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 BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE 
 
 SAGE ENDOV/MENT FUND 
 
 THE GIFT OF 
 
 HENRY W. SAGE 
 
 1891 
 
MEMOIRS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND 
 
 VOL. V. 
 
THE WRITINGS OF 
 
 THE FOUNDERS OF THE REPUBLIC. 
 
 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, comprising 
 his Diaries and his public and private correspondence, 
 including many letters and documents never before in 
 print, are being issued under the editorial supervision of 
 WoRTHiNGTON C. FoRD. To be complete in fourteen 
 royal octavo volumes. 
 Nine volumes are now ready. Each . . $5.00 
 
 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN 
 JAY, First Chief-Justice of the United States. Edited 
 by Henry P. Johnston, Professor of American History 
 in the CoUege of the City of New York. The set is to 
 be complete in four royal octavo volumes. 
 Two volumes are now ready. Each . . $5.00 
 
 Of the above works the edition will be limited to y^o copies, 
 printed from type (the type being distributed as printed from), 
 uniform with the previously issued sets of " Hamilton " and 
 *^ Franklin.^* 
 
 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON. Edited by Paul 
 Leicester Ford. This set wiU be in about ten volumes 
 octavo, uniform in size and style with the above works. 
 A limited edition will be printed from type. (In press.) 
 Price per volume $5.00 
 
 G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, Publishers 
 
 NEW YORE LONDON 
 
 27 WEST TWENTY-THIRD STREET 24 BEDFORD STREET, STRAND 
 
MEMOIRS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND 
 
 vol.. V. 
 
■.L 
 
 «/t /r^Z/'-Y^'.-'"^ 
 
 FROM A PAINTING E / T. GERARD. 
 
MEMOIRS 
 
 PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND 
 
 EDITED, WITH A PREFACE AND NOTES, BY 
 
 THE DUC DE BROGLIE 
 
 OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY 
 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 
 Mrs. ANGUS HALL 
 
 WITH AN INTRODUCTION BV 
 
 THE HONORABLE WHITELAW REID 
 
 AMERICAN MINISTER IN PARIS 
 
 VOLUME V (COMPLETING THE WORK) 
 
 H^JTH PORTRAITS 
 
 G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
 
 NEW YORK LONDON 
 
 37 WEST TWENTY-THIRD STREET 24 BEDFORD STREET, STRAND 
 
 S^e ^nicheibocKci ^rcsB 
 1892 
 
 All"! 
 
Copyright, i8gi 
 
 BY 
 
 G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
 
 ilbc 1ttnlcl!crbocl;ct press 
 
PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 The fifth and last volume of Prince de Talleyrand's Memoirs 
 concludes the publication which his testamentary executors 
 had bequeathed to their representatives. The Editors have 
 completed the task which they undertook, by depositing with 
 the Director of the Bibliotheque Nationale, the MS. volumes of 
 which the text now printed is the exact reproduction. It will 
 thus be easy to ascertain, that the trust which they have 
 received has not suffered any alteration or abridgment 
 whatever. 
 
 It is true, that the collection thus placed before the public, 
 not being an autograph, but a copy, certified by the testa- 
 mentary executors, such authentication can only serve to testify- 
 to the scrupulous good faith of the Editors, and would not of itself, 
 in the absence of other testimony, be sufficient to put an end to 
 the controversy which has been raised as to the character of 
 the Memoirs themselves. Happily the discussion to which this 
 controversy has given rise, has already sufficed to dispel all 
 doubts. 
 
 The question of the authenticity of Talleyrand's Memoirs 
 has been thrashed out by the Press, and their originality has 
 been established beyond doubt, by eminent critics and judges, 
 whose authority can hardly be disputed. M. Sorel in the Temps, 
 M. Chuquet in the Revue Critique, M. Sustane Monod and M. 
 Farge in the Revue Historique, have pronounced for it with 
 
viii PREFACE. 
 
 the weight derived from their comparative study of all docu- 
 ments connected with contemporaneous history, and in support 
 of the same decision, M. Pierre Bertrand has brought forward, 
 in the Revue EncyclopMique, curious details respecting the style 
 of Prince de Talleyrand's composition, which he has been able 
 to gather from many of the Prince's inedited letters, published 
 by him. 
 
 If, therefore, I now revive a subject which may seem exhausted, 
 it is not with the view of adding anything to such conclusive 
 testimony, but simply to offer its reproduction and r^sum^ to 
 those readers, who, not having followed the phases of the 
 controversy, desire to ascertain the true value of the entire work 
 now placed in their hands. 
 
 A few words will suffice to recall the points on which the 
 dispute was maintained, and the exact limit to which it was 
 confined. No attempt has been made to compare Talleyrand's 
 Memoirs with those apocryphal compositions wbich abound in 
 our literature, veritable historic romances, compiled from all 
 kinds of documents by professional writers and then issued 
 under the name of such and such celebrated personage. The 
 undoubted origin of the documents, and the evidences of superior 
 ability visible in certain portions, do not permit such a sup- 
 position. It has only been sought to prove that the original 
 text has been revised and mutilated, and not made public 
 until it had undergone alterations which render it unrecognisable, 
 and in order to justify this, it is asserted, that there have been 
 found either omissions, which appear to be the effect of abridg- 
 ments made by a strange hand after the work was completed, 
 or a confusion of facts and names, which could not have 
 escaped the author's notice, as they would have been the in- 
 troduction of errors with respect to events with which he was 
 personally connected, or with regard to contemporaries, friends, 
 
PREFACE. ix 
 
 or adversaries whom he had personally known. The absence of 
 an autograph manuscript would then account for the intention 
 of those who transcribed it, to remove traces of the modi- 
 fications which they did not hesitate to introduce. 
 
 It must be remembered, that in the Memoirs all the events 
 of the author's life, which have long ago appeared in his 
 biography, do not, to say the least, present themselves with 
 the same degree of detail and importance. The narrative 
 progresses rapidly, and without dwelling upon the commence- 
 ment of Talleyrand's political career ; the part he played in 
 the Constituent Assembly; his relations with the illustrious 
 personages of that period ; and the missions and public offices 
 which he filled during the early part of the Revolution. Without 
 even considering the extent of the narrative, there are but few 
 chapters devoted to these early years, compared with the 
 complete and detailed exposition of the great negotiations of 
 1 8 14 and 1830. But so far from this difference being surprising, 
 it is only what might be expected, and it presents nothing to us 
 but what is natural. 
 
 In the course of an almost secular existence, Talleyrand, as- 
 sociated as he was with all the vicissitudes of which Europe and 
 France were the theatre during this turbulent period, had actu- 
 ally seen the whole aspect of the world around him change ; and 
 as the effect of such long experience, accompanied by repeated 
 disappointment, he as well as most men of his generation, must 
 have found that the same feelings and ideas which he had shared 
 together with the wisest of his contemporaries, no longer existed. 
 
 When he took up his pen after the Restoration, to which he 
 had so powerfully contributed. Prince de Talleyrand, representing 
 as he did legitimate Monarchy at Vienna, in the presence of 
 assembled Europe, must have retained but few ideas and traits 
 in common with the Abbe de I'^rigord, sitting on the Left in the 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 Constituent Assembly, and he could scarcely have recognized this 
 almost effaced likeness of himself after so distant a past. He 
 had learnt much, and perhaps also forgotten a little. Many 
 resolutions which he had taken during times of hope, of disap- 
 pointment, and of anxiety must have appeared to him, if not the 
 result of influence, against vi^hich he was not proof, at least neces- 
 sities to which he must submit. Would he not then have hastened 
 to turn over this page of his history, in order to arrive rapidly at 
 that on which were inscribed the eminent services he had just 
 rendered to his country 1 How could he linger, to recapitulate 
 with complacency for the benefit of posterity, impressions which 
 he perhaps no longer retained, which did not even affect 
 him, or in any case revive their memory .? 
 
 A man who exercised an influence on the political affairs of 
 his time, such as that ascribed to Talleyrand, would not set him- 
 self to write like an ordinary author, to soothe his old age by 
 recalling the reminiscences of his youth. His constant thought 
 was to obtain full appreciation of the efforts he had made to 
 protect the interests that vi^ere confided to him, and the results 
 which he took credit to himself for having obtained. 
 
 From this point of view, 1789 recalled nothing to M. de 
 Talleyrand but wasted energy. Is it therefore a matter of 
 astonishment that he should have preferred to concern himself 
 most with the incontestible greatness and utility of the role, which 
 heplayedin 1814 and 1830? No one moreover could have occu- 
 pied so great a position in his time, without being subject to 
 much accusation and censure. 
 
 The intention of the Memoirs therefore is not to reveal 
 unknown facts, but to prepare matter for a case to be examined 
 by history, and history itself ought to search therein, less for 
 fresh information than for fitting elements to enlighten the 
 judgment which it is called on to pronounce. 
 
PREFACE. xi 
 
 I am well aware that a general impression had been created 
 respecting Talleyrand's Memoirs totally different to that which a 
 full knowledge of them now conveys. In consequence of the 
 perhaps excessive precautions taken by the testamentary 
 executors to prevent premature publication, people have been 
 inclined to imagine that the secret would not have been kept so 
 long had not the Memoirs contained facts of a delicate and 
 mysterious nature, and that the veil once lifted, piquante revela- 
 tions, satirical portrait?, malicious anecdotes, who knows what all ? 
 would be made public ; perhaps even the facilities which a lax 
 morality afforded to the worldly clergy of the Ancien Regime. 
 The grave style of the narrative, quite in keeping with the nature 
 of the subjects treated, has disappointed this frivolous curiosity, 
 and from that, to the supposition that everything which would 
 have satisfied it has been intentionally suppressed, is but a step. 
 
 But it was not necessary to have known M. de Talleyrand ; 
 it was enough to have lived with those who knew him, to 
 prevent the conception of or a belief in any illusion of the kind. 
 It would even suffice to remember that among all the reproaches 
 of every kind that have been laid to his charge, that of want of 
 tact and good taste is perhaps the only one of which he is 
 acquitted. 
 
 If serious writers have looked for interest of this kind in 
 these Memoirs, and are astonished at not finding it, they have 
 displayed a want of judgment which does not permit them to 
 call themselves historians. 
 
 Moreover, it is difficult to understand how anyone in the 
 least accustomed to write history from original documents, could 
 attach any real importance to such errors in chronology or proper 
 names as might be found in the Memoirs de Talleyrand. 
 Instead of regarding them as evidence of forgeries, they ought 
 to be recognized as being, what is plain to everyone, the 
 
xii PREFACE. 
 
 failure of memory inevitable at the close of a long life, passed 
 under such varied circumstances. I venture to assert that 
 there are no known Memoirs, not even those whose authen- 
 ticity is beyond doubt, which do not contain errors more or less 
 grave, and if subjected to criticism would stand the test so 
 well. 
 
 For instance, I have had occasion, in the course of my 
 labours, to study the memoirs of men who during the sixteenth 
 century played an important part as ministers, generals, or 
 ambassadors, and I will cite amongst others. Marshal de Belle 
 Isle and the Marquis d'Argenson. After comparing their 
 narratives with the correspondence written by them during their 
 life-time, I have found not once, or by accident, but constantly, 
 differences and even contradictions apparently irreconcilable, 
 between the details of facts described by them in their retire- 
 ment and after the events, and their letters written the next or 
 even the same day on which these events occurred. Most of 
 these differences no doubt have arisen from a desire to excuse 
 themselves from certain reproaches, or to enhance the merit of 
 certain services ; but others are without explanation, except 
 that of forgetfulness or involuntary confusion of ideas. 
 
 Further, two politicians who have occupied an important 
 place in our contemporaneous history, and of whom one is dead, 
 having kindly placed at my disposal, either in whole or in part, 
 their unpublished recollections ; I ventured to point out to them 
 in their narration of events, where they figured as principal 
 actors, inaccuracies, doubtless very harmless and very innocent, 
 but much more serious than those of which they accuse 
 Talleyrand's Memoirs, when merely on my observation they 
 expressed an eager desire to admit and correct them. 
 
 I must add, that having been called upon myself to publish 
 my father's memoirs, I can show from his own testimony, how 
 
PREFACE. xiii 
 
 the most conscientious man, writing after the lapse of years, 
 ought to mistrust his memory and take precautions to prevent 
 its deceiving him. 
 
 It is well known that the first and one of the most characteris- 
 tic acts of my father's political life, was the determination he came 
 to in 1 8i 5, to take his seat in the Chamber of Peers during Marshal 
 Ney's trial, although he was not legally of age and would not at- 
 tain his majority until the day the sentence was pronounced. I 
 have many times heard him relate the particulars of the first 
 sitting in which he took part, and of which an ineffaceable 
 impression ought to haye remained engraven on his memory, 
 from the novelty and gravity of the spectacle before him. The 
 subject of debate on that day, he told me, was the decision of 
 perhaps the most important point in the trial, namely, whether 
 Marshal Ney should be given the benefit of the amjiesty 
 promised to rebels by the capitulation of Paris. Judge of my 
 astonishment at finding in his Memoirs these same details but 
 related with the following reservation : 
 
 " I took my seat," he writes, " on the 4th December. At 1 1 
 o'clock in the morning, I entered the Chamber ; the members 
 were already assembled in the Council Chamber, namely the 
 picture gallery, in which they deliberated in private. I still 
 recollect the position of every member I knew, and the place 
 where I was myself seated on the last bench, but, inconceivable 
 as it may appear, were I called upon, I would take my oath, that 
 the subject under deliberation was, to decide whether Marshal 
 Ney could be permitted to plead the capitulation of Paris in 
 extenuation. It is well known that the error, the great error, I 
 would almost say crime, committed by the Chamber, was, in 
 having in this way closed the mouth of the accused. I heard M. 
 Mold take one side and Lanjuinais and Porcher de Richebourg 
 the other. This sitting was an epoch in my life. How then 
 
xiv PREFACE. 
 
 could I have made a mistake ? Nevertheless it must be so, for 
 the official report places this sitting not on the first, but on the 
 last day of the proceedings or completion of the pleadings. But 
 while fully admitting my mistake, my common sense alone, gives 
 in. My memory remains unconvinced and I here repeat, that I 
 would take my oath against the official report." 
 
 Let us now suppose that the narrator had not been able to 
 consult the official reports of the Chamber of Peers, and had 
 written his recollections, such as he retained them, would this 
 error in date have been sufficient to invalidate either the veracity 
 of the writer or the authenticity of the text .' ^ 
 
 Finally, if an error in capacity on the part of a public in- 
 dividual is sufficient to question the veracity of a work, how is it 
 to be accounted for that among the small number of M. de 
 Talleyrand's autograph letters which we possess, mistakes are to 
 be found in this respect more important than those which have 
 been pointed out in his Memoirs .' For instance, how can it be 
 explained, that when speaking to the Emperor Alexander, he 
 gives the title of brother-in-law of King Frederick William to 
 the head of a house, certainly very illustrious, but who was not 
 connected with the Royal Family of Prussia except by a much 
 more distant relationship .''^ and how is it to be accounted for, that 
 instead of correcting this mistake, he repeats it two days after- 
 wards, when giving Louis XVIII. an account of his interview.' 
 
 ^ An error in date of this description caused a momentary doubt as to the 
 authenticity of a letter from Louis XVIII. to Talleyrand, relative to the design of the 
 Prussians to blow up the Bridge of Jena. In citing this letter in his Memoirs (vol. iii. 
 p. l6o), M. de Talleyrand heads it, '^ Paris, X'^th July, 1815. Saturday, xo 0' clock." 
 This date could not be correct, because the event to which the letter refers happened on 
 Saturday, the l8th, not Saturday, 15th July. Fortunately the original letter exists. 
 It has been photographed, and is reproduced at the commencement of the first volume 
 of the Memoirs, and it bears no other date than this — " Saturday." The error, there- 
 fore, is evidently the mistake of the author of the Memoirs, who, desiring to place a 
 certain date upon the letter as a reminder, has made the mistake of a week. This, 
 for an incident of little importance, is not to be wondered at. 
 
 ^ See vol. iii. p. 48. 
 
PREFACE. XV 
 
 Assuredly for a courtier and a diplomatist, living and holding 
 converse with Sovereigns, and knowing how much they dislike 
 any mistakes concerning themselves, he thereby displayed an 
 incorrectness or committed a blunder, much greater than that 
 which consisted in giving the Director Carnot in 1796 the rank 
 of general, which was not conferred upon him till 1813. It 
 would therefore be useless to try and take advantage of inaccur- 
 acies inevitably certain in such minutiae, as a means of questioning 
 the authenticity of the Memoirs. 
 
 It remains to be explained, why the manuscript left by the 
 testamentary executors is a certified copy and not the autograph 
 text. The answer is most simple ; such a text — at least under the 
 supposed conditions— had probably never been in their hands, and 
 knowing M. de Talleyrand's habits, they themselves were not 
 surprised at it. 
 
 All those who were acquainted with M. de Talleyrand, knew, 
 in fact, that as heavy work fatigued him, he never himself wrote 
 any but completely private letters, or those which out of respect 
 for the persons addres.'^ed he considered ought not to be written 
 by a secretary. At all other times he dictated his correspond- 
 ence. Having done so, he revised it, making such corrections 
 as he deemed necessary ; then the writing thus revised was 
 rc-copied and filed amongst his papers. Sometimes when he 
 liad confidence in the ability and intelligence of his secretary, 
 he contented himself with giving him the gist of his ideas, leaving 
 to him the care of drafting them and reserving to himself the 
 task of correcting their form and giving them more force and 
 elegance. It was the text thus prepared, but no portion of which 
 probably was in the handwriting of the author, that M. de 
 Bacourt received in trust ; and in transcribing it afresh, he did 
 not dream of altering its character in the least, or, above all, of 
 depriving it of any guarantee of exactitude and authenticity. 
 
xvi PREFACE. 
 
 What would in fact be gained by having before us these 
 original writings — (remember I have never said originals) ? 
 They would only be copies like those we have received, except 
 that instead of being bound in volumes and in the same hand- 
 writing, they would be in loose sheets, perhaps in different 
 writing, all equally susceptible and open to the suspicion of sup- 
 pression or interpolation, and, to believe in them, it would still be 
 necessary to have confidence in the loyalty of the testamentary 
 executors and particularly of M. de Bacourt.^ 
 
 I am well aware that doubt has been cast, even on M. de 
 Bacourt's good faith, notwithstanding the unanimous opinion to 
 the contrary of those who knew him. In support of this we are 
 reminded, that the mark of confidence with which Talleyrand had 
 honoured M. de Bacourt, was not the first of the same nature, 
 which had been conferred upon him. His name figured at the 
 head of a publication some years ago containing very important 
 documents relative to Mirabeau's relations with the Court of 
 Louis XVI., of which the Comte de la Marck, afterwards 
 Prince d'Arenberg, had been the intermediary. M. de la Marck 
 when dying had charged M. de Bacourt to publish these 
 
 ' M. Bertrand, after explaining in detail the style of M. de Talleyrand's com- 
 position, with which the letters and documents emanating from him, extant at the 
 Foreign Office, made him familiar, thus sums up his opinion on the subject of the 
 Memoirs themselves : 
 
 The character of the private manuscripts and of his Memoirs, is very well 
 described by the following mention of the copy left by M. de Bacourt, in the inventory 
 of his papers attached to his will : 
 
 " Four volumes, bound in leather, which are the only authentic and complete copy 
 of the Memoirs of Prince de Talleyrand, compiled from the dictated manuscripts and 
 copies, respecting which M. le Prince de Talleyrand had given him instructions." 
 
 Here we see it is a question of dictated manuscripts and copies. The manuscripts 
 are evidently all writings emanating from different personages, of which the originals, 
 possessed by Talleyrand, are now in the possession of M. le Due de Broglie, and of 
 which some have been inserted by M. de Bacourt in the copy of the Memoirs. We 
 may, therefore, conclude that the copies spoken of in the inventory are copies made 
 for Talleyrand from documents amongst the State papers, or possessed by private in- 
 dividuals. There remain the dictated writings, but what can these dictated writings 
 be except the original manuscript of the Memoirs ? 
 
PREFACE. xvii 
 
 documents, in order to establish the character of these secret 
 relations of Mirabeau, which, according to him, were not 
 properly appreciated. M. de Bacourt is accused of not having 
 been sufficiently conscientious in the fulfilment of this request. 
 In some of the documents, suppressions and evasions have been 
 traced, and it has therefore been concluded that Talleyrand's 
 Memoirs have in their publication suffered similar eliminations 
 at the hands of M. de Bacourt. Were this fact true, as alleged, 
 which I shall not discuss here, I do not see what conclusion 
 could be justly come to from an assimilation of two situations 
 which have nothing in common. 
 
 M. de la Marck had collected a great mass of papers of 
 different date and origin — letters and notes, some from Mira- 
 beau himself, others addressed to him, others subsequent to his 
 death. From this rather confused collection of documents, 
 M de Bacourt undertook to justify the illustrious man whose 
 friend and confident he had been. But to attain this end, and 
 produce the desired effect, or even to introduce a little order and 
 clearness in the arrangement of the documents, and make their 
 sense and intention plain to the reader, a classification and con- 
 sequently a selection was necessary. 
 
 To this task M. de la Marck had applied himself, but the 
 decline of his health did not permit him to accomplish it, and he 
 bequeathed to M. de Bacourt the duty of finishing it in the 
 spirit and intention known to him. In whatever manner the 
 proxy fulfilled his commission, he only exercised his right, and, 
 above all, deceived no one ; for nowhere is it stated that he was 
 enjoined by M. de la Marck, to publish without distinction all 
 that had been handed over to him by the will, nor has he him- 
 self pretended that no portion of what was placed in his hands 
 has been eliminated. 
 
 Finally, and this in the present case is most important, it is 
 VOL. V. ^ 
 
xviii PREFACE. 
 
 not stated or even hinted at, that M. de Bacourt has himself 
 fabricated any of the documents which he has published, with 
 the intention of issuing his own composition under the shelter 
 and the name of others.^ 
 
 Quite different and much more serious, would be the wrong 
 or rather injury done to the memory of M. de Bacourt, were the 
 imputation admitted. Each manuscript volume of Talleyrand's 
 Memoirs bears, as is known, an attestation on the last page, 
 signed by M. de Bacourt himself, to the effect that the contents 
 are authentic and complete. Let us however admit that by a 
 subtilty of conscience, very difficult to conceive, a man of honour 
 could believe himself justified in attesting the integrity of a col- 
 lection which he had himself altered and mutilated. But having 
 made the erasures and alterations, it would be necessary to use 
 a pen to fill up the gaps and re-establish the interrupted tran- 
 sitions in order to obliterate, in what follows, and in the plot of 
 the narrative, the solutions of continuity too plainly visible. In 
 a word, the Editor would thus attribute to the author, speaking 
 in the first person, like a personage in a play, a language which 
 he had not held. 
 
 M. de Bacourt's critics have not retired in the face of this sup- 
 position ; they pretend that there are even entire chapters in which 
 Talleyrand's elegant and delicate touch cannot be recognised, 
 the composition of which they do not hesitate to attribute to 
 M. de Bacourt, who, they declare, has sheltered himself behind 
 his name. Here there is no circumlocution possible. The fact, 
 if it were true, would be pure and simple falsification, and that 
 without the least extenuating circumstance. 
 
 How then can we refuse to take into consideration the 
 almost unanimous testimony and indignant protestations of all 
 
 1 See the explanations given by M. . . . , relative to this publication by M. de 
 Bacourt of documents respecting Mirabeau. — Vie de Mirabeau, pp. 258-267. 
 
PREFACE. xix 
 
 those who knew M. de Bacourt, and of whom there is not one 
 who does not bear witness, that the most salient trait in his char- 
 acter was a delicacy pushed to scrupulous fastidiousness. Such 
 besides was his profound and almost superstitious admiration for 
 the master whom he worshipped, that the idea of taking his 
 place and speaking in his name, was an excess of presumption 
 which could never have entered his head. He would never have 
 supposed that the reader could be in doubt for a moment. 
 
 The conclusion is therefore beyond question. The Memoirs 
 of Talleyrand can take a high place in that rich collection of 
 historical souvenirs, which is one of the greatest ornaments of 
 our literature, and they can be perused with as much confidence 
 as the Memoirs o/ J^ickelteu, -which, no one now contests, although 
 no manuscript is extant, or three-fourths of the Letters of 
 Madame de Sivigny, of which no one possesses the original. 
 
 Due DE BROGLIE. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PART XI. 
 
 THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 
 1832— 1833. 
 
 Talleyrand returns to London — He gives a brief rdsumd of the general posi- 
 tion of affairs in Europe — Letters from the different members of the new 
 French Cabinet under Marshal Soult — They ask to be allowed to drive 
 the Dutch out of Antwerp and then place the citadel in the hands of 
 the Belgians — Russia and Prussia object — The French Government 
 suggests that Prussia should temporarily occupy Venloo and certain 
 portions of Limburg and Luxemburg — Prussia refuses — The Countess de 
 Flahaut intrigues against Talleyrand — Despite the obstinate resistance 
 of the King of Holland and the delays of Russia and Prussia, the Con- 
 vention empowering England and France to use coercive measures 
 against Holland is signed — The French and English squadrons blockade 
 the Dutch ports — The French army enters Belgium and marches on 
 Antwerp — Arrest of the Duchess de Berry at Nantes— Another attempt 
 on the life of Louis Philippe — Madame Adelaide gives Talleyrand an 
 account of the siege of Antwerp and the Due d'Orldans' bravery — Russia 
 withdraws from the Conference — Arrival of the Marquis de Palmella in 
 London on a mission from Dom Pedro — Draft of the treaty between 
 Holland and Belgium — M. de Mareuil's complaint at being put aside — 
 Talleyrand interferes on his behalf — M. de Mareuil is sent to Naples — 
 Antwerp capitulates — The Dutch 'garrison is allowed to return to Holland 
 unconditionally — Death of the Princess de Vaud^mont — The Hague 
 accepts the Convention of May 31st — General Pozzo's secret mission to 
 the various Continental Courts — Austria and Prussia are asked to com- 
 bine with Russia against France and England — M. de Medem shows 
 the Due de Broglie the secret instructions sent to General Mouravieff 
 respecting Egypt — M. de Rayneval's account of the state of affairs in 
 the Peninsula — Colonel Campbell is sent to Alexandria to inform 
 Mehemet Ali that England will support the Sultan — Admiral Roussin's 
 action at Constantinople — An English squadron is sent to the Mediter- 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 ranean, under the command of Sir Pulteney Malcolm, to act in concert 
 with the French squadron — A serious riot breaks out at Frankfort — M. 
 d'Appony suggests that a Conference on Eastern affairs should as- 
 semble at Vienna — Talleyrand considers that it will require the joint 
 action of all four Powers to bring the affairs of the East to a close — The 
 Due d'Orl^ans' visit to England — Louis Philippe's gratification at the 
 Duke's reception — The ratification of the Convention by Holland — 
 Peace is signed between the Sultan and Mehemet All — Russia expresses 
 her readiness to withdraw her troops, as soon as Ibrahim Pasha has 
 effected his retreat — Talleyrand's r^sum^ of the tresh phase in Dutch 
 and Belgian affairs consequent on the Convention of May 2ist — The 
 landing at Villa Real of the expedition under the Marquis de Palmella 
 — The towns along the coast proclaim themselves in favour of Queen 
 Dona Maria — Capture of several of Dom Miguel's ships by the Queen's 
 fleet^Fresh complications in the Peninsula — It is suggested to separate 
 Dom Pedro from his daughter's cause and place her under a Regency 
 — Dona Maria is proclaimed at Lisbon — The rumoured treaty between 
 Russia and the Porte has been actually signed at Constantinople — 
 Talleyrand thinks no effort should be spared to prevent its ratification — 
 England and France express their disapprobation to Turkey — England 
 decides to recognize Dona Maria's Government — Lord William Russell 
 is accredited to Lisbon — A brilliant action between Dom Pedro's troops 
 and the MigueUtes, in which the former are victorious — The Due de 
 Broglie's rhumd of the treaty between Russia and the Porte — Talley- 
 rand's reply — The Duchess de Braganza wishes to arrange a marriage 
 between the Due de Leuchtenberg and Dona Maria — The Due de 
 Broglie points out the reason why France cannot consent to such an 
 alliance — England agrees v^'ith France — Unpleasantness between the 
 English Minister at St. Petersburg and Lord Minto at Berlin — The 
 Emperor of Russia goes to Stettin to meet the King of Prussia and the 
 Emperor of Austria — Hopeless condition of King Ferdinand of Spain 
 ■ — Excitement caused by the intercepted letters published by the Times 
 — Dona Maria's arrival in England — She stays at Windsor — Talleyrand 
 goes to France on leave of absence Pages \ — 178 
 
 PART XIL 
 
 THE REVOLUTION OF 183O. 
 
 1833— 1834. 
 
 Talleyrand almost decides not to return to England — Fresh complications 
 arise— He is urged to return by the King and the Ministers — Results of 
 the meeting between the three Northern Sovereigns, planned by Metter- 
 nich — The Due de Broglie's reply to the communication of the three 
 Courts — Talleyrand returns to London— He proposes to England to 
 
LUJSTKNTii. xxiii 
 
 form a defensive alliance with France — The Due de Broglie's scheme 
 for the basis of such a treaty — Lord Grey considers such a step unad- 
 visable, as giving Mettemich material for discussion at the Congress of 
 German Powers then convoked at Vienna — Russia desirous to reassure 
 France and England as to the projects of invasion attributed to her — 
 Reference in the Augsburger Gazette to a treaty between Russia and 
 Austria guaranteeing the existence of the Ottoman Empire — Anxiety in 
 England at the Due de Broglie's illness and reported resignation — De 
 Broglie's explanation of the scene in the Chamber — Louis Philippe 
 refuses to accept his resignation — Talleyrand's reply — He encloses a 
 note from Lord Grey expressing satisfaction at the Due's remaining in 
 office — Talleyrand's rdsumd of the state of Europe — Martinez dela Rosa 
 replaces M. Zea as Prime Minister at Madrid — Annoyance of Lord 
 Palmerston at M. de Nesselrode's despatch to Prince de Lieven — 
 Talleyrand condemns Lord Palmerston's habit of allowing his personal 
 feelings to influence his business relations^Cites the instance of Sir 
 Stratford Canning's nomination to St. Petersburg — The Emperor 
 Nicholas declines to receive him — Palmerston refuses to send any one 
 else — Prince de Lieven is recalled and both Embassies remain vacant — 
 Formidable riots break out in Paris and various parts of France — Dom 
 Miguel's troops beaten by Dom Pedro's forces — Spain sends troops into 
 Portugal — The Due de Broglie resigns, consequent on the French 
 Chamber rejecting the treaty between France and the United States — 
 He is succeeded by Admiral de Rigny — Fresh insurrections break out 
 in France— Very serious riots in Paris — Orangist demonstrations in 
 Brussels — Diplomatic fencing between Talleyrand and Palmerston 
 respecting the Spanish and Portuguese treaty — End of the Manuscript 
 of the Memoirs — Talleyrand does not quit London till August . 
 
 Further letters and despatches up to the conclusion of his Embassy — King 
 Leopold's wish to establish a Coburg succession, failing his having a 
 son, opposed by France and England — The War in Portugal is brought 
 to a close — Don Carlos lands at Portsmouth — Retirement of Lord Grey 
 — The King sends for Lord Melbourne — Don Carlos returns to Spain — 
 Lord Londonderry's speech in Parliament on the affairs of the Penin- 
 sula — Text of the additional Convention of the Quadruple Alliance — 
 Talleyrand tenders his resignation — Louis Philippe's reply 
 
 Pages 179 — 316 
 
 Appendix Pages yii — 333 
 
 Memoir of the Due de Choiseul Pcges ■m — 393 
 
MEMOIRS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND 
 
 VOL. V. 
 
PART XI. 
 
 REVOLUTION OF 1830. 
 1832— 1833. 
 
 Talleyrand returns to London — He gives a brief rdsumi of the general posi- 
 tion of affairs in Europe — Letters from the different members of the new 
 French Cabinet under Marshal Soult — They ask to be allowed to drive 
 the Dutch out of Antwerp and then place the citadel in the hands of 
 the Belgians — Russia and Prussia object — The French Government 
 suggests that Prussia should temporarily occupy Venloo and certain 
 portions of Limburgand Luxemburg — Prussia refuses — The Countess de 
 Flahaut intrigues against Talleyrand — Despite the obstinate resistance 
 of the King of Holland and the delays of Russia and Prussia, the Con- 
 vention empowering England and France to use coercive measures 
 against Holland is signed — The French and English squadrons blockade 
 the Dutch ports — The French army enters Belgium and marches on 
 Antwerp — Arrest of the Duchess de Berry at Nantes — Another attempt 
 on the life of Louis Philippe — Madame Adelaide gives Talleyrand an 
 account of the siege of Antwerp and the Due d'Orl^ans' bravery — Russia 
 withdraws from the Conference — Arrival of the Marquis de Palmella in 
 London on a mission from Dom Pedro — Draft of the treaty between 
 Holland and Belgium — M. de Mareuil's complaint at being put aside — 
 Talleyrand interferes on his behalf — M. de Mareuil is sent to Naples — 
 Antwerp capitulates — The Dutch'garrison is allowed to return to Holland 
 unconditionally — Death of the Princess de Vaud^mont — The Hague 
 accepts the Convention of May 31st — General Pozzo's secret mission to 
 the various Continental Courts — Austria and Prussia are asked to com- 
 bine with Russia against France and England — M. de Medem shows 
 the Due de Broglie the secret instructions sent to General Mouravieff 
 respecting Egypt — M. de Rayneval's account of the state of affairs in 
 the Peninsula — Colonel Campbell is sent to Alexandria to inform 
 
 B 2 
 
THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Mehemet Ali that England will support the Sultan — Admiral Roussin's 
 action at Constantinople — An English squadron is sent to the Mediter- 
 ranean, under the command of Sir Pulteney Malcolm, to act in concert 
 with the French squadron — A serious riot breaks out at Frankfort — M. 
 d'Appony suggests that a Conference on Eastern affairs should as- 
 semble at Vienna — Talleyrand considers that it will require the joint 
 action of all four Powers to bring the affairs of the East to a close — The 
 Due d'OrWans' visit to England — Louis Philippe's gratification at the 
 Duke's reception — The ratification of the Convention by Holland — 
 Peace is signed between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali — Russia expresses 
 her readiness to withdraw her troops, as soon as Ibrahim Pasha has 
 effected his retreat — Talleyrand's r^sumd of the fresh phase in Dutch 
 and Belgian affairs consequent on the Convention of May 21st — The 
 landing at Villa Real of the expedition under the Marquis de Palmella 
 — The towns along the coast proclaim themselves in favour of Queen 
 Dona Maria — Capture of several of Dom Miguel's ships by the Queen's 
 fleet — Fresh complications in the Peninsula — It is suggested to separate 
 Dom Pedro from his daughter's cause and place her under a Regency 
 - — Dona Maria is proclaimed at Lisbon — The rumoured treaty between 
 Russia and the Porte has been actually signed at Constantinople — 
 Talleyrand thinks no effort should be spared to prevent its ratification — 
 England and France express their disapprobation to Turkey — England 
 decides to recognize Dona Maria's Government — Lord William Russell 
 is accredited to Lisbon — A brilliant action between Dom Pedro's troops 
 and the Miguelites, in which the former are victorious — The Due de 
 Broglie's resumd of the treaty between Russia and the Porte — Talley- 
 rand's reply — The Duchess de Braganza wishes to arrange a marriage 
 between the Due de Leuchtenberg and Dona Maria — The Due de 
 Broglie points out the reason why France cannot consent to such an 
 alliance — England agrees with France — Unpleasantness between the 
 English Minister at St. Petersburg and Lord Minto at Berlin — The 
 Emperor of Russia goes to Stettin to meet the King of Prussia and the 
 Emperor of Austria — Hopeless condition of King Ferdinand of Spain 
 • — Excitement caused by the intercepted letters published by the Times 
 —Dona Maria's arrival in England — She stays at Windsor — Talleyrand 
 goes to France on leave of absence. 
 
 Before resuming the history of the events in connection with 
 my Embassy in London, whither I returned in the beginning of 
 October, 1832, I should like to recall some incidents which had 
 taken place during my absence. 
 
 On arriving in Paris in June, I found the French Ministry 
 much weakened by M. Casimir Purler's death, and unable 
 to settle down, or establish itself on any solid basis. Intrigues 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. j 
 
 of all kinds were rife in the Government offices ; the ambition 
 of individuals caused less embarrassment than the pre- 
 sumption of all. Hence arise revolutions which create such 
 confusion. 
 
 I hurried away to take the waters, having no desire to be 
 mixed up in matters with which I had nothing to do. However, 
 they did not leave me long in peace, and insisted upon my im- 
 mediate return to England. 
 
 This urgency was in consequence of another intrigue. They 
 desired to prove that M. Durant de Mareuil, who replaced me, 
 was incapable, because I had given him the preference over M. 
 de Flahaut, who was strongly supported by General Sebastiani. 
 But I did not allow myself to be affected by all these machi- 
 nations. I replied, from Bourbon I'Archambaud, that there was 
 nothing pressing which called for my presence in London, where 
 matters were progressing in their legitimate course ; that any 
 undue haste would hinder rather than assist them ; and that be- 
 fore putting on pressure it was, above all, desirable to be rational, 
 and to take into consideration the advantages and the difficulties 
 of one's position — one must not even seem to be hurried. 
 Finally, that we had taken our stand as the ally of England, and 
 as co-operating with her, and that to this end everything must 
 be sacrificed, all else being quite secondary. Notwithstanding 
 this they returned to the charge, pretending alarm at the vio- 
 lent complaints uttered against the London Conference by the 
 Belgian Chambers, which might, they declared, lead to a 
 resumption of hostilities. 
 
 In order to appease this clamour and put an end to the in- 
 trigues, I announced my intention of cutting short my leave and 
 returning to London in August, though fully determined not to 
 do anything of the kind ; I felt the need of complete rest after 
 taking the waters of Bourbon. This, however, sufficed to upset 
 the Flahaut-Sebastiani intrigue, and I was left in peace. At 
 the same time, I expressed myself very strongly against the 
 arrogant behaviour of the Belgians, who did not deserve that our 
 Government should compromise itself for them. But my advice 
 on this point was not followed ; on the contrary, they hastened, 
 
6 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 and most injudiciously according to my view, to conclude the 
 marriage of Madame la Princesse Louise d'Orleans with King 
 Leopold, which took place at Compi^gne on the 9th of August. 
 
 It was perfectly evident that the hurried accomplishment of 
 this marriage could only embarrass our affairs, by increasing the 
 demands of the Belgian and French revolutionary parties. For- 
 tunately, the King of Holland took upon himself to assist us out 
 of the difficulty, by the bad faith he displayed in his negotiations 
 with the London Conference. The latter, after endless verbal 
 and written discussions with the Dutch plenipotentiaries, being 
 unable to arrive at any result, found itself obliged to declare, in 
 a Protocol dated October 1st, 1832, that it had become necessary 
 to employ coercive measures against Holland, in order to compel 
 her to carry out the conditions of the treaty signed between the 
 five Powers and Belgium.^ It is true, that after this declaration 
 there was some dissent among the members of the Conference 
 as to the nature of the coercive measures to be employed. The 
 plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia only consented 
 to join in the pecuniary considerations ; whilst those of France 
 and England reserved to themselves " to have recourse to more 
 efficacious measures for the purpose of carrying out a treaty 
 which had been ratified by their Courts for months past, and the 
 prolonged non-fulfilment of which, exposed the peace of Europe 
 to continual and increasing dangers." 
 
 The principle having thus been laid down, it was necessary 
 to develop its results, and in order to obtain this, I decided 
 to return to London in the beginning of October, 1832. Never- 
 theless, before starting on my journey, I wished to make 
 sure that they had succeeded in forming in Paris, a Ministry 
 
 ^ This declaration was made by the English plenipotentiary ; the views of the 
 French plenipotentiary were even stronger. He would, he said, adhere to every 
 point of this declaration, and in addition "reserved to his Government full power to 
 enforce the execution of the treaty concluded with Belgium, according to the powers 
 therein contained, and as the tenor of her engagements and the interests of France 
 might require." 
 
 As to the pecuniary coercive measures, respecting which, as is mentioned 
 further on, the Conference had come to an agreement, they consisted in freeing 
 Belgium from the arrears due to Holland since the 1st of January, 1832, and in 
 deducting one million florins weekly from the total amount of the debt due by 
 Belgium to Holland, if at the end of a delay accorded for the cancelling of the 
 aiTears, the effect hoped for was not produced. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 7 
 
 which would offer some prospect of solidity and continuance. 
 This assurance I obtained from the lips of the King himself, the 
 evening before my departure for London, on the 9th of October, 
 1832.1 
 
 I think I cannot give a better idea of the position of the new 
 French Cabinet and how it affected me in London, than by 
 inserting here, the letters which the principal members of this 
 Cabinet wrote to me on the i ith of October, the day following 
 my departure. 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, October nth, 1832. 
 
 MON Prince, 
 
 I believe you were aware, on the eve of your departure, 
 that the aspect of affairs had again changed. At five o'clock 
 last evening, the future Cabinet assembled — this morning it is 
 announced in the Moniteur. 
 
 I need not tell you, that this Cabinet is composed of all those 
 whom the party of good order, peace, and legally constituted 
 authority counts as the staunchest among its ranks. I have 
 confided to you in full detail all my earnest desires and hopes. 
 It depends upon Europe, and above all upon England, to consoli- 
 date this Cabinet, and thus put an end to the dangers which the 
 victory of the opposition would entail, and of which Europe 
 would assuredly incur a large share. We intend to fight for the 
 cause of civilization, and civilization must assist us ; it is for you, 
 mon Prince, to tell me what is needed to enable us to begin our 
 session with eclat. If the English Cabinet will listen to you, our 
 triumph is assured, even in the opinion of the most timid. 
 
 About myself, I say nothing ; I will not speak of my 
 feelings toward you ; but I ask your advice and assistance, 
 feeling sure of obtaining it, and knowing in whose hands our 
 future now rests. 
 
 V. Broglie. 
 
 P.S. — I inclose, with these few hurried lines, a letter for 
 Lord Grey and another for Lord Palmerston. You see I have 
 not forgotten your instructions, and have much pleasure in carry- 
 ing them out. You will probably receive a despatch from me on 
 
 ^ The following was the Ministry which was formed on the i ith of October : 
 President of the Council and War Minister, Marshal Soult ; Foreign Affairs, the 
 Due de Broglie ; Interior, M. Thiers ; Finance, M. Humann ; Public Instruction, 
 M. Guizot ; M. Barthe, M. d'Argout, and M. de Rigny — ^Justice, Trade, and Marine. 
 
8 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 the same day, respecting the important matter of which you are 
 aware. Time is pressing ; I commend it once again to your 
 friendship, and to your influence over those with whom you 
 come in contact. 
 
 M. GUIZOT TO THE PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Paris, October nth, i%yi. 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I regretted exceedingly not having had ten minutes longer 
 chat with you yesterday. I wished again to impress upon 
 you how much we need your active and determined co- 
 operation. We are engaged in a great struggle. We accept the 
 honour and the burden of maintaining the cause of order, of 
 peace, of legally constituted interests, of true social prin- 
 ciples — the cause of civilization, and the security of Europe. We 
 shall devote ourselves to it entirely, without intermission or re- 
 servation, and I have every reason to hope that France, equally 
 with ourselves, desires the triumph of this grand and noble cause. 
 But, mon Prince, do your utmost to make our position clearly 
 understood ; let them see that the confidence of honest, sensible 
 men, outside France as well as in France, strengthens our hands, 
 and that it cannot be too quickly or too clearly manifested. 
 Invested with this confidence we can, I venture to affirm, do 
 much. If, on the other hand, it is wanting, lukewarm, or doubt- 
 ful, if we cannot reap the fruits of it for our country, we shall 
 meet with enormous difficulties. For my part I am quite ready to 
 face them, but they might disappear, or at any rate be greatly 
 diminished, from the very commencement. 
 
 In this you will aid us, mon Prince. Such a success merits 
 some sacrifices. You know how truly I am ever yours, 
 
 GUIZOT. 
 
 Admiral Comte de Rigny to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, October nth, 1832. 
 
 Mon Prince, 
 
 I cannot let Madame de Dino depart without sending 
 you a line as to the composition of our new Ministry and its 
 future. 
 
 Its future (I ought to say its duration) is of importance to 
 the whole of Europe ; and Europe, up to a certain point, can 
 greatly influence its duration. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 9 
 
 Notwithstanding the violence which will be exhibited in our 
 debates, we shall triumph, if we can announce a reasonable 
 termination of the Belgian affair ; they are all with us respecting 
 the evacuation of Antwerp. We must be allowed to ask for 
 this beneath its walls, and then retire next day. 
 
 For this, however, the approbation of the London Cabinet is 
 necessary. Silence on the part of the others will be the result 
 But without it, the parliamentary struggle may sweep us away, 
 and with us the last barrier. 
 
 Your great influence, mon Prince, can alone aid us. The work 
 is worthy of you. Our alliance with England will become in- 
 destructible, and the civilisation of Europe will be saved. 
 
 Madame de Dino will tell you that the appointments were 
 signed last night at half-past twelve. 
 
 I renew the homage of my respectful devotion. 
 
 C. DE RiGNY. 
 
 M. Thiers to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, October wth, 1832. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 Before this reaches you, you will have heard by telegraph 
 of the selections made by the King. We resisted for some time, 
 and were compelled to do so, in order to be fully assured of the 
 stability of the royal decisions. Now I believe we can count 
 upon the King's firmness. He will uphold by every consti- 
 tutional means the new administration he has just formed. He 
 looks upon the men who compose it as the last supporters of M. 
 Purler's policy, and he is convinced that this policy of moderation, 
 at home as well as abroad, can alone insure peace to France and 
 to Europe. But the King's decision will not suffice ; we must 
 receive assistance from all sides. You, mon Prince, can do this 
 more than any one else ; you can enlighten the English Cabinet 
 as to its interests as well as ours — they are now identical. 
 
 This Antwerp business will decide everything. None of the 
 Ministry wish to be exacting, but every one feels the necessity of 
 putting an end to these prolonged uncertainties, and of calming 
 men's minds. The countries which have the most to gain in 
 common are England and France. It is necessary for both that 
 the uncertainty which is involved in the Belgian question should 
 cease, and that a positive result should end all doubts. We 
 have reached a point in France when every one, especially those of 
 the moderate party, demands that this Belgian business should be 
 concluded. No matter what Ministry is formed, the same task 
 will be imposed upon it — namely, to show results. This phrase 
 
lo THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 has now become a proverb, and is on every one's lips. M. Dupin/ 
 M. Odilon Barrot, and M. Perier, if he had lived, would all have 
 been obliged to do the same thing, for the premeditated resistance 
 of Holland must be put an end to, no matter by what Ministry. 
 The question is : Is it better we should do it, or another } If, 
 for example, we were to take the citadel of Antwerp, our 
 word could be relied on ; we should evacuate it three days after 
 we had taken it. The entire Council will pledge itself to 
 this. M. de Broglie's word is, I should think, the most reassuring 
 of all. For my part, I will pledge my word as a Minister, and 
 my word of honour as a man ; and you know that my principle 
 is, that great undertakings can only be carried out hy keeping 
 good faith. 
 
 I do not think any one will cast a doubt upon our given 
 promise, but perhaps there might be a question as to our power of 
 keeping it, and whether we might not soon be succeeded by others, 
 who would rid themselves of the engagements undertaken by us. 
 To this I have an answer which I think is conclusive. 
 
 We have an assured majority, if we can show the country 
 any immediate results. We are told that we can hope for a 
 majority if we can defend our position, but we are promised it 
 with certainty if this Antwerp business is brought to an end. 
 This parliamentary exigency has become quite irresistible, and 
 it is absolutely necessary to satisfy it. Moreover, it is a matter 
 which the dignity of England, and that of France, equally 
 demand. If it is done, we can answer for everything. It will 
 be for us to see that the promise we have given is effectually 
 carried out. If not, we shall be exposed to all the chances of 
 the tribune and the ballot. But after us there only remains 
 Dupin, allied to Odilon Barrot ; and the requirements of these 
 gentlemen will assuredly not be less, and will not always be 
 founded, like ours, on the thoroughly recognized interests of 
 both countries. Therefore, mon Prince, second us with the whole 
 strength of your genius and with all your influence. The 
 question resolves itself in these words. "Every one wants 
 Antwerp." If we obtain it, we shall have an assured majority, 
 and the other Powers will have the advantage of consolidating 
 with us, the policy of moderation. We only want it for three days. 
 
 Pardon me, mon Prince, for mentioning these matters, which 
 
 ^ Andre Marie Dupin, born 1783, advocate under the Restoration, Deputy in 
 1827, Procuralor-General of the Corns de Cassation in 1830, President of the 
 Chamber of Deputies 1832-40, re-elected in 1848. He was President of the 
 Assembly in 185 1. He gave in his resignation as Procurator-General, in consequence 
 of the decree which confiscated the property of the Orleans family. But he resumed 
 office in 1857, and became a Senator. He died in 1865. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 11 
 
 you know much better than I do, but it is necessary to speak of 
 them to every one, and on every occasion. 
 
 Accept, I pray you, the assurance of my most profound 
 respect and devoted friendship. 
 
 A. Thiers. 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, October 12th, 1832. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 In sending you the accompanying despatch, allow me 
 to recall our position, our needs, and our hopes to your recollec- 
 tion and your friendship. 
 
 Half the present Ministry is composed of M. Perier's col- 
 leagues, and half, of those of his political friends who were pledged 
 even more than he was to uphold order and peace, and who had 
 been kept in reserve by him until more propitious times. 
 
 These times have now arrived. You have seen for yourself 
 that the state of France is thoroughly satisfactory. Peace reigns 
 in every portion of her territory, order has been restored every- 
 where, and men's minds have become reassured. 
 
 All the bye-elections are rational and moderate ; business, both 
 in town and country, has visibly recovered itself; the harvest 
 has been excellent ; one difficulty alone remains to be overcome. 
 That is, the maintenance of the majority gained last year with 
 so much care and labour. The political divisions, as you are 
 aware, have broken up this majority ; absurd prejudices, purely 
 literary rivalries, and wretched cavillings, threaten to give our 
 adversaries an advantage over us which will cost Europe torrents 
 of blood and years of incalculable calamity. 
 
 If the present Ministry had not taken upon themselves the 
 burden of affairs, you know well, mon Prince, for you have seen 
 it yourself, that power would have passed into the hands of those 
 who, without being aware of or even desiring it, would inevitably 
 have transmitted it to the party of anarchy and war. 
 
 If the present Ministry were to succumb in the struggle, its 
 defeat would even more effectually and more directly have the 
 same result. We are all fully convinced that there is a certain 
 means of preventing this. Let England (without taking alarm) 
 allow us to take the citadel of Antwerp from the Dutch and hand 
 it over to the Belgians. If the coming session opens under such 
 auspices, you can count on a brilliant triumph. If, on the con- 
 trary, we have again to excuse from the Tribune all the political 
 delays, postponements, and procrastinations, our position will be 
 a very dangerous one, and the weight of prejudice against us will 
 
12 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 be greatly increased. I doubt whether we shall be able to stand 
 against it. 
 
 When I mentioned these ideas to Lord Granville in your 
 presence, he made various objections. He said : " But if Europe 
 does trust to your word, how can she be sure that you will remain 
 long enough in power to redeem it .? " To this my answer was : 
 " If England consents, we can enter Belgium between the 20th and 
 22nd. . Our troops are ready ; we should be before Antwerp on 
 the 26th or 27th ; from the 8th to the 15th of November the 
 citadel would be ours; and between the i6th and 20th our 
 troops would have again re-entered French territory. The 
 session does not commence till the 19th ; the address will not take 
 place before the 1st of December ; therefore any danger from this 
 quarter is impossible." 
 
 Lord Granville then said to me : " But suppose the Dutch 
 attack you during the siege, what will you do then.'" My 
 answer was equally simple : " If the Dutch attack us, we shall 
 drive them back to the limits of the Belgian territory. We will 
 pledge ourselves not to advance one inch beyond. ... It will be 
 notified in the Monitenr, which would announce the entry of our 
 troops into Belgium, that they will not even enter Antwerp ; 
 that the citadel will be given up to the Belgians from the mo- 
 ment of the capitulation ; and that our withdrawal will commence 
 on that very day." 
 
 Lord Granville seemed still uneasy, on account of the possible 
 intervention of the Prussians ; but, in the first place, an expedition 
 conducted with such a degree of celerity would not leave them 
 time to concentrate their troops, which are greatly scattered. 
 Again, we offer, as you know, to allow them to occupy Venloo 
 and all that portion of Dutch territory which is at present in the 
 hands of the Belgians. The reply to this proposal cannot reach 
 us for three weeks. The orders for the assembly of Prussian 
 troops would necessarily take about the same time to reach the 
 generals. Our expedition would be ended ere they were in a 
 position to make a serious demonstration.^ 
 
 ^ The relations between France and Prussia passed through a very critical period 
 during the expedition to Antwerp. Frequent allusion to this is made in these memoirs 
 (see pages 25, 45, and following). We also think it useful to give some explanations on 
 this subject. Prussia watched with great jealousy the French intervention in 
 Belgium. M. Ancillon, personally hostile to France, made no secret of his keen 
 irritation ; and M. Bresson, in his correspondence, transmitted its echoes to Paris. 
 Thus M. Ancillon declared, that if the French army entered Belgium, Prussia would 
 be obliged to take such precautionary measures as could not fail to encourage the Dutch 
 in their resistance (despatch of M. Bresson, \Uh of October, giving an account of M, 
 Ancillon's interview with Lord Minto). On the 13th of October, M. Bresson added, that 
 in the event of French intervention Prussia would mass her troops on the Meuse, and 
 that if a single French soldier entered Holland, Prussia would consider it a casus belli. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1S30. 13 
 
 If the English Government refuses this proposition, see what 
 will be the result! First, it is doubtful whether we shall suc- 
 ceed in restraining the Belgians. King Leopold is at present 
 without any Government whatever. No Minister will under- 
 take the charge of affairs, unless the King is prepared to have 
 recourse to energetic measures. General Goblet is the sole 
 member of the Cabinet, and he wishes to retire in a few days.^ 
 King Leopold's hand will be forced ; the Belgians will attack ; 
 the King of the Netherlands will attack in his turn ; we shall 
 be obliged to defend them ; and there you have a regular war ! 
 
 Supposing even that this does not happen, though I can 
 see no possibility of preventing it, the position of the French 
 Cabinet at the opening of the Chambers will become a very 
 dangerous one ; and if we succumb in the struggle, power will 
 pass into the hands of the war party, and the expedition to 
 Antwerp will only be one of the least of its enterprises. It 
 therefore seems to me that this expedition to Antwerp is no 
 longer a matter with regard to which Europe has any choice. 
 It is not a question whether it is to be done, but who shall 
 do it — whether the Belgians or the French ; whether it is to 
 be accomplished by the war or the peace party. 
 
 Looking at the question in this light, I do not see that 
 there can be any doubt about it. 
 
 This expedition will not in any way prevent the blockade. 
 
 M. Bresson was not however to be intimidated. He assured them in Paris that, no 
 matter how much she might be displeased, Prussia would not dare to oppose the action 
 of France (despatches of ■12nd and 2^h of October ; see also in the Appendix, letter 
 No. 2, an able letter which M. Bresson wrote to the Due de Broglie on the 24th of 
 October). In order to allay the irritation of the Berlin Cabinet, the French Govern- 
 ment bethought itself of proposing to Prussia that she should take possession, under a 
 conditional guarantee, of the territories assigned to Holland by the treaty of November 
 15th, which Belgium was improperly occupying, i.e. Venloo and certain districts of 
 Limburg and Luxemburg (despatch of the Due de Broglie to M. Bresson, October Zth ; 
 see this letter in Appendix, letter No. I). M. de Talleyrand, being consulted, approved 
 of this idea (letter of M. de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie of i-jth October, Appen- 
 dix, letter No. 3). M. Bresson also approved, with the exception of Luxemburg, 
 {despatch, I'jth rf October). The Prussian Cabinet was sorely perplexed. M. Ancillon 
 appeared disposed to accept the proposal, but asked for Liege in addition, which was 
 rerasedhim (despatch, 2^th of October). Finally he refused, fearing to become embroiled 
 with Russia by seeming to accede to the proposed coercive measures against Holland, 
 and requested that the disputed territories, instead of being handed over to him, 
 should be given direct to the King of the Netherlands. The French Cabinet could 
 not accept this proposal, although England appeared willing to consent to it. Lord 
 Palmerston, in fact, wrote to Lord Minto that the five Powers ought to come to some 
 arrangement offering the said territories to King William (despatch of M. Bresson, 
 \<)th of December). Briefly, no resolution was arrived at, and this long negotiation had 
 no further results than gaining some time, and enabling the French army to take 
 possession of Antwerp without opposition on the part of Prussia, which had been the 
 real object of the French Cabinet. 
 
 1 General Goblet had been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs on the l8th 
 of September, and retired on the 27th of September following. 
 
14 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 We shall not make the acceptance of the treaty, or the solution 
 of the Scheldt question, a condition of our withdrawal ; these are 
 points which must be settled either by negotiation, or if necessary 
 by means of maritime or pecuniary coercion. Our undertaking 
 to quit Belgium immediately after the surrender of the citadel, 
 would be absolute. If you gain this point, mon Prince, the 
 Cabinet, of whose formation you are aware, and of which you 
 have had the goodness to approve, is certain to be established, 
 and if it is established, the peace of France and that of Europe 
 are assured. In a contrary event, I can foresee nothing but 
 misfortunes before us, the number and extent of which it is im- 
 possible to estimate. 
 
 In conclusion I will add, that tour army is now very 
 concentrated, and in a position to act. If the expedition does 
 not take place we must disperse it ; we dread that any moment 
 cholera might break out ; and if we are reduced to scattering 
 it, what a multitude of accusations will be raised against us 1 
 
 Pardon this long letter, mon Prince. I have not had time to 
 think it over, or even to read it through. I trust to your 
 kindness and your indulgence to excuse whatever I may have 
 written inconsiderately, and to supply whatever I may have 
 omitted. 
 
 Our fate is in your hands. Accept, with your accustomed 
 kindness, the expressions of my most sincere and devoted 
 attachment. 
 
 V. Broglie. 
 
 I reached London on the 15th of October, after a very trying 
 passage, and did not lose a moment in resuming the work that 
 had been intrusted to me. The very day of my arrival, I had a 
 long interview with Lord Palmerston, in which I took up the 
 course of affairs since my departure, and dealt with the import- 
 ant question which at this moment pressed so heavily on the 
 Cabinets of London and Paris — namely, the execution of the 
 treaty of November the 15th. I at once saw that M. Durant de 
 Mareuil had very thoroughly prepared the way. 
 
 As I have already stated, the Conference had reassembled 
 on the 1st of October, in order to determine whether coercive 
 measures against Holland had become necessary, and what these 
 measures should be. No one had called in question the necessity 
 for coercive measures, but as these measures might be of two 
 kinds, pecuniary or material, there had been some disagreement 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 15 
 
 on this point between the plenipotentiaries ; those of Austria, 
 Prussia, and Russia declaring that they could not associate 
 themselves with anything but the pecuniary measures, whereas 
 the plenipotentiaries of. France and Great Britain, considering 
 these measures insufficient, announced the intention of their 
 Courts to proceed to more efficacious ones. A protocol was drawn 
 up, establishing this position. This may be considered as the last 
 public act of the Conference, though for a long time it continued 
 to exercise the great influence it had acquired. It was necessary 
 to develop the principle laid down by the plenipotentiaries of 
 France and England in the protocol of October ist, by a fresh 
 negotiation between these two Powers. What more efficacious 
 measures could they adopt .' The French Cabinet proposed to 
 proceed with their troops to compel the evacuation of the cita- 
 del of Antwerp, while the combined squadrons of France and 
 England blockaded thecoasts of Holland. The English Cabinet 
 (for reasons which will be explained further on) would have 
 preferred confining tlie measures to the blockade. I had to 
 begin by bringing Lc^d Palmerston and Lord Grey round to 
 the views of the Fren^ch Cabinet, and after lengthy and tedious 
 efforts I succeeded. It will be soon seen that the difficulties I 
 met with in the English Cabinet were still further increased by 
 intrigues which originated in Paris, and were directed against 
 our Cabinet. I will now proceed to give extracts from my 
 despatches and letters, and from those which I received, 
 which, I think, will plainly describe the progress of the 
 negotiations. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, October i6tk, 1832. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 M. de Mareuil received a letter yesterday from Berlin, 
 in which M. Bresson informed him of the account he had given 
 you of a conversation which he and Lord Minto' had had with 
 
 1 Gilbert Elliot, Earl of Minto, bom in 17S2, entered the House of Commons in 
 1806, and the House of Lords in 1814, on «4ie death of his father. He sided with 
 the Whig party. In 1832, he was sent as Ambassador to Berlin. In 1835, 1^6 became 
 Postmaster-General ; then First Lord of the Admiralty. He resigned in 1841, and 
 became Lord Privy Seal in 1846. He retired from public life in 1852, and died 
 in 1859. 
 
i6 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 M. Ancillon, after the arrival of Comte DouhofT,^ the bearer of 
 the protocol of October ist. 
 
 I requested M. de Mareuil to go to Lord Palmerston, and ask 
 him whether he had not received the same accounts from Lord 
 Minto, and whether he did not see in them a fresh reason 
 for accelerating the decisions of the French and English 
 Cabinets. 
 
 M. de Mareuil has just given me an account of his inter- 
 view. Lord Palmerston appeared to him, as he did to me, to be 
 fully impressed with the urgent necessity for full and prompt 
 decision on the great question of the moment. The Cabinet 
 Council held yesterday morning, also went fully into details on 
 this matter. It would seem that some doubt was expressed 
 as to the success of a hasty attack upon the citadel of 
 Antwerp ; for Lord Palmerston asked M. de Mareuil, whether he 
 had such positive information on this point as might inspire full 
 confidence ; and shortly after. Lord Durham came and expressed 
 the same desire to me. Without being more positive than was 
 advisable, M. de Mareuil replied, that in Paris, in Brussels, and 
 even at the Hague, he had heard professional men, who knew the 
 strength and the weakness of this citadel, state that it could 
 not possibly hold out against a well-directed attack. He added, 
 however, that if it was defended, it would probably not be taken 
 without considerable damage resulting to the town, which induced 
 him to repeat that it would be necessary to acquaint Belgium, 
 formally, that such damage would be compensated. Lord 
 Palmerston seemed quite to agree in these remarks, and he 
 confirmed the hope he had given me, that I should receive a full 
 communication of the resolutions come to by the Government 
 either this evening, or at latest to-morrow morning. 
 
 During the course of this interview, Lord Palmerston 
 mentioned an incident which had caused some surprise in the 
 Cabinet. You are already aware, through a despatch from 
 Vienna, which Lord Granville will have communicated to you, 
 that some utterances by Marshal Maison appeared very pre- 
 mature to Sir Frederick Lamb, and had called forth serious 
 remonstrances on the part of Prince Metternich. 
 
 Still greater surprise was felt, on learning through a com- 
 munication from Baron d'Ompteda,^ the Hanoverian Minister, 
 
 ^ Councillor of the Prassian Legation. 
 
 ^ Louis Charles George, Baron d'Ompteda, born in 1767, a Hanoverian states- 
 man and diplomat. He was Secretary to the Legation at Dresden in 1791, then 
 Chargi d' Affaires at Berlin in 1795. Hanover having passed under the rule of 
 Prussia, M. d'Ompteda passed into the service of that Power, which he represented 
 at Dresden, He was several times charged with important missions, especially to 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 17 
 
 that the French Minister at Hanover had officially announced 
 the immediate joint action of the French and English Govern- 
 ments against Holland; and it certainly must have appeared 
 somewhat strange that a resolution of the King of England 
 should have been notified to the King of Hanover, whilst 
 deliberations as to the principle and the forms of this co- 
 operation were still being carried on under the Prince in whom 
 the two crowns were united. However, Lord Palmerston 
 displayed no bitterness whatever when he made this observation 
 to M. de Mareuil, and he only drew one conclusion from it, 
 similar to that which he had already expressed to me — namely, 
 that after the hints given in the newspapers respecting the resolu- 
 tions of France and England, it was imperative to carry them 
 out with the least possible delay. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Princess de 
 Vaudemont. 
 
 London, October 16/A, 1832. 
 
 I am regularly surrounded here by the intrigues of Madame 
 de Flahaut, who hardly ever quits Lady Grey, to whom she says 
 all she can against our present Government : " It cannot possibly 
 last ; the Ministry cannot hold out ; it will have no majority ; no 
 one will have anything to say to it. . . ." This is what she 
 repeats everywhere. To-day she is sitting in judgment at Lord 
 Holland's. To have to deal with difficult affairs, and to be 
 at the same time exposed to society scandals which are per- 
 petually renewed, is really unbearable. The fact is, that her 
 husband in Paris, and she in London, really do harm to the new 
 Ministry : this is very wrong. At first I could not believe all 
 I was told about it ; now I am forced to admit that I was a 
 fool, when I rejected as calumny, all I was told of that manage. 
 
 I forgot to tell you that Madame de Flahaut sounds 
 Sebastiani's praises loudly, adding : " The King will have to 
 recall him again." . . . 
 
 The Prince ee Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, October lyth, 1832. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 The plenipotentiaries of Russia, Prussia, and Austria 
 have several times during the last few days asked Lord Palmer- 
 Vienna. In 1815, having again become a Hanoverian subject, he was accredited to 
 Berlin. In 1823, he became a Minister of State, and later on. Minister in attendance 
 on the King in London. He retired in 1837, and died in 1854. 
 
 VOL. V. C 
 
i8 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 ston to reassemble the Conference, in order to discuss the 
 measures to be adopted against Holland. They have also come to 
 me with the same request ; but I have asked Lord Palmerston to 
 refuse this demand, pointing out to him the inconveniences of a 
 discussion which just now could only have unpleasant results. 
 Lord Palmerston quite agreed with me as to this, and he will 
 not call the Conference together, until he is in a position to 
 communicate to it our resolutions, definitely drawn up. 
 
 Evenmg of October iZth. 
 
 . . . This morning I saw Lord Palmerston, who permitted me 
 to hope, that at the close of the Cabinet Council I should receive 
 a positive communication as to the resolutions of the Cabinet. 
 Nevertheless, up to this hour, the Minister has been unable to give 
 me the decision I so anxiously await. True, the King, who was to 
 have returned to London to-day, will not arrive till to-morrow, 
 and his presence is necessary for a definite sanction. But I have 
 also reason to believe, after a very long conversation with Lord 
 Palmerston, of which I will give you a detailed account, that the 
 matter, having been brought before the whole Cabinet, has given 
 rise there, not to any opposition as to the actual fact of the exe- 
 cution of the treaty (on this point every one is agreed), but to 
 the necessity of carrying to the utmost limits the examination of 
 the consequences which might result from coercive measures 
 employed jointly by France and England ; and moreover that 
 discussions as to the position of home affairs (which I will 
 explain in a letter to-morrow) might suggest the idea that 
 more time should still be gained. These are the views of several 
 members of the Cabinet ; I have combated them, will do so 
 again, and hope to succeed ; but it is only a hope. To-morrow I 
 shall see the King, and after the Cabinet Council, I shall have an 
 explanation with Lord Palmerston, which I will at once report 
 to you. 
 
 I must tell you, that I feel fir.-nly convinced that this prolonged 
 discussion need not disquiet you in any way, and that it will 
 only result in giving greater weight to the decision that will be 
 taken. . . . 
 
 Morning of October ir^th. 
 
 ... I really am distressed to have to tell you each day, that 
 what has been promised the evening before is again put off to 
 the following day. 
 
 The King came up from Windsor yesterday, and I had the 
 honour of paying my respects to him. I found all the member 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 19 
 
 of the Cabinet at St. James's, and I was able to remind several 
 of them, how very important it was to come to some decisive 
 resolution respecting the co-operation of France and England in 
 carrying out the treaty of November 15th. All admitted this 
 necessity ; but, nevertheless, the Cabinet Council held by the 
 King, which sat from four in the afternoon till half-past seven, 
 was solely occupied with the report in the Recorder on the 
 criminal convictions, which have taken place during the last few 
 months, and by the discussion which followed it. Lord Pal- 
 merston assured me last night that the political question of the 
 moment was not even touched upon, and that it was put off till 
 the meeting which is to take place to-day at Lord Grey's at East 
 Sheen, where all the members of the Cabinet are to meet and 
 dine. 
 
 But I owe you the explanation of these delays, at least as 
 far as I have been able to ascertain them during the last con- 
 versations I have had with Lord Palmerston. Last night he 
 added a few further details to what he had already told me. 
 
 On the one hand, it seems that after having apparently quite 
 decided to adopt the principle of co-operation, and the successive 
 and simultaneous employment of naval and military forces, the 
 Council discovered that some of its members, though admitting 
 that the new French Government inspired thorough confidence, 
 expressed some anxiety as to its stability ; that reports had come 
 over from Paris, brought here by persons whom one credited with 
 more discretion, which had roused the opposition, and even sen- 
 sible people were now afraid that if joint coercive measures were 
 brought to bear on Holland by France and England, they might 
 lead to a general war ; and that a change of Ministry in Paris 
 would turn this into a propagandist war, with which England 
 would not care to be associated. 
 
 On the other hand, this hesitation of the Cabinet is also due 
 to home affairs, which require to be carefully dealt with. 
 
 The difficulties caused by the negro question in the West 
 Indies and the Island of Mauritius, as well as the neces- 
 sity of providing against them, have already occasioned lengthy 
 deliberations.^ This matter is evidently of far greater 
 
 ^ People's minds in England were greatly exercised on the question of negro 
 slavery. It was decided to abolish it in 1834. From 1832, the Government 
 gradually worked on towards this end, while discussing various measures in 
 Parliament for regulating the fate of the slaves in the colonies (Order in Council of 
 November 2nd). The feeling roused by these discussions stirred up serious troubles 
 in the colonies. The insurrection in Jamaica in 1831, was very serious. In 
 Trinidad and St. Lucia, the colonists refused to submit to the orders of the Home 
 Government. In the Mauritius, the Governor-General having published a pamphlet 
 in favour of the liberation of the blacks, the colonists rose in rebellion. All these 
 were grave indications, which justly and rightly alarmed the English Cabinet. 
 
 C 2 
 
20 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 importance than was at first supposed, for Lord Palmerston has 
 spoken to me about it at two different conferences. Besides, 
 Lord Palmerston, while seeing the necessity of ending the matter, 
 and the need there is that France and Belgium should be able 
 to declare, at the opening of the Chambers, that a definite 
 resolution had been taken, and its execution begun, finds 
 himself obliged to confess that the English Government almost 
 felt a contrary necessity, and that, as far as he was concerned, 
 a delay of some weeks would be very advantageous. This is 
 the explanation he gave me. Parliament is prorogued till 
 the nth of December. It is the intention of Government to 
 dissolve it. They think it would be inconvenient to assemble 
 it again ; meanwhile if coercive measures were at once employed 
 against Holland, as such would not be a formal declaration 
 of war, convoking Parliament could be dispensed with. But if 
 the King of Holland was himself to make an actual declaration 
 of war, it would be necessary, according to the Constitution, 
 either to assemble the present Parliament, or to dissolve it and 
 convoke a new one. In the first case, a very strong opposition 
 might be expected, and there is reason to believe that it is 
 specially with this hope that the King of Holland will feel 
 disposed to make the declaration in question. In the second 
 case, and if Parliament is dissolved, it is necessary to ascertain 
 that the registration of the electors, according to the new law, 
 is sufficiently completed, so that there may be no fear, in the 
 case of an immediate election, of the still more dangerous 
 choice that might be made by men whom the effect of the 
 Reform Bill would deprive of the right to vote, and who would 
 consequently exercise it for the last time. 
 
 This singularity in the position of the English Cabinet 
 requires to be fully recognised. It was easier for me to combat 
 the fears that had been expressed regarding the stability of 
 our Ministry ; and I could make use of the consideration accorded 
 to it, to show how necessary it was for the policy of both 
 Cabinets to assist ours in its present position. I therefore 
 eagerly urged that the proposals which had been made here, 
 and which Lord Granville had confirmed to you, should be 
 promptly and fully carried into effect. I am very far from 
 losing all hope of this. The last letters from the Hague, the 
 King of Holland's speech at- the opening of the States-General, 
 the virulent language of the newspapers which are inspired 
 by the Dutch Cabinet, have been fully appreciated here as 
 evident symptoms of a still more obstinate resistance ; and 
 unless the intervention of the Berlin Cabinet, and the letters which 
 M. de Donhoff is bringing, produce a complete change at the 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 21 
 
 Hague (which we shall know in the course of a couple of days,) 
 I have grounds for believing that the English Government does 
 not wish to go back from its original proposals, and I willingly 
 accept as a proof of its steadfastness, the formal permission it 
 has just given for our vessels to take up their station with its 
 fleet at Spithead. . . . 
 
 19//4 October, Eight 0^ clock in the Evening. 
 
 We received a summons from Lord Palmerston to attend a 
 conference, late this afternoon. This meeting took place at the 
 request of the Dutch plenipotentiary, who had addressed a 
 sealed packet to the Conference. Lord Palmerston could not 
 refuse it as we had arranged, since it was not instigated by 
 one of the three plenipotentiaries, and besides it was necessary 
 to hear the explanations which had come from Holland, and might 
 be of great importance. 
 
 When Baron de Zuylen's packet was opened, we heard a long 
 statement read, in which it was attempted to refute protocols 
 69 and 70. I may remark that the latter had not been commu- 
 nicated to the Dutch plenipotentiary. Anyhow, this long polemic 
 effusion is of no consequence ; it ought not and will not have any 
 influence whatever on the Conference ; it is evidently a document 
 intended to be read before the States-General of Holland. We 
 looked upon it as such, and adjourned without any discussion 
 on it. . . . 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand 
 
 Paris, October iZth, 1832. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 Your letter confirmed the hopes with which M. de 
 Mareuil's despatch and Lord Granville's conversation had in- 
 spired me. We now await your courier of to-morrow with great 
 impatience, and are preparing ourselves for all contingencies. 
 
 The political position of the Ministry is much better than we 
 at first dared to hope for. After a great amount of wrangling, 
 people have ended by coming to their senses and asking them- 
 selves what all the fuss was about. They are generally disposed, 
 if not to be friendly, to be at least attentive ; the most usual 
 remark one now hears is : " Let us see what this Ministry will 
 do." Our fate, therefore, depends more and more on our actions 
 from the present until the commencement of the session, and 
 of all our actions, the principal, the only one that occupies 
 public attention — is this expedition to Antwerp. On this point, 
 
22 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 opinion grows stronger every day ; it is not the turbulent 
 minority, but the reasonable majority which importunes. I am 
 therefore all the more rejoiced at the part the English Cabinet 
 has just taken, for even if it had decided against our expedition, 
 I do not see how it would be possible to avoid it. 
 
 If we carry it out, our success in the Chamber is assured. 
 We shall neglect nothing to prevent any unforeseen complica- 
 tions. Our fleet is all ready ; it is composed of officers, who for 
 the most part have served with the English. I will not conceal 
 from you, that if it were possible for both fleets to be jointly 
 engaged at the mouth of the Scheldt, and if some cannon 
 shots were fired simultaneously at the English and French, it 
 would have the best possible effect here : the alliance would 
 become more and more popular, and we should be more at 
 liberty to act in conformity with the wishes of the English 
 Cabinet. 
 
 I must conclude, mon Prince, by once again placing our 
 interests in your hands : all my hope, and all my peace, lies in 
 the knowledge that you are in London. . . . 
 
 October \<)th. Ten o'clock in the Morning. 
 
 .... I have this moment received your despatch of the 
 1 6th, and I reply by courier without loss of time, in order to 
 put you in a position to give all the explanations that may be 
 asked of you. 
 
 The French army assembled on the northern frontier is 
 48,000 strong. About 18,000 are destined for the siege of 
 Antwerp ; and 30,000 will take up their position on the road to 
 Bergen-op-Zoom and Breda, within the limits of the Belgian 
 territory, so as to cover the siege. 
 
 The French outposts will relieve the Belgian outposts over 
 the entire front of the circle of military operations. 
 
 We shall ask the King of the Belgians to assemble his army 
 behind Turnhout, so as to threaten the flank of the Dutch army, 
 if it advances against our army of observation, in the same way 
 that our army of observation will threaten its flank, if it ad- 
 vances against the Belgian army within the limits of Belgian 
 territory. 
 
 As to the facility of taking the citadel, Marshal Gerard 
 thinks it could not hold out more than ten days. He has 
 obtained all requisite information respecting this. Everything 
 is ready. There need not be the slightest disquietude on 
 this point. . . . 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 23 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, October 22nd, 1832. 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 I have received all the despatches you did me the 
 honour to write, up to the 20th October inclusive ; I quite 
 understand the impatience of the King's Government at this 
 critical moment, and you may have seen that I fully shared his 
 wish to arrive at the end of these tedious uncertainties on the 
 Belgian question. Nevertheless, the hesitation of the English 
 Ministry is entirely due to the gravity of the situation. Lord 
 Grey and Lord Palmerston wished to get as many members of 
 the Cabinet together as possible, so as to obtain that unanimity 
 of decision which circumstances render highly important. I 
 feel it is necessary to dwell on this point, as it is due to these 
 two ministers to state, that it is impossible for anyone to be 
 more favourably disposed towards us than they are in all my 
 transactions with them. You will find the proof of this, 
 Monsieur le Due, in the Convention I have just signed with 
 Lord Palmerston, and which I have the honour to transmit to 
 you : it will, I hope, fully satisfy the wishes of the King's 
 Government. 
 
 It is midnight, and I have not time to enter into the different 
 articles of this Convention ; I can only say that it was im- 
 possible to obtain more. 
 
 It is absolutely necessary, that the ratifications should leave 
 Paris by Thursday evening, the 25 th, so as to be in London 
 on the 27th. 
 
 I have no need to impress upon you the necessity for 
 complete secrecy as to this Convention. We do not wish it to 
 be known, until after it has been communicated to the pleni- 
 potentiaries of the three Powers at the Conference, which will 
 take place the day after the exchange of the ratifications. 
 
 You will no doubt deem it advisable to inform the King's 
 consuls, so that French interests should not be com- 
 promised. . . . 
 
 As this despatch announced, I had signed the Convention 
 with England on the evening of October 22nd, which the 
 French Government so earnestly desired. By it, both Powers 
 agree to proceed to carry into effect the treaty of November iSth, 
 in conformity to their engagements : that the territorial evacua- 
 tion would be the first step taken ; that the Governments of 
 
24 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLE YRAND. 
 
 Holland and Belgium would be requested to carry out this eva- 
 cuation reciprocally by the 1 2th of November ; and force would 
 be employed against whichever of these governments had not 
 given its consent by the 2nd November. That in case of a re- 
 fusal on the part of Holland, an embargo would be laid on al 
 Dutch vessels, and that on the 15th of November, a French army 
 would enter Belgium to lay siege to the fortress of Antwerp. 
 
 The disquietude at Paris was immense, and all the letters I 
 received, showed how impatiently the result, which I at last suc- 
 ceeded in obtaining, was awaited. This impatience at times in- 
 commoded me greatly ; I therefore wrote a letter to the Princess 
 de Vaudemont at this period, from which I will cite a few 
 passages : 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Princess de 
 Vaud£mont. 
 
 London, October 2ith, 1832. 
 
 .... The Marquis of Lansdowne^ leaves for Paris to-day; he 
 will inspire our Ministry, which is rather easily frightened, with 
 fresh courage. In all and in everything, they always appear too 
 hurried. This does not inspire confidence in those who look on. 
 I have been here eight days, and have obtained all that they 
 wished, which had been well prepared by Durant. But though 
 it is hardly a week since I have returned to London, I have 
 already received an impatient letter from Mademoiselle. Do you 
 remember when it was thought the Belgians were going to enter 
 Holland, and that is now three months ago ? 
 
 I told them the Broglie Ministry would settle down all right ; 
 but they would not believe me. Well ! now it has established 
 itself, and will last for some time, if it does not make such foolish 
 prosecutions as that of M. Berryer.^ Now they are fully armed to 
 face the Chamber, having received the authority to march on 
 
 ^ The Marquis of Lansdowne was President of the Council in the English 
 Cabinet. He went to Paris to negotiate the exchanges that were to take place in 
 the custom duties, 
 
 ^ The Ministry had ordered the arrest of Messrs. Berryer, Chateaubriand, Hyde 
 de Neuville, and Fitz James, accused of complicity with the Duchess de Berry 
 (7th June). The three last were soon set at liberty, nothing having been proved 
 against them. M. Berryer was brought before the Court of Assizes at Blois, on 
 October 16th. The charge was so badly drawn up, that the public prosecutor 
 had to dismiss the case, and the accused benefited by an acquittal, which resolved 
 itself into a triumph. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 25 
 
 Antwerp. What we now want is to be on better terms with 
 Prussia at any price, for she is well disposed towards us. That 
 done, the rest will run on wheels. . . . 
 
 Immediately after the signature of the Convention of 
 October 22nd, therefore, and while awaiting the ratifications 
 which did not arrive from Paris until the 27th, I made all 
 arrangements with Lord Palmerston for carrying it into effect. 
 Accordingly, simultaneous with the exchange of the ratifica- 
 tions, the ratified Convention was transmitted to the three 
 Courts, accompanied by a brief and simple Note, so as to avoid, 
 as much as possible, any request for explanations from them. 
 A steamboat was in readiness and started immediately for 
 Rotterdam, carrying to the Hague the communication to 
 be made by the Charges d^ Affaires of France and England 
 to the Government of the Netherlands, which, by referring 
 everything to the Convention, was short and peremptory. 
 Lastly, a courier was also sent off to Brussels, who carried to 
 the Belgian Government a Note precisely similar to that sent 
 to the Dutch Government. By this we wished to show our 
 complete impartiality, and also to demand that the Belgians 
 on their part should surrender Venloo and those portions of 
 territory which they still held unfairly, and which were to be 
 given back to the King of the Netherlands on the day that he 
 accepted the treaty of November 15 th. We rather wished to 
 make the most of this restitution demanded of the Belgians, in 
 order to detach the Prussian Cabinet from those of Austria and 
 Russia. With this object, we proposed that the Prussian 
 troops should occupy Venloo and the territories of Limburg 
 and Luxemburg, which the treaty of November ISth, handed 
 over to Holland, or undertake to guard them until the king 
 had agreed to the treaty, and not to give them up to him 
 until after the execution of his share of its conditions. This 
 proposal gave rise to a private and rather complicated negotia- 
 tion with the Berlin Cabinet, which seemed at first disposed 
 to accept it, but finally refused,^ not daring to join in the 
 coercive measures taken by the two maritime Powers. The 
 
 ^ See page 13. 
 
26 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 result was that the Belgians kept the territories which had been 
 demanded of them, and were thus placed in a still more favour- 
 able position as regards Holland. 
 
 We will now return to the despatches and letters. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, October 7.6ih, 1832. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 Lord Palmerston called the Conference together this 
 morning, at t-hc request of M. de Biilow, who said he had a 
 communication to make to us. This communication was the 
 draft of a treaty sent by the Cabinet of the Hague. Lord 
 Palmerston and I at once declared, that in conformity with the 
 strict rules we had hitherto followed, we could not entertain 
 proposals from any other intermediary, excepting the pleni- 
 potentiary recognized by the Court who made them to us ; that 
 if M. de Zuylen had anything to communicate to us from his 
 Court, we were quite ready to hear it, but that we could not 
 entertain M. de Billow's request.^ The latter did not insist. We 
 thus avoided all explanations. The draft treaty was not even 
 read. The principal clause in it was the recognition of the free 
 navigation of the Scheldt, with the reservation of imposing dues 
 of three shillings per ton, instead of one shilling, as agreed to by 
 King Leopold and by Prussia. I trust our ratifications will have 
 arrived before M. de Zuylen himself submits to us this project 
 of his Court, which just now would not be in much favour 
 with the Conference. We are all agreed, that the meeting this 
 morning is not to be considered as a conference held at the 
 Foreign Office. . . . 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, October 25M, 1832. 
 Mon Prince, 
 
 Your courier arrived here yesterday at five in the 
 afternoon. I at once took the Convention to the king : in the 
 
 ' a last attempt had been made by Prussia to prevent a rupture. The Berlin 
 Cabinet had transmitted to the Hague a statement of the concessions required by 
 the Conference. On the 23rd October, the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 announced to the envoys of Russia, Prussia^ and Austria, that the king would adhere 
 to this scheme, with the exception of some modifications. The treaty was then sent 
 to London. It has been seen how it was received by the Conference. A few days 
 later, on the 9th November, the Dutch Minister in London communicated it to 
 Lord Grey, who replied that this treaty did not remove all the difficulties, and that 
 besides it had come too late, and the evacuation of Antwerp would henceforth be the 
 indispensable preliminary of all fresh negotiations. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 27 
 
 evening we held a Cabinet Council. The night was passed in 
 preparing the ratifications ; the courier is just about to start, and 
 you will receive them early to-morrow. 
 
 I need hardly tell you with what joy this piece of news has 
 been received. Neither will I speak to you of our gratitude for 
 so great a success. You alone could have accomplished it ; you 
 could not have rendered your country a greater service, and now 
 allow me to ask you a few questions as to how this treaty is to 
 be executed. 
 
 The King of the Belgians is summoned, simultaneously with 
 the King of the Netherlands, to evacute that portion of territory 
 which does not belong to him, according to the terms of the 
 twenty-four articles. 
 
 If the King of Holland refuses by the 2nd November, to 
 evacuate, will the King of the Belgians be obliged to do so .' 
 and in that case, to whom would he hand over Venloo and the 
 other portions of Limburg .' 
 
 It is impossible to conceive that it should be to the King 
 of Holland. 
 
 If the King of the Netherlands accepts the proposal, if he 
 consents to ei^acuate the Belgian territory, ought the King of 
 the Belgians to hand over to the King of Holland the territory 
 now occupied by the Belgians, before the King of Holland has 
 accepted the remainder of the twenty-four articles, and whilst 
 still contesting arrangements concerning the Scheldt, the syn- 
 dicate,^ and the navigation of the intermediary waters ? Would 
 this be prudent .' 
 
 I put these questions to you, in order that we may be quite 
 sure as to what directions we have to give to the King of the 
 Belgians. Besides you know that his people are not the most 
 reasonable, and as soon as they gain a little confidence, they will 
 give us no end of trouble. Kindly give me your idea as to 
 the solution of these questions. However I hope to receive 
 a letter from you to-day, which will perhaps solve all our 
 doubts. 
 
 Accept. . . . 
 
 ^ This question of the syndicate was a very difficult one, and requires some 
 explanations. 
 
 A law of December 27th, 1822, had created a sinking fund syndicate, in place of 
 the syndicate of the Netherlands and the sinking fund office. This sinking fund 
 syndicate had been endowed with 250 million of florins. But in consequence of 
 default or irregularity in the accounts, it was found impossible in 1 832, to ascertain how 
 this credit had been used ; hence it was impossible to determine exactly the amount 
 of the debt of the Netherlands ; and on this subject, the Belgian and Dutch 
 plenipotentiaries argued till they could not see. The treaty of the twenty-four 
 articles fixed the division of the debt, but the King of the Netherlands had refused to 
 accept the figures of the Conference. 
 
28' THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, October -rjih^ 1832. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 I have this morning received the ratifications of the 
 Convention of 22nd October, which you have done me the honour 
 to send, together with your despatch No. JJ. I see with pleasure 
 that this Convention has fulfilled the requirements of the King's 
 Government, and I repeat again, that I feel convinced that its 
 important results will be more appreciated each day. 
 
 We have just effected the exchange of ratifications with Lord 
 Palmerston ; I will send you those of England in the next 
 despatch. 
 
 We have transmitted the ratified Convention to the pleni- 
 potentiaries of the three Courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, 
 together with the Note, of which I send you herewith a copy. 
 
 A steamboat will leave this in an hour for Rotterdam ; it 
 takes Note No. 2 to the French and English Chm-ge's {£ Affaires 
 at the Hague, and a courier who also starts this evening will 
 carry Note No. 3 to Brussels. 
 
 As for the explanations you request. Monsieur le Due, 
 respecting the clause of the Convention relative to the giving up 
 of Venloo by the Belgians, I can assure you, that we never had the 
 slightest intention of handing over Venloo to the King of the 
 Netherlands, before the complete execution of the treaty of 
 November 15th. The summons will be made to the Belgians, to 
 show our impartiality, but we propose to deal with this town as 
 follows. To-morrow, Lord Palmerston and I intend to propose to 
 Baron de Bulow, that the Belgians should hand Venloo over to 
 H.M. the King of Prussia, under the condition, that that sovereign 
 will undertake not to restore it to the King of the Netherlands, 
 until the latter has fulfilled all the stipulations of the treaty of 
 November 15th. I will inform you of the result of this proposal, 
 which I agreed to, knowing that it would completely meet the 
 king's views. . . . 
 
 The King Louis Philippe to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Neuilly, October i^th, 1S32. 
 
 Mon CHER Prince, 
 
 In signing the important document you have just sent 
 us, I must congratulate you on your success in having obtained 
 it. It is one of the greatest services you could have rendered 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 29 
 
 me, and one of the greatest advantages that could have been 
 assured to France, for it is the honourable pledge of a general 
 peace. 
 
 I have only time to reiterate the expression of all those 
 sentiments which you know I have so long felt for you. 
 
 Louis Philippe. 
 
 Madame Adelaide d'Orl^ans to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Neuilly, Thursday, October i^th, 1832. 
 
 I have this moment received your admirable letter of the 
 23rd, and hasten, mon cher Prince, to thank you for it ; all the 
 more so as you have relieved me from a terrible anxiety, by 
 telling me that this great business is finished, and that the 
 Convention has been signed. It appears the need of secrecy 
 was so strongly impressed upon him, that our beloved king 
 thought himself obliged not to mention it, either to his wife or 
 his sister ; he also exacted this from M. de Broglie, and I can 
 certify that he has thoroughly kept it. When I went to him in 
 triumph with your precious letter, he only laughed, saying : " I 
 have not told you anything about it." I thank you for it with all 
 my heart, and need hardly tell you that there will be no indiscre- 
 tion on my part, though I must confess I cannot see why there 
 should be all this secrecy. However any way, it is no business 
 of mine ; I only know that you have done me a very great kind- 
 ness in sending me this grand and good piece of news, over which 
 I rejoice with you with all my heart. You have cut the Gordian 
 knot, as I asked you to do. It. is a very great matter, which 
 assures the prosperity of our beloved France, and of the reign of 
 our dearly-loved king. Now I trust all will go well. Our 
 beloved king desires me to tell you, how greatly he is satisfied 
 with the great success of all your efforts, and that he hopes and 
 counts upon your achieving equally happily the great work, 
 which he says, you alone could complete. . . . 
 
 M. GUIZOT TO THE PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Paris, October 26th, 1832. 
 
 I felt sure, mon Prince, that you would do the impossible, for 
 that is your habit. I hope we may accomplish what you have 
 done. Now that we possess a dowry our cause will be espoused. 
 You are quite right, it is necessary to humour the prejudices of 
 the country you are in, and not to place the British Cabinet in 
 
30 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 opposition to British instincts. We are in exactly the same 
 position, we have our prejudices which are very strong, and our 
 io-norances which are infinite. We ask that these also should be 
 considered. Let us know what it wants, and tell it what we 
 want. We shall succeed both here and in London, God and 
 you helping us. . . . 
 
 Nothing is ever finished in this world ; and after all that 
 you have just done, we shall probably ask you to do much more 
 still. We must needs seek for common sense everywhere, for 
 we have not sufficient at hand. You will furnish us with some, 
 will you not 1 
 
 I have asked the king to restore the class of moral and 
 political sciences at the Institute.^ 
 
 They have a very good effect here, and I was fortunate 
 enough to find you were connected with them. I regret ex- 
 ceedingly that you will not be here for the elections which are 
 about to take place ; but however important the Academies may 
 be, what you are doing in London is far more so. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, October iZth, 1832. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 I have just received from the two plenipotentiaries ot 
 Russia, the letter and the Note of which I have the honour to 
 send you copies. It is only what we might have expected from 
 them. It has made no impression whatever on Lord Palmer- 
 ston, nor on M. de Wessenberg or M. de Biilow. It seemed to 
 them a kind of precaution taken by the Russian plenipotentiaries, 
 who acted according to some former instructions of their court, 
 and who having been once blamed for taking too much upon 
 themselves, wished this time to make a reservation.^ 
 
 ^ See M. Guizot's report to the King [Journal des Dibats, 28th October). The 
 class of moral and political sciences had been established on the 3rd Brumaire, year 
 IV., by a law of the Convention, and had been suppressed by a Consular decree of 
 the 3rd Pluviose, year XI. 
 
 - The Russian plenipotentiaries addressed the following Note to M. de Talleyrand 
 and Lord Palmerston in reply to the communication made to them at the Conference 
 of the 22nd October. 
 
 "The undersigned, in compliance with a formal order from the emperor their master, 
 make the following declaration : That the adoption of coercive measures which France 
 and Great Britain have resolved to take against Holland has brought about a position 
 in which the Russian plenipotentiaries by virtue of the instructions with which they 
 are furnished (the tenor of which is not unknown to the plenipotentiaries of the other 
 Cabinets), find themselves under the necessity of withdrawing from the Conferences. 
 They will at once report to their court the grave circumstances, which by changing the 
 character of the pacific mediation in which they have been called to take part, permit 
 them no longer to associate themselves in the labours of their colleagues. In suspend- 
 
THE RE VOL UTION- OF i%io. 31 
 
 In reading the Note, you will no doubt notice the first words 
 of the fourth paragraph. M. de Lieven and M. Matusiewicz 
 only mean to suspend their participation in the Conferences ; 
 there is therefore no question of a rupture, or even a coolness 
 towards the two courts : that, according to my view, is the 
 essential point to which we must confine ourselves. 
 
 I hear that Comte Pozzo di Borgo, who must have arrived 
 at Paris on his return from Russia, has spoken very favourably 
 concerning our affairs at Berlin, Vienna and Munich. I should 
 advise you to act towards him in the sense I have just had 
 the honour to point out to you ; that is the way in which I 
 mean to treat this question here. I even think, that upon the 
 whole, this temporary absence of the Russian plenipotentiaries 
 from the Conference, which moreover will not reassemble for 
 some time, will be rather useful to us while executing the 
 measures we have in hand. The Hollando-Belgian business 
 must be finished in about twenty days, by the course of action 
 which will be adopted. That will be the length of time 
 required to obtain an answer from St. Petersburg to the com- 
 munication of our Convention ; the assembling of the Conference 
 during this period would be useless, and might be inconvenient. 
 I believe that the position taken by Russia in this matter will 
 have no other result than perhaps to encourage the King of the 
 Netherlands somewhat longer in his obstinacy. 
 
 Austria and Prussia will do nothing further, than simply 
 acknowledge the communications we made to them when 
 sending this Convention. . . . 
 
 I have the honour to transmit herewith the ratifications of 
 Great Britain, to the Convention of October 22nd. . . . 
 
 October ■yith, 1832. 
 
 I have just been informed by Lord Palmerston, that orders 
 will be sent down this evening to Admiral Malcolm at Portsmouth, 
 directing him to send off three English frigates to-morrow, one 
 to cruise off Texel, another at the mouth of the Meuse, and the 
 third at the mouth of the Scheldt. These frigates are to require 
 all English merchant vessels that may wish to enter the Dutch 
 ports, not to go thither. They have orders not to commence 
 hostilities, and not to impede Dutch commerce in any way, but 
 to defend themselves if they are attacked by Dutch men-of-war. 
 
 ing their participation in the Conferences, the Russian plenipotentiaries while awaiting 
 the ultimate decision of their court are moved by the gravity of the circumstances to 
 make this declaration. 
 
 "LlEVEN. 
 
 "Matusiewicz." 
 
32 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 When Lord Palmerston gave me this information, he asked 
 me to take the same steps with the French admiral in command 
 of our squadron at Spithead. I did not hesitate to give the 
 required instructions to M. Durcrest de Villeneuve,i telling him I 
 should at once report the steps I had taken to the king's govern- 
 ment. I have therefore asked him to despatch to-morrow in 
 concert with Admiral Malcolm three French frigates, which 
 will be entrusted with the same work and the same orders as 
 the English frigates, and which will act towards the French 
 merchant vessels, in the same manner as the former will towards 
 the English merchantmen. 
 
 I trust, Monsieur le Due, that His Majesty will approve the 
 step I have taken ; as time did not permit of my waiting for 
 instructions from Paris, I was compelled to act on my own 
 responsibility. 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, October -K^th, 1832. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 You have done wonders ; the treaty, as I told you, 
 satisfied us completely. We are now equally content with the 
 steps you have taken to carry it out. The only point to which 
 we wish to draw your immediate attention to, is that the King of 
 the Belgians should not be required to actually evacuate Venloo, 
 until our troops have got to Antwerp. It might create diffi- 
 culties, cause disturbance in the Belgian Chambers, and compli- 
 cate our operations. It is only a matter of a day or two, and we 
 must not for that run the risk of some gross act of folly on the 
 part of the Belgians. If the Prussians do not accept our proposal, 
 there ought to be no difficulty in delaying for two or three days, 
 not the undertaking to evacuate Venloo, but the arfz^a/ evacuation 
 of the fortress. I am not sure whether in such a case, you 
 would consider it advisable that the evacuation should take 
 place, for to whom could the fortress be given up .? If the 
 Prussians accept, arrangements must be made, that they should 
 net arrive there before the isth or i6th of November. I, on 
 my side, will use my best efforts with M. de Werther. 
 
 Ministerial matters here are going fairly well, at least as far 
 as one can judge at present, when only a comparatively small 
 number of Deputies have yet arrived. If our undertaking 
 
 1 Alexandre Louis Ducrest de Villeneuve, bom in 1777, entered the navy at 
 fourteen, and became captain in 1814. In 1830, lie was made rear-admiral of the 
 fleet of Toulon. He commanded the squadron sent to the Scheldt in 1832. In 
 1834, he was made marine prefet at Lorient. He retired in 1838, and died in 1852. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830: 33 
 
 succeeds, as I have every hope of its doing, it will be entirely 
 due to you. As for me, I place even a greater value on the 
 sentiments you have expressed towards me, than on the advan- 
 tages which will result therefrom to my country. 
 
 Admiral de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, November 2nd, 1832. 
 
 MON Prince, 
 
 When I sent our vessels from Cherbourg, I gave orders 
 to Rear-Admiral Ducrest de Villeneuve, to inform you of his 
 arrival, and also to carry out any instructions you might consider 
 it necessary to give him. 
 
 I deemed it quite in order, that such directions should come 
 from London, without passing through Paris. Time is precious, 
 and must not be wasted in useless circumlocution. You, mon 
 Prince, who have in this instance utilized it so effectually, will 
 fully agree with me. 
 
 Our dissentients are getting rather more reasonable ; never- 
 theless it would not be safe to say that matters will all be 
 arranged. Dupin has arrived and saw the king yesterday. He 
 says that he will not offer any opposition, and that he will sit 
 neutral on the Presidential chair. Being one of the members of 
 the commission for the address, he will have some weight. The 
 Opposition propose to put in a word with reference to the quasi- 
 legitimacy matter. 
 
 We believe that we shall receive the answer from the Hague, 
 probably via London, on the 4th or 5th ; you might send it to us 
 by the Calais telegraph. 
 
 The Melpomene s.nd the Creole have started for Spithead. . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, November ind, 1 832. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 I have this morning received a despatch from M. le 
 Comte de Latour Maubourg, who informs me of a difficulty in 
 which he has been placed, by a request from General Goblet. 
 The latter, on receiving the requisition made in consequence of 
 the Convention of October 21st, for the surrender, by the 
 Belgian Government, of Venloo and the territories of Limburg 
 and Luxemburg, has demanded an official declaration, tending 
 to guarantee, that in no case would the town of Venloo and those 
 VOL. V. D 
 
34 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 territories which are destined to be restored to Holland, be 
 occupied by foreign troops before the citadel has been sur- 
 rendered to the Belgians. 
 
 You will have seen by the letter, a copy of which I had the 
 honour to send you the day before yesterday, that I had 
 authorised M. de Latour Maubourg, to announce confidentially 
 to General Goblet when sending him the requisition, that the 
 surrender of those territories would in no case be made to the 
 Dutch, and that we were occupied in arranging this matter 
 here, in the way most tranquillising for Belgium. 
 
 It seems to me that this communication was more than 
 sufficient to allay the anxieties of the Belgian Government, at a 
 time when both France and England are so energetically 
 supporting the interests of Belgium. I feared, and I think with 
 reason, the indiscreet publications which the Belgian Ministry 
 has never denied itself. The articles in the Belgian papers have 
 already caused us too much trouble, not to put us on our guard. 
 
 The official declaration demanded by General Goblet will, 
 I feel sure, produce a very bad effect on the Cabinets. If, as 
 M. de Latour Maubourg writes me, Sir Robert Adair considered 
 himself authorised to give this declaration, I cannot understand 
 why the immediate publicity of all the Acts sent to the Brussels 
 Cabinet, should not have been stopped at once. 
 
 It is far more important for us just now, to reassure the 
 Powers by our actions, than to satisfy the puerile susceptibilities 
 of the Belgians. I think, therefore, that the declaration asked 
 for by General Goblet, which under any circumstances would be 
 fraught with difficulties, should be flatly refused by M. de 
 Latour Maubourg ; it is in this sense that I discussed the 
 matter with Lord Palmerston in my first interview with him ; 
 he has gone into the country until the day after to-morrow, 
 but I shall see him as soon as he returns. . . . ^ 
 
 November ^ih, 1 832. 
 
 An hour ago I received the King of the Netherlands' reply 
 to the communication made to him by the Charges d'Aff'aircs 
 
 ^ In sending this despatch, M. de Talleyrand wrote to the Due de Broglie the 
 following private letter ; — I write to you to-day that you may be thoroughly aware, in 
 your relations with General Goblet, with whom you have to deal. General Goblet is 
 an Orangist. He does all he can to please the insurgents in Belgium by creating 
 disturbance, in order to complicate matters so as to leave the door open to the Orangist 
 party. I have had the opportunity of forming an opinion about him here, where his 
 presumptuous objections never cease to cause us trouble. He plays at Brussels a 
 similar role to that of those of our Carlists who have become republicans. In my 
 correspondence with Sebastiani, I have many times warned him not to place any 
 confidence in him. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 35 
 
 of France and England.^ I have the honour to send you a copy- 
 herewith, although I suppose you will have received one direct 
 from the Hague. This answer is a refusal, but couched in 
 sufficiently mild terms. . . . 
 
 Lord Palmerston to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Foreign Office, November dth, 1832. 
 MoN CHER Prince, 
 
 I send you quite confidentially, a copy of a letter I have 
 to-day sent to the Admiralty, as a guide to that department for 
 the instructions they are to give Admiral Malcolm ; I have 
 sent a copy this evening to Granville, for communication 
 to your government, so that they may judge whether it 
 would be suitable to give similar instructions to Admiral Ville- 
 neuve. It would, nevertheless, be as well that you should bring 
 these instructions confidentially to the knowledge of your 
 admiral, for he ought to be made aware of the orders that have 
 been given to his colleague. 
 
 Ever yours, 
 
 Palmerston. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Princess de 
 Vaud£mont. 
 
 London, November 7th, 1832. 
 
 The declaration of the Russians is of no consequence, except 
 for the chatter it occasions. The fact is, M. de Lieven did not 
 wish to make it, and it was Matusiewicz who persuaded him 
 to do it. We must not look upon this as anything. Pozzo is 
 made to say all sorts of things. Every one makes use of his 
 words to suit their own views. M. de Lieven has gone so far as 
 to say that in the state matters are in at present, we could do 
 nothing more than make a convention containing final conditions, 
 and that the terms in which ours has been drawn up, appeared 
 most suitable to him. The date of my letter induces me to 
 hope that we shall arrive at the 15th, without striking a blow. 
 What will happen after that is beyond my guidance, it will be 
 
 ^ The Dutch Cabinet refused to submit to the injunctions of the Convention of 
 October 22nd. It declared that the evacuation of Belgium by its troops, before the 
 exchange of the ratifications of the treaty of November 15th, would be contrary to 
 the intention of the negotiations, and that moreover it was the absolute duty of 
 Holland, not to give up, by the surrender of Antwerp, the pledge which would aid 
 her to obtain equitable conditions of separation. 
 
 D 2 
 
36 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 for those men who conduct the war, to take all necessary 
 precautions. Politically, our affairs are on the right road ; that 
 is all I was entrusted with, and what I have been entrusted with, I 
 have carried out. When I left Paris I was told : " This is essential, 
 else we shall not gain a majority." The thing is done ; will 
 they have a majority now .'.... 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, November Wt, 1832. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I send you two lines to say that I am not able to 
 write to you more fully. It is time for the courier to start, and 
 I could not return sooner. You will easily understand the 
 reason, when I tell you that Madame la Duchesse de Berry was 
 yesterday arrested at Nantes. 
 
 We have spent the whole morning in concerting the 
 necessary measures for her security. This will assure us a large 
 and certain majority. Accept. . . . 
 
 Madame Adelaide d'Orl^ans to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, November '^th, 1832. 
 
 Certainly, mon cher Prince, I am tlwroughly satisfied with 
 yon, with all you have done, and with your letter of the 1st of 
 this month, for which I thank you with all my heart. I intended 
 doing so yesterday, when the grand news of the arrest of the 
 Duchesse de Berry arrived. She was taken at Nantes ; this is a 
 most important matter, and I feel sure you will approve of the 
 article in the Moniteur oi to-day, and of the resolution taken by 
 our Government with regard to this. It seems to me that it will 
 satisfy every one. The whole thing passed off very quietly 
 at Nantes. From the previous day, periodical visits had been 
 made to the house, warning having been given that she was 
 there, but nothing was discovered ; then the general and the 
 pr6fet ordered a troop of the National Guard to surround all the 
 entrances of a number of houses which formed a sort of island, 
 in one of which it was thought, and with reason, that Madame 
 de Berry was concealed. Here the prefet had left a guard of 
 gendarmes, who having lit a fire in the grate of a small room 
 on the third floor to warm themselves, heated the slabs to such 
 an extent, that Madame la Duchesse de Berry, who together 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 37 
 
 with M. de Mesnard,^ M. de Guibourg and Mademoiselle de 
 Kersabiec, was hidden in a small chamber at the back, being 
 almost asphyxiated, could stand it no longer, and came forth and 
 gave herself up. But for this extraordinary incident, it is probable 
 that she would not even now have been discovered. She was at 
 once taken to the chateau at Nantes. That is all I know up to 
 now of this important event, which I hasten to communicate 
 to you. 
 
 Chartres and Nemours leave on Sunday for the army. I hope, 
 and we have need of it just now, that their absence will not be for 
 long, and that they will soon come back to us with the grand and 
 good news of the surrender of Antwerp. I think that the King 
 of Holland's reply, though it is a refusal, does not seem to me to 
 mean any great resistance. All difficulties appear gradually to 
 disappear before our just, noble and grand cause, and I have 
 more and more the sweet and firm conviction, that our beloved 
 king will yet enjoy the recompense of all his troubles and 
 sacrifices, in seeing our beautiful France, peaceful, happy and 
 prosperous. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, November nth, 1832. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 Monsieur le Baron de Zuylen, after having several times 
 vainly attempted to renew negotiations with Lord Palmerston, 
 has at last addressed himself to Lord Grey, in the hope, no 
 doubt, of obtaining some concessions which Lord Palmerston 
 had refused him. He went to Lord Grey yesterday and gave 
 him the draft of the treaty proposed by the Berlin Cabinet, 
 about which I wrote to you, and the document of which I have 
 the honour to send you a copy.^ I also add a copy of the draft 
 of the treaty, which I could not procure till last night. 
 
 After his conversation with M. de Zuylen, Lord Grey invited 
 us to come to him, so that we might arrive at some understanding 
 with Lord Palmerston. He then informed us of what I have just 
 
 ^ Louis eharles, eomte de Mesnard, bom in 1769, was captain of the regiment of 
 Conti in 1789. He emigrated, sei-ved in Conde's army, and remained in England 
 until the Restoration. He was afterwards made Colonel and aide-de-camp to the 
 Due de Berry, then first equerry to the Duchess de Berry, and peer of France in 
 1823. After the Revolution of 1830, he accompanied the Duchess de Berry to 
 England, and Italy, and followed her to France where he was arrested, tried, and 
 acquitted. He left France, and died in 1842. 
 
 ' See page 26, and note the reply which Lord Grey made to M. de Zuylen on 
 the subject of this treaty. The document here referred to is a Note which further 
 explained this reply. 
 
38 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 told you. I was able at once to express my opinion on the new pro- 
 posals from the Hague, and I felt obliged to say, that there was 
 no longer a possible basis for negotiations until after the surrender 
 of the citadel of Antwerp, and until the King of the Nether- 
 lands had given an undertaking to accept the treaty of Novem- 
 ber 15th, with such modifications as Belgium could agree to. 
 
 Lord Grey, who is quite of my opinion, drew up a scheme 
 on these lines ; but he said that he thought he was nevertheless 
 obliged to lay the matter before a Cabinet Council, and he fixed 
 a meeting for to-day at Lord Palmerston's after the Council. I 
 went there as agreed on, and he gave me the subjoined Note, which 
 has been approved by the Council and sent to M. le Baron de 
 Zuylen, in reply to his communication of yesterday. 
 
 You will perceive. Monsieur le Due, that by this Note we de- 
 mand the evacuation of the citadel of Antwerp, as an indispensable 
 preliminary to any fresh negotiations. Lord Grey told me that 
 the Council did not think it advisable to adopt the second con- 
 dition of the scheme arranged between us yesterday, as it allowed 
 no opening whatever for any future negotiations, by first imposing 
 the obligation on the Government of the Netherlands to accept 
 the treaty of November iSth, and then submitting any possible 
 modifications of this treaty to the wishes of Belgium alone. 
 
 You will observe that Lord Grey's Note to the Baron de 
 Zuylen is not signed, which takes away its strictly official 
 character ; nevertheless it appeared sufficiently important to M. 
 de Zuylen, for he sent it at once by courier to the Hague. 
 
