, 809 
 
 Symonds v. Clay County, 71 111. 355 1300 
 
 SymouB V. San Francisco, 115 Cal. 555 323 
 
 Symsbury Case, Kirby, 444 32 
 
 Syracuse v. Stacey, 80 Hun 441 1071, 1073 
 
 Syracuse, etc., E. R. Co. v. Carrier, 149 App. Div. 411 197, 1091 
 
 Syracuse Solar -Salt Co. v. Eome, etc., Ry. Co., 168 N. Y. 650 317 
 
 Syracuse Water Co. v. Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 167 363 
 
 T 
 
 Taber v. Boston, 190 Mass. 101 1134 
 
 Taber v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 28 E. I. 269 526, 767, 769, 811 
 
 Tackaberry County v. Simmons Warehouse Co., 152 N. W. 779 1371 
 
 Tacoma v. Bonnell, 58 Wash. 593 694 
 
 Tacoma v. Brown, 69 Wash. 538 917, 1112, 1145 
 
 Tacoma v. Hansen, 59 Wash. 594 1143 
 
 Tacoma v. Niaqually Power Co., 57 Wash. 420 65, 149, 151, 209, 660, 668 
 
 973, 979 
 
 Tacoma v. State, 4 Wash. 64 65, 989 
 
 Tacoma v. Titlow, 53 Wash. 217 917, 921 
 
 Tacoma v. Wetherby, 57 Wash. 295 790, 814, 1070, 1145, 1168 
 
 Tacoma Mill Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 154 Pac. 173 601 
 
Table of Cases. ccxxvu 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Tacoma Safety Deposit Co. v. Chicago, 247 111. l^a 470, 479, 481, 482 
 
 Taft V. Commonwealth, 158 Mass. 526 303, 722, 724 
 
 Taggert v. Jaflfrey, 75 N. H. 473 40fi, 433, 434 
 
 Taggert v. Newport St. Ry. Co., 16 R. I. 688 542, 543, fi07 
 
 Tainter v. Morristown, 19 N. J. Eq. 46 1410 
 
 Tainter v. Worcester, 123 Mass. 311 1324, 1329 
 
 Taintor v. Mayor & Aldermen of Cambridge, 197 Mass. 412 1057 
 
 Tait V. Central Lunatic Asylum, 84 Va. 271 60, 915 
 
 Tait V. Hall, 71 Cal. 149 1255 
 
 Tait V. Matthews, 33 Tex. 112! 812 
 
 Talbot V. Hudson, 16 Gray 417 64, 88, 116, 131, 141, 143, 156, 242, 632 
 
 635, 914, 982 
 
 Talbot V. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 151 N. Y. 155 303, 514 
 
 Talbot Coimty v. Queen Anne County, 50 Md. 245 101 
 
 Talcott V. Des Moines, 134 Iowa 113 515 
 
 Talcott V. Pine Grove, 1 Flipp. 147 1404, 1417 
 
 Talladega County Commissioners v. Thompson, 15 Ala. 134 1117 
 
 Tallman v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 121 N. Y. 119 1277, 1281 
 
 Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586 434 
 
 Tanner v. Provo Beach Canal, etc., Co., 40 Utah 105 1139 
 
 Tanner v. Treasury, etc., Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 5931 115, 128, 131, 135 
 
 141, 154, 256, 913 
 
 Taphorn v. Cincinnati etc., R. R. Co., 6 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 865 1395 
 
 Tate V. Greensborough, 114 N. C. 392 474, 486 
 
 Tate V. Missouri, etc., R. R. Co., 64 Mo. 149 507, 524, 1178, 1286 
 
 Tate V. Ohio, etc., R. R. Co., 7 Ind. 479 526 
 
 Tate V. St. Paul, 56 Minn. 527 313, 1332, 1339, 1360, 1374, 1375 
 
 Taylor v. Baltimore, 45 Md. 576 691 
 
 Taylor v. Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co., 33 W. Va. 39i .' 1393 
 
 Taylor v. Bay City St. R. R. Co., 80 Mich. 77 969 
 
 Taylor v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 85 Wash. 592 847, 850, 864 
 
 Taylor v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 63 Wis. 327 1269, 1276 
 
 Taylor v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 81 Wis. 82 1236 
 
 Taylor v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 8 Wis. 645 955, 966 
 
 Taylor v. Crawford, 72 Ohio St. 560 243 
 
 Taylor v. Drainage District No. 56, 167 Iowa 42 70, 932, 956 
 
 Taylor v. Hampden County Commissioners, 18 Pick. 309 931 
 
 Taylor v. Nashville, etc., R. R. Co., 6 Coldw. 646 265 
 
 Taylor v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 126 La. 420 1154, 1162, 1265, 1275 
 
 Taylor v. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 38 N. J. L. 28 609 
 
 Taylor v. Plymouth, 8 Mete. 462 264 
 
 Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 142 59, 121, 142, 234, 274, 902 
 
 Taylor v. Portsmouth, etc., St. Ry. Co., 9il Me. 193 471, 541, 1086, 1400 
 
 Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Association, 85 Ohio St. 90 1306 
 
 Taylor v. Reading, N. J. unreported 32 
 
 Taylor v. St. Louis, 14 Mo. 20 ■ 607, 615 
 
 Taylor v. Waverly, 94 Iowa 661 267 
 
 Taylor v. Worcester County Commissioners, 105 Mass. 225 947, 1048 
 
 Tedens v. Sanitary District, 149 111. 87 659, 920, 921, 1142 
 
ccxxviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Teele v. Boston, 165 Mass. 88 666, 671, 1176, 1196, 1203, 1204, 120S, 1207 
 
 Tegeler v. Kansas City, 95 Mo. App. 162 516 
 
 Tehama County v. Bryan, 68 Cal. 57 793 
 
 Teick V. Commissioners of Carver County, 11 Minn. 292 1234 
 
 Telluride Power Co. v. Bruneau, 41 Utah 4 734 
 
 Templin v. Iowa City, 14 Iowa 59 1317, 1363 
 
 Ten Broeck v, Sherrill, 71 N. Y. 276 145 
 
 Tenement House Departments v. Moeschen, 179 N. Y. 325 273 
 
 Ten Eyck v. Delaware & Earitan Canal Co., 3 Harrison 200 406, 1387 
 
 Tennessee Central E. R. Co. v. Campbell, 109 Tenn. 640 1117 
 
 Tennessee Coal, etc., Co. v. Birmingham, etc., Ry. Co., 128 Ala. 526.1085, 1095 
 Tennessee Coal, etc., Co. v. Paint Rock Flume & Transportation Co., 128 
 
 Tenn. 277 256, 1236, 1237 
 
 Tennessee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Adams, 3 Head 596 1236, 1250 
 
 Tennessee, etc., R. R. Co. v. State, 141 Ala. 10i3 1194, 1203 
 
 Tennessee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Taylor, 102.Ala. 224 1413 
 
 Terminal R. R. Co., Re, 16 App. Div. 515 &47 
 
 Terminal R. R. Co. v. Gerbereux, 55 Misc. 1 948 
 
 Terre Haute v. Evansville, etc., R. R. Co., 149 Ind. 174 370, 752, 972, 1041 
 
 Terre Haute v. Sachs, 171 Ind. 679 1100 
 
 Terre Haute v. Terre Haute Waterworks Co., 94 Ind. 305 1414 
 
 Terre Haute v. Turner, 39 Ind. 522 507 
 
 Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co. v. McKinley, 33 Ind. 274 1244, 1249 
 
 Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co. v. Robbins, 247 111. 376 370, 913 
 
 Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rodel, 87 Ind. 128 526, 1245, 1263, 1396 
 
 Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43 78, 359 
 
 Territory v. Crary, 15 N. Mex. 213 1067 
 
 Territory v. Deegan, 3 Mont. 82 1410 
 
 Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628 957 
 
 Terry v. Richmond, 94 Va. 537 567, 1316 
 
 Texarkana v. Lanson, 168 S. W. 867 888 
 
 Texarkana v. Leach, 6 Ark. 40 1405 
 
 Texarkana v. Talbot, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 202 1275 
 
 Texas Central Ry. Co. v. Bowman, 97 Tex. 417 390 
 
 Texas, etc., E. R. Co. v. Cella, 42 Ark. 528 733, 734 
 
 Texas, etc., R. R. Co. v. Durrett, 57 Tex. 48 730 
 
 Texas, etc., R. R. Co. v. Eddy, 42 Ark. 527 1207 
 
 Texas, etc., R. R. Co. v. Edrington, 100 Tex. 496 864 
 
 Texas, etc., R. R. Co. v. El Paso, etc., R. R. Co., 156 S.-W. 561. . .1283, 1286 
 
 Texas, etc., R. R. Co. v. Goldberg, 68 Tex. 685 596, 59i8, 860 
 
 Texas, etc., E. E. Co. v. Jarrell, 60 Tex. 267 , 1269 
 
 Texas, etc., E. E. Co. v. Kirby, 44 Ark. 108 1186, 1216 
 
 Texas, etc., R. E. Co. v. Sutor, 56 Tex. 496 707 
 
 Texas, etc., St. Ry. Co. v. Rosedale St. Ry. Co., 64 Tex. 80 537 
 
 Texas Midland R. R. Co. v. Kaufman County Improvement District, 175 
 
 S. W. 482 ^*9 
 
 Texas Midland R. R. Co. v. Southwestern, etc., Tel. Co, 57 S. W. 312 .. . 757 
 
 Textor v. Baltimore, etc., R. E. Co., 59 Md. 63 535, 585 
 
 Textor v. Shipley, 86 Md. 424 71 
 
Table of Cases. ooxxix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGB 
 
 Thames v. Lovell, 18 Conn. 301 1<*1 
 
 Tharp v. Witham, 65 Iowa 566 90,, 943, 944, 1273 
 
 Thatcher v. Dartmouth Bridge Co., 18 Pick. 501 621, 992 
 
 Thayer v. Boston, 206 Fed. 969 330 
 
 Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511. . . .491, 587, 834, 1295, 1313, 1318, 1345, 1346 
 
 Thayer v. New Bedford R. R. Co., 125 Mass. 253 426, 429, 826, 843 
 
 Thayer v. Worcester County Commissioners, 10 Cush. 151 1060 
 
 Theilan v. Porter, 14 Lea 620 287 
 
 Theobold v. Louisville, etc., Ey. Co., 66 Miss. 279 497, 499, 505, 526 
 
 530, 596 
 
 Theresa Drainage District, In re, 90 Wis. 301 244 
 
 Thetford v. Kilburn, 36 Vt. 179 106O 
 
 Thibodeau v. Maggioli, 4 La. Ann. 73 93, 918, 1410 
 
 Thein v. Voegtlander, 3 Wis. 461 227 
 
 Third Ave. Ry. Co., In re, 121 N. Y. 536 539, 561 
 
 Thirteenth St., In re, 38 Pa. Super. Ct. 265. 653 
 
 ThirtynSecond St., Re, 19 Wend. 128 352 
 
 Thomas v. Boise City, 25 Idaho 522 925 
 
 Thomas v. Covington, 23 Ky. L. Eep. 117 1353 
 
 Thomas v. Grafton, 34 W. Va. 282 1308 
 
 Thomas v. Intercounty St. Ry. Co., 167 Pa. 120 1400 
 
 Thomas v. St. Louis, etc., Ey. Co., 164 111. 634 1084 
 
 Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaughn 341 1296, 1406 
 
 Thomas v. South Side Elevated R. E. Co., 218 111. 571 1088 
 
 Thompkins v. Augusta, etc., Ey. Co., 37 S. C. 382 1264 
 
 Thompkins v. Hodgson, 2 Hun 146 586 
 
 Thompson, Ee, 121 N. Y. 277 1144 
 
 Thompson, Re, 127 N. Y. 463 1197, 1198 
 
 Thompson, Ee, 57 Hun 419 616 
 
 Thompson v. Allen County, 115 U. S. 550 1418 
 
 Thompson v. Androscoggin Bridge, 5 Me. 62 988 
 
 Thofflipson V. Androscoggin Eiver Improvement Co., 54 N. H. 545. . .294, 297 
 
 Thompson v. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 110 Mo. 147 70, 356, 1120 
 
 Thompson v. De Weere, etc., R. E. Co., 25 Colo. 243 1111 
 
 Thompson v. Grand Gulf, etc.. Banking Co., 3 How. 240 2, 641 
 
 Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327 904 
 
 Thompson v. Lova, 42 Ohio St. 61 948 
 
 Thompson v. Major, 58 N. H. 242. 1408 
 
 Thompson v. Manhattan Ey. Co., 130 N. Y. 360 341, 364 
 
 Thompson v. McCormick, 136 111. 135 1419 
 
 Thompson v. Moiles, 46 Mich. 42 1201 
 
 Thompson v. Multnomah County, 2 Ore. 34 947 
 
 Thompson v. New York, etc., E. E. Co., 3 Sand. Ch. 625 364 
 
 Thompson v. Ocean City E. E. Co., 60 N. J. L. 74 997, lOOO 
 
 Thompson v. Pennsylvania E. E. Co., 51 N. J. L. 42 1152, 1214 
 
 Thompson v. Winona, 96 Miss. 591 894 
 
 Thompson-Houston Electric Co. v. Simon, 20 Ore. 60 536, 994 
 
 Thorberg v. Hoquiam, 77 Wash. 679 868, 1265 
 
 Thorn v. Sweeney, 12 Nev. 251 201 
 
ccxxx Table op Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Thorndike v. Norfolk CJounty Commissioners, 117 Mass. 566 944, 958 
 
 Thornton v. Franklin Sq. House, 200 Mass. 465 1306 
 
 Thornton v. ShefBeld, etc., E. R. Co., 84 Ala. 109 1255, 1260, 1281 
 
 Thornton v. Stevens Coal Co., 117 111. App. 376 1400 
 
 Thorpe v. Rutland, etc., R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 140 56, 273, 387 
 
 Thorpe v. Spokane, 78 Wash. 488 871 
 
 Threadgill v. Anson County Commissioners, 99 N. C. 352 1301 
 
 Thunder Bay Booming Co. v. Speechly, 31 Mich. 336 408, 422 
 
 Thurman v. Morrison, 17 B. Mon. 249 416 
 
 Thurman v. Multnomah County, 70 Ore. '401 1077, 1082 
 
 Thurston v. Portland, 63 Me. 149 1134 
 
 Thurston v. St. Joseph, 51 Mo. 510 313, 1250, 1318, 1375, 1378 
 
 Tide-Water Co. v. Coster, 1» N. J. Eq. 518 116, 131, 242, 914 
 
 Tidewater Ey. Co. v. Cowan, 106 Va. 817 813 
 
 Tidewater Ry. Co. v. Shartzer, 107 Va. 562 851, 864, 966 
 
 Tiernan v. Lincoln, 88 Neb. 662 479 
 
 Tilbury v. iSilva, 45 Oh. D. 98 407 
 
 Tileston v. Street Commissioners of Boston, 182 Mass. 325 1118 
 
 Tilly V. Mitchell & Lewis Co., 121 Wis. 1 ' 491, 887 
 
 Tindley v. Salem, 137 Mass. 171 1307 
 
 Tingley v. Providence, 8 R. I. 493 811, 1215, 1216 
 
 Tingley v. Providence, 9 R. I. 388 936, 1079 
 
 Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. 21 455 
 
 Tinker v. Eockford, 137 111. 123 874 
 
 Tinker v. Russell, 14 Pick. 279 1405 
 
 Tinsman v. Belvidere Delaware R. R. Co., 2 Butcher 148 1388 
 
 Tippecanoe County v. Lucas, 93 U. S. 108 391, 392, 401 
 
 Tippets V. Walker, 4 Mass. 595 1417 
 
 Tisbury v. Vineyard Haven Water Co., 193 Mass. 196 684 
 
 Tissot V. Great Southern Tel., etc., Co., 39 La. Ann. 696 580, 1252 
 
 Titus V. Boston, 149 Mass. 164 483, 614 
 
 Titus V. Boston, 161 Mass. 209 614 
 
 Titus St., In re, 139 App. Div. 238 1142 
 
 Titus St., In re, 152 App. Div. 752 351 
 
 Tobey v. Taunton, 119 Mass. 404 709, 1135 
 
 Tobie V. Brown County Commissioners, 20 Kan. 14 774, 790 
 
 Todd V. Austin, 34 Conn. 78 2, 61, 71, 227, 913, 918 
 
 Todd V. Jackson, 26 N. J. L. 526 1135 
 
 Todd V. Kankakee, etc., R. R. Co., 78 111. 530 762 
 
 Todd V. Old Colony R. R. Co., 194 Mass. 302 732, 827, 828, 1235, 1391 
 
 Todernier v. Aspinwall, 43 111. 401 345, 346 
 
 Toledo El. St. Ry. Co. v. Toledo Con. St. Ry. Co., 11 Ohio Dec. 365 196 
 
 Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Daniels, 16 Ohio St 390 986, 987 
 
 Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Darst, 61 111. 231 943, 1275 
 
 Toledo, etc., R. E. Co. v. Detroit, etc., R. R. Co., 62 Mich. 564 753, 754 
 
 973, 976, 1027, 1068, 1072 
 
 Toledo, etc., R. E. Co. v. Dunlap, 47 Mich. 456 704, 705, 706, 902, 922 
 
 953, 1019 
 Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. East Saginaw, etc., E. E. Co., 72 Mich. 206. . 191 
 
 192, 922 
 
Table of Cases. ocxxxi 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volumei I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Toledo, etc., E. R. Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 111. 37 387 
 
 Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Munson, 57 Mich. 42 626, 1082 
 
 Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Toledo, 7 Ohio N. P. 285 : 164 
 
 Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Toledo, etc., Ry. Co., 5 Ohio St. 603 382, 976 
 
 Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wagner, 171 Ind. 185 722 
 
 Toledo, etc., Traction Co. v. Indiana, etc., Ry. Co., 171 Ind. 213 lOOfl 
 
 Tolland v. Berkshire County Commissioners, 13 Gray 12 1048 
 
 ToUefson v. Ottawa, 22» 111. 134 1307, 1341 
 
 Toluca, etc., R. R. Co. v. Haws, 194 111. 92 1034 
 
 Tombigbee Valley R. R. Co. v. Loper, 184 Ala. 343 1281 
 
 Tomlin v. Cedar Rapids, etc., R. R. Co., 141 Iowa 599 184, 619 
 
 Tomlin v. Dubuque, etc.. Railroad Co., 32 Iowa 106 426 
 
 Tompkins v. Augusta, etc., R. R. Co., 21 S. C. 420 1269 
 
 Tompkins v. Augusta, etc., R. R. Co., 37 S. C. 382 1244 
 
 Tompkins v. United States, 45 Ct. CI. 66 314 
 
 Toone v. State, 178 Ala. 70 268 
 
 Tooze V. Willamette Valley St. Ry. Co., 150 Pac. 252 498 
 
 Topeka v. Martineau, 42 Kan. 387 1144, 1213, 1216 
 
 Torbush v. Norwich, 38 Conn. 225' 1320 
 
 Torchia, In re, 185 Fed. 576 357, 1154 
 
 Torrence v. Charlotte, 163 N. C. 562 620 
 
 Towanda Bridge Co., In re, 91 Pa. 216 68, 981, 1057, 1126 
 
 Tower v. Boston, 10 Gush. 235 616, 838, 1235, 1242 
 
 Towle V. Eastern R. R. Co., 18 N. H. 547 967 
 
 Towns V. Klamath County, 33 Ore. 225 175, 925, 927 
 
 Townsend, In re, 39 N. Y. 171 96, 98, 198, 914 
 
 Townsend v. Bell, 70 Hun 557 449 
 
 Townsend v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 91 111. 545 1120 
 
 Townsend v. Epstein, 93 Md. 537 116, 220', 492, 497, 588 
 
 Townsend v. Michigan Central R. R. Co. 101 Fed. 757 1411, 1412, 1413 
 
 Townsend v. Norfolk Ry. & Light Co., 105 Va. 22 1388 
 
 Towson V. Debow, 5 Sneed 193 1137 
 
 Trabert v. Boyes, 98 Neb. 671 768, 805 
 
 Tracy v. Elizabethtown, etc., R. R. Co., 78 Ky. 309 21 
 
 Tracy v. Elizabethtown, etc., R. R. Co., 80 Ky. 259 907, 911, 912, 913 
 
 915, 919, 921, 925, 926, 928 
 
 Tracy v. Mount Pleasant, 166 Iowa 435 671, 1129, 1182 1184 
 
 Trammel v. Russelville, 34 Ark. 105 1316, 1344 
 
 Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 63'5 300, 302, 334, 507 
 
 Transylvania University v. Lexington, 3 B. Mon. 25 322, 325 
 
 Traphagen v. Jersey City, 29 N. J. Eq. 206 571, 1379 
 
 Traver v. Merrick County, 14 Nebr. 327 225, 228 
 
 Traverse City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Seymour, 81 Mich. 378 1086 
 
 Travis County v. Trogdon, 88 Tex. 302 640, 812 
 
 Treacy v. Elizabethtown, etc., R. R. Co., 85 Ky. 270 970 
 
 Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 7 Gray 393 1415 
 
 Trempelean Drainage District, Re, 146 Wis. 398 66, 241 
 
 Trenton, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. American, etc., News Co., 43 N. J. L. 381 . . 211 
 
 1072 
 
ccxxxii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volumq I, 721-1422 ini Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Trenton Water Power Co. v. Eoff, 36 N. J. L. 336 314, 733 
 
 Trester v. Missouri Pao. Ky. Co., 33 Neb. 171 936, 1065, 1077 
 
 Trevett v. Weeden, 1 Thayer's Cas. Const. Law 73 32 
 
 Trimmer v. Pennsylvania, etc., E. R. Co., 55 N. J. L. 46. .651, 707, 1150, 1151 
 
 Trinity College v. Hartford, 32 Conn. 452 766, 767, 772, 785, 794 
 
 Trinity, etc., R. R. Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 32 850, 894 
 
 Tripp V. Bristol County Commissioners, 2 Allen 556 1127 
 
 Tripp V. Overocker, 7 Colo. 72 1235 
 
 Tri-State Tel., etc., Co. v. Cosgriflf, 19 N. D. 771 577, 579, 693 
 
 Trosper v. Sabine County Commissioners, 27 Kan. 391 768, 799 
 
 Trowbridge v. Brookline, 144 Mass. 139 732, 836, 842, 855 
 
 Troy V. Cheshire E. R. Co., 23 N. H. 83 396, 397, 470, 1235 
 
 Troy V. Coleman, 58 Ala. 570 1358 
 
 Troy, etc., R. R. Co. v. Lee, 13 Barb. 169 1125, 1167 
 
 Troy, etc., R. R. Co. v. North Turnpike Co., 16 Barb. 100 754 
 
 Troy, etc., E. E. Co. v. Potter, 42 Vt 265 609 
 
 Truby v. American Natural Gas Co., 38 Pa. Super. Ct. 166 1276 
 
 Truckee Eiver General Electric Co. v. Durham, 38 Nev. 311 954 
 
 Truesdale v. Peoria Grape Syn. Co., 101 111. 565 192 
 
 Truro v Freeman, 123 Mass. 187 1208 
 
 Trustees v. Auburn, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Hill 567 534 
 
 Trustees of Schools v. Harshman, 262 111. 72 356, 722, 723 
 
 Trustees of Schools v. Kuhn, 261 111. 190 1144 
 
 Trustees of Schools v. Tatman, 13 111. 27 402 
 
 Trustees of Wabash & Erie Canal v. Brett, 25 Ind. 409 326 
 
 Tnckahoe Canal Co. v. Tuekahoe, etc., R. R. Co., 11 Leigh 42. .4, 68, 360, 371 
 
 612, ©24, 630, 632, 639, 753, 973, 999 
 
 Tucker v. Eldred, 6 E. I. 404 482, 487 
 
 Tucker v. Massachusetts Central R. E. Co., 118 Mass. 546. . . .722, 1178, 1186 
 
 Tucker v. Tower, 9 Pick. 109 470, 487, 613 
 
 Tudor V. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 164 111. 73 653 
 
 Tuebner v. California St. Ry. Co., 66 Cal. 171 538 
 
 Tufts V. Charlestown, 2 Gray 271 709, 1135 
 
 Tufts V. Charlestown, 4 Gray 537 709, 1135 
 
 Tulare Irrigation District v. Shepard, 185 U. S. 1 1087 
 
 TuUer v. Detroit, 97 Mich. 597 1120 
 
 Tuolumne Water Power Co. v. Frederick, 13 Cal. App. 498 920 
 
 Turner v. Dartmouth, 13 Allen 291 1361 
 
 Turner v. Gardner, 216 Mass. 65 1055, 1056 
 
 Turner v. Hillsboro, 127 N. C. 153 1409 
 
 Turner v. Holtzman, 54 Md. 148 522 
 
 Turner v. Nye, 154 Mass. 579 231, 232, 233, 615 
 
 Turner v. Ringwood Highway Board, L. E. 9 Eq. 418 1407 
 
 Turner v. Robbins, 133 Mass. 207 708, 715 
 
 Turner v. Stanton, 42 Mich. 506 1274 
 
 Turner v. Williams, 10 Wend. 140 338, 716 
 
 Turpin v. Lemon. 187 U. S. 51 : . .84, 925 
 
 Tuskegee Land & Security Co. v. Birmingham Realty Co., 161 Ala. 542. . 1162 
 Tuthill, Re, 163 N. Y. 133 85, 86, 128, 137, 245 
 
Table of Cases. ocxxxiu 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II. 1 PAGH 
 
 Tutt V. Port Royal, etc., E. E. Co., 28 S. C. 388 958 
 
 Tuttle V. Brush Electric 111. Co., 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. 508 583 
 
 Tuttle V. Jefferson Power & Improvement Co., 31 Okl. 710 208 
 
 Tuttle V. Moore, 3 Ind. Ter. 712 2, 115, 131, 258, 913 
 
 Tuttle V. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501 324, 1407, 1420, 1422 
 
 Twelfth Ave. South, In re, 74 Wash. 132 1152, 1153, 1155 
 
 Twelfth St. Market Co. v. Philadelphia, etc., E. E. Co., 142 Pa. 580. ,. . 3 
 
 Twenty-ninth St., Re, 1 Hill 189 352 
 
 Twenty-Second Corporation v. Oregon, etc., E. E. Co., 36 Utah 238 847 
 
 851, 864 
 
 Twenty-second St., In re, lOa Pa. 108 76 
 
 Twin Palls v. Stubbs, 15 Idaho 68 213, 572 
 
 Twin Lakes, etc., Mining Co. v. Colorado, etc., Ry. Co., 16 Colo. 1 692 
 
 Twyman v. Frankfort, 117 Ky. 518 1307 
 
 Tyler v. Beecher, 44 Vt. 648 133, 156, 228, 915 
 
 Tyler v. Brown, 1 Pittsb. 225 932 
 
 l^-ler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71 57, 288, 930 
 
 Tyler v. Hudson, 147 Mass. 609 600, 691 
 
 Tyler v. Revere, 183 Mass. 98 1345, 1362 
 
 Tyler v. Tehama County, 109 Cal. 618 1301 
 
 Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason 400 404 
 
 Tyler County Court v. Grafton, 86 S. E. 924 394, 396 
 
 Tyrone School District, Appeal of, 1 Monaghan 20 1003 
 
 Tyson v. Milwaukee, 50 Wis. 78 508 
 
 u 
 
 Uhl v. Ohio River R. R. Co., 51 W. Va. 106 609 
 
 Uhland Club v. Shupbach, 168 Mass. 430 601, 711, 715 
 
 Uhler v. Cowen, 192 Pa. 443 714 
 
 Uline v. New York, etc., E. E. Co., 101 K. Y. 98 514, 535, 1277, 1281 
 
 Ulmer v. Lime Rock R. E. Co., 98 Me. 579 115, 145, 156, 173, 191 
 
 192, 257, 1091 
 
 Ulrich V. St. Louis, 112 Mo. 138 1308 
 
 Umatilla Irrigation Co. v. Bamhart, 22 Ore. 389 249, 250 
 
 Uncanoonuck Eoad Co. v. Orr, 67 N. H. 541 1271 
 
 Underwood v. North Wayne Scythe Co., 41 Me. 291 1235 
 
 Underwood v. Worcester, 177 Mass. 173 507, 833, 840 
 
 Union v. Crawford', 19 Conn. 331 1418 
 
 Union v. Durkes, 38 N. J. L. 21 1357, 1366 
 
 Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364 460 
 
 Union Canal Co. v. Landis, 9 Watts 228 460 
 
 Union Canal Co. v. O'Brien, 4 Eawle 358 1059 
 
 Union Canal Co. v. Woodside, 11 Pa. 176 1023 
 
 Union Depot Co. v. Frederick, 117 Mo. 138 936, 1079 
 
 Union Depot, etc., Co. v. Brunswick, 31 Minn. 297 455, 456, 458 
 
 Union Electric Tel. Co. v. Applequist, 104 111. App. 517 '. . 576 
 
 Union Elevated R. E. Co., Re, 113 N. Y. 275 63 
 
 Union Elevator Co. v. Kansas City, etc., E. R. Co., 135 Mo. 353 741, 1170 
 
ocxxxiv Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Union, etc., Stock Yard Co. v. Moore, 80 Ind. 458 730 
 
 Union, etc., E. E. Co., Ma,tter of, 112 N. Y. 61 70 
 
 Union Ferry Co., Ee, 98 N. Y. 139 199, 914 
 
 Union lee and Coail Co. v. Euston, 135- La. 898 215 
 
 Union Lime Co. v. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 233 U. S. 211 192, 193 
 
 Union Lime Co. v. Chicago, etc., E. R. Co., 152 Wis. 633 192, 193 
 
 Union Lime Co. v. Wisconsin Eailroad- Commission, 144 Wis. 523 193 
 
 Union Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Slee, 123 111. 57 92, 1022, 1099 
 
 Union Pacific E. E. Co. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365 130& 
 
 Union Pacific E. E. Co. v. Burlington, etc., E. E. Co., 1 McCrary 452. . . 104 
 
 Union Pacific E. E. Co. v. Burlington, etc., E. E. Co., 3 Fed. 106 1126 
 
 Union Pacific R. E. Co. v. Colorado Postal Tel. Cable Co., 30 Colo. 133. . 211 
 
 613, 756, 915, 1004, 1085, 1086, 1090 
 
 Union Pacific E. E. Co. v. Foley, 19 Colo. 280 959, 960 
 
 Union Pacific E. E. Co. v. Kindred; 43 Kan. 134 906, 1001 
 
 Union Pacific E. E. Co. v. Leavenworth Ey. Co., 29; Fed. 728 104 
 
 Union Pacific E. E. Co. v. Stanwood, 71 Neb. 150 1196, 1198, 1203 
 
 Union Ey. Co. v. Hunton, 114 Tenn. 609 1176, 1196 
 
 Union Ey. Co. v. Standard- Wheel Co., 149 Fed. 69S IIOO, 1114 
 
 Union Ey., etc., Co. v. Moore, 80 Ind. 45S 1187 
 
 Union Eefrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 96 
 
 Union Savings Institution v. Boston, 129 Mass. 82 357 
 
 Union Terminal R. E. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 119 Fed. 209 1041 
 
 Union Terminal- E. E. Co. v. Kansas City Belt R. R. Co., 9 Kan. App. 
 
 281 933, 1006, 1008, 1009, 1078 
 
 Union Terminal E. E. Co. v. Peet Bros. Mfg. Co., 58 Kan. 197 741 
 
 Union Traction Co. v. Pfeil, 39 Ind. App. 51 603, 722, 726, 798 
 
 Union Trust Co. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., S N. M. 327 365 
 
 United E. E., etc., Co. v. Weldon, 47 N. J. L. 59 970 
 
 united States, In re, 24 Pitsb. Leg. J. 105 1073 
 
 United States, Petition of, 96 N. Y. 227 108, 631 
 
 United States v. Alexander, 148 U. S. 186 732 
 
 United States v. Ames, 1 Wood. & M. 76' 94, 90 
 
 United States v. Baltimore, etc., E. E. Co., 17 Wall. 322 402 
 
 United- States v. Baltimore, etc., E. E. Co., 27 App. D. C. 105 910, 916 
 
 United States v. Beatty, 232 U. S. 463 1039 
 
 United»States v. Beatty, 198 Fed. 284 109, 1111 
 
 United- States v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 176 Fed. 963 1'lO, 113 
 
 389, 480, 481 
 
 United States v. Buffalo Pitts Co., 234 U. S. 22S 355, 1280 
 
 United States v. Burley, 172 Fed. 615 913, 918 
 
 United States v. Burns, 12 Wall. 246 68 
 
 United States v. Certain Lands, 112- Fed. 622 298, 349, 365, 719 
 
 United States v. Certain Lands, 140 Fed. 463 349 
 
 United States v. Certain Lands, 153 Fed. 876 719 
 
 United States v. Certain Lands, 208 Fed: 429 99 
 
 United States v. Certain Lands in Narragansett, 180 Fed. 260 676 
 
 United States v. Certain Lands in Newcastle, 165 Fed. 783 113 
 
 United States v. Certain Tract of Land, 70 Fed. 94 1036 
 
Table of Cases. coxxxv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 22£( U. S. 53 150 
 
 197, 198, 421, 423, 436, 460, 630, 671, 1130 
 
 United States v. Chicago, 7 How. 185 98 
 
 United States v. Cooper, 9 Mackey 104 62 
 
 United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason 60 99 
 
 United States v. Bickson, 127 Fed. 774 1097, 1099, 1104, 1109 
 
 United States v. Dumplin Island, 1 Barb. 24 107 
 
 United States v. Dxmnington, 146 U. S. 344 265 
 
 United States v. Eisenbeis, 112 Fed. 190 1036 
 
 United States v. Engelman, 46 Fed. 176 939 
 
 United States v. Engelman, 46 Fed. 898 , 656, 951 
 
 United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315 158 
 
 United States v. Ctettysburg Electric Ey. Co., 160 U. S- 668 126, 143^ 
 
 154, 164, 918 
 
 United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645 434, 1280 
 
 United States v. Grizzard, 219 U. S. 180 320, 721,^ 730 
 
 United States v. Hoar, 2 Mason C. C. 134 1408 
 
 United States v. Honolulu Plantation Co., 122 Fed. 581 665, 939 
 
 United States v. Inlots, Fed. Cas. No. 15441a ■ • 339, 658, 740 
 
 United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513 1, 58, 912, 925, 938, 945 
 
 United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 735 1408 
 
 United States v. Land in Monterey County, 47 Cal. 515 703 
 
 United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 93 
 
 United States v. Lynch, 188 U. S. 445 313, 418, 1280 
 
 United States v. Meyers, 190 Fed. 688 697, 699, 717 
 
 United States v. Minnesota, etc., E. E. Co., 1 Minn. 127 622 
 
 United States v. Mission Eock Co., 189 U. S. 391 414 
 
 United States v. Nahant, 153 Fed. 520 113, 397, 401, 654, 721 
 
 United States v. O'Neill, 198 Fed. 677 109, 631, 635, 1037 
 
 United States v. Oregon, etc., E. E. Co., ft Sawyer 61 63, 913 
 
 United States v. Oregon E. E., etc., Co., 16 Fed. 524 1099, 1104 
 
 United States v. Parkersburg Branch E. E. Co., 134 Fed. 969 460 
 
 United States v. Portneuf-Marsh Valley Irrigation Co., 205 Fed. 416 1280 
 
 United States v. Eailroad Bridge Co., 6 McLean 517 98 
 
 United States v. Eauers, 70 Fed. 748 1036 
 
 United States v. Eealty Co., 163 U. S. 426 966 
 
 United- States v. Eeed, 56 Mo. 565 91, 1029 
 
 United States v. Sargent, 162 Fed. 81 653, 1018 
 
 United States v. Smith, 110 Fed. 338 706 
 
 United States v. Tiffin, 190 Fed. 279 113 
 
 United States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333 346, 348, 730 
 
 United States Gypsum Co. v. Kent Circuit Judge, 150 Mich. 668 1093 
 
 University Ave., In re, 82 Misc. 598 175, 1029 
 
 University of Maryland v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. 365 30 
 
 University of North Carolina v. North Carolina Eailroad Co., 76 N. C. 
 
 103 288 
 
 Undergrove v. Pennsylvania, etc., E. E. Co., 132 Pa. 540 1272 
 
 Upham V. Marsh, 128 Mass. 546 483, 484 
 
 Upham V. Worcester, 113 Mass. 97 1...767, 788, 802 
 
ccxxxvi Table of Oases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Upper Ten Mile Plank Eoad v. Braden, 172 Pa. 460 484 
 
 Uppington v. New York, 165 N. Y. 222 1252, 1253, ISS?, 1374, 1379 
 
 Upton V. South Reading Branch E. R. Co., 8 Cush. 600 763, 801, 1193 
 
 Urqnhart v. Ogdensburg, 91 N. Y. 67 1326, 1348 
 
 Utah, etc., R. R. Co. v. Utah, etc., R. R. Co., 110 Fed. 879 1O08 
 
 Utica, Re, 73 Hun 256 998, 1002 
 
 Utica, etc., R. R. Co., Re, 56 Barb. 456 732, 733 
 
 Utica, etc., Ry. Co. v. Weaver, 6 St. Ry. Rep. 192 197 
 
 Utter V. Richmond, 112 N. Y. 610 356 
 
 V 
 
 Vail V. Morris, etc., R. R. Co., 21 N. J. L. 189 1027, 1067 
 
 Vaile V. Independence, 116 Mo. 333 1275 
 
 Valentine v. Boston, 22 Pick. 75 462 
 
 Valentine v. Englewood, 76. N". J. L. 509 1308 
 
 Vallejo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Home Savings Bank, 24 Cal. App. 166. . . .151, 190 
 
 694,920, 1085 
 
 Valley City Salt Co. v. Brown, 7 W. Va. 191 253 
 
 Valley Ry. Co. v. Bohm, 34 Ohio St. 114 1066 
 
 Valparaiso v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 12'3 Ind. 467 966, 1001 
 
 Valparaiso v. Hagen, 153 Ind. 337 444 
 
 Valparaiso v. Kyer, 30 Ind. Ap.p. 447 1359 
 
 Valparaiso v. Spaeth, 166 Ind. 14 1317, 1359, ia60 
 
 Van Bentham v. Osage County Commissioners, 49 Kan. 30 735 
 
 Variblaricum v. State, 7 Blackf. 200 763, 797 
 
 Van Bokelen v. BrooMyn City R. R. Co., 5 Blackf. 379 525, 537 
 
 Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151 99 
 
 Van Brunt v. Flatbush, 128 N. Y. 50 .• . .474, 572 
 
 Van Buren v. Fishkill, etc.. Waterworks Co., 50 Hun 448 435 
 
 Van Cleve v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'issioners, 60 N. J. L. 214 . . 963 
 Van Cleve v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners, 71 N. J. L. 183. . 401 
 
 Vandalia R. R. Co. v. LaFayefte, etc., R. E. Co., 175 Ind. 391 916 
 
 Vandalia R. E. Co. v. 'State, 166 Ind. 219 750 
 
 Vandegrift v. Delaware R. R. Co., 2 Houst. 287 21 
 
 Vanderburgh v. Minneapolis, 103 Minn. 515 322, 647, 887, 888 
 
 Vanderhurst v. Tholcke, 113 Cal. 147 485, 486 
 
 Vanderlip v. Grand Rapids, 73 Mich. 522 516, 1256, 1258, 1318 
 
 Van De Vere v. Kansas City, 107 Mo. 83 847, 851, 857, 859 
 
 Vandine v. Burpee, 13 Met. 288 1216 
 
 Van Dyke v. Midnight Sun Mining, etc., Co., 177 Fed. 85 1095 
 
 Van Horn v. Des Moines, 63 Iowa 447 650, 1329 
 
 Van Home v. Newark Passenger Ry. Co., 48 N. J. Eq. 332 537, 1400 
 
 Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304 31, 58, 625 
 
 Van Husen v. Omaha Bridge, etc., R. R. Co., 118 Iowa 36& 1148 
 
 Van Orsdall v. Hazard, 3 Hill 243 270 
 
 Van Pelt v. Davenport, 42 Iowa 308 1317, 1338, 1339, 1370, 1374, 1375 
 
 Van .Reipen v. Jersey City, 58 N. J. L. 262 997, 1003 
 
 Van Riper v. Essex Public Road Board, 38 N. J. L. 23 877 
 
Table of Cases. ccxxxvii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are ill Volume I, 7ZL-U2'i in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Van Sicleii v. Jamaica Electric Liglit Co., 45 App. Div. 1 487 
 
 Van Steenbergh v. Bigelow, 3 Wend. 42 1126 
 
 Vantllburgh v. Shaun, 24 K". J. L. 499 929 
 
 Van Valkenburgh v. Milwaukee, 43 Wia. 574 1192 
 
 Van Valkenburgh v. Rutherford, 92 Neb. 803 323 
 
 Van Witsen v. Gutman, 79 Md. 405 64, 156, 183 914 
 
 Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige Ch. 137 205, 612, 914 
 
 Variek v. Smith, 9 Paige 547 409 
 
 Varner v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 534 (U. 117, 134, 136. 22o, 230, 915, 919 
 
 Varney v. Manchester, 58 N. H. 430 3 
 
 Varney v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318 277 
 
 Vassalborough, In re, 19 Me. 338 1126 
 
 Vaulx V. Tennessee Central E. R. Co., 120 Tenn. 316 812, 1194 
 
 Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568 100, 101 
 
 Velte V. United States, 76 Wis. 278 654 
 
 Venable \ . Wabash, etc., R. R. Co., 1 12 Mo. 103 346 
 
 Venard v. Cross, 8 Kan. 248 115, 133, 227, 491, 996, 1003 
 
 Ventura County v. Thompson, 51 Cal. 577 793, 1082 
 
 Vermilya v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 66 Iowa 6sll 599 
 
 Vermont Central R. R. Co. v. Baxter, 22 Vt. 365 66, 191, 951 
 
 Vernon v. United Natural Gas Co., 64 Pittsburgh Law Journal 150. . . . 396 
 
 Ver Steeg v. Wabash R. R. Co., 250 Mo. 01 969 
 
 Vice V. Eden, 113 Ky. 255 952 
 
 Vickaburg v. Herman, 72 Miss. 211 867 
 
 Vicksburg v. Marshall, 59 Miss. 563 1410 
 
 Vicksburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Calderwood, 15 La. Ann. 481 800, 953 
 
 Vicksburg, etc., R. R. Co. >. Dillard, 35 La. .\nn. 1045 730, 731 
 
 Victorian Woolen' & Clothing Co. v. Board of Land & Works, 7 Vict. 
 
 L. R. 461 - 1298 
 
 Victory v. Fitzpatrick, 8 Ind. 261 1235 
 
 Viebahn v. Crow Wing County Commissioners, 96 Minn. 276 886 
 
 Vigeant v. Marlborough, 175 Mass. 459 833, 840 
 
 Vigo County Commissioners v. Daily, 132 Ind. 73 1300 
 
 Viliski V. Minneapolis, 40 Minn. 304 484, 1314 
 
 Vineennes University v. Indiana, 14 How. 268 389 
 
 Vinegar Bend Luntber Co. v. Oak Grove, etc., R. R. Co., 89 Miss. 84 . . 1 16, 145 
 
 Virginia-Carolina R. R. Co. v. Booker, 99 Va. 633 1155 
 
 Virginia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Crow, 108 Tenn. 17 1412 
 
 Virginia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Elliott, 5 Nev. 358 940, 1111 
 
 Virginia, etc., R. E. Co. v. Henry, 8 Nev. 171 624, 660, 1112, 1145 
 
 1172, 1209 
 
 Virginia, etc., R. R. v. Lovejoy, 8 Nev. 100 986 
 
 Virginia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Lynch, 13 Nev. 92 596 
 
 Virginia, etc., R. R. Co. v. McLean, 158 N. C. 498 660 
 
 Virginia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Nickels, 116 Va. 792 703 
 
 Visalia v. Jacob, 65 Cal. 434 1409 
 
 Vise v. Hamilton County, 19 111. 78 271, 369 
 
 Voegtly V. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Grant Cas. 243 342, 714 
 
 Vogel V. New York, 92 N. Y. 10 1253 
 
 xvi 
 
ocxxxviii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Vogel V. State, 61 Misc. 35 886 
 
 Vogt T. Grinnell, 133 Iowa 363 445 
 
 Von Eiolithofen v. Bijou Irrigation. District, 52 Col. 527 626 
 
 Vought V. Columbus, etc., R. R. Co., 58 Ohio St. 123 612, 619, 1420 
 
 Vreeland* v. Forest Park Reservation- Commission, 82 N. J. Eq. 349 .... 310 
 
 w 
 
 Wabash, etc., R. R. Co. v. McDougall, 118 111. 229 659 
 
 Wabash, etc., R. R. Co. v. McDougall, 126 111. lU 604, 722, 796, 1073 
 
 Wabash R. R. Co. v. Coon Run Drainage District 194 111. 3ilO 308, 621 
 
 943, 1376 
 
 Wabash R. R. Co. v. Defiance, 167 U. S. 88 385, 513, 1273 
 
 Wabash R. R. Co. v. Ft. Wayne, etc.. Traction Co., 161 Ind. 295 385 
 
 Wabash & Erie Canal v. Speare, 16 Ind. 441 314 
 
 Waddell, Appeal of, 84 Pa. 90 193, 235, 253 
 
 Waddy v. Johnson, 5 Ired. L. 333 225 
 
 Wade V. Hennessy, 55 Vt. 207 356, 1074 
 
 Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me. 403 275 
 
 Wadsworth Land Co. v. Piedmont Traction Co., 162 N. C. 503 144, 660 
 
 662, 1092 
 
 Wager v. Troy Union R. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 525 526, 1396 
 
 Waggeman v. North Peoria, 155 111. 545 768 
 
 Wagner v. Bristol Belt Line Ry. Co., 108 Va. 594 554, 847, 892 
 
 Wagner v. Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co., 22 Ohio St. 563 397, 1422 
 
 Wagner v. Gage County, 3 Nebr. 237 805 
 
 Wagner v. Long Island R. R. Co., >0 N. Y. 614 611, 1392 
 
 Wagner v. Purity Water Co., 241 Pa. 328 1283 
 
 Wagner v. Railway Co., 38 Ohio St. 32 1256 
 
 Wagner v. Salzburg, 132 Pa. 63© 624 
 
 Wagner v. White, 4 Harr. & J. 564 712 
 
 Wakefield v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 63 Me. 385 1142 
 
 Wakeman v. Wilbur, 147 N. Y. 657 887 
 
 Walden, In re, 14 N. Y. St. Rep. 590 1001 
 
 Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 134 1405 
 
 Walish V. Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 16 514 
 
 Walker v. Board of Public Works, 16 Ohio 540 422 
 
 Walker v. Boston & Maine R. R., 3 Cush. 1 970, 1062, 1175, 1178 
 
 Walker v. Caywood, 31 N. Y. 51 619 
 
 Walker v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 57 Mo. 275 1263 
 
 Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14 186 
 
 Walker v. Des Moines, ©• Iowa 215 323 
 
 Walker v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co., 6 Hare 593 1098 
 
 Walker v. Gatlin, 12 Fla. 9 61 
 
 Walker v. Illinois- Central R. R. Co., 215 111. 690. 603 
 
 Walker v. Manchester, 58 N. H. 438 351 
 
 Walker v. Morgan Park, 175 111. 570 517, 518 
 
 Walker v. Old Colony, etc., R. R. Co., 103 Mass. 10. .. . . .317, 610, 727, 731 
 
 732, 1392 
 
 Walker v. Sauvinet, m V. S. 90 • 938 
 
Table of Cases. ocxxxix 
 
 (Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Walker v. Schauf, 196 N. Y. 286 361, 709 
 
 Walker v. Shasta Power Co., 160 Fed. 856 144, 145, 155, 208 
 
 Walker v. South Chester R. R. Co., 174 Pa. 288 1147 
 
 Wall, Ex parte, 107 U. S. 265 58 
 
 Wallace v. Alvord, 39 Ga. 609 265 
 
 Wallace v. Cable, 87 Kan. 835 1410 
 
 Wallace v. Chesapeake, etc., R. R. Co., 73 W. Va. 347 890 
 
 Wallace v. Fee, 50 N. Y. 694 1420 
 
 Wallace v. Menasha, 48 Wis. 79 1308 
 
 Wallace v. Muscatine, 4 Greene 373 1296, 1317, 1364, 1368, 1378 
 
 Wallace v. Norman, 9 Okla. 339 1329, 1341, 1346 
 
 Wallace v. Richmond, 94 Va. 204 •. 991 
 
 Wallace v. Winfield, 96 Kan. 35 434, 440 
 
 Walla Walla v. Dement Bros. Co., 67 Wash. 186 llSO 
 
 Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1 361 
 
 Wallenberg v. Minneapolis, 111 Minn. 471 1274 
 
 Waller v. State, 144 N. Y. 579 310 
 
 Walls V. United States, 44 Ct. CI. 482 313 
 
 Walnut St. Bridge, Re, 191 Pa. 153 429, 456 
 
 Walpole V. Elliott, 18 Ind. 258 56 
 
 Walsh V. Board of Education, 73 N. J. L. 643 , . . . 1176 
 
 Waltemeyer v. Wisconsin, etc., R. R. Co., 71 Iowa 626 1136, 1253 
 
 Walter v. Haugen, 71 App. Div. 40 1185 
 
 Walter v. Wicomico County, 35 Md. 385 1301 
 
 Walters v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 120 Md. 644 321, 497 
 
 Walther v. Warner, 25 Mo. 277 310 
 
 Walton V. Green Bay., etc., R. R. Co., 70 Wis. 414 1152, 1155, 1236 
 
 Walton Ave., In re, 131 App. Div. 696 . ,632, 637, 867, 1130, 1155 
 
 Wamesit Power Co. v. Allen, 120 Mass. 352 1055 
 
 Wamesit Power Co. v. Lowell & Andover R., R. Co., 139 Mass. 173 1063 
 
 Wanamaker v. Schuylkill River East Side R. R. Co., 244 Pa. 214. .1047, 1148 
 
 Ward V. Asldermen of Newton, 181 Mass. 432 1118, 1119 
 
 Ward V. Bartholomew, 6 Pick. 409 1408 
 
 Ward V. Marietta Turnpike Co., 6 Ohio St. 15 613 
 
 Ward V. Neal, 37 Ala. 500 495 
 
 Ward V. Ohio River R. R. Co., 35 W. Va. 481 944 
 
 Ward v. Peck, 42 N. J. L. 42 308 
 
 Ward v. Triple State Nat. Gas Co., 115 Ky. 723 573, 575 
 
 Ward Co. v. Street Commissioners, 217 Mass. 381. . .935, 936, 989, 992, 1011 
 
 1046 
 
 Warden v. Madisonville, etc., R. R. Co., 125 Ky. 644 1087 
 
 Ware v. Fitchburg, 200 Mass. 61 402 
 
 Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 171 36 
 
 Ware v. Penobscot County Commissioners, 38 Me. 492 936, 1076 
 
 Ware v. Regent's Canal Co., 3 De G. & J. 212 gig 
 
 Waring v. Cherew, etc., R. R. Co., 16 S. C. 416 958 
 
 Warner v. Ford Lumber, etc., Co., 123 Ky. 103 igg, 420 
 
 Warner v. Gunnison, 2 Colo. App; 430 201, 916, 990, 1139 
 
 Warner v. Hennepin County Commissioners, 9 Minn. 141 630, 1024 
 
ocxl Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] FAOH 
 
 Warner v. New York, etc., E. R. Co., 86 Conn. 561 323 
 
 Warrell v, Wheeling, etc., R. R. Co., 130 Pa. 600 1155 
 
 Warren v. Bunnell, 11 Vt. 600 282 
 
 Warren v. First Division, etc., R. E. Co., 18 Minn. 384 60, 1093 
 
 Warren v. First Division, etc., R. R. Co., 21 Minn. 424 656 
 
 Warren v. Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 24 570, 1378 
 
 Warren v. Spencer Water Co., 143 Mass. 9 839, 1055, 1068, 1244 
 
 Warren v. Spencer Water Co., 143 Mass. 155 950, 1186 
 
 Warren v. Street Commissioners of Boston, 183 Mass. 119 1118 
 
 Warren v. Wisconsin Valley R. E. Co., 6 Biss. 425 1041 
 
 Wartman v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. 202 586, 587 
 
 Warwick Savings Inst. v. Providence, 12 R. I. 144 355 
 
 Washburn v. Fourth Parish of West Springfield, 1 Mass. 32 32 
 
 Washburn v. Miller, 117 Mass. 376 1254 
 
 Washburn v. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 59 Wis. 364 667, 766, 767, 76S 
 
 770, 815, 953, 1143, 1144, 1196, 1203, 1206 
 
 Washburn v. National Wall Paper Co., 81 Fed. 17 - 366 
 
 Washburn v. Worcester County, 113 Mass. Ill 1134 
 
 Washburn & Moen Mfg. Co. v. Worcester, 21 Pick. 344 1261 
 
 Washburn & Moen Mfg. Co. v. Worcester, 116 Mass. 458 443, 837, 1250 
 
 1318, 1380 
 
 Washington Ave., In re, 34 Misc. 654 1156 
 
 Washington, etc., Nav. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510 373 
 
 Washington, etc., R. R. Co. v. Osbom, 160 U. S. 103 343, 1133 
 
 Washington Ice Co. v. Chicago, 147 111. 327 762, 796 
 
 Washington Ice Co. v. Shortall, 101 111. 46 615 
 
 Washington Park Commissioners, In re, 52 N. Y. 131 1068 
 
 Washington Park Commissioners, In re, 56 N. Y. 144 1097 
 
 Washington Water Power Co. v. Waters, 186 Fed. 572 983, 988 
 
 Washington Water Power Co. v. Waters, 19 Idaho 595 65, 97, 98, 158 
 
 208, 916, 954 
 
 Watauga, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ferguson, 169 N. C. 70 632 
 
 Waterbury v. Piatt, 75 Conn. 387 988, 992 
 
 Waterbury v. Piatt, 76 Conn. 435 913, 942, 1419 
 
 Water Commissioners, In re, 195 N. Y. 502 650 
 
 Water Commissioners v. Hudson, 13 N. J. Eq. 420 377, 379 
 
 Water Commissioners v. Lawrence, 3 Edw. 552 693 
 
 Water Commissioners v. Westchester County Waterworks Co., 71 App. 
 
 Div. 544 672 
 
 Water Commissioners of Amsterdam, Matter of, 96 N. Y. 351 950 
 
 Waterford Turnpike Road v. Cochran, 2 Hall. L. J. 88 941 
 
 Water Front, Ee, 190 N. Y. 350 327, 329, 618, 763 
 
 Water Front, Ee Improvement of, 192 N. Y. 295 696, 717 718 
 
 Waterloo v. Union Mill Co., 73 Iowa 437 1410 
 
 Waterloo Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Shanahan, 128 N. Y. 345 91, 1088 
 
 Waterman v. Connecticut, etc., R. E. Co., 30 Vt. 610 726, 1250 
 
 Waters v. Bay View, 61 Wis. 242 1355 
 
 Waters v. Lilley, 4 Pick. 145 431 
 
 Watertown v. Middlesex County Commissioners, 176 Mass. 22 1050 
 
Table of Cases. ccxli 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in. Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Watkins v. Freeholders of Atlantic County, 73 N. J. L. 213 1300 
 
 Watkins v. Hopkins County, 72 S. W. 872 931, 952 
 
 Watkins v. Walker County, 18 Tex. 586 177, 314, 622 
 
 Watkins v. Welch Grape Juice Co., 96 App. Div. 114 991 
 
 Watson V. Fairmont, etc., Ry. Co., 49 W. Va. 528 647 
 
 Watson V. Jersey City, 84 N. J. L. 422 650, 1228, 1230 
 
 Watson V. Kingston, 114 N. Y. 88 1338, 1357 
 
 Watson V. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 57 Wis. 332 656, 1194, 1211, 1224 
 
 Watson V. Needham, 161 Mass. 404 200, 202 982 
 
 Watson V. New Milford, 72 Conn. 561 445, 1317 
 
 Watson V. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 157 353 
 
 Watson V. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 37 Pa. 469 730 
 
 Watson V. Pleasant, 21 Ohio St. 667 C22 
 
 Watt V. Zueca, 145 N. Y. Supp. 754 873 
 
 Watters v. Omaha, 76 Nehr. 855 1318, 1333, 1334 
 
 Watts V. Norfolk, etc., Ry. Co., 39 W. Va. 196.t611, 729, 735, 1260, 1272, 1301 
 
 Watuppa Reservoir Co. v: Fall River, 134 Mass. 267 838, 842 
 
 Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River, 147 Mass. 548. .410, 413, 433, 838, 842 
 
 Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River, 154 Mass. 305 4oi 
 
 Waverly Water Works Co., Re, 85 N. Y. 478 1108 
 
 Waverly v. Waverly Water Co., 194 N. Y. 545 102,S 
 
 Wayne v. Caldwell, 1 S. D. 433 1121 
 
 Wayne v. Kennebec Coxmty Commissioners, 37 Me. 558 1050 
 
 Wayne v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 231 Pa. 512 663 
 
 Wead v. St. Johnsibury, etc., R. E. Co., 64 Vt. 42 526, 874 
 
 Weage v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 227 111. 421 519 
 
 Weaver v. Mississippi Boom Co., 28 Minn. 534 312 
 
 Webb v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 114 Md. 216 592, 728 
 
 Webb V. Butler County, 52 Kan. 375 T 1410 
 
 Webb V. Demopolis, 95 Ala. 116 1409 
 
 Webb V. Lucas, 125 Minn. 403 1083 
 
 Webb V. New York, 64 How. Pr. 10 392, 401 
 
 Webb V. Ohio Gas Fuel Co., 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 662 573 
 
 Webber v. Eastern R. R. Co., 2 Met. 147 733 
 
 Webber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221 868, 876 
 
 Weber v. Detroit, 159 Mich. 14 1410 
 
 Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 18 Wall. 57 414 
 
 Weber v. Santa Clara County, 59 Cal. 265 944 
 
 Webster v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 116 Mo. 114 651, 654, 672 
 
 Webster v. Larned, 6 Met. 522 1404 
 
 Webster v. Lowell, 142 Mass. 324 835, 880 
 
 Webster v. Susquehanna Pole Line Co., 110 Md. 416. .116, 149, 208, 921, 1259 
 
 Webster v. Washington County, 26 Minn. 220 947 
 
 Weckler v. Chicago, 61 HI. 142 763 
 
 Weed V. Mayor & Aldermen of Boston, 172 Mass. 28 1050 
 
 Weeks v. Grace, 194 Mass. 296 59, 60, 70, 71, 74, 623 
 
 Weeks-Thome Paper Co. v. Syracuse, 124 N. Y. Supp. 317 1269 
 
 Weems Steamboat Co v. People's Steamboat Co., 214 U. S. 344. . . .456, 457 
 
ccxlii Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, T21-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Wegmann v. Jefferson, 61 Mo. 55 1318, 1350 
 
 Wehn V. Gage County, 5 Nebr. 494 1300 
 
 Weide v. St. Paul, 62 Minn. 67 ' 651 
 
 Weidenfeld v. Sugar Run R. R. Co., 48 Fed. 615 910, 1009 
 
 Weiges v. St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co., 35 La. Ann. 641 317 
 
 Weinschenck v. Western Allegheny E. E. Co., 233 Pa. 442 1169, 1222 
 
 Weir V. Plymouth, 148 Pa. 566 1360 
 
 Weir V. St. Paul, etc., E. E. Co., 18 Minn. 155 71, 644, 776, 803, 937, 944 
 
 989, 1033, 1078 
 
 Weis V. Madison, 75 Ind. 241 '. 1317, 1331, 1353, 1359 
 
 Weisbrod v. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 21 Wis. 602 1396 
 
 Weiser Valley Land, etc., Co. v. Eyan, 111 C. C. A. 221. . .6513, 668, 661, 678 
 
 1114, 1183, 1269 
 
 Weismer v. Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91 219 
 
 Weiss V. Louisville Sewerage Commissioners, 152 Ky. 552. ...659, 662, 10i70 
 
 1083 
 
 Weiss V. South Bethlehem, 136 Pa. 294 652 
 
 Weiss V. Taylor, 144 Ala. 440 1409 
 
 Welborne v. Davies, 40 Ark. 83 884 
 
 Welch V. Milwaukee, etc., E. E. Co., 27 Wis. 108 739, 740, 741 
 
 Welch V. Eutland, 56 Vt. 228 1308 
 
 Welch V. StoweU, 2 Dougl. 332 284 
 
 Welch V. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91 276, 277 
 
 Welch V. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364 166 
 
 Welch V. Tippery, 66 Nebr. 604 1271 
 
 Welch County Eoad, Ee, 7 Ohio St. 16 1126 
 
 Welde V. New York, etc., R. E. Co., 168 N. Y. 597 559 
 
 Weller v. Gadsden, 141 Ala. 642 374 
 
 Weller v. McCormick, 52 N. J. L. 470 486 
 
 Welles V. Cowles, 4 Conn. 182 1159 
 
 Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 87.... 24, 36, 63, 76, 90, 392, 996, 973, 1002 
 Wellington v. Boston, etc., R. E. Co., 158 Mass. 185.. 727, 732, 827, 863, 1137 
 
 Wellington v. Boston, etc., E. R. Co., 164' Mass. 380i 732, 737, 743 
 
 Wellington v. Cambridge, 214 Mass. 35 457, 1056 
 
 Wellington v. Cambridge, 220 Mass. 312 457 
 
 Wellington, etc., E. E. Co. v. Cashie, 114 N. C. 690 1087 
 
 Wells V. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 30 Conn. 316 1058 
 
 Wells V. Kelsey, 15 Abb. Pr. 53 1193 ' 
 
 Wells V. New Haven & Northampton Co., 151 Mass. 46 1277 
 
 Wells V. Somerset, etc., E. R. Co., 47 Me. 345 67 
 
 Wellsburg, etc., E. E. Co. v. Panhandle Traction Co., 56 W. Va. 18 . . 371, 753 
 
 Welsh V. Wilson, 101 N. Y. 254 478 
 
 Welter v. St. Paul, 40 Minn. 460 1310, 1376 
 
 Welton V. Dickson, 38 Neb. 767 116, 173, 236, 1256, 1259 
 
 Wendel v. Spokane County, 27 Wash. 121 . .314, 344, 1319, 1344, 1348 
 
 Wendt V. Minnetrista, 87 Minn. 403 .' 886 
 
 Wentworth v. Portsmouth, 68 N. H. 3«2 651 
 
 Werges v. St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co., 35 La. Ann. 641 1400 
 
 Werth V. Springfield, 78 Mo. 107 867, 872 
 
Table of Cases. cexliii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 la Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co., 13 Allen 95 ^^^ 
 
 West V. Bancroft, 32 Vt. 367 586 
 
 West V. Milwaukee, etc., E. R. Co., 56 Wis. 318 650, 656, 1150 
 
 West V. West, etc., R. R. Co., 61 Miss. 536 IWO 
 
 West Berkeley Land Co. v. Berkeley, 164 Cal. 406 lOH 
 
 West Boston Bridge v. County Commissioners, 10 Pick. 270 906, 1001 
 
 Westbrook v. Muscatine, etc., R. R. Co., 115 Iowa 106 742 
 
 Westbrook v. North, 1 Me. 179 1098 
 
 Westchester County v. Leake & Watts Orphan House, 140 App. Div. 188. 1097 
 
 Westchester County v. Wakefield Park Realty Co., 71 Misc. 485 349, 667 
 
 Wes* Chester, etc.. Road Co. v. Chester County, 182 Pa. 40 6S0, 683, 684 
 
 West Chicago Park Commissioners v. Boal, 232 111. 248 1174 
 
 West Chicago Park Commissioners v. McMullin, 134 III. 170 398, 986 
 
 West Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 172 111. 198 666 
 
 West Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 201 U. S. 506 459 
 
 West Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 214 111. 9 459 
 
 Westcott V. Boston, 186 Mass. 540 836, S37, 1248, 1250, 1314, 1318, 1363 
 
 1366 
 
 Westcott V. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 152 Mass. 465 1411, 1414, 1419 
 
 West Covington v. Freking, 8 Bush 121 482, 1419 
 
 West Covington v. Schultz, 30 S. W. 660 516 
 
 Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375 1329 
 
 Western Counties R. R. Co. v. Windsor, etc., R. R. Co., 7 App. Cas. 178. 818 
 Western, etc., R. R. Co. v. Western Union Tel Co., 138 Ga. 420. .338, 756, lOOt 
 
 Western Maryland R. R. Co. v. Owings, 15 Md. 199 1266, 1259 
 
 Western Newspaper Union v. Des Moines, 157 Iowa 68S. . .798, 876, 1209, 1223 
 Western New York Water Co. v. Niagara Falls, 154 N. Y. Supp. 1046. . 406 
 
 Western Pacific R. E. Co. v. Reed, 35 Cal. 621 1111, 1112, 1141, 1145, 1270 
 
 Western Pacific R. R. Co. v. Southern Pacific ,Ry. Co., 151 Fed. 376.427, 453 
 
 Western Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Hill, 56 Pa. 460 734 
 
 Western Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Johnston, 59 Pa. 294 .' 1417 
 
 Western E. R. Co. v. Alabama, etc., R. R. Co., 96 Ala. 272. .474, 525, 890, 1397 
 
 West One Hundred and Thirty-fourth St., In re, 143 App. Div. 258 10O4 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Union Tel. Co., 9 Biss. 72 607, 755 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Union Tel. Co., 65 Ga. 160 364 
 
 365, 1004 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ann Arbor R. R. Co., 189 U. S. 239 112 
 
 581, 756 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ann Arbor E. E. Co., 3i3 C. C. A. 113 581 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co., 7 Biss. 367 755 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Baltimore, etc., Tel. Co., 23 Fed. 12 365 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bullard, 67 Vt. 272 1265 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Burlington, etc., Ey. Co., 11 Fed. 1 364 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Electric, etc., Co., 178 N. Y. 325 380 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Guernsey & Scudder Electric Light Co., 46 
 
 Mo. App. 120 377, 380 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hill, 163 Ala. 18 211 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Krueger, 30 Ind. App. 2'S 487 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville, etc., E. E. Co., 201 Fed. 932. . . . 106 
 
 1044 
 
ccxliv Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] page 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 107 Miss. 626... 106(5 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Nashville, etc., E. R. Co., 182 S. W. 254. . . . 1004 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania E. E. Co., 196 U. S. 540 104 
 
 112, 370, 631, 755, 984 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania E. E. Co., 120 Fed. 362 581 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Polhemus, 102 C. C. A. 105 613 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Eeich, 19 Kan. 517 607, 608 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Richmond, 224 U. S. 160 112, 113, 389 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Satterfield 34 III. App. 386 580 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. South, etc., E. R. Co., 184 Ala. 66 1004 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 15 
 
 Cal. App. 679 1096 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Western, etc., R. R. Co., 142 Ga. 532 997 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Williams, 86 Va. 696 470, 577, 1397 
 
 Westhaeffer v. Lebanon, etc., St. Ey. Co., 163 Pa. 54 551 
 
 West Jersey Ry. Co. v. Camden Ry. Co., 52 N. J. Eq. 31 385, 542, 544 
 
 West Jersey E. E. Co. v. Cape May, etc., E. R. Co., 34 N. J. Bq. 164 537 
 
 West Newbury v. Ohase, 5 Gray 521 1178, 1217 
 
 West One Hundred and Fifty-first St., Ee, 123 N. Y. Supp. 843 886 
 
 West Orange v. Field, 37 N. J. Eq. 600 1318, 1360 
 
 Westphal v. New York, 177 N. Y. 140 107i> 
 
 Westport Stone Co. v. Thomas, 170 Ind. 91 1093 
 
 Westport Stone Co. v. Thomas, 175 Ind. 319 144, 154, 155, 192 
 
 193, 256, 916 
 
 West Eiver Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507 58, 68, 71, 76, 79, 129 
 
 136, 159, 907, 972, 978 
 
 West Skokie Drainage District v. Dawson, 243 1)1. 175 614, 722, 723 
 
 728, 740, 1030, 1144, 1188, 1196, 1199 
 
 West Virginia, etc., E. R. Co. v. Gibson, 94 Ky. 234 666, 670, 671 
 
 West Virginia Transportation Co. v. Ohio River Co., 22 W. Va. 600 365 
 
 West Virginia Transiportation Co. v. Volcanic Oil Co., 5 W. Va. 382. . . 210 
 
 Wetherill v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 195 Pa. 156 320, 322, 879 
 
 Weyer v. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 68 Wis. 180 732, 734, 737, 1173 
 
 Weyl V. Sonoma Valley E. E. Co., 69 Cal. 203 1395 
 
 Weymouth v. Port Townsend, etc., R. E. Co., 6 Wash. 575 997, 1000 
 
 Whately v. Franklin County Commissioners, 1 Met. 336 1050, 1119 
 
 Wheeler v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio St. 19 1308, 1329, 1325 
 
 Wheeler v. Essex Public Eoad' Board, 39 N. J. L. 291 1341 
 
 Wheeler v. Gilsum, 73 N. H. 42© 1308 
 
 Wheeler v. Plymouth, 116 Ind. 158 1316 
 
 Wheeler v. Rochester, etc., R. R. Co., 12 Barb. 227 606 
 
 Wheeler v. St. Johnsbury, 87 Vt. 46 338, 342, 1257, 1260 
 
 Wheeler v. Wall, 6 Allen 558 267 
 
 Wheeler v. Worcester, 10 Allen 591 830, 1233, 1356 
 
 Wheeling Bridge Co. v. Wheeling, etc., Bridge Co., 34 W. Va. 155 369 
 
 Wheeling, etc., E. R. Co. v. Toledo, etc.. Terminal Co., 72 Ohio St. 368 . . 3 
 
 117, 256, 359, 911, 912, 914, 916 
 
 Wheeling, etc., R. E. Co. v. Warrell, 122 Pa. 613 1245 
 
 Wheeling, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wheeling Steel & Iron Co., 41 W. Va. 747 . . 1094 
 
Table op Cases. ocxlv 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Wheelock v. Auditor of Suffolk County, 130 Mass. 486 1231, 1232 
 
 Wheelwright v. Boston, 188 Mass. 521 147, 175, 621 
 
 Whipple V. Fair Haven, 63 Vt. 221 313, 1360 
 
 Whitacre v. St. Paul, etc., E. R. Co., 24 Minn. 311 656 
 
 Whiteher v. Benton, 48 N. H. 157 344 
 
 Whitcher v. Benton, 50 N. H. 25 770, 806 
 
 Whitcomb v. Boston, 192 Mass. 211 1271 
 
 White V. Blanchard Bros. Granite Co., 178 Mass. 363 131, 188, 197, 549 
 
 White v. Boston, 186 Mass. 65 1187, 1188 
 
 White V. Charleston, 2 Hill 571 264 
 
 White V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 122 Ind. 317 533 
 
 White V. Chowan, 90 N. C. 437 T 1300 
 
 White V. Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co., 34 Ind. App. 287 693. 722 
 
 White V. Fifth Ave., etc.. Bridge Co., 189 Pa. 500 744 
 
 White V. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 4 Cush. 440 1200 
 
 White V. Foxborough, 151 Mass. 28 735 
 
 White V. Godfrey, 97 Mass. 473i 485 
 
 WTiite V. Lincoln County Commissioners, 70 Me. 317 1118 
 
 White V. MoKeesport, 101 Pa. 394 1236 
 
 White V. Medford, 163 Mass. 164 735, 829, 1222 
 
 White V. Metropolitan, etc., R. R. Co., 154 HI. 620 737, 74,0, 742, 743 
 
 White ,. New York, 15 App. Div. 440 1252 
 
 White V. Norfolk County Commissioners, 2 Cush. 361 1061, 1271 
 
 White V. Northwestern, etc., R. R. Co., 113 N. C. 310 470, 498, 505 
 
 526, 530, 1244, 1282 
 
 White V. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 229' Pa. 480 419, 894, 1182 
 
 White V. Romney, 69 W. Va. 606 982 
 
 White V. South Shore R. R. Co., 6 Cush. 472 1051 
 
 White V. Strout, 72 Wash. 62 251 
 
 White V. Susquehanna Pole Line Co., 112 Md. 416 1256 
 
 White V. Wabash, etc., R. R. Co., 64 Iowa 281 1245 
 
 White v. Western Allegheny R. R. Co., 222 Pa. 534 1177, 1178 
 
 White V. Yazoo, 27 Miss. 357 507, 570, 1378 
 
 White Deer Creek Improvement Co. v. Sassaman, 67 Pa. 415 422 
 
 Whitefield v. Paris, 84 Tex. 431 1308 
 
 Whitehead v. Arkansas Central R. R. Co., 28 Ark. 460 792 
 
 Whitehead v. Denver, 13 Colo. App. 134 1065 
 
 Whitehead v. Jessup, 53 Fed. 707 429 
 
 Whitehouse v. Androscoggin R. R. Co., 52 Me. 208 590, 1393 
 
 Whitely v. Baltimore, 113 Md. 541 694 
 
 Whitely v. Mississippi, etc., Boom Co., 38 Minn. 523 762, 803 
 
 Whiteman v. Wilmington, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Harr. 514 58, 185, 913 
 
 940, 9'83 
 
 White Plains Water Commissioners, Matter of, 71 App. Div. 544 1167 
 
 White River Turnpike Co. v. Vermont Central R. R. Co., 21 Vt. 590 360 
 
 973, 983, 999 
 
 White's Case, 2 Overt. 109 917 
 
 White's Creek Turnpike Co. v. Davidson, 3 Tenn. Ch. 396 280 
 
 Wiate Water Valley Canal Co. v. Ferris, 2 Ind. 331 957 
 
ccxlvi Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGB 
 
 White Water Valley Canal Co. v. Henderson, 3 Ind. S 1058, 1059, 112.0 
 
 1228, 1229 
 
 White Water Valley R. R. Co. v. McClure, 29 Ind. 536 729, 735, 798 
 
 Whiting V. New Haven, 45 Conn. 303 355 
 
 Whiting V. Sheboygan, etc., R. E. Co., 25 Wis. 167 4, 186 
 
 Whitman v. Boston & Maine R. R., 7 Allen 313 801, 1147, 1177, 1178 
 
 1179, 1186, 1190, 1192 
 
 Whitman v. Wilmington, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Harr. 514 773, 794 
 
 Whitmeyer v. Salt Lake, etc., Ry. Co., 151 Pac. 48 190 
 
 Whitmier & Filhrick Co. v. Buffalo, 118 Fed*. 773 277 
 
 Whitney v. Boston, 98 Mass. 312 744, 768, 801, 802, 1179 
 
 Whitney v. Central Georgia Ry. Co;, 134 Ga. 213 1034 
 
 Whitney v. Cheshire R. R. Co., 210 Mass. 263i 601 
 
 Whitney v. Commonwealth, 190 Mass. 531 889 
 
 Whitney v. Lynn, 122l Mass. 338. , 955, 967, 1108 
 
 Wliitney v. State, 96 N. Y. 240 326, 332, 400, 1421 
 
 Whitney v. Stow, 111 Mass. 368 400 
 
 Whitney v. Toledo, 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 74 571, 572, 1379 
 
 Whitsett V. Union Depot, etc., Co., 10 Colo. 243i 323, 1404 
 
 Whitten v. Haverhill, 204 Mass. 95 837, 1051, 1055, 1244 
 
 Whittington v. Polk, 1 Harris & J. 236 32 
 
 Whitwell, Ex parte,- 9'S Cal. 73 278 
 
 Whitworth v. Puckett, 2 Grat. 528 614 
 
 Whyte V. Kansas, 22 Mo. App. 409 1106 
 
 Wichita, etc., E. R. Co. v. Feohheimer, 36 Kan. 45 1282 
 
 Wichita, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kuhn, 38 Kan. 104 650, 731, 1214 
 
 Wichita Falls, etc., Ry. Go. v. HoUoman, 28 Okla. 419 660, 667, 1170 
 
 1195, 12.11, 1212 
 
 Wichita Falls, etc., Ry. Co. v. Munsell, 38 Okla. 256 733, 734, 1137 
 
 Wichita Falls, etc., Ry. Co. v. Wyriek, 147 S. W. 730 1223 
 
 Wichita Falls, etc., Ry. Co. v. Wyriek, 158 S. W. 570 1139 
 
 Wicks V. De Witt, 54 Iowa 130 1328, 1339 
 
 Widman Investment Co. v. St. Louis, 191 Mo. 459 789, 805 
 
 Wieland v. Ashton, 18 S. D. 331 1121 
 
 Wiggin V. New York, 9 Paige 16 708 
 
 Wiggins V. Tallmadge, 11 Barb. 457 ' 174 
 
 Wight V. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371 787 
 
 Wilber v. Eeed, 84 Neb. 767 925, 1256 
 
 Wilbraham v. Hampden 'County Commissioners, 11 Pick. 322 948, 1048 
 
 Wilbur v. Taunton, 123 Mass. 522i ; 831, 873 
 
 Wilbur Lumber Co. v. Milwaukee Light, etc., Co., 134 Wis. 352 1152 
 
 Wilburn v. Eaines, 111 Va. 334 902 
 
 Wilcox V. Chicago, 107 111. 334 1307 
 
 Wilcox V. Meriden, 57 Conn. 120 794 
 
 Wilcox V. New Bedford, 140 Mass. 570 1104, 1407 
 
 Wilcox V. Rochester, 190 N. Y. 137 1308 
 
 Wilcox V. St. Paul, etc., Ey. Co., 35 Minn. 439 743, 1102, 1129 
 
 Wild V. Deig, 43 Ind. 455 236 
 
 Wilde V. Minsterly, 2 Roll. Abr. 564 568 
 
Table of Cases. ccixlvii 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are In Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGH 
 
 Wilder v. Aurora, etc., Traction Co., 216 111. 493 526, 636, 545, 549 
 
 Wilder v. Hubbell, 43 Mich. 487 1119 
 
 Wilkin V. St. Paul, etc., R. E. Co., 16 Minn. 271 933, 1078 
 
 Wilkina v. Hillman, 45 Okla. 451 260, 269 
 
 Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 658 975 
 
 Willamet Falls Canal, etc., Co. v. Kelly, 3 Ore. 99 810, 1129 
 
 WUlamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. 6. 1 101 
 
 Willamette Iron Works v. Oregon Ky., etc., Co., 26 Ore. 224 321, 498 
 
 515, 1257, 1259 
 
 Willard v. Boston, 149 Mass. 176 1061 
 
 Willard v. Cambridge, 3 Allea 574 491, 834 
 
 Willcox V. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19 358, 680 
 
 Willets V. Laughaar, 212 Mass. 573 464 
 
 Willets Mfg. Co. V. Mercer County, 62 N. J. L. 95 514 
 
 Willey V. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 96 N. C. 408 347 
 
 Williams, In re, 59 Me. 517 970 
 
 Williams v. Brooklyn Ry. Co., 12'6 N. Y. 96 465, 558 
 
 Williams v. Corey, 73 Iowa 194 911 
 
 WiUiams v. Citizens' Ry. Co., 130 Ind. 71 374, 375 
 
 Willianjs v. City Electric St. Ry. Co., 41 Fed. 556 536, 539, 541 
 
 Williams v. Commonwealth, 168 Mass. 364 696, ft97 
 
 Williams v. Eighteenth Judicial District Judge, 45 La. Ann. 1295.... 115 
 
 155, 1119 
 
 Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co., 85 S. C. 1 445 
 
 Williams v. Hathaway, 21 E. I. 566 773 
 
 Williams v. Hutchinson, etc., Ry. Co., 62 Kan. 412 90, 353, 1265 
 
 Williams v. Kirby, 169 Mo. 622 1067 
 
 Williams v. Lafourche Parish Judge, 45 La. Ann. 1295 115, 155, 1119 
 
 Williams v. Lockman, 46 Ohio St. 417 1144 
 
 Williams v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 150 Cal. 592 497, 505, 529, 555, 588 
 
 Williams v. Meridian' Light & Ry Co., 69 So. 596 542, 893 
 
 Williams v. Mitchell, 49 Wis. 285. 947 
 
 Williams v. Nelson, 23 Pick. 141. . 230, 959, 1061, 1412 
 
 Williams v. New Orleans, etc., R. K. Co., 60 Miss. 689 651, 1101, 1151 
 
 Williams v. New York Central R. R. Co., 16 N. Y. 97 470, 526, 561 
 
 1256, 1395 
 
 Williams v. Parker, 188 U. S. 491 631, 636, 649 
 
 Williams v. Pittsburgh, 83 Pa. 71 944 
 
 Williams v. Eivenburg, 145 App. Div. 93 283 
 
 Williams v. Routt County Commissioners, 48 Colo. 541 926 
 
 Williams v. School District, 33 Vt. 271 211, 212, 915, 921 
 
 Williams v. Taunton, 125 Mass. 34 801, 802, 1170, 1188, 1225 
 
 Williams v. Taunton, 126 Mass. 287 941, 952, 954 
 
 Williams v. United States, 104 Fed. 50 313, 415 
 
 Williamson v. Carlton, 51 Me. 449 II34 
 
 Williamson v. East Amwell, 28 N. J. L. 270 806 
 
 Williamson v. Louisville Industrial School, 96 Ky. 251 130g 
 
 Williamson v. Reed, 106 Va. 453 8J3 
 
 Williamson Coimty Justices v. Jeifferson, 1 Coldw. 420 1057 1231 
 
ccxlviii Table op Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1432 in Volume II.] PAQH 
 
 Williamsport v. Citizens Water & Oas Co., 232 Pa. 232 684 
 
 Williamaport, etc., R. E. Co. v. Philadelphia, etc., E. R. Co., 141 Pa. 414 984 
 
 1008, 1009, 1147 
 
 William St., Matter of, 19 Wend. 678 340, 345 
 
 Willink V. United States, 240 U. S. 572 459 
 
 Willis V. Erie Tel. Co., 37 Minn. 347 576 
 
 Willis V. Winona, 59' Minn. 27 303, 514 
 
 Willis Ave., In re, 56 Mich. 244 1144 
 
 Willison V. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320 275, 280, 828 
 
 WUlock V. Beaver Valley E. E. Co., 222 Pa. 590 527, 531, 891 
 
 Willock V. Beaver Valley E. E. Co., 229 Pa. 526 594, 597 
 
 Willson V. Boise City, 20 Idaho 133 1317, 1331, 1366 
 
 Willyard v. Hamilton, 7 Ohio, Part II, 111 116, 146, 198, 632, 941, 949 
 
 Wihnes v. Minneapolis, etc., E. E. Co., 29 Minn. 242 740 
 
 Wilmington Canal, etc., Co. v. Dominguez, 50 Cal. 505 923 
 
 Wilmington, etc., R. E. Co. v. StaufFer, 60 Pa. 374 733 
 
 Wilshire, In re, 103 Fed. 620 277, 278 
 
 Wilson v. Baltimore, etc., E. R. Co., 5 Del. Ch. 524 21, 58, lOT, 115 
 
 155, 913, 926 
 
 Wilson V. Beaver Valley R. R. Co., 17 Pa. Dist. E. 151 608 
 
 Wilson V. Burr Oak, 87 Mich. 240 947 
 
 Wilson V. Compton Bond & Mortgage Co., 103 Ark. 452 243 
 
 Wilson V. East Jersey Water Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 329 998 
 
 Wilflon V. Equitable Oas Co., 152 Pa. 566 667 
 
 Wilson V. European, etc., E. E. Co., 67 Me. 368 354 
 
 Wilson V. Fannin County, 74 Ga. 818 1300 
 
 Wilson V. Hathaway, 42 Iowa 173 932 
 
 Wilson V. Janes, 29 Kan. 233 1407 
 
 Wilson V. Lynn, 119 Mass. 174 839, 1051, 1068, 1069, 1243 
 
 Wilson V. Mitchell, 17 S. D. 515, 1343 
 
 Wilson V. Muskegon, etc., R. R. Co., 132 Mich. 469i 1263 
 
 Wilson V. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 261 838 
 
 Wilson V. New York, 1 Denio 595 508, 1325, 1355 
 
 Wilson V. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 222 Pa. 541 190, 921 
 
 Wilson V. Trenton, 53 N. J. L. 645 ' 935 
 
 Wilson V. Troy, 135 N. Y. 96 ■■ 1310 
 
 Wilson V. Waterbury, 73 Conn. 416 1375 
 
 Wilson V. Welch, 12 Ore. 353 415 
 
 Wilson V. Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 203 1252 
 
 Winans v. Crane, 36 N. J. L. 394 947 
 
 Winchester v. Capron, 63 N. H. 605 588 
 
 Winchester v. Middlesex County Commissioners, 114 Mass. 481 715 
 
 Winchester, etc.. Road Co. v. Chester County, 182 Pa. 40 120« 
 
 Windsor ,. Field, 1 Conn. 279 691 
 
 Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274 924 
 
 Winkelmau v. Chicago, 213 111. 360 1107, 1109, 1156 
 
 Winkelman v. Des Moines, 62 Iowa 11 732, 1181 
 
 Winkler v. Winkler, 40 111. 185 236 
 
 Winn v. Rutland, 52 Vt. 481 313, 1328 
 
Table of Cases. ocxlix 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-W22 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Winnebago Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Wisconsin, etc., E. R. Co., 81 Wis. 389 931 
 
 932, 1066 
 
 Winnetka v. Clifford, 201 111. 475 325, 536 
 
 Winnipiseogee, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Gifford, 67 N. H. 514 660 
 
 Winnisimmet Co. v. Grueby, 111 Mass. 543 1058, 1060, 1201 
 
 Winona v. Botzet, 169 Fed. 321 1309 
 
 Winona, etc., R. R. Co. v. Denman, 10 Minn. 207 735, 1150 
 
 Winona, etc., R. R. Co. v. Waldron, 11 Minn. 515 735, 763, 766, 773 
 
 780, 788, 803 
 
 Winona, etc., R. R. Co. v. Watertown, 4 S. D. 323 60, 915, 973, 982 
 
 997, 998, 999, 1001 
 
 Winons Point Shooting Club v. Oasperen, 193 U. S. 189 80. 126 
 
 Winslow V. Gififord, 6 Cush. 327 310 
 
 Winter \ . Montgomery, 83 Ala. 589 481 
 
 Winter v. New York, etc., Tel. Co., 51 N. J. L. 83 1066, 1070 
 
 Winter v. Peterson, 24 N. J. L. 525 470, 485 
 
 Wintenbottom v. Lord Derby, L. R. 2 Ex. 316 491, 882 
 
 Winthrop v. Lechmere (Privy Council 172T) 28 
 
 Winthrop v. New England Chocolate Co., 180 Mass. 464 278 
 
 Wirt V. McEmery, 21 Fed. 233 1419, 1420 
 
 Wisconsin Central R. R. Co. v. Cornell, 49 Wis. 162 921 
 
 Wisconsin Central R. R. Co. v. Cornell, 52 Wis 1083 
 
 Wisconsin Central R. R. Co. v. Kneale, 79 Wis. 89 952 
 
 Wisconsin, etc., R. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287 373, 964 
 
 Wisconsin, etc., R. R. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379 968 
 
 Wisconsin River Improvement Co. v. Pier, 137 Wis. 325 148, 208 
 
 Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Eau Claire St. Ry. Co., 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 383 380 
 
 Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Oshkosh, 62 Wis. 32 994 
 
 Wisconsin Water Co. v. Winans, 85 Wis. 26 117, 129, 130, 201, 917, 1085 
 
 Wise V. Yazoo City, 96 Miss. 507 3, 59, 116, 195, 196, 988, 991, 992 
 
 Wissler v. Yadkin River Power Co., 158 N. C. 465 3, 204 
 
 Witcher v. Holland Waterworks Co., 142 N. Y. 626 201 
 
 Witcher v. Holland Waterworks Co., 66 Hun 619 588 
 
 Witham v. Osborn, 4 Ore. 318 117, 236 
 
 W^itherspoon v. Meridian, 69 Miss. 288 1410 
 
 Witman v. Reading, 191 Pa. 134 340 
 
 Witmark v. New York Elevated Ry. Co., 149 N. Y. 393. . 710, 1158, 1224 
 
 Witt v. St, Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 35 Minn. 404 1099, 1100 
 
 Wixom V. Bixby, 127 ilioh. 479 943 
 
 Wixon V. Newport, 13 R. I. 454 1308 
 
 Woart V. Winnick, 3 N. H. 475 32 
 
 Wolf V. Green Bay, etc., E. R. Co., 140 Wis. 337 723, 724, 1178 
 
 Wolf V. Manhattan Ry. Co., 101 N. Y. Supp. 493 553 
 
 Wolfard v. Fisher, 48 Ore. 479 193 
 
 Wolfe v. Sullivan, 133 Ind. 331 1407, 1410 
 
 Wolff V. Georgia Southern Ry. Co., 94 Ga. 555 790, 795 
 
 Wolters V. St. Louis, 132 Mo. 1 789, 805 
 
 Wood V. Duke Land, etc., Co., 165 N. C. 367 508 
 
 Wood V. Highway Commissioners, 62 111. 391 939 1076 
 
ocl Table of Cases. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Wood V. Hudson, 114 Mass. 513 .785, 801 
 
 Wood V. Mears, 12 Ind. 516 477 
 
 Wood V. Milton, 197 Mass. 531 1051 
 
 Wood V. Mobile, 47 C. C. A. 9 " 616, 1421 
 
 Wood V. Natural Waterworks Co., 33 Kan. 590 572 
 
 Wood V. Quincy, 11 Cush. 387 1060 
 
 Wood V. State Hospital, 164 Pa. 159 1097, 1101 
 
 Wood V. Tacoma, 66 Wash. 266 871, 876 
 
 Wood V. Truckee Turnpike Co., 24 Cal. 474 1417 
 
 Wood V. Veal, 5 Barn. & Aid. 454 .% 175 
 
 Wood V. Waud, 3 Ex. 748 443 
 
 Wood V, Westborough, 140 Mass. 413 . . .' 355, 356 
 
 Woodbury v. Beverly, 153 Mass. 245 831, 842, 856, 1360 
 
 Woodbury v. Marblehead Water Co., 145 Mass. 509 1055 
 
 Woodcliff Land Improvement Co. v. Nevir Jersey Shore Line E. R. Co., 72 
 
 N. J. L. 137 66 
 
 Woodcock V. Wabash Ey. Co., 135 Iowa 559 955 
 
 Woodfolk v: Nashville, etc., E. R. Co., 2 Swan 422 763, 778, 779, 780, 812 
 
 Woodman v. Somerset County, 25 Me. 30O 1057, 1228 
 
 Woodring v. Forks Township, 28 Pa. 355 397, 478 
 
 Woodruff V. Neal, 28 Conn. 165 485, 487 
 
 Woodruff V. No. Bloomfield G. M. Co., 18 Fed. 753 312 
 
 Woodruff V. Taylor, 20 Vt. 65 924 
 
 Woods V. Nashua Mfg. Co., 4 N. H. 527 1235 
 
 Woods Eun Ave., Ee., 43 Pa. Super. Ct. 475 356 
 
 Woodstock V. Gallup, 28 Vt. 587 162 
 
 Woodstock, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Charleston Light & Water Co., 84 S. C. 
 
 306 337, 339 
 
 Woodward v. Worcester, 121 Mass. 245 313, 837, 1256, 1258 
 
 Woodworth v. Brooklyn El. Ey. Co., 22 App. Div. 501 1185 
 
 Woodyer v. Hadden, 5 Taunt. 125 175 
 
 Woolard v. Nashville, 108 Tenn. 353 989, 1239 
 
 Wooley V. Fall Eiver, 220 Mass. 584 833, 869, 1175 
 
 Woolsey, Matter of, 95 N. Y. 135 92 
 
 Wooster v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 39i Me. 246 93, 94 
 
 Wooster v. Sugar Valley E. E. Co., 57 Wis. 311 1217 
 
 Worcester v. Keith, 5 Allen 17 1060 
 
 Worcester v. Norwich, etc., R. E. Co., 109 Mass. 103 964, 984 
 
 Worcester v. Worcester County Commissioners, 100 Mass. 103 1066 
 
 1057, 1058 
 
 Worcester v. Worcester, etc., Ey. Co., 196 U. S. 539 392, 394, 402 
 
 Worden v. Bielenberg, 119 Minn. 330 876, 895 
 
 Worden v. New Bedford, 131 Mass. 23 1309 
 
 Workman v. Mifflin, 30 Pa. 326 342, 712 
 
 Wormser v. Brown, 72 Hun 93 328 
 
 Wray v. Knoxville, etc., E. R. Co., 113 Tenn. 544 812, 1217 
 
 Wray v. Mott, 83 N. J. L. 110 1066 
 
 Wray v. Mott, 84 N. J. L. 769 1066 
 
 Wrentham v. Corey, 159 Mass. 93. 1057 
 
Table of Oases. ocli 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 In Volume II.] PAGE 
 
 Wright V. Augusta, 78 Ga. 241 ■ 1307 
 
 Wright V. Austin, 143 Cal. 236 469 
 
 Wright V. Butler, 64 Mo. 145 1129 
 
 Wright V. Carter, 27 N. J. L. 76 619 
 
 Wright V. Georgia, etc.. Banking Co., 216 U. S. 420 75 
 
 Wright V. Morris, 43 Ark. 193 364 
 
 Wright V. Mt. Vernon, 167 N. Y. 541 383 
 
 Wright V. State, 3 Heisk. 256 271, 369 
 
 Wright V. Wilson, 95 Ind. 408 933 
 
 Wright V. Woodcock, 86 Me. 113 616, 617 
 
 Wroe V. Harris, 2 Wash. 126 20, 22, 225 
 
 Wuester v. Topeka, etc., R. R. Co., 85 Kan. 636 627, 691 
 
 Wulzen V. San Francisco Supervisors, 101 Cal. 15, 22 155, 899, 901 
 
 915, 932, 1049, 1117 
 
 Wunderlich v. Pennsylvania E. R. Co., 223 Pa. 114 863 
 
 Wurts V. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606 241, 290 
 
 Wyandotte, etc., R. R. Co. v. Waldo, 70 Mo. 629 745 
 
 Wyant v. Central Tel. Co., 123 Mich. 51 486, 578, 580 
 
 Wyatt v. Rome, 105 Ga. 312 1307 
 
 Wyatt V. Seaboard Air Line Co., 156 N. C. 307 1175 
 
 Wylie V. Elwood, 134 111. 281 856 
 
 Wyman v. Essex County Commissioners, 157 Mass. 55 1010, 1011 
 
 Wyman v. Lexington, etc., R. E. Co., 13 Met. 316 1189, 1196, 1200 
 
 1201, 1206 
 
 Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378 274 
 
 Wynn v. Beardsley, 126 N. C. 116 1045 
 
 Wyoming Coal, etc., Co. v. Price, 81 Pa. 156 613 
 
 Wyzata v. Great Northern E. R. Co., 46 Minn. 505 1268 
 
 Y 
 
 Yadkin River Vowei Co. v. Wissler, 160 N. C. 269 66, 916, 917, 986 
 
 Varborough v. Bank of England, 16 East 6 1293, 1294 
 
 Yates V. Big Sandy Ry. Co., 28 Ky. L. Rep. 206 878 
 
 Yates V. Judd, 18 Wis. 119 453 
 
 Yates V. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497 275, 426, 453, 456, 457 
 
 Yates V. Warrenton, 84 Va. 337 1410 
 
 Yates V. West Grafton, 33 W. Va. 507 528, 1395, 1406 
 
 Yaw V. State, 127 N. Y. 192 958, 1054, 1070 
 
 Yazoo, etc., E. R. Co. v. Davis, 73 Miss. 678 610, 1392 
 
 Yazoo, etc., R. E. Co. v. Jennings, 90 Miss. 93 736, 737 
 
 Yazoo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Teissier, 135 La. 19 659, 671, 733, 1139 
 
 Yazoo-Mississippi Delta Board v. Daney, 65 Miss. 335 1019 
 
 Yeager v. Fairmont, 43 W. Va. 259 1357 
 
 Yeamans v. Hampden County Commissioners, 16 Gray 36 1055 
 
 Yeargain v. Johnston, Taylor 80 1135 
 
 Yellowstone Park R. R. Co. v. Bridges Coal Co., 34 Mont. 545 .660, 108O 
 
 1081, 1111, 1225 
 
 Yolo County v. Barney, 79 Cal. 375 1408 
 
eclii Table of CAses. 
 
 [Pages 1-720 are in Volume I, 721-1422 in Volume II.] PAGE! 
 
 Vonkers, In re, 117 N. Y. 564 571, 1379 
 
 York V. Welsh, 117 Pa. 174 345 
 
 York Tel. Co. v. Keesey, 5 Pa. Dist. Ct. Eep. 366 578 
 
 Yost V. Conroy, 92 Ind. 464 1214, 1216 
 
 Yost V. Stout, 4 Coldw. 205 70 
 
 Yost'8 Eeport, 17 Pa. 524 632, 637 
 
 Youghiogheny Bridge Co. v. Pittsburg, €tc.„ R. R. Co., 201 Pa. 457 1007 
 
 Young V. Buckingham, 5 Ohio 485 174, 1126 
 
 Young V. Charleston, 20 S. C. 116 1308 
 
 Young V. Harrison, 6 Ga. 130 .,. 631, 635 
 
 Young v. Harrison, 17 Ga. 30 I 671, 774, 795 
 
 Young V. Seedom, 67 Pa. 351 1353 
 
 Young V. Maquon Township Highway Commissioners, 134 111. 569 1359 
 
 Young V. MoKenzie, 3 Ga. 31 30, 58, 78, 174, 622 
 
 Young V. Rothrock, 121 Iowa 588 886 
 
 Young V. Steamship Scotia ( 1903),, A. C. 501 1298 
 
 Young V. United States, 97 U. S. 39 265 
 
 Younkin v. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 120 Wis. 477 543, 545, 549, 596 
 
 Youtzy V. Cedar Rapids, 150 Iowa 53 1196, 1204 
 
 z 
 
 Zabriakie v. Jersey City, etc., R. R. Co., 13 N. J. Eq. 314 1400 
 
 Zachry v. Harlem, 138 Ga. 195 991 
 
 Zack V. Pennsylvania R. E. Co., 25 Pa. 394 926 
 
 Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel., etc., Co., 64 Ohio St. 67 391, 396 
 
 Zehner v. Miller, 172 Ind. 493 1008 
 
 Zehren v. Milwaukee El. Ry. Co., 99 Wis. 83. . . .474, 536, 545, 547, 561, 1395 
 
 Zeilda Forsee Inv. Co. v. Phoenix Brick, etc., Co., 143 :Mo. App. 357. . . 1120 
 
 Zettel V. West Bend, 79 Wis. 316 491, 885 
 
 Zigler v. Menges, 121 Ind. 99 115, 141, 243 
 
 Zimmerman v. Canfield, 42 Ohio St. 470 914, 925, 927, 946 
 
 Zimmerman v. Union Canal Co., 1 Watts & S. 346 421 
 
 Zircle V. Southern Ry. Co., 102 Va. 17 117, 130, 193, 915, 917 
 
 Zug V. Pittsburg, 194 Pa. 367 1142 
 
 Zwietusch v. East Milwaukee, 161 Wis. 519 815 
 
THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 The Oeigin op the Powee, and the Causes of Its Geadual 
 
 SUBOEDINATION' TO THE RiGHTS OF PeIVATE PeOPEETY. 
 
 Section 1. Eminent Domain Defined. 
 
 2. Early History of Eminent Domain in European Countries. 
 
 3. Eminent Domain in the American Colonies. 
 
 4. The Term " Eminent Domain ". 
 
 5. The Power of Parliament Absolute. 
 
 6. The British Constitution. 
 
 7. Sovereign Powers of the States. 
 
 8. The Kestrictions upon the Powers of the Representatives of 
 
 the People. 
 
 9. The Change in the Attitude of the Public toward the Bill of 
 
 Eights. 
 
 10. The Three Canons of Constitutional Government. 
 
 11. The Disregard of the Presumption in Eavor of the Validity 
 
 of an Act of the Legislature. 
 
 12. The Extension of the Scope of the Bill of Rights. 
 
 13. The Rise and Fall of the Independent Judiciary. 
 
 14. The Effect of the Loss of an Independent Judiciary upon the 
 
 Power of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 1. Eminent Domain Defined. 
 
 Eminent domain is the power, inherent in a sovereign 
 state, of taking or of authorizing the taking of any property 
 within its jurisdiction for the public good. 
 
 The power of eminent domain as it existed in the original 
 thirteen states, and as it still exists in such of the states 
 as have abided most closely by the early American con- 
 ception of the functions of a written constitution, is the 
 power of taking or of authorizing the taking of any 
 property within the jurisdiction of the state for the public 
 use, upon the payment of just compensation, determined 
 by an impartial tribunal.^ 
 
 1. United States. — Mississippi, States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513, 27 
 etc., Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 L. ed. 1015. 
 U. S. 403, 25 L. ed. 206; United ^Zabomo.— Caldwell v. State, 1 
 
The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 The power of eminent domain, as it exists in some of the 
 states which in their zeal for progress have wandered 
 furthest from the principles of government established by 
 the founders of the republic, may be defined as the power 
 of the legislature of a state to authorize the institution of 
 judicial proceedings for the taking of such property or 
 such interest in property, for use by the public, as may 
 be found by a judicial tribunal to be necessary, upon the 
 payment, in advance of the taking, of compensation for the 
 
 Stew. & P. 327, 379; Dyer v. Tus- 
 kaloosa Bridge Co., 2 Port. 296, 27 
 Am. Dec. 655. 
 
 Arizona. — Revised Statutes, § 
 3071. 
 
 Arka/nsas. — Ex parte Martia, 13 
 Ark. 198, 58 Am. Dec. 321; Little 
 Rock Junction R. R. Co. v. Wood- 
 ruffl, 49 Ark. 381, 5 S. W. 792, 4 
 Am. St. Rep. 51. 
 
 California. — Gilmer v. Lime 
 Point, 18 Cal. 229, 250; Marin 
 County Water Co. v. Marin County, 
 145 Cal. 586, 79 Pac. 282. 
 
 Colorado. — People v. Pitkin 
 County Court, 11 Col. 147, 17 Pac. 
 248. 
 
 Connecticut. — Todd v. Austin, 34 
 Conn. 78. 
 
 Florida. — ^ Moody v. Jacksonville 
 R. R. Co., 20 Fla. 597; State v. 
 Jacksonville Terminal Co., 41 Ma. 
 377, 27 So. 225. 
 
 Georgia.— Mims v. Macon, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 3 Ga. 333, 338. 
 
 Idaho. — Potlatcli Lumber Co. v. 
 Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 88 Pac. 
 426, 118 Am. St. Rep. 233; Port- 
 neuf Irrigation Co. v. Budge, 16 
 Idaho 116, 100 Pac. 1046, 18 Ann. 
 Cas. 674. 
 
 Illinois. — South Park Commis- 
 sioners v. Ward, 248 Dl. 299, 93 
 N. E. 910, 21 Ann. Cas. 127; Ed- 
 wardsville v. Madison County, 251 
 III. 265, 96 N. E. 238, 37 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) lOL 
 
 IndioMa. — Indianapolis Water- 
 works Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 
 
 364; Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. 
 Harless, 131 Ind. 446, 29 N. E. 
 1062, 15 L. R. A. 505. 
 
 Indian Territory. — Tuttle V. 
 Moore, 3 Ind. Terr. 712, 64 S. W. 
 585. 
 
 Iowa. — Gano v. Minneapolis, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 114 Iowa 713, 721, 87 
 N. W. 714, 55 L. R. A. 263, 89 Am. 
 St. Rep. 393. 
 
 Kansas. — Jockheck v. Shawnee 
 County Commissioners, 53 Kan. 
 780, 37 Pac. 621. 
 
 Kentucky. — O'Hara v. Lexing- 
 ton, etc., R. R. Co., 1 Dana 232; 
 Long V. Louisville, 98 Ky. 67, 32 
 S. W. 271. 
 
 Maine. — Brown v. Gerald, 100 
 Me. 351, 360, 61 Atl. 785, 70 
 L. R. A. 472, 109 Am. St. Rep. 426. 
 
 Maryland. — Baltimore, etc., Turn- 
 pike Road V. Baltimore, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 81 Md. 247, 31 Atl. 854. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Perry v. Wilson, 
 7 Mass. 393; Commonwealth v. Al- 
 ger, 7 Cush. 53, 85; Lowell v. Bos- 
 ton, 111 Mass. 454, 462, 15 Am. 
 Rep. 39; Commonwealth v. Bearse, 
 132 Mass. 542, 42 Am. Rep. 540. 
 
 Michigan. — People v. Humphrey, 
 23 Mich. 471, 9 Am. Rep. 94; Port- 
 age V. Van Hoesen, 87 Mich. 536, 
 49 N. W. 894, 14 L. R. A. 114; 
 Port St. Union Depot Co. v. 
 Backus, 103 Mich. 556, 61 N. W, 
 787. 
 
 Minnesota. — ^Weir v. St. Paul, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 155. 
 
 Mississippi. — Thompson v. Grand 
 
§ 1 
 
 Origin and Decline of the Poweb. 
 
 property taken, assessed by a jury and from which the bene- 
 fits to the remaining property of the owner cannot be set 
 off, and also upon the payment of the damages caused to 
 property not taken, either by the taking of other private 
 property and the use to which such property is put, or by 
 the putting of property already belonging to the public and 
 devoted to the public use to a different or additional use. 
 That the power of eminent domain, one of the most 
 
 Gulf Bankmg Co., 3 How. 240; 
 Wise V. Yazoo City, 96 Miss. 507, 
 51 So. 453, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 1130, Ann. Cas. 1912 B 377. 
 
 Missouri.- — Newby v. Platte 
 County, 25 Mo. 258; Southern Il- 
 linois, etc., Bridge Co. v. Stone, 
 174 Mo. 1, 73 S. W. 453, 63 L. R. A. 
 301. 
 
 Montana. — Butte, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 Montana, etc., Ry. Co., 16 Mont. 
 504, 536, 41 Pao. 232, 31 L. R. A. 
 298, 50 Am. St. Rep. 508. 
 
 Nebraska. — Tomey v. Fremont, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 23 Neb. 465, 36 
 N. W. 806. 
 
 Nevada. — Gibson v. Mason, 5 
 Nev. 283. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Vamey v. 
 Manchester, 58 N. H. 430, 40 Am. 
 Rep. 592; State v. Griffin, 69 N. H. 
 1, 39 Atl. 260, 41 L. R. A. 177, 76 
 Am. St. Rep. 139. 
 
 New Jersey. — American Print 
 Works V. Lawrence, 21 N. J. L. 
 248, 257; Hale v. Lawrence, 21 
 N. J. L. 714, 728, 47 Am. Dec. 190. 
 
 New Mexico. — Albuquerque Land, 
 etc., Co. V. Gutierrez, 10 N. M. 177, 
 61 Pac. 357. 
 
 New York. — Beekman v. Sara- 
 toga, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Paige 45, 
 73, 22 Am. Dec. 679; Bloodgood v. 
 Mohawk, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Wend. 
 9, 31 Am. Dec. 313; Buffalo, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Brainard, 9 N. Y. 100; 
 People V. Adirondack R. R. Co., 
 160 N. Y 225, 227, 54 N. E. 689. 
 
 North Carolina. — Spencer v. Sea- 
 board Air Line Co., 137 N. C. 107, 
 49 S. E. 96, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 604; 
 
 Jeffress v. Greenville, 154 N. C. 
 490, 70 S. E. 919; Wissler v. Yad- 
 kin River Power Co., 158 N. C. 465, 
 r4 S. E. 466. 
 
 North Dakota. — Compiled Laws, 
 1913, § 8202. 
 
 Ohio.— Griesy v. Cincinnati, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308; Wheel- 
 ing, etc., R. R. Co. V. Toledo, etc.. 
 Terminal Co., 72 Ohio St. 368, 74 
 N. E. 209, 106 Am. St. Rep. 622, 2 
 Ann. Cas. 941. 
 
 Oklahoma. — Blincoe v. Choctaw, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 16 Okl. 286, 83 Pac. 
 903, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 890, 8 Ann. 
 Cas. 689. 
 
 Oregon. — Bridal Veil Lumbering 
 Co. V. Johnson, 3 Ore. 205, 46 Pac. 
 790, 34 L. R. A. 368, 60 Am. St. 
 Rep. 818; Dallas v. Hallock, 44 
 Ore. 246, 75 Pac. 204. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Groff's Appeal, 
 128 Pa. 621, 18 Atl. 431, 5 L. R. A. 
 661; Twelfth St. Market Co. v. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 142 
 Pa. 580, 21 Atl. 989; Jacobs v. 
 Clearview Water Supply Co., 220 
 Pa. 388, 69 Atl. 870; Common- 
 wealth V. Plymouth Coal Co., 232 
 Pa. 141, 81 Atl. 148. 
 
 Rhode Island. — In the Matter of 
 Dorranee St., 4 R. I. 230. 
 
 South Carolina. — ^Lindsay v. East 
 Bay Street Commissioners, 2 Bay 
 38; Stark v. McGowen, 1 Nqtt. & 
 McC. 387. 
 
 South Dakota. — Hyde v. Minne- 
 sota, etc., R. R. Co., 29 S. D. 220, 
 136 N. W. 92, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 48. 
 
 Tennessee. — Southern Ry. Co. v. 
 
4 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 2 
 
 important and essential rights of the people as a whole, 
 has been so seriouslj- abraded, and has been subordinated 
 in so many vital features to the rights of individual owner- 
 ship, and that this process of abrasion and subordination 
 has taken place without the disapproval and often with 
 the express consent of the people, and has been most 
 marked in the states usually considered most assiduous in 
 upholding the rights of the peopl^ are such surprising facts 
 that a rather extended analysis of the underlying causes of 
 this development is not wholly out of place. 
 
 § 2. Early History of Eminent Domain in European 
 Countries, 
 
 The origin of the power of eminent domain is lost in 
 obscurity, since before the title of the individual property 
 owner as against the state was recognized and protected 
 by law, the right to take land for public use was merged 
 in the general power of the government over all persons 
 and property within its jurisdiction. Under the Boman 
 law however, the rights of Eoman citizens were regarded 
 with such respect that it is open to serious doubt if the 
 taking of their property for the public use was ever author- 
 ized by law, although the aqueducts and straight military 
 
 Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267, 148 S. W. Co. v. Union Boom Co., 32 Wash. 
 
 662, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 828. 586, 73 Pae. 670. 
 
 Texas. — ^Austin v. Nalle, 102 Tex. West Virginia. — Pittsburg Hy- 
 
 536, 120 S. W. 996; Byrd Irriga- dro-Eleetric Co. v. Liston, 70 W! Va. 
 
 tion Co. V. Smythe (Tex. Cjv. 83, 73 S. E. 86, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 
 App.), 146 S. W. 1064. 602. 
 
 Utah. — Kimball v. Grantsville Wisconsin. — Whiting v. Sheboy- 
 
 City, 19 Utah 369, 57 Pac. 1, 45 gan, etc., E. R. Co., 25 Wis. 167. 
 
 L. R. A. 628. Wyoming. — Sterritt v. Young, 14 
 
 Vermont.— ARen v. Drew, 44 Vt. Wyo. 146, 82 Pae. 946, 4 L. R. A. 
 
 174; Aitkin v. Wells River, 70 Vt. (N. S.) 169, 116 Am: St. Rep. 994; 
 
 308, 40 Atl. 829, 41 L. R. A. 566, Grover Irrigation, etc., Co. v. Lo- 
 
 67 Am. St. Rep. 672. veUa Ditch, etc., Co., 21 Wyo. 204, 
 
 Virginia.— Tuekahoe Canal Co. 131 Pae. 43, Ann. Cas. 1915 D 1206. 
 
 V. Tuekahoe R. R. Co., 11 Leigh 42, As to whether the obligation 
 
 36 Am. Dec. 374; Fallsburg Power, to make compensation is an essen- 
 
 ete., Co. V. Alexander, 101 Va. 98, tial portion of the power of emi- 
 
 43 S. E. 194, 61 L. R. A. 129, 19 nent domain, or a restriction upon 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 855. the power imposed by the various 
 
 Waahiugton. — SamishRiverBoom bills of rights, see infra, § 204. 
 
§ 2 Origin and Decline of the Powee. 5 
 
 roads seem to indicate the existence of some form of com- 
 pulsory power. These structures however were usually 
 laid out through conquered territory, the ownership of 
 which was in the government. It is said that Marcus 
 Licinius Crassus objected to the construction of an aqueduct 
 through his farm, and was sustained in his objection by 
 the senate,^ although the senate subsequently decreed that 
 it should be lawful to take from the adjoining lands of 
 individuals the materials needed for the repair of aque- 
 ducts, upon an estimate of the value or damages, to be 
 made by good men, and during the imperial period damages 
 to private houses caused by a public road or aqueduct 
 were paid by the emperor.^ There is however no pro- 
 vision for the exercise of eminent domain in the Institutes 
 of Justinian and how and to what extent it was actually 
 employed by the Romans is open to considerable doubt. 
 
 With the downfall of Eome all trace of the power of 
 eminent domain disappears for centuries, and during the 
 mediaeval period, when the demand for public improve- 
 ments was small and the rights of individuals little 
 regarded, the power of eminent domain was neither con- 
 sidered nor discussed. Under the feudal system, as all 
 land was held under a tenure which recognized the ultimate 
 ownership of the sovereign, the construction of a public 
 improvement would not in any event involve the taking of 
 property in its modern sense. It was only with the decline 
 of the feudal system and the rise of the modern conception 
 of individual ownership and of the rights of private prop- 
 erty that the power of eminent domain began to be 
 recognized, and, as the Dutch were the most progressive 
 people of that period, it was naturally in Holland that it first 
 took definite shape, and was defined and denominated by 
 the political philosophers of the time.* 
 
 In England one of the prerogatives of the king that were 
 recognized by the common law was that of entering upon 
 
 2. Bynkershoek, Quest. Jur. Pub. 3. Tacitus, Ann, b. 1, § 75. 
 
 lib. ii, e. 15, 4. Infra, § 4. 
 
6 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 2 
 
 private property for the purpose of erecting defenses 
 against either the attacks of the public enemy or the inroads 
 of the sea.® So also the king might erect beacons or light- 
 houses either upon the royal domain or upon private prop- 
 erty, without compensation.® Another prerogative of the 
 crown which strongly resembled the power of eminent 
 domain as it is now understood was that of purveyance and 
 preemption, by which the king had the right to seize 
 provisions for the use of the royal household, without the 
 consent of the owner, and to pay for them at a fair valu- 
 ation made by appraisers.'' This ancient prerogative was 
 recognized and regulated by section 28 of Magna Charta 
 and was finally abolished by statute in the time of Charles 
 II. Its strong resemblance to the power of eminent domain 
 in its modern form has been pointed out in at least one 
 American decision.* 
 
 Eminent domain as it now exists seems however to have 
 grown out of the ancient proceeding known as inquest of 
 office. This was an inquiry by jurors concerning any 
 matter that entitled the king to the possession of lands, 
 tenements, goods and chattels, and was originally invoked 
 in the case of escheat or forfeiture. As Blackstone says 
 in referring to this proceeding, 
 
 " It is a part of the liberties of England, and greatly 
 for the safety of the subject, that the king may not 
 enter upon and seize any man's possession upon bare 
 surmises, without the intervention of a jury."* 
 
 The inquest of office was thus the appropriate proceeding 
 at common law to take land for public use, and especially 
 to lay out new highways. At the time when the ownership 
 of private land by freehold tenure began to be the rule in 
 England, so that private property could not be taken for 
 
 5. Case of the Isle of Ely, 10 Co. 7. 1 Bl. Com. 287; CHtty, Pre- 
 iRep. 141 ; Attorney-General v. Tom- rogatives of the Cro-wn, 213. 
 
 line, 12 Ch. D. 214. 8. Little Rock Junction R. R. Co. 
 
 6. 5 Bac. Abr. 510; 1 Bl. Com. v. Woodruff, 49 Ark. 381, 5 S. W. 
 265. See also St. 8 Eliz. c. 13. 792, 4 Am. St. Rep. 51. 
 
 9. 2 Bl. Com. 259. 
 
§ 2 Oeigin and Decline of the Poweb. « 
 
 public use except by some proceeding in the nature of the 
 exercise of eminent domain, the country had been settled 
 so long that it was amply supplied with roads, some of 
 which had been built by the Eomans and others either 
 established by custom or laid out by the feudal lords. 
 These roads were either king's highways leading from 
 town to town, common ways leading from place to place 
 within the same town, or private ways established for the 
 benefit of particular individuals. When new ways were 
 needed they were usually either established by prescription, 
 or by grant or dedication, or were constructed over com- 
 mon or unimproved lands without legal proceedings. 
 When however it was necessary to lay out a new highway 
 by legal proceedings, to determine the amount of damages 
 the writ of ad quod damnum was issued and an inquest 
 was held. The writ of ad quod damnum was a writ issuing 
 out of and returnable into chancery, directed to the sheriff 
 of the county or to the -escheator, commanding him to 
 inquire by a jury what damage it would be to the king, or 
 to any other person, to grant a liberty, fair, market, high- 
 way or the like^" and it appears to have been used for 
 determining the damages in the comparatively few reported 
 cases that have come down to us in which the establishment 
 of a new highway was involved, and to have been universally 
 recognized as the appropriate procedure for such a pur- 
 pose." It was not until long after the American colonies were 
 
 10. Whishaw, Fitzherbert, Nat. ad quod damnum issued to en- 
 Brev. 221. quire, Whether it were to the dam- 
 
 11. King V. Warde, Cro. Car. age etc. if the king should grant 
 266, decided in 1633 was an infor- such license to the defendants to 
 mation for obstructing a highway stop the said way? And thereupon 
 with hedges and ditches. The de- an inquisition was taken, 31st May, 
 fendants admitted obstructing the 7 Car. 1, that it was not to the 
 highway but alleged that the way damage, etc. if the king should 
 had become dangerous and one g^ant such license, etc. for that 
 Carew Sands, owner of the adjoin- another way is laid out as bene- 
 ing close had "laid out another flcial to the people." The At- 
 way more commodious for the tomey-General demurred to this 
 king's people there to pass; and plea, and it was held ill, be- 
 before the laying out of that way, cause Carew Sands might stop at 
 viz., 18th May, 7 Car. 1, a writ of pleasure the way which he had laid 
 
8 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 settled that a convenient statutory method for establishing 
 highways was provided by Parliament.^ It is to be noted 
 that while the inquest held pursuant to a writ of ad quod 
 damnum was in one sense a judicial proceeding, it was 
 entirely ex parte. The persons who might be damaged 
 were not named in advance, or notified of the proceedings, 
 and they had no opportunity to be heard in opposition to 
 the establishment of the new way, or in respect to the 
 amount of damages.^^ 
 
 Eminent domain was also exercised from time to time 
 for purposes other than highways, and without the issuance 
 of the writ of ad quod damnum. Thus in 1544 the corpora- 
 tion of the city of London was granted power by Parlia- 
 ment to enter upon and appropriate private property for 
 the purpose of supplying the city with water, and pro- 
 vision was made for the payment of compensation deter- 
 mined by appraisers appointed by the Chancellor.^* 
 
 out, and the subjects had no inter- 
 est in such way to justify their 
 going there, nor was any person 
 liable to repair and maintain it; 
 and also because " the pleading the 
 issuing of the ad quod damnum, 
 and the inquisition thereupon is to 
 no purpose when he doth not 
 plead that he obtained Kcense, 
 for that is only on purpose 
 to enable him to obtain license." 
 In Ex parte Armitage, Ambler 
 293, decided in 1756, it appeared 
 that one Charles Brandling obtained 
 a writ of ad quod damnum to lay 
 out a waggon way over an exist- 
 ing lane, so that he, his heirs and 
 assigns make good and keep the 
 same in repair as long as he and 
 they should use the same. It was 
 objected, inter alia that, "if such 
 writ might be, this is bad, because 
 the condition on which it is 
 granted is too uncertain, and that 
 the condition is the only compen- 
 sation to the King and his subjects 
 for making such change." The 
 Lord Chancellor was of opinion 
 
 "that under a general writ of ad 
 quod damnum, without specif5Tng 
 any condition in the writ, the jury, 
 by virtue of the words, qualiter 
 and quomodo, may find it would 
 be to the damage, unless, etc., and 
 the condition may be afterwards 
 added in the grant." 
 
 12. It was said in Davison v. 
 Gill, 1 East 64, that the " mode of 
 proceeding chalked out in the 19th 
 section (of 13 Geo. Ill, c. 78) was 
 substituted in lieu of the old writ 
 of ad quod damnum, which had be- 
 come inconvenient from the ex- 
 pense and difScidty with which it 
 was attended. , A more compen- 
 dious and easy method was thereby 
 given ; but stUl the substance of the 
 old proceedings was to be preserved 
 in aU essential points." For the 
 provisions of this statute and the 
 subsequent history of eminent do- 
 main in England see infra, § 368. 
 
 13. Chesapeake, etc.. Canal Co. 
 V. Union Bank, 4 Cranch C. C. 75, 
 Fed. Cas. No. 2653. 
 
 14. 2 Kent Com. 340 note. 
 
§ 2. Origin and Decline oe the Power. 9 
 
 Another purpose for whicli eminent domain was exer- 
 cised in early times was the drainage of low lands. In 
 fact the two fundamental limitations upon the power of 
 eminent domain now generally recognized wherever written 
 constitutions are in force were set out for perhaps the first 
 time in 1622 in connection with the subject of drainage by 
 Robert Callis in his well known * ' Reading upon the Statute 
 of Sewers." This statute (23 Hen. VIII, c. 5) was aimed 
 at preventing the flooding of lands either by the sea or by 
 running streams, and it provided specifically for the repair 
 of sea-walls and the removal of obstructions to water- 
 courses. Among other things the statute authorized the 
 commissioners of sewers to 
 
 ** take such and as many trees, woods, underwoods 
 and timber and other necessaries as for the same works 
 and reparations shall be sufiicient at a reasonable price 
 by you or six of you * * * to be assessed or limited 
 as well within the limits and bounds aforesaid as in 
 any other place within the said county or counties near 
 unto the said places." 
 
 The words of that part of the statute which granted 
 authority to the commissioners, literally taken, seemed to 
 extend only to the maintenance of old structures and the 
 removal of obstructions therefrom, and the question arose 
 whether the statute also authorized the establishment of new 
 structures. Sir Edward Coke, in the Case of the Isle of 
 Ely,^^ was of opinion that no new river should be made and 
 cast by the power of this commission, and that in case a new 
 
 15. 10 Co. Rep. 141. « if * * » as for public damage, as stopping 
 a man would sue to the King to of havens (which are the gates of 
 have leave to make a new trench, the kingdom) and other common 
 and to stop the old trench, he first rivers, as particular nuisance and 
 ought to sue ad quod damnum, to prejudice to private men, by drown- 
 know what damage it will be to the ing of their lands and inheritance. 
 King or others. * * * For if any and therefore such new rivers can- 
 commissioners might do it ex officio, not be made without the King's 
 great inconvenience thereupon for license, grounded upon a wnt of 
 private lucre might ensue as well ad quod damnum." 
 
10 The Law of Eminent Domain". § 2 
 
 river or stream was desired to be made, the proper pro- 
 cedure was to cause the writ of ad quod damnum to be 
 issued, directed to the escheator of the county, to inquire 
 and certify what damage it might be if such a cut should 
 be made or new trench cast, and he concluded directly 
 against the making of new rivers and drains by the mere 
 order of the commissioners of sewers. Callis however 
 cites two occasions in which it W3,s held that a new drain 
 might be built by the commissioners over private land, by 
 virtue of their statutory authority and without an inquest 
 by a jury, one arising in 1601 in which the two Chief 
 Justices, Popham and Anderson, decided that the new 
 works might be erected, and the other in 1615, in which it 
 appeared that certain persons had brought actions at com- 
 mon law against the commissioners for erecting new cuts 
 and drains, and by order of the Privy Council these plain- 
 tiffs were committed for contempt until they should release 
 and discharge their actions against the commissioners.^® 
 
 Callis therefore concludes that under the statute new 
 works might be built, but he admits that the most forcible 
 argument against this conclusion is that, " by the making 
 and erecting of these new defences the inheritances of 
 private persons are thereby prejudiced whereon they be 
 built. "^'^ But, he says, " things that concern the common- 
 weal are of greater account in the law than the interest of 
 private persons " and consequently it should lie in the 
 power of the commissioners of sewers to erect new walls, 
 streams, sluices and other structures even upon private 
 property. He adds however that such power should be 
 exercised 
 
 * ' With this caution. That under the pretence of the 
 commonweal a private man's welfare be not intended 
 to the charge, trouble and burthen of the country. 
 And with this also, That where any man's particular 
 interest and inheritance is prejudiced for the common- 
 
 16. Callis, Sewers, p. 101. 17. Callis, Sewers, p. 103. 
 
§ 2 Origin and Declinb of the Powbe. H 
 
 wealth's cause, That that part of the country be ordered 
 to recompense the same which have good thereby."^* 
 
 The power of eminent domain was thus well established 
 in England by the time of the American Eevolution, and 
 the obligation to make compensation had become a neces- 
 sary incident of the exercise of the power. The obligation 
 to pay for property which had merely been damaged by 
 the construction of a public work was not however recog- 
 nized by the common law, and there appears to have been 
 no requirement that compensation be paid in advance even 
 when property was actually taken. The limitation of emi- 
 nent domain to the taking of property for the public use, 
 as that phrase is understood in America, has never been 
 recognized in England,^® and in recent years the power has 
 been employed in behalf of the general welfare in numerous 
 ways that have not, as yet at least, been permitted in this 
 country. 
 
 Blackstone said in 1765, in referring to the absolute right 
 of property inherent in every Englishman, and to the pro- 
 vision of Magna Charta that no freeman should be divested 
 of his freehold, but by the judgment of his peers or the 
 law of the land, 
 
 " So great moreover is the regard of the law for 
 private property, that it will not authorize the least 
 violation of it; no, not even for the general good of 
 the whole community. If a new road, for instance, 
 were to be made through the grounds of a private 
 person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to 
 the public ; but the law permits no man, or set of men, 
 
 18. Callis, p. 104. He cites St. matters therein expressed, yet they 
 27 Eliz. c. 22 and 3 Jac. e. 18 as may serve as good rules to direct 
 statutes applicable to particular our commissioners to imitate upon 
 sewers under ■which the commis- like occasion happening." 
 sioners have power to compound 19. Note that Callis objects to 
 and agree with the owners of the the taking of property for private 
 grounds through which the new use, not on the ground that it is a 
 cuts are to be made, and says that violation of the rights of the own- 
 " although these statutes hold not ers of the property taken, but be- 
 in the general case of sewers, but cause it results in the public money 
 are applied to the said particular being expended for private benefit. 
 
12 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 2 
 
 to do this without consent of the owner of the land. 
 In vain may it be urged, that the good of the individual 
 ought to yield to that of the community; for it would 
 be dangerous to allow any private man, or even any 
 public tribunal, to be the judge of this common good, 
 and to decide whether it be expedient or no. Besides, 
 the public good is in nothing more essentially inter- 
 ested, than in the protection of every individual's 
 private rights, as modelled by the municipal law. In 
 this and similar cases the legislature alone can, and 
 indeed frequently does, interpose, and compel the indi- 
 vidual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and 
 compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of 
 his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving 
 him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury 
 thereby sustained. The public is now considered as 
 an individual, treating with an individual for an 
 exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the 
 owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable 
 price ; and even this is an exertion of power, which the 
 legislature indulges with caution, and which nothing 
 but the legislature can perform."^" 
 
 Blackstone well adds that the rights of Englishmen 
 would be declared and ascertained by the law in vain if 
 the constitution had not established certain auxiliary sub- 
 ordinate rights for the protection of the great and primary 
 rights of security, liberty and property, and that one of 
 these auxiliary rights is that of applying to the courts of 
 justice for redress of injuries. But while the right of an 
 individual to sue in the ordinary courts of justice for 
 injuries inflicted under color of governmental authority 
 is doubtless much more fully recognized in England than 
 in the countries governed by the civil law, it must be remem- 
 bered that, even in England, if an injury to property is 
 expressly authorized by act of Parliament, the courts of 
 justice can give no redress, no matter how grossly the 
 provisions of Magna Charta have been violated. 
 
 20. 1 Bl. Com. 139. 
 
^ 
 
 I 3 Oeigin and Decline of the Poweb. 13 
 
 Under the civil law, which, has always prevailed in 
 France, streets might be laid out through private land 
 without compensation. The power of eminent domain in 
 its modern sense, and subject to limitations upon the arbi- 
 trary power of government, was not recognized in France 
 until the revolution, although it was provided in 1705 that 
 when a highway was laid out through improved land, the 
 owner should be paid for the improvements. He still how- 
 ever received nothing for the land. The Declaration of 
 Rights of 1789 contained however the following provision : 
 
 ' ' Property being an inviolable and sacred right, 
 no one can be deprived of it unless the public necessity 
 plainly demands it, and upon condition of a just and 
 previous indemnity." 
 
 This provision has been followed in substance in the 
 subsequent constitutions and charters.^* The Code Napo- 
 leon provided that 
 
 ' ' no one is obliged to transfer his property, unless 
 it be for public utility, and in consideration of a just 
 and previous indemnity." 
 
 It is to be noticed that the foregoing provisions, though 
 unquestionably influenced by the similar clauses in Ameri- 
 can bills of rights, contained the additional requirement 
 that compensation be paid in advance. This requirement 
 of the Code Napoleon, continued in force in the state of 
 Louisiana and other portions of the Louisiana Purchase 
 after its acquisition by the United States, has undoubtedly 
 had an important effect upon the constitutional law upon 
 this subject in this country .^^ 
 
 § 3. Eminent Domain in the American Colonies. 
 
 The primary object for the exercise of eminent domain 
 in any community is the establishment of roads. When 
 
 21. See the French Code Civile, Fundamental Law of Holland, art. 
 art. 545, also the Constitutional 147. 
 Law of Belgium, art. II, and the 22. Infra, § 212. 
 
" The Law of Eminent Domain. § 3 
 
 the settlement of the American colonies began, the situation 
 in respect to roads was just the reverse of what it was in 
 England; there were no roads, but the land was wholly- 
 unsettled and unimproved, and in many cases not even 
 allotted to private ownership, so that there was no difficulty 
 in acquiring a location for such roads as at first were found 
 necessary. When thousands of square miles of arable land 
 were unused and unoccupied, unimproved land, although 
 held in private ownership, had no substantial value by the 
 square foot, so that, even after land had been allotted to 
 individuals, no duty to compensate the owner when a road; 
 was laid out through such land so long as it remained 
 unimproved was at first recognized in any of the colonies. 
 At the time of the settlement of Jamestown and Plymouth 
 the power of eminent domain had never been analyzed or 
 denominated, and its actual exercise in England was in its 
 crudest beginnings, so that, when the settlement of the 
 colonies had advanced to such a point that the laying out 
 of new roads required at least some semblance of legal 
 proceedings, there were no firmly established precedents 
 in the common law for the colonists to foUow. Neverthe- 
 less, it is apparent that the whole system of exercising 
 eminent domain in the American colonies was influenced 
 to a considerable extent by the English practice of inquest 
 by a jury, and in many of the colonies the writ of ad quod 
 damnum was used, eo nomine, and continued to be so used 
 until long after the Eevolution. 
 
 The first provision for the laying out of highways in 
 Massachusetts appears in 1639.** Under the statute enacted 
 in that year, upon complaint of the need of a highway, the 
 
 23. Ane. Chart. 126. It was or- jury and upon oath charge them to 
 
 dared in Plymouth Colony in 1627 lay out such waies both for horse 
 
 that " the old path ways be still and foot as in conscience they shall 
 
 allowed," 11 Plym. Col. Rec. 21, find most beneficiall for the com- 
 
 and in 1639 it was enacted in monwealth, and as little prejudi- 
 
 Plymouth Colony that " if an high- cial as may bee to the particulares, 
 
 way bee wanting in any township and that all old pathes shaJbee still 
 
 of thee government, upon due com- allowed except other provision bee 
 
 plaint, that then the governor or orderly made." 1 Laws of Colony 
 
 any of his assistants impanell a of New Plymouth 64. 
 
§ 3 Origin and Decline of the Poweb. 15 
 
 court of the county was authorized to appoint two or three 
 men of each next town, who upon view were to lay out such 
 highways 
 
 " provided always it occasioned not the pulling down 
 of any man's house, or laying open any garden or 
 orchard." 
 
 It was also provided that 
 
 ' ' if any man be thereby damaged in his improved 
 ground, the town shall make him reasonable satis- 
 faction, by estimation of those that laid out the same 
 * * * and if any person find himself justly grieved 
 with any act or thing, done by the persons deputed 
 aforesaid, he may appeal to the county court 
 aforesaid." 
 
 It is to be noted that damages were to be assessed in the 
 first place by the jury of view, without notice to the owner 
 or any opportunity for him to be heard ; but, if he was dis- 
 satisfied, the determination was to be by the court, upon 
 the application of the owner. Two years later provision 
 was made for the laying out of town ways by the selectmen 
 of towns 
 
 " only so as no damage be done to any man without 
 due recompense to be given by the judgment of the 
 selectmen, and one or two chosen by the selectmen and 
 one or two chosen by the party, and if any person shall 
 find himself justly grieved, he may appeal to the next 
 county court of that shire, who shall do justice therein 
 as in other cases. "*** 
 
 In 1693 further provision was made for the laying out 
 of highways upon application to the court of quarter ses- 
 sions.** Under this statute this court appointed a com- 
 mittee of freeholders to inquire whether the way applied 
 for was required by common necessity and convenience, 
 and if they decided in the affirmative, the court issued a 
 
 24. Anc. Chart. 126. 25. St. 1693-4, c. 6. 
 
16 The Law of Emlnestt Domaiw. § 3 
 
 warrant to the sheriff to summon a jury to view and lay 
 out such Mghway 
 
 "provided, that if any person be thereby damaged 
 in his propriety or improved grounds, the town shall 
 make him reasonable satisfaction, by the estimation 
 of those that laid out the same. And if such person 
 so damaged find himself aggrieved by any act or thing 
 done by the jury, either in laying of the said way, or 
 estimate of his damages, he may apply unto the court 
 of quarter sessions for relief." 
 
 Provision was also made for the laying out of town ways 
 by the selectmen and the determination of damages either 
 by agreement or upon inquiry by a jury. 
 
 In 1757, it having been found inconvenient to require a 
 jury in all cases, it was provided that new highways should 
 be laid out and damages estimated by a committee of five 
 disinterested freeholders; but any person finding himself 
 aggrieved might apply to the court of sessions, and such 
 court should cause a jury to be summoned by the sheriff, 
 and such jury was given power to alter the way or increase 
 the damages.*^ 
 
 The colonial system of laying out highways has been 
 retained until the present time, except that the duties of 
 the court of sessions were transferred to the county com- 
 missioners in 1835,^'^ and in 1870 the jury was deprived of 
 its power to alter the course of the road.^^ The county 
 commissioners under the present practice assess the 
 damages ex parte, and without application on the part of 
 any landowner, but any person aggrieved may apply to 
 them for a jury to revise their assessment. They there- 
 upon issue their warrant to the sheriff, who summons a 
 jury for the purpose and presides over their deliberations.^^ 
 
 26. St. 1756-7, c. 18. ing out of highways and town ways 
 
 27. St. 1835, c. 152. in Massachusetts, see Nichols, Land 
 28! St. 1870, 0. 75. Damages in Massachusetts, §§ 20, 
 29. Mass. Revised Laws, c. 48. 21, 
 
 For further details as to the lay- 
 
§ 3 Origin and Decline of the Power. 17 
 
 In practice however the sheriff's jury is becoming obsolete, 
 as since 1873 landowners have been given the concurrent 
 remedy of an appeal to the superior court, and in this 
 court land damage cases are heard in the same manner as 
 civil actions generally. In cities the laying out of streets 
 is generally governed by provisions of the charter but it 
 is in almost every case based upon the colonial practice, 
 and the right to a hearing upon the question of damages 
 is dependent upon the owner's application within a specified 
 time. 
 
 New York, while it constituted a Dutch colony, was 
 subject to the civil law, which recognized the right of the 
 sovereign to lay out streets through private lands with- 
 out compensation. This right however does not appear 
 to have always been exercised in the colony, for in 1656 
 the burgomasters were directed to make a survey of the 
 streets of New Amsterdam and to give notice to all who 
 might be damaged to make a statement thereof. If an 
 agreement could not be reached the damages were to be 
 referred to two or three disinterested appraisers.*" 
 
 In the laws promulgated by the Duke of York after the 
 province had been taken from the Dutch, there was no 
 provision for the laying out of roads. In the charter of 
 the city of New York granted by Governor Dongan in 1686 
 the city authorities were authorized to lay out and construct 
 streets, but it was expressly provided that this power 
 
 " be not extended or construed to the taking away of 
 any person's right of property without his or her con- 
 sent, or by some known law of the province." 
 
 As there was no law of the province authorizing the 
 taking of land for street purposes, the city did not at that 
 time have the power of eminent domain. In 1691 however 
 the surveyors of highways were authorized to lay out 
 streets in the city of New York, and it was provided that, 
 
 30. 2 Record of Burgomasters Laws and Ordinances of New 
 and Schepens, 362; O'Callaghan's Netherlands, 219. 
 2 
 
18 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 3 
 
 if they should take any person's grounds, unless the land 
 was ceded by agreement, damages were to be assessed 
 according to the owners' interests and estates, through a 
 jury, after notice. In the same year provision was made 
 for the regulation and laying out of highways in the rest 
 of the province through the town overseers, either by agree- 
 ment with the owners or by direction of a jury of free- 
 holders, and subject to the approval of the next court of 
 sessions.*' 
 
 In New Jersey in all grants of land from the proprietary 
 government the right to take back six per cent, of the land 
 granted for highway purposes was reserved, so that the 
 exercise of eminent domain was not required for the laying 
 out of highways through unimproved lands.*^ This right 
 was not construed to warrant the taking of improved land 
 without compensation, and when it was desired to take such 
 property an inquest appears to have been held and the 
 writ of ad quod damnum issued in accordance with the 
 common law. The writ of ad quod damnum was not how- 
 ever in use universally. Thus in 1681, under the propri- 
 etary government, certain commissioners for the settling 
 and regulating of lands in the province ordained that, in 
 laying out public highways, the owners of lands taken 
 should be allowed reasonable compensation, at the discre- 
 tion of the commissioners.** 
 
 When the colony of Pennsylvania was established, it 
 was the plan of the proprietors to lay out all the necessary 
 highways before any lands were allotted to private owners, 
 but when it was sought to put this plan into practice, as no 
 one knew where any of the towns, except Philadelphia, were 
 to be located, it was abandoned, except in Philadelphia, and 
 instead, when lands were granted, the right to take back 
 
 31. For the foregoing statutes in 32. Infra, i 204. 
 
 greater detail, and a history of the 33. Seudder v. Trenton Delaware 
 
 statutes providing for the laying Falls Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 694, 722, 23 
 out of streets and highways in New Am. Dee. 756. 
 York, see Gerard, City Water 
 Eights, Streets and Real Estate, 
 pp. 129 et seq. 
 
§ 3 Obigin aitd Decline op the Poweb. 19 
 
 six per cent, for highways was reserved, and consequently 
 it was not necessary to take land by eminent domain for 
 that purpose.** In 1700 it was enacted that no road should 
 be laid out through improved land without necessity, and 
 that 
 
 " when that appears, the respective county courts shall 
 appoint six indifferent men to view and adjudge the 
 value of so much of such improved lands as shall be 
 taken up for the use aforesaid, and the value thereof 
 shall be paid to the owner." 
 
 The statutes in force until the Revolution contained this 
 or a similar provision. There was no compensation allowed 
 for land, whether it was improved or not; the allowance 
 was solely for the improvements.*® 
 
 The southern colonies, as their inhabitants did not tend 
 to concentrate in the cities to the same extent as was custom- 
 ary in the north, found no difficulty in retaining the practice 
 of laying out highways without compensation to the owner 
 of the land for many generations. In Virginia the writ of 
 ad quod damnum was finally introduced in highway cases by 
 statute,** but in South Carolina the practice prevailed until 
 long after the Revolution of not only taking land for high- 
 ways without compensation, but of using the timber, stones 
 and other material upon the adjoining land for building 
 the way.*^ 
 
 The roads established during the colonial period were 
 not merely county highways, town ways and city streets, 
 but in most if not all of the colonies provision was made 
 for the establishment of private ways, for the use of one 
 or more inhabitants, at their own expense, over lands of 
 others. In some states these private ways were open to 
 
 34. See infra, § 204, and Mc- see Loyd, Early Courts of Penn- 
 Clenachan v. Curwen, 3 Teates sylvania, c. 6. 
 
 (Pa.) 362. 36. Stokes v. Upper Appomatox 
 
 35. Feree v. Meily, 3 Yeates Co., 3 Leigh (Va.) 318, 337. 
 (Pa.) 153. Tor a learned and in- 37. State v. Dawson, 3 HUl 
 teresting discussion of the laying (S. C.) 100. 
 
 out of highways in Pennsylvania, 
 
20 The Law of Eminent Domaiw. § 3 
 
 use by the public, in others they were not, but in any event 
 they were considered a necessity in communities in which 
 the public ways could not be expected to reach every man's 
 land, and it was not untU long after the Eevolution that the 
 propriety of laying out private ways by eminent domain 
 was questioned.^® 
 
 Next to roads, the most important object for the exercise 
 of eminent domain in the colonial period was the erection 
 and maintenance of mills. Statutes authorizing lands to be 
 taken or flowed in invitum, to enable the owner of a mill 
 site to construct or maintain a dam in order to raise a head 
 of water sufficient to operate a mill were in force in seven 
 of the colonies prior to the Revolution, namely New Hamp- 
 shire, Massachusetts, Ehode Island, Delaware, Maryland, 
 Virginia and North Carolina.^* Of these statutes the oldest 
 appear to be those of Virginia, which date back to 1667. It 
 is to be noted that these colonies are divided into two 
 groups of contiguous units — three New England colonies 
 and four in or upon the border of the south. In New Eng- 
 land the statutes merely made lawful the erection of a dam 
 by one who owned land on both banks of a stream, although 
 it might cause the flooding of upper riparian land, and pro- 
 vided a more convenient remedy for the recovery of dam- 
 ages by the owners of lands so flooded than successive 
 actions of trespass at common law. Such statutes were 
 treated merely as a regulation of the conflicting rights of 
 the different riparian owners in the stream. In the south- 
 ern colonies, and afterward in many of the southern states, 
 the statutes authorized a person owning a miU site on one 
 side of a stream not merely to flow the land of upper 
 riparian proprietors, but to take by eminent domain one 
 acre of land on the opposite side of the stream for the abut- 
 ments of his dam.*** 
 
 38. See infra, § 85. Manufacturing Co., 113 U. S. 9, 16, 
 
 39. Tor a discussion of the early 28 L. ed. 889. 
 
 mill acts, and a complete tabulation 40. See for example Sadler v. 
 
 of the statutes, see the opinion of Langham, 34 Ala. 311; Wroe v. 
 Gray, J., in Head v. Amoskeag Harris, 2 Wash. (Va.) 126. 
 
§ 3 Origin and Decline of the Power. 21 
 
 There was another distinction between the southern mill 
 acts and those of New England, of equal or greater impor- 
 tance. In Massachusetts the legislature made no pro- 
 vision for the institution of proceedings by the mill-owner, 
 but merely enacted that if any person found himself dam- 
 aged by the flowing of his lands, he might apply to the 
 court for the issue of a warrant for a jury to make an 
 appraisal of his yearly damage.*^ Such verdict was made 
 a bar to any action for damages by such flowing, except an 
 action of debt for the yearly sum assessed. In the southern 
 colonies, on the other hand, the statutes required the suing 
 out of a writ of ad quod damnum by the mill-owner, and the 
 institution of proceedings in which the owners of land to be 
 taken or flowed were usually required to be made respond- 
 ents. This was the origin of the fundamental difference in 
 the procedure for taking land for public use which now 
 exists in the United States,^^ for in Massachusetts and 
 those of the states which have followed her lead, the taking 
 of land for public use, whether by the public itself or by 
 private corporations, has continued to be effected without 
 judicial proceedings, and the right to a hearing upon the 
 question of damages has continued to be dependent upon 
 the institution of proceedings by the land-owner, whereas 
 in many of the other states the taking of land by private 
 corporations has always been effected by judicial proceed- 
 ings instituted by the condemning party in which the 
 amount of damages as well as the right to condemn is passed 
 upon. In many of the states the writ of ad quod damnum 
 has continued to be employed for such purposes^ in some 
 until very recent times,** and the method of taking land 
 
 41. St. 1714, c. 15. Iowa. — Skillman v. Chicago, etc., 
 
 42. Infra, §§ 366-373 inc. Ry. Co., 78 Iowa 404, 43 N. W. 275, 
 
 43. See for example, 16 Am. St. Eep. 452. 
 
 Alabama. — Sadler v. Langham, Kentucky. — Gay v. Caldwell, 
 
 34 Ala. 311. Hardin 63; Tracy v. Elizabethtown, 
 
 Delaware. — Wilson v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 78 Ky. 309. 
 
 etc., R. R. Co., 5 Del. Ch. 524, 540; Nebraska.— Gross v. Jones, 85 
 
 Vandegrift v. Delaware R. R. Co., Neb. 77, 122 N. W. 681, 32 L. R. A. 
 
 2 Houst. 287; Elbert v. Scott, 90 (N. S.) 47. 
 
 Atl. 587. New Jersey. — Scudder v. Tren- 
 
22 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 4 
 
 for public use by private corporations now in use in the 
 great majority of states is the outgrowth of the common 
 law inquest upon a writ of ad quod damnum as taken over 
 and adapted to local conditions by the middle and southern 
 colonies. In many states this method has been adopted 
 even when the taking is by the public itself. 
 
 The only other purpose for which compulsory powers 
 were employed in the colonies was the drainage of low- 
 lands ; and the early statutes providing for drainage were 
 enacted under the well recognized power to provide for the 
 improvement of property held in common in accordance 
 with the wishes of the majority of the owners, rather than 
 as an exercise of eminent domain in its proper sense.** 
 
 It will thus be seen that the power of eminent domain 
 was exercised in the American colonies, and that the obli- 
 gation to make compensation for land taken, although not 
 treated as an absolute right, was recognized in all of the 
 colonies except South Carolina as soon as property of that 
 character had attained sufficient value to make the taking of 
 it more than a nominal injury. On the other hand the exer- 
 cise of the power was not restricted to the public use, at 
 least in the narrow sense in which that phrase is commonly 
 used today, but eminent domain was used in behalf of mills, 
 and of private roads and in a certain sense of private drain- 
 age, as freely as in the case of public highways. In short, 
 the history of eminent domain in the American colonies 
 seems to sustain the doctrine that the power of eminent 
 domain as it exists untrammelled by constitutional limita- 
 tions extends to the taking of any property within the juris- 
 diction of the state for the public good, subject only to the 
 moral obligation of making compensation. 
 
 § 4. The Term " Eminent Domain." 
 Although the power of taking private property for public 
 use has doubtless been exercised from time immemorial, 
 
 ton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N. J. Eq. Virgima. — ^Wroe v. Harris, 2 
 
 694, 23 Am. Dec. 756. Wash. 126; Maus v. GaUahue, 9 
 
 Pennsylvcmia. — Schuylkill, etc., Grat. 94. 
 
 E, E. Co. V. Decker, 2 Watts 343. 44. Infra, § 88. 
 
§ 4 Oeigin and Decline op the Poweb. 23 
 
 the name of such power is of comparatively recent origin. 
 It was not until after the close of the middle ages that the 
 taking of property for public use as a distinct branch of 
 governmental power began to be discussed. As civilization 
 advanced the functions of the government in times of peace 
 increased and at the same time the rights of the individual 
 began to be given more consideration. Political philoso- 
 phers then analyzed the recognized powers of established 
 governments and named and classified them. Grotius, in 
 1625, first used and apparently originated the phrase 
 " eminent domain," saying that 
 
 " the property of subjects'is under the eminent domain 
 of the state, so that the state or he who acts for it may 
 use and even alienate and destroy such property, not 
 only in the case of extreme necessity, in which even 
 private persons have a right over the property of 
 others, but for ends of public utility, to which ends 
 those who founded civil society must be supposed to 
 have intended that private ends should give way. But 
 it is to be added that when this is done .the state is 
 bound to make good the loss to those who lose their 
 property. ' ' *® 
 
 Since then the phrase ' ' eminent domain ' ' has been gener- 
 ally adopted by political philosophers and the power has 
 been recognized and discussed.*' 
 
 The definitions and discussions of the political writers of 
 the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are of great 
 importance in determining the extent of the power of emi- 
 nent domain under American constitutions, for it is known 
 that the authors of our constitutions were familiar with 
 
 45. Grotius, De Jure Belli et movable or immovable or in a 
 Pacis, lib. iii, c. 20. claim." Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, 
 
 46. Bynkershoek, Quest. Jur. lib. i, c. 20, § 244 (1758). "The 
 Pub. lib. ii, c. 15 (1737). "I have right -which belongs to society or 
 determined merely to treat of that the sovereign to dispose in ease of 
 part by ■which a prince out of his necessity and for the public good 
 supreme power takes away from his of every possession which the state 
 subjects an acquired right, whether contains is called eminent domain." 
 it consists in a thing itself, whether 
 
24 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 4 
 
 these writings.*'' It is probably on this account that the 
 phrase ' ' eminent domain ' ' has been accepted in common 
 use in this country. Such use however dates back less than 
 a hundred years, for while the sovereign power of taking 
 property for the public use was recognized and limited in 
 several of the original state constitutions, the phrase ' ' emi- 
 nent domain ' ' is not to be found in any of them. Kent in Ms 
 Commentaries, published in 1827, speaks confidently of the 
 * ' right of eminent domain, or inherent sovereign power ' ' *^ 
 but as late as 1834 we find the term used with apparent hesi- 
 tation by Chief Justice Shaw,*^ and even since then it has 
 been applied by some jurists more broadly than the present 
 understanding of its meaning warrants.'" At present how- 
 ever ' ' eminent domain ' ' is not merely a legal term of 
 precise meaning well understood by the profession, but it 
 is familiar to all but the more illiterate members of the 
 community at large. 
 
 The term ' ' eminent domain ' ' in the sense in which it is 
 understood in this country is not used in England at all. 
 Eminent domain, in its English sense, is the ownership or 
 dominion of an independent sovereign over the territories 
 of his sovereignty, by virtue of which no other sovereign 
 can exercise any jurisdiction therein.'^ Inasmuch as the 
 
 47. Marshall, C. J., in Ogden v. its citizens in common, and to ap- 
 Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 213, propriate and control individual 
 353, 6 L. ed. 606. property for the public benefit, as 
 
 48. 2 Kent's Com. 339. the public safety, necessity, conve- 
 
 49. In Wellington, Petitioner, 16 .nience or welfare may demand." 
 Pick. (Mass.) 87, 27 Am. Dec. 631, In Gold Hill Mining Co. v. Ish, 5 
 the court refers, at page 102, to Ore. 104, the control of the legia- 
 "that sovereign power over all lature over the public domain is 
 property, inherent in all govern- referred to as eminent domain. As 
 ments, sometimes called the right of to the distinction between eminent 
 eminent domain, the power of domain and other governmental 
 taking property for public use, as powers, see infra, § 15. 
 
 the exigencies of the country may 51. Brown, Law Dictionary 
 
 require." (1880). But see Agg's Wharton's 
 
 50. Thus, Cooley, Constitutional Law Lexicon (1911), in which emi- 
 Limitations, 524, defines eminent nent domain is defined as "the 
 domain as "the rightful authority, right which a government retains 
 which exists in every sovereignty, over the estates of individuals to 
 to control and regulate those rights resume them for public use." 
 
 of a public nature which pertain to 
 
§ 5 Origin and Decline of the Poweb. 25 
 
 powers of Parliament are not restricted by a written con- 
 stitution, the necessity of a classification, and consequently 
 of an exact terminology, of the powers of government has 
 not been felt in England as strongly as in this country. 
 The only equivalent for eminent domain in its American 
 sense is the phrase " compulsory powers " although " com- 
 pensation ' ' is frequently used in the restricted sense of 
 compensation for land taken for the public use,^^ and 
 " expropriation " as the taking of land for public use. 
 
 § 5. The Power of Parliament Absolute. 
 
 At the time of the settlement of A-merica, and even of the 
 American Eevolution, the conception of restraints, enforced 
 by the courts for the protection of the citizen, upon the 
 powers of a sovereign and independent government had not 
 been reached. The executive, in most instances a heredi- 
 tary monarch, had, it is true, in many cases been stripped 
 of his absolute authority over all branches of government, 
 and in England Magna Charta imposed definite limitations 
 upon the king's control over the persons and property of 
 his subjects, previously unqualified except by certain vague 
 customs and traditions. The Petition of Right, under 
 Charles I, and the Bill of Eights assented to by William and 
 Mary, still further established the rights and liberties of 
 Englishmen. The powers of the state were not, however, 
 diminished and the rights of individuals made paramount, 
 but Parliament gained what the king lost. The power of 
 Parliament continued to increase and that of the king to 
 correspondingly decrease, and moreover Parliament fell 
 into the control of representatives of the people. But the 
 limitations of Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights do not 
 apply to Parliament, and there are, in theory at least, no 
 restrictions upon its power. It may do anything. Black- 
 stone says, not naturally impossible.''* Although, as shoAvn 
 later, there were a number of instances in which it was 
 
 52. Thus the English text-books Cripps, Lloyd, Wordsworth and 
 on eminent domain are styled works Woolf and Middleton. 
 on the Law of Compensation ; e. g., 53. 1 Bl. Com. 160. 
 
26 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 6 
 
 stated by the courts that they would adjudge void a statute 
 against common right and reason,®* there are no actual 
 cases where an act of Parliament was thus set aside, and 
 Blackstone says " if the Parliament will positively enact 
 a thing to be done which is unreasonable I know of no power 
 that can control it. ' ' ®® 
 
 § 6. The British Constitution. , 
 
 While there is no British Constitution in the American 
 sense, in other words there is no frame of government pre- 
 pared at a definite time and not susceptible to amendment 
 as readily as an ordinary statute, there is an unwritten 
 constitution based upon the long established customs of 
 the nation which exists for the guidance of the king and 
 Parliament.^® This constitution is not however binding 
 upon the executive or legislative branches of government. 
 Even so radical a change in the frame of government as 
 the recent curtailment of the power of the House of Lords 
 was effected by a mere act of Parliament. 
 
 As regards the rights of the individual as against the 
 government, until recently at least, both the rights of per- 
 sonal liberty and property rights were as fully protected 
 
 54. Infra, § 8. appearances into the service of free- 
 
 55. 1 Bl. Com. 91. dom. Through the extraordinary 
 
 56. "When one scrutinizes the energy of the English political 
 English Constitution, it is like look- genius, the old institutions have 
 ing at the nests of birds or at the grown elastic and significant of new 
 curious and intricate work of beav- thought. ' I, the writer,' says the 
 ers and insects; its strange con- author of Ottimo Commento, ' heard 
 trivances seem not so much the Dante say that never a rhyme had 
 ordered and foreseen result of led him to say other than he would, 
 human wisdom as a marvellous out- but that many a time and oft he 
 come of instinct, of a singular po- had made words say in his rhjnnes 
 litical sense and apprehension, feel- what they were not wont to express 
 ing its sure way for centuries, amid for other poets.' In like manner 
 all sorts of obstacles, through and the English have forced their fa- 
 around and over them, with the miliar institutions to express their 
 busy persistence of a tribe of ants. highest political conceptions. Never 
 England, in emerging from the an institution has led them to say 
 Middle Ages, has brought along its other than they would; and, indeed, 
 old forms and institutions — king they have said through these insti- 
 and lords and all the phraseology of tutions things that other nations 
 feudal subjection — but it has har- have not known how to express." 
 nessed all these stately mediaeval Thayer, Legal Essays, 191-2. 
 
§ 7 Origin and Decline of the Powee. 27 
 
 as in this country. Parliament was restrained by ancient 
 custom and by the habits and thoughts of the ruling classes 
 from passing any act interfering with either liberty or prop- 
 erty which did not fall within one of the recognized divi- 
 sions of matters proper for legislative regulation. English 
 conservatism looked upon ' * vested rights ' ' with much more 
 favor than we regarded them in America. Property was 
 as safe from uncompensated seizure anywhere within the 
 British Empire as in a state in which the legislature was 
 tied down by the minutest constitutional restrictions.^'' 
 
 § 7. Sovereign Powers of the States. 
 
 When the people of the American colonies became inde- 
 pendent of Great Britain, each colony became a sovereign 
 state, and by the mere fact of sovereignty assumed absolute 
 control over the persons and property within its juris- 
 diction. To each state passed all the powers of king and 
 Parliament,®^ to be exercised as the people of the state saw 
 fit. The states which were created later had the same pow- 
 ers,®® except as they were limited by the United States 
 Constitution. The territories derive their powers from the 
 enabling acts of congress, and under general grants of gov- 
 ernmental power may exercise the customary features of 
 sovereignty such as eminent domain,*" but the new states 
 
 57. Thus in all cases of th« exer- stance of their government. They 
 cise of eminent domain the owners retained for the purposes of gov- 
 of property injuriously affected are emment all the powers of the 
 entitled to compensation. See i«- British Parliament and through 
 fra, §§ 308, 310. So also it is pro- their state constitutions or other 
 posed whenever the sale of liquor is forms of social compact undertook 
 prohibited to compensate the pro- to give practical effect to such as 
 prietors of licensed places, a pro- they deemed necessary for the eom- 
 ceeding unheard of in this country. mon good and the security of life 
 
 58. Dartmouth College v. Wood- and property." 
 
 ward, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518,4 L.ed. 59. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 
 
 629; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 113, 24 L. ed. 77; Coyle v. Okla- 
 
 Pet. (U. S.) 1, 47, 8 L. ed. 25; homa, 221 U. S. 559, 55 L. ed. 853; 
 
 Munn V. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, at Cincinnati v. Louisville, etc., R. R. 
 
 p. 124, 24 L. ed. 77, "When the Co., 223 U. S. 390, 56 L. ed. 481. 
 
 people of the United Colonies sep- 60. Sanford v. Tucson, 8 Ariz, 
 
 arated from Great Britain, they 247, 71 Pac. 903. 
 changed the form but not the sub- 
 
28 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 8 
 
 on being admitted to the union came in with all the sover- 
 eign powers of the old ones. 
 
 Each one of the United States, by the mere fact of its 
 being sovereign, has therefore complete and unqualified 
 control over the persons and property within its jurisdic- 
 tion, deducting only the powers granted to the United 
 States and the powers it is forbidden to exercise by the 
 constitution of the United Stateg.*^ 
 
 § 8. The Restrictions upon the Powers of the Representa- 
 tives of the People, 
 
 The original thirteen states, having established their inde- 
 pendence, had the power to govern themselves as they saw 
 fit, as long as they did not violate the rights of foreigners 
 or shock the sensibilities of the civilized world. They might, 
 if they had so desired, allowed their legislative bodies to 
 retain all the powers of the British Parliament and their 
 executive the powers of the king. Each individual might 
 have trusted to the wisdom and fairness of the majority 
 to be free from unjust and oppressive legislation. A dif- 
 ferent course, however, was adopted, and each new state 
 included in its frame of government restrictions upon the 
 legislative power of the representatives of its own people. 
 
 It is interesting to note the reasons which led to the ready 
 adoption of this novel conception, by no means a necessary 
 incident of self-government. One reason is found in the 
 form of government under which the colonists had been liv- 
 ing. Each colony or its founders had had a charter from the 
 king, which formed its frame of government and which con- 
 tained restrictions on the powers of the legislative assem- 
 blies and other public bodies and officers. Any enactment by 
 a colonial assembly in violation of the restrictions in the 
 charter would be declared void by the court,*^ just as a sim- 
 ilar excess of jurisdiction by a colonial government ®^ or by 
 
 61. Munn v. Illinois, 94 TJ. S. 62. Winthrop v. Lechmere, Privy 
 
 113, 124, 24 L. ed. 77; Bertholf v. Council 1727, 1 Thayer's Cases 
 
 O'ReiUy, 74 N. Y. 509, 30 Am. Rep. Const. Law 34. 
 
 323. 63. Brophy v. Attorney-General 
 
§ 8 Oeigin and Decunb of the Power. 29 
 
 a chartered miinicipality would be treated now. When the 
 colonies became independent states, and desired to set up a 
 republican form of government, as there was no traditional 
 form familiar to all and the people were accustomed to a 
 written frame of government, written constitutions were 
 adopted. Many of them merely adapted the colonial charter 
 to the new conditions, and in Ehode Island the charter was 
 retained as the constitution of the state for a considerable 
 period after the independence of the colonies. In these 
 constitutions were usually inserted declarations of rights, 
 taken largely from Magna Charta and the English BiU of 
 Rights, but giving the individual for the first time protec- 
 tion from oppression by his own representatives. The 
 power of the courts to set aside acts of the legislature 
 repugnant to the constitution did not, when it was first 
 asserted, seem such a startling innovation as it would have 
 seemed to a people who had lived under an independent 
 government whose king and Parliament had had absolute 
 power to make and enforce laws, uncontrolled from within 
 or without. 
 
 Furthermore, it cannot be denied that at and before the 
 time of the American Revolution there was a strong feeling, 
 both in England and America, among the more liberal 
 thinkers, which even found expression in reported judicial 
 decisions, that a statute against common right and natural 
 justice was void and should not be enforced by the courts.'* 
 
 of Manitoba, Appeal Cases (1895) Association on the Duty of Courts 
 
 202, 217, 226-228; Montreal v. to Refuse to Execute Statutes in 
 
 Montreal St. Ey., Appeal Cases Contravention of the Fundamental 
 
 (1912) 333, 346; King v. Barger, Law (1915). 
 
 6 Com. L. R. (Australia) 42; Rex 64. Before the Reformation an 
 V. Commonwealth Court of Con- act of Paxliamenit attempting to as- 
 cUiation and Arbitration, 11 Com. sume spiritual jurisdiction was 
 L. R. (Australia) 2; Sinclair v. questioned in the courts. Prior of 
 Bagge, 1 New Zealand Court of Castleaere v. Dean of St. Stephens, 
 Appeal 50; Howard v. Attorney- Y. B. 21 Hen. VII, 1. There was 
 General, Transvaal L. R. 1909, High a well known dictum in Dr. Bon- 
 Court, 164. See this subject treated ham's ease, 8 Coke Rep. 114-a, 
 in extenso in Report of the Com- 118-a, in which Lord Coke said, 
 mittee of the New York State Bar "And it appears in our books, that 
 
30 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 §8 
 
 Even after the state constitutions had been adopted, the 
 principle that a statute which violated no clause of the 
 constitution might be void, if it was against natural justice, 
 still had its supporters,®® and while that doctrine is not 
 
 in many cases, the common law will 
 control acts of parliament, and 
 sometimes adjudge them to be ut- 
 terly void; for when an act of par- 
 liament is against common right 
 and reason, or repugnant, or impos- 
 sible to be performed, the common 
 law will control it, and adjudge 
 such act to be void." In Day v. 
 Savadge, Hob. 85, Lord Chief Jus- 
 tice Hobart said, " Because even 
 an act of parliament made against 
 natural equity, as to make a man a 
 judge in his own cause, is void." 
 In City of London v. "Wood, 12 
 Mod. 669, Lord Chief Justice Holt 
 afflrmed these views, and they were 
 stated as unquestioned law in the 
 early digests. 6 Bacon's Abridge- 
 ment, Statute (a) (1735); 4 Co- 
 myn's Digest, Parliament (R. 27) 
 (1762-1767); 19 Viner's Abridge- 
 ment, Statutes (E. 6) Construction 
 of Statutes, 15 ( 1741-1751 ) . There 
 can be no question that the' fore- 
 going dicta were the chief legal 
 reliance of the leaders of the oppo- 
 sition to the writs of assistance and 
 to the Stamp Act, in Massachusetts 
 just prior to the outbreak of the 
 Revolution. Note to Paxton's Case, 
 Quincy (Mass.) 200, 441, 474, 521, 
 527. 
 
 65. See infra, § 204, in which 
 the eases are collected which hold 
 an attempted taking of property 
 for public use without compensa- 
 tion to be void as in violation of 
 a natural right which the legisla- 
 ture is bound to respect. So also 
 an early South Carolina case held 
 an act of Parliament against com- 
 mon right to be void. Bowman v. 
 Middleton, 1 Bay 252 (1792). 
 
 There are also dicta of some of 
 
 the most eminent judges even in- 
 cluding Chief Justice Marshall (in 
 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch. (U. S.) 
 87, 135, 3 L. ed. 162), that a stat- 
 ute may be void as being against 
 natural justice even if it violates 
 no clause of the constitution. See 
 for example, 
 
 United States. — Calder v. Bull, 
 3 Dall. 386, 388, 1 L. ed. 648; Loan 
 Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 
 655, 663, 22 L. ed. 455; Bonaparte 
 V. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., Baldw. 
 220. 
 
 Georgia. — Young v. McKenzie, 3 
 Kelly 31; Parham v. Decatur 
 County Justices, 9 Ga. 341 ; Lough- 
 bridge V. Harris, 42 Ga. 500. 
 
 Indiana. — In re Petition of 
 Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 668, 34 N. E. 
 641. 
 
 Maryland. — University of Mary- 
 land V. Williams, 9 Gill & S. 365, 
 408. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Bristol v. New 
 Chester, 3 N. H. 534. 
 
 New Jersey. — Sinnickson v. John- 
 son, 17 N. J. L. 129, 146, 34 Am. 
 Dec. 184; Re Public Highway in 
 Bergen and Hudson Counties, 22 
 N. J. L. 293. 
 
 New Torh. — Gardner v. New- 
 burgh, 2 Johns. 162, 166, 7 Am. 
 Dec. 526; Bradshaw v. Rogers, 20 
 Johns. 103; People v. Morris, 13 
 Wend. 325; Benson v. New York, 
 10 Barb. 223, and see a very recent 
 recrudescence of this dootrine in 
 Matter of Estate of Leslie, 92 Misc. 
 663, discussed in XXIX Harvard 
 Law Review 521-525. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Palairet's Ap- 
 peal, 67 Pa. 479, 5 Am. Rep. 450. 
 
 South Carolina. — Ham v. Mc- 
 Claws, 1 Bay 93. 
 
§ 9 Origin and Decline of the Powbb. 31 
 
 now considered good law,®® it undoubtedly liad its effect 
 upon our jurisprudence by making it easier for the courts 
 to hold that a statute in violation of an express prohibition 
 of the constitution was void. 
 
 § 9. The Change in the Attitude of the Public toward the 
 Bill of Rights. 
 
 The state constitutions did not in terms give to the courts 
 the power of declaring acts of the legislature in violation 
 of the restrictions of the bill of rights to be void, and it 
 is conceivable that it was intended that these restrictions 
 should operate merely as directions to the legislature, and 
 that the legislature was to be the sole judge of its own com- 
 pliance with the fundamental law. It is apparent however 
 that such was not the common understanding at the time 
 when these restrictions were imposed, for it was held in 
 almost every state within a few years from the adoption of 
 its constitution that the highest cojirt of the state had the 
 power to declare void any statute in conflict with the express 
 
 Tennessee. — Lanier v. Lanier, 5 Iowa 603, 105 N. W. 203, 3 L. R. A. 
 
 Heisk. 462, 471-472. (N. S.) 1103. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Durkee v. Janes- Massachusetts. — Stoughton v. 
 
 ville, 28 Wis. 464, 9 Am. Rep. 500; Baker, 4 M'ass. 522, 3 Am. Dee. 
 
 Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 236; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 
 
 190, 198, 108 N. W. 627, 9 L. R. A. Cush. 101. 
 
 (N. S.) 121. Michigan. — People v. Gallaghfer, 
 
 The question has ceased to be of 4 Mich. 244. 
 
 practical importance since the adop- Nebraska. — Redell v. Moores, 63 
 
 tion of the fourteenth amendment Neb. 219, 88 N. W. 243, 55 L. R. A. 
 
 to the constitution of the United 740, 93 Am. St. Rep. 431. 
 
 States, as an act of legislature Nevada. — Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 
 
 against natural justice would not be 283. 
 
 " due process of law." New York. — People v. Fisher, 24 
 
 66. United States.— Vaxihome v. Wend. 215, 220; Bertholf v. 
 
 Dorrance, 2 Ball. 304, 1 L. ed. 391; O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509, 614. 
 
 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 398, 1 0/sio.— Probaseo v. Raiae, 50 
 
 L. ed. 648. Ohio St. 378, 34 N. E. 536. 
 
 Illinois. — People v. Marshall, 6 Pennsylvania. — Sharpless v. Phil- 
 
 m. 672. adelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 59 Am. Dee. 
 
 Indiana. — Churchman v. Martin, 759; Com. ex rel. Elkin v. Moir, 
 
 54 Ind. 380; Hedderich v. State, 199 Pa. 534, 49 Atl. 351, 53 L. R. A 
 
 101 Ind. 564, 1 N. E. 47, 51 Am. 837, 85 Am. St. Rep. 801. 
 
 Rep. 768. Bhode Island. — Newport v. Hor- 
 
 lowa. — Des Moines Park Com- ton, 22 R. I. 196, 47 Atl. 312, 50 
 
 missioners v. Diamond Ice Co., 130 L. R. A. 330. 
 
32 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 limitations of the bill of rights, and in very few states was 
 the existence of this power seriously denied.®'^ When new 
 constitutions were adopted in the original states, or when 
 new states were admitted to the union and drew up consti- 
 tutions of their own, after this interpretation had been 
 placed upon the earlier constitutions, there can of course 
 be no question that the power of the courts to declare uncon- 
 stitutional statutes to be void was implicitly understood to 
 be incorporated therein.®^ 
 
 67. Connecticut. — Symsbnry Case, 
 Kirby 444 (1785). 
 
 Georgia. — State v. Savannah, 1 
 T. U. P. Charlton 235, 4 Am. Dec. 
 708 (1809). 
 
 Kentucky. — Stidger v. Eogers, 2 
 Ky. 52 (1801). 
 
 Maryland. — ^Whittington v. Polk, 
 1 Harris & J. 236 (1802). 
 
 Massachusetts. — Questions involv- 
 ing the constitutionality of stat- 
 utes are discussed in the first vol- 
 ume of reported cases. Washburn 
 V. Fourth Parish of West Spring- 
 field, 1 Mass. 32 (1804); Mount- 
 fort V. Hall, 1 Mass. 442 (1805). 
 Statutes appear to have been held 
 unconstitutional as early as 1786. 
 See Brattle v. Hinckley and Brat- 
 tle V. Putnam, VII Harvard Law 
 Review, 415. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Woart v. Win- 
 nick, 3 N. H. 473 (1826). 
 
 New Jersey. — State v. Parkhurst, 
 9 N. J. L. 427 (1804). In this case 
 the court referred to the unreported 
 cases of Holmes v. Walton (1780) 
 and Taylor v. Beading (1796) in 
 which acts of the legislature had 
 been held unconstitutional. 
 
 New York. — Rutgers v. Wad- 
 dington, 1 Thayers' Cas. Const. 
 Law 63 (1784). 
 
 North Carolina. — Bayard v. Sin- 
 gleton, 1 Martin 42 (1787). 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Austin v. Univer- 
 sity of Pennsylvania, 1 Yeates 260 
 (1793); Respublica v. Duquet, 2 
 Yeates 493 (1799). 
 
 Rhode Island. — Trevebt v. Weed- 
 en, 1 Thayer's Cas. Const. Law 73 
 (1786). 
 
 South Carolina. — Ham v. Mc- 
 Claws, 1 Bay 93 (1789). 
 
 Tennessee. — Miller's Lessee V. 
 Holt, 1 Overton 243 (1807). 
 
 Vermont. — Dupy v. Wiekwire, 1 
 D. Chip. 237 (1814). 
 
 Virginia. — Commonwealth v. Ca- 
 ton, 4 Call 5 (1782). 
 
 68. Thus Chief Justice Gibson of 
 Pennsylvania, the principal pro- 
 ponent of the theory that a court 
 could not declare a statute in vio- 
 lation of a state constitution to be 
 unconstitutional (Eakin v. Raub, 12 
 Serg. & R. 345) conceded that after 
 a convention had drawn up a new 
 constitution, the convention " by 
 their sUenee sanctioned the preten- 
 sions of the courts to deal freely 
 with the acts of the legislature." 
 Chief Justice Gibson's aversion to 
 the power of the courts to hold acts 
 of the legislature unconstitutional 
 is reflected in his decision in Har- 
 vey V. Thomas, 10 Watts 63, 36 
 Am. Dec. 141, that property might 
 be taken for a private use; in the 
 case of the Philadelphia, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 6 Whart. 25, 36 Am. Dec. 202, 
 that a steam railroad might be laid 
 in a street without compensation 
 to the owner of the fee; and in 
 Commonwealth v. Fisher, 1 Pa. 466, 
 that land might be permanently 
 flooded without compensation. 
 
§ 9 Obigin and Decline or the Powee. 33 
 
 Th« power of the courts to declare the will of the people, 
 as expressed in the constitutions which they had themselves 
 adopted, paramount to the acts of their delegated agents, 
 the memhers of the legislature, when the latter attempted 
 to exercise a power which the people had expressly denied 
 to them, was not, in the early days of the republic, dis- 
 pleasing to the people. "When a citizen of the United 
 States boasted that his was a ' ' free country ' ' he meant 
 not so much that it was free from foreign domination, or 
 that there was no hereditary monarch, and that the ulti- 
 mate sovereignty rested in the people, as that the individual 
 was free from arbitrary, oppressive or merely meddlesome 
 interference with his person, his property and his beliefs, 
 and that no statute which attempted to exercise such inter- 
 ference could be enforced against him. The sentiment of 
 the limes was well expressed in the Kentucky constitu- 
 tion,®^ which declared that, 
 
 "Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty 
 and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, 
 not even in the largest majority." 
 
 So far from curtailing the restrictions upon the power of 
 the legislature, the tendency of each succeeding year was 
 to increase them, and, as each new constitution was adopted, 
 new and additional features were added to the bill of 
 rights. Of all the democratic institutions which had been 
 introduced into this country, the system of judicial protec- 
 tion of the individual against oppressive and discriminatory 
 legislation was the one of which our citizens were appar- 
 ently most proud. 
 
 In recent years, in many parts of the country, a reaction 
 of feeling has taken place, and a decision of the courts 
 declaring a statute to be unconstitutional has, instead of 
 being received with general approval, often provoked public 
 
 69. Bill of Rights, § 2. See also -whieh when they enter into a state 
 
 the Yirginia Constitution of 1776 of society they cannot by any 
 
 in which it is declared that all men compact deprive or divest their 
 
 "have certain inherent rights of posterity." 
 
 3 
 
34 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 10 
 
 indignation, and aroused among superficial thinkers hos- 
 tility to the judiciary, upon the supposition that, in declar- 
 ing that the agents of the people have exceeded the powers 
 which the people granted them, the court has in some way 
 curtailed the power of the people themselves. Various 
 remedies have been suggested, but no practical one adopted, 
 and the distrust and ill feeling which certain decisions upon 
 matters of constitutional law have created have seriously 
 threatened the bulwark against governmental tyranny 
 which only a short while ago was looked upon with almost 
 religious veneration.™ 
 
 While to trace the growth of this unrest would require 
 too wide a departure from the main topic of this work, it is 
 undoubtedly pertinent to point out the connection between 
 the causes which have led to this change of the public atti- 
 tude in respect to the power of the courts to declare uncon- 
 stitutional laws to be void, and the steady diminution of 
 the power of the legislature to apply and enforce the rights 
 of the public as against the individual, and particularly 
 to apply and enforce that public right so essential to the 
 material development and prosperity of the community, the 
 power of eminent domain. 
 
 § 10. The Three Canons of Constitutional Government. 
 
 The exercise by a court of the power to nullify the wishes 
 of the representatives of the people, enacted into law in 
 solemn form, is indeed full of grave responsibility and not 
 to be called into play indiscriminately. During the early 
 
 70. That this danger is not unreal sion in this constitution, and the 
 is shown by the following extract authority of the legislature to con- 
 from the constitution of California, fer such additional powers is ex- 
 art. XII, § 22 (adopted in 1911). pressly declared to be plenary and 
 " No provision of this constitution unlimited by any provision of the 
 shall be construed as a limitation constitution." Under this provision 
 upon the authority of the legisla- a man might be deprived of his 
 ture to confer upon the railroad property without compensation, or 
 commission additional powers of the even be hanged without a trial, 
 same kind or different from those See Pacific Tel., etc., Co. v. Eshle- 
 conferred herein which are not in- man, 166 Cal. 640, 137 Pac. 119, 50 
 consistent with the powers con- L. R. A. (N. S.) 652. 
 ferred upon the railroad commis- 
 
§ 11 Obigin and Decline of the Powee. 35 
 
 years of the republic there were three recognized prin- 
 ciples under which this power was exercised. While these 
 principles remained in force the American system of writ- 
 ten constitutions executed by the courts was applied with 
 general satisfaction ; the individual was protected but at the 
 same time the rights of the people remained unimpaired; 
 and the states that have been wise enough to adhere to the 
 old conditions have not suffered from the evils so prevalent 
 in those parts of the country which have fallen away from 
 the principles of constitutional government as applied in 
 earlier times. 
 
 These principles were three in number. 
 
 (1) Every presumption should be made in favor of the 
 validity of a statute. It is not to be held a violation of the 
 fundamental charter established by the people in their con- 
 stitution unless so clearly outside the power conferred upon 
 the legislature as to be free from reasonable doubt in that 
 regard. It must be assumed that the legislature intended 
 to act within its lawful bounds, and this assumption cannot 
 be overthrown unless the statute unmistakably oversteps 
 these bounds by manifest and plain terms. 
 
 (2) The constitutional limitations upon the power of the 
 legislature should be no more than a bill of rights establish- 
 ing in general terms the fundamental and iounutable pria- 
 ciples of liberty and justice. 
 
 (3) The constitution should be interpreted and enforced 
 by an independent judiciary, the members of which should 
 hold office during good behavior and should be subject 
 neither to reward nor pimishment for their decisions. 
 
 § 11. The Disregard of the Presumption in Favor of the 
 Validity of an Act of the Legislature. 
 
 Concurrently with the assumption by the courts of the 
 power to declare acts of the legislature in conflict with the 
 provisions of the constitution to be void, was the promul- 
 gation made of the principle that this power would not be 
 exercised in doubtful cases. Every presumption in favor 
 of the validity of an act of the legislature was recognized, 
 
36 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domahst. 
 
 11 
 
 and it was only when a statute was clearly and manifestly 
 in violation of the fundamental law that the court would 
 undertake to declare it to be unconstitutional^* The 
 accepted principle was well expressed in 1808 by Charlton, 
 J., of the Superior Court of Georgia, in the following 
 words -^^ 
 
 "No nice doubts, no critical exposition of words, no 
 abstract rules of interpretation, suitable in a contest 
 between individuals, ought to be resorted to in deciding 
 on the constitutional operation of a statute. This vio- 
 lation of a constitutional right ought to be as obvious 
 to the comprehension of every one as an axiomatic 
 truth, as that the parts are equal to the whole * * * 
 When it remains doubtful whether the legislature have 
 or have not trespassed on the constitution, a conflict 
 ought to be avoided, because there is a possibility 
 in such a case of the constitution being with the 
 legislature." 
 
 71. United States. — Warev. Hyl- 
 ton, 3 Dall. 171, 1 L. ed. 568 
 (1796) ; Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 
 14, 1 L. ed. 721 (1800) ; Fleteher 
 V. Peck, 6 Oraneh 87, 128, 3 L. ed. 
 162 (1810). 
 
 Connecticut, — Hartford Bridge 
 Co. V. Union Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 
 210, 227 (1860). 
 
 Georgia. — GrimbaU v. Ross, 
 T. U. P. Charlton, 175 (1808). 
 
 Illinois. — Lane v. Dorman, 4 111. 
 238, 36 Am. Dec. 543 (1841). 
 
 Louisiarea. — Brooks v. Weyman, 
 
 3 Martin 9 (1813). 
 
 Maryland. — Baltimore v. State, 
 15 Md. 376 (1859). 
 
 Massachusetts. — Kendall v. King- 
 ston, 5 Mass. 624, 534 (1809); 
 Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 87 
 (1834). 
 
 New Hampshire. — Dow v. Norris, 
 
 4 N. H. 16 (1827). 
 
 New York. — Ex parte McCollum, 
 1 Cow. 564 (1823). 
 
 Penmsylvania. — Commonwealth v. 
 Smith, 4 Bin. 117 (1811). 
 
 South Carolina. — Bume v. Stew- 
 art, 3 Des. 466 (1812). 
 
 Virginia. — Kamper v. Hawkins, 
 1 Va. Cas. 60 (1793). 
 
 See also infra, §§26 and 52. 
 
 72. Grimball v. Ross, T. U. P. 
 Charlt. (Ga.) 175, 178. In the 
 following year however the same 
 judge, in setting aside the acts of 
 a municipal council used the follow- 
 ing language, much more assertive 
 of the powers of the judiciary: 
 "No act of the legislature can 
 directly, or per obliquum, deprive 
 the superior court of that jurisdic- 
 tion. All acts of that description 
 I would without any kind of hesi- 
 tation declare unconstitutional. I 
 will not sit here and suffer the con- 
 stitution to be violated; no, not 
 by the legislature, and certainly not 
 by a small body of men clothed with 
 a 'little brief authority,' and exer- 
 cising a puny legislation upon mat- 
 ters of city police." State v. Sa- 
 vannah, T. U. P. Charlton 235, 
 4 Am. Dee. 708. 
 
§ 11 Origin and Decline of the Powee. 37 
 
 Closely connected with the foregoing principle is the 
 even more obvious one, that the courts have nothing to do 
 with the wisdom or expediency of a statute, and that ques- 
 tions of public or governmental policy are not judicial. 
 These doctrines were not, in early American jurisprudence, 
 mere brutum fulmen, to be solemnly enunciated and at the 
 same time tacitly ignored, but were real living principles 
 by which the judges were guided in the decision of litigated 
 cases. Statutes were rarely declared unconstitutional, and 
 then only when no other conclusion was possible, and 
 instances were not unusual of judges diligently peeking 
 some theory upon which they could support a statute, the 
 policy of which they abhorred and which they privately 
 believed to be beyond the power of the legislature to enact. 
 
 As the power of the courts to set aside acts of the legisla- 
 ture became more firmly established, and as it became clear 
 that the exercise of this power by the courts was not dis- 
 tasteful to the people, the principle that a statute should not 
 be declared unconstitutional except in plain and manifest 
 cases, while not openly overruled, began to be ignored in 
 practice. At first the tacit modification of this so essential 
 principle of successful constitutional government excited 
 no opposition or alarm. Indeed, in some of the states, con- 
 stitutional provisions were adopted by the people expressly 
 providing that in certain branches of the law the question 
 whether a statute was constitutional should be treated as 
 a purely judicial question without any regard to the asser- 
 tion of the legislature that the conditions existed under 
 which the statute would be constitutional.''^ Encouraged by 
 this and by similar expressions of popular approval, it 
 became a common thing for courts to declare statutes to be 
 unconstitutional upon strained and technical reasoning, 
 whenever they seemed to the courts to be unfair or even 
 merely unwise. In time however the inevitable consequence 
 followed. It is the treatment from this narrow and par- 
 tisan standpoint of statutes expressing the modern concep- 
 tions of social and industrial justice that is in great measure 
 
 73. Infra, § 52. 
 
38 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 12 
 
 to blame for the feeling against the enforcement of even 
 the fundamental principles of liberty and justice by courts 
 of law. 
 
 The most conspicuous examples of the curtailment of the 
 power of eminent domain by the narrow and illiberal hand- 
 ling of legislative enactments are found among the cases 
 which define the meaning of ' ' public use ' ' ^* and of 
 " taken, "■'s 
 
 § 12. The Extension of the Scope of the Bill of Rights. 
 
 In the constitutions of the original thirteen states the 
 limitations upon the power of the legislature were contained 
 in a comparatively brief bill of rights, which, while it 
 varied in detail in the different states, was in general a 
 declaration of a few fundamental principles of liberty and 
 justice of much the same character as the limitations upon 
 the power of Congress contained in the first eight amend- 
 ments of the constitution of the United States. In some 
 of the states the bill of rights has not lost this character. 
 Thus, in Massachusetts, in which the original constitution 
 of 1779 is still in force, although over forty articles of 
 amendment have from time to time been adopted, all but 
 one of these articles either relate to the frame of govern- 
 ment, or to the qualification of voters, or remove a limita- 
 tion upon the power of the legislature previously imposed, 
 and only one additional limitation upon legislative power 
 — that prohibiting the appropriation of public money for 
 the schools of a religious sect — has been adopted. 
 
 As new states were admitted to the union and as some 
 of the older states adopted new constitutions, the general 
 approval by the people of the judicial supervision of stat- 
 utes accorded by the bill of rights, and an increasing 
 distrust of the legislature, led to a wide increase in the 
 scope of that portion of the constitution devoted to the 
 limitation upon legislative power, and subjects which 
 hitherto had been matters of statutory regulation, or even 
 
 74. Infra, § 40. 75. Infra, §§ 108, 109. 
 
§ 12 Obigin and Decline op the Powee. 39 
 
 merely rules of practice in tlie various legislative bodies, 
 became embodied in the constitution itself. Every such lim- 
 itation cut down the powers of the representatives of the 
 people to legislate in such a way as to affect private prop- 
 erty rights, and gave the opponents of every new statute 
 a new ground for challenging its constitutionality, and in 
 some states the provisions of the constitution were so min- 
 ute, and so difficult to comply with in every detail, that 
 whenever a bill embodying legislation of an original char- 
 acter was introduced, its passage by the legislature was 
 looked upon merely as the first stage of its enactment, and, 
 before it could actually go into effect, an even more serious 
 contest before the courts was expected as a matter of course. 
 Many statutes embodying reforms earnestly desired by the 
 people, and involving no violation of any fundamental prin- 
 ciple of liberty or justice, have been held void by the courts 
 because of a failure by the legislature to comply with some 
 technical requirement of the constitution of the state. 
 
 While no sensible person conversant with the facts could 
 criticise a court with any fairness for holding a statute 
 invalid if it really contained a misleading caption, or 
 included more than one subject, or was in some other way in 
 conflict with the express provisions of the constitution of 
 the state, the average citizen, who understood only that the 
 highest court of his state had balked a reform in which he 
 was earnestly interested and which had been adopted in a 
 neighboring state, was frequently filled with resentment, not 
 only against the court, but against the whole system which 
 made such things possible. There can be no doubt that the 
 distortion of the functions of a written constitution so com- 
 mon in certain sections of the country has had much to do, 
 with developing the sentiment against the American system 
 of constitutional government. 
 
 The power of eminent domain is of course affected by 
 general prohibitions in the constitution of a state, such as 
 those against special legislation or against the enactment 
 of statutes under a misleading caption or containing more 
 
40 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 13 
 
 than one subject. In addition to these general prohibitions, 
 in many of the states in recent years constitutional provi- 
 sions have been adopted specifically aimed at eminent 
 domain and limiting the exercise of that power by the pub- 
 lic in favor of the individual owner of property. The most 
 important of these are the extension of the right to compen- 
 sation in cases when property is damaged, by the exercise 
 of eminent domain/® the requirement that compensation 
 shall be secured, deposited with the court, or, in some states, 
 paid to the owner before property is taken,'''' the require- 
 ment of a trial by jury to assess the compensation or dam- 
 ages,''* and the prohibition of the setting off of benefits to 
 the owner's remaining land from the compensation for the 
 land taken and in some states, from the damages.^® 
 
 § 13. The Rise and Fall of the Independent Judiciary. 
 
 To all students of English history it is well known that 
 the Stuart kings were for many years able to maintain their 
 ascendency over their subjects in the memorable struggle 
 for civil liberty that took place during the reign of those 
 monarchs chiefly by their power of removing any judge 
 who rendered a decision displeasing to them. The com- 
 missions of the judges ran during the pleasure of the sov- 
 ereign, but in Elizabeth's reign the judges were never 
 removed on account of their decisions in litigated cases. 
 With the accession of James I the contest between the king 
 and the people over the prerogatives of the crown and the 
 rights of the subject became acute. The disputed questions 
 usually found expression in legal proceedings, criminal or 
 civil, and James, by his control over the judiciary, was 
 enabled invariably to secure decisions in his favor. 
 
 With the appointment of Sir Edward Coke as Chief Jus- 
 tice of the Common Pleas there 'came a change. Coke, as 
 Attorney General, had been a most drastic prosecutor of 
 political offenders, but once upon the bench he conceived 
 himself an umpire between sovereign and subject rather 
 
 76. Infra, § 311. 78. Infra, § 339. 
 
 77. Infra, § 212. 79. Infra, § 254. 
 
§ 13 Oeigin and DECLiiirE of the Power. 41 
 
 than a mere instrument to carry out the sovereign's will. 
 His great learning and forceful personality gave him a con- 
 trolling influence over the other judges, and for a time 
 decisions upon contested points were rendered in favor of 
 the people whenever the law of the constitution warranted 
 it. James however finally removed Coke from the bench 
 for refusing to state in advance what his decision would be 
 upon a certain question involving the prerogatives of the 
 crown, and the judiciary became once more subservient to 
 the royal wishes. The removal of Coke however started 
 the popular demand for an independent judiciary that would 
 be able to decide a controversy between the sovereign and 
 the humblest subject according to law and justice, without 
 fear of the consequences. Charles I, in 1641, when the 
 opposition of Parliament to his arbitrary actions had 
 become dangerous, granted that the judges should there- 
 after hold their places during good behavior, but this grant 
 was revocable at the pleasure of the crown. The same 
 conditions existed upon the restoration of Charles IT, but 
 finally, when William and Mary came to the throne, the 
 Act of Settlement, which contained the Bill of Eights and 
 was in the nature of a fundamental charter of the rights and 
 liberties of Englishmen, included a provision establishing 
 the permanent tenure of the judges. It was still felt however 
 that the commission of a judge expired upon the death of 
 the sovereign who granted it, and it was not until the first 
 year of the reign of George III that provision was made 
 to the contrary. Since that time the judges have held 
 office during good behavior (quamdiu se bene gesserint) 
 without reduction of salary, and are removable only upon 
 the address of both houses of Parliament. The courts 
 thus constituted have been notable not only for their wis- 
 dom and impartiality, but for their breadth and progres- 
 siveness and for the part they have played in freeing the 
 administration of justice from formalism and from the 
 subservience to technicalities so prevalent in earlier times. 
 The struggle for an independent judiciary in England 
 was watched with interest in the American colonies and 
 
42 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 13 
 
 had its reflexes among them, the most notable of which 
 was the trial of Zenger in New York in 1735 for an alleged 
 libel upon the governor. In this case counsel for the defense 
 attacked the commissions of the judges as unconstitutional, 
 as they ran " during pleasure," and for this the counsel 
 who raised the objection were disbarred. Nevertheless the 
 bar of New York continually opposed the claim of the 
 royal governors to appoint judges during their pleasure 
 until the question was finally settled by the Eevolution. 
 Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the 
 permanent tenure of the judges was one of the safeguards 
 of civil liberty most firmly insisted upon by the people of 
 the respective states when they came to adopt written con- 
 stitutions. The sentiment of the times is well expressed in 
 the twenty-ninth article of the Declaration of Eights of the 
 Massachusetts constitution in the following language. 
 
 " It is essential to the preservation of the rights of 
 every individual, his life, liberty, property, and char- 
 acter, that there be an impartial interpretation of the 
 laws, and administration of justice. It is the right of 
 every citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial, 
 and independent as the lot of humanity will admit. It 
 is, therefore, not only the best policy, but for the secur- 
 ity of the rights of the people, and of every citizen, that 
 the judges of the supreme judicial court should hold 
 their offices as long as they behave themselves well ; and 
 that they should have honorable salaries ascertained 
 and established by standing laws. ' ' 
 
 Similar provisions were found in the constitutions of the 
 other original states, and of the United States, although the 
 method of selecting judges was not uniform. The power of 
 appointing the federal judges was given to the President, 
 and in some of the states the governor .and in others the 
 legislature appointed the judges of the court of last resort.*** 
 
 80. The judges of the highest shire, Pennsylvania, Maryland and 
 courts were appointed by the gov- New York; by the legislature in 
 emor in Massachusetts, New Hamp- Rhode Island, Connecticut, New 
 
§ 13 Origin and Decline of the Poweb. 43 
 
 The permanency of tenure was however in every case 
 stoutly maintained. 
 
 The highest courts of the different states during the early 
 years of the republic, considering the disadvantages under 
 which they labored, performed very efficient service, and 
 some of the judges of these courts were men of profound 
 learning and great ability. There does not appear to have 
 been any serious complaint as to the character of the judges 
 or the soundness of their decisions, although the necessary 
 retention in office of Federalist judges after the majority 
 of the states had become Republican was irksome to the 
 extreme partisans. It was felt however that the popular 
 election of the chief executive and the legislative officers for 
 short terms with an opportunity for rotation in office had 
 been a great success, and a movement arose to extend the 
 principle to public officers of every description. During 
 the first half of the nineteenth century many offices, such 
 as the heads of the various departments of the state govern- 
 ments, clerkships of the courts, district attorneyships and 
 the like, which had previously been appointive, became elec- 
 tive. Without realizing the distinction between judicial and 
 administrative officers, and the necessity of keeping the 
 former free from external influence, and forgetful of the 
 long struggle by which their ancestors had established an 
 independent judiciary, but believing that they were making 
 their government still more democratic, the people of many 
 of the states caused even their judicial officers to be subject 
 to election by popular vote, and, as an almost necessary 
 corollary, for short terms of office. 
 
 Ohio was the first state to be admitted to the union with 
 a constitution providing for tenure of office by the judges 
 for a short term of years, namely seven.*^ The judges 
 however were chosen by the legislature. By the first consti- 
 tution of Mississippi the judges held their office during 
 
 Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, the only state to deny the public the 
 
 South Carolina and Georgia, and right to grade its own highways 
 
 by the governor and legislature in without compensation to the adjoin- 
 
 joint session in Delaware. ing property owners. See infra, 
 
 81. It is notable that Ohio was § 162. 
 
44 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 13 
 
 good behavior, but in 1833 they were made elective by popu- 
 lar suffrage for terms of six years.®^ In 1846 similar provi- 
 sions were enacted in New Tork*^ and Wisconsin and in 
 1848 in Illinois. California, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, and 
 Ohio soon followed suit, and by the time that the principle 
 that all men are born free had been established as part of 
 the fundamental law, the people of almost all of the United 
 States had lost the privilege of having their rights adjudi- 
 cated by courts in which the humblest citizen could feel 
 that, when the interests of the public were opposed to those 
 of an individual land owner, however wealthy or powerful 
 the latter might be, there was no hope of reward or fear of 
 punishment by which the judgment of the court might be 
 influenced in his favor. 
 
 The recent adoption in a number of the states of the sys- 
 tem of recalling a judge when he renders an unpopular 
 opinion, or one adverse to those possessing great political 
 influence, while it makes the reversion of the position of the 
 judiciary to that which it held in the time of the Stuart 
 kings complete, is merely a final step in the movement which 
 began nearly a hundred years earlier. At the present time 
 the federal judges are appointed for life during good 
 behavior, and there are but four states which also have an 
 independent judiciary.®* 
 
 82. It will be seen ttat the most Island, New Hampshire and Dela- 
 extreme view in favor of the prop- ware. In Pennsylvania the term 
 erty owner and against the public of the judges of the court of last 
 in respect to the set-of£ of benefits resort is 21 years and in New York 
 is taken in Mississippi. See infra, 14 years. In Delaware, New Jer- 
 §§ 252, 280. In 1890 Mississippi sey, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
 reverted to appointive judges. Hampshire, Louisiana and Missis- 
 
 83. It was in New York that the sippi the judges or some of them 
 doctrine originated that individuals, are appointed by the governor, and 
 owning land adjacent to streets in Connecticut, Rhode Island, Ver- 
 owned by the public in fee, have mont, South Carolina and Virginia 
 private rights in such streets. See by the legislature. In the other 
 infra, §§ 160, 179. states the judges are elected by 
 
 84. Namely, Massachusetts, Rhode popular vote. 
 
§ 14 Origin and Decline of the Powee. 45 
 
 § 14. The Effect of the Loss of an Independent Judiciary 
 upon the Power of Eminent Domain. 
 
 Whatever may have been the effect of the loss of an inde- 
 pendent judiciary upon the jurisprudence of the states as 
 a whole, and however it may have affected other branches 
 of governmental power, there can be no doubt that, for 
 good or for evil, it has been the principal cause of the 
 curtailment of the rights of the public in the exercise of the 
 power of eminent domain. 
 
 There is no branch of constitutional law in which the 
 need of far-seeing and impartial judges for the pres- 
 ervation of the rights of the public is so pronounced as- in 
 eminent domain. The litigated cases arising out of the 
 exercise of eminent domain have on one side a private land 
 owner, keen to protect his own interest, and resentful of any 
 intrusion upon his rights and who perhaps wiU be ruined 
 by an adverse decision. On the other side is at best the 
 impersonal public, no member of which will seriously feel 
 any increased expenditure due to the loss of one litigated 
 case, and who as a whole are inclined to sympathize with 
 the land owner in his contest with the overwhelming power 
 of the state. A decision against the land owner will fill 
 him and his friends with a desire for vengeance, but it 
 wiU impress the public at large in whose favor the decision 
 is given (if the public pays any attention to it at all) merely 
 as an example of the lack of human qualities on the part of 
 the judges.*® If the party seeking to exercise eminent 
 domain is a private corporation, the situation is even worse. 
 Not one man in a thousand realizes that a decision in favor 
 of the land owner is a decision against the public, and that 
 a series of such decisions will result in the complete subor- 
 dination of the essential public right of eminent domain to 
 
 85. As was well said by Sergeant, est sufficient to make them vigilant. 
 
 J., in Commonwealth v. Alburger, But in public rights of property, 
 
 1 Whart. (Pa.) 469, at page 488: each individual feels but a slight 
 
 " Individuals may reasonably be interest, and rather tolerates a 
 
 held to a limited period to enforce manifest encroachment than seeks 
 
 their rights against adverse oecu- a dispute to set it right." 
 pants, because they have an inter- 
 
46 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 14 
 
 tlie private rights of ownership in land. As a result, the 
 decision in favor of the land owner is always the popular 
 one, and to a judge seeking re-election even at the expense 
 of the maintenance of sound principles of law the only safe 
 course is to decide against the public rights in every eminent 
 domain case that arises. 
 
 The effect of these influences can be readily traced. In 
 the early years of the republic, when an independent judi- 
 ciary was in office in every state, it was realized that the 
 public right of eminent domain, like other sovereign powers, 
 was capable of use in such a way as to work hardship upon 
 individuals, but it was felt that the proper remedy for such 
 hardship was in the legislature, which might make provi- 
 sion to redress a particular injustice without curtailing the 
 right of the public to exercise its powers to their full extent 
 when the public necessities required it. Accordingly it was 
 uniformly held that an act of legislature authorizing the 
 exercise of eminent domain was constitutional, unless it was 
 clearly in violation of the fundamental law. 
 
 After the majority of the states had lost their independ- 
 ent judiciary, cases of individual hardship received a differ- 
 ent treatment. When the legislature of a state intentionally 
 or inadvertently had enacted a law which authorized the 
 interference with private property rights in a novel, harsh 
 or unjust manner, although not in violation of any express 
 provision of the constitution, the highest court of the state, 
 instead of enforcing the law and letting the public, if it so 
 desired, elect a legislature that would remedy the injustice, 
 would sometimes evolve a subtle theory by which it could be 
 demonstrated to the satisfaction of those who were anxious 
 to be convinced that the victims of the law were being 
 deprived of their constitutional rights. The theory thus 
 evolved would be seized upon with eagerness by the courts of 
 other states, and by equally heedless annotators, regardless 
 of the fact that the effect of the acceptance of the theory 
 would be the curtailment of public rights and sometimes 
 even the surrender of public property without the consent of 
 the people or their representatives, and in a very short time 
 
§ 14 Origin and Decline of the Power. 47 
 
 the new theory would become known as the ' ' enlightened 
 doctrine, ' ' and be adopted as a binding principle of constitu- 
 tional law in many if not all of the states which had estab- 
 lished an elective judiciary. As a result of the acceptance of 
 these novel theories, limiting the exercise of the power of 
 eminent domain in so many particulars, in many states the 
 construction of public improvements has been rendered 
 extremely precarious, and the development of the resources 
 of the community retarded to a marked degree. 
 
 Examples of the curtailment of the public rights in the 
 exercise of the power of eminent domain by novel theories 
 evolved by judges elected for fixed terms, but which have 
 not been accepted in the jurisdictions retaining an inde- 
 pendent judiciary^ are the doctrine recognizing the existence 
 of private property rights in land which the public has 
 acquired in fee f^ the doctrine that the rights of the public 
 in a public highway are not as extensive in the rural dis- 
 tricts as in a city f the doctrine that when part of a tract of 
 land is taken the public cannot set off benefits to the remain- 
 ing land from the value of the land taken,®* and the doctrine 
 that the payment of compensation cannot be made condi- 
 tional upon the institution of proceedings by the owner.*' 
 
 86. Infra, §§ 140, 160. 88. Infra, §§ 252, 253. 
 
 87. Infra, § 155. 89. Infra, §§ 330, 372. 
 
CHAPTEE n. 
 
 Natuee and Ohabacteeistics of the Pottbe. 
 
 SECaaON 15. Eminent Domain Distinguished from other Crovemmfintal 
 Powers. 
 
 16. Tie Necessity of Keeping in Mind the Distinction between 
 
 Eminent Domain and other Governmental Powers. 
 
 17. Eminent Domain is an Attribute of Sovereignty, and even of 
 
 Self -Government. 
 
 18. Eminent Domain is Based upon Sovereignty and not upon 
 
 the Ultimate Ownership of the Soil. 
 
 19. The Power to Authorize the Exercise of Eminent Domain is 
 
 Ordinarily in the Legislature. 
 
 20. What Property is Subject to Eminent Domain. 
 
 21. Nature of the Title Created by Eminent Domain — Whether 
 
 Original or Derivative. 
 
 22. The Power of Eminent Domain is Inalienable. 
 
 § 15. Eminent Domain Bistinguished from other Govern- 
 mental Powers, 
 
 The power of eminent domain is not the same as the 
 power of constructing public improvements. Public works 
 may be constructed upon land already owned by the public 
 or upon property acquired by purchase or upon private 
 property with the consent or acquiescence of the owner with- 
 out the exercise of the power of eminent domain.^ Accord- 
 ingly it is well settled that a grant of authority to construct 
 a certain public improvement does not, in the absence of 
 controlling circumstances, authorize the exercise of the 
 power of eminent domain in order to acquire a site for the 
 improvement.^ 
 
 So also the right to control the public domain should be 
 distinguished from the exercise of eminent domain. There 
 
 1. Thus in Murphy v. Wilming- nent domain for that purpose. So 
 
 ton, 6 Houst. (Del.) 345, 22 Am. in Mead v. Michigan Central R. R. 
 
 St. Rep. 345, it was held that under Co., 174 Mich. 521, 140 N. W. 973, 
 
 a statute authorizing a city to regu- it was held that the abolition of a 
 
 late the flow of drains and water- grade crossing was not an exercise 
 
 courses it might divert a small pri- of eminent domain, but of the pub- 
 
 vate watercourse, with the acquies- lie control over highways, 
 
 cenee of the owners, although the 2. Infra, § 358. 
 city had no power to exercise emi- 
 
 [49] 
 
§ 15 Nature and Chabacteeistics of the Poweb. 49 
 
 is a vast amoTint of land throughout tjie United States that 
 has never been assigned to individual ownership, and which 
 is held by the federal government or by the state in which 
 it lies. There are also thousands of acres held for the 
 public use, such as streets, parks, schoolyards and the 
 like, which either the state or one of its subdivisions owns in 
 fee, or in which the public holds an easement which the 
 state as representative of the public controls. So also 
 there are the navigable waters within the limits of a state, 
 in some of which the public has an easement and in others 
 the entire ownership and control, both of the waters and of 
 the submerged bed. Except in those states in which the 
 courts have created private property rights in the public 
 domain in favor of adjoining land owners, and in those 
 states in which the constitution prohibits the damaging 
 of private property without compensation, the legislative 
 body which controls the public domain may provide for the 
 use or disposal thereof to further the public interests in 
 any manner that it may deem best, without calling into play 
 the power of eminent domain,^ 
 
 The power of eminent domain is clearly distinct from the 
 power of taxation. The power of taxation is the power of 
 exacting a contribution in accordance with some uniform 
 rule of apportionment from all the inhabitants of a certain 
 locality, or upon aU the property or the property of a cer- 
 tain class situated therein, for the purpose of defraying the 
 public expenses of that locality. Taxation differs from 
 eminent domain in that in the exercise of the former power 
 each person pays his share in the expenses of government 
 without regard to the need the public has for his particular 
 property, while in the exercise of the latter his property 
 is taken, not because he is under any obligation to give it 
 up, but because the public needs that particular property; 
 and unless he receives compensation for the property taken 
 the public burdens will be directly and intentionally made 
 
 3. Infra, §§ 137, 140, 159. 
 4 
 
50 The Law of Emii^ent Domain. § 15 
 
 to fall unequally and without regard to compensating bene- 
 fits or ability to sustain the burden.* The contribution 
 required under the power of taxation may be in money, 
 property, or services,* but the principle is the same; the 
 property or services are taken, not because the government 
 needs them rather than money, but because the assessment 
 of taxes in such a manner is considered the most conven- 
 ient way of paying for the benefits of government. As 
 the power of taxation is not the same as that of eminent 
 domain, it does not necessarily follow that a subject which 
 is proper for the exercise of eminent domain is one for 
 the benefit of which a tax may be constitutionally levied; 
 but in this particular the powers are closely allied, so that 
 there is no great difference in their general scope.® 
 
 There are forms of exacting money from individuals 
 which are not strictly taxes, for although the money thereby 
 raised is used to defray the public expenses, the object of 
 the exaction is regulation. Examples of this class are the 
 tariff, when used for the purpose of protecting local manu- 
 factures; the high fee for liquor licenses, when the object 
 is to limit the number of liquor shops ; and fines, penalties 
 and forfeitures for crimes. Exactions of this class fall 
 more properly within the police power. '^ 
 
 A special assessment, or betterment, is a charge placed 
 
 4. People V. Mayor of Brooklyn, Taxation operates upon a com- 
 4 N. Y. 419, 55 Am. Dec. 266. munity or upon a class of persons 
 " Taxation exacts money or serv- ia a community and by some rule 
 ices from individuals as and for of apportionment. The exercise of 
 their respective shares of contribu- the right of eminent domain op- 
 tion to any public burthen. Private erates upon an individual and with- 
 property taken for public use by out reference to the amount or 
 right of eminent domain is taken value exacted from any other indi- 
 not as the owner's share of con- vidual or class of individuals." 
 tribution to a public burthen, but 5. E. g.: The highway tax for- 
 as so much beyond his share. merly levied in many of the states 
 Special compensation is, therefore, by which every male inhabitant was 
 to be made in the latter case because obliged to work on the roads of the 
 the government is a debtor for the town in which he lived for a certain 
 property so taken; but not in the period each year. See State v. 
 former because the payment of Topeka, 36 Kan. 76, 12 Pac. 310, 
 taxes is a duty and creates no obli- 59 Am. Rep. 529, and infra, § 125. 
 gation to repay, otherwise than in 6. See infra, I 51. 
 the proper application of the tax. 7. Infra, § 103. 
 
§ 15 Natube and Characteristics of the Power. 51 
 
 upon land specially benefited by a public improvement, to 
 pay the whole or part of the cost of the improvement. 
 The power of levying special assessments is not of such 
 antiquity as general taxation, but under proper restric- 
 tions it is recognized as due process of law.* It is closely 
 allied to both taxation and eminent domain. It is merely 
 the specialization of taxation; instead of requiring those 
 benefited by all public enterprises taken as a whole to pay 
 for the aggregate cost of such improvements, a special 
 assessment separates the expense of one improvement from 
 that of the others and charges it upon those benefited by 
 that improvement. On the other hand, the levy of a special 
 assessment is closely allied to one feature of eminent 
 domain. When a public improvement injures a piece of 
 land in one way, but enhances its value in another, in esti- 
 mating the owner 's compensation the benefits are sometimes 
 set off against the injury, and if they equal or exceed the 
 injury he receives no damage and is entitled to no compensa- 
 tion.^ Instead, the owner may be paid the full amount of his 
 damage, but the benefits may be made the basis of a special 
 assessment and if they exceed the damage the land owner 
 may pay out more than he received. If the benefits do not 
 exceed the damage the result might be the same, whichever 
 method was employed. The levy of a special assessment is 
 however in all cases an exercise of the power of taxation 
 and not of the power of eminent domain.^" 
 
 The power of calling upon inhabitants whose services 
 are particularly needed to perform those services is still 
 recognized as an attribute of sovereignty. Thus in Eng- 
 land and some of the older states in America, members of 
 a municipal corporation may be compelled to accept munic- 
 ipal offices, even without compensation. Other familiar 
 
 8. Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen 6 L. R. A. 155; Austin v. Nalle, 
 (Mass.) 223; People v. Mayor of 102 Tex. 536, 120 S. W. 996. Al- 
 Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 55 Am. Dee. though the benefit exceeds the dam- 
 266. ages, land cannot be taken in a pro- 
 
 9. Infra, §§ 246, 250, 255. ceeding merely to assess better- 
 
 10. Clute V. Turner, 157 Cal. 73, ments. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 106 Pac. 240; Adams County v. Little Tarkio Drainage District, 
 Quincy, 130 111. 566, 22 N. E. 624, 237 Mo. 86, 139 S. W. 572. 
 
52 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 15 
 
 examples of the power are the compulsory attendance of 
 witnesses and jurors in court, and the drafting of soldiers. 
 This is really an eminent domain of the person and differs 
 from taxation payable in services in that only those whose 
 services chance to be needed are called upon; whereas, in 
 enforcing service under the power of taxation, every able- 
 bodied man is required to perform his share of the neces- 
 sary work. The obligation to pay compensation for such 
 services, if it exists at all, rests upon such a different basis 
 from the obligation to pay for property taken for the public 
 use that a distinction between this power and the power of 
 eminent domain is plainly apparent.*^ 
 
 More closely allied to the power of eminent domain is the 
 power of destruction from necessity. In the case of fire, 
 flood, pestilence or other great public calamity, when imme- 
 diate action is necessary to save human life or to avert an 
 overwhelming destruction of property, any individual may 
 lawfully enter another 's land and destroy his property, real 
 or personal. Similarly he may, in self-defense, even take 
 the life of another. The right to destroy life or property 
 for self-preservation differs from eminent domain in that 
 it is an individual right rather than an attribute of sov- 
 ereignty, and when it is exercised by a public ofi&cer he must 
 justify his conduct as an individual whose position makes 
 him a natural leader, rather than as an agent of the govern- 
 ment.^^ The right is a natural one and requires no statutory 
 sanction; in fact it is doubtful if the exercise of the right 
 could be constitutionally prohibited, whereas eminent 
 domain requires specific authority from the legislature to 
 warrant its exercise even by mimicipal corporations or 
 officers of the state. 
 
 The residuum of valid legislation which does not fall 
 within any of the foregoing special classes is justified as 
 an exercise of what is called for the sake of convenience 
 the police power. In other words, the police power is a 
 
 11. See infra, § 98. 12. See infra, § 96. 
 
§ 15 Natueb and Chaeacteeistios of the Powee. 53 
 
 name for the entire governmental power of the state, except- 
 ing such well defined branches of the governmental power 
 as eminent domain, taxation and the like.^" The mass of 
 legislation that falls within the police power is so heterogen- 
 eous that an accurate and concise definition of it is impos- 
 sible, but as the characteristic exercise of the power in 
 question is in the nature of regulation, the police power may 
 be somewhat loosely described as the power of the sover- 
 eign to prevent persons under its jurisdiction from conduct- 
 ing themselves or using their property to the detriment of 
 the general welfare.^* In its more specific sense and as 
 limited by the usual constitutional provisions, the police 
 power is the power of the sovereign to legislate in behalf 
 of the public health, morals or safety by general regula- 
 tions reasonably adapted to the end in view and not creating 
 any arbitrary discrimination between different classes of 
 men or things.^^ From one point of view there is a con- 
 siderable resemblance between the police power and the 
 power of eminent domain in that each power recognizes the 
 superior right of the community against the selfishness of 
 individuals, the one preventing the use by an individual of 
 his own property in his own way as against the general com- 
 fort and protection of the public, and the other depriving 
 him of the right to obstruct the public necessity and conven- 
 ience by obstinately refusing to part with his property 
 when it is needed for the public use.^® 
 
 As the characteristics of the police power, in its limited 
 sense are (1) that it act in the form of a restriction and 
 (2) that it pertain to the public health, morals or safety, 
 there is a tendency to classify all statutes either regulating 
 
 13. Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 1098, 58 L. R. A. 748, 91 Am. St. 
 222 U. S. 224, 233, 56 L. ed. 1Z5, Rep. 934. 
 
 and see further as to the police 15. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 
 
 power, infra, l§ 99-106 inc. 27, 28 L. ed. 923; Goddard, Peti- 
 
 14. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, tioner, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 504, 28 
 97 U. S. 659, 24 L. ed. 1036; Com- Am. Dec. 259. 
 
 monwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 16. People ex rel. Detroit, etc., 
 
 <Mass.) 84; State ex rel. Zillmer v. R. R. Co. v. Salem, 20 Mch. 452 
 Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 90 N. W. 4 Am. Rep. 400, ' 
 
54 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 15 
 
 the use of property or pertaining to the public health, 
 morals or safety as an exercise of the police power. It is 
 shown elsewhere that such statutes, if they do in fact author- 
 ize a taking of property, become subject to the same consti- 
 tutional limitations as affect a taking by eminent domain, so 
 that the exact classification of such enactments is not of vital 
 importance." For the sake of accurate thinking however it 
 is well to keep in mind the fundamental distinction between 
 the two powers in their application to private property. In 
 the exercise of eminent domain property or an easement 
 therein is taken from the owner and applied to public use 
 because the use or enjoyment of such property or easement 
 therein is beneficial to the public; in the exercise of the 
 police power the owner is denied the unrestricted use or 
 enjoyment of his property, or his property is taken froiji 
 him, because his use or enjoyment of such property is injuri- 
 ous to the public welfare. 
 
 The police power in its more general sense includes the 
 power of control which remains in the legislature over prop- 
 erty charged with a public interest, such as railroads, 
 canals, turnpikes, grain elevators and the like.^^ Such prop- 
 erty is subject to regulation to a much greater extent than 
 purely private property, but such regulation applied within 
 constitutional limits, is not in itself an exercise of eminent 
 domain," although under such power the corporation which 
 owns the property may be required to exercise eminent 
 domain ^° or to incur expense in other ways.^^ 
 
 There is another branch of the police power which more 
 nearly resembles eminent domain. When property in which 
 several persons have a common interest cannot be fully and 
 beneficially enjoyed in its existing condition and the parties 
 
 17. Infra, § 102. road to abolish grade crossings. 
 
 18. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bris- 
 113, 24 L. ed. 77. tol, 151 U. S. 556, 38 L. ed. 269; 
 
 19. State V. Jacksonville Ter- Norwood v. New York, etc., R. R. 
 minal Co., 41 Fla. 363, 27 So. 221. Co., 161 Mass. 259, 37 N. E. 199; 
 
 20. Infra, § 347. Houston, etc., R. R. Co, v. Dallas, 
 
 21. Thus it is not an exercise of 98 Tex. 396, 84 S. W. 648, 70 
 eminent domain to require a rail- L. R. A. 850. 
 
§ 15 Nattjbe and Chabacteeistios of the Power. 55 
 
 interested therein cannot agree upon a scheme for the more 
 advantageous use of the property, the law often provides a 
 way in which they may compel one another to submit to 
 measures necessary to secure its beneficial enjoyment, mak- 
 ing just compensation to any of the proprietors whose 
 control of the property or interest therein has been modified 
 by the new arrangement, which compensation those of the 
 proprietors who are benefited are obliged to pay. The 
 exercise of this power is in most instances upon property 
 held in common, but the principle is the same if applied to a 
 tract of land affected by common necessities and interests 
 although divided into parcels held by individual owners in 
 severalty. Although land within the tract affected is actu- 
 ally taken, it is settled that the compulsory improvement of 
 the tract in the manner described is an exercise of the police 
 power.^^ 
 
 The police power, as a residuary branch of sovereignty 
 and as a legislative as distinguished from an executive or 
 judicial power remains with the sovereign states,^^ and 
 upon the division of their sovereignty into three branches 
 falls, without special enactment and without any limitations 
 except those imposed by the constitution, into the control of 
 the legislative department.^* 
 
 22. See infra, i§ 84, 88. stitution, as they shall judge to be 
 
 23. It is not necessary to the for the good and welfare of this 
 purposes of this work to enter into commonwealth." The Supreme Ju- 
 the discussion of the question dicial Court of Massachusetts in 
 whether there is any police power passing upon enactments under the 
 of the United States within the police power has frequently put 
 limits of the states. If there is, it them to the test of this clause and 
 pertains only to those subjects, con- sustained them if they were whole- 
 trol of which is granted to the some and reasonable and such as 
 United States by the constitution. the legislature might judge to be 
 
 24. The constitution of Massa- for the public good and welfare, 
 chusetts, part II, c. 1, § 1, art. See for example, Lowell v. Boston, 
 IV, however, following the words 111 Mass. 454, 15 Am. Rep. 39. 
 of the original charter of the Mas- It has sometimes been intimated, 
 sachusetts Bay Company, grants both in Massachusetts courts and 
 to the General Court the power to elsewhere that the power granted 
 make " all manner of wholesome by this clause is broader than the 
 and reasonable * » » j^^s police power as it falls by implica^ 
 * * * so as the same be not tion into the hands of other legis- 
 repugnant or contrary to this con- latures, but there would seem to be 
 
56 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 16 
 
 § 16. The Necessity of Keeping in Mind the Distinction 
 between Eminent Domain and other Governmental Powers. 
 
 It is now well settled that the provisions of the state con- 
 stitutions are limitations npon an otherwise absolute legis- 
 lative power and not grants of authority to the legislature.^* 
 Accordingly, when a case arises involving the question 
 whether the legislature has exceeded its constitutional pow- 
 ers, it cannot be settled by decicjing that the enactment is 
 or is not a proper exercise of some recognized branch of 
 sovereignty, but the true question is whether any provision 
 of the constitution has been violated.^® The specific prohi- 
 bitions of the constitution cannot be violated in what- 
 ever class the act purports to fall, although even the specific 
 provisions are applied with different degrees of rigidity in 
 
 no good basis for snoh an intima- 
 tion. The Massachusetts constitu- 
 tion contains limitations upon the 
 exercise of legislative power 
 equivalent to those found else- 
 where, and the specific grant of 
 power to the General Court, thus 
 limited, can certainly be no more 
 extensive than the inherent police 
 power of a sovereign state which 
 embraces, subject only to specified 
 exceptions, the power to enact any- 
 thing not naturally impossible and 
 which includes the entire legislative 
 sphere of sovereignty, deducting 
 only the powers which the legisla- 
 ture is forbidden to exercise by the 
 state constitution, the powers 
 which have been granted to the 
 United States or which the state is 
 forbidden to exercise by the United 
 States Constitution and the special 
 branches of sovereignty which have 
 been enumerated in the text. 
 
 25. United States.— lilbcinn v. Illi- 
 nois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77. 
 
 Arkansas. — Taylor v. The Gov- 
 ernor, 1 Ark. 27. 
 
 California. — Smith v. Judge of 
 the Twelfth District, 17 Cal. 547. 
 
 Connecticut. — Starr v. Pease, 8 
 Conn. 541. 
 
 Florida. — Ponder v. Graham, 4 
 Fla. 23. 
 
 Indiana. — Walpole v. Elliott, 18 
 Ind. 258, 81 Am. Dec. 358. 
 
 Iowa. — Morrison v. Springer, 15 
 Iowa 304; State y. Hockett, 70 
 Iowa 442, 30 N. W. 742. 
 
 Michigan. — Sears v. Cottrell, 5 
 Mich. 257. 
 
 New York. — Sill v. Coming, 15 
 N. Y. 303; People v. New York 
 Central R. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 504; 
 People V. Supervisors of Orange, 
 27 Barb. 593. 
 
 ' Pennsylvania. — Page v. Allen, 
 58 Pa. 338, 345, 98 Am. Dec. 272. 
 
 Texas. — 'Ex parte Mabry, 5 Tex. 
 App. 93; Logan v. State, 5 Tex. 
 App. 306. 
 
 Vermont. — Thorpe V. Rutland & 
 Burlington R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 
 62 Am. Dec. 625. 
 
 Virginia. — Kamper v. Hawkins, 
 1 Va. Cas. 24. 
 
 See also Cooley, Constitutional 
 Limitations, 87, 173, 177; Potter's 
 Dwarris on Statutes, 447. 
 
 26. Connolly v. Union Sewer 
 Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 
 679; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 
 U. S. 223, 48 L. ed. 169. 
 
§ 16 Natuee and Chabacteeistios of, the Power. 57 
 
 the different branches of governmental power.^'' Moreover 
 appeal is most frequently made to the clause found in the 
 federal constitution, and, either in the same or equivalent 
 language, in most of the state constitutions, providing that 
 no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property 
 without due process of law. While, in spite of all that has 
 been said and written upon the meaning of this phrase, it 
 is impossible to define it with accuracy and precision, and 
 while it is undoubtedly true that new forms and methods 
 which are based upon equal and substantial justice are not 
 obnoxious to the article of the constitution in which it is 
 contained,^* it may be safely stated as a general principle 
 that any form of legislative interference with private prop- 
 erty which was customary when the constitutions were 
 adopted and was not specifically forbidden by them is * ' due 
 process of law. ' ' ^* 
 
 It is for this reason desirable to understand the limits 
 of the recognized branches of sovereignty, the various 
 customary kinds of legislative interference with private 
 property, and to keep in mind the distinction between 
 eminent domain and the other governmental powers as set 
 forth in the preceding section ; but if it can be shown that 
 a particular statute was in force and generally acquiesced 
 in at the time of the Eevolution, and was not specifically 
 forbidden by the constitution, it is not obnoxious to the 
 fourteenth amendment, even if it is difficult or impossible 
 
 27. Infra, §§ 95-107 inc. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 
 
 28. Tyler v. Court of Rostra- 42 L. ed. 780. Brown, J.: "We 
 tion, 175 Mass. 71, 55 F. E. 512, must look to those settled usages 
 51 L. R. A. 433; Hurtado v. Call- and modes of proceeding existing 
 fomia, 110 U. S. 516, 28 L. ed. in the common and statute law of 
 232. Matthews, J. : " It follows England, before the emigration of 
 that any legal proceeding enforced our ancestors, and which are shown 
 by public authority, whether sane- not to have been unsuited to their 
 tioned by age and custom, or newly civil and political condition by hav- 
 devised, in the discretion of the ing been acted upon by them after 
 legislative power, in furtherance of the settlement of this country." 
 the general public good, which 29< E. g. The Mill Acts (infra, 
 regards and preserves these prin- §§ 83, 84) and Drainage Acts 
 ciples of liberty and justice, must {infra, %% 86-89 inc.). 
 
 be held to be due process of law." 
 
58 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 17 
 
 to classify it.*" Nevertheless the classifications are helpful 
 and necessary to an intelligent study of the decided cases. 
 
 § 17. Eminent Domain is an Attribute of Sovereignty, 
 and even of Self-Govemment. 
 
 The power of eminent domain is an attribute of sover- 
 eignty. In other words, once it is conceded that the gov- 
 ernment of a given territory is sovereign, it .necessarily 
 follows that such government possesses the power of taking 
 or of authorizing the taking of any property within its 
 jurisdiction for the public use. The power of eminent 
 domain would exist in the government of each one of the 
 United States without any mention or recognition of the 
 power in the constitution of the state or of the United 
 States. The provisions found in most of the state consti- 
 tutions relating to the taking of property for the public 
 use therefore do not by implication grant the power of 
 eminent domain to the government of the state, but they 
 limit a power already existing which would otherwise be 
 unlimited.*^ 
 
 30. Mturay v. Hoboken Land Point, 18 Cal. 229; San Francisco, 
 Co., 18 How. (U. S.) 272, 15 etc., E. E. Co. v. Caldwell, 31 Cal. 
 L. ed. 372; Ex parte Wall, 107 367; Lindsay Irrigation Co. v. 
 U. S. 265, 27 L. ed. 552; Eilen- Mehrtens, 97 Cal. 676, 32 Pae. 802. 
 becker v. Pl3mioutli County Court, Connecticut. — ■ New York, etc., 
 134 U. S. 31, 33 L. ed. 801; Lowe R. E. Co. v. Long, 69 Conn. 424, 
 V. Kansas, 163 U. S. 81, 41 L. ed. 37 Atl. 1070. 
 
 78. Delaware. — WMteman v. Wil- 
 
 31. United States. — Vanhome v. mington, etc., R. E. Co., 2 Harr. 
 Dorrance, 2 Call. 304, 1 L. ed. 514, 33 Am. Dec. 419; WUson v. 
 391; West Eiver Bridge Co. V. Dix, Baltimore, etc., R. E. Co., 5 Del. 
 6 How. 507, 12 L. ed. 535; Boom Ch. 524. 
 
 Co. V. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 25 Georgia. — ^Young v. McKenzie, 3 
 
 L. ed. 206; United States v. Jones, Ga. 31. 
 
 109 U. S. 513, 27 L. ed. 1015; Cin- Idaho.— Fotlneh Lumber Co. v. 
 cinnati v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 88 Pac. 
 Co., 223 U. S. 390, 56 L. ed. 481, 426, 118 Am. St. Eep. 233; Port- 
 affirming 82 Ohio St. 466, 92 N. E. neuf Irrigating Co. v. Budge, 16 
 1111. Idaho 116, 100 Pac. 1046, 18 Ann. 
 
 Alabama. — Steele v. Madison Cas. 674. 
 
 County, 83 Ala. 304, 3 So. 761. Illinois.— ShoU v. German Coal 
 
 Arkansas.— Ex parte Martin, 13 Co., 118 111. 427, 10 N. E. 199, 59 
 
 Ark. 198, 58 Am. Dec. 321. Am. Rep. 379; Penn Mutual Life 
 
 California. — Gilmer v. Lime Insurance Co. v. Heise, 141 111. 35, 
 
§ 17 Natuee and Chabactebistios op the Power. 
 
 59 
 
 A general grant of governmental power, even without 
 sovereignty and without any special mention of eminent 
 domain, carries the power to take or to authorize the taking 
 of property for the public use. Thus all of the American 
 colonies exercised the power freely, under the general grant 
 of self-government contained in their charters. Upon the 
 declaration and establishment of independence, the power 
 of eminent domain inhered in the existence of the thirteen 
 colonies as independent states. Even in the case of the 
 Northwest Territory, the provision in regard to eminent 
 domain ia the fundamental ordinance was a limitation and 
 
 31 N. E. 138, 33 Am. St. Rep. 373; 
 South Park Commissioners v. 
 Ward, 248 111. 299, 93 N. E. 910. 
 
 Indiana. — Indianapolis Water- 
 works Co. V. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364; 
 Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. 
 Harless, 131 Ind. 446, 29 K E. 
 1062, 15 L. E. A. 505; Kinney v. 
 Citizens' Water & Light Co., 173 
 Ind. 252, 90 N. E. 129. 
 
 Iowa. — Sisson v. Buena Vista 
 County, 128 Iowa 442, 104 N. W. 
 454, 70 L. R. A. 440. 
 
 Kansas. — Challis v. Atchison, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 16 Kan. 117. 
 
 Maine. — Kennebec Water Dis- 
 trict V. WaterviUe, 96 Me. 234, 52 
 Atl. 771. 
 
 Maryland. — Alexander v. Mayor 
 of Baltimore, 5 Gill 383, 46 Am. 
 Dec. 630; Moale v. Baltimore, 5 
 Md. 314, 61 Am. Dec. 276. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Boston, etc., R. 
 E. Co. V. Salem, etc., R. R. Co., 2 
 Gray 1; Eastern R. R. Co. v. Bos- 
 ton, etc., R. R., Ill Mass. 125, 15 
 Am. Rep. 13; Weeks v. Grace, 194 
 Mass. 296, 298, 80 N. E. 220. 
 
 Michigan. — Swan v. Williams, 2 
 Mich. 437; People ex rel. Trombley 
 V. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, 9 Am. 
 Rep. 94; Kundlinger v. Saginaw, 
 59 Mich. 335, 26 N. W. 634. 
 
 Minnesota. — Langf ord v. Ram- 
 sey County, 16 Minn. 375 ; Weir v. 
 St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 
 155. 
 
 i. — Brown v. Beatty, 
 34 Miss. 227, 69 Am. Dee. 389; 
 Wise V. Yazoo City, 96 Miss. 507, 
 51 So. '453, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 1130, Ann. Cas. 1912 B 377. 
 
 Missouri. — St. Louis, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Hannibal Union Depot Co., 
 125 Mo. 82, 28 S. W. 483; South- 
 em Illinois, etc.. Bridge Co. v. 
 Stone, 174 Mo. 1, 73 S. W. 453, 63 
 L. R. A. 301. 
 
 Montana. — Butte, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Montana, etc., R. R. Co., 16 
 Mont. 504, 41 Pac. 232, 31 L. R. A. 
 299, 50 Am. St. Rep. 508. 
 
 New Jersey. — Hale v. Lawrence, 
 21 N. J. L. 714, 47 Am. Dec. 190. 
 
 New York. — Taylor v. Porter, 4 
 Hill 142, 40 Am. Dec. 274; Blood- 
 good V. Mohawk, etc., R. R. Co., 18 
 Wend. 9, 31 Am. Dec. 313; People 
 V. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 117 
 N. Y. 150, 22 N. E. 1026; People 
 V. Adirondack R. R. Co., 160 N. Y. 
 225, 54 N. E. 689 (affirmed, 176 
 U. S. 335, 44 L. ed. 492). 
 
 North Carolina. — Jeffress v. 
 Greenville, 154 N. C. 490, 70 S. E. 
 919. 
 
 Ohio. — Giesy v. Cincinnati, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308; Coving- 
 ton, etc., Bridge Co. v. Magruder, 
 63 Ohio St. 455, 59 N. E. 216; Cin- 
 cinnati V. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 
 82 Ohio St. 466, 92 N. E. 1111 
 (affirmed, 223 U. S. 390, 56 L. ed. 
 481). 
 
60 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 18 
 
 not a grant of power.^^ So also the territories subsequently 
 formed were allowed to exercise eminent domain under the 
 authority of general grants of governmental power found 
 in the enabling acts,^* and upon being incorporated into 
 states with all the powers of the original thirteen became 
 entitled to exercise eminent domain by virtue of their sover- 
 eignty.^* It can thus fairly be said that back of all private 
 titles lies the eminent domain as an inherent attribute of 
 organized government.^^ 
 
 § 18. Eminent Domain is Based upon Sovereignty and 
 not upon the Ultimate Ownership of the Soil. 
 
 Although the phrase originated by Grotius ^® to describe 
 the power of the government to take private property for 
 
 Oklahoma. — Arthur v. Choctaw 
 County Commissioners, 43 Okla. 
 174, 141 Pae. 1. 
 
 Oregon. — Bri<Jal Veil Lumbering 
 Co. V. Johnson, 30 Ore. 205, 46 
 Pae. 790, 34 L. R. A. 368, 60 Am. 
 St. Rep. 818. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Jacobs v. Clear- 
 view Water Supply Co., 220 Pa. 
 388, 69 Atl. 870; Philadelphia Clay 
 Co. V. York Clay Co., 241 Pa. 305, 
 88 Atl. 487. 
 
 South Carolina. — Dunn v. 
 Charleston, Harp. L. 189; South 
 Carolina R. R. Co. v. Blake, 9 
 Rich. L. 228; Riley v. Charleston 
 Union Station Co., 71 S. C. 457, 51 
 S. E. 485, 110 Am. St. Rep. 579. 
 
 South Dakota.- — Winona, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Watertown, 4 S. D. 323, 
 56 N. W. 1077; Hyde v. Minnesota, 
 etc., Ry. Co., 29 S. D. 220, 136 
 N. W. 92, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 48. 
 
 Tennessee. — Allen v. Tamsworth, 
 5 Terg. 189; Southern Ry. ,Co. v. 
 Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267, 148 S. W. 
 662. 
 
 Texas, — Imperial Irrigation Co. 
 V. Jayne, 104 Tex. 395, 138 S. W. 
 575, Ann. Cas. 1914 B 322; Byrd 
 Irrigation Co. v. Smythe (Tex. Civ. 
 App.), 146 S. W. 1064. 
 
 Vermont. — Steams v. Barre, 73 
 
 Vt. 281, 50 Atl. 1086, 87 Am. St. 
 Rep. 721. 
 
 Virginia. — Tait v. Central Luna- 
 tie Asylum, 84 Va. 271, 4 S. E. 697. 
 
 Washington. — Gasaway v. Seat- 
 tle, 52 Wash. 444, 100 Pae. 991, 21 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 68; Kineaid v. 
 Seattle, 74 Wash. 617, 134 Pae. 
 504; State v. Cowlitz County, 77 
 Wash. 585, 137 Pae. 994. 
 
 West Virginia. — Baltimore, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 17 W. Va. 812. 
 
 See also supra, § 7. 
 
 32. Cincinnati v. Louisville, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 223 U. S. 390, 56 L. ed. 
 481, affirming 82 Ohio St. 466, 92 
 N. E. 1111. 
 
 33. Oury v. Goodwin, 3 Ariz. 
 255, 26 Pae. 376; Sanford v. Tuc- 
 son, 8 Ariz. 247, 71 Pae. 903; Swan 
 V. Williams, 2 Mich. 427; Warren 
 V. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 
 384. 
 
 34. Idaho-Iowa Lateral & Reser- 
 voir Co. V. Fisher, 27 Idaho 695, 
 151 Pae. 998. 
 
 35. Weeks v. Grace, 194 Mass. 
 296, 80 N. E. 220. This power is 
 not however inherent in a mere 
 municipal corporation without 
 special legislative or constitutional 
 authority. See infra, § 359. 
 
 36. Supra, § 4. 
 
I 18 Nature akd Chabacteeistics of the Powee. 61 
 
 the public use has been universally adopted in this country, 
 the theory upon which Grotius accounted for the existence 
 of the power, which appears by implication in the phrase 
 itself and was elaborated by him elsewhere, has not been 
 generally accepted. It was the theory of Grotiua that the 
 power of eminent domain was based upon the principle 
 that the state had an original and absolute ownership of 
 the whole property possessed by the individual members 
 of it, antecedent to their possession of it, and that their 
 possession and enjoyment of it was derived from a grant 
 by the sovereign, and was consequently held subject to an 
 implied reservation that it might be resumed, and that all 
 individual rights to such property might be extinguished 
 by a rightful exertion of this ultunate ownership by the 
 state. This explanation of the basis of the power of eminent 
 domain was adopted by several of the state courts in their 
 earlier decisions.^^ 
 
 The theory of Grotius was however criticised by others 
 of the early political philosophers, and especially by Puffen- 
 dorf ^* and Heineccius,^* and it was generally repudiated 
 
 37. See for example, must be able to apply this thing to 
 Arkansas. — -Little Rock Junction the public necessities; provided 
 
 R. E. Co. V. Woodruff, 49 Ark. 381, nevertheless that what exceeds the 
 
 5 S. W. 792, 4 Am. St. Rep. 51. proportional share of its owners 
 
 Connecticut. — Todd v. Austin, 34 shall be refunded by the other 
 
 Conn. 78. citizens." 
 
 Florida. — ^Walker v. Gatlin, 12 39. Heineccius, Elem. Jur. Nat 
 
 Fla. 9, 15. et Gen., lib. ii, e. 8, § 168 (1730). 
 
 New York. — Beekman v. Sara- "Among the inherent rights of su- 
 
 toga, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. preme power there is furthermore 
 
 45, 22 Am. Dec. 679. the right of imposing taxes and 
 
 Tennessee. — Harding v. Goodlett, tribute upon its citizens ; nay, even 
 
 3 Yerg. 40, 24 Am. Dec. 546. of applying to the use of the state 
 
 38. Puffendorf, De Jure Naturae their property when necessity re- 
 et Gentium, lib. viii, e. 5, § 7 quires it — a right which is usually 
 (1672). "As regards eminent do- called the right of eminent domain, 
 main, some persons condemn not so We confess however that this use of 
 much the thing itself but the name the word is not quite apt. Tor this 
 • * * But it is idle to contend reason what Grotius first styled 
 over words • * * But since dominium eminens, Seneea more ac- 
 often * * • some specific posses- curately called potestas. To kings 
 •ion of one citizen, or of a few is he said belongs the control of 
 required for the necessary uses of things, to individuals the ownership 
 the state the supreme government of them." 
 
62 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 18 
 
 in this country, as smacking too much of the feudal system. 
 It is of course true that almost all the lands in private 
 ownership in the original thirteen states were granted to 
 the predecessors in title of the present owners either by the 
 colonial proprietors or governments, or by the states which 
 succeeded them; but the public lands in the newer states 
 have usually been granted to private owners by the federal 
 government; Nevertheless it has never been disputed that 
 the states may exercise the power of eminent domain over 
 such lands. When the District of Columbia was ceded to 
 the United States, provision was made in the acts of cession 
 that the property rights of the inhabitants should remain 
 unaffected. Nevertheless it was held that their land might 
 be taken by eminent domain by the United States.*" So 
 also, in the case of buildings, fixtures and articles of per- 
 sonal property, which are often created by their owners 
 and were never the property of the state, it has never been 
 doubted that eminent domain may be as fully and exten- 
 sively exercised as in the case of land.** 
 
 Accordingly it is now generally considered that the power 
 of eminent domain is not a property right, or an exercise 
 by the state of an ultimate ownership in the soil, but that 
 it is based upon the sovereignty of the state.*^ As the 
 sovereign power of the state is broad enough to cover the 
 enactment of any law affecting persons or property within 
 its jurisdiction which is not prohibited by some clause of 
 the constitution of the United States, and as the taking of 
 property within the jurisdiction of a state for the public 
 
 40. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. Iowa. — Noll v. Dubuque, etc., R. 
 V. Union Bank, 4 Cranch C. C. R. Co., 32 Iowa 66. 
 
 (tj. S.) 75; Shoemaker v. United Kansas. — Jockheck v. Shawnee 
 
 States, 147 U. S. 282, 37 L. ed. 170. County Commissioners, 53 Kan. 
 
 41. Infra, § 20, and see also 780, 37 Pac. 621. 
 
 infra, §§ 227, 228. New TorA;.— Bloodgood v. Mo- 
 
 42. United States. — Shoemaker v. hawk, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Wend. 9, 
 United States, 147 U. S. 282, 37 31 Am. Dec. 313. 
 
 L. ed. 170; Contra Costa Water North Carolina. — Raleigh R. R. 
 
 Co. V. Van Rensselaer, 155 Fed. Co. y. Davis, 2 Dev. & B. L. 451. 
 
 140. See also the eases holding the 
 
 District of Columbia. — United power of eminent domain inherent 
 
 States V. Cooper, 9 Mackey 104. in sovereignty, supra, § 17, 
 
§ 19 Nature and Chaeacteeistios op the Poweb. 63 
 
 use upon payment of compensation is not prohibited by the 
 constitution of the United States, it necessarily follows that 
 it is within the sovereign power of a state, and it needs no 
 additional justification. 
 
 § 19. The Power to Authorize the Exercise of Eminent 
 Domain is Ordinarily in the Legislature. 
 
 Under the customary division of governmental power into 
 three branches, executive, legislative and judicial, the right 
 to authorize the exercise of eminent domain is legislative, 
 and there can be no taking of private property for public 
 use without the consent of the owner in the absence of direct 
 authority from the legislature.** The power of eminent 
 
 43. United States. — United States 
 V. Oregon, etc., R. R. Co., 9 Sawyer 
 61, 16 Fed. 524. 
 
 Alabama. — Aldridge v. Tuseum- 
 bia, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Stew. & P. 
 199, 23 Am. Dec. 307. 
 
 California. — San Joaquin Irri- 
 gation Co. V. Stevenson, 164 Cal. 
 221, 128 Pac. 924. 
 
 Colorado. — Londoner v. Denver, 
 52 Colo. 15, 119 Pac. 156. 
 
 Georgia. — Eatonton v. Griffith, 
 132 Ga. 793, 64 S. E. 1085; Nolan 
 V. Central Georgia Power Co., 134 
 Ga. 201, 67 S. E. C56. 
 
 Illinois. — Shell v. German Coal 
 Co., 118 lU. 427, 10 N. E. 199, 59 
 Am. Rep. 379. 
 
 Indiana. — Lafayette, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. .Butner, 162 Ind. 460, 70 
 N. E. 529. 
 
 Iowa. — Sisson v. Buena Vista 
 County, 128 Iowa 442, 104 K W. 
 454, 70 L. R. A. 440. 
 
 Maine. — Bangor, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. McComb, 60 Me. 290. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Perry v. Wilson, 
 7 Mass. 393; Wellington, Petition- 
 er, 16 Pick. 87, 26 Am. Dee. 631. 
 
 Minnesota. — Eohl v. Sleepy Eye 
 Lake, 80 Minn. 67, 82 N. W. 1097. 
 
 Nevada. — • Dayton, etc., Mining 
 Co. V. Seawall, il Nev. 394. 
 
 New Jersey. — Be Lower Chat- 
 
 ham and Little Palls, 35 N. J. L. 
 497. 
 
 New York. — Rensselaer, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Davis, 43 N. Y. 137; Be 
 Poughkeepsie Bridge Co., 108 N. Y. 
 483, 15 N. E. 601; Be Union Ele- 
 vated R. R. Co., 113 N. Y. 275, 21 
 N. E. 81. 
 
 Ohio. — Giesy v. Cincinnati, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308. 
 
 Oregon. — Bridal Veil Lumbering 
 Co. V. Johnson, 30 Ore. 205, 46 
 Pac. 790, 34 L. R. A. 368, 60 Am. 
 St. Rep. 818. 
 
 South Carolina. — South Carolina 
 R. R. Co. V. Blake, 9 Rich. L. 228. 
 
 South Dakota. — Illinois Central 
 R. R. Co. V. jEast Sioux Falls 
 Quarry Co., 33 S. D. 63, 144 N. W. 
 724. 
 
 Tennessee. — Anderson v. Turbe- 
 ville, 6 Coldw. 150. 
 
 Virginia. — Roanoke v. Berko- 
 witz, 80 Va. 616; Jeter v. Vinton- 
 Roanoke Water Co., 114 Va. 769, 
 76 S. E. 921. 
 
 Washington. — Gasaway v. Seat- 
 tle, 52 Wash. 444, 100 Pac. 991, 21 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 68; State v. Pierce 
 County Court, 86 Wash. 155, 149 
 Pac. 652. 
 
 Wisconsin. — State ex rel. Balt- 
 zell v. Stewart, 74 Wis. 620, 43 
 N. W. 947, 6 L. R. A. 394. 
 
64 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 19 
 
 domain lies dormant until legislative action is had, pointing 
 out the occasions, modes, agencies and conditions for its 
 exercise.** There is however to be noted a distinction 
 between the power of eminent domain as it exists in a 
 state, and as it exists in the legislature of a state. A state 
 may exercise eminent domain over any property Avithin its 
 jurisdiction with no other limitations than those which are 
 found in the federal constitution, since the people, who 
 constitute the state, may make such provision in regard to 
 eminent domain in their own constitution as they see fit; 
 but the legislature of a state is subject to the limitations 
 of the constitution of the state, as well as of the United 
 States. 
 
 While the governor or the supreme court of a state could 
 not, without legislative authority, set in motion the power 
 of eminent domain, even for the purpose of acquiring a site 
 for the executive offices of the state or for the court house.*^ 
 the executive and judicial branches of the government are 
 not wholly without authority over the manner in which the 
 power is exercised. Once authority is given to exercise the 
 power of eminent domain, the matter ceases to be wholly leg- 
 islative. The executive authorities may then be allowed to 
 decide whether the power will be invoked and to what 
 extent,*® and the judiciary must decide whether the statute 
 authorizing the taking violates the constitutional rights of 
 any person who contests the validity of the proceedings; 
 and the fixing of the compensation is wholly a judicial 
 question.*^ 
 
 44. Colorado. — Londoner v. Den- corporation the power of eminent 
 ver, 52 Colo. 15, 119 Pac. 156. domain. Nolan v. Central Geoi^a 
 
 IZZmois.— Gillette v. Aurora E. Power Co., 134 Ga. 201, 67 S. E. 
 
 R. Co., 228 111. 261, 81 N. E. 1005. 656. 
 
 New York. — Re Poughkeepsie 46. Van Witsen v. Gutman, 79 
 
 Bridge Co., 108 N. T. 483, 15 N. E. Md. 405, 29 Atl. 608, 24 L. R. A. 
 
 601. 403; Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray 
 
 Virginia. — ^Alexandria, etc., R. R. (Mass.) 417; Kramer v. Cleveland, 
 
 Co. V. Alexandria, etc., R. R. Co., etc., R. R. Co. 5 Ohio St. 140, and 
 
 75 Va. 780, 40 Am. Rep. 743. see also infra, % 333. 
 
 West Virginia. — Vamer v. Mar- 47. As to legislative interference 
 
 tin, 21 W. Va. 534. with judicial functions see infra, 
 
 45. A court cannot grant to a §§ 329, 331. 
 
§ 20 Nature and Chaeacteeistios of the Powbb. 65 
 
 Such is the customary distribution of powers with respect 
 to the exercise of eminent domain; and the powers of the 
 judiciary as indicated above could not be materially cur- 
 tailed by the special provisions of a state constitution with- 
 out violating the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. 
 There is however nothing in the federal constitution which 
 requires the exercise of eminent domain to originate with 
 an act of the legislature,** and it has been held that a con- 
 stitutional provision which declares that land can be con- 
 demned for certain specified uses is self -executing, and that 
 proceedings to take land for such purposes may be insti- 
 tuted without waiting for authority from the legislature.*® 
 So also ordinarily a municipal corporation has no preroga- 
 tive right to exercise eminent domain and cannot take land 
 for public use unless the power has been conferred upon 
 it by the legislature ; °° but when a state constitution author- 
 izes cities to make their own charters, a city may give itself 
 the power of eminent domain and even provide that it may 
 exercise the power beyond its own limits, without the aid 
 of any act of legislature.®^ 
 
 § 20, What Property is Subject to Eminent Domain. 
 
 The power of eminent domain of a sovereign state extends 
 to all property within its jurisdiction which may be taken 
 without infringing any specific constitutional prohibition.®^ 
 
 48. Compare Kieman v. Port- C 193. Contra, Taeoma v. State, 
 land, 223 U. S. 151, 56 L. ed. 386, 4 Wash. 64, 29 Pac. 847. 
 holding that state legislation by 52. United States. — Cincinnati v. 
 initiative and referendum does not Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 223 U. S. 
 violate any rights under the federal 390 55 l_ g^_ ^g^^ 
 constitution. Alabama.— Alabama., etc., R. R. 
 
 49. Washmgton Water Power ^o. v. Kenney, 39 Ala. 307. 
 Co. V. Waters, 186 Fed. 572. „ ,., . >i-i 
 
 50. Infra, § 359. ^ ^f ^.TTTo^"'^'' ""• ^""^ 
 
 51. In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. 71, ^"^^t, 18 Cal. 229. 
 
 88 Pac. 270, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) Connecticut.— EnMiToll Bridge 
 
 1092, 11 Ann. Cas. 911; State v. Co. v. Hartford, etc., R. R. Co., 17 
 
 District Court, 87 Minn. 149, 91 Conn. 40, 454, 42 Am. Dee. 716, 44 
 
 N. W. 300; Kansas City v. Marsh Am. Dee. 716; New York, etc., R. 
 
 Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458, 41 S, W. 943; R- Co. v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 
 
 McMinnville v. Howenstine, 56 Ore. 36 Conn. 196. 
 
 451, 109 Pae. 81, Ann. Cas. 1912 Illinois, — Metropolitan City R. 
 5 
 
66 
 
 The Law op Eminekt Domain. 
 
 20 
 
 Eeal estate is of course subject to the power and all rights 
 or interests therein. Existing easements may be taken,^* 
 or new easements carved out of the unencumbered fee,^* 
 and the easements so created need not be of a character 
 known to the common law, but may consist of any rights 
 over real estate that are appropriate to the use for which 
 they are taken.^® Eiparian rights may be taken,''® apart 
 from the land to which they are appurtenant.®'' The only 
 
 R. Co., V. Chicago, etc., E. R. Co., 
 87 111. 317. 
 
 Indiana. — Indianapolis Water- 
 works Co. V. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364. 
 
 Maine. — ^ State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 
 189; Brown v. Gerald, 100 Me. 351, 
 61 Atl. 785, 70 L. R. A. 472, 109 
 Am. St. Rep. 526. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Boston, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Salem, etc., R. R. Co., 2 
 Gray 1; Dingley v. Boston, 100 
 Mass. 544; Eastern, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Boston, etc., R. R., Ill Mass. 
 125, 15 Am. Rep. 13. 
 
 New York. — People v. Adiron- 
 dack R. R. Co., 160 N. Y. 225, 54 
 N. E. 689. 
 
 Ohio. — Kramer v. Cleveland, 
 ietc, R. R. Co., 5 Ohio St. 140. 
 
 Texas.— Qulf, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Puller, 63 Tex. 467. 
 
 53. Rensselaer v. Leopold, 106 
 Ind. 29, 5 N. E. 761; Deavitt v. 
 Washington County, 75 Vt. 156, 
 53 Atl. 563. 
 
 54. Burnett v. Commonwealth, 
 169 Mass. 417, 48 N. E. 758. 
 
 55. Thus the right to excavate 
 material for constructing public 
 works may be condemned. Parsons 
 V. Howe, 41 Me. 218; Hunt v. Bos- 
 ton, 183 Mass. 303, 67 N. E. 244; 
 Bliss V. Hosmer, 15 Ohio 44; Ver- 
 mont Central R. R. Co. v. Baxter, 
 22 yt. 365; or the right to trim 
 trees near a line of electric wires, 
 Yadkin River Power Co. v. Wissler, 
 160 N. C. 269, 76 S. E. 267, 43 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 483, Ann. Cas. 
 1914 C 268; or an overhead ease- 
 ment widening out over adjacent 
 
 property, Kansas City v. Woeris- 
 hoeffer, 249 Mo. 1, 155 S. W. 779; 
 or a horizontal plane underneath 
 the ground, Boston v. Talbot, 206 
 Mass. 82, 91 N. E. 1014. 
 
 56. Infra, §§ 134r-149 inc. 
 
 57. California. — Lux v. Haggin, 
 69 Cal. 255, 4 Pae. 919, 10 Pac. 
 674. 
 
 Maine. — Ingraham v. Camden, 
 etc.. Water Co., 82 Me. 335, 19 
 Atl. 861. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Martin v. Glea- 
 son, 139 Mass. 183, 29 N. E. 664. 
 
 North Dakota. — Bigelow v. Dra- 
 per, 6 N. D. 152, 69 N. W. 570. 
 
 Ohio. — Cooper v. Williams, 5 
 Ohio 291, 24 Am. Dec. 299. 
 
 Virginia. — Clear Creek Water 
 Co. V. Gladeville Improvement Co., 
 107 Va. 278, 58 S. E. 586, 13 Ana. 
 Cas. 71; Jeter v. Vinton-Roanoke 
 Water Co., 114 Va. 769, 76 S. E. 
 921, Ann. Cas. 1914 C 1029. 
 
 Washington. — State v. Chehalis 
 County Court, 48 Wash. 277, 93 
 Pac. 423, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1005, 
 125 Am. St. Rep. 927. 
 
 Wisconsin. — In re Trempelean 
 Drainage District, 146 Wis. 398, 
 131 N. W. 838. 
 
 So also the interest which the 
 grantee or lessee acquires after a 
 grant or lease from the state of 
 lands lying between high and low- 
 water mark is private property 
 subject to condemnation. Wood- 
 cliff Land Improvement Co. v. New 
 Jersey Shore Line R. 1?,. Co., 72 
 N. J. L. 137, BO Atl. 44; Kerr v. 
 West Shore R. R. Co., 127 N. Y. 
 
§ 20 Nature and Chaeaoteeistics of the Powee. 
 
 67 
 
 limitation upon the power to condemn rights over real estate 
 that has been seriously put forward is that a right to be 
 taken by eminent domain must be capable of valuation in 
 money.®* 
 
 Nothing in the nature of the title to land can withdraw 
 the land itself from subjection to eminent domain. The 
 state, and the corporations, municipal or private, to which 
 it his delegated the power of eminent domain, cannot bar- 
 gain away the right to take property when it is needed by the 
 public, and land granted by the state or by such a corpora- 
 tion may be taken by the grantor whenever the public 
 exigencies require it, notwithstanding any contracts to the 
 contrary.^® Of course contracts of wholly private parties 
 have no greater effect.^** 
 
 Buildings, whether used as dwellings or for other pur- 
 poses, may be taken,®^ and homestead rights therein.*^ So 
 also, personal property is subject to eminent domain.^* 
 Intangible property, such as choses in action,®* patent 
 
 269, 27 N. E. 833; BalUet v. Com- 
 monwealth, 17 Pa. 509, 55 Am. 
 Dec. 581. The preference right of 
 owners of uplands to lease from 
 the state harbor lands in front of 
 their property is a right which 
 may be taken by emiaent domain, 
 although no lease has been exe- 
 cuted. State V. Gray's Haj^bor, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 60 Wash. 32, 110 
 Pae. 676. 
 
 58. It was on this ground that 
 it was held that the right to fish 
 in a private pond could not be 
 taken for public use, in Albright 
 V. Sussex County Lake & Park 
 Commission, 71 N. J. L. 303, 57 
 Atl. 398, 69 L. R. A. 768, 108 Am. 
 St. Rep. 749, 2 Ann. Cas. 48. 
 
 59. Infra, % 22. When land is 
 acquired for public use subject to 
 certain rights, those rights may be 
 taken by subsequent proceedings. 
 Page V. Baltimore, 34 Md. 558; 
 Kenny v. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 
 208 Pa. 30, 57 Atl. 74; State v. 
 King County Court, 46 Wash. 516, 
 90 Pae. 663. When an easement 
 
 has been acquired for public use, 
 the fee may subsequently be con- 
 demned for the same use. Matter 
 of the City of New York, 217 
 N. Y. 1. 
 
 60. Infra, §§ 124, 229, 231. 
 
 61. Wells V. Somerset, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 47 Me. 345; Brocket v. Ohio, 
 etc., R.R. Co., 14 Pa. 241, 53 Am. 
 Dec. 534. 
 
 62. Ancell v. Southern Illinois, 
 etc., Bridge Co., 223 Mo. 209, 122 
 S. W, 709. 
 
 63. Homochitto River Commis- 
 sioners V. Withers, 29 Miss. 21, 64 
 Am. Dec. 126 ; Christy v. St. Louis, 
 20 Mo. 143, 61 Am. Dec. 598; Peo- 
 ple V. Brooklyn, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 535; Southern Kansas R. R. Co. v. 
 Oklahoma City, 12 Okla. 82, 69 
 Pae. 1050. 
 
 64. Cincinnati v. Louisville, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 223 U. S. 390, 56 L. ed 
 481 ; Meade v. United States, 2 Ct. 
 CI. 224; Morris Canal & Banking 
 Co. v. Townsend, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 658. 
 
68 
 
 The Law or EMDraasri Domaiw. 
 
 20 
 
 rights,*^ franchises/*' charters or any other form of con- 
 tract;®'' are within the sweep of this sovereign authority as 
 fully as land or other tan^ble property. Even shares in a 
 railroad corporation owned by a dissenting minority may be 
 taken by another corporation of the same character under 
 legislative lauthority for the purpose of effecting a consoli- 
 dation oif the road with others to create a through line."" 
 
 65. United States v. Bums, 12 
 WaU (TJ. S.) 246, 20 L. ed. 388; 
 James v. Campbell, 104 U. S. 356, 
 26 L. ed. 786; Brady v. Atlantic 
 Works, Fed. Cas. No. 1794. 
 
 66. The franchise of a private 
 corporation may be direetiy con- 
 demned, or an exclusive franchise 
 may be destroyed by the grant of 
 authority to a competitor. 
 
 United States. — West River 
 Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507, 12 
 L. ed. 535 ; Richmond, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Louisa R. il. Co., 13 How. 
 71, 14 L. ed. 45; Greenwood v. 
 Union Freight E. R. Co., 105 U. S. 
 13, 26 L. ed. 961; Monongahela 
 Navigation Co. v. United States, 
 148 U. S. 312, 37 L. ed. 463; Long 
 Island Water Supply Co. v. Brook- 
 lyn, 166 U. 8. 685, 41 L. ed. 1165; 
 Cincinnati v. Louisville, etc., R. jR. 
 Co., 223 U. S. 390, 56 L. ed. 481. 
 
 Mdbama. — ^Mobile, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Alabama, etc., R. R. Co., 87 Ala. 
 501, 6 So. 404. 
 
 Connecticut. — Enfield Toll Bridge 
 Co. V. Hartford, etc., R. R. Co., 17 
 Conn. 454, 44 Am. Dec. 556. 
 
 Georgia. — Shorter v. Smith, 9 
 Ga. 517. 
 
 Illinois. — Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Lake, 71 111. 333. 
 
 Indiana. — ■ Lafayette Plank Road 
 Co. V. New Albany, etc., R. R. Co., 
 13 Ind. 90, 74 Am. Dec. 246. 
 
 Kentucky. — Covington, etc.. Road 
 Co. V. Sanford, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 689, 
 20 S. W. 103L 
 
 Maine. — State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 
 189. 
 
 i. — Baltimore, etc.. Turn- 
 
 pike Co. V. Union R. R. Co., 35 
 Md. 224, 6 Am. Rep. 397. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Boston Water 
 Power Co. v. Boston, etc, R..R. Co., 
 23 Pick. 460; Central Bridge Co. 
 V. Lowell, 4 Gray 474. 
 
 Miehigmi. — East Saginaw Mfg. 
 Co. V. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259, 
 2 Am. Rep. 82. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Backus v. Leb- 
 anon, 11 N. H. 19, 35 Am. Dec 
 466; Crosby v. Hanover, 36 N. H. 
 404. 
 
 New Jersey. — Brady v. Atlantic 
 City, 53 N. J. Eq. 440, 32 Atl. 271. 
 
 New York. — Re Kerr, 42 Barb. 
 119. 
 
 Penmsylvania. — lie Tpwanda 
 Bridge Co., 91 Pa. 216; Scranton, 
 etc.. Water Co. v. Northern, etc.. 
 Iron Co., 192 Pa. 80, 43 Atl. 470, 
 73 Am. St. Rep. 798. 
 
 Tennessee.— Red River BTidge 
 Co. V. ClarksviUe, 1 Sneed 176, 60 
 Am. Dec 143. 
 
 Vermont. — Armington v. Bamet, 
 15 Yt. 745, 40 Am. Dee. 705. 
 
 Virginia. — Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. 
 Tuckahoe, etc, R. R. Co., 11 Leigh 
 42, 36 Am. Dee. 374. 
 
 67. Cincinnati v. Louisville, etc., 
 R. E. Co., 223 U. S. 390, 56 L. ed. 
 481. 
 
 68. Umted' States. — Dickinson v. 
 Consolidated Traction Co., 114 Fed. 
 232. 
 
 Connecticut. — New York, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Offield, 77 Conn. 417, 
 59 Atl. 510; affirmed, Offleld v. 
 New York, etc, R. R. Co., 203 U. 8. 
 372, 51 L. ed. 231. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Gregg v. 
 
§ 2Q Nature and ©HA.BA;eTEBiSTicS', qfthe Power. 69 
 
 Eights of a citizen, which are not property rights cannot 
 however be taken by eminent domain. For example, the 
 right to vote as he sees fit cannot be taken from a citizen by 
 eminent domain by a legislature seeking to perpetuate its 
 power. It has been held that when a, statute requires the 
 consent of abutting owners before a railway can be built in 
 a street, a railway company authorized to exercise eminent 
 domain cannot condemn the consent of objecting abutters,®* 
 Upon the same principle any constitutionally protected priv- 
 ilege of exercising a, choice could not be taken away even if 
 compensation was offered. 
 
 A largely academic discussion has been waged over the 
 question whether money can be taken by eminent domain, 
 and it has been held or intimated that it cannot be.'^° The 
 objection is not based on an implied inherent limitation upon 
 the power of government, but upon the difficulty of effecting 
 a taking of money that would be of any service to the public 
 without violating the constitution. The use for which it 
 was wanted might weH be public, but, as compensation 
 must be paid in money, and, if not in advance, at least with: 
 such expedition a& conveniently may be had, the seizure 
 of money without compensation, or with an offer of pay- 
 ment in notes, bonds, or merchandise — in other words^ a 
 forced sale or loan — however it might be justified by dire 
 necessity would not be a constitutional exercise of the power 
 of eminent domain. Circumstances may be imagined, how- 
 ever,, under which, a solvent state required a large sum of 
 money in a certain place at once for an unquestioned public 
 use, and an individual whose coin was seized with the cer- 
 tainty of repayment as soon as funds could be brought to 
 the scene of the trouble from the state treasury could hardly 
 
 Northern R. R. Co., 67 N. H. 452, 69. Hamilton, etc., Traction Co. 
 
 41 Atl. 271. V. Parish, 67 Ohio St. 181, 65 N. B. 
 
 New Jersey.— Blaek v. Delaware, 1011, 60 L. R. A. 531. 
 
 etc., Canal Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 455; 70. Burnett v. Sacramento, 12 
 
 Mills V. Central R. R. Co., 41 N. J. Cal. 76, 73 Am. Dec. 518; Cary 
 
 Eq. 1, 2 Atl. 453. Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 25 
 
 North Carolina. — Spencer v. Sea- N. E. 92, 7 L. R. A. 765 (where the 
 
 board Air Line Co., 137 N. C. 107, taking is by a private corporation) 
 49 S. E. 96, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 604. 
 
70 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 21 
 
 complain that he was deprived of his constitutional rights/* 
 unless the constitution of his state specifically provided that 
 compensation must be paid in advance of the taking. 
 
 § 21. Nature of the Title Created by Eminent Domain — 
 Whether Original or Derivative. 
 
 It seems to be generally conceded that eminent domain 
 proceedings, whatever their form may be, are ess-entially 
 at least quasi in rem,''^ and that the jurisdiction of the court 
 depends upon the subject matter of the taking. There i^ 
 however a difference of opinion whether the title created 
 by eminent domain is a new and paramount title, or is the 
 
 71. United States. — Mitchell v. 
 Harmony, 13 How. 128, 14 L. ed. 
 81. 
 
 Missouri. — Wellman v. Wicke- 
 man, 44 Mo. 484. 
 
 New York. — People v. Brooklyn, 
 4 N. Y. 419, 55 Am. Dec. 266. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Hammett v. Phil- 
 adelpliia, 65 Pa. 146, 1 Am. Eep. 
 615. 
 
 Tennessee. — Yost v. Stout, 4 
 Coldw. 205. 
 
 72. District of Columbia. — Dis- 
 trict of Columbia v. Jones, 38 App. 
 D. C. 560. 
 
 Indiana. — ^Wright v. Wilson, 95 
 Ind. 408; Baltimore, etc., E. R. Co. 
 V. State, 159 Ind. 510, 65 N. E. 
 508. 
 
 Iowa. — Costello v. Burke, 63 Iowa 
 361, 19 N. W. 247; Taylor v. Drain- 
 age District No. 56, 167 Iowa 42, 
 148 N. W. 1040. 
 
 Kansas. — Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Selders, 4 Kan. App. 497, 44 
 Pae. 1012. 
 
 Louisiana. — Iberia, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Morgan's etc., Steamship Co., 129 
 La. 492, 56 So. 417. 
 
 Maryland. — Ridgely v. Balti- 
 more, 119 Md. 567, 87 Atl. 909. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Edmands v. Bos- 
 ton, 108 Mass. 535, 544; Appleton 
 V. Newton, 178 Mass. 276, 281, 59 
 N. E. 648; Laney v. Boston, 185 
 
 s. 219, 70 N. E. 88; Sweet v. 
 Boston, 186 Mass. 79, 71 N. E. 
 113; Weeks v. Grace, 194 Mass. 
 296, 299, 80 N. E. 220. 
 
 Minnesota. — St. Paul, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Minneapolis, 35 Minn. 141, 
 27 N. W. 400; Lumberman's In- 
 surance Co. V. St. Paul, 82 Minn. 
 497, 85 N. W. 525. 
 
 Mississippi. — Stewart v. Board 
 of Police, 25 Miss. 479; New Or- 
 leans, etc., R. R. Co. V. Hemphill, 
 35 Miss. 17. 
 
 Missouri. — Thompson v. Chi- 
 cago, etc., R. R. Co., 110 Mo. 147, 
 19 S. W. 77; St. Louis v. Koch, 
 169 Mo. 587, 70 S. W. 143. 
 
 New Jersey. — Crane v. Eliza^ 
 beth, 36 N. J. Eq. 339. 
 
 New York. — Matter of Union, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 112 N. Y. 61, 19 
 N. E. 664. 
 
 Ohio. — Cupp V. Seneca County 
 Commissioners, 19 Ohio St. 173, 
 184. 
 
 rea;as.— Smith v. Taylor, 34 Tex. 
 589. 
 
 Washington. — Gasaway v. Seat- 
 tle, 52 Wash. 444, 100 Pac. 991, 21 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 68; Silverstone v. 
 Ham, 66 Wash. 440, 120 Pac. 109; 
 Carton v. Seattle, 66 Wash. 447, 
 120 Pac. Ill ; State v. Lewis County 
 Court, 80 Wash. 417, 141 Pac. 906. 
 
§ 21 Natube and Chabacteeistics of the Power. 71 
 
 title of the former owner or owners which they have been 
 compelled to transfer to the public. 
 
 In the states in which the earlier conception of the power 
 of eminent domain prevails, it is held that the power when 
 exercised acts upon the land itself, not upon the title, or 
 upon the sum of the titles if there are diversified interests. 
 Upon appropriation all inconsistent proprietary rights are 
 divested and not only privies but strangers are concluded. 
 Thereafter, whoever may have been the owner, or whatever 
 may have been the quality of his estate, he is entitled to full 
 compensation according to his interest and the extent of the 
 taking, but the paramount right is in the public, not as 
 claiming under him by a statutory grant, but by an inde- 
 pendent title.'^^ The title is analogous to that derived from 
 the sale of land for unpaid taxes, where the purchaser gets 
 a new unincumbered title in fee by force of the lien of the 
 taxing power, which cuts under all incumbrances or qualify- 
 ing estates,''* and if it is within the power of government to 
 create such a title in order to supply the public revenue, 
 there is no sound reason why a similar title cannot be 
 created to carry out the equally essential function of taking 
 
 73. United States. — West River Washington. — Gasaway v. Seat- 
 Bridge Co. V. Dix, 6 How. 507, 12 tie, 52 Wash. 444, 100 Pae. 491, 21 
 L. ed. 535; Long Island Water L. R. A. (N. S.) 68; Silverstone 
 Supply Co. V. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. v. Ham, 66 Wash. 440, 120 Pao. 
 685, 41 L. ed. 1165. 109; Carton v. Seattle, 66 Wash. 
 
 Connecticut. — Todd v. Austin, 447, 120 Pac. Ill ; State v. Lewis 
 
 34 Conn. 78. County Court, 80 Wash. 417, 141 
 
 Massachusetts. — Boston Water Pac. 906. 
 
 Power Co. v. Boston, etc., R. R. 74. United States. — Hefner v. 
 
 Co., 23 Pick. 360, 393; Dingley v. Northwestern Insurance Co., 123 
 
 Boston, 100 Mass. 544, 559; Emery U. S. 747, 751, 31 L. ed. 309. 
 
 V. Boston Terminal Co., 178 Mass. Iovm. — MeQuity v. Doudna, 101 
 
 172, 184, 59 N. E. 763, 86 Am. St. Iowa 144, 146, 70 N. W. 99. 
 
 Rep. 473; Weeks v. Grace, 194 Maryland. — Textor v. Shipley, 
 
 Mass. 296, 300, 80 N. E. 220. 86 Md. 424, 438, 38 Atl. 932. 
 
 Minnesota. — Weir v. St. Paul, Massachusetts. — Harrison v. Do- 
 
 etc, R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 155. Ian, 172 M'ass. 395, 398, 52 N. E. 
 
 New York. — B'eekman v. Sara- 513; Hunt v. Boston, 183 Mass. 
 
 toga, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Paige 45, 303, 306, 67 N. E. 244; Abbott v. 
 
 73, 22 Am. Dec. 679. Erost, 185 Mass. 398, 400, 70 N. E. 
 
 ■Harding v. Good- 478. 
 lett, 3 Yerg. 40, 24 Am. Dec. 546. 
 
72 The Law of Eminent Domain". § 21 
 
 land for the public use wheiu public necessity- requires it. 
 If this view is sound, when there has been a taking by 
 eminent domain, and such notice has been given and com- 
 pensation awarded as the constitution and laws require, if 
 it subsequently appears that a mistake has been made in 
 respect to ownership, the true owner cannot set aside the 
 taking or require that compensation be awarded to him 
 anew. It is felt that the probability of such an interfer- 
 ence, if a mistake has been made in the identity of the owner 
 or owners, is repugnant to the nature and scope of the right 
 itself. This view is the original conception of eminent 
 domain and, while it is consistent with the theory of 
 Grotius that eminent domain is the exercise of an ultimate 
 existing title in the state,''^ it is not inconsistent with the ' 
 modern doctrine that eminent domain is an exercise of 
 sovereignty, since it may well be that a new and paramount 
 title is created rather than the existence of an old one 
 asserted whenever the power of eminent domain is called 
 into play. 
 
 The other theory of eminent domain concerns itself more 
 with the protection of the interests of property owners 
 than of the public. Eminent domain, if this theory be 
 accepted, is merely an exercise of the inherent sovereign 
 power to compel a holder of property to give it up and 
 transfer it for a full consideration to the state, or to a 
 representative of the state, which takes it by an involun- 
 tary proceeding because it is needed for the public use. 
 In such a case if the title acquired is found to be invalid 
 because a mistake has been made in. ascertaining the owner- 
 ship, the condemnation must be repeated, or the public 
 can be ousted by the true owner. The acceptance of this 
 theory seems almost inevitable when the constitution of 
 the state provides that property cannot be taken for public 
 use unless compensation is paid in advance, and unless 
 provision is made for paying the compensation into court 
 when the ownership of land is unknown or in doubt, it is 
 
 75. Supra, § 4. 
 
I 21 Natuee and. Chabacteristios qp the Power. 73 
 
 havd ta see kow proeeedinga can be institeted ,at all, aad 
 even then only by giving the requirement of prepaynnient 
 a rather loose construction. It has been held in more thaa 
 one jurisdiction in which payment in advance is required 
 that condemnation proceedings pass nothing more than the 
 title to whatever interest the parties who took part in the 
 proceedings have in the property, and that a party who 
 could not be notified is not bound by the award or judg- 
 ment.^® In suck cases the condemnor wbuld fail to acquire 
 a perfect title to the property ; and this, it is felt, imposes 
 no greater hardship upon a city or town or a public service 
 corporation than it does upon any other person who. desires 
 to purchase property in which there is a contingent interest 
 outstanding in some one whose identity cannot be deter- 
 mined at the time of the purchase. The condemnation 
 proceedings in the jurisdictions in which this theory pre^ 
 vails are no more than a compulsory sale of all the owner 's 
 interest in the property, and no one can be thus compelled 
 to sell who is not a party to the judgment rendered by the 
 tribunal which is erected for this purpose. 
 
 If this theory of the nature of the title created by eminent 
 domain is correct, it is analogous to the interest acquired 
 by the state in case of escheat or forfeiture, or by the 
 trustee in case of bankruptcy or by an individual pur- 
 diaser when an execution is levied by sale of real estate, 
 or when a mortgage is foreclosed. In all of these cases 
 there is an involuntary trajisfer by operation of law, but 
 the title of the transferee is wholly derivative, and is no 
 greater than that held by the one from whom the transfer 
 was made. The distinction is fundamental, and is typical 
 of a conflict which runs through the exercise of eminent 
 domain in all its aspects, one school contending that in 
 exercising eminent domain, apart from the right to employ 
 compulsory powers, the public stands no better than an 
 individual citizen, and the other that the rights of the 
 
 76. Charleston, etc., Ry. Co. v. Ry. Co. v. Miller; 251 lU. 58, 95 
 Hughes,^ 105 Ga. 1, 30 S. E. 972, N. E. 1097. 
 70 Am. St. Rep. 17;, Chicago, etc.,. 
 
74 ' The Law op Eminent Domain. § 22 
 
 individual property owner are subordinate to the public 
 rights and that in delimiting the rights of the individual 
 as against the public no analogy is to be drawn from the 
 rights of individuals among themselvesJ^ 
 
 The chief practical distinction arising from the disagree- 
 ment over the nature of the title acquired is in the effect 
 of a taking in the course of which although all the require- 
 ments of the constitution and tfce statutes have been com- 
 plied with, the true owner of the fee or of some interest in 
 the property taken has not been made a party. There would 
 also be a different decision in accordance with the theory 
 prevalent in the state, when the existence of an easement 
 created by eminent domain was alleged to constitute a 
 violation of a covenant of 'warranty against the claims and 
 demands of all persons claiming " by, through or under " 
 the grantor of a deedJ^ So also the question whether a 
 statutory or constitutional provision in regard to the 
 ' ' purchase " or " sale ' ' of property was broad enough 
 to include a taking by eminent domain might be affected 
 by the distinction discussed in this section, although it 
 would by no means be decisive^® 
 
 § 22. The Power of Eminent Domain is Inalienable. 
 
 It is an interesting question of constitutional law how 
 far and to what extent a legislature can, by the statutes 
 which it enacts during the term for which it has been 
 elected, decrease its own powers, so that legislatures 
 
 77. Infra, i 109. against the sale of such property. 
 
 78. Weeks v. Grace, 194 Mass. In Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 
 296, 80 N. E. 220. 367, 23 L. ed. 449, and Burt v. Mer- 
 
 79. In Idaho-Iowa Lateral & Res- chants' Insurance Co., 106 Mass. 
 ervoir Co. v. Fisher, 27 Idaho 695, 356, it was held that the word 
 151 Pac. 998; In re Condemnation "purchase" was broad enough to 
 of Lands in St. Louis County, 124 include a taking by right of emi- 
 Minn. 271, 144 N. W. 960, and nent domain. In San Antonio v. 
 Imperial Irrigation Co. v. Jayne, Grandjean, 91 Tex. 430, 41 S. W. 
 104 Tex. 395, 138 S. W. 575, Ann. 477, it was held that eminent do- 
 Cas. 1914 B 322, it was held that main was not a compulsory con- 
 eminent domain might be exercised veyance, and that a statute in re- 
 over public lands, notwithstanding gard to conveyances by married 
 restrictions in the fundamental law women did not apply. 
 