 I have in this instance, as in all the others, found Lord Grey 
 and Lord Palmerston possessed of a sincerity and an uprightness 
 beyond all praise. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Princess de 
 Vaud£mont. 
 
 London, November I'^th, 1832. 
 
 I am looking forward to the i6th, with more pleasure than 
 anxiety ; it will deliver us from the fatiguing uncertainty in which 
 we now are. M. de Zuylen has injured himself greatly by his 
 trickery, his reservations, and I may say, by his bad faith, in a 
 matter which every one wished to clear up and finish. He did 
 not go straight ; he allied himself with the Tories, in order that 
 the papers might say what would suit the enemies of the English 
 Ministry. With M. Falck, everything would have been arranged 
 six months ago, and the King of Holland would have been in a 
 better position. . . 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 39 
 
 14M November. 
 
 We are approaching the moment when our troops will enter 
 Belgium; in a few hours they will be on the march. I have 
 done all that was necessary on my side, and trust that all has 
 been prepared for action in Paris ; no time must be lost. The 
 shorter the expedition, the more brilliant it will be, and the 
 less inconvenient to Europe. The English squadron is off the 
 Dutch coast, under Admiral Malcolm. Any demonstration 
 on the part of England is favourable to us, for it is only by our 
 union with her that war will be avoided, no matter what the 
 French papers may say. Our Convention with England is too 
 much like an offensive and defensive treaty, not to cool the 
 the most zealous partisans of war. Adieu ; it is most necessary 
 that I should be kept an courant, from day to day, of the march 
 of our army and the movements of the Prussian troops, of which 
 mention is made in the papers. . . } 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, November 16th, 1832. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 We are impatiently awaiting news of the French army, 
 whose entry into Belgium, it was said, would take place this 
 morning. It is in this direction that we must in future turn our 
 attention, and I beg you to keep me most fully posted as to what- 
 ever of interest may occur ; there is no doubt that many persons 
 will endeavour to circulate all kinds of false reports here about 
 our army, and it is very important that I should always be in a 
 position to refute them ; I should even wish, if it is possible, to be 
 informed direct by the telegraph from Lille to Calais. Those 
 who are best disposed towards us express great anxiety ; they 
 fear that we have not sufficient troops on our northern frontier, 
 and that this will furnish the Prince of Orange with an oppor- 
 tunity to throw himself into the centre of Belgium. I try to allay 
 their fears, but it is necessary that I should be able to contradict 
 the false reports which will serve as a foundation for them. . . . 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Pringe de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, November ir^tk, 1832. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I have barely time to send you a few lines. The out- 
 rage of this morning adds to the anxieties of this day. The 
 
 ^ Upon the entry of the French troops into Belgium, the Pnissians had concen- 
 trated an army of observation on the Meuse, but did not make any offensive 
 movement. 
 
40 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 indignation in the Chambers and in the whole of Paris is very 
 great. Probably this may help the good cause ; I say probably, 
 for we are terribly changeable here. The king, as he always is on 
 these occasions, was very calm, very self-possessed, and displayed 
 great courage. He did not wish that the news of the occurrence 
 should reach the Chamber ere his arrival, and no one would 
 have suspected it from the tranquillity of his voice and face. The 
 effect of his speech was excellent ; I hope you will approve of 
 its general tone, its firmness, and its reticence. I had added a 
 final paragraph respecting the negotiations that are being 
 carried on in England, with regard to postal arrangements, 
 wines, books, &c., but at the last reading, this paragraph was 
 eliminated as adding to the length of the speech and accentuating 
 it ; I will however take care to speak of it in the discussion. 
 Adieu, mon Prince ; the assassin has not yet been discovered. . ^ 
 
 Madame Adelaide d'Orl£ans to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 TUILERIES, lilonday, November igih, 1S32. 
 
 For what acts of mercy we have to thank Providence, mon 
 cher Prince ! A horrible outrage has just failed, thanks to 
 Heaven ! A monster fired a pistol at our dearly beloved king, 
 as he was riding across the Pont Royal on his way to the 
 Chamber. He behaved splendidly and \vas perfectly calm, con- 
 tinuing his route as if nothing had happened ; he did not even 
 wish it to be mentioned in the Chamber, and delivered his speech 
 in a calm and unmoved voice. It was admirably received. Un- 
 fortunately the mxonstcr has not yet been arrested. As soon as 
 the Cham.bers were informed of this horrible outrage, both the 
 Peers and Deputies arrived here simultaneously ; La Fayette 
 and Dupont de I'Eure alone were missing; but perhaps they 
 will still come. I do not know whether you will be able to 
 read this, mon cher Prince, but you will quite understand how 
 my hand shakes ; I wanted, however, to write to you at once by 
 special messenger. ... 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, November zznd, 1832. 
 
 Mon Prince, 
 
 Lord Granville has communicated to me Lord Palmer- 
 ston's letter, respecting all the tittle-tattle of the Belgian Govern- 
 
 The assassin was n-ver discovered, which caused the Opposilion to declare that 
 the outrage had only bejn a triclx of the police. A man named E-jrijeron was finally 
 arrested, but he was acquitted 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 41 
 
 ment. Lord Palmerston attaches more importance to it than I 
 do. As the Belgians made use of his name in their dispute with 
 us respecting the indemnity in M. Pescatore's ^ affair and various 
 other points, I was very glad to know what truth there really 
 was in their proposals. Otherwise all these little bickerings 
 are not worth the trouble of noticing. 
 
 To-day General Chasse will be summoned to surrender. Will 
 he defend himself.'' We shall know this very soon, but it is 
 impossible to conjecture. You have no need to remind me 
 of the resolution to evacuate Belgium after the taking of the 
 citadel, and of keeping to the letter, the engagement entered into 
 on the 22nd October. I would not continue in office half an 
 hour, if there could be any doubt about this. 
 
 Lord Lansdowne will tell you that ministerial affairs are pro- 
 gressing favourably here, and that the majority seem quite of 
 one mind. Our friends have no doubt as to our success. I am 
 not so confident. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, November 26th, 1832. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 I may tell you that our position here has greatly im- 
 proved within the last few days. The despatches that have arrived 
 from Vienna and Berlin show a decided modification in the 
 feelings that were noticeable during the first state of excitement. 
 The Austrian and Prussian Ministers in London have even gone 
 so far as to evince the desire that the measures adopted by 
 France and England to overcome the obstinacy of the King of 
 the Netherlands may prove successful. 
 
 The more one thinks over it, the more one feels convinced, 
 that the various Continental Cabinets will try and break up 
 the union between France and England ; but one also feels, that 
 they will have to resign themselves to this union and its results, 
 as long as they have to recognize such evident symptoms of 
 its duration. . . . 
 
 November 29M, 1832. 
 
 I am very grieved to see, by the information you have 
 kindly sent me, that fresh delays have occurred in the siege 
 operations against the citadel of Antwerp. The anxiety here 
 
 ^ M. Pescatore was a member of the civil government of Luxemburg, who 
 had been arrested in October 1831, by the Belgian gendarmerie in reprisal for the 
 arrest of M. Thorn. The tvio prisoners were exchanged in the end of 1832. 
 
42 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLE YRAND. 
 
 increases each day, and the English Cabinet has even gone so 
 far as to say, that they lay as much stress on the speedy 
 reduction of that citadel, as the new French Cabinet could have 
 done on the conclusion of the Convention of October 22nd. 
 This language shows the importance of this question to the 
 Government ; it is by no means exaggerated, and I fully share 
 this view. 
 
 I am not at all surprised at the neglect and carelessness of 
 the Belgians, of which you complain. One must be prepared 
 for all sorts of hindrances from them, and I think that our 
 general method of dealing with them is not suitable to so new 
 and so self-conceited a Government. 
 
 The delays respecting the Antwerp expedition, show us 
 more than ever, how necessary it is not to hurry anything in 
 our negotiations with the Prussian Cabinet. 
 
 Time is a great teacher and solves many difficulties for us. 
 You will no doubt think that it is necessary to allow oneself 
 great latitude when one is committed to the chances of a siege, 
 and I advise you not to settle anything with Berlin, before you 
 are sure of the result at Antwerp. You will perceive that if 
 you had kept to the Sth December (the date last fixed by you 
 for the surrender of Venloo to the Prussians) you would now be 
 placed in a very difficult position. As the negotiation is being 
 carried on by M. Bresson with Lord Minto's help, there ought 
 to be no difficulty in retarding it, by expressing the need of 
 joint instructions from the Paris and London Cabinets. 
 
 I have just communicated to Lord Palmerston your despatch 
 No. loi, relative to the expenses of our expedition into 
 Belgium, which you consider you ought to demand from the 
 Belgian Government. I read him the whole of it. After listen- 
 ing to it with great attention. Lord Palmerston replied that it 
 did not alter his opinion in any way, because all the reasons 
 given by the King's Council remained in their entirety. I tried 
 in vain to give a fresh turn to the arguments with v/hich your 
 despatch had furnished me, but I must tell you candidly, that I 
 was unable to modify this opinion, which appeared to me to be 
 irrevocably fixed. 
 
 I, thereupon, at once spoke to Lord Palmerston respecting 
 the mission which England is said to have entrusted to an 
 agent of the Ottoman Porte. He replied, that he had certainly 
 been informed by a letter from Constantinople of the 26th 
 October, of the Sultan's resolution to send Namick Pasha, 
 Colonel of the Guards, to England ; that this resolution had not 
 received the assent of the Divan, which had however consented 
 to Namick Pasha's proceeding vi& Paris ; that moreover, although 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 43 
 
 it was well known that Namick's mission related to the war 
 which was going on between the Porte and the Pasha of Egypt, 
 the exact nature of the communications he was bringing to the 
 English Government was not known,' but it was supposed that 
 the Porte only intended thereby to give sufficient eclat to this 
 mission in order to disquiet the Pasha of Egypt, who could not 
 fail to hear of it. Lord Palmerston also assured me, that Sir 
 Stratford Canning ° had never made any suggestion that might 
 be interpreted as an offer of actual assistance on the part of 
 England, and that you were quite right in thinking, that he had 
 only confined himself to such expressions of goodwill as it is 
 customary to make use of on such occasions. . . . 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, November 2jtk, 1832. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 The answer which I send you is an official one. I fancy 
 that Lord Palmerston has adopted this course so as to be able 
 to answer any questions in Parliament. It is for this same cause 
 that I am so importunate. 
 
 You know that the reason which induced us to ask for re- 
 imbursement from Belgium for our extraordinary expenditure, 
 was due to the positive refusal of the Chamber of Deputies last 
 year, to grant us the expenses of our Belgian expedition in 1831. 
 We should, therefore, be without an answer, if we could not show 
 publicly that we had used every effort to protect the interests of 
 the Treasury. However, we have but little hope of being en- 
 riched by what we shall get for it. 
 
 Nevertheless, the fact is, our position is not the same as that 
 of England. She furnishes a squadron for the common cause ; 
 we do the same. She wants nothing from Belgium ; nor do we 
 for that matter. But, in addition, we undertake an expedition 
 on land, infinitely more costly, which we carry out at our expense 
 alone. 
 
 Lord Palmerston thinks that it is solely in European interest 
 that we are acting. I do not think so. The best proof that it is 
 at the same time in purely Belgian interest is, that we have 
 only sent our troops at the express request of Belgium. If we 
 did not take Antwerp, the Belgian army would have to take it ; 
 and what we now ask of her is much less than it would have cost 
 
 ^ The mission of Namiclc Pasha. See pages 67 and 75. 
 
 ^ Sir Stratford Canning, at one time English Ambassador at the Porte, had been 
 sent to Constantinople in November 1831, on a special mission. He was to ask for 
 an extension of frontier, in favour of Greece. 
 
44 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 her to do this. It is true Belgium does not pay for a single 
 soldier less, but she does not pay for all the actual expenses of 
 the siege, which we conduct at our expense. 
 
 Lord Palmerston adds, that we ourselves desired, in the in- 
 terests of the formation or continuance of the Ministry, that 
 this expedition should take place. This however is quite outside 
 the circle of general discussion. It is a discussion on what takes 
 place in the lobbies. It is a reason that we cannot urge publicly. 
 If we desire thus to take into consideration the secret causes of 
 things, we might then say, that the dread of Belgian absurdities, 
 the fear of seeing them organise an expedition against Holland, the 
 necessity of extricating them from their present position, are 
 among the various reasons which have made us wish to undertake 
 the expedition against Antwerp. Without doubt, the provocations 
 of the Belgians and their effect on public opinion in France, 
 have more than half contributed towards rendering this expedi- 
 tion inevitable. 
 
 Besides, I say again, one must not take things for more th-an 
 they are worth : the object of our request is to cover our 
 responsibility. I believe that Lord Palmerston's despatch is 
 precisely of the same nature, and I beg you to assure him that I 
 have not the slightest wish to see anything else in it. 
 
 Our expedition does not progress as quickly as I could have 
 wished. The whole army arrived at the date fixed, but the 
 transport of the siege artillery and ammunition has been and 
 is still greatly delayed. Marshal Gdrard does not wish to issue 
 his summon.s, until he is in a position to answer a refusal with a 
 fierce fire. I am assured that the summons will be made to-day, 
 but I still fear delays. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, Nove7}iber y:)th, 1832. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 M. le Marquis de Palmella arrived in London yester- 
 day, charged with a mission from Dom Pedro to the English 
 Government ; he left Oporto on the 22nd of this month. It 
 appears that this city is beginning to feel the necessity of putting 
 an end to the state of affairs which is now laying Portugal waste ; 
 the Marquis de Palmella is therefore to ask the English Cabinet ^ 
 for an armistice. He spoke to me on this subject. Such 
 
 ' It will be remembered that Dom Pedro had landed on the island of Terceira on 
 the 3rd March, 1832. On the 8th July, he entered Oporto, which became the centre 
 of the Constitutional Government, while Dom Miguel maintained an absolute 
 government at Lisbon. A fierce struggle was carried on between the two brothers. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 45 
 
 an armistice as he asks for would have no weight unless it is 
 made jointly with France and England. 
 
 Having obtained this armistice, they would then try to effect 
 a mediation in which the Powers most interested, i.e. Spain, 
 England, and France, should take part ; and it is more than 
 probable that if these three Powers agree as to what is required 
 to re-establish order in Portugal, the country would insist on the 
 two princes of the House of Braganza adopting the proposals 
 made to them. 
 
 I will keep you posted as regards M. de Palmella's actions 
 with respect to the English Government, and as to the resolutions 
 which that Government may be disposed to adopt. Have the 
 goodness to inform me what I should say, if M. de Palmella's 
 proposals are accepted here. . . . 
 
 December \st. 
 MON CHER Due, 
 
 We have got no further : this state of affairs becomes 
 more and more unpleasant for the English Cabinet, and more 
 awkward for me. I fear that this embarrassment will be still 
 further increased by Berlin ; we carried the negotiation about 
 Venloo thither, hoping that the long distances and the hesitations 
 of M. Ancillon would have given us time to take Antwerp and 
 thus sever the greatest difficulty of all. The time you gave me 
 as being required for the movements of our army, has un- 
 fortunately not proved sufficient, and we are now on the eve of 
 seeing a Convention signed at Berlin, before anything has been 
 effected at Antwerp. The foolish bragging of the Belgians with 
 their threat of not handing Venloo over to the Prussians until 
 after Antwerp has been taken, may complicate everything in a 
 manner truly fatal to the peace of Europe. 
 
 What ought to be done now .■' Nothing — unless it be to 
 obtain fresh delays, spin out all the details of the negotia- 
 tions, hasten everything connected with the army, and above 
 all, put down with a strong hand the meddlesome spirit and 
 ridiculous pretensions of the Belgians. I have seen it proved 
 here, where, so far from encouraging them, they are treated with 
 a degree of haughtiness, which it would be well if they ex- 
 perienced from us. 
 
 I therefore entreat you, mon cher Due, only to send M. 
 Bresson very vague instructions, and give him to understand 
 that what we desire least is a speedy conclusion. Moreover, I 
 also think, what I neither could or would point out in my de- 
 spatch, that the (//i^zozi/w^w^ between Belgium and Holland would 
 be far more easily arranged, if we could feel assured of Prussia's 
 
46 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 friendly neutrality, without calling upon her to take a more 
 active part. I believe this is not impossible, if we can yet make 
 ourselves masters of Antwerp without much delay, and if they 
 will only keep on negotiating matters in Berlin without bringing 
 them to a conclusion. 
 
 I think I have found a combination on those grounds which 
 will not be without value ; but I must first mature it before 
 submitting it to you. I therefore confine myself for the present 
 to begging you to leave all negotiations open, and not to 
 conclude any. 
 
 We must not forget that England evinced some regret that 
 the negotiations with Prussia had been carried on in Berlin. All 
 the greater reason that M. Bresson should do nothing without 
 Lord Minto's most complete co-operation. But, as I said before, 
 what is most required is, that he should do nothing there just 
 now, and that he must be most cautious in what he says. . . . 
 
 Madame Adelaide d'Orleans to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 TuiLERlES, December 2nd, 1S32. 
 
 MoN CHER Prince, 
 
 I hasten to give you news of our army, which has just 
 come to hand. I send you a copy of what has been sent me, dated 
 four o'clock in the afternoon, November 30th. " We opened the 
 first trench before the citadel yesterday; M. le Due d'Orldans 
 was in command, and on this first occasion of his being under 
 fire and in actual warfare, the Prince Royal displayed a great 
 deal of coolness, foresight, and zeal in all his preparations ; he 
 constantly passed along the line of working parties, visited his 
 main guards and looked after his reserves ; did in fact what 
 an experienced soldier would have done. Thanks to a very 
 dark and wet night, we were enabled to hide this delicate 
 operation from the enemy, and it was not till daylight that 
 they found us covered by a parallel of two thousand seven 
 hundred fathoms, and sheltered from his fire. I think, there- 
 fore, that it was only in order to give pleasure to M. le Due 
 d'Orleans, that he commenced about mid-day to send a few 
 shells and some shot. The siege has advanced so rapidly 
 within these few hours, that it is hoped the king will very 
 shortly receive the keys of the citadel." 
 
 This is what we earnestly desire for everyone's sake, mon cher 
 Prince, for you can well imagine how anxious we are. Marshal 
 G6rard, who was in the trench with Chartres, wrote to the king, 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 47 
 
 that no one could have shown more coolness or greater bravery. 
 The marshal's aide-de-camp, who brought the despatches, 
 says that when the first bullet passed over Chartres' head he 
 leapt for joy, and all the soldiers began to dance. 
 
 We still do not know whether the perpetrator of that 
 horrible outrage of the 19th November, has been discovered ; 
 the police hope they are on the track. One thing is certain, 
 however, this outrage has made it more universally and warmly 
 evident than ever, that France feels she possesses a rare treasure 
 in her king, and that she would be exposed to innumerable 
 dangers were he not there. Everything connects itself with 
 him and the Constitutional Monarchy ; it is this that gives us 
 so large a majority in the Chamber, which is turning out 
 excellently, and affords us every assurance of a happy session. 
 What we now want is to finish this Antwerp business ; then we 
 shall be all right. Truly, the Belgians ought to be very 
 grateful, happy, and satisfied ; but they are not. I must candidly 
 tell you, that I am very angry at their folly and their in- 
 gratitude. Why, they are actually grumbling now at General 
 Schramm's^ division, which, after the anxiety expressed by the 
 English Government, that we had not sufficient troops in 
 Belgium, the king sent thither. It really seems to me, that the 
 English Government ought to make them feel how foolish they 
 are, and what harm they do to themselves by it. . . . 
 
 The Due de Brogue to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, December 6th, 1832. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 At last I am enabled to send you some news of the 
 siege, which may and ought to satisfy the English Ministry. 
 The mistake has not been in failing to keep our promise, but in 
 not having allowed sufficient time for preparation during this 
 terrible season of the year. The army has made superhuman 
 efforts ; the placing of the last battery, carried out in the open 
 under the very glacis of the citadel, is, they say, one of the 
 most daring enterprises that has ever been executed. It is 
 thought that in eight, or at the latest ten days, and probably 
 much sooner, the citadel will be taken. I hope the news will 
 arrive in the midst of the English elections. 
 
 ''- Jean Paul Adam, Comte Schramm, born in 1789, entered the service in 1803, 
 and was made Brigadier-General in 1813. He lived in retirement during the 
 Restoration, toolc part in the expedition to Antwerp, and became General of 
 Division, and a Peer of France in 1839. He was War Minister in 1850, and created 
 a Senatoi in 1852. He died in 1883. 
 
48 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 You will see by my despatch of to-day, that I have been, 
 and had cause to be, greatly surprised to find the affair of 
 Venloo suddenly terminated, by an offer to give this place 
 and Limburg back to Holland. Anyhow, I cannot understand 
 the course of this business. It went to Berlin in a Note from 
 you and Lord Palmerston. Sent back to London, it was returned 
 to Berlin, Lord Palmerston making it rather a grievance, as you 
 yourself remarked to me, that it was done without his consent ; 
 and now the matter is wound up by an offer, of which neither 
 you nor I are cognizant, and of which I only know the conditions 
 through letters from Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville.^ I 
 greatly fear that this offer will plunge us into endless difficulties 
 when it comes to the question of carrying it out, and place us, 
 meanwhile, I feel sure, as regards Prussia, in an uncertain and 
 changeable light, which vexes me extremely. 
 
 The king is greatly opposed to this offer, and I think, on 
 more accounts than one, that he is right. 
 
 I had a long talk this morning with M. d'Offalia,^ who is 
 leaving his post as Spanish Ambassador here, to return to 
 Madrid, where he will be Minister of the Interior. The following 
 is what he stated after touching on divers other matters. 
 
 If the English Government thinks it has cause of complaint on 
 account of the shots that were fired at one of its vessels at the 
 mouth of the Douro, the Spanish Government will be quite 
 willing to give it satisfaction. But if the English Government 
 makes use of this to break up the neutrality and declare itself 
 in favour of Dom Pedro, the Spanish Government will at once 
 send an army into Portugal. 
 
 I interrupted M. d'Offalia, and asked him in what capacity he 
 spoke to me ; was it merely an ordinary conversation, or was it 
 a proposal he was making me in the name of his Government. 
 He said he was not speaking to me as an ambassador, as he no 
 longer considered himself as such, but that he was very glad to 
 be able to tell me in the course of conversation, that such was 
 the opinion of his Government, and that he would not become 
 the King of Spain's Minister except under that condition. 
 
 I then asked him Avhat use he wished me to make of his con- 
 versation, and whether he wished me to communicate it to the 
 
 1 See page 13. 
 
 2 Don Navisco de Herddia, Comte d'Offalia, a Spanish statesman, born in 1777, 
 secretary to the Embassy at Washington in iSoo. He retired into private life during 
 King Joseph's accession. In 1823, he was made Minister of Justice, then envoy 
 extraordinary to London in 1827, and ambassador at Paris in 182S. He was 
 Minister of the Interior in the Zea Bermudez Cabinet, in 1832. In 1837, he 
 became head of the Cabinet and Minister of Foreign Affairs. He retired in 1838, 
 and died in 1843. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 49 
 
 English Ambassador. He informed me that such was his wish, 
 and entered at some length into this subject. After having 
 listened to him for some time, I told him, that as all this was 
 a mere conversation and without any official character, I would 
 carry it on in the same tone, and would ask him a question 
 which had just struck me, disavowing any inference he might 
 draw therefrom, beyond that of my own personal satisfaction to 
 learn his views on an eventuality. 
 
 " Supposing," I said to him, " that the cause of Dona Maria 
 could be separated from that of the Constitution, and it chanced 
 that there was a question of placing her on the throne, putting 
 the Constitution on one side, would you then still be disposed 
 to interfere by force of arms in Dom Miguel's favour .■■ " 
 
 He plainly told me, " No ; " it was the Constitution on which 
 Spain laid such great stress, and that the present Government 
 could not be interfered with without collapsing. 
 
 I did not push the conversation any further, and I have told 
 Lord Granville about it. I believe you will be equally glad to 
 know of this conversation. However, I foresee many obstacles 
 and difficulties without number, to the project you mentioned to 
 me.^ I will wait, if necessary, before speaking about it to his 
 friends, until England makes us some definite proposals. 
 
 Adieu, mon Prince ; get well quickly ; I shall look forward to 
 hearing from you with the utmost impatience. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, December \oth, 1832. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 I have received the despatch you did me the honour to 
 write on the 6th of this month, and it was with some surprise 
 that I read the information it contained. I at once communi- 
 cated it to Lord Palmerston. 
 
 It would be very easy, in bringing forward all the contradic- 
 tions which presented themselves with regard to the manner in 
 which the affair of Venloo was conducted, to show many causes 
 for explanation and recrimination. But this would produce no 
 result, and might even compromise the issue of the very serious 
 questions with which we are now dealing and which must go 
 before everything ; I have therefore thought it better to cut short 
 all these explanations. 
 
 Moreover, we need hardly be surprised that a negotia- 
 
 ■* The project of mediation about which M. de Talleyrand wrote to the Due de 
 Broglie in his letter of the 30th November. (^See page 44. ) 
 
 VOL. V. E 
 
50 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 tion which has successively been carried on in Paris, London, 
 and Berlin should have occasioned some misunderstandings, 
 especially when the principal object was to obtain delays. The 
 want of proper instructions, the necessity or the desire to do 
 without them, words lightly spoken or wrongly interpreted, and 
 a thousand other circumstances, have no doubt contributed to 
 create the greater part of the difficulties with which we have 
 just had to contend. 
 
 You must not however imagine, M. le Due, that I have 
 neglected to express my surprise to Lord Palmerston, with all 
 the seriousness which your letter demanded. I was personally 
 entitled to do so, since I had read the despatch. No. 37, which I 
 had the honour to send you on the 6th ; he had thoroughly 
 approved it, and I had even at his request slightly altered a phrase 
 of no importance. He never said a word to me then, as to the 
 instructions he deemed it necessary to send to Lord Minto. 
 
 I recalled this circumstance to him with sufficient warmth 
 for him to say, that if he had done wrong in acting thus, he had 
 himself to blame for what had passed with regard to the 
 summons made by Marshal Gerard, in the name of the French 
 and English Governments ; that his sovereign, on that occasion, 
 had been made to say things without his having been previously 
 consulted, and that the king had shown the greatest displeasure 
 thereat. 
 
 I repeat again, M. le Due, that I could no doubt have still 
 furthur urged this matter on Lord Palmerston, without any real 
 result accruing therefrom to the interests of the king's govern- 
 ment ; I therefore deemed it more prudent to end my interview 
 without any bitterness. I hope you will share my opinion, and 
 that you will consider it better to let all the wrong that may be 
 deemed to have been done involuntarily, sink into oblivion. It 
 will be a lesson for the future, by which we shall do well to 
 profit, to confine ourselves always to official conduct and com- 
 munications. I have therefore requested Lord Palmerston to 
 inform you through Lord Granville, with regard to the new 
 arrangement which we have discussed, an account of which 
 I shall have the honour to send you. Before doing so, however, 
 it is necessary I should answer another question contained in 
 your despatch. 
 
 You ask me to let you know, what reasons I had for believing 
 in the possibility of reassembling the Conference after the tak- 
 ing of the citadel of Antwerp. I always thought, and so did 
 Lord Palmerston, that this fact once accomplished, we should 
 find the plenipotentiaries of the other three Powers favourably dig- 
 posed to resume the negotiations which were interrupted by the 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 51 
 
 use of coercive measures against Holland ; this would have been 
 a grand calmative for the tranquilization of Europe. Our 
 hopes with regard to this seemed perfectly justified, until the 
 arrival of a courier the day before yesterday, with despatches 
 from St. Petersburg for M. de Lieven and M. Matusiewicz. In 
 these despatches, the emperor expressed great satisfaction at 
 their conduct when the Convention of October 22nd had been 
 communicated to them, and they were furthur informed that the 
 powers with which they had been entrusted to act at the Con- 
 ference, and which they had declared to Lord Palmerston and me 
 were only suspended, were withdrawn. This upset the design 
 we had formed, of assembling the Conference immediately after 
 the taking of the citadel of Antwerp. 
 
 Under these circumstances, it is a matter of the utmost im- 
 portance, that England and France should arrange what course 
 they would deem it most suitable to adopt, if they were called upon 
 to put an end to the Hollando-Belgian question without the aid 
 of the other three Powers. This is the aim of the new project 
 to which I wish now to draw all your attention : 
 
 France and England having united in order to overcome the 
 obstinacy of the King of the Netherlands, believe that it is their 
 duty, as the Conference no longer exists, to propose for the 
 acceptance of the Cabinet of the Hague, a treaty agreed to by 
 Belgium, containing the following conditions : — 
 
 1. The surrender to the King of the Netherlands of those 
 territories which are to be his ; 
 
 2. The surrender, on the part of that sovereign, of the Forts 
 of Lillo and Liefkenshok, which are dependent on Antwerp ; 
 
 3. The recognition by Holland of the free navigation of the 
 Scheldt, in consideration of the dues of one florin per ton ; 
 
 4. Determining the right of establishing buoys and pilotage 
 in the intermediary waters ; 
 
 5. The opening of the Meuse ; 
 
 6. The opening of two routes for the commercial intercourse 
 of Belgium with Germany ; 
 
 7. A general amnesty for all political offences ; 
 
 8. An act by which all the former subjects of the King of the 
 Netherlands shall be released from their oath of allegiance. 
 
 This treaty entered into between France and England shall 
 be sent to the Hague by the French and English plenipo- 
 tentiaries. I pray you, Monsieur le Due, to kindly transmit me 
 your orders respecting this. 
 
 The English Cabinet has just ordered Sir Stratford Canning 
 to proceed to Madrid, there to carry out the mediation between 
 the two princes of the House of Braganza, of which I have 
 
 E 2 
 
S2 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 already informed you. He will pass through Paris, where he 
 will remain several days, in order to come to some understanding 
 with you. He is to give you full particulars as to the object of 
 his mission. You will then be able to send M. de Rayneval 
 whatever instructions you deem most suitable. . . . 
 
 The Comte de Latour Maubourg to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Brussels, December lith, 1832. 
 
 Prince, 
 
 Just as the courier was about to start and my packet 
 was already closed, I received news from Antwerp, stating that 
 in consequence of various delays occasioned by the heavy rains 
 of the last few days, we shall not be able to commence making 
 a breach until the day after to-morrow. I must therefore, in this 
 respect, alter the information I had the honour to send you in 
 my despatch of this morning. 
 
 Marshal G6rard is greatly hurt at certain articles in some 01 
 the English papers, in which it is said that our soldiers can only be 
 got to work in the trenches by means of brandy and ill-treatment 
 on the part of the officers. He hopes that these falsehoods will 
 be contradicted by the Embassy in London. I all the more 
 gladly hasten to inform you of his wishes with respect to this, 
 as I know that Colonel Caradoc (the English military com- 
 missioner at the French headquarters) is writing in the same 
 sense to Lord Palmerston. . . . 
 
 The Baron Durant de Mareuil to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, December i^th, 1832. 
 
 I hardly know how to inform you, mon Prince, of what has 
 just happened to me. 
 
 Ever since my return here from London, I have not ceased 
 to ask the Ministry for my last instructions for Berlin. First I 
 was told, that I had better await the opening of the Chambers, 
 the discussion over the speeches, and the first acts of the 
 two Assemblies. Everything going on satisfactorily, I at last 
 asked officially for my credentials, my instructions, and my 
 passports, when yesterday M. le Due de Broglie informed me, 
 that under present circumstances, M. Bresson is the man who is 
 required at Berlin, and that he cannot consent to his being 
 removed. There is however more than this, for I was made to 
 
THE RE VOL UTION OF \%io. 53 
 
 understand, that despite my representations, despite the appeal 
 I made to all the reasons which could render this proceeding 
 especially painful to me, it is more than probable that M. 
 Bresson will ere long be definitely appointed to the mission at 
 Berlin. 
 
 It is true, some very fine speeches accompanied the blow 
 thus dealt me ; my services were fully recognized ; ample justice 
 was done to my ability, and the first vacant Embassy was 
 promised me ; though just at present they could only offer me 
 Florence. But I ask to remain where I am, and as I am, until 
 they consider it proper to send me to Berlin. It is very 
 probable that I shall not obtain this. I have experienced many 
 a painful moment in my political career ; but this is the worst. 
 The change of fortune which I owed to your influence, and 
 which, in making me share your labours, was of such great 
 value to me, did not prepare me for this disgrace. . . . 
 
 I pray you to give me your interest and your advice. 
 Pardon me for intruding this personal matter upon the great 
 questions that occupy you. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Princess de 
 
 VAUDfiMONT. 
 
 London, December 10th, 1832. 
 
 I shall write first to Durant and then to his minister. It is 
 quite out of the question not giving him something better than 
 Florence. If there is a change in the Embassies, and if 
 Barante ^ is sent to a larger Embassy than Turin, it would only be 
 natural, and according to the custom of the Tuileries, to appoint 
 M. de Rumigny to Turin, and give Switzerland to M. Durant, 
 That is the best thing to do. You and I are always sincere 
 and loyal in all our relations. I take care to see that we are 
 not sometimes rather deceived. 
 
 December ■zist. 
 
 I am writing to Durant to-day. I say to you, that what 
 they are doing is very unfair ; it lowers the Government. I 
 shall insist on their giving him Turin, if it becomes vacant. 
 But what good will my insisting do 1 I have done all that was 
 
 ^ Amable-Guillaume-Prosper Brugiere, Baron Barante, bora at Riom in 1782, 
 Auditor to the State Council in l8o6, Sub-Prefet, then Pr^fet. He tendered his sub- 
 mission during the Hundred Days, became then State Councillor, then Deputy and a 
 Peer of France (1819). After the July revolution, he was appointed Ambassador at 
 Turin, and subsequently at St. Petersburg, where he remained till 1848. He died in 
 1866. 
 
54 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 necessary ; they do not require me any more, and men are only 
 valued by the use they are. 
 
 Marshal Gerard complains that the English papers find 
 fault with the slowness of the siege, and it is said that this greatly 
 discourages the soldiers. Surely, although some papers say 
 this, others say the contrary, therefore it cannot greatly influence 
 general opinion. The Tory papers speak ill of the expedition ; 
 the Whig and Radical papers speak well of it ; one must put up 
 with that. The king, the queen, and all the English ministers 
 have to submit to it. . . . 
 
 December l^th. 
 
 Antwerp is taken ! ! P The garrison have been made 
 prisoners of war until the forts are reduced, as I am informed 
 by telegraph. So our princes are out of all danger. I am 
 delighted. It has been a real anxiety to me for the last 
 month. I have lived almost entirely by myself, for when one is 
 anxious and troubled, one is ill at ease with strangers. . . . 
 
 You have not told me why Pozzo is coming here. I believe, 
 it is (but this is for your ear alone) that, as senior of the corps 
 diplomatique, \i& would have had to make the speech on New Year's 
 day, and this would have embarrassed him. This is what I think, 
 and I believe I am right. I always tell you all that comes into 
 my head, no matter whether it be sense or folly. . . . 
 
 My work is not ended yet, for we must endeavour to make 
 the King of Holland do something, and you know whether that 
 is easy or not. Meanwhile, I am going to dine to-morrow with 
 Namick Pasha and some other Turks. The pasha has a fine face, 
 and speaks French very well ; he even writes it. His dress is 
 somewhat European, though you can tell the Turk by his 
 head. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, December 26th, 1832. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 .... The news of the reduction of the citadel of 
 Antwerp has been received in London as a fresh pledge of the 
 maintenance of peace, and one may say, that looking at it in 
 that light, the satisfaction is general. Thanks to the kindness 
 of M. le Prefet du Nord, I was the first to hear of the capitula- 
 tion, and I made good use of this information by contradicting 
 the erroneous statements of several papers. . , . 
 
 ' General Ghass^ capitulated on the 23rd December, twenty-five days from the 
 opening of the trenches and after nineteen days of bombardment. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 55 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, December li^h, 1832. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 The end has arrived. You will have heard of it at the 
 same time as we did. We have not yet received any details. 
 The telegraphic despatch was interrupted by bad weather. The 
 future is now in your hands, and this makes me feel tranquil 
 I am impatiently waiting to hear your news. Here matters are 
 going on very well. . . . 
 
 The Baron Durant de Mareuil to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, December z^tk, 1832. 
 
 I hope this letter, which I am sending by special courier, 
 will arrive before my preceding one, as I wish to tell you that 
 at last they have dealt fairly with me. I am going as am- 
 bassador to Naples. I told you why I should have preferred 
 being ambassador at Berlin ; but there is more than one com- 
 pensation in this appointment, and my gratitude is divided 
 between the king, the minister, and you, as I am sure that you 
 have powerfully contributed to gain me such prompt and full 
 justice. I was all "but forgetting to rejoice with you at the 
 result of Antwerp. Here it has made a great and very good 
 effect, and will no doubt have done the same in London. . . . 
 
 Lord Grey to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 East Sheen, December yath, 1832. 
 
 Dear Prince Talleyrand, 
 
 A thousand thanks for your welcome letter. The 
 news it contained was nothing less than I expected from the 
 wise policy and the good faith of the French Government. 
 The decision to send back the Dutch garrison unconditionally, 
 is even better than releasing them on parole. 
 Believe me yours always. . . . 
 
 The citadel of Antwerp was taken. The whole of this 
 business was satisfactorily ended, and every one was rejoicing 
 at this happy termination, when a heavy blow fell upon me 
 that caused me the deepest grief. The Princess de Vaud^mont, 
 
S6 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 after an illness of only a few days, died on the night of the 31st 
 December, 1832. I thus lost a friend whom I had known for 
 fifty years. I met her first at her mother-in-law's, Madame 
 la Comtesse de Brionne, where I spent the happiest years of 
 my youth ; our relations never varied, and I cannot even now 
 reconcile myself to the loss of so dear and faithful a friend. 
 She even rendered me a service after her death, for her heirs 
 sent me back the greater part of the letters I had written 
 to her ; from these, as has been seen, I have been able to 
 extract many of the details which have served to connect my 
 memoirs, and which without this aid, would probably have 
 escaped my memory. I shall therefore be pardoned, if I here 
 insert a few of the many testimonies to her noble character by 
 those who, more fortunate than myself, were able to be with her 
 at the last : 
 
 Baron Pasquier to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, January 2nd, 1833. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 The misfortune that has just befallen us, makes me feel 
 the need of joining my sympathy with yours, being fully assured 
 that no one felt deeper or more profound affection than yourself. 
 You will, of course, have been informed of Madame de 
 Vaudemont's illness, the progress of which was so rapid, that 
 the news of her death reached us almost at the same time. . . . 
 Those who had the good fortune to be numbered among 
 her friends, may well confess that they have suffered the greatest 
 possible loss they could experience. Her praise can be 
 summed up in a few words. She had a great many friends 
 but she never forsook one, and never lost one through any 
 fault of her own. I know how greatly you were attached to 
 her, and fully understand the terrible loss you have sus- 
 tained. . . . 
 
 Madame Adelaide d'Orl^ans to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 TuiLERlES, January dth, 1833. 
 
 The misfortune which I had foreseen only too well, and 
 which I dreaded for ourselves, and above all for you, mon cher 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 57 
 
 Prince, has very speedily followed the letter I wrote to you. I 
 am most anxious to hear from you after this cruel blow, and I 
 again entreat you to write to me. You are constantly in our 
 thoughts, and we deeply and sorrowfully feel the loss of our 
 beloved princess, from whom I received so many proofs of 
 real friendship, and who so warmly identified herself with 
 our cause and our interests. I wish with all my heart that I 
 could in any way soften the great grief you must experience, 
 and which I share to the depths of my soul. . . . 
 
 I will now again take up my narrative, which was interrupted 
 by this sorrowful incident. 
 
 I have already given extracts from the letters which led up 
 to the taking of Antwerp, not wishing to interrupt the recital of 
 that event ; but before arriving at this result, it may well be 
 supposed that we had to think over the consequences which 
 might result therefrom, and above all, what measures the French 
 and English Governments would have to adopt. This will 
 necessitate my going back a little. 
 
 It will have been seen from my despatch of loth December, 
 1832, that ever since that date, both Lord Palmerston and I, had 
 thought over what steps it would be necessary for us to take 
 when the citadel of Antwerp had surrendered. 
 
 The Due de Broglie, after the communications I had had 
 with him on this subject, sent me an admirable memorandum 
 containing a complete rhum^ of the question. I will confine 
 myself here to enumerating its conclusions : 
 
 " As soon as the citadel of Antwerp is taken, the French army 
 will retire ; 
 
 ' The embargo will continue ; 
 
 " The fleets will remain united, and will not leave the Downs 
 until they receive the order to do so from both Governments. 
 
 " The French and English Cabinets will draw up the draft 
 of a treaty on the following bases : — 
 
 " I. The surrender to the King of the Netherlands of those 
 territories which are to belong to him : 
 
 " 2. The surrender by this sovereign of the forts of Lille 
 and of Liefkenshok, dependent upon Antwerp, if they have not 
 already fallen into the hands of the French, together with the 
 citadel : 
 
S8 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 " 3. The recognition by Holland of the free navigation of the 
 Scheldt, in consideration of a due of one florin per ton ; 
 
 " 4. The determination of the right to establish buoys and 
 pilotage on the Scheldt and the intermediary waters ; 
 
 " 5. The opening of the Meuse ; 
 
 " 6. The opening of two routes for the commercial intercourse 
 of Belgium with Germany ; 
 
 " 7. A general amnesty for all political offences ; 
 
 " 8. An act by which, all the former subjects of the King of the 
 Netherlands shall be released from their oath of allegiance. 
 
 " This treaty will be arranged with Belgium, and will then be 
 sent on to the Hague by the English and French Chargh 
 d Affaires at Brussels. 
 
 "An understanding can be come to beforehand with the 
 Vienna and Berlin Cabinets, so that they may second the 
 offer made by France and England to the King of the Nether- 
 lands. 
 
 " The treaty presented to the King of the Netherlands 
 must be accepted by him, purely and simply, without any dis- 
 cussion. 
 
 " If it is accepted, the coercive measures will cease at once and 
 the embargo will be removed ; 
 
 " If it is refused, a provisional occupation by the Prussians of 
 Venloo and Luxemburg will be arranged. 
 
 " After these preliminaries have been settled, the Conference 
 will assemble to modify the treaty of 15th November, in concert 
 with Holland and Belgium (if Holland shows a conciliatory 
 spirit), or to find a solution of the Belgian question independent 
 of the wishes of the King of the Netherlands. 
 
 " This solution would be : — 
 
 " I. To determine a statu quo, such as would quickly compel 
 the King of the Netherlands to accept the treaty ; 
 
 " 2. To place the territory of Belgium under the guarantee of 
 Europe, and assure her sufficient aid, so that her disarmament 
 could be insisted upon, and yet leave her under no fear of an 
 invasion." 
 
 I could not communicate this project to Lord Palmerston 
 at once, as he was out of town on account of his election, 
 rendered necessary by the dissolution of Parliament. He had 
 told me he would not be back before the 22nd of December. I 
 saw him the next day, and the following letter gives an 
 account of our interview : 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 59 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, December 24ik, 1832. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 I only succeeded last night in seeing Lord Palmerston, 
 and in speaking to him respecting the course which the king's 
 government proposes to follow as soon as the citadel of Antwerp 
 shall have fallen into our hands. Before giving him the statement 
 of which I had the honour to send you a copy, I read it out to 
 him, so as to be able to discuss successively in the course of 
 conversation the different questions contained in it. 
 
 In reading this statement, M. le Due, you will see that I have 
 reproduced, almost word for word, the various considerations 
 which you have turned to such good account in the last letters 
 which I have had the honour to receive from you. 
 
 Our proposal has been very well received by Lord Palmerston ; 
 he recognizes the correctness of the facts contained in the state- 
 ment, and he thinks the measures indicated are very suitable 
 and might prove very useful. He thanked me for having shown 
 him this document, and promised me that he would very shortly 
 submit it to a Cabinet Council, at which he intended to support 
 it. I cannot tell you exactly on what day this will take place, 
 as several of the ministers have not yet returned to London. 
 The Lord Chancellor, the Marquis of Lansdowne, and some 
 others are still away. 
 
 I also spoke to Lord Palmerston about the anxiety that might 
 be felt respecting the intention, announced by the King of the 
 Netherlands, to obstruct the navigation of the Scheldt, and I 
 begged him to let me know what line he thought the British 
 Government would consider it ought to take, if this design was 
 realized. He replied, that the question might resolve itself in 
 two ways, according to the measures taken by the Dutch 
 Government. " In fact," he said, " the King of the Netherlands 
 must declare that he only closes the Scheldt to the flags of 
 France, England, and Belgium, or that he closes it to all nations." 
 
 " But in that case," I replied, " he would be declaring war 
 against us." 
 
 " Yes," he answered, " it would be war, but ke would declare 
 it against us ; and he must be aware that the valuable mer- 
 chandise which has fallen into our hands, in consequence of 
 the blockade and the embargo, would then suffer the fate of 
 prizes taken in time of war." 
 
 " If," added Lord Palmerston, " King William thinks he 
 ought to close the Scheldt to all the nations, we shall be entitled to 
 demand the co-operation of those Cabinets which took part in the 
 
6o THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 acts of the Congress of Vienna, and who are all more or less 
 interested in the free navigation of the rivers, a principle 
 solemnly recognized at Vienna. 
 
 " In this latter case, nothing will prevent our proceeding also 
 to condemn those Dutch vessels, which we at present only hold 
 under sequestration." 
 
 It seems to me, M. le Due, that this line of action would only 
 be fair and reasonable, and might possibly modify the resolutions 
 of the Cabinet of the Hague, which is quite aware of the profound 
 impression which the seizure of the Dutch vessels now held by 
 France and England would produce in Holland, and as this 
 would be one of the surest ways of separating the interests of 
 Holland from those of the king, it must not be neglected. 
 
 December yii^. 
 
 It was with great satisfaction that I received this morning 
 the despatch which you did me the honour to write on the 27th. 
 I at once communicated to Lord Palmerston and Lord Grey the 
 orders which had been issued to Marshal Gerard, respecting the 
 return of our army to France and the release, on parole, of the 
 Dutch garrison. They both expressed their thanks to me in 
 such a manner, as to make me feel the great value they attach 
 to this noble and loyal conduct on the part of the king's 
 government. 
 
 We thought, M. le Due, that no time should be lost, as you 
 yourself informed me in your despatch, in trying the measures 
 which we deemed would be effective with the Hague, whether they 
 prove successful or not ; and we have, therefore, in conjunction 
 with Lord Palmerston, drawn up a memorandum containing our 
 proposals to the King of the Netherlands : it will be sent off this 
 evening, and will be forwarded, as you wished, by the Charges 
 d Affaires of France and England at the Hague.^ 
 
 ^ Draft of Convention presented to the Dutch Government by the Marquis 
 d'Eyrargues in the name of France and England : 
 
 1. The King of the Netherlands undertakes to withdraw his troops from the forts 
 of Lille and Liefkenshok. 
 
 2. He pledges himself to open the Meuse and all its branches, immediately after 
 the ratifications. 
 
 3. The navigation of the Scheldt shall be free until the conclusion of a 
 definite peace. 
 
 4. The Belgians will evacuate and give back to the King of the Netherlands, 
 Venloo, the Dutch part of Limburg, and the German part of Luxemburg. 
 
 5. The Belgians will have free use of a route into Germany tlid Limburg, as well 
 as of the routes of Maestricht and Sittard. 
 
 6. The King of the Netherlands promises a full and complete amnesty. 
 
 7. The Dutch army will be placed on a peace footing. 
 
 8. The Belgian army the same. 
 
 9. The embargo laid by France and England on Dutch vessels will be removed. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 61 
 
 I have the honour to send you a copy of this memorandum. 
 You will notice that we have kept very closely to the proposals 
 you sent me on the 22nd of this month/ and that we have carefully 
 eliminated everything that might excite public opinion against 
 us in Holland. 
 
 The unison, which I think exists between our memorandum 
 and the proposals you sent me, the advice contained in your 
 despatch of to-day, and lastly, the news we have received from 
 the Hague, which makes us feel the necessity of hastening 
 our communications to the Dutch Government, have all decided 
 me to sign and send off our memorandum to Holland at once, 
 without awaiting fresh orders from you ; I trust that you will 
 not disapprove the step I have taken in this matter. 
 
 I insisted that our memorandum and our proposals should 
 be drawn up in the plainest terms, so as not to furnish any subjects 
 for controversy to the Cabinet of the Hague, which is always 
 so ready to seize on anything. 
 
 The French and English Charges d Affaires at the Hague 
 handed our note of the 2nd January, 1833, to the Government 
 of the Netherlands. The King of Holland, urged no doubt by 
 the complaints of his people respecting the effects of the embargo 
 and the blockade of the ports, felt that he could not well decline 
 to enter into negotiations with the two Powers who offered 
 to put an end to a state of affairs so injurious to the in- 
 terests of his country. He therefore sent a counter-proposal^ 
 on the 9th January, 1833, by M. de Zuylen, in reply to ours of 
 30th December, and thus negotiations were begun between 
 France and England on the one part, and the Netherlands on 
 the other.* 
 
 It is not my intention to give the details here of this tedious 
 negotiation, which lasted nearly five months, before arriving at 
 
 ^ See these proposals, p. 57- 
 
 ' The Dutch counter-project approached somewhat closely to the Franco-English 
 one. Nevertheless, Article II. only spoke of the Meuse, not of its branches. For 
 the Scheldt, the Dutch Government claimed the right of imposing tonnage dues. 
 An additional article laid down, that France and England should undertake to obtain 
 from Belgium the payment of an annual sum of 8,400,000 florins to Holland. No 
 mention was made of disarmament. Finally, toll dues were to be established on the 
 route vi& Limburg. 
 
 ' A letter will be found in the Appendix from King Louis Philippe to the Due 
 de Broglie (letter No. 4), and also a private letter from the Due de Broglie to M. 
 de Talleyrand, in which is explained the line of conduct which the French Government 
 intended to adopt, during that period of the negotiations which followed the expedi- 
 tion to Antwerp. 
 
62 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLE YRAND. 
 
 the results which I shall relate further on. It will suffice to say- 
 in a few words, that the King of the Netherlands, faithful to his 
 system of procrastination and evasion, tried in every possible 
 way to escape the recognition of the treaty of November 15 th, 
 and to maintain a provisional position, which might enable him 
 to commence the struggle again, if chance at all favoured him. 
 Nevertheless, we did not allow ourselves to be diverted from 
 our aim, which was, either the full recognition of the treaty of 
 November iSth, or a provisional position so advantageous to 
 Belgium and so unfavourable to Holland, that it would oblige 
 the latter to come to some definite arrangement. M. de Zuylen 
 exhausted all the quibbles of chicanery to draw us on to other 
 ground, but in vain ; and tired of fighting, he quitted his post in 
 the middle of March, and the negotiation remained suspended 
 for some days. But the consequences of the blockade and the 
 embargo made themselves felt so strongly in Holland, that the 
 king was obliged to put an end to them. He therefore sent a 
 new plenipotentiary, M. S. Dedel, to London, who was much more 
 conciliatory than his predecessor, and whose pleasant demeanour 
 greatly assisted in smoothing our discussions. But the powers 
 he had received were so limited, that it took more than two 
 months before the Convention of May 21st, to which I shall 
 have to revert later on, was concluded. Until then, I will put 
 aside these tiresome Hollando-Belgian affairs, which had become 
 a matter of almost secondary importance.^ 
 
 ^ It is necessary to say a few words to complete this outline of the Hollando- 
 Belgian question. After the counter-project of the gth January, and the claim of 
 Holland to interdict the navigation of the Scheldt to French, English, and Belgiaa 
 vessels, a rupture had taken place between the parties. But when the Cabinet of 
 the Hague gave in, negotiations were again resumed. The Conference rejected the 
 counter-project of January gth, and proposed a second draft of Convention, somewhat 
 like the former one, adding that the plenipotentiaries were ready to sign a definite 
 treaty on the bases offered. M. de Zuylen refused, and a second counter-project 
 was submitted, February 5th. A very sharp reply followed, 14th February, from 
 the members of the Conference, who absolutely refused to entertain it. Holland 
 appeared inclined to give in. M. de Zuylen was recalled, replaced by M. Dedel, and 
 the Dutch Minister announced from the Tribune, that this change should be looked 
 upon as being favourable to the measures of conciliation. Nevertheless, the first 
 project presented by M. Dedel still contained some singular demands, such as 
 refusing to recognize the neutrality of Belgium (23rd March). The Conference 
 replied, dated April 2nd. M. Dedel answered, April i6th. Finally, on receipt of a 
 categoric and threatening note from the Conference, dated April 22nd, the Cabinet 
 of the Hague gave in, and on the 1 6th May, proposed conditions which were ac- 
 cepted, and formed the subject of the Convention of May 21st (see pages 106 and 1 14). 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 6j 
 
 The attention of France and England had been directed to 
 various other quarters at the same time. Eastern affairs,^ as has 
 already been seen, had become greatly complicated by the 
 successes of Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, against the Ottoman 
 Porte. The new Greek Government likewise experienced great 
 difficulty in establishing itself.^ 
 
 In another quarter, the presence of M. de Zea-Bermudez at 
 the head of the Spanish Ministry, just at the time when 
 Ferdinand VII. was struggling with the malady which was to- 
 bring him to the grave, had revived difficulties^ greatly aggravated 
 
 ^ The Eastern question became at this period a subject of much importance with 
 M. de Talleyrand in London. This question, which for nearly ten years had given 
 endless trouble to European diplomacy, was the rivalry between Sultan Mahmoud and 
 Mehemet Ali Pasha of Egypt. The latter, bom in 1769, at one time a simple Albanian 
 soldier, had become Viceroy of Egypt (1806), and had been recognized as such by the- 
 Ottoman Porte. By his energy and ability he had created in Egypt an army, a fleet, 
 and a government. At the same time he subdued the whole of Upper Egypt, Nubia, 
 and part of Arabia, and did not conceal his intention of founding an Egyptian Empire^ 
 at the expense of that of Turkey. 
 
 A rupture between the sovereign and the vassal became inevitable. In 183 1, 
 Mehemet found a pretext for it, in the refusal of the Sultan to give him Syria as the 
 price of his co-operation in the war of Grecian independence. His son Ibrahim 
 immediately invaded this province (November 1 831) and possessed himself of Gaza, 
 Jaffa, and St. Jean d'Acre, routing the Turkish forces at Horns and Beilan. From 
 Syria, Ibrahim advanced into Anatolia, where he gained a great victory at Konieh 
 (21st November, 1832). 
 
 Then Europe intervened. Russia offered aid to Turkey, and it was this step which, 
 very justly awakening the distrust of France and England, turned the whole attention 
 of diplomacy to the shores of the Bosphorus. 
 
 ^ King Otto embarked at Brindisi on January 14th, 1833, for Nauplia. All 
 sorts of difl5culties assailed the new government. Not only were the Pallikares (the 
 boldest and most turbulent part of the population), with the redoubtable Colocotroni 
 at their head, hostile to it, but an entire administration had to be created in a country 
 which was barely civilized and almost without financial resources. 
 
 ' The question of the Spanish succession occasioned great excitement throughout 
 the Peninsula, and Europe did not view it with indifference. 
 
 King Ferdinand had by his fourth marriage a daughter, the Infanta Isabella, bom 
 loth October, 1830. Females had formerly reigned in Spain, but the law of succession 
 established by the first Bourbon King, Philip V., in 1714, excluded them from the throne. 
 According to the Salic law, therefore, the throne reverted on the death of Ferdinand 
 to his brother Don Carlos. But Ferdinand had in 1830, revoked the law of 1714. 
 After having reconsidered the revocation, he confirmed it afresh, and then died 
 (29th September, 1833), leaving the crown to his daughter Isabella, under the Regency 
 of her mother Maria Christina. 
 
 Then arose a desperate war between the partizans of Don Carlos and those of Queen 
 Isabella, which lasted many years. Don Carlos represented absolute power. Maria 
 Christina in order to resist him, had to lean on the Constitutional party. She therefore 
 did not hestitate to dismiss .her minister, Zea-Bermudez, who was a thorough Absolutist. 
 The crisis in Spain was closely allied to that which raged in Portugal ; for the 
 establishment of either an absolute or a constitutional government at Lisbon would 
 necessarily recoil at Madrid. Therefore, as long as King Ferdinand lived he upheld 
 Dom Miguel. The Queen Regent, on the contrary, was favourable to Dona Maria. 
 
64 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 by the prolonged civil war in Portugal, between the two brothers 
 Dom Miguel and Dom Pedro. Just at this period, also, General 
 Pozzo, the Russian Ambassador in France, thought it neces- 
 sary to make a journey to London. M. Pozzo had recently 
 returned to his post in Paris, from a visit he had made to St. 
 Petersburg by order of his sovereign, who wished to confer with 
 him. On his return, he stopped at Munich and Stuttgard, having 
 been instructed, it was asserted, to confer with these different 
 Courts.! No sooner had he returned to Paris, than he at once 
 started for London, just at the time when his being senior of the 
 corps diplomatique would have placed him in the position of 
 having to offer congratulations to King Louis-Philippe on New 
 Year's day. These brief indications will suffice to explain the 
 correspondence, of which we will confine ourselves to giving 
 extracts. I wish again to recall the fact, that the English 
 Government had just nominated to represent it temporarily at 
 Madrid, Sir Stratford Canning, whom the Court of Russia, out 
 of rancour at his conduct at Constantinople,^ had refused to 
 receive as ambassador at St. Petersburg. 
 
 Sir Stratford Canning, who was going to Spain vi& Paris, 
 received orders to stop there to have an interview with the 
 Due de Broglie, respecting the mission he had to carry out at 
 Madrid. M. de Broglie informed me of the result of this inter- 
 view by the following letter : — 
 
 Besides, if Dom Miguel was successful, Don Carlos would find an asylum and every 
 description of aid in Portugal. It will therefore be easily understood, that, in the eyes 
 of European diplomacy, the Spanish succession and that of Portugal were only one 
 and the same question, and that France and England were especially interested in the 
 sovereignty of Queen Isabella and a Constitutional Cabinet. 
 
 ^ It appears that Comte Pozzo, during his journey through Evu-ope, had ad- 
 dressed a project of alliance from Russia to the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets. 
 This project stated first, that the Convention of October 2ist, between France and 
 England, and the dangers that might result therefrom, imposed upon the other three 
 Courts, the necessity of combining to maintain peace in Europe. It was consequently 
 stipulated, that as soon as a French army entered Belgium, a Prussian army would 
 advance to the front, and take possession of Venloo and those portions of Limburg 
 and Luxemburg which were destined for Holland. Prussia would guard these 
 territories, in the name and under the authority of the three contracting parties, in 
 order to place them in the hands of the Dutch, after the taking of Antwerp. Russia 
 and Austria agreed to join in these operations with Prussia ; accepting the joint 
 responsibility, and promising to support her with all their power. (Extract from a 
 despatch of M. Bresson to the office, 14th February, 1833.) 
 
 ^ Sir Stratford Canning's mission to Constantinople (see page 43 and note). 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 65 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, Deceitiber lath, 1832. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 .... Sir Stratford Canning has spent two days here, 
 and has communicated his instructions to me. His object 
 is first to obtain an armistice, and then to conclude the 
 Portuguese business by setting aside both the brothers, and es- 
 tablishing a regency in the name of Dona Maria, on condition of 
 renouncing the Constitution of 1826. In the present state of the 
 Spanish Government, I have but little hope that Sir Stratford 
 Canning's arguments will be listened to. No mention is made 
 as to the intervention of France in Sir Stratford Canning's in- 
 structions ; nevertheless, at the close of our conversation, he 
 expressed the wish that the French Government should be 
 associated with his mission. I referred the matter to the Council, 
 and this is the reply the king has decided upon by my advice : 
 
 1. If Sir Stratford Canning's mission should, sooner or later, 
 tend towards the employment of force against Dom Miguel, and 
 consequently against Spain, the French Government considers it 
 only loyal to declare at once, that it could not be associated with 
 it. Against Dom Miguel alone, England has no need of our 
 support. If Spain intervenes, we cannot make war with her in 
 the interest of Dom Pedro and his daughter, without such an 
 enterprise at once assuming a revolutionary character on both 
 sides of the Pyrenees. It would be the counterpart of our ex- 
 pedition of 1823 ; a universal war would be the consequence. It 
 would be impossible to prevent the general impression that 
 we had only entered Spain in order to re-establish the Cortes 
 Government. 
 
 2. Sir Stratford Canning proposes to bring forward the 
 argument, that the situation and the rights of the young Dona 
 Maria are analogous to those of the young Infanta of Spain. 
 To this line of reasoning we cannot agree either. It would 
 give colour in advance to the question of the Spanish suc- 
 cession, and be quite opposed to the real interests of France. 
 It would be pledging ourselves against the maintenance of the 
 Salic law, and for the benefit of a weak, vacillating party, which 
 to all appearance will get the worst of the struggle, if it engages 
 in it. 
 
 With these two limitations, we should be ready and willing 
 
 to give M. de Rayneval instructions to second Sir Stratford 
 
 Canning. The demand for an armistice seems to us the most 
 
 important point ; there is no inconvenience attached to such a 
 
 VOL. V. F 
 
66 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 demand ; it has the advantage, if it succeeds, of giving time for 
 the formation of a third party in Portugal, which party would 
 equally reject both brothers and declare itself in favour of Dona 
 Maria without a Constitution. I do not know whether the ele- 
 ments of such a third party exist ; but if they do not, there is 
 evidently nothing to be done. 
 
 As for pacific measures subsequent to the armistice, we 
 think that even to obtain a hearing, Sir Stratford Canning will do 
 well not to express himself in too categorical terms, but show 
 himself ready to try various measures — either Dona Maria alone, 
 an amnesty with Dom Miguel, a marriage, or anything. 
 
 If he is too precise in his proposals at first, he will be refused 
 point blank. Whereas if he keeps to generalities, until the state of 
 Portugal furnishes him with a point of departure, it is possible 
 that negotiations may be opened up. 
 
 I am sending instructions to Rayneval to this effect. He will 
 second Sir Stratford Canning in his demand for an armistice, 
 and in all measures which may tend towards the pacification 
 of Portugal. 
 
 I trust, mon Prince, that you will consider that we have taken 
 a just position with regard to this delicate proposition. Sir 
 Stratford Canning seemed to me quite satisfied. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, January (sth, 1833. 
 
 .... Yesterday Lord Palmerston invited the members 
 of the Conference to meet on the affairs of Greece, in order 
 to communicate to them the last despatches received from the 
 boundary commissioners of the three Powers in the Morea. 
 The result of these despatches is, that difficulties have arisen in 
 consequence of the inaccuracy of the map on which the com- 
 missioners had to base their work ; this map, it is said, is full of 
 errors, nevertheless they hope to arrive at a proper and exact 
 demarcation, which will not cause any difficulties. . . . 
 
 After the Conference, I spoke to Lord Palmerston, as you 
 wished, about the negotiations being carried on here by Namick 
 Pasha. He began by telling me the circumstances which had 
 brought this envoy from the Porte to England. It seems, that 
 the Court of St. Petersburg has lately proposed to the Grand 
 Signior to assist him with an army of fifty thousand men 
 against the Pasha of Egypt ; this force would be taken from the 
 Russian troops in the Caucasus, and would join the army in Syria 
 under the command of the Grand Vizier. The Sultan de- 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 67 
 
 dined the Emperor Nicholas's offer by saying, that what he needed 
 just now was maritime help. It is therefore for the purpose 
 of obtaining such assistance from the English Government, that 
 Namick Pasha has been sent to London. Since his arrival, he 
 has made a formal request for the support of a British maritime 
 force in the Levant, in order to compe-1 the Pasha to return to his 
 allegiance. 
 
 This request will be submitted at the first Cabinet Council, 
 which will not take place before the end of this month, as the 
 English ministers do not return to London till then. 
 
 Lord Palmerston, even while saying that he had not formed 
 his opinion on this matter, nevertheless, allowed me to understand 
 that there was a very plausible reason for the request of the 
 Grand Signior. " Here," he said, " it is not a question of one 
 of those interventions, to which England has always been 
 opposed ; it would only be assistance given to an ancient ally 
 against a rebellious subject, whose revolt, if it were crowned with 
 success, must have most dangerous consequences for the future 
 tranquillity of Europe. For it is probable that Russia, who now 
 makes a parade of vain-glorious generosity towards the Sultan, 
 would not fail to secretly support the pasha in his rebellion. 
 It is therefore to the interest of Europe to recognise that the 
 Porte, placed as she is between the ambition of Russia and that 
 of the Pasha, could not in her present state of depression sustain 
 such a struggle. If the necessity for the existence of the Ottoman 
 Empire is admitted, the critical position in which it is now placed, 
 must render it equally necessary to give it that support, which 
 can alone save it from ruin." 
 
 Lord Palmerston's view of the matter has no doubt been 
 strengthened by the remarks we have often made in our conver- 
 sation on the encroaching policy of Russia, for I must admit, that 
 I have never allowed an occasion to pass without bringing it to 
 the notice of the English ministers. 
 
 However, as I had the honour of telling you. Lord Palmerston 
 will submit the Sultan's request to the Council, and I will take 
 care to acquaint you with the decision they arrive at. Meanwhile, 
 I will see those members separately who are in London, and 
 endeavour to learn the opinion which will probably prevail in the 
 Cabinet. 
 
 The happy influence exercised by the taking of the citadel at 
 Antwerp, has made itself forcibly felt by the rise in all the public 
 funds ; this is a peaceful symptom, not always certain, but 
 which must be noticed, especially when it is simultaneous in 
 London and Paris, and even in Amsterdam. No one can deny 
 that this event has given great strength to the present Govern- 
 
 F 2 
 
68 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 ments of Belgium, France, and Great Britain. Belgium can, in 
 fact, count her existence as an independent State from the time 
 of the reduction of Antwerp. France feels the good effects of it, 
 by the smoother progress of the discussions in the Chamber ; 
 and the English Ministry, upheld by the new elections, gains 
 fresh strength every day.^ It has just obtained a proof of the 
 consolidation of its power in a circumstance which might other- 
 wise be insignificant, but just now is of some importance. 
 
 H.M. the Queen of England had been obliged last year, 
 on the reiterated insistance of the ministers, to dismiss her 
 first Chamberlain, Lord Howe,^ who voted against the Ministry 
 on the Reform question. Up to the present, Her Majesty had 
 refused to name a successor to Lord Howe ; at last she gave in, 
 and selected Lord Denbigh,^ a very pronounced partizan of the 
 Ministry. The latter looks upon this selection as the first step 
 towards a reconciliation with the Court. 
 
 General Pozzo, accompanied by M. de Lieven, came to see 
 me a few hours after his arrival in London. We had a fairly 
 long talk, during which I must say he spoke very judiciously. 
 Such conduct on his part is in no way remarkable, and I only 
 mention it to you, because I think, that under the circumstances, 
 we ought to put on one side, any doubts we may have as to 
 Russia's intentions. General Pozzo expresses himself perhaps 
 with some bitterness concerning the English Cabinet, and the 
 line of policy it has adopted ; the English ministers are cer- 
 tainly rather distrustful of Russia ; nevertheless, they are exces- 
 sively polite to General Pozzo. I should, I think, place myself in 
 a false position, were I not to follow their example. 
 
 I need not say, that I shall be excessively cautious in my 
 intercourse with this ambassador ; but at the same time, I shall 
 take as his real opinion, all the good he may consider it necessary 
 to express to me, respecting France and the King's Govern- 
 ment. . . . 
 
 iith January, 1833. 
 
 . . . .What you tell me respecting the language held by 
 M. de Zea to M. de Rayneval, on the occasion of Sir Stratford 
 
 1 The elections had been' very favourable to the Ministry. The new House 
 recruited in great measure from the Whig party, had only two weak groups in 
 opposition — the Tories on one side and the Radicals on the other. 
 
 2 Richard William Penn, Earl Howe, grandson of the admiral of that name, 
 was bom in l8o5, entered the House of Lords in 1820, under the title of Viscount 
 Curzon, and had been for fifteen years Grand Chamberlain to the Queen of 
 England. 
 
 " William Basil Percy Fielding, Earl of Denbigh, born in 1796, succeeded his 
 grandfather in the House of Lords. He was Grand Chamberlain to the Queen. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 69 
 
 Canning's mission to Madrid, has not surprised me in the least. 
 This language seems to me to be quite in accordance with 
 M. de Zea's ^ known antecedents. 
 
 I wish I was in a position, M. le Due, to furnish you with the in- 
 formation you ask of tne, as to the real aim of the English Cabinet 
 in sending Sir Stratford Canning to Spain ; but I must draw your 
 attention to the fact, that it is almost impossible to procure any 
 other intelligence on this point than what has been given you 
 by Sir Stratford Canning himself. When I questioned Lord 
 Palmerston on this subject, he replied that Sir Stratford Canning 
 had received orders to communicate all his instructions to you ; 
 since then he has told me that this ambassador, in rendering an 
 account of the observations you had made to him in his different 
 interviews with you, seemed perfectly satisfied with them, and 
 ha'd added that he considered them quite in accordance with 
 your position. This ambassador has not yet entered Spain ; it 
 would therefore be rather difficult to find any real reason for sup- 
 posing that any alteration had taken place in the instructions 
 given him. 
 
 I am led to believe that Sir Stratford Canning has been 
 allowed great latitude of action in his powers ; it might therefore 
 be possible that, in admitting M. de Zea's invincible repugnance 
 to adopt the proposals made to him, the English Cabinet 
 had foreseen the eventuality, in which it would be necessary to try 
 and remove this minister from office ; the state of M. de Zea's 
 health, would, as it were, offer a very plausible pretext. This would 
 surprise me still less, as the influence the Russian Court exercises 
 over M. de Zea's mind, is well known in London. He has been 
 successively Spanish consul and minister at St. Petersburg, 
 and has been more than once nominated Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs by King Ferdinand VII., at the instigation of Russia, and 
 as it might naturally be supposed, that under present circum- 
 stances the influence of Russia would be exerted to oppose the 
 views of the English ministers, the hidden aim attributed to Sir 
 Stratford Canning's mission might be easy of explanation. 
 
 But whether or not there is anything in these suppositions, 
 you have at Madrid, in M. de Rayneval, a sufficiently able 
 
 ^ M. de Rayneval, the French Ambassador at Madrid, wrote as follows on this 
 matter, "that nothing could prevent M. de Zea from entering into explanations as 
 to Sir Stratford Canning's mission ; that M. de Zea considered the proposal of an 
 armistice made to a prince in possession of the throne by a Power which had thrust 
 war upon him, quite chimerical ; and that he expressed his firm determination, to 
 oppose any violation of the neutrality by every means in his power." According to 
 M. de Rayneval, Sir Stratford Canning had no chance of succeeding in his 
 mission, until he had upset M. de Zea. (Extract from M. de Raynevafs despatch to 
 the Department, 2<)th December, 1832.) 
 
70 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Minister to quickly discover the real intentions of the English 
 Ambassador, and I have no doubt that he will constantly send 
 you valuable information, which it would be impossible for me 
 to procure here. 
 
 Lord Palmerston informed me confidentially, that the Emperor 
 Nicholas had stated that he would not receive Sir Stratford 
 Canning as ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburg, which 
 post he was to have held on his return from Madrid. The 
 English Cabinet does not conceal its dissatisfaction at this 
 decision. I was not called upon to give my opinion on this 
 matter ; nevertheless, I did not fail to profit by it to make some 
 remarks, which I have reason to believe will not be thrown away. 
 
 Baron Pasquier to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 VplKIS, January nth, 1833. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 .... I can quite understand your determination 
 to stop there, when you have finished the great undertak- 
 ing which you alone could have achieved, and which I 
 like to think, has nearly reached its end ; nevertheless, I 
 cannot imagine what will happen to the policy of our France, 
 when it is no longer under your guidance. In the general state 
 of European affairs, it would be very difficult to prevent grave 
 circumstances from cropping up at any moment ; and I have 
 not as yet seen among the new men who have arisen round us, 
 anyone who would be in a position to direct them ably, I might 
 almost say, even to understand them. All my hope, in truth, 
 is in the va da se. 
 
 If I can be of any service to you here, I beg of you most 
 urgently to make use of me. I knew you were always kept so 
 carefully informed by our poor friend,^ that I did not think there 
 was anything for me to tell you. Now, if matters are different, 
 let me know ; I am quite at your orders. 
 
 Our position at home has visibly improved ; we cannot help 
 seeing it ; and the manner in which the order of the day, on the 
 subject of the Duchess de Berry, was lately carried in the Chamber 
 of Deputies, has relieved the Government from a most serious 
 embarrassment with which it might have had to contend.^ It is 
 
 ■^ The Princess de Vaudemont, who had just died. 
 
 ^ Sitting of January sth. A discussion arose on M. Sapey's report, respecting the 
 various petitions that had been addressed to the Government relative to Mde. la 
 Duchess de Berry — some demanded that the princess should be set at liberty, others 
 requested that a plebiscite should decide her fate — all contained protestations against 
 the revolution of July. The Chamber, after a long and tunlultuous sitting, voted the 
 order of the day, pure and simple, as demanded by the Government, which reserved 
 its liberty of action. 
 
THE RE VOL UTION OF 1&30. 71 
 
 therefore now quite certain that with ordinary ability, matters 
 will go on right. 
 
 Pozzo, as you represent him in London, is just what I ex- 
 pected. The disposition he showed here only too plainly was, I 
 have no doubt, caused by the terrible fear with which his 
 Emperor had inspired him. He has come back positively 
 terrified, to speak plainly. This is a matter about which there 
 can be no doubt, and I do not think it would be easy to get 
 him now to undertake a journey similar to the one he accomp- 
 lished during the last six months of the year 1832. 
 
 Kindly accept, mon Prince, together with the assurances of 
 my great esteem, those of a devotion which I beg you to put to 
 the proof, on every occasion when you may deem it can be of 
 use. . , , 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, January iTih, 1833. 
 
 .... I must inform you of a rather important communica- 
 tion, which has just been made to the English Ministry by the 
 Austrian Ambassador in London. It relates to the present 
 state of Portugal, and to the means of putting an end to the 
 civil war, which is desolating that country. 
 
 The Austrian Minister has been instructed by his Court, to 
 offer to the English Government the mediation of the Vienna 
 Cabinet in the affairs of Portugal, and in mentioning it to 
 Lord Palmerston, he added, that the first condition of this 
 mediation would be the recognition of Dom Miguel as King 
 of Portugal, he undertaking to issue a general amnesty and 
 to remove all the sequestrations that had been laid on special 
 properties. 
 
 In support of this proposal, the Cabinet of Vienna insisted, 
 that for the last four years the Infant Dom Miguel had occupied 
 the throne of Portugal ; that while admitting all the evils attri- 
 buted to his government, it was impossible not to recognize the 
 fact that a large majority of the Portuguese nation were in his 
 favour, and that the small success which had attended Dom 
 Pedro's enterprise was a proof of this, if such were needed. 
 
 The Austrian Minister, in concluding this communication, 
 which he had been ordered to make, stated, that his sovereign had 
 quite determined upon taking this step, no matter how greatly it 
 •was opposed to the interests of his granddaughter,^ as he felt 
 
 ^ Dona Maria was in fact a granddaughter of the Austrian Emperor through the 
 Archduchess Leopoldine who was Dom Pedro's first wife. 
 
72 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 convinced, that the pacification of Portugal had, by its connection 
 with the tranquillity of the Peninsula, become a question of 
 vital importance to the peace of Europe, and that this pacifica- 
 tion could only be promptly effected by the recognition of the 
 Infant Dom Miguel; but he intended that the amnesty, which 
 would be insisted on with this prince, should be without any 
 restriction, and given in such a manner as to reassure all 
 parties. 
 
 Lord Palmerston at once replied, that Baron de Neumann ^ 
 did not fully explain the views of the Vienna Cabinet in this 
 matter ; that it appeared to him very strange, to say nothing 
 more, to propose to Dom Pedro to quit Portugal, to give up the 
 Azores, to completely abandon his daughter's cause, and to offer 
 him nothing in exchange for all these concessions, but an 
 amnesty, for which, besides, there would be no actual guarantee 
 other than the word of a prince well known for not keeping 
 faith in his engagements. Lord Palmerston ended by declin- 
 ing to accept Austria's mediation in the terms offered. 
 
 Thus ended a discussion which had been carried on rather 
 warmly, both by Lord Palmerston and M. de Neumann. 
 
 In one of the last despatches you did me the honour to write, 
 you expressed a wish to know what foundation there was for 
 the reports spread abroad in Madrid as to the real object of 
 Sir Stratford Canning's mission. In my reply on the nth of 
 this month, I pointed out to you the difficulties which prevented 
 my procuring precise information on this point, but I have 
 nevertheless tried to verify some of the facts which you have 
 stated to me. A member of the diplomatic body, in whom I 
 place some confidence, gave me almost the identical information 
 contained in M. de Rayneval's despatch ; but he supported his 
 statement by a circumstance, which would tend to strengthen 
 the opinion held in Madrid as to the disquietude exhibited by 
 M. de Zea. I refer to the solemn act by which the King of 
 Spain, when renewing his first declaration relative to the right 
 of the Infanta Isabella to succeed to the throne, annulled the 
 dispositions, which he stated had been drawn from him during 
 his illness.^ He thought that this act was a measure taken by 
 M. de Zea to thwart the manoeuvres of Sir Stratford Canning 
 who was, as you informed me, to try and assimilate the interests 
 of the Infanta Isabella to those of Dona Maria, by promising to 
 the Queen of Spain the support of the English Government in 
 obtaining the recognition of her daughter's rights, if she, on her 
 
 ^ Secretary of the Austrian Embassy in London. He acted as Charg^ d' Affaires 
 during the absence of Prince Esterhazy, the Ambassador. 
 ^ See page 63, 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 73 
 
 side, would protect the young Queen of Portugal. M. de Zea, 
 it is said, would have deprived the English Ambassador of one 
 of his most powerful arguments, had he pronounced himself 
 strongly in favour of the rights of the Infanta Isabella before 
 the arrival of that Ambassador. 
 
 As the information given me may also have come from 
 Madrid, I only transmit it to you with the greatest diffidence. 
 You will soon be in a position to verify its truth, and I repeat 
 again, that you may rely on M. de Rayneval's ability to discover 
 all the intrigues which cannot fail ere long to be rife in the 
 Peninsula. 
 
 Among the various explanations given for General Pozzo's 
 journey to London, there is one which does not seem to me 
 improbable. It is said, that for some months past, St. Peters- 
 burg has received rather contradictory despatches regarding 
 England from Prince de Lieven on the one hand, and 
 Count Matusiewicz on the other ; that uncertain as to what 
 opinion to form between the very different statements of his 
 ministers in England, the Emperor Nicholas wished to send 
 General Pozzo, (who had acquired his full confidence during the 
 sojourn he had just made at St. Petersburg), to London, so as to 
 receive from him some positive information, according to which 
 he might regulate his political relations with Great Britian. 
 This journey would then, therefore, be but the completion of 
 General Pozzo's mission to Berlin and the various German Courts. 
 You will know best, whether this explanation is of any value 
 or not. . . . 
 
 20th January. 
 
 ... .1 have already had the honour to draw your attention 
 to a question, concerning which the members of the English 
 Cabinet often speak to me, and which is of great interest to them. 
 It is with regard to the changes which it is much desired here 
 might be adopted in our custom-house tariffs. 
 
 The petitions lately addressed to the Chamber of Deputies 
 on this subject, by the industries of Lyons, Bordeaux, Nantes, 
 and other commercial towns, have found a warm echo in England, 
 where it is asserted, that public opinion in France has undergone 
 a great change as regards prohibitive duties. It is thought that 
 it would be easy now for the French Government to adopt 
 a more liberal scale, and this is wished for very serious 
 reasons. 
 
 The present English Cabinet regards this question in a 
 political, even more than in a commercial light ; for under this 
 
74 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 latter aspect, it has been found that Mr. Huskisson's ^ system had 
 already produced the happiest results, and that the diminution 
 of the import duties on silk, gloves, and other articles, had been 
 more than compensated for by the enormous increase in the con- 
 sumption. Therefore, even if only taking into consideration the 
 commercial interests of England, the ministers might perhaps 
 dispense with reciprocal measures from other countries, and still 
 derive great advantages from the liberal system which they 
 advocated. But important political interests now make it their 
 duty to endeavour to extend still further commercial relations 
 with France. 
 
 During the last elections, several speeches were made in the 
 different manufacturing towns of England, which cannot have 
 escaped your notice, and which you may have remarked, contained 
 numerous allusions to the recent alliance between France and 
 Great Britain ; it is often referred to, as a matter which ought 
 soon to place the relations between the two countries on a more 
 equal footing. The newspapers, whose influence is so great in 
 England, have warmly supported this new tendency on the part 
 of the industrial classes. 
 
 The Ministry feel, that as the House of Commons is now 
 constituted, they could not count upon a substantial majority, 
 nor on the support of public opinion, if they did not show 
 some advantageous results from this alliance with the French 
 Government. The privileges they ask for, are by no means 
 detrimental to France ; what they desire is a more equitably 
 arranged exchange of the products of both countries. By these 
 means the ties which unite both nations will be drawn closer from 
 day to day, and their utility and importance become more fully 
 realized. 
 
 We must not lose sight of the fact that by strengthening the 
 power of the present English Cabinet, we insure a certain con- 
 tinuance of the close alliance which has only subsisted for a few 
 months between France and England ; and that this alliance, by 
 creating a fresh power in Europe, checks all the intrigues from 
 the North, and forms a real point d'appui for all the interests of 
 the world. 
 
 I cannot help thinking, that considerations of such very great 
 poHtical significance will be appreciated by the King's Govern- 
 ment, and I feel sure that you will do your utmost to point out 
 their full value. 
 
 As I have already had the honour to inform you, all the 
 ministers requested me to express to you their earnest wishes 
 
 ' 'WiUiam Huskisson, 1770-1830, had been President of the Board of Trade in 
 1823, and in that capacity had been one of the most ardent advocates of Free Trade. 
 
THE RE VOL UTION OF 1S30. 75 
 
 on the matter I have just indicated. I shall be extremely- 
 obliged, if you will always put me in a position to make known 
 to them the influence which these earnest wishes exert on the 
 decisions of the French Government. . . . 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, January 2ist, 1833. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I have very little to add to the official despatch I sent 
 you. I have spoken quite frankly to Lord Granville respecting 
 the contents of this despatch. It is impossible to say what may 
 happen in the East ; but events have not found us unprepared, 
 for very reasonable proposals (admitted to be such by every- 
 one endowed with any degree of sense in the Council of 
 the Divan) have been obtained by our Consul from Mehemet 
 AH, and transmitted to Constantinople by our Charg^ d' Affaires, 
 and it is on these proposals that the present negotiations are 
 being conducted.^ It is very important that Lord Palmerston 
 should be informed that he must not trust Namick Pasha in 
 anything ; he is a very insignificant intriguer, sent, not by the 
 Porte, but by the Seraglio, which never can carry out anything. 
 We must now negotiate at Constantinople. I believe that the 
 interests of the English Government on this point are identical 
 with ours, and time is pressing. I have every reason to believe 
 that if our Governments come to an understanding, Austria will 
 end by joining us to counteract the possible aggrandisement of 
 Russia. This is the object for which you strove at the Congress 
 of Vienna, and which the Hundred Days upset. It is for you 
 to accomplish it now. . . . 
 
 Madame Adelaide d'Orl£ans to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 TuiLERlES, January 2l^h, 1833. 
 
 MoN CHER Prince, 
 
 I at once informed the King of what you told me 
 respecting the customs. He desires me to say, that he is quite 
 of your opinion on this point, and that he never ceases to speak 
 in this sense, in order to bring about the result which you and 
 
 ^ Mehemet Ali had sent his proposals to the Sultan in the beginning of January. 
 He offered to enter into negotiations on the following bases : 
 
 The Porte to cede the Pashaliks of Syria, and the district of Adana, subject to a 
 tribute. 
 
 The tie which united Egypt to the Porte was to be modified in such a way, as to 
 place the Pasha of Egypt on the same footing as the ancient Beys of Algiers. 
 
76 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 he with so much wisdom and reason both desire, for, in 
 truth, our alliance with England is now more fortunate and 
 more important than ever, both for us and for her. 
 
 Ibrahim Pasha's victory is a great piece of news ;^ our 
 beloved King is very anxious to know your views respecting this 
 event. What will be its consequences ? What do you think 
 ought to be done, and what arrangements made to prepare for 
 the results arising therefrom, and also for the future .' He thinks 
 rightly, that no one could be a better judge of this than you, 
 and having such great confidence in your judgment, he is most 
 anxious to have your opinion on this important question. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, January 2%tk, 1833. 
 
 My despatch, No. 56, will have informed you of the many 
 obstacles that intervened to prevent my communicating to Lord 
 Palmerston, as soon as I could have wished, the contents of the 
 despatch you did me the honour to send on the 21st of this 
 month. I was only enabled to do so the day before yesterday, 
 and Lord Palmerston then promised me to submit the proposals 
 of the French Government to a Cabinet Council, which he 
 would summon for that purpose the next day. This Council 
 was held yesterday, Sunday ; but before making known to you 
 the result of its deliberations, I must inform you of some circum- 
 stances that preceded it. 
 
 If you will have the goodness to recall the despatch I had 
 the honour to send you on the 6th of this month, you will notice 
 that I was then already greatly occupied with the events that 
 were taking place in the East; I must confess, that the despatches 
 I received from you on the loth and 14th, did not fully reassure 
 me, and I was still of opinion that some species of action 
 on the part of France and England would soon become impera- 
 tive. In my conversations with the members of the English 
 Cabinet, I had tried to draw their attention to the various con- 
 sequences that might result from the struggle between the 
 Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt, if the continued successes of 
 the latter should compel the Ottoman Porte to seek the protec- 
 tion of Russia. 
 
 In the midst of all this, I received your despatch, No. 13, 
 which proved to me that my previsions had been unfortunately 
 
 ' The battle of Konieh, December 21st, 1832, in which the Turkish army was 
 cut in pieces. It was in consequence of this battle that the negotiations were begun, 
 of which mention has already been made. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 77 
 
 realized. This despatch contains an admirable account of the 
 present state of the East, and the measures that will be needed 
 to arrest the dangers that threaten the Ottoman Empire.^ This 
 document struck me as so remarkable, that I thought I ought 
 to read it to Lord Palmerston at the interview I had with him on 
 Saturday evening. He was struck quite as much as I had been 
 by the considerations so ably dealt with in this despatch, and 
 became convinced of the necessity for immediate action by 
 England and France, and of commencing it by offering to 
 Constantinople and Alexandria, an armed mediation, in which 
 Austria would be asked to join. 
 
 After I left Lord Palmerston, I still busied myself in devis- 
 ing such measures as might ensure the promptest success to 
 our mediation ; and yesterday morning I wrote him a letter, 
 from which I herewith send you an extract : 
 
 " If the English Cabinet approves the projected mediation, 
 which I put before you last night, it will be necessary that the 
 measures adopted should be carried out with as little delay as 
 possible. The following course, according to my opinion, might 
 be adopted. 
 
 " Instructions should be drawn up for Sir Frederick Lamb. 
 They would be transmitted to Lord Granville, who would com- 
 municate them to the Due de Broglie. He would no doubt 
 also deem it his duty to draw up for Marshal Maison, instruc- 
 tions similar to those of Lord Palmerston. M. le Due de 
 Broglie would probably at once communicate them to Lord 
 Granville and arrange with him for the despatch of a courier 
 by each to Vienna. These couriers should start together. 
 
 " The instructions to both ambassadors would contain an 
 order to propose to M. de Metternich to unite Austria's offer of 
 mediation with those of France and England. 
 
 " If the Cabinet of Vienna accepts the proposal thus made, the 
 two ambassadors, guided by the instructions from which they 
 would not be empowered to depart, would arrange with M. de 
 Metternich the terms of the mediation to be proposed to Constan- 
 tinople ; and the English, French, and Austrian couriers would 
 then at once continue their journey to that capital. There they 
 would deliver the instructions from their respective Courts to the 
 representatives of Austria, England, and France. 
 
 " If the Cabinet of Vienna refuses the proposal, the English 
 and French couriers would, notwithstanding, proceed direct to 
 Constantinople. It is of course understood, that in both cases 
 
 ' In this despatch (despatch No. 13, dated January 21st), the Due de Broglie 
 requested M. de Talleyrand to propose to the English Cabinet - project of joint 
 mediation with reference to the East. See this despatch in the Appendix, letter No. 6. 
 
78 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 the couriers would be the bearers of powers and instructions 
 direct from Lord Palmerston and the Due de Broglie to the 
 representatives of England and France at the Ottoman Porte." 
 
 This, M. le Due, was the plan I proposed to follow ; it had 
 the advantage, in my opinion, of hastening as much as possible 
 the execution of those measures which you recommended to me 
 in your despatch of the 2 1st, and at the same time of inducing^ 
 Austria to come forward. 
 
 The English Ministers, after discussing for some hours the 
 projected mediation as I had sent it to Lord Palmerston, wound 
 up by adopting the somewhat curious idea of extending the 
 offer of joining in the mediation not only to Austria, but also to 
 Russia. They resolved on this course in consequence of the 
 great importance, under these circumstances, of uniting the policy 
 of Russia to that of the other three Courts. 
 
 This resolution was at once communicated to me by Lord 
 Palmerston, and I have done my utmost to combat it in a 
 conference which lasted more than five hours. I will give you 
 full details of this to-morrow ; but you have no doubt already fore- 
 seen all the reasons which it was my duty to bring forward 
 against the co-operation of Russia. I had effected nothing yes- 
 terday when we separated. On leaving Lord Palmerston, I begged 
 him to think over the painful complications in which the resolution 
 of the English Cabinet would involve us, and we appointed to 
 meet again to-day. I have just come from another conference, 
 and after a very lengthy discussion, I have at last obtained, that 
 the mediation shall be offered in the names of France and 
 Great Britain only. The conditions will not be arranged until 
 to-morrow. I have barely time to finish this despatch, and you 
 will therefore quite understand how impossible it is for me to 
 enter into more details to-day. I will reserve these for to- 
 morrow. 
 
 I will only add, that Lord Ponsonby has received orders to 
 start at once for Constantinople,^ and that the English Consul at 
 Alexandria, of whose conduct you complained, has been recalled. 
 Parliament meets to-morrow, and the speech from the throne 
 will be read at 5 o'clock. , . . 
 
 January list. 
 
 You have no doubt been surprised at not hearing ere this, 
 the result of the communication which you desired me to make 
 to the English Government, and I must therefore give you some 
 explanation on this subject. 
 
 1 Lord Ponsonby had just been appointed Ambassador to the Porte. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 79. 
 
 It must never be lost sight of that here, home affairs always 
 take precedence of all others, no matter what interest may 
 attach to the latter. Just now Parliament is reassembling ; the 
 Cabinet has several measures of great importance to bring for- 
 ward — the state of Ireland, the tithes of the clergy , the finances — 
 all require its most serious attention ; and I often find it very 
 difficult to recall it from all these conflicting and pressing 
 interests, to questions of foreign policy. For the last eight days, 
 all my efforts have tended towards making it clear, that the 
 Eastern question needs speedy action to prevent our intervention 
 becoming ridiculous ; everyone agrees with me ; they promise to 
 go into the matter at once, and every day the question is deferred 
 till the morrow. You will understand better than anyone else, 
 that all these delays are but the result of the position in which 
 the Cabinet is placed. 
 
 I informed you in my despatch of the 28th, that I would send 
 some further details of the conversation I had with Lord 
 Palmerston on the subject of our mediation. 
 
 As I have already had the honour to acquaint you, the 
 design of the English Ministers is based on their desire to arrest 
 the encroaching policy of Russia, while preserving the appearance 
 of a friendly understanding ; they believe that this end would be 
 attained by the inclusion of that Power in our mediation. In 
 opposing this scheme, I was obliged to draw attention to all 
 the dangers which it presented. I pointed out to Lord Palmer- 
 ston, that rapidity of execution was the first condition to the 
 success of our enterprise, that we would lose this by putting 
 ourselves in the position of having to wait for an answer from 
 Russia, and that the inevitable consequence would be that we 
 should arrive too late both at Constantinople and Alexandria ; 
 that this question of time would, in addition, possess the great 
 inconvenience of preventing France and England from taking 
 any action, as they would be bound, from the very fact of their 
 proposal to Russia, not to take any steps before receiving the 
 reply from that power, whilst the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, 
 still free from all engagements, would not fail to profit by this 
 circumstance ; further, that in consequence of the mission of 
 General Mouravieff^ to the Sultan, the Court of Russia had 
 
 ' General Mouravieff had been sent by the Czar to offer assistance to the Sultan 
 against Mehemet Ali. The Sultan, suffering under the defeat of Konieh, at first 
 eagerly accepted it, and also gave his assent to General Mouravieff, going on a mission 
 to Alexandria, to summon Mehemet to surrender with his troops. 
 
 Nicholas Nicolaievitch, Prince Mouravieff-Karski, bom in 1793, entered the army, 
 took part in the campaign of 1812 and 1815, became Major-General in 1829, 
 Lieutenant-General after the Polish war (183 1 ), and was sent in 1832 to Turkey and 
 Egypt. Dismissed from 1838 to 1848, he became, in 1854, Commander-in-chief of the 
 army of the Caucasus, then State Councillor (1855), and died in 1866. 
 
8o THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 taken up the position of ally to Turkey, and that the Pasha 
 of Egypt would therefore have the right to refuse to accept her 
 as a mediator. 
 
 Finally, I succeeded in getting Lord Palmerston to admit 
 one consideration, which has always great weight with an 
 English minister, namely, the constitutional side of the ques- 
 tion. I was able on this subject to point out to him, that a 
 mediation carried on solely by two countries under the rule of 
 Constitutional Governments, would meet with more favour in 
 the English Parliament and in the French Chambers, than if 
 Russia took part therein. This consideration sufficiently im- 
 pressed Lord Palmerston, to make him deem it necessary that 
 the Cabinet Council should reconsider its decision, and as 
 here everything ends by resolving itself in parliamentary ques- 
 tions, it is probable that the English Cabinet has been induced 
 to alter its first decision, on the ground I have just pointed 
 out. 
 
 But if the mediation itself has been decided upon, nothing 
 has yet been arranged, either as to its form or the course 
 that is to be pursued with regard to it. For the last three 
 days, these questions have been put off till the next day, 
 and as I had the honour of telling you at the commence- 
 ment of this despatch, all my efforts up to the present have 
 had no results. I am led to believe that the last news from 
 Constantinople, announcing that the Sultan had decided to 
 treat with the Pasha of Egypt, still further increases the hesita- 
 tion of the ministers, and it is quite possible that they will end 
 by not coming to any decision. 
 
 However this may be, M. le Due, I think the King's 
 Government is in a very good position, and has done every 
 thing that could be expected of it under the circumstances. 
 Russia is already pledged, and Austria has refused to join in 
 the mediation. . . . 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 V A.KIS , January zSih, 1833. 
 
 MON Prince, 
 
 The evening before last, in the midst of a state recep- 
 tion, M. de Medem,^ the Russian Charg^ d' Affaires, came up to 
 me, and asked me whether I should like him to inform me con- 
 fidentially of the instructions which had been given to General 
 MouraviefF. 
 
 ' The Comte de Medem, Councillor of the Russian Embassy in Paris ; acted as 
 Charge d' Affaires during the absence of the Ambassador, Comte Pozzo di Borgo. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 81 
 
 I thought I ought not to show too great eagerness, and 
 therefore confined myself to saying that I should be very 
 pleased to hear them. 
 
 This morning he came personally to renew his offer, adding, 
 that it was in the strictest confidence that he mentioned it, as 
 he had received no instructions from his Court. He produced 
 from his pocket, first a despatch containing a statement of the 
 general reasons which decided the Emperor Nicholas to send 
 General Mouravieff, and then a notification that the communica- 
 tion of the instructions given to that general had only been 
 made to M. de Medem himself, that he was not to acquaint 
 the French Government with them, as relations with it were 
 not sufficiently intimate for the Russian Ambassador to anticipate 
 any explanations. 
 
 Nevertheless, mon Prince, you will notice that it was the 
 Charge d^ Affaires who made all the advances, that I only replied 
 to his overtures with great indifference, and that he came back 
 again to the charge. 
 
 After the despatch had been read, there followed the in- 
 structions, the substance of which was somewhat as follows : 
 
 The instructions open by a rhum^ of events in the East and 
 Mehemet All's progress during the last six months. 
 
 It is then stated that the continuation of this progress must 
 necessarily lead to some catastrophe, that as the result of this 
 would be to give Russia a neighbour, probably but little disposed 
 to respect the treaty of Adrianople, Russia would be obliged 
 to adopt a threatening attitude, which she is anxious to avoid. 
 
 It is further added that the Emperor knows that Mehemet AH 
 has said, that if it had been possible to foresee the progress of 
 the Egyptian army, Russia would have taken good care not to 
 withdraw her consul from Alexandria. 
 
 The object of General Mouravieff's mission is an answer to 
 this idea. 
 
 The general is first to go to Constantinople, and there deliver 
 an official letter to the Sultan, containing the assurance of 
 Russia's unalterable friendship, and the horror she experienced 
 on hearing of Mehemet All's rebellion, concluding by soliciting 
 the consent of the Porte, to the course the general is instructed 
 to take with regard to the Pasha. 
 
 Having obtained this assent, the general is to proceed to 
 Alexandria, and use all possible solemnity in his intercourse 
 with the Pasha; he is to place before him in the blackest colours, all 
 the enormity of his attempt, he is to invite him to return to his 
 duty, and, in case of refusal, he is to tell him that he will only have 
 himself to blame for the consequence of his conduct. Nothingmore. 
 VOL. V. G 
 
82 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 If Mehemet AH, touched by this remonstrance, asks the 
 general to mediate between him and the Porte, the general is 
 to refuse, because Russia does not wish to interfere in the affairs of 
 others, any more than she will allow others to interfere in hers. 
 
 (N.B. This is probably the real object of the communication : 
 it is intended either as an indirect reproach or warning to France.) 
 
 If Mehemet Ali persists in his folly, the general is at once to 
 return to St. Petersburg and report himself to his master. 
 
 It is added in a postscript, that if the general does not ob- 
 tain the assent of the Porte to his mission, he is to return to St. 
 Petersburg without going to Alexandria ; but the Russian 
 Minister would write to Mehemet Ali, informing him of what M. 
 de Mouravieff was commissioned to tell him. 
 
 The Russian Charg^ (T Affaires exhausted himself in pro- 
 testations, as to the firm determination of his master only to use 
 persuasive measures ; he even stated that the Emperor Nicholas 
 was more worried than enriched, by the provinces he had acquired 
 from the Porte, and that he was much more inclined to give up 
 his conquests than to extend them further. 
 
 My opinion respecting this communication is, that only one 
 half of it is true ; that what it says about the instructions given 
 to General Mouravieff, in the event of the conflict between the 
 Porte and the Pasha remaining doubtful, is really a fact, but 
 that it also contains other contingent instructions, should it so 
 happen that the Mussulman army is defeated, and that he has 
 acted in conformity with these instructions, as I had the honour 
 of informing you in my last despatch. The source whence I 
 received the information I sent you in that despatch, is of such a 
 nature as to leave me in no doubt on this point. 
 
 I confined myself to replying to this communication in very 
 few words and very general terms, laying stress on our pacific 
 intentions, and our desire to see this quarrel speedily brought to 
 an amiable termination. 
 
 M. de Medem having advised the most profound secrecy 
 with regard to this communication, I pray you, mon Prince, to 
 keep this information to yourself, although I feel sure that M. 
 de Medem has not run any risk in confiding it to me. . . . 
 
 The Comte de Rayneval to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Madrid, January i^th, 1833. 
 
 Prince, 
 
 I think that under the present circumstances, you might 
 like to be informed directly and exactly, as to the position ia 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 83 
 
 which Sir Stratford Canning has found Spain. I therefore take 
 advantage of the first courier he is sending, to give you some 
 details on this subject, and I do so all the more readily, as it 
 gives me an opportunity of bringing myself to your recollec- 
 tion, and begging you to continue your former kindness to me. 
 
 It was only natural to suppose that the change in the home 
 policy of Spain would equally affect her foreign policy. It was 
 thought that the party which the Queen and her adherents had 
 to oppose (being that which by its ardent wishes and, probably, 
 by its secret aid, supported the cause of Dom Miguel), the 
 interest shown by the Spanish Cabinet in this Prince would 
 disappear before one nearer and more pressing. But the 
 Spanish Ministers reasoned differently. According to them, 
 the Government cannot succeed in holding the apostolic^ party 
 in check, except by treating them with great circumspection. 
 They believe that this party would procure them all the 
 Royalists in Spain, if they favoured Dom Pedro, who is looked 
 upon as the head of all the liberals in the Peninsula, and if they 
 failed in fulfilling the previous engagements entered into with 
 Dom Miguel. 
 
 When it is suggested that it might be possible to eliminate 
 Dom Pedro and the constitution, they reply that it would not 
 be possible to eliminate his partizans, his ministers, and his 
 councillors, some of whom are much more dangerous than himself. 
 This is the view taken by M. de Zea and M. d'Offalia. As long as 
 they continue at the head of affairs, one need not expect Spain 
 to adhere to a conciliatory project, and to cease from insisting on 
 the maintenance of the neutrality of all the Powers. The various 
 parties each work on their own account, and with equal ardour, 
 against these ministers. Nevertheless, their fall cannot be looked 
 upon as an immediate certainty. Just now, the course they are 
 pursuing with regard to the succession assures to them the 
 confidence and the favour of the King and Queen. 
 
 The events that are taking place in Portugal will really 
 decide their fate, and possibly that of the Spanish monarchy. 
 We all feel this, and it is on this account, that there is great 
 anxiety as to the consequences which may result from the 
 differences that have arisen between our Government and that 
 of Dom Miguel, respecting a French vessel sunk in the Douro, 
 which will be furthur aggravated by a fresh insult to our flag 
 at the mouth of the Tagus. The Spanish Cabinet maintains 
 that the fault is on our side, and that consequently we are not in 
 a position to demand reparation ; but it does not accuse us of any 
 
 1 Name given to the absolutist party, that is to say the Carlists. 
 
 G 2 
 
84 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 mental reservations. The public are more severe than ever since 
 the departure of General Solignac ^ for Oporto ; it is openly stated, 
 that we wish to intervene, either directly or indirectly, in the 
 struggle between the two brothers, and put an end to it by force 
 of arms. The Spanish Government thinks that our interference 
 would prove more dangerous than that of England, to Dom 
 Miguel and the peace of the Peninsula. Therefore, just now, our 
 quarrel with Portugal interests them far more even than 
 Canning's mission. 
 
 Such, mon Prince, is the present state of affairs. All this 
 may lead to such complications, and so strongly excite men's 
 passions, that no human power will be able to save the country 
 from a catastrophe. Under these circumstances, I feel the 
 burden that has been laid upon me too heavy to support. 
 What would I not give to be able to avail myself of your 
 advice } But the great distance and the speed with which all 
 these events happen, are unfortunately opposed to it. Never- 
 theless, a few words (whereby I could learn your views as to the 
 position of affairs in the Peninsula), would be very helpful to 
 me, and I cannot refrain from expressing the pleasure and the 
 gratitude with which they would be welcomed. 
 
 I am writing at a time when you are experiencing a 
 great sorrow. In losing the Princess de Vaudemont, you have 
 suffered one of those losses for which there is no reparation. I 
 do not think there has ever been a truer friendship than hers for 
 you. It was impossible to know her and not to love her. I 
 myself was sincerely attached to her, which I could hardly fail 
 to be, seeing that her kindness to me was unceasing. 
 
 Please to accept, Prince. . . . 
 
 I am very pleased to be able to give here this letter of M. 
 de Rayneval's, which does as much honour to his heart, as to 
 his good sense, and his judgment. He draws a picture of the 
 Peninsula, which enables one perfectly to seize the difficulties of the 
 present, and to foresee the still greater ones of the future. His 
 previsions have come true with rare exactitude ; and even now, 
 as I am writing these memoirs, Spain and Portugal are a prey 
 to a state of disorder, of which it is impossible to predict the end 
 It will soon be seen what efforts the French and English 
 Governments made, in order to prevent the disasters which 
 threatened the unhappy Peninsula. May these efforts some day 
 
 * The French General Solignac commanded one portion of Dom Pedro's troops 
 at Oporto. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 85 
 
 bring about a happy result ! I do not want to anticipate the 
 march of events ; but it affords me pleasure to express in passing, 
 the high opinion I always had of the character and ability of M. 
 de Rayneval, who broke down under the burden, the weight of 
 which he had already found too heavy, when he wrote me the 
 admirable letter I have just quoted. Is there any need for me 
 to say here, as I have already done on other similar occasions, 
 that I should like to eliminate from the letters I quote, all the 
 passages that flatter and praise me, did I not feel that the very 
 praise in such circumstances is but a reflex of the situation 
 itself, and that the more one is embarrassed and troubled, the 
 more one feels called upon to praise others ? 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, February ■yd, 1833. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 The difficulties which I pointed out to you in my 
 despatch No. 59,^ with regard to Eastern affairs, have not 
 prevented my continuing to ask for assistance from the 
 English Government, in a question which has always appeared 
 to me of the highest interest to Europe. I can at last inform 
 you that my efforts have not been absolutely without some 
 result. The following action has been decided upon by England. 
 
 Colonel Campbell has just been appointed Consul-General 
 at Alexandria ; he starts to-morrow with all speed for his post. 
 The instructions which he is to take with him will be sent this 
 evening to Lord Granville, who is to communicate them to you. 
 I can tell you pretty nearly what these instructions contain. 
 
 It has been deemed necessary under present circumstances, 
 and at such a great distance, to allow for two possibilities : 
 either, that peace has not yet, or that peace has already been 
 concluded between the Sultan and the Pasha, by the time that 
 Colonel Campbell reaches Alexandria. 
 
 In the first case, he will, on his arrival, loudly proclaim the 
 interest that England takes in the Sultan, and give Mehemet 
 Ali to understand in plain language, the full extent of the pro- 
 tection which this interest will assure to the Porte on the part 
 of England. 
 
 If, as there is every reason to believe, peace has already been 
 signed between Turkey and Egypt, Colonel Campbell will con- 
 
 ^ See, page 78. Despatchof January 31st. 
 
86 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 fine himself to the rdle of a spectator, while at the same time 
 plainly indicating what the original object of his mission was. 
 
 In both cases, Colonel Campbell is to preserve intimate 
 relations with the French and Austrian Consuls ; but only to 
 be on friendly terms with the Russian Agent, and to listen to all 
 he has to say, without displaying to him the same confidence as 
 to the other two. 
 
 You will no doubt see, with me, that these instructions, which 
 moreover are very fully detailed, are quite in accordanee with 
 the course which you have adopted with regard to the Pasha of 
 Egypt. 
 
 The English Government has been informed of the Sultan's 
 resolution to treat with Mehemet Ali at the instance of the 
 Austrian internuncio, it is therefore of opinion that a direct 
 appeal to the Porte has now become useless, and it will, for its 
 part, confine itself to hastening the departure of Lord Ponsonby 
 for Constantinople. . . . 
 
 Zth February. 
 
 I have received your despatch of the 4th of this month. 
 The news from Constantinople which it contains, and which 
 you will no doubt have communicated to Lord Granville, has 
 caused the greatest possible satisfaction here. The intervention 
 of France which has stopped Ibrahim's onward march, and by 
 the re-establishment of peace in the East, prevented a complica- 
 tion, which in various ways threatened to become dangerous,^ 
 is greatly approved here. It is very noticeable, that the idea, 
 which just now is prevalent all over Europe, is to avoid anything 
 approaching to an affair. This disposition, in individuals as 
 well as in cabinets, is too favourable to us not to encourage it 
 by our line of policy. The conduct of the French Chargi 
 d' Affaires at Constantinople during the late events, is therefore 
 beyond all praise. . . . 
 
 The English papers, which you receive every day, keep you 
 so fully au courant respecting the debates in Parliament, that I 
 
 ' When the first moment of alarm caused by the battle of Konieh was over, the 
 Sultan Mahomet quickly perceived the imprudence he had committed, in calling the 
 Russians into Turkey. He therefore changed his mind, and deferring to the advice of 
 M. de Varennes, the French ChargS d' Affaires, decided to enter into negotiations 
 with the Pasha. He sent the venerable Captain Halil Pasha to Egypt in January, 
 whilst M. de Varennes wrote to Mehemet Ali to endeavour to persuade him to accept 
 his overtures, and to Ibrahim Pasha asking him to postpone his march. This latter 
 waited at Kutaya. At the same time, the Turkish Plenipotentiary disembarked at 
 Alexandria, on the 21st January, with a proposal to invest the Pasha wiih the 
 governments of Acre, Tripoli, Nauplia, and Jerusalem. Mehemet claimed the whole 
 of Syria and Adana. These conditions were accepted by the Sultan on the 5th of 
 May following. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 87 
 
 do not think I need mention them to you. You will have 
 seen that the King's Government has been nobly defended by 
 Lord Grey, and well supported by the members who vote with 
 the Ministry. . . . 
 
 \lth February. 
 
 The observations which you transmitted to me in your letter 
 of the 8th, with regard to the views of the Vienna and Berlin 
 Cabinets, are I believe thoroughly justified. You have, I think, 
 very clearly explained the object of the complaints which these two 
 Cabinets bring against the English Government ; there is no 
 doubt that every effort is being made to separate France from 
 England. Last year, there were complaints that France exercised 
 undue influence over the English Cabinet ; this year, England is 
 accused of preponderance. But as there is no more truth in this 
 accusation than there was in that of last year, we can only see in 
 all this, the real facts, namely, that they find at St. Petersburg, 
 Vienna, and Berlin, that an alliance which places France and 
 England at the head of Europe becomes stronger every day, and 
 by insuring the maintenance of universal peace removes all hope 
 of forming any coalitions.^ 
 
 ^ The entente between France and England had strangely alarmed the Continental 
 Cabinets. M. Ancillon especially did not conceal his irritation, and M. Bresson, in his 
 correspondence, insisted on the dissatisfaction experienced at Berlin by the separate 
 negotiation of France and England with Holland. "Well-disposed persons here," 
 lie wrote, " like M. de Bemstoff for example, are anxious that our negotiation with 
 the King of the Netherlands should end satisfactorily, but that would not suit M. 
 Ancillon, who looks forward to fresh difficulties, which might enable him to regain 
 some little ascendency, or at least some importance. I am convinced that he is 
 ■deceiving us, when he says that he continues to urge the Cabinet of the Hague to 
 make fresh concessions." (Despatch of Feb. loth). " The offensive arrogance of the 
 English Cabinet," M. Ancillon said to M. Bresson, is no doubt due to the personal 
 character of Lord Palmerston ; but an end must be put to this " (M. Bresson's 
 ■despatch of January iTth). Lord Minto, on his side, wrote to M. Bresson, after having 
 had an interview with the Prussian Minister, " No species of dishonesty could surprise 
 me, but I must confess that I was not prepared for such criminal folly as I encountered 
 in him last night. He denied everything he had said to me on Belgian matters 
 ever since we had known each other " {M. Bresson's despatch of February loth). In 
 Vienna, irritation and fears were no less rife. It was this which decided the two 
 German Courts to try and disturb the union of the two Western Powers, by sowing 
 seeds of distrust between them. Hence also arose the attempt, made at this period by 
 Austria and Prussia, of a nearer approach to friendliness with France. M. d'Appony 
 and M. de Werther made a proposal to the Due de Broglie, to resume the negotiations 
 of the Conference relative to Belgian affairs, by giving up coercive measures. The 
 Due de Broglie, in transmitting this information to M. de Talleyrand, added : " In 
 comparing the conducts of the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin in their present joint 
 attitude,and thegreatly moderated language which theCourtofRussia has lately adopted, 
 we are led to believe that these three Governments, fearing lest the Belgian question 
 should unravel itself without their aid, are impatient to escape from the passive rSle 
 to which they condemned themselves in a moment of thoughtless irritation. This 
 feeling specially predominates at Berlin, where M. Ancillon's policy has met with 
 almost universal disapprobation. Possibly also these approaches towards friendship 
 
88 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 The English Ministry has just displayed great prudence in 
 its conduct towards the House of Commons ; it has allowed the 
 debates on the address in reply to the speech from the throne, 
 to be prolonged for several days. Without taking any direct part 
 in the discussion, the most advanced members of the Radical 
 party showed no tact whatever in their speeches ; and the 
 violence of their language resulted in their losing a great number 
 of their adherents, who either through distaste or conviction 
 have sided with the Government, by voting against the amend- 
 ments of the Opposition and in favour of the address. . . . 
 
 February iZth, 1833. 
 
 .... The Austrian Charge cT Affaires showed me a letter 
 yesterday from M. de Metternich, in which the views of Aus- 
 tria, respecting the present affairs of Switzerland, are fully set 
 forth. M. de Metternich seems greatly engrossed by the designs 
 of the party, which now demands considerable modifications in 
 the federal compact, and the success of such an attempt might, 
 according to him, lead to complications fatal to the interests 
 and the peace of that portion of Europe.^ 
 
 Without either sharing, or entirely rejecting this opinion, I 
 must tell you, that even before receiving Baron de Neumann's 
 communication, I am induced to think that we ought to oppose 
 any alteration just now in the home and foreign policy of 
 Switzerland. You know how very quickly revolutionary parties 
 go to great extremes, and if they went the length of assailing 
 the neutrality of Switzerland, Austria, Piedmont, and France 
 would at once find themselves placed respectively in very 
 different positions from what they are in now. 
 
 My views in this respect are not merely applicable to Switzer- 
 
 are intended to sow the germs of division, or at any rate doubt, between France and 
 England, and on that hypothesis we can quite explain the constant complaints addressed 
 to us by Austria and Prussia, as to the revolutionary tendencies and tfie assumption of 
 superiority of the English Government " {The Due de Broglie to the Prirue de Talley- 
 rand ; despatch, February "jth. Also in Appendix, letter No. 7, a long letter from the 
 Ducde Broglie, giving his conversation with these two ambassadors). 
 
 ^ Serious disturbances had agitated Switzerland for the past two years. Following 
 tTie revoUuion of July, insurrections had broken out in several cantons ; new cantonal 
 coastiuuions had been established, so much so, that it had become necessary to place 
 the federal compact in harmony with the special reforms. The Diet assembled on 
 the 2nd July, 1832, and voted a revision of the Compact. A scheme presented by 
 M. Rossi, was acceded to by the Diet, although with numerous modifications, and 
 submitted for sanction by the Cantons. This occasioned serious disturbances in several 
 Cantons, degeneraiing into civil war. The Diet therefore adjourned the matter 
 ad referendum. The revised Constitution was not put into force, and everything, 
 remained suspended. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830, 89 
 
 land, as to whose condition my notions are somewhat vague, but I 
 think that in a general way, the French Government ought to 
 avoid giving any encouragement to this spirit of innovation, which, 
 under the guise of improving them, has taken possession of 
 several countries bordering on France. I think it is better for 
 the welfare of Europe, rather to postpone improvements than to 
 provoke an upheaval. 
 
 I have spoken to Lord Palmerston about Swiss affairs, very- 
 much in the sense I have indicated to you ; and if you are of my 
 opinion, I think it would be well to discuss the matter with 
 Lord Granville. 
 
 It might also be advisable to let it be known through the 
 French Embassy in Switzerland, that France rejects in advance, 
 any participation in the attempts of the agitators, which will no 
 doubt become apparent in the Helvetian Diet, when it assembles 
 at the beginning of next March. . . . 
 
 February iind. 
 
 .... I have only this morning received the despatch of the 
 1 8th of this month. The explanations you wished to give me 
 respecting Russia's new views have just been confirmed by 
 Prince de Lieven, whom I met at the King's levde, and who ex- 
 pressed himself very strongly as to the desire of his Government 
 to be on good terms with France. Prince Lieven is to show me 
 this evening, the last despatch he has received from St. 
 Petersburg, and which is probably couched in the same terms as 
 that communicated to you by the Comte de Medem. 
 
 I had the honour of a private audience with His Majesty 
 before the levee, during which the King spoke for a long time 
 of his attachment to the King of the French, how delighted he 
 was at the great success of his Government, and the special 
 confidence he placed in you. Monsieur le Due. Altogether, I 
 could not fail to be highly gratified at the reception and 
 friendly language of His Majesty. . . . 
 
 March \th. 
 
 . . . . M. le Comte Pozzo quits London the day after to- 
 morrow to return to his post at Paris. I must say again, that I 
 could find nothing in this ambassador's language during the 
 whole of his sojourn here, except what was favourable to us. On 
 the whole, Comte Pozzo's presence in London, will in my 
 opinion have been rather useful to the affairs with which the 
 French Government is dealing just now. . . . 
 
90 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, March ^th, 1833. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I wish that my courier could bring you some news, 
 but we are very dull here. The Ministry is going on fairly well, 
 and there is every prospect of our reaching the end of the session 
 without any hindrance. The majority still holds together, and 
 only separates on questions of minor importance ; our opponents 
 are greatly divided and completely routed ; Dupin, especially, 
 has regularly collapsed. Of foreign matters I know very little ; 
 our policy seems to me to be stationary and expectant as 
 regards Holland, Belgium, and the East. 
 
 We do not think we can release the Duchess de Berry before 
 her accouchement. There is a sort of semi-Carlist plot trying to 
 draw us on, and when once she is out of our hands, she can deny 
 everything. It is only after the event has taken place that the 
 party will lose all hope, and we must therefore put off all pardon 
 until then. 
 
 It seems to me that the Ministry in England is doing very 
 well. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, March i/\ih, 1833. 
 
 .... Yesterday, at the King's levee, Lord Grey spoke to me 
 about the sitting in the French Chamber of Deputies at which 
 the occupation of Algiers was discussed. He expressed himself 
 very strongly, as to the language which had been held on that 
 occasion, assuring me that it would cause him great trouble in 
 the House of Lords, where the question will be constantly 
 brought forward. He would have liked that the King's Govern- 
 ment should have avoided making such positive engagements, 
 more especially as the promises made to England by the last 
 French Government had been so hostilely revealed last year by 
 Lord Aberdeen. 
 
 I had to tell Lord Grey that I should have the honour to 
 make his remarks known to you, and I added, that the speech 
 made by M. le President of the Council on this subject, contained 
 several phrases sufficiently vague to prevent the intentions of 
 the King's Government with respect to the occupation of Algiers 
 from being prejudged, and that I also believed that there never 
 had been any other idea, than to use this territory as a penal 
 colonv. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 91 
 
 It would I think be well to verify the nature of the promises 
 which, according to Lord Aberdeen, were given by the Prince de 
 Polignac. Evidences of them must exist in the Foreign Office. 
 
 You can understand, Monsieur le Due, that from the very 
 difficult position in which the English Cabinet is placed, it 
 dreads the slightest shock that may come from abroad, and above 
 all from our Government, which has shown itself opposed to 
 their views on the question of the customs duties. The Cabinet, 
 as yet, hardly knows the feeling of the new House of Commons, 
 and it dreads, probably not without reason, that a discussion 
 started inopportunely might have a baneful influence on the 
 deliberations of that Chamber, which is just now occupied with 
 most complicated and important business. 
 
 On the other hand, I am quite aware that the King's 
 Government also has its parliamentary difficulties, and I have 
 more than once regretted that our Chamber of Deputies does 
 not better understand the real interests of France, and that 
 questions have been imprudently raised, on which it would have 
 been better to maintain silence. In the English Parliament, 
 even the Opposition would not seek to embarrass the Govern- 
 ment by bringing forward indiscreet demands which might 
 compromise the material interests of the country. . . . 
 
 March l%th. 
 
 .... It is with great satisfaction, that I have read the 
 postscript of your despatch No. 34, which contains the tele- 
 graphic despatch from the French Charg^ d' Affaires in Vienna. 
 The news it gives about Constantinople, and which has been 
 confirmed to me by the Austrian Charge d' Affaires, seems to 
 me of the utmost importance. I must congratulate the King's 
 Government, on the result obtained by Admiral Roussin ; it is a 
 great and splendid success for the honour of France and the 
 tranquillity of Europe. I am fully convinced that we shall 
 speedily feel its good effect, and that the present policy of 
 France will make a profound impression on all the various 
 Cabinets.^ 
 
 ' This is what had occurred at Constantinople : 
 
 The French Ambassador, Admiral Roussin, had arrived at Constantinople on the 
 17th February, just as the Russians were entering the Bosphorus. He at once declared 
 that he would leave immediately, unless the Porte insisted on the departure of the 
 Russian fleet. The Sultan replied, that the Russian fleet was his only safeguard 
 against the troops of Ibrahim Pasha. The admiral answered, that he would imdertake 
 to impose peace on Mehemet Ali and make him accept the conditions that Halil was 
 taking to him (see page 86 and note). The Divan, delighted to see France espousing 
 its cause so warmly, at once required the Russians to depart, and they left in the course 
 of a few days. This retreat was at first looked upon as a victory for France ; but the 
 
92 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Baron Neumann has told me of the despatch sent to him 
 on this subject by Prince Metternich ; you will have received 
 the details by telegraphic despatch, but I can give you the 
 assurance that M. de Metternich's letter is noticeable for the 
 satisfaction it expresses at the failure of Russia's attempts.^ 
 
 It is quite evident that all the Powers, who are called on to 
 reap the benefit of our efforts, must share the sentiments of the 
 Vienna Cabinet. As for ourselves, we shall have thereby gained 
 the enormous advantage of having exercised the noblest 
 patronage, in the solution of a question which is both a French 
 and a European one, and of having again linked our interests 
 to those of the other Governments by a fresh tie. It is, I repeat 
 again, a grand success, which places the King's Government in 
 the high position which is its due. . . . 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 PariSj March iZth, 1833. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I quite feel with you, all the annoyance and puerile 
 folly of bringing the affairs of Algiers forward just now. But 
 we have to do with people who are so unreasonable, that it is 
 impossible to avoid all discussion on this wretched subject. 
 Nevertheless, there is one point I should greatly like made clear 
 between the English Government and ourselves ; that is, as to 
 the engagements made with England on the subject of Algiers. 
 I have carefully gone through the whole correspondence before 
 saying anything. Each page shows not only the absence of all 
 engagements, but a most obstinate resistance to any engage- 
 ment of this nature, a resistance which continued up to the 
 taking of Algiers, and all but caused a rupture between France 
 and England. I sent for M. de Bois-le-Comte,^ who had 
 
 following month, Mehemet having distinctly refused Halil's conditions, the Sultan, 
 notwithstanding the remonstrances of the admiral, recalled the Russians, and the 
 position of our ambassador, who had thus imprudently pledged himself, became 
 awkward. 
 
 ' This also was the feeling in the English Cabinet, if one is to believe what Lord 
 Palmerston wrote to his brother, Sir William Temple. ' ' Roussin," he says in his letter 
 of 2ist March, " has admirably ended the dispute between the Turk and the Egyptian, 
 and has done well in sending back the Russian admiral with his tail between 
 his legs." {Private correspondence of Lord Palmerston.) 
 
 '^ Charles Joseph Edmund, Comte de Bois-le-Comte, bom in 1796, entered the 
 diplomatic service in 1814, and went to Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Madrid. In 1829, 
 he became director of political affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Under the 
 July Monarchy, he was made minister in Portugal, Holland, and Switzerland. He was 
 created a Peer of France in 1845, and died in 1863. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 93 
 
 been director of political affairs under M. de Polignac. I inter- 
 rogated him closely on the matter ; he declares that no engage- 
 ment whatever has been entered into. Finally, I desired him 
 to write me a full account of the Algerian affair : from this 
 memorandum I will extract everything that concerns England 
 and forward it to you, so that you may make what use of 
 it you think best. I therefore wish, on the one hand, to 
 have it made plain, that I have not spoken lightly on this 
 subject, and on the other, I wish to come to a clear under- 
 standing with the English Government, as to the value and 
 nature of these supposed engagements, of which we can find no 
 trace whatever here, either in the documents, or in the recol- 
 lection of the persons attached to the department. Be good 
 enough to speak of this, mon Prince, to Lord Palmerston. I 
 say again, that I should be very sorry if anyone could 
 accuse me, with the slightest show of reason, of having retracted 
 from any engagement made even by M. de Polignac. . . . 
 
 Lord Grey to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Downing Street, March i\st, 1833. 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I return you herewith, with many thanks, the docu- 
 ments you did me the honour to entrust to me. 
 
 In them I have found all the good feeling and uprightness 
 that distinguish M. le Due de Broglie, and I hope that we shall 
 be enabled to come to an understanding on this Algerian 
 business, in a manner conformable to the friendly relations of 
 both Governments and the European interests thereto attached. 
 I pray you. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, March iind, 1833. 
 
 .... I have informed Lord Grey of everything relating to 
 the Algerian question.^ I have more reason than ever to think 
 that great importance is attached here to this matter, and I shall 
 be very glad to get the memorandum you speak of Lord 
 Palmerston has instructed the Crown counsel to draw up one 
 
 ^ Sitting of March 8th. On the occasion of the crenits demanded for the army 
 in Africa, Marshal Soult, President of the Council, made the following statement : — 
 " .... I have already said that we are not pledged to any undertaking relative to 
 Algiers, as regards the Foreign Powers. France may deal with that country in any 
 way suitable to her policy. The measures taken by the Government, and the loans we 
 now ask for, do not look as if we thought of giving up the country." 
 
94 THE MEMOIRS. OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 on the same subject ; as he has no documents, I do not know 
 on what he can base it ; Lord Stuart's letters to his Govern- 
 ment, reporting some verbal communications, seem to me to 
 furnish but poor arguments to persons of good faith. 
 
 I am not surprised at the dissatisfaction which the results 
 obtained by Admiral Roussin have produced on the Russian 
 Government and its agents ; it is easy to understand that after 
 having taken the lead in so important a matter, the Russian 
 Cabinet should feel hurt at seeing it put an end to by our inter- 
 vention. It is however only a question of amour-propre, though 
 for that very reason, I think we ought to show more moderation, 
 in our satisfaction at a success which everyone will know how 
 to appreciate. . . . 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, March 22nd, 1833. 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 .... I am very glad that you are satisfied with the 
 conduct of Admiral Roussin. His instructions were to endeavour 
 by all lawful and reasonable means to prevent the Russians 
 from occupying Constantinople, with the consent of the Porte. 
 Should they occupy it against the wishes of the Porte, it 
 would at once become a European matter, and we should 
 then have more allies than would be necessary, to make them 
 clear out. Roussin has managed very well. I am quite 
 prepared for an outburst from St. Petersburg, but, after all, 
 what can they do .? They can only protest against the proceeding, 
 and then I shall make a counter-protest and will complain of 
 the dissimulation with which the whole of this business has been 
 carried on, and the small amount of sincerity in their com- 
 munication of MouraviefFs mission . . . Poor Pozzo is in 
 mortal fear of being recalled, and the rest of the diplomatic 
 corps are very anxious. 
 
 I am greatly pleased that all this is so much approved of in 
 England. The extreme coldness with which for the last three 
 months the English Government has received all our overtures 
 relative to Eastern affairs, made me fear that we might be 
 abandoned at this juncture, and it is for this reason, that in the 
 short article inserted in our papers of the day before yesterday, 
 no mention was made of the English legation. I feared that 
 the English Government might accuse us of wishing to com- 
 promise it in this affair ; but now that it shows itself disposed 
 to come forward and join in it, I will have another article 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 95 
 
 drawn up to-morrow, in which the English legation will 
 almost play the principal part. I hoped I should have been 
 interrogated this morning in the Chamber of Deputies, when 
 in my reply I should have placed the English legation in 
 the front rank ; but our adversaries found the ground too 
 favourable for us, and they voted the money we asked for the 
 armaments in the Mediterranean, without a word and unani- 
 mously. Would it not be possible for the English to send some 
 reinforcements to their naval station .■' Even if they only made 
 a pretence, it would have the best effect. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, March iZth, 1833. 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 In one of the last despatches you did me the honour to 
 send, you spoke of an interview between Sir Stratford Canning 
 and M. de Rayneval, the result of which was that England 
 would not be indisposed to treat the Portuguese question on the 
 basis of Dom Miguel's recognition. 
 
 I have already pointed out to you, the difficulties I have to 
 contend with, in order to procure information as to the precise 
 intentions of the English Cabinet with respect to Spain and 
 Portugal. I can, however, inform you that I have several times 
 spoken to Lord Palmerston about the state of the Peninsula, and 
 from what he has said to me on these different occasions, 
 I feel sure England has no settled scheme for putting an end 
 to the condition of affairs in Portugal. I am even led to believe, 
 that since the departure of Sir Stratford Canning, and more 
 especially since that diplomat has failed in the negotiation he 
 was to carry out at Madrid, the English Cabinet has rather 
 trusted to the chapter of accidents to solve the Portuguese 
 question. It now awaits further information from Sir Stratford 
 Canning, and I think that he has received no other instructions 
 than to act according to circumstances. 
 
 I am not sending you the note which Sir Stratford Canning 
 sent to M. de Zea on February 3rd, nor the latter's reply, 
 dated February 28th ; I have them here, but I suppose M. de 
 Rayneval will not have failed to transmit copies of these two 
 documents to you. 
 
 I again renew the assurance, that I will neglect no means to 
 procure all the information I possibly can, as to the intentions of 
 the English Government with regard to the affairs of Spain 
 and Portugal, and will hasten to forward them to you. . . . 
 
96 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Madame Adelaide d'Orl^ans to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 TUILERIES, March iith, 1833. 
 
 I write, mon cher Prince, to inform you of a visit which you 
 will shortly receive in London, namely, from Chartres. Our 
 dear King considers that this journey, which he is so anxious to 
 make, cannot fail to have a good effect. Lord Granville, to 
 whom the Due de Broglie spoke about it, is of the same opinion. 
 Last night Chartres asked me to write to you about it ; and we 
 shall be very glad to hear what you think of it. I believe that it 
 will be most useful and beneficial to our dear boy ; he wishes to 
 make it a matter of instruction, and see all the great manufactories, 
 the improvements, the railroads, &c. You will be an admirable 
 guide for him in this journey. He proposes to leave here on 
 April 7th, Easter day, and return on May 1st, the fete day of the 
 King, who will probably write to the King of England, telling 
 him of Chartres proposed visit. What do you think of it .'' . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, April ()th, 1833. 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 Lord Palmerston has not been well enough to receive 
 me to-day ; he has not in fact seen anyone. I also failed in 
 seeing Sir James Graham ^ the First Lord of the Admiralty, who 
 is also indisposed, but I succeeded in seeing Lord Grey, to whom 
 I made known the contents of the despatch respecting Eastern 
 affairs which you sent me on the 4th of this month. 
 
 Lord Grey told me that England would not remain inactive 
 under these grave circumstances, and that orders had been issued 
 to all the available ships stationed in the Tagus and the various 
 English cruisers in the Mediterranean to proceed at once to 
 Alexandria. This naval force has been instructed to support 
 Colonel Campbell's negotiations ; you have been informed of the 
 instructions that officer received when he was sent to Alexandria, 
 you can therefore judge of the line of conduct he will follow. 
 
 In the event of the Pasha of Egypt refusing to consent to 
 the proposals approved by Colonel Campbell, the English 
 squadron will not permit a single war-vessel of Mehemet All's 
 to leave the ports of Egypt, and will also intercept all transport 
 
 ' Sir James Graham, born in 1792, member of the House of Commons, was First 
 Lord of the Admiralty in Lord Grey's Cabinet. In 1841, he became Home Secretary, 
 and in 1852, Colonial Secretary. He died in 1861. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830, 97 
 
 of men or ammunition that they may attempt to send to 
 Ibrahim's army. 
 
 Further, orders have been sent to the commander of the 
 English naval forces in the Mediterranean to act in concert with 
 the French admiral, if Colonel Campbell's negotiations at 
 Alexandria should fall through. 
 
 Such is the communication I have received from Lord Grey 
 in Lord Palmerston's absence. 
 
 It appears, according to the advices you have received 
 from Vienna, and which you did me the honour to forward, that 
 M. de Metternich is greatly disturbed at the events that are 
 taking place in the East, and that he is secretly disquieted as 
 to the ulterior projects of Russia. The information received in 
 London from Vienna, either by the Cabinet or the Foreign 
 Ministers whom I have seen, is not in this sense. On the contrary, 
 both .the despatches and private letters state, that M. de Met- 
 ternich tries to reassure all those who are alarmed at the pres- 
 ence of the Russians in the Bosphorus, and that he has full and 
 complete confidence in the assurances given by the Cabinet of 
 St. Petersburg, and by the Emperor Nicholas. 
 
 It is also stated in the accounts you have from Vienna, 
 that public opinion has expressed itself loudly against Russia. 
 I am a little surprised to hear the public opinion of Vienna 
 quoted ; my recollections and my actual knowledge of that 
 place, led me to believe that there vlras no such thing as public 
 opinion in Vienna ; society there has an opinion, but society is 
 one ; it is not divided, and M. de Metternich is its leading spirit ; 
 it would, I think, be a great mistake to count upon finding an 
 ally in public opinion there. 
 
 However, the general feeling in London is, that the present 
 Eastern affairs will settle themselves, because the four Great 
 Powers (including Russia) who have a more or less direct interest 
 in them, seem all to incline towards the same end, namely, the 
 maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. . . . 
 
 April wth, 1833. 
 
 .... By to-day's post, we have received an account of the 
 occurrences that have just taken place at Frankfort, which 
 appear to be rather serious.^ I pray you to consider them in 
 
 ^ A sanguinary insurrection had broken out at Frankfort, on the 3rd April. It 
 was after the Revolution of July. The movement was the final episode of the ferment 
 and the disturbances that had arisen all over Germany. It was quelled by the 
 troops of the Diet, and the territory of the Republic was placed under the military 
 occupation of Austria. 
 
 VOL. V. H 
 
98 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 connection with what I have had the honour several times 
 to point out to you, the influence they will have on the 
 Austrian Cabinet. M. de Metternich only shows perfect con- 
 fidence in the intentions of Russia, because he is afraid of 
 the influence and the disturbances which a revolutionary spirit 
 may create in Germany and Italy. He is, in general, inclined 
 to sacrifice the foreign policy of Austria to what he considers 
 the essential principle of his home policy, and as he now 
 sees in the Russian Government a declared enemy to the 
 spirit of innovation, he is quite dstermined to ally himself with 
 it, in order to repress any attempts on the part of German 
 or Italian agitators. Not that he absolutely neglects the 
 important interests of Hungary and Austria for Eastern 
 affairs, but these are only a secondary consideration with 
 him. 
 
 I am not surprised at the suggestions thrown out to you by 
 M. d'Appony and M. de Werther, to open a conference on Eastern 
 affairs in Vienna ; this is another of M. de Metternich's inspira- 
 tions. Ever since the existence of the London Conference, he has 
 not attempted to conceal his dissatisfaction at seeing negotiations 
 carried on outside his direct influence, and he uses his best 
 endeavours to bring them back to himself again ; it is, I believe, 
 entirely a question of amour-propre. . . ?- 
 
 ' M. de Metternich, in fact, earnestly desired to withdraw the centre of the 
 negotiations from London, especially as regards Eastern affairs. In January last, 
 he had given indications of this to the St. James's Cabinet, but they were ignored. 
 In the beginning of February, just when the Courts of Berlin and Vienna sought 
 to improve their relations with France (see p. 87 and note), a move, which had the 
 same end in view, was attempted with the Cabinet of the Tuileries. When events 
 were precipitated in the East, and an understanding was come to between the 
 Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt (see p. 118), M. de Metternich's vexation increased. 
 He addressed himself to M. de Sainte-Aulaire, to whom he repeated the proposition 
 he had already made to Lord Palmerston and the Due de Broglie. The latter, in 
 acquainting the Prince de Talleyrand of these incidents added, "Prince de Metternich, 
 on learning from M. de Sainte-Aulaire the terms of the arrangement concluded on the 
 5th of this month, manifested considerable excitement and uneasiness. He attaches 
 sach importance to the territory of Adana, that although fully recognizing that the 
 Powers should unite their efforts to maintain the arrangement arrived at between the 
 Porte and the Pasha, he considers it indispensable it should be modified in this respect. 
 He spoke vaguely of the necessity of coming to an agreement on the Eastern 
 question, and of establishing for this purpose at Vienna, not a Congress, nor even 
 a regular Conference, but a centre for deliberations. All this is very vague and 
 very confused, and singularly manifests the false and uncertain position in which 
 the Cabinet of Vienna has placed itself with reference to Eastern events." [Despatch 
 of 26th May.) The Cabinet at the Tuileries refused to acceed to the Austrian 
 demand. Eight days later the Due de Broglie wrote : " We shall not give the 
 slightest encouragement to the Austrian proposal. M. de Sainte-Aulaire will simply 
 acquaint M. de Metternich, that he is authorized to discuss with him, any overtures 
 which the Chancellor considers it necessary to make respecting the condition of 
 the Ottoman Empire." {^DisJ>atch of yd June). 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 99 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, Afril 12th, 1833. 
 MON Prince, 
 
 I blame myself for not having written to you more fully 
 respecting M. le Due d'Orleans' journey. When the question 
 was first mooted, the various little difficulties to which it might 
 give rise did not, I confess, strike me as they ought to have done. 
 It seemed to me quite a simple matter, and to say truth, I had 
 not thought it over sufficiently when I foolishly mentioned it to 
 Lord Granville as a probable and possible event, before it had 
 actually been decided upon. He regarded it as a fact, and wrote 
 at once to his Government about it, assuring me that nothing 
 would please the King of England more. Nevertheless, on 
 thinking it over quietly, it seemed to me that though it was not 
 a bad idea in itself, it would be well to prepare for it, and to take 
 such measures as would insure its success. With this view, I 
 have done my best to defer the journey. M. le Due d'Orleans 
 does not wish to go as a Royal Prince, nor as a Prince travel- 
 ling incognito. It still remains to be ascertained, how one can 
 arrange a suitable reception for him in this intermediate 
 position. I do not know whether I am right, but, for my part, I 
 have laid great stress, both with the King and with him, on his 
 taking the highest possible stand when he goes to England, and 
 on his not giving a chance to those persons who would ask nothing 
 better than to treat him en parvenu. I have begged him to think 
 well over this, and then give me his ideas as to the number and 
 description of the people who are to accompany him, and the 
 etiquette to which he wishes to resign himself ; in a word, as to 
 all the accessories of the journey as he thinks it ought to be 
 carried out. When he has given me his ideas on this subject, I 
 will write to you, and ask for your valuable advice to aid me in 
 rectifying whatever may be deficient. M. le Due d'Orleans has 
 acquired much knowledge. I feel sure that his deportment will 
 be admirable ; his desire to visit England is caused more by the 
 wish to escape from the idle life in Paris than anything else. 
 Here he is absolutely a stranger to all politics, almost too much 
 so, for it has made him gayer than he would be naturally. After 
 all, we have at least a month before us, and between then and 
 now, I shall have time to receive your directions as to what had 
 better be done. 
 
 Our affairs in the East are becoming somewhat complicated, 
 but I think we shall, nevertheless, succeed in the end. 
 
 H 2 
 
loo THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, April i^th, 1833. 
 MON CHER Due, 
 
 The delay respecting M. le Due d'Orleans's journey has 
 had this advantage, that he will have escaped the slight epidemic 
 that is prevalent here ; Lord Palmerston and M. Dedel have 
 been attacked ; the King of Holland, who is also ill, has sent no 
 answer. . . . 
 
 I trust that M. le Due d'Orleans will not quit Paris until 
 after the approaching event at Blaye ; it would hardly be 
 suitable for so near a relation, and under such special circum- 
 stances, to be abroad at such a period. No political interest 
 whatever is felt here in Madame la Duchesse de Berry ; but she 
 has inspired a feeling of pity. Why then should not M. le Due 
 d'Orleans, who is master of his own time, put off his journey 
 until after the convalescence of his cousin .'' 
 
 My despatch of to-day is somewhat meagre, for the week 
 that has just elapsed has been very dull, at least apparently so. If 
 one were to believe all the reports that are circulated, it has been 
 passed in a sort of intestine war which would threaten immediate 
 changes in the Cabinet. But without believing in so serious a 
 result, the Ministry must at present not only experience great 
 Parliamentary difficulties, but also difficulties in the Cabinet from 
 the varied opinions of those composing it. I do not think matters 
 have advanced far enough in this direction to be made the 
 subject of a despatch ; I must confess, however, mon cher Due, 
 that I have no great opinion of the importance that is attached 
 by us to secrecy. I have several times during the last three 
 years had reason to fear, that what took place at the Council in 
 Paris very quickly became the property of the salons. 
 
 The storm that threatens here will, in my private opinion, 
 pass away without burs-ting ; but it would not need its recurrence 
 for me to draw your attention to the difficulties of the home 
 administration. . . . 
 
 April iSM, 1S33. 
 
 I saw Lord Palmerston yesterday. In speaking to him con- 
 cerning matters in the Levant, I made use of the observations 
 contained in your despatch No. 47, in order to prove to him the 
 great inconvenience of even an apparent discord between Great 
 Britain and France, in the negotiations that are now being 
 carried on at Alexandria and Constantinople. He fully appre- 
 ciated the importance of these observations, and said that as 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF \%io. loi 
 
 Colonel Campbell's instructions laid down that in his conduct, he 
 was, as much as possible, to conform to that of the Consul-General 
 of France, he had no doubt our action on this point would be 
 simultaneous ; that with regard to Constantinople, he could not 
 entirely approve of the hastiness which Admiral Roussin had 
 displayed, ever since the commencement of the mission with 
 which he had been entrusted ; ^ that the English Charg^ d' Affaires, 
 who had received no instructions, was bound to exhibit a certain 
 reserve, which was better suited to his secondary position, and 
 perhaps also, to the actual circumstances in which he was 
 placed. 
 
 I am very glad that you have requested Lord Granville to 
 inform Lord Palmerston, of the ideas with which the conduct of 
 England in Eastern affairs has inspired you. I have already, 
 more than once, had occasion to point out to you that the English 
 Cabinet, either through pre-occupation by the increase of 
 Egyptian supremacy, or the indifference it feels in questions of 
 foreign policy which do not interest it directly, has always 
 received the various proposals I have brought forward rather 
 coldly. I shall therefore be very glad of the support of Lord 
 Granville's opinion with the members of the Cabinet. 
 
 Lord Palmerston told me that the Austrian Charge d Affaires 
 had informed him of M. de Metternich's project, which you wished 
 to communicate to me, and which consisted in negotiating, the 
 various questions relative to Eastern affairs at Vienna.^ M. de 
 Metternich does not want this negotiation to take the form of a 
 Congress or a Conference ; he is afraid, no doubt, that he might 
 seem to imitate in some way what is now being done in London. 
 Lord Palmerston is not indisposed to adopt M. de Metternich's 
 idea, as regards the meeting of the four Powers to regulate the 
 pacification of the Levant ; for he thinks, and in this I agree 
 with him, that the best way to neutralise the evil intentions of 
 Russia is to ask her to take part in all the negotiations, and 
 bind her by such engagements as she could hardly refuse to 
 accept. Russia, acting alone, will require the utmost vigilance ; 
 working in concert with the other three Powers, the danger 
 of her action is greatly lessened. But, on the other hand. Lord 
 Palmerston would prefer that this matter should rather be 
 dealt with at Constantinople than at Vienna. The apparent 
 reasons he gives are, the necessity for being actually on the spot 
 in an affair of such great importance, and the difficulties caused 
 by distance. But I believe the real cause for his preferring 
 Constantinople to Vienna, is the idea that M. de Metternich, by 
 
 * See page 91. " See page 98. 
 
I02 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 holding this negotiation at Vienna, might end in attracting thither 
 the affairs of Europe, and thereby diminishing the influence of the 
 close alliance between France and England, which now offends 
 him. In my opinion, Constantinople is decidedly to be preferred, 
 as there all the inconvenience of delays will be avoided, a serious 
 evil in the weak state of the Ottoman Empire. I fancy that having 
 such confidence in Admiral Roussin, the King's Government could 
 not fail to agree to the choice of that city as the centre of the 
 negotiation. . . . 
 
 April 2yd, 1833. 
 
 I have read with great interest M. Bresson's letter of April 
 14th, which you have done me the honour to communicate,^ and 
 I confess that I have great hopes as to the results of Comte Matu- 
 siewicz's presence in Berlin, in solving our negotiations with the 
 King of the Netherlands. I think it would not conduce to 
 the success of the Hollando-Belgian affairs, to show any distrust 
 just now respecting the conduct of the Russian Cabinet ; we 
 must, on the contrary, make the most of whatever is offered us. 
 My former experience has taught me, that there are circum- 
 stances in which confidence, even if somewhat hazardous, 
 becomes a matter of expediency. This opinion gains still further 
 strength and value, when one finds a pledge of security in the 
 separate and well-founded interests of those in whom one trusts. 
 
 It is on this principle also, that I base the necessity for France, 
 England, and above all Austria, to claim the co-operation of 
 Russia in Eastern affairs ; for I am fully persuaded that it is to 
 the true interests of Russia to reassureEurope,7^r ^/2^/r«^«^, as 
 to the ambitious projects attributed to her. The very conciliatory 
 language, so full of abnegation, which M. de Eleven has never 
 ceased to hold here, only still further confirms me in this opinion. 
 
 The last news received in London from Constantinople, has 
 created some exaggerated alarm here, partly, I think, because no 
 one was prepared for so rapid a march of events. There has 
 evidently been a want of forethought on the part of the Govern- 
 ment, and for repairing this provision must now be made. 
 
 The English Ministry, which up to now has taken but little 
 
 ^ In this despatch M. Bresson announced the arrival in Berlin of Comte Matusie- 
 wicz, on a mission to invite the Prussian Cabinet to join in the Note of April 2nd. It 
 will be remembered (see page 62) ihat this Note had been sent by the Prince de 
 Talleyrand and Lord Palmerston to M. Dedel, in reply to some inadmissible proposals 
 he had formulated in his project of March 23rd. M. Bresson gave an account of the 
 steps taken by M. Matusiewicz, who, he said, had convinced the King of Prussia. He 
 praised his boldness, for he had acted thus without having specially referred to his 
 Court. He also spoke of his request on the same subject to the Austrian Minister, 
 who however had not replied, and had asked for instructions from Vienna. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 103 
 
 interest in this grave question, is at last beginning to appreciate 
 its just value. Lord Grey and Lord Palmerston had both 
 spoken to me with some anxiety respecting the stateof the East, 
 even before the arrival of Lord Granville. I have no doubt that 
 this ambassador's presence in London, vsrill contribute greatly to 
 draw the attention of the British Cabinet to this matter. 
 
 I have given much thought as to what really would be the 
 best to do for the East, and though it is very difficult to form any 
 plans with regard to such complicated and uncertain events as 
 those now taking place in Asia, it is at least possible to hold 
 oneself in readiness to lessen their evil effects, by providing for 
 a future teeming with dangerous collisions, or by sanctioning the 
 results of these events, if they really offer some kind of guarantee 
 to the Governments of Europe. 
 
 As recent events permit the expression of individual 
 opinions, my observations have confirmed me in the idea, 
 that in order to terminate Eastern affairs now in a way most re- 
 assuring to Europe, the joint action of all the four Powers is 
 absolutely necessary. This joint action would have to be 
 expressed by some deed, which would contain a formal under- 
 taking on the part of the contracting Powers not to receive any 
 territorial augmentation at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. 
 There would be nothing unusual in such an undertaking; it 
 was even recently applied to the Greek question, when the 
 three signatory Powers of the treaty of July 6th, 1827, pledged 
 themselves not to choose a sovereign for Greece from among 
 the members of the reigning families of France, Russia, and 
 England. 
 
 We should find no difficulty as regards Algiers in such an 
 undertaking, the principle of our expedition having already 
 received the full and entire approbation of Russia and Austria. 
 Moreover, to shelter ourselves completely, it would suffice to 
 choose a time, when there could be no possible doubt as to our 
 right to a permanent occupation of the Algerian territory. 
 
 I have communicated the opinion I have just had the honour 
 to explain to you, to Lord Palmerston ; it will be submitted to 
 a Cabinet Council this evening, and I hope to-morrow to be in a 
 position to acquaint you of a definite resolution. . . . 
 
 April iith, 1833. 
 MON CHER Due, 
 
 This Eastern business is becoming too bad. It is certainly 
 rather strange that Admiral Roussin should nothave assured him- 
 self of the feeling at Alexandria, before taking such a high hand 
 
104 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 at Constantinople ^ ; this has led us all astray. However, we must 
 face matters as they now stand. Here, after a long spell of 
 lethargy, they have suddenly awakened to a sort of alarm ; but 
 this fright has not resulted in any expedient, and each in turn 
 has come to talk to me about it and to ask my advice. I was 
 able therefore to tell them what, in my private opinion, I believe 
 to be the only sound issue. You will find the details of it in my 
 despatch of to-day. To-morrow I shall be able to tell you more, 
 as my verbal project is to be submitted to a Cabinet Council 
 this evening. Lord Palmerston accepted it eagerly this morn- 
 ing ; but his opinion of itself is not sufficient to warrant taking 
 any action, which this time I hope will not be long delayed, 
 as it is specially a question of expediency. So adieu till to- 
 morrow. 
 
 April 26th. 
 
 The resolution which I had the honour to mention in my de- 
 spatch of yesterday, has been adopted by the English Cabinet, 
 which will, I believe, propose to the Russian, Austrian, and French 
 Governments, to conclude a convention containing in about three 
 articles, the following : — 
 
 1. An undertaking not to consent to any dismemberment of 
 the Ottoman Empire, either in favour of one of the four contracting 
 parties, or any other Power. 
 
 2. The consent of all the four Powers to be given, in any 
 arrangement between the Ottoman Porte and the Pasha of 
 Egypt in consequence of which the suzerainty and the integrity 
 of the Ottoman Empire would be maintained. 
 
 3. An undertaking to be given equally by the four Courts, to 
 compel the Pasha of Egypt by such measures as they may 
 mutually agree on, should he not consent to an arrangement, 
 such as that defined in the preceding article. 
 
 I have here indicated the three points which will be embodied 
 in the draft of the convention, but cannot specify how it will be 
 definitely drawn up and adopted. That however will at once be 
 communicated to you. 
 
 My despatch of yesterday will have reassured you, I hope, on 
 the only question which directly interests France ; I insisted on 
 the dates, you will see whether those proposed suit you. 
 
 I did not see any objection to the proposal coming from 
 England, who only wishes to have a European interest in East- 
 ern afiairs, and who, having up to the present taken no active 
 part in them, finds herself placed in a more impartial position 
 with regard to the other Powers than we are. 
 
 If such a proposition is not accepted by the Austrian and 
 ' See page 91. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 105 
 
 Russian Governments, we might see in this refusal a proof that 
 those two Governments have some arriere-pensees, perhaps even 
 some projects of division, for to make use of a common saying, 
 " they are old hands at such work." 
 
 I shall await with impatience, your replies to my despatches 
 of yesterday and to-day. . . . 
 
 April i^th, 1833. 
 
 I learn with great pleasure that you consider the discussion 
 which had arisen between the Court of St. Petersburg and the 
 French Government, respecting Admiral Roussin's negotiations 
 at Constantinople, as ended. That is one complication the less, 
 at a time when such are assuredly not wanting. 
 
 When this despatch reaches you, Monsieur le Due, the English 
 papers which almost always anticipate our couriers, will have 
 informed you of the serious embarrassment which has arisen for 
 the Government in consequence of the vote on Friday night in 
 the House of Commons, by which the malt tax has been reduced 
 by one half. This reduction will cause a decrease in the receipts 
 of nearly ;£'2, 500,000 sterling, and if the abolition of the win- 
 dow tax is adopted to-morrow, as it is quite possible it may be, 
 there will be a deficit of nearly five millions sterling. 
 
 The Ministry has had several meetings during the last three 
 days, in order to provide for this embarrassment. They find 
 the greatest possible difficulty in meeting the deficit with which 
 they are threatened ... It is a very serious matter ; men's 
 minds are greatly excited here ; the funds have experienced' 
 a considerable change ; and the discussions in the papers 
 have redoubled in violence. It is not thought however, 
 that this triumph on the part of the opposition will lead to the 
 resignation of the Ministry ; but it will have the unfortunate 
 effect of awakening distrust among its partisans and con- 
 sequently weakening its strength. It is thought that this 
 evening the Ministry will present to the House of Commons a 
 resolution which the vote of Friday has obliged them to take ; 
 its tenor is not yet known, and the state of the tide will, I fear, 
 prevent my sending it you to-day. But I will write to you on 
 this subject to-morrow, by courier. 
 
 Your despatch of the 25th, containing the copy of a letter from 
 M. Bresson of the i8th, caused me great satisfaction, which, 
 however, unfortunately, did not last long. By the last accounts 
 from Berlin, we learn that M. Ancillon, when on the point of 
 signing the note agreed upon with Comte Matusiewicz, suddenly 
 changed his mind, under the pretext that the vote of the Cabinet 
 
io6 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 at the Hague, of April l6th, ought to suffice us, owing to the pro- 
 positions it contains with reference to the armistice. I must 
 say that I cannot understand such a method of doing business ; 
 it would be discouraging for the future, were it not that one 
 must always expect some fresh departure on the part of M. 
 Ancillon.^ We have received no intelligence from the Hague 
 since the despatch of our letter of the 22nd,^ but we expect to 
 hear at any moment ; the first accounts will probably not be of 
 much interest. It is greatly to be feared that M. Ancillon's 
 indecisions, the state of the East, and above all the present 
 embarrassment of the English Ministry, will only create fresh 
 difficulties for us at the Hague. . . . 
 
 Evening, April 2()tk, 1833. 
 MON CHER Due, 
 
 An enemy to evil predictions, I refrain from making 
 any as to to-day's results, which nevertheless are of great 
 importance as regards the political and financial interests of the 
 Ministry and the country. I will confine myself to draw- 
 ing your attention to the Times of to-day. Read, I pray you, 
 the leading article and the money market. You will not fail to 
 see their tendency, and you will then understand England's 
 present position. 
 
 The Tories will honestly support the Ministry in the House 
 to-day ; but if Friday's vote is not annulled, matters here 
 
 ^ Comte Matusiewicz's mission at Berlin had passed through various phases. At 
 first it seemed to have great success, so much so, that M. Bresson in a desjDatch of 
 April 24th, positively announced that M. Matusiewicz was starting for the Hague, 
 after having drawn up with M. Ancillon the terms of the collective Note which was to 
 be sent to the Cabinet of the Netherlands under two hypotheses, the first, if its reply 
 to the note of October 2nd was negative, evasive, or dilatory, the second, if no reply 
 was received within a reasonable period of delay. If the reply were favourable, 
 action would not be taken, and the Berlin Cabinet would join its efforts to those 
 of the other courts to hasten the conclusion of a definite treaty. Everything seemed 
 in order, when suddenly M. Ancillon changed his mind (M. Bresson's despatch of 
 22nd April) and declared that there was no reason whatever for sending the collective 
 Note. Notwithstanding this, the French Cabinet returned to the charge and with the 
 assistance of Lord Minto, the English minis! er, ended by persuading the king. Finally, 
 on the 6th of May, M. Bresson was able to write to Paris, that the Note had 
 been sent off the evening before, to the Hague. He added that M. Ancillon had told 
 him that should the King of the Netherlands refuse, Prussia intended to leave him to 
 himself. [Official correspondence of M. Bresson.] 
 
 2 It will be remembered (see page 62) that M. Dedel had made fresh proposals 
 to the Conference, in a Note dated April i6th. These, considered inadmissible in 
 London (see letter on this subject from Lord Palmerston 10 M. de Talleyrand, 
 Appendix, letter No. 9), had provoked a very sharp response from the Conference in 
 the form of a collective letter to the Cabinet of the Hague. It is this letter, dated April 
 22nd, which is here spoken of. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 107 
 
 will speedily assume a totally different aspect, and one will soon 
 see, as Madame de Lieven said yesterday with suppressed 
 delight, that " England will hardly then weigh in the balance 
 of Europe." Adieu ; a thousand greetings. 
 
 London, May ist, 1833. 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 As I had the honour to acquaint you yesterday, the 
 sitting in the House of Commons did not end until 4 o'clock 
 this morning, with a vote in favour of the Ministry. By a 
 majority of 154, the House decided to cancel the abolition of the 
 malt tax. 
 
 It is hoped that this circumstance, which at first caused some 
 serious apprehension, will render the discussion on the budget 
 somewhat easier. The funds have risen considerably to-day. 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, AJ/ril 29M, 1833. 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 You will find in my despatch sent herewith, the de- 
 cision arrived at this morning by the King's Council. We accept 
 England's proposal as far as its principle goes, reserving to our- 
 selves discussion of the draft when we receive it. I trust the 
 matter at Constantinople will be concluded, before the answer 
 from the Courts of Austria and Russia arrives ; yet that will 
 be a good reason for the Russians to clear out. I am very 
 vexed that England did not make up her mind sooner, but it 
 certainly is not my fault. Ever since I took office, I have not 
 ceased to urge her to send an Ambassador to Constantinople. 
 I have shown Lord Granville almost daily, all the despatches I 
 sent off as well as those which I received on this subject ; I have 
 warned him, entreated him and urged him ; I have not left him 
 in ignorance of anything, whenever an incident of the slightest 
 importance occurred ; I also entreated you, mon Prince, to renew 
 your overtures on this subject. However, better late than never ; 
 I still hope we shall come out of it triumphantly ; but everything 
 might have been finished, both at Alexandria and Constantinople, 
 if the English Cabinet had liked. 
 
 I send you a despatch from M. Bresson which will show 
 you that M. Matusiewicz has failed at Berlin.^ I believe we 
 must begin to show our teeth, otherwise people will fancy that we 
 
 ■■ See page 106. 
 
io8 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 have reached the summit of our influence, and Holland will 
 laugh at us. Would it not be possible to make the blockades 
 more stringent, and to press more heavily on Dutch commerce ? 
 The best season of the year is passing ; if we do not proiit by it, 
 what will be said of us ? Adieu, mon Prince. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, May yd, 1833. 
 
 .... I often converse with Lord Palmerston as to the means 
 best suited to France and England in coming to some final 
 arrangement with King William, and those which you mention 
 in your despatch, and in your letter of the 29th, have more than 
 once formed the topic of our conversations ; but I must tell you 
 that we see, at any rate for the present, more than one difficulty 
 in carrying out the proposed scheme. The English Cabinet is 
 fully occupied with various motions on Hollando-Belgian 
 matters, with which it is threatened in both Houses of Parliament, 
 and also pretty strongly expressed demands from the English 
 commercial world against the imposition of the embargo. The 
 Cabinet therefore fears to increase the dissatisfaction which has 
 lately been expressed on this question, by any fresh restrictions 
 brought forward just now. Lord Grey and Lord Palmerston still 
 hope that M. Ancillon will come round to us again, and think 
 that Russia's assistance would be more advantageous to us than 
 an increase of coercive measures ; they are supported in this 
 opinion by recent letters from Berlin, which represent M. Ancillon 
 as not being indisposed to return to the project of a declaration 
 from the three Courts at the Hague. Finally, we all think that 
 it is not possible to decide upon anything definite, before knowing 
 what will be the reply of the Hague to our Note of April 
 23rd 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, May \th, 1833. 
 
 You will find in my official despatch, mon Prince, the 
 resume of our news from Constantinople. The whole affair 
 at Alexandria only hangs on a thread. Ibrahim is retiring ; I 
 have reason to hope that the united effiDrts of everyone will 
 have their effect on the Pasha, and that we shall have it all our 
 own way. But this makes it all the more needful now to 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 109 
 
 influence Russia, who, I hear from Constantinople, is doing all 
 she can to prevent the d^noilment, in order to quietly obtain the 
 upper hand in the Levant, thoroughly establish herself there, 
 and not depart without creating a thousand difficulties. I 
 suppose that the late occurrences in the English Parliament are 
 the only difficulty to the proposal you mentioned to me, and 
 about which I hastened to reply to you. After the victory, I 
 hope we shall take up Eastern affairs afresh, and I entreat you, 
 do not let the English Government go to sleep again. 
 
 I do not know what we can hope for here from the pro- 
 ceedings of the three Courts at the Hague ; M. d'Eyragues' 
 accounts are not very reassuring ; the affair must, however, be 
 brought to an end. 
 
 Here, matters are going on very well ; everything seems to 
 point to a short and easy session 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, May 6ih, 1833. 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 Monseigneur le Due d'Orl^ans arrived here the night 
 before last, at ten in the evening, having had a good crossing 
 and a comfortable journey. 
 
 I have received the despatch and private letter which you 
 were good enough to send me on the 4th of this month ; 
 that which I had the honour to write to you on the 3rd, is 
 virtually an answer to the observation you make on the 
 Hollando-Belgian business. I quite feel with you the need 
 there is to terminate this matter ; but there are circumstances 
 here which render its speedy accomplishment just now very 
 difficult. It seems to me that the argument brought forward in 
 the last paragraph of your despatch, is open to question ; for it 
 must not be lost sight of that the first Belgian expedition and 
 the convention of October 22, were acts which, while they 
 strengthened the French Ministry, contributed greatly to weaken 
 the English one ; so that there is no parallel between the two 
 situations. The imposition of the embargo has already caused 
 much dissatisfaction in England, and the discussion to which it 
 will give rise on Thursday or Friday next, in the House of 
 Commons, cannot fail to produce a bad impression on public 
 opinion. As I pointed out to you in my last despatch, the 
 accounts from Berlin still further strengthen the English Cabinet 
 in their determination to await the result of the proceedings of 
 the three Courts at the Hague, and the reply of the Government 
 
no THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 of the Netherlands to our Note of April 23rd. This reply, accord- 
 ing to M. d'Eyragues'^ letters, will not now be long delayed. . . . 
 
 By writing this despatch, I wished rather to lessen the 
 ardour of the French Government, which, urged on by the 
 Belgians, was led to ask for increased severities towards Holland, 
 just when I felt assured that the King of the Netherlands was 
 about to give in, if not on every point, at least on those which 
 were most important to Belgium, and consequently to us. My 
 opinion was, as will be seen, soon proved to be well founded. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, May i^th, 1833. 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 I had the honour to inform you, that Sir Pultney 
 Malcolm had been appointed to the command of the English 
 station in the Mediterranean. He is to start at once, and has 
 been entrusted with more extended powers than his pre- 
 decessor. Sir Arthur Aston ^ will have informed you of this, 
 as well as what has been written to Lord Ponsonby, the English 
 ambassador at Constantinople, on this subject. The admiral 
 and the ambassador are to come to an understanding with 
 Admiral Roussin, and it is thought here that this concord 
 between the two Powers will suffice to insure to their policy 
 in the Levant, that influence which it must exercise under the 
 present circumstances. 
 
 The English Cabinet has abandoned the draft of the con- 
 vention, v/hich Lord Palmerston promised me should be proposed 
 to the three Courts. The Prince de Lieven, to whom he com- 
 municated it, made some objections to it, the chief of which 
 somewhat surprised us. He thinks that the Emperor of Russia 
 could never consent to enter into a convention, which might 
 constitute an actual act of intervention in the home affairs of 
 Turkey. On Lord Palmerston remarking that it seemed to 
 him, the despatch of Russian vessels and troops to Constan- 
 tinople was a much more positive act of intervention, M. de 
 
 ^ The Marquis d'Eyragnes, a French diplomnt, nt that time Secretary of the 
 Embassy at the Hague since 1832. He was first sent to Copenhagen {1S27). In 1S35, 
 he went as first secretary to Constantinople, and was subsequently accredited to 
 Cavlsruhe as minister plenipotentiary (1S3S) ; and then to Dresden {1S45). 
 
 2 Sir Arthur Ingram Aston, English diplomat, born in 179S, was secretary to the 
 Legation at Paris in 1S33. He was appointed minister to Madrid in 1840. 
 
THE RE VOL UTION OF iS^o. 1 1 1 
 
 Lieven replied that he could not agree to that opinion. The 
 Sultan, he said, had asked the Emperor for assistance. The 
 Emperor had sent it to him with the firm resolution to leave it 
 entirely at the Porte's disposal, as long as she deemed it neces- 
 sary for her safety ; but also, with equal resolution, to withdraw 
 it as soon as the Sultan expressed a wish on this point. Thefe- 
 fore, in this instance, it was a matter of assistance from an ally, 
 not an intervention. 
 
 However small the plausibility of this reply, Lord Palmer- 
 ston had perforce to be satisfied with it, and to abandon 
 a project which seemed to him fraught with innumerable 
 difficulties. 
 
 You will be able to judge for yourself, whether the instruc- 
 tions given to Admiral Malcolm will suffice to bring about a 
 happy solution of Eastern affairs. 
 
 The English papers will have informed you, of the result of 
 Friday's discussion in the House of Commons on the Dutch 
 embargo and the state of Turkey. This result, though favour- 
 able to the ministry, does not reassure them ; and the very 
 general complaints in commercial circles make them feel the 
 imperative necessity of putting an end to this Belgian affair. 
 Nevertheless, it would be very difficult to get them to have 
 recourse to stronger measures, than those which have been 
 employed up to now 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince be Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, May 13/A, 1833. 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 There is nothing spoken of here but the magnificence 
 of your fetes. The king is enchanted with the reception 
 accorded in England to M. le Due d'Orldans.^ and he attributes 
 to you, and with reason, the greater part of this general good 
 feeling. I, for my part, am all the more rejoiced, as it gives 
 an answer to the reports which our ambassadors often seek to 
 spread abroad, respecting a coldness between France and 
 England. 
 
 A still more complete answer to this are Lord Ponsonby's 
 instructions, which Sir Arthur Aston has communicated to me 
 
 ' The Due d'Orleanshas arrived, and I dined with him yesterday at T.illeyrand's. 
 He has marvellously improved since I faw him in Paris in 1830. Even then he was 
 good-looking, but now he has become a man, and a very handsome one, and has all 
 the manners and the deportment suitable to his rank. He has really quite the air of 
 an hereditary Prince, and from the conversations I have had with him, it struck me 
 that his mind had developed quite as much as his person .... [Lord Palmerston 
 to the Honourable William Temple, May 7th, 1833.] 
 
112 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 this morning, and also those given to Sir Pultney Malcolm by 
 the Admiralty. These instructions are almost identical with 
 ours, and I see that we shall begin to act in concert in Eastern 
 affairs. I am impatiently awaiting every moment the news 
 from Alexandria, which has been announced by telegraph. I 
 trust it will contain the conclusion of the affair at that end. 
 Then there will only be the Russians to get rid of. 
 
 If you can terminate the provisional convention with Holland, 
 honourably and effectually, you will be rendering a great service 
 to the King of the Belgians, who does not know which way to 
 turn. In any case, we are quite prepared to go as far as may 
 be wished with coercive measures. The Chambers are disposed 
 to be patient, if it is necessary, or to support us in any ener- 
 getic movement we may wish. Home matters are working 
 admirably, and prosperity has never before recovered itself so 
 rapidly. Tranquillity has been established everywhere. If 
 nothing from abroad occurs to disturb us, in another year there 
 will not be a trace left of the agitation caused by the revolution 
 of July. 
 
 You will see in the Moniteur of to-morrow, full details of 
 Madame la Duchess de Berry's declaration. That matter has 
 ended in a somewhat burlesque and less disgraceful manner 
 than could have been expected ' 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, May 17th, 1833. 
 MON CHER Due, 
 
 Your friendship wishes to attribute some of M. le Due 
 d'Orleans' success in London to me. I may perhaps admit, 
 between you and me, that I am not quite innocent of it ; but, 
 nevertheless, I must say that it would be impossible to be 
 more successful in every way than our young Prince is. The 
 Duchess of Cumberland ! ! ! ^ has just requested Madame de 
 Dino to ask M. le Due d'Orleans to go to Kew on Sunday, 
 where she wishes to entertain him at luncheon. For once the 
 great bells are ringing, and I think this mark of attention 
 which I never expected is greatly due to the liberation of the 
 prisoner at Blaye. 
 
 1 When about to be confined, Madame la Duchess de Berry declared that she 
 was married to the Comte de Luches-Palli. 
 
 2 Frederica of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, sister of Queen Louisa of Prussia, born in 
 1778, maiTied in 1815 Ernest Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, son of George HI., 
 King of England, subsequently King of Hanover. The Duchess of Cumberland died 
 in 1841. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 113 
 
 When sending you M. Dedel's Note ^ yesterday, I omitted to 
 tell you that it would be better not to let M. Lehon have a 
 copy. I am afraid that he might make it known too soon 
 in Brussels ; on that account also I decided only to let M. Van de 
 Weyer read it. Moreover, if, as this Note gives us reason to 
 hope, we shall soon arrive at a preliminary convention, we must 
 protect ourselves against the demands of the Belgians, who will 
 yet give us some trouble. 
 
 I am delighted that you are satisfied with the instructions 
 given to Lord Ponsonby and to Admiral Malcolm. Under the 
 circumstances, I think it is indeed no small matter to have 
 gained as much as we have. 
 
 Let us hope that a preliminary and tranquillizing convention 
 may be the result of M. Dedel's last Note, to which, it seems to 
 me, very few objections can be raised. You will notice that the 
 title of Grand Duke of Luxembourg has been omitted. Is this 
 done on purpose .' We are to have a conference with M. Dedel 
 either to-morrow or the day after. I will write to you as soon 
 as anything is decided . . 
 
 May 10th, 1833. 
 
 I have received the despatch you did me the honour to send, 
 numbered 59, as well as the ratifications of the supplementary 
 treaty, which regulates the order of succession to the Greek 
 throne. ^ 
 
 Wc had some conferences both yesterday and to-day, lasting 
 several hours, between Lord Palmerston, M. Dedel, and myself, 
 and if I dared to believe in a hope which has so often deceived 
 me, I should tell you that perhaps to-morrow we shall sign the 
 preliminary Convention. M. Dedel, whom I have just left, still 
 hesitates about an explanatory article which we proposed to 
 him, and if he does not decide between this and to-morrow, he 
 will refer it to the Hague ; that will cause a fresh delay of eight 
 days. If, on the other hand, after a careful examination of his 
 instructions, he considets that he is justified in consenting to the 
 
 ^ The Note of May i6th, in which, after a long discussion, M. Dedel declared that 
 "until a definite treaty had been signed. His Majesty of the Netherlands undertook 
 not to recommence hostilities with Belgium, and to leave the navigation of the Scheldt 
 entirely free." 
 
 '^ The object of this supplementary treaty, which was signed on the 30th April, 
 1833, was to establish and complete the provisions of Article 8 of the Convention of 
 May 7th, which defined the succession to the Greek throne. It declared that the 
 succession to the Crown, either in King Otto's branch, or that of the Princes Luitpold 
 and Adalbert, which had been eventually substituted for that of Prince Otto, should 
 be established from male to male by order of primogeniture. Females were not to 
 be entitled to succeed to the Crown, except in case of the total extinction of legitimate 
 male heirs in the three branches. 
 
 VOL. V. I 
 
114 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 proposal we have made to him, the Convention will be signed 
 to-morrow. 
 
 I need not assure you that I am doing all in my power to 
 hasten the solution of a matter of which no one appreciates 
 the importance more than myself. I shall have the honour to 
 inform you of the result of the Conference, which we are to 
 have to-morrow 
 
 May 2isi, 1833. 
 
 This time my hopes have not been deceived, and I have the 
 honour to send you the preliminary Convention which I men- 
 tioned to you yesterday, and which we have just signed with 
 M. Dedel.i It contains all the stipulations which it seemed to 
 me were essentially necessary to obtain, for the evident result of 
 this Convention is, that Belgium finds herself in a most favour- 
 able position, whilst that of the King of the Netherlands is so 
 unfavourable that he will himself be compelled speedily to ask 
 for a definite treaty. The opening of the Scheldt, and the non- 
 payment of the interest of the debt by Belgium, will very quickly 
 force him to do this. I think, therefore, that I have completely 
 carried out the wishes of the king's Government, by concluding 
 an arrangement which contains everything it was possible to 
 ask just now from the Dutch Government. 
 
 You will perceive that we have added a separate Article at 
 the end, which fully explains Article III., respecting which we did 
 not wish there should be any uncertainty. We first asked that 
 it might be inserted in the treaty ; but M. Dedel, whose assent 
 to this Article we only obtained with great difficulty, objected 
 to its forming part of the Convention itself, for a reason which 
 seemed to us fairly founded, namely, that an explanation 
 immediately following Article III., would appear to throw a 
 doubt on the good faith of the proposal made by the King of 
 the Netherlands, and that we owed at least this slight satisfac- 
 tion both to the King of the Netherlands and to himself, as he 
 feared he had exposed himself to the reproaches of his sovereign 
 
 ^ By this Convention, King William promised the maintenance of the annistice, the 
 free navigation of the Scheldt and the Meuse, free communication between Maastricht, 
 Brabant, and Germany. On the other hand, the embargo on the Dutch vessels was 
 removed, and the prisoners of war were set at liberty. The explanatory Article, 
 referred to further on, was as follows : — 
 
 It is agreed between the high contracting parties, that the stipulation relative 
 to the cessation of hostilities, contained in Article III. of the Convention of this day, 
 includes the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and those portions of Limburg provisionally 
 occupied by the Belgian troops. It is also understood, that until the conclusion of 
 the definite treaty, of which mention is made in the said Article III. of the Convention 
 of to-day, the navigation of the Scheldt will be conducted as it was before the 1st Novem- 
 ber, 1832. The present Article will have the same force and value 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1.830. 115 
 
 by consenting to its insertion as we desired. We agreed all the 
 more readily to this, as the question is in itself of no great 
 importance, since the explanatory Article must be ratified at the 
 same time as the Convention, and have the same value. 
 
 You will no doubt consider it unadvisable to make the 
 Convention, public until after the expiry of ten days, the time 
 fixed for the exchange of the ratifications. 
 
 The king's Government will doubtless deem that the proper 
 time to ask for the disarmament of Belgium will be after the 
 Convention has been ratified. It might be advisable to hint at 
 this measure in Brussels ; it would hasten a definite arrangement 
 more than anything else ; for if Belgium is once disarmed, the 
 Dutch troops will disband themselves, or will very quickly be 
 dismissed, and the Dutch Government will thus find itself 
 obliged to put an end to a state of affairs which so seriously 
 compromises its existence. 
 
 M. le Due d' Orleans started this morning for Liverpool 
 and Manchester ; His Royal Highness will return to London 
 on the 28th .... 
 
 Baron Pasquier to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, May \?,th, 1833. 
 
 I have received your letter of the 14th, mon Prince, and 
 thank you for all tTie good news it contains. The success of 
 the tour, which you have planned so admirably, will have an 
 excellent effect here ; not that we can hope that our Faubourg 
 St. Germain will as yet listen to reason, but because its evil 
 desires will be at least somewhat restrained thereby, and it will 
 find fewer ears ready to listen to its insipid absurdities. 
 
 The event at Blaye took place sooner than we expected ; 
 but I agree with you that, taking it altogether, the result has 
 been very satisfactory. It does not seem to have caused any 
 unpleasantness in England as regards the Prince's position, and 
 that was one of the essential points. 
 
 I thank you for the support you have been able to give to 
 my earnest desire for an amnesty ; this desire, I admit, has 
 become a fixed idea with me, and I cannot understand why 
 every one does not see that it is an indispensable issue, and the 
 only one by which it is possible to come profitably and honourably 
 out of a serious political crisis. If the occasion of the Duchesse 
 de Berry's departure is not utilized, I do not see when another 
 such favourable occasion is likely to arise. 
 
 I need say nothing about our home affairs ; their improve- 
 
 I 2 
 
ii6 THE MEMOjRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 ment is visible to every eye ; and as for foreign affairs, you 
 know a hundredfold more about them than I do. 
 
 I certainly neither lent my aid, nor did I approve of the 
 measures taken, in connection with our poor friend Dalberg's 
 death.-' On the contrary, I was among those who were strongly 
 against it, and even desired to bring about a positive decision, 
 which would for the future afford protection against similar 
 outrages, of which the utter uselessness is, and always will be, 
 their least inconvenience.^ 
 
 A great deal is said about the consequences of the July 
 Revolution ; it seems to me that this one cannot be denied. 
 
 Pray accept, mon Prince, with your usual kindness, the 
 assurances of my most sincere devotion. 
 
 Pasquier. 
 
 The Due de Brogue to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, May in^h, 1833. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 Accept my sincere congratulations ; j'ou have effected, 
 as you always do, the very best thing possible. If the King of 
 the Belgians has any sense at all now, he will quietly establish 
 himself under the provisional Convention, dismiss half his army, 
 and state plainly that he is quite ready to sign a definite 
 treaty, but that he hopes it will be as late as possible, seeing 
 that the provisional one is all in his favour. If he acts and 
 speaks thus, we shall have the definite treaty before very long. 
 
 While you have been doing such marvels, we have been 
 running a terrible risk here : the discussion on the Greek loan 
 has been most troublesome, and we only carried it by making it 
 a regular Cabinet question.* However, the session is drawing 
 to a close, and in six weeks all will be finished 
 
 ^ The Due de Dalberg died on the 27th April, at the Chateau de Herrensheim, 
 near Worms, at the age of tifty-five. 
 
 ^ On the death of the Duo de Dalberg, the Government had sealed all his papers, 
 which they claimed on account of the official positions which the Due had filled. 
 [Note by M. de Bacourt.] 
 
 ' After the Convention of May 7th, 1832, by which the Greek throne was given to 
 King Otto, the signatory Powers (France, Russia, and England) had undertaken to 
 guarantee a loan of sixty millions, which the young king was about to raise. The first 
 revenues of Greece were exclusively appropriated for the interest and the sinking fund 
 of this loan. On the 24th January, 1833, the French Cabinet brought in a bill for 
 authority to give its guarantee. On April 4lh, it was favourably reported upon by 
 Colonel Paixhans. It did not come up for discussion until May i8th. The bill, whicli 
 was hotly contested by the opposition, occupied four days in discussion, and was finally 
 passed by a vote of one hundred and seventy-five against one hundred and twelve. 
 Fifteen days after, it was also passed by the Peers, with a majority of ninety-one against 
 nine. 
 
THE RE VOL UTION OF 1 830. 117 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, May 2jth, 1833. 
 
 .... The discussion in the Chamber of Deputies, respecting 
 the Greek loan, has been followed here with great interest, 
 Monsieur le Due, and I must tell you that public opinion has 
 been quite unanimous with regard to the various speeches you 
 have made on this matter. The very clear and at the same time, 
 brilliant statement you have made on the whole Greek negotia- 
 tion, has been very generally admired. Moreover, a very im- 
 portant constitutional question was involved in this business, 
 and you have admirably defined the rights that are given to, and 
 the limits that are imposed on the Chambers, when they inter- 
 vene in diplomatic transactions concluded by the Government. 
 
 I have the honour to send you a despatch which arrived 
 this morning from the Hague. It will show you the good 
 effect produced there by the Convention which was signed on 
 the 2 1 St. We can, I think, find in this a fresh proof of the in- 
 convenience we should have experienced, if we had allowed our- 
 selves to be influenced by any exaggerated reports. If we had 
 credited the information received from various quarters during 
 the last few months, we should have been forced to believe that 
 Holland's resistance was insurmountable, and that she was up- 
 held by the three northern Courts. Now we see that this in- 
 formation was rather the result of personal impressions, and 
 perhaps inexperience in business affairs, than of a complete 
 knowledge of the actual state of matters there. 
 
 It is thought that the ratifications will arrive from the Hague 
 on the 29th. M. Dedel, whom I have just seen, and who has also 
 received most satisfactory accounts from the Hague, expects them 
 on that day. 
 
 M. le Due d'Orldans returned this afternoon at 4 o'clock 
 from Liverpool. His Royal Highness proposes to attend the 
 Queen's drawing-room to-morrow, and then to start for Deal to 
 inspect the French squadron stationed in the Downs. . . . 
 
 King Louis Philippe to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Neuilly, May ■zs^h, 1833. 
 
 Mon CHER Prince, 
 
 I do not wish to put off any longer telling you, how 
 very sensible I am of the reception given to my son in England, 
 and how fully I appreciate the part you have taken in preparing 
 
Ii8 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 the way, and gaining this success, to which I attach the greatest 
 value, both on account of its actual inriportance, and from my old 
 feelings of friendship for that grand country. This success will 
 confirm these feelings in my son, which will in itself be a great 
 blessing for both countries. He is very sensible of it, and begs 
 me tell you, and especially Madame de Dino, how very grateful 
 he is for all you have done for him in this matter. I hope she 
 will allow me to join in these thanks, until I can repeat them in 
 person to her. 
 
 I pray you, mon cher Prince, to try and seize an opportunity 
 to express from me and the Queen, to the King and Queen of 
 England, how very sensible we are of the kind reception they 
 have given our son, and all the attention they have paid him. 
 Also kindly be my interpreter in the same way, to the Princes 
 and Princesses of the Royal Family, and the other English 
 and foreign magnates, and above all, tell them how greatly I 
 have been touched and rejoiced at the manner in which my son 
 has been received in England. 
 
 And last, but 7iot least, I must complirnent you on the sig- 
 nature of the Convention of May 2ist, with M. Dedel. I look 
 upon that as assuring a pacific conclusion to the grand task 
 which I congratulate myself on having entrusted to j'ou, and 
 which you have so skilfully brought to a successful issue. I 
 hope and believe that they will be satisfied with it in Brussels, 
 and that it will have the effect there, which I look upon as the 
 decisive point of the question, namely, that the expenses will be 
 reduced within the limits of the revenue. Once this equilibrium 
 is established, we can wait with patience and resignation for the 
 time when the King of the Netherlands will consider it right to 
 sign the definite treaty. 
 
 You know of old, all my feelings of friendship for you, mon 
 cher Prince. 
 
 Louis Philippe. 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, May 26M, 1833. 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 In the official despatch which I send you by courier, 
 you will find the latest news we have received from Constanti- 
 nople ; it is up to 8th May. 
 
 The most prominent fact is the decision come to by the Grand 
 Signior, to cede Adana to Ibrahim, and the important part 
 of this fact is, that Lord Ponsonby has advised it ; this 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF i%io. 119 
 
 pledges the English Government more than I had dared to hope 
 for. Now everything is finished legally, and there is no further 
 pretext for the Russians to remain. But as a fact, it might 
 easily be very different. Admiral Roussin has sent me a letter, 
 in which he seems very uneasy respecting the efforts made by 
 Comte Orloff to break up the whole of this business, and establish 
 the Russians, if not permanently, at least temporarily, at Constan- 
 tinople ; he even seems to fear that arrangements are being made 
 to bring fresh forces secretly into the Bosphorus. I do not know 
 how much real importance should be attached to these alarms.^ 
 The aspect at Constantinople is so changeable, that things alter 
 from black to white in the same day. Nevertheless, his letter is 
 written in such evident perturbation, that it has given us matter 
 for thought. I felt I ought to submit it to a special Cabinet 
 Council, which decided unanimously that I should write to you 
 on this subject, and ask you to sound the English Cabinet as 
 to its intentions, supposing that Russia were to partially throw 
 aside the mask, oblige the Porte to break all the engagements 
 entered into under our joint guarantee, and scheme half secretly, 
 to establish herself on the Bosphorus under pretence of pro- 
 tecting the Sultan. 
 
 The Council was of opinion that it would be well to equip 
 two more vessels at Toulon, and send them to Admiral Hugon ; 
 these two vessels will be ready in twenty days, that is to say, 
 about the isth of June. As we do not wish to excite any 
 jealousy in London by this increase of our forces, which will 
 make the French squadron stronger than the English one, we 
 request you to make this known to Lord Palmerston, asking 
 him to similarly increase the English squadron. 
 
 But the most important point on which we wish to be 
 thoroughly in concert with the English Cabinet, is the alteration 
 to be made in the instructions to the two admirals. 
 
 At present, Admiral Malcolm's instructions are exactly 
 similar to those of Admiral Hugon." They will join their forces 
 
 ^ An arrangement had in fact been come to on the Sth Maj", between the Sultan 
 and the Pasha of Egypt, in consequence of which Ibrahim retired beyond the Taurus. 
 On hearing this, which upset all his plans, the Emperor Nicholas sent Comte OrlofT 
 to Constantinople with very full powers. The fears manifested by Admiral Roussin 
 were only too well founded, since, as will be seen in the course of this recital, 
 the Russian plenipotentiary succeeded in effecting an offensive and defensive treaty 
 of alliance with Turkey (July Sth). It was not uniil after the signature of this 
 treaty, which placed Turkey at the mercy of the Czar, that the Russian fleet quitted 
 the Bosphorus. 
 
 2 Baron Hugon, born in 1783, entered the service in 1795, and took part as a 
 commander in the battle of Navarino. In 1821, he was made rear-admiral, and sent 
 to put down Greek piracy in the Levant. He became vice-admiral in 1840, senator 
 in 1853, and died in 1862. 
 
120 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 near Smyrna, everything being now finished in Egypt. They have 
 both received orders to await fresh instructions before attempt- 
 ing to pass the Dardanelles ; but the distances are so great, that 
 it seems to us there would be much risk in continuing these 
 arrangements. According to our view, it would be better to 
 point out in advance, dating from now, under what circum- 
 stances the two ambassadors at Constantinople would be 
 authorized to direct the admirals to secure that spot from being 
 taken possession of by the Russians. It seems to us that this 
 authority ought to be given to them in either of the following 
 events. 
 
 1. If the Russians, by their movements, give them cause to 
 fear that they wish to obtain possession of the Dardanelles. 
 
 2. If, after the peace that has now been made and concluded, 
 fresh reinforcements are sent to Odessa and Bucharest, for these 
 reinforcements can have no other object, than to secure to 
 themselves an impregnable position. 
 
 It must of course be clearly understood that, having passed 
 through the Dardanelles, the two squadrons will lie to, and will 
 not approach Constantinople, avoiding all aggression, and con- 
 tenting themselves with repulsing force by force, in case of need. 
 
 The Council also resolved that our Charge d' Affaires at St. 
 Petersburg should be instructed to declare, in measured but 
 decisive terms, that the French Cabinet expects, now that peace 
 is made, that the Russians will not take advantage of any idle 
 pretext to prolong their sojourn at Constantinople, and that they 
 will follow the example set by us this year in Belgium. This is 
 the attitude I am taking as regards M. Pozzo. 
 
 Kindly inform the English Cabinet, mon Prince, as to what 
 you think most advisable in this matter, and keep us au courant 
 as to its views. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, May igth, 1833. 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 I have received the despatch, No. 63, which you did me 
 the honour to write, relative to Eastern affairs. I have just had 
 a long conversation respecting it with Lord Palmerston, who 
 has received almost similar accounts to yours from Constan- 
 tinople. I fancy that when once the Porte has consented 
 to the cession of Adana, it may be looked upon as definitely set- 
 tled, and that there will be no longer the slightest pretext for the 
 Russians to prolong their sojourn in the Bosphorus. Lord 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 121 
 
 Palmerston has already written in this sense to the English 
 minister at St. Petersburg, and he will renew the orders he gave 
 him, and make them even more positive. 
 
 Lord Palmerston refuses to believe that the Sultan would, 
 at the instigation of Russia, reconsider the cession of Adana, 
 after the representations that have been made to him on this 
 subject by the French and English ambassadors ; nevertheless, 
 he approves the measure adopted by the king's Government, of 
 sending two more vessels to the Archipelago, and he added, that 
 a similar step would be taken by the English Government. Two 
 of the vessels, therefore, which in consequence of the Convention 
 of May 2 1st, will no longer be employed on the Dutch coasts, 
 will at once be despatched to rejoin the squadron under Admiral 
 Malcolm. 
 
 Lord Palmerston will not however, in any case, consent to 
 giving such ample powers as the king's Government proposes 
 to the ambassadors of France and England at Constantinople, 
 and in this matter I am quite of his opinion. In fact, would it 
 not be unheard of, to grant an ambassador the power of coming 
 to a decision, which might lead to a war, without first consulting 
 his government .'' The inconvenience caused by distance, how- 
 ever great it may be in the present circumstances, could never 
 justify the adoption of such a course. I must say myself, 
 that I would not care either to give or to receive such powers. 
 
 I think that nothing would alter Lord Palmerston's opinion 
 on this point, and all his colleagues, whom he consulted at the 
 Cabinet Council held this morning, fully agree with him. 
 
 May sisi, 1833. 
 
 In the despatch you did me the honour to send on the 27th 
 of this month, you ask me to give you my views respecting M. 
 de Metternich's and M. le Comte St. Aulaire's proposal, on the 
 subject of Eastern affairs.^ 
 
 ^ M. de Metternich had made a proposal to the French Cabinet to hold a kind of 
 congress in Vienna, for the purpose of discussing the Eastern question. The Due de 
 Broglie wrote about this to the Prince de Talleyrand : " The Prince de Metternich, 
 on hearing from M. de Sainte-Aulaire, the terms of the agreement concluded at 
 Constantinople on ihe 5th of this month, manifested a very strong feeling of anxiety. 
 He attaches so much importance to the territory of Adana, that even while admitting 
 that the Powers must unite their efforts to maintain the transaction eniered into between 
 the Porte and the Pasha, he considers it indispensable that it should be modified on 
 this point. He talks vaguely of the necessity of coming to some agreement on the 
 Eastern question, and of establishing for this purpose at Vienna, not exactly a 
 congress, nor even a regular conference, but a centre of discussion. All this is very 
 obscure, and still shows the effects of the false and uncertain position in which the 
 Vienna Cabinet has placed itself, in connection with the events in the East." (Despatch 
 ofMay 26th. ) The French Cabinet refused to accede to Austria's request. "We 
 shall not in any way enter into the proposal of Austria," the Due de Broglie wrote 
 
122 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 I must admit, that under the circumstances, I feel a certain 
 difficulty in responding to the confidence you wish to show me. 
 The Eastern question has, for the last six months, been regarded 
 in so many ways, both for and against — it has been the subject of 
 so many uncertain and changeable schemes, alternately accepted 
 and refused — it has brought into action so many different interests 
 — that I feel it would be impossible to decide on any really effec- 
 tual course, as long as the Powers who are called to this 
 work, do not adopt one principle alone, that of the preservation of 
 the Ottoman Empire, which, for the present at least, is assured 
 by the peace that has just been signed. 
 
 It is easy to understand the confusion that reigns among 
 the various European Cabinets on this point, when one considers 
 the divers feelings by which they are actuated. All, with the 
 exception of Russia, regard the state of Turkey according to their 
 relative considerations. Thus we see that Austria is influenced 
 by her anxiety with respect to Germany and Italy ; France, 
 probably without any very clear reason, first favours the interests 
 of the Pasha of Egypt, and then speedily abandons them ; 
 England manifests a degree of coldness bordering on utter 
 indifference ; Russia alone, as I said before, goes steadily on 
 towards a certain aim. She has thus by her action (skilfully 
 conducted, one must admit) arrived at a result, which if advan- 
 tageous for herself, is only all the more dangerous to Europe. 
 
 I find it necessary, M. le Due, to recall here the different steps 
 I had to take with the English Cabinet, respecting affairs in the 
 Levant, in order to show, that as far as I was concerned, I have 
 never neglected anything that could bring about a happy solution 
 of these affairs. 
 
 At the close of last January I communicated to Lord 
 Palmerston, as stated in despatch No. 5/,^ which I had 
 the honour to send you, a plan of joint action between Eng- 
 land, France, and Austria. This plan, which I think offered 
 great advantages, and which was at first favoura,bly received by 
 the English Ministry, was not adopted by M. de Metternich, 
 who replied that he had the most complete confidence in the 
 loyalty and the assurances of the Emperor Nicholas. Matters 
 therefore remained thus, left to themselves, or rather to Russian 
 influence, which had not gone to sleep. 
 
 Towards the end of February, Admiral Roussin concluded 
 
 eight days later ; " M. de Sainte-Aulaire will .simply tell M. de Metternich, that he is 
 empowered to discuss any proposals with him that the Chancellor may think it 
 necessary to bring forward, respecting the state of the Ottoman Empire." (Despatch 
 of June 3rd.) See also p. 98 and note. 
 ' See despatch of January 28th, p. 76. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 123 
 
 an imprudent convention with the Porte, which at first esta- 
 bHshed a baneful security among the Powers. I say imprudent, 
 because this ambassador, before concluding it, had not assured 
 himself as to the intentions of the Pasha of Egypt, whom he 
 could not induce to accept his views. 
 
 The Russians disembarked in the Dardanelles, and with the 
 consent of the Porte occupied several points there. It was then 
 that I proposed a fresh scheme to the English Ministry, which 
 consisted of joint action on the part of the Powers ; but this 
 time I considered it would be necessary to seek the concurrence of 
 Russia which, if it exhibited at the end of January all the incon- 
 venience which I then pointed out, had become a necessity 
 since her occupation of Constantinople. You know, M. le Due, 
 that this scheme found no more favour with the English Cabinet 
 than the first, and that they confined themselves to sending 
 fresh instructions which had but slight influence on the chief 
 question, namely, that of maintaining the Ottoman Empire 
 equally free from protectors as from enemies. 
 
 M. de Metternich has several times, I confess, proposed to 
 come to some understanding on this important matter ; but one 
 cannot help seeing that all his ideas are equally impracticable 
 with those which he recently confided to M. de Sainte-Aulaire. 
 
 Peace has at last been signed, and whatever may have been 
 the projects up to the present, I think they must now be con- 
 sidered to be annulled by the very fact that peace has been 
 concluded between the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt, and we 
 must keep to this fact, as one which will for the future rule the 
 whole Eastern question. We must boldly declare that we look 
 upon this peace as putting an end to everything, and not allow 
 the faintest doubt to arise respecting the immediate with- 
 drawal of the Russians. 
 
 My opinion, therefore, would be to reply to M. de Metter- 
 nich's overtures, that any assembly of the Powers to terminate 
 this matter is now no longer needed, as there is nothing further 
 to arrange, and that the cession of the district of Adana is only 
 the result of an agreement between the Sultan and the Pasha — 
 that is to say, between the sovereign and his vassal, with which 
 the Powers have no right to interfere. 
 
 I am inclined to believe that this is the best line to take, as that 
 proposed by M. de Metternich would throw matters back into 
 uncertainty, encourage the evasions of the Sultan, and serve as 
 a pretext to the Russians not to withdraw from Constantinople. 
 It would certainly deprive the Sultan of the small amount of 
 moral force still remaining to him, and in the present weak state 
 of the Ottoman Empire, would expose it to all kinds of dangers, 
 
124 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 by provoking the revolt of the Pashas, who could easily excite 
 the people against European intervention. 
 
 Moreover, the course I propose to follow is quite in accord 
 with the language you have used to M. le Comte Pozzo and 
 M. d'Appony, and with the instructions you have given to the 
 French Charg^ d' Affaires at St. Petersburg ; it equally accords 
 with Lord Palmerston's views, as he, and I think rightly, does 
 not wish to have conferences either at Vienna or Constantinople, 
 where some time ago, under different circumstances, I pro- 
 posed having them ; and we both think, that in the face of the 
 expressed wish of all the Powers, the Court of Russia will not 
 hesitate to recall her troops from Constantinople. 
 
 June 2nd, 1833. 
 
 The Prince de Lieven received letters yesterday from St. 
 Petersburg, which, while informing him that peace had been 
 signed between the Sultan and the Pasha, announced the formal 
 intention of the Emperor Nicholas to withdraw his troops as 
 soon as he has been asked to do so by the Sultan. This is quite 
 in accord with what we foresaw here, and I confess I am 
 inclined, under the circumstances, to believe in the assurances 
 of Russia. . . . 
 
 Lord Palmerston and I have to-day sent to M. Van de Weyer 
 the Note of which I have the honour to enclose you a copy.^ 
 Its object, you will observe, is to obtain the immediate fulfil- 
 ment by the Belgian Government of the articles of the Conven- 
 tion of May 2 1st, which concern Belgium. . . . 
 
 June i^th, 1833. 
 
 I have the honour to transmit to you a copy of the Note, in 
 which Lord Palmerston and I communicated the Convention 
 of May 2 1st, to the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian plenipoten- 
 tiaries in London, and of the reply thereto sent to me by M. de 
 Lieven, which is identical with that of the other two pleni- 
 potentiaries. 
 
 In reading this reply you will see, that the plenipotentiaries 
 do not pledge themselves to any undertaking, which is only 
 natural, as they were informed by the Secretary of the Dutch 
 Embassy, who arrived yesterday in London, that the Dutch 
 Government had addressed itself to the three Governments of 
 Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, with the view of reopening 
 
 ^ Note of June isl. M. Van de Weyer replied on the loth of June, by a Note 
 addressed to Lord Palmerston and M. de Talleyrand, in which he finally accepted the 
 Convention of May 2lst. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 183a 125 
 
 negotiations with the five Powers.^ The plenipotentiaries there- 
 fore must learn the result of this step and the instructions from 
 their respective Courts to which it will give rise, before expressing 
 an opinion, which moreover under the circumstances could only 
 be a personal one. Nevertheless, as Prussia was Ihe last to 
 address the Hague in the name of the three Powers, it is 
 possible that the reply from Berlin might suffice to decide the 
 three plenipotentiaries to rejoin the Conference. 
 
 One must suppose, that in communicating with the three 
 northern Courts, the King of the Netherlands has informed 
 them of the claims he intends to bring forward at the final 
 negotiation ; but, be that as it may, we are justified in expecting, 
 that the first communication made to the Conference by the 
 Dutch plenipotentiary, will contain the figures of the Dutch 
 Cabinet, as to the financial points still to be decided. If this is 
 not the case, and if the King of the Netherlands raises fresh 
 difficulties which would tend to prolong the negotiations, an 
 adjournment might be proposed. This would certainly be 
 displeasing to Holland and would not inconvenience us, for now 
 that Belgium is placed in a much more favourable position than 
 she could be by the definite treaty, she can wait patiently, until 
 the Dutch Government returns to more reasonable views. . . . 
 
 In the English papers of to-day, you will find a detailed 
 account of the sitting in the House of Lords last night. The 
 Duke of Wellington brought forward a motion to present a 
 petition to the king, asking him to maintain the strictest 
 neutrality in the struggle now going on between the two princes 
 of the House of Braganza. This motion, which was opposed 
 
 ^ A very energetic attempt at reconciliation was made at this period, between the 
 Cabinet of the Hague and the three Continental Courts, especially that of Berlin. 
 M. Ancillon gave it his adhesion. On the nth of June, M. Bresson announced, not 
 without some surprise mingled with anxiety, that Prince Frederick of the Netherlands 
 had arrived unexpectedly in Berlin. On the 13th, he sent an account to the Department 
 of an interview he had relative to this subject with M. Ancillon. " Prince Frederick," 
 the Prussian Minister told him, "had appeared in Berlin, like a bombshell in a house ; 
 no one had been more surprised at it than the king himself. " According to M. Ancillon, 
 the prince stated that he had come as an envoy from his father, to thank the King of 
 Prussia, and through him the Emperors of Austria and Russia, for the part they had 
 taken in the conclusion of the provisional convention. M. Bresson added, that he had 
 noticed a change in the Berlin Court. It wished, he said, to see the Conference give 
 up its character of arbitrator and take that of mediator. He recalled the fact that a 
 few months previously (M. Bresson's despatch of March 12th) he had already drawn 
 the attention of the French Cabinet to a letter of IM. de Metternich's to M. Clam, 
 Austrian agent at Berlin (who had shown it to M. Ancillon), which contained the first 
 intimation of this idea. He saw in this scheme, the fixed determination of the Con- 
 tinental Courts to intervene in favour of the King of the Netherlands. The Due de 
 Broglie at once sent this information to London, and requested M. de Talleyrand, to 
 eliminate all proposals and suggestions which might tend to alter the character of 
 the Conference. (Despatch of June 24th.) 
 
126 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 by the ministers, ended by being carried by eighty-eight votes 
 against sixty-eight. This is a defeat, but it is not thought that 
 it will affect the Ministry. . . . 
 
 Madame Adelaide d'Orl^ans to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Neuilly, June 2nd, 1833. 
 
 MoN CHER Prince, 
 
 The King of Holland's ratification of the Convention 
 of May 2 1st, is indeed a grand, good piece of news! Now I 
 have no longer any doubt as to the speedy and happy 
 termination of this wearisome and difficult Belgian business. 
 Your views, as to the line of conduct to be followed by King 
 Leopold, seem to me perfectly right and fair ; I have therefore 
 written to Brussels in this sense ; but I think they are very well 
 disposed there and that they will commence the disarmament at 
 once. . . . 
 
 The accounts from Blaye are excellent ; Madame la Duchesse 
 de Berry is able to go out in the garden, and I hope before long, 
 that she will be strong enough to travel. She has asked Madame 
 Laurence de Bauffremont ■*■ to return and accompany her on the 
 journey to Palermo. The latter has accepted, and asked M. 
 d'Argout yesterday for a passport, and permission to go there, 
 which has been granted. I have just seen her brother Raoul,^ 
 who told me she was starting to-day for Blaye. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, June iitk, 1833. 
 
 Lord Palmerston received news yesterday from Constanti- 
 nople, which he was anxious to communicate to me. Lord 
 Ponsonby has written to say, that in an interview he had had 
 with Comte Orloff, the latter gave him most positive and satis- 
 factory assurances of the Emperor Nicholas's readiness to recall 
 the Russian troops from Constantinople, as soon as Ibrahim 
 Pasha had effected his retreat. These assurances have now been 
 repeated in so many quarters that it seems impossible to regard 
 them as unfounded. The Russian Cabinet is too astute, not to 
 
 ^ Laurence de Montmorency, daughter of Anne de Montmorency, peer of France, 
 was born in 1802, and married in 1819 to Theodore, Prince de Bauffremont, a majorin 
 the cavalry. 
 
 ^ Raoul, Due de Montmorency, a grandee of Spain, bom in 1790, entered the 
 service in 1807, vcas aide-de-camp to Marshal Davoust, then chamberlain to the 
 emperor. Under the restoration, he became aide-de-camp to the Due d'Orl^ans. He 
 died in 1S62. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 127 
 
 recognize that the destruction of the Ottoman Empire is not a 
 matter to be accomplished by a coup de main. The time for its 
 partition has not yet arrived, and the cautious Cabinets who may 
 foresee it, will have time to prepare for it. Russia has at this 
 period gained great moral force by accustoming the Turks to 
 the presence of Russian soldiers, and she will be satisfied with that 
 for the present. Poland exhibits only too well the effect of gradual 
 procedure, which Russian policy knows how to utilize even in 
 matters which seem to interest her most. 
 
 Lord Ponsonby also gives Lord Palmerston an account of a 
 step taken by Admiral Roussin with the Porte, which does not 
 appear to have been very opportune ; it is with reference to the 
 request made by the French ambassador, that the French 
 squadron might be permitted to enter the Bosphorus, simultane- 
 ously with the Russian ambassador's undertaking to procure the 
 recall of the Russian troops, as soon as Ibrahim had effected his 
 retreat. I am very sorry that this has occurred, as in any case, 
 such a step will be considered as having been made either 
 too soon or too late. However, you will no doubt have already 
 heard, that Lord Ponsonby had induced Admiral Roussin 
 to withdraw his request. 
 
 King Leopold's speech has just been received here. It is 
 more noticeable for future requirements than for satisfaction ^ 
 with the present. . . . 
 
 June 2^h, 1833. 
 MON CHER Due, 
 
 I have not disguised from you the difficulties of the 
 English Ministry, but I think I also told you, two months ago, 
 that I did not consider the crisis was as imminent as some 
 people supposed. The result has proved I was right ; but if 
 the difficulties disappeared gradually, they have as gradually 
 cropped up again, and it is only too evident that they have now 
 attained a serious degree of gravity. It is no longer a mere 
 question of establishing harmony between the two Houses 
 by a fresh and extensive creation of peers, to which the king is 
 averse, as being an abuse of power, but it is also a question of 
 triumphing over the two factions, Tory and Radical, in the lower 
 House, both of which are much dissatisfied with the Church 
 Bill,^ one side because too much has been taken away, the other 
 because too much has been retained. United, these two factions 
 might easily upset the majority in the House of Commons., 
 
 * The King of the Belgian's speech at the opening of the Chambers. 
 " The Bill for the reduction of the Irish Church establishment, which for more 
 than two months had been the subject of violent debates in Parliament, 
 
128 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 I keep carefully aloof, almost absurdly so, from all these 
 present agitations ; but, if as a simple spectator, I cannot help 
 seeing the difficulties that surround the Cabinet, I, nevertheless, 
 cannot yet share the predictions of those who accord it only a 
 very short existence. One must, however, admit the possibility 
 of this ; the next three weeks will solve this great question. . . . 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, June 2')th, 1833. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 The papers will have informed you of the unfortunate 
 fate of the amendment, which we had intended should take place 
 in the Customs law. No sooner was this amendment printed, 
 than it excited a general outcry in the Chamber ; the uproar was 
 so great that most of those who had intended to support it lost 
 courage.^ Saint Cricq, who was to have explained it, was in the 
 room next to the Chamber ; he declares on his honour, that he 
 had only gone out for a moment, and that the President spite- 
 fully brought forward the amendment for discussion before it 
 was due. However, the fact remains, that the amendment, 
 having been put to the vote before it was explained, was rejected 
 with acclamation by an enormous majority, no one having the 
 hardihood to defend it against such universal opposition. We 
 had against us, besides those interested, of whom there were a 
 great number, and who made a great disturbance, the whole of 
 the Opposition, who declaimed against the power which this 
 amendment would place in the hands of the government. I 
 fancy that the English Ministry will be very vexed at all this, 
 and I frankly express my own great annoyance. The truth is, 
 that both Thiers and Humann are very conservative at heart, 
 
 ^ The session of the Chamber was about to close, without having passed the new 
 Customs Law containing important reductions in the duties, which were impatiently 
 awaited in England. At one of the final sittings, therefore, on the iSth June, the 
 Cabinet presented, through M. de Saint-Cricq, the following additional Article to the 
 financial law: — " The king shall, by order in Council, have power from now until 
 next session of the Chambers to put in provisional execution, by extension of the 
 privilege granted by Article 34 of the law of December 14, 1814, such of the pro- 
 visions of the draft Customs Law, presented to the Chamber of Deputies on the 3rd 
 December last, as in the interest of trade, agriculture, and manufacture, appear to be 
 urgent. Such orders as may have been issued in virtue of this arrangement shall be 
 presented to the Chamber next session, in order to be converted into law." 
 
 The reading of this Article created loud protestations in the Chamber, and it was 
 thrown out without discussion. Nevertheless, the Cabinet passed, on the 29th of 
 June, irrespective of and after, the close of the session, a royal ordinance, containing 
 numerous reductions of duties, which appeared in the Moniteur ; it was countersigned 
 by M. Thiers. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 129 
 
 and that it is only out of compliance they yield to my impor- 
 tunities and my efforts to modify the Customs tariff; if they 
 did not actually show any bad faith, in the delays created to 
 prevent the discussion of this law, and in the misadventure of 
 the amendment, they probably did not exhibit quite as much 
 zeal as I should have done. You must kindly do your best to 
 appease the displeasure of the English Government. Mean- 
 while, I will endeavour to repair the evil, by trying to find in the 
 existing laws some means of doing in part, what the amend- 
 ment would have given us a right to do. I am working heart 
 and soul, and hope to succeed. I rest all my hopes, mon Prince, 
 on your friendly skill to repair our follies. Accept. . . . 
 
 Paris, /«/)/ ist, 1833. 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I told you in my last letter of the Customs question, 
 of the rejection of the amendment in the Chamber of Deputies, 
 and of the hope I had of finding in existing legislation some way of 
 repairing this parliamentary mishap. We have, in effect, found 
 this way, though not without seriously involving our responsi- 
 bility. I have succeeded in getting my colleagues to adopt it ; 
 the order is signed, and will appear to-morrow or the day after 
 in the Moniteur ; it contains on the silk question, which was 
 not discussed, all that the Customs law bore. With regard to 
 cotton, as the proposals of the Commission were not to take 
 effect until two years after the promulgation of the law, the 
 delay is but of slight importance to the English Government. 
 It is in fact of little consequence, whether the law is passed this 
 session or not, since its effect would become deferred. We shall 
 exercise every care to see that account is taken of this delay, when 
 the Customs law is next drawn up. I think the English Govern- 
 ment will be satisfied with what we have done ; they will be 
 wrong if they are not, for in truth we are compromising our- 
 selves greatly on this point, and I am not at all sure that we 
 may not repent it yet. 
 
 I should like to give here, as I did after the recital of the 
 taking of Antwerp in January last, a rhumi, as short and 
 succinct as possible, of the new phase on which the affairs of 
 Holland and Belgium had entered, consequent upon the Conven- 
 tion of May 2 1 St. I will thus spare the reader the details of the 
 long and wearisome negotiations which very shortly recommenced 
 and continued for several months. This point once set aside, I 
 VOL. V. K 
 
130 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 shall only have to give extracts from the correspondence con- 
 cerning those other European matters, which the French 
 Embassy in London had to deal with at that time. 
 
 As has been seen, King William of the Netherlands had 
 ratified the preliminary Convention of May 2ist,^ which placed 
 Belgium in such an advantageous position, that she had no need 
 to desire the conclusion of a treaty which would definitely 
 regulate her relations with Holland. It was not quite the same, 
 however, as regards the other Powers, notably Austria and 
 Prussia, who, when signing the treaty of November 15th, 183 1, 
 on which the existence of the new Kingdom of Belgium was 
 based, had, in the name of the German Diet, reserved its rights 
 to the Duchy of Luxemburg. It must be remembered that in 
 virtue of this treaty, one portion of the Duchy of Luxemburg 
 had been incorporated with the Kingdom of Belgium, in exchange 
 for a part of the province of Limburg, which in 1790 did not 
 belong to the States-General of Holland. The Vienna and 
 Berlin Cabinets were therefore specially interested in resuming 
 the negotiations, in order that a definite treaty might be arrived 
 at between Belgium and Holland, such as had been formerly 
 stipulated for in the Convention of May 21st. Article V. of this 
 Convention was conceived in the following terms : 
 
 "The high contracting parties pledge themselves to attend with- 
 out delay to the definite treaty which is to determine the relations 
 between the States of H.M. the King of the Netherlands, Grand 
 Duke of Luxemburg, and Belgium. They will invite the Courts 
 of Austria, Prussia, and Russia to concur therein." 
 
 This invitation, given by France and England to the other 
 three Courts, had been accepted by them, and the London Con- 
 ference, which had been dissolved, consequent on the adoption 
 of coercive measures, was now again reconstituted. 
 
 The treaty of November iSth, 1831, concluded between the 
 five Powers and Belgium, had declared that a direct treaty 
 between Holland and Belgium would still have to be carried 
 out. But what was to be the character of this direct treaty } 
 
 According to the Note of the Conference of November 
 
 ^ The ratjficzitions wers exchanged in London, May 29th. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 131 
 
 iSth, 1831, the direct treaty between Holland and Belgium 
 ought to have contained the literal reproduction of the twenty- 
 four articles, to be accepted word for word by Holland, as had 
 been done by Belgium. But a literal reproduction was no 
 longer possible, because : 
 
 1. The three Courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, when 
 ratifying the treaty of November iSth, had made some reserva- 
 tions which entitled Holland, by agreement, to open up a fresh 
 discussion on some of the twenty-four articles ; 
 
 2. It had been recognized that some explanation was in- 
 dispensable respecting such of those articles as were not quite 
 clear ; 
 
 3. Lastly, the plenipotentiaries of the five Courts, in default 
 of sufficient information, had been compelled to leave some 
 questions unsolved which it now became necessary to reduce to 
 some definite arrangement. 
 
 The King of the Netherlands had decided on sending M. 
 Verstolck de Soelen, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, to join his 
 plenipotentiary, M. Dedel ; and the Belgian Government, on its 
 side, had sent General Goblet, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
 assist M. Van de Weyer. The new negotiations were thus 
 opened with an amount of solemnity which seemed to promise 
 their speedy termination. 
 
 The Conference held its first sitting on July 15th, 1833, and 
 resolved that : 
 
 1. The plenipotentiaries of the Netherlands and Belgium 
 should be heard separately and treated exactly alike ; 
 
 2. That the negotiations should, as much as possible, be 
 verbal ; 
 
 3. That the treaty of November 15th, should serve as the 
 basis for the negotiations ; 
 
 4. That the articles of this treaty should be submitted 
 separately to each side, and initialed, in case of adoption, either 
 with or without modifications. 
 
 The territorial question was to form the first subject of the 
 negotiations. No objections were raised as to the arrangements 
 come to respecting this question by the treaty of November 1 5l.h, 
 but there was some hesitation on a secondary point. 
 
132 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 These arrangements, as has been seen, were based on 
 the principle of an exchange between a portion of the Belgian 
 territory in the province of Limburg, and a portion of the 
 Grand Duchy of Luxemburg ; consequently, according to this 
 principle, the ceded portion of Limburg ought to have been 
 substituted for that of Luxemburg in all the transactions of 
 this latter country with the Germanic Confederation. But in 
 citing in Article III. the co-relation that existed between these 
 two cessions, the treaty of November 1 5th admitted in Article 
 IV. the alternative of the reunion of that portion of Limburg, 
 either to Holland or to the Germanic Confederation, and by 
 Article V. reserved to the King Grand Duke, the power to 
 arrange regarding this with the Diet and the agnates of his 
 House. The Cabinet of the Hague, which wished to incorporate 
 the right bank of the Meuse with Holland, instructed its 
 plenipotentiaries to ask, that Articles HI. and V. of the treaty 
 and the terms of Article II., which pointed out the connection 
 between the two cessions, might be eliminated. The Belgian 
 plenipotentiaries, after having referred to their government, 
 consented to this excision, on condition that the King Grand 
 Duke should gain the assent of the Germanic Diet, and the 
 agnates of the House of Nassau, before the treaty was signed. 
 The Dutch plenipotentiaries on their part, declared themselves 
 authorised to accept this double undertaking. 
 
 The articles relative to the territorial delimitations were 
 thereupon initialed by both parties, and subsequently also 
 the Articles VII., VIII., X., XV., XVI., XVII., XVIII., 
 XIX., XX., XXL, XXII., XXIII., XXIV., and a twenty-fifth 
 Article was added, which declared that there would be peace 
 between the King of the Netherlands and the King of the 
 Belgians, &c. 
 
 The examination of the five articles which gave rise to these 
 demands on the part of Holland was then proceeded with. These 
 were : Article IX., relative to the navigation of the rivers and 
 streams ; Article XL, concerning the use of the roads which 
 traversed Limburg ; Article XII., concerning the power of estab- 
 li.shing a canal or a road through Limburg ; Article XIII., relative 
 to the annual payment of the debt, and to the liquidation of the 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 133 
 
 sinking fund syndicate; and lastly, Article XIV., concerning 
 the arrears of the debt.^ 
 
 The Conference for some time, followed both parties in 
 the examination of these questions ; but when it became 
 convinced, that the Cabinet of the Hague had taken no steps 
 whatever to obtain the double consent required for the cession 
 of Luxemburg, it considered it ought again to suspend the 
 negotiations, and subordinate their resumption to the accom- 
 plishment of the engagement entered into by the King Grand 
 Duke. We shall, further on, find mention of this suspension of 
 the negotiations and the reasons which caused it 
 
 We will now return to the correspondence. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, July /^th, 1833. 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 I informed Lord Palmerston of the resolutions adopted 
 by the king's government on the subject of the customs, of which 
 you kindly gave me notice. Lord Palmerston was much 
 pleased, and requested me to express in his own name as well as 
 that of his colleagues, their great satisfaction thereat 
 
 I had the honour of informing you that the English Cabinet 
 were about to endeavour, by some conciliatory measures, to 
 escape from the difficulties which had arisen in the House of 
 Commons ; in this they have succeeded by means of some 
 concessions in the Bill on the temporal affairs of the Irish Church. 
 The difficulties have almost disappeared, and the Ministry now 
 seem to feel that they will reach the end of the session 
 happily, despite the obstacles inseparable from parliamentary 
 struggles. The session will probably close about the middle of 
 August. 
 
 News has been received here, but without any details, of the 
 disembarkation on the coast of Algarve of the expedition 
 organized by M. Palmella and M. Villaflor at Lagos. This 
 expedition, which only consists of 2,500 men, was not strong 
 enough to venture on landing at Lisbon, where it expected to 
 receive further encouragement. 
 
 * This method of procedure was not approved at Paris. The Cabinet of the 
 Tuileries did not desire to reopen negotiations on questions which appeared to it to 
 have been decided by the treaty of November isth. See Madame Adelaide's letter 
 on the subject, Appendix letter No. 10. 
 
134 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 July ith, 1833. 
 
 I am very glad that M. de Freville ^ has come here, he will 
 appreciate the success of your courageous ordinance. It will 
 speedily be seen, thanks to your care, that reciprocity is better 
 than reprisals ; the former never engenders quarrels. In the 
 present state of public opinion, the most cautious will be com- 
 pelled to acknowledge that no one nation can continue to 
 produce at a cheaper rate than the others. The soil never 
 changes, but all industries can be learnt. 
 
 M. Dedel and M. Verstolck are expected to-morrow morning. 
 It is seven weeks now since the preliminary treaty was made ; in 
 this treaty, all the advantages are on the side of the Belgians ; 
 notwithstanding this the King of Holland still creates delays. 
 It is very difficult to explain this, for money will soon fail him, 
 and it is more than probable that the States-General will not grant 
 him a fresh credit ; at least, that is the general opinion. I will 
 tell you my first impression as soon as these gentlemen have 
 arrived. . . . 
 
 July ^th, 1833. 
 
 Intelligence has just been received of the expedition which left 
 Oporto under the orders of M. de Palmella and M. de Villaflor. 
 The disembarkation took place on the 24th June, at the small port 
 of Villa Real, in the kingdom of the Algarve, close to the 
 Spanish frontier. The letters, which are dated on the 28th, state, 
 that immediately after the disembarkation, which was effected 
 with hardly any resistance from the Miguelist governor, M. de 
 Villaflor proceeded to Tavira and was to advance thence on Beja, 
 the capital of the province of Alemtigo, where he expected a 
 good deal of support. M. de Palmella, for his part, went to 
 Faro, where he busied himself in organizing the Kingdom of 
 Algarve ; all the towns along the coast have proclaimed Queen 
 Dona Maria. . . . 
 
 Captain Napier,^ commandant of the fleet, was to return to 
 
 ' French Councillor of State, sent to London to advise as to the application of the 
 Royal Ordinance on the Customs, mention of which is made in the Due de Broglie's 
 letter of July 1st. 
 
 ' Captain Napier commanded the fleet of Dom Pedro ; he had taken the name of 
 Carlos de Ponza v.hile in Portugal, because in 181 3 he had taken possession of the 
 little Island of Ponza on the Neapolitan coast, with great eclat. 
 
 Sir Charles Napier, born in 1780, commanded a vessel in 1809, took part in the 
 Portuguese campaign, and signalized himself in various enterprises till 1815. He was 
 then placed on the retired list. In 1829, he entered the service of Dom Pedro, and 
 contributed largely to the successesof his cause. In 1834, he entered Parliament. He 
 was made commodore in 1839, rear-admiral in 1846, and vice-admiral in 1853. He 
 failed before Cronstadt in 1854, and returned to England, where he died in i860. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 135 
 
 the mouth of the Tagus to blockade Lisbon, as soon as he had 
 proclaimed the queen at Lagos. . . . 
 
 July li^h, 1833. 
 
 The news arrived this morning in London that Queen Dona 
 Maria's fleet, commanded by Admiral Carlos Ponza (Captain 
 Napier), had encountered the squadron of Dom Miguel on the 
 5 th of this month off Cape St. Vincent, and that, after a spirited 
 engagement. Admiral Ponza had captured two of Dom Miguel's 
 line-of-battle ships, two frigates, and one corvette. . . . This 
 news has created great sensation in London ; the Ministry are 
 much pleased, and one cannot but think that this will be very 
 helpful to them, in the important discussions that will come on 
 when Parliament opens this week. 
 
 M. de Bourmont's son has arrived here from France, bringing 
 considerable sums of money with him. He has just purchased 
 a large steamer. The United Kingdom, which will start for 
 Lisbon during the course of the week, laden, it is said, with 
 ammunition, artillery, and English officers, who have been 
 induced to enrol themselves. 
 
 July islA, 1833. 
 