§ 22 Natuee and Chaeacteeistios op the Poweb. 75 
 
 subsequently elected will have less authority than their pred- 
 ecessors. In a general way it can be said that one legis- 
 lature can create private property rights which must be 
 recognized by its successors, as by the conveyance of pub- 
 lic lands or the grant of a franchise, but that it cannot 
 impair the sovereign power of legislation, and that each 
 legislature assumes the legislative power as fully and com- 
 pletely as its predecessors.*" Thus a statute providing, 
 for example, that ' ' imprisonment for debt is forever abol- 
 ished ' ' may be repealed at any time, by the same or a 
 subsequent legislature. There is an exception to this rule 
 generally recognized in the case of exemption from tax- 
 ation. The legislature of a state may lawfully contract 
 with a private corporation, in consideration of its attempt- 
 ing some enterprise considered beneficial to the public, that 
 its property shall be exempt from taxation, and thus bar- 
 gain away a portion of the sovereign power of taxation as 
 it is handed on to succeeding legislatures.®^ 
 
 There is no such exception in the case of eminent domain. 
 The legislature cannot, even by specific enactment, clothe 
 the property of a corporation with exemption from sub- 
 sequently authorized condemnation. The power of eminent 
 domain is inalienable, and being an essential attribute of 
 sovereignty cannot be even partially bargained away. One 
 legislature cannot tie the hands of its successors or restrict 
 their power to authorize the taking of property for public 
 use when public necessity requires it, and thus prevent the 
 exercise of one of the functions allotted to the legislature 
 by the constitution. By no form of contract or legislative 
 
 80. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, Mobile, etc., R. E. Co. v. Tennessee, 
 97 U. S. 659, 24 L. ed. 1036. 153 U. S. 486, 38 L. ed. 793; 
 
 81. New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Wright v. Georgia, etc., Banking 
 Cranch (U. S.) 164, 3 L. ed. 303; Co., 216 U. S. 420, 54 L. ed. 544. 
 Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 This principle would not apply in 
 How. (U. S.) 133, 11 L. ed. 529; states in which the power of the 
 State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 legislature to grant special exemp- 
 How. (U. S.) 369, 385, 14 L. ed. tions from taxation is taken away 
 977; Home of the Friendless v. by the constitution, or to a char- 
 Rouse, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 430, 19 ter granted subject to alteration, 
 L. ed. 495; Farrington v. Tennes- amendment or repeal. 
 
 see, 95 U. S. 679, 24 L. ed. 558; 
 
7.6 
 
 The Law of Eminent? Domain. 
 
 22 
 
 grant can the state surrender its rigkt totake any property 
 within the limits of the state when it may be required for 
 the public use., A statutory provision that the power of 
 eminent domain shall not be exercised in whole or in part 
 is therefore invalid.®^ 
 
 82. Wellington, Petitioner, 16 
 Pick. (Mass.) 87, 101, 26 Am. Dee. 
 361. " Another objection taken 
 and somewhat relied on was that 
 the legislature had no power to 
 declare that any portion of terri- 
 tory should be forever appropri- 
 ated to any one public use, because 
 it had a tendency to encroach upon 
 the acknowledged sovereign power 
 of the state, in case of emergency, 
 to take any property, public or 
 private, which the exigencies of 
 the country might require. We 
 think tbere is no weight in this 
 objection. Nothing- in this act su- 
 persedes, or has a tendency to su- 
 persede, that soverei^ power over 
 all property, inherent in all gov- 
 ernments, sometimes called the 
 right of eminent domain, the power 
 of taking property for public use, 
 as the exigencies of the country 
 may require. All acts of legisla^ 
 tion not in terms limited, in. their 
 operation to a particular term of 
 time, are in legal contemplation 
 perpetual or declared to-be in force 
 forever; which means, until duly 
 altered or changed by" competent 
 authority." Eastern, etc., R. R. Co, 
 V. Boston, etc., R. R., Ill Mass. 
 125, 15 Am. Rep. 13. " The power 
 of the state to take private prop- 
 erty for the public use reaches 
 every description of property within 
 its jurisdiction, even when acquired, 
 by grant from the state. It is an 
 inherent element of sovereignty; 
 and from the necessity of the case, 
 and the highest considerations of 
 public welfare, it must continue un- 
 impaired in the state. It is im- 
 pliedly reserved in every grant. It 
 cannot be abridged so as to bind 
 
 future legislation." People v. Ad- 
 irondack Ry. Co., 160 N. T. 225, 
 54 N. E.. 689. "While the state 
 may delegate the power (of emi- 
 nent domain) to a subject for a 
 publJc use,, it cannot permanently 
 part with it as to any property 
 under its jurisdiction, but may re- 
 sume it at will, subject to property 
 rights and the duty of paying 
 therefor." In re Twenty-second 
 St., 102 Pa. 108, holds a city hav- 
 ing the general power of taking 
 land by eminent domain may lay 
 out a highway over the property 
 of a corporation which by its char- 
 ter is exempt from such takings. 
 See also. 
 
 United States. — ^West River 
 Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507, 12 
 L. ed. 535. 
 
 Idaho. — HoUister v. State, 9 
 Idaho 8, 71 Pac. 541. 
 
 Illinois. — Hyde Park v. Oak- 
 wood Cemetery Assn., 119 ILL 141,, 
 7 K E. 627. 
 
 Indiana. — ^New Castle, etci, R. R. 
 Co. V. Peru, etc., B. R. Co., 3 Ind.. 
 464; Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Connersville, 170 Ind. 316, 83 N. E. 
 503. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Brewster v. 
 Hough, 10 K H. 138. 
 
 New Jersey. — State v. Hudson 
 Tunnel R. R. Co., 38 N. J. L. 548. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Lock Haven 
 
 Bridge Co. v. Clinton County, 157 
 Pa. 379, 27 Atl. 726 (holding a 
 provision in the company's charter 
 as to the manner its property may 
 be purchased by the public does 
 not prevent its being taken by emi- 
 nent domain.) 
 
 Wisconsin. — Chieagfo, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Douglas County, 134 Wis. 
 
§ 22 Nature and Characteeistics op tse Power. 77 
 
 For similar reasons a munixsipal corporation to wHch 
 the power of eminent domain has been granted caimcit 
 lawfully contract that the power will not be exercised in 
 a particular manner,^® and a like rule applies to a private 
 corporation.** The power is given to be used wien public 
 necessity or convenience requires it, and when such an 
 occasion ari«es private contracts cannot stand in the way. 
 The corporation is acting as a trustee of public powers, the 
 use of which cannot be restricted by any thing the corpora- 
 tion may have done in its private capacity. Such contracts 
 certainly cannot be specifically enforced in equity and are 
 probably absolutely void, being both ultra vires and against 
 
 197, 114 N. W. 511, 14 L. E. A. 
 (N. S.) 1074. See however South 
 Park Commissioners v. Ward, 248 
 111. 299, 93 N. E. 910, 21 Ann. Cas. 
 127, holding that when land has 
 been dedicated for a park and the 
 dedication accepted, it is beyond 
 the power of the legislature to au- 
 thorize the condemnation of the 
 easements of the dedicators so that 
 the land can be devoted to a dif- 
 ferent public use. This decision is 
 utterly inconsistent with the exist- 
 ence of eminent domain as a sov- 
 ereign power as recognized else- 
 where, and is probably the most 
 extreme example of judicial en- 
 croachment upon legislative power 
 in behalf of private property 
 rights that has occurred in connec- 
 tion with the power of eminent 
 domain. 
 
 83. Thus it was Tield in Osceola 
 V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 116 
 C. C. A. 72, 196 Fed. 777, that 
 after a city in pursuance of a con- 
 tract vacated certain streets where 
 they crossed a railroad and con- 
 veyed the land to the railroad com- 
 pany, it might silbsequently reopen 
 the streets by the exercise of emi- 
 nent domain. In Master df First 
 Street, 66 Mich. 42, 33 N. W. 15, 
 it was held that a city cannot law- 
 fully contract with a railroad com- 
 
 pany that no street should be laid 
 over its location. In Brinimer v. 
 Boston, 102 Mass. 19, it was held 
 that the city officials in laying out 
 highways act as public officers or 
 representatives of the state, and 
 the contracts of the city as a cor- 
 poration cannot bind them. See 
 also Bell v. Boston, 101 Mass. 506. 
 In Penley v. Auburn, 85 Me. 278, 
 27 Atl. 158, 21 L. R. A. 657; State 
 ex rel. MeClellan v. Graves, 19 Md. 
 351, 81 Am. Dec. 639; State v. 
 Minnesota Transfer R. R. Co., 80 
 Minn. 108, 83 N. W. 33, 50 L. R. A. 
 656; State v. Minneapolis PaA 
 Commissioners, 100 Minn. 150, 110 
 N. W. 1121, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 1045, it was held that a covenant of 
 a city never to discontinue a cer- 
 tain street was ultra vires and void. 
 
 84. Illinois. — Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Illinois, etc., R. R. Co., -113 
 m. 156. 
 
 Kentucky. — Cornwall v. Louis- 
 ville, etc., R. R. Co., 87 Ky. 72, 7 
 S. W. 553. 
 
 New York. — Matter of Long 
 Island R. R. Co., 143 N. T. 67, 37 
 F. E. 636; Matter of New York, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 44 Hun 194. 
 
 Washington.— North Coast R. R. 
 Co. T. Kra;ft Co., 63 Wash. 250, 
 115 Pac. 97, 
 
78 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 22 
 
 public policy.*' When however a tract of land has been 
 donated to a city in consideration of a promise that no 
 more will be condemned, if the promise is violated the 
 donated land must be returned or paid for;*® when the 
 contract is repudiated the consideration cannot be kept. 
 But in no case has the validity of such a contract been 
 sustained and damages for breach of it awarded. 
 
 There is nothing however in the principle that the power 
 of eminent domain cannot be alienated which prevents the 
 legislature, or any public or governmental body to which 
 the necessary power has been delegated, from creating 
 private property rights which must be recognized when 
 the power of eminent domain is exercised, and thus to a 
 certain extent hampering or limiting the exercise of the 
 power by a subsequent legislature. Thus a state may by 
 the power of eminent domain take back property which it 
 has granted to private owners,*^ but such property must 
 of course be paid for.** So also the legislature may create 
 a franchise which constitutes property in the constitutional 
 sense, and while such a franchise, like other property, may 
 be transferred or destroyed at the will of the legislature, 
 
 85. It has been held that a lessor property by the railroad. Ocean 
 who takes the leased premises by Grove Camp Meeting Assn. v. Pub- 
 eminent domain does not thereby lie Utility -Commiseioners, 82 
 violate any covenant of quiet en- N. J. L. 309, 82 Atl. 306. 
 jojnment he may have made with 86. Cornwall v. Louisville, etc., 
 the lessee, for his capacity as land- R. R. Co., 87 Ky. 72, 7 S. W. 553; 
 lord is distinct from his position as Penley v. Auburn, 85 Me. 278, 27 
 representative of the public. Good- Atl. 158, 21 L. E. A. 657. 
 year Shoe Machinery Co. v. Bos- 87. Young v. McKenzie, 8 Ga. 
 ton Terminal Co., 176 Mass. 115, 31; Cox v. Revelle, 125 Md. 579, 
 57 N. E. 214. And see also Brim- 94 Atl. 203, L. R. A. 1915 E 443; 
 mer v. Boston, 102 Mass. 19; Phil- Beekman v. Saratoga, etc., R. R. 
 adelphia, etc., R. R. Co. v. PhUa- Co., 3 Paige (N. Y.) 45, 22 Am. 
 delphia, 9 Phila. (Pa.) 563; North Dee. 679; State v. King County, 
 Coast R. R. Co. v. Kraft Co., 63 31 Wash. 445, 72 Pae. 89, 66 
 Wash. 250, 115 Pae. 97. So also L. R. A. 897. 
 
 the reversion of property granted 88. Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Craneh. 
 
 to a railroad, for breach of eondi- (U. S.) 43, 3 L. ed. 650; Detroit 
 
 tion, does not prevent the subse- v. Detroit, etc., Plank Road Co., 43 
 
 quent condemnation of the same Mich. 148. 
 
§ 22 Natueb and Charactbeistics of the Poweb. 
 
 79 
 
 whenever that body considers that the public necessities 
 require such action, it can be taken only by the exercise of 
 eminent domain and upon payment of just compensation.*® 
 
 89. United States. — West River 
 Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507, 12 
 L. ed. 535; Richmond, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Louisiana R. R. Co., 13 How. 
 71, 83, 14 L. ed. 55, 61; New Or- 
 leans Gas Co. V. Louisiana Light 
 Co., 115 U. S. 650, 673, 29 L. ed. 
 516, 524. 
 
 Connecticut. — Salem, etc., Turn- 
 pike Co. V. Lyme, 18 Conn. 431. 
 
 Indiana. — LaFayette Plank Road 
 Co. V. New Albany, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 13 Ind, 90, 74 Am. Dec. 246. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Boston, etc., B. 
 R. Co. V. Salem, etc., R. R."'Co., 2 
 Gray 1. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Piseataqua 
 Bridge Co. v. New Hampshire 
 Bridge Co., 7 N. H. 35. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Philadelphia, etc., 
 By. Co.'s Appeal, 102 Pa. 123. 
 
 West Virginia. — Mason v. Har- 
 per's Ferry Bridge Co., 17 W. Va. 
 396. 
 
 See also infra, § 123. 
 
CHAPTER m. 
 
 Limitations upon the Power op Eminent Domain. 
 
 Section 23. Constitutional Limitations — the Specific RrovisioiL 
 
 24. Constitutional Limitations — the Due Process Clause. 
 
 25. Other Constitutional Limitations. 
 
 26. Treatment of Constitutional Questions. 
 
 27. Who may Raise Ohjeetions to the Constitutionality of an 
 
 Attempted Exercise of Eminent Domain. 
 
 28. Taking of Property Situated in Anotha- State. 
 
 29. Taking of Property for the Use of Junother IState. 
 
 30. Taking by a State of Property within the Control ^or Juris- 
 
 diction of the United States. 
 
 31. Obstruction of Navigable Waters by a State. 
 
 32. Interference by a State with Interstate Commerce. 
 
 33. Violation by a State of Rights Secured by a Treaty. 
 
 34. Taking of Property for the Use of the United States. 
 
 35. Taking of Property by Authority of the United States by 
 
 Corporations Engaged in Interstate Commerce. 
 
 36. Taking of the Property of a State by Authority of the United 
 
 States. 
 
 § 23. Constitutional Limitations — the Specific Provision. 
 
 The power of eminent domain is of course to be exer- 
 cised in conformance with all the limitations upon legis- 
 lative power found in the constitution of the United States 
 and of the state in which the property which it is sought 
 to take is situated, but the provision especially intended 
 to limit the exercise of the power and which is most fre- 
 quently invoked in eminent domain cases is that which 
 declares that private property shall not be taken for public 
 use without just compensation. 
 
 This provision is contained in the fifth amendment to 
 the constitution of the United States, but in that instru- 
 ment it is a limitation on the powers of the United States 
 only.^ A state law authorizing the taking of property for 
 private use or mthout compensation does not violate that 
 provision of the United States constitution. The same 
 
 1. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 193 U. S. 189, 48 L. ed. 675; Me- 
 (U. S.) 243, 8 L. ed. 672; Winous Grew v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 
 Point Shooting Club v. Caspersen, 230 Mo. 496, 132 S. W. 1076. 
 
 [80] 
 
f 24 Limitations on Poweb of Eminent Domain. 81 
 
 provision, however, with slightly different wording in some 
 instances, is found in the constitution of every state except 
 North Carolina and New Hampshire. The comparative 
 unimportance of eminent domain xmtil recent times is 
 illustrated by the fact that there was no express limitation 
 upon the power in the original constitutions of many of the 
 states. The provision now under consideration was first 
 adopted by New York in 1822, by New Jersey in 1844, by 
 Louisiana in 1845, by Maryland in 1851, and by Arkansas, 
 Oeorgia and South Carolina in 1868. 
 
 The language of the constitutional provision in question 
 seems in itself reasonably clear and unambiguous, but it 
 has given rise to unlimited litigation. Text writers and 
 courts of last resort have written volumes upon it, and the 
 discussion still continues. Under it no less than five serious 
 questions have arisen upon which the authorities are not 
 agreed: (1) To what branches of legislative power does 
 it apply? (2) What is a " taking? " (3) What is " prop- 
 erty? " (4) What is a " public use? " (5) What is " just 
 compensation? " 
 
 Upon each of these questions the courts of the different 
 jurisdictions have been divided, and the alignment has in 
 general been much the same in each controversy, the courts 
 whose members are chosen for life, and those of the more 
 conservative states generally, sustaining the view which 
 tends to uphold the rights of the public, while the courts 
 whose members are elected for short terms, and, in general, 
 the courts of the newer and more radical states, are as a 
 rule inclined to sustain the view which tends to uphold 
 private property rights. 
 
 § 24. Constitutional Limitations — the Due Process 
 Clause. 
 
 Next to the specific clause referred to in the preceding 
 
 section, which prohibits the taking of property for public 
 
 use without just compensation, the constitutional provision 
 
 most frequently invoked in connection with the exercise of 
 
 6 
 
82 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 24 
 
 eminent domain is that which in terms or in substance 
 prohibits the deprivation of any person of his life, liberty 
 or property without due process of law. Such a provision 
 is contained in the fifth amendment to the constitution of 
 the United States, but it is of course well understood that 
 the first ten amendments are limitations upon the power 
 of the federal government and not upon that of the states. 
 In 1868 however the fourteenth amendment to the federal 
 constitution was adopted, which expressly provided that 
 no state should deprive any person of life, liberty or prop- 
 erty without due process of law. 
 
 The same or an equivalent provision is found in most of 
 the state constitutions. " The judgment of his peers or 
 the law of the land ' ' is the expression used in the consti- 
 tutions of Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
 Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
 South Carolina and Tennessee. The same phraseology is 
 used in Maine and Ehode Island, but the provision is 
 limited to criminal cases. "Due course of law" is the 
 Connecticut restriction, while in Indiana, Kansas, Mich- 
 igan, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, Virginia 
 and Wisconsin the provision is wholly lacking. It has, 
 however, been held in New Jersey that the clause declaring 
 that the privilege of possessing and protecting property is 
 inalienable is equivalent to the due process clause,^ and a 
 similar conclusion has been reached in Wisconsin in inter- 
 preting the clause guaranteeing every person a certain 
 remedy for all injuries.* In all the other states " due 
 process of law " is the expression employed. 
 
 * ' Due process of law " is a phrase which is not easy to 
 define, and which has been the source of unending contro- 
 versy. As applied to legislative interference with private 
 property, it may be said in a general way that the clause of 
 the constitution which prohibits the taking of life, liberty 
 or property without due process of law was intended to 
 secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the 
 
 2. Maxwell v. Goetschius, 40 3. Durkee v. Janesville, 28 Wis. 
 
 N. J. L. 383. 464, 9 Am. Rep. 500. 
 
§ 24 Limitations on Power of Eminent Domain. 83 
 
 power of government, unrestrained by the established prin- 
 ciples of private right and distributive justice,* and that 
 any legal proceeding enforced by public authority which 
 is sanctioned by age and authority, and especially if it 
 was the established and recognized practice when the state 
 constitutions were first adopted and was not in terms 
 prohibited, constitutes due process of law, and, further- 
 more, that any statute authorizing interference with pri- 
 vate property which is enacted with the public interests 
 in view and which is reasonably adapted to the end sought 
 and which regards and preserves the recognized princi- 
 ples of right and justice, and which does not create any 
 arbitrary discrimination between persons and things sim- 
 ilarly situated and is not unreasonably oppressive upon 
 individuals, also constitutes due process of law in the con- 
 stitutional sense, even if it is without the sanction of any 
 precedent in the history of constitutional government.^ 
 The requirement of due process of law relates both to the 
 substance of any legislative enactment and to the procedure 
 and forms adopted for carrying it into effect. 
 
 The constitutional provision which requires due process 
 of law is of general application to all branches of govern- 
 mental power, and thus affects the power of eminent 
 domain. It is however not so frequently invoked in the 
 case of the exercise of eminent domain as it is to resist the 
 enforcement of statutes of a regulatory nature enacted 
 under the police power, and of statutes providing novel 
 methods of taxation, because the more specific clause pro- 
 hibiting the taking of property for public use without com- 
 pensation, which is especially directed against abuses 
 under color of eminent domain, is more readily available 
 for such a purpose. In the case of the taking of property 
 by eminent domain under federal authority, the due process 
 clause of the fifth amendment is rarely invoked, as the 
 
 i. Bank of Columbia v. Okely, v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 28 
 
 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 235, 4 L. ed. 559. L. ed. 232; Holden v. Hardy, 169 
 
 5. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780. 
 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616; Hurtado 
 
84 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 24 
 
 portion of the same amendment specifically aimed at emi- 
 nent domain forbidding the taking of property without 
 compensation is more directly in point; and the same is 
 true of the requirement of due process or the law of the 
 land in the state constitutions in the case of takings under 
 state authority. 
 
 It is of course well established that a taking of property 
 by authority of a state for a public use upon payment of 
 just compensation, although an extreme exercise of gov- 
 ernmental control over private rights of property, is, when 
 effected in accordance with a statute which affords the 
 owner a reasonable opportunity to be heard upon the ques- 
 tion of damages, due process of law in the constitutional 
 sense, because the exercise of eminent domain was a recog- 
 nized and established power of government when the state 
 constitutions were first adopted.® It is, however, well 
 settled that a taking of property in violation of the specific 
 clause — 'that is, for private use or without just compen- 
 sation — is also a deprivation of property without due 
 process of law, and if a state attempts to authorize such a 
 taking, and the owner, for any reason, cannot successfully 
 invoke the more specific clause, the broad protection of 
 the due process clause comes into play. In addition to pro- 
 hibiting the taking of property for private use or without 
 just compensation, the due process clause gives the land- 
 owner protection not granted by any other constitutional 
 provision from arbitrary and unfair methods of procedure 
 in eminent domain cases.'' Accordingly, since the adoption 
 of the fourteenth amendment, there is the possibility of a 
 federal question in every taking by eminent domain under 
 state authority, even if all the requirements of the con- 
 stitution of the state are held to have been complied with. 
 
 Appeal to the due process clause has been found neces- 
 sary in several classes of cases arising under the exercise 
 
 6. Aldridge v. Tuseumbia, etc., road Co., 130 U. S. 559, 32 L. ed. 
 E. R. Co., 2 Stew. & Port. (Ala.) 1045; Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 
 199, 23 Am. Dec. 307. 51, 47 L. ed. 70. See also infra, 
 
 7. Huling V. Kaw Valley Rail- §§ 328-345 inc. 
 
§ 24 Limitations on Power of Eminent Domain. 85 
 
 of eminent domain in addition to those involving merely 
 forms and procedure. It was made several times in states 
 which had not adopted the specific clause, and the due 
 process clause in the state constitution was held to carry 
 the necessary protection.* More recently a number of the 
 state constitutions have specifically authorized some form 
 of interference with property which would otherwise be 
 obnoxious to the clause prohibiting the taking of property 
 for public use without compensation. Such specific author- 
 ization overrides any general prohibition contained in the 
 state constitution, but the due process clause in the four- 
 teenth amendment to the United States constitution fully 
 protects the owner.^ 
 
 The most common appeal to the fourteenth amendment 
 in this class of cases is when an owner considers that his 
 property has been taken by authority of a state without 
 compensation or for private purposes. State courts some- 
 times set aside the acts of their own legislatures on this 
 ground,^" but, if they do not, the owner may take the case 
 
 8. Arkansas. — Ex parte Martin, which the court was not satisfied 
 
 13 Ark. 198, 58 Am. Dec. 321; that the provision prohibiting the 
 
 Cairo, etc., E. E. Co. v. Turner, 31 taking of property for public use 
 
 Ark. 494, 25 Am. Eep. 564. without just compensation pre- 
 
 Georgia. — Parham v. Decatur vented the taking of property for 
 
 County, 9 Ga. 341. private use, but held that at all 
 
 Ma/ryland. — Harness v. Chesa- events such a taking was withouit 
 
 peake & Ohio Canal Co., 1 Md. Ch. due process of law. In People ex 
 
 248. rel. New York Central E. E. Co. v. 
 
 New Hampshire.— Piscataqua Priest, 206 N. T. 274, 99 N. E. 547, 
 
 Bridge V. New Hampshire Bridge, it was said that a taking without 
 
 7 N. H. 35; Mt. Washington Eoad compensation was not the "law of 
 
 Co., Petitioner, 35 N. H. 134; East- the land." 
 
 man v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 44 9. U. S. Constitution, art. VT; 
 
 N. H. 143, 82 Am. Dee. 201. Fallbrook Irrigation District v. 
 
 North Ca/rolina.— Raleigh E. E. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. ed. 
 
 Co. V. Davis, 2 Dev. & B. E. 451, 369; Be TuthiU, 163 N. Y. 133, 57 
 
 460; State v. Glen, 7 Jones L. 321; N. E. 303, 49 L. E. A. 471, 79 Am. 
 
 Staton V. Norfolk, etc., E. E. Co., St. Eep. 574 (opinion of Gray, J.). 
 
 Ill N. C. 278, 16 S. E. 181, 19 See also infra, §§ 24, 39. 
 
 L. E. A. 838; Phillips v. Postal 10. As in Pacific Tel., etc., Co. v. 
 
 Tel. Cable Co., 130 N. C. 513, 41 Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 137 Pae. 
 
 S. E. 1022, 89 Am. St. Eep. 868. 119, 50 L. E. A. (N. S.) 652; Mt 
 
 See also Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 
 
 (N. Y.) 140, 40 Am. Dee. 274, in Mass. 509, 33 N. E. 695, 35 Am. 
 
86 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 25 
 
 to the Supreme Court of the United States, and if his con- 
 tention is sustained the taking will be held invalid." Not 
 only is the owner protected from unconstitutional statutes, 
 but the Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold that it is 
 a violation of the fourteenth amendment if a state court 
 justice in his instructions to the jury adopts a measure of 
 damages for the taking of property by eminent domain 
 which would not constitute just compensation in the con- 
 stitutional sense.^* It is not however a violation of the 
 fourteenth amendment if the owner of property taken by 
 eminent domain after a fair hearing is awarded only nomi- 
 nal damages,^^ or even if, by reason of a mistake of law by 
 the court, he gets less than he ought." 
 
 § 25. Other Constitutional Limitations upon the Power 
 of Eminent Domain. 
 
 There are other provisions of the state and federal con- 
 stitutions which affect to a less important extent the exer- 
 
 St. Rep. 515; and Be TuthiU, 163 Co., 208 U. S. 598, 52 L. ed. 637, 
 
 N. Y. 183, 57 N. E. 303, 49 L. R. A. 13 Ann. Cas. 1008; Consolidated 
 
 471, 79 Am. St. Rep. 574. This is Turnpike Co. v. Norfolk, etc., E. R. 
 
 a little dangerous however, as un- Co., 228 U. S. 326, 596, 57 L. ed. 
 
 der the present federal statutes 857, 982. See also infra, §§ 39, 
 
 such a decision cannot be taken on 204. 
 
 writ of error to the United States 12. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 
 Supreme Court. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed., 
 
 11. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 979. See also Portland Ry., etc.,' 
 
 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616; Cole v. Co. v. Portland, 181 Fed. 632, hold- 
 
 LaGrrange, 113 U. S. 1, 28 L. ed. ing that a municipality in attempt- 
 
 896; Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., ing to take private property for a 
 
 113 U. S. 9, 28 L. ed. 889; Ken- street without authority for that 
 
 tueky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 particular taking is attempting to 
 
 IT. S. 321, 29 L. ed. 403; Missouri take property without due process 
 
 Pacific R. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 of law. 
 
 U. S. 403, 41 L. ed. 489; Smyth v. 13. Appleby v. Buffalo, 221 U. S. 
 
 Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 525, 42 L. ed. 524, 55 L. ed. 838, sustaining 189 
 
 819, 842; San Diego Land, etc., Co. N. Y. 163, 81 N. E. 954; Provo 
 
 V. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 754, Beach Canal & Irrigation Co. v. 
 
 43 L. ed. 1154, 1160; Madisonville Tanner, 239 U. S. 323, 60 L. ed. 
 
 Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mln- — , sustaining 40 Utah 105, 121 
 
 ing Co., 196 U. S. 239, 252, 49 Pac. 584. 
 
 L. ed. 462, 468; Clark v. Nash, 14. MeGovem v. New York, 229 
 
 198 U. S. 361, 49 L. ed. 1085; U. S. 363, 57 L. ed. 1228, sustain- 
 
 Hairston v. Danville, etc., R. R. ing 195 N. Y. 573, 88 N. E. 1132. 
 
§ 25 Limitations on Powek of Eminent Domain. 87 
 
 cise of eminent domain, among them the interstate com- 
 merce clause of the federal constitution^® and the pro- 
 hibition against the impairment of the obligation of con- 
 tracts in the same instrument," also the provisions in 
 regard to jury trial in both state and federal constitu- 
 tions." So also the provisions against special legislation 
 found in some of the state constitutions necessarily affect 
 the exercise of eminent domain to a considerable degree.^* 
 
 In many of the states in recent years constitutional 
 amendments have been adopted specific3.1ly aimed at emi- 
 nent domain and revising the previous judicial interpreta- 
 tion of the clause prohibiting the taking of property for 
 private use or without compensation. Most of such amend- 
 ments are intended to limit the exercise of governmental 
 power in favor of the individual owner of property. The 
 most important of these are the requirement of compen- 
 sation when property is damaged,^* of payment of com- 
 pensation in advance^" and of jury trial,^' the prohibition 
 of the setting off of benefits from damages,^^ and pro- 
 visions that the necessity of a taking shall be a judicial 
 question ^^ and that courts in deciding whether a use is 
 public shall not be influenced by the declaration of the 
 legislature.^* 
 
 On the other hand, in some of the states, the constitu- 
 tions, by declaring certain uses to be public, specifically 
 authorize the exercise of eminent domain upon conditions 
 under which the customary general provisions have been 
 held to prohibit it.^® 
 
 When the owners of property 17. Infra, § 339. 
 
 taken had the right to appeal to 18. See for example Anderton v. 
 
 the court in respect to the dam- Milwaukee, 82 "Wis. 279, 52 N. W. 
 
 ages awarded, and failed to do so, 95, 15 L. R. A. 830. 
 
 their property was not taken with- 19. Infra, § 311. 
 
 out due process of law, although 20. Infra, § 212. 
 
 the damages awarded were inade- 21. Infra, § 339. 
 
 quate. Evans v. Crisfleld, 122 Md. 22. Infra, § 254. 
 
 184, 89 Atl. 430. 23. Infra, § 335. 
 
 15. Infra, §§ 31, 35. 24. Infra, § 52. 
 
 16. Infra, §§ 123, 127, 179. 25. Infra, § 38. 
 
88 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 26 
 
 § 26. Treatment of Constitutional Questions. 
 
 Before turning to the consideration of the constitutional 
 questions arising under the foregoing provisions, there is 
 one fundamental point that must be clearly understood. 
 When a court is asked to pass upon the constitutionality 
 of an act of the legislature, a co-ordinate branch of the 
 government, the court should not decide whether in its own 
 opinion the act is constitutional or not, but whether the 
 members of the legislature, as reasonable men, might have 
 fairly considered it constitutional. Every presumption is 
 in favor of the validity of the law, and it is only when it 
 seems clearly a violation of the constitution " at first 
 blush ' ' that the court will hold it invalid.^® This canon of 
 constitutional construction has seldom been openly dis- 
 puted, but much of the confusion and disagreement of the 
 decisions has been caused by the failure of some courts to 
 
 26. Talbot v. Hudson, 16. Gray 
 (Mass.) 417. "But it is "to be 
 borne in mind that in determining 
 whether a statute is within the le- 
 gitimate sphere of legislative ac- 
 tion, it is the duty of courts to 
 make all reasonable presumptions 
 in favor of its validity. It is not 
 to be supposed that the law-making 
 power has transcended its author- 
 ity or committed, under the form 
 of law, a violation of individual 
 rights. When an act has been 
 passed with all the requisites neces- 
 sary to give it the force of a bind- 
 ing statute, it must be regarded as 
 valid unless it can be clearly shown 
 to be in conflict with the constitu- 
 tion. It is, therefore, incumbent 
 on those who deny the validity of 
 a statute to show that it is a plain 
 and palpable violation of constitu- 
 tional right. If they fail to do so, 
 or leave room for a reasonable 
 doubt upon the question whether 
 it is an infringement of any of the 
 guaranties secured by the consti- 
 tution, the presumption in favor of 
 
 the validity of the act must stand." 
 Fleicher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 
 87, at p. 128, 3 L. ed. 162, 175. 
 " The question whether a law be 
 void for its repugnancy to the con- 
 stitution is at all times a question 
 of much delicacy which ought sel- 
 dom if ever to be decided in the 
 affirmative in a doubtful case. 
 * * * It is not on slight implica- 
 tions and vague conjecture that 
 the legislature is to be pronounced 
 to have transcended its powers and 
 its acts to be considered as void. 
 The opposition between the con- 
 stitution and the law should be 
 such that the judge feels a clear 
 and strong conviction of their in- 
 compatibility with each other." 
 Similar citations might be extended 
 indefinitely. See also for example 
 Ogden V. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 
 (U. S.) 213, 6 L. ed. 606; Sinking 
 Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 25 L. ed. 
 495; Civil Eights Cases, 109 U. S. 
 3, 27, 29 L. ed. 835, 844, and supra, 
 § 11. 
 
§ 26 LaMiTATioNs ON Power of Eminent Domain. 89 
 
 follow the rule, in the same breath witli "wiiieh they declare 
 their adherence to it. 
 
 Another point to be kept in mind is that constitutional 
 distinctions are seldom sharply drawn.^^ The limits of 
 legislative power end in a shadowy region, and each new 
 case that falls in that region must be decided by itself 
 xmtil, by the gradual process of judicial exclusion and 
 inclusion, the limits become better understood. It is only 
 in this way that the constitutions retain the flexibility so 
 necessary to the changing conditions of our national and 
 individual existence. As constitutional questions are thus 
 questions of degree, it does not help at all to cite cases 
 only partially analogous to the one being considered, and 
 which fall clearly upon one side or the other of the line, 
 or to demonstrate that the legislature might pass an act 
 similar in kind, but differing in degree, which would be 
 clearly valid or invalid. 
 
 That the due process clause cannot be satisfactorily 
 interpreted by a consultation with the dictionary is obvious, 
 but it is equally true that the more specific language of the 
 article forbidding the taking of property for public use 
 without compensation must be studied from the point of 
 view of the political historian, rather than from that of 
 the lexicographer. The evils aimed at give the best clue 
 to the sense of the provision, and enactments which were 
 considered of unquestionable propriety before the state 
 constitutions were adopted and for many years thereafter 
 should not now for the first time be put to the test of the 
 literal meaning of the words of the clause. On the other 
 hand, a matter which was known in earlier times, but was 
 not then treated as a proper subject for eminent domain, 
 
 27. Danforth v. Groton Water certaia freedom in fixing the line, 
 
 Co., 178 Mass. 472, 59 N. E. 1033, as has been recognized with regard 
 
 86 Am. St. Rep. 495, per Holmes, to the police power." See also 
 
 C. J. "It may be that it would Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 
 
 have been better to say definitely 19 N. E. 390, 2 L. R. A. 81, 12 
 
 that constitutional rules, like those Am. St. Rep. 560, infra, § 100; 
 
 of the common law, end in a pe- Camfield v. United States, 167 
 
 numbra where the legislature has a U. S. 518, 523, 42 L. ed. 260, 262. 
 
90 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 27 
 
 would be looked at with considerable suspicion by the courts 
 if put forward now as a cause for the enforced alienation 
 of property. Similarly the courts would hesitate to permit 
 a form of damage to property to pass uncompensated if it 
 had always been treated as a taking of the owner's legal 
 rights, or to allow a, new and less satisfactory form of com- 
 pensation to be substituted for the method of payment for 
 property taken for public use sanctioned by long-estab- 
 lished custom. It is only entirely new problems which can 
 be solved neither by precedent nor analogy that can be con- 
 sidered from a purely academic standpoint. 
 
 § 27. Who may Raise Objections to the Constitutionality 
 of an Attempted Exercise of Eminent Domain. 
 
 The constitutional provisions which affect the exercise 
 of the power of eminent domain are not intended as abstract 
 limitations upon the power of the government so that any 
 statute which violates such provisions is necessarily and 
 for all purposes void, and the acts of any public officials 
 thereunder are necessarily illegal. On the contrary, the 
 provisions were intended solely for the protection of the 
 individual property owner from the aggressions of the gov- 
 ernment in concrete cases. It necessarily follows that, so 
 far as the limitations upon the power of eminent domain are 
 concerned, no one but the owner of property whose consti- 
 tutional rights are violated can object to the validity of a 
 statute on the ground that it authorizes the exercise of emi- 
 nent domain in a manner forbidden by the constitution, and 
 if, when property is taken under an unconstitutional statute, 
 the owner sees fit to waive his right to object, no one else 
 has any ground to complain, and the taking is as effective 
 to pass the title to the property as if all the requirements 
 of the constitution had been complied with.^^ 
 
 28. United States. — St. Louis, son, etc., Ry. Co., 62 Kan. 412, 63 
 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Foltz, 52 Fed. Pae. 430, 84 Am. St. Rep. 408. 
 
 627. Massachusetts. — ^Wellington, Pe- 
 
 Zowffl.— Tharp v. Witham, 65 titioner, 16 Pick. 87, 27 Am. Dee. 
 
 Iowa 566, 22 N. W. 677. 631; HaskeU v. New Bedford, 108 
 
 Kansas. — WiUiams v. Hutchin- Mass. 208; Prince v. Crocker, 166 
 
§ 27 Limitations on Power of Eminent Domain. 91 
 
 It may happen, of course, that the taking of property 
 by eminent domain under an unconstitutional statute vio- 
 lates rights which the law recognizes and protects of others 
 than the owner of the property taken. Thus provision is 
 usually made, by statute or otherwise, for the institution 
 of proceedings by taxpayers to restrain the illegal expendi- 
 ture of money by the municipal corporation of which they 
 are members, and as the taking of property by a municipal 
 corporation for a use not public might involve the expendi- 
 ture of money raised by taxation for an illegal and unconsti- 
 tutional purpose, such a taking might be prevented by pro- 
 ceedings instituted by taxpayers even if the owner of the 
 property acquiesced. The mere failure to include an ade- 
 quate provision for compensation in a statute which author- 
 izes the taking of property for the public use is not however 
 ground for intervention by taxpayers, even if a taking 
 under the statute might result in costly and burdensome 
 litigation with the owners, since in justice such a question 
 cannot be determined without hearing the parties whose 
 
 Mass. 347, 362, 44 N. E. 446, 32 Wisconsin.— Moore v. Roberts, 
 
 L. R. A. 610; Higginson v. Boston, 64 Wis. 538, 25 N. W. 564. 
 
 212 Mass. 583, 99 N. E. 523, 42 See also infra, §§ 474^477 inc. 
 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 215. Such waiver may be by parol. 
 
 Michigan. — People ex rel. Trom- Maine. — Clement v. Durgin, 5 
 
 bley V. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, Me. 9. 
 
 476, 9 Am. Rep. 94. Massachusetts. — Euller v. Plym- 
 
 Missouri. — United States v. outh County Commissioners, 15 
 
 Reed, 56 Mo. 565. Pick. 81. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Gumsey v. Michigan. — Bumpus v. Miller, 4 
 
 Edwards, 26 N. H. 224. Mich. 159. 
 
 New Jersey. — Debine v. Olney, New York. — People v. Goodwin, 
 
 68 N. J. L. 284, 53 Atl. 466. 5 N. T. 568; Marble v. Whitney, 
 
 New York.— Baker v. Braman, 6 28 N. Y. 297. 
 
 Hill 47, 40 Am. Dec. 387; Ambury Or may be implied from the 
 
 V. Conner, 3 Comst. 511, 53 Am. owner's acceptance of the compen- 
 
 Dec. 325; Waterloo Woolen Mfg. sation. 
 
 Co. V. Shanahan, 128 N. Y. 345, Colorado. — Denver, etc.. Water 
 
 28 N. E. 358, 14 L. R. A. 481. Co. v. Middaugh, 12 Colo. 434, 21 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Body v. Negley, Pac. 565. 
 
 40 Pa. 377. Connecticut. — Hawley v. Har- 
 
 Washington. — Pulton v. Methow rail, 19 Conn. 142; Skinner v. 
 
 Trading Co., 45 Wash. 136, 88 Hartford Bridge Co., 29 Conn. 523. 
 
 Pac. 117. Illinois.— Kile v. Yellowhead, 80 
 
92 The Law of EMiFEiiFT Domain. § 28 
 
 property rights are said to be involved ; ^^ and in the case 
 of a taking by a private corporation, no one bnt the owner 
 of the property taken can have any ground to intervene. 
 
 § 28. Taking of Property Situated in Another State. 
 
 There is one limitation upon the power of eminent domain 
 which depends upon no express constitutional provision. 
 The powers of a sovereign state, however vast in their 
 character and searching in their extent, are inherently 
 limited to subjects within the jurisdiction of the state, and 
 any attempt to exercise governmental powers in another 
 state is necessarily void. A state therefore cannot take or 
 authorize the taking of property or rights in property situ- 
 ated in another state, and, conversely, each state holds all 
 the property within its limits free from the eminent domain 
 of any other state and cannot be compelled to surrender 
 such property to another state in any way.*" 
 
 No case of a state openly attempting to condemn land 
 within another state against the will of the latter has arisen 
 or is likely to arise, though the courts have had to construe 
 statutes, authorizing in general terms the condemnation 
 of interstate bridges, as giving no power to take that part 
 of the bridge lying beyond the boundary of the state in 
 which the statute was enacted.*^ As will be shown later, 
 
 111. 208; Union Mutual Life In- 30. McCarter v. Hudson County 
 
 surance Co. v. Slee, 123 111. 57, 13 Water Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 695, 65 
 
 N. E. 222. Atl. 489, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 197, 
 
 Massachusetts. — Hatch v . 118 Am. St. Rep. 754; affirmed, 209 
 
 Hawkes, 126 Mass. 177. U. S. 349, 52 L. ed. 828. See also 
 
 Michigan. — Prescott v. Patter- Illinois State Trust Co. v. St. 
 
 son, 49 Mich. 622, 14 N. W. 571. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 208 111. 419, 
 
 New York.— Sherman v. Me- 70 N. E. 357. 
 
 Keon, 38 N. Y. 275; Matter of 31. Evansville, etc., Traction Co. 
 
 Woolsey, 95 N. Y. 135. v. Henderson Bridge Co., 134 Fed. 
 
 Texas.~¥ort Worth Ice Co. v. 973; Croshy v. Hanover, 36 N. H. 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 11 Tex. 404. See also Rainy Lake River 
 
 Civ. App. 600, 33 S. W. 159. Boom Co. v. Rainy River Lumber 
 
 But an owner, by merely filing a Co., 162 Fed. 287. Wlien a city 
 
 claim for damages is not estopped seeks to condemn land ■within its 
 
 from contesting the constitution- limits for a ferry landing, it is no 
 
 ality of the taking. See infra, objection that the other landing is 
 
 § 396. in another state. Helm v. Gxay- 
 
 29. Higginson v. Boston, 212 ville, 224 lU. 274, 79 N. E. 689. 
 Mass. 583, 593, 99 N. E. 523, 42 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 215. 
 
§ 28 Limitations ok Powee op Emikent Domain. 93 
 
 a taking of property within the meaning of the constitution 
 can be effected without formal condemnation or even with- 
 out actual entry .'^^ One may inflict such severe injury upon 
 another's land by a particular use of his own that he will 
 be held to have taken it. The principle that one state cannot 
 authorize the taking of land outside its jurisdiction applies 
 to a taking of such a character. Accordingly when a citi- 
 zen of one state uses his own land in such a way as to 
 "take" land situated in another state, even if he has 
 authority from the legislature of his own state, he is acting 
 without legal justification, and the person whose land is 
 thus taken may secure redress in the federal courts,^* 
 
 The most common source of controversies of this char- 
 acter is the interference by authority of the legislature of 
 one state with a watercourse running through other states. 
 Certain acts of interference with running waters are action- 
 able at common law, and may be so injurious as to consti- 
 tute a taking of the property of riparian proprietors above 
 or below the spot where the act was committed.** Some- 
 times such acts of interference are committed in one state 
 and the injury is inflicted in another. It is well settled in 
 such a case that the person who causes the injury is liable 
 in tort when he acts on his own responsibility,^® and the 
 rule is the same if the injurious act is performed by author- 
 ity of the state in which it was committed or even by the 
 state itself, if the injury is so severe as to amount to a 
 taking. For although a state cannot be sued either directly 
 or indirectly through its officers, this exemption does not 
 extend to the case of a state officer who interferes with 
 private property.*® He is sued, not as an officer, but as an 
 
 32. Infra, §§ 111-116 inc. Mfg. Co., 39 Me. 246; Armendiaz 
 
 33. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper v. Stillman, 54 Tex. 623. 
 
 Co., 206 U. S. 230, 51 L. ed. 1038. 36. Osbom v. Bank of United 
 
 In this case the fumes of a smelter States, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 738, 6 
 
 standing in one state destroyed the L. ed. 204; United States v. Lee, 
 
 vegetation upon certain land across 106 U. S. 196, 27 L. ed. 171; Cun- 
 
 the boundary of another state. ningham v. Macon R. E.. Co., 109 
 
 34. Infra, §§ 143, 146. U. S. 446, 27 L. ed. 992. See also 
 
 35. Howard v. Ingersoll, 17 Ala. Raleigh v. Gosehen (1898), 1 Ch. 
 780 ; Eachus v. Illinois, etc., Canal, 73. 
 
 17 HI. 534; Wooster v. Great Falls 
 
94 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 28 
 
 individual, and he cannot justify his interference unless he 
 can show that his authority was legal and valid. This he 
 could not do if he took property in a state other than that 
 from which he received his authority. Accordingly it has 
 been held that a state statute is no justification for flooding 
 lands in another state,^'^ for diverting an unreasonable 
 amount of water which would otherwise flow into another 
 state,^® or for destroying a fishery in another state.^® If 
 however the statute, under color of which the act was done, 
 provides compensation for all injuries thereby caused, a 
 party whose property in another state was injured, may, if 
 he wishes, waive the tort and petition for damages under 
 the statute.*" If the injury to the interests of the inhabit- 
 ants of the state where the damage is done is extensive, 
 the state causing the injury may be sued directly by the 
 state in which the damage is done, in the Supreme Court 
 of the United States.*^ 
 
 No corporation, municipal or private, can be given power 
 by the state which issued its charter to take lands by emi- 
 nent domain outside the limits of such state ; *^ but a state 
 
 37. United States v. Ames, 1 under the authority of another 
 Wood. & M. (U. S.) 76; Bm.tz v. state. Wooster v. Great FaUs Mfg. 
 St. Louis, 7 Ted. 438; Foot v. Co., 39 Me. 246; Salisbury Mills v. 
 Edwards, 3 Blatchf. (U. S.) 310; Forsaith, 57 N. H. 124. 
 Holyoke Water Power Co. v. Con- 41. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 
 necticut River Co., 52 Conn. 570. 208, 45 L. ed. 497 (poUution of 
 
 38. Pine v. New York, 185 U. S. stream) ; Kansas v. Colorado, 185 
 93, 46 L. ed. 820; Kansas v. Colo- U. S. 125, 46 L. ed. 838 (with- 
 rado, 185 U. S. 125, 46 L. ed. 838 ; drawal of water from a stream) ; 
 Manville Co. v. Worcester, 138 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 
 
 89, 52 Am. Rep. 264. 206 U. S. 230, 51 L. ed. 1038 (pol- 
 
 39. Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 15 lution of the air). 
 
 Wall. (U. S.) 500, 21 L. ed. 133. 42. United /S'toies.— Saunders v. 
 
 And see also Palmer v. Cuyahoga Bluefield, etc., Improvement Co., 58 
 
 Co., 3 McLean (U. S.) 226. Fed. 133; St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. 
 
 40, Banigan v. Worcester, 30 v. Southwestern, etc., Tel. Co., 121 
 Fed. 392; Brickett v. Haverhill Fed. 276. 
 
 Aqueduct Co., 142 Mass. 394, 8 Alaska. — Miocene Ditch Co. v. 
 
 N. E. 119. An owner cannot how- Lyng, 2 Alaska, 265, 70 C. C. A. 
 
 ever proceed under a statute of the 458, 138 Fed. 544. 
 
 state in which the land was situated Georgia. — Chestatee Pyrites Co. 
 
 for injury due to the construction v. Cavenders, etc., Co., 119 Ga. 354, 
 
 of works within the territory and 46 S. E. 422, 100 Am. St. Rep. 174. 
 
§ 28 Limitations on Power of Eminent Domain. 95 
 
 may authorize a foreign corporation to condemn land within 
 its own limits.*^ A state may even grant the power to exer- 
 
 Illinois. — Illinois State Trust Co. 
 V. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 208 HI. 
 419, 70 N. E. 357. 
 
 Louisiana. — Southwestein Tel. 
 Co. V. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 
 108 La. 691, 32 So. 958. 
 
 Missouri. — Southern Illinois, etc.. 
 Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 Mo. 1, 
 73 S. W. 453, 63 L. R. A. 301, 
 affirmed 206 U. S. 267, 51 L. ed. 
 1057. 
 
 Montana. — Helena Power Trans- 
 mission Co. V. Spratt, 35 Mont. 108, 
 88 Pac. 773, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 567, 
 10 Ann. Cas. 1055. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Crosby v. 
 Hanover, 36 N. H. 404. 
 
 South Carolina. — Duke v. Postal 
 Tel. Cable Co., 71 S. C. 95, 50 
 S. B. 675. 
 
 West Virginia. — Baltimore, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 17 W. Va. 866. 
 
 And see also Bank of Augusta 
 V. Earle, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 519, 10 
 L. ed. 274; Baltimore, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Koontz, 144 U. S. 5, 12, 26 
 L. ed. 643; Central Union Tel. Co. 
 V. Columbus Grove, 28 Obio Cir. 
 Ct. 131. 
 
 43. United States. — Hagerla v. 
 Mississippi River Power Co., 202 
 Fed. 776. 
 
 Alabama. — Columbus Water- 
 works Co. V. Long, 121 Ala. 245, 
 25 So. 702. 
 
 Arkansas.- — Russell v. St. Louis, 
 etc., Ry. Co., 71 Ark. 451, 75 S. W. 
 725. 
 
 California. — Deseret Water, etc., 
 Co. V. State, 167 Cal. 147, 138 Pae. 
 981. 
 
 Georgia. — Southwestern R. R. 
 Co. V. Southern, etc., Tel. Co., 46 
 Ga. 43, 12 Am. Rep. 585 ; Chestatee 
 Pyrites Co. v. Cavenders, etc.. Min- 
 ing Co., 119 Ga. 354, 46 S. E. 422, 
 100 Am. St. Rep. 174. 
 
 Illinois. — ■ Illinois State Trust Co. 
 V. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 208 HI. 
 419, 70 N. E. 357. 
 
 Iowa. — Dodge v. Council Bluffs, 
 57 Iowa 560, 10 N. W. 886. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Abbott v. New 
 York, etc., R. R. Co., 145 Mass. 450, 
 15 N. E. 91. 
 
 Missouri. — St. Louis, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Lewright, 113 Mo. 660, 21 
 S. W. 210; State v. Cook, 171 Mo. 
 348, 71 S. W. 829; Southern Illi- 
 nois, etc.. Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 
 Mo.Jl, 73 S. W. 453, 63 L. R. A. 
 301; afiBrmed, 206 U. S. 267, 51 
 L. ed. 1057. 
 
 Montana. — Spratt v. Helena 
 Power Transmission Co., 35 Mont. 
 108, 88 Pac. 773, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 567, 10 Ann. Cas. 1055. 
 
 Nebraska. — State v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 25 Neb. 156, 41 
 N. W. 125, 2 L. R. A. 564; Myers 
 V. McGavock, 39 Neb. 843, 58 N. W. 
 522, 42 Am. St. Rep. 627; Rogers 
 V. Cosgrave, 98 Neb. 608, 153 N. W. 
 569. 
 
 New York. — Be Townsend, 39 
 N. Y. 171; New York, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Welch, 143 N. Y. 411, 38 
 N. E. 378, 42 Am. St. Rep. 734. 
 
 Ohio. — State v. Sherman, 22 
 Ohio St. 434. 
 
 Oregon. — ■ Northwestern Electric 
 Co. V. Zimmerman, 67 Ore. 150, 135 
 Pac. 330, Ann. Cas. 1915 C 927. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — New York, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Young, 33 Pa. 175. 
 
 Texas. — San Antonio, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Southwestern, etc., Tel. Co., 
 93 Tex. 313, 55 S. W. 117, 49 
 L. R. A. 459, 77 Am. St. Rep. 884. 
 
 West Virginia. — Pittsburg Hy- 
 dro-Electric Co. V. Liston, 70 
 W. Va. 83, 73 S. E. 86, 40 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 602. 
 
96 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 29 
 
 cise eminent domain within its limits to a foreign corpora- 
 tion wMch. has no such, power in its charter.** 
 
 In all the cases involving the taking of property in 
 another state which appear to have arisen, the subject mat- 
 ter of the taking was real estate, and there is of course no 
 question that real estate is within the jurisdiction of the 
 state in which, it is situated, regardless of the domicile of 
 the owner. Serious complications might arise if a state 
 attempted to take the personal property of nonresidents 
 found within its limits, or of its own residents kept outside 
 the state. It is safe to assume that in such a case all the 
 modem modifications of the doctrine that mobilia sequuntur 
 personam would be held applicable, and property perma- 
 nently kept in one state would be held to be within the juris- 
 diction of such state and of no other,*^ but whether prop- 
 erty of nonresidents temporarily within a state could be 
 taken by eminent domain, just as it may be attached on 
 mesne process, is open to more doubt. 
 
 § 29. Taking of Property for the Use of Another State. 
 
 A state may, by purchase or otherwise, acquire property 
 within another state, but when a state owns land situated in 
 another state it has no greater rights than a private propri- 
 etor and the land is subject to all the governmental powers 
 of the state in which it is situated.*® 
 
 A state may constitutionally prohibit the diversion of its 
 natural resources for the benefit of the people of other 
 states. Thus it may prohibit riparian owners from divert- 
 ing water from a river within the state to furnish a water 
 supply to a city in another state,*'' and it may grant the 
 
 44. Hageria v. Missi^ppi River Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 50 
 Power Co., 202 Fed. 776; Deseret L. ed. 150. 
 
 Water, etc., Co. v. State, 167 Cal. 46. Burbank v. Fay, 65 N. T. 57. 
 
 147, 138 Pae. 981; Southern H- 47. MeCarter v. Hudson County 
 
 linois, etc., Bridge Co. v. Stone, Water Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 695, 65 Atl. 
 
 174 Mo. 1, 73 S. W. 453, 63 L. R. A. 489, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 197, 118 
 
 301; affirmed, 206 U. S. 267, 51 Am. St. Rep. 754; aflnned, 209 
 
 L. ed. 1057. U. S. 349, 52 L. ed. 828. 
 
 45. Union Refrigerator Transit 
 
§ 29 Limitations on Poweb of Eminent Domain. 97 
 
 power of eminent domain only to snch corporations as are 
 engaged in supplying patrons within the state.** 
 
 One state cannot take or authorize the taking of property 
 situated within its limits for the use of another state. Any 
 employment of the power of eminent domain for other pur- 
 poses than to enable the government of the state to exercise 
 and give effect to its proper authority, effectuate the pur- 
 pose of its creation and carry out the policy of its laws 
 could not be rested upon the justification and basis which 
 underlie the power, and has never received the sanction 
 of the courts.*® Accordingly it would seem that if a munic- 
 ipality was located close to the boundary of another" state, 
 and the only available property for satisfying the necessity 
 and convenience of its people for such purposes as a water 
 supply, a sewer outlet, or a park was situated across the 
 boundary line, it would be impossible to take the necessary 
 land by eminent domain even with the consent of the state 
 in which it was situated, for the legislature of neither state 
 would have power to grant the requisite authority — in 
 one case because the property sought to be taken was not 
 within its jurisdiction, and in the other because the use 
 for which it was sought to take the property was not one 
 for which it lay within its power to invoke the exercise of 
 eminent domain.^" "When however a taking of property is 
 for the use of the people of the state in which it is situated, 
 
 48. Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Wyoming. — Grover, etc., Land 
 Harless, 131 Ind. 446, 29 N. E. Co. v. Lovella, etc., Irrigation Co., 
 1062, 15 L. R. A. 505. In such a 21 Wyo. 204, 131 Pae. 43, Ann. 
 case, however, care must be taken Cas. 1915 D 1206. 
 
 not to interfere with interstate See also infra, § 34. 
 
 commerce. See infra, § 32. 50. When, however, the purpose 
 
 49. United States. — ^Kohl v. United is one for which the United States 
 States, 91 U. S. 367, 23 L. ed. 449. may authorize the exercise of the 
 
 Alabama. — Columbus Water- power of eminent domain, a munici- 
 
 works Co. v. Long, 121 Ala. 245, 25 pal corporation situated in one 
 
 So. 702. state may be authorized by Con- 
 
 Idaho. — Washington Water gress to condemn land in another 
 
 Power Co. v. Waters, 19 Idaho 595, state. Latinette v. St. Louis, 120 
 
 115 Pac. 682. C. C. A. 638, 201 Fed. 676. 
 
 Michigan. — People ex rel. Trom- 
 bley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, 9 
 Am. Rep. 94. 
 
 7 
 
98 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 30 
 
 the mere fact that it will also benefit the people of another 
 state is no ground for denying the right to exercise the 
 power.®^ 
 
 § 30. Taking by a State of Property within the Control or 
 Jurisdiction of the United States. 
 
 The power of a state to exercise the right of eminent 
 domain within its territorial liQiits is restricted by its lack 
 of authority to interfere with the performance of the pow- 
 ers and duties assigned by the constitution to the United 
 States government. It is well settled that a state cannot 
 take by eminent domain land owned by the United States 
 and devoted to governmental uses.®^ 
 
 Whether a state can condemn land within its limits which 
 is owned by the United States, but not devoted to any public 
 use, is a more doubtful question. It has been held that the 
 United States stands in the position of a private proprietor 
 of lands which it owns but which are not used for public 
 purposes,^* and there are decisions tending to support the 
 power of the state to take such lands, though the point has 
 never been actually passed upon by the Supreme Court." 
 
 51. In Be Townsend, 39 N. Y. other state would be benefited by a 
 171, it appeared that a company taking was no defense if there was 
 constructing a canal in New Jer- a direct benefit to the people of 
 sey was authorized by the legislar the state in which the taking was 
 ture of New York to condemn a sought to be made. See also Co- 
 water supply in New York and this lumbus Waterworks Co. v. Long, 
 statute was sustained by the court, 121 Ala. 245, 25 So. 702 ; Wash- 
 but on the ground that the canal ington Water Power Co. v. Waters, 
 was of great benefit to New York 19 Idaho 595, 115 Pac. 682. 
 also. If this feature had been lack- 52. United States v. Chicago, 7 
 ing the decision would probably How. (U. S.) 185, 12 L. ed. 660. 
 have been otherwise, as there would A territory cannot condemn such 
 have been no use, public to New land. Pratt v. Brown, 3 Wis. 603. 
 York, to be subserved. In Grover, 53. Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. 
 etc.. Land Co. v. Lovella, etc., Irri- v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 29 L. ed. 
 gation Co., 21 Wyo. 204, 131 Pac. 264. 
 
 43, Ann. Cas. 1915 D 1206, it was 54. It was held such land might 
 held that a corporation could not be taken in United States v. Rail- 
 be authorized to condemn property road Bridge Co., 6 McLean (U. S.) 
 in Wyoming in order to irrigate 517, and the doctrine approved, 
 lands in Colorado, but it was said obiter, in United States v. Chicago, 
 that the fact that people of an- 7 How. (U. S.) 185, 12 L. ed. 610. 
 
§ 30 Limitations on Poweb of Eminent Domain. 99 
 
 The problem is not free from doubt, but the better view 
 would seem to be that which holds such a taking valid. The 
 land is held merely as property and not as by itself perform- 
 ing any governmental function, and the compensation which 
 the United States would receive would be of equal value as 
 property and of equal assistance in performing the duties 
 of the national government. 
 
 A state cannot condemn land in a district formally ceded 
 to the United States, because the land so ceded is out of 
 the state's jurisdiction.^^ A distinction in connection with 
 the respective jurisdiction of the states and of the United 
 States has been drawn between land within a state acquired 
 by the United States without the consent of the state and 
 land ceded to the United States by the state. In the latter 
 case the state loses its jurisdiction altogether except so far 
 as it has been specially retained in the act of cession.^® In 
 the former case the state retains its jurisdiction so far as the 
 exercise thereof does not interfere with the use of the prop- 
 erty by the United States,^'^ but, as has just been stated, 
 whether this jurisdiction includes the power of condemning 
 unused land is an open question. 
 
 In Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 ing such acquisition and reserving 
 
 U. S. 151, 29 L. ed. 845, Gray, J., only the right to execute process in 
 
 seems to disapprove, but says the the lands to be acquired, 
 
 question ■will require careful eon- 56. United States. — Fort Leaven- 
 
 sideration when directly raised. See worth R. E. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 
 
 also a discussion of this question in 525, 29 L. ed. 264; United States v. 
 
 Utah Power & Light Co. v. United Cornell, 2 Mason 60. 
 
 States, 230 Fed. 328 and Roekport, Massachusetts. — Commonwealth v. 
 
 etc., R. Co. V. State (Tex. Civ. Clary, 8 Mass. 72; Mitchell v. Tib- 
 
 App.), 135 S. W. 263, the former bets, 17 Pick. 298. 
 
 disapproving and the latter ap- New York. — People v. Godfrey, 
 
 proving a taking of public lands 17 Johns. 225; Barrett v. Palmer, 
 
 by eminent domain. 135 N. Y. 336, 31 N. E. 1017, 17 
 
 55. United States v. Ames, 1 L. R. A. 730, 31 Am. St. Rep. 835 ; 
 
 Woodb. & M. (U. S.) 76; Opinion afiSrmed, 162 U. S. 399, 40 L. ed. 
 
 of the Justices, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 1015. 
 
 580. See also United States v. Cer- Ohio. — Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio 
 
 tain Lands, 208 Fed. 429, holding St. 306, 2 Am. Rep. 397. 
 
 that the state is estopped to exer- 57. Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. 
 
 else eminent domain in lands taken v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 29 L. ed. 
 
 for a forest reserve by the United 264; Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Mc- 
 
 States pursuant to a resolution of Glinn, 114 U. S. 542, 29 L. ed. 270. 
 the legislature of such state, invit- 
 
100 The Law of Emestent Domain. § 31 
 
 When a state by one of the provisions of its constitution 
 accepts land from the United States subject to a certain 
 trust, and upon the condition that the lands shall not be 
 disposed of without the consent of the United States, none 
 of such lands can be taken by eminent domain by authority 
 of such state.^^ 
 
 § 31. Obstruction of Navigable Waters by a State. 
 
 The power of a state to exercise the power of eminent 
 domain and to authorize the erection of public works within 
 its limits is still further impaired by the grant of power to 
 Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and 
 among the several states ®® contained in the constitution of 
 the United States. All waters which are navigable in fact 
 are open to the commerce of the entire nation and unless 
 there is a natural physical obstruction which confines the 
 navigation to the ports of a single state,®" such waters are 
 considered navigable waters of the United States and are 
 subject to control and regulation by Congress for the bene- 
 fit of foreign and interstate commerce.®^ Any obstruction 
 of a navigable stream which flows unimpeded into the ocean, 
 or into rivers, lakesi and harbors connected therewith, 
 even though the stream lies wholly within the limits of one 
 state, is, or may be to some extent, an interference with 
 foreign and interstate commerce, and it is well settled that, 
 as an incident of its power to regulate interstate and foreign 
 commerce, the federal government may control all works 
 and structures which interfere in any way with the navi- 
 gable capacity of the navigable waters of the United States. 
 It has however always been held that until Congress has 
 exercised its power over the navigable waters of the United 
 States, each state has control over so much of such waters 
 
 58. State v. Sanders County, 42 61. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 
 Mont. 105, 112 Pae. 706. (U. S.) 1, 203, 6 L. ed. 23, 72; The 
 
 59. Artide I, § 8. Daniel Ball, 10 WaU, (U. S.) 557, 
 
 60. Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 19 L. ed. 999. 
 (U. S.) 568, 14 L. ed. 545; Com- 
 monwealth V. King, 150 Mass. 221, 
 
 22 N. E. 905, 5 L. E. A. 536, 
 
§ 31 Limitations on Powejb of Eminent 
 
 as lie within its territorial limits. The con^ 
 nizes the fact that it is desirable that the states^"91stai!it,e*Gr- 
 cise a large measure of power over navigable waters, and 
 has left to them the control and management of bridges, 
 dams and similar structures, subject to the right of the 
 United States to interfere and supersede the state author- 
 ity when it is exercised in such a mauner as not to meet 
 with the approval of Congres. It has accordingly many 
 times been held that, in the absence of action by Congress, 
 a state may constitutionally authorize the construction of 
 a dam or a bridge or other public work so as to obstruct a 
 navigable stream which lies wholly within its limits.*^ 
 
 62. United States. — Wilson v. 
 Blackbird Creek Marsli Co., 2 Pet. 
 245, 250, 7 L. ed. 412; GUman v. 
 Philadelphia, 3 WaU. 713, 18 L. ed. 
 96; The Passaic Bridges, 3 "Wall. 
 782, 16 L. ed. 799; Pound v. Turck, 
 95 U. S. 459, 24 L. ed. 525; Es- 
 canaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 
 678, 27 L. ed. 442; CardweU v. 
 American Bridge Co., 113 U. S. 
 205, 28 L. ed. 959 ; WiUamette Iron 
 Bridge Co. V. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1, 
 31 L. ed. 629. 
 
 Illinois. — Chicago v. McGinn, 51 
 lU. 266, 2 Am. Rep. 295. 
 
 Kentucky. — Green, etc., Naviga- 
 tion Co. V. Chesapeake, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 88 Ky. 1, 10 S. W. 6, 2 L. R. A. 
 540. 
 
 Maine. — State v. Leighton, 83 
 Me. 419, 22 Atl. 380. 
 
 Maryland. — Talbot County v. 
 Queen Anne County, 50 Md. 245. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Commonwealth v. 
 New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray 339. 
 
 Michigan. — Manlius Highway 
 Commissioners v. Chaffee, 1 Mich. 
 N. P. 147. 
 
 Minnesota. — Minnesota Canal & 
 Power Co. v. Pratt, 101 Minn. 197, 
 112 N. W. 395, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 105. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Dover v. 
 Portsmouth Bridge, 17 N. H. 200. 
 
 New York. — People v. Renssel- 
 
 aer, etc., R. R. Co., 15 Wend. 113, 
 30 Am. Dee. 33. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Commonwealth y. 
 Erie Railway Co., 62 Pa. 286, 1 
 Am. Rep. 399. 
 
 So also in the absence of action 
 by Congress, a state may improve 
 the waterways within its limits, and 
 charge a toll for the privilege of 
 using them. 
 
 United States. — ^Veazie v. Moor, 
 14 How. 568, 14 L. ed. 545; Sands 
 V. Manistee River Improvement 
 Co., 123 U. S. 288, 31 L. ed. 149; 
 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. 
 United States, 148 U. S. 312, 37 
 L. ed. 463; Palmer v. Cuyahoga 
 County, 3 McLean 226,' Fed. Caa. 
 No. 10688. 
 
 Alabama. — Columbus v. Rodgers, 
 10 Ala. 37. 
 
 Connecticut. — Kellogg v. Union 
 Co., 12 Conn. 7; Thames Bank v. 
 Lovell, 18 Conn. 501, 46 Am. Dec. 
 332. 
 
 Illinois. — ^Harmon v. Chicago, 140 
 ni. 374, 29 N. E. 732. 
 
 Kentucky. — ^McReynoIds v. Small- 
 house, 8 Bush. 447; Sinking Fund 
 Commissioners v. Green, etc.. Navi- 
 gation Co., 79 Ky. 73. 
 
 Louisiana. — BoyMn v. Shaffer, 13 
 La. Ann. 129; Carondelet Canal Co. 
 V. Parker, 29 La. Ann. 430. 
 
 Michigan. — Benjamin v. Manis- 
 
102 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 31 
 
 When and how far the courts, in the absence of action by 
 Congress, may interfere with an obstruction created by 
 authority of a state in a navigable stream flowing through 
 the territorial limits of such state from other states in 
 which it is used for commerce is an interesting question. 
 In the famous case of the Wheeling bridge,®^ built across 
 the Ohio river by authority of the state of Virginia, the 
 Supreme Court of the United States, in equity proceedings 
 brought by the state of Pennsylvania, ordered the bridge 
 to be raised or removed; but it is not quite clear whether 
 the true basis of this decision was the fact that the Ohio 
 river flowed through more than one state, or that Pittsburg 
 had been made a port of entry and the commerce of the 
 Ohio had been regulated and aided by Congress so that it 
 was not a case in which Congress had not acted at all. 
 
 The power to regulate interstate commerce, and inci- 
 dentally to control obstructions in navigable waters, is 
 primarily in Congress and not in the courts, and it is a 
 legislative and not a judicial function to weigh the relative 
 importance of the traffic which seeks to cross a navigable 
 river by means of a bridge on the one hand and the water- 
 borne commerce which would pass on the stream below on 
 the other. This primacy of Congress was forcibly illus- 
 trated in the case of the Wheeling bridge above referred to ; 
 for, after the Supreme Court had ordered the bridge to be 
 raised or removed Congress enacted that it might stand as 
 it was, and the court was obliged to modify its decree in 
 accordance with the act.®* Congress retains control after 
 it has once acted and if water-borne commerce increases in 
 importance it may order a bridge which it had previously 
 authorized to be altered or removed.®^ 
 
 Congress eventually enacted general legislation upon the 
 
 tee River Improvement Co., 42 64. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, 
 
 Mich. 628, 4 N. W. 483. etc., Bridge Co., 18 How. (U. S.) 
 
 Texas.— Moms v. State, 62 Tex. 421, 15 L. ed. 435. 
 
 728. 65. Newport, etc., Bridge Co. v. 
 
 63. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, United States, 105 U. S. 470, 26 
 
 etc., Bridge Co., 13 How. (U. S.) L. ed. 1143. 
 518, 14 L. ed. 262. 
 
§ 32 Limitations on Power of Eminent Domain. 103 
 
 subject, and the power of the states to authorize obstruc- 
 tions to navigable waters was thus suspended. The present 
 federal statute forbids the erection of any bridge, dam, dike 
 or causeway over or in any navigable waters of the United 
 States without the consent of the chief of engineers and 
 the secretary of war, regardless of its actual effect on navi- 
 gation.^^ The statute does not transfer the exclusive con- 
 trol over navigable waters which lie entirely within the 
 limits of a state to the federal authorities, nor could it 
 constitutionally do so. The power to prohibit or permit, 
 conditionally, the erection of structures over navigable 
 waters does not include the right to authorize their con- 
 struction ; *" this right remains exclusively with the state 
 in which the waters lie, unless the structure is a bridge 
 which connects two states or is in some other way a link 
 in a chain of interstate commerce.®® The right to erect 
 in navigable waters of the United States structures which 
 are not of themselves an aid to interstate commerce thus 
 requires the consent of both the federal and the state 
 governments.*® 
 
 § 32. Interference by a State with Interstate Commerce. 
 
 The transportation of merchandise and the transmission 
 of intelligence from one state to another by land is inter- 
 state commerce in the constitutional sense to the same 
 extent as traffic by sea, and is equally subject to regulation 
 by Congress, and consequently the right of the states to 
 exercise the power of eminent domain in such a way as to 
 interfere with interstate commerce upon the highways and 
 
 66. 30 Stat. L. 1151, 6 Fed. sation are state and not federal 
 Stats. Anno. 805. officers. Brackett v. Common- 
 
 67. Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co. v. wealth, 223 Mass. 119, 111 N E 
 Ohio, 165 U. S. 365, 41 L. ed. 747. 1036. 
 
 When Congress authorizes the con- 68. Infra, § 35. 
 
 struetion of a bridge across a navi- 69. Montgomery v. Portland 190 
 
 gable watercourse by authority of U. S. 89, 47 L. ed. 965; Minnesota 
 
 a state upon condition that the own- Canal & Power Co. v. Pratt 101 
 
 ers of wharves above the bridge are Minn. 197, 112 N. W. 395 H 
 
 awarded compensation, the commis- L. R. A. (N. S.) 105' People v. 
 
 sioners who determine the compen- Kelly, 76 N. Y. 475. 
 
104 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 32 
 
 railroads "within their respective limits may be at any time 
 cut off by Congress.'^'* However, as one public work can 
 be generally carried across another by means of a bridge, 
 and as bridges do not materially interfere with transporta- 
 tion by land, and, even if one highway is wholly closed, 
 another may be readily substituted. Congress and the courts 
 have allowed the states to retain control of the erection of 
 public works across the highways and railroads within their 
 respective limits which are used for interstate commerce. 
 A state cannot however use the power of eminent domain 
 in such a way as to discriminate against interstate com- 
 merce, and it has been held that a statute which allows the 
 exercise of eminent domain by corporations engaged wholly 
 in business within the state and denies it under similar 
 conditions to corporations engaged in interstate commerce 
 is unconstitutional/^ 
 
 Most railroads and other corporations engaged in inter- 
 state commerce hold their charters from one or more of the 
 states, but a few of such corporations have been chartered 
 by Congress. When Congress has chartered a private cor- 
 poration to assist in carrying on one of the functions 
 assigned by the constitution to the federal government, a 
 state cannot hamper the actions of such a corporation by 
 taking its property by eminent domain ; but it has neverthe- 
 less been held that a state may authorize the acquisition of 
 an easement for the public use over the land of an inter- 
 state railroad chartered by Congress when such action can 
 be taken without any serious interference with the operation 
 of the railroad.'^^ Individuals cannot, for private purposes, 
 acquire by adverse possession under a state statute of limi- 
 tations any portion of a right of way granted by the United 
 
 70. Western Union Telegraph Co. 72. Union Pae. Ry. Co. v. Bnr- 
 V. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 195 lington, etc., R. R. Co., 1 MeCrary 
 U. S. 540, 49 L. ed. 312, 1 Ann. (U. S.) 452, 3 Fed. 106; Northern 
 Cas. 517. Pacific Ry. Co. v. St. Paul, etc., Ry. 
 
 71. Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Co., 3 Ted. 702; Union Pacific Ry. 
 Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229, 55 L. ed. Co. v. Leavenworth Ry. Co., 29 
 717; Haskell v. Kansas Natural Ted. 728. 
 
 Gas Co., 224 U. S. 217, 56 L. ed. 
 738. 
 
§ 33 Limitations on Power of Eminent Domain. 105 
 
 States to a railroad company;''* but crossings and other 
 easements in favor of the general public that do not seri- 
 ously inco mm ode the railroad may be acquired on the 
 ground that Congress must have realized what great incon- 
 venience would be caused if such a railroad constituted an 
 impassable barrier between different parts of a state, and, 
 having made no provision upon the subject of crossings, 
 must have assumed that they would be established under 
 authority of the state statutes in the usual manner^* So 
 also the act of Congress which constitutes certain railroads 
 as post roads does not interfere with the right of a state to 
 authorize the condemnation of part of the location of such 
 a railroad for a purpose not inconsistent with the con- 
 tinued operation of the railroadJ^ 
 
 § 33. Violation by a State of Rights Secured by a Treaty. 
 
 The power of a state to exercise eminent domain within 
 its territorial limits may be restricted by a treaty entered 
 into by the United States with a foreign country. Without 
 discussing what limitations, if any, the reserved rights of 
 the states impose upon the treaty-making power of the 
 federal government, it must be conceded that there may be 
 a treaty entered into within the acknowledged limits of that 
 power which will render unlawful an exercise of eminent 
 domain by authority of a state which would otherwise be 
 lawful, and to this extent the power of eminent domain of 
 the state is diminished by the treaty, since the constitution 
 of the United States expressly provides that all treaties 
 made under authority of the United States shall be the 
 supreme law of the land, and that the judges in every state 
 shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws 
 
 73. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. tion of such railroads shall be ae- 
 Townsend, 190 U. S. 267, 47 L. ed. quired by adverse possession, 
 1044. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Con- 
 
 74. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. cannon, 239 U. S. 382. 
 Townsend, 190 U. S. 267, 47 L. ed. 75. Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
 1044. See, however, as to the effect Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 201 Fed. 
 of the Act of Congress of 1904 946 (telegraph line on railroad 
 providing that no part of the loca- location). 
 
106 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 34 
 
 of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.''^ A state 
 statute in violation of a valid treaty is therefore void.'''' 
 
 § 34, Taking of Property for the Use of the United 
 States. 
 
 For many years after the constitution was adopted and 
 while the fear of a too centralized government was still 
 prevalent and the extent of the powers of the United States 
 under the constitution was yet but dimly understood, when- 
 ever the acquisition of land within the limits of a state for 
 the use of the federal government became necessary it was 
 
 76. Article VI. 
 
 77. In Minnesota, etc., Power Co. 
 V. Pratt, 101 Minn. 197, 112 N. W. 
 395, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 105, the 
 petitioner sought to condemn cer- 
 tain lands for the construction of 
 dams which would affect the flow of 
 waters in a stream forming an in- 
 ternational boundary, in violation 
 of the Webster-Ashburton treaty 
 of 1842. The court said, " For the 
 breach of a treaty, a nation is re- 
 sponsible only to the other con- 
 tracting power, its own sense of 
 right and justice, and the public 
 opinion of the world. Its treaty 
 obligations are not cognizable ordi- 
 narily in any court of justice de- 
 riving its authority from municipal 
 law. A treaty entered into by the 
 United States in accordance with 
 the constitutional requirements, 
 which does not require legislation 
 to carry its provisions into effect, 
 is a municipal law, as well as an in- 
 ternational contract. * * * Such 
 a treaty operates directly upon the 
 citizens of the United States, and 
 thus becomes a controlling law to 
 which full force and effect must be 
 given by state as well as federal 
 courts • * » appellant claims 
 that the courts can recognize a 
 treaty as the supreme law of the 
 land only when it is called upon to 
 protect individual rights created by 
 
 the treaty. It is, of course, con- 
 ceded that the courts can give no 
 redress to a party who is injured 
 by the failure of a government to 
 observe the terms of a treaty. A 
 party so injured must look to his 
 government for relief. But there is 
 another p'hase of the question which 
 is presented indirectly at least by 
 the present proceeding. A treaty 
 may stipulate for the protection of 
 the rights and privileges granted or 
 conceded therein to the people of 
 the other contracting power. The 
 United States may thus be a party 
 to a treaty which prohibits its citi- 
 zens or the states from doing some 
 designated thing. Being the su- 
 preme law of the land, the treaty 
 is obligatory upon all the courts 
 and people of the nation. Its pro- 
 hibitions recognize no state lines. 
 Every citizen of the United States 
 is under a duty to observe and re- 
 spect the law of the treaty. The 
 petitioner is proceeding to con- 
 struct dams and reservoirs which it 
 is claimed wiU result in a violation 
 of the Webster-Ashburton treaty. 
 If this result would follow the con- 
 struction of such works, we aj?e 
 very clear that the courts of the 
 state should not authorize any pro- 
 ceeding which would result in the 
 violation of the treaty." 
 
§ 34 Limitations on Power of Eminent Domain. 107 
 
 the practice for the taking to be made in a state court and 
 by authority of a state statute^* This practice continued 
 without objection for many years, and, when it was finally 
 questioned, it was sustained in some states on the ground 
 that the public work for which the taking was made, 
 although to be controlled and managed by the United 
 States, was for the use and benefit of the people of the 
 state.™ It is still held that when land is taken by a state 
 for a lawful state purpose, that the state intends to turn the 
 land over to the United States to better effectuate the 
 object of the taking is no objection to the validity of the 
 ta-king;®" and when the United States in a purely propri- 
 etary capacity owns lands within the limits of a state, and 
 the constitution and laws of the state permit a private 
 owner to invoke the power of eminent domain under certain 
 conditions, the United States may, as an owner, take advan- 
 tage of such provisions for the benefit of its own land^.*^ 
 It is now however generally considered to be the sounder 
 rule that a state cannot authorize the exercise of eminent 
 domain except for the use of its own people, and that conse- 
 quently a state cannot authorize the taking of property 
 within its jurisdiction for the use of the United States 
 in carrying out the public and governmental functions 
 assigned exclusively to the United States by the constitu- 
 tion.®^ The present practice is for the United States to 
 
 78. California. — Gilmer v. Lime property in Maryland to supply 
 Point, 18 Cal. 229. the city of Washington with water 
 
 Massachusetts. — -Burt v. Mer- was justified on the ground that 
 
 chants' Insurance Co., 106 Mass. Maryland had never given up all 
 
 356, 8 Am. Rep. 339. its interest in the District of 
 
 New Hampshire. — Orr v. Quim- Columbia. 
 
 by, 54 N. H. 590. 80. Lancey v. King County, 15 
 
 New Tori.— United States v. Wash. 9, 45 Pac. 645, 34 L. R. A. 
 
 Dnmplin Island, 1 Barb. 24. 817; State v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 
 
 Washington. — Lancey v. King 549, 146 N. W. 775. 
 
 County, 15 Wash. 9, 45 Pac. 645, 81. Hurley v. United States, 102 
 
 34 L. R. A. 817. C. C. A. 429, 179 Fed. 1, 33 L. R. A, 
 
 79. Burt V. Merchants' Insurance (N. S.) 807. 
 
 Co., 106 Mass. 356, 8 Am. Rep. 82. f/wifed/S'totes.— Kohl v. United 
 
 339; Lancey v. King County, 15 States, 91 U. S. 367, 23 L. ed. 449. 
 
 Wash. 9, 45 Pac. 645, 34 L. R. A. Maryland.— Reddall v. Bryan, 14 
 
 817. In Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. Md. 444, 74 Am. Dec. 550. 
 444, 74 Am. Dee. 550, a taking of 
 
108 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 34 
 
 condemn directly, by authority of an act of Congress, the 
 property which it needs for such purposes, without any action 
 on the part of the state in which the property lies, and it is 
 well settled that the United States government has the power 
 of condemning lands for the purpose of facHitatLag its per- 
 formance of the functions entrusted to it by the constitution, 
 within the several states and without their consent.^ Within 
 
 Michigan. — ^People ex rel. Tromb- 
 ley V. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, 9 
 AJm. Rep. 94. 
 
 New York. — Petition of United 
 States, 96 N. Y. 227. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Daxling^on v. 
 United States, 82 Pa. 382, 22 Am. 
 Eep. 766. 
 
 83. This point was first deter- 
 mined in 1875 in the case of Kohl 
 y. United Slates, 91 U. S. 367, 23 
 L. ed. 449. This was a proceeding 
 instituted by the United States in 
 the Circuit Court of the United 
 States for the Southern District of 
 Ohio to appropriate a parcel of 
 land in the city of Cincinnati as a 
 site for a post-office, eustom-house, 
 internal revenue and- pension offices, 
 United States depository and for 
 the accommodation of tiie United 
 States courts. The plaintiffs in 
 error owned a perpetual leasehold 
 estate in a portion of the property 
 sought to be appropriated, and 
 moved to dismiss the proceeding on 
 the ground of want of jurisdiction. 
 The motion was overruled and the 
 case brought on writ of error to the 
 Supreme Court of the United" States. 
 The opinion of the court, delivered 
 by Strong, J., was in part as fol- 
 lows : " It has not been seriously 
 contended during the argument that 
 the United States government is 
 without power to appropriate lands 
 or other property within the states 
 for its own uses, and to enable it to 
 perform its proper functions. Such 
 an authority is essential to its in- 
 dependent existence and perpetuity. 
 
 These cannot be preserved if the 
 obstinacy of a private person, or 
 if any other authority can prevent 
 the acquisition of the means or in- 
 struments by which alone govern- 
 mental functions can be performed. 
 The powers vested by the constitu- 
 tion in the general government de- 
 mand for their exercise the acquisi- 
 tion of lands in all the states. 
 These are needed for forts, armo- 
 ries and arsenals, for navy-yards 
 and light-houses, for custom-houses, 
 post-offices and court-houses, and 
 for other public uses. If the right 
 to acquire property for such uses 
 may be made a barren right by un- 
 willingness of property-holders to 
 sell, or by the action of a state pro- 
 hibiting a sale to the federal gov- 
 ernment, the constitutional grants 
 of power may be rendered nuga- 
 tory, and the government is de- 
 pendent for its practical existence 
 upon the will of a state, or even 
 upon that of a private citizen. 
 This cannot be. No one doubts the 
 existence in the state governments 
 of the right of eminent domain — a 
 right distinct from and paramount 
 to the right of ultimate ownership. 
 It grows out of the necessities of 
 their being, not out of the tenure 
 by which lands are held. It may 
 be exercised, though the lands are 
 not held by grant from the govern- 
 ment, either mediately or immedi- 
 ately, and independent of the con- 
 sideration whether they would es- 
 cheat to the government in case of 
 a failure of heirs. The right is 
 
§ 34 Limitations on Powee of Eminent Domain. 
 
 109 
 
 the sphere assigned to it, the United States is sovereign and 
 it has all the powers of any other sovereign in carrying out 
 the duties delegated to it by the people except so far as it is 
 limited by the constitution. As a necessary consequence it 
 may employ the power of eminent domain to condemn sites 
 for forts, lighthouses, post-offices, custom-houses and sim- 
 ilar structures.** In places outside the limits of any state 
 in which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction it 
 may condemn land for any public purposes.*^ 
 
 the offspring of political necessity; 
 and it is inseparable from sover- 
 eignty, unless denied to it by its 
 fundamental law. * * * But it 
 is no more necessary for the exer- 
 cise of the powers of a state gov- 
 ernment than it is for the exercise 
 of the conceded powers of the fed- 
 eral government. That government 
 is as sovereign within its sphere as 
 the states are within theirs. True, 
 its sphere is limited. Certain sub- 
 jects only aire admitted to it; but 
 its power over those subjects is as 
 full and complete as is the power 
 of the states over the subjects to 
 which their sovereignty extends. 
 The power is not changed by its 
 transfer to another holder. But if 
 the right of eminent domain exists 
 in the federal government, it is a 
 right which may be exercised within 
 the states, so far as is necessary to 
 the enjoyment of the powers con- 
 ferred upon it by the constitution. 
 In Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 523, 
 Chief Justice Taney described in 
 plain language the complex nature 
 of our government, and the exist- 
 ence of two distinct and separate 
 sovereignties within the same terri- 
 torial space, each of them restricted 
 in its powers, and each, within its 
 sphere of action prescribed by the 
 constitution of the United States, 
 independent of the other. Neither 
 is under the necessity of applying 
 to the other for permission to exer- 
 cise its lawful powers. Within its 
 
 own sphere, it may employ all the 
 agencies for exerting them which 
 are appropriate or necessary, and 
 which are not forbidden by the law 
 of its being. When the power to 
 establish post-offices and to create 
 courts within the states was con- 
 ferred upon the federal govern- 
 ment, included in it was authority 
 to obtain sites for such offices and 
 for court-houses, and to obtain 
 them by such means as were known 
 and appropriate. The right of emi- 
 nent domain was one of those 
 means well known when the con- 
 stitution was adopted, and em- 
 ployed to take lands for public 
 uses. Its existence, therefore, in 
 the grantee of that power, ought 
 not to be questioned. * * * " 
 
 84. United States. — ^Kohl v. United 
 States, 91 U. S. 367, 23 L. ed. 449; 
 Cherokee Nation v. Kansas R. B. 
 Co., 135 U. S. 641, 34 L. ed. 295; 
 Luxton V. North River Bridge, 153 
 U. S. 525, 38 L. ed. 808; Chappell 
 V. United States, 160 U. S. 499, 40 
 L.ied. 510; Nahant v. United States, 
 136 Fed. 273, 69 L. R. A. 723; 
 United States v. Beaty, 198 Fed. 
 284; United States v. O'Neill, 198 
 Fed. 677. 
 
 85. Shoemaker v. United States, 
 147 U. S. 282, 37 L. ed. 170. By 
 the treaty with Panama, Article 
 VII, the United States was granted 
 the right to acquire within the 
 Canal Zone "by purchase or the 
 exercise of the right of eminent 
 
110 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 35 
 
 The United States in taking land within a state does not 
 stand in the shoes of the state ; it cannot take advantage of 
 the power of the state to amend the charter of a private 
 corporation^® or of the right of the state to take without 
 compensation the property of a municipal corporation used 
 for a strictly public purpose.^^ 
 
 The power of the United States to acquire lands within 
 a state for governmental purposes cannot be so exercised 
 as to dismember the state, and to separate a part of its 
 territory from its jurisdiction. When lands are acquired 
 by the United States by the exercise of the power of emi- 
 nent domain, the United States becomes simply an ordinary 
 proprietor, and the jurisdiction and authority of the state 
 over the lands remain unchanged, except so far as their 
 use for the purpose of executing the powers of the general 
 government necessarily remove them from the domain of 
 state authority. But it has been held that the state may 
 cede to the general government political jurisdiction over 
 such lands, and then Congress has the power to legislate 
 in regard to them.®* 
 
 § 35. Taking of Property by Authority of the United 
 States by Corporations Engaged in Interstate Commerce. 
 
 The power of the United States to authorize the exercise 
 of eminent domain within the limits of the several states is 
 not limited to the taking of property by the government 
 itself for its own proper uses, but includes the right to dele- 
 gate the power of eminent domain to corporations and other 
 agencies for the purpose of carrying out any public use 
 
 domain any lands, buildings, water 87. Nahant v. United States, 136 
 rights or other properties necessary Fed. 273, 69 L. R. A. 723 ; United 
 and convenient for the construction, States v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 
 maintenance, operation and protec- 176 Fed. 963. The state may con- 
 tion of the canal, and of any works fer upon the United States its 
 of sanitation * • • necessary right to take property for a certain 
 and convenient for the constniction, use without compensation. Over- 
 maintenance * * * of said ton v. United States, 45 Ct. CI. 17. 
 canal." 88. Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. 
 86. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 29 L. ed. 
 V. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 37 264, and see supra, § 30. 
 L. ed. 463. 
 
§ 35 Limitations on Power of Eminent Domain. Ill 
 
 within the sphere of federal control. Thus Congress, by- 
 virtue of its control over interstate commerce, may incor- 
 porate a railroad which is to extend into more than one 
 state, and endow the corporation so formed with the power 
 of eminent domain, to be exercised within the limits of a 
 state.*® So also land within a state may be condemned 
 by a corporation under authority of Congress for the 
 approaches of a bridge connecting two states.®" In such 
 cases Congress may create its own instrumentalities or use 
 those already existing, and it may give to a corporation 
 organized under authority of a state power which the state 
 did not give it and could not constitutionally have given it.®^ 
 As the transmission of intelligence between the different 
 states constitutes interstate commerce. Congress might con- 
 stitutionally authorize the exercise of eminent domain by 
 corporations engaged in such commerce. It has not however 
 done so. It has however by what is commonly called the 
 ' ' Post Eoads Act ' ' declared the railroads and highways 
 within the several states to be post roads and author- 
 ized the use of such post roads by telegraph companies 
 which accept the act.®^ The effect of this act is to prevent 
 the states from excluding the telegraph companies, or from 
 imposing unjustifiable burdens upon their business;®* but 
 
 89. California v. Central Pacific 92. The act of Congress of July 
 R. R. Co., 127 U. S. 1, 32 L. ed. 24, 1866, confers upon all telegraph 
 150. companies "the right to construct, 
 
 90. Luxton V. North River Bridge maintain, and operate lines of tele- 
 Co., 153 U. S. 525, 38 L. ed. 808; graph through and over any por- 
 Decker v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., tion of the public domain of the 
 30 Ted. 723 ; Stockton v. Baltimore, United States," and " over and 
 etc., R. R. Co., 32 Ted. 9; Penn- along any of the military or post 
 sylvania R. R. Co. v. Baltimore, roads of the United States which 
 etc., R. R. Co., 37 Fed. 129; Latin- have or may hereafter be declared 
 ette V. St. Louis, 120 C. C. A. 638, such by act of Congress." It is 
 201 Fed. 676. further provided that before any 
 
 91. Thus it was held in Latinette such company shall exercise the 
 v. St. Louis, 120 CCA. 638, 201 power conferred, it must file with 
 Fed. 676, that the United States the Postmaster General its written 
 may authorize a city chartered by acceptance of the restrictions and 
 one state to build an interstate obligations imposed by the act. 14 
 bridge across navigable waters and Stat, at L. 221, c. 230, Rev. Stat. 
 to condemn land for approaches in §§ 5263 et seq. 
 
 another state. 93. Essex v. New England Tel. 
 
112 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 36 
 
 it does not effect the extinction of either public or private 
 rights without compensation, or prevent the holders of 
 such rights from resorting to the ordinary processes of the 
 state courts in enforcing their claim for compensation,®* 
 or even authorize the establishment of a telegraph line any- 
 where within the limits of a state, except in the public 
 domain, without the consent of the owner of the property 
 over which it passes, and in the absence of such consent a 
 telegraph company can establish its line only by instituting 
 condemnation proceedings under the state law, if any exists 
 which is applicable to the case.*^ 
 
 § 36. Taking of the Property of a State by Authority of 
 the United States. 
 
 The United States cannot interfere with the performance 
 of the duties retained by the states under the constitution ;** 
 but, on the other hand, the legislation of a state, even if 
 enacted in the exercise of the acknowledged powers of the 
 state, must yield, in case of conflict, to the supremacy of 
 the constitution of the United States and of the acts of 
 Congress passed in pursuance of its provisions.®'^ Apply- 
 ing these principles, it would seem that the United States 
 could not, for the sake of mere convenience, take the prop- 
 erty of a state which was devoted to the public use and the 
 
 Co., 239 U. S. 313, 60 L. ed. — . 239, 44 L. ed. 1052; Western Union 
 Thus it was held in Pensacola Tel. Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 
 Co. V. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 195 U. S. 544, 594, 49 L. ed. 314, 
 U. S. 1, 24 L. ed. 708, that a state 322, 1 Ann. Cas. 517, 533; Louis- 
 statute conferring upon a certain ville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Postal Tel. 
 telegraph company the exclusive Cable Co., 143 Ga. 331, 85 S. E. 
 right to maintain a telegraph Hne 110. 
 
 in two counties could not prevent 96. The United States cannot tax 
 
 another telegraph company from the salary of a judicial oflBcer of a 
 
 erecting its lines upon a railroad state. The Collector v. Day, 11 
 
 location within such counties by WaU. (U. S.) 113, 20 L. ed. 122. 
 
 contract with the railroad company. A United States stamp tax on legal 
 
 94. Western Union Tel. Co. v. process in state courts is not valid. 
 Richmond, 224 U. S. 160, 56 L. ed. Fifield v. Close, 15 Mich. 505. 
 710. See also infra, §§ 126, 186, 97. Northern Securities Co. v. 
 198,245. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 48 
 
 95. Western Union Tel. Co. v. L. ed. 679. 
 Ann Arbor R. R. Co., 178 U. S. 
 
§ 36 Limitations ok Power of Eminent Domain. 113 
 
 loss of whicii would seriously cripple the state in carrying 
 on its proper functions. The right of the United States 
 to take for federal uses property devoted to the public use 
 of the state is however paramount, and may be exercised, 
 even for mere convenience, if the importance to the state 
 of the property required is comparatively trivial, and in 
 case of necessity, the state would have to yield in any 
 event.®* The comparative importance of the conflicting 
 needs of the federal and the state governments is a matter 
 for determination by the federal courts.®^ 
 
 98. See the opinion of Brad- 
 ley, J., in Stockton v. Baltimore, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 32 Fed. 9. " If it 
 is necessary that the United States 
 government should have an eminent 
 domain still higher than that of the 
 state, in order that it may fully 
 carry out the objects and purposes 
 of the constitution, then it has it." 
 See also New Orleans v. United 
 States, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 662, 723, 9 
 L. ed. 573, holding that property 
 devoted to a local public use might 
 be taken for a higher national use. 
 And In re Land at Nahant, 128 
 Fed. 185; Nahant v. United States, 
 136 Fed. 273, 69 L. R. A. 723; 
 United States v. Nahant, 153 Fed. 
 520; United States v. Boston Ele- 
 vated Ry. Co., 176 Fed. 963; United 
 States V. Tifln, 190 Fed. 279, in 
 which land held for public use by 
 authority of a state was actually 
 taken by the United States. So 
 also the right of the United States 
 to authorize the taking of such 
 property has been assumed with- 
 out discussion in the cases in- 
 volving the right of the state 
 
 8 
 
 to charge compensation under such 
 circumstances (as to which see 
 infra, § 130) ; St. Louis v. Western 
 Union Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92, 37 
 L. ed. 380, 4 Am. Elect. Cas. 102, 
 149 U. S. 465, 37 L. ed. 810, 4 Am. 
 Elect. Cas. 115; Richmond v. 
 Southern, etc., Tel. Co., 174 U. S. 
 761, 43 L. ed. 1162; Western Union 
 Tel. Co. V. Richmond, 224 U. S. 
 160, 56 L. ed. 710, cases involving 
 the placing of telegraph poles un- 
 der federal authority in highways 
 within a state. 
 
 99. In United States v. Certain 
 Land in Newcastle, 165 Fed. 783, 
 the court doubted whether the 
 United States could take land which 
 was held by a state for a public 
 way, without express authority 
 from Congress, but in United 
 States V. Tiffin, 190 Fed. 279, it 
 was held that the United States 
 might take part of a public alley 
 for a post-ofBce without special au- 
 thority, the comparative importance 
 of the two uses being a matter for 
 judicial determination. 
 
CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 The Public Use — Geneeal Principles 
 
 Secmoit 37, The Basis of the Rule that Property cannot be Taken except 
 for the Public Use. 
 
 38. Provisions of the State Constitutions Extending the Uses 
 
 for which Property m% be Taken. 
 
 39. Provisions of the Federal Constitution. 
 
 40. Difficulty in Defining " Public Use "—The Two Conflicting 
 
 Tteories. 
 
 41. Historical Development. 
 
 42. Other Considerations Affecting the Meaning of " Public 
 
 Use "- 
 
 43. Variation in Local Conditions. 
 
 44. The Three Classes of Public Improvements for which Emi- 
 
 nent Domain may be Exercised. 
 
 45. The True Meaning of " Public Use ". 
 
 46. Number Participating in or Benefiting by the Use. 
 
 47. Character of Party Exercising the Power. 
 
 48. Incidental Private Benefit. 
 
 49. Disposal of Surplus for Private Use. 
 
 50. Uses neither Public nor Private. 
 
 51. Aid from other Branches of the Law. 
 
 52. Primarily a Legislative, Ultimately a Judicial Question. 
 
 53. Government Buildings. 
 
 54. Public Health and Safety. 
 
 55. Aesthetic Purposes. 
 
 56. Parks. 
 
 57. Public Recreation. 
 
 58. Restrictions Imposed for Artistic Reasons. 
 
 § 37. The Basis of the Rule that Property cannot be 
 Taken except for the Public Use. 
 
 It is well settled in every state in the union that private 
 property cannot constitutionally be taken by eminent 
 domain, escept for the public use,^ and although there is 
 
 1. ^Ja6a9»a.— Aldridge v. Tus- 884, 20 L. R. A. 434; Cloth v. Chi- 
 
 eumbia, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Stew. & P. cago, etc., Ry. Co., 97 Ark. 86, 132 
 
 199, 23 Am. Dec. 307; Sadler v. S. W. 1005, Ann. Cas. 1912 C 
 
 Langham, 34 Ala. 311. 1115. 
 
 Avizona. — Oury v. Goodwin, 3 California. — St. Helena Water 
 
 Ariz. 255, 26 Pae. 376. Co. v. Forbes, 62 Cal. 182, 45 Am. 
 
 Arkansas. — Roberts v. Williams, Rep. 659; Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 
 
 15 Ark. 43; St. Louis, etc., R. R. 225, 10 Pac. 674; Beveridge v. 
 
 Co. V. Petty, 57 Ark. 359, 21 S. W. Lewis, 137 Cal. 619, 67 Pae. 1040, 
 
 [114] 
 
§ 37 The Public Use — Geneeal Pbinciplbs. 
 
 115 
 
 great disagreement over the meaning of " public use," that 
 the power of eminent domain is limited to the taking of 
 property for the public use has rarely been questioned. It 
 is to be noted however that, except in a few of the most 
 
 70 Pae. 1083, 59 L. E. A. 581, 92 
 Am. St. Rep. 188; Sutter County 
 V. Nicols, 152 CaJ. 688, 93 Pae. 872, 
 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 616, 14 Ann. 
 Cas. 900. 
 
 Colorado. — Ortiz v. Hansen, 35 
 Colo. 100, 83 Pae. 964; Tanner v. 
 Treasury, etc., Reduction Co., 35 
 Colo. 593, 83 Pae. 464, 4 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 106; Hartman v. Tresise, 
 36 Colo. 146, 84 Pae. 685, 4 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 872. 
 
 Connecticut. — Olmstead v. Camp, 
 33 Conn. 532, 89 Am. Dee. 221; 
 Farist Steel Co. v. Bridgeport,( 60 
 Conn. 278, 22 Atl. 561, 13 L. R. A. 
 590; Connecticut College for 
 "Women v. Calvert, 87 Conn. 421, 
 88 AU. 633, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 485. 
 
 Delaware. — Heekman's Case, 4 
 Harr. 580; Wilson v. Baltimore, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 5 Del. Ch. 524; 
 Clendaniel v. Conrad, 3 Boyce 549, 
 83 Atl. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1915 B 968. 
 
 Florida. — Moody v. Jacksonville 
 R. R. Co., 20 Fla. 597; State v. 
 Jacksonville Terminal Co., 41 Fla. 
 377, 27 So. 225. 
 
 Georgia. — ^Loughbridge v. Harris, 
 42 Ga. 501; Garbutt Lumber Co. 
 V. Georgia, etc., Ry. Co., Ill Ga. 
 714, 36 S. E. 942; Jones v. North 
 Georgia Electric Co., 125 Ga. 618, 
 54 S. E. 85, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 122, 
 5 Ann. Cas. 526; Bridwell v. Gate 
 City Terminal Co., 127 Ga. 520, 56 
 S. E. 624, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 909. 
 
 Idaho. — Potlateh Lumber Co. v. 
 Peterson, 12 Idaho 769,88 Pao.426, 
 118 Am. St. Rep. 233; Portneuf 
 Irrigating Co. v. Budge, 16 Idaho 
 116, 100 Pae. 1046, 18 Ann. Cas. 
 674: 
 
 IlUtwis. — ^Nesbit v. Trumbo, 39 
 Dl. 110, 89 Am. Dee. 290; ShoU v. 
 
 German Coal Co., 118 111. 427, 10 
 N. E. 199, 59 Am. Rep. 379; Ligare 
 V. Chicago, 139 111. 46, 28 N. E. 
 934, 32 Am'. St. Rep. 179; Gaylord 
 V. Sanitary District, 204 111. 576, 
 68 N. E. 522, 63 L. R. A. 582, 98 
 Am. St. Rep. 235; Bradbury v. 
 Vandalia Levee District, 236 111. 36, 
 86 N. E. 163, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 991, 15 Ann. Cas. 904. 
 
 Indiana. — ■ Ross v. Davis, 97 Ind. 
 79, 49 Am. Rep. 430; Zigler v. 
 Menges, 121 Ind. 99, 22 N. E. 782, 
 16 Am. St. Rep. 357; Logan v. 
 Stogsdale, 123 Ind. 372, 24 N. E. 
 135, 8 L. R. A. 5. 
 
 Indian Territory. — Tuttle v. 
 Moore, 3 Ind. Ter. 712, 65 S. W. 
 585. 
 
 Iowa. — Bamkhead v. Brown, 25 
 Iowa 640; Bumham v. Thompson, 
 35 Iowa 421; Johnson v. Clayton 
 County, 61 Iowa 89, 15 N. W. 856; 
 Sisson V. Buena Vista, 128 Iowa 
 442, 104 N. W. 454, 70 L. R. A. 
 440. 
 
 Kansas. — ^Venard v. Cross, 8 Kan. 
 248 ; Lake Koen, etc., Irrigation Co. 
 v. Klein, 63 Kan. 484, 65 Pae. 684; 
 Howard Mills Co. v. Schwartz Lum- 
 ber, etc., Co., 77 Kan. 599, 95 Pae. 
 559, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 356. 
 
 Kentucky. — ^Lexington, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Applegate, 8 Dana 289, 33 
 Am. Dee. 497; Chesapeake Stone 
 Co. V. Moreland, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 
 1075, 104 S. W. 762, 16 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 479. 
 
 Louisiana. — Williams v. Eigh- 
 teenth Judicial District Judge, 45 
 La. Ann. 1295, 14 So. 57; Bradley 
 V. Pharr, 45 La. Ann. 426, 12 So. 
 618, 19 L. R. A. 647. 
 
 Maine. — Ulmer v. Lime Rock R. 
 R. Co., 98 Me. 579, 57 Atl. 1001, 66 
 L. R. A. 387; Brown v. Gerald, 100 
 
116 
 
 The Law of Eminekt Domain. 
 
 §37: 
 
 Me. 351, 61 Atl. 785, 70 L. R. A. 
 472, 1Q9 Am. St. Eep. 526; Bowden 
 V. York Store Water Co., 95 Atl. 
 779. 
 
 Ma/ryland. — Kane v. Baltimore, 
 15 Md. 240; Townsend v. Epstein, 
 93 Md. 537, 49 Atl. 629, 52 L. R. A. 
 409, 86 Am. St. Rep. 441; Amsper- 
 ger V. Crawford, 101 Md. 247, 61 
 Atl. 413, 70 L. R. A. 497; Webster 
 V. Susquehanna Pole Line Co., 112 
 Md. 416, 76 Atl. 254. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Boston & Rox- 
 bury Mill Corporation v. Newman, 
 12 Pick. 467, 23 Am. Dee. 622; 
 Talbot V. Hudson, 16 Gray 417; 
 Lowell V, Boston, 111 Mass. 454, 15 
 Am. Rep. 39; Moore v. Sanford, 
 151 Mass. 285, 24 N. E. 323, 7 
 L. R. A. 151; Opinion of the Jus- 
 tices, 204 Mass. 607, 91 N. E. 405, 
 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 483; Salisbury 
 Land & Improvement Co. v. Com- 
 monwealth, 215 Mass. 369, 102 
 N. E. 619, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 1196. 
 
 MiehiffOM. — Swan v. Williams, 2 
 Mich. 427; People v. Salem, 20 
 Mich. 452, 4 Am. Rep. 400; Board 
 of Health v. Van Hoesen, 87 Mieb. 
 533, 49 'N. W. 894, 14 L. R. A. 
 114; Berrien Springs Water Power 
 Co. V. Berrien Circuit Judge, 133 
 Mich. 48, 94 N. W. 379, 103 Am. 
 St. Rep. 438. 
 
 Minnesota. — Kettle River R. E. 
 Co. v; Eastern R. R. Co., 41 Minn. 
 461, 43 N. W. 469, 6 L. R. A. Ill; 
 Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. 
 Koochiching Co., 97 Minn. 429, 107 
 N. W. 405, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 638, 
 7 Ann. Cas. 1182, 
 
 Mississippi. — Vinegar Bend Lum- 
 ber Co. V. Oak Grove, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 89 Miss. 84, 43 So. 292; Wise 
 y. Yazoo City, 96 Miss. 507, 51 So. 
 453, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1130, Ann. 
 Cas. 1912 B 377. 
 
 Missouri. — ^Dickey v. Tamison, 27 
 Mo. 373; St. Louis v. Brown, 155 
 Mo. 545, 56 S. W. 298; Kansas 
 City V. Hyde, 196 Mo. 498, 96 
 
 S. W. 201, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 639; 
 Kirkwood v. Cronin, 259 Mo. 207,, 
 168 S. W. 674. 
 
 Montana. — Butte, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Montana, etc., R. R. Co., 16 
 Montana 504, 41 Pac. 232, 31 
 L, R. A. 299,, 59 Am. St. Rep. 50 f 
 Billings Sugar Co. v. Fish, 40 Mont. 
 256, 106 Paa 565, 20 Ann. Cas. 264. 
 
 Nebraska. — Jenal v. Green Island 
 Draining Co., 12 Neb. 163, 10 N. W. 
 547;. Welton v. Dickson, 33 Neb. 
 767, 57 N. W. 559, 22 L. R., A. 
 496, 41 Am. St. Rep. 771; Paxton, 
 etc.. Land Co. v. Tarmers, etc., 
 Land Co., 45 Neb. 884, 64 N, W. 
 343, 29 L. R. A. 853, 5Q Am. St. 
 Rep. 585. 
 
 Nevada. — Dayton, etc.. Mining 
 Co. V. Seawell,. 11 Nev. 394. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Concord R. R. 
 Co. V. Greely, 17 N. H. 47; Rock- 
 ingham County Light & Power Co. 
 V. Hobbs, 72 N. H. 531, 58 Atl. 46, 
 66 L. R. A. 581. 
 
 New Jersey. — Scudder v. Tren- 
 ton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N. J. Bq. 
 694, 23 Am. Dec. 756; TidB-Water 
 Co. V. Coster, 18 N. J. Eq. 518, 90 
 Am. Dec. 634; AUbright v. Sussex 
 County Lake & Park Commission, 
 71 N. J. L. 303, 57 Atl. 398, 69 
 L. R. A. 768, 108 Am. St. Rep. 749, 
 2 Ann. Cas. 48. 
 
 New Mexico. — Isleta v. Tondre, 
 18 N. M. 388, 137 Pae. 86. 
 
 New York. — Matter of Albany 
 St., 11 Wend. 148, 25 Am. Dee. 
 618 ; Bloodgood v. Mohawk, etc., R. 
 R. Co., 18 Wend. 59, 31 Am. Dee. 
 313; Embury v. Curtis, 3 Comst. 
 511, 53 Am. Dee. 325; Matter of 
 Eureka Basin, etc., Co., 96 N. Y. 
 .42; Matter of Niagara Falls, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 
 429; Matter of Split Rock Cable R. 
 R. Co., 128 N. Y. 408, 28 N. E. 506; 
 Brewster v. Rogers Co., 169 N. Y. 
 73, 62 N. E. 164, 58 L. R. A. 495. 
 
 North Dakota. — Bigelow v. Dra- 
 per, 6 N. D. 152, 69 N. W. 570. 
 
 Ohio. — ^Willyard v. Hamilton, 7 
 
§ 37 Th£ Public Use — Geneeal Pbinciplbs. 
 
 117 
 
 Ohio, Part II, 111, 30 Am. Dee. 
 195; McQuillen v. Hatt)on, 42 Ohio 
 St. 202; Wheeling, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Toledo, etc., R. R. 'Co., 72 Ohio SL 
 368, 74 N. E. 209, 106 Am. St. Rep. 
 622, 2 Ann. Cas. 941. 
 
 Oklahoma. — Blincoe v. Choctaw, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 16 OUa. 286, 83 
 Pae. 903, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 890, 8 
 Ann. Cas. 689. 
 
 Oregon. — Witham v. Osbom, 4 
 Ore. 318, 18 Am. Rep. 287; Dalles 
 Lumber Co. v. Urquhart, 16 Ore. 
 67, 19 Pae. 78; Bridal Veil Lum- 
 bering Co. V. Johnson, 30 Ore. .205, 
 46 Pae. 790, 34 L. R. A. 386, 60 
 Am. St. Rep. 818; Apex Transpor- 
 tation Co. V. Garbade, 32 Ore. 588, 
 54 Pae. 367, 62 L. R. A. 5. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Palairet's Ap- 
 peal, 67 Pa. 479, 5 Am. Rep. 450; 
 Edgewood R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 79 
 Pa. 257; Philadelphia, etc., St. Ry. 
 Co.'s Petition, 203 Pa. 354, 53 Atl. 
 191; Jacobs v. Clearview Water 
 Supply Co., 220 Pa. 388, 69 AtL 
 870, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 410; Penn- 
 sylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co. 
 V. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 88 Atl. 
 904, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062. 
 
 Ehode Island. — He Rhode Island 
 Suburban R. R. Co., 22 R. I. 457, 
 48 Atl. 591, 52 L. R. A. 879. 
 
 South Carolina. — Louisville, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Chappell, Rice L. 383; 
 Mey V. Charleston Union Statibn 
 Co., 71 S. C. 457, 51 S. E. 485, 110 
 Am. St. Rep. 579. 
 
 South Dakota. — Illinois Central 
 R. R. Co. V. East Sioux Palls 
 <3nanry Co., 33 S. D. 63, 144 N. W. 
 724. 
 
 Tennessee. — Clark v. WTiite, 2 
 Swan 540; Harding v. Goodlet, 3 
 Yerg. 40, 24 Am. Dec. 546; Mem- 
 phis- Freight Co. v. Memphis, 4 
 Coldw. 419; Ryan v. Louisville, 
 etc.. Terminal Co., 102 Tenn. Ill, 
 50 S. W. 744, 45 L. R. A. 303. 
 
 Texas. — Borden v. Trespalacios, 
 etc., Irrigation Co., 98 Tex. 494, 86 
 S. W. 11, 107 Am. St. Rep. 640. 
 
 Utah. — Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah 
 
 158, 75 Pae. 371, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 208, 101 Am. St. Rep. 953, 1 Ann. 
 Cas. 300; Highland Boy Gold Min- 
 ing Co. V. Striekley, 28 Utah 215, 
 78 Pae. 296, 1 L. R- A. (N. S.) 
 976, 107 Am. St. Rep. 711, 3 Ann. 
 Cas. 1110. 
 
 Vermont. — Re Barre Water Co., 
 62 Vt. 27, 20 Atl. 109, 9 L. R. A. 
 195 ; Avery v. Vermont Electric Co., 
 75 Vt. 235, 54 Atl. 179, 98 Am. St. 
 Rep. 818; Deerfield River Co. v. 
 Wilmington Power, etc., Co., 83 
 Vt. 548, 77 Atl. 862. 
 
 Virginia. — EaUsburg, etc., Mfg. 
 Co. V. Alexander, 101 Va. 98, 43 
 S. E. 194, 61 L. R. A. 129, 99 Am, 
 St. Rep. 855; Zirele v. Southern 
 Ry. Co., 102 Va. 17, 45 S. E. 802, 
 102 Am. St. Rep. 805. 
 
 Washington. — HeaJy Lumber Co. 
 V. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 74 Pae. 
 681, 63 L. R. A. 820, 99 Am. St. 
 Rep. 964; State v. White River 
 Power Co., 39 Wash. 490, 82 Pae. 
 150, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 842, 4 Ann. 
 Cas. 987; Neitzel v. Spokane In- 
 ternational Ry. Co., 65 Wash. 100, 
 117 Pae. 864, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 522. 
 
 West Virginia. — Vamer v. Mar- 
 tin, 21 W. Va. 534; Pittsburg, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Benwood Iron Works, 
 31 W. Va. 710; 8 S. E. 453, 2 
 L. R. A. 680; Henoh v. Pritt, 62 
 W. Va. 270, 57 S. E. 808, 125 Am. 
 St. Rep. 966. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Attorney-General v. 
 Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400; Wiscon- 
 sin Water Co. v. Winaus, 85 Wis. 
 26, 54 N. W. 1003, 20 L. R. A. 662, 
 39 Am. St. Rep. 813 ; In re South- 
 em Power Co., 140 Wis. 245, 265, 
 122 N. W. 801, 809; State ex rel. 
 Wausau St. Ry. Co. v. Bancroft, 
 148 Wis. 124, 134 N. W. 330, 38 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 526. 
 
 Wyoming. — Edwards v. Chey- 
 enne, 19 Wyo. 110, 114 Pae. 677; 
 Grover, etc.. Land Co. v. Lovella, 
 etc.. Irrigation Co., 21 Wyo. 204, 
 131 Pae. 73, Ann. Cas. 1915 D 
 1206. 
 
118 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 37 
 
 recent constitutions,^ the taking of property by authority 
 of the government for uses not public is not in terms pro- 
 hibited. The provision relating to eminent domain usually 
 found in the fundamental law of the states is merely to the 
 effect that property shall not be taken for the public use 
 without compensation, and was undoubtedly intended only 
 for the purpose of embodying in the constitution the prin- 
 ciple enunciated by Grotius and the other political philos- 
 ophers of the period and recognized in England and many 
 of the colonies, that compensation should be paid when prop- 
 erty was taken — a principle which needed recognition in 
 the fundamental law, since it had been the practice in Euro- 
 pean countries and in several of the colonies, notably South 
 Carolina, to take private property for certain public uses 
 without compensation. It is to be noted that even this pro- 
 vision was not included in the original constitution of the 
 United States or of many of the older states. 
 
 The taking of property for private use under color of 
 emiiient domain was not a debated issue when the constitu- 
 tions of the states were adopted. Eminent domain was 
 employed without objection for purposes such as mills, pri- 
 vate roads and the drainage of private lands, which now 
 seem rather private than public, and the extension of the 
 power to any uses directly or indirectly enuring to the pub- 
 lic good was not one of the evils of which the colonists com- 
 plained. For other purposes eminent domain had not been 
 invoked. It was not until the introduction of improved 
 methods of transportation operated by private corporations 
 and the general extension of the activities of municipal gov- 
 ernments which began in the next century that the limits of 
 the power of eminent domain with respect to the purposes 
 for which it could lawfully be exercised became a living issue. 
 When the state constitutions were adopted, the taking of 
 property for private use in its bald form, as the seizure of the 
 property of one man and the bestowal of it upon another, 
 
 2. Some of the more recent con- e. g., Arizonjt, art. 11, § 17; South 
 stitations prohibit in terms the tak- Carolina, art. I, § 17; Wyoming, 
 ing of property for private use, art. I, § 32. 
 
§ 37 The Public Use — General Principles. 119 
 
 was sufficiently prohibited by the requirement of due process 
 of law, or even by the implied restriction against legislation 
 in violation of natural justice generally supposed to exist. 
 In its more subtle form, as it presents itself today, as the 
 taking of property for the benefit of some enterprise in 
 which the public welfare is to an insufficient but none the 
 less perceptible degree involved, it had apparently never 
 occurred to anyone that it might be attempted. It is accord- 
 ingly not surprising that the taking of property for a pri- 
 vate use was not in terms expressly prohibited by any of 
 the early constitutions. 
 
 Nevertheless, it has been consistently recognized ever 
 since the introduction of new methods of transportation and 
 new forms of public service inevitably brought the question 
 before the courts, that it is not within the power of a consti- 
 tutional government to authorize the taking of the property 
 of an individual without his consent for the private use of 
 another, upon specious grounds of public advantage, even 
 upon the payment of full compensation, although the courts 
 have not always agreed upon the basis upon which this limi- 
 tation rests. At first, when it was not fully realized that 
 the constitutions of the states were limitations, not grants, 
 of power, and when some courts claimed the right to set 
 aside an act of the legislature that was opposed to natural 
 justice, even if it violated no provision of the constitution, 
 it was often intimated or held that an act authorizing the 
 exercise of eminent domain for private purposes was 
 beyond the power of the legislature, because the legislature 
 had been granted only the power to enact legislation, and 
 such an act was spoliation, not legislation, or because it 
 violated the universally recognized principles of justice.' 
 
 After it became the accepted doctrine that the courts 
 could not set aside an act of the legislature unless it violated 
 some specific provision of the constitution, a different 
 
 8. See for example, Hanson v. Tide Water Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 518, 
 
 Vemon, 27 Iowa 28, 1 Am. Rep. 90 Am. Dec. 634; Oozard v. Kana^ 
 
 215; Brown v. Beatty, 34 Misa wha Hardwood Co., 139 N. C. 283, 
 
 227, 69 Am. Dec. 389; Coster v. 51 S. E. 932, 111 Am. St. Rep. 779. 
 
120 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 37 
 
 justification for refusing to permit fhe taMng of property 
 for private use had to be found. The theory was then put 
 forward that the clause of the constitution which prohibited 
 the taking of private property for public use without just 
 compensation, by implication prohibited the taking of prop- 
 erty for uses not public with or without compensation. This 
 theory was not accepted from the start without opposition. 
 It was argued with force by Chief Justice Gibson of Penn- 
 sylvania that implied prohibitions in the constitutions of 
 the states were not to be favored, and that if it had been 
 intended to prohibit the taking of property for private 
 purposes, the clause of the constitution relating to eminent 
 domain would have been phrased to prohibit the taking of 
 property " except for the public use and upon payment of 
 just compensation. ' ' * As a matter of strict legal reasoning, 
 this argument is difiScult to answer ; but it has always been 
 the understanding of the people of this country that eminent 
 domain could be justified only by the public needs, and an 
 interpretation of the constitution which accorded so thor- 
 oughly with the sentiment of the community was impossible 
 to withstand. It is now well settled in every state in the 
 union that the prohibition against the taking of property for 
 the public use without just compensation impliedly, but 
 none the less definitely, forbids a taking of property for 
 private uses,^ and it is too late to raise scholastic objec- 
 tions to the established interpretation of this clause of the 
 constitution. 
 
 In most of the state constitutions a clause prohibiting 
 the taking of property without due process of law, or some 
 equivalent provision, is found.® A taking of property by 
 eminent domain for a use not public is such a violation of 
 
 4. Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts son Railroad Co., 18 Wend. 59, 31 
 (Pa.) 63, 36 Am. Dec. 141. Am. Dec. 313. 
 
 5. Maryland. — Amsperger v. Vermont. — Embury v. Curtis, 3 
 Crawford, 101 M'd. 247, 61 Atl. Comst. 511, 53 Am. Dee. 325; Be 
 413, 70 L. R. A. 497. Barre Water Co., 62 Vt. 27, 20 Atl. 
 
 New York. — Matter of Albany 109, 9 L. R. A. 195, and see also 
 St., 11 Wend. 148, 25 Am. Dec. supra, note 1. 
 618; Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hud- 6. Supra, § 24. 
 
§ 37 ,The Public Use — Genebal Peinciples. 121 
 
 the basic and essential features of constitutional govern- 
 ment that it amounts to a taking without due process of 
 law/ and in some instances the courts of a state have relied 
 upon the due process clause in holding a taking for private 
 use unconstitutional, either because the more specific clause 
 had not then been adopted in the state in question, or 
 because the court was not satisfied with the implied prohi- 
 bition contained in that clause.* At present however, it is 
 the specific clause that is almost always relied on by the 
 state courts, but if for any reason it is not available, the 
 due process clause may be invoked. 
 
 Perhaps it would have better justified the vague and 
 variable meaning that the limitation of governmental power 
 now under discussion has been given, resting as it does more 
 on precedent than principle, and would have been more in 
 accordance with the intent of the makers of the constitutions 
 of the original thirteen states, if this limitation had been 
 attributed to the due process rather than to the more 
 specific clause, and those who feel that the constitution 
 should be studied with the aid of a dictionary rather than 
 of a knowledge of the laws and customs of our ancestors 
 would, perhaps, have been less troubled by the interpreta- 
 tion which it has received from the courts, for even those 
 who advocate the most literal construction of the constitu- 
 tion admit that the due process clause is not violated by 
 practices that were considered legal and proper before the 
 Revolution, and have been continued without objection since 
 the state and federal constitutions were adopted, however 
 arbitrary they might seem if now introduced for the first 
 time. But however that may be, it must be accepted that 
 the taking of property for other than a public use is pro- 
 hibited by the state constitutions, and that the accepted 
 practices of the colonial and provincial periods are impor- 
 tant as throwing light upon the meaning of " public use " 
 as the phrase was used in the early state constitutionB, 
 
 7. Infra, § 39. 4 Hill (N. T.) 147, 40 Am. Dee. 
 
 8. Ex parte Martin, 13 Ark. 198, 274. 
 58 Am. Dec. 381 ; Taylor v. Porter, 
 
122 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 38 
 
 rather than as establishing, in and of themselves, prece- 
 dents which must necessarily be followed. 
 
 § 38. Provisions of the State Constitutions Extending the 
 Uses for which Property may be Taken. 
 
 The constitutions of several of the states specifically 
 authorize the taking of property for purposes not ordina- 
 rily considered public. A list of such purposes for which a 
 taking by eminent domain is authorized in the state con- 
 stitutions is as follows : 
 
 Alabama, Art. I, Section 23. " The legislature may by 
 law secure to persons or corporations the right of way over 
 the lands of other persons or corporations." 
 
 Arizona, Art. II, Section 17. Private ways of necessity, 
 and drains, flumes or ditches on or across lands of others 
 for mining, agricultural, domestic or sanitary purposes. 
 
 California, Art. XIV, Section 1. " The use of all water 
 now appropriated or that may hereafter be appropriated 
 for sale, rental or distribution is hereby declared to be a 
 public use." 
 
 Colorado, Art. II, Section 14. Private ways of neces- 
 sity and reservoirs, drains, flumes or ditches on or across 
 the land of others, for agricultural, mining, milling, domes- 
 tic or sanitary purposes. 
 
 Florida, Art. XVI, Section 28. " The legislature may 
 provide for the drainage of the land of one person over or 
 through that of another, upon just compensation therefor 
 to the owner of the land over which such drainage is had." 
 
 Georgia, Art. I, Section 3, Par. 1. Private ways in case 
 of necessity. 
 
 Idaho, Art. I, Section 14. " Reservoirs or storage basins, 
 for the purpose of irrigation, or for rights of way for the 
 construction of canals, ditches, flumes oi* pipes, to convey 
 water to the place of use for any useful, beneficial or nec- 
 essary purpose, or for drainage; or for the drainage of 
 mines or the working thereof, by means of roads, railroads, 
 tramways, cuts, tunnels, shafts, hoisting works, dumps, or 
 other necessary means to their complete development, or 
 
§ 38 The Public Use — Genebal Principles. 123 
 
 any other use necessary to the complete development of the 
 material resources of the state or the preservation of the 
 health of its inhabitants." 
 
 Illinois, Art. IV, Section 30. ' ' The general assembly may 
 provide for establishing and opening roads and cartways, 
 connected with a public road, for private and public use." 
 
 Section 31 (amended). " The general assembly may pass 
 laws permitting the owners of land to construct drains, 
 ditches and levees for agricultural, sanitary or mining pur- 
 poses across the lands of others." 
 
 Massachusetts, Part I, Art. X, as amended by 39th 
 Amendment. ' ' The legislature may by special acts for the 
 purpose of laying out, widening or relocating highways or 
 streets, authorize the taking in fee by the commonwealth, 
 or by a county, city or town, of more land and property than 
 are needed for the actual construction of such highway or 
 street; Provided, however, that the land and property 
 authorized to be taken are specified in the act and are no 
 more in extent than would be sufficient for suitable build- 
 ing lots on both sides of such highway or street, and after 
 so much of the land or property has been appropriated 
 for such highway or street as is needed therefor, may 
 authorize the sale of the remainder for value with or with- 
 out suitable restrictions." 
 
 43d Amendment. * ' The general court shall have power 
 to authorize the commonwealth to take land and to hold, 
 improve, subdivide, build upon and sell the same for the 
 purpose of relieving the congestion of population and pro- 
 viding homes for citizens; provided however that this 
 amendment shall not be deemed to authorize the sale of 
 such land or buildings at less than the cost thereof. ' ', 
 
 Minnesota, Art. XVIII, Section 14. " Private roads may 
 be opened in the manner to be prescribed by law, but in 
 every case the necessity of the road and the amount of all 
 damages sustained by the opening thereof shall be first 
 determined by a jury of freeholders and such amount 
 together with the expenses of the proceeding shall be paid 
 by the person benefited." 
 
124 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 38 
 
 Mississippi, Art. IV, Section 110. " The legislature may 
 provide by general laws for condemning rights of way for 
 private roads, when necessary for ingress or egress by the 
 party applying, on due compensation being first made to the 
 owner of the property, but such rights of way shall not be 
 provided for in incorporated cities and towns. ' ' 
 
 Art. XI, Section 233. " The levee boards shall have and 
 are hereby granted authority and full power to appropriate 
 private property in their respective districts for construct- 
 ing, maintaining and repairing levees therein." 
 
 Missouri, Art. II, Section 20. Private ways of necessity 
 and drains and ditches across the lands of others for agri- 
 cultural and sanitary purposes. 
 
 Montana, Art. Ill, Section 15. " The use of all water 
 * * * and all ditches, drains, flumes, canals and aque- 
 ducts, necessarily used in connection therewith, as well as 
 the sites for reservoirs necessary for collecting and storing 
 the same. Private roads may be opened in the manner to 
 be prescribed by law, but in every case the necessity of the 
 road and the amount of all damage to be sustained by the 
 opening thereof shall be first determined by a jury." 
 
 New York, Art. I, Section 7. * ' Private roads may be 
 opened in the manner to be prescribed by law, but in every 
 case the necessity of the road and the amount of all dam- 
 ages sustained by the opening thereof shall be first deter- 
 mined by a jury of freeholders and such amount together 
 ■with the expenses of the proceeding shall be paid by the per- 
 son benefited. G-eneral laws may be passed permitting the 
 owners or occupants of agricultural lands to construct and 
 maintain for the drainage thereof, necessary drains, ditches 
 and dytes upon the land of others. ' ' 
 
 " The legislature may authorize cities to take more land 
 and property than is needed for actual construction in the 
 laying out, widening, extending or relocating parks, public 
 places, highways or streets; provided, however, that the 
 additional land and property so authorized to be taken shall 
 
§ 38 The Pubuco Use — Gbnbbal Peenoiples. 125 
 
 be no more than sufficient to^ form suitable building sites 
 abutting on such park, public place, highway or street. 
 After so much of the land and property has been appropri- 
 ated for such park, public place, highway or street as is 
 needed therefor, the remainder may be sold or leased. 
 
 South Dakota, Art. XII, Section 7. " Irrigation of agri- 
 cultural lands is hereby declared to be a public purpose." 
 
 Texas, Art. XI, Section 7a. Sea wall and sea wall recla- 
 mation with right to sell land when reclaimed. 
 
 Washington, Art, I, Sectioij 16. Private ways of neces- 
 sity and drains, flumes or ditches on or across the lands of 
 others for agricultural, domestic or sanitary purposes. 
 
 Wisconsin, Art. XI, Section 3a. " The state or any of its 
 cities may acquire by gift, purchase, or condemnation lands 
 for establishing, laying out, widening, enlarging, extending 
 and maintaining memorial grounds, streets, squares, park- 
 ways, boulevards, parks, playgrounds, sites for public 
 buildings and reservations in and about and along and lead- 
 ing to any and all of the same ; and after the establishment, 
 laying out and completion of such improvements, may con- 
 vey any such real estate thus acquired and not necessary for 
 such improvements, with reservations concerning the future 
 use and occupation of such real estate so as to protect such 
 public works and improvements and their environs, and to 
 preserve the view, appearance, light, air and usefulness of 
 such public works. ' ' 
 
 Section 3b. ' ' When private property shall be or has been 
 taken for public use by a municipal corporation, additional, 
 adjoining or neighboring property may be taken, under 
 conditions to be prescribed by the legislature by general 
 law. Property thus taken shall be deemed to be taken for 
 public use. ' ' 
 
 Wyoming, Art. I, Section 32. Private ways of necessity, 
 and reservoirs, drains, flumes or ditches on or across the 
 lands of others for agricultural, mining, milling, domestic 
 or sanitary purposes. 
 
126 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 39 
 
 § 39. Provisions of the Federal Constitution. 
 The fifth amendment to the constitution of the United 
 State is brought to a conclusion by the following words, 
 
 ' ' nor shall private property be taken for public use 
 without just compensation." 
 
 It is well settled that this provision is a limitation upon 
 the power of the United States only and is not applicable to 
 the states.* It is also settled that the same inference is to 
 be drawn from the mention of *' public use " in this provi- 
 sion of the federal constitution as has been drawn from 
 the same phraseology in the corresponding provision in 
 the constitutions of the states, and that the employment of 
 this phrase as descriptive of the purposes for which emi- 
 nent domain may be exercised upon payment of compensa- 
 tion impliedly prohibits the taking of property by author- 
 ity of the federal government for any other purposes.^" 
 
 A provision that no person shaU be deprived of his life, 
 liberty or property without due process of law is also found 
 in the fifth amendment, but, like the other provisions of 
 that amendment, is applicable only to the United States. 
 The fourteenth amendment however imposes the same lim- 
 itation upon the power of the states, and due process of 
 law is thus essential to every deprivation of property by 
 authority either of the federal or the state governments. 
 
 Whatever may be the precise meaning of due process 
 of law, there can be no question that it does not include such 
 a gross violation of the rights of property and of the prin- 
 ciples of constitutional government as the taking of one 
 man's land by the state and giving it to another for his 
 private use and benefit. It follows that a taking of prop- 
 erty for private use cannot be authorized by Congress 
 
 9. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 10. Loan Association v. Topeka, 
 
 (U. S.) 243, 8 L. ed. 672 ; Pallbrook 20 WaU. (U. S.) 655, 22 L. ed. 455 ; 
 
 Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 Shoemaker v. United States, 147 
 
 U. S. 112, 158, 41 L. ed. 369; U. S. 297, 37 L. ed. 170; United 
 
 Winous Point Shooting Club v. States v. Gettysburg Electric R. R. 
 
 Caspersen, 193 U. S. 189, 48 L. ed. Co., 160 U. S. 668, 40 L. ed. 576; 
 
 675. In re Manderson, 51 Fed. 503. 
 
§ 39 The Public Use — General Principles. 127 
 
 without violating the due process clause of the fifth amend- 
 ment to the constitution of the United States, and that 
 such a taking when authorized by a state is in violation of 
 the fourteenth amendment." 
 
 There is thus the possibility of a federal question in 
 every eminent domain case arising under the laws of a 
 state, in which it is contended that the use for which the 
 property is sought to be taken is not public, but as the 
 courts of the several states have not as a rule attempted 
 to stretch the powers of their respective legislatures in 
 taking property by eminent domain to an unreasonable 
 limit, and as the Supreme Court of the United States has 
 not encouraged appeals to its jurisdiction over such pro- 
 ceedings by showing any tendency to interfere except in 
 the most flagrant cases, suits involving the constitutional- 
 ity of state statutes which rest for their justification upon 
 the customary constitutional provision relating to eminent 
 domain are not very frequently brought before the Supreme 
 Court of the United States. Questions involving the con- 
 sistency of state statutes, authorizing the taking of prop- 
 erty by eminent domain, with the fourteenth amendment 
 more often arise in the case of statutes enacted under the 
 authority of the special provisions found in several of the 
 state constitutions, declaring certain uses to be public 
 which are not generally so considered.^^ Such provisions 
 are of course binding upon the state courts so far as the 
 constitutions of the states are concerned, but they can 
 not override the fourteenth amendment, and a state stat- 
 ute which authorized a taking for a use clearly private, 
 though specifically authorized by the constitution of the 
 state, would be overturned by the Supreme Court of the 
 
 11. Fallbrook Irrigation District It was held in State v. Cowlitz, 77 
 
 V. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. ed. Wash. 585, 137 Pac. 994, that a 
 
 369 ; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. taking of property in behalf of the 
 
 Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403, 41 L. ed. general welfare, but for private use, 
 
 489; Madisonville Traction Co. v. was not a taking without due pro- 
 
 St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U. S. cess of law. 
 
 239, 49 L. ed. ,462; O'Neill v. 12. Supra, § 38. 
 Learner, 239 U. S. 244, 60 L. ed. — . 
 
128 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 40 
 
 United States/* or even by the highest court of the state 
 itself, since the federal constitution is binding- upon the 
 courts of every state notwithstanding any provision in its 
 own constitution." Especially would this be the case if the 
 state constitntioai) did not declare the use in. question to 
 be public, but merely provided that . property might be 
 taken for that use, even if it was private. In such a case, 
 it would seem, the highest court of a state would have no 
 alternative but to declare an act of its legislature, though 
 specifically authorized by the constitution of the state, 
 inoperative and void on account of its inconsistency with 
 the fourteenth amendment.^^ 
 
 § 40. DifiBculty in Defining Public Use, 
 
 It is generally recognized that the phrase " puiblie use," 
 when considered in relation to the power of eminent domain, 
 is incapable of a precis© and comprehensive definition 
 of universal application, but that, in a given case of a use 
 clearly enuring to the welfare of the community as such, 
 the courts are governed, if the case is a close one, more by 
 the settled practices and the vital necessities of the people 
 of the state in which the question arises than by philolog- 
 ical considerations. Efforts have been continually made to 
 find a concise definition which will embrace aU the under- 
 takings which may be constitutionally endowed with the 
 power of eminent domain and will exclude all others, but 
 the task has never been accomplished.^® The difficulty is 
 
 13. Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361, etc., Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 593, 
 49 L. ed. 1085; Hairston v. Dan- 83 Pac. 464, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 106. 
 ville & Western Railway Co., 208 Kentucky. — Ch^apeake Stone 
 U. S. 598, 52 L. ed. 637, 13 Ann. Go. v. Moreland, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 
 Case. 1008. 1075, 104 S. W. 762, 16 L. R. A. 
 
 14. Constitution of the United (N. S.) 479. 
 
 States, art. VI. New Hampshire. — Concord R. R. 
 
 15. Be TuthiU, 163 N. T. 133, 57 Ck). v. Greely, 17 N. H. 47. 
 
 N. E. 303, 49 L. R. A. 781, 79 JNTew Torfc. — Pocantieo Water- 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 574. works Co. v. Bird, 130 K Y. 249, 
 
 16. The impracticability of defin- 29 N. E. 246. 
 
 ing "public use" has been recog- Oregon. — Dalles Lumber Co. v. 
 
 nized in the following cases: Urquhart, 16 Ore. 67, 19 Pac. 78. 
 
 Colorado. — Tanner v. Treasury, South Carolina. — Riley v. Char- 
 
§ 40 The Public Use — GEWSiBAi, Principles. 129 
 
 due in part to the impossibility of reconciling tbe deci- 
 sions of the courts of the various states, or even of the 
 same state, in part to the fact that the courts are more 
 influenced by the established customs of the various states 
 at the time that the constitutions were adopted than by 
 a literal interpretation of the words of the instrument, in 
 part by the difference in conditions in different parts of 
 the United States and in the same part at different times; 
 but the fundamental trouble is the fact that the word " use " 
 is capable of two entirely different meanings, namely, 
 " employment " and " advantage." 
 
 The disagreement over the meaning of ' ' public use ' ' is 
 based largely upon the question of the sense in which the 
 word ' ' use ' ' in the constitution was intended to be under- 
 stood, and has developed two opposing views, each of which 
 has its ardent supporters among the text writers and courts 
 of last resort. The supporters of one school insist that ' ' pub- 
 lic use " means " use by the public," that is, public service 
 or employment, and that consequently to make a use public 
 a duty must devolve upon the person or corporation seeking 
 to take property by right of eminent domain to furnish the 
 public with the use intended, and the public must be entitled, 
 as of right, to use or enjoy the property taken." The 
 
 leston ITiiioii Station Co., 71 S. C. Co., 118 lU. 427, 10 N. E. 199, 59 
 
 457, 51 S. E. 485, 110 Am. St. Rep. Am. Eep. 379; Gaylord v. Sanitary 
 
 579. District, 204 111. 576, 68 N. E. 522, 
 
 Vermont.— Re Barre Water Co., 63 L. R. A. 582, 98 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 62 Vt. 27, 20 Atl. 109, 9 L. R. A. 235; Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 
 195. Polecat Drainage Dist., 213 111. 83, 
 
 Washington.— State v. White 72 N. E. 684. 
 
 Eiver Power Co., 39 Wash. 648, 82 KentiMiky. — Chesapeake Stone 
 
 Pac. 150, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 842, 4 Co. v. Moreland, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 Ann. Cas. 987. 1075, 104 S. W. 762, 16 L. R. A. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Wisconsin Water (N. S.) 479. 
 
 Co. V. Winaus, 85 Wis. 26, 54 Maryland. — ^Amsperger v. Craw- 
 
 N. W. 1003, 20 L. R. A. 662, 39 ford, 101 Md. 247, 61 Atl. 413, 70 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 813. L. R. A. 497. 
 
 17. United States. — West River Michigan. — Board of Health v. 
 
 Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507, 546, Van Hoesen, 87 Mich. 533, 49 
 
 12 L. ed. 535, 551; Shasta Power N. W. 894, 14 L. R. A. 114. 
 
 Co. V. Walker, 149 Fed. 568. Minnesota. — Minnesota Canal & 
 
 Illinois. — ShoU v. GermaB Coal Power Co. t. Koochiching Co., 97 
 
 9 
 
130 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 40 
 
 cases which lend support to this view are numerous and 
 weighty, but the force of many of such decisions is weak- 
 ened by the erroneous conception of the relation of the 
 courts and the legislature that is shown in the opinion, 
 and by the tendency disclosed to treat the question of 
 public use as one to be decided by the courts without regard 
 to the assertion upon that point by the legislature. In a 
 general way it may be said .that the courts which are 
 inclined in doubtful cases to sustain the rights of private 
 property as against the rights of the public are arrayed 
 in favor of the foregoing meaning of public use. 
 
 On the other hand the courts that are inclined to go fur- 
 thest in sustaining public rights at the expense of property 
 rights contend that " public use " means " public advan- 
 tage," and that anything which tends to enlarge the 
 resources, increase the industrial energies, and promote 
 the productive power of any considerable number of the 
 inhabitants of a section of the state, or which leads to the 
 
 Minn. 429, 107 N. W. 405, 5 
 L. R. A. (N. S,) 638, 7 Ann. Cas. 
 1182. 
 
 Nebraska. — Jenal v. Green Island 
 Draining Co., 12 Neb. 163, 10 N. W. 
 547. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Rockingham 
 County Light & Power Co. v. 
 Hobbs, 72 N. H. 531, 58 Atl. 46, 66 
 L. R. A. 581. 
 
 New York. — Matter of Eureka 
 Basin, etc., Co., 96 N. Y. 42; Mat- 
 ter of Split Rock Cable R. R. Co., 
 128 N. Y. 408, 28 N. E. 506; Poean- 
 tico Water-Works Co. v. Bird, 130 
 N. Y. 249, 29 N. E. 246; Be New 
 York, 135 N. Y. 253, 31 N. E. 1043, 
 31 Am. St. Rep. 253. 
 
 Tennessee. — Memphis Freight 
 Co. V. Memphis, 4 Coldw. 419; 
 Ryan v. Louisville, etc.. Terminal 
 Co., 102 Tenn. Ill, 50 S. W. 744, 
 45 L. R. A. 303. 
 
 Texas. — Borden v. Trespalaeios 
 Rice & Irrigation Co., 98 Tex. 494, 
 86 S. W. 11, 107 Am. St. Rep. 640. 
 
 Vermont. — -Avery v. Vermont 
 
 Electric Co., 75 Vt. 235, 54 Atl. 
 179, 98 Am. St. Rep. 818; Deer- 
 field River Co. v. WUmington 
 Power & Paper Co., 83 Vt. 548, 77 
 Atl. 862. 
 
 Virginia. — Eallsburg, etc., Mfg. 
 Co. V. Alexander, 101 Va. 98, 43 
 S. E. 194, 99 Am. St. Rep. 855; 
 Zircle v. Southern Railway Co., 102 
 Va. 17, 45 S. E. 802, 102 Am. St. 
 Rep. 805. 
 
 Washington. — Healy Lumber Co. 
 V. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 74 Pac. 
 681, 63 L. R. A. 820, 99 Am. St. 
 Rep. 964; State ex rel. Tacoma 
 Industrial Co. v. White River 
 Power Co., 39 Wash. 490, 82 Pac. 
 150, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 842, 4 Ann. 
 Cas. 987. 
 
 West Virginia. — Hench v. Pritt, 
 62 W. Va. 270, 57 S. E. 808, 125 
 Am. St. Rep. 966. 
 
 Wisconsin. — ^Wisconsin Water 
 Co. v. Winaus, 85 Wis. 26, 54 N. W. 
 1003, 20 L. R. A. 662, 39 Am. St. 
 Rep. 813. 
 
§ 40 The Public Use — Geneeal, Peinciplbs. 
 
 131 
 
 growth of towns and the creation of new resources for the 
 employment of capital and labor, manifestly contributes to 
 the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole com- 
 munity, and, giving the constitution a broad and comprehen- 
 sive interpretation, constitutes a public use.^* 
 
 Neither of the two extreme views of the meaning of pub- 
 lic use holds good when applied to all the concrete cases 
 which are likely to arise, each definition of public use being 
 in some respects too broad and in others too narrow. 
 Neither is sufficiently comprehensive to justify the taking 
 of land for all the purposes that the courts have held to be 
 proper, while each of them leads logically to the employ- 
 ment of eminent domain for purposes at which the ordi- 
 nary mind, both legal and lay, would instinctively revolt. 
 
 18. United States. — Headrich, v. 
 Larson, 152 Fed. 93. - 
 
 Alabama. — Aldridge v. Tuseum- 
 bia, etc., Railroad Co., 2 Stew. & 
 P. 199, 23 Am. Dee. 307. 
 
 Colorado. — Tanner v. Treasury, 
 etc., Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 593, 83 
 Pac. 464, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 106. 
 
 Connecticut. — Olmstead v. Camp, 
 33 Conn. 532, 89 Am. Dec. 221; 
 In re Hartford Water Commission- 
 ers, 87 Conn. 193, 87 Atl. 870. 
 
 Idaho. — Potlateh Lumber Co. v. 
 Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 88 Pac. 
 426, 118 Am. St. Rep. 233. 
 
 Indian Territory. — Tuttle v. 
 Moore, 3 Ind. Ter. 712, 65 S. W. 
 585.. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Boston & Rox- 
 bury Mill Corporation v. Newman, 
 12 Pick. 467, 23 Am. Dec. 622; 
 Hazen v. Essex Co., 12 Cush. 475; 
 Talbot V. Hudson, 16 Gray 417; 
 White V. Blanehard Bros. Grranite 
 Co., 178 Mass. 363, 59 N. E. 1125. 
 
 Montana. — Butte, etc., Railroad 
 Co. V. Montana Union Railroad Co., 
 16 Mont. 504, 41 Pac. 232, 31 
 L. R. A. 299, 59 Am. St. Rep. 50. 
 
 Nevada. — Dayton, etc., Mining 
 Co. V. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394. 
 
 New Jersey. — Scudder v. Tren- 
 ton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 
 
 644, 23 Am. Dec. 756; Tide-Water 
 Co. V. Coster, 18 N. J. Eq. 518, 90 
 Am. Dec. 634. 
 
 North Carolina. — Norfleet v. 
 CromweU, 70 N. C. 634, 16 Am. 
 Rep. 787. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Shoenberger v. 
 Mulhollan, 8 Pa. 134; Jacobs v. 
 Clearview Water Supply Co., 220 
 Pa. 388, 69 Atl. 870, 21 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 410. 
 
 Utah.— 'Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah 
 158, 75 Pac. 371, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 208, 101 Am. St. Rep. 953, 1 Ann. 
 Cas. 300; affirmed, 198 U. S. 361, 
 
 49 L. ed. 1085 ; Highland Boy Gold 
 Mining Co. v. Strickley, 28 Utah 
 215, 78 Pac. 296, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 976, 107 Am. St. Rep. 711, 3 Ann. 
 Cas. 1110; affirmed, 200 U. S. 527, 
 
 50 L. ed. 581, 4 Ann. Cas. 1174. 
 Wyoming. — Grover, etc., Land 
 
 Co. V. Lovella, etc., Irrigation Co., 
 21 Wyo. 204, 131 Pac. 43. 
 
 Judge Cooley (Const. Lim. p. 
 *524) says that the power of emi- 
 nent domain is the right to ap- 
 propriate property for the public 
 benefit. Mr. Tiedemann (Control 
 of Persons and Property, p. 693) 
 says public use is now synonymous 
 with public good. 
 
132 Th35 Law of Eminent Domain. § 40 
 
 For example, if '■' public use " means " use by the public," 
 eminent domain may be employed to secure sites for hotels 
 and theatres, which are bound by custom or statute in many 
 states to serve the public without discrimination, but on 
 the other hand the weight of authority, which sustains the 
 exercise of eminent domain for purposes sanctioned by 
 ancient custom and in behalf of improvements vital to a 
 state's prosperity, must be disregarded. . If, however, 
 "public use" is synonymous with "public advantage," 
 or rather what the legislature might reasonably conceive 
 to be the public advantage, eminent domain might consti- 
 tutionally be employed in behalf of all large industrial 
 enterprises, and the size of farm holdings might be regu- 
 lated to suit the prevailing economic theory of the time;^® 
 but on the other hand, the devotion of even a highway to 
 use by the public would not in itself be sufficient to justify 
 the exercise of eminent domain unless it appeared that 
 enough of the public were likely to use the road to make its 
 establishment a public advantage. 
 
 Accordingly, however much may be said in favor of either 
 of these views, neither can be accepted as the true one with- 
 out disregarding some of the well established doctrines of 
 this branch of the law ; and any further attempt at a concise 
 and comprehensive definition of ' ' public use ' ' would be 
 equally unsuccessful. Many courts have recognized the folly 
 of attempting to lay down any hard and fast rule, and, while 
 repudiating the dangerous doctrine that any enterprise 
 which indirectly promotes the public welfare is necessarily 
 a public use, have not attempted to confine the exercise of 
 eminent domain to cases in which the public will have the 
 
 19. Tiedemami, Control of Peo if the qniet and order of prosper- 
 
 sons and Property, p. 696, suggests ous times could be restored by an 
 
 that if a similar state of affairs expropriation of the land of 
 
 were to exist in the United States large land-owners, it would be emi- 
 
 as existed in Ireland a few years nently republican for the state to do 
 
 ago, and the public order and peace so. See however the opinion of 
 
 were daily and hourly threatened by Sharswood, J., in Palairet's Ap- 
 
 the lack of small land holdings and peal, 67 Pa. 479, 5 Am. Rep. 450. 
 the exactions of absentee landlords, 
 
§ 41 The Public Use — Geneeal Pbinciples. 133 
 
 rigkt to use the property sought to be taken.^" It is now 
 generally realized that only by the gradual process of judi- 
 cial exclusion and inclusion, and by a study of the influ- 
 ences which have affected the development of the law upon 
 this subject, can an authoritative delimitation of "public 
 use " be attained. 
 
 § 41. Historical Development. 
 
 The accepted significance of " public use," so far as it 
 can be said to have an accepted significance, is the result 
 of gradual development and of certain perceptible influ- 
 ences which have affected it. When the constitutions of 
 the original thirteen states were adopted, the subjects of 
 eminent domain were few, and it clearly was not intended to 
 exclude from the class of public uses any of the enterprises 
 which were then considered to faU within it.^^ And accord- 
 ingly, although it has sometimes grated upon logical minds, 
 the justification of antiquity has been held sufficient to sup- 
 port, as public, undertakings which, if new, would never be 
 held to fall within the line.^^ Moreover, some of these 
 
 20. Maine. — Brown v. Gerald, as one reason why the miUdam act 
 100 Me. 351, 61 Atl. 785, 70 of Kansas was constitutional, that, 
 L. R. A. 472, 109 Am. St. Rep. 526. at the time of the adoption of the 
 
 Massachusetts. — Lowell v. Bos- state constitution, similar acts had 
 
 ton, 111 Mass. 454, 15 Am. Rep. 39. been sanctioned by the legislatures, 
 
 New Jersey. — AUbright v. Sussex executives, and courts of many of 
 
 Comity Lake & Park Commission, the states, and almost universally 
 
 71 N. J. L. 303, 57 Atl. 398, 69 upheld; and, if the people had not 
 
 L. R. A. 768, 108 Am. St. Rep. 749, intended the legislature of Kansas 
 
 2 Ann. Cas. 48. to exercise a like power, they would 
 
 New York. — Bloodgood v. M'o- have imposed a clear limitation, 
 
 hawk & Hudson River Railroad Co., See also Tyler v. Beecher, 44 Vt. 
 
 18 Wend. 9, 31 Am. Dec. 313. 648, 8 Am. Rep. 398, in which the 
 
 North Ca/rolina. — Cozard v. same argument is made, and a dis- 
 
 Kanawha Hardwood Co., 139 N. C. tinction drawn between acts in force 
 
 283, 51 S. E. 932, 1 L. R. A. when the state constitution was 
 
 (N. S.) 969, 111 Am. St. Rep. 779. adopted, and acts subsequently 
 
 South Ca/rolina. — Riley v. Char- adopted, 
 
 leston Union Station Co., 71 S. C. 22. See the opinion of Midler, J., 
 
 457, 51 S. E. 485, 110 Am. St. Rep. in Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 
 
 579. Wall. (U. S.) 655, 22 L. ed. 455, 
 
 21. In Venard v. Cross, 8 Kan. on a question of public use aa 
 248, Brewer, J., afterward of the applied to taxation : " In deciding 
 United States Supreme Court, gave in a given ease whether the object 
 
134 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 41 
 
 ancient uses have been extended gradually, so that their 
 offshoots comprise the most extreme cases in which the 
 courts have been satisfied with an ahnost infinitesimal 
 public advantage. 
 
 On the other hand, undertakings which were conducted 
 before the Revolution by individuals, without the aid of a 
 grant of power from the state, have remained in that con- 
 dition since then. An inn, f or^ example, may be of great 
 benefit to the community, and the innkeeper may be obliged 
 by law to serve any of the public who desire accommodation, 
 but we may search in vain for the case of an innkeeper 
 permitted to acquire a suitable site for his building without 
 the consent of the owner of the land, and it seems very 
 doubtful if any court would uphold a statute authorizing 
 such a taking.^* 
 
 It must not be understood, however, that the constitu- 
 tion has not received the same flexibility of interpretation 
 in this particular that it has in others. No branch of con- 
 stitutional law has felt the effect of the mechanical and 
 industrial progress of the last hundred years more than 
 
 falls on one side or the other of the New Hampshire. — McMillan v. 
 line, the courts must be governed Noyes, 75 N. H. 258, 72 Atl. 759. 
 mainly by the course and usage of New Jersey. — Hoagland v. 
 the government the objects for Wurts, 41 N. J. L. 175. 
 which taxation has been customarily Pennsylvania. — Palairet's Ap- 
 and by long course of legislation peal, 67 Pa. 479, 5 Am. Rep. 450. 
 employed. Whatever is sanctioned West Virginia. — Vamer v. Mar- 
 by time and the acquiescence of the tin, 21 W. Va. 534. 
 people may well be held to belong Wisconsin. — Fisher v. Horieon 
 to the public use." Iron & Mfg. Co., 10 Wis. 351. 
 
 See also: 23. A hotel is not such a public 
 
 United States. — Otis Co. v. Lud- use that it can be exempted from 
 
 low Co., 201 U. S. 140, 50 L. ed. taxation (Lancaster v. Clayton, 86 
 
 696. Ky. 373, 380, 5 S. W. 864), and a 
 
 Connecticut. — Olmstead v. Camp, theatre cannot be maintained with 
 
 33 Conn. 532, 89 Am. Dec. 221. public funds (Sugar v. Munroe, 108 
 
 Delaware.— Keckman's Case, 4 La. 677, 32 So. 961, 59 L. R. A. 
 
 Harr. 580. 723; State ex rel. Toledo v. Lynch, 
 
 iowo.— Bumham v. Thompson, 88 Ohio St. 71, 102 N. E. 670, 48 
 
 35 Iowa 421. L. R. A. (N. S.) 720, Ann. Cas. 
 
 Kentucky. — RcVbinson v. Swope, 1914 D 949. See however Egan v. 
 
 12 Bush. 21. San Francisco, 165 Cal. 576, 133 
 
 Massachusetts. — Pierce v. Drew, Pac. 294, Ann. Cas. 1915 A 754). 
 136 Mass. 75, 49 Am. Rep. 7. 
 
§ 42 The Public Use — Gtenekal Pkinciples. 135 
 
 that relating to eminent domain."* Not only have new means 
 of carriage and the transmission of intelligence become 
 known, but many things formerly looked upon as luxuries 
 are now considered the common necessities of life, and 
 the courts have had to consider the application of the con- 
 stitutional limitation in question to these new undertakings 
 designed to meet the ever-increasing needs of society. Some 
 of the modern inventions are merely improvements on old 
 methods, and with them there should have been no diffi- 
 culty, although almost every forward step has had to fight 
 its way in the courts. For example, all improved methods 
 of transportation for the public were as much for the public 
 use as the older highways and turnpikes. Other inventions 
 such as telephones and telegraphs related to a wholly new 
 subject, but if they provided a public service were from 
 their nature proper objects for eminent domain, and they 
 also were accepted by the courts. 
 
 § 42. Other Considerations Aflfecting Meaning of ' ' Public 
 Use." 
 
 There are other considerations which appear to have 
 influenced the development of this branch of the law into 
 its present condition and which are of great assistance in 
 understanding some of the decisions. In the first place, the 
 uses which are recognized as public but which seem to rest 
 on the least public good arose under circumstances in which 
 the benefit to the individuals was great, and the land taken 
 was unimproved, unoccupied and of little value,"^ and not 
 utilized to any great extent by its owners, so that the out- 
 rage to property rights did not seem serious. These tak- 
 ings had the support of public acquiescence for many years 
 before some litigous individual sought to contest their valid- 
 ity. It was under such conditions that the acts in aid of 
 
 24. Tanner v. Treasury, etc., Re- 17 N. H. 47; Ryan v. Louisville, 
 
 auction Co., 35 Colo. 593, 83 Pac. etc., Terminal Co., 102 Tenn. Ill, 
 
 464, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 106; Brown 50 S. W. 744, 45 L. R. A. 303. 
 
 V. Gerald, 100 Me. 351, 61 Atl. 785, 25. Gaylord v. Sanitary District, 
 
 70 L. R. A. 472, 109 Am. St. Rep. 204 111. 576, 68 N. E. 522, 63 
 
 526; Concord R. R. Co. v. Greeley, L. R. A. 582, 98 Am. St. Rep. 235. 
 
136 The Law op Eminbht' Domain. § 42 
 
 mills, drainage, irrigation and lumbering arose. On the 
 other hand, quasi-public buildings, such as hotels and 
 theatres, which are usually built in thickly settled commu- 
 nities, on valuable land in which the owner would have a 
 strong sense of proprietorship, have never been considered 
 proper objects of eminent domain. 
 
 Secondly, courts have been more ready to uphold a par- 
 ticular use of land as public when, from the nature of the 
 imdertaking, it was impossible or difficult to carry it out 
 without the aid of eminent domain than when a particular 
 site was not essential, and a suitable one could be secured 
 equally well by purchase.^® Once a use is declared public, 
 the necessity of employing condemnation proceedings is 
 for the legislature to decide,^^ yet it is noticeable that the 
 courts have gone farther in allowing takings for such pur- 
 poses as railroads than they have for quasi-public buildings. 
 
 Thirdly, commercial or pecuniary benefit has, until recent 
 years at least, been looked upon more favorable than mere 
 amusement or aesthetic enjoyment. 
 
 26. "West Eiver Bridge Co. v. tioe of free government must be our 
 
 Dix, 6 How. (U. S.) 507, 12 L. ed. guides in determining what is or is 
 
 535. "No necessity seems to exist not to be regarded a public use; and 
 
 which, is sufficient to justify so that only can be considered siieh 
 
 strong a measure. A particular lo- where the government is furnishing 
 
 cality as to a few rods in respect its own needs or is furnishing f aeili- 
 
 to their site (referring to certain ties for its citizens in regard to 
 
 public buUdings) is usually of no those matters of public necessity, 
 
 consequence." Varner v. Martin, 21 convenience, or welfare which on 
 
 W. Va. 534. To justify eminent account of their peculiar character, 
 
 domain "it must be impossible, or and the difficulty — perhaps impose 
 
 very difficult at least, to secure the sibUity — of making provision for 
 
 same public uses and purposes in them otherwise, it is alike proper, 
 
 any other way than by authorizing useful, and needful for the govem- 
 
 the condemnation, of private prop- ment to provide * * *. It must 
 
 erty." And see also Eyerson v. be 6onceded that the term ' public 
 
 Brown, 35 Mich. 333, 24 Am. Hep. use,' as employed in the law of emi- 
 
 464; Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me. nent domain, has a meaning much 
 
 317; Dayton Mining Co. v. Seawell, e'ontroUed by the necessity, and 
 
 11 Nev. 394 ; Cooley, Constitutional somewhat different from that which 
 
 Limitations, p. *533 : " The rea- it bears generally." 
 
 son of the ease and the settled prac- 27. Infra, § 333. 
 
§ 43 The Public Use — General Pkinciples. 137 
 
 § 43. Variation in Local Conditions. 
 
 One of the circumstances that tends to make a concise 
 definition of public use substantially impossible is that what 
 is a public use is to a great extent a local question, and its 
 determination in the courts of the different states has been 
 influenced by considerations touching the resources, the 
 capacity of the soil, and the relative importance of indus- 
 tries to the general public welfare as well as by the long- 
 established methods and habits of the people.^^ In all these 
 respects conditions vary so much in the different states that 
 different results may well be expected. 
 
 'Even the Supreme Court of the United States, in inter- 
 preting a constitution which applies alike to every state of 
 the union, has frequently recognized the propriety of keep- 
 ing in view the diversity of local conditions, and of regard- 
 ing with great respect the judgments of the state courts 
 upon what should be deemed public uses. While the 
 Supreme Court has frequently enunciated the rule that a 
 taking of property for private use is a taking without due 
 process of law, and there have come before it cases which, 
 to say the least, go to the verge of legislative power, it is 
 worthy of note that this court has never actually held a use 
 to be private which the courts of a state, with their intimate 
 knowledge of local conditions and requirements, and with 
 the concurrence of the legislature or even of the people of 
 the state, have declared to be public.^^ 
 
 28. Kansas. — Lake Koen, etc., 107 Am. St. Eep. 711, 3 Ann. Cas. 
 
 Irrigation Co. v. Klein, 63 Kan. 1110. 
 
 484, 65 Pac. 684. 29. Thus the Supreme Court has 
 
 Montana.— Billings Sugar Co. v. declined to interfere with the con- 
 Fish, 40 Mont. 256, 106 Pae. 565, denmation by one person of an 
 20 Arm Cas 264 easement over the land of another 
 
 New' York.- Ee TuthiU, 163 for the construction of an irrigation 
 
 N. Y. 133, 57 N. E. 303, 49 L. R. A. f^"^ 5°'' ^' .°''f "^V ^f^^^"*'^ 
 
 781, 79 Am. St. Rep. 574. ^^^l^ 4^1. 7' q6Q r7' ,''* 
 
 „ n n T u ■ r. ^- ^- ■^■^'^> ^ ^- ^o- 369; Clark v. 
 
 Oregon.- Dalles Lumbering Co. j^^^^ ^gg jj g gg-^ ^g ^ ed 1085- 
 
 V. Urquhart, 16 Ore. 71, 19 Pac. 78. „, „/ , ^ght of way over the land 
 
 ?7«a;^.~ Highland Boy Gold Mm- of another for an aerial bucket 
 
 ing Co. V. Strickley, 28 Utah 215, line; Strickley v. Highland Boy 
 
 78 Pae. 296, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 976, Gold Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527 50 
 
138 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 44 
 
 § 44. The Three Classes of PubUc Improvements for 
 Which Eminent Domain May Be Exercised. 
 
 Another difficulty in defining public use concisely is that 
 there are three distinct classes of public improvements 
 recognized by the courts as proper objects of eminent 
 domain each of which is subject to different limitations and 
 affected by different considerations. 
 
 The first class includes the cases in which the United 
 States, a state, or a municipal cotporation seeks to acquire 
 a parcel of land on which to carry on its governmental 
 functions, or by means of which to directly enhance the 
 safety, health or comfort of the community. In such cases 
 it is of no consequence whether the same result could be 
 reached without the exercise of any franchise from the 
 government, and there is no requirement of ' ' use by the 
 public ' ' in the sense that the individual members of the 
 public must have the right to use the land so taken. The 
 use is by the public through its officers or agents, or by its 
 enjoyment of greater safety, health and comfort, and emi- 
 nent domain may unquestionably be employed for such 
 purposes, although the public is to be rigorously excluded 
 from the land taken. 
 
 The second class includes the cases in which the public 
 is supplied with some service, commodity or convenience. 
 In such cases it is universally held that, to justify a taking 
 by eminent domain, the public must have the opportunity 
 to make use of the service offered at reasonable rates and 
 without discrimination, as of right, and not merely at the 
 pleasure or caprice of the condemning party. In this class 
 of cases it is of some importance whether the service in 
 
 L. ed. 581; or of the right to flow 1008; or with the taking of land 
 the land of another by the erection for drainage purposes; O'Neill v. 
 of a dam; Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Learner, 239 U. S. 244, 60 L. ed. 
 Co., 113 U. S. 9, 28 L. ed. 889; — ; or with the taking of land and 
 Otis Co. V. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 201 water rights to facilitate the manu- 
 U. S. 140, 50 L. ed. 696 ; or of the facture or distribution of hydro- 
 right to construct a spur track over electric power; Mt. Vernon Cotton 
 the land of another; Hairston v. Co. v. Alabama Power Co., 240 
 Danville, etc., Ry. Co., 208 U. S. U. S. 30. 
 598, 52 L. ed. 637, 13 Ann. Cas. 
 
§ 44 The Public Use — Geneeal Pbinciples. 139 
 
 question can be and ordinarily is furnished without the aid 
 of any governmental franchise, for although it is now gener- 
 ally agreed that, if a use is public, eminent domain may be 
 employed in its behalf, regardless of the feasibility of 
 acquiring the desired land by purchase, when the claim of 
 a particular enterprise to the right to exercise eminent 
 domain is based upon service to the public, the question 
 whether that kind of enterprise ordinarily requires the 
 power of eminent domain to be successfully carried on is a 
 considerable factor in determining whether it is a public 
 use, although the necessity of using eminent domain in any 
 particular instance is not material. In other words eminent 
 domain cannot be employed in behalf of a particular under- 
 taking, even if its proprietors are bound by law to serve the 
 public, if it is one which can be and ordinarily is carried 
 on by private parties without the aid of any franchise from 
 the government. For example, a railroad could not ordi- 
 narily be laid out unless it was granted the power of 
 eminent domain, and consequently a railroad is a public use 
 and a railroad company may be granted the power of emi- 
 nent domain even if in a particular case it might be able to 
 acquire a suitable location by purchase; but hotels can be 
 and ordinarily are established without the aid of eminent 
 domain and although they are as completely bound to serve 
 the public as railroads, a hotel is not a public use and a hotel 
 corporation could not be invested with the power of emi- 
 nent domain even if it was unable to acquire by purchase 
 the site that it most desired. 
 
 The third class includes the cases in which individual 
 members of the public are allowed to take land by eminent 
 domain in order to enable them to cultivate their land or 
 carry on their business to better advantage. In cases of 
 this class the public has no claim to any service from the 
 persons who have exercised the power, or any right to make 
 use of the land so taken, and the benefit to the public is 
 wholly indirect. It need hardly be said that there is no 
 universally accepted rule which justifies the exercise of 
 eminent domain for such purposes. Cases of this class are 
 
140 The Law of EMiNEira Domain. f 46 
 
 special and peculiar, and they are based either upon an 
 ancient custom running back before the constitutions were 
 adopted, or upon peculiar local conditions which make the 
 adoption of such a rule the only alternative to economic 
 ruin. Nevertheless takings of this character are Sanc- 
 tioned by law in many of tiie states, and no definition of 
 "public use" which does not recognize them is either 
 complete or accurate, 
 
 § 45. The True Meaning of Public Use. 
 
 A definition of public use which, while not concise, is 
 consistent in all particulars with the weight of judicial 
 authority, is accordingly the following : 
 
 It is a public use for which property may be taken by 
 eminent domain, (1) to enable the United States or a state 
 or one of its subdivisions to carry on its governmental 
 functions, and to preserve the safety, health and comfort 
 of the public, whether or not the individual members of the 
 public may make use of the property so taken, provided the 
 taking is made by a public body; (2) to serve, the public 
 with some necessity or convenience of life which is required 
 by the public as such and which cannot be readily furnished 
 without the aid of some governmental power, whether or 
 not the taking is made by a public body, provided the public 
 may enjoy such service as of right; (3) in certain special 
 and peculiar cases, sanctioned by ancient custom or justified 
 by the requirements of unusual local conditions, to enable 
 individuals to cultivate their land or carry on business in 
 a manner in which it could not otherwise be done, if their 
 success will indirectly enhance the public welfare, even if 
 the taking is made by a private individual and the public 
 has no right to service from him or enjoyment of the 
 property taken. 
 
 § 46. Number Participating in or Benefiting by the Use. 
 
 The use which will justify the taking of property by 
 eminent domain is use by the government, or use by or for 
 the public as such, and not use by or for particular indi- 
 
§ 46 The Public Use — Genebal Pbinciples. 
 
 141 
 
 viduals or for the benefit of certain estates,*" but it is not 
 the number of people who will participate in or benefit by 
 the use for which the property is sought to be taken that 
 determines whether the use is or is not public. However 
 " public use " may be defined, for a use to be public it is 
 not necessary that the entire community or any consider- 
 able portion of it should enjoy it. Under those conditions 
 in which it is held that the public use is equivalent to public 
 advantage, it is enough if the people of a particular locality 
 receive the benefit ; ^'^ and under the circumstances in which 
 use by the public is the test, while it is considered requisite 
 that every member of the public, if he has occasion, shall 
 be allowed to use the property, the extent which that right 
 will be exercised is considered of little, if any, importance, 
 provided the use is of such a character that those who use 
 it will do so as members of the public.*^ The extent of the 
 
 30. MiUer v. Pulaski, 109 Va. 
 137, 63 S. E. 880, 22 L. E. A. 
 (N. S.) 552. 
 
 31. Indiana. — Zigler v. Memges, 
 121 Ind. 99, 22 N. E. 782, 16 Am. 
 St. Rep. 357. 
 
 Kansas. — Lake Koen, etc, Irri- 
 gation Co. V. Klein, 63 Kan. 484, 
 65 Pac. 684. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Talbot v. Hud- 
 son, 16 Gray 417; Moore v. San- 
 ford, 151 Mass. 285, 24 N. E. 323, 
 7 L. R. A. 15L 
 
 Nebraska. — Paxton, etc.. Land 
 Co. V. Farmers', etc.. Land Co., 45 
 Neb. 884, 64 N. W. 343, 29 L. R. A. 
 853, 50 Am. St. Rep. 585. 
 
 New Jersey. — Coster v. Tide 
 Water Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 54, 518, 90 
 Am. Dec. 635. 
 
 32. California. — Lux v. Haggin, 
 69 Cal. 255, 10 Pac. 674. 
 
 Colorado. — Tanner v. Treasury- 
 Tunnel Mining & Reduction Co., 35 
 Colo. 593, 83 Pac. 464, 4 L. R. A. 
 (K S.) 106. 
 
 Iowa. — Dubuque, etc., R. R. Co., 
 V. Port Dodge, etc., R. R. Co., 146 
 Iowa 666, 125 N. W. 672. 
 
 Kentucky. — Chesapeake Stone 
 Co. V. Mbreland, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 
 1075, 104 S. W. 762, 16 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 479. 
 
 Maine. — Brown v. Gerald, 100 
 Me. 351, 61 Atl. 785, 70 L. R. A. 
 472, 109 Am. St. Rep. 526. 
 
 Minnesota. — Kettle River Rail- 
 way Co. V. Eastern Railway Co., 41 
 Minn. 461, 43 N. W. 469, 6 L. R. A. 
 Ill; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Porter, 43 Minn. 527, 46 N. W. 75. 
 
 Montana. — Butte, etc.. Railroad 
 Co. V. Montana Union Railroad Co., 
 16 Mont. 504, 41 Pac. 232, 31 
 L. R. A. 299, 50 Am. St. Rep. 508. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Jacobs v. Clear- 
 view Water Supply Co., 220 Pa, 
 388, 69 Atl. 870. 
 
 Virginia. — Miller v. Pulaski, 109 
 Va. 137, 63 S. E. 880, 22 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 552. 
 
 West Virginia. — Caretta R. R. 
 Co. V. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal 
 Co., 62 W. Va. 185, '67 S. E. 401; 
 Carnegie Natural Gas Co. v. 
 Swiger, 72 W. Va. 557, 79 S. E. 3. 
 
142 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 46 
 
 probable use has more bearing upon the expediency than 
 upon the constitutionality of the taking. 
 
 In one aspect however, the number who will make use of 
 the improvement for which the property is taken is material. 
 If the improvement is of such a character that it can, in the 
 nature of things, be used by but few people, those who will 
 use it will not do so as members of the public, and the use 
 will not be public. Thus it has J)een held that the right to 
 fish in small inland ponds could not be acquired by eminent 
 domain because, in the nature of things, it could be exer- 
 cised by but few.^^ The same objection has been raised 
 to the exercise of the power of eminent domain to aid in 
 the generation and distribution of hydro-electric power for 
 manufacturing purposes.^* On the other hand a public 
 highway is unquestionably for the public use, and may be 
 established by eminent domain even if it is probable that 
 but one individual will use it, because the entire community 
 can use it, and the one who does use it will use it as a 
 member of the public.** 
 
 Except in the peculiar cases in which the indirect benefit 
 to the public is accepted as sufficient to constitute a public 
 use, when an easement is taken for a public use it must be 
 a public easement, even if taken by a private corporation, 
 and a statute providing that any member of the public 
 might acquire a certain private easement is unconstitu- 
 tional; for even if every member of the public should 
 acquire the easement it would remain a bundle of private 
 easements, and the easement not being public the use is 
 not.'*^ 
 
 33. Albright V. Sussex County 146, 84 Pac. 685, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 Lake & Power Commission, 71 872; Eoss v. Davis, 97 Ind. 79, 49 
 N. J. L. 303, 57 Atl. 398, 69 L. R. A. Am. Rep. 430 ; Brewster v. Rogers 
 768, 108 Am. St. Rep. 749, 2 Ann. Co., 169 N. Y. 73, 62 N. E. 164, 58 
 Cas. 48. L. R. A. 495. 
 
 34. Infra, § 72. Contra, Chesapeake Stone Co. v. 
 
 35. Infra, § 61. Moreland, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1075, 104 
 
 36. Hartman v. Tresise, 36 Colo. S. W. 762, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 479. 
 
§ 47 The Public Use — Gtenebal Pbinoiples. 143 
 
 § 47. Character of Party Exercising the Power, 
 It is of course well established that the legislature of a 
 state can, if it sees fit, exercise the power of eminent domain 
 itself, or it can delegate the power to a public board, to a 
 city or town, to a private corporation or even under some 
 circumstances to an individual, provided the use for which 
 the property is taken is public ;^^ but in determining 
 whether a use for which the taking of property has been 
 authorized is public, the character of the party exercising 
 the power is, in a close case, of some importance, as the 
 courts are inclined to view a proposed use more favorably 
 if the taking is to be made by a public body.^^ In such a 
 case a difficulty would arise before the taking of land was 
 reached, for money could not be raised by taxation for a 
 private purpose. Moreover, it is obviously less likely that 
 the public will indulge in private business than that an indi- 
 vidual or a. private corporation will do so. 
 
 Except in the cases in which, on account of the peculiar 
 local conditions, the taking of land for use by private indi- 
 viduals or corporations is justified on account of the inci- 
 dental advantage to the public, a private corporation 
 authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain must, 
 ipso facto, be what is generally designated a " public service 
 corporation " — that is to say, a corporation organized 
 
 37. Infra, § 355. tion provided for those whose prop- 
 
 38. Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray erty may be taken or injured by the 
 (Mass.) 417: "Nor is it to be over- reduction of the dam is to be paid 
 looked in this connection that the from the public treasury. An act 
 ordinary presumption in favor of thus framed clearly indicates that in 
 the validity of an act of the legis- the judgment of the legislature it 
 lafcure is greatly strengthened in the was des'gred to subserve some im- 
 present case by the consideration portant public use, so necessary that 
 that the power to take the property it ought not to be left to private 
 of the defendants is not delegated enterprise, and so universal that the 
 to any persons oi corporation for burrlpn nf pfcomplisliing the object 
 their private advantage and emolu- shoiiW be borne, not by individuals, 
 ment who are to make compensation corporations, or towns, but by all 
 for the property taken out of their the peop'e of the commonwealth." 
 private capital or stock. But it is See ahn TTnited States v. Gettys- 
 an exercise of the power of eminent burg Electric Rv. Co., 160 U. S. 
 domain directly by the state itself 668, 40 Tj. ed. 576, and Long Sault 
 through agents specially appointed nevelopment Co. v. Kennedy, 143 
 for the purpose, and the compensa- N. Y. Snpp. 4.F4, 
 
144 The Law of Eminent Domaiit. § 4J 
 
 under the authority of a state to serve the public, by sup- 
 plying the people of a specified district on equal terms and 
 for a reasonable compensation, with services or conamodi- 
 ties which because of their nature, location or manner of 
 production and distribution can be best produced and dis- 
 tributed by some organized form of enterprise oper- 
 ating under state controP* — but there is no constitutional 
 requirement that a corporation exercising eminent domain 
 should have no other functions than public service. That a 
 corporation has incidental powers under its charter to con- 
 duct some private enterprise or to engage in private busi- 
 ness does not deprive it of the power of eminent domain 
 when it is seeking to condemn property for the public use,*" 
 unless its two functions are so hopelessly intermingled that 
 it is impossible to distinguish what is to be taken for the 
 public from what is to be devoted to the private use.*^ The 
 nature of the use and not the character of the party exercis- 
 ing the power is the test ; but in a close case the court might 
 well be influenced by the fact that the party seeking to exer- 
 cise the power was not wholly devoted to the public 
 
 39. Minnesota Canal &Power Co. Indiana. — -"Westport Stone Co. v. 
 V. Pratt, 101 Minn. 197, 112 N. W. Thomas, 175 Ind. 319, 94 N. E. 406. 
 395, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 105. See North Carolina. — Wadsworth 
 also Attorney-General v. Haverhill Land Co. v. Piedmont Traction Co., 
 Gas Light Co., 215 M'ass. 394, 101 162 N. C. 314, 78 S. E. 297. 
 
 N. E. 1061, Ann. Cas. 1914 C 1266, Tewwessee.— Great Palls Power 
 
 in which the court said : "A pub- Co. v. Webb, 123 Tenn. 584, 133 
 
 He service or quasi-public corpora- S. W. 1105. 
 
 tion is one private in its ownership Washington. — State ex rel. Har- 
 but having an appropriate fran- Ian v. Centralia-Chehalis Electrio 
 •chise from the state to provide for Ry. & Power Co., 42 Wash. 632, 85 
 a necessity or convenience of the Pac. 344, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 198, 
 general public incapable of being 4 St. Ry. Rep. 1064; State v. Pa- 
 furnished through the ordinary ciflc County Court, 56 Wash. 214, 
 channels of private competitive 105 Pac. 637; State v. Snohomish 
 business and dependent for its ex- County Court, 71 Wash. 84, 127 
 ercise upon eminent domain or some Pac. 591. 
 agency of government." 41. Infra, § 48. 
 
 40. United States. — Walker v. 42. EaUsburg Power & Mfg. Co. 
 Shasta Power Co., 87 C. C. A. 660, v. Alexander, 101 Va. 98, 43 S. E. 
 160 ffed. 856, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 194, 61 L. jB. A. 129, 99 Am. St. 
 725. Eep- 855. 
 
47 The Publio Use — G-eneeal Principles. 
 
 145 
 
 Conversely it is not conclusive in favor of the right to 
 condemn that a corporation seeking to take property by 
 eminent domain is, by the provisions of its charter, exclu- 
 sively a public service corporation; but the question is in 
 each case whether the use for which the property is sought 
 to be taken is public or private.** 
 
 The party exercising the power must be the one for whose 
 use it is taken. Eminent domain can be exercised only for 
 the needs of the donee of the power ; land cannot be taken 
 to be conveyed to some one else to carry out the public use.** 
 In the absence of fraud however the mere fact that a rail- 
 road company has power to lease its road does not deprive 
 it of the right to exercise eminent domain,*^ nor does its 
 intention to operate the public works for which the taking 
 was made through the instrumentality of an independent 
 contractor have any greater effect.** 
 
 43. United States. — Denver, etc., 
 Coal Co. V. Union Pacific E. R. Co., 
 34 Fed. 386; Walker v. Shasta 
 Power Co., 87 C. C. A. 660, 160 
 Ted. 856, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 725. 
 
 Maine. — Ulmer v. Lime Rock 
 Railroad Co., 98 Me. 579, 57 Atl. 
 1001, 66 L. R. A. 387. 
 
 Mississippi. — Vinegar Bend Lum- 
 ber Co. V. Oak Grove, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 89 Miss. 84, 43 So. 292. 
 
 New York. — Be DeansvUle Ceme- 
 tery Association, 66 N. T. 569, 23 
 Am. Rep. 86; Be Niagara Falls, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 108 N. Y. 375, 15 
 N. E. 429. 
 
 Oregon. — Bridal V«il Lumbering 
 Co. V. Johnson, 30 Ore. 205, 46 
 Pac. 790, 34 L. R. A. 368, 60 Am. 
 St. Rep. 818 ; Apex Transportation 
 Co. V. Garbade, 32 Ore. 588, 54 
 Pac. 367, 62 L. R. A. 5. 
 
 Virginia.— 3e\e.T v. Vinton-Roan- 
 oke "Water Co., 114 Va. 769, 76 
 S. E. 921. 
 
 West Virginia. — Caretta R. R. 
 Co. V. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal 
 Co., 62 W. Va. 185, 57 S. E. 401. 
 
 44. California. — Beveridge v. 
 
 10 
 
 Lewis, 137 Cal. 619, 67 Pao. 1040, 
 70 Pac. 1083, 59 L. R. A. 581, 92 
 Am. St. Rep. 188. 
 
 Indiana. — Swinney v. Ft. 
 Wayne, etc., R. R. Co., 59 Ind. 205. 
 
 Nebraska.— BeckmaxL v. Lincoln, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 79 Neb. 89, 112 
 N. W. 348. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Glaser v. Glen- 
 wood R. R. Co., 208 Pa. 328, 57 
 Atl. 713. 
 
 Washington. — Spokane v. Spo- 
 kane, etc., R. R. Co., 75 Wash. 651, 
 135 Pac. 636; State v. Skagit 
 County Court, 78 Wash. 679, 139 
 Pac. 601, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 987. 
 
 45. Bridwell v. Gate City Ter- 
 minal Co., 127 Ga. 520, 56 S. E. 
 624, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 909. 
 
 46. State, Slingerland, Prose- 
 cutor, V. Newark, 54 N. J. L. 62, 
 23 Atl. 129; Ten Broeck v. Sher- 
 rill, 71 N. Y. 276. So also in Hart- 
 ford Water Commissioners v. Man- 
 chester, 87 Conn. 193, 87 Atl. 870, 
 96 Atl. 182, Ann. Cas. 1915 A 
 1104, it was held that when to 
 obviate objections of riparian 
 owners to taking the waters of a 
 
146 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 48 
 
 § 48. Incidental Private Benefit. 
 
 If the use for which land is taken by eminent domain is 
 public, the taking is not invalid merely because an inci- 
 dental benefit wiU enure to individuals. This condition 
 arises in almost every case in which a taking of land is 
 made by a public service corporation. While the primary 
 object in taking and holding such land is the public benefit, 
 which alone justifies a taking without the consent of the 
 owner, an incidental object is the hope of profit to be 
 derived by the corporation from the use of the land. It is 
 well settled that the incidental benefit to the stockholders 
 in the profits arising from tolls, fares and other charges 
 does not render the taking for a private use, if the toUs, 
 fares and charges are to be derived from serving the 
 public.*'^ 
 
 Similarly it does not derogate from the public nature of 
 an improvement that its construction will cause an inci- 
 dental private advantage to accrue to neighboring lands, 
 
 river for a city's water supply, 
 a compensation reservoir was pro- 
 jected, and the statute author- 
 izing the city to condemn land 
 therefor, the agreement of the city 
 with the riparian proprietors, and 
 the general law of the state re- 
 quired the corporation, formed of 
 the riparian owners owning water 
 powers in the river, which was to 
 control the reservoir, to "use con- 
 trol with reasonable regard to the 
 common benefit of all lower ripa- 
 rian owners to the same extent that 
 the city would be bound to do if it 
 had retained the control of the 
 reservoir in: its own- hands, the 
 grant to the city of the power to 
 condemn land for the reservoir 
 was not invalid, on the ground that 
 the flow of water from the reser- 
 voir would be controlled for the 
 private advantage of such owners 
 of water powers in the river as 
 were members of the corporation. 
 47. United States. — Long Island 
 Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 
 
 U. S. 685, 41 L. ed. 1165; Bona- 
 parte V. Camden, etc, R. E. Co., 
 Baldw. 205, Fed. Cas. No.' 1617. 
 
 California. — St. Helena Water 
 Co. V. Forbes, 62 Cal. 182, 45 Am. 
 Rep. 659. 
 
 Maine. — CottriU v. Myrick, 12 
 Me. 222. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Gardner Water 
 Co. V. Gardner, 185 Mass. 190, 69 
 N. E. 1051. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Rockingham 
 County Light & Power Co. v. 
 Hobbs, 72 N. H. 531, 58 Atl. 46, 
 66 L. R. A. 581. 
 
 New York. — Bloodgood v. Mo- 
 hawk & Hudson River Railroad 
 Co., 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 31 Am. 
 Dec. 313. 
 
 Ohio. — Willyard v. Hamilton, 7 
 Ohio, Part II, 111, 30 Am. Dec. 
 195. 
 
 South Carolina. — Louisville, etc., 
 R. R. Co. v. Chappell, Rice L. 383. 
 
 Tennessee. — Ryan v. Louisville, 
 etc., Terminal Co., 102 Tenn. Ill, 
 50 S. W. 744, 45 L. R. A. 303. 
 
§ 48 The Public Use — Geneeal Principles. 
 
 147 
 
 if the improvement is established for the public use.** 
 Highways almost always benefit the owners of land through 
 which they are laid out, and are often constructed at the 
 request of individuals, and the same is true of certain other 
 public works ; but it has never been held that the laying out 
 of a highway or other public work is invalid on that account. 
 Even although the persons who expect to benefit agree to 
 defray the whole cost of the work, if the use is public the 
 taking is valid.** No one would contend that the use for 
 
 48. Moore v. Sanford, 151 Mass. 
 285, 24 N. E. 323, 7 L. E. A. 151. 
 A large tract of flats was taken by 
 the commonwealth to be filled and 
 used for commercial and railroad 
 purposes. It was held for the pub- 
 lic use. The court said : " Even 
 if it be true that the commonwealth, 
 as the result of the enterprise, ex- 
 pects to sell its lands to advantage, 
 many enterprises of great public 
 utUity are of advantage to indi- 
 viduals. If lands are taken for a 
 public use and for the benefit of 
 the community, it is not of im- 
 portance that individuals, or, as in 
 this case, the commonwealth, may 
 derive incidental advantage there- 
 from. The eases cited by the plain- 
 tiffs to the proposition that if a 
 private use is combined with a pub- 
 lic use in such a way that the two 
 cannot be separated, lands thus 
 taken cannot be said to be taken 
 for a public use do not affect the 
 case at bar. No land is here taken 
 for a private use, although an inci- 
 dental and private advantage may 
 arise from such taking for -a public 
 use." RothschUd v. Chicago, 227 
 111. '205, SIN. E. 407: A raUroad 
 station in a department store with 
 a passage across the street to the 
 tracks was held proper as it was 
 chiefly for the benefit of the pub- 
 lic though it was incidentally for 
 the benefit of the proprietor of the 
 store. 
 
 See also. 
 
 Arkansas. — St. Louis, etc.. Rail- 
 road Co. V. Petty, 57 Ark. 359, 21 
 S. W. 884, 20 L. R. A. 434. 
 
 California. — Be Madera Irriga- 
 tion District Bonds, 92 Cal. 296, 28 
 Pao. 272, 14 L. R. A. 755, 27 Am. 
 St. Rep. 106. 
 
 Illinois. — Dunham v. Hyde Park, 
 75 lU. 371. 
 
 Indiana. — Rensselaer v. Leopold, 
 106 Ind. 29, 5 N. E. 761; Mull v. 
 Indianapolis, etc.. Traction Co., 
 169 Ind. 214, 81 N. E. 657; Glen- 
 denning V. Stahley, 173 Ind. 674, 
 91 N. E. 234. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Wheelwright v. 
 Boston, 188 Mass. 521, 74 N. E. 
 937. 
 
 New York. — New York, etc., R. 
 R. Oo. V. Metropolitan Gaslight 
 Co., 63 N. Y. 326; Re Bums, 155 
 N. Y. 23, 49 N. E. 246; People 
 ex rel. Bingham v. State Water 
 Supply Commission, 209 N. Y. 229, 
 103 N. E. 162. 
 
 South Carolina. — Riley v. Char- 
 leston Union Station Co., 71 S. C. 
 457, 51 S. E. 485, 110 Am. St. Rep. 
 879. 
 
 49. United States. — Barr v. New 
 Brunswick, 67 Fed. 402. 
 
 Arkansas. — Cloth v. Chioag'o, 
 etc., Ry. Co., 97 Ark. 86, 132 S. W. 
 1005, Ann. Cas. 1912 C 1115. 
 
 Illinois. — Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Naperville, 169 111. 25, 48 
 N. E. 535. 
 
 Kentucky. — Henderson v. Lex- 
 
148 
 
 The Law of Emustent Domain. 
 
 §48 
 
 whieh property was takea was not public merely because 
 the whole or part of the expense was to be met by special 
 assessments on adjoining land,®" and the case is no different 
 if the contributions are voluntary. 
 
 When a taking is made for a public use, it is no objection 
 that a by-product of the property taken is to be sold for 
 private profit,^^ even, it has been held, Lf the public improve- 
 ment would not have been made had it not been for the 
 expected profit from the by-product.^* When however a 
 statute authorizes a single taking for uses both public and 
 private and does not limit the extent of the taking to the 
 necessities of the public use, and the uses are so commingled 
 that they cannot be separated and the taking for private use 
 disregarded, the whole statute is unconstitutional.^' 
 
 iDgfcon, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 703, 111 
 S. W. 318, 22 L. K. A. (N. S.) 20. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Parks v. Mayor 
 & Aldermen of Boston, 8 Pick. 
 218 j Copeland v. Packard, 16 
 Pick. 217; Harrington v. Harring- 
 ton, 1 Met. 404. 
 
 Mississippi. — Illinois Central B. 
 E. Co. V. Swalm, 83 Miss. 631, 36 
 So. 147. 
 
 New Jersey. — State, North Bap- 
 tist Cliurcli, Prosecutor, v. Orange, 
 54 N. J. L. Ill, 22 Atl. 1004, 14 
 L. R. A. 62. 
 
 New York. — Bunyan v. Pali- 
 sades Park Oommissioners, 153 
 N. Y. Snpp. 622. 
 
 North Carolina. — Stratford v. 
 Greensboro, 124 N. C. 127, 32 S. E. 
 394. 
 
 If however there is no other 
 ground alleged for the laying out 
 of the road than the proposed con- 
 tribution, the laying out will be in- 
 valid. Commonwealth v. Sawin, 2 
 Pick. (Mass.) 547. 
 
 60. Moale v. Baltimore, 5 Md. 
 314, 61 Am. Dec. 276; Denham v. 
 Bristol County Commissioners, 108 
 Mass. 202. 
 
 51. See Eyan v. Louisville, eitc.. 
 Terminal Co., 102 Tenn. Ill, 50 
 
 S. W. 744, 45 L. E. A. 303, in 
 which it was held that a corpora- 
 tion acquiring land by eminent do- 
 main for a station might maintain 
 therein a hotel, restaurant and 
 news stand. 
 
 52. Wisconsin Eiver Improve- 
 ment Co. v. Pier, 137 Wis. 325, 118 
 K W. 857, 21 L. E. A. (N. S.) 
 538; In re Southern WisoonsiQ 
 Power Co., 140 Wis. 245, 265, 122 
 N. W. 801, 809. In these cases 
 eorpotations were allowed to exer- 
 cise eminent domain in constructing 
 a dam for the improvement of 
 navigation, although they also in- 
 tended to use the dam for the gen- 
 eration of power for private use 
 and expected to derive more profit 
 from the power than from tolls for 
 the use of the stream, and would 
 not have built the dam except for 
 the opportunity to generate power, 
 if the use of the dam in improv- 
 ing navigation was real, and was 
 not impaired by its use in gen- 
 erating power. 
 
 53. Alabama. — Sadler v. Lang- 
 ham, 34 Ala. 311. 
 
 California. — ^Hercules Water Co. 
 V. Fernandez, 5 Cal. App. 726, 91 
 Pac. 401. 
 
§ 49 The Public Use — Gbbtebal Pkinciplbs. 
 
 149 
 
 § 49. Disposal of Surplus for Private Use. 
 
 When property is taken for the public use, there cannot 
 at the same time be taken additional adjacent property 
 which it is not intended to devote to the public use, but 
 which is to be sold for profit as soon as the improvement is 
 completed.^* It is not however objectionable that a statute 
 which authorizes a taking provides that the municipal 
 authorities may sell the lands taken whenever they deter- 
 mine that such property is no longer needed for public 
 use.^^ Such a power is latent in every taking, and is very 
 different from a taking of land with a contemporaneous 
 knowledge and purpose that a definite and separable part 
 is not necessary for the public use. Similarly, when an 
 easement is all that is required for the public use, it is not 
 competent for the legislature to authorize the taking of the 
 fee and the immediate sale of the property to private par- 
 ties subject to the easement.^^ When however it is 
 
 Illinois. — Gaylord v. Sanitary 
 District, 204 111. 576, 68 N. E. 522, 
 63 L. E. A. 582, 98 Am. St. Eep. 
 235. 
 
 Kansas. — Lake Koen, etc.. Irri- 
 gation Ca. V. Klein, 63 Kan. 484, 
 65 Pac. 684. 
 
 Maryland. — Webster v. Snsque- 
 hanna Pole Line Co., 112 Md. 416, 
 76 Atl. 254. 
 
 Michigan. — Berrien Springs 
 
 Water Power Co. v. Berrien Cir- 
 cuit Judge, 133 Mich. 48, 94 N. W. 
 379, 103 Am. St. Rep. 438. 
 
 Minnesota. — Stewart v. Great 
 Northern Eailroad Co., 65 Minn. 
 515, 68 N. W. 208, 33 L. R. A. 427; 
 Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. 
 Koochiching Co., 97 Minn. 429, 107 
 N. W. 405, 5 L. E. A. (K S.) 638, 
 7 Ann. Cas. 1182. 
 
 New York. — Harris v. Thomp- 
 son, 9 Barb. 350. 
 
 Tennessee. — Harding v. Goodlet, 
 3 Yerg. 41. 
 
 Virginia. — MiUer v. Pulaski, 109 
 Va, 137, 63 S. E. 880, 22 L. E. A. 
 (N. S.) 552; Jeter v. Vinton-Eoan- 
 oke Water Co., 114 Va. 769, 76 
 
 S. E. 921; Norfolk County Water 
 Co. V. Wood, 116 Va. 142, 81 S. E. 
 19. 
 
 Washington, — State ex rel. Har- 
 ris V. Thurston County Court, 42 
 Wash. 660, 85 Pac. 666, 5 L. E. A. 
 (N. S.) 672, 7 Ann. Cas. 748; Ta^ 
 coma V. Nisqually Power Co., 57 
 Wash. 420, 107 Pac. 199. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Attomey-Gteneral v. 
 Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400. 
 
 54. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co. v. 
 Cicero, 157 111. 48, 54, 41 N. E. 
 640; Salisbury Land & Improve- 
 ment Co. V. Commonwealth, 215 
 Mass. 369, 102 N. E. 619, 46 
 L. E. A. (N. S.) 1196; Jones v. 
 Tatham, 20 Pa. 398, and see also 
 infra, § 63. 
 
 55. Re Rochester, 137 K Y. 243, 
 33 N. E. 320. 
 
 56. Pennsylvania Mutual Life 
 Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 
 Pa. 47, 88 Atl. 904, 49 L. E. A. 
 (N. S.) 1062. A taking of this 
 character is specifically authorized 
 by the constitution of Wisconsin, 
 art. XI, § 3a; supra, § 38. 
 
150 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 49 
 
 necessary in the course of the construction of a public work 
 to enter into the exclusive occupation- of property, although 
 after the work is completed an easement is aU that is 
 required for operation and maintenance, the legislature 
 may authorize the taking of the property in fee and the 
 sale of the fee subject to the public easement after the work 
 is completed as the most reasonable method of safeguarding 
 the public interests.^'' 
 
 When property is taken for the public use there is no 
 constitutional requirement that the taking be limited in 
 extent to the present public necessities, and it is proper to 
 keep in mind the possible requirements of unusual con- 
 ditions, and the probable expansion that an increase in 
 population will demand. "When a highway is origiuaUy 
 laid out, a much wider location is almost always taken than 
 is at first wrought into a road for travel ; ^* a water supply 
 that will be adequate in seasons of drought, under normal 
 conditions will be excessive.^® If a taking of the fee is 
 made for a public use, in good faith and without a wholly 
 unnecessary excess, it is no ground for opposing the taking 
 that the parties making it intend to derive a private revenue 
 by leasing the land not required for immediate occupation 
 or by selling the surplus water when it is not needed for 
 the public use.®" 
 
 57. Boston v. Talbot, 206 Mass. obtaining a water power to lease 
 82, 91 N. E. 1014. to private individuals, or wliere in 
 
 58. Howard v. North Bridge- building a dam for a public im- 
 water, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 189. provemenf a wholly unnecessary 
 
 59. Edwards v. Chfeyenne, 19 excess of water ia created, and 
 Wyo. 110, 114 Pae. 677. cases where the surplus is a mere 
 
 60. Kakauna Co. v. Green Bay incident to the public? improve^ 
 Co., 142 U. S. 254, 273, 35 L. ed. ment, and a reasonable provision 
 1004, 1011, holds that if the state for securing an adequate supply of 
 authorizes the creation of a sur- water at all times for such im- 
 plus supply of water by erecting a provement." See also, 
 
 dam for a recognized public use, the United States. — Fox v. Cincin- 
 
 surplus waters may be disposed of nati, 104 U. S. 783, 26 L. ed. 928; 
 
 for profit. It is said by the court United States v. Chandler-Dunbar 
 
 in that case: "The true distino- Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 57 
 
 tion seems to be between cases L. ed. 1063 (water from dam in aid 
 
 where the dam is erected for the of navigation) ; Dyer y. Baltimore, 
 
 express or apparent purpose of 140 Eed. 880 (wharves). 
 
§ 50 The Public Use — General Principles. 
 
 151 
 
 It has been held that it does not invalidate a taking of 
 water-rights for the public use that the municipal authori- 
 ties, in order to secure certain riparian rights, have con- 
 tracted to supply the riparian owners with some of the 
 water taken."' This decision could not however be pressed 
 to its logical results without treading upon dangerous 
 ground. 
 
 § 50. Uses Neither Public Nor Private. 
 
 That no private advantage is subserved by a particular 
 taking is not conclusive in its favor; it may be that it is 
 wholly useless, serving neither public nor private good. 
 The mere fact that it is not feasible to construct the public 
 improvement for which the property is sought to be taken, 
 or that if completed it will prove unprofitable is however 
 no ground for opposing the taking if the legislature has 
 seen fit to authorize it.®^ Similarly, water may be taken for 
 public use although a large part of it will be lost by seepage 
 and evaporation.*'^ There is a well-known Massachusetts 
 
 California. — Vallejo, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Home Savings Bank, 24 Cal. 
 App. 166, 140 Pac. 974 (railroad 
 station) . 
 
 Connecticut. — Hartford Water 
 Commissioners v. Manchester, 87 
 Conn. 193, 87 Atl. 870, 96 Atl. 182, 
 Ann. Cas. 1915 A 1104 (water 
 supply). 
 
 Illinois. — BeU v. Mattoon Water- 
 works Co., 245 111. 544, 92 N. E. 
 352, 137 Am. St. Rep. 338 (water 
 supply). 
 
 MassacJiusetts. — Spaulding v. 
 Lowell, 23 Pick. 71, 80 (market- 
 house) ; French v. Quincy, 3 Allen 
 
 9 (town hall). 
 
 New Hampshire. — McMillan v. 
 Noyes, 75 N. H. 258, 72 Atl. 759 
 (electric light). 
 
 New Jersey.— State, Slingerland, 
 Prosecutor, v. Newark, 54 N. J. L. 
 62, 23 Atl. 129 (water supply). 
 
 Ohio. — Cooper v. Williams, 4 
 Ohio 253, 22 Am. Dec. 745 (water 
 from canal) ; Buckingham v. Smith, 
 
 10 Ohio 288 (water from canal) ; 
 
 Little Miami Elevator Co. v. Cin- 
 cinnati, 30 Ohio St. 639 (water 
 from canal). 
 
 Washington. — Tacoma v. Nis'- 
 qually Power Co., 57 Wash. 420, 
 107 Pac. 199; State v. Klickitat 
 County Court, 70 Waah. 486, 127 
 Pac. 104 (electric power). 
 
 Wisconsin. — State v. Eau Claire, 
 40 Wis. 533 (surplus water from 
 dam). 
 
 Wyoming. — Edwards v. Chey- 
 enne, 19 Wyo. 110, 114 Pac. 677 
 (water supply). , 
 
 61. Pocantico Waterworks Co. v. 
 Bird, 130 N. Y. 249, 29 N. E. 246. 
 
 62. Infra, § 414. See, however, 
 Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. 
 Fall Lake Boom Co., 127 Minn. 23, 
 148 N. W. 561, in which it is said 
 that property cannot be taken for a 
 purpose that cannot be accom- 
 plished. 
 
 63. San Joaquin, etc.. Irriga- 
 tion Co. v. Stevenson, 164 Cal. 221, 
 128 Pac. 924. 
 
152 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 51 
 
 case which held that a statute was unconstitutional which 
 required the transfer of funds bequeathed for a public 
 library from the trustees named in the will to a corpora- 
 tion created for the purpose by the legislature, on the 
 ground that there was not and could not be any public neces- 
 sity for transferring such property from one party to 
 another.** This conclusion was not necessary to the deci- 
 sion, as the statute was held bad as impairing the obligation 
 of contracts, and it is perhaps open to criticism. Eminent 
 domain may be exercised without public necessity. If, how- 
 ever, by necessity the court means need or advantage, it 
 would seem somewhat narrow to hold that the legislature 
 might not see some advantage in the management of a pub- 
 lic library by a corporation instead of by trustees. A pub- 
 lic library in itself is, of course, a public use.*® 
 
 § 51. Aid from Other Branches of the Law. 
 
 When the question whether a particular undertaking is 
 public or private has never been passed upon by the courts 
 with reference to the propriety of the exercise of the power 
 of eminent domain in its behalf, but the same question 
 has received attention for other purposes, the decisions 
 reached in such cases may prove valuable when it is pro- 
 posed to take land for the benefit of such an undertaking. 
 
 The question whether a use is public sometimes arises in 
 another aspect from that now under consideration, even in 
 eminent domain cases. When it is proposed to take prop- 
 erty by eminent domain under authority of a general stat- 
 ute, the fact that it is already devoted to the public use is 
 a ground for opposing the proceedings,*® and decisions in 
 controversies arising out of the application of this prin- 
 ciple are of value in determining the meaning of public use 
 for the present purposes. 
 
 Money cannot be raised by taxation except for the public 
 ■use. It has often been said that the public use which 
 
 64. Gary Library v. Bliss, 151 65. Infra, § 75. 
 
 Mass. 364, 25 N. E. 92, 7 L. R. A. 66. Infra, § 361. 
 
 765, 
 
§ 51 The Public Use — Gtenebal Principles. 153 
 
 justifies taxation is the same as that for which eminent 
 domain may be employed."'^ On the other hand, it has been 
 argued that the restriction on taxation should be less liber- 
 ally applied, for the party whose land is taken by eminent 
 domain receives coippensation in money whether the use 
 be public or private, and the taxpayer whose money is spent 
 for public use is compensated by participating in the gen- 
 eral good resulting therefrom, but, when his contributions 
 are spent for private ends and he does not participate in 
 the benefit arising from such expenditure, he receives noth- 
 ing in return.^* At any rate however the meaning of the 
 term is very similar in both branches of the law and deci- 
 sions regarding taxation have been of much help in eminent 
 domain cases. The fact that public money could lawfully 
 be spent for artistic purposes was a strong precedent for 
 justifying the taking of rights in land for like reasons,^* 
 and the cases holding that public money cannot be donated 
 to private manufactories are the best authority for believ- 
 ing that eminent domain cannot be employed in the same 
 behalf.™ 
 
 It is probable that all of those private corporations whose 
 rates are subject to legislative control are quasi-public so 
 that they may be granted the power of eminent domain. At 
 any rate all the enterprises of the so-called ' ' public service 
 companies ' ' which have been held to be under the rate 
 making power of the legislature '^'^ have also been held 
 proper subjects to be entrusted with eminent domain. 
 Accordingly, any future decision as to new public service 
 companies may be of some value in deciding whether such 
 companies may be permitted to condemn land. 
 
 67. Lowell V. Boston, 111 Mass. " public service companies " whose 
 454, 462, 15 Am. Rep. 39. See rates have been held subject to 
 also Laughlin v. Portland, 111 Me. legislative control consist of the 
 486, 90 Atl. 318, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) following: Railroads, street rail- 
 1143. ways, ferries, turnpikes, toll 
 
 68. Cooley, Taxation, 3d ed. bridges, telegraphs, telephones, 
 ?• 192. electric light, gas, water supply, 
 
 69. Infra, § 55. grist-mills, grain elevators, and 
 
 70. Infra, § 80. stock-yards. Tor a definition of 
 
 71. According to an article in 17 « public service company " see 
 Harvard Law Review, 156, the supra % 47. 
 
154 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 52 
 
 From decisions upon the constitutionality of statutes 
 which attempt to regulate property under the so-called 
 police power, we get little assistance, as it is held that the 
 general welfare, and not tlie public use, is the proper test 
 in such cases, and regulations can thus constitutionally be 
 imposed for purposes which would not justify the taking 
 of landJ'' 
 
 § 52. Primarily a Legislative, Ultimately a Judicial 
 Question. 
 
 Before passing to an examination of the particular uses 
 held public or private, it is well to remember that the ques- 
 tion, as it presents itself to the courts, is not whether the 
 use for which the property is taken is public, but whether 
 the legislature might reasonably consider it public. In any 
 jurisdiction in which the doctrine of separation of powers 
 is clearly understood and given proper recognition, no act 
 of the legislature will be held unconstitutional unless it is 
 plainly and unquestionably in violation of the will of the 
 people as declared in the fundamental law. The presump- 
 tion is that a use is public if the legislature has declared it 
 to be such, and the decision of the legislature must be 
 treated with the consideration due to a co-ordinate depart- 
 ment of the government of the state.'^^ 
 
 72. Infra, § 100. Voight, 110 Ind. 279, 11 N. E. 306; 
 
 73. United States. — ^United States Westport Storue Co. v. Thomas, 175 
 V. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 160 Ind. 319, 94 N. E. 406. 
 
 U. S. 668, 40 L. ed. 576; Horton Iowa.— Sisson v. Buena Vista 
 
 V. Squamkum, etc., M'arl Co., Fed. County, 128 Iowa 442, 104 N. W. 
 
 Cas. No. 6710. 454, 70 L. R. A. 440. 
 
 California. — Lux v. Haggin, 69 Massachusetts. — Hazen v. Essex 
 
 Cal. 255, 10 Pec. 674; Lindsay Irri- Co., 12 Cush. 477; Salisbury Land 
 
 gation Co. v. Mehrtens, 97 Oal. 676, & Improvement Co. v. Common- 
 
 32 Pac. 802. wealth, 215 Mass. 369, 102 N. E. 
 
 Colorado.— Taxmer v. Treasury 619, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1196. 
 
 Tunnel, etc., Co., 35 Colo. 593, 83 Nebraska. — Lucas v. Ashland 
 
 Pae. 464, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 106. Light, etc., Co., 92 Neb. 550, 138 
 
 Connecticut. — New York, etc., N. W. 761. 
 
 R. R. Co. V. Offield, 77 Conn. 417, Nevada. — Dayton, etc., Mining 
 
 59 Atl. 510. Co. V. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394. 
 
 Indiana. — Rensselaer v. Leopold, New Jersey. — Be Lower Chat- 
 
 106 Ind. 29, 5 N. E. 761; Heiek v. ham and Little Falls, 35 N. J. L. 
 
§ 52 The Public Use — Genebal Principles. 
 
 155 
 
 Nevertheless, the legislature has no power to determine 
 finally the extent of its own authority over private prop- 
 erty, and the question whether a use for which the legis- 
 lature has authorized the taking of property by eminent 
 domain is really public is ultimately a judicial one, and if 
 the court, after giving due weight .to the declaration of the 
 legislature, considers that the purpose for which the taking 
 of property has been authorized has no real and substantial 
 relation to the public use, it is its duty to declare the act 
 authorizing the taking to be unconstitutional.''* 
 
 497; Albright v. Sussex County 
 Lake & Park Commission, 71 
 N. J. L. 303, 57 Atl. 398, 69 
 L. E. A. 768, 108 Am. St. Rep. 
 749, 2 Ann. Cas. 48. 
 
 New York. — Long Sault Devel- 
 opment Co. V. Ken-nedy, 143 N. Y. 
 Supp. 454. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Pittsburgh v. 
 Seott, 1 Pa. 309; Jacobs v. Cleax- 
 view "Water Supply Co., 220 Pa. 
 388, 69 Atl. 870. 
 
 Tennessee. — Ryan v. Louisville, 
 etc., Tenninal Co., 102 Tenn. Ill, 
 50 S. W. 744, 45 L. R. A 303. 
 
 Washington. — State ex rel. Ta- 
 eoma Industrial Co. v. White River 
 Power Co., 39 "Wash. 648, 82 Pae. 
 150, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 842, 4 Ann. 
 Cas. 987. 
 
 West Virginia. — Caretta Ry. Co. 
 v. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal Co., 
 62 "W. Va. 185, 57 S. E. 401. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Chicago & North- 
 western Railway Co. v. Morehouse, 
 112 "Wis. 1, 87 N. "W. 849, 88 Am. 
 St. Rep. 918. 
 
 74. United States. — Shoemaker v. 
 United States, 147 U. S. 282, 37 
 L. ed. 170 ; "Walker v. Sh'asta Power 
 Co., 87 C. C. A. 660, 160 Fed. 856, 
 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 725. 
 
 Alabama. — Sadler v. Langham, 
 34 Ala. 311. 
 
 Arkansas. — Cloth v. Chicago, 
 etc., Ry. Co., 97 Ark. 86, 132 S. "W. 
 1005, Ann. Cas. 1912 C .1115; 
 Ozark Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania 
 
 Anthracite R. R. Co., 97 Ark. 495, 
 134 S. "W. 634, Ann. Cas. 1912 D 
 1000. 
 
 California. — Re Madera Irriga- 
 tion District Bonds, 92 Cal. 296, 28 
 Pae. 272, 14 L. R. A. 755, 27 Am. 
 St. Rep. 106; "Wulzen v. San Fran- 
 cisco, 101 Cal. 15, 35 Pae. 353, 4 
 Am. St. Rep. 17. 
 
 Colorado. — Ortiz v. Hansen, 35 
 Colo. 100, 83 Pec. 964. 
 
 Connecticut. — Farist Steel Co. v. 
 Bridgeport, 60 Conn. 278, 22 Atl. 
 561, 13 L. R. A. 590. 
 
 DelavMre. — ^WUson v. Baltimore, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 5 Del. Ch. 524. 
 
 Illinois. — Lake Shore, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 97 
 111. 506; Terre Haute, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Robbins, 247 HI. 376, 93 
 N. E. 398. 
 
 Indiana. — Logan v. Stogsdale, 
 123 Ind. 372, 24 N. E. 135, 8 
 L. R. A. 5; "Westport Stone Co. v. 
 Thomas, 175 Ind. 319, 94 N. E. 
 406; Gary v. Much (Ind. App.), 
 94 N. E. 583. 
 
 Kansas. — Lake Koen, etc., Irri- 
 gation Co. V. Klein, 63 Kan. 484, 
 65 Pae. 684. 
 
 Kentucky.— Chesapeake Stone 
 Co. V. Moreland, 31 Ky. L. R. 1075, 
 104 S. "W. 762, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 479. 
 
 Louisiana. — "Williams v. Eigh- 
 teenth Judicial District Judge, 45 
 La. Ann. 1295, 14 So. 57. 
 
 Maine. — Kennebec "Water District 
 
156 
 
 The Law of Eminebtt Domaih. 
 
 52 
 
 In determining whether the use for which a taking has 
 been authorized by the legislature is public, the court is 
 not bound by the designation of the use in the statute, nor 
 is it restricted to a consideration of the question whether 
 a use so described is public, but may look at the statute as 
 a whole to discover the dominant purpose of the taking,^^ 
 
 V. Waterville, 96 Me. 234, 52 AtL 
 774; Ulmer v. Lime Eock E. E. Co., 
 98 Me. 579, 67 Atl. 1001, 66 
 L. E. A. 387. 
 
 Maryland. — ^Kane v. Baltimore, 
 15 Md. 240; Van Witsen v. Gut- 
 man, 79 Md. 405, 29 Atl. 608, 24 
 L. E. A. 403. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Talbot v. Hud- 
 son, 16 Gray 417; Boston v. Tal- 
 bot, 206 Mass. 82, 91 N. E. 1014; 
 Salisbury Land & ImproTement Co. 
 V. Commonwealtli, 215 Mass. 369, 
 102 N. E. 619, 46 L. E. A. (N. S.) 
 1196. 
 
 Michigan. — Board of Health r. 
 Van Hoesen, 87 Mich. 533, 49 
 N. W. 894, 14 L. E. A. 114. 
 
 Minnesota. — Minnesota Canal, 
 etc., Co. V. Koochiching- Co., 97 
 Minn. 429, 107 N. W. 405, 5 
 L. E. A. (K S.) 638, 7 Ann. Cas. 
 1182. 
 
 Missouri. — St. Louis v. Brown, 
 155 Mo. 545, 56 S. W. 298. 
 
 Nevada. — Dayton, etc., Mining 
 Co. V. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Eockingham 
 County Light & Power Co. v. 
 Hobbs, 72 N. H. 531, 58 Atl. 46, 66 
 L. E. A. 581. 
 
 New Jersey. — Scudder v. Tren- 
 ton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 
 694, 23 Am. Dec. 756. 
 
 New York. — Pocantieo Water 
 Works Co. V. Bird, 130 N. Y. 249, 
 29 N. E. 246. 
 
 North Carolina. — Jefeess v. 
 Greenville, 154 N. C. 490, 70 S. E. 
 919. 
 
 North DaTcota. — Bigelow v. Dra- 
 per, 6 N. D. 152, 69 N. W. 570. 
 
 Ohio. — ^Wheeling, etc., E. E. Co. 
 
 V. Toledo, etc., E. E. Co., 72 Ohio 
 St. 368, 74 N. E. 209, 106 Am. St. 
 Eep. 622, 2 Ann. Cas. 941. 
 
 Oregon. — Bridal Veil Lumber- 
 ing Co. V. Johnson, 30 Ore. 205, 46 
 Pac. 790, 34 L. E. A. 360, 60 Am. 
 St. Eep. 818. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — ^Philadelphia, etc., 
 St. Ey. Co.'s Petition, 203 Pa. 354, 
 53 Atl. 191. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Be Ehode Island 
 Suburban E. E. Co., 22 E. L 457, 
 48 Atl. 591, 52 L. E. A. 879. 
 
 South Dakota.— UMaois Central 
 E. E. Co. V. East Sioux FaUs 
 Quarry Co., 33 S. D. 63, 144 N. W. 
 724. 
 
 Tennessee. — Anderson v. Turbe- 
 ville, 6 Coldw. 150. 
 
 Texas. — Borden v. Trespalacios, 
 etc., Irrigation Co., 98 Tex. 494, 86 
 S. W. 11, 107 Am. St. Eep. 640. 
 
 Utah. — Highland Boy Gold Min- 
 ing Co. V. StricMey, 28 Utah 215, 
 78 Pac. 293, 1 L. E. A. (N. S.) 976, 
 107 Am. St. Eep. 711, 3 Ann. Cas. 
 1110. 
 
 Vermont. — Tyler v. Beeeher, 44 
 Vt. 648, 8 Am. Eep. 398. 
 
 Virginia. — Fallsburg Power, etc., 
 Co. V. Alexander, 101 Va. 98, 43 
 S. E. 194, 61 L. E. A. 129, 99 Am. 
 St. Eep. 855. 
 
 West Virginia. — ^Pittsburgh, etc., 
 E. E. Co. V. Benwood Iron Works, 
 31 W. Va. 710, 8 S. E. 453, 2 
 L. E. A. 680. 
 
 Wisconsin. — In re Southwestern 
 Power Co., 140 Wis. 245, 265, 122 
 N. W. 801, 809. 
 
 75. Salisbury Land & Improve- 
 ment Co. V. Commonwealth, 215 
 Mass. 369, 102 N. E. 619, 46 
 L. E. A. (K S.) 1196. 
 
§ 52 The Public Use — General Pehstciples. 157 
 
 and, if an attempted taking has actually been made, may 
 draw inferences as to the real nature of the use from the 
 interpretation thus put upon, the statute^® It may consider 
 the actual business of the condemning party and the opera- 
 tions in which it is engaged, and what it really intends to do 
 and is capable of doingj^ In short, the constitutional pro- 
 tection against the taking of property for private use cannot 
 be evaded by any colorable declarations that the use is 
 public however formally and officially made. 
 
 The tendency noticeable in many states to exalt the judi- 
 ciary at the expense of other branches of government, and 
 to sacrifice public rights to property rights, is illustrated in 
 not a few of the cases in which the rule is laid down that 
 whether a use is public is a judicial question, by the scant 
 respect in which the legislative assertion is held; and an 
 even more striking illustration of the same tendency is 
 found in the constitutions of a few states which in terms 
 provide that the question whether a use is pubUe shall be 
 purely judicial and decided as such without any regard to 
 the assertion of the legislature J* In these states the ques- 
 tion comes to the court without any presumption in favor 
 of or against the constitutionality of the statute and is to 
 
 76. Boston v. Talbot, 206 Mass. Pennsylvania. — Edgewood E. R. 
 82, 91 JSr. E. 1014; Salisbury Land Co.'s Appeal, 79 Pa. 257. 
 
 & Improvement Oo. v. Common- Washington.— State ex rel. Kent 
 
 wealth, 215 Mass. 369, 102 N. E. Lumber Co. v. King County Court, 
 
 619, 46 L. E. A. (N. S.) 1196. 46 Wash. 516, 90 Pae. 663. 
 
 77. Illinois. — Sholl v. German Li Kirkwood v. Cronin, 259 Mo. 
 Coal Co., 118 111. 427, 10 N. E. 199, 207, 168 S. W. 674, it was held 
 59 Am. Eep. 379. that any competent evidence was 
 
 Maine. — Brown v. Gerald, 100 admissible to show that a use was 
 
 Me. 351, 61 Atl. 785, 70 L. E. A. private. 
 
 472, 109 Am. St. Rep. 526. 78. Arizona, art. 11, § 17; Colo- 
 
 New York. — Be Niagara Falls & rado, art. II, § 15 ; Mississippi, 
 
 Whirlpool E. E. Co., 108 N. Y. 375, art. in, § 17; Missouri, art. II, 
 
 15 N. E. 429. § 20; Washington, art. I, § 16. It 
 
 Oregon. — Bridal Veil Lumbering is declared by the constitution of 
 
 Co. V. Johnson, 30 Ore. 205, 46 Pae. Oklahoma (art. II, § 24), that the 
 
 790, 34 L. R. A. 368, 60 Am. St. determination of the character of a 
 
 Rep. 818; Apex Transportation Co. use shall be a judicial question, but 
 
 V. Garbade, 32 Ore. 582, 588, 592, the court is not expressly in- 
 
 52 Pae. 573, 54 Pae. 367, 882, 62 structed to disregard the assertion 
 
 L. R. A. 513. of the legislature. 
 
158 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 53 
 
 be tried by tbe court like any other question submitted to 
 its discretion.'''' Such a provision does not however author- 
 ize the court to determine the question of public use without 
 reference to other clauses of the constitution, and to hold 
 a use to be private which the constitution itself declares to 
 be public.*" 
 
 When the constitution of the state authorizes the exercise 
 of eminent domain in behalf of certain uses not generally 
 considered public, the question whether a statute authoriz- 
 ing a taking for a particular purpose is justified by such a 
 provision is, like the question whether a use is public, ulti- 
 mately a judicial one.®^ 
 
 § 53. Government Buildings. 
 
 That land may be taken by eminent domain to enable the 
 United States, a state, or a county, city or town to carry on 
 its governmental functions is so generally conceded that 
 there are few cases in which the question has been litigated. 
 It is undoubtedly the law that land can be acquired by emi- 
 nent domain for the site of a capitol, custom-house, post- 
 office, courthouse, county building, city or town hall or for 
 similar structures, in which the affairs of the government 
 are administered.*^ 
 
 79. Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris, Court, 59 Wash. 621, 110 Pac. 429, 
 33 Wash. 490, 74 Pac. 681, 63 140 Am. St. Rep. 893. 
 
 L. R. A. 820, 99 Am. St. Rep. 964. 81. Washington Water Power 
 
 See also Savannah v. Hancock, 91 Co. v. Waters, 186 Fed. 572. Un- 
 
 Mo. 54, 3 S. W. 215, holding that der the Idaho constitution it is for 
 
 the efifeet of this provision -was to the court to say, ultimately, what 
 
 repeal the rule that the judgment are uses "necessary for the eom- 
 
 of the legislature as to the public plete development of the material 
 
 nature of a particular use will be re- resources of the state." 
 
 spected by the courts unless clearly 82. United States. — Kohl v. United 
 
 wrong. In Denver R. R., etc., Co. States, 91 U. S. 367, 23 L. ed. 449; 
 
 V. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 34 Fed. 386, United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 
 
 however, it was held that this pro- 24 L. ed. 192. 
 
 vision in the constitution of Colo- Illinois. — Mercer County v. Wolff, 
 
 rado was merely declaratory of the 237 111. 74, 86 N. E. 708. 
 
 law as it already stood and the Kansas. — Jockheck v. Shawnee 
 
 question whether a particular use County Commisaoners, 53 Kan. 
 
 was public was esseniially judicial. 780, 37 Pae. 621. 
 
 80. State v. Spokane County Maine. — Hayford v. Bangor, 102 
 
§ 53 The Publio Use — Genebal Peinciples. 159 
 
 When property is taken for such a purpose there is no 
 requirement in any state of ' ' use by the public ' ' in the 
 sense that the individual members of the public should have 
 the right to use the building erected on the land. The use 
 is by the public through its officers and agents and there is 
 no question that eminent domain may be employed in such 
 a case although the public is permitted to use the property 
 taken or have access to it only in a very restricted manner.^* 
 It was never doubted that buildings for which a particular 
 locality was essential were objects for which eminent 
 domain might properly be employed. But there is a well- 
 known dictum by a judge of the Supreme Court of the 
 United States in an early case ^* that land could not be taken 
 for an ordinary public building for the reason that 
 
 ' ' no necessity seems to exist which is sufficient to 
 justify so strong a measure. A particular locality as 
 to a few rods in respect to their site is usually of no 
 consequence. ' ' 
 
 This suggestion has not been adopted. It is a virtual neces- 
 sity to take by eminent domain the site of a large public 
 building in the central part of a populous city, and a reason- 
 able interpretation of the constitution does not empower the 
 courts to examine into the necessity of each case, and if they 
 should find that the owners were willing to sell at a fair 
 price, or that the exact locality was not essential and there 
 were neighboring owners willing to sell, to hold that the 
 legislature exceeded its powers in authorizing the land to be 
 taken by eminent domain.*^ Accordingly, statutes have been 
 upheld which authorize the taking of land for public build- 
 ings of all sorts, large or small, in the city or country, and 
 this is clearly the correct rule. The only proper test is 
 whether the use is public. 
 
 Me. 340, 66 Atl. 731, 11 L. R. A. 83. Re New York, 135 N. Y. 253, 
 
 (N. S.) 940. 31 N. E. 1043, 31 Am. St. Rep. 825. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Burt v. Mer- 84. Woodbury, J., in West River 
 
 chants' Insurance Co., 106 Mass. Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. (U. S.) 
 
 356, 8 Am. Rep. 339. 507, at p; 546, 12 L. ed. 551. 
 
 Michigan. — People v. Humphrey, 85. Infra, § 333. 
 23 Mich. 471, 9 Am. Rep. 94. 
 
160 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 54 
 
 In determining whether a use is public it is often material 
 that the undertaking for which it is sought to take property 
 by eminent domain is of such a character that it cannot be 
 and is not ordinarily carried on by private enterprise with- 
 out the aid of a franchise from the government ; *" but this 
 test can have no application when the use is purely govern- 
 mental, and accordingly in the case of the exercise of emi- 
 nent domain in order to acquire a site for public buildings 
 the necessity of the taking is not material in any aspect. 
 
 § 54. Public Health and Safety. 
 
 It is universally conceded that the government of any 
 sovereign state possesses the power to take and use or to 
 take and destroy private property in behalf of the public 
 health and safety, upon payment of just compensation ; but 
 under what branch of the sovereign power such takings are 
 made it is not always agreed. Many jurists seem to con- 
 sider that any taking in behalf of the public health and 
 safety is necessarily an exercise of the police power, but this 
 is clearly an error, when the property so taken is to be used 
 and occupied by the public, or even in some cases when it 
 is to be destroyed, if it is valuable property and the taking 
 of it was required in behalf of the public health and safety 
 through no fault of its owner.*'^ 
 
 Land may accordingly be taken by public authority in the 
 exercise of the power of eminent domain for purposes not 
 directly connected with the administration of the govern- 
 ment but which pertain to the security and health of the 
 public at large. The taking of land for military purposes, 
 such as arsenals, armories, navy yards, fortifications and 
 military camps, and, in time of war the seizure of ships, 
 munitions and supplies may perhaps be said to fall within 
 this branch of governmental power and is unquestionably 
 constitutional.®* 
 
 86. Infra, § 78. L. R. A. 723; Morris v. Oomptrol- 
 
 87. Infra, § 102. ler, 54 N. J. L. 268, 23 Atl. 664; 
 
 88. Kohl V. United States, 91 In re League Island, 1 Brewst. 
 U. S. 367, 23 L. ed. 449; Nahant v. (Pa.) 429. 
 
 United States, 136 Fed. 273, 69 
 
§ 55 The Pubuo Use — Genebal PEnsrcrPLES. 161 
 
 Eminent domain may also be employed to protect the 
 public safety in matters not pertaining to war, as for prisons 
 or jails, and for lighthouses and life-saving stations,** and 
 for the abolition of dangerous grade crossings.®" Similarly 
 the preservation of the public health is a public use, and 
 property may be condemned for hospitals,®^ almshouses®^ 
 and quarantine stations. So buildings which, although not 
 nuisances, are detrimental to the public health may be taken 
 and destroyed upon payment of compensation.®* 
 
 The drainage or filling of swamp lands which are danger- 
 ous to the public health is another illustration of this power. 
 In such a case the state may constitutionally take the lands 
 required for the necessary drains, or even, if it seems 
 desirable, take title in fee to a whole low lying tract and 
 fill it at the public expense.®* The proposed improvement 
 must however have some direct connection with the public 
 health or safety; it would not be for the public use for the 
 state to take by eminent domain a large tract of vacant land 
 in the suburbs of a densely populated city for the purpose 
 of selling house lots to working people at moderate cost, 
 even if it might be fairly considered that the removal of 
 the purchasers of these lots from the overcrowded tene- 
 ments of the city would indirectly benefit the public health.®^ 
 
 § 55. Aesthetic Purposes. 
 
 Questions differing but slightly from those already dis- 
 cussed arise in deciding whether a use is public which 
 
 89. Chappell v. United States, Montgomery County Commission- 
 160 U. S. 499, 40 L. ed. 510; Gil- ers, 34 Ind. App. 72, 71 N. E. 272; 
 mer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Manning v. Bruce, 186 Mass. 282, 
 People V. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, 71 N. E. 537. 
 
 9 Am. Rep. 94. 92. Hayward v. Mayor of New 
 
 90. Chicago V. LeMoyne, 119 York, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 846. 
 
 Fed. 662; McKeon v. New York, 93. Metzger v. Markham, 38 App. 
 
 etc., R. R. Co., 75 Conn. 343, 56 Cas. (D. C.) 383, Ann. Cas. 1913 C 
 
 Atl. 656, 61 L. R. A. 730; Chicago 597. 
 
 V. Jackson, 196 111. 496, 63 N. E. 94. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 
 
 1013; Long Island R. R. Co. v. 380, 40 L. ed. 188, and see also 
 
 Sherwood, 205 N. Y. 1, 98 N. E. infra, §§ 86, 89. 
 
 169. 95. Opinion of the Justices, 211 
 
 91. Markham v. Brown, 73 Ga. Mass. 624, 98 N. E. 611, 42L.R. A. 
 277, 92 Am. Dec. 73; Annable v. (N. S.) 221. 
 
 11 
 
162 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 55 
 
 satisfies no material needs but gratifies the artistic sense of 
 the public or supplies means for public pleasure and 
 recreation. It was felt in former times that land could 
 be taken only to be used by the public for necessary and 
 useful purposes and not for public pleasure and aesthetic 
 gratification.*® Inroads on this doctrine have been made on 
 all sides, partly by general acquiescence and partly by judi- 
 cial decisions, until all that is left of it is the possibility that 
 in a close case lack of material advantage to the public may 
 be held to be decisive against the public nature of a taking. 
 From the earliest recorded times public money has been 
 spent to make public buildings attractive, and under Amer- 
 ican constitutions it has long been considered proper for 
 the nation, state or city to erect memorial halls, monuments, 
 and statues and to plan public buildings upon a more expen- 
 sive scale than if designed for utility alone.®^ The public 
 mind has thus been educated to feel that aesthetic and artis- 
 tic gratification are purposes public enough to justify the 
 
 96. Bynkershoek, Quest. Jur. 
 Pub., lib. ii, e. 15: "Since the 
 subject then is bound to part with 
 his property for both reasons, aa 
 I said, must he also lose it for 
 purposes of public pleasure or 
 aesthetic gratification or even pub- 
 lic decoration alone? I should not 
 think so, nor did the Roman sen-i 
 ate think so in the case of Marcus 
 Licinius CrassTis, who objected to 
 leading through his farm an aque- 
 duct which the praetors were buUd- 
 ing and which was said to have no 
 other occasion than public pleasure 
 and decoration." Shiras, J., in 
 Shoemaker v. United States, 147 
 U. S. 282, 37 L. ed. 170, decided in 
 1892 said, " In the memory of men 
 now living, a proposition to take 
 private property without the con- 
 sent of its owner, for a public park, 
 and to assess a proportionate part 
 of the cost upon real estate bene- 
 fited thereby, would have been re- 
 garded as a novel exercise of legis- 
 lative power." See also the dictum 
 
 of Putnam, J., in the well-known 
 case of Boston & Boxbury MiU 
 Corp. V. Newman, 12 Pick 467, 
 480, 23 Am. Dec. 662 (decided in 
 1832) : " Property is nevertheless 
 sufi&ciently guarded by the consti- 
 tution. The individual is protected 
 in its enjoyment, saving only when 
 the public want it, not merely for 
 ornamental, but for some neces- 
 sary and useful purposes." And 
 see also Woodstock v. Gallup, 28 
 Vt. 587 (1856). "Highways can- 
 not be laid out for the mere pur- 
 pose or mainly for the purpose of 
 embellishing and ornamenting the 
 grounds about a public building, 
 but these results may be taken into 
 oomsideration in connection with 
 the public convenienoe and neces- 
 sity; if the latter exist the result- 
 ing iucidental embellishment will 
 not render the establishment of the 
 highway illegal." 
 
 97. See Attomey-Gteneral v. Wil- 
 liams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77, 
 47 L. R. A. 314. 
 
§ 56 The Pubuo Use — Geneeal Pbinciples. 163 
 
 expenditure of public money, and to authorize the exercise 
 of eminent domain in behalf of similar purposes was but a 
 short step beyond. 
 
 § 56. Parks. 
 
 The laying out of public parks and the taking of private 
 land for park purposes is a comparatively recent undertak- 
 ing for American cities. Formerly the only public open 
 spaces were the commons, which were never private prop- 
 erty but were set side for the grazing of cattle when the 
 towns in which they were situated were first laid out. When 
 the population became denser, parks were established and 
 private land was, when necessary, taken. Central Park 
 in New York was the first place deliberately provided for 
 the inhabitants of any city or town in the United States for 
 exclusive use as a pleasure ground for rest and exercise 
 in the open air, but by the close of the nineteenth century 
 there was scarcely a city of any considerable size in the 
 entire country that had not established one or more parks. 
 It was not at first necessary to hold public pleasure a public 
 use to justify such takings, for there were considerations 
 affecting the health and comfort of a dense population which 
 the legislature may well have regarded as sufficient and the 
 statutes authorizing the taking of land for park purposes 
 were uniformly held constitutional.*® The recognized func- 
 tion of parks has been gradually extended far beyond the 
 
 98. United States. — Shoemaker v. ville, 127 Mass. 408 ; Attomey-Gen- 
 
 United States, 147 U. S. 282, 37 eral v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 
 
 L. ed. 170; Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. N. E. 77, 47 L. R. A. 314; Higgin- 
 
 Minneapolis, 232 U. S. 430, 58 son v. Treasurer and Sohoolhouse 
 
 L. ed. 671, affirming 115 Minn. 460, Commissioners of Boston, 212 
 
 133 N. W. 169, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) Mass. 583, 99 N. E. 523, 42 L. R. A. 
 
 236. (K S.) 215; Salisbury Land & Im- 
 
 Colorado. — Londoner v. Denver, provement Co. v. Commonwealth, 
 
 52 Colo. 15, 119 Pac. 156. 215 Mass. 369, 102 N. E. 619, 46 
 
 Iowa.— Be Cedar Rapids, 85 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1196. 
 
 Iowa 39, 51 N. W. 1142. Missouri. — Kansas City v. "Ward, 
 
 Kentucky. — Rowan's Executors 134 Mo. 172, 35 S. W. 600; Brunn 
 
 V. Portland, 8 B. Mon. 232; Lex- v. Kansas City, 216 M'o. 108, 115 
 
 ington V. Kentucky Chautauqua S. W. 446. 
 
 Assembly, 114 Ky. 781, 71 S. W. New Torfc.— Brooklyn Park 
 
 943. Commissioners v. Armstrong, 45 
 
 Massachusetts. — Holt v. Somer- N. Y. 234, 6 Am. Rep. 70; In re 
 
164 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 57 
 
 original notion of breathing spaces in congested parts of 
 populous cities. It is shown elsewhere that parkways, 
 boulevards and pleasure drives may be laid out by the pub- 
 lic authorities."^ Land may be taken by a city for a park 
 outside the city limits.^ Vast tracts of uninhabited wood- 
 land, or spots made beautiful by nature, may be taken for 
 state or national parks,^ and the whole site of a famous 
 battle may be reserved.* It is apparent that pleasure and 
 sentiment must be the principal factors in justifying the 
 taking of property for such purposes. 
 
 § 57. Public Recreation. 
 
 Just how far the legislature can go in authorizing a taking 
 of land to provide a place for public pastimes is a question 
 not fully settled. Playgrounds in congested districts so 
 benefit the health and morals of the children of the neigh- 
 borhood that a taking for such purposes is clearly valid,* 
 and the courts could hardly draw the line if part of a large 
 park outside the thickly settled section of a city was 
 
 Mayor of New York, 99 N. T. 569, of New York, 99 N. Y. 569, 2 N. E. 
 
 2 N. E. 642; In re Central Park 642; Memphis v. Hastings, 113 
 
 Commissioner, 63 Barb. 282. Tenn. 142, 86 S. W. 609, 69 
 
 Ohio.— Toledo, etc., R. B. Co. v. L. E. A. 750. 
 
 Toledo, 7 Ohio N. P. 285. 2. People v. Adirondack Ry. Co., 
 
 Pennsylvania.— hsiird v. Pitts- 160 N. Y. 225, 54 N. E. 689; af- 
 
 burg, 205 Pa. 1, 54 Atl. 324, 61 firmed, sub. nom., Adirondack Ry. 
 
 L. R. A. 332. Co. v. New York, 176 U. S. 335, 44 
 
 Tennessee. — Memphis v. Hast- L. ed. 492. It was held in Bunyan 
 
 ings, 113 Tenn. 142, 86 S. W. 609, v. Palisades Park Commissioners, 
 
 69 L. R. A. 750 ; Southern Ry, Co. 153 N. Y. Supp. 622, that it was 
 
 V. Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267, 148 for the public use to take land used 
 
 S. W. 662. for a quarry in order to preserve 
 
 99. Infra, § 61. It was held in the scenic beauty of a river and a 
 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Minne- park. 
 
 apolis, 115 Minn. 460, 133 N. "W. 3. United States v. Gettysburg 
 
 169, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 236; af- Electric Ry. Co., 160 U. S. 668, 40 
 
 firmed, 232 U. S. 430, 58 L. ed. L. ed. 576. 
 
 671, that a canal connecting two 4. Stroek v. East Orange, 80 
 
 park lakes and open only for pleas- N. J. L. 619, 77 Atl. 1051; State 
 
 ure boating was a public use. v. Chelan County Court, 69 Wash. 
 
 1. St. Louis County Court v. 189. 124 Pac. 484. 
 Griswold, 58 Mo. 175; Be Mayo* 
 
§ 57 The Public Use — Geneeal Principles. 165 
 
 reserved for sports or outdoor exhibitions.® Land may be 
 taken for a municipal bathhouse or for a public bathing 
 beach.® Speedways have been constructed in many large 
 cities. Public money has often been granted to aid an indus- 
 trial exposition operated by a private corporation, and a 
 grant for such a purpose by a municipality has been held 
 valid.'^ But public pleasure and recreation alone would 
 not justify the expenditure of public money for a theatre,* 
 or the taking of land by private individuals for a baseball 
 field or trotting track, even if the public was admitted on 
 payment of a reasonable fee, as the taking of property 
 under this branch of eminent domain must be by the public 
 and for public advantage, and mere use by the pubUc is not 
 the test.® 
 
 A taking which, as a practical matter, is solely for the 
 recreation of a limited few, even if the property taken is 
 in theory of law open to enjoyment by the public, would be 
 of such imperceptible public advantage that it could not 
 fairly be said to constitute a public use, and statutes 
 attempting to establish a public right of fishing for pleasure 
 
 5. Strock V. East Orange, 80 horticultural products, for public 
 N. J. L. 619, 77 Atl. 1051. education, is a pblic use for which 
 
 6. Salisbury Land & Improve- the right of eminent domain may 
 ment Co. v. Commonwealth, 215 be exercised. 
 
 Mass. 369, 102 N. E. 619, 46 8. Sugar v. Munroe, 108 La. 677, 
 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1196. So also 32 So. 961, 59 L. R. A. 723; State 
 
 for a public elevated board walk ex rel. Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio 
 
 along a beach or ocean front. St. 71, 102 N. E. 670, 48 L. R. A. 
 
 Sharpless v. Longport, 79 N. J. L. (N. S.) 720, Ann. Cas. 1914 D 949. 
 
 279, 75 Atl. 744. See however Egan v. San Eran- 
 
 7. Minneapolis v. Janney, 86 cisco, 165 Cal. 576, 133 Pac. 294, 
 Minn. Ill, 90 N. W. 312. See also Ann. Cas. 1915 A 754. 
 
 Daggett V. Colgan, 92 Cal. 53, 28 9. Thus the use of a wharf for 
 Pac. 51, 14 L. R. A. 474, 27 Am. furnishing refreshments, pleasure 
 St. Rep. 95; Norman v. Kentucky boats and amusements to the pub- 
 Columbian Exposition Board, 93 lie for gain is not a public use. 
 Ky. 537, 20 S. "W. 901, 18 L. R. A. State v. Wiethaupt, 231 Mo. 449, 
 556; State v. Cornell, 53 Neb. 556, 133 S. W. 329. See however Bry- 
 74 N. W. 59, 39 L. R. A. 513, 68 ant v. Logan, 56 W. Va. 141, 49 
 Am. St. Rep. 629. It was held in S. E. 21, 3 Ann. Cas. 1011, in 
 Rees's Appeal, 8 Sadler (Pa.) which the lease of a portion of a 
 582, 12 Atl. 427, that an expo- public park to a private driving 
 sition for works of art and man- club to be used as a race track was 
 nfaeture, and of agricultural and sustained. 
 
166 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 58 
 
 In private waters by the exercise of eminent domain have 
 for this reason been uniformly held unconstitutional.^" 
 
 § 58. Restrictions Imposed for Artistic Reasons. 
 
 The imposition of general restrictions on the height of 
 buildings for the safety and convenience of the public is a 
 valid exercise of the police power ; " but in some instances 
 the erection of high buildings or other ugly objects has been 
 prohibited so that a park or a beautiful public building 
 would not be disfigured by the proximity of such structures. 
 To sustain such an interference with the use of private land 
 without compensation as an exercise of the police power has 
 been farther than the courts have been willing to go.^^ When 
 however compensation is provided,, such restrictions may be 
 looked upon as easements, created by statute for the benefit 
 of the land on which the park or public building lies, and 
 which have been taken by the public by eminent domain. 
 The same reasoning that justifies the taking in fee of beau- 
 tiful natural regions so that the scenery will never be dis- 
 figured warrants the taking of easements which will prevent 
 the marring of the appearance of a spot which has been 
 artifically made attractive by the expenditure of public 
 money.^^ For like reasons the owners of land abutting upon 
 
 10. Haitman v. Tresise, 36 Colo. 12. Massachusetts. — Parker v. 
 146, 84 Pac. 685, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) Commonwealth, 178 Mass. 199, 59 
 872; Albright v. Sussex County N. E. 634; Commonwealth v. Bos- 
 Lake and Park Commission, 71 ton Advertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 
 N. J. L. 303, 57 Atl. 398, 59 Atl. 74 N. E. 601, 69 L. R. A. 817, 108 
 146, 69 L. R. A. 768, 108 Am. St. Am. St. Rep. 494; Welch v. Swa- 
 Rep. 749, 2 Ann. Gas. 48; New sey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745, 
 England Trout & Salmon Club v. 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1160, 118 Am. 
 Mather, 68 Vt. 338, 35 Atl. 323, St. Rep. 523; affirmed, 214 U. S. 
 33 L. R. A. 569. On the other hand 91, 53 L. ed. 923. 
 oyster beds, available for a public New York. — Gunning System v. 
 food supply, may be taken over by Buffalo, 75 App. Div. 31 ; People 
 the state. Cox v. Revelle, 125 Md. v. Ghreen, 85 App. Div. 400. 
 579, 94 Atl. 203, L. R. A. 1915 E See also infra, §§ 100, 101, 
 443. . 13. Attorney-General v. Wil- 
 li. Infra, §§ 100, loi, and see liams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77, 
 Welch V. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 47 L. R. A. 314; affirmed, sub. 
 79 N. E. 745, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) nom., Williams v. Parker, 188 U. S. 
 1160, 118 Am. St. Rep. 523; af- 491, 47 L. ed. 559; Parker v. Corn- 
 firmed, 214 U. S. 91, 53 L. ed. 923. monwealth, 178 Mass. 199, 59 N. E. 
 
§ 58 The Public Use — GENBBAii Peinoiples. 
 
 167 
 
 a beautiful street or boulevard are sometimes forbidden to 
 build within a certain distance of the street line. If com- 
 pensation is provided for the taking of the easement thus 
 annexed to the street such a restriction can be constitu- 
 tionally imposed." 
 
 634; American Unitarian. Assn. v. 
 Commonwealth, 193 Mass. 470, 79 
 N. E. 878. Contra, Tarist Steel Co. 
 V. Bridgeport, 60 Conn. 278, 22 Atl. 
 Rep. 561, 13 L. R. A. 590. 
 
 14. In re City of New York, 167 
 N. Y. 624, 60 N. E. 1108; Matter 
 of Bushwick Ave., 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 9. In Pennsylvania Mutual Life 
 Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 
 Pa. 47, 88 Atl. 904, 49 L. R. A. 
 
 (N. S.) 1062, a statute authoriz- 
 ing the imposition of such an ease- 
 ment was held unconstitutional, not 
 oil the ground that the use was not 
 public, but because of the method 
 provided, namely the taking in fee 
 of the land to be restricted and ita 
 immediate resale, subject to the 
 restriction. This was clearly un- 
 constitutioiial. See supra, §§ 4S, 
 49. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 The Public Use — Public Seevicb 
 
 Section 59. What Constitutes a Public Service. 
 
 60. Uses Incidental to Public Service. 
 
 61. Public Highways. 
 
 62. Purposes Incidental to Public Ways. 
 
 63. Taking of Remnants — Excess Takings. 
 
 64. When the Discontinuance of a Highway must be for the 
 
 Public Use. 
 
 65. Steam Railroads. 
 
 66. Uses Incidental to the Construction and Operation of 
 
 Railroads. 
 
 67. Spur Tracks. 
 
 68. Street Railways. 
 
 69. Traffic and Transportation by Water. 
 
 70. Public Water Supply. 
 
 71. Artificial Light. 
 
 72. Generation and Distribution of Power. 
 
 73. Pipe Lines for Conveying Natural Gas and Petroleum. 
 
 74. Telegraph and Telephone Lines. 
 
 75. Public Education — Schools, Colleges and Libraries. 
 
 76. Public Cemeteries. 
 
 77. Common Sewers. 
 
 78. Goods Delivered without the Aid of a Franchise. 
 
 § 59. What Constitutes a Public Service. 
 
 In the preceding sections there have been considered uses 
 which affect the public as members of an organized govern- 
 ment, but which as individuals they may not be permitted 
 to enjoy. Under consideration at present is the vast class 
 of takings made for the purpose of furnishing the necessi- 
 ties and conveniences of life to each member of the public 
 who may require them in the form either of tangible matter 
 furnished at his house or elsewhere, or of service performed 
 by others, or of the right to make use in common with others 
 of land devoted to a particular public purpose. 
 
 When it is attempted to justify a taking of property under 
 this branch of eminent domain, namely, public service, it 
 is not material whether the taking is made by a public or a 
 private corporation^^ or whether the public is served free or 
 
 1. Supra, § 47. 
 
 [168] 
 
§ 59 The Public Use — Public Service. 169 
 
 a charge is imposed,^ but it is universally agreed that the 
 public must have the right to make use of the service offered 
 at reasonable rates and without discrimination, and not 
 merely at the pleasure or caprice of the condemning party,'' 
 but the existence of such a right is not alone sufficient. The 
 undertaking must be of such a character as to require the 
 exercise of some governmental function to carry it out suc- 
 cessfully, and business enterprises which can be and ordi- 
 narily are carried on by private parties without any fran- 
 chise from the state cannot be rendered public by the mere 
 imposition of a legal obligation to ..serve all customers who 
 apply.* 
 
 Whether the obligation to serve the public must be 
 expressed in the statute authorizing the taking is a point 
 upon which the courts are not agreed. In some jurisdic- 
 tions it is held that a use is not public unless it appears in 
 terms in the statutes under which the taking is made that 
 the public will have the unquestioned right to make use of 
 the service in behalf of which the property is taken.^ In 
 
 2. Long Island "Water Supply 179, 59 L. R. A. 817, 98 Am. St. 
 Co. V. Brooklyn, 166 V. S. 685, Rep. 818. 
 
 694, 41 L. ed. 1165, 1168. See also supra, § 44. 
 
 3. United States— Shasta Power 4. Infra, § 78. 
 
 Co. V. Walker, 149 Fed. 568. 5. Fallsburg Power & Manufae- 
 
 Illinois.- GayloTi v. Sanitary ^i^^f 5^°- ^„^'®^^°^^' ^^^ '^^• 
 
 District, 204 111. 576, 68 N. E. 522, H' f ^ S. E. 194, 61 L R. A. 129, 
 
 63 L. R. A. 582, 98 Am. St. Rep. ?? ^"^^ ^l' Rep. 855 ; State exrel. 
 
 nqc lacoma Industrial Co. v. Wnite 
 
 ,■ . n ,. ^ <. + ^^^^^ Power Co., 39 Wash. 648, 
 
 Ind^ana.- Great Western, etc ^^ ^^^ ^g^ ^ ^ ^ ^_ g ' 
 
 ^'J'^7Jr^' ^^' ' 842. See, however, Jeter v. Vin- 
 
 65 N. E. 765. ton-Roanoke Water Co., 114 Va. 
 
 M^ssoMri.— Belcher Sugar Refin- 759, 76 S. E. 921, holding that even 
 
 mg Co. V. St. Louis Elevator Co., jf ^^^ charter is vague, if the com- 
 
 82 Mo. 121. pany is under the control of the 
 
 New York.— Matter of Eureka corporation commission, the service 
 
 Basin, etc., Co., 96 N. Y. 42; Po- ig public; and State v. Klickitat 
 
 oantico Water-Works Co. v. Bird, County Court, 70 Wash. 486, 127 
 
 130 N. Y. 249, 29 N. E. 246. Pac. 104, holding that the power 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Farmers' Market to prevent a public service corpo- 
 
 Co. V. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., ration from devoting property 
 
 142 Pa. 580, 21 Atl. 902, 989. taken by eminent domain to a pri- 
 
 Vermont. — Avery v. Vermont vate use is in the supervising and 
 
 Electric Co., 75 Vt. 235, 54 Atl. controlling power of the stite. 
 
170 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 60 
 
 the majority of states however the courts do not impose 
 such a requirement, but are satisfied with the consideration 
 that a corporation, by accepting a public franchise and 
 undertaking a public service, submits itself to legislative 
 control,* and that if it misuses its privileges and discrim- 
 inates between customers, the legislature has ample power 
 to protect the public interests by imposing additional obli- 
 gations upon it or even by revoking its franchise if neces- 
 sary. In such jurisdictions a public service corporation 
 may exercise eminent domain even if its obligation to serve 
 the public depends wholly upon the supervising and control- 
 ling power of the state.'' 
 
 If a corporation has been invested by the legislature with 
 the power of eminent domain, it is not necessary that it be 
 already engaged in public service when it seeks to exercisie 
 eminent domain,* but it must be bound to devote the prop- 
 erty taken to the public use within a reasonable time,® 
 
 § 60. Uses Incidental to Public Service. 
 
 When a public service is performed by a private corpora- 
 tion, difficult questions miay arise in deciding what objects 
 
 6. Murm v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, toga & Schenectady Railroad Co., 
 24 L. ed. 77. 3 Paige Ch. 45, 22 Am. Dec. 679. 
 
 7. Delaware. — Clendaniel v. Con- Pennsylvania. — Keys v. Union- 
 rad, 3 Boyce 549, 83 Atl. 1036, town Radial St. Ry. Co., 236 Pa. 
 Ann. Oas. 1915 B 968. 611, 84 Atl. 1109. 
 
 Georgia. — Jones v. North Geor- Tennessee. — Ryan v. Louisville 
 
 gia Electric Co., 125 Ga. 618, 54 & Nashville Terminal Co., 102 
 
 S. E. 85, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 122, 5 Tenn. Ill, 50 S. W. 744, 45 
 
 Ann. Gas. 526. L. R. A. 303. 
 
 Idaho. — McLean V. District Court,- Texas. — Borden v. Trespalacios 
 
 24 Idaho 441, 134 Pac. 536. Rice & Irrigation Co., 98 Tex. 494, 
 
 Massachusetts.— Lumbard v. 86 S. W. 11, 107 Am. St. Rep. 640. 
 
 Steams, 4 Cush. 60. 8. Deseret Water, Oil & Irriga- 
 
 Minnesota. — Minnesota Canal &! tion Co. v. State, 167 Cal. 147, 138 
 
 Power Co. v. Pratt, 101 Minn. 197, Pac. 981. As to necessity of hav- 
 
 112 N. .W. 395, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) ing a francMse which will enable- it 
 
 105. to perform the public service for 
 
 New Hampshire. — Rockingham which the land is taken, see infra, 
 
 County Light & Power Co. v. § 409. 
 
 Hobbs, 72 N. H. 531, 58 Atl. 46, 9. Clendaniel v. Conrad, 3 Boyee 
 
 66 L. R. A. 581. (Del.) 549, 83 Atl. 1036, Ann. Cas. 
 
 New York.— Beekman v. Sara- 1915 B 968. 
 
§ 60 The Public Use — Public Sebvicb. 171 
 
 are fairly incidental to its service of the public, for even 
 although such a corporation has no other function than 
 public service, it does not necessarily follow that it may con- 
 stitutionally take land by eminent domain for every pur- 
 pose for which it may find it convenient. It is generally 
 felt that a public service corporation should not be per- 
 mitted to take by eminent domain lands which will not be 
 actually used by the public, and which will aid it only indi- 
 rectly in the exercise of its franchise. With the private 
 part of its business the public is not concerned, and such a 
 corporation is not allowed to use the power of eminent 
 domain merely to supply itself economically with some nec- 
 essary commodity/ ordinarily obtainable in the open 
 market.^" It is not, however, necessary, to make a taking 
 by a public service corporation valid, . that the public 
 actually use that part of its system which it seeks to acquire 
 by eminent domain, if the* use of such part is fairly inci- 
 dental to its service of the public, and such a corporation 
 may take anything, however remotely bearing on its public 
 service, if it is essential to that service and can be obtained 
 in no other way.** 
 
 When a public service corporation lays out its works 
 through occupied territory, it may find it necessary to dis- 
 place another existing public work; and if the statute 
 authorizes such a corporation to condemn additional land 
 to which the existing structure can be moved, there is no 
 constitutional difficulty in taking land for such a purpose, 
 since the use for which the land is taken is public in the 
 strictest sense, even although the taking may incidentally 
 save the new company from paying heavy damages to the 
 
 10. In re Rhode Island Subur- running therefrom, such company- 
 ban Ry. Co., 22 R. I. 457, 48 Atl. was not authorized to exercise the 
 591, 52 L. R. A. 879. See also powers of eminent domain for the 
 Bowden v. York Shore "Water Co. purpose of taking land not part 
 (Me.) 95 Atl. 779, in which the rule of the watershed of the pond for 
 was laid down that where a water the purpose of protecting its other 
 company was empowered- to take, lands against danger from fire 
 hold, protect and use the water of such purpose being a private and 
 a certain pond, and all other ponds, not a public one. 
 streams and tributaries thereto or 11. Infra, §§ 62, 66. 
 
172 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 61 
 
 corporation owning the existing work; but if the existing 
 structure is not one in behalf of which eminent domain could 
 be exercised in the first instance it is difficult to see why a 
 new site for such a structure can be condemned by a public 
 service corporation which finds the structure in the way of 
 its projected works and wishes to escape paying heavy 
 damages for destroying it.^^ Thus if, in laying out a rail- 
 road, it became necessary to move the aqueduct of a public 
 water supply system, the railroad company might be author- 
 ized to condemn a new site for the aqueduct and to move it 
 thereto, but it could hardly take one man's land as a site to 
 which it might move another man's dwelling-house. Never- 
 theless, the taking of property for such a purpose has been 
 sustained in one state, although it is doubtful if such a deci- 
 sion would be followed in other jurisdictions.^* 
 
 § 61. Public Highways. 
 
 A public highway is a road or street of any description 
 and however established over which any member of the 
 public may lawfully pass. Public highways were the earli- 
 est objects for the exercise of eminent domain in this 
 country, and in some of the states the only one authorized 
 before the Eevolution. It has never been doubted that land 
 might be taken for the purpose of laying out, extending or 
 
 12. Rogers v. Bradsliaw, 20 defendant's land) whereby, al- 
 Johns. (N. Y.) 735. though the water of the river was 
 
 13. Pitznogle v. Western Mary- taken, it might be kept at its usual 
 land" Ry. Co., 119 Md. 673, 87 Atl. stage through the use of the reser- 
 917. See also supra, § 47. In voir, defendant's contention that 
 Hartford Water Commissioners v. his land could not be taken, as the 
 Manchester, 87 Conn. 193, 87 Atl. essential purpose of the taking 
 870, 96 Atl. 182, Ann. Cas. 1915 A would be to buy off the opposi- 
 1104, it was held that when it tion of the riparian owners, was 
 was proposed to better the water without merit, since both the im- 
 supply of a city by the use of a provement of the water supply of 
 river, and the waters of such river the city and the restoration or im- 
 could not be taken on account of provement of the flow of the river 
 riparian proprietors' water rights, were in themselves public uses, ir- 
 so that it was planned to build a respective of the opposition of the 
 compensation reservoir (which riparian owners to the diversion 
 would require the condemnation of of the waters. 
 
§ 61 
 
 The Public Use — Public Seevice. 
 
 173 
 
 widening a public highway." Public highways are ordina- 
 rily laid out and constructed by the county authorities ; but 
 county roads are not the only form of public highways which 
 may be established by the exercise of eminent domain. 
 Town or township roads laid out by the local municipal 
 authorities, but open to use by the general public, are clearly 
 for the public use in the constitutional sense ; ^^ and the 
 same is true of city streets.^® State and even national 
 roads are not unknown, and an appropriation by the state 
 to aid local authorities in constructing roads is proper, and 
 is not forbidden by a constitutional provision prohibiting 
 the state from becoming involved in works of internal 
 improvement." Toll-roads, toll-bridges, turnpikes or plank- 
 roads constructed and managed by individuals or private 
 corporations at their own expense, but open to use by any 
 member of the public upon payment of a reasonable fee". 
 
 14. California. — San Mateo 
 County V. Cobum, 130 Cal. 631, 63 
 Pac. 78, 621. 
 
 Idaho. — Latah County v. Peter- 
 son, 3 Idaho 398, 29 Pac. 1089, 16 
 L. E. A. 81. 
 
 Indiana. — Speck v. Kenoyer, 164 
 Iifd. 431, 73 N. E. 896. 
 
 Iowa. — Bankhead v. Brown, 25 
 Iowa 540. 
 
 Kentucky. — Chesapeake Stone 
 Co. V. Moreland, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 
 1075, 104 S. W. 762, 16 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 479. 
 
 Maine. — Ulmer v. Lime Rock 
 Railroad Co., 98 Me. 579, 57 Atl. 
 1001, 66 L. R. A. 387. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Haverhill Bridge 
 Proprietors v. Essex County Com- 
 missioners, 103 Mass. 120, 9 Am. 
 Rep. 518. 
 
 Nebraska. — Welton v. Dickson, 
 38 Neb. 767, 57 N. W. 559, 22 
 L. R. A. 496, 41 Am. St. Rep. 
 771. 
 
 North Carolina. — Jeffress v. 
 Greenville, 154 N. C. 490, 70 S. E. 
 919. 
 
 Vermont. — Armington v. Bar- 
 net, 15 Vt. 745, 40 Am. Dec. 705. 
 
 Washington. — State ex rel. 
 Schroeder v. Adams Comity Court, 
 29 Wash. 1, 69 Pac. 366. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Norton v. Peck, 3 
 Wis. 723. 
 
 15. Hull V. Lincoln County, 62 
 Me. 325 ; Davis v. Smith, 130 Mass. 
 113; Ferris v. Bramble, 5 Ohio St. 
 109. 
 
 16. Indiana. — McCormiek v. La- 
 fayette, 1 Ind. 48. 
 
 Iowa. — Cherokee v. Sioux City, 
 etc.. Land Co., 52 Iowa 279, 3 
 N. W. 42. 
 
 Minnesota. — Knoblauch v. Min- 
 neaprolis, 56 Minn. 321, 57 K W. 
 928. 
 
 Missouri. — Savannah v. Han- 
 cock, 91 Mo. 54, 3 S. W. 215. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Pittsburgh v. 
 Seott, 1 Pa. 309; Smedley v. Ir- 
 win, 51 Pa. 445. 
 
 Tennessee. — Anderson v. Turbe- 
 ville, 6 Cold. 150. 
 
 Washington. — State ex rel. 
 Thomas v. Whatcom County, 42 
 Wash. 521, 85 Pac. 256. 
 
 17. Bonsai v. Yellott, 100 Md. 
 481, 60 Atl. 593, 69 L. B. A. 914. 
 
174 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 61 
 
 have invariably been held a public use.^^ A road or bridge 
 which is not a public highway and which is not open to the 
 public as of right is not a public use, even if the public are 
 permitted to use it and the maintenance of the way will 
 increase the trade and business of the community.^* 
 
 The public character of the road does not depend upon 
 the degree of public necessity or convenience that require 
 it or the extent to which the public uses it, or the number 
 of persons that it accommodates,^" and it is no legal objec- 
 tion that a proposed highway will be a cul de sac^^ or that 
 
 18. ToU-roads:— 
 
 United States. — Bonaparte v. 
 Camden, etc., R. R. Co., Baldw. 
 205, Ted. Cas. No. 1617. 
 
 Connecticut. — State v. Maine, 27 
 Conn. 641, 71 Am. Dee. 89. 
 
 Kentucky. — Arnold v. Covington, 
 etc.. Bridge Co., 62 Ky. 372. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Backus v. Leb- 
 anon, 11 N. H. 24, 35 Am. Dee. 
 466; In re Mt. Washington Road 
 Co., 35 N. H. 134. 
 
 New York. — Rogers v. Brad- 
 shaw, 20 Johns. 735; Benedict v. 
 Gk)it, 3 Barb. 459. 
 
 Ohio. — Yomig V. Buckingham, 5 
 Ohio 485. 
 
 Virginia. — Flecker v. Rhodes, 30 
 Gratt. 795. 
 
 Toll-bridges 
 
 Georgia. — Young v. MeKenzie, 
 3 Ga. 31. 
 
 Kentucky. — Arnold v. Covington 
 Bridge Co., 1 Duv. 372. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Crosby v. 
 Hanover, 36 N. H. 404. 
 
 Ohio. — Young v. Buckingham, 5 
 Ohio 485; Palmer v. State, Wright 
 364. 
 
 An interesting state of facts was 
 presented in the case of Clendaniel 
 V. Conrad, 3 Boyce (Del.) 549, 83 
 Atl. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1915 B 968. 
 A wealthy individual endowed a 
 corporation with funds sufficient to 
 construct a boulevard two hundred 
 feet wide the whole length of the 
 
 state, with roadways for vehicles 
 and spaces reserved for electric 
 cars and pipes and wires of all 
 kinds. The public was to have the 
 use of the boulevard without 
 charge. It was held that eminent 
 domain might be employed in its 
 behalf. 
 
 19. Smith V. Smythe, 197 N. Y. 
 457, 90 N. E. 1121, 35 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 524; Manning v. Devil's 
 Lake, 13 N. D. 47, 99 N. W. 51, 65 
 L. R. A. 187, 112 Am. St. Rep. 
 652. See also as to private roads, 
 infra, § 85. 
 
 20. Butte, etc.. Railroad Co. v. 
 Montana Union Railroad Co., 16 
 Mont. 504, 41 Pac. 232, 31 L. R. A. 
 299, 59 Am. St. Rep. 508. 
 
 21. England. — Rugby Charity 
 Trustees v. Merryweather, 11 East 
 375; Rex v. Lloyd, 1 Camp. 260; 
 Bateman v. Bluek, 18 Q. B. 870; 
 Reg. V. Bumey, 31 L. T. (N. S.) 
 828; Attorney-General v. Chandos 
 Land & Building Society, 74 J. P. 
 40. 
 
 Connecticut. — Peckham v. Leb- 
 anon, 39 Conn. 231. 
 
 Illinois. — Sheaff v. People, 87 
 111. 189, 29 Am. Rep. 49. 
 
 Indiana. — Adams v. Harrington, 
 114 Ind. 66, 14 N. E. 603. 
 
 Maine. — Bartlett v. Bangor, 67 
 Me. 460. 
 
 New York. — People v. Kingman, 
 24 N. Y. 559; Wiggins v. Tall- 
 
§ 61 
 
 The Public Use — Public Sebviob, 
 
 175 
 
 it will lead to the residence or place of business of but one 
 individual, for the public may desire to visit or do business 
 with him.^^ If a road is to be open for public travel the 
 purpose for which the public may wish to travel is not 
 material, and land may be taken by eminent domain for a 
 road which is intended solely for driving for pleasure and 
 recreation or to furnish a view of beautiful natural scen- 
 ery.^* Streets are frequently laid out for the purpose of 
 opening up private land, but if a street is to be open to 
 public travel it is well settled that it is for the public use, 
 although it is of especial convenience or advantage to cer- 
 tain individuals,^* or even if its sole or principal object is 
 to enhance the value of the land through which it passes"^ 
 and the entire cost is met by special assessments on the land 
 thus benefited.^® Land may be taken for widening existing 
 
 madge, 11 Barb. 457; Hickok v. 
 Plattsburg, 41 Barb. 130; In re 
 University Ave., 144 N. Y. Supp. 
 1086. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Greene v. O'Con- 
 nor, 18 R. I. 56, 25 Atl. 692, 19 
 L. E. A. 262. 
 
 It was at one time doubted, both 
 in England and New York, whether 
 there could be a highway that was 
 not a thoroughfare. Woodyer v. 
 Hadden, 5 Taunt. 125; Wood v. 
 Veal, 5 Bam. & Aid. 454; Holdane 
 V. Cold Spring, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 103; Jordan v. Otis, 37 Barb. 
 (N. y.) 50. Later cases estab- 
 lished the doctrine as stated in the 
 text, although strong evidence is 
 required to prove that a cul de sac 
 is a highway, especially in ma-al 
 districts. Bourke v. Davis, 44 
 Ch. D. 110, 123. 
 
 22. California. — Sherman v. 
 
 Buick, 32 Oal. 241, 91 Am. Dee. 
 577. 
 
 Kansas. — Masters v. McHoUand, 
 12 Kan. 17. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Denham v. Bris- 
 tol County Commissioners, 108 
 Mass. 202. 
 
 Minnesota. — Mueller v. Court- 
 
 land, 117 Mitm. 290, 135 N. W. 
 996. 
 
 Oregon. — Towns v. Klamath 
 County, 33 Ore. 225, 53 Pao. 604; 
 Fanning v. Grilliland, 37 Ore. 368, 
 61 Pac. 636, 62 Pac. 209, 82 Am. 
 St. Rep. 758. 
 
 23. United States. — Chicago, etc., 
 Ry. Co. V. Minneapolis, 232 U. S. 
 430, 58 L. ed. 671, affirming 115 
 Minn. 460, 133 N. "W. 169, 51 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 236. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Higginson v. 
 Nahant, 11 Allen 530. 
 
 New Hampshire. — In re Mt. 
 "Washington Road Co., 35 N. H. 
 134. 
 
 New Jersey. — Sharpless v. Long- 
 port, 79 N. J. L. 279, 75 Atl. 744. 
 
 New York. — Re Clinton Ave., 57 
 App. Div. 166, 68 N. Y. Supp. 196, 
 affirmed, 167 N. Y. 624, 60 N. E. 
 1108. 
 
 24. Glendenning v. Stahl^, 173 
 Ind. 674, 91 N. E. 234. 
 
 25. Dunham v. Hyde Park, 75 
 111. 371; Wheelwright v. Boston, 
 188 Mass. 521, 74 N. E. 937; Barr 
 V. New Brunswick, 67 Fed. 402, 72 
 Fed. 689. 
 
 26. Moale v. Baltimore, 5 Md. 
 
176 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 61 
 
 highways even if the necessity of the widening is created by 
 a railroad corporation, and the railroad is required to pay 
 the expense.^'^ 
 
 Streets and highways are sometimes laid out by the legis- 
 lature, or by its express commands,^® but ordinarily the 
 power and duty of laying out public ways is delegated to 
 the county commissioners, or to the appropriate authorities 
 of the various cities, towns and yillages. Nothing is better 
 settled than that under such circumstances the courts have 
 no jurisdiction to revise the discretion of the local author- 
 ities, or to determine whether a way open to the public and 
 laid out by the officials designated for the purpose is of 
 sufficient public utility to constitute a public use?® There 
 are however two decisions in which public highways laid 
 out in due form were held by the court to be illegally estab- 
 lished because the use was not public. The court in these 
 cases found that the ways were not in fact intended for 
 public use, but for the use of railroad companies to the 
 exclusion of the public, in one case coming to this conclu- 
 sion from the fact that an ordinance granting the use of the 
 street to the railroad company was passed on the same 
 day that the street was laid out,^" and in the other on extrin- 
 sic evidence as to the real motives of the city council.^' 
 These decisions, while perhaps illustrating the too common 
 tendency of certain courts to interfere with matters beyond 
 the scope of their authority, may be defended on the ground 
 
 314, 61 Am. Dec. 276, and see also 29. Infra, § 333. 
 
 supra, § 15, and infra, §i 97 and 30. Ligare v. Chicago, 139 111. 
 
 255. 46, 28 N. E. 934, 32 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 27. Summerfleld v. Chicago, 197 179. 
 
 111. 270, 64 N. E. 490; Stewart v. 31. Kansas City v. Hyde, 196 
 
 El Paso County (Tex. Civ. App.), Mo. 498, 96 S. W. 201, 7 L. R. A. 
 
 130 S. W. 590; Tacoma v. Brown, (N. S.) 639. See also Parham v. 
 
 69 Wash. 538, 125 Pac. 940. A Inferior Court Justices, 9 Ga. 341. 
 
 change of grade of a street to cross See however In re Ely Ave., 217 
 
 a railroad is also for a public pur- N. Y. 45, 111 N. E. 266, holding 
 
 pose, although paid for by the that a court cannot interfere with 
 
 railroad company. Spokane v. a taking for street purposes on the 
 
 Thompson, 69 Wash. 650, 126 Pac. ground that the real object was to 
 
 47. provide a location for an elevated 
 
 28. Smedley v. Irwin, 51 Pa. 445. railway. 
 
§§ 62, 63 The Public Use — Public Sbbvice. 177 
 
 that use by the public of the proposed streets would be 
 impossible, and so the streets were not for the public use, 
 and the cases are not authority for the proposition that 
 a court can interfere with the discretion of the appropri- 
 ate municipal boards in laying out ways if it eonsiders 
 them of little service to the public. 
 
 § 62. Purposes Incidental to Public Ways. 
 
 While general authority to lay out public ways does not 
 carry the right to enter land or take property outside the 
 limits of the way,*^ there is no constitutional objection to 
 the grant of authority to take easements incidental to the 
 construction or maintenance of a public way over land out- 
 side the boundaries of the way. Such easements include the 
 right to slope earth upon abutting property when the grade 
 of the way is higher than that of the land through which it 
 is laid out,** the right to take gravel and other materials 
 for constructing the way from convenient places,** and the 
 right to cut ditches and drains upon land adjacent to public 
 ways for the purpose of carrying away surface water from 
 the way so that the Way itself will be safe and convenient 
 for travel after heavy rains.*^ 
 
 § 63. Taking of Remnants — Excess Takings. 
 
 It often happens that when a highway is laid out or 
 widened in a district in which the land is divided into small 
 holdings and covered with small buildings owned by differ- 
 ent individuals, the result of the taking will be that many 
 
 82. Anthony v. Adams, 1 Mebc. kins v. Walker Co., 18 Tex. 585, 
 
 (Mass.) 284; Hawks v. Charlemont, 70 Am. Dec. 298. 
 
 110 Mass. 110 ; Mayo v. Springfield, 35. Illinois. — Baughman v. Hein- 
 
 138 Mass. 70; Doon v. Natiek, 171 selman, 180 111. 251, 54 N. E. 313. 
 
 Mass. 228, 50 N. E. 616. Indiana.— Brss v. Elliott, 105 
 
 33. See for example Mass. St. Ind. 517, 5 N. E. 663. 
 
 1906, c. 463, art. I, i 36. See also Texas. — ^Palmer v. Harris County, 
 
 Eikenberry v. St. Paul, etc., R. E. 29 Tex. Civ. App. 340, 69 S. W. 
 
 Co. (Iowa), 156 N. W. 163. 229. 
 
 34. Hatch v. Hawkes, 126 Mass. Wisconsin. — Smeaton v. Martin 
 177; Jerome v. Boss, 7 Johns. Ch. 57 Wis. 364, 15 N. W. 403; Smith 
 (N. Y.) 315, 11 Am. Dec. 484; v. Gould, 59 Wis. 631, 18 N. W. 
 Bliss V. Hosmer, 15 Ohio 44; Wat- 457. 
 
 12 
 
178 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 63 
 
 buildings will be substantially destroyed and the owners 
 will be left with parcels of such size and shape as to be 
 practically worthless. It is accordingly not an uncommon 
 provision in the statutes relating to the laying out and wid- 
 ening of highways in force in the cities in which such condi- 
 tions exist that, when part of a parcel of land is taken and 
 the remainder is left in such condition or in such a shape as 
 to be of little value to its owner, the city may take the whole 
 and use or sell what it does not need for the highway, it 
 being felt that it will be less expensive in the end for the 
 city to take and pay for the whole of such lots and either to 
 devote the remnants to municipal purposes, or, by consol- 
 idating contiguous remnants, sell them for a fair price, than 
 to engage in protracted litigation over the question of dam- 
 ages to the remaining land with each owner. If the owner 
 consents '^^ or if the statute provides merely that he may sur- 
 render the whole tract if he chooses,^'' no constitutional 
 objections can arise, for such a proceeding doubtless tends 
 to save the public money; but, if the owner insists upon 
 keeping what is left of his land, grave constitutional diffi- 
 culties would be encountered if it was attempted to compel 
 him to part with it. Construing such a statute as limited in 
 its application to trifling and almost negligible remnants 
 which would be unsuitable for private use after the part 
 actually needed for public use had been appropriated, it 
 would probably be sustained in some jurisdictions at least 
 as authorizing a taking for a purpose reasonably incidental 
 to the laying out of public ways ; ^* but if the proposed tak- 
 ing savored at all of a municipal land speculation, no court 
 would hesitate to hold it unconstitutional. 
 
 36. Gregg v. Baltimore, 56 Md. 38. Opinion of the Justi-ses, 204 
 256; Embury v. Conner, 3 N. Y. Mass. 607, 91 N. E. 405, 27 L. R. A. 
 511, 53 Am. Dee. 325; Matter of (N. S.) 483; Boston v. Talbot, 206 
 Albany St., 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 149, Mass. 82, 91 N. E. 1014; Salisbury 
 25 Am. Dee. 618 ; Dunn v. Charles- Land & Improvement Co. v. Corn- 
 ton, Harper (S. C.) 189. monwealth, 215 Mass. 369, 102 
 
 37. Boulat V. Municipality No. 1, N. E. 619, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1196. 
 5 La. Ann. 363; Mayor of Balti- 
 more V. Chunet, 23 Md. 449. 
 
§ 63 The Public Use — Public Sebvice, 179 
 
 It often happens in old and densely populated cities that 
 the narrowness and crookedness of the public ways and the 
 minute subdivision of the adjoining land in the business dis- 
 trict seriously retards the prosperity and growth of the 
 community; but to rectify such conditions by a general 
 widening and straightening of the public ways, or by the 
 laying out of broad, new thoroughfares through the heart 
 of the congested district, would be inordinately expensive 
 on account of the heavy damages that would be claimed by 
 the owners of buildings cut in halves and of land left inca- 
 pable of beneficial use, and no lasting benefit to the public 
 would accrue if the minute subdivision of the land left in 
 private ownership continued, so that buildings appropriate 
 to the improved conditions could not be erected thereon. 
 