 .... We have this morning held our first conference on 
 Dutch and Belgian affairs. . . . After the conference, I informed 
 Lord Palmerston of the communication you made to me in 
 your last despatch, on the subject of an offensive and defensive 
 treaty of alliance between Russia and the Porte, which Admiral 
 Roussin had mentioned to you."- Lord Palmerston has received 
 the same information from Lord Ponsonby, although in a rather 
 less positive manner. Sir Frederick Lamb also writes that when 
 M. de Metternich spoke to him of it, he seemed very much 
 annoyed that anyone should believe in the existence of such a 
 treaty. Neither Lord Palmerston nor I, can conceive that Russia 
 would have dared to take such a step ; but my own opinion is, 
 that if the treaty does exist, Austria must be a party to it, for 
 it would be unreasonable to suppose that Russia would, by her- 
 self, make a treaty which must necessarily place Austria, France, 
 and England in opposition to her ; besides, the conduct of the 
 Vienna Cabinet would, on this occasion, be quite in accord with 
 many of its antecedents. . . .^ 
 
 July igtA, 1833. 
 
 The discussion in the House of Lords on the second reading 
 of the Bill relative to the temporal power of the Irish Church, 
 
 * See pages 119 and note, also 140. ' See pages 140 and 141. 
 
136 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 which has already lasted two days, will probably be concluded 
 this evening. Lord Grey's speech on the first night produced an 
 immense effect, and has been universally applauded. The 
 position of the Cabinet has greatly improved during the last few 
 days ; there seems no longer any doubt that the Bill will pass 
 its second reading, and it is even thought that only some un- 
 important changes will be made in committee. The calmer 
 and more conciliatory feeling shown just now by the Opposition 
 in the House of Peers, is generally attributed to the moderate 
 stand taken by the Duke of Wellington. . . . We have heard 
 nothing from Portugal since the news of Admiral Napier's 
 victory. . . . 
 
 July 26th, 1833. 
 
 I can perfectly understand the interest with which you must 
 follow the course of the Hollando-Belgian affairs ; I will there- 
 fore, as I have done since the negotiations were resumed, con- 
 tinue to keep you aic coiirant of all the deliberations of the 
 Conference. You always have been, and will continue to be, 
 kept informed of everything that strongly interests us here, 
 and truly, on this point, you ought often to be much wearied by 
 the multiplicity of my letters and despatches. The other 
 ambassadors generally wait till we have arrived at some decision 
 in the Conference before writing to their Courts. I think I am 
 the only one who writes almost daily ; and perhaps this is a 
 mistake, as I thereby draw your attention to mere crude ideas, 
 and so expose your judgment to an uncertainty v/hich might 
 even momentarily lead it astray. 
 
 I do not think that during the three years that I have been in 
 London, the king has had cause to complain of weakness or 
 imprudence on my part, or that he can ascribe the present 
 delays to any other reason than to that spirit of conciliation, the 
 great advantage of which, experience proves to me more and 
 more each day. 
 
 I do not believe that this is a time for trying a new system, and 
 the incident at Maestricht, mentioned by M. d'Eyrague, confirms 
 this opinion. Remember, that in order to terminate the Belgian 
 affair, we have at last obtained the friendly joint action of the 
 northern Powers ; that we owe the present calm to them, and 
 that it would be as easy as it would be dangerous to compromise 
 their present good feeling, so little dm to natural impulse, by 
 unlimited complaisance towards Belgium. The real interests of 
 the Belgians will be secured ; but their fancied needs must not 
 be allowed to obstruct our course and prejudice the good feeling 
 existing in Europe, which is of such importance just now. . . . 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 137 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, July iith, 1833. 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 Whenever any difficulties arise, we are always obliged 
 to have recourse to you. I am therefore most anxious to 
 acquaint you at once of the Portuguese business, and ask your 
 advice as to what course to pursue, if Lisbon should shortly 
 surrender to the Marquis de Palmella. 
 
 Without doubt we shall rejoice at this event, supposing 
 it does take place ; but we cannot conceal from ourselves that 
 it will certainly cause us some serious embarrassment. The 
 very precarious position in which Spain is already placed, will 
 become still more so, and every day we are brought face to face 
 with fresh complications, consequent on the attempts made to 
 bring about a revolutionary state of affairs in the Peninsula. 
 These difficulties will be more or less numerous, or more or less 
 urgent, according as the establishment of the young queen is 
 directed by Dom Pedro or by Palmella, and according as the 
 Brazilian Charter is or is not, set aside. I fancy that it is quite 
 as important to the English Government as it is to us, that Dom 
 Pedro and his Charter should be removed from Portugal as soon 
 as possible, and for this it is necessary that the two governments 
 should understand each other, and agree in good time as to the 
 line of conduct they intend to pursue. We learn from Oporto, 
 that Dom Pedro has forbidden Palmella to enter Lisbon without 
 him. We also know that Palmella has decided not to obey him. 
 Lastly, we are also aware, that the empress has received secret 
 orders not to permit the young queen to embark, until Dom 
 Pedro himself writes to say that he wishes to have her sent to 
 him. It seems to- me, that we cannot too soon endeavour to 
 frustrate his design to take exclusive possession of the whole 
 affair. I should like to know what measures you consider most 
 efficacious to arrive at this end, and at the same time those you 
 deem most easy to arrange with the English Government. 
 
 Be so good as to give me the benefit of your advice on this 
 point, as well as on all the others, and accept. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie, 
 
 London, /«</)/ 27M, i833. 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 M. Bresson will no doubt have informed you, that H.M. 
 the King of Prussia was obliged to go to Toplitz from the 22nd 
 
138 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 to the 24th of this month, accompanied by M. Ancillon, another 
 of his ministers, and one of his private secretaries. Prince Felix 
 de Schwarzenberg ^ was to be there at the same time as his 
 Majesty. It appears that H.M. the Emperor of Austria, who just 
 at this time is staying at his estates in Bohemia, has invited the 
 King of Prussia to visit him there. Prince Metternich will go 
 from Konigswerth, and it is believed that the meeting of the 
 two sovereigns will take place on the 20th of August. It is not 
 yet known in London whether the Emperor Nicholas will be 
 present at this meeting. . . . 
 
 July yith, 1833. 
 MON CHER Due, 
 
 I reply, with the least possible delay, to the very friendly 
 and flattering letter you have written to me, respecting our 
 position and that of England with regard to Portugal. I have 
 seen Lord Palmerston on this subject ; I think he seems fully to 
 recognize the advantage there would be, in separating Dom Pedro 
 from his daughter's cause and recognizing a regency excluding 
 the Due de Braganza, but of which Palmella would be the centre 
 and the head. While Lord William Russell for example, 
 might be accredited to it. The two other members (because 
 matters only require three) would be M. de Villaflor on the one 
 side, and a moderate Miguelite, if it were possible to secure 
 one for the cause of the young Queen, on the other. It 
 would be a very fortunate thing if the Miguelite in question was 
 M. le Due de Cadaval.^ 
 
 I am too ignorant as to the actual state of feeling in Spain, and 
 as to your language at Madrid respecting Portugal, to be certain 
 whether you would care to follow the course I have just pointed 
 out to you ; but in case it should meet with your approval, I 
 think it would be useful to send a French envoy to Portugal 
 in the same position as that of William Russell, to act in 
 concert with him there, point out, when opportunity occurs, 
 the advantages of the regency, and recognize it at once in 
 the name of France. This plan would certainly have the 
 
 ^ Felix Louis Jean Frederic, prince de Schwarzenberg, an Austrian General 
 and Statesman. Born in 1800. He followed simultaneously a military and 
 diplomatic career, was attache at the Embassy at St. Petersburg in 1824, then in 
 London (1826), at Rio de Janeiro (1827), at Paris, and Berlin. He was then 
 appointed Minister at Turin, whence he was transferred to Parma and to Naples 
 (1846). In 1848, he became head of the Austrian Cabinet, and held this high office 
 tillhis death {1852). 
 
 ^ Minho-Caetano- Alvarez Pereira de Mello, due de Cadaval, born in 1798, was 
 descended from a younger branch of the house of Braganza. Dom Miguel nominated 
 him in 1828, President of the Council of Ministers. He was an energetic supporter 
 of the absolutist cause, and after Dom Pedro's triumph he fled to Paris, where he died 
 in 1838. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 139 
 
 advantage of establishing a government in Portugal, which would 
 act in the name of the young Queen, without her presence being 
 absolutely necessary, at a time when you might fear that 
 her stepmother, in obedience to Dom Pedro's orders, would 
 place some obstacle in the way of Dona Maria's departure. I think 
 that the regency should abandon Dom Pedro's constitution, that 
 great terror of Spain ; this in my opinion would not be difficult 
 to do, and it would allay all the irritability of Europe. It will 
 not be an easy matter for you to select some one to send to 
 Portugal, as above all he must not be a party man. You will no 
 doubt talk all this over with Lord Granville. Lord Palmerston 
 is to-day writing fully on this question to him ; it has occupied 
 us the greater part of the morning. . . . 
 
 July 2,isi, 1833. 
 
 It is midnight, the sitting in the House of Peers has just 
 ended ; the ministers have had a majority of fifty-three votes.^ 
 You may consider the session as concluded. The Ministry will 
 have no more real difficulties to contend with. 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, Jufy 30/A, 1833. 
 
 A thousand thanks, mon Prince, for your kind letter of the 
 26th, and for all the admirable work you have done. It seems to 
 me that, thanks to you, this Belgian business is in a very fair 
 way, and I am beginning to hope that we shall see the end of it 
 at last. I pray you to believe that my opinion of the Belgians 
 is the same as yours, and that my sole idea in mentioning 
 them to you, is to endeavour to deprive them of any pretext for 
 committing some folly, which would either spoil your work or 
 cause you fresh embarrassments. 
 
 Our fetes ^ went off admirably, and I really think if you were 
 to return here a few weeks hence to spend part of the autumn, 
 you would hardly recognize us. , , , 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, August 2nd, 1833. 
 
 Lord Palmerston has just communicated to me the following 
 news from Lisbon : — 
 
 '_ This was the Bill on the Reform of the Irish Church Establishment. It was 
 carried in the Peers by 135 votes against 81. 
 
 '■' The fetes on the anniversary of the days of July. They were signalized this year 
 by the replacement of Napoleon s statue on the VendSme column. 
 
140 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 " Queen Dona Maria was proclaimed at Lisbon on the 
 24th July. Tliere has been an engagement, south of the Tagus, 
 on the 23rd between General Villaflor and Tellez Jorda6 ; the 
 latter was killed and his troops were defeated ; the Spanish min- 
 ister ^ who was fighting with the Miguelites was taken prisoner 
 by Villaflor. On the morning of the 24th the Due de Cadaval 
 retired from Lisbon with the garrison. The people immediately 
 and unanimously proclaimed Dona Maria Queen. In the after- 
 noon of the same day, Villaflor crossed the Tagus with fifteen 
 hundred men. On the 25th, the fleet entered the Tagus. On 
 the evening of the 26th, the Emperor Dom Pedro embarked with 
 all his ministers on board a steamer for Lisbon, leaving 
 Saldanha^ as civil and military governor of Oporto. The 
 besieging army were beginning to retire." . . . 
 
 August 2nd, 1833. 
 
 You will already have received the news which reached 
 London to-day, and of which I have this moment been informed. 
 They have just heard that the treaty between Russia and the 
 Porte has been signed at Constantinople,^ and although it is 
 stated to be purely defensive (which even we might admit), 
 experience proves that in similar circumstances, a defensive 
 treaty when it suits can very easily become an offensive one. 
 
 Such a matter demands the full attention of the king's 
 Government, and it is because I feel the importance of prompt 
 
 ^ Louis-Fernandez de Cordova, Spanish General and Diplomat, born 1799, one 
 of the staunchest partisans of King Ferdinand VII., whom he supported unceasingly 
 against the constitutional party. He was Secretary of the Embassy at Paris in 1825, 
 then Minister in Prussia. In 1832, he was accredited to Dom Miguel, whose cause 
 he energetically supported. He took part in the civil wars of Spain and sided with 
 Queen Isabella. He died in 1840. 
 
 ^ Joao Carlos, Due de Saldanha Oliveira e Daun, a Portuguese statesman and 
 General, grandson of the Marquis de Pombal, bom in 1 780 ; in 1810, he accepted the 
 French rule and was taken prisoner by the English ; he then went on to Brazil. On 
 his return to Portugal, he was made Minister of Foreign Affairs to King John VI. 
 On the king's death, he became head of the Liberal party, and upheld the cause of 
 Dom Pedro. Created a Marshal in 1834, he was made War Minister and President 
 of the Council in 1835. He retired from office in 1846, and was for the next fifteen 
 years mixed up with all the civil struggles in Portugal. In 185 1, he again came into 
 power, which he retained for five years. The Marshal later on became minister 
 plenipotentiary in London. He died in 1875. 
 
 3 This was the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, signed on the 8th July, between Comte 
 Orloff and the Ottoman Government. By this treaty, Russia and Turkey contracted 
 an offensive and defensive alliance against any attack at home or abroad whatsoever. 
 Russia promised to assist Turkey with all the help she might need, either by land or 
 sea. Finally, by a supplementary article, it was agreed that in case of necessity, the 
 Porte would close the Dardanelles, that is to say, that she would allow no vessel to 
 enter there under any pretext whatever. 
 
 This treaty was to hold good for eight years. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 141 
 
 and vigorous action, that I do not hesitate to send you the 
 result of some reflections suggested to me by the situation. 
 
 It seems to me that France ought to act in concert with 
 England, and you will no doubt deem it advisable to make 
 known your views to Lord Granville with regard to this ; I on my 
 side will make use of any directions you may think fit to send 
 me. 
 
 According to the letters received from Constantinople, the 
 ratifications of the treaty are not to be exchanged for two 
 months : this is valuable time, of which we must make the most. 
 
 In the present state of affairs, France and England have to 
 choose between St. Petersburg, Bohemia, where M. de Metternich 
 is, and Constantinople, and use all their influence in order to 
 prevent the ratification of the treaty just concluded. 
 
 It is more than probable, that it was only after very mature 
 reflection, and in consequence of a persevering policy, that they 
 decided at St. Petersburg to draw the Porte into this alliance ; 
 there is therefore every reason to fear that the proceedings of 
 the two courts will have no influence with a Cabinet fixed in its 
 resolutions, and, one moreover which does not usually show itself 
 very well disposed towards France and England. 
 
 As for M. de Metternich, judging from his language to M. 
 de Sainte-Aulaire and Sir Frederick Lamb, we must suppose 
 either that he is himself deceived, or that he wishes to deceive 
 us.^ In the former case much time would be wasted in 
 disabusing him ; in the second, he would only seek to increase 
 our embarrassment still further by the tortuous measures of the 
 policy he has adopted. Although I do not lay much stress 
 on the efficacy of any attempts that may be made with him, still I 
 think they must not be entirely neglected. 
 
 ^ M. de Sainte-Aulaire wrote to the Due de Broglie on the 5th of July, giving him 
 an account of an interview he had had with M. de Metternich on Eastern aflairs : 
 M. de Metternich, he said, " pretends that he knows nothing of this treaty (Unkiar- 
 Skelessi), but he declares that if it exists, it has been conceived and accomplished not 
 only without Austria's participation, but without a single circumstance occurring to 
 arouse the suspicions of the Vienna Cabinet. This would, however, according to liim, 
 be one more reason for working together in the future, and the greater the importance 
 attached to this fresh danger against the independence of the Porte, the greater reason 
 will England and France have to unite with Austria and Russia, in order to substitute 
 a common protectorate, in place of an exclusive one." M. de Metternich gives 
 reiterated assurances, that Austria will not permit Russia to acquire either an increase 
 of territory or an exclusive protectorate of the Porte. Prince Mettemich's distrust and 
 ill-will towards Russia are very strong. Nevertheless, he would not at any price 
 decide to break with her abruptly, but he is very anxious to organize mutual 
 negotiations. M. de Sainte-Aulaire added, that on the 14th July he had come to an 
 agreement with M. de Metternich, as to the necessity of the four Powers notifying to 
 the Porte that they all took an equal interest in her preservation, and that they intended 
 to protect the integrity of her territory. [Official correspondence of M. de Sainte- 
 Aulaire. Extracts. ] 
 
142 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 But it is at Constantinople, above all, that we must con- 
 centrate our means of action ; it is there that the French and 
 English ambassadors must represent to the Sultan the danger 
 into which he is rushing ; they must entreat him, even menace 
 him, if necessary, and above all, they must endeavour to secure that 
 large party in the Divan and the Ministry, which refused the 
 Russian alliance. It is not possible to believe that just when 
 the Russian troops have quitted Constantinople, and when, 
 consequently, the Sultan has recovered some sort of independence, 
 the united voice of France and England should not make itself 
 successfully heard. 
 
 Our sole aim must be to prevent the ratification of the treaty, 
 and in my opinion the way to arrive at this is by a prompt and 
 energetic declaration from both Powers, in order to assure the 
 Porte of a support which may have become necessary to her, and 
 in default of which she has allowed herself to be led away. 
 
 It seems to me that the English and French representatives 
 have acted prudently, in not taking any steps before the departure 
 of Comte Orloff and the Russian troops. 
 
 August 2nd, 1833. 
 MON CHER Due, 
 
 I send you some very important news from Lisbon, 
 which I believe is quite true. It appears that Dom Pedro has 
 gone thither. By this time the regency will have been estab- 
 lished ; my views of the day before yesterday are therefore 
 out of place. But if, in consequence, England and France have 
 not been enabled to take part in establishing the regency, they 
 now remain in a position either to recognize it or not. I cannot 
 at this moment tell you which side England will take with 
 regard to this, and perhaps, under these circumstances, the course 
 to be pursued by us must not depend entirely on that which she 
 will adopt. England has direct interests with Portugal ; our 
 direct interests are with Spain. Portugal has only a second-hand 
 interest for us. The conditions under which it might suit us 
 to recognize the regency, could therefore not be identically 
 the same as those which would suit England. I think I 
 ought to draw your attention to all this, when the time for a 
 decision seems so near. . . . 
 
 August c^tk, 1833. 
 
 I have received the despatch No. 85 ^ which you did me the 
 honour to send, and I notice with great satisfaction from its 
 contents, that my opinion is quite in accord with yours con- 
 ' See Despatch of 1st August, Appendix letter No. 11. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 143 
 
 cerning the serious matter that has just taken place at Con- 
 stantinople. 
 
 I have been urging the English Ministry for the last few 
 days, to take in this question the line which I pointed out to 
 you in my last despatch, and I can now tell you the resolution 
 they have adopted. 
 
 An English courier will start to-morrow for Constantinople, 
 taking Paris on his way. Lord Granville will be instructed to 
 communicate to you the despatch that has been sent to Lord 
 Ponsonby. This despatch will express, in a very clear and 
 pronounced manner, the astonishment and dissatisfaction ex- 
 perienced by the English Government on hearing of the alliance 
 concluded between the Ottoman Porte and Russia, accompanied 
 by an orderto make this known to the Ottoman Government, at the 
 same time pointing out the dangers of the situation in which it has 
 placed itself Lord Ponsonby will have to make it plain that the 
 Porte, in accepting this treaty, renounces her independence, which 
 henceforth will be submissive to the wishes and requirements of 
 Russia ; that by this one act, her power has become annihilated 
 in the eyes of Europe, as well as in those of her own people. He 
 will specially insist on the dangers that such a treaty must occa- 
 sion, in the existing relations between the Sublime Porte and her 
 old allies ; that England can only recognize her as a dependent 
 of Russia, and that in the event of a war with this latter Power 
 she would be obliged to treat the Ottoman empire as an enemy ; 
 that such a result, which nevertheless is inevitable, would annul 
 all the Porte's relations with old and faithful allies such as 
 England and France, and would deliver her up to the power of 
 Russia, her persistent enemy. 
 
 This is about the summary of what is being sent to Lord 
 Ponsonby ; you will probably deem it desirable to transmit some- 
 what similar instructions to Admiral Roussin. I think it very 
 important that both the ambassadors should be in accord in the 
 steps they take, and work in concert on all points. 
 
 If you adopt this course, you will no doubt communicate to 
 Lord Granville the instructions you send to Admiral Roussin. 
 It would also, I think, be advisable, that the French courier who 
 takes your orders should start at the same time, and perhaps 
 together with the English courier, so as to furnish, even in actual 
 execution, a fresh proof of the community of views between 
 France and England. 
 
 There is no time to lose, for the exchange of the ratifications 
 between Russia and the Porte is to take place on the 8th of 
 September, and all our efforts must be directed to prevent this 
 exchange. 
 
144 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 You will see that in all this I make no mention of Austria. 
 As I had the honour to inform you in my last despatch, any 
 overture made to Austria just now would hamper instead of help 
 us. But after the departure of the couriers, it might be as well 
 to allow some observations on the present circumstances to reach 
 Vienna, so that later on we may be enabled to represent to the 
 Austrian Cabinet that we did not neglect to make known our 
 views to it, and that it rested with them to join us ; for we 
 must equally avoid being hampered, or accused of want of 
 confidence. . . . 
 
 August ith, 1833. 
 
 The English Cabinet has decided to recognize Queen Dona 
 Maria's Government officially. This recognition will be ex- 
 pressed simply by accrediting an English envoy to the regency. 
 Lord William Russell, who, as you are aware, is already at Lisbon, 
 will be charged with this, which will have the character of a 
 special mission. 
 
 Lord Palmerston will write at the same time to Mr. Adding- 
 ton,^ the English minister at Madrid, to tranquillize the Spanish 
 Government as to the consequences of this recognition, by letting 
 them understand that in thus acting, England has only made use 
 of the same right that Spain exercised when she recently re- 
 cognized Dom Miguel. Mr. Addington is also to give the further 
 assurance, that it is the firm intention of England to prevent any 
 sort of reaction in the Peninsula. 
 
 When the return of Queen Dona Maria comes into question, 
 would you not deem it advisable that she should be escorted by 
 a French as well as an English frigate 1 I believe the English 
 Government would regard this with pleasure. . . . 
 
 August 6th, 1833. 
 
 I have just seen Lord Palmerston, who told me that the 
 departure of the courier for Constantinople has been delayed 
 until to-morrow. The disposition displayed by the English 
 Government in always bringing forward fresh delays in the 
 decisions on Eastern affairs, induces me sometimes to think that 
 it does not sufficiently realize their importance. However, 
 the king's Government will thereby have one more day, for 
 deliberating on a matter which certainly merits the most serious 
 attention. 
 
 ' Henry Unwin Addington, cousin of the minister of that name. Born in 1790, 
 he entered the diplomatic service, was Secretary of Legation at Berne and at 
 Copenhagen, Ckargi d^ Affaires at Washington (1822), then Envoy Extraordinary at 
 Frankfort (1828), and at Madrid (1829). In 1833, he was Under-Secretary of State 
 at the Foreign Office, and became Privy Councillor in 1854. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 145 
 
 The steamer which is to take Lord William Russell's 
 credentials, starts for Lisbon to-morrow. I think there is no 
 reason for you to hasten the despatch of a minister to Portugal. 
 Such action taken by France would be much more marked 
 than when taken by England, who only accredits some one who 
 is already on the spot. You, however, will have information on this 
 point, which ought to place you in a position to judge much 
 better than I can, as to the most opportune moment for 
 taking such a step. . . 
 
 August Zth, 1833. 
 
 .... Lord Palmerston sent Lord William Russell his cre- 
 dentials yesterday, but at the same time authorized him 
 not to make known his position, if any disturbances or 
 other circumstances seemed to him to render this step un- 
 advisable. This information may, in case of need, be useful 
 to you. 
 
 The night before last, the English Government asked the 
 shipowners in the city for fifteen transports of three and 
 four hundred tons, whose services they would require for 
 three months. A report got abroad that they were intended 
 for the conveyance of troops to Portugal, which did not 
 seem at all improbable. However, it appears this is not the 
 case, at any rate for the present, since they have confined 
 themselves to receiving the shipowners' offers, without giving 
 any positive replies ; it is probable that they only desired to 
 assure themselves as to the facilities available in case of urgency. 
 
 Moreover, the English Government is fully assured as to 
 the views of the Madrid Cabinet ; the ministers acquainted 
 me that Mr. Addington had informed them that in his last 
 interviews with M. de Zea, he found him much more con- 
 ciliatory and moderate, and that he even seemed to wish 
 to reject any project of intervention on the part of Spain 
 in the affairs of Portugal. 
 
 Mr. Aston will have made known to you the instructions 
 that were sent from here yesterday to Lord Ponsonby. Lord 
 Palmerston has received the draft of the formal protest to 
 Constantinople, of which you informed Mr. Aston ; he enter- 
 tains it very favourably, and I may tell you, that it is quite 
 in accord with the views of the English Cabinet. . . . 
 
 August \oth, 1833. 
 
 We have to-day exchanged with the Bavarian minister 
 the ratifications of the explanatory and supplementary article 
 VOL. V. L 
 
146 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 to Art. VIII. of the Convention signed in London on the 
 7th of May, 1832, for the final settlement of Greek affairs.^ 
 
 During this assembly of members of the Conference on 
 Greek affairs, a question arose as to the demand that will 
 be immediately made to us by the Greek Government, in 
 order to obtain the guarantee of the three Powers to the 
 third part of the loan. Lord Palmerston and Prince de Lieven 
 told me that they were authorized to accord this guarantee, 
 and I have promised to obtain your instructions on this 
 point ; I therefore pray you to inform me of the wishes of 
 the king's Government, and whether or not, I am authorized 
 to accede to this Greek demand. . . . 
 
 August loth, 1833. 
 
 I herewith send you an extract of the news received here 
 to-day from Portugal ; it is dated up to the 31st July, and 
 is, on the whole, very satisfactory as regards Queen Dona 
 Maria's cause. 
 
 The Emperor Dom Pedro entered Lisbon on the 28th, and 
 a great number of people of the higher classes, among them 
 several grandees of the kingdom, hastened to do homage 
 and make their submission to the young Queen. The Patriarch 
 of Lisbon, not wishing to follow the Due de Cadaval, had 
 already ordered the names of the Queen and the regent 
 to be inserted in the church prayers. . . . 
 
 In the action that took place on the 23rd, against Tellez 
 Jordao, the Due de Terceira took eight pieces of cannon ; the 
 enemy lost 300 men and two squadrons of cavalry. M. de 
 Cordova, the Spanish minister, was actually taken prisoner 
 during this business ; but although he had been seen directing 
 and encouraging the Miguelist troops during the fight, the Due 
 de Terceira at once ordered him to be set at liberty. On his 
 return to Lisbon, M. de Cordova had all the arms of the legation 
 removed from his hotel, and retired to Coimbra. . . . 
 
 Several diplomatic and other despatches have been seized, 
 which throw a good deal of light on the intrigues of Dom Miguel's 
 agents, friends, and protectors. According to letters from Oporto, 
 dated July 29th, the enemy is said to have lost five thousand 
 men in the action of the 25th. Among the list of dead are 
 General Cardozo, M. de Bourmont's son, and M. Duchatel, and 
 it is also affirmed that a number of other important persons have 
 
 ' See page 113. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 147 
 
 been killed : M. de Bourmont ^/^/-^, M. Clouet, and M. Lemos are 
 among the wounded. . . . 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, August ith, 1833. 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 To-day I confine myself to replying to your com- 
 munications concerning the treaty between the Porte and Russia. 
 To-morrow I will write to you about the Portuguese business. 
 Let every day bear its own burden. 
 
 The first thing that strikes me in reading over this treaty 
 again is that the Eastern question is drawing to its close, and 
 that whatever we do, we must avoid reopening and starting it 
 afresh. You approve the conduct of our ambassadors ; you 
 consider that they have done well not to compromise the 
 evacuation of the Bosphorus, by trying to place obstacles in the 
 way of the signature of the treaty. I fully agree with you, and 
 the conclusion I draw therefrom is, that any action on our part 
 which might have the effect of raising fresh difficulties and 
 reproducing complications at Constantinople, would cause 
 greater inconveniences than advantages. 
 
 Another consideration which also influences me is that the 
 treaty does not materially change anything in the existing 
 state of affairs. 
 
 The Porte undertakes to give aid to Russia if the latter 
 demands it. This is a mere farce. It is no real advantage to 
 Russia ; she has no need of it, and the Porte is not in a position 
 to carry out her undertaking, if she were put to the proof. 
 
 Russia undertakes to give aid to the Porte if the latter 
 demands it, and in such proportion as she may require. This is 
 not more serious either. Treaty or no treaty, Russia will always 
 be ready to send her ships into the Bosphorus and her troops to 
 Constantinople, and from the moment that she no longer ac- 
 quires the right by treaty to send them there, without awaiting 
 a request from the Porte, (as the Porte, in like manner, reserves to 
 
 ^ Louis-Auguste- Victor, Comte de Ghaisnes de Bourmont, born in 1773, was an 
 officer in the French Guards at the time of the Revolution. He emigrated, served 
 in Conde's army and then in Vendee. He was arrested during the Consulate, but 
 managed to escape. Returned to France in 1810, and re-entered the service. He 
 became a General of Division. His conduct in 1815 will be remembered. In 1829, 
 he was for a short time War Minister, and in 1830, commanded the expedition to 
 Algiers, which won him a Field Marshal's baton. He refused to swear allegiance to 
 Louis Philippe, followed the Duchess de Berry into Vendfe in 1832, and then placed 
 his services at the disposal of Dom Miguel, whose troops he commanded. He 
 returned to France in 1836. 
 
 L 2 
 
148 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 herself the right of asking for them or not, and deciding the 
 extent and the nature of the aid she may seek,) Russia has 
 gained no positive right, and I say again, that actually, matters 
 remain pretty much as they were. 
 
 But, if the treaty does not assure any material advantage 
 to Russia, it will produce a great moral effect, to which she 
 is quite right to attach some value, and which we must not 
 ignore. 
 
 First, by concluding this treaty, under the very eyes of 
 France and England, Russia has had the best of it, if I may so 
 express myself ; she has concluded the matter to her own profit, 
 and proved herself in the ascendant. 
 
 Secondly, the treaty has the air of sanctioning and in some 
 way perpetuating, what has been done : the intervention of Russia 
 in the quarrel between the Porte and her Pashas, the occupation 
 of the Bosphorus and Constantinople, instead of being something 
 extraordinary and unheard of, on which all eyes have been fixed, 
 becomes a simple and natural matter, an aspect quite habitual 
 to the Ottoman Empire. 
 
 The power of the Divan to resist the Sultan, when his fear 
 or his fancy induces him to invoke the aid of Russia, will thus 
 be diminished. 
 
 The Emperor of Russia, likewise, will acquire the facility of 
 interfering again, without being obliged to take so many pre- 
 cautions, engagements, and considerations with reference to the 
 Western Powers of Europe. 
 
 This, if I am not very much mistaken, is the real result of the 
 treaty. This is what we must guard against, while at the same 
 time taking care not to disturb the state of tranquillity in which 
 the departure of the Russians has left Constantinople. 
 
 This once established, if we did make any effort to 
 prevent the ratification of the treaty, I fear, either that we 
 should not succeed, or that we should be obliged to do more 
 than we wish. 
 
 The treaty is to be ratified in two months, or sooner if 
 possible; it will probably be sooner. When our instructions 
 arrive, matters will probably be so far advanced, and the ratifica- 
 tions so near being exchanged, supposing it has not already 
 been done, that our chance of preventing them will be very 
 small ; and if, after attempting it, we fail, the triumph of 
 Russia will be all the greater, her power more affirmed, and her 
 success more complete. Admitting that we succeed, we should, 
 as matters are at present, embroil Russia hopelessly with the 
 Porte ; consequently, we should be pledged implicitly to sup- 
 port the latter in all her difficulties, to assist her in her troubles, 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 149 
 
 and to protect her in every way — in a word, to take charge of 
 her. This is a good deal for Powers so distant from the Porte 
 as France and England. And troubles would not be 
 long in making themselves felt. Russia is so mixed up with 
 Turkish affairs, the treaty of Adrianople has given her such great 
 advantages, the war contribution, (the greater portion of which the 
 Porte still owes,) the occupation of the principalities, the troubles 
 in Servia,^ and numerous other circumstances, afford so many 
 means of complicating the Sultan's position, that her work will 
 always be ready to her hand, while we shall be obliged to keep 
 soldiers and vessels constantly at the service of the Porte, if we 
 do not want her to elude us, and again throw herself into those 
 arms from which we have only with difficulty rescued her. 
 
 This would, if I mistake not, create more trouble than need 
 be, and the remedy might end in becoming more dangerous than 
 the evil. What then should be done .' 
 
 The following is my view of the matter. Both the legations 
 of France and England should on the same day send a note to 
 the Porte, couched as nearly as possible in the following terms : 
 after announcing that the existence of the treaty has become 
 known to them, they should complain of it to the Porte (but in 
 very measured terms) as showing a want of confidence towards 
 those governments with whom the Porte has always had reason 
 to be well satisfied, who have constantly given her proofs of 
 their interest and friendship, and are still ready to do so. They 
 should point out that as the existence of the Porte is not menaced 
 by any foreign Power, but, on the contrary, the maintenance and 
 integrity of the Ottoman Empire are urged, upheld, and de- 
 manded by all the Powers with whom this empire comes in 
 contact, the treaty could only have one aim, namely, that of 
 establishing, as a fact, the habitual intervention of Russia in the 
 home affairs of the Ottoman Empire, that is to say, of placing 
 that empire under the protection of Russia, and making the 
 occupation of the Bosphorus, if not a constant fact, at any rate 
 a simple and by no means extraordinary one. It must then 
 be stated, that such an arrangement could never be admitted 
 either by France or England ; that if individuals have the right 
 to give up their independence, such is not the case with States, 
 their independence being of consequence to other States and a 
 matter of public right ; that the interdiction of the Bosphorus 
 to armed vessels of all nations is a principle founded on treaties ; 
 that the existence of the Porte, as a state sui juris, is a common 
 
 ' In virtue of the treaty of Adrianople, Turkey had obtained certain portions of 
 Servia. This incorporation had not taken place without protest. The inhabitants of 
 the ceded districts rose, and, aided by the Servian troops, drove out the Turks. 
 
ISO THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 interest ; that, consequently, neither France nor England could 
 recognize or respect the treaty in question, inasmuch as it would 
 be in violation of this ; and that when the time for the execu- 
 tion of this treaty arrived, they reserved to themselves the right 
 of acting as if it did not exist, believing that they could not 
 possibly be opposed, either by the Porte or by Russia, in their 
 just demands, which they would know best how to support, if 
 necessary. 
 
 This note, after having been remitted to the Porte, without 
 asking for any reply, and merely as a simple declaration, should 
 then be communicated also to Russia by the two legations at 
 St. Petersburg and likewise without asking for any reply. 
 
 It seems to me that this mode of proceeding has the 
 advantage of not opening up the Eastern question again, or 
 entering into fresh discussions. It leaves it undisturbed and at 
 the same stage at which it has arrived. Moreover, we shall have 
 the last word in this affair instead of Russia. 
 
 Whatever answer we may receive, we shall reply that we can 
 only refer to our declaration. 
 
 Finally, this will be sufficient to annul the moral effect of the 
 treaty. On the one side, the anti-Russian portion of the Ottoman 
 Government will be made aware that it is supported by France 
 and England ; that it can offer opposition without running the 
 risk of finding itself standing alone ; and that as by the actual 
 terms of the treaty, aid from Russia must be asked for, it can 
 make a struggle to prevent this demand, as though the treaty 
 did not exist. On the other hand, the Emperor of Russia is 
 warned that if he attempts to send his vessels a second time into 
 the Bosphorus, he will be subjected to the same treatment as 
 before ; that he is being watched ; that the treaty will not be 
 accepted as an excuse ; and that the very existence of this treaty 
 is only a further reason for vigilance and disquietude. 
 
 This, mon Prince, is how I look at the matter, its con- 
 sequences, and the remedies it is possible to apply to it. To do 
 more than this would, I think, lead us into a path strewn with 
 rocks, and with a very vague and uncertain ending. Have the 
 goodness to tell me how far you deem these ideas feasible, and 
 wherever you find them faulty, kindly point out to me the means 
 of rectifying them. 
 
 As for M. de Metternich, I confess I do not count much on 
 him. If he is really sincere, I think if he takes offence it will only 
 be short-lived and of little consequence. Nevertheless, it is 
 unfortunate that he should just now be away from the influence 
 of M. de Sainte-Aulaire and Sir Frederick Lamb ; but as neither 
 of them is invited, I do not see any means of their going to 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 151 
 
 Bohemia in attendance on the Emperor of Austria. I will, 
 however, endeavour to learn what takes place there from Maison, 
 who is at Carlsbad, and who has received an invitation from the 
 Emperor of Austria, a means of rendezvous of which he intends 
 to avail himself. . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, August \ith, 1833. 
 MON CHER Due, 
 
 I should like my answer to your confidential and frank 
 letter to be equally full and useful to you. Your last letter 
 showed me the need, if I required any further stimulant, for 
 earnestly wishing that your Ministry, already so fortunate in 
 many respects, should be equally fertile in good results, amid all 
 the numerous complications which arise each day. 
 
 The Eastern question is undeniably the most serious of 
 the whole range. The very fact of a treaty between the Porte 
 and Russia, apart from the other Powers, so evidently upsets the 
 equilibrium, that it seems to me it must be put a stop to 
 before anything else. Like yourself, I fear that we may 
 be too late, but I also think that we ought at least to attempt 
 what later on, we might be reproached for not having tried. The 
 other considerationsso clearly developed in your letter, necessarily 
 escaped me, as in default of a mass of information which can only 
 be obtained at the Foreign Office, I could but take note of isolated 
 facts. I have been particularly struck by the encroaching, though 
 measured and slowly progressive, policy of the North ; by her 
 uniformly persevering and cautious action, which never becomes 
 rapid except when it is a question of availing herself by prompti- 
 tude and skill of the actually opportune moment. This has 
 alone occupied me, as being the real danger against which 
 civilized P2urope demanded the close and simultaneous union of 
 France and England. 
 
 But collateral considerations might, I admit, paralyze this 
 action. I therefore yield to those which you have been good 
 enough to bring to my notice. I cannot, however, understand 
 the Sultan's monetary difficulties as regards Russia, for the Greek 
 loan furnishes him with the means of acquitting himself of the 
 tribute imposed by the treaty of Adrianople.^ I am not aware 
 
 ' The Treaty of Adrianople imposed upon Turkey a tribute of 137 millions ; but 
 Greece only owed Turkey the sum of 12 millions, levied upon her by the Convention 
 of l6th September, 1832, which determined her northern frontier. It is evident 
 therefore, that although Turkey had her tribute materially reduced by the Treaty of 
 29th January, 1833, a considerable difference still existed between the amount due by 
 the Porte to Russia, and that which was due to her from Greece. 
 
152 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 whether there exist any special and pecuniary exigencies on the 
 part of the Russians for the period of their occupation of 
 Constantinople. 
 
 However, the great distances will of themselves have resolved 
 one part of the question, for the English courier, as well as yours, 
 will probablyonly arrive in time to protest against an accomplished 
 fact. The protest of England, which Lord Ponsonby is ordered 
 to make use of if the ratifications have been exchanged, is drawn 
 up in the same spirit as that of which you speak in your letter to 
 me, and which has served as a guide and model here. There is 
 therefore nothing further to be done just now ; we must wait for 
 the replies from Constantinople. 
 
 In my despatch to-day, I send you all that is known here 
 about Portugal ; the news is up to the 31st. 
 
 The refractory spirit of the Belgian Cabinet is such, that 
 the whole Conference is half inclined to grant King William the 
 delays he no longer dares ask for. . . . 
 
 August i6th, 1833. 
 
 The last accounts from Portugal have by no means reassured 
 the English Government, which, for the last fortnight especially, 
 shares the apprehensions you expressed to me, in the last despatch 
 you did me the honour to write respecting the claims of the 
 Emperor Dom Pedro. The English ministers would like to set 
 aside this Portuguese prince altogether, but have not as yet found 
 any suitable means of attaining this end. For the peace of the 
 Peninsula, they dread the influence which the very advanced men 
 who surround Dom Pedro may exercise over him ; and they 
 have no confidence in anyone, except the Due de Palmella and 
 the Due de Terceira. The instructions sent to Mr. Addington 
 and Lord William Russell, which have been communicated to 
 you, will have been useful to you in directing the conduct of the 
 King's Government in an affair which needs the greatest possible 
 care. . . . 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, August l^th, 1833. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 Eight days ago Mr. Aston, the Chargd d' Affaires \r\ Lord 
 Granville's absence, showed me, by Lord Palmerston's wish, the 
 instructions he has sent to Lord William Russell, which appeared 
 to me very judicious, very reasonable, and completely adapted 
 to the present state of affairs in Portugal. Lord Palmerston at 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 153 
 
 the same time informed the French Cabinet, that the intention 
 of the English Cabinet was to accredit Lord William Russell 
 to the regency of Dom Pedro, but as an envoy extraordinary, 
 entrusted with a special and provisional mission ; it being 
 the intention of the English Cabinet not to defer establishing 
 diplomatic relations with Queen Dona Maria's Government. 
 Nevertheless, the organization of an ordinary and permanent 
 mission is to be considered as a favour which Dom Pedro 
 must first merit by his wisdom, prudence, and his good 
 conduct. 
 
 The English Cabinet has avoided the formal recognition of 
 Dona Maria's Government, by referring to the recognition which 
 had taken place in 1826, and making the present recognition 
 consist in the simple fact of resuming diplomatic relations. 
 
 Mr. Aston asked the French Government to associate itself with 
 him, both in the nature of the steps to be taken, and in the choice 
 and position of the agent who would be entrusted with them. 
 
 I at once observed that the English Government had the 
 advantage of having its agent already established there on the 
 spot, whereas if we were to send a man of the same rank and 
 position as Lord William Russell as our envoy to Portugal, 
 it would be a much graver step and pledge us much further. 
 Nevertheless, as Mr. Aston urged it, I promised him I would take 
 the King's directions and the advice of my colleagues on this 
 subject. 
 
 The advice of the Council was to satisfy the English 
 Government, as far as it was in our power, by recognizing Dona 
 Maria, supposing that the English Government recognizes her ; 
 to make this recognition, as it has done, consist in the resumption 
 of diplomatic relations ; and to send a man of the same rank and 
 position as Lord William Russell, to Portugal, as a minister 
 charged with a special and provisional mission. In order however 
 that we should not do more than the English Government, I pro- 
 posed and the Council adopted, the following expedient : that this 
 official should go with Dona Maria, without any title, as if to 
 take her back and do honour to her, reserving to ourselves not to 
 send him his credentials until after his arrival in Lisbon, and when 
 he would be already there for another reason. 
 
 The King had already designated M. de Flahaut for this post, 
 his relations with England and Portugal seeming to point him 
 out as more suitable than anyone else. 
 
 In the midst of all this, we heard of the Marquis de Louie's ^ 
 arrival at Brest. He had come from Dom Pedro, but had to 
 
 ^ Dom Pedro's Minister, who had married his sister, the Princess Anne. 
 
154 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 undergo quarantine for ten days. It was thought that at the end 
 of two or three days he would send on his despatches, and that we 
 should then know what he had come for ; but until this evening 
 he kept, or rather they kept, the object of his mission a profound 
 secret. ^ Only it was easy to see that there was some mystery at 
 work. The King, having visited the Duchess de Braganza, with 
 the view of offering her a French frigate, if she wished it, to carry 
 her to Portugal, found her very cold and reserved. 
 
 At length, last night, when the Duchess de Braganza went to 
 see the Queen, she incidentally mentioned that she intended 
 leaving at once ; that some Portuguese vessels would be at Havre 
 on the 25 th to convey her ; that she would not therefore require a 
 French frigate, and further, that she meant to take her brother, the 
 Due de Leuchtenberg, with her and had written to tell him to 
 meet her at Havre. 
 
 That was the key to the enigma. It is clear that Dom 
 Pedro and his wife intend to endeavour, at once and openly, 
 to bring about a marriage between Dona Maria and the Due de 
 Leuchtenberg. 
 
 I need not point out to you, mon Prince, the foolishness of 
 this project, and how very offensive this proceeding is to the King. 
 
 It is also quite plain now, that if the success of Dona Maria's 
 cause has been so difficult to accomplish, if even now it is still 
 somewhat doubtful in Portugal, it is not because the Portuguese 
 like Dom Miguel, but because Dom Pedro has done his best 
 to denaturalize this cause, and to deprive it of everything 
 national and Portuguese, by identifying it with himself, his 
 follies, his freaks, and his idiotic Constitution, and in confounding 
 it with the cause of all the disturbances, all the fire-brands, and 
 all the fuor usciti of Europe. Now, there certainly is no more 
 direct and certain way of achieving this in the minds of the 
 Portuguese, and at once disgusting the moderate party as well 
 as the masses, than by endeavouring to make Dona Maria 
 marry an adventurer, whose sister Dom Pedro married, when 
 despairing of his cause, and when none of the reigning families 
 in Europe would contract an alliance with him. Nothing would 
 more completely shock the pride of the Portuguese than such an 
 alliance, or ruin all hopes of even the semblance of a peaceful 
 future. 
 
 Moreover, what could we say to Spain in such a case ">. 
 
 In 1831, we declared that we could not tolerate the Due 
 de Leuchtenberg on the Belgian throne, because that throne 
 would necessarily become the hot-bed of all the Buonapartists' 
 intrigues, and all the authors of disorder who follow in the wake 
 of every claimant. How can we now tell the Spanish Government 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 155 
 
 that it must not mind seeing the Due da Leuchtenberg 
 on the throne of Portugal, when that throne must inevitably 
 become the rendezvous and centre of all \he Josephines''- and all 
 the malcontents of the Peninsula ? Add to this the Constitution, 
 the liberty of the press, the tribune and the refugees. How- 
 could we contest the right of the Spanish Government to defend 
 itself against a state of affairs which would so manifestly 
 threaten its existence ? 
 
 Lastly, the matter is also very serious from another point 
 of view. It shows that Dom Pedro evidently intends to go 
 his own road, to gratify his whims, and conduct his daughter's 
 affairs at random to the same point to which he has so happily 
 brought his own, without any regard for the other Powers whose 
 support is necessary to him. If England and France give in 
 to him now, if they do not at once take a very high hand 
 with him, I believe that all chance of exercising the slightest 
 ascendency over him, will disappear entirely. 
 
 As for the king, how unbecoming, I might almost say insolent, 
 it was, to take such a resolution without informing him of it — 
 without consulting him — and only telling him about it incidentally 
 and by chance as it were ! 
 
 Under these circumstances, mon Prince, the French Govern- 
 ment considers that it ought to ask the English Cabinet to act 
 energetically with it, to thwart so senseless and disastrous a 
 scheme. It thinks that a joint step should be taken by both 
 Governments towards Dom Pedro, which would consist in sending 
 him a despatch couched in the plainest and most categorical 
 terms, pointing out the danger and folly of such a project, and 
 concluding by stating that the French and English Govern- 
 ments did not intend to compromise themselves in Dona 
 Maria's cause, except in so far as the sensible conduct of those 
 who directed it, gave a reasonable hope of success, and that 
 the moral and material support, which they were expected to 
 accord, would be regulated hy the deference paid to wise and 
 prudent counsels. 
 
 In conclusion it should be demanded that the Due de Leuchten- 
 berg should depart, and the projected marriage be absolutely 
 abandoned. 
 
 In thus proposing a joint action to the English Government, 
 mon Prince, you will see that we do not renounce the idea of 
 at once establishing diplomatic relations with Dom Pedro's 
 Regency. Nevertheless, the conduct of the Due de Braganza, 
 
 ^ This was the name given to the Spanish partizans of King Joseph during the 
 French occupation. Later on, this term was extended and applied to all liberals 
 and revolutionists. 
 
156 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 is on this occasion so offensive to the king, that it would be 
 impossible for him to send any person of distinction with Dona 
 Maria, or to have her escorted by a French frigate. He owes 
 it to himself to resent the insult offered and to show it plainly. 
 We shall content ourselves by sending credentials to M. de 
 Lurde,^ the Secretary of Legation at Oporto, who will reside 
 provisionally at Lisbon, not exactly as a Chargi d' Affaires, 
 (which would indicate a permanent mission,) but as charged with 
 the affairs of France. He will second Lord William Russell 
 in all his efforts to restrain and moderate Dom Pedro. If the 
 English Government is of opinion that the course I have 
 indicated above should be carried out, I will communicate 
 the despatch which I shall send to M. de Lurde to Mr. Aston, 
 so that he may inform Lord Palmerston of its contents, and 
 I will also send you a copy, mon Prince. It would I think 
 be well, that the language should be as much alike as possible. 
 
 It is moreover not necessary for me to remind you, that this 
 is not the first time the question of Dona Maria's marriage has 
 been the subject of correspondence between England and 
 France. The English Government is already quite in accord 
 with us as to the impossibility of tolerating the Due de 
 Leuchtenberg ; and it also agrees with the French Govern- 
 ment, that it would be well for Dona Maria to marry a 
 prince of Naples, which according to the information we 
 have received, does not seem at all impossible. In any case, 
 there can be no question of her marrying one of our princes. It 
 is quite enough to have to defend Belgium, and please Heaven 
 we may never have another such task to carry out.^ . . . 
 
 The Due de Brogue to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, August 17M, 1833. 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 Events succeed each other very rapidly, but their daily 
 progress it seems to me, shows more and more the necessity of 
 acting with prudence and decision in Portuguese affairs. If we 
 allow matters to take their natural course, everything before long 
 will have reached such a state of confusion that even the most 
 skilful will not be able to put them straight. 
 
 ' The Comte de Lurde, Secretary of the Legation in Portugal since 1833, had 
 been previously on a mission to Rio de Janeiro (in 1830). In 1838, he became first 
 Secretary of the Embassy at Constantinople, then Minister at Buenos Ayres. 
 
 "^ Since the preceding February, M. de Talleyrand, who had probably felt his way 
 in Paris on this question, had received from Madame Adelaide a most categorical reply. 
 See Appendix, letter No. 8. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 157 
 
 The following, if I am not mistaken, is the object we ought 
 to have in view. 
 
 1. To exclude Dom Pedro and Dom Miguel from Portugal. 
 
 2. To adjourn putting the Constitution of 1 826 into operation, 
 until more peaceable times will allow of its revision and 
 adaptation to the customs of Portugal and the interests of all 
 parties. 
 
 3. To marry Dona Maria to some prince, who would 
 not excite either the anxiety of Spain or the jealousy of any 
 one. 
 
 Looking at it in this light, I do not think the proposal made 
 by M. de Zea to M. de Rayneval, is quite to be despised.^ 
 
 If by guaranteeing the exclusion of Dom Pedro and the 
 adjournment of the Constitution, subject to its revision later on, 
 we could obtain from the Spanish Government its recognition 
 of Dona Maria, and aid in negiotiating a marriage between 
 this princess and a prince of Naples, we should I think be doing 
 a wise action, and one not exceeding the measure of possibility. 
 
 The Spanish Government is evidently in great perplexity ; 
 it has little hopes of upholding Don Miguel ; it is dissatisfied 
 with his conduct as regards Don Carlos ; it feels the necessity of 
 returning to friendly relations with the Court of Naples, with 
 which it had almost become embroiled over the question of 
 the succession ; there would be an opportunity of doing so by 
 offering it a crown for the second or third prince of the house of 
 Naples. 
 
 By taking this line, the French and English Governments 
 would not only have Spain on their side, but also the whole of 
 Europe, as well as the greater part of Portugal ; they would have 
 no adversaries, so to speak, except Dom Pedro and the train of 
 blunderers who follow in his suite. 
 
 It will then remain to be seen how the two Governments will 
 proceed in order to dispossess Dom Pedro and succeed in driving 
 out Dom Miguel, without intervening openly and with an armed 
 force in the affairs of Portugal. 
 
 ' The Spanish Cabinet was extremely excited about Dom Pedro. It feared that 
 England would openly take up arms in his favour, and declared that it should consider 
 such an act as a declaration of war, for the fall of Dom Miguel, would, they said, involve 
 that of the Spanish monarchy itself (M. de RaynevaTs despatches of lyk and \<^th 
 July. ) When the news of Dom Pedro's entry into Lisbon on the 2nd of August, reached 
 the Government, Madrid became more and more anxious. M. de Zea proposed to 
 M. de Rayneval to exclude Dom Pedro and instal Dona Maria with a Regency, from 
 ■which her father should be left out. {Despatch of August l2iA.) Mr. Addington was 
 also sounded as to this. On the 9th August, M. de Rayneval confirmed the preceding 
 information, and added that M. de Zea consented formally to recognize Dona Maria, 
 provided he received a complete guarantee against Dom Pedro and his Constitution, 
 (M. de RaynevaVs official correspondence'). 
 
1S8 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 As for Dom Miguel, his fall will be greatly accelerated if 
 Spain abandons him ; it will result naturally from the course of 
 events and from the success of the opposite party. 
 
 As regards Dom Pedro, however, the matter is much more 
 difficult. 
 
 The true way, as far as I can judge, is to separate Dom Pedro 
 from the cause of the Constitution, and to turn, if I may so express 
 it, his Constitution against himself. According to the terms of 
 article ninety-two of this Constitution, the Regency devolves on 
 the nearest heir to the existing sovereign. Dom Pedro is not a 
 Portuguese ; Dom Pedro is not an heir ; his regency is a usurpa- 
 tion ; the regency belongs to the Infanta Maria Isabella, who 
 administered it in 1826, in default of Dom Miguel.^ 
 
 This is the ground upon which we can take a stand. 
 
 If the two Governments formally declare, that they resume 
 affairs at the exact point they occupied when the summons of 
 Dom Miguel to the Lieutenant-Generalcy upset everything, that 
 they will not give any moral or material support except to Dona 
 Maria's Government, as it then existed, it is probable that they 
 will create a Portuguese party at Lisbon which will awe Dom 
 Pedro and end by forcing him to retire from affairs. In acting 
 thus, they might, if it is absolutely necessary, deviate more or 
 less with the approbation of every one from the system of neu- 
 trality, and from the moment that their efforts are directed 
 simultaneously against both princes, and with the object of 
 benefiting Spain, it is quite certain that no objections will be 
 made. Their arbitration would in fact be admitted, similarly to 
 that of the whole Conference in the affairs of Belgium. 
 
 Dom Pedro once expelled, it would be easy enough to come 
 to an understanding about the Constitution, and to modify it in the 
 manner most favourable to the peace of the Peninsula. 
 
 I am writing these views rather hurriedly, mon Prince, as 
 they come into my head, for I have not had time since the 
 morning to think them over. I submit them, or rather hand 
 them over to your experience. Adopt from them as much as 
 you desire, or nothing at all, if they do not appear to you 
 capable of execution. We shall however adhere to the resolu- 
 tions taken with respect to the Due de Leuchtenberg, and I 
 now confirm all I said to you in my letter of the night before 
 last. . . . 
 
 ^ Dom Pedro was no longer a Portuguese, as Brazil had been separated from 
 Portugal. He was no longer heir to King John VI., as on becoming Emperor of 
 Brazil, he had resigned his right to the Crown of Portugal. The Regency therefore 
 devolved upon the Infanta Maria Isabella, daughter of Dom Pedro, who was Dom 
 Miguel's elder brother. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 159 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie, 
 
 London, August i-jth, 1833. 
 MoN Cher Due, 
 
 Your letter of the 15 th reached me this morning. 
 After reading it carefully and thinking it well over, and like- 
 wise the admirably drawn up documents accompanying it, I went 
 to see Lord Palmerston. My despatch of to-day will give you 
 the general and very satisfactory result of our interview. Here 
 are a few more details. 
 
 The Belgian question has been suspended for the last ten 
 days, this wearies every one. In Brussels they do not fail to 
 prolong this state of affairs. Strong in an advantageous 
 provisional arrangement, confident, more than they ought to be, 
 in the ties of a French relationship, the Belgians give but little 
 thought to peace, equilibrium, and a recognized existence which 
 can only be arrived at by a definite arrangement. The Con- 
 ference cuts but a sorry figure in face of this Belgian silence, 
 which, to say truth, is quite as impertinent as the abuse of the 
 Dutch. You are quite right to set aside all these family interests 
 which are grafted on a foreign policy. It was this which ruined 
 the Emperor Napoleon, it is what is now embarrassing us at Brus- 
 sels, and what would have caused Portugal to become a thorn in the 
 side of France, if they had tried there to bring about a marriage 
 with one of our princes. I pray you to do your very utmost 
 with regard to the Belgians, for matters are becoming urgent. 
 
 England quite understands our objections to the Due de 
 Leuchtenberg, as well as our just indignation at the unbecoming 
 conduct of the Duke and Duchess of Braganza. Lord 
 Palmerston agrees with us that Spain should not be exposed to 
 so disturbing an influence as this marriage would become. In- 
 structions will be sent from England to Lord William Russell to 
 place serious obstacles in the way of such a project. The 
 marriage as well as the Constitution, would disappear with Dom 
 Pedro ; but a more decided course should have been adopted here, 
 and diplomatic agents should only have been accredited to a 
 wise and responsible Regency. Palmella and Villaflor appear to 
 have been quite set aside by Dom Pedro. However, we are 
 without news from Lisbon for some days, and it is impossible to 
 know exactly what is happening there. The English seem to 
 think that for the present, M. de Lurde is a very sufficient repre- 
 sentative ; when matters are a little cleared up, M. de Flahaut 
 will no doubt do admirably. 
 
 The despatch relative to Switzerland, which you have 
 
i6o THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 addressed to Vienna and Berlin, appeared so conclusive to Lord 
 Palmerston, that his letters on this subject, will only be as it 
 were, paraphrases of yours. . . . ^ 
 
 August 17th, 1833. 
 
 This morning I received by courier, the despatch No. 89, 
 which you did me the honour to write, and I profited by the 
 opportunity I had of meeting Lord Palmerston to-day, to discuss 
 the various subjects which you recommended to my notice. 
 
 When I spoke to him of the Due de Leuchtenberg's journey, 
 and the scheme of a marriage with Queen Dona Maria, which 
 might have been the Emperor Dom Pedro's object in inviting his 
 brother-in-law, Lord Palmerston did not hesitate to reply that 
 England could never give her assent to such a project, and that 
 she fully agreed in all the considerations you had so clearly 
 brought forward, in order that France and England might oppose 
 its execution. He added that he was quite ready to give such 
 instructions to Lord William Russell, as would in reality be 
 similar to those you had pointed out. The difference that ex- 
 isted between the position of France and England with regard 
 to Portugal, might perhaps necessitate some slight alteration in 
 the actual form sent, but this would in no way influence the 
 result. You can therefore arrange about these instructions with 
 Mr. Aston, and transmit them to whatever agent you may ac- 
 credit to Portugal. Lord William Russell will receive orders to 
 come to an understanding with this agent, in order that their 
 action may be simultaneous. 
 
 I could not help noticing, from Lord Palmerston's language 
 during this interview, how well founded was the information I 
 had the honour of sending you yesterday, as to the discontent 
 with which Dom Pedro's conduct has inspired the English 
 Cabinet. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, August i^th, 1833. 
 
 I received your despatch No. 90, this morning, and hastened 
 to see Lord Palmerston, to whom I at once communicated it, 
 with certain portions of M. de Rayneval's letters.^ He then 
 gave me Mr. Addington's second despatch to read, which was 
 dated the nth, that is to say, one day later than M. de Rayneval's. 
 
 ^ See in Appendix the. despatch in question, which the Due de Broglie sent to 
 M. Bresson, letter No. 12 
 ^ See page 159. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 161 
 
 In this despatch Mr. Addington gives an account of a conversa- 
 tion he had just had with M. de Zea, the tenor of which was 
 very different to that held with M. de Rayneval. 
 
 Instead of proposing, as he did to the latter, to endeavour to 
 come to some understanding, and find means of securing the 
 pacification of the Peninsula by conciliatory measures, JVl. de 
 Zea on the contrary, declared to Mr. Addington that Spain 
 would in no way swerve from the line of conduct she had 
 followed up to the present in Portuguese affairs, and that for 
 his part, he intended to hold to it. 
 
 Neither Lord Palmerston nor I, could help being struck 
 by this contradiction in the reports of two ambassadors, in 
 whom their Governments, and rightly so, place full confidence, 
 and we were obliged to conclude that M. de Zea was double- 
 tongued, and that he wished to deceive either one or the other 
 of the ambassadors. 
 
 I also told Lord Palmerston that we should expect the 
 English Cabinet to show more determination in its communica- 
 tions, both with Lisbon and Madrid. 
 
 You will have learnt from my despatch. No. 1 59, that Lord 
 William Russell is to act in concert with the agent whom you 
 may accredit to Lisbon, to oppose the marriage projected by 
 Dom Pedro. Lord Palmerston is equally decided to support the 
 scheme of marrying Queen Dona Maria to one of the Neapolitan 
 princes, and he is quite prepared to take any steps you may 
 deem advisable in this matter. 
 
 As to the expulsion of Dom Pedro from Portugal, and the 
 suspension of the Constitution of 1826, he fully shares in your 
 views, and is only held back by the difficulty in finding some 
 means of accomplishing it, without having recourse to violence. 
 He dreads anything that might even have the semblance of in- 
 terfering with the home affairs of the country ; he does not even 
 care for a solemn declaration by both Governments, which would 
 tend to re-establish, under their auspices as you proposed, the 
 state of affairs that existed in Portugal before the usurpation of 
 Dom Miguel. 
 
 Lord Palmerston does not conceal from himself the incon- 
 venience of Dom Pedro's presence in Portugal, or the dangerous 
 effect of the faulty Constitution in 1826 ^ on the peace of 
 the Peninsula ; but, as I had the honour of telling you, even 
 while desiring the end, he recoils from the means. I omitted 
 
 ^ The Constitution wtiich Dom Pedro, had given Portugal, on assuming the 
 Regency in the name of his daughter Dona Maria afier the death of King John VI. 
 It conferred legislative power upon two Chambers, one elective, the other nominated 
 by the King. 
 
 VOL. V. M 
 
l62 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 none of the many weighty arguments you brought forward in 
 your different letters, but I could not get him to make up his 
 mind to any of the bold measures which England ought to 
 adopt under these circumstances. 
 
 Lord Palmerston also told me that after Mr. Addington's 
 reports, it would be impossible for him to take any steps what- 
 ever with the Madrid Cabinet, until M. de Zea had made fresh 
 overtures to the English Government, of a nature somewhat 
 similar to those recently made to M. de Rayneval. 
 
 As I found him quite determined on this point, I thought it 
 best not to urge him further ; reserving to myself, however, to 
 speak to Lord Grey about it, I went to him as soon as my 
 interview with Lord Palmerston was ended. I did not find him 
 in .; I will therefore go there again to-morrow ; but I do not wish 
 to delay in sending you information, which it may perhaps be 
 useful to forward to Madrid. . . . 
 
 Lord Grey to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Downing Street, August 21st, 1833. 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I return you, with many thanks, the Due de Broglie's 
 very interesting letter, with which you did me the honour to 
 entrust me. 
 
 I think there is great justice in the Duke's views and reasons, 
 though I do not share all his fears respecting the marriage of 
 the Due de Leuchtenberg. I shall be delighted to have an 
 opportunity of talking this over with you on my return from 
 Windsor. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, August 22nd, 1833. 
 
 .... I could only see Lord Grey for a few moments 
 about Portuguese affairs ; he is absorbed by Parliament and 
 has also been over to Windsor for a day. He certainly shares 
 your dislike to the marriage projected by Dom Pedro for his 
 daughter, but, nevertheless, he hardly appreciates the very 
 serious consequences it may have on the future of the Peninsula, 
 and I have found both in Lord Grey and Lord Palmerston, if 
 not actual indifference, certainly a hesitation, and indecision 
 concerning the Portuguese question, which might have very 
 serious results, if it were prolonged. I should advise you to be 
 perfectly frank as to this with Mr. Aston. . . . 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 163 
 
 August 2yd, 1833. 
 
 .... Lord Palmerston seemed quite to understand our 
 objections to the Due de Leuchtenberg's marriage ; but I have 
 noticed with pain, that several other members of the Cabinet look 
 at this question with a sort of sentimental policy, which to me 
 seems quite misplaced. Meanwhile, nothing is really being 
 done. Dom Pedro is establishing himself more firmly in the 
 Regency, which he claims as his own, he is leading it to the 
 devil, and unfortunately each day makes it more difficult to turn 
 him out ; it is greatly to be feared now that a civil war alone 
 will upset him. . . . 
 
 August zdtk, 1833. 
 
 .... The instructions which you have sent to M. de Lurde 
 seem to me admirably drawn up, they apply equally to 
 emergencies wisely thought out, and to facts which we know 
 exist already. 
 
 I must congratulate the King's Government more and more, 
 on the line of policy it has adopted in its relations with Spain, 
 and of which your despatch to M. de Rayneval furnishes me with 
 a fresh proof. 
 
 I am inclined to agree with you, that M. de Zea's overtures 
 to our ambassador at Madrid were made with the intention of 
 following suit, and assuring peace to the Peninsula, jointly with 
 France and England. Whether this novel tone on the part of the 
 Madrid Cabinet has been dictated by fear as to the result of the 
 different events at Lisbon, or by some other feeling, it is perhaps 
 as well not to inquire too closely. I have therefore not neglected 
 any arguments, which might induce the English ministers to see 
 the necessity of our coming to an understanding with Spain, in 
 order to arrange the future of Portugal to the advantage of 
 everyone. . . . 
 
 I had the honour to inform you of the bad impression produced 
 here by Mr. Addington's last despatches ; but I do not think that 
 the unfavourable disposition of the English Cabinet towards the 
 Spanish Government is entirely due to these reports ; for people 
 go so far as to say, that there is a general feeling of animosity 
 against M. de Zea, which might lead to some very troublesome 
 complications. The recent nomination of Mr. George Villiers ^ in 
 
 ^ George William Frederick Villiers, Earl of Clarendon, bom in 1800, was in 
 1833, appointed Minister at Madrid. In 1833, he became Lord Privy Seal ; Chan- 
 cellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in 1840 ; Lord- Lieutenant of Ireland from 1847 to 
 1852; and then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He resigned in 1858; was 
 again made Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in 1864, and resumed the ministry 
 of Foreign Affairs in 1865. 
 
 M 2 
 
i64 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 place of Mr. Addington seems rather to give point to this feeling, 
 and although full justice is done to the high character of this new- 
 envoy, a fear is expressed as to his views, which are much more 
 pronounced than those of Mr. Addington, in a way which is 
 hardly in accord with the policy of the Madrid Cabinet. Mr. 
 Villiers' nomination is all the more unfortunate, since M. de Zea 
 only very recently expressed a wish that Mr. Addington should 
 remain at Madrid. 
 
 I must further cite, as a fact in support of the reproaches 
 addressed to the English Government, the publication of the 
 letters which were intercepted at Lisbon — a publication which I 
 have deplored quite as much as you, M. le Due, and which the 
 English Government will have some trouble in justifying.^ Some 
 portions of these letters might have been made use of advan- 
 tageously, either in the hands of some English members of 
 Parliament, or such foreign governments as were more or less 
 compromised by them, and whom the fear of indiscreet revelations 
 would certainly have made more reticent and careful. What seems 
 to me to make this imprudent publication still more to be regretted 
 is, that the English Government has not known how to profit by 
 the sole advantage which it had gained thereby, in being able to 
 
 ^ During the war in Portugal, a certain number of letters addressed to Dom 
 Miguel's Government had been intercepted and communicated to the British Cabinet. 
 The Times obtained possession of them and published them. Amongst this cor- 
 respondence the most curious are, reports addressed to the Due de Cadeval and 
 Vicomte de Santarem by a man named Antonia Ribera Sareiva, secret minister of 
 Dom Miguel in London, seriously compromising many influential members of the 
 Tory party and representatives of continental courts. The letters of 14th July, 1833 
 (reproduced in the Dcbats of 20th August), speak of secret conferences which had 
 been held in London by Marshal de Bourmont with Lord Beresford, M. de Neumann, 
 Austrian Charge d'Affaires, and M. Vial, Spanish Minister. The Portuguese agent 
 thus writes : "The Baron de Neumann told me that, not only he himself, but a 
 number of other persons, and among others the Duke of Wellington, would be 
 delighted to learn that Marshal de Bourmont had gone to Portugal. He added that 
 the three powers had praised his Majesty's resolution to take the Marshal into his 
 service, and that in fact Bourmont ought to look upon his departure for Portugal not 
 as being a mission to save the Portuguese cause only, but that of legitimacy in the 
 whole Peninsula, in Europe, and in the world." After receipt of the news of the 
 destruction of Dom Miguel's fleet on the 17th July, Ribera wrote again : " I have no 
 longer any hope. I have spoken on this subject with the ambassadors of the great 
 powers and other exalted personages. All consider our cause, if not entirely lost, at 
 least very seriously compromised, and the sole hope of those who are interested in us 
 is, that Marshal de Bourmont may be maintained at the head of the land forces." 
 The publication of this correspondence caused a lively sensation in England. Lord 
 Palmerston was questioned on the subject by Mr. Murray in the House of Commons. 
 He asked him if these letters were authentic, or not. " As far as I can judge," added 
 the honourable member, "this correspondence is very strange, and it is annoying to 
 see certain persons therein spoken of as agents of the most detestable government 
 that ever was. If the letters are authentic they do but little honour to English 
 character, but I am ready to believe that the noble Viscount is prepared to deny 
 them." Lord Palmerston refused to reply to the question, which leaves but little 
 doubt as to the authenticity of the documents published. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 165 
 
 pronounce itself energetically with reference to Portuguese affairs. 
 After these letters, it might have considered itself authorized to 
 interfere at Lisbon, in order to expel Dom Pedro and facilitate 
 the reconciliation of Dona Maria's Government with that of 
 Spain. It would have been quite easy for it to have concealed 
 this intervention in the home affairs of the country, under some 
 pretext or other, and besides, success in such cases justifies every- 
 thing. All the Cabinets would thereby have been satisfied, silence 
 would have been imposed on the Tory party in Parliament, and 
 tranquillity thus re-established in Portugal (notwithstanding the 
 suspension of the Constitution of 1826, until the majority of 
 Dona Maria) would have given the Government the most 
 powerful means of defence against that fraction in Parliament 
 which holds the most exaggerated opinions. As you authorized 
 me to do, I have just communicated to Lord Palmerston 
 the instructions you sent to M. de Lurde. He was very 
 sensible of this mark of confidence, and desired me to tell 
 you that he fully approved of these instructions, and that he 
 intended writing to Lord William Russell to instruct him that 
 in his measures generally, he was to act in concert with M. de 
 Lurde. . . . 
 
 August •26th, 1833. 
 MON CHER Due, 
 
 I have taken away the official character of the despatch 
 I am sending herewith, so that you may, if you think proper, 
 only look upon it as a private letter. I think I ought to 
 forward the information it contains to the Government. You 
 will besides find in it some arguments, which you could, of course 
 without citing me, turn to account with Mr. Aston. I need not 
 point out to you what very serious unpleasantnesses would 
 arise from any direct indiscretion as to the contents of this 
 despatch. 
 
 The English Government is very dissatisfied with its minister 
 at St. Petersburg, who has for no reason whatever compromised 
 Lord Minto with the Berlin Cabinet. I have done all in my 
 power to prevent injury to Lord Minto in his position, through an 
 indiscretion on the part of one of his colleagues. My opinion is 
 that the Ministry will strain every effort to hush up this affair in 
 order to keep Lord Minto at Berlin. . . . 
 
 August 2yth, 1833. 
 
 The following news arrived in London to-day from Lisbon 
 and Oporto : — 
 
 Lord William Russell presented his credentials to the regent 
 at Lisbon, on the isth. 
 
1 66 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 On the 1 6th, Saldanha defeated the Migu elites before Oporto, 
 the siege of which is completely raised, and in such a manner 
 that a great many trading vessels have entered the Douro. 
 The Cortes have been convoked at Lisbon, and the elections 
 are to commence on the ist October. 
 
 Another piece of news, which also reached London this 
 morning, and for which no one was prepared, is the arrival of 
 the Emperor of Russia at Stettin.^ We heard this from a 
 courier who had been sent to the Prince de Lieven. 
 
 The Comte de Rayneval to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Madrid, August i()th, 1833. 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I thank you much for your letter of the 27th July. I can 
 quite understand how very little attraction a stay in Paris has 
 for you now, and for my part, I frankly admit that I do not 
 consider it any privation to be away from it. There are mo- 
 ments when I should much like to put in an appearance 
 there, such as the present for instance, for I should meet you, 
 which would be both a very great pleasure, and an immense 
 help to me. You would, I feel sure, dispel a cloud of 
 
 ■• The Emperor of Russia went to Miinchengratz, where he was to meet the 
 Emperor of Austria on the 9th September (see page 181). M. Pozzohad just informed 
 the Due de Broghe of this officially, and he had told it to the king. "M. Pozzo," he 
 wrote, "has shown me a long despatch from M. de Nesselrode, in which he gives as the 
 reasons for this journey, the long standing wish of the three sovereigns to meet 
 again and exchange mutual tokens of friendship. Political circumstances have hitherto 
 prevented this : the war in Poland, the cholera, and the general state of agitation 
 everywhere. Now that Europe is at peace, that Poland is tranquil, that Eastern 
 affairs are ended, Belgian matters on the point of being so, and all else too insigni- 
 ficant to disturb the peace of Europe, there is nothing further to stand in the way of 
 the wishes of the three sovereigns, and their interview must therefore not be looked 
 upon as anything alarming. It has no hidden designs for its object, nor has it been 
 arranged in order to attain any such ends. It is merely a proof of affection they wish 
 reciprocally to give each other, and no other motive should be looked for. Such, Sire, 
 is the substance of this despatch, to which I listened without comment, either for or 
 against, as something perfectly indifferent to France, and without showing the least 
 curiosity as to the details of the interview. Time will show whether this interview 
 conceals any profound mystery. I think not : nevertheless it is as well to be on one's 
 guard and to watch everything." — (The Due de Broglie to King Louis Philippe, 
 August 30/A.) 
 
 A similar step was taken by M. de Lieven with Lord Palmerston, who wrote on 
 this subject to his brother : " The reason for the meeting of the three sovereigns in 
 Bohemia will explain itself later on. Nesselrode writes to Lieven so that he could 
 show me the letter, that it was only 'an epanchement de coeur,' and that politics 
 had nothing to do with it. How can anyone take up his pen to write such stuff! It 
 is truly as if they wished us to disbelieve every word they said." — Lord Palmerston to 
 the Hon. William Temple, '^rd September, 1833. — Private Correspondence of Lord 
 Palmerston. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 167 
 
 doubts which constantly presents itself to me, and you would 
 show me the path I ought to follow, to enable me to extricate 
 myself from the ever increasing difficulties of my present 
 position here. The Ministry ought really to send for me, even 
 if only for a few days. It seems to me that there are some 
 points in the affairs of this kingdom for which writing is not 
 sufficient, they must be talked over. 
 
 One might believe in a speedy deno-Hment of the drama 
 that is being enacted here, if Dom Pedro would resign him- 
 self to disappearing from the scene. But he no doubt has 
 some idea that they are only too eager to set him aside, and 
 has taken his precautions accordingly. Dom Miguel and his 
 adherents are pretty nearly hors de combat. Is there not some 
 fear, however, that a fresh conflict may arise and that the country 
 may be divided between Dom Pedro and Dona Maria "i Spain 
 would, I think, in a manner, accept the sovereignty of this 
 Princess ; but dreads the father. The hasty measures he has 
 adopted against the clergy, cause him to be regarded here as a 
 most violent revolutionary.' Notwithstanding this, if he humours 
 Spain she will leave him in peace. The Government of Madrid 
 knows its own weakness and will undertake nothing, unless 
 driven thereto by desperation. It is very anxious to be assured 
 as to the views of England ; Mr. Addington's recall, although 
 foreseen, seemed to augur ill ; the dread is that he will be re- 
 placed by an ardent and prejudiced man. Much can be done 
 by humouring the Spaniards, but if they are roughly handled or 
 threatened, they fire up at once and will not only decline to act 
 with you, but you may even cause them to rush into the most 
 dangerous follies. 
 
 M. de Zea thanks your Highness for remembering him. He 
 trusts you will endeavour to conciliate Lord Palmerston, who he 
 fancies is not over well disposed towards Spain. 
 
 King Ferdinand is in a very sad condition. It is feared he 
 may not live through September. I believe that Don Carlos's 
 determination to remain in Portugal, notwithstanding the war 
 and the cholera, is entirely due to the accounts of the king's 
 
 ^ Dom Pedro on entering Lisbon on the 28th July, had at once assumed the reins 
 of Government. He suspended the Charter until after the close of the war, and 
 dismissed from the Ministry the Due de Palmella, who had the confidence both of 
 France and England, in order to surround himself with people who were well known 
 for their advanced democratic views. He also ill-used the clergy, who were the firm 
 supporters of Dom Miguel. The Pope's Nuncio was forcibly compelled to embark for 
 Italy, and the Jesuits were expelled. It was strictly forbidden to pay the revenues due 
 to other Miguelist corporations. Decrees were issued, dismissing all the bishops 
 nominated by Dom Miguel, and forbidding all novices, who were then in convents, 
 to enter Holy Orders. Lastly, Dom Pedro claimed for the Crown all presentation to 
 benefices. 
 
i68 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 health. His death under present circumstances would, I feel 
 sure, throw this country into terrible confusion, and I do not think 
 that even the tranquillity of Europe, which your care has 
 so miraculously preserved up to now, would be able to withstand 
 this shock. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, August 2gth, 1833. 
 
 .... I have the honour to send you herewith, the speech 
 made by the King of England at the prorogation of Parliament 
 to-day. You will notice the paragraphs which relate to the 
 Dutch, Portuguese, and Turkish questions. 
 
 The Chancellor leaves London this evening for two months, 
 and Lord Grey starts in a few days for his country seat in the 
 north of England, where he also hopes to pass a couple of 
 months. . . . 
 
 The Comte de Rayneval to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Madrid, August li^h, 1833. 
 
 Prince, 
 
 We are in a sort of crisis here. While Lord Palmerston is 
 giving reiterated assurances of England's neutrality to the Madrid 
 Cabinet, and requiring more imperiously than ever that Spain 
 should do the same, declaring that if a sitigle Spanish soldier sets 
 foot on Portuguese territory England will look upon it as a 
 declaration of war. Lord William Russell announces that he has 
 decided, in order, as he says, to protect the English subjects, to 
 land not one soldier, but two thousand of those who are with 
 Admiral Parker's ^ squadron, and to occupy with them not only 
 Fort St. Julian, which defends the mouth of the Tagus, but also 
 Fort St. George, which commands the town of Lisbon. Lord W. 
 Russell communicated this decision to M. de Cordova, in a letter 
 dated 1 3th. This, as you may imagine, has created a very strong 
 impression on the Government here, which only two days before 
 had received the reassuring communication above mentioned. 
 It is at a loss to know whether this idea of disembarking the 
 British troops is due to Lord William or to his Government. It 
 is rather inclined to believe in the former than in the latter 
 
 ^ Sir William Parker, born in 1781, entered the navy very young, became a 
 captain in 1810, and rear-admiral in 1830. In this capacity, he commanded the 
 English squadron sent at this time to the mouth of the Tagus. He was appointed a 
 Lord of the Admiralty in 1834, and again in 1841. Commanded, at this latter date, 
 the English naval force in the Chinese seas ; was promoted admiral in 1863, and died 
 in 1866. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 169 
 
 hypothesis, which would seem to be too directly opposed to what 
 the English Cabinet had stated. In the uncertainty in which M. 
 de Zea, is placed, he is hastening to send a courier to London to 
 ask the Government not to pass the bounds which it has 
 itself established, and not to force Spain, in spite of herself, to 
 quit that line of conduct, to which at the request of England she 
 has so faithfully adhered. He assures me that the Note on 
 this matter, which will be transmitted to Lord Palmerston, is 
 couched in such terms as could not possibly be taken in bad 
 part. He asks our Government to support this pacific measure, 
 and he would be most grateful, if you would use your personal 
 influence to endeavour to change a decision of which it is 
 impossible to calculate the results. But I very much fear that 
 this request will arrive too late. On the i6th, M. de Bourmont 
 quitted Coimbra to join his army, en route for Lisbon. It consists 
 of 5, 000 or 6,000 men, not including some detached corps on the 
 Tagus and the coast of Torres Vedras. With this force he can 
 certainly attempt to relieve the capital, and with success. Lord 
 William will no doubt be obliged to carry out his plan, or else 
 relinquish it, without awaiting instructions from his Govern- 
 ment. The whole future of the Peninsula therefore, depends upon 
 what resolution he may come to. 
 
 We cannot conceal from ourselves that these wretched 
 Portuguese affairs are taking the most vexatious possible turn. 
 A bloody anarchy is preparing for the whole country, and Dom 
 Pedro offends all opinions and all interests by the decrees he is 
 constantly issuing, and renders return to order all but impossible. 
 It is now only necessary that Spain and England should take 
 part in the struggle to make matters completely hopeless, not 
 only for the Peninsula, but for the whole of Europe. . . . 
 
 Madame Adelaide d'Orleans to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 St. Cloud, August loth, 1833. 
 
 I cannot let M. Thiers start for London without a few words 
 from me to you, mon cher Prince ; he asked me to write last 
 night, and I am charmed to be able to tell you how greatly our 
 beloved king appreciates and is fully satisfied with, his ability and 
 his devotion ; he is doing admirably, and is an excellent little man. 
 
 The most satisfactory accounts have reached us respecting 
 the king's journey ^ ; it appears to be a regular triumph. I am 
 
 ' The king had gone on a tour into Normandy on the 26th August. Fetes took 
 place on his passing through Cherbourg, where the rest of the royal family joined him. 
 The king returned to Saint-Cloud on the 12th September. 
 
I70 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 going with the Queen, my nieces, and my two youngest nephews 
 to join him at Cherbourg, whence I hope to send you further 
 news. I am writing this in haste, as I am just going out for a 
 drive. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, September i^h, 1833. 
 
 I only received the despatches yesterday, which you did me 
 the honour to write on the 29th and 31st of last month. Their 
 arrival has been greatly delayed owing to stress of weather. 
 
 The Marquis de Rezende arrived here a few days ago from 
 Havre, charged by H.I.M. the Duchess of Braganza to ask 
 H.M. the King of England for permission for herself and her 
 daughter, Queen Dona Maria, to await in England the arrival of 
 the Portuguese vessels which are to convey them to Lisbon. In 
 making this communication to the English ministers, the Marquis 
 de Rezende complained bitterly of the manner in which the 
 Duchess of Braganza had been received at Havre, and especially 
 of the very bad treatment experienced by M. le Due de Leuchten- 
 berg at the hands of the authorities at Havre.^ 
 
 Lord Grey, who informed me of M. de Rezende's mission, 
 told me that he had received a copy of the protest made by the 
 Due de Leuchtenberg before leaving Havre, which had been 
 remitted by him to the Sous-Prefet. He seemed to me to be 
 greatly struck with the manner in which this document was drawn 
 up, though he could not show it to me as he had left it with the 
 king. Lord Grey added that he had received His Majesty's 
 orders respecting the Duchess of Braganza's request, and that 
 the king had told him to inform M. de Rezende that he would 
 be very pleased to see Queen Dona Maria and the Empress in 
 England, and that if there was an available vessel he would send 
 it to Havre, so that they might make use of it. 
 
 When Lord Grey informed me of what I have just had the 
 honour to communicate to you, I had not yet received your 
 
 ^ The Due de Leuchtenburg arrived at Havre under an assumed name. The king's 
 Government having pointed out to him that he could not, without inconvenience, 
 prolong his stay in France, which he had only entered by means of an irregular pass- 
 port, he was at first not inclined to give in to this suggestion, but he soon changed 
 his mind, and wrote to the Sous-Pr^fet that he had gone at once to Havre, as he liad 
 expected to find the vessels there which were to convey Dom Pedro's family to 
 Portugal, but that as the arrival of these vessels appeared to have been deferred, he 
 would himself proceed to Munich. — {The Due de Broglie to the Princede Talleyrand, 
 August 3IJA) 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 171 
 
 despatch of the 31st, which contained the explanation of what 
 had occurred at Havre, relative to the Due de Leuchtenberg ; 
 nevertheless, I was enabled to assure him that the recital of the 
 Marquis de Rezende must have been greatly exaggerated, for it 
 was impossible for anyone to believe, that after a sojourn of two 
 years in France, during which T.I.H. the Duke and Duchess of 
 Braganza and Queen Dona Maria had always been treated with 
 every possible consideration and respect, they should, just at the 
 moment of their departure, be subjected to any unbecoming 
 proceedings so foreign to the Court of France. Nevertheless, 
 here again, as on several other occasions, I found that Lord Grey 
 was rather surprised that we laid such stress on rejecting the 
 Due de Leuchtenberg, and could not understand that this was a 
 question of maintaining the dignity of Portugal and the tran- 
 quillity of the whole Peninsula, a point on which I specially 
 insisted. 
 
 I have to-day had an interview with Lord Palmerston 
 respecting the Note which is being sent to him by the Spanish 
 Government, relative to the occupation of the forts at Lisbon by 
 English troops. He had not yet received the Note, but M. Vidal, 
 the Spanish minister, had mentioned it at the king's levde. I 
 took the opportunity thus offered me, to renew the urgent 
 entreaties which I had already so frequently made at various 
 times, as to the necessity of friendly relations between Spain and 
 England. I pointed out to him, that by working in concert with 
 the Madrid Cabinet to prevent revolutionary disturbances in the 
 Peninsula, he would win over those foreign cabinets which 
 intrigues might have alienated, and would thereby gain an 
 influence beneficial to the whole of Europe ; that the best method 
 of satisfying Spain just now, would be to renounce the occupation 
 of the forts at Lisbon and to reject unhesitatingly the marriage 
 of Dona Maria with the Due de Leuchtenberg, which could 
 only result in bringing on a civil war both in Portugal and 
 Spain. 
 
 Lord Palmerston listened to all my remarks with great 
 attention, and gave me his promise that, as soon as he received 
 the Note of the Spanish Cabinet, he would endeavour to see how 
 he could best enter into friendly relations with Spain. I think 
 he quite recognized all the importance of the matter, and even 
 assured me, as Mr. Aston had already informed you, that the 
 directions for the English troops to occupy the forts at Lisbon 
 had been cancelled, and that Lord William Russell had received 
 instructions to act in conformity with the previous orders 
 that had been transmitted to him, of which you are cog- 
 nizant. 
 
172 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, September s^h, 1833. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I herewith send you a despatch which I received from 
 Madrid this morning. It is not quite so satisfactory as I had 
 hoped. It is very plain that as the crisis in Portuguese affairs 
 still continues, the Spanish Government hopes that Dom Miguel 
 may yet be successful and is not therefore prepared to be quite 
 open with us, while the English Government, looking upon 
 Dom Miguel as ruined, thinks more about its grievances against 
 Spain than about its own real interests. If Lisbon is taken by 
 assault and if Dom Miguel is defeated in the attack, each 
 Government will I fear follow its own course, and remain 
 perfectly intractable. But if I am not mistaken, neither of 
 these events are at all probable. Unless Dom Pedro has 
 entirely lost his head, he will not risk fighting in the open 
 country, and as long as he keeps on the defensive, it will take 
 more than De Bourmont's fifteen or twenty thousand men to 
 enter a city like Lisbon by force. As the bad season of the 
 year is approaching, it seems that the future of this unhappy 
 country will be to see both its capitals occupied by the Pedrists, 
 and the rest of the territory by the Miguelites, or delivered up 
 to their ravages, and that without any apparent limit, or any 
 early or probable termination. How can such a state of affairs 
 continue .' 
 
 I for my part do not think it possible. I much respect the 
 principle of non-intervention. Every man for himself and by 
 himself is only fair and right. But this principle, like all others, 
 has its limits ; it presupposes, that the country to which it is 
 applied possesses within itself the means of suppressing anarchy 
 and preventing civil war ; it presupposes, that the country has a 
 majority and a minority, a majority too sufficiently strong to 
 overcome the minority, no matter how much it resists, and 
 to protect it without giving into it when it has succumbed. But 
 when after a long, patient, and sincere trial, it has been proved 
 that the country in question does not possess any of the means 
 necessary to re-establish order within itself; that there is no real 
 majority on any side capable of coming forward and making it- 
 self obeyed ; when, in fact, it is quite evident, that the struggle 
 cannot end in the absolute triumph of any party, then it appears 
 to me that humanity, reason, and common sense demand, that 
 those neighbours who have any sort of interest in the pacification 
 of the country in question, should agree to intervene, in order 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 173 
 
 to make the combatants lay down their arms, and should sub- 
 sequently bring about a compromise between the opposing 
 parties, apportioning the mutual advantages as much as possible 
 to the respective strength of the parties. 
 
 This, according to my view, is Portugal's position at present. 
 
 The more I think over it, the more I look into it, the more am 
 I persuaded that this unfortunate business can only be ended by 
 the friendly intervention of France, Spain and England — an 
 intervention more or less pronounced, more or less direct, and 
 more or less active, according to the exigencies of the case and 
 the requirements of the circumstances, but an intervention with- 
 out which this affair will drift into a war between Spain and 
 England, each side pledging itself deeper and deeper in support 
 of its protegee, and making fresh appeals every day to public 
 opinion in each country, until men's minds get so excited, that 
 they lose all power of choice or of holding independent views. 
 
 I trouble you with these reflections, mon Prince, not with the 
 view of asking you to take any actual steps just now, so much 
 as to pray you to prepare beforehand, those measures which events 
 may soon render necessary. If some sort of convention should 
 be established between the three Governments to act simul- 
 taneously in this affair, you will be the person to settle the 
 basis on which it should be founded. Your wisdom and your 
 experience will be relied upon by the English Government. 
 I feel that I alone could have but little hope of being listened to. 
 Moreover, I count above all on receiving some assistance from 
 your advice and will not hasten anything without your ap- 
 proval. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, September gih, 1833. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 Queen Dona Maria and H.I.M the Duchess of Braganza 
 disembarked yesterday at Portsmouth, having come from Havre 
 by a steamer, chartered by one of Dom Pedro's agents. The 
 young queen was received with great honours on her arrival : 
 the Lords of the Admiralty who were then at Portsmouth 
 hastened to present their respects to her, as well as all the civil 
 and military authorities in the place. She has been invited to 
 stay at Windsor, where it seems she will spend three or four days. 
 There is an evident desire of display in this very friendly recep- 
 tion of Dona Maria in England ; it is easy enough to guess the 
 reason, and The Times in an article this morning leaves no 
 possible doubt on this point. . . . 
 
174 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 September gth, 1833. 
 MON CHER Due, 
 
 Parliament is dissolved, the English ministers are all in 
 the country and the Conference has been adjourned, until it 
 pleases the King of Holland to reply and to give in. At present 
 he does not seem disposed to do either one or the other, and we 
 are not doing anything here. I therefore think this is a good 
 time to obey the doctors' orders, who consider that change of air 
 is absolutely necessary for me to throw off the terrible cold I am 
 suffering from. My family are anxious that I should come to 
 Paris, where the sad state of my brother's health requires my 
 presence to carry out certain measures which cannot be done 
 without me ; and, in addition, my private affairs have suffered so 
 much, since the death of the man who managed them for 
 twenty-five years, that I cannot any longer leave them as they 
 are. 
 
 As the state of matters here does not seem to require my 
 presence specially just now, I beg to request leave of absence, 
 the length of which would depend upon the greater or less 
 importance of political affairs. I beg you will kindly grant my- 
 request with as little delay as possible, as I feel that my health 
 sadly needs some repose. 
 
 I am inclined to think that the King of the Netherlands will 
 find means to let us wait sometime for his decision ; but even if 
 he should shortly give in, it will not now be by more or less 
 skilful negotiations that he will accede ; the pressure of events, 
 the evident advantages that we have assured to Belgium by our 
 Convention of May 21st, which will continue as long as the 
 provisional arrangement remains in force, will alone decide King 
 William to sign. The course taken by the Frankfort Diet at 
 the Hague, and our refusal here to continue a useless negotiation 
 as long as the King of the Netherlands has any arriere pensees, 
 were two excellent measures. Everything therefore is well 
 prepared. All that was difficult and needful to do has been 
 done ; now, time and time alone can bring matters to a con- 
 clusion. My presence here will neither hasten the progress nor 
 the conduct of affairs. 
 
 If, which is very improbable, the first answers from Holland 
 were sufficiently favourable to give me any certainty that the 
 definite treaty might be concluded in September, I would 
 consider it my duty not to make use of my leave until after 
 the signature of the treaty ; but this chance is so very remote 
 that it is hardly worth while taking it into consideration, . . . 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 175 
 
 September nth, 1833. 
 
 .... I have read with great interest M. le Comte de Ray- 
 neval's despatch of August 30th, of which you kindly sent me 
 a copy, and I have already made use of its contents in my 
 conversation here.^ 
 
 Mr, George Villiers, on his way through Paris, en route for 
 Spain, will have communicated to you the views of his Govern- 
 ment respecting the state of the Peninsula ; he was told by Lord 
 Palmerston to do so. He is entrusted with the reply of the 
 English Cabinet to M. de Zea's last Note, which, as you are 
 already aware, only contained two points : the occupation of 
 the forts at Lisbon by English troops, and the disembarkation 
 of these same troops, for the protection of English subjects, 
 in the event of a conflict at Lisbon itself when such protec- 
 tion would be necessary. As to the first point, the Spanish 
 Cabinet, as you know, is quite satisfied. As to the second. Lord 
 Palmerston has replied, that the English admiral was bound 
 to use every means at his disposal to protect British interests 
 if they were threatened, and that he had received formal in- 
 structions relatively to this. To the two articles above indicat- 
 ed, M. de Zea added some earnest protestations of friendship, 
 to which Lord Palmerston has replied in the same spirit. How- 
 ever, you will be much better informed on these questions by 
 your conversation with Mr. Villers than by my correspondence. 
 
 The news from Portugal, which you will have seen in the 
 English papers of to-day, shows that matters in that country are 
 approaching if not a decisive, at any rate a very important crisis. 
 The forces of Dom Pedro and Dom Miguel are pretty evenly 
 balanced, and it is impossible to foresee the result of the struggle. 
 Queen Dona Maria remains at Windsor until the iSth, when she 
 will return to Portsmouth ; it is said that she will almost 
 -immediately leave that port for Lisbon ; but she will probably 
 
 ^ M. de Rayneval in this despatch, gave an account of an interview he had just had 
 with M. de Zea as to the contingency of an Anglo-French mediation in Portugal. 
 Our ambassador did not conceal from M. de Zea that the two mediatory Powers 
 had expressed some doubts as to the sincerity of the Spanish Cabinet in this matter. 
 The minister protested vehemently ; nevertheless, although closely pressed by M. de 
 Rayneval, he refused to point out the conditions he would propose as to the arrange- 
 ment for intervention in Portugal. If Dom Miguel triumphed, Spain promised not to 
 allow any interference with English interests ; but she required the same guarantee on 
 the part of England, if Dom Pedro was successful. M. de Zea insisted on the great 
 moderation of the Spanish Government, which with its thousands of men could 
 easily weigh down the scale in favour of its candidate. M. de Rayneval concluded 
 by saying that the Spanish Cabinet had given up the idea of excluding both brothers 
 at once, as the success of Dom Miguel seemed to them assured. He thought a rupture 
 between Spain and Portugal imminent. 
 
176 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 not depart until intelligence has been received that it will be safe 
 for her to return to her capital. . . . 
 
 I believe, without attaching any exaggerated importance to 
 the Emperor Nicholas's journey, that it would be useful to 
 watch the results carefully. The return of M. de Metternich to 
 Vienna and M. Ancillon to Berlin, will put M. de Saint-Aulaire 
 and M. Bresson in a position to give you some information on 
 this subject ; I shall be much obliged if you will kindly forward 
 anything fresh to me. . . 
 
 September \oth, 1833. 
 
 I am in receipt of your letter, telling me that His Majesty is 
 pleased to grant me leave to return to France. I should like at 
 once to profit by this permission, and had intended to start on 
 the 20th, but as H. M. the King of England has done me the 
 honour to invite me to Windsor for three days, I have been 
 obliged to delay my departure. I shall only return from 
 Windsor on Sunday the 22nd, and will leave on the 24th, so as 
 to be in Paris on the 27th. I will take care before leaving 
 London to present M. de Bacourt, as Charge d' Affaires, to Lord 
 Palmerston as you wish. 
 
 No other news has reached London from Portugal, except 
 that which came vid France ; it is just twenty-one days now 
 since there has been any direct communication between London 
 and Lisbon. The uncertainty existing as to the state of the 
 latter city has not prevented the embarkation of Dona Maria, 
 who left Portsmouth the day before yesterday in very bad 
 weather. . . . 
 
 Madame Adelaide d'Orl^ans to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 St. Cloud, September 16th, 1833. 
 
 On my arrival here, mon cher Prince, I found your letter of 
 the 9th awaiting me, and I at once spoke to the king as to your 
 wish to return here. He is always delighted to do what he can 
 to please you, and he immediately wrote to the Due de Broglie, 
 from whom you will ere this have received the answer you 
 wish. I know how painful one of your reasons for returning to 
 Paris is, and you have my full sympathy in this, as in everything 
 else that affects you ; but I shall be very glad to see you again 
 and to be able to chat quite freely with you. ... I regret 
 exceedingly that the King of Holland's obstinacy still retards 
 the conclusion of Belgian affairs. However, the Belgians are not 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 177 
 
 of my opinion, as they find the Convention of May much more 
 advantageous to them than another which would oblige them 
 to pay the debt ; this I feel quite sure they do not see ^ all. 
 
 You have the young Queen of Portugal and the Duchess of 
 Braganza in England just now. The conduct of the latter, and 
 that also of Dom Pedro, towards our king is incomprehensible, 
 most ungrateful and highly improper. The duchess left here as 
 soon as she heard of Dom Pedro's entry into the city, without 
 thanking the king for the offer he made her of a frigate so that 
 she might take the young queen to Lisbon, or even informing 
 the Government of her departure. Not only has Dom Pedro 
 never written to the king since his entry into Lisbon, but he 
 did not even entrust M. de Louie, who came to see the king on his 
 own account, with a word or message for the king, notwithstand- 
 ing all the kindness the latter has shown to him and his family. 
 It is right you should know, that Madame de Loul6 (Dom 
 Pedro's sister) has had sixty thousand francs during her sojourn 
 in Paris ; she is very grateful, but I think Dom Pedro also owes 
 something to the king. All this is very unpleasant, but I none 
 the less sincerely wish every success to the cause of the young 
 queen. Good-bye, mon cher prince, till we meet, . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, September it^th, 1833. 
 
 .... While speaking to Lord Palmerston this morning 
 respecting the news from Constantinople, of which you kindly 
 informed me, we went into the question as to the line to 
 be adopted towards the Russian Cabinet with regard to the 
 treaty of July 8th, which it has made with the Porte. After the 
 declaration transmitted to the Porte, we both think that some 
 steps should be taken by the ambassadors of France and 
 England at St. Petersburg. It is a question, whether this step 
 should consist of a simple notification of what has been done at 
 Constantinople, or of a declaration somewhat of the same nature 
 as that addressed to the Porte. I incline to the latter measure, 
 which seems to me plainer, and fairer, and would at the same 
 time give a higher character to our policy. It would, in any case, 
 certainly be better and more appropriate, after the meeting of 
 the three northern sovereigns, to give some very marked proof 
 of the union of France and England. I beg you to consult with 
 Lord Granville about this, and arrange with him what steps the 
 two Governments ought to take under these circumstances. 
 
 We are still without news from Portugal. . . . 
 
 VOL. V. N 
 
178 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 September lyd, 1833. 
 
 .... Lord Palmerston has begged me to thank you for 
 your kind reception of Mr. George Villiers. He is also perfectly 
 satisfied with the last instructions you have sent M. de Rayneval, 
 and he thinks they ought to produce a very good effect on the 
 Madrid Cabinet. 
 
 I still hope to sleep at Dover to-morrow, and embark the day 
 after. . . . 
 
 I did finally leave London on the 24th September and 
 reached Paris on the 26th. 
 
 END OF PART XI. 
 
PART XII. 
 
 THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 
 (1833-1834.) 
 
 Talleyrand almost decides not to return to England — Fresh complications 
 arise — He is urged to return by the King and the Ministers — Results of 
 the meeting between the three Northern Sovereigns, planned by Metter- 
 nich — The Due de Broglie's reply to the communication of the three 
 Courts — Talleyrand returns to London — He proposes to England to 
 form a defensive aUiance with France — The Due de Broglie's scheme 
 for the basis of such a treaty — Lord Grey considers such a step unad- 
 visable, as giving Mettemich material for discussion at the Congress of 
 German Powers then convoked at Vienna — Russia desirous to reassure 
 France and England as to the projects of invasion attributed to her — 
 Reference in the Augsburger Gazette to a treaty between Russia and 
 Austria guaranteeing the existence of the Ottoman Empire — Anxiety in 
 England at the Due de Broglie's illness and reported resignation — De 
 Broglie's explanation of the scene in the Chamber — Louis Philippe 
 refuses to accept his resignation — Talleyrand's reply — He encloses a 
 note from Lord Grey expressing satisfaction at the Due's remaining in 
 office — Talleyrand's rdsumi of the state of Europe — Martinez de la Rosa 
 replaces M. Zea as Prime Minister at Madrid — Annoyance of Lord 
 Palmerston at M. de Nesselrode's despatch to Prince de Lieven — 
 Talleyrand condemns Lord Palmerston's habit of allowing his personal 
 feelings to influence his business relations — Cites the instance of Sir 
 Stratford Canning's nomination to St. Petersburg — The Emperor 
 Nicholas declines to receive him — Palmerston refuses to send any one 
 else — Prince de Lieven is recalled and both Embassies remain vacant — 
 Formidable riots break out in Paris and various parts of France — Dom 
 Miguel's troops beaten by Dom Pedro's forces — Spain sends troops into 
 Portugal — The Due de Broglie resigns, consequent on the French 
 Chamber rejecting the treaty between France and the United States — 
 He is succeeded by Admiral de Rigny — Fresh insurrections break out 
 in France — Very serious riots in Paris — Oringist demonstrations in 
 Brussels — Diplomatic fencing between Talleyrand and Palmerston 
 respecting the Spanish and Portuguese treaty — End of the Manuscript 
 of the Memoirs — Talleyrand does not quit London till August. 
 
 N 2 
 
i8o THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Further letters and despatches up to the conclusion of his Embassy — King 
 Leopold's wish to establish a Coburg succession, failing his having a 
 son, opposed by France and England — The War in Portugal is brought 
 to a close — Don Carlos lands at Portsmouth — Retirement of Lord Grey 
 — The King sends for Lord Melbourne — Don Carlos returns to Spain — 
 Lord Londonderry's speech in Parliament on the affairs of the Penin- 
 sula — Text of the additional Convention of the Quadruple Alliance — 
 Talleyrand tenders his resignation — Louis Philippe's reply — Appendix. 
 
 Memoir of the Due de ChoiseuL 
 
 On quitting London in September, I had almost decided not to 
 return again. I felt that I had left affairs there in such a posi- 
 tion that my presence was no longer necessary, and in addition 
 to my great age, my infirmities and the condition of my 
 personal affairs, greatly deranged by my long absence, made 
 me think that it was time to retire into private life. 
 
 I should probably have persevered in this determination if 
 I had not received urgent solicitations recalling me to Paris. 
 
 These entreaties began early in November ; at first I resisted 
 them, putting forward the reasons above stated, but the king 
 and the Ministry urgently insisted, and I went to Paris at the 
 commencement of December, to learn the reasons which 
 rendered it so desirable that I should return to my post in 
 London. 
 
 It was not merely a question of the negotiations respecting 
 Belgian affairs, which they hoped would soon be resumed, con- 
 sequent on the steps which the King of the Netherlands had 
 taken with the Diet at Frankfort, and the agnates of his 
 house, in order to obtain their assent to the conditions imposed 
 by the London Conference.^ 
 
 ^ The King of the Netherlands had, in fact, determined upon this step at the 
 pressing solicitation of the Courts of Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Prince Felix of 
 Schwartzenberg had for this purpose been sent to the Hague, bearing autograph letters 
 from the three sovereigns, pointing out the uselessness and danger of a further 
 resistance (Letter from M. Bresson to M. de Talleyrand of zr^th September, 1833). In 
 consequence, in November following, the King of the Netherlands applied to the 
 agnates of the House of Nassau and the Diets, for their consent to the cession of the 
 Walloon portion of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. The Diet replied that it would 
 require a tenitorial equivalent in exchange. The King replied that he had made too 
 many sacrifices already, and that the Germanic Confederation, not having known how 
 to protect Luxemburg, had no right to compensation of any kind ; and the matter 
 remained in abeyance. As for the Duke of Nassau, he formally refused his consent. 
 The negotiation, therefore, fell through on these two points. 
 
THE RE VOL UTION OF 1850. 181 
 
 The king and his Government were very uneasy respecting 
 the meeting that had taken place during the autumn in Bohemia, 
 between the sovereigns of Prussia and Austria, as well as the 
 events that were occurring in Spain and Portugal, which gave 
 rise to the fear, either of a revolutionary movement, or of the 
 continuance of a civil war, inconvenient and perhaps even 
 dangerous to our Pyreneean frontier. 
 
 Immediately on my arrival in Paris, I had several long inter- 
 views with the king and his ministers, and I was shown the 
 whole correspondence relative to these three questions, so as to 
 put me completely au fait as to what had occurred during my 
 absence. 
 
 As to the first point, I did not share in their hopes that 
 serious negotiations respecting Belgian affairs would be resumed 
 in London, and I must confess, that if it had only been a ques- 
 tion of these, I should not have considered it necessary for me 
 to return to England. The other two questions seemed to me 
 much more serious. I will first speak of the meeting between 
 the Russian, Austrian and Prussian sovereigns, and the im- 
 pression this had left on me. 
 
 This meeting, it appears, had been first suggested by Prince 
 Metternich. The Austrian chancellor, filled with recollections 
 of the Ancona Expedition, and dreading that Austria's liberty of 
 action in Italy might be interfered with, in consequence of the 
 doctrines professed by France and England, on the right of non- 
 intervention, had proposed to the Russian Government to come 
 to an agreement with him on this subject, and prepare jointly 
 a statement of the principles according to which the two 
 Governments intended to regulate the exercise of this right. 
 
 The desire to come to some decision on this point, initiated 
 the idea of a meeting, either in Silesia or Bohemia. This idea, 
 brought forward by the St. Petersburg Cabinet, was eagerly 
 welcomed at Vienna. They thought themselves sure of Prussia's 
 concurrence, and the Emperor Nicholas, who had to pass through 
 his father-in-law's country, to reach the spot designated for the 
 interview, never doubted but that he would obtain his consent. 
 
 He was not however completely successful. At Schwedt, 
 where a preliminary meeting was held, the overtures made by the 
 
1 82 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Emperor failed in part. The King of Prussia declined to enter into 
 any formal engagements, which might compromise his Govern- 
 ment in German public opinion, the liberal tendencies of which 
 were well known. The Emperor Nicholas was therefore obliged 
 to go on to Bohemia alone, and meet the Austrian emperor at 
 Munchengratz. There, questions of general policy such as those 
 of the East and Poland, which interested both countries equally, 
 were first discussed. The Austrian Cabinet, swayed by the fears 
 with which the general feeling in Germany, and the precarious 
 situation of Italy inspired it, and abandoning its old traditions, 
 would have consented to admit in principle the almost exclusive 
 supremacy of the Russians in Constantinople. It would also 
 have agreed to the measures adopted by the Russian Govern- 
 ment, to take away from Poland the remaining vestiges of a 
 national and independent existence. 
 
 Once agreed on these two points, M. de Metternich would 
 then have proposed to conclude a Convention, which laid down, 
 on the basis previously recommended by Austria, the principle 
 of a new right of intervention, in virtue of which no Power 
 would be allowed to intervene in the home affairs of any other 
 state, unless it had been formally called upon to do so by that 
 state ; but at the same time assuring to the Power whose aid 
 had been invoked, the exclusive right of intervening, without any 
 other Cabinet taking part therein or opposing it. 
 
 The Russian Cabinet, which in this Convention saw the as- 
 surance of having the power to intervene whenever it pleased at 
 Constantinople, as the treaty of 8th July with the Porte per- 
 mitted it to do, would not have hesitated to agree to this. 
 
 M. de Metternich, not content with having obtained for 
 himself the right to intervene in Italy, with the certainty of 
 Russia's support in that case, would then, in addition, have pro- 
 posed to convene the heads of the Cabinets of the various states 
 of the Germanic Confederation at Vienna, and to induce them, 
 by an Act drawn up conjointly, to annul all the concessions 
 made since 1815, by those constitutional German states who 
 objected to the repressive measures which it was proposed to 
 employ against the propagation of revolutionary ideas. The 
 Emperor Nicholas would have eagerly approved this project. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 183 
 
 When all these points had been arranged and drawn up be- 
 tween the sovereigns of Russia and Austria, M.de Nesselrode and 
 M. de Fiquelmont 1 would have been sent to Berlin, to persuade 
 the Prussian Government to enter into the views of the two allies. 
 After a sufficiently prolonged resistance, and much hesitation, 
 the King of Prussia would have ended by giving in to the urgent 
 solicitations made to him, and would have signed the Conven- 
 tion, but under the formal condition that it was to remain 
 secret 
 
 This is as near as possible, a rdsunti of the information con- 
 tained in the correspondence of our diplomatic agents which 
 was sent to me. I would not venture to guarantee its being 
 perfectly correct, but that the treaty of 8th July, 1833, was im- 
 posed on the Porte by Russia, and that a collective step was 
 taken in Paris during the last days of October by the Austrian, 
 Prussian, and Russian ministers was perfectly true and correct. 
 They had successively presented themselves to the Due de 
 Broglie, to read a despatch to him from their Court, which 
 in substance contained the following : I cite the Austrian 
 despatch. 
 
 M. de Metternich began by pointing out that the three 
 sovereigns who had met in Bohemia had found, during the 
 explanations they had had together, the most undeniable proofs 
 of the strength of the ties of friendship which united them, as 
 well as the friendly dispositions which they all equally felt 
 towards the other Powers. 
 
 After this preamble, the Austrian chancellor proceeded to 
 develop the principles which the sovereigns had agreed to 
 recognize as the only ones that could possibly guarantee the 
 peace of Europe. 
 
 According to M. de Metternich, or rather, according to the 
 Cabinets of which he here represented himself as the mouth- 
 piece, each Government was naturally disposed to favour those 
 
 ^ Charles Louis, Comte de Fiquelmont, an Austrian general and statesman, born 
 in 1777, was the son of a French imigri killed at Marengo. He became major- 
 general in the Austrian army, and was made Minister Plenipotentiary at Stockholm, 
 Florence, Naples, and St. Petersburg. In 1840, he became War Minister, and then 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs. In 1848, he was for a short period Prime Minister. He 
 died in 1857. 
 
l84 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 doctrines on which its existence rested. This kind of proselytism 
 is too common for any one to dream of condemning it, as long as 
 it is carried out in a pacific manner, and by moral influence only. 
 There is, however, a system of propagandism which, extending 
 its action over the whole of Europe, tries to upset existing in- 
 stitutions everywhere, in order to substitute violent and danger- 
 ous innovations. Such a system, equally hostile to all established 
 governments, must necessarily be opposed by their joint 
 efforts. Should the French Government, which has known so 
 well how to defend itself against the aggressions of revolu- 
 tionists, not be able in future to equally baffle the machina- 
 tions which are being practised in its territory against foreign 
 states, interior disturbances and disorders might result to some 
 of these states, which would oblige them to ask for the support 
 of their allies. Such support would not be refused, and every 
 attempt which aims at opposing this, will be looked upon by the 
 three courts as an act of hostility directed against each. 
 
 The communications made by the Russian and Prussian 
 ministers differed slightly in the doctrine expressed, but were 
 fully in accord as to the summing up, and thus proved that there 
 was an actual joint responsibility between the three Cabinets in 
 the course they had taken. 
 
 The Due de Broglie answered these communications with as 
 much firmness as tact.^ He informed the three foreign ministers, 
 that if the documents he had just heard of were only intended 
 as a profession of faith, more or less open to dispute, he thought 
 it superfluous to discuss them ; but that as he presumed that 
 this communication was somewhat more than a useless ex- 
 pression of principles, he was bound to endeavour to seek its 
 object. 
 
 Was it intended, he asked, to insinuate that the French 
 Government favoured revolutionary propagandism .'' he fancied 
 not, but if there was the least uncertainty on this point, he wished 
 at once to refute by the most positive denial, even the semblance 
 
 ^ In consequence of the course adopted by the ambassadors of the three courts 
 towards the Cabinet of the Tuileries, the Due de Broglie addressed a circular to all 
 the French agents abroad, of which the lines that follow are an analysis and almost a 
 literal reproduction. This circular has been published by M. d'Haussonville in his 
 Histoire de la Politique exth-ieure du Gouvernment Fran^ais, T. I., p. 47. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 185 
 
 of an imputation, in which the King's Government could only- 
 see a gratuitous insult, which it was quite resolved not to 
 submit to. 
 
 It will soon be seen that the French envoy at Stockholm 
 had quitted that capital, in accordance with orders he had 
 received, and without taking leave of King Charles John, because 
 that prince thought he could make allusions to the policy of the 
 King's Government similar to those above referred to.^ 
 
 The Due de Broglie thus replied to the sort of intervention 
 referred to in the end of the three despatches : " There are 
 some countries, such as Belgium, Switzerland, and Piedmont, in 
 which, as we have already stated, France would not suffer 
 intervention by foreign troops at any price. There are other 
 countries again in regard to which, without approving of an 
 intervention, she could not oppose it under given circumstances, 
 in so absolute a manner as she would under other conditions. 
 This was the case when the Austrian army entered the Romagna. 
 The conclusion to be drawn therefrom is, that each time that a 
 foreign Power enters the territory of an independent state, we 
 shall consider ourselves legally entitled to follow such a line of 
 conduct as our interests may demand. Such would be any 
 occasions on which the rule of common right no longer being 
 applicable, each one would act on either side, at his own risk 
 and peril." 
 
 This answer, transmitted to the three Cabinets, had been 
 received by them without their making any reply.^ Thus far had 
 matters arrived when I returned to Paris, that is to say, one 
 month after the reply sent by the Due de Broglie. 
 
 I must also not omit to mention that during my absence 
 
 ^ Charles John, King of Sweden, had been much vexed at the revolution of July. 
 On the arrival of M. de Saint- Simon, the new French Minister, he complained 
 bitterly of the conduct of the French Government towards the other Powers. He ac- 
 cused it of favouring revolutionary propagandism, and even reproached the king himself 
 as wanting in good faith and sincerity (M. de Saint-Simon's despatch of 6th October, 
 1833). The Cabinet of the Tuileries immediately ordered M. de Saint-Simon to ask 
 for his passports ; the King of Sweden was somewhat embarrassed ; he denied the 
 conversation which had led to this rupture. Nevertheless, friendly relations were not 
 re-established until 1835, when M. de Momay was accredited to Stockholm. 
 
 2 The Berlin Cabinet especially, which had unwillingly allowed itself to be led 
 away by M. de Mettemich, was greatly astonished and taken aback by the Due de 
 Broglie's reply. (See in Appendix, letter No. 13, a letter of M. Bresson's on this 
 subject.) 
 
1 86 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 from London the English and French Governments had, through 
 their agents at St. Petersburg, sent a formal and identical protest 
 against the said treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, signed on the 8th 
 July between Russia and the Porte, which protest wound up 
 by a declaration that the above treaty was looked upon by the 
 Paris and London Cabinets as non-existent. 
 
 It was evident that the three courts of Austria, Russia and 
 Prussia, were offended that France and England, by separating 
 themselves from them in the Hollando-Belgian question, had suc- 
 ceeded by their joint action in conquering the obstinacy of the 
 King of the Netherlands ; it was, I say, perfectly evident, that 
 these three courts had intended to make a demonstration, which 
 would cover the defeat of their policy. But was it only a 
 demonstration, or had a resolution been adopted to take action 
 together should an occasion present itself.'' I thought not ; 
 nevertheless such symptoms ought not to be neglected, and it 
 became necessary either to reply to threats by threats, which 
 would be puerile and do no good, or to resolve on some 
 measure, which would prevent the three courts advancing any 
 further on a course perilous to the maintenance of peace, and 
 at the same time announce the determination to resist all 
 offensive action on their part. 
 
 After carefully thinking over this question, I proposed to the 
 king and to the Due de Broglie, to try and induce the English 
 Government to form a treaty of alliance with us, couched in 
 sufficiently liberal terms not to inconveniently bind the two 
 Governments, but which might, if necessary, be made use of 
 according to circumstances. And with this view, I cited the 
 precarious situation of the Ottoman Empire, and the state of 
 the Peninsula, which at this moment caused the greatest possible 
 disquietude, in consequence of the troubles that had arisen in 
 Spain between the Infant Don Carlos and Queen Isabella ; and 
 also, in Portugal between Dom Pedro and his brother Dom 
 Miguel. It was impossible to conceal from one's self that if 
 these troubles were prolonged, of which there seemed every 
 likelihood, the time would arrive when French interests in 
 Spain, and English interests in Portugal would oblige the 
 French and English Governments to take some kind of action 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 187 
 
 in the Peninsula to put an end to the civil war. In my 
 opinion, this action ought to be concerted between the two 
 Governments, and I thought that it would have been useful to 
 connect it with a preliminary treaty, which would at the same 
 time have the advantage of showing to every one, the intimate 
 union between France and England. I considered that such a 
 measure would be the best reply to the Russian treaty of July 
 8th, and to the unusual communications of the three northern 
 courts. 
 
 I succeeded in inducing the king and his Government to agree 
 to my views ; they, however, were all the more urgent that I should 
 return to England. I was forced to give in to their solicitations, 
 even while declaring that I was very far from believing that I 
 should succeed in inducing the English Government to adopt 
 my opinion. Nevertheless, I considered the results to be of 
 suificient importance to be worth the trouble of endeavouring to 
 obtain them. 
 
 I therefore started for London, having arranged with the 
 Due de Broglie that he should send me a detailed exposition of 
 bis views on the subject of the treaty, the conclusion of which I 
 "wished to propose to the English Government. It was with this 
 object that he wrote me the following letter, which I will give in 
 its entirety, despite its length, as it brings forward admirably all 
 the arguments in favour of the political measure, which I deemed 
 it so important for my country that England should adopt. The 
 rest of my correspondence will follow later. 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, December iStk, 1833. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 The idea of a defensive alliance between France and 
 Great Britain is yours ; and it is doubly so, as you were the first 
 to mention the subject to me two months ago on your way 
 through Paris. You were the first to speak to Lord Granville 
 about it ; I have only thought over and developed your own 
 arguments. Nevertheless, you wish me to sum up, in a purely 
 confidential letter, those which, during your absence, had 
 
1 88 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 appeared to me of value. You will not, I fear, find anything 
 fresh, but the least I can do is to defer to your wish. 
 
 It is a question of a defensive alliance. 
 
 It is a question of a treaty, by which the enemies of one 
 country would become those of the other, in the event of unpro- 
 voked and gratuitous aggression against either. In no case could 
 there be, for example, a question of allowing England to incur 
 dangers caused by a just or an unjust attack on the part of 
 France against some other country, or of making her responsible 
 for the consequences of a reprisal which France had drawn on 
 herself. 
 
 In the hypothesis of a purely defensive alliance it might at 
 first sight be asked, whether England would have the same 
 reasons for subscribing to it as France t It might be questioned 
 whether the advantages were equal for both countries, that is to 
 say, is the danger the same, and is England threatened equally 
 with France ? Looking at it from this point of view, the answer 
 would be unfavourable. The safety of France is evidently more 
 threatened than that of England. Although both Governments 
 have the same foundation — I mean a revolution, just in its 
 principles and moderate in its results — and although there is an 
 analogy between the institutions of both countries often approach- 
 ing to identity, France is exposed to dangers from which 
 England is exempt. Our Government is new ; the English 
 Government dates back for a hundred and fifty years. We have 
 a claimant to contend with ; there is no longer any claimant to 
 the English throne. We are a continental country, and conse- 
 quently vulnerable at many points ; England is an island, and 
 the English are masters of the sea. The enumeration of the 
 differences might be extended much further. 
 
 But either I am all wrong, or this view is purely a superficial 
 one. 
 
 It is not necessary when two countries enter into an alliance 
 that the advantages should be equal ; nor is it necessary that 
 they should find therein the same advantages. All that is needed 
 is that each should find what they counted upon. The advan- 
 tages may be greater for the one than for the other ; they may be 
 different, not only in degree, but in nature ; that is of little con- 
 sequence. Provided they exist, and provided they are sufficient, 
 it would be puerile and unreasonable to insist on this difference, 
 and make it a ground for refusal. That would be injuring one's self, 
 through dread of benefiting others. 
 
 That France has great interest in the treaty in question is so 
 self-evident that I need not pause to demonstrate it. 
 
 That England also has a real and great interest in it, the 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 189 
 
 more I think it over the more I am convinced of, for the 
 following reasons: 
 
 I will first suppose that the alliance exists, no matter whether 
 it has been committed to paper or not. I will suppose that if 
 France became the object of an unprovoked and gratuitous 
 aggression — if France were attacked by the north of Europe, as 
 Spain was attacked by France in 1823 — England would defend 
 France, and make common cause with her. The English 
 Government could not prevent this, even if it wished, and it 
 would not desire it, even if it could. 
 
 The revolution of 1830 was, from the very commencement, 
 very popular in England, so popular, indeed, that when it was 
 represented by Lord Stuart, certainly not in the best light, to 
 Lord Aberdeen and the Duke of Wellington, who had no reason 
 to view it favourably, they neither of them ventured either to 
 blame or disavow it. And not only was the revolution of 1 830 
 popular in England (popularity is but ileeting), but it was a 
 national matter ; by this I mean, that the revolution found men's 
 minds in that country in conformity with the ideas and senti- 
 ments which originated it ; public opinion was ripe for a great 
 political change and prepared to run the risks, although at the 
 same time resolved only to proceed with justice and caution, and 
 not to trust either to excitement or chance. What France saw 
 herself obliged to obtain through the perils of a revolution, 
 England also desired to have, but more fortunate than her neigh- 
 bour, she was able to obtain it without going beyond constituted 
 authority. The aim was the same, and both countries have 
 equally attained it. The revolution of 1830 was not the cause 
 of parliamentary revolution ; but it was the signal for it, and 
 this signal once given, both nations have advanced side by side 
 along the same path. There has been a community of desires, 
 interests, and conduct ; the enemies of the one, both at home 
 and abroad, have become the enemies of the other ; and before 
 this complete and joint liability all the old enmities, all the 
 ancient jealousies, all the inveterate prejudices have disappeared. 
 This is not the work of any particular person, no one man, no 
 single Cabinet can claim the merit of it. France and England 
 have naturally taken their stand side by side in the face of the 
 other European Powers, not because they are the only two 
 great nations who enjoy political liberty, but above all because 
 they have simultaneously made a great stride in the career of 
 political liberty, another great stride taken together. This 
 double event has, in the same degree, roused against both the 
 distrust and the enmity of the absolute governments, and 
 it has created for these governments, in the very heart of both 
 
IQO THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 countries, auxiliaries whom it suits us equally to restrain — in 
 France the vanquished Carlists, in England the Tories, who are 
 out of power. 
 
 I therefore repeat, that I hold it to be impossible that France, 
 such as the revolution of 1830 has made her, should be attacked 
 in her honour and her safety, without England, such as Parlia- 
 mentary reform has made her, feeling her own honour, and up to 
 a certain point also her safety, equally attacked. I hold it as a 
 certainty, that in such a case, no matter what Ministry was in 
 power, it would be bound to defend France, and that if (which 
 heaven forefend ! ) Lord Aberdeen should find himself at the 
 head of the Foreign Office in England, it would only be under such 
 conditions as would oblige him to act thus, whether he liked it 
 or not, and that he would be compelled to defend the revolution 
 of 1830, even more imperatively than he was forced to recognize 
 it. 
 
 I say therefore that what public feeling and national impulse 
 would oblige any Ministry to do in such a case, the most 
 ordinary common sense, and the most evident self-interest would 
 equally counsel them to do. 
 
 It is to England's interest to maintain the statu quo of 
 Europe. 
 
 England performed her part in 181 5 ; it is only justice to say 
 that she did it splendidly. Every country in Europe passed 
 beneath Napoleon's yoke, she alone resisted him. Her resistance 
 saved Europe from the scourge of tyranny and a universal mon- 
 archy. I repeat, that England played a grand part, and the 
 position which she created for herself in Europe is proportionately 
 great and strong. Any important changes which might hence- 
 forth occur in Europe, more especially if they take place without 
 her concurrence, would be very disadvantageous to her, and 
 would necessarily turn against her. 
 
 Now, supposing that France was attacked by the rest of 
 Europe, one of two things would happen, we should either be 
 conquerors or be conquered. 
 
 I have the firm belief that we should be the victors ; but in 
 order to become victorious, we should be obliged to stir up 
 frightful passions both within and outside of France. We should 
 be reduced to making terrible sacrifices ; we should run great 
 risks. The passions thus roused would have to be satisfied, 
 and we should require compensation for all our sacrifices and 
 our dangers. We should have to fall back upon making 
 conquests, and England, who in this hypothesis had done 
 nothing for us, would have neither the right nor the power to 
 oppose us. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 191 
 
 If, on the other hand, we were vanquished, the result would 
 be precisely the same, but in an opposite sense. France would 
 be mutilated, dismembered, and under military occupation, in 
 every part that was still left of her. 
 
 Is it possible to imagine England looking on unmoved at 
 such a spectacle, or coming forward to demand her share of 
 the decimated and crushed spoils of the revolution of July } 
 
 The great fact once admitted that the alliance really does 
 exist, that a defensive treaty of alliance between France and 
 England would not bring upon England any danger which she 
 has not already necessarily to contend with in the existing state 
 of affairs, it remains for her to see what will be the surest way 
 for her to escape from eventual dangers, and provide for those 
 chances which she cannot completely avoid. 
 
 This way, I believe, is to be found in carrying out the treaty, 
 and not waiting for events, but forestalling them. 
 
 As long as the union between France and England exists, 
 as long as it exists not only tacitly and in reality, but out- 
 wardly and visibly, all hostile demonstration on the part of the 
 northern Powers is impossible. The six hundred thousand 
 men at the disposal of France joined to the English army, the 
 combined French and English navies, the French credit added 
 to that of England, and the means of action possessed by both 
 Governments in Italy, Germany and Poland, are all matters 
 which the northern Powers dare not face. But the real, and in 
 fact indestructible union between France and England may be 
 impaired in a thousand ways from a merely apparent point of 
 view. Nothing will be left undone by the violent parties in 
 both countries, no matter what their inclination, or by the 
 foreign Governments abroad, to provoke, to foster, and turn to 
 account, every possible cause for estrangement. In free countries 
 politics are more or less changeable ; during the course of the 
 last session the London Cabinet, and likewise that of Paris, was 
 several times on the point of being dissolved and giving place to 
 others. Other men mean another system — at least that is 
 what would be thought ; all the slight coolnesses would spread, 
 increased by the violent language of the press ; a thousand 
 insignificant circumstances would cause it : questions of custom 
 dues, the affair of Algiers, or anything, may furnish fresh 
 pretexts, and pretexts, as soon as they acquire the slightest 
 consistency, are quickly changed into real misunderstandings. 
 All this, I repeat, would be nothing in reality ; when the time 
 for action arrived, all these worries would disappear before an 
 inevitable joint responsibility, and an evident community of 
 interests. But meanwhile, supposing action has become necessary; 
 
192 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 the northern Powers will have regained courage ; they will 
 have plunged into a course which must prove fatal to them, 
 but which would none the less press heavily on France and 
 England, namely the scourge of a universal war. 
 
 If, on the contrary, a treaty of alliance is concluded, say for 
 five, eight, ten years, more or less, it matters little, all such ideas 
 will pass away from the Holy Alliance of Miinchengratz ; the 
 secret and open enemies of both Governments, both at home and 
 abroad, will be deprived of all hope ; all the accidental difficulties 
 to which events may give rise will be reduced to their just 
 value, their solution will be foreseen by every one, and people's 
 minds will be at peace. 
 
 But this is not all. 
 
 An attack on France is not the only danger which just now 
 threatens the statu quo of Europe. There is more than one way 
 of impairing it. It is quite possible to prepare such changes in 
 the midst of peace, as would only need a breath to complete 
 them. 
 
 I will explain my meaning. 
 
 There exists among the three northern Powers a joint 
 responsibility of interests, similar to that which exists between 
 France and Great Britain, although based on directly opposite 
 principles. This joint responsibility keeps them united, and 
 each day we have fresh proofs of this union. The past year 
 furnishes them in abundance. 
 
 This situation may lead to two results : 
 
 The first would be the temporary abandonment of all 
 ideas of aggrandizement, of all increase of territory or of pre- 
 ponderance ; the sacrifice of any purely Prussian, Austrian or 
 Russian policy, to a conservative European one. This is what 
 happened in 1830 and 183 1, when the danger of revolutions was 
 great and imminent. 
 
 The second is a sort of compromise between the ambitions 
 and the claims of the three Powers ; it is a compact, by which they 
 mutually give up to one another certain parts of Europe, in 
 exchange for other parts. 
 
 This is what is happening now, when anxiety has decreased, 
 and when hopes of aggrandizement may again rise to the surface. 
 
 Russia says to Austria : In heaven's name do not let us 
 quarrel, let us remain united against the common enemy ; but, 
 meanwhile, let me do with Turkey as I list. To this Austria 
 replies : I am agreed, we will not quarrel ; but if I permit you to 
 dispose of Turkey, you must second me in the dominion I wish 
 to establish in Italy ; and thus the bargain is concluded. 
 
 Prussia in her turn says to Austria : I am quite willing to 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 193 
 
 lend you a hand in your projects about Italy, but then you 
 must let me introduce my system of custom duties ^ ; allow me to 
 establish my frontier custom houses as far as the shores of Lake 
 Constance, impose my tariffs on the whole Confederation, put 
 down the opposition of all the refractory States, and lay 
 the foundations of a united Germany, which later on will bear 
 fruit. 
 
 And Austria allows Prussia to have her way. 
 
 In Turkey, Italy, and Germany, they have only arrived at an 
 increase of power, protectorates and guardianships ; but any one 
 who has read history, or who has the slightest knowledge of the 
 progress of events, knows to what all this leads and what all 
 these protectorates become. 
 
 Now, it must be one of two things. Either France and 
 England must quietly look on at this great alteration in the 
 equilibrium of Europe, this successive demolition of the independ- 
 ence of States of secondary rank, or they must seize the oppor- 
 tunity and oppose it. In the first case, these States will be 
 considerably diminished, as might be expected. In the second 
 case, both nations will be obliged to act in common, and we 
 think that already in truth, as far as Turkey is concerned, both 
 Governments are on the point of making some arrangement to 
 check the enterprises against Constantinople. If both Govern- 
 ments act in concert, they will be obliged to mutually guarantee 
 the consequences resulting from this common action. Here 
 then is the defensive treaty which appears imperatively necessary ; 
 but as it stands at present it is only for the purpose of settling 
 the consequences of war, whereas if concluded and made public 
 at once, it would have the effect of preventing them. 
 
 Let us suppose, in fact, that a defensive treaty exists now 
 between France and England ; it is not necessary that there 
 should be any other undertaking than to mutually support each 
 other in such events as shall be judged by both parties to 
 be in accordance with the letter of the treaty. Behind this 
 general stipulation, the other Powers will conjure up all kinds of 
 secret articles intended to anticipate any encroachments they may 
 meditate. Each time England raises her voice, there will be seen 
 behind her the six hundred thousand men at the disposal of 
 France. Each time France raises her voice, the power and 
 ascendency of England will be there to back her up. It will be 
 
 1 It will be remembered that Prussia at this period had entered into a long series 
 of negotiations, for the purpose of establishing the customs union of Germany — the 
 ZoUverein. A preliminary treaty had already been signed on the 22nd March, 1833, 
 between Prussia and eight of the States, among which were Bavaria and Wurtemburg. 
 Saxony joined on the 30th March. All the other German States by degrees joined this 
 union, which ever since 1871 has become the Constitutional law of the Empire. 
 
 VOL. V. O 
 
194 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 enough for them to speak in order to disconcert those schemes, 
 which, by adopting another line of conduct, they would probably 
 iind themselves obliged to thwart. 
 
 I may add, that this alliance would become the na.tura.1 pot'ni 
 tfappid of all those sovereigns who feel an inclination to resist : 
 the King of Naples in Italy, against the Austrian dominion ; the 
 duchy of Baden ; the duchy of Nassau ; the city of Frankfort 
 against the Prussian customs duties ; all the small German princes 
 against the prepotency of the Diet, It would become the centre 
 of a fresh group of interests ; it would be, in my opinion, the sole 
 efficacious counterpoise to the union of the three great northern 
 monarchies. 
 
 Lastly, there is a final consideration which, although but of 
 secondary interest, still has its importance. 
 
 As long as the union of France and England only exists as 
 an understanding, it will be liable apparently to variation and 
 eventualities. On the one hand, each Government will be forced 
 to hold itself in readiness for any event, just as if it had to sup- 
 port alone the whole weight of the chances of the future ; on the 
 other hand, the commerce and industry of each country will 
 only pursue their natural course in a doubtful and hesitating 
 manner. If, on the contrary, we suppose the union to be public, 
 indissoluble and founded on a treaty, the power of both Govern- 
 ments will be doubled by this fact alone, and they will be able, 
 without any inconvenience, to reduce their military and naval 
 armaments. Then, as regards the home policy of each Govern- 
 ment, the possibility of such reductions is in itself a matter not 
 to be despised. In addition, all men's minds will calm down, 
 confidence in the future will increase tenfold, national wealth will 
 be doubled, whilst expenditure will be diminished. There is 
 not a single Ministry under a representative Government that 
 would not realize the value of such a result. 
 
 These, mon Prince, are the considerations I have put before 
 Lord Granville. Either out of friendship for me, or interest for 
 France, and I do not know of which of these two sentiments I 
 was most sensible, he seemed to consider them worthy of being 
 carefully weighed. The obstacle which appeared to him the 
 most serious was the difficulty of making the English public 
 understand them, and of procuring their adoption by Parliament. 
 This is an obstacle the power of which it is not for me to 
 estimate, much less indicate the means of overcoming it. You, 
 mon Prince, are on the spot, it is for you to enlighten the French 
 Government on this point. As long as you do not give me any 
 hope that my ideas have been welcomed by the English Cabinet, 
 I shall .abslain from speaking about them .to my colleagues or 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 195 
 
 taking any official steps. This will remain a secret between you 
 and me. Accept. . . . 
 
 I am very glad to be able here to show the great political 
 capacity of the Due de Broglie. If the recollections I am now 
 writing ever see the light of day, justice will be done to the 
 clearness and firmness of the views which inspired this letter, and 
 I feel sure that herein will be found the true basis of a close 
 alliance between France and England, which has been my most 
 ardent wish from the beginning to the end of my political career, 
 convinced as I am that the peace of the world, the confirmation 
 of liberal ideas, and the progress of true civilization, can only 
 be founded on such a basis. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, December iii,th, 1833. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 I have thought a good deal both during my journej'- 
 and since my arrival here, about the question which was the 
 principal subject of the last conversations I had the honour to 
 have with you before my departure from Paris. I have not 
 wavered in my opinion as to the importance and benefit that a 
 defensive treaty of alliance concluded with England would be 
 to the king's Government. I have gone carefully into the 
 manner in which such a treaty might most advantageously be 
 brought forward, which would offer the best chances of success 
 with the English Government, and at the same time approach 
 sufficiently near to the views of some of the continental Govern- 
 ments, as to encourage the hope that they might some day be 
 induced to join it. 
 
 After having carefully weighed all the considerations which 
 you lately placed before me, and compared them with the facts 
 which my own experience has shown me to be my best guide 
 in so very serious a matter, I have come to the conclusion that 
 the statu quo as it now exists in Europe should be our point 
 of departure, and that its maintenance is the best basis to 
 select for a defensive alliance between France and Great 
 Britain. 
 
 To France, the statu quo presents nothing that has not been 
 already recognized and admitted by her ; it does not militate 
 against our real interests at any single point, and has moreover 
 
 O 2 
 
196 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 always formed part of the policy upheld ever since its origin 
 by the present French Government. 
 
 As for England, it is incontestable that she should wish to see 
 the present state of affairs in Europe maintained ; it guarantees 
 her all the advantages of the treaties of 1815, and, as you very 
 justly remarked, these advantages were immense. It is un- 
 necessary to say that they have lost nothing in strength since 
 1830. It is possible that I may be mistaken, but I do not see 
 what difficulties could be raised in Parliament, if the English 
 Government entered into a defensive alliance with us, based on 
 the maintenance of the European statu quo. It seems to me 
 that such a treaty would be justifiable in every respect, and 
 before changing my opinion on this point, I must wait to see 
 objections raised such as I at present cannot conceive. 
 
 On looking round the different continental Cabinets, it is 
 impossible to see how a treaty such as I speak of could cause 
 them alarm ; nay more, it is quite in accordance with the views 
 of the most reasonable amongst them. Is not the statti quo M. de 
 Metternich's fixed idea, so to speak } Has not the Prussian Cabinet 
 perpetually shown its desire, to see universal peace guaranteed by 
 the stability of the existing state of affairs .-' Does not Russia 
 herself emphatically declare, that the treaty of 8th July with the 
 Porte is the plainest proof of her friendly intention to preserve 
 the Ottoman empire } Which of all these Powers would dare, 
 with any show of reason, to declare itself hostile to a union 
 between France and England, proclaimed for the purpose of 
 maintaining the statu quo of Europe .■' If there still remains 
 some hope of bringing round those Cabinets whose more moderate 
 policy offers a means of reconciliation, I do not doubt that a 
 treaty, drawn up according to the principles I have just indicated, 
 would but hasten their return to us. 
 
 It was therefore on this ground, that I conceived I ought to take 
 my stand, in order to place most advantageously before Lord 
 Grey and Lord Palmerston the treaty about which I had the 
 honour to speak to you. Both these ministers listened very 
 attentively to my explanations on this matter, and, I thought, 
 were greatly impressed by it. Nevertheless, as I expected, they 
 could only promise me to think over the scheme, to discuss it 
 with their colleagues, and then let me know what resolution the 
 British Government had come to. 
 
 I impressed upon both English ministers that this resolution 
 should be in accordance with the position of affairs, that is to say, 
 it should be noble and high-minded. " A simple expedient," I 
 said to them, " would be very dangerous ; it would only seem to 
 be the result of some intrigue, or the indirect expression of our 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 197 
 
 ill-feeling, which we must above all avoid. The true way for us 
 to succeed is by frank and energetic action, without any doubtful 
 colouring or mental reservations." 
 
 I do not think I shall be in a position for some time to send 
 you anything positive as to the views of the English Cabinet on 
 this question. Lond Grey and Lord Palmerston both leave 
 either to-day or to-morrow for the country, and the other ministers 
 will not be in London before the beginning of January. The 
 matter will not be dealt with in council until then. . . . 
 
 On the same day, in addition to the despatch, I added the 
 following in a private letter : 
 
 I arrived here at the same time as your letter of the i6th. I 
 have read it with the utmost attention, and it was not until I had 
 thoroughly mastered it that I went to see first Lord Grey and 
 then Lord Palmerston. My despatch will tell you the impression 
 made on both ministers by the overtures I made to them. These 
 seemed to me to have the small merit of having been unexpected, 
 at any rate as to the form, even if not as to the idea, of the treaty 
 itself. . . . 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, December y^th, 1833. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 According to your wish, I am sending you a draft of 
 the treaty.^ It is a simple, rough sketch, on which the king 
 asks your advice. I have endeavoured to carry out your own 
 ideas ; and in order to make it as general as possible, and to 
 admit of the amplest construction being put upon it, I have 
 reduced it to a preamble and one article, the article stating 
 nothing beyond the simple fact of a defensive alliance, and con- 
 sequently referring all executive measures to be decided by a 
 special convention, circumstances requiring it. It seemed to me, 
 on the one hand, that this single article would give the impression 
 that there were a number of secret articles ; and on the other 
 hand, I considered that by only tying down the English Govern- 
 ment to the beginning of the measure, and leaving it at full 
 liberty with regard to the rest, it would facilitate the admission 
 
 ^ This treaty stipulated purely and simply for a defensive alliance. It added, that 
 the two parties undertook to act in concert on all occasions, whenever the peace of 
 Europe and the independence of the States composing it, seemed to them to be 
 threatened. 
 
198 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 of the principle of the treaty. By reducing the treaty to its 
 moral effect, the objections that may be brought against it would 
 to a great extent be eliminated. 
 
 I founded the preamble, as you wished, on the statu quo ; but 
 I thought this statu quo ought to be called la foi des traitis. 
 It would be very unpopular in France, if we were ostensibly 
 to pledge ourselves to renounce all right to the departments we 
 have lost ; but there is not a single soul bold enough to come 
 forward and declare that we ought to violate, nay, even that we 
 ought not to respect, the good faith of treaties. The remainder 
 of the preamble is, I think, very conciliatory and irreproachable, 
 as far as the foreign Powers are concerned. 
 
 The separate article is only a measure of negotiation with the 
 English Government. We do not wish it to be inserted in the 
 treaty ; but in the event of the English Government wishing us 
 to join to some extent in the Eastern question, or if it should 
 make its consent the price of a future engagement, or should the 
 Russians return to Constantinople, we would have no objection 
 to this article being then inserted, as it gives extended liberty to 
 both parties, and is quite in keeping with the character of the 
 defensive treaty itself Meanwhile, as I said before, it is but a 
 rough sketch, respecting which we ask your advice. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, January yd, 1834. 
 MON CHER Due, 
 
 I thank you for your letter and the draft of the treaty 
 which accompanied it, and which I think admirable. I trust 
 that we shall ere long be able to make use of it, and that we 
 shall succeed in obtaining a recognition of its advantages by 
 the English Government. Just now, however, I think we must 
 let it lie dormant ; that at least is the impression I have gained 
 from the frequent conversations I have had lately with Lord 
 Grey and Lord Holland, the only members of the Cabinet who 
 are in London. You know the dislike the English ministers 
 have always shown to be fettered by ties, which have no special 
 or decided aim. 
 
 Setting aside the parliamentary difficulties, which will be 
 very serious here in questions of foreign policy, the English 
 Government is strengthened in its desire to do nothing 
 hurriedly, by the last despatches received from Vienna and 
 Berlin. 
 
 They have heard from Vienna that M. de Metternich is 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 199 
 
 greatly embarrassed by his Congress, not knowing what proposals 
 to submit to it.^ Lord Grey concludes from this, and I think 
 with reason, that if we were just now to bring forward an arrange- 
 ment, no matter of what nature, between France and England, 
 we should give cause for some action at Vienna, and thus 
 relieve M. de Mettemich from his embarrassment. This ob- 
 jection, which seems to me very plausible, would be still 
 further strengthened, if, as Lord Minto writes from Berlin, 
 Prussia seems disposed to separate herself from the Courts of 
 Austria and Russia, in the event of their proposing to her some 
 joint arrangement on Eastern affairs, which might be displeasing 
 to France and England. 
 
 I therefore think, mon cher Due, that this is not an oppor- 
 tune moment for urging the English Government. You may 
 rest assured that I will carefully watch the tendency of feeling 
 here, and will eagerly seize the first occasion I may deem at all 
 favourable. The meeting of Parliament next month, will 
 necessarily give occasion for discussion on Eastern affairs, as it 
 is probable that the speech from the throne will refer to it. It is 
 quite possible that this may oblige the Ministry to come to some 
 definite resolution, and moreover, by that time, M. de Metternich's 
 Congress will have come to an end, and we shall no longer 
 require to disquiet ourselves as to his machinations. . . . 
 
 January ytk, 1834. 
 
 .... Lord Palmerston only arrived in London this morning, 
 and I have not yet been able to see him ; but I have just come 
 from Lord Grey, with whom I had a long talk about Eastern 
 affairs, and particularly as to the relations of Austria and 
 England with regard to this question. This last point you 
 
 ^ A Congress of the representatives of the German Powers had been convoked at 
 Vienna by M. de Metternich, for the purpose of discussing the general interests of the 
 Germanic Confederation. They were to deliberate on five groups of questions. 
 
 1. On the principle that sovereignty belongs entirely to princes and not to 
 nations. 
 
 2. On the publicity of legislative assemblies. 
 
 3. On schools and universities, 
 
 4. On the press. 
 
 5. On the accord of special legislation with general laws. 
 
 M. de Sainte-Aulaire kept the French Cabinet infoimed as to the course of these 
 deliberations, which however did not make much stir. "There is no doubt," he 
 wrote on the 28th November, " that a scheme has been drawn up between Austria 
 and Prussia ; but these two Powers, and especially Austria, desire that the small States 
 should take the initiative, as their independence would thus seem to be respected. 
 The secondary Governments, on their part, though quite disposed to make a good 
 bargain at the cost of their own Constitutions, nevertheless desired to avoid thS 
 reproach of having voluntarily sacrificed them, anfl wished to shelter themselves frona 
 responsibility as regards their people." (M. de Sainte-Aulaire's official despatch.) 
 
20O THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 specially drew my attention to, in your despatch of the 2nd 
 of this month. 
 
 Lord Grey told me that Prince Esterhazy had in fact been 
 to see him several times lately, especially about ten days 
 ago, to discuss with him, in the name of his Court, the very 
 important matter which was just now so earnestly occupying 
 all the Cabinets of Europe, and had spoken in the most satis- 
 factory manner on this subject, assuring him that M. de 
 Metternich's aim was one with that of England, namely, the 
 maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
 Prince Esterhazy having added that he feared, on this 
 occasion, the English Cabinet had shown itself too distrustful of 
 Russia, Lord Grey replied, that it might also be feared that 
 Austria had shown herself too confiding in Russia ; that the 
 English Cabinet, moreover, was liable to constant questions in 
 Parliament respecting Eastern affairs, and that public opinion 
 had pronounced itself so strongly in England against the ambi- 
 tious projects of Russia, that he. Lord Grey, would require very 
 strong testimony of that Power's moderation in order to allay 
 an irritation the cause of which he was quite aware was not 
 without foundation. 
 
 In reply to this, Prince Esterhazy having asked what proofs 
 were necessary to give weight to the repeated assurances of the 
 St. Petersburg Cabinet, Lord Grey, without wishing specially to 
 indicate them, pointed out the immediate and complete evacua- 
 tion of Moldavia and Wallachia, and the relinquishment by 
 Russia of all that Turkey still owed her, consequent on the 
 treaty of Adrianople. 
 
 Prince Esterhazy promised to make the details of this con- 
 versation known to M. de Metternich, and even added, that he 
 hoped his Government would entertain these ideas, which ap- 
 peared to him most reasonable. Prince Esterhazy's courier, 
 conveying this information to Vienna, left some days ago. 
 
 Since then, despatches have been received from Sir Frederick 
 Lamb, which, from what I hear, are quite in conformity with 
 the language held by this ambassador to M. de Sainte-Aulairc.^ 
 According to these despatches, he states, that in the course of a 
 
 1 The despatches of M. de Sainte-Aulaire confirmed those sent by Sir Frederick 
 Lamb to his Government. He wrote on the I2th December, that the Austrian Cabinet 
 had been much satisfied with Lord Palmerston's overtures ; that he had rephed that 
 Austria and England had the same interests in and the same views on the Eastern 
 question, but that Austria sided with Russia, whom England distrusted, and that England 
 sided with France, of whom Austria was suspicious ; that, consequently, England ought 
 to accept Austria's guarantee with respect to Russia, and that then Austria would have 
 to accept England's guarantee with regard to France. (M. de Sainte-Aulaire's despatch 
 to the Foreign Office.) 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 201 
 
 conversation he had had with M. de Metternich, the latter, even 
 while repeating the assurances of moderation so often renewed 
 by Russia, nevertheless declared that Austria was quite 
 determined not to consent to a single village being ceded by 
 Turkey to Russia. This declaration, M. le Due, coming as it 
 does from M. de Metternich direct, appears to me of very great 
 importance, especially if, as Sir Frederick Lamb writes, it was 
 made in a very positive manner. 
 
 I must add, that in all this there was not, I am told, the 
 slightest idea of separating France and England, and that if the 
 king's Government was less frequently mentioned, it was only 
 because the Cabinet of Vienna seemed assured of its concurrence 
 in everything that tended to the maintenance of an honourable 
 peace, and lastly, that it was in London where irritation with 
 regard to Eastern affairs had lately manifested itself in a marked 
 manner, and, I repeat again, that there was never a thought ex- 
 pressed as to separating us from England. 
 
 Lord Grey also informed me of the despatches he received a 
 few days ago from Sir John Bligh,^ the English minister at St. 
 Petersburg. It appears that this minister has been much 
 made of lately by the emperor, M. de Nesselrode, and most of 
 the influential people, and that he has been asked to express the 
 emperor's complete disinterestedness in the Eastern question. 
 On this occasion, also, the former declarations were repeated as 
 to the treaty of 8th July, that it would never have been 
 made but at Turkey's earnest request, and that the emperor's 
 sole aim was the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
 The Prince de Lieven, whom I saw frequently during my late 
 sojourn at Brighton, always spoke to me in the same sense, and 
 I cannot fail to remark, that the Court of Russia attaches great 
 importance just now to assuring France and England as to the 
 projects of invasion which are attributed to her. 
 
 It appears to me from all these facts that, without sharing 
 M. de Metternich's blind confidence in Russia, one may conclude 
 that it would be as well not to repulse the advances which that 
 Power seems disposed to make. 
 
 However, M. de Lieven did not conceal from me, that he 
 rather feared the effect produced in St. Petersburg by the articles 
 against Russia lately published in the French and English 
 newspapers. He said as to this : " The emperor is young, and 
 but little accustomed to put up with abuse of this kinjd. 
 
 ' Sir John Bligh, bom in 1798, was Attache to the Embassy at Vienna in 1 820, 
 then Secretary of Legation at Florence. He went subsequently to the Hague, then 
 to St. Petersburg as Chargi cC Affaires, became Minister at Stockholm, and finally at 
 Hanover (1833). 
 
202 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 He will probably be at Moscow when these papers reach him, 
 and as this city is the centre of that powerful party which is in 
 favour of war, it is to be feared that the insults of these papers 
 may raise great difficulties in the path of the moderate party, at 
 the head of which is Comte de Nesselrode, who always tries to 
 return to moderation. 
 
 I could only regret with M. de Lieven, that the liberty of the 
 Press was so badly understood in Russia, as it was only fair to 
 acknowledge that Constitutional Governments had but little 
 influence over it. . . . 
 
 January loth, 1834. 
 
 I have I'ead with great interest despatch No. 2, which 
 you did me the honour to write, as well as the copy of that 
 from M. de Sainte-Aulaire which was enclosed.^ This 
 latter contains some curious details and valuable hints. I 
 have judiciously made use of some of them in my interviews 
 with Lord Palmerston and Lord Grey, and by impressing upon 
 both these ministers the exact state of the relations of their 
 Government with that of Austria relative to Eastern affairs, I 
 have called forth some explanations which appear to me very 
 satisfactory. 
 
 The conviction left on my mind by them is, that for the last 
 three months there have been a good many poiwparlers and 
 attempts at closer relations between the London Cabinet and 
 that of Vienna, and that the Eastern question has been the 
 principal topic ; ^ but that until the last conversation between 
 
 ^ Despatch from the Comte de Sainte-Aulaire of 25th December. The ambassador 
 gives an account of an interview he has had with M. de Metternich. The latter thinks 
 that the treaty of 8th July between Russia and the Porte opens the door to a terrible 
 catastrophe, which Europe ought to try and prevent, and which she only can do by 
 joint action and joint consent. He therefore proposes to open a Conference. M. de 
 Tatitscheff, on the contrary, will not hear of anything except joint action at Alexan- 
 dria, to intimidate Mehemct Ali, and M. de Sainte-Aulaire concludes from this, that 
 Austria and Russia are completely at discord respecting Eastern affairs. Austria, he 
 adds, calls Europe to her aid ; she will accept the first help that is o,.ered her. M. de 
 Metternich said to him in M. de Tatitscheff's presence : " You can assure Admiral 
 Roussin, that there is not the slightest dissent between us, and that Austria's policy is 
 identical with that of France in Eastern affairs." M. de Sainte-Aulaire then stated, 
 that Sir Frederick Lamb had been directed by M. de Metternich to propose to his 
 Government to agree to a profession of faith by the four Powers relative to Eastern 
 affairs, which would either take the form of a treaty or a joint declaration, and become 
 the basis of a European public right. 
 
 ^ M. de Sainte-Aulaire also wrote to Paris, as to the growing influence of Sir 
 Frederick Lamb at Vienna. (Despatch of \2th December.') ffe declared that, in con- 
 formity with the orders of his Government, he tried to place England between France 
 and Austria. {Despatch of 2%th December.) Finally, on the 5th January, he slated that 
 he was sure something was going on between Sir Frederick Lamb and M. de Metter- 
 nich, which they wished to keep from him. (As to this, see also despatch of 2nd 
 January from the Due de Broglie to M. de Talleyrand, appendix, letter No. 14.) 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 203 
 
 Lord Grey and Prince Esterhazy, of which I had the honour to 
 inform you in my last despatch, no attempt has been made to 
 give shape to the views shared by both Governments. 
 
 By mentioning, as it were casually, to Lord Palmerston, that 
 I was aware of the more intimate relations that had recently 
 taken place between Sir Frederick Lamb and Prince de Metter- 
 nich, I led him on to tell me of the last despatches from that 
 ambassador, and after our conversation he ordered, in my 
 presence, that copies of these despatches should be sent to Lord 
 Granville, who will show them to you. You will find them the 
 same in substance as those sent by M. de Sainte-Aulaire. 
 
 This very frank and open conduct was accompanied by 
 the reiterated assurance, that everything in this business would 
 be done conjointly with France ; with respect to this, I have 
 also received separately Lord Grey's promise and likewise 
 that of Lord Palmerston. It seems to me more than probable 
 that the document mentioned by M. de Sainte-Aulaire as having 
 been shown by Sir Frederick Lamb to the Emperor of Austria, 
 is a copy of the instructions sent to Lord Ponsonby. It was no 
 doubt intended thereby to convince the emperor that England's 
 views on Eastern matters are in accord with those of Austria. 
 
 However, I am induced to think that the first steps in this 
 business should be taken in London ; and what makes me fancy 
 this, are the complaints which have been made to me against 
 M. de Metternich and against the coolness he has so long shown 
 concerning the Eastern question, the direction of which he 
 seems inclined to abandon entirely to Russia. Moreover, it is 
 not at all impossible that Lord Palmerston, whom the Cabinets 
 also reproach for having, in some circumstances, held rather 
 haughty language, should deem it advisable to approach the 
 Vienna Cabinet, which was one of those not the least irritated 
 by the tone of his communications. On the other hand, I think 
 that the English Cabinet recognizes the justice of the reproaches 
 now addressed to it relative to its conduct last year in Turkish 
 affairs. It feels that had it adopted the project we suggested to it 
 before the arrival of the Russians at Constantinople, much harm 
 might have been avoided. This project, as you may remember, 
 included Austria in our joint efforts to prevent the evils which 
 then threatened the Sultan ; you will find the outlines of it in 
 my despatches of the 8th, 28th, and 31st January, 1833.1 
 
 I believe that the English Government, swayed by the 
 effect of this political error, will follow the line it has now 
 adopted with all the greater zeal and perseverance. 
 
 1 See pp. 76 and 78. The despatch of 8th January has not been transcribed in 
 these Memoirs. 
 
204 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 The overtures made by Lord Grey, in reply to Prince 
 Esterhazy's communications, will necessarily induce M. de 
 Metternich to explain clearly his actual intentions. He will no 
 doubt appreciate at its full value the course adopted by England, 
 which has been entirely dictated by expediency, for Lord Grey 
 told the Austrian Ambassador frankly, that England wished that 
 the demand for guarantees which she claims from Russia, should 
 pass through the Vienna Cabinet, as such an indirect course 
 would remove anything that might wound Russia's amour-propre. 
 
 It seems to me, M. le Due, that we shall have to congratulate 
 ourselves if they decide at St. Petersburg to give in on some 
 of the points advanced by Lord Grey, such as the disbanding of 
 the army in Wallachia and Moldavia, and the breaking up of 
 that in the Crimea. The king's Government will find means 
 to defend these facts before the Chambers, as will also the 
 English Cabinet before Parliament, should it be attacked, and 
 besides, they will give us breathing space, the better to concert 
 such measures as the unsettled state of the East will, in a short 
 time, render inevitably necessary. 
 
 I think that now we must not neglect any opportunity of con- 
 vincing the Court of Austria, that it is our intention to act to- 
 gether with her and Great Britain in this affair, and not let it be 
 supposed that we fancy any proposals had been made without 
 our knowledge. M. de Sainte-Aulaire's despatch describes M. 
 de Metternich as being disposed to enter into a joint alliance of 
 the four Courts. Perhaps later on, Russia's refusal, if she does 
 not accede to the guarantees that are now asked of her, will 
 induce the Chancellor to agree to a triple alliance. We are on 
 the right track, which cannot fail to improve. . . . 
 
 January I2(h, 1834. 
 
 On reading the French newspapers of the 9th of this month, 
 I noticed an article, taken from t\\& Augsburger Gazette of the 5th, 
 which will not have escaped you, and which has been repeated 
 by all the English papers. The correspondent of the Augsburger 
 Gazette, referring to the treaty concluded between Russia and 
 Austria for the purpose of guaranteeing the existence of the 
 Ottoman Empire (even in the event of the reigning dynasty 
 becoming extinct, but to the exclusion of Mehemet Ali), adds 
 that the Prince de Metternich has informed Sir Frederick Lamb 
 of the provisions of this treaty, and that he has approved of 
 them fully.^ 
 
 ^ This is the article : The Eastern question has latterly taken a turn which 
 seriously threatens the peace of Europe. The treaty concluded between 
 Russia and the Porte has caused great disquietude to England, whose policy 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830, 205 
 
 However reassuring I may have felt the declarations of the 
 English Ministers, of which I sent you an account in my last 
 despatches, the condition excluding Mehemet All, which I knew 
 was of a nature to affect the English Cabinet, has raised some 
 doubts in my mind, and I deemed it necessary to obtain some fresh 
 explanations from Lord Palmerston and Lord Grey. I therefore 
 saw them again yesterday, and I may assure you that their 
 language was quite as frank and explicit as in our previous inter- 
 views. But although there was no mention made between us 
 then respecting the Pasha of Egypt, I cannot refrain from telling 
 you that the king's Government should not fail to use every care 
 to allay any suspicions on the part of the English Government as 
 to the nature of any relations it might have with the Pasha. I 
 feel almost certain that here we are always supposed to have 
 arriere-pensees on that point. 
 
 Lord Palmerston told me that he had sent Sir Frederick 
 Lamb's despatches to Paris to be shown to you ; but he also 
 gave me a later one to read, which had arrived this morning, in 
 which that ambassador states that after the conversations which 
 he as well as M. de Sainte-Aulaire have had with Prince de 
 Metternich, he has arrived at the conclusion that the Austrian 
 Chancellor was only trying to separate the Courts of France 
 and England. I do not know how far this remark of Sir 
 Frederick Lamb's may be well founded, but it seems to be an 
 indication well worth attending to. 
 
 In the Globe of this evening you will find a long article, 
 which all throughout gives a fresh proof of the sincerity of the 
 assurances that have been given me for the last three days. 
 This ministerial organ insists, with truly remarkable vehemence, 
 on the necessity of England's union with France. . . . 
 
 is principally directed by the interests of its commerce and industries, while 
 J'rance dreads to lose the influence it has gained at Constantinople in con- 
 sequence of the energetic actions of Admiral Roussin. Hence has arisen 
 the coolness in the relations of Russia with France and England .... In order 
 to avoid such a conflict, the Vienna Cabinet, which during these last few years has 
 acted with so much energy in order to preserve the general peace and the statu quo 
 in Europe, has addressed itself to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, with which, ever 
 since the negotiations at Miinchengratz, it has been in close and friendly relations, 
 recalling those which existed between them at the time of Napoleon's wars. The 
 reply of the Russian Cabinet has been most satisfactory in every way, and it is stated 
 that a treaty has been concluded between the two Courts, by which they will guarantee 
 the existence of the Turkish Empire, even should the existing dynasty die out, but to 
 the exclusion of Mehemet Ali. We are also assured, that Prince de Metternich, two 
 djys ago, communicated the substance of this treaty to the English ambassador. Sir 
 Frederick Lamb, and that the latter has fully approved, in the most positive terms, a 
 negotiation which can only produce the happiest results, and which entitles the great 
 statesman, who directs the affairs of Europe with such ability, and who has so long 
 preserved us from the horrors of anarchy and war, to the fresh gratitude of all the 
 friends of order and peace. 
 
2o6 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Confidential, 
 
 "Lo^HOlS., January I'ith, 1834. 
 MON CHER Due, 
 
 The newspapers declare you are ill. The Times even 
 goes so far as to speak of retirement. Pray reassure me as to 
 your health ; the retirement I do not believe in, and do not wish 
 to do so. Write me a few lines which I can show to Lord Grey, 
 as he seemed somewhat surprised at what had passed from the 
 tribune between you and M. Bignon.^ The English Cabinet 
 fears being hampered in Parliament by utterances on the 
 Eastern question which are not identical in Paris and London. 
 It is therefore absolutely necessary that I should be able to 
 satisfy Lord Grey by some clearer explanation than that given 
 in the Journal des D3ats, and which it will be easier for you to 
 send through me than to give from the tribune .... 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 VPiKlS, January l6tk, 1834. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 Here are the facts : I submit them to your wisdom. On 
 Wednesday, January 8th, the discussion came on relative to para- 
 graph 8 of the address. This paragraph, we had been informed, 
 was specially directed against the Ministry. In my opinion, on 
 the contrary, nothing was easier than to show that it contained 
 the most complete approbation of our policy for the last three 
 years. M. Bignon rose, in the name of the Cotumission, to explain 
 his paragraph in a perfectly reasonable manner and quite in con- 
 formity with my views ; he then proceeded to make a long speech 
 on the general state of Europe, in which, as you will have seen, 
 there was much that was quite reasonable, and more that was 
 utter folly. 
 
 I ascended the tribune after him, and, in so doing, I agreed to 
 to what he had said, in the 7iame of the Commission, intending to 
 make use of it the following day, and show that our policy 
 prevailed by common consent over that of our habitual adver- 
 saries. As regards M. Bignon's speech itself, I took no notice of 
 
 ' Louis Pierre Edouard, Baron Bignon, bom in 1771. He entered early into the 
 diplomatic service, was Secretary of Legation at Berne in 1797, then at Milan (Cisal- 
 pine Republic) in 1 799, and at Berlin in 1800. In 1802, he was made Chargi it Affaires, 
 then Minister in 1804. In 1806, he was entrusted with the administration of the 
 Prussian provinces. In 1809, he was nominated Administrator-General of Austria. 
 From Vienna he went to Warsaw as Minister Plenipotentiary. During the Hundred 
 Days he was Under-Secretary of Slate for Foreign Affairs, and had charge of this 
 department for some days in June. M. Bignon was elected deputy in 1817, and was 
 regularly re-elected until 1837. He was then created a Peer of France, and died 
 in 1841. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 207 
 
 it ; seeing that it contained no attack on the Government, there 
 was no occasion for me to make any reply to it. I concluded 
 by thanking M. Bignon for the moderation of his language 
 towards us. 
 
 The next day I was seriously unwell, so much so, that I 
 hesitated for some time whether I should go to the Chambers. 
 Nevertheless, I decided to make the effort. On my arrival, I found 
 the whole Chamber in a state of uproar. The adhesion which I had 
 given to the explanations of the Commission had been taken as 
 given to M. Bignon's speech, to which I had not replied at all. 
 Men's imaginations had been fired, and every one was firmly 
 convinced that we should go to war with the whole of Europe 
 in a week ! Being violently attacked by M. Mauguin, I was 
 obliged to rectify this general error, and to point out what I really 
 had agreed to and thus endeavour to reassure men's minds ; 
 unfortunately, as I said before, I was too unwell to have full 
 possession of my own. Just when about to speak, I suddenly 
 turned so faint, that I was compelled to grasp the tribune to support 
 myself Under these circumstances, I hurried on as fast as I 
 could. I replied, without really knowing what I said ; I parti- 
 cularly explained the treaty of 8th July, respecting which a 
 great deal of nonsense had been talked, but while endeavouring to 
 show that neither its meaning nor its intentions had been under- 
 stood, I failed to make them see its real dangers and its true 
 character. I was obliged, I repeat, to cut short my speech and 
 finish abruptly, lest I should lose consciousness completely. On 
 leaving the tribune, I had to go to bed, and was profusely bled. 
 
 The result of all this, I do not conceal from myself, is very 
 vexatious, both for me and for business. Although I have not 
 said or done anything really reprehensible, I think it would be 
 better that the king should have another Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs ready at his hand. But as this is not the case, and as 
 my retirement would upset the whole Ministry, I have consented 
 to remain. If you will read the Moniteur of the 9th and lOth, 
 you will now perfectly understand what has occurred. I should 
 have done better not to have entered into the explanations given 
 by M. Bignon in the name of the Commission, as I already felt 
 unwell on the 8th. It would have been better to avoid all 
 discussion. Such has been my fault, I do not pretend to excuse it. 
 All the rest was unfortunate and inevitable. If I had been 
 master of myself the next day, the discussion, instead of ending 
 in my failure, would have resulted in the most signal defeat our 
 adversaries have experienced for a long time. 
 
 You may make what use you like, mon Prince, of all these 
 details. I have nothing to conceal, nothing to dissemble, nothing 
 
2o8 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLE YRAND. 
 
 to justify. I was wrong, feeling as ill as I did, to play for such 
 high stakes ; I was wrong to lose. That is all I can say. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, January 2oth, 1834. 
 MON CHER Due, 
 
 There is a certain candour, which, to be perfectly true, 
 requires no little skill. Your admirable letter of the i6th is the 
 best proof of this. You will see the effect it has had on Lord 
 Grey from the note which he wrote to me, and which I enclose. 
 
 I am induced to think that we shall have a very good 
 paragraph about France in the King of England's speech on the 
 4th February : I have done my best to secure it. I cannot suffi- 
 ciently urge you to impress upon all those journals that depend on 
 you, not to recur perpetually to the incident of the Address ; it 
 should be buried in oblivion. . . . 
 
 {Note inclosed in the above letter!) 
 Lord Grey to the Prince de Talleyrnd 
 
 Downing Street, January loih, 1834. 
 
 MoN CHER Prince, 
 
 I return you with many thanks M. le Due de Broglie's 
 letter, which you were kind enough to send me last night. 
 
 I find in his explanations fresh proofs of his candour, and of his 
 upright and honourable character. The matter has no doubt been 
 very annoying, and I feared that it would give Russia some advan- 
 tage in her future discussions with us, however it is impossible 
 to impute any other motives to the Duke than those which he 
 himself acknowledges. But this is of little consequence, as long 
 as both governments maintain the close union which has been so 
 fortunately established between them. 
 
 I am greatly rejoiced that M. de Broglie has given up all idea 
 of sending in his resignation ; it would have been an irreparable 
 loss to France as well as to us, as we trust so entirely to his 
 loyalty and his honour. 
 
 Pray accept. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 LoT^TiON, January 2o//t, 1834. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 I wrote to you somewhat hurriedly the night before 
 last, telling you that the reports which had got abroad as to the 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 209 
 
 resignation of the English Cabinet were entirely without founda- 
 tion. I am still of this opinion ; but although there is no question 
 of a change of Ministry, it is none the less certain that a very 
 decided difference of opinion has arisen among some of its 
 members, and it seems that a proposed English intervention in 
 Portugal is the cause of it. Several of the Ministers thought 
 that an immediate intervention had become imperative ; but the 
 majority having voted against this measure, it has for the present 
 been abandoned. This matter was the cause of Lord Grey's last 
 journey to Brighton, and I am told that the king shares the 
 opinion of the majority of the Council. However, you will find a 
 full, and I think fairly true, account in to-day's Times of the prin- 
 ciples on which the partizans of intervention in Portugal lean. . . 
 
 It will have been seen, from the extracts of these despatches, 
 that I had been obliged to put off any attempts to persuade the 
 English Cabinet to conclude a defensive alliance between France 
 and England. The difficulties I had to encounter were various. 
 First, I was assured that there was no hope of any closer relations 
 with Austria, whom such a treaty could not fail to alarm and 
 throw still further into the Russian alliance. Nearly the same 
 objection had been raised with regard to Prussia. But these 
 were not the only obstacles I had to encounter. There were 
 some who upheld the foreign relations of England, others the 
 home position of the Cabinet, and they feared that by pledging 
 themselves to us, they might lose their independence as regards 
 Portuguese matters, which England watched with a jealous eye, 
 and with the firm resolution of acting independently of us in that 
 portion of the Peninsula ! It was also feared that if we per- 
 mitted her full liberty in this respect, she might, in return, be 
 obliged some day to grant us the same liberty of action in 
 Spanish affairs. And it is well known that ever since the peace 
 of Utrecht, England has always sought to oppose our influence 
 in Spain. This is a species of political axiom which, I am 
 inclined to think, is taught at the Universities of Oxford and 
 Cambridge. Finally, the existence of the English Cabinet was 
 somewhat shaken ; there was a diversity of opinion on several 
 subjects among its members, and, not to conceal any reasons 
 which might prevent its forming the alliance I had suggested, I 
 must admit that it was not at all confident as to the con- 
 VOL. V. P 
 
210 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 tinued existence of the French Ministry. The incident which 
 happened to the Due de Broglie maintained distrust on this 
 point, and I saw plainly that I must give up my scheme of an 
 alliance, if not altogether, at any rate until some event, either in 
 the East or in the Peninsula, made England recognize the 
 importance of such an alliance. 
 
 There was besides, at this time, a series of complications in the 
 policy of Europe, which would require to be unravelled before the 
 English Cabinet would feel disposed to entertain the scheme I 
 had proposed to it in the name of my Government. 
 
 The fall of the Zea Ministry at Madrid,^ was regarded as 
 a success for England, as the latter looked upon this Ministry as 
 entirely submissive to France, and therefore rejoiced at seeing it 
 replaced by that of M. Martinez de la Rosa,^ whom she hoped 
 to lead. 
 
 On the other hand, the Russian Government at this time tried 
 to approach France, and specially England, in order to prevent 
 the latter from allying herself too closely with us.' The follow- 
 ing letters will enable the reader easily to follow the course I 
 have indicated, as well as the events resulting therefrom : 
 
 ' M. de Zea had fallen in consequence of the action of several Captains-General, 
 who had addressed a statement to the Queen Regent, begging her to dismiss her 
 Ministry. The question was submitted by the Queen to the Council of Regency, 
 which decided that M. de Zea's retirement was imperative. The Cabinet, in con- 
 sequence, resigned on the i6th January. 
 
 ^ Francisco Martinez de la Rosa, bom in 1789, Deputy to the Cortes in 1812, had 
 become one of the most influential members of the Liberal Party. He became head 
 of the Cabinet in 1822, but was exiled after the re-establishment of absolute power in 
 1823. He returned to his native land in 1830, and became President of the Council in 
 1834. In 1840, he was Ambassador at Paris, and at Rome in 1842. In 1844, he joined 
 the Navarez Cabinet, was again accredited to Paris from 1847 to 1S51, then became 
 President of the First Chamber of the Cortes, Chief Secretary of State in 1857, and 
 President of the State Council in 1858. He died in 1862. 
 
 ' Marshal Maison in his correspondence drew, the attention of the government to 
 the reaction in the St. Petersburg Cabinet. On the 31st December, he wrote that 
 M. de Ncsselrode had expressed himself perfectly satisfied with the attitude adopted 
 by France relative to the Eastern question. " When one takes so nearly the same 
 ■views," he had said, " one must end by a thorough understanding." On the 3rd Jan- 
 nary, the Marshal again recurred to the same subject, and stated that M. de Nesselrode 
 iad shown the greatest satisfaction at the efforts France was making to consolidate her 
 government and repress revolutionary propagandism. On the 6th January, the 
 ambassador gave an account of an interview he had had with the emperor, during 
 which the latter had expressed himself with great violence regarding England. He 
 thought ttat the Russian Government, after having sought for the last eighteen 
 months -to embioil England with France, was now trying to embroil France with 
 Englanfl. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 211 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, January 25M, 1834. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 The English Ministers are entirely of your opinion 
 respecting the advances recently made to the King's Government 
 both by the Emperor Nicholas and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg ; 
 they quite recognize with you, that these fresh advances made to 
 France have no other object than to try and separate the Paris 
 and London Cabinets. They are very glad here to see that we are 
 not duped by these demonstrations, and I have reason to believe 
 that they will give you credit for this when occasion requires. 
 
 The steps taken by the Russian Government at Stockholm and 
 the precautionary measures it has deemed it necessary to take in 
 the Baltic, point to some anxiety, which will not be allayed by 
 anything done here.^ 
 
 Lord Grey spoke to me this morning about M. Martinez de 
 la Rosa. He considers him by far the best suited to conduct 
 Spanish affairs. I fancy that the praises lavished on M. Martinez 
 are greatly due to the dissatisfaction felt by the English Govern- 
 ment against M. de Zea. This will not surprise you. 
 
 I thank you for the memorandum you sent me relative to the 
 conspiracy which lately broke out in Greece.^ I shall find it of great 
 use when we are called on to take the affairs of that country in hand, 
 which, as far as we are concerned, is not very urgent ; but which will 
 no doubt become so as soon M. Tricoupis ' arrives in London. . . . 
 
 ^ The St. Petersburg Cabinet had sounded the Swedish Government as to the 
 attitude it would take, in the event of war breaking out between England and France 
 on the one side, and Russia) on the other. M. Billecocq, our Charge d'Afiaires at 
 Stockholm, had an interview on this subject with M. de Wetterstedt, the Swedish 
 Minister (see page 222), of which he sent an account to Paris in a despatch, dated 
 January 4th. M. de Wetterstedt declared "with extraordinary energy," that Sweden 
 ha'd made no engagement, that she had entered into no alliance, and that Russia had 
 left her the power of remaining perfectly neutral. A few days later, the Minister 
 declared that if such a war should take place, Sweden would throw open her ports to 
 the ships of both parties (despatch 20th January). Two months after, in an interview 
 with the English Charge d'Affaires, M. de Wetterstedt admitted that Sweden had been 
 formally asked by Russia to enter into an alliance with her against France and 
 England, but that she had only promised to remain neutral (M. Billecocq's despatch 
 of 7th March). 
 
 ^ A conspiracy against the Greek Government had been discovered at Nauplia in 
 the month of September 1833. Its object was to overthrow the regency, proclaim the 
 king's majority, and the conspirators would have then seized the reins of power in his 
 name. The arrest of the ringleaders caused the enterprise to miscarry. 
 
 ' Spiridion Tricoupis, bom in 1791, a Greek statesman and historian. He took 
 an active part in the Wars of Independence. On the accession of King Otto, he was 
 accredited to London (1835-1838), and returned in 1841. He was Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs in 1843, 'hen Envoy at Paris 1850, and again in London. He was Minister 
 at various periods between 1855 and 1862, and died in 1873. 
 
 P 2 
 
212 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 January l%th, 1834. 
 I was with Lord Grey and Lord Palmerston yesterday when 
 they received the news of General Saldanha's entry into Leiria. 
 It is looked on here as a matter that cannot fail to have import- 
 ant results ; but the details received are so characterized by 
 ferocity, that one cannot help wishing to see the end of the 
 struggle now going on in Portugal. It seems quite evident that 
 General Saldanha^ will not stop at this success, and that he 
 intends to march at once to Coimbra, in order to combine his 
 forces with the corps cTarinee of the Due de Terceira. This news 
 is the best possible augury for the solution of a question which, 
 as you are aware, has greatly occupied the English Cabinet for 
 some time. It replies to the fears of the partizans of an imme- 
 iiate intervention in Portugal, and has, for the time, caused the 
 English Ministry to give up all idea of any direct and material 
 action in the affairs of that country. . . . 
 
 February 1st, 1834. 
 As I had the honour of telling you in my despatch of the 
 morning, I went to Lord Palmerston last night at ten. He 
 gave me a despatch to read, the original which M. de Lieven had 
 received the night before, having been entrusted to him. I read 
 it through twice very carefully, and he then allowed me to take 
 some notes. . . . 
 
 This despatch seems to be a reply to one written from 
 London by the Russian Ambassador on December 27th. M. 
 de Lieven therein stated, that Lord Palmerston had expressed 
 the wish that a frank explanation should be come to between 
 England and Russia. To this entirely conciliatory overture, 
 Russia replies by eager protestations of her desire to entertain 
 only peaceful and friendly relations. A few lines lower down 
 are these words : England is the natural ally of Russia. Then 
 it is remarked, that in her intercourse with England, Russia has 
 I always followed and will continue to follow such forms as she 
 ■has contimioiisly ^■ax'^Xoye.di. with her. In proof of this the Note of 
 (October 27th ^ is cited, to which Russia made the only reply 
 rshe felt consistent with her dignity, and thereupon an apolo- 
 getic remark is made, that the Notes were not called forth 
 jby her. After this observation, they endeavour to show that 
 wherever the English Government has made any communication, 
 
 ' General Saldanha had taken possession on the 15th Januaiyof the fortified town of 
 Leiria, situated at an equal distance between Lisbon and Oporto. Of the 500 men who 
 composed the garrison, barely a handful succeeded in escaping from the conquerors. 
 
 ^ Note of October 27th 1832, which notified the Anglo-French Convention of 
 22nd October to the Russian Government. Russia sent an answer in reply, which 
 ■will be found on page 30 as a foot note. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 213 
 
 which was moderate in its views and conciliatory in form, they 
 had at once hastened to reply in the same spirit, and that when 
 England had expressed a desire to have more extended 
 information, Russia had gladly lent herself to remove everything 
 that might complicate the relations between the two countries or 
 prejudice the friendly feeling. 
 
 Looked at from this point of view, the request of the English 
 Government does not present any objections to the Russian 
 Government, which is quite willing to accede thereto. 
 
 M. de Nesselrode then proceeds to give some exact particulars 
 relative to military arrangements. He declares that the 
 information the English Government has received is not correct, 
 and he tries to point out the errors. The military measures that 
 have been notified to England could not in any way be con- 
 sidered as indicating an offensive policy on the part of Russia, 
 and still less so towards England than towards any other power. 
 
 Then come some details. He assures the English Government : 
 
 First, That the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, is in exactly 
 the same condition as it was when it returned from Constanti- 
 nople, and that no fresh vessels have been added since that 
 period. (As regards this. Lord Palmerston remarked to me, that 
 no explanation was given, as to why, when the expedition was 
 ended, so large a force was kept there, and that it naturally 
 gave the impression of some ulterior object in view.) 
 
 Secondly, That the division encamped in the Crimea, was 
 simply that which had returned from Constantinople last 
 autumn on board the Russian squadron, that no reinforcements 
 had been sent there, and that all the troops in the southern 
 provinces of the empire, did not exceed the number that had 
 been quartered there for the last fifteen years. 
 
 Thirdly, The Russian Government did not hesitate to 
 declare that the reports spread abroad as to the increase of its 
 maritime forces in the Baltic, were utterly without foundation. 
 M. de Nesselrode computes the number of vessels at twenty- 
 seven. This number, he said, is far less than the Empress 
 Catherine had in those same waters, and the fortifications on the 
 Aland Isles were merely a fortified barrack intended to hold 
 two battalions. No naval establishment had been formed there. 
 Those islands, moreover, had only harbours of refuge, which were 
 of use to all the world, and which could not disquiet Sweden, who 
 alone might feel alarmed. 
 
 Fourthly, That the object of the fortifications in Poland, was 
 solely for the proper security of the empire, which, as will be 
 remembered, might have been seriously threatened two years 
 ago in that quarter. 
 
214 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 His Government might find very just cause for alarm in 
 Lord Palmerston's own words. These words, according to the 
 despatch, run as follows : " That it would be to the interest of 
 England, to prefer seeing the Sultan's throne occupied by 
 Mehemet Ali, a change which would substitute Arab supremacy 
 for Ottoman rule." 
 
 There is a great want of accuracy in this quotation. Lord 
 Palmerston might have said that he would prefer seeing the 
 throne occupied by Mehemet Ali, rather than by the Emperor 
 of Russia. That certainly is the rheaning of the expression used 
 by Lord Palmerston, and from what he has told me, it is what 
 he did express. 
 
 M. de Nesselrode then makes some observations on the 
 subject of the words attributed to Lord Palmerston, and says 
 that the policy they advocate aims at replacing a powerful ally 
 of Russia by a power hostile and dangerous to the maintenance 
 of peace in the East. He admits, however, that England has not 
 acted in the sense that has been gratuitously attributed to her, 
 but declares the admission that such an idea could have existed 
 exhibits greater hostility to the interests of Russia, than is dis- 
 played by the forts on the Vistula against the interests of England. 
 
 From that he goes on to say, that the treaty of 8th July 
 should be looked upon less as an offensive weapon placed in the 
 hands of Russia, than as a moral guarantee against the projects 
 of invasion and conquest which an Arab Power would endeavour 
 to extend over European Turkey. 
 
 As a summing up to all these reasons, he gives the assurance 
 that the separate act of 8th July, does not give the Russian flag 
 any exclusive privileges to the prejudice of the other Powers, and 
 that in that respect, no alteration has been made in the usages 
 established by the Porte ; for, it is added, Russia is as far removed 
 from the idea of wishing to infringe them herself, as she is 
 interested in their not being misunderstood by any other power. 
 
 Then follow some explanations, relative to the reproach of 
 secrecy towards the other Courts when this treaty was made. 
 The reason for this, given by M. de Nesselrode is that the secret 
 did not belong to Russia, that it pertained solely to the Porte ; it 
 was the latter who felt the necessity of a treaty and who had a 
 direct interest in this transaction, and that therefore it was for her 
 to decide when it would suit her to give legal publicity to this 
 document, Russia according the most absolute liberty to the 
 Divan either to publish it or keep it secret. 
 
 In proof of this, the Convention of 22nd October is cited (only 
 they are not happy in their citations) relative to the measures 
 concerted between France and England with respect to Holland. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 215 
 
 They quite forgot, in recalling this circumstance, that when the 
 plenipotentiaries of the five Courts were assembled, two of them 
 asked the other three whether they would take part in coercive 
 measures, and that when they refused, France and England con- 
 sidered themselves free to act independently of them. There 
 certainly was no secrecy there. 
 
 The best thing in this Note is at the end, where there is a 
 question of the present pourparlers which are going on at St. 
 Petersburg between the representatives of the Porte. These are 
 the terms generally. 
 
 The result of the mission to the Porte, which we may look 
 upon as near its end, will plainly prove that Russia, in pur- 
 suance of the conservative policy she has adopted towards the 
 Ottoman Empire, will make a point of honour of respecting its 
 integrity and independence, and of strengthening the Sultan's 
 authority rather than making the slightest attempt to lessen 
 it " The arrangements we are now making with Achmet 
 Pasha" (these are M. de Nesselrode's last words) "will give 
 fresh weight to the frank explanations which form the subject- 
 matter of the present despatch." 
 
 This, Monsieur le Due, is the somewhat lengthy analysis of 
 M. de Nesselrode's despatch to the Prince de Lieven, but I do not 
 wish to miss the opportunity of making known to you, if you have 
 not already heard it from the Comte de Pozzo, Russia's reply to 
 the reproaches addressed to her with reference to the line of 
 policy she has adopted in the Levant. 
 
 To conclude : it appears evident to me, that this lengthy 
 Russian document is specially intended to allay the anxieties of 
 the London and Paris Cabinets ; it even shows a disposition to 
 satisfy them. To estimate the degree of confidence that should 
 be accorded to these expressions is somewhat difficult ; but to 
 doubt them altogether would I think be imprudent. There are 
 certain characters, and I believe the Emperor Nicholas is one 
 of them, who feel themselves pledged in proportion to the confi- 
 dence placed in them. . . . 
 
 I have the honour to transmit to you the despatches from the 
 Hague. You will see that the King of Holland has not yet 
 exhausted his dilatory ruses, and that he attributes language to 
 one of the members of the Conference which is evidently in 
 opposition to the engagements entered into by all the members 
 at their last meetings. There could have been no ambiguity in 
 Lord Palmerston's explanations to M. Dedel, and I cannot 
 think that the plenipotentiaries representing the three Northern 
 Courts would have shown anything but the conciliatory spirit 
 which has always distinguished them. 
 
2i6 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 The Conference, when it separated, decided not to meet 
 again until it had received positive and acceptable overtures 
 for a final arrangement from the King of Holland, or until 
 one of the plenipotentiaries made such a proposal. This latter 
 course has been adopted to resume negotiations, and we shall no 
 doubt have a meeting either on Wednesday or Thursday. It 
 will, to all appearance, lead to no results. . . . 
 
 I was obliged to give this long extract from the despatch of 
 the St. Petersburg Cabinet, as later on it had a most serious 
 effect, and reveals a trait in Lord Palmerston's character which 
 I have already alluded to in other circumstances ; I mean, that 
 he so often allowed personal feelings to enter into the conduct of 
 public affairs. Thus, this Russian despatch made him so angry, 
 that he was led to adopt a measure which I considered most ill- 
 judged, to say nothing more. The English Court had at this 
 period to nominate an ambassador to St. Petersburg to replace 
 Lord Durham,^ who had asked to be recalled on account of his 
 health. Lord Palmerston had decided to replace him by Sir 
 Stratford Canning, knowing well that such a choice was the most 
 disagreeable he could make for the Court of Russia. In fact, 
 when it was announced to M. de Nesselrode, he hastened to 
 make it known in London that the emperor would be very 
 displeased if Sir Stratford Canning was sent to St. Petersburg, 
 because that diplomatist, while English ambassador at Con- 
 stantinople, had always exhibited the most hostile feelings 
 towards Russia, and that he therefore considered him but little 
 calculated to foster the friendly relations, he was desirous 
 of establishing between the two Courts. Lord Palmerston 
 replied with his usual haughtiness, that it was very possible that 
 an English ambassador might have displeased the emperor by 
 conscientiously fulfilling his duties and the instructions of his 
 Government, but that he did not consider this a sufficient reason 
 for not giving him an appointment to which his great services 
 had entitled him, and that if this choice was not accepted, the 
 English Government would leave the post of ambassador at St. 
 
 ' Lord Durham was not ambassador at St. Petersburg ; he had been sent on a 
 special mission for the purpose, it was said, of offering to the Emperor Nicholas the 
 mediation of England in favour of the Poles. This mission however led to no results. 
 As for the English Embassy in Russia, which was then without a head, the duties 
 were carried on by Mr. Bligh, the Char^^ if Affaires. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 217 
 
 Petersburg vacant. The Emperor Nicholas in his turn showed 
 himself greatly offended at this, and decided to recall his am- 
 bassador, the Prince de Lieven, who had been accredited to 
 London since 1812. The two embassies remained vacant for 
 some time, and the relations between the two Courts naturally 
 felt the effect of this. 
 
 I did not share Lord Palmerston's views, or rather his feelings ; 
 I thought Russia's explanations ought to have been accepted 
 for what they were worth, and a watch kept on her, but that 
 we should not embroil ourselves, unless it was seriously resolved 
 to go to war with her. 
 
 I therefore wrote : — 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, February yd, 1834. 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 I have received your despatch No. 8. I thank you 
 for having sent me the document enclosed therein. After 
 its perusal, I was still further confirmed in the opinion I had 
 formed as to the line which the king's Government ought to 
 take with regard to Russia, at a time when that Power seems 
 disposed to be friendly. Our position is good ; we ought to 
 believe in the sincerity of the Russian Government's protes- 
 tations. The language uniformly held by the ambassadors 
 in London and Paris and the Russian ministers at St. Petersburg, 
 proves the desire and almost the necessity, of convincing us. 
 Knowing all we do, what danger can we run by appearing 
 to be convinced } 
 
 The truth is that Russia's course is arrested just now ; she 
 will have to seek for some time ere she finds a fresh pretext for 
 meddling directly in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire ; it 
 is to these we must direct all our attention. The English 
 Government seems to take the same view, if, as I have reason 
 to believe it will, the speech from the throne expresses itself 
 relative to Turkey in this way : 
 
 " Since the arrangement with Mehemet Ali, the peacefulness 
 of Turkey has been uninterrupted, and will not be menaced by any 
 other danger ; the English Government will do all in its power, to 
 prevent any change in the relations of this empire with those 
 Powers which can insure its future stability and independence." 
 
 I am also induced to believe, that there is a paragraph in 
 this speech which concerns us alone, and which is conceived as 
 nearly as possible in the following terms : 
 
2i8 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 " The constant aim of my policy has been to insure to my 
 people the continued enjoyment and blessings of peace ; in this 
 I have been greatly aided by the good feeling that has happily 
 been established between my Government and that of France ; 
 the continued assurances I receive of the friendly disposition 
 of the other Continental Powers, gives me full confidence in 
 the success of my efforts.". . . 
 
 February \th. 
 
 I have just returned from the opening ceremony ; it was 
 most brilliant. I hasten to send you the King of England's 
 speech. France is mentioned separately from the other Powers ; 
 the king wished this to be understood, by the way in which he 
 uttered the passage which concerns us specially ; he even made 
 a pause before pronouncing those words : " the assurances which I 
 have received!''^. . . . 
 
 February Jih. 
 
 Our conference on Dutch affairs took place at the request 
 of Lord Palmerston. It was very long, because in discussing the 
 various opinions, we were carried back far into the past. 
 
 The Austrian plenipotentiaries took the initiative, and 
 declared that their Court, not wishing to neglect anything that 
 could bring about a speedy settlement of the Hollando-Belgian 
 affair, had charged them to express to the plenipotentiaries of 
 the other Courts the desire that the negotiations which had been 
 so long interrupted should be resumed ; they assigned as the 
 reason for their request the action taken by the King of the 
 Netherlands, the pledge he had given, the steps he had taken to 
 obtain assent to the territorial arrangements from the parties 
 interested, and moreover the fresh instructions he had sent to 
 the Dutch plenipotentiaries to renew the negotiations of those 
 matters still in dispute. 
 
 Lord Palmerston then spoke, and taking up the question 
 where it had been left on the 30th August, when the Conference 
 separated, he proved that nothing had really changed since 
 that period ; that the Germanic Confederation had not ac- 
 quiesced in the demand of the King of the Netherlands ;^ that 
 
 1 The King of England's speech at the opening of Parliament. The following is 
 the passage alluded to by M. de Talleyrand. " . . . . The constant aim of my policy 
 has been to insure to my people the enjoyment of the uninterrupted blessings of peace. 
 In this I have been fully seconded, by the good feeling so happily established between 
 my Government and that of France, and the assurances which I have received of the 
 friendly disposition of the other Continental Powers, gives me full confidence that my 
 efforts will continue to be crowned with success . . . " 
 
 '^ It will be remembered that the negotiations relative to the Hollando-Belgian 
 question had been suspended in the month of August, in consequence of King William's 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 219 
 
 the Austrian and Prussian ministers, trusting to their influence, 
 had led us to believe in the success of such a course, but 
 having been mistaken, the important difficulty as to the 
 boundaries was not removed, and that thus the principal 
 guarantee (without which it was impossible to foresee the issue 
 of this negotiation) had not yet been given, and was as far off 
 as ever from being so. It was the same also with the question 
 as to the powers of the Dutch plenipotentiaries ; he had seen 
 M. Dedel, and after pointing out to him that the delays of 
 the Diet deprived the Conference of the guarantee it had 
 asked for, in order to conclude the territorial arrangements, he 
 had told him, that looking to the difficulties which had succeeded 
 each other for the last three years, he must ask him whether 
 he had at last got a guarantee to give us : for example, had he 
 received powers authorizing him to sign the articles initialled 
 by M. Verstolck himself, among others. Art. IX. and the 
 paragraphs it contained ; M. Dedel replied that he was not 
 authorized, and could not take it upon himself to sign. Lord 
 Palmerston then added, that he was compelled to come to the 
 conclusion that fresh conferences would lead to nothing, and 
 that the negotiation was just at the same point now which it 
 had reached five months ago. 
 
 The Prussian minister, M. de Biilow, tried to answer, and 
 insisted that the Conference ought to assemble, giving as a 
 convincing reason that the King of the Netherlands would 
 represent our refusal to the Dutch nation and the different 
 Cabinets of Europe, as the cause of the negotiation not being 
 brought to a close. 
 
 I was then enabled to show, by going on with several of the 
 arguments so ably brought forward by Lord Palmerston, that 
 to proceed with the negotiations, when there was no prospect 
 of arriving at any definite conclusion, would be placing the Confer- 
 ence in a very unsuitable position ; that we ought always to be 
 agreed among ourselves ; that the division of territory, the actual 
 basis of the Belgian Kingdom, had been settled without any 
 reservation by the Powers ; in this respect, therefore, we were 
 bound ; if M. Dedel had no powers to sign with us what we 
 were pledged to, there was no use in any negotiation, and 
 that therefore my opinion coincided with that of Lord Palmer- 
 refusal to authorize the Diet and the Princes of Nassau to take the necessary steps 
 to cede that portion of Luxemburg to Belgium, which the treaty of the twenty-four 
 articles had given her. When the King of the Netherlands had at last determined to act 
 (see p. 180), he had met with a double refusal. Nevertheless, he thought that having 
 shown such goodwill, the Conference would agree to commence negotiations again, 
 and had given his plenipotentiaries powers accordingly. It will be seen what reception 
 his proposal met with in London. 
 
220 THE MEMOIRS OF PAlNCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 ston ; that matters must for the present be allowed to remain as 
 they were, and as action had not proved successful, we must fain 
 trust to the power of inaction. 
 
 After a silence of some minutes, we all separated, and as I 
 had foreseen and told you, this Conference ended in nothing. 
 The Austrian and Prussian plenipotentiaries carried out to the 
 letter the instructions of their Governments ; — they could not 
 well seem to agree to our observations, but their silence made us 
 think that they found our reasons unanswerable. We separated 
 without any adjournment, as is the case when a matter is quite 
 given up. . . . 
 
 February \i^h, 1834. 
 
 At the request of M. Skinas, Grecian Chargd d Affaires, the 
 Conference assembled to-day to discuss the pi'oposal he was 
 directed to submit to us, viz., to give our guarantee to the third por- 
 tion of the Greek loan. M. Skinas laid before us the embarrassed 
 state of the Greek finances, and entered into full details on this 
 matter. . . . We, that is Lord Palmerston and I, were aware 
 that the Prince de Lieven had received instructions, which did 
 not permit him to consent that the guarantee asked for should be 
 granted. We therefore allowed him to estimate the difficulties 
 raised by his Government as to granting this guarantee. The 
 difficulties are as follows : Russia wishes to have detailed accounts 
 as to the real state of the Greek finances, and M. Skinas 
 having promised to furnish these in a very short time, we 
 listened to M. de Lieven's further observations, which only 
 pledged us to a delay. 
 
 I need hardly point out to you, that the visible reason given 
 by M. le Prince de Lieven was not the real one on which the 
 objections were founded. Russia does not wish to lose a means 
 of interference in Greek affairs, which she still possesses. Perhaps 
 she has some special schemes, which the present difficulties would 
 render easier of execution. The information which you will have 
 received, will enable you better than anyone else, to judge as to 
 the value of the conjectures we have formed here, and will pro- 
 bably explain to you how it is that Russia, who a year ago was 
 the first to ask for a guarantee of the three Powers, should now 
 have raised a difficulty on this point. . . . 
 
 London, February lyd, 1834. 
 
 . . . Accept my thanks for sending me Marshal Maison's 
 despatch, in whic'h he gives you an account of the new Conven- 
 tion concluded at St. Petersburg on January 29th, between 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 221 
 
 the Porte and Russia.^ This Convention somewhat ameliorates 
 the conditions which the treaty of Adrianople had imposed on 
 Turkey ; but it is not difficult to recognize, that the renunciations 
 of Russia are not nearly so extensive as they seem. Turkey is 
 really her insolvent creditor, if therefore she remits any part of 
 the loan, the sacrifice is not so very great. The evacuation 
 of the Principalities is an incomplete measure, for the occupation 
 of Silistria and the military route across the provinces which 
 are to be evacuated, are almost as good guarantees for Russia, 
 as those she gave up by the treaty of January 29th. In all this, 
 there is neither much abnegation or generosity. What is to 
 be regretted more than all, is, that the Turkish plenipotentiary 
 did not stipulate in the Convention as to what number of 
 troops were to form the garrison of Silistria. That is a most 
 important point, which the Porte and Austria ought not to have 
 neglected to arrange in accordance with their joint interest 
 You know what an occupation of eight years means. Austria 
 appears to have forgotten that only two months ago, she 
 declared she would never allow Russia to take possession of even a 
 Turkish village ; she would find it difficult to show in her own 
 annals that an occupation of eight years had not become a 
 possession. It would, I think, be a grand and beneficial 
 stroke of policy for France and England to unite in making a 
 loan to the Porte which would free her at once, and enable the 
 Principalities, as well as the Porte herself, to resume their 
 sovereign rights. Never would the credit of our country and 
 that of England have been more nobly and politically em- 
 ployed. . . . 
 
 February is,th. 
 
 On reading over what I had the honour of writing to you in 
 my despatch of yesterday, as to the benefit which would accrue 
 were the Porte to be freed by a loan, from the obligations she has 
 lately contracted with Russia, I found, that in order to make this 
 idea complete, it would be necessary to endeavour to associate 
 
 1 Despatch of 1st Febraary, 1834. The Convention of 29th January stipulated for 
 the evacuation of the principalities by Russia, before the end of May following, it 
 settled the organization of those provinces, the quota of tribute to be paid to the Porte, 
 the mode of nominating the Hospodars, who were to be chosen by the Sultan from a 
 list presented by the Boyards. The Principalities were to have their army, their fleet, 
 and their flag. 
 
 The Sandjacks of Tcheldir and Pasken were to be definitely united to Turkey. 
 
 It granted the Porte a deduction of two million ducats, on the six million which 
 the treaty of Adrianople had assigned to it as a contribution. The payment of the 
 remaining four millions, to be accomplished in eight years, and until Turkey was 
 completely free, Russia was to occupy the fortress of Silistria, communications between 
 it and the Empire being kept open by a military route through the Principalities. 
 
222 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Austria in the scheme I suggested to you : the security of her 
 eastern frontiers, the free navigation of the Danube, (which 
 is commanded by Silistria,) and also her German interests, 
 make it her duty, so it seems to me, to use all her efforts to take 
 from Russia the position which that Power is endeavouring to 
 preserve in the Principalities. I should think therefore, that this 
 would be a favourable time to make this proposition to her, and 
 that if she accepted it, we for our part should find the immense 
 advantage of breaking up the united policy, followed for the last 
 three years by the three northern Powers. I think this matter 
 is worthy of your careful attention. 
 
 The Swedish minister spoke to me yesterday, relative to 
 some advances made to his Government by General Suchtelen,^ 
 the Russian ambassador at Stockholm, for the purpose of 
 finding out what Sweden intended to do, if a war should break 
 out between France, England, and Russia. The Government 
 had replied by a memorandum, that it would remain neutral, and 
 had instructed its minister at St. Petersburg to notify this to 
 the Russian Government. I thought I ought to advise you of 
 this fact, although I do not believe it will have any con- 
 sequences. . . . 
 
 Madame Adelaide d'Orleans to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 TuiLERIES, February 11 th, 1834. 
 
 .... What happened at Marseilles, Lyons, and St. Etienne, 
 and what occurred here at Paris, were all from the same cause ; 
 an affair got up by the same factions, the republicans and the 
 associations and secret societies.^ The working-classes of Lyons 
 and St. Etienne fortunately did not wish to take any part in 
 these riots, and everything has again settled down in those 
 towns. Here, not only did the populace take no part in these 
 wicked attempts at disorder, but they were most indignant, the 
 National Guard was much exasperated, and likewise the regular 
 troops ; they were brought about by a mere handful of wretches, 
 which could not cause any serious anxiety. In fact, it has been an 
 
 ' Jean Pierre, Comte de Suchtelen, born in 1759, formerly a Dutch officer who 
 entered the Russian service in 1783, rose to be a General and was then sent as Ambas- 
 sador to Stockholm. He took part in the campaign of 1813 on the staff of Bemadotte, 
 returned to Stockholm after the peace, and remained there until his death in 1836. 
 
 - Some disturbances had broken out in various parts of the country, consequent on 
 the law relative to public auctioneers. The law of February l6th, obliged them to 
 first apply for authority. This produced most violent scenes, especially in Paris and 
 Lyons, on the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd February. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 223 
 
 evil resulting in a benefit, by proving the necessity of having a 
 law to repress all these associations and secret societies, and 
 thus causing everyone to desire it. There is no doubt now that 
 this law will be passed in the Chamber.^ . . . 
 
 The king agrees with you, that the new Russo-Turkish 
 treaty is a great improvement, but that it cannot materially 
 change the relative position of Russia and Turkey, which is 
 that of strength and nonentity. What the king therefore 
 considers most important, is the disarmament of the fleet in the 
 Black Sea, for as long as it remains equipped, it can transport the 
 Russians to Constantinople in three days. Once this fleet is 
 laid up no rapid movement is possible. As for the evacuation 
 of the Principalities, that no doubt is a good measure, but with 
 a military route and Silistria, it is more apparent than real. 
 
 The essential point, the Gordian knot of this whole affair, is 
 Austria's policy. Russia will not move unless she is assured of 
 Austria's assent, and in this case I should call the certainty of 
 her inaction assent. The question is to know what is being 
 done as to this. England is in every way in a better position 
 than we are, to find this out, and it is for her to tell us. Try and 
 get her to do this. . . . 
 
 Le Comte de Rayneval to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Madrid, February list, 1834. 
 
 MoN CHER Prince, 
 
 I did not wish to disturb the rest which I thought you 
 would like to enjoy, during your sojourn in France. I thought 
 you would not take it amiss if I allowed you to forget the 
 affairs of the Peninsula for a brief period. But I was unable to 
 resist the too tempting opportunity of recalling them to you, 
 offered me by M. de Florida-Blanca's departure.^ 
 
 We heard here yesterday officially. Lord Palmerston's reply 
 to the request for aid addressed to the English Government by 
 Dom Pedro. The feeling experienced by the new Spanish 
 Cabinet, at the assurance that England will not depart from her 
 policy of inaction, is one of deep consternation. Spain is, and 
 will be for a long time, unable to intervene effectively in Portugal, 
 and as long as Dom Miguel and Don Carlos support each other, 
 there can be no peace or safety for the young Queen's Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 ^ This law was passed the following March in the Chamber of Deputies, by a 
 majority of 246 to 154. 
 
 ' The Comte de Florida-BIanca was leaving for London, whither he had just 
 been accredited. 
 
224 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 M. de Florida-Blanca is instructed to enlarge on this text and 
 endeavour to effect a change in England's decision. It is thought 
 here, that even if the Enghsh Government cannot actually- 
 become the auxiliary of its ally Dona Maria, it might at least 
 aid her indirectly by granting subsidies to Spain. But I fancy 
 the time for subsidies is passed. 
 
 They are talking seriously here of convoking the Cortes. It 
 is a dangerous experiment, of which no one can foresee the 
 result, but it has become impossible not to do so. When one comes 
 to think of the work to be accomplished by those who govern this 
 country, one almost feels inclined to despair. These are a 
 few of the tasks imposed on them — altering the order of suc- 
 cession, changing the form of government, reforming the finances 
 and the administration, putting down the civil war, and pacifying 
 a neighbouring country — all this to be done too during a regency, 
 and that regency entrusted to a woman ! 
 
 M. de Florida-Blanca trusts that your Highness will honour 
 him with your goodwill and assist him with your advice. He 
 knows how valuable it is, and that it is only by following it, that 
 he can hope to succeed in the difficult mission that has been 
 entrusted to him. . . ."^ 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, March /^th, 1834, 
 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 The English Ministry have received news from Portugal, 
 announcing that a serious engagement has taken place near 
 Santarem between the troops of Dom Pedro and those of Dom 
 Miguel. ^ Baron Mortier's despatches, which I transmit to you 
 to-day, will give you fuller and more circumstantial details than 
 I could send you. But I must warn you that the reports which 
 have reached the British Ministry, and even the letters from 
 persons attached to Dom Pedro's party, all agree in stating that 
 this affair so much boasted of at first, was anything but decisive, 
 
 ^ The Due de Broglie wrote at the same time to M. de Talleyrand :".... The 
 Spanish Cabinet continues to see in the prolongation of this struggle [in Portugal] one 
 of the greatest dangers that could threaten the throne of Queen Isabella, and as it 
 believes that the intervention of England can alone put an end to it, it does not yet 
 give up all hope of inducing the London Cabinet to forego her neutrality. M. de 
 Florida Elanca who is momentarily expected to arrive in Paris, has instructions to 
 urge this point most vehemently with Lord Palmerston. There is no need, Prince, 
 for me to beg you to accord your support and advice to the Spanish Legation, when- 
 ever you think you can be of the slightest use to them . . . . " 
 
 ^ The battle took place on February l8th, the Miguelite troops beat a retreat after 
 a desperate struggle. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 225 
 
 for Dom Miguel's army, according to the latest accounts, was 
 four leagues in advance of Santarem. 
 
 Although Dom Pedro's partizans consider his military forces 
 sufficient to insure success to the cause of the young Queen, 
 a great many enlistments are nevertheless being made in 
 London, as well as purchases of arms and warlike stores. 
 
 London, March loth, 1834. 
 
 I have received your despatch. No. 19. I will certainly not 
 delay in offering my services to M. de Florida-Blanca as soon as 
 he arrives in London. I should hope that the British Govern- 
 ment, when better informed as to the real interests of the Peninsula 
 and freed from the obstacles which home affairs impose on it, 
 will at last recognize the necessity of renouncing the neutrality 
 they have maintained in Portugal. I have always endeavoured 
 to lead it in that direction, and I will continue to do so after M. 
 de Florida-Blanca's arrival, but I must confess that, so far, 1 have 
 but little hope we shall attain the end so greatly desired by 
 the present Spanish Government. . . . 
 
 March iZth. 
 
 I think I ought to draw your particular attention to the 
 account of the Parliamentary sitting last night in the House of 
 Commons, reported in the English papers to-day. A motion of 
 Mr. Sheil's.i requesting that all the documents relative to Eastern 
 affairs should be laid before the House, gave rise to a very im- 
 portant discussion.^ 
 
 You will no doubt notice with pleasure those passages in 
 Lord Palmerston's and Mr. Stanley's^ speeches, which referred 
 specially to the political relations so happily established between 
 France and Great Britain.* The King's Government cannot fail 
 
 1 Richard Lalor Sheil, born in 1791, an Irish writer and politician. He entered 
 the House of Commons, became Vice-President of the Board of Trade in 1839, and 
 Master of the Mint in 1846. He was nominated Minister at Florence in 1850, and 
 died the following year. 
 
 2 Mr. Shell's motion, which amounted to a vote of censure against the Cabinet, 
 was rejected, notwithstanding the intervention of Sir Robert Peel. 
 
 s Edward John, Baron Stanley of Alderley, born in 1802, entered the House of 
 Commons in 1831, was Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1833 ta 1834 ; Lord 
 of the Treasury in the Melbourne Cabinet (1835-1841), Under-Secretary of State for 
 Foreign Affairs in 1846. In 1852, he succeeded his father in the House of Lords, 
 became Vice-President of the Board of Trade in 1853, and was made Privy Councillor 
 in 1855. He became Postmaster-General in i860. 
 
 * Lord Palmerston : " The relations between France and England become each 
 day more friendly. As both Governments know each other better, they appreciate 
 one another more, and it is, I must confess, a real matter of pride and satisfaction to 
 me to think that the prejudices which divided both countries have almost entirely 
 disappeared." 
 
 VnT,_ V. 
 
226 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 to be satisfied with the language of both ministers, which was 
 not only honourable to France, but which proved to the eyes of 
 Europe in a manner very favourable to us, the union of the two 
 countries. This union should be the aim of all our efforts : its 
 realization has already procured us and promises also (so it seems 
 to me) still further good results. . . . 
 
 March T.-jth. 
 .... I eave Lord Palmerston the letter to read which 
 you wrote to the French Chargi cCAffaii-es at the Hague, 
 requesting him to ask some explanation from M. de Zuylen, 
 respecting the movements that have taken place in the Dutch 
 army.'^ Lord Palmerston approves of this step so thoroughly, 
 that he will cause a similar request to be made at the Hague, and 
 has sent a memorandum to the English Charge d' Affaires, 
 which he is to give to M. de Zuylen. This memorandum is 
 worded almost in the same terms as the letter of which you 
 were kind enough to send me a copy. 
 
 I did not suggest any alterations in the form of his represen- 
 tations to the Hague, but I think that your letter to M. Drouyn 
 de I'Huys^ is preferable, and that it is better to avoid the use of 
 a diplomatic Note, the formality of which may sometimes offend. 
 I am induced to think this from the example I have just seen. 
 You are aware that the Vienna Cabinet sent an evasive reply, 
 somewhat like that from Berlin to the Note of the English 
 ambassador, I'elative to the events which have taken place at 
 Luxembourg.^ 
 
 1 This incident resulted in notliing. The Due de Broglie wrote on the 31st March : 
 "The anxiety manifested by the Belgians did not actually rest on any positive facts. 
 It has entirely disappeared now, and the Brussels Cabinet itself admits, that it gave 
 too ready credence to the reports of its agents. " (Despatch of the Due de Broglie 
 to M. de Talleyrand.) 
 
 2 Edward Drouyn de I'Huys, born in 1805, entered the diplomatic service and 
 was attached to the Embassy at Madrid in 1S30, was then for three years Chars^i 
 d Affaires at the Hague, and in 1S36 First Secretary at Madrid. In 1840, he became 
 Director of Commercial Affairs at the Foreign Office, and Deputy for Melun in 1S42. 
 Re-elected in 1S4S, he became Minister for Foreign Affairs the same year, Ambassador 
 in London (1S49), again Minister in 1 85 1, and later on Vice-President of the Senate. 
 He again entered the Ministry in 1852, left it in 1855, and came in once more in 
 1S62. 
 
 3 A serious incident had just occurred at Luxembourg. The Belgian Government, 
 relying on the treaty of May 21st, which had guaranteed the territorial statu quo of 
 Belgium, had commenced the usual sale of felled timber and the levy of the militia in 
 the German part of Luxembourg. General Dumoulin, who commanded the fortress of 
 Luxembourg, objected to this, and the Government, anxious to avoid all conflicts, 
 desisted. Nevertheless, as the notices relative to the mililia levy had been posted up 
 in two Communes, General Damoulin carried off' M. Hanno, the Belgian district 
 commissioner, notwithstanding that he was outside the strategic radius, and made him 
 a prisoner (February 15th). The Belgian Cabinet appealed to France and England, 
 who made representations to the Diet. This latter at once gave orders for the Belgian 
 commissioner's release and repudiated General Dumoulm's action. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 227 
 
 But M. de Metternich at the same time instructed the Austrian 
 ambassador in London to give fuller explanations to the English 
 Cabinet. These explanations refer to the two facts which had 
 served as a pretext for the arrest of M. Hanno, that is to say, the 
 levy of the militia and the sale of the felled timber within the 
 strategic radius of the fortress of Luxemburg. With regard to 
 the first of these points, M. de Metternich maintains that the 
 Belgian Government was in the wrong, because the levy of the 
 militia is entirely a military question, and on that ground 
 the commandant of the fortress could oppose the measures of 
 the Belgian administration. As to the sale of the felled timber, 
 the chancellor believes that Belgium had the right to claim that 
 privilege, and adds somewhat ironically, that on this point he 
 cannot share the opinion of Lord Palmerston, who, at the outset 
 of the discussion, had condemned the Belgian action. M. de 
 Metternich makes use of this last circumstance, to show the im- 
 partiality he has brought to bear on the facts, and he winds up 
 by expressing the astonishment felt at Vienna at the course 
 adopted by the English Cabinet, for which he says there was no 
 ground whatever, as England had a minister at Frankfort and 
 Belgium had one at Vienna, and that the proper course would 
 have been to instruct one of these agents to act, and not the 
 English Embassy in Austria.^ Throughout the whole of M. de 
 Metternich's communication, there runs a tone which plainly 
 shows how little goodwill he bears to the English Government, 
 or it may be to Lord Palmerston alone, and one perceives 
 that the chancellor has eagerly seized the occasion to condemn 
 the memorandum, remitted perhaps somewhat too thought- 
 lessly, by Sir Frederick Lamb to the Austrian Cabinet. 
 
 I have communicated the news from Madrid which you 
 transmitted to me, to Lord Palmerston. He was very pleased to 
 hear of the entry of eight thousand Spaniards into Portugal, and 
 I did not think it was necessary to enter into further explanations.^ 
 
 ' France had intervened at Vienna, simultaneously with England, respecting the 
 occurrence at Luxembourg. M. de Sainte-Aulaire wrote about it stating that he had 
 found M. de Metternich very iIl-di=posed as to this matter, and that this ill-feeling 
 was due to the Note which S'r Frederick Lamb had transmitted to him. M. de 
 Metternich declared that Austria could not interfere in this more than the other 
 Powers. When pressed by the ambassador, he at last admitted that General 
 Dumoulin's proceeding had been indefensible, and that if he had been in the 
 Austrian service, he would have been recalled at once. (M. de Sainte-Aulaire's 
 despatch to the Department, March 9th.) 
 
 ^ Spain's intervention in Portugal had been provoked by Dom Miguel's attitude. 
 Having taken refuge near the frontiers of the two countries, he had refused to 
 recognize Queen Isabella, and had welcomed Don Carlos as King of Spain, aiding 
 him in every way. The Government of the Queen Regent took advantage of these 
 facts to send General Rodil with 8,000 men into Portugal, with orders to assist Dom 
 Pedro. (April i6th.) 
 
 2 
 
228 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 The English Cabinet only looks at the Portuguese side of the 
 question in all this, and are in favour of everything that may lead to 
 its solution. Nevertheless, we are both surprised that the Span- 
 ish Queen Regent should, in her present position, be able to dis- 
 pense with eight thousand men ; it would lead one to suppose, that 
 her difficulties were in reality less great than one imagined, but 
 that I find in your despatch more than one reason for modifying 
 this opinion. . . . 
 
 March -^jlst. 
 
 At the last interview I had with Lord Palmerston and Lord 
 Grey, before the departure of these ministers for the country, 
 they spoke to me about a despatch they had just received from 
 Vienna, in which Sir Frederick Lamb gave them an account 
 of a conversation he had had with the Prince de Metternich. 
 It appears that in this conversation, the chancellor brought 
 forward one of those questions which he loves to uphold and 
 enlarge upon. The one referred to was respecting the Ottoman 
 Empire, whose speedy downfall he predicted. As a reason for 
 this he assigned the Mohammedan religion, which had placed the 
 Turkish race under the yoke of an absurd fanaticism, an enemy 
 to all progress, in the midst of European populations, whose 
 tendency was perpetually to modify it. Applying this view to 
 the Arab race, and without caring a straw for the contradiction 
 exhibited by the bold enterprises of the Pasha of Egypt, M. de 
 Metternich declared this latter race to be equally incapable for 
 the same reason of becoming fit successors to power in Turkey, 
 and he added, that it would be necessary to seek for a fresh 
 combination to avert the catastrophe which was brewing in 
 the East, or at any rate to take advantage of what might happen 
 there. 
 
 To this extent, at any rate on that day, the chancellor 
 limited his confidences, but both English ministers, desirous 
 of still further ascertaining the Chancellor's views, strove to 
 discover what the Vienna Cabinet proposed to substitute for 
 the present state of affairs in Turkey ; and having put on one 
 side the idea of a European Prince at Constantinople, they 
 concluded that the aj'riere-pensee which dominated M. de 
 Metternich, was a divison of the Ottoman Empire. I have not 
 attempted to oppose this conviction on the part of Lord Palm- 
 erston and Lord Grey, although I think they have allowed 
 themselves to be too much influenced by what M. de Metternich, 
 probably with that fickleness to which he is prone, has said ; but 
 I thought I ought to inform you of the chancellor's conversation, 
 and the impression it has produced on the English Cabinet. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 229 
 
 The ministers will be out of town until April 7th, on account 
 of the Easter holidays. . . . 
 
 Matters had arrived at this stage, when an unfortunate 
 incident occurred which momentarily disturbed the confidence 
 which the English Government seemed at last to have placed in 
 our Cabinet : I refer to the resignation of the Due de Broglie, 
 which he considered it necessary to tender in consequence of 
 the vote in the Chamber of Deputies rejecting the treaty con- 
 cluded between France and the United States of America.^ 
 This treaty settled the compensation claimed twenty years 
 before by the United States, for depredations committed by the 
 French Navy during the wars of the Empire. 
 
 France undertook to pay twenty-five million francs to the 
 United States, and on account of this clause the treaty was sub- 
 mitted to the Chamber of Deputies. It had been signed by 
 General Sebastiani when Minister of Foreign Affairs ; but the 
 Due de Broglie generously assumed the responsibility of it. An 
 intrigue was raised in the Chamber to defeat the proposal of 
 the Government. It succeeded, and the Due de Broglie tendered 
 his resignation. Some letters which I received from Paris on 
 this occasion, are sufficiently interesting to induce me to give 
 them a place here. 
 
 Madame Adelaide d'Orleans to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, April 2nd, 1834. 
 
 MoN CHER Prince, 
 
 I feel sure that you would like to hear from me just 
 now ; therefore, although I know nothing as yet of what is prob- 
 ably being now decided at the Council, which our king has been 
 holding ever since half-past ten this morning (and it is now half- 
 past two), after having been in Council last night till midnight, 
 I sit down to lament with you over the deplorable vote passed in 
 the Chamber yesterday. It is very serious and very unfortunate. 
 
 ^ Treaty of 4th July 1831. The question dealt with in this treaty had been 
 pending ever since 1812. The United States demanded seventy millions ; they ended 
 by accepting the sum of twenty-five millions offered by France, and conceding in ad- 
 dition several reductions in the wine and silk duties. This treaty, which was submitted 
 to the Chamber on the 28th March, was rejected after a discussion lasting five days, 
 by 176 votes to 168. The Due de Broglie at once tendered his resignation. 
 
230 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 I understand that the Due de Broglie and Sebastiani will not 
 remain in, and what other sad consequences may not arise 
 from this rejection of the American treaty ! What ignorance 
 and what folly on the part of this Chamber, which acted so 
 wisely with respect to the law of the associations. . . . 
 
 3 o'clock. The king is still in Council, but General Sebastiani, 
 who has just come from there, tells me that M. de Rigny will 
 probably be nominated Minister of Foreign Affairs. I do not 
 yet know who will replace M. de Rigny in the Marine. In 
 other respects the Ministry remains the same, which is what one 
 would wish under the present circumstances. 
 
 It is said that already there is a reaction, and regret concern- 
 ing the vote in the Chamber. Unfortunately, it is too late. . . . 
 
 \tk April. 
 
 I hoped, when I wrote to you on the 2nd, to be able to tell 
 you yesterday that the arrangement in the Ministry had been 
 accomplished as I thought, namely, with the least possible 
 change, — for that very reason alone, and under present cir- 
 cumstances, the best thing that could be done. This also was 
 the opinion of Marshal Soult, Sebastiani, and at first, of the 
 majority of the Council. The first stumbling-block was M. Mole, 
 to whom there was some objection on your account and that 
 of England. In truth, as you observed in your letter, nothing but 
 the king's authority, his forbearance, and his conciliatory spirit, 
 could have succeeded in keeping his Ministry together so long, 
 Men become tired of working together, and what satisfied them 
 at first does not content them after a time. The king has the 
 most difficult task, for he has to reconcile and keep everyone 
 together ; but, thank heaven, he is one who, for the sake of his 
 country, can face anything. It needs his patience, his strength 
 of mind and determination, to stand up against it. Nothing has 
 yet been decided about the Ministry. Meanwhile, everyone 
 remains at his post. . . . 
 
 ^th April. 
 
 The great business of the Ministry was at length concluded 
 yesterda)/ evening. I send you enclosed the Monitciir, which 
 will give you the entire new Cabinet.^ They are men of ability, 
 and 1 hope matters will work well. I am very thankful that it 
 is settled, as our king sadly needed some rest after all the 
 
 ^ The new Ministiy was formed on the 4th of April. Marshal Soult, M. Humann, 
 and M. Guizot kept their posts ; M. Thiers went from Commerce and Public 
 Works to the Home Office ; M. de Riffny, Minister of Marine, to the Foreign Office. 
 M. Duchatel took Commerce, and M. Persil was appointed Keeper of the Seals. 
 .■Vdmiral Jacob became Minister of Marine after the refusal of Admiral Roussin, to 
 whom the post was offeied. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 231 
 
 fatigues and anxieties of every kind he has had lately. There is 
 one omission in the Moniteur which I send you, but it will be 
 corrected, namely, that Sebastiani has been made ambassador at 
 Naples, where he will do excellently. 
 