 In London and some other European cities the difficulty 
 is solved by laying out a broad, straight highway through 
 the section of the city which it is desired to improve, and by 
 taking land on both sides of the new street for a consider- 
 able depth. Entire parcels are taken and thus no question 
 of damages to remaining land is left open. After the new 
 street is built the land on either side is cut up into lots of 
 appropriate size and shape and sold to private purchasers, 
 the profit from the transaction often going far toward pay- 
 ing the whole cost of the improvement. Such an enter- 
 prise, although sanctioned in countries in which the power of 
 the legislature is not restricted by a written constitution, 
 involves the taking of the property of one person and the 
 sale of it to another for his own private use and, until 
 recently at least, was impossible anywhere within the 
 United States on account of the provisions of the state con- 
 stitutions.^® Recently however there have been amendments 
 
 39. Opinion of the Justices, 204 habitants of the Common-wiealth and 
 
 Mass. 607, 91 N. E. 405, 27 L. R. A. particularly of the city of Boston 
 
 (N. S.) 483. The House of Repre- are dependent upon the existence in 
 
 sentatives passed an order requir- that city of facilities for the trans- 
 
 ing the opinion of the Justices of action of foreign and domestic 
 
 the Supreme Judicial Court upon trade and commerce, and chief 
 
 the following question (in sub- among such facilities is a broad 
 
 stance) : if the commercial interests thoroughfare with adequate sites 
 
 and general prosperity of liie in- upon it for warehouses and other 
 
180 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 63 
 
 adopted to some of the state constitutions designed to per- 
 mit the taking of property for just such purposes,*** but 
 
 buildings, and no such street exists, 
 and if such a street should be laid 
 out in the ordinary way the adjoin- 
 ing land would be left divided into 
 parcels of such unsuitable size and 
 shape,that the proper facilities could 
 not be furnished by the mere laying 
 out of a street, but could only be se- 
 cured by the concentration through 
 the exercise of eminent domain of 
 estates abutting thereon into par- 
 cels of suitable size and shape, is 
 it within the constitutional power 
 of the legislature to authorize the 
 taking by the city of land for such 
 a thoroughfare and of so much land 
 on both sides thereof as may be 
 reasonably necessary to furnish the 
 proper facilities and with a view to 
 subsequent use of such land by pri- 
 vate individuals in such manner as 
 to secure the public interests re- 
 ferred to? The answer of the court 
 ■was in part as follows : " The 
 question seems to relate particu- 
 larly to the power of the legislature 
 to take and use land outside of the 
 proposed thoroughfare, for pur- 
 poses which have no direct rela^ 
 tion to the construction or use of 
 the street for travel. It is pre- 
 sented upon the hypothesis that the 
 desired facilities for the profitable 
 use of the land can be secured only 
 by the obliteration in whole or in 
 part of the present lines of indi- 
 vidual ownership along the street, 
 the concentration, through the exer^ 
 cise of the power of eminent 
 domain, of these abutting estates, in 
 parcels of suitable size and shape, 
 and the development or use of such 
 parcels for warehouses, mercantile 
 establishments and other 'buildings 
 suited to the demands of trade and 
 commerce. The question is whether 
 such land can be taken with a view 
 to the subsequent use of it by pri- 
 vate individuals, under conveyances, 
 
 leases or agreements which shall 
 embody suitable contracts for the 
 construction on the land of build- 
 ings adapted to use in domestic and 
 foreign trade and commerce, and 
 for the use, management; and con- 
 trol of the lands and buildings in 
 such manner as to secure and pro- 
 mote such trade and commerce. 
 The proposed legislation, to which 
 the inquiry relates, necessarily 
 would contemplate action by the 
 city in the procurement, manage- 
 ment and control of land along a 
 street within the city, for no other 
 purpose than to induce and pro- 
 mote a use of it by merchants or 
 traders. It would contemplate a 
 taking of private property in the 
 exercise of the right of eminent 
 domain, and an expenditure of 
 money to pay for it and fit it for 
 occupation. It is a rule of law uni- 
 versally recognized in this country 
 that neither of these things can be 
 done unless the taking or expendi- 
 ture is for a public use. This has 
 been stated so often, and the prin- 
 ciples on which it is founded have 
 been considered so fully that it is 
 unnecessary to discuss it or to cite 
 authorities. The only question 
 about which there is a possibility of 
 doubt is whether the proposed use 
 of the land outside of the thorough- 
 fare is a public use. It is plain 
 that a use of the property to obtain 
 the possible income or profit that 
 might enure to the city from the 
 ownership and control of it would 
 not be a public use. The city can- 
 not be authorized to take the prop- 
 erty of a private owner for such a 
 purpose, nor can the city tax its 
 inhabitants to obtain money for 
 such a use. It could as well tax 
 them to raise money to carry on 
 any other private business with a 
 hope of gain. Such proceedings are 
 
§ 63 
 
 The Public Use — Public Seevioe. 
 
 181 
 
 it cannot be confidently stated that such, improvements can 
 now be effected until it has been determined whether a 
 taking for such a purpose would not be a violation of the 
 fourteenth amendment.*^ 
 
 It does not necessarily follow, even if a statute carrying 
 into effect the recent amendments was held to be a violation 
 of the federal constitution, that such an iinprovement is 
 constitutionally impossible. A tract of land incapable of 
 
 entirely outside the funetions of a 
 state or of any subdivision of a 
 state. It is equally true and indubi- 
 table that a management and use 
 of such property to promote the in- 
 terests of merchants and traders 
 who might occupy it, and to fur- 
 nish better facilities for doing busi- 
 ness and making profits, would not 
 be a public but a private use of the 
 real estate. An affirmative answer 
 to this question would make it pos- 
 sible for the city to take the home 
 of a resident near the line of the 
 thoroughfare, or the shop of a 
 humble tradesman, and compel him 
 to give up his property and go else- 
 where, for no other reason than that, 
 in the opinion of the authorities of 
 the city, some other use of the land 
 would be more profitable and there- 
 fore would better promote the pros- 
 perity of the citizens generally. We 
 know of no case in which the exer- 
 cise of the right of eminent domain 
 or the expenditure of public money 
 has been justified on such groTinds. 
 • * * We answer the question in 
 the negative." 
 
 40. Massachusetts ; Part I, art. 10 
 as amended by 39th Amendment, 
 adopted in 1911. The legislature 
 may by special acts for the purpose 
 of laying out, widening or relocat- 
 ing highways or streets, authorize 
 the taking in fee by the common- 
 wealth, or by a county, city or town, 
 of more land and property than are 
 needed for the actual construction 
 of such highway or street, provided, 
 
 however, thai the land and prop- 
 erty authorized to be taken are 
 specified in the act and are no more 
 in extent than would be sufficient 
 for suitable building lobs on both 
 sides of such highway or street, and 
 after so much of the land or prop- 
 erty has been appropriated for such 
 highway or street as is needed 
 therefor, may authorize the sale of 
 the remainder for value with or 
 without suitable restrictions. New 
 York, art. I, § 7. The legislature 
 may authorize cities to take more 
 land and property than is needed 
 for actual construction in the lay- 
 ing out, widening, extending or re- 
 locating parks, public places, high- 
 ways or streets; provided however 
 that the additional land and prop- 
 erty so authorized to be taken shall 
 be no more than sufficient to form 
 suitable building sites abutting on 
 such park, public place, highway oc 
 street. After so much of the land 
 and property has been appropri- 
 ated for such park, public place, 
 highway or street as is needed 
 therefor, the remainder may be sold 
 or leased. Wisconsin, art. XI, § 3b. 
 When private property shall be or 
 has been taken for public use by a 
 mxmicipal corporation, additional, 
 adjoining or neighboring property 
 may be taken, under conditions to 
 be prescribed by the legislature by 
 general law. Property thus taken 
 shall be deemed to be taken for 
 public use. 
 41. Supra, § 39. 
 
182 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 64 
 
 beneficial use by reason of its minute subdivision might 
 well be held to fall within the class of possible subjects 
 of compulsory joint improvement under the police power,** 
 and a scheme might be worked out whereby all the owners 
 of land lying within such tract would be made members of 
 a quasi corporation similar in its fundamental principles 
 to a drainage district and governed by a vote of the majority 
 in interest. The physical features of the improvement could 
 then be carried out in the same manner as it is done abroad, 
 but the profits would be divided among the members of the 
 district in proportion to the value of the land contributed 
 by each. Such a suggestion may seem fanciful, but it not 
 only removes some of the technical constitutional objections 
 to the existing plan for excess takings, but it effectuates a 
 result more consonant with justice and a reasonable respect 
 to the rights of private property. 
 
 § 64. When the Discontinuance of a Highway must be for 
 the Public Use. 
 
 Ordinarily, when a highway is discontinued, no private 
 property is taken, and consequently there is no constitu- 
 tional requirement that the discontinuance must be effected 
 for the public, use. If the power has been delegated by the 
 legislature to the municipal authorities to discontinue a 
 highway whenever they think such action will advance the 
 public interests, there is no occasion for the courts to inter- 
 fere at the behest of the owners of property injuriously 
 affected by the discontinuance of a highway, whatever the 
 reason for the discontinuance may be. For example, it is 
 not unusual or improper, if a private corporation desires 
 to erect a large factory upon a tract intersected by public 
 streets that have been legally established but are little used, 
 for the municipal authorities, if they believe that the pros- 
 perity of the community will be enhanced by the erection of 
 the factory, to vote to discontinue the streets; and owners 
 of land who find it a longer trip from their property to the 
 
 42. Supra, § 15, and infra, §§84 
 and 88. 
 
§ 64 The Public Use — Public Service, 183 
 
 centre of the town have no standing in court to complain.*' 
 It is true that it has frequently been held that municipal 
 authorities have no power to discontinue a highway except 
 when it is no longer necessary for the public use, or when 
 the land is needed for some other public purpose, and loose 
 language has been used to the effect that a highway could 
 not constitutionally be vacated for a private purpose;" 
 but the cases in which an order of discontinuance has been 
 set aside by the courts really turn upon the extent of author- 
 ity delegated to the municipal authorities rather than upon 
 the constitutional power of the legislature, and there is no 
 escape from the conclusion that when there is no taking of 
 property, there is no requirement to be found in the consti- 
 tution that the discontinuance of a highway must be for the 
 public use. 
 
 The discontinuance of a highway under some conditions 
 however constitutes a taking of property in the constitu- 
 tional sense by depriving an owner of access to his land ; *^ 
 and it would seem to follow that under such conditions a 
 street could not be discontinued except for the public use, 
 as well as upon the payment of compensation. In other 
 words, when the property of an owner will be so seriously 
 affected by the closing of a street that he is constitutionaEy 
 entitled to compensation, the street cannot be discontinued 
 unless the land that it covers is to be devoted to some use 
 for which private land may be constitutionally taken by 
 eminent domain.*® 
 
 43. Illinois — Meyer v. Teuto- 148 HI. 51, 35 N. E. 141, 22 L. K. A. 
 poUs, 131 lU. 552, 23 N. E. 651; 393. 
 
 People V. Wieboldt, 233 111. 572, 84 Maryland.— Yan Witsen v. Gut- 
 
 N. E. 646. man, 79 Md. 405, 29 Atl. 608, 24 
 
 Iowa. — Marshalltown v. Forney, L. R. A. 403. 
 
 61 Iowa 578, 16 N. W. 740. New York.— Ackerman v. True, 
 
 New Jersey.— Kean v. Elizabeth, 175 N. Y. 353, 365, 67 N. E. 629. 
 
 54 N. J. L. 462, 24 Atl. 495, 55 0/iJo.— Kinnear Mfg. Co. v. 
 
 N. J. L. 337, 26 Atl. 939. Beatty, 65 Ohio St. 264, 62 N. E. 
 
 New York.— Be New York, 157 341, 87 Am. St. Rep. 600. 
 
 N. Y. 409, 52 N. E. 1126. 45. Infra, § 115. 
 
 44. See for example, 46. Baltimore v. Brengle, 116 
 Georgia.— Marietta Chair Co. v. Md. 342, 81 Atl. 677. See also 
 
 Henderson, 121 Ga. 399, 49 S. E. Gary v. Much (Ind. App.), 94 
 312, 104 Am. St. Rep. 156. N. E. 583, in which it was held that 
 
 Illinois. — Smith v. McDowell, 
 
184 The Law of Emineitt Bomain- § 65 
 
 § 65. Steam Railroads. 
 
 Wlien railroads were first introduced, tlie chief merit of 
 this new form of transportation was supposed to lie in the 
 road bed rather than in the motive power, and a " rail 
 road " was looked upon as a new form of turnpike upon 
 which vehicles would run more easily than upon the existing 
 roads but which was to be used in much the same manner, 
 each traveller furnishing his own carriage and propelling 
 it by animal or mechanical power as he might prefer.*'^ 
 When the fulfillment of this expectation proved to be 
 impracticable and it became necessary for the proprietors 
 of a railroad to furnish both the vehicle and the motive 
 power, a new form of pubEc service corporation had come 
 into being, and vigorous objection was made to the consti- 
 tutionality of the statutes by which the power of eminent 
 domain was granted to «ueh a body and for such a purpose. 
 A railroad, it was contended, differed from other public 
 improvements such as turnpikes and canals because travel- 
 lers could not use it with their own carriages and boats, 
 but must accept such accommodations as the railroad com- 
 pany might care to offer and at such terms as it saw fit to 
 charge. What the history of this country would have been 
 if this contention had prevailed is an interesting specula- 
 tion, but, it is needless to say, it did not prevail, and it was 
 held in every state in which the question arose that a rail- 
 road company was a common carrier and bound to serve 
 all alike at a reasonable fare, and that although a railroad 
 differed in detail from earlier methods of transportation, 
 it was none the less a pulDlic highway and the power of emi- 
 nent domain might be constitutionally exercised to secure 
 a location for its roadbed.^^ At the same time the question 
 
 a street eould not be vacated to pro- Salem, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Gray 
 
 vide a site for a commereial (Mass.) 1, 28. 
 
 exchange. See however Tomlin v. 48. United States. — Secombe v. 
 
 Cedar Rapids, etc., Light Co., 141 Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., 23 Wall. 
 
 Iowa 599, 120 N. W. 93, 22 L. R. A. 108, 23 L. ed. 67. 
 
 (N. S.) 530, in which the correct Alabama. — Aldridge v. Tuseum- 
 
 iprinciple is stated. bia, etc., Railroad Co., 2 Stewart & 
 
 47. Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Porter, 199, 23 Am. Dec. 307. 
 
§ 65 
 
 The Public Use — Public Seevice. 
 
 185 
 
 arose whether a state or a municipal corporation might be 
 constitutionally authorized to subscribe to the stock of a 
 railroad corporation, and it was only after a vigorous dis- 
 sent on the part of many courts that it became generally 
 established that a railroad was for the public use to such an 
 extent that money raised by taxation could be expended on 
 its behalf.** 
 
 California. — Contra Costa Coal 
 Mines Co. v. Moss, 23 Cal. 324. 
 
 Connecticut. — Enfield Toll 
 Bridge v. Hartford, etc., Railroad 
 Co., 17 Conn. 40, 42 Am. Dee. 716. 
 
 Delaware. — Whiteman's Execu- 
 trix V. Wilmington & Susquehanna 
 Railroad Co., 2 Harr. 514, 33 Am. 
 Dec. 411. 
 
 Florida. — Moody v. Jacksonville, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 20 Fla. 597. 
 
 Iowa. — • Cook V. Burlington, 30 
 Iowa 94, 6 Am. Rep. 649. 
 
 Kentucky.- — ^Lexington, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Applegate, 8 Dana 289, 33 
 Am. Dec. 497. 
 
 Michigan. — Swan v. Williams, 2 
 Mich. 427. 
 
 Missouri. — Kansas, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Northwestern Coal, etc., Co., 
 161 Mo. 288, 61 S. W. 684, 51 
 L. R. A. 936, 84 Am. St. Rep. 717. 
 
 Nebraska. — Hallenbeck v. Hahn, 
 
 2 Neb. 337. 
 
 Nevada. — Gibson v. Mason, 5 
 Nev. 283. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Concord R. R. 
 Co. V. Greely, 17 N. H. 47. 
 
 New York. — Beekman v. Sara- 
 toga & Schenectady Railroad Co., 
 
 3 Paige Ch. 45, 22 Am. Dec. 679; 
 Bloodgood V. Mohawk & Hudson 
 Railroad Co., 18 Wend. 9, 31 Am. 
 Dec. 313; Porter v. International 
 Bridge Co., 200 N. Y. 234, 93 N. E. 
 716. 
 
 North Carolina. — Raleigh, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Davis, 2 Dev. & B. L. 
 451. 
 
 South Carolina. — Louisville, etc., 
 R. R. Co. v. ChappeU, Rice L. 383; 
 
 Ex parte South Carolina R. R. Co., 
 2 Rich. L. 434. 
 
 Texas. — Texas Central R. R. Co. 
 v. Bowman, 97 Tex. 417, 79 S. W. 
 295. 
 
 Vermont. — Armington v. Bamet, 
 
 15 Vt. 745, 40 Am. Dec. 705. 
 Washington. — State v. Snohom- 
 ish County Court, 68 Wast. 572, 
 123 Pae. 996. 
 
 49. United States. — Chicago, etc., 
 Railroad Co. v. Otoe County, 16 
 Wall. 667, 21 L. ed. 375; Oleott v. 
 Fond du Lac County Supervisors, 
 
 16 Wall. 678, 21 L. ed. 382; Pine 
 Grove v. Taleott, 19 WaU. 666, 22 
 L. ed. 227; Humbird v. Jackson 
 County, 154 U. S. 592, 38 L. ed. 
 1089. 
 
 Alabama. — Ex parte Selma, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 45 Ala. 696, 6 Am. Rep. 
 722. 
 
 Illinois. — Prettyman v. Tazewell 
 County Supervisors, 19 111. 406, 71 
 Am. Dee. 230; Chicago, Danville & 
 Vincennes Railroad Co. v. Smith, 
 62 111. 268, 14 Am. Rep. 99. 
 
 Iowa. — Stewart v. Supervisors 
 of Polk County, 30 Iowa 9, 1 Am. 
 Rep. 238. 
 
 Kansas. — Leavenworth County 
 Commissioners v. MiUer, 7 Kan. 
 479, 12 Am. Rep. 425. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Supervisors v. 
 Wisconsin Central R. R. Co., 121 
 Mass. 460, 470, 471; Kittredge v. 
 North Brookfleld, 138 Mass. 286; 
 Prince v. Crocker, 166 Mass. 347, 
 361, 44 N. E. 446, 32 L. R. A. 610. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Perry v. 
 Keene, 56 N. H. 514. 
 
186 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 65 
 
 It having been established beyond controversy that a rail- 
 road extending from one portion of the state to another and 
 constituting a common carrier of freight and passengers 
 might be granted the power of eminent domain, questions 
 soon arose in regard to railroads of a less public character. 
 It was held in one state that a railroad which served no 
 commercial purpose and carried passengers only to allow 
 them to view the scenery was not for a public use,®" but 
 this decision seems too narrow and has not been generally 
 approved. It is inconsistent with the cases which hold that 
 land may be taken for parks ^^ and pleasure drives,^^ and. 
 while there are no actual decisions to the contrary, it is 
 safe to say that similar railroads in other states have been 
 allowed to exercise eminent domain without controversy. 
 
 If a railroad is a common carrier of passengers or freight 
 or both, and is open to use by the public on reasonable and 
 uniform terms, the extent of the public need and probable 
 use of the projected railroad is not a question for the courts ; 
 and the right to take property cannot be denied a corpora- 
 tion having proper authority from the legislature merely 
 because it is to run through a sparsely populated country, 
 
 Ohio. — ^Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 be compelled to subscribe to the 
 
 Ohio St. 14, 8 Am. Eep. 24. stock of a railroad company. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Sharpless v. 50. In re Niagara Falls, etc., Ry. 
 
 Mayor of Phildelphia, 21 Pa. 147, Co., 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429. 
 
 59 Am. Dee. 759. This case involved a railroad ia the 
 
 South Carolina. — State v. White- gorge of the Niagara River ■which 
 
 sides, 30 S. C. 579, 9 S. E. 661, 3 was operated only in summer for 
 
 L. R. A. 777. the purpose of furnishing pas- 
 
 Tennessee. — Louisville & Nash- sengers ■with a vie^w of the scenery, 
 
 ville Railroad Co. v. Davidson It carried them a few miles and 
 
 County Court, 1 Sneed 637, 62 Am. back again, had no terminal sta- 
 
 Dec. 424. tions, connected ■with no other rail- 
 
 Contra, Hanson v. Vernon, 27 roads, transported no freight and 
 
 Iowa 28, 1 Am. Rep. 215; People had neither habitations nor places 
 
 ex rel. Detroit & Howell Railroad of business along its line. If this 
 
 Co. v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 4 Am. railroad could not be justified as a 
 
 Rep. 400; Whiting v. Sheboygan, public use, it would seem to follow 
 
 etc., R. R. Co., 25 Wis. 167, 3 Am. that the park at Niagara Falls was 
 
 Rep. 30. See also People v. Batch- equally objectionable, 
 
 elor, 53 N. Y. 128, 13 Am. Rep. 51. Supra, § 56. 
 
 480, holding that a to^wn could not 52. Supra, § 61. 
 
65 
 
 The Public Use — Public Seevicb. 
 
 187 
 
 or because it will accominodate but a small territory,®* 
 even if the land required for its right of way is paid for by 
 the inhabitants of the district through which it is to run,®* 
 or because of the restricted nature of its facilities and of the 
 trafiSc which it plans to accommodate,®® or because it wiU 
 be chiefly of service in bringing out the products of a par- 
 ticular mine or factory or logging company, even if the 
 stockholders of the railroad company are also interested in 
 the business which the railroad will especially benefit.®® 
 Belt or terminal railway companies and union station com- 
 panies, organized for the purpose of furnishing connecting 
 terminal and depot facilities to other railroad companies, 
 are also clearly for a public use, although they may not 
 themselves deal directly with the public.®^ Land cannot 
 
 53. California. — Madera Ry. Co. 
 V. Raymond Granite C!o., 3 Cal. 
 App. 668, 87 Pac. 27. 
 
 Missouri. — Dietrich v. Murdock, 
 42 Mo. 279. 
 
 New Jersey. — De Camp v. Hi- 
 bemia Undergroimd R. R. Co., 47 
 N. J. L. 43. 
 
 Ohio. — State v. Toledo, etc., Ry. 
 Co., 24 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 321. 
 
 Washington. — State v. Eong 
 County Court, 46 Wash, 516, 90 
 Pac. 663. 
 
 West Virginia. — Caretta Ry. Co. 
 V. Virginia Pocahontas Coal Co., 
 62 W. Va. 185, 57 S. E. 401. 
 
 54. Shirley v. Southern Ry. Co., 
 121 Ky. 187, 89 S. W. 124. 
 
 55. Madera Ry. Co. v. Raymond 
 Granite Co., 3 Cal. App. 668, 87 
 Pac. 27; Dismal Swamp R. R. Co. 
 V. Roper Lumber Co., 114 Va. 537, 
 77 S. E. 598. 
 
 56. Arkansas. — Ozark Coal Co. 
 V. Pennsylvania Anthracite Rail- 
 road Co., 97 Ark. 495, 134 S. W. 
 634, Ann. Cas. 1912 D 1000; St. 
 Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Ft. Smith, 
 etc., Ry. Co., 104 Ark. 344, 148 
 S. W. 531. 
 
 Idaho. — McLean v. District 
 
 Court, 24 Idaho 441, 134 Pac. 536, 
 Ann. Cas. 1915 D 542. 
 
 Missouri. — Kansas & Texas Coal 
 Railway v. Northwestern Coal & 
 Mining Co., 161 Mo. 288, 61 S. W. 
 684, 51 L. R. A. 936, 84 Am. St. 
 Rep. 717. 
 
 Oregon. — Bridal Veil Lumbering 
 Co. V. Johnson, 30 Ore. 205, 46 Pac. 
 790, 34 L. R. A. 460, 60 Am. St. 
 Rep. 818; Oswego, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Cobb, 66 Ore. 587, 135 Pac. 181. 
 
 Texas. — Chapman v. Trinity Val- 
 ley, etc., Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 
 138 S. W. 440. 
 
 57. Alabama. — Central of Georgia 
 Railway Co. v. Union Springs & 
 Northern Railway Co., 144 Ala. 639, 
 39 So. 473, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 144. 
 
 Georgia. — Bridwell v. Gate City 
 Terminal Co., 127 Ga. 520, 56 S. E. 
 624, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 909. 
 
 Missouri. — ■ Southern Illinois & 
 Missouri Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 
 Mo. 1, 73 S. W. 453, 63 L. R. A. 
 301. 
 
 South Carolina. — Riley v. Char- 
 leston Union Station Co., 71 S. C. 
 457, 51 S. E. 485, 110 Am. St. Rep. 
 579. 
 
 Tennessee. — Ryan v. Louisville & 
 
188 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 66 
 
 however be taken for the use of a private railroad, and if a 
 railroad is built solely for the use of a single corporation 
 and the public has no right to use it, or even, it has been held 
 in some states, if it is not physically possible for others than 
 the corporation for whose use the railroad was built to make 
 use of it, although the railroad company is in legal theory 
 a common carrier, it cannot constitutionally be invested with 
 the power of eminent domain.®® 
 
 § 66. Uses Incidental to the Construction and Operation 
 of Railroads. 
 
 As already intimated, the mere fact that a railroad com- 
 pany is a public service corporation and entitled to exercise 
 the power of eminent domain in acquiring the right of way 
 for its tracks does not warrant the grant to such a company 
 of the right of taking by eminent domain any property 
 which it may deem desirable or convenient for the most 
 economical management of its business.®® A common car- 
 rier serves both the public and itself. It has its public and 
 its private functions. The public part is the exercise of its 
 franchise for the accommodation of public travel; the pri- 
 vate part is its incidental business, with which the public 
 is not concerned, and which the company manages for its 
 own interests. Whatever is necessary to the exercise of 
 the franchise is for the benefit of the public, but that which 
 
 Nashville Terminal Co., 102 Tenn. 573, 54 Pac. 367, 882, 62 L. E. A. 
 
 Ill, 50 S. W. 744, 45 L. R. A. 303; 513. 
 
 Collier v. Union Ey. Co., 113 Tenn. Contra, tinder a special constitu- 
 
 96, 83 S. W. 155. tional provision, Jones & Co. v. 
 
 58. Louisiana.— BT&dley v. Pharr, Venable, 120 Ga. 1, 47 S. E. 549, 
 
 45 La. . Ann. 426, 12 So. 618, 19 1 Ann. Cas. 185. See also White 
 
 L. E. A. 647; New Orleans Ter- v. Blanchard Bros. Granite Co., 
 
 minal Co. v. Tellier, 113 La. 733, 37 178 Mass. 363, 59 N. E. 1025, in 
 
 So. 624, 2 Ann. Cas. 127. which it was said that it was for 
 
 New York. — In re Split Eock the public advantage that the in- 
 
 Cable Co., 128 N. Y. 408, 28 N. E. dividual be enabled to aeliver his 
 
 506. goods to the public. In this case 
 
 North Carolina.— Coza.d v. however no private land was actu- 
 
 Kanawha Hardwood Co., 139 N. C. ally taken, as the railroad was laid 
 
 283, 51 S. E. 932, 1 L. E. A. (N. S.) in a public way and the ears were 
 
 969, 111 Am. St. Rep. 779. drawn by horses. 
 
 Oregon. — Apex Transportation 59. Supra, § 60. 
 Co. V. Garbade, 32 Ore. 582, 52 Pac. 
 
§ 66 
 
 The Public Use — Public Sebvice. 
 
 189 
 
 pertains simply to its means of supply is the private busi- 
 ness of the company.**" 
 
 The right of a railroad company to take land by eminent 
 domain is not however confined to its right of way or the 
 location of its tracks. Land may be taken for purposes inci- 
 dental to the construction of a safe roadbed, such as for 
 draining or supporting a cut or an embankment,^^ or for 
 diverting a stream so as to obviate the necessity of a 
 bridge,"^ or for raising a highway so that it will not cross 
 the tracks at grade.*** After the railroad has been con- 
 structed, land may be taken for additional main tracks, if 
 needed for expeditious public travel.** A railroad company 
 may also take such land as may be required to furnish 
 accommodations for receiving, landing or delivering pas- 
 sengers and all classes of freight, such as passenger 
 stations,"^ freight depots,** sidings,*^ grain elevators,** 
 
 60. In re Rhode Island Suburban 
 Ry. Co., 22 R. I. 457, 48 Atl. 591, 
 52 L. R. A. 879. 
 
 61. Smith V. Cleveland, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 170 Ind. 382, 81 N. E. 501; 
 Matter of New York Central B. R. 
 Co., 67 Barb. (N. T.) 426. 
 
 62. Reusch v. Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 57 Iowa 687, 11 N. W. 647; 
 State V. Meagher County, 34 Mont. 
 535, 88.Pae. 44, 115 Am. St. Rep. 
 540. 
 
 63. Summerfield v. Chicago, 197 
 lU. 270, 64 N. E. 490; Long Island 
 R. R. Co. V. Sherwood, 205 N. Y. 
 1, 98 N. E. 169; State v. Spokane, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 75 Wa^h. 651, 135 
 Pac. 636. As to the right of a 
 railroad to take land for 'the pur- 
 pose of removing thereto a struc- 
 ture which sitood upon its location, 
 see supra, § 60. 
 
 64. New York Central R. R. Co. 
 V. Untermyer, 196 N. Y. 531, 89 
 N. E. 1106. 
 
 65. Illinois. — Chicago, etc., R. B. 
 Co. V. Chicago Mechanics' Institute, 
 239 111. 197, 87 N. E. 933. 
 
 Indiana. — Eckart v. Fort Wayne, 
 
 etc.. Traction Co., 181 Ind. 352, 
 104 N. E. 762. 
 
 Michigan. — Fort St. Union Depot 
 Co. V. Morton, 83 Mich. 265, 47 
 N. W. 228; Michigan Central Ry. 
 Co. V. Miller, 172 Mich. 201, 137 
 N. W. 555. 
 
 New Tork. — In re Staten Island 
 Rapid Transit Co., 103 N. Y. 251, 
 8 N. E. 548. 
 
 Ohio. — -Giesy v. Cincinnati, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308. 
 
 South Carolina. — Riley v. Char- 
 leston Union Station Co., 71 S. C. 
 457, 51 S. E. 485, 110 Am. St. Rep. 
 579. 
 
 66. Cloth v. Chicago, etc., Ry. 
 Co., 97 Ark. 86, 132 S. W. 1005, 
 Ann. Cas. 1912 C 115; State v. 
 Railroad Commissioners, 56 Conn. 
 308, 15 Atl. 756; Central Pacific 
 Ry. Co. V. Feldman, 152 Cal. 303, 
 92 Pac. 849; New York Central 
 R. R. Co. V. Metropolitan Gaslight 
 Co., 63 N. Y. 326. 
 
 67. State v. Chicago, etc., Ry. 
 Co., 115 Minn. 51, 131 N. W. 859. 
 
 68. Stewart v. Great Northern 
 Ry. Co., 65 Minn. 515, 68 N. W. 
 208, 33 L. R. A. 427. 
 
190 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 66 
 
 stockpens** and similar structures actually used for the 
 accommodation of the public, and it may take more land 
 than is required at the time for such purposes, if such a 
 taking is justified by a reasonable consideration of the 
 demands which might fairly be anticipated on account of 
 the expected growth of the surrounding community.''*' 
 
 A railroad company may also in some cases take land for 
 the location of structures which -^11 not be actually used by 
 the public, or devoted to the protection or transportation 
 of passengers or freight, but which must necessarily be 
 close to the track to be of service, and which are essential 
 to the safe and convenient use of the railroad by the public, 
 and are recognized as properly appurtenant to a railroad 
 location. In this class fall buildings and tracks used for 
 storing and repairing engines and cars,''^ coal pockets, 
 water tanks '^^ and the like. Under a general power to take 
 land for railroad purposes, sites for car factories ''* and 
 employees ' dwellings ''* cannot however be condemned, and 
 it would seem that under ordinary circumstances a special 
 authority to make such takings could not be constitutionally 
 granted, since the proximity of such buildings to the tracks 
 does not in any way facilitate public travel, but is a matter 
 pertaining purely to the private interests of the railroad. 
 
 In some cases railroad companies have been allowed to 
 condemn land outside the right of way to obtain material 
 to use in constructing the road bed on the ground that such 
 
 69. Covington Stock Yards Co. v. 72. Dillon v. Kansas City, etc., 
 Keith, 139 U. S. 128, 35 L. ed. 73; R. E. Co., 67 Kan. 687, 74 Pae. 
 Chicago, etc., Ey. v. Baugh, 175 251; Northern Pacific Ey. Co. v. 
 Ind. 419, 94 N. E. 571. Kreszeszewski, 17 N. D. 203, 115 
 
 70. VaUejo, etc., R. E. Co. v. N. W. 679; Wilson v. Pittsburgh, 
 Home Savings Bank, 24 Cal. App. etc., E. E. Co., 222 Pa. 541, 72 Atl. 
 166, 140 Pac. 974, and see also 235. 
 
 supra, § 49. 73. Eldridge v. Smith, 34 Vt. 484. 
 
 71. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co. v. 74. Illinois Central E. E. Co. v. 
 Wilson, 17 111. 123; Low v. Galena, Normal, 175 111. 562, 51 N. E. 781; 
 etc., E. E. Co., 18 111. 324; Hanni- State v. Mansfield, 23 N. J. L. 510, 
 bal, etc., E. E. Co. v. Muder, 49 Mo. 57 Am. Dee. 409; Eldridge v. Smith, 
 165. So also a way leading to such 34 Vt. 484. 
 
 structures. Whitmeyer v. Salt Lake, 
 etc., Ey. Co. (Utah) 151 Pac. 48. 
 
§ 67 The Public Use — Public Sbbvice, 191 
 
 material cannot ordinarily be purchased in the open market 
 and must be obtained at the nearest and most accessible 
 points or the cost of construction will be enormously 
 increased.^® Condemnation for such a purpose has however 
 been denied in at least one case/® and the point would cer- 
 tainly be an open one if a gravel pit was sought to be taken 
 on the ground of mere convenience.''^ 
 
 § 67. Spur Tracks. 
 
 There is no principle of constitutional law which limits 
 the right of a railroad corporation in exercising eminent 
 domain to the acquisition of a right of way for its main 
 line, and it has never been doubted that land may be taken 
 for railroad branches carrying passengers and freight from 
 the main line into the less thickly settled districts upon 
 either side of the track.''* The use of such branches is 
 enjoyed by fewer members of the public than the main 
 line, but if a branch forms part of the system of the rail- 
 road and is open to public use in the same manner as the 
 main line, the number of people who will actually make use 
 of it is immaterial. Carrying this principle to its logical 
 conclusion, it is held by the great preponderance of author- 
 ity that, when a branch line or spur track is sought to be 
 laid from the main line of a railroad to a factory, mine or 
 
 75. Georgia. — Hopkins v. riorida Gunnison^ 1 Hun (N. Y.) 496. 
 Central R. R. Co., 97 Ga. 107, 25 77. Vermont Central R. R. Co. v. 
 S. E. 452. Baxter, 22 Vt. 365. 
 
 Michigan. — Saginaw, etc., R. R. 78. United States. — Colorado 
 
 Co. V. Bordner, 108 Mich. 236, 66 Eastern R. R. Co. v. Union Pacifle 
 
 N. W. 62. R. R. Co., 41 Ted. 293. 
 
 Minnesota. — Minneapolis, etc., R. California. — Madera R. R. Co. v. 
 
 R. Co. V. Nieolin, 76 Minn. 302, 79 Raymond Granite Co., 3 Cal. App. 
 
 N. W. 304. 668, 87 Pac. 27. 
 
 South Dakota. — Chicago, etc., Ry. Maine. — Ulmer v. Lime Rock R. 
 
 Co. V. Mason, 23 S. D. 564, 122 R. Co., 98 Me. 579, 57 Atl. 1001, 66 
 
 N. W. 601. L. R. A. 387. 
 
 Washington. — State ex rel. Great Michigan. — Toledo, etc., R. R. 
 
 Northern Railway Co. v. Snohomish Co. v. East Saginaw, etc., R. R. Co., 
 
 County Court, 68 Wash. 572, 123 72 Mich. 206, 40 N. W. 436. 
 
 Pac. 996, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 793. Montana.— 'Buiie, etc., R. R. Co. 
 
 So also o£ a place to dump earth v. Montana Union Ry. Co. 16 
 
 removed from a cut. Ohio, etc., R. M'ont. 504, 41 Pac. 232, 31 L. R. A. 
 
 R. Co. V. Hinckle, 1 Ohio N. P. 63. 299, 59 Am. St. Rep. 508. 
 
 76. New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 
192 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 67 
 
 other private establishment, and the chief and preponderat- 
 ing object of laying such track is to furnish a means of con- 
 necting such establishment with the outside world and it 
 will be of little if any use for any other purpose, if such 
 line or track is part of the railroad system and by the char- 
 ter of the corporation or the laws of the state may be used 
 by the public as of right, it is for the public use and the 
 necessary land may be acquired by the exercise of eminent 
 domain.™ Under such circumstances it is immaterial that 
 
 79. United States. — Hairston v. 
 Danville, etc., Ey. Co., 208 U. S. 
 598, 52 L. ed. 657, 13 Ana. Cas. 
 1008; Union. Lime Ck). v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 233 U. S. 211, 58 
 L. ed. 924, sustaining 152 Wis. 633, 
 140 N. W. 346; Colorado Eastern 
 R. R. Co. V. Union Pacific R. R. 
 Co., 41 Fed. 293. 
 
 Arkansas. — St. Louis, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Petty, 57 Ar)£. 359, 21 S. W. 
 884, 20 L. R. A. 434; Ozark Coal 
 Co. V. Pennsylvania Anthracite Co., 
 97 Ark. 495, 134 S. W. 634, Ann. 
 Cas. 1912 D 1000. 
 
 California. — Madera Ry. Co. v. 
 Raymond Granite Co., 3 Cal. App. 
 668, 87 Pac. 27. 
 
 Georgia. — Ilarrold v. Amerieus, 
 142 Ga. 686, 83 S. E. 534. 
 
 Illinois. — Truesdale v. Peoria 
 Grape Sugar Co., 101 EI. 565; 
 South Chicago R. R. Co. v. Dix, 
 109 111. 237; Chicago Dock, etc., Co. 
 V. Garrity, 115 111. 155, 3 N. E. 448; 
 McGann v. People, 194 111. 526, 62 
 N. E. 941; People v. Blocki, 203 
 lU. 363, 67 N. E. 809. 
 
 Indiana. — Bedford Quarries Co. 
 V. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 175 Ind. 
 303, 94 N. E. 326, 35 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 641; Westport Stone Co. v. 
 Thomas, 175 Ind. 319, 94 N. E. 406, 
 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 646. 
 
 Iowa. — Phillips v. Watson, 63 
 Iowa 28, 18 N. W. 659 ; Morrison v. 
 Thistle Coal Co., 119 Iowa 705, 94 
 N. W. 507; Dubuque, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Port Dodge, etc., R. R. Co., 146 
 Iowa 666, 125 N. W. 672. 
 
 Kansas. — Dotson v. Atchison, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 81 Kan. 816, 106 
 Pac. 1045. 
 
 Kentucky. — Greasy Creek Min- 
 eral Co. V. Ely Jellico Coal Co., 132 
 Ky. 692, 116 S. W. 1189; Riley v. 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 142 Ky. 
 67, 133 S. W. 971, 35 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 636, Ann. Cas. 1912 D 230. 
 
 Louisiana.— Kansas City, etc., 
 Ry. Co. V. Louisiana Western R. R. 
 Co., 116 La. 178, 40 So. 627, 5 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 512, 7 Ann. Cas. 
 831. 
 
 Maine. — Ulmer v. Lime Rock R. 
 R. Co., 98 Me. 579, 57 Atl. 1001, 66 
 L. R. A. 387. 
 
 Maryland. — New York Coal Co. 
 V. George's Creek, etc.. Coal Co., 37 
 Md. 537; New York Mining Co. v. 
 Midland Mining Co., 99 Md. 508, 58 
 Atl. 217; D-ulaney v. United Rail- 
 ways & Electric Co., 104 Md. 423, 
 65 Atl. 45. 
 
 Michigan. — Toledo, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. East Saginaw, etc., R. R. Co., 
 72 Mich. 206, 40 N. W. 436; Pere 
 Marquette R. R. Co. v. United 
 States Gypsum Co., 154 Mich. 290, 
 117 N. W. 733, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 181. 
 
 Minnesota. — Kettle River R. R. 
 Co. V. Eastern R. R. Co., 41 Minn. 
 461, 43 N. W. 469, 6 L. R. A. Ill; 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Porter, 
 43 Minn. 527, 46 N. W. 75. 
 
 Missouri. — Sherlock v. Kansas 
 City Belt Railway Co. 142 Mo. 172, 
 43 S. W. 629, 64 Am. St. Rep. 172; 
 Kansas, etc., Coal Railroad Co. v. 
 
§ 67 
 
 The Public Use — Public Seevice. 
 
 193 
 
 the expense of constructing the spur is met by the corpo- 
 ration owning the establishment with which it connects,*" 
 or even that such corporation actually itself condemns the 
 land*^ if the spur is to connect with the railroad and be open 
 to public use. It has even been held that eminent domain 
 may be employed in behalf of a spur track for the exclusive 
 use of a private corporation if any other party desiring 
 to use the track has the right under the statutes to condemn 
 
 Norfchwestern Coal & Mining Co., 
 161 Mo. 288, 61 S. W. 684, 51 
 L. R. A. 936, 84 Am. St. Rep. 717. 
 
 Montana. — Butte, etc.. Railway 
 Co. V. Montana Union Railway Co., 
 16 Mont. 504, 41 Pae. 232, 31 
 L. R. A. 298, 50 Am. St. Rep. 508; 
 Kipp V. Davis-Daly Copper Co., 41 
 Mont. 509, 110 Pae. 237, 36 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 666. 
 
 New Jersey. — National Docks R. 
 R. Co. V. Central R. R. Co., 32 N. J. 
 Eq. 755. 
 
 New York. — Clarke v. Blackmar, 
 47 N. Y. 150. 
 
 O^io.— State v. Toledo R. R., 
 etc., Co., 24 Ohio Cir. Ct. 321. 
 
 Oregon. — Wolfard v. Fisher, 48 
 Ore. 479, 84 Pae. 850, 87 Pae. 530, 
 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Appeal lof Wad- 
 dell, 84 Pa. 90; Getz v. Philadel- 
 phia, etc., R. R. Co., 105 Pa. 547; 
 Rudolph V. Pennsylvania Schuylkill 
 Valley R. R. Co., 166 Pa. 430, 31 
 Atl. 131; Rochester, etc., Iron Co. 
 V. Berwind- White Coal Mining Co., 
 24 Pa. Co. Ct. 104; Robbing v. 
 Western Washington R. R. Co., 31 
 Pitts. Leg. J. (N. S.) 181. 
 
 South Carolina. — Ex parte Baeot, 
 36 S. C. 125, 15 S. E. 204, 16 
 L. R. A. 586. 
 
 Utah. — Stockdale v. Rio Grande 
 Western R. R. Co., 28 Utah 201, 77 
 Pae. 849. 
 
 Vermont. — Barre Railroad Co. v. 
 Montpelier & White River Railroad 
 Co., 61 Vt. 1, 17 Atl. 923, 4 
 
 13 
 
 L. R. A. 785, 15 Am. St. Rep. 877. 
 
 Virginia. — Zircle v. Southern Ry. 
 Co., 102 Va. 17, 45 S. E. 802, 102 
 Am. St. Rep. 805. 
 
 Washington. — State ex rel. Ami 
 Co. v. Pierce County Court, 42 
 Wash. 675, 85 Pae. 669. 
 
 West Virginia. — Caretta Ry. Co. 
 V. Virginia Pocahontas Coal Co., 62 
 W. Va. 185, 57 S. E. 401. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Morehouse, 112 Wis. 1, 87 
 N. W. 849, 56 L. R. A. 240, 88 Am. 
 St. Rep. 918; Union Lime Co. v. 
 Wisconsin Railroad Commission, 
 144 Wis. 523, 129 N. W. 605; In re 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 152 Wis. 633, 
 140 N. W. 346; affirmed, 233 U. S. 
 211, 58 L. ed. 924. 
 
 Contra, Pittsburg, etc.. Railroad 
 Oo. V. Benwood Iron Works, 31 
 W. Va. 710, 8 S. E. 453, 2 L. R. A. 
 680, in which it was held that such 
 a taking, stripped of aU disguises, 
 was really for the private use of 
 the factory at the end of the spur. 
 See also Kyle v. Texas, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 3 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. § 436, 4 
 L. R. A. 275. 
 
 80. Union Lime Co. v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 233 U. S. 211, 58 
 L. ed. 924, affirming 152 Wis. 633, 
 140 N. W. 346. 
 
 81. Westport Stone Co. v. Thomas, 
 175 Ind. 319, 94 N. E. 406, 35 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 646; Phillips v. 
 Watson, 63 Iowa 28, 18 N. W. 659; 
 New Central Coal Co. v. George's 
 Creek Coal, etc., Co., 37 Md. 537. 
 
194 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 67 
 
 the privilege;*^ but this decision hardly seems consistent 
 with generally accepted principles, since no matter how 
 many parties acquired the right to use the track, the ease- 
 ment would not be public.®* 
 
 A spur track leading to a private establishment which 
 the public has not the right to use cannot be laid out by the 
 exercise of eminent domain** except in states in which 
 specific constitutional provisions authorize the taking of 
 land for such purposes.*® A contrary doctrine was laid 
 down in Pennsylvania by Chief Justice Gibson, on the 
 ground that the constitution did not in terms prohibit the 
 taking of property for private use,*® and while this prin- 
 ciple has not been followed, the statutes authorizing the 
 laying out of spur tracks have been sustained in Penn- 
 sylvania, sometimes on the ground that cheapness and con- 
 venience of transportation were essential to manufacturing 
 and mining establishments, and that such establishments 
 were an important element in the general wealth and pros- 
 perity of the community,*'^ but finally upon the same ground 
 as in other states, namely that such spurs were open to 
 use by the public.** To constitute a public use, the public 
 
 82. Ch^apeake Stone Co. v. More- NortTi Carolina. — ^Leigh v. Gairys- 
 land, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1075, 104 S. W. burg Mfg. Co., 132 N. C. 167, 43 
 762, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 479. S. E. 632. 
 
 83. Supra, § 46. Pennsylvania. — Edgewood R. R. 
 
 84. Georgia.— Garbutt Lumber Co.'s Appeal, 79 Pa. 257. 
 
 Co. V. Georgia, etc., Ry. Co., Ill South Carolina. — Mays v. Sea- 
 
 Ga. 714, 36 S. E. 942; Atlanta, board Air Line Ry. Co., 75 S. C. 
 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Bradley, 141 Ga. 455, 56 S. E. 30. 
 
 740, 81 S. E. 1104. Wisconsin. — Maginnis v. Ejiick- 
 
 Illinois.— Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. erbocker Ice Co., 112 Wis. 385, 88 
 
 V. Wiltse, 116 ni. 449, 6 F. E. 49; N. W. 300, 69 L. R. A. 833. 
 
 Sholl V. German Coal Co., 118 111. 85. Jones & Co. v. Venable, 120 
 
 427, 10 N. E. 199. Ga. 1, 47 S. E. 549, 1 Ann. Cas. 
 
 Missouri. — St. Louis, etc., R. R. 185. 
 
 Co. V. Clark, 121 Mo. 169, 195, 25 86. Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts 
 
 S. W. 192, 906, 26 L. R. A. 751. (Pa.) 63, 36 Am. Dec. 141. 
 
 New York.— In re Buffalo Grade 87. Getz v. Philadelphia, etc., R. 
 
 Crossing Commissioners, 207 N. Y. R. Co., 105 Pa. 547. 
 
 52, 100 N. E. 714; George Sweet 88. Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. 479, 
 
 Mfg. Co. V. Van Der Hoof, 137 5 Am. Rep. 450 ; Rudolph v. Penn- 
 
 App. Div. 492, 121 N. Y. Supp. sylvania Schuylkill Valley R. R. 
 
 842. Co., 166 Pa. 430, 31 Atl. 131. In 
 
§ 68 The Public Use — Public Seevice. 195 
 
 must have the right to use the spur upon the same terms 
 and conditions as the corporation for whose benefit it was 
 constructed, and when the railroad company has the right 
 to use the spur for general traffic only when it can do so 
 without interfering with the business of the corporation, 
 the use is not public.** 
 
 Cases sometimes arise in which it is contended that a 
 spur track is for the public use, although it is not open to 
 general traffic, on the ground that the establishment with 
 which it connects is itself a public use. If the establish- 
 ment depends for its public character upon its service to 
 the public, and the spur is used in the prosecution of its 
 public business, the contention is well taken ; *" but a spur 
 track cannot be laid out by the exercise of eminent domain 
 merely to enable a public service corporation to carry on 
 its business more economically, as such use is incident to 
 its private rather than to its public functions.®^ When how- 
 ever a private corporation is engaged in a business which 
 itself is considered a public use because it is vital to the 
 prosperity of the state, such corporation may take the land 
 needed for a spur track for its private use.*^ 
 
 § 68. Street Railways. 
 
 Street railways were introduced into this country as 
 early as 1831, and although for many years they did not 
 ' attempt to exercise the power of eminent domain, they are 
 so obviously for the public use that when it became neces- 
 sary for street railway companies to acquire land outside 
 
 Edgewood R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 79 129, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 195; Wise 
 
 Pa. 257, it was held that a spur v. Yazoo City, 96 Miss. 507, 51 So. 
 
 track not open to use by the public 453, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1130, Ann. 
 
 was not for a public use. Cas. 1912 B 377. 
 
 89. Pere Marquette Railroad Co. 92. Strickley v. Highland Boy 
 V. United States Gypsum Co., 154 Gold Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527, 50 
 Mich. 290, 117 N. W. 733, 22 L. ed. 581, 4 Ann. Cas. 1174; Butte, 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 181. etc., Railroad Co. v. Montana Union 
 
 90. Dulaney v. United Railways Railway Co., 16 Mont. 504, 41 Pa«. 
 & Electric Co., 104 Md. 423, 65 Atl. 232, 31 L. R. A. 298, 50 Am. St. 
 45 (spur track to express com- Rep. 508 ; Kipp v. Davis-Daly Cop- 
 pany's warehouse) . per Co., 41 Mont. 509, 110 Pac. 237, 
 
 91. Kinney v: Citizens' Water & 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 666. 
 Light Co., 173 Ind. 252, 90 N. E. 
 
196 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 68 
 
 the limits of a public street to avoid curves, grades or rail- 
 road crossings, it was universally held that they might be 
 constitutionally authorized to exercise the power of eminent 
 domain.®^ Similarly, when interurban electric railways 
 were introduced, running partly in the streets, and partly 
 upon a private right of way, it was held that they might 
 exercise eminent domain to acquire such right of way,®* or 
 to secure a desirable site for a terminal station.*^ 
 
 There is some divergence of opinion on the question 
 whether an electric street railway may exercise eminent 
 domain to acquire a site for a power house. It has been 
 held that as it is not necessary for the site of such a build- 
 ing to be near the tracks, the erection of a power house is 
 not a matter pertaining to the public functions of the com- 
 pany and that the appropriation of a particular site to 
 which coal can be economically shipped cannot be effected 
 by the exercise of the power of eminent domain;®^ but 
 there are decisions pointing in the other direction.®''^ Sim- 
 ilarly there is a conflict of authority upon the constitutional- 
 ity of a statute authorizing the flooding of land by a dam 
 to be used to create electric power for a street railway.®* 
 
 93. Connecticut.— Stevens v. New 217 111. 409, 75 N. E. 510, 4 St. 
 York, etc., B. R. Co., 83 Conn. 603, Ky. Rep. 194. 
 
 78 Atl. 440. 96. In re Rhode Island Suburban 
 
 Illinois.— Hartshorn v. lUinois Ry, Co., 22 R. I. 457, 48 Atl. 591, 
 
 Valley Traction Co., 210 111. 609, 71 52 L. R. A. 879. 
 
 N. E. 612, 3 St. Ry. Rep. 145; Gil- 97. Eddleman v. Union, etc., 
 
 lette V. Aurora Ry. Co., 228 111. Power Co., 217 HI. 409, 75 N. E. 
 
 261, 81 N. E. 1005. 510, 4 St. Ry. Rep. 194. See also 
 
 Michigan. — Detroit United Ry. v. "Wise v. Yazoo City, 96 Miss. 507, 
 
 Barnes Paper Co., 172 Mich. 586, 51 So. 453, Ann. Cas. 1912 B 377, 
 
 138 N. W. 211. in which a city maintaining a street 
 
 New York. — People v. Kerr, 27 railway was allowed to condemn 
 
 N. Y. 188. land for a spur track to bring coal 
 
 Ohio. — Toledo El. St. Ry. Co. v. to its power house. 
 
 Toledo Con. St. Ry. Co., 11 Ohio 98. Held constitutional in State 
 
 Dee. 365. ex rel. Harland v. Centralia-Cheha/- 
 
 94. St. Louis Electric Terminal lis Electric Railway & Power Co., 
 Ry. Co. V. MacAdaras, 257 Mo. 448, 42 Wash. 632, 85 Pac. 344, 7 
 166 S. W. 307. L. R. A. (N. S.) 198. Contra, 
 
 95. Eckart v. Fort "Wayne, etc., Avery v. Vermont Electric Co., 75 
 Traction Co., 181 Ind. 352, 104 Vt. 235, 54 Atl. 179, 59 L. R. A. 
 N. E. 762. So also a car bam. Ed- 817, 98 Am. St. Rep. 818, 8 Am. 
 dleman v. Union etc.. Power Co., Elect. Cas. 171. 
 
§ 69 The Public Use — Public Service. 197 
 
 It appears to be held however that a transmission line for 
 carrying electricity to be used to furnish motive power for 
 the cars of a street railway is as much for the public use as 
 the tracks themselves.^® 
 
 The street railways which are ordinarily considered to 
 be for the public use are common carriers, but in one case 
 it was held that a horse railway might be laid in a public 
 street, although it was not a common carrier but was main- 
 tained solely for the purpose of taking stone from a private 
 quarry to a steam railroad, the court saying that the use of 
 a highway for the transportation of merchandise to be used 
 by many purchasers in different places is a public use.^ This 
 decision however is not in accord with the law as it is gen- 
 erally understood ^ and it is to be noted that in the case in 
 which it was rendered no private land was actually taken. 
 
 § 69. Traffic and Transportation by Water. 
 
 Eminent domain may be employed in aid of public travel 
 by water as unquestionably as in the case of travel by land, 
 and consequently the improvement of the navigation of a 
 harbor or watercourse is for the public use.* The power 
 to take property for this purpose exists in the case of a 
 fresh water stream, the bed of which belongs to the riparian 
 proprietors, as well as in a public water course, provided 
 the stream, when the improvement is completed, is open to 
 travel or the transportation of goods by the public* The 
 character of the travel or transportation is not material, 
 
 99. Mull V. Indianapolis, etc., 3. United States. — Kakauna Co. 
 
 Traction Co., 169 Ind. 214, 81 N. E. v. Green Bay Canal, 142 U. S. 254, 
 
 657, 6 St. Ry. Rep. 192; Syracuse, 273, 35 L. ed. 1004, 1011; United 
 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Carrier, 149 App. States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water 
 
 Div. (N. Y.) 411, 134 N, Y. Supp. Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 57 L. ed. 
 
 791; Matter of Utica, etc., Ry. Co. 1063; Avery v. Vox, 1 Abb. 246, 
 
 V. Weaver (N. Y. not off. rep.), 6 Fed. Cas. No. 674. 
 
 St. Ry. Rep. 192 ; State v. Olympia Massachusetts. — Hazen v. Essex 
 
 Light & Power Co., 46 Wash. 511, Co., 12 Cush. 475. 
 
 90 Pae. 656. Wisconsin. — In re Sonthem Wis- 
 
 1. White v. Blanchard Bros. consin Power Co., 140 Wis. 245, 
 Granite Co., 178 Mass. 363, 59 N. E. 265, 122 N. W. 801, 809. 
 
 1025. 4. Spring V. RusBell, 7 Me. 273. 
 
 2. See contra, Hatfield v. Straus, 
 189 N. Y. 208, 82 N. E. 172. 
 
198 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 69 
 
 and it is competent for the legislature to authorize the 
 improvement of a waterway for the floating of logs if it is to 
 be open to all who may desire to use it; but not if the use of 
 the waterway is to be confined to the party making the 
 improvement.® 
 
 The power of eminent domain may be exercised in aid 
 of navigation in various ways as public necessity and con- 
 venience may require, as for example, the taking of land on 
 both sides of a waterway,® the erection of a dam across a 
 water-course which will flood riparian land further up the 
 stream,'^ the construction of a breakwater or sea wall on 
 private property,® the establishment of harbor lines,^ or 
 merely temporary entry upon private land for the purposes 
 of coast survey." Eminent domain may also be invoked for 
 the creation of a wholly artificial system of navigation by 
 means of canals." It is immaterial whether the canal is 
 built by the state or by private parties, if it is open to the 
 use of the public upon payment of a reasonable fee. Even a 
 canal for pleasure boating only, forming part of a public 
 park system, has been held to be for the public use." 
 
 5. Infra, § 93. Illinois.— People v. Wells, 12 III. 
 
 6. United States v. Chandler-Dun- 102. 
 
 bar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, Indiana. — Nelson v. Fleming, 56 
 
 57 L. ed. 1063. Ind. 310. 
 
 7. Kakauna Co. v. Green Bay Maine. — Spring v. Russell, 7 Me. 
 Canal, 142 U. S. 254, 35 L. ed. 273. 
 
 1004; In re Southern Wisconsin New Jersey. — National Docks 
 Power Co., 140 Wis. 245, 265, 122 R. R. Co. v. Central R. R. Co., 32 
 N. W. 801, 809. As to right to use N. J. Eq. 755. 
 for commercial purposes surplus New York. — Matter of Town- 
 water from dam erected in aid of send, 39 N. T. 171; Birdsall v. 
 navigation, see supra, i 49. Gary, 66 How. Pr. 358. 
 
 8. Sweet v. Buffalo, etc., R. R. O^jJo.— Cooper v. WiUiams, 4 
 Co., 79 N. Y. 293. As to taking Ohio 253, 22 Am. Dec. 745; Will- 
 land for levees, see infra, % 90. yf^d v. HamUton, 7 Ohio, Part H, 
 
 9. rarist Steel Co. v. Bridgeport, ^^]' ^0 Am. Dec 195. 
 
 60 Conn. 278, 22 Atl. 561, 13 ?rTT?«^^ T^f^^ ^o 
 
 T R . P-on ' ' V. Urquhart, 16 Ore. 67, 19 Pac. 78. 
 
 i..±t. A. 09U. .. „^.on Pe»ms2/2mma.— Haldeman v. 
 
 10. Orr v. Quimby, 54 N. H. 590. Pennsylvania Central R. R. Co., 50 
 
 11. United States. — Chesapeake, pg^g 425. 
 
 etc.. Canal Co. v. Key, 3 Cranch 12. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Min- 
 
 C. C. 599, Fed. Cas. No. 2649. neapolis, 232 U. S. 430, 58 L. ed. 
 
 Connecticut.— Hooker v. New 671, affirming 115 Minn. 460, 133 
 
 Haven, etc., Co., 15 Conn. 312. N. W. 169, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 236. 
 
§ 69 The Public Use — Public Service. 199 
 
 Land may unquestionably be taken by a state or a city 
 for a public wharf or landing.^' Similarly the landing-place 
 of a ferry may be acquired by eminent domain, even if the 
 ferry is operg-ted by private parties," since it has long been 
 established that the assumption of a ferry privilege or 
 franchise carries with it the obligation to serve the pub- 
 lic at all reasonable times, and subjects the holder to 
 regulation by the public authorities in respect to rates and 
 accommodations. 
 
 In many of the large seaports of the world, it has been 
 found advisable for the public authorities either to take over 
 the existing wharves and waterfront, or to develop, by 
 dredging or filling or other means, a large tract of unoccu- 
 pied shore for purposes of wharves and docks, with a view 
 to accommodating the commerce of the port in a more satis- 
 factory manner than could be accomplished by the divided 
 efforts of individual wharf owners. When statutes author- 
 izing the exercise of eminent domain for such a purpose 
 have been enacted in this country, it has been uniformly 
 held that the furtherance of the commercial interests of the 
 port, and the facilitation of the transportation of goods and 
 the travel of passengers to and from all parts of the world 
 furnished ample justification for the enactment and that a 
 taking for such a purpose was for the public use, although 
 it was part of the plan that the wharves and piers should 
 be leased separately to private parties and left in the exclu- 
 sive possession of the lessees, since all persons desirous of 
 leasing wharves were to be accommodated without dis- 
 crimination, and the wharves were to remain subjeict to 
 
 13. Iron R. R. Co. v. Ironton, 19 ber & Mfg. Co., 123 Ky. 103, 93 
 Ohio St. 299; Pittsburgh, v. Scott, 1 S. W. 650, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 667. 
 Pa. 309. But not for a private Makte. — Day v. Stetson, 8 Greenl. 
 wharf to be used for renting pleas- 365. 
 
 ure boats. State ex rel. United New York. — Re Union Terry Co., 
 
 Railways Co. v. Wiethaupt, 231 Mo. 98 N. Y. 139. 
 
 449, 133 S. W. 329. North Ca/rolma.— Barrington v. 
 
 14. California^ — Pool v. Sim- Neuse River Ferry Co., 69 N. C. 
 mons, 134 Cal. 621, 66 Pae. 872. 165. 
 
 Kentucky. — Warner v. Ford Lum- 
 
200 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 70 
 
 public control.^^ On the other hand statutes which author- 
 ize the taking of land for wharf purposes by a private 
 corporation not bound to serve the public have been held 
 unconstitutional." 
 
 § 70. Public Water Supply. 
 
 The construction of aqueducts for the purposes of a water 
 supply was common in the time of the Roman Empire, and 
 one of the earliest English statutes authorizing the exer- 
 cise of eminent domain related to the water supply of the 
 city of London." The taking of streams and ponds and the 
 laying of pipes by cities and towns for the purpose of sup- 
 plying their inhabitants with water is customary and 
 proper.^® The power to take land and water for such a pur- 
 pose may also be granted by the legislature to a public cor- 
 poration organized solely to maintain waterworks/® or to a 
 private corporation bound to supply all of the public within 
 reach at reasonable rates.^" Private property may be taken 
 
 15. Massachusetts. — Moore v. 
 Sanford, 151 Mass. 285, 24 N. E. 
 323, 7 L. K A. 151; Opinion of the 
 Justices, 204 Mass. 607, 91 N. E. 
 405, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 483. 
 
 New Jersey.— Delaware Biver 
 Transportation Co. v. Trenton, 85 
 N. J. L. 479, 90 Atl. 5. 
 
 New Tork. — People v. Baltimore, 
 etc., R. B. Co., 117 N. Y. 150, 22 
 N. E. 1026; Be New York, 135 
 N. Y. 253, 31 N. E. 1043, 31 Am. 
 St. Rep. 825. 
 
 16. State ex rel. United Railways 
 Co. V. Wiethaupt, 231 Mo. 449, 133 
 S. W. 329; Matter of Eureka Basin, 
 etc., Co., 96 N. Y. 42; Memphis 
 Freight Co. v. Memphis, 4 Coldw. 
 (Tenn.) 419. 
 
 17. Enacted in 1544. See 2 Kent 
 Com. 340, note. 
 
 18. Colorado. — Lyons v. Long- 
 mont, 54 Colo. 112, 129 Pac. 198. 
 
 Connecticut. — Hartford Water 
 Commissioners v. Manchester, 87 
 Conn. 193, 87 Atl. 870, 96 Atl. 182, 
 Ann. Cas. 1915 A 1104. 
 
 Maine. — Mayo v. Dover, etc.. Fire 
 Co., 96 Me. 539, 53 Atl. 62. 
 
 Maryland. — Beddall v. Bryan, 14 
 Md. 444, 74 Am. Dec. 550. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Harback v. Bos- 
 ton, 10 Cush. 295; Watson v. Need- 
 ham, 161 Mass. 404, 37 N. E. 204, 
 24 L. R. A. 287; Smith v. LincoM, 
 170 Mass. 488, 49 N. E. 743. 
 
 New York. — Stamford Water Co. 
 V. Stanley, 39 Hun 424; Be New 
 Rochelle Water Co., 46 Hun 525. 
 
 Ohio.— Stute V. Toledo, 48 Ohio 
 St. 112, 26 N. E. 1061, 11 L. R. A. 
 729. 
 
 Virginia. — Miller v. Pulaski, 109 
 Va. 137, 63 S. E. 880, 22 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 552. 
 
 Washington. — State v. Pacific 
 County Court, 51 Wash. 386, 99 
 Pae. 3. 
 
 Wyoming. — Edwards v. Chey- 
 enne, 19 Wyo. 110, 114 Pac. 677. 
 
 19. M'ayo v. Dover, etc., Pire Co., 
 96 Me. 539, 53 Atl. 62. 
 
 20. United States. — Long Island 
 Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 
 U. S. 685, 41 L. ed. 1165. 
 
 Alabama. — Burden v. Stein, 27 
 Ala. 104, 62 Am. Dec. 785. 
 
§ 70 
 
 The Public Use — Public Service. 
 
 201 
 
 to facilitate the distribution of water to the public,^^ as 
 well as to secure an adequate supply .^^ It has been held 
 that when the obligation to serve the public is not expressly 
 stated in the charter of a water company, the act authoriz- 
 ing it to exercise the power of eminent domain is consti- 
 tutional, for, if the company acted unreasonably, the legis- 
 lature might revoke its charter,^^ but the rule in some of 
 
 California. — St. Helena Water 
 Co. V. Forbes, 62 Cal. 182, 45 Am. 
 Rep. 659. 
 
 Colorado. — ^Warner v. Gunnison, 
 2 Colo. App. 430, 31 Pac. 238. 
 
 Maine. — Riche v. Bar Harbor 
 "Water Co., 75 Me. 91. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Old Colony R. 
 R. Co. V. Framingham Water Co., 
 163 Mass. 561, 27 N. E. 662, 13 
 L. R. A. 332. 
 
 Minnesota. — Minnesota Canal, 
 etc., Co. V. Pratt, 101 Minn. 197, 
 112 N. W. 395, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 105. 
 
 Nevada. — ■ Thorn v. Sweeney, 12 
 Nev. 251. 
 
 New Jersey. — Olmsted v. Morris 
 Aqueduct, 46 N. J. L. 495, 47 
 N. J. L. 311. 
 
 New York. — Pocantico Water- 
 works Co. V. Bird, 130 N. Y. 249, 29 
 N. E. 246; Witcher v. Holland 
 Waterworks Co., 142 N. Y. 626, 37 
 N. E. 565. 
 
 North Carolina. — Geer v. Dur- 
 ham Water Co., 127 N. C. 349, 37 
 S. E. 474. 
 
 Wisconsin. — ^Wisconsin Water Co. 
 V. Winans, 85 Wis. 26, 54 N. W. 
 1003, 20 L. R. A. 662, 39 Am. St. 
 Rep. 813. 
 
 21. Lyons v. Longmont, 54 Colo. 
 112, 129 Pac. 198; Warner v. Gun- 
 nison, 2 Colo. App. 430, 31 Pae. 
 238 ; State, Slingerland, Prosecutor, 
 V. Newark, 54 N. J. L. 62, 23 Atl. 
 129; Edwards v. Cheyenne, 19 
 Wyo. 110, 114 Pac. 677. It has 
 been held that land cannot be taken 
 by a water company for a pipe line 
 
 to convey water to a city unless it 
 appears that the company has 
 the right to construct and main- 
 tain waterworks in the city and 
 to dispose of water to its in- 
 habitants, since the public use de- 
 pends upon the disposition of the 
 water after it reaches the city. 
 Wisconsin Water Co. v. Winans, 85 
 Wis. 26, 54 N. W. 1003, 20 L. R. A. 
 662, 39 Am. St. Rep. 813. This 
 however is not generally the law. 
 See infra, § 409. 
 
 22. The right may be conferred 
 upon a water supply district to take 
 an easement in land for the site of 
 a dike or mound of earth for the 
 benefit of an adjoining reservoir. 
 Burnett v. Commonwealth, 169 
 Mass. 417, 48 N. E. 758. Land 
 may be taken to relocate a high- 
 way and a railroad which have had 
 to be moved on account of the 
 construction of a reservoir. Mul- 
 ligan V. Strauss, 156 N. Y. Supp. 
 967. A water company cannot be 
 authorized to take forest lands, not 
 upon the water-shed of its source 
 of supply, for the purpose of pro- 
 tecting lands acquired for protect- 
 ing the purity of its water from 
 danger from fire. Bowden v. York 
 Shore Water Co. (Me.) 95 Atl. 
 779. 
 
 23. Hartford Water Commission- 
 ers v. Manchester, 87 Conn. 193, 87 
 Atl. 870, 96 Atl. 182, Ann. Cas. 
 1915 A 1104; Lumbard v. Steams, 
 4 Cush. (Mass.) 60. 
 
202 The Law of Eminentt Domain. § 70 
 
 the states is that it must specifically appear in the act 
 authorizing the taking that the corporation is bound to 
 serve the public.^* 
 
 The ordinary use for which a public water supply is 
 taken is to furnish the inhabitants of a more or less thickly 
 settled district with pure water for drinking and domestic 
 purposes. It is beyond the power of the state to appropri- 
 ate to itself the property of individuals for the sole purpose 
 of creating a water power to be leased for manufacturing 
 purposes,^^ and it has also been held that it is not a public 
 use to supply water to private parties to be used in generat- 
 ing steam for the purpose of operating mills and manufac- 
 turing establishments.^* The flooding of riparian land by 
 the erection of dams to create water power for manufactur- 
 ing purposes is justified on other grounds, and it is the 
 actual occupation of upland by aqueducts and reservoirs 
 that is now under consideration. But it is not only for 
 domestic purposes that the inhabitants of a particular dis- 
 trict may be supplied. Such needs as are fairly incidental 
 to ordinary living in cities and large towns involving the 
 use of small motors requiring an amount of water which 
 might be reasonably supplied from an aqueduct only large 
 enough for ordinary domestic purposes may also be 
 satisfied.^'' 
 
 If a greater supply of water is taken than is needed for 
 the present public use, but the taking is in go6d faith and 
 with a reasonable regard to dry seasons and other emer- 
 gencies as well as to possible future requirements, the 
 
 24. Great Western, etc., Co. v. 220 Pa. 388, 69 Atl. 870, 21 L. R. A. 
 Hawkins, 30 Ind. App. 557, 66 (N. S.) 410. In Miller v. Pulaski, 
 N. E. 764; Rome v. Whitestown 109 Va. 137, 63 S. E. 880, 22 
 Waterworks Co., 187 N. Y. 542, 80 L. R. A. (N. S.) 552, it was held 
 N. E. 1106. See also supra, § 59. that it was not for the public use 
 
 25. Infra, § 72. for a town to supply water to 
 
 26. Be Barre Water Co., 62 Vt. others than the inhabitants of the 
 27, 20 Atl. 109, 9 L. R. A. 195; town. 
 
 State V. Pacific County Court, 51 27. Watson v. NeeiHiam, 161 
 
 Wash. 386, 99 Pac. 3. Contra, Mass. 404, 37 N. E. 204, 24 L. R. A. 
 Jacobs V. Clearwater Supply Co., 287. 
 
§ 71 The Public Use — Public Service. 203 
 
 surplus water may be disposed of for profit without inval- 
 idating the taking.^* 
 
 § 71. Artificial Light. 
 
 Artificial light is not perhaps, so absolutely necessary 
 as water, but it is necessary for the comfortable living of 
 every person. Although artificial light can be supplied 
 in other ways than by the use of gas or electricity, yet the 
 use of one or both for lighting cities and thickly settled 
 towns is common, and has been found to be of great conven- 
 ience, and it is practically impossible for every individual 
 to manufacture gas or electricity for himself. If gas or 
 electricity is to be generally used in a city or town, it must 
 be furnished by private companies or the municipality, and 
 it cannot be distributed without the use of the public streets 
 or the exercise of the power of eminent domain.^* It is 
 accordingly well settled that the furnishing of artificial light 
 to the householders of a particular district is a public pur- 
 pose, and that the power of eminent domain may be consti- 
 tutionally delegated either to a city or town *" or to a public 
 
 28. United States.— Kakaiana, Co. gustine, 42 Tla. 287, 29 So. 421, 89 
 V. Green Bay Canal, 142 U. S. 254, Am. St. Rep. 227. 
 
 35 L. ed. 1004, 1010. Indiana. — Crawf ordsville v. Bra- 
 
 ConnecticM*.— Hartford Water den, 130 Ind. 149, 28 N. E. 849, 
 
 Commissioners v. Manchester, 87 14 L. R. A. 268, 30 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 Conn. 193, 87 Atl. 870, 96 Atl. 182, 214. 
 
 Ann. Cas. 1915 A 1104. Massachusetts. — Opinion of the 
 
 Maine.— Mayo v. Dover, etc.. Justices, 150 Mass. 592, 24 N. E. 
 
 Fire Co., 96 Me. 539, 53 Atl. 62. 1084, 8 L. R. A. 487. 
 
 New Jersey.- State v. Newark, Michtgan.- Mitchell v. Negau- 
 
 54 N. J. L. 62, 23 Atl. 129. °««' ^^^ Mich. 359, 71 N. W. 647, 
 
 New Torld-Poes^tico Water- JS L. R. A. 157, 67 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 Works Co. V. Bird, 130 N. Y. 249, *^°- . . „, , , „ , 
 
 „- _ - . _ Missouri. — Btate ex ret. Canton 
 
 ^ifN.tL.^0. V. Allen, 178 Mo. 555, 77 S. W. 868. 
 TF2/om.»^.- Edwards V. Chey- Pennsylvama.-Lmn v. Cham- 
 
 enne, 19 Wyo. 110, 114 Pac. 677 bersburgh, 160 Pa. 511, 28 Atl. 
 
 29. Opinion of the Justices, 150 343 35 L. R. A. 217, 4 Am. Elect. 
 Mass. 592, 24 N. E. 1084, 8 L. R. A. ^as. 647. 
 
 ^^'^- Virginia. — Miller v. Pulaski, 109 
 
 30. United. States.— Levis v. New- Va. 137, 63 S. E. 880, 22 L. R. A. 
 ton, 75 Ted. 884, 6 Am. Elect. Cas. (N. S.) 552. 
 
 13; affirmed, 25 C. C. A. 161, 79 Washington.— Staie v. Snoho- 
 
 Fed. 715. mish County Court, 71 Wash. 84, 
 
 Florida.— Middieton v. St. Au- 127 Pac. 591. 
 
204 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 71 
 
 service corporation^^ to enable it to acquire land for gen- 
 erating or transmitting artificial light to be used for light- 
 ing streets and public buildings and for furnishing the 
 public with the means of lighting their homes and places 
 of business. 
 
 Eminent domain cannot however be employed to generate 
 light for the use of the party making it, or to sell to other 
 individuals or corporations, in the absence of a legal obliga- 
 tion to distribute to the people of the district generally ,^^ 
 except in states in which the taking of private property for 
 manufacturing purposes is specifically authorized by the 
 constitution.*' The mere fact that a corporation may use 
 some of the power developed by its dam for private gain 
 does not show that the use of electricity generated by the 
 dam for general lighting purposes is not a public use ; '* and 
 
 31. United States. — Shasta Power 
 Co. V. Walker, 149 Fed. 568. 
 
 Florida. — Jacksonville Electric 
 Light Co. V. Jacksonville, 36 Fla. 
 229, 18 So. 677, 30 L. R. A. 540, 51 
 Am. St. Rep. 24, 6 Am. Elect. Cas. 
 668. 
 
 Georgia. — Nolan v. Central Geor- 
 gia Power Co., 134 Ga. 201, 67 S. E. 
 656. 
 
 Indiana. — Consumers' Gas Trust 
 Co. V. Huntsinger, 14 Ind. App. 
 166, 42 N. E. 640; MiUer v. South- 
 em Indiana Power Co., Ill N. E. 
 308. 
 
 Maine. — Brown v. Gerald, 100 
 Me. 351, 61 Atl. 785, 70 L. R. A. 
 472, 109 Am. St. Rep. 526. 
 
 Nebraska. — Luoas v. Ashland 
 Light, etc., Co., 92 Neb. 550, 138 
 N. W. 761. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Rockingham 
 County Light & Power Co. v. 
 Hobbs, 72 N. H. 531, 58 Atl. 46, 66 
 L. R. A. 581; MeM'Ulan v. Noyes, 
 75 N. H. 258, 72 Atl. 759. 
 
 New York. — Bloomfleld Natural 
 Gas Light Co. v. Calkins, 62 N. Y. 
 386 ; In re Niagara, etc., Power Co., 
 Ill App. Div. 686, 97 N. Y. Supp. 
 686; In re East Canada Creek 
 
 Electric Light & Power Co., 49 
 Misc. 565, 99 N. Y. Supp. 109. 
 
 North Carolina. — Wissler v. Yad- 
 kin River Power Co., 158 N. C. 465, 
 75 S. E. 460. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Carothers v. Phil- 
 adelphia Co., 118 Pa. 468, 12 Atl. 
 314; Brown v. Radnor Township 
 Electric Light Co., 208 Pa. 453, 57 
 Atl. 904. 
 
 South Carolina. — McMeekin v. 
 Central Carolina Power Co., 80 
 S. C. 512, 61 S. E. 1020, 128 Am. 
 St. Rep. 885. 
 
 Tennessee. — Great Palls Power 
 Co. V. Webb, 123 Tenn. 584, 133 
 S. W. 1105. 
 
 Vermont. — Deerfield River Co. v. 
 Wilmington Power & Paper Co., 83 
 Vt. 548, 77 Atl. 862. 
 
 Washington. — State v. King 
 County Court, 52 Wash. 196, 100 
 Pae. 317, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 448. 
 
 32. Pallsburg Power & Mfg. Co. 
 V. Alexander, 101 Va. 98, 43 S. E. 
 194, 61 L. R. A. 129, 99 Am. St. 
 Rep. 855. 
 
 83. Lambom v. Bell, 18 Colo. 
 346, 32 Pac. 989, 20 L. R. A. 241. 
 
 34. McMillan v. Noyes, 75 N. H. 
 258, 72 Atl. 759. 
 
§ 72 The Public Use — Pttblic Service. 205 
 
 similarly a corporation" may condemn land for the genera- 
 tion and transmission of electricity to cities for the lighting 
 of streets and public buildings, although its powers also 
 embrace matters of private use.^^ 
 
 § 72. Generation and Distribution of Power. 
 
 As is shown at length later, under certain conditions a 
 single manufacturer may be authorized to erect a dam 
 across a watercourse which will cause the land of other 
 riparian proprietors to be permanently flooded, for no other 
 purpose than to furnish power for his own mill.^® The con- 
 stitutionality of statutes which authorize such action is 
 defended either on historical grounds, or upon the doctrine 
 that they do not authorize the exercise of the power of emi- 
 nent domain. Of course if such statutes can be constitu- 
 tionally invoked for the benefit of a single mill, a fortiori 
 they would justify the erection of a dam to create power 
 to be distributed among a number of mill owners, or to such 
 of the public as could avail themselves of the power. The 
 mill acts are not however of universal application; and, 
 even in the states in which they are in force, they would not 
 justify the taking of land for the site of a power-house, or 
 for the right of way of a transmission line. The question 
 now to be considered is whether, apart from the mill acts, 
 a statute authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent 
 domain for the purpose of generating and distributing 
 power to the public is constitutional; in other words 
 whether such an enterprise is a public service to such an 
 extent that it can be classed as ,a public use. 
 
 In the case of power supplied directly from the water 
 wheels of a mill, the answer must be in the negative.^'' It 
 
 35. Deerfield River Co. v. Wil- Power Co. v. Green Bay Canal, 142 
 mington Power & Paper Co., 83 Vt. U. S. 254, 35 L. ed. 1005. 
 
 548, 77 Atl. 862. New Tork.— Varick v. Smith, 5 
 
 36. Infra, §§ 83, 84. Paige 137, 28 Am. Dec. 417. 
 
 37. Minnesota Canal & Power Ohio. — Buckingham v. Smith, 10 
 Co. V. Koochiching Co., 97 Minn. Ohio 296. 
 
 429, 107 N. W. 405, 5 L. R. A. Texas.— Nalle v. Austin (Tex. 
 
 (N. S.) 638, 7 Ann. Cas. 1182, Civ. App.), 21 S. W. 375; reversed, 
 
 9 Am. Elect. Cas. 708. And see 85 Tex. 520, 22 S. W. 668, 960. 
 
 also Wisconsin. — Atty.-Gen. v. Eau 
 
 United States. — ^Kaukauna Water Claire, 37 Wis. 400. 
 
206 The Law of Eminent Domain, § 72 
 
 is a physical and mechanical impossibility for water power 
 to be sold from the wheels (Of a mill to more than a few 
 persons. Water power from the wheels must be used at 
 the wheels, and the actual result of the construction of a 
 dam to generate water power for sale necessarily is that a 
 very few individuals will use the power for manufacturing 
 purposes to the exclusion of all others. The effect is the 
 creation of a power plant to furnish water power to a few 
 manufacturers for use in their private business. Under 
 such conditions the expressed willingness of the party who 
 has created the power to sell it to the general public has no 
 real value, for a use which is necessarily restricted to a 
 very few persons is not a public use. 
 
 The case of hydro-electric power is a different matter 
 and has raised the most important controversy over the 
 meaning of ' ' public use ' ' since it became settled that steam 
 railroads were entitled to exercise eminent domain. In 
 recent years it has been found practicable by the aid of a 
 sufficient head of water to generate electricity in ahnost 
 unlimited quantities, and it is of course physically possible 
 to divide electric power into any desired portions and to 
 transmit it freely to great distances. Mill sites which had 
 fallen into disuse and dams which were looked upon as 
 obsolete relics of a past age have become once more of a 
 great value, and even the Mississippi river and the falls of 
 Niagara have been set to work to produce electric power. 
 To generate and distribute hydro-electric power upon an 
 extensive scale often requires the exercise of the power of 
 eminent domain; and whether a plant established for the 
 purpose of generating, storing and distributing electricity 
 to be used for power By all who may desire it is a public 
 use is a question which has arisen or is bound to arise in 
 ahnost every state of the union. 
 
 In some of the states the courts have not been inclined 
 to draw any distinction between power directly transmitted 
 from the wheels of a mill and electric power produced from 
 the same source. Power, it is said, is of service only to 
 manufacturing enterprises, and cannot, in the nature of 
 
§ 72 The Public Use — Public Service. 207 
 
 things, be distributed generally to the public at large. 
 Manufacturing enterprises themselves are not, merely 
 because of their utility to the public, a public use, nor are 
 they sufficiently numerous that it can fairly be said that 
 they will enjoy the privilege as members of the public or 
 that their demand for power will constitute a public demand. 
 It is possible for each factory to generate its own power. 
 Moreover, by every unit of power used the capacity to 
 serve others is exhausted, and it is possible for the first 
 customer to take the entire supply. On these and other 
 grounds it has been held in several jurisdictions that the 
 generation and distribution of hydro-electric power is not 
 a public use, especially when the statute which attempted 
 to authorize the exercise of eminent domain for such pur- 
 poses did not in terms require service to be given on equal 
 terms to aU who might apply .^^ 
 
 On the other hand it is held in the majority of the states 
 in which the question has arisen that the demand for hydro- 
 electric power is sufficiently wide-spread to be impressed 
 with a public character and to make the distribution of such 
 power to all who might desire to use it a genuine public 
 service. It is felt that the erection of a power plant requires 
 a large capital, and the construction of a dam and the acqui- 
 sition of a right of way for the distributing wires necessarily 
 involves the use of some governmental franchise, and that 
 in accordance with the recognized tests such an enterprise 
 
 38. Maine. — Brown v. Grerald, 100 coma Industrial Co. v. White River 
 
 Me. 351, 61 Atl. 785, 70 L. R. A. Power Co., 39 Wash. 648, 82 Pac. 
 
 472, 109 Am. St. Rep. 526. 150, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 842, 4 Ann. 
 
 >. — Berrien Springs Cas. 987; State ex rel. Harris v. 
 
 Water IPower Co. v. Berrien Cir- Thurston County Court, 42 Wash, 
 
 cuit Judge, 133 Mich. 48, 94 N. W. 660, 85 Pae. 666, 55 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 
 379, 103 Am. St. Rep. 438. 672, 7 Ann. Cas. 748; State ex rel. 
 
 Virginia. — Fallsburg Power & Tolt Power & Transportation Co. v. 
 
 Manufacturing Co. v. Alexander, King County Court, 50 Wash. 13, 
 
 101 Va. 98, 43 S. E. 194, 61 L. R. A. 96 Pac. 519. 
 
 129, 99 Am. St. Rep. 855 ; Miller v. Wisconsin. — State ex rel. Wau- 
 
 Pulaski, 109 Va. 137, 63 S. E. 880, sau Street Railway Co. v. Bancroft 
 
 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 552. 148 Wis. 124, 134 N. W. 330, 38 
 
 Washington.— Qi&ie ex rel. Ta- L. R. A. (N. S.) 526. 
 
208 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 72 
 
 is for the public use.^^ It would seem that this view is not 
 only gaining momentum every year, but that it is the only 
 view consistent with the true understanding of constitu- 
 tional law. If electric power is capable of general distri- 
 bution and of use for ordinary domestic purposes, or for the 
 customary occupations of the inhabitants of progressive 
 communities, the mere fact that a particular power plant 
 
 39. United States. — Mt. Vernon 
 Cotton Co. V. Alabama Power Co., 
 240 U. S. 30; Walker v. Shasta 
 Power Co., 87 C. C. A. 660, 160 
 Fed. 856, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 725. 
 
 Alabama. — Alabama Power Co. 
 V. Mt. Vernon Cotton Co., 186 Ala. 
 622, 65 So. 287. 
 
 Colorado. — Denver Power, etc., 
 Co. V. Denver, etc., R. R. Co., 30 
 Colo. 204, 69 Pac. 568, 60 L. R. A. 
 383. 
 
 Georgia. — Jones v. North Geor- 
 gia Electric Co., 125 Ga. 618, 54 
 S. E. 85, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 122, 5 
 Ann. Cas. 526; Nolan v. Central 
 Georgia Power Co., 134 Ga. 201, 67 
 S. E. 656. 
 
 Idaho. — HoUister v. State, 9 
 Idaho 8, 71 Pac. 541; Washington 
 Water Power Co. v. Waters, 19 
 Idaho 595, 115 Pae. 682 (special 
 constitutional provision). 
 
 Indiana.- — -Miller v. Sonthern In- 
 diana Power Co., Ill N. E. 308. 
 
 Maryland. — ^Webster v. Susque- 
 hanna Pole Line Co., 112 Md. 416, 
 76 Atl. 254, 21 Ann. Cas. 357. 
 
 Minnesota. — -Minnesota Canal & 
 Power Co. v. Koochiching Co., 97 
 Minn. 429, 107 N. W. 405, 5 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 638, 7 Ann. Cas. 1182, 9 
 Am. Elect. Cas. 708; Minnesota 
 Canal & Power Co. v. Pratt, 101 
 Minn. 197, 112 N. W. 395, 11 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 105. 
 
 Montana. — Helena Power Trans- 
 mission Co. V. Spratt, 35 Mont. 108, 
 88 Pac. 77, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 567, 
 10 Ann. Cas. 1055. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Rockingham 
 
 County Light & Power Co. v. 
 Hobbs, 72 N. H. 531, 58 Atl. 46, 66 
 L. R. A. 581, 9 Am. Elect. Cas. 102. 
 
 New York. — Long Sault Devel- 
 opment Co. v. Kennedy, 158 App. 
 Div. 398, 143 N. Y. Supp. 454. 
 
 Oklahoma. — Tuttle v. Jefferson 
 Power & Improvement Co., 31 Okl. 
 710, 122 Pac. 1102. 
 
 Oregon. — Grand Ronde Electrical 
 Co. V. Drake, 46 Ore. 243, 78 Pae. 
 1031. 
 
 South Carolina. — Ingleside Mfg. 
 Co. V. Charleston Light, etc., Co., 
 76 S. C. 95, 56 S. E. 664; MoM'eekin 
 V. Central Carolina Power Co., 80 
 S. C. 512, 61 S. E. 1020, 128 Am. 
 St. Rep. 885. 
 
 South Dakota. — Sioux Falls 
 Light, etc., Co. v. Coughran, 27 
 S. D. 443, 131 N. W. 504. 
 
 Tennessee. — Great Fall Power 
 Co. V. Webb, 123 Tenn. 584, 133 
 S. W. 1105. 
 
 Utah.— Salt Lake City v. Salt 
 Lake City, etc., Power Co., 24 Utah 
 249, 25 Utah 441, 67 Pac. 672, 71 
 Pac. 1067, 61 L. R. A. 648. 
 
 Vermont. — Rutland Railroad, 
 Light & Power Co. v. Clarendon 
 Power Co., 86 Vt. 45, 83 Atl. 332, 
 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1204. 
 
 West Virginia.— Pittsburg Hy- 
 dro-Electric Co. V. Liston, 70 W. Va. 
 83, 73 S. E. 86, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 602. 
 
 Wisconsin. — ^Wisconsin River Im- 
 provement Co. v. Pier, 137 Wis. 
 325, 118 N. W. 857, 21 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 538. 
 
§ 73 The Public Use — Public Seevice. 209 
 
 will have but a single customer until the population in its 
 vicinity develops further in numbers and in the material 
 requirements of life is no ground for holding that the 
 legislature has not the power to grant to its proprietors the 
 right to exercise eminent domain in behalf of what the legis- 
 lature considers the public interests. Whether suflfioient 
 demand exists to justify the exercise of eminent domain is a 
 purely legislative question. 
 
 Even in the states which do not recognize the distribution 
 of hydro-electric power as constituting in itseK a public 
 use, the power of eminent domain may under some circum- 
 stances be employed to aid in the generation or distribution 
 of such power, as, for example, when it is to be sold only 
 to public service companies,*" or when the principal purpose 
 of the taking is to acquire power for a public use and the 
 sale and distribution to private parties is of the surplus 
 only.** 
 
 § 73. Pipe Lines for Conveying Natural Gas and 
 Petroleum. 
 
 Natural gas is used largely for heat, and often being 
 found at great distances from the places where it is used 
 must be conveyed by pipe lines, and accordingly requires 
 the exercise of original eminent domain more extensively 
 than the distribution in a city of gas manufactured within 
 the city limits and sent to the consumers by pipes in the 
 street ; and it is held that a way for natural gas pipe lines 
 may be acquired by condemnation when the gas is to be used 
 to supply consumers generally and not merely such patrons 
 as the owners of the line choose to accommodate.*^ It is not 
 
 40. State ex rel. Dominick v. Co., 57 Wash. 420, 107 Pae. 199; 
 Superior Court for King County, State v. Klickitat County Court, 70 
 52 Wash. 196, 100 Pac. 317, 21 Wash. 486, 127 Pac. 104. 
 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 448. Contra, 42. Indiana. — Consumers' Gas 
 
 Avery v. Vermont Electric Co., 75 Trust Co. v. Harless, 131 Ind. 446, 
 
 Vt. 235, 54 Atl. 179, 59 L. E. A. 29 N. E. 1062, 15 L. R. A. 505; 
 
 817, 98 Am. St. Rep. 818, 8 Am. Great Western Natural Gas & Oil 
 
 Elect. Cas. 171. Co. v. Hawkins, 30 Ind. App. 557, 
 
 41. Tacoma v. Nisqually Power 66 N. E. 765. 
 
 14 
 
210 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 74 
 
 however essential that the corporation maintaining the 
 pipe line be the actual distributer of the gas to the public, 
 and a pipe line may be condemned by a corporation organ- 
 ized to supply or convey gas to local gas companies for 
 their own distribution to consumers.*^ 
 
 Petroleum is not distributed to the public by pipes in the 
 streets or other means requiring the exercise of a franchise 
 from the goverimient, but it is conveyed from the section 
 of the country in which it is found to the centres of distri- 
 bution by pipe lines which cannot well be laid without the 
 exercise of eminent domain. A pipe line designed to enable 
 one producer to market his wares would not be for the 
 public use; but in some states corporations have been 
 organized to construct and maintain pipe lines for the con- 
 veyance of petroleum for all who desire to ship it, at rates 
 fixed by their charters, and such corporations have been 
 permitted to exercise eminent domain on the ground that 
 they are common carriers.** 
 
 § 74. Telegraph and Telephone Lines. 
 
 The use of land for constructing and maintaining a line 
 of wires to conduct currents of electricity employed in trans- 
 mitting intelligence by telegraph by a corporation bound 
 to serve all who desire to use the facilities supplied at rea- 
 sonable rattes is undoubtedly a public use,*^ and the same is 
 
 Kamsas. — La Harpe v. Elm poration might maintain a system 
 
 Township Gas, etc., Co., 69 Kan. of pipes for distributing natural 
 
 97, 76 Pac. 448. gas for heating putposes. 
 
 New York.— Bloomfield, etc., 43. Calor Oil & Gas Co. v. Fran- 
 Natural Gaslight Co. v. Richardson, zeU, 128 Ky. 715, 109 S. W. 328, 
 63 Barb. 437. 36 L. E. A. (N. S.) 456; Calor Oil 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Carothers v. Phil- & Gas Co. v. Withers' Administra- 
 
 adelphia Co., 118 Pa. 468, 12 Atl. tor, 141 Ky. ^9, 133 S. W. 210. 
 
 314 ; Johnston's Appeal, 4 Sadler 44. Great Western Naliiral Gas & 
 
 215, 7 Atl. 167. Oil Co. v. Hawkins, 30 Ind. App. 
 
 West Virginia.— Charleston Nat- 557, 66 N. E. 765; Calor Oil & Gas 
 
 ural Gas Co. v. Lowe, 52 W. Va. Co. v. Withers' Administrator, 141 
 
 662, 44 S. E. 410. Ky. 489, 133 S. W. 210; West Vir- 
 
 So also it was held in State ex ginia Transportation Co. v. Voi- 
 re?. Attorney-General v. Toledo, 48 canic Oil Co., 5 W. Va. 382. 
 Ohio St. 112, 26 N. E. 1061, 11 45. Aiabojno.— New Orleans, etc., 
 L. R. A. 729, that a municipal cor- R. R. Co. v. Southern, etc., Tel. Co., 
 
§ 75 The Public Use — Public Seevice. , 211 
 
 true of the line of wires of a telephone company, since under 
 modern conditions a telephone company is unquestionably 
 a public service corporation.** It has been held however 
 that a head of water to create power for a telephone 
 exchange cannot be acquired by eminent domain ; " and it 
 would undoubtedly be held that a private telegraph or tele- 
 phone line not connected with the system of any telegraph 
 or telephone company could not be considered for the public 
 use in any sense of that term. 
 
 § 75. Public Education — Schools, Colleges and Libraries. 
 
 It is well settled that land may be taken by eminent 
 domain to acquire a site for a public school which the chil- 
 dren of any of the inhabitants of the town or district who 
 are properly qualified may attend for the purpose of receiv- 
 ing instruction.** The right to exercise eminent domain in 
 such a case is not limited to the land which the school build- 
 ings will cover, but the appropriation of as much more as 
 
 53 Ala. 211, 1 Am. Elect. Cas. 190; 46. Buncombe Metallic Tel. Co. 
 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. HiU, 163 v. McGinnis, 268 111. 504, 109 N. E. 
 
 Ala. 18, 50 So. 248, 23 L. R. A. 257. See also Northwestern Tele- 
 
 (N. S.) 648, 19 Ann. Cas. 1058. P'loiie Exchange v. Chicago, etc., 
 
 Colorado — Vnion Pacific E. R. ^- R- Co., 76 Minn. 334, 79 N. W. 
 
 Co. V. Colorado Postal Tel. Cable ^15; Southwestern Tel., etc., Co. v. 
 
 Co., 30 Colo. 133, 69 Pac. 564, 97 ^^^\ «*"•' ^y- Co. (Tex. Civ. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 106. ^PP-)' ^^ S. W. 106, holding that 
 
 Massachusetts.-Pierce v. Drew, telephones are analogous to tele- 
 
 136 Mass. 75, 49 Am. Rep. 7. graphs m the^e of the law. See 
 
 ,,. . ox X cii. T • tACL also infra, 8 360. 
 
 Mtssoun. — State V. St. Louis, 145 .„ -A. ' c,, ^-- _, 
 
 nr KK-i /ifl C5 TIT noi ^o T TD A *' ' ^^^^ ^- Sherman, 107 Va. 
 
 Mo. 551, 46 S. W. 981, 42 L. R. A. 424, 59 s E 388 
 
 113 7 Am. Elect. Cas. 195 4^ Missouri.- Board of Educa- 
 
 New HampsUre.— Rockmgham tj^jj ^ Hackmann, 48 Mo. 343 
 
 County Light & Power Co. v. ATorffe CaroZiwa.— Graded School 
 
 Hobbs, 72 N. H. 531, 58 Atl. 46, 66 Trustees v. Hinton, 166 N. C. 209 
 
 L. R. A. 581. 80 S. E. 890. ' 
 
 ATeicJersej/.— Trenton, etc., Turn- Pennsylvania.— hong y. Fuller, 
 
 pike Co. V. American, etc.. News 68 Pa. 170. 
 
 Co., 43 N. J. L. 381. Bhode Islamd.—Peckh&m v. School 
 
 Utah. — Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. District, 7 R. I. 545. 
 
 Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 23 Vermont. — ^Williams v. School 
 
 Utah 474, 65 Pac. 735, 90 Am. St. District, 33 Vt. 271 
 
 Rep. 705. 
 
212 The Law of Emih-bnt Domain, § 76 
 
 may be requisite for the reasonable and proper enjoyment 
 of the use is also permissible.*® 
 
 Similarly, a state university, which forms part of the 
 public school system and is open to all the residents of the 
 state, although actually used by a much smaller proportion 
 than the schools of lower grade, may acquire a site by enai- 
 nent domain ; ^° but an endowed college, which is under no 
 obligation to admit all pupils, however well qualified, who 
 may apply, cannot be constitutionally authorized to acquire 
 a site by eminent domain.^^ The establishment of such an 
 institution is undoubtedly for the advantage of the public, 
 but colleges of this character are justified neither by long- 
 established practice nor by urgent and peculiar local 
 requirements in exercising eminent domain, and conse- 
 quently mere public advantage is not sufficient. 
 
 A public library maintained by a municipal corporation 
 and open to the use of all the inhabitants is clearly for the 
 public use ; ®^ and a library located on public land aid open 
 to use by the public does not cease to be public merely 
 because one-half of its directors are appointed by the donor 
 of the building.^^ 
 
 § 76. Public Cemeteries. 
 
 The burial of the dead in a place consecrated and set 
 apart for that purpose, in which any member of the com- 
 munity may acquire burial rights, is for the public use, and 
 land may be acquired by eminent domain to establish such a 
 
 49. Kirkwood v. School District, emy v. Salmond, 11 Me. 109, and 
 45 Colo. 368, 101 Pac. 343; WU- Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mvir- 
 liams V. School District, 33 Vt. 271. ray, 1 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 301, hold- 
 
 50. Knapp v. State, 125 Minn. ing that a highway may be laid out 
 194, 145 N. W. 967. under general authority through 
 
 51. Connecticut College for the grounds of a private school. 
 Women v. Calvert, 87 Conn. 421, 52. Hayford v. Bangor, 102 Me. 
 88 Atl. 633, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 340, 66 Atl. 731, 11 L. R. A. 
 485. See also Jenkins v. Andover, (N. S.) 940; Lyford v. Laconia, 75 
 103 Mass. 74, and Curtis v. Whip- N. H. 220, 72 Atl. 1085, 22 L. R. A. 
 pie, 24 Wis. 350, 1 Am. Rep. 187, (N. S.) 1062; Laird v. Pittsburgh, 
 holding statutes allowing public aid 205 Pa. 1, 54 Atl. 324, 61 L. R. A. 
 to private educational insititutions 332. 
 
 unconstitutional ; and Belfast Aead- 53. Laird v. Pittsburgh, 205 Pa. 
 
§ 77 
 
 The Public Use — Public Sebviob. 
 
 213 
 
 place.^* It is immaterial whether the burial ground is con- 
 trolled by a municipal corporation or by a private cemetery 
 association, and the use does not cease to be public because 
 the association requires the payment of varying sums for 
 burial rights in different parts of the cemetery, the cost in 
 some parts operating as the practical exclusion of all but 
 the wealthier people of the community. ^^ Land for the 
 needed paths in the burial ground may be taken as well as 
 that used solely for interment.^® But unless the public has 
 the right of burial the use of eminent domain is not 
 permitted.^^ 
 
 § 77. Common Sewers. 
 
 Common sewers fall within the class of improvements 
 which furnish the public with the necessities and conven- 
 iences of life. Sewers for the carrying away of the house 
 drainage of any community may be laid either through the 
 public streets or through strips of private land taken by emi- 
 nent domain.^^ The correctness of this rule is so obvious 
 
 1, 54 Atl. 324, 61 L. K. A. 332; and 
 the purpose is none the less public 
 if the library is constituted a sepa- 
 rate corporation, provided the cor- 
 poration is a public and not a pri- 
 vate one and is under a legal obli- 
 gation to serve the public. Lani- 
 bert v. Owensboro Public Library, 
 151 Ky. 725, 152 S. "W. 802, Ann. 
 Cas. 1915 A 180. 
 
 54. Connecticut. — Edwards v. 
 Stonington Cemetery Assn., 20 
 Conn. 466; Evergreen Cemetery 
 Assn. V. New Haven, 43 Conn. 234, 
 ?1 Am. Eep. 634; Re St. Bernard, 
 etc.. Cemetery Assn., 58 Conn. 91, 
 19 Atl. 514; Starr Burying Ground 
 Assn. V. North Lane Cemetery 
 Assn., 77 Conn. 83, 58 Atl. 467. 
 
 Illinois. — People v. Forest Home 
 Cemetery Co., 258 111. 36, 101 N. E. 
 219. 
 
 Indiana. — rameman v. Mt. Pleas- 
 ant Cemetery Assn., 135 Ind. 344, 
 35 N. E. 271. 
 
 New York. — In re Lyons Ceme- 
 tery Assn., 86 N. Y. Supp. 960, 93 
 App. Div. 19. 
 
 Vermont. — Edgecombe v. Bur- 
 lington, 46 Vtr218. 
 
 55. Evergreen Cemetery Assn. v. 
 Beecher, 53 Conn. 551, 5 Atl. 353. 
 
 56. Balch v. Essex County Com- 
 missioners, 103 Mass. 106. 
 
 57. Board of Health of Portage 
 V. Van Hoesen, 87 Mich. 533, 49 
 N. W. 894, 14 L. R. A. 114. In re 
 Deausville Cemetery Assn., 66 
 N. Y. 569, 23 Am. Rep. 86; Fork 
 Ridge Baptist Cemetery Assn. v. 
 Redd, 33 W. Va. 262, 10 S. E. 405. 
 
 58. Arkansas. — McLaughlin v. 
 Hope, 107 Ark. 442, 155 S. W. 910, 
 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 137. 
 
 Georgia. — McDaniel v. Columbus, 
 91 Ga. 462, 17 S. E. 1011. 
 
 Idaho.— Twin Falls v. Stubbs, 15 
 Idaho 63, 96 Pac. 195. 
 
 Illinois. — Berwyn v. Bei^lund, 
 255 Bl. 498, 99 N. E. 705. 
 
214 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 78 
 
 that it has rarely been questioned. The use is none the less 
 public because the city authorities allow a building outside 
 the city limits to use the sewer,^® or conversely, because the 
 sewer itself extends beyond the city limits.*" The right 
 to exercise eminent domain may be granted to a city or town 
 for the purpose of condemning a sewer outlet or outfall as 
 well as for the easement of laying pipes.®^ 
 
 § 78. Goods Delivered without the Aid of a Franchise. 
 
 The foregoing sections complete the list of improvements 
 considered public because some essential or very desirable 
 commodity which cannot well be distributed without the aid 
 of a franchise from the state is supplied through them to 
 all the inhabitants. Other such undertakings are possible, 
 and how far they will be considered public remains to be 
 seen. Power for domestic purposes, heat, and freezing 
 mixtures for cold storage are conveyed by pipes or wires, 
 and if supplied to all who desire them, would seem to rank 
 with water and gas. The question may however arise in 
 cases in which it is desired to distribute some commodity 
 necessary and convenient to the public, to all who choose to 
 apply for it, but which does not require pipes or wires for 
 distribution, and which may be and ordinarily is dealt with 
 by individual tradesmen without the aid of any franchise 
 from the state. It has been held that private property may 
 be condemned for markets, in which stalls are leased by the 
 municipality to individual dealers.'* But ordinary dealings 
 
 Massachusetts. — Hildreth v. Low- dumping ground. Hoquiam v. Len- 
 
 ell, 11 Gray 345. tart, 86 Wash. 625, 150 Pae. 1196. 
 
 Missouri.— Joplm Consolidated 59- Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 C'd. 
 
 Mining Co. v. Joplin, 124 Mo. 129, ^38, 27 Pae. 604. 
 
 27 S W 406 ^^- McLaughlin v. Hope, 107 
 
 »r' -^ ,' TTi TT- qo Ark. 442, 155 S. W. 910, 47 L. R. A. 
 
 New York. — Kelsey v. King, 32 ,,y a \ -,o'7 -d td i j 
 
 _ , .^n "^ (N. S.) 137; Berwyn v. Bei^lund, 
 
 Uarb. 410. 255 111. 498, 99 N. E. 705. 
 
 Oklahoma.— Cnimmgham v. gl. Cunningham v. Ponca City, 
 
 Ponca City, 27 Okl. 858, 113 Pa«. 27 Okl. 858, 113 Pae. 919. 
 919. 62. Henkel v. Detroit, 49 Mieh. 
 
 So also land may be taken by 2^9, 13 N. W. 611, 43 Am. Eep. 
 
 eminent domain for the site of a 464; Matter of Cooper, 28 Hun 
 
 garbage incinerator and for a (N. Y.) 515. 
 
78 
 
 The Public Use — Public Sebvicb. 
 
 215 
 
 in provisions and fuel have, until recently at least, not been 
 considered a form of enterprise proper to be taken out of 
 the hands of individual dealers.®* If, however, by reason 
 of impending famine, or of changed or unusual economic 
 conditions, numerous deaths from cold or starvation could 
 be avoided in no other way, it would seem within the consti- 
 tutional power of the state to step in and seize the supply 
 of fuel and food from the owners who were unable or unwill- 
 ing to dispose of it to the public, and thus avert the impend- 
 ing calamity.^* If eminent domain can! be employed for 
 obtaining a supply of water and light, it may be used when 
 necessary for food and heat.®^ But as far as decided cases 
 go, and excepting markets which have the sanction of 
 ancient usage in occupying public squares, no enterprise 
 has yet been held to be public so far as to be justified in 
 exercising eminent domain unless a commodity, useful to 
 the consumer as one of the public and which he has the 
 right to require, is delivered to him by means of pipes 
 
 63. See McCuUough v. Brown, 41 
 S. C. 220, 19 S. E. 458, 23 L. E. A. 
 410, holding a statute providing for 
 the sale of intoxicating liquors by 
 the state unconstitutional; and 
 Opinion of the Justices: 155 Mass. 
 598, 30 N. E. 1142, 15 L. R. A. 809, 
 holding that the legislature cannot 
 constitutionally authorize cities and 
 towns to buy coal and wood for 
 the purpose of sale to their inhab- 
 itants for fuel, on the ground that 
 the sale of fuel was considered a 
 purely private enterprise when the 
 constitution was adopted. Barker, 
 J., held that a town might be au- 
 thorized to sell fuel if it was neces- 
 sary, but not as an economic ex- 
 periment merely. A municipal 
 coal-yard was held improper in 
 Baker v. Grand Rapids, 142 Mich. 
 687, 106 N. W. 208, a municipal 
 plumbing establishment in Keen v. 
 "Wayeross, 10 Ga. 588, 29 S. E. 42, 
 a municipal grain elevator in Rippe 
 V. Becker, 56 Minn. 100, 57 N. W. 
 331, 22 L. R. A. 857, and a mu- 
 
 nicipal ice house in Union Ice and 
 Coal Co. V. Ruston, 135 La. 898, 
 66 So. 262, L. R. A. 1915 B 858, 
 and State ex rel. Mueller v, Thomp- 
 son, 149 Wis. 488, 137 N. W. 20, 43 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 339, Ann. Cas. 
 1913 C 774. 
 
 64. See Opinion of the Justices, 
 182 Mass. 604, 66 N. E. 25, 60 
 L. R. A. 592, holding that while 
 ordinarily the sale of fuel could 
 not be undertaken by the govern- 
 ment, conditions of scarcity might 
 arise which would make public ex- 
 penditure for a general supply a 
 public use. 
 
 65. In State ex rel. Attorney- ' 
 General v. Toledo, 48 Ohio St. 112, 
 26 N. E. 1061, 11 L. R. A. 729, it 
 was held that a municipality might 
 distribute natural gas for heating 
 purposes, and in Cox v. Revelle, 
 125 Md. 579, 94 Atl. 203, L. R. A. 
 1915 E 443, that natural oyster 
 beds might be taken over by the 
 state by the exercise of eminent 
 domain. 
 
216 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 78 
 
 or wires which cannot be laid without the exercise of 
 eminent domain. Beyond that the courts have not gone, 
 and the legislatures have not as yet attempted to go. 
 There have however in recent years been cases in which 
 courts have allowed funds raised by taxation to be expended 
 by a municipality in conducting the business of distributing 
 one of the necessities and conveniences of life to the public, 
 although the business was of a character ordinarily con- 
 ducted by private dealers in competition with each other 
 and without the aid of any governmental franchise; and 
 the courts which have sustained taxation for such purposes 
 have expressly repudiated the usual distinction between 
 public and private uses based upon the necessity of a gov- 
 ernmental franchise.®® In the states which have sustained 
 this form of public ownership of what is ordinarily consid- 
 ered private business the courts could not well deny the 
 right of the legislature to authorize the exercise of eminent 
 domain for similar purposes. 
 
 66. In Laughlin v. Portland, 111 127 Ala. 1, 28 So. 791, 85 Am. St. 
 
 Me. 486, 90 Atl. 318, 51 L. R. A. Rep. 68; Equitable Loan, etc., Co. 
 
 (N. S.) 1143, it was held that a v. Edwardsville, 143 Ala. 182, 38 
 
 municipal fuel yard might be con- So. 1016, 111 Am. St. Rep. 34. 
 stitutionally maintained with pub- Georgia. — Plumb v. Christie, 103 
 
 lie funds, and in Holton v. Camilla, Ga. 686, 30 S. E. 759, 42 L. R. A. 
 
 134 Ga. 560, 68 S. E. 472, 31 181. 
 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 116, 20 Ann. Cas". South Carolina. — State ex rel. 
 
 199, a similar decision was made in George v. Aiken, 42 S. C. 222, 20 
 
 the case of a municipal ice plant. S. E.^ 221, 26 L. R. A. 345. 
 The cases which sustain the estab- Virginia. — FarmvUle v. Walker, 
 
 lishment of a public liquor dispen- 101 Va. 323, 43 S. E. 558, 61 
 
 sary can, however, be explained as L. R. A. 125, 99 Am. St. Rep. 870. 
 justifjdng a means of regulating See also Huesing v. Rock Island, 
 
 the liquor traflSe rather than the 128 111. 465, 21 K E. 558, 15 Am. 
 
 distribution of one of the necessi- St. Rep. 129, holding that a town 
 
 ties of life. See for example: might be authorized to maintain a 
 
 Alabama. — Sheppard v. DowUng, public slaughterhouse. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 The Public Use — Aid to Private Enterprise 
 
 Section 79. Direct Aid to Private Enterprise Unconstitutional. 
 
 80. Factories, Stores and Tarms. 
 
 81. Ma^itude of the Enterprise does not Make the Use Puhlic, 
 
 82. Exceptions Based on Historical Grounds or on Abnormal 
 
 Local Conditions. 
 
 83. The Mill Acts. 
 
 84. Mills — the M'assachusetts Doctrine. 
 
 85. Private Roads. 
 
 86. Drainage of Swamps and Lowlands. 
 
 87. Drainage of Swamps to Abate a Nuisance. 
 
 88. Compulsory Joint Drainage under the Police Power. 
 
 89. Reclamation of Wet Land as a Public Use. 
 
 90. Levees and Sea Walls. 
 
 91. Irrigation of Arid Lands. 
 
 92. Mines and Mining. 
 
 93. Lumbering and Log Driving. 
 
 94. Clearing a Doubtful Title. 
 
 § 79. Direct Aid to Private Enterprise Unconstitutional. 
 
 It is well settled, as a general principle of law, that the 
 power of eminent domain cannot be constitutionally 
 employed to enable private individuals to cultivate their 
 land or to carry on their business to better advantage, even 
 if the prosperity of the community will be enhanced by their 
 success. It is not one of the proper functions of a consti- 
 tutional government to furnish direct assistance to private 
 enterprise, either in the form of a gift of public funds, or 
 of the grant of such franchises as exemption from taxation, 
 and the right to exercise eminent domain. The basis of 
 this rule was well set forth by Judge Cooley in 1870, and 
 although it is now generally accepted that " railroading " 
 is not a private enterprise, the soundness of the principle 
 set forth by him has never been disputed and is as good 
 law today as it was when it was written. Judge Cooley 
 said: 
 
 " The discrimination by the state between different 
 classes of occupations and the favoring of one at the 
 
 1217] 
 
218 The Law of Eminent Domain. §§ 79, 80 
 
 expense of the rest, whether that one be farming or 
 banking, merchandising or milling, printing or rail- 
 roading, is not legitimate legislation and is an inva- 
 sion of that equality of right and privilege which is a 
 maxim in state government. When the door is once 
 opened to it there is no line at which we can stop and 
 say that thus far can we go with safety, and propriety 
 but no farther. Every honest employment is honor- 
 able; it is beneficial to the public; it deserves encour- 
 agement. The more successful we can make it the more 
 does it generally subserve the public good. But it is 
 not the business of the state to make discriminations 
 in favor of one class against another, or in favor of one 
 employment against another."* 
 
 § 80. Factories, Stores and Farms. 
 
 It often happens that the erection of a large factory will 
 be of more material benefit to the whole community in 
 which it is planned to build it than any strictly public 
 improvement which the inhabitants of the place could pos- 
 sibly undertake; but even if the plan was blocked by the 
 refusal of the selfish owner of a small but necessary parcel 
 of land to part with it at any price, the public mind would 
 
 1. People V. Salem, 20 Mich. 452, or to the state, which results from 
 486, 4 Am. Eep. 400. See also the the promotion of private interests, 
 opinion of Wells, J., in Lowell v. and the prosperity of private enter- 
 Boston, 111 Mass. 454, 15 Am. prises or business, does not justify 
 Bep. 39, and especially the follow- their aid by the use of public money 
 ing quotation from page 461 : " The raised by taxation, or for which tax- 
 promotion of the interests of indi- ation may become necessary. It is 
 viduals, either in respect of prop- the essential character of the direct 
 erty or business, although it may object of the expenditure which 
 result incidentally in the advance- must determine its validity, as jus- 
 ment of the public welfare, is, in tifying a tax, and not the magnitude 
 its essential character, a private, of the interests to be affected, nor 
 and not a public, object. However the degree to which the general 
 certain and great the resulting good advantage of the community, and 
 to the general public, it does not, thus the public welfare, may be 
 by reason of its comparative impor- ultimately benefited by their pro- 
 tance, cease to be incidental. The motion." 
 incidental advantage to the public, 
 
§ 80 PxjBLJc Use — Aid to Pbivate Enteepeise. 219 
 
 instinctively revolt at any attempt to take such land by emi- 
 nent domain. The fact that large manufacturing establish- 
 ments have acquired their sites without the exercise of 
 eminent domain for many years is good evidence that such 
 power could not be constitutionally granted, for long stand- 
 ing unopposed construction is as valid a reason for the 
 exclusion of subjects from the limits embraced by the defini- 
 tion of public use as it is for their inclusion within them, 
 and in the only case in which it has been attempted to take 
 land for the site of a factory without the consent of the 
 owner, it was held that eminent domain could not be 
 employed.^ 
 
 The gift of public funds to the owners of a factory, or the 
 grant to them of an exemption from taxation, does not 
 apparently strike the average layman with as much repug- 
 nance as the appropriation of private property for the site 
 of the building, since the depletion of a supposedly inex- 
 haustible public treasury seems a much more impersonal 
 affair than the seizure of a citizen's private lands, but the 
 principle is the same, and it is well settled that no person can 
 be deprived of his property, through the medium of addi- 
 tional taxation, to aid in the construction of a private fac- 
 tory.^ There is nothing in the decisions which allow the 
 exercise of eminent domain for the purpose of supplying 
 electric power to private factories contrary to the principle 
 just enunciated, since a taking of property for such a pur- 
 pose is not sustained on the ground of indirect benefit to 
 the public from the establishment of factories, but because 
 
 2. Howard Mills Co. v. Sciwarts v. Ottawa, 114 HI. 659, 666, 3 N. E. 
 Lumber & Coal Co., 77 Kan. 599, 216, 219. 
 
 95 Pac. 559, 18 L. E. A. (N. S.) Maine.— Opinion of the Justices, 
 
 356_ 58 Me. 590; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 
 
 o 7T -^ J r.^ ^ T A • 124, 11 Am. Rep. 185 : Brewer Brick 
 
 3. Umted States. — Loan Associa- „ t> an W Z^ -, « . 
 
 .. Co. V. Brewer, 62 Me. 62, 16 Am. 
 
 tion V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 22 -d one 
 
 L. ed. 455 ; Dodge v. Mission Town- ^;^ Torfc.-Weismer v. Douglas, 
 
 sHp, 46 C. C. A. 661, 107 Fed. 64 N. Y. 91, 103, 21 Am. Rep. 586. 
 
 827, 54 L. R. A. 242. Ohio.— Markley v. Mineral City, 
 
 Illinois. — Bissell V. Kankakee, 64 58 Ohio St. 430, 51 N. E. 28 65 
 
 III. 249, 16 Am. R«p. 554; Mather Am. St. Rep. 776. 
 
220 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 81 
 
 the power is distributed to the public in such a way as to 
 constitute a public service; and when the circumstances are 
 such that but few factories can use the power, the use is not 
 considered public* 
 
 Trade stands in the same position as manufacture. Land 
 cannot be taken by eminent domain for the site of a whole- 
 sale grocery,^ or to aid in the successful carrying on of a 
 department store, although the tajiing is said to be for the 
 convenience of the public doing business with the owner of 
 the store.® Agriculture stands no higher in the eye of 
 the law than manufacture and trade ; and it is not a public 
 use within the meaning of the constitution to enable indi- 
 vidual farmers to cultivate their land to better advantage. 
 Public money cannot be spent for such a purpose,^ and if 
 the legislature reasonably supposed the cultivation of small 
 farms to be an uneconomic method of agriculture, their 
 absorption by a larger and more systematically managed 
 establishment could not be accomplished against the will 
 of their owners.* 
 
 § 81. Magnitude of the Enterprise does not Make the Use 
 Public. 
 
 If, in its essential characteristics, it is a private business 
 for which property is sought to be taken, and the resulting 
 good to the general public will be merely an incidental result 
 of the successful promotion of the interests of individuals, 
 the importance or magnitude of the enterprise, the number 
 of people who will participate in it, or even the fact that 
 the taking will be made in the first instance by the public, 
 will not render the use of property for the advancement 
 of such an enterprise a public use. Thus after the great fire 
 
 4. Supra, § 72. 7. Michigan Sugar Co. v. Dix, 
 
 5. Neitzel v. Spokane Interna/- 124 Mieh. 674, 83 N. W. 625, 56 
 tional Ry. Co., 65 Wash. 100, 117 L. R. A. 329, 83 Am. St. Rep. 354. 
 Pac. 864, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 522. But see Kirk-Christy Co. v. 
 
 6. Townsend v. Epstein, 93 Md. American Association, 32 Ky. L. R. 
 537, 49 Atl. 629, 52 L. R. A. 409, 1177, 108 S. W. 232. 
 
 86 Am. St. Rep. 441. See also Hat- 8. Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. 479, 
 
 field V. Straus, 189 N. Y. 208, 82 5 Am, Rep. 450. 
 N. E. 172. 
 
§ 81 Public Use — Aid to Private Entebprise. 221 
 
 in Boston in 1872, which destroyed most of the buildings in 
 the commercial section of the city, it was held that a statute 
 authorizing the lending of money by the city to the land- 
 owners whose buildings had been burned was unconstitu- 
 tional, although the lending of such money would have 
 promoted building and the transaction of business in the 
 devastated district, for the benefit to the public would not 
 have been direct, but only incidental.* Similarly, when a 
 corporation was chartered in New York for the purpose of 
 taking certain low lands of little value and erecting thereon 
 docks, wharves, basins, foundries, and factories of all kinds, 
 although it was provided that a certain part of the basin 
 was to be open to the use of aU vessels that might apply, 
 it was held that the company could not constitutionally be 
 given the right of taking the land by eminent domain, the 
 court saying: 
 
 "The fact, that the use to which the property is 
 intended to be put will intend to incidentally benefit 
 the public by affording additional accommodations for 
 business, commerce, or manufactures is not sufficient 
 to bring the case within the operation of the right of 
 eminent domain, so long as the structures are to remain 
 under private ownership and control, and no right to 
 their use or to direct their management is conferred 
 upon the public."" 
 
 A statute authorizing the taking by a city of a large tract 
 of land which has been cut up into numerous small and 
 irregularly shaped parcels owned by different proprietors 
 and the division of the same into lots adequate in size and 
 shape for the construction and use of warehouses, mercan- 
 tile establishments and other buildings suited to the needs 
 of trade and commerce, with a view to the subsequent sale 
 or lease of such lots to individuals for the construction of 
 such buildings under agreements which would provide for 
 the management and control of such land and buildings in 
 
 9. Lowell V. Boston, 111 Mass. 10. Matter of Eureka Basin, etc 
 454, 15 Am. Rep. 39. Co., 96 N. Y. 42. '' 
 
222 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 82 
 
 such manner as would best promote the public interests, 
 would be unconstitutional, since the management and use 
 of such property to promote the interests of merchants or 
 traders who might occupy it, and to furnish better facilities 
 for doing business and making profits would not be a public, 
 but a private use of the real estate." For similar reasons 
 property cannot be taken by eminent domain to provide a 
 site for an exchange for handling the product "of the prin- 
 cipal industry of the city.^^ 
 
 § 82. Exceptions Based on Historical Grounds or on 
 Abnormal Local Conditions. 
 
 The cases cited in the foregoing sections amply support 
 the rule laid down by Judge Cooley that it is not legitimate 
 legislation to assist one form of private enterprise at the 
 expense of others, but the exceptions to the rule are so 
 numerous that many have questioned the existence of the 
 rule. However, a study of the history of the exceptions and 
 of the conditions by which they have been brought into 
 being, leaves one's faith in the existence of the rule itself, 
 and its application under normal conditions, unimpaired. 
 
 Manufacture, trade and agriculture can be and ordinarily 
 are carried on without the aid of eminent domain or of any 
 other franchise from the state ; but there are certain forms 
 of assistance to private enterprise and certain methods of 
 improving private land which have been authorized by law 
 since the first settlement of this country and which, while 
 not involving the seizure and occupation by one person of 
 another's entire estate as a site for the former's works, 
 nevertheless interfere with private property rights in a 
 manner not ordinarily justified except as an exercise of 
 eminent domain, and yet through the sanction of long estab- 
 lished and unopposed practice, have been tolerated until 
 the present time. 
 
 A study of the history of those uses which originated with 
 
 11. Opinion of the Justices, 204 12. Gary v. Much (Ind. App.), 
 
 Mass. 607, 91 N. E. 405, 27 L. R. A. 94 N. E. 583. 
 (N. S.) 483. 
 
§ 82 PuBuo Use — Aid to Private Entebpkisb. 223 
 
 the first settlement of the country brings us back to a period 
 when the natural obstacles to the successful establishment 
 of permanent colonies in America had proved in many 
 cases too formidable to be overcome; and at a time when 
 the very life of the community depended upon the most 
 advantageous use of every resource that could be availed 
 of, it was not to be expected that over-refined scruples in 
 respect to the rights of private property would be allowed 
 to stand in the way, or that an individual who held his own 
 title from a colonial grant would be allowed to use that 
 self same title to thwart the efforts of others to keep the 
 colony alive. Furthermore, it is to be remembered that 
 there were then no constitutional limitations upon the power 
 of the legislature, and that every colonial statute was nec- 
 essarily valid, unless it was repugnant to the charter of the 
 colony or was forbidden by English law. It was under 
 such conditions that private individuals were allowed in 
 certain instances to encroach upon the property of others 
 in order to develop the natural resources of the land for 
 their own gain and for the incidental public advantage ; and 
 the statutes which authorized such encroachment were 
 looked upon as reasonable and wholesome laws, even after 
 the conditions which made their enactment a public neces- 
 sity had passed away. When the state constitutions were 
 adopted, such laws were not in terms prohibited, and it was 
 not at the time supposed that it was intended to prohibit 
 them by the general provision in regard to the taking of 
 property for public use. It was many years before any 
 doubt was thrown upon the constitutionality of such legisla- 
 tion, and it was then too late to disregard entirely the long 
 acquiescence of the public in its enforcement. 
 
 In the course of the development of the western states 
 similar problems were encountered. In some states the 
 natural conditions are such that, unless the owners of wild 
 and uncultivated lands can be compelled to yield their 
 undoubted property rights in such a way as to enable their 
 neighbors to make use of the natural resources of their OAvn 
 lands, the development of the state will come to a stop and 
 
224 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 83 
 
 its inhabitants will be obliged to abandon tbeir homes or 
 starve. In other states particular industries dominate the 
 entire community, the prosperity of which is so bound up 
 in the success of the industry that the very foundations of 
 public welfare can not be laid without requiring concessions 
 from individuals to each other upon due compensation 
 which, under other circumstances, would be left wholly to 
 voluntary consent. Under such conditions an interpretation 
 of the constitution which prevented a state from requiring 
 such concessions would be a public misfortune. In the states 
 in which such conditions exist, the necessary legislation has 
 been enacted, and sustained by the courts, often with the 
 express sanction of specific constitutional provisions; and 
 the Supreme Court of the United States has held that in 
 such unusual cases there is nothing in the fourteenth amend- 
 ment which prohibits legislation of this character.^* 
 
 § 83. The Mill Acts. 
 
 It is held in many of the states that the owners of riparian 
 land may be constitutionally authorized to erect a dam for 
 mill purposes, although the land of upper riparian propri- 
 etors is thereby flooded without their consent, provided that 
 compensation is paid to the parties injured. It is obvious 
 that this rule, under present conditions in most of the United 
 States, is inconsistent with the doctrine, set forth in the 
 preceding pages, that the assistance of private enterprise 
 is not a public use. To understand the subject fully, it is 
 necessary to study the early statutes relating to mills and 
 the gradual formulation of the theories on which the stat- 
 utes were sustained when called into question. 
 
 In nearly all of the older states of the union and in some 
 of the others, there were enacted, during the earlier years 
 of the settlement of each state, statutes permitting an owner 
 of riparian land at a suitable site upon a river to construct 
 a dam of sufficient height to raise a head of water to furnish 
 power to a mill, and providing for compensation to be paid 
 
 13. 'Strickley v. Highland Boy L. ed. 581, and see also supra, §§ 39, 
 Gold Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527, 50 41, 42. 
 
§ 83 Public Use — Aid to Pbivate Entbepeise. 225 
 
 by him to the owners of lands further up the stream that 
 were flooded by the dam.'* Thus in Massachusetts, St. 
 1713-14, Chap. 12 referred to ' ' mills serviceable to the 
 public good and the benefit of the town," and gave the mill 
 owners liberty to continue and improve the mill ponds, pay- 
 ing damages for raising the water. The acts were revised 
 in 1795 and the mill owner allowed to flow any lands which 
 might be necessary, and similar statutes have been in force 
 in Massachusetts ever since. The Massachusetts act was 
 followed in 1718 by a similar one in New Hampshire, and 
 subsequently in most of the colonies where water-power was 
 much employed. In the southern colonies, and subsequently 
 in the southern states, the owner of a mill-site on one side of 
 a stream was authorized not only to flood the lands of upper 
 riparian owners, but also to take not more than one acre of 
 land on the other side of the stream for the abutments of his 
 dam,'^ but in the north only the right of flowage was usually 
 conferred. In many cases the mills erected under authority 
 of such statutes were grist mills. The grinding of corn was 
 a public necessity, which could not well be accomplished in 
 any other way ; the miller was bound by law to grind for all 
 who brought corn to his mill and the rates he was permitted 
 to charge were subject to regulation by law. It requires no 
 deviation from well established principles to hold that a 
 grist mill maintained under such conditions is for the public 
 use, and such is undoubtedly the law.'* 
 
 14. Supra, § 3. West Virgima. — Vamer v. Mar- 
 
 15. See for example, Sadler v. tin, 27 W. Va. 534 
 
 Langham, 34 Ala. 311; Wroe v. In several states statutes author- 
 Harris, 2 Wash. (Va.) 126. izing the flowing of land to provide 
 
 16. Alabama — Sadler v. Lang- ^ head of water for a public grist 
 ham, 34 Ala. 311; Buttones v. miH have been enforced "without any 
 Brewer 54 Ala 288 question of constitutionality being 
 
 I«dia»a.- Sexauer'v. Star Mill- ""^'^^-^ ^T ^°''^ir''^\. . 
 ing Co., 173 Ind. 342, 90 N. E. ^entuchy. -Bihh v. Montjoy, 2 
 
 474, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 609. Arlft^ t w j^ 
 
 ,' , ^ ' ,, . , North Carolina. — Waddy v. John- 
 
 Nebraska.- TTa.Yer v. Memck g^^^ 5 j^ed. L. 333; Burgess v 
 
 County, 14 Neb. 327, 45 Am. Rep. ciark, 13 Ired. L. 109. 
 
 ■'■•'■-'■' Virginia.— Bernard v. Brewer, 2 
 
 Tennessee. — Harding v. Goodlett, "Wash. 77; Wroe v. Harris 2 Wash 
 
 3 Yerg. 40, 24 Am. Dec. 546. 126. ' 
 
 15 
 
226 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 83 
 
 The only other form of mill that was common before the 
 Revolution was the sawmill. Mills of this character were 
 almost if not absolutely necessary to the prosperity of the 
 community, for power could not be obtained in any other 
 way and if even lumber had to be sawed by hand the prob- 
 lems of settling the country would have been rendered much 
 more difficult. It does not seem to have been until after the 
 adoption of the state constitutions that mills for mechanical 
 purposes became common, but they were not excluded from 
 the benefits of the mill acts, and for many years no contro- 
 versy arose. The first case involving the question of the 
 constitutionality of the mUl acts was decided in Massachu- 
 setts in 1832. 
 
 In this case, it appeared that the Boston & Roxbury Mill 
 Corporation had been chartered under a special statute 
 which authorized it to construct a tide mill and to condemn 
 the right to fill and lay bare a large tract of flats. A mill 
 power of great extent was thereby obtained and grist mills, 
 iron manufactories and other mills erected. The owner of 
 some of the flats objected, on the ground that his property 
 was taken for a private use. The court, however, held that 
 use by the public was not the proper test, and the expecta- 
 tion that great numbers of citizens would have the means 
 of employment brought to their homes, and that corn would 
 be ground near the city, was sufficient to give the public a 
 certain and direct interest and benefit in the undertaking.^'^ 
 Similarly, in 1853 an act authorizing the construction of a 
 dam across the Merrimack river to create a large mill power 
 was held to be a valid exercise of the power of eminent 
 domain on the ground that it would promote one of the groat 
 industrial pursuits of the commonwealth.^® It was also in 
 1832 that a case arose in New Jersey, where it was sought 
 to create a water power sufficient for seventy mills, and it 
 was held that this was for the public use or benefit, on the 
 ground that a manufacturing emporium would be created, 
 
 17. Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. 18. Hazen v. Essex Co., 12 
 
 V. Newman, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 467, Cush. (Mass.) 475. 
 23 Am. Dee. 622. 
 
§ 83 PuBUc Use — Aid to Pbivatb Enteepbise. 227 
 
 increasing the value of property, opening a market for farm 
 produce, and stimulating all industries.^* 
 
 These cases were at first pretty generally followed, 
 although the magnitude of the enterprise was not made the 
 test. The public advantage to be derived from the develop- 
 ment of the natural resources of the state, and general and 
 long continued acquiescence in the validity of the statutes 
 were held to be sufficient grounds for sustaining them, and 
 mills for all purposes and of all sizes were allowed to flood 
 the riparian lands situated above them.*" Several courts 
 however accepted this doctrine with reluctance, and inti- 
 mated that if the question were a new one they would have 
 decided it differently.*^ 
 
 19. Seudder v. Trenton Delaware 
 Falls Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 694, 23 Am. 
 Dec. 756. 
 
 20. United States. — Holyoke 
 Water Power Co. v. Lyman, 15 
 Wall. 500, 21 L. ed. 133. See also 
 Burlington v. Beasly, 94 U. S. 310, 
 24 L. ed. 161, and Osborne v. 
 Adams, 106 U. S. 181, 27 L. ed. 
 835, as to the constitutiomality of 
 statutes by which the power of tax- 
 ation is invoked in favor of mills. 
 
 Connecticut. — Olmstead v. Camp, 
 33 Conn. 532, 89 Am. Dee. 221; 
 Todd V. Austin, 34 Conn. 78. 
 
 Indiana. — Hawkins v. Lawrence, 
 8 Blackf. 266; Snowden v. Wilas, 
 19 Ind. 10, 81 Am. Dec. 370. 
 
 Maine. — Ingram v. Maine Water 
 Co., 98 Me. 566, 57 Atl. 893. 
 
 Michigan. — Matter of Hartwell, 
 
 2 Mich. N. P. 97 (but see infra, 
 note 22). 
 
 New Hampshire. — Great Falls 
 Mfg. Co. V. Femald, 47 N. H. 444; 
 Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Head, 56 
 N. H. 386; Rockingham County 
 Light & Power Co. v. Hobbs, 72 
 N. H. 531, 58 Atl. 46, 66 L. R. A. 
 581. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Thien v. Voegtlan- 
 der, 3 Wis. 461; Pratt v. Brown, 
 
 3 Wis. 603. 
 
 It is expressly declared by the 
 constitutions of Colorado (art. II, 
 § 14) and Wyoming (art. I, § 32) 
 that eminent domain may be em- 
 ployed to establish "reservoirs 
 * * * for milling purposes." 
 For the right to take land for a 
 compensation reservoir, to equalize 
 the flow of water for the benefit of 
 all the mill-owners on a certain 
 river as well as for a municipal 
 water supply, see Hartford Water 
 Commissioners v. Manchester 
 (Conn.) 96 Atl. 182, and supra, 
 § 47. 
 
 21. As early as 1814 Chief Jus- 
 tice Parker of Massachusetts, in 
 applying the mill act in the case 
 of Stowell V. Flagg, 11 Mass. 364, 
 said (at page 368): "I cannot 
 help thinking that this statute was 
 incautiously copied from the 
 ancient colonial and provincial acta, 
 which were passed when the use of 
 mUls, from the scarcity of them, 
 bore a much greater value, com- 
 pared to the land used for the pur- 
 poses of agriculture than at 
 present." See also, 
 
 Iowa. — Fleming v. Hull, 73 
 Iowa 598, 35 N. W. 673. 
 
 Kansas. — Venard v. Cross, 8 
 Kan. 248; Harding v. Funk, 8 
 Kan. 315. 
 
228 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 84 
 
 In a number of the states the courts in more recent times 
 have felt that under modem conditions the statutes which, 
 recognize mills as a public necessity are an anachronism, 
 and that the recognition of the mill acts as constitutional 
 necessarily involves either the danger of accepting the doc- 
 trine that indirect public benefit is a public use, or the 
 unfairness of discriminating in favor of mills and factories 
 using water power as against other industries, and such 
 courts have held that eminent domain cannot be employed 
 in behalf of a mill owned by private parties and under no 
 obligation to serve the public.^^ 
 
 § 84. Mills — the Massachusetts Doctrine. 
 
 The difficulty with the decisions which sustain the mill 
 acts as an exercise of eminent domain is the logical conclu- 
 sion that follows from them that any large manufactory 
 is for the public use, and may be assisted by a grant of 
 public money, or of the power of eminent domain. As such 
 is not generally the law,^^ an unjust discrimination between 
 
 Maine.— J oriaji. v. Woodwaxd,, 94 N. W. 379, 103 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 40 Me. 317. 438. 
 
 Minnesota^ — Miller v. Troost, 14 Mimiesotee. — Minnesota Canal & 
 
 Minn. 365. Power Co. v. Koochiehiag Co., 97 
 
 Nebraska.— Travel v. Merrick Minn. 429, 107 N. W. 405, 5 
 
 County, 14 Nebr. 327, 15 N. W. L. R. A. (N. S.) 638, 7 Ann. Gas. 
 
 690, 45 Am. Rep. 111. 1182. 
 
 -Neweomb v. Smith,. New York. — Hay v. Cohoes 
 
 1 Chandler 71; Fisher v. Horicon, County, 3 Barb. 42; Harris v, 
 
 etc., Mfg. Co., 10 Wis. 351. Thompson, 9 Barb. 350. 
 
 22. Alabama. — Sadler v. Lang- Oregon. — Baities v. Marshfleld & 
 
 ham, 34 Ala. 311. Suburban Ry. Co., 62 Ore. 510, 124 
 
 Georgia. — Loughbridge v. Har- Pac. 672. 
 
 ris, 42 Ga. 501. Tennessee. — Harding v. Good- 
 
 Illinois. — Gaylord v. Sanitary lett, 3 Yerg. 40, 24 Am. Dec. 546. 
 
 District of Chicago, 204 111. 576, 68 Vermont.— Tyler v. Beaeher, 44 
 
 N. B. 522, 63 L. R. A. 582, 98 Am. Vt. 648, 8 Am. Rep. 398; Aveiy v. 
 
 St Rep. 236. Vermont Electric Co., 75 Vt. 235, 
 
 Indiama. — Great Western, etc., 54 Atl. 179, 59 L. R. A. 817, 98 
 
 Co. V. HawMns, 30 Ind. App. 557, ^ Am. St. Rep. 818. 
 
 66 N. E. 764. Washington.— State ex ret Ta- 
 
 Michigan^ — Ryerson v. Brown, coma Industrial Co. v. White River 
 
 35 Mich. 333, 24 Am. Rep. 546; Power Co., 39 Wash. 648, 82 Pac. 
 
 Berrien Springs,, etc., Co. v. Ber- 150, 4 Ann. Cas. 987. 
 
 rien Circuit Judge, 133 Mieh. 48, 23. Supra, t§ 79, 80. 
 
§ 84 Public Use — Aid to Peivate Enteepbise. 229 
 
 factories relying upon water power and tkose nsiag steam 
 or electric power is raised- Such objections are so obvious 
 that in Massachusetts, where the largest number of cases 
 under the mill acts have arisen, those statutes have been 
 justified upon another ground. When a large tract of land 
 or other piece of property is owned by several parties in 
 common and they cannot agree upon the best method of 
 putting it to use, the legislature may intervene and provide 
 some means of adjusting the differences of the owners so 
 that the property as a whole may be employed most profit- 
 ably, and each proprietor may derive some return from his 
 share even if his notions regarding the management of the 
 property are overruled. This is a form of legislation which 
 has been customary in our jurisprudence since early times, 
 and is usually classified as a branch of the police power, 
 or, in Massachusetts, of the equivalent power to make all 
 manner of reasonable and wholesome laws. Familiar 
 examples of this class of legislation are the statutes pro- 
 viding for the repair of houses, mills and wharves owned 
 by several parties, the employment of ships held on shares, 
 the partition of land held in common, the construction and 
 maintenance of party walls, the government of the propri- 
 etors of private ways and bridges and common fields, and 
 the drainage of swamps and meadows.^* 
 
 In a similar way a stream running through the lands of a 
 number of proprietors is often capable of use which will 
 be of great value to them, but if they are unable to agree 
 amicably upon the manner of obtaining sufficient head of 
 water for mill purposes, the latent power will go to waste. 
 Accordingly, by an exercise of legislation of the class 
 described in the preceding paragraph, the stream and the 
 adjoining lands are treated as a single piece of property 
 and provision is made for what appears to be its most 
 advantageous use. The construction of dams is authorized 
 wherever they can be profitably located, and the owners 
 whose lands are thereby flooded receive compensation in 
 money. Such legislation, it is held, is merely a regulation 
 
 24. Infra, § 88. 
 
230 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 84 
 
 of conflicting rights and not a taking of property by emi- 
 nent domain. Consequently a public use is not necessary to 
 justify it, for a mere regulation is constitutional when 
 enacted in behalf of the general welfare ; and undoubtedly 
 the general welfare is enhanced by the construction of mills 
 made possible by the statutes under consideration. 
 
 The line of cases which set forth this justification of the 
 mill acts originated with a decision of Chief Justice Shaw 
 handed down in the same year that the Boston and Eoxbury 
 Mill Corporation was sustained in its takings.^^ The con- 
 stitutionality of the mill acts was not questioned by counsel, 
 but the chief justice remarked that these statutes ' ' rest for 
 their justification partly upon the interest which the com- 
 munity at large has in the use and employment of mills, 
 and partly upon the nature of the property, which is often 
 so situated that it could not be beneficially used without 
 the aid of this power." The same judge developed the 
 argument upon the latter ground in a number of subsequent 
 cases,^® and it is now well settled in Massachusetts that the 
 mill acts are constitutional and are not an exercise of emi- 
 nent domain.^'' The Massachusetts rule has been followed 
 
 25. riske v. Framinghaim Mfg. for reg^ating the rights of pro- 
 Co., 12 Pick. (Mass.) 68, decided in prietors oil one and the same 
 1832. stream, from its rise to its outlet, 
 
 26. Murdoek v. Stickney, 8 in a manner best calculated, on the 
 Cush. (Mass.) 113: "The prin- whole, to promote and secure their 
 ciple on which this law is founded coromon rights in it." See also 
 is not, as has sometimes been sup- WUliams v. Nelson, 23 Pick. 141, 
 posed, the right of eminent domain, 34 Am. Dec. 45 ; Trench v. Brain- 
 the sovereign right of taking pri- tree Mfg. Co., 23 Pick. 216; Gary 
 vate property for public use. It is v. Daniels, 8 Mete. 466, 41 Am. 
 not in any sense a taking of the Dec. 532; Gould v. Boston Duck 
 property of an owner of the land Co., 13 Gray 442. But see the 
 flowed, nor is any compensation opinion of Shaw, C. J., in Chase v. 
 awarded by the public." Bates v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 
 Weymouth Iron Co., 8 Cush. 548: (1849) : "But these acts (the Mill 
 " It is not a right to take and use Acts) justifying the flowing of an- 
 the land of the proprietor above, other's land without his consent 
 against his will, but it is an an- can rest only on the right of emi- 
 thority to use his own land and nent domain, to take private prop- 
 water privilege for his own advan- erty for public use on making a 
 tage and for the benefit of the com- compensation." 
 
 munity. It is a provision of law 27. Tor elaborate statements of 
 
§ 84 Public Use — Aid to Pbivate Entebpbise. 231 
 
 in the Supreme Court of the United States in a case arising 
 in New Hampshire, the opinion of the court, given by Judge 
 Gray, a Massachusetts man, being an interesting and valu- 
 able one, both as an historical statement of the development 
 of the mill acts, and as an argument in behalf of the Massa- 
 chusetts doctrine.^* 
 
 It is an integral part of this doctrine that no land is taken 
 under the miU acts ; that the mill owner acquires no right to 
 flood the upper land, as the owner may protect it by dykes. 
 As such dykes might well cost more than the value of the 
 land flooded this right might prove of little value to the 
 owner. It is held in the Supreme Court of the United States 
 and in the majority of the state courts that a permanent^ 
 flooding of land is a taking.'" It is not to be supposed that 
 
 the doctrine see Lowell v. Boston, 
 111 Mass. 454, 15 Am. Rep. 39, and 
 Tnmer v. Nye, 154 Mass. 579, 28 
 N. E. 1048, 14 L. R. A. 487. See 
 also Great Western, etc., Co. v. 
 Hawkins, 30 Ind. App. 557, 66 
 N. E. 764. And see Otis Co. v. 
 Ludlow Mfg. Co., 186 Mass. 89, TO 
 N. E. 1009, 104 Am. St. Rep. 563, 
 affirmed, 201 U. S. 140, 50 L. ed. 
 696, in which a statute prohibiting 
 the erection of a dam injurious to a 
 previously existing dam was held 
 constitutional. 
 
 28. Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 
 113 U. S. 9, 28 L. ed. 889: « The 
 right to the use of running water is 
 publici juris and common to all the 
 proprietors of the bed and banks 
 of the stream from its source to ita 
 outlet. Each has a right to the 
 reasonable use of the water as it 
 flows past his land, not interfering 
 with a like reasonable use by those 
 above or below him. One reason- 
 able use of the water is the use of 
 the power, inherent in the fall of 
 the stream and the force of the 
 current, to drive mills. That power 
 cannot be used without damming 
 np the water, and thereby causing 
 it to flow back. If the water thus 
 
 dammed up by one riparian pro- 
 prietor spread over the lands of 
 others they could at common law 
 bring successive actions against him 
 for the injury so done them, or 
 even have the dam abated. Before 
 the Mill Acts, therefore, it was 
 often impossible for a riparian 
 proprietor to use the water power 
 at all, without the consent of those 
 above him. The purpose of these 
 statutes is to enable any riparian 
 proprietor to erect a mill and use 
 the water power of the stream, pro- 
 vided he does not interfere with an 
 earlier exercise by another of a like 
 right or with any right of the pub- 
 lic. • * * The statute under 
 which the Amoskeag Mfg. Co. has 
 flowed the land in question is 
 clearly valid as a just and reason- 
 able exercise of the power of the 
 l^^lature, having regard to the 
 public good in a more general 
 sense, as well as the rights of the 
 riparian proprietors, to regulate 
 the use of the water-power of run- 
 ning streams, which without some 
 such regulation could not be bene- 
 ficially used." 
 29. Infra, § 113. 
 
232 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 84 
 
 the Massachusetts courts would hold that non-riparian land 
 could be flooded except for a public use ; but the real mean- 
 ing of the decisions is that a river and the lands adjoining 
 it are considered a single piece of property and are held 
 subject to such alterations in the flow of the stream as are 
 conducive to obtaining the best results from its power, and 
 that the flooding of lands already subject to such a servitude 
 is not a taking.^** 
 
 The Massachusetts courts have not hesitated to carry 
 their doctrine to its logical conclusion, and they hold that 
 dams may be erected on streams and private lands flooded 
 for any purpose that enures to the general good and to the 
 profitable development of riparian land. Statutes author- 
 izing such flooding for the purpose of cranberry culture 
 have been sustained by implication,** and even the making 
 of a private trout pond has been held to be a proper justi- 
 fication for backing up a stream, when it appeared that 
 there was much valueless land in the county which could be 
 profitably employed if it could be shown by experiment that 
 trout could be successfully raised.^^ In states in which 
 
 30. The Massachusetts doctrine 576, 68 N. E. 522, 63 L. R. A. 
 
 ia this particular is criticised by 582, 98 Am. St. Rep. 235, holding 
 
 Munson, J., in Avery v. Vermont a mill wMch the public coidd not 
 
 Electric Co., 75 Vt. 235, 54 Atl. of right use was not for the public 
 
 179, 59 L. R. A. 817, 98 Am. St. use, and that the Massachusetts 
 
 Rep. 818 : " We cannot adopt this doctrine did not apply where the 
 
 view. It seems to assxime that the statute specifically authorised a 
 
 land goes with the stream instead "taking." 
 
 of the stream with the land and to 31. The Cranberry Act came 
 
 give the riparian owners a joint before the court and no doubts as 
 
 interest in the land because of their to its constitutionality were sug- 
 
 peculiar rights in the water. But gested in Bearse v. Perry, 117 
 
 the owners of the various prop- Mass. 211; Hinckley v. Nickerson, 
 
 erties are the several and independ- 117 Mass. 213 ; Blackwell v. Phin- 
 
 ent owners of their respective par- ney, 126 Mass. 458; Howes v. 
 
 eels of land and their only right in Grush, 131 Mass. 207, and there is 
 
 the water is such as their ownership a dictum sustaining the act in 
 
 gives them. To say that one's hold- Turner v. Nye, 154 Mass. 579, 28 
 
 ing of the land is subservient to N. E. 1048, 14 L. R. A. 487. 
 
 such use as the lower owners may 32. Turner v. Nye, 154 Mass. 
 
 desire to make of the water is to 579, 28 N. E. 1048, 14 L. R. A. 
 
 reverse all our theories regarding 487. "It is for the public good 
 
 the use of streams." See also Gay- that swamps and waste lands should 
 
 lord v. Sanitary District, 204 HI. be reclaimed and made productive. 
 
§ 84 PuBUo Use — Aid to Pbivate Enteepeisb. 233 
 
 flooding under the mill acts is justified as a taking by emi- 
 nent domain such statutes would doubtless be held void.'^ 
 
 It has been argued in opposition to the Massachusetts 
 doctrine that no court would sustain the mill acts if compen- 
 sation were not provided; but if they fall under the police 
 power compensation is not necessary. This argument 
 merely illustrates the futility of attempting to place every 
 statute in some division of the sovereign power and thereby 
 making it automatically subject to certain rules. If land 
 is actually taken by authority of the state it must be paid 
 for, under whatever head the legislature purports to act.^* 
 
 The chief ol)jection to the Massachusetts doctrine is that, 
 while it purports to respect the strict letter of the consti- 
 tution, it is, after all, a very ingenious and perhaps flawless 
 evasion of that instrument. To open the door to circuitous 
 and sophistical methods of escaping from the prohibitions 
 laid down by the constitution is extremely dangerous, and 
 while the result in this instance may be desirable and also 
 
 It is also for the public good that held that it was the intention of 
 streams should be used to operate that instrument to render them 
 mills, to raise ■ cranberries and to void. * * * It has never been 
 cultivate useful fishes. If private supposed that the MiU Acts would 
 rights appear to some extent to be be sustained if they contained no 
 iuvaded, that is inseparable from provision for compensation to the 
 the nature of the use authorized, persons whose lands were flowed." 
 without which the streams could not 33. Compare New England 
 be advantageously or profitably Trout & Salmon Club v. Mather, 
 used, and compensation is provided 68 Vt. 338, 35 Atl. 323, 33 L. B. A. 
 for any injury that may be done. 569, holding that a statute author- 
 The character of the property and izing persons to cross private lands 
 the resulting general good are to reach ponds and streams for the 
 deemed sufficient to justify the purpose of fishing is uneonstitu- 
 aetion of the legislature. It is tional, and Allbright v. Sussex 
 doubtful, however, whether any County Commissioners, 71 N. J. L. 
 property of the plaintiff is taken, 303, 309, 57 Atl. 398, 59 Atl. 146, 
 or any of his rights are invaded." 69 L. R. A. 768, 108 Am. St. Rep. 
 Field, C. J., dissented, on the 749, 2 Ann. Cas. 48, holding in- 
 ground that the purpose of the valid the taking of a free public 
 statute was not public ; that over- fishery in certain lakes with Turner 
 flowing a person's land without his v. Nye, supra, and CotriU v. 
 consent is a taking of property. Myrick, 12 Me. 222, holding that 
 "MUl Aots were in force long be- private property may be taken for 
 fore the adoption of the constitu- a sluiceway for the passage of fish, 
 tion, and it could not properly be 34. Infra, §§ 96, 97 and 102. 
 
234 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 85 
 
 legally correct, yet it would perhaps have been better to 
 have said openly that " public use " should be construed 
 in the light of the conditions existing at the time when the 
 constitution was adopted and that it was never intended to 
 exclude subjects which were then deemed proper for emi- 
 nent domain. As the number of such subjects was very 
 limited there would be no danger of the mill acts proving 
 an opening wedge for the exercise of eminent domain by a 
 mass of subjects of doubtful propriety. 
 
 § 85. Private Roads. 
 
 At the time that the constitutions of the thirteen original 
 states were adopted, there were in force in many of the 
 states statutes which authorized the taking of land by emi-. 
 nent domain to establish a private road leading from the 
 land of an individual to the nearest highway, when he had 
 no means of ingress and egress in any other manner.*^ Such 
 provisions seem to have been considered reasonable and 
 proper, and were continued in force for many years. Sim- 
 ilar statutes were enacted in the newer states, and indeed 
 when a state was in process of settlement the private roads 
 furnished the only practicable means of opening up the land, 
 since it was obviously impossible for the public authorities 
 to furnish all the necessary highways at once. As the land 
 crossed by such roads was generally unimproved and of 
 little pecuniary value, and the acquiescence in the propriety 
 of legislation of this character was general, it was many 
 years before the constitutionality of such statutes was ques- 
 tioned. In course of time, however, in almost every state 
 in which such statutes were in force, the objection was 
 raised that land taken for a private road was not taken for 
 a public use. In some of the states it was held that the 
 private roads authorized by the statutes were private only 
 
 35. A private road statute was in Pennsylvania in 1735 (Palairet's 
 
 enacted in the Plymouth Colony in Appeal, 67 Pa. 479, 5 Am. Rep. 
 
 1671 (1 Laws of Colony of New 450). See also Matter of Hick- 
 
 Plj-mouth, 278), in New York in man, 4 Harr. (Del.) 580; Robin- 
 
 1772 (Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill son v. Swope, 12 Bush. (Ky.) 21. 
 (N. Y.) 142, 40 Am. Dec. 274) and 
 
§ 85 Public Use — Aid to Pbivate Enteepeise. 235 
 
 in name ; that althougli they were laid out upon the petition 
 of individual land-owners and were constructed at the 
 expense of the parties at whose request they were estab- 
 lished, they were open to use by the general public as com- 
 pletely as if they were highways, and they consequently 
 formed a part of the general public road system of the state. 
 Such roads, it was held, might be laid out over private land 
 without the consent of the owner,^® and the decisions to this 
 effect are clearly sound, since it is well established that a 
 highway that is open to public use may be laid out by the 
 exercise of eminent domain, even if it is especially advan- 
 tageous to but few people, or leads to the residence of a 
 single individual.*^ Private roads of this character are 
 very similar, in their legal aspect, to modern city streets, 
 the cost of which is usually met by betterment assessments 
 upon the land which receives a special and peculiar benefit 
 from the laying out of the streets. 
 
 In a few states, although the use of the private roads was 
 limited to the persons for whose benefit they were made, it 
 was held that it was for the public benefit that every citizen 
 should have the means of discharging his public duties, such 
 
 36. California. — Sherman v. Water Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 54, 518, 
 
 Buiek, 32 Cal. 241, 91 Am. Dec. 90 Am. Dee. 634. 
 
 577 ; Los Angeles County v. Reyes, North Carolina. — Singleton v. 
 
 97 Cal. xvii, 32 Pac. 233; Madera Road Commissioners, 2 Nott & 
 
 County V. Raymond Granite Co., McC. 526. 
 
 139 Cal. 128, 72 Pac. 915. Ohio.— Shaver v. Starrett, 4 
 
 Delaware. — Matter of Hickman, Ohio St. 494; Ferris v. Bramible, 5 
 
 4 Harr. 580. Ohio St. 109. 
 
 Idaho. — Latah County v. Peteiv Oregon. — Fanning v. GiUiland, 
 
 Bon, 3 Idaho 398, 29 Pac. 1089, 16 37 Ore. 369, 61 Pac. 636, 62 Pac. 
 
 L. R. A. 81. 209, 82 Am. St. Rep. 758. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Flagg v. Flagg, Pennsylvania. — Pocopson Road, 
 
 16 Gray 175; Denhaan v. Bristol 16 Pa. 15; Killbuck Private Road, 
 
 County Commissioners, 108 Mass. 77 Pa. 39; Waddell's Appeal, 84 
 
 202; Davis v. Smith, 130 Mass. Pa. 90. 
 
 113. Tennessee. — Bashor v. Bowman, 
 
 New Hampshire.— FroatoT v. 180 S. W. 326. 
 
 Andover, 42 N. H. 348. Vermont.— Bell v. Prouty, 43 
 
 New Jersey. — Perrine v. Farr, Vt. 299. 
 
 22 N. J. L. 356; Allen v. Stevens, 37. Supra, § 61. 
 29 N. J. L. 356; Coster v. Tide 
 
236 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 85 
 
 as voting, or attending court as a juror or witness, and con- 
 sequently a road which brought about this result by pro- 
 viding a citizen with a means of egress from his home was 
 for the public use.^* Private roads in such states can be laid 
 out only to furnish access to a person's residence.^^ 
 
 In the great majority of states it was held that, however 
 much long public acquiescence might influence the court in 
 a doubtful ease, the taking of t^e land of one man to furnish 
 a road for the exclusive use of another was such a direct 
 violation of the terms of the constitution that the court must 
 necessarily declare the statutes which authorized it 
 invalid.*" To avoid the effect of these decisions special 
 constitutional provisions were adopted in a number of 
 states, beginning with New York in 1846, authorizing the 
 
 38. Brewer v. Bowman, 9 Gra. 
 37; Eobinson v. Swope, 12 Bush. 
 (Ky.) 21; Kirk-Chri^y Co. v. 
 American Association, 32 Ky. L. K. 
 1177, 108 S. W. 232; People v. 
 Richards, 38 Mich. 214. 
 
 39. Shake v. Frazier, 94 Ky. 
 143, 21 S. W. 583; Mtz/patrick v. 
 Warden, 157 Ky. 95, 162 S. W. 
 550. 
 
 40. Alabama. — ^ Sadler v. Lang- 
 ham, 34 Ala. 311. 
 
 Arkansas. — Roberts v. Williams,' 
 15 Ark. 43. 
 
 Illinois. — Nesbit v. Tmmbo, 39 
 111. 110, 89 Am. Dee. 290 ; Crear v. 
 Crossley, 40 111. 175; Winkler v. 
 Winkler, 40 111. 185. 
 
 Indiana. — Wild v. Deig, 43 Ind. 
 455, 13 Am. Rep. 399; Stewart v. 
 Hartman, 46 Ind. 331; Logan v. 
 Stogsdale, 123 Ind. 372, 24 N. E. 
 135, 8 L. R. A. 58. 
 
 Iowa. — Bankhead v. Brown, 25 
 Iowa 540; Johnson v. Clayton 
 County Supervisors, 61 Iowa 89, 15 
 N. W. 856. 
 
 Kansas. — Clark v. Mitchell 
 County Commissioners, 69 Kan. 
 542, 77 Pae. 284, 66 L. R. A. 965. 
 
 Maryland. — ^Amsperger v. Craw- 
 ford, 101 Md. 247, 61 Atl. 413, 70 
 
 L. R. A. 497; Pitznogle v. Western 
 Maryland R. JB. Co., 119 Md. 673, 
 87 Atl. 917. 
 
 Missouri. — Dickey v. Tennison, 
 27 Mo. 373. 
 
 Nebraska. — ^Welton v. Dickson, 
 38 Neb. 767, 57 N. W. 559, 22 
 L. R. A. 496, 41 Am. St. Rep. 771. 
 
 New York. — Taylor v. Pi^rter, 4 
 Hill 140, 40 Am. Dec. 274; Baker 
 V. Braman, 6 Hill 47; Embury v. 
 Connor, 3 N. Y. 511; Powers v. 
 Bergen, 6 'N. T. 368; Dempsey 
 V. Kipp, 61 N. Y. 567. 
 
 Oregon. — ^Witham v. Osborn, 4 
 Ore. 318, 18 Am. Rep. 287; An- 
 derson V. Smith-Powers Logging 
 Co., 71 Ore. 276, 139 Pae. 736. 
 
 Tennessee. — Clark v. Wihite, 2 
 Swan 540; Rice v. AEey, 1 Sneed 
 51. 
 
 Washington. — Healey Lumber 
 Ck). V. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 74 
 Pae. 681, 63 L. R. A. 497, 99 Am. 
 St. Rep. 964. 
 
 West Virginia. — ^Vamer v. Mar- 
 tin, 21 W. Va. 534; Scott Lumber 
 Co. V. Waif ord, 62 W. Va. 555, 59 
 S. E. 516. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Osborn v. Hart, 24 
 Wis. 89, 1 Am. Rep. 161. 
 
§ 86 Public Use — Aid to Peivatb Entekpeise. 237 
 
 taking of land for private "ways.*^ Some of these amend- 
 ments were limited in terms to tlie authorization of ways 
 of necessity/^ and, even in the absence of such limitation, 
 it has generally been held that it was not intended to author- 
 ize private ways for mere convenience ; *^ but a private way 
 of necessity thus authorized is not necessarily a way to a 
 person's residence, but may be a way reasonably necessary 
 to enable a land-owner to get out the natural products of 
 the land.** It has been held by a state court that the taking 
 of land for a private way under specific constitutional 
 authority is not a taking without due process of law ; *^ but 
 this point has never been passed upon by the Supreme Court 
 of the United States. 
 
 § 86. Drainage of Swamps and Lowlands. 
 
 In many parts of the world there are vast tracts of land 
 which, by reason of their wet and swampy condition, or of 
 their liability to overflow by freshets or tides, are incapable 
 of cultivation or of application to any beneficial use. Such 
 lands are, however, often capable of reclamation through 
 the construction of dykes or drains, and when reclaimed are 
 fertile and readily available for agricultural purposes, or 
 in some instances for the sites of commercial cities and 
 towns. The reclamation of such lands cannot well be under- 
 taken by individuals without the aid of some franchise from 
 the government, since the construction of the necessary 
 
 41. Alabama, art. I, § 23; Ari- even if it had become impassable, 
 zona, art. 11, § 17 j Colorado, art. a private way could not be laid out. 
 n, i 14; Georgia, art. I, i 3, par. 1; See also Colville v. Judy, 73 Mo. 
 lUinois, art. IV, § 30; Minnesota, 651; Barr v. Flynn, 20 Mo. App. 
 art. XVIII, § 14; Mississippi, art. 383. 
 
 IV, i 110; Missouri, art. II, § 20; 43. Ayres v. Richards, 38 Mich. 
 
 Montana, art. Ill, § 15; New York, 214; Eundell v. Highway Commis- 
 
 art. I, § 7; Washington, art. I, sioners, 47 Mich. 575, 11 N. "W. 
 
 § 16; Wyoming, art. I, § 32. 392. 
 
 42. In Gaines v. Lunsford, 120 44. State v. Cowlitz County 
 Ga. 370, 47 S. E. 967, 102 Am. St. Court, 77 Wash. 585, 137 Pae. 994. 
 Rep. 109, it was held that if there 45. State v. Cowlitz County 
 was means of access to the peti- Court, 77 Wash. 585, 137 Pac. 994. 
 tioner's property by a public road. 
 
238 The Law or Emineitt Domain. § 87 
 
 works would usually involve interference with private prop- 
 erty rights ; and if it was attempted to carry out a scheme 
 of reclamation by voluntary co-operation of the owners of 
 all the land affected, the necessity of securing the agree- 
 ment of all parties interested to each step taken would in 
 most cases prove an insuperable obstacle. In European 
 countries the drainage of submerged lands haa always been 
 considered a matter appropriate for governmental action, 
 and there have been several instances of extensive public 
 improvements of this character which have been of infinite 
 service to the community, the most notable of which were, 
 perhaps, those in Holland. In parts of this country laws 
 were in force before the Eevolution under which it was pos- 
 sible to invoke the aid of certain governmental powers in 
 order to bring wet, low or swampy lands into a fit condition 
 for cultivation. Such laws were looked upon as wise and 
 wholesome legislation, and it would have been a great sur- 
 prise to the people who adopted the state constitutions in 
 the hope of securing a more advantageous system of gov- 
 ernment, if they had been told that thereafter no scheme of 
 reclamation could be undertaken, however beneficial it 
 might be to the community as a whole and to the owners of 
 the lands affected, that might not be blocked by the selfish- 
 ness or obstinacy of a single individual. It is fortunate 
 that the American system of constitutional government has 
 not proved such a detriment to progress, and that the laws 
 which authorize interference with the rights of private 
 property to effectuate the drainage of a tract of land of suf- 
 ficient extent to make its reclamation of more than merely 
 private interest have almost universally been sustained; 
 but the difficulty of reconciling such statutes with the estab- 
 lished principles of constitutional law has frequently been 
 felt and the reasons assigned for the decisions which sustain 
 them have been by no means uniform. 
 
 § 87. Drainage of Swamps to Abate a Nuisance. 
 It almost goes without saying that when a tract of land, 
 large or small, is in such a condition as to menace the health 
 
§ 87 Public Use — Aid to Peivate Enteepbise. 239 
 
 of the community, it is within the power of the state to 
 cause this condition to he remedied. There has been some 
 unprofitable discussion whether the statutes which bring 
 about this result are an exercise of the police power or of 
 the power of eminent domain, in the course of which the 
 vague notion that any act of the legislature aimed to pro- 
 mote the public health or safety is necessarily an exercise 
 of the police power has in some cases added to the con- 
 fusion of thought displayed. An owner of land so swampy 
 as to constitute a menace to the public health may be sub- 
 jected to regulations in respect to his use of the land, or 
 even under some circumstances be compelled to abate the 
 nuisance, without compensation, and the statutes which 
 enforce such obligations are clearly an exercise of the police 
 power.*® When however private land is actually taken 
 from the owner into the possession and control of the public 
 authorities, it is the power of eminent domain which is 
 invoked. Examples of the exercise of this power in behalf 
 of the public health are the taking of a strip of land for 
 a drain, or, when the legislature deems it advisable, the tak- 
 ing in fee by a city or town of an entire swamp so that it 
 may be filled. As such a taking is for the benefit of the 
 public health, it is clearly made for a public use, and the 
 fiiling effects such a material change in the property that 
 it is only reasonable to allow the city or town to retain the 
 fee. It is settled that such a taking may be made, upon 
 payment of compensation to the owners of the swamp.*'' 
 
 46. Bancroft v. Cambridge, 126 ever, the legislature provides for 
 Mass. 438; Patrick v. Omaha, 1 the actual taking and appropria- 
 Nebr. UnofE. 250, 95 N. W. 477; tion of private property for public 
 Rude V. St. Marie, 121 Wis. 634, uses its authority to enact such a 
 99 N. W. 260. regulation rests upon its right of 
 
 47. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. eminent domain. • * • gut Jt 
 380, 40 L. ed. 188 : " Undoubtedly is a condition precedent to the ex- 
 the state without taking the title ercise of such power that the stat- 
 to itself may in some appropriate ute make provision for reasonable 
 mode and without compensation to compensation to the owner." Ding- 
 the owner forbid the use of speci- ley v. Boston, 100 Mass. 544: 
 fled private property where such "But where the sanitary condition 
 use would be injurious to the pub- of a large city requires an interfer- 
 lie health. * * * When, how- ence with the real estate of a great 
 
240 The Law oe EMnrEBTT Domain. § 88 
 
 Of course if a swamp is drained or filled for the benefit 
 of the public health, the use is none the less public because 
 there is an incidental advantage to the community or to 
 individuals in making such land available for use, and there 
 has been some tendency to use the possibility that malaria 
 may be lurking in every swamp as a cloak to cover a scheme 
 of drainage primarily intended for the purposes of recla- 
 mation, or at least an inclination on the part of certain 
 courts to sustain drainage acts on the ground of the inci- 
 dental benefit to the public health when the primary object 
 of such statutes is to enlarge the material resources of the 
 state., 
 
 § 88. Compulsory Joint Drainage under the Police Power. 
 
 In several of the states the courts stistained the statutes, 
 long in force, which authorized the use of compulsory pow- 
 ers to effect the drainage of swamps and lowlands, without 
 conceding that such enactments authorized the taking of 
 property for public use or the exercise of the power of emi- 
 nent domain. The statutes in some states provide that 
 when a swamp is owned in severalty by a number of sepa- 
 rate proprietors and cannot be made productive by individ- 
 ual effort, the owners may be compelled, upon the petition 
 of the majority, to act together and to form a quasi-corpo- 
 ration called a drainage district, which drains the swamp 
 
 number of persons, making essen- Dec. 63; CJoolman v. Fleming, 82 
 
 tial and expensive changes in the Ind. 117. 
 
 condition and character of the land, Iowa. — Hull v. Baird, 73 Iowa 
 
 a case is presented within that 528,. 35 N. W. 613. 
 
 clause of the constitution which Kentucky. — Duke v. O'Bryan, 
 
 confers authority on the legislature 100 Ky. 710, 39 S. "W. 444, 824. 
 
 to make all manner of wholesome Michigan. — Kinnie v. Bare, 68 
 
 and reasonable laws so that the Mich. 625, 36 N. W. 672. 
 
 same be not repugnant to this eon- Minnesota. — Miller v. Jensen, 
 
 stitution." See also 102 Minn. 391, 113 N. W. 914. 
 
 California. — Hagar v. Supervi- New York. — In re Eyers, 72 
 
 sors of Yolo County, 47 Cal. 222. N. T. 1, 28 Am. Rep. 88. 
 
 Illinois. — Springer v. Walters, Washington. — Bowes v. Aber- 
 
 139 IlL 419, 28 N. E. 761. deen, 58 Wash/ 535, 109 Pac. 369. 
 
 Indiana. — ^Anderson y. Kerns Wisconsin. — Donnelly v. Decker, 
 
 Draining Co., 14 Ind. 199, 77 Am. 58 Wis. 461, 46 Am. Rep. 637. 
 
§ 88 PuBLio Use — Aid to Peivate Enteepeise. 241 
 
 and assesses the expense upon tlie land in proportion to 
 the benefit it has received. Statutes authorizing such action 
 are in force in states the prosperity of which does not 
 depend upon the reclamation of swamps ; but they are sus- 
 tained as falling within that branch of the police power 
 under which the state intervenes when a particular cause 
 prevents the development of an estate in which several 
 parties have conflicting interests and cannot be removed 
 without joint action.** Other instances of this branch of 
 legislative power are found in the laws relating to the parti- 
 tion of joint estates, the repair of buildings, wharves, and 
 ships owned by several proprietors, the building of party 
 walls and division fences, and the mill acts in Massachu- 
 setts.'*® The Supreme Court of the United States °" and 
 several state courts®^ have sustained such statutes on the 
 ground just stated. When a drain is built through private 
 land it seems a stretch of language to say there has not 
 been a taking ; but the explanation is that the whole swamp 
 is treated as a unit and as constituting in itself a single 
 estate, although it is divided into separate parcels held by 
 different proprietors. Such a view prevailed when the con- 
 stitutions were adopted and the drainage statutes were 
 then considered proper. It is now too late to raise literal 
 objections to their constitutionality. It is to be noted how- 
 ever that it would not be possible, as an exercise of the 
 branch of the police power in question, to take land for a 
 drain or dykes outside the limits of the tract which it was 
 sought to improve, and this power is consequently by no 
 means as extensive as the power of eminent domain. 
 
 48. Supra, % 15. Missouri. — Mound City Land & 
 
 49. Supra, § 84. Stock Co. v. Miller, 170 Mo. 240, 
 
 50. Wirrts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 70 S. W. 721, 60 L. R. A. 190, 94 
 606, 29 L. ed. 229. See also Hagar Am. St. Rep. 727. 
 
 V. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. Washington. — Lewis Co. v. Gror- 
 
 701, 28 L. ed. 569. don, 20 Wash. 90, 54 Pae. 781. 
 
 51. Massachusetts. — Coomes V. Wisconsin. — Bryant v. Robbins, 
 Burt, 22 Pick. 422; LoweU v. Bos- 70 Wis. 271, 35 N. W. 550; In re 
 ton. 111 Mass. 454, 469, 15 Am. Trempealeau Drainage Dktrict, 
 Rep. 39. 146 Wis. 398, 131 N. W. 838. 
 
 16 
 
242 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 89 
 
 § 89. Reclamation of Wet Land as a Public Use. 
 
 In many cases the courts have sustained as an exercise of 
 eminent domain statutes which authorize the use of compul- 
 sory powers to aid in the reclamation of an extensive area 
 of wet or inundated land, and have openly held that the inci- 
 dental advantage to the public from the opening of so much 
 land to settlement and cultivation makes the improvement 
 a public use in the constitutional sense. Thus in a fre- 
 quently cited Massachusetts case a dam belonging to private 
 parties which had caused a large and thickly populated 
 region to be flooded was lowered by commissioners 
 appointed for the purpose by authority of a special statute. 
 It was held that 
 
 " the improvement of so large a territory situated iu 
 several different towns and owned by a great number 
 of persons, by draining off the water and thereby ren- 
 dering the land suitable for tillage, which could not 
 otherwise be usefuUy used at all, would seem to come 
 fairly within the scope of legislative action."®^ 
 
 Similarly when the country is flooded by natural causes to 
 such an extent as to leave it substantially valueless, land may 
 be taken for drains to carry away the water.^* In most 
 
 52. Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray such works, to build roads across 
 (Mass.) 417. it, and consequently it bas bereto- 
 
 53. Tide-Water Co. v. Coster, 18 fore interposed a barrier to any- 
 N. J. Eq. 518, 90 Am. Dec. 634. thing like easy access, except by 
 " That the legislative authority is means of railroads, from one town 
 competent to effect the end pro- to another situated upon its bor- 
 vided for in this act, I can enter- ders. To remove these evUs, and 
 tain no doubt. The purpose con- to make this vast region fit for 
 templated is to reclaim and bring habitation and use, seems to me 
 into use a tract of land covering plainly within the legitimate prov- 
 about one-fourth of the county of inee of legislation; and to effect 
 Hudson and several thousand acres such ends, I see no reason to doubt 
 in the county of Union. This that both the prerogatives of taxa- 
 large district is now comparatively tion and of eminent domain may be 
 useless. In its present condition it resorted to." Norfleet v. Cromwell, 
 impairs very materially the bene- 70 N. C. 634, 16 Am. Eep. 787: 
 fits which naturally belong to the "It is well known that in the At- 
 adjaceney of the territory of the lantic section of this state there 
 etate to its navigable waters. It is are hundreds of thousands of acres 
 difficult, from the great expense of of what are called swamp lands, 
 
§ 89 PuBUO Use — Aid to Pbivatb Enteepbise. 243 
 
 instances the title to the land reclaimed is not affected and 
 the procedure is similar to that authorized by statutes 
 which are justified as an exercise of the police power. In 
 
 whioh from the flatness of their 
 surface and the filling up of the 
 natural courses of drainage, i£ any 
 ever existed, cannot be relieved of 
 the water which ordinarily covers 
 them, and made fit for human habi- 
 tation and cultivation, except by 
 cutting artificial canals from them 
 into some convenient creek or river, 
 which must necessarily pass 
 through the intervening lands of 
 the riparian proprietors. If these 
 canals can be cut only by permis- 
 sion of the owners of the banks of 
 the necessary outlets, this vast area 
 of fertile land must remain for 
 ages an uncultivated and unpopu- 
 lated wUdemess, and it will be en- 
 tirely valueless to those who bought 
 it from the state on the faith of its 
 laws. An act which aims to rem- 
 edy so great an eivil, affecting so 
 many persons now living, and so 
 many more in the future, must be 
 deemed one of general and public 
 utility. In an agricultural view it 
 now benefits the whole population 
 of that part of the state in which 
 these swamps are found. The 
 right of the state to condemn lands 
 for drains rests on the same foun- 
 dation as its right in cases of pub- 
 lie roads, mills, railroads, cartways, 
 school houses, forts, lighthouses, 
 etc. In the case of public roads, 
 it has never been doubted, and the 
 weight of authority is decidedly in 
 favor of its existence for the other 
 purposes mentioned. Roads and 
 aqueducts are classed together in 
 the Institutes as servitudes of the 
 same public character. In the 
 swamps which the act in question 
 chiefly afifeets, the canals are more 
 important than the roads, as they 
 must always precede them. The 
 right to drain through the banks 
 of a natural watercourse is ex- 
 
 actly similar in character to the 
 right to construct dikes or levees 
 to keep their excessive waters from 
 overflowing the adjacent lands, a 
 right which has been recognized 
 in the legislation of aU countries 
 from the most ancient times. Wit- 
 ness the dikes which protect the 
 coast of Holland, the fens of Lin- 
 colnshire, the lands on the Missis- 
 sippi and on the Po. Both pur- 
 poses are classed together in our 
 Act of 1789." See also 
 
 Arkansas.— WHaon v. Compton 
 Bond & Mortgage Co., 103 Ark. 
 452, 146 S. W. 110. 
 
 Illinois. — Heffner v. Cass & Mor- 
 gan Counties, 193 lU. 439, 62 N. B. 
 201, 58 L. R. A. 353; JuvinaU v. 
 Jamesburg Drainage District, 204 
 HI. 106, 68 N. E. 440. 
 
 Indiana. — Zigler v. Menges, 121 
 Ind. 99, 22 N. E. 782, 16 Am. St. 
 Rep. 357. 
 
 Iowa. — Sisson v. Supervisors of 
 Buena Vista County, 128 Iowa 442, 
 104 N. W. 454, 70 L. R. A. 440. 
 
 Minnesota. — Lien v. Norman 
 County, 80 Minn. 58, 82 N. W. 
 1094; State ex rel. Utick v. Polk 
 County Commissioners, 87 Minn. 
 325, 92 N. W. 216, 60 L. R. A. 161. 
 
 Montana. — Billings Sugar Co. v. 
 Fish, 40 Mont. 256, 106 Pae. 565, 
 20 Ann. Cas. 264. 
 
 North Carolina. — Sanderlin v. 
 Luken, 152 N. C. 738, 68 S. E. 
 225. 
 
 Ohio. — Lake Erie, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Hancock County, 63 Ohio St. 23, 
 57 N. B. 1009; Taylor v. Craw- 
 ford, 72 Ohio St. 560, 74 N. E. 
 1065, 69 L. R. A. 805. 
 
 Tennessee. — State v. Powers, 124 
 Tenn. 553, 137 S. W. 1110. 
 
 Washington. — Hansen v. Ham- 
 mer, 15 Wash. 315, 46 Pae. 332. 
 
244 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 89 
 
 some cases the improvement makes such a substantial 
 change in the property that it is all appropriated by the 
 party making the improvement. Thus a large tract of 
 submerged flats may be taken by the state, filled, and used 
 for commercial purposes when the enterprise is of sufficient 
 importance to promote the welfare of the community.®* 
 
 There are statutes in many of the older states and in 
 some of the newer providing that if the owner of a swamp 
 or low land cannot make use of it without constructing a 
 drain outside the limits of his own land, he may establish 
 the necessary drain on adjacent land, paying its owner 
 damages. It is obvious that swamps may be smaU but so 
 numerous as to retard the progress of the community, and, 
 under such circumstances, a general law providing for the 
 development of the individual swamps might be as bene- 
 ficial to the public as a special law authorizing the reclama- 
 tion of a single vast inundated area. Likewise eminent 
 domain may be employed to drain swamps, however few 
 and small, if they in fact endanger the public health.^® But 
 it is contrary to the fundamental principles of constitutional 
 law to allow one man to take his neighbor's property so that 
 he may cultivate his own land to better advantage.^* Never- 
 theless, such is the force of established usage, and of con- 
 temporaneous construction of the constitution, that private 
 
 54. Moore v. Sanford, 151 Mass. Iowa. — Fleining v. Hull, 73 Iowa 
 285, 24 N. E. 323, 7 L. K. A. 151. 598, 35 N. W. 673. 
 
 55. Supra, § 87. Kentucky. — Duke v. O'Bryan, 
 
 56. Private drainage acts have 100 Ky. 710, 39 S. W. 444, 824. 
 been held unconstitutional in the Minnesota.— In re Schubert, 102 
 foUowing cases : Minn. 442, 114 N. W. 244, 120 Am. 
 
 California.— mekej v. Steams S*- ^P- ^40. 
 Eanchos Co., 126 Cal. 150, 58 Pa«. ^ Nebraska.-Jenal y Green Island 
 .CO ' ' Draining Co., 12 Nebr. 163, 10 
 
 N W 547 
 
 Illinois. — Bradbury v. Vandalia ', ' _' ^.„ , -r, . 
 
 T T.- J. • t ooc Til Qc oc XT T? ^^^ Tork. — Gilbert v. Foote 
 
 Levee District, 236 lU. 36, 86 N. E. ,„„-g_(,_ted cited in 5 Barn 474) • 
 
 Ifiq IQ T R A CTvr R ■» QQl Ti ^unreportea, citeQ in o uaTD. ft/*j , 
 
 Ibd, 19 L. K. A. (N. b.) 991, 15 p^^pj^ ^ Henion, 64 Hun 471, 19 
 
 Ann. Cas. 904. jf_ Y. Supp. 488. 
 
 Indiana.— Anieisaa v. Kems 0/wo.— MeQuillen v. Hatton, 42 
 
 Drainage Co., 14 Ind. 199, 77 Am. Ohio St. 202. 
 
 Dee. 63; Gifford Drainage District Wisconsin.— ^In re Theresa Drain- 
 
 V. Shroer, 145 Ind. 572, 44 N. E. age District, 90 Wis. 301, 63 N. W. 
 
 636. 288. 
 
§ 89 PuBUc Use — Aid to Peivatb Enteepeise. 245 
 
 drainage acts have been sustained in several states on the 
 ground that they promote the public welfare.'*'' In New- 
 York however it was held that private property could not 
 be taken for drainage except to promote the public health.'* 
 The constitution of 1894 authorized the passage of general 
 laws permitting the owners of agricultural lands to con- 
 struct drains and dykes upon the lands of others, upon 
 paying them compensation. A drainage law was passed in 
 1895, authorizing such works and permitting the builder 
 to assess the cost upon all persons benefited. The act was 
 held unconstitutional on the ground that the assessment 
 feature of it was unauthorized, but the judge who delivered 
 the opinion of the court in an able argument contended 
 that the private drainage acts authorized by the state con- 
 stitution were in violation of the fourteenth amendment to 
 the constitution of the United States.'® There are however 
 constitutional provisions in many of the states specifically 
 authorizing the exercise of eminent domain for drainage 
 purposes,®'' and it has never been held that such provisions 
 
 57. California. — Laguna Drain- triot, 98 Neb. 260, 152 N. W. 
 
 age District v. Charles Martin Co., 374. 
 
 144 Cal. 209, 77 Pac. 933. North Carolma.— Fool v. Trex- 
 
 ininois.— 'EeSaeT v. Cass and ler, 76 N. C. 297. 
 
 Morgan Counties, 193 Dl. 439, 62 Ohio. — Reeves v. Wood County, 
 
 N. E. 201, 58 L. R. A. 353; Cleve- 8 Ohio St. 333; Chesbrough v. 
 
 land, etc., Ry. Co. v. Polecat Drain- Putnam County Conunissioners, 37 
 
 age District, 213 lU. 83, 72 N. E. Ohio St. 508. 
 
 684. Oregon. — Seely v. Sebastian, 4 
 
 Indicma. — Ross v. Davis, 97 Ind. Ore. 25. 
 
 79. Wisconsin. — Donnelly v. Decker, 
 
 lowa.— B.a.tch. v. Pottawattamie 58 "Wis. 461, 17 N. W. 389. 
 
 County, 43 Iowa 442; Sisson v. 58. Be Ryers, 72 N. Y. 1, 28 Am. 
 
 Buena Vista, 128 Iowa 442, 104 Rep. 88. 
 
 N. W. 454, 70 L. R. A. 440 (hold- 59. Be Tuthill, 163 N. T. 133, 57 
 
 ing that private drainage is a pub- N. E. 303, 49 L. R. A. 781, 79 Am. 
 
 lie use only when it benefits indi- St. Rep. 574. 
 
 vidnal owners as members of the 60. Arizona, art. 11, i 17; Colo- 
 community), rado, art. II, § 14; Florida, art. 
 
 Kentucky.— WiHiams v. Wed- XVI, § 28; Idaho, art. I, § 14; 
 
 ding, 165 Ky. 361, 176 S. W. 1176. Illinois, art. IV, § 31; Missouri, 
 
 Nebraska. — State v. Hanson, 80 art. II, § 20; New York, art. I, 
 
 Neb. 724, 115 N. W. 294; Grimm § 7; Washington, art. I, § 16; 
 
 V. Elkhom Valley Drainage Dis- Wyoming, art. I, § 32. 
 
246 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 90 
 
 are in conflict with the federal constitution. On the con- 
 trary, it has been held that no right under the federal consti- 
 tution was violated by statutes of a state authorizing the 
 drainage of swamps and wet lands in order to facilitate the 
 development of the state and the utilization of its natural 
 resources.®^ 
 
 The only ground upon which the private drainage acts 
 can stand, in the absence of special constitutional authority, 
 is their age. When first passed the wild and unimproved 
 land was of little value and subject to all sorts of unopposed 
 trespasses. The construction of a ditch or dyke through 
 such land by a neighboring owner would not seem a gross 
 violation of property rights. But under present conditions, 
 in a state in which a general reclamation of swamps is not 
 a matter in which the community is deeply concerned, it 
 does not seem that such statutes can be upheld without 
 frankly admitting that long usage and practice contem- 
 porary with the adoption of the constitutions is not merely 
 an aid in interpreting ambiguous language in that instru- 
 ment but that it overrides the plain and literal meaning of 
 its words — an admission that would make easier the task 
 of the courts and the text writers in defining public use 
 and in reconciling the cases which bear upon the meaning 
 of that phrase. 
 
 § 90. Levees and Sea Walls. 
 
 Land may be taken for the construction of levees which 
 tend to prevent floods so extensive as to constitute a public 
 calamity. The taking of land for such levees has been sus- 
 tained under the police power,*^ but it has usually been 
 considered an exercise of eminent domain.®* In Louisiana 
 
 61. O'Neill V. Learner, 239 U. S. payment of compensation in ad- 
 244, sustaining 93 Nebr. 786, 142 vance, which was required by the 
 N. W. 112. state constitution. 
 
 62. Morrison v. Moray, 146 Mo. 63. Hollingsworth v. Tensas, 17 
 543, 48 S. "W. 629. And see Pen- Fed. 109; Missouri, etc., R. R. Co. 
 rice V. "Wallis, 37 Miss. 172, hold- v. Cambem, 66 Kan. 365, 71 Pac. 
 ing that when the danger of a flood 809 ; Hansen v. Hammer, 15 Wash, 
 was imminent, property eould be 315, 46 Pac. 332. 
 
 taken for levee purposes without 
 
§ 91 Public Use — Aid to Private Entekpeise. 247 
 
 all riparian land is subject to a levee easement and levees 
 may be constructed without compensating the owner of 
 such lands,®* but this servitude, even if it existed in the 
 whole Louisiana Purchase, has never been asserted outside 
 the state of Louisiana and cannot be elsewhere enforced.*^ 
 Even in Louisiana the servitude is attached to the land only 
 and the owner is entitled to compensation for buildings 
 removed in constructing a levee;*® and where the levee 
 was not originally necessary but is required to preserve 
 swamp lands artificially reclaimed the owner is entitled to 
 compensation.®^ 
 
 In Mississippi it is expressly declared by the constitution 
 that private property may be appropriated for the construc- 
 tion, maintenance and repair of levees,®* and in Texas 
 provision is made for the taking of land for sea-walls, the 
 establishment of sea-wall districts, and the appropriation, 
 reclamation and sale of land within such districts.®' The 
 taking of land for sea-walls and levees is undoubtedly con- 
 stitutional,'''' and in fact is one of the oldest, if not the oldest, 
 of the purposes for which the power of eminent domain 
 has been exercised.''^ 
 
 § 91. Irrigation of Arid Lands. 
 
 The constitutional questions arising from the enactment 
 of statutes providing for the exercise of the power of emi- 
 nent domain in behalf of irrigation are much the same as 
 those arising out of the drainage acts. Although the irri- 
 gation acts did not have the sanction of ancient usage, they 
 affected a much more extensive territory than was ever 
 reclaimed by drainage. Forty years ago there appeared 
 
 64. Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 67. Cash v. WLitmore, 13 La. 
 U. S. 452, 40 L. ed. 490; MitthofE Ann. 401, 71 Am. Dec. 515. 
 
 V. Carrollton, 12 La. Ann. 185; 68. Art. XI, § 233. 
 
 Peart v. Meeker, 45 La. Ann. 421, 69. Art. XI, § 7-a. 
 
 12 So. 490. 70. Donnelly v. Longport (N. J.) 
 
 65. Levee Inspectors v. Critten- 95 Atl. 740. 
 den, 94 Ted. 613. 71. Supra, § 2. 
 
 66. MitthofE v. Carrollton, 12 La. 
 Ann. 185. 
 
248 The Law op Emikent Domain. § 91 
 
 upon the maps of the United States a vast area denom- 
 inated "The Great American Desert" extending from 
 west of the Missouri river to the Sierra Nevada in Cali- 
 fornia. Today this region is one of the most fertile por- 
 tions of the country; and the change has been effected 
 entirely through irrigation. Where there is no water it is 
 still desert, and there are at least four states which can 
 never greatly increase in stable population unless much 
 more of their lands are brouglit under irrigation. In all of 
 the western states there are tens of thousands, and in some 
 millions, of acres that will remain waste land, fit only for 
 the poorest cattle range, and much not even for that, unless 
 elaborate irrigation works are constructed. Even with the 
 most complete system of storage there is not water enough 
 to supply all the arable land, and the future of Arizona, 
 New Mexico, Nevada and Utah, southern Idaho, central 
 Oregon, eastern Washington, and parts of Montana, Colo- 
 rado, Wyoming and Nebraska is still dependent upon the 
 successful prosecution of additional irrigation systems.''* 
 It was only by concerted action of the owners of the 
 arid lands, with the aid of compulsory powers to remove 
 the objections of the holders of land and water-rights which 
 it was necessary to take or encroach upon, or by action of 
 the state or even of the federal government, that it has 
 been possible to make so much of this vast territory as has 
 been reclaimed capable of cultivation and of supporting 
 any considerable population, and it is not to be imagined 
 that any academic theory of the meaning of public use, 
 evolved by those who, in the comfortable surroundings of 
 the populous states of the east, delight in whittling away 
 the sovereign powers of the people, has been allowed to 
 stand in the way of an improvement so vital to the pros- 
 perity or even the existence of such a large portion of the 
 United States. 
 
 In some of the states the demand for irrigation has been 
 met by the construction of canals which all owners of land 
 
 72. See Report of Secretary of 
 the Interior, 1913. 
 
§ 91 Public Use — Aid to Peivate Enteepeise. 249 
 
 "within reach, may make use of, and if there are enough of 
 such owners needing the water to use it as members of the 
 public, the irrigation canal is a public service and can be 
 established by the exercise of eminent domain without any 
 constitutional objection arising, even if irrigation is not 
 really essential to the prosperity of the stateJ^ More diffi- 
 cult questions are raised when it is sought to take land so 
 as to irrigate' the estates of individuals and to construct 
 canals which the public has no right to use. This is usually 
 done by the formation of irrigation districts, quasi-munic- 
 ipal corporations which reclaim the arid lands within their 
 limits and assess the expense upon the owners specially 
 benefited, although the power of doing the work is some- 
 times granted to private corporations,''* and is sometimes 
 undertaken by the state itself^ In the states within the arid 
 zone, which have depended upon irrigation for their exist- 
 ence, there has been no hesitation in sustaining the consti- 
 tutionality of the statutes which authorized the exercise of 
 eminent domain in behalf of irrigation effected in this man- 
 ner, under public or quasi-public auspices,'^® and in several 
 
 73. United States. — Ghitierres v. 74. That the power is granted to 
 
 Albuquerque, etc., Co., 188 U. S. a private corporation is not in it- 
 
 645, 47 L. ed. 588. self an objection. 
 
 California. — San Joaquin, etc., California. — Lux v. Haggin, 69 
 
 Irrigation Co. V. Stevenson, 164 Gal. 255, 10 Pac. 674. 
 
 Cal. 221, 128 Pac. 924. Nebraska.— Pstxton Irrigation 
 
 Montana.— Spratt v. Helena Canal Co. v. Farmers' Irrigation 
 
 Power Transmission Co., 35 Mont. Co., 45 Nebr. 884, 64 N. W. 343, 
 
 108, 88 Pac. 773, 8 L. R. A. (K S.) 29 L. E. A. 853, 50 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 567. 585. 
 
 New Mexico. — Isleta v. Tondre, Oregon. — Umatilla Irrigation 
 
 18 N. M. 388, 137 Pac. 86. Co. v. Bamhart, 22 Ore. 389, 30 
 
 Texas. — Borden v. Trespalacios Pac. 37. 
 
 Rice & Irrigation Co., 98 Tex. 494, Texas. — Imperial Irrigation Co. 
 
 86 S. W. 11, 107 Am. St. Rep. 640; v. Jayne, 104 Tex. 395, 138 S. W. 
 
 affirmed, 204 U, S. 667, 51 K 3d. 575, Ann. Cas. 1914 B 322. 
 
 671. 75. United States. — Burley v. 
 
 Water may be condemned for ir- United States, 102 C. C. A. 429, 
 
 rigation purposes, although part of 179 Fed. 1, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 
 it will be lost by seepage and evap- 807. 
 
 oration. San Joaquin, etc., Irriga- Arizona. — Oury v. Goodwin, 3 
 
 tion Co. V. Stevenson, 164 Cal. 221, Ariz. 255, 26 Pac. 376. 
 
 128 Pac. 924. California. — In re M'adera Irri- 
 
250 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 91 
 
 of the states tlie constitutions specifically provide that 
 irrigation shall constitute a public use.''® 
 
 The federal constitution presents no obstacle to such 
 legislation. Thus, in a case taken up from California, the 
 Supreme Court of the United States held that although it 
 would be improper for the legislature to provide for irri- 
 gating the lands of any number of owners for their own 
 gratification, yet in a state like California, embracing mil- 
 lions of acres of arid lands which when left in their original 
 condition would present an effectual obstacle to the advance 
 of a large portion of the state in material wealth and pros- 
 perity, irrigation of such lands was a public use and the 
 method of carrying it out by the creation of irrigation dis- 
 tricts was due process of law. The court further says that 
 the case does not essentially differ from the decisions relat- 
 ing to the draining of swamp land, and refers to the power 
 to make reasonable regulations for the general advantage 
 of those who are treated for this purpose as owners of a 
 common property. The court also intimates that the use 
 
 gation District, 92 Cal. 296, 28 Pac. away, 67 Nebr. 325, 93 N. W. 781, 
 
 272, 14 L. R. A. 755, 27 Am. St. 108 Am. St. Rep. 647. 
 
 Rep. 106; Rialto Irrigation Dia- New Mexico. — Isleta v. Tondre, 
 
 triet V. Brandon, 103 Cal. 384, 37 18 N. M. 388, 137 Pac. 86. 
 
 Pac. 484; Merrill v. South Side Oregon. — Umatilla Irrigation 
 
 Irrigation Oo., 112 Cal. 426, 44 Co. v. Bamhart, 22 Ore. 389, 30 
 
 Pac. 720. Pac. 37. 
 
 Idaho. — ^Portneuf Irrigating Co. Texas. — Imperial Irrigation Co. 
 
 V. Budge, 16 Idaho 116, 100 Pae. v. Jayne, 104 Tex. 395, 138 S. W. 
 
 1046, 18 Ann. Cas. 674. 575, Ann. Cas. 1914 B 322. 
 
 Kcmsas. — Lake Koen Co. v. Utah. — Lundberg v. Green River 
 
 Klein, 63 Kan. 484, 65 Pae. 684. Irrigation District, 119 Pae. 1039. 
 
 Montana. — Ellinghouse v. Tay- Washington. — Prescott Irriga- 
 
 lor, 19 Mont. 462, 48 Pac. 757; tion Co. v. Mathers, 20 Wash. 454, 
 
 Smith V. Denniffi, 24 Mont. 20, 60 55 Pac. 635; State v. Yakima 
 
 Pac. 398, 50 L. R. A. 741, 81 Am. County Court, 67 Wash. 556, 122 
 
 St. Rep. 408. Pae. 19. 
 
 Nebraska. — Paxton & Hershey 76. Arizona, art. II, § 17; Cali- 
 
 Iirigating Canal & Land Co. v. fomia, art. XIV, § 1; Colorado, 
 
 Farmers' & Merchants' Irrigation art. II, § 14; Idaho, art. I, § 14; 
 
 & Land Co., 45 Nebr. 884, 64 N. W. Montana, art. ni, § 15; South Da- 
 
 343, 29 L. R. A. 853, 50 Am. St. kota, art. XH, § 7; Washington, 
 
 Rep. 585; Alfalfa Irrigation Dis- art. I, i 16; Wyoming, art. I, 
 
 trict V. CoUins, 46 Nebr. 411, 64 § 32. 
 N. W. 1086; Crawford Co. v. Hath- 
 
§ 91 Public Use — Aid to Pbivatb Enteepbise. 251 
 
 is public because all persons have the right to use the water 
 under the same circumstances, but it rests its decision on 
 the ground first stated, namely, that the cultivation of such 
 a vast area would benefit the public of the whole state.^'' 
 
 In some of the states the natural obstacles can best be 
 overcome by allowing the individual owners to construct 
 the ditches which will irrigate their own lands, and statutes 
 have been enacted which allow each proprietor to exercise 
 eminent domain for his own private irrigation. While it is 
 generally recognized that such statutes go to the verge of 
 constitutionality, and that, where agricultural conditions 
 are normal, such an interference with private rights would 
 not be tolerated, it has been held, in such states as have 
 fotmd it advisable to enact such statutes, that they make 
 possible the development of the natural resources of the 
 state and are consequently constitutional^^ In passing 
 upon a statute of this character enacted by the legislature 
 of Utah the Supreme Court of the United States admitted 
 that in most states such a taking would be in violation of 
 the fourteenth amendment but held that there might be 
 local conditions with which the state courts must be sup- 
 posed to be famdliar which would bear on the question 
 whether the individual use proposed might not, in fact, be 
 a public one, and declined to overturn a decision made in 
 the light of such knowledge^® 
 
 In California the irrigation of arid lands is not consid- 
 ered a public use unless it affects a district so large that the 
 private gain is not the chief benefit, and unless all who own 
 lands that may be benefited by the irrigation have the 
 
 77. Fallbrook Irrigation District Cas. 300; affirmed, 198 U. S. 361, 
 V. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. ed. 49 L. ed. 1085, 4 Ann. Cas. 1171. 
 369. W<zshington. — State v. Spokane 
 
 78. Colorado. — Ortiz v. Hansen, County Court, 59 Wash. 621, 110 
 35 Colo. 100, 83 Pae. 964. Pae. 429, 140 Am. St. Rep. 893; 
 
 ilfo««a»a.— Ellinghonse v. Tay- White v. Strout, 72 Wash. 62, 129 
 
 lor, 19 Mont. 464, 48 Pae. 757. Pae. 917. 
 
 Utdh.— 'Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah 79. Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361, 
 
 158, 75 Pae. 371, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49 L. ed. 1085, 4 Ann. Cas. 1171. 
 208, 101 Am. St. Rep. 953, 1 Ann. 
 
252 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 92 
 
 privilege of taking advantage of it.*' It has been held else- 
 where that it is immaterial whether one or many proprietors 
 are benefited by a particular irrigation enterprise, if the 
 state is one dependent for its prosperity on the irrigation 
 of its arid lands as a whole.*^ At any rate the limit of the 
 power of the legislature is somewhat elastic, both as to the 
 amount of arid land in the district sought to be irrigated ' 
 and as to the actual aridness of such land.*^ These are 
 questions of fact for the legislature to decide, and the courts 
 will not interfere unless it plainly appears either that the 
 amount of arid land is so small that its cultivation will 
 benefit its owners only, or that it is already reasonably fit 
 for cultivation. 
 
 § 92. Mines and Mining. 
 
 It has frequently been found convenient, if not necessary, 
 for the operator of a mine, if he is to carry on his business 
 to advantage, to be able to exercise the power of eminent 
 domain, either to procure a supply of water, or to dig a 
 shaft or tunnel under adjacent land, or to establish a right 
 of way to the nearest railroad so as to be able to ship the 
 products of the mine. It may, however, be laid down as a 
 general rule of law that under normal conditions the oper- 
 ation of mines by private individuals or corporations is not 
 a public use, and that eminent domain cannot be employed 
 in behalf of mining any more than of any other form of 
 private business.*^ 
 
 80. Lorenz v. Jacob, 63 Cal. 73; Court, 59 "Wash. 621, 110 Pac. 42S, 
 Lindsay Irrigation Co. v. Mehrtens, 140 Am. St. Rep. 893. In a state 
 97 Cal. 676, 32 Pac. 802. in wMch the constitution declares 
 
 81. EUinghouse v. Taylor, 19 irrigation to be a public use it is 
 Mont. 462, 48 Pae. 757; Nash v. immaterial that water might be se- 
 Clark, 27 Utah 158, 75 Pac. 371, 1 cured by pumping, or whether the 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 208, 101 Am. St. owner intends to farm the irrigated 
 Rep. 953, 1 Ann. Cas. 300. lands or sell them in tracts. State 
 
 82. FaUbrook Irrigation District v. Spokane County Court, 59 
 V. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. ed. "Wash. 621, 110 Pae. 429, 140 Am. 
 369; Oury v. Goodwin, 3 Ariz. 255, St. Rep. 893. 
 
 26 Pao. 376; Lindsay Irrigation Co. 83. California. — Consolidated 
 
 V. Mehrtens, 97 Cal. 676, 32 Pac. Channel Co. v. Central Pacific R. 
 802; State v. Spokane County R. Co., 51 Cal. 269 ; People v. Pitts- 
 
§ 92 PuBUo Use — Aid to Private Entebpeise. 
 
 253 
 
 There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Thus it has 
 been held that the production of gold is a public use on 
 account of its relation to the national currency,** although 
 this line of reasoning has not been generally followed;*^ 
 and the public need of coal has been invoked as a justifica- 
 tion for the use of eminent domain in behalf of coal min- 
 ing,®* and, although this contention has been abandoned for 
 the time being, there is a possibility that it may have to be 
 reckoned with in the future.*^ 
 
 burgh R. R. Co., 53 Cal. 694; 
 Lorenz v. Jacob, 63 Cal. 73; Ama- 
 dor Queen Mining Co. v. Dewitt, 73 
 Cal. 482, 15 Pac. 74; Sutter County 
 V. Nicols, 152 Cal. 688, 93 Pae. 
 872, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 616, 14 
 Ann. Cas. 900. 
 
 Colorado. — People ex rel. Aspen, 
 etc., Co. V. District Court, 11 Col. 
 147, 17 Pae. 298. 
 
 Illinois. — Sholl v. German Coal 
 Co., 118 III. 427, 10 N. E. 199, 59 
 Am. Rep. 379. 
 
 Indiana. — Great Western, etc., 
 Co. V. Hawkins, 30 Ind. App. 557, 
 66 N. E. 765. 
 
 Iowa. — Phillips v. Watson, 63 
 Iowa 28, 18 N. W. 659. 
 
 Ohio. — State v. Hazleton R. R. 
 Co., 40 Ohio St. 504. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Edgewood R. R. 
 Co.'s Appeal, 70 Pa. 257; Wad- 
 deU's Appeal, 84 Pa. 90. 
 
 Tennessee. — Alfred Phosphate 
 Co. V. Duek River Phosphate Co., 
 120 Tenn. 260, 113 S. W. 410, 22 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 701. 
 
 West Virginia. — Valley City 
 Salt Co. V. Brown, 7 W. Va. 191. 
 
 84. Hand Gold Mining Co. v. 
 Parker, 59 Ga. 419. 
 
 85. Thus in Sutter County v. 
 Nicols, 152 Cal. 688, 93 Pae. 872, 
 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 616, 14 Ann. 
 Cas. 900, the court said: "The 
 production of sufficient gold to 
 maintain the gold standard may be 
 a, matter of public importance, and 
 
 it may be within the power of Con- 
 gress to encourage it by appropri- 
 ate legislation. It probably has the 
 same power with regard to any 
 other industry tending to increase 
 the wealth of the nation. It can- 
 not be admitted, however, that the 
 mining of gold to be applied 
 wholly to the private use of the 
 miner, to whatever extent it may 
 increase the general output, is a 
 public purpose, in behalf of which 
 the power of eminent domain may 
 be resorted to, or for which the pri- 
 vate property of others may be 
 taken, or its injury lawfully au- 
 thorized." 
 
 86. In Sehoenberger v. Mulhol- 
 lan, 8 Pa. 134, the court held that 
 a statute authorizing the owners of 
 coal mines to condemn a right of 
 way for a lateral railroad to the 
 nearest highway was not only con- 
 stitutional but wise, and happily 
 adapted to bring on the public 
 works a large amount of business, 
 and cheapen the article of coal, 
 which is so essential to the manu- 
 factures and commerce of the 
 country and to every family. Later 
 Pennsylvania cases held that emi- 
 nent domain could not be employed 
 in behalf of coal mines (supra, 
 note 83), and sustained the lateral 
 railroad acts on the ground that 
 such railroads were open to use by 
 the public (supra, § 67). 
 
 87. Supra, § 78. 
 
254 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 92 
 
 California, with its immense agricultural and commercial 
 possibilities, was never obliged to recognize the gold mines 
 which laid the foundation of its prosperity as a public use,^* 
 but in some of the western states less fortunately situated, 
 the successful operation of the mines has been so essential 
 to the very existence of the community and to the occupa- 
 tion of the state by any considerable number of permanent 
 inhabitants that the courts ha^e sustained statutes which 
 authorized the exercise of eminent domain by the owners 
 of mines, on the ground that mining was the paramount 
 interest of the state and that anything calculated to encour- 
 age it would advance the general prosperity and welfare of 
 the people of the state.*' In a few of the states the consti- 
 
 88. Supra, notes 83 and 84. 
 
 89. Thus in Dayton, etc., Mining 
 Co. V. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, the 
 court, through Hawley, C. J., said, 
 " The mining and milling interests 
 give employment to many men, and 
 the benefits derived from this busi- 
 ness are distributed as much and 
 sometimes more among the laboring 
 classes than with the owners of the 
 mines and mills. The mines are 
 fixed by the laws of nature, and 
 are often found in places almost 
 inaccessible. For the purpose of 
 successfully conducting and carry- 
 ing on the business of 'mining, 
 milling, smelting, or other reduc- 
 tion of ores,' it is necessary to erect 
 hoisting works, to build mills, to 
 construct smelting furnaces, to se- 
 cure ample grounds for dumping 
 waste, rock, and earth; and a road 
 to and from the mines always in- 
 dispensable. The sites necessary 
 for these purposes are often con- 
 fined to certain fixed localities. 
 • * * The issue is clearly pre- 
 sented, and it ought to be fairly 
 met. That the purposes men- 
 tioned in the act ' are of vital ne- 
 cessity to the people of this state' 
 cannot be denied; that mining is 
 the paramount interest of the state 
 
 is not questioned; that anything 
 which tends directly to encourage 
 mineral developments and increase 
 the mineral resources of the state is 
 for the benefit of the public, and is 
 calculated to advance the general 
 welfare and prosperity of the peo- 
 ple of this state, is a self-evident 
 proposition. Hence, it necessarily 
 follows that if the position con- 
 tended for by petitioner is correct, 
 and I believe it is, then the act is 
 constitutional and should be up- 
 held. Although other and weaker 
 reasons have more frequently been 
 assigned, it seems to me that this is 
 the true interpretation, upon which 
 courts have really acted in sustain- 
 ing the right of eminent domain in 
 favor of railroads and other ob- 
 jects, and in several of the de- 
 cided eases this reason is expressly 
 given." In Highland Boy Gold 
 Mining Co. v. Strickley, 28 Utah 
 215, 78 Pac. 296, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 976, 107 Am. St. Rep. 711, 3 Ann. 
 Cas. 1110 (affirmed in 200 U. S. 
 527, 50 L. ed. 581, 4 Ann. Cas. 
 1174), the court, through McCar- 
 thy, J., said, " We have in this 
 state, in addition to the extensive 
 deposits of gold, silver, lead, and 
 copper ores, lar^e areas of lands 
 
§ 92 Public Use — Aid to Pbivate Entekprise. 255 
 
 tution specifically declares the assistance of mining to be 
 for the public use,®" and the Supreme Court of the United 
 States has held that if the people of a state consider the 
 success of the mining industry essential to their prosperity 
 as a community, it will not undertake to say that they are 
 
 wrong. ^ 
 
 containing coal in almost limitless 
 quantities, and we depend almost 
 exclusively upon the coal mines for 
 the fuel used in our manufacturing 
 ^ablishments and for domestic 
 purposes. Now, it is of vital im- 
 portance to the people that the 
 coal, as well as the other hidden re- 
 sources of the state, be opened up 
 and developed, and that the mining 
 industry in general, which has been 
 the source of so much wealth to the 
 people of this and other Western 
 states, be conducted on the same 
 extensive scale in the future that 
 has characterized its operations in 
 the past. Therefore the public 
 policy of the state, as exempli- 
 fied by the act of the legislature 
 under consideration, is to encour- 
 age the people to open up and ex- 
 ploit the mines with which the 
 state aboimds, and thereby not only 
 give to the state the wealth which 
 will enable other industries to be 
 created, but furnish thousands of 
 laborers with remunerative employ- 
 ment." See also 
 
 United States. — Horton v. Squan- 
 kum, etc., Marl Co., Fed. Cas. No. 
 610; Douglas v. Byrnes, 59 Ted. 
 29; Miocene Ditch Co. v. Jacobsen, 
 77 C. C. A. 106, 146 Fed. 680. 
 
 Maryland. — New Central Coal 
 Co. V. George's Creek, etc., Coal 
 Co., 37 Md. 537. 
 
 Montana. — Helena Power Trans- 
 mission Co. V. Spratt, 35 Mont. 
 108, 88 Pae. 773, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 567. 
 
 Nevada. — Overman Silver Min- 
 ing Co. V. Corcoran, 15 Nev. 147; 
 Goldfleld, etc., Transportation Co. 
 
 V. Old Sandstrom, etc.. Mining Co., 
 150 Pac. 313 (holding that land 
 may be condenmed for a place to 
 deposit tailings from an ore-mill). 
 
 90. Arizona, art. II, § 17; Colo- 
 rado, art. II, § 14; Idaho, art. I, 
 § 14; Illinois, art. 4, § 31; Wyom- 
 ing, art. I, § 32. 
 
 91. Strickley v. Highland Boy 
 Gold Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527, 50 
 L. ed. 581, 4 Ann. Cas. 1174, af- 
 firming 28 Utah 215, 78 Pac. 296, 
 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 976, 107 Am. 
 St. Rep. 711, 3 Ann. Cas. 1110. 
 In this case the court, through 
 Holmes, J., said, " The question, 
 thus narrowed, is pretty nearly 
 answered by the recent decision 
 in Clark v. Nasih, 198 U. S. 361, 
 49 L. ed. 1085. That case estab- 
 lished the constitutionality of the 
 Utah statute, so far as it per- 
 mitted the condemnation of land 
 for the irrigation of other land be- 
 longing to a private person, in pur- 
 suance of the declared policy of the 
 state. In discussing what consti- 
 tutes a public use, it recognized 
 the inadequacy of use by the gen- 
 eral public as a universal test. 
 While emphasizing the great cau- 
 tion necessary to be shown, it 
 proved that there might be excep- 
 tional times and places in which 
 the very foundations of public wel- 
 fare could not be laid without 
 requiring concessions from individ- 
 uals to each other upon due com- 
 pensation, which, under other 
 circumstances, would be left wholly 
 to voluntary consent. In such un- 
 usual cases there is nothing in the 
 fourteenth amendment which pre- 
 
256 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 92 
 
 Jn some instances, moreover, eminent domain may be 
 employed in behalf of mines without violating any of the 
 recognized principles of constitutional law. Thus a flume 
 may be laid out by eminent domain to carry water to all 
 the mines within reach, if its proprietors are bound to serve 
 all who apply, although in fact it is used by but few persona 
 and serves but a small area.®^ Similarly a way for drain- 
 ing, ventilating and carrying out ore from mines has been 
 held to be public when it was for the use of all the mines 
 along its course.®^ Spur tracks or lateral railroads leading 
 to a mine or a quarry may be laid out by eminent domain, if 
 they form part of a railroad system and are open to public 
 use, although they are in fact of no practical benefit except 
 to the mine or quarry to which they lead."* 
 
 vents a state from requiring such 
 concessions. If the state constitu- 
 tion restricts the legislature -within 
 narrower bounds, that is a local af- 
 fair, and must be left where the 
 state court leaves it in a case .like 
 the one at bar. In the opinion of 
 the legislature and the supreme 
 court -of Utah the public welfare 
 of that state demands that aerial 
 lines between the mines upon its 
 mountain sides and the railways in 
 the valleys below should not be 
 made impossible by the refusal of 
 a private owner to seU the right to 
 cross his land. The constitution of 
 the United States does not require 
 us to say that they are wrong." 
 
 92. Miocene Ditch Co. v. Jacob- 
 sen, 77 C. C. A. 106, 146 Fed. 680 j 
 Tennessee CoaJ, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Paint Rock Plume & Transporta- 
 tion Co., 128 Tenn. 277, 160 S. W. 
 522. 
 
 93. Tanner v. Treasury, etc.. Re- 
 duction Co., 35 Col. 593, 83 Pac. 
 464, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 106; State, 
 De Camp Prosecutor v. Hibemia 
 Underground R. R. Co., 47 N. J. L. 
 43. See also the last sentence of 
 the decision in Strickley v. High- 
 land Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 
 
 U. S. 527, 50 L. ed. 581, 4 Ann. 
 Cas. 1174, in which the court said 
 that if an aerial bucket way was 
 open to use by all mine operators 
 .in the neighborhood the use was 
 unquestionably public. See how- 
 ever Alfred Phosphate Co. v. Duck 
 River Phosphate Co., 120 Tenn. 
 260, 113 S. "W. 410, 22 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 701, in which it was held 
 that a few mining companies con- 
 stituted too limited a class to make 
 the use public when the way was 
 not under governmental control. 
 
 94. Arkcmsas. — St. Louis, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Petty, 57 Ark. 359, 21 
 S. W. 884, 20 L. R. A. 434; Ozark 
 Coal Co. V. Pennsylvania Anthrar- 
 cite R. R. Co., 97 Ark. 495, 134 
 S. W. 634, Ann. Cas. 1912 D 1000. 
 
 Indiana. — Bedford Quarries Co. 
 V. Chicago, etc.. Railway Co., 175 
 Ind. 303, 94 N. E. 326, 35 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 641; Westport Stone Co. 
 V. Thomas, 175 Ind. 319, 94 N. E. 
 406, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 646. 
 
 Iowa. — PhiUips v. Watson, 63 
 Iowa 28, 18 N. W. 659. 
 
 Kentucky. — Chesapeake Stone 
 Co. V. Moreland, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 
 1075, 104 S. W. 762, 16 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 479; Greasy Creek Min- 
 
§ 93 Public Use — Aid to Private Entebpbise. 
 
 257 
 
 § 93. Lumbering and Log Driving. 
 
 In certain parts of the country eminent domain is 
 employed to a considerable extent in behalf of the lumber 
 trade, principally to aid in bringing out logs from the 
 timber lands to the public highways and railroads and 
 navigable water-courses, but although lumbering is in 
 many states an industry of the greatest importance and the 
 difficulty of bringing out logs through a district so sparsely 
 settled that it is not penetrated by the general highway and 
 railroad system is often serious, the accepted principles of 
 constitutional law have not been departed from, and the 
 courts have not allowed the power of eminent domain to 
 be bestowed upon individuals or corporations to enable 
 them to get their ovm logs to market by land or water,®^ 
 except in a state in which the constitution authorizes the 
 exercise of eminent domain for any use necessary to the 
 
 eral Co. v. Ely Jellico Coal Co., 
 132 Ky. 692, 116 S. W. 1189. 
 
 Maine. — Ulmer v. Lime Rock 
 Eailroad Co., 98 Me. 579, 57 Atl. 
 1001, 66 L. R. A. 387. 
 
 Missouri. — Kansas, etc.. Coal R. 
 E. Co. V. Northwestern Coal & 
 Mining Co., 161 M'o. 288, 61 S. W. 
 684, 51 L. R. A. 936, 84 Am. St. 
 Rep. 717. 
 
 Montana. — Butte, etc.. Railway 
 Co. V. Montana Union Railway Co., 
 16 Mont. 504, 41 Pac. 232, 31 
 L. R. A. 298, 50 Am. St. Rep. 
 508; Kipp v. Davis-Daly Copper 
 Co., 41 Mont. 509, 110 Pac. 237, 36 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 666. 
 
 Oregon. — Oswego, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Cobb, 66 Ore. 587, 135 Pac. 181. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Hays v. Riaher, 
 32 Pa. 169; Boyd v. Nealey, 40 Pa. 
 377. 
 
 In some of the earlier cases spur 
 tracks to mines were held to con- 
 Btitute a public use without regard 
 to the right of the public to use 
 them. New Central Coal Co. v. 
 George's Creek, etc.. Coal Co., 37 
 Md. 537; Harroy v. Lloyd, 3 Pa. 
 17 
 
 331; Schoenberger v. Mulhollan, 8 
 Pa. 134. 
 
 95. Michigan. — Garth Lumber, 
 etc., Co. V. Johnson, 151 Mich. 205, 
 115 N. W. 52, 123 Am. St. Rep. 
 262. 
 
 New York. — Brewster v. Rogers 
 Co., 169 N. y. 73, 62 N. E. 164, 58 
 L. R. A. 495. 
 
 North Carolina. — Cozard y. Kan- 
 awha Hardwood Co., 139 N. C. 
 283, 51 S. E. 932, 1 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 969, 111 Am. St. Rep. 779. 
 
 Oregon. — Apex Transportation 
 Co. V. Garbade, 32 Ore. 582, 52 
 Pac. 573, 54 Pac. 367, 882, 62 
 L. R. A. 513; Anderson v. Smith- 
 Powers Logging Co., 71 Ore. 276, 
 139 Pac. 736. 
 
 Washington. — Healy Lumber Co. 
 V. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 74 Pac. 
 681, 63 L. R. A. 820, 99 Am. St. 
 Rep. 564. 
 
 West Virginia. — Hench v. Pritt, 
 62 W. Va. 270, 57 S. E. 808, 125 
 Am. St. Rep. 966; Scott Lumber 
 Co. V. Wolford, 62 W. Va. 555, 59 
 S. E. 516. 
 
258 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 93 
 
 complete development of the material resources of the 
 state.®" One class of statutes in aid of lumbering which 
 have been sustained provides for the improvement of rivers 
 for floating logs,®'' and the right to condemn land for such 
 purposes depends upon the right of the public to use the 
 stream when improved.®* Boom companies are also per- 
 mitted to take land for constructing their booms.®® These 
 companies, however, float, gather, sort, and distribute the 
 logs belonging to other people, are often subject to regula- 
 tion as to rates and are bound by law or custom to serve all 
 who apply. Therefore their business is not strictly private, 
 and the laws relating to the boom companies rest for their 
 justification more upon the obligation of such companies to 
 serve the public than upon the importance of the lumber 
 industry. 
 
 Similarly land may be taken for a railroad open to use 
 by the public although its main purpose is to transport logs 
 to a saw-mill,^ and a corporation chartered to construct log- 
 ging roads may exercise the power of eminent domain if it 
 is required by law to transport logs for all alike. That all 
 the stock of such a corporation is held by a certain timber 
 company or its stockholders is immaterial, especially if it 
 appears that timber land owned by others will be rendered 
 accessible.^ 
 
 Courts had good reason for treating the logging railroads 
 with a liberal spirit, for the cutting of timber not only 
 
 96. Potlateh Ltimber Co. v. Pe-' W(ishington. — ^North River Boom 
 terson, 12 Idaho 769, 88 Pae. 426, Co. v. Smith, 15 Wash. 138, 45 Pac. 
 118 Am. St. Rep. 233. 750; State v. Chehalis County 
 
 97. Olive V. State, 86 Ala. 88, 5 Court, 47 Wash. 397, 92 Pae. 269; 
 So. 653; State v. Clallam County Kalama, etc., Power Co. v. Kalama 
 Court, 62 Wash. 612, 114 Pac. 444. Driving Co., 48 Wash. 612, 94 Pae. 
 
 98. State v. Chehalis County 469, 125 Am. St. Rep. 948. 
 Court, 47 Wash. 397, 92 Pac. 269. 1. Bridal Veil Lumbering Co. v. 
 
 99. Maine. — Lawler v. Baring Johnson, 30 Ore. 205, 46 Pae. 790, 
 Boom Co., 56 Me. 445. 34 L. R. A. 368, 60 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 Michigan. — Benjamin v. Manis- 818. See also Jarrett Lumber Cor- 
 
 tee River Imp. Co., 42 Mich. 628, poration v. Christopher, 65 Fla. 
 
 4 N. W. 483. 379, 61 So. 831. 
 
 Minnesota. — Cotton v. Missis- 2, State v. Clallam County Court, 
 
 sippi, etc.. Boom Co., 22 Minn. 62 Wash. 612, 114 Pac. 444. 
 372. 
 
§ 93 Public Use — Aid to Private Enterprise. 259 
 
 furnished employment to many men and made material 
 available for building the houses required by every inhab- 
 itant, but it opened the land for settlement. It is said to be 
 the fact that logging railroads are almost never abandoned 
 when the timber in the district through which they pene- 
 trate is exhausted, but are gradually made over to meet the 
 public demand for general transportation as the denuded 
 forest is occupied by farms and villages.® It is only recently 
 that it has been realized that the public welfare is not sub- 
 served by an unlimited cutting down of timber and that the 
 conservation of the remaining forest lands has become a 
 subject of general interest. 
 
 § 94. Clearing a Doubtful Title. 
 
 Closely allied to the questions discussed in the preceding 
 pages involving the development of land for agricultural 
 purposes which has been hitherto prevented by natural 
 causes are those arising when the development of land is 
 prevented or impaired by the state of the title or the con- 
 dition of the owners. As it is indisputable that the general 
 welfare of society is involved in the security of the titles 
 to real estate, and in the public registry of such titles, it is 
 obvious that the power to legislate as to such subjects 
 inheres in the very nature of government,* but the exercise 
 of this power has not generally been considered to be a 
 taking by eminent doman, although it may result in an 
 actual transfer of ownership,^ so that the public use is not 
 required for its justification. It has been held however 
 that the lands of an Indian tribe may be taken by eminent 
 domain for town-site purposes, the court holding it to be 
 for the public good that a civilized town be erected in lands 
 otherwise incapable of such settlement, and saying that the 
 public use is synonymous with the public good.* Some of 
 
 3. Compare Jaxrett Lumber Cor- 5. Infra, § 105. 
 
 poration v. Christopher, 65 Ma. 6. Tuttle v. Moore, 3 Ind. Ter. 
 
 379, 61 So. 831, in which it is said 712, 65 S. W. 585. See also 
 that a logging' railroad may be a Ckwmbs, Petitioner, 127 Mass. 278. 
 permanent structure. 
 
 4. American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 
 219 U. S. 47, 55 L. ed. 82. 
 
260 The Law of Eminent Domain, § 94 
 
 the reasoning in the case seems to lead to extreme results, 
 but it by no means follows that a white owner of a vast 
 tract, who refused to allow its development, could be com- 
 pelled to part with it to intending settlers. Indians, in the 
 eye of the law, are classed as dependents, with infants and 
 insane persons, and the involuntary alienation of the prop- 
 erty of such persons is a common subject of legislation. 
 This fact is pointed out at some length by the court. 
 
 A large number of estates in Pennsylvania were subject 
 to inextinguishable ground rents which greatly interfered 
 with the sale and development of the land, but it was held 
 that the incumbrances could not be taken by compelling the 
 rent-owner, at the option of the land-owner, to receive a 
 gross sum and release the rents, since the use was private 
 and not public.'' In an early case in the United States 
 Supreme Court, chiefly notable because of its assertion of 
 the power of the courts to hold acts of the legislature void, 
 an act of the Pennsylvania legislature which attempted to 
 settle the numerous disputes which had arisen between per- 
 sons claiming title to land in Pennsylvania under grants 
 from Connecticut and Pennsylvania respectively, by giving 
 tlie lands to one party and compensating the other in money, 
 was held unconstitutional.® Later cases in the Court of 
 Claims in relation to the assumption of claims against 
 France are not inconsistent with this decision. By a treaty 
 with France the United States released the claims of its 
 citizens against France and undertook to compensate them 
 itself. It was lield that their property was taken for a 
 public use, the benefit not being to the individual claimants, 
 but to the government, in settling its controversy with 
 France.® 
 
 7. Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. 479, 9. Meade v. United States, 2 Ct. 
 5 Am. Rep. 450. CI. 224; Gray v. Uaited States, 21 
 
 8. Van Home's Lessee v. Dor- Ct. CI. 340. 
 ranee, 2 Dall. (U. S.) 304, 1 L. ed. 
 
 391. 
 
CHAPTER Vn. 
 What Constitutes a Taking. 
 
 Sectiok 95. Scope of the Prohibition against Taking without Com- 
 pensation. 
 
 96. Taking of Property at Time of War or other Calamity. 
 
 97. Taking under the Power of Taxation. 
 
 98. The Eequirement of Personal Services. 
 
 99. Taking of Property under the Police Power — Emulations 
 
 Affecting the Public Health, Morals or Safety. 
 
 100. Poliee Regulations not Affecting the Public Health, Morals 
 
 or Safety. 
 
 101. Regulations which are Really the Taking of an Easement by 
 
 Eminent Domain. 
 
 102. Actual Appropriation a Taking, even if for Public Health, 
 
 Morals or Safety. 
 
 103. Fines and Forfeitures. 
 
 104. Destruction of Property to Abate a Nuisance. 
 
 105. Legislation Aimed to Prevent the Tieing up of Productive 
 
 Property. 
 
 106. Subjection to Police Regulations as Result of a Taking. 
 
 107. Taking by Eminent Domain Defined. 
 
 108. Damaging Property not Necessarily a Taking. 
 
 109. The Fallacy of the Argument that a Damaging is a Taking. 
 
 110. The Question whether a Damaging is a Taking no Longer 
 
 Open. 
 
 111. Erection of Permanent Structures upon Private Land with- 
 
 out Formal Condemnation. 
 
 112. Entry for a Temporary Purpose. 
 
 113. Covering Land with Earth, Sewage or Water. 
 
 114. Pollution of the Air — Smells — Noises. 
 
 115. Deprivation of Access — Discontinuance of Streets and other 
 
 Public Works. 
 
 116. Discontinuance or Change of Use when Betterments have been 
 
 Assessed. 
 
 117. Authorization of Nuisances. 
 
 § 95. Scope of the Prohibition against Taking without 
 Compensation. 
 
 The constitutional provision which prohibits the taking 
 
 of property for public use without compensation is directed 
 
 only against the enforcement of an act of legislature which 
 
 ^attempts to authorize the seizure or destruction of property 
 
 against the will of the owner. It has no application to the 
 
 [261] 
 
262 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 95 
 
 decision of a court upon the relative rights in property of 
 parties litigant which have been voluntarily created by 
 contract/ or to the acts of individuals not authorized by 
 law, even if the individuals are public officers who are pur- 
 porting to act on behalf of the government.* It cannot 
 have the effect of making the state or one of its subdivisions 
 responsible for the acts of persons who are not its agents, 
 even if they have taken property for the public use and are 
 financially unable to pay just compensation.* In short, it 
 is a restriction upon the legislative branch of the govern- 
 ment, a mere negation of power, and does not create a 
 positive right in an individual citizen to receive compensa- 
 tion from the government, arising whenever his property 
 is taken for the public use. 
 
 There is nothing on the face of the constitutional pro- 
 vision in question which confines its application to a taking 
 of property under color of eminent domain, and, although 
 it was undoubtedly specifically aimed at the power of emi- 
 nent domain, it nevertheless applies to all the sovereign 
 powers of government which may be used to interfere with 
 the quiet enjoyment of private property ; but in its applica- 
 tion to powers other than eminent domain it must be con- 
 strued in the light of the universal understanding of the 
 people when the constitutions were adopted that the par- 
 ticipation in the protection and other benefits which an 
 organized government affords is the only compensation to 
 which an individual is entitled for the interference with 
 certain of his property rights.* Thus in case of actual war, 
 or of impending public calamity, property is taken in the 
 
 1. Bowditeli v. Jackson Co., 76 erty for which a city is liable. So 
 N. H. 351, 82 Atl. 1014, Ann. Cas. also it was held in Craig v. Grreen- 
 1913 A 366. wood District, 91 Ark. 274, 121 
 
 2. Hooe V. United States, 218 S. W. 280, that an owner was not 
 U. S. 322, 54 L. ed. 1055. entitled to compensation when a 
 
 3. Infra, § 485, and see also highway became impassable and 
 Bigelow V. Springfield, 178 Mo. the public travelled over the ad- 
 App. 463, 162 S. W. 750, in which jacent land. 
 
 it was held that the acquisition of 4. Thayer, Cases on Constita- 
 
 the easement of a public way by tional Law, 1078. 
 adverse use is not a taking of prop- 
 
§ 96 What Constitutes a Taking. 263 
 
 strictest sense, and no duty to compensate the owner 
 arises.' And so of taxation ; the person taxed cannot evade 
 payment by proving, no matter how conclusively, that he 
 received no benefit or protection from the government 
 imposing the tax.* Even with regard to special assess- 
 ments it is the prevailing doctrine that the amount assessed 
 may exceed the amount of the benefit.'' It is often said that 
 the provision in question does not apply to the police power 
 at all, and while this statement is not literally true, it is 
 undoubtedly the case that under some circumstances an 
 interference may be made with property under the police 
 power without compensation which if effected under the 
 power of eminent domain would constitute a taking in the 
 constitutional sense.® Nevertheless as will be shown more 
 in detail in the following sections the subject cannot be 
 dismissed by a bald assertion that the provision in question 
 applies only to a taking of property by eminent domain. 
 
 § 96. Taking of Property at Time of War or other 
 Calamity. 
 
 When immediate action is necessary in order to avert a 
 great public calamity, private property may be controlled, 
 damaged or even destroyed without compensation.® Under 
 such conditions any individual has the right to enter 
 another's land and destroy his property, and if he acts with 
 reasonable judgment he is not liable to the owner.^" If the 
 individual who thus enters and destroys private property 
 
 5. Infra, § 96. U. S. 16, 25 L. ed. 980. "At the 
 
 6. Infra, § 97. common law everyone had the right 
 
 7. Infra, § 97. to destroy real and personal prop- 
 
 8. Infra, § 99. erty in cases of actual necessity to 
 
 9. Supra, § 15. prevent the spreading of a fire, and 
 
 10. Case of the Prerogative, 12 there was no responsibility on the 
 Co. Rep. 13. " For the common- part of such destroyer, and no 
 wealth a man shall suffer damage, remedy for the owner. There are 
 as for saving a city or town, a many other cases besides that of 
 house shall be plucked down if the fire — some of them involving the 
 next one be on fire ; and a thing for destruction of life itself- — where 
 the commonwealth every man may the same rule is applied." See also 
 do without being liable' to an ac- Eespublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 
 tion." Bowditeh v. Boston, 101 (Pa.) 357. 
 
264 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 96 
 
 happens to be a public oflScer wkose duty it is to avert the 
 impending calamity, the rights of the owner of the prop- 
 erty to compensation are no greater." The most familiar 
 example of the exercise of this right is seen in case of a fire. 
 The neighbors and firemen freely trespass on the adjoining 
 land, and houses are even blown up to prevent the spread 
 of the conflagration. The danger of a flood or the existence 
 of a pestilence may call for equally drastic action. Stat- 
 utes sometimes provide for compensation in such cases, but 
 unless the provisions of the statute are strictly complied 
 with, the owner stands no better than he did at common 
 law.^^ Even in those states in which the statutes regulate 
 or specifically authorize the destruction of property in the 
 presence of impending calamity, such legislation is not the 
 exercise of a new power, but a recognition and continuation 
 of the old power, and hence is due process of law, and does 
 not effect a taking of property without compensation in the 
 constitutional sense. 
 
 The right of taking, destroying, or injuring property in 
 time of war in some cases rests upon this power of destnio- 
 tion from necessity, and in others upon the power of emi- 
 
 11. United States. — Bowditch v. Washington. — Davison v. Walla 
 
 Boston, 101 U. S. 16, 25 L. ed. Walla, 52 Wash. 453, 100 Pac. 981, 
 
 980. 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 454, 132 Am. 
 
 California. — Snroeeo v. Geary, 3 St. Kep. 983. 
 
 Cal. 69, 58 Am. Dec. 385. 12. United States.— Bowditeh v. 
 
 Iowa.— Field v. Des Moines, 39 Boston, 101 U. S. 16, 25 L. ed. 980. 
 
 Iowa 575, 28 Am. Rep. 46. , California. — Dunbar v. San 
 
 Massachusetts. — Taylor v. Ply- Francisco, 1 Oal. 355. 
 mouth, 8 Mete. 462; Metallic Com- Iowa. — Field v. Des Moines, 39 
 pression Casting Co. v. Fitchburg Iowa 575, 18 Am. Rep. 46. 
 Railroad Co., 109 Mass. 277, 12 Massachusetts. — Coffin v. Nan- 
 Am. Rep. 689. tucket, 5 Cush. 269; Ruggles v. 
 
 New Jersey. — American Print Nantucket, 11 Cush. 433. 
 
 Works V. Lawrence, 23 N. J. L. Minnesota. — ^McDonald v. Red 
 
 590, 57 Am. Dec. 423. Wing, 13 Minn. 38. 
 
 New York. — Russell v. New New York. — Stone v. New York, 
 
 York, 2 Denio 461. 25 Wend. 157; Russell v. New 
 
 Texas. — Keller v. Corpus Christi, York, 2 Denio 461. 
 
 50 Tex. 614, 32 Am. Eep. 613. South Carolina.— WUte v. Char- 
 
 Vermont. — • Aitken v. Wells leston, 2 HiU 571. 
 River, 70 Vt. 308, 40 Atl. 829, 41 
 L. R. A. 566, 67 Am. St. Rep. 672. 
 
§ 97 What Constitutes a Taking. 265 
 
 nent domain* The mere fact that a government is engaged 
 in war does not justify it in impressing the property of 
 its citizens without compensation. But the national defense 
 is a public purpose, and if ships and munitions of war 
 are needed, they may be taken by eminent domain and 
 paid for.^* Beyond this, however, at the actual seat of the 
 struggle, necessity compels the contesting armies to enter 
 upon and dig up private land and to seize supplies for their 
 own use, or to destroy them so that they wiU not fall into 
 the hands of the enemy. All this may be done, not only in 
 the enemy's country, but wherever military operations are 
 being carried on, and whenever the emergency arises. For 
 this the owner has no remedy,^* except against the officer 
 directing the operations in case his view, of the necessity 
 was not reasonable under the circumstances.^'' 
 
 § 97. Taking under the Power of Taxation. 
 
 There can be no doubt that when a direct tax is assessed 
 upon a person on account of his ownership of certain prop- 
 erty, and he is obliged to pay such tax under pain of having 
 his goods and estate, seized and sold, his property is as 
 certainly taken from him as when it is appropriated for a 
 public highway, and that, if the constitution is to be con- 
 strued literally, property can only be so taken for the public 
 use and upon payment of just compensation.^* Although 
 it is considered by some that the constitutional provision 
 
 13. Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 U. S. 315, 48 L. ed. 904; Juragua 
 How. (U. S.) 115, 14 L. ed. 75. Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U. S. 
 "There are no doubt occasions 297, 53 L. efl. 520; Herrerra v. 
 * * * where a military officer United States, 222 U. S. 558, 56 
 charged with a particular duty may L. ed. 316 ; Heflebower v. United 
 impress private property into the States, 21 Ct. CI. 237. 
 
 public service or take it for public Missouri. — Drehman v. Stifel, 
 
 use." See also Wallace v. Alvord, 41 Mo. 184, 97 Am. Dec. 268. 
 
 39 Ga. 609. Tennessee. — Taylor v. Nashville, 
 
 14. United States. — Mitchell v. etc., R. R. Co., 6 Coldw. 646, 98 
 Harmony, 13 How. 115, 14 L. ed. Am. Dec. 474. 
 
 75; Miller v. United States, 11 Vermont. — George v. Consoli- 
 
 Wall. 268, 20 L. ed. 135 ; Young v. dated Lighting Co., 87 Vt. 411, 89 
 
 United States, 97 U. S. 39, 60, 24 Atl. 635. 
 
 L. ed. 992; United States v. Dun- 15. Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 
 
 nington, 146 U. S. 344, 36 L. ed. How. (U. S.) 115, 14 L. ed. 75. 
 996; Hijo v. United States, 194 16. Taxation in an unconstitu- 
 
266 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 97 
 
 aimed at eminent domain has no application to the power 
 of taxation,^'^ yet it is well settled that money cannot he 
 raised by taxation to be applied to a use not public/* and 
 the meaning of public use in connection with taxation is 
 much the same as in its application to eminent domain." 
 The just compensation, however, to which the owner of the 
 property taken is entitled, is measured by a very different 
 standard. The compensation which one receives from the 
 payment of his taxes is of course the use of the streets, 
 parks, and schools, the protection afforded by the police 
 and fire departments and the advantages derived from the 
 other functions of state and municipal government, and 
 the amount of the tax is apportioned to the amount of the 
 property which enjoys such protection or is enhanced in 
 value by such public improvements, but an exact appor- 
 tionment of the tax to the benefit is never attempted. As 
 was said by Judge Cooley, 
 
 " If it were possible to do so the taxes levied by any 
 government ought to be apportioned among the people 
 according to the benefit which each receives from the 
 protection the government affords him, but this is 
 manifestly impossible. The value of life and liberty, 
 and of the social and family rights and privileges can- 
 not be measured by any pecuniary standard. ' ' ^^ 
 
 tional manner was held a taking in 305; Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 
 
 Sears v. Street Commissioners, 173 691, 703, 26 L. ed. 238. 
 
 Mass. 350, 353, 53 N. E. 876, and 7o«;a.— Stewart v. Polk Coxmty 
 
 Wilkins v. Hillman (Okla), 145 Supervisors, 30 Iowa 9. 
 
 Pac. 1111, L. R. A. 1915 t) 249. Pennsylvcmia. — Sharpless v. 
 
 See also Opinion of the Jus- Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 
 
 tices, 182 Mass. 604, 607, 66 N. E. 59 Am. Dee. 759. 
 
 25, 60 L. R. A. 592. " It is estab- Tennessee. — Louisville, etc., R. 
 
 lished that under our constitution R. Co. v. Davidson County Court, 
 
 private property cannot be taken 1 Sneed 637, 62 Am. Dec. 424. 
 
 from its owner except for a public 18. Loan^ Association v. Topeka, 
 
 use. This is equally true whether 20 Wall. (U. S.) 655, 22 L. ed. 
 
 the property is a dwelling house 455; Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 
 
 taken by right of eminent domain, 1, 28 L. ed.'896; Lowell v. Boston, 
 
 or money demanded by the tax 111 Mass. 454, 15 Am. Rep. 39. 
 
 collector." 19. Supra, § 51. 
 
 17. United States. — GUman v. 20. Cooley, Taxation, 24. 
 Sheboygan, 2 Black 510, 17 L. ed. 
 
§ 97 What Constitutes a Taking. 267 
 
 Accordingly the necessity of the case and the sanction of 
 ancient and long established practice justify the assess- 
 ment and collection of a tax without an exact apportion- 
 ment of the benefit; and that such an assessment is 
 constitutional is so well settled that it is a question of 
 purely academic interest whether the justification of the 
 rule is based upon the ground that the assessment of a tax 
 is not a taking in the constitutional sense, or upon the con- 
 clusive presumption that property within the jurisdiction of 
 a state is benefited by the protection and service afforded by 
 the state and the principle that such protection and service 
 is sufficient provision for compensation. In either event con- 
 clusive proof that property assessed received no protection 
 or other advantages from the government would not make 
 the collection of the tax a taking of property without com- 
 pensation in the constitutional sense.^' For similar rea- 
 sons a person assessed cannot defeat the collection of a tax 
 by showing that he had no voice in its disposition.^^ 
 
 "When however it is sought to raise money by taxation to 
 devote to a use not public, there is a taking of property in 
 
 21. Thus a statute authorizing Mississippi. — Martin v. Dix, 52 
 
 the annexation to a city and the Miss. 53, 24 Am. Rep. 661. 
 
 subjection to municipal taxation of Utah. — Kimball v. Grantsville, 
 
 outlying property which can re- 19 Utah 368, 57 Pac. 1, 45 L. R. A. 
 
 ceive no protection or benefit from 628 (overruling Kaysville v. Elli- 
 
 the city government is not uncon- son, 18 Utah 163, 55 Pac. 386, 43 
 
 stitutional. L. B. A. 81, 72 Am. St. Rep. 772). 
 
 United States. — Kelly v. Pitts- Vermont. — Atherton v. Essex 
 
 burgh, 104 U. S. 78, 82, 26 L. ed. Junction, 83 Vt. 218, 74 Atl. 1118, 
 
 659, afflrming 85 Pa. 170, 27 Am. 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 695, Ann Cas. 
 
 Rep. 633. 1912 A 339. 
 
 Georgia. — Liinton v. Athens, 53 Washington. — Ferguson v. Sno- 
 
 Ga. 588. homish, 8 Wash. 668, 36 Pae. 969, 
 
 Illinois.— Gary v. Pekin, 88 HL 24 L. R. A. 795. 
 
 154, 30 Am. Rep. 543. The contrary view prevails in 
 
 Indiana. — Logansport v. Sey- Iowa, Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 
 
 bold, 59 Ind. 225. 82; Taylor v. Waverly, 94 Iowa 
 
 Kansas. — Callen v. Junction 661, 63 N. W. 347, and formerly 
 
 City, 43 Kan. 627, 23 Pac. 652, 7 prevailed in Kentucky, Cheaney v. 
 
 L. R. A. 736. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 491, as 
 
 Kentucky. — Hughes v. Carl, 106 well as in Utah (supra). 
 
 Ky. 533, 50 S. W. 852. 22. Wheeler v. Wall, 6 Allen 
 
 Michiaan. — Mitchell v. Negaunee, (Mass.) 558. 
 113 Mich. 359, 71 N. W. 646, 38 
 L. B. A. 157, 67 Am. St. Rep. 468. 
 
268 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 97 
 
 the constitutional sense, since the exception or qualifieation 
 to the literal meaning of " taken," if it exists at all, applies 
 only to the assessment of taxes by lawful authority, and 
 not to spoliation under the guise of taxation. A taking for 
 a purpose not public is doubly obnoxious to the constitu- 
 tion, being both for a private use and without compensa- 
 tion; for if the purpose for which the money is to be 
 expended is not public, there is no compensation to the 
 person assessed even in theory of the law.^^ 
 
 In the case of an excise or indirect tax imposed by public 
 authority upon the performance of an act, the enjoyment of 
 a privilege or the engaging in an occupation, subjection to 
 the tax ordinarily results from the voluntary act of the per- 
 son assessed ; but if it was attempted to impose such a tax 
 after the act had been performed, the privilege enjoyed or 
 the occupation abandoned, objection might be made that 
 there was a taking of property without compensation;^* 
 and it is undoubtedly the law that property lawfully held 
 cannot be subjected to use by the public for a certain period 
 each year without compensation, under the guise of an 
 excise.^^ As far as the amount of an excise is concerned, 
 if the legislature has the power to withhold the privilege 
 altogether, it may put any price it wishes upon its exercise, 
 and one who voluntarily assumes the benefit cannot com- 
 plain of the burden; if the privilege is one the exercise of 
 which may be regulated but not forbidden altogether, the 
 legislature may not, under the guise of taxation, impose 
 such a severe burden as to substantially amount to a prohi- 
 bition.^" It would not be reasonable to impose an excise 
 arbitrarily, irrespective of the benefit which the privilege 
 taxed conferred, and some method must be resorted to, in 
 
 23. Lowell V. Boston, 111 Mass. equal length of time cannot be su9- 
 454, 15 Am. Rep. 39. tained as a license law but is a 
 
 24. Matter of Pell, 171 N. Y. 48, taking of property without com- 
 63 N. E. 789, 89 Am. St. Rep. 791. pensation. Toone v. State, 178 
 
 25. A statute declaring all ani- Ala. 70, 59 So. 665. 
 
 mals and implements suitable for 26. Minot v. Winthrop, 162 
 
 road duty owned or located in a Mass. 113, 38 N. E, 512, 26 
 county subject to road duty for an L. R. A. 259. 
 
§ 97 What Constitutes a Taking. 269 
 
 order to ascertain a fair and just basis on which to calcu- 
 late the amount of the tax, so that there may be some pro- 
 portion between the benefits received and the sum paid for 
 their enjoyment.^'^ The usual method is to proportion the 
 excise to the value of the 'property to which the privilege 
 taxed relates ; and such a method is not unreasonable, even 
 when the property itself is exempt from taxation. 
 
 In the case of special assessments, how far there must be 
 an actual quid pro quo for the money exacted is a matter 
 of considerable doubt. It has long been a mooted point 
 among constitutional lawyers all over the country whether 
 a special assessment can be constitutionally imposed upon 
 a parcel of land in accordance with a rule which excludes 
 all inquiry upon the question of actual benefits and which 
 may result in the assessment of an amount in substantial 
 excess of such benefits. Many eminent authorities, among 
 them the Supreme Court of the United States, hold that it 
 is no violation of the general prohibitions of the fourteenth 
 amendment to the United States constitution, or of similar 
 provisions of the constitutions of the states, if the legisla- 
 ture designates a certain area as benefited by a public 
 improvement and directs that the whole or a part of the cost 
 of the improvement be assessed upon the various parcels 
 of land situated within the designated area, in proportion 
 to the size, frontage or value of the respective parcels,^* 
 unless it plainly appears that the so-called assessment is 
 an abuse and not an exercise of the taxing power, and a 
 mere act of confiscation under the guise of law.^® In other 
 jurisdictions however, it is held that the customary consti- 
 tutional provisions protect an owner of land from being 
 obliged to pay a special assessment in excess of the benefit 
 actually received by his land.*" Even an assessment of the 
 
 27. CoHiinonwealth v. Provident 30. Dexter v. Boston, 176 Mass. 
 Institution for Savings, 12 Allen 247, 57 N. E. 379, 79 Am. St. Eep. 
 (Mass.) 312. 306; Harwood v. Street Commis- 
 
 28. French v. Barber Asphalt aioners, 183 Mass. 348, 67 N. E. 
 Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324, 45 L. ed. 336; Wilkins v. Hillman (OHa.), 
 879. 145 Pao. lUl, L. B. A. 1915 D 249. 
 
 29. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 
 269, 43 L. ed. 433. 
 
270 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 98 
 
 whole or a specified portion of the cost of a public improve- 
 ment upon the parcels benefited in proportion to the benefits 
 actually received cannot be sustained in such jurisdictions 
 unless it can be inferred from the statute authorizing such 
 assessment that the actual benefit to each parcel assessed is 
 not to be exceeded.^* 
 
 § 98. The Requirement of Personal Services. 
 
 It is within the power of a constitutional government to 
 call upon those of its inhabitants whose services are par- 
 ticularly needed to perform such services without compen- 
 sation of equivalent value. In the exercise of this power 
 only those whose services are needed are called upon, 
 whereas, as an exercise of the power of taxation, every 
 able-bodied man may be required to perform his share of 
 labor upon the public works. 
 
 In England and in some of the older of the United States 
 members of a municipal corporation can be compelled to 
 accept certain municipal offices, even without compensa- 
 tion.*^ Other familiar examples of the exercise of this 
 power are the compulsory attendance of witnesses and 
 jurors in court, and the conscription of soldiers. Although 
 it is necessary to provide compensation in such cases, the 
 stipend allowed is given as a matter of policy, to keep the 
 persons whose services have been required and their fam- 
 ilies from starvation, rather than as a constitutional obliga- 
 tion,** and at any rate the compensation is awarded upon a 
 
 31. Lorden v. Coffey, 178 Mass. Illinois. — People v. Williams, 
 489, 60 N. E. 124. 145 III. 573, 32 N. E. 849, 24 
 
 32. E. g., Mass. Revised Laws, L. R. A. 492, 36 Am. St. Rep. 514. 
 c. 25, § 97. See also, New Jersey. — Reeves v. Fergu- 
 
 England.— 'Kva.g v. Bower, 1 son, 31 N. J. L. 107. 
 Bam. & C. 585 ; Rex. v. Burder, New York. — ^Van Orsdall v. Haz- 
 4 T. R. 778; Rex v. Lone, 2 Strange ard, 3 Hill 243. 
 920 ; Rex v. Jones, 2 Strange 1146 ; North Carolina. — Hoke v. Hen- 
 King & Queen v. Larwood, 4 Mod. derson, 4 Dev. L. 1, 25 Am. Dec. 
 270; London v. Vanacker, 1 Ld. 677. 
 
 Raym. 496 ; King v. Raines, 3 Salk. 33. Thus it is held that witnesses 
 
 162. can be compelled to attend court 
 
 United States. — Edwards v. and testify without fees (Ex parte 
 
 United States, 103 U. S. 471, 473, Dement, 53 Ala. 389, 25 Am. Bep. 
 
 26 L. ed. 314, 315. 611; Bennett v. Kroth, 37 Kan. 
 
§ 99 What Constitutes a Taking. 271 
 
 different principle from that employed when property is 
 taken by eminent domain, as the method sanctioned by 
 ancient practice is to pay all persons alike, regardless of 
 what their time or services may be worth.^* A statute 
 applying the same method to eminent domain and fixing a 
 uniform price for land taken for the public use, regardless of 
 its actual value, would be clearly unconstitutional. 
 
 § 99. Taking of Property under the Police Power — Reg- 
 ulations Affecting the Public Health, Morals or Safety. 
 
 It is undoubtedly true that, in the great majority of cases 
 in which it has been decided that a statute purporting to be 
 an exercise of the police power of the state was unconstitu- 
 tional, the fourteenth amendment, or the similar clause 
 found in most of the state constitutions which prohibits the 
 deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process 
 of law and the denial of the equal protection of the law, is 
 the provision of the fundamental law which has been held to 
 have been violated; for when a regulation purporting to 
 be enacted under the police power has no reasonable con- 
 nection with the public health, morals, safety or welfare, or 
 the means adopted are not reasonably adapted to the end 
 sought to be attained, or there is an unwarranted discrim- 
 ination in the application of the regulation to persons or 
 things similarly situated, it is set aside by the courts as a 
 deprivation of liberty without due process of law and a 
 
 235, 15 P'ac. 221, 1 Am. St. Rep. Arkansas. — Flinn v. Prairie 
 
 248; State v. Henley, 98 Tenn. 665, County, 60 Ark. 204, 29 S. W. 459, 
 
 41 S. W. 352, 1104, 39 L. R. A. 27 L. R. A. 669, 46 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 126), and jurors can be compelled 168. 
 
 to serve without compensation Colorado. — ^Larimer County Com- 
 
 (Neely v. State, 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) missioners v. Lee, 3 Col. App. 177, 
 
 175), and an attorney can be 32 Pac. 841. 
 
 obliged to defend a criminal gratui- Illinois. — Dixon v. People, 168 
 
 tously (Vise v. Hamilton County, 111. 179, 48 N. E. 108, 39 L. R. A. 
 
 19 111. 78; Wr>'t v. State, 3 116. 
 
 Heisk. (Tenn.) 256). Minnesota. — State v. Teipner, 36 
 
 34. An expert cnn be compelled Minn. 535, 32 N. W. 678. 
 
 to attend court and answer by- Texas. — Summers v. State, 5 
 
 pothetical questions upon the pay- Tex. App. 365. 
 
 ment of the same fee given ordi- See also infra, § 125. 
 nary witnesses. 
 
272 The Law of EMrBrBNT Domain. § 99 
 
 denial of the equal protection ol the law, without any regard 
 to the question whether any property which would be 
 injuriously affected by the enforcement of the regulation 
 has been taken in the constitutional sense, and it is accord- 
 ingly unnecessary and in most eases would be impossible 
 to invoke the more limited prohibition applicable in case 
 property is taken. 
 
 It is not, however, true that the prohibition against the 
 taking of property for public use without compensation 
 does not apply to the police power. Cases of such varied 
 nature are said to fall under the police power that no gen- 
 eral rule can apply to them all. -The typical exercise of the 
 police power, however, consists of a general regulation 
 applying to all persons, or to all persons of a certain class, 
 and prohibiting some line of conduct injurious to the public 
 health, safety or morals ; but the police- power of a state 
 embraces regulations designed to promote the public con- 
 venience or the general prosperity as well as the public 
 health, safety or morals ; *^ it is not confined to the suppres- 
 sion of what is offensive, disorderly or unsanitary, but 
 extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in a 
 state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of its 
 people.^* In one sense, the police power is but another name 
 for the power of government.^^ 
 
 When injury, is inflicted upon the value of a particular 
 piece of real estate as an incident of a general regulation 
 of a restrictive character, enacted in behalf of the public 
 health, safety or morals, the courts are slow to consider 
 such injury a taking of property for public use requiring 
 compensation,** and the same view is taken of a regulation 
 
 35. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Connecticut. — La Croix v. Tair- 
 Drainage Commissioners, 200 U. S. field County Commissioners, 50 
 561, 592, 50 L. ed. 596. Conn. 321, 47 Am. Rep. 648. 
 
 36. Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. Indiana. — Jourdan v. Evansville, 
 311, 318, 51 L. ed. 499. 163 Ind. 512, 72 N. E. 544, 67 
 
 37. Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, L. R. A. 613; Selvage v. Talbott, 
 222 U. S. 224, 233, 56 L. ed. 175. 175 Ind. 648, 95 N. E. 114, 33 
 
 38. United States.— Mugler v. L. R. A. (N. S.) 973. 
 Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 
 
 280; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 
 U. S. 86, 34 L. ed. 620. 
 
99 
 
 What Constitutes a Taking. 
 
 273 
 
 enacted for similar objects which requires an actual outlay 
 of money by property owners, such as an ordinance requir- 
 ing the owners of tenement houses to equip them with fire- 
 escapes, or with sanitary plumbing.'^® But it is always a 
 question of degree, and a restriction of the most general 
 nature, with the public health, safety or morals most clearly 
 its object, if in effect it deprives the owners of lawfully 
 acquired property which is not in itself a nuisance of the 
 opportunity to make any beneficial use thereof, may be held 
 to be so severe as to amount to a taking, and to be forbidden 
 by the constitution unless the property which it affects is 
 paid for.*" For example, the sale of intoxicating liquors 
 
 Iowa. — Santo v. State, 2 Iowa 
 165, 63 Am. Dee. 487. 
 
 Kentucky. — ■ Ashbrook v. Com- 
 monwealth, 1 Bush 139, 89 Am. 
 Dee. 616. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Commonwealth 
 V. Alger, 7 Cush. 53. 
 
 New Hampshire. — State v. Grif- 
 fin, 69 N. H. 1, 39 Atl. 260, 41 
 L. R. A. 177, 76 Am. St. Rep. 139. 
 
 Ohio. — • Chicago & Erie Railroad 
 Co. V. Keith, 67 Ohio St. 279, 65 
 N. E. 1020, 60 L. R. A. 525. 
 
 Washington. — Davison v. Walla 
 Walla, 52 Wash. 453, 100 Pae. 981, 
 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 454, 132. Am. 
 St. Rep. 983. 
 
 39. Missouri. — St. Louis v. Gait, 
 179 Mo. 8, 77 S. W. 876, 63 
 L. R. A. 778. 
 
 New York. — Health Department 
 V. Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32, 39 
 N. E. 833, 27 L. R. A. 714, 45 Am. 
 St. Rep. 579; Tenement House De- 
 partment V. Moeschen, 179 N. Y. 
 325, 72 N. E. 231, 70 L. R. A. 704, 
 103 Am. St. Rep. 910. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Roumfort Co. v. 
 Delaney, 230 Pa. 374, 79 Atl. 653. 
 
 Vermont. — Thorpe v. Central 
 Vermont R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 62 
 Am. Dec. 625. 
 
 40. Holmes, C. J., in Bent v. 
 Emery, 173 Mass. 495, 53 N. E. 
 910. "It would be open to argu- 
 
 18 
 
 ment at least that an owner might 
 be stripped of his rights so far as 
 to amount to a taking without any 
 physical interference with his land. 
 On the other hand we assume that 
 even the carrying away or bodily 
 destruction of property might be 
 of such small importance that it 
 would be justified under the police 
 power without compensation. We 
 assume that one of the iKes of that 
 convenient phrase, police power, is 
 to justify those small diminutions 
 of property rights which, although 
 within the letter of constitutional 
 protection are necessarily incident 
 to the free play of the machinery 
 of government. It may be that 
 the extent to which such diminu- 
 tions are lawful without compensa- 
 tion is larger when the harm is in- 
 flicted only as incident to some 
 general requirement of public wel- 
 fare. But whether the last-men- 
 tioned element enters into the prob- 
 lem or not the question is one of 
 degree, and sooner or later we 
 reach a point at which the consti- 
 tution applies and forbids physical 
 appropriation and legal restric- 
 tions alike unless they are paid 
 for." See also, Beebe v. State, 6 
 Ind. 501, 63 Am. Dec. 391; People 
 V. Van De Carr, 178 N. Y. 425, 70 
 N. E. 965, 66 L. R. A. 189, 102 Am. 
 
274 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 99 
 
 may be prohibited without compensating the owners of land 
 used for breweries and saloons ; ** but the owner of liquor 
 lawfully in existence must be given an opportunity to dis- 
 pose of it ; otherwise it is to all intents and purposes taken 
 from him without compensation.*^ The erection of wooden 
 buildings in the thickly settled part of a city may be pro- 
 hibited;*^ but the owner of an existing wooden building 
 cannot be prevented from repairing it when it is injured by 
 fire.** 
 
 Where the condition of lawfully-acquired property 
 remains unchanged, but a change in the statutes makes its 
 continued existence unlawful, a slightly different situation 
 is presented. Under such circumstances property of value 
 cannot be actually destroyed without compensating the 
 owner. It is within the power of a state to authorize the 
 destruction of wooden buildings erected within the ' ' fire 
 
 St. Rep. 516, and for regulations 
 requiring the expenditure of money 
 or effort by the property owner 
 held unoonstitutional, State v. 
 Jackman, 69 N. H. 318, 41 Atl. 
 347, 42 L. R. A. 438; Chicago, etc., 
 Railroad Co. v. Keith 67 Ohio St. 
 279, 65 N. E. 1020, 60 L. R. A. 525. 
 
 41. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 
 U. S. 25, 24 L. ed. 989. 
 
 42. Wynehamer v. People, 13 
 N. Y. 378. See also People v. 
 Van De Carr, 178 N. Y. 425, 70 
 N. E. 965, 66 L. R. A. 189, 102 Am. 
 St. Rep. 516. In Jones v. Rich- 
 mond, 18 Grat. (Va.) 517, 98 Am. 
 Dec. 695, it was held that the oity 
 of Richmond was bound by a prom- 
 ise to pay for liquors destroyed by 
 order of the city counedl at the time 
 of the evacuation of the city by the 
 confederate forces. 
 
 43. Illinois. — King v. Davenport, 
 98 III. 315, 38 Am. Rep. 89. 
 
 Massachusetts. ■ — -Salem v . 
 Maynes, 123 Mass. 372. 
 
 Michigan. — Micks v. Mason, 145 
 Mich. 212, 108 N. W. 707, 11 
 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 653, 9 Ann. Gas. 
 291. 
 
 Tennessee. — Knoxville v. Bird, 
 
 12 Lea 121, 47 Am. Rep. 326. 
 Washington. — Olympia v. Mann, 
 
 1 Wash. 389, 25 Pac. 337, 12 
 L. R. A. 150. 
 
 West Virginia. — Charleston v. 
 Reed, 27 W. Va. 681, 55 Am. Rep. 
 336. 
 
 44. Mt. Vernon National Bank v. 
 Sarlle, 129 Ind. 201, 28 N. E. 434, 
 
 13 L. R. A. 481, 28 Am. St. Rep. 
 185; Goldstein v. Connor, 212 
 Mass. 57, 98 N. E. 701; Seneca v. 
 Cochran, 84 S. C. 279, 66 S. E. 
 288, 26 L. R. A. (K S.) 124; 
 Roanoke v. Boiling, 101 Va. 182, 
 43 S. E. 343. See however contra, 
 Monteleone v. Royal Insurance Co., 
 47 La. Ann. 1563, 18 So. 472, 56 
 L. R. A. 784; State v. Lawing, 164 
 N. C. 492, 80 S. E. 69, 51 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 62; Davison v. Walla 
 Walla, 52 Wash. 453, 100 Pac. 981, 
 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 454, 132 Am. 
 St. Rep. 983. 
 
§ 99 
 
 What Constitutes a Taking. 
 
 275 
 
 limits," in violation of law/^ but a sound wooden building, 
 lawfully erected, cannot be torn down by the city when the 
 "fire limits " are extended so as to include the land on 
 which it stands, unless it is paid for,*® and as has been stated 
 previously, mere restrictions, which substantially wipe out 
 the value of property lawfully in existence, cannot be con- 
 stitutionally imposed.*^ But it is all a question of degree, 
 and a statute may be constitutional which authorizes the 
 actual destruction of existing lawful property if such prop- 
 erty is of little service to its owner and a great injury to 
 others,*® and an existing lawful use of most valuable land 
 may be prohibited by a change in the health laws when the 
 land itself and its use for all harmless purposes is left to 
 the owner.*® 
 
 45. Arkansas. — McKibbin v. Ft. 
 Smith, 35 Ark. 352. 
 
 Connecticut. — Hine v. New 
 Haven, 40 Conn. 478. 
 
 Illinois. — King v. Davenport, 98 
 111. 305, 38 Am. Rep. 89. 
 
 Indiama. — ^Baumgartner v. Hasty, 
 100 Ind. 575, 50 Am. Rep. 830. 
 
 Iowa. — Lemmon v. Guthrie Cen- 
 ter, 113 Iowa 36, 84 N. W. 986, 86 
 Am. St. Rep. 361. 
 
 Maine. — Wadleigh .v. Gibnan, 12 
 Me. 403, 28 Am. Dee. 188. 
 
 Michigan. — Micks v. Mason, 145 
 Mich. 212, 108 N. W. 707, 11 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 653, 9 Ann. Cas. 
 291. 
 
 Missoiiri. — Eichenlaub v. St. 
 Joseph, 113 Mo. 395, 21 S. "W. 8, 
 18 L. R. A. 590. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Klingler v. 
 Biekel, 117 Pa. 326, 11 Atl. 555. 
 
 Washington. — Davison v. WaUa 
 Walla, 52 Wash. 453, 100 Pac. 981, 
 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 454, 132 Am. 
 St. Rep. 983. 
 
 46. Buffalo V. Chadeayne, 134 
 N. Y. 163, 31 N. E. 443, and see 
 also Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 
 (U. S.) 497, 505, 19 L. ed. 984, 987. 
 
 47. Supra, and see also People v. 
 Van De Carr, 178 N. Y. 425, 70 
 
 N. E. 965, 66 L. R. A. 189, 102 Am. 
 St. Rep. 516, holding that a stat- 
 ute forbidding the use of a United 
 States flag with advertising upon it 
 could not be constitutionally ap- 
 plied to existing flags. 
 
 48. Rideout v. Kjiox, 148 Mass. 
 368, 19 N. E. 390, 2 L. R. A. 81, 
 12 Am. St. Rep. 560. A statute 
 declared fences maliciously erected 
 and maintained over six feet in 
 height a nuisance. Held constitu- 
 tional, even when applied to fences 
 in existence when enacted. " If a 
 fence which was built before the 
 act and is simply allowed to stand 
 may be found to be a nuisance, and 
 abated at the expense of the owner, 
 there is a taking of property with- 
 out compensation which is more 
 marked and significant than in the 
 case of a simple prohibition to 
 build. * * * On the whole, hav- 
 ing regard to the smallness of the 
 injury, the nature of the evil to be 
 avoided, the quasi accidental char- 
 acter of the defendant's right to 
 put up a fence for malevolent pur- 
 poses, and also to the fact that 
 police regulations may limit the 
 use of property in ways which 
 greatly diminish :^ts value, we are 
 
276 The Law op Eminent Domain. § lOO 
 
 § 100. Police Regulations not Affecting the Public Health, 
 Morals or Safety. 
 
 The police power may be invoked in behalf of the public 
 welfare, and regulations which interfere with the use of 
 property by its owner without providing for compensation 
 are constitutional although the preservation of the public 
 health, morals or safety is not involved;®" but it is notice- 
 able that in eases in which the public welfare is the only 
 object of a police regulation, the power to injuriously affect 
 private property without compensation is much more lim- 
 ited than in cases in which a similar restraint is placed upon 
 the use of land in behalf of the public health, morals or 
 safety. Eestrictions upon the height of buildings illustrate 
 the distinction. General regulations regarding the height 
 and mode of construction of buildings in thickly-settled 
 communities, enacted ia behalf of the public health and 
 safety, are often imposed, and are clearly constitutional, 
 although no compensation is provided for the landowners 
 who would have found it more profitable to have built dif- 
 ferently and whose land is, therefore, decreased in value ; "* 
 
 of opinion that the act ia constitu- New York. — Carthage v. Fred- 
 
 tional to the fuU extent of its eriek, 122 N. Y. 268, 25 N. E. 480, 
 
 provisions." 10 L. R. A. 178, 19 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 49. Tertiliziiig Co. v. Hyde Park, 490. 
 
 97 U. S. 659, 24 L. ed. 1036 ; Rein- North Carolina. — Shelby v. 
 
 man v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171, Cleveland Mill & Power Co., 155 
 
 59 L. ed. 900; Hadacheck v. Sebas- N. C. 196, 71 S. E. 218. But the 
 
 tian, 239 U. S. 394. state cannot take property under 
 
 50. United States. — Ohio OU Co. the guise of regulation. State v. 
 V. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190, 44 L. ed. Skagit River Tel., etc., Co., 85 
 29; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, Wash. 29, 147 Pae. 885. 
 
 219 U. S. 104, 55 L. ed. 341, 33 51. Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 
 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062; Lindsley 91, 53 L. ed. 923, 23 L. R. A. 
 
 V. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 (N. S.) 1160, aflBrming 193 Mass. 
 
 U. S. 61, 55 L. ed. 369. 364, 79 N. E. 745, 118 Am. St. 
 
 Indiana. — State v. Richcreek, Rep. 523 ; Attorney-General v. 
 
 167 Ind. 217, 77 N. E. 1085. 119 Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 491; Selvage v.' Tal- 77, 47 L. R. A. 314; People v. 
 
 bott, 175 Ind. 648, 95 N. E. 114, D'Oench, 111 N. Y. 359, 18 N. E. 
 
 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 973. 862; Davison v. Walla Walla, 52 
 
 Maine. — Opinion of the Justices, Wash. 453, 100 Pac. 981, 21 
 
 103 Me. 506, 69 Atl. 627, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 454, 132 Am. St. 
 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 422. Rep. 983. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Commonwealth 
 V. Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55. 
 
§ 100 
 
 What Cokstitutbs a Taking. 
 
 277 
 
 but a restriction upon the height of buildings established 
 only for aesthetic reasons, and to preserve an artistic sky- 
 line, though imposing no severer burden, is unconstitutional 
 unless compensation is provided.^^ The billboard cases are 
 to the same effect. Restrictions upon the height of bill- 
 boards erected close to the street lines have been upheld 
 because such boards, by their liability to fall or to spread 
 fire, endanger the public ;^^ but a prohibition of boards 
 which cannot endanger the public safety, and which are not 
 used to display indecent posters injurious to the public 
 morals, and are objectionable only as offending the aesthetic 
 sensibilities of the public, amounts to a taking of property 
 for public use.'* So also an owner of property may be pro- 
 
 52. Welch V. Swasey, 214 U. S. 
 91, 53 L. ed. 923, 23 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 1160, affirming 193 Mass. 
 364, 79 N. E. 745, 118 Am. St. 
 Rep. 523. See also the following 
 eases in which it was held that an 
 owner could not be prevented from 
 erecting structures which offended 
 the aesthetic sensibilities of his 
 neighbors or were out of harmony 
 with the neighborhood. Boyd v. 
 Frankfort, 117 Ky. 199, 77 S. W. 
 669, 111 Am. St. Rep. 240; Bos- 
 tock V. Sams, 95 M'd. 400, 52 Atl. 
 665, 59 L. R. A. 282, 93 Am. St. 
 Rep. 394; Newton v. Belger, 143 
 Mass. 598, 10 N. E. 464; Bristol 
 Door & Lumber Co. v. Bristol, 97 
 Va. 304, 33 S. E. 588, 75 Am. Sf. 
 Rep. 783. 
 
 53. United States. — In re Wil- 
 shire, 103 Ted. 620; Whitmier & 
 Filbrick Co. v. Buffalo, 118 Fed. 
 773. 
 
 Illinois. — Chicago v. Churning 
 System, 214 lU. 628, 73 N. E. 1037, 
 70 L. R. A. 230,. 2 Ann. Cas. 892. 
 
 Kcmsas. — Crawford v. Topeka, 
 51 Kan. 756, 33 Pac. 476, 20 
 L. R. A. 692, 37 Am. St. Rep. 323. 
 
 Missouri. — St. Louis Gunning 
 Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 235 
 Mo. 99, 137 S. W. 929. 
 
 New Yorh. — Rochester v. West, 
 164 N. Y. 510, 58 N. E. 673, 53 
 L. R. A. 548, 79 Am. St. Rep. 659; 
 Gunning System v. Buffalo, 62 
 App. Div. 498, 75 App. Div. 31. 
 
 North Carolina. — ■ State v. Whit- 
 lock, 149 N. C. 542, 63 S. E. 123, 
 128 Am. St. Rep. 670, 10 Ann. Cas. 
 765; State v. Staples, 157 N. C. 
 637, 73 S. E. 112, 37 L. R. A, 
 (N. S.) 696. 
 
 54. California. — Vamey v. WU- 
 liams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 Pac. 867, 
 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 741, 132 Am. 
 St. Rep. 88. 
 
 Colorado. — Currau BiU Posting 
 Co. V. Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107 
 Pac. 267, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 544. 
 
 Illinois. — ' Chicago v. Gunning 
 System, 214 111. 628, 73 N. E. 1037, 
 70 L. R. A. 230, 2 Ann. Cas. 892; 
 Haller Sign Works v. Physical 
 Culture Training School, 249 111. 
 436, 94 N. E. 920, 34 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 998. 
 
 Kansas. — Crawford v. Topeka, 
 51 Kan. 756, 33 Pac. 476, 20 
 L. R. A. 692, 37 Am. St. Rep. 323. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Commonwealth 
 V. Boston Advertising Co., 188 
 Mass. 348, 74 N. E. 601, 69 
 L. R. A. 817, 108 Am. St. Rep. 494. 
 
 New Jersey. — BUI Posting Sign 
 
278 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 100 
 
 hibited from carrying on a trade thereon which interferes 
 with the comfort and health of his neighbors or the good 
 order of the neighborhood;^' but a statute or ordinance 
 which prohibits the devotion of private property to a law- 
 ful and useful business merely because it will retard the 
 most advantageous development of the district or offend the 
 sensibilities of neighboring owners is unconstitutional.*® 
 
 Under the power to regulate property in behalf of the 
 public welfare, the state may fix the rates to be charged by 
 
 Co. V. Atlantic City, 71 N. J. L. 
 72, 58 Atl. 342; Passaic v. Pater- 
 son Bill Posting, etc., Co., 72 
 N. J. L. 285, 62 Atl. 267, 111 Am. 
 St. Rep. 676, 5 Ann. Cas. 995. 
 
 New York. — People ex rel. Wine- 
 burgh Advertising Co. v. Murphy, 
 195 N. Y. 126, 88 N. E. 17, 21 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 735; People v. 
 Green, 85 App. Div. 400, 83 N. Y. 
 Supp. 460. 
 
 North Cwrolma. — State v. Whit- 
 loek, 149 N. C. 542, 63 S. E. 123, 
 128 Am. St. Rep. 670, 10 Ann. Cas. 
 765. 
 
 Pennsylvamiia. — Bryan v. Ches- 
 ter, 212 Pa. 259, 61 Atl. 894, 108 
 Am. St. Rep. 870. 
 
 Contra. — In re Wilshire 103 Fed. 
 620; Ex parte Savage, 63 Tex. 
 Crim. App. 285, 141 S. W. 244, 
 Ann. Cas. 1913 D 951. 
 
 55. The eases which sustain this 
 proposition are too numerous to 
 cite. Among the more recent are 
 Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 
 171, 59 L. ed. 900; Hadacheck v. 
 Sebastian 239 U. S. 394; Norfih- 
 westem Laundry v. Des Moines, 
 239 U. S. 486. See also Joyce, 
 Nuisances, §§ 85-134 inc. 
 
 56. Alabama. — Montgomery v. 
 West, 149 Ala. 311, 42 So. 1000, 9 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 659, 123 Am. St. 
 Rep. 33, 13 Ann. Cas. 651; Cuba 
 V. Mississippi Cotton Oil Co., 150 
 Ala. 259, 43 So. 706, 10 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 310. 
 
 Arha/nsas. — Swaim v. Morris, 93 
 Ark. 362, 125 S. W. 422, 20 Ann. 
 Cas. 930. 
 
 California^ — Ex parte Sing Lee, 
 96 Cal. 354, 31 Pac. 245, 24 
 L. R. A. 195, 31 Am. St. Rep. 218; 
 Ex parte WhitweU, 98 Cal. 73, 32 
 Pae. 870, 35 Am. St. Rep. 152. 
 
 Colorado. — Denver v. Rogers, 46 
 Colo. 479, 104 Pae. 1042, 25 
 L. R, A. (N. S.) 247; Willison v. 
 Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 130 Pac. 828, 
 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1030. 
 
 Illinois. — People ex rel. Friend 
 v. Chicago, 261 111. 16, 103 N. E. 
 609, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 438, Ann. 
 Cas. 1915 A 292. 
 
 Kentucky. — Boyd v. Frankfort, 
 117 Ky. 199, 77 S. W. 669, 111 
 Am. St. Rep. 240. 
 
 Maryland. — State v. Mott, 61 
 Md. 297, 48 Am. Rep. 105. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Winthrop v. 
 New England Chocolate Co., 180 
 Mass. 464, 62 N. E. 969; Belmont 
 v. New England Brick Co., 190 
 Mass. 442, 77 N. E. 504; Goldstein 
 V. Conner, 212 Mass. 57, 98 N. E. 
 701. 
 
 Missouri. — St. Louis v. Dorr, 
 145 Mo. 466, 41 S. W, 1094, 46 
 S. W. 976, 42 L. R. A. 686, 68 
 Am. St. Rep. 575; St. Louis v. 
 Dreisoemer, 243 Mo. 217, 147 
 S. W. 998, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 177. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Lane v. Con- 
 cord, 70 N. H. 485, 49 Atl. 687, 85 
 Am. St. Rep. 240. 
 
§ 101 What Constitutes a Taking. 279 
 
 public service corporations within its jurisdiction ; ®^ but a 
 statute setting the rates so low that the stockholders of the 
 company cannot get a reasonable return on their investment 
 is a taking of property without compensation.®^ When 
 however a corporation is required to incur expense or suffer 
 a loss by a regulation enacted in behalf of the public health, 
 morals or safety, it cannot complain even if its profits are 
 wholly swept away.**® 
 
 In substance then, the prevailing doctrine seems to be 
 that a general regulation which is not a mere meddlesome 
 interference with the private affairs of individuals and 
 which has some real public purpose behind it and bears a 
 direct relation to the enhancement of the public welfare, 
 may constitutionally be permitted to interfere with the man- 
 ner in which private property is used without a right to 
 compensation arising; but unless such &, regulation is 
 enacted in behalf of the public health, morals or safety, it 
 is not within the power of a state to apply it so as to deprive 
 an owner of an ordinary, natural and remunerative use of 
 his property without compensation. 
 
 § 101. Regulations which are Really the Taking of an 
 Easement by Eminent Domain. 
 
 'When a restriction upon the use of property which causes 
 it to depreciate in value is not a general regulation enacted 
 in behalf of the public health, safety, morals or welfare, and 
 the injury is not a mere incident of such regulation, but the 
 restriction is intentionally placed upon certain land for the 
 benefit of a specific public improvement, the courts are still 
 more ready to require compensation. Perhaps, if such 
 
 57. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 58. Chicago, etc., R. E. Co. v. 
 