 One thing has greatly vexed us, namely, that several of the 
 English papers, and others also, desire to attribute the close 
 union between France and England and the idea of the alliance, 
 to other causes than the influence of the king and yourself, 
 whereas, as the king says, he is the father of it, and you are the 
 godfather ! You must lay claim to this honour, both for yourself 
 and for him. . . . 
 
 Lord Holland to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Holland House, April i^th, 1834. 
 
 What vexatious news ! May one not hope that M. de Broglie 
 will take back his portfolio .■" Why will they not attend to the 
 wise counsel of the ancient monk, who said : 
 
 " In omnibus tuis cogitationibus semper caveto de resigna- 
 tionibus " } 
 
 Tell me, I pray you, all you know about it. 
 
 Lord Brougham to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 April itth, 1834. 
 
 Mon CHER Prince, 
 
 A thousand condolences on the resignation of our good 
 friend in Paris. Nothing could have been worse just now. But 
 we must redouble our efforts so that nothing shall injure the 
 ties so happily established between our two countries. That is the 
 point on which nearly all my foreign policy turns, and yours 
 likewise, as I well know. . . . 
 
 The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand 
 
 April 6th, 1834. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I have delayed writing to you until the crisis we have 
 just come out of was over. I had not the courage to do so while it 
 lasted. Although I was fully resolved, and though I was con- 
 vinced that the resolution I had taken was indispensable, my 
 anxiety was intense when I saw that power threatened to pass into 
 the hands of those who would deliver it up to our enenlies. I feared 
 I should not be able to conceal this from you. Thank heaven, 
 everything is ended, and happily so. The Council has been re- 
 formed ; it is more united, stronger, and more firmly seated than 
 
232 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 the preceding one ; nothing will be changed in its working ; every- 
 thing will be done more unanimously and with greater vigour and 
 speed. The impotency of our adversaries has again been forcibly 
 proved ; they are very much ashamed of themselves and much 
 put out. 
 
 I have therefore only to congratulate myself on what I have 
 done ; but even if matters had turned out differently, I could not 
 have acted otherwise. 
 
 A Minister of Foreign Affairs is obliged every day to pledge 
 the faith of his Government, and to do so, more often than not, 
 without consulting his colleagues or taking the king's orders. 
 Every word he utters is at once taken hold of, and sent to the four 
 quarters of Europe ; it is not only necessary that his language 
 should be sincere, but that it should also be guarded. One ought 
 to be able to rely on it, not merely as being frank, but as being a 
 reality. He must not merely have the desire, but he must have 
 the power of fulfilling what he has promised. But from the 
 moment it is seriously established, that the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs is not in a position to obtain the respect of the Chamber 
 for a pledge given in the name of the Government, he is bound 
 to retire ; the interest of the country requires it, and his own 
 honour demands it. One of the reasons, which more than 
 anything else contributed to the rejection of the American 
 treaty, was that the Government would in fact have been very 
 glad if its hand had been forced , I therefore felt I could no 
 longer hesitate in giving the most public denial to such baseness. 
 
 Another reason also left me no liberty of choice. The 
 Chamber did not see what would be the result of its action ; it 
 imagined, no matter what was said to it, that the rejection of a 
 treaty was quite a simple matter ; that a treaty might be put 
 aside like an amendment to a law of local interest ; it fancied, 
 that in warning it of the consequences, I, as it were, overrated 
 them ; that in stating that I attached my own ministerial existence, 
 and probably that of the entire Cabinet, to the vote, was merely 
 a form of speech ; that I was a sort of Marshal Soult, first threaten- 
 ing to leave, and then accommodating myself to whatever posi- 
 tion fate chose to assign me. I was therefore obliged to prove the 
 contrary, and to evince to the Chamber that there are things and 
 men in the world whom one cannot lightly treat with impunity. 
 The lesson has been a severe one, and the anxiety of the majority 
 has been very great during the last few days. I trust this anxiety 
 will bear fruit. Nevertheless, it is quite certain that at present 
 the Chamber is greatly humiliated at its conduct, and that the 
 treaty will now be passed by four-fifths of the votes. 
 
 You have always been so kind to me, mon Prince, but more 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 233 
 
 especially during the last eighteen months, that I feel bound to 
 acquaint you with my reasons for the step I took. As for my 
 successor, you know him as well as I do ; the king and my col- 
 leagues insisted, so to speak, that I should name him myself. I 
 feel sure that he will follow the course I have hitherto pursued 
 under your auspices and according to your advice. This he is 
 fully resolved to do. He has great talent and is very able. I 
 believe he is sincerely attached to me, in fact I am sure of it ; 
 whatever good I could have done he will do, and do it even 
 better than I, because the accession of M. DuchateV as 
 Minister of Commerce, will furnish him with the means. I count 
 greatly on the excellent principles and feelings of this young 
 man, in drawing still closer the alliance between France and 
 England. He is a man of distinguished ability. My only and 
 real grief is, that the friendly intercourse which I have had with 
 you, and through you with the English Ministry, among whom 
 I count several friends, is interrupted. But I trust they will not 
 quite forget me, and will consider, that neither by entering the 
 Ministry, remaining there, nor leaving it, have I falsified the im- 
 pression they had formed of me. 
 
 Pray, mon Prince, kindly remember me to Madame de Dino, 
 and count for ever on my sincere and unalterable friendship. 
 
 Admiral Comte de Rigny to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, April 6th, 1834. 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 A political hurricane has cast me, in spite of myself, 
 on a platform, where I feel my complete insufficiency. I foresee 
 all that awaits me. 
 
 In order to overcome my reluctance, they have repeatedly 
 assured me that I should not be personally disagreeable to you, 
 and that my advent would not be ill-received by those who are 
 around you. 
 
 Driven into a corner, urged on by my colleagues, and per- 
 ceiving that if I refused, the king had only one desperate 
 resource left, I accepted a burden, which the near and pressing 
 discussions make me dread. 
 
 Allow me to count on your support and advice ; on receiving 
 this assurance from you, I shall feel encouraged, and of this I 
 have great need. 
 
 ' Charles Marie Tannequy Comte Duchatel, born in 1803, was made Councillor 
 of State in 1830, and elected a deputy in 1833. He was Minister of Commerce from 
 1834 to 1839 ; finally, he was made Minister of the Interior from 1840 to 1848. He 
 retired from public life after the Revolution of February, and died in 1867. 
 
234 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 I cannot to-day give you all the particulars of the last few- 
 days ; but I did not wish to lose a moment in adding a 
 fresh expression of my devotion to the official announcement. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Broglie. 
 
 London, April jth, 1834. 
 MON CHER Due, 
 
 Nothing can be more honourable than your resignation ; 
 this opinion can however only suffice for you ; it leaves us room 
 for deep regret, the expression of which is evinced by the entire 
 English Ministry in a variety of ways. You cannot for a moment 
 doubt my feelings, or my devoted friendship. Pray offer my 
 kindest and most respectful homage to Madame de Broglie. 
 Adieu. . . . 
 
 London, April 10th, 1834. 
 
 Hon CHER Due, 
 
 If your admirable letter of the 6th still further increased 
 the regret which your actual retirement from office caused me, it 
 has also occasioned me a great pleasure, namely, that of reading it 
 to Lord Grey, Lord Brougham and Lord Holland, and of seeing 
 the deep and keen impression it made on them. They found a 
 fresh motive therein for rendering you all honour, and welcoming 
 M. de Rign_v, whose name is already well known and greatly 
 appreciated here. They read with great pleasure what you wrote 
 to me relative to the invariability of the system, the sentiments, 
 and the principles of our Government. This, mon cher Due, 
 you will be as glad to hear as I am to tell it you, both for 
 the general good and your own personal satisfaction. Do not 
 entirely cease writing to me, and give me accounts sometimes of 
 yourself and of France. Your letters may be most useful to me : 
 I trust to you to write when you have time. A thousand best 
 wishes. P. S. — Keep what I am now going to tell you to your- 
 self. Your admirable and useful letter has been to Windsor, 
 where it had a most excellent effect in every way. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, Ap7-il -jih, 1S34. 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 I have just -heard, in an indirect way it is true, that the 
 king has called upon you to assume the direction of the Foreign 
 Office, and I will not wait to receive the official confirmation of the 
 news, in order to express to you how greatly pleased I am. I 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 235 
 
 have not the slightest doubt that it will be equally well received 
 by the English Government, and from what I have gathered in 
 the various conversations which I have had with His Britannic 
 Majesty about you, I feel convinced that the king's choice will, 
 in present circumstances, be personally agreeable to the King of 
 England. 
 
 The English ministers have not yet returned to town, and 
 consequently I have not been able to see Lord Palmerston to-day, 
 or converse with him respecting the matters mentioned by the 
 Due de Broglie in his despatches Nos. 26 and zj?- I will not 
 fail to give you an account of the successive results of my inter- 
 views on everything in these despatches relating to Spain, 
 Portugal, and the Germanic Diet ; but I lose no time in calling 
 your attention to a question which, it seems to me, greatly needs 
 it. I refer to Turkish affairs, and especially as they affect our 
 position with England. 
 
 The honourable and important command which you have so 
 long held in the Greek Archipelago, the thorough knowledge of 
 the interests and the situation of the various Eastern Powers 
 which you have acquired, the position which you have for some 
 years occupied in the Government, and by which means you 
 have been kept informed of all the political relations of France, 
 obviate. Monsieur le Comte, my having to recall facts and 
 events which are vividly present to your memory. I shall there- 
 fore only confine myself to what has more recently taken place. 
 
 If you will have the goodness to look over the despatch 
 which I had the honour to send M. le Due de Broglie on the 24th 
 December last,^ you will find the details of a draft treaty for a 
 defensive alliance, which I had submitted to the English Cabinet. 
 This treaty between France and England, which in my opinion 
 ought to be based on maintaining the European statu quo, had 
 the advantage of being applicable not only to Eastern affairs, but 
 also to any complications that might arise elsewhere. The de- 
 spatch referred to contains full particulars. The proposal was 
 not welcomed by the English Government, and if I did not then 
 insist on carrying it through, I was none the less convinced of 
 its immense utility. 
 
 More than three months have elapsed since that period, and 
 the events which have happened meanwhile have only still 
 further confirmed me in the opinion, that a defensive treaty of 
 alliance, such as we drew up, has, one might say, become an 
 actual necessity, to England as well as to France. 
 
 1 These despatches related to Spanish affairs (see despatch, in Appendix, letter 
 No. 15). 
 
 ^ See page 195. 
 
236 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 In fact, the discussions both in the English Parliament and 
 in the Chamber of Deputies, have plainly revealed an anxiety, 
 which neither Russia's explanations, nor those of the Porte, have 
 tended to allay completely. The efforts of the Northern 
 Governments, on the one hand, and those of the periodical press 
 on the other, have been redoubled in order to rupture, or at any 
 rate to weaken, the close union that exists between France and 
 Great Britain, and we must not conceal from ourselves, that these 
 attempts have not failed in making some impression in this 
 country. The change that has just taken place in the French 
 Cabinet has already been interpreted in this sense, and for all 
 these joint reasons, I think it would be very advisable just 
 now to renew the unsuccessful attempt of last December, and 
 propose to England to form a defensive treaty of alliance 
 with us. 
 
 Not only would it be the best possible answer to those who 
 accuse us of having withdrawn from the English alliance in 
 order to curry favour with Russia ; but likewise the best means 
 of dispelling the distrust of the English Cabinet, if by chance it 
 has conceived any as to our good faith. 
 
 If the English Government, better disposed this time, should 
 enter into our views, there is no doubt that we should gain 
 immense advantages. A treaty of alliance between the two 
 Governments would consolidate our position in Europe. It 
 would offer to everyone a guarantee for security and the main- 
 tenance of peace, because it would put a complete stop to all 
 the intrigues of the other Cabinets who are endeavouring to 
 separate us. 
 
 You may feel quite assured, Monsieur le Comte, that by 
 placing the king's Government on this line of conduct, I do not in 
 any way wish to isolate it in Europe, or compel it to espouse 
 all the well or ill-grounded quarrels of England ; such a result 
 would be quite opposed to my idea. I am fully convinced that 
 a striking exhibition of the union of the two countries could 
 only tend to draw the other Cabinets nearer to us, for being 
 compelled to accept an accomplished fact, they would only 
 attach a still higher value to it as lessening the consequences of 
 what might befall them. 
 
 If the views I have just expressed strike you as strongly as 
 they have done me, and if you think them sufficiently important 
 to determine the king's Government to make a fresh attempt at 
 an alliance with the British Government, you should not lose any 
 time in speaking about it to Lord Granville, and also to Lord 
 Durham during his sojourn in Paris. I, on my side, will not 
 neglect anything that may make our proposal acceptable here, as 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 237 
 
 soon as I receive your authority. You will understand, that 
 in that case it will also be necessary to send me a general 
 scheme of the conditions you desire should be contained in the 
 treaty. 
 
 But whatever is decided, allow me to urge upon you the 
 necessity of choosing a successor to Admiral Roussin at Con- 
 stantinople without delay,! and of selecting an able and prudent 
 man and one well versed in diplomacy. By so doing, we shall 
 avoid such reproaches as were showered on the English Ministry, 
 owing to the long-delayed departure of Lord Ponsonby for 
 Constantinople. 
 
 April, gih, 1834. 
 
 I received the despatch yesterday, which you did me the 
 honour to write, and I was at once enabled to make use, in my 
 interviews with Lord Palmerston and Lord Grey, of the ex- 
 planations it contained, with reference to the change that has 
 just taken place in the French Ministry. These explanations 
 were very well received by both ministers, who, as I had already 
 foretold in my despatch of the day before yesterday, consider 
 your appointment to the Foreign Office as a guarantee that the 
 king's Government will continue that system of moderation 
 and firmness which has already produced such advantageous 
 results. 
 
 At the interview I had with Lord Palmerston, there was some 
 conversation relative to the last Notes received from the Porte. 
 Lord Palmerston, while stating that no deiinite resolution had 
 been come to by the English Government with regard to this, 
 told me that he had thought it best to let this matter stand over 
 for the present, and that later on, we might jointly arrange such 
 a course as might be considered necessary, either at Constan- 
 tinople or elsewhere. I did not wish to insist upon this point, 
 before hearing your answer to my despatch of the day before 
 yesterday. 
 
 .... The recent advent of M. le Comte de Florida 
 Blanca, who came to see Lord Palmerston while I was with him, 
 afforded me a good opportunity of speaking to the latter as to the 
 state of the Peninsula. He gave me some details, very similar 
 to those contained in M. de Broglie's despatch No. 26,^ as to what 
 had taken place in Madrid, after the arrival in that capital of M. de 
 
 ' Admiral Roussin remained at Constantinople. As he had been nominated 
 Minister of the Marine, M. de Talleyrand thought he would have quitted his post ; but 
 one can quite understand that the Admiral refused the portfolio and preferred retain- 
 ing his Embassy. 
 
 " See this despatch in Appendix, letter No. 15. 
 
238 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Sarmento, the Portuguese minister. It appears that Mr. Villiers, 
 nevertheless, does not yet despair of obtaining a frank and open 
 declai-ation from M. Martinez de la Rosa on the part of the Spanish 
 Government,! against Dom Miguel. Lord Palmerston pro- 
 posed to urge M. de Florida Blanca to write in a similar sense to 
 his Court. I was then enabled to question him as to the com- 
 munications which had lately been made by Lord Howard de 
 Walden^ to Dom Pedro's Government. According to what 
 Lord Palmerston told me, the scheme for the pacification of 
 Portugal, is not so far advanced as was thought at Lisbon, and 
 the articles which were sent to our Foreign Office by M. Mortier, 
 would appear only to be suggestions for the points on which 
 the English minister has been requested to sound Dom Pedro's 
 Government. The English Cabinet always prefers limiting its 
 relations with the Portuguese Government to official steps, and is 
 very far removed from any idea of intervening by sending troops 
 to the Peninsula. 
 
 I do not know how far this declaration by Lord Palmerston 
 is true ; I will try to verify its exactness by other means, which 
 are not available just now, and I shall have the honour of 
 informing you of the result of my researches. . . . 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, April loth, 1S34. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I am very sensible of all the kind thinigs you have said 
 to me. I know how much I am in need of your counsel and 
 support, which I shall not fail to claim. 
 
 Maison's despatches show a growing irritation on the part of 
 Russia against England. I do not know whether I am mistaken; 
 but I think the English Cabinet might perhaps be induced by 
 this situation to favour the idea which you suggested at a certain 
 period, and which the new Congress at Vienna might revive 
 again ! 
 
 Home affairs here will feel the recoil of what is happening 
 
 ^ M. de Sarmento had asked the Spanish Cabinet to intervene in Portugal in 
 favour of Dom Pedro. M. Martinez de la Rosa had refused to assist him, but he had 
 sent a body of troops into Portugal to disperse the Carlist forces who had taken refuge 
 there, and had made joint cause with the Miguelites. It was, in fact, though under a 
 somewhat disguised and less decisive form, the intervention sought by M. de 
 Sarmento. 
 
 ^ Charles Augustus Ellis, Baron Howard de Walden, English diplomatist born 
 in 1779, Under- Seci-etary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1824, Minister at Stockholm 
 in 1832, then at Lisbon 1 834, and at Brussels 1846. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1S30. 239 
 
 at Lyons. We expect news this morning. That received last 
 night states that the troops had charged with spirit and carried 
 the barricades.'- It is absolutely necessary that this success 
 should be maintained, so as to put a stop to the plots at Stras- 
 burg, Dijon, and Chalons. After that the course of the law as 
 regards the associations will be easier or less necessary. 
 
 We shall soon close this session, probably about the loth of 
 May, and the elections will take place in June. Dupin will 
 be away at that time. 
 
 Disturbances would recommence again at Brussels, if the 
 presence oi the troops did not keep them in check.^ La Tour- 
 Maubourg thinks that in order to bring matters home to the indif- 
 ferent townsmen of Brussels, it will be necessary for him to come 
 to some arrangement with Sir Robert Adair, as to the steps to 
 be taken in case fresh troubles break out ; he will be authorized 
 to do this with the English minister. . . . 
 
 The difficulties caused by the retirement of the Due de 
 Broglie from the Cabinet had barely been surmounted, when a 
 formidable insurrection broke out at Lyons, Paris soon following 
 suit. All possible measures were quickly taken to repress it, 
 and I had no doubt that they would be successful ; but this 
 deplorable occurrence was not calculated to facilitate my nego- 
 tiations in London. I have already had occasion more than 
 once to state in these Memoirs, how little calculated such 
 accidents were to inspire confidence in foreign Governments. 
 I should probably under these circumstances, have experienced 
 much greater difficulties had not the afi'airs of the Peninsula 
 obliged the English Government to approach us. The following 
 correspondence will, I think, justify this remark : — 
 
 ^ Insurrections at this period broke out afresh in different parts of the countr)', in 
 consequence of a general strilce of the workmen at Lyons. Six of the principal leaders 
 had been arrested ; the commencement of their trial on the 5th April, was the signal for 
 a fierce struggle, which lasted five days. The troops at last succeeded in re-establishing 
 order in the city. Revolutionary movements had at the same time disturbed Marseilles, 
 Saint-Etienne, Perpignan, Chalons, and several other towns. In Paris, a riot broke 
 out on the 12th April. The cloister of Saint-Merry was the scene of a bloody struggle. 
 Quiet was not established until the 14th. 
 
 ^ Orangist demonstrations, not however of any serious consequence, had recently 
 taken place in Belgium. In Brussels great excitement prevailed, and this city became 
 the scene of serious disturbances on the 5th and 6th of April. Bands of rioters 
 pillaged the houses of all the known partizans of the Prince of Orange. But the dis- 
 turbance was promptly and energetically put down. 
 
240 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Madame Adelaide d'Orl^ans to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, April nth, 1834. 
 
 .... The terrible anxieties of the last fortnight have not 
 left us a moment's peace. That about the Ministry was speedily 
 followed by the one at Lyons. I hasten to let you know the 
 news received this morning, which announce a complete success. 
 The troops are masters of every position, and according to what 
 t\iQ prefet wrote on the evening of the 9th, the result is assured ; 
 but one has always to lament the disasters which these successes 
 bring upon those unfortunate persons who are their victims. 
 The insurgents have retreated and barricaded themselves in some 
 small streets, where however they will be at our discretion ; it is 
 impossible for them to hold out there. It seems that they 
 have broken the telegraph near Lyons ; at least we suppose so, 
 as no telegraphic despatches have been received here since 
 yesterday morning. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, April i-^th, 1834. 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 Lord Palmerston asked me to go and see him this 
 morning, in order to discuss a subject which, he wrote, merited 
 all our attention. I have just come back from this interview, 
 which has been a pretty long one, and hasten to send you an 
 account of it. 
 
 Lord Palmerston informed me that he had received, some 
 days ago, a memorandum from the Comte de Florida Blanca, 
 the new Spanish minister. This memorandum, which he showed 
 me, contains a statement of the present condition of Spain, and 
 invites the English Government to join the Spanish Government 
 in putting an end to the agitation which has spread itself 
 all over the Peninsula, by an active war made jointly against 
 Dom Miguel and Don Carlos. It is a formal request for an 
 English armed intervention in Portugal. 
 
 Lord Palmerston, after he had read this document to me, 
 added, that M. de Sarmento, the Portuguese minister in London, 
 had urgently supported this step on the part of the Spanish 
 Cabinet, only verbally it is true, but insisting equally strongly on 
 the necessity of an English armed intervention. 
 
 In the face of this simultaneous demand on the part of Spain 
 and Portugal, Lord Palmerston said, that His Britannic Majesty's 
 
CARICATURE OF TALLEYRAND, FROM FRASER'S MAGAZINE 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 241 
 
 Government did not think they could any longer refuse to take a 
 step which had been forced on them by circumstances ; and that 
 he was directed to reply to M. de Florida Blanca's and M. de 
 Sarmento's proposals, by a draft treaty to be signed between 
 England, Spain, and Portugal. By this treaty Spain undertakes 
 to carry out actively, by every means in her power, the expulsion 
 of Don Carlos and Dom Miguel from Portugal, and to retire from 
 Portuguese territory as soon as this end has been attained. 
 Dona Maria's Government, on its side, will join Spain in this 
 undertaking, and will consent to grant a general amnesty in 
 Portugal, and make a suitable allowance to Dom Miguel at the 
 expiration of the struggle. Lastly, England undertakes to send 
 ships to the coasts of Spain and Portugal, to assist the Spanish 
 army and that of Dom Pedro ; but with the reservation, that she 
 is in no case to be called upon to disembark English troops on 
 any part of the Peninsula. 
 
 " The draft of this treaty, which is already drawn up," 
 continued Lord Palmerston," contains in addition an article, by 
 which it is understood that the three Powers will agree to ask 
 France to approve it ; and it was for this purpose that I begged 
 you to come and see me, in order to hear your opinion as to this 
 proposal, and to ask whether you would be seriously disposed to 
 give your adhesion to the treaty in question." 
 
 I did not hesitate a moment. Monsieur le Comte, in replying 
 to Lord Palmerston, that my Government would not refuse to 
 agree to such a treaty, if England would, in return, consent to 
 sign one of a nature similar to that which I had proposed to him 
 in the end of December last, and of which all others would in 
 future only be the natural result ; but for my part, I did 
 not think one was possible without the other, and that I 
 would use my utmost efforts to prevent the king's Government 
 from giving its consent to an act which would place it relatively 
 in an inferior position. 
 
 In reply to this. Lord Palmerston said that we should bear in 
 mind that England's position with regard to Portugal was entirely 
 different to ours ; that she was united by special treaties to 
 Portugal, and that this quite explained the different part we 
 should take in this matter. 
 
 But I in my turn then remarked, that our position as regards 
 Spain was the same ; that we had joint interests of neighbourhood, 
 frontiers, and family ties with that country ; and that these would 
 most certainly be compromised if we played a part which, from 
 no possible point of view, was suitable either to our dignity or 
 our influence in Europe. 
 
 I then proceeded afresh to impress on Lord Palmerston all 
 
 VOT,. V. R 
 
242 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 the weighty reasons which should decide the English Govern- 
 ment to enter into a general defensive treaty of alliance with 
 France, from which it would be perfectly easy to elaborate a 
 complete and definite arrangement for the pacification of the 
 Peninsula. In vain he tried to entrench himself behind the 
 dangers England would run, by binding herself to an undertaking 
 with our Cabinet, whose existence, he said, was not yet assured, 
 and which might not even perhaps remain in power after the com- 
 ing elections. I replied that there was the same danger for us, as 
 we also might later on have to do with another English Govern- 
 ment ; that, moreover, the French Government, as now constituted, 
 could never change its policy as regards England, and that if any 
 alteration took place in its formation, the English Government 
 would by this very fact, be freed from all engagements it might 
 have contracted under other circumstances. In this way I 
 combated this final objection, which seemed to me as futile in 
 appearance as in reality. 
 
 Not wishing, however, to reject Lord Palmerston's overtures 
 entirely, and to allow it to be supposed at Madrid that we objected 
 to an arrangement by means of which it might be possible to 
 accomplish the pacification of the Peninsula, I concluded by 
 proposing to him a medium course between his project and 
 mine, should this latter be absolutely rejected by his Government. 
 This consisted of a treaty between the four Powers, France, 
 Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal. I made him see that it would 
 be possible to draw up this act in such a way, that each of these 
 Powers would preserve its own liberty of action. 
 
 It was on this understanding that our conversation ended. 
 He then went to attend a Cabinet Council, and promised me 
 that he would make an exact statement of what had passed 
 between us. He did not however conceal from me, that he, per- 
 sonally, had great objections to forming an alliance such as I had 
 suggested. I replied, that I regretted this all the more earnestly, 
 as I feared each day would only still further confirm the neces- 
 sity of such a treaty for the peace of Europe. . . . 
 
 April lifih, Ten o'clock at night. 
 
 As I informed you yesterday, a Cabinet Council was held 
 immediately after my interview with Lord Palmerston. The 
 proposal I had made of a general defensive treaty of alliance 
 between France and England has not been accepted by the 
 English ministers, notwithstanding that they admitted the force 
 of the arguments I brought forward on this point. They persist 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 243 
 
 in their scheme of a treaty between the Courts of England, 
 Spain, and Portugal, to which we shall be asked to assent. 
 
 I saw Lord Palmerston twice yesterday. In our first inter- 
 view he informed me of the resolution of his Government. I 
 did not therefore insist any further on the defensive treaty of 
 alliance, which had still been in question between us the evening 
 before ; on that head I could not possibly hope for success. I 
 therefore objected to the treaty which he had communicated to 
 me ; I disputed it with him and refused to sign it, as it was. 
 In consequence of the observations I made, he was obliged to 
 have another consultation with his colleagues and the Spanish 
 and Portuguese ministers, in order to submit the modifications 
 which I demanded, according to which France would form 
 one of the contracting parties to the treaty, instead of being 
 merely a consenting one. I must however tell you, that I had to 
 sustain a lengthened struggle ere arriving at this concession. 
 
 I have just seen Lord Palmerston, again, he has given me the 
 new scheme, of which I have the honour to transmit you a copy. 
 
 I did not pledge myself that this scheme would receive 
 the approbation of the king's Government, and while merely 
 promising to send it to you, I obtained the introduction of 
 several alterations. Among others, you will find that part of 
 Article IV. has been drawn up in two ways. It has been agreed 
 that in the event of the French Government consenting to my 
 signing this treaty, it will choose whichever of the two renderings 
 of Article IV. will best satisfy it. In the present state of affairs, 
 I cannot see any real difficulty to the king's Government join- 
 ing the treaty as it is, on the contrary, it appears to me to 
 present some great advantages. 
 
 I have not time to add a single remark to this simple 
 narration. I must not delay the departure of my courier. 
 Lord Granville is receiving instructions to come to an under- 
 standing with you ; you will therefore be able to make known to 
 him your reasons for granting or refusing your consent. 
 
 I have to inform you that M. de Florida Blanca and M. de 
 Sarmento, while taking upon themselves to affix their signatures 
 to this treaty, which does not quite accord with their instructions, 
 have requested that nothing should be said about it to the 
 Spanish or Portuguese ministers in Paris — this has been 
 promised them. They are afraid that a premature disclosure, 
 made either at Madrid or Lisbon, might compromise the success 
 of the treaty, the ratification of which, they say, could not well be 
 refused, after it has once been signed by the French and English 
 plenipotentiaries. 
 
 As they are very anxious here to arrive at some decision, I 
 
 R 2 
 
244 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 pray you to send me your earliest reply as speedily as possible, 
 and by telegraph. . . . 
 
 April isth, 1834. 
 
 .... The Prince de Lieven showed me this morning a 
 despatch he had just received from St. Petersburg, in which the 
 Comte de Nesselrode informs him, that the Imperial Government 
 of Russia is perfectly satisfied with the last explanations given 
 by France and England respecting Eastern affairs. The Vice- 
 Chancellor also expresses the desire to see all the discussions 
 which have unfortunately arisen on this question during the last 
 few months, buried in oblivion, and gives the assurance that his 
 master, the emperor, wishes to retain no recollection of them. . . . 
 
 Madame Adelaide D'ORLi;ANS to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 April 14M, 1834. 
 
 I had not the slightest idea, mon cher Prince, when I wrote 
 to tell you yesterday that everything was over at Lyons, that a 
 few hours later we should have barricades raised in a corner of 
 Paris.' This was however but a snare for committing some 
 assassinations, for not one was defended ; a band of assassins and 
 cowardly wretches has been let loose on Paris. We have passed a 
 terrible night, and even up to now are in the most cruel anxiety 
 while our beloved king is out walking through the city, and also 
 Chartres and Nemours, who both went out into the Rue St. 
 Martin this morning, with the wretches firing down on them from 
 the windows of a house. Thank heaven all is over now. The 
 Chamber of Deputies have just come in a body to testify their 
 indignation to the king, and assure him afresh by the mouth of 
 their President of their attachment to his person. The Chamber of 
 Peers are also coming. The people are admirable and filled with 
 indignation. The National Guard behaved splendidly, as also 
 did the regular troops ; unfortunately, several of them fell victims 
 to these ruffians. . . . 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, April 141/i, 11 o'clock, 1834. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 It is now eleven o'clock ; the whole night has been 
 passed under arms ; the insurgents, barricaded inside the houses, 
 fired individually on the troops ; the affair degenerated into 
 
 1 See page 239. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 245 
 
 partial assassinations ; there was no other organized resistance, 
 and it was impossible to make use of artillery. The troops and 
 the National Guard have also lost several officers, who were 
 picked out. There is therefore no public danger, but individual 
 assassinations. The day will pass in this way ; the soldiers have 
 been aroused to the extreme limit, and have given no quarter 
 wherever they have effected an entrance.^ We are just now 
 deliberating as to the measures to be proposed to the Chambers. 
 
 At Lyons, matters have pretty well come to an end ; there 
 have been some sanguinary executions there. At Chalons, Dijon, 
 and St. Etienne, several attempts were made, but the troops 
 remained firm everywhere, and likewise the National Guard 
 in Paris ; but one cannot say as much for it in other places. 
 
 Upon the whole, the event, or rather the events, are of a 
 nature to strengthen the Government. I will continue to keep 
 you informed up to the time of the courier's departure. 
 
 The same Day, 3 in the Afternoon. 
 
 The streets are almost quiet again ; some houses are still 
 being searched, and I am unable to give you full details which 
 can only be gradually collected. 
 
 We are greatly exercised in trying to find means to make 
 the most of this, in order to consolidate all that has been so 
 terribly shaken. Unfortunately, we can do nothing with the 
 Press. To-morrow something will be brought before the 
 Chambers — what, will only be decided this evening. It will 
 probably consist in an effective increase of the army. 
 
 The National Guard has been increased considerably. We 
 are sending it out in all directions, for we must be in advance 
 everywhere. I pray you to pardon my being so brief and so 
 hurried. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, April i^th, 1834. 
 
 You will have seen from my previous despatches, that I had 
 forestalled the instructions you sent me in your letter No. 30, 
 by working by myself with the English ministers to induce 
 them to conclude a defensive treaty of alliance with us. The 
 fact of the treaty respecting the affairs of the Peninsula appeared 
 to me too important a matter not to take advantage of, and if I did 
 
 ^ It was during this riot that the bloody episode of the Rue Transnonain 
 occurred. 
 
246 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 not succeed in my attempt, I am at least certain that I have not 
 compromised the dignity of the king's Government, which I had 
 not time to consult, when I was asked to sign the treaty between 
 the four Powers. Here everyone is impatiently awaiting your 
 decision respecting this last treaty ; all the members of the 
 Cabinet whom I saw this morning, eagerly questioned me on 
 this subject, and I could only promise them a speedy reply. 
 
 The occurrences at Lyons and Paris, at present preoccupy 
 everyone, to the exclusion of all other matters. I have already 
 made use of the information contained in your despatch No. 31, 
 and it was not difficult for me to show the advantages which 
 England, probably more than any other country, would gain by 
 the prompt and energetic repression of excesses, such as those 
 committed at Lyons. It will have all the greater effect here, as 
 for the last few days some serious disturbances are going on 
 among the workmen in several of the manufacturing districts in 
 England, caused by associations of a similar nature to those we 
 are trying to put down in France. I may tell you, that public 
 opinion, which is of some value here, is quite with us in this 
 matter, notwithstanding what some of the periodical Press 
 organs may say ; all sensible men are grateful to the King's 
 Government for restraining the revolutionary inclinations of 
 those who only wish to disturb the peace of Europe, by first 
 delivering France up to anarchy. . . . 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, April i-jth, 1834, 4 o'clock. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I am as much grieved as I am troubled, that I can 
 only send you observations in place of a positive affirmative. 
 
 I have found many scruples among my colleagues, not as to 
 the fact, for your idea of a defensive alliance is adopted by all, 
 but as to the form. The King shared these scruples, and was 
 somewhat put out at finding himself in a preamble, which 
 appears again in the middle of the treaty. 
 
 However secret this convention may be kept for a time, it 
 will leak out, and you can understand what would be said, if 
 Art. V. allowed it to be too apparent that at the requisition of 
 the three Courts, we would furnish arms and troops ; not that we 
 should be pledged to do this by your wording, but we might be 
 accused of it, and these accusations, although unjust, would 
 weaken the effect of this Convention, even with regard to the result 
 to be gained therefrom, namely, a more visible union with 
 England. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 247 
 
 We here fully recognize the serious difficulty you have had 
 to overcome, in order to obtain even a first concession ; 
 the present was against us, the future appeared equally 
 so — the riots in Lyons, and those in Paris, general feeling, 
 everything was against us. Now the position has improved, 
 though I dare not venture to say, mon Prince, that you can 
 profit by it, as probably in London they hardly as yet judge us 
 as we here judge ourselves. 
 
 All this will notably influence the elections, for it is especially 
 the bourgeois electoral class that is threatened by these agitations, 
 it feels it, and the effect in Paris is undeniable. If therefore 
 we can hasten the dissolution of the Chambers and the Convo- 
 cation, our policy will be strengthened. This is the opinion of 
 reflecting men. 
 
 I have just come from Lord Granville, and have given him 
 all the reasons I intend to bring forward at the Council this 
 morning. He is writing to Lord Palmerston by our courier, and 
 seems inclined to side with us. 
 
 I have endeavoured to assist you, by having the official de- 
 spatch drawn up in such a way that it can be shown to Lord 
 Palmerston. 
 
 If, in adopting the principle of our idea, there should only 
 arise the question of changing or otherwise transposing the 
 wording of the two articles which remain intact in the counter 
 project, we do not think, mon Prince, in that case and in view 
 of the urgency, that it would be necessary for you to return them 
 to us here. 
 
 We see that this is pressing, and that we must not allow 
 England to take action alone with Spain. We have availed our- 
 selves of a former Memorandum of Martinez de la Rosa, which is 
 almost similar to that which was accepted when we intervened 
 in the treaty of 6th July, 1827, relative to Greece, consequent 
 on a request from the Greek Government. 
 
 After all, whatever noise may be made over the treaty in the 
 north, we need not be afraid if we can succeed in obtaining 
 credit for it at home. You alone, mon Prince, can solve this 
 problem, and the King entrusts himself with full confidence to 
 your great influence and solicitude. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, April igih, 1834. 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 I received the telegraphic despatch yesterday, which 
 you did me the honour to send on the 17th, and this morning 
 
248 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 your despatch No. 32, to which is attached the draft of the 
 modified treaty between the four Powers. 
 
 I had great difficulty yesterday in restraining the impatience 
 of the plenipotentiaries of the three Courts, by the aid of your 
 telegraphic despatch, as they had quite persuaded themselves 
 that your assent was not at all doubtful. 
 
 Immediately on the arrival of my courier this morning, I sent 
 Lord Palmerston the packet Lord Granville had enclosed for 
 him, and requested him to grant me an interview in the forenoon. 
 In the course of an hour he sent me the letter, a copy of which 
 I have the honour to transmit to you herewith [see further on 
 Memorandum No. I] so as to enable you to judge of the nature 
 of the opposition that I had to encounter. I went to him at the 
 hour appointed ; and fully prepared as I was to find him excited 
 over this business, he was even much more so than his letter had 
 led me to expect. One difficulty, which I could not have foreseen, 
 still further increased my embarrassment — they had written from 
 Paris that the King's Government approved the treaty, just as I 
 had sent it, and it might therefore be concluded that the objec- 
 tions raised by me came from me alone. I was then obliged to 
 make use of your despatch No. 32 ; I read part of it to Lord 
 Palmerston, and while enlarging on the views it contains, I con- 
 fined myself distinctly to the resolution of not signing anything 
 but the conditions given me by you. As to the personal remark 
 about myself, I said that it could not be true, seeing that every- 
 thing which related to France in this treaty, being the outcome 
 of public opinion, I, placed as I was, could not judge of its dis- 
 advantages, and that the King's Government alone was in a 
 position to estimate them. 
 
 When I left Lord Palmerston, he went to the Cabinet Council, 
 where I learn that the discussion was very hot, and that our 
 observations were not very readily received. After the Council 
 was over I went to see both Lord Palmerston and Lord Grey. 
 They were still far from convinced of the importance of our 
 objections, but after a conversation of more than two hours, I at 
 last obtained a promise that some signal changes would be made in 
 the draft of the treaty. Lord Palmerston's letter, which I received 
 in the evening, and of which I enclose a copy together with the 
 note which was added to it [see Documents Nos. II. and III.] will 
 give you an idea of the progress I have already made. There 
 was only one preamble in which France and Great Britain 
 were not placed on the same footing as regards Spain, which, 
 according to my views, and I think yours also, Monsieur le 
 Comte, was the essential point. But there still remained two 
 difficulties : the article which concerns us in the treaty was 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 249 
 
 relegated to the end, after the articles relating to the amnesty 
 in Portugal and the allowance to the Infant Don Carlos, and, 
 what was still more serious, they wished this article to be drawn 
 up as follows : — 
 
 " In order to attain the end proposed by the present treaty, 
 His Majesty the King of the French undertakes to furnish such 
 aid as may be jointly decided upon between him and the three 
 other contracting parties, when he shall be asked to do so by them!' 
 
 I have just written to Lord Palmerston, returning him the 
 draft of the treaty, and asking him to eliminate the words, 
 when he shall be asked to do so by them, as being a repetition 
 of the same idea in the same article. I also demanded 
 several other amendments. I cannot get his answer till 
 to-morrow morning, for it is now eleven o'clock in the evening, 
 therefore I have decided to delay the departure of my courier, in 
 order to acquaint you with the definite result of the negotiation, 
 which will probably be concluded some time to-morrow. 
 
 April 2otk. 
 
 This morning I received a letter from Lord Palmerston of 
 which I here enclose a copy [see Memorandum No. IV.], and I 
 hastened to reply that I must insist on the elimination of the 
 words I had asked for yesterday, or at all events an alteration in 
 the wording of the article. He has sent me an amended article, 
 which you will find in the copy of the treaty which accompanies 
 this despatch.^ I have accepted it, because it seems to me to have 
 no disadvantages, and because I had come to the end of all the 
 objections I could with decency bring forward. You may therefore 
 consider the treaty as drawn up in the form in which I send 
 it you. It will be necessary to submit it for approval to the 
 King, who is now at Windsor, and to have it copied in the four - 
 languages, which makes me fear that it will not even be signed 
 to-morrow. I will forward it to you as soon as it is, but do 
 not let it get noised abroad, lest it should be known at Madrid 
 before the Spanish minister has had time to send it there. 
 
 I must draw your attention to the fact that I have only sent you 
 Lord Palmerston's letters to enable you to get an exact know- 
 ledge of the course of the negotiation. It is most important that 
 these letters should remain completely secret ; the slightest indis- 
 cretion with regard to this would seriously compromise our 
 relations with England, and render my position here extremely 
 unpleasant and difficult. I trust to you to destroy the copies of 
 the letters as soon as you have read them. . . . 
 
 ^ See page 25^ 
 
2SO THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 {Documents accompanying the above letter?) 
 
 No. I. — Lord Palmerston to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Stanhope Street, April i<)th, 1834. 
 MON CHER Prince, 
 
 I received the packet you sent me this morning with 
 much regret. It is very unfortunate that so many difficulties 
 should have arisen where we had not expected any. It seems 
 that in Paris they have but imperfectly understood the princi- 
 ples and object of the treaty in question ; and the alterations 
 proposed to us would tend to denaturalise the whole transac- 
 tion. 
 
 We hear that your Government has received a Note from 
 Martinez de la Rosa of the same tenor as that remitted to me 
 by M. de Miraflores ;^ I confess this has surprised me greatly ; 
 first, because M. de Miraflores' Note was not presented according 
 to instructions received from his Court to that effect, but at my 
 request, and in consequence of a conversation I had with 
 him, and finally, in order to enable me to bring the arguments 
 he had used to me verbally more faithfully before my colleagues. 
 Again, what was the object of M. de Miraflores' Note .' It was 
 to tell us, that the Spanish Government, being aware that the 
 Portuguese Government had asked us for material aid against 
 Dom Miguel, would be glad if we would consent to send troops 
 to Portugal, because the interests of Spain suffered from Don 
 Carlos' presence in Portugal. But the Portuguese Government 
 had not addressed a similar request to you ; how then could M. 
 Martinez ask you to accede to a request which had not been 
 made to you } 
 
 Your Government may have received a communication from 
 M. Martinez, as in the past it had received from M. de Zea, 
 relative to a French intervention in the affairs of Spain ; but it 
 is not a question now of the home affairs of Spain, but of Portu- 
 guese affairs. But even if, as your Government appears to 
 think, it was a question of a foreign intervention in the affairs of 
 Spain, we should not hesitate to declare, that in asking you for 
 such an intervention, M. Martinez would fail to recognize the 
 
 1 Don Manuel de Pando, Marquis de Miraflores, Comte de Florida Blanca, born 
 in 1792, afterwards envoy extraordinary in London, was ambassador in Paris in 1838. 
 He subsequently became head of the Cabinet, then Governor of the Royal Domains, 
 and Senator in 1S48. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 251 
 
 real interests of Spain, and that your Government, in acceding to 
 it, would, it appears to me, fail to recognize the true inturests of 
 France. But in any case, so far from joining in any such request, 
 or sanctioning it by an article in the treaty — as it is now proposed 
 we should do — we should certainly protest against it as a matter 
 injurious to all parties. 
 
 Consequently, as regards the alteration in the basis of the 
 treaty desired in Paris, you must surely feel, mon Prince, that 
 we cannot possibly adopt it. 
 
 As to the alteration in the wording, it has already cost the 
 ministers of Spain, Portugal, and myself sufficient trouble to bring 
 our polyglot production into harmony, and I must beg of you not 
 to impose a fresh task on us. Time is passing ; we have lost two 
 days, Wednesday and Thursday, on account of the Court, and 
 we hope that you will consider yourself authorized to sign the 
 document as it stands. Try and come here, if you can, before 
 one o'clock, as the Cabinet Council meets at two. Always 
 yours. . . . 
 
 No. II. — Lord Palmerston to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Foreign Office, April igih, 1834. 
 MoN CHER Prince, 
 
 We will agree to substitute the paragraph, a draft of 
 which I now enclose, in place of the existing paragraph in the 
 treaty, and the last article will therefore undergo the slight 
 change I have made in it. If this suits you, I will propose these 
 alterations to the King and to the Spanish and Portuguese 
 plenipotentiaries. Kindly send me a reply this evening. 
 
 No. III. — {Enclosed in the above.) 
 
 In consequence of this article, T.M. the Regents have 
 addressed themselves to T.M. the King of the French and the 
 King of Great Britain, and their said majesties, taking into con- 
 sideration the interest they must always take in the safety of the 
 Spanish Monarchy, and being moreover animated with an 
 earnest desire to assist in establishing peace in the Peninsula, as 
 well as in all other parts of Europe, and H.M. the King of 
 Great Britain, also bearing in remembrance the engagements 
 resulting from his former alliance with Portugal, Their Majesties 
 have consented to become parties to the proposed engage- 
 ment. 
 
252 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 No. IV. — The Prince de Talleyrand to Lord 
 Palmerston. 
 
 Hanover Square, April \()th, 1834, 9 p.m. 
 
 Dear Lord Palmerston, 
 
 I have just read your fresh scheme with great care. 
 Since you persist in not accepting the draft of the French 
 Cabinet for the latter part of the preamble, I submit to your 
 view of looking at this matter. 
 
 As to Article VI. I consider it, first of all, wrongly placed. 
 It ought to follow Article III. and so form Article IV. of the 
 treaty, seeing that Articles IV. and V. of your scheme are 
 mere accessories ; it is besides only logical and the proper way of 
 drafting a treaty, that the articles forming the treaty should 
 precede those which are only the result of it. 
 
 I have also another remark to make respecting this same 
 Article VI., with regard to which it will be easy for you to 
 satisfy me, for it is merely to eliminate a few words. I ask you 
 to suppress the words : when he shall be asked to do so, and 
 simply to conclude with the words : such aid as may be jointly 
 decided upon between him and his august allies. The suppression 
 I here ask for is quite grammatical, for the first draft was 
 redundant, and moreover, it carries out the spirit of the entire 
 draft, in which the same idea is already established. 
 
 If you assent to my slight modifications, kindly acquaint me of 
 the hour at which you will sign to-morrow, and I shall be at your 
 orders, for I shall then take it upon myself not to refer the 
 matter to my Cabinet. Ever yours. . . . 
 
 No. V. — Lord Palmerston to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Stanhope Street, April igth, 1834, 11 p.m. 
 
 MoN CHER Prince, 
 
 I am quite ready to assent to the transposition of 
 Article IV. which you propose, and I agree with you that this 
 change is a great improvement in every way. 
 
 As regards the suppression of the last words of this article, I 
 must beg of you to take our sensitiveness into consideration, 
 equally as we have done yours. I agree with you that those words 
 do not add anything really essential to the meaning of the 
 article, and that what they express is already contained in 
 what precedes them ; but we lay great stress on them, and when 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 253 
 
 I say we I mean many persons. You must remember, that in 
 the treaty it is solely a question of an armed intervention in the 
 affairs of Portugal, and that we have precedents for this 
 point. 
 
 As for ourselves, not only have we not intervened without 
 being specially invited to do so, but we have not accepted the 
 invitation given us. You must not blame us, therefore, if we are 
 a little inclined to be stiff on this subject. 
 
 I was just writing an account to the King of the changes 
 with which I believed you were satisfied, and for which I have to 
 obtain his sanction, when your note arrived. Now however I 
 must wait for your reply to this letter, and consequently I shall 
 not be able to send my courier to Windsor till to-morrow. There 
 is another day lost again. Be satisfied, I pray you, mon Prince, 
 with the great changes you have already effected in this draft, 
 which may now be looked upon much more as your child than 
 mine. Ever yours. . . . 
 
 No. VI. — The Prince de Talleyrand to Lord 
 Palmerston. 
 
 Hanover Square, April 10th, 1834, 8 a.m. 
 
 Dear Lord Palmerston, 
 
 We are now in complete accord on all points excepting 
 on the elimination of three words which our amour-propre asks 
 of you. It seems to me that yours cannot be involved in this 
 question, for it is evident, that even without these three words, 
 we can do nothing in the affairs of the Peninsula except in 
 concert with you and the two other Powers. A repetition of the 
 same idea in the same article could only therefore express 
 distrust. It is this which we must avoid in the interest of both 
 our countries and the position of our Governments with regard 
 to one another. The slightest symptom of distrust in our treaty 
 would be more dangerous in its consequences than the fact itself, 
 for when it becomes public, the Opposition both with us and with 
 you, will not fail to take hold of, and certainly utilize it, to 
 the detriment of the close alliance which it is so necessary to 
 encourage. Pray therefore only see in my insistence a desire to 
 be consistent with our point of departure. Your clear mind will 
 perfectly grasp this and arrange everything, in such a way that 
 your next note will tell me at what hour to call and sign at your 
 house. I am almost ashamed of the trifles to which, according 
 to my instructions, I am obliged to attach so much importance. 
 Ever yours. . . . 
 
2S4 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 No. VII. — Lord Palmerston to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Stanhope Street, April loth, 1834. 
 MoN CHER Prince, 
 
 Upon my word, you are very difficult to satisfy ! I 
 agree with you, however, that we should fail in the principal aim 
 of our treaty if, instead of showing unanimity and confidence, 
 we were to proclaim defiance and suspicion. I have therefore 
 endeavoured to draw up Article IV. in such a way as to satisfy 
 all parties. Tell me if I have succeeded as far as you are 
 concerned. 
 
 You propose to come here to-day to sign, as if preparing a 
 treat)' were as simple a matter as writing a letter. But I shall 
 have to submit all your alterations for the King's approval, who 
 is at Windsor, and introduce them into the Spanish and 
 Portuguese text, after having obtained the assent of the Spanish 
 and Portuguese ministers ; that will be a nice little task. 
 
 ■'S 
 
 Ever yours. 
 
 No. VIII. — The Prince de Talleyrand to Lord 
 Palmerston. 
 
 Hanover Square, April 10th, 1834, 2 a.m. 
 
 Dear Lord Palmerston, 
 
 However difficult I may be to please, I now lay 
 down my arms, and will this time confine myself to a simple 
 grammatical remark. Do not you think that the article would 
 be expressed better in French, if the meaning were not interrupted 
 by a number of incidental and useless phrases. I think therefore 
 that we should strike out the words by tJie high contracting 
 parties, which cut up the first part of the article and obscure its 
 meaning. M. de Voltaire said that of all the alterations in his 
 works suggested to him by his friends, the only one he never 
 repented doing was, cutting out. You will send for me when 
 you want me. Ever yours. . . . 
 
 No. IX. — Lord Palmerston to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Stanhope Street, April 20th, 1834. 
 MoN CHER Prince, 
 
 I am very sorry, but I really cannot meet you any 
 further. The alteration you propose, might perhaps improve 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 255 
 
 the style, but would certainly destroy the sense. Voltaire's 
 saying is a true one, as far as books are concerned, but when 
 it is a question of treaties, I think the contrary ought rather to 
 be affirmed, and that one might well say that many a dispute 
 between States would never have taken place had the treaties 
 been drawn up with greater care and exactness. Can I send 
 the article as it is, for the King's approval ? Send me a yes, and 
 speedily, for truly time presses. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, April 22,rd, 1834. 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 I found it impossible to send you by the despatch bag 
 yesterday, the treaty which I have the honour to transmit to 
 you to-day .1 The transcription of the four originals, each in 
 
 ^ The following is the text of the treaty as it was signed in London, April 22nd, 
 
 1834. 
 
 " Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain .... and His Imperial Majesty the 
 Duke of Braganza .... firmly convinced that the interests and safety of both crowns 
 require the immediate and energetic employment of reciprocal efforts to put an end to 
 the hostilities, which, if at first intended to overthrow the throne of His Portuguese 
 Majesty, now furnish support and protection to the subjects and malcontents of Spain ; 
 their said Majesties, wishing at the same time to provide the means necessary to re- 
 establish peace and happiness at home, and place the future of both countries on 
 reciprocal and solid bases, have agreed to unite their forces for the purpose of com- 
 pelling the Infant Don Carlos of Spain and the Infant Dom Miguel of Portugal to 
 quit the dominions of this latter kingdom. 
 
 " In consequence of these Conventions, the Royal Regents, have addressed them- 
 selves to their Majesties the King of the French and the King of Great Britain and 
 Ireland. These latter princes, feeling the interest they must always take in the 
 safety of the Spanish monarchy, and animated by an ardent desire to contribute to the 
 establishment of peace in the Peninsula as well as in Europe, His Britannic Majesty 
 feeling also, the special obligations arising out of his former alliance with Portugal, 
 have agreed to become parties to the said treaty. With this view these sovereigns have 
 named their plenipotentiaries .... and the plenipotentiaries have agreed to the 
 following articles : 
 
 " I. H.I.M. the Duke of Braganza, in the name of Queen Dona Maria II., under- 
 takes to put in action all the means in his power to drive the Infant Don Carlos out of 
 the Portuguese dominions. 
 
 " II. Her Majesty the Queen of Spain, prayed and invited by H.I.M. the Duke of 
 Braganza, having besides very just and serious cause of reproach against the Infant 
 Dom Miguel for the assistance he has given to the Infant Don Carlos of Spain, under- 
 takes to send into Portugal such a number of Spanish troops as will suffice to co-oper- 
 ate with those of H.M. for the purpose of driving Don Carlos of Spain and Dom 
 Miguel out of Portuguese territory .... 
 
 " HI. H.M. the King of Great Britain undertakes to co-operate by sending a naval 
 force to second the necessary operations and decisions consequent on the present 
 treaty. 
 
 " IV. In the event of the co-operation of France being considered necessary by the 
 high contracting parties, H.M. the King of the French undertakes to do whatever he 
 and his august allies shall mutually agree upon. 
 
 " V. The high contracting parties have agreed that in consequence of the powers 
 
2S6 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 four languages, occupied some time, and we were only able to 
 to sign them an hour ago. 
 
 My correspondence will have enabled you to judge pretty 
 accurately of the difficulties we had to encounter in negotiating 
 this treaty. I think they should now be entirely buried in 
 oblivion, and that we should only occupy ourselves with the 
 results. 
 
 I am convinced that the King's government appreciates the 
 advantages of the treaty which has just been concluded between 
 the four Powers ; but you must allow me to point out to you 
 succinctly, the reasons which decided me to enter this alliance. 
 I have looked at it from all points of view, and it was only after 
 mature reflection that I considered it offered us real advantages 
 without any danger. 
 
 This quadruple alliance cannot fail to make some noise in 
 Europe ; I do not say that it will not even excite some jealousy 
 on the part of the great Northern Powers ; but I do not believe 
 they will think sufficiently about it, to cause us further embar- 
 rassment than they have done during the last three years. I 
 should rather feel disposed to think that they will work more 
 energetically to separate us from England, and consequently 
 be more friendly with us. Our treaty will certainly not con- 
 tribute to strengthen still further the ties which unite the Cabinets 
 of Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg ; we have seen lately that 
 these ties are as strong as they can be. It will be easy for us to 
 justify the principles and the object of this quadruple alliance 
 to them, since the state of the Peninsula was a question that 
 appealed specially to the Anglo-French policy. On the whole, 
 I cannot bring myself to believe that the alliance which we have 
 just concluded, which binds us still closer to England, and which, 
 so to speak, makes Spain and Portugal dependent on us, will 
 not result in inspiring the Northern Cabinets with some respect. 
 
 contained in the preceding articles, a declaration shall at once be made to the 
 Portuguese nation, announcing the principles and the object of the present treaty, and 
 H.I.M. the Duke of Braganza, animated by the sincere wish to efface afresh all 
 recollection of the past, and desiring to unite the whole nation around his daughter's 
 throne, declares his intention of proclaiming a complete and general amnesty in favour 
 
 of all the subjects of H.M who, within such period as shall be determined 
 
 on, will return to their allegiance ; and the said Regent further declares his intention 
 of assuring to the Infant Dom Miguel, as soon as he shall have quitted Portuguese 
 territory, an allowance suitable to his name and birth. 
 
 " VI. H.M. the Queen of Spain, in virtue of the present article, declares her inten- 
 tion to assure to the Infant Don Carlos, as soon as he shall have quitted the Spanish and 
 Portuguese dominions, an allowance suitable to his rank and his birth. 
 
 " VII. The present treaty will be ratified and the ratifications exchanged at London, 
 in one month, or sooner if possible. 
 
 " Florida-Blanca, Palmerston, 
 "Talleyrand, Moraes-Sarmento." 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 257 
 
 They might, in their own minds, add Belgium and perhaps 
 Switzerland to the circle of our alliance, and supposing they 
 only wish to look upon all this, as the reunion of nations, at 
 present agitated by a revolutionary spirit, they will only fear still 
 more to provoke the attacks of a mass sufficiently formidable in 
 itself and rendered more so by reason of the good feeling it 
 maintains with all the other nations. 
 
 Looking at the treaty especially in its relation to Spain, we 
 may do ourselves the justice that we have not in any way com- 
 promised the interests of that Power, they having been more 
 especially entrusted to us. In fact, the treaty only stipulates for 
 conditions useful and honourable for Spain, and if these conditions 
 should not have the results we anticipate (which is quite possible 
 in the present state of Spain) no one will be able to accuse us of 
 having brought down another scourge on that unhappy country, 
 by adding a foreign war to the civil war. The Spanish territory 
 will remain inviolable, and that must be one of the fixed princi- 
 ples of our policy in the Peninsula. 
 
 If we may judge of the importance which the English Cabinet 
 attaches to our participation in this treaty, by the difficulties it 
 has raised as to its form, we ought to think it very great, and it 
 seems to me that we should not be wrong, for now it is evident 
 that the English Ministry has submitted its policy in the 
 Peninsula to our control, and even if this should not in reality 
 be so much as it seems, it will suffice us if it is so apparently in 
 public opinion.^ 
 
 There was still another point of view from which it was 
 necessary to examine this treaty ; and one I considered most 
 essential, namely, the influence it would have on France. I must 
 confess that in this respect, also, it appeared to me quite as satis- 
 factory as in all the other relations. Is it a question of our material 
 interests ? We are not pledged to anything by the fact, for if our 
 allies call upon us to join in the execution of the treaty (which 
 is not at all likely, with England's consent) we are masters of our 
 
 ^ The following letter from Lord Palmerston to his brother Sir William Temple, 
 April 23rd, is z.piquante counterpart of M. de Talleyrand's despatch: — " I have been 
 very busy since the 4th of this month elaborating my quadruple alliance between 
 England, France, Spain, and Portugal, to compass the expulsion of Carlos and Miguel 
 .... I carried it at the Council by a coup- de-main, not allowing them time to 
 raise objections. I was not so fortunate with old Talley {sic) and the French Govern- 
 ment, for they made innumerable objections ; but these objections were all based on the 
 manner in which I proposed to them to join us. Finally, however, I succeeded in 
 satisfying their vanity by giving them the place in our midst they seemed to 
 desire. I look upon this as a great stroke. Firstly, it will decide this Portuguese 
 matter, and also serve somewhat to arrange those of Spain. But what is of pre-eminent 
 and general importance is, that it establishes a quadruple alliance among the ■Con- 
 stitutional States of the West, which will serve as a counterpoise to the Holy Alliance 
 of the East." (Private Correspondence of Lord Palmerston.) 
 
 VOL. V. S 
 
2S8 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 own actions, and can refuse to take part in any armed interven- 
 tion, the terrible possibilities of which are incalculable. If it is 
 only a question of the national amour propre, how could that 
 ever be hurt by a treaty in which we play politically an equal 
 part with England, without employing an additional soldier or 
 spending a sou ? 
 
 I repeat again, Monsieur le Comte, I do not see anything in 
 this treaty of the quadruple alliance which is not justifiable and 
 honourable, both as regards our enemies and our friends. If its 
 results are not as satisfactory as we hope, it can never at any 
 rate be brought up as a reproach against the King's Government, 
 and we shall have done everything that circumstances per- 
 mitted. 
 
 You will see that the ratifications are to be exchanged in 
 one month or sooner if possible ; you must not forget that it 
 will be necessary to ^end three ratifications in the three different 
 languages, Spanish, English and Portuguese. 
 
 I am sending to-day a copy of the Convention to M. de 
 Rayneval at Madrid, and another to M. le Baron Mortier at 
 Lisbon. 
 
 Here ends the manuscript of the Memoirs. M. de Talley- 
 rand, however, did not quit London until the month of August, 
 and during those last months he had still some very important 
 matters to deal with. We therefore considered we ought to 
 continue the work, which he had himself commenced during the 
 preceding years, to the termination of his Embassy. All the 
 materials were at hand : oflScial despatches and private letters. 
 We have confined ourselves to classing them according to rational 
 order, as M. de Talleyrand had done during the last volumes. 
 
 The prince's private correspondence during this period, 
 was published, two years ago, under the superintendence of 
 Madame la Comtesse de Mirabeau. It would therefore have 
 been superfluous to re-edit it here. We have however been 
 obliged to reproduce some of the letters, in order to show the 
 course of the negotiations as fully as possible ; they will be 
 found on pages 268, 269, 279, 300, 312, 313, 314. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 259 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, Sunday, April 2yth, 1834. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I am taking advantage of the Due de Frias' ^ courier. 
 Our latest news from Madrid is up to the 19th. The press there 
 was unfavourable to, and public opinion generally in favour of, 
 the E.oyal Statute.^ Burgos^ has been replaced by Moscoso de 
 Altamira.* 
 
 As a rule the news from Germany now shows a disposition on 
 the part of the Northern Courts to throw the blame of all the 
 delays on the Due de Nassau and exonerate King William ; 
 they evidently would like to bring the London and Paris 
 Cabinets round from their resolve, not to recommence the 
 Conferences ; they complain bitterly, and take advantage of the 
 events in Brussels. 
 
 Memorandums are being showered upon Switzerland ; the 
 Canton of Berne will however give in, on the matter of the 
 refugees who took part in the movement in Savoy.^ 
 
 ^ Spanish Ambassador in Paris at that time. 
 
 2 The Constitution granted to Spain by the Martinez de la Rosa Cabinet. It was 
 promulgated on the 12th June. 
 
 * Don Francisco Xavier de Burgos, born in 1778. Having accepted some employ- 
 ment under King Joseph, he was exiled at the Restoration of Ferdinand. He returned 
 to Spain in 1817, and made a name for himself as a debater on the Liberal side. He 
 became Intendant of the Council of Customs in 1827, then Chief Councillor of 
 Finance, Minister of the Interior at Ferdinand's death, and finally Minister of 
 Finance. 
 
 * Don Jose Maria de Moscoso de Altamira had already been Minister of the 
 Interior in 1822. A few months after, he and his colleagues were dismissed and im- 
 prisoned. Again made Minister of the Interior in 1834, he was replaced by Don 
 Diego Medrano in January 1835. 
 
 " Switzerland at this period was the refuge and centre of reunion of all the 
 revolutionary spirits in Europe. In the beginning of January 1834, about a thousand 
 refugees of all nations assembled in the Canton de Vaud, for the purpose of entering 
 Savoy and proclaiming a republic there. The Polish General Romarino headed the 
 movement. On the 2nd February, several armed bands crossed the frontier and got 
 as far as Annecy, but without exciting any interest among the inhabitants. They were 
 quickly attacked and completely routed by the Sardinian troops. In consequence of 
 this skirmish, Sardinia demanded that Switzerland should take some steps against the 
 refugees ; she insisted that the Directory should expel them and that those Swiss who 
 had taken part in the enterprise should be brought to trial. Several states individu- 
 ally supported the course of the Sardinian Cabinet, and the Swiss Government received 
 similar demands from Austria, the Grand-Duchy of Baden, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, the 
 Germanic Confederation, the Kingdom of Naples, Prussia, and even Russia. It 
 resisted at first, declaring that such a summons affected the independence of Switzer- 
 land. Nevertheless it ended by giving in, so far at least as regarded the expulsion of 
 the foreigners ; even the Canton of Beme, which appeared the most rebellious, and 
 which had welcomed the Polish refugees with great friendliness, expelled them from 
 her territory. This incident, which for a moment startled diplomatic circles, was not 
 brought to a close till the end of July. 
 
 S 2 
 
26o THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 At home, we shall only have the increased effective force 
 asked for 1835, for the first six months. We shall have to obtain 
 the remainder from the new Legislature, as we have been obliged 
 to compound with the Commission, which only wanted to allow 
 for three months in 1835.1 
 
 Quesada has just been beaten by Zumalacarreguy ^ and 
 obliged to retire to Pampeluna ; he has lost three or four hun- 
 dred men. 
 
 Rodil ought to have taken Don Carlos, who got off with the 
 loss of his baggage. 
 
 I cannot assure you too often, mon Prince, of the very 
 favourable impression made by the treaty here, and how greatly 
 you are applauded for having brought it to a conclusion. Appony 
 is the only one among the foreigners who has not yet said any- 
 thing. I wound up some explanations by telling him, that 
 we had not forgotten that Dona Maria was the granddaughter 
 of the Emperor Francis. 
 
 Pozzo seems in a bad humour. I think nevertheless the 
 general tendency all round is to look upon the matter as of 
 very slight importance. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, April zZth, 1834. 
 
 Monsieur LE Comte, 
 
 Lord Palmerston has gone to Windsor for two or three 
 days ; this prevents my seeing him as soon as I should have 
 liked, respecting the question of Luxemburg and the conduct of 
 the Prussian Government towards General Goblet^ mentioned 
 in your despatch. 
 
 As soon as the Minister for Foreign Affairs returns, I will see 
 him, communicate to him your observations on these two points, 
 and arrange with him as to the best measures to be adopted 
 by the French and English Governments under the circumstances. 
 
 ^ On the i6th of April, the War Minister had submitted a. scheme to bring the 
 army up to an effective force of 360,000 men. He therefore asked for supplementary 
 loans for the military exercises of 1834-1835. The Commission only granted him 
 half the loans asked for, and the Chamber ratified the decision of the Commission, 
 May 13th. 
 
 2 Thomas Zumalacarreguy, bom in 1788, entered the service in 1808 at the time of 
 the French invasion ; after the death of Ferdinand VII. , he sided with Don Carlos and 
 became one of the generals of the insurrection. He held the country for two years, 
 gained numerous advantages, which rendered his name famous as a party leader, but 
 he was mortally wounded at the siege of Bilbao in June 1835. 
 
 3 General Goblet had been made Minister at Berlin, but the King of Prussia, at 
 the instigation, it was said, of the Cabinet of the Hague, had refused to receive 
 him, although he had previously agreed to his nomination. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 261 
 
 The proceeding of the Prussian Government seems to me, M. 
 le Comte, as it does to you, perfectly inexplicable ; I may even 
 say more, it is perfectly unbearable. We cannot allow it to 
 pass unnoticed without exposing ourselves to seeing some fresh 
 insult, either gratuitously or otherwise, offered to Belgium every 
 day, which eventually would recoil on the two Governments 
 which specially protect her. The choice of General Goblet for 
 the Berlin Embassy may have been very ill advised, but, if so, 
 the Prussian Government ought to have intimated its dislike to 
 receiving him before his departure from Brussels, which was 
 known long beforehand. In the present state of things, one 
 cannot admit the right of the Berlin Cabinet to reject the 
 Belgian envoy, for so insulting a reason as that which it puts 
 forward, more especially when there is an accredited Prussian 
 Minister at Brussels, who is always treated with great consider- 
 ation by the Belgian Government. 
 
 I cannot say, as yet, what line Lord Palmerston will take in 
 this matter, but I will urge upon him to come to some decision 
 promptly. 
 
 As to the proposals made by Prussia and Austria for a fresh 
 arrangement in the affair of Luxemburg, I do not think it will 
 suit us to entertain them. As you truly observe, they would 
 modify the treaties of 18 15, and would also possess the objection 
 of renewing the discussions on the territorial question of the 
 Hollando-Belgian treaty, a question which it is very important 
 that we should consider, and also prevail upon the other Powers 
 to consider, as irrevocably decided and determined by the treaty 
 of November 15. . . . 
 
 .... I am convinced that we for our part did very wisely to 
 keep the treaty secret. We can only regret its premature pub- 
 lication by the English newspapers. It is always better in all 
 such cases not to have to reproach oneself for any indiscretion. 
 I suppose those journals over which the King's Government 
 possesses some influence, will be instructed to point out the 
 moral and political use to France of this treaty, when the time 
 for announcing it has arrived. . . . 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand, 
 
 Thursday, May isi, 1834. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I am sending you a few lines, in the midst of all the 
 turmoil of the ist of May. Goblet has been recalled. M. de 
 Mdrode's'^ note is very firm. Bresson took rather a high hand in 
 1 Comte Felix de Merode was at that time Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
262 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 this matter at Berlin, and he has done right. I believe King 
 Leopold was in fault, for not replying to a private letter of the 
 King of Prussia's before despatching Goblet. I have communi- 
 cated the tenour of this letter to Lord Granville. 
 
 Marshal Maison has to-day given me some explanation 
 respecting the preparations in the Black Sea, which our Consul 
 at Odessa had announced, but which do not exist. Mr. Bligh 
 having, probably on the same authority, transmitted similar 
 information to London, it might be as well to acquaint Lord 
 Palmerston of this exaggeration. 
 
 Switzerland is taking action with regard to her refugees. 
 You will have read the proclamation of the Bernese Police in 
 the Debats ; that was my suggestion. I think that the Foreign 
 Legations are now rather taken in by being relegated to Zurich. 
 
 Our newspapers are commencing to chatter about the treaty. 
 Diplomacy has not yet attacked us, but I know it is all astir ; 
 the Carlist party especially, is furious. . . . 
 
 Excepting Quesada's defeat, the news from Barcelona, 
 Valencia, and Murcia is very good. The Royal Statute has had a 
 great success everywhere. The Gazette de Madrid, of the 23rd, 
 announces the reciprocal despatch and reception of the Ministers 
 accredited between Madrid and Lisbon ; here we have the 
 formal recognition ! 
 
 Don Carlos has been closely pressed a second time, and has 
 again lost some equipment. 
 
 M. Sontag^ has already returned from Brussels, to which 
 place M. Perier ^ is now going. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, May 1st, 1834. 
 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 • • • • I was able to see Lord Palmerston yesterday, 
 and to speak to him respecting the two chief subjects in your 
 despatch No. 33. He thoroughly agrees with you as to the 
 conduct of the Prussian Government with regard to General 
 Goblet, and he has written to Berlin, directing Lord Minto to 
 make some representations on the subject. . . . 
 
 So many and such varied proposals have been brought 
 forward lately, on the subject of Luxemburg, that Lord 
 Palmerston thinks we ought not to exhibit too much interest 
 in that affair, and should wait until some positive proposal is 
 
 1 Second Secretary to the Embassy in London. 
 
 ^ Auguste Casimir Victor Laurent Pdrier, son of M. Perier, at that time Secretary 
 of Legation at Brussels. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 263 
 
 submitted to us, which France and England will then be at 
 liberty to accept or refuse. 
 
 Lord Palmerston also informed me of the despatches he had 
 received from Vienna, in which Sir Frederick Lamb gave him an 
 account of several interviews he had had with the Prince de 
 Metterrrich, respecting the resumption of the Conferences in 
 London to conclude the Hollando-Belgian affair. All these con- 
 versations were simply a long series of arguments on the part of 
 the Chancellor, to prove the necessity of re-assembling the Con- 
 ference, and although on the whole they bring forward nothing 
 fresh, Lord Palmerston proposes to instruct Sir Frederick Lamb 
 to reply to them, and announce the intention of the English Go- 
 vernment to accede to the wishes of the Austrian Cabinet, as soon 
 as it has received the assurance that the King of the Netherlands 
 agrees to sign the first seven Articles of the treaty of November 
 15th, respecting which the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian 
 Governments have never raised the slightest question. He thinks 
 with me, that the King of the Netherlands' refusal or acceptance 
 will plainly show whether he does or does not desire to bring 
 matters to a conclusion. 
 
 Lord Palmerston's despatch will be transmitted to Vienna 
 ^id Paris, and Lord Granville is to communicate it to you. . . . 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, May yd, 1834. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 .... Matters are in a complete state of disorder on 
 the northern frontier of Spain, nevertheless I do not see that 
 Madrid is much disturbed thereby. Rayneval does not say a word 
 about it. 
 
 Pozzo was to have an interview with the King this morning. 
 I strongly cautioned His Majesty, more especially impressing 
 upon him not to make any excuses to Pozzo, still less to tell 
 him that it was in order not to allow the English to act alone in 
 the Peninsula, and to enable us to keep an eye on them. 
 
 I fancy he was rather inclined to take that line, but I did all 
 in my power to prevent his doing so. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, May gth, 1834. 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 I think it would be as well if you were to send me, as 
 soon as possible, the ratifications of the treaty of April 22nd. 
 
264 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Those from Portugal may arrive at any moment, and as we can 
 count on those from Madrid, a first exchange will probably be 
 made with the Portuguese minister ; that is, however, if Dom 
 Pedro's Government does not refuse to ratify the treaty, as some 
 people here seem to fear, which I must confess would certainly 
 be a greater act of folly on the part of that Government than any 
 they have yet been blamed for. 
 
 I will get Lord Palmerston to delay no longer in send- 
 ing the necessary instructions to Copenhagen to conclude the 
 treaty relative to the slave trade.^ 
 
 You will have seen in the English papers the announcement 
 of the arrival of the Comte de Montfort (M. Jerome Bonaparte) 
 in London. This is quite correct ; M. Lucien and M. Joseph 
 Bonaparte are also living here. 
 
 Accept .... 
 
 London, May ie,th, 1834. 
 
 M. Feuillet has sent me the ratifications of the treaty of 22nd 
 April. 
 
 The two documents, of which I herewith send copies, will 
 show you that Dom Pedro's Government has decided to ratify 
 the treaty signed by its plenipotentiaries in London. We are 
 not yet aware what day the Portuguese ratifications will arrive 
 here, but that is not of so much consequence now that we know 
 what are the intentions of the Regent of Portugal with regard to 
 this treaty. I think, however, that all will be completed in three 
 or four days, unless the Portuguese and Spanish ratifications are 
 not quite in order, which might be the case, owing to their having 
 been sent off so hurriedly from Madrid and Lisbon. 
 
 I was not able to see Lord Palmerston to-day ; I shall not 
 omit to tell him your wishes respecting Swiss affairs when next 
 I see him. 
 
 London, May 18M, 1834. 
 
 In thinking carefully over the draft of the declaration 
 referred to in Art. V. of the treaty of April 22nd,^ which M. 
 
 ' Negotiations were at this time being carried on between France and England on 
 the one part, and Denmark on the other, in order to obtain the assent of the Cabinet 
 at Copenhagen to the treaty concluded on the 30th November, 1831, between the 
 Cabinets of London and Paris, (and completed by the Convention of 22nd March, 1833) 
 for the repression of the slave trade. Denmark joined it on the 26th July, 1834. 
 
 ^ Art V. It is agreed between the high contracting parties, that in consequence 
 of the stipulations contained in the preceding Articles, a declaration shall be published 
 at once, announcing to the Portuguese nation the principles and the 'object of the 
 engagements of this treaty. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 265 
 
 Martinez de la Rosa desires should be made by a joint act 
 signed by the four plenipotentiaries, I find there are several 
 difficulties, which I must point out to you as I have already done 
 to Lord Palmerston. First of all, I see in this a direct interven- 
 tion in the purely home affairs of the Peninsula, and we should 
 pledge ourselves, it seems to me, by the very first step, much more 
 than we are bound by the treaty itself For in this latter, I took 
 care that we should only be the guarantors to the conditions of 
 Art. V. and that we should not be asked to execute them. If, 
 through the inevitable consequences of a war, such as that 
 being waged in the Peninsula, it should come about that in the 
 different towns and fortresses occupied successively by both 
 parties, the declaration of the four Courts becomes subject to all 
 the evil chances of an act drawn up in the name of one of the 
 two combatant parties, would not the dignity of France and 
 Great Britain find itself compromised by the insults which would 
 immediately be heaped upon a declaration emanating from 
 them } 
 
 I do not moreover, under the circumstances, recognize the 
 necessity of the step demanded by the Madrid Cabinet. It 
 seems to me that it ought to suffice if, after the publication of 
 the treaty, the Portuguese Government makes the declaration 
 mentioned and guaranteed by Art. V. 
 
 These are the observations I communicated to Lord Pal- 
 merston and to which I wish especially to draw your attention, 
 Monsieur le Comte. You will have time to let me have your 
 definite opinion on this matter, for we cannot decide on the form 
 of the declaration until after the ratifications have been 
 exchanged, which will not be for some days yet. . . . 
 
 Lord Palmerston told me that he would positively send the 
 necessary instructions to Copenhagen to complete the negotia- 
 tion relative to the slave trade. 
 
 By the time this letter reaches you, you will already have 
 learnt that the English Cabinet had forestalled your wishes 
 respecting the Frankfort affairs.^ Lord Granville will have 
 informed you of the despatch which Lord Palmerston has 
 written to the English minister in that city, directing him to 
 make some representations as to the occurrences which have just 
 
 ' In consequence of the revolt of the S'l> April, 1833, the Diet had ordered 
 Frankfort to be occupied by a garrison, consisting of half Austrian and half Prussian 
 troops ; this became the source of daily quarrels and conflicts with the town militia. 
 When more serious riots broke out afresh on the 2nd May, the Diet passed a 
 second resolution, by which the police and all the military authorities were placed 
 under the Austrian commandant. The Senate of Frankfort protested vehemently 
 against this measure, which deprived the Republic almost completely of its indepen- 
 dence. It was this same abuse of power on the part of the Confederation which 
 called forth the intervention of the Powers. 
 
266 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 taken place, and as to the schemes attributed to the Diet. I 
 thought Lord Palmerston's letter rather too strong and fear it 
 will overreach its aim. I hope it will make the same impression 
 on you that it has done on me, and that the King's Government, 
 keeping to the sensible views so well expressed in your despatch 
 No. 42, will confine itself to making reservations expressed in 
 terms sufficiently moderate not to cause any irritation. We 
 must as much as possible humour the susceptibilities of the 
 small German States, and show our strength by our moderation 
 towards them. You may remember that, only very lately, the 
 somewhat aggressive tone of the English agents in Germany has 
 not greatly served our interests there. . . . 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, May i()th, 1834. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 .Roussin has just refused ; ^ he will I believe be replaced 
 by Admiral Jacob. I left the Council completely free to 
 nominate either a Minister for Foreign Affairs or a Minister of 
 Marine. 
 
 We have a number of letters both from Constantinople and 
 from Vienna. Roussin informs us that the Russian naval 
 preparations are enormous and are being much pressed forward : 
 it has been announced that the Emperor is going to make a 
 journey to the Crimea. Mehemet-Ali is getting uneasy on his 
 Divan, and believes himself threatened, but he is sufficiently 
 troubled with Syria and Candia, and does not think of occupy- 
 ing himself with anything else except the intrigues in the 
 Divan itself. 
 
 Sainte-Aulaire thinks that the three Northern Courts will 
 form a separate arrangement with Holland, if the Conferences 
 are not resumed. 
 
 M. de Metternich cannot digest the treaty, but outwardly, he 
 takes the matter very quietly. M. Ancillon is more vehement. 
 We are just now having a slight Ministerial agitation, which will 
 not result in anything, but it takes up my time, as well as some 
 of that which I require for writing to you. . . . 
 
 M. de Lafayette is sinking rapidly — this evening, to-morrow 
 or the day after at latest. . . P- 
 
 1 The portfolio of the Marine Department. 
 
 2 M. de Lafayette died on the 20th of May. His obsequies took place on the 22nd, 
 amid an immense concourse of people. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 267 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, May iind, 1834. 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 The Portuguese ratifications have not yet arrived ; we 
 cannot account for this delay, except by the bad weather at sea, 
 which for the last few days has been most unfavourable for any 
 arrivals from Portugal. 
 
 The Prince de Lieven, Russian Ambassador in London for 
 the last twenty years, has just been recalled by his Court to fill 
 the post of Governor, or, as the Russians call it, curator to the 
 hereditary Grand Duke, whose majority was celebrated a few 
 ■days ago at St. Petersburg. The letter informing M. de Lieven 
 of his appointment is worded in the most flattering and 
 honourable terms. 
 
 This piece of news produced a very lively sensation yesterday 
 at the Exchange in London, and some people thought they 
 saw in it evidence of a speedy rupture between England and 
 Russia ; they have however already recovered from this groundless 
 fear. The Prince de Lieven will be much regretted in England ; he 
 had won the esteem of all those who for so many years have 
 had the opportunity of estimating the loftiness and nobility of 
 his character. 
 
 Lord Palmerston, to whom I spoke this morning about the 
 project he has sent to Mr. Foster^ at Turin, relative to Sardinia's 
 joining the Convention on the slave trade treaty, confessed to 
 me that it was entirely through forgetfulness that you had not 
 received this project, and he promised to repair the error as 
 speedily as possible, by directing Lord Granville to transmit a 
 copy to you at once. 
 
 I hope to send you by the next courier the Order in Council 
 which has removed the embargo laid upon Dutch vessels in 1833. 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, May 16th, 1834. 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 The King has been greatly excited by a letter from 
 King Leopold, announcing his scheme for establishing an order 
 of succession in Belgium.^ Lehon started yesterday, and I 
 
 ^ Augustus John Foster, born in 17S0, English Minister Plenipotentiary in 
 Sardinia. 
 
 " The Prince Royal of Belgium, only a few months old, had just died. King 
 
268 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 begged him most earnestly not only to postpone all decisions, 
 but if possible all discussion on this subject, which is not much 
 relished in France. 
 
 Lord Granville has received nothing from London about it ; 
 I fancy I have reason to believe, that this announcement by 
 King Leopold will surprise the London Cabinet as much as 
 it has ours. 
 
 From Madrid we have heard nothing since the 14th. The 
 insurrection in Navarre is spreading rapidly, but the other 
 provinces are taking no part in it. . . . 
 
 Madame Adelaide to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 NeUILLY, May lyd, 1834. 
 
 Who would have believed, mon cher Prince, that King 
 Leopold, who is only forty-three years of age, and with a young 
 wife in perfect health, has allowed himself to be so carried away 
 by grief at the loss of his child, that he himself wishes to assure the 
 succession to the Belgian throne to his nephews, though he never 
 thought of so doing at the time of his marriage, nor before it ; 
 and surely he has less reason for doing so now than before the birth 
 of the dear infant whose loss we deplore. Our dear Louise has 
 shown that she can have children, and at three-and-twenty, fresh 
 and in good health, it is quite likely that she will have others. 
 You will not be surprised that our King (in the letter of which 
 I herewith send you a copy) should impress upon him at once, 
 that he cannot alone and of himself covnt. to a resolve of such an 
 important nature, without first consulting England and France, 
 and that we cannot consent to Belgium becoming Germanized, 
 nor allow her to be smothered by a host of agnates like those of 
 Luxemburg, who have already caused us so much trouble and 
 difficulty, which you, mon Prince, know better than any one else. 
 The King thinks that it is both advisable and necessary that 
 you should be made aware of this business, so that if they make 
 it known in England and you hear it spoken of, you may, with 
 your usual skill, avert the dangers and difficulties which might 
 arise therefrom for the general peace, by causing them to be 
 thoroughly understood in England to their fullest extent. We 
 trust this entirely to your high sense of justice and your great zeal 
 for the good of France. 
 
 Leopold, who had no other children, wished to assure the inheritance of the crown to 
 his family, by getting the Belgian Chambers to proclaim the contingent rights of his 
 relations, the princes of the House of Coburg. This determination on the part of 
 the King of the Belgians provoked the intervention of King Louis Philippe. 
 
the revolution of 1830. 269 
 
 King Louis Philippe to King Leopold. 
 
 Paris, Thursday, May 22nd, 1834. 
 
 My very dear Brother and excellent Friend, 
 
 I am writing to you separately on the very important 
 portion of your letter of the 19th, which I have just received. 
 What you have communicated to me is of so serious a nature, 
 that I do not think it is solely in order that I should not hear it 
 through others, that you have informed me of it. Resolutions 
 of such a nature must not only be arranged with England and 
 ourselves, but you cannot take them without our concurrence 
 and approbation. Neither the act which called you to the throne, 
 the Belgian Constitution, nor the treaties which guaranteed 
 it to you, conferred this right. It is necessary therefore, before 
 going any further in this strange matter, that you should make 
 it the subject of an official negotiation from your Government 
 to both ours. I say strange, my dear brother, for in truth I 
 cannot conceive that at your age, with a wife like yours, grief at 
 the loss we have just sustained, should lead you to believe that 
 it is imperative for you to provide for the chances of your 
 succession, and overwhelm Belgium with a host of agnates like 
 those of Luxemburg. 
 
 1. I am far from believing that such an act would be a 
 guarantee for the solidity of your throne, and I should rather be 
 inclined to think that, in consequence of the difficulties of all 
 Icinds which would arise therefrom, the idea would please those 
 who do not desire its solidity. I do not think that it is necessary 
 to remind Belgium of the danger involved in the return of the 
 Nassau family, or the establishment of a Republic, for every one 
 knows that France would never permit either one or the other. 
 
 2. No one is ignorant of what we want, namely, the real and 
 not the nominal independence of Belgium ; that we do not wish 
 her to be dependent either on us, on England, or on both ; that we 
 still less wish her to depend upon Prussia, the Germanic Confede- 
 ration, or Germany. Not only have we desired Belgium to be 
 independent, but we have established her neutrality for ever, so 
 that she cannot be bound by such ties. 
 
 The independence of Belgium is also of importance to us for 
 another reason, of which you are well aware : it is the basis, the 
 bond of our alliance with England, which is so valuable to us, 
 and is the guarantee for universal peace and social order. We 
 shall therefore resist to the utmost everything that could possibly 
 injure it or Germanize Belgium, either by uniting it with the 
 
270 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Germanic Confederation, or becoming dependent on any of the 
 States composing it. 
 
 I therefore hope, my dear brother, that you will put a stop to 
 the message to the Chambers you speak of in your letter to me, 
 and that you will not take any further steps in this matter, before 
 informing the London and Paris Cabinets of it and receivings 
 their replies. 
 
 After all this, my dear brother, please accept every expression 
 of my affection. I am just starting for Neuilly, and remain 
 always and for ever, your dear brother, affectionate father-in- 
 law, and faithful friend, 
 
 Louis Philippe. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, May 26th, 1834. 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 I saw Lord Grey yesterday, and spoke to him about 
 King Leopold's idea of regulating the succession to the Belgian 
 throne, in concert with the Belgian Chambers. I easily made 
 him see the objections to such a scheme. I must do Lord Grey 
 the justice to say, that he, like you, at once perceived the 
 difficulties of more than one nature which would result from 
 King Leopold's scheme. He gave me a positive assurance, 
 that England would oppose any decision come to respecting the 
 succession to the Belgian throne without the concurrence of 
 France and England. Instructions to this effect will be sent 
 to Brussels, and I may also add, that Lord Durham, to whom 
 I have spoken, and whose advice is generally very well received 
 by King Leopold, stated, that he would inform him of the 
 opposition which the execution of his scheme would meet with 
 in England. 
 
 London, May 2^th, 1834. 
 
 I generally refrain from telling you of the English Parlia- 
 mentary debates which specially refer to the home affairs of 
 the country, as I know that the papers which are forwarded 
 to you from here, afford you in this respect quicker and more 
 exact details than I could do. I must however give you an 
 account to-day of a very serious incident occasioned by the 
 discussion of a bill in the House of Commons. 
 
 This bill, the first reading of which took place more than 
 a fortnight ago, relates to the redemption of the tithes of the 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 271 
 
 Protestant clergy in Ireland. It was thought that the financial 
 results produced thereby would eventually leave a surplus, the 
 distribution of which would have to be arranged for. Lord 
 John Russell, one of the members of the Cabinet, who 
 supported the Bill in the House of Commons, had spoken 
 perhaps somewhat injudiciously at the first reading, main- 
 taining that the funds should be used according to the wishes 
 of the Government. This proposal excited strong dissent in 
 the Cabinet, several members of which, sharing the opinion of 
 a considerable portion of the House of Commons and certainly 
 of the majority in the House of Peers on this subject, declared 
 they could not assent to it. The ministers who most strongly 
 opposed Lord John Russell's proposal were Mr. Stanley and Sir 
 James Graham. They declared it would be a spoliation of 
 the Anglican clergy, and claimed that if there remained a 
 surplus, after all the provisions of the Bill had been carried out, 
 such surplus should be handed over to the Anglican clergy 
 in Ireland, who should decide as to its appropriation. . . . 
 
 Lord John Russell, on his side, persisting in the opinion he 
 had enunciated, declared he must resign if it was not adopted. 
 He was however persuaded to withdraw his resignation, and 
 the Cabinet were endeavouring to put an end to this difficulty 
 when a motion, which Mr. Ward^ is to bring before the House 
 of Commons to-morrow, has revived all the difficulties which 
 it was hoped were dispersed. Mr. Ward will propose, that the 
 funds in question should be employed for the benefit of the 
 Irish Dissenting and Roman Catholic chapels, and it is im- 
 possible to foresee the end of this motion. Whatever it is, 
 however, they declare that it must result in the resignation of 
 several of the Ministry. If Mr. Ward obtains a majority in 
 the House, Mr. Stanley and Sir James Graham have announced 
 their positive intention of retiring ; if the contrary is the case, 
 Lord John Russell and probably some other members of the 
 Cabinet will resign. 
 
 For the last three days a succession of Cabinet Councils 
 have been held, without so far finding any means of reconciling 
 the various opinions expressed. Mr. Stanley's retirement would 
 be a very serious loss to the Ministry, of which he is the most 
 reliable and undoubtedly the most able supporter in the House 
 of Commons. Lord John Russell's resignation and that of several 
 
 ' Henry George Ward, bom in 1798, an English diplomat and politician. He 
 was successively Secretary of Legation at Stockholm, the Hague, and Madrid, and 
 was nominated Minister to Mexico in 1825. In 1832, he became member of the 
 House of Commons. In 1849, he was made High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, 
 Governor of Ceylon in 1856, and died in i860. 
 
272 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 of the other members might also produce some unexpected 
 results. 
 
 Lastly, Monsieur le Comte, you will perceive that this is a very 
 critical time, so that if some arrangement is not come to, the 
 existence of the present Cabinet is seriously compromised. 
 
 You must excuse my here expressing any opinion as to 
 the Government which might be called to succeed this one ; 
 predictions would certainly be useless in the presence of such 
 changeable and uncertain circumstances as may arise at any 
 moment. I will confine myself therefore to keeping you fully 
 informed of everything that comes to my knowledge. . . . 
 
 London, May 2-jth, lo p.m. 
 
 Mr. Ward has brought forward his motion in the House 
 of Commons ; it was seconded by Mr. Grote.' 
 
 Lord Althorp, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in a very 
 able speech, proposed the adjournment of the House till Monday 
 next. Mr. Grote hastened to support the minister's proposition, 
 by referring to the serious matters in connection with it. The 
 House adopted it amid loud and very decided acclamations ; so 
 matters, as far as that is concerned, are still undecided. Neverthe- 
 less, the Ministerial majority has thereby certainly obtained great 
 moral support, and it appears that Mr. Stanley, Sir James 
 Graham, the Duke of Richmond, and perhaps Lord Ripon will 
 retire. 
 
 It is said that the King is determined to support Lord Grey 
 and the Cabinet ministers who side with him. 
 
 London, May 2<)th, 1834. 
 
 The Portuguese ratifications arrived in London this morning. 
 I believe the exchanges will be effected this evening or to-morrow 
 morning. As soon as I receive the English, Spanish, and 
 Portuguese ratifications, I will remit them to M. Feuillet. 
 
 I have the honour to send you herewith a copy of the Note, in 
 which Lord Palmerston announces the conclusion of the treaty 
 of the quadruple alliance to the foreign legations accredited in 
 England. 
 
 The Duke of Richmond and Lord Ripon have positively ten- 
 
 ^ George Grote, historian and an English politician, born in 1794, entered the 
 House of Commons in 1832, where he sided with the Whig party. He retired in 
 1841, after which he devoted himself exclusively to historical research. He wrote a 
 history of Greece, a. large work, which established his reputation. In 1868, he 
 succeeded Lord Brougham as President of the Council of the London University. He 
 died in 1871. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 273 
 
 dered their resignations, which have been accepted. This will 
 render the fresh Ministerial arrangements somewhat more difficult, 
 but it is hoped nevertheless that all will be settled by Monday, 
 the day fixed for the re-assembling of the House.^ 
 
 I am not losing sight of the Eastern question, and I will again 
 bring it before Lord Palmerston and Lord Grey, as soon as the 
 organisation of the new Cabinet allows them time to think 
 about it. 
 
 Accept. . . . 
 
 5 o'clock in the Evening. 
 
 P.S. I have just come from the Foreign Office, to which I had 
 gone to carry out the exchange of the ratifications ; this however 
 has not been accomplished, for the document from Lisbon is so 
 incorrect, that it is almost impossible to accept it. Among its 
 many irregularities, I will confine myself to pointing out to you 
 the abridgment of the preamble. We are trying to find some 
 means of providing for this difficulty, but up to now we have not 
 succeeded. This delay, which is unpleasant for us, and which I 
 beg you to keep secret, is a very serious matter for the English 
 Cabinet, as it hoped to be in a position to lay the treaty before 
 Parliament on Monday. 
 
 London, May i\st, 1834. 
 
 M. Feuillet, who will have the honour to hand you this 
 despatch, also bears the three ratifications of the treaty of 
 April 22nd. 
 
 After carefully weighing the inconveniences which the delay in 
 the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty would occasion, we 
 have decided to accept the Portuguese draft despite its incorrect- 
 ness. 
 
 We have, moreover, endeavoured to obviate the evil results of 
 our decision by means of two memorandums, copies of which I 
 have the honour to enclose herewith. 
 
 The first is a declaration by the Portuguese minister in London, 
 as explicit as possible, and the second, a counter declaration by 
 the plenipotentiaries of the three courts, by which they take 
 upon themselves the solemn engagement undertaken by the 
 Portuguese plenipotentiary — that the errors committed in the 
 
 ' As a result of this alteration, the English Ministry lost four of its members : 
 Lord Stanley, Secretary for the Colonies and War Minister, was succeeded by Mr. 
 Spring-Rice for the Colonies, and by Mr. EUice in the War Department ; Sir J. 
 Graham, First Lord of the Admiralty, by Lord Auckland ; the Duke of Richmond, 
 Postmaster-General, by the Marquis of Conyngham ; and Lord Ripon, Lord Privy 
 Seal, by the Earl of Carlisle. 
 
 VOL. V. T 
 
274 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 execution of the Portuguese ratifications shall be rectified as 
 quickly as possible. 
 
 When reading these two documents, you will, I think, agree 
 with me, Monsieur le Comte, that under the circumstances we 
 could not have done better. 
 
 Our refiisal to ratify would have caused a delay of not less 
 than a month ; during that time, and even long after, the 
 operations of the Spanish army would be suspended, since they 
 would have had to await the necessary orders from London 
 authorising the Spanish Government to take action. Moreover, 
 the request we have transmitted to the three ministers of Spain, 
 France, and Great Britain at Lisbon, gives us the certainty that 
 the order to advance will not be accorded to the Spanish 
 Government until they have received the ratified ratifications. 
 
 You will find herewith, a copy of the despatch I have just 
 written to M. le Baron de Mortier on this subject, and I venture 
 to hope that you will consider I was justified in sending him his 
 instructions without awaiting your orders. Speed, at the present 
 juncture, outweighs all other considerations. 
 
 After the exchange of the ratifications, we discussed the 
 projected amnesty, of which mention is made in Article V. of 
 he treaty, and we drew up the draft, a copy of which I have 
 the honour herewith to enclose. 
 
 The reason which specially decided me, Monsieur le Comte, 
 to consent to the arrangement of which I have just informed 
 you, was, that it seemed to me very urgent to give all possible 
 weight to the treaty of April 22nd. The Ministerial difficulties 
 that have arisen here lately, which, although happily arranged for 
 the time, may arise again, make it a matter of the highest im- 
 portance to us that this treaty should be ratified by the present 
 Ministry, or at least recognised as having been so. 
 
 I think the King's Government, in realising this consideration, 
 will approve the resolve I have taken. 
 
 You will already have been made aware by the papers, of the 
 names of those who have been summoned to replace the retiring 
 members of the English Cabinet. As soon as it was certain, as I 
 had the honour of informing you, that Lord Grey would remain 
 at the head of affairs, the names of the new ministers did not 
 excite much interest. 
 
 It now remains to be seen what effect the Ministerial 
 changes will have on the two Houses of Parliament. The 
 most generally accepted opinion is, that the Cabinet has not 
 strengthened itself by the addition of those it has summoned to 
 join it. I fancy this opinion is pretty well founded. 
 
the revolution of 1830. 275 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, June ist, 1834. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 In order that you may be fully acquainted with our 
 reasons for sending you a copy of the fresh instructions for M. 
 Perier at Brussels, I must inform you, that in consequence of a 
 conversation M. Van de Weyer had with Lord Palmerston, the 
 latter wrote a private letter to King Leopold, in which he 
 approved of his plan of naming a successor. King Leopold sent a 
 copy of this letter to his father-in-law, which he showed me 
 yesterday ; we thereupon at once wrote to Brussels, not relying 
 on this very confidential information, but on Purler's last letter, 
 which announced a renewal of this scheme. 
 
 As it is evident from this, that Lord Grey and Lord 
 Palmerston must have expressed themselves very differently, I 
 felt that I ought to inform you of this ; I pray you to consider 
 it strictly as between you and me ; even the King is not aware 
 that I have mentioned it to you. 
 
 We are anxiously awaiting the result of the London 
 Ministerial arrangement. 
 
 The Portuguese are exceedingly clumsy with their abbre- 
 viated ratifications : I fear we shall not get any further. 
 
 M. DE Rayneval to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Aranjuez, y««« 2nd, 1834. 
 
 Prince, 
 
 This will probably be the last despatch that I shall send 
 you, relative to the events of the Portuguese war, for behold ! 
 this war, which, only a few days ago, was looked upon as 
 interminable, has come 'to ain end, as if by magic ! You are the 
 real conqueror in this affair. The treaty has done it all. The 
 co-operation of the Spaniards no doubt produced some effect, 
 but had it not been known that we were behind them, like a 
 reserve corps, the Miguelites^ would certainly not have laid down 
 their arms so promptly. 
 
 1 The civil war had in truth nearly come to an end in Portugal. After the battle 
 of Santarem, February 1 8th, and the repeated successes of Admiral Napier and the 
 Comte de Villaflor in the North, the Miguelist troops were completely disorganised. 
 The Spanish intervention still further hastened matters. Dom Miguel, completely 
 beaten near Thomar (May 1 6th), retired on Evora, where he was shut up and obliged 
 to capitulate unconditionally, May 26th. Don Carlos, who had joined forces with him, 
 shared the same fate. The following day, May 27th, Dom Pedro proclaimed a general 
 amnesty. Don Carlos was released and permitted to retire without any conditions : 
 he embarked at Aldea Gallega together with his family and came to England. As for 
 Dom Miguel, he was obliged to sign an engagement to quit the Peninsula, in con- 
 
 T 2 
 
276 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 The agreement signed by the Secretary of the British Lega- 
 tion in Portugal and Dom Pedro's generals, relative to Don 
 Carlos, does not impose on that prince any of the conditions 
 required of Dom Miguel. This greatly displeases the Cabinet 
 here, which had just made a request, that before allowing the 
 Spanish pretender to embark, the signatories of the Convention 
 of April 22nd should decide the place where he would be 
 permitted to live. Such a wish was perhaps hardly in accord- 
 ance with this Convention ; nevertheless, here they fully hoped it 
 would be granted. Now they fear that it may be too late, but if 
 they do not receive satisfaction on this point, they will only insist 
 all the more on the necessity of obliging Don Carlos to give the 
 same pledges as Dom Miguel, before receiving the pension 
 which has been assured him. This is easier of compliance, but 
 it is not all : the Spanish Cabinet at the same time proposes that 
 its allies should declare, that, if the same circumstances which 
 rendered their union necessary for the purpose of pacifying the 
 Peninsula, should recur, the treaty would immediately resume 
 all its strength and vigour. 
 
 M. Martinez de la Rosa has hastily drawn up and addressed 
 a Note to me and Mr. Villiers, in which the three points I have 
 indicated are dealt with, the whole tenor being to ask France 
 and England to assure to Spain the guarantees which she 
 considers indispensable for her future tranquillity. I should like 
 to have sent you this document, on which your Highness and 
 Lord Palmerston will have to deliberate, but I am obliged, for 
 want of time, to ask you to request that minister to let you 
 see it. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, June ith, 1834. 
 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 .... I was only able to see Lord Palmerston for a 
 few moments this morning, but long enough nevertheless to 
 speak to him about the resumption of the scheme to provide by 
 some special measure for the contingent succession to the Belgian 
 throne. He admitted, that after having at first entered into 
 King Leopold's views on this subject, he had given in to the 
 opinion that an indefinite adjournment of this question was 
 
 sideration of which, he received a pension of 375,000 francs. After Dom Pedro's 
 death, the Portuguese Cabinet took very stringent measures against the claimant. He 
 was declared to have forfeited all his civil and political rights, and any attempt on his 
 part to return to Portugal was to be punished by death within twenty-four hours. 
 The Cortes however refused to ratify whatever was too Draconian in these 
 measures. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 277 
 
 preferable. He promised me he would to-morrow, in accordance 
 with this, transmit instructions to Sir Robert Adair. He more- 
 over showed me a letter, dated the 3rd, which he had just 
 received from that Ambassador, which stated in a few lines, that 
 the adjournment we wish, appears to have been adopted by the 
 Brussels Cabinet. 
 
 I have the honour, M. le Comte, while sending you a copy of 
 the Note in which Lord Palmerston proposes to communicate 
 to the diplomatic' body here the treaty of the quadruple alliance, 
 to inform you that this communication was to have been made 
 at once. This however has not been done, and in accordance 
 with the opinion expressed by the Crown lawyer, the English 
 Cabinet has resolved to keep back the publication of this treaty, 
 until it has received the fresh ratifications from Lisbon. If there 
 is still time, I think it would be as well for you also to sus- 
 pend the publication, to which I was wrong to pledge you 
 prematurely. 
 
 I may tell you that the English Squadron which quitted 
 Malta, has received no other instructions than to proceed to the 
 coast of Smyrna, where it habitually takes up its station in 
 summer. 
 
 Letters have been received here to-day from Lisbon, dated 
 May 27th, which state that the Infant Don Carlos will not 
 embark in the same vessel as the Infant Dom Miguel. It appears 
 that the former of those two princes has asked to be taken to 
 Plymouth and thence to Holland. 
 
 The new ministers, Lord Auckland,^ Mr. Spring-Rice,^ and 
 Mr. Ellice,' kissed hands at the King's lev^e this morning. 
 
 The success of the Ministry in the House of Commons on 
 Monday * has not yet completely reassured the public mind. 
 Lord Grey himself is not free from grave anxiety, which is plainly 
 traceable in his speeches and in the letter he wrote to the 
 
 ' Lord Auckland was in the preceding Cabinet, as President of the Board of 
 Trade. 
 
 "^ Thomas Spring- Rice, bom in 1790, entered the House of Commons in 1820, 
 was Under-Secretary in the Home Office in 1827. In 1830, he was Secretary to the 
 Treasury in Lord Grey's Cabinet, and in 1834, Minister of the Colonies. In 1835, he 
 was made Chancellor of the Exchequer. He retired in 1839, and was created a peer 
 under the title of Baron Monteagle. 
 
 * Edward EUice, bom in 1 781, an English manufacturer and statesman. After 
 holding several important posts in the Hudson's Bay Company, he entered political 
 life, was elected member of the House of Commons in 1830, was made 
 Secretary to the Treasury in the Grey Cabinet, then Secretary of War from June till 
 November 1834. In 1836 he was sent on a special mission to Paris. After this he 
 retired into private life until his death (1869). 
 
 * This was the sitting at which Mr. Ward's motion was discussed (see pages 271 
 and 272). It was rejected after LordjAlthorp's speech on the previous question, by 
 396 votes against 1 20. 
 
278 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 deputation of 1 50 members of the House of Commons, who had 
 sent him a petition, urging him to continue in the Ministry. 
 Accept. . . . 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, June nth, 1834. 
 
 MON Prince, 
 
 It seems to us here, that Sir John Grant^ has been very- 
 officious and very prompt with regard to Don Carlos. If he had 
 allowed him to be threatened twenty-four hours longer by Rodil, 
 we should have got him to agree to a Convention, similar to that 
 subscribed to by Dom Miguel. 
 
 Anyhow, the treaty has well attained its object — the expulsion 
 of both Pretenders ; and it appears to us that, with the excep- 
 tion of some written undertakings, Don Carlos is in exactly the 
 same position as Dom Miguel. 
 
 It was not possible to fix their future residence in a treaty ; it 
 is better to do this in a supplementary treaty. As for making 
 the treaty permanent, I hear that Martinez de la Rosa desires 
 it as a perpetual moral restraint on the partisans of Don Carlos ; 
 but we must not take upon ourselves the necessity or obligation 
 of a continued intervention ; that would become very troublesome. 
 Rayneval and Villiers however seem to agree that something 
 further will have to be done. If they wish this in London we 
 shall make no objection, but we should not like it to result in any 
 fresh obligations on our part outside the terms of the treaty, of 
 which you have so admirably attested the fitness and calculated 
 the effects. 
 
 The Due de Frias received instructions to press the matter 
 on us, but I simply replied this morning, that it was a matter 
 which must be settled in London. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, /k«£ iztk, 1834. 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 .... I thoroughly understand the necessity under which 
 the King's Government finds itself, of having to refute the 
 attacks of some of the French papers, with respect to the 
 exchange of the ratifications of the treaty of April 22nd. It 
 
 ' Sir John Grant (1804-1850) was Secretary of Legation in Portugal. He acted 
 as Chargi d Affaires in Lord Howard de Walden's absence. The conditions of the 
 capitulation of Evora had been discussed in a Conference between him, the General 
 in command of the Miguelist troops, and the Comte de Saldanha. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 279 
 
 could not act differently, and I do not think it will cause any 
 inconvenience to the English Government ; no remark whatever 
 has as yet been made to me on this subject, and I am quite able 
 to reply to any that may be brought forward. 
 
 I had the honour to transmit to you the day before yesterday, 
 the same day on which I received it, a copy of the Note 
 addressed to Lord Palmerston by the Marquis de Miraflores. I 
 had not time to think over and decide what reply should be sent 
 to this Note, neither was I able to talk to Lord Palmerston 
 about it ; we were only able to discuss it yesterday.^ 
 
 I pointed out to him that we ought not to reply to this 
 communication from the Spanish Government, except by refus- 
 ing to mix ourselves up in the matter he brings to our notice ; 
 that, being in no way bound to this question by the treaty of 
 April 22nd, there would, in my opinion, be something very 
 objectionable, in the French and English Governments wishing to 
 decide the future fate of the Infants Don Carlos and Dom 
 Miguel, after they have been expelled the Peninsula. 
 
 These two Princes are now in exactly the same position re- 
 specting Spain and Portugal, as all the other pretenders with regard 
 to the countries to which they claim a right. England, France, and 
 Sweden, have not asked the other Powers for guarantees against 
 the pretenders who might disturb them, and if the Spanish and 
 Portuguese Governments think they have just cause to dread 
 the two Infants in future, it is for the Cortes to ask for 
 rigorous measures against any attempts that these Princes might 
 make which would be of a nature to disturb the tranquillity of the 
 Peninsula. 
 
 I think Lord Palmerston shares my views on this question. 
 He will however ascertain the opinions of his Cabinet, and I for 
 my part will await the instructions which I have the honour to 
 request you will send me. 
 
 Madame Adelaide to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 IvuJERl^S, June iiih, 1834. 
 
 P.S. My brother has just told me of the idea they have in Spain, 
 of making a fresh declaration, in connection with the treaty of 
 the quadruple alliance. According to his view, if we want to 
 preserve its strength and effect, nothing should be said, especially 
 
 ^ The Madrid Cabinet would have liked the signatory Powers of the treaty of 
 April 22nd to agree, that the two exiled Princes, Don Carlos and Dom Miguel, should 
 be interdicted from returning to the Peninsula, and if need be, that their persons 
 should be secured ; this was the object of the step taken by M de Miraflores. 
 
28o THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 at a time when its efficacy has been so conspicuously proved, and 
 we must abstain from all confirmatory or explanatory declara- 
 tions, for any such action would invalidate instead of consolidate it, 
 and might, moreover, be attributed to regret that the affair should 
 have been settled without the need of troops or French armies, or 
 to a desire to make use of pretexts for sending them later on. 
 
 He directs me to tell you that he spoke about it yesterday 
 with Lord Granville, who seems quite satisfied with the arrange- 
 ments which our beloved King explained to him, which was all 
 the more satisfactory, said the King, because at Madrid a little 
 hitch has occurred in the matter which each delay makes more 
 difficult to remove. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 ijysnTxysi, June i-^th, 1834. 
 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 I have the honour to send you a telegraphic despatch 
 together with this ; it tells you of Don Carlos' arrival at Ports- 
 mouth, about which, as yet, I have no further details to give you. 
 
 I have this morning received the despatch which you did me 
 the honour to write on the i ith, and I hastened to see Lord 
 Palmerston and Lord Grey to confer with them on the various 
 points mentioned therein. They had received letters from Mr. 
 Villiers, which were quite in accord with M. de Rayneval's 
 despatch, of which you kindly sent me a copy. Both ministers, 
 therefore, were fully informed as to the wishes and claims of the 
 Spanish Government when I went to see them. 
 
 We entered thoroughly into the question as to what it was 
 possible to do under the circumstances, and I was soon able to 
 perceive that your prognostications had been verified, and that the 
 English Government did not wish to go beyond the stipulations 
 of the treaty of April 22nd. Lord Palmerston told me positively, 
 that when the new ratifications of this treaty are once exchanged, 
 he would consider the treaty as completed in its execution as well 
 as in its form, and that he did not think the action of England ought 
 to extend further than the engagements entered into by the act 
 of April 22nd. He added that he intended to reply to M. de 
 Miraflores' Note, and to the request sent to Mr. Villiers by 
 M. Martinez de la Rosa, stating that the English Government 
 could not intervene in the questions submitted to it, and if the 
 Spanish Government considered that it had any engagements to 
 carry out with the Infant Don Carlos, they must instruct a Spanish 
 negotiator to treat directly with the Prince. 
 