 113, 24 L. ed. 77; Budd v. New Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 33 L. ed. 
 
 York, 143 U. S. 517, 36 L. ed. 247, 970; Reagan v. Farmere' Loan & 
 
 affirming People v. Budd, 117 N. T. Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 
 
 1, 22 N. E. 670, 5 L. R. A. 554, 1014; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 
 
 15 Am. St. Rep. 460; Cotting v. 466, 42 L. ed. 819; San Diego 
 
 Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 Land, etc., Co. v. National City, 
 
 U. S. 79, 46 L. ed. 92; San Diego 174 U. S. 739, 43 L. ed. 1154. 
 
 Water Co. v. San Diego, 118 Cal. 59. Supra, § 99. 
 556, 50 Pac. 633, 38 L. R. A. 460, 
 62 Am. St. Rep. 261. 
 
280 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 101 
 
 classification assists at all, such a restriction may be more 
 accurately called the taking of an easement by eminent 
 domain. The mere fact that the enactment is in form a 
 restriction does not prove that it is not a taking. Thus a 
 private individual cannot be forbidden to maintain on his 
 own property a fence that injures no one except those who 
 desire to pass over a private road across his land; such a 
 restriction amounts to taking his land for a public way.®" An 
 owner of land adjacent to a lighthouse cannot be forbidden 
 to erect structures on his own land that obstruct the rays of 
 the lighthouse without being paid for the easement thereby 
 imposed.®^ When a ' ' building-line ' ' is established, in other 
 words, when the abutters on a street are forbidden to build 
 within a certain distance of the street line, an easement is 
 taken which must be paid for;®^ and it has been strongly 
 intimated that when the height of structures near a park 
 or a handsome public building has been limited so that the 
 
 60. Morse v. Stocker, 1 Allen 
 (M'ass.) 150; Riley v. Grreenwood, 
 72 S. C. 90, 51 S. E. 532, 110 Am. 
 St. Eep. 592; White's Creek Turn- 
 pike Co. V. Davidson, 3 Tenn. Ch. 
 396. Otherwise of a " spite fence " 
 intended only to injure neighboring 
 land. Eideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 
 368, 19 N. E. 390, 2 L. R. A. 81, 
 12 Am. St. Rep. 560. The same 
 result cannot be reached indireetly. 
 Thus, when a statute prohibits toll- 
 gates within city limits, a city can- 
 not make part of a chartered turn- 
 pike a public highway by annexing 
 to the city a narrow strip of land, 
 including the turnpike. BeUevUle v. 
 St. Clair County Turnpike Co., 234 
 ni. 428, 84 N. E. 1049, 17 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 1071; Fort Wayne Land & 
 Improvement Co. v. Maumee Ave. 
 Gravel Road Co., 132 Ind. 80, 30 
 N. E. 880, 15 L. R. A. 651; Detroit 
 V. Detroit, etc.. Plank Road Co., 37 
 Mich. 195, 26 Am. Rep. 512; but 
 a state does not unconstitutionally 
 take the property of a turnpike 
 company by opening the gates when 
 
 the road is out of repair, although 
 the company has spent all its in- 
 come in repairs. Norfolk Turn- 
 pike Co. V. Virginia, 225 U. S. 264, 
 56 L. ed. 1082. 
 
 61. Chappell v. United States, 
 34 Fed. 673. 
 
 62. United States. — Eubank v. 
 Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, 57 L. ed. 
 156. 
 
 Colorado. — ^WUlison v. Cooke, 54 
 Colo. 320, 130 Pac. 828. 
 
 Missouri. — St. Louis v. Hill, 116 
 Mo. 527, 22 S. W. 861, 21 L. R. A. 
 226. 
 
 New York. — People v. Calder, 89 
 App. Div. 503, 85 N. Y, Supp. 
 1015. 
 
 West Virginia. — IVuth v. Char- 
 leston Board of Affairs, 84 S. E. 
 105, L. R. A. 1915 C. 981. 
 
 See also Farist Steel Co. v. 
 Bridgeport, 60 Conn. 278, 22 Atl. 
 561, 13 L. R. A. 590, holding that 
 the establishment of harbor lines to 
 prevent marring the beauty of a 
 bridge was unconstitutional. 
 
§ 101 What Constitutes a Taking. 281 
 
 beauty of the public reservation will not be marred, the 
 restriction is really the taking of an easement by eminent 
 domain,** and to hold it valid without compensation " would 
 be a startling advance on anything hitherto done," and 
 would " certainly present grave difficulties, even when 
 approached with all the presumptions that exist in favor 
 of a legislative decision and with the 'duty to uphold it 
 unless it was impossible to do so."®* Similarly, an ordi- 
 nance attempting to restrict the use of property fronting 
 upon a certain park or boulevard to residential purposes, 
 or forbidding its use for a legal and innocent business, is 
 an unwarranted invasion of the right of private ownership 
 which amounts to a taking in the constitutional sense.*^ 
 
 The mapping out of streets upon vacant land near large 
 and growing cities has often been provided for, so that a 
 systematic plan for the gradual enlargement of the city 
 can be followed. A mere provision that after the recording 
 of the map no streets shall be laid out which are not in 
 accordance therewith is unobjectionable ; ** but it is some- 
 times enacted that if the owner builds upon the land marked 
 out for a street, when the street is actually laid out he shall 
 
 63. Atty-Gen. v. Williams, 174 making a legitimate use of his 
 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77, 47 L. R. A. property because it was within five 
 314. hundred feet of a railroad and was 
 
 64. Parker v. Commonwealth, thus exposed to fire is unconstitu- 
 178 Mass. 199, 59 N. E. 634. tional; Janesville v. Carpenter, 77 
 
 65. WUlison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. Wis. 288, 46 N. W. 128, 8 L. R. A. 
 320, 130 Pac. 828; St. Louis v. 808, 28 Am. St. Rep. 123, holding 
 Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 41 S. W. 1094, that an owner cannot be restrained 
 46 S. W. 976, 42 L. R. A. 686, 68 from erecting a building on the 
 Am. St. Rep. 575; St. Louis v. bed of a river, when it is his own 
 Dreisoemer, 243 Mo. 217, 147 S. W. property and no injury to the pub- 
 998. See also Curtin v. Benson, lie wiU be effected; Huber v. Mer- 
 222 U. S. 78, 56 L. ed. 102, holding kel, 117 Wis. 355, 94 N. W. 354, 
 that it is a taking of property to 62 L. R. A. 589, 98 Am. St. Rep. 
 prohibit the grazing of cattle on 933, holding an act prohibiting the 
 private lands within Yosemite owner of an artesian well from 
 Park; School Corporation of An- wasting water a taking. 
 
 drews v. Heiney, 178 Ind. 1, 98 66. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 
 
 N. E. 628, and Vreeland v. Forest 548, 597, 42 L. ed. 270, 290; In re 
 
 Park Reservation Commission, 82 Opening Ave. D, 200 N. T. 536, 
 
 N. J. Eq. 349, 87 Atl. 435, holding 93 N. E. 498. 
 that to prohibit an owner from 
 
282 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 102 
 
 receive no compensation for his building. As the platting of 
 a street under such a statute substantially amounts to 
 depriving the owner of the use of the land within the limits 
 of the projected street for any but temporary purposes, it is 
 generally held that such statutes are unconstitutional unless 
 the owner is given compensation for his loss." 
 
 ft 
 
 § 102. Actual Appropriation a Taking, even if for Public 
 Health, Morals or Safety. 
 
 The close connection which exists between the police 
 power and the public health, morals and safety has led 
 many authorities to classify any legislation which has for 
 its object the public health, morals or safety as an exercise 
 of the police power, even if it appears on its face to author- 
 ize the levy of a tax or the taking of property for the public 
 use. Whether this classification is sound is not, however, 
 material to the question now under consideration, for it is 
 universally conceded that when land or other property is 
 actually taken from the owner and put to use by the public 
 authorities, the constitutional obligation to make just com- 
 pensation aiiises, however much the use to which the prop- 
 erty is put may enhance the public health, morals or safety. 
 No one would seriously contend that private land or build- 
 ings or other property might be taken for a hospital,** or 
 for a prison, or for the abolition of a dangerous grade cross- 
 ing *® without as complete a liability for compensation aris- 
 
 67. Marylamd. — Moale v. Balti- Wisconsin. — Paine Lumber Co. 
 
 more, 5 Md. 314, 61 Am. Dec. 275; v. Oshkosh, 86 Wis. 397, 56 N. W. 
 
 Baltimore v. Hook, 62 M'd. 371. 1088. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Edwards v. Contra, Forbes Street, 70 Pa. 
 
 Bruorton, 184 Mass. 529, 69 N. E. 125; In re South Twelfth St., 217 
 
 328. Pia. 562, 66 Atl. 568. 
 
 New Jersey. — State v. Carragan, 68. Markham v. Brown, 37 Ga. 
 
 36 N. J. L. 52. 277, 92 Am. Dee. 73; Manning v. 
 
 New York.— Forster v. Scott, Bruce, 186 Mass. 282, 71 N. E. 537. 
 
 136 N. Y. 577, 32 N. E. 976, 18 See also Allen v. Detroit, 167 Mieh. 
 
 L. E. A. 543; People ex rel. New 464, 133 N. W. 317, 36 L. R. A. 
 
 York Central, etc., R. R. Co. v. (N. S.) 890 (fire engine house). 
 
 Priest, 206 N. Y. 274, 99 N. E. 547. 69. Chicago v. Le Moyne, 119 
 
 Vermont. — Warren v. Bunnell, Fed. 662; MoKeon v. New York, 
 
 11 Vt. 600. etc., R. R. Co., 75 Conn. 343, 56 
 
§ 103 What Constitutes a Taking. 283 
 
 ing as if the land were to be used for a street or for a city 
 hall. Similarly when a noxious swamp is taken in fee by 
 the public authorities and filled, the owners are entitled to 
 payment ; ''° and this rule applies to all property put to use 
 by the party condemning it.''^ 
 
 § 103. Fines and Forfeitures. 
 
 It is under the police power of course that fines are 
 imposed, and on the same principle property kept in viola- 
 tion of law is forfeited and destroyed.''^ This is in the 
 nature of a punishment for crime, and need not be further 
 considered here, except to say that the taking of money or 
 property under such conditions is one of the historical 
 exceptions to the constitutional prohibition now under con- 
 sideration. But even under this heading there is a distinc- 
 tion of degree between property of little and of considerable 
 value. Where to draw the line is a difficult question, but 
 property of trifling value, the destruction of which is nec- 
 essary to effect the public object in view, may be summarily 
 destroyed by executive officers. Property of great value, 
 such as a vessel employed for smuggling or other illegal 
 purposes, cannot be summarily sold or destroyed by the 
 
 Atl. 656, 61 L. R. A. 730; Chicago N. Y. 226, 23 N. E. 878, 16 Am. St. 
 
 V. Jackson, 196 lU. 496, 63 N. E. Eep. 813; afflrmed, 152 U. S. 133, 
 
 1013. 38 L. ed. 385. Gambling imple- 
 
 70. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. ments, Glennon v. Britton, 155 111. 
 380, 40 L. ed. 188; Bradbury v. 232, 40 N. E. 594; Police Commia- 
 Vandalia Levee & Drainage Dist., sioners v. Wagner, 93 Md. 182, 48 
 236 111. 36, 86 N. E. 163; People Atl. 455, 52 L. B. A. 775, 86 Am. 
 V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 262 HI. St. Rep. 423. Tools used for 
 492, 104 N. E. 831. A city, to aid counterfeiting, Boyd v. United 
 the public health, cannot take land States, 116 U. S. 616, 29 L. ed. 
 along the banks of a stream with- 746. Veal from young calves, Wil- 
 out compensation. Schenectady v. liams v. Rivenburg, 145 App. Div. 
 Purman, 145 K T. 482, 40 N. E. (N. T.) 93, 129 N. Y. Supp. 473. 
 221, 45 Am. St. Rep. 624. Dogs, not licensed in accordance 
 
 71. Beidler v. Sanitary District, with law. State v. Topeka, 36 Kan. 
 211 111. 628, 71 N. E. 1118, 67 76, 12 Pac. 310, 59 Am. Rep. 529; 
 L. R. A. 820. Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass. 136, 
 
 72. For example, intoxicating li- 97 Am. Dec. 82, 1 Am. Rep. 94. A 
 quors, sold illegally. State v. Mil- dam erected without compliance 
 ler, 48 Me. 576. Nets used in ille- with law. Big Horn Power Co. v. 
 gal fishing, Lawton v. Steele, 119 State (Wyo.), 148 Pac. 1110. 
 
284 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 104 
 
 customs officials without depriving the owner of his prop- 
 erty without due process of law, and judicial proceedings 
 are consequently necessary for its condemnation^^ The 
 principle de minimis non curat lex does not, of itself, justify 
 a violation of the constitution ; but the means of enforcing 
 a police enactment must be reasonably necessary and not 
 unduly oppressive. In deciding whether a statute authoriz- 
 ing the destruction of property «fulfills that requirement the 
 value of the property is material.''* In any event, of course, 
 the owner of property of however small value, would have 
 an action against the officer who summarily destroyed it 
 if it was not, in fact, kept or used in violation of law.''^ 
 
 § 104. Destruction of Property to Abate a Nuisance. 
 
 It often happens that the continued existence of property 
 lawfully acquired becomes a violation of law through no 
 fault of its owner, on account of a change in the physical 
 condition of the property for which he is not to blame. In 
 such a case it is well settled that if the property is of small 
 or trifling value it may be summarily destroyed without 
 compensation when it has fallen into a condition which 
 makes it a menace to the community. For this reason cattle 
 affected with a contagious disease which renders them of 
 little value to the owner and a source of danger to the public 
 may be kiUed without compensation to the owner;''® and 
 
 73. United States. — Lawton v. DougL (Mich.) 332; Miller v. 
 Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. ed. 385. Burch, 32 Tex. 208, 5 Am. Rep. 
 
 Illinois. — Darst v. People, 51 lU. 242. 
 
 286, 2 Am. Rep. 301. 75. Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 
 
 Louisiana.— l.a.niear v. New Or- 540, 26 N. E. 100, 10 L. R. A. 116, 
 
 leans, 4 La. Ann. 97, 23 Am. Dec. 23 Am. St.' Rep. 850. 
 
 477; Rost v. New Orleans, 15 La. 76. Georgia. — Dunbar v. Au- 
 
 Ann. 129, 35 Am. Dec. 186. gusta, 90 Ga. 330, 17 S. E. 907. 
 
 Massachitsetts. — Fisher v. Mo- Indiana.- — ^Loesch v. Koehler, 144 
 
 Girr, 1 Gray 1, 61 Am. Dec. 381. Ind. 278, 41 N. E. 326, 43 N. E. 
 
 74. State v. French, 71 Ohio St. 129, 35 L. R. A. 682. 
 
 186, 73 N. E. 216, 104 Am. St. Rep. Louisiana.— New Orleans v. Char- 
 
 770. Thus it is unreasonable to ouleau, 121 La. 890, 46 So. 911, 18 
 
 summarily destroy a building be- L. R. A. (N. S.) 368, 126 Am. St. 
 
 cause it is occupied for immoral Rep. 322, 15 Ann. Cas. 46. 
 
 purposes. Welch v. Stowell, 2 Massachusetts. — Miller v. Hor- 
 
§ 104 
 
 What Constitutes a. Taking. 
 
 285 
 
 similarly, diseased trees may be cut down/'' and impure 
 food destroyed^* Even a house may be burned without 
 compensation to the owner if it is infected with small-pox 
 and its destruction is necessary to prevent the spread of the 
 disease, since a house so infected would be of little valued* 
 In aU such cases the owner is entitled to a hearing at some 
 stage of the proceedings on the question whether his prop- 
 erty was, in fact, a nuisance, and if it was not, he is enti- 
 tled to compensation for its destruction.*" It may well be 
 a reasonable method and necessary for the public health to 
 
 ton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100, 
 10 L. R. A. 116, 23 Am. St. Eep. 
 850. 
 
 New Jersey. — Newark, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Hunt, 50 N. J. L. 308, 
 12 Atl. 697. 
 
 Texas. — Livingston v. Ellis Co., 
 30 Tex. Civ. App. 19, 68 S. W. 
 723. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Lowe v. Conroy, 120 
 "Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942, 102 Am. 
 St. Rep. 983. 
 
 77. State v. Main, 69 Conn. 123, 
 37 Atl. 80, 36 L. R. A. 623, 61 Am. 
 St. Rep. 30; ColviU v. Fox (Mont.), 
 149 Pac. 496, L. R. A. 1915 F 894. 
 
 78. United States. — ^North Amer- 
 ican Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 
 211 U. S. 306, 53 L. ed. 195, 15 
 Ann. Cas. 276; Armour Packing 
 Co. V. Snyder, 84 Fed. 136. 
 
 Mwrylamd. — Deems v. Baltimore, 
 80 Md. 164, 30 Atl. 648, 26 L. R. A. 
 541, 45 Am. St. Rep. 339. 
 
 Minnesota. — Nelson v. Minne- 
 apolis, 112 Minn. 16, 127 N. W. 
 445, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 260. 
 
 New York. — Blazier v. Miller, 10 
 Hun 435. 
 
 Wisconsin. — ^Adams v. Milwau- 
 kee, 144 Wis. 371, 129 N. W. 518, 
 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1066. 
 
 79. Sings V. Joliet, 237 El. 300, 
 86 N. E. 663, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 1128, 127 Am. St. Rep. 323; 
 Pricbard v. Morganton, 126 N. C. 
 
 908, 36 S. E. 353, 78 Am. St. Rep. 
 679. And. see also Allison v. Cash, 
 143 Ky. 679, 137 S. W. 245, hold- 
 ing that the closing by the board 
 of health of a store infected with 
 the smaU-pox is not a taking. 
 The destruction of bedding infected 
 with a contagious disease is clearly 
 lawful. Savannah v. Mulligan, 95 
 Ga. 323, 29- S. E. 621, 29 L. R. A. 
 303, 51 Am. St. Rep. 86. 
 
 80. Pearson v. Zehr, 138 111. 48, 
 29 N. E. 854, 32 Am. St. Rep. 113; 
 Stone v. Heath, 179 Mass. 385, 60 
 N. E. 975; Stevens v. Worcester, 
 219 Mass. 128, 131, 106 N. E. 587; 
 Houston V. State, 98 Wis. 486, 74 
 N. W. 113, 42 L. R. A. 39. Biit 
 when property, of such a character 
 that inspection is necessary for the 
 protection of the public health, is 
 offered for sale, a statute authoriz- 
 ing an inspector to seize a trivial 
 quantity as a sample for inspection 
 and analysis is valid as a reason- 
 able police regulation, even as 
 against one whose goods were in 
 fact pure. State v. Dupaquier, 46 
 La. Ann. 577, 15 So. 502, 26 L. R. 
 A. 162, 49 Am. St. Rep. 334; Com- 
 monwealth V. Carter, 132 Mass. 12 ; 
 St. Louis V. Liessing, 190 Mo. 464, 
 89 S. W. 611, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 918, 109 Am. St. Rep. 774, 4 Am. 
 Cas. 112. 
 
286 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 104 
 
 destroy first and investigate afterward; but if sound and 
 valuable property is destroyed as a result of such, necessity, 
 it is taken for the public use in the constitutional sense and 
 the owner is entitled to compensation.®^ On the other hand, 
 however valuable property is, if it falls into such condition 
 as to menace the public health or safety the owner can be 
 ordered in proper judicial proceedings to abate the nui- 
 sance, and if he fails to comply with the order, the property 
 may be destroyed, if destruction is a reasonable means of 
 removing the menace. Thus under the police power, and 
 without compensation, the state may order the destruction 
 
 81. United States. — North Ameri- 
 can Cold Storage Co. v. Ohieago, 
 211 U. S. 306, 53 L. ed. 195, 15 
 Ann. Cas. 276. 
 
 Georgia. — SavannaJi v. Mulligan, 
 95 Ga. 323, 22 S. E. 621, 29 L. R. A. 
 303, 51 Am. St. Rep. 86. 
 
 Illinois. — Pearson v. Zehr, 138 
 111. 48, 29 N. E. 854, 32 Am. St. 
 Rep. 113;' Sings v. Joliet, 237 111. 
 300, 86 N. E. 663, 22 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 1128, 127 Am. St. Rep. 
 323. 
 
 Indiana. — Annable v. Montgom- 
 ery County Commissioners, 34 Ind. 
 App. 72, 71 N. E. 272. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Salem v. Easteim 
 R. R. Co., 98 Mass. 431, 96 Am. 
 Dee. 650; Miller v. Horton, 152 
 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100, 10 L. R. A. 
 116, 23 Am. St. Rep. 850. 
 
 New York. — People v. Board of 
 Health, 140 N. Y. 1, 35 N. E. 320, 
 23 L. R. A. 481, 37 Am. St. Rep. 
 522. 
 
 Wisconsin. — ^Lowe v. Conroy, 120 
 Wis. 151, 97 ¥. W. 942, 102 Am. 
 St. Rep. 983. 
 
 In Jones v. Richmond, 18 Grat. 
 (Va.) 517, 98 Am. Dee. 695, 
 the city was held liable for liquors 
 destroyed by order of the city 
 council when the • city was evacu- 
 ated by the confederate forces. In 
 Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 
 
 26 N. E. 100, 10 L. R. A. 116, 23 
 Am. St. Rep. 850, the court said, at 
 p. 547, " We cannot admit that the 
 legislature has an imlimited right 
 to destroy property without com- 
 pensation, on the ground that de- 
 struction is not an appropriation 
 to public use. When a healthy 
 horse is killed by a public oflcer, 
 acting under a general statute, for 
 fear that it should spread disease, 
 the horse certainly would seem to 
 be taken for public use, as truly as 
 if it were seized to drag an artil- 
 lery wagon. The public equally 
 appropriates it, whatever they do 
 with it afterward. Certainly the 
 legislature eould not declare all 
 cattle to be nuisances, and order 
 them to be killed without compen- 
 sation. It does not attempt to do 
 so. As we have said, it only de- 
 clares certain diseased animals to 
 be nuisances. And even if we as- 
 sume that it could authorize some 
 trifling amount of innocent prop- 
 erty to be destroyed as a necessary 
 means to the abatement of a nui- 
 sance, still if it had added in terms 
 that such healthy animals as should 
 be killed by mistake for diseased 
 ones should not be paid for, we 
 should deem it a serious question 
 whether such provision could be 
 upheld." 
 
§ 104 What Constitutes a Taking. 287 
 
 of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering the 
 lives of passers-by,*^ 
 
 When a building, by reason of its age and unsanitary 
 condition, has become unsuited to the conditions of city life, 
 although it is not such a nuisance that it can be abated with- 
 out compensation, it may be destroyed upon payment of 
 such compensation only as would be its value if it were to 
 be occupied in a sanitary manner, or in other words, the 
 compensation may be subject to deduction for the expense 
 of putting the building into such a condition that it could 
 be occupied without danger to the health of the inmates.** 
 
 The power of the public authorities over nuisances is so 
 sweeping that there is sometimes a great temptation to 
 usurp authority or to silence opposition by declaring a cer- 
 tain act or thing to be a nuisance. There is no greater 
 magic in the word ' ' nuisance ' ' than there is in " police 
 power," and neither expression can be used as a cloak to 
 cover an invasion of the constitutional rights of private 
 property. The legislature itself cannot by its mere declara- 
 tion make that a nuisance which is not one in fact, so as to 
 deprive any person of his constitutional rights therein,®* 
 and the power of city councils and of local boards of health 
 is of course no greater. An attempt to make a man pay for 
 his own property by declaring it a nuisance but permitting 
 him to maintain it upon the annual payment of a certain 
 sum to the state is clearly unconstitutional.*' 
 
 82. United States. — Lawton v. has become dangerous, without no- 
 
 Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. ed. tice and a hearing. Matter of 
 
 385. Brooklyn, 87 Hun (N. Y.) 54. 
 
 Alabama. — ^Montgomery v. Hutch- 83. Metzger v. Markham, 38 
 
 inson, 13 Ala. 573. App. Cas. (D. C.) 383, Ann. Cas. 
 
 Maine.— Swett v. Sprague, 55 1913 C 597. 
 
 Me. 190. 84. Grand Rapids v. Powers, 89 
 
 New York.— Smith v. Irish, 37 Mich. 94, 50 N. W. 661, 14 L. R. A. 
 
 App. Div. 220, 55 N. Y. Supp. 837. 498, 28 Am. St. Rep. 276. 
 
 Tennessee. — Theilan v. Porter, 14 85. State ex rel. Wausau St. Ry. 
 
 Lea 622, 52 Am. Rep. 173. Co. v. Bancroft, 148 Wis. 124, 134 
 
 But the owner cannot be com- N. W. 330, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 
 pelled to tear down a building that 526. 
 
288 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 105 
 
 § 105. Legislation Aimed to Prevent the Tieing up of Pro- 
 ductive Property. 
 
 It is within the power of a constitutional government to 
 enact legislation which will prevent the tieing up of produc- 
 tive property through doubt as to ownership, inability of 
 the owners to convey, or other like cause, by making provi- 
 sion for the acquisition of title by adverse possession, the 
 disposition of abandoned property, the registration of land 
 titles and the management and transfer of the property of 
 incompetents.** Such legislation is usually classified as an 
 exercise of the police power, but it undoubtedly may involve 
 the taking of the property of the true owner, and unless 
 ample opportunity is given him to protect his rights, 
 and compensation is provided when his property is lost 
 without fault or neglect on his part, it will be held to be 
 unconstitutional.*'^ 
 
 86. A striking illustration of the 
 exercise of this power is the Tor- 
 rens system of land registration, 
 whereby the title to land is con- 
 clusively determined by a proceed- 
 ing in rem upon such actual notice 
 to adverse claimants as is reason- 
 ably possible. Statutes establish- 
 ing this system- have been h«Id con- 
 stitutional in several states. 
 
 California. — Robinson v. Kerri- 
 gan, 151 Cal. 40, 90 Pae. 129, 12 
 Ann. Cas. 829. 
 
 Colorado. — People v. Grissman, 
 41 Colo. 450, 92 Pae. 949. 
 
 Illinois. — People ex rel. Dineen 
 V. Simon, 176 111. 165, 52 N. E. 
 910, 44 L. R. A. 801, 68 Am. St. 
 Eep. 175. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Tyler v. Judges 
 of Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 
 71, 55 N. E. 812, 51 L. R. A. 433. 
 
 Minnesota. — State esc rel. Doug- 
 las V. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 
 N. W. 175, 57 L. R. A. 297, 89 Am. 
 St. Rep. 571. 
 
 In a few states the statutes have 
 been held unconstitutional on ac- 
 count of certain administrative de- 
 tails which were considered objec- 
 
 tionable or inadequate. People v. 
 Chase, 165 111. 527, 46 N. E. 454, 
 36 L. R. A. 105; State ex rel. At- 
 torney-General V. Guilbert, 56 Ohio 
 St. 575, 47 N. E. 551, 38 L. R. A. 
 519, 60 Am. St. Rep. 756. The 
 Supreme Court of the United States 
 has declined to interfere on the 
 ground of lack of provision for no- 
 tice at the instance of one who was 
 himself notified. Tyler v. Judges 
 of Court of R^stration, 179 U. S. 
 405, 45 L. ed. 252. 
 
 87. Kentucky. — Pearee'a Heirs 
 V. Patton, 7 B. Monroe 162, 45 Am. 
 Dec. 61. 
 
 New York. — Cochran v. Van 
 Surley, 20 Wend. 365, 32 Am. Dee. 
 570. 
 
 North Carolina. — University of 
 North Carolina v. North Carolina 
 Railroad Co., 76 N. C. 103, 22 Am. 
 Rep. 671. 
 
 Ohio. — State ex rel. Attorney- 
 General V. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St. 
 575, 47 N. E. 551, 38 L. R. A. 
 519, 60 Am. St. Rep. 756; Kiser 
 V. Logan County Commissioners, 85 
 Ohio St. 129, 97 N. E. 52. 
 
§ 105 What Constitutes a Taking. 289 
 
 There is one example of this branch of the police power 
 ■which strongly resembles an exercise of the power of emi- 
 nent domain, although it is held by the courts that it does 
 not involve a taking of property, or require the public use 
 for its justification. When property in which several per- 
 sons have a common interest cannot be fully and beneficially 
 enjoyed in its existing condition and the parties interested 
 therein cannot agree upon a scheme for the more advan- 
 tageous use of the property, the law often provides a way 
 in which they may compel one another to submit to meas- 
 ures necessary to secure its beneficial enjoyment, making 
 just compensation to any of the proprietors whose control 
 of the property or interest therein has been modified by the 
 new arrangement, which compensation those of the propri- 
 etors who are benefited are obliged to pay. Familiar 
 examples of this class of legislation are the statutes provid- 
 ing for the repair of houses, mills and wharves owned by 
 several parties, the employment of ships held on shares, 
 the partition of land held in common, the construction and 
 maintenance of party walls, the government of the propri- 
 etors of private ways and bridges and common fields and 
 the drainage of swamps and meadows. 
 
 The exercise of this power in most instances is upon prop- 
 erty held in common, but the principle is the same if applied 
 to a tract of land affected by common necessities and inter- 
 ests, although divided into parcels held by individual own- 
 ers in severalty. When a tract of such land is divided into 
 several parcels held by different owners and a general 
 improvement of the whole cannot be effected without the 
 harmonious co-operation of all the owners, the common 
 necessity is met and the common interest secured by the 
 intervention of the state, and the individual rights of each 
 owner are subjected to such modifications as seem most 
 adapted to secure the best advantage of all. Those who are 
 damaged are compensated by those who are benefited. Land 
 is actually taken and pecuniary impositions are levied 
 19 
 
290 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 106 
 
 although the use is not public, but neither the power of emi- 
 nent domain nor the power of taxation is exercised. No 
 land outside -the tract affected by the common interest is 
 taken or assessed, and it is settled that the compulsory 
 improvement of the tract in the manner described is a valid 
 exercise of the police power,** 
 
 § 106. Subjection to Police Regulations as Result of a 
 Taking. 
 
 The beclouding effect of the vague notion that the consti- 
 tutional prohibition of the taking of property for the public 
 use without compensation has no application to the police 
 power is nowhere more forcibly illustrated than in the cases 
 arising out of the laying out of highways across existing 
 railroads. In such cases many courts hold that the railroad 
 company is not entitled to recover the expense of making 
 the crossing safe, because the obligation to construct and 
 maintain the necessary structures is imposed upon it as an 
 exercise of the police power.** The same reasoning would 
 deny an owner of a building, part of which was cut off in 
 the widening of a street, the right to compensation for the 
 expense of making the remaining portion of the building 
 safe for use, since he might be obliged by the public author- 
 ities to take this course or else tear down the building, so 
 that the lives of travellers on the street and of occupants 
 of the building would not be endangered, but no court would 
 on this account hold that the owner could not recover this, 
 expense. If, when part of a tract of land is taken, the 
 owner is entitled to damages for the decrease in the' value 
 of the remaining land, he is entitled to have the value of 
 his land estimated before and after the taking in the light 
 of the existing laws (with due consideration of the possi- 
 bility that they may be changed) and not upon the suppo- 
 sition that no laws will affect it. He cannot before the 
 
 88. "Wurts V. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 89. Infra, § 243. 
 
 606^ 29 L. ed. 229; Lowell v. Bos- 
 ton, 111 Mass. 454, 15 Am. Rep. 
 39. See also supra, i§ 84, 88. 
 
§ 107 What Constitutes a. Taking. 291 
 
 taking, nor can the condemning party after the taking, 
 enhance the value of the land by assuming that it might 
 be used as a site for a twenty-story building, or for a 
 gambling house or a liquor saloon, or even for a wooden 
 dwelling house, if the laws do not permit the erection of 
 such structures, or their use for such purposes, in the place 
 where the land is situated. If, as a result of the taking, it 
 is made subject to laws to which it was not subject before, 
 and such laws affect its value, the owner is entitled to be 
 compensated for the decrease thus brought about, because 
 it is a direct result of the taking of his land by eminent 
 domain, regardless whether the laws which will impair its 
 use are natural laws or police regulations. Thus if a man 
 owned a parcel of land suitable for an apartment house in 
 a district in which the erection of apartment houses was the 
 only profitable use of land, and a part of his lot was taken 
 for the public use, and the remainder of the lot was left so 
 small that an apartment house could not be erected upon 
 it, he would be entitled to recover compensation for the 
 diminished value of the remaining land resulting from this 
 cause whether the impossibility of constructing an apart- 
 ment house upon his remaining land was due to the fact 
 that the size and shape in which the lot was left made it 
 architecturally impracticable, or the requirements of the 
 building laws in regard to floor space and open areas made 
 it legally impossible. Yet it is this nebulous notion that 
 the police power can be enforced without compensation 
 that has been invoked against the railroads in cases which 
 in their legal aspects are the same as that of the apartment 
 house; and it is upon specious reasoning of like character 
 that private watercourses have, in substance, been taken 
 from their owners without compensation to serve as the 
 reservoirs of a public waterworks system.®" 
 
 § 107. Taking by Eminent Domain Defined. 
 
 The taking of property by eminent domain was undoubt- 
 edly what was in the minds of the framers of the bills of 
 
 90. Infra, § 47. 
 
292 Tbe Law of Eminent Domain. § 107 
 
 rights which are found in the constitutions of the several 
 states and in the first ten amendments to the federal con- 
 stitution, when they declared that private property should 
 not be taken for public use without just compensation, and 
 it is in connection with the exercise of eminent domain that 
 this provision is most frequently applied. 
 
 In the exercise of eminent domain there are no excep- 
 tions to the literal enforcement of the provision, based upon 
 the general understanding of the public when the constitu- 
 tions were adopted. On the contrary the provision is given 
 a broad construction, and is called into play when a case 
 comes within its spirit, even if the letter of the law is not 
 disturbed. It is weU settled that a taking of property 
 within the meaning of the constitution may be accomplished 
 without formally divesting the owner of his title to the 
 property or of any interest therein.®^ Constitutional rights 
 rests on substance, not on form, and the liability to pay com- 
 pensation for property taken cannot be evaded by leaving 
 the title in the owner, while depriving him of the beneficial 
 use of the property. It has already been shown that a legal 
 restriction upon the use of land may constitute a taking, 
 although the title is unaffected and the land is physically 
 untouched,®^ and the same is true when the owner's enjoy- 
 ment of the land is physically interfered with, although his 
 legal rights remain unimpaired; but just how severe the 
 interference with the owner's enjoyment of his property 
 must be to constitute a taking, and to render a statute 
 authorizing the injury, but providing for no compensation, 
 unconstitutional, is not a question which can be answered 
 in such a way as to furnish a concise rule readily appli- 
 
 91. See the opinion of Shaw, ranted by the legislature, does in 
 C. J., in Old Colony, etc., R. R. its necessary natural consequences, 
 Co. V. Plymouth, 14 G-ray (Mass.) affect the property, by taking it 
 155, 161, in which he said, " Nor is from the owner, or depriving him 
 it material whether the property is of the possession or some beneficial 
 removed from the possession of the enjoyment of it, then it is ' appro- 
 owner, or in any respect changes priated ' to public use by compe- 
 hands; if it is of such a character tent authority, and the owner is 
 and so situated that the exercise entitled to compensation." 
 of the public use of it, as war- 92. Supra, § 101. 
 
§ 108 What Constitutes a Taking. 293 
 
 cable to all cases likely to arise. Each case must be decided 
 on its own merits until, by the gradual process of judicial 
 exclusion and inclusion, it is possible to say on which side 
 of the line any given injury to private property rights may 
 be said to fall; but in a general way it may be said that 
 when an interference with the use and enjoyment of land 
 that would be actionable at common law is effected under 
 color of legal authority and as an incident to the construo- 
 tion of a public improvement, and consists of actual entry 
 upon land and its devotion to public use for more than a 
 momentary period, or of an injury of such a character aa 
 to substantially oust the owner from the possession of the 
 land and to deprive him of all beneficial use thereof, there 
 is a taking of property in the constitutional sense, whether 
 there has been any formal condemnation or not. 
 
 § 108. Damaging Property Not Necessarily a Taking. 
 
 It is the prevailing and now almost universally accepted 
 doctrine, in the absence of a special provision in the con- 
 stitution to the contrary, that when a tract of land has been 
 taken by legislative authority for the public use and the 
 devotion of such land to the use for which it was taken 
 injuriously affects neighboring land in a manner that would 
 be actionable at common law if the injury had been com- 
 mitted by a private individual without legislative sanction, 
 but does not substantially oust the owner from the posses- 
 sion of the land or deprive him of all beneficial use thereof, 
 the owner of the injured land is not entitled to compensa- 
 tion under the constitution ; for merely damaging property 
 does not necessarily constitute a taking.®* 
 
 93. Lincoln v. Commonwealth, not claim any under the constitu- 
 
 164 Mass. 368, 41 N. E. 489, tion, because what is done does not 
 
 Holmes, J., " When the legislature amount to a taking. And even if 
 
 authorizes something to be done in the thing authorized would be ac- 
 
 the neighborhood of a plaintiff's tionable at common law and a nui- 
 
 land which diminishes its value, but sance but for the statute, still it is 
 
 which would not be actionable at not necessarily a taking, and unless 
 
 common law if done by a neighbor- it does amount to that no compen- 
 
 ing owner, if the statute provides sation can be recovered if the stat- 
 
 no compensation th« plaintiff can- ute does not give it. If what is 
 
294 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 108 
 
 That a use of land which, though causing injury to the 
 neighboring land, would not be actionable at common law, 
 in other words, a use that would not constitute a private 
 nuisance, is not a taking is universally conceded to be 
 true.®* When however the injury is of a kind which would 
 create liability at common law a more difficult question 
 arises. At first such a case was summarily dismissed with 
 the statement that a public corporation was not liable for 
 " consequential damages " resulting from the proper exe- 
 cution of a public work. This rule, however, was neither 
 accurate nor precise, for consequential damages may or 
 may not be actionable at common law, and, as will be shown 
 later, may or may not constitute a " taking." Unsatis- 
 factory as it was, this rule prevailed without much contro- 
 versy for many years and owners were not allowed compen- 
 sation unless their land was taken in the strictest sense. 
 
 Perhaps the first American jurist to seek to break away 
 from the established rule was Chief Justice Atcher of 
 Maryland, in a case in which it appeared that the city of 
 Baltimore, under general legislative authority, had gath- 
 ered surface water into artificial channels and turned it 
 into the plaintiff's dock, which soon became shallow and 
 unfit for use by reason of the sediment brought down during 
 heavy rains, and the plaintiff sought to recover the damages 
 thus caused.®* The case was tried before Chief Justice 
 
 done does amount to a taMng, of Chief Justice Archer's .decision is 
 course, if the statute gives no com- not officially reported, but ia dis- 
 pensation an action can be main- cussed at length in the opinion of 
 tained, since the legislature cannot the same court in Cumberland v. 
 authorize property to be taken WUlison, 50 Md. 138, 33 Am. Rep. 
 without being paid for." See also 304. After the adverse decision of 
 infra, § 109, notes 6, 10 and 11. the Court of Appeals the plaintiff 
 
 94. Thompson v. Androscoggin took the case to the Supreme Court 
 River Improvement Co., 54 N. H. of the United States on the ground 
 545, which contains a long argu- that his property was taken for the 
 ment extending the meaning of public use without just oompensar 
 "taking " to its extremest limit ad- tion, in violation of the fifth amend- 
 mits that a nonactionable injury is ment to the federal constitution, 
 not a " taking." and the decision of that court, re- 
 
 95. This decision is reported in ported in 7 Pet. 243, 8 L. ed. 672, 
 2 Am. Jut. 203. The decision of overruling this contention, estab- 
 the Court of Appeals, reversing lished the principle that the firat 
 
§ 108 What Constitutes a Taking. 295 
 
 Archer and a jury in 1828 and a verdict was rendered for 
 the plaintiff, and in discussing a motion in arrest of judg- 
 ment the chief justice rendered an opinion which has since 
 been quoted frequently as if it were the decision of a court 
 of last resort. Among other things, the chief justice said : 
 
 ' ' But the party inflicting the injury in this case is 
 a public corporation, which, it is said, has acted within 
 the scope of its authority, upon advice, with due care 
 and circumspection, and is, therefore, not answerable. 
 * * * If it was a measure necessary to be done for 
 the public benefit of the inhabitants of Baltimore, and 
 the natural and necessary consequence of the measure 
 has been the permanent injury and sacrifice of the 
 plaintiff's property, justice seems to demand that he 
 whose property has fallen a victim to the public service 
 should be compensated in some way. And if he do not 
 succeed, it must be admitted that the most striking and 
 apparent justice must yield before some unbending 
 technical principle or some fancied theory of public 
 policy. It must, however, be admitted that justice 
 would seem to demand that the compensation should 
 proceed from the quarter to which the benefit flows." 
 
 The case however was taken to the Court of Appeals on 
 exceptions, and the judgment was reversed, and Maryland 
 has ever since adhered to the principle that a public 
 corporation is not liable for consequential injuries from 
 an authorized public work, unless they are so severe as 
 to amount to a taking.®* The contrary doctrine continued 
 however to crop out from time to time in other states, 
 notably in the decisions in Ohio in respect to injuries from 
 a change of the grade of a public way,*^ and in occasional 
 actions against municipal corporations for injuries from 
 surface water, which might well have been decided upon 
 
 eight amendments to the federal 96. Cumberland v. Williaon, 50 
 
 constitution were limitations upon Md. 138, 33 Am. Rep. 304, and see 
 
 the powers of the United States also infra, § 109, n<>te 11. 
 
 and not of the several states. 97. Infra, § 162. 
 
296 The La.w op Eminent Domain. § 108 
 
 the ground that the injury complained of had not in fact 
 been authorizsed by the legislature.*^ 
 
 Within the last forty years the distinction between an 
 injury which has not in fact been authorized by the legis- 
 lature and one which could not constitutionally be author- 
 ized, except for the public use and upon payment of just 
 compensation, has been more clearly recognized^ and the 
 limits of the constitutional power of the legislature with 
 respect to the taking of property by eminent domain more 
 accurately defined, but a disputed point has arisen and 
 some of the most eminent text writers and courts have 
 accepted the doctrine that any use of land in the con- 
 jstruction or maintenance of a public improvement under 
 authority of law which would constitute an actionable 
 injury to neighboring land if done without such authority 
 is a taking within the meaning of the constitution. This 
 theory, it seems, was first clearly expounded in 1872 by 
 Judge Jeremiah Smith in the case of Eaton v. Boston, 
 Concord & Montreal Bailroad^^ and the decision, remark- 
 able for its strength of logic and clearness of reasoning, 
 attracted and retained the attention of the legal profession 
 throughout the country. The facts were as follows: The 
 plaintiff owned a lot of land, and the defendant, under legis- 
 lative authority, constructed its railroad near by. As a 
 result of the reasonable and proper construction of the 
 road, a cut was made through an embankment which had 
 previously acted as a barrier between the plaintiff's land 
 and the neighboring stream, and great quantities of water 
 were allowed to pour down upon the land in times of ordi- 
 nary freshet, leaving it covered with sand, gravel, and 
 stones. As no compensation for such an injury was pro- 
 vided by statute, it was held an action of tort would lie, 
 and with the actual decision no one can find fault, for the 
 damage was severe enough to amount to a taking even 
 under the prevailing doctrine. The court goes on to argue, 
 
 98. See for example Nevins v. 99. 51 N. H. 504, 12 Am. Rep. 
 
 Peoria, 41 111. 502, 89 Am. Dee. 147. 
 392. 
 
§ 109 What Constitutes a Taking. 297 
 
 however, that the right of a landowner to be free from 
 injury by the unreasonable use of his neighbor's land is 
 property, of which he cannot be deprived without 
 compensation. 
 
 " In a strict legal sense land is not * property ' but 
 the subject of property. * * * if property in land 
 consists of certain essential rights, and a physical 
 interference with the land substantially subverts one 
 of those rights, such interference * takes ' ipro tanto 
 the owner 's * property. ' * * * If the right of indefi- 
 nite user is an essential element of absolute property 
 or complete ownership, whatever physical interference 
 annuls this right takes property, although the owner 
 may still have left to him rights in the article of a 
 more circumscribed nature." 
 
 This case was affirmed by an even more elaborate opinion 
 in the same court two years later,^ and the substance of the 
 principle established by the two cases is that the right to 
 be free from a private nuisance on adjoining land is prop- 
 erty, and that when the public takes the adjoining land and 
 erects a nuisance upon it it takes a right which the former 
 owner of such land did not have but which was the property 
 of his neighbor. 
 
 § 109. The Fallacy of the Argument that a Damaging 
 is a Taking. 
 
 The fallacy of the foregoing argument lies in its assump- 
 tion that the property rights of an individual against other 
 individuals are the same as they are against the public. 
 In respect to all other branches of sovereign power they 
 are admittedly entirely different. It was said in early 
 times ' ' For the commonwealth a man shall suffer 
 damage,"^ and that has been the law ever since. Under 
 the police power and for the public benefit restrictions are 
 
 1. Thompson v. Androscoggin 2. Case of the Prerogative, 12 
 
 River Improvement Co., 54 N. H. Co. Rep. 13. 
 545. 
 
298 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 109 
 
 placed on a private individual's use of his own land which 
 his neighbors could not impose. He has, for example, an 
 absolute right in the absence of statute to maintain a liquor 
 saloon on his premises. If his neighbors should attempt 
 to prevent him by force, the law would protect him in his 
 property right. But if the state prohibits the maintenance 
 of liquor saloons his property right is taken away; never- 
 theless he is not entitled to compensation. All such rights 
 are held subject to the exercise of the police power, for 
 such was the universal understanding when the constitu- 
 tional limitations were created.* On the other hand, if his 
 neighbor erects a factory or a business block on his own 
 land and incidentally greatly enhances the value of the 
 neighboring land, the builder unlike a municipal corpora- 
 tion which has erected a public improvement is not entitled 
 to collect a betterment assessment from the persons so ben- 
 efited. Illustrations could be multiplied indefinitely. The 
 distinction is well put in an early Pennsylvania case.* 
 
 "As in man himself, so in man's title to land there 
 are two necessary elements, the individual and the 
 social. Private right and public right, individual prop- 
 erty and eminent domain are perfectly consistent ele- 
 ments of the one thing, property in land. Those who 
 are engaged in a contest for damages to land caused 
 
 3. Parker v. Commonwealth, 178 the law affects or even takes away 
 Mass. 199, 59 N. E. 634, Holmes, such rights it may do so within 
 C. J. : " The exercise of the police reasonable and somewhat narrow 
 power always deprives a party of limits upon considerations which 
 what would be his rights under the the constitution cannot be supposed 
 constitution but for such an adjudi- , to have been intended to exclude." 
 cation (that the public needs re- 4. Patten v. Northern Central R. 
 quire the restriction). The right R. Co., 33 Pa. 426, 75 Am. Dec. 
 to build the seventy-first foot from 612; and see also United States v. 
 the ground is just as much a right Certain Lands, 112 Ted. 622. 
 under the constitution as the right " There is a clear distinction be- 
 to build the sixty-ninth or the first, tween acts done by private indi- 
 It may be of less importance, but viduals for their own benefit and 
 it is the same in kind. The justifl- working injurious consequences and 
 cation of a building law is not that acts, perhaps equally injurious done 
 it does not qualify or affect a right for a public purpose in the exeeu- 
 under the constitution » » • tion of a public duty." 
 The justification is that although 
 
§ 109 "What Constitutes a Taking. 299 
 
 by the construction of public improvements are prone 
 to forget the social element that is involved in all pri- 
 vate titles. * * * Individual property is exclusive 
 as against individuals, but not as against society." 
 
 It is accordingly wholly inconclusive to demonstrate in 
 the Eaton case that Eaton's private property rights were 
 infringed, for the question remains just as it did before, 
 whether such rights are not held subject to infringement by 
 the exercise of the right of the public to construct public 
 improvements. The argument of the court in the Eaton 
 case either proves too much or proves nothing at all. Either 
 any interference with private land by public authority 
 which would be unlawful if done by private individuals is a 
 taking, and the exercise of the police power and the power 
 of taxation must be accomplished by compensation, or else 
 certain interferences with private property which are justi- 
 fied by ancient usage and contemporary understanding 
 form exceptions to such a strict interpretation of the con- 
 stitutional prohibition. The first alternative being clearly 
 wrong, at the end of the argument we are left where we 
 started or should have started; that is, by investigating the 
 understanding of the prohibition when it was inserted in 
 the constitutions, and by ascertaining the. contemporary 
 usages of English and American governments. 
 
 In the first place, before proceeding to an examination of 
 the early cases, the question inevitably arises why, if the 
 constitution makers, who generally used reasonably clear 
 English, meant to require compensation when land was 
 damaged by the construction of a public improvement, did 
 they not say so directly, instead of using an expression 
 which, to the lay mind. at least, meant something wholly 
 different. It is only by an extremely technical argument 
 that the New Hampshire court demonstrated that the word 
 " taken " can be construed to mean " damaged," and the 
 fact remains that that is not its natural interpretation. 
 
 Secondly, and most important, it was the common law of 
 England, and consequently of this country, when the con- 
 stitutions were adopted, that if a private owner suffered 
 
300 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 1Q9 
 
 necessary damage from a public improvement, but his land 
 was not actually entered on or taken, it was damnum absque 
 injuria.^ In England, where Tested rights are treated with 
 
 5. Cast Plate Mamifaeturera v. 
 Meredith, 4 Dumf. & East. 794. 
 Defendants, as paving commission- 
 ers, tinder authority of an Aot of 
 Parliament raised the grade of a 
 street in front of plaintiff's prem- 
 ises. Held : " If the legislature 
 think it nece^ary, as they do in 
 many cases, they enable the com- 
 missioners to award satisfaction to 
 the individuals who happen to suf- 
 fer. But if there be no such power 
 the parties are without remedy, 
 provided the commissioners do not 
 exceed their jurisdiction. • * * 
 Some individuals suffer an incon- 
 venience under all these Acts of 
 Parliament; but the interests of 
 individuals must give way to the 
 accommodation of the public." 
 Boulton V. Crowther, 2 B. & C. 
 703. In <this ease the act pro- 
 vided for compensation for prop- 
 erty " taken," and it was held that 
 damaging property by cutting off 
 its access was not a taking. Cal- 
 lender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 
 418. Plaintiff owned a house abut- 
 ting upon a street, and suffered 
 damage by the change of grade of 
 the street which was done by de- 
 fendant, a surveyor of highways, 
 under authority of statute. The 
 court says, speaking of the consti- 
 tutional provision in question: 
 " There has been no construction 
 given to this provision which can 
 extend the benefit of it to the case 
 of one who suffers an indirect or 
 consequential damage or expense 
 by means of the right use of prop- 
 erty already belonging to the pub- 
 lic. It has ever been confined in 
 judicial application, to the case of 
 property actually taken and appro- 
 priated for the government." 
 
 O'Connor v, Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187. 
 "No property was taken in thia 
 instance; but the cutting down of 
 the street consequent on the reduc- 
 tion of its grade left the building 
 useless. • • * The constitu- 
 tional provision for the case of 
 property taken for public use ex- 
 tends not to the case of property 
 injured or destroyed." Smith v. 
 Washington, 20 How. (U. S.) 135, 
 15 L. ed. 858. « The plaintiff may 
 have suffered inconvenience and 
 been put to expense in consequence 
 of such action, yet as the act of 
 the defendants is not ' unlawful or 
 wrongful' they are not bound to 
 make any recompense. It is what 
 the law styles dammim ahsque in- 
 juria. Private interests must yield 
 to public accommodation." Trans- 
 portation Co. V. Chicago, 99 TJ. S. 
 635, 25 L. ed. 336. "It is unde- 
 niable that in making the improve- 
 ment of which the plaintiffs com- 
 plain the city was the agent of the 
 state, and performing a public duty 
 imposed upon it by the legislature; 
 and that persons appointed or au- 
 thorized by law to make or improve 
 a highway are not answerable for 
 consequential damages, if they act 
 within their jurisdiction and with 
 care and skill, is a doctrine almoat 
 universally accepted alike in Eng- 
 land and in this country. • * • 
 The doctrine, however it may at 
 times appear to be at variance with 
 natural justice, rests upon the 
 soundest legal reason. The state 
 holds its highways in trust for the 
 public. Improvements made by ita 
 direction or by its authority are 
 its acts, and the ultimate responsi- 
 bility, of course, should rest up<Hi 
 it. But it is the prerogative of the 
 
1 
 
 § 109 What Constitutes a Taking. 301 
 
 what sometimes seems to us unnecessary respect, the fail- 
 ure to compensate an owner for indirect injury from the 
 construction of public improvements was not looked upon as 
 an extreme exercise of the power of Parliament, or as a 
 violation of the unwritten constitution which the courts 
 denounced but were powerless to prevent. It was not the 
 common law that the Revolution was directed against, but 
 it was the protection of the common law and rights equal to 
 those of British subjects that our ancestors desired,® and 
 when they acquired political independence they crystalized 
 the rights of the individual under the Magna Charta, the 
 Bill of Rights, the common law, and the unwritten British 
 Constitution into privileges which neither the executive nor 
 the legislative branch of the government might violate. 
 There is nothing in the history of the law or politics of the 
 time to lead us to believe that uncompensated indirect 
 injury from public improvements was one of the evils that 
 the framers of our constitutions sought to abolish. In fact 
 the law remained undisturbed, and for nearly a century it 
 was universally held that the constitutional limitation 
 applied only to an actual or substantial taking. Yet, as far 
 as appears, none of the framers of the various bills of 
 rights arose from retirement and announced that the clause 
 now under discussion was being constantly misunderstood 
 and misinterpreted. "Whatever, then, one may think of the 
 abstract logic of the Eaton case, it come too late to stand 
 on its merits as an interpretation of the constitution. And 
 accordingly, although it has found some following among 
 
 state to be exempt from eoercion lature gives. It does not exist at 
 
 by suit, except by its own consent. common law. The decisions to 
 
 This prerogative would amount to which we have referred were made 
 
 nothing if it does not protect the in view of Magna Charta and the 
 
 agents for improving highways restriction to be found in the con- 
 
 which the state is compelled to em- etitution of every state, that pri- 
 
 ploy. The remedy, therefore, for vate property shall not be taken 
 
 a consequential injury resulting for public use without just com- 
 
 from the state's action through ita pensation being made." 
 agents, if there be any, must be 6. Parker v. Simpson, 180 Mass. 
 
 that, and that only, which the legis- 334, 353, 62 N. E. 401. 
 
302 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 109 
 
 the courts^ and text writers,® the Supreme Court of the 
 United States ' and the great majority of the state courts 
 have adhered to the old doctrine, and hold that when the 
 owner of property continues in use and possession as before, 
 it is not taken in the constitutional sense, however much it 
 may be depreciated in value. In other words, when a munic- 
 ipal or a public service corporation, or other party to whom 
 the power of eminent domain can be constitutionally dele- 
 gated, inflicts injury upon private land under authority of 
 
 7. See for example, Knowles v. 
 New Sweden Irrig'ation District, 16 
 Idaho 217, 101 Pac. 81; Nevins v. 
 Peoria, 41 111. 502, 89 Am. Dec. 
 392; Gordon v. Silver Creek, 197 
 N. Y. 509, 90 N. E. 1159, affirming 
 127 App. Div. (N, Y.) 888, 112 
 N. Y. Supp. 54; Staton v. Norfolk, 
 etc., R. R. Co., Ill N. C. 278, 16 
 S. E. 181, 17 L. R. A. 838. 
 
 8. Lewis, Eminent Domain, §§ 
 54-59; Mills, Eminent Domain, 
 § 30. The doctrine of the Eaton 
 case is not, however, favored by 
 Sedgwick, Stat. & Const. Law, 533 
 (written, however, before the Eaton 
 opinion was given) ; Dillon, Mu- 
 nicipal Corporations, 4th ed. § 587; 
 Randolph, Eminent Domain, § 148; 
 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 
 541; Tiedman, State and Federal 
 Control, § 143. 
 
 9. Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 
 99 U. S. 635, 25 L. ed. 336. " But 
 acts done in the proper exercise of 
 governmental powers, and not di- 
 rectly encroaching upon private 
 property, though their consequences 
 may impair its use, are universally 
 held not to be a taking within the 
 meaning of the constitutional pro- 
 vision. They do not entitle the 
 owner of such property to compen- 
 sation from the state or its agents, 
 or give him any right of action. 
 This is supported by an immense 
 weight of authority. • * * The 
 extremest qualifications of the doc- 
 
 trine is to be found, perhaps, in 
 PumpeUy v. Green Bay Co. and 
 Eaton V. Railroad. In those cases 
 it was held that permanent flooding 
 of private property may be re- 
 garded as a "taking." In those 
 cases there was a physical invasion 
 of the real estate of the private 
 owner, and a practical ouster of his 
 possession. But in the present case 
 there was no such invasion. No 
 entry was made upon the plaintiffs 
 lot. All that was done was to ren- 
 der for a time its use more incon- 
 venient." See also, Osborne v. 
 Missouri Pacific R. R. Co., 147 
 U. S. 248, 37 L. ed. 155; Gibson 
 V. United States, 166 U. S. 269, 
 275, 41 L. ed. 996, 1002; Meyer v. 
 Richmond, 172 U. S. 82, 95, 43 
 L. ed. 374, 379; Sharp v. United 
 States, 191 U. S. 341, 48 L. ed. 211; 
 Bedford v. United States, 192 U. S. 
 217, 48 L. ed. 414; Jackson v. 
 United States, 230 U. S. 1, 57 L. ed. 
 1363; Peabody v. United States, 231 
 U. S. 530, 58 L. ed. 351; Rutz v. 
 St. Louis, 10 Fed. 341; Mills v. 
 United States, 46 Fed. 738, 740, 12 
 L. R. A. 673 ; High Bridge Lumber 
 Co. V. United States, 69 Fed. 324; 
 Saliotte v. King Bridge Co., 58 
 C. 0. A. 466, 122 Fed. 378 ; De Lucca 
 V. North Little Rock, 142 Fed. 597; 
 St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. 
 Miller Levee District, 207 Fed. 338; 
 Hood V. United States, 46 Ct. CL 
 30. 
 
§ 109 
 
 What Constitutes a Taking. 
 
 303 
 
 and in compliance with an act of the legislature, and there 
 has been no want of reasonable care or skill in the execu- 
 tion of the power, such party is not liable in an action at law 
 for such injury, even although the same act if done without 
 legislative sanction would be actionable, unless the injury 
 is of such a character as to deprive the owner of the 
 use and possession of his land, or compensation is required 
 by special statutory or constitutional provision when- 
 ever property is damaged by the construction of a public 
 improvement.^" 
 
 10. California. — Reardon v. San 
 Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 Pac. 317, 
 56 Am. Rep. 109; Green v. State, 
 73 Cal. 29, 11 Pac. 602, 14 Pac. 
 610; Lamb v. Reclamation District, 
 73 Cal. 125, 14 Pac. 625, 2 Am. St. 
 Rep. 775; De Baker v. Southern 
 California Ry. Co., 106 Cal. 257, 
 39 Pac. 610, 46 Am. St. Rep. 237. 
 
 Colorado. — Aicher v. Denver, 10 
 Colo. App. 413, 52 Pac. 86. 
 
 Connecticut. — HoUister v. Union 
 Co., 9 Conn. 436, 25 Am. Dec. 36; 
 Holyoke Water Co. v. Connecticut 
 River Co., 52 Conn. 575; Lane v. 
 Harbor Commissioners, 70 Conn. 
 685, 40 Atl. 1058. 
 
 Florida. — Selden v. Jacksonville, 
 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457, 14 L. R. A. 
 370, 29 Am. St. Rep. 278; Ander- 
 son V. Fuller, 51 Fla. 380, 41 So. 
 684, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1026. 
 
 Indiana. — Cummings v. Seymour, 
 79 Ind. 491, 41 Am. Rep. 618; In- 
 diana R. R. Co. V. Eberle, 110 Ind. 
 542, 11 N. E. 467, 59 Am. Rep. 
 225; Morris v. Indianapolis, 177 
 Ind. 363, 94 N. E. 705; Stein v. 
 Lafayette, 6 Ind. App. 414, 33 
 N. E. 912; Richmond v. Test, 18 
 Ind. App. 482, 48 N. B. 610; 
 Pritchett v. Knox County Commis- 
 eioners, 42 Ind. App. 3, 85 N. E. 
 32. 
 
 Kansas. — Ottawa, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Larson, 40 Kan. 301, 19 Pac. 
 661, 2 L. R. A. 59. 
 
 Maine. — Cushman v. Smith, 34 
 Me. 247; Nichols v. Somerset R. B. 
 Co., 43 Me. 356. 
 
 Maryland. — O'Brien v. Balti- 
 more Belt R. R. Co., 74 Md. 363, 22 
 Atl. 141, 13 L. R. A. 126; Garrett 
 V. Lake Roland Ry. Co., 79 Md. 
 277, 29 Atl. 830, 24 L. R. A. 396; 
 Northern Central Ry. Co. v. Olden- 
 burg, 122 Md. 236, 89 Atl. 601. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Bacon v. Bos- 
 ton, 154 Mass. 100, 28 N. E. 9; 
 Taft V. Commonwealth, 158 Mass. 
 526, 33 N. E. 1046; Lincoln v. Com- 
 monwealth, 164 Mass. 368, 41 N. E. 
 489; Bent v. Emery, 173 Mass. 495, 
 53 N. E. 910. 
 
 Minnesota. — Genois v. St. Paul, 
 35 Minn. 330, 29 N. W. 129; WUlis 
 v. Winona, 59 Minn. 27, 60 N. W. 
 814, 26 L. R. A. 142. 
 
 Missouri. — Pajme v. Kansas City, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 112 Mo. 6, 20 S. W. 
 322, 17 L. R. A. 628. 
 
 Nebraska. — Omaha v. Flood, 57 
 Neb. 124, 77 N. W. 379. 
 
 New Jersey. — Morris R. R. Co. v. 
 Newark, 10 N. J. Eq. 352; Bese- 
 man v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 50 
 N. J. L. 235, 13 Atl. 165. 
 
 New York. — Atwater v. Trustees 
 of Canandai^a, 124 N. Y. 602, 27 
 N. E. 385; Benner v. Atlantic 
 Dredging Co., 134 N. Y. 156, 31 
 N. E. 328, 17 L. R. A. 220, 30 Am. 
 St. Rep. 649; Talbot v. New York, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 151 N. Y. 155, 45 
 
304 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 110 
 
 § 110. The Question whether a Damaging is a Taking no 
 longer Open. 
 
 For a number of years the controversy over the question 
 whether " taken " meant anything more than " damaged " 
 was maintained with considerable vigor on both sides, 
 although for various reasons the distinction was never of 
 the practical importance that one would naturally suppose. 
 Many cases of damage were held to constitute a taking, even 
 by those who gave the constitutional limitation its narrower 
 construction. The cases in which the question whether the 
 construction of a particular public improvement consti- 
 tuted the taking of property was most frequently passed 
 upon by the courts were those in which the laying of rails, 
 pipes, wires or other structures in public ways, the fee of 
 which was in the abutting owner, was involved,^^ and in 
 these cases the question whether an injury to land not 
 entered upon was a taking was not in issue, as the real ques- 
 tion was whether the new use was an exercise of the exist- 
 ing easement, and, if the new use was not within the 
 easement, it was a direct entry upon and appropriation of 
 private property and constituted a taking according to 
 every construction of the constitution; but, if it was within 
 the easement, it was the exercise of a right that had pre- 
 viously been taken and paid for, and no one contended that 
 damage to property had to be paid for twice. Even when 
 the fee of the way was in the public, the right of the abutting 
 owner to compensation for a use of the way for other than 
 
 N. E. 382; In re Grade Crossing mont Central B. R. Co., 25 Vt. 465, 
 
 Commissioners of Buffalo, 201 60 Am. Dee. 283. 
 
 N. Y. 32, 94 N. E. 188. Virginia. — Kehrer v. Richmond, 
 
 Pennsylvania.— Cleveland, etc. B. 81 Va. 748; Home Building, etc., 
 
 B. Co. V. Speer, 56 Pa. 325, 94 Am. Co. v. Roanoke, 91 Va. 52, 20 S. E. 
 
 Dec. 84. 895, 27 L. R. A. 551. 
 
 South Carolina, — G-aaraux v. Wisconsin. — Black River Im- 
 
 Greenville, 53 S. C. 575, 31 S. E. provement Co. v. La Crosse Trans- 
 
 597; Columbia v. Melton, 85 S. C. portation Co., 54 Wis. 659, 11 
 
 558, 67 S. E. 902. N. W. 443, 41 Am. Rep. 66; Col- 
 
 Vtah.— Salt Lake City v. East eolough v. Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 182, 
 
 Jordan Irrigatioii Co., 40 Utah 126, 65 N. W. 1039. 
 
 121 Pac. 592. 11. Infra, § 151, and, generally, 
 
 Vermont. — Richardson v. Ver- §§ 167-184 inc. 
 
§ 110 What Constitutes a Taking. 305 
 
 highway purposes depended upon the existence of ease- 
 ments of light, air and access in the way, which would be 
 destroyed by the new use of the way, rather than upon the 
 acceptance of the doctrine that a damage is a taking.^^ 
 
 Furthermore, the right to inflict damage upon private 
 property in the course of the construction of a public work 
 without compensation is an extreme exercise of the sover- 
 eign power not to be assumed to have been granted to pri- 
 vate parties in the absence of specific legislative enactment. 
 Power granted to a private corporation to construct a 
 public work authorizes no injuries not necessarily incident 
 to the construction of such work, and for other injuries, 
 though the result of constructing the work in the chosen 
 manner without negligence, the corporation is liable to the 
 same extent as a private owner. In other words, an act of 
 the legislature will not justify the maintenance of a nuis- 
 ance without compensation unless it is capable of no other 
 construction. If the public end can be attained without con- 
 structing anything offensive, or if the offensive structure 
 can be readily placed in a position where it will do little, 
 if any harm, the statute being silent as to its location, or 
 if it is reasonably possible to do the authorized work in an 
 inoffensive way, the statute will not be construed as author- 
 izing a nuisance, and the persons who erected one, their 
 justification failing, will be liable at common law.^ In 
 Massachusetts and some other states it has long been 
 the practice to insert in every act authorizing the construc- 
 tion of a public improvement a special provision for the 
 payment of compensation both for land taken and for land 
 damaged in any other way.^* As a result of these various 
 causes, cases involving the right to compensation for injury 
 to land in the exercise of eminent domain did not often 
 directly involve the constitutional question over the mean- 
 ing of "taken," although it was frequently discussed in 
 cases in which it was not necessary to a decision of the case. 
 
 12. Infra, §1 160, 161. 14. Infra, § 309. 
 
 13. Infra, §§ 470, 502. 
 
 20 
 
306 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 110 
 
 Nevertheless cases did occasionally arise ia which it was 
 necessary to decide whether a mere damage was a taking, 
 and in such cases the courts divided, as they did on other 
 constitutional questions, those inclined to sustain property 
 rights at the expense of public rights giving the broader 
 interpretation to the word " taken." This interpretation, 
 though unsound in theory, had behind it a strong popular 
 feeling that uncompensated injury to private property by 
 the erection of public works was a gross injustice, and 
 before long many of the states amended their constitutions 
 by specifically providing that property should not be either 
 taken or damaged for the public use without compensation/^ 
 and in such states the question of the significance of 
 "taken" ceased to be of practical importance. In the 
 forty-five years that have passed since this amendment was 
 first adopted in Illinois, over half of the states have added 
 it to their fundamental law; but in some of the remaining 
 states it has been proposed and rejected, and in all of the 
 others there has been plenty of opportunity to adopt it if 
 public sentiment approved it. It is accordingly a reason- 
 able inference that, in the states in which the amendment 
 has not been adopted, it is the will of the people to reserve 
 in their hands the right of constructing public improve- 
 ments without paying the owners of private property for 
 incidental injury thereby caused, whenever they feel that 
 the public necessities require the exercise of such right, 
 so that the question whether that right exists is now no 
 longer considered to be open.^ 
 
 16 
 
 15. Infra, § 311. 538, 7 Am. Rep. 253). In 1885 a 
 
 16. Thus in Selden v. Jackson- new constitution was adopted, but 
 villa, 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457, 14 the old provision in regard to emi- 
 L. R. A. 370, 29 Am. St. Rep. 378, nent domain was retained. In re- 
 it appeared that prior to 1885 the jeeting a contention that this pro- 
 Florida constitution had contained vision should be construed to in- 
 the usual provision prohibiting the elude damage not amounting to a 
 taking of property for public use taking in the ordinary sense, the 
 without just compensation, and that court, through Raney, C. J., dis- 
 it had been construed to exclude cussed, the history of the eonstitu- 
 " consequential damages " from an tional amendment in Illinois and 
 authorized public improvement other states, and pointed out what 
 (Dorman v. Jacksonville, 13 Fla. occurred at the oonstitutional con- 
 
§ 111 
 
 What Constitutes a Taking. 
 
 307 
 
 Many of the states which have adopted the amendment in 
 regard to damage have also adopted provisions which 
 require payment of compensation to be made in advance 
 when property is taken by eminent domain, but not when 
 it is merely damaged. In such states cases involving the 
 meaning of " taken " frequently arise under the latter pro- 
 vision, but as they involve only questions of procedure, and 
 a decision unfavorable to the owner does not deprive him of 
 any substantial rights, but merely postpones the date of 
 payment of compensation, the courts are not in such cases 
 inclined to stretch the significance of the word " taken " 
 beyond its original and primary meaning." 
 
 § 111. Erection of Permanent Structures on Private Land 
 without Formal Condemnation. 
 
 Ordinarily, except in states in which the eminent domain 
 laws are so burdensome or impractical that public sentiment 
 does not demand their enforcement,'® when land is taken by 
 eminent domain an entry is made in accordance with some 
 
 vention in Florida in 1885, as fol- 
 lows: "On the 24th of July, the 
 16th article being under considera- 
 tion, there was offered a section to 
 be entitled ' Private Property, How 
 Taken for Public Use,' the first 
 paragraph of it being : ' No pri- 
 vate property of persons or corpo- 
 rations shall be taken nor damaged 
 for public use in the construction 
 of railroads, canals, or if taken for 
 other purposes, under chartered 
 rights without just compensation 
 to be paid for the same.' This pro- 
 posed section was also referred to 
 the committee on miscellaneous pro- 
 visions, and on the 28th day of that 
 month it reported as a substitute 
 for the same what is now the 29th 
 section of the 16th article, as given 
 at the outset of this opinion, it hav- 
 ing been adopted on the last day of 
 July. These proceedings, if they 
 indicate anything, tend to the con- 
 viction that the purpose of the con- 
 vention was, as shown by its final 
 action, to exclude from the constitu- 
 
 tion any provision for compensa- 
 tion for damage other than where 
 there was a ' taking ' or ' appro- 
 priation ' of property. If such was 
 not the intention, the word ' dam- 
 aged ' or its equivalent would have 
 been put in the 29th section, such 
 word being in the proposed provi- 
 sion for which it was a substitute." 
 
 17. See for example Hubbell v. 
 Des Moines, 168 Iowa 418, 154 N. W. 
 337; Smith v. Sedalia, 244 Mo. 107, 
 149 S. W. 597; McCammon & Lang 
 Lumber Co. v. Trinity, etc., Ry. Co., 
 104 Tex. 8, 133 S. W. 247, 36 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 662; Milwaukee 
 Term. Ry. Co. v. Seattle, 86 "Wash. 
 102, 149 Pac. 644. 
 
 18. See infra, § 478, for the 
 eases in which a public service cor- 
 poration having the power of emi- 
 nent domain erects its structures 
 upon private land without comply- 
 ing with the provisions of law, and 
 for the convenience of all parties, 
 the damages are assessed as if there 
 bad been a taking. When such en- 
 
308 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domaih". 
 
 § Ul 
 
 statute whicli provides a means for formally divesting the 
 owner of his title to the fee or to the easement necessary 
 for the public work. But his constitutional rights are no 
 less if the reasonable and proper formalities are ignored. 
 It is open to some doubt whether a man can constitutionally 
 be deprived of his property without the recording of some 
 definite statement of the extent of the taking ; ^® certainly he 
 can stand in no worse position because the taking is in pais. 
 If land is invaded, without statutory authority, a trespass is, 
 of course, committed, but if a statute authorizes the con- 
 struction of a permanent public work upon private land, 
 such construction constitutes a taking and the owner is enti- 
 tled to compensation; if the statute provides for none it 
 is void. 
 
 It has been held a taking where ditches, or drains have 
 been dug across private land,*" when a sidewalk,^* a levee,^" 
 or a fence,*^ has been built upon it, when pipes are laid 
 tlirough it,^* or an elevated railroad over it.''® The excava- 
 
 try is not authorized by law, of 
 course no constitutional question ia 
 nrvolved. 
 
 19. Infra, § 342. 
 
 20. Illinois. — Payson v. People> 
 175 lU. 267, 51 N. E. 588; Wa- 
 bash R. R. Co. V. Ooon Run, etc., 
 Bistriet, 194 111. 310, 62 N. E. 679; 
 Juvinall v. Jamesburg Drainage 
 District, 204 III. 106, 68 N. E. 440; 
 Drainage Commissioners v. Knox, 
 237 111. 148, 17 S. E. 981. 
 
 Iowa. — Aldrieh v. Paine, 106 
 Iowa 461, 76 N. W. 812. 
 
 Maine. — Plimmier v. Sturtevant, 
 32 Me. 325. 
 
 New Jersey. — Ward v. Peck, 49 
 N. J. L. 42, 6 Atl. 805. 
 
 New York. — People v. Haines, 
 49 N. T. 587. 
 
 North Carolina. — State v. New, 
 130 N". C. 731, 41 S. E. 1033. 
 
 Ohio. — Reeves v. Wood County, 
 8 Ohio St. 333; Lake Erie, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Hancock County Com- 
 missionera, 63 Ohio St. 23, 57 N. E. 
 1009. 
 
 Texas. — Harrison v. Sulphur 
 Springs (Tex. Civ. App.), 67 S. W. 
 515. 
 
 Wisconsim. — Fraser v. Mulaney, 
 129 Wis. 377, 109 N. W. 139. 
 
 21. Clinton v. Franklin (Ky.), 
 83 S. W. 142. 
 
 22. Hollingsworth v. Tensas, 17 
 Fed. 115, and so of a dam, Cav- 
 anagh v. Boston, 139 Mass. 426, 52 
 Am. Rep. 716. 
 
 23. Goodale v. Sowell, 62 S. C. 
 516, 40 S. E. 970. 
 
 24. Smith v. Atlanta, 92 Ga. 119, 
 17 S. E. 981; Lake Erie, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Hancock County Commis- 
 sioners, 63 Ohio St. 23, 57 N. E. 
 1009 ; Lavett v. West Virginia Cen- 
 tral Gas Co., 65 W. Va. 739, 65 
 S. E. 196, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 230. 
 A city cannot take an underground 
 stream flowing under the land of an 
 individual for a sewer without com- 
 pensation, Kevil V. Princeton 
 (Ky.), 118 S. W. 363. 
 
 25. Bass V. Metropolitan EI. Ry. 
 Co., 82 Fed. 857, 39 L. R. A. 711; 
 
§ 112 WsAT Constitutes a Takhstg. 309 
 
 tion of flats so as to keep tliein permanently submerged is 
 a taking f^ and, as the title to land extends indefinitely 
 upward, a bridge high above but not resting upon private 
 land cannot be built without paying the owners of the prop- 
 erty directly below it.^^ 
 
 In such a case, when land has been actually entered and 
 put to a public use, or some permanent structure has been 
 erected upon it, there is a taking in the constitutional sense 
 no matter how trivial the pecuniary injury may be, or how 
 little the owner's use of his property has been interfered 
 with, since he has a constitutional right to the undisturbed 
 possession of his land until it has been condemned accord- 
 ing to law.^^ The application of this principle is of impor- 
 tance in the numerous controversies that have arisen over 
 the laying of rails, pipes or wires over land already subject 
 to a public easement, such as a highway or railroad. In 
 such a case, if it is held that the rails, pipes or wires so 
 laid are not warranted as an exercise of the existing ease- 
 ment, but constitute an additional servitude, the owner of 
 the fee is constitutionally entitled to compensation as a 
 matter of law as for an occupation of his land, regardless 
 of the extent of the injury to his remaining land."* 
 
 § 112. Entry for a Temporary Purpose. 
 
 An entry on private land may constitute a taking, thougli 
 temporary in its nature and for only a temporary purpose. 
 A city could not, for example, while it was building a new 
 city hall on the site of an old one, formally divest the owner 
 of a neighboring building of the use of his property for a 
 year and employ it for a temporary seat of government 
 
 Metropolitan, etc., EL Ry. Co. v. 27. White v. Ciacinnati, etc., 
 
 Springer, 171 IlL 170, 49 N. E. 416, R. R. Co., 34 Ind. App. 287, 71 
 
 and so of an ordinary steam rail- N. E. 276. 
 
 road, Louisiana Land Co. v. Blake- 28. Ryan v. Weiser Valley Land 
 
 wood, 131 La. 539, 59 So. 984; & Water Co., 20 Idaho 288, 118 
 
 Stockdale v. Rio Gcrande Western Pae. 769; Lovett v. West Virginia 
 
 Ry. Co., 28 Utah 201, 77 Pao. 849, Central Gas Co., 65 W. Va. 739, m 
 
 and see also infra, §§ 478, 503. S. E. 196, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 230. 
 
 26. Bent v. Emery, 173 Mass. 29. Infra, § 190. 
 495, 53 N. E. 910. 
 
310 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 112 
 
 without compensation for depriving him of the use of his 
 land and building. Accordingly it is held that land or other 
 property cannot be actually put to use by public authority 
 for a temporary purpose without compensating the owner.*" 
 When land is entered and occupied during proceedings 
 which result in its not being finally condemned, there is a 
 taking for the period during which it is held.*^ A momentary 
 entry for the purpose of a survey is not however a taking, 
 and may be authorized without compensation whether the 
 survey is preliminary to some public work** or is for any 
 other public purpose,** but a right to enter upon private 
 land for the purpose of cutting down trees ** or of diverting 
 
 30. McKeon v. New York, etc., 
 E. R. Co., 75 Conn. 343, 53 Atl. 
 656, 61 L. R. A. 730. (Railroad 
 tracks placed in street while grade 
 of railroad was being changed.) 
 Brighiam v. Edwards, 7 Grray 
 (Mass.) 359. (Land taken for a 
 military encampment for a few 
 days.) Cavanagh v. Boston, 139 
 Mass. 426, 52 Am. Rep. 716. (Tem- 
 porary dam on flats.) Waller v. 
 State, 144 N. Y. 579, 39 N. E. 680. 
 (Temporary stoppage of flow of 
 watercourse.) Ogden v. New York, 
 141 App. Div. (N. Y.) 578, 126 
 N. Y. Supp. 189. (Cutting off all 
 access for two years by work in 
 streets for other than a street use.) 
 Johnson's Case, 4 Ct. CI. 250. 
 (Occupation by government held to 
 create implied lease.) Peck's Case, 
 14 Ct. a. 84. (Use of a hay-press 
 by a quartermaster.) Clifford v. 
 United States, 34 Ct. CI. 233. 
 (Lease implied by owner not bring- 
 ing ejectment.) Alexander v. 
 United States, 39 Ct. CI. 383. 
 (Military Camp.) 
 
 31. Steinhart v. Mendocino, 137 
 Gal. 575, 70 Pac. 629, 59 L. R. A. 
 404, 92 Am. St. Rep. 183. 
 
 32. United States. — Montana Co. 
 V. St. Louis Mining Co., 152 U. S. 
 160, 38 L. ed. 398. 
 
 Maine. — Cushman v. Smith, 34 
 Me. 247. 
 
 Maryland. — Stuart v. Baltimore, 
 7 Md. '500. 
 
 Missouri. — Walther v. Warner, 
 25 Mo. 277. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Orr v. Quim- 
 by, 54 N. H. 590. 
 
 New Jersey. — State v. Seymour, 
 35 N. J. L. 47. 
 
 New York. — Polly v. Saratoga 
 R. R. Co., 9 Barb. 449. 
 
 33. Winslow v. Giffiord, 6 Cush. 
 (Mass.) 327; State v. District 
 Court, 28 Mont. 528, 73 Pac. 230; 
 Orr V. Quimby, 54 N. H. 590. 
 
 34. Thus a cut of a strip several 
 feet wide through a forest to make 
 a base-line incident to surveying 
 the boundary between two counties 
 is a taking, Litchfield v. Bond, 186 
 N. Y. 66, 78 N. E. 718, revg. 93 
 N. Y. Supp. 1016, and a statute 
 authorizing a forest commissioner 
 to clear trees and vegetation ofi 
 private land within a specified dis- 
 tance of a railroad track ia also 
 unconstitutional, Vreeland v. For- 
 est Park Reservation Commission, 
 82 N. J. Eq. 349, 87 Atl. 435. So 
 also a road overseer cannot be au- 
 thorized to go upon land adjacent 
 to a highway and take timber trees 
 for road purposes, without com- 
 
§ 113 What Constitutes a Taking. 311 
 
 water ^^ cannot be acquired without the payment of 
 compensation. 
 
 Instances occasionally arise of the taking of a site for a 
 public work by proper proceedings, followed by encroach- 
 ment on the adjoining land. In case of the use of such lands 
 for the storage of materials and tools during construction, 
 ordinarily no constitutional question would arise, and such 
 action would constitute an ordinary trespass, but, if it 
 clearly appeared that such invasion was authorized by stat- 
 ute, if carried beyond reasonable bounds it might constitute 
 a taking. It should be looked at broadly and a mere occa- 
 sional trespass would not constitute a taking.^* 
 
 When a corporation engaged in constructing a public 
 work intentionally extends its structure beyond the limits 
 of its legal location it ' ' takes ' ' the land so occupied, even 
 if the encroaching structure is not intended to be perma- 
 nent,*'' but an encroachment resulting from accident or 
 mistake is merely a trespass.^* 
 
 § 113. Covering Land with Earth, Sewage or Water. 
 
 No doubt there may be a taking of land when it is not 
 physically invaded by any substance even as intangible as 
 smeUs or sounds. Legal restrictions, it has already been 
 shown, may constitute a taking,*® and the same result is 
 reached when access to a parcel of land is physically cut 
 off.*" Such cases are, however, rare. The more common 
 case of constructive taking is by invasion of matter, and it 
 is well settled that when land is devoted to the public use 
 under legislative authority in such a manner as to cause 
 neighboring land to be invaded by such quantities of matter 
 
 pensation to the owner of the land. R. B. Co., 75 ^ Conn. 343, 53 Atl. 
 
 Watkins v. Walker County, 18 Tex. 656, 61 L. B. A. 730. 
 
 585, 70 Am. Dec. 298. 38. Morris v. Wisconsin Midland 
 
 35. MarshaU v. Niagara Springs R. R. Co., 82 Wis. 541, 52 N. W. 
 Orchard Co., 22 Idaho 144, 125 758; Burland v. Montreal, Eep. 
 Pae. 208. Jud. Que. 19 C. S. 574. 
 
 36. Landerbrun v. Duffy, 2 Pa. 39. Supra, § 101. 
 398. 40. Infra, § 115. 
 
 37. McKeon v. New York, etc., 
 
312 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 113 
 
 as to effectually destroy its usefulness, there is a taking of 
 the land so invaded.*^ 
 
 Thus it is a taking of private land to cover it to any con- 
 siderable depth with earth. When a street is graded to its, 
 full width above the level of the surrounding land and the 
 embankment is allowed to slope on the adjacent property, 
 the land so covered is taken in the constitutional sense. It 
 is shown elsewhere that the easement of a public highway 
 does not include the right to slope earth upon any land out- 
 side the limits of the strip taken for highway purposes, 
 and a municipality cannot use land so situated for such a 
 purpose without compensating the owner.*^ When the earth 
 used for raising the grade of a street or of any other public 
 work is originally contained by a retaining wall, and by the 
 action of the elements the wall bulges over upon the adjoin- 
 ing land, the owner is entitled to compensation.*^ Similarly, 
 when earth, sand, and other debris is cast upon land by the 
 water used in mining operations or by floods let loose for 
 other purposes, if the injury is sufficiently serious, it is 
 held to be a taking.** 
 
 41. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., embankment pressed up the adjoin- 
 
 13 WaU. (U. S.) 166, 20 L. ed. ing land. 
 
 557. " Where real estate is actu- 44. Covering land with earth and 
 
 ally invaded by superinduced addi- debris was held a taking in the 
 
 tions of water, earth, sand, or other following oases : 
 
 material or by having any artificial United States. — Woodruff v. 
 
 structure placed on it, so as to North Bloomfield, eite., Co., 18 Fed. 
 
 effectually destroy or impair its 753 (debris from mining). 
 
 usefulness, it is a taking, within the Michigwn.— Edwards v. Allouez 
 
 meaning of the constitution. * * * Mining Co., 38 Mich. 46, 31 Am. 
 
 Beyond this we do not go, and the ^^ g^j^ ^^^ waste). 
 
 case caUs us to go no further." Minnesota. - Weaver v. Missis- 
 
 ,,.f ■ ^f'^'J 163- ^'^ ^"l^^f sippi Boom Co., 28 Minn. 534, 11 
 Milwaukee Term. Ry. Co. v. Seat- xr w ii/t n.,™= ^^a A-^f+\ 
 ^i„ o« w„„;, -ino 1.10 TJ„„ fi/t/i N. W. 114 (logs and drift). 
 
 tie, 86 Wash. 102, 149 Pac. 644, 
 
 Montana. — Titzpatrick v. Mont^ 
 
 holding that the taking of an ease- „„ ,, , V01 nn -n aic 
 
 , ^„ , J . , gomery, 20 Mont. 181, 50 Pac 416, 
 
 ment of slope was a damagmg and °^ . •"_, ^ „ „„„ ' ... „ 
 
 not a taking. 63 Am. St Rep. 622 (taihngs from 
 
 43. Miles V. Worcester, 154 Plac^r mines). 
 
 Mass. 511, 28 N. E. 676, 13 L. R. A. ^^'^ Eampshvre.—^aton v. Bos- 
 
 841, 26 Am. St. Rep. 264, and see ton, etc., R. R. Co., 51 N. H. 504, 
 
 also Herbert v. Pennsylvania R. R. 12 Am. Rep. 147 (sand and stones. 
 
 Co., 43 N. J. Eq. 21, 10 Atl. 872, See supra, § 108). 
 
 where the weight of defendant's In East Pennsylvania R. R. Co. 
 
§ 113 
 
 What Constitutes a Taking. 
 
 313 
 
 No more obnoxious form of the invasion of land appears 
 in the decided cases than the turning of sewage upon it. 
 As such use of the land could hardly fail to deprive the 
 owner of all enjoyment of the land so covered, it is invari- 
 ably held that he is entitled to compensation.*^ The rule is 
 the same whether the sewage is turned directly upon the 
 land, or upon other land from which it is carried by gravity 
 to that of the complaining party.** 
 
 It is held in the federal courts that a permanent flooding 
 of riparian lands, rendering them practically irreclaimable 
 and valueless, is a taking,*^ even when the flooding is caused 
 by works constructed to improve navigation.*® When how- 
 ever the injury can be averted by the construction of drains 
 and levees, though at considerable expense, it is a mere 
 injury and not a taking.*^ The same rule is followed in the 
 
 V. SehoUenljeTger, 54 Pa. 545, it 
 was lield. that wlaeii a railroad com- 
 pany exercised the right given it by 
 law of depositing stone and earth 
 on private lands outside its location, 
 there was a taking in the constitu- 
 tional sense. 
 
 45. United States. — Carmiohael 
 V. Texarkana, 94 Fed. 561. 
 
 California. — Lehn v. San Fran- 
 cisco, 66 Cal. 76, 4 Pac. 965. 
 
 Georgia. — ^ Smith v. Atlanta, 75 
 Ga. 110; M'artin v. Gainsville R. R. 
 Co., 78 Ga. 307. 
 
 Illinois. — Jacksonville v. Lam- 
 bert, 62 lU. 519; Dierks v. Addi- 
 son, 142 lU. 197, 31 N. E. 496. 
 
 Iowa. — LoTighran v. Des Moines, 
 72 Iowa 382, 34 N. "W. 172. 
 
 Kentucky. — Louisville v. O'Mal- 
 ley, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 873, 53 S. "W. 
 287. 
 
 MassacJiusetts. — Woodward v. 
 Worcester, 121 Mass. 245. 
 
 Minnesota. — Tate v. St. Paul, 56 
 Minn. 527, 58 N. W. 158, 45 Am. 
 St. Rep. 501. 
 
 Missouri. — Thurston v. St. 
 Joseph, 51 Mo. 510, 11 Am. Rep. 
 
 463; Smith v. Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 
 53 S. W. 907, 48 L. R. A. 711. 
 
 New Jersey. — State Board of 
 Health v. Jersey City, 65 N. J. Eq. 
 116, 35 Atl. 835; Miller v. Morris- 
 town, 47 N. J. Eq. 62, 20 Atl. 61. 
 
 New York. — New York Cent. R. 
 R. Co. V. Rochester, 127 N. Y. 591, 
 28 N. E. 416 ; Sammons v. Glovers- 
 ville, 70 N. Y. Supp. 284. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Harris v. Phila^ 
 delphia, 155 Pa. 76, 26 Atl. 874. 
 
 Tennessee. — Pierce v. Gibson 
 County, 107 Tenn. 224, 64 S. W. 33, 
 89 Am. St. Rep. 946. 
 
 Vermont. — Winn v. Rutland, 52 
 Vt. 481; Whipple v. Fair Haven, 
 63 Vt. 221, 21 Atl. 533. 
 
 46. Woodward v. Worcester, 121 
 Mass. 245. 
 
 47. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 
 13 Wall. (U. S.) 166, 20 L. ed. 
 557; United States v. Lynah, 188 
 U. S. 445, 47 L. ed. 539. And see 
 also King v. United States, 59 Fed. 
 12; Williams v. United States, 104 
 Fed. 50 ; Heyward v. United States, 
 46 Ct. CI. 484. 
 
 48. Infra, §§ 138, 139. 
 
 49. MUls V. United States, 46 
 
314 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 113 
 
 state courts,^** some of which would doubtless be more lib- 
 eral to the landowner in deciding what injury was serious 
 enough to constitute a taking. A single flood of short dur- 
 ation, or occasional temporary flowage, is not usually held 
 to amount to a taking ;^^ but this is, of course, a question 
 
 Fed. 738, 12 L. E. A. 673, approved 
 in United States v. Lynah, 188 
 U. S. 445, 473, 47 L. ed. 539, 550. 
 See also Walls v. United States, 44 
 Ct. CI. 482. 
 
 50. A flooding of lands with 
 water was held to constitute a tak- 
 ing in the following cases: 
 
 California. — Conniff v. San 
 Francisco, 67 Cal. 45, 7 Pae. 41. 
 
 Connecticut. — Hooker v. New 
 Haven & Northampton Co., 14 
 Conn. 146, 36 Am. Dee. 477. 
 
 Indiana. — Wabash & Erie Canal 
 V. Spears, 16 Ind. 441, 79 Am. Dec. 
 444. 
 
 Kentucky. — Kemper v. Lonia- 
 ville, 14 Bush. 92. 
 
 Louisiana. — M'abire v. Oanal 
 Bank, 11 La. 83, 30 Am. Dee. 710. 
 
 M<^yland. — Baltimore v. Merry- 
 man, 86 Md. 584, 39 Atl. 98; 
 Northern Central Ry. Co. v. Olden- 
 burg, 122 Md. 236, 89 Atl. 601. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Boston & Rox- 
 bury Mill Corporation v. Newman, 
 12 Pick. 467, 23 Am. Dec. 622. 
 
 Michigan. — Grand Rapids Boom- 
 ing Co. V. Jarvis, 30 Mich. 321. 
 
 Minnesota. — Carlson v. St. 
 Louis, etc., Lnprovement Co., 73 
 Minn. 128, 75 N. W. 1044, 41 
 L. R. A. 371, 72 Am. St. Rep. 610. 
 
 New Jersey. — ColweU v. May's 
 etc.. Power Co., 19 N. J. Eq. 245. 
 
 South Dakota. — Johnson v. Cen- 
 terville MUling Co., 156 N. W. 82. 
 
 Vermont, — Doty v. Johnson, 84 
 Vt. 15, 77. Atl. 866. 
 
 Virginia. — Rankin v. Harrison- 
 burg, 104 Va. 524, 52 S. E. 555, 
 113 Am. St. Rep. 1050. 
 
 Washington. — Wendel v. Spo- 
 kane County, 27 Wash. 121, 67 Pac. 
 576, 91 Am. St. Rep. 825 ; Burrows 
 
 V. Grays Harbor Boom Co., 44 
 Wash. 630, 87 Pac. 937. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Jones v. United 
 States, 48 Wis. 385, 404, 4 N. W. 
 519. An existing mill which is 
 flooded by the construction of a 
 new dam lower on the stream is 
 "taken." Lee v. Pembroke Iron 
 Co., 57 Me. 481; Trenton Water 
 Power Co. v. Half, 36 N. J. L. 335; 
 contra, Hood v. United States, 46 
 Ct. CI. 30. 
 
 51. It was held in Coleman v. 
 United States, 181 Fed. 599, that 
 for flooding to constitute a taking, 
 there must be a permanent flooding 
 and an actual ouster, practically 
 destroying the value of the land. 
 When land was previously subject 
 to annual overflow, and the erec- 
 tion of a dam made the overflows 
 increase in frequency and extent, 
 but the land was free from water 
 most of the time, there was no tak- 
 ing. See also. 
 
 United States. — High Bridge 
 Lumber Co. v. United States, 69 
 Fed. 324; Cubbins v. Mississippi 
 River Commission, 204 Fed. 299; 
 Mclntyre v. United States, 25 Ct. 
 CI. 200; Tompkins v. United States, 
 45 a. CI. 66. 
 
 California. — Lamb v. Reclama- 
 tion District, 73 Cal. 125, 14 Pae. 
 625, 2 Am. St. Rep. 775; De Baker 
 V. Southern CaUfomia R. R. Co., 
 106 Cal. 257, 284, 39 Pac. 610, 46 
 Am. St. Rep. 237. 
 
 Missouri. — Payne v. Kcinsas 
 City, etc., R. R. Co., 112 Mo. 6, 17, 
 20 S. W. 322, 17 L. R. A. 628. 
 
 New York. — Atwater v. Trustees 
 of Canandaigna, 124 N. Y. 602, 27 
 N. E. 385. 
 
§ 113 What Constitutes a Taking. 315 
 
 of degree, and a serious flood, especially if frequently recur- 
 ring and accompanied by other damage, might well be held 
 to fall upon the other side of the line.^^ It has also been 
 held that it is a taking of property to turn the current of a 
 stream upon private land so as to wear it away, if the owner 
 cannot avert the injury by reasonable precautions;^^ but 
 when the public authorities merely build up and strengthen 
 one bank of a river to protect it from flooding or erosion, 
 the owner of land on the opposite bank cannot complain if 
 the effect of such construction is to cause his land to be 
 flooded or washed away.®* 
 
 The legal aspect of the flooding of riparian lands by dams 
 constructed to furnish a head of water for mill purposes is 
 discussed at some length in connection with the meaning of 
 " public use."^® As supporting the doctrine that the mill 
 acts are constitutional although mills which are not con- 
 structed for the public use are allowed the benefit of the 
 acts in question, it has often been contended that such 
 flooding is not a ' * taking ' ' of land, but a regulation of the 
 conflicting rights of the various riparian owners. But no 
 one has gone so far as to suggest that land can be perma- 
 nently flooded for mill purposes without compensating the 
 owner, and what really is meant by such contention is that 
 riparian lands are held subject to the legislative right to 
 authorize the most beneficial use of the water power of the 
 stream, those receiving the benefit compensating those who 
 suffer damage. Some courts insist that such flooding consti- 
 tutes a ' ' taking, ' ' but the controversy is of no consequence 
 in connection with the aspect of the constitutional provision 
 in question now under discussion, for it is admitted on all 
 sides that when land is permanently flooded to furnish 
 power for a mill, compensation must be paid to the owners 
 of the flooded lands. 
 
 52. Eaton v. Boston, etc., R. E. Co., 58 C. C. A. 466, 122 Fed. 378, 
 Co., 51 N. H. 504, 12 Am. Rep. 147. 65 L. R. A. 620; Green v. Swift, 
 
 53. Barron v. Memphis, 113 47 Cal. 536. 
 
 Tenn. 89, 80 S. W. 832, 106 Am. 54. Jackson v. United States, 230 
 
 St. Rep. 810; Pettigrew v. Evans- U. S. 1, 57 L. ed. 1363, affirming 
 
 ville, 25 Wis. 223, 3 Am. Rep. 50; 47 Ct. CI. 579. 
 
 contra, Salliotte v. King Bridge 55. Supra, §§ 83, 84. 
 
316 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 114 
 
 § 114. PoUutioaoftheAir— Smells— Noises. 
 
 PoUulion of the air may be carried so far as to amount to 
 a taking. A small nuisance of this kind may be authorized 
 by the legislature without compensation, and this is done 
 continually ; but it must be remembered that ownership in 
 land extends indefinitely up and down, and that gases and 
 smoke are as unquestionably matter as solids or liquids. 
 If they are turned into the air and allowed to pass over 
 adjacent land so as to deprive the owner of the beneficial 
 use of his property, it is as much a taking as if it was sew- 
 age or water that caused the injury. The only difference 
 is one of fact, not of law, in that gases are not as potent as 
 water in impairing the usefulness of land. And accord- 
 ingly it has been strongly intimated that pollution of the 
 air by smoke, smells, and gases may in an extreme case 
 amount to a taking of land.®^ 
 
 56. The cases of practical ouster 
 by a nuisance of the Mnd in ques- 
 tion have been held not to be justi- 
 fied by the statute under which the 
 public agent purported to act, the 
 courts being very strict in con- 
 struing the statutes. But it has 
 several times been implied that pol- 
 lution of the air might amount to a 
 taking. In Richards v. Washing- 
 tan Terminal Co., 233 U. S, 546, 
 58 L. ed. 1088, L. R. A. 1915 A 
 887, it was held that an owner of 
 land near the portal of a tunnel 
 was entitled under the Fifth 
 Amendment to compensation for 
 special and peculiar injury to his 
 premises due to the forcing of 
 smoke and gases from the tunnel 
 by a fanning system directly upon 
 his land. If this was unavoidable, 
 under the act of Congress author- 
 izing the tunnel his land should 
 have been condemned. If avoidable 
 it was unauthorized. In Cogs- 
 well V. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 
 103 N. Y. 10, 8 N. E. 537, 57 Am. 
 Rep. 701, the court said: "In 
 short the engine-house as used 
 
 practically deprived the plaintiff of 
 the use of the house as a residence. 
 The defendant did not physically 
 eject her therefrom, but by filling 
 it with smoke and dust and by cor- 
 rupting and tainting the at- 
 mosphere with offensive gases made 
 life therein uncomfortable and un- 
 safe. * * * It is undoubtedly 
 true that there are cases in which 
 the legislature in the public inter- 
 est may authorize and legalize the 
 doing of acts resulting in conse- 
 quential injury to private property 
 without providing compensation. 
 * * * It (the non-liability for 
 removal of lateral support by the 
 grading of a street) is an applica/- 
 tion of a principle well settled that 
 private interests must yield to the 
 pubUe welfare, but the case carries 
 to the utmost limit the right of the 
 legislature for public reasons to in- 
 terfere with private property to the 
 injury of the owner without com- 
 pensation." In Pennsylvania R. R. 
 Co. V. Angel, 41 N. J. Eq. 316, 7 
 Atl. 432, 56 Am. Rep. 1, the 
 court said: "Whether you flood 
 
114 
 
 What Constitutes a Taking. 
 
 317 
 
 An ordinary steam railroad, kowever, operated on ita 
 own right of way, although it would doubtless constitute a 
 common-law nuisance, is not held to take, and is not 
 required to pay for, the land near its tracks upon which it 
 pours smoke and cinders."'' The decisions holding that the 
 
 the farmer's field so that they can- 
 not be cultivated or pollute the 
 bleacher's stream so that his fabrics 
 are stained, or fill one's dwelling 
 with smells and noise so that it can- 
 not be occupied in comfort you 
 equally take away the owner's prop- 
 erty. * • • It must not be g-ath- 
 ered from these propositions that 
 all these inconveniences which are 
 the necessary concomitants of the 
 location of railroads in populous 
 neighborhoods are to be considered 
 civil injuries. * * • gut if in 
 any case these annoyances become 
 so great as to destroy or substan- 
 tially impair the legitimate use of 
 private property the person in- 
 jured becomes entitled to redress." 
 See also 
 
 United States. — Georgia v. Ten- 
 nessee Copper Co., 205 U. S. 230, 
 51 L. ed. 1038. 
 
 District of Columbia. — Seufferle 
 V. Macfarland, 28 App. D. C. 94. 
 
 Illinois. — Stone v. Fairbury, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 68 111. 394; Stack v. East 
 St. Louis, 85 111. 377, 28 Am. Rep. 
 619; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. 
 Trustees of Schools, 212 lU. 406, 
 72 N. E. 39. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Bacon v. Bos- 
 ton, 154 Mass. 100, 28 N. E. 9. 
 
 New York. — Garvey v. Long 
 Island R. R. Co., 159 N. Y. 323, 54 
 N. E. 57, 70 Am. St. Rep. 550; 
 Sjrraeuse Solar-Salt Co. v. Rome, 
 etc., Ry. Co., 168 N. T. 650, 61 
 N. E. 1135; Gordon v. SUver 
 Creek, 197 N. Y. 509, 90 N. E. 
 1159, affirming 127 App. Div. 888, 
 112 N. Y. Supp. 54. 
 
 Texas. — Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. 
 V. Calkins (Tex. Civ. App.), 79 
 S. W. 852. 
 
 57. United States. — Richards v. 
 Washington Terminal Co., 233 
 U. S. 546, 58 L. ed. 1088, L. R. A. 
 1915 A 887; Mason City, etc., R. R. 
 Co. v. Wolf, 148 Fed. 961; Roman 
 Catholic Church v. Pennsylvania 
 R. R. Co., 125 C. C. A. 629, 207 
 Fed. 897, L. R. A. 1915 B 623. 
 
 California. — Kishlar v. Southern 
 Pacific R. R. Co., 134 Cal. 636, 66 
 Pae. 848. 
 
 District of Columbia. — Richards 
 V. Washington Terminal Co., 37 
 App. D. C. 289. 
 
 Illinois. — Aldrich v. Metropoli- 
 tan, etc., Ry. Co., 195 111. 456, 63 
 N. E. 155, 57 L. R. A. 237; Illinois 
 Central R. R. Co. v. Trustees of 
 Schools, 212 m. 406, 72 N. E. 39. 
 
 Indiana. — Decker v. Evansville 
 Suburban R. R. Co., 133 Ind. 433, 
 33 N. E. 349. 
 
 Iowa. — Dunsmore v. Central 
 Iowa R. R. Co., 72 Iowa 182, 33 
 N. W. 456. 
 
 Louisiana. — Weiges v. St. Louis, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 35 La. Ann. 641. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Walker v. Old 
 Colony R. R. Co., 103 Mass. 10, 
 4 Am. Rep. 509; Sawyer v. Davis, 
 136 Mass. 239, 241, 49 Am. Rep. 27. 
 
 Minnesota. — Carroll v. Wiscon- 
 sin Central R. R. Co., 40 Minn. 
 168, 41 N. W. 661. 
 
 Nebraska. — Omaha, etc.. Rail- 
 road Co. V. Janeeek, 30 Neb. 276, 
 46 N. W. 478, 27 Am. St. Rep. 399. 
 
 New Jersey. — Beseman v. Penn- 
 sylvania R. R. Co., 50 N. J. L. 235, 
 13 Atl. 164, 52 N, J. L. 221, 20 
 Atl. 169. 
 
 Ohio. — Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co. 
 V. Burski, 26 Ohio C. C. 486. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Cleveland, etc., 
 
318 
 
 The Law or Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 114 
 
 construction of a steam railroad in a street is a taking are 
 based on the fact that the adjoining owner holds the fee or 
 certain easements in the land actually covered by the tracks. 
 If he has no such rights he is not entitled to compensation 
 for damages to his land outside the line of the street."* 
 
 When a highway is constructed on land adjacent to that 
 of an individual owner, but none of his land is actually 
 taken, although he may suffer damage from the noise and 
 dust and increased obligation to fence, he has no constitu- 
 tional right to compensation."* Similarly the maintenance 
 of a hospital for contagious diseases may decrease the value 
 of neighboring lands, but it does not ordinarily amount to 
 a taking, or even a legal damage.^" If, however, a house is 
 rendered uninhabitable by the dangers arising from blast- 
 ing in its immediate vicinity, and from the vibration arising 
 from the same cause, so as to deprive the owner of the use 
 
 E. R. Co. V. Speer, 56 Pa. 325, 94 
 Am. Dec. 84. 
 
 Utah. — Stoekdale v. Rio Grande 
 Western Ry Co., 28 Utah 201, 77 
 Pae. 849. 
 
 Vermont. — Hatch v. Vermont 
 Central R. R. Co., 28 Vt. 142. 
 
 Upon the question whether the 
 operation of a railroad upon its 
 own right of way is a legal dam- 
 age to adjacent land, see infra, 
 § 317. 
 , 58. Infra, §§ 159, 167. 
 
 59. Georgia. — Peel v. Atlanta, 
 85 Ga. 138, 11 S. E. 582, 8 L. R. A. 
 787. 
 
 Illinois. — Hoag v. Switzer, 61 
 111. 294. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Kennett's Pe- 
 tition, 24 N. H. 139. 
 
 New York. — People v. Oneida 
 County, 19 Wend. 102; Sadlier v. 
 New York, 185 N. Y. 408, 78 N. E. 
 272. 
 
 The same rule was applied in 
 the case of damage from vibration 
 and dust arising from the con- 
 struction of a sewer in a public 
 
 street. Pfeifer v. Passaic Valley 
 Sewerage Commissioners, 82 N. J. 
 Eq. 169, 88 Atl. 630. 
 
 60. Infra, § 316. But see An- 
 nable v. Montgomery Co. Commis- 
 sioners, 34 Ind. App. 72, 71 N. E. 
 272, 107 Am. St. Rep. 173, holding 
 an owner entitled to recover for the 
 erection of a pest-house so close to 
 his land as to render it uninhabit- 
 able. The house was erected under 
 legislative authority, but the site 
 was selected by the town and it was 
 held that " if it be conceded that 
 the state might direct some particu- 
 lar specific act to be done in a 
 specified manner which would 
 necessarily under any condition 
 result in the creation of what would 
 be without such authorization a pri- 
 vate nuisance, yet in the absence of 
 specific legislative direction as to 
 the manner the act should be done, 
 it should not be assumed that the 
 state, public necessity not requir- 
 ing it, would so exercise the power 
 as to injure the property of aa 
 individual." 
 
§ 115 What Constitutes a Taking. 319 
 
 of his premises for a substantial period, it is taken during 
 the time that it is so affected.*' 
 
 It has been intimated by the Supreme Court of the United 
 States that damage from noise may be so severe that it can- 
 not be constitutionally authorized without compensation, 
 but in the case containing this suggestion it was held only 
 that the noise complained of had not in fact been author- 
 ized by Congress,®^ and it has been held that even such loud 
 noises and violent concussions as are caused by the dis- 
 charge of heavy coast defense guns near or even over 
 private land adjacent to a fortification is not a taking.** 
 
 § 115. Deprivation of Access — Discontinuance of Streets 
 and other Public Works. 
 
 The discontinuance of a highway or other public work 
 does not of itself constitute a taking of the abutting land 
 so as to entitle the owner of such land to compensation. 
 In the case of a highway, the abutting owner generally owns 
 the fee of the land within the limits of the way subject to 
 an easement in favor of the public. His is the servient 
 estate ; and it is well settled at common law that the owner 
 
 61. Gossett V. Southern Ry. Co., invasion of others' property to the 
 115 Tenn. 376, 89 S. W. 737, 112 extent which would amount to an 
 Am. St. Rep. 846. entire deprivation of its use and 
 
 62. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. enjoyment without compensation to 
 Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U. S. the owner." 
 
 317, 27 L. ed. 739. "It admits 63. Peabody v. United States, 
 
 indeed of grave doubt whether Con- 231 U. S. 530, 58 L. ed. 351, affirm- 
 
 gress could authorize the company ing 46 Ct. CI. 39. In this case it 
 
 to occupy and use any premises was said that installing a battery 
 
 within the city limits in a way with the purpose and effect of sub- 
 
 which would subject others to phys- ordinating the strip of land be- 
 
 ical discomfort and annoyance in the tween the battery and the sea to the 
 
 quiet use and enjoyment of their right and privilege of firing projee- 
 
 property, and at the same time ex- tUes directly across it in time of 
 
 empt the company from the liability peace, thereby depriving the owner 
 
 to suit f of damages or compensation of the profitable use of his land, 
 
 to which individuals acting without would be a " taking ;" but the mere 
 
 such authority would be subject location of the battery without 
 
 under like circumstances. With- claiming or exercising the right to 
 
 out expressing any opinion on this fire projectiles over the land in 
 
 point, it is sufficient to observe that front of it, except possibly in time 
 
 such authority would not justify an of war, is not a " taking." 
 
320 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 115 
 
 of the dominant estate may abandon an easement if he sees 
 fit without any act of assent or concurrence on the part of 
 the servient tenant.^ Although, as a matter of fact> the 
 abandonment may injure th« land upon or near which the 
 easement was exercised, it would not constitute an action- 
 able injury at common la"w, and certainly does not amount 
 to a taking- within the meaning of the constitution. If the 
 fee of the street is in the public, the adjoining owner suffers 
 no legal injury by the public merely ceasing to use the 
 street. 
 
 On the other hand the construction of an impassable bar- 
 rier around a tract of private land, so that ingress to and 
 egress from the land was entirely cut off and the owner's 
 right of access to his property destroyed, would deprive the 
 owner of all beneficial use of his property, and would clearly 
 constitute a taking of it in the constitutional sense.®^ 
 Accordingly if there is only one means of access from a 
 parcel of land over other private property to the public 
 ways and that means is destroyed by the taking of the land 
 over which the owner had a right to pass, whether such land 
 belonged to him or to others, his land thereby cut off is 
 taken and he is entitled to compensation.*® 
 
 Similarly the erection in a public street by authority of 
 law of a viaduct or other structure devoted to other than 
 highway purposes, so that it is not open to ordinary public 
 
 64. Mason v. Shrewsbury, etc., 65. Dana v. Bock Creek K R. 
 
 Ry. Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 578; King v. Co., 7 App. D. C. 482. 
 Murphy, 140 Mass. 254, 4 N. E. 66. United States. — ^United States 
 
 566; Flagg v. Conoord, 222 Mass. v. Grizzard, 219 U. S. 180, 55 L. ed. 
 
 569, 573, 111 N. E. 369; WetheriU 165; Central Trust Co. v. Hennen, 
 
 V. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 195 Pa. 33 C. C. A. 189, 90 Fed. 593. 
 156, 45 Atl. 658. See, however, Massachusetts. — Munn v. Boa- 
 
 Kray v. Mu^li, 77 Minn. 231, 79 ton, 183 Mass. 421, 67 N. E. 312. 
 N. W. 964, 45 L. R. A. 218, hold- Minnesota. — Adams v. Chicago, 
 
 ing that a millowner who has s©- etc., Railroad Co., 39 Minn. 286, 39 
 
 cured a pr^criptive right to dam a N. W. 629, 1 L. R. A. 493, 12 Am. 
 
 stream and flood the lands above St. Rep. 644. 
 cannot remove the dam againat the Tennessee, — Frater v. Hamilton 
 
 will of an owner of land abutting County, 90 Team. 661, 19 S. W. 
 
 on the miUpond who has adapted 233. 
 his land to the situation. 
 
§ 115 
 
 What Constitutes a Taking. 
 
 321 
 
 travel or to the use of the abutting owner by the adaption 
 of his premises to the changed conditions, and physically 
 cutting off premises abutting upon the street from access 
 thereto, is a taking of the property so cut off, regardless of 
 the nature of the owner's rights in the soil of the street."'' 
 The discontinuance of a public street, even if it was not 
 physically obstructed, would in legal effect ordinarily 
 deprive an owner of land abutting thereon of his means of 
 access to his property by such street, and if the street so 
 discontinued was the only street upon which his property 
 abutted, such discontinuance would in substance deprive the 
 owner of all access to his land and consequently of the bene- 
 ficial use thereof and would inflict such a severe injury as to 
 constitute a taking in the accepted sense, even if the owner 
 was able by purchase or otherwise to acquire a private 
 right of way to his property, and the courts have generally 
 
 67. Cownecticut. — Knapp, etc., 
 Mfg. Co. V. New York, etc., Rail- 
 road Co., 76 Conn. 311, 56 Atl. 512, 
 100 Am. St. Rep. 994. 
 
 District of Columbia. — Dana v. 
 Rock Creek R. R. Co., 7 App. 
 D. C. 482. 
 
 Georgia. — Macon v. Wing, 113 
 Ga. 90, 38 S. E. 392. 
 
 Kentucky. — Stickley v. Chesa- 
 peake, etc., R. R. Co., 93 Ky. 323, 
 20 S. W. 261. 
 
 Maryland. — Walters v. Balti- 
 more, etc., R. R. Co., 120 Md. 644, 
 88 Atl. 47, 
 
 Massachusetts. — Billiard v. New 
 York, etc., R. R. Co., 178 Mass. 
 570, 60 N. E. 380. 
 
 Michigan. — Ranson v. Sanlt Ste. 
 Marie, 143 Mich. 661, 107 N. W. 
 439, 15 L. R. A. {N. S.) 49. 
 
 Minnesota. — Lamm v. CMcago, 
 etc.. Railroad Co., 45 Minn. 71, 47 
 N. W. 455, 10 L. R. A. 268. 
 
 Missouri. — Spencer v. Metropoli- 
 tan Street Railway Co., 120 Mo. 
 154, 23 S. W. 126, 22 L. R. A. 668. 
 
 21 
 
 New York. — Reining v. New 
 York, etc.. Railroad Co., 128 N. Y. 
 157, 28 N. E. 640, 14 L. R. A. 133; 
 Egerer v. New York Central, etc., 
 Railroad Co., 130 N. Y. 108, 29 
 N. E. 95, 14 L. R. A. 381; Ogden v. 
 New York, 141 App. Div. 578, 126 
 N. Y. Supp. 189. 
 
 Ohio. — Parrott v. Cincinnati, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 10 Ohio St. 624. 
 
 Oregon. — ^WUlamette Iron Works 
 V. Oregon Railroad & Navigation 
 Co., 26 Ore. 224, 37 Pae. 1016, 29 
 L. R. A. 88, 46 Am. St. Rep. 620. 
 
 South Carolina. — South Bound 
 R. R. Co. V. Burton, 67 S. C. 515, 
 46 S. E. 340. 
 
 Tennessee. — Coyne v. Memphis, 
 118 Tenn. 651, 102 S. W. 355. 
 
 Utah. — Dooly Block v. Salt Lake 
 Rapid Transit Co., 9 Utah 31, 33 
 Pac. 229, 24 L. R. A. 610. 
 
 West Virginia. — Spencer v. 
 Point Pleasant, etc., B. B. Co., 23 
 W. Va. 406. 
 
322 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 115 
 
 so held,®^ although there is some authority to the contrary.** 
 If all access to the property was actually cut off from a par- 
 ticular parcel of land, it would be immaterial whether such 
 
 68. Georgia. — Harvey v. Georgia 
 Southern R. R. Co., 90 Ga. 66, 15 
 S. E. 783. 
 
 Iowa. — Dairy v. Iowa Central 
 Ry. Co., 113 Iowa 716, 84 N. W. 
 688; Borghart v. Cedar Rapids, 
 126 Iowa 313, 101 N, W. 1120, 68 
 L. R. A. 306; MeCann v. Clarke 
 County, 149 Iowa 13, 127 N. "W. 
 1011, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115; 
 Sutton V. Mentzer, 154 Iowa 1, 134 
 N. W. 108. 
 
 Kentucky. — Transylvania Uni- 
 versity V. Lexington, 3 B. Mon. 25, 
 38 Am. Dee. 173. 
 
 Michigan. — Pearsall v. Eaton 
 County, 74 Mich. 558, 42 N. W. 77, 
 4 L. R. A. 193. 
 
 Minnesota. — Brakken v. Min- 
 neapolis, etc., Ry. Co., 29 Minn. 41, 
 11 N. W. 124; Hayes v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. E. Co., 46 Minn. 349, 49 
 N. W. 61; Vanderburgh v. Min- 
 neapolis, 103 Minn. 515, 108 N. W. 
 480. 
 
 Washington. — Smith v. Cen- 
 tralia, 55 Wash. 573, 104 Pac. 797. 
 
 See also Long v. Wilson, 119 Iowa 
 267, 93 N. W. 282, 97 Am. St. Rep. 
 315, in which the question whether 
 the discontinuance of a highway 
 was a taking was made to depend 
 upon the ownership of the fee, the 
 court saying (at page 271) : "In 
 the vacation of an ordinary high- 
 way outside of a city or town, all 
 that is done is to yield control of 
 the easement in the land, and the 
 right of exclusive possession passes 
 to the owner, to be occupied as a 
 private way, or otherwise, as he 
 pleases. Its discontinuance does 
 not of necessity cut off access to his 
 property. The public merely 
 ceases to keep up and repair the 
 strip of land as a highway. The 
 situation, although analogous in 
 some respects, is different with a 
 
 town or city street. The abutting 
 lot owner cannot complain if the 
 street be left in precisely the same 
 condition as a country road. The 
 municipality owes hiTn no legal 
 duty of improving it. Upon its 
 vacation, however, the fee remaiur- 
 ing in the city or town may be 
 devoted to whatever purposes it 
 may choose, and hence access be 
 entirely cut off. It may be diverted 
 absolutely from the purposes for 
 which dedicated, and this brings us 
 to the main distinction: between a 
 country highway and a street. The 
 former is established by law for the 
 public, the owner usually being 
 paid value for a mere easement in 
 his land, though there may be gra- 
 tuitous dedication. Title to the 
 streets of a city or town is acquired 
 by grant with the implied right of 
 ingress and egress in the abutting 
 lot owner, the grantor or the party 
 m akin g the dedication of the city 
 or town saying to him, ' This right 
 of ingress and egress you shall 
 have.' " 
 
 69. California. — Levee District 
 V. Farmer, 101 Cal. 178, 35 Pae. 
 569, 23 L. R. A. 388. 
 
 Iowa. — Ellsworth v. Chickasaw 
 County, 40 Iowa 571 ; Barr v. Oska- 
 loosa, 45 Iowa 275; McKinney v. 
 Baker, 100 Iowa 362, 69 N. W. 
 683 (but see the later Iowa cases, 
 supra, note 68). 
 
 Montana. — State ex rel. Johnson 
 V. Deer Lodge County, 19 Mont. 
 582, 49 Pac. 147. 
 
 New Jersey. — Herbert v. Penn- 
 sylvania R. R. Co., 43 N. J. Eq. 
 21, 10 Atl. 872. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Wetherill v. 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 195 Pa. 
 156, 45 Atl. 658; Howell v. Morris- 
 viUe, 212 Pa. 349, 61 Atl. 932. 
 
§ 115 
 
 What Constitutes a Taking. 
 
 323 
 
 property abutted upon the discontinued portion of the 
 street. It would be a taking of an abutting owner's prop- 
 erty, for example, to close up one end of a cul-de-sac, even 
 if the portion in front of his property was still in legal 
 theory a public way. If, however, although the only public 
 way upon which a parcel of land abuts is discontinued, 
 the owner of such property, by reason of his ownership of 
 the fee of the discontinued street or otherwise, retains 
 access to the remaining public ways, he is not necessarily 
 entitled to compensation.'^" 
 
 It was formerly a well settled principle of law that, when 
 part of a street was discontinued, the owners of land which 
 did not abut upon the discontinued part of the street, and 
 which still had access to the public highways of the town, 
 were not constitutionally entitled to compensation.''^ Many 
 
 70. Parker v. Framingham, 8 
 Mete. (Mass.) 260; Heilscher v. 
 Minneapolis, 46 Minn. 529, 49 
 N. W. 287; In re Olinger, 145 
 
 .N. Y. S-upp. 173, 160 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 96; Hamilton, etc., Trac- 
 tion Co. V. Parrish, 67 Ohio St. 
 181, 65 N. E. 1011, 60 L. R. A. 531. 
 
 71. Alabama. — Dennis v. Mobile, 
 etc., E. E. Co., 137 Ala. 649, 35 
 So. 30, 97 Am. St. Eep. 69; South- 
 em Ry. Co. V. Albes, 153 Ala. 523, 
 45 So. 234; Hall v. Atlanta, ©te., 
 R. R. Co., 158 Ala. 271, 48 So. 365. 
 
 California. — Pollack v. San 
 Francisco Orphan Asyltun, 48 Cal. 
 490; Symons v. San Francisco, 115 
 Cal. 555, 42 Pac. 913, 47 Pac. 543. 
 
 Colorado. — Whitsett v. Union 
 Depot Co., 10 Colo. 243, 15 Pae. 
 339. 
 
 Connecticut. — Seeley v. Bishop, 
 19 Conn. 228; Warner v. New 
 York, etc., E. R. Co., 86 Conn. 561, 
 86 Atl. 23. 
 
 Illinois. — Chicago V. Union 
 Building Association, 102 111. 379, 
 40 Am. Eep. 598 ; East St. Louis v. 
 O'Flynn, 119 111. 200, 10 N. E. 
 395, 59 Am. Rep. 795. 
 
 Iowa. — Sawyer v. Meyer, 45 
 
 Iowa 152; Dantzer v. Indianapolis 
 Union E. E. Co., 141 Ind. 604, 29 
 N. E. 223, 34 L. E. A. 769, 50 Am. 
 St. Eep. 343; Walker v. Des 
 Moines, 161 Iowa 215, 142 N. W. 
 51; Hubbell v. Des Moines, 168 
 Iowa 418, 154 N. W. 337. 
 
 Kansas. — Heller v. Atchison, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 28 Kan. 625; Leav- 
 enworth V. Douglass, 59 Kan. 416, 
 53 Pac. 123. 
 
 Kentucky. — Chenault v. Collins, 
 155 Ky. 312, 159 S. W. 834. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Castle v. Berk- 
 shire County, 11 Gray 26 ; Davis v. 
 Hampshire County Commissioners, 
 153 Mass. 218, 26 N. E. 848, 11 
 L. R. A. 750; Hammond v. Wor- 
 cester County Commissioners, 154 
 Mass. 509, 28 N. E. 902. 
 
 Michigan. — Kimball v. Homan, 
 74 Mich. 699, 42 N. W. 167. 
 
 Minnesota. — State v. Holman, 40 
 Minn. 369, 41 N. W. 1073. 
 
 Missouri. — Bailey v. Culver, 84 
 Mo. 531; Gorman v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 255 Mo. 483, 164 S. W. 
 509. 
 
 Nebrasha. — Van Valkenburgh v. 
 Rutherford, 92 Neb. 803, 139 N, W. 
 652. 
 
324 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 115 
 
 of the cases whicli inferentially at leafit sustain this rule 
 were brcught under statutes providing that the owners of 
 land damaged by the discontinuance of a public way should 
 be entitled to compensation ; but it was held that such an 
 injury was not special and peculiar and the owners could 
 not recover under the statute ; of course, a fortiori, such an 
 injury is not a " taking " within the meaning of the consti- 
 tution. This rule is stiU in force in many of the states, and 
 especially in those in which the courts are not inclined to 
 sacrifice the rights of the public in favor of the rights 
 of private property at every opportunity. On the other 
 hand in some of the states in which easements of access 
 to the public highways from abutting lands have been 
 recognized by the courts, it has been held that an abut- 
 ting owner has a. right of access to the general system of 
 streets and also to a continuation of the remainder of his 
 street with all its connections to a point where they cease to 
 be of more than remote and incalculable advantage to him, 
 so that he is entitled to compensation when his property 
 abuts upon a street leading into other public streets at both 
 ends, and one end of the street is closed up or discontinued, 
 and thus one outlet, perhaps the most valuable one, is 
 destroyed and the property now abuts upon a cul-de-sac 
 instead of a thoroughfare,''* although there is no interfer- 
 
 New Hampshire. — Cram v. La^ Pennsylvania E. K. Co., 32 Pa. 
 
 cania, 71 N. H. 41, 51 Atl. 635, 57 Super, a. 555. 
 
 L. R. A. 282. Bhode Island. — Clark v. Provi- 
 
 New Jersey. — State v. Elizabeth, denee, 10 B. I. 437. 
 
 54 N. J. L. 462, 24 Atl. 495; New- South Carolina. — Cherry v. 
 
 ark, etc., R. R. Co. v. Montclair, 84 Rock HiU, 48 S. C. 553, 26 S. E. 
 
 N. J. L. 46, 85 Atl. 1028; Pfeifer 798. 
 
 V. Passaic Valley Sewerage Com- Texas. — Stevens t. Dublin (Tes. 
 
 missioners, 82 N. J. Eq. 169, 88 Civ. App.), 169 S. W. 188. 
 
 Atl. 630. Utah.— Tuttle v. SowadzM, 41 
 
 New Torft.— Kings County Fixe Utah 501, 126 Pae. 959. 
 
 Ins. Co. V. Stevens, 101 N. Y. 411, Virgmm.— BoMre v. Seott, 113 
 
 5 N. E. 353. Va. 500, 75 S. E. 123. 
 
 North Carolina. — Crowell v. 72. Urdted States. — Chicago v. 
 
 Monroe, 152 N. C. 399, 67 S. E. Baker, 86 Eed. 753, 98 Fed. 830. 
 
 899. Illinois. — Rigney v. Chicago, 102 
 
 Petm8ylvama.— MeGee's Appeal, 111. 64; Chicago v. Burcky, 158 111. 
 
 114 Pa. 470, 8 Atl. 237; Norton v. 103, 42 N. E. 178, 29 L. R. A. 568, 
 
§ 115 What Constitutes a TAKiifQ. 325 
 
 ence with access from the property in qiaestion to the street 
 and thence to the outside world. Many of these same deci- 
 sions however deny him damages for the diversion of travel 
 and for the inconvenience of having to go by a more cir- 
 cuitous route, and some of the courts that recognize abut- 
 ters' easements do not require compensation when access to 
 other public ways remains, on the ground that the right of 
 access does not extend beyond the actual necessity of the 
 caseJ* 
 
 Even when land does abut on the part of the street that is 
 discontinued, and all access to the land over the discontinued 
 street is cut off, the owner in some jurisdictions is denied 
 compensation if the land may still be reached by other public 
 ways. This rule appears to have originated in a Massachu- 
 setts case ^* in which it appeared that a highway had been 
 discontinued in front of certain lots of land, which still how- 
 ever faced other public streets. Although a statute pro- 
 vided for the payment of compensation to all persons dam- 
 aged by the discontinuance of a public highway, it was held 
 that the owner of these lots could not recover, because he 
 still had "free access to all his lots by public streets." 
 This case has been widely followed,''^ although it is looked 
 
 49 Am. St. Rep. 142; Winnetka v. See also infra, §§ 322, 323, as to 
 
 Clifford, 201 111. 475, 66 N. E. 384. damage by discontinuance. 
 
 Indiana. — O'Brien v. Central 73. Transylvania University v. 
 
 Iron & Steel Co., 158 Ind. 218, 63 Lexing:ton, 3 B. Mon. (Ky.) 25, 
 
 N. E. 302, 57 L. R. A. 508, 92 Am. 38 Am. Dec. 173. 
 
 St. Rep. 305; Oler v. Pifctsburgti, 74. Smith v. Boston, 7 Gush, 
 
 etc., R. R. Co., Ill N. E. 619. (Mass.) 254. 
 
 Kentucky. — Gaig'an v. Louis- 75. Kings County Fire Insur- 
 
 ville, etc., R. R. Co., 89 Ky. 212, ance Co. v. Stevens, 101 N. Y. 417, 
 
 12 S. W. 259, 6 L. R. A. 340. 5 N. E. 353. « It is claimed also 
 
 Mississippi. — Laurel v. Rowell, that another limitation upon the 
 
 84 Miss. 435, 36 So. 543. right of the city with the sane- 
 
 Ohio. — Schimmelmann v. Lake tion of the legislature to close the 
 
 Shore, etc., R. R. Co., S3 Ohio St. street protects the defendant, and 
 
 356, 94 N. E. 840. is a prohibition against such eom- 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Be Melon St., plete environment as prevents ac- 
 
 182 Pa. 397, 38 Atl. 482, 38 cess to the premises without a 
 
 L. R. A. 275. trespass. But the proof shows no 
 
 Rhode Isl<m&. — Johnston v. Old such state of facts. A means of 
 
 Colony R. R. Co., 18 R. I. 642, 29 access remains. The rule preserves 
 
 Atl. 594, 49 Am. St. Rep. 800. access, but does not give two modes 
 
326 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 115 
 
 upon, at least so far as it establishes a rule that such 
 damage is not special and peculiar, more as a statement 
 of the usual fact than as the enunciation of a principle of 
 law J* When the local law recognizes an easement of access 
 from abutting land to the street, it would seem to have no 
 application in any event.'^''^ 
 
 An owner of land has no private rights in the continued 
 existence of any public work upon or near his land other 
 than a highway. When a park or a public square is dis- 
 continued by public authority or devoted to some incon- 
 sistent use, an owner of abutting land has no constitutional 
 right to compensation for the depreciation in the value of 
 his land incident to the loss of light, air and prospect.''* 
 No action lies when a state capitol ™ or a college *" is moved 
 away, when water pipes *^ in the street are removed, or 
 when a railroad*^ or canal ^* is discontinued, provided the 
 
 of access and a double right of way. 
 The city might choose which to 
 leave." Gerhard v. Seekonk River 
 Bridge Commissioners, 15 R. I. 
 334. " It is competent for the 
 state to authorize the entire dis- 
 continuance of the street, at least 
 so long as the abutters have access 
 and egress to and from their es- 
 tates by other ways." See also, 
 
 Massachusetts. — Stanwood v. 
 Maiden, 157 Mass. 17, 31 N. E. 
 702, 16 L. R. A. 591. 
 
 Michigan. — Buhl v. Fort St. 
 Union Depot Co., 98 Mich. 596, 57 
 N. W. 829, 23 L. R. A. 392. 
 
 New York. — Coster v. Albany, 
 43 N. Y. 399 ; Fearing v. Irwin, 55 
 N. Y. 486; Reis v. New York, 188 
 N. Y. 58, 80 N. E. 572. 
 
 76. Putnam v. Boston, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 182 Mass. 351, 65 N. E. 790. 
 
 77. Henderson v. Lexington, 33 
 Ky. L. Rep. 703, HI S. W. 318; 
 Heinrich v. St. Louis, 125 Mo. 424, 
 28 S. W. 626, 46 Am. St. Rep. 
 490; Christian v. St. Louis, 127 
 Mo. 109, 29 S. W. 996. 
 
 78. East Chicago Co. v. East 
 
 Chicago, 171 Ind. 654, 87 N. E. 
 17; Brooklyn Park Commissioners 
 V. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234, 6 Am. 
 Rep. 70; Clarke v. Providence, 10 
 R. I. 437, 16 R. I. 337, 15 Atl. 763, 
 1 L. R. A. 725; CaldweU v. Seat- 
 tle, 75 Wash. 565, 135 Pac. 470, 
 Ann. Cas. 1915 C 176. See also 
 infra, § 161. 
 
 79. Edwards v. Lesneur,-132 Mo. 
 410, 33 S. W. 1130, 31 L. R. A. 
 815. 
 
 80. Bryan v. Board of Educa- 
 tion, 151 U. S. 639, 38 L. ed. 297. 
 
 81. Asher v. Hutchinson Water, 
 etc., Co., 66 Kan. 496, 71 Pac. 813, 
 61 L. R. A. 52. 
 
 82. Kinealy v. St. Louis, etc., R. 
 R. Co., 69 Mo. 658; Rockefeller v. 
 Northern Cent. Ry. Co., 212 Pa. 
 485, 61 Atl. 960. 
 
 83. United States. — Fox v. Cin- 
 cinnati, 104 U. S. 783, 26 L. ed. 
 928. 
 
 Indiana. — Trustees of Wabash Ss 
 Erie Canal v. Brett, 25 Ind. 409; 
 Fishback v. Woodruff, 51 Ind. 102. 
 
 New York. — ^Whitney v. New 
 York, 96 N. Y. 241. 
 
§ 116 What Constitutes a Taking. 327 
 
 change is made by authority of law. An abutter upon the 
 location of a public service corporation has been permitted 
 to enjoin the unauthorized discontinuance of the works of 
 such corporation.^* 
 
 § 116. Discontinuance or Change of Use when Better- 
 ments have been Assessed. 
 
 In the cases in which the rule was first established that 
 an owner of land had no right to compensation if a street 
 or other public place upon which his property abutted was 
 discontinued by the public authorities unless access was 
 wholly cut off, it did not appear that the owners had paid 
 any betterment assessments when the improvements were 
 laid out, and there seemed to be no injustice in holding that 
 when a benefit is conferred upon a land owner, the value 
 of which he does not pay for, he takes it upon the implied 
 condition that he shall not be paid for it when it is taken 
 away.*° When however it became the practice to lay out 
 highways and parks at the expense of the owners of abut- 
 ting land, who were assessed large sums for the benefit 
 that their land would receive from the construction and 
 maintenance of the highway or park, it seemed that such 
 owners had just ground for complaint if the highway or 
 park were discontinued, or devoted to some use of no benefit 
 or even actually injurious to their land, and they were 
 denied either compensation for the discontinuance or 
 change, or the right to recover back any part of the money 
 that they had been compelled to pay. The injustice of such 
 a proceeding has appealed so strongly to some courts that 
 
 OTm'o.— Hubbard v. Toledo, 21 84. New York Cement Co. v. 
 
 Ohio St. 379; Little Miami El. Co. Consolidated, etc., Co., 178 N. Y. 
 
 V. Cincinnati R. R. Co., 30 Ohio St. 167, 70 N. E. 451. See also infra, 
 
 629. §§ 508-510, and as to the unlawful 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Commonwealth v. obstruction of a public landing see 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 51 Pa. Reighard v. Elinn, 189 Pa. 355, 42 
 
 351 ; Fredericks v. Pennsylvania Atl. 23, 43 L. R. A. 502. 
 Canal Co., 109 Pa. 50. See also 85. See Holmes, J., in Stanwood 
 
 In re Water Front, 190 N. Y. 350, v. Maiden, 157 Mass. 17, 31 N E 
 
 83 N. E. 299, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 702, 16 L. R. A. 591. 
 335. 
 
328 
 
 The Law or Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 116 
 
 it has been held that it cannot constitutionally be done.*' 
 To sustain such decisions it is necessary to hold either that 
 the payment of the assessment creates a property right in 
 the nature of an easement over the highway or park in 
 favor of the land assessed, or that the assessment is a con- 
 tract that the land taken shall always be used for a high- 
 way or park, as the case may be, the obligation of which 
 cannot be impaired without a "violation of the federal con- 
 stitution. If this view is sound, it would seem to follow 
 that an owner of land taken for the pubhe use would have 
 a right to insist upon the continuance of the use for which 
 the land was taken, if the damages to his remaining land 
 were assessed in view of such use, and especially if benefits 
 from such use were set off from his damages.*'^ As a 
 
 86. In Wonnser v. Brown, 72 
 Hun (N. Y.) 93, it appeared that 
 the plaintiff's premises had been 
 assessed for the benefit aeomitig 
 thereto from an opening of Fifth 
 avenue under an act of 1807. The 
 court held that the street could not 
 be used for other purposes without 
 compensation saying (page 97), 
 " The levying of such an assess- 
 ment and its payment gave the 
 owner of the plaintiffs' premises 
 and his successors in title the light 
 to the enjoyment of such light, air 
 and access which they had paid for, 
 and it could not be taken from 
 them for private use at all, and 
 for public use only upon compen- 
 sation being paid." In Gilman v. 
 Milwaukee, 55 "Wis. 328, 13 N. "W. 
 266, it was held that landowners 
 who had been assessed for a public 
 square could have its use for other 
 purposes, such as an industrial ex- 
 hibition, or its discontinuance as a 
 park, enjoined. The court says 
 (page 335), "Persons who have 
 purchased and improved their lots 
 facing upon a public square, law- 
 fully dedicated to a public use, 
 may enjoin its encumbrance or di- 
 version. Owners of lots adjacent 
 
 to a public square and interested in 
 having it actually applied to the 
 use to which it was originally de- 
 voted may restrain by injunction 
 its diversion to other uses. It 
 would seem that the owners of lots 
 lying so near a public square as to 
 be specially benefited thereby, and 
 whose benefits have been assessed 
 and paid to aid the city in procur- 
 ing title to the same for such pur- 
 pose, by the principle of the above 
 cases could enjoin its diversion to 
 other uses." See also, Pearsall v. 
 Supervisors of Eaton County, 74 
 Mich. 558, 42 N. "W. 77, 4 L. R. A. 
 193; Lahr v. Metropolitan El. Ey. 
 Co., 104 N. T. 268, 10 N. E. 528. 
 87. Thus in Burk v. Simoneon, 
 104 Ind. 173, 54 Am. Rep. 304, 
 which was a biU in equity by the 
 owner of the fee to prevent the re- 
 moval of certain structures by a 
 canal company upon the abandon- 
 ment of the canal, the court said 
 " "Where land is acquired for a pub- 
 lie purpose, as a canal, railroad, or 
 the like, direct benefits to the owner 
 from its construction are deemed 
 part of the consideration paid by 
 the corporation acquiring the right 
 
§ 116 
 
 What Constitxjtes a Taking. 
 
 329 
 
 corollary to this last proposition, it has been held in some 
 jurisdictions that a benefit cannot be set off unless the 
 owner of the land has a legal right to have the cause of the 
 benefit maintained.^* 
 
 The weight of authority however seems to sustain the 
 view that abutters who have been assessed for the con- 
 struction of a street or park have no greater rights in the 
 street or park than any other taxpayers.^® The assess- 
 
 to construct the public work. This 
 was so under the act which created 
 the Whitewater Canal Company 
 and endowed it with corporate pow- 
 ers. * * * jf embankments and 
 abutments essential to the construc- 
 tion and maintenance of the canal 
 did protect the appellant's land 
 from overflow, they were to that 
 extent a benefit, and the presump- 
 tion is that this benefit was taken 
 into consideration, for the ordinary 
 rule is, that a contract for a right 
 of way for a canal, or a condemna- 
 tion for that purpose and the as- 
 sessment of damages, includes all 
 direct benefits and damages, thus 
 precluding an owner from main- 
 taining a subsequent action for 
 damages. Where the use of land is 
 continued for such a period as to 
 permit the running of the' statute 
 of limitations, the presumption is 
 that all damages were assessed and 
 paid. * * * The same principle 
 must apply here; it must be pre- 
 sumed that the long acquiescence 
 of the owner of the fee was due, 
 in part at least, to the benefit which 
 accrued to his land from the em- 
 bankments and structures con- 
 structed by the canal company. 
 The abandonment of the canal did 
 not divest the appellant of his 
 rights nor invest the appellee with 
 authority to deprive him of them. 
 The embankment which protected 
 the latter's land was a benefit to 
 Mm, and this benefit could not be 
 
 taken from him. The right thus 
 secured him was a permanent one." 
 
 88. In re Water Front, 190 
 N. Y. 350, 83 N. E. 299, 16 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 335; In re Barre Water 
 Co., 72 Vt. 413, 48 Atl. 653. 
 
 89. Chicago v. Union BuUding 
 Association, 102 HI. 379, 40 Am. 
 Rep. 598. " The point is made 
 however that appellee's property 
 and other property in the vicinity 
 on LaSalle street was specially as- 
 sessed as benefited by the opening 
 of that part of LaSalle street which 
 it is now pro_posed to vacate and 
 close, and the owners were com- 
 pelled to and did pay considerable 
 sums of money in consequence 
 thereof, wherefore such owners 
 have a special property in that part 
 of the street. The point is not ten- 
 able. No case is referred' to where 
 it has been held that the payment 
 of a special assessment gave the 
 party paying a special property 
 right in the street. If such a right 
 were once recognized it is intpos- 
 sible to perceive why the principle 
 would not recognize in every tax- 
 payer a special property irr the 
 streets to the extent of the amount 
 paid for opening or improving 
 them, and thus in effect hold that 
 the streets are the private prop- 
 erty of those from whom the money 
 was obtained which was paid out 
 for their opening and improvement. 
 Money raised by special assessment 
 as well as by taxation becomes the 
 property of the municipality in 
 
330 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 116 
 
 ment, it is said, is for the increase in the market value of 
 the land from the construction of the public improvement, 
 and market value depends upon many things which the 
 owner has no legal right to have maintained in his neigh- 
 borhood, but the existence and probable continuance of 
 
 trust for the use for which it is 
 raised, and all private ownership 
 in it ceases- the moment it goes into 
 the hands of the proper of&cer. 
 There is certainly a strong natural 
 equity in favor of a party who has 
 heen assessed for special benefits, 
 that he should have the use of the 
 streets for which he is thus made 
 to pay, but it has never been 
 deemed advisable to invest him, as 
 a means of protection, with an equi- 
 table ownership in so much of the 
 street." Home for Aged Women v. 
 Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 429, 
 89 N. E. 124, 24 L. R, A. (N. S.) 
 79. " The erection of many kinds 
 of public works increases the' value 
 of property in the neighborhood by 
 reason of their proximity, and this 
 increase is often a reason for a spe- 
 cial taxation of real estate. After 
 the erection of the South Terminal 
 Station in Boston, there was spe- 
 cial taxation upon real estate, cov- 
 ering a very large area, because of 
 the increase of its value from the 
 establishment of the station there. 
 If for good reasons, in the public 
 interest, the legislature should pro- 
 vide for the removal of this station, 
 it can hardly be contended that the 
 diminution of the value of prop- 
 erty in the neighborhood would en- 
 title the owners to compensation as 
 for a taking of their property un- 
 der the right of eminent domain." 
 State, Kean Prosecutrix v. Eliza- 
 beth, 54 N. J. L. 462, 24 Atl. 495; 
 affirmed on appeal, 55 N. J. L. 337, 
 26 Atl. 939. "It appears that 
 when York street was laid out, one 
 of the persons assessed for the 
 benefit was the prosecutrix. She 
 then had, and still has, property 
 
 abutting on York street. It is as- 
 sumed by counsel for prosecutrix 
 that because the prosecutrix was 
 assessed for a benefit resulting 
 from the opening of this street pe- 
 cuhar to herself, that she got a 
 vested right in the continued ex- 
 istence of the street, of which she 
 could not be stripped without com- 
 pensation. But this, I think, is 
 more plausible than substantial. 
 While the right she got may have 
 been of peculiar benefit to her 
 property, ye^ it was a right which 
 she shared with the public. The 
 privilege of using the street was 
 shared by each member of the com- 
 snunity. It may not have been* of 
 the same value to each member of 
 the community, but the right tia use 
 the street was in each citizen the 
 same. It was exclusively a -publio 
 right put under the control nt the 
 representatives of the public. It 
 was subject to alteration or aboli- 
 tion when in the judgment of those 
 to whom the public interests were 
 confided those interests denfemded 
 such action. The assessment of 
 benefits is preSimied to be based 
 upon the recognized powesr of the 
 state and its- agencies to modify or 
 destroy the improvement. The at- 
 titude of those who' have been as- 
 sessed for peculiar benefits differs 
 in no respfect from that of any 
 other citizen- in regard to this con- 
 trol of the public over a public 
 right." Thayer v. Boston, 206 
 Fed. 969. "The plaintiff has in 
 the first place to show that the as- 
 sessments upon adjacent properties, 
 including hers, were levied and paid 
 upon terms or under circumstances 
 which fairly gave those assessed 
 
§ 116 
 
 What Constitutes a Taking. 
 
 331 
 
 which a prospective purchaser would take into considera- 
 tion, If, under the laws in force at the time of the laying 
 out, or even if the legislature has the power to enact such 
 laws, the public improvement may be discontinued at any 
 time or its character wholly changed, the possibility of 
 such discontinuance or change is considered in reckoning 
 the amount of the assessment.*" If the street or park lasts 
 
 owners who paid them, or subse- 
 quent purchasers, the right to un- 
 derstand that they were then being 
 assessed and were paying for noth- 
 ing less than the perpetual main- 
 tenance of an adjacent park, con- 
 sisting of the land acquired by the 
 city as stated. Nowhere in the 
 state statute of 1875, or in any of 
 the proceedings under it to take 
 this land, or assess betterments 
 therefor and collect them, or in the 
 decision sustaining those assess- 
 ments (Foster v. Park Commis- 
 sioners, 133 Mass. 321), can any 
 more explicit definitions be found 
 of the use for which the land was 
 being taken 4;han that it was for 
 the 'location or laying-out of a 
 pubUc park or parks.' The plain- 
 tiff says that a public park is in 
 its nature of permanent duration, 
 and that devotion of the land to 
 other uses destroys the entire con- 
 sideration .for the assessments. But 
 in Higginson v. Treasurer and 
 Sehoolhouse Commissioners of Bos- 
 ton, 212 Mass. 583, 99 N. E. 523, 
 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 215, before 
 cited, the Supreme Court of the 
 state has held as to this land that, 
 though taken by the city in fee, it 
 had been taken by an agency of the 
 state for a public use, and that the 
 right remained in the state to 
 change that public use when it sap^ 
 fit and devote the land, as it did, 
 to another and an inconsistent use. 
 This being the law of the state, I 
 think all parties affected by the tak- 
 ing and assessments of 1879 must 
 be presumed to have understood 
 
 that the special benefits then paid 
 for did not consist in having the 
 land taken maintained as a park 
 forever, but only in having it es- 
 tablished as a park and so main- 
 tained so long as the state should 
 not see fit to substitute for that 
 use a different public use. As is 
 said in Nichols, Eminent Dbmain, 
 section 141, with regard to the dia- 
 continuance of streets for the loca- 
 tion whereof abutters have been 
 assessed, ' The possibility of dis- 
 continuance is considered in reckon- 
 ing the amount of the assessment.' 
 Such substitution by the state of a 
 different public use would, of 
 course, be a thing unlikely to hap- 
 pen soon after .the establishmfent of 
 a park, and in this case it has not 
 happened for more than thirty 
 years afterward. Upon such au- 
 thorities as have been found, I am 
 unable to hold that any right to 
 assume that it would never happen 
 accrued in favor of the assessed 
 land." In Lockhart v. Craig St. 
 Ry. Co., 139 Pa. 419, 21 Atl. 26, 3 
 Am. Elect. Cas. 314, it was held 
 that the fact that an abutting 
 owner had paid an assessment for 
 paving a street gave him no right 
 to prevent the construction of an 
 electric street railway therein. 
 90. Sears v. Street Commission- 
 ers, 180 Mass. 274, 282, 62 N". E. 
 397. " With regard to speculative- 
 ness, the possible changes in the 
 future use of the station and all ele- 
 ments of doubt are discounted by 
 the public and allowed for in 
 market value." 
 
332 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 116 
 
 longer than anticipated the owner gains; if discontinued 
 sooner he loses, and, if he sells, the possible future actions 
 of the public authorities are an element in fixing the price.®^ 
 In any event, if the existence of this rule is recognized when 
 the improvement is made and the amount of the assess- 
 ment is determined, no injustice is done by its enforcement. 
 If however land is taken for a public park and better- 
 ments assessed and collected bgfore the grading and plant- 
 ing of the park has been completed, as may constitutionally 
 be done, and if as soon as the betterments are collected the 
 public authorities decide to erect upon the whole of the 
 tract taken for a park a building of a character detrimental 
 to the value of neighboring land, it seems probable that the 
 courts will find some way of protecting the owners of land 
 assessed from such a grave injustice. On the other hand 
 if, many years after the assessments have been paid and 
 enjoyment of the improvement begun, public necessity and 
 convenience require the modification of the original use of 
 a portion of the land taken, reasons of public policy might 
 be invoked to sustain a so much less flagrant injustice. If 
 however the question is to be treated as one of degree, 
 
 91. Whitney v. New York, 96 tion of the canal by the increased 
 N. Y. 241. "Nor is there any value of the property adjoining, 
 ground for the assumption that the and the advantages accruing from 
 canal appraisers, in fixing the its proximity to the canal. For 
 amount of damages which the own- forty years, while the canal was in 
 ers sustained, and in considering operation, the original owner of 
 the probable benefits which might the land and his grantees reaped 
 accrue by reason of the construe- the advantages arising from its 
 tion of the canal, based their esti- use, and whether they be more or 
 mate upon the theory that the less than the amount of the dam- 
 canal was to be used and operated ages and benefits estimated by the 
 for all future time. It is a legiti- appraisers is of no consequence, 
 mate inference that they consid- and presents no ground for an 
 ered that the time which it might equitable claim against the state 
 be used might depend upon unfore- for additional damages. It would 
 seen contingencies, and that in the be going very far to hold that the 
 progress of improvement the period state, by taking the land for the 
 might arrive when, as a means of benefit of the canal, entered into an 
 transportation, the canal would be obligation or contract that its use 
 useless and of no account. * * * should be in perpetuity, and neither 
 The owner of the land received the law nor equity sustains any such 
 benefits arising from the construe- construction of the statute." 
 
§ 116 What Constitutes a Taking. 333 
 
 where to draw the line would be a difficult problem, but it 
 is possible that the Supreme Court of the United States 
 might take the same position as in the case of betterments 
 in excess of benefits, and not interfere unless it could plainly 
 detect a case of mere spoliation under the pretense of 
 taxation.®^ 
 
 The question has never been before the Supreme Court 
 of the United States and the few states in which it has 
 arisen are about evenly divided. If the subject is one upon 
 which a definite rule can be laid down, in deciding what 
 that rule should be it is essential to note the distinction 
 between an assessment for the establishment of a public 
 improvement and an assessment for the construction or 
 maintenance of a public improvement. In the latter case 
 nothing for which an assessment is levied is in the nature 
 of things permanent ; "^ streets, sidewalks and sewers wear 
 out and must be replaced ; the benefit from street watering 
 is even more transitory, and it would be absurd to contend 
 that the owners of land which had been assessed a part of 
 the cost of constructing a sidewalk, a sewer or a street were 
 constitutionally entitled to have the work replaced over 
 and over again at the public expense whenever its useful- 
 ness had come to an end from natural causes. The legal 
 establishment of a public improvement and especially of 
 such an improvement as a park is in the nature of things 
 permanent; it needs no renewal; it is its expected perma- 
 nency that leads people to build in proximity to it and gives 
 the increased value upon which the special assessment is 
 based. The distinction between an assessment for estab- 
 lishing a public work and an assessment for construction 
 is recognized and discussed in several Massachusetts 
 cases.®* The decisions that sustain an assessment for a 
 
 92. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. ers, 133 Mass. 321; Jones v. Metro- 
 269, 43 L. ed. 443; French v. Bar- politan Park Commissioners, 181 
 ber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. Mass. 494, 64 N. E. 76; New Eng- 
 324, 45 L. ed. 879. land Hospital v. Street Commie- 
 
 93. Lowell V. French, 6 Cush. sioners, 188 Mass. 88, 74 N. E. 
 (Mass.) 223. 294. 
 
 94. Foster v. Park Commissioiir 
 
334 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 117 
 
 transitory benefit merely recognize that an improvement 
 which is in its nature transitory may be the subject of a 
 special assessment, and do not intimate that an improve- 
 ment which is in its nature permanent, and is treated as 
 permanent in fixing the amount of the assessment, may be 
 treated as transitory whenever it suits the convenience of 
 the municipal authorities. It may be that it is here that 
 the true distinction lies and that it is only an assessment 
 for establishment that gives the owner of land assessed a 
 vested right in the continuance of the improvement; but 
 whatever his rights may be, like all other property they 
 can of course be taken by eminent domain upon payment 
 of compensation if the public needs require it. 
 
 § 117. Authorization of Nuisances. 
 
 The use of the word * ' nuisance ' ' in connection with the 
 subject of authorized indirect injury to land has led, per- 
 haps, to some confusion of thought. A private nuisance 
 is, of course, nothing more nor less than such use of one's 
 own premises as creates an actionable injury to the land 
 of another.®^ What would be a nuisance, unless authorized 
 by the legislature, may, if the general welfare is thereby 
 enhanced, be required or permitted, and for the commis- 
 sion of the act thereafter no liability to the injured land 
 owner arises.®* But if the nuisance so authorized creates 
 
 95. The late Professor E. R. galizing the ring^g of factory 
 Thayer well said (in XXVII Har- bells, and in Sawyer v. Davis, 136 
 vard Law Review, 326), "Nuisance Mass. 239, 49 Am. Rep. 27, the 
 is a good word to beg a question act was held to be valid and the 
 with. It is so comprehensive a injunction was dissolved, the court 
 term and its content is so hetero- saying, " AVhen the legislature al- 
 geneous, that it scarcely does more lows that to be done which would 
 than state a legal conclusion that otherwise be a nuisance, it will be 
 for one or another of widely vary- valid, upon the ground that the 
 Ing reasons, the thing stigmatized legislature is ordinarily the proper 
 as a nuisance violates the rights of judge of what the public good re- 
 others." quires, unless carried to such an 
 
 96. Thus in Davis v. Sawyer, 133 extent that it can fairly be said to 
 Mass 289, 43 Am. Rep. 519, the be an unwholesome and unreason- 
 ringing of a factory bell was held able law." In Transportation Co. 
 to be a nuisance and enjoined. The v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, 25 L. ed. 
 legislature then passed an act le- 336, the court said, " That cannot 
 
§ 117 
 
 What Constitutes a Taking. 
 
 335 
 
 such severe injury to neighboring land as to render it use- 
 less and so constitutes a taking, the constitution protects 
 the injured parties and the nuisance may be abated unless 
 compensation is provided.®^ In other words, as was said 
 by the court in a well known Massachusetts case,®* " The 
 legislature may authorize small nuisances without com- 
 pensation, but not great ones." This statement seems to 
 have puzzled some people, but it is nothing more than the 
 doctrine that indirect injury, unless destructive of the use 
 of land, does not constitute a taking. Of course if compen- 
 sation is provided and the object is a public one, the 
 legislature, under the power of eminent domain, may 
 authorize a nuisance, however great, and on the other hand, 
 a nuisance cannot be authorized at all except in behalf of 
 the general welfare. 
 
 be a nuisance, sueli as to give a 
 common-law right of action, which 
 the law authorizes. We refer to 
 an action at common law such as 
 this " is. A legislature may and 
 often does authorize and even di- 
 rect acts to be done which are harm- 
 ful to individuals and which with- 
 out the authority would be nui- 
 sances; but in. such a case, if the 
 statute be such as the legislature 
 has power to pass, the acts are law- 
 ful, and are not nuisances, unless 
 the power has been exceeded. In 
 such grants of power a right to 
 compensation for consequential in- 
 juries caused by the authorized 
 erections may be given to those 
 who suffer, but then the right is a 
 creature of the statute. It has no 
 existence without it. If this were 
 
 not so, the suffering party would 
 be entitled to repeated actions un- 
 til an abatement of the erections 
 would be enforced, or perhaps he 
 might restrain them by injunction." 
 
 97. In Richards v. Washington 
 Terminal Co., 233 U. S. 546, 553, 
 58 L. ed. 1088, L. R. A. 1915 A 
 887, the court said, " We deem the 
 true rule, under the fifth amend- 
 ment, as under state constitutions 
 haviag a similar prohibition, to be 
 that while the legislature may legal- 
 ize what otherwise would be a pub- 
 lic nuisance, it may not confer im- 
 munity from action for a private 
 nuisance of such a character as to 
 amount in effect to a taking of pri- 
 vate property for public use." 
 
 98. Bacon v. Boston, 154 Mass 
 100, 28 K. E. 9. 
 
CHAPTER Vm. 
 
 What Constittjtes Peopeett. 
 
 Section 118. "Property" Includes Every Interest in the Thing Taken. 
 
 119. Estates Successive in Time — Leasehold Interests. 
 
 120. Interests in Eeal Estate not Successive in Time. 
 
 121. Easements and Profits. 
 
 122. Liens and Mortgages. 
 
 123. Franchises. 
 
 124. Good-will. 
 
 125. EJiowledge, Labor and OflSces. 
 
 126. Property of Public Service Corporations. 
 
 127. Rails, Pipes and Wires in Public Highways. 
 
 128. Eights in Existing Crossings. 
 
 129. Property of Charitable Corporations. 
 
 130. Property of a State. 
 
 131. Twofold Character of Municipal Corporations. 
 
 132. Property of Municipal Corporations — Streets. 
 
 133. Property of Municipal Corporations other than Streets. 
 
 § 118. " Property " Includes Every Interest in the Thing 
 Taken. 
 
 The word " property," as used in the constitutional pro- 
 vision that property shall not be taken for the public use 
 without just compensation, is treated as a word of most 
 general import and is liberally construed. It is held to 
 include every kind of right or interest, capable of being 
 enjoyed as property and recognized as such, upon which 
 it is practicable to place a money value.^ It embraces both 
 real estate and personal property, tangible and intangible, 
 incorporeal hereditaments and franchises. Accordingly, 
 whenever it appears that there has been a "taking" of 
 land within the meaning of the constitution, it is not merely 
 
 1. Illinois. — Chicago, etc., Ry. Massachusetts. — Ashby v. Eiast- 
 
 Co. V. Garrett, 239 111. 297, 87 N. E. em R. R. Co., 5 Met. 368, 38 Am. 
 
 1009, 130 Am. St. Rep. 229. Dee. 426; Old Colony E. B. Co.' v. 
 
 Indiana. — Sherwood v. Lafayette, Plymouth, 14 Gray 155. 
 
 109 Ind. 411, 58 Am. Rep. 414. Mississippi. — lUinois Central R. 
 
 Maryland. — Mayor and Council R. Co. v. State, 94 Miss. 759, 48 So. 
 
 of Hagerstown v. Groh, 101 Md. 561. 
 560, 61 Atl. 467, 4 Ann. Cas. 943. 
 
 [336] 
 
§ 119 What Constitutes Pbopeety. 337 
 
 the owner of the fee who is entitled to compensation, but 
 every person holding an estate or interest in the subject 
 matter of the taking which will be recognized by the courts 
 as valid as against the owner of the fee, is equally pro- 
 tected by the constitution. 
 
 Although there are many decisions of the courts which, 
 inferentially at least, sustain this principle of law, many, 
 probably most, of such decisions do not contain any discus- 
 sion of the significance of the term "property" in the 
 clause of the constitution now under consideration. Stat- 
 utes authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent 
 domain often provide 'compensation for " owners " of the 
 land taken. As " owner " and " property " are substan- 
 tially correlative terms,^ decisions on the meaning of such 
 statutes may well be thought to bear on the interpretation 
 of the constitutional question now under discussion. For 
 the same reasons, courts, in deciding who should be made 
 parties to condemnation proceedings, often throw consider- 
 able light on the meaning of " property," since it is usually 
 necessary that all persons having property in the land 
 taken be made parties.^ 
 
 § 119. Estates Successive in Time — Leasehold Interests. 
 
 The principle that the holder of every estate or interest 
 
 in a parcel of real estate taken for the public use is entitled 
 
 2. Parks v. Boston, 15 Pick. in the estate taken or damaged. 
 (Maiss.) 198. "Every person hav- Woodstock, etc., Mfg. Co. v. 
 ing an interest in real estate ca- Chajrleston Light & Water Co., 84 
 pable of being damnified by the S. C. 306, 66 S. E. 194. "Land- 
 laying out of a street through or owner" in a statute embraces not 
 over it is an 'owner ' and entitled to only the owner of the fee, but any 
 compensation." Dugan v. Cedar other person who has an interest 
 County, 87 Neb. 689, 128 N.W- 29; in the property affected by the 
 Eule V. Sioux County, 94 Neb. 736, taking. 
 144 N. W. 806. " Owner" applies 3. Infra, §§ 403, 404. 
 to all persons having an interest 
 22 
 
338 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 119 
 
 to compensation is most frequently applied in the case of 
 estates successive in time. 
 It is well settled that life tenants,* and lessees for years ' 
 
 4. Arkwnsas. — Hare v. Fort 
 Smith, etc., E. R. Co., 104 Ark. 187, 
 148 S. W. 1038. 
 
 Connecticut. — Shelton v. Derby, 
 27 Conn. 414. 
 
 Georgia. — Charleston, etc., Ey. 
 Co. V. Hughes, 105 Ga. 1, 30 S, E. 
 972, 70 Am. St. Eep. 17. 
 
 Indiana. — Burbridge v. New Al- 
 bany, etc., E. E. Co., 9 Ind. 546. 
 
 Iowa. — Chiesa v. Des Moines, 
 158 Iowa 343, 138 N. W. 922. 
 
 Kansas. — Chicago, etc., E. E. Co. 
 V. Ellis, 52 Kan. 41, 48, 33 Pac. 
 478, 34 Pac. 352. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Ellis v. Weleli, 
 6 Mass. 246, 4 Am. Dee. 122. 
 
 Missouri. — Kansas City, etc., E. 
 R. Co. V. Weaver, 86 Mo. 473. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Pittsburgh E. E. 
 Co. V. Bentley, 88 Pa. 178; Harris- 
 burg V. Grange, 3 Watts. & S. 460. 
 
 Tennessee. — Colcough v. Nash- 
 ville, etc., E. R. Co., 2 Head 171. 
 
 Vermont. — ^Austin v. Eutland E. 
 E. Co., 45 Vt. 215; Wheeler v. 'St. 
 Johnsbury, 87 Vt. 46, 87 Atl. 349. 
 
 5. England. — Eegina v. Great 
 Northern E. E. Co., 2 Q. B. D. 
 151; Cranwell v. London, L. E., 5 
 Exch. 284; In re Masters (1901), 
 2 K. B. 84. 
 
 United States. — Kohl v. United 
 States, 91 U. S. 367, 23 L. ed. 449. 
 
 Arkansas. — Hare v. Tort Smith, 
 etc., E. E. Co., 104 Ark. 187, 148 
 S. W. 1038; McLaughlin v. Hope, 
 107 Ark. 442, 155 S. W. 910, 47 
 L. E. A. (N. S.) 137. 
 
 California. — ^McCauley v. Brooks, 
 16 Cal. 11. 
 
 Georgia. — Pause v. Atlanta, 98 
 Ga. 92, 26 S. E. 489, 58 Am. St. 
 Rep. 290; Western, etc., R. E. Oo. 
 v. Western Union Tel. Co., 138 Ga. 
 420, 75 S. E. 471. 
 
 Illinois. — Chicago, etc., E. E. Co. 
 V. Dresel, 110 HI. 89; Stubbings v. 
 
 Evanston, 136 111. 37, 26 N. E. 511, 
 U L. E. A. 339, 29 Am. St Rep. 
 300; Chicago, etc., E. E. Co. v. Mil- 
 ler, 233 111. 508, 84 N. E. 683; Chi- 
 cago, etc., E. R. Co. v. Chicago Me- 
 .chanics' Institute, 239 HI. 197, 87 
 N. E. 933; Carieago v. Garrity, 7 
 lU. App. 474. 
 
 Indiana. — Burbridge v. New Al- 
 bany, etc., R. E. Co., 9 Ind. 546. 
 
 Iowa. — CMesa v. Des Moines, 
 158 Iowa 343, 138 N. W. 922. 
 
 Kansas. — Bales v. Wichita, etc., 
 E. E. Co., 97 Kan. 771, 141 Pac. 
 1009. 
 
 Mwrylwnd. — Baltimore, etc., E. 
 E. Co. V. Thompson, 10 Md. 76; 
 Baltimore v. Eice, 73 Md. 307; 
 Gluok V. Baltimore, 81 Md. 315, 32 
 Atl. 515, 48 Am. St. Rep. 515. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Ellis v. Welch, 
 6 Mass. 246, 4 Am. Dee. 122; Parks 
 V. Boston, 15 Pick. 198. 
 
 Michigan. — Detroit v. Little Co., 
 146 Mich. 373, 109 N. W. 671. 
 
 Mississippi. — Levee Commisaon- 
 ers V. Johnson, 66 Miss. 248. 
 
 Missouri. — Biddle v. Hussman, 
 23 Mo. 597. 
 
 New York. — Turner v. Williams, 
 10 Wend. 140; Kemoehan v. New 
 York El. Ry. Co., 128 N. T. 559, 
 29 N. E. 65; Kearney v. Metropoli- 
 tan El. Ry. Co., 129 N. Y. 76, 29 
 N. E. 70; Baker v. State, 63 Misc. 
 549, 118 N. Y. Supp. 618; Musanti 
 V. State, 131 N. Y. Supp. 20, 73 
 Misc. 534. 
 
 Ohio. — Foote v. Cincinnati, 11 
 Ohio St. 408. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — ^Brown v. Powell, 
 25 Pa. 229; Dyer v. Wightman, 66 
 Pa. 425; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. 
 Eby, 107 Pa. 166; Consolidated lee 
 Co. V. Pennsylvania E. E. Co., 224 
 Pa. 487, 73 Atl. 937. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Gilligan v. Provi- 
 dence, 11 E. I. 258. 
 
§ 119 What Constitutes Property. S39 
 
 or from year to year,^ holding under a valid devise, grant 
 or lease, have such an interest in the property as to be 
 classed as ' * owners ' ' in the constitutional sense, and to be 
 entitled to be compensated for the taking of their interest 
 in the property, or to sue for damages or apply for an 
 injunction when an unlawful injury to the property under 
 color of eminent domain is inflicted or threatened,''^ and the 
 same rules apply to a sublessee as to a tenant holding a 
 lease directly from the owner of the fee.* The right of a 
 tenant in possession under an estate of less dignity than 
 those already mentioned to recover compensation for the 
 taking of the property depends upon his right to continued 
 possession against the will of the landlord ; a mere expecta- 
 tion of continued possession based upon the previous con- 
 duct of the parties cannot be considered, for as anything 
 the tenant might gain the landlord would lose, and it cannot 
 be presumed that the latter would voluntarily act to his 
 own disadvantage. Applying this principle it would seem 
 that a tenant at will has an estate or interest in the land, 
 even if it be of little value, and should be allowed to share 
 in the compensation. It has been so held,^ but the weight 
 of authority, in litigated cases at least, is otherwise." A 
 tenant from year to year with a covenant of renewal may 
 
 South Carolina. — Woodstock, etc., 6. Getz v. Philadelphia, etc., R. 
 
 Mfg. Co. V. Charleston Light & R. Co., 105 Pa. 547; GilUgan v. 
 
 Water Co., 84 S. C. 306, 66 S. E. Providence, 11 R. I. 258. 
 
 194. 7. Lowery v. Pekin, 186 lU. 387, 
 
 Ftr^ima.— Alexandria, etc., R. 57 N. E. 1062, 51 L. R. A. 301; 
 
 R. Co. V. Fannee, 31 Gratt. 761. Kensington v. Wood, 10 Pa. 93, 49 
 
 Washington. — North Coast Ry. Am. Dec. 582. 
 
 Co. V. Hess, 56 Wash. 335, 105 Pae. 8. Boteler v. Philadelphia, etc., 
 
 853; North Coast Ry. Co. v. Gen- Terminal R. R. Co., 164 Pa. 397, 
 
 try, 58 Wash. 82, 107 Pae. 1060; 30 AtL 303. 
 
 Olson Land Co. v. Alki Park Co., 9. Sheehan v. Tall River, 187 
 
 63 Wash. 521, 115 Pae. 1083; State Mass. 356, 73 N. E. 544. 
 
 V. Lewis County Court, 80 Wash. 10. United States v. Inlots, Fed. 
 
 417, 141 Pa«. 906. Cas. No. 15441a; Shaaber v. Read- 
 
 West Virgima.— Fox v. Balti- ing, 150 Pa. 402, 24 Atl. 692 ; Cana- 
 
 more, etc., R. R. Co., 34 W. Va. dian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Brown Mill- 
 
 466, 12 S. E. 757. ing & Elevator Co., 18 Ont. L. Rep. 
 
 For the measure of a tenant's 85, 15 Ann. Cas. 709. 
 compensation, see infra, § 233. 
 
340 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 119 
 
 have his damages assessed with reference to the covenant," 
 but a mere expectation of renewal based on evidence that 
 the landlord and tenant were mutually satisfied and were 
 likely to keep on together cannot be considered by the 
 courts.^^ A tenant by sufferance is not ranked as an owner 
 of any interest in the property, since he may be put out of 
 possession at any moment/* but it has been held that a 
 person in possession under a lease that was void on account 
 of the statute of frauds, who had made valuable improve- 
 ments and paid all rent due, had an interest in the property 
 that would be protected by the courts and was entitled to 
 share in the compensation." 
 
 To entitle a person having a right of occupancy of real 
 estate to recover compensation when the land is taken, he 
 must have g,n actual estate or interest in the soil, and a 
 mere contractual relation not creating an interest is not 
 sufficient,^® but if by force of an agreement with the owner, 
 
 11. England. — Boiime v. Liver- 
 pool, 32 L. J. Q. B. 15. 
 
 Iowa. — Storm Lake v. Iowa 
 T'alls, etc., R. E. Co., 62 Iowa 218, 
 17 N. W. 489. 
 
 New York. — Matter of •William 
 St., 19 Wend. 678; Storms v. Man- 
 hattan Ey. Co., 178 N. Y. 493, 71 
 N. E. 3, 66 L. R. A. 625. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Northern Penn- 
 sylvania R. R. Co. V. Davis, 26 Pa. 
 238. 
 
 When the lease provides that at 
 its termination the landlord must 
 pay for the tenant's improvemfflits 
 or renew the lease, the expectation 
 of renewal must be considered. Me- 
 Goldrick v. King, 8 Can. Exch. 
 169. In Witman v. Reading, 191 
 Pa. 134, 43 Atl. 140, it was held 
 that when a lessee has obtained an 
 extension of his lease for a term of 
 years under circumstances which 
 would prevent the lessor, in equity, 
 from revoking the lease arbitrarily 
 on the ground that the requirement 
 of the statute of frauds was not 
 complied with in the extension, the 
 lessee has such interest in the prop- 
 
 erty as is subject to injury and 
 damage by the exercise of the 
 power of eminent domain. 
 
 12. Rex V. Liverpool, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 4 Ad. & El. 650; Pause v. At- 
 lanta, 98 Ga. 92, 26 S. E. 489, 58 
 Am. St. Rep. 473; Emery v. Bos- 
 ton Terminal Co., 178 Mass. 172, 
 59 N. E. 763, 86 Am. St. Rep. 473. 
 Contra, Baltimore v. Rice, 73 Md. 
 307, 21 Atl. 181. 
 
 13. Conness v. Indiana, etc., R. 
 R. Co., 193 HI. 464, 62 N. E. 221; 
 Emerson v. SomervUle, 166 Mass. 
 115, 44 N. E. 110; Shaaber v. 
 Reading, 150 Pa. 402, 24 Atl. 692. 
 
 14. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Mil- 
 ler, 233 ni. 508, 84 N. E. 683. So 
 in Cole v. Ellwood Power Co., 216 
 Pa. 283, 65 Atl. 678, a parole lessee 
 of a quarry was held entitled to 
 compensation. 
 
 15. Thus a party to whom the 
 owner has agreed to give a lease is 
 not entitled to compensation, Mc- 
 Grath v. Boston, 103 Mass. 369; 
 or the holder of a parole license to 
 use a certain portion of the land, 
 Bird V. Great Eastern Ry. Co., 34 
 
§ 119 What Constitutes Propebty. 341 
 
 even if it is not called a lease, other persons acquire an 
 interest in the use and occupation of the estate, they are 
 owners in the constitutional sense." The estate or interest 
 must be an existing one, and a lessee whose term has expired 
 when the taking is made has no interest in the property for 
 the deprivation of which he is entitled to damages.^'^ It has 
 become customary in drawing leases of valuable city prop- 
 erty to insert a provision that upon the taking by eminent 
 domain of a whole or a part of the premises leased, the 
 term shall come to an end, and under such a lease the tenant 
 has no estate or interest in the property remaining after the 
 taking to sustain a claim for compensation," although 
 under some circumstances he may be entitled to recover for 
 improvements.^* 
 
 Possession is not necessary to the maintenance of pro- 
 ceedings to enforce the constitutional right of compensa- 
 tion for the taking of property by eminent domain, and 
 when the premises taken are in possession of tenants for 
 life or years, the remainder-man or reversioner must be 
 compensated for the destruction of his interest.^" Simi- 
 larly the owner of an inextinguishable ground rent is 
 
 L. J. C. P. 366; Clapp v. Boston, speeifieally provides tliat nothings 
 
 133 Mass. 367 ; or the lessee of desk contained therein shall prevent the 
 
 room in an office building, Muniei- lessee from recovering damages 
 
 pal Lighting Co. v. Metropolitan, from the corporation by which the 
 
 etc., R. R. Co., 1 Cab. & E. 184; land is taken. Boteler v. Philadel- 
 
 or of a stall in a market, Strick- phia, etc., Terminal R. R. Co., 164 
 
 land V. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 154 Pa. 397, 30 Atl. 303. 
 
 Pa. 348, 26 Atl. 431, 21 L. R. A. 19. Infra, § 234. 
 
 224. . 20. United States. — ^Alexander v. 
 
 16. Ashby v. Eastern R. R. Co., United States, 39 Ct. CI. 383. 
 
 5 Met. (Mass.) 368, 38 Am. Dec. Arkansas. — Hare v. Fort Smith, 
 
 426. So, the holders of cemetery etc., R. R. Co., 104 Ark. 187, 148 
 
 certificates have been held entitled S. W. 1038. 
 
 to share in the compensation. In New Yorfc.-:— Hine v. New York 
 
 re Bensel, 144 App. Div. (K Y.) Elevated R. R. Co., 128 N. Y. 571; 
 
 751, 129 N. Y. Snpp. 682. Mortimer v. Manhattan R. R. Co., 
 
 17. Putney Bros. Co. v. Milwau- 129 N. Y. 81, 29 N. E. 5; Thomp- 
 kee Light, etc., Co., 134 Wis. 379, son v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 130 N. Y. 
 114 N. W. 809, and see also infra, 360, 29 N. E. 264. 
 
 81232,233. South Carolina.— CvLvetoTi v. 
 
 18. Matter of New York, 124 South Bound Ry. Co., 59 S. C. 
 App. Div. (N. Y.) 465, 109 N. Y. 371, 37 S. E. 914; Charleston, etc., 
 Supp. 2; affirmed, 192 N. Y. 539, R. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 69 S. C. 481, 
 84 N. E. 1123. Aliter if the lease 48 S. E. 476; Seaboard Air Line 
 
342 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 119 
 
 entitled to compensation when part of the land from which 
 the rent is payable is taken, even if the remaining land is 
 ample security for the rent, as he is the owner of an interest 
 in the land taken and so within the protection of the con- 
 stitution.^^ When however land is held in fee simple deter- 
 minable when the land ceases to be devoted to a certain use, 
 whether the estate is regarded as a determinable fee or 
 as subject to a condition sulteequent, the rights of the 
 grantor, although enforceable if the land ceased to be used 
 for the designated purpose, are not an estate or interest 
 in land, and are not property in the constitutional sense.^^ 
 As the interest of the occupant is a fee simple, the entire 
 estate is in him. Nevertheless a statute providing that a 
 lessee for a term of a hundred or more years shall be the 
 holder of a fee does not make the lessor's estate so remote 
 that he cannot recover compensation when the land is 
 taken.^^ 
 
 Ry. V. aarrett, 85 S. C. 543, 67 
 S. E. 903 ; Bridges v. Southern Ry. 
 Oo., 86 S. C. 267, 68 S. E. 551, 
 Ann. Cas. 1912 A 1056. 
 
 Vermont. — ^Wheeler v. St. Johns- 
 bury, 87 Vt. 46, 87 Atl. 349. 
 
 It has been held otherwise how- 
 ever in the case of a contingent 
 remainder. Decatur v. Randall 
 (Ga.) 87 S. E. 1036. 
 
 21. Baltimore v. Latrobe, 101 
 Md. 621, 61 Atl. 203, 4 Ann. Cas. 
 1005; Voegtly v. Pittsburgh, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 2. Grant Cas. (Pa.) 243; 
 Cuthbert v. Kuhn, 3 Whart. (Pa.) 
 357. See also Workman v. Mifflin, 
 30 Pa. 362; Dyer v. Wightman, 66 
 Pa. 427. 
 
 22. Connecticut. — Scovill v. Mc- 
 Mahon, 62 Conn. 378, 26 Atl. 479, 
 21 L. R. A. 58, 36 Am. St. Rep. 
 350. 
 
 Kentucky. — Lutes v. Louisville, 
 etc., R. R. Co.,. 158 Ky. 259, 164 
 S. W. 792. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Chandler v. Ja- 
 maica Pond Aqueduct Co., 125 
 Mass. 544. 
 
 New Sampshire. — Lyford v. La^- 
 conia, 75 N. H. 220, 72 Atl. 1085, 
 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062, 139 Am. 
 St. Rep. 680. 
 
 Ohio. — Cincinnati v. B'abb, 4 
 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 464. 
 
 See also Pifer v. Allen, 228 111. 
 507, 81 N. E. 1105, deciding that 
 the holder of an executory devise 
 after a fee is not entitled to com- 
 pensation, and New Haven County 
 V. Trinity Church, 82 Conn. 378, 
 73 Atl. 789, 17 Ann. Cas. 432, hold- 
 ing that a church to which a legacy 
 has been given on condition that 
 certain land be used for a certain 
 purpose is not entitled to recover 
 the amount of the legacy from the 
 county when the land in question 
 is taken for a court house, for the 
 legacy is not forfeited. 
 
 23. Stark v. Mansfield, 178 Mass. 
 76, 59 N. E. 643. A jury may 
 however when the lease has many 
 years to run consider the reversion 
 of no value. Chicago, etc., R. B. 
 Co. V. Chicago Mechanics' Institute, 
 239 m. 197, 87 N. E. 933. 
 
§ 120 What Constitutes Peopeety. 343 
 
 § 120. Interests in Real Estate not Successive in Time. 
 
 Mere occupancy, unaccompanied by any claim of owner- 
 ship, is not in and of itself an estate or interest in land 
 sufficient to form the basis of a claim for damages when the 
 land so occupied is taken by eminent domain.^* Thus a 
 trespasser is not entitled to compensation,^^ even if he has 
 erected a building upon the land;^^ but adverse possession 
 under claim of right, although not supported by the legal 
 title and not yet ripened into an unimpeachable ownership, 
 creates an interest which the law recognizes as property ,'*'' 
 especially wheii all other possible claimants of compensa- 
 tion are barred by the statute of limitations.^* The same 
 principle is applied in the case of a person holding land by 
 parole gift and several years occupancy thereunder,^* and 
 of Indians in possession with a right to perpetual occu- 
 pancy.*" A mere ' ' squatter ' ' on public lands has no right 
 to compensation when the lands are taken for public use,*^ 
 but an entry-man under the federal homestead laws, who 
 is in possession and has complied with all the requirements 
 to entitle him to a patent, has a property right protected 
 by the constitution.*^ 
 
 24. Geyde v. Commissioners of E. Co., 24 Cal. 245; Rosa v. Mis- 
 Public Works (1891), 2 Ch. 630. souri, etc., Ry. Co., 18 Kan. 124; 
 
 25. Rooney v. Sacramento Valley Hobart v. Ford, 6 Nev. 77. 
 
 R. R. Co., 6 Cal. 638. 32. United ^fotes.— Washington, 
 
 26. Norris v. Pueblo, 12 Col. etc., R. R. Co. v. Osbom, 160 U. S. 
 App. 290, 55 Pac. 747. 103, 40 L. ed. 356; Spokane Falls, 
 
 27. In re Evans, 42 L. J. Cb. etc., Ry. Co. v. Ziegler, 167 U. S. 
 357; Perry v. Clissold (1907), 65, 42 L. ed. 79. 
 
 A. C. 73; Andrews v. Nantasket Indian Territory. — St. Louis, 
 
 Beach R. R. Co., 152 Mass. 506, 25 etc., R. R. Co. v. Pfennighausen, 
 
 N. E. 566; Canadian Paeiflc Ry. 104 S. W. 880. 
 
 Co. V. Brown Milling & Elevator Kansas. — Burlington, etc., R. R. 
 
 Co., 18 Ont. L. Rep. 85, 15 Ann. Co. v. Johnson, ,38 Kan. 142, 16 
 
 Cas. 709. Pac. 125. 
 
 28. Hawkins v. Berkshire County Missouri. — Kinion v. Kansas 
 Commissioners, 2 Allen (Mass.) City, etc., R. R. Co., 118 Mo. 577, 
 254. 24 S. W. 636. 
 
 29. Anderson v. Pemberton, 89 Nevada. — Las Vegas, etc., R. R. 
 Mo. 61, 1 S. W. 216. Co. V. Summerfleld, 35 Nev. 229, 
 
 30. Payne v. Kansas, etc., R. R. 129 Pac. 303. 
 
 Co., 46 Fed. 546. New Mexico. — Atchison, etc., Ry. 
 
 31. Doran v. Central Paeiflc R. Co. v. Richter, 148 Pac. 478. 
 
344 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 120 
 
 All the holders of undivided interests in a parcel of land 
 taken for public use are entitled to share in the compensa- 
 tion,^^ and, in general, it may be said that the owner of any- 
 legal interest in the property,** as distinguished from a 
 remedy against it,^^ is treated as one of the owners when the 
 damages are awarded. 
 
 Although eminent domain proceedings are upon the law 
 and not the equity side of the court, equitable as well as 
 legal rights are protected by the constitution, and are prop- 
 erty in the constitutional sense.*" In the case of an express 
 trust however, it is the trustee, the holder of the legal title, 
 and not the beneficiary, who is recognized as the owner in 
 eminent domain proceedings and awarded compensation,*^ 
 
 Oklahoma. — Oklahoma City v. 
 McMaster, 12 Okla. 570, 73 Pao. 
 1012. 
 
 Oregon. — Larson v. Oregon R. R. 
 Co., 19 Ore. 240, 23 Pac. 974. 
 
 Washington. — Wendell v. Spo- 
 kane County, 27 Wash. 121, 67 Pac. 
 576, 91 Am" St. Rep. 825; Atkinson 
 V. Washington Irrigation Co., 44 
 Wash. 75, 86 Pac. 1123, 120 Am. 
 St. Rep. 978. 
 
 Ellsworth, etc., Ry. Co. v. Gates, 
 41 Kan. 574, 21 Pac. 632, holds that 
 a settler should be compensated only 
 for his expectancy. But see Spo- 
 kane Falls etc., Ry. Co. v. Ziegler, 
 167 U. S. 65, 74, 42 L. ed. 79, 82. 
 
 33. Hare v. Fort Smith, etc., R. 
 R. Co., 104 Ark. 187, 148 S. W. 
 1038; New Madrid County v. Phil- 
 Up, 125 Mo. 61, 28 S. W. 321; 
 Whitcher v. Benton, 48 N. H. 157, 
 97 Am. Dec. 697; Hill v. Glendon, 
 etc., Co., 113 N. C. 259, 18 S. E. 
 171. 
 
 34. Supra, § 118. 
 
 35. Thus it is held in Elinois 
 that the holder of an invalid tax 
 title is not entitled to any part 
 of the compensation as against the 
 true owner, although under the stat- 
 ute the owner is not entitled to 
 have the cloud on his title removed 
 
 without repaying the holder of the 
 tax title what he had paid for it. 
 Chicago V. Pick, 251 111. 594, 96 
 N. E. 539; South Park Commis- 
 sioners V. Berg, 259 111. 447, 102 
 N. E. 815; Sanitary District v. 
 Murphy, 261 111. 269, 103 N. E. 
 1001; Chicago v. Gage, 268 111. 232, 
 109 N. E. 28, 49 Natl. Corp. Rep. 
 522. The holder of a valid tax title 
 is however a necessary party. Sani- 
 tary District of Chicago v. Mun- 
 ger, 264 lU. 256, 106 N. E. 185. 
 
 36. Metropolitan West Side El. 
 Ry. Co. v. Esehner, 232 111. 210, 83 
 N. E. 809; Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. 
 V. Garrett, 239 111. 297, 87 N. E. 
 1009, 130 Am. St. Rep. 229; Sani- 
 tary District v. Hunger, 264 111. 
 256, 106 N. E. 185. 
 
 37. Alabama. — Birmingham, etc., 
 R. R. Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 152 Ala. 422, 44 So. 679. 
 
 Georgia. — Small v. Georgia, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 87 Ga. 602, 12 S. E. 694. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Davis v. Charlea 
 River Branch R. R. Co., 11 Cush. 
 506. 
 
 Montana. — Forbis v. Cannon, 35 
 Mont. 424, 90 Pac. 162. 
 
 New Jersey. — State v. Orange, 
 32 N. J. L. 49. 
 
§ 120 What Constitutes Pbopebty. 345 
 
 the compensation in such case taking the place of the land 
 and being held subject to the same trust.** When a pur- 
 chaser is in possession of land under a contract of sale and 
 has made all the payments required of him, although he 
 has not yet received a deed and his only right against the 
 land is that of requiring specific performance of the con- 
 tract in equity, he is usually considered the owner in emi- 
 nent domain proceedings and entitled to all the compensa- 
 tion.** A more difficult question arises when a contract has 
 been made for the sale of land at a certain price which is 
 less than its fair market value as subsequently fixed, and 
 the intending purchaser has made an initial payment, but 
 before the date fixed for conveyance the land is taken by 
 eminent domain. Of bourse the contract is rendered impos- 
 sible of performance and the purchaser is not entitled to 
 damages from the vendor for his failure to carry out his 
 agreement ; but it would seem that the purchaser is entitled 
 to compensation from the condemning party for the taking 
 of his equitable interest in the land,*" and, if the award is 
 greater than the contract price, the vendor should receive 
 the exact amount for which he had agreed to sell the prop- 
 erty and the purchaser should be awarded the balance. 
 
 Questions have sometimes arisen with respect to the right 
 of a married woman to share in the compensation for the 
 taking of her husband's real estate, on account of her dower 
 interest. When dower has been assigned, of course the wife 
 is to be considered owner of the land set off to her,*^ and 
 after the husband's death, but before assignment, it would 
 seem that she has such an interest in all his real estate as 
 to make her the owner of a proprietary interest in every 
 
 38. Infra, § 466. sheriff's sale has a property right 
 
 39. Infra, § 440. entitled to protection, although the 
 
 40. Atlanta v. Callaway, 137 Ga. land is taken before the execution 
 495, 73 S. E. 736; Bailey v. Osbom, of the deed. 
 
 80 N. J. L. 333, 78 Atl. 9. So, in 41. Todemier v. Aspinwall, 43 
 
 Pennsylvania Schuylkill Valley R. HI. 401; Matter of William, etc., 
 
 R. Co. V. Cleary, 125 Pa. 442, 17 Streets, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 679; 
 
 Atl. 468, 11 Am. St. Rep. 913, it York v. Welsh, 117 Pa. 174, 11 Atl. 
 
 was held that a purchaser at a 390. 
 
346 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 121 
 
 part of it.*^ But the inchoate right of dower, before the 
 husband's death, is not generally held to be such a pro- 
 prietary interest as to bring the wife within the protection 
 of the constitution, and to entitle her to have any portion 
 of the compensation paid for the land turned over to her 
 directly, or set aside for her benefit upon the contingency 
 of her surviving her husband.*' On the other hand, when 
 a husband and wife have an estate by the entirety in land 
 which is taken for the public use, the wife has an interest 
 in the property which must be paid for without awaiting 
 the event of her surviving her husband.** 
 
 § 121. Easements and Profits. 
 
 It is well settled that a private easement in real estate 
 is property in the constitutional sense,*^ and that when one 
 
 42. Todemier v. Aspinwall, 43 
 ni. 401, holds that the wife is not 
 entitled to a share in the compen- 
 sation after the hushand's death 
 and before assignment of dower 
 when part of his lands are taken 
 and enough is left so that she can 
 get her entire dower. The ease 
 eeems wrong, and in Lavery v. 
 Hutchinson, 249 111. 86, 94 N. E. 6, 
 it was held that the fund paid for 
 land was subject to the wife's right 
 of dower. When however a man 
 who has secured a divorce from his 
 wife dies and land in the possession 
 of a purchaser from his devisee is 
 condemned by a railroad, and the 
 decree of divorce is reversed on 
 writ of error, the widow is not 
 entitled to dower. Chicago, etc., 
 Ey. Co. v. Garrett, 239 HI. 297, 87 
 N. E. 1009, 130 Am. St. Eep. 229. 
 
 43. Indiana. — Duncan v. Terra 
 Haute, 85 Ind. 104. 
 
 Maine. — French v. Lord, 69 Me. 
 537. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Elynn v. Flynn, 
 171 Mass. 312, 50 N. E. 650, 42 
 L. R. A. 98, 68 Am. St. Rep. 427. 
 
 Missouri. — ^Venable v. Wabash, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 112 Mo. 103, 20 
 S. W. 493, 18 L. R. A. 68. 
 
 Montana. — Summers v. Sullivan, 
 39 Mont. 42, 101 Pac. 166. 
 
 New Tork. — Moore v. New York, 
 8 N. Y. 110, 59 Am. Dec. 473; 
 Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298, 
 13 Am. Rep. 523 (dictum). 
 
 Ohio. — Guynne v. Cincinnati, 3 
 Ohio 24, 17 Am. Dec. 576. 
 
 Virginia. — Justis v. Georgia In- 
 dustrial Realty Co., 109 Va. 366, 
 63 S. B. 1084. 
 
 But when a railroad company 
 purchases land instead of taking it 
 by eminent domain, the inchoate 
 right of dower is protected. Nye 
 V. Taunton R. R. Co., 113 Mass. 
 277. 
 
 44. Holmes v. Kansas City, 209 
 Mo. 513, 108 S. W. 9, 123 Am. St. 
 Rep. 495 ; Grosser v. Rochester, 148 
 N. Y. 235, 42 N. E. 672. In Good- 
 rich V. Otego, 216 N. Y. 112, 110 
 N. E. 162, it was held that while 
 a wife, as tenant by entirety is 
 the holder of an interest, if she 
 does not join in the proceedings 
 the husband should be paid the 
 entire award, and if they both join, 
 the award should be paid into court 
 and given to the survivor. 
 
 45. United States. — ^United States 
 V, Welch, 217 U. S. 333, 54 L. ed. 
 
§ 121 
 
 What Constitutes Peopbkty. 
 
 347 
 
 parcel of land is subject to an easement in favor of another, 
 and the former or servient tenement is taken for or devoted 
 to a public use which destroys or impairs the enjoyment of 
 the easement, the owner of the latter or dominant tenement 
 is entitled to compensation. In such a case it makes no 
 difference whether the servient tenement is taken by emi- 
 nent domain and the owner of the easement is awarded a 
 share in the compensation as one of the owners of the land, 
 or a corporation having the power of eminent domain and 
 owning or controlling the servient tenement makes a use 
 of its property destructive of the easement and the owner 
 of the easement is the only person damaged. An easement 
 is an interest in land, and it is taken in the constitutional 
 sense when the land over, which it is exercised is taken ; but 
 if it is only destroyed and ended, a destruction for public 
 
 787, 28 L. E. A. (N. S.) 385, 19 
 Ann. Cas. 680; Central Trust Co. 
 V. Hennen, 33 C. C. A. 189, 90 Fed. 
 593. 
 
 Illinois. — Lowery v. Pekin, 186 
 lU. 387, 57 N. E. 1062, 51 L. R. A. 
 301; Chicago v. Walker, 251 HI. 
 629, 96 N. E. 536. 
 
 Indiana. — Indianapolis, etc.. 
 Road Co. V. Belt Ry. Co., 110 Ind. 
 5, 10 N. E. 923; Cincinnati, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Miller, 36 Ind. App. 
 26, 72 N. E. 827. 
 
 Maine. — Lancaster v. Augusta 
 Water District, 108 Me. 137, 79 
 Atl. 463. 
 
 Maryland. — De Lauder v. Balti- 
 more County Commissioners, 94 
 Md. 1, 50 Atl. 427. 
 
 Massachusetts. — -Marsden v. 
 Cambridge, 114 Mass. 490; Onset 
 Ry. Co. V. Plymouth County Com- 
 missioners, 154 Mass. 395, 28 N. E. 
 286. 
 
 Michigan. — Detroit Leather 
 Specialty Co. v. Michigan Central 
 Ry. Co., 149 Mich. 588, 113 N. W. 
 14. 
 
 New Jersey. — Butterworth-Jud- 
 son Co. V. Central R. R. Co., 72 
 N. J. Eq. 568, 66 Atl. 198. 
 
 New York. — Arnold v. Hudson 
 River R. R. Co., 55 N. Y. 661; 
 In re Eleventh Ave., 81 N. Y. 436; 
 In re B'rookfield, 176 N. Y. 138, 
 68 N. E. 138. 
 
 North Carolina. — ^Willey v. Nor- 
 folk Southern Ry. Co., 96 N. C. 
 408, 1 S. E. 446; Moose v. Carson, 
 104 N. C. 431, 10 S. E. 689, 7 
 L. R. A. 548, 17 Am. St. Rep. 800. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Stoner v. Pitts- 
 burg, etc., R. R. Co., 229 Pa. 521, 
 79 Atl. 158; Chambersburg Shoe 
 Mfg. Co. v. Cumberland Valley R. 
 R. Co., 240 Pa. 519, 87 Atl. 968. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Johnston v. Old 
 Colony R. R. Co., 18 R. I. 642, 29 
 Atl. 594, 49 Am. St. Rep. 800. 
 
 When one owns the fee and 
 another the easement, they are the 
 owners, and entitled to the compen- 
 sation. Seton V. New York, 130 
 App. Div. (N. Y.) 148, 114 N. Y. 
 Supp. 565. 
 
348 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 121 
 
 purposes may as well be a taking as would be an appropria- 
 tion for the same end.*® To entitle the holder to compensa- 
 tion, the easement must be an enforceable one and not a 
 mere privilege enjoyed at the will of the owner of the 
 servient tenement.*'^ As a right to light and air from" 
 adjoining premises can arise in this country only from 
 actual grant, in the absence of a grant compensation based 
 on the existence of such a right "cannot be recovered.*^ 
 
 It often happens that owners of a large tract of land, 
 which they design to put into the market in lots for dwelling 
 houses, insert in the deeds of the several lots a uniform set 
 of restrictions as to the purposes for which the land may 
 be used, the portions of it which may be covered by build- 
 ings and the height and mode of construction of the build- 
 ings that may be erected upon it. So far as such restric- 
 tions are reasonable in their character, they are enforced 
 by courts of equity in favor of the original owner, so long 
 as he continues to own any part of the tract for the benefit 
 of which the restrictions were created, as well as in favor 
 of the owner of any one of the lots into which the tract was 
 divided, and against the owner of any of the lots who 
 attempts to set the restrictions at naught.*^ Such restric- 
 tions constitute equitable easements in the land restricted, 
 and when such land is taken for a public use that will violate 
 the restrictions, there is a taking of the property of the 
 owners of the land for the benefit of which the restrictions 
 were imposed. The owners of such property cannot of 
 
 46. United States v. Welch, 217 easement as to entitle its owner to 
 tr. S. 333, 54 L. ed. 787, 28 L. R. A. share in the compensation. A pre- 
 (N. S.) 385, 19 Ann. Cas. 680. scriptive right to pollute a stream 
 
 47. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. is property, Sprague v. Dorr, 185 
 Stewart, 265 lU. 35, 106 N. E. 512; Mass. 10, 69 N. E. 344, bnt not a 
 McSweeney v. Commonwealth, 185 reserved right of rafting and boat- 
 Mass. 371, 70 N. E. 429; James ing through a certain pond. 
 Frazee Milling Co. v. State, 131 Davidson v. Boston & Maine R. R., 
 N. Y. Supp. 23, 73 Misc. (N. Y.) 3 Cush. (Mass.) 91. 
 
 529. And see In re East One Hun- 48. Paine v. Boston, 4 Allen 
 
 dred and Forty-second Street, 83 (Mass.) 168. 
 
 App. Div. (N. Y.) 430, 82 N. Y. 49. Sanborn v. Rice, 129 Mass. 
 
 Supp. 445, holding that a right of 387, 396. 
 
 way by necessity is not such an 
 
§ 121 
 
 What Constitutes Peopebty. 
 
 349 
 
 course maintain proceedings for damages against the orig- 
 inal owner ^^ or enforce the restrictions against the con- 
 demning party ,®^ but they are entitled to an award of 
 compensation for the destruction of their easements.^^ 
 
 When land is conveyed by a deed which contains a refer- 
 ence to a map or plan upon which streets and ways which 
 are not public highways are marked out, it is the general 
 rule that the purchaser acquires an easement to use such 
 streets and ways, which cannot be taken from him without 
 compensation; and the use of such streets or ways by 
 public authority in such a manner as to substantially 
 deprive the purchaser of the enjoyment of his easement is 
 a taking of his property.^* If, however, the public use does 
 not interfere with the enjoyment of the existing private 
 easement, as is usually the case when a private way is taken 
 for a public street, the owner of the right of way is not 
 entitled to more than nominal damages.^* A distinction 
 
 50. Bailey v. De Crespigny, 
 L. R. 4 Q. B. 180, 15 Eng. Rul. 
 Cas. 799. 
 
 51. Kirby v. School Board for 
 Harrogate (1896), 1 Ch. 437. 
 
 52. Kirby v. School Board for 
 Harrogate (1896), 1 Ch. 437; Ladd 
 V. Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 24 N. E. 
 858, 21 Am. St. Rep. 481; Allen v. 
 Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N. W. 
 317, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 890. But 
 see United States v. Certain Lands, 
 112 Ted. 622, and infra, § 235. 
 
 53. United States. — ^United States 
 V. Certain Lands, 140 Fed. 463; 
 United States v. Certain Lands, 
 112 Fed. 622; affirmed, 83 C. C. A. 
 58, 153 Fed. 876. 
 
 Kentucky. — Elizabethtown, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Thompson, 1 Ky. L. 
 Rep. 395. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Munn v. Boston, 
 183 Mass. 421, 67 N. E. 312; Cut- 
 ter V. Boston, 200 M!ass. 400, 86 
 N. E. 798. 
 
 New York. — In re Eleventh Ave., 
 81 N. Y. 436. 
 
 North Carolina. — Moose v. Car- 
 son, 104 N. C. 431, 10 S. E. 689, 
 7 L. R. A. 548, 17 Am. St. Rep. 
 681. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Chambersburg 
 Shoe Mfg. Co. V. Cumberland Val- 
 ley R. R. Co., 240 Pa. 519, 87 Atl. 
 668, 
 
 Rhode Island. — Johnston v. Old 
 Colony R. R. Co., 18 R. I. 642, 29 
 Atl. 594, 49 Am. St. Rep. 800. 
 
 54. Clayton v. Gilmer County 
 Court, 58 W. Va. 253, 52 S. E. 
 103, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 598. 
 So in Westchester County v. 
 Wakefield Park Realty Co., 71 
 Misc. (N. Y.) 488, 129 N. Y. 
 Supp. 156, it was held that the 
 owners of easements in a dedi- 
 cated street were not entitled to 
 more than nominal damages for the 
 laying of a sewer therein. In In re 
 Avenue between Fort Washington 
 and Haven Avenues, 153 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 164, 138 N. Y. Supp. 107, 
 it was held that non-abutting own- 
 ers of private rights of way in land 
 taken for a street were not entitled 
 
350 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 121 
 
 has however been drawn in such a case between owners of 
 property abutting on the street and owners of property 
 which does not so abut. The former suffer no possible 
 damage, since the street when opened will afford all that 
 the private easement represents, and if it is discontinued 
 or obstructed they will be entitled to compensation, whereas 
 the latter, although they will not suffer while the street is 
 left open, wiU lose their right to compensation for its dis- 
 continuance, and so are in theory at least deprived of a 
 property right.®® Under ordinary conditions however, 
 when there was no evidence that a street, which had proved 
 so useful as a private way that it had been converted into 
 a public highway, was likely to be discontinued, the damages 
 for the taking of such a right would be too remote and 
 speculative to be capable of computation. 
 
 Another form of easefment which is considered property 
 in the constitutional sense is the right of way of a railroad 
 company or other public service corporation. It is well 
 settled that when land in which an easement has been taken 
 by such a corporation is taken for a different public use, 
 the corporation is entitled to compensation.®* The right of 
 an individual land-owner to participate in the enjoyment 
 of a public easement is not however a property right.®^ On 
 
 to compensation except for the dif- the public easement of navigation 
 
 ference in value of a private rigkt and of passage from the foot of the 
 
 of way and of an easement shared street to navigable waters, and 
 
 with the public. It was held how- although the easement of the street 
 
 ever in In re Beverly Road, 131 would necessarily follow any re- 
 
 App. Div. (N. T.) 147, 115 N. Y. cession of the shore line, natural 
 
 Supp. 208, that if substantial dam- or artificial (as to which see infra, 
 
 ages are awarded for laying out a § 145). 
 
 dedicated street, a nominal sum 55. In re New Ave., 67 Misc. 
 should be given to the owner who (N. Y.) 510, 123 N. Y. Supp. 344. 
 retained the fee, and the rest to the In Johnston v. Old Colony R. R. 
 abutting owners, and in Matter of Co., 18 R. I. 642, 29 Atl. 594, 49 
 City of New York, 216 N. Y. 67, Am. St. Rep. 800, it was held that 
 110 N. E. 176, that an owner of a when a private street was made 
 tract of land under navigable public and subsequently discon- 
 waters opposite the foot of a pub- tinned, the private easements re- 
 lic street was entitled to more than vived, and the holders were entitled 
 nominal damages when it was to compensation, 
 taken in fee for the extension of the 56. Infra, § 126. 
 street, although it was subject to 57. Infra, § 323. 
 
§ 121 What Constitutes Propbkty. 351 
 
 the other hand when a public highway or a public water- 
 course is devoted to a public use other than travel or trans- 
 portation, and the. fee in the soilof the highway or in the 
 bed of the watercourse is in the public, but the local sub- 
 stantive law recognizes easements of access and the like in 
 the way or stream, attached to the abutting property, the 
 owners of the easements are entitled to compensation if 
 the exercise of the easements is impaired by the new use.** 
 It almost goes without saying that when land is taken for 
 public use the owner of the fee is entitled to compensation, 
 even if it is encumbered by an easement, although if the 
 existing easement is permanent and exclusive, or the use 
 for which it is taken is no more burdensome than the exist- 
 ing easement, his damages may be but nominal. Such is 
 generally considered to be the case when a private way, 
 which numerous property owners have the easement of 
 using for all the purposes for which streets are lawfully 
 used, is subjected to the easement of a public highway.*® 
 When however a private street is taken in fee for highway 
 purposes, the owner of the fee may well be entitled to sub- 
 stantial damages, since the ownership of the fee carries 
 with it the right to prevent the use of the land for other 
 than street purposes, and may furnish the basis for the 
 
 58. Infra, §§ 140, 160, and see 131 App. Div. 147, 115 N. Y. Supp. 
 also, Pearsall v. Eaton County, 74 208; In re Schneider, 136 App. 
 Mich. 558, 42 N. W. 77, 4 L. E. A. Div. 444, 121 N. Y. Supp. Q; In re 
 193; State v. King County Court, Carroll St., 137 App. Div. 39, 121 
 26 Wash. 278, 66 Pac. 385. N. Y. Supp. 435; In re Titus St., 
 
 59. Maine.— Stetson v. Bangor, 152 App. Div. 752, 137 N. Y. Supp. 
 60 Me. 313, 73 Me. 537; Bartlett v. 817; In re Hamburger, 149 N. Y. 
 Bangor, 67 Me. 460. Supp. 173, 86 Misc. 540. In 
 
 New Hampshire. — Walker v. Walker v. Schauf {In re Decatur 
 
 Manchester, 58 N. H. 438. St.), 196 N. Y. 286, 89 N. E. 829, 
 
 New York. — Be Olean, 135 N. Y. it was said that when the fee of a 
 
 341, 32 N. E. 9, 17 L. R. A. 640; dedicated street is taken, neither 
 
 Matter of Adams, 141 N. Y. 297, the owners of the fee nor the 
 
 36 N. E. 318; Walker v. Schauf abutting owners are entitled to 
 
 {In re Decatur St.), 196 N. Y. 286, more than nominal damages, except 
 
 89 N. E. 8^9; In re Johnson Ave., in an exceptional ease, the burden of 
 
 198 N. Y. 505, 92 N. E. 1087; In re proving the existence of which rests 
 
 Grand Boulevard, 212 N. Y. 538, on the owners. 
 106 N. E. 63; In re Beverly Road, 
 
352 The Law of Eminettt Domain. § 121 
 
 recovery of compensation for injury to abutting property 
 when an additional servitude is imposed upon the land 
 within the street.*" There were some early cases of the 
 taking in fee of private streets in the city of New York in 
 which the right of the owner of the fee to substantial 
 damages was denied, principally upon the ground that 
 Manhattan Island had very early been surveyed under 
 legislative acts and a plan made of streets that would be 
 established when the growth of the city demanded it, and, 
 when a street was constructed by a private owner in 
 accordance with the plan and lots thereon sold, there was 
 an implied agreement on his part to give the land to the 
 city when the city should accept it by laying out the streets 
 as public highways.*^ In the absence of such peculiar 
 facts, it is now held in New York, as in other states, that 
 the fee of a private street is property of appreciable value, 
 which cannot be taken without compensation.®^ Even when 
 land is already subject to so permanent and exclusive an 
 easement as a public highway, the owner of the fee is 
 entitled to compensation if it is taken for a different or an 
 additional use.** 
 
 Profits a prendre, or the right to take something from a 
 piece of land, are property in the constitutional sense, and 
 the owner of the right is entitled to compensation if the land 
 
 60. Infra, §§ 151, 159. v. Nassau Electric Ry. Co., 151 
 
 61. Be Seventeenth St., 1 Wend. App. Div. 613, 136 N. Y. Supp. 
 (N. Y.) 262; Re Lewis St., 2 Wend. 375, 8 St. Ry. Rep. 726; affirmed, 
 (N. Y.) 472; Livingston v. New 210 N. Y. 607, 104 N. E. 1134; 
 York, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 85, 22 Am. Appleton v. New York, 148 N. Y. 
 Dec. 622; Champlin v. Laytin, 18 Supp. 870, 163 App. Div. 680. 
 Wend. (N. Y.) 411, 31 Am. Dec. Virgin/ia. — Richmond v. Thomp- 
 382; Be Thirty-Second St., 19 son's Heirs, 116 Va. 178, 81 S. E. 
 Wend. (N. Y.) 128; Be Twenty- 105. 
 
 Ninth St., 1 Hill (N. Y.) 189. When a street is encumbered 
 
 62. Massaohmetts. — ^Beale v. Bos- with private easements the owner of 
 ton, 166 Mass. 53, 43 N. E. 1029. the fee is not entitled to the full 
 
 New York. — ^Buffalo v. Pratt, 131 market value of the land taken. 
 
 N. Y. 293, 30 N. E. 233, 15 L. R. A. In re Edgewater Road, 199 N. Y. 
 
 413, 27 Am. St. Rep. 592; In re 560, 93 N. E. 1120. 
 
 Board of Water Supply, 73 Misc. 63. Inf^-a, §§ 151, 167, 178, 186, 
 
 231, 130 N. Y. Supp. 997; Mayne 187. 
 
§ 122 What Constitutes Peopeett. 353 
 
 upon which it is exercised is taken for the public use ; ®* but 
 a mere parole license to make use of the land is not a pro- 
 prietary interest, and the licensee is not entitled to share 
 in the compensation.®^ 
 
 § 122. Liens and Mortgages. 
 
 A lien is not a proprietary interest or an estate in the 
 land upon which it stands, but is a remedy against it, and, 
 as the legislature may constitutionally impair a remedy 
 without compensation, when land subject to a lien is taken 
 by eminent domain, the holder of the lien is not entitled to 
 be made a party, or to recover compensation from the cor- 
 poration exercising the power.®* It is however well settled 
 that the award stands in place of the land,®'^ and is subject 
 to the same liens, and that consequently a lien-holder may 
 proceed against the award upon general equitable prin- 
 ciples, and without the aid of any statute, and have his lien 
 satisfied out of the fund awarded to the owners of the legal 
 title as compensation for the land, in advance of other 
 creditors.®* The lien however must be in existence when the 
 
 64. Carville v. Commoii'wealtli, The case last cited was of a tax 
 192 Mass. 570, 78 N. E. 735; Mine lien. It has been intimated that an 
 HUl, etc., R. R. Co. v. Zerbe, 2 attaching creditor is an " owner " 
 Walk. (Pa.) 409; Dilts V. Plumville within the meaning of a statute 
 R. R. Co., 222 Pa. 516, 71 Atl. relating to eminent domain pro- 
 1072; Fox v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. ceedings. Leigh v. Green, 62 
 Co., 34 W. Va. 466, 12 S. E. 757. Neb. 344, 352, 86 N. W. 1093, 89 
 
 65. Bird v. Great Eastern Ry. Am. St. Rep. 751, 758. In Alex- 
 Co., 34 L. J. C. P. 366; Clapp v. ander v. Plattsmouth, 30 Neb. 117, 
 Boston, 133 Mass. 367. 46 N. W. 213, it was held that the 
 
 66. Indiana. — Gimbel v. Stolte, lienholder had no remedy against 
 59 Ind. 446. the condemning party when only 
 
 Kansas. — Williams v. Hutchin- part of the land was taken and the 
 
 son, etc., Ry. Co., 62 Kan. 412, 63 remainder was sufficient security 
 
 Pac. 430, 84 Am. St. Rep. 408. for the lien. 
 
 Missouri. — Ross v. Gates, 183 fe?. Mayer v. McCraoken, 245 111. 
 
 Mo. 338, 81 S. W. 1107, 551, 92 N. E. 355. 
 
 New York. — "Watson v. New 68. Illinois. — Chicago v. Gage, 
 
 York, etc., R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 157. 268 111. 232, 109 N. E. 28. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Philadelphia v. Missouri. — Ross v. Gates, 183 
 
 Dyer, 41 Pa. 463. Mo. 338, 81 S. W. 1107. 
 
 ton. — Gasaway v. Seat- Nebraska. — Omaha, etc., Ry. Co. 
 
 tie, 52 Wash. 444, 100 Pae. 991, 21 v. Reed, 69 Neb. 514, 92 N. W. 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 68. 1021, 96 N. W. 276. 
 
 23 
 
354 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 122 
 
 right to compensation vests, and when a lien comes into 
 existence after land has been damaged or a part of it has 
 been taken by eminent domain, the lien is upon the remain- 
 ing land only, and the lien holder is not entitled to resort 
 to the fund in advance of the general creditors.®^ 
 
 Upon the question whether a mortgagee who has not 
 taken possession is the owner of a proprietary interest in 
 the mortgaged land so as to be constitutionally entitled to 
 compensation when the land is taken by eminent domain, 
 the cases appear to be in hopeless conflict, but the real cause 
 of the disagreement is the difference in the substantive law 
 of the different states in regard to the nature of a mortgage. 
 At common law a mortgage conveyed a defeasible title to 
 the land mortgaged, and this rule still prevails in many 
 jurisdictions. Under such conditions the interest of the 
 mortgagee is property, and entitled to the same constitu- 
 tional protection as other property, and the mortgagee has 
 his remedy directly against the condemning party .'^'' In 
 
 New Jersey. — In re Sleeper, 62 Canada. — Dunlop v. York Town- 
 
 N. J. Eq. 67, 49 Atl. 549; Bowers ship, 16 Grant Ch. 216. 
 
 V. Bloomfleld, 81 N. J. Eq. 163, 86 Illinois.— South Park Commis- 
 
 Atl. 428, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 451. sioners v. Todd, 112 111. 379; Calu- 
 
 New York. — In re Grade Cross- met River R. R. Co. v. Brown, 136 
 
 ing Commissioners, 69 Misc. 23, 124 111. 322, 26 N. E. 501, 12 L. R. A. 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 1025. 84. 
 
 Utah. — Oregon Short Line R. R. Indiana. — Gimbel v. Stolte, 59 
 
 Co. V. Halleek, 41 Utah 378, 126 Ind. 446; Deisner v. Simpson, 72 
 
 Pae. 394. Ind. 435; Sherwood v. Lafayette, 
 
 Washington.— 'RoTth Coast Line 109 Ind. 411, 10 N. E. 89, 58 Am. 
 
 Ry. Co. V. Hess, 56 "Wash. 335, 105 Rep. 414. 
 
 Pac. 853. ' Iowa. — Sevems v. Cole, 38 Iowa 
 
 It has been held that when land is 463 ; Sawyer v. Landers, 56 Iowa 
 
 taken by a city to which taxes are 422, 9 N. W. 341. 
 
 due, the taxes may be set off from Kentucky. — Owen County v. 
 
 the award, even without special Morgan, 22 Ky. L. R. 922, 59 S. W. 
 
 statutory authority. Carpenter v. 18. 
 
 New York, 44 App. Div. (N. Y.) Maine. — Lowell v. Shaw, 15 Me. 
 
 230, 60 N. Y. Supp. 633, 51 App. 242; Wilson v. European, etc., 
 
 Div. 584, 64 N. Y. Supp. 839. R. R. Co., 67 Me. 358. 
 
 69. In re Grade Crossing Com- Maryland. — Hagerstown v. Groh, 
 missioners, 69 Misc. (N. Y.) 23, 101 Md. 560, 61 Atl. 467, 4 Ann. 
 124 N. Y. Supp. 1025. Cas. 943. 
 
 70. England. — Martin v. London, Michigan. — Michigan Air Line 
 etc., R. R. Co., L. R. 1 Eq. 145. Co. v. Barnes, 40 Mich. 383. 
 
§ 122 
 
 What Constitutes Pbopeety. 
 
 355 
 
 many other states however, it is held that a mortgage does 
 not pass the title to mortgaged land, or create any estate 
 in the mortgagee before possession is taken, but is a mere 
 security in the nature of a lien upon the land, and in such 
 states, in the absence of express statutory requirement, the 
 mortgagee need not be made a party, or be notified of the 
 proceedings, and he is not entitled to compensation from 
 the corporation taking the landJ^ It is however the law 
 in all of the states that when mortgaged property is taken 
 by eminent domain, the mortgagee's rights against the land 
 follow the award in equity, and he may, in suitable proceed- 
 ings, have the mortgage debt satisfied out of that fund in 
 
 Minnesota. — Siman v. Rhodes, 24 
 Minn. 25; Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v. 
 St. Paul, 82 Minn. 497, 85 N. W. 
 525. 
 
 Mississippi. — Stewart v. Ray- 
 mond R.-R. Co., 7 Smed. & M. 568; 
 Levee Commissioners v. Wibom, 74 
 Miss. 396, 20 So. 861. 
 
 Nebraska. — Dodge v. Omaha, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 20 Neb. 276, 29 N. W. 
 936. 
 
 New Jersey. — North Hudson R. 
 R. Co. V. Booraem, 28 N. J. Eq. 
 450; Bright v. Piatt, 32 N. J. Eq. 
 362; State v. Easton, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 36 N. J. L. 181. 
 
 New York. — Re John & Cherry 
 Sts., 19 Wend. 659; Auburn Bank 
 V. .Roberts, 44 N. T. 192; Devlin v. 
 New York, 131 N. Y. 123, 127, 30 
 N. E. 45. 
 
 Eho^e Island. — ^Warwick Savings 
 Inst. V. Providence, 12 R. 1. 144. 
 
 Texas. — Aggs v. Schackelf ord 
 County, 85 Tex. 145, 19 S. W. 1085. 
 
 Vermont. — Hagar v. Brainerd, 
 44 Vt. 302; Wade v. Hennessy, 55 
 Vt. 207. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Davis v. Lacrosse, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 12 Wis. 16; Wooster 
 V. Sugar River Valley R. R. Co., 57 
 Wis. 311, 15 N. W. 401. 
 
 So, also, in the ease of a mortgage 
 of personal property. United States 
 V. Buffalo Pitts Co., 234 U. S. 228, 
 
 58 L. ed. 1290. In Bunyan v. Pali- 
 sades Park Commissioners, 153 
 N. Y. Supp. 622, it was held that 
 the holders of the bonds of a cor- 
 poration might sue to restrain an 
 unauthorized taking of the property 
 of the corporation. In the Indiana 
 cases, siJCpra, it is held that a mort- 
 gage, although only a lien, is 
 property. 
 
 71. California. — Schumacher v. 
 Toberman, 56 Cal. 508. ' 
 
 Connecticut. — Norwich v. Hub- 
 bard, 22 Conn. 588; Whiting v. 
 New Haven, 45 Conn. 303. 
 
 Kansas. — Goodrich v. Atchison 
 County Commissioners, 47 Kan. 
 355, 27 Pac. 1006, 18 L. R. A. 113; 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Sheldon, 
 53 Kan. 169, 35 Pac. 1105. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Famsworth v. 
 Boston, 126 Mass. 1; Read v. Cam- 
 bridge, 126 Mass. 427; Wood v. 
 Westborough, 140 Mass. 413, 5 
 N. E. 613; Bates v. Boston Ele- 
 vated Ry. Co., 187 Mass. 328, 72 
 N. E. 1017, 3 St. Ry. Rep. 360. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Parish v. Gil- 
 manton, 11 N. H. 293; Ghimsey v. 
 Edwards, 26 N. H. 224. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Knoll v. New 
 York, etc., Ry. Co., 121 Pa. 467, 15 
 Atl. 571, 1 L, B. A. 366. 
 
 West Virginia. — Keystone Bridge 
 Co. V. Summers, 13 W. Va. 482. 
 
356 
 
 The Law of Eminent DoMAiifr. 
 
 § 122 
 
 advance of other creditors of the mortgagor or of an 
 assignee of the awardJ^ The matter is now generally gov- 
 erned by statute, and both mortgagor and mortgagee may 
 or must become or be made parties to the proceedings, and 
 the mortgagee is allowed to satisfy the debt out of the com- 
 pensation paid for the land, while the balance goes to the 
 mortgagor J^ Such a statute does not take away the mort- 
 gagee's equitable lien on the compensation, and such a lien 
 may be enforced in equity in spite of the foreclosure of a 
 prior mortgaged* 
 
 When only a part of the mortgaged land is taken, if the 
 mortgagee is recognized by the local law as the owner, he 
 is entitled to so much of the compensation as would be pro- 
 portionate to the value of the land taken compared with 
 
 72. England. — Martin v. London, 
 etc., E. R. Co., L. R. 1 Eq. 145. 
 
 Illinois. — Keller v. Bading, 169 
 lU. 152, 48 N. E. 436, 61 Am. St. 
 Rep. 159; Nix v. Thaekaberry, 240 
 III. 352, 88 N. E. 811. 
 
 Indiana. — Sherwood v. Lafayette, 
 109 Ind. 411, 10 N. E. 89, 58 Am. 
 Rep. 414. 
 
 Iowa. — Sawyer v. Landers, 56 
 Iowa 422. 
 
 Kansas. — Rand v. Fort Scott, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 50 Kan. 114, 31 
 Pac. 683 ; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Sheldon, 53 Kan. 169, 35 Pae. 1105. 
 
 Maryland. — Hagerstown v. Groh, 
 101 Md. 560, 61 Atl. 467, 4 Ann. 
 Cas. 943. 
 
 Massachusetts. — ^Wood v. West- 
 borough, 140 Mass. 413, 5 N. E. 
 613; Bates v. Boston Elevated Ry. 
 Co., 187 Mass. 328, 72 N. E. 1017, 
 3 St. Ey. Rep. 360. 
 
 Minnesota. — M'oritz v. St. Paul, 
 52 Minn. 409, 54 N. W. 370; Bon- 
 telle V. Minneapolis, 59 Minn. 493, 
 61 K W. 554. 
 
 Mississippi. — Levee Commission- 
 ers V. Wibom, 74 MiaB. 396, 20 So. 
 861. 
 
 Missouri. — Thompson v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 110 Mo. 147, 19 
 S. W. 77. 
 
 l\Few Jersey. — Crane v. Elizabeth, 
 36 N. J. Eq. 339. 
 
 New Tork. — ^Utter v. Richmond, 
 112 N. Y. 610, 20 N. W. 554; Gates 
 V. De La Mare, 142 N. Y. 307, 37 
 N. E. 121; In re Sehott, 145 N. Y. 
 Snpp. 18, 159 App. Div. 824; In re 
 Sea Beach Ry. Co., 148 N. Y. Snpp. 
 1080; affirmed, 121 App. Div. 907, 
 106 N". Y. Supp. 1144, 196 N. Y. 
 533, 89 N. E. 1112. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Dollar Savings 
 Fund & Trust Co. v. Bellevue, 230 
 Pa. 240, 79 Atl. 4^; In re Woods 
 Run Ave., 43 Pa. Super. Ct. 475. 
 
 Vermont. — Brooks v. Hubbard, 
 73 Vt. 122, 50 Atl. 802. 
 
 Washington. — North Coast Ry. 
 Co. V. Hess, 56 Wash. 335, 105 
 Pae. 853; In re North Ave. North, 
 78 Wash. 482, 139 Pae. 219. 
 
 73. Michigan Air Line R. R. Co. 
 V. Barnes, 40 Mich. 384. 
 
 74. Bates v. Boston El. Ry. Co., 
 187 Mass. 328, 72 N. E. 1017, 3 St. 
 Ry. Rep. 360. 
 
§ 123 What Constitutes Peopbety. 357 
 
 that remaining.^^ If the land is damaged but not taken, it 
 is generally held that, so far as the security of the mortgage 
 is impaired, the mortgagee is entitled to compensation.''® 
 In states in which the mortgage does not pass the legal 
 title, as a mortgagee cannot recover for injury to the land 
 by a private party unless his security is impaired,'''' he 
 would have no greater right in eminent domain proceed- 
 ings ; but, in the states in which the common law rule pre- 
 vails, the mortgagee, being the legal owner, is the proper 
 party to bring an action for injury to the land, although 
 the amount recovered would have to be credited on the 
 mortgage. 
 
 A similar distinction is to be noted in connection with the 
 computation of interest. When the mortgagee has the legal 
 title, a taking of the land is a taking of his estate therein, 
 and he is entitled to interest from the party making the 
 taking at the rate provided by law in eminent domain pro- 
 ceedings generally, regardless of any rate fixed in the mort- 
 gage;''® but when the mortgagee has no estate in the 
 property and his right to compensation is founded upon an 
 equitable lien upon the award, even if a statutory method 
 is provided by which he may become a party to the eminent 
 domain proceedings and collect his share in the compen- 
 sation directly from the corporation which took the land, 
 he is entitled only to such interest as is fixed in the 
 mortgage.^® 
 
 § 123. Franchises. 
 
 A franchise is a special privilege conferred by the gov- 
 ernment upon an individual or corporation which does not 
 
 75. Trustees of Schools v. Har- however In re Torchia, 185 Fed. 
 sham, 262 111. 72, 104 N. E. 235. 576. 
 
 In Stamnes v. Milwaukee, etc., Ry. 77. Lane v. Hitchcock, 14 Johns. 
 
 Co., 131 Wis. 85, 109 N. W. 100, (N. Y.) 213. 
 
 it was held that the award takes the 78. German Savings Bank v. 
 
 place of the land as regards the Dunn, 75 M'isc. (N. Y.) 251, 135 
 
 mortgage and is indivisible, cover- N. Y. Supp. 56 ; affirmed, 150 App. 
 
 ing the value of the land taken and Div. (N. Y.) 928, 135 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 the damage to the land not taken. 1114. 
 
 76. Dollar Savings Fund & Trust 79. Union Savings Institution v. 
 Co. v. Bellevue, 230 Pa. 240, 79 Atl, Boston, 129 Mass. 82, 37 Am. Eep. 
 496; In re North Avenue North, 305. 
 
 78 Wash. 482, 139 Pac. 219. See 
 
358 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 123 
 
 belong to the citizens of the country generally, by common 
 right.*" A charter of incorporation, the right to exercise 
 the power of eminent domain, or to occupy public highways 
 by land or water, are examples of the franchises that are 
 required by almost all public service enterprises.®^ Fran- 
 chises of this character have been granted with such 
 frequency, and in many cases are of such great value, that 
 it is often very important to ascertain what protection 
 the constitution has given to rights arising from such 
 franchises. 
 
 A franchise usually carries obligations as well as priv- 
 ileges, and, when accepted, constitutes a contract and is 
 protected from abrogation or amendment without the con- 
 sent of its holder by that clause of the United States con- 
 stitution which prohibits a state from passing a law 
 impairing the obligation of contracts.*^ The fact that a 
 franchise relates to the service of the public does not place 
 it in the public control so that it may be abrogated without 
 compensation.*^ Such a franchise is as fully protected by 
 the constitution as a purely private contract. A franchise 
 is also property and protected by the constitutional pro- 
 visions that apply to other property;** but unless it pos- 
 sesses the attributes of a valid contract it is not protected 
 
 80. Au^sta Bank v. Earle, 12 R. R. Co., 35 Mich. 265, 24 Am. 
 Pet. (U. S.) 519, 595, 10 L. ed. Rep. 545. 
 
 274, 311; Cedar Rapids Water Co. 84. United States. — ^Hamilton Co. 
 
 V. Cedar Rapids, 118 Iowa 234, 91 v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632, 18 
 
 N. W. 1081. L. ed. 904; Wilcox v. Consolidated 
 
 81. St. Tammany Water Works Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 53 L. ed. 
 V. New Orleans Water Works, 120 389, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1134; 
 U. S. 64, 30 L. ed. 563; California Louisville v. Cumberland Tel. & 
 V. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 127 Tel. Co., 224 U. S. 649, 56 L. ed. 
 U. S. 1, 40, 32 L. ed. 150, 157. 934. 
 
 82. Dartmouth College v. Wood- Illinois. — Belleville v. St. Clair 
 ward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 4 County Turnpike Co., 234 111. 428, 
 L. ed. 629; Binghamton Bridge, 3 84 N. E. i049. 
 
 Wall. (U. S.) 51, 18 L. ed. 137; Massacfmsetts.— Boston, etc., R. 
 
 St. Tammany Water Works v. R. Co.' v. Salem, etc., R. R. Co., 2 
 
 New Orleans Water Works, 120 Gray 1, 35. 
 U. S. 64, 30 L. ed. 563. New Yorfc.— New York Tel. Co. 
 
 83. Grand Trunk Western Ry. v. State, 154 N. T. Supp. 1059. 
 Co. V. South Bend, 227 U. S. 554, Pennsylvania. — In re Mononga- 
 57 L. ed. 633; Grand Rapids, etc., hela Water Co., 223 Pa. 323, 72 
 R. R. Co. V. Grand Rapids, etc., Atl. 625. 
 
§ 123 What Constitutes Pkopeety. 359 
 
 as property. For example, when a franchise, not exclusive, 
 has been granted and accepted, and subsequently the legis- 
 lature has gratuitously made the franchise exclusive, the 
 exclusive character of the franchise may subsequently be 
 taken away without compensation, for there was no con- 
 sideration to make the later grant a binding contract.*^ 
 Ordinary property is, of course, equally protected whether 
 acquired by descent, gift or purchase.*^ However, a fran- 
 chise, like other property, is subject to the power of eminent 
 domain, with the usual qualification that what is taken must 
 be paid for. In other words, the state may, if it sees fit 
 rescind its contract, but only by the exercise of the power 
 of eminent domain, and such rescission is a taking of prop- 
 erty in the constitutional sense, but it is not an impairment 
 of the obligation of the contract, because it recognizes the 
 obligation of the contract in awarding compensation for its 
 breach.^'^ Even when a franchise is exclusive in terms, it 
 may be taken when the public needs require it, although its 
 freedom from competition gives it an added value which 
 must be reckoned in the compensation. Unless the contrary 
 clearly appears in the franchise, it will not be held to be 
 exclusive, and the legislature may constitutionally grant to 
 other individuals the privilege of performing like acts to 
 those authorized by the franchise in such close proximity 
 thereto that the competition thereby created will impair or 
 even utterly destroy the value of the first franchise, with- 
 out compensating its holders.** As the holders of the first 
 
 85. Wheeling Bridge Co. v. 87. Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 
 Wheeling, etc., Bridge Co., 34 (U. S.) 51, 18 L. ed. 137; Enfield 
 W.Va. 155,118. E. 1009; affirmed, Toll Bridge Co. v. Hartford, etc., 
 138 U. S. 287, 34 L. ed. 967. See R. R. Co., 17 Conn. 40, 42 Am. 
 also Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Craneh Dec. 716; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 
 (U. S.) 43, 3 L. ed. 650, holding N. H. 19, 35 Am. Dec. 466; Red 
 that a state may take away the ex- River Bridge Co. v. Clarksville, 1 
 elusive feature of a franchise Sneed (Tenn.) 176, 60 Am. Dec. 
 granted by a prior government, as 143. 
 
 it was not a party to the contract. 88. Charles River Bridge v. 
 
 86. Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Craneh Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 
 (U. S.) 43, 3 L. ed. 650; Detroit v. 344; affirmed, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 420, 
 Detroit, etc., Plank Road Co., 43 9 L. ed. 773. 
 
 Mich. 148, 5 N. W. 275. 
 
360 
 
 The Law ojp Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 123 
 
 francMse have no contract with, the state that they shall 
 have a monopoly, the exclusive privileges which they have 
 been fortunate enough to enjoy before a rival is chartered 
 are not property in the constitutional sense, so that the own- 
 ers are not entitled to compensation when such privileges 
 are taken away. This rule has had frequent application to 
 a variety of cases in which corporations had received fran- 
 chises from the state,*® and permits a municipal corporation, 
 which has granted to private parties a franchise to con- 
 struct and operate waterworks or an electric light plant 
 
 89. The chartering of a toll 
 bridge does not impliedly prohibit 
 the subsequent authorization of a 
 ferry (Carrow v. Washington Toll 
 Bridge, PhiU. [N. C] 119), an- 
 other toll bridge ( Shorter v. Smith, 
 9 Gra. 524), or a free bridge 
 (Charles River Bridge v. Warren 
 Bridge, 7 Pick. [Mass.] 344, 11 
 Pet. [U. S.] 420, 9 L. ed. 773; Fall 
 T. Sutter County, 21 Cal. 237; 
 Clarksville, etc., Turnpike Co. v. 
 Montgomery County, 100 Tenn. 
 417, 45 S. W. 345, 58 L. R. A. 155; 
 Janesville Bridge Co. v. Stoughton, 
 1 Pinney [Wis.] 667), close by, 
 and a ferry charter does not pro- 
 hibit the establishment of another 
 ferry (Mills v. St. Clair, 8 How. 
 [U. S.] 569, 12 L. ed. 1201), or a 
 bridge (East Hartford v. Hartford 
 Bridge Co., 10 How. [U. S.] 511, 
 13 L. ed. 518). Exclusive rights 
 will not be implied from a turn- 
 pike franchise against other turn- 
 pikes (Hyde's Ferry Turnpike Co. 
 V. Davidson, 91 Tenn. 291, 18 
 S. W. 626), or against a railroad 
 (White River Turnpike Co. v. Ver- 
 mont R. R. Co., 21 Vt. 595), from 
 a canal franchise against a rail- 
 road (Illinois Canal Co. v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 14 111. 314), or from 
 a, railroad charter against another 
 
 railroad (Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 State, 45 Md. 611). See also, 
 
 Alabama. — Dyer v. Tuskaloosa 
 Bridge Co., 2 Port. 296, 27 Am. 
 Dec. 655. 
 
 Connecticut. — Salem, etc.. Turn- 
 pike Co. V. Lyme, 18 Conn. 451. 
 
 Illinois.- — East St. Louis Con- 
 necting Ry. V. East St. Louis Union 
 Ry., 108 111. 265. 
 
 Indiana. — Bush v. Peru Bridge 
 Co., 3 Ind. 21; Newcastle, etc., 
 R. R. V. Peru, etc., R. R., 3 Ind. 
 464; Lafayette Plank Road Co. v. 
 New Albany etc., R. R., 13 Ind. 90, 
 74 Am. Dee. 246. 
 
 Kentucky. — Richmond, etc., Turn- 
 pike Road Co. V. Rogers, 1 Duvall 
 135 ; Piatt v. Covington, etc., Bridge 
 Co., 8 Bush. 31. 
 
 Maine. — State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 
 189, 208. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Proprietors of 
 Piscataqua Bridge v. New Hamp- 
 shire Bridge, 7 N. H. 35. 
 
 New York. — Mohawk Bridge Co. 
 V. Utica, etc., R. R. Co., 6 Paige 
 554; Oswego Falls Bridge Co. v. 
 Fish, 1 Ba,rb. Ch. 547. 
 
 Vermont. — ^White River Turn- 
 pike Co. V. Vermont Central R. R., 
 21 Vt. 590, 594. 
 
 Virginia. — Tuckahoe Canal Co. 
 V. Tuckahoe, etc., R. R., 11 Leigh 
 42, 36 Am. Dec. 374. 
 
§ 123 What Constitutes Peoperty. 361 
 
 within the municipality, to itself establish similar works in 
 competition.®" 
 
 There is however nothing unconstitutional in the grant of 
 an exclusive franchise by the legislature whenever it deems 
 those about to undertake an expensive public improvement 
 deserving of such protection and encouragement.®^ Such 
 a franchise^ when supported by an obligation to perform 
 some public service as a consideration, constitutes a con- 
 tract which cannot be constitutionally rescinded by the leg- 
 islature,®^ unless the franchise authorizes the performance 
 of acts injurious to the public health, safety or morals. A 
 franchise of such a character, whatever the language of the 
 grant, is necessarily revocable, for one legislature cannot 
 bargain away the sovereign powers of the state and prohibit 
 its successors from protecting the health, safety and morals 
 of the people. An attempt to do so is beyond its powers, 
 and words of permanency in such a franchise are void and 
 cannot create a constitutional right.®^ The mere fact that 
 a franchise involves a subject affecting the public health, 
 safety or morals does not make it repealable under the 
 police power and without compensation ; ®* it is only a f ran- 
 
 90. Bienville Water Co. v. Mo- North Dakota. — Patterson v. 
 bile, 175 U. S. 109, 44 L. ed. 92; WoUmann, 5 N. D. 608, 617, 67 
 Skaneateles Waterworks Co. v. N. W. 1040. 
 
 Skaneateles, 184 U. S. 354, 46 92. Bridge Proprietors v. Ho- 
 
 L. ed. 585; Joplin v. Southwest boken Co., 1 Wall. (U. S.) 116, 17 
 
 Missouri Light Co., 191 U. S. 150, X<. ed. 571; Binghamton Bridge, 3 
 
 48 L. ed. 127. Wall. 51, 18 L. ed. 137; St. Tam- 
 
 91. United States. — ^New Orleans many Water Works v. New Or- 
 Gas Co. V. Louisiana Light Co., 115 leans Water Works Co., 120 U. S. 
 U. S. 650, 29 L. ed. 516; New Or- 65, 30 L. ed. 563; City Ry. Co. v. 
 leans Water Works Co. v. Rivers, Citizens' Ry. Co., 166 U. S. 557, 
 115 U. S. 674, 29 L. ed. 525; Louis- 563, 41 L. ed. 1114, 1117; Walla 
 ville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co., Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 
 115 U. S. 683, 29 L. ed. 510. 172 U. S. 1, 43 L. ed. 341. 
 
 Iowa. — Des Moines St. Ry. Co. 93. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 
 
 v. Des Moines, etc., St. Ry. Co., 73 U. S. 25, 24 L. ed. 989; Fertilizing 
 
 Iowa 513, 521, 33 IST. W. 610, 35 Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659, 24 
 
 N. W. 602. L. ed. 1036 ; Stone v. Mississippi, 
 
 Kentucky.— Gordon v. Winches- 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. ed. 1079. 
 
 ter, 12 Bush 110, 23 Am. Rep. 713. 94. New Orleans Gas Co. v. 
 
 .Louisiana. — Pontchartrain R. R. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, 
 
 Co. V. Orleans Nav. Co., 15 La. 662-672, 29 L. ed. 516, 521-^24. 
 Ann. 404. 
 
362 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 123 
 
 chise to perform acts injurious to the public health, safety 
 or morals that may be annulled without a violation of the 
 constitutional prohibitions against impairing the obligation 
 of contracts and taking property for public use without 
 compensation. 
 
 For the same reason that a franchise to perform acts 
 injurious to the public health, safety or morals may be 
 revoked without compensation, when a franchise is, by its 
 terms, or by the provisions of the constitution of the state, 
 or of a general law in force when it was granted, expressly 
 subject to the right of amendment, alteration or repeal by 
 the legislature, an amendment, alteration or repeal of the 
 franchise, however much pecuniary loss it may inflict upon 
 the holders of the franchise, is not a taking of their property 
 in the constitutional sense, because they had no property 
 right in an irrevocable franchise.*^ In such a case the legis- 
 lature may repeal the franchise at pleasure, for reasons, 
 good, bad or indifferent, or for no reason at all; no right 
 being infringed, the motives of the legislature are not mate- 
 rial.^® The power to alter, amend or repeal a franchise does 
 not however carry with it the power to take the property 
 of the holders of the franchise without compensation, and, 
 upon the repeal of the franchise of a public service corpora- 
 tion, the property which it has acquired and devoted to the 
 public use still belongs to it, ox if its right to exist as a 
 corporation has been taken away, belongs to its stockhold- 
 
 95. United States. — Greenwood A franchise to use the public 
 V. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13, 26 streets, given by a city to a public 
 L. ed. 961; Hamilton Gas, etc., Co. service corporation, does not en- 
 V. Hamilton, 146 U. S. 258, 36 large its right to exist as a corpo- 
 L. ed. 963; Southern Pacific R. R. ration as against an expressly re- 
 Co. V. Portland, 227 U. S. 559, 57 served power to repeal its charter, 
 L. ed. 642. even if the corporation has mort- 
 
 Massaehusetts. — Commonwealth v. gaged the franchise. Calder v. 
 
 Eastern R. R. Co., 103 Mass. 254, 4 Michigan, 218 U. S. 591, 54 L. ed. 
 
 Am. Rep. 555; Commissioners of 1163. 
 
 Inland Fisheries v. Holyoke Water 96. Greenwood v. Freight Co., 
 
 Power Co., 104 Mass. 446, 6 Am. 105 U. S. 13, 26 L. ed. 961. 
 R«p. 247. 
 
§ 123 
 
 What Constitutes Peopeety. 
 
 363 
 
 ers, and is protected by the same constitutional provisions 
 that apply to other property.®^ 
 
 When a corporation, in consideration of undertaking the 
 construction of a puBlic work, has been granted a franchise 
 which is in terms exclusive and is not expressly subject to 
 alteration, amendment or repeal, the legislature cannot 
 charter a competitor without compensating the holders of 
 the first franchise.®^ Such action on the part of the legis- 
 lature is as clearly a taking of property as direct rescission 
 of the franchise. The infringement of an exclusive fran- 
 chise, if authorized by a statute not providing compensa- 
 tion, is as if wholly unauthorized, and will be enjoined as a 
 nuisance.^® Exclusive franchises are, however, strictly con- 
 strued and never extended by implication beyond the nar- 
 rowest meaning of their words.^ Thus the exclusive charter 
 of a toll bridge for ordinary travel is not violated by the 
 erection of a railroad bridge nearby,^ and the construction 
 
 97. People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 
 1, 18 N. E. 692, 2 L. E. A. 255, 7 
 Am. St. Rep. 684; Lord v. Equi- 
 table Life Assurance Society, 194 
 N. Y. 212, 87 N. E. 443. 
 
 98. United States. — Bridge Pro- 
 prietors V. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 
 116, 17 L. ed. 571; Binghamton 
 Bridge, 3 Wall. 51, 18 L. ed. 137; 
 New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana 
 Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, 29 L. ed. 
 516; Camblos v. Philadelphia, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 4 Eed. Cas. 1101. 
 
 Alabama. — Birmingham, etc., St. 
 Ry. Go. V. Birmingham St. Ry. 
 Co., 79 Ala. 465, 470, 53 Am. Rep. 
 615. 
 
 Connecticut. — Enfield Toll Bridge 
 Co. V. Hartford, etc., R. R. Co., 17 
 Conn. 40, 42 Am. Dee. 716. 
 
 Maine.— State v. Noyes, 47 M'e. 
 198, 208. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Boston, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Salem, etc., R. R. Co., 2 
 Gray 1. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Piseataqua 
 
 Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge, 
 7 N. H. 35. 
 
 New Jersey. — -Raritan, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Delaware, etc., Canal Co., 
 18 N. J. Eq. 546. 
 
 99. Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Salem, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Gray 
 (Mass.) 1. 
 
 1. Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 
 (U. S.) 51, 18 L. ed. 137; Stein v. 
 Bienville Water Supply Co., 141 
 U. S. 67, 35 L. ed. 622; Syracuse 
 Water Co. v. Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 
 167, 22 N. E. 381, 5 L. R. A. 546; 
 Memphis, etc., Gas Co. v. William- 
 son, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 326. 
 
 2. United States. — Bridge Pro- 
 prietors V. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 
 116, 17 L. ed. 571, aflarming 13 
 N. J. Eq. 81. 
 
 Georgia. — McLeod v. Savannah, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 25 Ga. 445. 
 
 Nevada.' — Lake v. Virginia, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 7 Nev. 294. 
 
 New Jersey. — ^Attorney-General 
 V. Delaware, etc., R. R. Co., 24 
 N. J. Eq. 1, 
 
364 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 123 
 
 of a railroad is not an infringement of the exclusive fran- 
 chise of a turnpike.^ A franchise granted by a municipality 
 to a private water company in which the former agreed not 
 to charter any other corporation to supply water within its 
 limits does not prevent the municipality from establishing 
 waterworks itself.* 
 
 Private parties cannot create a franchise. A franchise, 
 in order to constitute a property right in the constitutional 
 sense, must have been granted by the sovereign or its dele- 
 gated agents.^ A contract giving one public service corpo- 
 ration the exclusive privilege of maintaining its works upon 
 a certain tract of land creates no property right that the law 
 will recognize when enforcing the exercise of eminent 
 domain over the same land in behalf of another corporation.® 
 
 New York. — Thompson v. New 
 York, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Sand. Ch. 
 625. 
 
 North Carolina. — McRee v. Wil- 
 mington, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Jones L. 
 186. 
 
 Contra, Enfield Toll Bridge Co. 
 V. Hartford, etc., R. R. Co., 17 
 Conn. 40, 42 Am. Dee. 716. 
 
 The erection of a railroad bridge 
 is not a violation of a restriction 
 against ferries in the charter of a 
 toll bridge. Mohawk Bridge Co. v. 
 Utica, etc., R. R. Co., 6 Paige 
 (N. Y.) 554, 564. 
 
 A ferry it has been held is not a 
 violation of the exclusive franchise 
 of a toll bridge (Parrott v. Law- 
 rence, 2 DUl. (U. S.) 332, I'ed. 
 Cas. No. 10,772), and the grantee 
 of an exclusive franchise of a toll 
 bridge has no right to prevent the 
 public 'from using natural fords 
 (Wright V. Morris, 43 Ark. 193; 
 Compton V. Waco Bridge Co., 62 
 Tex. 715), but under a constitu- 
 tion requiring compensation for 
 damage a toll bridge is in viola- 
 tion of an exclusive ferry fran- 
 chise (Mason v. Harper's Ferry 
 Bridge Co., 17 W. Va. 412). 
 
 3. Bordentown, etc., Turnpike 
 
 Co. V. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., 17 
 N. J. L. 314. A steam railroad's 
 exclusive franchise is not infringed 
 by a horse railway on the same 
 street (Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Louisville City Ry. Co., 2 Duv. 
 [Ky.] 175), but a " dummy" street 
 railway infringes the privileges of 
 a horse railway in the same street 
 (Denver, etc., R. R. Co. v. Denver 
 City Ry. Co., 2 Col. 673); but a 
 cable road, it has been held, does 
 not (Omaha, etc., Ry. Co. v. Cable, 
 etc., Ry. Co., 30 Fed. 328). 
 
 4. KnoxvUle Water Co. v. Knox- 
 ville, 200 U. S. 22, 50 L. ed. 353. 
 
 5. Aug^ista Bank v. Earle, 13 
 Pet. (U. S.) 519, 595, 10 L. ed. 
 274, 311, and see also Lloyd v. 
 Loaring, 6 Ves. 773; Austin v. 
 Searing, 16 N. Y. 112, 69 Am. Dec. 
 665. Of course private parties 
 may create " franchises " which will 
 be valid among themselves, as in 
 the case of mutual benefit orders, 
 base-ball associations and the like. 
 
 6. United States. — ^Western Union 
 Tel. Co. V. American Union Tel. 
 Co., 9 Biss. 72, 1 Am. Elect. Cas. 
 288; Western Union Tel. v. Bur- 
 lington, etc., Ry. Co., 11 Fed. 1, 
 1 Am. Elect. Cas. 402; Western 
 
§ 123 What Constitutes Pbopebty. 365 
 
 If an individual owning, for example, the whole of a moun- 
 tain pass constituting the only practicable means of com- 
 muiiication between two populous regions, should convey a 
 right of way through the pass to a railroad corporation,, 
 and covenant that no other railroad should pass over his 
 land, and subsequently another railroad should take a loca- 
 tion through the pass by eminent domain, the first railroad 
 would not be entitled to compensation for the infringement 
 of its monopoly. Similarly a railroad company cannot, by 
 giving to one telegraph company the exclusive privilege of 
 constructing and maintaining its line along the railroad 
 location, impair or affect the right of another telegraph 
 company to acquire a similar privilege by the exercise of 
 eminent domain. Contracts attempting to create such priv- 
 ileges are held void as against public policy, though if not 
 aimed specifically against a taking of land for public use 
 they might create valid restrictions for the destruction of 
 which the owners would be entitled to compensation, to be 
 deducted from the amount paid to the owner of the f ee.'^ 
 
 Union Tel. Co. v. Baltimore, etc., Kentucky. — Calor Oil & Gas Co. 
 
 Tel. Co., 19 Fed. 660, 1 Am. Elect. v. FranzeU, 128 Ky. 715, 109 S. W. 
 
 Cas. 623; Western Union Tel. Co. 328, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 456. 
 
 V. Baltimore, etc., Tel. Co., 23 Fed. Minnesota.— Kettle River R. R. 
 
 12, 1 Am. Elect. Cas. 721 ; Balti- Co. v. Eastern R. R. Co., 41 Minn. 
 
 more, ertc, Tel. Co. v. Western 451, 43 N. W. 469, 6 L. R. A. 111. 
 
 Union Tel. Co., 24 Fed. 319, 1 Am. Mississippi.— Moh^e, etc., R. R. 
 
 Elect. Cas. 677; Grand Rapids ^o. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 76 
 
 Electric Light & Power Co. v. j^jgg_ 73^^ 745^ 26 So, 370, 45 
 
 Grand Rapids, etc.. Gas Co., 33 L R A 223 
 
 Fed 659 2 Am^ fleet Cas 152; ' ^'^ Mexic'o.-Umon Trust Co. 
 
 Pacific Postal Tel Cable Co v. ^_ p^^^j j,^^ ^.^^^ ^ g j^_ ^^ 
 
 Western Unxon Tel Co 50 Fed. ^3 p^^_ ^ ^_ ^ 
 
 493, 4 Am. Elect. Cas. 232; Mer- ' ' 
 
 cantile Trust Co. v. Atlantic, etc., ' _.. . . .^ , .^. . . 
 
 Tel. Co., 63 Fed. 910, 5 Am. Elect. ^««* Virgmm.-West Virgmia 
 
 Cas. 207; United States v. Certain transportation Co v 0,^^^ ^^^^^ 
 
 Lands, 112 Fed. 622. Co., 22 W. Va. 600, 46 Am. Rep. 
 
 Alabama. — New Orleans, etc., R. "^'^ 
 
 R. Co. V. Southern, etc., Tel. Co., See also Beasley v. Texas, etc., 
 
 53 Ala. 211, 1 Am. Elect. Cas. 190. R- R. Co., 191 U. S. 492, 48 L. ed. 
 
 Georgia. — ^Western Union Tel. 274. 
 
 Co. V. American Union Tel. Co., 65 7. Infra § 235. 
 Ga. 160, 38 Am. Rep. 781, 1 Am. 
 Elect. Cas. 306. 
 
366 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 124 
 
 § 124. Good-WiU. 
 
 An established business or what is called " good- will " 
 has never been held to be by itself property in the constitu- 
 tional sense.* No doubt it may be an added element of value 
 to a particular piece of land taken, but a business is less 
 tangible in nature and more uncertain in its vicissitudes 
 than the rights which the constitution undertakes absolutely 
 to protect, and although in some cases the destruction of an 
 established business works a much greater hardship than 
 many injuries for which the constitution makes compensa- 
 tion necessary, the diminution of its value is considered a 
 vaguer injury than the taking or appropriation with which 
 the constitution deals. A business might be destroyed by 
 the construction of a more popular street into which travel 
 was diverted or by a change in the location of a railroad 
 station, a subway entrance, or even a transfer point for 
 street cars, as well as by competition, but there would be 
 as little claim in the one case as in the other.^ 
 
 The case stands no differently when the business is 
 destroyed by taking the land on which it was carried on,^* 
 and it is well settled that when land occupied for business 
 
 8. Good- will is generally held Rev. 135), it may be made by ap- 
 property in matters of private law. propriate legislation subject to tax- 
 It is regarded as proper subject- ation as property. Adams Express 
 matter for a sale or bequest (How- Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 
 ard V. Taylor, 90 Ala. 241, 8 So. U. S. 185, 41 L. ed. 965; Bank of 
 36; Canham v. Jones, 2 Ves. & B. California v. San IVaneiseo, 142 
 218), and it has been held to be an Cal. 276, 75 Pac. 832. See also 
 asset of a partnership (Cooke v. San Francisco National Bank v. 
 Collingridge, 27 Beav. 456), and as Dodge, 197 U. S. 70, 49 L. ed. 669.. 
 an asset available in the hands of 9. Stanwood v. Maiden, 157 
 a trustee in bankruptcy (46 & 47 Mass. 17, 31 N. E. 702, 16 L. R. A. 
 Vict. c. 52, § 56). It has been con- 591, and see also supra, § 115, and 
 sidered as property within the infra, § 323. 
 
 terms of a statute regulating the 10. Sawyer v. Commonwealth, 
 issue of stock of a corporation 182 Mass. 245, 65 K E. 52, 59 
 (Washburn V. National Wall Paper L. R. A. 726: The Massachusetts 
 Co. 81 Fed. 17). Although it is constitution ,provides for a jury 
 not "property" within the terms trial in all "controversies concem- 
 of a statute taxing "all property ing property." A statute author- 
 within the jurisdiction" (Hart v. izing the taking of certain lands 
 Smith, 159 'ind. 182, 64 N. E. 661, provided compensation for injury 
 58 L. B. A. 949" XVI Harvard L. to an established business carried 
 
§ 124 
 
 What Cokstitutes Pbopebty. 
 
 367 
 
 purposes is taken by eminent domain, the owner or occu- 
 pant is not entitled to recover compensation for the destruc- 
 tion of his business or the injury thereto by its necessary 
 removal from its established location." When however a 
 business is directly taken over by the public, as when the 
 plant of a public service corporation is acquired by a city or 
 town to be operated under municipal control, the plant is 
 valued as a going concern, and the good-will, so far as it 
 adds value to the franchise and other property, is included 
 in the award of compensation/^ 
 
 In recent years the increasing demand for an adequate 
 water supply for some of the larger cities has made it nec- 
 essary to construct immense reservoirs, in some cases wip- 
 ing out of existence whole towns and villages. Of course 
 the owners were compensated for their land, but in many 
 
 on thereon. It w£is held that a 
 proceeding to assess damages for 
 injury to a buisness was not a 
 " controversy concerning prop- 
 erty" and might be tried without 
 a jury. So also it was held in 
 Hudson River Tel. Co. v. New 
 York, 210 N. Y. 394, 104 N. E. 
 935, under a similar statute that 
 interest would not be allowed on an 
 award for damage to an established 
 business. 
 
 11. California. — Oakland v. Pa- 
 cific Coast Lumiber & Mill Co., 153 
 Pac. 705. 
 
 Georgia. — Pause v. Atlanta, 98 
 Ga. 92, 26 S. E. 489, 58 Am. St. 
 Rep. 290. 
 
 Missouri. — St. Louis v. St. Louis 
 etc., Ry. Co., 172 S. W. 750, 755. 
 
 New York. — New York Tel. Co. 
 V. State, 154 N. Y. Supp. 1059. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Becker v. Phila- 
 delphia, etc., R. R. Co., 177 Pa. 252, 
 35 Atl. 617, 35 L. R. A. 583; Ham- 
 ilton V. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 
 190 Pa. 51, 42 Atl. 369, 51 L. R. A. 
 319; Philadelphia Ball Club v. 
 Philadelphia, 192 Pa. 632, 44 Atl. 
 265, 46 L. R. A. 724, 73 Am. St. 
 Rep. 835 ; Cox v. Philadelphia, etc., 
 
 R. R. Co., 215 Pa. 506, 64 Atl. 729, 
 114 Am. St. Rep. 979. 
 
 Virginia. — Fitzhugh v. Chesa- 
 peake & Ohio Ry. Co., 107 Va. 158, 
 59 S. E. 415, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 124. 
 
 And see also infra, § 229. 
 
 12. Infra, § 223, and see on the 
 general subject of this section 
 
 England. — Ricket v. Metropoli- 
 tan Railway Co., L. R. 2 H. L. 175; 
 Metropolitan Board of Works v. 
 McCarthy, L. R. 7 H. L. 243. 
 
 Missouri. — St. Louis, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Knapp, etc., Co., 160 Mo. 
 396, 61 S. W. 300. 
 
 New Hampshire. — In re Mt. 
 Washington Road Co., 35 N. H. 
 134, 147. 
 
 New Jersey. — State v. Chapman, 
 69 N. J. L. 464, 55 Atl. 94; Phila- 
 delphia, etc., Ferry Co. v. Inter- 
 City Link R. R. Co.; 77 N. J. L. 
 616, 72 Atl. 1119. 
 
 New York. — Coster v. Albany, 
 43 N. Y. 399. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — In re Race St., 
 24 Pa. Co. Ct. 433. 
 
 South Carolina. — Fuller v. Ed- 
 ings, 11 Rich. Law 239; Eddings 
 V. Seabrook, 12 Rich. Law 504. 
 
368 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 125 
 
 instances persons wko had built up an established business 
 in the towns thus destroyed were deprived of their means 
 of livelihood, without any redress being afforded by the 
 general laws. While such persons had no constitutional 
 right to compensation, the legislatures of Massachusetts 
 and New York in the case of takings of this character made 
 special provision for the payment of damages for the 
 destruction of an established business. These statutes were 
 liberally construed, and the right to compensation was not 
 limited to the destruction of purely mercantile occupations.^^ 
 
 § 125. Knowledge, Labor and Offices. 
 
 The peculiar knowledge of a scientific or professional, 
 expert is not property in the constitutional sense, and such 
 a person can be obliged, when summoned as a witness, to 
 answer hypothetical questions without greater compensa- 
 tion than ordinary witnesses receive." "Witnesses who are 
 acquainted with the facts of a controversy may be compelled 
 to attend court and testify, even without any fees what- 
 ever.^^ In some jurisdictions it is held that the services of 
 an attorney can be called on without compensation, and he 
 
 Wisconsin. — Stadler v. Milwau- 14. Arkansas. — Flinn v. Prairie 
 
 kee, 34 Wis. 98. County, 60 Ark. 204, 29 S. W. 459, 
 
 13. The statutes were held to ap- 27 L. E. A. 669, 46 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 ply to a doctor (Earle v. Common- 168. 
 
 wealth, 180 Mass. 579, 63 K B. 10, Colorado.— La.rimer County Com- 
 
 57 L. R. A. 292, 91 Am. St. Rep. missioners v. Lee, 3 Col. App. 177, 
 
 326 ; In re Board of Water Supply, 32 p^c. 841. 
 
 142 N. Y. Supp. 83, 81 Misc. /ZZmois.- Dixon v. People, 168 
 
 [N. T.] 19), and to a farmer who -^ ^79^ 43 ^_ j, -^^^^ 39 j^ ^_ ^_ 
 
 sold his produce (Allen v. Com- ^ig 
 
 monwealth, 188 Mass. 59, 74 N. E. ,',. . q^ j.„ rr ■ 00 
 
 narr an f -D A Knn\ j <• „ Mtnnesoto. — State V. Teipner, 36 
 
 287, 69 L. R. A. 599), and to a ,,. ^„. „„ t.t ™. „„„ ^ ' 
 
 , ',. , 1 ,T, , Minn. 535, 32 N. W. 678. 
 
 boarding-house keeper (People ex _ ' „ t^i ^ - 
 
 7 Tj I, -KT V 1 ina Texas. — Summers v. State, 5 
 
 rel. Bruhans v. New York, 198 " """=' 
 
 N. Y. 439, 92 N. E. 18 ; In re Board ^^f- ^PP" ^"^^ .^ 
 
 of Water Supply, 81 Misc. [N. Y.J 1^. Ex pwrte Dement, 53 Ala. 
 
 19, 142 N. Y. Supp. 83), but not 389, 25 Am. Rep. 611; Bennett v. 
 
 to a woman who kept occasional Kroth, 37 Kan. 235, 15 Pac. 221, 
 
 boarders (Gavin v. Commonwealth, 1 Am. St. Rep. 248; State v. Hen- 
 
 182 Mass. 190, 65 N. E. 37). As ley, 98 Tenn. 665, 41 S. W. 352, 
 
 to the measure of damages in such 1104, 39 L. R. A. 126. 
 
 cases, see infra, § 229. 
 
§ 125 What Constitutes Property. 369 
 
 can be required to defend a criminal gratuitously,^" and 
 although it is customary to pay an attorney for such serv- 
 ices, he rarely is paid the fair market value of the work that 
 he performs. In England and in some of the older states 
 in America, members of a municipal corporation may be 
 compelled to accept municipal offices, even without compen- 
 sation," and citizens may be obliged to serve as jurors on 
 similar terms.*^ 
 
 Labor is not property in the constitutional sense. The 
 power of the state to require all able-bodied citizens to 
 work upon the public roads on certain number of days in 
 each year without compensation has been exercised from 
 time immemorial and is still exercised in many of the states 
 and violates no constitutional right of the persons whose 
 labor is thus conscripted.^*^ 
 
 A public office and the salary and fees in prospect are not 
 property in the constitutional sense.'* Even when an office 
 has been lawfully purchased in perpetuity under existing 
 laws, it may be confiscated without compensation.*** 
 
 16. Vise V. Hamilton County, 19 Okla., Crim. Rep. 413, 101 Pao. 
 lU. 78; Wright v. State, 3 Heisk. 1092. 
 
 (Tenn.) 256. Contra, Clay County See also 1 Bl. Com. 357. 
 
 V. McGregor, 171 Ind. 634, 87 19. ZZZmois.— People v. Eapley, 
 
 N. E. 1. 171 lU. 44, 49 N. E. 229, 41 L. R. A. 
 
 17. See for example, St. 45 and 775. 
 
 46 Viet. e. 50, § 34 and Mass. Rev. Michigan. — Attomey-General v. 
 
 Laws, c. 25, § 97, and see supra § IS. JocMm, 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 611, 
 
 18. Neely v. State, 4 Baxt. 23 L. R. A. 699, 41 Am. St. Rep. 
 (Tenn.) 175. 606. 
 
 18a. United States. — Butler v. Nebraska. — State v. Houston, 94 
 
 Perry, 240 U. S. 328, affirming 67 Neb. 445, 143 N. W. 796, 50 L. R. A. 
 
 Ela. 405, 66 So. 150. (N. S.) 227. 
 
 Illinois. — Sawyer v. Alton, 4 111. Pennsylvania. — Commonwealth v. 
 
 127. Moir, 199 Pa. 534, 49 Atl. 351, 53 
 
 Kansas.— In re Dassler, 35 Kan. L. R. A. 837, 85 Am. St. Rep. 801. 
 
 678, 12 Pac. 130. ' West Virginia.— Moore v. Strick- 
 
 North Carolina.— StiAe v. Halifax ling, 46 W. Va. 515, 33 S. E. 274, 
 
 Commissioners, 15 N. C. 345 ; State 50 L. R. A. 279. 
 
 V. Wheeler, 141 N. C. 773, 53 S. E. Contra.— Malone v. Williams, 118 
 
 358. Tenn. 390, 462, 103 S. W. 798, 121 
 
 Ohio.— Dennis v. Simon, 51 Ohio Am. St. Rep. 1002, 1042. 
 
 St., 233, 36 N. E. 832. 20. Sanchez v. United States, 216 
 
 Oklahoma.— State v. Raybum, 2 U. S. 167, 54 L. ed. 432. 
 
 24 
 
370 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain, 
 
 § 126 
 
 § 126. Property of Public Service Corporations. 
 
 It was at first contended that when a private corporation 
 had acquired an easement in private land by the exercise 
 of eminent domain and had devoted to the public use the 
 land thus appropriated, such a corporation was not entitled 
 to compensation if the legislature should require the same 
 property to be devoted to a different public use ; but it was 
 almost universally held that, while in such a case the ease- 
 ment is in a sense a public easement since it was established 
 for the public use, which alone justifies the exercise of emi- 
 nent domain, it is none the less the private property of the 
 corporation which advanced the money to pay for the appro- 
 priation of the easement, and that consequently none of the 
 land upon which such an easement was exercised could be 
 taken for a different public use, or for a use to be exercised 
 by a different body, without just compensation to the corpo- 
 ration which held the easement.^^ In other words, the right 
 
 21. United States. — Chicago, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 
 41 L. ed. 979; Western Union Tel. 
 Co. V. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 195 
 U. S. 540, 49 L. ed. 312, 1 Ann. 
 Cas. 517; Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 6 Biss. 
 158, 1 Am. Elect. Cas. Ill; ElMns 
 Electric Ry. Co. v. Western Mary- 
 land R. R. Co., 108 C. C. A. 557, 
 186 Fed. 1022, affirming 163 Fed. 
 724. 
 
 Alabama. — Memphis, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Birmingham, etc., R. R. Co., 
 96 Ala. 571, 11 S. E. 642, 18 
 L. R. A. 166; Mobile, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. LouisviUe, etc., R. R. Co., 
 68 So. 905. 
 
 Connecticut. — New York, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. New Haven, 81 Conn. 
 581, '71 Atl. 780. 
 
 Georgia. — Southwestern R. R. 
 Co. V. Southern, etc., Tel. Co., 46 
 Ga. 43, 12 Am. Rep. 585; Georgia 
 R. R., etc., Co. V. Union Point, 119 
 Ga. 809, 47 S. E. 183; Poulan v. 
 Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 123 
 Ga. 605, 61 S. E. 657. 
 
 Illinois. — Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Chicago, 149 111. 457, 37 N. E. 
 78; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Cicero, 154 Ul. 656, 39 N. E. 574; 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Mat- 
 toon, 161 111. 247, 43 N. E. 1100; 
 People ex rel. Peeler v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 262 111. 492, 104 
 N. E. 831, L. R. A. 1915 B 486. 
 
 Indiana.— Crosslej v. O'Brien, 24 
 Ind. 325, 87 Am. Dec. 329; Terra 
 Haute V. Evansville, etc., R. R. Co., 
 149 Ind. 174, 46 N. E. 77, 37 
 L. R. A. 189. 
 
 Kansas. — Kansas Central R. R. 
 Co. V. Jackson County Commission- 
 ers, 45 Kan. 716, 26 Pac. 394. 
 
 Kentucky. — Louisville, etc., B. 
 R. Co. V. Louisville, 122 S. W. 849. 
 
 Maine. — Canadian Pacific Ry. 
 Co. V. Moosehead Tel. Co., 106 Me. 
 363, 76 Atl. 885, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 703, 20 Ann. Cas. 721. 
 
 Maryland. — Baltimore v. Cowen, 
 88 Md. 447, 41 Atl. 900, 71 Am. 
 St. Rep. 443. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Eastern R. R. 
 Co. V. Boston & Maine R. R., Ill 
 
§ 126 
 
 What Constitutes Peopebty. 
 
 371 
 
 of way of a railroad or other public service corporation, 
 when laid out over private land, is " property " in the con- 
 stitutional sense, and the corporation owning it is entitled 
 to compensation when a highway, a canal or another rail- 
 road is laid out by public authority across it, or a telegraph 
 line along it.^^ Even when the power to alter, amend or 
 repeal the charter of a corporation is expressly reserved, 
 although the corporation may be put to considerable pecun- 
 iary loss or expense by the exercise of such power without 
 any right to compensation arising, it is well settled that 
 such reserved power does not include the right to take with- 
 out compensation property of the corporation lawfully 
 acquired and held by it.*** 
 
 Mass. 125, 15 Am. Rep. 13 ; Boston 
 & Albany R. R. Co. v. Cambridge, 
 159 Mass. 283, 34 N. E. 382. 
 
 Michigan. — Grand Rapids, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Grand Rapids, etc., R. 
 R. Co., 35 Mich. 265, 24 Am. Rep. 
 545; People v. Detroit, etc., Ry. 
 Co., 79 Mich. 475, 44 N. W. 934, 7 
 L. R. A. 717. 
 
 Minnesota. — St. Paul, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Minneapolis, 35 Minn. 141, 
 27 N. W. 500; State v. St. Paul, 
 etc.,- Ry. Co., 98 Minn. 380, 108 
 N. W. 261, 120 Am. St. Rep. 581. 
 
 Missouri. — Hook v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 133 Mo. 313, 34 S. W. 
 549; St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Gordon, 157 Mo. 71, 57 S. W. 742. 
 
 Nebraska. — Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Douglas County, 1 Neb. Un- 
 off. 247, 95 N. W. 339; Missouri 
 Pacific R. R. Co. v. Cass County, 
 76 Neb. 396, 107 N. W. 773. 
 
 New Jersey. — State, New York, 
 etc., R. R. Co., Prosecutor, v. Cap- 
 ner, 49 N. J. L. 555, 9 Atl. 751; 
 Morris, etc., R. R. Co. v. Orange, 
 63 N. J. L. 252, 43 Atl. 730, 47 
 Atl. 363. 
 
 New Yorfc.— New York Tel. Co. 
 V. State, 154 N. Y. Supp. 1059. 
 
 North Dakota. — Grafton v. St. 
 Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 16 N. D. 313, 
 
 113 N. W. 598, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 1, 15 Ann. Cas. 10. 
 
 Ohio. — Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. 
 V. Ohio Postal Tel. Cable Co., 68 
 Ohio St. 306, 67 N. E. 890, 62 
 L. R. A. 941; Cincinnati, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Troy, 68 Ohio St. 510, 67 
 N. E. 1051. 
 
 Oklahoma. — Southern Kansas 
 Ry. Co. V. Oklahoma City, 12 Okla. 
 82, 69 Pac. 1050. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Keim V. Phila- 
 delphia, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. 149. 
 
 Tennessee. — Dyer County v. 
 Chesapeake, etc., R. R. Co., 87 
 Tenn. 712, 11 S. W. 943. 
 
 Virginia. — Tuckahoe Canal Co. 
 V. Tuckahoe R. R. Co., 11 Leigh 
 42, 36 Am. Dec. 374. 
 
 West Virginia. — ^Wellsbury, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Panhandle Traction 
 Co., 56 W. Va. 18, 48 S. E. 746. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Milwaukee, 97 Wis. 418, 72 
 N. "W. 1118; Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. 
 V. Fair Oaks, 140 Wis. 334, 122 
 N. W. 810. 
 
 22. For the measure of damages 
 in cases of this character see infra, 
 §§ 242-245 inc. 
 
 23. United States. — Shields v. 
 Ohio, 95 U. S. 319, 24 L. ed. 357; 
 
372 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 126 
 
 The only dissent from this principle is found in New 
 York. In that state it is held that, inasmuch as the title 
 of a public service corporation to its location is limited to 
 use for the purposes of its franchise, and as its franchise 
 is by special constitutional provision subject to alteration 
 and amendment without compensation, the title of such a 
 corporation to its location can also be altered or amended 
 without there being a taking of property in the constitu- 
 tional sense.^* Even in New York however, the right to 
 take the property of a public service corporation without 
 compensation does not extend beyond the right to make use 
 of such property concurrently with the corporation holding 
 it, and when the property of a public service corporation is 
 taken for a purpose which will prevent the use of the prop- 
 erty for the purpose for which it was held, the corporation 
 owning it is entitled to compensation.^' 
 
 While in other jurisdictions the concurrent use of the 
 property of a public service corporation is a taking, when 
 such a corporation owns only an easement in the land which 
 it occupies the imposition of another easement upon the 
 same land which does not interfere with the complete and 
 undisturbed enjoyment of the original easement, although 
 it may constitute a taking of the property of the owner of 
 the fee, as it is not an invasion, destruction or use of the 
 easement, is not a taking of the property of the first corpo- 
 
 Greenwood v. Union Freight R. E. Ohio. — State v. Neff, 52 Ohio St. 
 
 Co., 105 U. S. 13, 26 L. ed. 961. 375, 40 N. E. 720, 28 L. R. A. 409. 
 
 Massachusetts.— Commonweahhy. Wisconsin.— Staie ex rel. Wau- 
 
 Essex Co., 13 Gray 239. sau St. Ry. Co. v. Bancroft, 148 Wis. 
 
 ilficM^a^.- Detroit v. Detroit & 124, 134 N. W. 330, 38 L. R. A. 
 
 HoweU Plank Road Co., 43 Mieh. °26. „ „ „ 
 
 148, 5 N. W. 275. ^^ ^^"To^t^^^^' ^^ ^°- 
 
 ' A I. 1^ Tj V. Brownell, 24 N. Y. 345. 
 
 Nem Bampshwe.- Asimeldb R. 25. Albany Northern R. R. Co. v. 
 
 R. Co. V. Elliot, 52 N. H. 387, 58 Brownell, 24 N. Y. 345; Boston & 
 
 N. H. 451; Opinion of the Jus- Albany R. R. Co. v. Greenbush, 52 
 
 tices, 66 N. H. 629, 641, 33 Atl. n. y. 510; Delaware & Hudson 
 
 1076. Canal Co. v. Whitehall, 90 N. Y. 
 
 New York. — Lord v. Equitable 21; People ex rel. Buffalo v. New 
 
 Life Assurance Society, 194 N. Y. York Central, etc., R. R. Co., 156 
 
 212, 87 N. E. 443. N. Y. 570, 51 N. E. 312. 
 
§ 127 What Constitutes Peopeety. 373 
 
 ration in the constitutional sense,^® and if there is an inter- 
 ference with the original use, there is a taking only to the 
 extent of such interference.^'' 
 
 It is also to be remembered that a public service corpora- 
 tion, and especially a railroad corporation, is peculiarly 
 subject to regulation under the police power, and may be 
 compelled to submit to uncompensated interference to a 
 much greater extent than private individuals,^* The action 
 of the state authorities in compelling a public service corpo- 
 ration to destroy or alter at its own expense structures 
 which it has lawfully erected, when the continued existence 
 of such structures endangers the public health or safety, ia 
 not the taking of the property of such a corporation in 
 the constitutional sense.^' So also, while a public service 
 corporation cannot be compelled to allow another such 
 corporation to use its structures and right of way without 
 compensation, it may be compelled to make a physical con- 
 nection with the structure of another corporation so that 
 the patrons of such corporation may make use thereof upon 
 the payment of reasonable tolls, even if the effect of such 
 connection is to enable a rival company to secure a share of 
 its business.^" Such a requirement is not a taking of its 
 property, but on enforcement of its duty to serve all classes 
 of the public without discrimination, so far as it can rea- 
 sonably be done. 
 
 § 127. Rails, Pipes and Wires in Public Highways. 
 
 A corporation which has been authorized to lay and main- 
 tain rails, pipes or wires in a public highway stands in a 
 very different position from one which has acquired a 
 
 26. Pittsburg, etc., Ry. Co. v. 71 Minn. 519, 74 N. W. 893, 40 
 Point Bridge Co., 165 Pa. 37, 30 L. B. A. 389, 70 Am. St. Rep. 
 Atl. 511, 26 L. R. A. 323. 358; Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co. 
 
 27. Infra, §§ 242-245 inc. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257, 46 
 
 28. Infra, §§ 346, 347. L. ed. 1151; Washington ex rel. 
 
 29. New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Oregon, etc., Nav. Co. v. Fairchild, 
 Bristol, 151 U. S. 566, 38 L. ed. 224 U. S. 510, 56 L. ed. 863; Grand 
 269. Trunk R. R. Co. v. Michigan Rail- 
 
 30. United States. — ^Wisconsin, road Commission, 231 U. S. 457, 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Jaeobson, 179 58 L. ed. 310. 
 
 TJ. S. 287, 45 L. ed. 194, affirming 
 
374 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 127 
 
 location in private land by purchase or by the exercise of 
 eminent domain. The franchise to lay and maintain such 
 structures, like other franchises, is a contract which can- 
 not be arbitrarily rescinded or impaired,^^ unless the power 
 to alter, amend or repeal the franchise has been expressly 
 reserved; ^^ but the authorization to maintain them in a par- 
 ticular part of the highway is not an easement or any other 
 estate or interest in the land so occupied. On the contrary, 
 
 Florida. — ^Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. State, 42 Fla. 358, 29 So. 319. 
 
 Indicma. — Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Railroad Commission, 171 
 Ind. 189, 86 N. E. 328. 
 
 Iclwa. — Smith v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 86 Iowa 202, 53 N. W. 
 128. 
 
 Minnesota. — Jacobson v. Wiscon- 
 sin, etc., R. R. Co., 71 Mion. 519, 
 74 N. W. 893, 40 L. R. A. 389, 70 
 Am. St. Rep. 358. 
 
 Oklahoma. — Pioneer Tel. etc., 
 Co. V. State, 38 Okla. 554, 134 Pac. 
 398. 
 
 Virginia. — Louisville, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Interstate R. R. Co., 108 Va. 
 502, 62 S. E. 369. 
 
 Contra. — Pacific Tel., etc., Co. v. 
 Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 137 Pac. 
 1119, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 652; 
 Home Tel. Co. v. People's Tel., 
 etc., Co., 125 Tenn. 270, 141 S. W. 
 845, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 550. 
 
 31. United States. — Grand Trunk 
 Western Ry. Co. v. South Bend, 
 227 U. S. 554, 57 L. ed. 633; 
 44 L. R. A. (K S.) 405, reversing 
 174 Ind. 203, 89 N. E. 885, 91 N. E. 
 809, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 850; 
 Owensboro v. Cumberland Tele- 
 phone Co., 230 U. S. 58, 57 L. ed. 
 1389; Boise Water Co. v. Boise 
 City, 230 U. S. 84, 57 L. ed. 1400; 
 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Omaha, 
 230 U. S. 100, 57 L. ed. 1410; Rus- 
 sell V. Sebastian, 233 U. S. 195, 58 
 L. ed. 912 ; New York Electric Lines 
 Co. V. Empire City Subway Co., 235 
 U. S. 179, 59 L. ed. 184, Ann. Cas. 
 
 1915 A 906; Omaha Water Co. v. 
 Omaha, 77 C. C. A. 267, 147 Fed. 
 1, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 736, 8 Ann. 
 Cas. 614; Des Moines City Ry. 
 Co. V. Des Moines, 151 Fed. 854, 5 
 St. Ry. Rep. 281. 
 
 Alabama. — Weller v. Gadsden, 
 141 Ala. 642, 37 So. 682, 3 Ann. 
 Cas. 981. 
 
 Illinois. — Lobdell v. Chicago, 227 
 111. 218, 81 N. E. 354. 
 
 Indiana. — Williams v. Citizens 
 Ry. Co., 130 Ind. 71, 29 N. E. 804, 
 30 Am. St. Rep. 301. 
 
 Louisana. — New Orleans v. Great 
 Southern Tel., etc., Co., 40 La. 
 Ann. 41, 3 So. 533, 8 Am. St. Rep. 
 502. 
 
 Missouri. — State v. Corrigan Con- 
 solidated St. Ry. Co., 85 Mo. 263, 
 55 Am. Rep. 361. 
 
 New Jersey. — Hudson Tel. Co. 
 V. Jersey City, 49 N. J. L. 303, 8 
 Atl. 123, 60 Am, Rep. 619. 
 
 New York. — Milhau v. Sharp, 27 
 N. Y. 611, 84 Am. Dec. 314; People 
 v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 18 N. B. 
 692, 2 L. R. A. 255, 7 Am. St. Rep. 
 684; Rochester v. Rochester R. R. 
 Co., 182 N. Y. 99, 74 N. E. 953, 70 
 L. R. A. 773. 
 
 Oregon. — Savage v. Salem, 23 
 Ore. 381, 31 Pac. 832, 24 L. R. A. 
 787, 37 Am. St. Rep. 688. 
 
 Washington. — Seattle v. Colum- 
 bia, etc., E. R. Co., 6 Wash. 379, 33 
 Pac. 1048. 
 
 32. Southern Pacific Ry. Co. v. 
 Portland, 227 U. S. 559, 57 L. ed. 
 642. 
 
§127 
 
 What Constitutes Pbopebty. 
 
 375 
 
 it is merely a license to share in the public easement, and 
 consequently a corporation maintaining rails, pipes and 
 wires in a public highway is not entitled to compensation 
 for an invasion under legislative authority of the portion 
 of the highway occupied by its structures, as for a taking of 
 its property, provided it is not deprived of the enjoyment of 
 its franchise. 
 
 Consequently, although such a license may not be arbi- 
 trarily revoked as long as the highway remains public, and 
 the enjoyment thereof cannot be interfered with for purely 
 private ends,*^ it is well settled that when the continued 
 undisturbed existence of the licensed structure does inter- 
 fere with some other public need, the disturbance or 
 removal of the structures or an alteration of their location 
 is not a taking or even a damaging of property.^* The 
 
 33. Thus it was held in Edison 
 Electric Light & Power Co. v. 
 Blomquist, 185 Fed. 615, that an 
 ordinance requiring electric light, 
 telephone, street railway and simi- 
 lar corporations having valid loca- 
 tions in a street to remove and re- 
 place their structures at their own 
 expense in order to permit huild- 
 ings to be moved through the 
 streets, when requested so to do by 
 a licensed house-mover is unconsti- 
 tutional. So also in Northwestern 
 Tel. Exchange Co. v. Anderson, 12 
 N. D. 585, 98 N. W. 706, 102 Am. 
 St. Rep. 580, a licensed house- 
 mover was held liable for damages 
 to a telephone line caused by the 
 lawful moving of a house in a 
 public street, on the ground that 
 moving houses was not an ordinary 
 street use, and in Williams v. Citi- 
 zens' Ry. Co., 130 Ind. 71, 29 N. E. 
 408, 15 L. R. A. 64, 30 Am. St. 
 Rep. 201, a building mover was en- 
 joined from interfering with the 
 operation of a street railway. On 
 the other hand, in Indiana Ry. Co. 
 V. Calvert, 168 Ind. 321, 80 N. E. 
 961, 11 Ann. Cas. 635, it was held 
 that a street railway company was 
 
 not entitled to recover for damages 
 to its wires and interruption of its 
 business by the lawful moving of a 
 house. 
 
 34. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Quincy, 136 111. 563, 27 N. E. 192, 
 11 L. R. A. 670, 29 Am. St. Rep. 
 334. "The right given to a raU- 
 road company by the council of a 
 city to lay down and use a track in 
 one of the streets is subject to the 
 right of the general public to also 
 use such street. * » » The city 
 council had the right to take meas- 
 ures for paving the street notwith- 
 standing the fact that the railroad 
 had its tracks there and was using 
 such tracks from day to day. It 
 may be true that appellant's busi- 
 ness will suffer serious interruption 
 from the paving of the street, but 
 the inconvenience, to which appel- 
 lant may be temporarily subjected 
 can make no difference in the right 
 and duty of the city to make such 
 improvement of the street as it 
 deems necessary. * * * On such 
 occasions the owners of railways, 
 like other parties desirous of using 
 the street, must endure a tempo- 
 rary inconvenience for the sake of 
 
376 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 127 
 
 a permanent advantage." Rock- 
 land Water Co. v. Rockland, 83 Me. 
 267, 22 Atl. 166. Action on the 
 case for removing soil from a street, 
 in the course of repairs so that 
 plaintiff was obliged to sink its 
 water-pipe, legally located there, 
 lower, to keep it from freezing. 
 Held: In the absence of any im- 
 proper method defendant incurred 
 no, liability. Natick Gas Light Co. 
 V. Natick, 175 Mass. 246, 56 N. E. 
 292. Petition for damages by 
 alteration of a grade crossing. Pe- 
 titioner suffered damage by the 
 change of grade of the street, mak- 
 ing it necessary for it to relay its 
 gas main. By the statute the dam- 
 ages were to be assessed as in the 
 lajdng out of ways. Held: The 
 permission to lay down pipes in 
 public ways, whether revocable or 
 not, must be held to have been 
 granted on condition that the pipes, 
 neither then nor thereafter, shall 
 interfere with the public travel 
 upon the way as then existing or as 
 it may thereafter be changed to 
 meet the reasonable exigencies of 
 such travel. It is plain, therefore, 
 that no legal right to property of 
 the petitioner was invaded, even if 
 the statute is broad enough to cover 
 injuries suffered not as the conse- 
 quence of the loss or invasion of a 
 legal right. In removing its pipes, 
 petitioner was simply complying 
 with an implied condition. Spring- 
 field V. Springfield St. Ry. Co., 
 182 Mass. 41, 64 N. E. 577. The 
 locations given to street railway 
 companies in public streets do not 
 constitute contracts, or if they do 
 they are of such a nature that the 
 legislature can constitutionally 
 modify or anntd them. The public 
 authorities may revoke the loca- 
 tions or alter or discontinue the 
 streets without liability to damages 
 therefor. Lorain Steel Co. v. Nor- 
 folk, etc., St. Ry. Co., 187 Mass. 
 500, 73 N. E. 646. A street rail- 
 
 way gains no easement or freehold 
 interest in the soil. It is on the 
 same footing as other quasi public 
 corporations which lay pipes and 
 wires for the accommodation of the 
 public. Such pipes and wires laid 
 in public streets are personal prop- 
 erty which the owner may remove; 
 but if not removed and the street is 
 appropriated for another public 
 use which requires their removal, 
 as no interest in land is taken the 
 owner is not entitled to damages. 
 Detroit v. Fort Wayne, etc., Rail- 
 way Co., 90 Mich. 646, 51 N. W. 
 688. Petition for mandamus to 
 compel the cutting off of the ends 
 of respondent's ties so that the 
 street could be concreted. Held: 
 " The permission given respondent 
 to use this street is in subordina- 
 tion to the general power of the 
 municipality over its streets. The 
 city is not under obligation to con- 
 form its treatment of its streets to 
 the construction of respondent's 
 road-bed, but on the contrary, re- 
 spondent must conform the con- 
 struction of its road bed to such 
 reasonable regulations as are made 
 by the municipality in the reason- 
 able exercise of its powers- respect- 
 ing the use, control, regulation and 
 improvement of its streets. Street 
 railways occupy public streets sub- 
 ject to the use of such streets by 
 the public, subject to such burdens 
 as may be necessary by reason of 
 the improvement of such streets 
 and subject to such changes in the 
 construction of roadbeds as im- 
 proved and changed conditions may 
 demand." Stillwater Water Co. v. 
 Stillwater 50 Minn. 498, 52 N. W. 
 893. Plaintiff with due authority 
 laid certain water pipes in streets 
 in defendant city. Subsequently the 
 city re-established the grades at a 
 lower plane and graded the streets 
 accordingly. This made it neces^ 
 sary for plaintiff to lower and 
 relay its pipes and it brought 
 
§ 127 
 
 What Oonstituies Pboeeett, 
 
 377 
 
 action to recover the expense 
 thereof. Held : No liability. When 
 one acquires a right to use a street 
 for purposes of his own, the right 
 is subject and must be enjoyed in 
 subordination to the power of the 
 public authorities to keep it in con- 
 dition for public use, unless the 
 express terms of the grant by which 
 he acquires the right or the nature 
 of the right acquired by him neces- 
 sarily excludes or limits such 
 power. National Waterworks Co. 
 V. Kansas City, 20 Mo. App. 237. 
 A corporation which has estab- 
 lished lawfully water pipes in pub- 
 lic streets cannot recover when the 
 grades of the streets are lowered, 
 although the constitution of the 
 state gives compensation for prop- 
 erty damaged. Water Commission- 
 ers v. Hudson, 13 N. J. Eq. 420. 
 The expense incident to the lower- 
 ing of the water company's pipes 
 to conform to a new grade estab- 
 lished by the municipality must be 
 borne by the water company. Even 
 though the right to lay the pipes 
 under the streets constituted a 
 property right, that right was not 
 interfered with by a public im- 
 provement which merely required a 
 relaying of the pipes, as the right 
 to lay the pipes was held subject 
 to the public right to improve the 
 street. Matter of Deering, 93 N. Y. 
 361, 45 Am. Rep. 156. Petition to 
 modify an assessment for grading a 
 street which included an item of 
 damages paid to a gas company for 
 the cost of taking up and replacing 
 their pipes. Held: This item 
 should not have been included. For 
 aught that appears here, although 
 authorized to lay its pipes through 
 the public streets, the company 
 took the risk of their location and 
 should be required to make such 
 changes as public convenience or 
 security requires at its own cost 
 and charge. Ridge Ave. Passenger 
 Ry. Co. V. Philadelphia, 181 Pa. 
 
 592, 37 Atl. 910. Action on the 
 case for injury to plaintiff's busi- 
 ness by grading a street on which it 
 had a valid location. There was no 
 evidence of negligence or of unrea- 
 sonable delay. Held: No liability. 
 " The railway company was only 
 an artificial person using the street 
 in common with natural persons. 
 Whatever rights it may possess in 
 the use of the street, by reason of 
 its construction and purpose, dis- 
 tinct from those of the general pub- 
 lic, it has no peculiar or special 
 exemption from the interruption 
 and damage necessarily resulting 
 from municipal improvements." 
 See also to same effect. 
 
 United States. — New Orleans 
 Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Commis- 
 sion, 197 U. S. 453, 49 L. ed. 831,; 
 National Waterworks Co. v. Kan- 
 sas City, 28 Fed. 921. 
 
 Illinois. — Chicago v. Rothschild, 
 212 111. 590, 72 N. E. 698. 
 
 Maine.— Ueadi&eli Tel. & Tel. 
 Co. V. Cyr, 95 Me. 287, 49 Atl. 
 1047, 7 Am. Elect. Cas. 820. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Middlesex Ry. 
 Co. V. Wakefield, 103 Mass. 261; 
 Lynn, etc., R. R. Co. v. Boston, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 114 Mass. 88; Jamaica 
 Pond Aqueduct Co. v. Brooldine, 
 121 Mass. 5; New England Tel. & 
 Tel. Co. V. Boston Terminal Co., 
 182 Mass. 397, 65 N. E. 835, 8 Am. 
 Elect. Cas. 132; Boston Electric 
 Light Co. V. Eoston Terminal Co., 
 184 Mass. 566, 69 N. E. 346 ; French 
 V. Jones, 191 Mass. 522, 78 N. E. 
 545. 
 
 Missouri. — Western Union Tel. 
 Co. V. Guernsey & Scudder Electric 
 Light Co., 46 Mo. App. 120, 3 Am. 
 Elect. Cas. 425. 
 
 New York. — People v. Dolan, 
 126 N. Y. 166, 27 N. E. 269. 
 
 Ohio. — Columbus Gas Light Co. 
 V. Columbus, 50 Ohio St. 65, 33 
 N. E. 292, 19 L. R. A. 510, 40 Am. 
 St. Rep. 648; Cincinnati Inclined 
 Plane Ry. Co. v. City & Suburban 
 
378 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 127 
 
 permission to use the highway for such structures must be 
 held to have been granted upon an implied condition that 
 the structures shall not interfere, either at the time that they 
 are placed in position or thereafter, with any other public 
 use to which the legislature sees fit to devote the way. When 
 the condition takes effect the privilege ceases to exist, it is 
 not taken or damaged. To hold otherwise and to say that 
 whenever, under the statutory permission, a gas pipe is 
 laid in a public way, the pipe cannot be disturbed, even to 
 make such changes as are required by public travel, is to 
 make what is merely a subordinate use paramount to the 
 great important use for which the land is taken,^® 
 
 Accordingly, a company lawfully operating a street rail- 
 way in a public highway has no constitutional right to 
 compensation when the grade of the highway is altered and 
 it is thereby obliged to relay its tracks,^® or when it suffers 
 some necessary interference from the construction of a pub- 
 lic sewer in the highway,®^ or another street railway is 
 
 Telegraph Association, 48 Ohio St. 
 390, 27 N. E. 890, 12 L. E. A. 534, 
 29 Am. St. Eep. 559, 3 Am. Elect. 
 Cas. 443. 
 
 Virginia. — Roanoke Gras Co. v. 
 Roanoke, 88 Va. 810, 14 S. E. 665. 
 See also the cases in the following 
 notes. Contra, as to " damaging," 
 Moore v. New Orleans Waterworks 
 Co., 114 Fed. 380. 
 
 35. Natick Gas Light Co. v. 
 'Natiek, 175 Mass. 246, 56 N. E. 
 
 292. 
 
 36. Arkansas. — Little Rock v. 
 Citizens St. R. R. Co., 56 Ark. 28, 
 19 S. W. 17. 
 
 Illinois. — Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Quiney, 136 111. 563, 27 N. E, 
 192, 11 L. R. A. 670, 29 Am. St. 
 Rep. 334. 
 
 Iowa. — SnoTifiEer v. Cedar Rap- 
 ids, etc., R. R. Co., 118 Iowa 287, 
 92 N. W. 79. 
 
 Michigan. — Detroit v. Fori; 
 Wayne R. R. Co., 90 Mich. 646, 51 
 N. W. 688. 
 
 Minnesota. — Karst v. St. Paul, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 22 Minn. 118. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Ridge Ave. Pas- 
 senger Ry. Co. V. Philadelphia, 181 
 Pa. 592, 37 Atl. 910. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Ashland St. Ry. Co. 
 V. Ashland, 78 Wis. 271, 47 N. W, 
 619. 
 
 For like reasons, the poles of 
 an electric light company may be 
 moved for curb improvements, 
 Monongahela City v. Monongahela 
 Electric Light Co., 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 Rep. 529, 4 Am. Elect. Cas. 53. 
 It has been held however that a 
 municipal corporation has no right 
 to make such a radical change in 
 the grade of a street as to make 
 the operation of the street railway 
 impossible, and thus in effect to 
 destroy the franchise of the com- 
 pany. Seattle v. Columbia, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 6 Wash. 379, 33 Pae. 1048. 
 
 37. Kentucky. — Louisville City 
 Railway Co. v. Louisville, 8 Bush 
 415. 
 
§ 127 
 
 What Constitutes Pbopbety. 
 
 379 
 
 authorized to cross its tracks.^^ A corporation operating 
 pipes or wires below the surface is in no better position 
 when a change in the grade of the highway lays bare or 
 buries too deep its structures,"® or the construction of a 
 sewer or a subway makes their operation inconvenient or 
 their removal necessary." A corporation maintaining wires 
 in a street for the passage of electricity, whether for the 
 
 Maryland. — Kirby v. Citizens' 
 R. R. Co., 48 Md. 168, 30 Am. Rep. 
 455. 
 
 Missouri. — Kansas City R. R. 
 Co. V. Morley, 45 Mo. App. 304. 
 
 New York. — Brooklyn El. Ry. 
 €o. V. BrooUyn, 37 N. Y. Supp. 
 560, 2 App. Div. 98. 
 
 Texas. — San Antonio v. San An- 
 tonio St. Ry. Co., 15 Tex. Civ. 
 App. 1, 39 S. W. 136. 
 
 See however Des Moines City 
 Railroad Co. v. Des Moines, 90 Iowa 
 770, 58 N. W. 906, 26 L. R. A. 767, 
 holding that a street railway that 
 has been required to lay, and is 
 operating, its track in the middle of 
 a city street, cannot be compelled to 
 take up and relay, or to remove, 
 such track merely to accommodate 
 and facilitate the laying of a sewer 
 in the middle of such street, when 
 the sewer may just as well be built 
 along the side. See also Clapp v. 
 Spokane, 53 Fed. 515. 
 
 38. Alabama. — Highland Ave. 
 Ry. Co. V. Birmingham Un. Ry. 
 Co., 93 Ala. 505, 9 So. 568. 
 
 California. — Market St. Ry. Co. 
 V. Central Ry. Co., 51 Cal. 583. 
 
 New Jersey. — Consolidated Trac- 
 tion Co. V. South Orange, etc., 
 Traction Co., 56 N. J. Eq. 569, 40 
 Atl. 15, 7 Am. Elect. Cas. 390. 
 
 New York. — Brooklyn, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Brooklyn, etc., Ry. Co., 33 
 Barb. 420; New York etc. Ry. Co. 
 V. Forty-second St. Ry. Co., 50 
 Barb. 285. 
 
 39. United States. — New Orleans 
 Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Commis- 
 sion, 197 U. S. 453, 49 L. ed. 831; 
 
 National Waterworks Co. v. Kan- 
 sas City, 28 Fed. 921. 
 
 Colorado. — Moffat v. Denver, 67 
 Colo. 473, 143 Pac. 577. 
 
 Maine. — Rockland Water Co. v. 
 Rockland, 83 Me. 267, 22 Atl. 166. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Jamaica Pond 
 Aqueduct Co. v. Brookline, 121 
 Mass. 5; Natick Gas Light Co. v. 
 Natick, 175 Mass. 246, 56 N. E. 
 292. 
 
 Minnesota. — StUlwater Water 
 Co. V. Stillwater, 50 Minn. 498, 52 
 N. W. 893. 
 
 Missouri. — National Waterworks 
 Co. V. Kansas City, 20 Mo. App. 
 237. 
 
 New Jersey. — Water Commis- 
 sioners V. Hudson, 13 N. J. Eq. 420. 
 
 New York. — Matter of Deering, 
 93 N. Y. 361, 45 Am. Rep. 156. 
 
 Ohio. — • Columbus Gas Light Co. 
 V. Columbus, 50 Ohio St. 65, 33 
 N. E. 292, 19 L. R. A. 510, 40 Am. 
 St. Rep. 648. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Scranton Gas, 
 etc., Co. V. Scranton, 214 Pa. 586, 
 64 Atl. 84, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1033 
 (notwithstanding constitutional re- 
 quirement of compensation for 
 damage). 
 
 Virginia. — Roanoke Gas Co. v. 
 Roanoke, 88 Va. 810, 14 S. E. 665. 
 
 40. United States. — National 
 Waterworks Co. v. Kansas City, 28 
 Fed. 921. 
 
 Colorado. — ^Moffatt v. Denver, 57 
 Colo. 473, 143 Pac. 577. 
 
 Florida. — Anderson v. Fuller, 51 
 Fla. 380, 41 So. 684, 6 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 1026. 
 
 Maine. — Brtinswick Gas Light 
 
380 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 127 
 
 purposes of light, motive power or the transmission of intel- 
 ligence, is not entitled to compensation for injury by elec- 
 trical interference or induction due to the maintenance by 
 another public service corporation of other wires in the 
 street carrying a more powerful current Tinder a franchise 
 of a later date.*^ 
 
 The privilege of maintaining these structures in the 
 streets is not only subordinate to public travel and other 
 lawful exercise of the highway easement, but must also give 
 way to any other public use which the legislature may 
 authorize. A street railway coinpany cannot object when 
 it is put to expense and inconvenience by the laying out 
 of a steam railroad across its tracks,*^ and when a steam 
 railroad has been constructed across a previously existing 
 street railway, and subsequently an increased use of the 
 steam railroad makes additional precautions at the crossing 
 necessary, the street railway company can be required to 
 share in the expense.** 
 
 Co. V. Brunswick, 92 Me. 493, 43 
 Atl. 104. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Crocker v. Bos- 
 ton Electric Light Co., 180 Mass. 
 516, 62 N. E. 978. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Portsmouth 
 Gas Light Co. v. Shanahan, 65 
 N. H. 233, 19 Atl. 1002. 
 
 New York. — Western Union Tel. 
 Co. V. Electric, etc., Co., 178 N. Y. 
 325, 70 N, E. 866. 
 
 Ohio. — Elster v. Springfield, 49 
 Ohio St. 82, 30 N. E. 274. 
 
 Contra, under a constitution re- 
 quiring compensation for " damag- 
 ing," Moore v. New Orleans Water- 
 works Co., 114 Fed. 380. 
 
 41. Missouri. — Western Union 
 Tel. Co. V. Guernsey & Scudder 
 Electric Light Co., 46 Mo. App. 
 120, 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 425. 
 
 New York. — Hudson River Tel. 
 Co. V. Watervliet Turnpike Co., 
 135 N. Y. 393, 32 N. E. 148, 17 
 L. R. A. 674, 31 Am. St. Rep. 838, 
 4 Am. Elect. Cas. 275. 
 
 Ohio. — Cincinnati Inclined 
 
 Plane Ry. Co. v. City & Suburban 
 Tel. Assn., 48 Ohio St. 390, 27 
 N. E. 890, 12 L. R. A. 534, 29 Am. 
 St. Rejp. 559, 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 443. 
 
 Tennessee. — East Tennessee Tel. 
 Co. V. Knoxville St. Ry. Co., 3 Am. 
 Elect. Cas. 400; Cumberland Tel. 
 & Tel. Co. V. United Electric Ry. 
 Co., 93 Tenn. 492, 29 S. W. 104, 
 27 L. R. A. 236, 4 Am. Elect. Cas. 
 297. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Wisconsin Tel. Co. 
 V. Eau Claire St. Ry. Co., 3 Am. 
 Elect. Cas. 383. 
 
 Li Rutland El. Light Co. v. 
 Marble City El. Co., 65 Vt. 377, 26 
 Atl. 635, 20 L. R. A. 821, 36 Am. 
 St. Rep. 868, 4 Am. Elect. Cas. 256, 
 it was held that the first company 
 does not get an exclusive right but 
 the rights of a subsequent licensee 
 are subordinate, and must not inter- 
 fere. 
 
 42. Lynn, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bos- 
 ton, etc., R. R. Co., 114 Mass. 88. 
 
 43. Detroit, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Osbom, 189 U. S. 383, 47 L. ed. 
 
§ 127 What Constitutes Pkopeett. 381 
 
 The grant by the municipal authorities of a license to a 
 public service corporation to share in the public easement 
 does not impair the right of such authorities to discontinue 
 the public easement whenever in their opinion the public 
 interests -will be enhahced thereby ; and as such a license is 
 not an easement in the soil, it expires when the public ease- 
 ment of which it is a part ceases to exist. Consequently a 
 corporation operating structures upon or below the surface 
 of a street is not entitled to compensation if the street is 
 discontinued and the structures have to be removed.** Rails, 
 pipes or wires when laid in the street remain personal prop- 
 erty,*^ and of course, continue to belong to the corporation 
 operating them.*® The property in the structures is quite 
 different from the right to maintain them without inter- 
 ference in the place where they are located, and while the 
 latter may be impaired without infringing upon any con- 
 stitutional rights, the property of the company can be actu- 
 ally taken and put to use only upon the payment of just 
 compensation. After one street railway company has, 
 under legislative authority, laid rails in a highway, another 
 company cannot be authorized to make a concurrent use of 
 the same rails without compensating the corporation which 
 laid them,*'^ unless the right to authorize such use was 
 
 860, sustaiDing 127 Mich. 219, 86 Lorain Steel Co. v. Norfolk, etc., 
 
 N. W. 842, 62L. R. A. 149; Maine, St. Ry. Co., 187 Mass. 500, 73 
 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. "Waterville, etc., N. E. 646. 
 
 Ry. Co., 89 Me. 328, 36 Atl. 453. 46. Moore v. New Orleans Water- 
 
 44. New England Tel., etc., Co. works Co., 114 Fed. 380; Asher v. 
 V. Boston Terminal Co., 182 Mass. Hutchinson Water, etc., Co., 66 
 397, 65 N, E. 835, 8 Am. Elect. Cas. Kan. 496, 71 Pac. 813, 61 L. E. A. 
 132; In re Lands at Nahant, 128 52; New England Tel., etc., Co. v. 
 Fed. 185. Boston Terminal Co., 182 Mass. 
 
 45. Maiwe.— Readfleld Tel. & Tel. 397, 65 N. E. 835, 8 Am. Elect. Cas. 
 Co. V. Cyr, 95 Me. 287, 49 Atl. 132; Southern Kansas Ry. Co. v. 
 1047, 7 Am. Elect. Cas. 820. ■ Oklahoma City, 12 Okl. 82, 69 Pao. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Commonwealth 1050. 
 
 V. Lowell Gas Light Co., 12 Allen 47. United States. — Evansville, 
 
 75 ; Natick Gas Light Co. v. Natiek, etc.. Traction Co. v. Henderson 
 
 175 Mass. 246, 56 N. E. 292; New Bridge Co., 134 Fed. 973. 
 
 England Tel., etc., Co. v. Boston Kentucky. — Louisville City Ry. 
 
 Terminal Co., 182 Mass. 397, 65 Co. v. Central Pass. Ry. Co., 87 
 
 N. E. 835, 8 Am. Elect. Cas. 132; Ky. 223, 8 S. W. 329. 
 
382 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 127 
 
 expressly reserved when the franchise of the first corpora- 
 tion was granted.** A system of waterworks established in 
 a certain district, and belonging to a private owner, can- 
 not be made part of the city system without paying the 
 owner their value.** A corporation lawfully operating 
 structures in the street may have unauthorized interference 
 with them enjoined,®** and when a conflict arises between 
 two corporations exercising similar franchises in the same 
 street, if the second does not have specific authority from 
 the legislature to disregard the first, and interference is 
 unavoidable, the later occupant must give way.®^ When per- 
 mission to maintain structures in the highway is lawfully 
 revoked or withdrawn, the corporation owning them may be 
 compelled to remove them at its own expense,'^ but it may 
 
 Louisianct. — Canal, etc., St. Ry. 
 Co. V. Crescent City Ry. Co., 41 La. 
 Ann. 561, 6 So. 849. 
 
 Maryland. — North Baltimore 
 Pass. Ry. Co. v. North Avenue Ry. 
 Co., 75 Md. 233, 23 Atl. 466. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Metropolitan Ry. 
 Co. V. Quincy Ry. Co., 12 Allen 
 262. 
 
 Michigan. — Citizens Electric Light 
 & Power Co. v. Sands, 95 Mich. 551, 
 55 N. W. 452, 20 L. R. A. 411 
 (electric light poles). 
 
 New Jersey. — Jersey City, etc., 
 Ry. Co. V. Jersey City, etc., Ry. 
 Co., 21 N. J. Eq. 550; Citizens' 
 Coach Co. V. Camden Horse R. R. 
 Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 267, 36 Am. Rep. 
 542. 
 
 New York. — Sixth Ave. Ry. Co. 
 V. Kerr, 72 N. T. 330. 
 
 Ohio. — Toledo, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 Toledo, etc., Ry. Co., 50 Ohio St. 
 603, 36 N. E. 312. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Commonwealth v. 
 Bond, 214 Pa. 307, 63 Atl. 741, 112 
 Am. St. Rep. 745. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Providence v. 
 Union R. R. Co., 12 R. I. 473. 
 
 It has been held that the con- 
 struction of a new railway " strad- 
 dling" the old is a taking of the 
 
 property of the older company. 
 Hamilton, etc., Traction Co. v. 
 Hamilton, etc.. Transit Co., 69 
 Ohio St. 402, 69 N. E. 991; Com- 
 monwealth v. Philadelphia, etc., Ry. 
 Co., 214 Pa. 307, 63 Atl. 741, 4 St. 
 Ry. Rep. 940. 
 
 48. Pacific Ry. Co. v. Wade, 91 
 Cal. 449, 21 Pac. 763, 25 Am. St. 
 Rep. 20L 
 
 49. Chicago v. Smith, 204 HI. 
 356, 68 N. E. 395. 
 
 50. Atchison St. Ry. Co. v. 
 Missouri, etc., R. R. Co., 31 Kan. 
 661, 3 Pac. 284. 
 
 51. Minnesota. — Northwestern Td. 
 Co. V. Twin City Tel. Co., 89 Minn. 
 495, 95 N. "W. 460. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Edison, etc., Co. 
 V. Merchants', etc., Co., 200 Pa. 
 209, 49 Atl. 766, 86 Am. St. Rep. 
 712. 
 
 Texas. — Paris, etc., Co. v. South- 
 western, etc., Co., 27 S. W. 902. 
 
 Vermont.- — ^Rutland El. Light Co. 
 V. Marble City El. Light Co., 65 Vt. 
 377, 26 Atl. 635, 20 L. R. A. 821, 
 36 Am. St. Rep. 868, 4 Am. Elect 
 Cas. 256. 
 
 Canada. — Bell Tel. Co. v. Belle- 
 ville, etc., Co., 12 Ont. 571. 
 
 52. New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. 
 
§ 127 What Constitutes Property. 383 
 
 under such circumstances remove them and dispose of them 
 to its own advantage in spite of the objections of the munic- 
 ipal authorities,^* or of an abutting owner who desires them 
 to remain.^* 
 
 There is nothing in the nature of the rails, pipes and 
 wires that are usually laid in public ways that deprives them 
 of complete constitutional protection when they are main- 
 tained in other places. Private sewers in a private street 
 are private property ,^^ and water pipes lawfully established 
 in private land remain under constitutional protection after 
 the strip of land in which they are laid has become a public 
 highway.®® 
 
 It would seem that a public service corporation which 
 has been obliged to pay the abutting owners for the right 
 to lay its structures, with legislative authority, in a public 
 highway, on the ground that they constituted an additional 
 servitude,®^ might stand in a better position than a corpo- 
 ration which had gratuitously been permitted to enjoy part 
 of the public easement, not because of the payment, for 
 there is no incongruity in a person paying for a privilege 
 which he knows is revocable by action of the public author- 
 ities,®^ but because, ex hypotJiesi, the structure is not author- 
 ized as a participation in the highway easement, but the 
 right to maintain it is a separate and additional easement, 
 and is consequently property in the constitutional sense to 
 the same extent as the easement of any other public service 
 corporation over private land.®^ It would follow that the 
 structures of such a corporation could not be removed or 
 interfered with without compensation, except so far as they 
 endangered the public safety, even when the right to alter, 
 
 Hart, 40 La. Ann. 474, 4 So. 215, 8 55. Wright v. Mt. Vernon, 167 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 544; Crockery. Boston N. Y. 541, 60 N. E. 1123. 
 Electric Light Co., 180 Mass. 516, 56. In re Land at Nahant, 128 
 
 62 N. E. 978. Fed. 185. See also Boston v. 
 
 53. French v. Jones, 191 M'ass. Brookline, 156 Mass. 172, 30 N. E. 
 522, 78 N. E. 118, 7 L. R. A. 611. 
 
 (N. S.) 525, 5 St. Ry. Rep. 452. 57. Infra, §§ 167-187 inc. 
 
 54. Asher v. Hutchinson Water, 58. Supra, § 116. 
 etc., Co., 66 Kan. 496, 71 Pac. 813, 59. Supra, i 126. 
 01 L. R. A. 52. 
 
384 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 128 
 
 amend or repeal the charter of the corporation had been 
 expressly reserved. 
 
 § 128. Rights in Existing Crossings. 
 
 Care should be taken not to confuse decisions involving 
 the right to compensation when an easement is taken in 
 land alreadj devoted to a different public use, and decisions 
 declaring the respective rights of ^e holders of two differ- 
 ent easements already lawfully established in the same land. 
 "When the crossing of a public highway and a steam railroad 
 has been established in accordance with law, and the new- 
 comer has paid such compensation as the constitution and 
 statutes of the state require, there exist two conflicting ease- 
 ments in the same place,*" one held by the public and the 
 other by the railroad company, the extent and nature of 
 which are not determined by the actual use and enjoyment, 
 but by the right which was acquired in accordance with law 
 in the proceedings by which each of the easements was 
 established. An increased use of either easement may 
 incommode the exereise of the other, but if such use is within 
 the rights originally acquired, the holder of the other ease- 
 ment is not entitled to compensation, for the enjoyment of 
 an easement that has been already taken and paid for is not 
 a new taking. 
 
 In accordance with this principle, it is held that a rail- 
 road company is not entitled to be compensated for interfer- 
 ence with the operation of its trains, or for additional 
 expense to which it is subjected by the increased or modified 
 use for any purpose recognized by law as a proper exercise 
 of the highway easement of a highway already legally laid 
 out across its tracks, whether or not a special franchise to 
 a private corporation is required for the enjoyment of such 
 use. It is the duty of the company to adapt its structures to 
 increased use of the highway for general travel,®^ and it is 
 
 60. New York Central, etc., R. etc., R. R. Co. v. Smith, 61 Fed. 
 R. Co. V. Cambridge, 186 Mass. 885; Indiana v. Lake Erie, etc., 
 249, 71 N. E. 557. Co., 83 Fed. 287. 
 
 61. United States. — Lake Erie, Indiana. — Lake Erie, etc., R. R. 
 
§ 128 
 
 What Constitutes Pkopekty. 
 
 385 
 
 not entitled to compensation if the grade of the highway is 
 changed,®^ or if a street railway,®^ a sewer or any other rails, 
 wires or pipes ®* included in the highway easement are laid 
 
 Co. V. Cluggish, 143 Ind. 347, 42 
 N. E. 743. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Cooke v. Bos- 
 ton, etc., R. R. Co., 133 Mass. 185. 
 
 Minnesota. — State v. St. Paul, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 35 Minn. 131, 28 
 N. W. 3, 59 Am. Rep. 313. 
 
 62. Wabash R. R. Co. v. Defi- 
 ance, 167 U. S. 88, 42 L. ed. 87; 
 Cleveland v. Augusta, 102 Ga. 233, 
 29 S. E. 584, 43 L. R. A. 638; Bos- 
 ton, etc., R. R. Co. V. Worcester, 
 180 Mass. 71, 61 N. E. 806, 55 
 L. R. A. 623; Houston, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Dallas, 98 Tex. 396, 84 S. W. 
 648, 70 L. R. A. 850. 
 
 63. United States. — Pennsylvania 
 Co. V. Lake Erie, etc., Ry. Co., 146 
 Fed. 446, 8 St. Ry. Rep. 844; East 
 St. Louis St. Ry. Co. v. Louisville, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 149 Ted. 159, 5 St. 
 Ry. Rep. 183. 
 
 Connecticut. — New York, etc., R. 
 R. Co. v. Bridgeport Traction Co., 
 65 Conn. 410, 32 Atl. 953, 29 
 L. R. A. 367, 5 Am. Elect. Cas. 
 246. 
 
 Georgia. — Southern R. R. Co. v. 
 Atlanta Ry. Co., Ill Ga. 679, 36 
 S. E. 873, 51 L. R. A. 125. 
 
 Illinois. — Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. West Chicago St. Ry. Co., 156 
 lU. 255, 40 N. E. 1008, 29 L. R. A. 
 485. 
 
 Indiana. — ^Wabash R. R. Co. v. 
 Ft. Wayne, etc.. Traction Co., 161 
 Ind. 295, 67 N. E. 674, 1 St. Ry. 
 Rep. 139; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Whiting, etc., St. Ry. Co., 139 
 Ind. 297, 38 N. E. 604, 47 Am. St. 
 Rep. 264, 26 L. R. A. 337, 5 Am. 
 Elect. Cas. 236; South East, etc., 
 Ry. Co. V. Evansville, etc., Ry. Co., 
 169 Ind. 339, 82 N. E. 765; Michi- 
 gan Central R. R. Co. v. Ham- 
 mond, etc., Ry. Co., 42 Ind. App. 
 66, 83 N. E. 650; Cleveland, etc., 
 
 25 
 
 Ry. Co. V. Feight, 41 Ind. App. 
 416, 84 N. E. 15, 6 St. Ry. Rep. 
 842. 
 
 Kentucky. — Elizabethtown R. R- 
 Co. V. Ashland, etc., St. Ry. Co., 
 
 96 Ky. 347, 26 S. W. 181. 
 Louisiana. — Shreveport Traction 
 
 Co. V. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co., 
 119 La. 759, 44 So. 457, 5 St. Ry. 
 Rep. 342. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Old Colony R. 
 R. Co. V. Rockland, etc., St. Ry. 
 Co., 161 Mass. 416, 37 N. E. 370, 
 5 Am. Elect. Cas. 233. 
 
 Missouri. — Kansas City R. R. 
 Co. V. St. Joseph Term. R. R. Co., 
 
 97 Mo. 457, 10 S. W. 826, 3 
 L. R. A. 240; St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. 
 V. Lindell Ry. Co., 190 Mo. 246, 88 
 S. W. 634, 4 St. Ry. Rep. 628. 
 
 Nebraska. — Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Steel, 47 Nebr. 741, 66 N. W. 
 830. 
 
 New Jersey. — Morris R. R. Co. 
 V. Newark Pass. Ry. Co., 51 N. J. 
 Eq. 379, 29 Atl. 184, 5 Am. Elect. 
 Cas. 229; West Jersey R. R. Co. v. 
 Camden, etc., Ry. Co., 52 N. J. Eq. 
 31, 29 Atl. 423, 5 Am. Elect. Cas. 
 137. 
 
 Ohio. — Cincinnati St. Ry. Co. v, 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co., 12 Ohio 
 C. D. 113. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Buffalo R. R. Co. 
 v. Du Bois Traction Co., 149 Pa. 1, 
 24 Atl. 179; North Pennsylvania 
 R. R. Co. V. Inland Traction Co., 
 205 Pa. 579, 55 Atl. 774, 1 St. Ry. 
 Rep. 708 ; Delaware, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Wilkesbarre, etc., Ry. Co., 6 
 Kulp, 342, 4 Am. Elect. Cas. 237. 
 
 Texas. — Galveston, etc., Ry. Co. 
 V. Houston Electric Co., 57 Tex. 
 Civ. App. 170, 122 S. W. 287. 
 
 64. New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Cohasset Water Co., 216 Mass. 291, 
 103 N. E. 829; New York Central, 
 
386 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 128 
 
 in the highway across its tracks. Even the exclusive use 
 for highway purposes of a portion of the land subject to 
 both easements is not necessarily a taking.®^ 
 
 Conversely, the railroad company may, when public 
 necessity and convenience require it, adapt its road to 
 increased travel by laying additional ti:acks across the high- 
 way within its location,** or it may construct telegraph lines 
 for its own use in despatching trains, or lay water pipes 
 for supplying water to its engines,*'^ or otherwise make use 
 of the full extent of its easement,®^ without incurring any 
 obligation to compensate the municipality in which the' 
 crossing is situated, or any of the public service corpora- 
 tions which have a franchise to share in the easement of the 
 highway through the use of rails, pipes and wires laid 
 therein. On the contrary, public service corporations enjoy- 
 ing part of the highway easement may even be compelled 
 to share in the expense incurred in adapting the crossings 
 to increased use of the steam railroad evidenced by the 
 laying of additional tracks.®^ 
 
 Neither party may make such an unreasonable use of its 
 own easement as to amount to a total or practical destruc- 
 
 etc, R. R. Co. V. Central Massachu- thereafter was confined in its ex- 
 setts Electric Co., 219 Mass. 85, 106 ercise to its own plane. After such 
 N. E. 566. separation, when the highway is 
 65. Thus if the original crossing carried under the railroad, electric 
 was at grade, and the requirements light wires cannot be carried across 
 of public safety and convenience and above the raUroad. New York 
 made it necessary to carry the high- Central, etc., R. R. Co. v. Central 
 way over the tracks by a bridge, Massachusetts Electric Co., 219 
 the exclusive use of a portion of Mass. 85, 106 N. E. 566. 
 the railroad location by the abut- 66. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ho- 
 ments of the bridge is not a new gan, 115 111. App. 136; Common- 
 taking. Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. wealth v. Hartford, etc., R. R. Co., 
 Worcester, 180 Mass. 71, 61 N. E. 14 Gray (Mass.) 379. 
 806, 55 L. R. A. 623. When how- 67. Canton v. Canton Cotton 
 ever a grade crossing has been Warehouse Co., 84 Miss. 268, 36 
 abolished by carrying the railroad So. 266, 65 L. R. A. 561, 105 Am. 
 over or under the highway, by such St. Rep. 428. 
 
 separation of the grades a different 68. New York Central, etc., R. 
 
 domain was established for each R. Co. v. Cambridge, 186 Mass. 
 
 easement, divided by the lower side 249, 71 N. B. 557. 
 
 of the bridge structure, and each 69. Detroit, etc., Ry. Co. v. Os- 
 
§ 128 What Constitutes Property. 387 
 
 tion of the other. Moreover, besides the right of the public 
 to make use of the highway easement at the crossing, the 
 railroad company is subject to a rigid enforcement of the 
 police power. Eailroad companies, because of their public 
 nature as common carriers, and because they receive from 
 the state the privilege of exercising the right of eminent 
 domain, are subject to almost unlimited regulation not only 
 as to their rates,''" but as to their precautions for the safety 
 of persons crossing their tracks.''* When the legislature 
 considers a crossing at grade unsafe in spite of gates and 
 flagmen, it may forbid it to remain without a separation 
 of grades, and may require the railroad to bear the whole 
 or any part of the cost of making the necessary changes, 
 whether in the railroad bed or in the highway.'''^ The only 
 limit upon this power is that the requirements be reason- 
 ably necessary and not so inordinately expensive as to 
 deprive the railroad company of all chance of doing a profit- 
 able business, and that the alterations in the highway in the 
 cost of which the railroad company is obliged to share be 
 fairly incidental to changes in the crossing made necessary 
 by danger to public travel from the passing trains.''* Even 
 when a city has contracted, in return for a large sum of 
 money, to exempt a railroad company from further obliga- 
 tion in respect to the maintenance of a railroad crossing 
 , the railroad company may be compelled to erect a bridge 
 over the tracks at its own expense, for such a contract is 
 
 bom, 189 U. S. 383, 47 L. ed. 860, Jacksonville, 67 El. 37, 16 Am. 
 
 affirming 127 Mich. 219, 86 N. W. Rep. 611. 
 
 842, 62 L. R. A. 149. 72. New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 
 70. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 38 L. ed. 
 113, 24 L. ed. 77. The rates, how- 269; St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 ever, cannot be made so unreason- Fayetteville, 75 Ark. 534, 87 S. W. 
 ably low as to deprive the railroad 1174; Norwood v. New York, etc., 
 company of any chance of profit. R. R. Co., 161 Mass. 259, 37 N. E. 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 199; State ex rel. Minneapolis v. 
 134 U. S. 418, 33 L. ed. 970. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 35 Minn. 
 
 71. Thorpe v. Rutland, etc., R. R. 131, 59 Am. Rep. 313. 
 
 Co., 27 Vt. 140, 62 Am. Dee. 625; 73. Norwood v. New York, etc., 
 
 but these regulations must be rea- R. R. Co., 161 Mass. 259, 37 N. E. 
 sonable, Toledo, etc., Ry. Co. v. 199. 
 
388 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 128 
 
 void, as an attempt to bargain away the police power of 
 the stateJ* 
 
 The principles which govern the relative rights of the 
 public and the railroad company at the crossing of a high- 
 way and a railroad are equally applicable at the intersection 
 of any two other public works. It almost goes without say- 
 ing that when one highway crosses another, a public service 
 corporation permitted to maintain its structures in one of 
 the highways cannot complain if another such corporation 
 is given a franchise in the intersecting wayJ° It has even 
 been held that, when a railroad company has lawfully laid 
 out its road across a creek, and has constructed an adequate 
 bridge, and the use and capacity of the creek is subsequently 
 increased by the artificial drainage of additional swamp 
 lands under public authority, the railroad company may be 
 compelled to adapt its bridge to the new situation at its own 
 expensed* 
 
 The increased or modified use of an existing easement 
 which can be undertaken without compensation to the holder 
 of another easement in the same spot must be made within 
 the limits of the original location. If a highway is widened 
 at the point where its crosses a railroad, not merely by pre- 
 paring for public travel an additional portion of the loca- 
 tion already acquired, but by including within the limits of 
 the location a strip of private land outside its boundaries, 
 the railroad company is entitled to compensation for the 
 taking of its land thus newly subjected to the concurrent 
 exercise of the highway easement.'^^ 
 
 74. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. 4 Ann. Cas. 1175. See however 
 Minnesota, 208 U. S. 583, 52 L. ed. People ex rel. Peeler v. Chicago, 
 630, affirming 98 Minn. 429, 108 etc., R. R. Co., 262 111. 492, 104 
 N. W. 269. N. E. 831, L. R. A. 1915 B 486, 
 
 75. Consolidated Traction Co. v. holding that under such circum- 
 So. Orange, etc., Traction Co., 56 stances the railroad company could 
 N. J. Eq. 569, 40 Atl. 15, 7 Am. not he compelled to widen the 
 Elect. Cas. 390, and see supra, bridge at its own expense. 
 
 § 127, note 8. 77. Hudson County v. New York 
 
 76. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. H- Bay R. R. Co., 84 N. J. L. 354, 86 
 linois, 200 U. S. 561, 50 L. ed. 596, Atl. 381. 
 
§§ 129-130 What Constitutes Peopbety. 389 
 
 § 129. Property of Charitable Corporations. 
 
 Charitable, educational and literary corporations, although 
 public for some purposes, are sheltered by the constitution, 
 so that their property cannot be taken and devoted to the 
 same or other public uses without compensation.''* 
 
 § 130. Property of a State. 
 
 The property of a state is protected by the constitution, 
 and the United States cannot take such property for the 
 uses for which Congress may authorize the exercise of the 
 power of eminent domain without compensation to the 
 state.''* This rule applies to all property, whether held 
 merely as a valuable asset, or devoted to the use of the 
 public. Public highways are the property of a state for the 
 public uses of its own people, and a state may therefore col- 
 lect compensation from a corporation usiag them under 
 authority of Congress for the telegraph poles of an inter- 
 state line;*" but the United States may take lands under 
 navigable waters which belong to a state and devote them 
 to federal purposes without compensating the state, for 
 such lands are held by the state in trust for the whole pub- 
 lic.*^ The distinction is a narrow one, but it may be. 
 observed that the state may obstruct or discontinue its 
 
 78. United States. — Dartmouth 92, 37 L. ed. 380, 4 Am. Elect. Cas. 
 CoUege V. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 102, 115, 149 U. S. 465, 37 L. ed. 
 518, 46 L. ed. 629; Vincennes Uni- 810; Eiehmond v. Southern Bell 
 versity v. Indiana, 14 How. 268, 14 Tel. Co., 174 U. S. 761, 43 L. ed. 
 L. ed. 416. 1162; Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Cary Library v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160, 47 
 
 Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 25 N. E. 92, L. .ed. 995; Western Union Tel. Co. 
 
 7 L. E. A. 765. v. Richmond, 224 U. S. 160, 56 
 
 Ohio.— State v. Neff, 52 Ohio St. L. ed. 710. 
 
 375, 40 N. E. 720, 28 L. R. A. 409. Kentucky.— Postal Tel. Cable 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Lebanon School Co. v. New Port, 25 Ky. L. R. 635, 
 
 Dist. V. Lebanon Seminary, 22 76 S. W. 159. 
 
 WMy. Notes Cas. 65. Maryland.— Foatal Tel. Cable 
 
 79. Nahant v. United States, 136 Co. v. Baltimore, 79 Md. 502, 29 
 Fed. 273, 67 L. E. A. 723; United Atl. 819, 24 L. R. A. 161, 5 Am. 
 States V. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., Elect. Cas. 37; affirmed, 156 U. S. 
 176 Fed. 963. 210, 39 L. ed. 399. 
 
 80. United States. — St. Louis v. 81. Stockton v. B'altimore, etc., 
 Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U. S. R. R. Co., 32 Fed. 9. 
 
390 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 131 
 
 highways by land without the consent of the United States ; 
 but navigable waters cannot be incommoded without per- 
 mission from the federal government. 
 
 A state may authorize the taking of its own property by 
 a private corporation without compensation, when it is to 
 be devoted to a public use f^ but authority to take the state 's 
 property without any provision as to compensation implies 
 a duty to make payment therefor.*' 
 
 § 131. Twofold Character of Municipal Corporations. 
 
 Municipal corporations have a twofold character, the one 
 governmental, and the other private. In the one character 
 they are mere agencies of the state, or rather units into 
 which it has divided itself, in order that the business of gov- 
 ernment may be more conveniently handled, and in this 
 character they execute the functions and possess the attri- 
 butes of sovereignty which have been delegated to them by 
 the legislature. It is in this capacity that they conduct 
 general elections, construct and maintain public highways 
 and bridges, suppress disorder and crime, and perform sim- 
 ilar acts conducive to the safety and prosperity of the public 
 of the entire state. In their other or private character they 
 are mere aggregations of individuals living in the same 
 neighborhood who have banded together in order to supply 
 themselves with the necessities and conveniences of life 
 which co-operation will enable them to obtain more readily 
 and cheaply than individual effort, and in this character 
 they are clothed with the capacities of a private corpora- 
 tion, and may claim its rights and immunities and are sub- 
 ject to its liabilities. It is in this capacity that they 
 construct works for supplying water and light to the dwell- 
 ings of their inhabitants, and establish markets, cemeteries 
 and libraries for their use. Over the property which a 
 municipal corporation acquires as an agency of the state for 
 
 82. Indiana Central Ey. Co. v. 83. Commonwealth v. Boston, 
 
 State, 3 Ind. 421; Texas Central etc., E. E., 3 Cush. (Mass.) 25; 
 
 Ey. Co. V. Bowman, 97 Tex. 417, Commonwealth v. Boston Terminal 
 
 79 S. W. 295. Co., 185 Mass. 281, 70 N. E. 125. 
 
§ 131 
 
 What Constitutes Peopeety. 
 
 391 
 
 the performance of the strictly public duties devolved upon 
 it by law, the legislature may exercise a control to the extent 
 of requiring the municipal corporation, without receiving 
 compensation therefor, to transfer such property to some 
 other agency of the government to be devoted to similar 
 uses or to other strictly public purposes ; ** but the property 
 
 84. Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Bos- 
 ton, 158 Mass. 509, 33 N. E. 695, 
 35 Am. St. Rep. 515, and see also 
 
 United States. — Tippecanoe 
 
 County Commissioners v. Lucas, 93 
 U. S. 108, 23 L. ed. 822; Essex Pub- 
 lie Road Board v. Skinkle, 140 U. S. 
 334, 35 L. ed. 446, affirming 49 
 N. J. L. 641, 10 Atl. 379; In re 
 Certain Lands in Lawrence, 119 
 Fed. 453. 
 
 Alabama. — Eox v. McDonald, 101 
 Ala. 51, 13 So. 416, 21 L. B. A. 529, 
 46 Am. St. Rep. 98. 
 
 Connecticut. — State ex rel. Walsli 
 V. Hine, 59 Conn. 50, 21 Atl. 1024, 
 10 L. B. A. 83; State ex rel. Bulk- 
 ely V. Williams, 68 Conn. 131, 35 
 Atl. 24, 48 L. R. A. 465. 
 
 Georgia. — Americus v. Perry, 114 
 Ga. 871, 40 S. E. 1004, 57 L. B. A. 
 230. 
 
 Illinois. — Heffner v. Cass and 
 Morgan Counties, 193 lU. 439, 62 
 N. E. 201, 58 L. R. A. 353. 
 
 Indiana. — State ex rel. Law v. 
 Blend, 121 Ind. 514, 23 N. E. 511, 
 16 Am. St. Rep. 411; State ex rel. 
 Terra Haute v. Kolsem, 130 Ind. 
 434, 29 N. E. 595, 14 L. R. A. 566; 
 Amett V. State, 168 Ind. 180, 80 
 N. E. 153, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1192. 
 
 Iowa.— State v. Gref e, 139 Iowa 
 18, 117 N. W. 13. 
 
 Maryland. — Baltimore v. State, 
 15 Md. 376, 74 Am. Dee. 572. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Commonwealth v. 
 Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 19 N. E. 
 224, 2 L. R. A. 142, 12 Am. St. Rep. 
 566; Higginson v. Boston, 212 Mass. 
 583, 99 N. E. 523, 42 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 215. 
 
 Michigan. — Davock v. Moore, 105 
 
 Mich. 120, 63 N. W. 424, 28 L. R. A. 
 783. 
 
 Minnesota. — St. Paul v. Chicago, 
 etc., B. E. Co., 63 Minn. 330, 63 
 N. W. 267, 34 L. E. A. 184. 
 
 Mississippi. — Canton v. C&nton 
 Cotton Warehouse Co., 84 Miss. 268, 
 36 So. 266, 65 L. B. A. 561, 105 
 Am. St. Eep. 428. 
 
 Nebraska. — Bedell v. Moores, 63 
 Neb. 219, 88 N. W. 243, 55 L. B. A. 
 740, 93 Am. St. Eep. 431; State v. 
 Broateh, 68 Neb. 687, 94 N. W. 
 1016, 110 A. St. Bep. 477. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Gooch v. 
 Exeter, 70 N. H. 413, 48 Atl. 1100, 
 65 Am. St. Bep. 637. 
 
 New York. — Darlington v. New 
 York, 31 N. Y. 164, 88 Am. Dec. 
 248. 
 
 Ohio. — Champaign County v. 
 Church, 62 Ohio St. 318, 57 N. E. 
 50, 48 L. B. A. 738, 78 Am. St. 
 Rep. 718; Zanesville v. Zanesville 
 Tel., etc., Co., 64 Ohio St. 67, 59 
 N. E. 781, 52 L. R. A. 150, 83 Am. 
 St. Rep. 725. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Case of Phila- 
 delphia & Trenton R. R. Co., 6 
 Whart. 25, 36 Am. Dec. 202. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Newport v. Hor- 
 
 ton, 22 R. I. 196, 47 Atl. 312, 50 
 
 L. R. A. 330; Horton v. Newport, 
 
 27 B. L 283, 61 Atl. 759, 1 L. E. A. 
 
 ,(N. S.) 512, 8 Ann. Cas. 1097. 
 
 Tennessee. — Edmondson v. Mem- 
 phis, 108 Tenn. 557, 69 S. W. 274, 
 58 L. B. A. 170. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Columbus v. Colum- 
 bus, 82 Wis. 374, 52 N. W. 425, 16 
 L. E. A. 695. 
 
 And see also the cases cited in 
 the following section. The United 
 
392 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 131 
 
 acquired by municipal corporations for the private benefit 
 of their inhabitants is protected by the constitution, and 
 can be taken only by eminent domain, and upon payment of 
 its value,^^ 
 
 The rule itself is clear enough, and the distinction which 
 it draws is often plain; but many municipal functions fall 
 so close to the line that very perplexing questions arise in 
 deciding upon which side to place^,^ them. The difficulty is 
 increased by the fact that property devoted to the same use 
 may be held under different laws in one state from those 
 under which it was acquired in another, and may be subject 
 to different duties and obligations, so that property of the 
 
 States does not stand in the shoes 
 of the state, and it cannot take the 
 property of a municipal corpora- 
 tion held for governmental pur- 
 poses without compensation. Na- 
 hant V. United States, 136 Fed. 273, 
 69 L. R. A. 723. 
 
 85. United States. — Dartmouth 
 College V. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 
 518, 694, 4 L. ed. 629, 673; Tippe- 
 canoe County V. Lucas, 93 U. S. 
 108, 23 L. ed. 822; New Orleans v. 
 New Orleans Waterworks, 142 
 TJ. S. 79, 35 L. ed. 943; Worcester 
 V. Worcester, etc., St. Ry. Co., 196 
 U. S. 539, 49 L. ed. 591; In re 
 Land at Nahant, 128 Fed. 185. 
 
 California. — • Grogan v. San 
 Francisco, 18 Cal. 590. 
 
 Florida. — Bradford v. Shine, 13 
 Fla. 393, 7 Am. Rep. 239. 
 
 Georgia. — • Savannah v. Steam- 
 boat Co. of Georgia, R. M. Charlt. 
 342. 
 
 Indiana. — EvansviUe v. State, 
 188 Ind. 426, 21 N. E. 267, 4 
 L. R. A. 93; State v. Denny, 118 
 Ind. 449, 21 N. E. 274, 4 L. R. A. 
 65; State v. Fox, 158 Ind. 126, 63 
 N. E. 19, 56 L. R. A. 893. 
 
 Iowa. — Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 24 Iowa 455; State 
 V. Barker, 116 Iowa 96, 89 N. W. 
 
 204, 57 L. R. A. 244, 93 Am. St. 
 Rep. 222. 
 
 Kansas. — ^Wellington v. Welling- 
 ton, 46 Kan. 213, 26 Pac. 415. 
 
 Kentucky. — Louisville v. Uni- 
 versity of Louisville, 15 B. Mon. 
 642, 671. 
 
 Louisiana. — New Orleans, etc., 
 R. R. Co. v. New Orleans, 26 La. 
 Ann. 478. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Mt. Hope Ceme- 
 tery V. Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 33 
 N. E. 695, 35 Am. St. Rep. 515; 
 Higginson v. Boston, 212 Mass. 
 583, 99 N. E. 523, 42 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 215. 
 
 Michigan. — People v. Common 
 Council of Detroit, 28 Mich. 228, 
 15 Am. Rep. 202 ; Davidson v. Hine, 
 151 Mich. 294, 115 N. W. 246, 15 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 575, 123 Am. St. 
 Rep. 267, 14 Ann. Cas. 352. 
 
 Montana. — State v. Edwards, 42 
 Mont. 135, 111 Pac. 734, Ann. Cas. 
 1912 A 1063. 
 
 New York. — People v. Porter, 
 90 N. Y. 68 ; Benson v. New York, 
 10 Barb. 245; Webb v. New York, 
 64 How. Pr. 10. 
 
 Vermont. — Montpelier v. East 
 Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12, 67 Am. Dee. 
 748. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Milwaukee v. Mil- 
 waukee, 12 Wis. 94; State v. 
 Haben, 22 Wis. 660. 
 
§ 131 What Constitutes Pbopebty. 393 
 
 same kind might be held strictly for public uses in one state, 
 while in another it might not be.*® Moreover, although the 
 two-fold character of municipal corporations is recognized 
 in branches of the law other than that now under considera- 
 tion, notably that relating to their liability for tort, and in 
 general the same distinction is made between the two char- 
 acters of such bodies, the exact line drawn is sometimes 
 very different, so that the same undertaking may be held 
 in the same state governmental for some purposes and pri- 
 vate for others.*^ 
 
 When property has been acquired in fee by a municipal 
 corporation by gift, devise or special dedication for a desig- 
 nated purpose, the legislature cannot require the use of the 
 property for a different purpose without the exercise of 
 the power of eminent domain with all its incidents.** The 
 rights which are protected in such a case however are those 
 of the donor, devisor or dedicator, rather than of the munic- 
 ipal corporation, and the difficulty would not be removed by 
 the consent of the corporation or of its inhabitants. When 
 the public, or a municipal corporation representing the 
 public, has acquired only an easement in the property taken, 
 
 86. Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Bos- Massachusetts. — Gary Library v. 
 ton, 158 Mass. 509, 512, 33 N. E. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 25 N. E. 92, 
 695, 35 Am. St. Rep. 515. 7 L. R. A. 765; Howe v. Lowell, 
 
 87. Thus in Indiana a municipal 171 Mass. 575, 51 N. E. 536 ; Cod- 
 corporation holds its fire depart- man v. Crocker, 203 Mass. 146, 150, 
 ment in its private capacity so that 89 N. E. 177. 
 
 the state cannot take away the Minnesota. — St. Paul v. Chicago, 
 
 property connected therewith. etc., R. R. Co., 63 Minn. 330, 352, 
 
 State V. Fox, 158 Ind. 126, 63 63 N. W. 267, 65 N. W. 649, 68 
 
 N. E. 19, 56 L. R. A. 893. But it N. W. 458, 34 L. R. A. 184. 
 
 is not liable for the negligence of Mississippi. — Rowzee v. Pierce, 
 
 its fire department. Robinson v. 75 Miss. 846, 23 So. 307, 40 
 
 Evansville, 87 Ind. 344. See also L. R. A. 402, 65 Am. St. Rep. 625. 
 
 on the subject of municipal liabil- Missouri. — Rutherford v. Taylor, 
 
 ity for negligence, § 486, infra. 38 Mo. 315; Price v. Thompson, 48 
 
 88. Colorado.— Mclntyre v. El Mo. 361. 
 
 Paso County, 15 Col. App. 78, 61 Ohio. — Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. 
 
 Pac. 237. V. Cincinnati, 76 Ohio St. 481, 81 
 
 Illinois. — Jacksonville v. Jack- N. E. 983. 
 sonville R. R. Co., 67 111. 540; Orejrow.— Church v. Portland, 18 
 
 Riverside v. McLain, 210 111. 308, Ore. 75. 
 71 N. E. 408, 66 L. R. A. 288, 102 
 Am. St. Rep. 164. 
 
394 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 132 
 
 the owner of the fee may be heard in objection to a change 
 in the use of the property by direction of the legislature, 
 whether with or without the consent of the municipal 
 authorities.** Even when a municipal corporation has 
 acquired a tract of land in fee by the exercise of eminent 
 domain, if the funds required to pay for the property have 
 been raised by special assessments upon neighboring prop- 
 erty benefited by the use of the land taken for the purpose 
 designated in the proceedings, it has been held in some cases 
 that the owners of the land assessed may object to a change 
 in the use of the land taken under legislative authority.*" 
 But when a municipal corporation has acquired the absolute 
 title in fee of property by purchase or the exercise of emi- 
 nent domain, and has paid full consideration for the land 
 taken out of funds raised by general taxation, so that there 
 are no private parties legally interested in the use of the 
 property, the right of the legislature to change the use 
 depends wholly upon the capacity in which the municipality 
 acted in acquiring the property. 
 
 § 132. Property of Municipal Corporations — Streets. 
 
 Whatever doubts may arise regarding other property, it 
 is well settled that streets and highways are held in trust 
 for the public, and whatever estate or interest in them 
 belongs to the city or town in which they lie is owned by the 
 municipality in its governmental capacity and as an agency 
 of the state.*^ The power of the state over highways is, as 
 
 89. Infra, § 151. Massachusetts. — Prince v. 
 
 90. Supra, § 116. Crocker, 166 Mass. 347, 44 N. E. 
 
 91. United yS'taies.— Woreester v. 446, 32 L. R. A. 610; Browne v. 
 Worcester, etc., St. Ey. Co., 196 Turner, 176 Mass. 9, 56 N. E. 969; 
 U. S. 539, 49 L. ed. 591. Springfield v. Springfield St. Ry. 
 
 Illinois.— Veo-ple v. "Walsh, 96 Co., 182 Mass. 41, 64 N. E. 577. 
 
 ni. 232, 36 Am. Rep. 135; Heffner West Virginia. — A r 'ben z v. 
 
 V. Cass and Morgan Counties, 193 Wheeling, etc., R. R. Co., 33 W. 
 
 111. 439, 62 N. E. 201, 58 L. R. A. Va. 1, 10 S. E. 14; Tyler County 
 
 353. Court v. Grafton, 86 S. E. 924. 
 
 Kansas. — State v. Shawnee Wisconsin.— State v. Hilhert, 72 
 
 County Commissioners, 83 Kan. Wis. 184, 39 N. W. 326, and see 
 
 199, 110 Pac. 92. also infra, notes 94 and 95. 
 
§ 132 
 
 What Constitutes Pbopebty. 
 
 395 
 
 against the municipality, absolute, and the legislature, as 
 representing the public, may decide what roads shall be 
 built and how they shall be paid for, and unless its com- 
 mands are manifestly unreasonable, the burdened munic- 
 ipality cannot complain.*^ Included in this complete domin- 
 ion over the public ways lies the power to devote them to 
 any other use the legislature may consider of more advan- 
 tage to the public. If the municipality does not own the fee, 
 of course the abutting owner might complain, and in those 
 states in which it is held that the abutting owner has rights 
 in the streets even if the fee is in the public,** those rights 
 cannot be taken without compensation; but without com- 
 pensating the municipality, even if it owns the fee, the legis- 
 lature may change a street to a park,®* and authorize the 
 laying of water pipes or gas pipes, and the construction 
 of steam railroads, street railways and telephone and tele- 
 graph lines in public streets, against the wiU of the local 
 authorities.®^ 
 
 92. Connecticut. — State ex rel. 
 Bulkely v. Williams, 68 Conn. 131, 
 35 Atl. 24, 48 L. E. A. 465. 
 
 Maryland. — Pumphrey v. Balti- 
 more, 47 Md. 145, 28 Am. Rep. 446. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Norwich v. 
 
 Haijpshire County Commissioners, 
 13 Pick. 60; Hingham, etc., Bridge 
 Co. V. Norfolk County, 6 Allen 353. 
 
 Oregon. — Simon v. Northrup, 27 
 Ore. 487, 40 Pac. 560, 30 L. R. A. 
 171. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Philadelphia v. 
 Field, 58 Pa. 320. 
 
 93. Infra, § 160. 
 
 94. Gerhardt v. Reeves, 75 111. 
 301; Chicago v. Carpenter, 201 111. 
 402, 66 N. E. 362; Paul v. Detroit, 
 32 Mioh. 108. So also a street may 
 be taken for a levee without the 
 consent of the municipal authori- 
 ties. State V. Shawnee County 
 Commissioners, 83 Kan. 199, 110 
 Pae. 92. 
 
 95. California. — In re Johnston, 
 137 Cal. 115, 69 Pae. 973. 
 
 Georgia. — Savannah, etc., R. R. 
 
 Co. V. Savannah, 45 Ga. 602; Floyd 
 v. Rome St. Ry. Co., 77 Ga. 614; 
 Athens Terminal Co. v. Athens 
 Foundry, etc., Works, 129 Ga. 393, 
 58 S. E. 891. 
 
 Iowa. — Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 24 Iowa 455; Cham- 
 berlain v. Iowa Tel. Co., 119 Iowa 
 619, 93 N. W. 596. 
 
 Maine. — In re Millbridge, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 96 Me. 110, 51 Atl. 818. 
 
 Maryland. — Dulaney v. United 
 Railways & Electric Co., 104 Md. 
 423, 65 Atl. 45. 
 
 Minnesota. — St. Paul v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 63 Minn. 330, 63 
 N. W. 267, 34 L. R. A. 184; Inter- 
 national Falls v. Minnesota, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 117 Minn. 14, 134 N. W. 
 302. 
 
 Mississippi. — Meridean v. West- 
 em Union Tel. Co., 72 Miss. 912, 
 18 So. 84, 29 L. R. A. 770; Canton 
 V. Canton Cotton Warehouse Co., 
 84 Miss. 268, 36 So. 266, 65 L. R. A. 
 561, 105 Am. St. Rep. 428. 
 
 New Jersey. — Summit v. New 
 
396 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 132 
 
 A city or town is not however wholly without rights even 
 in a public way. The public easement in a bridge, forming 
 part of a highway; is completely under legislative control,®* 
 but the timbers or other materials in the bridge may be said 
 to be the property of the town in a stricter sense,®^ so that 
 there is some authority for holding that the town must be 
 compensated for them when they are destroyed by the con- 
 struction of some other public work.®* If the highway over 
 the bridge is discontinued, the materials in the bridge would 
 become the absolute property of the town,®® and the same is 
 probably true of the curbstones, lamp posts and other mate- 
 rials put into a roadway by a city or town.^ 
 
 York, etc., Tel. Co., 57 N. J. Eq. 
 123, 41 Atl. 146; Philadelphia, etc., 
 Ferry Co. v. Intercity Link R. R. 
 Co., 73 N. J. L. 86, 65 Atl. 1118. 
 
 New York. — People v. Kerr, 27 
 N. Y. 188; Pelham Manor v. New 
 Rochelle Water Co., 143 N. Y. 532, 
 38 N. E. 711; New Union Tel. Co. 
 V. Marsh, 96 App. Div. 122, 89 
 N. Y. Supp. 79. 
 
 Ohio. — Zanesville v. Zanesville 
 Tel., etc., Co., 64 Ohio St. 67, 59 
 N. E. 781, 52 L. R. A. 150, 83 Am. 
 St. Rep. 725. 
 
 Oregon. — Portland, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Portland, 14 Ore. 188, 12 Pae. 
 265, 58 Am. Rep. 299. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — ■ Case of Philadel- 
 phia & Trenton R. R. Co., 6 Whart. 
 25, 36 Am. Dec. 202; Mercer v. 
 Pittsburgh, etc., R. C. Co., 36 Pa. 
 99; MUlvale v. Evergreen Ry. Co., 
 131 Pa. 1, 18 Atl. 993, 7 L. R. A. 
 369. 
 
 When a city took land outside of 
 its limits for a water supply and 
 was given control of the highways 
 in such land, in trust for highway 
 purposes, it was not entitled to 
 compensation when a telephone line 
 was placed in such highways; State 
 Line Telephone Co. v. Ellison, 121 
 App. Div. (N. Y.) 499, 106 N. Y. 
 Supp. 130. When a public service 
 corporation has authority from the 
 
 legislature to lay pipes in the 
 streets of a city, subject to the 
 regulation of the municipal au- 
 thorities, the regulation must per- 
 tain to the safety of the public, and 
 the city cannot, under the guise of 
 regulation, require the corporation 
 to provide free service for munici- 
 pal purposes, by way of compensa- 
 tion for the use of the streets. Ver- 
 non V. United Natural Gas Co., 64 
 Pittsburgh Law Journal (Pa.), 150. 
 
 96. Floyd v. Rome St. Ry. Co., 
 77 Ga. 614; Tyler County Court v. 
 Grafton, (W. Va.) 86 S. E. 924. 
 
 97. Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 
 164 Mass. 687, 42 N. E. 119. 
 
 98. Troy v. Cheshire R. R. Co., 
 23 N. H. 83, 55 Am. Dee. 177. But 
 see HefEner v. Cass and Morgan 
 Counties, 193 m. 439, 62 N. E. 201, 
 58 L. R. A. 353; American Steel 
 Dredge Works v. Putnam County 
 Commissioners (Ind. App.), 84 
 N. E. 19, 170 Ind. 571, 85 N. E. 1. 
 
 99. Shirk v. CarroU County Com- 
 missioners, 106 Ind. 593, 5 N. E. 
 705, 7 N. E. 251; Greely v. Saline 
 County, 26 Kan. 510; Common- 
 wealth V. Fitzgerald, 164 Mass. 587, 
 42 N. E. 119. 
 
 1. United States. — Nahant v. 
 United States, 136 Fed. 273, 69 
 
§ 132 
 
 What Constitutes Pbopebty. 
 
 397 
 
 A town, when it does not own the fee of a public way, is 
 not an ' ' owner " so as to entitle it to petition for compen- 
 sation for injuries authorized hy the legislature,^ but it has 
 such an interest as to enable it to contest the validity of 
 statutes authorizing the taking or injuring of its highways.^ 
 When a town owns the fee of the land under a public way 
 it may maintain an action for an unauthorized injury con- 
 sisting of digging up and carrying away earth,* but when 
 the town owns only an easement, an injury to the road is 
 ordinarily only a public injury to be redressed by indict- 
 ment or some proceeding instituted by the attorney-general. 
 A town, however, may recover when it suffers special dam- 
 age,^ such as being put to expense in repairing the way,' 
 
 L. R. A. 723; United States v. 
 Nahant, 153 Fed. 520. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Commonwealth 
 V. Fitzgerald, 164 Mass. 587, 42 
 N. E. 119. 
 
 Ohio. — Corwin v. Cowan, 12 
 Ohio St. 639 (materials of canal) ; 
 Wagner v. Cleveland, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 22 Ohio St. 563, 10 Am. Rep. 
 770 (materials of railroad). 
 
 2. Milbury v. Blackstone Canal 
 Co., 8 Pick. (Mass.) 473; Andover 
 V. Sutton, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 182; 
 Cheshire v. Adams, etc., Reservoir 
 Co., 119 Mass. 347. When a stat- 
 ute provides that before a street is 
 vacated the abutting owners must 
 pay to the city the value of the 
 portion of the street in front of 
 their premises, the city is vested 
 with a valuable interest in the street 
 and is entitled to substantial dam- 
 ages when the street is condemned 
 for railroad purposes. In re 
 Omaha Bridge & Terminal Ry. Co., 
 90 Neb. 527, 134 N. W. 172. See 
 also Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. 
 Wihnington, 154 F. C. 331, 70 S. E. 
 628, in which, on the facts a city 
 was held entitled to compensation 
 for the taking of an easement in a 
 street by a railroad. 
 
 3. In re Certain Lands in Law- 
 rence, 119 Fed. 453. 
 
 4. Needham v. New York, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 152 Mass. 61, 25 N. B. 
 20. 
 
 5. California. — Sutter County v. 
 Nicols, 152 Cal. 688, 93 Pac. 872, 
 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 616, 14 Ann. 
 Cas. 900. 
 
 Kentucky. — Lawrence County v. 
 Chattaroi R. R. Co., 81 Ky. 224; 
 Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. 
 Whitley County Court, 95 Ky. 215, 
 24 S. W. 604, 44 Am. St. Rep. 220. 
 
 Indiana. — ■ M'uncie Natural Gas 
 Co. v. Muneie, 160 Ind. 97, 66 
 N. E. 436, 60 L. R. A. 822. 
 
 Maine. — Monmouth v. Gardiner, 
 35 Me. 247. 
 
 Massachusetts.— Brookfleld v. 
 Walker, 100 Mass. 94. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Troy v . 
 Cheshire R. R. Co., 23 N. H. 83, 
 55 Am. Dec. 177; Laconia v. Oil- 
 man, 55 N. H. 127. 
 
 New Jersey. — Bridgeton v. 
 Bridgeton, etc.. Traction Co., 62 
 N. J. L. 592, 43 Atl. 715, 45 
 L. R.sA. 837. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Woodring v . 
 Forks Township, 28 Pa. 355, 70 
 Am. Dec. 134. 
 
 6. Andover v. Sutton, 12 Mete. 
 (Mass.) 182; Bidelman v. State, 
 110 N. Y. 232, 18 N. E. 115. 
 
398 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain, 
 
 § 133 
 
 but not until it has suffered the damages by expending the 
 moneyJ A town has further been allowed to maintain an 
 action of ejectment against one who unlawfully occupies a 
 public way within its limits,^ and has been granted an 
 injunction to restrain a continuing injury to one of its high- 
 ways, even if the injury was only to the public* 
 
 § 133. Property of Municipal Corporations other than 
 Streets. 
 
 Public parks are, according to the weight of authority, 
 held by cities and towns for the benefit of the general public 
 rather than for that of the municipalities in their propri- 
 etary capacity, and may be taken by the legislature and 
 devoted to some other public use without compensation.** 
 The enjoyment of public parks can hardly be restricted to 
 residfints of a particular city or town. They cannot be made 
 
 7. Freedom v. Weed, 40 Me. 383, 
 63 Am. Dec. 670. 
 
 8. Chicago v. Wright, 69 111. 318; 
 Lee V. Harris, 206 111. 428, 69 N. E. 
 230, 99 Am. St. Bep. 176; Metho- 
 dist Episcopal Church v. Hoboken, 
 33 N. J. L. 13, 97 Am. Dee. 696; 
 Klinkener v. McKeesport, 11 Pa. 
 444. 
 
 9. InMana. — Muncie Natural Gas 
 Co. V. Muncie, 160 Ind. 97, 66 N. E. 
 436, 60 L. R. A. 822. 
 
 Michigan. — Merritt Township v. 
 Harp, 131 Mich. 174, 91 N. W. 
 156; Bangor Township v. Bay 
 City Traction, etc., Co., 147 Mich. 
 165, 110 N. W. 490, 5 St. By. Rep. 
 499. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Franklin v, 
 Durgee, 71 N. H. 186, 51 Atl. 911, 
 58 L. R. A. 112. 
 
 New Jersey. — Greenwich v. 
 Easton, etc., R. R. Co., 24 N. J. 
 Eq. 217. 
 
 New York. — Haverstraw v. Eck- 
 erson, 192 N. Y. 54, 84 N. E. 578. 
 
 10. United States. — In re Land 
 in Lawrence, 119 Fed. 453; In re 
 Land at Nahant 128 Fed. 185. 
 
 Connecticwt. — Hartford v. Ma»- 
 len, 76 Conn. 599, 611, 57 Atl. 740. 
 
 Illinois. — West Chicago Park 
 Commissioners v. McMuUen, 134 
 111. 170, 25 N. E. 676, 10 L. R. A. 
 215. 
 
 Kansas. — Daughters v. Riley 
 County, 81 Kan. 548, 552, 106 Pac. 
 297, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 938. 
 
 Maryland. — Baltimore v. Reitz, 
 50 Md. 574, 581. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Codman v. Croc- 
 ker, 203 Mass. 146, 89 N. E. 177, 25 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 980; Higginson v. 
 Boston, 212 Mass. 583, 99 N. E. 
 623, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 215. 
 
 Ohio. — Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Cincinnati, 76 Ohio St. 481, 497. 
 
 Contra, State v. Edwards, 42 
 Mont. 135, 111 Pac. 734, 32 L. B. A. 
 (N. S.) 1078, Ann. Cas. 1912 A 
 1063; Mount Hope Cemetery v. 
 Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 33 N. E. 695, 
 35 Am. St. Bep. 513 {dictum); 
 Park Commissioners v. Detroit, 28 
 Mich. 228, 15 Am. Bep. 202; State 
 V. Schweickardt, 109 Mo. 496, 512, 
 19 S. W. 47. See also People v. 
 Mayor of Chicago, 51 111. 17, 2 
 Am. Ben- 278. 
 
§ 133 What Constitutes Pkoperty. 399 
 
 a source of revenue as may a system of waterworks, or sew- 
 erage or gas, electric light, or markets. Their use by those 
 most needing them might be prevented by any pecuniary 
 charge. Historically, the advantages derived from parks 
 have never been treated as proper subjects for private 
 enterprise as have the other functions, which, when assumed 
 by the city or town, have been regarded as private. The 
 dominant aim in the establishment of public parks appears 
 to be the common good of mankind rather than the special 
 gain or private benefit of a particular city or town. The 
 healthful and civilizing influence of parks in and near con- 
 gested areas of population is of more than local interest, 
 and under modern conditions has become a concern of the 
 state." 
 
 The property of the police department of a city is 
 acquired and held for a strictly public use, for although the 
 suppression of crime and disorder is of especial benefit to 
 the inhabitants of the city by which the department is main- 
 tained, it is essentially a governmental function, and a fail- 
 ure upon the part of the city authorities to undertake it 
 with vigor would affect injuriously the interests of the 
 entire public. It is accordingly held that the property of a 
 municipal police department may be taken over, without 
 the consent of the city, by commissioners appointed by the 
 governor under legislative authority.^^ 
 
 11. Rugg, C. J., in Higginson v. Kentucky. — Police Commission- 
 Boston, 212 Mass. 583, 589, 99 era v. Louisville, 3 Bush 597; Lex- 
 N. E. 523, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 215. ington v. Thompson, 113 Ky. 540, 
 
 12. Alabama.— Fox v. McDonald, 68 S. W. 477, 57 L. R. A. 775, 101 
 101 Ala. 51, 13 So. 416, 21 L. R. A. Am. St. Rep. 361. 
 
 529, 46 Am. St. Rep. 98. Maryland. — Baltimore v. State, 
 
 Georgia.— Americus v. Perry, 114 15 Md. 376, 74 Am. Dec. 572. 
 
 Ga. 871, 40 S. E. 1004, 57 L. R. A. Massachusetts. — Commonwealth 
 
 230. V. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 19 N. E. 
 
 Indiana.— State ex rel. Law v. 224, 2 h. R. A. 142, 12 Am. St. 
 
 Blend, 121 Ind. 514, 23 N. E. 511, Rep. 566. 
 
 16 Am. St. Rep. 411; State ex rel. Michigan. — Davidson v. Hine, 
 
 Terre Haute v. Kolsem, 130 Ind. 151 Mich. 294, 115 N. W. 246, 15 
 
 434, 29 N. E. 595, 14 L. R. A. 566; L. R. A. (N. S.) 575, 123 Am. St. 
 
 Amett V. State, 168 Ind. 180, 80 Rep. 267, 14 Ann. Cas. 352. 
 
 N. E. 153, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1192. Missouri.— State v. St. Louis 
 
 Kansas. — State v. Hunter, 38 County Court, 34 Mo. 546. 
 
 Kan. 578, 17 Pac. 177. Nebraska.— Redell v. Moores, 63 
 
400 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 133 
 
 There appears to be a conflict of authority with respect 
 to the character in which a municipal corporation holds its 
 public school buildings,'* and the equipment of its fire 
 department." Both of these undertakings are of special 
 advantage to the inhabitants of the city; both of them in 
 certain parts of the world are looked upon wholly as mat- 
 ters of private concern ; but both enure incidentally to the 
 good of the whole community, and in neither of them is the 
 city liable in tort for negligence in operation. It would 
 seem the sounder rule to hold both of these undertakings to 
 be governmental. 
 
 The property of a municipal corporation which cannot be 
 taken from it without compensation includes its system of 
 
 Neb. 219, 88 N. W. 243, 55 L. R. A. 
 740, 93 Am. St. Rep. 431; State v. 
 Broatch, 68 Neb. 687, 94 N. "W. 
 1016, 110 Am. St. Rep. 477. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Gooeh v. 
 Exeter, 70 N. H. 413, 48 Atl. 1100, 
 85 Am. St. Rep. 637. 
 
 Ohio. — State v. Covington, 29 
 Ohio St. 102. 
 
 Bhode Island. — Newport v. Hor- 
 ton, 22 R. I. 196, 47 Atl. 312, 50 
 L. R. A. 330; Horton v. Newport, 
 27 R. I. 283, 61 Atl. 759, 1 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 512, 8 Ann. Cas. 1097. 
 
 Virginia. — Bureh v. Hardwieke, 
 30 Gratt. 24, 32 Am. Rep. 640. 
 
 13. Held subject to legislative 
 ademption in: 
 
 Connecticut. — State ex rel. Walsh 
 V. Hine, 59 Conn. 50, 21 Atl. 1024, 
 10 L. R. A. 83. 
 
 Illinois. — Bush v. Shipman, 5 HI. 
 190. 
 
 Indiana. — State v. Haworth, 122 
 Ind. 462, 23 N. E. 946, 7 L. R. A, 
 240. 
 
 Kansas. — State v. Freeman, 61 
 Kan. 90, 58 Pae. 959, 47 L. R. A. 
 67. 
 
 Maryland. — ReveU v. Annapolis, 
 81 Md. 1, 31 Atl. 695. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Whitney v. 
 Stow, 111 Mass. 368; Rawson v. 
 Spencer, 113 Mass. 40. 
 
 Tennessee. — Leeper v. State, 103 
 Tenn. 500, 53 S. W. 962, 48 L. R. A. 
 167; Edmondson v. Memphis, 108 
 Tenn, 557, 69 S. W. 274, 58 L. R. A. 
 170. 
 
 Contra, Milam County v. Bate- 
 man, 54 Tex. 153, 166; State v. 
 Haben, 22 Wis. 660. 
 
 14. Held subject to legislative 
 ademption in Baltimore v. State, 15 
 Md. 376, 74 Am. Dee. 572; RedeU 
 V. Moores, 63 Neb. 219, 88 N. W. 
 243, 55 L. R. A. 740, 93 Am. St. 
 Rep. 431. Contra, Evansville v. 
 State, 118 Ind. 426, 21 N. E. 267, 
 4 L. R. A. 93; State v. Eox, 158 
 Ind. 126, 63 N. E. 19, 56 L. R. A. 
 893; Lexington v. Thompson, 113 
 Ky. 540, 68 S. W. 477, 57 L. R. A. 
 775, 101 Am. St. Rep. 331; David- 
 son v. Hine, 151 Mich. 294, 115 
 N. W. 246, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 575, 
 123 Am. St. Rep. 267, 14 Ann. Cas. 
 352. 
 
§ 133 
 
 What Constitutes Peopehty. 
 
 .401 
 
 waterworks/^ and of sewers,'^® and its gas or electric light- 
 ing plants," its cemeteries,^* its markets," its hospitals,^" 
 its librariesj^^ its ferries,^^ and in general aU works from 
 which it can derive a revenue, or which enure to the advan- 
 tage of its inhabitants rather than to that of the public at 
 large ; and also all funds specifically devoted to enterprises 
 of this class.'^^ 
 
 15. United States. — In re Land 
 at Nahant, 128 Fed. 185; Omaha 
 Water Co. v. Omaha, 77 C. C. A. 
 267, 147 Fed. 1, 12 L. E. A. (N. S.) 
 736, 8 Ann. Cas. 614; United States 
 V. Nahant, 153 Fed. 520. 
 
 Iowa, — State v. Barker, 116 
 Iowa 96, 89 N. W. 204, 57 L. R. A. 
 244, 93 Am. St. Rep. 222. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Mt. Hope Ceme- 
 tery V. Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 33 
 N. E. 695, 35 Am. St. Rep. 515. 
 
 Michigan. — People v. Hurlburt, 
 24 Mich. 44, 9 Am. Rep. 103. 
 
 Montana. — Helena Consolidated 
 "Water Co. v. Steele, 20 Mont. 1, 49 
 Pae. 382, 37 L. R. A. 412. 
 
 New York. — Benson v. New 
 York, 10 Barb. 245 ; Webb v. New 
 York, 64 How. Pr. 10. 
 
 North Carolina. — Asbury v. Al- 
 bemarle, 162 N. C. 247, 78 S. E. 
 146, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1189. 
 
 South Dakota. — Huron Water- 
 works Co. V. Huron, 7 S. D. 9, 62 
 N. W. 975, 30 L. R. A. 848, 58 Am. 
 St. Rep. 817. 
 
 Contra, Coyle v. Mclntire, 7 
 Houst. (Del.) 44, 30 Atl. 728, 
 40 Am. St. Rep. 109; David v. 
 Portland Water Committee, 14 Ore. 
 98, and see Chicago v. Cicero, 210 
 111. 290, 71 N. E. 356, holding that 
 municipal waterworks, although the 
 private property of the city, are 
 subject to legislative regulation just 
 as the works of all public service 
 companies are. 
 
 16. Higginson v. Boston, 212 
 Mass. 583, 589, 99 N. E. 523, 42 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 215; People v. 
 Hurlburt, 24 Mich. 44, 9 Am. Rep. 
 103; Yan Cleve v, Passaic Valley 
 26 
 
 Commissioners, 71 N. J. L. 183, 574, 
 58 Atl. 571, 60 Atl. 214, 108 Am. 
 St. Rep. 754. 
 
 17. Higginson v. Boston, 212 
 Mass. 583, 589, 99 N. E. 523, 42 
 L. R. A. (N. S,) 215. 
 
 18. Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Bos- 
 ton, 158 Mass. 509, 83 N. E. 695, 
 35 Am. St. Rep. 515. When how- 
 ever a municipal corporation holds 
 a cemetery merely as trustee, with- 
 out any beneficial interest therein, 
 the l^slature may constitutionally 
 require the cemetery to be turned 
 over to some other trustee without 
 compensation to the municipality. 
 Smith V. Weseott, 17 R. I. 366, 22 
 Atl. 280, 13 L. R. A. 217; Columbus 
 V. Columbus, 82 Wis. 374, 52 N. W. 
 425, 16 L. R. A. 695. 
 
 19. Clinton v. Cedar Rapids R. 
 R. Co., 24 Iowa 455; Mt. Hope 
 Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 
 33 N. E. 695, 35 Am. St. Rep. 515; 
 Benson v. New York, 10 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 245. 
 
 20. Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Bos- 
 ton, 158 Mass. 509, 33 N. E. 695, 
 35 Am. St. Rep. 515. Contra, 
 Davock v. Moore, 105 Mich, 120, 63 
 N. W. 424, 28 L. R. A. 783. 
 
 21. State V. Des Moines, 103 Iowa 
 76, 72 N. W. 639, 39 L. R. A. 285, 
 64 Am. St. Rep. 157; Mt. Hope 
 Cemetery v. feoston, 158 Mass. 509, 
 33 N. E. 695, 35 Am. St. Rep. 515. 
 
 22. Benson v. New York, 10 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 245, and see also 
 Davies v. Boston, 190 Mass. 194, 
 76 N. E. 663. 
 
 23. Tippecanoe County Commis- 
 sioners V. Lucas, 93 U. S. 108, 23 
 
402 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 133 
 
 When a municipal corporation has entered into a valid 
 contract with private parties dealing with some govern- 
 mental matter, the legislature may, with the consent of the 
 other party thereto, but against the will of the municipality, 
 abrogate or modify the contract;^* but when the contract 
 relates to the private affairs of the municipality, its obliga- 
 tion cannot be impaired by the state,^^ A franchise granted 
 by the state to a municipal corporation is, however, what- 
 ever the nature of its subject-matter, legislation rather than 
 compact, and may be subsequently altered or annulled by 
 the legislature without the consent of the municipal corpo- 
 ration or the payment of compensation.^® 
 
 Whatever the character in which property is held, if the 
 municipality consents to the devotion of the property to a 
 different use, individual inhabitants cannot be heard to com- 
 plain.^'' The consent of the municipality, however, must be 
 given by the inhabitants themselves, at an election called 
 for the purpose, or by the city council or a similar body hav- 
 ing a general delegated power to act for the municipality. 
 The legislature cannot evade the constitutional provision 
 
 L. ed. 822 ; Spaulding v. Andover, Indiana^ — Sloeum v. State, 8 
 
 54 N. H. 38; State v. Haben, 22 Blackf. 361. 
 
 Wis. 660. Louisiana. — Police Jury v. 
 
 24. United States v. Baltimore, Shreveport, 5 La. Ann. 661. 
 
 etc., R. R. Co., 17 Wall. (U. S.) Michigan.— Saginaw County Su- 
 
 322, 21 L. ed. 597; Worcester v. pervisors v. Hubinger, 137 Mich 72, 
 
 Worcester, etc., Ry. Co., 196 U. S. loO N. W. 261, 4 Ann. Cas. 792. 
 
 539, 4 L. ed. 591; Springfield v. Missouri.— St. Louis v. Shields, 
 
 Springfield St. Ry. Co., 182 Mass. 52 Mo. 351. 
 
 '^'J\^\ ?■ ^^^ .,„ XT o, ^ew Toj-fc.— People v. Morris, 13 
 
 25. Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. Wg^^ 325 
 
 289, 305, 29 L. ed. 620, 626. t^\ ' w i,- tvt 
 
 ofl rr •* J c(^ * 17 4. IT -I. Tennessee. — Memphis v. Mem- 
 
 26. TJmted States. — East Hart- „.■ -rir , ^ c tt • i mxr 
 c 3 TT_i.j>3T>-j /> iA Piiis Water Co., 5 Heisk. 495. 
 ford V. Hartford Bndge Co., 10 ^ ._ , . ^ ' ^ ^ ^. 
 
 How. 511, 13 L. ed. 518; New ^ ™!?^*'"*-~?i^*t ^J-,^^^"'^ 
 
 Orleans, etc., R. R. Co. v. EUer- bounty Court, 67 Wash 37, 120 Pa*. 
 
 man, 105 U. S. 166, 26 L. ed. 1015; ^^1, Ann. Cas. 1913 D 78. 
 
 New Orleans v. New Orleans Wa- Contra, Benson v. New York, 10 
 
 terworks Co., 142 U. S. 79, 91, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 223. 
 
 L. ed. 943, 947. 27. Prince v. Crocker, 166 Mass. 
 
 Illinois.— Trustees of Schools v. 347, 44 N. E. 446, 32 L. R. A. 610; 
 
 Tatman, 13 111. 27, 30; Gutzweller Ware v. Fitohburg, 200 Mass. 61, 
 
 V. People, 14 111. 142. 71, 73, 85 N. E. 951. 
 
§ 133 What CoNSHTtrTES Pbopbety. 403 
 
 which prevents the taking of private property without the 
 consent of the municipality by providing that a particular 
 board of municipal officers of special and limited authority 
 shall have the power to give the consent of the city to the 
 taking of its property without compensation.^^ 
 
 28. Park Commissioners v. De- 202; Atkins v. Randolph, 31 Vt. 
 troit, 28 Mich. 228, 15 Am. Rep. 226. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 The Taking of Waters — ^^Ripaeiak Rights. 
 
 Bbcjtion 134. Tiiparian Eights are Property. 
 
 135. The Distinction between Public and ■Private "Waters. 
 
 136. Streams and Bodies of Wafers Classified. 
 
 137. Public Waters are Held by the State in Trust for the People. 
 
 138. The Public Rights do not Extend above High Water Mark. 
 
 139. The Public Right of Navigation. 
 
 140. The Right of Access to the Channel. 
 
 141. Limitations upon the Right of Access. 
 
 142. Riparian Owners' other Rights. 
 
 143. Diversion of Water. 
 
 144. The Doctrine of Prior Appropriation. 
 
 145. Riparian Rights of a Municipal Corporation. 
 
 146. Pollution by a Municipal Sewer System. 
 
 147. Prohibition of the Exercise of the Riparian Right of Rea- 
 
 sonable Pollution. 
 
 148. Wharves and Wharfage Rights. 
 
 149. Authorized Structures in Public Waters. 
 
 § 134. Riparian Rights are Property. 
 
 Water is capable of being reduced to property, as by 
 being confined in a tank, but in its natural state it is not 
 property.^ Every body of water is however the subject of 
 certain rights, known as littoral or riparian rights because 
 they appertain to the ownership of the shore or bank, which 
 extend to all parts of the body of water to which they belong. 
 In the case of a small unnavigable stream or pond lying 
 wholly within the lands of one individual, and having no 
 outlet except upon public waters, he is the owner of all the 
 rights in the stream or pond, and the stream or pond, and 
 
 1. Story, J., in Tyler v. Wilkin- mon by the law of nature." 2 Bl. 
 
 son, 4 Mason (U. S.) 400; Lynn- Com. 18. See also Race v. Ward, 
 
 field V. Peabody, 219 Mass. 322, 4 El. & Bl. 708, in which the court 
 
 106 N. E. 977; Sweet v. Syracuse, said: "An action for taking water' 
 
 129 N. Y. 335, 27 N. E. 10, 81, 29 the property of the plaintiff can- 
 
 N. E. 289. Blackstone says that an not be supported unless the water 
 
 action cannot be brought to recover was contained in a cistern or some 
 
 a certain amount of water, " for vessel or receptacle in which he had 
 
 water is a movable wandering thing placed it for his private use." 
 and must of necessity continue com- 
 
 [404] 
 
§ 134 The Taking op Wateks — Eipaeian Eights. 405 
 
 the water in it, may be called his property, except for the 
 technical purposes of common law pleading. When however 
 a watercourse lies within the lands of more than one pro- 
 prietor, each has certain rights in the whole stream by 
 virtue of his ownership of the shore or bank, and the sum of 
 these rights constitutes the ownership of the whole stream. 
 The same is true of a small lake or pond. If a watercourse 
 is navigable there are public rights in it, and in such case 
 the ownership consists of the public rights and the riparian 
 rights of the private owners, added together. In some 
 waters, such as the ocean below low water mark, there are 
 no private rights whatever. 
 
 In determining whether a taking of the property of a 
 riparian proprietor in the constitutional sense has been 
 effected by an interference with his rights in the water or 
 in the bed of the stream under legislative authority, the 
 first step is to determine what his rights are, for of course 
 a use of the waters or of the bed of the stream' which is 
 merely the exercise of the legal rights of one of the other 
 riparian proprietors, or of the public, however unpleasant 
 or injurious it may be, is not a taking of property. If how- 
 ever a new use of the waters or bed of a stream, under 
 authority of the legislature in behalf of a public improve- 
 ment, is a violation of the rights of a riparian proprietor in 
 the waters or bed of the stream, it is well settled that he 
 is protected by the constitution. In other words, riparian 
 rights are property which cannot be taken except for the 
 public use and upon the payment of just compensation.^ 
 
 2. California.— Sutter County v. 14 L. R. A. 498, 28 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 Nieols, 152 Cal. 688, 93 Pac. 872, 276. 
 
 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 616, 14 Ann. Minnesota. — Carlson v. St. Louis 
 
 Cas. 900; Northern Light & Power River Dam & Lnprovement Co., 73 
 
 Co. V. Stacker, 13 Cal. App. 404, Minn. 128, 75 N. W. 1044, 41 
 
 109 Pac. 896. L. R. A. 371, 72 Am. St. Rep. 610. 
 
 Colorado. — Strickler v. Colorado Missouri. — - State ex rel. Apple- 
 Springs, 16 Col. 61, 26 Pac. 313, gate v. Taylor, 224 Mo. 393, 123 
 25 Am. St. Rep. 245; Hartman v. S. W. 892. 
 
 Tresise, 36 Col. .146, 84 Pac. 685, Nebraska. — Crawford Co. v. 
 
 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 872. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N. W. 
 
 gam.—- Grand Rapids v. 781, 60 L. R. A. 889, 108 Am. St. 
 
 Powers, 89 Mich. 94, 50 N. W. 661, Rep. 647. 
 
406 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 134 
 
 Eiparian rights, like other property, are subject to the 
 police power of the state, and a reasonable regulation 
 enacted in behalf of the public health or safety in some 
 degree interfering with the free exercise of such rights is 
 not a taking for which compensation must be made.^ The 
 power of the state to impair the exercise of riparian rights 
 without compensation is however subject to the same some- 
 what shadowy limitations which govern the exercise of the 
 pplice power upon other property rights, and, as a restric- 
 tion ceases to be a general regulation in behalf of the public 
 health and safety and begins to more nearly resemble the 
 taking of an easement in property in behalf of a public 
 improvement, the line beyond which the state capnot go with 
 out compensating the individual is more quickly reached.^ 
 
 New Hampshire. — Taggart v. 
 Jaffrey, 75 N. H. 473, 76 Atl. 123, 
 139 Am. St. Rep. 729. 
 
 New Jersey. — Ten Eyck v. Dela- 
 ware & Raritan Canal Co., 3 Har- 
 rison 200, 37 Am. Dec. 233. 
 
 New York. — Gardner v. New- 
 burgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 161, 7 Am. Dee. 
 526; Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cowen 
 518, 16 Am. Dee. 447; In re Mon- 
 roe, 200 N. Y. 511, 93 N. E. 1125; 
 Western New York Water Co. v. 
 Niagara Palls, 154 N. Y. Supp. 
 1046. 
 
 North Ca/rolina. — Hutton v. 
 Webb, 124 N. C. 749, 126 N. C 
 897, 59 L. R. A. 33; Roanoke 
 Rapids Power Co. v. Roanoke Navi- 
 gation, etc., Co., 159 N. C. 393, 75 
 S. E. 29. 
 
 South Dakota^ — St. Germain 
 Irrigating Co. v. Hawthorn Ditch 
 Co., 32 S. D. 260, 143 N. W. 124. 
 
 Virginia. — Rankin v. Harrison- 
 burg, 104 Va. 524, 52 S. E. 555, 
 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 919, 113 Am. St. 
 Rep. 1050. 
 
 Washington. — Kalama Electric 
 Light & Power Co. v. Kalama Driv- 
 ing Co., 48 Wash. 612, 94 Pac. 469, 
 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 641. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Green Bay Canal 
 
 Co. V. Kaukauna Water Power Co., 
 90 Wis. 370, 61 N. W. 1121, 63 
 N. W. 1019, 28 L. R. A. 443, 48 
 Am. St. Rep. 937. 
 
 Riparian rights are none the less 
 property, and must be paid for 
 when taken, although all the ripar- 
 ian owners would have to unite to 
 make them available. Rankin v. 
 Harrisonburg, 104 Va. 524, 52 S. E.. 
 555, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 919, 113 
 Am. St. Rep. 1050. 
 
 3. Miles City v. State Board of 
 Health, 39 Mont. 405, 102 Pac. 
 696, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 589; State 
 V. Theriault, 70 Vt. 617, 41 Atl. 
 1030, 43 L. R. A. 290, 67 Am. St. 
 Rep. 695. See also infra, § 147. 
 
 4. See for example People v. Elk 
 River Mill & Lumber Co., 107 Cal. 
 221, 40 Pac. 531, 48 Am. St. Rep. 
 125, holding that riparian owners 
 cannot be prevented from causing a 
 reasonable degree of pollution with- 
 out condemnation of the rights 
 when the stream is required for a 
 public water supply; People v. 
 Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 91 N. W. 
 211, 64 L. R. A. 265, 100 Am. St. 
 Rep. 588, holding that riparian 
 owners could not be prevented from 
 bathing in water used for pubUc 
 
§ 135 The Taking of Watees — Eipaeian Eights. 407 
 
 Besides the public rights exercised by the public through 
 its governments, federal and state, there are many rights in 
 public waters exercised by members of the public as indi- 
 viduals and which, therefore, when asserted are never 
 alleged to constitute the taking of the property of the 
 riparian owners by eminent domain and which consequently 
 need not be further considered here. In this class fall the 
 rights of fishing, fowling, cutting ice and the like. 
 
 § 135. The Distinction between Public and Private 
 Waters. 
 
 Since the question whether in a particular case there has 
 been a taking of the riparian rights of the individual pro- 
 prietors or a mere assumption by public authority of the 
 public rights depends principally upon the substantive law 
 defining the relative rights of the public and the riparian 
 proprietors, to understand what rights in waters may thus 
 be assumed by the public without compensation, the sub- 
 stantive law referred to must be examined. By the common 
 law of England rivers were held to be public and navigable 
 as far as the rise and fall of the tide was felt.® This rule 
 was, however, rather a rule of fact crystallized into a rule 
 of law by reason of its applicability to almost all the streams 
 in the British Isles, than strictly speaking, a rule of law. 
 A number of streams above tide-water are held to be navi- 
 gable by prescription,^ and, on the other hand, small salt 
 water creeks not in fact navigable are held to be not navig- 
 able in law.'' The distinction between navigable and 
 
 supply; Janesville v. Carpenter, 77 5. Hale, De Jure Maris, cs. 1, 3; 
 
 Wis. 288, 46 N. W. 128, 8 L. E. A. Bulstrode v. Hall, 1 Sid. 148; 
 
 808, 20 Am. St. Rep. 123, holding Pearce v. Scotcher, 9 Q. B. D. 162; 
 
 that a riparian proprietor on a pri- Tilbury v. Silva, 45 Ch. D. 98; 
 
 vate stream cannot be prevented Murphy v. Ryan, Ir. R., 2 C. L. 
 
 from driving piles that will not 143. 
 
 interfere with any public right; 6. King v. Montague, 4 B. & C. 
 
 People V. Kirk, 136 App. Div. 96 ; Murphy v. Ryan, Ir. R., 2 C. L. 
 
 (N. Y.) 45, 119 N. Y. Supp. 862, 143. 
 
 holding a regulation of a board, of 7. Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, 1 
 
 health forbidding the cutting of ice Cowp. 86; Colchester v. B;-ooke, 7 
 
 on ponds used for a water supply Q. B. 339. 
 a taking of property without com- 
 pensation. See also infra, § 147. 
 
408 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 135 
 
 unnavigable streams in England is very important, for in 
 navigable streams the title to the bed is in the crown,^ but 
 in unnavigable streams each riparian proprietor owns to 
 the middle of the river, and has important private rights 
 in the waters.® In America it was almost immediately felt 
 that the English test of navigability was inappropriate to 
 the changed conditions, and if adopted would seriously hin- 
 der the development of the country. There are many large 
 streams navigable in fact far above tide-water and much 
 needed as highways, but on account of the recent settlement 
 of the country such rivers had of course not become navi- 
 gable by prescription. The old test was universally aban- 
 doned, and all streams that were in fact navigable were 
 held to be navigable in law,^" navigation being construed to 
 include boating for any useful purpose, and the floating of 
 logs." Public ownership of the bed of the stream has, how- 
 ever, not been held to be a necessary concomitant of naviga- 
 bility, and the relative rights of the public and the riparian 
 owners in the bed of navigable waters and in the beach 
 between high and low water mark is considered peculiarly 
 a matter for each state to decide for itself. Consequently 
 upon the test for public ownership of the bed of a navigable 
 
 8. Begina v. Ke3m, 2 Ex. D. 63. navigable in faot are not navigable 
 
 9. Rex V. Wharton, Holt 499. in law. Rowe v. Granite Bridge 
 
 10. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. Co., 21 Pick. (Mass.) 344. Ad- 
 324, 24 L. ed. 224, and see the fol- miralty jurisdiction extends be- 
 lowing early cases ■which established yond the ebb and flow of the tide, 
 the doctrine: The Genesee Chief, 12 How. (U. S.) 
 
 Connecticut. — Adams v. Pease, 443, 13 L. ed. 1058. 
 
 2 Conn. 481. 11. Brooks v. Cedar Brook, etc., 
 
 Maine. — Brown v. Chadboume, Enprovement Co., 82 M'e. 17, 19 
 
 31 Me. 9, 50 Am. Dee. 661. Atl. 87, 7 L. R. A. 460, 17 Am. St. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Commonwealth v. Rep. 549; Thunder Bay Booming 
 
 Chapin, 5 Pick. 199, 16 Am. Dee. Co. v. Speechly, 31 Mich. 336, 18 
 
 386. Am. Rep. 184; Grand Rapids v. 
 
 New York.— People v. Piatt, 17 Powers, 89 Mich. 94, 50 N. W. 661, 
 
 Johns. 211. 14 L. R. A. 498, 28 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Carson v. Blazer, 276 ; MUler v. Tennessee, 124 Tenn. 
 
 2 Bin. 475, 4 Am. Dee. 463. 293, 137 S. W. 760, 35 L. R. A. 
 
 The converse of the proposition (N. S.) 407. 
 is true, and salt water streams not 
 
§ 135 The Taking of Watebs — Riparian Rights. 409 
 
 watercourse the decisions are by no means harmonious, dif- 
 ferent rules having been applied to the same river as it flows 
 through several states, and even to different rivers in the 
 same state." A number of states have adhered to the com-' 
 mon law rule, that the public owns the bed of the river only 
 as far as the ebb and flow of the tide,^* but in several other 
 jurisdictions the title to the bed of large fresh-water 
 streams has been held to be in the public." These decisions 
 
 12. In New York it is held that 
 the bed of the Mohawk river is in 
 the public, People v. Canal Ap- 
 praisers, 33 N. Y. 461, but that the 
 abutting riparian proprietors own 
 the bed of the Hudson, Palmer v. 
 Mulligan, 3 Caines, 307, 2 Am. 
 Dee. 270; the Oswego, Varick v. 
 Smith, 9 Paige, 547, and the Gene- 
 see, Commissioners v. Kempshall, 
 26 Wend. 404. The bed of the 
 Mississippi river is in some states 
 public and in others private. See 
 the two following notes. 
 
 13. Connecticut. — Adams v . 
 Pease, 2 Conn. 481. 
 
 Belawa/re. — Delaney v. Boston, 2 
 Harr. 489. 
 
 Georgia. — Stanford v. Mangin, 
 
 30 Ga. 355. 
 
 Illinois. — Houck v. Yates, 82 HI. 
 179. 
 Maine. — Brown v. Chadboume, 
 
 31 Me. 9, 50 Am. Dee. 641. 
 Maryland. — Goodsell v. Lawson, 
 
 42 Md. 348. 
 
 Massac'lmsetts. — Commonwealth 
 V. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 90, 97. 
 
 Michigan. — Lorman v. Benson, 8 
 Mich. 18, 77 Am. Dee. 435. 
 
 Mississippi. — The Magnolia v. 
 Marshall, 39 Miss. 109. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Scott v. Wil- 
 son, 3 N. H. 321. 
 
 New Jersey. — ^Atty.-Gen. v. Dela- 
 ware E. R. Co., 27 N. J. Eq. 1. 
 
 Ohio. — June V. Purcell, 36 Ohio 
 St. 396. 
 
 South Carolina. — McCullough v. 
 Wall, 4 Rich. 68, 53 Am. Dee. 715. 
 
 Vermont. — Fletcher v. Phelps, 
 28 Vt. 257. 
 
 Wisconsin. — ■ Arimond v. Green 
 Bay Co., 31 Wis. 316. 
 
 14. United States. — St. Paul, etc., 
 R. R. Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 
 272, 19 L. ed. 74; Mobile Trans- 
 portation Co. V. Mobile, 187 U. S. 
 479, 47 L. ed. 266. 
 
 Alabama. — Bullock v. Wilson, 2 
 Porter 436. 
 
 Arkansas. — St. Louis Ry. Co. v. 
 Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S. W. 931, 
 8 L. R. A. 559, 22 Am. St. Rep. 
 195. 
 
 California. — Heckman v. Swett, 
 99 Cal. 303, 33 Pac. 1099. 
 
 Florida. — Bueki v. Cone, 25 Fla. 
 1, 6 So. 160. 
 
 Indiana. — Memphis, etc., Co. v. 
 Pikey, 142 Ind. 304, 40 N. E. 527. 
 
 Iowa. — McManus v. Carmichael, 
 3 Iowa 1. 
 
 Kentucky. — Louisville v. United 
 States Bank, 3 B. Mon. 138. 
 
 Minnesota. — Mankato v. Wil- 
 lard, 13 Minn. 13. 
 
 Missouri. — ^Benson v. Morrow, 61 
 Mo. 345. 
 
 Nevada. — Shoemaker v. Hatch, 
 13 Nev. 261. 
 
 North Carolina. — Skinner v. 
 Hettiek, 72 N. C. 53. 
 
 Oregon. — Moore v. Willamette 
 Transp. Co., 7 Ore. 335. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Carson v. Blazer, 
 2 Bin. 475, 4 Am. Dec. 463. 
 
 Tennessee. — Goodwin v. Thomp- 
 son, 15 Lea 209, 54 Am. Rep. 410. 
 
 Virginia. — Norfolk v. Cooke, 27 
 Gratt. 430. 
 
410 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 135 
 
 rest on various grounds ; in some states the common law test 
 has been openly discarded as inappropriate ; in others it is 
 said that the title to all lands was in the state originally 
 and these river beds have never been granted away ; other 
 courts rely upon some ancient statute or colonial ordinance. 
 The law in regard to lakes and ponds has been developed 
 upon lines very similar to those reached in regard to run- 
 ning streams. In England, where there are no really large 
 bodies of fresh water, the crown has no title to the bed,*^ 
 but upon lakes actually useful for navigation the public has 
 generally obtained the right of navigation by prescription." 
 It was readily seen that the common law doctrine could not 
 well be applied in this country, and in those states in which 
 large navigable lakes exist, they have been held, even in the 
 absence of statute, to belong to the public." In Massachu- 
 setts, by the colonial ordinance of 1641-7, it was provided 
 that " great ponds " containing more than ten acres should 
 be free for fishing and fowling by the public, and in accord- 
 ance with the spirit of the ordinance it has been held that 
 such ponds are public for all purposes for which they may 
 be needed, and though the riparian owner may have some 
 advantage by reason of his proximity to the pond, he has 
 no rights in it as against the public." Small ponds remain, 
 as at common law, the property of the owners of the 
 surrounding land.^® 
 
 15. Bristow v. Cormican, 3 App. Vermont. — Fletcher v. Phelps, 
 Cas. 641; Bloomfleld v. Johnston, 2 28 Vt. 257. 
 
 Ir. R., 8 C. L. 68. Wisconsin. — Diedrieh v. North- 
 
 16. Marshall v. Ulleswater Steam western Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 248, 24 
 Navigation Co., L. R. 7 Q. B. 166. Am. Rep. 399. 
 
 17. United States. — Illinois Cent. 18. Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. 
 R. R. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, Fall River, 147 Mass. 548, 18 N. E. 
 435, 36 L. ed. 1018, 1036. 465, 1 L. R. A. 466. The Massa- 
 
 New Hampshire. — State v. Gil- ehusetts rule regarding great ponds 
 
 manton, 9 N. H. 461; State v. is in force in New Hampshire. 
 
 Franklin Falls Co., 49 N. H. 240, Percy Summer Club v. Welch, 66 
 
 6 Am. Rep. 513. N. H. 180, 28 Atl. 22; Percy Sum- 
 
 New York. — Canal Commission- mer Club v. Astle, 163 Fed. 1. 
 ers V. People, 5 Wend. 423. 19. Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N. J. 
 
 Ohio.— Sloaa. v. BiemiUer, 34 L. 369; Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 
 
 Ohio St. 492. Barb. (N. T.) 102. 
 
§ 136 The Taking op Waters — Ripabian Rights. 411 
 
 § 136. Streams and Bodies of Water Classified. 
 
 In a general way, and subject to various exceptions and 
 qualifications, it may be said that streams and bodies of 
 water are divided into three classes : (1) Public navigable 
 waters, such as the ocean and its bays and harbors, and 
 large rivers and lakes, the bed and waters of which belong 
 to the public and which are, in general, subject to no private 
 rights whatever. (2) Private navigable waters, consisting 
 principally of fresh water streams actually available for 
 boating, and also, in some jurisdictions, tidal waters 
 between high and low water mark. In such waters the 
 littoral or riparian proprietor owns the submerged bed in 
 front of his upland in f ee,^" subject to certain public rights,^^ 
 and, in the case of fresh water streams, he also has, as 
 incident to his ownership of the shore or bank, the right of 
 drawing off such waters as he may need for domestic pur- 
 poses, and of making a reasonable use of the water in other 
 ways which will not interfere with similar uses by other 
 riparian proprietors, and of the right to insist that the 
 water shall flow past his land as it has been accustomed to 
 flow, except so far as the other riparian owners may use it 
 in accordance with their lawful riparian rights. (3) Private 
 unnavigable waters, consisting of small streams and ponds 
 not available for navigation in any form, in which the 
 respective private rights of the riparian owners are the 
 same as in private navigable waters, but in which there are 
 no public rights.^^ 
 
 20. Deerfield v. Arms, 17 Pick. navigable waters include the right 
 (Mass.) 41, 28 Am. Dec. 276; Sen- of navigation {infra, § 139) and in 
 eca Nation v. Knight, 23 N. T. 498. some jurisdictions of drainage 
 When a city, having the right to {infra, § 146). In some states, 
 use the waters of a lake, condemns also, the right of fishing upon pri- 
 a strip of land surrounding it, vate waters is in the public and 
 with the rights of the riparian certain fisheries are dealt with as 
 owners, it should pay a substantial matters of public property. Cole 
 sum for the fee of the land under v. Eastham, 133 Mass. 65. 
 
 the lake. In re Monroe, 200 N. Y. 22. The riparian owner upon a 
 
 511, 93 N. E. 1125, afiarming 131 private unnavigable watercourse 
 
 App. Div. (N. Y.) 872, 116 N. Y. has a constitutional right to erect 
 
 Supp. 334. any structures in the bed or make 
 
 21. The public rights in private any use of the waters that does not 
 
412 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 136 
 
 In examining the cases involving the injury to water 
 rights under color of eminent domain too much care cannot 
 be taken in finding out the precise point involved in each 
 decision, A quasi-public corporation, or even a munici- 
 pality, has no prerogative right to injuriously affect a 
 stream to a greater extent than a private individual law- 
 fully may. Unless the legislature has given specific author- 
 ity to the public agency to do the injurious act complained 
 of, the questions arising are not questions of constitutional 
 law or eminent domain at all, but involve merely the law in 
 regard to the relative private rights of riparian owners. A 
 general power to construct some public improvement will 
 not be construed to authorize interference with private 
 rights unless the work can be done in no other way.^^ The 
 great majority of cases involving public injury to private 
 water rights in which the injured party has been allowed 
 to recover decide nothing more than that the legislature 
 did not authorize the injury, but they are far too commonly 
 cited as authority for the proposition that the legislature 
 could not constitutionally authorize the injury without 
 compensation. 
 
 There is a close analogy between the cases involving the 
 relative rights of the public and of the adjoining owners in 
 highways^* and in waters. In both instances the point 
 generally at issue is whether the public is acting within its 
 easement. To define the limits of that easement is the 
 province of substantive law and true constitutional ques- 
 tions rarely arise in either class of cases. That different 
 courts have come to irreconcilable conclusions does not 
 prove that some are necessarily wrong, for the nature of 
 the title to land covered by ways and waters, depending, 
 as it often does, on the early colonial ordinances and grants 
 of public lands, or upon code provisions in the states of 
 
 interfere witli the private riparian 23. Infra, §§ 470, 502. 
 
 rights of the other proprietors. 24. Infra, i 154. 
 
 Grand Rapids v. Powers, 89 Mich. 
 94, 50 N. W. 661, 14 L. E. A. 498, 
 28 Am. St. Rep. 276. 
 
§ 137 The Taking op Waters — Eipabian Eights. 413 
 
 more recent settlement, may well vary in the different 
 states. 
 
 § 137. Public Waters are Held by the State in Trust 
 for the People. 
 
 Public navigable waters, and the bed underneath them, 
 are part of the public domain of the state within the bound- 
 aries of which they lie, and, it may be said in a general way, 
 and subject to some possible exceptions which will be noted 
 later, that the legislature may make or authorize to be 
 made any use of such waters and bed without compensation 
 to the littoral or riparian proprietors that it might make 
 of any other public property .^^ If one should own a tract 
 of land adjoining a portion of the public domain which con- 
 sisted of dry land, he might for many years enjoy the 
 advantage of unobstructed light and air, he might be per- 
 mitted access to his premises across the public land and 
 be allowed to pasture his cattle thereon and to gather fire- 
 wood therefrom; but he would acquire no private rights 
 over such land as against the public, and if the legislature 
 in course of time should decide that the land should be 
 used for some public purpose, or sold for private settle- 
 ment, although the adjoining owner would lose the advan- 
 tages and privileges, which he had enjoyed, and his land 
 might be seriously depreciated in value, there would be no 
 taking of his property in the constitutional sense, and he 
 would not be entitled to compensation. Similarly, those 
 who own land adjoining public navigable waters enjoy 
 advantages from the proximity of the water, but they have 
 no rights in the water as against the public, and if the legis- 
 lature deems it for the public interest that the water should 
 be diverted,^® or polluted,^'' or that the submerged bed 
 
 25. United States. — Hoboken v. New York. — Gould v. Hudson 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 124 U. S. River R. R. Co., 6 N. Y. 522. 
 
 656, 31 L. ed. 543. Teajos.— Salman v. Wolfe, 27 
 
 Delaware.— B&\\ey v. Philadel- Tex. 68. 
 
 phia, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Harr. 389, 26. Infra, § 143. 
 
 44 Am. Dee. 593. 27. Infra, § 146. 
 
 Massachusetts. — ^Watuppa Reser- 
 voir Co. v. Fall River, 147 Mass. 
 548, 18 N. E. 465, 1 L. R. A. 466. 
 
414 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 137 
 
 should be built upon,^® legislation authorizing such action 
 is merely a disposition of the public domain and not a taking 
 of private property. Such at least was the nature of the 
 title of the people in the public domain when the constitu- 
 tions were adopted and still is in the jurisdictions in which 
 the rights of the public have been maintained by an inde- 
 pendent judiciary. In some of the other states the courts 
 have recognized the existence of private rights, created 
 without the sanction of the legislature, in public navigable 
 waters, so that the legislature cannot constitutionally 
 authorize the use by the public itself of that portion of the 
 public domain which is subject to private rights thus 
 created, in such a manner as to interfere with the exercise 
 of such rights, without compensation.^® 
 
 Even in the states in which private rights in public 
 waters are not recognized unless created by authority of 
 the representatives of the people, the state does not own 
 the public navigable waters and the submerged bed beneath 
 them in its proprietary capacity, but it holds them as sover- 
 eign and in trust for the people. Thus the state is not 
 entitled to compensation for the diversion of such waters 
 or for the erection of structures in the bed by authority of 
 the United States government for the purpose of improving 
 navigation.^" The legislature of a state may, if it sees fit, 
 authorize the use of the public waters for private purposes, 
 or grant parcels of the submerged bed to private parties 
 for the erection of wharves or other structures in aid of 
 commerce, for the cultivation of oysters, or for any other 
 purpose which in its estimation will enure to the general 
 welfare ;^^ but it cannot wholly abdicate its trust by a 
 
 28. Infra, § 140. 798, 802; Hoboken v. Pennsyl- 
 
 29. Infra, § 140. vania E. R. Co., 124 U. S. 656, 657, 
 
 30. Infra, § 137. 31 L. ed. 543; Stevens v. Paterson, 
 
 31. See dissenting opinion in etc., R. R. Co., 34 N. J. L. 532, 3 
 Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. Illinois, Am. Rep. 269; Langdon v. New 
 146 U. S. 387, 36 L. ed. 1018, citing York, 93 N. Y. 129, 155. See also 
 Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 38 
 18 Wall. (U. S.) 57, 65, 21 L. ed. L. ed. 331; United States v. Mis- 
 
§ 138 The Taking of Watees — Eipabian Rights. 415 
 
 sweeping and general grant of submerged lands to private 
 parties.^^ The state also, it has been held, while it may of 
 course, as an exercise of the police power and to protect 
 the public health, morals and safety, regulate and, if neces- 
 sary, prohibit the enjoyment of such use of the public 
 waters as belongs to the public at large, as for example, 
 boating, floating logs, bathing, fishing, fowling and cutting 
 ice,^* cannot constitutionally make the exercise of these 
 rights conditional upon the issuance of a license and the 
 payment of a fee, merely for the purpose of raising 
 
 § 138. The Public Rights do not Extend above High 
 Water Mark. 
 
 By the civil law, the banks of a navigable river are pri- 
 vate property, but are subject to an easement or servitude 
 in favor of navigation almost as completely as the river 
 itself, in that all persons may lawfully tie their vessels to 
 the bank, unload their cargo thereon, or use the bank for a 
 tow-path. At the common law, the public has no right to 
 enter upon riparian land above high water mark even for 
 the purposes of landing, towing, tieing up or other objects 
 incidental to navigation.^^ In the state of Louisiana the 
 civil law doctrine is retained to its full extent, and the 
 
 sion Rock Co., 189 U. S. 391, 47 pond. Lynnfield v. Peabody, 219 
 
 L. ed. 865; People v. Kirk, 162 lU. Mass. 322, 106 N. E. 977. 
 
 138, 45 N. E. 830, 53 Am. St. Rep. 33. Des Moines Park Conunia- 
 
 277; Gardner Water Co. v. Gaxd- sioners v. Diamond lee Co., 130 
 
 ner, 185 Mass. 190, 69 N. E. 1051. lo^a 603, 105 N. W. 203, 3 L. R. A. 
 
 32. See niinois, etc., R. R. Co. V. (N- S-) ^^^^> Commonwealth v. 
 
 lUinois, 146 U. S. 387, 36 L. ed. ^^l^^I^'/^^ ^T;„^^J' ^^ ^- ®- 
 
 1018, holding that a grant of the ff' ^f L. R. A^439 ; Bittenhausj. 
 
 whole submerged bed of the harbor J»J'^J°^' ?f f «-,f «' ^6 N. W. 
 
 ?f,. T 7f r^ n n^° 34. Hutton v. Webb, 124 N. C. 
 
 lUmois Central R. R Co. v. Chi- 749 ^26 N. C. 897, 33 S. E. 169, 
 
 cago, 173 111. 471, 50 N. E. 1104, gg g, g. 34I, 59 L. R. A. 33; Ros- 
 
 53 L. R. A. 408, affirmed, 176 U. S. j^n^j. ^ g^ate, 114 Wis. 169, 89 
 
 646, 44 L. ed. 622; Coxe v. State, N. W. 839, 58 L. R. A. 93, 91 Am. 
 
 144 N. Y. 396, 39 N. E. 400. The St. Rep. 910. See also Wilson v. 
 
 state may however grant to a pri- Welch, 12 Ore. 353, 7 Pao. 341. 
 
 vate party the whole of a large 35. Ball v. Herbert, 3 T. R. 255. 
 
416 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 138 
 
 riparian owner cannot lawfully erect structures above- high 
 water mark that will interfere with the exercise of the 
 public rights.*^ In some of the other states which were 
 formed, from the Louisiana Purchase, the civil law rule has 
 been considerably modified, and the right to touch or make 
 fast to the bank is confined to cases of reasonable necessity 
 and as incidental to navigation and for temporary pur- 
 poses only.*'^ In the rest of the United States the common 
 law rule prevails, and no right in individual citizens as 
 members of the public to enter upon riparian land as inci- 
 dental to navigation is recognized,^* and consequently such 
 a right cannot be established by law except by the exercise 
 of eminent domain.^^ 
 In the states in which the mill acts are justified, not as 
 
 36. Shepherd v. Third Munici- 
 pality, 6 Rob. (La.) 349, 41 Am. 
 Dec. 269; Pickles v. McLellan Dry 
 Dock Co., 38 La. Ann. 412; Pecot 
 V. Police Jury, 41 La. Ann. 706, 6 
 So. 677; Sweeney v. Shakspeare, 42 
 La. Ann. 614, 7 So. 729, 21 Am. 
 St. Eep. 400. 
 
 37. Hunter v. Moore, 44 Ark. 
 184, 51 Am. Eep. 589; O'Fallon v. 
 Daggett, 4 Mo. 843, 29 Am. Dec. 
 640. Propinquity to the French 
 dominions appears to have affected 
 the law of Kentucky and Tennessee, 
 so that the right to enter upon or 
 tie up to riparian land is recog- 
 nized in those states to a certain 
 extent. Harvie v. Cammack, 6 
 Dana (Ky.) 242; Thurman v. Mor- 
 rison, 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 249, 66 
 Am. Dee. 153; Memphis v. Over- 
 ton, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 387. See 
 however Smith v. Atkins, 110 Ky. 
 119, 60 S. W. 930, 53 L. R. A. 790, 
 96 Am. St. Rep. 424, which seems 
 to bring Kentucky under the com- 
 mon law rule. 
 
 38. Alabama. — Compton v. Han- 
 Mns, 90 Ala. 411, 8 So. 75, 9 
 L. E. A. 387, 24 Am. St. Rep. 823. 
 
 Illinois. — Ensminger v. People, 
 47 111. 384, 95 Am. Dee. 495. 
 
 Indiana. — Bainbridge v. Sher- 
 lock, 29 Ind. 364, 95 Am. Dec. 644. 
 
 Michigan. — Lorman v. Benson, 8 
 Mich. 18, 77 Am. Dee. 435; Rei- 
 mold V. Moore, 2 Mich. N. P. 15. 
 
 Mississippi. — Morgan v. Read- 
 ing, 3 Sm. & M. 366; The Magnolia 
 V. Marshall, 39 Miss. 109. 
 
 New York. — Ledyard v. Ten 
 Eyek, 36 Barb. 102; Wetmore v. 
 Atlantic White Lead Co., 37 Barb. 
 70. 
 
 Ohio. — Pollock V. Cleveland Ship 
 Building Co., 56 Ohio St. 655, 47 
 N. E. 582. 
 
 Oregon. — Haines v. HaU, 17 
 Ore. 165, 20 Pac. 831, 3 L. R. A, 
 609. 
 
 Texas.— Butt v. Colbert, 24 Tex, 
 355. 
 
 West Virginia. — Ravenswood v. 
 Fleming, 22 W. Va. 52, 46 Am. 
 Rep. 485. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Chambers v. Furry, 
 1 Yeates 167; Olson v. Merrill, 42 
 Wis. 203. 
 
 39. Cohn V. Wausau Boom Co., 
 47 Wis. 314, 2 N. W. 546. See also 
 notes 41 and. 48, infra. 
 
§ 138 The Taking of Watebs — Eipaeian Eights. 417 
 
 an exercise of the power of eminent domain, but as a regu- 
 lation of the conflicting rights of the various riparian 
 owners in a particular watercourse, running waters and all 
 land adjacent thereto, so far as it can be flooded for any- 
 useful purpose, are treated as a single tract subject to 
 common interests and necessities, and it is held in such 
 jurisdictions that lands adjacent to a watercourse and 
 owned by one proprietor may be permanently submerged 
 as the consequence of the erection of a dam by another pro- 
 prietor, not indeed without compensation, but without the 
 existence of any public use to justify such an intrusion upon 
 private property rights, and without the occurrence of a 
 * ' taking ' ' of property in the constitutional sense.^" In all 
 other respects however, the ownership of a riparian pro- 
 prietor in such of his land as lies above high water mark 
 upon any stream or body of water, whether tidal or not, is 
 as full and complete as his ownership of any other private 
 property, and the public has no right to enter upon it or to 
 occupy it or to deprive him of the beneficial enjoyment of 
 it except for the public use and upon the payment of just 
 compensation. In other words, contiguity to navigable 
 waters does not make the title to the upland less secure, 
 and land immediately above highwater mark is entitled to 
 the same constitutional protection as land situated miles 
 from any watercourse. 
 
 Even the public right to improve navigation, which is 
 paramount to all private rights in the waters or bed of a 
 navigable watercourse, cannot be exercised in such a way 
 as to " take ' ' land above high water mark without payment 
 of compensation. In improving navigable streams the 
 public authorities cannot trespass upon the lands of ripa- 
 rian proprietors, cut timber or dig away the banks.*^ It 
 is of course well settled that, apart from the peculiar doc- 
 trine already noted in respect to the mill acts, the construc- 
 tion of a dam raising the waters of a stream to such an 
 
 40. Supra, § 83. provement Co., 19 Idaho 30, 113 
 
 41. Mashbum v. St. Joe Im- Pac. 92. 
 
 27 
 
418 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 138 
 
 extent as to permanently flood riparian land naturally dry 
 is a " taking " in the constitutional sense,*^ and no excep- 
 tion to this rule is made when the level of the stream is 
 raised for the purpose of making navigation more safe and 
 convenient. In such case the owners of riparian land 
 that is thereby flooded are constitutionally entitled to 
 compensation.** 
 
 The owner of the upland bordering upon a watercourse 
 has however no greater protection from injury resulting 
 from the construction of public improvements than the 
 owner of any other land, and he is not entitled to compen- 
 sation if his land is merely damaged as the result of the 
 improvement of the watercourse, if it is not taken in the 
 constitutional sense. Thus the erection of a dam for the 
 purpose of improving navigation, which increases the lia- 
 bility of riparian land to overflow in time of freshets but 
 does not keep it permanently submerged, gives the owner 
 of such land no right to compensation.** When the natural 
 consequence of the erection of structures upon one bank 
 of the stream, or in its bed, will be to deflect the current 
 upon the other bank and to gradually wash it away, it is 
 held by the federal and by some of the state courts that 
 such injury is not a taking, since the owner might protect 
 his land by piles or a sea-wall.*^ In other states however 
 
 42. Supra, § 113. stroy the power of a mill held not 
 
 43. United States v. Lynah, 188 a taJdng in Hood v. United States, 
 U. S. 445, 47 L. ed. 539; King v. 46 Ct. CI. 30. 
 
 United States, 59 Fed. 9; Williams 45. United States. — Salliotte v. 
 
 V. United States, 104 Fed. 50; Hey- King Bridge Co., 58 C. C. A. 466, 
 ward V. United States, 46 Ct. Q. , 122 Fed. 378, 65 L. E. A. 620, 
 
 484; jRe Minnetonka Lake Improve- aflSrmed, 191 U. S. 569, 48 L. ed. 
 
 ment Co., 56 Minn. 513, 58 N. W. 306; Bedford v. United States, 192 
 
 295, 45 Am. St. Eep. 494. In Bia- U. S. 217, 48 L. ed. 414. 
 
 sell V. Olson, 26 N. D. 60, 143 Connecticut. — Hollister v. Union 
 
 N. W. 340, it was held that the Co., 9 Conn. 436, 25 Am. Dee. 36. 
 
 capacity of a navigable stream can- Maine. — Brooks v. Cedar Brook, 
 
 not be increased by artificial means etc.. Improvement Co., 82 Me. 17, 
 
 to the injury of a riparian owner 19 Atl. 87, 7 L. R. A. 460, 17 Am. 
 
 without compensation. St. Rep. 459. 
 
 44. Mills V. United States, 46 Massachusetts. — Fitchburg R. R. 
 Fed. 738, 12 L. R. A. 673. Back- Co. v. Boston & Maine R. R., 3 
 ing water up a river so as to de- Cush. 58. 
 
§ 139 The Taking of Watees — Eipabian Rights. 419 
 
 it has been held that such injury constitutes a taking,** and 
 at all events, when the constitution provides that property 
 cannot be damaged without compensation, such an injury 
 is within the protection of the constitution.*'' 
 
 For purposes other than navigation, however public their 
 nature, it is clear that the legislature cannot establish a 
 right of entry upon riparian land without compensation. 
 When the public has the right of fishery in a body of water, 
 the legislature cannot authorize members of the public to 
 cross or stand upon land above high water mark for the 
 purpose of fishing, without compensation to the owner of 
 the land.*^ Even when a stream is so stagnant as to endan- 
 ger the public health, the public authorities cannot widen 
 and straighten the stream by cutting away the banks with- 
 out acquiring and paying for the right.** 
 
 § 139. The Public Right of Navigation. 
 
 The rights of a riparian proprietor in the waters of a 
 navigable stream, or in the submerged bed and in the shore 
 below high water mark, whether the stream be public or 
 private, are all held subject to the public easement of navi- 
 gation and to the incidental right of the public to construct 
 works in aid of navigation. The primary use of navigable 
 
 Ohio. — Covington Harbor Co. v. 47. Freeland v. Pennsylvania 
 
 Phoenix Bridge Co., 10 Ohio Deo. Railroad Co., 197 Pa. 529, 47 Atl. 
 
 Reprint 657, 23 Ohio L. J. 34. 745, 58 L. R. A. 206, 80 Am. St. 
 
 Vermont. — Henry v. Vermont Rep. 850; White v. Pennsylvania 
 
 Central R. R. Co., 30 Vt. 638, 73 Railroad Co., 229 Pa. 480, 78 Atl. 
 
 Am. Dec. 329. 1035, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1040; 
 
 See also Jackson v. United Fort Worth Improvement District 
 
 230 U. S. 1, 57 L. ed. v. Port Worth (Tex.), 158 S. W. 
 
 1363, holding that the United States 164, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 994. 
 
 is not liable for the overflow of 48. Hartman v. Tresise, 36 Colo, 
 
 lands not protected by its levees by 146, 84 Pac. 685, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 
 a rise in the level of a river due 872 ; New England Trout & Salmon 
 
 to levees in other places, con- Club v. Mather, 68 Vt. 338, 35 Atl. 
 
 stnieted to improve navigation. No 323, 33 L. R. A. 569. 
 
 right is impaired, and there is no 49. Schenectady v. Furman, 145 
 
 liability for consequential damages. N. Y. 482, 40 N. E. 221, 45 Am. St. 
 
 46. Barron v. Memphis, 113 Rep. 624. 
 Tenn. 89, 80 S. W. 832, 106 Am. 
 St. Rep. 810. 
 
420 The Law qf Eminjint DoMAiif. f 139 
 
 waters is navigatiaii, and, as the Supreme Court of ihe 
 United States has emphatically stated, it is well settled that 
 
 " whatever the nature of the interest of a riparian 
 owner in the submerged lands in front of his upland 
 bordering on a public navigable water, his title is not 
 as full and complete as his title to fast land which has 
 no direct connection with the navigation of such water- 
 It is a qualified title, a bare technical title, not at his 
 absolute disposal, as is his upland, but to be held at all 
 times subordinate to such use of the submerged lands 
 and of the waters flowing over them as may be con- 
 -sistent with or demanded by the public right of 
 navigation."®" 
 
 Accordingly, the exercise of the public right in any form 
 which does not involve the physical invasion or occupation 
 of the upland is not a taking in the constitutional sense, 
 however much pecuniary injury it may inflict upon the 
 riparian owners.®^ A lighthouse, for example may. be con- 
 structed in the T)ed of a private stream without compensa- 
 tion to the owner of the fee of the soil on which it is 
 ereeted,^^ just as a lamp post may lawfully be set up in a 
 highway,®^ and, in general, navigable streams may be 
 unproved so as to make navigation safer and more con- 
 venient without any liability to mate compensation for 
 
 50. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 navigation, but it was held, what- 
 
 U. S. 141, 45 L. ed. 126, afifirming ever the local law was, he could not 
 
 113 Mich. 565, 71 N. W. 1091, 67 recover. 
 
 Am. St fiep. 484. Under authority 51. Thus a riparian owner upon 
 
 of Congress a pier was constructed a navigable stream is not entitled to 
 
 to benefit navigation in a public damages for injury to his right to 
 
 navigable river, between the ehan- maintain booms along the shore by 
 
 nel and the shore, and parallel to the establishment of a ferry. War- 
 
 the course of the stream, thus cut- ner v. Ford Lumber, etc., Co., 123 
 
 ting off the upland completely from Ky. 103, 93 S. W. 650, 12 L. R. A. 
 
 access to deep water. By the law of (N. S.) 667. 
 
 Michigan, where this pier was built, 52. Hawkins Point Lighthouse 
 
 the owner of the upland owns the Case, 39 Fed. 77. 
 
 submerged flats in front of his up- 53. Infra, §§ 165, 187. 
 land, subject to the public right of 
 
f 139 The Taking of Waters — Eipaeian Rights. 421 
 
 incidental injury to the riparian proprietors." The United' 
 States or a state may even construct works in aid of navi- 
 gation in the bed of a navigable watercourse which wholly 
 cut off access from the riparian land to the water without 
 any obligation to make compensation arising.'^ The public 
 authorities may divert or draw off the water from one point 
 upon a navigable watercourse to improve navigation else- 
 where,^" although it has been held that water cannot be 
 diverted from a private navigable watercourse without 
 compensation whqn the navigation which it is sought to 
 
 54. United States. — ^United States 
 V. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power 
 Co., 229 U. S. 53, 57 L. ed. 1063. 
 
 Connecticut. — Hollister v. Union 
 Co., 9 Conn. 436, 25 Am. Dec. 36; 
 Holyoke Water Power Co. v. Con- 
 necticut River Co., 52 Conn. 570. 
 
 Maine. — • Spring v. Eussell, 7 Me. 
 273. 
 
 Minnesota. — Doucetta v. Little 
 FaUs, etc., Co., 71 Minn. 206, 73 
 K. W. 847. 
 
 New York. — Fulton Light, Heat 
 & Power Co. v. State, 200 N. Y. 
 400, 94 N. E. 199. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Zimmerman v. 
 Union Canal Co., 1 Watts & S. 346; 
 McKeen v. Delaware, etc.. Canal 
 Co., 49 Pa. 424. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Falls M£g. Co. v. 
 Oconto River Improvement Co., 87 
 Wis. 134, 58 N. W. 257. 
 
 Incorporating a navigable creek 
 into a canal is not a " taking " al- 
 though the creek had practically 
 ceased to be used by the public for 
 navigation. Champlain Sand & 
 Stone Co. v. State, 66 Misc. (N. Y.) 
 434, 123 N. Y. Supp. 546; affirmed, 
 142 App. Div. (N. Y.) 94, 127 N. Y. 
 Supp. 131. When an individual 
 purchased tide lands fronting upon 
 a slip dedicated to public use, im- 
 provement of the slip by the staie 
 was not a "taking." Chlopeck 
 Fish Co. V. Seattle, 64 Wash. 315, 
 117 Pac. 232. Inasmuch as log 
 
 driving is recognized as a speoiea 
 of navigation, it is generally al- 
 though not universally held that an 
 injury to riparian rights by thff 
 maintenance of booms is not a 
 taking. Mullen v. Penobscot Log 
 Driving Co., 90 Me. 555, 38 Atl. 
 557; Osborne v. Knife FaUs Boom' 
 Co., 32 Minn. 412, 21 N. W. 704,, 
 50 Am. Rep. 590; Grays Harbor 
 Boom Co. V. Lownsdale, 54 Wash. 
 83, 104 Pac. 267; Cohn v. Wausau 
 Boom Co., 47 Wis. 314, 2 N. W. 
 546. Contra, Kalama Electric 
 Light & Power Co. v. Kalama Driv- 
 ing Co., 48 Wash. 612, 94 Pae. 469, 
 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 641. 
 
 55. Gibson v. United States, 166 
 U. S. 269, 41 L. ed. 996; Scranton 
 v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 45 L. ed. 
 126, affirming 113 Mich. 565, 71 
 N. W. 1091, 67 Am. St. Rep. 484; 
 Sage V. New York, 154 N. Y. 61, 47 
 N. E. 1096, 38 L. R. A. 606, 61 Am. 
 St. Rep. 592: Slingerland v. Inter- 
 national Contracting Co., 169 N. Y. 
 60, 61 N. E. 995, 56 L. R. A. 549. 
 See also infra, § 140. 
 
 56. United States v. Chandler- 
 Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 
 U. S. 53, 57 L. ed. 1063; Homo- 
 chitto River Commissioners v. With- 
 ers, 29 Miss. 21, 64 Am. Dec. 126; 
 Black River Improvement Co. v. 
 La Crosse Booming, etc., Co., 54 
 Wis. 659, 11 N. W. 443, 41 Am- 
 Rep. 66. 
 
422 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 139 
 
 improve is carried on by means of a wholly artificial system 
 of canals.®^ 
 
 The reason for the immunity of the public authorities 
 from liability to make compensation, when private property 
 is invaded or valuable riparian rights destroyed by the con- 
 struction of works in aid of navigation, is not that such 
 injury is not severe enough to constitute a taking, but that 
 it is an exercise of the public easement, and a use by the 
 public of the public domain ; and there are no private rights 
 in navigable waters that are not held subject to the public 
 easement or which conflict with or encroach upon the rights 
 of the public in respect to navigation. When however a 
 watercourse in its natural condition at the regular seasons 
 of high water is not capable of useful service in floating 
 boats and logs, it is not in any sense a part of the public 
 domain or subject to a public easement in favor of naviga- 
 tion, and an act of legislature declaring it to be navigable 
 in law or authorizing dredging or draining or other means 
 of making it navigable in fact is a taking of the property 
 of the riparian owners.^^ The diversion of the waters of 
 
 57. Fulton Light, Heat & Power 58. United States. — Hlmoos v. 
 Co. V. State, 200 N. Y. 400, 94 Economy Light & Power Co., 234 
 N. T. 199. In accordance with this U. S. 497, 58 L. ed. 1429, affirming 
 principle it was held that riparian 241 111. 290, 89 N. E. 760. 
 owners were entitled to eompensa- California. — People v. Elk River 
 tion for the lowering of the Chi- Mill & Lmnber Co., 107 Cal. 221, 40 
 eago river by the eonstraction of Pac. 531, 48 Am. St. Rep. 125. 
 the drainage canal, because the im- Idaho. — Potlach Lumber Co. v. 
 provement was to aid navigation Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 88 Pae. 426, 
 upon a different stream and because 118 Am. St. Rep. 233. 
 it was primarily for the public Michigan. — Thunder Bay Boom- 
 health and only secondarily in be- ing Co. v. Speechly, 31 Mich. 336, 
 half of navigation. Beidler v. Sani- 18 Am. Rep. 184. 
 tary District, 211 111. 628, 71 N. E. New Tor/c— Morgan v. King, 35 
 1118, 67 L. R. A. 820, and see also N. Y. 454, 61 Am. Dec. 508; Sche- 
 Bigham Bros. v. Port Arthur Dock nectady v. Furman, 145 N. Y. 482, 
 & Canal Co., 100 Tex. 192, 97 S. W. 40 N. E. 221, 45 Am. St. Rep. 624; 
 686, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 656, hold- De Camp v. Dix, 159 N. Y. 436, 54 
 ing that the construction of a canal N. E. 63. 
 
 in aid of navigation from sea to Ohio. — ^Walker v. Board of Pub- 
 fresh water, introducing salt water lie Works, 16 Ohio 540. 
 and thereby injuring crops on the Pennsylvania. — White Deer Creek 
 riparian lands was not within the Improvement Co. v. Sassaman, 67 
 public rights. See also infra. § 143. Pa. 415. 
 
§ 139 The Taking of Waters — Ripabian Rights. 423 
 
 an unnavigable watercourse, even for the purpose of 
 improving navigation upon another navigable watercourse 
 is also a taking for which compensation must be provided.^' 
 While the power of improving a navigable watercourse 
 for the purposes of navigation may be exercised by the 
 government of the United States or of the state in which 
 it lies with equal immunity from liability to the owners of 
 the submerged bed, or to the holders of riparian rights in 
 the waters, there is a distinction to be noted between the 
 federal and the state power in one particular. The state 
 may, within certain limits, as has already been shown, grant 
 to private owners the title to portions of the submerged bed 
 of a public navigable watercourse for purposes inconsistent 
 with the free exercise of the public right of navigation over 
 the granted premises,®" and in such a case the grantee 
 acquires, as against the state, a perfect title free from the 
 public easement, and the state cannot resume its grant 
 except by the exercise of eminent domain and upon the pay- 
 ment of just compensation.*^ When however the power to 
 regulate foreign and interstate commerce was granted to 
 congress, a servitude in favor of the federal government 
 was created, and all rights in navigable waters are held 
 subject to that servitude."^ No legislation of a state can 
 impair this servitude or cut down the power of congress to 
 improve or regulate the use of navigable waters.** The 
 
 Tennessee.— Miller v. State, 124 Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 57 L. ed. 
 
 Tenn. 293, 137 S. W. 760, 35 1063. 
 L^R. A. (N. S.) 407. 63. Thus the power of the United 
 
 59. Cohea v. United States, 162 States to establish harbor lines is 
 Fed. 364. not affected by a state statute giv- 
 
 60. Supra, § 137. ing title to the soil. Philadelphia 
 
 61. Infra, § 148. Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 56 
 
 62. Gibson v. United States, 166 L. ed. 570. There is no liability 
 U. S. 269, 41 L. ed. 996. WiUiiik v. for damage to oyster grants by 
 United States, 240 U. S. 572. When dredging to improve navigation, 
 the local law gives a reparian owner Lewis Blije Point Oyster Cultiva- 
 title to the bed of a navigable tion Co. v. Briggs, 229 U. S. 82, 
 stream, it is held subject to the 57 L. ed. 1083. See however as to 
 public right of navigation. United wharves lawfully erected infra. 
 States V. Chandler-Dunbar Water § 148. 
 
424 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 14Q 
 
 power of congress is> of course, limited by the Fifth Amend- 
 ment; but. the' exercise of an existing easement is not a 
 taking of property. 
 
 § 140. The Right of Access to the Channel. 
 
 Inasmuch as the riparian proprietor upon a private navi- 
 gable watercourse owns the fee of the submerged bed, sub- 
 ject only to the public right of navigation, and in some juris- 
 dictions of drainage, and to the private rights of the other 
 riparian proprietors, the erection of a structure under legis- 
 lative authority upon such bed for any purpose, however 
 public, not connected with navigation, is a taking of his 
 property for which he is entitled under the constitution to 
 compensation, whether it interferes with access to his 
 upland from the watercourse or not.®* Public watercourses 
 were however, in all countries in which the common law 
 prevailed, considered to be part of the public domain, and 
 not subject to any private rights whatever. The riparian 
 owner, it was. said, might enjoy some advantage from the 
 proximity of the water, but he had no property in it, and 
 when that advantage was withdrawn he stood in no better 
 position than, for example, a retail tradesman from the 
 proximity of whose shop a, railroad station or a post-office 
 had been moved away. 
 
 This doctrine is not now universally accepted without 
 qualification.. The principal advantage that a riparian 
 owner upon public waters possesses is that of access from 
 his land to the channel of the stream. It was held in the 
 well-known English case of Lyon v. Fishmongers' Com- 
 pany ®' that this advantage is a ' ' right to which the owner 
 of the bank is by law entitled." By act of Parliament 
 the conservators of the Thames were empowered to license 
 the construction of docks in the river, " but not so as to take 
 away, alter, or abridge any right to which any owner or 
 occupier of lands on the banks of the river was by law enti- 
 tled." The conservators licensed one owner to extend his 
 
 64. Ball V. Slack, 2 Wharton 65. L. R. 1 App. Cas. 662. See 
 
 (Pa.) 508, 30 Am. Dec. 508. also Rose v. Groves, 5 M. & G. 613. 
 
§ 14Q The Taking op Watees — Eieaeian" Eights. 425 
 
 wharf in front of his neighbor 'a bank. It was held that the- 
 neighbor had a legal right of access to the river and conse- 
 quently that the conservators, under the act of Parliament, 
 had no power to take it away. 
 
 This decision has been generally followed in this country 
 and it is almost universally held that an owner of land 
 fronting upon a navigable watercourse has a right of access 
 to the channel of the watercourse, regardless of the owner- 
 ship of the submerged bed, and that this right will be pro- 
 tected by the courts against any unauthorized interference 
 by any other private individual^, at the instance of the 
 riparian owner aggrieved and without waiting for the attor- 
 ney-general to act.®® It has been argued that it necessarily 
 follows from the principle thus established that the riparian 
 owner's right of access is a property right, and that, when 
 that right is destroyed, there is a taking of his property for 
 which he is constitutionally entitled to compensation. Such 
 a result does not, however, necessarily follow from an 
 acceptance of the English decision. In that case the riparian 
 owner's right was asserted as against a private individual 
 who undertook to construct his own wharl in front of 
 another 's bank. How far this right is superior to the public 
 rights in public waters is another question. It may well be 
 that a riparian owner's advantage from contiguity to public 
 waters is a legal right as against other individuals, but is 
 subject to the paramount right of the legislature to use the 
 waters in behalf of the public for any purpose to which it 
 could lawfully devote any other portion of the public 
 domain. 
 
 Upon this question the cases are not in agreement. The 
 point has several times arisen when a railroad or other pub- 
 lic work not connected with navigation is constructed under 
 legislative authority in the shallow water close to the shore 
 of some public river or lake, thus cutting off access from 
 the riparian lands to the channel. The majority of decided 
 
 66. Barron v. Baltimore, 2 Am* 156; Haskell v. New Bedford, 108 
 Jiir. 203 (see however supra, i 108. Mass. 208; Brayton v. Fall Biver, 
 note 95) ; Blane v. Klumpke, 29 Cal. 118- Mass. 218; 18 Am. Rep. 470. 
 
426 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain, 
 
 § 140 
 
 cases have allowed the owner of the shore land to recover, 
 although the public work may have been expressly author- 
 ized by statute.®^ The right of access is thus recognized as 
 a property right superior not only to the rights of other 
 individuals but to the public right to devote the waters to 
 ordinary public uses. On the other hand, in the jurisdictions 
 in which the rights of the public have not been subordinated 
 to the rights of private property, the courts have generally 
 declined to recognize the existence of any private rights in 
 the public domain, and have denied compensation for 
 impairment of access resulting from the erection of a public 
 work in the bed of a public stream.®* The question raised 
 
 67. United States. — ^Yates v. Mil- 
 waukee, 10 "Wall. 497, 19 L. ed. 984 
 (semble). 
 
 Connecticut. — Richards v* New 
 York, etc., R. R. Co., 77 Conn. 501, 
 60 Atl. 295, 69 L. R. A. 929 
 (semble). 
 
 Florida. — Broward v. Mabry, 58 
 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826. 
 
 Illinois. — Revell v. People, 177 
 III. 468, 52 N. E. 1052, 43 L. R. A. 
 690, 69 Am. St. Rep. 257; Cobb v. 
 Lincoln Park Commissioners, 202 
 111. 427, 67 N. E. 5, 63 L. R. A. 264, 
 95 Am. St. Rep. 258. 
 
 Minnesota. — Brisbane v. St. Patil 
 R. R. Co., 23 Minn. 114. 
 
 New York. — Rumsey v. New 
 York & New England Railroad Co., 
 133 N. Y. 79, 30 N. E. 654, 15 
 L. R. A. 618, 28 Am. St. Rep. 600; 
 Re New York, 168 N. Y. 134, 61 
 N. E. 158, 56 L. R. A. 500; Brook- 
 haven V. Smith, 188 N. Y. 74, 80 
 N. E. 665, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 326; 
 Barnes v. Midland R. R. Terminal 
 Co., 193 N. Y. 378, 85 N. E. 1093. 
 
 North Carolina. — Shepard's Point 
 Land Co. v. Atlantic Hotel Co., 132 
 N. C. 517, 44 S. E. 39, 61 L. R. A. 
 937. 
 
 Ohio. — Gawn v. Wilson, 7 Ohio 
 S. & C. P. Dee. 683. 
 
 Rhode Island.- — Clark v. Peck- 
 ham, 10 R. I. 35, 14 Am. Rep. 654. 
 
 Washington. — State v. Chehalis 
 County Court, 48 Wash. 277, 93 
 Pae. 426, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1005. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Delaplaine v. Chi- 
 cago & Northwestern Railway Co., 
 42 Wis. 214, 24 Am. Rep. 386; 
 Diedrich v. Northwestern Ry. Co., 
 42 Wis. 248, 24 Am. Rep. 399. 
 
 See also dissenting opinion in 
 Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 
 165, 45 L. ed. 126, 138. 
 
 68. United States. — Shively v. 
 Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 38 L. ed. 331, 
 affirming 22 Ore. 410, 30 Pac. 154. 
 
 Connecticut. — O'Brien v. Nor- 
 wich, etc., Ry. Co., 17 Conn. 371. 
 
 Iowa. — Tomlin v. Dubuque, etc.. 
 Railroad Co., 32 Iowa 106, 7 Am. 
 Rep. 176. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Thayer v. New 
 Bedford R. R. Co., 125 Mass. 253; 
 Home for Aged Women v. Com- 
 monwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 89 N. E. 
 124, 24L. R. A. (N. S.) 79. 
 
 New Jersey. — Stevens v. Paterson 
 Railroad Co., 34 N. J. L. 532, 3 Am. 
 Rep. 269. 
 
 New York. — Gould v. Hudson 
 River R. R. Co., 6 N. Y. 522 (over- 
 ruled, see preceding note). 
 
 Washington. — Eisenbach v. Hat- 
 field, 2 Wash. 236, 26 Pac. 539, 12 
 L. R. A. 632. 
 
§ 141 The Taking of Wateks — Riparian Rights. 427 
 
 is one of local law,®" and each state may, of course, deter- 
 mine the nature of the title to public waters within its juris- 
 diction. The early ordinances and grants of riparian lands 
 differed in the various states, and each state must decide 
 for itself what interest it was intended that the public 
 should retain. It seems however a rather drastic proceed- 
 ing for a court to create at one stroke, by its own fiat, and 
 without the consent of the people of the state or their repre- 
 sentatives, private property rights in thousands of acres of 
 valuable public lands. As in all the other instances of the 
 sacrifice of well established public rights in favor of the 
 rights of private property, the courts which have recognized 
 the right of access from public waters as a right of private 
 property have plumed themselves upon their acceptance of 
 the " more enlightened doctrine;" but it would seem that 
 even if the old principle that the rights of the public in 
 public waters are paramount inflicted a hardship upon the 
 owners of riparian land, it would have been more fitting for 
 the courts to have allowed the people themselves, either 
 directly or through their representatives in the legislature, 
 to decide whether and to what extent they should yield up 
 their rights in the public domain to the owners of the 
 adjoining private estates. 
 
 § 141. Limitations upon the Right of Access. 
 
 Even in the states in which the right of access to riparian 
 land from public navigable waters is recognized by the local 
 law, this right is not without limitations which may in some 
 instances wholly destroy its value. Thus, as already stated, 
 it is subordinate to the right of the federal government to 
 construct works in aid of navigation.™ When the owner of 
 
 West Virginia. — Eavenswood v. be prohibited from boating upon 
 
 Fleming, 22 "W. Va. 52, 46 Am. such waters. 
 
 Rep. 485. 69. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 
 
 See also Sprague v. Minon, 195 1, 38 L. ed. 331; Western Paoiflc 
 
 Mass. 581, 81 N. E. 284, in which Ry. Co. v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 
 
 it is held that there are no private 151 Fed. 376. 
 
 rights in public waters, and that the 70. Supra, §§ 139, 140. 
 owner of land fronting thereon can 
 
4»28 The. Law of Eminewt Domain. § 141 
 
 the upland is deprived of Ms access to the channel by works 
 in aid of navigation constructed by authority of a state-, 
 whether he is entitled to compensation is a question of local 
 law; but there is nothing illogical in holding that the own- 
 er's right of access, while superior to the public right to 
 make public uses of the water other than those in aid of 
 navigation, is inferior to the public right of navigation by 
 whomsoever exercised. In fact such is the law in New 
 York at present. It was originally held that the owner of 
 the upland had no rights in the public waters in front of 
 his estate ; ''^ but in accordance with the doctrine of the ele- 
 vated railway cases which established as a property right 
 the right of access of an abutting owner to a street owned 
 in fee by the public,''^ it was held that an owner of land 
 abutting upon a watercourse owned in fee by the public had 
 a right of access to deep water which was ' ' taken ' ' by the 
 construction of a railroad ''* or a highway ''* in the stream 
 in such a manner as to cut off access from the upland- to 
 the channel. But just as the private right of access to the 
 highway is inferior to the public right to grade the street 
 for benefit of ordinary travel,''^ the private right of access 
 to public waters is inferior to the public right to construct 
 works in aid of navigation, whether exercised by the United 
 States ''^ or by the state." 
 
 The right of access to public waters is limited to access to 
 the channel in front of the upland to which the right is 
 appurtenant. Even when passage up and down a water- 
 course is obstructed unlawfully, the owners of riparian land 
 have no civil action against the wrong doer and the remedy 
 is by indictment only.'^* Accordingly, in the states in which 
 
 71. Gould V. Hudson River R. R. 76. Slingerland v. International 
 Co., 6 N. Y. 522. Contracting Co., 169 N. Y. 60, 61 
 
 72. Infra, §§ 160, 179. N. E. 995, 56 L. R. A. 549. 
 
 73. Rumsey v. New York, etc., 77. Sage v. New York, 154 N. Y. 
 R. R. Co., 136 N. Y. 543, 32 N. E. 61, 47 N. E. 1096, 38 L. R. A. 606, 
 979. 61 Am. St. Rep. 592. 
 
 74. Be New York, 168 N. Y. 134, 78. Rose v. Groves, 5 M. & G. 
 61 N. E. 158, 56 L. R. A. 500. 613; -Brayton v. Pall River, 113 
 
 75. Infra, § 162. Mass. 218, 18 Am. Rep. 470. See 
 
§ 141 The Taking of Watees — Ripaeian Rights. 429 
 
 the right of access is recognized as superior to the public 
 right to devote the bed of the stream to the public use, and, 
 a fortiori in the states in which the public rights are para- 
 mount, it seems to be generally conceded that if the legisla- 
 ture authorizes the construction of a dam, or of a bridge 
 with or without a draw, across a stream, upper riparian 
 proprietors who are cut off from navigation to and from 
 the outside world have no redress.''* A contrary decision 
 has been reached in a state in which compensation is 
 required by the constitution when property is damaged ; *" 
 but it must be remembered that damage may be inflicted 
 within the meaning of such a constitutional provision by 
 the mere exercise of unquestioned public rights.^^ 
 
 The right of access is apparently not recognized as prop- 
 erty in the constitutional sense unless it is capable of enjoy- 
 ment under natural conditions ; and if by reason of the shal- 
 lowness of the water in front of a tract of upland the land 
 is not accessible from the channel, the mere fact that it 
 might be made accessible by dredging is, it has been held, 
 
 also Seeley v. Bishop, 19 Conn. 128, Maine. — Parker v. Cutter Mill- 
 
 and also Blackwell v. Old Colony dam Co., 20 Me. 253; Frost v. 
 
 E. R. Co., 122 Mass. 1, holding that Washington County Ry. Co., 96 Me. 
 
 the construction of a bridge took no 76, 51 Atl. 806, 59 L. R. A. 68. 
 
 private right, although plaintiff Massachusetts. — Davidson v. B'os- 
 
 owned the only wharf on the river ton & Maine R. R., 3 Cush. 91; 
 
 above the bridge, and for a fuller Blackwell v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 
 
 discussion of the subject infra, 122 Mass. 1; Thayer v. New Bed- 
 
 § 323. ford R. R. Co., 125 Mass. 233; 
 
 79. United States. — GiLman v. Brackett v. Commonwealth, 223 
 
 Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 18 L. ed. Mass. 119, 111 N. E. 1036. 
 
 96; Miller v. New York, 109 U. S. New Hampshire. — ^ Dover v. 
 
 385, 27 L. ed. 971; Whitehead v. Portsmouth Bridge, 17 N. H. 200. 
 
 Jessup, 53 Fed. 707. New Jersey. — Sugar Refining Co. 
 
 Connecticut. — O'Brien v. Nor- v. Jersey City, 26 N. J. Eq. 247. 
 
 wich, etc., R. R. Co., 17 Conn. 372 ; New York. — Lansing v. Smith, 8 
 
 Clark V. Saybrook, 21 Conn. 313; Cow. 146. 
 
 Richards v. New York, etc., R. R. Wisconsin. — Clark v. Chicago, 
 
 Co., 77 Conn. 501, 60 Atl. 295, 69 etc., R. R. Co., 70 Wis. 593, 36 
 
 L. R. A. 501. N. W. 326. 
 
 Delaware.— Bailey v. Philadel- 80. Re Walnut St. Bridge, 191 
 
 phia, etc., R. B. Co., 4 Harr. 389, Pa. 153, 43 Atl. 88, and see infra, 
 
 44 Am. Dee. 593. § 323. 
 
 Indiana. — Depew v. Wabash, etc., 81. Infra, § 312. 
 Canal Trustees, 5 Ind. 8. 
 
430 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 142 
 
 no ground upon which to base a claim for compensation for 
 destruction of the right.^^ 
 
 The right of access to the upland from private waters is 
 apparently not recognized as a riparian right by itself, but 
 is merged in the ownership of the bed and of the incidental 
 right of the owner to prevent any use thereof by the public, 
 except for purposes of navigation, without compensation to 
 him. Consequently, when part of the bed of a private water- 
 course is taken for the public use and the owner is paid just 
 compensation, he cannot complain of being shut off from 
 navigation when\.the work for which the land was taken is 
 erected.** 
 
 § 142. Riparian Owners' Other Rights. 
 
 There are many other advantages that a riparian owner 
 upon public waters possesses besides that of access. The 
 disposal of sewage, the use of the waters for bathing or for 
 mechanical purposes, and the enjoyment of prospect, light, 
 and air are among them. It is conceivable that all of these 
 advantages might be held " legal rights " within the mean- 
 ing of the decision in Lyon v. Fishmongers' Company.^ 
 But it has never been held that any of them are superior to 
 the public rights in public waters.®^ 
 
 82. Hedges v. West Shore R. R. loss of river frontage of the garden 
 Co., 150 N. Y. 150, 44 N. E. 691, of a manor was an item of damage 
 55 Am. St. Rep. 660. See also to be considered when it was caused 
 Richards v. New York, etc., R. R. by work done under a statute giv- 
 Co., 77 Conn. 501, 60 Atl. 295, 69 ing compensation for "injuriously 
 L. R. A. 929, in which the court, in affecting " property, the court say- 
 denying compensation to a riparian ing " it would be an actionable 
 owner for impairment of access wrong at the suit of the owner 
 took into account the shallowness of * * • unless justified by special 
 the waters and the fact that their acts." See also Delaplaine v. Chi- 
 use for purposes of navigation had cago, etc., R. R. Co., 42 Wis. 214, 
 always been and in the nature of 24 Am. Rep. 386 : . "All the f aoili- 
 things must continue to be quite ties which the location of his land 
 insignificant. with reference to the lake affords, 
 
 83. Kerr v. West Shore R. R. he has the right to enjoy for the 
 Co., 127 N. Y. 269, 27 N. E. 833. purposes of gain or pleasure." 
 
 84. Thus in Buccleuch v. Metro- 85. In Freeland v. Pennsylvania 
 politan Board of Works, L. R. R. R. Co., 197 Pa. 529, 47 Atl. 745, 
 5 H. L. 418, it was held that the 58 L. R. A. 206, 80 Am. St. Rep. 
 
§ 142 The Taking of Watees — Riparian Rights. 431 
 
 The rights of a riparian owner upon public waters to 
 make use of them for boating, bathing, fishing, cutting ice 
 and similar purposes are no more extensive than those of 
 the general public,^® although his means of enjoying such 
 rights may be readier, since the public has no right to cross 
 private land to reach public waters for the enjoyment of 
 the public rights. 
 
 Upon a private watercourse, whether navigable or not, 
 the right to cut ice is exclusively in the riparian proprietors, 
 and constitutes one of the recognized riparian rights which 
 cannot be taken or destroyed without compensation.^'' The 
 exclusive right to take fish in private unnavigable water- 
 courses is in the riparian owner,** and this right is a 
 
 850, it was held that a riparian 
 proprietor on whose land alluvial 
 deposits of sand were prevented 
 from accumulating by an embank- 
 ment on the other side of the river 
 might recover, even if the embank- 
 ment was built in the exercise of 
 the power of eminent domain. But 
 this was under a constitution giv- 
 ing compensation for damaging 
 property, and moreover was not an 
 attempt to use the stream for publio 
 purposes, but was the use of the 
 land on the other side. In Munici- 
 pality No. 2 V. Orleans Cotton 
 Press, 18 La. Ann. 122, 36 Am. Dec. 
 624, it was held that the legislature 
 cannot constitutionally deprive a 
 riparian owner of his right to the 
 future alluvion that may be depos- 
 ited upon his river front. In 
 Sprague v. Minon, 195 Mass. 581, 
 81 N. E. 284, it was held that an 
 owner of land adjoining a public 
 " great pond " had no private rights 
 therein, and consequently no stand- 
 ing to complain when the pond was 
 used for a public water supply and 
 boating thereon was prohibited. 
 
 86. The privilege of gathering ice 
 from public waters is a public right. 
 Gehlen v. Knorr, 101 Iowa 700, 70 
 N. W. 757, 63 Am. St. Rep. 416; 
 People's Ice Co. v. Davenport, 149 
 
 Mass. 322, 21 N. E. 385, 14 Am. 
 St. Rep. 425; Rossmiller v. State, 
 114 Wis. 169, 89 N. W. 839, 91 Am. 
 St. Rep. 910. It has been held how- 
 ever that a riparian owner may 
 have the taking of an unreasonable 
 quantity of ice from a public body, 
 of water for sale in a distant mar- 
 ket enjoined. Sanborn v. People's 
 Ice Co., 82 Minn. 43, 84 N. W. 641, 
 83 Am. St. Rep. 401. 
 
 87. ,Lake Auburn Crystal Ice Co. 
 V. Lewiston, 109 Me. 489, 84 Atl. 
 1004; People v. Kirk, 136 App, 
 Div. (N. Y.) 45, 119 N. Y. Supp. 
 862. Upon the right to cut ice 
 upon waters upon which an ease- 
 ment for the public use has been 
 acquired, see infra, § 200. 
 
 88. Colorado. — Hartman v. Tre^ 
 sise, 36 Colo. 146, 84 Pac. 685, 4 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 872. 
 
 Illinois. — Beckman v. Kreamer, 
 43 111. 447, 92 Am. Dec. 146. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Waters v. Lilley, 
 4 Pick. 145, 16 Am. Dec. 333; Cole 
 V. Eastham, 133 Mass. 65. 
 
 New York. — Hooker v. Cum- 
 mings, 20 Johns. 90, 11 Am. Dec. 
 249. 
 
 Vermont. — State v. Theriault, 70 
 Vt. 617, 41 Atl. 1030, 43 L. R. A. 
 290, 67 Am. St. Rep. 695. 
 
432 The Law of Eminent Dxjmain. 1§ 143 
 
 property right in the constitutional sense,^® but the fish are 
 not property until actually caught.*" The riparian pro- 
 prietors have no right to obstruct the free passage of fish,®* 
 and may be prosecuted for taking fish out of the seasons 
 prescribed "by law f^ and the public authorities may stodj 
 the water with fish without their consent.®* 
 
 § 143. Diversion of Water. 
 
 The waters of the ocean and of its bays, and of public 
 watercourses and lakes, so far as they lie within the limits 
 of a state, are as completely a part of the public domain aa 
 the bed over which they flow, and the state may authorize 
 the diversion of the waters of a public watercourse or lake 
 for any purpose that it deems advantageous to the public, 
 without providing compensation to riparian proprietors 
 injuriously affected by such action. Such diversion is 
 merely an exercise of the power of the legislature to dispose 
 of public property for the good of the public, and while it 
 is, pro tanto, a taking of the waters of the river or pond, 
 it is not a taking of private property, for it does not inter- 
 fere with any individual rights recognized by law. It is 
 consequently almost universally conceded that the legisla- 
 ture may authorize water to be drawn from any public river 
 or pond for the purpose of supplying any community, 
 riparian or otherwise, with water, or for any other public 
 use, without compensating owners of land bordering on the 
 
 89. Upon the taking of riparian Essex Co., 13 Gray (Mass.) 239; 
 
 land, a substantial sum should be Commissioners on Inland Fisheries 
 
 paid for the right of fishing. In re v. Holyoke Water Power Co., 104 
 
 Monroe, 200 N. Y. 511, 93 N. E. Mass. 446, 453. 
 
 1125. The soundness of the de- 90. Sollers v. SoUers, 77 Md. 148, 
 
 eision in Cole v. Eastham, 133 26 M\. 188, 20 L. R. A. 94, 89 Am. 
 
 Mass. 65, contra, was questioned in St. Rep. 404. 
 
 Dodge V. Rockport, 199 Mass. 274, 91. People v. Truckee Lumber 
 
 85 N. E. 172. When dams have Co., 116 Cal. 397, 48 Pac. 374, 39 
 
 been authorized by the legislature, L. R. A. 581, 58 Am. St. Rep. 183. 
 
 the riparian owners have been 92. State v. Roberts, 59 N. H. 
 
 allowed to recover compensa/tion 256, 47 Am. Rep. 199. 
 
 from the owners of the dams for 93. State v. Tehriault, 70 Vt. 617, 
 
 the injury to their fishing rights. 41 Atl. 1030, 43 L. R. A. 290, 67 
 
 MeFarlin v. Essex Co., 10 Cush. Am. St. Rep. 695. 
 (Mass.) 304; Commonwealth v. 
 
§ 143 The Taking of Watbes — Eipaeian Rights. 433 
 
 river or pond who may thereby suffer damage.®* When how- 
 ever a body of water, which is the subject of private owner- 
 ship and in which private rights have become vested, 
 becomes public by a change in the fundamental law, the pri- 
 vate rights are not thereby extinguished and the water 
 cannot be taken for public use without compensation.®^ Con- 
 sequently the constitutional provisions which have been 
 adopted in several of the western states, by which all navi- 
 gable waters are declared to be public property, do not have 
 the effect of divesting the riparian rights of an owner which 
 were acquired before the adoption of the constitutional pro- 
 vision, and if they were construed to have such effect they 
 
 94. United States. — Rtindle v. 
 Delaware Canal Co., 14 How. 80, 
 14 L. ed. 335. 
 
 Maine. — Auburn v. Union Water 
 Power Co., 90 Me. 575, 38 Atl. 
 561, 38 L. E. A. 188; Hamor v. 
 Bar Harbor Water Co., 92 Me. 364, 
 42 Atl. 790. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Fay v. Salem 
 Aqueduct Co., Ill Mass. 27; Wa^ 
 tuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River, 
 147 Mass. 548, 18 N. E. 465, 1 
 L. R. A. 466. 
 
 Minnesota. — Minneapolis Mill 
 Co. V. Water Commissioners, 56 
 Minn. 485, 58 N. W. 33. 
 
 Mississippi. — Homochitto River 
 Commissioners v. Witters, 29 Miss. 
 21, 64 Am. Dee. 126. 
 
 New Hampshire. — State v. Su- 
 napee Dam Co., 70 N. H. 458, 50 
 Atl. 108, 59 L. R. A. 55. 
 
 New York. — People v. Canal Ap- 
 praisers, 33 N, Y. 461; Fulton 
 Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State, 
 200 N. T. 400, 94 N. E. 199 
 (semble). 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Carson v. Blazer, 
 2 Bin. 475, 4 Am. Dee. 463; M'e- 
 Keen v. Delaware Canal Co., 49 
 Pa. 424. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Black River Imp. 
 Co. V. La Crosse Transportation 
 Co., 54 Wis. 659, 11 N. W. 443, 41 
 Am. Rep. 66. 
 
 28 
 
 Contra, Morrill v. St. Anthony 
 Water Co., 26 Minn. 222, 2 N. W. 
 842, 37 Am. Rep. 399; Meyers v. 
 St. Louis, 8 Mo. App. 266, 
 
 In Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. 
 Fall River, 147 Mass. 548, 18 N. E. 
 465, 1 L. R. A. 466, it was held that 
 water might be drawn from a pub- 
 lic pond without compensating ri- 
 parian owners on a piivfite stream 
 fed by the pond. The contrary was 
 held on the same facts in Concord 
 Mfg. Co. V. Robertson, 66 N. H. 1, 
 25 Atl. 718, 18 L. B. A. 679, and 
 Taggart v. Jaffrey, 75 N. H. 473, 
 76 Atl. 123, 139 Am. St. Rep. 729. 
 95. Thus after the decision in 
 the Watuppa Reservoir case cited 
 in the preceding note, the ease 
 came before the court again on 
 additional facts, from which it ap- 
 peared thait the pond had been 
 granted to the plaintiff's prede- 
 cessors in title by the Plymouth 
 Colony at a time when the common 
 law had not been modified and all 
 ponds were the subject of private 
 ownership. It was held that the 
 rights of the grantees in the pond 
 were not extinguished by the union 
 of the colonies of Plymouth and 
 Massachusetts Bay and the conse- 
 quent subjection of what had been 
 the Plymouth Colony to the Ordi- 
 nance of 1647 by which " great 
 
434 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 143 
 
 would be in violation of the due process clause of the federal 
 constitution.®" 
 
 The principle has been established with little, if any, 
 dissent that the rights of the public in a private watercourse 
 or pond do not include the right to divert all or any part of 
 the waters for any purpose, however public, except for the 
 improvement of navigation.®'' The waters of a private 
 watercourse or a private pond are private property and 
 cannot be taken without compensation to all the riparian 
 owners whose rights are injuriously affected. The diver- 
 sion of water is obviously a taking of property in the consti- 
 tutional sense, and the water, while not the property of any 
 one owner, is the property of all of the riparian propri- 
 etors who are entitled to enjoy the use of it. It is accord- 
 ingly held that each riparian proprietor who suffers damage 
 is entitled to compensation when water is drawn from a 
 private watercourse or pond under legislative authority for 
 
 U. S. 581, 31 L. ed. 527; Cuyahoga 
 River Power Co. v. Akron, 210 
 Fed. 524. 
 
 ponds " were made public property 
 (supra, § 135). Watuppa Reser- 
 vor Co. V. Fall River, 154 Mass. 
 305, 28 N. E. 257, 15 L. R. A. 255. 
 
 96. Idaho. — Montpelier Milling 
 Co. V. Montpelier, 19 Idaho 420, 
 113 Pac. 731. 
 
 North Dakota. — Bigelow v. 
 Draper, 6 N. D. 152, 69 N. W. 570. 
 
 South Dakota.-^ St. Germain 
 Irrigating Co. v. Hawthorn Ditch 
 Co., 32 S. D. 260, 143 N. W. 123. 
 
 Texas. — M c G h e e Irrigating 
 Ditch Co. V. Hudson, 85 Tex. 591, 
 22 S. W. 398, 967; Barrett v. Me1> 
 calfe, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 247, 33 
 S. W. 758. 
 
 Washington. — New Whatcom v. 
 Fairhaven Land Co., 24 Wash. 493, 
 64 Pac. 735, 54 L. R. A. 190; Mad- 
 son V. Spokane Valley Land & Wa- 
 ter Co., 40 Wash. 414, 82 Pac. 718, 
 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 257. 
 
 97. As to the right to divert 
 water for purposes connected with 
 navigation, see supra, § 139. 
 
 98. United States. — ^United States 
 V. Great FaUs Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 
 645, 28 L. ed. 846; Great Falls 
 Mfg. Co. V. Attorney-General, 124 
 
 Alabama. — Stein v. Burden, 24 
 Ala. 130, 60 Am. Dee. 453; Bur- 
 den V. Stein, 27 Ala. 104, 62 Am. 
 Dee. 758. 
 
 Connecticut. — Harding v. Stam- 
 ford Water Co., 41 Conn. 87; 
 Beckerle v. Danbury, 80 Conn. 124, 
 67 Atl. 371. 
 
 Florida. — Tampa Waterworks 
 Co. V. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 20 So. 
 780, 33 L. R. A. 376. 
 
 Georgia. — Elberton v. Hobbs, 
 121 Ga. 749, 49 S. E. 779. 
 
 Idaho. — Montpelier Milling Co. 
 V. Montpelier, 19 Idaho 420, 113 
 Pac. 731.1 
 
 Kansas. — Emporia v. Soden, 25 
 Kan. 588, 37 Am. Rep. 265: Wal- 
 lace V. Winfield, 96 Kan. 35, 149 
 Pac. 693. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Lund v. New 
 Bedford, 121 Mass. 286; Stevens v. 
 Worcester, 196 Mass. 45, 81 N. E. 
 907. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Taggart v. 
 Jaffrey, 75 N. H. 473, 76 Atl. 123, 
 139 Am. St. Rep. 729. 
 
§ 143 The Taking of Waters — Ripabian Eights. 435 
 
 a public water supply,®* for irrigation,*® for a canal ^ or 
 for any other public use.^ The measure of damages in the 
 case of the diversion of the waters of a private watercourse 
 or pond is not the value of the water taken from the stream 
 or pond, since the water was not the property of any one 
 proprietor, but is the decrease in market value of the 
 riparian land by reason of the diversion of the water.' 
 
 New Jersey. — Higgins v. Flem- 
 ington Water Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 538. 
 
 New York. — Gardner v. New- 
 burgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 7 Am. 
 Dec. 526; Smith v. Rochester, 92 
 N. Y. 463, 44 Am. Rep. 393. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Lord v. Mead- 
 viUe Water Co., 135 Pa. 122, 19 
 Atl. 1007, 8 L. R. A. 202, 20 Am. 
 St. Rep. 864; Irving v. Media, 194 
 Pa. 648, 45 Atl. 482; Miller v. 
 Hanover, etc., Water Co., 240 Pa. 
 393, 87 Atl. 706. 
 
 Virginia. — Jeter v. Vinton- 
 Roanoke Water Co., 114 Va. 769, 
 76 S. E. 921. 
 
 Washington. — Rigney v. Tacoma 
 Light & Water Co., 9 Wash. 576, 
 38 Pac. 147, 26 L. R. A. 425. 
 
 See infra, § 145, for a discussion 
 of the question whether a municipal 
 corporation owning riparian land 
 may draw water for the use of its 
 inhabitants as an exercise of its pri- 
 vate rights as a riparian proprietor. 
 
 99. Nebraska.— Claik v. Cam- 
 bridge, etc.. Irrigation Co., 45 Nebr. 
 798, 64 N. W. 239; Crawford Co. 
 V. Hathaway, 67 Nebr. 325, 93 
 N. W. 781, 60 L. R. A. 889, 108 
 Am. St. Rep. 647. 
 ' New Mexico.— Miller v. Hager- 
 man Irrigation Co., 20 N. M. 604, 
 151 Pac. 736. 
 
 Texas. — McGhee Irr. Ditch Co. 
 V. Hudson, 85 Tex. 587, 22 S. W. 
 398. 
 
 Washington. — Madson v. Spo- 
 kane Valley Land & Water Co., 40 
 Wash. 414,' 82 Pac. 718. 
 
 In Miller & Lux v. Madera Canal 
 & Irrigation Co., 155 Cal. 59, 99 
 Pac. 502, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 391, 
 
 this rule was applied in the case of 
 flood waters of a river which was 
 annually swelled beyond its ordi- 
 nary banks by climatic conddtiona 
 at certain seasons of the year. 
 
 1. Illinois. — Beidler v. Sanitary 
 District, 211 lU. 628, 71 N. E. 1118, 
 67 L. R. A. 820. 
 
 New York. — Ex parte Jennings, 
 6 Cowen 447, 16 Am. Dec. 447; 
 Canal Commissioners v. Kempshall, 
 26 Wend. 404; Eulton Light, Heat 
 & Power Co. v. State, 200 N. Y. 
 400, 94 N. E. 199. 
 
 Ohio. — ■ Cooper v. Williams, 4 
 Ohio 253, 22 Am. Dec. 745. 
 
 2. Hubbard v. Limerick Water 
 & Electric Co., 109 Me. 248, 83 
 Atl. 793; Swain v. Pemigewasset 
 Power Co., 76 N. H. 498, 85 Atl. 
 288; Coalter v. Hunter, 4 Rand 
 (Va.) 58, 15 Am. Dee. 726. See 
 also Stevens v. Worcester, 219 
 Mass. 128, 106 N. E. 587, in which 
 it was held that a riparian proprie- 
 tor was entitled to compensation 
 for the diversion of a natural wa- 
 tercourse in a thickly settled dis- 
 trict into a straight, walled-in chan- 
 nel for the protection of the public 
 health, in the absence of an adjudi- 
 cation, after notice and a hearing, 
 that the brook was a nuisance. 
 
 3. Fosgate v. Hudson, 178 Mass. 
 225, 59 N. E. 809; Van Buren v. 
 Fishkill, etc., Waterworks Co., 50 
 Hun (N. Y.) 448, 3 N. Y. Supp. 
 336; Miller v. Wiadsor Water Co., 
 148 Pa. 429, 23 Atl. 1132; Lewis v. 
 Springfield Water Co., 176 Pa. 237, 
 35 Atl. 187. As the riparian own- 
 ers do not own the water as a mar- 
 ketable commodity they cannot 
 
436 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 144 
 
 While it is agreed that the waters of a private navigable 
 stream may be diverted in order to aid navigation, without 
 compensation i,o the riparian proprietors, it is not entirely 
 clear whether, when water is so taken in good faith, the sur- 
 plus may be sold for other purposes, without a right to com- 
 pensate the riparian proprietor arising. The Supreme 
 Court of the United States does not however recognize a 
 right to compensation in such a case.* 
 
 § 144. The Doctrine of Prior Appropriation. 
 
 In some of the arid, mountainous regions in the western 
 portion of the United States, the common law rules in 
 regard to riparian rights have been greatly modified, on 
 account of the difference in physical conditions. In arid 
 regions the little rainfall quickly comes and quickly goes. 
 The dry air dissipates it ; the earth and the sands swallow 
 it; and it sinks away io the rock strata underlying the 
 gravel beds. But the reservoirs of the mountains are annu- 
 ally filled with snow, which when melted, runs down in 
 streams sufficient in quantity to supplant the cactus and 
 the sage brush of the desert with foliage and flowers and 
 properous farms. Without diversion this water could not 
 be made potent for agriculture, mining, or manufactur- 
 ing purposes; and it is therefore entirely dissociated, in 
 legal thought, from the channel in which it flows, and 
 declared to be the public property of the state, subject to 
 appropriation by anyone who will capture it and devote it 
 to beneficial uses ; and, among the appropriators, those who 
 are prior in time are prior in right. It has been conceived 
 that this doctrine meets the necessities of the people dwell- 
 ing in arid, mountainous states better than that of the 
 common law relating to the use of the water of running 
 
 have their damages assessed on the 53, 57 L. ed. 1063. See however 
 
 basis of the value of the water for contra, Green Bay, etc., Canal Co. 
 
 a public water supply. Lynnfield v. Kaukauna Water Power Co., 90 
 
 V. Peabody, 219 Mass. 322, 106 Wis. 370, 61 N. W. 1121, 63 F. W. 
 
 N. B. 977. 1019, 28 L. R. A. 443, 48 Am. St. 
 
 4. United States v. Chandler- Rep. 937. 
 Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 
 
§ 144 The Taking op Waters — Ripaeian Rights. 437 
 
 streams ; and it has been established there by constitutional 
 provisions, by legislative acts and by decisions of the courts. 
 Viewed historically, the foundation for this doctrine is not 
 nearly so broad. It arose in California at a time when gov- 
 ernment and law were not yet established ; when there was 
 no agricultural population and were no riparian owners; 
 and when streams could be put to no use except for mining. 
 From the necessities of the case, there being no law appli- 
 cable, the miners held meetings in each district or locality, 
 and adopted regulations by which they agreed to be gov- 
 erned. As at that time streams could be put to no use 
 except for mining, and as the use of large quantities of water 
 was essential to mining operations, it became settled as one 
 of the mining customs or regulations that the right to use 
 a definite quantity of water, and to divert it from streams or 
 lakes, could be acquired by prior appropriation. This cus- 
 tom acquired strength; rights were gained under it, and 
 investments made, and it was soon approved by the courts 
 and by local legislation; and, though not originally avail- 
 able against the general government or its patentees, was 
 made so available by the act of Congress in 1866.^ The rule 
 of prior appropriation prevails in California, Oregon and 
 Washington in the public lands only ; it prevails generally in 
 Colorado, Idaho and Wyoming by constitutional provisions ; 
 in Arizona and Utah by statute ; in Nevada by judicial deci- 
 sion.® It does not prevail elsewhere, whatever the character 
 of the soil.'' 
 
 In states in which the rule of prior appropriation has 
 been adopted, the rights of one who has made an appropria- 
 tion of the waters of a stream are property in the constitu- 
 tional sense, and the waters of the stream cannot be diverted 
 for a public use in such a manner as to destroy the rights of 
 
 5. Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 269, 21 Pae. 317, 4 L. R. A. 60, 19 
 206, 80 Pae. 571, 70 L. R. A. 971 ; Am. St. Rep. 364. 
 
 Meng V. Coffee, 67 Neb. 500, 93 7. Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 
 
 N. W. 713, 60 L. R. A. 910. 206, 80 Pae. 571, 70 L. R. A. 971; 
 
 6. Jones v. Adams, 19 Nev. 78, 6 Crawford Co. v. Hall, 67 Neb. 325, 
 Pae. 442, 3 Am. St. Rep. 788 ; Reno, 93 N. W. 781, 60 L. R. A. 889, 108 
 etc.. Works v. Stevenson, 20 Nev. Am. St. Rep. 647. 
 
438 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 145 
 
 the prior appropriator without compensation.* In states 
 in which the common law rule in respect to riparian rights 
 prevails, it is not competent for the legislature to adopt the 
 rule of prior appropriation in such a way as to interfere 
 with the exercise of vested riparian rights, except in behalf 
 of a public use, such as irrigation, and upon payment of 
 just compensation.® 
 
 § 145. Riparian Rights of a Municipal Corporation. 
 
 It is, as has already been stated, universally conceded 
 that the.legislature of a state has not the power to authorize 
 the diversion of water from a private watercourse or pond, 
 even if navigable, for the purposes of a public water supply, 
 as an exercise of the public rights in the water, and without 
 compensation to the riparian proprietors whose rights 
 would be unfavorably affected.^" It has, however, been con- 
 tended that a municipal corporation situated or owning 
 land on the banks of a stream, and ranking, therefore, as a 
 riparian proprietor, may use the stream for the benefit of 
 its inhabitants to the same extent as a private riparian 
 owner might use it for his own needs; that in supplying 
 water for the domestic use of its people it acts wholly within 
 its private riparian rights ;^^ that in polluting the stream 
 
 8. Davis V. Gale, 32 Cal. 26, 91 property and public works, and in 
 Am - Dee. 554 ; Strickler v. Colorado its corporate capacity provides for 
 Springs, 16 Col. 61, 26 Pac. 313, 25 the convenience and welfare of its 
 Arn, St. Rep. 245; Salt Lake City inhabitants as to streets, fire pro- 
 V. Salt Lake City, etc., Power Co., teetion, lighting, and supplying 
 24 Utah 249, 67 Pac. 672, 61 water; and in such and other like 
 L. R. A. 648, aflSrmed, 25 Utah matters the city overshadows the 
 456, 71 Pac. 1069. individuals and stands in its oor- 
 
 9. Crawford Co. v. Hall, 67 Nelv porate capacity as a single pro- 
 325, 93 N. W. 781, 60 L. R. A. prietor extending through its entire 
 889, 108 Am. St. Rep. 647. And limits and entitled as such to all 
 Bee also supra, § 143. the rights and subject to all the 
 
 10. Supra, i 143. liabilities of a riparian proprietor 
 
 11. Canton v. Shock, 66 Ohio St. on the stream upon which it is sit- 
 19, 63 N. E. 600, 58 L. R. A. 637, uated. Sound reason, the weight 
 90 Am. St. Rep. 557. "While the of authority, and the present ad- 
 inhabitants own their lots individu- vanced state of municipal govem- 
 ally, the city owns the streets, the ment rights and liabilities, require 
 fixe department and all other public that a municipality should be held 
 
§ 145 The Taking of Waters — Eipabian Eights. 439 
 
 with sewage it makes what is, under the circumstances, a 
 reasonable use of the water as it flows past.^^ This con- 
 tention, however, seems fallacious. It is doubtless the law 
 that a municipal corporation which owns a riparian lot upon 
 which it conducts some public enterprise or has placed one 
 of its public buildings, as a school house or a municipal 
 lighting plant, may make a reasonable use of the water for 
 the benefit of that particular lot, to the same extent as a 
 private corporation might, just as it is held that a riparian 
 railroad company may make a reasonable use of the waters 
 of the stream for supplying its engines with water.^* To 
 use the river for the water supply or drainage of all the 
 individuals who happen to be inhabitants of the city or town 
 which owns the lot is a very different matter, and an accept- 
 ance of the doctrine would, especially in those states all the 
 territory of which is embraced within some municipal cor- 
 poration, extend the benefits of riparian ownership far 
 beyond the limits established by the common law. A munic- 
 ipal corporation can have no domestic wants, and it seems 
 clearly inadvisable and unjust to deprive individuals of 
 valuable property rights in the stream by a mere legal 
 fiction. As it is well settled that a riparian owner may take 
 all the water he needs for domestic purposes, regardless of 
 the effect on those situated lower down the stream, the 
 extension of this privilege to the inhabitants of a city with 
 a large population might have a ruinous effect upon mill 
 owners below who were making a reasonable use of the 
 stream to obtain mechanical power. A private riparian 
 
 ■and regarded in its entirety as an 36 Am. St. Rep. 891; Jones on 
 
 individual entity having in its oor- Easements, § 747. 
 
 porate capacity the rights and sub- 12. See note in 84 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 ject to the liabilities of a riparian 908. 
 
 proprietor, and we so hold in this 13. Sandwich v. Great Northern 
 
 case." This was a case of diversion Ry. Co., 10 Ch. D. 707; Elliott v. 
 
 of water of a stream for sale to the Pitchburg R. R. Co., 10 Clish. 
 
 inhabitants for domestic purposes. (Mass.) 191, 57 Am. Dee. 85. But 
 
 See also Philadelphia v. Spring a railroad company is liable in tort 
 
 Garden Commissioners, 7 Pa. 348; for using an unreasonable amount 
 
 Philadelphia v. Collins, 68 Pa. 106 ; of water for its engines. Penn- 
 
 Barre Water Co. v. Games, 65 Vt. sylvania R. R. Co. v. Miller, 112 
 
 626, 27 Atl. 609, 21 L. R. A. 769, Pa. 34, 3 Atl. 780. 
 
440 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 145 
 
 proprietor has no right at common law to divert water from 
 a private watercourse for the purposes of sale, and it would 
 seem that a municipal or a public service corporation 
 should stand in no better position. The cases involving the 
 point are not numerous, for provision is generally made by 
 statute that the municipality or water company taking the 
 water shall pay the damages thereby caused, and under 
 such an act the riparian owners may recover, even if noth- 
 ing was done which would not be lawful if done by an 
 individual riparian owner ; " but the doctrine that a riparian 
 town may take from a private stream all the water it needs 
 for the domestic use of its inhabitants is certainly not gener- 
 ally accepted and is expressly denied in a number of cases.'* 
 It is not law in England,'® and as it involves a question not 
 of constitutional law but of private riparian rights, the 
 English decisions should be given great weight. 
 
 The mere fact that a municipal or a public service corpo- 
 ration has only an easement in riparian lands does not how- 
 ever prevent the exercise of riparian rights so far as they 
 are properly appurtenant to the riparian land in question. 
 The condemnation by such a corporation of upland adjoin- 
 ing a body of water embraces the riparian- rights of improve- 
 ment and occupancy of the submerged lands, although no 
 specific mention is made of riparian rights in the condemna- 
 tion proceedings." So also when a highway extends to high 
 
 14. Aetna Mills v. Waltham, 126 New Jersey. — • Sparks Mfg. Co. 
 Mass. 422; A'etna Mills v. Brook- v. Newton, 57 N. J. Eq. 367, 41 
 line, 127 Mass. 69. Atl. 385; McCarter v. Hudson 
 
 15. Alabama.— Sievn v. Btirdem, County Water Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 
 24 Ala. 130, 60 Am. Dec. 453. 695, 65 Atl. 489, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 
 Connecticut.— Suffield v. Hatha- l^^, 118 Am. St. Rep. 754, affirmed, 
 way, 44 Conn. 521, 26 Am. Rep. ^09 US. 349, 52 L. ed. 828. 
 4gq 16. Swindon Waterworks Co. v. 
 
 TTn^.n. TTrm-nn^-, ^ <i^a.^ ^K ^"^^ ^anal, L. R. 7 H. L. 697; 
 
 Kansas.— ihrnipona, v. boaen, Zo oi • i ii/r j. i-i. t> j i 
 
 T2- COD orr A -n o/.r ttt i btainton V. Metropolitan Board of 
 
 1 t I ff-nf'^ %^.t Works, 29 L. J. Ch. 300. 
 
 laee v. W^field, 96 Kan. 35, 149 17 g^^f^^^ ^ g^ p^^I^ ^^^ ^ 
 
 ^^- ^^^- R. Co., 43 Minn. 104, 42 N. W. 
 
 Massachusetts. —LjimM.d. v, 596, 44 N. W. 1144, 7 L. R. A 722. 
 
 Peabody, 219 Mass. 322, 106 N. E. 18. United States.— Snulet v. 
 
 ^'^'^- Shepherd, 4 Wall. 502, 18 L. ed. 
 
 Michigan.- B.all v. Zona, 38 442; Elliott v. Atlantic City, 149 
 
 Mich. 493. Fed. 849. 
 
§ 146 The Taking of Watees — Eipaeian Eights. 441 
 
 water mark, whether the land needed for the way was 
 acquired by eminent domain, dedication or by a conveyance 
 from the owner, when the shore line is extended by accre- 
 tion, or by filling effected by the owner of the fee, the pub- 
 lic easement will attach to the newly formed land, and the 
 highway will continue to the water's edge without addi- 
 tional compensation to the owner,^* and for a similar reason 
 the right to erect a wharf at the end of a street leading to 
 navigable water is in the public and not in the owners of the 
 fee of the street at the point where it reaches the water.** 
 
 § 146. Pollution by a Municipal Sewer System. 
 
 A city or town may lawfully turn its sewage into the 
 ocean or into tidal or other public navigable waters without 
 any obligation to compensate the owners of lands upon the 
 shore for the annoyance or injury resulting therefrom.^** 
 
 Alabama. — ^Doe ex dem. Kennedy 
 V. Jones, 11 Ala. 63. 
 
 Connecticut. — Lockwood v. New 
 Yark, etc., E. R. Co., 37 Conn. 387. 
 
 Illinois. — Godfrey v. Alton, 12 
 111. 29, 52 Am. Dec. 476. 
 
 Iowa. — Cook V. Burlington, 30 
 Iowa 94, 6 Am. Eep. 649. 
 
 Maine. — State v. Yates, 104 Me. 
 360, 71 Atl. 1018, 22 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 592. 
 
 New Hampshire. — ^Dana v. Crad- 
 doek, 66 N. H. 593, 32 Atl. 757. 
 
 New Jersey. — ^Newark Lime, etc., 
 Co. V. Newark, 15 N. J. Eq. 64; 
 Hoboken Land, etc., Co. v. Ho- 
 boken, 36 N. J. L. 540. 
 
 New York. — People v. Lambier, 
 5 Denio 9, 47 Am. Dec. 273; Mark 
 V. West Troy, 151 N. Y. 453, 45 
 N. E. 842; Matter of City of New 
 York, 216 N. Y. 67, 110 N. E. 176. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Hathaway v. Mil- 
 waukee, 132 "Wis. 249, 111 N. W. 
 750, 112 N. W. 455, 9 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 778, 122 Am. St. Rep. 975. 
 When a highway crosses a small 
 watercourse, a bridge spanning the 
 stream at the crossing and within 
 the limits of the highway is a part 
 
 of the highway, and is not an addi- 
 tional servitude on the fee of the 
 riparian proprietors. Jones v. 
 Keith, 37 Tex. 399, 14 Am. Rep. 
 382. 
 
 19. McMurray v. Baltimore, 54 
 Md. 103; Backus v. Detroit, 49 
 Mich. 110, 43 Am. Rep. 447. 
 
 20. Thus it was said by the court 
 in Sayre v. Newark, 60 N. J. Eq. 
 361, 45 Atl. 985, 48 L. R. A. 722, 
 83 Am. St. Rep. 629: "These 
 explicit declarations of the judg- 
 ment of the court seem to place 
 beyond question the power of the 
 legislature to authorize the munici- 
 palities of the state to use the tidal 
 navigable streams within our bor- 
 ders for sewerage purposes * * *• 
 as no private property exists in 
 such waters there remain only the 
 jura publica over which, in the 
 words of the chief justice, the do- 
 minion of the legislature appears 
 to be unlimited. Indeed, the his- 
 tory of sewere shows that from 
 time immemorial the right to con- 
 nect them with navigable streams 
 has been regarded as part of the 
 jus publicum. * * * The degree 
 
442 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 146 
 
 The right to use public waters for the disposal of sewage 
 has been exercised so long and with such general acqui- 
 escence that, in spite of the modern tendency to exalt the 
 rights of property at the expense of public rights, the public 
 has not yet been deprived of this privilege, and the right 
 to use the public waters for this purpose whenever assailed 
 has been upheld. The justification of this use of public 
 waters is of course that such waters and the bed beneath 
 them are public property; when private rights have been 
 established by law in public waters the impairment of such 
 rights is a taking of property .^^ Thus when sewage invades 
 and fills up a dock which has become the subject of pri- 
 vate ownership, according to well established principles 
 there is a taking of property for which there must be 
 compensation.^* 
 
 of pollution to be permitted is a 
 matter over •which the legislature 
 has full power and control. * * * 
 The last point for consideration is 
 whether the complainants may re- 
 strain the exercise of this authority 
 because of the incidental damage 
 which it will cause to them and 
 their property. * * * T^e have 
 therefore, the city of Newark, a 
 public corporation, executing, within 
 the bounds of its discretion and 
 with care, a franchise lawfully 
 granted to it by the legislature for 
 a public purpose, but thereby pro- 
 ducing consequential damage to the 
 complainants. Such damage is a 
 loss for which there is no remedy. 
 It is a burden to which the sufEerers 
 must submit as members of the 
 community from which they receive 
 compensatory benefits." Hasbell v. 
 New Bedford, 103 Mass. 208: " One 
 great natural office of the sea and 
 of all running waters is to carry 
 off and dissipate, by their perpetual 
 motion and currents, the impurities 
 and off-scourings of the land. The 
 owner of any lands bord'ering upon 
 the sea may lawfully throw refuse 
 
 matter into it, provided he does not 
 create a nuisance to others. And 
 there can be no doubt that public 
 bodies and officers, charged by law 
 with the duty and power of con- 
 structing and maintaining drains 
 for the benefit of the public health, 
 have an equal right." See also 
 Boston v. Lecraw, 17 How. (U. S.) 
 426, 15 L. ed. 118; District of Co- 
 lumbia V. Cropley, 23 App. D. C. 
 232; Attwood v. Bangor, 83 Me. 
 583, 22 Atl. 466. 
 
 21. Thus it was held in Huffmire 
 V. Brooklyn, 162 N. Y. 584, 57 
 N. E. 176, 48 L. E. A. 421, that 
 when under legislative authority an 
 individual had been granted the ex- 
 elusive use of a certain portion of 
 the submerged bed of a tidal stream 
 for planting oysters, he was enti- 
 tled to compensation when his 
 oysters were dam'aged by pollution 
 from the defendant's sewers. 
 
 22. Maine. — ^Franklin Wharf Co. 
 V. Portland, 67 Me. 46, 24 Am. 
 Rep. 1. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Brayton v. Fall 
 River, 113 Mass. 218, 18 Am. Rep. 
 470; Constitution Wharf Co. v. 
 
§ 146 The Taking of Watees — Eipaeian Eights. 443 
 
 The pollution of a private watercourse, whether navi- 
 gable or otherwise, is a different matter. No private 
 riparian owner has the right to pour drainage or other nox- 
 ious matter into a private watercourse so as to materially or 
 unreasonably pollute the water, and consequently each such 
 owner has the right, as incident to his ownership of riparian 
 land, to have the water flow past in substantially the same 
 degree of purity in which it was wont to flow."' When a 
 city or town gathers the house sewage of its inhabitants and 
 pours it into a private watercourse there is a serious impair- 
 ment of the enjoyment of riparian rights, and the injury 
 resulting therefrom undoubtedly constitutes a " damage," ^* 
 but whether such injury is of such a character as to consti- 
 tute a " taking " is not entirely clear. It is held in a few 
 states that a lower riparian owner upon a private water- 
 course is not entitled to compensation for the pollution of 
 the water by a municipal sewer system;"* but the weight 
 
 Boston, 156 Mass. 397, 30 N. E. 
 1134; Fairfield v. Salem, 213 Mass. 
 296, 100 N. E. 542. 
 
 Petmsylvania. — Butchers' lee Co. 
 V. PhiladelpiMa, 156 Pa. 54, 27 Atl. 
 376. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Clark v. Peck- 
 ham, 9 R. I. 455. 
 
 23. Wood V. Waud, 3 Ex. 748; 
 Merrifield v. Lombard, 13 Allea 
 (Mass.) 16, 90 Am. Dee. 172. 
 
 24. Arkansas. — McLaughlin v. 
 Hope, 107 Ark. 442, 155 S. W. 
 910, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 137; El 
 Dorado v. Scruggs, 113 Ark. 239, 
 168 S. W. 846; Jones v. Sewer Im- 
 provement District, 177 S. W. 888. 
 
 Illinois. — Kewanee v. Otley, 204 
 111. 402, 68 N. E. 388. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Washburn & 
 Moen Mfg. Co. v. Worcester, 116 
 Mass. 458 ; Morse v. Worcester, 139 
 Mass. 389, 2 N. E. 694; Harring- 
 ton V. Worcester, 183 Mass. 254, 67 
 N. E. 428. 
 
 Missouri. — Joplin Consolidated 
 
 Mining Co. v. Joplin, 124 Mo. 129, 
 27 S. W. 406; Smith v. Sedalia, 
 152 Mo. 283, 53 S. W. 907, 48 
 L. R. A. 711 ; Smith v. Sedalia, 244. 
 Mo. 107, 149 S. W. 597. 
 
 Texas. — New Odorless Sewerage 
 Co. V. Wisdom, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 
 224, 70 S. W. 354. 
 
 The measure of damages for the 
 pollution of a stream by a public 
 sewer system of permanent char- 
 acter is the dimunition in the market 
 value of the land. El Dorado v. 
 Scruggs, 113 Ark. 239, 168 S. W. 
 846. 
 
 25. Merrifield v. Worcester, 110 
 Mass. 216, 14 Am. Rep. 592, is a 
 leading ease and holds that the 
 rights of the riparian proprietors 
 are subordinated to the public 
 needs. " Eor the incidental disad- 
 vantage, loss or inconvenience nec- 
 essarily resulting to individuals, in 
 their rights of property, from suah 
 action; or from the execution of 
 the work, in a proper and skilful 
 
444 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 146 
 
 of authority favors the principle that the court cannot bal- 
 ance the public convenience and inconvenience; that the 
 pollution of a stream by sewage or for any other public 
 purpose is a taking of property in the constitutional sense 
 and that it cannot be effected without compensation.^® 
 
 manner, as so laid out; or from the 
 maintenance and use of the drains 
 in. a proper and reasonable manner, 
 without negligence in their care and 
 management, no action of tort can 
 be maintained against the city. 
 This exemption of municipal bodies 
 and their officers from liability, and 
 corresponding subordination of in- 
 dividual rights and interests to the 
 safety, health and welfare of the 
 general public, is a principle of fre- 
 quent application." In this case it 
 seems to be assumed that the pol- 
 lution of a stream is not a taking 
 of property. Valparaiso v. Hagen, 
 153 Ind. 337, 54 N. E. 1062, 48 
 L. R. A. 707, 74 Am. St. Rep. 305: 
 " The sewage must be dispatched or 
 the city abandoned. The place 
 adopted for the outpour is that 
 provided by nature, and cannot be 
 had elsewhere. The facts present a 
 case wherein the principle of the 
 greatest good to the greatest num- 
 ber must be permitted to operate, 
 and private interest yield to the 
 public good ; and if the erection- has 
 been skilfully performed, and with- 
 out negligence, as is shown to be 
 the fact by the record, and in a way 
 to do the least mischief, it must be 
 held to be a lawful exercise of 
 power that equity will not restrain." 
 See also Richmond v. Test, 18 Ind. 
 App. 482, 48 N. E. 610; Harring- 
 ton V. Worcester, 186 Mass. 594, 
 72 N. E. 326. In Smith v. SedaJia, 
 244 Mo. 107, 149 S. "W. 597, it was 
 held that pollution of a water- 
 course was a damaging and not a 
 taking, and that compensation need 
 not be paid in advance. 
 
 26. Piatt Bros. & Co. v. Water- 
 
 bury, 72 Conn. 351, 45 Atl. 154, 48 
 L. R. A. 691, 77 Am. St. Rep. 312: 
 " The right to pour into the river 
 surface drainage does not include 
 the right to mix with that drainage 
 noxious substances in such quanti- 
 ties that the river cannot dilute 
 them, nor safely carry them o£E 
 without injury to the property of 
 others. The latter act is in efEect 
 an appropriation of the bed of the 
 river as an open sewer and the 
 proposition that it may become law- 
 ful by reason of necessity is incon- 
 sistent with undoubted axioms of 
 jurisprudence. The appropriation 
 of the river to carry such sub- 
 stances to the property of another 
 is an invasion of his right of prop- 
 erty. * » * The plaintiff has 
 certain: rights aa riparian land- 
 owner. These rights are property, 
 within the meaning of our consti- 
 tutional guaranty, and an invasion 
 of these rights such as the dtefend- 
 ant has made is a taking of that 
 property." Grey v. Paterson, 58 
 N. J. Eq. 1, 42 Atl. 749, 48 L. R. A. 
 717, 83 Am. St. Rep. 642. "Ri- 
 parian owners above tide owa ad 
 medium filum aquae and have a 
 property right in the water flowing 
 along and over their land. This 
 property right cannot be impaired 
 except by the lawful use of the 
 waters- by riparian owners higher 
 up the stream. Lower owners must 
 submit to such pollution as results 
 from the natural or reasonable use 
 of the owners above, produced by 
 the surface drainage or by the per- 
 colation of offensive matter through 
 the soU. But the higher owners 
 cannot lawfully combine and by 
 
§ 146 The Taking of Watebs — Ripabian Eights. 445 
 
 In many jurisdictions the question has not arisen, either 
 because compensation has been provided by statute, or 
 because the courts have held the pollution to be unauthor- 
 ized. In England in recent years Parliament has authorized 
 
 construction of artificial conduits 
 collect foul matter and pour it in 
 mass iuto the stream. Such a 
 scheme when put into operation 
 constitutes the taking of private 
 property, which the legislature can- 
 not authorize except upon just com- 
 pensation to the party injured." 
 •See also the following oases in 
 which municipal corporations au- 
 thorized to maintain sewer systems 
 were held liable at common law for 
 turning their sewage into private 
 watercourses in such quantities as 
 to materially and unreasonably pol- 
 lute the water. The liability was 
 usually based upon the ground that 
 such pollution was not authorized 
 by the legislature, but in most of the 
 oases cited the court strongly in- 
 timated that it could not be consti- 
 tutionally authorized without com- 
 pensation to the parties specially 
 injured. 
 
 United States. — Sandusky Port- 
 land Cement .Co. v. Dison Pure'Ice 
 Co., 221 Fed. 200. 
 
 Alabama. — ^Birmingham v. Land, 
 137 Ala. 538, 34 So. 613. 
 
 ' California. — Peterson v. Santa 
 Eosa, 119 Cal. 387, 51 Pac. 557. 
 
 Connecticut. — Nolan v. New 
 B'ritain, 69 Conn. 668, 38 Atl. 708; 
 Watson V. New Milford, 72 Conn. 
 561, 45 Atl. 167, 77 Am. St. Rep. 
 345; Dudley v. New Britain, 77 
 Conn. 322, 59 Atl. 89; G-orham v. 
 New Haven, 79 Conn. 670, 66 Atl. 
 505. 
 
 Illinois. — Dwight v. Hayes, 150 
 m. 273, 37 N. E. 218, 41 Am. St. 
 Kep. 367; Robb v. La Grange, 158 
 111. 21, 42 N. B. 77; Kewanee v. 
 Otley, 204 111. 402, 68 N. E. 388. 
 
 Iowa. — Bennett v. Marion, 119 
 Iowa 473, 93 N. "W. 558; Vogt v. 
 
 GrinneU, 133 Iowa 363, 110 N. W. 
 603. 
 
 Kansas. — State v. Concordia, 78 
 Kan. 250, 96 Pac. 487, 20 L. E, A. 
 (N. S.) 1050. 
 
 Michigan. — Attorney-General v. 
 Grand Rapids, 175 Mich. 503, 141 
 N. W. 890, Ann. Cas. 1915 A 968. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Lockwood v. 
 Dover, 73 N. H.,209, 61 Atl. 32. 
 
 New Jersey.— DoTexrms v. Pater- 
 son, 63 N. J. Eq. 605, 52 Atl. 1107, 
 
 65 N. J. Eq. 711, 55 Atl. 304, 69 
 N. J. Eq. 775, 61 Atl. 396, 73 N. J. 
 Eq. 474, 69 Atl. 225. 
 
 New York. — Noonan v. Albany, 
 79 N. Y. 470, 35 Am. Rep. 540; 
 Chapman v. Rochester, 110 N. Y. 
 273, 18 N. E. 88, 1 L. R. A. 296, 
 6 Am. St. Eep. 366; Sammons v. 
 GloveraviUe, 175 N. Y. 346, 67 
 N. E. 622. 
 
 North CaroUna. — Donnell v. 
 Greensboro, 164 N. C. 330, 80 S. E. 
 377. 
 
 Ohio. — Mansfield v. Balliet, 65 
 Ohio St. 451, 63 N. E. 86, 58 
 L. R. A. 628; Mansfield v. Bmstor, 
 76 Ohio St. 270, 81 N. E. 631, 10 
 L. E. A. (N. S.) 806, 118 AnL St. 
 Eep. 852, 10 Ann. Cas. 767. 
 
 Oklahoma. — Markwardit v. Guth- 
 rie, 18 Okla. 32, 90 Pac. 26, 9 
 L. E. A. (N. S.) 1150, 11 Ann. 
 Cas. 581. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Good v. Altoona, 
 162 Pa. 493, 29 Atl. 741, 42 Am. 
 St. Eep. 840. 
 
 South Carolina. — ^Williams v. 
 HaUe Gold Mining Co., 85 S. C. 1, 
 
 66 S. E. 117, 1057; Parrish v. 
 Yorkville, 96 S. C. 24, 79 S. E. 
 635, L. R. A. 1915 A 282. 
 
 See also Missouri v. Illinois, 180 
 U. S. 208, 45 L. ed. 497. 
 
446 The LAw of Eminent Domain. § 146 
 
 a mimber of cities and towns to empty their sewers 
 into fresh water streams, provided that no nuisance is 
 thereby created.^^ If this provision were lacking the courts 
 construed the statutes as not authorizing a nuisance, on the 
 ground that any other construction would result in too great 
 an injustice for Parliament to have contemplated,^* and 
 many American courts have held a nuisance from sewage 
 pollution to be unauthorized in the absence of an express 
 provision of the statutes.^® Perhaps it would best protect 
 both the needs of the public and the rights of the individual 
 if the English rule were adopted in America, so that the 
 courts would hold that the public had a right of drainage 
 in all rivers, so long as a nuisance was not created. Nuis- 
 ance in connection with this subject probably signifies more 
 than merely exceeding the degree of pollution that would 
 be lawful for a private individual to cause, and connotes 
 pollution of the air as well as of the water. 
 
 The simplest method of justifying the uncompensated 
 infliction of damage by the pollution of private navigable 
 watercourses with sewage would be to hold that in addition 
 to the public right of navigation there is a public right of 
 drainage in all running streams; but the practice of deny- 
 ing compensation for the taking of property for the public 
 use on the ground that it is merely the exercise of a public 
 right is capable of such unlimited possibilities of abuse 
 as to be a dangerous one, and should not be extended in 
 the absence of an unquestioned historical foundation for the 
 public right claimed. 
 
 27. Atty.-Gen. v. Leeds, L. R. 5 694; Boston Belting Co. v. Boston, 
 Ch. 583. 183 Mass. 254, 67 N. E. 428; Har- 
 
 28. Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Wells rington v. "Worcester, 186 Mass. 
 Improvement Commissioners, L. R. 594, 72 N. E. 326. 
 
 1 Ch. 349. Missouri. — Edmondson v. Mob- 
 
 29. Connecticut.— Nolan v. New erly, 98 Mo. 526, 11 S. W. 990. 
 Britain, 69 Conn. 668, 38 Atl. 708. Oregon.— Smith v. SUverton, 71 
 
 Moime.— Franklin Wharf Co. v. Ore. 379, 142 Pae. 609. 
 
 Portland, 67 Me. 46, 24 Am. Rep. 1. Pennsylvania. — Blizzard v. Dan- 
 
 Massachusetts. — Haskell v. New ville, 175 Pa. 479, 34 Atl. 846; 
 
 Bedford, 108 Mass. 208; Morse v. Owens v. Lancaster, 182 Pa. 257, 
 
 Worcester, 139 Mass. 389, 2 N. E. 37 Atl. 858. 
 
§ 146 The Taking of Waters — Eipabian Rights. 447 
 
 Even however if it is assumed that the public has no 
 greater right of drainage than a private individual, it^doea 
 not necessarily follow that the material and injurious pol- 
 lution of a stream is a taking of property. The fact that 
 each owner has a common law right to be free from pollu- 
 tion by the other proprietors does not give him a greater 
 estate than a fee simple in severalty, and the question 
 becomes, whether, if an entire stream were the property 
 of an individual, the pouring of sewage into it would be the 
 taking of his property. Such an invasion upon dry land 
 is ordinarily held to be a taking,^" and it might be argued 
 that the same rule ought to be applied to a private river.'* 
 If that is so it necessarily follows that each owner of prop- 
 erty rights in the river is entitled to his share in the com- 
 pensation. On the other hand, the invasion of a running 
 stream by sewage in such limited quantities as not to create 
 
 30. Supra, § 113. 
 
 31. See the quotation from. Platit 
 Bros. & Co. V. Waterbury, supra, 
 note 26, and the following extract 
 from the opinion of the court in 
 Huffmire v. Brooklyn, 162 N. Y. 
 584, 57 N. E. 176, 48 L. R. A. 421, 
 which although it relates to public 
 waters exemplifies this contention. 
 "Applying the rule which the de- 
 fendant invokes in all its force and 
 breadth, we think this case falls di- 
 rectly within the constitutional in- 
 hibition against the taking of prop- 
 erty without compensation. The 
 plaintiffs were lawfully in posses- 
 sion of a piece of land under water 
 upon which they had planted a bed 
 of oysters. They held their title 
 under legislative authority, which 
 was as ample and unquestioned as 
 that under which defendant's sewer 
 was constructed. Although this 
 land was under public waters, it 
 was as much the private property 
 of the plaintiffs as though it had 
 been a tract of farm land held 
 under a lease from the town of 
 Platlands under legislative author- 
 
 ity. The act of the defendant in 
 pouring its sewage upon this land 
 was not consequential. It was as 
 direct as though it had been dis- 
 charged upon a piece of land owned 
 or rented by the plaintiffs, and used 
 for farming or gardening purposes. 
 In the latter ease a municipal cor- 
 poration could not successfully de- 
 fend its trespass because it was 
 acting under legislative authority, 
 or because its sewage had been car- 
 ried to the lands of the person com- 
 plaining over the lands of others. 
 The fact that plaintiffs' land was 
 under public water, and that de- 
 fendant's sewage was discharged 
 upon it, after passing through 300 
 feet of public water, the land under 
 which was not in the possession or 
 control of the plaintiffs, does not 
 differentiate this case in principle 
 from the illustrative case of a dis- 
 charge of sewage upon surface 
 lands. ■ In either case the injury is 
 so direct as to amount to an inva- 
 sion of a private right, which no 
 legislative sanction or direction can 
 justify or excuse." 
 
448 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 147 
 
 a public miisanee does not necessarily result in substantial 
 ouster of the owners, and if no such serious result is reached, 
 the pollution might well be held to be a damaging merely 
 and not a taking of property. 
 
 § 147. Prohibition of the Exercise of the Riparian Right 
 of Reasonable Pollution. 
 
 It is, as has been already shawn, universally held to be 
 the law that, when it is attempted to divert all or a part of 
 the waters of a private watercourse for the purposes of a 
 public water supply, there is a taking of the riparian right 
 of the proprietors upon the stream below the point of diver- 
 sion, to have the water flow past their land as it was wont 
 to flow, which can be effected only by the exercise of emi- 
 nent domain and upon the payment of just compensation.^* 
 The further question then presents itself, whether the 
 proprietors upon the stream above the point of diversion 
 can be prohibited without compensation from exercising 
 their recognized riparian rights in the stream and from 
 making a reasonable use of their own land adjacent to the 
 stream in such a manner as to pollute the water and thus 
 to endanger the health of that portion of the public which 
 is using the water for drinking purposes. The majority of 
 courts have answered this question in the affirmative. Such 
 a prohibition is, it is said, an exercise of the police power 
 in behalf of the public health, and upon well established 
 principles can be enforced without compensation. Accord- 
 ingly statutes which prohibit the use of lakes or streams, 
 from which a public water supply is taken, for bathing, or 
 for the drainage of riparian land in even a limited degree, 
 have been sustained by the courts, although no compensa- 
 tion has been provided for the riparian owners whose use 
 of the water is thus cut off.^^ 
 
 32. Supra, § 143. Board of Health, 39 Mont. 405, 102 
 
 33. Connecticut.— D-anham v. New Pac. 696, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 589- 
 Britain, 55 Conn. 378, 11 Atl. 354. New Hampshire. — State v. Grif- 
 
 Massachusetts.—SipTB^e v. Dorr, fin, 69 N. H. 1, 39 Atl. 260, 41 
 
 185 Mass. 10, 69 N. E. 344. L. R. A. 177, 76 Am. St. Rep. 139. 
 
 Montana. — Miles City v. State New Jersey. — State v. Wlieeler, 
 
§ 147 The Taking of Watees — Eipaeian Eights. 449 
 
 The question is not one that can be so easily disposed of. 
 It will of course be conceded that any use of a body of 
 water, even in the exercise of riparian rights, that endan- 
 gers the public health, morals or safety while the public is 
 exercising its own recognized rights may be prohibited with- 
 out compensation. Furthermore, public lakes and streams 
 are public property; the legislature may use them for a 
 public water supply if it sees fit, and forbid any use of such 
 waters by members of the public inconsistent with the 
 particular public use to which they have been devoted. As 
 there are no private rights in public waters, at least as 
 against the public, riparian owners who have been accus- 
 tomed to use the waters for bathing or to carry off the 
 offscourings of the land have no standing to complain if 
 they are deprived of these privileges. But upon private 
 waters each riparian proprietor has a right to make a rea- 
 sonable use of the waters for bathing and for drainage, even 
 if he causes a limited degree of pollution.** This right is 
 an absolute one, subject only to the corresponding rights 
 of other riparian proprietors to a reasonable enjoyment 
 of the waters and, upon navigable bodies of water, to the 
 paramount public right of navigation. If the public had 
 also the paramount right to use the water for a public 
 water supply, the riparian owner could be prevented with- 
 out compensation from making any use inconsistent with 
 such right. It is however conceded that the public has no 
 such right. When the public takes the right to divert the 
 
 44 N. J. L. 88; State Board of General v. Gee, L. R. 10 Eq. 131; 
 
 Health v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., Lingwood v. Stowmarket, 11 Jur. 
 
 63 N. J. Eq. Ill, 51 Atl. 1019. N. S. 993. 
 
 North Carolina. — Shelby v. Cleve- Indiana. — Barnard v. Shirley, 
 
 land Mill & Power Co., 155 N. C. 151 Ind. 160, 47 N. E. 671, 41 
 
 196, 71 S. E. 218, 35 L. R. A. L. R. A. 737. 
 
 (N. S.) 488; Durham v. Eno Cot- New York. — BuUard v. Saratoga 
 
 ton MUls, 141 N. C. 615, 54 S. E. Victory Mfg. Co., 77 N. Y. 525; 
 
 453, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 321. Townsend v. Bell, 70 Hun 557. 
 
 Vermont. — State v. Morse, 84 Vermont. — Jacobs v. AUard, 42 
 
 Vt. 387, 80 Atl. 189, Ann. Cas. Vt. 303, 1 Am. Rep. 331. , 
 
 1913 B 218. Wisconsin. — Hazeltine v. Case, 
 
 34. England.— Elmhirat v. Spen- 46 Wis. 391, 32 Am. Rep. 715. 
 ear, 2 Macn. & G. 45; Attomey- 
 29 
 
450 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 147 
 
 water for a public water supply by eminent domain, it 
 is not exercising a public right, but it is taking the prop- 
 erty of the riparian owners, and if the effect of the taking 
 is to destroy a riparian owner's right to make a reasonable 
 use of the water as it flows past his land, it is impossible 
 to deny that there is a taking of his property, unless riparian 
 rights, or that particular riparian right, are not property. 
 The introduction of the police power into the argument is 
 nonsense. If a city desired to use a man's house as a hos- 
 pital, it might not be able to do so if he persisted vi et armis 
 in occupying the whole of it as his residence; but it could 
 not lawfully get possession of the property for hospital pur- 
 poses by passing an ordinance prohibiting the owner from 
 continuing to use it as a residence, and deny him compensa- 
 tion on the ground that the ordinance was merely a police 
 regulation enacted in behalf of the public health. A private 
 watercourse, apart from the public right of navigation, is 
 as much private property as a man's home, even if the 
 ownership is, to a certain extent, joint ; and if a city desires 
 to acquire a private watercourse for a reservoir, and to 
 prevent the owners of the property from using it them- 
 selves, it should take it by eminent domain and pay for it.'^ 
 
 35. In People v. Hurlburt, 131 waters of an inland lake or stream 
 Mich. 156, 91 N. W. 211, 64 L. R. A. by an upper riparian proprietor, 
 265, 100 Am. St. Rep. 588, which without the exercise of the right of 
 involved the prosecution of a ripa- eminent domain or without oom- 
 rian owner for swimming in a city's pensation. In what we have said 
 source of water supply the court we do not mean to intimate that an 
 said, "It is insisted by the people upper proprietor may convert his 
 that, under the police power, it was property into a summer resort, and 
 competent to forbid any act on the ihvite large numbers of people to 
 part of the upper proprietor that his premises for purposes of bath- 
 would tend to impair the public ing, and give them the right pos- 
 health. It may be conceded that sessed only by the riparian owner 
 the police power of the state is very and his family. We are undertak- 
 broad, but our attention has not ing to decide only the ease which 
 been called to any principle of law, is presented here. Upon the record 
 or to any ease, the practical appli- as made, we think the court should 
 cation of which will enable a vil- have directed a verdiot in favor of 
 lage, city, or other municipality, respondent." George v. Chester, 59 
 for the purpose of obtaining a Misc. (N. T.) 553, 111 N. Y. Supp. 
 water supply, to prevent the ordi- 722, was a similar ease. The court 
 nary and reasonable use of the said, "Until the plaintiff's rights 
 
§ 147 The Taking op Waters — Ripabian Eights. 451 
 
 A similar confusion of thought, caused by the introduc- 
 tion of the police power into the argument, has occurred in 
 respect to the destruction for public uses of a prescriptive 
 right to pollute a private watercourse. At common law a 
 
 in the lake are acquired by the vil- 
 lage of Chester by purchase or con- 
 denmation he undoubtedly has a 
 right to use his lands in any reason- 
 able manner, for living and agri- 
 cultural purposes, even though the 
 drainage therefrom may pollute the 
 waters of the reservoir; and he, 
 likewise, has a right to use the 
 waters for boating, bathing, feh- 
 ing, swimming, etc., for himself, 
 his guests and lessees, so long as 
 such use is reasonable; and uses, 
 which otherwise would be reason- 
 able, cannot be made unreasonable 
 by the fact that a municipality 
 sees fit to adopt the lake for a 
 water supply. In that event it 
 becomes the duty of the munici- 
 pality to purify its water supply 
 by the acquisition of sufficient ad- 
 jacent property to accomplish that 
 result, and by compensating those 
 who, theretofore, were making law- 
 ful and reasonable use of the water, 
 where such use may interfere with, 
 or have a tendency to pollute, the 
 water supply of the village. It may 
 be conceded, for the purposes of 
 this decision, that the bathing of 
 the human body in the waters of 
 the lake wiU have a tendency to 
 pollute the waters thereof and ren- 
 der them unfit for general village 
 purposes; but that fact does not 
 give ttie village of Chester the 
 right to interfere with the plain- 
 tiff's common-law rights in the 
 waters of the lake, where they cover 
 a part of, and are adjacent to, other 
 parts of his premises. Those rights 
 existed before the village acquired 
 any right in the said lake; and be- 
 fore the village can take away from 
 the plaintiff those reasonable uses, 
 
 to which the law has always enti- 
 tled the riparian owner, it must 
 make just compensation to the 
 plaintiff." This decision was sus- 
 tained by the Court of Appeals La 
 202 N. Y. 398, 95 N. E. 767, so far 
 as it applied to the right of the 
 plaintiff, his family, guests and 
 lessees to bathe in the lake. In 
 Helfrich v. CatonsviUe Water Co., 
 74 Md. 269, 22 Atl. 72, 13 L. R. A. 
 117, 28 Am. St. Rep. 269, it was 
 held that a riparian owner could 
 not be enjoined from using his soil 
 for pasturage even if the water 
 was polluted so as to impair its 
 use for the purposes of a public 
 water supply, the court saying, 
 " Our opinion is placed on the dis- 
 tinct ground that Helfrich was 
 using his pasture-lot in a reason- 
 able manner, and that he had a right 
 so to use it. His right was not in 
 amy way abridged by the incorpora- 
 tion of the water company and the 
 establishment of its works. And 
 it was not in the power of the 
 legislature to abridge it. It is a 
 right of property protected by the 
 declaration of rights. The water 
 company has power under its char- 
 ter to acquire the water-right by 
 making due compensation to the 
 owner, and ntit otHerwise." See 
 also People v. Elk River Mill & 
 Lumber Co., 107 Cal. 221, 40 Pae. 
 531, 48 Am. St. Rep. 125, and 
 People v. Kirk, 136 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 45, 119 N. Y. Supp. 862. 
 In the latter case it was held that 
 a board of health regulation for- 
 bidding the cutting of ice upon 
 ponds used for a water supply was 
 a taking of property without com- 
 pensation. 
 
452 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 147 
 
 riparian owner might, by adverse user, acquire a prescrip- 
 tive right to pollute a watercourse to a much greater extent 
 than the reasonable degree to which every riparian owner 
 may, merely by virtue of his riparian ownership, pollute it.*® 
 It has been held that when the waters of a stream in which 
 such a right has been acquired are taken for a public water 
 supply, this right can be extinguished without compensa- 
 tion, because there is no such thing as a prescriptive right 
 to maintain a public nuisance.^^ If, apart from its effect 
 upon the public water supply, the pollution was a public 
 nuisance, it could undoubtedly be suppressed without com- 
 pensation. But it is a misuse of the police power to invoke 
 it to destroy a prescriptive right the exercise of which is 
 dangerous to the public health only because the public has 
 taken the property over which it is exercised. In the sup- 
 posititious case of the house acquired for a hospital by 
 forbidding the owner to occupy it, if an owner of adjoining 
 land had acquired a right of way by prescription across the 
 parcel of land on which the house stood, the way could not 
 be closed against him without compensation as a health 
 regulation on the ground that his use of his easement inter- 
 fered with the care of the inmates of the hospital, and that 
 he could not acquire by prescription a right which would 
 prevent the enactment of regulations in behalf of the public 
 health. Similarly, if a prescriptive right to make a par- 
 ticular use of a private watercourse has been lawfully 
 acquired, the enjoyment of such right cannot be made unlaw- 
 ful when the property over which it is exercised is taken 
 for the public use, unless the right is condemned and paid 
 for. *« 
 
 36. Baxendale V. MeMurray, L. R., 38. In Sprague v. Dorr, 185 
 2 Ch. 790; Nolan v. New Britain, Mass. 10, 69 N. E. 344, it was held 
 69 Conn. 668, 38 Atl. 703; Masonic that when the right to divert the 
 Temple Association v. Harris, 79 waters of a stream was taken by 
 Mte. 250, 9 Atl. 737; Holsman v. authority of a statute which pro- 
 Boiling Spring Bleaching Co., 14 vided compensation for all damages, 
 N. J. Eq. 335. tlie holder of a prescriptive right 
 
 37. Shelby v. Cleveland Mill & to pollute the water above the- point 
 Power Co., 155 N. C. 196, 71 S. E. of diversion was entitled to com- 
 218, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 488. pensation under the statute. The 
 
§ 148 The Takikg of Waters — Eipaeian Rights. 453 
 
 § 148. Wharves and Wharfage Rights. 
 
 As the riparian proprietor upon a private navigable 
 watercourse owns the fee of the bed of the watercourse, sub- 
 ject only to the public easement of navigation, he may 
 lawfully construct wharves or any other structures upon 
 the submerged flats in front of his land, provided he does 
 not interfere with navigation.^® The public right of navi- 
 gation is however paramount, and the owner can be consti- 
 tutionally prohibited by the legislature from erecting 
 wharves upon his own property without a permit from the 
 public authorities, if the authorities exercise the power thus 
 conferred upon them in good faith, and for the protection of 
 navigation. Similarly a " harbor line " may be established 
 in private navigable waters, beyond which wharves cannot 
 lawfully be erected, if the establishment of the harbor line 
 has some reasonable connection with navigation.*" When 
 however a wharf has been lawfully erected in private navi- 
 gable waters, it is private property, and can be taken or 
 destroyed only by the exercise of eminent domain and upon 
 the payment of just compensation.*^ 
 
 Upon public waters the situation is somewhat different. 
 At common law, the ownership of the crown in navigable 
 waters extended to high-water mark, and the riparian pro- 
 prietor had no right to construct a wharf beyond that line.*^ 
 In England the right to construct wharves in navigable 
 
 court expressly declined to decide 41. Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall, 
 
 whether the right could have been (U. S.) 497, 19 L. ed. 984; Lev- 
 
 constitutionally extinguished under eriek v. Mobile, 110 Fed. 170 ; Beid- 
 
 the police power without compen- ler v. Sanitary District, 211 111. 628, 
 
 sation. 71 N. E. 1118, 67 L. E. A. 820; 
 
 39. Ryan v. Brown, 18 Mich. 196, Grant v. Davenport, 18 Iowa 179. 
 100 Am. Dec. 154; Grand Rapids V. 42. Hale, De Portibus Maris, 
 Powers, 89 Mich. 94, 50 N. W. 661, c. 7; Western Pacific Ry. Co. v. 
 14 L. R. A. 498, 28 Am. St. Rep. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 151 Ted. 
 276 ; JanesviUe v. Carpenter, 77 376 ; Hudson v. Cuero Land & Emi- 
 Wis. 288, 46 N. W. 128, 8 L. R. A. gration Co., 47 Tex. 56, 26 Am. 
 808, 20 Am. St. Rep. 123. Rep. 289; Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 
 
 40. Harlan, etc., Co. v. Paschall, Wash. 236, 26 Pac. 539, 12 L. R. A. 
 5 Del. Ch. 435; Commonwealth v. 632; Ravenswood v. Flemings, 22 
 Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53; Rice v. W. Va. 52, 46 Am. Rep. 485. 
 Ruddiman, 10 Mich. 126, 141; 
 
 Yates v. Judd, 18 Wis. 119. 
 
454 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 148 
 
 waters rests upon grants from the crown, issued after an 
 inquest upon a writ of ad quod damnum, and the mainte- 
 nance of old ones upon prescription, often based on the pre- 
 sumption of a lost grant. This rule has been generally 
 modified in this country, either by statute or by the deci- 
 sions of the courts, and it is the law in most of the states 
 that the owner of the upland may construct a wharf in front 
 of his estate to low-water mark, or in some jurisdictions, 
 as far as the deep channel, provided he does not interfere 
 with navigation. In Massachusetts, by the colonial ordi- 
 nance of 1641-7, the title of the owner of the upland was 
 extended to low-water mark, subject to the public right of 
 navigation.*^ The ordinance, it was held, was in force in 
 Maine, and the same rule applies there." In Virginia, by 
 an early statute, the owner's title was extended to low 
 water, and he may wharf out indefinitely as long as he 
 does not in fact interfere with commerce. In Maryland, by 
 statute of 1745, a right to extend improvements in Balti- 
 more harbor was given. In North Carolina,*^ Florida, and 
 Oregon the owner of the upland may extend wharves to the 
 channel, the right being created by statute. 
 
 In Connecticut the owner has no title to the flats, but 
 has the right to wharf out, if he does not thereby obstruct 
 navigation. This right rests on local custom or local com- 
 mon law.*® In Rhode Island the rule is the same, and it is 
 attributed to usage or an unpublished ordinance.*'' In New 
 Jersey the title is in the public from high-water mark, but 
 if the littoral proprietor wharves out with the assent or the 
 
 43. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 2 46. Mather v. Chapman, 40 Conn. 
 Dane Abr. (Mass.) 696; Common- 382, 16 Am. Rep. 46. So also in 
 wealth V. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) New Hampshire it has been held 
 70. that the rule that riparian owners 
 
 44. Knox V. Pickering, 7 Greenl. cannot build wharves without the 
 (Me.) 106; State v. Wilson, 42 consent of the sovereign is not ap- 
 Me. 9. plieable to conditions in this 
 
 45. Gregory v. Forbes, 96 N. C. country. Concord Mfg. Co. v. Rob- 
 77, 1 S. E. 541 ; Shepard's Point ertson, 66 N. H. 19, 25 Atl. 718, 18 
 Land Co. v. Atlantic Hotel, 132 L. R. A. 695. 
 
 N. C. 517, 44 S. E. 39, 61 L. R. A. 47. Clark v. Peckham, 10 R. I. 
 
 937. 35, 38, 14 Am. Rep. 654. 
 
§ 148 Thk Taking of Waters — Ripabian Eights. , 455 
 
 acquiescence of the public, he acquires the property so 
 included.*^ In Pennsylvania the owner of the upland has 
 title to the low-water mark, but cannot construct wharves 
 without express authority of the legislature.** In New 
 York he does not own beyond high water and cannot wharf 
 out without permission of the legislature.*" 
 
 It was said by the Supreme Court of the United States 
 in a case®* originating in Illinois that 
 
 ' ' the riparian proprietor is entitled, among other 
 rights, to access to the navigable part of the water 
 on the front of which his land lies, and for that pur- 
 pose to make a landing, wharf, or pier for his own use 
 or for the use of the public, subject to such general 
 rules and regulations as the legislature may pre- 
 scribe for the rights of the public * * * The 
 right must be understood as terminating at the point of 
 navigability;" 
 
 hence an owner who wharves out gains title to the edge of 
 the navigable channel but no farther. It is held, neverthe- 
 less, in Illinois, that the common law has not been changed 
 there by any local usage, custom, or statute and the owner 
 of the upland has no right to wharf out unless he owns the 
 submerged lands.*^ In Minnesota®^ and Wisconsin,®* on 
 the other hand, it is held that a riparian owner upon navi- 
 gable waters, although he does not own the fee of the bed 
 
 48. Gough V. BeU, 22 N. J. L. lUinois, 146 U. S. 387, 36 L. ed. 
 441, 23 N. J. L. 624; New Jersey 1018. 
 
 Zinc & Iron Co. v. Morris Canal & 52. Revell v. People, 177 111. 468, 
 
 Banking Co., 44 N. J. Eq. 398, 15 52 N. E. 1052, 43 L. R. A. 790, 69 
 
 Atl. 227, 1 L. R. A. 133. ^^- ^t. Rep. 257; Cobb v. Lincoln 
 
 49. Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Car- Park Commissioners, 202 111. 427, 67 
 ter, 61 Pa. 21, 30, 100 Am. Dec. N. E. 5, 63 L. R. A. 264, 95 Am. St. 
 goy Rep. 258. 
 
 50. Gould V. Hudson River R. R. ^ ^^- ^."^,1"."?°*' it' H'^'. ""• 
 /-( ,3 -KT 17- rno -r. i. T. 1 Brunswick, 31 Mmn. 297, 47 Am. 
 Co., 6 N. Y. 522 But see Brook- ^^^ ^gg . ^^^^^^ ^ g^_ p^^ 
 
 haven v. Smith, 188 N. Y. 74, 80 ^ ^ (.^^ 43 -^^^^ ^^^^ 43 N. W. 
 
 N. E. 665, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 326; ggg^ 44 jj ^_ 1144^ 7 l_ ^ ^_ 732. 
 
 Barnes v. Midland R. R. Terminal 54. Diedrioh v. Northwestern 
 
 Co., 193 N. Y. 378, 85 N. E. 1093. Union Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 248, 24 Am. 
 
 51. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Rep. 399. 
 
456 
 
 The Law or Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 148 
 
 below low water mark, may erect wharves to the ' ' point of 
 navigability. ' ' 
 
 In all of these states it is recognized that the right of the 
 owner to wharf out is subordinate to the public right of 
 navigation, and may be subjected to reasonable regulations 
 such as the establishment of " harbor lines "®^ in order to 
 prevent interference with navigation, but a wharf, lawfully 
 constructed, and the bed of the stream reclaimed by the 
 construction of the wharf, become the absolute property of 
 the builder, and receive the same protection from the courts 
 as his property on dry land. A wharf so constructed can- 
 not be taken to furnish a site for a bridge or for any other 
 public use,®® and, it is held in some jurisdictions, cannot be 
 constitutionally impaired in value by the erection of struc- 
 tures so near to the wharf as to prevent vessels from tieing 
 
 L. R. A. 722 ; Union Depot, etc., 
 Co. V. Brunswick, 31 Minn. 297, 17 
 N. W. 626, 47 Am. Eep. 789. 
 
 New York. — Langdon v. New 
 York, 93 N. Y. 129; Knickerbocker 
 
 55. State v. Sargent, 45 Conn. 
 358; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 
 Cush. (Mass.) 53; Bay City Gas 
 Light Co. V. Industrial Works, 28 
 Mich. 182; People v. Vanderbilt, 26 
 N. Y. 287. 
 
 56. United States. — ^Yates v. Mil- 
 waukee, 10 Wall. 497, 19 L. ed. 984; 
 Davenport, etc., Railroad Co. v. 
 Eenwick, 102 U. S. 180, 26 L. ed. 
 51; Weems Steamboat Co. v. Peo- 
 ple's Steamboat Co., 214 U. S. 344, 
 53 L. ed. 1029, 16 Ann. Cas. 1222; 
 Mobile V. Sullivan Timber Co., 63 
 C. C. A. 412, 129 Ted. 298. 
 
 Illinois. — Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Stein, 75 HI. 41; Beidler v. Sani- 
 tary District of Chicago, 211 lU. 
 628, 71 N. E. 1118, 67 L. R. A. 
 820. 
 
 Maryland. — Baltimore v. Balti- 
 more, etc., Steamboat Co., 104 Md. 
 485, 65 Atl. 353. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Commonwealth v. 
 Alger, 7 Cush. 70; Bradford v. 
 McQuesten, 182 M'ass. 80, 64 N. E, 
 688. 
 
 Minnesota. — Carli v. Stillwateo: 
 Street Railway & Transfer Co., 28 
 Minn. 373, 10 N. W. 245, 41 Am. 
 Rep. 290; Hanford v. St. Paul, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 43 Minn. 104, 42 
 N. W. 596, 44 N. W. 1144, 7 
 
 Ice Co. V. Forty-second St., etc., 
 Ry. Co., 176 N. Y. 408, 68 N. E. 
 864; In re Commissioner of Public 
 Works, 199 N. Y. 531, 92 N. E. 
 1081, affirming 135 App. Div. 561, 
 120 N. Y. Supp. 1081. 
 
 Oregon. — Lewis v. Portland, 25 
 Ore. 133, 35 Pac. 256, 22 L. R. A. 
 736, 42 Am. St. Rep. 772, 
 
 Washington. — Northern Pacific 
 Railway Co. v. Slade Lumber Co., 
 61 Wash. 195, 112 Pac. 240, 34 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 423. 
 
 57. Illinois. — Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Stein, 75 111. 41. 
 
 New York. — Steers v. Brooklyn, 
 101 N. Y. 51, 4 N. E. 7; American 
 Ice Co. V. New York, 193 N. Y. 673, 
 87 N. E. 675. 
 
 Ohio. — Gawn v. Wilson, 9 Ohio 
 S. & C. P. Dee. 683, 7 Ohio N. P. 
 33. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Be Walnut St. 
 Bridge, 191 Pa. 153, 43 Atl. 88 
 (under damage clause). 
 
 Canada. — Magee v. Regina, 5 
 Can. Exeh. 391. 
 
§ 148 The Taking op Watees — Ripaeian Eights. 457 
 
 up to it,^'' or by the shoaling of the dock by sewage.^^ Even 
 the paramount right of the federal authorities of improving 
 a navigable watercourse cannot, it has been held, be invoked 
 to destroy without compensation a wharf erected in public 
 waters by authority of a state.®* When the right of a ripa- 
 rian proprietor upon public waters to construct wharves in 
 front of his land is recognized by the law of the state, it is 
 a vested riparian right, and, while it is subordinate to the 
 public right of navigation, it cannot be destroyed for any 
 other purpose without compensation, and the use of the bed 
 of a public watercourse under legislative authority in such 
 a manner as to deprive the riparian owner of his right to 
 project a wharf, even if the right has never been exer- 
 cised, or the imposition of restrictions which have the 
 same effect, is considered to be a taking of property in 
 the constitutional sense, when the use to which the bed is 
 put or for which the restrictions are imposed has no 
 direct connection with the exercise of the public right of 
 navigation.*" 
 
 The constitutional questions arising out of the reclama- 
 tion of submerged flats by the riparian owner by means of 
 filling are similar to those in the case of wharves, although 
 the right of a riparian owner to fill land under navigable 
 water is not usually established by general statutes or by 
 custom. When however a riparian owner under authority 
 
 Contra. — Boston & Worcester R. Co. v. United States, 204 Fed. 489 ; 
 
 R. Co. V. Old Colony R. R. Co., 12 Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. 
 
 Cush. (Mass.) 605; Wellington v. Garrison, 208 Ted. 1022. A pri- 
 
 Cambridge, 214 Mass. 35, 100 N. E. vate wharf -upon a navigable stream 
 
 1096, 220 Mass. 312, 107 N. E. 976. is private property, even if it is 
 
 58. Massachusetts. — Haskell v. the only wharf in the port. Weems 
 New Bedford, 108 Mass." 208; Bray- Steamboat Co. v. People's Steam- 
 ton V. Fall River, 113 Mass. 218, boat Co., 214 U. S. 344, 53 L. ed. 
 ]8 Am. Rep. 470; Constitution 1029, 16 Ann. Cas. 1222. 
 
 Wharf Co. v. Boston, 156 Mass. 60. Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 
 
 397, 30 N. E. 1134. 497, 19 L. ed. 984; Earist Steel Co. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Butchers lee & v. Bridgeport 60 Conn. 278, 22 Atl. 
 
 Coal Co. V. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 561, 13 L. R. A. 590; Pacific Mill- 
 
 54, 27 Atl. 376 (damage clause). ing & Elevator Co. v. Portland, 65 
 
 Rhode IsZomd.— Clark v. Peck- Ore. 349, 133 Pac. 72; Peek v. 
 
 ham, 10 R. I. 35, 14 Am. Rep. 654. Hampton, 115 Va. 855, 80 S. E. 
 
 59. Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber 593. 
 
458 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 149 
 
 from the legislature has actually filled the flats in front of 
 his land, it would seem that the land so reclaimed would 
 lose its characteristics as part of the bed of a watercourse 
 and be entitled to the full protection accorded to land above 
 high water mark.** 
 
 § 149. Authorized Structures in Public Waters. 
 
 Individuals and corporation are frequently licensed by 
 the legislatures of the various states to erect structures in 
 public waters other than wharves, such as bridges, dams, 
 log booms and the like, which may to some extent interfere 
 with naivigation and which without the sanction of the legis- 
 lature would be illegal. After the structures thus author- 
 ized have been completed and maintained for a considerable 
 period, it may happen that the increased public use of the 
 waters for navigation or other purposes may require that 
 they be demolished, or they may be so damaged by the con- 
 struction of some other public work subsequently author- 
 
 61. It was said by the court in 
 Union Depot, etc., Co. v. Bruns- 
 wick, 31 Minn. 297, 17 N. W. 626, 
 47 Am. Rep. 789, "Neither is it 
 material whether in exercising these 
 riparian rights the property is 
 made available and useful by build- 
 ing piers and landings of wood or 
 other material, or as is the usual 
 and often the only practicable way 
 on the Mississippi and its tribu- 
 taries, by reclaiming the land by 
 artificial filling with earth out to 
 the requisite depth of water. 
 Whether the fee in this " made 
 land " would be in the state or in 
 the riparian owner- — that is, 
 whether it partakes of the nature 
 of the bed of the stream upon 
 which it is made, or of the shore to 
 which it is addfed — may be a ques- 
 tion of speculative interest, but it 
 is not one of any practical im- 
 portance. If the fee be in the 
 riparian owner, yet of course it 
 must be a qualified fee; that is, 
 subject to the paramount right of 
 public navigation. But if it be in 
 
 the state, the riparian owner still 
 has, subject to this same public 
 right, the exclusive right of posses- 
 sion and the entire beneficial inter- 
 est. Hence the determination of 
 the question one way or the other 
 would not affect the value of the 
 riparian owner's interest in the 
 property, or the amount of com- 
 pensation he is entitled to. Sup- 
 pose however a riparian owner has 
 unlawfully intruded into the water 
 beyond the point of navigability, as 
 above defined, and filled up the bed 
 of the stream beyond that point, for 
 the sole purpose of extending his 
 possessions, and so as to obstruct 
 and interfere with the public right 
 of navigation. This would consti- 
 tute a purpresture. The public 
 would have a right to abate it' as 
 a public nuisance. It would give 
 no rights to the person who made 
 it. It would not forfeit or destroy 
 his riparian rights as they existed 
 before, but he could claim no addi- 
 tional rights on account of it. 
 When it is proposed to take his 
 
§ 149 The Taking of Watebs — Eipaeian Eights. 459 
 
 ized as to be rendered worthless, and the question arises 
 whether the owner of a structure thus affected is constitu- 
 tionally entitled to compensation. The answer depends 
 upon whether the original authorization is a grant or merely 
 a revocable license ; but even if it is the latter, the licensee 
 might perhaps argue that until the legislature adjudicated 
 that public necessity or convenience required the revocation 
 of the license he was entitled to continue in his undertaking 
 undisturbed.'* Nevertheless, it has been held by the 
 Supreme Court of the United States and by some of the 
 state courts that permission to erect structures in public 
 waters is granted subject to the condition that the struc- 
 tures shall not then or at any future time interfere with 
 navigation or any other public use to which it is deemed 
 best by the legislature that the waters should be put,** and 
 consequently such permission may be revoked by the legis- 
 lature whenever it sees fit; and the owners of a structure 
 erected by virtue of such permission are consequently with- 
 out redress for injuries inflicted upon it by other public 
 works subsequently authorized.®* On the other hand, while 
 
 property for public use by the ex- railroad company could be com- 
 
 ercise of eminent domain, be can pelled to remove tbe obstructions it 
 
 elaim no additional compensation had placed there, but not the natu- 
 
 by reason of it." ral ones. West Chicago St. Ry. Co. 
 
 62. Thus in Davenport, etc., Rail- v. IHinois, 214 111. 9, 73 N. E. 393; 
 road Co. v. Renwick, 102 U. S. 180, afllrmed, 201 U. S. 506, 50 L. ed. 
 26 L. ed. 51, it was held that when 845. A raUroad company with the 
 a railroad company desired to take consent of the city built a tunnel 
 part of a wharf for its tracks it under a navigable stream seventeen 
 could not be heard to argue that feet below the surface. Increasing 
 the wharf was illegally maintained commerce required a depth of 
 as an interference with navigation, twenty-one feet. It was held that 
 
 63. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. the railroad company could be com- 
 Drainage Commissioners, 200 U. S. pelled to lower the tunnel at its 
 561, 590, 50 L. ed. 596, 607 ; Willink own expense. Monongahela Bridge 
 V. Urated States, 240 U. S. 572. Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177, 
 
 64. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. 54 L. ed. 435. A lawfully eon- 
 Drainage Commissioners, 212 111. structed bridge can be removed 
 103, 72 N. E. 219 ; affirmed in part, without compensation when it be- 
 200 U. S, 561, 50 L. ed. 596. A comes an obstruction to navigation; 
 railroad had been lawfully built and the owners of the bridge are 
 across a creek with a sufficient not entitled to a jury 'trial upon the 
 bridge. Subsequently it was de- question whether it is in fact an ob- 
 sired to enlarge the creek for drain- struction. Hannibal Bridge Co. v. 
 age purposes. It was held that the United States, 221 U. S. 194, 55 
 
460 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 149 
 
 it is everywhere conceded that structures lawfully erected 
 in public waters must yield to the paramount right of navi- 
 gation,®^ it is held by most of the state courts that when a 
 license to occupy public waters has been acted upon and a 
 valuable structure erected, the structure is in all other 
 respects protected by the constitution and can be destroyed 
 or taken only for the public use and upon payment of 
 compensation.®® 
 
 L. ed. 699. A bridge authorized by 
 act of Congress may be ordered to 
 be removed when it becomes an ob- 
 struction to navigation. United 
 States V. Chandler-Dunbar Water 
 Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 57 L. ed. 
 1063. Every structure in a navi- 
 gable stream may be removed with- 
 out compensation if Congress de- 
 clares it to be an obstruction to 
 navigation. See also, 
 
 United States. — Rundle v. Dela- 
 ware, etc.. Canal Co., 14 How. 80, 
 93, 14 L. ed. 335, 341; Union 
 Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 
 U. S. 364, 51 L. ed. 523. 
 
 Delaware. — Bailey v. Philadel- 
 phia, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Harr. 389, 
 44 Am. Dec. 593. 
 
 Kansas. — Kaw Valley Drainage 
 District v. Kansas City Terminal 
 Ry. Co., 87 Kan. 272, 123 Pae. 991. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Union Canal Co. 
 V. Landis, 9 Watts 228. 
 
 65. Supra, note 64. So also, it is 
 held in. some jurisdictions, to the 
 passage of fish. State v. Meek, 112 
 Iowa 338, 84 N. W. 3, 51 L. R. A. 
 414, 84 Am. St. Rep. 342; State v. 
 Franklin Falls Co., 49 N. H. 240, 
 6 Am. Rep. 513. Contra, Common- 
 wealth V. Essex Company, 13 Gray 
 (Mass.) 239; Commonwealth v. 
 Pennsylvania Canal Co., 66 Pa. 41, 
 5 Am. Rep. 329. 
 
 66. United States. — ^United States 
 V. Parkersburg Branch R. R. Co., 
 134 Fed. 969. 
 
 Kentucky. — Anderson v. Cincin- 
 nati Southern Railway, 86 Ky. 44, 
 5 S. W. 49, 9 Am. St. Rep. 263. 
 
 Maine. — Lee v. Pembroke Iron 
 Co., 57 Me. 481, 2 Am. Rep. 59. 
 
 Massachusetts. — ^Blood v. Nashua 
 & Lowell Railroad Co., 2 Gray 137, 
 61 Am. Dec. 444; Proprietors of 
 Mills V. Braintree Water Supply 
 Co., 149 Mass. 478, 21 N. E. 761, 
 4 L. R. A. 272. 
 
 New Jersey. — Glover v. Powell, 
 10 N. J. Eq. 211. 
 
 New York. — Langdon v. New 
 York, 93 N. Y. 129. 
 
 Ohio. — Kiser v. Logan County 
 Commissioners, 85 Ohio St. 129, 97 
 N. E. 52, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1029. 
 
 Oregon. — Mead v. Portland, 45 
 Ore. 1, 76 Pac. 347. 
 
 Virginia.— Crenshaw v. Slate 
 River Co., 6 Rand. 245. 
 
 Wisconsin. — State ex rel. Wau- 
 sau St. Ry. Co, v. Bancroft, 148 
 Wis. 124, 134 N. W. 330, 38 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 526. 
 
 In People v. Chicago, etc., R. ' 
 R. Co., 262 111. 492, 104 N. B. 
 831, L. R. A. 1915 B 486, it 
 wias held that when the waters of a 
 river fifty-five miles long were di- 
 verted into a creek five miles long 
 a railroad company which had built 
 a bridge across the creek could not 
 be compelled to alter it without com- 
 pensation, as the necessity for al- 
 teration was not caused by the 
 natural flow. This right to com- 
 pensation however does not extend 
 to structures erected in public 
 waters without authority of law. 
 Diedrieh v. Northwestern Union 
 Railway Co., 42 Wis. 248, 24 Am. 
 Rep. 399. 
 
CHAPTEE X. 
 
 The Extent op the Inteeest Taken fob the Public Use. 
 
 Section 150. The Public Ordinarily Holds an Easement Only. 
 
 151. What is Meant by "Additional Servitude." 
 
 152. Exercise of the Public Easement Causing Direct Injury out- 
 
 side the Limits of the Land Taken. 
 
 153. Limitation of the Use of Adjacent Land by the Establish- 
 
 ment of the Public Easement. 
 
 154. A Highway an Easement. 
 
 155. Urban and Rural Servitudes. 
 
 156. Right of the Owner of the Fee to Make Use of the Space 
 
 within the Limits of a Highway. 
 
 157. Ownership of the Earth and Minerals within the Limits of a 
 
 Highway. 
 
 158. Ownership of the Trees and Herbage in a Public Highway. 
 
 159. Rights of the Abutter when the Fee is in the Public. 
 
 160. Origin of the Doctrine of the Abutters' Easements. 
 
 161. Nature and Extent of the Abutters' Easements. 
 
 162. Change of Grade of a Public Highway. 
 
 163. Extent of the Right of the Public to Change the Grade of a 
 
 Public Way without Compensation to the Owners of 
 Abutting Property. 
 
 164. The Right of the Public to Reserve the Whole or Part of a 
 
 Highway for Special Forms of Travel. 
 
 165. Structures Obstructing the Highway, the Ultimate Object of 
 
 Which is to Make General Travel more Convenient. 
 
 § 150. The Public Ordinarily Holds an Easement Only. 
 
 It necessarily follows from the principle that property 
 cannot constitutionally be taken by eminent domain except 
 for the public use, that no more property can be taken by 
 eminent domain than the public use requires, since all that 
 might be appropriated in excess of the public needs would 
 not be taken for the public use. While considerable latitude 
 is allowed in providing for the anticipated expansion of the 
 requirements of the public, the rule itself is well established, 
 and applies both to the amount of property to be acquired 
 for public use and to the estate or interest acquired in such 
 property.* If an easement will satisfy the public needs, to 
 take the fee would be unjust to the owner, who is entitled 
 to retain whatever the public needs do not require, and to 
 
 1. Supra, § 49. 
 
 [461] 
 
462 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 150 
 
 the public, which should not be obliged to pay for more than 
 it needs, and such a taking would thus involve a violation 
 of the constitutional rights of the owner and of the tax- 
 payers as well. Ordinarily however, no constitutional ques- 
 tion arises, since it is universally recognized that a grant 
 of the power of eminent domain will not be extended by 
 implication, and that, when an easement will satisfy the 
 purpose of the grant, the power to condemn the fee will not 
 be included in the grant unless it is so expressly provided.^ 
 Accordingly, it is well settled tbat when land is taken for 
 the public use by either a public or a private corporation or 
 by the public at large, unless the fee is necessary for the 
 purposes for which the land is taken, the body which makes 
 the taking acquires only such an interest in the land as wiU 
 be necessary for the exercise of its franchise and of the 
 right to apply the land then or at any future time to all uses 
 directly or incidentally conducive to the enjoyment thereof,* 
 and to nothing else ; and the owner retains the title to the 
 land in fee and the right to make any use of it that does not 
 interfere with the full and free exercise of the public use.* 
 Similarly, when the public acquires rights in private land 
 by prescription, unless the rights acquired are wholly incon- 
 sistent with the enjoyment of any property in the land by 
 the owner, he retains the fee subject to the exercise of the 
 public rights,® and, when an owner of land dedicates it to 
 the public use, he does not ordinarily part with the fee, but 
 he merely grants to the public the right to use the land for 
 
 2. Infra, § 358. right. The right, whether it be 
 
 3. Brainard v. Clapp, 10 Cush. called easement or by any other 
 (Mass.) 6, 57 Am. Dec. 74: "This name, is statutory, and must be 
 rule is general and applies to all construed to be large enough to ac- 
 cases where land is taken for high- complish all that it is taken to do." 
 ways, town-ways, turnpikes, canals 4. Atlanta v. Jones, 135 Ga. 376, 
 and railroads ; the principle is, that 69 S. E. 571 ; Smith v. Minneapolis, 
 such right extends to all uses, 112 Minn. 446, 128 N. W. 819; New 
 directly or incidentally conducive to Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. v. Morris 
 the enjoyment of the franchise, and Canal & Banking Co., 44 N. J. Bq. 
 for the advancement of the public 398, 15 Atl. 227, 1 L. R. A. 133; 
 benefit contemplated by the estab- Cooper v. Williams, 5 Ohio 391, 24 
 lishment of such public work." Am. Dee. 299. See also infra, 
 Newton v. Perry, 163 Mass. 319, §§ 156-158. 
 
 39 N. E. 1032: "But it is plain 5. Valentine v. Boston, 22 Pick. 
 
 * * * that the purpose of the (Mass.) 75; Gordon v. Taunton, 126 
 taking must fix the extent of the Mass. 349. 
 
§ 151 Extent op Interest Taken foe Public Use. 463 
 
 the purpose for which it was dedicated and for none other.* 
 It is only when land is conveyed in fee by a voluntary deed, 
 or when the fee is necessary for the purposes for which the 
 land is taken, as is usually the case when the site of a public 
 building is acquired by eminent domain,'^ that the owner 
 retains no interest in land which has been devoted to the 
 public use. 
 
 The estate or interest which is acquired by eminent 
 domain when it is not necessary to condemn the fee is 
 usually called an easement or servitude. This designation 
 has been criticised, since there is a wide difference between 
 such an estate or interest and a private easement; it is 
 appurtenant to nothing, there is no dominant tenement, and 
 it is commonly held\by the public at large rather than by 
 any definite person or organized body.^ Nevertheless such 
 an estate or interest exists, and has existed at least as long 
 as private easements have existed, its attributes and the 
 points in which it resembles as well as those in which it 
 differs from private easements are well established, and 
 whether it is called a peculiar kind of easement or some- 
 thing else is a matter of no substantial importance.® 
 
 § 151. What is Meant by "Additional Servitude." 
 It often happens that after a public easement in private 
 land has been taken by eminent domain, and the land has 
 been devoted to the use for which it was taken for a number 
 of years, a change or an increase in the necessities and 
 requirements of the public makes an altered or an increased 
 use of the land desirable. In such a case, if the new use to 
 which it is desired to devote the land is of the same char- 
 acter as the use for which it was taken and merely amounts 
 to the advancement of the original purpose, as when the 
 wrought portion of a highway is widened so as to include 
 the whole of the original location, or a second track is laid 
 
 6. Schurmeler v. St. Paul & Pa- 9. In Spear v. BickneU, 5 Mass. 
 cific R. R. Co., 10 Minn. 82, 88 Am. 125, it is said that a public way ia 
 Dec. 59; O'Neal v. Sherman, 77 a real (as distinguished from a per- 
 Tex. 182, 14 S. W. 31, 19 Am. St. sonal) franchise, held by the com- 
 Rep. 743. monwealth for the benefit of all the 
 
 7. Tnjra, % 202. citizens. 
 8 Infra, § 153 ; and see also supra, 
 
 i 132. 
 
464 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 151 
 
 upon a railroad right of way, the new use is only an exer- 
 cise of the easenient which has been taken in the first place, 
 and the owner of the fee has no ground for complaint, even 
 if he is deprived of opportunities to make use of the land 
 taken which he had previously enjoyed, or his remaining 
 land suffers damages from which it had previously been 
 exempt, by reason of the increased use by the public of its 
 easement in the land taken. All these damages were paid 
 for when the easement was takfen, and the owner's good 
 fortune in escaping for several years an injury for which 
 he had been fully paid cannot be the basis of a property 
 right protected by the constitution, or entitle him to be com- 
 pensated both when the right to inflict the damage was 
 acquired by the public and when the damage is actually 
 inflicted. 
 
 When however the new use is of a character different 
 from that for which the land was taken, it is not an exer- 
 cise of the existing easement but amounts to the imposition 
 of a new and additional easement or servitude upon the 
 land. In such a case, if the new use cannot be justified as 
 an exercise of the existing easement, the rights of the owner 
 are the same as if a separate enclosure held by him in fee 
 and not subject to any easement had been entered upon; 
 and as the entry upon and occupation of private land with- 
 out formal condemnation amounts to a " taking ' ' in the 
 constitutional sense without regard to the extent of the 
 injury,^" an additional servitude cannot in any event be 
 imposed upon land, although it is already subject to one 
 public easement, except for another public use,^' and then 
 only upon payment of just compensation.^^ 
 
 It will thus be seen that the question whether a certain 
 use of land already subject to a public easement is an addi- 
 tional servitude and the owner of the fee has consequently 
 a constitutional right to compensation for such use does 
 
 10. Supra, § 111. Cowles Manufacturing Co. y. New 
 
 IL Willets V. Langhaar, 213 York, etc., Railroad Co., 76 Conn. 
 
 Mass. 573, 99 N. E. 466; Acme Ce- 311, 56 Atl. 512, 100 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 ment Plaster Co. v. American Ce- 994; Bradley v. Pliarr, 45 La. Ann. 
 
 ment Plaster Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 426, 12 So. 618, 19 L. R. A. 647; 
 
 167 S. W. 183. McCammon & Lang Lumber Co. v. 
 
 12. Nicholson v. New Tort & Trinity, etc., Ry. Co., 104 Tex. 8, 
 
 New Haven Railroad Co., 22 Conn. 133 S. W. 247, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 
 74, 56 Am. Rep. 390; Knapp & 662. 
 
§ 152 Extent of Intebest Taken foe Public Use. 465 
 
 not involve any controverted points in constitutional law, 
 but depends for its answer upon a precise definition in each 
 case of the limits of the original public easement.^' The 
 extent of the easement taken for highways, railroads and 
 other public works depends so much upon the statutes of 
 the states and the customs of different parts of the country 
 that it may well differ in different jurisdictions. The large 
 number of points in the determination of what constitutes 
 an additional servitude upon which the courts are in hope- 
 less disagreement does not necessarily indicate erroneous 
 conceptions of fundamental principles of constitutional law 
 upon one side or the other, but merely illustrates the 
 divergence in the character and extent of certain familiar 
 public easements throughout the United States. 
 
 A careful distinction should be made between decisions 
 upon the question whether a certain use is an additional 
 servitude and decisions under statutes and constitutional 
 provisions requiring compensation for damage to property, 
 when the damage claimed happens to arise out of a new or 
 increased use of an existing easement, as for example a 
 change in the grade of a highway. Decisions of the latter 
 class have nothing to do with the question of additional 
 servitude and should not be confused with decisions prop- 
 erly arising under that head. 
 
 § 152. Exercise of the Public Easement Causing Direct 
 Injury Outside the Limits of the Land Taken. 
 
 If, when a public work is laid out, the owners of adjacent 
 land are entitled to compensation for the injury that will 
 result from the construction and operation of the public 
 work, the public agency in charge of the work acquires the 
 right to inflict upon such adjacent land, then or at any 
 future time and without making any further compensation, 
 the injuries that result naturally from the construction and 
 operation of the work in a reasonable manner. It is well 
 settled that when a public work is laid out through a tract 
 of private land, the owner is entitled to receive, in addition 
 
 13. Whether a given use is an Williams v. Brooklyn Elevated R. 
 additional servitude is a question R. Co., 126 N. Y. 96, 26 N. E. 1048. 
 for the court, and not for the jury. 
 
 30 
 
466 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 152 
 
 to the value of the land taken, compensation for the injury 
 that wUl be done to the remainder of the tract by the con- 
 struction and operation of the public work." Although the 
 owners of tracts, no part of which is taken, are not in the 
 absence of special statutory or constitutional provisions 
 entitled to recover for indirect injury, yet in most juris- 
 dictions, by the specific requirements of the constitution or 
 of the statutes, the public agency constructing any public 
 work is bound to pay all damages caused by its construc- 
 tion or operation. 
 
 Ordinarily in such cases, before any work is done, a 
 formal taking is made which definitely fixes the extent of 
 the proposed work, and owners who will be damaged by its 
 construction or operation receive compensation measured 
 by the rights formally taken from them. It is of course 
 apparent that if the owners have received in advance the 
 damage to the value of their land by the acquisition by the 
 public of the right to erect and maintain a particular public 
 work, they are not entitled to recover the damages again 
 when the work is constructed; so also when, after the work 
 has been constructed and after such compensation has been 
 made, or after the owners, by allowing the period fixed for 
 claiming compensation to expire, have waived their rights, 
 alterations are made, inflicting increased injury upon the 
 neighboring landowners, the first question that arises is 
 whether the alterations were within the public easement 
 already taken and paid for. If for example the work as 
 originally planned is not completed at once, and a tem- 
 porary arrangement is superseded after several years' use, 
 or changes are made which might have been contemplated 
 when the work began, the owner cannot be heard to claim 
 compensation once more, but is fortunate in having been 
 free, if only for a limited period, from the damage for which 
 he had already received full payment. In other words, the 
 public agency acquires the right to construct and operate 
 its work in a reasonable manner at the time it is built and 
 to alter it at any future time, and to perform acts on the 
 land that it has taken which would otherwise be illegal, and 
 which may inflict direct or indirect injury to the adjaoent 
 
 14. Infra, § 236. 
 
§ 152 Extent of Interest Taken foe Public Use. 467 
 
 land. This right over the adjacent land is not strictly an 
 easement," because the owner may do what he pleases with 
 his own land to prevent the damage from being done." 
 
 When the statutes do not require a formal taking, and the 
 extent of the damages is measured by the actual injury 
 caused by the construction of the public work, or the owner, 
 no part of whose land is taken, is left without remedy for 
 injury to his property of the character which the state may 
 constitutionally inflict without compensation, a different 
 situation is presented. When new damages are inflicted 
 by an alteration or improvement in the work, it cannot be 
 said that they have already been paid for. If land outside 
 the limits of the public work receives under such circum- 
 stances an injury amounting to a tort at common law, the 
 owner may recover damages therefor unless the statute 
 expressly or by clear implication provided that he should 
 not. Neither a town nor a railroad company has a preroga- 
 tive right to commit a trespass on private land, and cannot 
 justify a trespass without legislative authority. Even then, 
 if the injury is so severe as to amount to a taking, the 
 owner would have a constitutional right to compensation. 
 
 The true question, in the case of injury to land outside as 
 well as inside the boundaries of a public work, is what rights 
 have been taken and paid for ; and that is a question of sub- 
 stantive and not of constitutional law. It is only when it 
 
 15. But see Rathke v. Gardner, lie authorities with exactness, and 
 134 Mass. 14, holding that the right the easement of the public, which 
 to collect surface water in artificial consists of the right to make them 
 channels on a railroad location and safe and convenient for travellers, 
 throw it upon adjoining lands is and to use them for public travel, 
 none the less an easement because does not extend beyond the limits of 
 It is claimed as an incident of the the location. A surveyor of high- 
 right to construct and maintain the ways who fells a tree upon the ad- 
 railroad, joining land, extra viam is a tres- 
 
 16. Franklin v. Fisk, 13 Allen passer. * * * They (the public) 
 (Mass.) 211, 90 Am. Dec. 194. This may raise the level of their trav- 
 was a bill in equity by a town to elled path and do not violate his 
 restrain an abutting owner from rights if the effect of their act is 
 obstructing the flow of surface to cause the surface water to flow 
 water from a highway by obstruct- upon his land. And he may also 
 Ing the mouth of a culvert leading raise his land, or may erect upon it 
 from the highway to his land. It a building or other structure which 
 was held he might lawfully obstruct shall prevent this effect without 
 it. 'When highways are estab- violating their rights." 
 
 lished they are located by the pub- 
 
468 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 153 
 
 is attempted to exercise rights that have not been duly con- 
 demned that constitutional questions arise. It is chiefly 
 because the methods of condemning and paying for public 
 easements differ in different jurisdictions that the relative 
 rights of the owner and the public agency, after the work 
 has been laid out, are not the same all over the United 
 States. 
 
 Many courts, in adjudicating questions arising out of an 
 attempted exercise of the public easement causing direct 
 injury outside, are misled by the analogy of the law defining 
 the rights of adjoining landowners, seemingly forgetting 
 that a city or town or a public service corporation which 
 has acquired a location by eminent domain is not an ordi- 
 nary landowner but is the holder of a certain statutory 
 easement in the soil. Of course there is no fundamental rea- 
 son why the public easement of a highway, a railroad or 
 any other public work should not be "the exact equivalent 
 of private owmership of the soil if the statutes of the state 
 so declare it, but such is not the usual practice in the parts 
 of the world in which the common law prevails, and it is 
 noticeable that some of the courts which assert with the 
 greatest vehemence that the rights of the public in a high- 
 way are the same as those of an individual landowner in 
 private land when, according to the doctrines established 
 in the more conservative states, they are greater, are the 
 first to repudiate this principle when to sustain it would 
 leave an adjoining owner without remedy for an injurious 
 use of the highway which a private owner might lawfully 
 make of his own land. 
 
 § 153. Limitation of the Use of Adjacent Land by the 
 Establishment of the Public Easement. 
 
 The taking of land for public use often effects a limita- 
 tion upon the uses to which neighboring land can lawfully 
 be put. Thus if a street is laid out through a tract of land 
 upon which an offensive or a dangerous trade is carried on, 
 it may thereafter be illegal or impracticable to carry on such 
 trade upon the premises, and thus, in a sense, the estab- 
 lishment of the street imposes a servitude upon the neigh- 
 boring land.^'^ So also the erection of the public work for 
 
 17. As to the right to compensa- 
 tion In such a case, see supra, § 106. 
 
§ 154 Extent of Intebest Taken for Public Use. 469 
 
 which the land was taken may limit the right of the owner 
 to improve his remaining land as he may see fit ; for after 
 the taking the owner cannot lawfully injure or destroy the 
 public work erected thereon, even by a use of his own land 
 that would be lawful as against an adjoining owner. Thus 
 at common law the right of lateral support is limited to 
 the land in its natural condition; but the establishment 
 and construction of a highway or a railroad imposes upon 
 adjacent land the burden of supporting the completed 
 structure and the vehicles travelling thereon, so that the 
 adjoining owner cannot lawfully remove such support by 
 excavations upon his own land and impair the safety or 
 convenience of travel upon the public easement.^® 
 
 § 154. A Highway an Easement. 
 
 At the civil law, when a highway was established over 
 private land, no interest in the soil within the limits of the 
 way remained in the owner. This principle has always 
 prevailed in Louisiana." It was in force in New York while 
 that province was in the hands of the Dutch, and in the 
 streets established during the Dutch occupation the fee 
 is still in the public.^" On the other hand, at the common 
 law it was well settled that a highway is only an easement 
 in the public ^^ and that when a highway was established, 
 whether by prescription, dedication or by the exercise of the 
 power of eminent domain, the owner of the land over which 
 the highway was established retained the title to the fee. 
 In those of the United States in which the common law 
 prevails this principle has been accepted ^^ and is still in 
 
 18. Haverstraw v. Eckerson, 19.3 , 20. Kane v. New York Bl. Ey. Co., 
 N. Y. M, 84 N. E. 578, 20 L. R. A. ISS N. Y. 164, 26 N. E. 278, 11 
 (N. S.) 287 (highway) ; Maiming v. L. R. A. 640. 
 
 New Jersey, etc., R. R. Co., 80 21. Goodtitle v. Alker, 1 Burr 
 
 N. J. li. 349, 78 Atl. 200, 32 L. R. A. 133; Harrison v. Rutland (1893), 1 
 
 (N. S.) 155 (railroad). See also Q. B. 142. 
 
 Boston & Maine R. R. v. Hunt, 210 22. United States. — Barclay v. 
 
 Mass. 128, 96 N. B. 140, In which Howell, 6 Pet. 513, 8 L. ed. 477; 
 
 an owner of a field through which a Harris v. Elliott, 10 Pet. 25, 9 L. ed. 
 
 railroad ran was enjoined from 333. 
 
 damming a brook upon his own land Alahama. — Southern Bell Tel. Co. 
 
 in such a way as to cause the rail- v. Francis, 109 Ala. 224, 19 So. 1, 
 
 road location to be overflowed. 31 L. R. A. 193, 55 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 19. Irwin v. Great Southern Tel. 930; Cloverdale Homes v. Clover- 
 Co., 37 La. Ann. 63, 1 Am. Elect. dale, 182 Ala. 419, 62 So. 712, 47 
 Cas. 709. See also Mitchell v. Bass, L. R. A. (N. S.) 606. 
 
 33 Tex. 259. California.— Wright v. Austin, 143 
 
470 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 154 
 
 force except as changed in some states by statute. The 
 public, it is generally held, has the easement of travel and 
 transportation with all means of conveyance which can be 
 introduced with a reasonable regard for the safety and con- 
 venience of other travellers and without infiicting upon the 
 
 Cal. 236, 76 Pac. 1023, 65 L. R. A. 
 949, 101 Am. St. Rep. 97; Cole- 
 grove Water Co. v. Hollywood, 151 
 Cal. 425, 90 Pac. 1053, 13 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 904; Gurnsey v. Northern 
 California Power Co., 160 Cal. 699, 
 117 Pac. 906, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 185. 
 
 Connecticut. — Imlay v. Union 
 Branch Railroad Co., 26 Conn. 249, 
 68 Am. Dec. 392. 
 
 Georgia. — Marietta Chair Co. v. 
 Henderson, 121 Ga. 399, 49 S. E. 
 312, 104 Am. St. Rep. 156. 
 
 Illinois. — Tacoma Safety Deposit 
 Co. V. Chicago, 247 111. 192, 93 N. E. 
 153, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 868, 20 Ann. 
 Cas. 564; Sears v. Chicago, 247 111. 
 204, 93 N. B. 158, '20 Ann. Cas. 539 ; 
 Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. 
 Chicago, 247 111. 264, 93 N. E. 167. 
 
 Iowa. — Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 
 Iowa 451, 74 Am. Dec. 358. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Commonwealth v. 
 Peters, 2 Mass. 125; Spear v. Bick- 
 nell, 5 Mass. 125; Perley v. Chand- 
 ler, 6 Mass. 453, 4 Am. Dec. 159; 
 Tucker v. Tower, 9 Pick. 109, 19 Am. 
 Dec. 350; Moran v. Gallagher, 199 
 Mass. 486, 85 N. E. 579, 20 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 116. 
 