 In accordance with the instructions you have done me the 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 2B1 
 
 honour to send, I did not think I ought to urge the demands of 
 Spain upon the two English ministers; I therefore confined 
 myself to telling them I should inform you of my conversation 
 with them. 
 
 My opinion, of which you will have been able to judge from 
 my despatch of yesterday, Monsieur le Comte, quite agrees, I 
 confess, with that of Lord Grey and Lord Palmerston, and if I 
 regret, with you, that some more positive conditions were not 
 laid upon Don Carlos, I am no less persuaded that now that 
 Prince can only be dealt with by agreement. 
 
 M. DE Rayneval to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Madrid, June i^lh, 1834. 
 Prince, 
 
 The Queen Regent desires to show her gratitude to 
 you for the treaty of April 22nd. M. de Florida-Blanca has 
 therefore been directed to send you, in her name, the insignia of 
 the order of Charles III. I feel highly honoured by becoming in 
 this way your brother in chivalry ; but as it is wrong to deprive 
 any one of what belongs to them, I must state that this royal 
 decision was not in any way owing to me. The honour is due 
 alone to M. Martinez de la Rosa, if it is not entirely her 
 Majesty's own idea. 
 
 That minister receives also the same decoration. 
 
 I have to thank you for sending me the documents relative 
 to the Portuguese ratifications. Has there been gross ignorance 
 or bad faith .■' Fortunately, the speedy conclusion of the sad 
 drama played in Portugal removes any occasion for investigating 
 this question. You will have noticed that the amnesty arranged 
 at Evora-Monto, is almost identical with that drafted by you in 
 London. 
 
 The Spanish troops have already returned to Spain ; they 
 are being sent towards Biscay. It is to be desired, though one 
 can scarcely hope for it, that on their approach, the insurgents will 
 throw down their arms, as did the Miguelites. If this should be 
 so, it will be another miracle effected by the treaty. 
 
 We have to-day learnt the success gained by the ministry in 
 the House of Commons. It is a good omen. Here, as with us, 
 nothing is talked of but the elections. Heaven grant that they 
 may be satisfactory in both countries ! 
 
 I believe that the Comte de Toreno^ will continue to be 
 Minister of Finance. 
 
 ^ Jose Maria Queipo e Llano, Comte de Toreno, Spanish statesman and historian. 
 Born in 1786, became one of the leaders in the War of Independence in 1808 in the 
 
282 the memoirs of prince talleyrand. 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, June i6th, 1834. 
 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 .... I have seen with pleasure that the King's 
 Government has adopted a course with respect to the last 
 proposals of the Madrid Cabinet, quite in accordance with 
 the views of the English Ministry. You will have seen by 
 my last despatches, that with regard to this I have always 
 confined myself within the bounds you prescribed for me, 
 and within which I continue to think we shall do well to hold 
 ourselves. 
 
 I made known to M. de Miraflores, in reply to the Note he 
 addressed to me, the opinion I had the honour to express to you 
 in my despatch No. 63, and as the Spanish minister had 
 received a similar reply from Lord Palmerston, he has decided 
 to go down to Portsmouth in order to negotiate directly with 
 Don Carlos. 
 
 The offers he was directed to make to this Prince in the 
 name of his Government, consisted of a pension of thirty 
 thousand pounds sterling, in return for which the Infant was to 
 undertake similar engagements to those subscribed to by Dom 
 Miguel. Further, the Spanish claimant was not to live at Rome, 
 as it was feared that his presence there just now might exercise 
 a baneful influence on the Papal Government, already so badly 
 disposed towards Spain. 
 
 M. de Miraflores started on his mission the day before 
 yesterday, and Lord Palmerston on his part sent Mr. Backhouse, 
 one of the under secretaries at the Foreign Office, to Portsmouth ; 
 the latter is directed to offer Don Carlos any assistance that it is 
 in the power of the English Government to give him, always 
 excepting a monetary loan, as to which this Government 
 is perfectly immovable. He was at the same time to sound the 
 Infant as to his views respecting M. de Miraflores' proposals. 
 It was thought that the refusal of a monetary loan was the best 
 support the English Cabinet could give the Spanish negotiator, 
 for it was supposed that the Infant and his suite, composed of 
 about sixty persons, would be utterly without resources. 
 
 This was not so however, and Mr. Backhouse has just 
 
 Asturias, and was elected to the Cortes at Cadiz : proscribed in 1814, he took refuge 
 in France, returned to Spain a few years later, was elected Deputy in 1820, but had 
 again to expatriate himself in 1823. He was made Minister of Finance in 1833, and 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs and President of the Council in 1835, but retired at the 
 end of a month. He died in Paris in 1843. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 283 
 
 informed Lord Palmerston that Don Carlos did not intend to 
 continue his journey just now ; that, on the contrary, he wished 
 to disembark at once and remain in England for some time. He 
 does not desire to hear anything of M. de Miraflores' proposals ; 
 according to what he says, he does not mean to give up any- 
 thing and will never cease to prosecute his rights ; he will not 
 consent to receive a penny on condition of submitting to any 
 restrictive engagement whatever. 
 
 Lord Palmerston attributes the Infant's resistance to the 
 counsels of the Princess de Beira and the Bishop of Leon, both 
 of whom are on board the Donegal ; and without concealing from 
 ourselves the bad effect this will have on the insurgents in the 
 north of Spain, there is not much importance to be attached 
 to it. 
 
 After Don Carlos' reply to Mr. Backhouse, the Marquis de 
 Miraflores gave up the idea of seeing the Prince, to whom he 
 wrote a letter, enclosing the draft of the compromise — copies of 
 which I forward herewith — and returned to London. 
 
 Don Carlos has sent for M. de Sampayo, who acted as Dom 
 Miguel's consul general, and requested him to take a house for him 
 at Portsmouth for a fortnight, and then to look out for a country 
 seat for him near London. But the most remarkable thing, 
 and which seems a positive fact, is, that the Infant has a credit 
 of one million francs, (which has been sent by M. de Blacas,) in the 
 hands of M. de Saraiva, Dom Miguel's minister in London. One 
 must conclude from this, that everything was prepared in case of 
 accidents, and that Don Carlos intends to live in England for 
 some time. Of course it is quite understood that the English 
 Government will make no objection to this ; it even looks upon 
 this decision with some favour, in the belief that it will be easier 
 to keep an eye on his movements, and the intrigues of his 
 partisans. 
 
 The news of the republican revolution in Lisbon, so pomp- 
 ously announced in some of the papers, was nothing but a stock- 
 jobbing fraud, arising out of some shouting in the theatre, when 
 Dom Pedro was present, against his Government, for having 
 allowed Dom Miguel to escape. I do not know whether such a 
 violent spirit of animosity on the part of the Portuguese people 
 justifies the decree, in consequence of which all the convents in 
 Portugal and in the Portuguese possessions are abolished. This 
 decree, however useful it may be in itself, seems to me to have 
 been issued too hastily, and may be the cause of fresh troubles 
 in the country ; the Government, barely established, has at any 
 rate committed an imprudence in provoking the whole of the 
 clergy, now united in their hatred against it, and it is impossible 
 
284 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLE YRAND. 
 
 not to recognise in this fresh act of Dom Pedro, the bad feeling 
 which has influenced him for the last two years. 
 
 The immediate arrival in England of the Due de Palmella 
 has been announced ; he is coming from Lisbon with Admiral 
 Parker, who retires from the command of the Tagus station, 
 where he will be succeeded by Sir William Gage.i 
 
 Some people say that the Due de Palmella's journey is only 
 on private affairs, but it is difficult to believe that political 
 reasons do not occasion it. 
 
 Lord Palmerston to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Stanhope Street, /«w« idth, 1834. 
 MoN CHER Prince, 
 
 Backhouse informs me that Don Carlos does not wish 
 to continue his journey just now, and that, on the contrary, he 
 wants to disembark at once with the intention of remaining here 
 " some time." As for Miraflores' proposals, he will not hear them 
 mentioned ; he renounces nothing, he will never cease to prose- 
 cute his rights, and he will not accept a single penny on the 
 condition of remaining quiescent. It seems that his courage has 
 risen wonderfully, since he finds the Bay of Biscay between him- 
 self and Rodil. 
 
 All this is natural enough, and of no great importance. The 
 only result will be, that Spain will save thirty thousand pounds 
 a year, and that her interior tranquillity will not be disturbed in 
 the least. . . . Ever yours. 
 
 Palmerston. 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, June iZth, 1834. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 Rouen ^ writes to me on the 28th May, that the 
 English squadron was at Nauplia, and that it YidLd fifteen hundred 
 troops on board and six field pieces. The admiral spoke of 
 going towards the Dardanelles, but was still waiting for a few 
 days for orders from Malta. 
 
 This half measure appears singular to me, but is quite in 
 accordance with the language held by Lord Ponsonby at Con- 
 stantinople up to the 30th of May. I am inclined to think that 
 
 ' Sir Williairi Hall Gage, bom in 1777, entered the Navy at 29, and had a 
 most brilliant career. He was made Lord of the Admiralty [in 1841, was promoted 
 to the rank of admiral in 1862, and died in 1865. ■ 
 
 ^ Baron Rouen was at that time French minister in Greece. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 285 
 
 he has since modified this language, and that he has even 
 advised the admiral not to assemble his fleet on the coast of 
 Asia. In any case, however, Russia will use this as a pretext to 
 remain under arms, and we shall be perpetually thwarted. 
 
 A Russian, named Mayenvorth, who is in business here, tells 
 every one that he has received the assurance from Medem, 
 that if another English vessel enters the Mediterranean, the 
 Russians will go to the Bosphorus. We know that their 
 maritime position in the Black Sea is only guaranteed by the 
 castles in the Bosphorus, for Sebastopol is not properly fortified 
 on the sea-front. 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, June 22,rd, 1834. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 Sainte-Aulaire informs me that there has been a great 
 stir in Vienna on account of the appearance of the English 
 squadron in the Archipelago. Pozzo was greatly excited about 
 it, and I am quite exhausted with my endeavours to get him to 
 see the matter in its true light — a naval cruise which a new 
 admiral thought it his duty to make, without any political object. 
 At least, I suppose this is so. 
 
 Swiss matters are getting complicated. Rumigny^ is not 
 always wise. The Sardinian minister told me yesterday, that, 
 his Cabinet having declared themselves satisfied with the lan- 
 guage of the deputation, everything was going on smoothly, 
 when a fresh Note arrived which revived the whole question.^ 
 
 We have written to Egypt, telling them that they must fulfil 
 the engagements entered into with the Porte, and so remove all 
 pretexts. All this stir will end in giving the Russians an excuse 
 for remaining under arms in the Black Sea, and so checkmate us 
 in that quarter. Our elections are going on satisfactorily ; of 
 the three hundred nominations already known, the opposition 
 have lost twenty-four, all well filled. We shall have two 
 legitimists at Marseilles.^ 
 
 1 The Comte de Rumigny was at that time French minister in Switzerland. 
 
 ' A Swiss deputation waited upon the King of Sardinia, during a journey which 
 that prince was making in Savoy, in order to express the regrets of the Swiss Govern- 
 ment for the unfortunate skirmish of February last (see page 259). The King 
 received them very graciously, which however did not prevent the Swiss Cabinet from 
 addressing a Note to the Directory on the 20th of June, to complain of the insufficient 
 measures taken by the police. 
 
 3 The general elections of June 22nd, resulted in a greatly reduced republican 
 opposition. On the other hand, the legitimists, who had not been at all represented in 
 the preceding Chamber, gained twenty seats. 
 
286 the memoirs of prince talleyrand. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, June 26ih, 1834. 
 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 I went to see Lord Palmerston this morning and have 
 just had a long talk with him ... on the various points touched 
 on in your despatch. 
 
 He admitted that Sir Robert Morier,i while sharing the views 
 which guided our embassy in Switzerland, was nevertheless not 
 quite in accord with M. de Rumigny in the course he had just 
 adopted. Sir Robert Morier thinks that it will need great 
 prudence and skill to maintain the Helvetian Diet in the position 
 which it has taken up, with regard to the neighbouring Powers. 
 
 Lord Palmerston, while making the most of Sir R. Morier's 
 narrative, nevertheless told me that he quite saw how important 
 it was, that England and France, under present circumstances, 
 should show they were of one mind on all questions. He wishes 
 you to be convinced that as regards this, he fully appreciates 
 the reasons detailed in your despatch. 
 
 He also gave me the assurance, that he would not only write 
 to Switzerland, but also to the English ministers at Turin, 
 Stuttgard, and Munich, directing them to make such repre- 
 sentations as we desire to the Governments to which they are 
 accredited. 
 
 As he thought that, according to Lord Minto's reports, M. 
 Ancillon especially, had adopted quite erroneous ideas respecting 
 Swiss affairs, he suggested also, sending such observations to 
 Berlin as he hoped would produce a good effect. I believe that 
 the instructions I have just referred to, which Lord Pal- 
 merston is sending to the various ministers, will be sent off by 
 courier to-morrow. . . . 
 
 .... He (Lord Palmerston) showed me Lord Ponsonby's 
 last despatches, which are almost identical with those from our 
 own ambassador. I could not fail to see that the news con- 
 tained in these despatches much engrossed the English Govern- 
 ment. . . . 
 
 .... I obtained Lord Palmerston's promise that he would 
 send instructions to Alexandria, directing that Mehemet Ali 
 should be given to understand that he must put an end to his 
 unreasonable demands upon the Porte. It will not be easy to 
 make the Viceroy listen to reason on the question of the arrears 
 claimed by the Sultan, as it appears that nothing was put in 
 
 ' Sir Robert Morier, an English writer and diplomat, bom in 1790, was at that 
 time minister in Switzerland. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 287 
 
 writing on this subject in the Convention of Kutaya, and every- 
 thing relating to the arrears was arranged verbally ; but Colonel 
 Campbell will be instructed to insist on this point, as well as 
 with regard to the districts of which Ibrahim demands the 
 surrender. 
 
 I asked Lord Palmerston to give me some fresh information 
 respecting the movements of the English fleet in the Archipelago, 
 and he gave me the same reply I had the honour to transmit 
 to you a short time ago. England, he said, considers it necessary 
 for her safety in the present state of the east to keep a fleet in 
 the Archipelago. 
 
 This fleet, which winters at Malta, goes through a course of 
 naval manoeuvres every summer, and no change has been made 
 this year in the usual custom. Moreover, the English Govern- 
 ment would be very pleased to see itself freed from the heavy 
 expense entailed by maintaining this fleet, which would no 
 longer be required, if an end were put to the intrigues which 
 disturb the east. 
 
 The last despatches received from Lisbon, dated the 9th, 
 afiirm that the errors in the Portuguese ratifications of the 
 treaty of 22nd April, were not caused by bad faith, and that 
 we shall immediately receive fresh ones, as full and complete 
 as we have a right to demand. 
 
 London, July 6th, 1834. 
 
 I had the honour to inform you in my last despatch, that I 
 should make -use of the observations you had made to me, as to 
 the effect produced among several of the Cabinets by the move- 
 ments of the English fleet in the Mediterranean. 
 
 I saw Lord Palmerston for some time yesterday, and after 
 acquainting him with your views and the particulars contained 
 in Admiral Roussin's despatch, I thought I ought again to 
 attack him openly on the Eastern question, which, with good 
 reason, occupies the attention of all the Cabinets just now. After 
 going through all the various phases of this question with him, I 
 succeeded in proving that, in my opinion, France and England 
 could now only take one of the two following courses : they must 
 either adopt the measures recommended by Admiral Roussin, 
 and attack the Russian maritime establishments in the Black 
 Sea, and this meant war, or they must continue to do all in 
 their power to maintain the general peace, and in that case, they 
 ought as much as possible to avoid all half measures, all causes 
 for disquietude to the other Powers, and adhere to a firm but 
 moderate and conciliatory line of conduct. 
 
288 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLE YRAND. 
 
 I put on one side the first proposition, which it was not 
 necessary to discuss just now, and which moreover would first 
 have to be preceded by an offensive treaty of alliance between 
 England and France. 
 
 I therefore confined myself to discussing the second proposi- 
 tion, and reiterated the considerations which I had already 
 entered into in my previous conversations, respecting the move- 
 ments of the English fleet in the Mediterranean. I said that 
 these movements could not fail to have a very dubious effect on 
 the St. Petersburg Cabinet, that in reality they were only a 
 demonstration, the issue of which was perfectly plain, and that 
 in all these sort of things a half measure without any results did 
 more harm than good. 
 
 Finally, looking at the question from a purely French point 
 of view, I gave Lord Palmerston to understand that the King's 
 Government, having constantly to reply, to the questions of the 
 Austrian, Prussian, and Russian representatives in Paris, with 
 respect to the matter we were then discussing, could not help 
 feeling some uneasiness about any enterprise in the Black Sea, 
 which France would have to answer for on the Rhine ; that we 
 considered that a purely defensive treaty between ourselves 
 and England, would serve much more effectually to intimidate 
 Russia than naval cruises ; that we had been compelled to 
 abandon that measure because just now the English Cabinet 
 objected to it, but that that Cabinet must not in its turn be sur- 
 prised if we acted with caution and reserve in an affair, the 
 results of which were so important to us ; that if, for instance, 
 we should not think it necessary to send our fleet to the Archi- 
 pelago this year (and with regard to this I knew nothing of the 
 views of our Government), the English Government would have 
 to accept in explanation, the efforts we were already making in 
 keeping up a large land army. 
 
 Lord Palmerston began by expressing his regrets at the 
 difficulties which had hitherto stood in the way of, and were 
 still opposed to, concluding the treaty of which I had so often 
 spoken to him. 
 
 From the way in which he explained matters, I was enabled 
 to see, as I have already had the honour to write to you, that 
 these difficulties did not come from him, but that they arose in 
 the Cabinet. I should not even be greatly surprised if the 
 English Government were, before very long, to come round and 
 consent to form a treaty, the advantages of which are so self- 
 evident. 
 
 Then referring to my observations on the uselessness of the 
 movements of the English fleet. Lord Palmerston brought for- 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 289 
 
 ward the considerations I mentioned in my last despatch, which 
 tended to prove that the anxiety manifested by Russia and 
 Austria, sufficiently testified to the importance attached by those 
 Powers to the naval demonstrations of England ; he is still 
 fully convinced of the efficacy of these demonstrations, and I 
 doubt the English fleet being recalled before the end of the 
 autumn. 
 
 Lord Palmerston however admitted that the account I had 
 just given him of the peculiar position occupied by France, 
 was quite correct, and that we might have reasons for not acting 
 in the same way as England under such circumstances, and 
 reciprocally. I thought the essential point for us would be to 
 preserve our liberty of action in this affair ; for this reason, I 
 asked him plainly whether his Government desired that our fleet 
 should also go to the Archipelago this year. 
 
 He replied, that however satisfactory such a movement on 
 our part might be for the sake of general effect, his Government 
 did not actually ask for it. The discussion ended with this 
 question. Monsieur le Comte, and the result of my conversation 
 shows me that England is determined just now to keep her 
 men-of-war in the Mediterranean, but that we are in no way 
 obliged to follow her example. 
 
 I will insist on this latter point, as I believe that as a matter 
 of fact our fleet in the Mediterranean could not without some 
 inconvenience, come out during this present season. 
 
 The English Cabinet will have no cause to complain, as it 
 did not formally ask us to send our vessels to sea, and more- 
 over, we are keeping up a very large army which would be a 
 heavy weight in the scale, if, later on, an open rupture in the 
 East should supervene. It would at any rate be an equivalent 
 to the English fleet, for there is no doubt that then there would 
 be war on the Rhine as well as in the Black Sea. 
 
 This reason, which quite justifies us as far as England is 
 concerned, ought not, I think, to be less powerful with the 
 Chambers and public opinion in France. 
 
 We may also hope, that the northern Cabinets will feel 
 themselves somewhat indebted to us for having avoided a course 
 which is superfluous to demonstrate the union of England 
 and France, now so fully proved to the eyes of all Europe. 
 
 London, /w/y -^th, 1834. 
 
 .... I have learnt with great satisfaction that Swiss affairs 
 have taken a turn for the better; it is to be hoped that the 
 intrigues of the Austrian Cabinet will cease before the positive 
 VOL. V. U 
 
290 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 decisions of the Helvetian Diet. These will no doubt be con- 
 ceived in sufficiently conciliatory terms to enable the Governments 
 of Austria, Sardinia Wurtemberg, and Baden to withdraw 
 decently the extraordinary claims they have put forward. 
 
 You will see that Lord Palmerston has expressed himself 
 to the Austrian Chargi d' Affaires, in such a manner as to 
 convince him that England has not separated herself from us 
 in this question. Lord Palmerston quite realizes, as you so well 
 remarked, M. le Comte, that this is a question involving the 
 principles on which the alliance between France and Great 
 Britain rests. Austria wished to try how far our two Cabinets 
 would put up with her demands ; it was well that she found us 
 very firm in this first attempt. 
 
 I informed Lord Palmerston of the Note which you instructed 
 M. Alleye i to transmit to the Germanic Diet, in reply to 
 that of June I2th. He thanked me for having shown it him, 
 and considers it so thoroughly suitable, that he proposes to make 
 Mr. Cartwright^ reply in almost similar terms. 
 
 Your view of the contest between Comte dArmansperg,* 
 and the other members of the Regency, is fully shared by the 
 English Cabinet, which will continue to support the efforts of 
 Comte d'Armansperg in every way.* I am inclined to think 
 that the King of Bavaria will himself retain the count at the 
 head of the Regency, seeing that he, as well as M. de Gise, his 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, is anxious to keep M. dArmans- 
 perg as long as possible out of Bavaria. 
 
 I have just been informed by the Portuguese minister in 
 London, that the fresh Portuguese ratifications of the treaty 
 of 22nd April, were transmitted to M. le Baron Mortier on the 
 2 1st June. As soon as you have received them, M. le Comte, 
 
 ^ Baron Alleye de Ciprey, at that time French minister to the Germanic Con- 
 federation. 
 
 ' The English minister at the Germanic Confederation. He was previously 
 commissioner of the London Conference at Brussels. 
 
 * Joseph Louis, Comte d'Armansperg (1789-1853) a Bavarian statesman. He 
 was the Bavarian plenipotentiary at the Congress of Vienna in 1814, and was made 
 President of the Council of the Greek Regency in 1832. 
 
 * A Council of Regency had been nominated in Greece, by the King of Bavaria, 
 during the minority of King Otto. It was composed of Comte d'Armansperg, 
 President, Councillor de Maurer, and General Heydeck. Discord very soon broke out 
 in their midst. Comte d'Armansperg was accused of keeping all the power in his own 
 hands, of unduly favouring English interests, and of alienating public opinion by filling 
 all posts with Bavarians. On the 2nd of May, General Heydeck and M. de Maurer 
 attempted a sort of coup d'etat, and immediately after, passed a series of resolutions, 
 which deprived the president of the direction, and of the administration of the Finances 
 of Foreign Affairs. But the King of Bavaria supported M. d'Armansperg and recalled 
 M. de Maurer, who was replaced by M. de Kobell, a Bavarian statesman. General 
 Heydeck was forced to give in, and M. d'Armansperg resumed the Presidency of the 
 Council, together with all the powers he had arrogated to himself. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 291 
 
 will you kindly send the old ones to M. le Chevalier de Lima/ 
 who is instructed to return them to Portugal. I am very glad 
 that this matter has been so happily arranged by the measures 
 we adopted, for it caused us serious embarrassment at the time 
 of the exchanges. 
 
 The Infant Don Carlos has established his whole family in 
 his new house near London. He has been visited there by the 
 minister of the Two Sicilies,^ and a great number of the Tory 
 party. Most of those who have seen him are greatly amazed at 
 his ignorance of his rightful position and interests. He is 
 addressed as King, and his eldest son as Prince of the Asturias, 
 by all those who come to see him. . . . 
 
 I have just received your letter informing me that the King 
 has had the goodness to grant me leave of absence, of which 
 however I shall probably not avail myself until after the closing 
 of Parliament. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 Telegraphic Despatch. London, July glh, 1834. 
 
 Lord Grey and Lord Althorp ^ have tendered their resigna- 
 tions to the King, who has accepted them. The King has 
 summoned Lord Melbourne, who it appears will form the new 
 Cabinet. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, /«/)' i^ih, 1834. 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 For the last few days a report has been spread in 
 London that Don Carlos has left for Spain, but particulars as to 
 this piece of intelligence were so very vague and contradictory, 
 that it was difficult to place any trust in them. Even now that 
 the actual fact is beyond a doubt, there is a variety of opinion as 
 
 1 Louis Antoine d'Abreu e Lima, Vicomte de Carreira, a Portuguese diplomat, 
 bom in 1785, one of the plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Vienna, Secretary to the 
 Legation, and Chargi (P Affaires at St. Petersburg, then minister at the Hague from 
 1824 to 1830. He was accredited to Paris in 1833. 
 
 2 The Comte de Ludolf. 
 
 3 The English Cabinet had been much disturbed ever smce the late changes. 
 When therefore in the month of July, violent debates took place in the House of 
 Commons respecting the coercive Bill for Ireland, Lord Althorp, the Chancellor of 
 the Exchequer, seeing that he no longer possessed the necessary weight to carry the 
 Government measure in the House of Commons, sent in his resignation without even 
 waiting to put this to the test. Lord Grey, who for some months had wished to resign, 
 took advantage of this circumstance to retire from office. 
 
 U 2 
 
292 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 to how it has taken place. Some people maintain that the 
 Infant embarked on board an English vessel, The United- 
 Kingdom, for a port in the north of Spain. This is the report 
 made by the English police ; but on the other hand, the Spanish 
 minister thinks he has proof that the Infant left London the very- 
 same day on which the English papers stated he had been 
 present at the Italian Opera with all his family, that he went to 
 Paris, accompanied by General Moreno and a Frenchman ^ who 
 had organized the whole enterprise, and that from thence the 
 Prince and his two companions had continued their journey 
 towards the Spanish frontier, where the measures taken by 
 M. Colomarde ^ would assure them a free entry into Spain. 
 
 I give you the facts communicated to me by Lord Palmerston 
 and the Marquis de Miraflores, without being able to say which 
 are the true ones, for in affairs of this nature, which rest almost 
 entirely with the police, it is very difficult at first to ascertain the 
 truth. 
 
 The formation of the new English Cabinet is not yet 
 definitely concluded, although it is pretty nearly decided. The 
 King first sent for Lord Melbourne with the view of forming a 
 coalition ministry. This attempt having fallen through, his 
 Majesty made a second appeal to Lord Grey in the hope of 
 inducing him to return to office, but the repeated requests of the 
 King proving ineffectual to overcome Lord Grey's firm resolution 
 to retire, Lord Melbourne has been chosen to I'eplace him as First 
 Lord of the Treasury. It appears that the other members of the 
 Cabinet will continue in their present posts, and at a meeting of 
 the ministers to be held this evening. Lord Melbourne's successor 
 at the Home Office will be decided on. It is also possible that a 
 successor will have to be found for the Marquis of Lansdowne, 
 who, it is said, still intends to resign. Lord Grey has succeeded 
 in persuading Lord Althorp to come in again as Chancellor of the 
 Exchequer, and thus resume his place as leader of the House of 
 Commons. 
 
 London, July I'^th, 1834. 
 
 .... The ministers assembled this evening, for the purpose 
 of completing the arrangements necessitated by the King's choice 
 
 ^ M. Augusts de Saint-Sylvain. 
 
 2 Francois Thadee Colomarde, a Spanish statesman, born in 1775. Was first 
 Secretary to the Council of Castile, then Minister of Justice in 1824. He retained 
 his portfolio until 1832, was an earnest partizan of absolute power, and actively per- 
 secuted the constitutional party. On the death of King Ferdinand, he sided with 
 Don Carlos, and was obliged to retire from o66ce. He took refuge in France, where 
 he for some time served the Pretender's cause ; but he soon withdrew altogether from 
 public life, and retired to Toulouse, where he died in 1842. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 293 
 
 of Lord Melbourne to replace Lord Grey as First Lord of the 
 Treasury. I have just been informed that they have decided to 
 ask Lord Duncannon to replace Lord Melbourne at the Home 
 Office. Lord Duncannon/ who was Commissioner of Woods and 
 Forests, without a seat in the Cabinet, will be succeeded by Sir 
 John Hobhouse,^ who will receive a seat in the Cabinet. 
 
 Lord Melbourne left for Windsor this morning, for the 
 purpose of submitting these propositions to the King, but no 
 doubt is expressed as to their being accepted by his Majesty. 
 
 There will probably be some other less important changes, in 
 consequence of the retirement of Lord Howick,^ Earl Grey's son, 
 who filled the post of under secretary at the Home Office.* The 
 Cabinet may therefore be considered to be reconstituted, and 
 one can now form an opinion as to what it will be. 
 
 I must begin by telling you, M. le Comte, that the changes 
 which have just taken place will in no way affect the present 
 relations between France and England. Lord Duncannon and 
 Sir John Hobhouse have always professed views which ought 
 completely to reassure the King's Government on that point. 
 
 Looking at the present position of the English Ministry as 
 regards its foreign relations, one cannot conceal from oneself that 
 it has sustained an irreparable loss in Lord Grey, whose noble 
 character and well known loyalty inspired both his friends and 
 enemies with confidence. It is difficult to believe that the more 
 advanced and reformatory opinions of the two new members of 
 the Cabinet, can compensate in the eyes of the country and of 
 all Europe for Lord Grey's withdrawal from the high position 
 he occupied. 
 
 I am told by persons, as impartial as it is possible to meet 
 with in the midst of the violence of party spirit, that the succes- 
 sive retirement, during the last few weeks, of Mr. Stanley, Sir James 
 Graham, the Duke of Richmond, the Earl of Ripon, and finally 
 of Earl Grey, has so enfeebled the Ministry that there is but 
 little guarantee for its future duration. One must be more fully 
 
 ^ John William, Baron Duncannon of Bessborough, 1781-1847. 
 
 ° John Cam Hobhouse, bom in 1785, became a member of Pariiament in 1820. In 
 1821, he was Secretary of the War Department, then Secretary of State for Ireland. 
 Commissioner of Woods and Forests in 1834, and President of the India Board in 
 1846. He was created a Peer in 1851 with the title of Lord Broughton, and died in 
 1869. 
 
 ' Henry George Howick,' Earl Grey, bom in 1802, member of the House of 
 Commons in 1826, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1830, then trans- 
 ferred to the Home Office, War Minister and Privy Councillor in 1835. He retired 
 in 1839, but was again Colonial Secretary from 1846 to 1852. He succeeded his 
 father in the House of Lords in 1845, with the title of Earl Grey. 
 
 * A few days later, the Earl of Carlisle, Lord Privy Seal, also sent in his resigna- 
 tion, and was replaced by Loid Mulgrave. The Cabinet, thus reconstructed, lasted 
 until the month of November, at which period the Tories came into power. 
 
294 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 cognisant, than I can be, of the slight divisions which will always 
 exist in the Cabinet, to be in a position to judge how far this 
 opinion is justly founded. What however appears to be beyond 
 any doubt, is, that the necessity they are under of passing the 
 Irish Church Bill in the House of Lords before the end of the 
 session, almost renders a collision between the two Houses 
 (which has for so long been dreaded by the Government) inevit- 
 able. Will a fresh batch of peers be made .' This question, 
 answered affirmatively, might possibly decide some other members 
 of the Cabinet to retire ; answered negatively, it is not easy to 
 see how the Government can go on between the contrary desires 
 of the two Houses. 
 
 I need not remind you, M. le Comte, that my observations on 
 this matter are of a strictly confidential nature, and that it is to the 
 advantage of the King's Government that nothing should be 
 indiscreetly revealed. 
 
 I repeat again, that the English Cabinet, as it has now been 
 reconstructed, will remain well disposed towards France ; this is 
 the main point for us, and must guide our policy until other cir- 
 cumstances, which it would be imprudent to prejudge, place us 
 in a position to alter it. . . . 
 
 P.S. — I have just been informed that the Infant Don Carlos, 
 who was said to have left London on the 2nd of this month, 
 disembarked at a port in Biscay on the 9th, where he was very 
 favourably received. It is said he was only accompanied by one 
 Frenchman. I send you this bit of news, without however guaran- 
 teeing it, for it is impossible in the face of the diverse accounts 
 which succeed each other so rapidly, to gauge the exact truth. 
 This last piece of news has however reached the English Govern- 
 ment, which attaches some confidence to it. This morning M. de 
 Miraflores assured me that he had received positive proof that 
 Don Carlos had traversed France to go to Navarre. 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, July ijtk, 1834. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 The observations contained in your letter, accord per- 
 fectly with the ideas we have formed here as to the composition of 
 the English Cabinet. What chiefly concerns us is, to be assured 
 that the friendly relations between the two countries will be con- 
 tinued. This is very important in the present circumstances. 
 
 We hear from Genoa that, although Dom Miguel did not wish to 
 break the engagement to which he had subscribed, he will soon be 
 so badgered and excited, that he will meditate a return to the 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 295 
 
 Peninsula if the death or the illness of his brother gives him a 
 favourable opening.^ There is no doubt that Don Carlos has sent 
 for him, and is quite ready to- extend to him the same hospitality 
 in Navarre, that he himself received from him in Portugal. 
 
 I read an article in The Globe of the 15 th, which makes some 
 allusions to the results which might arise from the treaty of 
 April 22nd. 
 
 I have little doubt that Spain will make an appeal to us, and 
 1 think, mon Prince, it would be well if you could sound the 
 English Cabinet on this point beforehand. . . . 
 
 • • • • Marshal Soult has this morning sent in his resignation ; ^ 
 that he means it, is certain, and the King is just now trying to 
 persuade Gerard, who still hesitates, dreading the Tribune and the 
 responsibility. I believe he also thinks of the awkwardness of 
 coming in alone ; he spoke of Jacob's feebleness. I do not know 
 whether he has gone any further in his confidential talks with 
 Thiers. I, for my part, am quite ready to facilitate matters, all 
 the more so, that I am alone in my opinion, (which is contrary to 
 the prevailing one) that to make a long opening speech and 
 thereby raise a discussion on the address, will be quite useless, 
 and will only serve to create a disturbance and render foreign 
 questions more difficult to deal with. . . . 
 
 Madame de Dino will be more skilful than Champollion if 
 she deciphers this, but my hand is shaking terribly, as I am 
 slightly feverish to-day. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, July ijth, 1834. 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the 
 copy of a letter which I have just received from the Spanish 
 minister, and which was accompanied by a Note, copy of which 
 is also here enclosed, addressed by that minister to Lord Palmer- 
 ton. This Note, which is a perfect illustration of the thoughtless- 
 ness of a step, taken, I think, somewhat hastily, will necessarily 
 
 ^ Dom Pedro had been ill for some time. He got rapidly worse towards the end 
 of August, and died on the 24th September, at the age of thirty-six. 
 
 ^ There was downright hostility in the Cabinet between Marshal Soult and several 
 of his colleagues, especially M. Guizot and M. Thiers. A sort of conspiracy was 
 organized, to get the Marshal to send in his resignation. He was known to favour 
 military rule in Algeria. M. Guizot and M. Thiers talked of substituting a civil 
 administration. Marshal Soult opposed it, and threatened to retire. He was taken 
 at his word, and his resignation accepted. As for substituting the civil administration, 
 which had served as a pretext in this incident, there was no question of it at this 
 time. 
 
296 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 place the English Government in the position of having to come 
 to an understanding with us, as to the course the London and 
 Paris Cabinets will have to take under the new circumstances in 
 which Spain will be placed. I beg you, Monsieur le Comte, to 
 kindly let me know the intentions of the King's Government 
 with regard to this, and to give me the instructions which it is 
 absolutely necessary I should have in so important a question, 
 one too which is so intimately connected with the interests of 
 France. 
 
 I have simply acknowledged the receipt of this Note to M. 
 de Miraflores, and as it is plain that it is his own work, and that 
 he has not had time to receive orders from his Court, you will no 
 doubt consider that we should wait, before taking any decisive 
 line, until the Spanish Government has enunciated its views 
 directly on this matter. 
 
 I have the honour to send you a copy of the Bill brought 
 into Parliament last session, respecting the execution of the 
 conventions concluded between France and Great Britain for 
 the suppression of the slave trade. 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, July iZtk, 1834. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I am writing from the Council itself: the order, naming 
 Marshal Gerard as successor to Marshal Soult, has just been 
 signed and will appear in the Moniteur to-morrow, together with 
 proper explanations respecting Marshal Soult, whose retirement 
 is, after all, voluntary. 
 
 We have no fresh news from the frontier, except that the 
 troops on both sides are being concentrated, and there is every 
 prospect of a speedy engagement. 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, July 2isi, 1834. 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I need hardly tell you how greatly Don Carlos' 
 arrival in Spain embarrasses us. 
 
 The Queen has rather brought discredit on herself, and her 
 party presents itself between her and her sister — at the head 
 of an army. 
 
 On the other hand, Toreno's financial scheme announces a 
 reduction in the interest on the Spanish rentes. This affects 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 297 
 
 a number of the lower classes in Paris, who are beginning 
 to make a great outcry. 
 
 Under all these different influences, we are on the eve of 
 a public discussion, in which the treaty of April 22nd will play 
 a great part, both owing to what it has promised, what it has 
 already done, and also what it has not been able to prevent. 
 
 Either it exists, or it no longer exists. 
 
 If it does not exist, then we fall back on our former position 
 as regards the Queen's Government, formal recognition and 
 promises of support and aid ; and there is no doubt that we shall 
 be appealed to in that sense with all the more force and even 
 reason, because Don Carlos has traversed the whole of our 
 territory. 
 
 If the treaty exists, there will probably be an appeal to 
 Articles 3 and 4,1 and the step taken by M. de Miraflores is a 
 forerunner of that which the Madrid Cabinet will put in execution. 
 
 It is the principle therefore which we must first decide ; the 
 consequences we can arrange for afterwards. 
 
 You will perceive, mon Prince, how very difficult it will be to 
 draw up first the speech, and then the address. In the discus- 
 sion, we shall not fail to be told that England having arranged 
 her affairs with Portugal, Dom Miguel having gone after signing 
 his renunciation, we have been utilized to pull their chestnuts 
 out of the fire, and have then been left in the lurch, &c. 
 
 And in addition, think of all these Carlist movements on our 
 southern frontier, of a Carlist restoration in Spain, just when 
 Berryer is made a deputy at Toulouse and Marseilles. I already 
 perceive an ill-natured feeling on this subject among the ministerial 
 deputies who have arrived ; and here we shall find both parties 
 in the Chamber leagued together to accuse us of weakness, 
 while at the same time they will prevent our taking any more 
 active steps in the north of the Peninsula, and we shall have to 
 adopt a medium course, changeable and idiotic, and lay ourselves 
 open to all the false ideas of a national dignity, which will blame 
 us for our inaction. 
 
 The King I know, fears the northern Powers ; he dreads a 
 war, he is afraid to enter Spain even for a few steps. I also 
 dread this, but there is quite as much to fear on the other hand. 
 After all, we have not yet received a request from Spain, but 
 before it arrives, I should wish us to be all agreed, so that no 
 fresh divisions may arise in the Cabinet, and I foresee that there 
 will be some on this important subject before very long. 
 
 ^ These were the articles in the treaty which provided for the eventual interven- 
 tion of France and England. The Spanish Cabinet did not make an official appeal 
 till the following year (May 17th, 1835). 
 
298 the memoirs of prince talleyrand. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, July iist, 1834. 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 I had a long talk with Lord Palmerston yesterday 
 relative to Spanish affairs and the fresh complication created by 
 Don Carlos' presence in the revolted provinces. He agreed 
 with me, that the object of the treaty of April 12nd had not been 
 attained, and was very much struck by the remark contained in 
 your despatch No. 63, that the consequences of this treaty should 
 ultimately have turned to the benefit of the Infant, as he now 
 finds himself transported into the midst of his partisans, whereas, 
 before the treaty, all access to the Basque provinces was virtually 
 closed to him. 
 
 I pointed out to Lord Palmerston that if he once admitted, 
 as we did, that the object of the treaty had not been fulfilled, it 
 must also seem necessary to him that some measures should be 
 taken to complete the work which both our Courts had in view 
 when they arranged it. 
 
 " On that point," he said to me, " we are not disinclined to 
 think that something must be done to aid the cause of the Queen 
 of Spain, but in order to determine that something, we must first 
 know the nature of the demands which Madrid will make to 
 London and Paris. We shall send some lightly armed vessels to 
 the northern coast of Spain, to watch the movements of the 
 insurgents ; the presence of our flag in those parts may be of use 
 to the Spanish Government, but that is the only measure we 
 can take, until the Madrid Cabinet asks for more direct assist- 
 ance." 
 
 Lord Palmerston having once admitted that the treaty of 
 April 22nd, though executed in the letter, was not so in principle, 
 and that something would have to be done to complete its execu- 
 tion, I did not insist further, and should even have waited for a 
 positive request to come from Madrid, before speaking again to 
 him about it, when a few hours ago, I received your despatch 
 No. 66. 
 
 After having read it, I thought that its contents were too 
 serious, not to ask Lord Palmerston to confirm what he had told 
 me yesterday, and which was so complete an answer to the 
 questions you put to me. The despatch of vessels by the King's 
 Government to St. Sebastian, Bilboa, Santander, etc., which is 
 quite in accord with the step taken by the English Government, 
 gave me besides the opportunity of reverting to our conversation 
 of yesterday. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 299 
 
 Lord Palmerston did not hesitate to repeat to me what he 
 had said before, namely, that he did not consider that the object of 
 the treaty of April 22nd had been attained, and that both his 
 Government and ours would have to do something to insure the 
 execution of this treaty. I repeat these same words, as they 
 were those used by Lord Palmerston, both yesterday and 
 to-day. 
 
 He informed me besides, that he had just received a second 
 Note from M. de Miraflores, in which the latter renews the 
 requests contained in the first, and draws up some of the 
 stipulations which should be inserted in the new treaty or 
 supplementary convention, which will have to be concluded. 
 
 The Marquis de Miraflores desires, among other things, that 
 an auxiliary Portuguese corps should be sent into Spain, in the 
 same manner as a Spanish corps had pursued the two Pretenders 
 into Portugal. 
 
 Lord Palmerston said that he would send the same reply to 
 this Note that he had done to the former one, declining to take 
 any action in the matter of its contents, until the intentions of 
 the Madrid Cabinet were known, and I suggested quietly, that it 
 was especially important with regard to the entry of Portuguese 
 troops into Spain to know the wishes of the Madrid Cabinet. 
 I think you may now sound M. le Chevalier de Lima on this 
 very delicate point. The measure determined on by the English 
 Government, to send some vessels to the northern coast of 
 Spain, cannot fail to produce a good effect ; for, when carried out, 
 together with that of a similar nature which you mentioned to 
 me, it will show that, from the very commencement we have 
 agreed to support the Queen's cause. 
 
 These, Monsieur le Comte, are the only particulars I am in a 
 position to furnish you with, in reply to your last despatches. 
 
 I will only add one remark, namely, that it is my opinion, 
 the English Government would be much displeased to see any 
 armed intervention on our part in Spain, yet on the other hand, 
 the measures it would agree to adopt to assist the Queen's cause, 
 would probably not suffice ; but all this is of course only hypo- 
 thetical. 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, July i^th, 1834. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 The despatches from Madrid are not very reassuring 
 and do not encourage one to interfere. 
 
 It is as well that you should know that the foreign ministers 
 
300 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 here, who can easily perceive the King's personal views, take 
 advantage of them to inform and encourage Don Carlos ; we 
 have actual proof oi this. In all their private conversations they 
 constantly assert that if we support the Queen by an armed 
 intervention, there will be a general war ; they induce their 
 Courts to send precise Notes on this subject, and declare that 
 they will stop us very quickly. I should therefore like it to be 
 decided either one way or the other, before such language is 
 addressed to us. 
 
 What would suit us best would be that Spain should not 
 ask us for anything, and I have not given any encouragement on 
 this subject to Rayneval. 
 
 The English vessels have quitted Smyrna ; this is as well, for 
 their stay there was a source of perpetual irritation to 
 Constantinople, and nearly the whole of its dragomanate almost 
 entirely to no purpose. 
 
 Madame Adelaide to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Neuilly, July iith, 1834. 
 
 Our beloved King, to whom I read your letter, of which he 
 thoroughly approves, wishes me to give you his views as to the 
 Spanish matter. He will give all the moral support he can to 
 the young Queen's crown, and thus give strength and solidity to 
 her Government. He believes that such moral support will be 
 more efficacious than an armed intervention, he will therefore 
 make every effort to avoid such intervention, but at the same 
 time he knows the vicissitudes of human life too well to pledge 
 himself that it shall never take place ; on the contrary, he wishes 
 it to be known, that he will always be ready, no matter what it 
 may cost him, to take such bold measures as it may seem to 
 him the interests of France, which are the sole motive of his 
 conduct and his thoughts, demand. 
 
 The King desires me also to tell you, that he is quite aware 
 that there are people who consider, that with a body of ten, twelve, 
 or fifteen thousand French troops at the outside, we might carry 
 off Don Carlos, bring him into France, and then withdraw these 
 troops again at once into French territory. The King does not 
 believe in the success of such an attempt, even if it were made. 
 It would be exceedingly difficult to cut off Don Carlos in the 
 mountains or to pursue and take him prisoner. But the King also 
 thinks, that even if it were possible, the name of Don C^^rXos carried 
 off by the French, would be more formidable than his presence, 
 which will become a source of continual embarrassment to his 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 301 
 
 partisans, and especially those who have to guard him. He says 
 that such an abduction would be compared in Spain to that of 
 Ferdinand VII. by Napoleon, and would be even more ad- 
 vantageous than hurtful to his cause. Whereas if Don Carlos' 
 influence is lessened by the action of Spain, and he finds that he 
 has to retire into French territory because Spain will have 
 nothing to do with him, his cause will be lost, and we shall then 
 be able, without any inconvenience, to take such preventive 
 measures against him as will preserve Spain from the dangers to 
 which his return might later on expose her. This, mon cher 
 Prince, is one of the views the King wishes to confide to your 
 discretion, he knows you will only make a good use of it, and 
 he regrets exceedingly not being able to discuss personally 
 with you all his opinions on this very serious and complicated 
 question. 
 
 He begs you will always, at all hazards, keep in view, that as 
 any intervention by France in Spain must necessarily weaken 
 the former on the Rhine and along the Alps ; it would be desired 
 and not dreaded by the northern Powers, and that consequently 
 as it might cause them to make war, France would never think 
 of embarking in such an undertaking, unless England bound 
 herself by an alliance to make common cause with her. 
 
 All this, mon Prince, is under the seal of the most profound 
 secrecy. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, July I'ith, 1834. 
 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 I saw Lord Palmerston yesterday, and after a long con- 
 versation together on the present situation of Spain, I made him 
 see all the difficulties in which this question would involve the 
 King's Government, just at the time when the assembling of the 
 Chambers would oblige him to explain the policy he intended to 
 pursue in the affairs of the Peninsula. I also told him that it was 
 absolutely necessary for us to know the opinion of the English 
 Cabinet, with respect to the value it attached to the treaty of 
 April 22nd, and further, whether after what he, Lord Palmerston, 
 had said to me two days ago, the French Government would be 
 authorized to declare officially, that France and England both 
 recognized that the object of the treaty not having been attained, 
 some fresh measures would have to be adopted to provide for its 
 execution. In conclusion I added, that in the event of the English 
 Government recognizing with us the non-execution of the treaty 
 of April 22nd, it might perhaps be possible to inform me at once, 
 
302 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 and even before we have been asked to give any assistance, what 
 measures England would think of proposing in order to aid the 
 cause of the Queen of Spain. 
 
 Lord Palmerston, to whom I had shown all the reasons 
 which made me anxious to have categorical replies, if not on 
 all points, at least on that relative to the value and importance 
 to be attached to the treaty of April 22nd, promised to 
 submit my observations to the other members of the Cabinet 
 to-day, and I now hasten to transmit to you the result of this 
 conference with his colleagues which he has just communicated 
 to me. 
 
 The English Government thinks that a phrase, somewhat 
 like the following, might be introduced in the speech at the 
 opening of the Chambers. 
 
 " England agrees with us, that the object of the treaty of 
 22nd April has not been attained, and the four Powers signatory 
 thereto are now occupied in deciding the measures which will 
 have to be taken under the present circumstances." 
 
 This, Monsieur le Comte, is the phrase which I drew up with 
 Lord Palmerston and which has his complete approval. The 
 King's Government nevertheless is not obliged to adhere to the 
 actual wording of this phrase, but it could not deviate from the 
 spirit of it without running the risk of going beyond what the 
 English Government would approve. 
 
 As regards the measures to be adopted, Lord Palmerston 
 said that it was impossible to arrange anything until a request 
 had come from Madrid, and that it would be useless just now to 
 discuss the question of an armed intervention on our part in 
 Spain, before the development of events in the Peninsula 
 rendered such an important step imperative. 
 
 I did not wish to insist further, as it seemed to me that for 
 the present the phrase which I have just had the honour to 
 communicate to you, was a sufficient answer to the exigencies 
 experienced by the King's Government. In fact, if a discussion 
 is raised in the Chamber of Deputies as to the results of the 
 treaty of April 22nd, it will be sufficient to state that the 
 signatory Powers have recognized that as the object of the treaty 
 has not been attained, they must consider what further steps 
 should be taken, but that these steps are a matter of nego- 
 tiation, the details of which could not yet be made public. 
 
 I think, M. le Comte, that you will agree with me 
 regarding this, and I shall impatiently await your reply to this 
 despatch. 
 
 I must add, that Lord Palmerston, both in his own name and 
 that of his colleagues, expressed the earnest desire that some 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 303 
 
 phrase in our opening speech should allude to the union of 
 France and Great Britain. It would not, I think, be difficult 
 to include it in that relative to the events in the Peninsula. 
 
 M. TricoupiSj.the Greek minister in London, has informed me 
 of some propositions which had been made to him a few days 
 ago by the new Russian Charge d' Affaires, in the name of his 
 Government. One of these propositions was to induce the Greek 
 Government to ask the three allied Courts for a declaration 
 recognizing the neutrality of the Greek kingdom. M. Tricoupis, 
 while undertaking to transmit this overture to his Government, 
 told me that he had informed the Comte de Medem, that a 
 declaration such as he proposed would undoubtedly oblige his 
 Government, in case of war, to close her ports against French 
 and English vessels. 
 
 The second proposition related to King Otto, whom the 
 Russian Government was anxious to see embrace the Greek 
 religion, or at any rate declare his firm intention to bring up his 
 children in that religion. M. Tricoupis replied that King Otto 
 not having as yet attained his majority, was not obliged to 
 express himself on this point ; that in any case it was a matter 
 of conscience which could not be settled by a treaty, and that as 
 far as the religion of the young King's children was concerned, 
 there was no necessity to trouble about that since he had none, 
 and was not even married. 
 
 I have just seen Lord Palmerston, who informed me of an 
 alteration made at the Cabinet Council, relative to the phrase 
 which [I had the honour to communicate to you, as ex- 
 pressing the opinion of the French and English Governments 
 on the treaty of 22nd April. He told me, that having only 
 consulted a few of his colleagues when he saw me, he had after- 
 wards considered the matter of too serious a nature not to be 
 dealt with by a Cabinet Council and that it was by the general 
 advice of the Council that the new phrase had been modified 
 and sent to Lord Granville to be submitted to you. 
 
 Lord Palmerston read this phrase to me, which appeared to 
 contain, although in a less distinct form, the substance of that I 
 have sent to you. I expressed this view to Lord Palmerston, 
 adding that it was just possible that the King's speech would 
 have already received the sanction of the Ministerial Council, 
 before Lord Granville made his communication to you, 
 and that consequently it would be too late to make any 
 alteration. 
 
 I think I may say that in my opinion there would be no 
 difficulty in keeping to the first draft which I sent you, if you 
 prefer that one. 
 
304 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, August yd, 1834. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I thoroughly understand what has occurred; Palmerston 
 has taken advantage of your absence to do what he would have 
 found very difficult had you been in London. 
 
 However, all this is now finished. Here opinions are greatly 
 divided : some declare we have not said enough, others think we 
 have said too much. 
 
 Dupin is against all armed intervention ; the Journal des 
 D^bats for any sort of armed intervention ; I can only influence 
 it thus far, but cannot keep it silent. 
 
 It is impossible for us to know what Don Carlos and Rodil 
 are doing in their mountain fastnesses. I am rather uneasy as 
 to the designs, not of Rodil himself, but of his surroundings. 
 The massacre of the monks at Madrid ^ has revived the insur- 
 rection, and the conspiracies that have been traced and brought 
 to light at Madrid, show that there are divisions in the Queen's 
 party. 
 
 The accounts from Catalonia are better. I should much like 
 you to send me by special courier. Lord Londonderry's speech 
 in the House of Lords. ^ 
 
 It has occurred just in time for our debates here, which will 
 commence the end of this week. 
 
 ' Some murderous scenes had stained Madrid with blood. The cholera had 
 broken out in the capitaL As in Paris, the populace refused to believe in the malady, 
 and attributed the epidemic to the effect of poison, which they declared had been dis- 
 tributed by the priests. On the 17th of July armed bands attacked the convents in 
 the towns, and massacred most of the priests they found. 
 
 2 Lord Londonderry had given notice that he would bring forward a motion on 
 the affairs of the Peninsula. On the 4th of August, he violently attacked the policy 
 of the Cabinet in the House of Lords. This is what he said of France : 
 
 "As regards the alliance with France, I do not think it is fair to give that country 
 a preference over all the others, and I cannot join in the eulogies so often lavished on 
 the three days of July. 
 
 ", Louis-Philippe governs on the principle of force ; he has filled the provinces and 
 the capital with his troops ; his proclamations and his conduct in general are as 
 arbitrary as those of Charles X., only Louis-Philippe has acted with greater frankness 
 and skill. ... As far as the quadruple treaty is concerned, I can conceive nothing 
 really more base, more atrocious, than the course that has been adopted as regards 
 Portugal in negotiating this treaty. We had pledged ourselves to a positive neutrality, 
 but under the mask of such neutrality, the Government prepared an armed interven- 
 tion in concert with a powerfiil ally. I really think that for a. great nation such 
 conduct is atrocious." 
 
 Lord Londonderry added, that England had gained nothing by this policy, and 
 wound up by demanding " that a humble address should be presented to his Majesty 
 praying him to order that copies of the whole correspondence and of the information 
 which had led to the negotiation and the conclusion of the treaty of April 22nd, 
 might be laid on the table." This motion was rejected by a large majority. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 305 
 
 i^h August. 
 
 Harispe^ writes us that Rodil has gained a decided advantage 
 over Zumalacarreguy : Don Carlos has retreated to our frontier, 
 and Har.ispe has no doubt that he will ere long be forced to 
 recross it. 
 
 Here are the demands from Madrid, duplicates of which 
 have been sent to Lord Palmerston by Villiers and M. de 
 Miraflores. 
 
 An armed intervention finds but little support in the Chamber. 
 The King does not care about a declaration at all, and we could, 
 in fact, consider the phrase in the speech as an equivalent. 
 
 On the other hand, Toreno, with his loan in London and the 
 bankruptcy he has brought on our small landowners, gives us no 
 means of assisting him ; it is said he is reducing the interest to two- 
 fifths. We have written very strongly about this, but Spain wants 
 a bankruptcy, and I fancy she cannot do anything else. This will 
 make Toreno as popular in Madrid as he is the reverse here. 
 
 The Comte de Rigny to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 August i^h, 1834, 9 d clock in the Evening. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 We have just received the following despatch from 
 Bayonne, dated up to to-day : 
 
 " The insurgents have been beaten at all points since the ist. 
 Rodil attacks with great energy." ^ 
 
 I shall receive the details this evening. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Comte de Rigny. 
 
 London, August ith, 1834. 
 Monsieur le Comte, 
 
 I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, the copy 
 of a document of which you are already aware, namely, the Note 
 by which Lord Palmerston replied on the 28th of last month, to 
 the renewed proposals of the Spanish Minister. I send at the 
 
 ^ Jean Isidore, Comte Harispe, born in 1761, served as a volunteer in 1792, 
 became Brigadier-General in 1807, and served specially in Spain. Placed on the un- 
 attached list under the Restoration for having rallied round the Emperor during the 
 Hundred Days, he re-entered the service in 1830 and vifas created a peer of France. 
 He commanded a division in 1834 on the Pyrenean frontier. He was made a Marshal 
 of France in 1851, and died in 1855. 
 
 ' General Rodil had just been placed at the head of a formidable force. On 
 reaching Logrono on the Ebro, he heard of Don Carlos' arrival in the revolted 
 provinces. He determined to do his utmost to secure his person ; he covered the 
 country vi'ith fortified outposts and won signal successes, but the claimant always 
 succeeded in eluding him in the midst of the greatest dangers. 
 
 VOL. V. X 
 
3C36 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 same time a literal translation of the fresh Note which the Marquis 
 de Miraflores has just addressed to Lord Palmerston, and in 
 which he dwells on the different points, which the Spanish Govern- 
 ment is desirous should be inserted in the additional articles of 
 the treaty of April 22nd. 
 
 A similar communication will no doubt have been made to 
 you by M. le Due de Frias, and as it will have engaged your full 
 attention, I shall be greatly obliged, if you will make known to 
 me the intentions of the King's Government, respecting the five 
 new propositions of the Madrid Cabinet. 
 
 The first expresses a desire which has been forestalled by the 
 French Cabinet, and which cannot, consequently, cause any 
 difficulty. I believe that this is equally so with the second,^ and 
 as regards the third, which relates to the entry of a body of 
 Portuguese troops, it does not seem possible that under the given 
 circumstances, we should make any objection. 
 
 But respecting the fourth proposition, I particularly wish to 
 have positive, precise, and fully detailed data. I am not in a 
 position to judge as to the nature, the quantity, or the value of 
 the material assistance with which the King's Government would 
 propose to furnish Spain, and I must therefore ask you, M. le 
 Comte, to send me a fully drawn up and complete article to 
 which I shall have nothing more to add, but to ask for the 
 signature of the other plenipotentiaries. 
 
 I must also beg you to acquaint me with the form you wish 
 given to the species of guarantee and moral support, which is the 
 subject of the fifth proposition of the Spanish Government. 
 
 You can understand, M. le Comte, that these two last points 
 contain questions which I am not in a position to solve, for it 
 requires much more knowledge than I possess, of the resources 
 which the King's Government means to employ in favour of 
 Spain and the extent to which it would pledge itself to take part 
 in the affairs of the Peninsula. 
 
 As it is very probable that my opinion will soon be asked 
 respecting the additional articles that are to be added to the 
 treaty of 22nd April, I venture to beg you will hasten as much 
 as possible, the despatch of the instructions and orders I await 
 from you. 
 
 London, August "jth, 1834. 
 
 I have just had an interview with Lord Palmerston, on the 
 subject of the demands recently made by the Madrid Cabinet to 
 
 ' The first proposition was relative to the measures to be adopted by the French 
 Cabinet on the Pyrenean frontier ; the second to the assistance which England was to 
 furnish to Queen Isabella's Government. 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 307 
 
 the French and English Governments. He acquainted me with 
 the views suggested to him by a close examination of these de- 
 mands, which led him to doubt the possibility of adding any 
 articles to the treaty of April 22nd, or even of making a fresh 
 treaty. In fact, he said, the demands of the Madrid Cabinet 
 touch on points which cannot possibly form the subject of 
 stipulations in a treaty, but are matters of police regulation 
 which every Government is always free to adopt. Thus the 
 French Government has a right to forbid the introduction into 
 Spain, by her land frontier, of any species of assistance in favour 
 of the Spanish insurgents. It can, in concert with the English 
 Government, cause the Spanish coasts to be watched, and prevent 
 the delivery of contraband munitions of war within the limits laid 
 down by the law of nations. But it is not necessary that such 
 measures should be stipulated for in a treaty ; it would even be im- 
 possible to do so, without admitting the rights of neutrals, and 
 consequently, without invalidating in advance all pursuit that 
 would be made of foreign vessels, which might attempt to land 
 arms, ammunition, &c., in Spain, for the insurgents. Without 
 a formal declaration of war by France and England against 
 Don Carlos, which could not reasonably be asked for, it would be 
 very difficult for those two Powers to obtain the recognition by the 
 other Governments of a blockade of the Spanish coasts. It would 
 therefore be much better, that the Spanish Government should 
 declare her ports blockaded, and that the French and English 
 vessels should lend their aid in maintaining this blockade, always 
 acting within the limits assigned them by the rights of neutrals. 
 
 As for the demand for material aid made by the Madrid 
 Cabinet, no treaty is required to satisfy this ; every Government 
 is at liberty in this respect to do what it thinks best, and the 
 aid will be none the less real, that it is given without a 
 treaty. 
 
 Lastly, as regards the official declaration, which the 
 Spanish Government is desirous should be given by the Govern- 
 ments signatory to the treaty of 22nd April, the English Cabinet 
 does not in any way oppose it, but it thinks that such a declara- 
 tion might merely form the subject of a diplomatic Note, which 
 could be made public in Madrid if necessary. 
 
 There can be no question of the entry of Portuguese troops 
 into Spain, since the Cabinet of Madrid has made no mention of 
 this project in the demands it has addressed to the English 
 Government, and has, on the contrary, insisted that the cordon of 
 Portuguese troops, which will assemble on the frontiers of 
 Portugal, shall not be allowed to enter Spain. 
 
 Having gone over these different considerations with Lord 
 
 X 2 
 
3o8 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Palmerston, we arranged to meet the Spanish and Portuguese 
 plenipotentiaries, and invite them to send us a Note containing 
 such demands as may reasonably enter into such a document ; 
 we shall at the same time inform them of our intention to reply 
 to this Note by a counter-note, expressing the opinion of both 
 our Governments on the present situation of the Peninsula, and 
 containing the assurances of our support when circumstances will 
 permit. This counter-note might then be made public in Madrid, 
 and would thus, no doubt, render that moral support to the 
 Spanish Government which it asks of us. 
 
 This, M. le Comte, is the scheme which we have drawn up ; 
 it can be modified, but in any case, it will exempt us from con- 
 cluding a convention or making additional articles to the treaty 
 of April 22nd. 
 
 I shall be particularly obliged, if you will let me hear whether 
 this scheme has met with your approval and that of the King's 
 Government. 
 
 London, August ()th, 1834. 
 
 .... After several conferences between Lord Palmerston, 
 the Spanish and Portuguese Ministers, and myself, in which M. 
 de Miraflores and M. de Sarmento vehemently insisted that the 
 additional articles should be added to the treaty of April 22nd, 
 we have agreed to the draft of an additional convention, which I 
 have the honour to transmit to you. It has received the approval 
 of the English Cabinet. . . . 
 
 I, nevertheless, did not deem it advisable to say that I was 
 ready to sign these additional articles, and stated that I must 
 refer the matter to my Government. 
 
 A careful examination of the project which I send you, M. le 
 Comte, will no doubt convince you, as it did me, that it does not 
 offer any real objection to the King's Government, since it contains 
 no fresh engagements, except that of not allowing any supplies for 
 Don Carlos' army to pass our frontier, and we have provided 
 for this point by the stipulations in the first article. 
 
 One consideration alone makes me pause, though in reality it 
 does not appear to me of very great importance. 
 
 By Article II., the English Government undertakes to furnish 
 assistance in arms and munition of war, the value of which is 
 to be repaid later on by Spain. Might not this last stipulation 
 give rise to wrong interpretations by the Chamber of Deputies 
 and the newspapers ^ May not the King's Government be 
 accused of having deprived French trade of the sale of those 
 articles which will be delivered to the Spanish Government by 
 England .' 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 309 
 
 Such an accusation would be without foundation, for it is 
 perfectly evident that, as always happens in such cases, England 
 will not recover ultimately any of the disbursements she may be 
 called on to make, and that it is a positive gain for us to avoid 
 such expenditure. But I am ignorant whether the French 
 Ministry is able to take advantage of this opinion, and I have 
 therefore decided to suspend my assent to the article. 
 
 To sum up, the additional draft of convention is sufficiently 
 insignificant, to offer no danger whatever to our accepting it. 
 Its very insignificance would almost be objectionable, if we 
 could not always affirm, that it contains all the demands made 
 by the Madrid Cabinet. Only one point in the project is of 
 value, namely, the recognition by France and England, that the 
 aim of the 22nd of April has not been attained. 
 
 I still persist in thinking that this fact would be proved just 
 as effectually if it were mentioned in the speech of the King of the 
 French at the opening of the Chanibers, and also in that which 
 the King of England will make at the end of next week, when 
 Parliament is prorogued. If need be, even an exchange of 
 diplomatic Notes between France and England on the one part, 
 and Spain on the other, would suffice to replace the somewhat 
 pompous preamble of a convention which stipulates for such 
 unimportant obligations. 
 
 We were however finally obliged to give in to the reiterated 
 solicitations of M. de Miraflores and M. de Sarmento : the former 
 of these gentlemen especially, pointed out to us several passages 
 in M. Martinez de la Rosa's despatches, which, he said, imposed 
 upon him the necessity of trying to obtain the additional articles 
 of the treaty of April 22nd. 
 
 London, August \ith, 1834. 
 
 .... It seems to me, that the draft of the additional articles 
 which was inclosed in my despatch, is quite in accord with the 
 intentions which you have expressed in the name of the King's 
 Government. 
 
 The declaration mentioned in the preamble of the articles, is 
 conceived in terms sufficiently vague, not to give me cause for 
 any serious objection. 
 
 I should have preferred, as I informed you in my despatch 
 yesterday, that the phrase in the King's speech should be 
 adhered to ; but it was impossible to make additional articles to 
 the treaty of April 22nd without assigning some reason for them, 
 and I think the words used for this purpose say as little as it was 
 possible to do. 
 
 The stipulations in the first article having received your 
 
310 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 approval, there only remains the unimportant objection I pointed 
 out to you in Article II. 
 
 I do not think you wish that the proposition of the King's 
 Government to the Madrid Cabinet, with respect to the transport 
 of the Foreign Legion of Algiers to the coast of Spain, should 
 form a fresh additional article. I shall only bring it forward if 
 you send me instructions to do so. . . . 
 
 Just as I was finishing this despatch, I saw Lord Palmerston, 
 who informed me, that at the request of M. de Miraflores, and in 
 accordance with the unanimous opinion of the Council, he would 
 propose to me to add the following article to those which I had 
 the honour to send you yesterday : " In the event of fresh 
 circumstances arising, which would require fresh measures, the 
 high contracting parties pledge themselves to such action in this 
 matter as may be mutually agreed on." 
 
 I did not conceal from Lord Palmerston, that I neither 
 approved of the spirit nor the form of this article, which was 
 offensive to the Spanish Government, for it suggested a doubt 
 as to its strength, and the publication of such a doubt on the 
 part of the three Courts might produce a very bad effect in 
 Madrid. I concluded by saying, that in communicating this 
 article to you, I should express the objection I had to it. If 
 you refuse to adopt it, I think it would be as well for you to 
 send me a despatch to that effect so expressed, that I can show 
 it. . . 
 
 London, August 15^, 1834. 
 
 .... I have the honour to transmit herewith, the speech just 
 made by the King of England on adjourning Parliament until 
 the 25th of next September. When reading the speech, the 
 King gave a special intonation to the sentences relating to the 
 foreign policy of France, which appeared to cause quite a sensa- 
 tion in the diplomatic gallery. 
 
 London, August i<)th, 1834. 
 
 I hasten to send you the additional articles which we have 
 just signed. I think the King's Government cannot fail to be 
 satisfied with their contents.^ You will perceive that we have 
 
 ^ The following is the text of the additional convention to the treaty of the quad- 
 ruple alliance, as drawn up and signed on the l8th August, 1834 : 
 
 " His Majesty the King of the French, Her Majesty the Queen of Spain, His 
 Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, His Imperial Majesty the Duke of 
 Braganza, Regent of the kingdom of Portugal and of the Algarves, the high contract- 
 ing parties to the treaty of April 22nd, 1834, having given their serious attention to 
 the recent events which have taken place in the Peninsula, and being fully convinced 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 183a 311 
 
 made some alterations, as I informed you yesterday, in the 
 original draft of these articles ; the most important is that at the 
 end of Article II. By this article, England pledges herself to 
 the Queen Regent by a much more decided line of policy, whilst 
 the first article remains the same, and pledges France to no 
 further obligations than she has already been" anxious to fulfil. 
 
 I am very well satisfied that this additional convention to the 
 treaty of April 22nd has, by the suppression of the last part of 
 Article II., taken an entirely political character.^ You will no 
 doubt perceive, M. le Comte, that by this it connects itself more 
 intimately with the treaty of April 22nd, and with the views of 
 the Courts when they entered into it. 
 
 M. de Talleyrand had arrived at the end of his task. A few 
 days after he had signed the additional articles to the treaty of the 
 quadruple alliance, he took advantage of the leave granted him, 
 and returned to France. Three months later he determined to 
 resign his post as ambassador, and wrote the following letters to 
 the King, to Madame Adelaide, and to the Ministers for Foreign 
 Affairs :— 
 
 that in this fresh state of affairs, fresh measures have become necessary to fully attain 
 the end of the said treaty ; 
 
 "The undersigned" (here follow the names of the plenipotentiaries) "being 
 furnished with authority from their respective Governments, have agreed to the follow- 
 ing additional articles to the treaty of April 22nd, 1834 : 
 
 " ' I. His Majesty the King of the French pledges himself to take such measures 
 in those portions of his states which border on Spain, as will be best calculated to 
 prevent every description of assistance in men, arms, or munition of war, b&ing con- 
 veyed from French territory to the insurgents in Spain. 
 
 " ' II. His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland pledges himself to 
 fiimish Her Catholic Majesty with such arms and munition of war as Her Catholic 
 Majesty may require, and further to assist her with naval forces, if such should be 
 needed. 
 
 " ' III. His Imperial Majesty the Duke of Braganza, Regent of the kingdom of 
 Portugal and of the Algarves . . . fully sharing the sentiments of his august allies, 
 and wishing to acknowledge by a fair return the engagements contracted by the 
 Queen Regent of Spain in the second article of the treaty of April 22nd, 1834, under- 
 takes to give assistance, should occasion require, to Her Catholic Majesty, by every 
 means in his power, in such form and manner as shall afterwards be agreed on 
 ■between their said Majesties. 
 
 " ' IV. The above articles will have equal force and equal value,' &c., &c. . . . 
 " Tali-evrand, Palmerston, 
 
 " MiRAFLORES, C. P. DE MORAES SaRMENTO." 
 
 ^ See page 255, for the tenor of the original draft of this treaty. The alterations 
 which had been effected, were thus expatiated upon by M. de Talleyrand in a 
 despatch dated August 17th. 
 
 .... " We have agreed to confine ourselves to the signature of the three articles, 
 while however altering some expressions in Article II., which by their commercial 
 tone take away from the strength and dignity of the measures stipulated for by this 
 article." 
 
312 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to Madame Adelaide. 
 
 Valencay, November iith, 1834. 
 
 .... Mademoiselle will have noticed that I have abstained 
 for some time from writing to her about myself and distracting her 
 attention for a single moment from the painful crisis 1 which must 
 have greatly fatigued the King. But now that the crisis is over, 
 I claim a fresh proof of Mademoiselle's kindness, with all the con- 
 fidence of a tried servant. I beg her to prevail upon the King to 
 give a favourable hearing to a letter I am sending to the Foreign 
 Office. It contains my resignation. I am induced to believe 
 that the King will be disposed to accept it, Monseigneur the Due 
 d'Orleans having expressed to me that, in his opinion, I could 
 no longer be of any use in London. He is right, for I am old, I 
 am infirm, and I grow sad at the rapidity with which I see my 
 own generation dying out. A man of times gone by, I feel 
 myself a stranger to the present. 
 
 I must also repeat to Mademoiselle what the Prince Royal 
 feels so strongly, namely, that we have obtained from England 
 during the last four years all that could possibly be of use to us. 
 May she never transmit to us anything hurtful ! England has 
 altered greatly, and I do not think she can pause in the new 
 course she is pursuing. I do not feel myself called on to follow 
 her therein. Here also, in addition to the difference of policy, a 
 personal question has arisen. Lord Palmerston and I no longer 
 agree, nor do we satisfy one another. It is not right that the 
 King's business should suffer by this misunderstanding. These 
 are my reasons. I believe they are founded on common sense and 
 expediency, and I feel convinced that the King's admirable 
 sagacity will consider them worthy of my devotion to his interests. 
 I will not therefore further urge my attachment to his person, but 
 will once more revert to the need I feel of having complete rest 
 before I die. I also think I owe it to the place I may fill in 
 history, not to compromise the remembrance of those services 
 which I was fortunate enough to be able to render to France, 
 amidst the countless vicissitudes through which she has passed 
 during the last fifty years. 
 
 In remaining in office, henceforth without an object, I should 
 be of no use to my country, and could only injure my own 
 dignity. 
 
 I will make no excuses to Mademoiselle for having written at 
 
 ^ The ministerial crisisof November 1834. After the three days' Ministry presided 
 over by the Due de Bassano, the Cabinet of the nth October returned into power 
 under the presidency of Marshal Maison. 
 
. THE REVOLUTION OF 1830. 313 
 
 such length on one subject ; her noble friendship will, I know, be 
 only further strengthened by my unreserved confidence. So high 
 a mind, so tender a heart, will preserve to me my most cherished 
 consolations — her remembrance and her kindness. . . . 
 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to the Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs.^ 
 
 Valencay, November l^th, 1834. 
 
 Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 When the King appointed me to the Embassy in London 
 four years ago, the very difficulty of the mission made me accept 
 it. I believe I have fulfilled the duties, both to the advantage of 
 France and that of the King — two interests ever present to my 
 mind and closely connected in my thoughts. 
 
 During these four years, the general peace which has been 
 maintained has permitted all our relations to be much simplified : 
 our policy, isolated as it then was, has now become blended with 
 that of other nations ; it has been accepted appreciated, and 
 honoured, by upright men and intelligent minds in all count- 
 ries. The co-operation of England, which we have succeeded 
 in obtaining, has cost us nothing, it has not affected our inde- 
 pendence or our national susceptibilities ; and such has been our 
 respect for the rights of others, such has been the candour of our 
 actions, that so far from inspiring distrust, our guarantee is now 
 sought against certain influences which are disturbing ancient 
 Europe. 
 
 It is certainly to the King's undoubted wisdom and to his great 
 ability, that these very satisfactory results must be attributed. I 
 claim no other merit for myself than that of having divined 
 before any one else the King's inmost thoughts, and told them to 
 those who, later on, were convinced of the truth of my words. 
 
 But now that Europe knows and admires the King, the most 
 serious difficulties have for that very reason been surmounted ; 
 now that our mutual alliance is probably as important to 
 England as to ourselves, and that from the course she seems 
 inclined to pursue, she must prefer a mind less given to ancient 
 traditions than mine ; now that I think I can, without any want 
 of devotion to the King or to France, respectfully entreat his 
 Majesty to accept my resignation, I pray of you. Monsieur, to 
 present it to him. 
 
 ^ In consequence of the dissolution of the Ministry, two or three intermediary ones 
 having been successively nominated, M. de Talleyrand was obliged to address this 
 letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs simply, without designating any one. (Note 
 by Madame la Comtesse de Mirabeau.) 
 
314 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 My great age, the infirmities which are its natural con- 
 sequence, the rest it counsels, and the thoughts it suggests, render 
 this step of mine a very simple one, which is fully justified, and 
 is indeed only a duty. I trust to the King's inestimable goodness 
 to look upon it in this light. 
 
 Accept. . . . 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand to King Louis Philippe. 
 
 Valencay, November lyd, 1834. 
 
 Sire, 
 
 Your Majesty will forgive my delay in thanking you 
 for your fresh kindness, your confidence, and, I venture to say, 
 your friendship. I would I could reply to them more satis- 
 factorily, but I cannot refuse to listen to the serious warnings 
 inculcated by the sad ceremony at which I have just had to 
 assist.^ 
 
 From it I have gained courage to persevere in a determination, 
 the most painful part of which is the thought of displeasing the 
 King. He will pardon me if he will deign to recognise the 
 devotion with which, in spite of my great age, I have served him 
 for the last four years, and he will perhaps still think kindly of 
 me now, when the death of my old friends and the weight of 
 years no longer permit my actions to equal my zeal. 
 
 It would be very unjust to seek to find any other motives 
 than those indicated in the last lines of my letter to the Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs. It would be a great mistake to attribute my 
 resignation to a matter of either English or French personality. 
 Thanks to you. Sire, I have won for the Revolution of July 
 the right of citizenship in Europe. My task is accomplished, 
 and I must now persist in retiring because I have the right, and 
 it is necessary that I should do so. 
 
 Were I to set aside this true and simple desire, and to 
 search for still further reasons, I should tell the King, that no 
 one honours the Duke of Wellington more than I do ; that I feel 
 assured that to him alone will belong the honour, if such a thing 
 is still possible, of arresting the decadence of England.^ But 
 however much I respect his character, his strength, and his 
 prudence, I could not, if only from the simple fact of his having 
 
 1 The burial of the Comtesse Tietzkewitz, bom Princess Poniatowski. (Note by 
 Madame la Comtesse de Mirabeau.) 
 
 2 Lord Melbourne's Cabinet had just resigned (November 14th). The Duke of 
 Vi^ellington had been provisionally appointed, while awaiting the arrival of Sir Robert 
 Peel, who was travelling, and whom the King wished to appoint as his new minister. 
 For nearly a month the Duke of Wellington alone represented the entire English 
 Government. He became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Sir Robert Peel's Cabinet. 
 
THE RE VOL UTION OF 1830. 3 1 S 
 
 taken oflSce, recall my resignation, founded on such serious 
 grounds and already publicly known for some days, without at 
 once becoming a party man in both countries, and on that account 
 less fitted to render the King faithful service. 
 
 I have never been a party man ; I have never wished to be 
 one, and in this has lain my strength. When I started four years 
 ago for England, I was in the eyes of France (so exacting in 
 her national susceptibilities) what I have always desired to be — 
 the man of France ! now I should be in her eyes the man of the 
 Duke of Wellington ! 
 
 The King in his indulgent goodness too often forgets my great 
 age ; he forgets that it is not permitted to an octogenarian to set 
 aside prudence, for that which renders the faults of old age so 
 sad, is, that they are irreparable. 
 
 I believe it will not be difficult for the King to make a suitable 
 choice for London. M. de Saint- Aulaire would, as he has done at 
 Rome and Vienna, know how to make his Government respected 
 and himself esteemed. M. de Rayneval, full of experience, 
 skilful and prudent, would perhaps, under the present circum- 
 stances, be even a still better choice, for he knows better than 
 any one else, the interests and the difficulties of the Peninsula, the 
 fate of which will no doubt be one of the first things with which 
 the new English Government will have to deal. 
 
 Nevertheless, I see so many divers interests to be attended to, 
 or at any rate to be discussed, that I am more and more convinced 
 another Conference is imminent. If it should suit your Majesty 
 to send me to it, I would willingly make a final trial of my 
 strength in so short a mission. In this alone, taking every- 
 thing into consideration, I might perhaps still be able to serve 
 the King. He would not blame me for the infirmities of my age 
 and the exhaustion of my life. 
 
 I am, Sire, 
 
 The Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 King Louis Philippe to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, November 2c,th, 1834. 
 
 MoN CHER Prince, 
 
 I have never seen anything more perfect, more noble, 
 more honourable or better expressed, than the letter I have just 
 received from you. I am most deeply touched by it. There is 
 no doubt that it costs me a good deal to admit the justice of the 
 greater portion of your reasons for not returning to London, but 
 I am too sincere, and too much the friend of my friends, not to 
 recognise that you are right. Nevertheless, to be thoroughly 
 
3i6 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 frank with you, I fear that the weight of the sorrow that has 
 overwhelmed you, has led you to overrate that of your years, and 
 what you are incUned to look upon as warnings. Believe me, 
 the more fully I appreciate the great services which you have 
 rendered to me, and likewise to France, the more I feel that 
 you alone could bestow them again, and you surely cannot 
 conceal from yourself how much your resolution, well founded 
 as it is, will increase my difficulties. It is impossible to settle 
 anything until the English Ministry is reconstituted, but I quite 
 enter into your views ; we must prepare for the future, and it is 
 for this reason, mon cher Prince, I so earnestly desire that 
 you should return to Paris as speedily as possible. I am very 
 anxious to hear your views and tell you mine : I feel that I need 
 the help of your experience, and above all the advice of that 
 enlightened friendship which is so precious to me. I like to 
 repeat to you how fully you can count on mine, and on all those 
 feelings which I have for so long entertained for you. 
 
 Louis Philippe. 
 
 END OF PART XII. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 No. I— The Due de Broglie to M. Bresson.^ 
 
 ith October, 1832, 
 
 We continue to hope that the naval measures will exercise sufficient 
 weight on King William's mind, to destroy his last illusions. 
 
 If this hope is realised, all difficulties will disappear. 
 
 But it is not at all impossible that this Prince, strengthened in his 
 obstinacy by the signs of discord which have so unfortunately arisen in the 
 Conference, may persist in rejecting the only arrangement which is now 
 admissible, and that, at the risk of calling upon his country for fresh sacri- 
 fices, he will still wait for more favourable chances in the future, than those 
 for which he has vainly hoped during the last two years. 
 
 In this hypothesis, the measures taken for the blockade might be insuf- 
 ficient. I may as well tell you, monsieur, that until this insufficiency has 
 been proved in the most incontestable manner, we shall not come to the 
 determination of regarding it as the basis of our calculations and previsions. 
 
 But, the fact once recognised, more efficacious measures will certainly 
 have to be taken. Then, and only then, should France and England unite 
 their forces to oblige HoUand to evacuate Antwerp, and it seems to us im- 
 possible that, under such circumstances, our allies would not give their full 
 assent. 
 
 There is moreover, monsieur, a method of humouring Russia's suscepti- 
 bility, and of giving to the proceeding of the allied Courts all the appear- 
 ance of that complete improbability, which, inj reality, has never ceased 
 to exist. As the Dutch occupy Antwerp, which must some day be re- 
 stored to Belgium, so the Belgians occupy Venloo and those portions of 
 Luxemburg and Limburg which have been assigned to Holland by the treaty 
 of the 15th November. It might be arranged, that simultaneous with our 
 taking possession of Antwerp, the Prussians should receive over Venloo and 
 the territories in question from the Belgians, take charge of them provision- 
 ally, and hand them over to King William when he finally decides to accept 
 the treaty of the isth November. . . . 
 
 No. 2 — M. Bresson to the Due de Broglie.^ 
 
 Berlin, October lifh, 1832. 
 
 If we show any weakness, if we make any further concessions, advantage 
 will be taken of it, as has just been done, to retard by a few days, even by a 
 few hours, the decision which has become indispensable to us. It is not 
 
 1 See page 13. 2 See page 13 , 
 
31 8 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 from any ill-will, but from a foolish dread of imaginary evils. For this 
 reason, on first looking at it, I much regretted the proposal relative to 
 Venloo. Since then, I feel assured that it has produced a good effect, 
 that it is much appreciated, and is felt to be reassuring. But, notwith- 
 standing all this, it has been insufficient to stimulate the Prussian Cabinet. 
 You have nothing to fear from that quarter ; I will, if you desire it, stake my 
 existence on this. You may go straight ahead, carry out your expedition 
 well, no one will interfere with you, and if Russia tries to take advantage of 
 this circumstance to rouse prejudice or irritation against us, it will only be 
 waste of time. They are quite reconciled to it here, and although they do 
 not wish to acquiesce, they quite feel that we are doing right, and we shall be 
 thanked for it later on. 
 
 Do not therefore lose a moment, M. le Due. Strengthen the good cause 
 and sound doctrines by preparing a success for them. They are, alas ! too 
 much compromised everywhere. You will gain great glory by doing so much 
 good. Believe me, I have carefully weighed every word I say. I know well 
 that peace or war depends upon the disposition shown by Prussia, and that 
 if I am mistaken, I shall be left to blush for shame and eternally to regret 
 all the evils I have provoked. But I am not mistaken, I know the ground 
 on which I stand. . . . 
 
 No. 3 — The Prince de Talleyrand to the Due de Brogue. "^ 
 
 {Private^ 
 
 October 2Tth, 1832. 
 MON CHER Due, 
 
 Our ratifications have been exchanged. I am very glad that you 
 are satisfied, the more so as I have served a Ministry I like and of which 
 you form the chief interest. I was obliged to send off the communications at 
 once, and I hope I have written as prudently as the circumstances required. 
 The Gordian knot will be cut when Venloo is placed in the hands of the 
 Prussians. 
 
 There will be no inconvenience in this, and it will release us from all the 
 demands of the Northern Powers, who, if Prussia is satisfied, dare not 
 express any doubts as to our good faith. It is, besides, a mark of respect to 
 the King of Prussia, whose good will it is most essential to retain ; for it acts 
 as a barrier, which we must endeavour to make insurmountable. I beg you 
 to urge M. de Werther to write in this sense to his Court. I on my side will 
 stir up M. de Biilow. You will see therefore that it must be quite understood, 
 that even if the King of Holland refuses, the King of the Belgians must 
 evacuate the territories which do not belong to him. This will place the 
 King of Holland still further in the wrong, without in any way endangering us, 
 since we must stipulate that the King of Prussia shall evacuate Venloo as 
 soon as the King of the Netherlands shall have acceded to the treaty of the 
 15th November. 
 
 Adieu, a thousand kind remembrances, Talleyrand. 
 
 No. 4 — King Louis Philippe to the Due de Broglie.'' 
 
 Valenciennes, i i o'clock in the evening. 
 MON CHER Due, Wednesday, January <ith, 1833. 
 
 I hasten to send you, as you wish, the extracts from the despatches 
 of 7th and 8th January, which you sent me. Thank you much for the trouble 
 you have taken to make them so clear and exact. . . . 
 
 1 See page 13. ^ See page 13. 
 
APPENDIX. 319 
 
 In thinking over all the circumstances, I believe that our expedition to 
 Antwerp produces, both at home and abroad, a much greater sensation than 
 we could possibly have hoped for. The refusal of the Hague is with the view 
 of not seeming to give in to us, and of seeing whether our desire to avoid a 
 war will not make us give in to the earnest wishes of Prussia ; I think for 
 that very reason, now that we have made propositions which have been 
 rejected, we must abstain from making any more, and wait till the King of 
 Holland condescends to make some to us. I do not think that we shall 
 have long to wait ; I see even still less reason for making any advance, 
 as he dare not close the Scheldt, and the feeling in his country is opposed 
 to his policy of resistance. I think, therefore, that it is now our turn to 
 stand aloof. 
 
 The Governments in France and England are both firmly seated, our union 
 has been drawn closer by our victory and the loyalty of our return : therefore, 
 in soldiers' language, let us stand at ease and see what will happen. . . . 
 
 L. P. 
 
 No. s — The Due DE Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand.' 
 
 Vkrjs, January 16th, 1834. 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 I acquainted you in my last despatch of the impression I formed 
 after reading the Dutch Note and the counter-project which accompanied it. 
 The King is absent. The President of the Council has followed him to the 
 army. I have not yet been able to get the rest of my colleagues together 
 and discuss matters thoroughly. I am consequently unable to transmit to you 
 just now the views of the Cabinet. The ideas which I shall embody in this 
 letter are therefore personal, and I submit them to you simply to receive the 
 benefit of your advice. 
 
 The reply of the King of the Netherlands is just what I expected. He 
 eludes our propositions and only seeks to gain time ; the tone is conciliatory, 
 and the aim evasive. Were we to defer to him, the result would be to place 
 Holland precisely in the same position in which we wish, and have every 
 reason to wish, to place Belgium. Such a result would be to establish a 
 most favourable statu quo for Holland, in which King William would remain 
 indefinitely, without recognising the independence of Belgium, negotiating 
 without ceasing, and awaiting some favourable chance for a general war. 
 
 Possessed of the whole of the territory assigned to him by the treaty of 
 November 15th, collecting tolls both on the Scheldt and the Meuse, con- 
 firmed in his new claim of a right of transit vid Sittard and Maestricht, 
 relieved from the interest of the Belgian debt, and freed from our coercive 
 measures, he would set us at naught, reserving his question of the inter- 
 mediary waters, the syndicate, the pilotage and the beacons, as pretexts for 
 quibbling and never settling anything. 
 
 The difficulty therefore does not seem to me whether we shall or shall 
 not accept these propositions, but what course of action we should adopt 
 after having appreciated their full importance. 
 
 It appears to me that our first care must be to fully assure our present 
 position and not allow it to be injured in any way. 
 
 According to the terms of the Convention of the 22nd October, we are 
 acting as the signatories and the guarantors of the treaty of November 25th. 
 We have undertaken to execute this treaty by means of joint action, pro- 
 vided that the negotiations respecting two or three articles of the treaty, which 
 
 1 See page 6i, 
 
320 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 it had been agreed to should be reopened, were not merely for the purpose 
 of adjourning the matter indefinitely, and ending by cancelling it. We have 
 taken this course, because we were fully convinced of the King of the Nether- 
 land's bad faith. After the taking of Antwerp, we were willing once more to 
 put his desire of bringing matters to an end to the proof. We only asked 
 for a very simple matter, that he should recognise and carry out all those 
 portions of the treaty which he did not object to. We promised on that con- 
 dition to give up our coercive measures. That proposition was not accepted ; 
 our coercive measures must therefore be continued. It is a question of our 
 dignity ; all chances of success are involved therein. If we desist before 
 three-fourths or four-fifths of the treaty are carried out, we shall have done 
 nothing, we shall have gained nothing ; the Antwerp expedition will have 
 been utterly useless ; we shall indeed be in a much worse position than we were 
 before, for we shall have exhibited the climax of our strength and our resolu- 
 tion. If we were then to attempt any threats, we should only be laughed at. 
 
 A second, though no less important point, was the intervention of the 
 three Powers. 
 
 The King of the Netherlands seemed averse to treating only with England 
 and France. He wanted the concurrence of the whole Conference. We 
 have no reason to object to this. But Prussia, Austria, and Russia have 
 withdrawn on the ground that the employment of coercive measures seemed 
 to them unfair and inopportune ; as our opinion has not changed and our 
 conduct remains the same, it is for those Powers to approach us if they 
 wish to do so ; it is not for us, whom they have in a way denounced to 
 Europe, to seek them and throw ourselves into their arms. If the King of 
 the Netherlands desires their intervention, let him bring them to us, let him 
 reconcile them to those coercive measures which we shall not abandon, or 
 else let him of his own accord render those coercive measures unnecessary, 
 by accepting our propositions and carrying out forthwith all that portion of 
 the treaty which he does not contest. 
 
 As for the root of the question, this is my view : the object of our 
 propositions was to simplify the difficulty of separating that part of the 
 treaty which was contested, from that which was not, and thus show plainly, 
 the very slight importance of the points in dispute ; to invite both parties in 
 the name of common sense not to rush into expenses a hundred times 
 greater than the objects claimed, but to disarm, and to threaten the peace of 
 Europe no more. 
 
 The King of the Netherlands accepts the idea of a preliminary Conven- 
 tion, but he expects that two or three of the disputed points will be introduced 
 into it. Of what use then is a preliminary Convention .? If negotiations 
 have to be entered into both with him and the Belgians, why not negotiate 
 the whole matter at once from the beginning to the end ? 
 
 I think we ought to say to him : You do not want a preliminary Conven- 
 tion, that is to say, a Convention which is all arranged beforehand, which 
 can either be accepted or not, since it only consists of such preliminary 
 points as have been agreed to by both sides. Very well ! What you want 
 is to negotiate. By all means : then let us negotiate. But let us negotiate to 
 some purpose ; let whatever is arranged be definitely so, and then bring 
 forward all your claims at once, and let us regulate everything by one and 
 the same arrangement. Do not keep anything back, and then pull it out of 
 your pocket just when everything is on the point of being settled, and thus 
 adjourn everything afresh. 
 
 The three following proposals occur to me : 
 
 We are quite ready to negotiate, but on condition that the coercive 
 measures are not discontinued. 
 
APPENDIX. 321 
 
 We are quite willing to negotiate with Austria, Prussia, and Russia, but 
 on condition that those three Powers come forward of their own accord and 
 do not ask us to give up coercive measures beforehand. 
 
 We are quite willing, I repeat, to negotiate, but it must be simultaneously, 
 on all the disputed points, and so as to have done with them once and for all. 
 If you desire the cessation of the coercive measures, carry out that portion of 
 the treaty which you do not dispute. If you desire a partial Convention, then 
 let it be a Convention which bears solely on those points which have already 
 been agreed to by both sides, and which are not subject to negotiation. 
 
 I repeat, it appears to me that these ideas, expressed in language 
 moderate and conciliatory, though at the same time firm and resolute, 
 would deprive the King of the Netherlands, and likewise his friends, of 
 all hopes of trifling with us any more, and we should not have to wait long 
 for the end ; whereas if, on the contrary, we fall into the trap, and if we allow 
 ourselves first to be induced to give up the coercive measures, and then to 
 be drawn into a series of negotiations, we shall inevitably entangle our- 
 selves in a hopeless difficulty. 
 
 There is however one point which, in my opinion, should be kept quite 
 distinct from all the rest. 
 
 I refer to the closing of the Scheldt. This is a fresh departure, as to 
 which it is necessary above all to be very explicit. 
 
 The free navigation of the Scheldt is not a Dutch or a Belgian question ; 
 it is a European one. All the nations of Europe, France and England 
 especially, have a direct and personal interest in this question. All the 
 nations of Europe have further, a direct and personal right to maintain the free 
 navigation of the Scheldt, in terms of the article of the Congress of Vienna. 
 
 The five Powers signatory to the treaty of 15th November have a 
 special right in this. They notified by a protocol ad hoc in 1830, that they 
 would look upon any attempt to close the Scheldt as an act of hostility on 
 the part of the King of the Netherlands, and the King of the Netherlands 
 solemnly declared, that he intended to leave the Scheldt open, and would 
 remain a simple spectator of what might take place there, until the conclu- 
 sion of HoIIando-Belgian affairs. 
 
 The Powers therefore have a positive right, not only to the freedom of 
 the Scheldt, but to the provisional maintenance of the statu quo and the 
 provisional absence of all tolls. 
 
 I think that England and France must refuse to entertain any negotia- 
 tions until the Scheldt is open. I even believe it would be well to add, that 
 in case of refusal on this point, they will consider what steps they must take, 
 and make it plain that in reprisal, and considering the closing of the Scheldt 
 as an act of hostility, they will commence by confiscating the vessels that have 
 been seized, in order to utilise the amount realised thereby to indemnify 
 Belgium, which is more especially affected by the closing of the Scheldt. 
 
 If we are not careful to settle this question before all the others, we 
 may be sure that the freedom of the Scheldt will be sold to us as the price 
 of some fresh concession. It seems to me a matter that must be dealt 
 with at once, and with a very high hand. 
 
 Such, mon Prince, are the views which have occurred to me ; I will wait 
 until I hear from you what value I may attach to them, before drawing up 
 anything definite. AH I can learn concerning Prussia and Austria, leads me 
 to think that if we only stand firm, they will come round to our views ; but 
 we have reached a very critical and decisive point, where it will depend 
 upon our action, whether we shall lay down the law or have to submit to it. 
 Accept, mon Prince, the testimony of my utmost devotion. 
 
 V. Broglie. 
 
 VOL. V. Y 
 
322 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 No. 6. — The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand.^ 
 
 Paris, January 2is(, 1833. 
 
 Prince, 
 
 We have just received some very important news from Constan- 
 tinople. On the 24th of last month, Ibrahim Pasha has completely routed, 
 .... near Konieh. 
 
 To save the Porte and prevent the intervention of Russia, is 
 
 plainly the double aim assigned at this moment to the policy of France and 
 England. The active and immediate joint action of both Governments is 
 necessary to reassure the Porte, and I will proceed to indicate to you, mon 
 Prince, the measures by which we think this joint action should be carried 
 out. 
 
 It is necessary, first of all, that Lord Ponsonby should at once start for 
 Constantinople, where his prompt arrival will show the firm determination 
 of the London Cabinet not to remain inactive in the midst of the crisis 
 that has befallen the Ottoman Empire. Jointly with Admiral Roussin, he 
 should declare to the Porte, that France and England take upon them- 
 selves to guarantee the preservation of the Sultan's throne, but on the ex- 
 press understanding that the Ottoman Government, whose independence 
 they are thus protecting, will not itself sacrifice this independence by 
 admitting foreign armies into its territories and allowing them the free pass- 
 age of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, the real key of the Empire. 
 
 At the same time, both Courts should formally ask Mehemet-Ali to stay 
 the march of his troops ; they should besides offer their mediation to obtain 
 fair concessions for him, but also give him to understand, that in the event 
 of his abusing the advantage he has gained, by endeavouring to dethrone 
 the Sultan, or imposing inadmissible demands, they will feel themselves 
 reduced to the necessity of interposing, in order to prevent catastrophes 
 irreconcilable with their interests. 
 
 Such demonstrations would probably suffice to decide Mehemet-Ali to 
 confine his ambition within the limits which we desire. Nevertheless, 
 provision must be made in the event of their not being successful. It is 
 quite evident that in this state of affairs, our interest being dominant, the 
 principle which must direct our action is to prevent Russia from bringing 
 forward any plausible pretext for occupying, (on the plea of being an 
 auxiliary of the Porte,) either Constantinople, the two straits, or the 
 provinces in Asia Minor. It might be advisable, Prince, that henceforth the 
 French and English Cabinets, in the event of action becoming necessary 
 either on the coast of Syria or on that of Egypt, should combine in such a 
 manner, that the Divan of Constantinople, reassured of its existence by so 
 powerful a diversion, would no longer be tempted to abandon itself to the 
 armed protection of Russia. 
 
 Pray, mon Prince, lose not a moment in conferring with Lord Palmerston 
 on this important question. You will quite understand the impatience with 
 which we shall await the decisions of the London Cabinet on a matter in 
 which the slightest delay may cause the most serious consequences. 
 
 You will have to consider whether it will be necessary to make the reso- 
 lutions we may come to, the subject of a communication to the St. Petersburg 
 Cabinet. Among the considerations which will aid you in forming an 
 opinion on this matter, will no doubt be the great danger of still further 
 increasing the gravity of the complications which may supervene in Eastern 
 affairs, by showing ourselves at first too engrossed by them. 
 
 1 Seepage 77, 
 
APPENDIX. 323 
 
 We learn from Constantinople, that the Prussian and Austrian Missions 
 have supported General MouraviefPs offers. It is difficult to believe this 
 support to be sincere on the part of Austria. M. de Mettemich, as might 
 have been foreseen, exhibits much'perturbation 'at the possibility of Russian 
 intervention in the affairs of Turkey, and although in the present position of 
 Europe one cannot expect to see him side with France and England in order to 
 prevent it, it is not improbable, that if we were once pledged to do so, so far 
 from thwarting our efforts, he would in some way assist them, even while 
 probably finding fault with them in public. This minister is not the man to 
 sacrifice to temporary combinations a real and vital interest, such as the 
 removal of the Russians from Constantinople would be for Austria. . . . 
 
 No. 7. — The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand.^ 
 
 Paris, February %th, 1833. 
 
 MoN Prince, 
 
 In my despatch of yesterday, I mentioned a conversation I had had 
 the evening before with M. le Comte d'Appony. I now send yoii the details, 
 as I think their perusal will not be without interest to you. 
 
 You will no doubt remember that about six weeks ago, M. de Metternich 
 proposed to the English Government to bring the Belgian affair to an end, 
 by assembling a kind of Congress, at which all the questions relative to this 
 affair were to be discussed afresh. The proposition was equivocal and 
 hesitating ; it was insinuated that the Congress might be held elsewhere than 
 in London, and it was even reported in Germany, that this Congress was to 
 be held either at Aix-la-Chapelle or Frankfort. 
 
 Be that as it may. Lord Palmerston, in answer to this rather embarrassing 
 and non-conclusive overture, made a very vigorous reply. This reply, which 
 formed a lengthy despatch taking about twenty minutes to read, was shown 
 me by Lord Granville. In it, the Belgian matter was reviewed subsequent to 
 the twenty-four articles ; it was proved by very forcible logic, that all the ques- 
 tions relative to Belgian affairs had been definitely decided by the treaty of 
 November isth ; that France and England had made Belgium accept this 
 solution ; that the three other Powers, so far from acting in the same way 
 with the King of Holland, had, on the contrary, encouraged him in his 
 resistance by the delays attendant on their ratifications ; that if some 
 points had again come under discussion at the request of the three Powers, 
 it was on the understanding that no alterations should be made, except with 
 the free assent of the two parties interested ; that such assent not having 
 been obtained after six months of fresh negotiations, no other course 
 remained open but to constrain Holland by forcible measures, and thus 
 bring about the same result as had been obtained from Belgium by persua- 
 sion ; that France and England had adopted this course on the refusal of the 
 other three Powers, and that nothing remained but to persist in it, unless 
 the King of Holland, brought back to more reasonable ideas by experience or 
 the advice of his allies, made us such fresh proposals as might suit Belgium. 
 Lord Palmerston concluded, by rejecting all propositions for a fresh Congress 
 to arrange what had been already settled and only now required to be put 
 into execution. 
 
 This was the despatch which occasioned my interview with the Comte 
 d'Appony. 
 
 .... He gave me a despatch to read, in which M. de Metternich com- 
 
 ^ See page 88. 
 
 Y i 
 
324- THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 plains bitterly at not hearing anything further as to the position of the 
 Belgian affair, or the intentions of France and England ; he complains that 
 a denouement is no longer possible, and seems disposed to abandon every- 
 thing ; he complains especially of England and of Lord Palmerston, his 
 obstinacy and his daring ; he also accuses Lord Palmerston of having 
 misrepresented his proposition. Its object was not to assemble a new 
 Congress, but only to resume the Conference, by admitting to it the Dutch 
 and Belgian plenipotentiaries ; he never intended that the territorial portion 
 of the treaty of November 15th should be again discussed, but only the points 
 contested by the King of Holland ; it never entered his head that the Congress 
 should assemble elsewhere than in London, &c. After a series of lengthy 
 lamentations, M. de Metternich addresses himself to me as a man of greater 
 moderation and more conciliating than Lord Palmerston (and here follows 
 a shower of compliments and flatteries), in order to know what I really thought 
 of the Belgian question, what were the intentions of England, and whether, 
 in her dealings with us, she behaves in the same way as she does towards 
 Austria, answering questions that were never asked, misrepresenting the 
 views presented to her, and evading all the points in discussion. 
 
 The reading of this document was followed by that of a private letter, in 
 which the same subject is treated in a jocose manner, and in which Lord 
 Palmerston is accused of answering white when one says black, and good 
 morning when one wishes him good-night. 
 
 I listened to all this very quietly and without interrupting M. d'Appony. 
 When he had finished, I began by pointing out to him, that the proposal 
 referred to in this despatch had not been communicated to us by the Austrian 
 Government. At this remark M. d'Appony coloured up to the whites of his 
 eyes. I continued saying, that not knowing the terms in which the proposition 
 was couched, it was impossible for me to decide whether Lord Palmerston had 
 or had not understood it properly ; that not being able to judge of the merits 
 of the demand, I could still less judge of the merits of the reply, and that 
 therefore I must decline all intervention in a controversy to which my 
 Government was a stranger. 
 
 " However, " I continued, " if you desire to know the views of the French 
 Government on the position of the Belgian affair and its future, I have no 
 hesitation in making them known to you, and I will endeavour to explain 
 matters to you sufficiently clearly not to deserve the reproach addressed 
 by M. de Metternich to Lord Palmerston." 
 
 I then went over the whole subject of Lord Palmerston's despatch 
 (without however making any remarks thereon), following the various 
 arguments step by step, and wound up by telling M. d'Appony that such 
 were the views of the French Government, and that on this point there 
 never had been the slightest difference of opinion or the least misunder- 
 standing between it and the English Government. 
 
 I paused every now and then to ask M. d'Appony whether I had made 
 myself thoroughly understood, whether he wished any further explanations, 
 or whether there was anything in my language which was not perfectly 
 clear. 
 
 M. d'Appony, to whom no doubt Lord Palmerston's despatch had been 
 communicated, and who saw me produce it under the name of the French 
 Government, quite recognised that his attempt to separate the two Govern- 
 ments and bring about a division between them had no chance of success, 
 and took this for granted. 
 
 Then changing his tactics, he said he would not speak to me in the 
 name of his Government, having no orders to that effect, but only in his own 
 name and in ordinary conversation. 
 
APPENDIX. 32s 
 
 "As long as you persevere with coercive measures," he continued, " we 
 cannot join you ; we are too deeply pledged against the employment of such 
 measures ; but if you would abandon them, the Conference would reassemble 
 as a matter of course, and with the addition, as M. de Mettemich proposes, 
 of the Dutch and Belgian plenipotentiaries, everything would be speedily 
 terminated." 
 
 " What guarantee," I then asked him, " can you offer us, that the King of 
 HoUand would now show himself more disposed to end matters than he has 
 done in the past ? If we renounce coercive measures, we are giving in to him ; 
 it is as much as telling him he may resist as long as he likes, and no harm 
 will befall him. By admitting his plenipotentiary to the Conference, equally 
 with that of Belgium, we give him an advantage he did not possess before; it 
 would be leading him to believe that everything was to be again discussed ; it 
 would furnish him with the means of objecting to everything and throwing 
 obstacles in the way at every moment. How could we hope that matters, 
 under these circumstances, would progress either quicker or better ? " 
 
 " Oh ! " replied M. d'Appony, " but if France and England gave Europe 
 such a great proof of their desire to terminate the Belgian business, and their 
 wish for peace, the three Powers would then be with them, heart and soul ; we 
 should second you with all our efforts ; nothing would be neglected by us, to 
 induce the King of Holland to give in." 
 
 "Ah ! " I exclaimed, " then were you not entirely with us last summer ? Did 
 you not then second us with all your efforts ? Did you then neglect anything 
 that would have caused the King of Holland to give in ? Can you do more 
 in the future than you were able to do in the past ? " 
 
 M. d'Appony coloured up a second time and made no reply. 
 
 After a few minutes' silence, seeing that the conversation had come to an 
 end, I said to him, " I in my turn will now speak to you, not as the mouth- 
 piece of the French Government, but merely as a friend, and we will discuss 
 some simple hypotheses. We will suppose that England and France accept 
 the invitation of the three Powers (I laid stress on the word invitation) ; we 
 will suppose that they consent to allow the Conference to reassemble, by 
 abandoning the coercive measures, and that the trial having been made, the 
 King of Holland shows himself just as obstinate as he has done in the past : 
 would you then approve of the employment of coercive measures ; would you 
 join us in putting them in force ? " 
 
 "But," replied M. d'Appony with some embarrassment, "we were not 
 opposed to /ec««zary coercive measures." " Yes, indeed," I answered, " and 
 it was just on account of your refusal that the Conference separated. Look 
 at Protocol No. 70. You have, it is true, consented since then, but only 
 individually, and in order to prevent the siege of Antwerp. Besides, what if 
 the pecuniary coercive measures did not suffice?" 
 
 " We have morally consented to maritime coercive measures." 
 
 " Yes ; but there again, only when you saw we were determined to take 
 Antwerp, and in order to prevent the siege. Moreover, Russia has never 
 consented." 
 
 " I think we can arrive at that." 
 
 " If you should ever have any proposals to make to me on the part of 
 your Government on this subject," I concluded, " I will have had time to 
 think over it Just now we have neither of us anything official to com- 
 municate to one another." 
 
 And thus ended this conversation. 
 
 M. de Werther called yesterday. He read me a despatch very much in the 
 same style as M. de Mettemich's, tending towards the same end, but much 
 shorter and making no mention of the proposal submitted to England. He 
 
326 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 then entered into a short conversation in which he introduced the same 
 officious insinuations ; the despatch also contained similar praises and 
 personal flatteries, to the detriment of Lord Palmerston and the English 
 Government. Finally, these two gentlemen, knowing how intimate I am 
 with Saint- Aulaire, who has just arrived here, made him their confidant, 
 asked him to repeat to me their conversations with him on the same subject, 
 and even went so far as to let him read the despatches they had communicated 
 to me. 
 
 If we take these advances, in connection with the tone of the St. 
 Petersburg despatch relative to Marshal Maison, which Pozzo showed you— 
 a despatch which replies to a purely official communication by protestations 
 oi friendship, and this just when I had purposely told M. d'Appony (about 
 six weeks before) that it seemed Russia wished to keep in peaceful but not 
 friendly relations with us — the conclusion I draw therefrom is as follows : 
 
 The three Powers are much afraid that this Belgian affair will be 
 terminated without their intervention. Spring is approaching. The cruisers 
 will soon show signs of activity. Public opinion is getting excited in 
 Holland. They therefore wish above all things to recommence negotiations. 
 They would even go so far as to approve the use of coercive measures 
 in the future, but as for prese?it coercive measures, their amour-propre is 
 affected ; their disapprobation has been too plainly manifested for them to 
 draw back now ; they must find some expedient to save this point of honour. 
 
 On the other hand, the King of Holland, who is perfectly aware of the 
 situation, makes capital out of it, by refusing to treat definitely, without the 
 concurrence of the five Powers. 
 
 It might be worth considering whether, without losing our present 
 position or placing ourselves at the discretion of the three Powers, we could 
 offer them some means of joining us without the humiliation of having to 
 contradict themselves, which would withdraw them from the King of Holland, 
 and place them on our side. 
 
 This is my view of the matter : 
 
 The Conference, it is true, exists no longer, but the elements of the 
 Conference are still in London ; the plenipotentiaries of the five Powers are 
 still there, and see each other daily. 
 
 What is there to prevent M. de Biilow, M. de Wessenberg, M. de Lieven 
 and M. Van de Weyer being sounded all at the same time in private converse, 
 as to the most reasonable solution of the three or four questions still in 
 dispute ? 
 
 When all are agreed, or at any rate pretty nearly so, Lord Palmerston 
 might do what he did last August, namely, draw up a scheme and some 
 articles which might be officially communicated to the persons who had 
 already been sounded. 
 