 Minnesota.— 'Rich v. Minneapolis, 
 37 Minn. 423, 35 N. W. 2, 5 Am. St. 
 Rep. 861 ; Smith v. Minneapolis, 112 
 Minn. 446, 128 N. W. 819. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Troy v. Ches- 
 hire Railroad Co., 23 N. H. 83, 55 
 Am. Dec. 177; Graves v. Shattuck, 
 35 N. H. 257, 69 Am. Dec. 536. 
 
 New Jersey. — ^Winter v. Peterson, 
 24 N. J. L. 525, 61 Am. Dec. 678; 
 Einchman v. Paterson R. R. Co., 17 
 N. J. Eq. 75, 82, 86, 86 Am. Dec. 
 252 ; Salter v. Jonas, 39 N. J. L. 469, 
 472, 23 Am. Rep. 229; Friedman v. 
 Snare & Triest Co., 71 N. J. L. 605, 
 61 Atl. 401, 70 L. R. A. 147, 108 
 Am. St. Rep. 764. 
 
 New York. — Jackson v. Hatha- 
 
 way, 15 Johns. 447, 8 Am. Dec. 263; 
 Williams v. New York Central 
 Railroad Co., 16 N. Y. 97, 69 Am. 
 Dee. 651; Paige v. Schenectady Ry. 
 Co., 178 N. T. 102, 70 N. E. 213; 
 In re Rosebank Ave., 147 N. Y. 
 Supp. 638, 162 App. Div. 332. 
 
 North Carolina. — White v. North- 
 western North Carolina Railroad, 
 113 N. XS. 610, 18 S. E. 330, 22 
 L. R. A. 627, 37 Am. St. Rep. 639; 
 Brown v. Asheville Electric Co., 138 
 N. C. 533, 51 S. E. 62, 107 Am. St 
 Rep. 554. 
 
 North Dakota. — Donovan v. Al- 
 lert, 11 N. Dak. 289, 91 N. W. 441, 
 58 L. R. A. 775, 95 Am. St Rep. 720. 
 
 Ohio. — Phifer v. Cox, 21 Ohio St 
 248, 8 Am. Rep. 58. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Sterling's Appeal, 
 111 Pa. 35, 2 Atl. 105, 56 Am. Rep. 
 246. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Rhode Island 
 Hospital Trust Co. v. Hayden, 20 
 R. I. 544, 40 Atl. 421, 42 L. R. A. 
 107. 
 
 South Dakota. — Bdmison v. 
 Lowry, 3 S. D. 77, 52 N. W. 583, 
 17 L. R. A. 275, 44 Am. St Rep. 774. 
 
 Tennessee. — Carroll v. Griffith, 
 117 Tenn. 500', 97 S. W. 66. 
 
 Texas. — O'Neal v. Sherman, 77 
 Tex. 182, 14 S. W. 31, 19 Am. St 
 Rep. 743 ; International, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Boles (Tex. Civ. App.), 161 
 S. W. 914. 
 
 Vermont. — Cole v. .Drew, 44 Vt. 
 49, 8 Am. Rep. 363. 
 
 Virginia. — Western Union Tel. Co. 
 T. Williams, 86 Va. 696, 11 S. E. 106, 
 8 L. R. A. 429. 19 Am. St Rep. 908. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Ford v. Chicago & 
 Northwestern Railroad Co., 14 Wis. 
 609, 80 Am. Dec. 791; Chicago & 
 Northwestern Railway Co. v. Mil- 
 waukee, etc., Railway Co., 95 Wis. 
 561, 70 N. W. 678, 60 Am. St. Rep. 
 136. 
 
154 Extent op Intebest Taken foe Public Use. 471 
 
 owner of the fee an injury differing in kind from that 
 imposed by use and improvement for ordinary public 
 travel.^* Every right or interest not included in the public 
 easement remains to the owner of the fee.^* As against 
 everything but a proper exercise of that easement the 
 
 23. Knowlton, C. J., In New Eng- 
 land Tel., etc., Co. v. Boston Ter- 
 minal Co., 182 Mass. 397, 65 N. E. 
 835. " On the laying out and con- 
 struction of a highway or public 
 street, the fee of the land remains 
 in the landowner, and the public 
 acquires an easement in the street 
 for travel. This easement is held 
 to Include every kind of travel and 
 communication for the movement or 
 transportation of persons or prop- 
 erty which is reasonable or proper 
 in the use of a public street. It 
 includes the use of all kinds of vehi- 
 cles which can be introduced with a 
 reasonable regard for the safety and 
 convenience of the public, and every 
 reasonable means of transportation, 
 transmission and movement beneath 
 the surface of the ground'as well as 
 upon or above it." Mitchell, J., in 
 Cater v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. 
 Co., 60 Minn. 539, 63 N. W. Ill, 28 
 L. R. A. 310, 51 Am. St. Bep. 543. 
 "Whether it be travel, the trans- 
 portation of persons and property, 
 or the transmission of intelligence, 
 and whether accomplished by old 
 methods or by new ones, they are 
 all included within the public 
 ' highway easement,' and impose no 
 additional servitude on the land, 
 provided they are not inconsistent 
 with the reasonably safe and prac- 
 tical use of the highway in other 
 and usual and necessary modes and 
 provided they do not unreasonably 
 Impair the special easements of 
 abutting owners in the street for 
 purposes of access, light and air." 
 Taylor v. Portsmouth, etc., St. Ry., 
 91 Me. 193, 39 Atl. 216, 64 Am. St 
 Bep. 216. " It is the right of tran- 
 sit for travelers on foot and in 
 vehicles of all descriptions. It Is 
 the right of transmitting intelli- 
 gence by letter, message or other 
 contrivance suited for communica- 
 
 tion as by telegraph or telephone. 
 It is the right to transmit water, 
 gas and sewage for the use of the 
 public." See also 
 
 Maine. — Briggs v. Lewiston & 
 Auburn Horse Bailway Co., 79 Me. 
 363, 10 Atl. 47, 1 Am. St. Bep. 316. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Commonwealth v. 
 Morrison, 197 Mass. 199, 83 N. E. 
 415, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 194; Pea- 
 body V. Boston, 220 Mass. 376, 107 
 N. E. 952. 
 
 Minnesota. — Carli v. Stillwater 
 Street Railway & Transfer Co., 28 
 Minn. 373, 10 N. W. 205, 41 Am. 
 Rep. 290. 
 
 Netraska. — Jaynes v, Omaha 
 Street Railway Co., 53 Neb. 631, 74 
 N. W. 67, 39 L. R. A. 751. 
 
 Tennessee. — Frazier v. East Ten- 
 nessee Tel. Co., 115 Tenn. 416, 90 
 S. W. 620, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 323, 
 112 Am. St. Rep. 856, 5 Ann Cas. 
 838. 
 
 In New York the easement of 
 a highway is limited to travel by 
 the public by such methods as do 
 not require a special franchise and 
 the exclusive occupation of any por- 
 tion of the highway by poles, rails, 
 wires or similar structures upon, 
 above or below the surface. See 
 infra, §§ 170, 171, 181, 186. 
 
 24. Perley v. Chandler, 6 Mass. 
 455, 4 Am. Dec. 159. " By the loca- 
 tion of a way over the land of any 
 person the public have acquired an 
 easement which the owner of the 
 land cannot lawfully extinguish or 
 unreasonably interrupt. But the 
 soil and freehold remain in the 
 owner, although incumbered with a 
 way. And every use to which the 
 land may be applied, consistently 
 with the continuance of the ease- 
 ment, the owner can lawfully 
 claim." See also Jackson v. Hath- 
 away, 15 Johns. (N, T.) 447, 8 Am. 
 Dec. 263. 
 
472 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 154 
 
 rights of the owner of the fee are absolute; he may main- 
 tain trespass ^^ or ejectment ^® against a stranger who makes 
 an unwarranted use of the way. As against the public, how- 
 ever, his privileges vary conversely to the extent of the 
 actual public use. He may make every use of the land within 
 the limits of the highway, above, upon or below the surface 
 of the ground, that does not interfere with the public ease- 
 ment as it is actually exercised, and a country road only 
 occasionally travelled may constituted but a slight incum- 
 brance on his fee. As population increases and the public 
 needs advance, the owner's, privileges are diminished" and 
 he may thereby suffer damage. He is not entitled to com- 
 pensation, because such damage was paid for when the way 
 was laid out and the easement of indefinite public travel 
 taken.^^ On the contrary, he is fortunate in having been 
 permitted to enjoy, for a considerable period, advantages 
 for parting with which he has received full compensation. 
 The question that arises when an additional use is made 
 of the highway is not how much the owner suffers, but 
 whether the new use is included in the highway easement. 
 The owner may be ruined and have no remedy, but he is 
 entitled to at least nominal damages for the most fanciful 
 injury caused by a use of the highway in an unwarranted 
 manner. 
 
 It has often been argued with some degree of plausibil- 
 ity that it would be better policy to require the public or 
 its delegated agents to pay for each use of the highway as 
 it is actually made, and to save the public from paying a 
 lump sum when the way is laid out for the damages that 
 will result from the exercise of the highway easement in 
 
 25. Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 Iowa of a highway within a specified dis- 
 451, 74 Am. Dec. 358; Kobbins v. tance of certain premises is an 
 Borman, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 132; " owner of real estate " within such 
 Locks & Canals v. Nashua, etc., R, distance, so as to have the right to 
 R. Co., 104 Mass. 1, 6 Am. Rep. 181 ; object to its use as a liquor saloon. 
 L Realty Co. v. Johnson, 92 Minn. Moran v. Gallagher, 199 Mass. 486, 
 363, 100 N. W. 94, 66 L. R. A. 439, 85 N. E. 579, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 104 Am. St Rep. 677. See also 116. 
 
 infra, § 506. 27. Cloverdale Homes v. Clover- 
 
 26. Goodtttle V. Alker, 1 Burr. dale, 182 Ala. 419, 62 So. 712, 47 
 133; Commonwealth v. Peters, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 606. 
 
 Mass. 125. See also infra, §§ 473, 28. State v. Yates, 104 Me. 360, 
 
 506. So also the owner of the fee 71 Atl. 1018. 
 
§ 154 Extent of Interest Taken foe Public Use. 473 
 
 every conceivable f orm.^® The public, it is said, may often 
 have to pay for what it will never actually require, or for 
 what should properly be paid for by the private corpora- 
 tions which are authorized to make use of the highway. As 
 a practical matter, however, damages are given only for 
 such use of the highway as is probable,^" and, if a landowner 
 is damaged by the unanticipated rails and wires of a modern 
 city street, he is much more than compensated by the rise 
 in land values due to the increase in population that such 
 improvements indicate. Moreover, it would prove an intol- 
 erable nuisance to the landowners, the courts and the public 
 if a whole new set of actions was brought whenever a new 
 pipe or wire was laid in an existing street. If it is desired 
 that the public service corporations contribute to the dam- 
 ages caused by laying out a public way, it is better that the 
 public should bear the whole cost primarily and charge the 
 private corporations their share when they come to use the 
 street. 
 
 A use of the highway, to be justified as a proper exercise 
 of the highway easement, must tend to promote public 
 travel or transportation ; a use for a clearly public purpose, 
 but having no relation to the motion of persons or matter, 
 would constitute an additional servitude. Moreover, a 
 special use, even if clearly in aid of public travel of a par- 
 ticular kind, is not permitted if it unreasonably incom- 
 modes or endangers travel in the other ordinary and usual 
 methods, or inflicts an unreasonable injury upon the own- 
 ers of the fee differing in character and extent from the 
 damage contemplated when the way was laid out. But a 
 change in the highway, however sweeping, that tends to 
 make it more useful for general travel and injures the 
 owner of the fee in the manner contemplated when the way 
 was laid out but to a greater degree is not an additional 
 servitude. 
 
 That a proposed new use will exclude general travel 
 from a certain portion of the street is not in itself enough 
 to make it an additional servitude, if it is otherwise a 
 proper highway use and enough space is left for reasonable 
 
 29. See for example the dissent- 30. Infra, § 257. 
 
 iug opinion in Pierce v. Drew, 136 
 Mass. 75, 49 Am. Rep. 7. 
 
474 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 155 
 
 accommodations for the general travel, although state- 
 ments in some of the earlier cases would leave the contrary 
 impression. 
 
 § 155. Urban and Rural Servitudes. 
 
 It follows from what has been already said that, when 
 the population of a sparsely settled village increases and 
 the village becomes a city, and what were formerly country 
 roads are paved to their full width and encumbered mth 
 car tracks, subterranean pipes and overhead wires, and the 
 adjoining owner is deprived of his grass and trees, of his 
 right to project his cellar, and to some extent, of his light 
 and air, he has suffered no legal damage. The rule is the 
 same whether the change takes place gradually,^^ or, by 
 annexation or otherwise, the road is suddenly included in a 
 municipality in which such improvements are lawful.*'' 
 Nevertheless there is a line of cases holding, or seeming to 
 hold, that, while a rural road remains rural, it cannot, with- 
 out compensating the owner of the fee, be subjected to uses 
 which are recognized as proper for a city street.^' In the 
 
 Bl. Palatine v. Krueger, 121 lU. 103 S. W. 309, 11 L. K. A. (N. S.) 
 
 72, 12 N. E. 75; Tate v. Greens- 727. 
 
 borougfi, 114 N. C. 392, 19 S. E. 767, Maryland. — Chesapeake, etc., 
 
 24 L. K. A. 671 ; Chase v. Oshkosh, Telephone Co. v. Mackenzie, 74 Md. 
 
 Si Wis. 313, 51 ISf. W. 560, 15 L. R. A. 36, 21 Atl. 690, 28 Am. St. Hep. 219 ; 
 
 553, 29 Am. St. Rep. 898. See also Baltimore County Water, etc., Co. v. 
 
 Shreveport v. McClure, 132 La. 468, Dubreuil, 105 Md. 424, 66 Atl. 339, 
 
 61 So. 530. 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 684. 
 
 32. Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co. v. New York. — Bloomfield, etc., Nat. 
 Whiting, 161 Ind. t6, 67 N. E. 933 ; Gas Light Co. v. Calkins, 62 N. Y. 
 Huddleston v. Eugene, 34 Ore. 343, 386; Van Brunt v. Flatbush, 128 
 55 Pac. 868, 43 L. R. A. 444. N. Y. 50, 27 N. E. 973 ; Eels v. 
 
 33. United Btates. — Nahant v. American Telephone, etc., Co., 143 
 United States, 136 Fed. 273, 279, 69 N. Y. 133, 38 N. E. 202, 25 L. R. A. 
 L. R. A. 723. ^^' ^ •^™- Elect. Cas. 92 ; Palmer v. 
 
 ' Alahama.—WesteTn R. R. Co. v. Larchmont Electric Co., 6 App. Div. 
 Alabama Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 12, 6 Am. Elect. Cas. 128; Richards 
 96 Ala. 272, 11 So. 483, 17 L. R. A. ^; Citizens' Water Supply Co., 104 
 
 474. 
 
 California. — ^Montgomery v. Santa 
 Ana, etc., Ry. Co., 104 Cal. 186, 37 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 927, 140 App. Div. 206, 
 125 N. Y. Supp. 116. 
 Pennsylvania. — Sterling's Appeal, 
 „,. o^ ^ ^ . ^^. .„ u 111 Pa- 35, 2 Atl. 105, 56 Am. Rep. 
 
 Pac. 654, 25 L. R. A. 654, 43 Am. g^g; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. 
 St. Rep. 89. Montgomery County Passenger Ry. 
 
 Indiana. — Kincaid v. Indiana Nat. (^ jgy p^ gg 31 Atl 468 27 
 Gas. Co., 124 Ind. 577, 24 N. E. 1066, l, r. a. 766, 46 Am. St. Rep. 659. 
 8 L. R. A. 602, 19 Am. St. Rep. 113. Wisconsin.— Zehren v. Milwaukee 
 
 Kentucky. — Paine's Guardian Bl. Ry. Co., 99 Wis. 83, 74 N. W. 538, 
 (Strother) v. Calor Oil & Gas Co., 41 L. R. A. 575, 67 Am. St. Rep. 844, 
 133 Ky. 614, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 754, 7 Am. Elect. Cas. 345. 
 
§ 155 Extent of Intebbst Taken for Public Use. 475 
 
 jurisdictions in which this rule prevails the public easement 
 in country roads is strictly limited to travel by pedestrians, 
 vehicles and animals, and to the improvement of the road 
 so as to make such travel safer or more convenient,** and 
 in some states only such vehicles are held to be within the 
 highway easement as do not require special and peculiar 
 structures in the highway for their exclusive use. This 
 seemingly fanciful distinction between urban and rural 
 servitudes does not, however, really rest on a legal differ- 
 ence between the public easement of a highway in the city 
 and in the country, but on a different ground. No com- 
 munity, however rural, enterprising enough to desire to 
 supply itself with the conveniences common in cities or 
 towns, has been denied the use of its own highways to lay 
 pipes or wires of a kind maintained without compensation 
 in thickly settled municipalities,*^ but the use of the high- 
 ways running through such a region has been denied to the 
 promoters of an undertaking, of no benefit to the community 
 through which it passes or to the abutters upon the high- 
 ways therein, who seek to secure the transportation of 
 passengers or the transmission of matter from one distant 
 point to another without paying for the right of way. 
 
 This view of the functions of a highway is, it is submitted, 
 too narrow. The local community which maintains the ' 
 highways holds them in trust for the public at large. The 
 abutting owners cannot complain if persons use the high- 
 way with ordinary vehicles while traveling from one end of 
 the United States to the other. Similarly, if rails, pipes or 
 wires are for the use and benefit of the public generally, and 
 are of a nature proper for streets, the residents upon which 
 they do benefit, it is refining unnecessarily to adjudge that 
 the same structures are improper in roads, the residents 
 upon which they do not benefit, and that the local commun- 
 ity holds its roads in trust for the general public for travel 
 
 34. Thus it is said that means for 35. See however Palmer v. Larch- 
 facilitating travel, such as pipes and mont Electric Co., 6 App. Div. 
 hydrants for sprinkling and water- (N. T.) 12, 6 Am. Elect. Cas. 128, 
 ing troughs are not an additional in which it was held that poles for 
 servitude even upon a country road. electric lights to light a rural high- 
 Richards V. Citizens' Water Supply way were an additional servitude. 
 Co., 140 App. Div. (N. Y.) 206, 125 
 N. Y. Supp. 116. 
 
476 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 156 
 
 on foot and in ordinary vehicles, but for its own use only 
 for all other branches of the highway easement. While the 
 distinction between city streets and country roads has 
 received considerable support, it is by no means univers- 
 ally accepted, and in many of the states the easement of a 
 public highway is the same, regardless of the form of munic- 
 ipal government in the district in which it is located or the 
 amount of use to which the highway is subjected, and a par- 
 ticular form of transportation by the public, as for example 
 an electric street railway or a system of natural gas pipes, 
 which is held to be within the highway easement in a city 
 street, would not be an. additional servitude upon a county 
 road in the most thinly populated section of the state.*® 
 
 In the states in which the distinction between urban and 
 rural servitudes is maintained, it is held that the test is 
 whether the street in question is within or without a city 
 or an incorporated village and not the actual density of 
 the population resident upon it.^^ It would seem to follow, 
 in the states which adopt this test, that whenever a new city 
 is incorporated or additional territory is annexed to an 
 existing city, the owners of the fee of all the roads would be 
 entitled to compensation for the increased servitude put 
 upon them, but no court has as yet gone so far as to allow 
 compensation in such a case. 
 
 § 156. Right of the Owner of the Fee to Make Use of the 
 Space Within the Limits of a Highway. 
 
 The owner of the fee may make a reasonable use of the 
 
 36. Alabama. — ^Hobbs v. Long Dis- New Jersey. — Bhret v. Camden, 
 
 tance Tel. & Tel. Co., 147 Ala. 393, etc., Ry. Co., 61 N. J. Eq. 171, 47 
 
 41 So. 1003, 7 L. K. A. (N. S.) 87, Atl. 562, 7 Am. Elect Cas. 883. 
 
 11 Ann. Cas. 461. New York. — Rochester, etc., Wa- 
 
 Indiana. — Cummins v. Seymour, ter Co. v. Rochester, 176 N. Y. 36, 
 
 79 Ind. 491, 41 Am. Rep. 618. 68 N. E. 117 ; Osborne v. Auburn 
 
 Kansas. — McCann v. Johnson Telephone Co., 189 N. Y. 393, 83 
 
 County Tel. Co., 69 Kans. 210, 76 N. E. .428. 
 
 Pac. 870, 66 L. R. A. 171, 2 Ann. Pennsylvania. — McDevitt v. Peo- 
 
 Cas. 156. pie's Natural Gas Co., 160 Pa. 367, 
 
 Massachusetts.— Lincoln v. Com- 28 Atl. 948. 
 
 monwealth, 164 Mass. 1, 41 N. B. West Virginia. — Hardman v. 
 
 112; Cheney v. Barker, 198 Mass. Cabot, 60 W. Va. 664, 55 S. E. 756, 
 
 356, 84 N. E. 492, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 7 L. R. A. (N. g.) 506. And see also 
 
 436. infra, §§ 172, 184. 
 
 Minnesota. — Cater v. Northwest- 37. Palmer v. Larehmont Electric 
 
 ern Tel. Exch. Co., 60 Minn. 539, 63 Co., 6 App. Div. (N. Y.) 12, 6 Am. 
 
 N. W. Ill, 28 L. R. A. 310. Elect. Cas. 128. 
 
156 Extent of Inteeest Taken fob Public Use. 477 
 
 surface of a public way in front of his premises, but such 
 use must be temporary and connected with the use of the 
 way as such. It is well settled that the owner of the fee 
 cannot lawfully maintain permanent structures within the 
 limits of a public way and above its surface, even if they 
 are outside the traveled path and do not interfere with 
 public passage.^* The public is entitled to light and air 
 from the entire width of the way. The adjoining owner, 
 whether he owns the fee of the way or not, may make a 
 reasonable temporary use of that part of the way in front 
 of his premises. What is reasonable depends on circum- 
 stances.^® In a populous town where land is valuable and 
 lots are small it is not unreasonable to erect buildings on 
 the line of the street so that doors and gates project into 
 the street when opened.*" In such a locality it is customary 
 and proper, when a building is being erected, to pile the 
 materials in the street, if this is done in such a manner as 
 not to unnecessarily obstruct travel and they are removed 
 within a reasonable time.** Similarly, after the building 
 
 38. England. — King v. Wright, 3 
 B. & Ad. 681; Queen v. Betts, 16 
 Q. B. ioa2. 
 
 United States. — Barney v. Keo- 
 kuk, 94 V. S. 324, 24 L. ed. 224. 
 
 California.— People v. Holladay, 
 93 Cal. 241, 29 Pac. 54, 27 Am. St. 
 Rep. 186. 
 
 Connecticut. — Hawley v. Harrall, 
 19 Conn. 142. 
 
 Indiana. — Pettis v. Johnson, 56 
 Ind. 139; State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 
 185, 38 Am. Rep. 117; Cheek v. Au- 
 rora, 92 Ind. 107. 
 
 Maime. — Dickey v. Maine Tel. Co., 
 46 Me. 483. 
 
 Massachusetts. — ^Morton v. Moore, 
 15 Gray 573 ; Commonwealth v. 
 Blaisdell, 107 Mass. 234 ; Bay State 
 Brick Co. v. Foster, 115 Mass. 431; 
 Ryan v. Boston, 118 Mass. 248. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Garland v. 
 Towne, 55 N. H. 55, 20 Am. Rep. 
 164. 
 
 Wew Jersey. — Smith v. State, 23 
 N. J. L. 712. 
 
 New York. — People v. Maher, 141 
 N. Y. 330, 36 N. E. 396. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Barclay v. Com- 
 monwealth, 25 Pa. 503, 64 Am. Dec. 
 715. 
 
 Wisconsin.— State v. Leaver, 62 
 Wis. 387, 22 N. W. 576. 
 
 39. O'Linda v. Lothrop, 21 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 292, 32 Am. Dec. 261; Mor- 
 ris V. Whipple, 183 Mass. 25, 66 
 N. E. 199 ; State v. Edens, 85 N. C. 
 522. 
 
 40. O'Linda v. Lothrop, 21 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 292, 32 Am. Dec. 261. 
 
 41. England. — Res v. Ward, 4 Ad. 
 & El. 405. 
 
 United States. — Chicago v. Rob- 
 bins, 2 Black 418, 17 L. ed. 298. 
 
 Connecticut. — Knapp & Cowles 
 Mfg. Co. V. New York, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 76 Conn. 311, 56 Atl. 512, 100 
 Am. St. Rep. 994. 
 
 Indiana. — Wood v. Mears, 12 Ind. 
 516, 74 Am. Dec. 222. 
 
 Massachusetts. — O'Linda v. Loth- 
 rop, 21 Pick. 292, 32 Am. Dec. 261. 
 
 New Jersey. — Friedman v. Snare 
 & Trlest Co., 71 N. J. L. 605, 61 Atl. 
 401, 70 L. R. A. 147, 108 Am. St. 
 Rep. 764. > 
 
 New York. — People v. Cunning- 
 ham, 1 Denio 524, 48 Am. Dec. 709 ; 
 Callanan v. Oilman, 107 N. Y. 360, 
 14 N- E. 264, 1 Am. St. Rep. 831. 
 
 Ohio. — Clark v. Fry, 8 Ohio St. 
 358, 7,2 Am. Dec. 590. 
 
478 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 156 
 
 has been erected, merchandise may be temporarily placed 
 on the sidewalk and sMds may be laid across the sidewalk 
 for a reasonable time.*^ On the other hand, the amount 
 of traffic must be considered, and an obstruction which 
 would be proper on a side street or country road would be 
 improper on a thoroughfare over which thousands passed 
 daily.** The use in all cases where the abutting owner does 
 not own the fee must be temporary,** and connected with 
 the use of the way as a way, otherwise it constitutes a 
 trespass.*^ The owner of the fee of the land within the 
 limits of the way, when he also owns the adjoining land, 
 may exercise the rights of an adjoining owner and interfere 
 with public travel in the limited manner above described, 
 and in; addition thereto, make any use of the land that does 
 not interfere with the exercise of the public easement of 
 travel, excepting the erection of permanent structures above 
 the surface. 
 
 Below the surface of the street the rights of the owner of 
 the fee are more extensive, since an exclusive use of the 
 underground space does not interfere with travel in its 
 ordinary form. It has been held for example that the owner 
 of the fee may sink a watercourse below the highway pro- 
 vided he leaves the surface of the road in repair.** In 
 large cities it is customary for the cellars and vaults of the 
 abutting buildings to extend under the street, and the owner 
 of the fee may, of right, make such excavations as he chooses 
 beneath the surface of the highway, provided that he does 
 
 Pennsplvania. — Commonwealth v. N. Y. 360, 14 N. E. 264, 1 Am. St. 
 
 Passmore, 1 Serg. & R. 217 ; Palmer Rep. 831 ; Flynn v. Taylor, 127 N. T. 
 
 V. Silverthom, 32 Pa. 68 ; Mallory v. 596, 28 N. E. 418, 14 L. R. A. 556. 
 Griffey. 85 Pa. 275. i The owner of a lot in a town may 
 
 Wisconsin. — ^Hundhausen v. Bond, not maintain hay scales in the 
 
 36 Wis. 38. street in front of his premises when 
 
 42. Matthews v. Kelsey, 58 Me. the fee of the street is in the town. 
 56, 4 Am. Rep. 248; Welsh v. Wil- Emerson v. Babcock, 66 Iowa 257, 
 son, 101 N. T. 254, 4 N. E. 633, 54 55 Am. Rep. 273. 
 
 Am. Rep. 698; Callanan v. GUman, 45. Brauer v. Baltimore, etc., 
 
 107 N. Y. 360, 14 N. E. 264, 1 Am. Heating Co., 99 Md. 367, 58 Atl. 21, 
 
 St. Rep. 831; Jochem v. Robinson, 66 L. R. A. 403, 105 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 72 Wis. 199, 39 N. W. 383, 1 L. R. A. 304 ; Codman v. Evans, 5 Allen 
 
 178. (Mass.) 308, 81 Am. Dec. 748; Mor- 
 
 43. Morris v. Whipple, 183 Mass. rls v. Whipple, 183 Mass. 25, 66 
 25, 66 N. B. 199. N. E. 199. 
 
 44. Coburn v. Ames, .52 Cal. 387, 46. Perley v. Chandler, 6 Mass. 
 28 Am. Rep. 634; Gerdes v. Chris- 453, 4 Am. Dec. 159; Woodring v 
 topher, etc., Co., 124 Mo. 347, 27 Forks Township, 28 Pa. 355, 70 Am. 
 S. W. 615 ; Callanan v. Gilman, 107 Dec. 134. 
 
§ 156 Extent op Inteeest Taken foU Public Use. 479 
 
 not interfere with public travel and transportation above or 
 below the surface.*'^ When the street is, under legislative 
 authority, devoted in part to a use which, while public, is 
 not an exercise of the highway easement and which destroys 
 or interferes with the maintenance of cellars and vaults or 
 other lawful structures in the way, the owner of the fee 
 is constitutionally entitled to compensation.** 
 
 47. Allen v. Boston, 159 Mass. 324, 
 34 N. E. 519, 38 Am. St. Eep. 423. 
 "The first objection now urged by 
 defendant is that the plaintiff acted 
 in violation of law in building his 
 cellar into the highway. This objec- 
 tion is untenable. There is no doubt 
 that the general easement in the 
 public acquired by the location of a 
 highway extends to the limits of 
 the highway so located. The right 
 of the public includes various un- 
 derground uses, of which the con- 
 struction of sewers Is one. But the 
 owner of land over which a high- 
 way is laid retains his right in the 
 soil for all purposes which are con- 
 sistent with the full enjoyment of 
 the easement acquired by the public. 
 The right of the owner may grow 
 less as the public needs increase. 
 But at all times he retains all that 
 is not needed for public uses, sub- 
 ject, however, to municipal or police 
 regulations. The plaintiff, there- 
 fore, had a right to excavate under 
 the sidewalk if he did not violate 
 any ordinances or regulations of the 
 city." McCarthy v. Syracuse, 46 
 N. Y. 194. " The excavation by the 
 plaintiffs of the area under the side- 
 walk was not unlawful. They 
 owned to the center of the street, 
 subject to the right of way of the 
 public over the surface. For any 
 interference with this right of way 
 the plaintiffs would have been re- 
 sponsible, but so long as they did 
 no Injury to the street they were 
 at liberty to use the space under it 
 as they might any other part of 
 their property." See also 
 
 Illinois. — Tacoma Safety Deposit 
 Co. V. Chicago, 247 111. 192, 93 N. E. 
 153, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 868, 20 Ann. 
 Gas. 564; Sears v. Chicago, 247 111. 
 304, 93 N. E. 158, 20 Ann. Gas. 539. 
 
 Iowa. — 'Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 
 Iowa 450, 74 Am. Dec. 358. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Perley v. Chand- 
 ler, 6 Mass. 454, 4 Am. Dec. 159; 
 Kendall v. Hardy, 208 Mass. 20, 29, 
 94 N. E. 254. 
 
 Michigcm. — Fisher v. Thirkell, 21 
 Mich. 1, 4 Am. Rep. 422. 
 
 Missouri. — Pemberton v. Dooley, 
 43 Mo. App. 176. 
 
 Nebraska. — Tiernan v. Lincoln, 88 
 Neb. 662, 130 N. W. 280, 32 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 1034. 
 
 New York. — Deshong v. New 
 York, 176 N. Y. 475, 68 N. B. 880. 
 
 Rhode Island. — ^Adams v. Fletcher, 
 17 E. I. 137, 20 Atl. 263, 33 Am. St. 
 E«p. 859. 
 
 South Dakota. — Dell Rapids Mer- 
 cantile Co. v. Dell Rapids, 11 S. D. 
 116, 75 N. W. 898, 74 Am. St. Rep. 
 783. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Papworth v. Mil- 
 waukee, 64 Wis. 389, 25 N. W. 431. 
 
 48. Matter of Brooklyn Union El. 
 Ry. Co., 105 App. Div. (N. Y.) 93 
 N. Y. Supp. 924; Quigley v. Penn- 
 sylvania Schuylkill Valley R. R. Co., 
 121 Pa. 35, 15 Atl. 478, 1 L. R. A. 
 503. After a vault has been law- 
 fully constructed under a street by 
 permission of the municipal au- 
 thorities, it cannot be summarily 
 declared a nuisance and destroyed 
 when the space is not required for 
 any highway purpose. Tiernan v. 
 Lincoln, 88 Neb. 662, 130 N. W. 280, 
 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1034. When the 
 abutting owner does not own the fee 
 of the street, he is not entitled to 
 compensation when a vault below 
 the surface of the street built and 
 maintained under a permit from the 
 city authorities is destroyed by the 
 construction of a subway which is 
 held not to be a proper street use. 
 Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. New 
 York, 210 N. Y. 34, 103 N. E. 768. 
 
480 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 156 
 
 The public right to make use of the way for highway pur- 
 poses is however paramount, and the rights of the owner of 
 the fee are all subordinate to the lawful exercise of the 
 public easement, and when any conflict arises the owner 
 must give way. As the public requirements grow larger 
 the privileges of the owner of the fee decrease. His use 
 of the surface, lawful at first, may be curtailed or forbidden 
 altogether if it interferes with the exercise of the public 
 easement. The same is true of his occupation of the space 
 below the surface of the street. If, after cellars and vaults 
 have been lawfully built, a proper subterranean use of the 
 highway by the public is authorized which prevents the 
 further enjoyment of the cellars by the owner of the fee, 
 he is not entitled to compensation*® for the exercise of an 
 easement already existing and paid for, but which had 
 hitherto lain dormant, is not a taking of property. 
 
 As the right of the owner of the fee to make a temporary 
 use of the surface or to construct vaults under the street 
 when public travel is not obstructed is, under reasonable 
 police regulation, absolute, it follows that he cannot acquire 
 any prescriptive right to continue such use however long he 
 
 49. Sears v. Crocker, 184 Mass. edly a city has the right to invade 
 i586, 69 N. E. 327, 100 Am. St. Kep. the limits of an area for the pur- 
 577. If a subway is not an unrea- pose of constructing sewers, laying 
 sonable mode of using the streets mains, or using the entire street for 
 " the mere fact that it deprives any public improvement." See also 
 abutters of the use of vaults and Allen v. Boston, in preceding note, 
 similar underground structures is of and United States v. Boston Ele- 
 little importance. Abutters are vated Ry. Co., 176 Fed. 963 ; Cobum 
 i)ound to vnthdraw from occupation v. New Telephone Co., 156 Ind. 90, 
 of streets above or below the sur- 59 N. E. 824, 52 L. R. A. 671; Pea- 
 face, whenever the public needs the body v. Boston, 220 Mass. 376, 107 
 occupied space for travel. The nee- N. E. 952, and Julia Building Asso- 
 essary requirements of the public elation v. Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo. 258, 
 for travel were all paid for when 1 Am. Elect. Cas. 801. In RafEerty 
 the land was taken." Deshong v. v. Central Traction Co., 147 Pa. 579, 
 New York, 176 N. Y. 475, 68 N. E. 23 Atl. 884, 30 Am. St. Rep. 763, It 
 880. " Whenever the existence of a was held that an abutter had no 
 vault would interfere with the pub- remedy when his water pipes within 
 lie use of the street the right to the highway were interfered with 
 maintain it must be held to termi- by a cable railway, and in New 
 nate, as the rights of individuals York Steam Co. v. Foundation Co., 
 under such permits must be re- 195 N. Y. 43, 87 N. E. 765, 21 L. R. A. 
 garded as subordinate to the neces- (N. S.) 470, it was held that the 
 sities or requirements of the pub- abutting owner was liable for con- 
 lie." Dell Rapids Mercantile Co. v. structing a vault under the street in 
 Dell Rapids, 11 S. D. 116, 75 N. W. such a manner as to injure pipes 
 898, 74 Am. St. Rep. 783. " Undoubt- already lawfully there. 
 
§ 156 Extent of Interest Taken for Public Use. 481 
 
 may have enjoyed it.*" If the municipal authorities license 
 the construction of a cellar, the owner is in no better posi- 
 tion, for such a license is always subject to withdrawal or 
 revocation.*^ If we assume that a cellar cannot be lawfully 
 built without a license, or the local ordinances require a 
 license, a license will be presumed to have been granted if 
 it appears that the cellar was allowed to be built and main- 
 tained, and the owner will not have the adverse possession 
 necessary to create a prescriptive title.*^ 
 
 The exercise of the owner's rights within the limits of 
 the highway is subject to reasonable regulation by the pub- 
 lic authorities in behalf of the safety and convenience of 
 public travel,** and when inspection is necessary to insure 
 
 50. Bliss V. Johnson, 94 N. Y. 233 ; 
 McClellan v. Weston, 49 W. Va. 669, 
 39 S. E. 670, 55 L. R. A. 898. As to 
 the right of an abutting owner to 
 acquire a prescriptive right by a 
 permanent enclosure of a portion of 
 a public way, see infra, § 509. 
 
 61. Winter v. Montgomery, 83 
 Ala. 589, 3 So. 235. Bill for injunc- 
 tion to prevent defendant from fill- 
 ing up excavations under the side- 
 walk made by plaintiff under mu- 
 nicipal license. It did not appear 
 that the license had been revoked, 
 but the city council had voted to 
 fill up the excavations. Held, it is 
 the duty of the city government to 
 control the streets and sidewalks 
 whenever the public safety or con- 
 venience requires it, and no license 
 to a private individual can interfere 
 with this right. It was not a " tak- 
 ing of property " requiring compen- 
 sation, because the " property " was 
 subject to withdrawal by the city. 
 See also. 
 
 United States. — Pabst Brewing 
 Co. v. Thorley, 127 Fed. 439, 145 
 Fed. 117; United States v. Boston 
 Elevated R. R. Co., 176 Fed. 963. 
 
 Illinois. — Gregsten v. Chicago, 
 145 111. 451, 34 N. E. 426, 36 Am. 
 St. Rep. 496 ; Snyder v. Mt. Pulaski, 
 176 111. 397, 52 N. E. 62, 44 L. R. A. 
 407; Tacoma Safety Deposit Co. v. 
 Chicago, 247 111. 192, 93 N. E. 153, 
 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 868. 
 
 New York. — New York Steam Co. 
 V. Foundation Co., 195 N. T. 43, 87 
 
 31 
 
 N. E. 765, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 470; 
 Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. New 
 York, 210 N. Y. 34, 103 N. E. 768; 
 New York v. United States Trust 
 Co., 116 App. Div. 349, 101 N. Y. 
 Supp. 574 ; Potter v. Interborough 
 Rapid Transit Co., 54 Misc. 423, 105 
 N. Y. Supp. 1071 ; aflarmed, 124 App. 
 Div. 920, 108 N. Y. Supp. 1145. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Eddy v. Granger, 
 19 R. I. 105, 31 Atl. 831, 28 L. R. A. 
 517 (a town cannot give a vested 
 right to maintain a private drain in 
 a highway so that a subsequent cut- 
 ting off of the drain by the con- 
 struction of a sewer will create any 
 liability against the town). 
 
 62. United States. — Robbins v. 
 Chicago, 4 Wall. 657, 18 L. ed. 427. 
 
 Illinois. — Nelson v. Godfrey, 12 
 111. 20; Grldley v. Bloomington, 88 
 111. 50. 
 
 New YorTc. — Jennings v. Van 
 Schaick, 108 N. Y. 530, 15 N. E. 
 424, 2 Am. St. Rep. 459 ; Babbage v. 
 Powers, 130 N. Y. 281, 29 N. E. 132, 
 14 L. R. A. 398. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Snively v. Wash- 
 ington Township, 218 Pa. 249, 67 
 Atl. 465, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 918. A 
 permit will be presumed even if 
 a record of permits is kept, and 
 none is found in the record. De- 
 shong V. New York, 176 N. Y. 475, 
 68 N. E. 880. 
 
 53. Skaggs V. Martinsville, 140 
 Ind. 476, 39 N. E. 241, 33 L. R. A. 
 781, 49 Am. St. Rep. 209. The owner 
 is liable to travellers on the high- 
 
482 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 157 
 
 the safety and convenience of the travelling public a reason- 
 able fee to cover the cost of such inspection may be imposed, 
 but a city or town cannot collect a charge in the nature of 
 rent from the owner of the fee for the use of his own land 
 within the highway location, as for example by maintain- 
 ing a marquee in front of his store, or cellars and vaults 
 under the sidewalk.®* If such use does not interfere with 
 public travel the owner may enjoy it as of right; if it does 
 interfere with public travel it is unlawful and such pay- 
 ment is in effect a bribe to the city or town to adjudicate 
 that it does not so interfere. It is only when the munic- 
 ipal authorities are specifically given power to discontinue 
 part of the highway, or a horizontal section thereof, for a 
 cash consideration that a substantial fee for the mainte- 
 nance of marquees and vaults in a highway can be collected. 
 
 § 157. Ownership of the Earth and Minerals within the 
 Limits of a Highway. 
 
 It is well settled that, when the public has an easement 
 only, the earth, stones and gravel within the limits of a 
 public way belong to the owner of the f ee,'® and he may dig 
 up and remove the soil if he does not thereby interfere with 
 the exercise of the public easement.^® But the right of the 
 
 way who are injured by the defec- When however the fee of the 
 
 tive condition of the vault He is street is in the city, the abut- 
 
 bound to teep it safe for public ter may be charged a substan- 
 
 travel over it. Bowley v. Mangrum, tial sum for maintaining a vault 
 
 3 Cal. App. 229, 84 Pac. 946; under the street. Sears v. Chicago, 
 
 Schneider v. Winkler, 74 N. J. L,. 71, 247 111. 204, 93 N. E. 158, 20 Ann. 
 
 70 Atl. 731 ; Gelof v. Morgenroth, Cas. 539. The sum charged in such 
 
 130 App. Div. (N. Y.) 17, 114 N. Y. a case is in legal effect rent for a 
 
 Supp. 293. portion of the public property not 
 
 54. Illinois. — Gregsten v. Chicago, needed for the public use. See 
 
 145 111. 451, 34 N. E. 426, 36 Am. St. supra, § 49. 
 
 Eep. 496 ; Chicago v. Norton Mill- 55. Kentucky. — Hawesville v. 
 
 ing Co., 196 111. 580, 63 N. B. 1043 ; Hawes, 6 Bush. 232. 
 
 Tacoma Safety Deposit Co. v. Chi- Hew Yorfc.^ Higgins v. Reynolds, 
 
 cago, 247 III. 192, 93 N. E. 153, 31 31 N. Y. 151 ; Robert v. Sadler, 104 
 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 868, 20 Ann. Cas. N. Y. 229, 10 N. E. 428, 58 Am. Rep. 
 
 564; Sears v. Chicago, 247 111. 204, 408; Fisher v. Rochester, 6 Lans. 
 
 93 N. E. 158, 20 Ann. Cas. 539. 225; Kenney v. Williams, 14 Barb. 
 
 tfew Jersej/. — State, Benson, 629. 
 
 Prosecutor, v. Hoboken, 33 N. J. L. Rhode Island. — Tucker v. Eldred, 
 
 280. 
 
 6 R. I. 404. 
 
 'New York. — People ex rel. Zieg- 56. West Covington v. Freking, 8 
 ler V. CoUis, 17 App. Div. 448, 45 Bush. (Ky.) 121; Gamble v. Petti- 
 N Y. Supp. 282. John, 116 Mo. 375, 22 S. W. 783. 
 
§ 157 Extent op Inteeest Taken foe Public Use. 483 
 
 public to use the earth for repairs upon the way is para- 
 mount, and, if it is needed for that purpose, the owner 
 may be enjoined from removing it,^'' and in thickly settled 
 districts the right of the owner of the fee to remove the 
 soil hardly exists, as the public use usually extends to the 
 entire width of the way.°® 
 
 It is a general, but not a universal, rule that the public 
 may take earth from any part of a highway to repair the 
 same way at another point or to use on any other public 
 way within the same jurisdiction.®" In Indiana the right of 
 removal is limited to highways within the same plan of 
 public improvement,®" and it is held in some states that 
 the soil cannot be removed unless the removal is itself the 
 needed repair.®^ When earth and stones are taken away 
 
 57. New Haven v. Sargent, 38 
 Conn. 50, 9 Am. Rep. 360; Palatine 
 V. Krueger, 121 111. 72, 12 N. E. 75; 
 Madison v. Mayers, 97 Wis. 399, 73 
 N. W. 43, 40 L. R. A. 635, 65 Am. St. 
 Rep. 127. 
 
 58. Thus in Palatine v. Krueger, 
 121 111. 72, 12 N. E. 75, the court, in 
 discussing the right of the owner 
 of the fee to remove the soil, said: 
 " In the location of highways in the 
 country, the public require nothing 
 more than an easement, with the 
 rights incident, under which may be 
 included the right to tile drain be- 
 neath the soil, and the right to use 
 the soil or other material on the 
 line of the road for construction and 
 repairs. But the uses to which 
 streets may be put in incorporated 
 towns, where the fee of the street 
 may remain in the owner of the 
 adjoining land, are far more numer- 
 ous. It may be necessary to change 
 the grade. Culverts, drains and 
 sewers, may be required. Gas-pipes 
 and water-pipes may be needed; 
 and the authorities of the incorpo- 
 rated town or city may lay them, 
 or authorize them to be laid, under 
 the street. Lamp-posts may be 
 erected on the streets, and various 
 other improvements which the pub- 
 lic wants may require; and, while 
 the owner of the land adjoining the 
 street may own the fee in the street, 
 he has no right to do any act which 
 vsrill interfere with the rights of the 
 
 public to the use of the street, for 
 all purposes for which they may be 
 needed by the public." 
 
 59. Connecticut. — New Haven v. 
 Sargent, 38 Conn. 50, 9 Am. Rep. 360. 
 
 Illinois. — Bundy v. Catto, 61 111, 
 App. 209. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Adams v. Emer- 
 son, 6 Pick. 57 ; Denniston v. Clark, 
 125 Mass. 216 ; TJpham v. Marsh, 128 
 Mass. 546; Titus v. Boston, 149 
 Mass. 164, 21 N. E. 310. 
 
 Michigan. — Bissell v. Collins, 28 
 Mich. 277, 15 Am. Rep. 217. 
 
 Vermont. — Baxter v. Turnpike 
 Co., 22 Vt. 119, 52 Am. Dec. 84. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Huston v. Fort At- 
 kinson, 56 Wis. 350, 14 N. W. 444. 
 
 60. Haas v. Evansville, 20 Ind. 
 App. 482, 50 N. E. 46, 51 N. E. 105 ; 
 Delphi V. Evans, 36 Ind. 90, 10 Am. 
 Rep. 12; Aurora v. Fox, 78 Ind. 1. 
 
 61. In Robert v. Sadler, 104 N. Y. 
 229, 10 N. E. 428, 58 Am. Rep. 498, 
 the court said : " The courts have 
 held that where, to reach and pre- 
 pare the surface of the road in ac- 
 cordance with its grade line, super- 
 incumbent material Is necessarily 
 removed, it may be used upon other 
 parts of the road and on the prem- 
 ises of other land owners, and that 
 where there has been no negligence 
 in construction consequential In- 
 juries necessarily resulting cannot 
 be recovered. It was said in 
 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 13 
 Wall. 166, 181, that this class of de- 
 
484 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 157 
 
 from a public way for the purpose of lowering the grade, 
 or because their presence in the way renders it unsafe or 
 inconvenient for travel, the ownership of the material so 
 removed is in the municipality, and it may dispose of it as it 
 sees fit ; ®^ but when the material is not removed to improve 
 the way or to be used for repairs on other ways it is the 
 property of the owner of the fee and cannot be disposed of 
 by the town for its own pecuniary advantage.®* 
 
 Mines and quarries within the highway belong to the 
 owner of the fee and he may work them if he does not 
 thereby interfere with public travel.®* When the fee of the 
 street is in the town the abutting owner has no right to 
 operate mines in the street, and if he takes out ore the 
 town may recover its value from him.®^ Springs belong to 
 the owner of the fee,®® and he may dig wells in the street if 
 
 cisions ' have gone to the uttermost 
 limit of sound judicial construction ' 
 and ' in some cases beyond it.' The 
 observation was just. * * * Those 
 (cases cited by the lower court) 
 which are not adverse justify only 
 the taking of earth or soil which the 
 process of construction or repair 
 requires and necessarily compels to 
 be removed. I have found no case 
 in this state which goes further, and 
 am unwilling to pass beyond those 
 limits. Here the pits were dug to 
 be filled again. Concededly the 
 process was to take from the land 
 owner valuable material and substi- 
 tute a poorer quality. Digging the 
 pits was not only no incident neces- 
 sarily or naturally growing out of 
 construction but a deliberate de- 
 struction of the grade when reached, 
 and which did not need to be dis- 
 turbed, but on the contrary, com- 
 pelled replacement and repair of the 
 mischief done." See also Smith v. 
 Home, 19 Ga. 89, 63 Am. Dec. 298; 
 Macon v. Hill, 58 Ga. 595; Ander- 
 son V. Bement, 13 Ind. App. 248, 
 41 N. E. 547; Kich v. Minneapolis, 
 37 Minn. 423, 35 N. W. 2, 5 Am. St. 
 Rep. 861. 
 
 62. IJpham v. Marsh, 128 Mass. 
 546. The highway surveyor was 
 allowed to place the earth taken 
 from the highway upon his own 
 premises. Viliski v. Minneapolis, 40 
 
 Minn. 304, 41 N. W. 1050, 3 L. R. A. 
 831. The town permitted a con- 
 tractor to keep the stone removed 
 from a way in constructing a sewer 
 as compensation for the work. Held, 
 as to the stone necessarily removed, 
 lawful ; as to the rest, unlavrful. 
 
 63. Viliski v. Minneapolis, 40 
 Minn. 304, 41 N. W. 1050, 3 L. R. A. 
 831. 
 
 64. Adams v. Emerson, 6 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 56. And see also Southern 
 Pacific R. R. Co. v. San Francisco 
 Savings Union, 146 Cal. 290, 79 Pac. 
 961, 70 L. R. A. 221, 106 Am. St. 
 Rep. 36, holding that when a rail- 
 road is laid out over oil lands the 
 railroad must pay their entire value 
 unless in spite of the appropriation 
 of the surface the owner of the fee 
 can get the oil. 
 
 65. Leadville v. Coronado Mining 
 Co., 29 Colo. 17, 67 Pac. 289, the 
 court saying that whether the city 
 might remove the ore from beneath 
 its streets is a question for further 
 consideration. 
 
 66. Suffield V. Hathaway, 44 Conn. 
 521, 26 Am. Rep. 483 ; Old Town v. 
 Dooley, 81 111. 225 ; Tipper Ten Mile 
 Plank Road v. Braden, 172 Pa. 460, 
 33 Atl. 562, 51 Am. St. Rep. 759. 
 But see Neally v. Bradford, 145 
 Mass. 561, 14 N. E. 652, holding that 
 the owner of the fee has no rights 
 in a watercourse within the high- 
 
§ 158 Extent of Intbeest Taken fob Public Use. 485 
 
 he desires ; " but the town may fill them up if they interfere 
 with public travel.®* 
 
 § 158. Ownership of the Trees and Herbage in a Public 
 
 Highway. 
 
 The trees and herbage in a public highway are the prop- 
 erty of the owner of the fee. He has the right to use any 
 portion of the way not needed for public travel for grow- 
 ing grass, crops, or trees, either for their produce or for 
 improving the appearance and enhancing the comfort of his 
 premises.*^ For any injury to the trees and herbage that 
 is not the result of the proper exercise of the highway ease- 
 ment he is entitled to compensation as fully as if the high- 
 way did not exist.''** The owner's rights in the trees and 
 
 way. When a street extends to a 
 private navigable watercourse, it ex- 
 tends to the center of the stream, 
 and the abutting lotowners are en- 
 titled to the ice formed on the por- 
 tion of the stream within the limits 
 of the street. Brooklyn v. Smith, 
 104 111. 429, 44 Am. Rep. 90. 
 
 67. Ferrenbach v. Turner, 86 Mo. 
 416, 56 Am. Rep. 437. 
 
 68. Ferrenbach v. Turner, 86 Mo. 
 416, 56 Am. Rep. 437. 
 
 69. The owner of the fee may 
 plant trees anywhere outside the 
 traveled path. People's Ice Co. v. 
 Excelsior, 44 Mich. 229, 6 N. W. 636, 
 38 Am. Rep. 246; Graves v. Shat- 
 tuck, 35 N. H. 258, 69 Am. Dec. 536 ; 
 Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
 Smithdeal, 103 Tex. 128, 124 S. W. 
 627. 
 
 70. United States. — Barclay v. 
 Howell, 6 Pet. 498, 8 L. ed. 477. 
 
 Alabama. — Southern Bell Tel. Co. 
 V. Francis, 109 Ala. 224, 19 So. 1, 31 
 L. R. A. 193, 55 Am. St. Rep. 930, 6 
 Am. Elect. Cas. 160. 
 
 California. — Vanderhurst v. 
 Tholeke, 113 Cal. 147, 45 Pac. 266, 35 
 L. R. A. 267. 
 
 Connecticut. — Woodruff v. Neal, 
 28 Conn. 165. 
 
 Illinois. — Mt. Carmel v. Shaw, 
 155 111. 37, 39 N. B. 584, 27 L. K. A. 
 580, 46 Am. St. Rep. 311. 
 
 Indiana. — Hildrup v. Windfall 
 City, 29 Ind. App. 592, 64 N. B. 942. 
 
 Iowa. — Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 
 Iowa 451, 74 Am. Dec. 358; Over- 
 man V. May, 35 Iowa 89. 
 
 Kansas. — Shawnee Co. v. Beck- 
 with, 10 Kans. 603. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Stackpole v. 
 Healy, 16 Mass. 33, 8 Am. Dec. 121 ; 
 Adams v. Emerson, 6 Pick. 56 ; 
 White V. Godfrey, 97 Mass. 473; 
 Bliss V. Ball, 99 Mass. 597. 
 
 Michigan. — People v. Foss, 80 
 Mich. 559, 45 N. W. 480, 8 L. R. A. 
 472, 20 Am. St. Rep. 532. 
 
 Missouri. — Gamble v. Pettijohn, 
 116 Mo. 375, 22 S. W. 783; Cart- 
 wright V. Liberty Tel. Co., 205 Mo. 
 126, 103 S. W. 982, 12 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 1125. 
 
 Nebraska. — Bronson v. Albion 
 Tel. Co., 67 Neb. Ill, 93 N. W. 201, 
 60 L. R. A. 426, 8 Am. Elect. Cas. 
 177; Slabaugh v. Omaha Electric 
 Light Co., 87 Neb. 805, 128 N. W. 
 505. 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1084. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Avery v. Max- 
 well, 4 N. H. 38 ; Baker v. Shepherd, 
 24 N. H. 208 ; Bigelow v. Whitcomb, 
 72 N. H. 473, 57 Atl. 680, 65 L. R. A. 
 676. 
 
 New Jersey. — Winter v. Peterson, 
 4 Zabr. 524, 61 Am. Dec. 678 ; Wel- 
 ler V. McCormick, 52 N. J. L. 470, 19 
 Atl. 1101, 8 L. R. A. 798. 
 
 North Carolina. — Brown v. Ashe- 
 ville Electric Co., 138 N. C. 533, 51 
 S. E. 62, 107 Am. St. Rep. 554, 9 Am. 
 Elect. Cas. 467. 
 
486 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 158 
 
 herbage are however, like all his rights within the limits of 
 the way, subordinate to the rights of the public,^^ and when 
 the trees or herbage interfere with the proper exercise of 
 the highway easement they must give wayj^ For this rea- 
 son trees may be cut down or trimmed in order to widen 
 the wrought portion of the highway, or to accommodate 
 rails and wires laid by public service corporations in the 
 highway, for any purpose which is classed as within the 
 highway easement, without compensation to the owner of 
 the fee.^' It is held in some jurisdictions that the public 
 
 Ohio.— Phifer v. Cox, 21 Ohio St 
 248, 8 Am. Kep. 58; Daily v. State, 
 51 Ohio St. 348, 37 N. B. 710, 24 
 L. K. A. 724, 46 Am. St. Rep. 578, 5 
 Am. Elect. Gas. 186. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Sanderson v. Hav- 
 erstick, 8 Pa. 294. 
 
 Texas, — Southwestern Tel. & Tel. 
 Co. V. Smithdeal, 103 Tex. 128, 124 
 S. W. 627. 
 
 Vermont. — Cole v. Drew, 44 Vt. 
 49, 8 Am. Rep. 363. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Chase v. Oshkosh, 81 
 Wis. 313, 51 N. W. 560, 15 L. R. A. 
 553, 29 Am. St. Rep. 898. 
 
 71. It was said in Southern BeU 
 Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Francis, 109 Ala. 
 224, 19 So. 1, 31 L. R. A. 193, 55 Am. 
 St. Rep. 930, 6 Am. Elect. Gas. 160, 
 that an abutter cannot recover for 
 the cutting of trees for a telephone 
 wire in the street, although the tele- 
 phone was considered an additional 
 servitude, as the owner's rights In 
 the trees in a street are subject to 
 all public uses, whether additional 
 servitudes or not; but it is impos- 
 sible to support this position upon 
 principle. 
 
 72. California. — ^Vanderhurst v. 
 Tholcke, 113 Cal. 147, 45 Pac. 266, 
 35 li. R. A. 267. 
 
 Georgia. — Castlebury v. Atlanta, 
 74 Ga. 164. 
 
 Iowa. — Patterson v. Vail, 43 Iowa 
 142. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Boston v. Rich- 
 ardson, 13 Allen 146. 
 
 Missouri. — Colston v. St, Joseph, 
 106 Mo. App. 714, 80 S. W. 590. 
 
 New York. — Goodrich v. Otego, 
 216 N. T. 112, 110 N. E. 162. 
 
 North Carolina. — Tate v. Greens- 
 
 borough, 114 N. C. 392, 19 S. E. 767, 
 24 L. R. A. 671. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Chase v. Oshkosh, 81 
 Wis. 313, 51 N. W. 560, 15 L. R. A. 
 553, 29 Am. St. Rep. 898. 
 
 Since the owner may plant trees 
 in the highway as of right, he can 
 gain no prescriptive right as against 
 the public, as his possession is not 
 adverse. Bliss v. Jotmson, 94 N. Y. 
 233. 
 
 73. United States. — Southern Bell 
 Tel. Co. V. Constantlne, 69 Fed. 61, 
 4 Am. Elect. Gas. 219 (telephone 
 company directed by city authori- 
 ties to cut trees so as to remove 
 wires from street to sidewalk). 
 
 Alabama. — Southern Bell Tel. & 
 Tel. Co. V. Francis, 109 Ala. 224, 19 
 So. 1, 31 L. R. A. 193, 55 Am. St 
 Rep. 930, 6 Am. Elect Gas. 160; 
 Hobbs V. Long Distance Tel. & Tel. 
 Co., 147 Ala. 393, 41 So. 1003, 7 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87, 11 Ann. Gas. 
 461. 
 
 Iowa. — Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 
 Iowa 451, 74 Am. Dec. 358. 
 
 Michigan. — Wyant v. Central Tel. 
 Co., 123 Mich. 51, 81 N. W. 928, 47 
 L. R. A. 497, 81 Am. St. Rep. 155, 7 
 Am. Elect. Gas. 256; Miller v. De- 
 troit, etc., Ry. Co., 125 Mich. 171, 84 
 N. W. 49, 51 L. R. A. 955, 84 Am. 
 St Rep. 569, 7 Am. Elect Gas. 387. 
 
 Mississippi. — Hazlehurst v. Mayes, 
 84 Miss. 7, 36 So. 33, 64 L. R. A. 
 805. 
 
 Missouri. — McAntire v. Joplin 
 Tel. Co., 75 Mo. App. 535. 
 
 New Jersey. — Dodd v. Consoli- 
 dated Traction Co., 57 N. J. L. 482, 
 31 Atl. 980, 5 Am. Elect Gas. 201. 
 
 North Carolina. — Tate v. Greens- 
 
§ 158 Extent of Interest Taken foe Public Use. 487 
 
 authorities may use the vegetable growth for the purpose 
 of repairing the way, even when it does not incommode 
 public travel,^* but when the vegetation is cut for any other 
 purpose it belongs to the owner of the fee J^ If he fails to 
 remove it within a reasonable time he may be held to have 
 abandoned it J* 
 
 The public has no right to use the way for purposes of 
 pasturage,'^'' and for any interference with the trees by the 
 laying of wires or rails which constitute an additional 
 servitude upon the way the owner has his remedy^* When 
 the public owns the fee of the way it owns the vegetation 
 also, and the proper authorities may cause it to be cut 
 down for any purpose which they deem advantageous with- 
 out liability to the owner of the feeJ* The abutting owner 
 has however sufficient interest in the shade trees in front of 
 his premises to maintain an action against persons who cut 
 them down without authority;*" and for negligent and 
 unnecessary injury to trees an action lies even if authority 
 has been given to trim the trees and the purpose is a law- 
 ful one.*^ 
 
 borough, 114 N. C. 392, 19 S. E. 767, 
 24 L. R. A. 671. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Chase v. Oshkosh, 81 
 Wis. 313, 51 N. W. 560, 15 L. K. A. 
 553, 29 Am. St. Rep. 898. 
 
 74. Held it cannot in Baker v. 
 Shepherd, 24 N. H. 208; Tucker v. 
 Eldred, 6 R. I. 404. Contra, Felch 
 V. Gilman, 22 Vt. 38. And see 
 Tucker v. Tower, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 
 109, 19 Am. Dec. 350, where it was 
 held that a turnpike company might 
 cut trees from the surface of the 
 turnpike to erect a house for the 
 toll gatherer. 
 
 75. Clark v. Dasso, 34 Mich. 86; 
 Cole V. Drew, 44 Vt. 49, 8 Am. Rep. 
 363. 
 
 76. Murray v. Norfolk, 149 Mass. 
 328, 21 N. E. 757. 
 
 77. Connecticut. — ^Woodruff v. Neal, 
 28 Conn. 165. 
 
 Etinsas. — Coulkins v. Matthews, 
 5 Kans. 190. 
 
 Maine. — Cool v. Crommet, 13' Me. 
 250. 
 
 'Massachusetts. — Stackpole v. 
 Healy, 16 Mass. 33, 8 Am. Dec. 121. 
 
 Michigan, — Campau v. Konau, 39 
 Mich. 362. 
 
 Vew Hampshire. — Avery v. Max- 
 weU, 4 N. H. 36. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Harrison v. Brown, 5 
 Wis. 27. 
 
 78. Supra, note 70. 
 
 79. Georgia. — Atlanta v. Holliaay, 
 96 Ga. 546, 28 S. E. 509. 
 
 Illinois. — Baker v. Normal, 81 111. 
 108 ; Mt. Carmel v. Shaw, 155 lU. 37, 
 39 N. B. 584, 27 L. R. A. 580, 46 Am. 
 St. Rep. 311. 
 
 Indiana. — Western Union Tel. Co. 
 V. Krueger, 30 Ind. App. 28, 64 N. B. 
 635. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Gaylord v. King, 
 142 Mass. 495, 8 N. B. 596. 
 
 80. Donohue v. Keystone Gas Co., 
 181 N. Y. 313, 73 N. B. 1108, 70 
 li. R. A. 761, 106 Am. St. Rep. 549; 
 Lane v. Lamke, 53 App. Div. (N. Y.) 
 395, 65 N. T. Supp. 1090; Norman 
 Milling & Grain Co. v. Bethurem, 41 
 Okla. 735, 139 Pac. 830, 51 L. E. A. 
 (N. S.) 1082. 
 
 81. Van Siclen v. Jamaica Elec- 
 tric Light Co., 45 App. Div. (N. Y.) 
 1, 7 Am. Elect. Cas. 307. 
 
488 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 159 
 
 § 159. Rights of the Abutter when the Fee is in the Public. 
 
 While the interest of the public in a highway in the rural 
 districts is almost always no more than an easement, it often 
 happens that the fee of the streets of a large city is in the 
 municipality. In some cases, when a city was laid out upon 
 public lands, the fee in the public ways was expressly 
 reserved when the lands were sold; in states which were 
 first settled by races other than English, the common law 
 rule that a highway is only an easement did not prevail ; *^ 
 in other instances the city took a conveyance of the fee when 
 it settled with the owners for the damages caused by laying 
 out a highway; and in certain states cities are expressly 
 authorized to condemn a fee.** To the jurists of the first 
 century of this country's existence the idea that the rights 
 of the public in land which it had bought and paid for were 
 less than those of a private owner who held a similar title 
 apparently never occurred, nor was it then considered that 
 a sum of money raised by taxation from the pockets of the 
 people had in the eye of the law less purchasing power than 
 an equal amount in the hands of an individual, however 
 wealthy or powerful he might be. It was accordingly sup- 
 posed that if the public bought and paid for a tract of land, 
 it might use such land for any purposes to which a private 
 owner might devote his own premises without liability to 
 his neighbors, and that if the public, after using the land 
 for a certain purpose for several years, found it more 
 advantageous to use it for a different purpose, the owners 
 
 82. Thus it has always been the whether the title of the municipal- 
 law in Louisiana that the fee of ity is called a fee or An easement, 
 highways is in the public, supra, it is a limited estate, and the former 
 section 154, and the same is true of owner does not lose all his interest 
 streets in New York laid out during in the premises, and is entitled to 
 the period in which it was a Dutch compensation when an additional 
 colony. Kane v. New York El. Ky. burden is put upon the land. What 
 Co., 125 N. Y. 164, 26 N. E. 278, 11 is now under discussion is an abso- 
 li. E. A. 640. lute fee in the municipality in a 
 
 83. In some cases a municipality strip of land used for a street, in 
 is not authorized to acquire land which there is no right remaining in 
 except for certain specified pur- the former owner, either because 
 poses, and if under such conditions the land was never subject to pri- 
 it acquires land for a highway, vate ownership or because the mu- 
 whether by conveyance or by the nicipality, under legislative author- 
 exercise of eminent domain, it ac- ity, acquired the entire interest of 
 quires merely the right to use such the former owner and paid him for 
 land for highway purpose, and it. 
 
§ 159 Extent op Interest Taken fob Public Use. 489 
 
 of the neighboring land who had improved their property 
 upon the supposition that the first use was to always con- 
 tinue no more suffered a wrong for which the law would 
 give them redress than in the case of a similar -change of 
 use by a private owner. Hundreds of worthy citizens have 
 built their homes in close proximity to the spacious and 
 well kept grounds of a large private estate and have for 
 years enjoyed the advantage of such neighborhood, only in 
 the end to lose half the value of their property when the 
 neighboring estate is cut up into building lots and covered 
 with apartment houses, or devoted to commercial or manu- 
 facturing purposes; but it has never been supposed that 
 land owners were entitled to compensation for an injury of 
 such a character. Similarly, if the public bought a strip 
 of land in fee and opened it to public use as a public way, 
 and owners of adjoining land erected buildings fronting 
 upon such way, and subsequently the public necessity and 
 convenience required the use of the way for some other 
 public purpose, the adjoining property might be seriously 
 depreciated in value, but it seemed too clear for argument 
 that the abutting owners had no remedy, especially if the 
 new use of the way was such as a private owner might 
 lawfully make of his own land. 
 
 It is now however the law in many if not most of the 
 states, and especially in those which have an elective judi- 
 ciary, that the dollar raised by taxation from the people is 
 not as good as the private landowner's dollar; and while 
 an individual who buys land in fee owns it in fee and may 
 change its use as he sees fit, when the public buys land in 
 fee there immediately attach to it certain private easements 
 in favor of the adjoining property, so that the public, which 
 has already bought and paid for the land, cannot devote it 
 to such uses as public necessity and convenience may from 
 time to time require without paying a further sum to the 
 owners of these easements — easements for which the own- 
 ers have never paid a penny and which were created in 
 property belonging to the people and bought and paid for 
 with the money of the people, without the consent of the 
 people or their representatives. The origin and growth 
 of this doctrine make an interesting story. 
 
490 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 159 
 
 Before the introduction of modern methods of transporta- 
 tion and transmission of intelligence, the ownership of the 
 fee of a public way was considered of little importance. 
 When a highway was laid out through private land, the 
 owner usually received the full market value of the land 
 whether the fee or an easement was taken ; ** an abutter who 
 did not own the fee was generally allowed the same priv- 
 ileges in regard to the use of the land in front of his prop- 
 erty within the limits of the way as if the highway was 
 but an easement, and in general it may be said that the 
 distinction between fee and easement was looked upon as a 
 mere technicality and the fee of the highway as a barren 
 and useless title. When however such modern improve- 
 ments as steam railroads, elevated railways and telegraph 
 lines began to be constructed under legislative authority 
 upon the public ways, the ownership of the fee became a 
 matter of great importance. An abutter who owned the 
 fee of the highway was allowed to recover the entire depre- 
 ciation of the market value of his land on account of the 
 imposition of an additional servitude upon that portion of 
 it which lay within the highway; but the construction of a 
 steam railroad or an elevated railway or a telegraph line 
 upon adjoining land belonging to another could not be called 
 a ' * taking ' ' without overturning firmly established prin- 
 ciples of law, and thus an abutter upon a highway who did 
 nt)t own the fee was left without remedy for the same 
 injury for which an abutter who owned the fee recovered 
 substantial damages, because of a distinction which no one 
 had previously considered of the slightest importance. 
 
 It is a lasting reproach to the legislatures of several of 
 the states that they authorized the streets to be used by 
 public service corporations for other than street purposes 
 and made no provision for compensation to the abutters 
 ■ regardless of their ownership of the fee, so that even those 
 who owned the fee were obliged to recover their damages 
 by the uncertain process of the common law, while those who 
 did not own the fee were left apparently without remedy. 
 It was however felt by many an unjust refinement to rest 
 the whole question of compensation for such severe injuries 
 as were often received upon a matter of detail a hundred 
 
 84. See infra, § 225. 
 
§ 160 Extent op Interest Taken fob Public Use. 491 
 
 or more years before which no one had then cared about, 
 and a means was sought to bring within the constitutional 
 protection the abutting proprietor who did not own the fee. 
 The construction of elevated railways in the streets of New 
 York under authority of statutes which made no provision 
 for compensation to the abutting owners finally brought 
 the matter to a head. 
 
 § 160. Origin of the Doctrine of the Abutters' Easements. 
 
 It is well settled that, as against other individuals, an 
 abutting owner has rights in a public highway which are not 
 dependent upon his ownership of the fee. When a highway 
 is unlawfully obstructed, those who are inconvenienced by 
 being unable to pass along it, and are obliged to reach their 
 destination by a longer route, have no right of action against 
 the person creating the obstruction; the injury is a public 
 one and the remedy is by indictment.*^ When however an 
 obstruction is unlawfully placed in a highway so that an 
 adjoining owner cannot pass from his premises to the high- 
 way and from the highway to his premises, he has suffered 
 a special injury, and may maintain a private action against 
 the person who placed the obstruction in the highway.*® 
 
 85. England. — Winterbottom v. Pacific Transportation Co., 50 Cal. 
 Derby, L. R. 2 Bxch. 316 ; Benjamin 592. 
 
 V. Storr, L. R. 9 C. P. 401, 409, 19 Connecticut.— UnhbeLid v. Dem- 
 
 Eng. Rul. Cas. 263; Solten v. De Ing, 21 Conn. 356. 
 
 Held, 2 Sim. N. S. 133. Indiana.— O'Brien v. Central Iron 
 
 Illinois. — McDonald v. English, 85 & Steel Co., 158 Ind. 218, 63 N. E. 
 
 111. 232. 302, 57 L. R. A. 508, 92 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 Indiana. — O'Brien v. Central Iron 305. 
 
 & Steel Co., 158 Ind. 218, 63 N. E. Kansas. — Venard v. Cross, 8 Kan. 
 
 302, 57 L. R. A. 508, 92 Am. St. Rep. 248, 255. 
 
 305. Maine. — Sutherland v. Jackson, 
 
 Massachusetts. — Brainard v. Con- 32 Me. 80. 
 
 necticut River R. R. Co., 7 Cush. Massachusetts. — Stetson v. Faxon, 
 
 506 ; Hartshorn v. South Reading, 3 19 Pick. 147, 31 Am. Dec. 123 ; 
 
 Allen 501 ; Willard v. Cambridge, 3 Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick. 511, 31 
 
 Allen 574; Shaw v. Boston, etc., R. Am. Dec. 157. 
 
 R. Co., 159 Mass. 597, 35 N. E. 92. Neiv Jersey. — Green v. Kleinhans, 
 
 New Hampshire. — Griffin v. San- 2 Green 472. 
 
 bornton, 44 N. H. 246. South Dakota. — Edmison v.Lowt-y, 
 
 Wisconsin.— Zettel v. West Bend, 3 S. D. 77, 52 N. W. 583, 17 L. R. A. 
 
 79 Wis. 316, 48 N. W. 379, 24 Am. 275, 44 Am. St. Rep. 774. 
 
 St. Rep. 715. Vermont. — Abbott v. Mills, 3 Vt. 
 
 See also infra, § 323. 521 
 
 86. England. — Benjamin v. Storr, Wisconsin. — Tilly v. Mitchell & 
 L. R., 9 C. P. 400, 19 Eng. Rul. Cas. Lewis Co., 121 Wis. 1, 98 N. W. 969, 
 263. 105 Am. St. Rep. 1007. 
 
 California. — Schults v. Northern 
 
492 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 160 
 
 Similarly, it is to be supposed, an adjoining owner miglit 
 recover damages from one who unlawfully erected a struc- 
 ture in the highway which cut off light and air from his 
 premises.®'' Thus, it would seem that, as against other 
 individuals acting without authority of law, an abutting 
 owner has rights of light, air and access from the highway 
 to his premises which will be recognized and protected by 
 the courts, regardless of his ownership of the fee. That an 
 abutting owner has such rights as against the paramount 
 rights of the public, which bought and paid for the land 
 upon which the highway is located, is of course an entirely 
 different proposition.*® 
 
 In the central portion of the United States, long before 
 elevated Tailroads had been anywhere introduced, the right 
 of the owners of land abutting upon a highway to recover 
 compensation for a use of the highway under legislative 
 authority for other than highway purposes had in some 
 cases been predicated upon the existence of peculiar rights 
 in the highway in favor of the abutting owner, rather than 
 upon his ownership of the fee of the soil within the limits of 
 the way, and while it does not appear that in any instance 
 an abutting owner who did not own the fee was actually held 
 to be constitutionally entitled to compensation in such a 
 case, it is certainly true that, in cases in which the abutting 
 owner was allowed compensation, the imposition of an addi- 
 tional servitude upon the fee was not made the ground of 
 recovery.®^ 
 
 87. Cobb V. Saxby (1914), 3 K. B. venience and enjoyment of such 
 822 ; First National Bank v. Tyson, persons as should purchase and hold 
 133 Ala. 459, 32 So. 144, 59 L. R. A. lots contiguous to them. The title 
 399, 91 Am. St. Eep. 46; Pettit v. to such lots carries with it, as es- 
 Grand Junction, 119 Iowa 352, 93 sential incidents, certain services 
 N. W. 381 ; Townsend v. Epstein, 93 and easements, not only valuable 
 Md. 537, 49 Atl. 629, 52 L. E. A. 409, and almost indispensable, but as in- 
 86 Am. St. Eep. 441 ; Joyce, Nui- violable as the property in the lots 
 sauces, §§ 234, 236. themselves. And, therefore, the 
 
 88. Supra, § 109. owners and occupants of houses and 
 
 89. Thus it was said by the court lots on Main street, between Sixth 
 through Robertson, C. J., in Lexing- and Thirteenth, have a peculiar in- 
 ton & Ohio E. E. Co. v. Applegate, 8 terest in that street, which neither 
 Dana (Ky.) 289, 33 Am. Dec. 497, in the local nor general public can 
 1838, " The streets of Louisville pretend to claim — a private right 
 were designated, not only for sub- of the nature of an incorporeal 
 serving the public purposes for hereditament, legally attached to 
 which the town was established by their contiguous ground — an inci- 
 law, but also for the especial con- dental title to certain facilities and 
 
160 Extent of Interest Taken fob Public Use. 493 
 
 The first definite departure from the old rule however 
 occurred in New Jersey in 1863, in a case in which it 
 appeared that the plaintiff owned land adjacent to a canal. 
 
 franchises assured to them by con- 
 tract and by law, without which 
 their property would be compara- 
 tively of but little value, and would 
 never have been bought by them. 
 Although, therefore, an ordinary 
 public way may be discontinued or 
 applied to some other public pur- 
 pose than that for which it was 
 first established, without any legal 
 liability for pecuniary compensation 
 to the local public, or to any owner 
 of adjoining land — because neither 
 such public nor proprietor had any 
 right of property in the way, or 
 any other legal interest in it than 
 that which was common to all the 
 people — and though, also, the 
 mayor and council, holding the 
 legal title to the streets of Louis- 
 ville, in trust chiefly for public pur- 
 poses, might regrade and improve 
 those streets, or authorize the public 
 use of them, in any mode consistent 
 with the objects to which they were 
 first dedicated, without obtaining 
 the consent of the owners of lots 
 thereon, and without making any 
 compensation to them ; nevertheless, 
 there may be no constitutional au- 
 thority for closing or discontinu- 
 ing any one of the streets, or even 
 for applying it to any public or 
 private use incompatible with any 
 one of the ends for which such 
 street was established, without first 
 obtaining the consent of the owners 
 of lots thereon, or without making 
 just compensation to them for any 
 damage which may result to their 
 property, corporeal and incorporeal, 
 from such occlusion, discontinuance, 
 or new application of the street. 
 The commonwealth, with all her 
 sovereign right of eminent domain, 
 can not take away private property, 
 even for the most imperious or im- 
 portant public use, without either 
 the owner's consent, or the pay- 
 ment to him of a just equivalent in 
 money." It was held however that 
 a steam railroad was not an Im- 
 proper use of the street, and an 
 
 injunction against its operation at 
 the suit of an abutting owner was 
 denied. Elizabeth, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Combs, 10 Bush (Ky.) 382, 19 
 Am. Rep. 67, decided in 1874, was a 
 case of a railroad constructed in a 
 street, the fee of which was in the 
 abutters. The court however said, 
 " It being conceded that the owners 
 of adjacent lots have a peculiar pri- 
 vate right in the street which is ap- 
 purtenant to their lots, and is as 
 much property as the lots them- 
 selves, we cannot escape the con- 
 clusion that there may be such an 
 appropriation of the street as will 
 give the lot-owner a private right 
 of action against those who so ap- 
 propriate It as to exclude him from 
 its reasonable use, although such 
 appropriation may be expressly au- 
 thorized by the terms of legislative 
 and municipal grants. The private 
 right of the lot-owner in the adja- 
 cent street being conceded to be 
 property, such appropriation or ob- 
 struction of the street as deprives 
 him of its reasonable use deprives 
 him to that extent of his property, 
 and no reason is perceived why this 
 species of property can be taken 
 without just compensation rather 
 than any other." In Crawford v. 
 Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459, decided in 
 1857, the court said, "The latter 
 (lot owners) have a peculiar in- 
 terest in the street, which neither 
 the local nor the general public can 
 pretend to claim ; a private right of 
 the nature of an incorporeal here- 
 ditament legally attached to their 
 contiguous grounds and the erec- 
 tions thereon ; an incidental title to 
 certain facilities and franchises as- 
 sured to them by contracts and by 
 law, and without which their prop- 
 erty would be comparatively of 
 little value. The easement ap- 
 pendant to the lots, unlike any right 
 of one lot owner in the lot of an- 
 other, is as much property as the 
 lot Itself." In Cincinnati, etc.. Street 
 Railway Co. v. Cummlnsvllle, 14 
 
494 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 160 
 
 The fee of the canal was in the canal company and the 
 company authorized the defendant to erect a building over 
 the canal which would cut off the plaintiff's land completely 
 from light, air and access. The court held that in every 
 public highway, subordinate only to the public right of pas- 
 sage, is the private right of the adjoining owner to light and 
 air. It was said that this right is essential to the existence 
 of dense communities and is founded on urgent necessity, 
 and the construction of the building was consequently 
 enjoined.®" This decision was not, however, a surprising 
 one, for in New Jersey a right to light and air over private 
 land can be gained by prescription or by implication from 
 the grant of a house with windows overlooking other land 
 of the grantor,®^ and it was only a step to extend this right 
 to public highways. Elsewhere in the United States an 
 
 Ohio St. 524, decided In 1863, the 
 court said, " That abutting lot- 
 owners have a peculiar interest in 
 the street, which neither the local 
 nor the general public can pretend 
 to claim; a private right of the 
 nature of an incorporeal heredita- 
 ment, legally attached to their con- 
 tiguous grounds, and the erections 
 thereon ; an incidental title to certain 
 facilities and franchises, assured 
 to them by contracts and by law, 
 and without which their property 
 would be of little value. This ease- 
 ment, appendant to the lots, unlike 
 any right of one lot-owner In the 
 lot of another, is as much property 
 as the lot itself." In Scioto Valley 
 Ry. Co. V. Lawrence, 38 Ohio St. 41, 
 43 Am. Rep. 419, ' decided in 1882 
 prior to the decision of the Story 
 case, the preceding case was ap- 
 proved, the court adding, " It seems 
 to us it can make no material dif- 
 ference where the fee is vested, so 
 long as it is held to the same de- 
 fined uses." In Burlington, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Reinhackle, 15 Neb. 279, 
 48 Am. Rep. 342, it was held that 
 an abutting owner might recover 
 damages for the duly authorized lo- 
 cation of a steam railroad in the 
 street in front of his premises, al- 
 though the fee of the street was in 
 the city, the court saying, " The fee 
 of streets is in the public, but it is 
 
 held in trust for public use. The 
 municipal corporation cannot sell or 
 permanently obstruct the streets 
 without compensation to the own- 
 ers of property specially injured 
 thereby. The trust, like any other, 
 must be exercised in good faith. It 
 was created to give permanency to 
 streets and apply them wholly to 
 the use of the public. But in addi- 
 tion to the public benefit, every lot 
 owner whose lots abut on a street 
 has a special interest therein dis- 
 tinct from the public at large. Un- 
 less the owner can have free and 
 unobstructed access to his property 
 it will be of but little value. * * * 
 We therefore hold that municipal 
 authorities have no power to grant 
 authority to permanently obstruct a 
 street unless compensation be made 
 to lot owners abutting thereon who 
 suffer special damages by such ob- 
 struction." This case was decided 
 in 1883, several months after the 
 decision in the Story case had been 
 rendered, but that decision was not 
 cited by counsel and apparently 
 was not brought to the attention 
 of the court, as it is not referred to 
 in the decision. 
 
 90. Barnett v. Johnson, 15 N. J. 
 Eq. 481. 
 
 91. Robeson v. Pittlnger, 2 N. J. 
 Eq. 57, 32 Am. Dec. 412. 
 
§ 160 Extent of Intebest Taken foe Public Use. 495 
 
 easement of light and air over private land can be acquired 
 only by express grant,®^ and the New Jersey decision was 
 thus based on premises inapplicable to the other states. 
 
 In New York, in 1882, the leading case of Story v. New 
 York Elevated Railroad Company, ^^ was decided, involving 
 
 92. Alabama. — Ward v. Neal, 37 
 Ala. 500. 
 
 Iowa. — Morrison v. Marquadt, 24 
 Iowa 35, 92 Am. Dec. 444. 
 
 Maine. — Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 
 436, 46 Am. Dec. 573. 
 
 Maryland.— CheiTs v. Stein, 11 
 Md. 1." 
 
 Massachusetts. — Rogers v. Sawln, 
 10 Gray 376; Keats v. Hugo, 115 
 Mass. 204. 
 
 New York. — Myers v. Gammel, 10 
 Barb. 537; Palmer v. Wetmore, 2 
 Sandf. 316; Parker v. Foote, 19 
 Wend. 309. 
 
 Ohio. — Mullin v. Strickler, 19 
 Ohio St. 135, 2 Am. Rep. 379. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Haverstick v. Sipe, 
 33 Pa. 368. 
 
 Vermont. — Hubbard v. Town, 33 
 Vt. 295. 
 
 93. 90 N. T. 112, 43 Am. Rep. 
 146. This was an action to re- 
 strain the defendant from con- 
 structing an elevated railroad in a 
 street upon which plaintiff's prem- 
 ises abutted. The construction of 
 the railroad was authorized by a 
 statute which made no provision for 
 compensation. The opinion of the 
 court, delivered by Tracy, J., was in 
 part as follows : " The principal 
 question to be determined in this 
 case is, has the plaintiff's property 
 been taken for public use within the 
 meaning of the constitution of this 
 state? The plaintiff contends that 
 by the true construction of the 
 deeds from the city to his original 
 grantors the bed of Front (then 
 Water) Street was included in the 
 grant, and that he is now the 
 owner of one-half of the bed of 
 Front Street in front of his lots. 
 But if this claim be not sustained, 
 then he Insists that, in the original 
 grants of the premises in question, 
 the city of New York covenanted 
 with his grantors that Front Street 
 should be and remain an open street 
 
 forever. That this covenant, being 
 for the benefit of the abutting lands, 
 is one running with the land, and 
 the right or privilege secured 
 thereby constitutes property within 
 the meaning of article 1, section 6, 
 of the constitution which provides 
 that ''private property shall not be 
 taken for public use without just 
 compensation.' The defendant in- 
 sists, and the trial court found, 
 that, by the true construction of 
 the deed, the bed of Front Street 
 was excepted therefrom, and never 
 passed to the plaintiff's original 
 grantors. * * * Assuming the 
 construction placed upon the grant 
 by the court below to be correct, 
 we have to consider the effect of 
 such a covenant in a grant of land 
 made by a municipal corporation 
 having authority to lay out and 
 open streets, and to acquire lands 
 for that purpose. * * *' By the 
 law of this state as interpreted and 
 held by its highest courts for the 
 last fifty years, without criticism or 
 doubt, the grantees of the city by 
 force of their grant acquired the 
 right to have Front Street kept 
 forever as a public street. The 
 street thus became what is known 
 to the law as the servient tene- 
 ment, and the lots abutting thereon 
 the dominant tenement. Such servi- 
 tude constitutes a private easement 
 in the bed of the street attached to 
 the lots abutting thereon, and 
 passed to the plaintiff as the owner 
 of such lots. That an easement Is 
 property cannot be doubted. * * * 
 The next question to be considered 
 Is, has the plaintiff's property been 
 taken by the defendant within the 
 meaning of the constitution of this 
 state? To constitute such a taking 
 It is sufficient that the person 
 claiming compensation has some 
 right or privilege, secured by grant. 
 In the property appropriated to the 
 
496 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 160 
 
 the rights of an abutting owner upon a street in which the 
 city held the fee, but which the city had covenanted should 
 forever remain open, and upon which an elevated railroad 
 was nevertheless being constructed. This covenant was 
 contained in the deeds from the city, which had formerly 
 owned the land, to the individuals through whom the plain- 
 tiff claimed title. It was held that the covenant was for 
 the benefit of the abutting land and ran with it, and that the 
 construction of the railroad was a breach of the covenant. 
 The right created by the covenant was, it was held, in the 
 
 PTiblic use, which right or privilege 
 is destroyed, injured or abridged by 
 such appropriation. Has the plain- 
 tiff's easement In Front Street been 
 destroyed, or injured, by the appro- 
 priation of the street to the uses 
 of the defendant's road? As we 
 have seen, the plaintiff acquired 
 nothing more than a right to have 
 the street kept as a public street, 
 and this must be deemed to be held 
 subject to the power of the legis- 
 lature to regulate and control the 
 public uses of the street. This 
 brings us to the question whether 
 the occupation of the street by the 
 defendant's road is compatible with, 
 or destructive of its use as a public 
 street. * * * The court below 
 found that the series of iron col- 
 umns abridges the street, and the 
 superstructure erected thereon ob- 
 scures the light to the adjoining 
 premises, and depreciates the value 
 of the plaintiff's property. The ex- 
 tent to which plaintiff's property is 
 appropriated is not material ; it 
 cannot, nor can any part of it, be 
 appropriated to the public use with- 
 out compensation. We think such 
 a structure closes the street pro 
 tanto and thus directly invades the 
 plaintiff's easement in the street 
 as secured by the grant of the city. 
 * * * We have reached in this 
 case the following conclusions: 
 
 "First.— That the plaintiff, by 
 force of the grant of the city, made 
 to his grantors, has a right or privi- 
 lege in Front Street, which entitled 
 him to have the same kept open and 
 continued as a public street for the 
 benefit of his abutting property. 
 
 " Second. — That this right or 
 privilege constitutes an easement, in 
 the bed of the street, which attaches 
 to the abutting property of the 
 plaintiff, and constitutes private 
 property, within the meaning of the 
 constitution, of which he cannot be 
 deprived without compensation. 
 
 " Third.— That such a structure 
 as the court found the defendant 
 was about to erect in Front Street, 
 and which it has since erected, is 
 inconsistent with the use of Front 
 Street as a public street. 
 
 "Fourth. — That the plaintiff's 
 property has been taken and appro- 
 priated by the defendant for public 
 use without compensation being 
 made therefor. 
 
 " Fifth.— That the defendant's 
 acts are unlawful, and as the struc- 
 ture is permanent in its character 
 — and, if suffered to continue, will 
 inflict a permanent and continuing 
 injury upon the plaintiff — he has 
 the right to restrain the erection 
 and continuance of the road by in- 
 junction. 
 
 " Sixth. — That the statutes under 
 which the defendant is organized 
 authorize it to acquire such prop- 
 erty as may be necessary for its 
 construction and operation by the 
 exercise of the right of eminent 
 domain. 
 
 " Seventh. — The injunction pro- 
 hibiting the continuance of the road 
 in Front Street should not be issued 
 until the defendant has had a rea- 
 sonable time after this decision to 
 acquire the plaintiff's property by 
 agreement, or by proceedings to con- 
 demn the same." 
 
§ 160 Extent op Inteeest Taken foe Public Use. 497 
 
 nature of an easement over the street and could not be taken 
 without compensation. The court further added, 
 
 " we are of opinion that in cases where the public has 
 taken the fee, but in trust to be used as a public street, 
 no structure upon the street can be authorized that is 
 inconsistent with the continued use of the same as an 
 open public street. ' ' 
 
 In a series of hotly contested cases, the dictum in the 
 Story case was followed by the court, and became estab- 
 lished law in New York, and the abutting owner was allowed 
 compensation in all cases where an elevated railroad was 
 built in the street, no matter what the state of the title, or 
 how the public had acquired the fee.®* 
 
 The doctrine has been taken up elsewhere very exten- 
 sively, so that it is now held very generally throughout the 
 United States that, however a street may have been orig- 
 inally laid out, if the public has taken the fee, there have 
 attached automatically to the abutting lands easements of 
 access, light and air from the street, which are taken in the 
 constitutional sense by the use of the street in a manner 
 not constituting a proper exercise of the highway ease- 
 ment and interfering with such access, light and air.®^ It is 
 
 94. Infra, § 179. 93 Md. 537, 49 Atl. 629, 52 L. E. A. 
 
 95. United States. — Muhlker v. 409, 86 Am. St. Kep. 441 ; Walters v. 
 New York, etc., K. B. Co., 197 U. S. Baltimore, etc., E. E. Co., 120 Md. 
 544, 49 L. ed. 872. 644, 88 Atl. 47. 
 
 California. — Williams v. Los An- Michigan.' — Grand Eapids, etc., 
 
 geles Ry. Co., 150 Cal. 592, 89 Pac. Eailroad Co. v. Heisel, 38 Mich. 62, 
 
 330, 5 St. Ry. Rep. 42. 31 Am. Rep. 306. 
 
 Florida. — Selden v. Jacksonville, Minnesota. — Brakken v. Minne- 
 
 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457, 29 Am. St. apolis, etc., R. R. Co., 29 Minn. 41, 
 
 Eep. 278. 11 N. W. 124; Adams v. Chicago, 
 
 Indiana. — Decker v. Evansville etc., Eailroad Co., 39 Minn. 286, 39 
 
 Suburban, etc., E. B. Co., 133 Ind. N. W. 629, 1 L. E. A. 493, 12 Am. 
 
 493, 33 N. E. 349 ; Haslett v. New St. Eep. 644 ; Lamm v. Chicago, etc., 
 
 Albany Belt & Terminal Ry. Co., 7 Railroad Co., 45 Minn. 71, 47 N. W. 
 
 Ind. App. 603, 34 N. E. 845. 455, 10 L. R. A. 268. 
 
 Kentucky. — Fulton v. Short Route Mississippi. — Theobold v. Louis- 
 
 E. R. Transfer Co., 85 Ky. 640, 4 ville, etc., E. E. Co., 66 Miss. 279, 6 
 
 S. W. 332, 7 Am. St. Eep. 619 ; Stein So. 230, 4 L. E. A. 735, 14 Am. St. 
 
 V. Chesapeake, etc., E. R. Co., 132 Eep. 564; Hazlehurst v. Mayes, 84 
 
 Ky. 322, 116 S. W. 733. Miss. 7, 36 So. 33, 64 L. R. A. 805. 
 
 Louisiana. — Hepting y. New Or- Missouri. — Gaus & Sons Manufac- 
 
 leans, etc., R. R. Co., 36 La. Ann. turing Co. v. St. Louis, etc., E. R. 
 
 898. Co., 113 Mo. 308, 20 S. W. 658, 18 
 
 Maryland. — Townsend v. Epstein, L. R. A. 839, 35 Am. St. Eep. 706; 
 
 32 
 
498 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 160 
 
 argued that when an individual cuts up and offers for sale 
 a large parcel of land, with roads and lots marked out on a 
 plan, he impliedly covenants with purchasers of the lots 
 that the roads will forever remain open,®' and that, sim- 
 ilarly, when a city takes lands for streets, as the benefit to 
 the remaining land from the existence of the street is con- 
 sidered in the assessment of damages, in the purchase price, 
 or in the absence of price, if the land is dedicated, the city 
 impliedly covenants that the land will always be kept open 
 as a public street. Otherwise it is said the landowner gets 
 no clear title to what he pays for. There seem, however, 
 to be some gaps in this reasoning, for the city often did not 
 sell the land to the original holder or at any rate did not 
 sell it to him after the streets were marked out, and more- 
 over, the city usually pays the full market value of the 
 land when it takes the fee. The amount that the owner may 
 lose, either as a deduction for benefits in his compensation 
 
 Sherlock v. Kansas City Belt KaU- 
 way Co., 142 Mo. 172, 53 S. W. 629, 
 64 Am. St. Kep. 551 ; De Geof roy v. 
 Merchants' Bridge, etc., Railway. 
 Co., 179 Mo. 698, 79 S. W. 386, 64 
 L. R. A. 959, 101 Am. St. Rep. 524; 
 Rourke v. Holmes St. Ry. Co., 221 
 Mo. 46, 119 S. W. 1094; Gorman v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 255 Mo. 483, 
 164 S. W. 509. 
 
 New York. — Abendroth v. Man- 
 hattan Railway Co., 122 N. Y. 1, 25 
 N. E. 496, 11 L. R. A. 634, 19 Am. 
 St. Rep. 461; Kane v. New York 
 Elevated Railroad Co., 125 N. Y. 
 164, 26 N. E. 278, 11 L. R. A. 640; 
 Reining v. New York, etc.. Railroad 
 Co., 128 N. Y. 157, 28 N. E. 640, 14 
 L. R. A. 133 ; Sweet Mfg. Co. v. Van 
 Der Hoof, 137 App. Div. 492, 121 
 N. Y. Supp. 842. 
 
 North Carolina. — Moose v. Car- 
 son, 104 N. C. 431, 10 S. E. 689, 7 
 L. R. A. 548, 17 Am. St. Rep. 681; 
 White V. Northwestern North Caro- 
 lina Railroad, 113 N. C. 610, 18 S. E. 
 330, 22 L. R. A. 627, 37 Am. St. Rep. 
 639; Staton v. Atlantic Coast Line 
 R. R. Co., 147 N. C. 428, 61 S. E. 
 455, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 949. 
 
 Ohio.— Scioto Valley R. R. Co. v. 
 Lawrence, 38 Ohio St. 41, 43 Am. 
 
 Rep. 419 ; Callem v. Columbus Elec- 
 tric Light Co., 66 Ohio St. 166, 64 
 N. E. 141, 58 L. R. A. 782. ■ 
 
 Oregon. — Willamette Iron Works 
 V. Oregon Railway & Navigation 
 Co., 26 Ore. 224, 37 Pac. 1016, 29 
 L. R. A. 88, 46 Am. St. Rep. 620; 
 Tooze V. Willamette Valley St. Ry. 
 Co., 150 Pac. 252. 
 
 Utah.— Dooly Block v. Salt Lake 
 Rapid Transit Cp., 9 Utah 31, 33 
 Pac. 229, 24 L. R. A. 610. 
 
 Washington. — Brazell v. Seattle, 
 55 Wash. 180, 104 Pac. 155. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Hobart v. Milwaukee 
 City R. R. Co., 27 Wis. 194, 9 Am. 
 Rep. 461. 
 
 See also infra, §§ 167, 175, 180, 
 186, 187. 
 
 96. See for example Onset St. Ry. 
 Co. V. County Commissioners, 154 
 Mass. 395, 28 N. E. 286. A corpora- 
 tion laid out a summer resort with 
 streets and lots, and sold the lots 
 with reference to the plan. The 
 railway company then bought of the 
 corporation the privilege of con- 
 structing a dummy steam railway in 
 one of the streets. It was held an 
 actionable injury to the abutters' 
 easements in the streets, even if 
 the fee was in the corporation. 
 
§ 160 Extent of Inteeest Taken fob Public Use. 499 
 
 or as a special assessment, is payment for the enhanced 
 value of the land from the construction of the street and 
 the probability that it will remain. It is the prevailing rule 
 that it is no objection to the validity of a special assessment 
 that the cause of the benefit may cease to exist.®'' 
 
 It has been suggested that while it is conceivable that a 
 municipality might have an absolute fee in a street, and so 
 would have the same rights as a private owner to use its 
 land in any reasonable way that it found desirable, yet it 
 ordinarily holds the fee of a highway in trust to be used 
 for highway purposes.®* This may be true, but it is in 
 trust for the public that it is held, and not for the abutting 
 owners. If a trust is abused, the remedy is in the cestm 
 que trust, not in the vendor of the trust property. If a 
 highway is used unlawfully, the public has its remedy by 
 indictment, but if the local and the general public join in 
 licensing, by their representatives, the city government 
 and the state legislature respectively, a breach of the tru^t, 
 it is hard to see how there is any remedy, or in fact, any 
 wrong.'® It may further be added that, under the decisions 
 in many of the states, it appears that the relative rights of 
 the abutter and the public are exactly the same, whichever 
 owns the fee.' If that is so, what meaning or sense is there 
 
 97. Supra, § 116. Hittinger Fruit Co. v. Cambridge, 
 
 98. Theobald v. Louisville, etc., 218 Mass. 220, 105 N. E. 868, are 
 Ky. Co., 66 Miss. 279, 6 So. 230, 4 clearly distinguishable from those 
 L. R. A. 735, 15 Am. St. Rep. 564. now under consideration. 
 
 "If the fee is in the public it is 1. This is not the case in New 
 
 held in trust, expressly or im- York, but it appears to be in some 
 
 pliedly, that the land shall be used of the other states that have 
 
 as a street and it cannot be applied adopted the doctrine of the Story 
 
 to any other purpose without a case. See for example Callen v. 
 
 breach of trust. It is only when Columbus Edison El. Light Co., 66 
 
 the fee is in the public, free Ohio St. 166, 64 iV. B. 141, 58 
 
 from any trust or duty, that it may L. R. A. 782. But in Ohio it is 
 
 be disposed of for any purpose that held that the fee is qualified or 
 
 the public may deem proper." determinable when the street is not 
 
 99. Prince v. Crocker, 166 Mass. used for street purposes. See also 
 347, 44 N. E. 446, 32 L. R. A. 610. Hazlehurst v. Mayes, 84 Miss. 7, 36 
 Cases in which the municipality So. 33, 64 L. R. A. 805 ; De Geofroy 
 had no power to acquire the land in v. Merchants' Bridge, etc., Ry. Co., 
 question except for specified pur- 179 Mo. 698, 79 S. W. 386, 64 
 poses, but took a conveyance in fee L. R. A. 959, 101 Am. St. Rep. 524; 
 and attempted, without legislative Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid 
 sanction, to exercise the rights of Transit Co., 9 Utah 31, 33 Pac. 229, 
 an owner in fee to the detriment 24 L. R. A. 610. See also mfra, 
 of adjoining land-owners, such as §§ 167, 171. 
 
500 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 160 
 
 in the statutes providing for the taking of the fee by the 
 munieipality, and how can a strip of land be taken for the 
 purpose of being used as the public may, from time to time, 
 desire? A fee simple is the highest estate known to the 
 common law. 
 
 The real explanation and the only justification for. the 
 establishment of the doctrine of the abutters' easements 
 that is even plausible is that it was an attempt by the courts 
 to prevent injustice in the application of the law. As the 
 owner of the land usually receives full market value when 
 the highway easement is created,^ his right to compensation 
 for an additional servitude rests on a bare and technical 
 title, and the courts sought to avoid an inequitable distinc- 
 tion against the abutter whose legal claim was lacking.* 
 It was a point upon which there were few precedents among 
 
 2. Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 164 
 Mass. 1, 41 N. E. 112. "As practi- 
 cally the landowners get the full 
 market value of the land in such 
 cases, if there is any injustice it is 
 not they who suffer it" See also 
 Southern Pac. R. E. Co. v. San 
 Francisco Savings Union, 146 Cal. 
 290, 79 Pac. 961, 70 L. K. A. 221, 
 106 Am. St. Kep. 36, and mfra, 
 § 225. 
 
 3. Donahue v. Keystone Gas Co., 
 181 N. T. 313, 73 N. E. 1108, 70 
 L. R. A. 761, 106 Am. St. Rep. 549. 
 " If the plaintiff had owned to the 
 center of the highway his right to 
 recover damages would be beyond 
 question ; yet the difference between 
 such an action and the one before 
 us is theoretical rather than prac- 
 tical, because as long as the street 
 is kept open, which is the invari- 
 able rule in cities and the general 
 rule elsewhere, the abutting owner 
 has substantially the same benefit 
 in either case. * * * Is it better 
 to limit the recovery to cases 
 founded upon a mere technicality, 
 or to extend it to all where sub- 
 stantial injury Is inflicted upon the 
 abutting owner by the act of the 
 wrongdoer in a public street?" 
 Spencer v. Point Pleasant, etc., R. 
 R. Co., 23 W. Va. 406. " The gross 
 Injustice of holding that the owner 
 
 of an adjoining lot, because he did 
 not own the fee, could obtain no 
 compensation, though his property 
 should be almost ruined by the 
 construction of a railroad in the 
 etreet with the consent of the town 
 council, immediately in front of 
 his house, and cutting a deep cut 
 there or throwing up a high em- 
 bankment, while one who happened 
 to own this valueless fee was en- 
 titled to full compensation, though 
 the railroad inflicted on him but 
 very slight Injury, made certain 
 courts astute to bring within the 
 provision of the constitution re- 
 quiring compensation to be paid 
 when private property was taken 
 for public use, the case where the 
 railroad was In a street the fee of 
 which was not in the owner of an 
 adjoining lot. This was done by 
 holding that the owners of lots 
 have a peculiar interest in the 
 adjacent street, which neither the 
 local nor the general public can pre- 
 tend to claim; a private right in 
 the nature of an Incorporated 
 hereditament attached to the con- 
 tiguous ground; an incidental title 
 to certain facilities and franchises 
 secured to them by contract and by 
 law, and which are as much prop- 
 erty as the lots themselves, and are 
 therefore as inviolable as the lots 
 
§ 160 ExTES"! OF Interest Taken foe Public Use. 501 
 
 the older authorities, as most of the additional servitudes 
 are modern inventions, but it should be noted that this ease- 
 ment of access was not recognized in the cases which held 
 that a way might be discontinued without compensation to 
 the abutters* or in the earlier decisions with respect to 
 steam railroads in public streets.^ It would seem that the 
 courts which invented the doctrine that these easements of 
 access, light and air were superior to the rights of the 
 public, so as to hold unconstitutional statutes authorizing 
 certain uses of the streets without compensation, allowed 
 considerations more proper to be weighed by the legislative 
 than the judicial branch of the government to affect their 
 judgment, and violated a fundamental rule of constitutional 
 law by going to the extreme limits of reasoning to restrict 
 the power of the legislature. Hard cases proverbially 
 make bad law,- and the attempt to do substantial justice 
 without regard to well-established principles tends to result 
 in chaos. Especially is this the case when the court con- 
 siders only the parties before it and disregards the ultimate 
 effect of its decision. To award an individual whose dwell- 
 ing house has been half ruined by the construction of an 
 elevated railroad in front of it full compensation from the 
 corapany may seem a just, as well as a popular, thing to do, 
 but when the inevitable effect of such a decision is to create 
 private rights in the public domain, and thus give away 
 millions of dollars ' worth of public property, it would seem 
 that the courts ought to hesitate. Would it not have been 
 better for the court, in the Story ease, to have hewed to the 
 line, and to have let the legislature remedy the injustice, or 
 if the legislature failed in its duty, to have left it to the 
 
 themselves. That such a steam for the injury done to their adjoin- 
 
 railroad, with the consent of the ing house or lot, just as the owner 
 
 town council given by authority of of the lot was entitled to compen- 
 
 law, took this property, this incor- sation for the taking of his fee in 
 
 poreal hereditament, and that there- the street and the injury to his 
 
 fore under the constitution forbid- adjoining house and lot. It is true 
 
 ding private property to be taken that this rather fanciful incorpo- 
 
 without just compensation, these real hereditament was almost 
 
 owners of adjoining lots, though valueless, but so, too, was the fee 
 
 they did not own the fee in the in the street." 
 
 street, were entitled to just com- 4. Supra, § 116. 
 
 pensation for this taking of this 6. Infra, § 167. 
 incorporeal hereditaments as well as 
 
502 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 160 
 
 people, rather than to have assumed an authority which 
 did not properly belong to it? 
 
 While the jurisdictions which have accepted the doctrine 
 of abutters' easements do not constitute a majority of the 
 states, there are few courts in which the question has been 
 raised that have rejected the doctrine.® In most of the 
 states the question has never arisen, either because there 
 are no highways which are owned in fee by the public, or 
 because the legislature has not allowed the use of the high- 
 ways that are owned by the public for other than highway 
 purposes, or because by constitutional provision, as in 
 Illinois and Pennsylvania, or by statute, as in Massachu- 
 setts, the abutting owners were entitled to compensation for 
 all special and peculiar damage, and it was not necessary to 
 conjure up any artificial doctrine of abutters ' easements to 
 establish the right of the abutting owner who did not own 
 
 6. In Spencer v. Point Pleasant, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 23 W. Va. 406, it 
 was said by the court, through 
 Green, J. : " In the first place it 
 Is very difficult to tell what is 
 meant by ' this peculiar interest of 
 the lot owner who owns no fee in 
 the land in the street, which neither 
 the local nor the general public can 
 pretend to claim.' It certainly 
 does not refer to the fact that this 
 lot owner uses this part of the 
 street oftener and to a greater 
 extent than the general public. For 
 any member of the general public 
 has a right to use this portion of 
 the street just as often and as much 
 as he pleases; just as often and as 
 much as this owner of the adjoin- 
 ing lot. The only peculiar interest 
 of such lot owner in such street 
 that the most ingenious have been 
 able to suggest, so far as I know, 
 is that they have a right to have 
 this street kept perpetually open, 
 while one of the general public 
 could not prevent the town council 
 from closing it if they pleased. 
 Let this be admitted, how does the 
 location of a railroad in the middle 
 of this street take away or affect 
 the right to have the street kept 
 perpetually open How does the 
 appropriation of a certain portion 
 
 of the street to be used by a rail- 
 road as a general passage for the 
 general public over a certain part 
 of this street prevent the street 
 from being kept open as a street? 
 If, then, this right to have the 
 street kept open perpetually is an 
 exclusive right and can be regarded 
 as an incorporeal hereditament as 
 private property within the mean- 
 ing of the constitution, I cannot see 
 how the railroad company has 
 taken this private property. It has 
 not acquired and the original owner 
 has not lost it. It may be that 
 another and a very different thing 
 — his habitual use of this street, 
 which certainly is not private prop- 
 erty — may be injuriously affected, 
 but such injury by a railroad prop- 
 erly constructed by leave of the 
 legislature in this state is, as we 
 have seen, damnum absque injuria." 
 In Home for Aged Women v. Com- 
 monwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 89 N. E. 
 124, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 79, a case 
 involving the deprivation of access 
 to navigable waters, Knowlton, 
 C. J., In delivering the opinion of 
 the court clearly showed the fallacy 
 of the doctrine by which the pro- 
 pinquity to public works was 
 treated as a property right. 
 
§ 161 Extent of Intebest Taken fob Public Use. 503 
 
 the fee of the highway to participate in the compensation 
 when an elevated railway or a steam railroad was con- 
 structed in front of his premises. In states of this latter 
 class the doctrine will probably never be adopted; but in 
 states in which there is no statutory or constitutional pro- 
 vision for compensation, it is safe to say that there are few 
 courts that will have the courage to sustain the rights of 
 the impersonal public as against the insistent claims of the 
 injured property owners when the question arises. 
 
 The existence of abutters' easements in a highway does 
 not rest on a peculiar interpretation of the constitution, 
 but depends on a local rule of real property, defining the 
 state of the title in a public highway. While one cannot well 
 quarrel with the highest court of a state in the interpreta- 
 tion of its own land law, even if it decides that when a pri- 
 vate owner buys the fee of land he gets it unincumbered, 
 but when a municipality does the same thing, the adjoining 
 OAvriers acquire easements in the land which the municipal- 
 ity buys, the court should thoroughly realize that its action 
 in such a case is irrevocable; that when the judgment is 
 rendered the public domain has been given away. When 
 it has been decided that private easements exist over the 
 public domain and titles have been passed on faith of such 
 decisions, the rule cannot be changed without impairing the 
 obligation of contracts in violation of the United States 
 Constitution.'^ 
 
 § 161. Nature and Extent of the Abutters' Easements. 
 
 The abutters' easements, when recognized by the sub- 
 stantive law of the state, follow the fee of the land to which 
 they are appurtenant as the shadow follows the substance 
 and cannot be separated therefrom.* The easements differ 
 in the different states, and even in the same state have a 
 tendency to expand as different forms of injury to adjoining 
 land by the use of the street come before the courts. 
 
 In New York, the state in which the doctrine of abutters' 
 easements originated, it was at first held that the ease- 
 ments were confined to the rights of access, light and air 
 
 7. Muhlker v. New York, etc., R. 8. Foote t. Metropolitan Elevated 
 
 R. Co., 197 U. S. 544, 49 L. ed. 872. Ry. Co., 147 N. T. 367, 42 N. E. 181. 
 
504 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 161 
 
 from the street, and that such injuries to the market value 
 of abutting property as might arise from noise or from the 
 loss of privacy, by the use of a highway for other than 
 street purposes, which would be proper elements of damage 
 in case the fee was in the abutting owner, could not be con- 
 sidered when the fee was in the public.^ It was later held 
 that the easement of the abutter is not limited to light, air 
 and access, but includes all the advantages which spring 
 from the situation of the abutter's land upon the open space 
 of the street,^" and finally that it includes the right of lateral 
 support from the street." The relative rights of the public 
 and the abutting owner when the public owns the fee are 
 thus much the same in New York as they are in other parts 
 of the country when the fee is in the abutter; but in New 
 York the abutter who owns the fee has greater rights in 
 respect to the use of the highway by the public than he has 
 in the other states, so that the ownership of the fee by the 
 abutter is of substantial value,^^ and gives him the right to 
 compensation when the street is used for purposes which 
 are not within the highway easement, and which he does not 
 have when the fee is in the public — when for example an 
 electric street railway is maintained in the street,^* or any 
 other form of additional servitude which although injurious 
 to abutting property does not deprive the owner of access 
 or of lateral support or permanently occupy the space 
 above the surface of the street. Then further it is to be 
 remembered that the owner of the fee is entitled to at least 
 nominal damages for a technical infraction of his rights, 
 while the abutters' easements are not taken in the consti- 
 tutional sense unless actual damage is shown.^* 
 
 In California it has been held that an abutter has, in 
 addition to the easements of access, light and air, the right 
 
 9. Fobes V. Rome, etc., R. R. Co., 11. In re Rapid Transit Railroad 
 121 N. Y. 505, 24 N. E. 919, 8 Commissioners, 197 N. Y. 81, 90 
 L. R. A. 453; BischofE v. New York N. E. 456, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 647, 
 Elevated Ry. Co., 138 N. Y. 257, 33 18 Ann. Cas. 366. 
 
 N. E. 1073; Matter of Brooklyn 12. Bupra, § 121. 
 
 Union Elevated R. R. Co., 113 App. J3. Infra, § 171. 
 
 Div. (N. Y.) 817, 99 N. Y. Supp. 14. O'Reilly v. New York Ele- 
 
 222, 6 St. Ry. Rep. 761. vated Ry. Co., 148 N. Y. 347, 42 
 
 10. Donahue v. Keystone Gas Co., N. E. 1063, 31 L. R. A. 407. 
 181 N. Y. 313, 73 N. E. 1108, 70 
 
 li. R. A. 761, 106 Am. St. Rep. 549. 
 
§ 161 ExTEKT OF Inteeest Taken eob Public Use. 505 
 
 to have the street kept open so that goods in his windows 
 may be seen.^® 
 
 In Tennessee, on the other hand, it is held that the right 
 of ingress and egress is the only private property right in 
 the street which an abutter not owning the fee of the street 
 enjoys.*^ 
 
 In some of the other states which recognize the abutters' 
 easements there seems to be little if any difference in the 
 relative rights of the abutters and the public however the 
 title to the fee may stand, and any use of the street which 
 is not within the highway easement and which would con- 
 stitute an additional servitude if the fee were in the abutters 
 is looked upon as a taking of the abutters ' easements/^ 
 
 It almost goes without saying that the doctrine of abut- 
 ters' easements does not give to the abutter who does not 
 own the fee greater rights than are held by one who does, 
 and it consequently follows that the abutters' easements 
 are subordinate to the paramount right of the public to use 
 and improve the streets for street purposes. Any use of a 
 street in which the public has the fee that would be con- 
 sidered a lawful exercise of the highway easement if the 
 abutters owned the fee is not a taking of the abutters ' ease- 
 ments, even if it utterly destroys them.^* In one respect 
 however the adoption of the doctrine of abutters' ease- 
 ments has enlarged the rights of the abutter, regardless 
 of his ownership of the fee, over the rights of the abutter 
 who owns the fee in the states in which the doctrine has 
 
 15. Wailams v. Los Angeles Ky, Ry. Co., 142 Mo. 172, 43 S. W. 629, 
 Co., 150 Cal. 592, 89 Pac. 330, 5 St. 64 Am. St. Rep. 551. 
 
 Ry. Rep. 42. North Carolina. — White v. North- 
 
 16. Smith V. East End St. Ry. western North Carolina R. R. Co., 
 Co., 87 Tenn. 626, 11 S. W. 709. 113 N. 0. 610, 18 S. E. 330, 22 
 
 17. Minnesota. — Adams v. Chi- L. R. A. 627, 37 Am. St. Rep. 639. 
 eago, etc., R. R. Co., 39 Minn. 286, Ohio. — Scioto Valley Railroad 
 39 N. W. 629, 1 L. R. A. 493, 12 Co. v. Lawrence, 38 Ohio St. 41, 43 
 Am. St. Rep. 644. Am. Rep. 419; Callen v. Columbus 
 
 Mississippi. — Theobold v. Louis- Electric Light Co., 66 Ohio St. 166, 
 
 ville, etc., R. R. Co., 66 Miss. 279, 64 N. E. 141, 58 L. R. A. 782. 
 
 6 So. 230, 4 L. R. A. 735, 14 Am. St. Utah.— Dooly Block v. Salt Lake 
 
 Rep. 564; Hazlehurst v. Mayes, 84 Rapid Transit Co., 9 Utah 31, 33 
 
 Miss. 7, 36 So. 33, 64 L. R. A. 805. Pac. 229, 24 L. R. A. 610. 
 
 Missouri. — Gaus & Sons Manu- 18. Selden v. Jacksonville, 28 
 
 facturing Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. Pla. 558, 10 So. 457, 14 L. R. A. 370, 
 
 B. Co., 113 Mo. 308, 20 S. W. 658, 29 Am. St. Rep. 278; Reining v. 
 
 18 L. R. A. 339, 35 Am. St. Rep. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 128 N. T. 
 
 706; Sherlock v. Kansas City Belt 157, 28 N. E. 640, 14 L. R. A. 133. 
 
506 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 161 
 
 not been accepted. Thus when an abutter's right to com- 
 pensation is based upon the invasion of his fee in the street, 
 as he ordinarily owns only to the middle of the street, he has 
 no redress for a use of the further half of the street how- 
 ever obnoxious and however remotely connected with the 
 primary functions of a highway.^® But the easements of 
 access, light and air, when recognized at all, extend over the 
 whole street, and the abutters on both sides of the street 
 would be entitled to damages ffom the infraction of their 
 easements whether the offending structure was in the center 
 or on the side of the way.*" 
 
 It is almost always the case either that the fee of a street 
 is in the municipality, or that each of the abutting owners 
 owns the fee in front of his land to the center of the way. 
 It sometimes however happens that the fee is in a third 
 party .^^ In such a case, if a use was made of the street 
 which was not within the highway easement, the owner of 
 the fee would be entitled to at least nominal damages for 
 the additional servitude upon the way, and the abutter 
 would also be entitled to damages for the infraction of his 
 easements of access and light, if such easements were recog- 
 nized by the substantive law of the state. 
 
 The doctrine of abutters' easements has been extended, 
 as has been already shown, so as to establish an easement 
 of access to public navigable waters in favor of riparian 
 land.^^ It has not however, as yet at least, been held that 
 a land owner has any private rights in any other class of 
 public property which his land adjoins, and it has several 
 times been held that a land owner has no private right of 
 access to a public park or a public square contiguous to his 
 property.^* 
 
 19. Indiana, etc., R. R. Co. v. 21. Decker v. Evansville Subur- 
 Bberle, 110 Ind. 542, 11 N. B. 467, ban R. R. Co., 133 Ind. 493, 33 
 59 Am. Rep. 225; Stewart v. Ohio N. B. 349. 
 
 River R. R. Co., 38 W. Va. 438, 18 22. Supra, § 140. 
 
 S. E. 604. 23. Kentucky. — Quick v. Park 
 
 20. Adams v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Commissioners, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1457, 
 Co., 39 Minn. 286, 39 N. W. 629, 1 49 S. W. 483. 
 
 L. R. A. 493, 12 Am. St. Rep. 644; Louisiana. — Leftwich v. Plaque- 
 
 Herzog v. Cincinnati, 2 Ohio N. P. mine, 14 La. Ann. 152. 
 
 N. S. 17, 14 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. Michigan. — Abrey v. Park Com- 
 
 529; Brazell v. Seattle, 55 Wash. missioners, 95 Mich! 181, 54 N. W. 
 
 180, 104 Pac. 155. 714. 
 
§ 162 Extent op Intebest Taken for Public Use. 507 
 
 § 162. Change of Grade of a Public Highway. 
 
 When a public highway is established, whether by dedi- 
 cation, by prescription or by the exercise of eminent domain, 
 the public easement thus acquired includes the right to 
 establish the grade in the first place, and to alter it at any 
 future time, as the public necessity and convenience may 
 require ; and consequently the owner of land abutting upon 
 the way, even if he owns the fee of the land within the limits 
 of the way, has no constitutional right to compensation for 
 injury to his premises by reason of the raising or lowering 
 of the grade of the way by the public authorities.** 
 
 Minnesota. — Scranton v. Min- 
 neapolis, 58 Minn. 437, 60 N. W. 26. 
 
 Washington. — Caldwell v. Seat- 
 tle, 75 Wash. 565, 135 Pac. 470, Ann. 
 Cas. 1915 C 176. 
 
 See also supra, § 115, note 78. 
 
 24. United States. — Smith v. 
 Washington, 20 How. 135, 15 L. ed. 
 858 ; Goszler v. Georgetown, 6 
 Wheat. 593, 5 L. ed. 339; Trans- 
 portation Co. V. Chicago, 99 tl. S. 
 635, 25 L. ed. 336 ; Bttor v. Tacoma, 
 228 U. S. 148, 57 L. ed. 773. 
 
 Arkansas. — Simmons v. Camden, 
 26 Ark. 276, 7 Am. Eep. 620. 
 
 California. — Shaw v. Crocker, 42 
 Cal. 435. 
 
 Connecticut. — Hooker v. New 
 Haven Co., 14 Conn. 146, 36 Am. 
 Dec. 477; Fellowes v. New Haven, 
 44 Conn. 240, 26 Am. Rep. 447. 
 
 Florida. — Dorman v. Jacksonville, 
 13 Fla. 538, 7 Am. Kep. 253 ; Selden 
 V. JacksonvUle, 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 
 457, 14 L. E. A. 370, 29 Am. St. Rep. 
 278. 
 
 Georgia. — Markham v. Atlanta, 
 23 Ga. 402; Rome v. Omberg, 28 
 Ga. 46. 
 
 Illinois. — Roberts v. Chicago, 26 
 111. 249; Murphy v. Chicago, 29 111. 
 279, 287; Quincy v. Jones, 76 111. 
 231, 20 Am. Rep. 243 ; Shawneetown 
 V. Mason, 82 111. 337, 25 Am. Rep. 
 321. 
 
 Indiana. — Snyder v. Eockport, 6 
 Ind. 327, 63 Am. Dee. 385; Terre 
 Haute V. Turner, 39 Ind. 522 ; Davis 
 V. Crawfordsville, 119 Ind. 1, 21 
 N. E. 449, 12 Am. St. Rep. 361 ; Mor- 
 ris V. Indianapolis, 177 Ind. 369, 94 
 N. E. 705. 
 
 Iowa. — Creal v. Keokuk, 4 Greene 
 47; Burlington v. Gilbert, 31 Iowa 
 356, 7 Am. Rep. 143; Farmer v. 
 Cedar Rapids, 116 Iowa 322, 89 
 N. W. 1105; Eeilly v. Fort Dodge, 
 118 Iowa 633, 92 N. W. 887 ; Chiesa 
 V. Des Moines, 158 Iowa 343, 138 
 N. W. 922. 
 
 Louisiana. — Reynolds v. Shreve- 
 port, 13 La. Ann. 426. 
 
 Maine. — Mason v. Kennebec, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 31 Me. 215; KimbaU v. 
 Bath, 38 Me. 214; Hovey v. Mayo, 
 43 Me. 322. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Callender v. 
 Marsh, 1 Pick. 418 ; Purinton • v. 
 Somerset, 174 Mass. 556, 55 N. E. 
 461 ; Underwood v. Worcester, 177 
 Mass. 173, 58 N. E. 589; Sheehan 
 V. Fall River, 187 Mass. 356, 73 
 N. B. 544; Hyde v. Boston, etc., St. 
 Ry. Co., 194 Mass. 80, 80 N. E. 517, 
 5 St. Ry.. Rep. 415. 
 
 Michigan. — Pontiac v. Carter, 32 
 Mich. 164 ; Detroit v. Beckman, 34 
 Mich. 125 ; Detroit v. Grand Trunk 
 Ry. Co., 163 Mich. 229, 128 N. W. 
 250. 
 
 Minnesota. — Lee v. Minneapolis, 
 12 Minn. 13. 
 
 Mississippi. — White v. Yazoo 
 City, 27 Miss. 357. 
 
 Missouri. — St. Louis v. Gurno, 12 
 Mo. 414 ; Taylor v. St. Louis, 14 
 Mo. 20; Hoffman v. St. Louis, 15 
 Mo. 651; Tate v. Missouri, 64 Mo. 
 149. 
 
 'Nebraska. — Nebraska City v. 
 Lampkin, 6 Nebr. 27; Churchill v. 
 Beethe, 48 Neb. 87, 66 N. W. 992, 
 35 L. R. A. 442. 
 
508 
 
 The Law of Emineh-t DoMAiisr. 
 
 § 162 
 
 The reasoning of the earlier cases upon this point rests 
 upon several grounds, some of which are unsatisfactory, 
 and it is not always clear which is relied upon. Leader v. 
 Moxon^^ was the earliest English case, but there the abut- 
 ting owner was allowed to recover from the paving commis- 
 sioners for a change of grade, the court laying stress on the 
 magnitude of the injury. The leading English case on the 
 subject, Cast Plate Manufacturers v. Meredith^^ holds that 
 the abutting owner cannot recover for a change of grade, 
 and distinguishes Leader v. Moxon by stating that in that 
 case the liability must have rested upon the ground that the 
 commissioners exceeded their authority, and intimated that 
 the case could not have been correctly reported. But in the 
 Cast Plate case the court rests its decision largely on the 
 ground that the statute provided that the commissioners 
 might award compensation^'' and consequently that such 
 remedy was exclusive. It seems however to be established 
 
 'Neio Jersey. — Quinn t. Paterson, 
 27 N. J. L. 35. 
 
 'New York. — ^Wilson v. Mayor of 
 New York, 1 Denio 595, 43 Am. Dec. 
 719; Badcliff's Bxrs. v. Mayor of 
 Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195, 53 Am. Dec. 
 357 ; Mills v. Brooklyn, 32 N. Y. 489 ; 
 People V. Green, 64 N. Y. 606 ; In re 
 Anderson, 178 N.. Y. 416, 70 N. E. 
 921 ; Sadlier v. New York, 185 N. Y. 
 408, 78 N. E. 272; People v. Still- 
 ings, 198 N. Y. 504, 92 N. E. 1096; 
 In re Grade Crossing Commission- 
 ers, 201 N. Y. 32, 94 N. E. 188; Peo- 
 ple eoe ret, Olin v. Hennessey, 206 
 N. Y. 33, 99 N. E. 87; Goodrich v. 
 Otego, 216 N. Y. 112, 110 N. E. 162; 
 In re Baynes, 140 App. Div. 735, 126 
 N. Y. Supp. 132. 
 
 "North Carolina. — Hoyle v. Hick- 
 ory, 164 N. C. 79, 80 S. E. 254; 
 Wood V. Duke Land & Improvement 
 Co., 165 N. C. 367, 81 S. E. 422. 
 
 OKlahoma. — Adams v. Oklahoma 
 City, 2 Okla. 519, 95 Pac. 975. 
 
 Oregon. — Bush v. Portland, 19 
 Ore. 45, 23 Pac. 667, 20 Am. St. 
 Rep. 789. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Green v. Reading, 
 9 Watts 382, 36 Am. Dec. 127; 
 O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187 ; 
 Reading v. Keppleman, 61 Pa. 233. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Rounds v. Mum- 
 ford, 2 R. I. 154; Simmons v. 
 Providence, 12 R. I. 8. 
 
 South Carolina. — Branlett v. City 
 Council of Greenville, 88 S. C. 110, 
 70 S. B. 450. 
 
 Tennessee. — Humes v. Knoxville, 
 1 Humph. 403, 34 Am. Dec. 657. 
 
 Virginia. — Kehrer v. Richmond, 
 81 Va. 745 ; Stearns v. Richmond, 88 
 Va. 992, 14 S. E. 847, 29 Am. St 
 Rep. 758. 
 
 West Virginia. — Jordan v. Ben- 
 wood, 42 W. Va. 312, 26 S. E. 266, 
 36 L. R. A. 519, 57 Am. St. Rep. 859. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Alexander v. Mil- 
 waukee, 16 Wis. 247, 256 ; Tyson v. 
 Milwaukee, 50 Wis. 78, 5 N. W. 914; 
 McCullough V. Campbellsport, 123 
 Wis. 334, 101 N. W. 709. 
 
 25. 3 Wils. 461 ; 2 Bl. 924. 
 
 26. 4 T. R. 794. 
 
 27. Buller, J. : " The question 
 here is whether or not this action 
 can be maintained? and I am 
 .clearly of opinion that it cannot 
 because a particular remedy is 
 pointed out by the act." Grose, J. : 
 " The clause in the act which em- 
 powers the commissioners to award 
 satisfaction is decisive against this 
 action." 
 
§ 162 Extent oiP Interest Taken foe Pxtblio Use. 509 
 
 that there was no liability at common law for damages from 
 a lawful change of grade, whether a statutory remedy was 
 provided or not.^* The leading and earliest American case, 
 Callender v. Marsh,^^ follows the Cast Plate case in deny- 
 ing the abutter compensation, and the court rests its deci- 
 sion on three distinct grounds : First, that a damaging of 
 property is not a taking of it within the meaning of the con- 
 stitution ; second, that the right to change the grade is paid 
 for, once for all, when a street is first laid out ; and third, 
 that the defendant did no more than what a private land 
 owner might lawfully do, even if he thereby injured the 
 adjoining estate. 
 
 Of the reasons given for the decision in Callender v. 
 Marsh, the first and third are unsatisfactory. It is true 
 that the adjoining lot is damaged and not taken, but, if the 
 abutter owns the fee of the street, the heaping on or carry- 
 ing away of the earth, if not justified as an exercise of the 
 highway easement, would amount to a taking of the abut- 
 ter's land within the limits of the highway. As for the 
 third reason, a town may go much further than a private 
 owner in injuring adjoining land by changing the grade of 
 its own, and moreover, the town usually is not an ordinary 
 adjoining owner of the fee, but the custodian of a certain 
 easement in the highway. The true reason for the exemp- 
 tion of the town is that the right to grade the highway for 
 certain purposes is within the highway easement. If the 
 grading was for purposes not connected with the use of the 
 highway, no court would deny the owner of the fee compen- 
 sation. If the grading is for highway purposes, even those 
 courts which consider that a damaging of property con- 
 stitutes a taking deny the abutter 's right to recover, for he 
 was paid once for all when the highway was laid out, and 
 no construction of the constitution goes so far as to hold 
 that property cannot be damaged without being paid for 
 twice. 
 
 Accordingly there are few propositions better settled by 
 the authorities than that an owner of land adjoining the 
 highway and owning the fee of the way is not constitution- 
 ally entitled to compensation for injury resulting from a 
 
 28. Sutton V. Clarke, 6 Taunt. 29 ; HaU v. Smith, 2 Bing. 156. 
 
 29. 1 Pick. (Mass.) 418. 
 
510 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 162 
 
 change in the grade. As serious injuries to lands adjoining 
 public ways were inflicted by. changes of grade in the early 
 years of the last century, the question was thoroughly con- 
 tested and conclusively settled before the modern theories 
 extending municipal liability had been invented, and the 
 old rule was then too well supported by authority to be 
 shaken. 
 
 The only apparent dissent from the established doctrine 
 is in Ohio and Kentucky. The decisions in Ohio are peculiar 
 and the doctrine unsatisfactory. The two earliest cases ^* 
 went up on demurrer, and as the respective declarations 
 alleged the work to have been done illegally, the demurrers 
 were overruled. There followed a number of inconsistent *' 
 and somewhat loosely-reasoned cases, out of which the fol- 
 lowing doctrine has been evolved; that the town is liable 
 in tort to an owner who has erected a building after an 
 apparently permanent grade has been established, and who 
 suffers injury by a subsequent change of grade ; and to an 
 owner who has erected a building before a grade has been 
 established, and who suffers injury by the subsequent estab- 
 lishment of an unreasonable grade. In all other cases the 
 owner is without remedy .^^ Kentucky at first seemed to 
 follow the general rule,^^ but the reasoning in one case cast 
 doubt upon its orthodoxy. An ordinance of the city of 
 Louisville ordered the grade of a certain street to be raised 
 twelve feet and required a corporation whose premises 
 adjoined the street to raise the grade of its own land or to 
 build a retaining wall. The court enjoined the carrying out 
 of the ordinance until the corporation was compensated, 
 and based its decision upon the magnitude and unusual 
 
 30. Goodloe V. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio Huber, 78 Oliio St. 372, 85 N. B. 
 500, 22 Am. Dec. 764; Smith v. Cin- 583. It is interesting to note, in 
 cinnati, 4 Ohio 515. connection with tliis peculiar ex- 
 
 31. In Scovill V. Geddings, 7 Ohio cision of the rights of the public in 
 211, and Hicliox v. Cleveland, 8 favor of the rights of private prop- 
 Ohio 543, the court apparently erty ovcners, that Ohio was the first 
 adopted the rule prevailing in other state to be admitted to the union 
 states. with a judiciary appointed for a 
 
 32. Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio limited term of years. See also 
 St. 459 ; Jackson v. Jackson, 16 supra, § 160, note 89, showing ho-vr 
 Ohio St. 163 ; Cincinnati v. Penney, the doctrine of abutters' easements 
 21 Ohio St. 499, 8 Am. Hep. 73; was foreshadowed in Ohio. 
 Akron v. Chamberlain Co., 34 Ohio 33. Keasy v. Louisville, 4 Dana 
 St. 328, 32 Am. Rep. 367; Akron v. (Ky.) 154, 29 Am. Dec. 395 (1836). 
 
§ 162 Extent op Interest Taken foe Public Use. 511 
 
 character of the injury.** The decision itself, however, is 
 in accord with accepted principles. While the grade of the 
 street might be lawfully raised, the city would have no right 
 to slope the earth upon private land — that is a taking — 
 or to compel the corporation to bear the whole expense of 
 the retaining wall without regard to benefit — that is con- 
 fiscation.*^ An owner cannot be required to fill his land 
 except to abate a nuisance; on the question whether a 
 nuisance exists he is entitled to a hearing. The case does 
 not necessarily support the proposition that whether com- 
 pensation should be given for damage from grading is a 
 question of degree. More recent decisions reached however 
 under constitutional provisions requiring compensation for 
 damage seem to establish a rule in Kentucky similar to 
 that in Ohio.*« 
 
 The states which recognize the existence of easements of 
 light, air and access in the abutting property without regard 
 to the ownership of the fee of the street do not allow com- 
 pensation for the impairment or destruction of such ease- 
 ments by a change of grade of a street by the public 
 authorities for the purpose of making the street safer and 
 more convenient for general travel, for those easements are 
 held subject to the public right to make use of the way for 
 travel and other proper highway uses, and anything that 
 would constitute a proper exercise of the highway ease- 
 ment is no infringement of the abutters' rights.*'^ 
 
 34. Louisville v. Rolling Mill Co., be made from the preceding dls- 
 3 Bush (Ky.) 416, 96 Am. Dec. 243 cussion is, that if what is sought to 
 (1865). be enjoined is only an application 
 
 35. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. of the street to additional street 
 269, 43 L. ed. 443. purposes, there is, in the absence 
 
 36. Philpot V. Tompkinsville, 148 of any physical invasion of the 
 Ky. 511, 146 S. W. 1093; Louisville abutting lots, no taking or appro- 
 V. Sauter, 149 Ky. 721, 149 S. W. priation of any property or right of 
 1029; Gernert v. Louisville, 155 Ky. way of complainants, within tlie 
 589, 159 S. W. 1163. meaning of the prohibition of the 
 
 37. In Selden v. Jacksonville, 38 constitution." In Story v. New 
 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457, 14 L. K. A. York Elevated R. R. Co., 90 N. T. 
 370, 29 Am. St. Bep. 278, which in- 122, 43 Am. Rep. 146, the court 
 volved a change of grade of a radi- refers to the " elementary principle 
 cal and highly injurious character, that the public have a right to 
 the court, after discussing with make such use of the land taken 
 complete approval the New York for a street as may be deemed nec- 
 cases establishing the doctrine of essary for its proper construction, 
 easements of light, air and access, repair or maintenance. Within this 
 said : " The practical deduction to power is included the right to fix 
 
512 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 162 
 
 That the absence of any right to compensation for injury 
 from a change in the grade of a street, especially when 
 buildings had been erected to conform to an established 
 grade, was often a genuine hardship was fully appreciated 
 by the courts,®* and remedial legislation was frequently 
 recommended by them®^ and was adopted in at least one 
 state as early as 1836.*° That there is in such a case a moral 
 right to compensation, which may be transformed by the 
 legislature into a legal right without violating the consti- 
 tutional rights of the persons who will be taxed to pay the 
 damages is clear ; *^ but, except in New England and in some 
 of the states of the middle west in which New England 
 influence was strong, few legislatures saw fit to grant relief 
 in such cases. A growing sense of the harshness of the 
 doctrine which exempted cities and towns from liability for 
 damage from changes of grade was however largely respon- 
 
 the grade of the street and to 
 change such grade from time to 
 time as the necessities of the pub- 
 lic may require." In Reining v. 
 New York, etc., R. E. Co., 128 N. T. 
 157, 28 N. B. 640, 14 L. R. A. 133, 
 the court said : " The right of 
 abutting owners in the streets is 
 not of that absolute character that 
 they can resist or prevent any and 
 all interferences with the street to 
 their detriment. * * * The cases 
 of change of grade furnish apposite 
 illustrations. They proceed on the 
 ground that individual interests in 
 streets are subordinate to public 
 Interests." 
 
 38. In O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 
 Pa. 187, a case in which the city 
 authorities reduced the previously 
 established grade, with reference to 
 which the church of the plaintiff 
 had been constructed, and cut down 
 the street seventeen feet In front of 
 the church. Chief Justice Gibson de- 
 livering the opinion of the court 
 said : " We have had this cause re- 
 argued in order to discover if possi- 
 ble some way to relieve the plaintiff 
 consistently with law ; but I grieve 
 to say we have discovered none." 
 
 39. In Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 418 (1828), the court said 
 (pp. 433, 434) : " It may be a case 
 
 very suitable for the consideration 
 of the city authorities, whether, 
 according to the practice in like 
 cases of improvements designed for 
 the general good necessarily cre- 
 ating expense to individuals, some 
 fair indemnity ought not to be 
 allowed; but of this they are the 
 judges. If it is not now within 
 the authority of the city officers it 
 is certainly worthy of consideration, 
 whether an application to the legis- 
 lature ought not to be made, to au- 
 thorize them to indemnify those 
 citizens who may, in the necessary 
 exercise of powers used for public 
 improvement or convenience, be 
 made indirectly to contribute an 
 undue proportion for those purposes. 
 * * * That it might be proper 
 for the legislature, by some general 
 act, to provide that losses of the 
 kind complained of in this suit 
 should be compensated by the town 
 or city within which improvements 
 may be made for the public good, 
 or by the owners of land which may 
 be particularly benefited, is not for 
 us to deny." See also Johnson v. 
 Parkersburg, 16 W. Va. 402, 37 Am. 
 Rep. 779. 
 
 40. Mass. Rev. Sts., c. 25, § 6. 
 
 41. People ex rel. Olin v. Hen- 
 nessey, 206 N. Y. 33, 99 N. E. 87. 
 
§ 163 Extent of Intebest Taken foe Public Use. 513 
 
 sible for the amendment of the constitutions of many states, 
 beginning in 1870, by which compensation for all damage 
 or injury to property by the construction or alteration of 
 public works was assured.*^ 
 
 § 163. Extent of the Right of the Public to Change the 
 Grade of a Public Way Without Compensation to the 
 Owners of Abutting Property. 
 
 The right of the public to raise or lower the grade of its 
 highways without compensation is not impaired either by 
 the formal establishment of a grade by the municipal 
 authorities or by the erection of expensive buildings by the 
 owners of abutting property in conformance with the estab- 
 lished grade. In fact in many of the cases in which it was 
 held that there was no liability for change of grade both of 
 these circumstances existed and were urged as reasons for 
 the amelioration of the rule.*^ It makes no difference how 
 many years the grade first established has stood without 
 modification; as the enjoyment of the abutting owner in 
 such grade is not adverse, no right by prescription can 
 arise.** 
 
 It is not necessary in order to exonerate the municipality 
 from liability that the change of grade be undertaken for 
 the purpose of making the highway less steep and conse- 
 quently safer and more convenient for general travel. A 
 change of grade for the purpose of enhancing the public 
 safety and convenience in any lawful manner is within the 
 public rights, provided the public have the right to use the 
 way, as altered, for general travel. Thus a street may be 
 raised solely to :^urnish an approach to a bridge over a rail- 
 road or a watercourse,** or to make the grade of the street 
 conform to the grade of a railroad lawfully established in 
 
 42. Infra, § 311 ; and for the ap- rich v. Otego, 216 N. Y. 112, 110 
 plication of the damage clause to N. E. 162. 
 
 changes of grade, see infra, §§ 319- 44. Quincy v. Jones, 76 111. 231, 
 
 321 Inc. 20 Am. Rep. 243. 
 
 43. See for example Goszler v. 45. United States. — Wabash R. R. 
 Georgetown, 6 Wheat. (tJ. S.) 593, Co. v. Defiance, 167 TJ. S. 88, 42 
 5 L. ed. 339 ; O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, L. ed. 87. 
 
 18 Pa. 187. So also the owner of Indiana. — Morris v. Indianapolis, 
 
 the fee is not entitled to compensa- 177 Ind. 369, 94 N. E. 705, Ann. Cas. 
 
 tlon for the destruction of shade- 1915 A 65. 
 
 trees by a change of grade. Good- Massachusetts. — Hyde v. Boston, 
 
 33 
 
514 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 163 
 
 or across the street.*® The same principles apply when in 
 carrying a bridge over a railroad or a watercourse, it is 
 found necessary to erect a viaduct, either solid or sustained 
 by pillars, in the centre of an existing street as an approach 
 to the bridge, and the remainder of the street is left at its 
 former grade. Such a structure necessarily inflicts con- 
 siderable injury upon the premises abutting upon the street, 
 but it is nevertheless held that if the viaduct is intended 
 and used for ordinary public travel, its erection is in legal 
 effect a mere change in the grade of the street, even if the 
 bridge and viaduct are maintained by a private corporation 
 and are open to the public only upon' payment of toll; and 
 consequently there is no constitutional obligation to com- 
 pensate the abutting owners.*^ 
 
 etc., St. Ky. Co., 194 Mass. 80, 80 
 N. E. 517, 5 St. Ky. Rep. 415. 
 
 Michigan. — Schneider v. Detroit, 
 72 Mich. 240, 40 N. W. 329, 2 L. B. A. 
 54. 
 
 New Jersey. — ^WiUets Mfg. Co. v. 
 Mercer County, 62 N. J. L. 95, 40 
 Atl. 782. 
 
 New York. — Talbot v. New York, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 151 N. T. 155, 45 
 N. E. 382; Smith v. Boston, etc., 
 B. R. Co., 181 N. T. 132, 73 N. E. 
 679; In re Grade Crossing Commis- 
 sioners of Buffalo, 201 N. Y. 32, 94 
 N. E. 188. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Sullivan v. Web- 
 ster, 16 R. I. 33, 11 Atl. 771. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Walish v. Milwaukee, 
 95 Wis. 16, 69 N. W. 818. 
 
 46. Connecticut. — Nicholson v. 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co., 22 Conn. 
 74, 56 Am. Dec. 390. 
 
 Illinois. — Olney v. Wharf, 115 111. 
 519, 5 N. E. 366, 56 Am. Rep. 178. 
 
 Iowa. — Slatten v. Des Moines 
 Valley R. R. Co., 29 Iowa 148, 4 Am. 
 Rep. 205. 
 
 Maine. — Briggs v. Lewiston, etc., 
 By. Co., 79 Me. 363, 10 Atl. 47, 1 Am, 
 St. Bep. 316. 
 
 Maryland. — Green v. City & Su- 
 burban By. Co., 78 Md. 294, 28 Atl. 
 626, 44 Am. St Bep. 288. 
 
 Michigan. — Austin v. Detroit, etc., 
 Bailroad Co., 134 Mich. 149, 96 
 N. W. 35, 2 Ann. Cas. 530. 
 
 Minnesota. — Kelly v. Minneajwlis, 
 
 57 Minn. 294, 59 N. W. 304, 26 
 L. E. A. 92, 47 Am. St. Bep. 605. 
 
 New Yorlc. — Uline v. New York, 
 etc., B. B. Co., 101 N. Y. 98, 4 N. E. 
 536, 54 Am. Bep. 661 ; Bauensteln v. 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co., 136 N. Y. 
 528, 32 N. E. 1047, 18 L. B. A. 768. 
 
 Tennessee. — Iron Mountain Bail- 
 road Co. V. Bingham, 87 Tenn. 522, 
 11 S. W. 705, 4 L. B. A. 622. 
 
 Vermont. — Bichardson v. Vermont 
 Central B. B. Co., 25 Vt. 465, 60 
 Am. Dec. 283. 
 
 47. United States. — De Lucca v. 
 North Little Bock, 142 Fed. 597. 
 
 District of ColumMa. — Hutcher- 
 son V. District of Columbia, 39 App. 
 D. C. 512. 
 
 Florida. — Selden v. Jacksonville, 
 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457, 14 L. B. A. 
 370, 29 Am. St. Bep. 278. 
 
 Minnesota. — Willis v. Winona, 59 
 Minn. 27, 60 N. W. 814, 26 L. R. A. 
 142. 
 
 New York. — Rauenstein v. New 
 York, etc., R. R. Co., 136 N. Y. 528, 
 32 N. E. 1047, 18 L. B. A. 768 ; Sauer 
 V. New York, 180 N. Y. 27, 72 N. E. 
 579, 70 L. B. A. 717, affirmed, 206 
 U. S. 536, 51 L. ed. 1176 ; Bigney v. 
 New York Central, etc., B. B. Co., 
 217 N. Y. 31, 111 N. B. 226 ; People 
 ex rel. New York v. Sandrock 
 Bealty Co., 149 App. Div. 651, 134 
 N. Y. Supp. 427. 
 
 Oregon. — Brand v. Multnomah 
 County, 38 Ore. 79, 60 Pac. 390, 62 
 
§ 163 Extent of Intebbst Taken for Public Use. 515 
 
 It is held by the weight of authority that the right to 
 lower the grade of a public way may be exercised by the 
 public authorities in such a way as to remove the support 
 of the adjacent soil, without compensating the abutting 
 owner, even if his land and buildings slide into the street, 
 the excavation within the limits of the street being clearly 
 within the public rights, and the effect upon the land out- 
 side the street being looked upon as mere consequential 
 injury and not a taking.*® In a few states however it is held 
 that the right of lateral support from a street to the adjoin- 
 ing land exists to the same extent as between private own- 
 ers, and that a. deprivation of that right is a taking of 
 property.*^ 
 
 Pac. 209, 50 L. R. A. 389, 84 Am. 
 St. Rep. 772. 
 
 Virginia. — Home Building and 
 Conveyance Co. v. Roanoke, 91 Va. 
 52, 20 S. E. 895, 27 L. R. A. 551. 
 
 See however contra, Willamette 
 Iron Works v. Oregon, etc., Co., 26 
 Ore. 224, 37 Pac. 1016, 29 L. R. A. 
 88, 4 Am. St Rep. 620; Frater v. 
 Hamilton Co., 90 Tenn. 661, 19 S. W. 
 233. In the former case the de- 
 cision was based upon the ground 
 that it clearly appeared that it was 
 not intended that the erection of the 
 viaduct should constitute a change 
 in the grade of the street. See also 
 Stack V. East St. Louis, 85 111. 377, 
 28 Am. Rep. 619, in which relief was 
 granted an abutter when the erec- 
 tion of a viaduct was licensed by a 
 city without express authority from 
 the legislature. 
 
 48. United States. — Smith v. 
 Washington, 20 How. 135, 15 L. ed. 
 858; Goszler v. Georgetown, 6 
 Wheat. 593, 5 L. ed. 339. 
 
 California. — Chambers v. Satter- 
 lee, 40 Cal. 497. 
 
 Connecticut. — Fellowes v. New 
 Haven, 44 Conn. 240, 26 Am. Rep. 
 447. 
 
 Georgia. — Rome v. Omberg, 28 
 Ga. 46, 73 Am. Dec. 748; Mitchell 
 V. Rome, 49 Ga. 19, 15 Am. Rep. 669. 
 
 Illinois. — Murphy v. Chicago, 29 
 111. 279, 81 Am. Dec. 307 ; Quincy v. 
 Jones, 76 111. 231, 20 Am. Rep. 243. 
 
 Iowa. — Talcott Brothers v. Des 
 Moines, 134 Iowa 113, 109 N. W. 311, 
 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 696. 
 
 Michigan. — Pontiac v. Carter, 32 
 Mich. 164. 
 
 Missouri. — Taylor v. St. Louis, 14 
 Mo. 20, 55 Am. Dec. 89. 
 
 New York. — RadclifC's Executors 
 V. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195, 
 53 Am. Dec. 357. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Green v. Reading, 
 
 9 Watts 383, 36 Am. Dec. 127; 
 
 O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187. 
 
 Washington. — Copipton v. Seattle, 
 
 38 Wash. 514, 80 Pac. 757. 
 
 49. Indiana. — Aurora v. Fox, 78 
 Ind. 1. 
 
 Minnesota. — Armstrong v. St. 
 Paul, 30 Minn. 299, 15 N. W. 174; 
 Nichols V. Duluth, 40 Minn. 389, 42 
 N. W. 84, 12 Am. St. Rep. 743; 
 Hunger v. St. Paul, 57 Minn. 9, 58 
 N. W. 601. 
 
 Ohio. — Keating v. Cincinnati, 38 
 Ohio St. 141, 43 Am. Rep. 421. 
 
 Oregon. — Hosier v. Oregon, etc.. 
 Navigation Co., 39 Ore. 256, 64 Pac. 
 453, 87 Am. St. Rep. 652. 
 
 Virginia. — Stearns v. Richmond, 
 88 Va. 992, 14 S. E. 847, 29 Am. St. 
 Bep. 758. 
 
 Washington. — Parke v. Seattle, 5 
 Wash. 1, 31 Pac. 310, 32 Pac. 82, 20 
 L. R. A. 68, 34 Am. St Rep. 839. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Damkoehler v. Mil- 
 waukee, 124 Wis. 144, 101 N. W. 
 706; Dahlman v. Milwaukee, 131 
 Wis. 427, 111 N. W. 675. 
 
516 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 163 
 
 Winen however the -way is graded to its full width above 
 the level of the STirroimdiiig land and the public authorities, 
 instead of building a retaining wall, allow the earth to slope 
 upon the neighboring land, the owuer is almost everywhere 
 allowed to recover.®" SucTi an invasion amounts to a taking 
 of his property ,^^ and cannot be fairly presumed to have 
 been included in the original laying out, for it amounts to 
 using the land for the way rather than merely inflicting 
 incidental damage upon it. If the public authorities desire 
 a wider way than was originally planned, they should take 
 the necessary land by proper condemnation proceedings. 
 
 The oTvner of adjoining land has no right to compensa- 
 tion if a change in the grade of a public way results in an 
 increased amount of surface water flowing or remaining 
 upon his land, even if the water is collected in gutters and 
 turned direqtly upon it, for this is an injury that was con- 
 templated and paid for when the highway was established,®^ 
 but a s-ystem of drainage collecting the surface water from 
 the streets of an 'entire section of a city and turning it by 
 artificial channels upon private land to which it would not 
 naturally have flowed could not be constructed without 
 compensation to the owner of the land affected. Such an 
 injnry would not reasonably be contemplated when the 
 street in front of such land was laid out, nor would it fall 
 within the general power of a city to grade and improve its 
 streets, and if specifically authorized by the legislature 
 would be such a severe and direct invasion of property as to 
 constitute a taking in the constitutional sense.®* i 
 
 50. Mayo v. Springfield, 136 Mass. Miohiffwn. — Vanderlip v. Grand 
 
 10. The grade of a street was estab- Kapids, 73 Mich. 522, 41 N. W. 677, 
 
 lished "at a height which required 3 L. K. A. 247, 16 Am. St. Rep. 597. 
 
 an embankment, and in working the Minnesota. — Nelson v. West Du- 
 
 street up to its established grade, no luth, 55 Minn. 497, 57 N. W. 149. 
 
 bank wall was built or other means Missouri. — Broadwell v. Kansas 
 
 used to keep the earth Irom sloping City, 75-Mo. 213, 42 Am. Kep. 406 ; 
 
 off on to Mayo's land." It was held Tegeler v. Kansas Oity, 95 Mo. App. 
 
 that this was an occupation and 162, 68 S. W. 953. 
 
 appropriation of his land for which Oregon. — Davis v. SUverton, 47 
 
 he haduot been paid when the street Ore. 171, 82 Pac. 16. 
 
 was laid out, and that he was now Washington. — Kineaid v. Seattle, 
 
 entitled to an action of tort. See 74 Wash. 617, 134 Pac. 504. 
 
 also to same effect Contra, Shaw v. Crocker, 42 Cal. 
 
 Iowa. — Hendershott v. Ottumwa, 435. 
 
 46 Iowa 658, 26 Am. Kep. 182. 51. Supra, § 113. 
 
 Kentucky. — West Covington v. 52. Infra, § 497. 
 
 Schultz, 30 S. W. 660. 53. Supra, § 113, and infra, § 497. 
 
§ 164 Extent of Interest Taken foe Public Use. 511 
 
 § 164. The Right of the Public to Reserve the Whole 
 or Part of a Highway for Special Forms of Travel. 
 
 An individual proprietor has no right to insist that the 
 entire volume of traffic that would naturally flow over a 
 highway of which he owns the fee pass undiverted and unoh- 
 structed. In fact, while under some circumstances and 
 conditions he has a right of access to and from his own 
 premises, he has no constitutional . right to have anyone 
 pass by his premises at all.^* The easement taken by the 
 public extends to the use of the way for its whole width for 
 all kinds of public travel, and the prohibition of all travel 
 in parts of the way or of particular kinds of travel in the 
 whole way is merely an exercise of less than the whole ease- 
 ment, and the reverse of an additional servitude. The 
 owner of the fee therefore cannot complain because the way 
 is graded or wrought in a particular manner, or because the 
 whole or a part of the street is set aside for a special kind 
 of public travel. It has been held that a sidewalk reserved 
 for foot passengers ^^ is not an additional servitude and the 
 same is true of a bicycle path.^® Similarly, the owner of 
 the fee cannot complain because the relative width of the 
 roadway and sidewalk is changed,®'^ or because grass plots 
 are maintained on one side of the street and not upon the 
 other.^* A street may be turned into a parkway and devoted 
 to pleasure travel exclusively,'® and a speedway is a 
 
 54. Supra, § U5. tlon Co., 138 N. C. 288, 50 S. E. 711, 
 
 55. Illinois. — Walker v. Morgan 1 L. R. A. (N S.) 981. And see 
 Park, 175 111. 570, 51 N. E. 636. KeUy v. Marion, 161 Ind. 322, 68 
 
 Indiana. — BlufEton v. Silver, 68 N. E. 594, holding that an abutter 
 
 Ind. 262. cannot enjoin the construction of a 
 
 Kentucky. — Hazelgreen v. McNabb, driveway across his sidewalk from 
 
 23 Ky. L. R. 811, 64 S. W. 431. the street to the next lot at least 
 
 Maine. — PlUsbury v. Brown, 82 without alleging that he owns the 
 
 Me. 450, 19 Atl. 858, 9 L. R. A. 94. fee. But see Narchold v. Westport, 
 
 Nebraska. — Hitchcock v. Zink, 80 71 Mo. App. 508, holding that, under 
 
 Neb. 29, 113 N. W. 795, 13 L. R. A. a constitution allowing compensa- 
 
 (N. S.) 1110. tlon for damaging, an abutter is 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Hobson v. Phila- entitled to be paid when the side* 
 
 delphia, 155 Pa. 131, 25 Atl. 1046. walk in front of his premises has 
 
 56. Ryan v. Preston, 59 App. Dlv. been abolished or unreasonably 
 (N. Y.) 97, 66 N. Y. Supp. 162, 69 narrowed. 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 100. 58. English v. Danville, 170 111. 
 
 57. Munson v. Mallory, 36 Conn. 131, 48 N. E. 328. 
 
 165, 4 Am. Rep. 52; Marion v. Skill- 59. Kreigh v. Chicago, 86 111. 407; 
 
 mann, 127 Ind. 130, 26 N. E. 676, 11 People v. Walsh, 96 111. 232, 36 Am. 
 L. R. A. 55 ; Hester v. Durham Trac- Rep. 135 ; Cicero Lumber Co. v. 
 
518 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain, 
 
 § 165 
 
 proper use for part of a strip of land dedicated as a 
 boulevard.*" 
 
 In cases of the class now under discussion it is not open 
 to the owner of the fee to contend that the reservation made 
 of the whole or a portion of the highway was not warranted 
 by the public necessities, since that is a matter for the local 
 authorities to settle, and their decision is not open to review 
 by the courts.®* Neither is it open to him to complain that 
 his right of access is impaired, since the right of access, 
 when recognized by the local law, is subordinate to the pub- 
 lic right to improve and regulate the use of the way for 
 general travel.'" 
 
 § 165. Structures Obstructing the Highway, the Ultimate 
 Object of which is to Make General Travel more Convenient. 
 
 If the ultimate object for which a structure in the high- 
 way is erected is to improve the safety and convenience of 
 
 Cicero, 176 111. 9, 51 N. E. 758, 42 
 L. R. A. 696, 68 Am. St. Rep. 155. 
 See also People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 
 188, in which the court said : " So 
 far as the existing public rights In 
 these streets are concerned, such as 
 the right of passage and travel over 
 them as common highways, a little 
 reflection will show that the legis- 
 lature has supreme control over 
 them. When no private interests are 
 involved or invaded, the legislature 
 may close a highway and relin- 
 quish altogether its use by the pub- 
 lic, or it may regulate such use or 
 restrict It to peculiar vehicles or to 
 the use of particular motive power. 
 It may change one kind of use into 
 another, so long as the property con- 
 tinues devoted to public use. What 
 belongs to the public may be con- 
 trolled and disposed of in any way 
 which the public agent sees fit." 
 
 60. Howe V. Lowell, 171 Mass. 
 575, 51 N. B. 536. 
 
 61. Walker v. Morgan Park, 175 
 111. '570, 51 N. E. 636; BlufEton v. 
 Silver, 63 Ind. 262; Hazelgreen v. 
 McNabb, 23 Ky. L. R. 811, 64 S. W. 
 431. An ordinance prohibiting heavy 
 teaming upon a boulevard except 
 upon permission of the board of 
 trustees of the town was held void 
 
 in Cicero Lumber Co. v. Cicero, 176 
 111. 9, 51 N. E. 758, 42 L. R. A. 696, 
 68 Am. St. Rep. 155, because it un- 
 dertook to invest the board with an 
 unregulated official discretion. See 
 also Hawes v. Chicago, 158 111. 653, 
 42 N. E. 373, 30 L. R. A. 225, in 
 which it was held that the court 
 might review the action of the mu- 
 nicipality when it was apparent that 
 it was unreasonable, unjust and 
 oppressive. 
 
 62. In Cicero Lumber Co. v. 
 Cicero, 176 111. 9, 51 N. E. 758, 42 
 L. R. A. 696, 68 Am. St. Rep. 155, 
 It was held that, as against a lum- 
 ber company owning property abut- 
 ting upon a highway, vehicles used 
 for business purposes might be ex- 
 cluded, so that the company could 
 not transact its business, the court 
 saying : " The power to vacate or 
 discontinue a street necessarily in- 
 ' volves the power to change the use 
 of the street. The greater power of 
 absolutely vacating necessarily in- 
 cludes the lesser power of regulating 
 or restraining. If, therefore, the 
 legislature had the power to confer 
 upon the town of Cicero the author- 
 ity to vacate one of its streets, it 
 certainly had the power to confer 
 upon that municipality the power to 
 
§ 165 Extent of Intbbest Taken fob Ptjblio Use. 519 
 
 general public travel, it is no objection that snob a struc- 
 ture, to a reasonable extent, obstructs the use by the public 
 of a certain limited portion of the way. Thus it has been 
 seen that viaducts for general travel may be erected in 
 highways when necessary, although the requisite retaining 
 walls or pUlars may interfere with the use of a portion of 
 the way upon which the public had been accustomed to 
 travel.®^ So also there is a tendency to justify uses of the 
 highway which only incidentally aid general public travel, 
 such as street lights and watering-troughs.®* An interest- 
 ing case in which this principle was applied arose in New 
 York. A railroad had long occupied a cut in the middle of 
 a street, greatly interfering with the ordinary use of the 
 street. To remedy this trouble the legislature ordered the 
 cut filled up and the railroad carried on an elevated struc- 
 ture. As the purpose of this change was to make the high- 
 way safer and more convenient for general travel, the New 
 York courts held that the abutting owners had no remedy ; ** 
 but the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision 
 of the New York Court of Appeals and held that as the own- 
 ers had bought their land in reliance of the decisions that 
 an elevated railway was an improper street use, the New 
 York decision impaired the obligation of contracts.®® 
 
 limit the use of a street to a par- v. Chicago, etc., R. K. Co., 227 111. 
 ticular purpose benefiting all the 421, 81 N. B. 424, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 public, and not exclusively shared 589, holding that when a steam rail- 
 by any class of the citizens." road which had maintained its 
 
 63. Supra, § 163. tracks on the surface of a public 
 
 64. Infra, §§ 187, 188. See as to way for over twenty years was com- 
 hltching posts, Lacey v. Oskaloosa, pelled to elevate its tracks upon a 
 143 Iowa 704, 121 N. W. 542, 31 solid viaduct for the benefit of pub- 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 853. lie travel, the part of the street 
 
 65. Muhlker v. New York, etc., R. occupied by the viaduct did not 
 R. Co., 173 N. Y. 549, 66 N. B. 558. revert to its original grantor. 
 Contra, Coyne v. Memphis, 118 Tenn. 66. Muhlker v. New York, etc., R. 
 651, 102 S. W. 355. See also Weage R. Co., 197 U. S. 544, 49 L. ed. 872. 
 
CHAPTER XL 
 
 Additional Seevitudes Upon Land Taken fob Highwat 
 
 Purposes. 
 
 Section 166. Vehicles of Unusual Character — Stands in the Highway. 
 
 167. Steam Railroads in Public Highways. 
 
 168. Steam Railroads in Public Highways — ^Miscellaneous Points; 
 
 169. Steam Railroads Crossing- Public Highways. 
 
 170. Street Railways of the Earlier Types. 
 
 171. Electric Street Railways. 
 
 172. Street Railways in Country Roads. 
 
 173. Interurban Electric Railways. 
 
 174. Street Railways Carrying Merchandise. 
 
 175. Projecting Rails and Reserved Spaces. 
 
 176. Viaducts, Peed Wires, Increased Traffic, Change of System. 
 
 177. Special Damage to Adjoining Premises. 
 
 178. Elevated Railways; 
 
 179. The New York Elevated Railway Cases. 
 
 180. Elevated Railways in Other Jurisdictions. 
 
 181. Subways. 
 
 182. Subterranean Pipes. 
 
 183. Sewers and Drains. 
 
 184. Water Pipes and Gas Pipes. 
 
 185. Overhead Wires. 
 
 186. Telegraph and Telephone Lines. 
 
 187. Electric Light Lines. 
 
 188. Buildings and other Structures in Public Highways. 
 
 189. Exercise of the Highway Easement Causing Direct Injury 
 
 to Land Outside the Limits of the Way. 
 
 190. The Measure of Damage* for an Additional Servitude. 
 
 191. Elements of Damage in the Case of an Additional Servitude. 
 
 § 166. Vehicles of Unusual Character — Stands in the 
 Highway. 
 
 While the character of vehicles which use the highway 
 may be limited by the public authorities,^ and a traveller has 
 no constitutional right to use any description of vehicle 
 which suits his convenience, regardless of its weight, or size, 
 or its injurious effect upon the roadbed or the fear that it 
 may instil in horses, as against the abutting owner any 
 vehicle permitted by the public authorities to use the high- 
 way may lawfully do so, provided that it requires no perma- 
 nent structure in the street to facilitate its passage. The 
 
 1. Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 562, 48 Am. Dec. 679. 
 
 [520] 
 
§ 166 Additional Servitudes Upon Highways. 
 
 521 
 
 mere fact that the vehicle was of a character not contem- 
 plated when the highway was established is immaterial. 
 The present generation has seen bicycles, motor cycles, auto- 
 mobiles, motor trucks and other new forms of vehicle come 
 into common use ; but it has never been suggested that the 
 use of such vehicles upon the public highways imposed an 
 additional servitude upon the f ee.^ 
 
 The primary purpose of the highway is however motion, 
 the passing and repassing of the public and the transporta- 
 tion of property, and no member of the public has the right 
 to use the highway for any other purpose without the con- 
 sent of the owner of the fee. While a person using the 
 highway for travel unquestionably has the right to make 
 stops for temporary purposes incidental to his journey,* 
 no one has the right to occupy the highway for prolonged 
 periods for purposes not incidental to travel, even if the 
 structure or stand which he employs for such occupation 
 has wheels and is capable of use as a vehicle.* 
 
 2. Gregory v. Adams, 14 Gray 
 (Mass.) 242 (elephant) ; Spring v. 
 WlUiamstown, 186 Mass. 479, 71 
 N. E. 949 (bicycle) ; Baker v. Fall 
 Klver, 187 Mass. 53, 72 N. E. 336 
 (automobile). So also a building 
 may be moved through a highway 
 without violating the rights of the 
 owner of the fee. Graves v. Shat- 
 tuck, 35 N. H. 257, 68 Am. Dec. 
 536. For the rights of a public serv- 
 ice corporation maintaining wires 
 in a street when a building is being 
 moved thereon, see supra, § 127. 
 
 3. Babson v. Rockport, 101 Mass. 
 93 (replacing a stone) ; Britton v. 
 Cummington, 107 Mass. 347 (picking 
 berries) ; Smethurst v. Barton 
 Square Church, 148 Mass. 261, 19 
 N. E. 387,, 2 L. R. A. 695, 12 Am. St. 
 Rep. 550 (unloading goods) ; Dono- 
 hue V. Newburyport, 211 Mass. 561, 
 98 N. E. 1081, Ann. Gas. 1913 B 742 
 (watching men cutting down a 
 tree). 
 
 4. Commonwealth v. Morrison, 197 
 Mass. 199, 88 N. B. 415, 14 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 194. The defendant was 
 convicted of maintaining a night 
 lunch wagon upon a public highway. 
 Which was held to be a violation 
 
 of the rights of the owner of the 
 fee, notwithstanding an alleged 
 license from the municipal authori- 
 ties. The court, after reciting the 
 various uses that had been held to 
 be vrithin the highway easement, 
 said : " But, notwithstanding these 
 various instrumentalities, they are 
 all manifestations in divers forms 
 of the right of travel of persons, the 
 transmission of intelligence and the 
 transportation of commodities. The 
 primary purpose of a highway is 
 the passing and repassing of the 
 public which is entitled, so far as 
 needed, to the full, unobstructed 
 and uninterrupted enjoyment of the 
 entire width of the layout for that 
 purpose. Whenever the public does 
 not have occasion to exercise its 
 easement to its full extent, the 
 owner of the fee may make any use 
 not Inconsistent therewith. What- 
 ever Interferes with the exercise of 
 this easement is a nuisance. * * * 
 The business of the defendant does 
 not come within any description of 
 travel, nor does it have a necessary 
 or reasonably natural connection 
 with the passing of persons or the 
 transportation of commodities. The 
 
522 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 167 
 
 While the stands of hackney carriages may perhaps be 
 justified as a phase of public travel, and the use of streets 
 in connection with markets, in view of the long continued 
 customs in many of our larger cities, may be considered as 
 incidental to the transportation of merchandise, it is at 
 least open to serious doubt whether carriage or truck 
 wagon stands in a highway can be authorized against the 
 protest of the owner of the fee.® Hawking and peddling, 
 on the other hand, is a legitimate use of the highway. It 
 consists of the transportation of merchandise, and the stops 
 for sale are brief and ordinarily not of such character as to 
 constitute any substantial obstruction to the rights of 
 travellers.® 
 
 § 167. Steam Railroads in Public Highways. 
 
 There has been an immense amount of litigation arising 
 out of the practice, which has been unfortunately adopted 
 in almost every state in the union, of allowing steam rail- 
 road companies to lay their tracks and to run their trains 
 upon the public highways of populous cities, without any 
 
 establishment in highways of drink- Chicago, 181 111. 289, 54 N. E. 825, 
 
 Ing fountains, erection of guide 53 L. R. A. 223. 
 
 boards and planting and protection Iowa. — Miller v. Webster City, 94 
 
 of shade trees have all been ex- Iowa 162, 62 N. W. 648. 
 
 pressly authorized by statute, and Maryland. — Turner v. Holtzman, 
 
 bear an obvious relation to the con- 54 Md. 148. 
 
 venlence, comfort and pleasure of Massachusetts. — Commonwealth v. 
 
 travel. The obstruction they ofCer Morrison, 197 Mass. 199, 204, 83 
 
 to the use of the entire way for pas- N. E. 415, 14 L. E. A. (N. S.) 194. 
 
 ' sage is ordinarily trifling, and they Missouri. — SchofC v. St. Louis, 
 
 have been regarded as legally inci- 117 Mo. 131, 22 S. W. 898, 20 
 
 dental to the general purposes for L. R. A. 783 ; McFall v. St. Louis, 
 
 which the public easement of travel 232 Mo. 716, 135 S. W. 51, 33 
 
 has been taken from the owner by L. R. A. (N. S.) 471. 
 
 eminent domain. But eating, al- Jf etc Jersey. — Lippincott v. 
 
 though necessary for human beings, Lasher, 17 Stew. 120. 
 
 is no more essential to their welfare Uew York. — McCaffrey v. Smith, 
 
 than sleeping or clothing or clean- 41 Hun 117. 
 
 liness, nor does it bear any closer Ohio. — Branahan v. Hotel Co., 
 
 relation to travel upon highways 39 Ohio St. 333, 48 Am. Rep. 457. 
 
 than any of these other human South Carolina. — Spencer v. 
 
 functions." Mahon, 75 S. C. 232, 55 S. E. 321. 
 
 5. Alal)aina. ■ — • Montgomery, v. 6. Commonwealth v. Morrison, 
 
 Parker, 114 Ala. 118, 21 So. 452, 63 197 Mass. 199, 204, 83 N. E. 415, 14 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 95. L. R. A. (N. S.) 194; State v. Edens, 
 
 Illinois. — Pennsylvania Co. v. 85 N. C. 522. 
 
§ 167 Additional Servitudes Upon Highways. 523 
 
 special statutory provision for compensation to the owners 
 of abutting property. The distinction between steam rail- 
 roads and street railways proper is well understood, and 
 there has been more difficulty in finding a word to express 
 the difference than in making it clear that such a difference 
 exists. "Commercial," "long distance," and " interur- 
 ban ' ' have all been used to describe steam railroads, and 
 are all unsatisfactory, since each of these terms under some 
 circumstances applies to street railways as well; but the 
 origin of the two kinds of rail transportation was so dis- 
 tinct that there need be no difficulty in knowing what is 
 meant, though, in a few instances, the line between the two 
 classes has appeared obscure. 
 
 By steam railroad is meant the railroad familiar to all, 
 "with raised rails, on which run trains of cars for passengers 
 and freight, drawn by steam locomotives, and usually estab- 
 lishing communication between separate and often distant 
 towns, or at least stopping only at stations a considerable 
 distance apart in the same town. Such railroads are ordi- 
 narily constructed upon a strip of land specially condemned 
 for the purpose and subject to no other public use, but in 
 some instances it was found necessary or expedient to estab- 
 lish them upon existing public highways in order to pass 
 through a city or village which had been built up so closely 
 that it would be extremely expensive to condemn a private 
 right of way across it. Steam railroads, although they 
 constituted a new use of the way, promoted the purpose 
 for which highways were laid out — public travel — and 
 they took the place of stage coaches, which had occupied the 
 public ways without objection. Furthermore, when steam 
 railroads were first introduced in this country few people 
 had any conception of their future growth and development, 
 either in respect to the amount of business done or to the 
 mechanical power of their engines. When the first rail- 
 roads were constructed, the projectors were uncertain 
 whether to use horses or steam locomotives to furnish 
 motive power and in some cases they used both on the same 
 rails. An engine and train was hardly more formidable 
 than a motor truck and trailer of modern times. It is not 
 to be wondered at that, under these conditions, several 
 
524 
 
 The Law of Eminenx Domaik. 
 
 § 167 
 
 courts held a steam railroad a proper street use,'' and in a 
 few states it is still the law that a steam railroad is not 
 per se an additional servitude upon a public highway, and 
 in such states the abutting owner, even if he owns the fee 
 of the street, is not entitled to compensation for the con- 
 struction of a steam railroad in front of his premises, 
 unless he can show some special and peculiar injury to his 
 property differing in kind from the inconvenience to travel 
 or the usual unpleasant characteristics of a steam railroad, 
 as when the railroad is upon a viaduct in the street, or the 
 tracks are so close to his premises as to cut off access 
 thereto.® 
 
 7. See for example, Cook v. Bur- 
 lington, 30 Iowa 94, 6 Am. Rep. 649 ; 
 Morris, etc., R. R. Co. v. Newark, 10 
 N. J. Eq. 352 ; Case of Philadelphia 
 & Trenton Railroad Co., 6 Whart. 
 (Pa.) 25, 36 Am. Dec. 202. See also 
 the cases in the following note. 
 
 8. In Missouri It is held that an 
 ordinary steam railroad Is not an 
 additional servitude upon a high- 
 way and that the construction of a 
 steam railroad in a highway does 
 not in itself entitle the abutting, 
 owner to compensation whether he 
 owns the fee or not. Porter v. 
 North Missouri R. R. Co., 33 Mo. 
 128; Gaus & Sons Mfg. Co. v. St. 
 Eouis, etc., R. R. Co., 113 Mo. 308, 
 20 S. W. 658, 18 L. R. A. 339, 35 
 Am. St. Rep. 706; De Geofroy v. 
 Merchants', etc., R. R. Co., 179 Mo. 
 698, 79 S. W. 386, 64 L. R. A. 959, 
 101 Am. St. Rep. 524; Seibel-Suess- 
 dorf, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Manufac- 
 turers Ry. Co., 230 Mo. 59, 130 S. W. 
 288 ; Moore Mfg. Co. v. Springfield- 
 Southwestern Ry. Co., 256 Mo. 167, 
 165 S. W. 305. But a steam railroad 
 occupying the entire street cannot 
 be constructed without compensat- 
 ing the abutter. Lockwood v. 
 Wabash R. R. Co., 122 Mo. 86, 26 
 S. W. 698, 24 L. R. A. 516, 43 Am. 
 St. Rep. 547 ; Knapp, Stout & Co. v. 
 St. Louis Transfer Ry. Co., 126 Mo. 
 26, 28 S. W. 627 ; Schulenburg v. St. 
 Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 129 Mo. 455, 
 31 S. W. 796; Sherlock v. Kansas 
 City, etc., R. R. Co., 142 Mo. 172, 43 
 S. W. 629, 64 Am. St. Rep. 551; 
 
 Corly V. Chicago, etc., R. E. Co., 150 
 Mo. 457, 52 S. W. 282. So of a rail- 
 road which continually blocks the 
 street by strings of cars, water 
 tanks and the like. Lackland v. 
 North Missouri R. R. Co., 31 Mo. 
 180; Tate v. Missouri, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 64 Mo. 149; Spencer v. Metro- 
 politan Ry. Co., 120 Mo. 154, 23 
 S. W. 126, 22 L. R. A. 668, or con- 
 tinually pours cinders upon the ad- 
 joining property. Louisville So. R. 
 R. Co. V. Hove (Mo.), 47 S. W. 621. 
 Similarly in Kentucky it is held 
 that a steam railroad is not neces- 
 sarily an Improper street use, re- 
 gardless of the ownership of the 
 fee. Lexington, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Applegate, 8 Dana (Ky.) 289, 33 
 Am. Dec. 497 ; Elizabeth, etc., R. R. 
 Co. v. Combs, 10 Bush (Ky.) 382, 
 19 Am. Rep. 67 ; JefEersonvlIle, etc., 
 R. R. Go. V. Esterle, 13 Bush (Ky.) 
 667; Louisville Southern R. R. Co. 
 V. Hove, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 521, 35 
 S. W. 266, 38 S. W. 131; Ban v. 
 Maysville, etc., R. R. Co., 102 Ky. 
 486, 43 S. W. 731, 80 Am. St. Rep. 
 362. But a raUroad cannot occupy 
 or use a street to the total or un- 
 reasonable exclusion of other trafBc. 
 Fulton v. Short Route R. R. Trans- 
 fer Co., 85 Ky. 640, 4 S. W. 332, 7 
 Am. St. Rep. 619; Elizabethtown, 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Walton, 9 Ky. L. 
 Rep. 243 ; Stein, v. Chesapeake, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 132 Ky. 322, 116 S. W. 733. 
 In Oregon it is held that a steam 
 railroad is not an additional servi- 
 tude upon a highway, but the decls- 
 
§ 167 Additional Seevitudbs Upon Highways. 525 
 
 On. the other hand, before steam railroads had been many 
 years in operation, it was realized in the majority of the 
 states that they excluded all other traffic from the space 
 which they occupied, either from the way the rails and 
 sleepers were laid, or by the reasonable fear that the trains 
 caused to other travellers on the way, because of their great 
 speed and inability to turn out or to stop quickly. More- 
 over, by their weight, length, and noise and their pouring 
 forth of steam, smoke, and cinders, they inconvenienced 
 other traffic on the parts of the street which they did not 
 actually occupy and they inflicted a damage upon adjoining 
 property, differing in kind rather than merely in degree 
 from that inflicted by other highway uses, and without a 
 corresponding benefit from increased accessibility other 
 than that shared by the entire community. For these and 
 other reasons it was held sooner or later in almost every 
 jurisdiction that a steam railroad of the ordinary type could 
 not be laid out on a strip of land in which the public had 
 only the easement of a highway without the payment of 
 compensation to the owner of the fee ; in other words that a 
 steam railroad is an additional servitude upon a highway as 
 a matter of law.® 
 
 ions are put on the ground that the California. — Southern Pacific E. 
 
 owner of the fee has no right In E. Co. t. Eeed, 41 Cal. 256; Smith 
 
 the highway except of reversion v. Southern Pacific E. E, Co., 146 
 
 upon its discontinuance. Paquet v. Cal. 164, 79 Pac. 868, 106 Am. St. 
 
 Mt. Tabor St. E. E. Co., 18 Ore. 233, Eep. 17. 
 
 22 Pac. 906; McQuaid v. Portland, Colorado. — Denver v. Bayer, 7 
 
 etc., E. E. Co., 18 Ore. 237, 22 Pac. Colo. 113, 2 Pac. 6; Denver, etc., E. 
 
 899. See also Arbenz v. Wheeling, E. Co. v. Stinemeyer, 59 Colo. 396, 
 
 etc., E. E. Co., 33 W. Va. 1, 10 148 Pac. 860. 
 
 S. E. 14, 5 L. E. A. 371. Connecticut. — Nicholson v. New 
 
 9. United States. — Van Bokelen v. York, etc., E. E. Co., 22 Conn. 73, 
 
 Brooklyn City E. B. Co., 5 Blatchf. 56 Am. Dec. 390 ; Imlay v. TJnion 
 
 379, Fed. Cas. No. 16830; Greene v. Branch E. B. Co., 26 Conn. 249, 68 
 
 Aurora E. E. Co., 84 C. C. A. 589, Am. Dec. 392 ; McKeon v. New York, 
 
 157 Fed. 85. etc., E. E. Co., 75 Conn. 343, 53 Atl. 
 
 A?a6oTOO.— "Western Ey. v. Ala- 656, 61 L. E. A. 730; Knapp & 
 
 bama, etc., E. E. Co., 96 Ala. 272, Cowles Mfg. Co. v. New York, etc., 
 
 11 So. 483, 17 L. E. A. 474 ; New, E. E. Co., 76 Conn. 311, 56 Atl. 512, 
 
 etc., Terminal Co. v. Karcher, 112 106 Am. St. Eep. 994. 
 
 Ala. 676, 21 So. 825; Alabama, etc., Florida. — Florida Southern Ey. 
 
 E. E. Co. V. Collier, 112 Ala. 681, Co. v. Brown, 23 Fla. 104, 1 So. 512 ; 
 
 14 So. 327; South, etc., E. E. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line v. Southern In- 
 
 Davis, 185 Ala. 193, 64 So. 606. vestment Co., 53 Fla. 832, 44 So. 
 
 Arkansas. — Eeichert v. St. Louis, 351, 13 Ann. Cas. 18 ; Jarrett Lum- 
 
 etc, E. E. Co., 51 Ark. 491, 11 S. W. ber Co. v. Christopher, 65 Fla. 379, 
 
 696, 5 L. E. A. 183. 61 So. 831. 
 
526 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 167 
 
 Wlien the fee of the street is in the public, greater diffi- 
 culties arise. "When a steam railroad is constructed on a 
 private right of way, the owner of the adjoining lot, if none 
 
 etc., E. R. Co., 13 Minn. 315 ; Molitor 
 V. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 14 Minn. 
 285 ; Harrington v. St. Paul, etc., R. 
 R. Co., 17 Minn. 215 ; Brisbine v. St 
 Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 23 Minn. 114; 
 Newell V. Minneapolis, etc., R. R. 
 Co,, 35 Minn. 112, 27 N. W. 839, 59 
 Am. Rep. 303. 
 
 Mississippi. — Theobald v. Louis- 
 ville, etc., R. R. Co., 66 Miss. 279, 
 6 So. 230, 4 L. R. A. 735, 14 Am. St 
 Rep. 564. 
 
 Nebraska. — Hastings, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Ingalls, 15 Nebr. 123, 16 
 N, W. 762. 
 
 New Jersey. — Starr v. Camden, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 24 N. J. L. 592; 
 Bork V. United, etc., R. R. Co., 70 
 N. J. L 268, 57 Atl 412, 64 L. R. A. 
 836, 103 Am. Stl Rep. 808; New 
 York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stanley, 39 
 N. J. Bq. 361; Methodist Episcopal 
 Church V. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 
 48 N. J. Eq. 452, 22 Atl. 183. 
 
 New York. — Williams v. New 
 York Central R. R. Co., 16 N. Y. 97, 
 69 Am. Dec. 651; Wagte v. Troy 
 Union R. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 526 ; Hen- 
 derson V. New York Central R. R. 
 Co., 78 N. Y. 423. 
 
 North Carolina. — White v. North- 
 western, etc., R. R. Co., 113 N. C. 
 610, 18 S. E. 330, 37 Am. St Rep. 
 639. 
 
 Ohio. — Sells v. Columbus St Ry. 
 Co., 11 Ohio- Dec. Reprint 643 ; Par- 
 rott V. Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co., 
 
 10 Ohio St 624. 
 Pennsylvania. — Jones v. Erie, etc., 
 
 R. R. Co., 151 Pa. 30, 25 Atl. 134, 17 
 L. R. A. 758, 31 Am. St Rep. 722. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Taber v. New 
 York, etc., R. R. Co., 28 R. I. 269, 67 
 Atl. 9. 
 
 South Carolina. — South Bound R. 
 R. Co. V. Burton, 67 S. C. 515, 46 
 S. E. 340. 
 
 Tennessee. — Harrison v. Louis- 
 ville, etc., R. R. Co., 87 Tenn. 614, 
 
 11 S. W. 703. 
 Texas. — San Antonio Rapid Tran- 
 sit St. Ry. Co., V. Limburger, 88 
 Tex. 79, 30 S. W. 533, 53 Am. St 
 
 Georgia. — South Carolina R. R. 
 Co. V. Steiner, 44 Ga. 546; Atlanta, 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Atlanta, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 125 6a. 529, 54 S. E. 736 ; Har- 
 rold V. Americus, 142 Ga. 686, 83 
 S. B. 534. 
 
 Illinois. — Indianapolis, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Hartley, 67 111. 439, 16 Am. 
 Rep. 624; Bond v. Pennsylvania R. 
 R. Co., 171 111. 508, 49 N. E. 545; 
 O'Connell v. Chicago Terminal 
 Transfer R. R. Co., 184 111. 308, 56 
 N. E. 355; Wilder v. Aurora, etc.. 
 Traction Co., 216 111. 493, 75 N. E. 
 194. 
 
 Indiana. — ^Tate v. Ohio, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 7 Ind. 479 ; Protzman v. Indian- 
 apolis, etc., R. R. Co., 9 Ind. 467, 68 
 Am. Dec. 650; Cox v. Louisville, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 48 Ind. 178; Terre 
 Haute, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rodel, 89 
 Ind. 128, 46 Am. Rep. 164; Porter 
 V. Midland R. R. Co., 125 Ind. 476, 
 25 N. E. 566; Mordhurst v. Ft 
 Wayne, etc., R. R. Co., 163 Ind. 268, 
 71 'N. E. 642, 66 L. R. A. 105, 106 
 Am. St. Rep. 222. 
 
 Iowa. — Kucheman v. Chicago, 
 etc., Ry. Co., 46 Iowa 366 ; McClean 
 V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 67 Iowa 
 568, 25 N. W. 782. 
 
 Kansas. — Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Woodward, 47 Kan. 191, 27 Pac. 
 836. 
 
 Louisiana. — Bradley v. Pharr, 45 
 La. Ann. 426, 12 So. 618, 19 L. R. A, 
 647. 
 
 Maryland. — Phipps v. Western 
 Maryland R. R. Co., 66 Md. 319, 7 
 Atl. 556. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Springfield v. 
 Connecticut River R. R. Co., 4 Cush. 
 63; Onset Ry. Co. v. Plymouth 
 County Commissioners, 154 Mass. 
 395, 28 N. E. 286; Howe v. West 
 End St Ry. Co., 167 Mass. 46, 44 
 N. B. 306. 
 
 Michigan. — Grand Rapids, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Heisel, 38 Mich. 62, 31 
 Am. Rep. 306, 47 Mich. 393. 
 
 Minnesota. — Schurmeier v. St. 
 Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 10 Minn. 82, 
 88 Am. Dec. 59; Gray v. St. Paul, 
 
§ 167 Additional Sbevitudes Upon Highways. 
 
 527 
 
 of his land is taken, is not entitled to compensation for the 
 incidental injury, for such an injury is not severe enough to 
 amount to a taking.^" Consequently he was held to have no 
 remedy if a railroad was built in a street upon which his 
 land abutted but of which he did not own the fee," unless 
 the railroad company exceeded its authority or inflicted 
 
 Rep. 730 ; McCammon & Lang Lum- 
 ber Co. V. Trinity, etc., Ky. Co., 104 
 Tex. 8, 133 S. W. 247, 36 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 662, Ann. Cas. 1913 E 870. 
 
 Vermont. — Wead v. St. Johns- 
 bury, etc., R. R. Co., 64 Vt. 52, 24 
 Atl. 361. 
 
 Virginia. — Hodges v. Seaboard, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 88 Va. 653, 14 S. E. 
 380. 
 
 Washington. — Schwede v. Heln- 
 rlch Bros. Brewing Co., 29 Wash. 
 21, 69 Pac. 362 ; Kell v. Grays Har- 
 bor, etc., Ry. Co., 71 Wash. 163, 127 
 Pac. 1113. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Ford v. Chicago, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 14 Wis. 609, 80 Am. Dec. 
 791 ; Pomeroy v. Milwaukee, etc., R. 
 R. Co., 16 Wis. 640; Carl v. She- 
 boygan, etc., R. R. Co., 46 Wis. 625, 
 1 N. W. 295; Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. 
 V. Milwaukee, etc., Ry. Co., 95 Wis. 
 561, 70 N. W. 678, 60 Am. St. Rep. 
 136. 
 
 10. Supra, S 114, and upon the 
 question whether a steam railroad 
 upon its own location Is a legal 
 damage to neighboring property, see 
 infra, § 317. 
 
 11. United States. — Slmplot v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 5 McCrary 
 158, 16 Fed. 350; Frankle v. Jack- 
 eon, 30 Fed. 398. 
 
 California. — Carson v. Central R. 
 R. Co., 35 Cal. 325. 
 
 Colorado. — Colorado, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Mollandln, 4 Colo. 154; Den- 
 ver Circle R. R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 
 Colo. 403, 426, 15 Pac. 714, 726. 
 
 District of ColumMa. — Notting- 
 ham V. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 3 
 McArth. 517; Click v. Baltimore, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 19 D. C. 412. 
 
 Illinois. — Moses v. Pittsburg, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 21 111. 516; Murphy v. 
 Chicago, 29 111. 279, 81 Am. Dec. 
 307; Stetson v. Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 75 111. 74 ; Chicago, etc., R. R. ' 
 
 Co. V. MoGlnnls, 79 111. 269; Olney 
 V. Wharf, 115 111. 519, 5 N. E. 366, 
 56 Am. Rep. 178. 
 
 Indiana. — Indiana, etc., Ry. Co. 
 V. Eberle, 110 Ind. 542, 59 Am. Rep. 
 225. 
 
 Iowa. — Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 24 Iowa 455; Dav- 
 enport V. Stevenson, 34 Iowa 225; 
 Barr v. Oskaloosa, 45 Iowa 275; 
 Davis V. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 
 46 Iowa 389. 
 
 Kansas. — Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Garslde, 10 Kan. 552; Ottawa, 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Larson, 40 Kan. 
 301, 19 Pac. 661, 2 L. R. A. 59; 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Union 
 Investment Co., 51 Kan. 600, 33 
 Pac. 378. 
 
 Louisiana. — Harrison v. New Or- 
 leans, etc., Ry. Co., 34 La. Ann. 462, 
 44 Am. Rep. 438; Hill v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 38 La. Ann. 599. 
 
 Maryland. — O'Brien v. Baltimore, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 74 Md. 363, 22 Atl. 
 141, 13 L. R. A. 126. 
 
 Michigan. — Grand Rapids, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Heisel, 38 Mich. 62, 31 
 Am. Rep. 306. 
 
 New Jersey. — Morris, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Newark, 10 N. J. Eq. 352. 
 
 New York. — Drake v. Hudson 
 River R. R. Co., 7 Barb. 508 ; Fobes 
 V. Rome, etc., R. R. Co., 121 N. X. 
 505, 24 N. E. 919, 8 L. R. A. 453. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Wlllock v. Beaver 
 Valley R. R. Co., 222 Pa. 590, 72 
 Atl. 237. 
 
 South Carolina. — McLauchlin v. 
 Charlotte, etc., R. R. Co., 5 Rich. 
 583. 
 
 Tennessee. — Iron Mt. R. R. Co. v. 
 Bingham, 87 Term. 522, 11 S. W. 
 705, 4 L. R. A. 622. 
 
 Texas. — Houston, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Odum, 53 Tex. 343; Rlsche v. 
 Texas Transportation Co., 27 Tex. 
 Civ. App. 33, 66 S. W. 324. 
 
528 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 167 
 
 unreasonable and unnecessary damage so that, its justifica- 
 tion failing, it would be liable at common law for an illegal 
 obstruction of the street inflicting special and peculiar 
 injury upon the adjoining lots.^^ 
 
 When however the doctrine that abutters have easements 
 of light, air and access in a street, even if they do not own 
 the fee, came to be generally accepted,^^ a remedy for the 
 damage resulting from the construction of steam railroads 
 in streets owned by the public was available, but the appli- 
 cation of this doctrine to cases of the character now under 
 discussion has been by no means uniform. In states in 
 which it is held that a steam railroad is a proper street use 
 and that the abutting owner has no remedy when a railroad 
 is constructed in a street of which he owns the fee, it neces- 
 sarily follows that he has no greater rights if he does not 
 own the fee, and that his easements of light, air and access 
 are subordinate to the public right to use the street for rail- 
 road as well as for other highway purposes.^* In the states 
 which limit the right of the abutter to recovery for actual 
 injury to access, light and air, the construction of a steam 
 railroad in the middle of a public way at the street grade is 
 not considered a taking of the abutter's property, and no 
 right to compensation arises unless by the nearness of the 
 tracks to the curb or the construction of the raUroad upon 
 
 Vermont. — Hatch v. Vermont Louisiana^. — Hepting v. New Or- 
 
 Central R. E. Co., 25 Vt. 49. Jeans, etc., B. B. Go., 36 La. Ann. 
 
 West Virginia. — Tates v. West 898. 
 
 Grafton, 34 W. Va. 783, 12 S. E. Michigan.— Gi:B.n6. Rapids, etc., 
 
 1075. R. B. Co. V. Heisel, 38 Mich. 62, 31 
 
 Wisconsin. — Hanlin v. Chicago, -*ni- I^ep. 306. 
 
 etc., B. R. Co., 61 Wis. 515, 21 N. W. ^^w Jersey.— Pennsylvania B. R. 
 
 623 ; Heiss v. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. ^o. v. Angel, 41 N. J. Eq. 316, 56 
 
 Co., 69 Wis. 555, 34 N. W. 916. -^™- ^^P- ^ ' Methodist Episcopal 
 
 12. United States.- Chicago, etc., f^^^^h v. Pennsylvania E. R. Co., 
 
 Tly. Co. V. First Methodist Episcopal ^^ K J. T^q 452, 22 Atl. 183. 
 
 Ohio.— Little Miami R. B. Co. v. 
 Naylor, .2 Ohio St. ^35, 59 Am. Dec. 
 
 District of Columbia.- Baltimore, ^^''pennsylvania.-Hanimm v. Media, 
 etc. E. E. Co. V. Fitzgerald, 2 App. g^c. By. Co., 200 Pa. 44, 49 Atl. 
 
 Church, 42 C. C. A. 178, 102 Fed. 85, 
 50 L. E. A. 448. 
 
 D. C. 519, 
 
 789. 
 
 FZorWo.— Garnett v. Jacksonville, Wisconsin.— Evans v. Chicago, 
 
 etc., R. E. Co., 20 Fla. 889. etc.. By. Co., 86 Wis. 597, 57 N. W. 
 
 ffarasas.— Ottawa, etc., B. R. Co. 354, 39 Am. St. Rep. 908. 
 
 V. Larsen, 40 Kan. 301, 19 Pac. 661, 13. Supra, § 160. 
 
 2 L. R. A. 59. 14. Supra, note 8. 
 
§ 167 Additional Seevitudes Upon Highways. 
 
 529 
 
 a viaduct, or by other similar means, the abutters' ease- 
 ments of access, light and air are materially impaired." 
 
 In those states in which it is held that the relative rights 
 of the public and the abutters are the same, regardless of 
 the ownership of the fee, and that any use of the highway 
 which would not be a proper exercise of the highway ease- 
 ment is, when the public owns the fee, an interference with 
 the abutter's easements, and in which it is also held that 
 a steam railroad in a street is an additional servitude as a 
 matter of law, it necessarily follows that the abutting owner 
 
 15. In Kelning v. New York, etc., 
 Ey. Co., 128 N. Y. 157, 28 N. E. 640, 
 14 Ij. E. a. 133, It appeared that a 
 railroad company liad constructed 
 an embankment five feet high in a 
 street in front of plaintiff's prem- 
 ises, leaving a strip less than nine 
 feet wide between the embankment 
 and the sidewalk. The fee was in 
 the city. Held, plaintiff might re- 
 cover, the court saying, " It is no 
 longer open to debate in this state 
 that owners of lots abutting on a 
 city street, although they have no 
 title to the soU, are nevertheless en- 
 titled to the benefit of the street in 
 front of their premises for access 
 and other purposes of which they 
 cannot be deprived except upon 
 compensation. The right of abut- 
 ting owners in the streets is not, 
 however, of that absolute character 
 that they can resist and prevent any 
 and all interferences with the street 
 to their detriment, or which can be 
 asserted to stay the hand of the 
 municipality in the control, regula- 
 tion or improvement of the streets 
 in the public interest, although it 
 may be made to appear that the 
 privileges which they had thereto- 
 fore enjoyed and the benefits they 
 had derived from the street in its 
 existing condition would be cur- 
 tailed or impaired to their injury 
 by the changes proposed. * * * 
 While the law now is that it is 
 competent for the legislature to au- 
 thorize raUroad tracks, either for 
 steam or horse railroads, to be laid 
 on the ordinary grade of streets, the 
 
 34 
 
 fee of which is in the state or mu- 
 nicipality, without making compen- 
 sation to abutting owners for conse- 
 quential injuries to their property, 
 the legislature cannot legally au- 
 thorize structures for railroad pur- 
 poses to be erected therein for the 
 use and convenience of railroads 
 which practically exclude the abut- 
 ting owners from the part of the 
 street so occupied, without compen- 
 sating them for the injury suffered, 
 and that it is not necessary that 
 there should be an actual physical 
 exclusion of the lot owners from 
 the use of that part of the street 
 occupied by such structures in order 
 to entitle them to a legal remedy. 
 It is enough if such part of the 
 street is practically and substan- 
 tially closed against them for ordi- 
 nary street uses." See also, 
 
 California. — Smith v. Southern 
 Pacific Eailroad Co., 146 Cal. 164, 
 79 Pac. 868, 106 Am. St. Eep. 17; 
 Williams v. Los Angeles R. E. Co., 
 150 Cal. 592, 89 Pac. 330. 
 
 Kansas. — Central Branch Union 
 Pacific Eailroad Co. v. Twine, 23 
 Kan. 585, 83 Am. Rep. 203. 
 
 'Nebraska. — Burlington & Mis- 
 souri Eailroad Co. v. Eeinhackle, 15 
 Neb. 279, 18 N. W. 69, 48 Am. Eep. 
 842. 
 
 New York. — Fobes v. Eome, etc., 
 Eailroad Co., 121 N. Y. 505, 24 N. E. 
 919, 8 L. E. A. 453. 
 
 Tennessee. — Smith v. Bast End 
 St. Ey. Co., 87 Tenn. 626, 11 S. W. 
 709. 
 
530 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 167 
 
 is constitutionally entitled to compensation for the con- 
 struction of a steam railroad in the street in front of hi^ 
 premises.^* 
 
 Even in the states which have not accepted the doctrine 
 of abutters' easements, an abutter who does not own the 
 fee of the street is not always without remedy for the con-' 
 struction of a steam railroad in the street in front of his 
 premises. In the states which have adopted the constitu- 
 tional amendment requiring compensation when property 
 has been damaged for the public use, the abutter is entitled 
 to recover any special and peculiar damages resulting from 
 the construction of a railroad in the street ; " and in some of 
 the other states in recent years statutes have been enacted 
 providing for compensation to the abutters, regardless of 
 the ownership of the fee, when railroads are constructed in 
 the public streets.** Nevertheless it still remains the law 
 in most of the states that an abutter who does not own. the 
 
 16. Georgia. — South Carolina E. 
 R. Co. V. Steiner, 44 Ga. 546; 
 Streyer v. Georgia, etc., R. R. Co., 
 90 Ga. 56, 15 S. B. 637. 
 
 Indiana. — Decker v. Evansville 
 Suburban, etc., R. R. Co., 133 Ind. 
 493, 33 N. E. 349. 
 
 Louisiana. — Hepting v. New Or- 
 leans, etc., R. R. Co., 36 La. Ann. 
 898. 
 
 Minnesota. — Schurmeier v. St. 
 Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 10 Minn. 82, 88 
 Am. Dec. 59 ; Brakken v. Minneapo- 
 lis, etc., R. E. Co., 29 Minn. 41, 11 
 N. W. 124; Adams v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 39 Minn. 286, 39 N. W. 
 629, 1 L. R. A. 493, 12 Am. St. Rep. 
 644; Lamm v. Chicago, etc., R. E. 
 Co., 45 Minn. 71, 47 N. W. 455, 10 
 L. R. A. 268. 
 
 Mississippi. — Theobold v. Louis- 
 Tille, etc., R. R. Co., 66 Miss. 279, 6 
 So. 230, 4 L. R. A. 735, 14 Am. St. 
 Rep. 564. 
 
 North Carolina. — ^White v. North- 
 western, etc., R. E. Co., 113 N. C. 
 610, 18 S. E. 330, 22 L. E. A. 627, 37 
 Am. St. Rep. 639. 
 
 OMo. — Scioto Valley Railway Co. 
 V. Lawrence, 38 OMo St. 41, 43 Am. 
 Rep. 419. 
 
 South Carolina. — South Bound E. 
 E. Co. V. Burton, 67 S. C. 315, 46 
 S. E. 340. 
 
 Utah. — Dooly Block v. Salt Lake 
 Eapid Transit Co., 9 Utah 31, 33 
 Pac. 229, 24 L. R. A. 610. 
 
 17. Infra, § 324. 
 
 18. See for example. 
 
 United States. — Shepherd v. Bal- 
 timore, etc., R. R. Co., 130 U. S. 
 426, 32 L. ed. 970. 
 
 Connecticut. — Bradley v. New 
 York, etc., R. R. Co., 21 Conn. 294. 
 
 Georgia. — Streyer v. Georgia 
 Southern Ry. Co., 90 Ga. 56, 15 
 S. E. 637. 
 
 Iowa. — Mulholand v. Des Moines, 
 etc., R. E. Co., 60 Iowa 740, 13 
 N. W. 726; Merchants' Union Barb 
 Wire Co. v. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 
 70 Iowa 105, 28 N. W. 494; Gates 
 V. Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 82 Iowa 
 518, 48 N. W. 1040; Middleton v. 
 Mason City, etc., E. E. Co., 127 
 Iowa 433, 103 N. W. 364. 
 
 Kentucky. — ^Koch v. Kentucky, 
 etc.. Bridge Co., 26 Ky. L. Eep. 216, 
 80 S. W. 1133. 
 
 Maryland. — Lake Roland El. E. 
 E. Co. V. Hibernian Society, 83 Md. 
 420, 34 Atl. 1017. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Onset Ey. Co. v. 
 Plymouth County Commissioners, 
 154 Mass. 395, 28 N. B. 286. 
 
 Michigan. — Grand Eapids, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Heisel, 47 Mich. 393, 
 11 N. W. 212. 
 
§ 168 Additional Servitudes Upon Highways. 531 
 
 fee of the street cannot treat the construction of a steam 
 railroad in the street in front of his premises as in and of 
 itself a violation of his constitutional rights, and as enti- 
 tling him to recover the entire depreciation in the market 
 value of his property, or even as giving him a right to com- 
 pensation at all,*^ in the absence of any actual physical 
 injury, or cutting off of access to his premises by the prox- 
 imity of the tracks to the curb, or permanent obstruction of 
 light and air by the erection of a trestle or a viaduct in the 
 street. 
 
 § 168. Steam Railroads in Public Highways — Miscella- 
 neous Points. 
 
 The decisions set forth in the preceding section are not 
 applicable to street railways properly so-called, even if 
 steam is used as a motive power. The so-called ' ' dummy 
 lines," for example, are generally classed as street rail- 
 ways, and are not considered to constitute an additional 
 servitude upon a public way.^" On the other hand, railroad 
 tracks placed upon a street temporarily, to accommodate 
 the regular traffic of a steam railroad while alterations are 
 being made in its roadbed, constitute an additional servi- 
 tude while the use continues.^^ 
 
 If the right of the abutting owner to compensation is 
 based upon his ownership of the fee of the street in which 
 the railroad is constructed, as his title extends only to the 
 middle of the street, a railroad wholly upon one side of the 
 
 2few Hampshire. — Strickford v. 22 Pac. 583 ; Leavenworth, etc, R. 
 
 Boston, etc., E. R. Co., 73 N. H. 81, R. Co. v. Curtan, 51 Kan. 432, 33 
 
 59 Atl. 367. Pac. 297. 
 
 Ohio. — Columbus, etc., R. R. Co. Ohio. — Cleveland Burial Case Co. 
 
 V. Gardner, 45 Ohio St. 309, 13 N. E. v. Erie Ry. Co., 24 Ohio Cir. Ct. 
 
 69; Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. 107. 
 
 Campbell, 51 Ohio St. 328, 37 N. B. Oklahoma. — Scrutchfleld v. Choc- 
 
 266. taw, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Okla. 308, 88 
 
 19. See for example Willock v. Pac. 1048, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 496. 
 
 Beaver Valley R. R. Co., 222 Pa. Oregon. — McQuaid v. Portland, 
 
 590, 72 Atl. 237. See also, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Ore. 237, 22 Pac. 
 
 Florida.— Florida Southern R. R. 899. 
 
 Co. V. Brown, 23 Fla. 104. Tennessee. — Iron Mt. R. R. Co. v. 
 
 Illinois. — Stack v. East St. Louis, Bingham, 87 Term. 522, 11 S. W. 
 
 85 111. 377, 28 Am. Rep. 619. 705, 4 L. R. A. 622. 
 
 Kansas. — Kansas, etc., R. R. Co. 20. Infra, § 170. 
 
 V. Cuykendall, 42 Kan. 234, 21 Pac. 21. McKeon v. New York, etc., R. 
 
 1051, 16 Am. St. Rep. 479 ; Ft. Scott, E. Co., 75 Conn. 343, 53 Atl. 656, 
 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Fox, 42 Kan. 490, 61 L. R. A. 730. 
 
532 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 §168 
 
 street is not an additional servitude upon the property of 
 abutters upon the other side,*^ and when the railroad is in 
 the middle of the street the abutters upon each side are enti- 
 tled to compensation for that portion of the railroad only 
 which is constructed upon their own territory,** although 
 this last distinction is hardly capaJble of accurate applica- 
 tion, at least by a jury ; but, in states in which the easements 
 of light, air and access are recognized, such easements 
 extend to the whole of the way, and an abutting owner would 
 be entitled to damages for the impairment of such ease- 
 ments by a structure wholly on the other side of the street.** 
 The construction of a railroad in a street, under legislative 
 authority, is not however, it would seem, in any view of the 
 law, a violation of the eonstitutionalr rights of the owners 
 of land which does not abut upon that portion of the street 
 in which the railroad is located, so far as their rights are 
 based upon their ownership of the fee of the street, and in 
 some states it is held that the abutters' easements do not 
 extend iDeyond that portion of the street which lies in front 
 of the land in question.^^ 
 
 22. Indiana, «tc., R. R. Co. t. Bb- 
 erle, 110 Ind. 542, 11 N. B. 467, 59 
 Am. Hep. 225; Stewart v. Ohio 
 ElYer R. R. Co., 38 W. Va. 438, 18 
 S. E. 604. 
 
 23. Kucheman v. Chicago, etc., B. 
 R. Co., 46 Iowa 8'66. In this case 
 the court said, " There is great diffi- 
 culty in separating the damages for 
 which a recovery Is allowable from 
 those for which It is not, yet such a 
 separation must be made. If the 
 whole damages sustained by plain- 
 tiffs are $1,200, as the jury found, 
 the plaintiffs can recover only that 
 part thereof which arises from liie 
 occupancy of their side of the street. 
 We can lay down no rule for its as- 
 certainment which we think would 
 be of any practical benefit. The 
 damages recoverable are somewhat 
 more than one half of the whole 
 damages suffered, because the plain- 
 tiffs suffer somewhat more from the 
 occupancy of their side of the street 
 than from the occupancy of the 
 other. With this thought in mind, 
 the jury must allow such portion of 
 
 the entire damages as to fhem seems 
 lighL" 
 
 24. Adams v. Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 ■Co., 39 Minn. 286, 39 N. W. 629, 1 
 L. R. A. 493, 12 Am. St Rep. 644. 
 And see also supra, § 161, note 20. 
 
 25. Arkansas. — Tattle Rock, etc., 
 Eallroad Co. v. Newman, 73 Ark. 1, 
 83 S. W. 653, 108 Am. St. Rep. 17. 
 
 Florida. — Jacksonville, etc., Rail- 
 road Co. V. Thompson, 34 JFla. 346, 
 16 So. 282, 26 L. R. A. 410, and see 
 also the following section. 
 
 See however contra, 
 
 Kentucky. — Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Elliot, 129 Ky. 121, 110 S. W. 
 817. 
 
 Maryland. — Baltimore, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Strauss, 37 Md. 237; Lake 
 Roland El. R. R. Co. v. Webster, 81 
 Md. 529, 32 Atl. 186. 
 
 Missouri. — Heer Dry Goods Co. v. 
 Citizens' R. R. Co., 41 Mo. App. 63. 
 
 New York. — ^Eldert v. Long Island 
 El. R. R. Co., 28 App. Div. 451, 51 
 N. Y. Supp. 186. 
 
 Teanas. — Haney v. Gulf, etc, R, R. 
 Co., 3 Tex. App. Civ. Cas. 336. 
 
§ 168 Additional Seevitudes Upon Highways. 533 
 
 When the right to locate a railroad in a strip of land 
 already subject to the highway easement is acquired by emi- 
 nent domain, and the whole highway is subjected to the 
 concurrent easement of a railroad, damages should be 
 assessed upon the basis of the right acquired and of the use 
 thereof which is reasonably probable, and if the railroad 
 company lays but a single track at first, but afterwards 
 finds it necessary to lay additional tracks or to alter the 
 grade of its roadbed so it is no longer the same as that of 
 the street, the abutting owners are not entitled to additional 
 compensation.^® When however, as is usually the case, the 
 railroad company has laid its tracks ip. the public streets 
 without a formal condemnation of a definite location, and 
 has merely paid such damages as have been awarded the 
 abutters in ordinary common law actions, or in statutory 
 proceedings in which the measure of damages is the injury 
 actually inflicted, the company has acquired no rights in 
 the street except what it has actually exercised, and it can- 
 not alter the grade of its roadbed or lay additional tracks 
 without subjecting itself to the obligation of paying addi- 
 tional damages.^^ Mere increase in the traffic or the opera- 
 tion of an additional number of trains will not however 
 entitle the owner of the fee to additional compensation.^ 
 
 26. White V. Ctiicago, etc, E. R. Texas. — International, etc., R. E. 
 Co., 122 Ind. 317, 23 N. E. 782, 7 Co. v. Bell (Tex. Civ. App.), 130 
 L. R. A. 257 ; Davis v. Chicago, etc., g. w. 634. 
 
 R. R. Co., 46 Iowa 389. See also a fortiori ia this the case when 
 
 infra, I 193. the second track is laid by another 
 
 27. Arffftawtr.— Bimrimgham Belt railroad company. Southern Pacific 
 R. R. Co. V. lujckwood, 150 Ala. 610» r jj. Co. v. Reed, 41 Cal, 256. 
 
 43 So. 819. _ 28. Birmingham Belt K. R. Co. v. 
 
 minois-Bona V. PfnW ™ Lockwood, 150 Ala. 610, 43 So. 819 ; 
 
 Co., 171 II 508 49 N. E. 545; Dav- Hennegan v. Denver, etc., Ry. Co. 
 
 enport Bridge Ry. Co. v. Johnson, ,, ri„i„ loo nir i^ Lo ..= t ■,, . 
 
 188 111. 47? 59 N. B. 497; Rock f^^olo. 122, 95 Pac. 343 16 L. R. A. 
 
 Island, etc., R. R. Co. v. Johnson, l^' ^-IJ^^.^^^- ^*- »«P- ^^^' 
 
 204 111. 488, 68 N. B. 549. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Orr, 91 
 
 Iowa.— Henry v. Mason City, etc., ^y- 10^, 15 S. W. 8. So also when 
 
 R. R. Co., 140 Iowa 201, 118 N. W. *^® ^^^^ ^^ changed from narrow 
 
 31L to standard guage (Kakeldy v. Co- 
 
 -New rorfc.— Stephens v. New lumbia, etc., Co., 37 Wash. 675, SO 
 
 York, etc., R. R., 175 N. Y. 72, 67 Pac- 205), or when another railroad 
 
 N. B. 119. ^^ allowed to use the same track. 
 
 Ohio. — Chambers v. Cleveland, Miller v. Green Bay, etc., Ry. Co., 
 
 etc.. Traction Co., 5 Ohio C. C. N. S. 59 Minn. 169, 60 N. W. 1006, 26 
 
 298, 27 Ohio C. C. 193 ; Herzog v. L. R. A. 443. See however Hutche- 
 
 Cincinnati, 2 Ohio N. P. N. S. 17, son v. International, etc., Ry. Co., 
 
 14 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 529. 102 Tex. 471, 119 S. W. 85. 
 
534 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 169 
 
 When the construction of a railroad in a public street 
 involves the taking of private property — that is, when the 
 abutters own the fee of the street, or the local law recog- 
 nizes the existence of easements of access, light and air 
 which will be impaired by the location of the railroad — to 
 justify its location without the consent of the abutting own- 
 ers the railroad must be a common carrier of passengers or 
 freight,^* since property cannot be taken for a private use, 
 even upon payment of compensation ; *'' but a spur track 
 leading only to a private factory or commercial establish- 
 ment, if open to public use as part of the system of the rail- 
 road company with which it connected, is not a private 
 railroad, and may be laid in a street under the same con- 
 siderations as a railroad in general public use.^^ 
 
 § 169. Steam Railroads Crossing Public Highways. 
 
 When a steam railroad is laid out across a, public high- 
 way, the rights of the owners of Ihe land in front of which 
 the railroad is located are the same as when the railroad 
 runs longitudinally in the street.^^ Thus when the steam 
 railroad crosses the highway at right angles, if the fee of 
 the highway is in the abutters, they are entitled to com- 
 pensation for so much of the land within the highway as is 
 taken by the railroad ; and if the railroad crosses the street 
 diagonally there may be a taking of the easements of light, 
 air and access of the owners of property in front of which 
 the railroad passes.^^ 
 
 When a railroad is laid out across a highway at grade, the 
 owners of land abutting upon the street, other than those in 
 front of whose land the railroad passes, are not entitled 
 
 29. Kansas. — Mikesell v. Durkee, Utah. — Cereghino v. Oregon Short 
 
 34 Kan. 509, 9 Pac. 278. Line KaUroad Co., 26 Utah 467, 73 
 
 Louisiana.— Brsidley v . Pharr, 45 Pac. 634, 99 Am. St. Rep. 843. 
 
 La. Ann. 426, 12 So. 618, 19 L. R. A. 30. Supra, § 67. 
 
 647. 31. Sherlock v. Kansas City Belt 
 
 Minnesota.— Gnstsif son v. Hamm, Ry. Co., 142 Mo. 172, 43 S. W. 629, 
 
 56 Minn. 334, 57 N. W. 1054, 22 64 Am. St. Rep. 551. 
 
 L. R. A. 565. 32. Starr v. Camden, etc., R. R. 
 
 Missouri. — Sherlock v. Kansas Co., 24 N. J. L. 592 ; Trustees v. 
 
 City Belt Railway Co., 142 Mo. 172, Auburn, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Hill 
 
 43 S. W. 629, 64 Am. St. Rep. 551. (N. Y.) 567. 
 
 New York. — Hatfield v. Straus, 33. Minneapolis, etc., Traction Co. 
 
 189 N. T. 208, 82 N. B. 172. v. Searle, 208 Fed. 122. 
 
 Oregon. — Kurtz v. Southern Pa- 
 cific R. R. Co., 155 Pac. 367. 
 
§ 169 Additional Servitudes Upon Highways. 535 
 
 to compensation for the annoyance and delay to which they 
 may be put in crossing the tracks, even if the market value 
 of their property is perceptibly affected, as this is a dam- 
 age shared with the public at large ; ^* and the rule is the 
 same even if the grade of the street in front of the land 
 in question is raised or lowered solely on account of the 
 railroad crossing ; *^ since the public has the right to change 
 the grade of its streets to facilitate general travel, whether 
 the impediment to travel thus removed be natural or 
 artificial.*® 
 
 When a railroad crosses a highway at a higher or a lower 
 grade, and the grade of the highway is raised or lowered 
 to cross over or under the railroad, the owners of adjoining 
 property have no constitutional right to compensation, for 
 the reasons just stated.^'' If a railroad crosses a street at 
 a grade different from that of the street and no bridge is 
 provided for carrying the highway over the tracks or the 
 tracks over the highway, so that travel through the street 
 is cut off, land abutting on the street may be decreased in 
 value by the diversion of traffic and lessened accessibility, 
 but, if it may still be reached from the public streets, accord- 
 ing to the rule generally prevailing, the owner is not entitled 
 to compensation, for the damage differs in degree only and 
 not in kind from that suffered by the general public.** 
 When however the highway obstructed was the only means 
 of reaching other public ways from the lots abutting upon 
 
 34. Morgan v. Des Moines & St. 57 Minn. 294, 59 N. W. 304, 26 
 Louis Railway Co., 64 Iowa 589, 52 L. R. A. 92, 47 Am. St. Rep. 605. 
 Am. Rep. 462 ; Scrutchfleld v. Choc- New York. — XJline v. New York 
 taw, etc.. Railroad Co., 18 Okla. 308, Central, etc.. Railroad Co., 101 N. Y. 
 88 Pac. 1048, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 496. 98, 4 N. E. 536, 54 Am. Rep. 661; 
 So also municipalities may estab- Rauenstein v. New York, etc., Rail- 
 lish gates for the protection of the road Co., 136 N. Y. 528, 32 N. E. 
 public at a grade crossing, and the 1047, 18 L. R. A. 768. 
 
 owner of the premises in front of Vermont. — Richardson v. Vermont 
 
 which they are placed is without Central Railroad Co., 25 Vt 465, 60 
 
 remedy. Textor v. Baltimore, etc., Am. Dec. 283. 
 
 R. R. Co., 59 Md. 63, 43 Am. Rep. 36. Supra, § 163. 
 
 540. 37. Supra, § 163. 
 
 35. Connecticut. — Nicholson v. 38. Shaubert v. St. Paul, etc., R. 
 New York & New Haven Railroad R. Co., 21 Minn. 502; Rummel v. 
 Co., 22 Conn. 74, 56 Am. Dec. 390. New York, etc., R. R., 30 N. Y. St. 
 
 Iowa. — Slatten v. Des Moines Val- Rep. 235. See also supra, § 115, and 
 
 ley Railroad Co., 29 Iowa 148, 4 Am. infra, § 323, for a fuller discussion 
 
 Rep. 205. of the principles Involved. 
 
 Mitmesota. — Kelly v. Minneapolis, 
 
536 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 170 
 
 it, the injury to the land so cut off is special and peculiar, 
 and so severe as to constitute a taking in the constitutional 
 sense, and the owners are entitled to compensation.*® 
 
 § 170. Street Railways of the Earlier Types. 
 
 A street railway in the original sense of the term was a 
 railway laid wholly or principally in the public streets in 
 such a way as not to exclude othey traffic from the space 
 between the rails, operating single cars at frequent inter- 
 vals from place to place within the same town or in contigu- 
 ous towns, carrying passengers only, and taking them up 
 and setting them down at street crossings and other con- 
 venient places.*" 
 
 The first street railways introduced into American cities 
 
 39. Georgia. — Harvey v. Georgia 
 Southern R. K. Co., 90 Ga. 66, 15 
 S. E. 783. 
 
 Illinois. — Winnetka v. Clifford, 
 201 111. 475, 66 N. E. 384; Chicago 
 V. Webb, 102 111. App. 282. 
 
 Iowa. — Dairy v. Iowa Central 
 Ey. Co., 113 Iowa 716, 84 N. W. 688. 
 
 Minnesota. — Brakken v. Minne- 
 apolis, etc., Ry. Co., 29 Minn. 41, 11 
 N. W. 124 ; Hayes v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 46 Minn. 349, 49 N. W. 
 61. 
 
 Compare McQuade v. Rex, 7 Can. 
 Exch. 318. See also supra, § 115, 
 and infra, § 323. 
 
 40. Upon the meaning of " street 
 railway " see note in 2 St Ry. Rep. 
 294; Nellis, Street Railways, § 1. 
 Upon the distinctign between steam 
 railroads and street railways see. 
 
 United States. — Williams v. City 
 Electric St. Ry. Co., 41 Fed. 556; 
 Marlott V. CoUinsville, etc., Ry. Co., 
 47 C. C. A. 345, 108 Fed. 313. 
 
 California. — Railroad Commis- 
 sioners V. Market St. Ry. Co., 132 
 Cal. 677, 64 Pac. 1065. 
 
 Illinois. — Harvey v. Aurora, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 174 111. 295, 51 N. E. 163 ; 
 Wilder v. Aurora, etc., Traction Co., 
 216 HI. 493, 75 N. E. 194, 4 St. Ry. 
 Rep. 185 ; Spalding v. Macomb, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 225 111. 585, 80 N. E. 327. 
 
 Indiana. — Mordhurst v. Fort 
 Wayne, etc.. Traction Co., 163 Ind. 
 
 268, 71 N. E. 642, 66 L. R. A. 105, 
 106 Am. St. Rep. 222, 2 Ann. Cas. 
 967 ; Kinsey v. Union Traction Co., 
 169 Ind. 563, 81 N. E. 922. 
 
 Kentucky. — Louisville, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Louisville City Ry. Co., 3 
 Duv. 175. 
 
 Maryland. — Baltimore v. Balti- 
 more, etc., R. R. Co., 84 Md. 1, 35 
 Atl. 17, 33 L. R. A. 503. 
 
 Michigan. — Nichols v. Ann Arbor, 
 etc., St. Ry. Co., 87 Mich. 361, 49 
 N. W. 538, 16 L. R. A. 371; Ecorse 
 V. Jackson, etc., R. R. Co., 153 Mich. 
 393, 117 N. W. 89. 
 
 Minnesota. — Newell v. Minneapo- 
 lis, etc., R. R. Co., 35 Minn. 112, 27 
 N. W. 839, 59 Am. Rep. 303. 
 
 'North Carolina. — Merrick v. In- 
 tramontaine R. R. Co., 118 N. C. 
 1081, 24 S. E. 667. 
 
 Ohio. — Stale v. Dayton Traction 
 Co., 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. 490, 10 Ohio 
 C. D. 212. 
 
 Oregon. — Thomson-Houston Elec. 
 Co. V. Simon, 20 Ore. 60, 25 Pac. 
 147. 
 
 Tennessee. — East End St. Ry. Co. 
 V. Doyle, 88 Tenn. 747, 13 S. W. 936, 
 9 L. R. A. 100, 17 Am. St. Rep. 933. 
 
 Texas. — Rische v. Texas Trans- 
 portation Co., 27 Tex. Civ. App. 33, 
 66 S. W. 324. 
 
 Wisoonsi/n. — Zehren v. Milwaukee 
 Electric Ry. Co., 99 Wis. 83, 74 
 N. W. 538, 41 L. R. A. 575. 
 
§ 170 Additional Seevitudes Upon Highways. 
 
 537 
 
 were operated by horse power.*^ The rails were flat and 
 laid so as not to incommode other travel j the cars were 
 small, few in nnmber, carried passengers only, and stopped 
 at every street corner. The change from the old-fashioned 
 omnibus was not great, and the courts almost invariably 
 held that horse railways were not an additional servitude.*" 
 
 41. It was said by the court in 
 Slaughter v. Meridian Light, etc., 
 Co., 95 Miss. 251, 48 So. 6, 1040, 25 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1265, "The first 
 street railway of whieh we have 
 any history was constructed by one 
 John Stephenson in 1831 in the city 
 of New York. This venture proved 
 a failure from a commercial stand- 
 point, and in a short while was 
 abandoned. The enterprise was 
 again resumed in 1845, and from 
 this date it may be said that this 
 system of street traffic became 
 firmly established. The first street 
 railway was operated in Boston in 
 1856, in Philadelphia in 1857 and in 
 New Orleans in 1861." 
 
 42. United States. — ^Van Bokelen 
 V. Brooklyn St. Ry. Co., 5 Blatchf. 
 379. 
 
 California. — Carson v. Central R. 
 R. Co., 35 Cal. 325. 
 
 Connecticut. — Elliott v. Fairhaven, 
 etc., Ry. Co., 32 Conn. 579. 
 
 Florida. — Randall v. Jacksonville 
 St. Ry. Co., 19 Fla. 409; State v. 
 Jacksonville St. Ry! Co., 29 Fla. 590, 
 10 So. 590. 
 
 Georgia. — Savannah Ry. Co. v. 
 Savannah, 45 Ga. 602 ; Floyd County 
 V. Rome St. Ry. Co., 77 Ga. 614, 3 
 S. E. 3 ; Campbell v. Metropolitan 
 St. Ry. Co., 82 Ga. 320, 9 S. E. 1078. 
 
 Illinois. — Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. West Chicago St. Ry. Co., 156 
 ni. 255, 40 N. E. 1008, 29 L. R. A. 
 485. 
 
 Indiana. — Eichels v. Evansville 
 St. Ry. Co., 78 Ind. 261, 41 Am. 
 Rep. 561. 
 
 Iowa. — Sears v. Marshalltown St. 
 Ry. Co., 65 Iowa 742, 23 N. W. 150. 
 
 Louisiana. — Brown v. Duplessis, 
 14 La. Ann. 842. 
 
 Maine. — Briggs v. Lewiston, etc.. 
 Horse Ry. Co., 79 Me. 363, 10 Atl. 
 47, 1 Am. St. Rep. 316. 
 
 Maryland. — Hiss v. Baltimore, 
 
 etc., Ry. Co., 52 Md. 242, 36 Am. 
 Rep. 371 ; Hodges v. Baltimore, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 58 Md. 603. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Atty.-Gen. v. Met- 
 ropolitan Ry. Co., 125 Mass. 515, 28 
 Am. Rep. 264. 
 
 Michigan. — Grand Rapids, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Heisel, 38 Mich. 62, 31 
 Am. Rep. 306. 
 
 Minnesota. — Carli v. Stillwater 
 St. Ry. Co., 28 Minn. 373, 10 N. W. 
 205, 41 Am. Rep. 290; Newell v. 
 Minneapolis, etc., Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 
 112, 27 N. W. 839, 59 Am. Rep. 303. 
 
 Missouri. — Ransom v. Citizens' 
 Ry. Co., 104 Mo. 375, 16 S. W. 416. 
 
 New Jersey. — Hinchman v. Patr 
 erson Horse Ry. Co., 17 N. J. Bq. 
 75, 86 Am. Dec. 252 ; Citizens' Coach 
 Co. V. Hampden Horse Ry. Co., 33 
 N. J. E'q. 267, 36 Am. Rep. 542; 
 West Jersey R. R. Co. v. Cape May, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 34 N. J. Eq. 164; 
 Van Home v. Newark Passenger 
 Ry. Co., 48 N. J. Eq. 332, 21 AtL 
 1034. 
 
 Ohio. — Cincinnati, etc., St. Ry. 
 Co. v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St. 
 523. 
 
 Oregon. — Paquet v. Mt. Tabor St. 
 Ry. Co., 18 Ore. 233, 22 Pac. 906. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Lockhart v. Craig 
 St. Ry. Co., 139 Pa. 419, 21 Atl. 26. 
 
 Tennessee. — Smith v. East End 
 St. Ry. Co., 81 Tenn. 626, 11 S. W. 
 709. 
 
 Texas. — Texas, etc., St. Ry. Co. v. 
 Rosedale St. Ry. Co., 64 Tex. 80, 53 
 Am. Rep. 739. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Hobart v. Milwaukee 
 City R. R. Co., 27 Wis. 194, 9 Am. 
 Rep. 461. 
 
 So also a horse railway is not an 
 additional servitude upon a turn- 
 pike. Peddieord v. Baltimore, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 34 Md. 463. In New 
 York a horse railway is held an 
 additional servitude upon a public 
 highway (Craig v. Rochester, etc.. 
 
538 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 170 
 
 Several reasons were given to justify this distinction 
 between horse railways and steam railroads. The former, 
 unlike the latter, did not interfere with the use of the high- 
 way by other vehicles ; they did not inflict upon the abutting 
 property any great damage and counterbalanced what 
 injury they did inflict by making the abutting property more 
 accessible and conferring a benefit upon it different from 
 the benefit which a steam railroad conferred — one shared 
 by all the inhabitants of the town alike. Their tracks were 
 laid in the street in order to better accommodate their 
 patrons, by taking them and leaving them at a point near 
 their homes, and not, as in the case of a steam railroad, for 
 the purpose of acquiring a location at little or no expense.** 
 Most often it was said that the street railway carried the 
 traffic which would use the street at all events and that it 
 consequently made the number of carriages and foot pas- 
 sengers less, while the steam railroad carried a class of 
 passengers who would be unlikely to use the street for their 
 journey if the steam railroad was not there and imposed a 
 burden which was not contemplated when the highway was 
 laid out." Just how these travelers were to get about was 
 not made clear, but the reasons, good, bad, and indifferent, 
 were amply sufficient to justify the distinction between two 
 such markedly different means of public transportation. 
 
 Jt having become well settled that horse railways were 
 within the highway easement, there was no legal distinc- 
 tion drawn when the cars gradually became more and more 
 numerous and thereby excluded other traffic from the space 
 between the rails, or when cars of the same type and carry- 
 ing the same class of passengers, but propelled by mechan- 
 ical power, were introduced. Thus it was unanimously held 
 that cable roads were not an additional servitude.*^ The 
 
 Ey. Co., 39 N. Y. 404) , but If the fee 45. United States. — Lorie v. North 
 
 is in the town the abutting owner Chicago City R. R. Co., 32 Fed. 270. 
 
 is not entitled to compensation if a California. — Tuebner v. Califor- 
 
 horse railway is laid in the street nia St. Ry. Co., 66 Cal. 171, 4 Pac. 
 
 (People V. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188). 1162. 
 
 43. Carli v. Stillwater, etc., Indiana. — Indianapolis Cable St 
 Transfer Co., 28 Minn. 373, 10 N. W. Ry. Co. v. Citizens' St. Ry. Co., 127 
 205, 41 Am. Rep. 290. Ind. 369, 24 N. E. 1054, 26 N. B. 893, 
 
 44. For example, Cooley, J., in 8 L. R. A. 539. 
 
 Grand Rapids, etc., R. R. Co. v. Missouri. — Brady v. Kansas City 
 
 Heisel, 38 Mich. 62, 31 Am. Rep. Cable Ry. Co., Ill Mo. 329, 19 
 306. S. W. 953. 
 
§ 170 Additional Seevititdes Upon Highways. 
 
 539 
 
 so-called "dummy lines" presented the only difficulties 
 until near the end of the nineteenth century, and they 
 formed a connecting link between the two classes of rail- 
 roads. The dummy lines used steam as a motive power 
 and the cars were joined in trains, but the engine was in a 
 car, and the trains moved slowly, stopped at street cross- 
 ings, and carried the same class of passengers as ordinary 
 street railways. The trains were easily controlled and the 
 rails so laid as not to necessarily exclude other traffic. The 
 courts generally, but not unanimously, held them to be a 
 proper exercise of the highway easement.** 
 ' The courts -ihat sustained the first street railways as a 
 legitimate use of the highway sometimes intimated that the 
 
 New York. — In re Third Ave. Ky. 
 Co., 121 N. Y. 536, 24 N. E. 951, 9 
 L. K. A. 124. 
 
 Ohio. — Clement v. Cincinnati, 9 
 Ohio S. & G. P. 688; Harrison v. 
 Mt. Auburn Cable Ey. Co., 9 Ohio 
 S. & C. P. 805. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Rafferty v. Cen- 
 tral Traction Co., 147 Pa. 579, 23 
 Atl. 884, 30 Am. St. Rep. 763. 
 
 46. Briggs v. Lewiston & Auburn 
 Horse R. R. Co., 79 Me. 363, 10 AU. 
 47, 1 Am. St. Rep. 316. "The ar- 
 gument is, that however It may be 
 as to horse railroads, steam rail- 
 roads must make compensation. 
 We do not think the motor Is the 
 criterion. It is rather the use of 
 the street. If the railroad com- 
 pany exclusively occupy the land, 
 shut off the street from it, deprive 
 it of its character of bearing the 
 easement of a street, use it — not 
 for street traffic but for what is 
 known as railway traffic — the com- 
 pany may, perhaps, be said to make 
 a new and different use of the land. 
 But we have no occasion now to ex- 
 press an opinion on that question. 
 This defendant company is using 
 the land as a • street. Its railroad 
 is a street railroad. Its cars are 
 used by those who wish to pass 
 from place to place on the street 
 A change in the motor is not a 
 change in the use." Nichols v. Ann 
 Arbor & Ypsllanti St. Ry. Co., 
 87 Mich. 361, 49 N. W. 538, 16 
 L. R. A. 371. " The manner in 
 
 which the road of the defendant is 
 to be operated by the use of this 
 steam motor as it is, is no more of 
 a burden or servitude upon the 
 lands of the abutting owners than 
 an electric car with its overhead 
 wires." Williams v. City Electric 
 Ry. Co., 41 Fed. 556, 3 Am. Elect 
 Cas. 231. "The operation of a 
 street railroad by such motors 
 (those emitting little steam and 
 noise) when authorized by law, on 
 a public street is not an additional 
 servitude or burden on the land al- 
 ready dedicated or condemned to 
 the use of a public street." Kewell 
 V. Minneapolis, etc., Ry. Co., 35 
 Minn. 112, 27 N. W. 839, 59 Am. 
 Rep. 303, also allows no action to . 
 the owner of the fee for the con- 
 struction of a dummy steam rail- 
 road in the street, but in this case 
 the court was evenly divided. Bast 
 End St Ry. Co. v. Doyle, 88 Tenn. 
 747, 13 S. W. 936, 9 L. R. A. 100, 17 
 Am. St Rep. 933, holds such a rail- 
 way an additional servitude, but 
 Smith V. East End Street Railroad, 
 3 Pick. (Tenn.) 626, 11 S. W. 709, 
 gives the abutter no remedy when 
 the fee is in the public. Onset St 
 Railway v, Plymouth County Com- 
 missioners, 154 Mass. 395, 28 N. B. 
 286, holds such a railway in a pri- 
 vate street belonging to a corpora- 
 tion which sold the adjoining lota 
 with reference to the street an in- 
 jury to the abutting owners' rights 
 of way. 
 
540 Tbce Law of EMnsnEBn Domaibt. § 171 
 
 motive power was not the true test, and that street railways 
 might be dereloped so as to fall in the same class as steam 
 railroads. In other words, it was not laid down as an inflex- 
 ible rule of law that railways using motive power other 
 than steam were not and never would be additional servi- 
 tudes. Accordingly it was often held that a railway of any 
 kind, even a horse railway, that was constructed or oper- 
 ated in such a manner as to prohibit or seriously impair the 
 use of the street for its ordinary purposes was an addi- 
 tional servitude, for which the owner of the fee was entitled 
 to compensation.'*^ Similarly, the abutting owner who is 
 held by the substantive law of the state to have an easement 
 of access in the street has been held to be entitled to com- 
 pensation if his access is in fact impaired by a street rail- 
 way constructed or operated in a manner inconsistent with 
 the ordinary highway easement.*® 
 
 § 171. Electric Street Railways. 
 
 The electric street railway was first introduced in this 
 country in Cleveland in 1884, and before ten years had 
 elapsed electric railways had almost everywhere sup- 
 planted street railways of other types and had been intro- 
 duced in places where there had previously been no street 
 railways of any kind. As the electric street railways occu- 
 pied a perceptible fraction of the highway with their trolley 
 poles, to the exclusion of other traffic, and their cars pro- 
 ceeded more rapidly than horse cars and thus tended to a 
 greater extent to make general traffic upon the space 
 between the rails unsafe and inconvenient, and, by reason 
 of the unsightliness of the poles and wires and the buzzing 
 noise of the cars, they inflicted more injury upon abutting 
 property than the street railways of the earlier types, the 
 contention was earnestly made in almost every state in the 
 union that electric street railways constituted an additional 
 servitude upon the pubEc highways in which they were laid. 
 
 47. Cinciimati, etc.. Street Rail- 48. Mahady v. Bushwick St. Ry. 
 
 way Co. V. CTimmlnsville, 14 Ohio Co., 91 N. T. 148, 43 Am. Rep. 661 
 St. 523 (rails laid within two feet (habitual storage of cars on track 
 of the curb). Hobart v. Milwaukee within sixteen inches of the curb). 
 City Ry. Co., 27 Wis. 194, 9 Am. 
 Rep. 461 (material Impairment of 
 access to land and buildings). 
 
§ 171 Additional Sebvitudes Upon Highways. 
 
 541 
 
 The decisions of the courts were however ahnost unan- 
 imously advers.e to this contention.** The electric railways 
 
 49. United States. — Williams v. 
 City Electric St Ry. Co., 41 Fed. 
 556, 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 231; Ramken 
 V. St. Louis, etc., E. R. Co., 98 Fed. 
 479. 
 
 Alabama. — Birmingham Traction 
 Co. V. Birmingham Ry. Co., 119 Ala. 
 137, 24 So. 502, 43 L. R. A. 233; 
 Baker v. Selma St. Ry. Co., 130 
 Ala. 474, 30 So. 464; Baker v. Selma 
 St. R. R. Co., 135 Ala. 552, 33 So. 
 685, 93 Am. St Rep. 42; Morris v. 
 Montgomery Traction Co., 143 Ala. 
 246, 38 So. 834. 
 
 Arkansas. — Humphreys v. Fort 
 Smith, etc.. Power Co., 71 Ark. 152, 
 71 S. W. 662. 
 
 California. — Finch v. Riverside, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 87 Cal. 597, 25 Pac. 
 765. 
 
 Colorado. — • Haskell t. Denver 
 Tramway Co., 23 Col. 60, 46 Pac. 
 121. 
 
 Connecticut. — Canastota Knife Co. 
 V. Newington Tramway Co., 69 
 Conn. 164, 36 Atl. 1107. 
 
 Delaware. — Philadelphia, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Wilmington City Ry. Co., 8 
 Del. Ch. 134, 38 Atl. 1067. 
 
 Georgia. — Southern Ry. Co. v. At- 
 lanta, etc., Ry. Co., Ill Ga. 679, 36 
 S. E. 873, 51 L. R. A. 125 ; Piedmont 
 Cotton Mills V. Georgia, R. R., etc., 
 Co., 131 Ga. 143, 62 S. B. 52. 
 
 Illinois. — Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. West Chicago St Ry. Co., 156 
 111. 255, 40 N. E. 1008, 29 L. R. A. 
 485; General Electric Ry. Co. v. 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 184 111. 588, 
 56 N. E. 963 ; Barsaloux v. Chicago, 
 245 111. 598, 92 N. E. 525. 
 
 Indiana. — ^Decker v. Evansville, 
 etc., Ry. Co., 133 Ind. 493, 33 N. E. 
 349 ; Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Whit- 
 ing, etc., Ry. Co., 139 Ind. 297, 38 
 N. E. 604, 26 L. R. A. 337, 47 Am. 
 St Rep. 264; Mordhurst v. Ft 
 Wayne, etc.. Traction Co., 163 Ind. 
 268, 71 N. B. 642, 106 Am. St Rep. 
 222, 66 L. R. A. 105 ; Michigan Cen- 
 tral R. R. Co. V. Hammond, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 42 Ind. App. 66, 83 N. E. 
 650 ; Lonergan v. La Fayette St. Ry. 
 Co. (Ind. App.), 3 Am. Elect Cas. 
 
 273; Indiana Union Traction Co. v. 
 Gough, 54 Ind. App. 438, 102 N. E. 
 453. 
 
 Iowa. — Snyder v. Ft Madison St. 
 Ry. Co., 105 Iowa 284, 75 N. W. 179, 
 41 L. R. A. 345, 7 Am. Elect. Cas. 
 359. 
 
 Kansas. — Phillips v. Arkansas 
 Valley Interurban Ry. Co., 89 Kaa. 
 835, 133 Pac. 429. 
 
 Kentucky. — Louisville Bagging 
 Mfg. Co. V. Central Passenger Ry. 
 Co., 95 Ky. 50, 23 S. W. 592, 44 Am. 
 St Rep. 203, 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 236, 
 4 Am. Elect. Cas. 202 ; Ashland, etc., 
 St Ry. Co., V. Faulkner, 106 Ky. 
 332, 45 S. W. 235, 51 S. W. 806, 43 
 L. R. A. 554 ; Georgetown, etc.. Trac- 
 tion Co. V. MuIhoUand, 25 Ky. L. R. 
 578, 76 S. W. 148. 
 
 Louisiana. — FriscovIUe Realty Co. 
 V. St Bernard, 127 La. 318, 53 So. 
 578. 
 
 Maine. — Taylor t. Portsmouth, 
 etc., St. Ry. Co., 91 Me. 193, 39 Atl. 
 560, 64 Am. St. Rep. 216; In re 
 Millbridge, etc.. By. Co., 96 Me. 110, 
 51 Atl. 818; Parsons v. WatervUle, 
 etc., St Ry. Co., 101 Me. 173, 63 Atl. 
 728, 4 St. Ry. Rep. 371. 
 
 Maryland. — Koch v. North Ave. 
 Ry. Co., 75 Md. 222, 23 Atl. 463, 15 
 L. R. A. 377, 4 Am. Elect Cas. 153 ; 
 Green v. City & Suburban Ry. Co., 
 78 Md. 294, 28 Atl. 626, 44 Am. St 
 Rep. 288, 4 Am. Elect. Cas. 206; 
 Poole V. Falls Road Electric Ry. Co., 
 88 Md. 533, 41 Atl. 1069; Lonacon- 
 Ing, etc., Co. V. Consolidation Coal 
 Co., 95 Md. 630, 53 Atl. 420 ; Jeffers 
 V. Annapolis, 107 Md. 268, 68 Atl. 
 361. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Howe v. West 
 End St Ry. Co., 167 Mass. 46, 44 
 N. E. 386; McDermott v. Warren, 
 etc., St. Ry. Co., 172 Mass. 197, 51 
 N. E. 972, 7 Am. Elect Cas. 367; 
 Eustis v. Milton St. Ry. Co., 183 
 Mass. 586, 67 N. E. 663, 1 St. Ry. 
 Rep. 311. 
 
 Michigan. — Potter v. Saginaw 
 Union St Ry. Co., 83 Mich. 285, 47 
 N. W. 217, 10 L. R. A. 176, 3 Am. 
 Elect Cas. 299; Detroit City Ry. v. 
 
542 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 171 
 
 that were in use when these decisions were rendered were 
 street railways in the original and narrow sense of the term 
 
 Mills, 85 Mich. 634, 48 N. W. 1007, 
 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 333; People v. 
 Ft. Wayne, etc., Ry. Co., 92 Mich. 
 522, 52 N. W. 1010, 16 L. R. A. 752 ; 
 Dean v. Ann Arbor St. Ry. Co., 93 
 Mich. 330, 53 N. W. 396, 4 Am. 
 Elect. Cas. 172; Nieman v. Detroit, 
 etc., St. Ry. Co., 103 Mich. 256, 61 
 N. W. 519; Miller v. Detroit, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 125 Mich. 171, 84 N. W. 49, 
 51 L. R. A. 955, 84 Am. St. Rep. 569, 
 7 Am. Elect. Cas. 387; Austin v. 
 Detroit, etc., Ry. Co., 134 Mich. 149, 
 96 N. W. 35, 2 Ann. Cas. 530, 1 St. 
 Ry. Rep. 385; Detroit v. Detroit 
 United R. R. Co., 172 Mich. 136, 137 
 N. W. 645. 
 
 Minnesota. — Elf elt v. Stillwater 
 St. Ry. Co., 53 Minn. 68, 55 N. W. 
 116; State v. Minneapolis, etc., R. 
 R. Co., 114 Minn. 70, 130 N. W. 74. 
 
 Mississippi. — Williams v. Meridian 
 Light & Ry. Co., 69 So. 596. 
 
 Missouri. — Placke v. Union Depot 
 Ry. Co., 140 Mo. 634, 41 S. W. 915 ; 
 Nagel V. Linden Ry. Co., 167 Mo. 89, 
 66 S. W. 1090 ; St. Louis, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Linden, 190 Mo. 246, 88 S. W. 
 634, 4 St. Ry. Rep. 628. 
 
 New Jersey. — State, Kennelly, 
 Prosecutor, v. Jersey City, 57 
 N. J. L. 293, 30 Atl. 531, 26 L. R. A. 
 281; State, Roebling, Prosecutor, v. 
 Trenton Passenger Ry. Co., 58 
 N. J. L. 666, 34 Atl. 1O90, 33 L. R. A. 
 129, 6 Am. Elect. Cas. 137; Mon1> 
 Clair Military Academy v. North 
 Jersey St. Ry. Co., 70 N. J. L. 229, 
 57 Atl. 1050, 3 St. Ry. Rep. 649; 
 Halsey v. Rapid Transit St. Ry. 
 Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 380, 20 Atl. 589, 
 5 Am. Elect. Cas. 137 ; Paterson Ry. 
 Co. V. Grundy, 51 N. J. Eq. 213, 26 
 Atl. 788, 4 Am. Elect. Cas. 173; 
 West Jersey Ry. Co. v. Camden Ry. 
 Co., 52 N. J. Eq. 31, 29 Atl. 423; 
 Ehret v. Camden, etc., Ry. Co., 61 
 N. J. Eq. 171, 47 Atl. 562, 7 Am. 
 Elect. Cas. 383. 
 
 North Carolina.-^ Merrick v. In- 
 tramontaine Ry. Co., 118 N. C. 1081, 
 24 S. E. 667; Hester v. Durham 
 Traction Co., 138 N. O. 288, 50 S. E. 
 711, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 981, 3 St 
 By. Rep. 726. 
 
 Ohio.— Mt. Adams, etc., Ry. Co. 
 y. Winslow, 3 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 
 425, 2 Am. Elect. Cas. 262; Simmons 
 V. Toledo, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct Rep. 535, 
 
 5 Am. Elect Cas. 152; Sanfleet v. 
 Toledo, 10 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 460, 
 8 Ohio C. D. 711; Akron, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Keck, 23 Ohio Cir. Ct Rep. 
 57; Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co., v. 
 Urbana, etc., Ry. Co., 26 Ohio Cir. 
 Ct Rep. 180 ; Sells v. Columbus St. 
 Ry. Co., 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 643, 
 4 Am. Elect Cas. 163; Pelton v. 
 East Cleveland Ry. Co., 10 Ohio S. 
 
 6 C. P. 545, 3 Am. Elect Cas. 215. 
 Pennsylvania. — Lockhart v. Craig 
 
 St Ry. Co., 139 Pa. 419, 21 Atl. 26, 
 
 3 Am. Elect Cas. 314; HeUman v. 
 Lebanon, etc., Co., 145 Pa. 23, 23 
 Atl. 389 ; North Pennsylvania R. R. 
 
 ' Co. V. Inland Traction Co., 205 Pa. 
 579, 55 Atl. 774, 1 St Ry. Rep. 708 ; 
 Commonwealth v. Westchester, 9 Pa. 
 Co. Ct Rep. 512, 3 Am. Elect Cas. 
 326 ; Pox V. Catherine, etc., Ry. Co., 
 12 Pa. Co. Ct Rep. 180, 4 Am. Elect. 
 Cas. 158; Gillett v. Chester, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 2 Pa. Dist Ct Rep. 450, 
 
 4 Am. Elect. Cas. 160. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Taggart v. New- 
 port St Ry. Co., 16 R. I. 668, 19 Atl. 
 326, 7 L. R. A. 205, 3 Am. Elect 
 Cas. 306. 
 
 Tennessee. — Cumberland, Tel., 
 etc., Co. V. United Electric Ry. Co., 
 93 Tenn. 492, 29 S. W. 104, 27 
 L. R. A. 236. 
 
 Texas. — San Antonio Rapid Tran- 
 sit Co. V. Limburger, 88 Tex. 79, 30 
 S. W. 533, 53 Am. St Rep. 730, 5 
 Am. Elect Cas. 156; Galveston, etc., 
 Ry. Co. V. Houston Electric Co., 57 
 Tex. Civ. App. 170, 122 S. W. 287. 
 
 Utah. — Ogden City Ry. Co. v. 
 Ogden City, 7 Utah 207, 26 Pac. 288, 
 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 321 ; Rocky Moun- 
 tain Bell Tel. Co. v. Salt Lake City 
 Tel. Co., 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 356; 
 Dooly Block V. Salt Lake Rapid 
 Transit Co., 9 Utah 31, 33 Pac. 229, 
 24 L. R. A. 610, 4 Am. Elect Os. 
 189. 
 
 Virginia. — Reid v. Norfolk City 
 Ry. Co., 94 Va. 117, 26 S. E. 428, 36 
 L. R. A. 274, 64 Am. St Rep. 708. 
 
§ 171 Additional Servitudes Upon Highways. 
 
 543 
 
 in respect to the traffic served, and they did not in any real 
 and substantial degree exclude other traffic from the por- 
 tion of the street that they occupied "with their tracks, or 
 inflict a damage upon abutting property at all comparable 
 ■with that caused by steam railroads. The only dissent from 
 the prevailing doctrine was in New York, in which state the 
 easement of a highway is limited to general travel, and 
 even a horse car line is considered an additional servitude,®" 
 so that it almost necessarily followed that the same rule 
 would be applied to an electric street railway.®^ 
 
 In a number of cases the fact that a trolley pole was 
 erected upon that portion of the street which was owned by 
 the complainant, or even was on the sidewalk in front of his 
 residence, was held to be no ground for awarding him com- 
 pensation.®^ The courts were not however inclined to 
 
 Washington. — Keil v. Grays Har- 
 bor, eta, E. E. Co., 71 Wash. 163, 
 127 Pac. 1113; Brandt v. Spokane, 
 etc., E. E. Co., 78 Wash. 214, 138 
 Pac. 871. 
 
 Wisconsin. — La Crosse City Ey. 
 Co. V. Higbee, 107 Wis. 389, 83 
 N. W. 701, 51 L. E. A. 923, 7 Am. 
 Elect. Cas. 369; Linden Land Co. v. 
 Milwaukee, etc.. Light Co., 107 Wis. 
 493, 83 N. W. 851 ; Younkin v. Mil- 
 waukee, etc.. Traction Co., 120 Wis. 
 477, 98 N. W. 215, 2 St. Ey. Eep. 
 973. 
 
 50. Craig v. Eochester, etc., E. E. 
 Co., 39 N. Y. 404. 
 
 51. Peck V. Schenectady Ey. Co., 
 170 N. Y. 298, 63 N. E. 357; Paige 
 V. Schenectady Ey. Co., 178 N. Y. 
 102, 70 N. E. 213, 2 St. Ey. Eep. 768 ; 
 Easch V. Nassau Electric E. E. Co., 
 198 N. Y. 385, 91 N. E. 785, 36 
 L. E. A. (N. S.) 645, 7 St. Ey. Eep. 
 40; Clark v. Middletown-Goshen 
 Traction Co., 10 App. Div. (N. Y.) 
 354, 41 N. Y. Supp. 1109, 6 Am. 
 Elect. Cas. 148; Duncan v. Nassau 
 Electric E. E. Co., 127 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 252, 111 N. Y. Supp. 210; 
 BufCalo, etc., E. E. Co. v. Hoyer, 147 
 App. Div. (N. Y.) 205, 132 N. Y. 
 Supp. 31. See also Bradley v. Deg- 
 non Contracting Co., 157 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 237, 141 N. Y. Supp. 852, 
 holding that a tramway In a street 
 for transporting material excavated 
 from a subway cannot be built 
 
 without compensation to the owners 
 of the fee. In Paige v. Schenectady 
 Ey. Co., 178 N. Y. 102, 70 N. E. 213, 
 
 2 St. Ey. Eep. 768, it was held that 
 an electric street railway was an 
 additional servitude, even upon a 
 city street. See however St. 
 Michael's P. E. Church v. Forty 
 Second St. Ey. Co., 26 Misc. (N. Y.) 
 601, in relation to a street railway 
 operated by underground trolley. 
 
 52. Iowa. — Snyder v. Ft. Madison 
 St. Ey. Co., 105 Iowa 284, 75 N. W. 
 179, 41 L. E. A. 345, 7 Am. Elect 
 Cas. 359. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Howe v. West 
 End St. Ey. Co., 167 Mass. 46, 44 
 N. B. 386. 
 
 New Jersey. — Paterson Ey. Co. v. 
 Grundy, 51 N. J. Eq. '213, 26 Atl. 
 788, 7 Am. Elect. Cas. 173. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Lockhart v. Craig 
 St. Ey. Co., 139 Pa. 419, 21 Atl. 26, 
 
 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 314. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Taggart v. New- 
 port St. Ey. Co., 16 E. I. 668, 19 
 Atl. 326, 7 L. E. A. 205, 3 Am. Elect. 
 Cas. 306. 
 
 Wisconsin. — La Crosse City Ey. 
 Co. V. Higbee, 107 Wis. 389, 83 N. W, 
 701, 51 L. E. A. 923, 7 Am. Elect. 
 Cas. 369. 
 
 See however Jaynes v. Omaha St 
 Ey. Co., 53 Neb. 682, 74 N. W. 67, 
 39 L. E. A. 751, 7 Am. Elect. Cas. 
 328, contra, under a constitution re- 
 quiring compensation for damaging. 
 
544 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 172 
 
 dogmatize, or to establish a ninflexibk rule of law that an 
 electric railway was not and never could be an additional 
 servitude upon a public street, but were satisfied to decide 
 the cases on the facts before them, reserving the right to 
 apply a different rule wien the development of electric 
 railways required it.®^ 
 
 § 172. Street Hallways in Country Roads. 
 
 The first electric street railway^ were operated upon the 
 streets of the more populous cities; but it was soon real- 
 ized that the possibilities of street railway traffic were enor- 
 mously increased by the introduction of the new motive 
 power, and the street car lines were first extended to the 
 more remote suburbs of the large cities,** and soon after- 
 ward to the smaller towns and villages and finally to sec- 
 tions thoroughly rural. In most jurisdictions there is no 
 objection to a trolley line upon the rural highways, when it 
 is built to accommodate the passenger traffic in the districts 
 through which it passes, and when the cars stop at every 
 convenient point to take up or put down persons desiring 
 
 53. See for example West Jersey size as to practically work all evils 
 Ky. Co. v. Camden Ry. Co., 52 N. J. of the steam railway, and that there 
 Eq. 31, 29 AtL 423, wliere the court will be inaugurated systems of 
 said : " The electric street railway through cars in furtherance of 
 as now ordinarily in use by cars rapid transit between distant points 
 patterned in style and size after the which will crowd and burden the 
 horse railway car stands as a means street to the inconvenience and 
 of using the highway, in degree, ol)structlon of Its other uses with- 
 between the horse and steam rail- out any accommodation to the ordi- 
 way. As in case of the horse rail- nary local use of the street, and thus 
 way, its rails do not materially the degree of incompatibility wi13i 
 interfere with ordinary use of the the common nse may be so raised 
 highway. While its motive power, that the courts will be obliged to 
 as usually applied, exceeds in ca- distinguish between methods of use 
 paclty that of tiie horse railway and declare against some as cre- 
 and the noise and danger attending ating an additional servitude of the 
 its operation are greater, they do land occupied by the highway, the 
 not extend to the power, noise and crucial test for that distinction 
 danger of the steam locomotive with being whether the use contemplated 
 its attendant train of cars. Its is compatible vrith the purpose for 
 capacity for speed is great, hut that which the common highway was 
 is suhject to municipal control. I originally designed." 
 do not now deal with the future 54. A street railway extending 
 possibilities of the electric railway. beyond the city limits into the 
 It may readily be conceived that the remote suburbs was held not to eon- 
 greater motive power it possesses stltute an additional servitude in 
 may some time induce an attempt Newell v. Minneapolis, etc., Ky. Co., 
 to use the highways by trains of 35 Minn. 112, 27 N. W. 839, 59 Am. 
 cars, or by rails and cars of such a Kep. 303. 
 
§ 173 Additional Seevitudes Upon Highways. 545 
 
 to get on or off.'^ In fact the electric street railway is now 
 a well recognized feature of the country roads throughout 
 most of the United States. In a few states however the 
 distinction drawn between the easement of a city street and 
 that of a country road has been applied in the case of street 
 railways, and street railways of a type that would be con- 
 sidered a proper street use in a large city have been held 
 to constitute an additional servitude upon the country 
 roads.^® 
 
 § 173. Interurban Electric Railways. 
 
 Electric street railways had not been in use upon the 
 country roads for many years before they became the sub- 
 ject of gradual but rapid development. The cars grew 
 larger and more numerous and their speed increased. 
 Often spaces in the road were reserved for them, to the 
 exclusion of other traffic. Sometimes they were run in 
 trains and the tracks were laid at a grade different from 
 that of the rest of the street. Finally interurban electric 
 railways were constructed, carrying passengers who would 
 not otherwise have used the highways but would have 
 traveled on the steam railroads. It has several times been 
 held that an electric railway running upon a reserved space 
 in the highway or at a grade different from the rest of the 
 way, at high speed and between distant towns, is as much 
 an additional servitude as an ordinary steam railroad."^ 
 
 55. Montgomery v. Santa Ana, Traction Co., 227 111. 485, 81 N. E. 
 etc., Ry. Co., 104 Cal. 186, 37 Pac. 544, 118 Am. St. Rep. 284. 
 
 786, 25 L. R. A. 654, 43 Am. St. Rep. Indiana. — Kinsey v. Union Trac- 
 
 89; Lonaconlng, etc., R. R. Co. v. tion Co., 169 Ind. 563, 81 N. E. 922. 
 
 Consolidation Coal Co., 95 Md. 630, Ohio. — Schaaf v. Cleveland, etc., 
 
 53 Atl. 420; Austin v. Detroit, etc., Ry. Co., 66 Ohio St. 215, 64 N. E. 
 
 Ry. Co., 134 Mich. 149, 96 N. W. 35, 145. 
 
 2 Ann Cas. 530; Ehret v. Camden, Pennsylvania. — Pennsylvania R. 
 
 etc., R. R. Co., 61 N. J. Bq. 171, R. Co. v. Montgomery, etc., Ry. Co., 
 
 47 Atl. 562. 167 Pa. 62, 31 Atl. 468, 27 L. R. A. 
 
 56. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. 766, 46 Am. St Rep. 659. 
 Montgomery, etc., Ry. Co., 167 Pa. Wisconsin — ■ Chicago, etc, Ry. Co. 
 62, 31 Atl. 468, 27 L. R. A. 766, 46 v. Milwaukee, etc., Ry. Co., 95 Wis. 
 Am. St. Rep. 659; Zehren v. MU- 561, 70 K. W. 678, 37 L. R. A. 856, 
 waukee El. Ry. Co., 99 Wis. 83, 74 60 Am. St. Rep. 137 ; Zehren v. Mil- 
 K. W. 538, 41 L. R. A. 575, 67 Am. waukee, etc., Light Co., 99 Wis. 83, 
 St. Rep. 844, 7 Am. Elect. Cas. 345. 74 N. W. 538, 41 L. R. A. 575, 67 
 
 57. Illinois. — Wilder v. Aurora, Am. St. Rep, 844; Younkin v. Mil- 
 etc. Traction Co., 216 111. 493, 75 waukee, etc., R. R. Co., 120 Wis. 
 N. E. 194; Aurora T. Elgin, etc, 477, 98 N. W. 215, 2 St. Ry. Rep! 
 
 35 
 
546 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 173 
 
 On the other hand, courts of equal weight, while perhaps 
 admitting that the mere substitution of electric engines for 
 steam would not entitle the existing railroads to make free 
 use of the public highways, have held that interurban elec- 
 tric railways as at present operated do not constitute an 
 additional servitude.^* Stress is laid on the great size and 
 weight of the steam engines, their emission of smoke, 
 sparks, and cinders, and the length and unsightliness of 
 the freight trains, as well as the fact that the electric rail- 
 ways facilitate access to the abutting property and the 
 steam railroads do not.^® 
 
 973; Abbott v. Milwaukee, etc., 
 Traction Co., 126 Wis. 634, 106 N. W. 
 523, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 202, 4 St. Ry. 
 Rep. 1077; Brickies v. Milwaukee, 
 etc., Traction Co., 134 Wis. 358, 114 
 N. W. 810, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 644; 
 Gosa V. Milwaukee, etc.. Traction 
 Co., 134 Wis. 369, 114 N. W. 815, 15 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 531. 
 
 See also Malott v. OolliQsviUe, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 108 Fed. 313; Diebold v. 
 Kentucky Traction Co., 117 Ky. 146, 
 77 S. W. 674, 63 L. R. A. 637, 111 
 Am. St. Rep. 230 ; Cincinnati, etc., 
 St. Ry. Co. V. Lobe, 68 Obio St. 101, 
 67 N. E. 161, 67 L. R. A. 637. Wben an 
 interurban railway uses tbe tracks 
 of a street railway in a city, it has 
 been held that the abutting owner is 
 entitled to compensation for the 
 additional injury to the market 
 value of his property. Murdock v. 
 Beloit, etc., Ry. Co., 147 Wis. 100, 
 132 N. W. 979. 
 
 58. Connecticut. — Canastota Knife 
 Co. V. Newington Tramway Co., 69 
 Conn. 146, 36 Atl. 1107. 
 
 Indiana. — Mordhurst v . Ft. 
 Wayne, etc.. Traction Co., 163 Ind. 
 268, 71 N. E. 642, 66 L. R. A. 105, 
 106 Am. St. Rep. 222, 2 Ann. Cas. 
 967, 3 St. Ry. Rep. 182. 
 
 Kansas. — Phillips v. Arkansas 
 Valley Interurban Ry. Co., 89 Kan. 
 835, 133 Pac. 429. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Eustis v. Milton 
 St. Ry. Co., 183 Mass. 586, 67 N. B. 
 663. I 
 
 Minnesota. — Newell v. Minne- 
 apolis, etc., Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 112, 
 27 N. W. 839, 59 Am. Rep. 303. 
 
 69. Mordhurst v. Ft. Wayne, etc., 
 Traction Co., 163 Ind. 268, 71 N. E. 
 642, 66 L. R. A. 105, 106 Am. St 
 Rep. 222, 2 Ann Cas. 967, 3 St. Ry. 
 Rep. 1 82. " Trains on steam rail- 
 roads are drawn by locomotives of 
 enormous size and weight which 
 constantly emit smoke, sparks, cin- 
 ders and steam and which drop 
 coals of fire from their fire boxes. 
 Their passenger trains usually con- 
 sist of an express and baggage car 
 and from one to many large and 
 heavy passenger coaches. Freight 
 trains as commonly made up con- 
 tain from one to twenty-five or 
 thirty roughly constructed cars. 
 
 * * * Such trains so propelled 
 unavoidably fill the atmosphere in 
 their vicinity with dust, smoke and 
 steam, make much noise when run- 
 ning, stopping and starting, seri- 
 ously obstruct the streets and street 
 crossings and for considerable 
 periods every day to a great extent 
 exclude other travel and traflBc from 
 the streets on which they are moved. 
 
 * * * This distinction * * * 
 does not rest upon a difCerence in 
 name, nor upon the motive power 
 employed, nor upon the kind of rail 
 used, nor upon the length of the 
 railroad. It results from the nature 
 of the business done by each of the 
 two kinds of railroads, and the 
 physical agencies and manner by 
 which and in which that business is 
 carried on. Those of the one are 
 consistent with the use of the street 
 by the lot owner and the general 
 public and if not directly beneficial 
 
§ 173 Additional Sebvitudes Upon Highways. 547 
 
 The question whether a particular electric railway is an 
 additional servitude or not is a question of degree, and 
 each case must be decided on its merits. It cannot be 
 denied that the gradual development of electric railways 
 has influenced the decisions of the courts, and has led them 
 to sustain as proper highway uses railways which, if they 
 had been the first departure from the omnibus, would have 
 been held additional servitudes. In deciding whether a 
 given railway is an additional servitude or not, the test put 
 forward by some courts, based on a distinction between 
 local and interurban traffic, does not wholly commend itself 
 when looked at from the purely logical point of view. A 
 man who is traveling around the world may use the high- 
 way as lawfully as one who is going to his nearest neigh- 
 bor's house. But, even in the short time that railroads 
 have been in use, the conception of a distinction between 
 street railways proper and interurban or commercial rail- 
 roads in respect to the propriety of their use of the high- 
 ways has become sufficiently well developed to give the 
 street railway for local traffic a certain historical justifica- 
 tion in placing its rails upon the streets which the inter- 
 urban railroad lacks. Moreover the railway for local 
 traffic, as has been said before, specially benefits the abut- 
 ting property, while the good that an interurban railroad 
 does, unlike the damage that it inflicts, is distributed evenly 
 over the entire town. The nature of the traffic and the 
 class of passengers carried is therefore an item proper to 
 be considered in deciding a close question whether a par- 
 ticular railway is within the highway easement.®" Other 
 
 to the abutting real estate are not 844, holding that an Interurban 
 detrimental to it. They relieve the street railway was an additional 
 streets from some of the burdens of servitude upon a country road. The 
 travel upon it, they facilitate travel distinction was drawn, however, not 
 between different parts of the city, upon the kind of highway but upon 
 and they enhance the value of the kind of trafBc. " This through 
 abutting property by increasing the travel is unquestionably composed 
 convenience of access to it." See, of people who otherwise would 
 however, the later Indiana case, travel on the ordinary steam raU- 
 Kinsey v. Union Traction Co., 169 road and would not use the high- 
 Ind. 563, 81 N. B. 922. way at all. Thus, the operation of 
 60. Grand Rapids, etc., K. E. Co. this newly developed street railway 
 V. Heisel, 38 Mich. 62, 31 Am. Rep. (so called) upon the country road 
 306. See also Zehren v. Milwaukee is precisely opposite to the opera- 
 El. Ry. Co., 99 Wis. 83, 74 N. W. tion of the urban railway upon the 
 538, 41 L. R. A. 575, 67 Am. St. Rep. city street . It burdens the road 
 
548 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 174 
 
 matters to be considered are the injury which it inflicts 
 upon the light, air, quiet, and access of the abutting owners 
 as a whole and whether such injury differs in kind from 
 that contemplated when the highway was laid out; and 
 whether the railway excludes other traffic.*^ If it does not, 
 it is part of the use to which the highway was originally 
 applied, serving the same purpose in harmonious co-oper- 
 ation with the roadway. If the railway, by its manner of 
 construction or operation, actually or substantially excludes 
 other traffic from the entire highway, it is inconsistent with 
 the purpose for which the highway was built ; and a total 
 exclusion from part of the highway or a partial exclusion 
 from the whole highway of ordinary travel by a railroad 
 in the street tends to brand the railroad as an additional 
 servitude. 
 
 § 174. Street Railways Carrying Merchandise. 
 
 One of the many practical distinctions between the old 
 fashioned horse railways and the contemporary steam rail- 
 roads was that the latter carried freight and the former did 
 not. It is, of course, true as a matter of law that the high- 
 ways are as properly used for the transportation of mer- 
 
 wltii travel which would otherwise that the use of the ways by the 
 not be there, Instead of relieving it railways must be consistent with 
 by the substitution of one vehicle the use of the ways by other 
 for many." travellers at the same time. * * » 
 61. Howe V. West End St. Ry. Oo., The theory on which it has been 
 167 Mass. 46, 44 N. E. 386. " It Is held that the taking of a part of a 
 obvious that the use made of a pub- public way for a railroad location 
 lie way in the operation of an elec- was a new use for which eompensa- 
 tric railway is of the same general tion must be made, was that by this 
 kind as that for which the way was taking and the subsequent use the 
 originally laid out, viz., the trans- public were at times excluded from 
 portation of persons and things the way, and the abutting land- 
 from place to place along the way. owner was excluded from his land 
 It is equally obvious that the actual within the limits of the way. * * • 
 operation of the electric railway The test whether the land under a 
 shown in the present cases does not street is subjected to a new use by 
 exclude ordinary travel from the the opera,tion of new forms of trans- 
 way; that there is no exclusive portation of persons or things is 
 occupation by the railway of any undoubtedly in some respects a 
 part of the surface of the way. question of degree, but the solution 
 
 * * * The use of the ordinary of it does not depend so much upon 
 steam railroad when it crosses a the kind of power used as upon the 
 public way or runs along the way is structures which are required and 
 intended to be In a sense exclusive. the change in the occupation and 
 
 * * * The whole system of street use of the street occasioned by the 
 railways is founded on the theory new form of transportation." 
 
§ 174 Additional, Servitudes Upon Highways. 549 
 
 chandise as for the travel of human beings ; but long, slow- 
 moving freight trains are, as a matter of fact, one of the 
 most objectionable features of the use of a highway by a 
 steam railroad. Some courts have held a freight railway 
 to be an additional servitude upon a public highway even 
 if the cars are drawn by horses,*^ and it seems to be gener- 
 ally considered that an electric railway established solely 
 or principally for the purpose of carrying freight cannot 
 construct its tracks upon a public street without compen- 
 sation to the owner of the fee.** 
 
 The interurban lines frequently carry, in addition to 
 passengers, for the accommodation of whom they were 
 primarily established, mails, personal baggage, express 
 matter and light merchandise. On some lines articles of 
 this character are carried in compartments of the pas- 
 senger cars, and on others separate express cars are run. 
 It has been held that the carriage of such articles consti- 
 tuted an additional servitude,** but such decisions have not 
 been universally followed and do .not seem likely to meet 
 with general approval. Such lines have been held in sev- 
 eral states to constitute a proper highway use,'® and in 
 
 62. Carli v. SttUwater St Ry. Co., 120 Wis. 477, 98 N. W. 215, 2 St. Ry. 
 28 Minn. 373, 10 N. W. 205, 4 Am. Rep. 973. 
 
 Rep. 290; Rische v. Texas Trans- 65. In Montgomery v. Santa Ana, 
 
 portation C5o., 27 Tex. Civ. App. 33, etc., Ry. Co., 104 Cal. 186, 37 Pac. 
 
 66 S. W. a24. Contra, White v. 786, 25 L. R. A. 654, 43 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 Blanchard Bros. Granite Co., 178 89, the court said: "The great 
 
 Mass. 363, 59 N. E. 1052. highways of England were con- 
 
 63. Cadwell v. Connecticut Ry. & structed not so much for the con- 
 Lighting Co., 84 Conn. 40, 80 Atl. venience of passengers as for the 
 285, 83 Atl. 215, 444, 40 L. R. A. transportation of freight In the 
 (N. S.) 253, Ann. Cas. 1913 C 401, Infancy of commerce, when trade 
 7 St Ry. Rep. 44; Spalding v. Ma- and traffic by land were insignifl- 
 comb, etc., R. R. Co., 225 111. 585, cant in volume, when the sumpter 
 80 N. E. 327. horse, which answers to our modern 
 
 64. niimois. — Wilder v. Aurora, pack mule, answered all purposes of 
 etc.. Traction Co., 216 111. 493, 75 transportation for goods, footpaths, 
 N. B. 194, 4 St. Ry. Rep. 185. bridle paths, and lanes served all 
 
 OTiio.— Schaaf v. Cleveland, etc., needed purposes; but with the 
 
 Ry. Co., 66 Ohio St 215, 64 N. E. growth of inland commerce and the 
 
 145. need of greater facilities for the 
 
 Wismnsin. — Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. interchange of commodities, the use 
 
 V. Milwaukee, etc., Ry. Co., 95 Wis. of wheeled vehicles, and, as a means 
 
 561, 70 N. W. 678, 37 L. R. A. 856, thereto, the highway as we know it 
 
 60 Am. St Rep. 137; Lange v. La became a necessity. The Appian 
 
 Crosse, etc., Ry. Co., 118 Wis. 558, Way, commenced 312 B. C, which 
 
 95 N. W. 952, 1 St Ry. Rep. 834; has provoked the admiration of the 
 
 Younkin v. Milwaukee, etc., Ry. Co., world, was entitled to commendation 
 
550 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 175 
 
 many other states the point seemed so obvious that it has 
 never been raised in the courts. 
 
 § 175. Projecting Rails and Reserved Spaces. 
 
 As already pointed out, one of the distinguishing char- 
 acteristics of the street railways of the earlier type was 
 the flatness of the rails, and the fact that they were laid 
 in such a manner that other vehicles could readily cross 
 them, even at an acute angle, so that the portion of the 
 street occupied by the tracks was freely used for general 
 traffic also. As the more modern type of electric railway 
 
 for its roadway 16 feet In width, 
 constructed for the transportation 
 of burdens, while the paths of 8 feet 
 on each side of it for foot pas- 
 sengers, and upon which the Roman 
 legions were wont to march, were 
 unpaved. In the construction of 
 modern highways, urban and su- 
 burban, the great difficulty and the 
 prominent object has been to build 
 and adapt them by grade, width, 
 and structure of roadbed to the car- 
 riage of freight." In Mordhurst v. 
 Ft. Wayne, etc.. Traction Co., 163 
 Ind. 268, 71 N. E. 642, 66 L. R. A. 
 105, 106 Am. St. Rep. 222, 2 Ann. 
 Cas. 967, 3 St Ry. Rep. 182, the 
 court said : " The carriage of light 
 express matter, passenger baggage, 
 and mail matter upon street-cars 
 would not constitute ground of 
 complaint on the part of abutting 
 lot owners. If only one car is run, 
 the street is occupied and ob- 
 structed by it to no greater ex- 
 tent than it would be by a street- 
 car. If two constitute a train, 
 they will take up no more space 
 and do no more injury than a 
 motor-ear and trailer, which are 
 commonly run upon street railroad 
 tracks when the business of the com- 
 pany requires such additional car. 
 The fact that light express matter, 
 passenger baggage and United 
 States mail matter are carried in a 
 car does not affect the property 
 owner nor injure his property. The 
 transportation of articles of this 
 kind does not create any resem- 
 blance between the interurban elec- 
 tric railroad and a steam railroad 
 
 carrying ordinary goods and mer- 
 chandise, and results in none of the 
 annoyances and injuries which are 
 caused by either passenger or 
 freight trains on such a railroad." 
 In Kinsey v. Union Traction Oo., 
 169 Ind. 563, 81 N. B. 922, tbie court 
 said : " What principle can be ad- 
 vanced in condemnation of the in- 
 closed, reasonably sized, neatly con- 
 structed freight or express car? 
 Was not the transportation over the 
 roads and streets as deeply seated 
 in the dedicatory purpose as the 
 passage of persons? Plainly the 
 reasons that justify the one support 
 the other. The heavy drays and 
 wagons employed in hauling the 
 commerce of the city are a greater 
 obstruction to the street and menace 
 to the safety of those using it than 
 the number of pedestrians. There- 
 fore a suitable car, comparatively 
 noiseless, confined to a fixed track 
 4 or 5 feet vnde, in the center of 
 the street, to which track vehicles 
 may be safely adjusted by keeping 
 to the right, and which car will 
 carry twenty fold more freight or 
 express than a wagon occupying the 
 same amount of space in the street, 
 and meandering in an irregular 
 track, cannot, for any sufficient rea- 
 son, be declared a nuisance or an 
 improper use of the street. No use 
 should be held improper that pro- 
 duces no extra hazard and makes 
 the way easier, safer, and more con- 
 venient as a passage-way for the 
 public in common." See also De 
 Grauw v. Long Island Electric Ry. 
 Co., 163 N. Y. 597, 57 N. E. 1108. 
 
§ 175 Additional Seevitudes Upon HtoHWAYS. 551 
 
 was introduced, by reason of the high speed of the cars and 
 the frequency with which they ran it became unsafe and 
 inconvenient for general traffic to use the space between 
 the rails, and the use of that portion of the street by the 
 railway company became to a considerable degree exclu- 
 sive. This exclusive use became complete when the rail- 
 way companies were allowed to lay the so-called T rails, 
 which project so far above the surface of the street that it 
 would be difficult, if not impossible, to pull the wheels of a 
 loaded wagon across them. The character of the rails with 
 respect to their interference with other traffic upon the 
 streets is certainly one element in determining whether a 
 particular railway is a proper highway use,®® but except 
 in the states in which a narrow view of the extent of the 
 public easement is taken, the laying of T rails,®^ a change 
 
 66. Nichols v. Ann Arbor & Ypsi- 
 lanti St. Ry. Ck)., 87 Mich. 361, 49 
 N. W. 538, 16 L. R. A. 371. "A street 
 railway, the rails of which are laid 
 to conform to the grade and sur- 
 face of the street, and which is 
 otherwise so constructed that the 
 public is not excluded from the use 
 of any part of the street as a pub- 
 lic way, carrying passengers, stop- 
 ping at street crossings to receive 
 and discharge them, is a street rail- 
 way, whether it be operated by 
 horses or electric power, or by 
 steam-motor. * * ► ihe road as 
 constructed runs along the highway 
 within two or three feet of the road 
 fence ui>on complainants' land; the 
 roadbed does not conform to the 
 grade of the street, nor pass over 
 and along the surfaoe»of the ground 
 next to the fence, but the grade for 
 the roadbed is made by cuts and 
 fills. * * * Upon the roadbed so 
 constructed ties are placed to the 
 number of from 2,000 to 2,800 to the 
 mile. Upon these ties is placed a 
 T rail, such as is ordinarily used in 
 the construction of a railroad for 
 commercial purposes, except that 
 the T rail is somewhat lighter. 
 * * * A% constructed it is an 
 additional burden upon their lands." 
 See also 
 
 United States. — Hoist v. Savan- 
 nah Electric Oo., 131 Fed. 931. 
 
 Georgia. — Campbell v. Metropoli- 
 tan St. Ry. Co., 82 Ga. 320, 9 S. E. 
 1078. 
 
 Illinois. — Stetson v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 75 111. 74; Russell v. Chi- 
 cago, etc., Ry. Co., 205 HI. 155, 68 
 N. E.. 727. 
 
 Michigan. — Detroit City Ry. Co. 
 V. Mills, 85 Mich. 634, 48 N. W. 1007, 
 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 333. 
 
 Missouri. — Sherlock v. Kansas 
 City Belt R. R. Co., 142 Mo. 172, 
 43 S. W. 629, 64 Am. St Rep. 551. 
 
 North Carolina. — Merrick v. In- 
 tramontaine Ry. Co., 118 N. C. 1081, 
 24 S. B. 667. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — WesthaefEer v. 
 Lebanon, etc., St. Ry. Co., 163 Pa. 
 54, 29 Atl. 873. 
 
 Washington. — Seattle Transfer 
 Co. V. Seattle, 27 Wash. 520, 68 
 Pac. 90. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Zehren v. Milwaukee 
 El. Ry. Co., 99 Wis. 83, 74 N. W. 
 538, 41 L. R. A. 575, 67 Am. St. Rep. 
 844. 
 
 67. Cadwell v. Connecticut Co., 85 
 Conn. 40, 83 Atl. 215, 444, 40 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 253, Ann. Cas. 1913 C 401; 
 Mordhurst v. Fort Wayne, etc.. 
 Traction Co., 163 Ind. 268, 71 N. E. 
 642, 66 L. R. A. 105, 106 Am. St. 
 Rep. 222, 2 Ann. Cas. 967. 
 
552 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 176 
 
 of grade for the benefit of a street railway,^^ or even the 
 formal reservation of a certain portion of the highway for 
 the use of a street railway** would not in and of itself 
 constitute an additional servitude. 
 
 § 176. Viaducts, Feed Wires, Increased Traffic, Change 
 of System. 
 
 It would probably be held in most, if not all, of the states 
 that a railway upon a viaduct in tiie middle of the street 
 would constitute an additional servitude, even if the rail- 
 way was wholly used for local traffic, if its occupation of 
 the viaduct was exclusive.'^" In such a case the combina- 
 tion of an exclusive use of a substantial portion of the 
 street, and an injury to abutting owners differing in kind 
 and not merely in degree from that contemplated when the 
 highway was laid out, would be sufficient to carry such a 
 use of the way beyond the lawful limits of the highway 
 easement. 
 
 A wire for the transmission of electricity to be used for 
 furnishing motive power for a street railway is not an 
 additional servitude upon a street upon which no tracks 
 are laid.'^^ While it is true that such a wire is of no benefit 
 to the abutters upon the street, the maintenance of such a 
 wire is a lawful exercise of the highway easement, first 
 because it does in fact transmit matter, second because it 
 is incidental to the operation of a street railway, which is 
 everywhere recognized as a proper highway use, and third, 
 because as a practical matter, it inflicts less injury upon 
 abutting property than if the cars were operated in the 
 street. 
 
 If a two-track electric street railway for strictly local 
 purposes is not an additional servitude upon a highway in 
 which no tracks had ever been previously laid, it is obvi- 
 ously no worse if it takes the place of a single-track horse 
 railway. Consequently an additional servitude upon a 
 highway upon which a single-track street railway already 
 
 68. Green v. City & Suburban Ry. 70. Camden Interstate Ry. Co. v. 
 Co., 78 Md. 294, 28 Atl. 626, 44 Am. Smiley, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 134, 84 S. W. 
 St. Rep. 288, and see supra, § 163. 523, 3 St. Ry. Rep. 278. 
 
 69. Eustis V. Milton St. Ry. Co., 71. Brandt v. Spokane, etc., R. R. 
 183 Mass. 586, 67 N. E. 663, 1 St. Ry. Co., 78 Wash. 214, 138 Pac. 871. 
 Kep. 311. 
 
§ 177 Additional Servitudes Upon Highways. 553 
 
 exists is not imposed when an additional street railway 
 track is laid, or when a change is made from horse to 
 mechanical power, or larger or more numerous cars are 
 Tised.''^ When however the new use is not within the high- 
 way easement, it is no defense that the highway was already 
 encumbered by a railway which, though within the highway 
 easement, was almost as burdensome as the new use. Thus 
 a change from a " dummy line " to a steam railroad of the 
 customary type is an additional servitude upon the way.''^ 
 
 § 177. Special Damage to Adjoining Premises. 
 
 If it is held, after taking into consideration the motive 
 power, the traffic served, the extent of the use for general 
 travel of the space between the rails that is practicable, the 
 effect upon abutting property, and such other tests as may 
 be proper, that a particular railway is a street railway 
 and is a proper highway use, the fact that it is constructed 
 in such a way as to inflict a special and peculiar injury 
 upon some of the land adjoining the highway does not 
 create a liability to the owners of such property, unless the 
 work was constructed without authority of law or extended 
 outside of the limits of the highway, or the owners are 
 entitled to compensation by a special statutory or consti- 
 tutional provision. Once the railway is sanctioned as an 
 exercise of the public easement, it may be authorized to 
 use the land over which the public easement extends in any 
 way that is reasonably necessary for the operation of its 
 road without incurring any greater liability to the owners 
 of the fee than in the case of any other lawful exercise of 
 the highway easement, such as the laying of sewers or the 
 change of the grade. Accordingly, if it is found necessary 
 
 72. Alabama. — Birmingham Belt Virginia. — Reld v. Norfolk City 
 
 E. R. Co. V. Lockwood, 150 Ala. 610, Ry. Co., 94 Va. 117, 26 S. B. 428, 36 
 
 43 So. 819. L. R. A. 274, 64 Am. St. Rep. 708. 
 
 Colorado. — Denver, etc., R. R. Co. West Virginia. — Cotts v. Wheel- 
 
 V. Hannegan, 43 Colo. 122, 95 Pac. ing, etc., R. R. Co., 63 W. Va. 39, 
 
 343, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874, 127 59 S. E. 766. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 100. 73. Hutcheson v. International, 
 
 Kentucky.— Louisville, etc., R. R. etc., R. R. Co., 102 Tex. 471, 119 
 
 Co. V; Orr, 91 Ky. 109, 15 S. W. 8. S. W. 85. 
 
 New York. — Wolf v. Manhattan 
 Ry. Co., 101 N. Y. Supp. 493, 51 
 Misc. 426. 
 
554 The Law of Eminent Domain. %< 177 
 
 to trim or cut down shade trees standing in the street, or 
 to lop off branches of trees standing upon adjoining land 
 which project into the street, in order to make space for 
 the poles or wires of a trolley line, the owner of the fee has 
 no redressJ* 
 
 In the street railway cases which were first considered 
 by the courts, the street railway tracks were in the middle 
 of the street, and sufficient space was left for vehicles to 
 stand between the curb and the nearest rail. This is the 
 usual situation; but it sometimes happens that by reason 
 of the narrowness of the street or the sharpness of a curve, 
 or by the laying of the tracks upon one side of the street, 
 the nearest rail is so close to the curb that it is impossible 
 for the cars to pass while a wagon is standing in front of 
 the adjoining premises. In such case the stopping of 
 vehicles for the purpose of delivering or receiving goods 
 from such premises is necessarily interfered with to a con- 
 siderable degree, and the annoyance from the noise and 
 vibration caused by the cars is also considerably increased. 
 Nevertheless, if the railway company laying the tracks was 
 acting under authority of law, and the railway was a street 
 railway in the proper sense of the term, entitled to share 
 in the public easement, the owner is not entitled to com- 
 pensation.''® This is merely an instance of the concurrent 
 
 74. MUler v. Detroit, etc., Ry. Co., Mich. 522, 52 N. W. 1010, 16 L. R. A. 
 125 Mich. 171, 84 N. W. 49, 51 752 ; Austin v. Detroit, etc., Ry. Co., 
 L. K. A. 955, 84 Am. St. Rep. 569, 134 Mich. 149, 96 N. W. 35, 2 Ann. 
 7 Am. Elect. Cas. 387. See also Cas. 530. 
 
 supra, § 158. North Carolma. — Hester v. Dur- 
 
 75. Alabama. — Birmingham, etc., ham Traction Co., 138 N. G. 288, 50 
 Power Co. v. Smyer, 181 Ala. 121, S. E. 711, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 981. 
 61 So. 354, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 596 Pennsylvania. — RafEerty v. Cen- 
 (even under damage clause). tral Traction Co., 147 Pa. 579, 23 
 
 California.— Reynolds v. Presidio, Atl. 884, 30 Am. St. Rep. 763. 
 
 etc., R. R. Co., 1 Cal. App. 229, 81 Texas.— San Antonio Rapid Tran- 
 
 Pac. 1118, 4 St. Ry. Rep. 56 (al- sit Street Railway Co. v. Llmburger, 
 
 though unauthorized, held not a pri- 88 Tex. 79, 30 S. W. 538, 53 Am. St. 
 
 vate Injury). Eep. 730, 5 Am. Elect. Cas. 156. 
 
 ^era*Mcfcj/.— Ashland, etc., St. Ry. Firf^imo.— Wagner v. Bristol Belt 
 
 Co. V. Faulliner, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 156, Line Railway Co., 108 Va. 594, 62 
 
 45 S. W. 235, 51 S. W. 806, 43 S. E. 391, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1278. 
 
 L. R. A. 554. Wisconsin. — Hobart v. Milwaukee 
 
 Maine. — Parsons v. Waterville, City Railroad Co., 27 Wis. 194, 9 
 
 etc., St. Ry. Co., 101 Me. 173, 63 Am. Rep. 461. 
 
 Atl. 728, 4 St. Ry. Rep. 371. Contra, Slaughter v. Meridian, 
 
 Michigan. — People ex rel. Kunze etc., Ry. Co., 95 Miss. 251, 48 So. 
 
 V. Fort Wayne, etc., R. R. Co., 92 6, 1040, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1265 
 
§ 178 Additional Servitudes Upon Highways. 555 
 
 use of the Mghway by travellers of different classes, for 
 the owner of the adjoining premises may continue to exer- 
 cise his right of loading and unloading goods as long as he 
 does not unreasonably interfere with the use of the street 
 by the passengers in the cars. 
 
 When however a street railway close to the curb is con- 
 structed or maintained in such a way as to physically 
 exclude other traffic, few courts would deny the owner com- 
 pensationJ* In most cases a railway so constructed would 
 be held to be an improper street use, and thus an additional 
 servitude, or, if the abutter did not own the fee, a taking 
 of his easement of access, and even -if the railway was held 
 to be a proper street use, the injury would be so severe as 
 to constitute a taking,^^ since the owner, unlike one whose 
 access to the street is impaired by a change of grade, could 
 not restore the accessibility of his premises by adapting 
 them to the improvement. 
 
 § 178. Elevated Railways. 
 
 It seems to have been held in almost every jurisdiction 
 in which the question has arisen that, when the abutter 
 owns the fee of a highway, he is entitled to compensation 
 
 (margin of two Inches between alley in the rear remained. In 
 the cars and the hubs of ordinary Jaynes v. Omaha St. Ry. Co., 53 
 wagons destroys the use of the Neb. 631, 74 N. W. 67, 39 L. R. A. 
 street and the abutter is entitled to 751, It was even held that the erec- 
 compensation). Cincinnati, etc., St. tion of a trolley pole in the sidewalk 
 Ry. Co. V. Cumminsvllle, 14 Ohio St. in front of one's door was sufficient 
 523 (rails laid within two feet of interference with access to entitle 
 the curb). S€e also Dooly Block v. the owner to compensation. This 
 Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co., 9 is of course not the law elsewhere. 
 Utah 31, 33 Pac. 229, 24 L. R. A. 610. See also as to cutting off of access 
 76. Thus in Mahady v. Bushwick by street railway Decker v. Evans- 
 St Ry. Co., 91 N. Y. 148, 43 Am. ville Suburban R. R. Co., 183 Ind. 
 Rep. 661, the owner was entitled to 493, 33 N. E. 349 ; Farrar v. Mld- 
 recover for the habitual storage of land El. Ry. Co., 101 Mo. App. 140, 
 cars on a track laid within sixteen 74 S. W. 500, 1 St Ry. Rep. 469. 
 Inches of the curb. In Stephenson In Williams v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 
 V. Atchison, etc., Power Co., 88 Kan. 150 Cal. 592, 89 Pac. 330, 5 St. Ry. 
 794, 129 Pac. 1188, it was held that Rep. 42, It was held that a street 
 an owner might recover for the cut- railway signal tower in a street was 
 ting ofE of access by a street railway a violation of the abutter's ease- 
 track, although by reason of the dif- ments of access, light and air and 
 ference in level it was not possible of the right to the street space being 
 to drive from his land to the street, kept open so goods may be seen, 
 before the street railway was built, 77. Supra, § 115. 
 and although other access by an 
 
556 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 178 
 
 for the erection of a permanent structure therein, sup- 
 ported by posts and cross-beams, and used for the purpose 
 of carrying trains of cars or even single cars at a level 
 higher than the grade of the street, while the surface of 
 the street is left open for ordinary traffic; and in most 
 jurisdictions the same rule is applied when the fee of the 
 highway is in the public, although the reasoning upon which 
 this liability is based is not always clear. 
 
 A steam railroad of the ordinary type, but carried 
 through the streets of a city upon a trestle, would doubt- 
 less be held an additional servitude in almost every state ; ^* 
 for while it may encumber the roadway less than if it was 
 constructed upon the surface, the pillars upon which it 
 necessarily rests wholly exclude other traffic from a con- 
 siderable part of the way, and such a railroad certainly 
 inflicts an injury upon the owner of the fee much severer 
 than a railroad upon the surface of the street, since the 
 deprivation of light and air is continuous, and the damage 
 from noise, smoke and loss of privacy is as great or 
 greater. Even in states which do not allow compensation 
 to the abutting owners when a steam railroad is laid upon 
 the surface of the street, a different rule is applied when 
 such a railroad is constructed upon a trestle.™ 
 
 78. Jones v. Erie, etc., K. R. Co., tbelr easement as abutters on such 
 151 Pa. 30, 25 Atl. 134, 17 L. R. A. street. But they do contend that 
 758, 31 Am. St. Rep. 722. this court has not gone to the extent 
 
 79. In De Geofroy v. Merchants' of holding that an elevated rail- 
 Bridge Terminal Ry. Co., 179 Mo. road, buUt on permanent structures 
 698, 79 S. W. 386, 64 L. R. A. 959, in a public street which interfere 
 101 Am. St Rep. 524, it appeared with, and deprive the owners of, 
 that a steam railroad was carried their easement and free access to 
 on a trestle in front of plaintife's and from buildings and deprive 
 property in a street the fee of whicdi them of light and air, is not an 
 was in the public. The court said additional servitude and one not 
 (p. 716) : " On the part of the contemplated when the street was 
 plaintiffs we are not asked to re- established and laid out. They 
 verse the unbroken line of decisions insist that the logic and reasoning 
 in this state which hold that a of our decisions on the contrary lead 
 steam or street railroad constructed to the conclusion that such struc- 
 and maintained on the grade of a tures as those described in their pe- 
 street by authority of municipal au- tition are inconsistent with the 
 thority duly delegated is not a new original dedication of the street and 
 and additional servitude; neither is are such an injury to the abutting 
 it insisted that the municipal au- property owners as entitles them to 
 thority may not grant an elevated damages therefor. On the other 
 railroad the right to occupy a street hand, defendants assert that the 
 subject to its liability to pay abut- construction of an elevated street or 
 ting owners damages for injuries to steam railroad on a street differs 
 
§ 179 Additional Seevitudes Upon Highways. 557 
 
 An elevated railway proper, even though using electricity 
 as a motive power and designed to accommodate urban 
 passenger traffic solely, should clearly be held to constitute 
 an additional servitude when the fee of the street is in the 
 abutter, because of its exclusive use of a considerable por- 
 tion of the highway by its pillars and the unanticipated 
 injury it inflicts upon the abutter. It is when the fee of the 
 street is in the public that difficulties have arisen. 
 
 § 179. The New York Elevated Railway Cases. 
 
 It was in New York that the first important litigation in 
 regard to elevated railways arose, and it was in this litiga- 
 tion that the doctrine of the abutters' easements of light, 
 air and access had its origin. The elevated railroads in 
 New York used steam as a motive power and the structures 
 which carried the tracks were supported by large posts and 
 interfered considerably with the light, air and access of the 
 abutters. They were built in streets the fee of which was 
 in the public, and although they inflicted overwhelming 
 injury on the abutting property, the statutes authorizing 
 their construction made no provision for the payment of 
 compensation. This seemed particularly unfair in a juris- 
 diction in which a horse-car line was an additional servi- 
 tude when the abutter owned the fee.*" To meet this hard- 
 ship the doctrine that abutters on a street of which the 
 
 from one constructed on the grade and that an elevated road does not 
 of the street In degree only, and not destroy the street as much as a 
 In principle ; that the principle upon surface road. * * * Were it a 
 which our decisions hold that a new question, we would be greatly 
 railroad built on the grade is not inclined to say that a steam rail- 
 a new servitude, is not that they do road emitting steam, smoke, and 
 not in fact inconvenience and dam- cinders in front of an abutter's 
 age the abutting owners, and de- property was a servitude never con- 
 preciate their property, but is that templated in the establishment of 
 the city has the right to apply the the street, but the rule to the con- 
 street to any public service which trary, as already said, has been too 
 will not destroy it as a highway or long maintained, and too many 
 as a means of egress or ingress to rights have been vested on the faith 
 and from the abutting property, and of it, for the courts now to disturb 
 that all other resulting damages it, but there Is no sound argument 
 are only such as were contemplated or reason, in our opinion, for extend- 
 in the original dedication of the ing it one whit further than we have 
 highway, whether by donation, pur- heretofore gone. Our conclusion is 
 chase, or condemnation — that a that the plaintiffs state a good cause 
 long freight train passing on grade of action and one entitling them to 
 
 might make as much noise, emit as 
 
 much smoke, and raise as much 80. Supra, § 170. 
 
 dust, as a train on an elevated road ; i 
 
558 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 179 
 
 public owns the fee have easements of light, air, and access 
 in the street was worked out; first, as has been shown 
 before, in a case where an elevated railroad was built in a 
 street which the city had covenanted to keep open forever 
 — the well-known case of Story v. New York Elevated 
 Railway Co.^^ The doctrine of the Story case was soon 
 extended to protect streets laid out under an act assessing 
 the cost on the property benefited. In the absence of 
 express covenants it was held that the assessment was an 
 implied covenant to keep the street for proper street uses.*'' 
 Eventually it was held that whatever the state of the title 
 in the street, or however it had been originally laid out, an 
 elevated railway could not be built in it without compen- 
 sating the abutter.®* According to the civil law, which pre- 
 vailed in Holland and consequently in New York when it 
 
 81. 90 N. Y. 122, 43 Am. Kep. 146, 
 and supra, § 160. 
 
 82. Lahr v. Metropolitan El. Ry. 
 Co., 104 N. Y. 268, 10 N. B. 528; 
 Peyser v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 
 13 Daly (N. T.) 122. This is not in 
 accordance with the rule generally 
 prevailing. See supra, § 116. In the 
 Lahr case the court said : " We 
 hold that the Story Case has defi- 
 nitely determined: First, that an 
 elevated railroad in the streets of a 
 city, operated by steam power and 
 constructed as to form, equipments 
 and dimensions like that described 
 in the Story Case, is a perversion of 
 the use of the street from the pur- 
 poses originally designed for it, and 
 is a use which neither the city au- 
 thorities nor the legislature can 
 legalize or sanction without provid- 
 ing compensation for the injury in- 
 flicted upon the property of abutting 
 owners; second, that abutters upon 
 a public street claiming title to their 
 premises by grant from the munici- 
 pal authorities, which contains a 
 covenant that a street to be laid out 
 in front of such property shall for- 
 ever thereafter continue for the free 
 and common passages of and as pub- 
 lic streets and ways for the in- 
 habitants of said city and all others 
 passing and returning through or by 
 the same, in like manner as the 
 other streets of the same city now 
 
 are or lawfully ought to be, acquire 
 an easement in the bed of the street 
 for ingress and egress to and from 
 their premises, and also for the free 
 and uninterrupted passage and cir- 
 culation of light and air through 
 and over such street for the benefit 
 of property situated thereon ; third, 
 that the ownership of such easement 
 is an interest in real estate consti- 
 tuting property within the meaning 
 of that term as used in the consti- 
 tution of the state, and requires 
 compensation to be made therefor 
 before it can lawfully be taken from 
 its owner for public use; fourth, 
 that the erection of an elevated rail- 
 road, the use of which is intended to 
 be permanent, in a public street and 
 upon which cars are propelled by 
 steam engines generating gas, steam, 
 and smoke, and distributing in the 
 air cinders, dust, ashes, and other 
 noxious and deleterious substances, 
 and interrupting the free passage of 
 light and air to and from adjoining 
 premises, constitutes a taking of the 
 easement and its appropriation by 
 the railroad corporation, rendering 
 it liable to the abutters for the dam- 
 ages occasioned by such taking." 
 
 83. Abendroth v. Manhattan Ry. 
 Co., 122 N. Y. 1, 25 N. E. 496, 11 
 L. R. A. 634, 19 Am. St. Rep. 461; 
 Williams v. Brooklyn Ry. Co., 126 
 N. Y. 96, 26 N. B. 1048; Bohm v. 
 
§ 179 Additional Servitudes Upon Highways. 559 
 
 was a Dutch colony, the absolute title to a street was in the 
 sovereign, without any rights or easements in the abutter. 
 It was held, however, that an elevated railroad was an 
 improper use for a street laid out under Dutch rule, because 
 by the charter of 1686 there was made a declaration of 
 trust in regard to the streets which could not be abrogated 
 without compensation.*^ Even when a street was laid out 
 under a statute providing that it should be converted to 
 the use of the public " in the manner now designated and 
 settled by law " and " in such other manner as the legis- 
 lature may hereafter deem proper to enact ' ' it was held 
 that an elevated railroad could not be built upon it, because 
 such a railroad was not of the same general nature as the 
 uses designated and settled by law when the street was 
 laid out.«^ 
 
 More recently several cases arose in which it appeared 
 that a steam railroad had a valid location on the surface 
 of a public highway or in a cut running longitudinally in 
 the street. To improve the street for general travel the 
 legislature compelled the railroad to abandon its location 
 and to transfer its tracks to an elevated structure. It was 
 held that the abutter could not recover for the injury result- 
 ing, because the change was made for the benefit of general 
 travel, and it was well settled that the abutters' easements 
 were subject to the right of the public to improve the street 
 for general travel by grading or otherwise.*** The abutter 
 was allowed to recover for injury to his easements by the 
 construction of a station,*'^ but only to the extent that the 
 station exceeded the rest of the structure in size.** The 
 
 Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 129 N. T. 168 N. Y. 597, 61 N. E. 554 ; Fries v. 
 
 576, 29 N. E. 802, 14 L. R. A. 344 ; New York, etc., R. R. Co., 169 N. Y. 
 
 Hughes V. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 270, 62 N. E. 358 ; Muhlker v. New 
 
 130 N. Y. 14, 28 N. E. 765. York, etc., R. R. Co., 173 N. Y. 549, 
 
 84. Kane v. New York El. Ry. Co., 66 N. E. 558 ; Keirns v. New York, 
 125 N. Y. 164, 26 N. E. 278, 11 etc., R. R. Co., 173 N. Y. 642, 66 
 L. R. A. 640 ; Mortimer v. New York N. E. 1110. See, however, Coyne v. 
 El. R. R. Co., 25 Jones & S. (N. Y.) Memphis, 118 Tenn. 651, 102 S. W. 
 244, 6 N. Y. Supp. 898 355, contra. 
 
 85. American Primitive Methodist 87. Dolan v. New York, etc., R. R. 
 Society v. Brooklyn Elevated Ry. Co., 175 N. Y. 367, 67 N. E. 612. 
 Co., 46 Hun (N. Y.) 530. 88. Ketcham v. New York, etc., 
 
 86. Levris V. New York, etc., R. R. R. R. Co., 177 N. Y. 247, 69 N. B. 
 Co., 162 N. Y. 202, 56 N. E. 540; 533. 
 
 Welde V. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 
 
560 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 179 
 
 Supreme Court of the United States however upset all this 
 fine-spun reasoning and held that as owners had bought 
 property relying on the decisions that an elevated railway 
 could not be built without compensation, the later decisions 
 impaired the obligation of contracts in violation of the 
 United States Constitution.** This extraordinary and far- 
 reaching decision was not reached without strong dissent.®" 
 Whether the New York Court of Appeals repented of its 
 decision in the Story case, or really felt there was a valid 
 distinction between an elevated railroad built for the profit 
 of a private corporation and one erected at legislative com- 
 mand to improve the surface of the street, the Story case 
 has had an enormous influence in shaping the decisions in 
 other states. On the other hand, it has been subject to the 
 bitterest criticism and ridicule. It has often been pointed 
 out that, in New York, an abutter who does not own the fee 
 of the street has no remedy if the grade of the entire street 
 is raised twenty feet and filled in with earth to its entire 
 width and a steam railroad is then laid out on the surface 
 of the embankment so constructed; but if the steam rail- 
 road is built upon a solid embankment less than the width 
 of the street, or upon the skeleton frame of the ordinary 
 elevated structure, he may recover damages for the less 
 
 89. Muhlker v. New York, etc., L. ed. 520, as to public bonds bought 
 R. K. Co., 197 U. S. 544, 49 L. ed. on the faith of a decision that they 
 872. were constitutionally issued." That 
 
 90. Holmes, J., with Fuller, C. J., decision " certainly has never sup- 
 and White and Peckham, JJ., con- posed to mean that all property 
 curring in his dissent : " If at the owners in a state have a vested 
 outset the New York courts had de- right that no general proposition of 
 elded that apart from statute or ex- law shall be reversed, changed or 
 press grant the abutters on a street modified by the courts if the conse- 
 had only the rights of the public quence to them will be more or less 
 and no private easement of any kind pecuniary loss. I know of no con- 
 it would have been in no way amaz- stitutional principle to prevent the 
 ing." Such decisions " would have complete reversal of the elevated 
 infringed no rights under the con- railroad cases tomorrow." Judge 
 stitution of the United States. * * * Holmes goes on to say that the 
 What has happened to cut down the plaintifC must claim that a state 
 power of the same courts as against court cannot distinguish one de- 
 that same constitution at the present cision from a previous one unless 
 day? * * * The only thing that the distinction strikes the United 
 has happened is that they have de- States Supreme Court as sound, and 
 cided the elevated railway cases. that if such were the law, the dis- 
 * * * We are asked to extend to tinction drawn in this case seems 
 the present case the principle of to him " not wanting in good sense." 
 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 
 
§ 180 Additional Sbevitudes Upon Highways. 
 
 561 
 
 serious injury so caused. Nevertheless the law in New 
 York regarding the use of streets, while somewhat different 
 from that prevailing elsewhere,®^ is based on certain well 
 defined fundamental propositions and the decision in each 
 cas6 results logically enough, even if absurd distinctions 
 can be imagined, or perhaps are sometimes actually drawn. 
 But the history of the elevated railway decisions in New 
 York furnishes a striking example of the swarm of dan- 
 gers and difficulties let loose when the court attempts to 
 perform a duty which the legislature has neglected, and 
 thus ventures forth from its proper province.®^ 
 
 § 180. Elevated Railways in Other Jurisdictions. 
 There has been more or less litigation outside of New 
 York affecting elevated railways, generally when the fee 
 
 91. In New York If the fee of tie 
 street is in the abutting owner he 
 is entitled to compensation if a 
 steam railroad (Williams v. New 
 York Central R. R. Co., 16 N. Y. 
 97, 69 Am. Dec. 651), an electric 
 railway (Peck v. Schenectady Ry. 
 Co., 170 N. Y. 298, 63 N. E. 357), 
 even a horse railway (Craig v. 
 Rochester St. Ry. Co., 39 N. Y. 404), 
 or, it may clearly be inferred, an 
 elevated railway, is built in the 
 street If the fee of the street is 
 in the public the abutting owner has 
 an easement of light, air and access 
 in it.. This easement is not taken 
 and he is not entitled to compensa- 
 tion when a horse railway (People 
 V. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188), a cable rail- 
 way (In re Third Ave. Ry. Co., 
 121 N. Y. 536, 24 N. E. 951, 9 
 L. R. A. 124), or a steam railroad 
 (Pobes V. Rome, etc., R. R. Co., 
 121 N. Y. 505, 24 N. E. 919, 8 
 L. R. A. 453, is constructed on the 
 surface of the street. But the ease- 
 ment is taken and he is entitled to 
 compensation when an elevated rail- 
 way ( Story V. New York El. Ry. Co., 
 90 N. Y. 122, 43 Am. Rep. 146), or a 
 steam railroad upon an embankment 
 higher than the rest of the street 
 (Reining v. New York, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 128 N. Y. 157, 28 N. E. 640, 14 
 Ii. R. A. 133), is constructed in the 
 street. 
 
 36 
 
 92. There has been an immense 
 amount of litigation in New York 
 arising out of the construction and 
 operation of the elevated railways, 
 the difficulty of handling which has 
 been greatly increased by the lack 
 of statutory direction and the fact 
 that the courts have attempted to 
 apply consistently a theory which Is 
 based upon unsound reasoning. 
 Among the points decided are the 
 following. The owner is not enti- 
 tled to the entire decrease In mar- 
 ket value, but only for injury to his 
 easements of light, air and access. 
 He is not entitled to damages re- 
 sulting from noise, or from loss of 
 privacy. American Bank Note Co. 
 V. New York El. Ry. Co., 129 N. Y. 
 252, 29 N. B. 302; Bischoff v. New 
 York El. Ry. Co., 138 N. Y. 257, 33 
 N. E. 1073. When a railroad is con- 
 structed with more tracks and wider 
 stations, the abutter is entitled to 
 additional compensation (Rothschild 
 V. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 
 147 N. Y. Supp. 1040), but not when 
 an elevated railway company with 
 a franchise for three tracks erected 
 a sufficient structure but installed 
 but two tracks, and subsequently 
 laid the third track and increased 
 the size and frequency of the trains. 
 Gerken v. Interborough Rapid Tran- 
 sit Co., 68 Misc. (N. Y.) 389, 125 
 N. Y. Supp. 32. When a perpetual 
 
562 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 180 
 
 of the street is in the public. In Illinois it was held, in a 
 case in which it appeared that the fee of the street was in 
 the city, that an elevated railway is not an additional servi- 
 tude and its construction cannot be enjoined by the abut- 
 ting owner ;®^ but as the constitution in force when this 
 question arose provided for compensation when property 
 
 right to maintain a railroad In a 
 street had been condemned and 
 paid for, and the railroad company 
 was compelled by the legislature to 
 elevate its tracks, the abutting 
 owner was held not to be entitled 
 to additional damages. Leffman v. 
 Long Island K. R. Co., 197 N. Y. 
 513, 90 N. E. 1160, affirming 120 
 App. Div. (N. Y.) 528, 105 N. X. 
 Supp. 487. The most difficult com- 
 plications have arisen from the fact 
 that the courts attempt to assess 
 permanent damages as in the case 
 of a taking by eminent domain and 
 there is no formal act of condem- 
 nation to fix either the punctum 
 temporis of the taking or the extent 
 of the easement taken. See infra, 
 §§ 438, 443, 478. 
 
 93. In Doane v. Lake St. El. Ry. 
 Co., 165 111. 510, 46 N. B. 520, 36 
 L. R. A. 97, 56 Am. St. Rep. 265, 
 the court said, " It is conceded that 
 the common council of the city of 
 Chicago is, by the provisions of our 
 statutes, given exclusive control and 
 supervision of its streets, the fee 
 of which is vested in the municipal- 
 ity. WhUe they are held in trust 
 for the public use, and can only be 
 appropriated to the purposes for 
 which they were dedicated, it Is the 
 settled law of this state that per- 
 mitting street railroads to be placed 
 therein Is not subjecting them to an 
 unlawful use. It has often been so 
 decided by this court as to surface 
 roads, and no good reason has been 
 suggested, and none, we think, can 
 be offered, for making a distinction 
 in this regard between elevated and 
 surface roads. The road In ques- 
 tion, if constructed In conformity 
 with the requirements of the ordi- 
 nance, will certainly obstruct travel 
 upon the street by other means less, 
 and be less hazardous to the public. 
 
 than would a surface road. The 
 pillars upon which the superstruc- 
 ture is to be built, which It is 
 claimed will exclude the public 
 from a part of the street, are but a 
 necessary part of the road — as 
 much so as are rails and other parts 
 of tracks constructed upon the 
 ground, or as are trolley-posts placed 
 in the street for operating an elec- 
 tric road by the trolley system. It 
 la true that all these things do, to 
 some extent, interfere with the use 
 of the street by ordinary vehicles, 
 but the inconvenience is one which 
 must be borne for the benefit re- 
 sulting to the public from the better 
 modes of travel thus afCorded. 
 Moses V. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 
 21 111. 516. We held in Chicago, 
 etc. R. R. Co. V. West Chicago Street 
 R. R. Co., 156 111. 255, that a street 
 railway operated by electricity, with 
 trolley-posts on the streets, was not 
 a new servitude of the street, and 
 that the poles were not unwarranted 
 obstructions in the same, as are 
 telegraph and telephone poles, ' be- 
 cause such erections aid and facili- 
 tate the use of the public street for 
 the purposes of travel and trans- 
 portation.' The same is true of the 
 pillars used in constructing elevated 
 roads. In view of the knovTn fact 
 that such elevated lines in large 
 cities greatly accommodate the 
 public by increasing the facility and 
 safety of transit. It can scarcely be 
 seriously contended that permitting 
 them to be constructed and oper- 
 ated is to subject the streets to a 
 new servitude or unlawful use." 
 See also Phelps v. Lake Street El. 
 E. R. Co., 165 111. 526, 46 N. E. 1153 ; 
 Phelps V. Union El. R. R. Co., 166 
 111. 131, 46 N. E. 1153; Strong v. 
 Northwestern EI. R. R. Co., 166 111. 
 207, 46 N. E. 1153. 
 
§ 180 Additional Servitudes Upon Highways. 
 
 563 
 
 was damaged for the public use, the abutting owner was 
 allowed to recover such special damages as he actually 
 suffered,®* and the court was not under temptation to disre- 
 gard sound legal principles to save an individual property- 
 owner from financial loss. In Kentucky it is held imma- 
 terial whether the fee is in the public or in the abutting 
 owner ; a steam railroad is not an additional servitude as a 
 matter of law, but entitles the owner to compensation if, 
 as a matter of fact, it seriously impairs the highway for 
 its proper uses or inflicts special damage upon the abutter. 
 The same rule is applied to elevated railways ; and it was 
 held that a steam railroad carried thirteen feet above the 
 street on six-inch iron pillars was not an additional servi- 
 tude.®^ Maryland emphatically adhered to the old doc- 
 trines and declared that the construction of an elevated 
 railway in a street in which the public owned the fee 
 was not a ' ' taking ' ' of neighboring property.®^ In 
 
 94. Aldls V. Union EI. R. R. Co., 
 203 in. 567, 68 N. E. 95, 1 St. Ry. 
 Rep. 78; Chicago Office Building v. 
 Lake St. El. Ry. Co., 87 111. App. 
 594. It is not necessary to recover 
 compensation in such a case for the 
 abutting owner to show negligence 
 on the part of the company, either 
 in construction or operation. Met- 
 ropolitan West Side El. R. R. Co. v. 
 Goll, 100 111. App. 323. 
 
 95. Fulton V. Short Route Trans- 
 fer Co., 85 Ky. 640, 4 S. W. 332, 7 
 Am. St. Rep. 619. 
 
 96. Garrett v. Lake Roland Ele- 
 vated Ry. Co., 79 Md. 277, 29 Atl. 
 830, 24 L. R. A. 396. An elevated 
 railroad was built in a street, in 
 front of plaintifC's land, the fee be- 
 ing in the public. The statute pro- 
 vided for compensation, but plaintiff 
 sought an injunction until compen- 
 sation was made. The court denied 
 It, saying : " Though there has been 
 no physical invasion of the appel- 
 lant's property, still, if the act com- 
 plained of constitutes, by reason of 
 its consequences a taking of the ap- 
 pellant's property for a public use, 
 the injunction should have been 
 granted. * * * There is some 
 conflict among adjudged cases as to 
 what amounts to such a taking, but 
 
 the overwhelming weight of author- 
 ity accords with the conclusions 
 which this court announced in two 
 cases which will be referred to later 
 on. Apart from the Ohio decisions, 
 which rest upon a doctrine peculiar 
 to that state, and the recent New 
 York decisions in the elevated rail- 
 way cases, which are hopelessly in 
 conflict with the principles an- 
 nounced in other cases in the same 
 state, and the decisions in Minne- 
 sota, and a few cases in Mississippi 
 and possibly one or two other states 
 — all substantially following the 
 New York elevated railway cases — 
 there is practically an unbroken 
 current of adjudged cases broadly 
 and clearly marking and defining 
 the difference between an incidental 
 injury to, and an actual taking of 
 private property. * * * We must 
 either adhere to these two decisions 
 (50 Md. 148, 33 Am. Rep. 304; 74 
 Md. 363, 22 Atl. 141, 13 L. R. A. 
 126), strictly in accord as we have 
 shown them to be with the decided 
 weight of judicial opinion on this 
 subject — ■ or else receding from them 
 adopt the Ohio or the New York 
 doctrine. We see no reason for de- 
 parting from them or for modifying 
 our former deliberate judgment." 
 
564 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 181 
 
 Massachusetts the settled policy of the state was followed, 
 and the statutes that authorize the construction of elevated 
 railways provide for compensating the abutters whether 
 they own the fee or not ; *^ and in Iowa the statutes were 
 construed as requiring compensation for the construction 
 of an elevated railway.®* In Missouri an elevated railway 
 on permanent pillars shutting out light and air from the 
 abutters and interfering with their access is an additional 
 servitude and entitles abutters to compensation whether 
 they own the fee or not.®* In Ohio it was held that an ele- 
 vated railway is not an additional servitude.^ In Pennsyl- 
 vania a steam railroad on an elevated structure, when the 
 abutter owns the fee, is an additional servitude ; ' if the fee 
 was not in the abutter he was held not entitled to compen- 
 sation ; ^ but since the constitution was amended to require 
 payment for property damaged, the abutter specially 
 injured by an elevated railroad in the street may recover, 
 even if he does not own the fee,* 
 
 § 181. Subways. 
 
 An underground railway, or a subway or tunnel for pas- 
 senger travel, when constructed below the surface of a 
 public highway, is almost wholly without the attributes 
 of an additional servitude upon the land within the way. 
 It does not interfere with the use of the street for ordinary 
 travel, or inflict injury upon the light, air, and access of 
 abutters, while it relieves the surface of the street of travel 
 
 97. Mass. St. 1894, c. 548, § 8; aDd see also Kourke v. Holmes St. 
 Mass. Eevised Laws, c. Ill, § 117 ; Ey. Co., 221 Mo. 46, 119 S. W. 1094, 
 Baker v. Boston El. Ry. Co., 183 and (Mo. App.) 177 S. W. 1102. 
 Mass. 178, 66 N. E. 711. See also 1. Cincinnati Inclined Plane Ry. 
 Lentell v. Boston, etc., St. Ry. Co., Co. v. City & Suburban Tel. Assn., 
 202 Mass. 115, 88 N. E. 765, in which 48 Ohio St. 390, 27 N. E. 890, 12 
 an abutting owner was allowed com- L. R. A. 534, 29 Am. St. Rep. 539, 
 pensation for the construction in the 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 443. 
 
 street in front of his premises of a 2. Jones v. Erie, etc., R. R. Co., 
 
 trestle carrying an interurban elec- 151 Pa. 30, 25 Atl. 134, 17 L. R. A. 
 
 trie railway across a steam railroad. 758, 31 Am. St. Rep. 722. 
 
 98. Freiday v. Sioux City, etc., 3. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Lip- 
 Transit Co., 92 Iowa 191, 60 N. W. pincott, 116 Pa. 472, 9 Atl. 871, 2 
 656, 26 L. R. A. 246. Am. St. Rep. 618 ; Pennsylvania R. 
 
 99. De Geofroy v. Merchants' . R. Co. v. Marchant, 119 Pa. 541, 13 
 Bridge Terminal R. E. Co., 179 Mo. Atl. 690, 4 Am. St. Rep. 659. 
 
 698, 79 S. W. 386, 64 L. R. A. 959, 4. Pittsburgh Junction Ry. Co. v. 
 
 101 Am. St. Rep. 524, supra, § 161, McCutcheon (Pa.), 7 Atl. 146. 
 
§ 181 Additional, Seevittjdes Upon Highways. 
 
 565 
 
 which would otherwise have burdened it and promotes the 
 purpose for which highways are laid out. Accordingly it 
 has been held that a tunnel under the street for general 
 travel,® a subway for electric cars accommodating local 
 traffic,® or even an underground steam railroad^ can be 
 
 5. Chicago v. Rumsey, 87 111. 348. 
 Plaintiff owned land abutting upon 
 a street, the fee of which was in the 
 public, and the approaches of a tun- 
 nel were constructed opposite his 
 land. The tunnel was for ordinary 
 street traffic under the river. Held : 
 " The tunnel does not change the 
 character of the street or apply it 
 to a new use. It imposes no new 
 servitude, and is for the convenience 
 of passage by the ordinary modes of 
 travel in a street. Its inconvenience 
 and the only cause of its injury to 
 adjacent property holders is in the 
 fact that it necessitates excavations 
 and embankments, and thereby in- 
 commodes or obstructs passage from 
 one side of the street to the other. 
 This is also, however, quite fre- 
 quently, if not universally the case, 
 where railroads are located in the 
 streets, and sometimes by the mere 
 change of grade in the streets ; and 
 where there can be no recovery for 
 damages sustained by these im- 
 provements, it is impossible that 
 there can be for the simple act of 
 construction of a tunnel, which pro- 
 duces precisely the same injury." 
 See also Moffatt v. Denver, 37 Colo. 
 473, 143 Pac. 577, and Summerfield 
 V. Chicago, 197 111. 270, 64 N. E. 490, 
 holding a subway under railroad 
 tracks where they crossed a street 
 was a proper use of the street. 
 
 6. Sears v. Crocker, 184 Mass. 586, 
 69 N. E. 329, 100 Am. St. Rep. 577, 
 2 St. Ry. Rep. 444, holds that a 
 tunnel for travel by electric cars 
 between points in the same city is 
 not an additional servitude. " It 
 can hardly be contended that this is 
 an unreasonable method of using 
 the streets, in reference either to 
 travellers or abutters. * * * The 
 necessary requirements of the public 
 for travel were all paid for when 
 the land was taken, whatever they 
 may be and whether the particulars 
 
 of them were foreseen or not. The 
 only limitation upon them is that 
 they shall be of a kind which is 
 not unreasonable. * * * The travel 
 which is being provided for is from 
 place to place within the city. 
 There are stopping places on the 
 subway at convenient points. In 
 that respect it is different from a 
 tunnel designed only or chiefly for 
 travel for long distances. The new 
 method is a substitution in part of 
 a subterranean use of the streets 
 for the same general purpose." See 
 also Peabody v. Boston, 220 Mass. 
 376, 107 N. E. 952, L. R. A. 1915 F 
 1005, in which it was held that the 
 owner of the fee could not recover 
 compensation for the construction of 
 a tunnel for street railway traffic 
 within the limits of a street but de- 
 pri\'ing him of a space below the 
 sidewalk used for boilers, under a 
 statute which allowed the use of 
 public lands and ways without an 
 award of damages. In Moffatt v. 
 Denver, 57 Colo. 473, 143 Pac. 577, 
 it was held that when a city con- 
 structed a subway under a railroad 
 crossing it was proper to provide 
 accommodation for street railway 
 traffic. 
 
 7. Adams v. Saratoga & Wash- 
 ington R. R. Co., 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 414. " The use to which the rail- 
 road is to be applied when com- 
 pleted is not incompatible with the 
 enjoyment of it by the public as a 
 street. It can still be used by the 
 inhabitants residing on it, and by 
 all other persons, for all the pur- 
 poses for which it was originally 
 dedicated. Their enjoyment of light, 
 air, prospect and ,social intercourse 
 is not essentially impaired by any 
 portion of the railroad and in no 
 respect by the tunnel." Plant v. 
 Long Island R. R. Co., 10 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 26. "The primary object 
 of a street is to furnish a free pas- 
 
566 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 181 
 
 constructed in land subject to the Mgliway easement with- 
 out compensating the owner of the fee. The only dissent 
 from this doctrine is found in New York, and as it is con- 
 sistently held in that state that the exclusive occupation 
 under a special franchise from the state of any portion of 
 a highway for a purpose other than ordinary highway 
 traffic is an additional servitude, a subway for electric 
 trains accommodating local traffic was naturally not con- 
 sidered to be a proper street use.^ 
 
 There are two forms of injury to adjoining property 
 which the construction of a subway in a public street, 
 especially in a populous city, is very apt to inflict. In the 
 first place it may deprive the abutting owners of the use of 
 cellars and vaults extending from their premises under the 
 sidewalk ; but, as has already been shown, the right to such 
 use is not absolute and exists only so long as the space thus 
 occupied is not needed for highway purposes; and when 
 
 sage to the public. It is for that 
 end chiefly that the soil is appro- 
 priated to the public use. Such 
 being the case, there seems to be 
 no good reason why the use should 
 be confined to the natural surface 
 of the soil, and why a new surface 
 may not be created for the same 
 purpose, either by tunneling or ex- 
 cavation. If such new surface can 
 be created, it must follow that It 
 can be used in any way in which the 
 original surface could be legally 
 used. * * * We can see no good 
 reason why it is a misappropriation 
 of the street to allow it to be tun- 
 neled for a railroad any more than 
 it is to allow it to be excavated for 
 sewers, or water or gas pipes." See 
 also Ramsden v. Manchester, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 1 Ex. (Eng.) 723; Hodiin- 
 son V. Long Island R. R. Co., 4 Ed. 
 Ch. (N. Y.) 411; In the Matter of 
 New Tork District Ry. Co., 107 
 N. T. 42, 14 N. E. 187. While the 
 reasoning of the foregoing New 
 Xork cases is sound, the conclusion 
 is inconsistent with the subsequent 
 decisions in the following note. 
 
 8. Thus in In re Rapid Transit 
 Railroad Commissioners, 197 N. T. 
 81, 90 N. E. 456, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 647, 18 Ann. Cas. 366 the court said, 
 
 " The use made of the street by the 
 city in constructing the subway, and 
 operating, or causing to be operated, 
 a railroad therein, is not a street use 
 as that term is known in the law. 
 • * * Ttig subway occupies a 
 part of the street which, although 
 beneath the surface, might, by 
 proper construction and change of 
 grade, be used for ordinary highway 
 purposes, and traveled upon freely, 
 without license or recompense, by 
 persons using their own vehicles or 
 their own methods of transporta- 
 tion. The occupation by the subway 
 and its trains of cars is exclusive, 
 for no one may enter either with- 
 out payment of fare. Highways are 
 free and open to all the people ; the 
 subway is not. Highways are for 
 the exclusive use of none; the sub- 
 way is for the exclusive use of one. 
 Highways are for travel by means 
 under the exclusive control of the 
 traveler; the subway is for travel 
 by means under the exclusive con- 
 trol of its owner or operator." See 
 also Lincoln Safe Deposit Co. v. 
 New York, 210 N. Y. 34, 103 N. B. 
 768, and In re New Street in New 
 York, 215 N. Y. 109, 109 N. E. 104, 
 L. R. A. 1916 A 1290. 
 
§ 181 Additional Seevitudes Upon Highways. 
 
 567 
 
 the owner of the fee is deprived of the occupation of a 
 portion of the highway, even though it be below the sur- 
 face, by the use thereof for legitimate highway purposes, 
 he has no ground for complaint.® 
 
 The other form of injury often resulting from the con- 
 struction of subways is to the land and buildings outside 
 of the located limits of the highway. In soil of certain 
 qualities the construction of a subway may cause the found- 
 ations of the adjoining buildings to sink and the walls to 
 crack. If this is the result of negligence or of the failure 
 to take necessary precautions on the part of the builders, 
 they are, of course, liable.^** Even if it is the inevitable 
 result of the construction of the work, most courts would 
 be very loath to construe a statute as authorizing such work 
 to be done without compensating those injured ; ^^ if, 
 
 9. Supra. § 156. Even in New 
 York it is held that an abutter who 
 does not own the fee of the street 
 Is not entitled to compensation when 
 a vault under the sidewalk is de- 
 stroyed by the construction of a sub- 
 way. When the city owns the fee 
 the abutter has only easements of 
 light, air, access and lateral sup- 
 port, which are subject to impair- 
 ment by erections and excavations 
 made for street purposes. A sub- 
 way, it is said. Is not a street pur- 
 pose, but if it does not destroy these 
 easements the abutter is not entitled 
 to compensation. Lincoln Safe De- 
 posit Co. V. New York, 210 N. Y. 34, 
 103 N. E. 768. 
 
 10. Infra, § 470. A city is not re- 
 sponsible to an abutter injured by 
 the negligence of a railroad com- 
 pany In constructing a tunnel In the 
 street, under authority of the city. 
 Terry v. Richmond, 94 Va. 537, 27 
 S. E. 429, 38 L. K. A. 834. 
 
 11. See the case of Baltimore & 
 Potomac Bailroad Co. v. Eeaney, 43 
 Md. 71, 117, 20 Am. Rep. 83. The 
 defendant under legislative author- 
 ity constructed a tunnel in a street, 
 and as a result the plaintifC's house 
 settled and the walls cracked. 
 There was no evidence of negligence. 
 It was held that plaintiff might re- 
 cover. "As against the municipal 
 government, in the careful exercise 
 
 of Its right and power to grade, 
 change and Improve the street, there 
 could be no cause of action for any 
 unavoidable injury done, but as 
 against * * * a private corpora- 
 tion * » * the case is quite dif- 
 ferent. As against such a party, the 
 owner of a plot of ground, with a 
 building thereon, bounding on a 
 street is entitled to the natural sup- 
 port which the bed of the street may 
 afford to the foundation of his 
 house. And notwithstanding author- 
 ity may have been obtained both 
 from the city and state legislature, 
 to make the extraordinary use of 
 the street. * * * That there was 
 no negligence, or want of care in 
 doing the work is no answer in a 
 case like this, if the injury was 
 the inevitable result of making the 
 tunnel, then to the extent that the 
 appellee's property was actually in- 
 jured it was substantially taken for 
 the use of the appellants' road, and 
 of course should be paid for. It is 
 not to be assumed that either the 
 city authorities or the legislature of 
 the state Intended that the author- 
 ity delegated by them should be ex- 
 ercised irrespective of the rights of 
 private property; and if it were 
 clear that they did so Intend, It Is 
 far from being certain that such a 
 purpose could be accomplished. 
 • • ■» That the excavation of the 
 
568 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 181 
 
 however, the statute was capable of no other construction it 
 would be held constitutional and the owner would not be 
 entitled to compensation unless the injury was of such a 
 character as to constitute a taking, or the constitution of 
 the state required compensation for damage. The owner 
 would not however be necessarily entitled to compensation 
 on the ground that his property was taken in the consti- 
 tutional sense even if his buildings were utterly destroyed, 
 for at the common law even a pfrivate proprietor is not 
 responsible for the consequences of withdrawing percolat- 
 ing waters from the soil,^^ and may excavate upon his own 
 premises without liability for damages caused to neighbor- 
 ing property, except to the land in its natural state, as the 
 right to lateral support did not extend to buildings.^^ The 
 rights of the public, one would suppose, would not be less 
 than those of a private proprietor, and furthermore, no 
 injury which would not be actionable at common law is a 
 taking in the constitutional sense.^* The New York Court 
 of Appeals however, when a case arose in which it appeared 
 that the walls of a building were cracked bv the construc- 
 tion of a subway by the city in a street of which the abutter 
 did not own the fee, solved the difl&culty by inventing a new 
 easement over public highways in favor of abutting own- 
 ers, extending to their buildings as well as to their lands, 
 namely the easement of lateral support.^^ 
 
 street for' the tunnel was lawful, tunnel In the street was held recov- 
 
 and done in a lawful manner at the erable under a constitutional provi- 
 
 time, can constitute no defense to sion requiring compensation when 
 
 this action, if damages actually re- property was damaged for the public 
 
 suited from the work." It is inter- use. 
 
 esting to compare this case with 12. In New York Continental 
 
 Garrett v. Lake Roland Elevated Jewel Filtration Co. v. Jones, 37 
 
 Ry. Co., 79 Md. 277, 29 Atl. 830, 24 App. D. C. 511, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 
 L. R. A. 396, supra. See also Fifty 193, it was' held that an owner could 
 
 Associates v. Boston, 201 Mass. 585, not recover for the settling of his 
 
 88 N. E. 427, in which an abutting house, caused by the withdrawal of 
 
 owner was allowed to recover in a percolating sub-surface water in the 
 
 statutory proceeding damages re- course of excavating for a railroad 
 
 suiting from the cutting of a bulk- tunnel under a street, 
 
 head in a street, by the construction 13. Wilde v. Minsterly, 2 Roll, 
 
 of a subway therein, and thereby al- Abr. 564 ; Gilmore v. Driscoll, 12>2 
 
 lowing water to flow ^nto and under Mass. 199, 23 Am. Rep. 312. 
 
 his building, and Barnard v. Chi- 14. Supra, § 108. 
 
 cago, 270 111. 27, 110 N. E. 412, in 15. See In re Rapid Transit Rall- 
 
 which injury by the removal of sup- road Commissioners, 197 N. Y. 81, 
 
 port caused by the construction of a 90 N. E. 456, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 
§ 182 Additional Seevititdes Upon Highways. 569 
 
 § 182. Subterranean Pipes. 
 
 It is generally held that pipes may be laid beneath the 
 surface of a highway for the purpose of supplying the 
 public with the necessities and conveniences of life without 
 compensating the owner of the fee. The right of the public 
 to lay pipes for its own convenience is, it is held, included 
 in the ordinary highway easement. The exercise of this 
 right does not materially interfere with public travel on 
 foot and in vehicles, inflicts little, if any, injury on the land 
 outside the limits of the highway, but instead confers 
 immense benefit upon it and has been enjoyed in all large 
 cities since antiquity. It is not, however, as has sometimes 
 been suggested,^® a public right in the highway distinct 
 from and in addition to the easement of travel, but consti- 
 tutes a part of the easement of travel. Liquids may be 
 transported by the public or for its benefit in wagons on 
 the surface of the street or in pipes beneath the surface; 
 the easement of a highway includes every reasonable 
 means of transportation or transmission of persons or 
 matter beneath, upon, or above the surface of the ground.*^ 
 
 Based on a different principle, but often very similar in 
 its exercise, is the right of the public to lay pipes and other 
 structures in the street for the purpose of making ordinary 
 travel safer or more convenient, by draining or lighting the 
 street, or improving it in other ways. This distinction 
 
 647, 18 Ann. Cas. 366, in which constructing its road, and the city 
 
 Vann, J., said in delivering the opin- so far as this case is concerned is 
 
 ion of the court, after referring to merely a railroad company, it is a 
 
 a statute requiring owners making virtual appropriation pro tanto of 
 
 excavations more than 10 feet deep that building, and logically calls for 
 
 to support the adjacent buildings, compensation. It is well established 
 
 " I am personally of the opinion that a railroad corporation cannot 
 
 that a mere abutter, independent of interfere with the easements of 
 
 said local statute, by virtue of the light, air, and access without lia- 
 
 rapid transit act, the situation of bility, and if it cannot interfere with 
 
 his premises, and their proximity to these easements, which are merely 
 
 the street, is entitled to lateral sup- incidental to the convenient use of 
 
 port, and to freedom from physical a building, without making compen- 
 
 Interference with his abutting prop- sation, can it destroy the building 
 
 erty. The value of a city lot de- Itself, or crack its walls and break 
 
 pends on the value of the building its plumbing, with no liability what- 
 
 erected, or which may be erected, ever?" 
 
 thereon. If the building of an 16. XVII Harvard Law Review 
 
 abutting owner is torn down wholly 410. 
 
 or In part, by a railroad company in 17. Supra, § 154. 
 
570 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 183 
 
 is sometimes important and sometimes obscure and 
 immaterial. 
 
 It is in connection witli the laying of pipes in public high- 
 ways that the supposed distinction between urban and 
 rural servitudes originated and has been chiefly applied. 
 It seems to be conceded that a pipe need not be limited in 
 size so as to no more than satisfy the residents of the street 
 in which it is laid, and that within municipal boundaries 
 mains are as rightfully placed in any street as branch pipes. 
 But it has been held in some jurisdictions that pipes are an 
 additional servitude upon a country road.^* The distinc- 
 tion, however, as has been observed before, does not neces- 
 sarily rest on any difference between the legal rights of the 
 owner of the fee of a country road and those of the owner 
 of the fee of a city street, but more properly on the fact 
 that in the city the pipes are for the use of the community 
 which maintains the streets, while in the country the pipes 
 are of no benefit to the local community and the roads were 
 chosen as the cheapest and easiest place to lay them to 
 carry matter from its source of supply to a distant city.^' 
 Although this view has not always been taken by the courts 
 which seem to limit the servitudes of a country road, there 
 is no case of a town, however small, which was enterprising 
 enough to maintain a water supply or sewer system, that 
 was obliged to pay for the privilege of laying the pipes in 
 its own highways. 
 
 § 183. Sewers and Drains. 
 
 It seems to have been assumed without much controversy 
 that sewers or drains may be laid in a public highway, 
 either for carrying off sewage from the adjoining houses 
 or surface water from the limits of the highway, without 
 compensating the owner of the fee.^" In the case of sewers 
 
 18. Infra, § 184. ardson, 13 Allen 146; Pierce v. 
 
 19. Supra, § 155. Drew, 136 Mass. 75, 49 Am. Rep. 7. 
 
 20. United States. — Johnson v. St. Michigan. — Warren v. Grand 
 Louis, 96 0. C. A. 617, 172 Fed. 31. Haven, 30 Mich. 24. 
 
 Connecticut. — Cone v. Hartford, 28 Minnesota. — Carli v. Stillwater St. 
 
 Conn. 363. Ry. Co., 28 Minn. 373, 10 N. W. 205, 
 
 Indiana. — Leeds v. Richmond, 102 41 Am. Rep. 290. 
 
 Ind. 372, 1 N. E. 711. Mississippi. — White v. Yazoo, 27 
 
 Massachusetts. — Boston v. Rich- Miss. 357. 
 
§ 183 Additional Sebvitudbs Upon Highways. 571 
 
 the distinction between urban and rural servitudes does 
 not appear to have been frequently drawn. Thus it has 
 been held that a sewer laid by the state for the use of a 
 very large district is not an additional servitude upon a 
 highway within that district ; any sewer natural to the con- 
 figuration of the ground may, it was said, be laid in a high- 
 way without additional compensation.^^ This decision was 
 however rendered in a state in which the highways are held 
 to be for the use of all of the people, regardless of the form 
 of municipal government in the place in which they are 
 situated; but, even in the states which take a less liberal 
 view of the extent of the public easement in rural commu- 
 nities, it has been held that a city might construct a sewer 
 in a road outside the city limits in order to carry off the 
 sewage to the place of disposal without compensating the 
 owners of adjoining land.^^ In one case however an inland 
 
 New Jersey. — Stoudinger v. New- 
 ark, 28 N. J. Eq. 446; Traphagen v. 
 Jersey City, 29 N. J. Eq. 206. 
 
 NeiO York. — Story v. New Xork 
 El. Ky. Co., 90 N. Y. 122, 43 Am. 
 Eep. 146 ; In re Yonkers, 117 N. Y. 
 564, 23 N. E. 661; Kelsey v. King, 
 32 Barb. 410. 
 
 Ohio. — Cinciimati v. Penney, 21 
 Ohio St 499, 8 Am. Rep. 73 ; Whit- 
 ney V. Toledo, 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 
 74. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Michener v. Phil- 
 adelphia, 118 Pa. 535, 12 Atl. 174; 
 Carpenter v. Lancaster, 250 Pa. 541, 
 95 Atl. 702. 
 
 In Johnson v. St. Louis, 96 
 C. C. A. 617, 172 Fed. 31, 18 Ann. 
 Cas. 949, it was held that damage to 
 a brick building by cracking, caused 
 by the laying of a sewer in a street, 
 was damnum aisgue injuria. 
 
 21. Lincoln v. Commonwealth, 164 
 Mass. 1, 41 N. B. 112. A sewer was 
 constructed by the Metropolitan 
 Sewer Commission, representing the 
 commonwealth, and covering a dis- 
 trict forming half the state in popu- 
 lation. Held: "It is not disputed 
 that when a highway is laid out, 
 the right to lay common drains is 
 among the elements for which com- 
 pensation is given. But it is said 
 
 that the metropolitan sewer is an 
 uncommon drain and cannot be sup- 
 posed by any fiction to have been 
 contemplated and paid for in the 
 laying out of a suburban road. The 
 answer is that our law recognizes 
 no such distinctions, although they 
 seem to prevail in some other states. 
 * * * It being settled that one of 
 the uses covered by the taking for a 
 highway is an underground sewer, it 
 extends to any sewer which is natu- 
 ral to the configuration of the 
 ground. The fact that the public 
 in this case is represented directly 
 by the commonwealth instead of by 
 the town is of no importance. The 
 beneficial interest is the same either 
 way. Also it is held that the public 
 right extends to authorizing com- 
 panies to make use of the streets." 
 22. Cummings v. Seymour, 79 Ind. 
 491, 41 Am. Rep. 618. The defend- 
 ant city constructed an open drain 
 in a road outside the corporate lim- 
 its. Plaintiff was an abutting 
 owner, but does not seem to have 
 owned the fee of the road, for the 
 question of additional servitude was 
 not considered. It was held that 
 the legislature might authorize the 
 reasonable use of the highways for 
 the drainage of a city, outside its 
 
572 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 184 
 
 city which constructed a sewer to the sea was compelled to 
 pay for the use of the highways in the towns through which 
 the sewer passed.^^ This last decision seems to create an 
 unnecessary refinement, which has not received general 
 support. 
 
 . § 184. Water Pipes and Gas Pipes. 
 
 Pipes laid for the purpose of supplying the public with 
 water are a proper use, not only of a highway laid out in 
 the usual manner,^* but also of a strip of land dedicated 
 for a highway with provision of forfeiture,^^ or even when 
 the dedication was limited to the easement of travel.^® 
 
 The distinction between urban and rural servitudes has 
 not been frequently raised in the case of water pipes, and 
 in most jurisdictions waterpipes have been constantly laid 
 in country highways for the purpose of bringing a public 
 water supply from a river or lake to a city several miles 
 distant, without complaint from the owner of the fee that 
 an additional servitude had been imposed,^'' and probably 
 
 limits. " If this be correct, it must 
 follow that for consequential inju- 
 ries resulting from the proper and 
 reasonable exercise of such author- 
 ity, there can be no recovery." See 
 also State v. Montclair, 67 N. J. L. 
 426, 51 Atl. 494, where an assess- 
 ment for an extraterritorial outlet 
 sewer was sustained, and Twin 
 Falls V. Stubbs, 15 Idaho 68, 96 
 Pac. 195. In Whitney v. Toledo, 29 
 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 74, a storm and 
 surface water sewer extending out- 
 side the city limits was held not to 
 constitute an additional servitude. 
 
 23. Van Brunt v. Flatbush, 128 
 N. T. 50, 27 N. B. 973. The town 
 of Flatbush constructed a sewer 
 through a street in the town of Flat- 
 lands to the sea. The street was 
 held to be an urban one, but the 
 court held that the owners of the 
 fee might recover, because the sewer 
 was " in no way for the benefit of 
 the owners of the lands through 
 which it is built, or for the benefit 
 of the community in which they 
 live." 
 
 24. Massachusetts. — Bishop v . 
 
 North Adams Fire District, 167 
 Mass. 364, 45 N. E. 925. 
 
 New York. — Pelham Manor v. 
 New Rochelle Water Co., 143 N. Y. 
 532, 38 N. E. 711; Crooke v. Flat- 
 bush Water Works Co., 29 Hun 245 ; 
 Be Newton, 16 N. Y. Supp. 950, 62 
 Hun 621 ; Jayne v. Cortlandt Water 
 Works Co., 95 N. Y. Supp. 227, 107 
 App. Div. 587. 
 
 North Carolina. — Smith v. Golds- 
 boro, 121 N. C. 350, 28 S. E. 479. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Provost v. New 
 Chester Water Co., 162 Pa. 275, 29 
 Atl. 914 ; Carpenter v. Lancaster, 250 
 Pa. 541, 95 Atl. 702. 
 
 25. Howe V. Lowell, 171 Mass. 575, 
 51 N. E. 536. 
 
 26. Wood V. Natural Waterworks 
 Co., 33 Kan. 590, 7 Pac. 233. 
 
 27. Cheney v. Barker, 198 Mass. 
 356, 84 N. E. 492, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 436 ; Rochester, etc., Water Co. v. 
 Rochester, 176 N. Y. 36, 68 N. B. 
 117. See however Baltimore County 
 Water, etc., Co. v. Dubreull, 105 Md. 
 424, 66 Atl. 439, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 684, in which it was held that the 
 laying of water mains In a country 
 
§ 184 Additional Servitudes Upon Highways. 573 
 
 in every state pipes for the distribution of water to the 
 buildiags in a certain district could be laid in the highways 
 of that district vrithout compensation, even if the district 
 could not fairly be called urban. It is difficult to see how- 
 water pipes in a street could inflict any real injury upon 
 abutting land owners, and water supply systems, being 
 usually operated by the public itself or by small corpora- 
 tions financed by local capital, have not as a rule aroused 
 the hostility of the public sufficiently to warrant the con- 
 ception of novel legal principles in order to force them to 
 turn over a portion of their profits to individual land 
 ovsTiers. 
 
 Pipes for distributing illuminating gas to the inhabitants 
 of cities have been laid in the streets of cities without much 
 opposition;^* but it has been held in a number of states 
 that a pipe line for the conveyance of natural gas from the 
 source of supply to a distant city cannot be laid beneath the 
 surface of a country road without compensation to the 
 owners of the fee.^* This distinction is unsound on prin- 
 ciple, as there is no valid reason why the legislature may 
 
 highway to furnish connection with Atl. 948 ; Carpenter v. Lancaster, 
 
 other pipes and not to supply the 250 Pa. 541, 95 Atl. 702. 
 
 residents upon the highway with But see Webb v. Ohio Gas Fuel 
 
 water is an additional servitude, Co., 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 662, contra, 
 
 although the location is adjacent to when the gas is to be used for fuel. 
 
 a. well-settled community. See also 29. Indiana. — Kincaid v. Indiana 
 
 Richards v. Citizens' Water Supply Nat. Gas Co., 124 Ind. 577, 24 N. E. 
 
 Co., 104 N. Y. Supp. 927, in which 1066, 8 L. R. A. 602, 19 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 the same decision was reached al- 113 ; Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. 
 
 though the road was within the Huntsinger, 14 Ind. App. 155, 166, 
 
 limits of a city. 39 N. E. 423, 42 N. E. 640 ; Huffman 
 
 28. Massachusetts. — Pierce v. v. State, 21 Ind. App. 449, 52 N. E. 
 
 Drew, 136 Mass. 75, 49 Am. Rep. 7 713, 69 Am. St. Rep. 368. 
 
 (dictum) ; MacGinnis v. Marlbor- Kentucky. — Ward v. Triple State 
 
 ough-Hudson Gas Co., 220 Mass. 575, Nat. Gas. Co., 115 Ky. 728, 74 g. W. 
 
 108 N. E. 364. 709; Palne's Guardian (Strother) v. 
 
 Minnesota. — Carli v. Stillwater Calor Oil & Gas Co., 133 Ky. 614, 
 
 St. Railroad Co., 28 Minn. 373, 10 103 S. W. 309, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 
 N. W. 205, 41 Am. Rep. 290 (die- 727. 
 
 turn}. ^ew fork. — Bloomfleld, etc., Nat. 
 
 'New 7orh. — Story v. New York Gas Light Co. v. Calkins, 62 N. Y. 
 
 El. Ry. Co., 90 N. Y. 122, 43 Am. 386. 
 
 Rep. 146 (dictum); Plant v. Long Pennsylvania. — Sterling's Appeal, 
 
 Island R. R. Co., 10 Barb. 26 ; Kel- 111 Pa. 35, 2 Atl. 105, 56 Am. Rep. 
 
 sey V. King, 32 Barb. 410. 246. It is Interesting to compare 
 
 Pennsylvania. — McDevitt v. Peo- these cases with McDevitt v. Peo- 
 ple's Nat. Gas Co., 160 Pa. 367, 28 pie's Natural Gas Co., 160 Pa. 367, 
 
574 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 184 
 
 not authorize the through transmission of such a com- 
 modity as gas beneath the public ways for the purposes of 
 public distribution as well as through travel on the surface 
 of the ways in "prairie schooners" or in automobiles, 
 without regard to the character of the municipal govern- 
 ment in which the way is situated or the density of the 
 population or the question whether the inhabitants of the 
 district will be benefited or served.^" 
 
 28 Atl. 948. la that case the pipea 
 for natural gas were in Pittsburgh, 
 where the gas was distributed, and 
 they were held not to be an addi- 
 tional servitude, the court saying, 
 " The title of the owner is neither 
 better nor worse because of the lo- 
 cation of his land. But its situa- 
 tion may subject it to a greater 
 servitude In favor of the public in 
 a large compactly built city than 
 would be imposed upon it in the 
 open country. * * * If the city 
 abridges his control over the soil in 
 and under the streets, it compen- 
 sates him by making him a sharer 
 in the public advantages that re- 
 sult." 
 
 30. In the more recent case of 
 Hardman v. Cabot, 60 W. Va. 664, 
 55 S. B. 756, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 506, 
 natural gas pipes were held not to 
 constitute an additional servitude 
 upon a country road, the court re- 
 fusing to approve of the distinc- 
 tion between urban and rural servi- 
 tudes, and in Cheney v. Barker, 198 
 Mass. 356, 84 N. E. 492, 16 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 436, a main from works in 
 one city through a second city carry- 
 ing ga^ to be distributed in a third 
 was held not an additional servitude 
 in the highways of the second city, 
 the court saying, " Our roads or 
 public ways are established for the 
 common good and for the use and 
 benefit of all the inhabitants of the 
 commonwealth. The mere fact that 
 the burden of their construction and 
 maintenance has to a large extent 
 been put upon the cities and towns 
 in which they are situated, gives to 
 those cities or towns, or to their in- 
 habitants, no peculiar privileges in 
 such ways. As was said by Allen, J., 
 in 166 Mass. 359, 'The powers 
 
 which have been given to cities and 
 towns by the legislature, by special 
 or by general laws, are in no sense 
 a contract, and do not become vested 
 rights as against the legislature.' 
 A fortiori, the legislature, in deter- 
 mining whether any particular pub- 
 lic use, in its general nature per- 
 missible, shall be allowed to be made 
 of a public highway, is not to be 
 restricted to such uses as may be of 
 themselves beneficial to the abutters 
 upon that way. Because the high- 
 ways are established by state au- 
 thority for the general good; and 
 because our laws make no distinc- 
 tion among them as to rural ways 
 or urban streets, or otherwise, such 
 as was declared in the decisions 
 from other .states above referred to; 
 and because ' the legislature is the 
 supreme authority in regard to pub- 
 lic rights in the streets and high- 
 ways' (Knowlton, Ch. J., in Boston 
 Electric Light Co. v. Boston Ter- 
 minal Co., 184 Mass. 566, 570, 69 
 N. E. 346, 348), the legislature may 
 provide for the use of the highways 
 in the state as well for through 
 travel as for the through transmis- 
 sion of gas, water, or other commo- 
 dities from one place to another, 
 without regard to the question of 
 whether any municipality through 
 which the ways may pass, or those 
 who own the soil of the ways sub- 
 ject to the public easement therein, 
 are.served, or in any way benefited, 
 by such use. Nor do the municipal 
 ofiicers, in granting such locations 
 as are here in question, act in any 
 way as agents of the city or town, 
 but solely as public officers specially 
 designated by the legislature for 
 that purpose." 
 
§ 185 Abditional Sebvitudes Upon Highways. 575 
 
 When the fee is in the public, pipe lines for conveying 
 natural gas can be everywhere laid without compensation 
 to the abutter, since such lines in no way interfere with the 
 easements of light, air, access or even lateral support.^^ 
 
 It has been suggested that in the future many conveni- 
 ences besides gas and water will be distributed by means of 
 subterranean pipes.*^ Probably any commodity may be 
 supplied to the public by pipes beneath the surface of the 
 streets (at least in the neighborhood where it is distrib- 
 uted) without compensation to the owners of the fee, that 
 is so much for the public use that its distributors may con- 
 stitutionally be authorized to take land by eminent domain 
 outside the public highways.*' 
 
 § 185. Overhead Wires. 
 
 With respect to overhead wires strung upon poles in 
 public highways there has been much litigation and a 
 decided divergence of opinion. On the one hand it is argued 
 that such wires are used for the transmission of electricity, 
 whether for light, power, heat or the communication of 
 intelligence, and that electricity is matter, and consequently 
 the wires perform one of the primary functions of a high- 
 way, and although this function is performed in a manner 
 not contemplated when the main highways of our principal 
 cities were laid out, the same is true of pipes for the dis- 
 tribution of illuminating gas, which are universally con- 
 ceded to be within the highway easement. Whether the 
 wires are buried in underground conduits or carried over- 
 head upon poles can make no difference, as the highway 
 easement may be exercised upon, above or below the sur- 
 face of the earth. 
 
 31. Ward V. Triple State Nat. Gas minal Co., 182 Mass. 397, 65 i>f. E. 
 Co., 115 Ky. 723, 74 S. W. 709. 835. The public easement " includes 
 
 32. Carli v. Stillwater St. Ry. Co., the use of the street * * * for 
 28 Minn. 373, 10 N. W. 205, 41 Am. water pipes, gas pipes, sewers and 
 Rep. 290. " In cities custom has such other similar arrangements 
 sanctioned the use of the streets for for communication or transportation 
 sewers, and for water and gas pipes, as further invention may make de- 
 and it is probable that at no distant sirable." But a pipe for conveying 
 day pipes for the transmission of salt water is an additional servi- 
 steam for heating and mechanical tude. Hartman v. Tully Pipe Line 
 purposes will be added." New Eng- Co., 71 Hun (N. Y.) 367. 
 
 land Tel., etc., Co. v. Boston Ter- 33. Supra, § 78. 
 
576 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 186 
 
 On the other hand it is pointed out that wires differ in 
 their legal aspect from subterranean pipes in many impor- 
 tant particulars. The poles exclude other traffic from the 
 space which they occupy and they may materially incon- 
 venience general travel; they injure the adjoining land, to 
 some extent at least in its light and access, and often seri- 
 ously in its aspect, usually without conferring any special 
 benefit upon it. They have not the sanction of ancient 
 usage. The matter which they transmit is not tangible 
 and resembles but remotely and indirectly the subjects of 
 ordinary highway traffic. As the result of this difference 
 of opinion there is a marked conflict of authority upon the 
 question whether overhead wires constitute an additional 
 servitude. 
 
 § 186. Telegraph and Telephone Lines. 
 
 It is in connection with telegraph and telephone poles 
 and wires in the public streets that the greatest amount of 
 litigation bearing upon the question whether overhead 
 wires are an additional servitude has arisen. In the 
 majority of the states in which the question has been 
 passed upon, the courts, influenced by the considerations 
 outlined in the preceding section and by the tendency so 
 noticeable in some of the states to sustain the rights of 
 private property as against the rights of the public when- 
 ever they come in conflict, have held overhead telegraph 
 and telephone wires to be an additional servitude upon 
 public highways as a matter of law.** 
 
 34. United States.— Pacific Postal Kentucky.— East Tennessee Tel. 
 
 Tel. Co. V. Irvine, 49 Fed. 113, 4 Co. v. RusselMlle, 106 Ky. 667, 51 
 
 Am. Elect. Cas. 140 ; Kester v. West- S. W. 308. 
 
 ern Union Tel. Co., 108 Fed. 926. Maryland.— American Tel., etc., 
 
 Illinois.— Board of Trade Tel. Co. Co. v. Pearce, 71 Md. 535, 18 Atl. 
 
 V. Barnett, 107 111. 507, 47 Am. Rep. 910, 7 L. R. A. 200 ; Chesapeake, 
 
 453, 1 Am. Elect. Cas. 565; Postal etc., i Tel. Co. v. Mackenzie, 74 Md. 
 
 Tel. Cable Co. v. Eaton, 170 111. 513, 36, 21 Atl. 690, 28 Am. St Rep. 219, 
 
 49 N. E. 365, 39 L. R. A. 772, 62 Am. 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 196. 
 
 St. Rep. 390; Goddard v. Chicago, Minnesota. — Willis v. Brie Tel. 
 
 etc., R. R. Co., 202 111. 362, 66 N. E. Co., 37 Minn. 347, 34 N. W. 337. 
 
 1066 ; Burrall v. American Tel. & Mississippi. — Stowers v. Postal 
 
 Tel. Co., 224 111. 266, 79 N. E. 705; Tel. Cable Co., 68 Miss. 559, 9 So. 
 
 Dekalb County Tel. Co. v. Button, 356, 12 L. R. A. 864, 24 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 228 111. 178, 81 N. E. 838, 10 L. R. A. 290. 
 
 (N. S.) 1057, 10 Ann. Cas. 464; Wehraska. — Bronson v. Albion Tel. 
 
 Union El. Tel. Co. v. Applequlst, 104 Co., 67 Nebr. Ill, 93 N. W. 201, 60 
 
 111 App. 517. L. R. A. 426, 8 Am. Elect Cas. 177. 
 
§ 186 Addition-al Sebvitudes Upon Highways. 
 
 577 
 
 On the other hand, the courts of an almost equal number 
 of states, and especially those which are inclined in doubt- 
 ful cases to sustain the rights of the public as against the 
 rights of private property, have taken the opposite view. 
 The injury to general travel and to the abutting property 
 has not seemed to them so severe as to be unreasonable, 
 while telephone wires in city streets, used by large num- 
 bers of the business men and householders, any one of 
 whom may enjoy the service on payment of a reasonable 
 fee, certainly confer a special benefit upon the land which 
 they reach. Even if telegraphs and telephones are a 
 modern innovation, it has been argued that roads were 
 built in part for the communication of news and intelli- 
 gence; that, though formerly messengers were required, 
 modern invention has furnished another means, and the 
 wires are, if anything, a lighter burden on the road than a 
 constant passing of post boys. It has accordingly been 
 
 New Jersey. — Broome v. New 
 York, etc., Tel. Co., 42 N. J. Eq. 141, 
 7 Atl. 851; State, Domestic, etc., 
 Tel. Co., Prosecutor, v. Mayor of 
 Newark, 49 N. J. L. 344, 8 Atl. 128 ; 
 State V. New York, etc., Tel. Co., 51 
 N. J. L. 83, 16 Atl. 188; NicoU v. 
 New York, etc., Tel. Co., 62 N. J. L. 
 733, 42 Atl. 583, 72 Am. St. Rep. 666, 
 7 Am. Elect. Gas. 277. 
 
 New York,. — Eels v. American TeL 
 & Tel. Co., 143 N. Y. 133, 38 N. E. 
 202, 25 L. K. A. 640, 5 Am. Elect 
 Cas. 92 ; Osborne v. Auburn Tele- 
 phone Co., 189 N. Y. 393, 82 N. B. 
 428; Dusenbury v. Mutual Tel. Co., 
 11 Abb. N. C. 440 ; Metropolitan Tel. 
 & Tel. Co. V. Colwell Lead Co., 67 
 How. Pr. 365, 50 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 489, 1 Am. Elect Cas. 662 ; Andrews 
 V. Delhi, etc., Tel. Co., 72 N. Y. Supp. 
 50, 36 Misc. 23, 73 N. Y. Supp. 1129, 
 64 App. Div. 618 ; Gray v. New York 
 State Tel. Co., 83 N. Y. Supp. 920, 41 
 Misc. 108, 86 N. Y. Supp. 771, 92 
 App. Div. 89; Blashfleld v. Empire 
 State Tel. & Tel. Co., 71 Hun 532, 4 
 Am. Elect. Cas. 146. 
 
 North Carolina. — Hodges v. West- 
 em Union Tel. Co., 133 N. C. 225, 45 
 S. E. 572; Brown v. Ashville Elec- 
 
 37 
 
 trie Co., 138 N. C. 533, 51 S. B. 62, 
 107 Am. St Rep. 554. 
 
 North Dakota. — Donovan v. Al- 
 lert 11 N. D. 289, 91 N. W. 441, 58 
 L. R. A. 775, 95 Am. St Rep. 720, 8 
 Am. Elect. Cas. 183 ; CosgrifC v. Tri- 
 State Tel. & Tel. Co., 15 N. D. 210, 
 107 N. W. 525, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 1142; Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
 Cosgrlfle, 19 N. D. 771, 124 N. W. 
 75, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1171. 
 
 Ohio. — Smith v. Central Dist., etc., 
 Tel. Co., 2 Ohio C. C. 259, 2 Am. 
 Elect Cas. 237; Daily v. State, 51 
 Ohio St 348, 37 N. E. 710, 46 Am. 
 St. Rep. 578, 5 Am. Elect. Cas. 186. 
 
 Texas. — Erie Tel. Co. v. Kennedy, 
 80 Tex. 71, 15 S. W. 704 ; Southwest- 
 ern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Smithdeal, 103 
 Tex. 128, 124 S. W. 627. 
 
 Virginia. — Western Union Tel. Co. 
 V. Williams, 86 Va. 696, 11 S. E. 106, 
 8 L. R. A. 429, 19 Am. St Bep. 908, 
 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 184. 
 
 Washington. — Spokane v. Colby, 
 16 Wash. 610, 48 Pac. 248. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Krueger v. Wisconsin 
 Tel. Co., 106 Wis. 96, 81 N. W. 1041, 
 50 L. B, A. 298, 7 Am. Elect. Cas. 
 285. 
 
578 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 §186 
 
 frequently held that the laying and maintenance of tele- 
 phone and telegraph wires upon a highway is within the 
 public easement.^^ 
 
 Some courts have been inclined to compromise and to 
 draw practical distinctions between different classes of 
 wires. Underground wires have been held not to consti- 
 tute an additional servitude.*® A difference in legal aspect 
 has been suggested, if not actually drawn, between tele- 
 
 35. Alahama. — Southern Bell Tel. 
 & Tel. Co. V. Francis, 109 Ala. 224, 
 19 So. 1, 31 L. B. A. 193, 55 Am. St. 
 Rep. 930, 6 Am. Elect. Cas. 160; 
 Hobbs V. Long Distance Tel. & Tel. 
 Co., 147 Ala. 393, 41 So. 1003, 7 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87, 11 Ann. Cas. 
 461; Horton v. Long Distance Tel. 
 & Tel. Co., 148 Ala. 680, 41 So. 1006. 
 
 District of Columbia. — McCor- 
 mick V. District of Columbia, 4 
 Mackay 396, 54 Am. Rep. 284 ; Hew- 
 ett V. Western Union Tel. Co., 4 
 Mackay 424, 2 Am. Elect. Cas. 222. 
 
 Georgia. — See Southern Bell Tel. 
 & Tel. Co. V. Nalley, 165 Fed. 263. 
 
 Indiana. — Magee v. Overshiner, 
 150 Ind. 127, 49 N. E. 951, 40 L. R. A. 
 370, 65 Am. St. Rep. 358, 7 Am. 
 Elect. Cas. 241; Coburn v. New 
 Telephone Co., 156 Ind. 90, 59 N. B. 
 324, 52 L. R. A. 671. 
 
 Kansas. — McCann v. Johnson 
 County Tel. Co., 69 Kan. 210, 76 
 Pac. 870, 66 L. R. A. 171, 2 Ann. 
 Cas. 156. 
 
 Kentucky. — Cumberland Tel. & 
 Tel. Co. V. Avritt, 120 Ky. 34, 27 
 Ky. L. R. 394, 85 S. W. 204, 8 Ann. 
 Cas. 955 ; Bevis v. Vanceburg Tel. 
 Co., 121 Ky. 177, 89 S. W. 126. 
 
 Louisiana. — Irwin v. Great South- 
 ern Tel. Co., 37 La. Ann. 63, 1 Am. 
 Elect. Cas. 709. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Pierce v. Drew, 
 136 Mass. 75, 49 Am. Rep. 7, 1 Am. 
 Elect. Cas. 371 ; New England Tel. & 
 Tel. Co. V. Boston Terminal Co., 183 
 Mass. 397, 65 N. E. 835. 
 
 Michigan. — People v. Eaton, 100 
 Mich. 208, 59 N. W. 145, 24 L. R. A. 
 721, 5 Am. Elect. Cas. 87 ; Wyant v. 
 Central Tel. Co., 123 Mich. 51, 81 
 N. W. 928, 47 L. R. A. 497, 81 Am. 
 St. Rep. 155, 7 Am. Elect Cas. 256. 
 
 Minnesota. — Cater v. Northwest- 
 ern Tel. Exch. Co., 60 Minn. 539, 63 
 N. W. Ill, 28 L. R. A. 310, 51 Am. 
 St. Rep. 543, 5 Am. Elect. Cas. 111. 
 
 Missouri. — Julia Building Assn. 
 V. Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo. 258, 57 Am. 
 Rep. 398, 1 Am. Elect. Cas. 801 ; St 
 Louis V. Bell Tel. Co., 96 Mo. 623, 10 
 S. W. 197, 2 L. R. A. 278, 9 Am. St 
 Rep. 370 ; Gay v. Mutual Union Tel. 
 Co., 12 Mo. App. 485, 1 Am. Elect 
 Cas. 427 ; State v. Flad, 23 Mo. App. 
 185. 
 
 Montana. — Hershfleld v. Rocky 
 Mt. Bell Tel. Co., 12 Mont 102, 29 
 Pac. 883, 4 Am. Elect Gas. 73. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Tork Tel. Co. v. 
 Keesey, 5 Pa. Dist Ct Rep. 366, 6 
 Am. Elect Cas. 107. 
 
 South Dakota.— Kirby v. Citizens' 
 Tel. Co., 17 S. D. 362, 97 N. W. 3, 2 
 Ann. Cas. 152, 8 Am. Elect Oas. 199. 
 
 Tennessee. — Patton v. Chatta- 
 nooga, 108 Tenn. 197, 65 S. W. 414; 
 Frazier v. Bast Tennessee Tel. Co., 
 115 Tenn. 146, 90 S. W. 620, 3 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 323, 112 Am. St 
 Rep. 856, 5 Ann. Cas. 838. 
 
 Texas. — Roaring Springs Town- 
 site Co. V. Paducah Tel. Co. (Tex. 
 Civ. App.), 164 S. W. 50. 
 
 Vermont. — Rugg v^ Commercial 
 Union Tel. Co., 66 Vt 208, 28 AtL 
 1036, 4 Am. Elect. Cas. 142. 
 
 West Virginia. — Maxwell v. Cen- 
 tral, etc., Tel. Co., 51 W. Va. 121, 41 
 S. E. 125, 8 Am. Elect Cas. 206; 
 Lowther v. Bridgman, 57 W. Va. 
 306, 50 S. E. 410. 
 
 36. Coburn v. New Telephone Co., 
 156 Ind. 90, 59 N. B. 324, 53 L. R. A. 
 671; Castle v. Bell Telephone Co., 
 63 N. Y. Supp. 483, 49 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 437, 7 Am. Elect. Cas. 26L 
 
§ 186 Additional Servitudes Upon Highways. 
 
 579 
 
 phones and telegraphs,*'' but a distinction between tele- 
 phones connecting with the houses on a street and a public 
 telegraph that the householders might use by visiting the 
 telegraph ofi&ce is perhaps too pedantic to be of actual 
 value. The distinction between country roads and city 
 streets has been drawn in some jurisdictions,** but dis- 
 approved elsewhere, on the ground that poles and wires 
 on a country road rarely do any harm to the abutter, while 
 in a city street they materially interfere with his access, 
 light, and air, and render protection of his buildings more 
 difficult in case of fire.** Consequently, if the wires are 
 proper in a city, a fortiori they are not an additional servi- 
 tude in the country. Even upon a rural road however the 
 damages to the abutting owner are not necessarily merely 
 nominal.*" 
 
 If a telegraph or telephone is held to be within the high- 
 way easement, it falls into the same category with other 
 lawful highway uses, and is entitled to the same immuni- 
 ties and there is no greater liability because of some special 
 
 37. Magee v. Overshiner, 150 Ind. 
 127, 49 N. E. 951, 40 L. R. A. 370, 65 
 Am. St Rep. 358. In Shurzel v. 
 Bell Telephone Co., 31 Pa. Super. 
 Ct. 221, it was -held that a telephone 
 is not in itself an additional servi- 
 tude, but if it appreciably inter- 
 feres with light, air and access it is 
 one. In Prentiss v. Cleveland Tel. 
 Co., 32 Weekly Law Bull. (Ohio) 
 113, 5 Am. Elect. Cas. 125, it was 
 held that poles for fire alarm wires 
 were an additional servitude; but 
 In De Kalb County Tel. Co. v. But- 
 ton, 228 111. 178, 81 N. E. 838, 10 
 .L. R. A. (N. S.) 1057, 10 Ann. Cas. 
 464, a contrary view was taken. 
 The mere fact however that such 
 wires were upon the same poles as 
 telegraph wires does not deprive 
 the owner of the fee of compensa- 
 tion. In Roake v. American Tel. 
 Co., 41 N. J. Eq. 35, it was sug- 
 gested that while poles might be an 
 additional servitude, wires were not, 
 and an owner of land on a street 
 upon which a telegraph line was 
 laid was not entitled to an injunc- 
 tion if there were no poles in front 
 of his premises. 
 
 38. Chesapeake, etc., Tel. Co. v. 
 Mackenzie, 74 Md. 36, 21 Atl. 690, 
 28 Am. St. Rep. 219; Eels v. Amer- 
 ican Tel. Co., 143 N. Y. 133, 38 N. E. 
 202, 25 L. R. A. 640, 5 Am. Elect 
 Cas. 92. 
 
 39. Hobbs y. Long Distance Tel. 
 
 6 Tel. Co., 147 Ala. 393, 41 So. 1003, 
 
 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87, 11 Ann. Cas. 
 461 ; Cater v. Northwestern Tel. 
 Exch. Co., 60 Minn. 539, 63 N. W. 
 Ill, 28 L. R. A. 310, 51 Am. St Rep. 
 543, and see also McCann v. Johnson 
 County Tel. Co., 69 Kan. 210, 76 
 Pac. 870, 66 L. R. A. 171. See De 
 Kalb County Tel. Co. v. Dutton, 228 
 111. 178, 81 N. E. 838, 10 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 1057, 10 Ann. Cas. 464, hold- 
 ing a telephone line an additional 
 servitude upon a city street ; so also 
 Osborne v. Auburn Telephone Co., 
 189 N. Y. 393, 82 N. E. 428, the 
 court saying that the fee to lands 
 in the city is as sacred as in the 
 country. 
 
 40. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
 Cosgriff, 19 N. D. 771, 124 N. W. 75, 
 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1171. 
 
580 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 186 
 
 interference with the enjoyment of the fee by the abutter ; 
 but, if the telegraph or telephone is held to constitute an 
 additional servitude the abutting owner is entitled to all 
 damages caused to his property even though it lies within 
 the located limits of the way. Thus, in a state in which the 
 telephone is a proper street use, there is no liability because 
 of interference with the occupation of a vault under the 
 sidewalk ;^^ and as the owner's rights in the trees within 
 the highway are subordinate to the lawful exercise of the 
 highway easement, he has no redress when such trees are 
 cut down or trimmed to make room for telephone or tele- 
 graph wires.^^ On the other hand, in states in which such 
 lines are held to constitute an additional servitude, the 
 owner of the fee is entitled to compensation for the injury 
 to the trees.** 
 
 When the abutter does not own the fee of the highway he 
 has no remedy for the laying of telegraph or other wires 
 in front of his premises, except in those states in which 
 he is held to have an easement of access and light in the 
 
 41. Julia Building Assn. v. BeU Co., 17 S. Dak. 362, 97 N. W. 3, 2 
 Tel. Co., 88 Mo. 258, 57 Am. Eep. Ann. Cas. 152 ; Cumberland Tel., etc., 
 398, 1 Am. Elect Cas. 801. Co. v. Ppston, 94 Tenn. 696, 30 S. W. 
 
 42. United Statesj — Southern Bell 1040 ; or for cutting down the trees 
 Tel. Co. V. Constantine, 9 C. C. A. without lawful authority, Cartwright 
 359, 23 TT. S. App. 56, 61 Fed. 61, v. Liberty Tel. Co., 205 Mo. 126, 103 
 4 Am. Elect. Cas. 2,19. S. W. 982, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1125; 
 
 Alaiama. — Southern BeU Tel. Co. or for entering private property to 
 
 V. Francis, 109 Ala. 224, 19 So. 1, cut off branches overhanging the 
 
 31 L. K. A. 193, 55 Am. St. Kep. 930, sidewaljis, Tissot v. Great Southern 
 
 6 Am. Elect Cas. 160; Hobbs v. Tel. & Tel. Co., 39 La. Ann. 996, 3 
 Long Distance Tel. & Tel. Co., 147 So. 261, 4 Am. St Rep. 248, 2 Am. 
 Ala. 393, 41 So. 1003, 7 L. R. A. Elect Cas. 286; Memphis Bell Tel. 
 (N. S.) 87, 11 Ann. Cas. 461. Co. v. Hunt, 16 Lea (Tenn.) 456, 57 
 
 Michigan.— Wyant v. Central Tel. Am. Rep. 237, 2 Am. Elect. Cas. 282. 
 
 Co., 123 Mich. 51, 81 N. W. 928, 47 See also Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
 
 L. R. A. 497, 81 Am. St. Rep. 155, Satterfield, 34 111. App. 386, 2 Am, 
 
 7 Am. Elect Cas. 256. Elect Cas. 296, to same effect 
 Even in such states however the 43. Illinois. — Board of Trade TeL 
 
 telephone company is liable for Co. v. Barnett, 107 111. 507, 47 Am, 
 
 any unnecessary injury to the trees, Rep. 453, 1 Am. Elect. Cas. 565. 
 
 or to the abutting property In any Nebraska. — Bronson v. Albion TeL 
 
 other manner. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 67 Neb. Ill, 93 N. W. 201, 60 
 
 Co. V. Francis, 109 Ala. 224, 19 So. 1, L. R. A. 426, 2 Ann. Cas. 639, 8 Am. 
 
 31 L. R. A. 193, 55 Am. St Rep. 930, Elect Cas. 177. 
 
 6 Am. Elect Cas. 160 ; Meyer v. North Oa/roUna.— Brown v. Asii&- 
 
 Standard Tel. Co., 122 Iowa 514, 98 ville Electric Co., 138 N. O. 533, 51 
 
 N. W. 300; Kirby v. Citizens' Tel. S. B. 62, 107 Am. St Rep. 554. 
 
186 Additional Servitudes Upon Highways, 
 
 581 
 
 street.** Even in those jurisdictions it is not held that a 
 telegraph or other similar line in the street is as a matter 
 of law a taking of the easement; the owner, to recover, 
 must show that the poles or wires did in fact damage his 
 access or light.^' 
 
 It has sometimes been contended that the federal stat- 
 utes which authorize the construction of telegraph lines 
 upon post roads upon compliance with certain conditions 
 entitle the telegraph companies to use such roads without 
 compensation to the owners of the fee. Such is not the 
 effect of the statutes, nor could they be so interpreted with- 
 out a violation of the federal constitution. The only effect 
 of such statutes is to prohibit the states from interfering 
 with the operation of the telegraph companies so far as 
 they are engaged in interstate commerce,*® 
 
 Ohio.— DaUy v. State, 51 Ohio St. 
 348, 37 N. E, 710, 46 Am. St Rep. 
 578, 5 Am. Elect Cas. 186. 
 
 Texas. — Southwestern Tel. & Tel. 
 Co. V. Smithdeal, 104 Tex. 258, 124 
 S. W. 627. See also generally as to 
 the rights of abutting owners In 
 trees standing in a highway, supra, 
 
 5 158. 
 
 44. Maryland. — Chesapeake, etc., 
 Tel. Co. V. Mackenzie, 74 Md. 36, 21 
 Atl. 690, 28 Am. St Rep. 219, 3 Am. 
 Elect Cas. 196. 
 
 Mississippi. — Stowerg v. Postal 
 Tel. Cable Co., 68 Miss. 559, 9 So. 
 356, 13 L. R. A. 864, 24 Am. St Rep. 
 290. 
 
 Nebraska. — Bronson v. Albion Tel. 
 Co., 67 Neb. Ill, 93 N. W. 201, 60 
 li. R. A. 426, 8 Am. Elect. Cas. 177. 
 
 New York. — Eels v. American Tel. 
 
 6 Tel. Co., 143 N. T. 133, 38 N. E. 
 202, 25 L. R. A. 640, 5 Am. Elect. 
 Cas. 92; Metropolitan Tel. & TeL 
 Co. V. Colwell Lead Co., 67 How. Pr. 
 365, 50 N. Y. Sup. Ct 498, 1 Am, 
 Elect. Cas. 662; Clausen & Sons 
 Brewing Co. v. Baltimore, etc., Tel. 
 Co., 2 Am. Elect. Cas. 210. 
 
 45. Gay v. Mutual Union Tel. Co., 
 12 Mo. App. 485; Halleran v. Bell 
 Tel, Co., 64 App. Dlv, (N. Y.) 41, 7 
 Am. Elect Cas. 253; Post v. Hud- 
 eon River Tel. Co., 76 App. Dlv. 
 (N. Y.) 621. 
 
 46. United States. — Pensacola Tel. 
 Co. V. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 
 U. S. 1, 24 L. ed. 708; Western 
 Union Tel. Co. v. Ann Arbor R. R. 
 Co., 33 C. C. A. 113, 90 Fed. 379, 
 178 U. S. 243, 44 L. ed. 1052 ; Atlan- 
 tic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 6 Biss. 158, Fed. Cas. No. 
 632; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. South- 
 ern R. R. Co., 89 Fed. 190; Kester 
 V. Western Union Tel. Co., 108 Fed. 
 926; Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 130 Fed. 
 362. 
 
 Maryland. — American Tel. & Tel. 
 Co. V. Pearce, 71 Md. 535, 18 Atl. 
 910, 7 L. R. A. 200. 
 
 Minnesota. — Northwestern TeL 
 Exch. Co. V. Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 76 Minn. 343, 79 N. W. 315. 
 
 New York. — ■ Clausen & Sons 
 Brewing Co. v. Baltimore, etc., Tel. 
 Co., 2 Am. Elect. Cas. 210. 
 
 North Carolina. — PhUlips v. 
 Postal Tel. Cable Co., 130 N. C. 513, 
 41 S. E. 1022, 89 Am. St Rep. 868. 
 
 North Dakota.— Cossriti v. Trl- 
 State Tel. & Tel. Co., 15 N. D. 210, 
 107 N. W. 525, 5 L. B. A, (N. S.) 
 1142. 
 
 Ohio.— Daily v. State, 51 Ohio St 
 348, 37 N. E. 710, 24 L. R, A. 724, 
 46 Am. St Rep. 578, 5 Am. Elect 
 Cas. 186. See also on the general 
 subject of telephone and telegraph 
 
582 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 187 
 
 § 187. Electric Light Lines. 
 
 In determining whether the poles and wires of an electric 
 light line constitute an additional servitude upon a public 
 highway, a distinction is to be noted between poles and 
 wires used solely for furnishing electricity for lighting the 
 streets at night, and similar structures intended solely or 
 principally for the distribution of electricity to private 
 buildings along the street. In the.f ormer case, it is univers- 
 ally held that the construction and maintenance of the poles 
 and wires is a lawful exercise of the highway easement, 
 since the primary object of such structures is to enhance 
 the safety and convenience of general public travel upon 
 the highway. Light being an aid to the public in passing 
 along the highway in the night-time, and under some con- 
 ditions a necessity, it is held even in the state in which 
 the easement of the public in a highway is most rigidly 
 restricted, that electric street lights are not an additional 
 servitude.*' No distinction is drawn between urban and 
 
 wires as an additional servitude, 
 Curtis, Law of Electricity, §§ 284 
 to 300 inc. 
 
 47. Thus in Palmer v. Larchmont 
 Electric Co., 158 N. T. 231, 52 N. B. 
 1092, 43 L. R. A. 572, 7 Am. Elect. 
 Cas. 298, the court said : " The pri- 
 mary object of highways is for the 
 public travel by persons and ani- 
 mals, and by carriages or vehicles 
 used for the transportation of per- 
 sons and goods, other than by rail- 
 roads. Sewers drain the surface 
 water from the highways, and thus 
 relieve them from impairment and 
 destruction. In this respect sewers 
 are for a street purpose. In addi- 
 tion, they may drain also the abut- 
 ting property and houses, and thus 
 tend to promote the public health. 
 In this respect they are for a mu- 
 nicipal purpose. Water supplied by 
 mains through the highways may be 
 used for cleansing and sprinkling 
 the streets. In this respect it is for 
 a street purpose. It may be used by 
 the abutting owners for cleansing 
 and for domestic purposes, and is 
 also used for the extinguishment of 
 fires. In this respect it is for a 
 
 municipal purpose. Light is, as we 
 have seen, an aid to the public in 
 the night-time in traveling upon the 
 highway. It is therefore used for a 
 street purpose. All of the street 
 purposes which we have referred to 
 are clearly incident to the highway, 
 and are deemed within the grant of 
 lands for highway purposes when- 
 ever the necessity for these uses 
 arises. Not so with telegraph and 
 telephone wires. They in no way 
 preserve or improve the streets, or 
 aid the public in traveling over 
 them." See also to the same efCect, 
 
 Mississippi. — Gulf Coast Ice Mfg. 
 Co. V. Bowers, 80 Miss. 581, 33 So. 
 113, 8 Am. Elect. Cas. 226; Hazle- 
 hurst V. Mayes, 84 Miss. 7, 36 So. 
 33, 64 L. R. A. 805. 
 
 Montana. — Loeber v. Butte Gen- 
 eral Electric Co., 16 Mont. 1, 39 Pac. 
 912, 50 Am. St. Rep. 468, 5 Am. 
 Elect. Cas. 130. 
 
 New Jersey. — Meyers v. Hudson 
 County Electric Co., 63 N. J. L. 573, 
 44 Atl. 713; French v. Robb, 67 
 N. J. L. 260, 51 Atl. 509, 57 L. R. A. 
 956, 91 Am. St Rep. 433. 
 
 New TorTc. — Johnson v. Thomp- 
 
187 AoDiTiONAii Seevitudes Upon Highways. 
 
 583 
 
 rural highways, and it is considered that, if the local author- 
 ities deem it necessary, a country road may be lighted by 
 electricity without compensation to the adjoining owners.*' 
 It of course follows that the municipal authorities may 
 authorize the trimming of trees standing in the street, to 
 make room for electric wires for street lighting purposes, 
 without incurring any liability to the owner of the fee.*® 
 
 In the case of poles and wires used for the purpose of 
 furnishing electric light or power to the dwellings or places 
 of business of the inhabitants of a particular district, there 
 is a conflict of authority. Inasmuch as it is universally held 
 that pipes may be laid in public streets, without compensa- 
 tion to the owners of the fee, for the purpose of furnishing 
 
 son-Houston Electric Co., 54 Hun 
 469, 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 203; 
 Consumers', etc.. Light Co. v. Con- 
 gress Spring Co., 61 Hun 133, 15 
 N. Y. Supp. 624, 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 
 211 ; Electric Construction Co. v. 
 HefCeman, 34 N. Y. St. Rep. 436, 
 12 N. Y. Supp. 366, 3 Am Elect. Cas. 
 207; People v. Thompson, 65 How. 
 Pr. 407, 1 Am. Elect. Cas. 554; Tut- 
 tle V. Brush Electric 111. Co., 50 
 N. Y. Super. Ct 508, 18 Jones & S. 
 464, 1 Am. Elect. Cas. 508. 
 
 North Carolina. — Smith v. Golds- 
 boro, 121 N. C. 350, 28 S. E. 479. 
 
 48. Palmer v. Larchmont Electric 
 Co., 158 N. Y. 231, 52 N. E. 1092, 
 43 L. R. A. 572, 7 Am. Elect. Cas. 
 298. In this case the court said, re- 
 versing 6 App. Div. (N. Y.) 12, 39 
 N. Y. Supp. 522, 6 Am. Elect. Cas. 
 128 : " Light may not be necessary 
 in an ordinary country highway, and 
 yet there may be country roads In 
 which the travel is so great as to 
 make a light a necessity in order 
 to avoid collisions and injuries in 
 the night-time. The Inhabitants of 
 our large cities are in a measure 
 supplied with food and other neces- 
 saries of life from the surrounding 
 country. Scarcely a city can be 
 named in which there will not be 
 found one or more great public high- 
 ways leading into the country, 
 which, day and night, are thronged 
 with teams transporting the produce 
 
 of the farm to the markets of the 
 city. Towns, in some instances, 
 have recognized the public necessity, 
 and have caused some of these 
 thoroughfares to be lighted. In 
 many of our towns there are vil- 
 lages of considerable size remaining 
 unincorporated, in which lights in 
 the street would be of great con- 
 venience, and materially add to the 
 safety of the public. May not towns 
 properly supply these streets and 
 thronged highways with light? If 
 they may, they may properly con- 
 tract with others to supply the 
 light. * * * If the people of a 
 town want light In their highways, 
 and are willing to pay for it, no 
 reason is apparent, founded upon 
 public policy, morals, or law, why 
 the courts should interfere to pre- 
 vent it. If the highway be but a 
 country road, lightly traveled, and 
 no necessity exists for light, then a 
 taxpayer has a right to object; but, 
 until such objection Is made, we 
 think It may fairly be assumed that 
 the necessity for the light exists." 
 
 49. Hazlehurst v. Mayes, 84 Miss. 
 7, 36 So. 33, 64 L. R. A. 805. An 
 owner may however recover for the 
 trimming of the trees to make room 
 for such wires when it was not duly 
 authorized by the proper city ofll- 
 cials. Slabaugh v. Omaha Electric 
 Light Co., 87 Neb. 805, 128 N. W. 
 505, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1084. 
 
584 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 187 
 
 illuminating gas to the inhabitants of a city,^° any distinc- 
 tion between such a use of the highway and the maintenance 
 of electric wires for similar purposes must rest on the prac- 
 tical differences between wires and pipes in respect to their 
 effect upon abutting property, already pointed out;®^ and 
 the same reasons which have led some courts to hold tele- 
 graph and telephone wires an additional servitude have 
 led to a similar holding in relation to wires conveying elec-' 
 tricity for use by the public.^^ 
 
 In the states in which such lines are held to be an addi- 
 tional servitude, and which also recognize the abutters' 
 easements of light, air and access, an electric light line can- 
 not be constructed in a highway without compensation to 
 the abutter, even if the fee of the highway is in the pub- 
 lic; ^^ but in a state such as Illinois, in which, on account of 
 the constitutional provision allowing compensation when 
 property is damaged for the public use, it has not been nec- 
 essary to accept the doctrine of abutters' easements, 
 although an electric light line is an additional servitude, 
 when the public owns the fee the abutter is not entitled to 
 compensation unless he can show some special and peculiar 
 damage.*^* In the states in which an abutter is entitled 
 upon any theory to recover compensation for an electric 
 light line in the street, he may of course recover for the 
 injury to his property resulting from the cutting down or 
 
 50. Supra, § 185. Ohio. — Callen v. Columbus Bdi- 
 
 51. Supra, § 186. son El. Light Co., 66 Ohio St. 166, 
 
 52. California.— Gurnsey v. North- 64 N. E. 141, 58 L. K. A. 783 ; Schaaf 
 em California Power Co., 160 Cal. v. Cleveland, etc., Ey. Co., 66 Ohio 
 699, 117 Pac. 906, 36 L. K. A. (N. S.) St. 215, 64 N. E. 145. 
 
 185. Pennsylvania. — Brown v. Radnor 
 
 ZJJmeis.— Carpenter v. Capital Township Electric Light Co., 208 
 
 Electric Co., 178 III. 29, 52 N. E. Pa. 453, 57 Atl. 904 ; Haverford Elee- 
 
 973, 43 L. R. A. 645, 69 Am. St. Rep. trie Light Co. v. Hart, 13 Pa. Co. 
 
 268, 7 Am. Elect. Cas. 312 ; Goddard Ct. Rep. 369, 1 Pa. Dist. Rep. 571, 
 
 V. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 302 111. 4 Am. Elect. Cas. 148. 
 
 362, 66 N. E. 1066. 53. Callen v. Columbus Edison El. 
 
 New Jersey.— AnaresiS v. Gas, etc., Light Co., 66 Ohio St 166, 64 N. B. 
 
 Co., of Bergen County, 61 N. J. Eq. 141, 58 L. R. A. 782; McLean v. 
 
 69, 47 Atl. 555, 7 Am. Elect Cas. Brush Electric Light Co., 8 Ohio 
 
 319. Dec. Reprint 619, 9 Ohio L. J. 65, 
 
 North Carolina. — Brown v. Ashe- 1 Am. Elect Cas. 483. 
 
 ville El. Light Co., 138 N. C. 533, 54. McWethy v. Aurora, etc., 
 
 51 S. E. 62, 60 L. R. A. 631, 107 Am. Power Co., 202 111. 218, 67 N. E. 9. 
 St Rep. 554, 9 Am. Elect. Cas 467. 
 
§ 188 Additional Sebvitudes Upon Highways. 585 
 
 trimming of the trees standing in the street to make room 
 for the poles and wires.®^ 
 
 An electric light line stands no worse than a telephone or 
 telegraph line. In fact, to the unscientific mind at least, the 
 transmission of electricity to the various buildings of a city 
 seems more directly analogous to the original functions of 
 a highway than the use of a highway to facilitate conversa- 
 tions upon the telephone. It is safe to say that no court 
 which holds a telegraph or telephone line to be within the 
 highway easement would consider an electric light line to 
 be an additional servitude, and in the few cases in which 
 litigants have had the hardihood to argue to the contrary, 
 this assumption appears to be borne out.°* 
 
 § 188. Buildings and other Structures in Public High- 
 ways. 
 
 The erection and maintenance of certain small structures 
 in the streets which add to the safety, convenience, comfort, 
 and pleasure of travelers is sanctioned by custom and good 
 sense as a proper exercise of the highway easement. It is 
 for this reason that lamp-posts and electric light poles for 
 lighting the way,^'' shade trees,^* hydrants and cisterns for 
 
 55. Brown v. Asheville Electric or dedicated for public use. In other 
 Co., 138 N. C. 534, 51 S. E. 62, 69 words the taking of the land for use 
 li. R. A. 631, 107 Am. St. Rep. 554, as a street includes not only the 
 9 Am. Elect. Cas. 467; Moore v. right of passage, but of securing a 
 Carolina Power & Light Co., 163 convenient and safe passage; to 
 N. C. 300, 79 S. E. 596 ; Callen v. light it, if you please, for that pur- 
 Columbus Electric Light Co., 66 pose. It is not a new taking of 
 Ohio St. 166, 64 N. E. 141, 58 L. R. A. property for public use, but a com- 
 782. pleting to that extent of the uses of 
 
 56. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. the first taking by adding appliances 
 V. Boston Terminal Co., 182 Mass. included within it, and now con- 
 397, 65 N. E. 835; New York Cen- structed by reason of the public 
 tral, etc., R. R. Co. v. Central Mas- need. * * * The property rights 
 sachusetts Electric Co., 219 Mass. of the landowner * * * are 
 85, 106 N. E. 566 ; State v. Murphy, greatly modified by the rights of the 
 134 Mo. 548, 31 S. W. 748, 34 S. W. public, which is entitled to a free 
 51, 35 S. W. 1132, 34 L. R. A. 369, passage over the street, and to the 
 56 Am. St. Rep. 515. benefit of lights constructed and 
 
 57. Thus in Gulf Coast lee Mfg. operated for that end." See also 
 Co. V. Bowers, 80 Miss. 581, 32 So. supra, § 187. So also gates for the 
 113, 8 Am. Elect. Cas. 226, it was protection of the public at a rail- 
 said by the court: "The right to road crossing may be erected against 
 light the town is presumed to have the wishes of the abutting owner, 
 been acquired and paid for, as inci- Textor v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 
 dent to the right of public passage 59 Md. 63, 43 Am. Kep. 540. 
 
 when the property was condemned 58. Supra, § 158. 
 
586 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 188 
 
 use in sprinkling the streets,^' ornamental statuary,*" horse 
 blocks, hitching-posts and the like are located in the streets 
 of all prosperous municipalities without compensatiop, to 
 the owner of the fee. Even small shelters for persons wait- 
 ing for street cars have been built in the streets in some 
 places without objection from the abutters. 
 
 On the other hand, it must be remembered that a public 
 or a municipal use is not necessarily a street use, and that 
 a city cannot lawfully erect a building in a street of which 
 it does not own the unqualified fee, even if the building is 
 to be devoted to a strictly public use and is of great benefit 
 and convenience to the citizens, unless it is public travel in 
 one of its authorized forms that is benefited and made con- 
 venient. For this reason a town hall,*^ a jail,** a pound," 
 a voting booth,** or similar public buildings*® cannot be 
 built in a highway without compensating the owner of the 
 fee, and buildings for private use cannot be erected in a 
 highway even upon payment of compensation without the 
 owner's consent.** 
 
 Some uses of the highway fall close to the line. For 
 example a well, trough or pump for the benefit of travelers 
 
 59. Richards v. Citizens' Water 65. Alabama.— Montgomery, etc., 
 Supply Co., 140 App. Div. (N. Y.) Bank v. Tyson, 133 Ala. 459, 32 So. 
 206, 125 N. Y. Supp. 116 ; Savage v. 144, 59 h. R. A. 399, 91 Am. St. Rep. 
 Salem, 28 Ore. 381, 81 Pac. 832, 24 46. 
 
 L. R. A. 787, 37 Am. St Rep. 688 ; Arkansas.— Packet Co. v. Sorrels, 
 
 West V. Bancroft, 82 Vt. 367. Con- 50 Ark. 466, 8 S. W. 683. 
 
 tra, Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 Iowa Georgia. — Savannah v. Wilson, 49 
 
 450, 74 Am. Dec. 858. Ga. 476. 
 
 60. Thompkins v. Hodgson, 2 Hun Missouri. — Peters v. St. Louis, 
 (N. Y.) 146. 226 Mo. 62, 125 S. W. 1134, 21 Ann. 
 
 61. Pettit V. Grand Junction, 119 q^^ IQQQ. 
 
 Iowa 352, 93 N. W. 381. Perarasj/J-yoreio.— Wartman v. Phlla- 
 
 62. Pettit V. Grand Junction, 119 ^elphia, 83 Pa. 202. 
 Iowa352,93N W^381;Winche^er re^„,._ O'Neal v. Sherman, 77 
 V Capron, 63 N H. 605, 4 Atl. 795, ^^^ ^^^^ ^^ g_ ^ 3^_ ^9 ^^ ^^ 
 
 Do xxIQ. ilGp. uu4:< -^ TTAo 
 
 63. Lutterloh v. Cedar Keys, 15 -"^P- l***- ,,^ „ , 
 Fla. 306 ; Sprague v. Waite, 17 Pick. 66. CommonwealOi v. Morrison 
 (Mass) 309. 197 Mass. 199, 83 N. E. 415, 14 
 
 64. Haberiil v. Boston, 190 Mass. I^- «• A. (N. S.) 194, and supra, 
 358, 76 N. E. 907, 4 L. R, A. (N, S.) i 166, note 4. 
 
 571. 
 
§ 188 Additionai. Seevitudes Upon Highways. 587 
 
 is sometimes considered to be within the highway ease- 
 ment,«^ for its use is merely an incident of travel, but an 
 eating house cannot be set up in a street without the con- 
 sent of the owner of the fee.*^ In the case of weighing 
 scales the courts are not in agreement.^® Although markets 
 have sometimes been established in public streets and 
 squares without objection, yet at common law such use was 
 indictable unless established by custom,'^'' and, in all the 
 cases in which the question has arisen, market buildings 
 have been held to constitute an additional servitude." 
 
 Another class of cases in which some doubts occasionally 
 arise includes those involving the erection of substantial, 
 permanent structures in the street for the purpose of indi- 
 rectly facilitating public travel or the transmission of 
 matter in one of the forms justified as an exercise of the 
 highway easement. Although it is largely a question of 
 degree, the erection of such structures is generally consid- 
 xCred an improper use of the highway, partly because such 
 buildings only incidentally affect public travel, and partly 
 because they inflict a damage upon adjoining property dif- 
 ferent in kind from that contemplated when the way was 
 laid out. Thus probably few courts would allow a stone 
 
 67. Liostutter v. Aurora, 126 Ind. Florida. — Lutterloh v. Cedar 
 436, 26 N. E. 184, 12 Ii. R. A. 259; Keys, 15 Fla. 306. 
 
 Gushing v. Bedford, 125 Mass. 526 ; Oeorgia. — Columbus v. Jaques, 30 
 
 Richards v. Citizens' Water Supply Ga. 506; Savannah v. Wilson, 49 
 
 Co., 140 App. Dlv. (N. Y.) 206, 125 Ga. 476. 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 116. Corafrffl, Clutter V. Massachusetts.— Iba^er v. Bos- 
 Davis, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 532, 62 ^^^^ ^g pi^.^ 51-^_ gj^ ^^^ j^^ jg7_ 
 S. W. 1107. _ Missouri. — Schopp v. St. Louis, 
 
 68. Commonwealth v. Morrison, j^^ ^^ ^^, 22 S. W. 898 20 
 
 l^'J'T-.^Kf.^l ^-Z^^' '* ^- R- A- 783; Peters v. St. Louis, 
 
 ^,f« ''■/^- ^-^ ' "^ ' 226 Mo. 62, 125 S. W. 1134, 21 Ann. 
 
 i 166, note 4. q^^ ^Qgg 
 
 69. Held, an additional servitude. ' , ' _ . . _ 
 
 „ tZ ' „ , „ „ a^..„„„=^ ^^w Jersey.— State v. Laverack, 
 
 Berry-Horn Coal Co. v. Scruggs- oa -k i t om 
 
 McClure Coal Co., 62 Mo. Appl 93; ^* f ■ *'• V'^"^' . ^ „ ^ , 
 
 Cline V. Cornwall,, 21 Grant (Pa.) ,/r7Z^-~.^tt'^ I; ^"5^\*'' 
 
 129. Contra, Spencer v. Andrew, 82 1* N. Y. 374; St. John v. New York, 
 
 Iowa 14, 47 N. W. 1007, 12 L. R. A. 3 Bosw. 483. 
 
 215 Pennsylvania. — Wartman v. 
 
 70. Rex V. Smith, 4 Esp. 109 ; El- Philadelphia, 33 Pa. 203. 
 
 wood V. Bullock, 13 L. J. N. S. 330. See also as to market wagons 
 
 71. Alabama. — State v. Mobile, 5 standing in a street, supra, § 166. 
 Porter 279, 30 Am. Dec. 564. 
 
588 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 188 
 
 crusher to be permanently located in a public street with- 
 out the consent of the abutting owner, even if it was used 
 solely for providing material for constructing and repair- 
 ing public ways, and it has actually been held that a signal 
 tower for a street railway line,'^^ a power house for an elec- 
 tric lighting plant,''^ and a standpipe or pumping station 
 to aid in supplying water to the inhabitants,''* are all 
 improper street uses, in states in which the rails, pipes and 
 wires of the respective enterprises in aid of which these 
 structures were erected are held to be within the highway 
 easement. Such buildings, it is easy to see, are a step fur- 
 ther away from the original use of the highway than the 
 rails, pipes and wires which are actually a means for the 
 transportation of passengers or for the transmission of 
 matter. 
 
 When the abutting owner and the public authorities agree 
 that a building may be constructed in the street, it is diffi- 
 cult to see how anyone else can object,'''' unless his land is 
 wholly cut off from access to the public streets, for the leg- 
 islature, if it sees fit, may discontinue a street or any por- 
 tion thereof without any liability arising, except to the 
 owners of land abutting upon the part discontinued or 
 otherwise cut off from access to the outside world,''® and the 
 erection of a building upon a portion of the street under leg- 
 islative authority is pro tanto a discontinuance, but in 
 Maryland it was held that a neighbor might have such work 
 enjoined as interfering with his easement of light and air,'^ 
 — an easement generally supposed to be confined to the 
 street directly in front of the premises to which it is 
 appurtenant.^* 
 
 72. Williams v. Los Angeles Ry. Sherman, 77 Tex. 182, 14 S. W. 31, 
 Co., 150 Cal. 592, 89 Pac. 330, 5 St. 19 Am. St. Rep. 743. Contra, of a 
 Ry. Rep. 42. - hydrant, Witcher v. Holland Wa- 
 
 73. Mcllhinny v. Trenton, 148 terworks Co., 66 Hun (N. Y.) 619. 
 Mich. 380, 111 N. W. 1083, 10 75. Opinion of the Justices, 208 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 623, 118 Am. St Mass. 603, 625, 94 N. E. 749, 95 
 Rep. 583, 12 Ann. Cas. 23. N. E. 930. 
 
 74. Morrison v. Hinkson, 87 111. 76. Supra, § 115. 
 
 587, 29 Am. Rep. 77; Barrows v. 77. Townsend v. Epstein, 93 Md. 
 
 Sycamore, 150 111. 588, 37 N. E. 537, 49 Atl. 629, 52 L. R. A. 409, 86 
 
 1096, 25 L. R. A. 535, 41 Am. St. Am. St. Rep. 441. 
 
 Rep. 400; Howe v. Lowell, 171 78. Supra, § 161. 
 Mass. 575, 51 N. E. 536; O'Neal v. 
 
§ 189 Additional Sebvitudes Upon Highways. 589 
 
 § 189. Exercise of the Highway Easement Causing Direct 
 Injury to Land Outside the Limits of the Way. 
 
 ^ The extent to which the establishment of a highway car- 
 ries with it the right to cause the direct invasion of land 
 outside the limits of the way is discussed at length in other 
 portions of this work.^^ Thus it has already been shown 
 that a highway may be graded either when laid out or sub- 
 sequently, without regard to the injury to adjacent land;*" 
 the right to so grade it was paid for when the way was laid 
 out. But this right does not include the privilege of raising 
 the grade to the full width of the way and sloping the earth 
 upon the adjacent land.*^ Such a use would not be fairly a 
 reasonable incident of constructing the way within the 
 located limits, but would substantially make the land so 
 covered part of the way itself. It is generally held that 
 in the construction of highways below the grade of the sur- 
 rounding land, support may be withdrawn so that such land 
 subsides, without additional liability to the landowner.*^ 
 
 The rights acquired by the public authorities with respect 
 to the disposition of surface water when a highway is laid 
 out are not the same throughout the United States. This 
 disagreement is in part due to a difference in the substan- 
 tive law in regard to the respective rights of private land- 
 owners over surface water, and in part to the tendency in 
 some states to prefer the rights of the public to the rights 
 of the owners of private property, and to the contrary tend- 
 ency in others. It is almost universally held however that 
 the public authorities are not bound to provide drains for 
 carrying off the surface water from public highways, and 
 that the public easement includes the right to construct or 
 to alter the highway in such a way as to prevent the sur- 
 face water from flowing off the adjacent lands, or to turn 
 an increased flow of surface water upon such land. In 
 some states it is held that the public easement acquired and 
 paid for when the way was laid out includes the right to 
 gather the surface water from the highway into catch 
 basins and to turn it directly upon adjoining land, although 
 this right is limited to the water from the way then laid 
 
 79. For the principles applicable • 81. Supra, § 163. 
 to this subject, see supra, § 152. 82. Supra, § 163. 
 
 80. Supra, § 162. 
 
590 The Law of Eminent 'Domain. § 189 
 
 out and what would naturally flow therefrom. A system of 
 surface drainage gathering the water from a number of 
 ways or from an extensive district and turning it by means 
 of an artificial channel upon land to which it would not 
 naturally flow is an additional servitude upon land thus 
 inundated, even if the owner was given full compensation 
 for the damage to his remaining land from the establish- 
 ment of the highway when the highway was laid out ; and 
 in many of the states it is held that the turning of surface 
 water upon adjoining land by means of artificial channels 
 of any description is not within the highway easement.** 
 
 It is asserted with great spirit by some courts that a 
 municipal corporation has no greater rights with respect 
 to the disposition of surface water from its highways than 
 the humblest individual who owns a parcel of land may have 
 with respect to the surface water accumulating thereon. 
 It should be remembered however that a city or town, in 
 getting rid of the surface water from its streets, is not 
 exercising the rights of an ordinary landowner, but is doing 
 what it was authorized by the legislature to do and what 
 it paid for the privilege of doing when the ways were laid 
 out; it is making its highways safe and convenient for 
 travel. If a city or town should erect a structure in the 
 highway for purposes not incidental to travel, the owner of 
 the fee might recover damages as for a trespass, and any 
 injurious disturbance of the flow of the surface water would 
 be an element of damage ; but if the city or town is acting 
 within the highway easement it may lawfully inflict injuries 
 upon adjoining land for which a private landowner would 
 be liable at common law. 
 
 When a highway is laid out through a ledge of rocks, it is 
 obvious that blasting will have to be resorted to, and that 
 earth and stones may be thrown upon the surrounding 
 property. It is generally held that in such a case the pro- 
 spective injury from necessary and careful blasting may be 
 included in the original award of damages,** and conse- 
 quently that when the injury actually takes place, no right 
 
 83. Upon the liability of cities 84. Gary Bros. v. Morrison, 129 
 and towns with respect to surface Fed. 177, 65 L. E. A. 659; White- 
 water from public highways, see house v. Androscoggin R. R. Co., 
 infra, § 497. 52 Me. 208; Dodge v. Essex County 
 
§ 190 Additional Seevitudes Upon Highways. 591 
 
 to further compensation arises.*' If the landowner who 
 suffered from the falling rooks was not one of those part 
 of whose land was taken, and he had no statutory right to 
 have his damages assessed, most courts would allow him 
 compensation at common law, even in the absence of negli- 
 gence, on the ground that, in the absence of express statu- 
 tory provision to the contrary it was not intended by the 
 legislature to authorize such injury without compensation.®® 
 If it clearly appeared that the statute authorized the injury 
 to be inflicted without compensation the owner would not 
 be entitled to recover unless the injury was so severe as 
 to amount to a taking; but this precise state of facts does 
 not seem to have arisen in any of the decided cases. 
 
 The taking of land for a highway does not justify the 
 public authorities in personally entering upon land outside 
 the limits of the way in order to construct the way more 
 conveniently. If such entry is necessary the right to so 
 enter should be taken ; otherwise it constitutes a trespass.®'' 
 
 § 190. The Measure of Damages for an Additional 
 Servitude. 
 
 In considering the measure of damage for the use of land 
 devoted to one public purpose for a different and addi- 
 tional purpose, it is necessary to keep in mind in each case 
 the ground upon which recovery is based. When the land 
 in question is owned in fee by a private individual, subject 
 to a particular public easement, and an additional servitude 
 is imposed thereon for the public use and by legislative 
 authority, there is a taking of property in the constitutional 
 sense, and the owner is entitled to the same measure of 
 compensation as in the case of the taking of property which 
 was unencumbered by an easement, namely, the decrease 
 in the market value of his property. Similarly, when the 
 substantive law of the state recognizes the existence of ease- 
 ments in favor of the abutting owner in property which the 
 
 Commissioners, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 86. Infra, § 502. 
 
 380; Brown v. Providence, etc., R. 87. Elder v. Bemis, 2 Met. 
 
 R. Co., 5 Gray (Mass.) 35. (Mass.) 599; Providence, etc., S. S. 
 
 85. Murphy v. Lovsrell, 128 Mass. Co. v. Fall River, 183 Mass. 535, 
 
 396 ; Sabin v. Vermont Central B. 67 N. B. 647. 
 E. Co., 25 Vt. 363. 
 
592 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 190 
 
 public owns in fee, which are taken in the constitutional 
 sense by any use of the property for other than the pur- 
 poses for which it was originally acquired, the right of the 
 owner to compensation is the same as if he owned the fee 
 of the street. Under such conditions, whether the stat- 
 utes provide a method of recovering damages, as should be 
 the case in all well ordered communities, but unfortunately 
 is not, or whether the courts have worked out a system of 
 recovering permanent damages in actions at common law, 
 if permanent damages are to be awarded, the parcel abut- 
 ting upon the public work and the land within it, whether 
 the interest of the owner is a fee or an easement, are looked 
 upon as a single tract, and the measure of damages is< the 
 decrease in the market value of the tract. In determining 
 such decrease it is proper to take into consideration all ele- 
 ments which affect present market value and which arise 
 from the taking.^* It is immaterial in such cases whether 
 the damage is special and peculiar or is suffered alike by 
 
 88. Illinois. — Board of Trade Tel. 
 Co. V. Darst, 192 111. 47, 61 N. E. 
 398, 85 Am. St. Rep. 288; lUinois, 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Turner, 194 111. 
 575, 62 N. B. 798; Chiles v. Alton, 
 etc., Traction Co., 158 lU. App. 508 ; 
 Brand v. Union El. R. R. Co., 169 
 111. App. 449. 
 
 Kentucky. — Elizabeth, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Combs, 10 Bush 382, 19 Am. 
 Rep. 67 ; Chesapeake, etc., Ry. Co. 
 V. Stein, 142 Ky. 515, 134 S. W. 
 1169. 
 
 Maryland. — Chesapeake, etc., Tel. 
 Co. V. Mackenzie, 74 Md. 36, 21 
 Atl. 690, 28 Am. St. Rep. 219 ; Webb 
 V. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 114 
 Md. 216, 79 Atl. 193. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Logan v. Boston 
 El. Ry. Co., 188 Mass. 414, 74 N. B. 
 663, 4 St. Ry. Rep. 464. 
 
 Netraslca. — Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. O'Connor, 42 Neb. 90, 60 
 N. W. 326. 
 
 New Yorh. — Kane v. New York 
 Elevated Railroad Co., 125 N. T. 
 164, 26 N. E. 278, 11 L. R. A. 640; 
 Re Rapid Transit Railroad Com- 
 missioners, 197 N. Y. 81, 90 N. E. 
 456, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 647, 18 
 Ann. Cas. 366; Rasch v. Nassau 
 
 Electric Railroad Co., 198 N. Y. 
 385, 91 N. B. 785, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 645. 
 
 Utah. — Morris v. Oregon Short 
 Line Co., 36'utah 14, 102 Pac. 629. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Abbott v. Milwaukee, 
 etc.. Traction Co., 126 Wis. 634, 106 
 N. W. 523, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 202. 
 
 See also as to market value, infra, 
 § 237. When the owner of the fee 
 does not own the abutting lots it is 
 proper to award merely nominal 
 damages for an additional servi- 
 tude. Coatsworth v. Lehigh Valley 
 R. R. Co., 73 Misc. (N. Y.) 645, 131 
 N. Y. Supp. 300. If the new servi- 
 tude is beneficial to those using it 
 but not harmful to the owner of the 
 fee he is not entitled to substantial 
 damages, as for example a pipe line 
 in a railroad right of way. Calor 
 Oil & Gas Co. V. Withers' Adminis- 
 trator, 141 Ky. 489, 133 S. W. 210. 
 The owner of the fee is not entitled 
 to recover the rents and profits 
 when a telegraph line is laid on a 
 railroad right of way, but merely 
 his own damage. Chicago, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Snyder, 120 Iowa 533, 95 
 N. W. 183, 8 Am. Elect Cas. 284. 
 
§ 190 Additiokal Servitudes Upon Highways. 593 
 
 all who own property in the neighborhood, and whether it 
 arises from the construction or from the operation of the 
 public work for which the taking was made. 
 
 When the public owns the fee and the right to compensa- 
 tion is based upon the existence of easements in the public 
 property which are less extensive than the rights of an 
 owner of the fee, subject to a public easement, as is the 
 case when the rights of an abutter upon a public highway 
 are limited to easements of access, light and air, and such 
 easements are impaired by the use of the public property 
 for a purpose other than that for which it was acquired, no 
 damages can be recovered except those which arise from 
 the injury to such easements, and a depreciation in the 
 market value of the property, by reason of the new use to 
 which the public work is devoted, is not to be considered in 
 condemnation proceedings if it arises from some other 
 cause than the impairment of such easements.*® When how- 
 ever a corporation has failed to condemn the easements of 
 abutting owners, and is thus unlawfully using the public 
 work, it is held to be liable for damages to the adjoining 
 property of every description.®" 
 
 When the right to compensation from a new use of a 
 public work depends upon a constitutional provision pro- 
 hibiting the damaging of property for the public use with- 
 out compensation, it is. generally held that unless the injury 
 is special and peculiar and involves the disturbance of a 
 right either public or private which the owner of a parcel 
 of land enjoys in connection with his property and which 
 gives it an additional value, the owner is not entitled to 
 compensation at all,®^ and even if the injury is such as to 
 entitle the owner to compensation, unlike the case of a tak- 
 ing, it does not open the door to compensation for all injury 
 
 89. American Bank Note Co. v. Co., 125 N. T. 164, 26 N. E. 278, 11 
 New York El. H R. Co., 129 N. T. L. R. A. 640; Messenger v. Man- 
 252, 29 N. E. 302; Bischoff v. New hattan R. R. Co., 129 N. Y. 502, 29 
 York El. R. R. Co., 138 N. Y. 257, N. E. 955; Moore v. New York El. 
 33 N E 1073; Re Seaside, etc., El. R. R. Co., 130 N. Y. 523, 29 N. B. 
 R. R. Co., 83 Hun (N. Y.) 143, 31 997, 14 L. R. A. 731; Cliurch of Holy 
 N. Y. Supp. 630. See also Lamm v. Apostles v. New York El. R. R. Co., 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 45 Minn 71, 21 App. Div. (N. Y.) 47, 47 N. Y. 
 47 N. W. 455, 10 L. R. A. 268. Supp. 418. 
 
 90. Kane v. New York El. R. R. 91. Infra, § 312. 
 
 38 
 
594 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 §191 
 
 which affects market value and the owner is entitled to 
 recover for such elements of damage only as, standing 
 alone, would come within the constitutional provision.®^ 
 
 The principle by which permanent damages are assessed 
 in a proceeding at common law or in equity when a perma- 
 nent structure is erected for the public use upon private 
 land without condemnation proceedings®* applies in the 
 case of a structure erected upon a highway or other land 
 devoted to the public use when the erection of such struc- 
 ture is not sanctioned by the existing public rights in the 
 land, and in such cases the recognized measure of damages 
 is the same as in a statutory condemnation proceeding.®* 
 
 § 191. Elements of Dama,ge in the Case of an Additional 
 Servitude. 
 
 In all cases in which the right to recover compensation 
 for a use of public property additional to that for which it 
 was taken is established, any actual physical injury to the 
 
 92. California. — Smith v. South- 
 ern Pacific K. R. Co., 146 Gal. 164, 
 79 Pac. 868, ,106 Am. St. Rep. 17. 
 
 Illinois. — Calumet, etc.. Dock Co. 
 V. Morawetz, 195 111. 398, 63 N. B. 
 165; Metropolitan West Side El. 
 R. R. Co. V. GoU, 100 111. App. 823. 
 
 Kentucky. — Louisville, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Foster, 108 Ky. 743, 57 S. W. 
 480, 50 L. R. A. 813; Chesapeake, 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Gross, 19 Ky. L. 
 Rep. 192^, 43 S. W. 203. 
 
 Oklahoma. — Scrutchfield v. Choc- 
 taw, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Okla. 308, 
 88 Pac. 1048, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 496. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Jones v. Brie, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 151 Pa. 30, 25 Atl. 134, 
 17 L. R. A. 758, 31 Am. St. Rep. 722; 
 Willock V. Beaver Valley R. R. Co., 
 229 Pa. 526, 79 Atl. 138. 
 
 93. Infra, § 478. , 
 
 94. United States. — Frankle v. 
 Jackson, 30 Fed. 398. 
 
 Alahama. — Highland Ave., etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Matthews, 99 Ala. at, 
 10 So. 267, 14 L. R. A. 462. 
 
 Florida. — Jacksonville, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Lockwood, 33 Fla. 573, 15 So. 
 327. 
 
 Illinois. — Doane v. Lake St. Bl. 
 
 Ry. Co., 165 111. 510, 46 N. E. 520, 
 36 L. R. A. 97, 56 Am. St. Rep. 265. 
 
 Indiana. — Indiana, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Bberle, 110 Ind. 542, 11 N. E. 
 467, 59 Am. Rep. 225; Porter v. 
 Midland R. R. Co., 125 Ind. 476, 25 
 N. B.. 556. 
 
 Iowa. — Bslich v. Mason City, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 75 Iowa 443, 39 
 N. W. 700; Fowler v. Des Moines, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 91 Iowa 533, 60 
 N. W. 116. 
 
 Kansas. — Central Branch, etc, 
 R. R. Co. V. Twine, 23 Kan. 585, 
 33 Am. Rep. 203. 
 
 Kentucky. — Louisville, etc., R. R. 
 Co. v. Orr, 91 Ky. 109, 15 S. W. 8; 
 Klosterman v. Chesapeake, etc., R. 
 B. Co., 114 Ky. 426, 71 S. W. 6. 
 
 Minnesota. — Adams v. Hastings, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 260. 
 
 Nebraska. — Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. O'Connor, 42 Neb. 90, 60 
 N. W. 326. 
 
 Tennessee. — Harmon v. Louis- 
 ville, etc., R. R. Co., 87 Tenn. 614, 
 11 S. W. 703. 
 
 West Virginia. — Guinn v. Ohio 
 River R. R. Co., 46 W. Va. 151, 33 
 S; E. 87, 76 Am. St. Rep. 806. 
 
§ 191 Additional Sebvitudbs Upon Highways. 
 
 595 
 
 adjacent premises is of course an item to be considered in 
 making up the award. Thus when an excavation in a street 
 deprives the buildings upon the adjoining land of support, 
 and causes the foundations to settle and the walls to crack, 
 or the same result is caused by the vibration due to the run- 
 ning of heavy trains, the owner is entitled to recover for 
 such injury.®^ So also when the effect of the construction 
 of a railroad in a street is to turn additional surface water 
 upon the adjoining land, the damages so caused may be 
 recovered.®* 
 
 The damages are not however limited to actual physical 
 injury. Thus impairment of access from the street to the 
 abutting property is always considered a proper element of 
 damage.®'' So also the interference with light and air from 
 
 95. Georgia. — Soutli Carolina R. 
 B. Co. V. Sterner, 44 Ga. 546. 
 
 Illinois. — Lake St. El. Ry. Co. v. 
 Brooks, 90 111. App. 173. 
 
 Kentucky. — Jeffersonville, etc., B. 
 R. Co. V. Bsterle, 3 Bush 667; 
 Louisville Southern R. R. Co. v. 
 Hove, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 521, 35 S. W. 
 266, 38 S. W. 131. 
 
 Maryland. — Baltimore, eta, R. R. 
 Co. V. Reaney, 42 Md. 71, 20 Am. 
 Rep. 83. 
 
 ffeto York. — Re Rapid Transit 
 Railroad Commissioners, 197 N. Y. 
 81, 90 N. E. 456, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 647, 18 Ann. Cas. 366 ; Re New York 
 Central, etc., R. R. Co., 15 Hun 63. 
 
 96. Indiana. — Indianapolis, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Smith, 52 Ind. 428; 
 Indiana, etc., R. R. Co. v. Eberle, 
 110 Ind. 54^ 11 N. E. 467, 59 Am. 
 Rep. 225; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Eisert, 127 Ind. 156, 2.6 N. E. 759. 
 
 Kentucky. — Louisville, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Hennen, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 526; 
 Maysville, etc., R. R. Co. v Ingram, 
 16 Ky. L. Rep. 853, 30 S. W. 8. 
 
 Minnesota. — Adams v. Hastings, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 18 Minn. 260. 
 
 See also Fifty Associates v. Bos- 
 ton, 201 Mass. 585, 88 N. B. 427, in 
 which the cutting of a bulkhead in 
 the street which kept out underr 
 ground water, by the construction of 
 a subway, was held an element of 
 damage. 
 
 97. Alabama. — Highland Avenue 
 & Belt Railroad Co. v. Matthews, 99 
 Ala. 24, 10 So. 267, 14 L. R. A. 462. 
 
 Arkansas. — Hot Springs R. R. Co. 
 V. Williamson, 45 Ark. 429. 
 
 California. — Ford v. Santa Cruz 
 R. R. Co., 59 Cal. 290; Smith v. 
 Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 146 
 Cal. 164, 79 Pac. 868, 106 Am. St. 
 Rep. 17. 
 
 Colorado. — Jackson v. Kiel, 13 
 Colo. 378, 22 Pac. 504, 6 L. R. A. 
 254, 16 Am. St Rep. 207 ; Hannegan 
 V. Denver & Santa Fe Railway Co., 
 43 Colo. 122, 95 Pac. 343, 16 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 874, 127 Am. St. Rep. 100. 
 
 Illinois. — Mix v. Lafayette, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 67 111. 319; Chicago, etc., 
 B. R. Co. V. Ayres, 106 111. 511; 
 Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. Turner, 
 194 111. 575, 62 N. E. 798. 
 
 Indiana. — Hutton v. Indiana, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 7 Ind. 522; Indian- 
 apolis, etc., R. B. Co. V. Smith, 52 
 Ind. 428; Chicago, etc., R. B. Co. v. 
 Eisert, 127 Ind. 156, 26 N. E. 759; 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. B. Co. v. Nofts- 
 ger, 148 Ind. 101, 47 N. E. 332. 
 
 Iowa.— Park v. Chicago, etc., R. 
 B. Co., 43 Iowa 636. 
 
 Kansas. — Central Branch Union 
 Pacific Railway Co. v. Twine, 23 
 Kan. 585, 33 Am. Bep. 203; Fort 
 Scott, etc., B. B. Co. v. Fox, 42 Kan. 
 490, 2e Pac. 583 ; Leavenworth, etc., 
 E. B. Co. V. Curfan, 51 Kan. 433, 
 
596 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 §191 
 
 the street by the erection of permanent structures therein 
 in front of the premises in question is undoubtedly an ele- 
 ment of damage,*® but whether an owner is entitled to 
 recover when the structure which causes the injury is not 
 in front of his premises is a point upon which the courts 
 are not in agreement.®* 
 
 The throwing of smoke and cinders upon private prem- 
 ises from the engines of a railroad constructed in a street 
 under legislative authority, polluting the atmosphere and 
 obstructing the light, is also an element that may be included 
 
 33 Pac. 297; Atchison, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Davidson, 52 Kan. 739, 35 
 Pac. 787. 
 
 Kentucky. — Elizabethtown, etc., 
 Railroad Co. v. Combs, 10 Bush 
 382, 19 Am. Rep. 67; JefEersonville, 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Esterle, 13 Bush 
 667; Maysvllle, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Connor, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 635, 29 S. W. 
 344 ; Stein v. Chesapeake, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 132 Ky. 322, 116 S. W. 733. 
 
 Minnesota. — Hayes v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 46 Minn. 349, 49 
 N. W. 61; Kaje v. Chicago, etc.. 
 Railroad Co., 57 Minn. 422, 59 N. W. 
 493, 47 Am. St. Rep. 627. 
 
 Mississippi. — Theobold t. Iiouis- 
 vllle, etc.. Railroad Co., 66 Miss. 279, 
 6 So. 230, 4 L. R. A. 735, 14 Am. St. 
 Rep. 564; Slaughter v. Meridian 
 Light & Railway Co., 95 Miss. 251, 
 48 So. 6, 1040, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 1265. 
 
 Missouri. — Cross v. St. Louis, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 77 Mo. 318; Smith 
 V. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 98 
 Mo. 20 ; De Geofroy v. Merchants' 
 Bridge Terminal Railroad Co., 179 
 Mo. 698, 79 S. W. 386, 64 L. R. A. 
 959, 101 Am. St. Rep. 524. 
 
 NehrasTca. — Burlington, etc.. Rail- 
 road Co..v. Reinhackle, 15 Neb. 279, 
 18 N. W. 69, 48 Am. Rep. 348; 
 Omaha, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rogers, 16 
 Neb. 117, 19 N. W. 603; Jaynes v. 
 Omaha Street Railway Co., 53 Neb. 
 631, 74 N. W. 67, 39 L. R. A. 751. 
 
 'Nevada. — Virginia, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Lynch, 13 Nev. 92. 
 
 New Jersey. — Paterson R. R. Co. 
 V. Grundy, 51 N. J. Eq. 213, 26 
 Atl. 788. 
 
 New York. — Story v. New York 
 Elevated RaUway Co., 90 N. Y. 122, 
 43 Am. Rep. 146; Abendroth v. 
 Manhattan Railway Co., 122 N. Y. 
 1, 25 N. E. 496, 11 L. R. A. 634, 
 19 Am. St. Rep. 461; Kane v. New 
 York Elevated Railway Co., 125 
 N. Y. 164, 26 N. E. 278, 11 L. R. A. 
 640 ; Egerer v. New York, etc.. Rail- 
 road Co., 130 N. Y. 108, 29 N. E. 95, 
 14 L. R. A. 381. 
 
 Oklahoma. — Foster Lumber Co. 
 V. Arkansas Valley, etc.. Railroad 
 Co., 20 Okla. 583, 95 Pac. 224, 100 
 Pac. 1110, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 231. 
 
 Oregon. — McQuaid v. Portland, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 18 Ore. 237, 22 Pac. 
 899. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — P e n n s y Ivania 
 Schuylkill Valley Railroad Co. v. 
 Walsh, 124 Pa. 544, 17 Atl. 186, 10 
 Am. St. Rep. 611. 
 
 South Carolina. — South Bound R. 
 R. Co. V. Burton, 67 S. C. 515, 46 
 S. E. 340. 
 
 Tennessee. — Brumit v. Virginia, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 106 Tenn. 124, 60 
 S. W. 505; Pepper v. Union R. R. 
 Co., 113 Tenn. 53, 85 S. W. 864. 
 
 Texas. — Texas, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Goldberg, 68 Tex. 685, 5 S. W. 824, 
 
 Wisconsin. — Younkin v. Mil- 
 waukee, etc.. Traction Co., 112 Wis. 
 15, 87 N. W. 861. 
 
 98. Peyser v. Metropolitan El. R. 
 R. Co., 13 Daly (N. Y.) 122; Jones 
 V. Erie, etc., R. R. Co., 151 Pa. 30, 
 25 Atl. 134, 17 L. R. A. 758, 31 Am. 
 St. Rep. 722. 
 
 99. See supra, § 190, and infra, 
 I 324. 
 
§ 191 Additiokal Servitudes Upon Highways. 
 
 597 
 
 in the award when the owner is entitled to recover for the 
 entire depreciation of market value ;^ but when he is 
 limited to recovery for special and peculiar damage this 
 element should not be considered^ unless the land in ques- 
 tion suffers an injury differing in kind rather than degree 
 from other property in the neighborhood of the railroad.' 
 Noise from the operation of an elevated railway, or a steam 
 railroad, in a public highway is a proper element of dam- 
 age when all damages may be recovered ; * but cannot ordi- 
 narily be considered when the recovery is limited to special 
 and peculiar damages,^ or to damages for injury to the 
 easements of access, light and air.® Loss of privacy from 
 
 1. Illinois. — Stone v. Fairbury, 
 etc., R. E. Co., 68 111. 394, 18 Am. 
 Rep. 556; Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Turner, 194 111. 575, 62 N. E. 798. 
 
 Kentuclcy. — Maysville, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Ingram, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 853, 
 30 S. W. 8. 
 
 Minnesota. — Adams v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 39 Minn. 286, 39 
 N. W. 629, 1 L. R. A. 493, 12 Am. 
 St Rep. 644. 
 
 'Nebraska. — Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. O'Connor, 42 Neb. 90, 60 
 N. W. 326. 
 
 'New York. — ^Lahr v. Metropolitan 
 El. R. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 268 10 N. E. 
 528. 
 
 Texas. — Gulf, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Eddins, 60 Tex. 656; Dallas Ter- 
 minal, etc., Co. V. Ardrey (Tex. Civ. 
 App.), 146 S. W. 616. 
 
 2. Metropolitan West Side EI. 
 R. R. Co. V. Goll, 100 111. App. 323 ; 
 Cosby V. Owensboro, etc., R. R. Co., 
 10 Bush (Ky.) 288; Louisville 
 Southern R. R. Co. v. Hove, 18 Ky. 
 L. Rep. 521, 35 S. W. 266, 38 S. W. 
 131 ; Willock v. Beaver Valley R. R. 
 Co., 229 Pa. 526, 79 Atl. 138. 
 
 3. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Ayers, 106 111. 511; Calumet, etc., 
 Dock Co. V. Morawetz, 195 111. 398, 
 63 N. E. 165. 
 
 4. Illinois. — Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Darke, 148 111. 226, 35 N. E. 
 750; Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Turner, 194 111. 575, 62 N. B. 798. 
 
 Kentucky. — Louisville Railroad 
 
 Co. V. Foster, 108 Ky. 743, 57 S. W. 
 480, 50 L. R. A. 813. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Logan v. Boston 
 El. Ry. Co., 188 Mass. 414, 74 N. B. 
 663, 4 St. Ry. Rep. 464. 
 
 Nebraska. — Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. O'Connor, 42 Neb. 90, 60 
 N. W. 326. 
 
 New Jersey. — Laing v. United 
 New Jersey R. R., etc., Co., 54 
 N. J. L. 576, 25 Atl. 409, 33 Am. St 
 Rep. 682. 
 
 New York. — Kane v. New York 
 Elevated Railroad Co., 125 N. Y. 
 164, 26 N. E. 278, 11 L. R. A. 640; 
 Moore v. New York El. Ry. Co., 130 
 N. Y. 523, 29 N. E. 997, 14 L. R. A. 
 731; Sperb v. Metropolitan EI. Ry. 
 Co., 137 N. Y. 155, 32 N. E. 1050, 
 20 L. R. A. 752; Rasch v. Nassau 
 Electric Railroad Co., 198 N. Y. 385, 
 91 N. E. 785, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 645. 
 
 South Carolina. — South Bound 
 R. R. Co. V. Burton, 67 S. C. 615, 46 
 S. E. 340. 
 
 5. Metropolitan West Side El. Ry. 
 Co. V. Goll, 100 111. App. 323 ; Chesa- 
 peake, etc., R. R. Co. V. Gross, 19 
 Ky. L. Rep. 1926, 43 S. W. 203; 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Foster, 
 108 Ky. 743, 57 S. W. 480, 50 L. R. A. 
 813. 
 
 6. American Bank Note Co. v. 
 New York El. R. R. Co., 129 N. Y. 
 252, 29 N. E. 302; Bischofl v. New 
 York El. R. R. Co., 138 N. Y. 257, 
 33 N. E. 1073. 
 
598 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 191 
 
 the construction of an elevated railroad station in a street 
 in front of a dwelling house is subject to the same consid- 
 erationsJ Increased danger of fire,* and the frightening of 
 horses,® by the operation of a railroad in a street may be 
 considered so far as they affect market value, when depre- 
 ciation of market value is the test ; but not when only special 
 damages may be recovered," 
 
 It should of course be remembered that the existence of 
 any one of the foregoing elements of damage does not nec- 
 essarily lead to the conclusion that the abutting owner is 
 entitled to recover damages, unless the constitution of the 
 state requires compensation when property is damagied; for 
 if the construction of the public work which caused the 
 injury was a lawful exercise of the public easement, the 
 fact that it inflicts injury upon adjoining property does not 
 make it unlawful, or entitle the owners of such property 
 to compensation. 
 
 7. Loss of privacy may be con- tion R. B. Co. v. McCutcheon, 4 
 sidered in an action for the con- Sadler 245, 7 Atl. 146. 
 strucUon of an elevated railway In South GaroUna.— South Bound 
 a street without condemnation pro- K- »■ Co. v. Burton, 67 S. C. 515, 
 ceedings, Messenger v. Manhattan 46 S. E. 340. 
 
 K R. Co., 129 N. Y. 502, 29 N. E. Tewas.— Gxx\f, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 
 955; Moore v. New York El. R. R. Eddins 60- Tex egg; Texas, etc 
 
 Co., 130 N. Y. 523, 29 N. B. 997, 14 ^- ^- ^o. v. 'Goldberg, 68 Tex. 685, 
 
 L. R. A. 731 ; but not when the only ^ ^- J^- ^^^- 
 
 liability is under a damage clause ^^ f^ev. Fairbury, etc., R. R. 
 
 in the constitution; Metropolitan ^^^ gg jjj ^^^ ^g ^^ ^^^ ggg. 
 
 West Side El. Ry. Co. v. GoU, 100 g^^rd of Trade Tel. Co. v. Darst, 
 
 111. App. 323. 192 111. 47, 61 N. E. 398 ; Be Brook- 
 
 8. Gfeor-firio.— South Carolina R. ly^ jjl. R. R. Co., 6 App. Div. 
 R. Co. V. Steiner, 44 Ga. 546. (n. y.) 53, 39 n. y. Supp. 474; 
 
 Indiana. — Lafayette, etc., R. R, Jones v. Erie, etc., R. R. Co., 151 
 Co. V. Murdock, 68 Ind. 137. Pa. 30, 25 Atl. 134, 17 L. R. A. 758, 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Pittsburg June- 81 Am. St. Rep. 722. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Additional Sebvitudes Upon Land Taken fob Pubposes 
 Otheb Than Highways. 
 
 Section 192. The Estate of a Railroad Company in its Location. 
 
 193. Change of Grade — Additional Tracks. 
 
 194. Buildings and other Structures upon Railroad Locations. 
 
 195. The Ownership of Timber, Materials and Minerals upon a 
 
 Railroad Location. 
 
 196. Exercise of the Railroad Easement Causing Direct Injury to 
 
 Land Outside the Limits of the Railroad Location. 
 
 197. Canals and Turnpikes. 
 
 198. Telegraph Lines. 
 
 199. Drains and Sewers. 
 
 200. The Right of Flowaga 
 
 201. Public Water Supply. 
 
 202. Parks, Public .Buildings and other Public Uses. 
 
 203. Change of the PtibUc Easement. 
 
 § 192. The Estate of a Railroad Company in its Location. 
 
 In the preceding chapter much has been said in respect 
 to the rights of owners of the fee when a steam railroad is 
 laid in a public highway.^ Steam railroads are however 
 ordinarily constructed in a strip of private land specially 
 acquired for the purpose, by eminent domain or otherwise. 
 Nevertheless the railroad company does not, as a general 
 rule, hold in fee the land so acquired, but is merely per- 
 mitted to take the easement of laying and maintaining a 
 railroad, and the title to the fee and the right to make use 
 of the land for any purpose not inconsistent with the safe 
 and convenient operation of the railroad, is retained by the 
 former owner.^ Although an easement is all that is ordi- 
 narily taken for a railroad, and in the absence of a specific 
 
 1. Supra, §§ 167-169 inc. Indiana. — Cleveland, etc., R. R. 
 
 2. Alabama. — Alabama, etc., R. R. Co. v. Doan, 47 Ind. App. 322, 94 
 Co. V. Burkett, 42 Ala. 83. N. E. 598. 
 
 California. — Southern Pacific R. Iowa. — Henry v. Dubuque, etc., 
 
 R. Co. V. San Francisco Savings r. r cq.^ 2 Iowa 288 ; Vermilya v' 
 
 Union, 146 Cal. 290, 79 Pac. 961 70 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 66 Iowa 611. 
 
 L. R A. 221. 106 Am. St. Rep. 36. Kansas.- Kansas Central Ry. Co. 
 
 Illinois. — Peoria, etc., R. R. Co. ' 
 
 T. Birkett, 62 111. 332, 336. 
 
 [599] 
 
600 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 192 
 
 provision of statute to the contrary, authority to take more 
 than an easement is not presumed, the extent of the inter- 
 est that a railroad corporation may obtain in the land 
 required for its location lies almost wholly in the discretion 
 of the legislature, and there seems to be no constitutional 
 objection to a statute which authorizes a railroad corpora- 
 tion to condemn a fee, leaving no reversionary interest in 
 the former owner.* 
 
 As compared with the easement >of a public highway, the 
 easement of a railroad is more extensive. On account of 
 
 V. Allen, 22 Kan. 285, 31 Am. Rep. 
 190. 
 
 Louisiana. — Louisiana Land Co. 
 V. Blakewood, 131 La. 539, 59 So. 
 984. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Brainard v. 
 Clapp, 10 Gush. 6, 57 Am. Dec. 74; 
 Proprietors of Locks v. Nashua, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 104 Mass. 1, 6 Am. Rep. 
 181 ; May v. New England R. R. Co., 
 171 Mass. 367, 50 N. E. 652 ; Boston 
 & Maine R. R. v. Hunt, 210 Mass. 
 128, 96 N. E. 140; Battelle v. New 
 York, etc., R. R. Co., 211 Mass. 
 442, 97 N. E. 1004. 
 
 Minnesota. — Scott v. St. Paul, 
 etc., Ry. Co., 21 Minn. 322. 
 
 Missouri. — Kellogg v. Malln, 50 
 Mo. 496, 11 Am. Rep. 426. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Blake v. Rich, 
 34 N. H. 282; Chapin v. Sullivan 
 R. R. Co., 39 N. H. 564, 75 Am. Dec. 
 237. 
 
 New York. — Heard v. Brooklyn, 
 60 N. Y. 242. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Lance's Appeal, 
 55 Pa. 16, 93 Am. Dec. 722. 
 
 Tennessee. — Bast Tennessee, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. West, 89 Tenn. 293, 14 
 S. W. 776, 10 L. R. A. 855. 
 
 Washington. — Neltzel v. Spokane 
 International Railway Co., 65 Wash. 
 100, 117 Pac. 864, 36 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 522. 
 
 In Dilts V. Plum-nlle R. R. Co., 
 222 Pa. 516, 71 Atl. 1072, it was 
 said that the interest which a 
 railroad acquires is neither a fee, 
 nor an easement in the proper 
 sense of the word, but is in sub- 
 stance an interest in the land 
 special and exclusive In its nature. 
 
 The interest of a railroad chartered 
 by Congress is not an easement, nor 
 a fee simple, but a limited fee with 
 an implied condition of reverter if 
 the land ceases to be used for rail- 
 road purposes. Rio Grande Ry. Co. 
 V. Stringham, 239 U. S. 44. 
 
 3. Kansas. — Challis' v. Atchison, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 16 Kan. 117. 
 
 New Jersey. — Coster v. New Jer- 
 sey R. R. Co., 23 N. J. L. 227; 
 Currie v. New York Transit Co., 66 
 N. J. Eq. 313, 58 Atl. 308, 105 Am. 
 St. Rep. 647. 
 
 North Carolina. — Raleigh, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Davis, 2 Dev. & B. 451. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Haldeman v. 
 
 Pennsylvania Central R. R. Co., 50 
 Pa. 425. 
 
 South Dakota. — Hedger v. Aber- 
 deen, etc., Ry. Co., 26 S. D. 491, 128 
 N. W. 602. 
 
 The view has been expressed 
 that since an easement is all 
 that is necessary for the pur- 
 poses of a railroad, the legislature 
 cannot confer a greater interest or 
 estate. See Gurney v. Minneapolis 
 L'nion Elevator Co., 63 Minn. 70, 65 
 N. W. 136, 30 L. R. A. 554, in which 
 this question was raised but not 
 decided. See also Kellogg v. Malln, 
 50 Mo. 496, 11 Am. Rep. 426, in 
 which it was suggested that as 
 when a railroad is laid out the 
 benefits to the owner may be set 
 off from the damages, the railroad 
 could not acquire a fee simple abso- 
 lute which it might sell, thus de- 
 priving the owner of the enjoyment 
 of the benefits. 
 
§ 192 
 
 Othee Public Easements. 
 
 601 
 
 the danger both to passengers on the trains and to persons 
 in the vicinity of the tracks that would be incurred if the 
 owner of the fee were allowed to make use of that portion 
 of the railroad location not actually covered by the rails, 
 it is usually held that the right of the railroad company 
 to the occupancy of the surface of the location is exclusive.* 
 The principal rights remaining in the owner are the right 
 to prevent the use of the location for other than railroad 
 purposes, and the right of reversion if the operation of the 
 railroad is discontinued or abandoned. 
 
 As far as the right of reversion is concerned, the ease- 
 ment of a railroad is perpetual, as long as the land is used 
 for railroad purposes.® It is not limited to the duration of 
 the charter of the corporation which originally acquired it," 
 
 4. Connecticut. — New York, etc, 
 E. R.' Co. V. Comstock, 60 Conn. 
 200, 22 Atl. 511. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Hazen v. Bos- 
 ton, etc., E. R. Co., 2 Gray 574, 
 580; Boston & Maine R. R. v. 
 Hunt, 210 Mass. 128, 96 N. B. 140; 
 Whitney v. Cheshire Railroad, 210 
 Mass. 263, 96 N. E. 676 ; Battelle v. 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co., 211 Mass. 
 442, 97 N. E. 1004. 
 
 Michigan. — Flint R. E. Co. v. 
 Detroit R. E. Co., 64 Mich. 350, 31 
 N. W. 281. 
 
 Perlnsylvania. — Northern Central 
 Ey. Co. V. Harrisburg, etc., Ey. Co., 
 177 Pa. 142, 35 Atl. 624, 34 L. E. A. 
 572, 6 Am. Elect. Cas. 187, 180 Pa- 
 ll, 36 AU. 321. 
 
 Rhode Island. — ^Aldrich v. Dniry, 
 8 E. I. 554, 5 Am. Eep. 624. 
 
 Vermont. — Jackson v. Rutland, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 25 Vt. 150, 60 Am. 
 Dec. 246. 
 
 Kansas City E. R. Co. v. 
 Allen, 22 Kan. 285, 31 Am. Rep. 
 190, holds that the question of the 
 railroad's exclusive possession Is 
 one of fact. See also Munger v. 
 Tonawanda R. R. Co., 4 Comst. 
 (N. Y.) 349, 50 Am. Dec. 384, hold- 
 ing that a railroad company is to 
 be deemed the owner of the land 
 within its right of way in such 
 sense that animals which stray 
 upon the track are trespassers, and 
 Hudson, etc., E. E. Co. v. Wendel, 
 193 N. Y. 166, 85 N. E. 1020, hold- 
 
 ing that without special authority 
 a railroad does not take the fee, 
 even when the taking is for a sta- 
 tion, but a practically exclusive 
 easement during the corporate 
 existence, and Tacoma Mill Co. v. 
 Northern Pacific Ey. Co. (Wash.), 
 154 Pac. 173, holding that the rail- 
 road easement includes all uses 
 which the necessity and convenience 
 of the public may require. 
 
 5. Lewis V. Omaha, etc., Ey. Co., 
 158 Iowa 137, 138 N. W. 1092 ; Bos- 
 ton & Maine R. R. v. Hunt, 210 
 Mass. 128, 96 N. E. 140. It vras 
 said in TJhland Club v. Shupbach, 
 168 Mass. 430, 47 N. E. 113, that the 
 possibility that land taken for rail- 
 road purposes will revert to the 
 original owners upon the termina- 
 tion of the franchise of the rail- 
 road company and an abandonment 
 of the use is technical, and 6f little, 
 if any, value. It was held in Bat- 
 telle V. New York, etc., R. R. Co., 
 211 Mass. 442, 97 N. E. 1004, that 
 title to an estate in fee in land 
 under a railroad location may be 
 registered, although the rights of 
 the railroad corporation are sub- 
 stantially permanent and practi- 
 cally exclusive so long as the land 
 is used for the purposes of a 
 railroad. 
 
 6. Atlanta Terra Cotta Co. v. 
 Georgia Ey., etc., Co., 132 Ga. 537, 
 64 S. E. 563. 
 
602 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 193 
 
 for the charter might be renewed, or the property and fran- 
 chise of the company might be sold or leased to another 
 without, it is held, the necessity of condemning a new ease- 
 ment when the charter of the first company expired. The 
 necessity of condemning a fee instead of an easement does 
 not in any degree depend upon the perpetuity of the 
 charter.'' 
 
 § 193. Change of Grade — Additional Tracks. 
 
 It is the rule in most jurisdictions that when land is taken 
 for railroad purposes, the estate or interest acquired by the 
 company is not merely the right to construct and maintain 
 a railroad in accordance with the original plans, but it is 
 the easement to make any use of the land for railroad pur- 
 poses that the public necessity and convenience may from 
 time to time require ; ® and consequently the owner of the 
 fee is not entitled to additional compensation for a change 
 or increase in the use, so long as it is for railroad purposes. 
 The company may therefore change the grade of the road- 
 bed® or the gauge of the tracks," or lay additional tracks 
 
 7. Moore Planting Co. v. Mor- Incidental to the safe and bene- 
 gan's, etc., Steamship Co., 126 La. ficial operation of the road, by 
 840, 53 So. 22. raising or lowering grades, cutting 
 
 8. Thus in Coit v. Owenby-Wof- down hills and removing trees they 
 ford Co., 166 N. C. 136, 81 S. E. have a right to do so to the same 
 1067, it was said that a railroad extent as when the railroad was 
 company acquires an easement to originally laid out and con- 
 be used as the necessities and well- structed." 
 
 ordered management of the road 9. Illinois. — Chicago, etc., R. B. 
 
 may require, and the company au- Co. v. Hogan, 105 111. App. 136. 
 
 thorities are the judges of the Massachusetts. — Cassidy v. Old 
 
 extent and necessities of this use. Colony R. R. Co., 141 Mass. 174, 5 
 
 In Brainard v. Clapp, 10 Gush. N. E. 142. 
 
 (Mass.) 6, 57 Am. Dec. 74, the Mississippi. — New Orleans, etc., 
 
 court said : " Practically the dam- B. R. Co. v. Brown, 64 Miss. 482, 
 
 ages are commonly equal to the 1 So. 637 ; Canton v. Canton Cotton 
 
 value of the land. * * * The Warehouse Co., 84 Miss. 268, 36 So. 
 
 right and power of the company to 266, 65 L. R. A. 561, 105 Am. St 
 
 use the land within their limits Hep. 428. 
 
 may not only be exercised origi- New York. — In re Buffalo Grade 
 
 nally, when their road is first laid Crossing Commissioners, 209 N. Y. 
 
 out, but continues to exist after- 139, 102 N. E. 552. 
 
 ward ; and if after they have com- North Carolina. — Brinkley v. 
 
 menced operations it is found neces- Southern Ry. Co., 135 N. C. 654, 47 
 
 eary in the judgment of the com- S. E. 791. 
 
 pany to make further uses of the 10. Kakeldy v. Columbia, etc., R. 
 
 land assigned to them, for purposes B. Co., 37 Wash. 675, 80 Pac. 205'. 
 
§ 193 Other Public Easements. 603 
 
 at any time," without compensation to the owner of the 
 fee. The owner of the fee acquires no prescriptive right 
 to any privileges or advantages that the less burdensome 
 original construction left him, since even the occupation 
 by the owner of the fee of so much of the railroad location 
 as is not occupied by the tracks is not inconsistent with the 
 company's easement therein and will not amount to adverse 
 possession." For similar reasons the owner of the fee can- 
 not acquire an easement of light and air over the railroad 
 location.^* So also the owner of the fee cannot insist that 
 the use of the tracks be confined to traffic between the points 
 which marked the original termini of the railroad by which 
 his land was taken. That company may increase its use of 
 the tracks indefinitely, by absorbing other lines without any 
 right to compensation arising." In fact the owner can- 
 not insist that the railroad be operated by the original 
 corporation. 
 
 When the railroad which made the original taking sells 
 or leases its franchise to another company, or when there 
 is a merger of existing roads, the new company succeeds 
 
 11. Walker v. lUinais Central R. provided by its charter but the 
 R. Co., 215 111. 610, 74 N. E. 812; rlglit was acquired for such use 
 ■Dnion Traction Co. v. Pfeil, 39 Ind. (for railroad purposes) as is cus- 
 App. 51, 78 N. E. 1052 ; Louisville, tomary and as the public interest 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Scomp, 30 Ky. L. may at any time require during the 
 Rep. 487, 98 S. W. 1024 ; Manning continuance of the right. There are 
 V. New Jersey, etc., R. R Co., 80 probably instances where the 
 N. J. L. 349, 78 Atl. 200, 32 amount of use of a right of way 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 155. lias Increased twenty fold of what 
 
 12. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. was anticipated at the time of 
 Ives, 202 111. 69, 66 N. E. 940; 1111- acquiring the right. Such increase 
 nois Central R. R. Co. v. Hasen- has usually been largely due 
 winkle, 232 111. 224, 83 N. E. 815, 15 to connections and consolidations 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 129; Roberts v. for running of trains, bringing 
 Sioux City, etc., R. R. Co., 73 Neb. into continuous lines of great 
 8, 102 N. W. 60, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) length, short lines; detached lines 
 272, 10 Ann. Cas. 992; East Ten- ending in the air; lines of only 
 nessee R. R. Co. v. Telford, 69 local benefit. But when the right 
 Tenn. 293, 14 S. W. 776, 10 L. R. A. of way was acquired, whether by 
 855. purchase or condemnation, it was 
 
 13. Kotz V. Illinois Central R. R. acquired with reference to the busl- 
 Co., 188 111. 578, 59 N. B. 240. ness of conducting railroads, and to 
 
 14. Thus it was said by the court the manner in which that business 
 In Miller v. Green Bay, etc., Co., is and always has been carried on. 
 59 Minn. 169, 60 N. W. 1006, 26 The increased use imposed no 
 L. R. A. 443, " The easement taken greater burden than was contem- 
 is not limited to use by the rail- plated when the right of way was 
 road company making the taking in acquired." 
 
 the manner and within the limits 
 
604 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 194 
 
 to all the rights of the old/® and the owner of the fee can- 
 not complain even if the railroad which made the taking 
 allows another railroad the joint use of the tracks ; ^® but if 
 the old company retains its franchise and continues to use 
 the tracks, the laying of additional tracks by another rail- 
 road on the unused portion of the original location is an 
 additional servitude for which compensation must be 
 paid.^^ 
 
 While the foregoing principles are generally accepted, 
 it must be remembered that the extent of the interest 
 acquired by a railroad company in its location depends 
 entirely upon the statutes of the state in which it is located, 
 and in some states it is held that the easement taken is 
 limited by the plan filed, in accordance with which damages 
 are assessed; and consequently the railroad could not be 
 constructed in a different manner more injurious to the 
 landowners without additional compensation.^^ 
 
 § 194. Buildings and other Structures upon Railroad 
 Locations. 
 
 The railroad easement is not limited to the construction 
 and maintenance of the roadbed and tracks, and it is well 
 settled that the company may erect passenger stations, 
 freight houses and other buildings for its own use in oper- 
 
 15. CroUey v. Minneapolis, etc., 16. Miller v. Green Bay, etc., R. 
 Ey. Co., 30 Minn. 541, 16 N. W. 422 ; E. Co., 59 Minn. 169, 60 N. W. 1006, 
 Northern E. E. Co. v. Earhart, 167 26 L. E. A. 443. 
 Mo. 612, 67 S. W. 229; Blakely v. 17. Southern Pacific E. E. Co. v. 
 Chicago, etc., E. E. Co., 34 Neb. Eeed, 41 Cal. 256 ; Fort Worth, etc., 
 284, 51 N. W. 767 ; Fort Worth, etc., E. E. Co. v. Jennings, 76 Tex. 373, 
 E. E. Co. V. Jennings, 76 Tex. 373, 13 S. W. 270, 8 L. E. A. 180. 
 13 S. W. 270, 8 L. E. A. 180. In 18. Wabash, etc., E. E Co. v. 
 McCuUock V. North Carolina E. E. McDougall, 126 111. Ill, 18 N. B. 
 Co., 146 N. C. 316, 59 S. B. 882, it 291, 1 L. E. A. 207, 9 Am. St. Eep. 
 was held that when an easement 539; Lance's Appeal, 55 Pa. 16, 93 
 had been taken for railroad pur- Am. Dec. 722. See also Donisthorpe 
 poses and the railroad had been v. Fremont, etc., E. E. Co., 30 Neb. 
 leased to another company, it was 142, 46 N. W. 240, 27 Am. St Eep. 
 an additional servitude to use the 387, holding that when a railroad 
 land for trackage or warehouse company has obtained a deed of a 
 purposes for traffic originating on right of way under representations 
 other railroads; but additional that It is to be used for the main 
 traffic over the original road was line, the owner can recover dam- 
 proper, ages if it is used for side-tracks. 
 
§ 194 Otheb Public Easements. 605 
 
 ating the railroad," and even buildings which, though not 
 directly connected with the operation of the railroad, inci- 
 dentally make the travel of passengers and the transpor- 
 tation of freight safer or more convenient ; ^" but the com- 
 pany cannot, without violating the rights of the owner of 
 the fee, erect buildings upon that portion of its location not 
 in use for railroad purposes to be leased for mechanical or 
 manufacturing purposes, or to be devoted to any use not 
 incidental to the more convenient operation of the rail- 
 road.^' Thus the company may maintain an eating house 
 for the accommodation of employees and passengers on 
 land taken ' ' for railroad purposes ' ' but it cannot maintain 
 a hotel or restaurant for the use of the general public.^* 
 
 When land is taken by a railroad company by eminent 
 domain " for station purposes," the fee is not acquired by 
 the company, but the easement is more extensive than when 
 the taking is for the general purposes of a railroad, and 
 while the company cannot allow the land so taken to be 
 used for purposes having no connection with the travel or 
 traflSo upon the railroad,^^ it may use such land for the pur- 
 pose of increasing the business of the railroad by making 
 travel thereon more agreeable.'** The owner of the fee 
 
 19. Elyton Land Co. v. South, was used by but one shipper, as In 
 etc., E. R. Co., 95 Ala. 631, 10 So. the spur track cases, supra, § 67. 
 270; Coit v. Owenby-Wofford Co., 21. Locks & Canals v. Lowell, 
 166 N. C. 136, 81 S. E. 1067; Louis- etc., R. R. Co., 104 Mass. 1, 6 Am. 
 ville, etc., R. R. Co. v. French, 100 Rep. 181; Lance's Appeal, 55 Pa. 
 Tenn. 209, 43 S. W. 771, 66 Am. St. 16, 93 Am. Dec. 722 ; Neitzel v. 
 Rep. 752. Spokane, etc., Ry. Co., 65 Wash. 
 
 20. Thus It was held in Gurney v. 100, 117 Pac. 864, 36 L. R. A. 
 Minneapolis Union Elevator Co., 63 (N. S.) 522. 
 
 Minn. 71, 65 N. W. 136, 30 L. R. A. 22. Abraham v. Oregon, etc., R. 
 534, that a grain elevator for public R. Co., 37 Ore. 495, 60 Pac. 899, 82 
 use was not an additional servl- Am. St. Rep. 779; Milwaukee, etc., 
 tude upon a railroad location, and R. R. Co. v. Crawford County, 29 
 in Coit V. Owenby-WofCord Co., 166 Wis. 116 ; Milwaukee, etc., R. R. 
 N. C. 136, 81 S. E. 1067, that a rail- Co. v. Milwaukee, 34 Wis. 271 ; Chi- 
 road company might lease a part of cago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cravrford 
 its station grounds for a warehouse County, 48 Wis. 666, 5 N. W. 3. 
 to be used by a wholesaler for ship- 23. Lyon v. McDonald, 78 Tex. 
 ping and receiving freight. The 71, 14 S. W. 261, 9 L. R. A. 295. 
 latter decision is criticised in 24. Thus In Pierce v. Boston, etc., 
 XXVIII Harvard Law Review 208 R. R. Co., 141 Mass. 481, 6 N. E. 96, 
 on the ground that the warehouse it was held that when land Is taken 
 was for private use, unless it can " for station purposes " the ease- 
 be Inferred that It was, in theory at ment Is larger than a mere right 
 least, open to use by anyone who of way and it was unobjectionable 
 demanded it, although In fact it for the company to permit the sta- 
 
606 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 194 
 
 cannot maintain buildings upon the land,"* and the railroad 
 company may remove them at once if they form an obstruc- 
 tion."® The materials in the buildings belong to the owner 
 unless their value is included in the compensation awarded 
 him for the land and he accepts the award."^ The owner 
 cannot however acquire a prescriptive right to maintain 
 buildings upon the railroad location, especially if they were 
 used concurrently by the owner in carrying on his business 
 and by the company for convenience in handling his freight, 
 unless it appears that the company had actual or construc- 
 tive notice that such occupancy was adverse, or under a 
 claim of title."* 
 
 An owner may, under some circumstances, establish 
 crossings,"® but the right to crossings is a very limited one 
 and can be exercised only when necessary, and in such a 
 manner as not to interfere with the safe operation of the 
 railroad.*" An underground crossing would however seem 
 to be within the owner's rights,** pro\dded the roadbed was 
 sufficiently supported. 
 
 As the railroad easement includes the right to make any 
 use of the land within the location tending to enhance the 
 safe and convenient operation of the railroad, the com- 
 pany may lay and maintain pipes and wires for its own 
 use without compensation to the owner of the fee. Thus it 
 
 tion agent to maintain a boarding- v. Kochester, etc., E. E. Co., 12 
 
 house and livery stable on land so Barb. (N. Y.) 227; Cincinnati, etc., 
 
 taken, when there were no other R. R. Co. v. Wachter, 70 Ohio St 
 
 such establishments in the village, 113, 70 N. E. 974. 
 
 and their existence would tend to 30. Iowa. — Clayton v. Chicago, 
 
 increase travel on the railroad. In etc., R. R. Co., 67 Iowa 238, 25 
 
 Ryan v. Louisville, etc., Terminal N. W. 150. 
 
 Co., 102 Tenn. Ill, 50 S. W. 744, Massachusetts. — Boston Gas 
 
 45 L. R. A. 303, it was held that a Light Co. v. Old Colony, etc., R. R. 
 
 hotel might be maintained upon Co., 14 Allen 444; Presbrey v. Old 
 
 land taken for a station. Colony R. R. Co., 103 Mass. L 
 
 25. Cunningham v. Rome R. R. Minnesota. — Cedar Rapids, etc., 
 Co., 27 Ga. 499. R E.- Co. v. Raymond, 37 Minn. 204, 
 
 26. Odum V. Rutledge, etc., R. R. 33 N. W. 704. 
 
 Co., 94 Ala. 488, 10 So. 222. Missouri.— St. Louis, etc., R. R. 
 
 27. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Co. v. Clark, 121 Mo. 169, 25 S. W. 
 Knuffke, 36 Kan. 367, 13 Pa& 582. 192, 906, 26 L. R. A. 751. 
 
 28. Roberts v. Sioux City, etc., R. Texas.— Lyon v. McDonald, 78 
 R. Co., 73 Neb. 8, 102 N. W. 60, Tex. 71, 14 g. W. 261, 9 L. R. A. 295. 
 2 L. R A. (N. S.) 272, 10 Ann. 31. Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 Gas. 992. Smith, 177 Ind. 524, 97 N. E. 164; 
 
 29. Mississippi, etc., R. R. Co. v. Beardsley v. Lehigh Valley R. R. 
 Wooten, 36 La. Ann. 441; Wheeler Co., 142 N. Y. 173, 36 N. E. 877. 
 
§ 194 
 
 Other Public Easements. 
 
 607 
 
 may properly lay a pipe for bringing water for the use of 
 its engines ^2 or maintain a telegraph line for dispatching 
 its trains ; ^* but a line maintained by a telegraph company 
 for general public service is an additional servitude upon 
 land subject only to the easement of a railroad.** It would 
 seem however that if a railroad company maintained a tele- 
 graph line for its own use upon its location, and permitted 
 the use of the same poles and wires by a telegraph com- 
 pany, the owner of the fee would have difficulty in making 
 out a claim for substantial damages,*^ and that his case 
 would not be much stronger even if the telegraph company 
 was allowed to put up its own wires. Even when the tele- 
 graph company uses its own poles and wires, the actual 
 damage to the owner of the fee under ordinary conditions 
 could hardly be very substantial.*® 
 
 It has been held that the owner of the fee may lay pipes 
 under the tracks, provided of course that he does not inter- 
 fere with the safe and convenient operation of the railroad.*'' 
 
 32. Hougan v. Milwaukee, etc., 
 E. K. Co., 35 Iowa 558, 14 Am. Eep. 
 502 ; Canton v. Canton Cotton 
 Warehouse Co., 84 Miss. 268, 36 
 So. 266, 65 L. R. A. 561, 105 Am. 
 St Rep. 428. 
 
 33. United Btates. — ^Atlantic, etc., 
 Tel. Co. V. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 
 
 6 Biss. 158. 
 
 Kansas. — Western Union Tel. Co. 
 V. Rich, 19 Kan. 517, 27 Am. Rep. 
 159, 1 Am. Elect. Cas. 271. 
 
 Maryland. — American Tel., etc., 
 Co. V. Pearce, 71 Md. 535, 18 Atl. 
 910, 3 Am. Elect. Cas. 169 (««6. 
 nom. Am. Tel., etc., Co. v. Smith), 
 
 7 L. R. A. 200. 
 
 Mississippi. — Canton v. Canton 
 Cotton Warehouse Co., 84 Miss. 268, 
 36 So. 266, 65 L. R. A. 561, 105 Am. 
 St Rep. 428. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Pennsylvania R. 
 R. Co. V. Lilly Borough, 207 Pa. 
 180, 56 Atl. 412, 8 Am. Elect. Cas. 
 265. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Taggart v. New- 
 port St Ry. Co., 16 R. I. 688, 19 
 Atl. 326. 
 
 34. United States. — Western 
 Union Tel. Co. v. American Union 
 Tel. Co., 9 Biss. 72. 
 
 Iowa. — Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Snyder, 120 Iowa 532, 95 N. W. 
 183, 8 Am. Elect. Cas. 284. 
 
 Maryland. — American Tel., etc., 
 Co. V. Pearce, 71 Md. 535, 18 Ati. 
 910, 7 L. R. A. 200. 
 
 North Carolina. — Phillips v. Pos- 
 tal Tel. Cable Co., 130 N. O. 513, 
 41 S. E. 1022, 89 Am. St Rep. 868, 
 reversed, 131 N. C. 225, 42 S. E. 587. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Pittock v. Cen- 
 tral, etc., Tel. Co., 31 Pa. Super. 
 Ct 589. 
 
 So also for a pipe line for con- 
 veying gas or oil, Calor Oil & Gas 
 Co. V. Withers' Administrator, 141 
 Ky. 489, 133 S. W. 210. As to the 
 efCect of the Act of Congress au- 
 thorizing the establishment of tele- 
 graph lines upon post roads, see 
 supra, § 35. 
 
 35. Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
 Rich, 19 Kan. 517, 27 Am. Rep. 159, 
 1 Am. Elect Cas. 271. 
 
 36. As to the measure of damages 
 in such cases, see supra, § 191. 
 
 37. Hasson v. Oil Creek, etc., B. 
 R. Co., 8 Phila. (Pa.) 556. 
 
608 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 195 
 
 § 195. The Ownership of Timber, Materials and Minerals 
 upon a Railroad Location. 
 
 The railroad company is entitled, as an exercise of its 
 easement, to remove earth, gravel, stone and timber from 
 any part of its location for the purpose of grading, con- 
 structing or repairing its roadbed,** and it may cut the trees 
 so as to give its engineers an unobstructed view*® or to 
 diminish the danger of fire, or when they interfere with the 
 construction or operation of any of the appurtenances of 
 the railroad, such as a telegraph line used in connection 
 with the railroad.*" It may carry the material from one 
 part of the roadbed for use on another ; but it has no abso- 
 lute ownership thereof; the company can nse it only for 
 railroad purposes and cannot lawfully sell it to others.** 
 So also the company is entitled to use the water from 
 springs within its location for generating steam in its 
 engines.** 
 
 The owner of the fee is entitled to such oil and minerals 
 as the company does not remove in grading its road,** pre- 
 ss. Indiana. — Cleveland, etc., Ry. 39. Brainard v. Clapp, 10 Cush. 
 Co. V. Hadley, 179 Ind. 429, 101 (Mass.) 6, 57 Am. Dec. 74. See 
 N. E. 473, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 796. also Hayden v. SkUlinga, 78 Me. 
 
 Iowa. — Henry v. Dubuque, etc., 413, 6 Atl 830. 
 R. R. Co., 2 Iowa 288; Preston v. 40. Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
 
 Dubuque, etc., R. R. Co., 11 Iowa Rich, 19 Kan. 517, 27 Am. Rep. 159, 
 15 ; Hollingsworth v. Des Moines, 1 Am. Elect. Cas. 271. 
 etc., R. R. Co., 63 Iowa 443, 19 41. Alaiama. — NashvlUe, etc., R. 
 
 N. W. 325. R. Co. V. Karthaus, 150 Ala. 633, 
 
 i. — New Orleans, etc., 43 So. 791. 
 
 R. R. Co. V. Brown, 64 Miss. 482, Indiana. — Julien v. Woodsmall, 
 
 1 So. 637. 82 Ind. 568. 
 
 New EampsMre. — Cbapin v. Sul- New Hampshire. — Bailey v . 
 
 llvan R. R. Co., 39 N. H. 564, 75 Sweeney, 64 N. H. 296, 9 Atl. 543. 
 
 Am. Dec. 237. Pennsylvania. — Lyon v. Gormley, 
 
 Pennsylvania. — ^Wilson v. Beaver 53 Pa. 261. 
 
 Valley R. R. Co., 17 Pa. Dist. R. 151. Rhode Island. — Aldrich v. Drury, 
 
 Rhode Island. — Aldrich v. Drury, 8 R. I. 554, 5 Am. Rep. 624. 
 
 8 R. I. 554, 5 Am. Rep. 624. 42. Hougan v. Milwaukee, etc., 
 
 gee however Hendrix v. Southern R. R. Co., 35 Iowa 558, 14 Am. Rep. 
 
 Ry. Co., 162 N. C. 9, 77 S. E. 1001, 502. 
 
 and Hendler v. Lehigh Valley R. R. 43. Illinois. — Eldorado, etc., R. 
 
 Co., 209 Pa. 256, 58 Atl. 486, 103 R. Co. v. Sims, 228 111. 9, 81 N. B. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 1005, holding that 782. 
 
 when the removal of soil is, not Indiana. — Consumers' Gas Trust 
 
 itself an act of construction or Co. v. American Plate Glass Co., 
 
 repair, the company cannot law- 162 Ind. 393, 68 N. E. 1020. 
 
 fully excavate it for use upon an- Kansas. — Early wine v. Topeka, 
 
 other portion of the road. etc., R. R. Co., 43 Kan. 746, 23 Pac. 
 
§ 195 
 
 Othee Pxtbuc Easements. 
 
 609 
 
 vided that they can be taken out without depriving the 
 roadbed of support or otherwise interfering with tlie oper- 
 ation of the railroad.** He is entitled to use the water 
 from springs within the location which the company does 
 not need for its own purposes.*^ He is, in theory at least, 
 entitled to so much of the herbage and trees as the com- 
 pany does not lawfully remove for railroad purposes,** 
 but he cannot pasture his cattle upon the location *'' or enter 
 thereon for the purpose of removing herbage and trees** 
 on account of the danger to public travel if such rights 
 were generally exercised. The cultivation by the owner 
 of the fee of such portion of the railroad location as is not 
 covered by the tracks of the company is not however incon- 
 sistent with the company's easement therein, and will not 
 
 940; Missouri, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Schmuck, 69 Kan. 272, 76 Pac. 836. 
 
 Missouri. — Evans v. Hoefner, 29 
 Mo. 141. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Chapin v. Sul- 
 Uvan E. R. Co., 39 N. H. 564, 75 
 Am. Dec. 237. 
 
 Ohio. — Piatt V. Pennsylvania Co., 
 43 Ohio St 228, 1 N. E. 420. 
 
 Pennsylvcmia. — Searle v. Lacka- 
 wanna, etc., R. R. Co., 33 Pa. 57; 
 Lyon V. Gformley, 53 Pa. 261. 
 
 Texas.— 'Right of Way Oil Co. v. 
 Gladys City Oil, etc., Co., 157 S. W. 
 737. 
 
 West Virginia. — XJM v. Ohio 
 River R. R. Co., 51 W. Va. 106, 41 
 S. E. 340. 
 
 44. California. — Southern Pacific 
 R. R. Co. y. San Francisco Sav- 
 ings Union, 146 Oal. 290, 79 Pac. 
 961, 70 L. R. A. 221, 106 Am. St. 
 Rep. 306, 2 Ann. Cas. 562. 
 
 Florida. — Silver Springs, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Van Ness, 45 Fla. 589, 
 34 So. 554. 
 
 Illinois. — Eldorado, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Sims, 228 111. 9, 81 N. E. 782. 
 
 Indiana. — Consumers' Gas Trust 
 Co. V. American Plate Glass Co., 162 
 Ind. 393, 68 N. E. 1020. 
 
 Montana. — Northern Pacific R. 
 R. Co. V. Forbis, 15 Mont. 452, 39 
 Pac. 571, 48 Am. St. Rep. 692. 
 
 Pennsi/lvania. — Searle v. Lacka- 
 wanna, etc., R. R. Co., 33 Pa. 57; 
 Lawrence's Appeal, 78 Pa. 365; 
 
 39 
 
 Dilts V. Plumville R. R. Co., 222 
 Pa. 516, 71 Atl. 1072. 
 
 45. Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 Smith, 177 Ind. 524, 97 N. B. 164; 
 Dilts V. Plumville R. R. Co., 222 
 Pa. 516, 71 Atl. 1072; Beacon v. 
 Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., 1 Pa. 
 Dist. Ct. 618. Although the owner 
 of the fee is in legal theory entitled 
 to ice forming on a railroad loca- 
 tion, as he will not as a practical 
 matter be able to gather it, he is 
 entitled to damages for the loss of 
 his ice privilege, when the railroad 
 is located. Rock Island, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Leisy Brewing Co., 174 111. 
 547, 51 N. E. 572. 
 
 46. Iowa. — Preston v. Dubuque, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 11 Iowa 15. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Brainard v. 
 Clapp, 10 Cush. 6, 57 Am. Dec. 74. 
 
 Neio Hampshire. — Blake v. Rich, 
 34 N. H. 282. 
 
 New Jersey. — Taylor v. New 
 York, etc., R. R. Co., 38 N. J. L. 28. 
 
 Ohio. — Piatt V. Pennsylvania Co., 
 43 Ohio St. 228, 1 N. E. 420. 
 
 Tennessee. — ^East Tennessee R. R. 
 Co. v. Telford, 89 Tenn. 293, 14 
 S. W. 776, 10 L. R. A. 855. 
 
 47. Hurd v. Rutland, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 25 Vt. 116. 
 
 48. Troy, etc., R. R. Co. v. Potter, 
 42 Vt. 265, 1 Am. Rep. 325. See 
 also Connecticut, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Holton, 32 Vt. 43. 
 
610 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 196 
 
 amount to an adverse possession which will destroy the 
 company's easement or entitle the owner to compensation 
 when the land so occupied is required by the company for 
 additional tracks.*® 
 
 § 196. Exercise of the Railroad Easement Causing Direct 
 Injury to Land Outside the Limits of the Railroad Location. 
 
 It is everywhere the law that when a railroad corporation 
 has acquired a strip of land by eminent domain to be used 
 for railroad purposes, the easement so acquired includes 
 the right to operate a railroad upon the land so taken, and 
 as the compensation to the owners of the land taken includes 
 the damage to their remaining land by the operation of the 
 railroad, such owners cannot subsequently maintain an 
 action for- the damages to their land by the noise, smoke 
 and cinders arising from the operation of the railroad in a 
 reasonable and proper manner.®" The right to inflict such 
 damage was taken and paid for when the railroad was 
 located.®^ 
 
 In some jurisdictions the railroad easement is analogous 
 to that of a public highway, and, when a railroad location is 
 acquired by eminent domain, the company condemns and 
 pays for the right to grade and construct its road then or 
 at any future time in such manner as the public necessities 
 may require. Consequently an adjoining owner cannot 
 claim additional compensation when as a result of such 
 grading or construction his land is flooded by surface 
 water '* or is deprived of lateral support by a deep cut made 
 
 49. Supra, § 192, and infra, § 510. Maine. — Greeley v. Maine Cen- 
 
 50. Johnson v. Southern Ry. Co., tral R. R. Co., 53 Me. 200. 
 
 71 S. C. 241, 50 S. E. 775, 110 Am. Maryland. — Baltimore, etc., R. R. 
 
 St. Rep. 572. Co. v. Magruder, 34 Md. 79, 6 Am. 
 
 51. When one conveys a strip of Rep. 310. 
 
 land for railroad purposes, all dam- Massachusetts. — Babcock v. West- 
 ages to his remaining land are em R. R. Corp., 9 Met. 553, 43 Am. 
 waived. Irwin v. Yazoo, etc., R. R. Dec. 411; Walker v. Old Colony 
 Co., 99 Miss. 394, 55 So. 49. R. R. Co., 103 Mass. 10, 4 Am. Rep. 
 
 52. Indiana. — Hill v. Cincinnati 509. 
 
 Ry. Co., 109 Ind. 511, 10 N. E. 410. Minnesota. — Jordan v. St. Paul, 
 
 Kansas. — ^Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. etc., R. R. Co., 42 Minn. 172, 43 
 
 V. Hammer, 22 Kan. 763, 31 Am. N. W. 849, 6 L. R. A. 573. 
 
 Rep. 210 ; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. Mississippi. — ^Yazoo, etc. R. R. Co. 
 
 V. Steck, 51 Kan. 737, 33 Pac. 601. v. Davis, 73 Miss. 678, 19 So. 487, 
 
§ 196 
 
 Other Public Easements. 
 
 611 
 
 in the course of lowering the grade of the roadbed,^* or is 
 injured by blasting in a reasonable manner and without 
 negligence when necessary for the construction of the 
 railroad."* 
 
 In other states it is held that the statutory rights acquired 
 by a railroad company are no greater than those of a pri- 
 vate landowner (except that it may operate its railroad 
 without being charged with committing a nuisance), and 
 that it has no immunity, by reason of the damages paid 
 when the road was laid out, from further liability in case it 
 deprives an adjoining owner of lateral support®^ or floods 
 his land with surface water to a greater extent than would 
 be lawful if done by a private landowner."* 
 
 32 L. R. A. 262, 55 Am. St. Eep. 
 562. 
 
 Missouri. — Clark v. Hannibal, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 36 Mo. 202. 
 
 Neiraska. — Morrissey v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 38 Nebr. 406, 56 
 N. W. 946. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Aldrich v. Che- 
 shire R. R. Co., 21 N. H. 359, 53 
 Am. Dec. 212. 
 
 New York. — Wagner v. Long 
 Island R. R. Co., 70 N. T. 614. 
 
 South Carolina. — Baltzeger v. 
 Carolina Midland R. R. Co., 54 
 S. C. 242, 32 S. B. 358, 71 Am. St. 
 Rep. 789 ; Johnston v. Charleston, 
 etc., Ry. Co., 71 S. C. 241, 50 S. E. 
 775, 110 Am. St. Rep. 572. 
 
 Wisconsin. — O'Connor v. Fond du 
 Lac, etc., R. R. Co., 52 Wis. 526, 9 
 N. W. 287, 88 Am. Rep. 753. 
 
 53. Hortsman v. Covington, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 218; 
 Boothby v. Androscoggin, etc., R. 
 R. Co., 51 Me. 518; Chapman v. St. 
 Xjovis, etc., Ry. Co., 240 Mo. 592, 144 
 S. W. 469; Watts v. Norfolk, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 39 W. Va. 196, 19 S. B. 521, 
 23 L. R. A. 674, 45 Am. St. Rep. 894. 
 In Bradley v. New York, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 21 Conn. 294, it was held that 
 the construction of a railroad 
 through a cut, depriving neighbor- 
 ing land of lateral support, was not 
 a " taking " in the constitutional 
 sense ; but that the owner might re- 
 cover by reason of a statutory pro- 
 vision that the company should be 
 
 liable for all damages caused by 
 the construction of the railroad. 
 
 64. Hord v. Holston River R. R. 
 Co., 122 Tenn. 399, 123 S. W. 637, 
 135 Am. St. Rep. 878. 
 
 65. McCullough V. St. Paul, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 52 Minn. 12, 53 N. W. 
 802 ; Mosier v. Oregon Navigation 
 Co., 39 Oreg. 256, 64 Pac. 453, 87 
 Am. St. Rep. 652; Pettit v. James- 
 town, etc., R. R. Co., 222 Pa. 490, 71 
 Atl. 1048, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 318; 
 Richardson v. Vermont Central R. 
 R. Co., 25 Vt. 465, 60 Am. Dec. 283. 
 
 66. Arkansas. — Springfield, etc., 
 E. R. Co. V. Henry, 44 Ark. 360. 
 
 , Illinois. — Gillham v. Madison 
 County R. R. Co., 49 111. 484, 95 
 Am. Dec. 627. 
 
 Indiana. — IBaltimore, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Quillen, 34 Ind. App. 330, 72 
 N. E. 661, 107 Am. St. Rep. 183. 
 
 Iowa. — Drake v. Chicago, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 63 Iowa 302, 50 Am. Rep. 
 746; Albright v. Cedar Rapids, etc.. 
 Light Co., 133 Iowa 644, 110 N. W. 
 1052. 
 
 Minnesota. — Olson v. St. Paul, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 38 Minn. 419, 37 
 N. W. 953. 
 
 Missouri. — McCormiek v. Kansas 
 City, etc., R. R. Co., 70 Mo. 359, 35 
 Am. Rep. 431. 
 
 North Carolina. — Staton v. Nor- 
 folk, etc., R. R. Co., Ill N. C. 278, 
 16 S. E. 181, 17 L. R. A. 838. 
 
 Texas.— Qvilt, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Donahoo, 59 Tex. 128. 
 
612 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 197 
 
 § 197. Canals and Turnpikes. 
 
 Wlien land is acquired for a canal, whether by eminent 
 domain or by a conveyance from the owner, unless the con- 
 trary expressly appears in the statute or the deed, the inter- 
 est of the public authorities or of the canal company as the 
 case may be is only an easemnent,®'' and the owner of the 
 fee may make any use of the land that does not interfere 
 with navigation upon the canal.^* Similarly when the 
 waters of a lake or stream are taken for canal purposes, 
 so much as is not needed for the use of the canal belongs 
 to the riparian proprietors and cannot be disposed of with- 
 out their consent.^® There is however no fundamental 
 objection to the taking of the fee of land for canal purposes, 
 and if it clearly appears that the statute authorized the 
 taking of the fee or that the owner conveyed it, the entire 
 interest in the property will be held to have passed to the 
 proprietors of the canal and there will be no reversion to 
 the original owners if the use of the canal is abandoned or 
 the land sold.®" So also the reservoirs and water rights 
 
 57. United States. — Kennedy v. 
 Indianapolis, 11 Biss. 13, Fed. Cas. 
 No. 7703; Lyman v. Arnold, 5 Ma- 
 eon 195, Fed. Cas. No. 8626. 
 
 Colorado. — Smith Canal, etc., Co. 
 y. Colorado Ice, etc., Co., 84 Colo. 
 485, 82 Pac. 940, 3 L. E. A. (N. S.) 
 1148. 
 
 Indiana. — Edgerton v. HufE, 26 
 Ind. 35. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Derby v. Hall, 2 
 Gray 236. 
 
 Michigan. — Nichols v. New Eng- 
 land Furniture Co., 100 Mich. 230, 
 59 N. W. 155. 
 
 New Jersey. — Lehigh Valley R. 
 R. Co. V. Orange Water Co., 42 N. J. 
 Eq. 205, 7 Atl. 659. 
 
 North Carolina. — Bass v. Roan- 
 oke Navigation, etc., Co., Ill N. C. 
 439, 16 S. B. 402, 19 L. R. A. 247 ; 
 Mullen V. Lake Drummond Canal, 
 etc., Co., 130 N. C. 496, 41 S. E. 1027, 
 61 L. R. A. 833. 
 
 Ohio. — Corwin v. Cowan, 12 Ohio 
 St. 629; McCombs v. Stewart, 40 
 Ohio St. 647; Vought v. Columbus, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 58 Ohio St. 123, 50 
 N. E. 442. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Spear v. Allison, 
 20 Pa. 200 ; Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Bruce, 102 Pa. 23. 
 
 Virginia. — Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. 
 Tuckahoe, etc., R. R. Co., 11 Leigh 
 42, 36 Am. Dec. 374. 
 
 Wisconsin.' — Pinkum v. Eau 
 Claire, 81 Wis. 301, 51 N. W. 550. 
 
 58. Edgerton v. Huff, 26 Ind. 35. 
 
 59. Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige Ch. 
 (N. Y.) 137, 28 Am. Dec. 417; 
 Cooper V. Williams, 5 Ohio 391, 24 
 Am. Dec. 299. 
 
 60. Indiana. — Indianapolis Water- 
 works Co. V. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364; 
 Nelson v. Fleming, 56 Ind. 310; 
 Cromie v. Wabash, etc., Canal, 71 
 Ind. 208 ; Brookville, etc.. Hydraulic 
 Co. V. Butler, 91 Ind. 134, 46 Am. 
 Rep. 580. 
 
 New York. — Rexford v. Knight, 
 11 N. Y. 308; Higgins v. Reynolds, 
 31 N. Y. 151. 
 
 Ohio. — Malone v. .Toledo, 34 Ohio 
 St. 541 ; State v. Snook, 53 Ohio St. 
 521, 42 N. E. 544; State v. Griftner, 
 61 Ohio St. 201, 55 N. E. 612. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Craig v. Alle- 
 gheny, 53 Pa. 477; Robinson v. 
 
§ 198 Otheb Public Easements. 613 
 
 acquired for feeding the canal may be taken in fee if the 
 statutes so provide.®^ 
 
 A turnpike or toUroad subjects the land within its limits 
 to the same servitudes as a highway, except that a toll- 
 gate and tollhouse may be, erected on the land,®^ and the 
 turnpike company may fell trees within its location to sup- 
 ply material for the tollhouse.*^ 
 
 § 198. Telegraph Lines. 
 
 A telegraph company which condemns a strip of private 
 land for the purposes for which it was incorporated 
 acquires only an easement.®* This easement consists of 
 the right to erect telegraph poles and to suspend wires 
 upon them, to maintain and repair the same, to use the 
 structure for telegraph purposes,®^ and to make such fur- 
 ther use of the land as may be incidentally necessary or 
 convenient for the principal purpose for which it was 
 acquired.®^ The only exclusive right of the company is in 
 the ground actually occupied by the poles. The owner of 
 the fee may cultivate the land, subject to the right of the 
 company to enter to repair its structure, doing as little 
 damage as possible.®^ 
 
 West Pennsylvania R. K. Co., 72 Pa. Tel. Co. v. Polhemus, 102 C. C. A. 
 
 316; Wyoming Coal, etc., Co. v. 105, 178 Fed. 904. 
 
 Price, 81 Pa. 156; Pennsylvania, Colorado. — Union Pacific K. R. 
 
 etc.. Canal & R. R. Co. v. Billings, Co. v. Colorado Postal Tel. Cable 
 
 94 Pa. 40 ; Delosier v. Pennsylvania Co., 30 Colo. 133, 69 Pac. 564, 97 
 
 Canal Co., 7 Sad. 249, 11 Atl. 400. Am. St. Rep. 106. 
 
 Virginia. — Chesapeake, etc., R. R. Georgia. — Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co. 
 
 Co. V. Walker, 100 Va. 69, 40 S. E. v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 120 Ga. 268, 
 
 633, 914. 48 S. B. 15, 1 Ann. Cas. 734. 
 
 61. Columbus, etc., Ry. Co. v. Nel- Illinois. — Lockie v. Mutual Union 
 son, 32 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 431; Tel. Co., 103 111. 401, 1 Am. Elect. 
 Foust V. Dreutlein, 237 Pa. 108, 85 Csis. 425. 
 
 Atl. 68 ; Glass v. Columbian Paper Louisiana. — Postal Tel. Cable Co. 
 
 Co., Ill Va. 404, 69 S. E. 354. v. Louisiana Western R. R. Co., 49 
 
 62. Douglass V. Boonsborough La. Ann. 1270, 22 So. 219. 
 Turnpike Road, 22 Md. 219, 85 Am. 65. Lockie v. Mutual Union Tel. 
 Dec. 647; Tucker v. Tower, 9 Pick. Co., 103 111. 401, 1 Am. Elect. Cas. 
 (Mass.) 109, 19 Am. Dec. 350; 425. 
 
 Ward V. Marietta Turnpike Co., 6 66. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pol- 
 
 Ohio St. 15. hemus, 102 C. C. A. 105, 178 Fed. 
 
 63. Tucker v. Tower, 9 Pick. 904. 
 
 (Mass.) 109, 19 Am. Dec. 350. 67. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co.. 
 
 When the house ceases to be used v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 120 Ga. 268, 
 
 for toll purposes the owner of the 48 S. E. 15, 1 Ann. Cas. 734; Lockie 
 
 fee may have it removed. Feiber v. Mutual Union Tel. Co., 103 111. 
 
 V. Coyle, 3 Watts (Pa.) 407. 401, 1 Am. Elect. Cas. 425. 
 
 64. United States. — Western Union 
 
614 The Law of Eminent Domain. §§ 199, 200 
 
 § 199. Drains and Sewers. 
 
 For drains and sewers, whether open or covered, only 
 an easement is taken.** An nndergronnd sewer laid 
 through private land leaves the owner of the fee the use 
 of the surface for cultivation, and he may erect structures 
 thereon which will not be too heavy for the sewer to sup- 
 port.*® If a town which has taken land for sewerage pur- 
 poses constructs an open sewer, the owner of the fee has no 
 right to cover it,™ but, on the other hand, when the ease- 
 ment is merely to lay pipes, the town cannot substitute 
 an open ditch.^^ The town cannot take earth and other 
 materials from a strip of land in which it has an ordinary 
 sewer easement to use upon other parts of the same sewer 
 system,'^^ but when it has taken large tracts of land to 
 construct a sewer outlet, its easement includes the right 
 to excavate soil from one tract and use it elsewhere in car- 
 rying out the purpose of the taking.''* If it takes land for 
 sewerage purposes it may carry off through the sewer 
 which it constructs the sewage of other cities and towns.''* 
 
 § 200. The Right of Flowage. 
 
 When a right of flowage is taken by eminent domain, 
 although in such case only an easement is acquired,''® the 
 
 68. Illinois. — ^West Skokie Drain- 73. Titus v. Boston, 149 Mass. 164, 
 age District v. Dawson, 243 lU. 184, 21 N. E. 310. 
 
 90 N. B. 377, 17 Ann. Cas. 776 ; 74. Titus v. Boston, 161 Mass. 209, 
 
 Fountain Creek Drainage District 36 N. E. 793. 
 
 V. Smith, 265 III. 138, 106 N. E. 494. 75. Connecticut. — Curtiss v. Smith, 
 
 Kansas. — Rolens v. Hutchinson, 35 Conn. 156. 
 
 83 Kan. 618, 112 Pac. 129. Massachusetts. — French v. Brain- 
 
 . Massachusetts. — Clark v. Wor- tree Mfg. Co., 23 Pick. 216 ; Eddy v. 
 
 cester, 125 Mass. 226 ; Butchers', Chace, 140 Mass. 471, 5 N. E. 306. 
 
 etc., Assn. V. Commonwealth, 169 Michigan. — Day v. Walden, 46 
 
 Mass. 103, 47 N. E. 599. Mich. 575, 10 N. B. 26. 
 
 69. Clark v. Worcester, 125 Mass. Minnesota.— Alhert Lea v. Niel- 
 226. son, 80 Minn. 101, 82 N. W. 1104, 81 
 
 70. Melrose v. Cutter, 159 Mass. Am. St. Rep. 242. 
 
 461, 34 N. E. 695. Under such a VeJjraska. — Nosser v. Seeley, 10 
 
 taking the town may lay two pipes, Nebr. 460, 6 N. W. 755 ; Gross v. 
 
 one for surface water and the other Jones, 85 Nebr. 77, 122 N. W. 681, 32 
 
 for house sewage. Evans v. Bos- L. R. A. (N. S.) 47. 
 
 ton, 190 Mass. 525, 76 N. B. 905. Virginia. — Hunter v. Matthews, 1 
 
 71. Rolens v. Hutchinson, 83 Kan. Rob. 468 ; Whitworth v. Puckett, 2 
 618, 112 Pac. 129. ' Grat. 528. 
 
 72. Butchers', etc., Assn. v. Com- Wisconsin. — Pr^tt v. Brown, 3 
 monwealth, 169 Mass. 103, 47 N. E. Wis. 603. 
 
 599. 
 
§ 201 Other Public Easements. 615 
 
 owner of the fee does not have the right to fill the land 
 flowed or to dyke out the water ;'« but when the construc- 
 tion of a dam that will necessarily flood the land of other 
 proprietors is authorized, not as an act of eminent domain, 
 but as a regulation of conflicting rights in a running 
 stream, the right of the owner of land thus flooded to dyke 
 out the water is a vital part of the doctrine that such 
 flowage is not a taking." If the owner of the fee does not 
 dyke out, he niay make use of the millpond thus allowed 
 to exist on his land; he may boom logs to the exclusion of 
 the millowner,''* and he has the exclusive right to cut, sell 
 or use the ice,''® provided he does not materially interfere 
 with the enjoyment of the easement taken. 
 
 When the right to maintain a dam at a certain height 
 has been acquired, it is not lost by failure to constantly 
 maintain the water at the highest level, and the millowner 
 by repairing the dam and using more economical methods 
 may keep the water at the highest level without additional 
 compensation to the owners of lands flooded.*" 
 
 § 201, Public Water Supply. 
 
 "When land is taken for purposes incidental to a public 
 water supply, as for example the site of a dam, an artificial 
 reservoir or a pumping station, while the extent of the 
 interest acquired is governed by the purpose of the taking, 
 it is generally held that it is either the fee, or an exclusive 
 easement that is the equivalent of the fee while the use 
 
 76. Boston & Eoxbury Mill Co. v. Indiana. — State v. Pottmeyer, 33 
 Newman, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 467, 23 Ind. 402, 5 Am. Rep. 224; Brook- 
 Am. Dec. 622; Paine v. Woods, 108 ville, etc., Hydraijllc Co. v. Butler, 
 Mass. 160; Phillips v. Watuppa 91 Ind. 134, 46 Am. Rep. 580. 
 Reservoir Co., 184 Mass. 404, 68 Maine. — Stevens v. Kelley, 78 Me. 
 N. E. 848. 445, 6 Atl. 868, 57 Am. Rep. 813. 
 
 77. Turner v. Nye, 154 Mass. 579, Massachusetts. — Paine v. Woods, 
 28 N. E. 1048, 14 L. R. A. 487, and 108 Mass. 160. 
 
 supra, § 84. New York.— In re Brookfleld, 176 
 
 78. Jordan v. Woodvs^ard, 40 Me. ■ N. Y. 138, 68 N. E. 138. 
 
 317. 80. Cowell v. Thayer, 5 Met 
 
 79. niinois. — Washington Ice Co. (Mass.) 253. 
 V. Shortall, 101 111. 46, 40 Am. Rep. 
 
 196 ; Brooklyn v. Smith, 104 111. 429, 
 44 Am. Rep. 90. 
 
616 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 §201 
 
 continues,*^ since, on account of the necessity of protecting 
 the purity of the water, a concurrent use by the former 
 owner would not be desirable. The interest taken for the 
 purpose of laying pipes is less extensive, and amounts 
 only to an easement,^^ which does not interfere very seri- 
 ously with occupation by the owner of the f ee,^* except that 
 he can do nothing to interfere with the support of the 
 pipes.^* 
 
 When a private body of water is taken for a public water 
 supply, the owners retain such riparian rights as do not 
 tend to pollute the water.®' It has been held that a riparian 
 owner may continue to maintain a mill,*® but this would 
 depend largely upon local conditions; and similarly there 
 is a conflict of authority, whether the riparian owners can 
 
 81. United States. — Wood v. Mo- 
 bile, 47 C. C. A. 9, 107 Fed. 846. 
 
 California. — Los Angeles v. Pom- 
 eroy, 124 Oal. 597, 57 Pac. 585. 
 
 Idaho. — Idaho-Iowa Lateral & 
 Reservoir Co. v. Fisher, 27 Idaho 
 695, 151 Pac. 998. 
 
 Kansas. — Dillon v. Kansas City, 
 etc., K. R. Co., 67 Kan. 687, 74 Pac. 
 251. 
 
 Maine. — Wright v. Woodcock, 86 
 Me. 113, 29 Atl. 533, 25 L. R. A. 499. 
 
 Massacliusetts. — Newton v. Perry, 
 163 Mass. 319, 39 N. B. 1032; Flagg 
 V. Concord, 222 Mass. 569, 111 N. E. 
 369. 
 
 New York. — Re Amsterdam Water 
 Commissioners, 96 N. T. 351. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Finn v. Provi- 
 dence Gas & Water Co., 99 Pa. 631 ; 
 Reading v. Davis, 153 Pa. 360, 26 
 Atl. 62. 
 
 Washington. — Reichling v. Cov- 
 ington Lumber Co., 57 Wash. 225, 
 106 Pac. 777, 135 Am. St. Rep. 976. 
 
 When land is taken for a pump- 
 ing station the owner may first cut 
 the timber. Gardner v. Brookllne, 
 127 Mass. 858. 
 
 It has been held that the Interest 
 in land taken by a city for water 
 supply purposes may even include 
 the right to enter upon adjacent 
 land. Tower v. Boston, 10 Cush. 
 (Mass.) 235. 
 
 But when it is not necessary that 
 a water company have the fee to 
 
 carry out the purposes of the stat- 
 ute, it acquires only an easement. 
 Attorney-General v. Jamaica Pond 
 Aqueduct Co., 133 Mass. 361, 364. 
 
 82. Harback v. Boston, 10 Cush. 
 (Mass.) 295; Re Thompson, 57 Hun 
 (N. Y.) 419, 10 N. T. Supp. 705. 
 
 83. Thus a telephone for the sole 
 use of the water department is an 
 additional servitude upon land 
 through which the right to lay 
 pipes for a municipal water supply 
 has been taken. Spokane v. Colby, 
 16 Wash. 610, 48 Pac. 248. When 
 the easement to lay and maintain 
 an underground conduit has been 
 taken, the owner of the fee may 
 erect reasonable structures above 
 the conduit. Perley v. Cambridge, 
 220 Mass. 507, 512, 108 N. B. 494. 
 
 84. Rockland Water Co. v. Tell- 
 son, 75 Me. 170; and so of gas 
 pipes. Pennsylvania Gas Coal Co. v. 
 Versailles Fuel Gas Co., 131 Pa. 
 522, 19 Atl. 933. 
 
 85. Kansas. — Parsons's Water Co. 
 V. Knapp, 33 Kan. 752, 7 Pac. 568. 
 
 Maryland. — Kane v. Baltimore, 15 
 Md. 240. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Dwight Printing 
 Co. v. Boston, 122 Mass. 583; Mar- 
 tin V. Gleason, 139 Mass. 451, 29 
 N. E. 664; Fosgate v. Hudson, 178 
 Mass. 225, 59 N. E. 809. 
 
 86. Dwight Printing Co. v. Bos- 
 ton, 122 Mass. 58b. 
 
§ 202 
 
 Other Public Easements. 
 
 617 
 
 lawfully cut ice from waters which have been taken for a 
 public supply.8T According to the sounder rule, the taking 
 of a particular body of water for a public water supply 
 does not extinguish the riparian rights of the owners upon 
 this body or its tributaries, unless provision is made for 
 compensation.** 
 
 § 202. Parks, Public Buildings and Other Public Uses. 
 
 It is generally conceded that the interest acquired by the 
 public in a park is broad and substantially exclusive, but 
 whether it constitutes a fee or not appears to be a disputed 
 question. It is held by the weight of authority that a fee 
 is taken for a park without even a possibility of reverter 
 in case the land ceases to be used for park purposes,*® but 
 the view that a park is only an easement is not without 
 
 87. Held that they can cut ice In 
 Rockport V. Webster, 174 Mass. 385, 
 54 N. E. 852. But see Wright v. 
 Woodcock, 86 Me. 113, 29 Atl. 533, 
 25 L. R. A. 499, contra, and Dillon 
 V. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 67 
 Kan. 687, 74 Pac. 251, holding that 
 a railroad company which had con- 
 demned the easement of maintain- 
 ing a pond to store water for op- 
 erating its engines might cut and 
 sell the ice. 
 
 88. Supra, § 147. 
 
 89. Thus in Driscoll v. New Ha- 
 ven, 75 Conn. 92, 52 Atl. 618, the 
 court said, " The uses for which a 
 public park is acquired are con- 
 tinuous and peculiarly exclusive. 
 They are inconsistent, and must 
 ever be inconsistent, with the exist- 
 ence and exercise of any of the in- 
 cidents of private ownership 
 therein. They are Inconsistent with 
 the enjoyment of private rights, 
 whether upon the surface of the 
 ground thereof, or to the highest 
 heavens above, or the lowest earth 
 beneath. The idea of a public park 
 implies more than a use by the pub- 
 lic which is susceptible of co-ex- 
 istence with a private right capable 
 of concurrent exercise. The exist- 
 ence of a park implies the probabil- 
 
 ity of improvements and transfor- 
 mations, oftentimes extensive and 
 costly, and which in the nature of 
 things must be undisturbed. It im- 
 plies something more than the right 
 of public passage, however fre- 
 quent and exclusive. The right of 
 access in the capacity of owner is 
 an essential incident of beneficial 
 ownership. Without it there can be 
 no enjoyment. This right of ac- 
 cess incident to ownership cannot be 
 preserved to the original landowner 
 where it is swallowed up in the 
 oftentimes large tracts of public 
 parks, or whenever land contigu- 
 ous to the particular piece is not 
 retained by him." See also, 
 
 Massachusetts. — Hellen v. Med- 
 ford, 188 Mass. 42, 73 N. E. 1070, 69 
 L. R. A. 314, 108 Am. St. Rep. 459; 
 Higginson v. Boston, 212 Mass. 583, 
 591, 99 N. E. 523, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 215. 
 
 New York. — Brooklyn Park Com- 
 missioners V. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 
 234, 6 Am. Rep. 70; In re Buffalo, 
 148 App. Div. 384, 132 N. T. Supp. 
 926, 133 N. T. Supp. 1115. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Clarke v. Provi- 
 dence, 16 R. I. 337, 15 Atl. 736, 1 
 L. R. A. 725. 
 
618 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 203 
 
 support.'" When part of a stream is taken for park pur- 
 poses, no right to use the water more injuriously than any 
 other owner might use it is acquired by the public, and 
 consequently nothing is taken from the proprietors on the 
 stream above or below the park.®* 
 
 For public buildings, ordinarily the fee is taken,®^ but for 
 other public uses only an easement.®^ 
 
 § 203. Change of the Public Easement. 
 
 The cases in which the original use for which the land 
 was taken has been continued and some additional burden 
 imposed have been discussed in the preceding pages. It 
 sometimes becomes expedient to abandon the original use 
 and to substitute a different one. The owner of the fee, 
 who has received compensation for a perpetual easement 
 in the land, is in no position to require that the public use 
 continue precisely the same, or that it be operated by the 
 same public agent. If the new use is no more onerous than 
 the old, and is substituted for it by the same act which dis- 
 continues the old, he is not entitled to any compensation 
 for a change which did not in fact cause damage; if it is 
 more onerous, he is entitled to recover compensation for 
 the increase in the burden only ; provided, in both instances, 
 that the two uses are of the same general nature. Apply- 
 ing these principles, the owner of the fee is not entitled to 
 recover at all if a turnpike is changed to a public high- 
 
 90. Newton v. Manufacturers K. it was held that the fee was not 
 R. Ck)., 53 C. C. A. 599, 115 Fe<J. taken for a schoolhouse. 
 
 783 ; Eeed v. Winona Park Commis- 93. Thus in McCarty v. Southern 
 
 sioners, 100 Minn. 167, 110 N. W. Pacific R. R. Co., 148 Cal. 220, 82 
 
 1119; Lyford v. Laconia, 75 N. H. Pac. 615, it was held that the fee 
 
 220, 72 Atl. 1085, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) was not taken for a levee. In 
 
 1062. Belcher's Sugar Refining Co. v. St. 
 
 91. Proprietors of Mills v. Com- Louis Grain Elevator Co., 101 Mo. 
 monwealth, 164 Mass. 227, 41 N. E. 192, 13 S. W. 822, 8 L. R. A. 801 it 
 280. was assumed that a public wharf 
 
 92. Eighth School District v. Cope- was an easement, but it was held 
 land, 2 Gray (Mass.) 414; In re that a public grain elevator was 
 Harlem River Bridge, 174 N. Y. 26, not an additional servitude thereon. 
 66 N. E. 584 ; In re Water Front, 190 A public landing place is an ease- 
 N. Y. 350, 83 N. E. 299. In Lazarus naent only. Gardiner v. Tisdale, 2 
 v. Morris, 212 Pa. 128, 61 Atl. 815, Wis. 253, 60 Am. Dec. 407. 
 
§ 203 
 
 Otheb Pxiblio Easements. 
 
 619 
 
 way,»* or a public highway to a tTiriipike,^^ except that in 
 the latter case the tollhouse is an additional burden.'* A 
 city street is no greater burden than a country road,®'' or 
 an alley ,^^ and a change from a street to a parkway does 
 not entitle the owner of the fee to compensation.®' It has 
 been held that a railroad is no greater burden than a canal,^ 
 but when a railroad is laid out over a former highway,^ 
 turnpike ^ or park,* the owner of the fee must be paid for 
 
 94. Connecticut. — State v. Maine, 
 27 Conn. 641, 71 Am. Dec. 89 ; State 
 V. Suffield, etc., Bridge Co., 81 Conn. 
 56, 70 Atl. 55. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Murray v. Berk- 
 shire County Commissioners, 12 
 Mete. 455. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Pierce v. Som- 
 erswortli, 10 N. H. 369. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Pittsburgti R. R. 
 Co. V. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. 583. 
 
 Ohio. — Chagrin Falls Plank Road 
 Co. V. Cane, 2 Ohio St. 419. 
 
 Tennessee. — Nolensville v. Baker, 
 4 Humph. 315. 
 
 Vermont. — Panton Turnpike Co. 
 V. Bishop, 11 Vt. 198. 
 
 Virginia. — Callison v. Hedrick, 15 
 Gratt. 244. 
 
 95. Indiana. — Stratton v. Elliott, 
 83 Ind. 425 ; Carter v. Clark, 89 Ind. 
 238. 
 
 Maryland. — Douglass v. Boons- 
 borough Turnpike Co., 22 Md. 219, 
 85 Am. Dec. 647. 
 
 Missouri. — State v. Hannibal, 
 etc.. Road Co., 138 Mo. 332, 39 S. W, 
 910, 36 L. R. A. 457. 
 
 New Jersey. — Wright v. Carter, 27 
 N. J. L. 76. 
 
 New York, — Walker v. Caywood, 
 31 N. Y. 51. 
 
 Texas. — Jones v. Keith, 37 Tex. 
 399, 14 Am. Rep. 382. 
 
 96. Stratton v. Elliott, 83 Ind. 
 425; Wright v. Carter, 27 N. J. L. 
 76. 
 
 97. Huddleston v. Eugene, 34 Ore. 
 343, 55 Pac. 868, 43 L. B. A. 444. A 
 conveyance of property by a city to 
 Its sinking fund commissioners to be 
 
 used for the purpose for which it 
 was taken is not an abandonment. 
 Curran v. Louisville, 147 Ky. 592, 
 144 S. W. 1057. 
 
 98. Fagan v. Chicago, 84 111. 227. 
 
 99. Krelgh v. Chicago, 86 111. 407. 
 
 1. Chase v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 
 Cush. (Mass.) 152 ; Richards v. Cin- 
 cinnati, 31 Ohio St. 506. Contra, 
 Lafayette, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mur- 
 dock, 68 Ind. 137; Hatch v. Cincin- 
 nati, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Ohio St. 92 ; 
 Vought V. Columbus, etc., R. R. Co., 
 58 Ohio St. 123, 50 N. E. 442. 
 
 2. BuUard v. New York, etc., B. 
 R. Co., 178 Mass. 570, 60 N. B. 380 ; 
 Stehr V. Mason City, etc., R. R. Co., 
 77 Nebr. 641, 110 N. W. 701; Suf- 
 folk, etc., Ry. Co. v. West End, etc.. 
 Improvement Co., 137 N. C. 330, 49 
 S. E. 350, 107 Am. St. Rep. 490 ; Ar- 
 kansas Valley R. R. Co. v. Bullen, 
 31 Okla. 36, 119 Pac. 414. So also 
 when a railroad station is con- 
 structed in a public square. Porter 
 V. International Bridge Co., 200 
 N. Y. 234, 93 N. E. 716, 21 Ann. Cas. 
 684. But when a street is vacated 
 and the right of way given to a 
 street railway, the abutter is not 
 entitled to compensation. Tomlin v. 
 Cedar Rapids, etc., R. R. Co., 141 
 Iowa 599, 120 N. W. 93. 
 
 3. Mahon v. New York, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 24 N. Y. 658 ; Mifflin v. Harris- 
 burg, etc., R. R. Co., 16 Pa. 182; 
 Bralnard v. Missisquoi R. R. Co., 48 
 Vt. 107. 
 
 4. Newton v. Manufacturers' Ry. 
 Co., 115 Fed. 781. 
 
620 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 203 
 
 the difference. When a railroad location** or a canaP is 
 laid out as a public highway, no damage is done. In all the 
 above cases the new use is of the same general nature as 
 the old — public travel. It has been held that a public 
 library may be built in a park, for a similar reason.^ 
 
 To establish this immunity from liability the new use 
 must be imposed by the same act which discontinues the old; 
 for, if the public easement is discontinued or abandoned, 
 the land reverts to the owner of the fee free of the ease- 
 ment, and a new public use cannot be subsequently imposed 
 upon it without paying the owner full compensation.® The 
 imposition of a new easement of a different nature from 
 the old one, and wholly inconsistent with it, amounts to an 
 abandonment of the old easement, and the owner of the 
 fee is entitled to compensation as if his land was unencum- 
 bered,® and the same rule applies when the new use is a 
 private one.^** 
 
 5. Farwell v. Boston, 180 Mass. 
 433, 62 N. E. 751 ; Brinkley v. South- 
 ern Ey. Co., 185 N. C. 654, 47 S. E. 
 791. But see Heard v. Brooklyn, 60 
 N. Y. 242, and see also State v. 
 Spokane County Court, 55 Wash. 64, 
 104 Pac. 148, holding that a railroad 
 company could not convey land ac- 
 quired by condemnation for its own 
 use for railroad purposes to a city 
 to be used for different purposes. 
 
 6. Malone v. Toledo, 28 Ohio St. 
 643. 
 
 7. Laird v. Pittsburg, 205 Pa. 1, 
 54 Atl. 324, 61 L. R. A. 332. So 
 also a subway entrance, Oodman v. 
 Crocker, 203 Mass. 146, 89 N. E. 177, 
 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 980, and the 
 state may authorize the change of 
 waterworks to a park as a use no 
 more burdensome. Torrence v. 
 Charlotte, 163 N. C. 562, 80 S. E. 53. 
 But the public easement is lost by 
 the change of a cemetery to a park. 
 Campbell v. Kansas City, 102 Mo. 
 326, 13 S. W. 897, 10 L. R. A. 593. 
 
 8. Indicma. — Miller v. Cincinnati, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 43 Ind. App. 540, 88 
 N. E. 102. 
 
 Iowa. — Remey v. Iowa Central R. 
 R. Co., 116 Iowa 133, 89 N. W. 218. 
 
 Minnesota. — Albert Lea v. Niel- 
 sen, 80 Mmn. 101, 82 N. W. 1104, 81 
 Am. St. Rep. 242. 
 
 New Yorh. — Heard v. Brooklyn, 
 60 N. Y. 242. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Pittsburgh, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Bruch, 102 Pa. 23. 
 
 9. Newton v. Manufacturers' Ry. 
 Co., 113 Fed. 781; Suffolk, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. West End, etc., Improvement 
 Co., 137 N. C. 330, 49 S. E."350, 107 
 Am. St. Rep. 490; Hatch v. Cincin- 
 nati, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Ohio St 92. 
 
 10. Lucas V. Ashland Light, etc., 
 Co., 92 Nebr. 550, 138 N. W. 761; 
 Paterson v. Kearny, 84 N. J. L. 456, 
 87 Atl. 103; Neitzel v. Spokane In- 
 ternational Ry. Co., 65 Wash. 100, 
 117 Pac. 864, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 522. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 The Constitutional Right to Compensation. 
 
 Section 204. The Basis of the Right to Compensation. 
 
 205. Compensation must be in Money. 
 
 206. The Right to Compensation must be Unconditional. 
 
 207. EfEect of Tailure to Provide Compensation. 
 
 208. Just Compensation is what the Owner has Lost, not what 
 
 the Condemning Party has Gained. 
 
 209. Compensation need not be Paid in Advance. 
 
 210. When Property is Taken by the Public. 
 
 211. When Property is Taken by a Private Corporation. 
 
 212. Special Constitutional Ptovisions. 
 
 213. Application of the Special Constitutional Provisions. 
 
 214. Compensation in Advance not Required when no Property is 
 
 Taken. 
 
 215. Possibility of Denial of Liability. 
 
 216. Interest. 
 
 § 204. The Basis of the Right to Compensation. 
 
 It is now well settled law in every portion of the United 
 States that, when private property is taken by eminent 
 domain, the owner of the property is constitutionally 
 entitled to compensation.* The obligation of making com- 
 pensation is now in terms annexed to the power of eminent 
 
 1. United States. — Monongahela Iowa. — Dinwiddle v. Roberts, 1 
 
 Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 Greene 363 ; De Castello v. Cedar 
 
 U. S. 312, 37 L. ed. 463. Rapids, 153 N. W. 353. 
 
 Alabama. — Smith v. Inge, 80 Ala. Kansas. — Hunt v. Smith, 9 Kan. 
 
 283. 
 
 137. 
 
 Arkansas.— Ex parte Martin, 13 Kentucky.— FoTsy the v. Ellis, 4 
 
 Ark 198. 58 Am. Dec. 321. J- J- Marshall 298, 20 Am. Dec. 218. 
 
 California.— McCaxdey v. Weller, Louisiana.— 3 e&eiaon Police Jury 
 
 12 Cal. 500; Scott v. Dyer, 54 Cal. v. D'Helnefourt, 7 Rob. 509. 
 
 430; Colusa County v. Hudson, 85 ^^atne.- Spvmg v. Russell, 7 Me. 
 
 Cal. 633, 24 Pac 791. _„ ... Marvland.—America.n Tel., etc., 
 
 Flor^<la.-Uoo^yv. Jacksonville, ^^ ^_ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ 
 
 etc., R. R. Co., 20 Fla. 597. gjg^ 7 j^ ^ ^ gOO 
 
 Georgia.- PzvhB^m v. Decatur Massachusetts.- Ferry v. Wilson, 
 
 County Court, 9 Ga. 341. 7 m^ss. 393; Thatcher v. Dart- 
 
 /JJinois.— Norton v. Studley, 17 mo„th Bridge Co., 18 Pick 501- 
 
 111. 556 ; Wabash R. R. Co. v. Coon Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Salem! 
 
 Run Drainage, etc., Dist., 194 111. etc., R. R. Co., 2 Gray 1; Drury v! 
 
 310, 62 N. B. 679. Midland R. R. Co., 127 Mass. 571 ; 
 
 Indiana. — Evansville, etc., E. R. Wheelwright v. Boston, 188 Mass. 
 
 Co. V. Dick, 9 Ind. 433. 521, 74 N. E. 937. 
 
 [621] 
 
622 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 204 
 
 domain by the constitution of every state except North 
 Carolina, and is recognized by the courts of the latter 
 state. It was at first held in some of the states which had 
 not adopted the provision specifically requiring compen- 
 sation that the individual has a fundamental right to com- 
 pensation when his land is taken for the public use, which 
 the legislature is bound by unwritten restrictions to 
 respect,^ but as the modern and sounder tendency to disre- 
 gard restrictions not found in the constitution made itself 
 felt, the right to compensation was ascribed to the clause 
 of the declaration of rights which provided that no person 
 
 Michigan. — People v. Detroit, etc., 
 K. R. Co., 79 Mich. 471, 44 N. W. 
 934, 7 L. R. A. 717. 
 
 Minnesota. — United States v. Min- 
 nesota, etc., R. B. Co., 1 Minn. 127. 
 
 Mississipppi. — Donnaher v. State, 
 8 Sm. & M. 649. 
 
 Missouri. — Kansas City, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Farrell, 76 Mo. 183. 
 
 Nebraska. — Johnson v. Peterson, 
 85 Nebr. 83, 122 N. W. 683. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Abbott v. Stew- 
 artstown, 47 N. H. 228. 
 
 New Jersey. — Cherry v. Keyport, 
 52 N. J. L. 544, 20 Atl. 970. 
 
 New York. — Gardner v. Newburgh, 
 2 Johns. Ch. 167, 7 Am. Dec. 526. 
 
 North Carolina. — Beaufort County 
 Commissioners v. Bonner, 153 N. C. 
 66, 68 S. E. 970. 
 
 Ohio. — Watson v. Pleasant, 21 
 Ohio St. 667. 
 
 Oklahoma. — Southern Kansas Ry. 
 Co. V. Oklahoma City, 12 Okla. 82, 
 69 Pac. 1050. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — In re Sharett's 
 Road, 8 Pa. 89. 
 
 Rhode Island. — East Shore Land 
 Co. V. Peckham, 33 R. I. 541, 82 Atl. 
 487. 
 
 South Carolina. — Bird v. Wilming- 
 ton, etc., R. R. Co., 8 Rich. Eq. 46, 
 64 Am. Dec. 739. 
 
 Tennessee. — Frater v. Hannibal 
 County, 90 Tenn. 661, 19 S. W. 233. 
 
 Texas. — Watkins v. Walker 
 County, 18 Tex. 585, 70 Am. Dec. 
 
 298 ; Hamilton County v. Garrett, 62 
 Tex. 602. 
 
 Vermont. — Foster v. Stafford Na- 
 tional Bank, 57 Vt. 128. 
 
 Virginia. — Commonwealth v. Nor- 
 folk, etc., Ry. Co., Ill Va. 59, 68 
 S. B. 351. 
 
 Washington. — Olson v. Seattle, 30 
 Wash. 687, 71 Pac. 201. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Shepardson v. Mil- 
 waukee, etc., R. R. Co., 6 Wis. 605. 
 
 2. United States. — Bonaparte v. 
 Camden, etc., R. R. Co., Baldw. 220. 
 
 Arkansas. — Em parte Martin, 13 
 Ark. 198; Cairo, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Turner, 31 Ark. 497. 
 
 Georgia. — Young v. McKenzie, 3 
 Kelly 31; Parham v. Decatur 
 County Justices, 9 Ga. 341; Lough- 
 bridge V. Harris, 42 Ga. 500. 
 
 Maryland. — Harness v. Chesa- 
 peake, etc., R. R. Co., 1 Md. Ch. 
 248. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Bristol v. New 
 Chester, 3 N. H. 534; Piscataqua 
 Bridge v. New Hampshire Bridge, 7 
 N. H. 35. 
 
 New Jersey. — Sinnickson v. John- 
 son, 17 N. J. L. 129, 34 Am. Dec. 
 184; Re Public Highway in Bergin 
 & Hudson Counties, 22 N. J. L. 298. 
 
 New York. — Gardner v. New- 
 burgh, 2 Johns. 162, 7 Am. Dec. 
 526 ; Bradshaw v. Rogers, 20 Johns. 
 103. 
 
 North Carolina. — Johnson v. Ran- 
 kin, 70 N. C. 550. 
 
§ 204 The Constitutionax, Eight to Compensation, 623 
 
 should be deprived of his property but by the law of the 
 land.^ 
 
 The fifth amendment to the constitution of the United 
 States prohibits the taking of private property for public 
 use without just compensation, but the restriction of this 
 amendment applies only to the federal government. The 
 fourteenth amendment however throws the protection of 
 the federal courts over an individual whose property is 
 sought to be taken by authority of a state without com- 
 pensation ; such a deprivation would not be by due process 
 of law.* 
 
 There has been much discussion of the question whether 
 the obligation to make compensation is an essential part 
 of the power of eminent domain, so that the taking of prop- 
 erty for public use without compensation is not an exercise 
 of eminent domain at all, or whether the obligation to make 
 compensation is a condition imposed upon the exercise of 
 the power in all well ordered communities.^ The latter, is 
 now generally accepted as the sounder view,® and it cer- 
 tainly has historical corroboration. It was customary in 
 several of the middle and southern colonies during the 
 
 3. Staton v. Norfolk, etc., R. R. right of the state to take springs 
 Co., Ill N. C. 278, 16 S. E. 181, 17 from a different source, viz., a ne- 
 L. R. A. 838; Phillips v. Postal Tel. 'Cessity of government. These two, 
 Cable Co., 130 N. C. 513, 41 S. E. therefore, have not the same origin ; 
 1022, 89 Am. St. Rep. 868 ; Beaufort they do not come, for instance, from 
 County Commissioners v. Bonner, any implied contract between the 
 153 N. C. 66, 68 S. E. 970. See also state and the individual, that the 
 supra, § 24. former shall have the property, if 
 
 4. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chi- it will make compensation ; the right 
 cago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979 ; is no mere right of pre-emption, and 
 Scott V. Toledo, 86 Fed. 385, 1 it has no condition of compensation 
 L. R. A. 688; Newburyport Water annexed to it, either precedent or 
 Co. V. Newburyport, 85 Fed. 727 ; subsequent. But there is a right to 
 Pacific Tel., etc., Co. v. Eshleman, take, and attached to it as an inci- 
 166 Cal. 640, 137 Pac. 119, 50 dent, an obligation to make com- 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 652. See also pensation; this latter, morally 
 supra, § 24. speaking, follows the other, indeed, 
 
 5. The best discussion of this sub- like a shadow, but it is yet distinct 
 ject is found in Thayer's Cases on from it, and flows from another 
 Constitutional Law, Vol. I. p. 953, source." 
 
 in which it is said, in part " But 6. Long Island Water Supply Co. 
 
 while this obligation [to make com- v. Brooklyn, 166 V. S. 685, 41 L. ed. 
 
 pensation] is thus well established 1165; Weeks v. Grace, 194 Mass. 
 
 and clear, let it be particularly no- 296, 298, 80 N. B. 220 ; Common- 
 
 tlced upon what ground it stands, wealth v. Plymouth Coal Co., 232 
 
 viz., upon the natural rights of the Pa. 141, 81 Atl. 148. 
 Individual. On the other hand, the 
 
624 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 204 
 
 early years of tlieir existence to take land for highways 
 without compensation,^ and while in some instances this 
 practice was justified by a right reserved, in. all grants of 
 lands from the colonial proprietors, in others it had na 
 justification other than that it was the established practice 
 in communities in which the land was of slight value and 
 the need of new roads great. This practice continued in 
 some parts of the country even after the Eevolution.* 
 Even now in some instances all land of a certain character 
 is held subject to the right of the public to use it for speci- 
 fied purposes without compensation. Thus in Louisiana 
 all riparian land is subject to the right of the state to build 
 levees upon it without compensation,** and in Texas a lessee 
 of school lands is not entitled to compensation when cattle 
 are driven through," So also in all jurisdictions sub- 
 merged lands under navigable waters may be taken by 
 public authority for the improvement of navigation with- 
 out compensation to the owner.^^ 
 
 Many of the state constitutions require that the com- 
 pensation shall be "just," " reasonable " or " adequate; " 
 but these words are mere epithets rather than qualifica- 
 tions and add nothing to the meaning. ^^ Several of the 
 states have imposed restrictions upon the manner and 
 time of making compensation, and these will be considered 
 later.^* 
 
 7. New Jersey. — Re Public High- out af private ways, no sueli provi- 
 
 way in Bergen & Hudson Counties, sion was made in the case of public 
 
 22 N. J. L. 293 ; Simmons v. Passaic, ways. General Laws of Colony of 
 
 42 N. J. L. 619; Mangles v. Hudson New Plymouth (1671), Ch. IX. 
 
 County Freeholders, 55 N. J. L. 88, 8. See the South Carolina cases In 
 
 25 Atl. 322, 17 L. R. A. 785. the preceding note. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Commonwealth v. 9. Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U. S, 
 
 Fisher, 1 Pa. 466 ; Wagner v. Salz- 452, 40 L. ed. 490 ; Overton v. United 
 
 burg, 132 Pa. 636, 19 Atl. 294. States, 45 Ct. CI. 17 ; MitthofC v. Car- 
 
 South Carolina. — Stark v. Mc- roUton, 12 La. Ann. 185; Peart v. 
 
 Gowen, 1 Nott & McC. 389 ; Patrick Meeker, 45 La. Ann. 421. See also 
 
 V. Charleston Neck Cross Roads supra, §§ 90, 138. 
 
 Commissioners, 4 McCord L. 541; 10. Bugby, etc., Co. v. Matador, 
 
 State V. Dawson, 3 Hill L. 100. etc., Co., 26 Tex. Civ. App. 260, 63 
 
 Virginia. — Stokes v. Upper Ap- S. W. 914. 
 
 pomatox Co., 3 Leigh 337; Tucka- 11. Supra, § 139. 
 
 hoe Canal Co. v. Tuckahoe R. R. 12. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 
 
 Co., 11 Leigh 42, 36 Am. Dec. 374. 40 L. ed. 188; Virginia, etc., R. E. 
 
 So also in the colony of New Ply- Co. v. Henry, 8 Nev. 171 
 
 mouth, while compensation was pro- 13. Infra, § 212. 
 vided for in the case of the laying 
 
§ 205 The CoNSTrruTiosrAL RIght to Comfensation. 625 
 
 § 205. Compensation Must Be in Money. 
 
 While the constitutions of the states do not ordinarily 
 prescribe the medium by which compensation shall be paid, 
 that the compensation must be in money is a qualification 
 that has been read into the phrase now under consideration 
 by all the courts in which the question has arisen. Statutes 
 providing that the person whose land is taken shall accept 
 stock or bonds, or municipal warrants which the holder 
 could enforce only by a suit at law, if not paid, have been 
 unhesitatingly held invalid." A right to use the improve- 
 ment for which the land is taken cannot be tendered as 
 compensation.^^ So also the owner cannot be compelled to 
 accept other lands as compensation, even if they are equally 
 valuable.^® When, however, it is desired to diminish the 
 amount of the money to be paid by yielding to the owner 
 certain rights in the property taken or by providing that 
 the condemning party shall perform some service for him, 
 closer questions may arise. If a definite taking has been 
 actually made, or the relations of the parties are irre- 
 vocably fixed by the petition and the adjudication of the 
 right to condemn, the condemning party cannot mitigate 
 the damages by offering to stipulate to use the property 
 to a less extent than the easement taken would justify, or 
 to grant back certain rights or easements in the property 
 
 14. Thus payment cannot be made Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304, 1 
 in stock or bonds of the corporation L- ed. 391. 
 
 (Hamilton v. Annapolis, etc., R. B. California.— Beveridge v. Lewla, 
 
 Co., lMd.Ch. 107; Martin V.Tyler, 137 Cal. 619, 70 Pac. 1083, 59 
 
 4 N D. 278, 60 N. W. 392, 25 ^- K. A. 581, 92 Am. St. Eep. 188. 
 
 L. R. A. 838), or in canal scrip Massachusetts.-Gommonvfe^ltbY. 
 
 yc^ 4. -a „i ,-.,„ Q Tji„r.irc /•Tv.^ ^ Peters, 2 Mass. 125; Hellen v. Med- 
 (State V. Beackms, 8 Blackf. (Ind ) ' 
 
 246), or m interest-bearmg certifi- l t? a 314 
 
 cates of a municipal corporation ' Missouri.- Chicago, etc., B. B. 
 
 (CaldweU V. Highway Commission- ^ McGrew, 104 Mo. 283, 15 
 
 ers, 249 111. 366, 94 N. E. 490, Butlei- g_ ^ gg^ 
 
 V. Sewer Commissioners, 39 N.J.L. 'North Dakota.— Ma.Ttia v. Tyler, 
 
 665). 4 N. D. 278, 60 N. W. 392, 25 L. R. A. 
 
 15. When a railroad is taken for 838_ 
 
 use by a municipal corporation, South Carolina.— Groce v. Green- 
 running rights cannot be tendered ville, etc., By. Co., 94 S. C. 199, 78 
 as compensation. State v. King s. B. 888. 
 
 County Court, 77 Wash. 593, 138 Wisconsin. — Jeffery v. Chicago, 
 
 Pac. 277. etc., R. R. Co., 138 Wis. 1, 119 N. W. 
 
 16. United States.— Yan Home's 879. 
 
 40 
 
626 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 205 
 
 as a partial compensation," or to build something for the 
 owner to replace a convenience that he has lost.^* On the 
 other hand, it is open to the public agency that makes the 
 taking to limit the extent of the taking to the precise ease- 
 ment required, and the rights that are thereby left to the 
 owner he does not receive payment for." If, by the local 
 substantive law, the condemning party may decrease the 
 character or extent of the taking by an amendment of its 
 petition or by a stipulation filed in court after the adjudi- 
 cation of the right to condemn or even after the hearing 
 on damages has begun, the damages may be reduced by 
 
 17. Illinois. — Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Springfield, etc., R. R. Co., 67 
 111. 142; Carpenter v. Jennings, 77 
 111. 250. 
 
 Indiana. — Indianapolis, etc., Trac- 
 tion Co. V. Wiles, 174 Ind. 236, 91 
 N. E. 161; Louisville, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Western Union Tel. Co., 110 
 N. E. 70. 
 
 Iowa. — Klopp V. Chicago, etc., R. 
 R. Co., 142 Iowa 474, 119 N. W. 373. 
 
 Louisiana. — New Orleans, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Murrell, 34 La. Ann. 536. 
 
 Maryland. — Brack v. Baltimore, 
 125 Md. 378, 93 Atl. 994. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Commonwealth v. 
 Peters, 2 Mass. 125 ; Ham v. Salem, 
 100 Mass. 350. 
 
 Michigan. — Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Munson, 57 Mich. 42, 23 N. W. 
 445. 
 
 Missouri. — Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. McGrew, 104 Mo. 282. 
 
 New York. — Hill v. Mohawk, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 7 N. Y. 152; In re Sim- 
 mons, 206 N. T. 577, 100 N. E. 455. 
 
 Ohio.— Central Ohio R. R. Co. v. 
 Holler, 7 Ohio St. 220; Grant v. 
 Hyde Park, 67 Ohio St. 166, 65 
 N. E. 891. 
 
 Oregon. — Pacific, etc., Navigation 
 Co. V. Elmore Packing Co., 60 Ore. 
 534, 120 Pac. 389. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Pittsburgh, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Rose, 74 Pac. 362. 
 
 West Virginia. — Chesapeake, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Patton, 6 W. Va. 147; 
 Chesapeake, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hal- 
 stead, 7 W. Va. 301. 
 
 18. United States. — St. Francis 
 
 Levee District v. Webb, 110 C. C. A. 
 137, 188 Fed. 67. 
 
 Colorado. — Burlington, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Schweikart, 10 Colo. 178, 14 
 Pac. 329; Von Richthofen v. Bijou 
 Irrigation District, 52 Col. 527, 125 
 Pac. 495. 
 
 Illinois. — Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Melville, 66 111. 329. 
 
 Louisiana. — New Orleans, etc., 
 Ry. Co. V. Munell, 34 La. Ann. 536. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Old Colony Rail- 
 road V. Miller, 125 Mass. 1, 28 Am. 
 Rep. 194. 
 
 Michigan. — Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Munson, 57 Mich. 42, 23 N. W. 
 455. 
 
 Missouri. — St. Louis, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Clark, 121 Mo. 169, 25 S. "W. 
 192, 906, 26 L. R. A. 751. 
 
 Texas. — Pochila v. Calvert, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 31 Tex. Civ. App. 398, 72 
 S. W. 255; Byrd Irrigation Co. v. 
 Smith (Tex. Civ. App.), 157 S. "W. 
 260. 
 
 West Virginia. — Chesapeake, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Patton, 6 W. Va. 147. 
 
 Wisconsin. — JefEery v. Chicago, 
 etc., Ry. Co., 138 Wis. 1, 119 N. W. 
 879. 
 
 19. Ham v. Salem, 100 Mass. 350, 
 and see also infra, § 225. In Dorgan 
 V. Boston, 12 Allen (Mass.) 223, it 
 was held that a statute providing 
 that the value of the portion of the 
 buildings standing or of the materi- 
 als removed be deducted from the 
 damages was not unconstitutional 
 as authorizing payment other than 
 in money. 
 
§ 206 The Constitutional, Bight to Compensation. 627 
 
 sucli amendment or stipulation.*" The result in the latter 
 case is the same as far as both parties are concerned as if 
 the fee had been taken and then certain rights thrust back 
 at the owner as part of the compensation, but the distinc- 
 tion drawn, though one of form rather than substance, is 
 a plain one. 
 
 An unwarranted extension of the principle that compen- 
 sation must be in money is responsible for the doctrine, 
 prevalent in so many states and discussed more at length 
 in a subsequent section,*^ that, when part of a parcel of 
 land is taken for the public use, compensation in money 
 which makes the owner whole does not satisfy the consti- 
 tution, since it may involve the payment for the land taken 
 in benefits to the remaining land. It is however almost 
 everywhere held that an owner whose land has been taken 
 for a public improvement is not exempt from a betterment 
 assessment upon his remaining land based upon the benefit 
 arising from the improvement for which his land was 
 taken, even if the effect of the assessment is to swallow up 
 his whole claim for compensation.*^ There is nevertheless 
 a limit even to this power, and it has been held that a stat- 
 ute providing that the entire sum paid to owners of land 
 taken and the expenses incident to ascertaining the amount 
 payable to each shall be assessed back upon such owners 
 in proportion to their frontage upon the improvement 
 without regard to the actual or proportionate benefit is 
 unconstitutional as denying the owners just compensation.** 
 
 § 206. The Right to Compensation Must Be Unconditional. 
 
 The right of an owner of property taken for the public 
 use to compensation is an absolute one, and it cannot be 
 made subject to conditions.** It is even held in some juris- 
 dictions that payment cannot be made conditional upon the 
 
 20. Pinkstaff v. Allison Ditch Dis- 22. Infra, § 255. 
 
 trict, 213 111. 186, 72 N. E. 715 
 
 Smitli V. Claussen Park Drainage 1 L. E. A. 688 
 
 District, 229 111. 155, 82 N. E. 278 
 Wuester v. Topeka, etc., R. K. Co., 
 85 Kan. 636, 118 Pac. 1054; Olym 
 
 23. Scott V. Toledo, 36 Fed. 385, 
 
 24. Thus when the owner is enti- 
 tled to compensation by the consti- 
 tution, he cannot be required to 
 
 pia Light & Power Co. v. Harris, 58 present a duplicate of the map 
 
 Wash. 410, 108 Pac. 940. served on him. Hilflnger v. State, 
 
 21. Infra, § 253. > 208 N. Y. 572, 101 N. E. 878. 
 
628 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 207 
 
 owner's application for the same.^^ It is held however in 
 most jurisdictions that it is not imposing a condition in 
 the objectionable sense to require the owner of property 
 which has been taken for the public use, if he desires com- 
 pensation, to apply for it within a designated time,^® and 
 to prove his title to the property ^^ and the fact that the 
 property had some pecuniary value.^® That the owner has 
 an unconditional constitutional right to compensation has 
 bowever always to be considered, and he cannot be treated 
 as an ordinary litigant.^^ 
 
 § 207. Effect of Failure to Provide Compensation. 
 
 A statute which authorizes the taking of land for a par- 
 ticular public improvement and makes no adequate pro- 
 vision for the ascertainment and payment of compensation 
 is not necessarily absolutely void, for the site of the 
 improvement may be acquired by purchase;^** but that 
 portion of the statute which authorizes the exercise of 
 aninent domain is void, and the land owner has the same 
 rights against any person interfering with his property 
 under color of such authority as if the statute did not exist 
 at all.^^ An attempted taking by virtue of such a statute 
 cannot be the basis of a claim for damages as for land law- 
 fully appropriated to the public use,^^ and it cannot be 
 validated by a subsequent curative act which makes an 
 adequate provision for compensation.^^ 
 
 25. Infra, §§ 330, 344, 372. stltutlon of the state, as It negatives 
 
 26. Infra, § 344. an Intention in tlie legislature that 
 
 27. Infra, § 428. the land was to be acquired by pri- 
 
 28. Infra, § 432. vate contract, the whole statute will 
 
 29. See for example the subject of be treated as void. Martin v. Tyler, 
 costs, infra, § 343. 4 N. D. 278, 60 N. W. 392, 25 
 
 30. Carbon Coal & Mining Co. v. L. R. A. 838. 
 
 Drake, 26 Kan. 345. See also Com- 31.' Boston, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 
 monwealth v. Norfolk, etc., Ry. Co., Salem, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Gray 
 
 111 Va. 59, 68 S. E. 351, holding (Mass.) 1 ; Piscataqua Bridge Co. v. 
 
 that when a statute fails to make New Hampshire Bridge Co., 7 N. H. 
 
 provisions for compensation, the 35; Commonwealth v. Norfolk, etc., 
 
 right to acquire the property which Ry. Co., Ill Va. 59, 68 S. E. 351. 
 
 it provides may be acquired cannot 32. Connecticut River R. R. Go. v. 
 
 be accomplished by the exercise of Franklin County Commissioners, 127 
 
 eminent domain. When however a Mass. 50, 57, 34 Am. Rep. 338. 
 
 statute authorizing the construction 33. Connecticut River R. R. Co. v. 
 
 of a public improvement makes a Franklin County Commissioners, 127 
 
 provision for compensation which Mass. 50, 34 Am. Rep. 338. 
 is not in accordance with the con- 
 
207 The Constittitionai, Eight to Compensation. 629 
 
 It does not necessarily follow that the statute which 
 authorizes the taking must itself provide for compensation. 
 It has frequently been held that when a statute authorizes 
 the exercise of eminent domain in a particular case, and 
 makes no provision as to the manner in which such author- 
 ity is to be exercised, the procedure must conform to the 
 general statutes relating to the exercise of eminent domain 
 for the same purpose.^* It necessarily follows, and has been 
 consistently held, that if a statute authorizing the exercise 
 of eminent domain in a particular case makes no provision 
 for determining and awarding compensation, but the gen- 
 eral statutes relating to the exercise of eminent domain 
 for the same purpose make adequate provision in these 
 particulars, the owner of land taken under the special 
 statute is entitled to the protection of the provisions of the 
 general laws, and the statute is consequently constitutional.^' 
 
 34. Infra, § 375. 
 
 35. In Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20 
 Johns. (N. Y.) 735, It appeared that 
 a statute enacted in 1817 authorized 
 the laying out of a canal, and pro- 
 vided compensation for any injury 
 produced to any individual, by the 
 exercise of this povcer. A statute en- 
 acted in 1820 provided that the 
 canal commissioners might, when 
 necessary on account of interference 
 with the canal, discontinue or alter 
 any part of a public highway and 
 open and construct a new way in 
 substitution therefor, but made no 
 provision for damages. Held: per 
 Kent, Chancellor, an action of tres- 
 pass will not lie against an em- 
 ployee of the canal company who 
 entered upon land taken for a new 
 way being constructed in substitu- 
 tion for an old one. " But the court 
 below consider the absence of any 
 provision in the act of 1820, for 
 compensation to the owner of the 
 land, for damages sustained by such, 
 an alteration of the road, as a still 
 more serious diflBculty in the appli- 
 cation of the statute to the case. It 
 appears to me to be a suflSclent an- 
 swer to this objection, that the act 
 of 1817 had provided the remedy 
 for compensation for every injury 
 committed by the commissioners in 
 
 the execution of their powers; and 
 when new powers are added ♦ ♦ • 
 the same remedy would apply. All 
 statutes, said Lord Mansfield (Doug. 
 30), which are in pari materia, are 
 to be taken together as if they were 
 one law; and, in many instances, a 
 remedy provided by one statute, will 
 be extended to cases arising on the 
 same subject matter under a subse- 
 quent statute. The act of 1820 was 
 only a specification of the course of 
 duty of the commissioners in a par- 
 ticular case ; and it would have been 
 quite unnecessary, and, in my hum- 
 ble opinion, quite idle, to have pro- 
 vided, that the general remedy for 
 all damages occasioned by the exer- 
 cise of any part of the. whole mass 
 of undefined power given by the act 
 of 1817, should apply to a portion 
 of that power exerted in the par- 
 ticular manner provided for by the 
 act of 1820." In Sharett's Road, 8 
 Pa. 89, it appeared that an alley 
 was laid out by virtue of a special 
 act of assembly passed in 1846 au- 
 thorizing and requiring the street 
 and road commissioners of Gettys- 
 burg to lay out a public alley be- 
 tween certain points particularly 
 designated. The court said, "As 
 this act provides no mode for com- 
 pensating the owners of lands ap- 
 
630 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 208 
 
 § 208. Just Compensation is what the Owner has Lost, 
 not what the Condemning Party has Gained. 
 
 The just compensation to which an owner is entitled 
 when his property is taken by eminent domain is regarded 
 by law from the point of view of the owner and not of the 
 condemning party. In other words, just compensation in 
 the constitutional sense is what the owner has lost, and not 
 what the condemning party has gained.^® 
 
 propriated under it to public use, 
 the question is presented whether a 
 remedy is furnished by any of our 
 statutes regulating roads and high- 
 ways. If not, the act itself is in 
 contravention of the constitutional 
 prohibition forbidding the applica- 
 tion of private property to public 
 uses without just compensation be- 
 ing made. But a very short argu- 
 ment will suffice to show it does not 
 occupy this hostile position * * * 
 (Certain cases cited) conclusively 
 settled that the Court of Quarter 
 Sessions of Adams County possess 
 the power under the general road- 
 laws of the commonwealth, to lay 
 out and cause to be opened streets, 
 lanes and alleys within the borough 
 of Gettysburg, and to assess dam- 
 ages therefor. * * • The Court 
 of Quarter Sessions of Adams 
 County being possessed of this juris- 
 diction, the special act of 1846 only 
 interfered with it to the extent of 
 directing the alley to be laid out 
 and opened by the street and road 
 commissioners, instead of a jury of 
 view, acting under the supervision 
 of the court. But this by no means 
 withdrew the case from the general 
 road-law of 1836, providing for the 
 assessment of damages sustained by 
 the owners, nor deprived the court 
 of power to give effect to those 
 provisions." See also to the same 
 effect, 
 
 Kentucky. — Louisville, etc., B. R. 
 Co. V. Louisville, 131 Ky. 108, 114 
 S. W. 743, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1213. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Grimshaw v. Fall 
 River, 160 Mass. 483, 485, 86 N. E. 
 494. 
 
 Minnesota. — Warner v. Hennepin 
 County Commissioners, 9 Minn. 141 ; 
 
 Hurst V. Martinsburg, 50 Minn. 40, 
 42 N. W. 1099. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Smedley v. Irwin, 
 51 Pa. 445. 
 
 Virginia. — Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. 
 Tuckahoe R. R. Co., 11 Leigh' 42, 36 
 Am. Dec. 374. 
 
 36. United States. — Boston Cham- 
 ber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 
 U. S. 189, 54 L. ed. 725; United 
 States V. Chandler-Dunbar Water 
 Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 57 L. ed. 
 1063. 
 
 Georgia. — Elbert County v. Brown, 
 16 Ga. App. 834, 86 S. E. 651. 
 
 Idaho. — Rawson-Worka Lumber 
 Co. V. Richardson, 26 Idaho 37, 141 
 Pac. 74. 
 
 Illinois. — Lambert v. Griffin, 257 
 lU. 152, 100 N. E. 496. 
 
 Iowa. — Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 Snyder, 120 Iowa 532, 95 N. W. 183, 
 8 Am. Elect. Cas. 284. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Boston Chamber 
 of Commerce v. Boston, 195 Mass. 
 338, 81 N. E. 244. 
 
 Missouri. — Grand Ave. Ry. Co. v. 
 People's Ry. Co., 132 Mo. 34, 33 
 S. W. 472, 6 Am. Elect. Cas. 99. 
 
 New York. — In re New York, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 151 App. Div. 50, 135 N. Y. 
 Supp. 234. 
 
 Oregon. — Oregon, etc.. Navigation 
 Co. v. Taffe, 67 Ore. 102, 134 Pac. 
 1024. 
 
 Utah.— Sa.lt Lake City v. East 
 Jordan Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 126, 
 121 Pac. 592. 
 
 Virginia. — Burger v. State Female 
 Normal School, 114 Va. 491, 77 S. E. 
 489. 
 
 See however Baltimore v. Park 
 Land Corporation, 126 Md. 358, 95 
 Atl. 33, in which it is said that Just 
 compensation is the damage to the 
 owner and the benefit to the taker. 
 
§ 209 The Constitutionai, Right to Compensation. 631 
 
 § 209. Compensation need not be Paid in Advance. 
 
 It is well settled in most jurisdictions that, in the absence 
 of a specific requirement in the constitution, compensation 
 need not be paid, or even finally determined, in advance of 
 the taking, provided reasonable, certain and adequate pro- 
 vision is made at the time of appropriation to ascertain 
 and secure the compensation to be made to the owner." 
 
 37. Cherokee Nation v. Kansas 
 Railway Co., 135 U. S. 641, 34 L. ed. 
 295. "The constitution declares 
 that private property shall not be 
 taken ' for public use without just 
 compensation.' It does not provide 
 or require that compensation shall 
 be actually paid in advance of the 
 occupancy of the land to be taken. 
 But the owner is entitled to rea- 
 sonable, certain and adequate pro- 
 vision for obtaining compensation 
 before his occupancy is disturbed. 
 Whether a particular provision be 
 sufficient to secure the compensation 
 to which, under the constitution, he 
 is entitled is sometimes a question 
 of difficulty." Here held that a de- 
 posit of twice the referee's award, 
 pending appeal, was sufficient pro- 
 vision. Backus V. Fort St. Union 
 Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557, 42 L. ed. 
 853. "There can be no doubt that 
 if adequate provision for compensa- 
 tion is made, . authority may be 
 granted for taking possession pend- 
 ing inquiry as to the amount which 
 must be paid, and before any final 
 determination thereof." Williams v. 
 Parker, 188 TJ. S. 491, 47 L. ed. 559, 
 " So far as -the federal constitution 
 is concerned it is settled by repeated 
 decisions that a state may authorize 
 the taking of possession prior to any ' 
 payment or even final determination 
 of the amount of compensation." 
 Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. 
 Bernard Mining Co., 196 TJ. S. 239, 
 49 L. ed. 462. "If the purpose be 
 public the taking may be outright, 
 provided reasonable, certain and 
 adequate provision is made at the 
 time of appropriation to ascertain 
 and secure the compensation to be 
 made to the owner." Haverhill 
 Bridge v. Essex County Commission- 
 ers, 103 Mass. 120, 4 Am. Kep. 518. 
 
 " Payment need not precede the seiz- 
 ure, but the means for securing in- 
 demnity must be such that the 
 owner will be put to no risk or un- 
 reasonable delay." Petition of the 
 United States, 96 N. Y. 227. " The 
 fundamental doctrine, of course, ia 
 that private property cannot be 
 taken for public purposes without 
 just compensation, but this need not 
 be given in all cases concurrently in 
 point of time with the actual exer- 
 cise of the right of eminent domain. 
 It is enough if an adequate and 
 certain remedy is provided whereby 
 the owner of such property may 
 compel payment of his damages. 
 This means reasonable legal cer- 
 tainty." See also to same effect, 
 
 United States. — Sweet v. Rechel, 
 159 U. S. 380, 40 L. ed. 188 ; West- 
 em Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania 
 E. R. Co., 195 U. S. 540, 49 L. ed. 
 312 ; Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktien- 
 gesellschaft, 224 U. S. 290, 56 L. ed. 
 771; Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Gar- 
 land, 25 Fed. 521; De Lucca v. 
 North Little Rock, 142 Fed. 597; 
 Kaw Valley Drainage District v. 
 Metropolitan Water Co., 108 C. C. A. 
 393, 186 Fed. 315 ; United States v. 
 O'Neill, 198 Fed. 677. 
 
 Alahama. — Lowndes County v. 
 Bowie, 34 Ala. 461. 
 
 Arkansas. — Cairo, etc., R. B. Co. 
 V. Turner, 31 Ark. 494, 25 Am. Rep. 
 564. 
 
 California. — Fox v. Western Pa- 
 cific R. R. Co., 31 Cal. 538. 
 
 Connecticut. — Hawley v. Harrall, 
 19 Conn. 142. 
 
 Georgia. — Young v. Harrison, 6 
 Ga. 130. 
 
 Indiana. — Dirnberger v. Reed, 11 
 Ind. 420; Jefferson, etc., R, R. Co. 
 V. Dougherty, 40 Ind. 33. 
 
632 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 209 
 
 While it is obvious that when compensation is not paid in 
 advance of the taking, there can be no absolute certainty 
 that the owner will get his money at all, for even the gov- 
 ernment might be overthrown in the interval, or become 
 insolvent, or repudiate its obligations, the possibility of such 
 happenings is so remote as to be of no practical importance, 
 and a requirement that compensation must invariably 
 precede entry upon the property taken might prove 
 very inconvenient, either delaying a much needed public 
 improvement or requiring the assessment of damages to 
 
 Iowa. — In re Oedar Rapids, 85 
 iowa 39, 51 N. W. 1142. 
 
 Maine. — Nichols v. Somerset, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 43 Me. 356; State v. 
 Fuller, 105 Me. 571, 75 Atl. 315; 
 Lancaster v. Augusta Water Dis- 
 trict, 108 Me. 187, 79 Atl. 463. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Talbot v. Hud- 
 son, 16 Gray 417 ; Brickett v. Haver- 
 hill Aqueduct Co., 142 Mass. 394, 8 
 N. B. 119. 
 
 MiohigoM. — People v. Michigan 
 Southern Ry. Co., 3 Mich. 496. 
 
 Minnesota. — State v. Messenger, 
 27 Minn. 119, 6 N. W. 457; State 
 Park Commissioners v. Henry, 38 
 Minn. 266, 36 N. W. 874. 
 
 Nebraska. — State v. Several Par- 
 cels of Land, 79 Neb. 638, 113 N. W. 
 248. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Orr v. Quimby, 
 54 N. H. 590. 
 
 New Jersey. — Loweree v. Newark, 
 38 N. J. L. 151; Morris v. Comp- 
 troller, 54 N. J. L. 268, 23 Atl. 664. 
 
 New York. — -Bloodgood v. Mo- 
 hawk, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Wend. 9, 
 31 Am. Dec. 313 ; People v. Hayden, 
 
 6 Hill 359; Matter of Church, 92 
 N. T. 1; Matter of New York, 99 
 N. Y. 569, 2 N. E. 642; Matter of 
 State Reservation, 102 N. Y. 734, 
 
 7 N. E. 916; People v. Adirondack 
 R. R. Co., 160 N. Y. 225, 54 N. B. 
 689 ; Connolly v. Van Wyck, 72 N. Y. 
 Supp. 382, 35 Misc. 746 ; In re Wal- 
 ton Ave., 131 App. Div. 696, 116 
 N. Y. Supp. 471; Polo v. Stevens, 
 120 N. Y. Supp. 227, 66 Misc. 35; 
 Long Island R. R. Co. v. Jones, 151 
 App. Div. 407, 135 N. Y. Supp. 954. 
 
 North Ca/roUna. — Raleigh, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Davis, 2 Dev. & B. 451 ; 
 
 State V. Jones, 139 N. 0. 613, 52 
 S. B. 240, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 313; 
 Watauga, etc., R. R. Co. v. Fergu- 
 son, 169 N. C. 70, 85 S. B. 156. 
 
 Ohio. — Willyard v. Hamilton, 7 
 Ohio, Part II, 111, 30 Am. Dec. 195. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Yost's Report, 17 
 Pa. 524; LafCerty v. Schuylkill 
 River R. R. Co., 124 Pa. 297, 16 
 Atl. 869, 3 L. R. A. 124, 10 Am. St. 
 Rep. 587; Lewisburg Bridge Co. v. 
 Union County, 232 Pa. 255, 81 Atl. 
 324; State Highway Commissioner 
 V. Chambersburg, etc.. Turnpike 
 Road Co., 242 Pa. 171, 88 Atl. 938. 
 
 Rhode Island. — East Shore Land 
 Co. V. Peckham, 33 R. I. 541, 82 Atl. 
 487; In re Pavrtucket & Central 
 Falls Grade Crossing Commission, 
 36 R. I. 200, 89 Atl. 695. 
 
 Tennessee. — Saunders v. Memphis, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 101 Tenn. 206, 47 
 S. W. 155. 
 
 Texas. — Buffalo Bayou, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Ferris, 26 -Tex. 588. 
 
 Utah. — Salt Lake, etc., Co. v. 
 Salt Lake City, 24 Utah 282, 67 
 Pac. 791. 
 
 Virginia. — Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. 
 IMckahoe R. R. Co., 11 Leigh 42, 
 36 Am. Dec. 374. 
 
 Washington. — Seattle v. McEl- 
 wain, 75 Wash. 375, 134 Pac. 1089. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Powers v. Bears, 12 
 Wis. 213, 78 Am. Dec. 733; Kim- 
 berly, etc., Co. v. Hewitt, 79 Wis. 
 334, 48 N. W. 373 ; Janes v. Racine, 
 155 Wis. 1, 143 N. W. 707. 
 
 In Illinois prepayment is required, 
 unless the taking is by the state. 
 Hall V. People, 57 111. 307 ; CaldweU 
 V. Highway Commissioners, 249 lU. 
 366, 94 N. E. 490. 
 
§ 209 The Constitutional Right to Compensation. 633 
 
 a great number of land owners to be made without a proper 
 hearing and with undue haste. If the owner is sure of 
 being eventually paid he might much prefer an opportunity 
 to prepare his case at leisure and to present it at length. 
 On the other hand, if his buildings are destroyed and his 
 land dug up by a railroad on the verge of bankruptcy, or 
 by a municipality already unable to pay its debts, unless 
 he receives the compensation guaranteed him by the con- 
 stitution in advance, he is likely to lose it altogether. To 
 avoid the inconvenience on the one side, and the injustice 
 on the other, the courts have not construed the constitution 
 as laying down an inflexible rule that compensation must 
 precede entry upon the land, or on the other hand as dis- 
 pensing with prepayment in every case. Instead the pre- 
 vailing rule is that when the property is taken, unless com- 
 pensation is paid in advance, the owner must have open 
 to him a method of obtaining compensation with reasonable 
 legal certainty and without unreasonable delay. 
 
 Whether a particular provision is adequate or not is a 
 practical question,^^ and sometimes a very difficult one, 
 and may depend on a number of different considerations. 
 It will thus be seen that no definite rule has been laid down, 
 and the gradual process of judicial exclusion and inclusion 
 is, as in so many other branches of law, clearing up what 
 seems to some a state of hopeless and wholly unnecessary 
 confusion. The supposedly safe and simple rule that 
 requires in all cases the payment of compensation before 
 entry is, however, impractical and unnecessary. Not only 
 must the tribunal which first assesses the damages con- 
 sider and decide upon them, but in many states provision 
 is made for appeal to a jury or other body of impartial 
 citizens. In any case the owner has the right to bring dis- 
 puted questions of law to the supreme court of the state. 
 Items may there be allowed which were rejected when the 
 damages were assessed and paid. To delay the construc- 
 tion of a public work while such cases slowly worked their 
 way to the front of a crowded docket would be such an 
 undesirable result that it is almost everywhere held even 
 
 38. Brickett v. Haverhill Aqueduct Co., 142 Mass. 394, 8 N. E. 119. 
 
634 The Law of Eminent Domain, § 209 
 
 when it is expressly required that compensation be paid 
 in advance that entry may be made pending appeal,^* 
 although the possibility of an unascertained increase in 
 the damages cannot be provided for in such a case. 
 
 Moreover, even if he is unable to collect the compensa- 
 tion awarded, the owner does not ordinarily run the risk 
 of losing his property altogether. If compensation is not 
 made within a reasonable time, it is unanimously held that 
 he may have his property back.*" Some courts say that he 
 holds a lien for his compensation;*^ others that the title 
 passes subject to a condition subsequent; others that the 
 title does not pass at all until payment ; *^ a fourth view is 
 that equity will order a reconveyance.*^ In each case the 
 result would be the same, and the owner would lose only 
 the use of the property for a short period, and perhaps 
 buildings that had been torn down. As, to justify entry 
 at all, the courts must have been satisfied that the provision 
 for compensation was sufficient to pay for all the property 
 taken, it would be very unlikely that they would be so far 
 mistaken that payment could not be made even for tem- 
 porary use and incidental damage. It is generally thought 
 
 39. Infra, § 213. Massachusetts. — Drury v. Midland 
 
 40. Maine. — Riche v. Bar Harbor R. R. Co., 127 Mass. 571. 
 
 Water Co., 75 Me. 91. Ohio. — Dayton, etc., R. B. Co. v. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Haverhill Bridge Lewton, 20 Ohio St. 401. 
 V. County Commissioners, 103 Mass. South Carolina. — Gillison v, Sa- 
 120, 4 Am. St. Rep. 518 ; Attorney- vannah, etc., R. R. Co., 7 S. C. 173. 
 General v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 160 Vermont. — Adams v. St. Johns- 
 Mass. 62, 90, 35 N. B. 253, 22 bury, etc., R. R. Co., 57 Vt. 240. 
 L. R. A. 112. See also infra, § 479. 
 
 "New Jersey. — Fink v. Newark, 40 42. United States. — Kennedy v. 
 
 N. J. L. 11. Indianapolis, 103 U. S. 599, 26 L. ed. 
 
 'New York. — Matter of New York, 550 ; Cherokee Nation v. Kansas 
 
 99 N. T. 569, 2 N. E. 642. Railway Co., 135 U. S. 641, 34 L. ed. 
 
 Ohio.— Ryan v. Hofeman, 26 Ohio 295. 
 
 St. 109. Indiana. — Lake Brie B. B. Co. v. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Philadelphia v. Kinsey, 87 Ind. 514. 
 
 Miskey, 68 Pa. 49. Maine. — Nichols v. Somerset, etc.. 
 
 When property is taken for a pub- B. R. Co., 43 Me. 356 ; State v. 
 
 lie use and consumed in the use, the Fuller, 105 Me. 571, 75 Atl. 315 ; 
 
 provision for compensation should Lancaster v. Augusta Water Dis- 
 
 be more certain than if the owner tcict, 108 Me. 137, 79 Atl. 463. 
 
 might get his property back if not 43. Brickett v. Haverhill Aque- 
 
 paid. Attorney-General v. Old Col- duct Co., 142 Mass. 349, 8 N. B. 119 ; 
 
 ony R. R. Co., 160 Mass. 68, 90, 35 Attorney-General v. Old Colony R. 
 
 N. E. 252, 22 L. R. A. 112. R. Co., 160 Mass. 62, 90, 35 N. E. 
 
 41. 4rfc(msos.— Organ v. Memphis, 252, 22 L. R. A. 112. 
 etc., R. R. Co., 51 Ark. 235. 
 
§ 210 The Constitutional Right to Compensation. 635 
 
 in the states in which it is still in force, that the prevailing 
 doctrine when honestly and carefully administered pro- 
 tects the land owner sufficiently; and that the requirement 
 of prepayment cannot be strictly enforced without intoler- 
 able inconvenience. 
 
 § 210. When Property is Taken by the Public. 
 
 When property is taken for public use by the United 
 States government, and an adequate fund is provided for 
 compensation, it is not necessary that payment be made 
 in advance of taking possession.** Even a mere statutory 
 right to bring suit against the United States in the Court 
 of Claims is sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of a 
 taking of property by eminent domain.*^ Similarly when 
 property is taken by a state and provision is made for pay- 
 ment out of the state treasury, the constitution is satisfied.** 
 
 44. Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Gar- 
 land, 25 Fed. 521; United States v. 
 O'NeUl, 198 Fed. 677 ; Kimberly, etc., 
 Co. V. Hewitt, 79 Wis. 334, 48 N. W. 
 373. 
 
 45. Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Ak- 
 tlengesellschaft, 224 U. S. 290, 56 
 L. ed. 771. 
 
 46. Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray 
 (Mass.i) 417. In this case the stat- 
 ute provided that the damages when 
 ascertained by due proceedings 
 should be paid out of the treasury 
 of the commonwealth, and the gov- 
 ernor was authorized to draw his 
 warrant therefor. This was held 
 sufficient, the court saying : " Unless 
 we can say that such a provision 
 affords no reasonable guaranty that 
 the persons injured will receive com- 
 pensation we cannot adjudge the 
 statute to be unconstitutional. We 
 certainly cannot assume that the 
 commonwealth will not fulfill its 
 obligations. The presumption is 
 directly the other way. * * * 
 The answer to the argument that 
 no process is provided by which the 
 payment can be secured and en- 
 forced is, that no such provision is 
 necessary in cases where the power 
 of eminent domain is exercised im- 
 mediately by the state itself in pur- 
 suance of a statute which enacts 
 that compensation is to be made by 
 
 a warrant drawn by the governor 
 of the commonwealth. We are 
 bound to presume that the chief 
 magistrate of the state will perform 
 his duty." See also 
 
 Georgia. — Young v. Harrison, 6 
 Ga. 130. 
 
 Illinois. — Caldwell v. Highway 
 Commissioners, 249 111. 366, 94 N. B. 
 490 (senible). 
 
 Indiana. — Jeffersonville, etc., R. 
 E. Co. V. Dougherty, 40 Ind. 33. 
 
 Michigan.— People v. Michigan 
 Southern Ry. Co., 3 Mich. 496. 
 
 Minnesota. — State Park Compiis- 
 sioners v. Henry, 38 Minn. 266, 36 
 N. W. 874. 
 
 ISfew Jersey. — Morris v. Comp- 
 troller, 54 N. J. L. 268, 23 Atl. 664. 
 
 'New York. — Matter of State Res- 
 ervation, 102 N. T. 734, 7 N. E. 916 ; 
 People V. Adirondack R. R. Co., 160 
 N. T. 225, 54 N. E. 689. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — State Highway 
 Commissioner v. Chambersburg, etc., 
 Turnpike Road Co., 242 Pa. 171, 88 
 Atl. 938. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Bast Shore Land 
 Co. v. Peckham, 33 R. I. 541, 82 Atl. 
 487; In re Pawtucket & Central 
 Falls Grade Crossing Commission 
 36 R. I. 200, 89 Atl. 695. 
 
 In Bast Shore Land Co. v. Peck- 
 ham, 33 R. I. 541, 82 Atl. 487, It was 
 held that a statute authorizing the 
 
636 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domaikt. 
 
 § 210 
 
 For, although the state cannot be sued, and, if the legisla- 
 ture should rescind the provision for payment, the owner 
 might be remediless, it is held that such a breach of public 
 faith is not a reasonable possibility.*'' As a state may 
 always raise funds by taxation, inability to pay will not be 
 presumed. 
 
 When the taking is made by a municipal corporation, a 
 similar presumption is reached. In addition to his reliance 
 on the public faith, the owner may sue the municipality, 
 and in many jurisdictions may satisfy a judgment against 
 the corporation out of the property of any of its inhab- 
 itants. It is accordingly generally, although not univer- 
 sally, held that if nothing appears to the contrary, a taking 
 by a municipal corporation will be valid, as far as the 
 provision for compensation is concerned, if the owner may 
 recover a judgment for the amount of such compensation 
 which is enforceable by the laws of the state in some 
 effective mode.** It has never been actually held that the 
 
 taking of land for metropolitan park 
 purposes and providing that the 
 compensation, when ascertained, 
 should be paid by the state treas- 
 urer out of any funds available was 
 constitutional although it was not 
 certain that the compensation would 
 ever be paid. 
 
 47. But see Bloodgood v. Mohawk, 
 etc., R. R., 18 Wend.' (N. T.) 1, 
 which gives as the reason for the 
 rule that the state can be compelled 
 to pay by mandamus against its 
 officers. 
 
 48. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 V. S. 380, 
 40 L. ed. 188 : " The legislature may 
 authorize a municipal corporation to 
 take at the outset the absolute title 
 to specific private property if either 
 the statute under which that is done, 
 or a general statute, recognizes the 
 absolute right of the ovraer upon his 
 property being taken to just or rea- 
 sonable compensation therefor, and 
 makes provision, in the event of the 
 disagreement of the parties, for the 
 ascertainment by suit without un- 
 reasonable delay or risk to the 
 owner of the compensation to which 
 •under the constitution he is entitled 
 to, and to a judgment in his favor 
 enforceable against such corporation 
 
 in some effective mode so that the 
 ovTuer can certainly obtain the 
 amount of such compensation." See 
 also 
 
 United States. — Williams v. 
 Parker, 188 U. S. 491, 47 L. ed. 559. 
 
 Alabama. — Lowndes County Com- 
 missioners V. Bowie, 34 Ala. 461. 
 
 Arlcansas. — Barton v. Edwards, 
 179 S. W. 354. 
 
 Indiana. — Dirnberger v. Reed, 11 
 Ind. 420. 
 
 Maine. — Lancaster v. Augusta 
 Water District, 108 Me. 137, 79 Atl. 
 462. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Haverhill Bridge 
 V. Essex County Commissioners, 103 
 Mass. 120, 4 Am. R^. 518. 
 
 Minnesota. — State v. Messenger, 
 27 Minn. 119, 6 N. W. 457. 
 
 Nehraslca. — State v. Several Par- 
 cels of Land, 79 Neb. 638, 113 N. W. 
 248. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Orr v. Qulmby, 
 54 N. H. 590. 
 
 New Jersey. — Loweree v. Newark, 
 38 N. 3. L. 151. 
 
 New Yorle. — Chapman v. Gates, 
 54 N. T. 132 ; Matter of Church, 92 
 N. Y. 1; Matter of New York, 99 
 N. Y. 569, 2 N. E. 642; Connolly 
 V. Van Wyck, 72 N. Y. Supp. 382, 
 
§ 210 The Constitutionai, Bight to Compensation. 637 
 
 straitened circumstances of a municipality are a sufficient 
 reason for requiring payment in advance,** but if it could 
 be shown that there was a strong possibility that a town 
 would be unable to pay for what it took, there seems no 
 reason why the courts should not protect the land owner 
 in his constitutional rights. 
 
 Moreover even in the case of a taking by the state, when 
 there is no pledge of the public faith and credit, and no 
 appropriation of the general funds in the state treasury, 
 but merely authority to pay out of a particular fund which 
 may or may not prove sufficient, the provision for compen- 
 sation is inadequate,*" and a fortiori, when a taking is made 
 
 35 Misc. 746; In re Walton Ave., 
 131 App. Div. 696, 116 N. Y. Supp. 
 471. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Yost's Report, 17 
 Pa. 524 ; Lewisburg Bridge Co. v. 
 Union County, 232 Pa. 255, 81 Atl. 
 324. 
 
 Washington. — Seattle v. McEl- 
 wain, 75 Wash. 375, 134 Pac. 1089. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Powers v. Bears, 12 
 Wis. 213, 78 Am. Dec. 733 ; Janes v. 
 Hacine, 155 Wis. 1, 143 N. W. 707. 
 
 Contra, Caldwell v. Highway 
 Commissioners, 249 111. 366, 94 N. E. 
 490 ; Southern Kansas Ry. Co. v. 
 Oklahoma City, 12 OJila. 82, 69 Pac. 
 1050. In Sittler v. Custer County, 
 91 Neb. Ill, 135 N. W. 441, it was 
 held that before a county can take 
 land for a road it must provide for 
 the payment of damages, either by 
 •.ppropriation or by levy of suffi- 
 cient taxes. 
 
 49. In re Cedar Rapids, 85 Iowa 
 39, 51 N. W. 1142, holds that im- 
 pecuniosity of the city is not suffi- 
 cient reason for requiring compen- 
 sation in advance. De Lucca v. 
 North Little Rock, 142 Fed. 597. 
 Allegations that the city is consider- 
 ably indebted and in view of its 
 limited Income would not have the 
 means to pay a judgment, are not 
 •ufficient to require compensation in 
 advance. In Marshall v. Allen 
 (Tex. Civ. App.), 115 S. W. 849, it 
 was said that the solvency of a mu- 
 Bieipality should not be determined 
 In the same manner as that of an 
 
 individual, and that a city will not 
 be enjoined from erecting a public 
 work to the damage of an individual 
 if it is performing all its functions 
 and has paid its debts as they fell 
 due, although it might not be able 
 to pay the damages thus caused. 
 
 See however, contra, Keene v. 
 Bristol, 26 Pa. 46. In this case the 
 town's power of taxation was so 
 limited that it could not pay for 
 the taking within a reasonable time. 
 
 50. Connecticut River R. R. Co. v. 
 Franklin County Commissioners, 127 
 Mass. 50, 34 Am. Rep. 338. In this 
 case it was provided that owners 
 of lands taken for a railroad, which 
 was operated by the state, should 
 be paid out of the receipts. It was 
 conceded that the receipts would 
 probably prove adequate, but the 
 statute was held unconstitutional. 
 In state Water Supply Commission 
 V. Curtis, 192 N. Y. 319, 85 N. E. 
 148, compensation was to be paid 
 from a fund raised by special assess- 
 ment, but it was held sufficient as 
 payment was required to precede 
 entry. In Polo v. Stevens, 120 N. Y. 
 Supp. 227, 66 Misc. 35, it was held 
 that when a statute provided that 
 no contracts or expenses should 
 exceed the funds available, it was 
 impossible for liabilities to be in- 
 curred which would cut out the 
 claim of the owners of land taken, 
 and consequently the statute was 
 held constitutional. 
 
638 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 211 
 
 by a municipal corporation, and the corporation is under 
 no general liability to pay compensation, the right of the 
 owner to resort to a particular fund is not sufficient to 
 satisfy the constitution.^^ 
 
 § 211. When Property is Taken by a Private Corporation. 
 
 When property is taken for public use by a private cor- 
 poration, it is well settled that the right of the owner to 
 obtain and collect a judgment against the corporation by 
 the ordinary processes of law, and subject to the risks of 
 insolvency, priority of other claims and the like, is not an 
 adequate provision for compensation,^^ no matter how 
 large and prosperous the corporation may be.^^ On the 
 other hand it has rarely been laid down as an inflexible rule 
 of law, in the absence of special constitutional provision, 
 that in no event can property be taken by a private cor- 
 poration unless compensation is paid in advance.®* While 
 there is no hard and fast rule declaring what will consti- 
 tute adequate provision for compensation and the question 
 in each case is a practical one, to be decided upon the facts 
 
 51. Sage V. Brooklyn, 89 N. T. 1 Am. Elect. Gas. 448; Rothschild v. 
 189. Here the compensation was to Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 147 
 be from the fund raised by special N. Y. Supp. 1040, 162 App. Div. 532. 
 assessments on the property bene- Texas. — Buffalo Bayou, etc., R. 
 fited. See however Seattle v. McEl- R. Co, v. Ferris, 26 Tex. 588. 
 wain, 75 Wash. 375, 134 Pac. 1089, Vermont. — Foster v. Stafford Na- 
 in which it was held that a pro- tional Bank, 57 Vt. 128. 
 
 vision that the damages are to be Wisconsin. — Powers v. Bears, 12 
 
 paid wholly out of the benefits Wis. 213, 78 Am. Dec. 733. 
 
 assessed does not render the taking A statute which provides for the 
 
 invalid on the ground that the funds settling of damages by arbitration 
 
 may not be sufficient, as that is a but makes no provision for enforc- 
 
 contingency which always exists. ing the award of the arbitrators 
 
 52. California. — Bensley v. Moun- is clearly unconstitutional. South- 
 tain Lake Water Co., 13 Cal. 306, western R. R. Co. v. Southern, etc., 
 73 Am. Dec. 575. Tel. Co., 46 Ga. 43, 12 Am. Rep. 
 
 Florida. — Moody v. Jacksonville 585, 1 Am. Elect Cas. 32. 
 
 R. R. Co., 20 Fla. 597. 53. Rothschild v. Interborough 
 
 Massachusetts. — Attorney-General Rapid Transit Co., 147 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 V. Old Colony R. R. Co., 160 Mass. 1040, 162 App. Div. 532. 
 
 62, 90, 35 N. E. 252, 22 L. R. A. 112. 54. Hall v. People, 57 111. 307, lays 
 
 New Hampshire. — Piscataqua down such a rule, regardless 
 
 Bridge Co. v. New Hampshire whether the corporation which 
 
 Bridge Co., 7 N. H. 35. makes the taking is public or pri- 
 
 Neto Yorlc. — Brewster v. Rogers vate. Similar decisions have been 
 
 Co., 169 N. Y. 73, 62 N. E. 164, 58 made in states which now have em- 
 
 L. R. A. 495 ; Dusenbury v. Mutual bodied the rule in their constitutions. 
 Tel. Co., 11 Abbott's New Cases 440, 
 
§ 212 The Constitutional Right to Compensation. 639 
 
 before the court, it is generally held that, if the corporation 
 deposits an apparently adequate sum with the court, or 
 gives bond with sureties approved by the court, the pro- 
 vision is suflacient.^® Perhaps as far as has been gone in 
 permitting security to be dispensed with is illustrated by 
 a Massachusetts case, holding that where the owner might, 
 if unpaid, distrain the property of the corporation, and 
 might also recover the land that had been taken from him 
 substantially uninjured, he was sufficiently protected."® 
 
 § 212. Special Constitutional Provisions. 
 
 While many of the states, and especially those of the 
 northeastern section of the country, have continued to 
 exercise the power of eminent domain without any special 
 constitutional provision in regard to the method of secur- 
 ing compensation, and in such states the failure of land 
 owners to receive in due tim'e the compensation to which 
 they are entitled is never heard of, the majority of the 
 states have found it advisable to adopt some special con- 
 stitutional provision to prevent their legislatures from 
 authorizing the taking of land for public use without some 
 preliminary assurance that compensation will be paid. 
 These states fall into three groups (1) those that require 
 that compensation shall be actually paid in advance of the 
 taking; (2) those that require that compensation shall be 
 
 55. United States. — Cherokee Na- North Carolina. — Raleigh, etc., 
 
 tion V. Kansas Ky. Co., 135 TJ. S. E. R. Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & B. 451. 
 
 641, 34 I/, ed. 295 ; Backus v. Fort Tennessee. — Saunders v. Memphis, 
 
 St. Union Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557, etc., R. R. Co., 101 Tenn. 206, 47 
 
 42 L. ed. 853 ; Madisonville Trac- S. W. 155. 
 
 tion Co. V. St Bernard Mining Co., Texas. — Buffalo Bayou, etc., R. R. 
 
 196 U. S. 239, 49 L. ed. 462. Co. v. Ferris, 26 Tex. 588. 
 
 Arkansas. — Cairo, etc., R. R. Co. Utah. — Salt Lake, etc., Co. v. Salt 
 
 V. Turner, 31 Ark. 494, 25 Am. Rep. Lake City, 24 Utah 282, 67 Pac. 791. 
 
 564. Virginia. — Tuckahoe Canal v. 
 
 Connecticut. — Hawley v. Harrall, Tuckahoe, etc., R. R. Co., 11 Leigh 
 
 19 Conn. 142. 42, 36 Am. Dec. 374. 
 
 Illinois. — Prairie du Rocher v. Wisconsin. — Powers v. Bears, 12 
 
 Schoening-Koeningsmark Milling Wis. 213, 78 Am. Dec. 733. 
 
 Co., 251 111. 341, 96 N. E. 249. But a bond for five thousand dol- 
 
 Mavne. — Nichols v. Somerset, etc., lars in all cases, no matter how 
 
 R. R. Co., 43 Me. 356. much property is taken or damage 
 
 New Hampshire. — Orr v. Quimby, done is an insufficient provision. 
 
 54 N. H. 590. Brewster v. Rogers Co., 169 N. T. 
 
 New York.— Long Island R. R. Co. 73, 62 N. B. 164, 58 L. R. A. 493. 
 
 V. Jones, 151 App. Div. 407, 135 66. Brickett v. Haverhill Aque- 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 954. duct Co., 142 Mass. 394, 8 N. E. 119. 
 
640 
 
 The Law oe" Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 212 
 
 paid or deposited in court to the use of the owner in advance 
 of the taking; (3) those that require that compensation shall 
 be paid or secured in advance of the taking. There is a 
 further differentiation, in that some of the states make an 
 exception in favor of the state and of municipal corpora- 
 tions." In addition to' the states which hstve incorporated 
 such requirements in their fundamental law, and such as 
 construe the general provisions of the constitution as 
 requiring payment in advance, in many of the other states 
 payment in advance is required by the statutes authorizing 
 the exercise of eminent domain. 
 
 The requirement of payment in advance is found in the 
 civil law, and in the code Napoleon, and appears to have 
 been adopted in the southwestern states in conformity to 
 the civil code of Louisiana. It was held in Mississippi as 
 early as 1839 that a constitutional provision prohibiting the 
 
 57. The constitutions of the fol- 
 lowing states have specific pro- 
 visions in regard to previous pay- 
 ment or security: 
 
 Alabama, 1 § 24 (prepayment). 
 
 Arizona, 2, § 17 (prepayment In 
 case of private corporations other- 
 wise prepayment or deposit) . 
 
 Arkansas, 12, § 9 (prepayment or 
 deposit not required when the tak- 
 ing is by the state or a subdivision 
 thereof. Barton v. Edwards, 179 
 S. W. 354). 
 
 California, 1, § 14 (prepayment or 
 deposit). 
 
 Colorado, 2, § 15 (prepayment). 
 
 Georgia, 1, § 3 (prepayment). 
 
 Indiana, 1, § 21 (prepayment, ex- 
 cept when the taking is by the 
 state). 
 
 Iowa, 1, § 18 (prepayment or se- 
 curity). 
 
 Kansas, 12, § 4 (prepayment or 
 deposit). 
 
 Kentucky, § 242 (prepayment or 
 security). 
 
 Louisiana, art. 156 (prepayment). 
 
 Maryland, 3, § 46 (prepayment). 
 
 Michigan, 15, § 9 (prepayment or 
 security). 
 
 Minnesota, 1, § 3 (prepayment or 
 security). 
 
 Mississippi, 1, § 17 (prepayment). 
 
 Missouri, 2, § 20 (prepayment or 
 deposit). 
 
 Montana, 3, § 14 (prepayment or 
 deposit) . 
 
 Nevada, 8, § 7 (prepaymeat or 
 security). 
 
 New Jersey, 4, § 7 (prepayment, 
 except when the taking is by the 
 state-or a municipal corporation). 
 
 North Dakota, 1, § 14 (prepay- 
 ment or deposit). 
 
 Ohio, 1, § 19 (prepayment or 
 deposit). 
 
 Oklahoma, 2, § 24 (prepayment). 
 
 Oregon, 11, § 4 (prepayment or 
 security). 
 
 Pennsylvania, 1, § 10 (prepay- 
 ment or security). 
 
 South Carolina, 12, § 3 (prepay- 
 ment or deposit). 
 
 South Dakota, 6, § 13 (prepay- 
 ment before possession taken). 
 
 Texas, 1, § 17 (prepayment or 
 deposit except when the taking is 
 by the state. A taking for a county 
 road is a taking by the state. Travis 
 County V. Trogdon, 88 Tex. 302, 31 
 S. W. 358 ; Morgan v. Oliver, 98 Tex. 
 218, 82 S. W. 1028, 4 Ann. Cas. 900). 
 
 Washington, 1, § 16 (prepay- 
 ment). 
 
 West Virginia, 3, § 9 (prepayment 
 or security). 
 
212 The Constitutional Ea:GHT to Compensation. 641 
 
 taking of property for public use ' ' without just compensa- 
 tion first made therefor ' ' absolutely required payment of 
 compensation in advance of the taking.^® The general 
 extension of this or similar requirements throughout the 
 country in spite of the inconvenience and cumbersomeness 
 of the procedure which it involved would seem to indicate 
 that the lack of such protection had actually resulted in the 
 unjust treatment of individual land owners, although its 
 adoption in the newer states can be attributed in part at 
 least to the general tendency of the constitution makers of 
 the last half of the nineteenth century to restrict the rights 
 
 58. Thompson v. Grand Gulf, etc., 
 Banking Co., 3 How. (Miss.) 240. 
 In this case the court said: "The 
 word ' first,' used in the bill of 
 rights, can not be regarded as use- 
 less; nor are we at liberty to sup- 
 pose that it was inserted without 
 design or by accident. The sen- 
 tence is perfectly intelligible as it 
 stands, and in accordance with first 
 principles. By regarding the word 
 ' first ' as material, there can be no 
 difficulty in carrying the provision 
 into execution by proper legislation ; 
 but by rejecting it, and assuming 
 the position that it is suflBcient for 
 the legislature to provide the means 
 or the mode of obtaining compensa- 
 tion, the provision might be wholly 
 defeated, and owners compelled to 
 part with their property without 
 compensation. If the law be sus- 
 tainable, it must operEite generally, 
 there is no exception to it. Sup- 
 pose that a company or corporation, 
 to whom private property is ad- 
 judged, should be wholly irresponsi- 
 ble, and it is not straining too much 
 to suppose such a case, what com- 
 pensation has the owner for his 
 property? But even if it should be 
 responsible, is it fair or just to con- 
 vey away private property, and only 
 provide the owner with a legal rem- 
 edy for the value, which may easily 
 be exhausted in the pursuit of the 
 remedy? These, amongst others, 
 are evils which might follow under 
 an administration of the provisions 
 of the charter, if they are sufficient, 
 
 41 
 
 and being evils so apparent, it is 
 fair to presume that the convention 
 intended to guard against them, and 
 the presumption derives strength 
 from the fact that the words they 
 employed, if literally construed, are 
 of all others, best calculated to 
 effect this object. * * * The pro- 
 vision in the civil code is, that ' no 
 one can be divested of his property, 
 unless for some purpose of public 
 utility, and on consideration of a 
 previous and equitable Indemnity, 
 and In a manner previously pre- 
 scribed by law ;' Civ. Code of La., 
 art. 489. The idea is not new, that 
 compensation should precede, or be 
 concurrent with the appropriation 
 of private property, nor is the pro- 
 vision peculiar to our constitution. 
 As the right to apply private prop- 
 erty to public uses, is an incident of 
 inherent sovereignty which might 
 be exercised to the prejudice of in- 
 dividuals, it is fair to infer that the 
 convention were not content that 
 the restriction should rest upon the 
 uncertain application of the general 
 principles of justice, and therefore 
 incorporated it into the constitution, 
 thus placing it out of the power of 
 the legislature to exercise the right 
 on any other than equitable and 
 just terms. Under this view, we 
 think it was incompetent for the 
 legislature to authorize the railroad 
 company to take private property, 
 giving the owner no other compen- 
 sation than a judgment and 
 execution." 
 
642 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 213 
 
 of the public in favor of the rights of private property at 
 every opportunity. 
 
 As is shown more at length elsewhere, although the 
 requirement of prepayment has remained on the books, it 
 is not taken very seriously either by the people or by the 
 courts, when public necessity and convenience require that 
 it be dispensed with,^^ and it has become a common practice 
 to allow land to be taken for public use without any formal 
 condemnation, and to remit the owner to an action at law 
 to recover his compensation, thus giving him less protection 
 than is accorded in states which have no requirement as to 
 the manner of payment in their bills of rights.®'* The pro- 
 hibition of the taking of property without compensation 
 in advance, like other statutory prohibitions the strict 
 enforcement of which is not warranted by public sentiment, 
 thus merely leads to an unequal enforcement of the law, 
 and to a slackness which the enactment of a restriction less 
 rigid on its face but more capable of literal application will 
 generally avoid. 
 
 § 213. Application of the Special Constitutional Provi- 
 sions. 
 
 The application of the special constitutional provisions 
 relating to the assurance of the payment of compensation 
 varies not only on account of the difference in the provi- 
 sions, but on account of other differences in the fundamental 
 law. The requirement of prepayment or security causes the 
 least inconvenience and uncertainty, since it amounts to 
 little more than a specific affirmance of the doctrine pre- 
 vailing in the states in which there is no special constitu- 
 tional provision. An appropriation by the legislature of 
 a particular fund is sufficient when the taking is by the 
 state, even when the constitution requires that compensa- 
 tion be " first paid or secured."®^ 
 
 59. When the need of the public 493, 18 N. W. 454; State Highway 
 work Is so urgent as to admit of no Commission v. Chambersburg, etc., 
 delay the requirement of payment Turnpike Road Co., 242 Pa. 171, 88 
 in advance is not enforced. Penrlce Atl. 938. When however the consti- 
 V. Wallis, 37 Miss. 172. tution requires compensation to be 
 
 60. See infra, §§ 373, 474, 478. first paid or deposited, no exception 
 
 61. People V. Michigan Southern can be made in favor of a municipal 
 E. R. Co., 3 Mich. 496; State v. corporation. Martin v. Tyler, 4 
 Messenger, 27 Minn. 119, 6 N. W. N. D. 278, 60 N. W. 392, 25 L. R. A. 
 457 ; State v. Bruggerman, 31 Minn. 838. 
 
§ 213 The Constitutional Right to Compensation. 643 
 
 Payment (or deposit or security as the case may be) in 
 advance is a condition precedent either to any entry for 
 the purpose of construction pending the proceedings, or to 
 the vesting of title in the condemning party, and the owner 
 is entitled to remain in undisturbed possession of his prop- 
 erty and with his title unimpaired until the condition is com- 
 plied with.®^ The owner however has no right to demand 
 that the damages be paid over to him as soon as they are 
 assessed;®* his only right is to retain his property until, 
 the damages are paid. When the title is not divested com- 
 pensation need not be paid until the land is actually 
 entered.®* 
 
 When the constitution requires that the money be paid to 
 the owner or into court for his use, the owner must have the 
 right to withdraw and use the money at once, if he will 
 accept it. The requirement is not met by a conditional 
 deposit or by a deposit for the use of the supposed owners, 
 if the real owner is left out.®' On the other hand the owner 
 cannot, by withdrawing the amount deposited, terminate the 
 litigation, or deprive the condemning party of its right to 
 contest the amount of the award in the higher courts.*® 
 
 It is in connection with the right of appeal that the great- 
 est difficulty in the application of the requirement of pre- 
 payment, or prepayment or deposit, is encountered. When 
 questions of law are raised at the trial it is not required that 
 entry on the property condemned be deferred until the 
 owner has litigated the question of damages to the high- 
 est court that he can reach.®^ Legal title to the property 
 
 62. Stelnhart v. Mendocino County Supervisors, 128 Iowa 442, 10 N. W. 
 Ciourt, 137 Cal. 575, 70'Pac. 629, 454, 70 L. R. A. 440. 
 
 59 L. R. A. 404, 92 Am. St. Rep. 64. State v. Waite, 70 Ohio St. 
 
 183 ; Ryan v. Weiser Valley Land & 149, 71 N. B. 286. 
 
 Water Co., 20 Idaho 288, 118 Pac. 65. Holmes v. Kansas City, 209 
 
 769 ; In re Essex County Park Com- Mo. 513, 108 S. W. 9, 123 Am. St 
 
 mission, 80 N. J. Eq. 1, 83 Atl. 462; ^^P- ^95. 
 
 Edwards v. Thrash, 26 Okla. 472, ^6. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 
 109 Pac 832; McAulay v. Western ffj'"<='^^°' ^^^ ^o. 352, 97 S. W. 
 
 Vermont R. R. Co., 33 Vt. 311, 78 f 7' t\ «. A. (N. S.) 426, 116 
 
 Am. Dec. 627. When prepayment or ^^, ^t ^J^f^' ^ ^^,°- ^as. 822. 
 
 T^ ... - ■ J, ^ il„A t„ „..* 67. Vmted States. — Northern Pa- 
 
 deposit IS required, a bond is not „,«- t, -o n^ „ c,^ t, ^ .. V, ^ 
 
 suLlent. Canhorn V. Belden, 51 go'! f" L' ^2 ;'*Brrdm?<^' Jafd 
 
 Cal- 266. Co. V. Carr, 133 Fed. 37. 
 
 Contra, Ferris v. Bramble, 5 Ohio California.— Spring Valley Water- 
 
 St. 109. works v. Drinkhouse, 95 Cal. 220, 30 
 
 63. Slsson V. Buena Vista County Pac. 218. 
 
644 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 213 
 
 sought to be condemned vests in the condemning party upon 
 the payment of the award and the decree of appropriation, 
 and is not divested by an appeal to the Supreme Court. 
 But the party condemning the land must pay the amount 
 originally assessed by the jury or similar tribunal, notwith- 
 standing the appeal, if the constitution requires prepay- 
 ment, or deposit or secure it if such action is permitted by 
 the state constitution.®* 
 
 In the case of an appeal to a jury from an award by com- 
 missioners, when the constitution requires prepayment or 
 security, there can be no insuperable difficulty in giv- 
 ing a bond which will be sufficient to protect the owner, 
 however successful he may be before the jury, and i^ is 
 accordingly held that when the owner has appealed from 
 the award, payment of the sum awarded is not sufficient, 
 and security must be given for the possible increase in 
 the award which the jury may return.®* When however the 
 constitution requires payment in advance, the amount to 
 be paid cannot be determined until the verdict of the jury 
 has been returned, and consequently it is sometimes held 
 that there can be no entry upon the land until the ver- 
 dict of the jury has been rendered, although the damages 
 have been assessed by commissioners.'^'' The inconven- 
 ience of this rule has however led to its disapproval even 
 in states in which a jury trial is required by the con- 
 stitution,''^ and when there is no constitutional right to a 
 
 Indiana. — Lake Erie R. R. Co. v. 68. Faust v. Huntsville, 83 Ala. 
 
 Klnsey, 87 Ind. 514; CSncinnati, 279, 3 So. 771; Heilbron v. Sacra- 
 
 etc, R. R. Co. V. Wabash R. R. Co., mento County, 151 Cal. 271, 90 Pac. 
 
 162 Ind. 303, 70 N. E. 256. 706 ; Covington, etc., Ry. Co. v. Piel, 
 
 Iowa.— Peterson v. Ferreby, 30 87 Ky. 267, 8 S. W. 449 ; Redman v. 
 
 Iowa 327. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 33 N. J. 
 
 Kansas. — Central Branch R. R. Eq. 165. 
 
 Co. V. Atchison, etc., R. R. Co., 28 69. Harrisburg, etc.. Turnpike 
 
 Kan. 453. Road Co. v. Harrisburg, etc., Ry. 
 
 Kentucky. — Arnold v. Covington, Co., 177 Pa. 585, 35 Atl. 850, 34 
 
 etc.. Bridge Co., 1 Duv. 372. L. R. A. 439. 
 
 Minnesota. — Weir v. St. Paul, etc., 70. Southern Ry. Co. v. Birming- 
 
 B. R. Co., 18 Minn. 155. ham, etc., Ry. Co., 130 Ala. 660, 31 
 
 Montana. — State v. McHatton, 15 So. 509. 
 
 Mont. 159, 38 Pac. 711. 71. Rothan v. St. Louis, etc., R. 
 
 New York.— Matter of N. Y. Cen- R. Co., 113 Mo. 132, 20 S. W. 892 ; 
 
 tral R. R. Co., 60 N. Y. 116. St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Clark, 119 Mo. 
 
 Washington. — North Coast B. R. 357, 24 S. W. 157; St. Louis, etc., 
 
 Co. v. Gentry, 73 Wash. 188, 131 R. R. Co. v. Aubuehon, 199 Mo 352, 
 
 Pac. 856. 97 S. W. 867, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 
§ 214 The Constitutional Eight to Compensation. 645 
 
 jury trial, and, upon an award by an impartial tribunal, 
 the owner has the option to accept the award or appeal to 
 a jury, a statute which allows entry by the condemning 
 party before the verdict of the jury is rendered and the 
 amount thereof paid is not unconstitutional, for the appeal 
 is a matter of favor and not of right, and the power that 
 grants it may prescribe the terms upon which it shall be 
 takenJ* 
 
 § 214. Compensation in Advance not Required when no 
 Property is Taken. 
 
 The obligation to pay, deposit or secure compensation in 
 advance, contained in so many of the state constitutions, 
 is not limited to cases in which property is formally con- 
 demned, but applies to all cases of " taking " in the consti- 
 tutional sense, as by imposing an additional servitude upon 
 
 426, 116 Am. St Eep. 499, 8 Ann. 
 Cas. 822. 
 
 See also Prairie du Rocher v. 
 Schoening-Koenigsmark Milling Co., 
 251 111. 341, 96 N. E. 249. 
 
 72. See tlie opinion of Brewer, J., 
 in Central Branch Union Pacific R. 
 R. Co. V. Atchison, etc., R. R. Co., 
 28 Kan. 464, in which he says : 
 
 " Now, if the legislature violates 
 no constitutional provision in mak- 
 ing the award of the commissioners 
 final, if the landowner has no con- 
 stitutional right to an appeal from 
 such an award, it would seem to 
 follow necessarily that that which 
 the legislature may withhold alto- 
 gether it may grant upon conditions. 
 The appeal being a matter of favor 
 and not a matter of right, the power 
 that grants it may prescribe the 
 terms upon which it shall be taken. 
 How can it be held that a land- 
 owner who has no right to an ap- 
 peal can, when one is tendered to 
 him upon conditions, accept the 
 tender and repudiate the conditions? 
 Can he of his own volition enlarge 
 the scope of a grant, which is a 
 mere matter of legislative favor? 
 Many words cannot make this 
 clearer; the landowner's constitu- 
 tional guaranty terminates with the 
 award of the commissioners. The 
 appeal is a favor, and carries with 
 
 it all the conditions the legislature 
 has seen fit to impose. An examina- 
 tion of the statute leaves no doubt 
 as to the extent of these conditions ; 
 it provides that the appeal shall 
 only be as to the amount of dam- 
 ages, and that it shall not delay the 
 prosecution of the work. But we 
 are met here with the objection that 
 the appeal sets aside the award of 
 the commissioners ; that there then 
 exists no adjudication of the amount 
 of compensation ; that upon the trial 
 of the appeal it not infrequently 
 happens that the jury award a 
 much higher sum than the commis- 
 sioners ; and that if the railroad 
 company be already in possession of 
 the land, having constructed its 
 road over it, it may result that the 
 raUroad appropriates the land 
 without prior payment or deposit 
 of the compensation. To that we 
 reply, that the landowner is under 
 no obligations to appeal. His com- 
 pensation has been determined by a 
 competent and constitutional tri- 
 bunal, and the amount of that com- 
 pensation is paid or deposited for 
 him, and hence he has no- right to 
 complain if of his own volition he 
 Initiates further proceedings." See 
 also Portneuf Irrigating Co. v. 
 Budge, 16 Idaho 116, 100 Pac. 1046, 
 18 Ann. Cas. 674. 
 
646 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 214 
 
 land subject to the highway easement, or by depriving an 
 owner of land abutting upon a highway of his easements 
 of access, light and air, or by covering private land with 
 water, eart^ or other substances/^ 
 
 The requirement of prepayment is generally found in 
 the more elaborate constitutions, and is often accompanied 
 by the provision that there must be compensation for prop- 
 erty that is damaged, as well as for that which is taken. 
 Whether a prospective damaging by the erection of a public 
 work under authority of law must be paid for or the pay- 
 ment secured or deposited before it is inflicted is a question 
 that has been answered differently in different states. In 
 a few jurisdictions it has been decided that it must be,''* 
 but the extreme difficulty of ascertaining with any degree 
 of accuracy the proper amount of compensation for an 
 incidental injury that has not yet occurred, and the unde- 
 sirability of imposing the inconvenient and cumbersome 
 procedure, necessary for ascertaining compensation in 
 advance, upon the great mass of cases in which no property 
 is actually taken, has influenced the majority of courts to 
 rule that prepayment is required only when property is 
 actually entered upon, or ' ' taken ' ' within the accepted 
 meaning of the word and that when the damages are conse- 
 quential, the right to sue for them satisfies the constitution.''® 
 
 73. State v. King County Court, ' that obstruction to ingress and 
 26 Wash. 278, 66 Pac. 385; Dono- egress need not be paid for in 
 frio V. Seattle, 72 Wash. 178, 129 advance.) 
 
 Pac. 1094. This rule is not recog- North Dakota. — Donovan v. Al- 
 
 nized in some of the cases cited, lert, 11 N. D. 289, 91 N. W. 441, 
 
 infra, note 75, which involved inter- 58 L. R. A. 775, 95 Am. St. Rep. 720. 
 
 ference with private property which Pennsylvania. — ^Delaware County's 
 
 would undoubtedly have been held a Appeal, 119 Pa. 159, 13 Atl. 62. 
 
 taking if there had been no dam- South Dakota. — Searle v. Lead, 
 
 age clause; but unless the require- 10 S. D. 312, 73 N. W. 101, 39 
 
 ment of prepayment is to be disre- L. R. A. 345. 
 
 garded upon the slightest excuse, 75. In McMahon v. St. Louis, etc., 
 
 there can be no question that the R. R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 827, 6 So. 
 
 rule is sound on principle. 640, the court said : " It is true, the 
 
 74. United States. — McElroy v. Constitution, article 156, provides 
 Kansas City, 21 Fed. 257 (under that 'private property shall not be 
 Missouri constitution). taken nor damaged for public pur- 
 
 Alabama. — Niehaus v. Cooke, 134 poses without adequate compensa- 
 
 Ala. 223. 32 So. 728. tion being first paid.' We will not 
 
 California. — Sala v. Pasadena, say what might be the effect of this 
 
 162 Cal. 714, 124 Pac. 539. article on the right to bond if the 
 
 ( See however McCray v. Manning, act prohibited involved the taking 
 
 22 Cal. App. 25, 133 Pac. 17, holding of property, the value of which 
 
§ 214 The Constitutional. Right to Compensation. 647 
 
 The foregoing question almost invariably presents itself 
 to the court in the form of a bill in equity asking that the 
 erection of a public work which will inflict damage upon 
 the plaintiff be restrained until the compensation to which 
 
 might be settled In advance. But 
 In this case there is no taking 
 of plaintiff's property which Is not 
 Invaded or touched. The damages 
 claimed are purely consequential in 
 their nature, necessarily conjectural, 
 and impossible of any accurate de- 
 termination, except after the con- 
 struction of the road. To impose 
 upon the parties the necessity of 
 settling and paying such damages 
 before proceeding with the worls 
 would be to require a manifest im- 
 possibility, and, if such an injunc- 
 tion could not be bonded, it would 
 operate a perpetual bar to the con- 
 struction of public works, which was 
 certainly not contemplated by the 
 Constitution." See also to same 
 effect. 
 
 United States. — Lorle v. North 
 Chicago St. Ry. Co., 32 Fed. 270; 
 Blodgett V. Northwestern El. Ey. 
 Co., 80 Fed. 601 ; De Lucca v. North 
 Little Rock, 142 Fed. 597; Quinby 
 V. Cleveland, 191 Fed. 68. 
 
 Colorado. — Denver, etc., R. R. Co. 
 v. Domke, 11 Colo. 247, 17 Pac. 777. 
 
 nUnois. — Stetson v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 75 111. 74; Patterson v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 75 111. 588; 
 Peoria, etc., R. R. Co. v. Schertz, 
 84 in. 135; Doane v. Lake St. EI. 
 Ry. Co., 165 111. 510, 46 N. E. 520, 
 56 Am. St. Rep. 265 ; Aldis v. Union 
 Elevated Ry. Co., 203 111. 567, 68 
 N. E. 95; South Park Commission- 
 ers V. Ward, 248 111. 299, 93 N. E. 
 910. 
 
 (Illinois constitution is construed 
 as requiring prepayment although 
 there is no express provision.) 
 
 Indiana. — Delphi v. Evans, 36 
 Ind. 90, 10 Am. Rep. 12. 
 
 Iowa. — Hubbell v. Des Moines, 
 168 Iowa 418, 154 N. W. 337. 
 
 Kentucky. — Barfield v. Gleason, 
 111 Ky. 491, 63 S. W. 964 (but see 
 Barfield v. Louisville, 23 Ky. L. R. 
 1102, 64 S. W. 959). 
 
 Maryland.— O'Brien v. Baltimore, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 74 Md. 363, 22 Atl. 
 141. 
 
 Michigan. — Detroit, etc., Ry. Co. 
 V. Sioux City Seed & Nursery Co., 
 168 Mich. 668, 134 N. W. 1103. 
 
 Minnesota. — Vanderburgh v. Min- 
 neapolis, 98 Minn. 329, 108 N. W. 
 480, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 741; Austin 
 v. Tonka Bay, 130 Minn. 359, 153 
 N. W. 738. 
 
 Missouri. — Clemens v. Connecti- 
 cut Mutual Life Insurance Co., 184 
 Mp. 46, 82 S. W. 1, 67 L. R. A. 362, 
 105 Am. St. Rep. 526; McGrew v. 
 Granite Bituminous Paving Co., 247 
 Mo. 549, 155 S. W. 511; Medley v. 
 Barry, 143 Mo. App. 641, 128 S. W. 
 225. 
 
 Netraska. — Bronson v. Albion Tel. 
 Co., 67 Neb. Ill, 93 N. W. 201, 60 
 L. R. A. 426, 2 Ann. Cas. 639, 8 Am. 
 Elect. Cas. 177; O'Neill v. Learner, 
 93 Neb. 786, 142 N. W. 112. 
 
 Oklahoma. — Edwards v. Thrash, 
 26 Okl. 472, 109 Pac. 832; McAles- 
 ter V. McMurray, 26 Okl. 577, 109 
 Pac. 838. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Re Melon St., 182 
 Pa. 397, 38 Atl. 482, 38 L. R. A. 275. 
 
 Texas. — Marshall v. Allen (Tex. 
 Civ. App.), 115 S. W. 489; McCam- 
 mon & Lang Lumber Co. v. Trinity, 
 etc., Ry. Co., 104 Tex. 8, 133 S. W. 
 247, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 662, Ann. 
 Cas. 1913 B 870; Rische v. Texas 
 Transportation Co., 27 Tex. Civ. 
 App. 33, 66 S. W. 324; Settegast v. 
 Houston, etc., Ry. Co., 38 Tex. Civ. 
 App. 623, 87 S. W. 197. 
 
 Washington. — DeKay v. North 
 Yakima, etc., Ry. Co., 71 Wash. 648, 
 129 Pac. 574 ; Milwaukee Term. Ry. 
 Co. V. Seattle, 86 Wash. 102, 149 
 Pac. 644. 
 
 West Virginia. — Spencer v. Point 
 Pleasant R. R. Co., 23 W. Va. 406; 
 Watson V. Fairmont, etc., Ry. Co., 
 49 W. Va. 528, 39 S. E. 193. 
 
648 The Law of Eminent Domain. §■ 215 
 
 he is entitled under the constitution of the state is ascer- 
 tained and paid. In the majority of the states the bill is dis- 
 missed on the ground that the owner has a plain and 
 adequate remedy at law in the form of an action for his 
 damages, after the work has been completed and the injury 
 inflicted. When for any reason such remedy is not avail- 
 able, the injunction will issue.''® 
 
 In a very few of the foregoing states some statutory pro- 
 vision is made for ascertaining and enforcing the payment 
 of damages. In most jurisdictions the constitutional pro- 
 vision, requiring compensation when property is damaged 
 for the public use, is suffered to be self executing, and thus 
 in the states which purport to be most solicitous for the 
 rights of individual property, an owner is left to the uncer- 
 tain and tedious process of the common law to recover the 
 damages which the constitution assures him, and must take 
 his chance of the insolvency of the corporation, the existence 
 of prior liens, and the other familiar obstacles to the col- 
 lection of judgments upon unsecured claims, which may 
 result in his losing his damages altogether. On the other 
 hand, in the states in which property is taken by adminis- 
 trative order, and the owner recovers his compensation by 
 proceedings which he himself institutes, damages when no 
 land is taken, the right to recover which is purely statutory, 
 are ascertained and collected by a statutory proceeding as 
 prompt and effective as when land is actually taken. 
 
 § 215. Possibility of Denial of Liability. 
 
 Ordinarily, when property is "taken by eminent domain by 
 anyone except the state, the owner of the property taken 
 need concern himself only with the ability of the corporation 
 which has made the taking to pay the compensation and 
 not with its legal liability; for a party which has taken 
 
 76. As where a public corporation be unable to pay the damages is not 
 about to inflict Injury has no legal sufficient ground for requiring corn- 
 capacity to pay damages. Fort pensation in advance, if the mu- 
 Worth Improvement District v. Fort niclpality is performing all its 
 Worth (Tex.), 158 S. W. 164, 48 functions and paying its debts when 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 994. Possibility they fall due. MarshaU v. Allen 
 that a municipal corporation might (Tex. Civ. App.), 15 S. W. 849. 
 
§ 216 The Constitutionai, Bight to Compensation. 649 
 
 property by eminent domain is estopped to deny the valid- 
 ity of the taking. '^^ When, however, the compensation is to 
 to be paid by a party other than the one which takes the 
 property, there is no such estoppel, and, if there is suffi- 
 cient doubt of the validity of the statute authorizing the 
 taking to make the liability of the party ordered to pay the 
 compensation uncertain, the statute is unconstitutional 
 although the provisions for compensation are in other 
 respects adequate.''® 
 
 A statute authorizing the construction of a public work 
 which will result in a taking of property must make it clear 
 who is to pay the damages ; but the liability may be made 
 known by plain implication.''® 
 
 § 216. Interest. 
 
 The theory of the law is that, when land is taken by emi- 
 nent domain or when it is injured in such a way as to create 
 a constitutional right to damages, payment for the land 
 thus affected should be co-incident with the taking or injury, 
 and, if for any reason payment is postponed, the right to 
 interest from the time that payment ought to have been 
 until it is actually made follows as a matter of strict con- 
 stitutional right.®" When compensation is made before the 
 taking or injury, in accordance with the requirements of 
 
 77. Parker v. Boston, etc., R. R. city's liability to make the provision 
 Co., 3 Cusli. (Mass.) 107, 50 Am. for compensation inadequate. 
 
 Dec. 709; Peabody v. Boston, etc., 79. In Lentell v. Boston, etc., St 
 
 R. R. Co., 181 Mass. 76, 62 N. E. Ry. Co., 187 Mass. 445, 73 N. E. 
 
 1047. See also infra, §§ 396, 469, 542, statutory permission was given 
 
 478. a street railway company to con- 
 
 78. In Williams v. Parker, 188 struct a trestle over the tracks of a 
 U. S. 491, 47 L. ed. 559, the taking steam railroad. The statute pro- 
 was by the Commonwealth of Mas- vided that damages should be paid 
 sachusetts, but the compensation but did not say who was to pay 
 was to be paid by the city of Bos- them. It was held that the statute 
 ton. The owner denied the validity was constitutional, for as the trestle 
 of the taking, contending that the was for the benefit of the street 
 city might successfully resist mak- railway company and no one else it 
 ing payment on the ground that the sufficiently appeared that the street 
 statute imposing the burden on it was railway company was to pay the 
 unconstitutional. The court held, damages. 
 
 however, that while the city was not 80. People v. Stlllings, 198 N. Y. 
 
 estopped to set up such a defense, 504, 92 N. E. 1096, affirming 136 
 
 in view of various decisions of the App. Div. (N. T.) 438, 121 N. T. 
 
 Massachusetts Supreme Court there Supp. 13. 
 was not sufficient doubt about the 
 
650 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 §216 
 
 the constitutional or statutory law of the state, there is no 
 constitutional right to interest, and if interest is allowed 
 from the inception of the proceedings, or from the date 
 of the award, or from any other point of time, it is purely 
 a matter of legislative grace.*^ When however the owner 
 is not paid the compensation until after the taking or 
 injury is complete, as is the practice in many of the states, 
 either with or without the sanction of law, when land is 
 taken, and in almost all of them when it is merely damaged, 
 it is well settled that he is entitled to interest,®^ or at least 
 to its equivalent in the form of damages for the detention 
 
 81. In some jurisdictions it is held 
 that an award bears interest from 
 the time that It is made. 
 
 California. — Phillips v. Pease, 39 
 Cal. 582. 
 
 Oeorgia. — Gate City Terminal Co. 
 V. Thrower, 136 Ga. 456, 71 S. E. 
 903. 
 
 Missouri. — Plum v. Kansas City, 
 101 Mo. 525, 14 S. W. 657, 10 L. R. A. 
 371; Martin v. St. Louis, 139 Mo. 
 246, 41 S. W. 231. 
 
 Washington. — North Coast K. R. 
 Co. V. Aumiller, 61 Wash. 271, 112 
 Pac. 384. 
 
 West Virginia. — Chesapeake, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Bradford, 6 W. Va. 
 220. 
 
 And that when an appeal is 
 taken from an award, if the award 
 is confirmed the owner is entitled to 
 interest from the time it was first 
 made. 
 
 Illinois. — Moll V. Sanitary Dis- 
 trict, 228 111. 633, 81 N. E. 1147. 
 
 Iowa. — Hayes v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 64 Iowa 753, 19 N. W. 245. 
 
 Kansas. — Wichita, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Kuhn, 38 Kan. 104, 16 Pac. 75. 
 
 Minnesota. — Knauft v. St. Paul, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 22 Minn. 173. 
 
 NehrasTca. — Atchison, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Plant, 24 Nebr. 127, 38 N. W. 
 33. 
 
 New Jersey. — Watson v. Jersey 
 City, 84 N. J. L. 422, 86 Atl. 402. 
 
 Wisconsin. — West v. Milwaukee, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 56 Wis. 318, 14 N. W. 
 292. 
 
 And if the award is increased 
 
 on appeal, interest on the whole 
 runs from the date of the original 
 award. 
 
 Georgia. — Selma, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Gammage, 63 Ga. 604. 
 
 Iowa. — Vanhorn v. Des Moines, 63 
 Iowa 447, 19 N. W. 293, 50 Am. Rep. 
 750. 
 
 Missouri. — St. Louis, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Fowler, 113 Mo. 458, 20 S. W. 
 1069. 
 
 NetrasTca. — Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Bull, 56 Nebr. 205, 76 N. W. 
 571. 
 
 New York. — In re Water Commis- 
 sioners, 195 N. Y. 502, 88 N. E. 1102. 
 
 Texas. — Baldwin v. San Antonio 
 (Tex. Civ. App.), 125 S. W. 596. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Neilson v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 91 Wis. 557, 64 N. W. 
 849. 
 
 In Chicago v. Wheeler, 25 111. 478, 
 79 Am. Dec. 342, it was held that 
 the owner was entitled to interest 
 only after the city had failed to 
 pay it within a reasonable time, and 
 In In re Post Office Site in Bronx, 
 210 Fed. 832, that Interest does not 
 run against the United States. 
 
 82. United States. — Reed v. Chi- 
 cago, etc., R. R. Co., 25 Fed. 886. 
 
 Connecticut. — New Mllf ord Wa- 
 ter Co. V. Watson, 75 Conn. 237, 
 52 Atl. 947, 53 Atl. 57; Bishop v. 
 New Haven, 82 Conn. 51, 72 Atl. 
 646. 
 
 Oeorgia. — Selma, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Redwine, 51 Ga. 470. 
 
 Illinois. — Chicago v. Palmer, 93 
 111. 125; Phillips v. South Park 
 
§ 216 The Constitutional Right to iCoMFBNSATiON, 651 
 
 Commissioners, 119 III. 626, 10 N. B. 
 230; Moll V. Sanitary District, 228 
 111. 633, 81 N. B. 1147. 
 
 7owo.— Daniels v. Chicago, etc., R. 
 K. Co., 41 Iowa 52; Hartshorn v. 
 Burlington, etc., R. R. Co., 52 Iowa 
 613, 3 N. W. 648 ; Hayes v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 64 Iowa 753, 19 
 N. W. 245; Lough v. Minneapolis, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 116 Iowa 31, 89 N. W. 
 77; Guinn v. Iowa, etc., R. R. Co., 
 131 Iowa 680, 109 N. W. 209 ; Clark 
 V. Wabash R. R. Co., 132 Iowa 11, 
 109 N. W. 309. 
 
 Kansas. — Missouri River, etc., 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Owen, 8 Kan. 274 ; 
 Raney v. North Topeka Drainage 
 District, 84 Kan. 688, 115 Pac. 399 ; 
 Smith V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 90 
 Kan. 757, 136 Pac. 253. 
 
 Louisiana.— Lawrence v. Second 
 Municipality, 2 La. Ann. 651; 
 Shreveport, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hol- 
 lingsworth, 42 La. Ann. 749, 7 So. 
 693. 
 
 Maine. — Gay v. Gardiner, 54 Me. 
 477; Bangor, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mc- 
 Comb, 60 Me. 290. 
 
 Maryland. — Harness v. Chesa- 
 peake, etc.. Canal Co., 1 Md. Ch. 
 248. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Parks v. Boston, 
 15 Pick. 198; Reed v. Hanover 
 Branch R. R. Co., 105 Mass. 303; 
 Bdmands v. Boston, 108 Mass. 535; 
 Kidder v. Oxford, 116 Mass. 165; 
 First Baptist Society v. Fall River, 
 119 Mass. 95; Chandler v. Jamaica 
 Pond Aqueduct Corp., 125 Mass. 544 ; . 
 Norcross v. Cambridge, 166 Mass. 
 508, 44 N. B. 615, 33 L. R. A. 843 ; 
 Peabody v. New York, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 187 Mass. 489, 73 N. E. 649. 
 
 Minnesota.' — Minneapolis v. Wil- 
 kin, 30 Minn. 145, 15 N. W. 668; 
 Weide v. St. Paul, 62 Minn. 67, 64 
 N. W. 65. 
 
 Mississippi. — Williama v. New 
 Orleans, etc., R. R. Co., 60 Miss. 
 689. 
 
 Missouri. — Webster v. Kansas 
 City, etc., R. R. Co., 116 Mo. 114, 
 22 S. W. 474; Miller v. St. Louis, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 162 Mo. 424, 63 
 S. W. 85. 
 
 Nehrasha. — Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Bull, 56 Nebr. 205, 76 N. W. 
 571. 
 
 New Hampshire, — Fiske v. Ches- 
 terfield, 14 N. H. 240; Clough v. 
 Unity, 18 N. H. 75; Wentworth v. 
 Portsmouth, 68 N. H. 392, 44 Atl. 
 53L 
 
 New Jersey. — North Hudson B. R. 
 Co. V. Booraem, 28 N. J. Eq. 450 ; 
 New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stanley, 
 35 N. J. Bq. 283 ; Metier v. Easton, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 37 N. J. L. 222 ; Fink 
 V. Newark, 40 N. J. L. 11 ; Trimmer 
 V. Pennsylvania, etc., R. B. Co., 55 
 N. J. L. 46, 25 Atl. 932. 
 
 New York.— In re Edgecombe 
 Road, 194 N. Y. 545, 87 N. E. 1118 ; 
 People V. Stillings, 198 N. Y. 504, 
 92 N. B. 1096; In re Gouverneur 
 Slip, 210 N. Y. 451, 104 N.' E. 940. 
 
 North OaroUna. — Miller v. Ashe- 
 ville, 112 N. C. 759, 16 S. E. 762; 
 Abernathy v. South, etc., Ry. Co., 
 159 N. C. 340, 74 S. E. 890. 
 
 Ohio. — Atlanta, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Koblentz, 21 Ohio St. 334; Cincin- 
 nati V. Whetstone, 47 Ohio St. 196, 
 24 N. E. 409; Longworth v. Cincin- 
 nati, 48 Ohio St. 637, 29 N. E. 274. 
 
 Oklahoma. — St. Louis, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Oliver, 17 Okla. 589, 87 Pac. 
 423, 10 Ann. Cas. 748. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Sprague v. Sea 
 View R. R. Co., 72 Atl. 818. 
 
 Tennessee. — Bast Tennessee, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Burnett, 11 Lea 526; 
 Alloway v. Nashville, 88 Tenn. 510, 
 13 S. W. 123, 8 L. R. A. 123 ; Snow- 
 den V. Shelby County, 118 Tenn. 725, 
 102 S. W. 90. 
 
 Texas. — Missouri, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. O'Connor (Tex. Civ. App.), 51 
 S. W. 511; Panhandle, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Kirby (Tex. Civ. App.), 108 
 S. W. 498. 
 
 Utah.— Kimball v. Salt Lake (3ity, 
 32 Utah 253, 90 Pac. 895, 10 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 483, 125 Am. St. Rep. 859; 
 Hempstead v. Salt Lake City, 32 
 Utah 261, 90 Pac. 397; San Pedro, 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Board of Educa- 
 tion of Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 13, 
 99 Pac. 263. 
 
 Vermont. — Adams v. St. Johns- 
 bury, etc., R. R. Co., 57 Vt. 240; 
 Bridgeman v. Hardwick, 67 Vt. 653, 
 32 Atl. 502. 
 
 Washington. — Bellingham Bay, 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Strand, 14 Wash. 
 144, 44 Pac. 140, 46 Pac. 238. 
 
652 The Law of Eminent Domain. §216 
 
 of Hs money .^^ The ideal method would be to award the 
 damages at the same moment that the taking was made, but 
 the necessity of a judicial ascertainment of the amount of 
 damages makes this method impossible.** The ' ' just com- 
 pensation ' ' required by the constitution will not allow the 
 owner of the land to suffer for this delay. 
 
 In every instance in which land is taken for the public 
 use it is of importance to know the point of time when the 
 taking occurs. There must be a fixed punctum temporis as 
 of when damages are to be assessed,®® when the statute of 
 limitations begins to run,*® when the proceedings can no 
 longer be abandoned,*''^ and when interest begins to accrue. 
 The fixing of this punctum temporis is not, however, accom- 
 plished by the application of any constitutional provision 
 or general rule of law, but by the construction of the local 
 statutes governing the exercise of eminent domain, and, 
 moreover, the punctum temporis may be different for each 
 of the four purposes for which it must be ascertained. As 
 condemnation proceedings differ so widely in the different 
 states, it would serve no useful purpose to recite at this 
 point the stages that have been held to mark the comple- 
 tion of the taking. Of course, the right to compensation 
 becomes constitutionally vested when the proceedings can 
 no longer be abandoned, but there is nothing to prevent the 
 legislature providing that the compensation should be 
 assessed as of an earlier date. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Appleton Waterworks would be as in the case of other 
 
 Co. V. Railroad Commissioners, 154 purchases that the price is due and 
 
 Wis. 121, 142 N. W. 476, 47 L. R. A. ought to be paid at the moment the 
 
 (N. S.) 770, Ann. Cas. 1915 B 1160. purchase is made when credit is not 
 
 83. Kansas. — Cohen v. St Louis, specially agreed upon. And if a 
 etc., R. R. Co., 34 Kan. 158, 8 Pac. pie-powder court could be called on 
 138, 55 Am. Rep. 242. the instant and on the spot, the true 
 
 Maryland,. — Norris v. Baltimore, rule of justice for the public would 
 
 44 Md. 598. be to pay the compensation with 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Reading, etc., R. one hand whilst they apply the axe 
 
 R. Co. V. Balthaser, 126 Pa. 1, 17 with the other; and this rule is de- 
 
 Atl. 518 ; Weiss v. South Bethlehem, parted from only because some time 
 
 136 Pa. 294, 20 Atl. 801 ; Klages v. is necessary, by the forms of law to 
 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 160 conduct the inquiry ; and this delay 
 
 Pa. 368, 28 Atl. 862; Mengell's Ex- must be compensated by interest." 
 
 ecutors v. Molinsville Water Co., 224 85. Infra, § 436. 
 
 Pa. 120, 73 Atl. 201. 86. Infra, § 344. 
 
 84. Parks V. Boston, 15 Pick. 87. Infra, § 417. 
 (Mass.) 198, 208. "The true rule 
 
§ 216 The Constitutional Right to Compensation. 653 
 
 There is one limit upon the power of the legislature to 
 fix the punctum temporis in the case of interest; it cannot 
 be later than the time of actual dispossession.** It may- 
 be earlier, since possession is only one of the elements of 
 value in ownership, and the right to sell or rent the prop- 
 erty is practically cut off by the formal taking, and it fre- 
 quently is earlier, since in accordance with the usual rules 
 of law, interest ordinarily begins to run when the taking is 
 complete and the damages are payable.*' The owner may, 
 however, remain in possession for some time afterward and 
 enjoy the use of the property or receive rents from it, and 
 while the benefit of such occupancy cannot be set off from 
 the damages and interest if the statute sets an earlier 
 period as the point of time to be considered,'" there is 
 
 88. Connecticut. — Bishop v. New 
 Haven, 82 Conn. 51, 72 Atl. 646. 
 
 New Mexico. — Atchison, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Richter, 148 Pac. 478. 
 
 Oklahoma. — St. Louis, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Oliver, 17 Okla. 589, 87 S. W. 
 423, 10 Ann. Cas. 748. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Wayne v. Penn- 
 sylvania R. R. Co., 231 Pa. 512, 80 
 Atl. 1097 (interest from time of 
 entry, although railroad not built 
 at once, and injury to remaining 
 land did not occur until it was 
 built) ; In re Thirteenth St., 38 Pa. 
 Super. Ct. 265 (right to interest ac- 
 crues as soon as the part of the 
 work that will do the Injury is 
 begun) . 
 
 Rhode Island. — In re Southern 
 New England Ry. Co., 94 Atl. 738. 
 
 Utah. — San Pedro, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Board of Education of Salt Lake 
 City, 35 Utah 13, 99 Pac. 263. 
 
 An owner cannot however be com- 
 pelled to accept interest as full com- 
 pensation for dispossession under an 
 illegal taking, when a valid taking 
 is subsequently made. Tudor v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 164 111. 73, 
 46 N. E. 446, 36 L. R. A. 379. 
 
 89. United States.— Vnitei States 
 T. Sargent, 162 Fed. 81. 
 
 See however Weiser Valley Land 
 & Water Co. v. Ryan, 111 C. C. A. 
 221, 190 Fed. 417, holding that when 
 the statute provides that damages 
 shall be assessed as of the date of 
 
 the summons, interest runs from 
 that date. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Imbescheid v. Old 
 Colony R. R. Co., 171 Mass. 209, 50 
 N. E. 609 ; Hay v. Commonwealth, 
 183 Mass. 294, 67 N. E. 334; Ray- 
 mond v. Commonwealth, 192 Mass. 
 486, 78 N. E. 514. 
 
 New York. — In re Gouvemeur 
 Slip, 210 N. T. 451, 104 N. B. 940; 
 In re Morris Ave., 103 N. Y. Supp. 
 180, 118 App. Div. 117. 
 
 In In re Edgecombe Road, 194 
 N. Y. 545, 87 N. E. 1118, it was 
 held that the confirmation of an 
 award relates back to the time that 
 the property vests in the city, and 
 that interest runs from that time. 
 
 In In re Minzesheimer, 204 N. Y. 
 272, 97 N. E. 717, it was held that 
 the claimant was not entitled to in- 
 terest prior to the date of the report. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Delaware, etc., R. 
 R. Co. v. Burson, 61 Pa. 369. 
 
 Tennessee. — Snowden v. Shelby 
 County, 118 Tenn. 725, 102 S. W. 90. 
 
 Utah.— KimhaW v. Salt Lake City, 
 32 Utah 253, 90 Pac. 395, 10 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 483. 
 
 90. Massachusetts. — Pegler y. 
 Hyde Park, 176 Mass. 101, 57 N. E. 
 327. 
 
 In some states however the value 
 of the use and occupation by the 
 owner may be set off against inter- 
 est. See for example, 
 
654 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 §216 
 
 nothing unconstitutional in a rule, based on a specific stat- 
 ute or on the construction of a statute silent on the subject, 
 that interest shall not begin to run until the owner is actu- 
 ally deprived of the possession of his land and it is entered 
 upon by the public authorities for the purpose of construct- 
 ing the work for which it was taken.®^ If the owner is put 
 to trouble and expense by the fact that his land has been 
 subject to a paper taking and that he could not be sure when 
 
 Minnesota. — Minneapolis v. Wil- 
 kin, 30 Minn. 145, 15 N. W. 668. 
 
 Missouri. — Plum v. Kansas City, 
 101 Mo. 525, 14 S. W. 657, .10 
 L. R. A. 371. 
 
 New Jersey. — Fink v. Newark, 40 
 N. J. L. 11. 
 
 North Carolina. — Miller v. Ashe- 
 vUle, 112 N. O. 759, 16 S. E. 762. 
 
 Washington. — State v. Humes, 34 
 Wash. 347, 75 Pae. 348. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Stolze v. Milwaukee, 
 etc., K. R. Co., 113 Wis. 44, 88 N. W. 
 919, 90 Am. St. Rep. 833. 
 
 In In re Grote St., 150 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 215, 134 N. T. Supp. 844, in- 
 terest was allowed with deduction 
 of such sum as would represent the 
 value of the restricted use of the 
 property as long as it remained un- 
 der the owner's control. 
 
 91. United States. — Shoemaker v. 
 United States, 147 TJ. S. 282, 37 
 li. ed. 170; Bauman v. Ross, 167 
 U. S. 548, 42 L. ed. 270; United 
 States V. Nahant, 153 Fed. 520; 
 Hlngham v. United States, 161 Fed. 
 295, 15 Ann. Cas. 105. 
 
 California. — San Francisco, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Levlston, 134 Cal. 412, 
 66 Pac. 473; Los Angeles v. Gager, 
 10 Cal. App. 378, 102 Pac. 17. 
 
 Georgia. — Selma, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Redwine, 51 Ga. 470. 
 
 Illinois. — South Park Commis- 
 sioners V. Dunlevy, 91 111. 49; Chi- 
 cago V. Palmer, 93 111. 125 ; Phillips 
 V. South Park Commissioners, 119 
 111. 626, 10 N. B. 230; Moll v. Sani- 
 tary District of Chicago, 228 111. 63'3, 
 81 N. E. 1147. 
 
 Iowa. — Hays v. Chicago, etc., Ry. 
 Co., 64 Iowa 753, 19 N. W. 245; 
 Guinn v. Iowa, etc., Ry. Co., 131 
 Iowa 680, 109 N. W. 209. 
 
 Kansas. — Lake Koen, etc., Co. v. 
 McLain Land, etc., Co., 69 Kan. 334, 
 76 Pac. 853. 
 
 Louisiana. — Lawrence v. Second 
 Municipality, 2 La. Ann. 651. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Edmands v. Bos. 
 ton, 108 Mass. 535; Norcross v. 
 Cambridge, 166 Mass. 508, 44 N. E. 
 615, 33 L. R. A. 843. 
 
 Missouri. — Webster v. Kansas 
 City, etc., R. R. Co., 116 Mo. 114, 22 
 S. W. 474. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Fiske v. Ches- 
 terfield, 14 N. H. 240. 
 
 New York. — Hammersley v. New 
 York, 56 N. Y. 533; Donnelly v. 
 Brooklyn, 121 N. Y. 9, 24 N. E. 17 ; 
 In re New York, 140 App. Div. 238, 
 125 N. Y. Supp. 210. 
 
 North Carolina. — Miller v. Ash&- 
 ville, 112 N. C. 759, 16 S. E. 762. 
 
 Ohio. — Atlantic, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 Koblentz, 21 Ohio St. 334. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Second Street, 
 Harrisburg, 66 Pa. 139. 
 
 Utah. — Oregon Short Line R. R. 
 Co. V. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 80 Pac. 
 732. 
 
 Vermont. — Adams v. St. Johns- 
 bury, etc., R. R. Co., 57 Vt 240. 
 
 Wisconsin. — ^Velte v. United Statea, 
 76 Wis. 278, 45 N. W. 119. 
 
 Contra. — North Coast R. R. Co. v. 
 Aumiller, 61 Wash. 271, 112 Pac. 
 384. 
 
 When upon the laying out of 
 a certain street the owners agreed 
 that the payment of the damages 
 might be deferred until the better- 
 ments were assessed, and that the 
 betterments might be set off from 
 the damages, it was held that Inter- 
 est did not begin to run until the 
 offset had been made and the dam- 
 ages were payable. Burrage v. Boa- 
 ton, 198 Mass. 580, 84 N. E. 1017. 
 
§ 216 The Constitutionai, Eight to Compensation. 655 
 
 he would be actually ousted, he may be compensated for 
 such loss in the award of damages.^^ 
 
 In Pennsylvania interest is not awarded as such, but the 
 equivalent of interest is given as damages for the detention 
 of the compensation ; and if the delay in payment is due to 
 unreasonable and extortionate claims by the owner he for- 
 feits his right to such damages.^* In most Jurisdictions the 
 cause of the delay in payment is immaterial,®* although a 
 provision that interest shall not begin to run until there has 
 been a demand is not unknown.®^ A tender of compensation 
 or a deposit for the use of the owner stops the running of 
 interest.®® 
 
 There is no constitutional requirement that the interest 
 be at six per cent. It may be at any rate which the legisla- 
 ture may designate, provided it constitutes a fair compen- 
 sation for the retention of the money .^^ Compound interest 
 should not be awarded and consequently it has been held 
 that when interest is allowed in making up the award, the 
 award should carry interest only upon the original sum 
 fixed as compensation.®* The practice in some of the states 
 however is otherwise. 
 
 92. Shoemaker v. United States, Missouri. — St. Louis, etc., R. R. 
 147 U. S. 282, 37 L. ed. 170 ; Ed- Co. v. Fowler, 113 Mo. 458, 20 S. W. 
 mands v. Boston, 108 Mass. 535 ; 1069 ; Snyder v. Cowan, 120 Mo. 389, 
 Norcross v. Cambridge, 166 Mass. 25 S. W. 382 ; St. Louis, etc., R. R. 
 508, 44 N. E. 615, 33 L. R. A. 843. Co. v. Clark, 121 Mo. 169, 25 S. W. 
 
 93. Philadelpliia BaU Club v. Phil- 192, 906, 26 L. R. A. 751 ; Chicago, 
 adelphia, 192 Pa. 632, 44 Atl. 265, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bubanks, 130 Mo. 
 46 L. R. A. 724, 73 Am. St. Rep. 835 ; 270, 32 S. W. 658 ; St. Louis, etc., 
 Rea V. Pittsburg, etc.. Railroad Co., R. r. Co. v. Fowler, 142 Mo. 670, 44 
 229 Pa. 106, 78 Atl. 73, 140 Am. St. S. W. 771. 
 
 Rep. 721. To deprive the owner of Uew Hampshire.— MaTch v. Ports- 
 damages for delay. It must be shown mouth, etc., R. R. Co., 19 N H 372 • 
 afBrmatively that he made an exag- shattuck v. Wilton R. R. Co., 23 
 gerated claim. Hoffman v. Phila- jg- jj ggg 
 
 delphia, 250 Pa. 1, 95 Atl. 322. '^^^^ /e«e2/.-National Docks, etc.. 
 
 274 85 N 'e ^i^r'P'"^' ''' ''^^- B. R- Co. v. Pennsylvania, et;, r! 
 
 95 L re Edelmuth. 202 N. Y. 602, ^■^^■' '^ N. J. Eq. 142, 33 Atl. 860. 
 95 N. E. 804; In re Bankers' Invest- Texas.— Baldwrn v. San Antonio 
 
 Ing Co., 141 App. Div. (N. Y.) 591, <Tex. Civ. App.), 125 S. W. 596. 
 126 N. Y. Supp. 241 ; Kimball v. Salt 97. Norcross v. Cambridge, 166 
 
 Lake City, 32 Utah 253, 90 Pac. 395, Mass. 508, 44 N. B. 615, 33 L. R. A. 
 
 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 483. 843. 
 
 96. Kansas. — Reisner v. Atchison 98. In re New York, 179 N. Y. 496, 
 
 Union Depot, etc., Co., 27 Kan. 382. 72 N. E. 522. 
 
656 The Law of Eminent Domain, § 216 
 
 It is held in Wisconsin that when an owner collects the 
 award after an appeal has been taken, and he is awarded a 
 less amount on the appeal, the condemning party is enti- 
 tled to recover interest upon the difference,®^ but in this 
 too the practice is not uniform.^ 
 
 It is the better practice for the tribunal which makes 
 the final assessment of damages to include interest in the 
 amount of the award, although an award for a certain sum 
 " with interest " will be valid and the* interest will be com- 
 puted if the date when the interest begins to run is made 
 clear.^ There is considerable authority for the addition of 
 interest by the court to the verdict of a jury in ordinary 
 actions at common law when the claim is for a liquidated 
 sum due at a definite time, as for example an action on a 
 promissory note, and by inadvertence the jury has not 
 awarded or even mentioned interest. The practice of add- 
 ing interest in such cases has been adopted by some courts 
 in eminent domain cases,* but it is unsound, except under 
 peculiar provisions of statute, since, even if the verdict is 
 for the exact amount which one or more of the witnesses has 
 testified to be the damage, and nothing has been said about 
 interest, so that it is a fair assumption that compensation 
 for delay in payment was not included in the award, it can- 
 
 99. Watson v. Milwaukee, etc., R. clfic Ry. Co., 90 Kan. 757, 136 Pac. 
 
 R. Co., 57 Wis. 332, 15 N. W. 468; 253. 
 
 Spies V. Chicago, etc., Ky. Co., 148 Minnesota. — Warren v. First Divi- 
 
 Wis. 35, 133 N. W. 110. sion, etc., E. R. Co., 21 Minn. 424; 
 
 1. It was held that interest could Whitacre v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 
 not be recovered in St. Louis, etc., 24 Minn. 811. 
 
 R. R. Co. V. Knapp, Stout, etc., Co., Tennessee. — ^AUoway v. Nashville, 
 
 160 Mo. 396, 61 S. W. 300 ; Matter 88 Tenn. 510, 13 S. W. 123, 8 L. R. A. 
 
 of New York El. R. R. Co., 44 Hun 123. 
 
 117, 8 N. Y. St. Rep. 431. Wisconsin. — West v. Milwaukee, 
 
 2. When the date does not appear etc., R. R. Co., 56 Wis. 318, 14 N. W. 
 of record, the court cannot add In- 292. 
 
 terest. Southern Kansas R. R. Co. When the allowance of interest 
 
 V. Showalter, 57 Kan-. 688, 47 Pac. on appeal depends upon the ques- 
 
 831 ; Connecticut River R. R. Co. v. tion whether the verdict of the jury 
 
 Clapp, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 559. Is in excess of the original award, 
 
 3. United States. — Reed v. Chi- and it is considered improper for 
 cago, etc., R. R. Co., 25 Fed. 886 ; the jury to know the amount of the 
 United States v. Engeman, 46 Fed. award, the court must necessarily 
 898. add interest if the verdict warrants 
 
 Iowa. — Lough V. Minneapolis, it. Reed v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 
 
 etc., R. R. Co., 116 Iowa 31, 89 25 Fed. 886; St. Louis, etc., R. R. 
 
 N. W. 77. Co. V. Oliver, 17 Okla. 589, 87 Pac. 
 
 EoMsas. — Smith v. Missouri Pa- 423, 10 Ann. Cas. 748. 
 
§ 216 The Constitutional Risht to Compensation. 657 
 
 not be known whether the jury would have arrived at the 
 amount named in the verdict if they had supposed that it 
 would be largely increased by the court.* 
 
 4. Minot V. Boston, 201 Mass. 10, 
 86 N. E. 783, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 311; Blackwell, eta, Ry. C5o. v. 
 Bebout, 19 Okla. 63, 91 Pac. 877, 14 
 Ann. Gas. 1145. See also the fol- 
 lowing cases in which the court de- 
 clined to add interest when the 
 
 42 
 
 jury returned a verdict for a lamp 
 sum which might have included in- 
 terest. Butte Electric R. R. Co. v. 
 Matthews, 34 Mont. 487, 87 Pac. 
 460 ; Diedrich v. Northwestern 
 Union R. R. Co., 47 Wis. 662, 3 
 N. W. 749. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 Valuation of Peopebty Taken fob Public Use. 
 
 Seotion' 217. Market Value the Measure of Compensation. 
 
 218. Ascertainment of the Market Value of Real Estata 
 
 219. Market Value is Based on the Most Advantag'eous Use of 
 
 the Property. 
 
 220. Special Availability for Public Use as an Element of Value. 
 
 221. Appreciation in Value from the Improvement Itself. 
 
 222. Compensation when the Property is not Marketable. 
 
 223. Valuation of the Plant of a Public Service Corporation. 
 
 224. Effect of Impending Destruction upon Market Value. 
 
 225. When the Eull Market Value of the Land must be Paid for 
 
 the Taking of an Easement. 
 
 226. Vegetable Growth and Mineral Deposits. 
 
 227. Buildings upon Land Taken for PubUe Use, 
 
 228. Fixtures and Personal Property. 
 
 229. Destruction of Business Conducted upon the Land Taken. 
 
 230. Improvements made by Condemnor Prior to a Valid Taking. 
 
 231. Effect of Diversity of Interests upon the Total Compensa- 
 
 tion. 
 
 232. Leased Property — Rights of Landlord and Tenant against 
 
 each Other. 
 
 233. Measure of Tenant's Compensation. 
 
 234. Buildings and Fixtures upon Leased Land. 
 
 235. Mutual Restrictions. 
 
 § 217. Market Value the Measure of Compensation. 
 
 It is well settled that, when a parcel of land is taken for 
 public use by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, 
 the measure of compensation is the fair market value of 
 the land.^ By fair market value is meant the amount of 
 
 1. United States. — Boom Co. v. Arlcansas. — Little Rock Junction 
 
 Patterson, 98 TJ. S. 403, 25 L. ed. E. R. Co. v. McGehee, 41 Ark. 202 ; 
 
 206 ; Kerr v. South Park Commis-' Little Rock Junction Railroad Co. v. 
 
 sioners, 117 U. S. 379, 29 L. ed. 924; -woodrufif, 49 Ark. 381, 5 S. W. 792, 
 
 Shoemaker v United States 147 5 ^^^^^^ City 
 
 U. S. 282, 37 L. ed. 170; United „ ,. •□ „ r^ « /■ 
 
 States V. Inlots, Fed. Cas. No. Southern Railway Co. v. Anderson, 
 
 15441 ; Sharpe v. United States, 50 88 Ark. 129, 113 S. W. 1030, 16 Ann. 
 
 C. C. A. 597, 112 Fed. 893, 57 L. R. A. Cas. 784; St. Louis, etc., Railway 
 
 932 ; Weiser Valley Land & Water Co. v. Theodore Maxfield Co., 94 
 
 Co v Ryan, 111 C. C. A. 221, 190 Ark. 135, 126 S. W. 83, 26 L. R. A. 
 
 Fed. 417. (N. S.) 1111. 
 
 Alabama. — Jones v. New Orleans, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 70 Ala. 227. 
 
 [658] 
 
§ 217 Valuation op Pbopebty Taken foe Pubuc Use, 659 
 
 money which a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy 
 the property would pay to an owner willing but not obliged 
 
 California. — San Diego Land & 
 Town Co. V. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 20 
 Pac. 372, 3 L. R. A. 83 ; San Diego 
 Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 88 Cal. 
 50, 25 Pac. 977, 11 L. R. A. 604; 
 Santa Ana v. Brunner, 132 Cal. 234, 
 64 Pac. 287; Southern Pacific Rail- 
 road Co. V. San Francisco Savings 
 Union, 146 Cal. 290, 79 Pac. 961, 70 
 J^. R. A. 221, 106 Am. St. Rep. 36, 2 
 Ann. Cas. 962 ; Sacramento Southern 
 R. R. Co. V. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 
 104 Pac. 979. 
 
 Colorado. — Farmers' Irrigation 
 Co. V. Cooper, 54 Colo. 402, 130 Pac. 
 1004. 
 
 Connecticut. — New Haven County 
 V. Trinity Church, 82 Conn. 378, 73 
 Atl. 389, 17 Ann. Cas. 432. 
 
 Oeorgia. — Atlanta Terra Cotta Co. 
 V. Georgia, etc., R. R. Co., 132 Ga. 
 537, 64 S. E. 563; Central Georgia 
 Power Co. v. Mays, 137 Ga. 120, 72 
 S. E. 900. 
 
 Idaho. — Portneuf -Marsh Valley 
 Irrigation Co. v. Portneuf Irrigating 
 Co., 19 Idaho 483, 114 Pac. 19; 
 Rawson-Works Lumber Co. v. Rich- 
 ardson, 26 Idaho 37, 141 Pac. 74. 
 
 Illinois. — ^Wabash, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. McDougal, 118 111. 229, 8 N. E. 
 678; Kiernan v. Chicago, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 123 111. 188, 14 N. E. 18 ; Calu- 
 met R. R. Co. V. Moore, 124 111. 329, 
 15 N. E. 764; Tedens v. Sanitary 
 District, 149 111. 87, 36 N. E. 1033 ; 
 Lambert v. Griffin, 257 111. 152, 100 
 N. E. 496 ; Sanitary District of Chi- 
 cago V. Baumbach, 270 111. 128, 110 
 N. E. 331. 
 
 Indiana. — Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Svsfimiey, 59 Ind. 100; Lafayette, 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Murdock, 68 Ind. 
 137 ; Halstead v. Vandalia R. R. Co., 
 48 Ind. App. 96, 95 N. E. 439. 
 
 Iowa. — Everett v. Union Pacific 
 Ry. Co., 59 Iowa 243, 13 N. W. 109 ; 
 Cummins v. Des Moines, etc., R. R. 
 Co., 63 Iowa 397, 19 N. W. 268; 
 Bennett v. Marlon, 106 Iowa 628, 76 
 N. W. 844. 
 
 Kansas. — Kansas City R. R. Co. 
 V. Fisher, 49 Kan. 17, 30 Pac. Ill ; 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Roe, 77 
 
 Kan. 224, 94 Pac. 259, 15 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 679; McKnlght v. Wichita, 
 83 Kan. 7, 109 Pac. 994. 
 
 Kentucky. — Madisonville, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Ross, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 584, 103 
 S. W. 330, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 420; 
 Weiss V. Louisville Sewerage Com- 
 missioners, 152 Ky. 552, 153 S. W. 
 967. 
 
 Louisiana. — Orleans, etc., Ry. Co. 
 V. Jefferson, etc., Ry. Co., 51 La. 
 Ann. 1605, 26 So. 278; Louisiana, 
 etc., Nav. Co. v. Jones, 118 La. 506, 
 43 So. 79; Yazoo, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Teissier, 135 La. 19, 64 So. 866. 
 
 Maine. — Bangor, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 McComb, 60 Me. 290 ; Chase v. Port- 
 land, 86 Me. 367, 29 Atl. 1104 ; Ken- 
 nebec Water District v. Waterville, 
 97 Me. 185, 54 Atl. 6, 60 L. R. A. 
 857. 
 
 Maryland. — Brack v. Baltimore, 
 125 Md. 378, 93 Atl. 994. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Lawrence v. Bos- 
 ton, 119 Mass. 125 ; Moulton v. New- 
 buryport Water Co., 137 Mass. 163 ; 
 Cochrane v. Commonwealth, 175 
 Mass. 299, 56 N. E. 610, 78 Am. St. 
 Rep. 491 ; Conness v. Common- 
 wealth, 184 Mass. 541, 69 N. E. 
 341; Muskeget Island Club v. Nan- 
 tucket, 185 Mass. 303, 70 N. E. 
 61 ; Peirson v. Boston Elevated Rail- 
 way Co., 191 Mass. 223, 77 N. E. 
 769, 4 St. Ry. Rep. 478 ; Sargent v. 
 Merrimac, 196 Mass. 171, 81 N. E. 
 970, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 996, 124 
 Am. St. Rep. 528; Smith v. Com- 
 monwealth, 210 Mass. 259, 96 N. E. 
 666, Ann. Cas. 1912 Q 1236. 
 
 Michigan. — ^Detroit v. Beecher, 75 
 Mich. 454, 42 N. W. 986, 4 L. R. A. 
 813. 
 
 Minnesota. — Robbins v. St. Paul, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 22 Minn. 286. 
 
 Missouri. — Missouri Pacific R. R. 
 Co. V. Porter, 112 Mo. 361, 20 S. W. 
 568; Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. v. 
 Walsh, 197 Mo. 392, 94 S. W. 860. 
 
 Mississippi. — Levee Commission- 
 ers V. Hendricks, 77 Miss. 483, 27 
 So. 613. 
 
 Montana. — Montana R. R, Co. v. 
 Warren, 6 Mont. 275, 12 Pac. 641; 
 
660 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 217 
 
 Northern Pacific, etc., Railway Co. 
 V. Forbis, 15 Mont 452, 39 Pac. 571, 
 48 Am. St. Rep. 692; Yellowstone 
 Park Railroad Co. v. Bridges Coal 
 Co., 34 Mont. 545, 87 Pac. 963, 115 
 Am. St. Rep. 546, 9 Ann. Cas. 470. 
 
 Nebraska. — Fremont, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Whalen, 11 Nebr. 585, 10 
 N. W. 491 ; Lowe v. Omaha, 33 Nebr. 
 587, 50 N. W. 760. 
 
 Nevada. — ^Virginia, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 Heniy, 8 Nev. 165. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Winnipiseogee, 
 etc., Mfg. Co. V. Gilford, 67 N. H. 
 514, 35 Atl. 945; Swain v. Pemige- 
 wasset Power Co., 76 N. H. 498, 85 
 Atl. 288. 
 
 New Jersey. — Somerville, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Doughty, 22 N. J. L. 495; 
 Currie v. Waverly, etc., R. R. Co., 
 52 N. J. L. 381, 20 Atl. 56, 19 Am. 
 St. Rep. 452. 
 
 New York. — In re Clinton St. Po- 
 lice Station Site, 123 N. Y. Supp. 
 198 ; In re New York, etc., Ry. Co., 
 151 App. Div. 50, 135 N. Y. Supp. 
 234; In re Bensel, 142 N. Y. Supp. 
 982. 
 
 North Carolina. — Brown v. 
 Weaver Power Co., 140 N. C. 333, 
 52 S. E. 954, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 912; 
 Virginia, etc., R. R. Co. v. McLean, 
 158 N. C. 498, 74 S. B. 461 ; Wads- 
 worth Land Co. v. Piedmont Trac- 
 tion Co., 162 N. C. 503, 78 S. E. 299. 
 
 Ohio. — Glesy v. Cincinnati, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 308 ; Goodin v. 
 Cincinnati, etc., Canal Co., 18 Ohio 
 St. 169, 98 Am. Dec. 95 ; Cincinnati, 
 etc., Ry. Co. v. Pfitzer, 1 Prob. R. 
 248. 
 
 Ohlahoma. — Blineoe v. Choctaw, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 16 Obla. 286, 83 Pac. 
 903, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 890, 8 Ann. 
 Cas. 689; Wichita Falls, etc, Ry. 
 Co. V. HoUoman, 28 Okla. 419, 114 
 Pac. 700, Ann. Cas. 1912 D 287; 
 Revell V. Muskogee, 36 Okla. 529, 
 129 Pac. 833. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Pittsburg, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Vance, 115 Pa. 325, 8 Atl. 
 764 ; Pennsylvania Schuylkill Valley 
 Railroad Co. v. Cleary, 125 Pa. 442, 
 17 Atl. 468, 11 Am. St. Rep. 913; 
 Harris v. Schuylkill River, etc., 
 Railroad Co., 141 Pa. 242, 21 Ati. 
 590, 23 Am. St. Rep. 242 ; Gorgas v. 
 
 Philadelphia, etc.. Railroad Co., 215 
 Pa. 501, 64 Atl. 680, 114 Am. St. 
 Rep. 974; Cox v. Philadelphia, etc.. 
 Railroad Co., 215 Pa. 506, 64 Atl. 
 729, 114 Am. St. Rep. 979 ; Savings 
 & Trust Co. V. Pennsylvania R. R. 
 Co., 229 Pa. 484, 78 Atl. 1039. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Howard v. Provi- 
 dence, 6 R. I. 514 ; StafCord v. Provi- 
 dence, 10 R. I. 567, 14 Am. Rep. 710. 
 
 South Dakota. — Chicago, etc., Ry, 
 Co. V. Mason, 23 S. D. 564, 122 N. W. 
 601. 
 
 Tennessee. — Memphis v. Boltin, 9 
 Heisk. 508 ; Alloway v. Nashville, 88 
 Tenn. 510, 13 S. W. 123, 8 L. R. A, 
 123; McKinney v. NashvUle, 102 
 Tenn. 131, 52 S. W. 781, 73 Am. St 
 Rep. 859 ; Southern Ry. Co. v. Mem- 
 phis, 126 Tenn. 267, 148 S. W. 662. 
 
 Texas. — Boyer v. Lucas, etc., Ry. 
 Co., 97 Tex. 107, 76 S. W. 441; 
 Forth Worth v. Morgan (Tex. Civ. 
 App.), 168 S. W. 976. 
 
 Utah. — Salt Lake City v. East 
 Jordan Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 126, 
 121 Pac. 592. 
 
 Virginia. — Burger v. State Fe- 
 male Normal School, 114 Va. 491, 
 77 S. B. 489. 
 
 Washington. — Grays Harbor Boom 
 Co. V. Lownsdale, 54 Washi. 83, 104 
 Pac. 267; Tacoma v. Nisqually 
 Power Co., 57 Wash. 420, 107 Pac. 
 199; Kincaid v. Seattle, 74 Wash. 
 617, 134 Pac. 504. 
 
 West Virginia. — Stewart v. Ohio 
 River R. R. Co., 38 W. Va. 438, 18 
 S. E. 604 ; Guyandot Valley Ry. Co. 
 V. Buskirk, 57 W. Va. 417, .50 S. E. 
 521, 110 Am. St. Rep. 292. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Esch v. Chicago, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 72 Wis. 229, 39 N. W. 129. 
 
 Wyoming. — Edwards v. Cheyenne, 
 19 Wyo. 110, 114 Pac. 677. 
 
 It is not however improper for 
 the jury to consider that to sell land 
 at its market value sometimes re- 
 quires long negotiations (Kansas 
 City Southern Railway Co. v. An- 
 derson, 88 Ark. 129, 113 S. W. 1030, 
 16 Ann. Cas. 784), and that market 
 value is the value in the market in 
 which the land is located. Fort 
 Worth V. Morgan (Tex. Civ. App.), 
 168 S. W. 976. 
 
§ 217 Valuation op Peopekty Taken foe Public Use. 661 
 
 to sell it, taking into consideration all uses to whicli the land 
 was adapted and might in reason be applied.^ 
 
 The conception that property has a market value distinct 
 from its value for particular uses is an ancient one. It is 
 referred to by Aristole, and was recognized in colonial 
 times, being then called " the rule of common estimation."* 
 It has never been disputed that when property taken by 
 eminent domain is of such a character that its market value 
 can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such value is 
 the measure of compensation. The use of market value as 
 a test in land damage cases preceded the publication of 
 judicial decisions in this country, so that- we find it looked 
 upon as an established principle in the earliest reported 
 cases. 
 
 Market value is, essentially, based on assumption, not 
 on fact. To establish market value it is not necessary to 
 
 2. United States. — S h a r p e v . 
 United States, 50 C. 0. A. 597, 112 
 Fed. 893, 57 L. R. A. 932. 
 
 Arkansas. — Little Rock Junction 
 Ry. Co. V. Woodruff, 49 Ark. 381, 5 
 S. W. 792, 4 Am. St. Rep. 51. 
 
 California. — Santa Ana v. Brun- 
 ner, 132 Cal. 234, 64 Pac. 287. 
 
 Illinois. — ^Ligare v. Chicago, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 166 in. 249, 46 N. B. 803. 
 
 Kansas.' — Kansas City, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Fisher, 49 Kan. 17, 30 Pac. 
 111. 
 
 Maine. — Chase v. Portland, 86 Me. 
 367, 29 Atl. 1104. 
 
 Massachusetts. — ^Lawrence v. Bos- 
 ton, 119 Mass. 126. 
 
 Missouri. — Metropolitan St. Ry. 
 Co. V. Walsh, 197 Mo. 392, 94 S. W. 
 860. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Pittsburg, etc., 
 Ry. Co. V. Vance, 115 Pa. 325, 8 Atl. 
 764. 
 
 West Virginia. — Stewart v. Ohio 
 River R. R. Co., 38 W. Va. 438, 18 
 S. B. 604. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Esch v. Chicago, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 72 Wis. 229, 39 N. W. 129. 
 
 Other definitions of market value 
 are : " Fair cash value." Brown v. 
 Calumet River Ry. Co., 125 111. 600, 
 18 N. E. 285; Southern Ry. Co. v. 
 Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267, 148 S. W. 
 
 662. " The highest money price 
 which the land would bring if sold 
 in the open market to one buying 
 with knowledge of all the purposes 
 to which it was adapted, allowing a 
 reasonable time in which to find a 
 purchaser." Sacramento Southern 
 Ry. Co. V. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 
 104 Pac. 979. "Value of land for 
 any and all uses to which it might 
 be put, in the light of present busi- 
 ness conditions and those that might 
 reasonably be expected in the imme- 
 diate future." Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. 
 V. Mason, 23 S. D. 564, 122 N. W. 
 601. " What probably could be ob- 
 tained If a purchaser was sought, 
 applying the ordinary business 
 methods." Weiser Valley Land & 
 Water Co. v. Ryan, 111 C. C. A. 221, 
 190 Fed. 417. (See also Everett v. 
 Union Pacific Ry. Co., 59 Iowa 243, 
 13 N. W. 109). " Its value in view 
 of all the purposes to which it is 
 naturally adapted ; that means that 
 its market value, if it is unoccupied, 
 is fixed by its value for the most 
 valuable of those purposes." Coch- 
 rane V. Commonwealth, 175 Mass. 
 299, 56 N. E. 610, 78 Am. St. Rep. 
 491. 
 
 3. See for example, Anc. Chart. 
 (Mass.) pp. 69, 70. 
 
662 The Law of Eminent Domain. §217 
 
 point out any designated person who is able and willing 
 to buy the property at the price alleged, or at any price, 
 ^or to show that the owner is in fact willing, or even has the 
 legal capacity, to sell it. The actual facts of this character 
 are not only not controlling; they are not even material. 
 Thus offers to purchase the property at a certain price are 
 inadmissible in evidence to prove market value,* and on 
 the other hand, it is not competent for the owner to show 
 that he was unwilling to part with his land,® or that he had 
 plans which could not be carried out if the land was taken 
 from him.* 
 
 The land is looked upon merely as so much land, entirely 
 apart from the personality of its owner. It might well be 
 that two rival tradesmen held adjacent lots of land on the 
 same street, similar in all respects, upon which they main- 
 tained their respective shops. One of them, by reason of 
 shrewdness, foresight and good fortune might be deriving 
 a large return from his business and would doubtless be 
 unwilling to sell his land, and thus break up his established 
 trade, for a sum considerably in excess of its market value, 
 while the owner of the adjacent store, who found himself 
 losing money from day to day, might be glad to dispose 
 of his property at considerable sacrifice. If, however, the 
 two stores were taken by eminent domain, the measure of 
 compensation would be the same in each case. So also 
 there might be two neighboring dwelling houses, identical 
 in every respect, and standing upon lots of lands of pre- 
 cisely the same size and character. One might be the old 
 homestead of a family so attached to their dwelling and 
 so situated financially that the premises could not be bought 
 
 4. Infra, § 454. B. R. Co., 48 Ind. App. 96, 95 N. E. 
 
 5. Central Georgia Power Co. v. 439. 
 
 Mays, 137 GA. 120, 72 S. E. 900; Massachusetts.— 'Pin.^ha.vii v. 
 
 MadisonvUlfe, etc., Ey. Co. v. Ross, Chelmsford, 109 Mass. 225; Fair- 
 
 31 Ky. L. Rep. 584, 103 S. W. 330, banks v. Fitchburg, 110 Mass. 224. 
 
 13 L E A (N S ) 420 'North Carolina. — Wadsworth Land 
 
 6. What the owner intended to do C<). v. Piedmont Traction Co., 162 
 with the land is of no importance. «. C- 503, 78 S. B. 299. 
 
 r, 7jw;„„ • X „ A i„„ „ -E-^™!, Evidence of the owners particu- 
 
 Caltforma. — Los Angeles v. Kerck- , j^^, ,ji,ji.. 
 
 . „~ ^ „ ,,.,, „ tT,^kq- ri« -IK lar need of the land taken in his 
 
 noil Cuzner Mill & Lumber Co., 15 . . ..,..., _, . 
 
 .-1 , » /.fTQ 1-ic T> arzA business is inadmissible. Weiss v. 
 
 Cal. App. 676, 115 Pac. 654. t • -n o ^ • • 
 
 ^ ,. r-r , ^ J, XT J 15 Louisville Sewerage Commissioners, 
 
 ZndJtoraa.-Halstead v. Vandalia igg Ky. 552, 153 S. W. 967. 
 
§ 218 Valuation of Peopebty Taken foe Public Use. 663 
 
 at any price ; the other might be ready for sale to the first 
 bidder, in order to close an estate. For the purposes of 
 eminent domain however the price of the two houses would 
 be the same. Sentimental value to the owner, or his 
 unwillingness to part with the property can have no con- 
 sideration in determining the market vaue, and, when a 
 homestead is taken, the inconvenience resulting from the 
 loss of a home is not a proper element of damage.'^ 
 
 The productive value of land, or the value of the land 
 to its owner based on the income he is able to derive from 
 his use of it, is not the measure of compensation and is not 
 material except so far as it throws light upon the market 
 value. In other words, what Is sometimes called the 
 * ' value in use ' ' is everywhere repudiated as the test. So 
 also the compensation cannot be measured by the value 
 of the property to the party condemning it, or its need 
 for that particular property.* Market value, and market 
 value alone, is the universal test. 
 
 § 218. Ascertainment of the Market Value of Real Estate. 
 
 The fair market value of articles of a certain character 
 at a designated time can be determined with almost mathe- 
 matical accuracy. If there are thousands of articles of 
 such a character precisely alike, many of which are sold 
 every day in the ordinary course of trade to purchasers 
 who may with little inconvenience look elsewhere if they 
 are not satisfied with the article offered and the price, the 
 law of supply and demand and the trained judgment of the 
 market determine the market value with a finality which 
 it is vain to attempt to go behind with evidence of the 
 intrinsic value of the article or its availability for use for 
 any purpose other than that for which it is bought. 
 
 7. Madisonville, etc., By. Co. v. Snyder, 120 Iowa 532, 95 N. W. 183, 
 Boss, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 584, 103 S. W. 8 Am. Elect. Cas. 284. 
 
 330, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 420. ffeto York. — In re New York, etc., 
 
 8. Idaho. — Portneuf-March Valley Ry. Co., 151 App. Div. 50, 135 N. T. 
 Irrigation Co. v. Portneuf Irrigat- Supp. 234. 
 
 Ing Co., 19 Idaho 438, 114 Pac. 19 ; Utah.— Salt Lake City v. Bast 
 
 Bawson-Works Lumber Co. v. Rich- Jordan Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 126, 
 
 ardson, 26 Idaho 37, 141 Pac. 74. 121 Pac. 592. 
 
 Illinois. — Lambert; v. Griffin, 257 Virginia. — Burger v. State Fe- 
 
 111. 152, 100 N. E. 496. male Normal School, 114 Va. 491, 77 
 
 Iowa. — Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. S. E. 489. 
 
664 The Law of Eminent Domain. §218 
 
 Characteristic examples of articles of this sort are shares of 
 stock in corporations which are commonly traded in upon 
 the stock exchanges of the larger cities, or staple products 
 of the soil of designated qualities in the recognized units, 
 such as bales of cotton, bushels of grain or gallons of oil. 
 When property of such a character is taken by eminent 
 domain, its fair market value is a real and not an imaginary 
 standard, and can be definitely ascertained at a moment's 
 notice. 
 
 The market value of a piece of real estate is not ordinarily 
 the subject of such ready computation. The difficulty is 
 in part due to the fact that no two tracts of land are ever 
 exactly alike, and in part to the fact that, as applied to 
 real estate, market value is an almost wholly imaginary 
 standard. The sale of real estate usually requires so much 
 time, and the price is so largely affected by the necessities 
 of the seller and the requirements of the purchaser, and 
 depends so much upon the use to which the land has been 
 or is intended to be put, that the conditions described in 
 the definition of market value rarely concur. To apply in 
 court a standard not familiar in every day life is doubly 
 difficult. Nevertheless, as market value is the recognized 
 measure of compensation when land is taken by eminent 
 domain, and no better one has been devised, it devolves upon 
 the courts to apply it as fairly and as accurately as possible. 
 
 The tribunal which determines the market value of real 
 estate for the purpose of fixing compensation in eminent 
 domain proceedings should take into consideration every 
 element and indication of value which a prudent purchaser 
 would consider, except that when the determination is by 
 a jury, there should be excluded from consideration evi- 
 dence of little materiality or weight, and which a prudent 
 purchaser if it was called to his attention would look upon 
 as mere " seller's talk " but which would tend to mislead 
 an unskilled tribunal when put in the impressive form of 
 expert testimony. 
 
 The things to be considered in determining the market 
 value of real estate are accordingly 
 
 (1) A view of the premises and their surroundings.® 
 
 (2) A description of the physical characteristics of the 
 
 9. Infra, §§ 434, 435. 
 
§ 219 Valuation OF Pbopekty Taken FOE Public Use. 665 
 
 property and its situation in relation to the points of 
 importance in the neighborhood.^" 
 
 (3) The price at which the land was bought, if sufficiently 
 recent to throw light on present value." 
 
 (4)" The price at which neighboring similar land has sold 
 at or about the time of the taking. This test, so conclusive 
 m the case of articles of personal property commonly 
 bought and sold, is so much less valuable in the case of real 
 estate that in some jurisdictions it is rejected altogether, 
 but it is generally considered that it should be used for 
 what it is worth.'^ 
 
 (5) The opinion of competent experts.^^ 
 
 (6) A consideration of the uses for which the land is 
 adapted, and for which it is available." 
 
 (7) The cost of the improvements, if they are such as to 
 increase the market -value of the land.^^ 
 
 (8) The net income from the land, if the land is devoted 
 to one of the uses to which it coijld be most advantageously 
 and profitably applied.^' 
 
 § 219. Market Value is Based on the Most Advantageous 
 Use of the Property. 
 
 In determining the market value of a piece of real estate 
 for the purposes of a taking by eminent domain, it is not 
 merely the value of the property for the use to which it 
 has been applied by the owner that should be taken into 
 consideration, but the possibility of its use for all purposes, 
 present and prospective, for which it is adapted and to which 
 it might in reason be applied, must be considered, and its 
 value for the use to which men of prudence and wisdom 
 and having adequate means would devote the property if 
 owned by them must be taken as the ultimate test." On 
 
 10. Infra, § 445. Plantation Co., 58 C. C. A. 279, 122 
 
 11. Infra, § 454. Fed. 581. 
 
 12. Infra, § 455. Alabama. — Alabama Central R. 
 
 13. Infra, §§ 448-453 inc. E. Co. v. Musgrove, 169 Ala. 424, 53 
 
 14. Infra, § 219. So. 1009. 
 
 15. Infra, § 447. Arkansas.— St. Louis, etc., R. R. 
 
 16. Infra, § 446. Co. v. Theodore Maxfield Co., 94 
 
 17. United States. — Laflin v. Ark. 135, 126 S. W. 83, 26 L. R. A. 
 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 33 Fed. (N. S.) 1111; Fort Smith, etc., 
 415 ; Five Tracts of Land v. United Bridge District v. Scott, 103 Ark. 
 States, 41 C. C. A. 580, 101 Fed. 405, 147 S. W. 440, 111 Ark. 449, 
 661; United States v. Honolulu 163 S. W. 1137; El Dorado v. 
 
666 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 219 
 
 the other hand, possible uses which, are so remote and 
 speculative and which would require the concurrence of so 
 many extrinsic conditions and happenings as to have no 
 
 Scruggs, 113 Ark. 239, 168 S. W. 
 846, 
 
 California. — MuUer v. Southern 
 Pacific Branch Ry. Co., 83 Oal. 240, 
 23 Pac. 265; Santa Ana v. Harlin, 
 99 Cal. 538, 84 Pac. 224; Sacra- 
 mento Southern R. R. Co. v. Heil- 
 bron, 156 Cal. 408, 104 Pac. 979. 
 
 Colorado. — Denver, etc., B. R. Co. 
 V. Griffith, 17 Colo. 598, 31 Pac. 171. . 
 
 Connecticut. — New York, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. New Haven, 81 Conn. 581, 
 71 Atl. 780. 
 
 Georgia. — Central Georgia Power 
 Co. V. Cornwell, 141 Ga. 643, 81 
 S. E. 882. 
 
 Illinoisj — South Park v. Dunlevy, 
 91 111. 49 ; Dupuis v. Chicago, etc., 
 B. R. Co., 115 111. 97, 3 N. B. 720; 
 Reed v. Ohio, etc., R. R. Co., 126 
 111. 48, 17 N. E. 807; West Chicago 
 St. Ry. Co. V. Chicago, 172 111. 198, 
 50 N. E. 185; Phillips v. Scales 
 Mound, 195 III. 353, 63 N. E. 180 ; 
 Hartshorn v. Illinois Valley R. R. 
 Co., 216 111. 892, 75 N. E. 122 ; De- 
 catur V. Vaughan, 233 111. 50, 84 
 N. E. 50; Sanitary District of Chi- 
 cago V. Baumbach, 270 111. 128, 110 
 N. B. 331. 
 
 Indiana. — Ohio Valley, etc., Ter- 
 minal Co. V. Kerth, 130 Ind. 314, 30 
 N. E. 298 ; Muncie, etc., Traction Co. 
 V. Hall, 173 Ind. 292, 90 N. E. 812. 
 
 Iowa. — Everett v. Union Pacific 
 Ry. Co., 59 Iowa 243, 13 N. W. 109. 
 
 Kansas. — Kansas City, etc., R. R. 
 Co. v. Weidenmann, 77 Kan. 300, 94 
 Pac. 146 ; Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 Roe, 77 Kan. 224, 94 Pac. 259, 15 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 679; McKnight v. 
 Wichita, 83 Kan. 7, 109 Pac. 994. 
 
 KentucTtyj — West Virginia, etc., 
 Ry. Co. V. Gibson, 94 Ky. 284, 21 
 S. W. 1055; Chicago, etc., R. R. Qo. 
 V. Rottgering, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1167, 
 83 S. W. 584. 
 
 Louisiana. — Opelousas, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Bradford, 118 La. 506, 48 So. 
 79. 
 
 Maryland. — Brack v. Baltimore, 
 125 Md. 378, 93 Atl. 994. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Dickenson v. 
 Fitchburg, 13 Gray 546; Chandler 
 V. Jamaica Pond Water Co., 125 
 Mass. 544; Drury v. Midland R. R, 
 Co., 127 Mass. 571 ; Moulton v. New- 
 buryport Water Co., 137 Mass. 163 
 Maynard v. Northampton, 157 Mass. 
 218, 31 N. E. 1062; Fales v-. East- 
 hampton, 162 Mass. 422, 38 N. E, 
 1129 ; Teele v. Boston, 165 Mass. 88 
 42 N. B. 506 ; Pegler v. Hyde Park 
 176 Mass. 101, 57 N. E. 327; Fos- 
 gate V. Hudson, 178 Mass. 225, 59 
 N. B. 809. 
 
 Michigan. — Michigan Air Line R. 
 B. Co. V. Barnes, 44 Mich. 222, 6 
 N. W. 651. 
 
 Minnesota. — Colvill v. St. Paul, 
 etc., R. B. Co., 19 Minn. 283 ; Blue 
 Earth County v. St. Paul, etc., E. R. 
 Co., 28 Minn. 503, 11 N. W. 73; 
 Sherman v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 
 30 Minn. 227, 15 N. W. 229; Cedar 
 Rapids, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ryan, 37 
 Minn. 38, 33 N. W. 6. 
 
 Mississippi. — Louisville, etc., B. 
 R. Co. V. Ryan, 64 Miss. 399, 8 So. 
 173. 
 
 Missouri. — Mississippi River 
 Bridge Co. v. Ring, 58 Mo. 491; St. 
 Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Aubuchon, 
 199 Mo. 352, 97 S. W. 867, 9 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 426, 116 Am. St. Rep. 497. 
 
 Mvntana. — Montana R. R. Co. v. 
 Warren, 6 Mont. 275, 12 Pac. 641; 
 aflSrmed, 137 U. S. 848, 84 L. ed. 
 681; Northern Pacific, etc., Ry. Co. 
 V. Forbis, 15 Mont 452, 39 Pac. 571, 
 48 Am. St. Rep. 629. 
 
 NetrasTca. — Omaha Southern R. 
 B. Co. V. Beeson, 36 Nebr. 361, 54 
 N. W. 557. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Low v. Con- 
 cord R. B. Co., 63 N. H. 557, 3 Atl. 
 739. 
 
 New Jersey. — Somerville, etc., B. 
 B. Co. V. Doughty, 22 N. J. L. 495. 
 
 New York. — Re Furman, 17 Wend. 
 649 ; Re New York, etc., B. B. Co., 6 
 Hun 149 ; Matter of Gilroy, 85 Hun 
 424, 32 N. T. Supp. 891 ; In re Sim- 
 mons, 130 App. Div. 350, 356, 114 
 
§ 219 Valuation OF Pbopebty Taken FOB Public Use. 667 
 
 perceptible effect upon present market value must be 
 excluded from consideration." So also the profits that 
 might be derived from devoting the land to a particular 
 use depend so much upon contingencies that cannot be 
 foreseen that they have no real bearing upon present 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 571, 575; affirmed, 195 
 N. Y. 573, 88 N. B. 1132 ; In re New 
 York, etc., Ry. Co., 151 App. Div. 
 50, 135 N. Y. Supp. 234 ; New York 
 Tel. Co. V. De Noyelles Brick Co., 
 154 App. DIv. 845, 139 N. Y. Supp. 
 748 ; In re Manhattan Terminal Co., 
 120 N. Y. Supp. 465 ; In re Clinton 
 St. Police Station Site, 123 N. Y. 
 Supp. 198 ; In re Simmons, 60 Misc. 
 204, 121 N. Y. Supp. 113 ; Westches- 
 ter County V. Wakefield Park 
 Realty Co., 71 Misc. 485, 129 N. Y. 
 Supp. 30. 
 
 North Carolina. — Raleigh, etc., 
 Ry. Co. V. Mecklenburg Mfg. Co., 85 
 S. E. 390. 
 
 North Dakota. — Petersburg School 
 District v. Peterson, 14 N. D. 344, 
 103 N. W. 756. 
 
 Ohio. — Goodin v. Cincinnati, etc., 
 Canal Co., 18 Ohio St. 169, 98 Am. 
 Dec. 95; Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Longworth, 30 Ohio St 108. 
 
 Oklahoma. — Wichita Falls, etc., 
 Ey. Co. V. Holloman, 28 Okla. 419, 
 114 Pac. 700, Ann. Cas. 1912 D 287; 
 Lawton Rapid Transit Ry. Co. v. 
 Lawton, 31 Okla. 458, 122 Pac. 212; 
 Revell V. Muskogee, 36 Okla. 529, 
 129 Pac. 833. 
 
 Pennsylvania.-r- Shenango, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Braham, 79 Pa. 447 ; Penn- 
 sylvania, etc., R. R. Co. V. Cleary, 
 125 Pa. 442, 17 Atl. 468, 11 Am. St. 
 Rep. 913; Wilson v. Equitable Gas 
 Co., 152 Pa. 566, 25 Atl. 635 ; Gorgas 
 V. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 215 
 Pa. 501, 64 Atl. 680, 114 Am. St 
 Rep. 974 ; Cox v. Philadelphia, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 215 Pa. 506, 64 Atl. 729, 
 114 Am. St Rep. 979; Catlin v. 
 Northern Coal & Iron Co., 225 Pa. 
 267, 74 Atl. 56; Savings & Trust 
 Co. V. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 229 
 Pa. 484, 78 Atl. 1039. 
 
 South Dakota. — Belle Fourche 
 Valley Ry. Co. v. Belle Fourche 
 Land & Cattle Co., 28 S. D. 289, 133 
 N. W. 261. 
 
 Tennessee. — McKinney v. Nash- 
 ville, 102 Tenn. 131, 52 S. W. 781, 
 73 Am. St Rep. 859; Southern Ry. 
 Co. V. Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267, 148 
 S. W. 662. 
 
 Texas. — Sullivan v. Missouri, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 29 Tex. Civ. App. 
 429, 68 S. W. 745. 
 
 Vermont. — Hooker v. Montpelier, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 62 Vt 47, 19 Atl. 
 775. 
 
 Virginia. — Richmond, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Chamblin, 100 Va. 401, 41 
 S. E. 750; Burger v. State Female 
 Normal School, 114 Va. 491, 77 
 S. E. 489. 
 
 Washington. — Seattle, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Murphine, 4 Wash. 448, 30 
 Pac. 720; Gray's Harbor Boom Co. 
 V. Lownsdale, 54 Wash. 83, 104 Pac. 
 267; State v. Puget Sound, etc., R. 
 R. Co., 54 Wash. 530, 103 Pac. 809 ; 
 Seattle, etc., Ry. Co. v. Land, 81 
 Wash. 206, 142 Pac. 680. 
 
 West Virginia.' — Guyandot Valley 
 R. R. Co. V. Buskirk, 57 W. Va. 417, 
 50 S. E. 521, 110 Am. St Rep. 785. 
 
 Wisconsin — Washburn v. Milwau- 
 kee, etc., R. B. Co., 59 Wis. 364, 18 
 N. W. 328 ; Esch v. Chicago, etc., R. 
 R. Co., 72 Wis 229, 39 N. W. 129; 
 Alexian Bros. v. Oshkosh, 95 Wis. 
 221, 70 N. W. 162. 
 
 Wyoming. — Edwards v. Cheyenne, 
 19 Wyo. 110, 114 Pac. 677. 
 
 18. Alabama. — Alabama Central 
 R. R. Co. V. Musgrove, 169 Ala. 424, 
 53 So. 1009. 
 
 Louisiana. — Louisiana Ry. &Nav. 
 Co. V. Sarpy, 125 La. 388, 51 So. 
 433. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Smith v. Com- 
 monwealth, 210 Mass. 259, 96 N. E. 
 666, Ann. Cas. 1912 1236. 
 
 New York. — Daly v. Smith, 18 
 App. Div. 194, 45 N. Y. Supp. 785; 
 In re Simmons, 117 N. Y. Supp. 64. 
 
 Oklahoma. — Blincoe v. Choctaw 
 etc., R. R. Co., 16 Okla. 286, 83 Pac! 
 
668 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 2lS 
 
 value/" It is merely that the land is available for certain 
 purposes, and that consequently it might be sold to a pur- 
 chaser willing but not obliged to buy it at a certain price, 
 that can be considered in reaching a valuation.*" 
 
 A use for which a piece of land is especially available 
 need not be excluded from consideration merely because 
 the availability depends upon extrinsic conditions, the con- 
 tinuance of which is not within the control of the owner 
 of the land. Thus a lot near a railroad station may be 
 especially valuable for the site of a retail store, although 
 the company if it saw fit might move the station away. 
 The possibility of removal is considered and discounted 
 by prospective purchasers, and thus is one of the elements 
 in arriving at market value, but the existence of the station 
 and the probability that it will remain should not be dis- 
 regarded in determining market value for the purposes 
 of eminent domain any more than it would be by a pur- 
 chaser.*^ In fact it is not necessary that the extrinsic 
 improvement which will make the land specially available 
 for a particular purpose be in existence when the land is 
 taken, if the probability of its being constructed in the 
 
 ■903, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 890, 8 Aim. age to the remaining land, its en- 
 
 Cas. 689. hanced value because of the spur 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Hamory v. Penn- tracks could not be considered, as 
 
 sylvania, etc., K. K. Co., 222 Pa. the railroad might at any time cut 
 
 631, 72 Atl. 227. them off. Held : Circumstances 
 
 Washington. — Chicago, etc., R. R. which exist, but which the owner 
 
 Co. V. Alexander, 47 Wash. 131, 91 has no legal right to have continue 
 
 Pac. 626 ; Gray's Harbor Boom Co. are a proper element of value. For 
 
 V. liownsdale, 54 Wash. 83, 104 Pac. example, an owner in the business 
 
 267. centre has no legal right to have the 
 
 Wyoming. — Edwards v. Cheyenne, business of the city done in his 
 
 19 Wyo. 110, 114 Pac. 677. neighborhood, but the fact that it 
 
 19. Tacoma v. Nisqually Power is done there and is likely to con- 
 Co., 57 Wash. 420, 107 Pac. 199, and tinue affects the market value of his 
 see also infra, § 445. land. So also in In re Manhattan 
 
 20. Sacramento Southern R. R. Terminal, 120 N. Y. Supp. 465, it 
 Co. V. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 104 was held that an award for a lease- 
 Pac. 979. hold used for a saloon, based on its 
 
 21. In New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. location near the entrance of a 
 Blacker, 178 Mass. 386, 59 N. E. bridge, was not excessive merely be- 
 1020, it appeared that in proceed- cause the city was not obliged to 
 ings for the abolition of a grade keep the entrance there, 
 crossing, part of Blacker's land was 22. Sharpe v. United States, 191 
 taken. The land was contiguous to U. S. 341, 48 L. ed. 211 ; Fort Smith, 
 the tracks and connected with them etc.. Bridge District v. Scott, 103 
 by spur tracks. The railroad con- Ark. 405, 147 S. W. 440, 111 Ark. 
 tended that in considering the dam- 449, 163 S. W. 1137. 
 
§ 219 VaiiUation op Peopeety Taken foe Public Use. 669 
 
 immediate future is so strong as to have an effect upon 
 present market value.^* 
 
 The mere fact that a piece of land is devoted to an 
 unlawful use when condemnation proceedings are insti- 
 tuted does not prevent the owner from recovering its 
 value for the most advantageous lawful use,^* but the 
 availability of land for a use which is prohibited by law 
 and which in the present state of public morals is looked 
 upon as malum in se cannot be considered.^* When how- 
 ever a particular use of property is prohibited or restricted 
 by law, but there is a reasonable probability that the pro- 
 hibition or restriction will be modified or removed in the 
 near future, the effect of such probability upon the value 
 of the property may be taken into consideration.'^' 
 
 The most characteristic illustration of the rule that 
 market value is not limited to value for the use to which 
 the land is actually devoted, and the situation in which it 
 is most frequently invoked, and also most frequently 
 abused, is when evidence is offered of what the value of a 
 tract of land that is used for agricultural purposes or is 
 vacant and unused would be if cut up into house-lots. 
 It is well settled that if land is so situated that it is actually 
 available for building purposes, its value for such purposes, 
 may be considered, even if it is used as a farm or is covered 
 with brush and boulders.^' The measure of compensation 
 is not however the aggregate of the prices of the lots into 
 
 23. Lawrence v. Metropolitan El. bility that the by-law would soon 
 R. R. Co., 126 N. Y. 483, 27 N. E. be repealed might be considered, 
 765, 13 L. R. A 102. citing City & South London Ry. Co. 
 
 24. McKinney v. Nashville, 102 v. St. Mary Woolmouth, (1903) 2 
 Tenn. 131, 52 S. W. 781, 73 Am. St. K. B. 788, (1905) A. C. 1, holding 
 Rep. 859. So also when the owner that the value of church property 
 contended that his land would be was affected by the fact that an act 
 valuable for a quarry' if a railroad of Parliament might be obtained au- 
 led to it, the court should instruct thorizing a sale, and Cunard v. Rex, 
 the jury that a railroad cannot be 43 Can. Sup. Ct. 88, that the fact 
 established by enjinent domain for that an owner of flats might get a 
 private purposes. Sanitary District license to build out might be con- 
 V. Comeau, 257 111. 93, 100 N. E. sidered. See also State v. Puget 
 517. Sound, etc., R. R. Co., 54 Wash. 
 
 25. Thus in In re Gibson, 28 Ont. 530, 103 Pac. 809, to same effect 
 L. Rep. 20, Ann. Gas. 1914 B 507, as Cunard v. Rex. 
 
 It was held that when land re- 26. United States. — Five Tracts 
 
 stricted by by-laws to use for resi- of Land v. United States, 41 C. C. A. 
 dential purposes is taken, the proba- 580, 101 Fed. 661. 
 
670 
 
 The Law of Eminent DomaiSt. 
 
 §219 
 
 which the tract could be best divided, since the expense 
 of cleaning off and improving the land, laying out streets, 
 dividing it into lots, advertising and selling the same, and 
 holding it and paying taxes and interest until all the lots 
 are disposed of cannot be ignored, but is too uncertain and 
 conjectural to be computed.*'^ The measure of compen- 
 sation is the market value of the land as a whole, taking 
 into consideration its value for building purposes if that 
 is its most available use. 
 
 The same principles apply to availability for other uses. 
 Fitness of the land for raising a certain crop may be shown, 
 although such a crop has never been raised on the land 
 and a large outlay would be necessary.^* After evidence has 
 been offered that certain land was best adapted for farm- 
 ing, its value per acre for that purpose may be shown.*' 
 When the land is actually in use by the owner and it 
 
 Arleamsas. — St. Louis, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Theodore Maxfield C!o., 94 
 Ark. 135, 126 S. W. 83, 26 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 1111. 
 
 Illinois. — South Park v. Dunlevy, 
 91 111. 49. 
 
 Indiana. — Ohio Valley, etc., Ter- 
 minal Co. V. Kerth, 130 Ind. 314, 30 
 N. E. 298. 
 
 Kansas. — Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Davidson, 49 Kan. 589, 31 Pac. 
 131. 
 
 Kentucky. — ^West Virginia, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Gibson, 94 Ky. 234, 21 
 S. W. 1055. 
 
 Louisiana. — Opelousas, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Bradford, 118 La. 506, 43 So. 
 79. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Dickenson v. 
 Fitchburg, 13 Gray 546. 
 
 Minnesota. — Cedar Rapids, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Ryan, 37 Minn. 38, 33 
 N. W. 6. . 
 
 'NeirasTca. — Omaha Southern R. 
 R. Co. V. Beeson, 36 Nebr. 361, 54 
 N. W. 557. 
 
 Vew Jersey. — Manda v. Orange, 
 82 N. J. L. 686, 82 Atl. 869, Ann. 
 Cas. 1913 D 581. 
 
 'North Dakota. — Petersburg School 
 District v. Peterson, 14 N. D. 344, 
 103 N. W. 756. 
 
 Ohio. — Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Longworth, 30 Ohio St. 108. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Catlin v. North- 
 ern Coal & Iron Co., 225 Pa. 262, 
 74 Atl. 56; Savings & Trust Co. v. 
 Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 229 Pa. 484, 
 78 Atl. 1039. 
 
 Vermont. — Hooker v. Montpelier, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 62 Vt. 47, 19 Atl. 
 775. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Alexian Bros. v. Osh- 
 kosh, 95 Wis. 221, 70 N. W. 162. 
 
 27. New Jersey. — ^Manda v. Orange, 
 82 N. J. L. 686, 82 Atl. 869, Ann. 
 Cas. 1913 D 581. 
 
 New Yorfc.— Daly v. Smith, 18 
 App. Div. 194, 45 N. Y. Supp. 785 ; 
 In re Simmons, 117 N. T. Supp. 64; 
 In re Simmons, 60 Misc. 204, 121 
 N. Y. Supp. 113. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Pennsylvania, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Cleary, 125 Pa. 442, 17 
 A*r. 468, 11 Am. St. Rep. 913; Gor- 
 gas V Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 
 215 Pa. 501, 64 Atl. 680, 114 Am. 
 St. Rep. 974; Hamory v. Pennsyl- 
 vania, etc., R. R. Co., 222 Pa. 631, 
 72 Atl. 227. 
 
 28. Belle Fourche Valley Ry. Co. 
 V. Belle Fourche Land & Cattle Co., 
 28 S. D. 289, 133 N. W. 261. 
 
 29. Lawton Rapid Transit Ry. Co. 
 V. Lawton, 31 Okla. 458, 122 Pac. 
 212. 
 
§ 220 Valuation OF Property Taken FOK Public Use. 671 
 
 possesses a peculiar value for such use, such value may 
 of course be considered.^" The availability of land for 
 residential purposes may be shown by the fact that the 
 owner lived and raised his family upon it.** 
 
 § 220. Special Availability for Public Use as an Element 
 of Value. 
 
 Inasmuch as the compensation awarded when land is 
 taken by eminent domain is the market value of the land 
 for any use to which it is adapted and for which it is avail- 
 able, if it appears that the land is especially adapted and 
 available for some public use, even if it be the very use 
 for which it was taken, and that such adaptability and 
 availability adds to its market value, this feature must be 
 taken into consideration.*^ This principle is in no way 
 inconsistent with the accepted doctrine that the value of 
 
 30. Southern Ry. Co. v. Blemphls, 
 126 Tenn. 267, 148 S. W. 662. 
 
 31. Fort Worth v. Charbonneau 
 (Tex. Civ. App.), 166 S. W. 387. 
 
 32. England. — I n re Gough, 
 (1904) 1 K. B. 417; In re Lucas, 
 (1909) 1 K. B. 16, 28; Sidney v. 
 North Eastern Ry. Co. (1914), 3 
 K. B. 629. 
 
 United States. — Boom Co. v. Pat- 
 terson, 98 U. S. 403, 25 L. ed. 206; 
 United States v. Chandler-Dunbar 
 Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 57 
 L. ed. 1063; In re Ashokan Dam, 
 190 Fed. 413 ; In re Bensel, 206 Fed. 
 369 ; Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. United 
 States, 16 Ct. CI. 160. 
 
 Arkansas. — Little Rocli Junction 
 R. R. Co. V. WoodrufE, 49 Ark. 381, 
 5 S. W. 792, 4 Am. St. Rep. 51; 
 Gurdon, etc., R. R. Co. v. Vaught, 
 97 Ark. 234, 133 S. W. 1019. 
 
 California. — San Diego Land, etc., 
 Co. V. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 20 Pac. 
 372, 3 L. R. A. 83, 88 Cal. 50, 25 
 Pac. 977, 11 L. R. A. 604; Spring 
 Valley Waterworks v. Drinkhouse, 
 92 Cal. 528, 28 Pac. 681 ; Santa Ana 
 T. Harlin, 99 Cal. 538, 34 Pac. 224. 
 
 Colorado. — Colorado, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Brown, 15 Colo. 193, 25 Pac. 
 87. 
 
 Georgia. — Young v. Harrison, 17 
 Ga. 30. 
 
 Illinois. — Lake Shore, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 100 111. 
 21 ; Johnson v. Freeport, etc., R. R. 
 Co., Ill 111. 413 ; Ligare v. Chicago, 
 etc., K. R. Co., 160 111. 261, 46 N. E. 
 803 ; East St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 Illinois state Trust Co, 248 111. 559, 
 94 N. E. 149. 
 
 Iowa. — Tracy v. Mount Pleasant, 
 165 Iowa 435, 146 N. W. 78. 
 
 Louisiana. — • Orleans, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Jefferson, etc., R. R. Co., 51 
 La. Ann. 1605, 26 So. 278. 
 
 (See however Yazoo, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Teissier, 135 La. 19, 64 So. 
 866, holding that when land Is taken 
 for a railroad. Its adaptability for 
 railroad purposes cannot be consid- 
 ered, unless it has some special ad- 
 vantages.) 
 
 Kentucky. — West Virginia, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Gibson, 94 Ky. 234, 21 
 S. W. 1055. 
 
 Maryland. — Brack v. Baltimore, 
 125 Md. 378, 93 Atl. 994. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Teele v. Boston, 
 165 Mass. 88, 42 N. B. 506 ; Sargent 
 V. Merrimac, 196 Mass. 171, 81 N. B. 
 970, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 996, 124 
 Am. St. Rep. 528; Smith v. Com- 
 monwealth, 210 Mass. 259, 96 N. B. 
 666, Ann. Cas. 1912 C 1236; Holy- 
 hood Cemetery Association v. Brook- 
 line, 215 Mass. 255, 102 N. E. 340. 
 
672 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 220 
 
 the land taken to the party taking it is not the measure 
 of compensation in eminent domain proceedings.^^ A 
 distinction must however be drawn between availability 
 for a public use and availability for some purely private 
 purpose. If land is peculiarly well situated for a factory 
 or for a store, and there is no other land available, the 
 owner of the land can compel prospective purchasers to 
 pay the highest sum that they will part with rather than 
 abandon their enterprise altogether, and this power of the 
 owner necessarily enters into the market value. "When 
 however land is taken by eminent domain the owner has no 
 such power. Of course it can be argued that the owner is 
 entitled to the market value in such a case and that special 
 availability for a public purpose enters into market value, 
 since a purchaser would pay a large sum for land if he 
 knew that it was essential for a projected public improve- 
 ment and that he could use it as a means of extorting from 
 the public agency undertaking the improvement the highest 
 price that it would pay rather than aljandon its enterprise, 
 but on the ather hand it may be replied with equal force 
 that the private purchaser would not pay much more than 
 the land was worth for general purposes if he could not 
 recover any more than its value for such purposes if it was 
 taken by eminent domain. Thus the doctrine which allows 
 a substantial addition to the market value on account of 
 availability for the use for which the land was taken is the 
 
 Minnesota. — Conan v. Ely, 91 New York, etc., Ry. Co., 151 App. 
 
 Minn. 127, 97 N. W. 737. Div. 50, 135 N. T. Supp. 234. 
 
 Missouri. — Webster v. Kansas City, Oregon. — Oregon R. R., etc., Co. 
 
 116 Mo. 114, 22 S. W. 474 ; American v. Taffe, 67 Ore. 102, 134 Pac. 1024. 
 
 Tel., etc., Co. v. St. Liouis; etc., R. Pennsylvania. — Brown v. Forest 
 
 R. Co., 202 Mo. 666, 101 S. W. 576. Water Co., 213 Pa. 440, 62 Atl. 1078. 
 
 New Jersey. — Currie v. Waverly, Tennessee. — AUoway v. Nashville, 
 
 etc., R. R. Co., 52 N. J. L. 391, 20 88 Tenn. 510, 13 S. W. 123, 8 
 
 Atl. 56, 19 Am. St. Rep. 452. L. R. A. 123. 
 
 New York — College Point v. Den- Vermont. — Harwood v. West Ran- 
 
 nett, 2 Hun 669 ; Be Gilroy, 85 Hun dolph, 64 Vt. 41, 24 Atl. 97. 
 
 424, 32 N. Y. Supp. 891 ; Water Com- Virginia. — Burger v. State Female 
 
 missioners v. Westchester County Normal School, 114 Va. 491, 77 S. B. 
 
 Waterworks Co., 71 App. Div. 544, 489. 
 
 76 N. Y. Supp. 11 ; Re Daly, 72 App. Washington. — Columbia, etc., Raft- 
 
 Div. 394, 76 N. Y. Supp. 28 ; In re ing Co. v. Hutchinson, 56 Wash. 323, 
 
 Simmons, 130 App. Div. 350, 356, 105 Pac. 636. 
 
 114 N. Y. Supp. 571, 575; affirmed, 33. Supra, § 208. 
 195 N. Y. 573, 88 N. E. 1132; In re 
 
§ 220 Valuation OP Peopestt Taken FOE Public Use. 673 
 
 result of reasoning in a circle, since it all depends upon 
 the power of the owner to compel the public to pay a price 
 gauged by its need of his land rather than by the value 
 of the land in the general market. The very purpose of 
 reserving in the people the power of eminent domain is 
 to prevent an owner of a site especially available for a 
 public work, but not of great value for other purposes, 
 from trading upon the necessities of the public when it is 
 sought to acquire his land for public use, and from com- 
 pelling the public to pay for his land whatever figure he 
 may name, and it seems clear that the owner has no such 
 power .^* Consequently the market value of land peculiarly 
 adapted for public use is its value apart from such adapt- 
 ability, plus such sum as a purchaser would have added to 
 that value by reason of the chance that the land might be 
 required for public use and that in such case, to avoid 
 the expense and dangers of litigation, the public agency 
 requiring it would pay rather more than its value for other 
 purposes, and whether as a matter of justice or public 
 policy the land-owner is entitled even to this increment is 
 open to considerable doubt.^^ If the use upon which such 
 enhanced value depends requires the acquisition of numer- 
 ous other parcels owned by other persons, the chance that 
 the land will be acquired otherwise than by eminent domain 
 is too remote to be considered.'® While these principles 
 
 34. Thus it was held in McGovern 36. McGovem v. New York, 229 
 V. New York, 229 V. S. 363, 57 L. ed. U. S. 363, 57 L. ed. 1228, 46 L. R. A. 
 1228, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 391, af- (N. S.) 391; New York v. Sage, 
 firming 195 N. Y. 573, 88 N. E. 1132, 239 V. S. 57. In the latter case 
 that where land was taken for a it was held that compensation to 
 reservoir site, its value as a reser- the owner of one of many parcels 
 voir site need not be considered, the of land taken by eminent domain 
 court saying : " It could not come for a site for a reservoir for a mu- 
 into consideration except upon the uidpal water supply should not in- 
 hypothesis that the city of New ^lude any part of an increase in 
 York could not get along without it, ..^j^^ ^^^ ^j^^^. ^ ^^^ ^^ .^^ 
 and that its on y means of acquisi- „^.^^ ^.^^ ^^^^^ 
 
 tion was voluntary sale by owners ^^.^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ ^ ^ 
 aware of the necessity and intend- i, ^ ^^ Fxa.v,i,i 
 tag to make from it the most they '^^^X V"^. ^"^ attempted, ex- 
 could. It is just this advantage ««»* "^ ^^^ intervention of eminent 
 that a taking by eminent domain domain. The court said in part: 
 excludes." See also New York v. "Upon an inspection of the record 
 Sage, 239 U. S. 57, infra, note 36. it appears to us, as the language of 
 
 35. Sargent v. Merrimac, 196 the commissioners on its. face sug- 
 Mass. 171, 81 N. E. 170, 11 L. R. A. gests, that their report does not 
 (N. S.) 996, 124 Am. St. Rep. 528. mean that the claimant's land had 
 
674 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 220 
 
 may hot have been universally recognized, they have been 
 set forth in recent cases of unquestioned authority and the ' 
 soundness of the reasoning cannot be disputed.*'' 
 
 a market value of $11,948.90 — 
 that it would have brought thajt sum 
 at a fair sale — but that they con- 
 sidered the value of the reservoir 
 as a vrhole and allowed what they 
 thought a fair proportion of the in- 
 crease over and above the market 
 value of the lot to the owner of the 
 land, subject to the opinion of the 
 court upon the point of law thus 
 raised. Upon that point we are of 
 opinion that they were wrong. The 
 decisions appear to us to have made 
 the principles plain. No doubt when 
 this class of questions first arose it 
 was said in a general way that 
 adaptability to the purposes for 
 which the land could be used most 
 profitably was to be considered, and 
 that is true. But it is to be consid- 
 ered only so far as the public would 
 have considered it if the land had 
 been offered for sale in the absence 
 of the city's exercise of the power 
 of eminent domain. The fact that, 
 the most profitable use could be 
 made only in connection with other 
 land Is not conclusive against its 
 being taken into account if the union 
 of properties necessary Is so prac- 
 ticable that .the possibility would 
 affect the market price. But what 
 the owner is entitled to is the value 
 of the property taken, and that 
 means what it fairly may be be- 
 lieved that a purchaser In fair mar- 
 ket conditions would have given for 
 it in fact, not what a tribunal at a 
 later date may think a purchaser 
 would have been wise to give, nor a 
 proportion of the advance due to Its 
 union with other lots. The city is 
 not to be made to pay for any part 
 of what It has added to the land 
 by thus uniting it with other lots if 
 that union would not have been 
 practicable or have been attempted 
 except by the intervention of emi- 
 nent domain. Any rise in value be- 
 fore the taking not caused by the 
 expectation of that event is to be 
 
 allowed, but we repeat, It must be 
 a rise in what a purchaser might be 
 expected to give. It is said that in 
 this case there was testimony that 
 the lot was worth more than the 
 total allowed. But the only expla- 
 nation of the separation of items by 
 the commissioners is that they were 
 not prepared to say that the market 
 value of the lof was $11,948.90, see- 
 ing that the claimant bought it a 
 few days before for $4,500, but that 
 they thought the additional value 
 gained by the city's act should be 
 taken into account and shared be- 
 tween the city and the owner of the 
 land, a proposition to which we can- 
 not assent." 
 
 37. See comment on New York v. 
 Sage, supra, in XXIX Harvard Law 
 Review 428, in which it is said: 
 " If there is an appreciable possi- 
 bility that the land may be wanted 
 for the purpose in question by pur- 
 chasers not armed vrith compulsory 
 powers, the chance forms an ele- 
 ment of market value which unques- 
 tionably must be considered. But 
 where, as is certainly the case in 
 constructing railroads, and must 
 generally be the case in construct- 
 ing a very large reservoir, the mar- 
 ket is not appreciably affected by 
 such a possibility, this reasoning 
 fails. Two grounds might be sug- 
 gested on which a prospective de- 
 mand for property by a body armed 
 with compulsory powers could be 
 made the basis of a higher valua- 
 tion In eminent domain proceedings. 
 It may often be the case that the 
 tribunals fixing the compensation 
 are more favorably disposed toward 
 landowners than toward the con- 
 demning corporations, and may tend 
 to award more than the fair value 
 of the land. Certainly, if this 
 cause is operative at all, it is un- 
 fortunate enough of itself without 
 recognition by the law of its reflec- 
 tion In market value. The argu- 
 ment leads to the result that the 
 
§ 221 Valuation OF Pbopebty Taken FOE Public Use. 675 
 
 § 221. Appreciation in Value from the Improvement 
 Itself. 
 
 It rarely happens that proceedings for the condemnation 
 of land for the public use are instituted without months, 
 years, and, in some instances, centuries of time spent in 
 preliminary discussion and in the making of tentative plans. 
 These discussions and plans are usually known to the 
 owners and other persons interested in land in the vicinity 
 of the proposed improvement, and are matters of common 
 talk in the neighborhood. If the projected public work will 
 be injurious to the neighborhood through which it wiU 
 pass, the fact that it is hanging like the sword of Damocles 
 over the heads of the land owners in the vicinity cannot but 
 fail to have a depressing effect upon values, and on the 
 other hand if it is expected that the improvement will be 
 of such a character as to benefit the surrounding land, 
 values usually rise in anticipation of the construction of the 
 improvement. When the taking is finally made, the ques- 
 tion arises whether this anticipatory modification of values 
 should be considered in awarding damages. 
 
 If it is known from the very first exactly where the 
 improvement will be located if it is constructed at all, the 
 property that will be required for its site will not partici- 
 pate in the rise or fall in values, for since such property 
 is bound to be taken if the improvement is constructed, 
 it can never by any possibility either suffer from or enjoy 
 the effects of the maintenance of the public work in its 
 
 court must instruct the jury in as- cision, but liave assumed witliout 
 
 sessing damages to talse into ac- further analysis that a prospect of 
 
 count its own probable bias in compulsory taking enhances the 
 
 favor of one of the parties. Again, market value of the land, and 
 
 it might be urged that to avoid the should be reflected in the compen- 
 
 trouble and expense of compulsory sation allowed. It is submitted that 
 
 proceedings, corporations may be the whole doctrine leads to a per- 
 
 willing to buy the land for more petual trip around a vicious circle, 
 
 than it would be worth for purposes If the prospect of a generous award 
 
 other than those for which it is to Is reflected in a higher market 
 
 be used. Yet if it has in fact been value, and this higher market value 
 
 put to the expense pf such proceed- is then made the basis of an in- 
 
 ings, it is not just to require it to creased award, it follows that the 
 
 pay the expense over again, as a promise of this larger award will 
 
 part of the award. Generally, how- once more enhance the value, and 
 
 ever, the courts have not assigned that, conformably with the theory, 
 
 any particular reason for their de- a new Increment must be added to 
 
676 TsB Law op Emineis-t DoMaiK. § 221 
 
 neigliborhood; and consequently it is well settled that in 
 such case in valuing the land the effect of the proposed 
 improvement upon the neighborhood must be ignored.^* 
 
 It frequently happens that the exact site of the projected 
 improvement is not determined until the condemnation pro- 
 ceedings have been actually instituted and that it is only 
 known in a general way that it will be located in a certain 
 neighborhood. In such case the anticipatory rise and fall 
 in values may affect all land in the neighborhood, and it may 
 be the fact that when a certain location is taken, the land 
 acquired actually had on the day of the institution of pro- 
 ceedings a greater or less market value than it would have 
 had if there had been no preliminary discussion of the 
 improvement. If this modification of values is to be 
 disregarded, an exception to the rule that market value 
 is the test must be recognized. To allow a public agency 
 to depress market values in a particular neighborhood 
 by threatening to erect an offensive structure in its midst, 
 and then to take advantage of this depression in paying 
 for the land required for the structure would be so abhor- 
 rent to the public sense of justice that it has never been 
 seriously argued that it could be done ; when however the 
 situation is reversed, and the preliminary discussion has 
 enhanced the value of the land in the neighborhood, the 
 courts have not been inclined to create an exception to the 
 general rule that market value at the time of the taking 
 
 the award. An infinite series re- Massachusetts. — Dorgan v. Bos- 
 sults. The decision in the principal ton, 12 Allen 223 ; Cobb v. Boston, 
 case would therefore be sound. 112 Mass. 181; Howe v. Ray, 113 
 * * * To allow a purchaser to Mass. 88 ; Benton v. Brookline, 151 
 exact a high price for his lands sim- Mass. 250, 23 N. E. 846 ; May v. Bos- 
 ply because they are very necessary ton, 158 Mass. 21, 32 N. E. 902 ; 
 to the public is to defeat the whole Bowditch v. Boston, 164 Mass. 107, 
 purpose of eminent domain." 41 N. E. 132 ; Mowry v. Boston, 173 
 
 38. England.— In re Lucas, (1909) Mass. 425, 53 N. E. 885 ; Smith v. 
 
 1 K. B. 16. Commonwealth, 210 Mass. 259, 96 
 
 United States.— Vnited. States v. N. E. 666, Ann. Cas. 1912 C 1236. 
 
 Certain Lands in Narragansett, 180 Missouri.— St. Louis Electric Ter- 
 
 Fed. 260. minal Ry. Co. v. MacAdaras, 257 
 
 California.— San Diego Land & Mo. 448, 166 S. W. 307. 
 
 Town Co. V. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 20 New York.— In re Simmons, 130 
 
 Pac. 372, 3 L. R. A. 83. App. Div. 350, 356, 114 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 Louisiana.— Shreveport Traction 571, 575 ; affirmed, 195 N. Y. 573, 88 
 
 Co. V. Svara, 133 La. 900, 63 So. N. B. 1132. 
 396. 
 
§ 222 Valuation OF Pbopeety Taken FOB Public Use. 677 
 
 is the conclusive test and it is usually held that the owner 
 is entitled to the benefit of the appreciation in value from 
 the general expectation that the improvement for which 
 it was taken would soon be constructed.^® This would 
 undoubtedly be the rule if the improvement had actually 
 been located in the neighborhood of the land in question, 
 and such land had, by a change in the plan, been subse- 
 quently taken.*" A statute which denied compensation 
 for the added value except in such a case as last described 
 is however constitutional.*^ 
 
 § 222. Compensation when the Property is not Market- 
 able. 
 
 It occasionally happens that a parcel of real estate taken 
 by eminent domain is of such a nature, or is held or has been 
 improved in such a manner, that, while it serves a useful 
 purpose to its owner, if he desired to dispose of it he would 
 be unable to sell it at anything like its real value. A church, 
 or a college building, or a club-house located in a town 
 in which there was but one religious society, or college, 
 or club, might be worth all it cost to its owners, but would 
 be absolutely unmarketable. So also in many states an 
 owner of land abutting upon a public street might be very 
 glad that he owned the fee of the street, and was thus able 
 to protect himself against the use of the street for other 
 than street purposes without compensation; but it would 
 be almost impossible for him to sell his interest in the street 
 to a private purchaser. Even such a piece of property as 
 a mill site or a reservoir site, or a factory or store of 
 abnormal size may, to a somewhat less degree, be difficult 
 to dispose of, though of great value to its owner. , 
 
 In such a case as similar property is not commonly 
 bought and sold it is impossible to ascertain market value 
 
 39. Florida. — Sunday v. Louis- Ry. Co. v. Buskirk, 57 W. Va. 417, 
 
 ville, etc., R. R. Co., 62 Fla. 395, 57 50 S. E. 521, 110 Am. St. Rep. 785. 
 
 So. 351. ' 40. May v. Boston, 158 Mass. 21, 
 
 Georgia. — Gate City Terminal Co. '32 N. E. 902 ; Bowditch v. Boston, 
 
 V. Thrower, 136 Ga. 456, 71 S. E. 164 Mass. 107, 41 N. E. 132. 
 
 903. 41. Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen 
 
 Rhode Island.— StaSoTd Y. PvoYi- (Mass.) 223; May v. Boston, 158 
 
 denee, 10 R. I. 567, 14 Am. Rep. 710. Mass. 21, 30, 32 N. E. 902. 
 
 West Virginia.— Gnyandot Valley 
 
678 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 222 
 
 by the usual tests ; in fact as market value presupposes a 
 willing buyer the conditions upon which such value is based 
 are not present, and it is sometimes said that in cases of 
 this character market value is not the measure of compen- 
 sation and, as it is of course conceded that the owner cannot 
 on that account be deprived of his property without any 
 compensation whatever, some other measure is sought. It 
 must however be remembered that market value is always 
 based upon hypothetical conditions, and that it is never 
 necessary to show that there was in fact a person able and 
 willing to buy. The measure is still what another religious 
 society or college or club or public service corporation, or 
 abutting owner, would pay if there were one at hand, in 
 other words, the measure is still market value, but as the 
 usual means of ascertaining market value are lacking, other 
 means must from the necessity of the case be resorted to. 
 It is therefore proper in such cases to deduce market value 
 from the intrinsic value of the property, and its value to 
 its owners for their special purposes.*^ 
 
 42. United States. — Welser Valley 
 Land & Water Co. v. Ryan, 111 
 C. C. A. 221, 190 Fed. 417 (dam- 
 site for irrigation purposes). 
 
 California. — San Diego Land & 
 Town Co. V. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 20 
 Pac 372, 3 L. R. A. 83 (reservoir 
 site) . 
 
 Colorado.' — Colorado Midland R. 
 R. Co. V. Brown, 15 Colo. 193, 25 
 Pac. 87 (mill-site). 
 
 Georgia. — Elbert County v. Brown, 
 16 Ga. App. 834, 86 S. E. 651 ("ade- 
 quate compensation " may include 
 cost or value to the owner for the 
 purposes for which he designed to 
 use the property). 
 
 Idaho. — Idaho, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 Columbia Conference, 20 Idaho 568, 
 119 Pac. 60, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 497 
 (college campus). 
 
 Illinois. — Sanitary District of 
 Chicago V. Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co., 
 216 111. 575, 75 N. E. 248 (freight 
 terminal). 
 
 Massachusetts. — First Parish in 
 Woburn v. Middlesex County, 7 
 Gray 106 (church). Beale v. Bos- 
 ton, 166 Mass. 53, 43 N. E. 1029 
 (fee of street). In this case the 
 
 court said : " Ordinarily, where the 
 value of goods or lands is to be de- 
 termined, and they are of such a 
 kind and so situated as to be avail- 
 able for sale in the ordinary course 
 of trade or dealing, the market 
 value is perhaps the best test, and 
 under such circumstances it is 
 usually adopted in this Common- 
 wealth. But market value is not a 
 universal test, and cases often arise 
 where some other mode of ascer- 
 taining value must be resorted to. 
 Petitioner retained the ownership of 
 Tuttle St., subject to rights of way 
 and drainage which he had granted 
 therein. This title might not be 
 salable in the ordinary course of 
 dealing, and yet it might have a 
 real value to him, for which he was 
 entitled to be paid." Cochrane v. 
 Commonwealth, 175 Mass. 299, 56 
 N. E. 610, 78 Am. St. Rep. 491 
 (mill-site) ; Conness v. Common- 
 wealth, 185 Mass. 541, 69 N. E. 341 
 (mill-site) ; Smith v. Common- 
 wealth, 210 Mass. 259, 90 N. E. 666, 
 Ann. Cas. 1912 C 1236. " It is only 
 in those rare instances, when prop- 
 erty is of such a nature or so situ- 
 
§ 223 Y^^UATioN OF Peopbbty Taken FOB Public Use. 679 
 
 In the case of the fee of a street, the value of the property 
 for the only purpose for which it has value is not transfer- 
 able. The same is true of a cemetery, as in most juris- 
 dictions a private purchaser would not be allowed to 
 desecrate the graves of the dead. The owners of such 
 property are however entitled to full compensation if it 
 is taken by eminent domain. It sometimes even happens 
 that one of the features which gives a piece of property 
 its special value would be lost if the property was sold; 
 nevertheless the owner is entitled to the added value which 
 the feature in question gives to his property.*^ 
 
 § 223. Valuation of the Plant of a Public Service 
 Corporation. 
 
 A characteristic example of the class of property which 
 cannot be valued by the usual methods is the plant of a 
 public service corporation.** Cases have arisen from time 
 
 ated or improved that its real value 
 for actual use cannot be ascertained 
 by reference to market value, that 
 the standard of special value may 
 be resprted to." 
 
 New York. — Matter of New York, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 27 Hun 116 (aban- 
 doned canal bed taken for railroad ; 
 its value for railroad purposes 
 measure of damages). 
 
 Utah.— San Pedro, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Board of Education of Salt Lake 
 City, 35 Utah 13, 99 Pac. 263 (school 
 property). 
 
 Wisconsin. — Jeffrey v. Osborne, 
 145 Wis. 351, 129 N. W. 931 (manu- 
 facturing establishment). 
 
 43. Thus in Old South Associa- 
 tion V. Boston, 212 Mass. 299, 99 
 N. E. 235, It appeared that there 
 was taken by eminent domain prop- 
 erty which had been exempted from 
 taxation by special statute as long 
 as it remained in the hands of the 
 corporation which owned It when 
 it was taken. Although this ex- 
 emption was not transferable with 
 the property, and thus could not 
 affect the market value of the prop- 
 erty. It was held that it should be 
 taken into consideration in deter- 
 mining the value of the property for 
 the purposes of eminent domain. 
 
 44. As was said by the court in 
 San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego, 
 118 Cal. 556, 568, 50 Pac. 633, 38 
 L. R. A. 460, 62 Am. St. Rep. 261, 
 269 : " The judicial test of market 
 value depends upon the fact that the 
 property in question is marketable 
 at a given price which in turn de- 
 pends upon the fact that sales of 
 similar property have been and are 
 being made at ascertainable prices. 
 But such property as this Is not so 
 sold; at least, not often enough to 
 furnish a fair criterion; and the 
 very fact of governmental regula- 
 tion would necessarily control the 
 price." See also People v. State 
 Board of Tax Commissioners, 174 
 N. Y. 417, 439, 67 N. E. 69, 105 Am. 
 St. Rep. 674, 684, In which the court 
 said: "On the other hand, the 
 valuation of special franchises had 
 never been attempted before, but 
 presented a new field of action and 
 called for the exercise of new and 
 different functions. They could not 
 be seen, handled, measured, weighed 
 or counted. They were specialties 
 and had no market value. There 
 were no sales to guide and no ex- 
 ,perience from ownership, rental or 
 use to rely upon." 
 
680 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 223 
 
 to time for over a century in which turnpike roads or toll 
 bridges belonging to private corporations have been taken 
 by eminent domain in order to be established as public 
 highways. So also in more recent years a system for sup- 
 plying water or artificial light to the people of a designated 
 district, operated by a private corporation, has not infre- 
 quently been taken over by the municipality in which it is 
 located and subjected to municipal ownership and operas- 
 tion. In England the street railway or tramway systems 
 have in many cases been taken over by the municipality, 
 and a similar undertaking has frequently been proposed 
 in many American cities. In such a case the public service 
 corporation, the property of which is thus taken for a 
 public use, is entitled to just compensation, which is, as 
 in other cases of the exercise of eminent domain, the fair 
 market value of the property taken,*^ but to ascertain the 
 fair market value of the plant of a public service corpo- 
 ration is no easy matter. 
 
 The judicial valuation of the plants of public service 
 corporations is however required, not only in the case of 
 the taking over of such property by eminent domain and 
 the kindred case of the purchase of" such property, either 
 by mutual agreement or by virtue of a provision in the 
 franchise of the company, at a price fixed by arbitration, 
 but for other purposes as well, such as for determining 
 whether the rates fixed by public authority afford a fair 
 return on the property devoted to the public use, for pur- 
 poses of taxation, and for fixing the capitalization of such 
 a corporation when it is restricfted by law, and while there 
 are necessarily some differences in the methods of deter- 
 mining and applying the valuation for each of these pur- 
 poses,*^ the fundamental principles are essentially the 
 
 45. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & TJ. S. 180, 54 L. ed. 991, 54 L. R. A. 
 Trust Co., 154 TJ. S. 362, 410, 38 (N. S.) 1084. Thus the actual earn- 
 L. ed. 1014 ; Kennebec Water Dis- Ings are some evidence of the value 
 trict V. Waterville, 97 Me. 185, 54 of the franchise in eminent domain 
 Atl. 6, 60 L. R. A. 856 ; Mifflin proceedings ; but to allow the value 
 Bridge Co. v. Juniata County, 144 of the franchise to be reclioned in 
 Pa. 365, 22 Atl. 896, 13 L. R. A. this way for the purposes of rate 
 431 ; Westchester, etc., Road Co. v. regulation would establish an end- 
 Chester County, 182 Pa. 40, 37 Atl. less chain by means of which the 
 905. public might be compelled to pay 
 
 46. WlUcox V. Consolidated Gas excessive rates in the future be- 
 Co., 212 U. S. 19, 53 L. ed. 382 ; cause It had submitted to them in 
 Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 the past 
 
§ 223 Valuation OF Property Taken FOK Public Use. 681 
 
 same.*'' Upon this highly specialized subject a vast amount 
 of study has been expended, and conflicting theories have 
 grown up which are found set forth in the writings of 
 scientists and in the reports of public service commissions 
 and of similar bodies as well as in the decisions of the 
 courts. In fact the whole subject pertains more to the 
 science of civil engineering than to that of the law, and can 
 be discussed only in a general way in this work.*^ 
 
 When the plant of a public service corporation is taken 
 by eminent domain the corporation is not limited to the 
 value of its physical property,*® or to the cost of reproduc- 
 ing the same,^" but it is entitled to be paid the value of its 
 property and franchises taken together as a gping concern 
 and as parts of one system, and in reaching that value there 
 are a number of tests, no one of which is conclusive, but 
 each of which throws some light upon the subject of the 
 investigation. 
 
 The actual earnings of the corporation for a reasonable 
 period prior to the taking are sometimes offered as evi- 
 dence of the value of the plant, and it is frequently con- 
 tended when the earnings have been large that the value of 
 the plant can be accurately obtained merely by capitalizing 
 the net earnings on the basis of the prevailing rate of 
 interest. Such evidence is more convincing if confined in 
 its application to the value of the franchise apart from the 
 physical property, as there are so many other elements 
 which affect the value of the physical property that evi- 
 dence of the earnings or lack of earnings may be more 
 misleading than helpful in determining the value of the 
 plant as a whole. Even in determining the value of a 
 franchise there are objections to such evidence, and if the 
 company has no franchise it is rejected altogether since 
 there is no assurance that the earnings will continue.'^ 
 
 47. Spring Valley Waterworks v. 49. Infra, notes 56 and 63. 
 San Francisco, 124 Fed. 574 ; San 50. Infra, note 63. 
 
 Diego Water Co. v. San Diego, 118 51. National Waterworks Co. v. 
 
 Cal. 556, 567, 50 Pac. 633, 38 L. R. A. Kansas City, 10 C. C. A. 653, 62 
 
 460, 62 Am. St Rep. 261 ; State Fed. 853, 27 L. R. A. 827 ; Newbury- 
 
 ex rel. Bee Building Co. v. Savage, port Water Co. v. Newburyport, 168 
 
 65 Neb. 714, 91 N. W. 716. Mass. 541, 47 N. B. 533 (in discre- 
 
 48. See learned and exbaustive tion of trial court to reject or 
 notes in 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 770, 48 admit) ; Gloucester Water Supply 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1084, and Ann. Co. v. Gloucester, 179 Mass. 365, 
 Cas. 1915 B 1160. 60 N. E. 977 (evidence held prop- 
 
682 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 223 
 
 Nevertheless, if a corporation is actually doing business 
 under a franchise, its net income has some tendency to show 
 the fair value of its plant.®^ 
 
 When the capital stock of the corporation represents 
 the entire investment of capital, the market value of its 
 stock may be of some weight in determining the value of 
 the plant.*^ 
 
 The most approved method of valuing the plant is how- 
 ever to find the value of the franchise, and the value of the 
 tangible property separately, and to add to these items a 
 Certain sum which represents the additional value arising 
 from the fact that the company is a going concern. 
 
 That the franchise is property, which must be paid for,®* 
 unless it was expressly provided in the statute by which 
 the franchise was granted that it need not be,®^ is well 
 settled. The value of the franchise may be reached by 
 capitalizing the income which would probably be earned 
 during its existence over and above a fair return upon the 
 tangible property in the plant.®' If the franchise was no 
 
 erly excluded). Even when the 
 statute makes the measure of com- 
 pensation for the plant "Its fair 
 market value, including as an ele- 
 ment of such value, the earning ca- 
 pacity of such plant, based upon the 
 actual earnings," the earnings 
 should not be taken as the sole basis 
 of appraisal. Norwich G-as, etc., Co. 
 V. Norwich, 76 Conn. 565, 57 Atl. 
 746. 
 
 52. State v. Suffleld, etc., Bridge 
 Co., 82 Conn. 460, 74 Atl. 775 ; Ken- 
 nebec Water District v. Waterville, 
 97 Me. 185, 54 Atl. 6, 60 L. K. A. 
 856; Harrisburg, etc.. Turnpike 
 Road Co. V. Cumberland County, 225 
 Pa. 467, 74 Atl. 340. 
 
 53. Connecticut. — State v. Suf- 
 field, etc.. Bridge Co., 82 Conn. 460, 
 74 Atl. 775. 
 
 KentuGlty. — Richmond, etc.. Turn- 
 pike Co. V. Madison County Court, 
 114 Ky. 351, 70 S. W. 1044 (but see 
 Bardstown, etc.. Turnpike Co. v. 
 Nelson County, 117 Ky. 674, 78 
 S. W. 851). 
 
 Massachusetts. — Newburyport 
 Water Co. v. Newburyport, 168 
 Mass. 541, 556, 47 N. E. 533. 
 
 ("We are not prepared to say that 
 the price of Norman's stock was in- 
 admissible. But it gave a value for 
 the total property so far away from 
 the award that it is not necessary 
 to discuss the question, since it was 
 not adopted as a standard.") 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Montgomery 
 County V. Schuylkill Bridge Co., 110 
 Pa. 54, 20 Atl. 407; Mifflin Bridge 
 Co. V. Juniata County, 144 Pa. 365, 
 22 Atl. 896, 13 L. R. A. 431; In re 
 Monongahela Water Co., 223 Pa. 
 323, 72 Atl. 625. 
 
 54. Supra, § 123. 
 
 55. Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha, 
 218 TJ. S. 180, 54 L. ed. 991, 48 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1084; Newburyport 
 Water Co. v. Newburyport, 168 
 Mass. 541, 47 N. E. 533 ; Gloucester 
 Water Supply Co. v. Gloucester, 179 
 Mass. 365, 60 N. E. 977 ; Eau Claire 
 V. Eau Claire Water Co., 137 Wis. 
 517, 119 N. W. 555. 
 
 56. United States. — Monongahela 
 Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 
 II. S. 312, 37 L. ed. 463. 
 
 Connecticut. — State v. Suffleld, 
 etc.. Bridge Co., 82 Conn. 460, 74 
 Atl. 775. 
 
§ 223 Valuation OF Pbopebty Taken FOE Public Use. 683 
 
 more than an indeterminate permit which necessarily has 
 come to an end when the proceedings to take over the plant 
 were instituted, it can have no value,^' and if the franchise 
 is not exclusive in terms, in computing its value the fact 
 that its earning power might be impaired by the grant of 
 a similar franchise must be considered,^* and in any event 
 the past earnings are not a conclusive indication of what 
 will probably be earned in the future, because physical 
 conditions may change and the rates may be reduced by 
 public authority.*^ 
 
 In determining the present value of the physical prop- 
 erty, the actual cost, with an allowance for depreciation 
 and obsolescence, is not a conclusive test, for the money 
 may have been improvidently expended, or by reason of a 
 change in conditions parts of the works may have ceased 
 to be of value, or the cost of labor and materials may have 
 increased or decreased.®" Nevertheless it is generally 
 
 Maine. — Kennebec Water District 
 V. WatervUle, 97 Me. 185, 54 Atl. 6, 
 60 L. R. A. 856. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Montgomery 
 County V. Schuylkill Bridge Co., 110 
 Pa. 54, 20 Atl. 407; Mifflin Bridge 
 Co. V. Juniata County, 144 Pa. 365, 
 22 Atl. 896, 13 L. R. A. 431 ; Clarion 
 Turnpike, etc., Co. v. Clarion 
 County, 172 Pa. 243, 33 Atl. 580; 
 West Chester, etc.. Plank Road Co. 
 V. Chester County, 182 Pa. 40, 37 
 Atl. 905 ; Harrisburg, etc.. Turnpike 
 Road Co. V. Cumberiand County, 
 225 Pa. 467, 74 Atl. 340. 
 
 The value of a franchise depends 
 upon its earning capacity, but 
 whether it " largely " depends upon 
 that element is for the jury. Chest- 
 nut Hill, etc., Road Co. v. Mont- 
 gomery County, 228 Pa. 1, 76 Atl. 
 726. 
 
 57. Appleton Water Works Co. v. 
 Railroad Commission, 154 Wis. 121, 
 142 N. W. 476, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 770, Ann Oas. 1915 B 1160. So 
 also when the franchise has expired. 
 Sears v. Tuolumne County, 132 Cal. 
 167, 64 Pac. 270. When the fran- 
 chise Is subject to termination at 
 any time, it should be considered in 
 
 the valuation, with due regard to 
 the fact that it Is subject to termi- 
 nation. Brunsvrick, etc., Water Dis- 
 trict V. Maine Water Co., 99 Me. 
 371, 59 Atl. 537 ; SpringHeld v. West 
 Springfield Aqueduct Co., 167 Mass. 
 128, 44 N. E. 1063. 
 
 58. In re Brooklyn, 143 N. Y. 596, 
 38 N. E. 983, 26 L. R. A. 270, 
 aflSrmed, sub nom. Long Island 
 Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 
 U. S. 685, 41 L. ed. 1165. 
 
 59. Kennebec Water District v. 
 WatervUle, 97 Me. 185, 54 Atl. 6, 
 60 L. R. A. 856. 
 
 60. United States. — National Wa- 
 terworks Co. V. Kansas City, 10 
 C. C. A. 653, 62 Fed. 853, 27 L. R. A. 
 827. 
 
 Kansas. — State v. Pierce, 52 Kan. 
 521, 35 Pac. 19. 
 
 Maine. — Kennebec W-ater District 
 V. WatervUle, 97 Me. 185, 54 Atl. 6, 
 60 L. R. A. 856. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Mifflin Bridge Co. 
 V. Juniata County, 144 Pa. 365, 22 
 Atl. 896, 13 L. E. A. 431. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Eau Claire v. Eau 
 Claire Water Co., 137 Wis. 517, 119 
 N. W. 555. 
 
684 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 223 
 
 considered that evidence of the original cost is competent.*^ 
 Opinion evidence of the present cost of duplicating the 
 plant is however considered more reliable, unless it appears 
 that certain portions of the works are no longer desirable, 
 and the cost which would necessarily be incurred by a 
 reasonably prudent man, using ordinarily careful business 
 methods in reproducing a plant of equal efficiency, with a 
 reasonable allowance for depreciation, is taken as the value 
 of the bare physical property.®^ 
 
 Even when it is expressly provided in the company's 
 franchise that if the plant is taken over for public owner- 
 ship the company shall receive no compensation for the 
 unexpired term, or when the franchise is no more than an 
 indeterminate permit which by the act of the public authori- 
 ties in instituting proceedings to condemn the plant has 
 ceased to exist so that the company is entitled to receive 
 nothing for the taking of its franchise, the compensation is 
 not limited to the bare bones of the plant, its physical 
 properties, such as its lands, its machinery, and its pipes 
 or wires, nor to what it would cost to reproduce each of its 
 physical features., The value, in fairness and justice, must 
 include whatever is contributed by the fact that these items 
 are connected and constitute a complete and operating 
 plant."^ The difference in value between a dead plant and 
 
 61. Chaplin, etc., Turnpike Road Oregon. — Little Nestucca Road 
 
 Co. V. Nelson County, 25 Ky. L. Rep. Co. v. Tillamook County, 31 Ore. 1, 
 
 1154, 77 S. W. 377 ; Kennebec Water 48 Pac. 465, 65 Am. St. Rep. 802. 
 
 District v. Waterville, 97 Me. 185, Pennsylvania.— WiUia.msport v. 
 
 54 Atl. 6, 60 L. R. A. 856 j Brans- Citizens Water & Gas Co., 232 Pa. 
 
 wick, etc., Water District v. Maine ^32, 81 Atl. 316. 
 
 Water Co., 99 Me. 371, 59 Atl. 538; 62. Stockton, etc., Water Board v. 
 
 •«TT.,„j-„v,„„*„- „+„ Tjin,,!, Tf^aA p-n Klrklcatliam Local Board, (1893) 
 
 Westchester, etc.. Plank Road Co. ri aa^ ca r t ri tj /w a \ kr 
 
 „. . ~ .„ TOO T»„ An Qi A. G. 444, 63 L. J. Q. B. (JN. b.) 56, 
 
 IV, on. J? ^' ,;• t ' Z 69 L. T. N. g. 661 ; State V. Suffield, 
 
 Atl. 905. For cases m which the ^ g^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^ 
 
 actual cost with an allowance for ^^g. g^^^^, ^ ^^^^^^^ ^^.^ ^ater- 
 
 interest on the capital invested was ^Qj-ks 23 R. I 274 49 Atl. 975 ; 
 
 made the measure of compensation ^ppjeton Water Works v. Railroad 
 
 by a statute accepted when the Commission, 154 Wis. 121, 142 
 
 franchise was granted, see, n_ i^j 476^ 47 l_ r_ a. (N. S.) 770, 
 
 Massachusetts. — Central Bridge Ann. Cas. 1915 B 1160. 
 
 Co. V. Lowell, 15 Gray 106; Fal- 63. England. — t, o n d o n Street 
 
 mouth V. Falmouth Water Co., 180 Tramways Co. v. London City Coun- 
 
 Mass. 325, 62 N. E. 255; Tisbury v. cil, (1894) 2 Q. B. 189, affirmed. 
 
 Vineyard Haven Water Co., 193 (1894) A. C. 489, 25 Bng. Rul. Cas. 
 
 Mass. 196, 79 N. E. 256. 267 ; Edinburgh Street Tramways 
 
§ 223 Valtjation OF Propeety Taken FOB PiTBLic Use. 685 
 
 a live one is represented by what is known as the " going 
 value."®* The going value is a real value and is inde- 
 pendent of any franchise to continue the business, or of 
 any mere good will as between such a plant and its cus- 
 tomers. That kind of good will is of little or no commercial 
 value when the business is a natural monopoly, with which 
 the customer must deal whether he wishes to or not.®^ 
 
 That there is a difference between the cost of duplication, 
 less depreciation, of the elements making up the plant of 
 a public service corporation, and the commercial value of 
 the business as a going concern is evident. How to deter- 
 mine that value is another matter. Capitalization of the 
 earnings has all the disadvantages as a test that exist when 
 it is used for determining the value of a franchise. The 
 actual cost of establishing the business is sometimes con- 
 sidered the measure of the value of the business as estab- 
 lished. As was said by the Wisconsin Eailroad Commis- 
 sion,®® 
 
 Co. V. Edinburgh, (1894) A. C. 456, 
 63 L. J. Q. B. (N. S.) 767. 
 
 United States. — Omaha v. Omaha 
 Water Co., 218 U. S. 180, 54 L. ed. 
 991, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1084; Na- 
 tional Waterworks v. Kansas City, 
 10 C. C. A. 653, 62 Fed. 853, 27 
 L. R. A. 827. 
 
 Connecticut. — Norwich Gas, etc., 
 Co. V. Norwich, 76 Conn. 465, 57 
 Atl. 746. 
 
 Kansas. — Galena Water Co. v. 
 Galena, 74 Kan. 644, 87 Pac. 735. 
 
 Kentucky. — Covington Gas Light 
 Co. V. Covington, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 
 796, 58 S. W. 805. 
 
 Maine. — Kennebec Water District 
 V. Waterville, 97 Me. 185, 54 Atl. 
 6, 60 L. R. A. 856; Brunswick, etc., 
 Water District v. Maine Water Co., 
 99 Me. 371, 59 Atl. 537. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Newbury port 
 Water Co. v. Newburyport, 168 
 Mass. 541, 47 N. E. 533 ; Gloucester 
 Water Supply Co. v. Gloucesrter, 179 
 Mass. 365, 60 N. B. 977. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Re Monongahela 
 Water Co., 223 Pa. 323, 72 Atl. 625. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Eau Claire v. Eau 
 
 Claire Water Co., 137 Wis. 517, 119 
 N. W. 555; Appleton Water Works 
 V. Railroad Commission, 154 Wis. 
 121, 142 N. W. 476, 47 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 770, Ann. Cas. 1915 B 1160. 
 
 64. Going value is defined in 
 Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 
 212 U. S. 1, 53 L. ed. 371, as the 
 added value of the plant as a whole 
 over the sum of the values of its 
 component parts, which is attached 
 to it because it is in active and 
 successful operation and earning a 
 return. 
 
 65. Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha, 
 218 TJ. S. 180, 54 L. ed. 991, 48 
 I;. R. A. (N. S.) 1084; Kennebec 
 Water District v. Waterville, 97 Me. 
 185, 54 Atl. 6, 60 L. R. A. 856; 
 Bristol V. Bristol, etc., Waterworks, 
 23 R. I. 274, 49 Atl. 975. 
 
 66. Hill V. Antigo Water Co., 3 
 Wis. R. R. Com. Rep. 623. See also 
 Public Service Gas Co. v. Public 
 TJtility Commissioners, 84 N. J. L. 
 463, 87 Atl. 651; Pioneer Tel., etc., 
 Co. V. Westenhaver, 29 Okla. 429* 
 118 Pac. 354, 38 L. R. A. (N. S ) 
 1209. 
 
686 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 223 
 
 "A mere physical plant, no matter how perfect or 
 how well it is adapted to the purpose for which it is 
 intended, amounts to but little unless it has or can 
 obtain a paying business. Without business it is a 
 dead mass instead of a living concern earning profits. 
 To have profits, it must have business or customers 
 who avail themselves of the services it renders at rates 
 that yield an adequate income. But new plants are 
 seldom paying at the start. Several years are usually 
 required before they obtain a sufficient amount of 
 business or earnings to cover operating expenses, 
 including depreciation and a reasonable rate of interest 
 upon the investment. The amount by which the earn- 
 ings fail to meet these requirements may thus be 
 regarded as deficits from the operation. These deficits 
 constitute the cost of building up the business of the 
 plant." 
 
 Actual cost however frequently differs from actual value, 
 for reasons already pointed out, and the foregoing test 
 when applied to this subject matter would indicate a value 
 to the business directly in proportion to the difficulty in 
 building it up, which is contrary to the common experience 
 of mankind.®^ If these tests of the value of a going busi- 
 
 67. As was said by the court in in building up the business of a 
 the case of Appleton Waterworks number of concerns of like charac- 
 Co. V. Railroad Commission, 154 ter, and thus establishing what may 
 Wis. 121, 147, 142 N. W. 476, 47 be called a curve which can be used 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 770, Ann. Cas. in determining the time and outlay 
 1915 B 1160: "Again, it has been which would be reasonably neces- 
 thought that going value might be sary in the instant case. It is 
 measured by ascertaining as nearly quite apparent that the result 
 as possible the cost of reproducing reached by either of the suggested 
 the existing business, sometimes methods could hardly be considered 
 called the unrequited outlay, i. e. as anything more than suggestive, 
 the amount of the deficits which and that its persuasiveness would 
 would be Incurred added to the necessarily depend upon many other 
 promotion expenses necessary to be facts which must enter into the gen- 
 incurred up to the time the new eral problem of value. The actual 
 plant would have a business equal original cost of establishing the 
 to that of the present plant ; or business of the existing plant is 
 again, by ascertaining the actual very clearly unsatisfactory to the 
 unrequited outlay in building up the last degree as a test of going value, 
 present business ; or again, by ascer- because it may have been wasteful 
 talning the average time and pro- and extravagant, and because also 
 portlonal outlay actually incurred it is well knovra that the building 
 
§ 223 Valuation OF Pbopeett Taken FOB Public Use. 687 
 
 ness are rejected, there is nothing left but the more or less 
 arbitrary estimates of experts, and it is on such evidence 
 that it is usually necessary to rely.®^ 
 
 The fundamental diflficulty with the attempt to set a 
 definite sum as the measure of going value is that it is an 
 attempt to divide a thing which is in its nature practically 
 indivisible. The value of the plant and business is an 
 indivisible gross amount. While a division into separate 
 items may be of some assistance in getting at the value, 
 it cannot in the nature of things be definitely determined 
 by adding up a number of separate items, but it can only 
 be arrived at by taking a comprehensive view of each and 
 all of the elements of property, tangible and intangible, 
 including property rights, and considering them all not 
 as separate things, but as inseparable parts of one harmoni- 
 ous entity, and exercising a trained judgment as to the 
 value of that entity.** In this way the going value enters 
 into the final result, but it would be difficult for even an 
 expert to say how many dollars of the result represent it.'"* 
 
 up of the business of a water plant 
 thirty years ago, before sewerage 
 systems had become common and 
 the private water supply had been 
 discredited was a much slower 
 process than at the present time, 
 when in such a city as Appleton 
 the population has been educated 
 to use the public supply of water. 
 Estimates of cost of working up a 
 business under present conditions 
 approach nearer to the requirements 
 of a test, but they must always 
 remain estimates, however carefully 
 they be conducted; they cannot be 
 called facts." 
 
 68. In Pioneer Tel., etc., Co. v. 
 Westenhaver, 29 Okla. 429, 118 Pac. 
 354, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1209, 20 
 per cent, and in Public Service Gas 
 Co. V. Public Utilities Commission- 
 ers, 84 N. J. L. 463, 87 Atl. 651, 30 
 per cent, of the structural value 
 was added to represent going value. 
 
 69. People v. State Board of Tax 
 Commissioners, 174 N. T. 417, 441, 
 67 N. E. 69. 105 Am. St. Rep. 674, 
 685. 
 
 70. Appleton Waterworks Co. v. 
 Railroad Commission, 154 Wis. 121, 
 148, 142 N. W. 476, 47 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 770, Ann. Cas. 1915 B 1160. 
 See also Brunswick, etc., Water 
 District v. Maine Water Co., 99 Me. 
 371, 59 Atl. 537, in which the court 
 said: "The value of the structure 
 is enhanced by the fact that it is 
 being used in, and in fact is essen- 
 tial to, a going concern business. 
 We speak sometimes of a going con- 
 cern value as if it is, or could be, 
 separate and distinct from structure 
 value, — so much for structure and 
 so much for going concern. But this 
 is not an accurate statement. The 
 going concern part of it has no ex- 
 istence except as a characteristic of 
 the structure. If no structure, no 
 going concern. If a structure In 
 use, i,t is a structure whose value is 
 affected by the fact that it Is in use. 
 There is only one value. It is the 
 value of the structure as being 
 used." 
 
688 The Law op Eminent Domalbt, §§ 224, 225 
 
 § 224. Effect of Impending Destruction upon Market 
 Value. 
 
 Just as the availability of land for any purpose may be 
 considered as enhancing its value, so the existence of cir- 
 cumstances which will render land unavailable may be 
 considered as tending to show that its market value is less 
 than its usefulness at the time of the taking would seem 
 to indicate. Thus if the property taken would have been 
 destroyed by natural causes in a shorttime, this fact may 
 be considered as tending to show that its market value 
 was less than that of similar property not so threatened.'^^ 
 
 When property has come into existence in violation of 
 law, it will be treated for the purposes of the exercise of 
 eminent domain as if it was not in existence at all, since the 
 owner's claim for compensation rests wholly upon his own 
 unlawful act.'^^ On the other hand, the fact that the prop- 
 erty is subject to forfeiture by the state on account of the 
 unfaithfulness of its owners in the performance of public 
 duties cannot be considered in determining its value. 
 Whether the state would ever institute process for for- 
 feiture, and, if it did, whether the court would reach the 
 same conclusion as the tribunal seeking to ascertain the 
 value of the property, would be questions too speculative 
 and would raise issues too collateral to be passed upon in 
 eminent domain procedings.''* 
 
 § 225. When the Full Market Value of the Land must be 
 Paid for the Taking of an Easement. 
 
 In the great majority of cases in which land is taken by 
 eminent domain the title acquired is not a fee, but is merely 
 an easement, and the right of the owner of the fee to 
 prevent the use of the land for any purpose other than that 
 for which it was taken unless additional compensation is 
 paid to him is well recognized by the law and is frequently 
 
 71. Bishop V. Mayor of Macon, 7 buildings were erected without ap- 
 Ga. 200, 50 Am. Dec. 400 (fire) ; proval of the plans, as required by 
 Mifflin Bridge Co. v. Juniata the Building Code, the land was 
 County, 144 Pa. 365, 22 Atl. 896, 13 vacant for the purposes of ec-n- 
 L. R. A. 431 (erosion). demnation. 
 
 72. Thus In Coady v. Thatcher, 73. Kennebec Water District v. 
 146 App. Dlv. (N. Y.) 585, 131 N. T. Waterville, 97 Me. 185, 54 Atl. 6, 60 
 Supp. 178, it was held that when L. R. A. 856. 
 
§ 225 Valuation OF Peopeety Taken FOB Public Use. 689 
 
 enforced.''* Nevertheless, when land is taken for such pur- 
 poses as a highway or a railroad, which require a perma- 
 nent and substantially exclusive occupation of the surface, 
 the distinction between the taking of the fee and of the 
 easement has no practical application in the determination 
 of the compensation to be assessed for the land actually 
 taken. While the damages to the owner's remaining land 
 may be less if the use of the land taken is limited by the 
 nature of the easement, the interest remaining in the owner 
 of the fee in the land taken is in such case of nominal 
 value, and he is awarded the same measure of compensation 
 for the land actually taken as if the fee was acquired by 
 the condemning party, namely, the full market value of 
 the land.^^ 
 
 74. Supra, §§ 150, 151. 
 
 75. Thus in Southern Pacific 
 Railroad Co. v. San Francisco Sav- 
 ings Union, 146 Cal. 290, 79 Pac. 
 961, 70 L. R. A. 221, 106 Am. St. 
 Rep. 36, 2 Ann. Cas. 962, the court 
 said : " While It is no doubt true 
 that under the law of this state a 
 railroad company is only entitled to 
 acquire by condemnation proceed- 
 ings an easement over the land, and 
 that the fee thereof remains in the 
 owner, yet, in most condemnation 
 cases by railroad companies, this 
 distinction, as far as it enters into 
 a determination of the damages to 
 be assessed for the right of way ac- 
 quired thereby, has no practical 
 application. Usually in such cases 
 there is no substantial difference in 
 value between the easement and 
 the fee of which the law will take 
 notice. Hence, in ordinary cases, 
 where condemnation for a right of 
 way for railroad purposes is sought, 
 evidence is permitted to show, as 
 the damages sustained, the full 
 value of the land taken, upon the 
 theory that the easement will be 
 perpetual; that the right of way 
 acquired, though technically an 
 easement, will be permanent in its 
 nature, and the possibility of aban- 
 donment by non-user so remote and 
 improbable as not to be taken into 
 consideration; that the exercise of 
 the right will require practically the 
 
 44 
 
 exclusive use of the surface, and 
 that any interest which might be 
 reserved to the owner in the fee 
 would only be a nominal one and 
 of no value. Under such circum- 
 stances, as there can be no sub- 
 stantial determinative value in the 
 fee apart from the easement, the 
 law will not consider them sepa- 
 rately, but will require the con- 
 demning corporation to pay the 
 value of the fee as the measure of 
 damages sustained. To illustrate: 
 Where a right of way is condemned 
 over agricultural land or over build- 
 ing lots, this is in effect to take the 
 entire value of the land. In either 
 case the underlying ground upon 
 which the easement is imposed can 
 be of no value to the owner. The 
 sole value of such 'lauds consists of 
 the use to which the owner could 
 devote the surface — to cultivation 
 or building — and when he is de- 
 prived of that use, the entire value 
 of the land is taken from him, and, 
 hence, for all beneficial purposes to 
 the owner, there can be no differ- 
 ence in value between the easement 
 and the fee; they are substantially 
 identical in value." See also 
 Holmes, J., in Lincoln v. Common- 
 wealth, 164 Mass. 1, 41 N. E. 112. 
 "As practically the landowners get 
 the full market value of the land in 
 such cases, if there is any injustice 
 it is not they who suffer it." See 
 
690 
 
 The Law op Eminent Domain. 
 
 § 225 
 
 In some cases however, even when land is taken for a 
 highway or a railroad, by reason of the existence of 
 minerals or oil or other valuable deposits which can be 
 taken out withput interfering with the public use of the 
 land, the interest remaining in the owner has a real and 
 substantial value, and in such case the owner is not entitled 
 to recover the full market value of the land taken but 
 merely the decrease in market value that is due to the 
 imposition of the public easement ; in other words in award- 
 ing compensation the value of the interest in the land 
 remaining to the owner is to be deducted from the fair 
 market value of the landJ" So also when an easement is 
 
 also Brown v. Title Guaranty & 
 Surety Co., 232 Pa. 337, 81 Atl. 410. 
 This principle is so well established 
 that it is generally assumed with- 
 out discussion. See the cases cited 
 supra, §§ 217-219 inc., in which the 
 measure of market value of the 
 land was applied in numerous cases, 
 in the majority of which only an 
 easement was taken. See however 
 Custer V. Dawson, 178 Mich. 367, 
 144 N. W. 862, in which it was held 
 that in awarding damages for land 
 condemned for a highway, the fact 
 that the fee remains in the land- 
 owner must be considered, and Ala- 
 bama, etc., E. R. Co. V. Burkett, 42 
 Ala. 83, in which the court said: 
 " What, If anything, would be left 
 to the land owner of vp.lue consist- 
 ent with the enjoyment of the ease- 
 ment by the railroad company 
 should also be considered." 
 
 76. Thus in Southern Pacific R. 
 R. Co. V. San Francisco Savings 
 Union, 146 Cal. 290, 79 Pac. 961, 70 
 L. R. A. 221, 106 Am. St. Rep. 36, 
 2 Ann. Cas. 962, the court said: 
 " But while it is the rule that where 
 there is practically no substantial 
 difference between the value of the 
 fee and the value of the easement, 
 the court may properly permit the 
 value of the fee to be proven and 
 assessed by the jury as the dam- 
 ages, yet, in theory, the distinction 
 between the two remains, and in all 
 cases where it can be shown as a 
 fact that the fee, burdened with the 
 easement, is of some substantial 
 
 value to the owner, this value Is 
 reserved to him, and must be taken 
 Into consideration in determining 
 the damages to be awarded for the 
 imposition of an easement upon the 
 land. In condemning for a right of 
 way, no more land and no greater 
 Interest in it can be taken by the 
 railroad company than the public 
 use requires, which is ordinarily 
 the surface of the land. While it Is 
 true, as we have pointed out, that 
 imder some circumstances, in assess- 
 ing damages, the value of the fee of 
 the land taken is awarded, yet this 
 is because in the nature of things 
 there can be no difference in value 
 between them. When, however, 
 such a difference does exist, the rule 
 is different, and the value of the 
 easement taken as distinguished 
 from the value of the fee, Is alone 
 to be ascertained by the jury, and 
 the owner compensated therefor. 
 And this difference in value may, 
 and usually does, exist to a greater 
 or less degree in all cases where the 
 underlying estate Is valuable for the 
 minerals it contains, and when but 
 a portion of the owner's land which 
 contains them is burdened with the 
 easement." See also 
 
 Iowa. — HoUingsworth v. Des 
 Moines, etc., R. R. Co., 63 Iowa 444, 
 19 N. W. 325. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Tyler v. Hudson, 
 147 Mass. 609, 18 N. E. 582. 
 
 Minnesota. — Robbins v. St. Paul, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 22 Minn. 287. 
 
§ 225 Valuation OF Peopekty Taken FOE Public Use. 691 
 
 taken which does not require an exclusive occupation of 
 the surface, such as the right to lay and maintain telegraph 
 wires, or subterranean pipes, over or through private land, 
 the owner is not entitled to recover the entire market value 
 of the land subjected to the easement." 
 
 Similarly it is perfectly proper, when a taking is made 
 for a public use which ordinarily requires the exclusive 
 occupation of the surface, to reserve to the owner certain 
 specific rights and privileges in the property taken which, 
 in the absence of such reservation, he would not be per- 
 mitted to enjoy, as for example a right to use a certain 
 crossing when a railroad is laid out through a farm, and in 
 such a case these reserved rights should be taken into con- 
 sideration in awarding damages.''* It is not an attempt 
 
 Montana. — Northern Pacific, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Forbis, 15 Mont 459, 
 39 Pac. 571, 48 Am. St. Rep. 692. 
 
 New Hampshire. — Blake v. Rich, 
 34 N. H. 289. 
 
 Ohio.— Phlfer v. Cox, 21 Ohio St 
 255, 8 Am. Rep. 58. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Penn Gas Coal 
 Co. V. Versailles Fuel Gas Co., 131 
 Pa. 532, 19 Atl. 933. 
 
 77. Illinois. — Illinois Telegraph 
 News Co. V. Melne, 242 111. 568, 90 
 N. E. 230 (compensation for tele- 
 graph right of way is the value of 
 the land actually occupied by the 
 poles and the decrease in the value 
 of the land between the poles result- 
 ing from the right of the company 
 to use it, jointly with the owner, 
 for construction, maintenance and 
 repair of lines). 
 
 Maryland. — Taylor v. Baltimore, 
 45 Md. 576 (water-pipe). 
 
 New York. — Jerome v. Ross, 7 
 Johns. Ch. 315, 11 Am. Dec. 484 
 (temporary entry) ; New York Cen- 
 tral, etc., R. R. Co. V. Untermyer, 
 196 N. Y. 531, 89 N. E. 1106 (ease- 
 ment of slope) ; In re City of New 
 York, 119 N. Y. Supp. 1054. (When 
 an easement is taken only actual 
 damages can be awarded, and not 
 damages on a theory of a " cloud on 
 the title " caused by the taking.) 
 
 Ohio.— Phifer v. Cox, 21 Ohio St 
 255, 8 Am. Rep. 58. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — McGregor v. Equi- 
 table Gas Co., 139 Pa. 230, 21 AU. 
 13 (gas-pipe line). 
 
 78. Connecticut. — Windsor v. 
 Field, 1 Conn. 279. 
 
 Illinois. — Hayes v. Ottawa, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 54 111. 373 ; Chicago, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Jollet, 105 111. 388, 44 
 Am. Rep. 799; Elgin, etc, R. R. Co. 
 V. Fletcher, 128 III. 619; PinkstafC 
 V Allison Ditch District, 213 111. 
 186, 72 N. E. 715 ; Smith v. Claussen 
 Park Drainage District, 229 111. 155, 
 82 N. E. 278. 
 
 Indiana. — Evansville Terminal 
 Ry. Co. V. Herdink, 174 Ind. 537, 92 
 'N. E. 548. 
 
 Kansas. — Kansas Central R. R. 
 Co. V. Allen, 22 Kan. 285, 31 Am. 
 Rep. 190; Kansas City, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Kregelo, 32 Kan. 608 ; Wuester 
 V. Topeka, etc., R. R. Co., 85 Kan. 
 636, 11 Pac. 1054. 
 
 Louisiana. — Hunsicker v. Briscoe, 
 12 La. Ann. 169. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Ham v. Salem, 
 100 Mass. 350 ; Tyler v. Hudson, 147 
 Mass. 609, 18 N. E. 582; Conklm v. 
 Old Colony R. R. Co., 154 Mass. 155, 
 28 N. E. 143. 
 
 Missouri. — St. Louis, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Clark, 121 Mo. 169, 195, 25 
 S. W. 192, 906, 26 L. R. A. 751. 
 
 New Jersey. — Packard v. Bergen 
 Neck R. R. Co., 54 N. J. L. 553, 25 
 Atl. 506. 
 
 South Carolina. — Charleston, etc., 
 R. R. Co. V. Blake, 12 Rich. L. 634. 
 
692 The Law or Eminent Domain. § 226 
 
 to pay for the property taken in privileges instead of in 
 money, but an exact determination of what has been taken 
 and a limitation of the extent of the taking to the demands 
 of public necessity and convenience. 
 
 Privileges in the property taken, the enjoyment of which 
 is not ordinarily compatible with the exercise of the ease- 
 ment taken, cannot however be considered in awarding com- 
 pensation xmless they are formally established by the con- 
 demnation proceedings; privileges which are merely per- 
 missive and subject to revocation by the condemning party 
 at any time cannot be availed of in reduction of damages,''® 
 and an allowance of certain privileges as damages after a 
 definite public easement has been taken is objectionable as 
 a payment of compensation in a medium other than money .*•* 
 
 § 226. Vegetable Growth and Mineral Deposits. 
 
 When a tract of land taken by eminent domain contains 
 ore, stone, coal, sand, gravel, peat, loam, oil or gas or other 
 valuable deposits, which constitute part of the realty, or is 
 covered with growing crops, or with trees capable of being 
 converted into lumber, the existence of these features can 
 be taken into consideration in determining the compensa- 
 tion so far as they affect the market value of the land;®^ 
 
 Washington. — Oregon, etc., Nav. Georgia. — Atlanta Terra Cotta 
 
 Co. V. Owsley, 3 Wash. Terr. 38; Co. v. Georgia, etc., K. R. Co., 132 
 
 Olympia Light & Power Co. v. Har- Ga. 537, 64 S. E. 563. 
 
 ris, 58 Wash. 410, 108 Pac. 940. Illinois.— Uaslam v. Galena, etc., 
 
 79. Illinois.— Chicago, etc., R. R. R. e. Co., 64 111. 353. 
 
 Co. V. Springfield, etc., R. R. Co., Iowa.— Dond v. Mason City, etc., 
 
 67 lU. 142 Ry. Co., 76 Iowa 438, 41 N. W. 65. 
 
 Massacnusetts. — nam \. Salem, Massachusetts.— Gae v. Stevens, 
 
 100 Mass. 350 ; Presbrey v. Old Col- ^g g^ay 146 ; Providence, etc., R. R. 
 
 ony, etc., R. R. Co., 103 Mass. 1; go. v. Worcester, 155 Mass. 35, 29 
 
 Old Colony R. R Co. v. Miller, 125 j^_ ^_ gg. Manning v. LoweU, 173 
 
 Mass. 1 28 Am Rep 194; Drury v. ^^^_ gg j^ ^_ 
 
 Midland R. R. Co., 127 Mass. 571 Minnesota.- Cameron v. Chicago, 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Pittsburg, etc., 4. -n r, r-, ,,,• -.^^ .^ -..t ^ 
 
 R. R. Co. V. Rose, 74 Pa. 362. ^^' ^^- ^o- 51 Minn. 160, 53 N. W. 
 
 80. Supra, § 205. ^^;; ^ ^^ ^^ „ .^ „ 
 
 81. United S*aies.- Montana R. Montana.- SortheTn Pacific Ry. 
 R. Co. V. Warren, 137 U. S. 348, 34 Co. v. Forbis, 15 Mont 452, 39 Pac. 
 L. ed. 681. 571, 48 Am. St. Rep. 692. 
 
 Colorado.— Twin Lakes, etc., Min- Nebraska.— Burlington, etc., R. R. 
 
 ing Co. V. Colorado, etc., Ry. Co., Co. v. White, 28 Neb. 166, 44 N. W. 
 
 16 Colo. 1, 27 Pac. 258; Farmers' 95. 
 
 Irrigation Co. v. Cooper, 54 Colo. North Carolina. — Creighton v. 
 
 402, 130 Pac. 1004. Board of Water Commissioners, 143 
 
§ 227 Valuation OF Propebty Taken FOB Public Use. 693 
 
 but the market value of the land as land remains the test, 
 and there can be no recovery for any of the foregoing ele- 
 ments, valued separately as merchandise as items addi- 
 tional to the value of the land.*^ 
 
 § 227. Buildings upon Land Taken for Public Use. 
 
 When a tract of land, upon which buildings have been 
 erected and aflSxed to the soil so far as to become part of the 
 real estate, is taken by eminent domain, unless some special 
 provision is made for the removal of the buildings, the value 
 of the buildings must be considered in determining the com- 
 pensation to be awarded to the owner ;*^ but portable 
 
 N. C. 171, 55 S. E. 511, 10 Ann. Oas. 
 218. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Savings & Trust 
 Co. V. Pennsylvania K. R. Co., 229 
 Pa. 484, 78 AtL 1039. 
 
 West Virginia. — Norfolk, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Davis, 58 W. Va. 620, 52 
 S. E. 724. 
 
 82. Colorado. — Farmers' Irriga- 
 tion Co. V. Cooper, 54 Colo. 402, 130 
 Pac. 1004. 
 
 Georgia. — Atlanta Terra Cotta 
 Co. V. Georgia, etc., R. R. Co., 132 
 Ga. 537, 64 S. E. 563. 
 
 Illinois. — Sanitary District v. 
 Loughran, 160 111. 362, 43 N. E. 359. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Gile v. Stevens, 
 13 Gray 146 ; Squire v. SomervlUe, 
 120 Mass. 579 ; Providence, etc., R. 
 R. Co. V. Worcester, 155 Mass. 35, 
 29 N. E. 56 ; Manning v. Lowell, 173 
 Mass. 100, 53 N. E. 160; Penney v. 
 Commonvrealtli, 173 Mass. 507, 53 
 N. E. 865, 73 Am. St. Rep. 312. 
 
 Montana. — Northern Pacific Rail- 
 way Co. V. Forbis, 15 Mont. 452, 39 
 Pac. 571, 48 Am. St. Rep. 692. 
 
 Weio York. — Water Commission- 
 ers V. Lawrence, 8 Edw. 552; In re 
 Bensel, 142 N. Y. Supp. 982, 158 
 App. Div. 41. 
 
 North Dakota.— Tri-Stsite Tel. & 
 Tel. Co. V. Cosgriff, 19 N. D. 771, 
 124 N. W. 75, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 1171. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Reading, etc., R. 
 E. Co. V. Balthaser, 119 Pa. 472, 13 
 Atl. 294; Lafferty v. Schuylkill 
 River, etc., Railroad Co., 124 Pa. 
 
 297, 16 Atl. 869, 3 L. R. A. 124, 10 
 Am. St. Rep. 587; Savings & Trust 
 Co. V. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 229 
 Pa. 484, 78 Atl. 1039. 
 
 South Dakota. — Chicago, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Mason. 23 S. D. 564, 122 
 N. W. 60. 
 
 Washington. — Seattle, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Roeder, 30 Wash. 244, 70 
 Pac. 498, 94 Am. St. Rep. 864. 
 
 Wyoming. — Edwards v. Cheyenne, 
 19 Wyo. 110, 114 Pac. 677. 
 
 83. Georgia. — Pause v. Atlanta, 
 98 Ga. 92, 26 S. E. 489, 58 Am. St 
 Rep. 290. 
 
 Illinois. — Lafayette, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Wlnslow, 66 111. 219; Corri- 
 gan V. Chicago, 144 111. 537, 33 N. E. 
 746, 21 L. R. A. 212. 
 
 Indiana. — White v. Cincinnati, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 34 Ind. App. 287, 71 
 N. E. 276. 
 
 Kansas. — Missouri, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Schmuck, 79 Kan. 545, 100 Pac. 
 282. 
 
 Maryland. — Gluck v. Baltimore, 
 81 Md. 315, 32 Atl. 515, 48 Am. St. 
 Rep. 515. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Hyde v. Middle- 
 sex, 2 Gray 267 ; Stone v. Common- 
 wealth, 181 Mass. 438, 63 N. B. 
 1074; Peabody v. Boston Elevated 
 Ry. Co., 191 Mass. 513, 78 N. E. 392. 
 
 Missouri. — Mississippi Bridge Co. 
 V. Ring, 58 Mo. 495. 
 
 New York.— Storms v. Manhattan 
 Ry. Co., 178 N. Y. 493, 71 N. E. 3, 
 66 L. R. A. 625; In re Simmons, 
 195 N. Y. 573, 88 N. E. 1132 ; In re 
 
694 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 227 
 
 buildings not affixed to the soil need not be considered,** and 
 tbere is nothing unconstitutional in a statute providing that 
 when a building, though affixed to the soil, can be moved it 
 shall not be taken and that the damages shall be the cost of 
 ^ removing and readjusting it, or that the value as removed 
 shall be deducted from the award.*® 
 
 The cost of removing buildings upon land taken for the 
 public use is not allowed as an additional element of dam- 
 ages, but as an effort to reduce the damages.*® In the ordi- 
 nary case the cost of removing the buildings is almost if 
 not quite equal to the value of the materials, and the owner 
 is entitled to recover the full value of the buildings. He is 
 not however entitled to have the buildings valued as they 
 stand on the land as separate items additional to the market 
 value of the land, nor on the other hand is the condemning 
 party entitled to have the buildings valued apart from the 
 land merely as for purposes of removal. The proper meas- 
 ure is the market value of the land with the buildings upon 
 it, and the owner therefore receives nothing for the build 
 ings unless they increase the market value of the land. 
 Accordingly evidence of the structural value of the build- 
 ings is not admissible as an independent test of value." 
 When however it is shown that the character of the build- 
 ings is well adapted to the location, the structural cost of the 
 
 New York (In re Blackwell's Island 86. Springfield Southwestern Ry. 
 
 Bridge Approach), 198 N. T. 84, 91 Co. v. Schweitzer, 173 Mo. App. 650, 
 
 N. E. 278, 139 Am. St. Eep. 791. 158 S. W. 1058. It would seem that 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Finn v. Provi- the removal must be to part of the 
 
 dence Gas & Water Co., 99 Pa. 631. same lot, since if it was to another 
 
 Washington. — Seattle v. Atwood, lot much would depend upon the 
 
 59 Wash. 112, 109 Pae. 326 ; Sedro- ability of the owner to secure a 
 
 Wolley V. Lederle, 71 Wash. 646, suitable location, and the damages 
 
 129 Pac. 372. would vary with the distance the 
 
 Wisconsin. — Driver v. Western owner was obliged to move the 
 
 Union R. R. Co., 32 Wis. 569, 14 building. It was held in Seattle v. 
 
 Am. Rep. 726. Atwood, 59 Wash. 112, 109 Pac. 326, 
 
 84. Whltely v. Baltimore, 113 that the condemning party could 
 Md. 541, 77 Atl. 882 ; Kansas City not show that the owner of the land 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Second St. Im- taken owned another distinct and 
 provement Co., 256 Mo. 386, 166 separate lot and might have moved 
 S. W. 296. l^is building thereto. 
 
 85. Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen 87. Vallejo, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 (Mass.) 223; Mangles v. Hudson Home Savings Bank, 24 Cal. App. 
 County Freeholders, 55 N. J. I/. 88, 166, 140 Pac. 974; In re Simmons, 
 25 Atl. 322, 17 L. R. A. 785 ; Tacoma 195 N. T. 573, 88 N. E. 1132. See 
 V. Bonnell, 58 Wash. 593, 109 Pac. also infra, § 447. 
 
 60. 
 
§ 227 Valuation OF Pbopebty Taken FOR Public Use. 695 
 
 buildings, after making proper deductions for depreciation 
 by wear and tear, is a reasonable test of 'the amount by 
 which the buildings enhance the market value of the prop- 
 erty.*® As in other cases of determining market value, 
 not only the character and condition of the building, 
 but also the uses to which it might be put, are matters for 
 consideration.®® 
 
 The considerations already discussed in the case of prop- 
 erty of a character not commonly bought and sold are 
 peculiarly applicable to buildings, and in such cases market 
 value can be determined only by finding the value of the 
 building for the use to which it is applied.®" An unfinished 
 building falls in this class, and when the whole or part of 
 a lot upon which a building is being erected is taken, the 
 actual loss of the owner may be a test of the value of the 
 building.®^ 
 
 There has been considerable discussion, especially in New 
 York, of the practice of " planting " buildings upon land 
 that it is expected will be taken for the public use, with the 
 intention of making an exorbitant claim for damages when 
 the taking occurs. Of course, merely because an owner of land 
 is aware that public improvement has been proposed which 
 will result in the taking of his land, he is not to be deprived 
 of the right to recover the value of buildings subsequently 
 erected. It would be highly unjust to deprive an owner of 
 the right to make the best use of his property except at his 
 peril merely because it lies in the path of one of the many 
 public improvements which are so often discussed and pro- 
 jected without being actually consummated for many 
 
 88. Kansas City Southern Ey. Co. 35 feet of a lot upon which the 
 V. Boles, 88 Ark. 533, 115 S. W. 375 ; owner had commenced to excavate 
 In re New York {In re Black well's preparatory to erecting a large 
 Island Bridge Approach), 198 N. Y. mercantile building. Space in the 
 84, 91 N. B. , 278, 139 Am. St. Rep. building had been rented In advance 
 791; In re Block Bounded by Ave- to reliable tenants. Retaining 
 nue A, 66 Misc. 488, 122 N. Y. Supp. walls had been built and the work 
 321 ; In re Simmons, 127 N. Y. Supp. was ready to progress under the 
 940. contracts. The owner moved the 
 
 89. Sedro-Woolley v. Lederle, 71 site of his building 35 feet and 
 Wash. 646, 129 Pac. 372. proceeded with its construction. 
 
 90. Supra, § 222. Held: He is entitled to recover 
 
 91. St. Louis V. Brown, 155 Mo. the expense of moving the site of 
 545, 56 S. W. 298. In this case it his building, and the loss of rents 
 appeared that the city appropriated caused by the delay. 
 
696 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 228 
 
 years.*^ "When however a building is erected or moved upon 
 land which the owner knows is to be taken by eminent 
 domain, and is placed upon such land in bad faith, with the 
 sole purpose of enhancing the damages and not in the 
 natural, ordinary and legitimate use of such property, as 
 the intention of permanent affixment is lacking, the build- 
 ing remains personal property and should not be considered 
 in determining the value of the real estate."^ 
 
 § 228. Fixtures and Personal Property. 
 
 The rule in regard to machinery or other articles which 
 were originally chattels but which have been affixed to a 
 building by the owner in such a way as to indicate an inten- 
 tion that they are to remain permanently, and which thus 
 form part of the real estate, is the same as in the case of 
 buildings; that is, in determining the market value of the 
 premises as a whole, the fixtures are to be taken into con- 
 sideration, and the owner is entitled to recover for their 
 destruction, so far as they added to the market value of the 
 premises.^* If the fixtures have a value after removal 
 greater than the cost of removing them, such value should 
 
 92. Ireland.— niggms v. Dublin, 255, 89 N. B. 814, 36 L. K. A. (N. S.) 
 28 L. R. Ir. 484. 273, 17 Ann. Cas. 1032 ; In re Hawk- 
 
 -Briggs V. Labette stone St., 137 App. Div. 630, 122 
 
 County, 39 Kan. 90, 17 Pac. 331. N. Y. Supp. 316 ; affirmed, 199 N. Y. 
 
 Minnesota. — Shervrood v. St. 567, 93 N. B. 377 ; In re Parkway, 
 
 Paul, etc., R. R. Co., 21 Minn. 122. 150 App. Div. 482, 135 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 New Jersey. — State, Jones Prose- 65. 
 
 cutor, V. Carragan, 36 N. J. L. 52. Pennsylvania. — Schuylkill Navi- 
 
 New York. — New York v. Mapes, gation Co. v. Farr, 4 Watts & S. 
 
 6 Johns. Ch. 46; Matter ot New 362. 
 
 York, 24 App. Div. 7, 54 N. Y. Vermont. — Lloyd v. Fair Haven, 
 
 Supp. 1066; Matter of Baychester 67 Vt. 167, 31 Atl. 164. 
 
 Ave., 120 App. Div. 393, 105 N. Y. 94. United States.— In re Post 
 
 Supp. 241 ; Champlain Stone & Sand Office Site in Bronx, 210 Fed. 832. 
 
 Co. v. State, 142 App. Div. 94, 127 Arkansas. — Kansas City South- 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 131. ern Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 88 Ark. 
 
 Oregon.— Portland v. Lee Sam, 7 129, 113 S. W. 1030, 16 Ann. Cas. 
 
 Ore. 397. 784. 
 
 Permsylvania. — LafCerty v. Schuyl- Massachusetts. — Ashby v. Eastern 
 
 kill River R. R. Co., 124 Pa. 297, 16 R. R. Co., 5 Met. 368, 38 Am. Dec. 
 
 Atl. 869, 3 L. R. A. 124, 10 Am. St. 426 ; Bdmands v. Boston, 108 Mass. 
 
 Rep. 587 (crops). 538 ; Allen v. Boston, 137 Mass. 319 ; 
 
 Wisconsin. — Driver v. Western Williams v. Commonwealth, 168 
 Union R. R. Co., 32 Wis. 569, 14 Mass. 364, 47 N. E. 115; Cornell- 
 Am. Rep. 726; Krier v. Milwaukee Andrews Smelting Co. v. Boston, 
 Northern Ry. Co., 139 Wis. 207, 120 etc., R. R. Co., 209 Mass. 298, 311, 
 N. W. 847. 95 N. E. 887. 
 
 93. "Sew York. — Re City of New New York. — Re Improvement of 
 
 York (In re Briggs Ave.), 196 N. Y. Water Front, 192 N. Y. 295, 84 N. E. 
 
228 Valuation of Peopeety Taken foe Public Use. 697 
 
 be deducted from the compensation. There is no liability 
 for machinery or other fixtures attached only by screws or 
 which can otherwise be readily removed, at least in juris- 
 dictions which allow no recovery for the cost of removing 
 personal property.'^ 
 
 A taking of real estate does not affect the ownership of 
 personal property kept on the premises taken, but not 
 affixed thereto, and the owner is entitled to remove such 
 property.^^ It was formerly held in the great majority of 
 states that the owner was not entitled to recover the cost of 
 removing personal property or damages for injury to such 
 property resulting from its removal, since such loss is not 
 a taking of property ; ^'' but, in some at least of the states 
 in which compensation is required when property has been 
 damaged for the public use, it has been held that the owner 
 is entitled to recover for such items.®* In Missouri how- 
 ever, it is held that the cost of removing personal property 
 
 1105, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 423; 
 Phipps V. State, 69 Misc. 295, 127 
 N. Y. Supp. 260. 
 
 Washington. — North Coast R. R. 
 Co. V. Kraft Co., 63 Wash. 250, 115 
 Pac. 97. 
 
 95. Jackson v. State, 145 N. Y. 
 Supp. 131, 160 App. Div. (N. Y.) 
 110; New York Central, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Albany Steam Trap Co., 146 
 N. Y. Supp. 674, 161 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 321. 
 
 96. Big Beaver Creek Corporation 
 V. Beaver County, 37 Pa. Super. Ct. 
 250. 
 
 97. United States. — ^United States 
 V. Meyers, 190 Fed. 688 ; In re Post 
 Office Site in Bronx, 210 Fed. 832. 
 
 Arkansas. — Kansas City Southern 
 Ry. Co. V. Anderson, 88 Ark. 129, 
 113 S. W. 1030, 16 Ann. Cas. 784. 
 
 California. — Central Pacific R. R. 
 Co. V. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Edmands v. Bos- 
 ton, 108 Mass. 535; Cobb v. Boston, 
 109 Mass. 438; Williams v. Com- 
 monwealth, 168 Mass. 364, 47 N. B. 
 115 ; Emery v. Boston Terminal Co., 
 178 Mass. 172, 59 N. E. 763, 86 Am. 
 St. Rep. 473 ; New York, etc., R. R. 
 Co. v. Blacker, 178 Mass. 386, 59 
 N. E. 1020. 
 
 Missouri. — Missouri Pacific R. R. 
 Co. V. Porter, 112 Mo. 361, 20 S. W. 
 568; St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 Knapp-Stout, etc., Co., 160 Mo. 396, 
 61 S. W. 300. 
 
 THew Hampshire. — Ranlet v. Con- 
 cord R. B. Co., 62 N. H. 561. 
 
 New York. — New York Central 
 R. R. Co. V. Pierce, 35 Hun 306; 
 Matter of New York, etc., R. R. Co., 
 35 Hun 633; Jackson v. State, 145 
 N. Y. Supp. 131 ; New York Central, 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Albany Steam 
 Trap Co., 146 N. Y. Supp. 674. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Becker v. Phila- 
 delphia, etc., R. R. Co., 177 Pa. 252, 
 35 Atl. 617, 35 L. R. A. 838. 
 
 Virginia. — Fitzhugh v. Chesa- 
 peake, etc., Ry. Co., 107 Va. 158, 59 
 S. E. 415, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 124. 
 
 Washington — North Coast R. B. 
 Co. V. Kraft Co., 63 Wash. 250, 115 
 Pac. 97. 
 
 98. Illinois. — St. Louis, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Capps, 67 111. 607; Chicago, 
 etc., R. R. Co. V. Hock, 118 111. 587, 
 9 N. E. 205; Atchison, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Schneider, 127 111. 144, 20 
 N. E. 41. 
 
 Oklahoma. — Blincoe v. Choctaw, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 16 Okla. 286, 83 Pac. 
 903, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 890, 8 Ann. 
 Cas. 689. 
 
698 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 229 
 
 is not a taking or damaging, and could not be allowed with 
 any equality, since the amount awarded would depend upon 
 how far the owner had to remove the property; but that if 
 personal property cannot be removed without injury, the 
 owner of the property is entitled to recover the damage 
 thereto caused by the removal.®® 
 
 § 229. Destruction of Business Conducted upon the Laud 
 Taken. 
 
 There is one form of pecuniary injury, often of a crush- 
 ing character, incident to the taking of real estate by emi- 
 nent domain, which the most liberal constitution makers 
 have not yet guarded against and which, except in a few 
 cases of a very unusual character, is not regarded as a 
 basis of a legal claim for damages in any state in the union 
 — namely, the injury to the business conducted upon the 
 land taken. When a piece of real estate upon which an 
 established business is carried on is taken for the public 
 use, it often happens that the proprietor of the business 
 is unable to secure an equally available site in the neigh- 
 borhood, and by the interruption of his business and the 
 removal of his store to a considerable distance away he 
 may lose the greater part of his customers and never be 
 able to regain his standing in the business community. If 
 he is the owner of the land taken the jury may partly com- 
 pensate him by giving him a liberal award for the land, 
 but if he is a mere tenant, especially if there is an eminent 
 domain clause in his lease, he may not receive a dollar. 
 Nevertheless, for reasons already explained, a business is 
 not considered property in the constitutional sense.^ It is 
 well settled that the owner is not entitled to recover the 
 anticipated profits of his business which are lost by the 
 taking of the land upon which it is carried on,'' and, accord- 
 ing to the prevailing rule, he is not entitled to recover even 
 
 Virginia. — Richmond v. Williams, 1. Supra, § 124. 
 
 114 Va. 698, 77 S. E. 492 (under 2. United S«o«eg.— Laflin v. Chl- 
 
 statute allowing compensation for cago, etc., R. R. Co., 33 Fed. 415. 
 
 damages to land or " other prop- California. — San Francisco v. 
 
 erty"). Kiernan, 98 Cal. 614, 33 Pac. 720; 
 
 99. Springfield Southwestern Ry. Oakland v. Pacific Coast MUl & 
 
 Co. V. Schweitzer, 173 Mo. App. 650, Lumber Co., 153 Pac. 705. 
 
 158 S. W. 1058. Georgia. — Selma, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 
§ 229 Valuation OF Pbopbbtt Taken FOB Public Use. 699 
 
 for the loss of profits during the period necessary for 
 removing his business from land that has been taken by 
 eminent domain to a new location.' Furthermore, as the 
 business is something entirely distinct from the market 
 value of the land upon which it is carried on, it is not con- 
 sidered in determining the value of such land, except so far 
 as it illustrates one of the uses for which the land is taken.* 
 The reasons for this rule are doubtless sound, and any modi- 
 fication of it might lead to countless claims for damages, 
 some fraudulent and all very difficult to appraise fairly, 
 but it sometimes works great hardship. The only instances 
 in which compensation for the taking of an established 
 business has been allowed, other than when a franchise is 
 taken as well as tangible property,^ are found in the stat- 
 utes which authorized the submerging of whole valleys in 
 order to provide an adequate water supply for the cities 
 of New York and Boston. In these cases not only was all 
 
 Camp, 45 Ga. 180 ; Pause v. Atlanta, 
 98 Ga. 92, 26 S. E. 489, 58 Am. St. 
 Eep. 290. 
 
 Illinois. — Bravm v. Metropolitan 
 West Side El. By. Co., 166 111. 434, 
 46 N. E. 974 ; Cook & Kathbone Co. 
 V. Sanitary District, 177 111. 599, 52 
 N. E. 870. 
 
 Kentucky. — Henderson v. Lexing- 
 ton, 33 Ky. 703, 111 S. W. 318. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Patterson v. Bos- 
 ton, 23 Pick. 425; Cobb v. Boston, 
 109 Mass. 438. 
 
 Minnesota. — King v. Minneapolis 
 Union E. R. Co., 32 Minn. 224, 20 
 N. W. 135. 
 
 Missouri. — St. Louis, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Knapp, etc., Co., 160 Mo. 396, 
 61 S. W. 300. 
 
 Tiew Hampshire. — Ranlet v. Con- 
 cord R. R. Co., 62 N. H. 561. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Pennsylvania R. 
 R. Co. V. Eby, 107 Pa. 166; Hamil- 
 ton V. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 190 
 Pa. 51, 42 Atl. 369, 51 L. R. A. 319 ; 
 Philadelphia Ball Club v. Philadel- 
 phia, 192 Pa. 632, 44 Atl. 265, 46 
 L. R. A. 724, 73 Am. St. Rep. 835; 
 Cox V. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 
 215 Pa. 506, 64 Atl 729, 114 Am. St. 
 Rep. 979; Bobbins v. Scranton, 217 
 Pa. 577, 66 Atl. 977. 
 
 South Carolina. — Puller v. Ed- 
 Ings, 11 Rich. L. 239; Bddings v. 
 Seabrook, 12 Rich. L. 504. 
 
 Virginia. — Moses v. Sanford, 11 
 Lea 731. 
 
 Wisconsin. — Esch v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 72 Wis. 229, 39 N. W. 129. 
 
 3. United States. — United States 
 V. Meyers, 190 Fed. 688 ; In re Post 
 Office Site in Bronx, 210 Fed. 832. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Cobb v. Boston, 
 109 Mass. 438; New York, etc., R. 
 R.,Co. V. Blacker, 178 Mass. 386, 59 
 N. E. 1020. 
 
 Missouri. — St. Louis, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Knapp, etc., Co., 160 Mo. 396, 
 61 S. W. 300. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Becker v. Phila- 
 delphia, etc., B. R. Co., 177 Pa. 252, 
 35 Atl. 617, 35 L. R. A. 583. 
 
 Virginia. — Fitzhugh v. Chesa- 
 peake, etc., Ry. Co., 107 Va. 158, 59 
 S. E. 415, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 124. 
 
 Contra. — Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Schneider, 127 111. 144, 20 N. E. 
 41, 2 L. B. A. 422; Commissioners 
 of Parks v. Moesta, 91 Mich. 149, 51 
 N. W. 903. 
 
 4. Supra, § 219, and infra, % 446. 
 
 5. Supra, §§ 123, 223. 
 
700 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 229 
 
 the land taken upon which the business in the valley was 
 earned on, but also the land upon which the customers 
 lived, so that there could be no question but that the busi- 
 ness was destroyed, and the justice of awarding compensa- 
 tion made itself felt to the legislature in both instances.' 
 
 The mere fact that a business has assumed the form of 
 existing profitable contracts with respect to the use of the 
 land taken, does not, under ordinary circumstances, war- 
 rant the award of damages in excess of the value of the 
 land. The strongest examples of such contracts are leases 
 of the premises or agreements to lease the same to solvent 
 tenants at a greater rent than the present fair rental value 
 of the premises, and contracts to sell the produce of the 
 soil at a profitable price. The taking of the land terminates 
 all contracts in respect to its use and the owner is under 
 no liability for his failure to carry out such agreements,^ 
 but it is well settled that he is not entitled to compensation 
 for the loss of his contracts.* No distinction has been drawn 
 between a damage to business caused by making impossible 
 the performance of existing contracts, and a damage con- 
 sisting of the loss of expected contracts. If an owner of 
 land taken by eminent domain is not entitled to compensa- 
 tion for the loss of profits on his contracts, existing and 
 expected, taken as a whole — that is, injury to his business 
 — a fortiori he is not entitled to compensation for the loss 
 
 6. Supra, § 124. It was held In (or decrease in business, It sliould 
 
 In re Board of Water Supply, 211 not also have compensation for 
 
 N. Y. 174, 105 N. E. 213, that the poles, wires and equipment which 
 
 decrease in the value of an estab- had no value except In connection 
 
 lished business was to be deter- with the business, 
 
 mined in view of the profits, and 7. Bailey v. De Crespigny, L. R. 4 
 
 not of the market value of the Q. B. 180, 15 Eng. Rul. Cas. 799; 
 
 business, for a business may have Ellis v. Welch, 6 Mass. 246, 4 Am. 
 
 no market value. In determining Dee. 122 ; Parks v. Boston, 15 Pick, 
 
 profits, interest on the capital in- (Mass.) 198, 205. 
 
 vested, rental, depreciation, cost or 8. Burt v. Merchants' Insurance 
 
 value of labor though performed by Co., 115 Mass. 1 ; Ogden v. Pennsyl- 
 
 the owner or his household should vania R. R. Co., 229 Pa. 378, 78 Atl. 
 
 be deducted. The fact that the 929. So also an owner is not enti- 
 
 owner was fortunate in getting titled to recover for loss of rents 
 
 business or employment elsewhere while his building is made unten- 
 
 does not go in mitigation of dam- antable by the construction of a 
 
 ages. It was held in In re Bensel, public work in the street in front 
 
 140 App. Div. (N. T.) 806, 125 N. T. of it. Peck v. Chicago Rys. Co., 270 
 
 Supp. 872, that when a telephone 111. 34, 110 N. E. 414. 
 company was given compensation 
 
§ 230 Valuation OF Peopbety Taken FOE Public Use. 701 
 
 of expected profits on a single contract. It is true that the 
 constitution of the United States prohibits a state from 
 enacting any law impairing the obligation of contracts, but 
 a statute authorizing the taking of land with respect to the 
 use of which a valid contract is in existence is not obnox- 
 ious to this provision, even if no compensation is awarded 
 for the annulment of the contract, since all contracts for 
 the use of land are entered intc in view of the possible 
 taking of the land for public use, and the sovereign power 
 of eminent domain cannot be impaired by contracts of pri- 
 vate parties. It is only when property is created by con- 
 tract, as in the case of a franchise or a lease, that the 
 protection of the constitution can be invoked. 
 
 In the case of a wrongful taking of property under color 
 of eminent domain, unless the wrong is acquiesced in and 
 the damages assessed in the same manner as in the case of 
 a lawful taking, the injury to the owner's business and the 
 loss of expected profits may well be the measure of 
 damages.® 
 
 § 230. Improvements Made by Oondenmor Prior to a 
 Valid Taking. 
 
 It is pointed out at length in another portion of this work 
 that one of the results of the impractical and cumbersome 
 procedure in eminent domain cases required by the consti- 
 tutions or statutes of many of the states is that municipal 
 and public service corporations to which the power of emi- 
 nine domain has been delegated are in the habit of taking 
 land for the public use without any formality whatever 
 other than assuming possession of such land as suits their 
 purposes, and erecting their structures thereon, and that 
 public sentiment so far sanctions this dispensation with the 
 requirements of law that slight evidence of acquiescence 
 upon the part of the owner is held to be sufficient to show 
 
 9. Thus in Powell v. Houston, etc., and testified that he had, customers 
 
 R. R. Co., 104 Tex. 219, 135 S. W. upon the other side of the railroad 
 
 1153, in which a railroad crossing who did not come to him while the 
 
 was temporarily obstructed by a crossing was obstructed, and others 
 
 railroad company, the plaintiff, a to whom he delivered goods with 
 
 storekeeper, testified as to his vol- difficulty, and it was held that the 
 
 ume of trade before, during and jury might ascertain his damages 
 
 after the obstruction, and his profit, with reasonable certainty. 
 
702 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 230 
 
 his assent. Under such circumstances he will be allowed to 
 recover compensation as for a permanent taking in a com- 
 mon law action, and will not be allowed to regain the pos- 
 session or enjoin the occupation of his land unless the 
 corporation which has occupied it fails to pay the compensa- 
 tion awarded." In determining compensation in such a 
 case, the value of the land is estimated as of the date of 
 the taking, which is necessarily before the improvements 
 have been erected upon it, so that no question in regard 
 to the effect of the improvements upon the sum to be 
 awarded arises. • 
 
 It sometimes happens however that the land thus occu- 
 pied is so situated that the owner is wholly unaware of what 
 is going on, or that the owner protests so vigorously from 
 the very beginning that it is consequently not possible to 
 construe his actions to indicate acquiescence or assent. In 
 such case he cannot be denied the right to recover pos- 
 session of his land,^^ and the corporation which has seized 
 it must then either give it up altogether or institute con- 
 demnation proceedings against it in accordance with law. 
 If it accepts the latter alternative, the question whether 
 the value of the structures which the condemning party has 
 affixed to the land must be taken into consideration in deter- 
 mining the amount of compensation to which the owner is 
 entitled necessarily arises. 
 
 It is a maxim of the common law that whatever is affixed 
 to the realty is thereby made parcel thereof and belongs to 
 the owner of the soil.^^ {Quicquid plantatur solo, solo 
 cedit.) Consequently, whenever a trespasser erects struc- 
 tures upon the land of another which are so affixed to the 
 soil as to constitute part of the real estate, such structures 
 become the property of the owner of the land, and the tres- 
 passer cannot remove them or be credited with the value 
 of his improvements in any form of action.** Logically this 
 rule should apply although the structures were erected for 
 the public use," and in the states which provide a readily 
 
 10. Infra, §§ 373, 474, 478. (Mass.) 559, 561; Betts v. Lee, 5 
 
 11. Infra, § 473. Johns. (N. Y.) 348. 
 
 12. First Parish in Sudbury t. 14. Thus in Parley v. Cambridge, 
 Jones, 8 Gush. (Mass.) 184, 189. 220 Mass. 507, 108 N. E. 494, the 
 
 13 Peirce v. Goddard, 22 Pick. court, through Rugg, C. J., said, 
 
§ 230 Valuation OP Pboperty Taken FOB Public Use. 703 
 
 available and practicable method of taking property by emi- 
 nent domain, the fact that a corporation which occupied 
 "without right the land of another was invested with the 
 power of eminent domain and so might have taken the land 
 by due process of law is looked upon as an aggravation 
 rather than a palliation of its offense, and the common law 
 rule is enforced against such a corporation as rigidly as 
 against a private trespasser, so that when it undertakes to 
 condemn in a legal manner the land which it had previously 
 entered without right it is obliged to pay the owner for the 
 works which it had just constructed at its own expense, 
 so far as they added to the market value of the land.^^ 
 In the states in which corporations are permitted, if not 
 
 " We are able to perceive no sound 
 reason why this well established 
 rule should not apply in instances 
 where a municipality enters with- 
 out shadow of right and as a pure 
 trespasser upon the land of another 
 and without consent of the owner 
 aflBxes thereto structures which in 
 their nature become part of the 
 realty. A municipality enjoys no 
 special immunity in this respect not 
 accorded in general to others. It 
 commonly possesses the power to 
 exercise eminent domain and thus 
 take the property of the landowner 
 against his will. This factor af- 
 fords it the less excuse for invading 
 tortiously rights which it may ex- 
 tinguish in a legal manner." In St. 
 Johnsville v. Smith, 184 N. T. 341, 
 77 N. E. 617, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 922, 
 6 Ann. Cas. 379, the court says, at 
 page 349, " There is no more harsh- 
 ness in applying the rule to one 
 class of trespassers than to the 
 other. In both cases its application 
 tends to prevent the perpetration 
 of a wrong. Its operation in this 
 state has been, and will undoubt- 
 edly continue to be, most salutary 
 in constraining those municipal and 
 other corporations which the state 
 has authorized to exercise the 
 .power of eminent domain not to 
 assume the possession of lands in 
 advance of any right so to do, and 
 thus practically nullify, during the 
 
 period of unlawful possession, that 
 provision of the constitution which 
 guarantees the citizen against be- 
 ing deprived of his property for 
 public use without just compensa- 
 tion." See also Matter of City of 
 New York, 216 N. Y. 67, 110 N. B. 
 176. 
 
 15. California. — United States v. 
 Land in Monterey County, 47 Cal. 
 515 (but see Albion River R. R. Co. 
 V. Hesser, 84 Cal. 435, 439, 24 Pac. 
 288). 
 
 Indiana. — Graham v. Conners- 
 ville, etc., R. R. Co., 36 Ind. 463, 10 
 Am. Rep. 56 (but see McClarren v. 
 Jefferson School Township, 169 Ind. 
 140, 144, 82 N. E. 73, 13 Ann. Cas. 
 978). 
 
 Kansas. — Cohen v. St. Louis, etc., 
 R. R. Co., 34 Kan. 158, 55 Am. Rep. 
 242, 246 (semble). 
 
 Massachusetts. — Hunt v. Bay 
 State Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279; Mer- 
 riam v. Brown, 128 Mass. 391; 
 Perley v. Cambridge, 220 Mass. 507, 
 108 N. E. 494. 
 
 New York:.— St Johnsville v. 
 Smith, 184 N. Y. 341, 77 N. B. 617, 5 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 922, 6 Ann. Cas. 
 379; Re Long Island R. R. Co., 6 
 Thomp. & C. 298; Re New York, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 37 Hun 317. 
 
 Ohio. — Cleveland v. Slade, 4 Ohio 
 Dec. (Reprint) 194. 
 
 Virginia. — Virginia, etc., Ry. Co. 
 V. Nickels, 116 Va. 792, 82 S. E. 693. 
 
704 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 230 
 
 encouraged, to take land for public use without the formal- 
 ity of any legal procedure whatever, when an occasional 
 landowner is found who proves to be so obstinate as to 
 insist upon compliance with the technicalities of the law, 
 it is looked upon as highly unjust to impose upon the corpo- 
 ration the severe penalty which the literal enforcement of the 
 common law rule would require. Just as public sentiment 
 will not tolerate the infliction of the full pains and penalties 
 of the law upon one who is so unfortunate as to be prose- 
 cuted without warning for the violation of some clause of 
 the criminal code, which under like circumstances good 
 citizens habitually ignore, so in a number of states, when a 
 municipal or a public service corporation seizes the land of 
 a citizen without any legal justification and erects its struc- 
 tures upon it, if he demands his rights under the common 
 law and the constitution and insists that if his land is to be 
 taken from him it be taken in accordance with the forms of 
 law, and claims that he should be paid the value of his land 
 as it stands when it is legally taken, it is held that his claim 
 should be denied and the corporation should be exempted 
 from the strict enforcement of the principle of law appli- 
 cable to private trespassers, and should not be obliged to 
 pay the additional value which its own improvements con- 
 ferred upon the land.^® This rule is sometimes supported 
 on the ground that the corporation did not intend that the 
 
 16. Alabama. — Jones v. New Or- Missouri.— Cochran v. Missouri, 
 
 leans, etc., R. R. Co., 70 Ala. 227. etc., R. R. Co., 94 Mo. App. 469, 68 
 
 Arkansas. — Newgass v. St. Louis, S. W. 367. 
 
 etc., R. R. Co., 54 Ark. 140, 15 S. W. Nevada.— Goldfield, etc.. Trans- 
 
 188. portation Co. v. Old Sandstrom, etc., 
 
 Florida. — Jacksonville, etc., R. R. Mining Co., 150 Pac. 313. 
 
 Co. V. Adams, 28 Fla. 631, 10 So. Ifew Mexico. — Atchison, etc., Ry. 
 
 465, 14 L. R. A. 533. Co. v. Richter, 148 Pac. 478. 
 
 loioa. — Daniels v. Chicago, etc.. North Carolina. — Burgess v. Clark, 
 
 R. R. Co., 41 Iowa 52 ; Chicago, etc., 18 Ired. L. 109. 
 
 Ry. Co. V. Des Moines Union Ry. Oklahoma. — Aldridge v. Board of 
 
 Co., 165 Iowa 35, 144 N. W. 54. Education, 15 Okla. 354, 82 Pac. 827. 
 
 Michigan. — Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. . Pennsylvania. — Justice v. Nesque- 
 
 V. Dunlap, 47 Mich. 465, 11 N. W. honing Valley R. R. Co., 87 Pa. 28. 
 
 271. Texas. — Preston v. Sabine, etc., 
 
 Minnesota.— Greve v. St. Paul, R. R. Co., 70 Tex. 375, 7 S. W. 825; 
 
 etc., R. R. Co., 26 Minn. 66, 1,N. W. International Bridge, etc., Co. v. 
 
 816. McLane, 8 Tex. Cp. App. 665, 28 
 
 Mississippi. — Louisville, etc., R. S. W. 454. "■' 
 
 R. Co. V. Dickson, 63 Miss. 380, 56 TFos7imff«on.— Bellingham Bay, 
 
 Am. Rep. 809. etc., R. R. Co. v. Strand, 14 Wash. 
 
§ 230 Valuation OP Peopebty Taken FOB Public Use. 705 
 
 improvements should be affixed to the soil unless it was 
 allowed to retain possession," and sometimes on the ground 
 that the compensation to what the owner is entitled is ' ' just 
 compensation " and that there is no justice in requiring the 
 corporation to pay for its own improvements/* 
 
 However the ethics of such a rule when applied for the 
 benefit of a corporation which has wilfully disregarded the 
 plain provisions of law may strike one who has never lived 
 under a constitution full of such rigid and detailed require- 
 ments that a tacit evasion of the more objectionable is nec- 
 essary to a reasonable administration of public affairs, it 
 is at any rate plain that when a corporation enters upon 
 private land and erects improvements in good faith and 
 with no intention of disregarding the literal requirements 
 of law or of overriding the constitutional rights of the 
 owner, there is no principle either of justice or of public 
 policy which demands that it forfeit such improvements if 
 it becomes necessary to institute condemnation proceedings 
 again. It would be clear that if the entry was made with 
 the oral assent of the owner, while such assent would not 
 
 144, 44 Pac. 140, 46 Pac. 238 ; Seat- 
 tle, etc., R. R. Co. V. Corbett, 22 
 Wa^. 189, 60 Pac. 127. 
 
 17. Thus in Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. 
 V. Dunlap, 47 Mlcti. 465, 11 N. W. 
 271, the court said, " It would be 
 absurd to apply to land so used, and 
 to a railway track laid on it, the 
 technical rules which apply in some 
 other cases to structures insepara- 
 bly attached to the freehold. 
 Whatever rule might apply in case 
 of abandonment. It is clear that this 
 superstructure was never designed 
 to be incorporated with the soil, 
 except for purposes attending the 
 possession; and in a proceeding to 
 obtain a legal and permanent right 
 to occupy the land for this very pur- 
 pose, there would be no sense in 
 compelling them to buy their own 
 property." To this argument the 
 court in St. Johnsville v. Smith, 184 
 N. Y. 341, 77 N. B. 617, 5 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 922, 6 Ann Cas. 879, replied 
 (at p. 348), "So iiT as actual in- 
 tent is concerned, a personal tres- 
 passer who annexes a structure to 
 
 45 
 
 another's freehold does not mean 
 that it shall become the property 
 of the landowner any more than 
 does a trespassing railway company 
 or municipality which does the same 
 thing in contemplation of acquiring 
 the land at some future time by the 
 exercise of the power of eminent 
 domain. The law affixes the conse- 
 quences to the act, not the Intent. 
 It says to those who invoke the 
 power of eminent domain as well 
 as to all others : If you invade 
 land without legal right and place 
 structures of a permanent character 
 thereon, those structures belong to 
 the landowner." 
 
 18. Alabama. — Jones v. New Or- 
 leans, etc., R. R. Co., 70 Ala. 227. 
 
 California. — Albion River R. R. 
 Co. V. Hesser, 84 Cal. 435, 24 Pac. 
 288. 
 
 Florida. — Jacksonville, etc., R. R. 
 Co. V. Adams, 28 Fla. 631, 10 So. 
 465. 
 
 Minnesota. — Grave v. St. Paul, 
 etc., R. R. Co., 26 Minn. 66, 1 N. W. 
 816, 
 
706 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 230 
 
 pass title to the land, it might well estop the owner from 
 claiming the benefit of the improvements. Cases frequently 
 have arisen in which the element of estoppel is lacking, but 
 in which the enforcement of the conamon law rule would 
 work a genuine hardship, and in such cases the courts are 
 strongly inclined to suspend the operation of the rule. It 
 is held in the great majority of jurisdictions in which the 
 question has arisen that, when a corporation clothed with 
 the power of eminent domain enters upon a tract of land 
 with the assent of the person apparently in lawful posses- 
 sion, and takes possession thereof and makes improvements 
 thereon, and subsequently, to cure a defective title or to 
 extinguish a mortgage lien or an estate in remainder or 
 reversion, institutes condemnation proceedings, or when the 
 entry was made and improvements constructed in good 
 faith and under color of condemnation proceedings which 
 subsequently proved defective, and new proceedings have 
 to be instituted, the corporation is under no liability to 
 pay for the additional value which the structures thus 
 erected have imparted to the land.*® This rule, in some 
 
 Mississippi. — Louisville, etc., R. cago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Vaughn, 206 
 
 B. Co. V. Dickson, 63 Miss. 380, 56 111. 234, 69 N. E. 113. 
 
 Am. Rep. 809. Indiana. — Indiana, etc., R. R. Co. 
 
 19. United States. — Searl v. Lake v. Allen, 100 Ind. 409 (assent of 
 
 County School District No. 2, 133 owner) ; McClarren v. Jefferson 
 
 II. S. 553, 33 L. ed. 740 (entry under School District, 169 Ind. 140, 82 
 
 inferior title) ; United States v. n. E. 73, 13 Ann. Cas. 978 (defec- 
 
 Smith, 110 Fed. 338; Bear Gulch tive proceedings). 
 
 Placer Mining Co. v. Walsh, 198 Kansas. — Cohen v. St. Louis, etc., 
 
 Fed. 351 (proceedings pending) ; r_ r co., 34 Kan. 158, 8 Pac. 138, 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Western 55 ^m_ Rep. 242 ; St. Louis, etc., R. 
 
 Union Tel. Co., 207 Fed 1. ^ ^o. v. Nyce, 61 Kan. 394, 59 Pac. 
 
 California. — California Pacific R. -^q^q ^g j^_ j^ ^ 241. 
 
 B. Co. V. Armstrong, 46 Cal. 85 (de- MicJiigan.— MoTg&k v. Chicago, 
 
 fective proceedings); California etc., R. R. Co., 39 Mich. 675 ; Toledo, 
 
 Southern R. R. Co v. Southern ^ ^ ^^ ^ Dunlap, 47 Mich. 
 
 Pacific B. R. Co., 67 Cal. 59, 7 Pac. ^gg' ^ ^f ^ 271 
 
 123 (entry by consent of owner) ; Mis sour i.-Dietkch v. Murdock. 
 San Francisco, etc., R. R. Co. v. 
 
 42 Mo. 279 (assent). 
 
 Taylor, 86 Cal 246, 24 Pac im ^^j^,," ,,,,,;,._ Mississippi, etc., B. 
 
 n '"'"T-;;^ I'of gT' 1 3'o ^' E K- Co. V. Deveney, 42 Miss. 555, 2 
 
 07P ^70 AmSt Ret, 17 ^'"- I^P- 608 (defective proceed- 
 
 'lii.- ChicS: S., R. B. CO. ings) ; im-is Centrea B R^ Ca^. 
 
 V Goodwin, 111 111. 273, 53 Am. Hoskins, 80 Miss. 730, 32 So. 150, 
 
 Rep 622; Ellis v. Bock Island, etc., 92 Am. St. Rep. 612 (defective pro- 
 
 R R. Co., 125 111. 82, 17 N. E. 62 ceedings). 
 
 (entry under inferior title); Chi- 2febraslca.— Om&ha. Bridge, etc., 
 
§ 231 Valuation OP Property Taken FOB Public Use. 707 
 
 respects at least, corresponds with, the exceptions to the 
 common law rule in regard to improvements by an occu- 
 pant holding in good faith, but under a title which proves 
 defective, but that it is accepted universally cannot be 
 definitely stated.^" It has been held however that there is 
 nothing about it which is not " due process of law " within 
 the meaning of the federal constitution.^^ 
 
 § 231. Effect of Diversity of Interests upon the Total 
 Compensation. 
 
 It was formerly looked upon as one of the most firmly 
 established principles of the law of eminent domain, and 
 it is still the law in ordinary cases, that when a tract of 
 land is taken by eminent domain, as the land itself is taken 
 by a paramount title rather than the separate estates of 
 different persons having interests in the land,^^ the com- 
 pensation awarded is for the land itself, and not for the 
 sum of the different interests therein. The duty of the pub- 
 lic to make payment for the property which it has taken is 
 not, it is said, affected by the nature of the title or by the 
 diversity of interests in the property. The public pays 
 
 Co. V. Whitney, 68 Nebr. 399, 94 Atl. 38, 2 L. R. A. 528, 15 Am. St. 
 
 N. W. 513, 99 N. W. 525. Rep. 886. 
 
 ffew Jersey. — NortJi Hudson Virginia — Norfolk, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 
 County R. R. Co. v. Booraem, 28 Consolidated Turnpike Co., Ill Va. 
 
 N. J. Eq. 450; Baltimore, etc., R. R. 131^ gg g_ g. 346, Ann. Cas. 1912 A 
 
 Co. V. Bouvier, 70 N. J. Eq. 171, 62 239 (mortgage) 
 
 Atl. 868; Trimmer v Pennsylvania TTisconam.-Aspinwall v. Chicago, 
 
 etc., R R. Co., 55 N. J. L. 46, 25 g^c, R. R. Co., 41 Wis. 474; Lyon 
 
 Atl 932. V. Green Bay, etc., R. R. Co., 42 
 
 2few YorTi. — Matter of Norwood, w!, troa 
 
 etc., R. R. Co., 47 Hun 489, 14 N. Y. "„ ; "• . „ , ^ , ., 
 
 St Ren 437 ^"^ ^^^^ ^ Perley v. Cambridge, 
 
 bMaftomai-Aldridge v. Board of ^20 Mass. 507, 108 N. E. 494, it was 
 
 Education, 15 Okla. 354, 82 Pac. ^ald by the court, " If the circum- 
 
 g27 stances were that the city had been 
 
 Oregon.— Oregon, etc.. Navigation lawfully in possession of the land 
 
 Co. V. Mosier, 14 Ore. 519, 58 Am. i^der a defective title, and in good 
 
 Rep. 321 (agreement with occupant faith or by agreement or consent 
 
 and supposed owner). liad attached permanent improve- 
 
 resos.— Texas, etc., R. R. Co. v. ments to the soil, a different ques- 
 
 Sutor, 56 Tex. 496. tion would arise which need not 
 
 Utah.— Chase v. Jemmett, 8 Utah now be decided." 
 
 231, 30 Pac. 757, 16 L. R. A. 805 21. Consolidated Turnpike Co. v. 
 
 (ownership unknown). Norfolk, etc., R. R. Co., 228 U. S. 
 
 Vermont. — St. Johnsbury, etc., R. 596, 57 L. ed. 982. 
 
 R. Co. V. Willard, 61 Vt. 134, 17 22. Supra, § 21. 
 
706 The Law op Emiitent Domaif. § 231 
 
 what the land is worth, and lets the amount so paid be 
 divided among the various claimants, according to the 
 nature of their respective estates.^* The rule was expressed 
 by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the 
 following language, 
 
 " No contracts between the owners of different inter- 
 ests in the land can affect the right of the government 
 to take the land for the public use, or oblige it to pay 
 by way of compensation more than the entire value of 
 the land as a whole. ' ' ^* 
 
 Ordinarily no difficulty or apparent injustice arises from 
 the application of the rule. The value of a lease is paid to 
 the lessee and deducted from the compensation of the owner 
 of the fee, and, if land that is subject to a right of way 
 or other easement is taken, it is just that the amount paid 
 to the owner of the easement should diminish the damages 
 of the owner of the fee, for his land was less valuable by 
 reason of the encumbrance. 
 
 The rule however apparently is not of universal applica- 
 tion. It has always been the practice to deny the owner 
 of the fee of land taken by eminent domain the full market 
 value of the land if it was subject to an encumbrance which 
 diminished its value, even if the encumbrance was not of 
 such a nature that the person for whose benefit it was 
 created was entitled to share in the compensation.^^ So 
 
 23. England. — Penny v. Penny, Few YorU. — Wiggin v. New York, 
 
 L. K. 5 Eq. 227. 9 Paige 16 ; In re Buffalo, Sheld. 
 
 Illinois. — Bartlow v. Chicago, etc., 408 ; In re Park Commissioners, 1 
 
 E. K. Co., 243 III. 332, 90 N. E. 721 ; N. Y. Supp. 763. 
 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Relsch, 247 24. Burt y. Merchants' Insurance 
 
 111. 350, 93 N. E. 883 ; CMcago, etc., Co., 115 Mass. 1. 
 
 Ry. Co. r. Miller, 251 111. 58, 95 25. See for example First Parish 
 
 N. E. 1027; Lambert v. GrifiBn, 257 in Woburn v. Middlesex County, 7 
 
 III. 152, 100 N. E. 496. Gray (Mass.) 106, which was a pe- 
 
 Kentucky. — Paducah, etc., R. R. tition to assess damages for taking 
 
 Ca V. Dipple, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 62. land for highway. The land had 
 
 Massachusetts. — Edmunds v. Bos- been given to the town for paro- 
 
 ton, 108 Mass. 535 ; Burt v. Merch- chial purposes ; a meeting-house 
 
 ants* Insurance Co., 115 Mass. 1 ; was built on it and rails for tieing 
 
 Turner v. Robbins, 133 Mass. 207. horses ; the highway passed near 
 
 Michigan. — Cincinnati, etc., R. R. the church. Held: Ordinarily the 
 
 Co. V. Bay City, etc., R. R. Co., 106 rule of damage is the diminution of 
 
 Mich. 473, 64 N. W. 471. the value of land absolutely, but the 
 
 'New Jersey. — Herr v. Newark ruling that it was its value as a 
 
 Board of Education, 82 N. J. L. meeting-house to be considered here 
 
 610, 83 Atl. 173. is correct, for the parish has no 
 
§ 231 Valuation OP Pb,opeety Taken FOB Public Use. 709 
 
 also it was never the practice, when a private street was 
 taken over for a public highway, to award as compensation 
 the value of the land included in the street, in accordance 
 with the price of private land per square foot prevailing 
 in the neighborhood, to be divided between the owner of the 
 fee and the owners of lots to which rights of way over the 
 street were appurtenant. On the contrary each party was 
 limited to the damages which he had actually suffered.^' 
 The constitutionality of this method of limiting the dam- 
 ages was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United 
 States in a case in which it appeared that there had been 
 taken for highway purposes a tract of land subject to a 
 restriction against the erection of any building thereon in 
 favor of the owners of an adjoining building. The owners 
 of the land taken and of the land upon which the building 
 stood joined in asking for compensation, and contended that 
 they were entitled to the full value of the land, but the 
 court denied that either party was entitled to recover more 
 than the damages actually suffered by him, which were of 
 course almost nominal.^^ 
 
 This decision seems manifestly just, but does the prin- 
 ciple which it enunciates work both ways ? Is the owner of 
 an estate or interest in real estate, constituting ' ' property ' ' 
 in the constitutional sense,^* to be denied his full measure 
 of compensation because of conditions affecting the inter- 
 est of some one else in the same real estate? Such a case 
 may readily arise in the states in which benefits to the 
 
 title in the land except for a meet- 954, 3 L. K. A. (N. S.) 912; 
 
 ing-house and its appurtenances. Crelghton v. Water Commissioners, 
 
 See also, 143 N. C. 171, 55 S. E. 511, 10 Ann. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Tufts v. Charles- Cas. 218. 
 town, 2 Gray 271 ; Tufts v. Charles- 26. Walker v. Schauf (In re De- 
 town, 4 Gray 587; Boston & Maine catur St.), 196 N. Y. 286, 89 N. E. 
 KaUroad v. Middlesex County, 1 829, and see also supra, § 121. 
 Allen 325 ; Bigelow Carpet Co. v. 27. Boston Chamber of Commerce 
 Clinton, 108 Mass. 70; Tobey v. v. Boston, 217 V. S. 189, 54 L. ed. 
 Taunton, 119 Mass. 404; Crowell v. 725, affirming 195 Mass. 338, 81 
 Beverly, 134 Mass. 98; Allen v. N. E. 244. See also McGovem v. 
 Boston, 137 Mass. 319; Blaney v. New York, 229 V. 8. 363, 57 L. ed. 
 Salem, 160 Mass. 303, 35 N. E. 858; 1228, in which it was held that the 
 Forbes v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. owner was entitled to be paid for 
 289, 52 N. E. 511. what is taken, as the title stands. 
 
 North Carolina. — Brown v. Weaver 28. Supra, § 118. 
 Powep Co., 140 N. C. 341, 52 S. E. 
 
710 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 232 
 
 remaining land may be set off from the value of the land 
 taken, since a public improvement for which part of a tract 
 is taken may be of such benefit to the land as a whole that 
 no compensation is awarded, a'nd yet it may injuriously 
 affect the value of a leasehold interest in the property, 
 without a corresponding benefit. Is the tenant in such a 
 case to be denied compensation?^^ So also, even apart 
 from questions of benefits, cases may arise in which the 
 owner of the fee is entitled to the full market value of the 
 land and yet the holder of some other estate or interest 
 in the property may be fairly entitled to compensation, and 
 in one state at least the court has allowed it.^" The law upon 
 this point may thus be said to be in a formative state. 
 
 § 232. Leased Property — Rights of Landlord and Ten- 
 ant against Each Other. 
 
 That a leasehold interest is property in the constitutional 
 sense, and that a lessee is entitled to compensation for the 
 taking of his interest when the whole or a part of the leased 
 property is taken by eminent domain is set forth in another 
 
 29. In Galeano v. Boston, 195 two interests are more than what 
 Mass. 64, 80 N. E. 579, it was held the lots would be worth, if owned 
 that under such circumstances the by one person, the necessities of the 
 tenant was entitled to recover his case require an apparent exception 
 actual damages. This case however to the general rule announced above 
 turned upon the provisions of the as to what the condemning party 
 statute and the decision being must pay. It was said in Gluck's 
 against the city involved no con- case (81 Md. 315, 32 Atl. 515, 48 
 stitutional question. See also Cor- Am. St. Rep. 515), that the owner 
 nell-Andrews Smelting Co. v. Bos- of each separate interest has the 
 ton, etc., R. R. Co., 202 Mass. 585, constitutional right to be fully com- 
 89 N. E. 118; Philadelphia, etc., pensated before his estate can be 
 Iron Co. V. Boston, 211 Mass. 526, lawfully taken for a public use,' 
 98 N. E. 1067. So also in Witmark and as the two interests are not 
 V. New York El. R. R. Co., 149 only distinct, but may be some- 
 N. Y. 393, 44 N. E. 78, it was held what conflicting in a case of this 
 that a tenant might recover for character, we must, in order to do 
 the construction of an elevated rail- justice to both and to comply with 
 road in front of the premises, al- the requirements of the constitution, 
 though there was no damage to the recognize an exception to the gen- 
 fee, eral rule. Indeed, when a piece of 
 
 30. In Baltimore v. Latrobe, 101 property which is subject to an or- 
 Md. 621, 61 Atl. 208, 4 Ann. Cas. dinary lease for a short term is 
 1005, the court said, " each is enti- taken, it may happen that although 
 tied under the constitution to be the owner of the fee is allowed full 
 compensated in damages for the value for the property, the tenant 
 amount of his interest .taken, and must also be paid a large and sub- 
 if it be true that the values of the stantial amount in addition, by rea- 
 
§ 232 Valuation OP Pboperty Taken poE Ptjblio Use. 711 
 
 portion of this work,*^ What is now under consideration 
 is the measure of the lessee's compensation in such a case, 
 and from whom it may be recovered. 
 
 It is well settled that when leased property is taken by 
 eminent domain, as the taking is by a paramount title, there 
 is no eviction, and thus there is no breach of the landlord's 
 covenants, and the tenant consequently has no right of 
 action against the landlord for the disturbance of his pos- 
 session of the premises.^^ Even when the landlord collects 
 the entire compensation for the taking, the tenant has no 
 claim against him for his share, unless the landlord acted 
 as agent for the tenant in collecting the money .^* Con- 
 versely, as the tenant is not entitled to an abatement of his 
 rent if he has been dispossessed by a disseisor, or by the 
 public enemy, or if the premises are destroyed or rendered 
 untenantable by earthquake, lightning, floods or fire, he 
 remains liable in the same manner for the full amount of 
 the rent when a portion of the leased premises are taken by 
 eminent domain. While there are a few eases, chiefly in 
 the states formed from the Louisiana Purchase, which hold 
 
 son of the value of his lease. But Maryland. — Gluck v. Baltimore, 
 
 the jury, or other tribunal author- 81 Md. 315, 32 Atl. 515, 48 Am. 
 
 ized to malie the award, should al- St. Rep. 515. 
 
 ways keep the value of the entire Massachusetts. — Ellis v. Welch, 6 
 
 property in mind, and should limit Mass. 246, 4 Am. Dec. 122. 
 
 the whole amount to be paid to that New York. — Folts v. Huntley, 7 
 
 value, unless it is ' clearly shown Wend. 210. 
 
 that the lessee is entitled to more Pennsylvania. — Dyer v. Wight- 
 
 than the difference between what man, 66 Pa. 427. 
 
 they allow the reversioner and Washington. — Farnandis v. Great 
 
 what the whole property would be Northern Ry. Co., 41 Wash. 486, 84 
 
 worth In the market, if there had Pac. 18, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1086, 
 
 been no ground rent." In Chicago, 111 Am. St. Rep. 1027 ; Hockersmith 
 
 etc., By. Co. v. Reisch, 247 111. 350, v. Sullivan, 71 Wash. 244, 128 Pac. 
 
 93 N. E. 383, it was held that when 222. 
 
 the condemning party had settled 33. Uhland Club v. Shupbach, 168 
 
 with the tenants without the con- Mass. 430, 47 N. E. 113. Similarly, 
 
 sent of the owner, the amount paid if the condemning party pays the 
 
 cannot be used against the owner full value to the owner, it is still 
 
 to show the value of the leasehold liable to the tenant and cannot remit 
 
 and hence what should be deducted him to an action against the owner. 
 
 from the owner's share. Musantl v. State, 131 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 31. Bupra, § 119. 20, 73 Misc. (N. Y.) 534; Alexan- 
 
 32. England. — Baily v. De Cre»- dria, etc., B. R. Co. v. Faunce, 31 
 pigny, L. R. 4 Q. B. 180, 15 Eng. Gratt. (Va.) 761. 
 
 Bui. Cas. 799. 
 
712 
 
 The Law of Eminent Domain, 
 
 § 232 
 
 tlie contrary view/* tlie correct doctrine, both upon prin- 
 ciple and by tbe decided weight of authority, seems to be 
 that a condemnation of a part of a leasehold estate for a 
 public use does not at law amount to an eviction; and, 
 whether the fee or a mere easement is taken, the tenant still 
 remains liable under his covenant to pay the rent originally 
 reserved, because nothing short of a surrender, a release, 
 or an eviction will discharge him from his covenant in this 
 behalf.^'^ 
 
 34. Louisiana. — David v. Beel- 
 man, 5 La. Ann. 545. 
 
 Mississippi. — Levee Commission- 
 ers V. Johnson, 66 Miss. 248. 
 
 Missouri. — Biddle v. Hussman, 
 23 Mo. 597; Kingsland v. Clark, 24 
 Mo. 24; Barclay v. Pickles, 38 Mo. 
 143. 
 
 85. In Gluck v. Baltimore, 81 Md. 
 315, 32 Atl. 515, 48 Am. St. Rep. 
 515, the court said: "If a con- 
 demnation of part of the premises 
 will not discharge the tenant's cove- 
 nant to pay rent, neither will it 
 operate to apportion the rent so as 
 to relieve the tenant of any portion 
 of his liability to the lessor. Appor- 
 tionment of the rent does not mean 
 abatement of it; because though 
 rent may be apportioned, the tenant 
 stUl remains liable to pay the whole 
 of it, but in different parts to differ- 
 ent persons, except where he has 
 purchased or acquired the reversion 
 of part of the demised premises. 
 So the question recurs, not what 
 will apportion, but what will abate 
 the rent? The total destruction of 
 the premises does not discharge the 
 payment of rent, or any part of the 
 rent, and nothing save a release, a 
 surrender, or an eviction will. A 
 condemnation by eminent domain of 
 part of the landlord's reversion is 
 not in law an eviction or partial 
 eviction, for an eviction is the act 
 of the landlord or of a third party 
 holding under a paramount title: 
 Taylor on Landlord and Tenant, 
 sec. 381. Neither is it a release, 
 which is the descending of the 
 greater estate upon the less: Tay- 
 lor on Landlord and Tenant sec. 
 
 507 ; nor is it a surrender, which is 
 the yielding up of the less estate to 
 him who has the reversion or re- 
 mainder: Coke on Littleton, 387 b. 
 As a consequence, then, a condemna- 
 tion proceeding cannot of its own 
 vigor on principle operate to abate 
 any portion of the rent, and it 
 therefore follows that, notwith- 
 standing an appropriation under the 
 power of eminent domain of a part 
 of the reversion, the tenant remains 
 liable on his covenant to pay rent, 
 precisely as he does when the entire 
 habitable premises have been de- 
 stroyed by fire." See also to same 
 effect, 
 
 California. — Schilling v. Holmes, 
 23 Cal. 230. 
 
 Illinois^ — Stubbings v. Evanston, 
 136 111. 37, 26 N. E. 577, 11 L. R. A. 
 839, 29 Am. St. Rep. 300; Corrigan 
 V. Chicago, 144 111. 537 33 N. E. 746, 
 21 L. R. A. 212. 
 
 Maryland. — Wagner v. White, 4 
 Harr. & J. 564. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Ellis v. Welch, 6 
 Mass. 246, 4 Am. Dec. 122 ; Parks v. 
 Boston, 15 Pick. 198; Patterson v. 
 Boston, 20 Pick. 159, 23 Pick. 425; 
 Emmes v. Feeley, 132 Mass. 346. 
 
 ffeio York. — Folts v. Huntley, 7 
 Wend. 210. 
 
 Ohio. — Foote v. Cincinnati, 11 
 Ohio 408, 38 Am. Dec. 737; Steifel 
 V. Metz, 2 Cincinnati Law Bull. 95. 
 
 Pennsylvania. — ^Workman v. Mif- 
 flin, 30 Pa. 326 ; Dyer v. Wightman, 
 66 Pa. 427 ; Peck v. Jones, 70 Pa. 85. 
 
 Rhode Island. — Rhode Island 
 Hospital Trust Co. v. Hayden, 20 
 R. I. 544, 40 AtL 421, 42 L. R. A. 107. 
 
 Washington. — Olson Land Co. v. 
 
§ 232 Valuation OF Pbopebty Taken roR Public Use. 713 
 
 On the other hand it is generally held that when the 
 entire leased parcel is taken by eminent domain the cove- 
 nant to pay rent is discharged. In such a case the tenant's 
 obligation to pay rent would be an unsecured personal lia- 
 bility, and, if the rule were otherwise, it might happen in 
 many cases that a tenant who had no other property would 
 recover compensation for the taking of his leasehold inter- 
 est based upon the assumption that he was to continue to 
 pay the rent, and would spend the sum awarded or waste 
 it by unfortunate investments before the end of the term, 
 so that the landlord would lose his rent altogether. Such 
 an arrangement would not only be inequitable, but would 
 probably be unconstitutional, as it would amount to depriv- 
 ing the owner of his security for the rent without compensa- 
 tion. The courts would in any event have to allow the 
 owner an equitable lien upon the compensation, and, as the 
 taking would result in the entire termination of the rela- 
 tion of landlord and tenant, and leave nothing for the cove- 
 nant to operate upon, it is much the better and more prac- 
 tical rule to allow a taking of the entire property to operate 
 as a termination of the obligation to pay rent and to assess 
 the damages accordingly, even if it is not easy to justify, 
 this practice upon strict legal theory.^® 
 
 The same argument can be made when so much of the 
 leased premises is taken that the remainder no longer 
 affords sufficient security for the rent, and in such a case 
 the landlord would doubtless be entitled to an equitable lien 
 upon the tenant's award.*^ It would seem that under such 
 conditions it would be fairer to both parties, especially when 
 such a large proportion of the property is taken that the 
 tenant cannot devote the remainder to the use for which he 
 leased the premises, either to treat the taking as a termina- 
 tion of the lease, or to allow a proportional amount of the 
 
 Alki Park Co., 63 Wash. 521, 115 Contra, Foote v. Cincimiatl, 11 OMo 
 
 Pac. 1083. 408, 38 Am. Dec. 737. 
 
 See a criticism of this rule in 29 37. Stubbings v. Evanston, 136 111. 
 
 American Law Review, 351. 37, 26 N. E. 577, 11 L. R. A. 839^ 
 
 36. Corrigan v. Chicago, 144 111. 29 Am. St. Rep. 300 ; Dyer v. Wight- 
 
 537, 33 N. E. 746, 21 L. R. A. 212; man, 66 Pa. 427. 
 O'Brien v. Ball, 119 Mass. 28. 
 
714 The Law of Eminent Domain. § 233 
 
 rent to be abated and to have tbe damages of the respective 
 parties assessed accordingly.^* 
 
 When part of a tract upon which there is an irredeemable 
 ground rent is taken by eminent domain, as a ground rent 
 is a rent service and not a rent charge, it will be appor- 
 tioned in relief of the tenant, although the residue would be 
 sufficient security for the entire rent.*^ 
 
 § 233. Measure of Tenant's Compensation. 
 
 It is obvious that the measure of the tenant's compensa- 
 tion when all or part of the leased premises is taken for the 
 public use depends to a great extent upon whether he is 
 entitled to an abatment of the rent. If any important por- 
 tion of the premises is taken, and the tenant is still obliged 
 to pay the rent agreed upon as compensation for the use of 
 the whole, he is clearly entitled to substantial damages. 
 When a proportionate part of the rent is abated, it may 
 well be that the tenant's damages are merely nominal. 
 
 In any event, the damages which should be paid to the 
 tenant are not easy to ascertain. He is entitled to recover 
 the decrease in the market value of his unexpired term." 
 Ordinarily, of course, the value of the term is figured upon 
 the basis of the most advantageous use of the estate, but 
 when the lease limits the character of the business that can 
 be carried on upon the premises, the value of the term for 
 any purpose is not material.*^ 
 
 To fix the market value of an unexpired term is no simple 
 matter. Leases commonly are not assignable without the 
 
 38. TJhler v. Cowen, 192 Pa. 443, 81 Md. 315, 32 Atl. 515, 48 Am. St. 
 44 Atl. 42. Hep. 515. 
 
 39. Baltimore v. Latrobe, 101 Md. Massachusetts. — Lawrence v. Bos- 
 621, 61 Atl. 203, 4 Ann. Cas. 1005; ton, 119 Mass. 126. 
 
 Voegtly V. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. New York. — Matter of New York, 
 
 Co., 2 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 243; Cuth- 120 App. Div. 700, 105 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 bert V. Kuhn, 3 Whart. (Pa.) 357. 729. 
 
 40. Georgia. — Pause v. Atlanta, Pennsylvania. — Pittsburg, etc., R. 
 98 Ga. 92, 26 S. B. 489, 58 Am. St. R. Co. v. Jones, 111 Pa. 204, 56 Am. 
 Rep. 290. Kep. 260; Philadelphia, etc., R. R. 
 
 Illinois. — Stubbings v. Evanston, Co. v. Getz, 113 Pa. 214. 
 
 136 111. 37, 26 N. B. 577, 11 L. R. A. Washington. — North Coast Ry. 
 
 839, 29 Am. St. Rep. 300. Co. v. Kraft Co., 63 Wash. 250, 115 
 
 Kansas. — Bales v. Wichita, etc., Pac. 97. 
 
 R R. Co., 92 Kan. 771, 141 Pac. 41. North Coast Ry. Co. v. Kraft 
 
 1009. Co., 63 Wash. 250, 115 Pac. 97. 
 
 Maryland. — Gluck v. Baltimore, 
 
§ 233 Valuation OP Peopebty Taken FOB Ptjblio Use. 715 
 
 consent of the landlord, and are so infrequently sold, and 
 vary so much in length of term, rent reserved and other 
 particulars as well as in the character of the property, that 
 it is almost impossible to apply the customary tests of 
 market value to a leasehold interest. It would seem that a 
 lease might well be held to fall within the class of property 
 not commonly bought and sold, and that consequently the 
 intrinsic value, or the value to the owner, might be taken 
 as the best and only available test of market value.** The 
 value to the owner of a lease, when he is paying the full 
 rental value of the premises as rent, is the right to remain 
 in undisturbed possession to the end of the term, and it is 
 sometimes held that the loss resulting from the deprivation 
 of this right is the proper measure of the tenant 's compen- 
 sation.** In such case the value may depend upon the use 
 made and the nature of the tenant's business; but expected 
 profits cannot be considered.** In Massachusetts, it is pro- 
 vided by statute when part of a tract leased in its entirety 
 to one tenant is taken by eminent domain, the tenant is enti- 
 tled to the income of the total compensation awarded dur- 
 ing the term, out of which the rent is taken, and at the 
 expiration of the term the principal is paid to the landlord; 
 but when there are several leases the compensation is 
 apportioned 'by the jury. 
 
 45 
 
 42. Supra, § 218. Thus it was fered no damage by the taking. In 
 held in In re Seattle, 52 Wash. 226, North Coast Ry. Co. v. Hess, 56 
 100 Pac. 330, that In determining Wash. 335, 105 Pac. 853, it was held 
 the damages to a leasehold interest that the tenant is entitled to com- 
 from a change of grade, a witness pensation irrespective ot liens, as 
 familiar with the effect of grade his Interest is distinct from the 
 damages on rental values but not on value of the land. 
 
 the value of leasehold Interests was 44. Pause v. Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92, 
 
 competent, as rental value is an ele- 26 S. E. 489, 58 Am. St. Rep. 290 ; 
 
 ment in determining the value of a Bales v. Wichita, etc., R. R. Co., 92 
 
 leasehold Interest. Kan. 771, 141 Pac. 1009. 
 
 43. McMillan Printing Co. v. 45. Massachusetts Revised Laws, 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 216 Pa. c. 48, §§ 17-23 inc. See Winchester 
 504, 65 Atl. 1091 ; North Coast Ry. v. Middlesex County Commissioners, 
 Co. V. Kraft Co., 63 Wash. 250, 115 114 Mass. 481 ; Boston v. Robblns, 
 Pac. 97. See however Uhland Club 121 Mass. 453, 126 Mass. 384 ; 
 v. Shupbach, 168 Mass. 430, 47 N. E. Turner v. Robbins, 133 Mass. 207 ; 
 113, in which it was held that when Norwich, etc., R. R. Co. v. Worces- 
 it appeared that the rental value of ter, 147 Mass. 518, 18 N. E. 409 ; 
 the leased property was the same as Stark v. Mansfield, 178 Mass. 76, 59 
 the rent reserve^ the tenant suf- N. E. 643. 
 
716 The Law oi" Eminent Domain. § 234 
 
 When a lease has a very long unexpired term, a jury 
 would be warranted in considering the landlord's interest 
 of no value, except for the right to receive the rent.*® On 
 the other hand, it is a common practice in some of the 
 larger cities t6 insert in leases of business property that 
 the term shall come to an end if all or part of the leased 
 premises are taken by eminent domain, and in such case the 
 tenant is not entitled to share in the compensation, except 
 in respect to his improvements.*'' 
 
 The relation of landlord and tenant, in the absence of 
 special provision to the contrary, imposes the duty of 
 repairing the leased premises upon the tenant and not upon 
 the landlord, and when the effect of the taking is to cut 
 off part of the building or otherwise render it unfit for 
 occupancy, if repairing the building is the most reason- 
 able method of meeting the situation, the tenant is entitled 
 to recover the cost of repairs.** If however the effect of 
 the taking is to render the buildings substantially untenant- 
 able, the tenant may abandon them and recover the full 
 market value of the lease.** 
 
 § 234. Buildings and Fixtures upon Leased Land. 
 
 When an entire tract of land which is subject to a lease 
 is taken by eminent domain, the fact that the owner had 
 erected buildings and had affixed machinery or other arti- 
 cles to the real estate would not require any modification 
 of the usual method of apportioning the award between 
 landlord and tenant. If however a building on the leased 
 premises was partially destroyed as a result of the taking 
 and a reasonable method of treatment would be to restqre 
 the building to its original condition as far as possible, 
 if the tenant was bound by his lease to make the repairs, 
 that portion of the award which covered the cost of restora- 
 tion should be turned over to him.^" 
 
 It frequently happens that, in the case of a lease for a 
 
 46. Chicago, etc., R. B. Co. v. 515; Brooks v. Boston, 19 Pick. 
 Chicago Mechanics' Institute, 239 (Mass.) 174; Turner v. WUliams, 
 111. 197, 87 N. E. 933. 10 Wend. (N. T.) 140. 
 
 47. Matter of New York, 168 N. Y. 49. Pause v. Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92, 
 254, 61 N. E. 249. 26 S. B. 489, 58 Am. St. Rep. 290. 
 
 48. Gluck V. Baltimore, 81 Md. 50. Gluck v. Baltimore, 81 Md. 
 315, 32 Atl. 515, 48 Am. St. Rep. 315, 32 Atl. 515, 48 Am. St. Rep. 515. 
 
§ 234 Valuation OF Pboperty Taken FOB Public Use. 717 
 
 long term of years, the tenant erects buildings upon the 
 leased land or puts fixtures into the building for his own 
 use. It is well settled that, even if the buildings or fixtures 
 are attached to the real estate and would pass with a con- 
 veyance of the land, as between landlord and tenant they 
 remain personal property, and, in the absence of a special 
 agreement to the contrary, may be removed by the tenant 
 at any time during the continuation of the lease provided 
 such removal may be made without injury to the freehold.®* 
 This rule is however entirely for the protection of the ten- 
 ant and cannot be invoked by the condemning party. If the 
 buildings or fixtures are attached to the real estate, they 
 must be treated as real estate in determining the total 
 award, but in apportioning the award they are treated as 
 personal property and credited to the tenant.®^ A tenant is 
 not however entitled to recover for buildings or other prop- 
 erty not attached to the realty.®* 
 
 The tenant is not entitled to recover the value of the 
 buildings or fixtures as a separate item additional to the 
 value of his leasehold interest, nor the dimunition in value 
 of such as are removed by him,®* nor the cost of removal.®® 
 The measure of damages is the increased market value of 
 the leasehold interest by reason of the buildings and fix- 
 tures, deducting the value, if any, of the building and fix- 
 tures, for purposes of removal. Evidence of the cost of 
 
 51. Baker v. McClurg, 198 111. 28, Pennsylvania. — Consolidated Ice 
 64 N. E. 701, 59 L. R. A. 131 ; Col- Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 224 
 lamore v. Gillis, 149 Mass. 578, 22 Pa. 487, 73 Atl. 937. 
 
 N. E. 46, 5 L. R. A. 150, 14 Am. St. Washington. — North Coast R. R. 
 
 Rep. 460 ; Be Improvement of Water Co. v. Kraft Co., 63 Wash. 250, 115 
 
 Front, 192 N. Y. 295, 84 N. E. 1105, Pac. 97. 
 
 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 423. So also of crops. LafEerty v. 
 
 52. Kansas. — Bales v. Wichita, Schuylkill River R. R. Co., 124 
 etc., R. R. Co., 92 Kan. 771, 141 Pac. Pa. 297, 16 Atl. 869, 3 L. R. A. 124, 
 1009. 10 Am. St. Rep. 587. 
 
 Massachusetts. — Sheehan v. Fall 53. Kansas City Southern Ry. 
 
 River, 187 Mass. 356, 73 N. E. 544; Co. v. Second St. Improvement Co., 
 
 Cornell-Andrews Smelting Co. v. 256 Mo. 386, 166 S. W. 296. 
 
 Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 209 Mass. 54. Pause v. Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92, 
 
 298, 311, 314, 95 N. E. 887. 26 S. E. 489, 58 Am. St Rep. 290 ; 
 
 new TorTc. — Poillon v. Gerry, 179 North Coast R. R. Co. v. Kraft Co., 
 
 N. Y. 14, 71 N. E. 262 ; In re Piers, 63 Wash. 250, 115 Pac. 97. 
 
 117 App. Div. 553, 102 N. T. Supp. 55. United States v. Meyers, 190 
 
 667; In re Block Bounded by Ave- Fed. 688. 
 nue A, 66 Misc. 488, 122 N. Y. Supp. 
 321, 
 
718 The Law op Eminent Domain. § 234 
 
 removing the fixtures, the damage to them by removal and 
 the value of the fixtures lost because incapable of removal 
 is sometimes admitted, not as proving specific items of 
 damage, but as showing the value of the unexpired term.*® 
 The same rule is sometimes applied even in the case of 
 property not attached to the realty.*^ So also the structural 
 value of the buildings and fixtures may be a fair test of 
 what they add to the market value of the leasehold, if they 
 are well adapted to the best use of the' property and the 
 lease is of such duration that it will outlast the fixtures 
 or if it contains a covenant of perpetual renewal at the 
 option of the tenant.^* 
 
 "When however the lease has but a short time to run and 
 the tenant's buildings and fixtures are not capable of 
 removal without substantial depreciation in value, an inter- 
 esting problem is presented. The building and fixtures may 
 be such as to add largely to the market value of the prop- 
 erty as a whole ; but they add nothing to the value of the 
 fee because they do not belong to the owner of the fee and 
 they may add very little to the value of the leasehold inter- 
 est. If the condemning party has to pay the whole addi- 
 tional value of the real estate due to the existence of the 
 buildings and fixtures, either the landlord or the tenant wiU 
 receive more than his interest is actually worth. Whether 
 this is one of the cases in which the value of the real estate 
 as real estate is disregarded, and the total value of the sepa- 
 rate interests in the real estate is the proper measure of 
 compensation is not yet entirely clear .^® 
 
 When the lease provides that the buildings and fixtures, 
 though erected by the tenant, shall not be removed at the 
 
 56. North Coast E. R. Co. v. shortly before the expiration of the 
 Kraft Co., 63 Wash. 250, 115 Pac. 97. lease, and it was held that the ten- 
 
 57. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. v. ant could recover only what he lost 
 Getz, 113 Pa. 214, 6 Atl. 356; Mc- by having to move the fixtures at 
 Millan Printing Co. v. Pittsburg, the time of the taking rather than 
 etc., R. R. Co., 216 Pa. 504, 65 Atl. when the lease expired. In Be Im- 
 1091. provement of Water Front, 192 
 
 58. Storms v. Manhattan Ry. Co., N. Y. 298, 84 N. E. 1105, 18 L. R. A. 
 178 N. Y. 493, 71 N. E. 3, 66 L. R. A. (N. S.) 423, it was held that if the 
 625. award includes the full additional 
 
 59. In Emery v. Boston Terminal market value arising from the ten- 
 Co., 178 Mass. 172, 59 N. E. 763, 86 ant's fixtures, the tenant and not 
 Am. St. Rep. 473, the taking was the landlord gets the benefit of such 
 made by the owner of the fee payment. 
 
§ 235 Valuation OF Property Taken FOE Public Use. 719 
 
 end of the term the tenant is entitled to recover for the 
 buildings and fixtures only so much as they add to the 
 rental value of the unexpired tenn.°° 
 
 § 235. Mutual Restrictions. 
 
 A rather perplexing situation arises out of the existence 
 of what are commonly called ' ' building restrictions. ' ' A 
 large tract of land is often cut up into lots and sold for 
 residential purposes, and each lot is sold subject to restric- ' 
 tions against use for various obnoxious purposes, the 
 restriction upon each lot being for the benefit of all the 
 others. Such a restriction is enforceable in equity and is 
 an interest in real estate constituting property in the con- 
 stitutional sense.®^ When one of the lots is taken for a 
 public use which will violate the restrictions, the negative 
 easements of the other proprietors over the lot taken will 
 be destroyed and they may make a claim for compensation. 
 If the existence of the easement diminished the value of 
 the land subject thereto, as is ordinarily the case when the 
 easement is of such a character as a right of way, the com- 
 pensation of the holder of the easement might well be 
 deducted from the sum awarded to the owner of the servient 
 tenement. In the case of mutual building restrictions how- 
 ever, the existence of the restrictions often enhances rather 
 than decreases the value of the land, and the owner of the 
 land taken might consequently well object to receiving in 
 any event less than the fair market value of his property, 
 as a piece of real estate. On the other hand the public 
 might object to paying more than such value for all the 
 interests in the property, and, if both of these points were 
 sustained, the negative easements belonging to the other 
 owners would be taken without compensation. This result 
 has been reached in two recent cases,^^ the courts holding 
 that the restrictions need not be considered at all, as no 
 contracts of private individuals could make that a taking 
 
 60. Bass V. Metropolitan West 62. United States v. Certain 
 Side Elevated E. R. Co., 53 U. S. Lands, 112 Fed. 622, affirmed, 153 
 App. 542, 82 Fed. 857, 39 L. R. A, Fed. 876 ; Herr v. Board of Educa- 
 711. tion of Newark, 82 N. J. L. 610, 83 
 
 61. Ladd V. Boston, 151 Mass. 585, Atl. 173. 
 24 N. E. 858, 21 Am. St. Eep. 481, 
 
 and supra, § 121. 
 
720 The Law of Eminent Domain-. § 235 
 
 which was not, and that contracts purporting to do so are 
 against public policy and void. The courts seemed to fear 
 that any other decision would enable landowners by a mere 
 trick of conveyancing to impose a great burden upon the 
 exercise of the power of eminent domain. 
 
 A possible solution of the difficulty can be reached by con- 
 sidering the fact that the restrictions in favor of the lot 
 taken upon the other lots would not be needed for the public 
 use and consequently would not be taken. The lot taken 
 might be considered as burdened by the restrictions upon 
 it, but the increase in its value due to the existence of the 
 restrictions in its favor upon the other lots need not be 
 considered. The decrease in value by reason of the restric- 
 tions upon it might then be paid to the owners of the other 
 lots. This result however is not entirely satisfactory, and 
 it seems impossible to work out a solution that would do 
 justice to all the owners without abrogating the rule that 
 the total compensation should not exceed the value of the 
 land as land. 
 
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