 If the scheme was secretly agreed on, France and England would draw 
 up a so-called preliminary Convention, in which however all the difficulties 
 would be solved, and in which a special article would simply state, that the 
 said preliminary Convention having been agreed to by Holland and Bel- 
 gium, and by France and England, would by the signature of the Russian, 
 Austrian, and Prussian plenipotentiaries be converted into a definite treaty, 
 and substituted for the treaty of November 15th. 
 
 It would be necessary in drawing up the articles, to approach as near as 
 possible to the Prussian scheme, so as to gain M. de Bulow's interest. 
 
 The Convention once drawn up, would be sent officially to Brussels and 
 to the Hague, and would at the same time be officially communicated to the 
 plenipotentiaries of the three Powers, in the same manner as the Conven- 
 tion of October 22nd. 
 
APPENDIX. 327 
 
 The three Powers would support the Anglo-French proposition at the 
 Hague, by their ministers, they would declare themselves ready to convert 
 it into a definite treaty, and would inform the King of Holland that if he 
 persisted in rejecting such reasonable proposals, they would unite with 
 France and England, and reassemble the Conference to concert measures to 
 force him to submit. 
 
 In this way, the three Powers would re-enter into the negotiation with- 
 out contradicting themselves too evidently ; their present good will could be 
 utilised without suspending our coercive measures, and the King of Holland 
 would be caught in his own snare. 
 
 I submit these ideas to you, mon Prince, without attaching any other 
 importance to them, than that of being enlightened thereon by your clear and 
 experienced views. You are on the spot, and must therefore know a hundred 
 times more about the matter than I can possibly do. I hand the whole 
 conduct of this affair over to your discretion, and pray you to pardon this 
 lengthy gossip. Please accept the testimony of my greatest devotion. 
 
 V. Broglie. 
 
 No. 8.— Madame Adelaide to the Prince de Talleyrand.^ 
 
 TuiLERlES, February 13M, 1833. 
 
 I have communicated to our beloved King, the information you 
 
 have sent me relative to Portugal and Queen Dona Maria : I must tell you 
 quite frankly, that we have never desired such a very delicate situation 
 either for Nemours or any of our children. I am fully persuaded that they 
 ■will be much happier remaining in France as they are. In this respect there- 
 fore, our views could never give umbrage to the English Government. This 
 always troubles me ; not for the matter itself, but as showing the feeling of 
 prejudice, estrangement and mistrust, which, in spite of all, still exists, 
 against us, and which I look upon as very unfortunate in the interests of both 
 countries. But, as regards this Portuguese business, I say again, we neither 
 think of it nor desire it, for any of our children. At the same time it seems 
 to me, that it would not be to our interest to have an Archduke, and by such 
 arrangement give Austria the same influence in Spain as she already 
 possesses in too great a degree in Italy. I submit this idea to you, while 
 asking you to think of some other choice, and to write and tell me which 
 Prince you think it would be most desirable to see there and that we 
 should do well to support. I should have thought some Neapolitan Prince. 
 For my own part, I must confess, I should much prefer him to an Austrian, 
 whom we must above all avoid. 
 
 No. 9. — Lord Palmerston to the Prince de Talleyrand.== 
 
 Stanhope Street, April \6th, 1833. 
 Mon CHER Prince, 
 
 Here is the Note M. Dedel has just given me. It is, as I told him, 
 a very slight affair, after such an amount of consideration. 
 
 As to the new draft for the armistice, it has the merit of being perfectly 
 incomprehensible, or rather it can be read in two ways ; for we have always 
 held, that before last November there was a continuous suspension of arms, 
 whilst the King of the Netherlands, on the other hand, always declared that 
 he was free to recommence hostilities whenever he pleased. As regards 
 
 1 See pa^e 156. 2 See page 106. 
 
328 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 this, the Note does not help us in the least. No mention is made of the 
 neutrality, and there is this to be noticed, that an armistice is bilateral, and 
 that if the Dutch provoked the Belgians to any slight aggression on the 
 frontier, or if they alleged some infraction on the part of the Belgians, they 
 might declare the armistice to be broken. But an undertaking on the part 
 of Holland to respect the neutrality of Belgium, would be a tie from which 
 Holland could not so easily escape. 
 
 No mention either is made in this note as to the opening of commercial 
 communications vi& the town of Maestricht, but I fancy that when the 
 river is opened, the roads will no longer be closed. 
 
 Of course you are aware that Prince Metternich proposes an arrange- 
 ment which would be excellent, if Holland would adopt it, namely, a Con- 
 vention between us both and Holland, by which the embargo would be 
 removed, the indefinite armistice concluded, the Scheldt placed on the 
 footing of November last, and the Meuse opened ; a treaty would at the 
 same time be signed between the five Powers and Holland, by which the 
 latter finally accepts the twenty-one articles, regarding which there are no 
 reservations ; the other three articles would form the subject of immediate 
 negotiations. 
 
 For my part, I can see nothing but good in these proposals. 
 
 But we must wait and see whether they come back to us from Berlin 
 just as they left Vienna. . . . 
 
 No. lo.— Madame Adelaide to the Prince de Talleyrand. 
 
 Neuilly, July loth, 1833. 
 
 I hasten to thank you for so promptly sending us news of the 
 
 Conference, whieh interests us so much. I must tell you that our beloved 
 King greatly regrets, especially as England is supporting him, that you 
 did not insist more strongly that the adoption and ratification of the twenty- 
 one articles by the five Powers should not again be brought under dis- 
 cussion. He thought that the Conference would at once have declared this 
 to the Dutch plenipotentiaries, and that it would only have dealt with the 
 three reserved articles. He sees with astonishment that instead of this, only 
 those of the twenty-one articles which are in accord with the Dutch scheme 
 are to be initialled, and that the others are to be again discussed, which ap- 
 pears to be in direct contradiction to the engagements entered into with 
 Belgium by the five Powers and formally ratified by a treaty ; so much so, 
 that for his part, he does not see how he could ratify an act sullied by such a 
 contradiction. 1 hasten to let you know this, as I feel sure these reflections of 
 our beloved King cannot fail to strike you, and that your talent and your 
 zeal will enable you to find some means of remedying this first false step, 
 which disturbs us greatly. 
 
 No. II.— No. 83. The Due de Broglie to the Prince de 
 Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, August 1st, 1833. 
 Prince, 
 
 I have received the despatches Nos. 146 and 147, which you did 
 me the honour to write. The information they give as to the progress and 
 the tenor of the negotiation has much interested me. 
 
 A courier from Admiral Roussin informs us that the Russian troops 
 have departed ; this happy piece of news would have given us still more 
 
APPENDIX. 329 
 
 complete satisfaction, if it had not been accompanied by the almost positive 
 confirmation of another fact, which up to now we felt inclined to d,oubt, 
 namely, the conclusion of a defensive alliance between the Porte and 
 Russia. I send you the text of this treaty, such as our ambassador's 
 dragoman was enabled to write it out in haste, from the dictation of Reiss 
 Effendi. 
 
 We are still ignorant as to whether or not this alliance is to be made 
 public. It would, I think, be very little use to decide upon what measures we 
 may have to take in order to prevent the consequences arising from this 
 matter, before knowing all the circumstances pertaining thereto ; but I think 
 that France and England can hardly refrain from demanding explanations 
 from the Porte, as to the reason and aim of so unexpected and serious 
 an act, which cannot be explained by the necessity for protection against 
 foreign enemies, for all the Powers have agreed to protect her, and it therefore 
 seems only for the purpose of paving the way for the intervention of a 
 foreign government in the home disturbances of the Ottoman Empire ; an 
 act, in fact, which may be looked upon as changing the principles admitted up 
 to now with regard to the navigation of the Bosphorus, and as creating in 
 this respect a privilege in favour of Russia, which the other Courts could 
 never consent to recognise. A demand for explanations thus expressed 
 would be an actual protest, the advantages of which I need hardly point out 
 to you. 
 
 Pray speak to Lord Palmerston about it . . . 
 
 No. 12. — The Due DE Broglie to M. Bresson. 
 
 Paris, August i^iA, 1833. 
 Monsieur, 
 
 When you receive this despatch, you will already have learnt the 
 events which have just occurred in Switzerland. Everything seemed to tend 
 towards more friendly relations between the parties which for the last three 
 years have divided the Helvetian Confederation. That which so ardently 
 desired a revision of the Federal compact, and which decreed the emanci- 
 pation of the country of Basle and the outlying districts of Schvi^tz, had 
 already made numerous concessions, and seemed quite disposed to make 
 further ones. Extreme opinions had lost all credit in the Diet of Zurich, 
 which was under the exclusive influence of moderate and conciliatory men. 
 The assembly of Samen appeared latterly for its part to be animated by a 
 wise and peaceful spirit, and conferences were to be held to decide some 
 disputed points.^ 
 
 Unfortunately these satisfactory: feelings were only sincere on one 
 side. Facts speedily proved that the attitude lately assumed by the Cantons, 
 whose delegates were assembled at Sarnen, was only, at least in the opinion 
 of some of their leaders, assumed to hoodwink their too confiding adversaries, 
 and the attacks so unexpectedly made at Kiissnacht and the country round 
 
 1 A civil war broke out in 1831, between the town of Basle and the country surrounding it, brought 
 about by the refusal of the town grand council to allow the inhabitants of the country to return to the 
 old franchise. The Diet intervened, and authoritatively divided the territory of Basle into two parts ; 
 Basle city and Basle country. A similar division had taken place in Schwytz between the original 
 Canton and the districts which had been added to it: La Marche, Einsiedein, Kussnacht, and 
 Pfaffikon. Basle city and Schwytz united with the five Cantons of Uri, Unterwalden, Neufchatel, 
 and the Valois, and tried to form a separate league for the defence of their interests. The six 
 seceding Cantons sent delegates, who first met at Samen, then at Schwytz, and declared themselves 
 independent of the Federal Diet of Zurich. War broke out between the Confederation and the dis- 
 sentients. The latter began by taking possession of Kiissnacht, but they were speedily vanquished. 
 On the 4th of August, the Federal troops gained possession of Schwytz, and on the loth of Basle. 
 
330 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Basle, revealed schemes which loyal men and friends of their country were 
 very far from anticipating. 
 
 Under these circumstances, the Diet has acted with as much energy as 
 prudence. By crushing at its initiation this attempt at a civil war, it has 
 given itself time to concert and provide complete measures for the removal 
 of the dangers which this unforeseen outbreak signalised. The task which 
 it has still to accomplish is no doubt a difficult one ; for in order not to 
 fail in its duty, it must combine prudent circumspection with wise vigour. 
 While endeavouring to make the aggressions of a blind party impos- 
 sible in future, it must hold in check the passions of the opposite party, 
 whose apparently cooled ardour these late events have roused afresh. It 
 must restrain the disorganisers — the systematic innovators only recently so 
 discouraged, and to whom what has just occurred has given fresh chances ; 
 such a task, I repeat, is very ticklish. Nevertheless, the examples of the past 
 give us the firm hope, that supported by the good sense of the Swiss, the 
 Diet will be able to triumph over these obstacles. 
 
 But one would have to look upon them as almost insurmountable, if the 
 dread of foreign intervention were to agitate men's minds, wound national 
 susceptibilities, inspire irritation and exaggeration (which always follow fatal 
 disturbances) in some, and animate others with hopes as dangerous as they 
 are ill founded. No doubt such an intervention is now no longer possible. 
 To be convinced of this, one need only look at the present position of Europe. 
 Nevertheless, as the most unreasonable propositions are often the best 
 received when party spirit is rife — for they find only too ready an echo in 
 turbulent spirits, who utilise them to stir up the masses — the King's Govern- 
 ment has thought that the most efficacious way to contribute to the tranquillity 
 of the Helvetian Confederation, was to declare both by its language and its 
 attitude, the principle from which it is resolved never to depart as regards 
 that country, namely, that to the Swiss alone belongs the right to settle the 
 differences in which they alone are interested, and which foreign interference, 
 no matter of what kind, would render almost insolvable, by making them 
 unnecessarily a European question. 
 
 The Vienna and Berlin Cabinets are too enlightened not to share our views 
 fully as to the impossibility of an intervention ; but I think they do not 
 sufficiently realise the necessity of dispelling the hopes and the fears which 
 may be raised in Switzerland on this subject ; I even fancy, that deceived by 
 inexact reports, they fondly trust to the possibility of moderating and restrain- 
 ing the innovators, by adopting a vaguely threatening and ambiguous tone 
 towards them ; at least it is only in this way that I can explain the proposals, 
 the proceedings, and the perpetual agitation of the Prussian and Austrian 
 envoys. This would be a very dangerous error ; it would be an almost certain 
 means of taking away all credit from the supporters of moderate measures, 
 who would be accused of yielding to foreign dictation, and who to avoid this 
 imputation would be forced to fall in with the extreme opinions which hitherto 
 they have been able to control. 
 
 Do not neglect anything, monsieur, to make the views I have just expressed 
 to you plain to M. Ancillon. Urge him to send instructions in conformity 
 with the spirit of prudence and wisdom which the circumstances demand, 
 both to the Prussian envoy and to the authorities at Neufchatel. I am 
 writing in the same sense to M. de Rumigny, and we would fain believe that 
 in future all the representatives of the Great Powers will adopt this course 
 with the Helvetian Confederation. 
 
 It was with some surprise we learnt that M. de Bombelles^ had noised 
 
 1 Louis, Comte de Bombelles, Privy Councillor to the Emperor of Austria, and Austrian Minister 
 Plenipotentiary in Switzerland. 
 
APPENDIX. 331 
 
 abroad the account of an interview, in which I was said to have expressed 
 to the Austrian Ambassador or Chargi d^ Affaires, an opinion absolutely 
 in conformity with that of his Government as to the danger of introducing 
 the slightest modification into the Federal compact of 1815. This assertion 
 is quite unfounded, and might have too serious consequences for me not to 
 request M. de Rumigny to rectify it ; but I could have wished, in the interest 
 of all, that we had not been constrained to exhibit the dissent which exists 
 between the Great Powers on so important a question. 
 
 No 13. — M. Bresson to the Due de Broglie.i 
 
 Berlin, December lyth, 1833. 
 Monsieur le Due, 
 
 I thank you for making me the mouthpiece of a policy so clear, 
 so loyal, and so national. M. Ancillon will no longer be deceived 
 by the miserable manoeuvres employed to delude him. He, I am sure, 
 regrets his previous insinuations. I did not wish to force his last 
 entrenchments, and accepted his explanations so as to put an end to a painful 
 discussion. I read him the private letter you did me the honour to write. 
 He did not dare openly to blame M. de Mettemich, but it was with difficulty 
 he restrained his indignation. If he is himself wanting in frankness, and if 
 he goes back from his words and his promises, it is not from duplicity, but 
 from weakness. He is incapable of premeditated falsehood. I don't know 
 ■which is most to be admired, M. de Mettemich's perfidy or his want of skill. 
 It would be impossible for any one to fall more completely into his own trap. 
 I shall take care that all this is not ignored or lost sight of in Berlin. 
 
 M. Ancillon said, that in order not to increase the awkwardness of the 
 proceeding to which he had so imprudently committed his Government, it 
 must appear as coming from himself and he must not disavow it. This 
 role has probably been hinted to him from Vienna and St. Petersburg. But 
 the people who surround the King, and whom your energy has intimidated, 
 are profuse in explanations and excuses, which are equivalent to a dis- 
 avowal. Good Prince Wittgenstein is especially amusing ; it is so easy to 
 disquiet him, that I now do all I can to reassure him. He said to Lord 
 Minto : " But how could we possibly dream of a war ? The King would 
 have to place himself at the head of the army, and just see how completely 
 that would upset all his habits ! " The whole of his entourage is composed 
 of very excellent persons, truly pacifically inclined, who only ask to be 
 allowed to end their days in peace. Nothing but the most flagrant provo- 
 cations could rouse them to action. After the King dies, matters will be 
 different, and no one can speak with any certainty as to the Prince Royal's 
 views. But, thank God, we are a long way from that ! The father may 
 easily outlive the son. No one would grieve at this in Prussia. . . . 
 
 Accept. . . . 
 
 No. 14.— The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand.^ 
 
 Paris, January 2nd, 1834. 
 Prince, 
 
 A short time ago, M. de Bacourt informed me that some attempts 
 were being made to bring about more intimate relations between Austria 
 and England respecting Eastern affairs, to which I drew M. de Sainte- 
 
 1 See page 184. See page 202. 
 
332 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Aulaire's attention. This Ambassador, on his side, thought he had noticed 
 more frequent and intimate communications than usual between M. de 
 Mettemich and Sir Frederick Lamb, especially after the arrival of a 
 courier for the latter on the 20th of December. The Austrian Chancellor, 
 without entering into any full explanations with M. de Sainte-Aulaire, 
 expressed the most lively satisfaction at the news brought by this courier. He 
 said, that thanks to the efforts of the French Government to calm England, 
 the London Cabinet now took the same view of the Eastern question as did 
 those of Vienna and Paris. Sir Frederick Lamb appears to have held 
 somewhat similar language to M. de Sainte-Aulaire. All this is very 
 mysterious, and though I believe that the aim of M. de Mettemich's policy is 
 to throw uncertainty into our arrangements, by allowing us to suppose that 
 he has some private understanding with the English Government, I should 
 be glad if you could give us some information as to whether there is any 
 reality in these apparent intimate relations. I need hardly tell you, that so 
 far from being annoyed at a combination which would associate Austria with 
 a policy of guarantee against the ambitious schemes of the Russian 
 Government, we could in the present circumstances only find in it cause for 
 satisfaction. 
 
 No. 15.— The Due de Broglie to the Prince de Talleyrand.^ 
 
 Paris, March lyth, 1 834. 
 Prince, 
 
 I made known to you the resolution come to by the Spanish Govern- 
 ment, to send an army into Portugal for the sole purpose of dispersing the par- 
 tisans of Don Carlos. Mr. ViUiers, seconded in this matter by M. de Rayneval, 
 whose support he requested, has in vain endeavoured to induce M. Martinez 
 de la Rosa to give a more general aim to this expedition, by directing it both 
 against Dom Miguel and Don Carlos. The Spanish Minister however 
 refused, not wishing, as he said, to create fresh obstacles (unless absolutely 
 necessary) to the small body of troops which was about to cross the frontier 
 of the two kingdoms. We have reason to think, and this is also Mr. Villier's 
 opinion, that the dread of displeasing the Northern Powers has greatly 
 influenced M. Martinez's determination. 
 
 It is besides easy to foresee, that the Spanish troops, once on Portuguese 
 ground, may through the force of circumstances find themselves drawn into 
 making common cause with the Pedrists. This consideration has not 
 escaped the Spanish Cabinet. Thus, while M. Martinez de la Rosa, in order 
 to maintain the ground which he thinks he ought to take, has rejected the 
 overtures of M. Sarmento Dom Pedro's envoy, his colleague the War Minister, 
 has discussed with this latter a scheme of combined emigration, without its 
 appearing as such, which, while facilitating the movements of the Spaniards, 
 would place Dom Miguel, as regards his brother's troops, in a dangerous 
 and difficult position. 
 
 If the Spaniards have determined on an enterprise, the consequences of 
 which they have seemingly dreaded for some time, it is because they despair 
 of overcoming England's repugnance to a material intervention in Portugal. 
 Nevertheless, the news we have received from Lisbon might induce us to 
 believe that this repugnance is no longer so absolute. 
 
 Lord Howard, after receiving much more extended powers from London 
 than those with which Lord W. Russell was entrusted, has drawn up a 
 scheme of Convention intended for the pacification of Portugal, which he 
 
 1 See page 227, Note 2. 
 
APPENDIX. 333 
 
 has sent to Lord Palmerston, after having communicated it to M. Mortier 
 as well as to Dom Pedro's minister, who appeared very well satisfied with it. 
 The following are the principal clauses : 
 
 The Queen's Government will accord a full amnesty to all those of her 
 adversaries who, within a given time, take the oath of allegiance to her. 
 Those who refuse to do so will be permitted to sell their effects and quit 
 Portugal. 
 
 The rank of the Miguelite officers will be assured to them with half-pay. 
 
 Dom Miguel will retain his personal fortune and his appanage, or receive 
 an equivalent. Portuguese, French, and English vessels will be placed at 
 his disposal to take him out of the country. 
 
 All disputes which may arise as to the meaning of the stipulations of 
 this treaty, shall be decided by a commission composed of the French and 
 English Ministers and the Swedish Chargd oC Affaires. 
 
 Lastly, if Dom Miguel should refuse these conditions, the English 
 Government will place troops and war-vessels at Dona Maria's disposal, 
 in order to put an end to the hostilities. 
 
 I ought to remark, that in Lord Howard's communication to the Lisbon 
 Cabinet, there never was a question respecting this last clause, and it was 
 probably only through inadvertence, that the English envoy made it known 
 to M. Mortier. You will no doubt deem it advisable, mon Prince, to avoid 
 any mention of it in your interviews with Lord Palmerston. 
 
 What we do not know, and what it is most important that we should 
 know, is, up to what point the views enunciated by Lord Howard are his 
 own, or are connected with the instructions he may have received. I should 
 much like you, if possible, to furnish us with some explanations on this 
 point. The interests of France and those of England are identical, in the 
 double struggle which at this time is devastating the Peninsula. A sound 
 policy therefore prescribes to both Governments joint action there, and as 
 far as we are concerned, we are quite ready to second by every means in 
 our power, the scheme of the London Cabinet for the pacification of Por- 
 tugal, as soon as that Cabinet makes it known to us. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 
 
Begun at Bourbon-l' Archambaud in iSiij and finished at the residence 
 of Madame la Duchesse de Courlande, Chateauneuf, near St. Germain, 
 
 in 1816. 
 
M. LE DUG DE CHOISEUL. 
 
 M. LE DuCDE Choiseul, though wanting in culture, possessed 
 natural talent and ample assurance, and this, together with an 
 illustrious name and a slightly foreign polish, placed him on a 
 footing of equality with the grands seigneurs both of France and 
 Germany. The branch of the House of Choiseul to which he 
 belonged, was attached to the service of the Dukes of Lorraine. 
 His father, the Comte de Stainville, was grand chamberlain to 
 Francis, the last Duke of Lorraine, who became Grand Duke of 
 Tuscany, and subsequently Emperor of Germany, by his marriage 
 with Maria Theresa.^ 
 
 By a curious coincidence, in 1757, M. le Comte de Stainville, 
 the father. Chevalier of the Toison cTOr, was Austrian minister 
 in Paris, while the Comte de Stainville, his son. Chevalier of the 
 Order du Saijtt Esprit, was French ambassador at the Court of 
 Vienna. At the same time, also, another son was abbi com- 
 inandateur and prior of Reuil, while the third son was major of 
 a Croat regiment in the heart of Hungary. 
 
 The treaty of 1736^ having incorporated Lorraine with 
 
 ^ The Emperor Francis (1708-1765) belonged to the House of Lorraine. He 
 succeeded his father, Duke Leopold, in 1729, under the name of Francis IIL In June, 
 1738, he received Tuscany, which the death of the Grand Duke Gaston, the last of 
 the Medicis, had left without a master (1737). In 1736, Francis married the Arch- 
 duchess Maria Theresa, daughter of Charles VI. On the death of her father (1740), 
 the Archduchess claimed the entire succession of the House of Austria, in right of the 
 Imperial Edict, entitled the Pragmatic Sanction ; her claim being contested by- 
 France, gave rise to the war known as the Austrian war of succession. The Imperial 
 dignity, therefore, departed from the House of Austria, and was conferred on the 
 Elector of Bavaria, who took the name of Charles VII. Francis of Lorraine did 
 not become emperor until after the death of the former (1745). He reigned until 
 
 1765- 
 
 * The treaty of Vienna, which put an end to the war of succession in Poland. It 
 recognised the rights of the Elector of Saxony, who was crowned under the title of 
 Augustus III. As for Stanislas Leczinski, whose interests France had supported, h» 
 received Lorraine in compensation, under the condition that at his death that duchy 
 should revert to France. .Stanislas having died in 1766, Lorraine at that period 
 became a French province. 
 
 VOL. V. Z 
 
338 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 France, the House of Choiseul had to return to the birthplace of 
 its ancestors. The young Comte de Stainville began his career 
 as a sub-lieutenant in the Regiment du Roi, and soon after com- 
 manded the Regiment de Navarre. He distinguished himself in 
 the field as a colonel, but he played a still more brilliant part in 
 society. His first successes created a great sensation. M. de 
 Stainville was the lover of Madame de Gontaut,i whose affection 
 for him amounted to distraction. She was the eldest daughter 
 of M. Crozat du Chatel,^ lieutenant-general and Cordon Rouge, 
 under whom the Comte had served in the war of 1740. Madame 
 du Chatel, nde Gouffier, was in the habit of assembling every 
 evening at her house persons distinguished for their wit and 
 ability, such as Madame du Deffant,' Pont-de-Veyle,* and the 
 Chevalier de Curten." M. de Stainville, also, although somewhat 
 inattentive owing to the number of infidelities of which he was 
 guilty towards Madame de Gontaut, never failed to drop in for a 
 few minutes. Correctness in little attentions was one of his 
 principles. M. de Gontaut, one of the favourites of Louis XV., 
 gay and easy-going without much intelligence, qualities most 
 in request in Madame de Pompadour's society, had taken a 
 great fancy to him, but had not yet been able to introduce him 
 into this innermost circle, where a rather unfavourable opinion 
 had been formed of his character. It was currently reported in 
 Madame de Pompadour's circle that Gresset ^ had taken M. de 
 
 ' Antoinette Crozat du Chatel (1728-1747), daughter of the lieutenant-general of 
 that name and of Maria Theresa Gouffier de Heilly, married the Due Charles de 
 Gontaut, younger brother of Marshal de Biron, in 1744. The issue of this marriage 
 was the Due de Lauzun. 
 
 * Louis Fran9ois Crozat, Marquis du Chatel, belonged to a rich family of 
 financiers ; one of its members had recently ennobled himself by buying the Mar- 
 quisate of Du Chatel in Brittany. 
 
 ' Marie de Vichy Chamrond, bom in 1667, member of one of the oldest families in 
 Burgundy, married, when quite young, the Marquis du Deffant, from whom she was 
 shortly after separated. Her salon was for forty years the centre of a witty and dis- 
 tinguished society. She di&d in 1780. 
 
 ' Antoine de Ferriol, Comte de Pont-de-Veyle, born in 1697. His father was 
 President of the Parliament of Metz. He was himself Commissary-General of the 
 Naval Galleys. He wrote some comedies and a number of short poems. He died 
 in 1774, having been Madame du Deffant's friend for over fifty years. 
 
 ^ Maurice de Curten, of Swiss origin, passed into the French service. Born in 
 1692, he entered the army in 1706, became a major-general in 1743, lieutenant- 
 general in 1748, and Grand Cross of the Order of St. Louis in 1757. He died in 
 1766. 
 
 * Gresset, a comic poet, born in 1709 at Amiens, died in 1777. Le Mkliant, 
 which is the best of his comedies, was written in 1747. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 339 
 
 Stainville as one of the principal characters in his comedy of Le 
 Mediant. This, a few bons mots, and a sufficiently pronounced 
 ambition, made him pass for a dangerous man, and probably his 
 brilliant career would have been retarded, if a circumstance, which 
 ought to have increased the disquietude that his appearance 
 caused, had not on the contrary served to put an end to it. The 
 King had shown some preference for a very beautiful woman 
 whom the Comte de Choiseul-Beaupre,^ menin to the Dauphin, 
 had just married ; Madame de Pompadour became very jealous 
 of her. A kind of party had already been formed at Versailles 
 which favoured this intrigue ; and M. de Stainville, who had 
 been badly treated by Madame de Pompadour, and was a relative 
 of Madame de Choiseul, naturally found himself ranged on the 
 side of the new favourite. It is supposed, that later, having him- 
 self paid her court, and finding that she did not possess sufficient 
 esprit and ability for the role he wished her to play, he sacrificed 
 her, and conveyed to Madame de Pompadour, through M. de 
 Gontaut's agency, to be shown to the King, some letters, which 
 in the first moments of her passion she had written to himself 
 And as Madame de Choiseul died most unexpectedly very shortly 
 after, it was also said, that he was not a stranger to her death. This 
 is not the only suspicion of this kind which was entertained against 
 M. de Stainville. Though fully persuaded that none of them had 
 any foundation, I feel some embarrassment in not being able to 
 attribute my motives for this conviction to the morality of his 
 life, being obliged rather to seek for them in the fickleness of his 
 character. Madame de Pompadour, calmed down, looked around 
 her for fresh tools, and passed immediately, rather too quickly 
 perhaps for M. de Stainville's reputation, from the most marked 
 coldness towards him to a degree of interest of which she lost no 
 time in giving him proofs. During these circumstances Madame 
 de Gontaut fell seriously ill, and on her death-bed, she earnestly 
 entreated her young sister, who was then only fourteen years 
 old, to marry M. de Stainville, wishing to carry away with her 
 in death the satisfaction of having assured the fortune of her 
 
 ^ Fran9ois, Comlede Choiseul-Beaupre, was a lieutenant-general and menin to the 
 Dauphin (the term menin was of Spanish origin ; it was a designation given to the 
 six gentlemen who were specially attached to the person of the Dauphin). In 1 75 1, 
 he married Mademoiselle de Romanet, a niece of Madame de Pompadour. 
 
 Z 2 
 
340 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 lover, and likewise, as the excited state of her mind induced her 
 to believe, the happiness of her sister. 
 
 The species of fascination which M. de Stainville exercised 
 over the whole of this family, quickly decided the mother as 
 well as the daughter, and having thus become master of an income 
 of a hundred and twenty thousand francs, he had only to con- 
 sider what steps he should take to enter a career for which his 
 birth, his talents, his energy, and the mediocrity of those who filled 
 the chief places, gave him special advantages. His views 
 inclined to an embassy in Rome. A few flatteries, judiciously 
 addressed to M. Rouille,^ Minister for Foreign Affairs, the support 
 of his brother-in-law, M. de Gontaut, his return to favour with 
 Madame de Pompadour and the degree of dislike that the King 
 still felt for him, all combined to obtain for him this brilliant 
 removal ; and he went to replace M. de Nivernais. The magni- 
 ficence of his first arrival in Rome effaced that of all the 
 ambassadors who had preceded him ; the lavish luxury of his 
 surroundings, the splendour of his house, the choice of his in- 
 timate associates, soon created him the arbiter of all the ecclesi- 
 astical nominations ; he succeeded in gaining the friendship of 
 Benoit XIV.,^ who always spoke of him as Ids dear son, and who, 
 in the frequent and intimate converse he had with him, could 
 never refuse him anything. It was at this time that M. de 
 Stainville conceived those first impressions which have since 
 resulted in the destruction of the order of the Jesuits. The favour 
 which he enjoyed with the Holy Father placed him on an 
 intimate footing with the heads of that order, and one of the 
 General's recorders had imprudently allowed him to see the 
 secret register, in which the Society inscribed all the names of 
 its pupils, with remarks as to their character and sentiments 
 from their childhood upwards ; there, under his own column, he 
 read, that if any important places became vacant, he must be 
 
 1 Antoine Rouille, Comte de Jouy, born in 1689, of an old legal family ; Councillor 
 to the Parliament in 171 1 ; Naval Secretary of State in 1749, and Secretary of 
 Foreign Affairs in 1754. He tendered his resignation in 1757, and was made Chief 
 Superintendent of Mails. He retired in 1758, and died in 1761. 
 
 - Benoit XIV. (Prosper Lambertini) was born at Rome in 1675. He entered 
 holy orders, and was made Bishop of Ancona, then Archbishop of Bologna. He 
 had been Cardinal since 1726. In 1740, he was elected Pope in succession to 
 Clement XII. He died in 1758. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 341 
 
 looked upon as a man who did not and never would like the 
 Society} 
 
 The more friendly relations of M. de Stainville with .Madame 
 de Pompadour, were not of such a nature but that another and 
 an older man should be equally favoured with himself. The 
 Abbe de Bernis,^ an older and more intimate favourite, as am- 
 bassador at Venice was likewise somewhat irksomely paving his 
 way to future elevation. 
 
 M. de Stainville did not fail to profit by the relations be- 
 tween their respective posts, and also some disputes which the 
 Republic of Venice had at that period with the Holy Father, 
 to establish a correspondence, which speedily brought about an 
 intimacy ; so much so, that when the Abbe de Bernis returned to 
 France as the ostensible plenipotentiary of the famous treaty of 
 1756, and immediately after entered the Cabinet as a minister, 
 while awaiting the retirement of M. Rouille, he quite looked upon 
 M. de Stainville as one of his future colleagues in the grand and 
 sudden change about to take place in the political balance of 
 Europe. 
 
 On his part, M. de Stainville, who had had enough by this 
 time of ecclesiastical negotiations, and was devoured by the 
 wish to take part in the great events that were brewing, kept 
 up a very regular correspondence with Madame de Pompadour, 
 carefully executed the commissions for curiosities and other things 
 which Italy might present to him, for the favourite, and obtained 
 through her, leave of absence towards the end of 1756, which 
 enabled him to return to Versailles. 
 
 During the winter, great changes occurred in the Ministry ; 
 
 ^ The Jesuits were in fact expelled from France under the Ministry of Choiseul 
 (1762-1764). 
 
 ^ Fran9ois Joachim de Pierres, Comle de Bernis, was bom at the Chateau de 
 Saint-Marcel en Vivarais (1715), and belonged to one of the oldest families in 
 France. He was early destined for an ecclesiastical career; nevertheless, although 
 be bore the title of abbe from his youth upwards, he did not take the vows till he 
 was forty years of age. He owed his nomination as ambassador to Venice (1752) to 
 the protection of Madame de Pompadour. On his return to Paris in 1755, he nego- 
 tiated, though without holding any official title, the treaty of 1756 with the Imperial 
 ambassador. He was almost immediately made Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs and then Cardinal. Disgraced and exiled in 1757, he came out of his retire- 
 ment in 1764, was made Archbishop of Alby, then ambassador to Rome in 1769. He 
 was dismissed from this office in February, 1791, for having refused to take the oath 
 to the Civil Constitution, and died in 1794. 
 
 ' This is an allusion lo the revolution in the Cabinet, which marked the King's 
 
342 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 it is outside my subject to enter into this ; but I cannot, in passing, 
 refrain from saying that M. d'Argenson's dismissal,^ and that of 
 M. de Machault,^ had a very fatal influence on the war which 
 broke out in 1757. The Abb6 de Bemis was then appointed 
 ambassador to Vienna, a favour which was the natural con- 
 sequence of the treaty he had signed with M. de Stahremberg ; ^ 
 but as the Empress Maria Theresa urgently pressed for the 
 arrival of the French ambassador, and good M. Rouille still held 
 on to office, the Abbe de Bemis, rather than lose the ground 
 or sacrifice his career, got himself nominated ambassador to 
 Madrid, where no very urgent affairs had to be dealt with ; and M. 
 de Stainville was appointed to proceed immediately to Vienna, in 
 his stead. His preparations were speedily made ; all the pomp 
 of his surroundings passed on directly from Rome, and he himself 
 arrived at Vienna in the beginning of August. He found the 
 Imperial Court, hitherto so forlorn, now filled with confidence 
 after the victory of Kollin,* gained by Marshal Daun,' the 
 effect of which had been to raise the siege of Prague ; 
 Marshal d'Estrees® also had just gained that of Hastenbeck ^ 
 
 return to health. During his illness (following Damiens' outrage), Machault and 
 cVArgenson had taken it upon themselves to send Madame de Pompadour away. On 
 her return, she insisted on their dismissal, Machault resigned in favour of Peirenc de 
 Moras, and d'Argenson in favour of his nephew, the Marquis de Paulmy, February, 
 1757- 
 
 ' Marc-Pierre de Voyer, Comte d'Argenson, born in 1696, belonged to an old 
 family of Touraine, which shed a brilliant lustre on the seventeenth and eighteenth 
 centuries. Seven of its members filled high positions in the State. He himself was 
 Lieut. -General of Police (1720), Minister of State (1742), Secretary for War (1743- 
 1757). He died shortly after his dismissal in 1764. 
 
 ^ M. de Machault was at that time Minister of Marine. 
 
 ' George Adam, Prince de Stahremberg, born in London in 1724, was of an old 
 Austrian family. Ambassador at Paris in 1755, he was recalled to Vienna in 1766, 
 and became a State Minister, and later on Governor of the Low Countries {1780). 
 He died in 1807. 
 
 * Kollin, a town in Bohemia of 6,000 inhabitants, situated on the Elbe. The 
 Austrians gained a victory here on the l8th of June, 1757. 
 
 ' Leopold, Comte de Daun, born at Vienna in 1705, became field-marshal in 
 1748. He was Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial forces during the seven years' 
 war. Conqueror at Kollin and Hochkirchen, he was beaten at Leuthen and at 
 Torgau. He died in 1766. 
 
 ■^ Louis le Tellier, Marquis de Courtenvaux and Due d'Estrees, born in 1697, was 
 the grandson of the celebrated Louvois. His mother was the sister of Comte Victor 
 d'Estrees, Marshal of France. He having died without children in 1737, his nephew 
 inherited his name and his title. The Comte, later on Due d'Estrees, was lieut.- 
 general in 1744, and mani^hal in 1757. He lost his command in Germany owing to 
 court intrigues, and di^d in 1771. 
 
 ' Hastenbeck, a village in the Electorate of Hanover. The French victory took 
 place on the 20th July, 1757. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 343 
 
 over the Duke of Cumberland.^ Two months later, M. de Stainville 
 would have found in the Vienna Cabinet evidences of the greatest 
 deference ; but at this period, that Cabinet had assumed a very 
 haughty attitude. The French ambassador was however very 
 well treated by the Empress, and especially well received by the 
 kind Emperor Francis I., who welcomed him as a Lorrainer and 
 the son of his present minister at the French Court. 
 
 But Comte de Kaunitz ^ received him with the utmost cold- 
 ness. The hauteur he maintained during the first interviews, 
 showed M. de Stainville, that he should certainly not find in him 
 the State Secretary of the Papal Court. The insignificant 
 results of the battle of Hastenbeck, compared with the successes 
 which followed the affair of Kollin, and the raising of the siege 
 of Prague, which liberated the forty thousand men who were 
 shut up in that town with Prince Charles,* caused the Austrian 
 Minister to adopt a tone and manner very displeasing to the 
 French ambassador. 
 
 But in the month of November, all this haughtiness and 
 pride vanished in consequence of the two battles gained within 
 five days of each other by the King of Prussia in person ; that 
 of Rosbach * against the French, and the victory over the 
 Austrians under the walls of Breslau.^ The French and Austrian 
 armies were so completely defeated, that it was impossible to 
 say which of the two had been most humiliated. Thereupon 
 reproaches of unfitness were freely scattered on both sides. 
 M. de Stainville, a born satirist, fell with pitiless severity on 
 Marshal Daun, and M. de Kaunitz did not in any way spare 
 
 ^ William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, born in 1727, was the third son of 
 George II. Placed at the head of the English army on the Continent, he was per- 
 petually beaten. He was more fortunate in Scotland, where he defeated Prince Charles 
 Edward. He died in 1 765. 
 
 ^ Wenceslas-Antoine, Comte, then Prince de Kaunitz Rietberg, born in 171 1, 
 Aulic Councillor in 1735, Imperial Commissioner to the Diet of Ratisbon under 
 Charles VI., ambassador at Rome, then at Turin under Maria Theresa, Minister of 
 .State 1749, and ambassador at Paris. On his return he was made State Chancellor. 
 He died in 1794. 
 
 ' Charles, Prince of Lorraine, bom in 1712, was the brother of the Emperor 
 Francis. Field-marshal and commander-in-chief of the Imperial and Hungarian 
 troops, he took part in the wars of the Austrian succession and in the Seven Years' 
 war. 
 
 * Rosbach, a village in the Saxon Electorate near Merseburg. The French were 
 commanded by Soubise. 
 
 * The battle took place within seven kilos, of Breslau, close to the village of 
 Leuthen or Lissa. 
 
344 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 the French generals. The ChevaHer de Curten, an old lieut- 
 general, was then in Vienna, having come thither at the same 
 time as M. de Stainville ; he had a military commission, the 
 object of which was the retaking of the Saxon Electorate, which 
 was to be effected by Soubise's army, jointly with the imperial 
 troops under the command of the Prince de Hildburghausen.^ 
 
 The ChevaHer Curten was considered an excellent officer, and 
 was certainly one of the most amiable and most piquaiit men of 
 his time. His mission, being but a minor affair, was brought to 
 an end by the great events of the war which had just occurred, 
 but he did not trouble much about it. He was constantly asking 
 what had become of the imperial army, to which he received 
 in reply a similar question as to Marshal Soubise's army. So 
 that, notwithstanding all these mishaps, which would inevitably 
 end by some modification of German influence, or by the cession 
 of some provinces, but not as yet by the abdication of any 
 crowned head, or the destruction of a kingdom or an empire,- it 
 was quite possible to pass a winter in Vienna pleasantly enough. 
 When the complaints of M. de Kaunitz became somewhat 
 stronger, M. de Stainville sent the Comte de Montalet to him, 
 and he, under pretence of the greatest zeal, inquired most 
 minutely into the particulars of the great Austrian army, ex- 
 pressing a strong desire to join it, being, he said, destined to 
 have the honour of serving with it. . . . 
 
 Fresh levies were being raised everywhere for this army, and 
 M. de Kaunitz, even while criticising poor Marshal Daun, whom 
 the Empress supported on account of her favourite, Madame 
 de Daun, was secretly advancing towards fortune, a quiet, modest 
 man, whom he had met by chance, and who, a few months later, 
 by raising the siege of Olmiitz,^ became the saviour of the 
 Austrian power. 
 
 M. de Laudon* became the most distinguished man among 
 
 ^ Joseph de Save Hildburghausen, a German sovereign prince, born in 1702, was 
 made field-marshal in the Austrian service in 1735. He commanded an unfortunate 
 expedition against the Turks in 1739. He also took part, without much success, in 
 the Seven Years' war, and died in 1787. 
 
 ^ In allusion to the treaties, imposed later on by Napoleon. 
 
 ^ Olmiitz, an Austrian town in Moravia. The King of Prussia had besieged it, 
 but being unable to take it, had to beat a retreat. 
 
 * Ernest, Baron de Laudon, bom at Tootzen, in Livonia, was originally of a Scotch 
 family, which had emigrated at the beginning of the fourteenth century. He was for 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 345 
 
 all those whom Austria employed during the course of the 
 famous Seven Years' war. For M. de Lascy,^ whose name has 
 been perpetuated by the beautiful letter written to him by 
 Joseph II. when dying, had more talent for organisation than 
 for execution, and showed himself much better fitted to be an 
 able War Minister than a great general. 
 
 The numerous forces which were being assembled, the 
 formation of a large military organisation, and the high 
 hopes which were the result of these efforts and changes, 
 soon permitted M. de Kaunitz to resume that air of careless 
 indifference, which so cruelly wounded M. de Stainville's amour- 
 propre. Sometimes at the theatre, where their boxes were 
 actually side by side, M. de Kaunitz would come in, take his 
 seat with his back to the ambassador's box, and pretend not to 
 perceive until about the fifth act that M. de Stainville was 
 beside him. At another time, when invited to a formal dinner 
 at the French ambassador's, instead of arriving at two o'clock, 
 he would pitilessly keep about thirty people, who by their 
 rank and birth certainly seemed to merit some consideration, 
 waiting until six o'clock, then in the middle of dinner he would 
 suddenly shove aside his plate, smooth the table-cloth in front 
 of him, and drawing a small inkstand or pencil from his pocket, 
 commence writing, leaning half across the table, or else produce 
 a small toilet-case and begin to clean his teeth. . . . 
 
 It was customary to assemble every evening at this minister's 
 house, where his sister, Madame la Comtesse de Ouestemberg, 
 did the honours of his salon fairly well. None of the ministers 
 ever failed to attend, because M. de Kaunitz generally came 
 in about eleven o'clock, which was always a favourable time 
 
 eight years in the Russian service (1731-1739), and then offered his services to 
 Frederick II., who refused them; he then went to Austria, became a general in 
 1757, and field-marshal in 1758 ; he played a glorious part in the Seven Years' war. 
 Called on to undertake a campaign against the Turks in 1788, he died in the midst of 
 his successes on the 7th July, 1790. 
 
 ^ Joseph, Comte de Lascy, born in 1725 at St. Petersburg, came originally from a 
 noble Irish family. His falher was a general in the Russian army. He himself 
 entered the Austrian service, and became field-marshal in 1760, after numerous 
 brilliant successes during the seven years' war. After the peace he entered the Aulic 
 Council, and worked with the Emperor Joseph II. for many years. Entrusted 
 with the command of the troops against the Turks in 17S8, he was beaten, and 
 requested to be replaced by Laudon, notwithstanding that he was his personal 
 enemy. He died in 1801. 
 
346 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 either to speak to him on business, or hear from him the 
 last accounts which came in daily from the army ; he was 
 always privately informed whether the French ambassador had 
 arrived, and if, owing to circumstances, it was irriportant for the 
 latter to see him, he would keep him waiting until an hour after 
 midnight, and at last send a message by his valet to say that he 
 would not appear, without even taking the trouble to invent 
 an excuse. Then M. de Stainville, greatly annoyed, would 
 return home, saying to whoever was present that it was im- 
 possible to do business with such a man. The Empress, who 
 was informed through private sources of M. de Stainville's 
 vexation, lost no opportunity of telling him of M. de Kaunitz's 
 innumerable slights towards herself But she believed and 
 said, that this minister was so indispensable, that she forgave him 
 all his vagaries. The Empress's kindness was so frequently put to 
 the proof, that for some time it was thought that M. de Kaunitz's 
 relations with this Princess were more intimate than mere offi- 
 cial ones would be. It needed all the ^clat of an incident with 
 an opera dancer to prevent this idea from becoming thoroughly 
 established. There was a very beautiful Italian at the theatre, 
 called La Tagliatzi. M. de Kaunitz was publicly known as her 
 admirer. Some rigid moralists of the Court, and Doctor Wasa- 
 Sivieten, out of devotion and possibly also from a secret wish to 
 please, so stirred up the Empress's conscience about this scandal, 
 that she caused even a greater one, by having the dancer carried 
 off one morning and taken across the frontier into Italy, with the 
 strict injunction not to appear again at Vienna. M. de Kaunitz, 
 considering himself outraged, went to the Empress with his 
 resignation in his hand, caused her to change her decision, and 
 La Tagliatzi returned with all the honours of the adventure ; and 
 in order that no one should doubt his triumph, M. de Kaunitz, 
 the next day, drove her in his caleche along all the public 
 promenades of Vienna. No credence must be given either, to 
 the sentiment which the Empress was supposed to entertain for 
 General O'Donnell;^ she loved the Emperor, who was a very 
 
 ^ General Comte Charles O'Donnell, bom in 1715 in Ireland, entered the 
 Austrian service in 1736. Became a lieut. -field-marshal in 1757, Governor-General 
 of the Low Countries after the peace, and later Inspector-General of Cavalry. He 
 died in 1775. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 347 
 
 handsome man, and even forgave his little infidelity with the 
 Princess d'Auersperg ^ for the sake of the children. 
 
 But I am wandering from my subject. The mutual ill-will 
 between these ministers resulted in the two Courts being any- 
 thing but satisfied with the success of their grand alliance. 
 At Vienna, where men were even scarcer than money, they no 
 longer wished to continue the system of a combined army ; the 
 allies agreed to act separately, and Austria, in consequence, 
 claimed the choice of the alternative in the execution of the 
 treaty, which fixed the respective assistance at eighty thousand 
 men or eighty thousand millions. The Empress, who had never 
 for a moment ceased to use all her arts of fascination with M. de 
 Stainville, flattered herself that she would procure the subsidy. 
 She even on this occasion obtained assistance from the Emperor, 
 who always treated M. de Stainville with the familiarity of a 
 compatriot and fancied he had great influence over him. The 
 Empress wrote to Madame de Pompadour. M. de Stahremberg 
 had almost obtained the point through the friendliness of the 
 Abb6 de Bernis, but M. de Stainville's opinion on the matter 
 retarded the decision. Eighty millions, at this period, was a 
 very large subsidy. England, who since then has thrown away 
 enormous sums, only gave Frederick II. fifty thousand pounds 
 sterling,^ and one might say that he earned his money well, and 
 that if France had preserved him as an ally at that price, 
 Austrian influence would not have lasted so long in Germany. 
 Moreover, as it was not desired, either on one side or the other, 
 that these slight differences should prove detrimental to the 
 alliance, the design of a closer and more intimate union was at 
 this time formed, by the proposal of a marriage between the 
 infant Archduchess, Marie Antoinette, who was still in her 
 cradle, and the future heir to the crown of France. 
 
 M. de Stainville on this occasion received a marked proof of 
 favour ; he was created an hereditary duke (and took the title of 
 Due de Choiseul) ; at the same time his brother-in-law, the Comte 
 de Gontaut, was made duke by brevet, a sufficient honour for this 
 
 ^ The Princess Josepha d'Auersperg was the daughter of Jean, Prince de Trautson. 
 Born in 1734, she had married in 1744 Charles d'Auersperg, sovereign Prince of 
 Germany. 
 
 ^ 1,250,000 francs. 
 
348 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 latter, since his son, or rather M. de Stainville's son, since known 
 under the ever brilHant name of Due de Lauzun, was naturally- 
 called to inherit the peerage of Marshal de Biron,^ his uncle. This 
 double favour accorded simultaneously to the two friends was the 
 work of Madame de Pompadour, and as much the fruit of M. de 
 Gontaut's assiduity, as of the regularity of the correspondence 
 of M. de Stainville, who never allowed a courier to depart with- 
 out sending a private letter to the favourite containing a brief 
 summary of his despatches. Madame de Pompadour would not 
 have felt quite so flattered had she known how extensive and 
 confidential was M. de Choiseul's private correspondence. All 
 the couriers took the letters first to Madame de Robecq,^ then to 
 Madame de Luxembourg,^ to the Abbd de Bernis, whose influence 
 M. de Choiseul tried to weaken in his correspondence with the 
 favourite, to M. de Gontaut, to M. de Soubise, to M. de Praslin,* 
 to the Comte de Castellane,^ to M. du Chatelet,^ and to the 
 Chevalier de Beauteville ; '' and in return M. de Choiseul received 
 replies from them which kept him fully advised of all that was 
 taking place in the double intrigues of Versailles and Paris. 
 
 Just then M. de Choiseul had an idea of obtaining a high 
 place at Court. But M. de Gontaut convinced him that those 
 places were burdened with reversions ; he on his part reflected 
 that he would probably not have any children by Madame de 
 Choiseul, whose health was very delicate. This fragile little 
 woman, whose romantic temperament was ten times more ardent 
 
 ^ Louis Antoine de Gontaut, Due de Biron, son of the Marshal Due de Biron, born 
 in 1 701, entered the army, and took part in the Bohemian eampaign as major- 
 general ; became a lleut. -general in 1743, Marshal of France in I757> ^^^ Governor 
 of Languedoe in 1775. He died 1788. 
 
 ^ The Princess Anne de Robecq was the daughter of Marshal Due de Mont- 
 morency-Luxembourg. She married Anne de Montmorency, Prince de Robecq, a 
 lieu t. -general and grandee of Spain. She died in 1760, aged 32. 
 
 ' MadeUne-Angelique de Neufville-Villeroi, Duchesse de Luxembourg (1707- 
 1787). 
 
 •" Cesar, Comte de Choiseul, created a duke and peer in 1762, and known thence- 
 forth under the name of Due de Praslin, born 1712. He became lieut. -general, 
 ambassador at Vienna in 1758, Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1760, and Minister 
 of Marine in 1766. He was exiled in 1770, and died in 1785- 
 
 ' Michel, Comte de Castellane, Governor of Niort, ambassador at the Porte, and 
 major-general in 1762. 
 
 " Louis Florent, Due de Ch^telet-Lomont, born at Semur in 1727. He was a son 
 of the celebrated Madame du Chatelet, so well known, thanks to Voltaire. He was 
 made major-general, and went to Vienna as ambassador. 
 
 ' P. du Buisson, Chevalier de Beauteville, quartermaster-general to the army of 
 Flanders (1745), major-general (1758), minister to Switzerland (1762). 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 349 
 
 than her body had strength, was very exigeante, and very jealous of 
 any woman to whom her husband made himself agreeable. M. de 
 Choiseul therefore failed pretty nearly in anything approaching 
 to an intrigue which he attempted during his sojourn in Vienna. 
 Having received information from M. de Gontaut that Madame 
 de Pompadour was beginning to tire of the Abb^ de Bernis (who, 
 about to become a cardinal, took upon himself to make demands 
 for which his qualifications gave no guarantee), M. de Choiseul 
 altered the tone of his private letters, giving them that special direc- 
 tion which fresh circumstance required. He endeavoured to induce 
 Madame de Pompadour to look upon him as a rival and successorto 
 the Abbe de Bernis, as one upon whom she could always count, and 
 sought to prevail upon the abb6 to accept him as a faithful fellow- 
 labourer, whose services he might command should he succeed in 
 accomplishing the great step it was his secret ambition to attempt. 
 The Abbe de Bernis, sure of a cardinal's hat, began to speak of 
 his ill-health, nevertheless insinuating, whenever he was entreated 
 to remain, that he would be ready to prove his gratitude and his 
 devotion if the supreme control of the Council was given him. 
 For this they had been waiting. Arrangements were made for M. 
 de Choiseul's return, and measures were then devised for investing 
 him with the position which the future cardinal disdained to 
 occupy. M. de Bernis, on his side, proceeded to draw up a long 
 memorandum, in which he tried to prove to the King the necessity 
 of having a Prime Minister who would control the entire work 
 of all the departments with a firm hand. The critical position of 
 affairs was probably favourable to this view. But the King's 
 repugnance to this kind of tutorship was well known to Madame 
 de Pompadour, who, moreover, having now nothing but this iSle to 
 play, without any of the inconveniences of the title, had no wish 
 whatever to be deprived of it. Two months sufficed for all these 
 manoeuvres, and in the beginning of November, when the biretta 
 arrived from Rome, M. de Choiseul came from Vienna to take 
 up the post which the cardinal was about to quit. M. de 
 Choiseul's sudden arrival and the certain amount of discord that 
 prevailed among the views of the parties interested, could not 
 fail to produce very startling contradictions. Thus M. de 
 Choiseul, who in the official announcement in the gazette had only 
 
350 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 been named as an assistant, chosen by the cardinal, to conduct 
 the Foreign Office Department under his direction, and who was 
 not over favourably received by the King, was in the same 
 week created a peer at the opening of the Council, because ot 
 the claim raised by Marshal d'Estrees, that the Marshals of France 
 took precedence of those dukes who were not peers. The 
 cardinal also quitted the minister's official residence, and installed 
 himself in the finest apartments of the Chateau de Versailles, 
 where on the first Tuesday, the day for the ambassadors' 
 audience, he received them with great solemnity in concurrence 
 with the new minister, to whom they then only seemed to go as 
 to the Chief Secretary ; thus M. de Choiseul, Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, duke and peer of France, in the midst of all these 
 honours, appeared only to occupy a secondary post.- 
 
 The cardinal had delivered his memorandum to the King 
 himself, and took possession by main force of the high place of 
 which he thought himself secure. 
 
 The King said nothing, allowed matters to slide, and would 
 no doubt have given in, if Madame de Pompadour, to whom the 
 King had shown the memorandum, and who was greatly offended 
 at it, had not united with M. de Soubise, M. de Gontaut and 
 M. de Belle-Isle,^ in representing the author of it as a very 
 ambitious man, who wished to possess himself of a place, which 
 the personal feelings of the King, his well-known views on this 
 subject, and the last advice of Cardinal Fleury,^ ought to prevent 
 ever being re-established. This method of recalling to him his 
 
 ' 7^ouis Fouquet, Due de Belle-Isle, was the grandson of the celebrated Super- 
 intendent Fouquet. Born at Villafranca de Rouergue in 1684, he entered the army 
 early, and took part in the Spanish campaign as colonel. A major-general in 1719, 
 he was implicated in the trial of Leblanc, Secretary of State for War, accused of 
 peculation, and imprisoned in the Bastiie. Made a lieut. -general in 1732, he received 
 the governorship of Metz and the three bishoprics in 1736, which he retained till his 
 death. Created a Marshal of France in 1741, he very ably conducted some delicate 
 negotiations at Frankfort, where he paved the way for the election of the Emperor 
 Charles VII. Soon after, he distinguished himself in the Bohemian campaign, and 
 at the retreat of Prague (1743). The following year he was made a prisoner in 
 Hanover, and imprisoned for one year in England. In 1757, ^^ w.as made War 
 Secretary, and died in 1 761. 
 
 ^ Andre Hercule, Cardinal de Fleury, belonged to the old noblesse of Languedoc. 
 He was born at Lodeve on June 22nd, 1653. Almoner to the Queen, he was made 
 Bishop of Frejus in 1698. On the death of Louis XIV., he was made preceptor to 
 the new King, over whom he soon gained an immense influence. In 1726, Cardinal 
 Fleury became a State Minister and Postmaster-General, and was soon after created 
 a cardinal. He continued his official duties until his death in 1743. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 351 
 
 own principles, afforded the King evidence of the most sincere 
 attachment to himself and his dignity, and did not fail in its 
 effect. Cardinal de Bernis was sent into exile.i 
 
 Thus this gentle and amiable man, far more fitted for the 
 delights of society than for the deep intrigues of a Ministry, was 
 removed from the chief direction of affairs. His life later on 
 regained some eclat by means of his ecclesiastical position, his 
 large fortune, and the good use he made of it. He finished his 
 career very happily, his last moments being devoted to the care, 
 it might almost be said to the support, of the virtuous daughters 
 of his benefactor. History will say but little about him. 
 
 M. de Choiseul remained in sole charge of foreign affairs. 
 It will not perhaps be uninteresting to learn what use he made 
 of his power, and the position in which he placed France as 
 regards the other Courts of Europe. 
 
 One of the principal acts of his government was the treaty of 
 January, 1759, with Austria. By this treaty, France reduced the 
 subsidy of eighty millions, agreed upon by the treaty of 1756, 
 to forty millions. But through unjustifiable carelessness, a large 
 force, sufficient in fact for a matter of the greatest national interest, 
 was placed at the disposition of Austria. 
 
 It was not till 1761 that M. de Choiseul, alarmed at the evils 
 of every kind experienced by France, tried to shorten their 
 duration by a special peace with England, hoping thereby to 
 bring about one with Germany also. The first mention of 
 these relations had been brought over to London by M. le Bailli 
 de Solar,^ the Sardinian ambassador. 
 
 M. de Bussy ^ was thereupon accredited to Mr. Pitt,* and Mr. 
 Stanley went to France. 
 
 ' November, 1758. 
 
 ^ Ignace Solar de Breille, known under the name of Bailiff of Solar, bom in 1715, 
 a grand cross of Malta. Sardinian Ambassador in France (1758-1765). After the 
 peace of 1763, he received the Abbey of St. Jean-des-Vignes de Soissons. 
 
 ' Fran9ois de Bussy, bom in 1699, entered the Foreign Office in 1725 as Chargi 
 d' Affaires at Vienna, then at London in 1737. Minister Plenipotentiary in London 
 1740 ; Chief Secretary at the Foreign Office 1749. He died in 1780. 
 
 ■* William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, one of the greatest of English statesmen, bom in 
 1708, entered Parliament when he was 21. He was leader of the Opposition until 
 1746 ; became Vice-Treasurer of Ireland and Privy Councillor under the Newcastle 
 Government (1755-1761). In 1766, Pitt was created Earl of Chatham, and entered 
 the House of Lords. He then again took part in public affairs for a short period, and 
 died in 1775. 
 
352 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 Notwithstanding the concessions made by M. de Choiseul in 
 his negotiations with England, it was impossible even to establish 
 the preliminary basis ; Lord Chatham still saw too many happy 
 chances in the war to wish seriously to make peace. He began the 
 negotiations to make himself popular, and he concluded nothing, 
 because he was a statesman. After various attempts of every 
 kind it became necessary to abandon the idea. The only political 
 success gained by M. de Choiseul at this period, and which gives 
 him, as it were, a place in history, was the family compact with 
 Spain,! by which it may be said that France — without weakening 
 her continental position, in fact rather by strengthening it, and 
 without undertaking any onerous burdens — was assured, either in 
 peace or war, of the permanent co-operation of a Power which, at 
 that time, possessed the greatest maritime resources, and the rich 
 treasures of America and India. If this friendly arrangement 
 with Spain had been made at the same time as the treaty of 
 Versailles with the Court of Vienna, it is quite possible that 
 England would never have gained the victories which led to the 
 disastrous peace of 1763. 
 
 This period of our history will no doubt induce political 
 writers, if any such should still exist a few years hence, to 
 ascertain whether, as a general theory, treaties of permanent 
 alliance are of use to the parties which contract them. These 
 sort of transactions are generally supposed to lead to very 
 happy results. Nevertheless, experience has proved, that 
 whenever a Power tries to weigh down the scale in her 
 favour, she introduces into such an agreement a spirit of 
 caution and egotism injurious to the common cause. As 
 soon as the stipulations for friendly relations, assistance, and 
 definite aid have been settled, all efforts are directed to- 
 wards interpreting the clauses, and eluding the demands, in fact 
 to evading the consequences of the engagements just contracted ; 
 and when the casus foederis becomes so self-evident that it can- 
 
 1 This family compact consisted of a Convention signed at Paris on tlie 15th 
 August, 1761, between tlie representatives of France (Choiseul) and of Spain 
 (Grimaldi), by which the Sovereigns of the House of Bourbon, Louis XV., Charles III., 
 King of Spain, Ferdinand, King of the Two Sicilies (son of Charles III.), and 
 Philippe, Duke of Parma (his brother), contracted an offensive and defensive alliance 
 for the rnutual guarantee of their States. This alliance lasted as long as the French 
 monarchy. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEVL. 353 
 
 not be misinterpreted, a thousand circumstances are used as 
 pretexts, to retard the preparation and complicate the execution 
 of the very plainest articles. The ally who is attacked, has had 
 time to lose several provinces before receiving either a single 
 man or a single coin from the other, who ought to have come to 
 his assistance with aid of every kind. Would the four coahtions 
 which have been successively formed since the French Revolution, 
 have so speedily fallen through, if each of the contracting parties 
 had faithfully and in good time used every effort in the interest 
 of the common cause .' 
 
 But even taking for granted the loyalty of the ally whose 
 intervention has became necessary, would not natural obstacles, 
 distance, the delay in raising levies, and the state of the roads at 
 some seasons of the year suffice to render useless such aid, 
 which, if only the half had arrived in time, might have given 
 another direction and different results to most important events } 
 
 For example, Prussia would certainly have made a more 
 vigorous resistance if, before the battle of Jena, the Emperor 
 Alexander's headquarters had been at Custrin.^ 
 
 Among the reasons for the dilatoriness of allies, must also 
 be counted the dislike to seeing their troops, guns, and war 
 material badly employed and their regiments placed at the most 
 dangerous posts ; also to losing their men and money, often with- 
 out obtaining any other advantage from their co-operation than 
 that of assisting at the taking possession of conquests made 
 by their allies. 
 
 A great portion of the inconvenience attached to treaties of 
 alliance between continental Powers might be removed by 
 an understanding between the maritime Powers, and it was 
 on this account that the treaty of 1761 with Spain, although 
 made too late, is still the most able act of M. de Choiseul's 
 Ministry. In fact, it is easy to understand that assistance, even 
 if of no great value, becomes of importance at once, when, trans- 
 ported by sea, as it can threaten various points of the common 
 enemy's territory almost at the same time, and subsequently, 
 
 ^ At the time of the battle of Jena, the Russian army had not yet passed the 
 German frontier. Napoleon had to go in search of it in the heart of Poland, and 
 only reached it in January — that is, three months after the battle of Jena. 
 
 VOL. V. A A 
 
354 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLE YRAND. 
 
 when it becomes a question of arranging the conditions of peace 
 and sharing the fruits of a lucky war, it is possible to take the 
 part of one of the Powers without too greatly injuring the 
 interests of the other. 
 
 However, these few remarks on a question of such vast 
 interest, and one which ought to be treated with the u-tmost 
 care and consideration, are only applicable, as has been 
 seen, in a case where war, following closely on the completion 
 of the treaty, obliges the contracting parties to carry out its 
 clauses. For everyone must look upon an alliance, contracted 
 with deep deliberation and wisdom between Powers of the first 
 rank, with the noble idea of securing a permanent peace, and 
 removing the possibilities of war, as one of the grandest achieve- 
 ments of diplomacy, the only object of which would be to compel 
 by a just and imposing mediation all restless, ambitious, and 
 obstructive Powers seeking to disturb the general equilibrium, to 
 adopt ways of quietness and moderation, and to encourage the 
 free and easy interchange of the products of different countries. 
 
 Nevertheless, it is necessary to exercise great care in a com- 
 pact of this nature, for it must be drawn up in the interest of 
 Europe at large, indeed of everyone. It is indispensable there- 
 fore that this interest should be carefully established and very 
 evident, and it will not be sufficiently so if those, that is the 
 nations whom it affects, are not convinced that the arrangement 
 is for their own special advantage. For, were they to entertain 
 any distrust, all political alliance would become deceptive and 
 even dangerous. In the state of civilization to which Europe 
 has now attained, the tendency of all nations is to stand on a 
 common level ; and if they thought they were being diverted 
 from this path, they would speedily blame their Governments, 
 and work against them with irresistible force. 
 
 Henri IV.'s^ schemes of a Christian alliance, the perpetual 
 
 ^ Talleyrand here recalls the grand scheme of European reorganization so long 
 dreamt of by Henri IV. He wished first to bring about a lasting state of equilibrium 
 in Europe, t>y obliging each nation to keep within its natural frontier. Europe, thus 
 divided into a certain number of States, about equal in size and strength, would then 
 have become a great Christian Republic. A supreme council of deputies from all the 
 Slates was to be charged with the prevention of wars by settling disputes. This 
 scheme of the federation of all Christian nations was Henri IV. 's favourite topic 
 of conversation with .'lully ; but he had not the time, nor probably the intention, of 
 carrying it out in reality. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEuL. 355 
 
 peace of I'Abb^ de Saint-Pierre,^ were planned during a period 
 when the Governments possessed the entire confidence of their 
 people. These left it to their Sovereigns to provide for and 
 direct their destinies. The Sovereigns on their side, possessed 
 all the power requisite to conduct such great interests. The 
 great State bodies were but the auxiliaries of this power, and if 
 sometimes they tried to diminish its action, they never went so 
 far as to expose it to the discretion of the people. The concep- 
 tion of sovereignty was very complete in men's minds, presenting 
 itself everywhere as a tutelary power, against which no resist- 
 ance was legitimate. 
 
 During such a period it was possible to create political 
 systems, and that which the great soul of Henri IV. had con- 
 ceived might have been carried into execution. 
 
 But the progress of civilization, by raising the middle 
 classes, diminished the distance which divided them from the 
 Government. They began to examine its structure and its acts ; 
 ere long, criticism arose and brought on distrust, the result of 
 which was, that more sincerity and ability were needed in 
 governing the people than were formerly necessary. Under 
 such circumstances, therefore, it would require great skill and 
 foresight to form one of those alliances, whose only object would 
 be to guarantee universal peace. 
 
 I pause here, surprised that I should have been unable to 
 resist the attraction of generous views, which have caused me to 
 go outside the circumscribed matter within which I ought to have 
 remained. 
 
 M. de Choiseul's inherent pride, his almost unlimited and 
 uncontrolled power, and the carelessness of his habits, made him 
 despise those countries too much where civilization had only 
 just dawned. He disdained to notice the changes that were 
 then taking place in the north, and could not be induced to 
 consider Russia in any way. That Power, meanwhile, began, by 
 a sort of instinct, to follow the policy which led her towards 
 the centre of Europe, the tendency of which (without having 
 
 1 Charles Castel, Abbe de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743), celebrated for his plan of a 
 perpetual peace. He had taken up Henri IV. 's ideas, and spent his life in submitting 
 various schemes of reform to the different ministers. 
 
 A A 2 
 
3S6 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 as yet a decided object) was to arrive at a point where she 
 would one day exercise a preponderant and dangerous influence 
 on the xffairs of the Continent. He did not realize how far the 
 advantageous relations which England was beginning to open up 
 with that Power might extend, and as a result of this blindness, 
 he tried to foster a misunderstanding between Sweden and 
 Denmark, whereas he ought to have endeavoured to bring these 
 two small Powers together, as they, with the assistance of France, 
 were alone capable of closing at will the commercial com- 
 munication which, from force of circumstances, must closely 
 unite Russia with Great Britain. He at the same time showed 
 his contempt for the Court of St. Petersburg in the most offen- 
 sive manner. He recalled the old Marquis de I'Hdpital,! who 
 enjoyed great consideration and even some favour at the hands 
 of the Empress Elizabeth.^ He replaced him by the Baron de 
 Breteuil, a simple minister plenipotentiary, to whom he gave such 
 stringent orders, as rendered it impossible for him to proiit by the 
 advantages that might be expected from the fall of the Comte 
 de Bestucheff,* a declared partizan and probably a pensioner of 
 England. Nevertheless, all attempts to incense the Empress 
 Elizabeth proved futile. She, of her own accord, gave explana- 
 tions respecting the want of consideration shown towards 
 herself 
 
 But her unexpected death gave the throne to Peter HI.,* 
 whose inclinations were totally opposed to those of his aunt. He 
 was secretly attached to the military service of the King of 
 Prussia, and had received direct, without their passing through 
 
 ^ Paul de Galuccio, Marquis de I'Hopital, de-^cended from a noble family of 
 Neapolitan origin, born in 1697, entered tlie army, and l)ecame a lieutenant-general in 
 1745. Ambassador at Naples in 1739, he went on to St. Petersburg. He died 
 in 1776. 
 
 ■■^ Elizabeth, daughter of Peter the Great, bom in 1709, succeeded the Empress 
 Anne in 1741, and died in 1761. 
 
 ^ Alexis Bestoujet-Rumine or Bestucheff, descended, it was said, from an English 
 family who had migrated to Russia in the fifteenth century, was born at Moscow in 
 1693. He first took service with the Elector of Hanover, who when he became King 
 of England sent him as Ambassador to St. Petersburg. He then entered the Russian 
 service, was sent as Minister to Copenhagen, then Minister of State under the 
 Empress Anne, and Grand Chancellor under the Empress Elizabeth. Exiled in 1757, 
 he was recalled by Catherine in 1762, and died in 1766. 
 
 * Peter HI., son of the Empress Anne and nephew of Elizabeth, married, in 1746, 
 Sophie d'Anhalt Zerbst, known later as Catherine the Great. He succeeded to the 
 throne on 5th January, 1762, was deposed a few months later, an-ested, and strangled 
 in his prison (July, 1 762) 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 357 
 
 any intermediary hands, and with certain mysterious formulas, 
 the successive ranks of captain and colonel. That of general, to 
 which he was promoted on his succession, and the uniform of 
 which he at once wore, seemed to him the very height of glory. 
 He at once sent orders to the general of his army, which was 
 fighting against the King of Prussia, to range himself on his side 
 and to continue the war, under his direction, against the Austrians.^ 
 
 This extraordinary policy was, unfortunately for the Prince, 
 associated with one still more dangerous, namely, his manifest 
 intention to repudiate his wife, the famous Catherine IL, who 
 did not long allow him to give himself up to all the eccen- 
 tricities to which the disordered state of his mind inclined him. 
 
 M. de Choiseul's indifference to all that was passing in 
 Russia was so great, that at the time of Peter III.'s violent 
 death, the only Frenchman accredited to St. Petersburg was 
 the Abb6 Duprat, Baron de Breteuil's secretary, whom he had 
 left there as Chargi cP Affaires. It was this Abb6 who collected 
 all the details which M. de Rulhiere, then at Warsaw with the 
 Baron de Breteuil, transmitted to us as if he had been the actual 
 eye-witness of a piece of work, or rather a piece of news, written 
 with great elegance, but in which exactitude played but a 
 secondary part. 
 
 A fresh reign, a new minister and a very enterprising 
 Sovereign, however, compelled France to have a real diplomatic 
 agent at St. Petersburg, and M. de Choiseul found himself 
 obliged to order the Baron de Breteuil, who had come home on 
 leave, to return to his post. But faithful to the policy he had 
 adopted of humiliating the Sovereign, though doing nothing to 
 check the policy of the country, he gave M. de Breteuil no other 
 instruction than to ask the new Empress to send him the 
 Reversale, by which the Empress Elizabeth, on receiving from 
 France the title of Empress, had consented not to claim any 
 other rank, as regards France, than that accorded to the Czars 
 of Muscovy.^ 
 
 ^ The treaty of peace between Prussia and Russia is dated May 5th, 1762. 
 
 ' Until the reign of Elizabeth, the Russian Sovereigns were only recognized officially 
 under the title of Czars of Muscovy. In 1745, Elizabeth determined to obtain her 
 recognition as Emprefs by the Courts. For this purpose she signed an' Act, called the 
 Feversale, in 1745 with France, by which Louis XV., " out of friendship, and as a special 
 favour to her, condescended to recognize the Imperial title." In return, the Empress 
 
358 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 As what I am now writing is more the sketch of an epoch, 
 taken as a whole, than an historical picture of facts, all I must 
 guard against is not to mix up, in the impressions I wish to 
 give, the period when M. de Choiseul's power was not unlimited, 
 with that in which he was absolute master of France. 
 
 Peace had become a general necessity in Europe, and as 
 treaties were then faithfully kept, it was easy to establish 
 friendly relations between States who had hitherto been belli- 
 gerents. The occupation of a conquered country was not 
 prolonged after peace was declared, as has been witnessed in 
 later days ; the independence of each country was com- 
 pletely restored, and the ruinous consequences of war ceased 
 with it. 
 
 The death of George 11.,^ King of England, permitted the 
 question of peace to be seriously entertained. His successor, 
 George 11 1. ,^ accustomed to be on the most intimate terms with 
 the Earl of Bute,^ who was his governor during the time he was 
 Prince of Wales, accorded him such complete and full confidence 
 on his accession to the throne, that he at once sent for him in 
 place of Lord Chatham. The Earl of Bute, having been made 
 Prime Minister, hoped, through his personal interest, to secure 
 to England, by a peace of which he would gain the credit, 
 all the immense advantages which had accrued to her from 
 the war. He therefore spoke of the possibility of coming to 
 an understanding, and at the instigation of the Bailli de Solar, of 
 whom mention has already been made, he placed full confidence 
 in the overtures made to him, and added some eclat to a fresh 
 
 did not claim, as regards France, any other rank of precedence than that of Czarina 
 of Muscovy. On the 3rd December, 1762, Catherine declared that the Imperial title 
 had always belonged to the Czars, and that she would refuse to enter into relations 
 with those States v/ho did not recognize her as Empress. Breteuil received orders 
 to confirm the Reversale of 1745, reminding her of the definite condition which 
 Catherine seemed disposed to forget. Spain folluwed his example. (See a series of 
 memorandums on this subject in Martens' Recucil de Traitis). 
 
 ^ George II., King of England, son of George I., born in Hanover in 1683, 
 ascended the throne in 1727, and died in 1760. 
 
 ^ George III., King of England, grandson of George II., born in 1738, succeeded 
 his grandfather. He became insane in 1810, and died in 1820. 
 
 ' John Stuart, Earl of Bute, born in Scotland in 1713, was elected a Scotch 
 representative peer in 1737. Gentleman of the Bedchamber to the future King 
 George III., he was intrusted with his education {1751). On his pupil's accession, 
 he was called to the Council as Secretary of State and Lord of the Treasury (1761). 
 He signed the treaty of 1763, and seemed to be at the zenith of his power, when he 
 suddenly resigned. He died in 1 792. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 359 
 
 negotiation by sending the Duke of Bedford ^ to France. The 
 compliment was returned by sending the Due de Nivernais to 
 London. The former had Mr. Hume ^ as secretary of legation, and 
 the latter was accompanied by the Chevalier d'Eon ^ in the same 
 capacity. Notwithstanding these little incongruities, which always 
 bring M.de Choiseul's carelessness to the front, the treaty advanced 
 with such speed, that it was ready for signature in the beginning 
 of September 1763. It would indeed have been signed, if the 
 Spanish plenipotentiary, M. de Grimaldi,* had not opposed it, 
 under the belief that the English were about to receive a severe 
 check in Havannah. The check did not occur ; the English took 
 Havannah, and it was necessary, ere getting it back, to give them 
 Florida, for which M. de Choiseul indemnified Spain by ceding 
 Louisiana to her. All was agreed to, and peace was signed at 
 Fontainebleau on November 2nd, 1763.^ 
 
 It is almost impossible in these days to believe in the inter- 
 vention in so important a negotiation, of the Bailli de Solar, the 
 representative of a Government which, in our time, without the 
 
 ^ John Russell, fourth Duke of Bedford (1710-1771), was First Lord of the 
 Admiralty in 1 744. He retired in 1751, and was made Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, 
 and Lord Privy Seal in 1761. On his return from Versailles, where he had gone to 
 negotiate the treaty of Paris, he entered the Grenville Cabinet, where he remained 
 until his death. 
 
 " David Hume, English historian and philosopher, born at Edinburgh in 1711. 
 He was Secretary to the Embassy at Vienna and at Turin. He went to Paris in 
 1763, as Secretary to the Marquis of Hertford, the English Ambassador, and not in 
 1761 with the Duke of Bedford, as stated above. He died in 1776. 
 
 ' Charles d'Eon de Beaumont, called the Chevalier d'Eon, was bom at Tonnerre in 
 1728. A singular celebrity has attached itself to his name ; his sex was for a long 
 time a matter of doubt, and if it is now affirmed that he really was a man, public 
 opinion, on the faith of lying confessions, considered him, for a lengthened period, to 
 be a woman. The Chevalier d'Eon was one of the most stirring agents of the secret 
 diplomacy of Louis XV. After a mission to Russia and a short sojourn with the 
 army (1758), he was sent to London in 1762 as Minister ad interim. He was very 
 unwilling to give place to the Comte de Guerchy, the new Ambassador. This was the 
 commencement of a series of endless adventures and complical ions. Possessed as he 
 was of the King's secrets, he for several years trifled with the King and his Ministers, 
 lived in the most magnificent style while in London, and obliged the King in the end 
 to give in. Louis XVL permitted him to return to France. He soon after went back 
 to England, where he died in 1810. 
 
 * Don Geronimo, Due de Grimaldi, grandee of Spain, bom at Genoa in 1720. 
 He entered the diplomatic service, and was Ambassador to Paris in 1761, Minister 
 of Foreign .Affairs in 1764. He tendered his resignation in 1776, and died in Italy 
 in 1786. 
 
 * By this disastrous peace, France ceded nearly all her colonies to England : 
 Canada, all ihe islands and coast of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the whole of India. 
 She again raised the fortifications of Dunkirk, and evacuated Hanover, Hesse, and 
 Brunswick. 
 
360 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 opposition of a single European Cabinet, has been excluded from 
 among the number of the Great Powers. 
 
 The peace concluded with the King of Prussia, followed in 
 the course of a few weeks by that with England, ere long brought 
 about one between Prussia and the Court of Vienna.^ Thus 
 ended the famous Seven Years' war, which our forefathers found 
 so full of important issues, but which has paled sensibly before 
 the present generation, in face of the great struggles it has been 
 called upon to witness. 
 
 The following year Madame de Pompadour died, and no 
 apparent change was visible either at home or abroad. The 
 death of this woman, who for so many years had played the part 
 of Prime Minister — who in revenge for some proposal or some 
 verses written against her by Frederick IL, had been the real 
 author of the alliance between the Houses of France and Austria, 
 the consequence of which might have been to annihilate the 
 weak counterpoise that Prussia was beginning to bring into the 
 affairs of Europe — who by a breath had overthrown the Cardinal 
 de Bernis, for the crime of having for one moment contemplated 
 occupying the position which the Bishop of Frejus ^ had held at 
 the beginning of that reign — the death of this woman, I repeat, 
 was scarcely news for France, and did not even cause any disturb- 
 ance in the King's household. 
 
 Fallen completely for the last five years under the influence 
 of the Due de Choiseul, Hash, tired of all her pleasures, some- 
 times opposed by the very man whom she had raised so high, 
 and who had betrayed one of her friends, Madame d'Amblimont,* 
 and driven away the other, Madame d'Esparbes,* by publicly 
 insulting her ; still further humiliated by the kind of superiority 
 which Madame de Gramont ' and Madame de Beauvau ^ had 
 assumed in the King's private circle, at which she had now 
 
 ^ The treaty of peace between Prussia and Austria was signed at the Chateau de 
 Hubertsbiirg, near Leipzig, February 15th, 1763. 
 
 2 Cardinal de Fleury. 
 
 ' Probably Marie-Anne de Chaumont-Quitry, married in 1754 to Claude de 
 Fuchsamberg, Comte d'Arablimont. 
 
 '' Mademoiselle Toinard de Jouy, married to the Comte d'Esparbes de Lussan, 
 Major-general and governor of Montaubon. She died at a very advanced age. 
 
 ° Beatrix de Choiseul- Stainville, Duchesse de Gramont, sister to the Due de 
 Choiseul. 
 
 * Marie Sylvie de Rohan Chabot, Marechale and Princesse de Beauvau Craon. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 361 
 
 only the sad privilege of doing the honours ; overcome by- 
 infirmities which for a long time had driven Louis XV. from her 
 couch, and likewise him who had sought her favour, Madame de 
 Pompadour quitted this life without regret. 
 
 The King continued indifferent ; he even seemed to be rather 
 relieved than grieved at this change in his mode of life, and the 
 loss of a tie which among crowned heads generally replaces natural 
 likings. He only retired during two evenings for decency's sake. 
 On the third day, when he returned from hunting at Rambouillet, 
 after receiving his courtiers at his d^bott^ as usual, he went up 
 to Madame de Pompadour's apartment ; the room was exactly 
 the same, the bed alone had been removed. There he found 
 Madame de Gramont, Madame de Beauvau, M. de Choiseul, M. 
 de Gontaut, M. de Chauvelin,^ and other persons belonging to 
 his private circle. The name of the woman who had occupied 
 this apartment for eighteen years, and who had introduced there- 
 in all that had made the home life of the King, was no longer 
 mentioned. 
 
 Dating from that period, everything succumbed to the rule 
 of M. de Choiseul, whose audacity and will met with neither 
 check nor opposition. His career had reached its zenith ; he 
 changed ministers, recalled ambassadors, disquieted all the 
 Cabinets of Europe, braved the heir to the throne, set aside 
 parliamentary decrees, and restored decrees of council ; issued 
 proclamations, gave lettres de cachet, won for himself every 
 species of favour, and handed France over to his friends. It was 
 not until 1768, that a slight cloud on the horizon began to 
 menace him from afar. 
 
 An almost obscure individual was working, certainly quite 
 unintentionally, to put an end to this career, which seemed so 
 firmly established. 
 
 M. du Barry,^ a small proprietor of Toulouse, was living a 
 
 ■^ The Chevalier Bernard de Chauvelin was a brigadier in I774. lieutenant- 
 general in 1749, commandant of Corsica, then Minister at Genoa, Ambassador at 
 Turin in 1753, and Master of the King's Household in 1765. He died in 1773. 
 
 ^ Comte Jean du Barry-Ceres, bom at Levignac, near Toulouse, belonged to an 
 obscure family. Having come to Paris and being unable to enter the diplomatic 
 service, he contrived to realize a large fortune by the sale of supplies and provisions. His 
 brother was Comte Guillaurae du Barry, husband of Madame du Barry. On the 
 death of Louis XV. he hastened to quit France, but soon returned and lived at 
 Toulouse. He fell a victim to the guillotine there in 1794. 
 
362 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 somewhat disreputable life in Paris. Intimately associated with 
 all the shady intrigues of the times, he sought by their means to 
 lead an existence of daily dissipation, on a scale of luxury 
 scarcely to be conceived. 
 
 He had constituted himself a giver of suppers to women of 
 ill fame, of whom he always supported one or two, passing them 
 on to other men when he thought he could by so doing gain 
 some advantage. At first his connections of this nature did not 
 extend beyond the oflSces of the ministers, for in that society he 
 found slight favours were readily accorded, or promises made, still 
 more readily fulfilled, by the dupes from the country who always 
 abound in the capital. 
 
 He introduced himself as a general provider to Mar^chal de 
 Richelieu ^ and the Due de Duras.^ He had even enticed them to 
 some of his more select suppers at which were assembled M. de 
 Thiard,^ the Chevalier de Durfort,* the Comte de Bissy,^ the 
 Abbd de Mastin, M. de la Tour du Pin,® and several witty men 
 of letters, such as Moncrif,^ the Abbe Arnaud, Cailhava,^ his 
 
 ^ Armand Duplessis, Due de Richelieu, was the grand-nephew of the great 
 Cardinal. Born in 1696, he was a mousquetaire atDenain in 1712. Ambassador at 
 Vienna 1724. Lieutenant-general in 1744, he distinguished himself at Fontenoy and 
 at Kaucoux. Ambassador at Dresden, Marshal of France {1748), Govenor Guienne 
 (1 755)- Commanded the expedition to Minorca in 1756, and the army of Hanover in 
 1757. He died in 1788. 
 
 ^ Emmanuel de Durfort, Due de Duras, born in I7IS> belonged to an old family of 
 Guienne. His father was a marshal of France. He himself became a lieutenant- 
 general in 1748, Ambassador to Spain 1751, first gentleman of the bedchamber 1757, 
 became a marshal in 1775, and died in 1789. 
 
 ' Henry Comte de Thiard, nephew of Cardinal de Bissy, born in 1726. Brigadier- 
 General 1760, lieutenant-general, and chief equerry to the Due d'Orleans 1762. He 
 had a command in Provence 1782, then in Brittany 1787, was arrested in 1798, and 
 guillotined on the 9th Theimidor, year II. 
 
 * The Chevalier Joseph de Durfort-Boissiere, born in 1 745, was a captain in the 
 Regiment of Chartres. 
 
 ^ Claude de Thiard, known under the name of Comte de Bissy, was brother of 
 the Comte de Thiard. Bom in 1721, he became lieutenant-general in 1670, and 
 commandant in Languedoc. He was member of the Academy. He died in 18] 8. 
 
 " The family of La Tour du Pin belonged to the old noblesse of Dauphine. The 
 Marquis Philippe, born in 1723, became a lieutenant-general in 1788. Obliged to 
 give evidence at the Queen's trial, his testimony caused him to be suspected and 
 arrested; he was guillotined soon after {1794). His brother Comte Louis, bom in 
 1725, was major-general and chamberlain to the Due d'Orleans. He emigrated, and 
 did not return to France until the Restoration. 
 
 ' Fran9ois Paradis de Moncrif, so called after his mother (Moncriefif), who was an 
 Englishwoman. He was secretary to Comte d'Argenson, then to the Comte de 
 Clermont, reader to Queen Marie Leczinska, and secretary to the Due d'Orleans. 
 He wrote several novels, comedies, and operas, entered the Academy in 1733, and 
 died in 1770. 
 
 ^ Jean Cailhava, born at Estandous near Toulouse (1731), wrote all his life for 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 363 
 
 compatriot Robbd/ who told amusing stories, also actors of 
 dramatic proverbs ; Goy, better known under the name of My 
 Lord Goy ; in fact, every one who could in any way assist in 
 making these evenings amusing. His assiduity in discover- 
 ing debutantes in gallantry had brought him in contact with the 
 celebrated Lebel, the King's head valet and provider in ordinary 
 for the so-called pare aux cerfs. These two poachers had often 
 met on the same paths, and M. du Barry felt no scruples at 
 placing himself under the orders of the head contractor. 
 
 In the winter of 1767—68, after a very dejected conversation on 
 the difficulties of the times as regarded their business, especially 
 in doing it well, M. du Barry mentioned to Lebel a young 
 person who had been with him for four years, but who he under- 
 took should in a few days regain that innocent deportment which 
 the King's age required. 
 
 Lebel, either carried away or at his wit's end, accompanied him 
 and saw Mademoiselle L'Ange,^ the name under which she was 
 then known. After paying her several visits privately one after 
 the other, he speedily made up his mind. Du Barry, an apt 
 assistant in these sort of enterprises, lost no time in constructing 
 a scheme in which Lebel could co-operate. 
 
 L'Ange had a young cousin, not very pretty, but possessing 
 a good figure, and very agreeable, who was her companion 
 both at home and abroad. The Marquis d'Arcambal, com- 
 mandant of Corsica, was in love with her. Through M. 
 d'Arcambal and some clerks in the War Department, M. 
 du Barry had procured the contract for the supplies in 
 Corsica for a man named Nalet, a very good thing, by which 
 he, Du Barry, had covered his expenses for the last two 
 years. He told L'Ange to humour Lebel's wishes, and promise 
 him a successful issue if he could introduce her to the King's 
 favour, and procure a place as farmer-general for Nalet, who would 
 
 the theatres, and left a number of pieces, comedies, dramas, and operas. He died 
 in 1813. 
 
 ^ Pierre Robbe de Beauveset, born at Vendome 1712. He wrote several frivolous 
 poems, but more particularly known for his profane and licentious tales ; he died 
 in 1792. 
 
 ^ Marie Jeanne Gomart de Vaubemier, Comtesse du Barry, bom at Vaucouleurs 
 in 1746. On the death of Louis XV., she was exiled to the Abbaye de Pont aux 
 Dames, near Meaux. She quitted this soon after and retired to her country house at 
 Luciennes. She was guillotined in 1 793. 
 
364 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 marry her ; that then everything could be arranged. Lebel, who 
 did not wish a husband mixed up in the affair, said it would be 
 quite sufficient to call him a cousin ; but as M. du Barry insisted 
 on the marriage, and as Nalet was in Corsica, it was decided to 
 present her to the King as a married woman, but one who had 
 only gone through the religious ceremony, and had not lived with 
 her husband. Lebel thereupon invited her, together with her 
 cousin, to sup with him at Versailles. The King, through a glass 
 door, at no great distance from the table, was able both to see 
 and hear her, doubtless an ordinary practice of his at such 
 preliminaries. The first impression was very favourable. Their 
 behaviour and conversation had been all planned by a master's 
 hand, and each one played their part to perfection. A fancy to- 
 wards a woman married but yet a virgin induced the King to 
 order Lebel to invite her a second time. At this point M. 
 du Barry confided this adventure to Marshal de Richelieu, 
 who advised him, instead of making L'Ange Madame Nalet, to 
 marry her to his own brother, M. Guillaume du Barry, and to 
 carry out a little romance, rather clumsy in the main, but which he 
 thought capable of the development it afterwards assumed. It 
 was no longer therefore an aspirant for the pare aux cerfs who 
 was presented to the King, but a lady of position ; it was even 
 deemed advisable that she should not appear to be badly off. 
 M. du Barry exhausted the chest of the Corsican supplies in 
 order to provide an elegant wardrobe, a grand equipage and rich 
 liveries for her whose future rdle was not as yet well assured 
 She nevertheless made her first appearance at Compiegne with 
 this imprudent ^clat. She lodged in the town, kept very much at 
 home during the day, and did not go out till about midnight, 
 when she drove to the chateau, where she slept, returning each 
 morning in the same carriage followed by two servants. It is 
 probable th?.t the police reports, which might have revealed the 
 whole plot to the King, were diverted by Lebel, or possibly the 
 information only reached him after his fancy had become a 
 confirmed passion. 
 
 M. de Choiseul, fully aware of all that was passing, was some- 
 what disquieted ; but he only exhibited disdain, expressing 
 himself in very contemptuous terms, all of which were carefully 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 365 
 
 repeated to the King by Madame du Barry herself. Her be- 
 haviour and the course she adopted only served to increase the 
 King's infatuation, and incense him still further against the 
 obstacles which his weakness foresaw. The death of Lebel still 
 further increased the ascendency of the favourite. As she had 
 had the skill to let the King see that she was quite independent 
 of that confidant, and had shown herself superior to the sub- 
 ordinate part for which she was originally intended, all that 
 Lebel had said in her praise, up to the last moment, was regarded 
 by the King as a kind of dying testament, dictated by the con- 
 science of a most faithful subject. The cousin who had 
 remained with M. du Barry, therefore, was believed by the King 
 to be that Mademoiselle L'Ange who had been talked of ; in fact, 
 a regular state of confusion was created in this unfortunate 
 Prince's mind, which blinded him completely, and made him 
 reject as absurdities or calumnies all attempts made to enlighten 
 him as to the real state of affairs. 
 
 Her stay at Compiegne having ended, the Countess Guillaume 
 du Barry returned to Paris and went back to Comte Jean, now her 
 brother-in-law, without having received a single proof of her 
 royal lover's generosity, not even the smallest present ; so much 
 so, that the disinterested and impassioned air she knew how 
 to assume had succeeded in convincing the King that with her he 
 had found the supreme happiness of being loved for himself alone. 
 At the end of a few weeks the resources of the Corsican 
 commissariat chest began to run low. By the advice of her 
 brother-in-law, Madame du Barry had the audacity to ask M. 
 de Choiseul in Paris for an advance of money for her pivtegS 
 Nalet. She accompanied her request by some friendly overtures. 
 M. de Choiseul, true to his pride and his licentiousness, 
 committed the double blunder of rejecting her advances, saying 
 that he knew nothing of what occurred outside his department, 
 and at the same time granting her more than she asked for. All 
 however would have been lost without this slight help. 
 
 Marshal de Richelieu, who had been kept au courant by M. 
 du Barry, judging that a considerable change was then about to 
 take place at Court, thought there was no longer any danger 
 either to his position or his purse, in coming to the front, and 
 
366 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 he undertook to carry through the request for Madame du Barry's 
 presentation, by telling the King that he was acquainted with the 
 Du Barrys, that they were of good family, and that in his province 
 they were respected as equal to the first families in the country. 
 
 By means of a small monetary bribe and extensive promises, 
 Madame la Comtesse de Bearn,'^ a woman of position, was 
 induced to present at Court the new favourite, who however did 
 not appear in public except on that one day at Versailles, but 
 occupied herself in private, by quietly preparing for the demon- 
 stration in her favour on the occasion of the journey to 
 Fontainebleau. The King, on his side, carried away by his 
 inclination and gaining confidence by the unexpected success of 
 the presentation, thought that by changing the scene, a fresh 
 departure could be introduced. When making his arrangements 
 with M. de la Suze, the Grand Chamberlain, as to the distribution 
 of apartments at Fontainebleau, he reserved for himself, 
 without any explanation, those formerly occupied by Madame 
 de Pompadour, had the doors of communication with his own 
 apartments, which had been walled up, reopened, and the day 
 after his arrival at this new abode, some servants and the 
 women of Madame du Barry arrived there without any fuss. 
 Two days later she herself was established there. 
 
 Madame de Gramont and Madame de Beauvau, who were 
 invited to a private supper the same evening, made some excuses 
 to avoid going. This had been fully expected, as the scornful 
 remarks showered on the new favourite by these ladies, who had 
 been so indulgent to Madame de Pompadour, were well known, 
 and care had been taken to secure some other ladies, better 
 satisfied with themselves and not holding their heads quite so 
 high, among the first Madame de B^arn, the Marichale de 
 Mirepoix,^ and the old Princesse de Talmont,^ who was a cousin 
 of the late Queen. Courtiers did not fail to appear, and thus it 
 
 ' The Comtesse de Beam was the widow of a gentleman of Perigord, an officer of 
 the Gardes du Corps. 
 
 = Anne de Beauvau-Craon, bom m 1707, married first to Jacques de Lorraine, 
 Prince de Lexing, and secondly, in 1739, to Pierre de Levis, Due de Mirepoix, 
 Marshal of France. . . 
 
 3 Marie-Louise, Princesse Jablonowska, bom m 1700, married m 1730 Anne de 
 la Tremouille, Prince de Talmont, she died in 1773. Her father was cousin german 
 to King Stanislaus. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 367 
 
 came about that this new mistress, that L'Ange, destined at one 
 time for the pare mix cerfs, for a moment Madame Nalet, and 
 made Comtesse du Barry the same day, found herself occupying 
 the place of Madame de Pompadour. Lebel's death had dispersed 
 the pare aux eerfs ; Madame du Barry remained in peaceable 
 possession of the King's heart, without any rivals, and the King 
 believed he had found a new and more pleasant existence. 
 When the Court moved from Fontainebleau, it seemed quite 
 natural to continue the same arrangement ; almost all M. de 
 Choiseul's friends took up the plausible and easy position of 
 going every evening to Madame du Barry's to keep him well in- 
 formed as to the affairs of the King's household. M. de Choiseul, 
 for his part, surrounded himself with the women of Madame de 
 Pompadour's former circle, and persuaded himself that matters 
 would continue in this way, and that while Madame du Barry 
 remained mistress of the pleasures and amusements, he would 
 remain master of business matters. 
 
 This situation, so fine in theory, but unlikely to last, 
 nevertheless continued for some time. Intrigues however 
 supervened. M. le Marechal de Richelieu brought forward M. 
 d'Aiguillon,'' and criticisms on M. de Choiseul's administration 
 began to make themselves heard. The ministers, jealous of the 
 absolute power he wielded, commenced to attend the little court 
 of the favourite. M. de la Vrilliere ^ and M. Bertin ^ were the 
 first to come ; the cloak of the Abbe du Terray * and the 
 robe of the Chancellor de Maupeou,* offered a gay contrast to 
 
 ^ Armand Vignerod Duplessis-Richelieu, Due d'Aiguillon, was a member of the 
 cardinal's family, born in 1720, he became governor of Alsace, then of Brittany, 
 where he had to sustain a long struggle with the Parliament of Rennes. Very hostile 
 to Choiseul, he replaced him in the Foreign OfSce in 1770. It was during his 
 ministry that the division of Poland took place. Exiled on the accession of Louis 
 XVI., he died in 1782. 
 
 ' Louis Phelippeaux, Corate de Saint-Florentin, Due de la Vrilliere, born in 1705, 
 succeeded his father as Secretary of State of the King's household (1725), Minister of 
 State 1751, and created a d-ike in 1770. He quitted the Ministry in 1775, and died 
 two years after. 
 
 ' Henri Bertin, born in 1719, member of an old legal family, Parliamentary coun- 
 sel 1741 ; President of the Grand Council 1750; Intendant of Rousillon, then of 
 Lyons; Lieut. -General of Police 1757; Comptroller-General 1759-1763. Obliged 
 to give up this post owing to the hostility of Parliament, he nevertheless remained 
 Minister of State. In 1 774 he was for a very brief period Secretary of Foreign Affairs. 
 He died in 1 792. 
 
 * At that time Comptroller-General. 
 
 ^ Rene de Maupeou, born in 1714; Parliamentary counsel ; President ii miJr/tVr, 
 1743; Chief President, 1763. Made Chancellor in 1768, he undertook to free the 
 
368 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 her toilet powder. Ere long an underhand war was commenced 
 against M. de Choiseul, in which Madame du Barry as yet took 
 no part. She was flattered, even amused, at the visits of these 
 gentlemen ; she had sufficient judgment to find some disloyalty 
 in them. She neither had, nor cared to have, a taste for business ; 
 her aim was attained, her position was secured, and she only 
 wished to enjoy it, though sometimes she permitted herself to use, 
 and even encouraged sarcasms against the women of the former 
 circle, to prevent the King from feeling any regrets at having 
 lost them, but she had never yet ventured anything against M. de 
 Choiseul. The eclat which surrounded him awed her, and any slight 
 attentions from him would have secured the maintenance of that 
 neutrality which she was quite ready to continue. A ten minutes' 
 visit during one of the King's hunting excursions, would at this 
 period have flattered and charmed her ; and the King, to whom 
 on his return she would not have failed to mention it, would have 
 been very pleased. Polite relations would thus have been estab- 
 lished between them, and this would have sufficed to stifle the 
 intrigues at their very birth. 
 
 M. de Choiseul seemed inclined to adopt this course, but the 
 haughty spirit of the women by whom he was surrounded 
 decided otherwise. No relations of any kind could be tolerated. 
 The separation of the two parties became marked, and Madame 
 du Barry, who would have liked only to occupy herself with dress, 
 pleasures, and gaiety, found herself obliged to interfere in busi- 
 ness matters, and to learn, much against her will, lessons in politics 
 which she then tried to repeat with as little gauchej'ie as she 
 could manage. 
 
 Nearly two years passed thus without M. de Choiseul's 
 enemies gaining ground. Each day the favourite was accused of 
 having badly learnt, and still worse repeated, the lessons 
 so perpetually instilled into her. Matters had reached this 
 point when, in the middle of the year 1770, a great quarrel 
 arose, which became the battle-field on which all these Court 
 interests were destined to meet. 
 
 royal authority from the continued parliamentary hostility. He got rid of the old 
 Parliament and replaced it by another, consisting of all sorts of persons, which is 
 known in history as the Maitpeou Parliament (January, 1771). Maupeou was 
 exiled on the accession of Louis XVI., and died in 1792. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 369 
 
 A French navigator had taken possession of the Falkland 
 Isles, which had for sometime been abandoned.* Spain claimed 
 them, repaid the cost of the establishment he had founded, and 
 made good her right to proprietorship by sending a small 
 garrison there, which certainly would not have influenced the 
 commerce of any one. But England, ever disquieted about any- 
 thing of this kind, and taking advantage of a very vague article 
 in the Peace of Utrecht, intervened, maintaining that those 
 islands ought to belong to her, and that she alone had the right 
 to occupy them. She threatened Spain and commenced war- 
 like preparations, the first cost of which was ten times the value 
 of the contested possession, but which betrayed her secret 
 desire to prevent the restoration of the navies of Spain and 
 France. The French navy, especially, had begun to awake from 
 the lethargy into which the Seven Years' war, ending with the 
 unfortunate treaty of 1763, had thrown it. 
 
 M. de Choiseul did not hesitate to pronounce himself strongly 
 in favour of carrying out the family compact which had been his 
 own work, and his cousin, the Due de Praslin, who for the last 
 five years had toiled unceasingly and successfully to re-estab- 
 lish the navy, supported him in the Council in bringing about 
 most violent measures, no better suited to the condition of 
 Spanish finances than they were to those of France. Never- 
 theless, the Court of Madrid listened submissively, for ever since 
 the treaty of I76i,it had entirely given itself up to the direc- 
 tions of the Versailles Cabinet. 
 
 M. de Choiseul, believing that in a resumption of hostilities 
 and a costly war, he saw a sure way of remaining in office and 
 overthrowing the Abb6 de Terray, upheld the Spanish cause even 
 more hotly than the Court of Madrid itself, and inspired the 
 Spanish Ministry with claims and demands from which he then 
 declared it was impossible to withdraw. The Comptroller-General, 
 who owing to operations tarnished by bad faith had exhausted 
 
 ^ The Falkland Isles, or Malouines, are situated in the Southern Atlantic Ocean, 
 near the coast of Patagonia ; discovered in the sixteenth century, they remained a long 
 time without a recognized master. Bougainville led a French colony thither in 1763, 
 but these vcere dispossessed two years after by the , Spaniards. Then the English 
 intervened. In 1771, Spain definitely ceded these islands to them, and they now 
 belong to England without dispute. 
 
 VOL. V. B B 
 
370 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 the source of obtaining loans, found himself at his wits' end, 
 and did not know how to satisfy the demands for money with 
 which the Minister of Marine overwhelmed him. The King's 
 Council had become a sort of arena, in which the two influential 
 ministers daily defeated their adversaries. 
 
 Madame du Barry, at the close of the council (from which the 
 King always returned in favour of M. de Choiseul's views), gene- 
 rally inquired as to the result of these discussions. Already there 
 were murmured hints respecting the dismissal of the Abbe Terray 
 and by a sure but unseen channel, the favourite became secretly 
 disposed to abandon him, and to approve of M. de Choiseul's pro- 
 position to replace him by State Councillor Foulon, Director of 
 War and Naval Finances, a man who thoroughly understood the 
 art of transferring the funds of these two great departments, and 
 who, by the adoption of somewhat mysterious language, gained 
 credit for possessing both ideas and resources. In consequence of 
 the contracts for supplies for both these departments having been 
 influenced by M. du Barry, M. Foulon had formed an intimacy 
 with him, and was thus assured of some little interest. 
 
 As the reiterated attacks against M. de Choiseul produced no 
 effect, some disquietude arose round Madame du Barry. Her 
 cousin Chon, who occupied a sort of semi-subordinate position in 
 her establishment, fully instructed in all that was taking place, 
 and alarmed at the power which a war and a new Comptroller- 
 General might give to M. de Choiseul, came to Paris to consult 
 M. du Barry, who by the life of perpetual expedients that he led, 
 had gained a certain business aptitude. M. du Barry, much 
 elated that his relations should come back to him for advice, 
 went privately to see the Abbe de la Ville,^ one of the 
 chief Secretaries in the Foreign Office. This latter was an 
 ex-Jesuit, very ambitious, whom some bishops of the 
 Jesuit party had often inspired with the hope of some day 
 becoming a minister himself The small part he played was how- 
 ever totally eclipsed by the brilliancy of M. de Choiseul's party, 
 to whom he showed an almost monastic submission, though 
 
 ^ L'Abbe Jean-Ignace de la Ville, born in 1690. French Minister at the Hague 
 (1743), chief clerk in the Foreign Olfice (1755), bishop in partibus of Triconia and 
 Bdrector al Foieign Affairs {1774); died in 1774. He had entered the Academy 
 in J746. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 371 
 
 it did not entirely deceive M. le Due de Choiseul. M. du Barry, 
 who lived in an atmosphere of both intrigue and power, scarcely 
 required to display the hopes of becoming a Minister before the 
 Abb6 de la Ville's eyes. He found him quite au fait with the 
 matter of the Falkland Isles, and inclined to make the most of 
 the embarrassment to France of a fresh and certainly costly war. 
 
 " The cause is a very slight one," said the Abb^, " and the real 
 object can only be the ministerial interest of M. de Choiseul's party. 
 At the point which matters have now reached," he added, " there 
 is only one way of preventing it : the King must take upon himself 
 to write a confidential letter to His Catholic Majesty. His reply 
 will assuredly prove that he is disposed to avoid a war, by 
 giving up the Falkland Isles, the object of all this stir." 
 
 Nothing could have suited Du Barry better. He at once 
 hastened to his sister-in-law, and instructed her fully how to 
 bring the matter before the King, by stating it as her own idea, 
 and then, in order to give him confidence as to her clear-headed- 
 ness, she was to wind up by saying : " I am certain that if you 
 only have courage to send for the Abb6 de la Ville, and com- 
 mand him to tell you candidly what he thinks as to the success 
 of this direct step with the King of Spain, he cannot fail to ap- 
 prove it, and in this way you will be able to see the extent 
 of the great fidelity with which you believe M. de Choiseul serves 
 you." 
 
 The King, more and more struck by the intelligence of 
 Madame du Barry, replied : " But under what pretext can I send 
 for this Abb^ .' The Due de Choiseul will hear of it." 
 
 " How good and simple you are," she exclaimed, " I do not 
 know him, I have never even seen him, but I will undertake that 
 you shall find him here ; and to put you completely at your ease, 
 I will get him to come here about dusk, dressed in secular 
 clothes, with a bag to his wig and a sword by his side." 
 
 The King, charmed with the idea of a comic element thus 
 mingled with the most serious affairs, gave his assent ; and the 
 Abbe having been immediately informed, at once attended this 
 honourable and mysterious rendezvous dressed in grey. 
 
 Shortly after his arrival, the King came in, and after a little 
 plea.santry about the costume, began to speak to him as his 
 
 B B 2 
 
372 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 master, but withal a trusting one. He told the Abbe that he 
 had thought of writing to the King of Spain, and that as a faith- 
 ful servant, he desired to hear from him frankly what his ideas 
 were as to the real feelings of His Catholic Majesty, and also 
 with regard to such a letter. 
 
 The Abbe de la Ville did not fail to reply, that if Sovereigns 
 would always thus take their matters in hand, they would very 
 speedily be arranged, and the work of their ministers and am- 
 bassadors greatly diminished. 
 
 The King, well pleased, then made some reflections on M. de 
 Choiseul's administration. 
 
 The Abbd, with a certain amount of reserve which per- 
 rnitted it to be seen that he shared the same views, abstained 
 from speaking against his minister, out of respect to his master, 
 but said he could not possibly defend him. 
 
 The interview did not last long. 
 
 The King dismissed the Abbd with marks of the greatest kind- 
 ness, and the latter departed, his head filled with all kinds of 
 chimeras. 
 
 The King was now quite determined to write to the King of 
 Spain. As his amour-propre had prevented his asking the Abbe 
 de la Ville to draft a minute of the letter, he began to consider 
 how he should word it. The beginning was no easy matter. 
 
 " You will do it all wrong," said Madame du Barry, " leave 
 me to draft it for you." 
 
 He consented, laughingly. A courier was immediately dis- 
 patched by Madamoiselle Chon, to fetch M. du, Barry, known as 
 the rou^ from Luciennes, to draw up this important composition 
 that same night. 
 
 Du Barry started at midnight, but as the night was very dark 
 and the waters had overflowed, he was upset and almost thought 
 he was drowned, in the horse-pond at Marly. But he arrived at 
 last, dried himself, and forthwith proceeded to carry out his little 
 bit of work as well as he could. The contents of the letter 
 were somewhat as follows : 
 
 " That having had already too many wars to carry through 
 during his reign, and having arrived at a time of life when he had 
 nothing to wish for but to finish his career in peace, and to 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEVL. 373 
 
 employ the end by restoring order in his home administra- 
 tion and especially in his finances, he confided this wish in a 
 friendly spirit to his cousin, assuring him nevertheless, that 
 if he considered that the interests of the Spanish monarchy or of 
 his personal honour required that he should go beyond this great 
 consideration, he would not hesitate to subscribe thereto, on re- 
 ceiving a reply by the private courier who was taking this letter." 
 
 Madame du Barry copied this draft letter with her own 
 hand ; the next morning she got the King to transcribe it at her 
 table, and her hair-dresser was entrusted with this great mission, 
 which only took him eighteen days to accomplish. 
 
 Charles III.'s^ reply, drawn up by O'Reilly,^ who was the 
 person specially in his confidence, was just what was wished. 
 Charles gave the King his cousin the greatest possible praise for 
 the humanitarian sentiments which guided him ; protested that 
 his personal wishes were in entire conformity with them, and 
 submitted himself completely to the King's decision. 
 
 Nothing now appeared more evident to the King than the 
 intrigues of M. de Choiseul's party. The parliamentary quarrels 
 which were rife at this epoch, and which were directed against the 
 Chancellor, represented him and his adherents as men who were 
 ready to sacrifice both home and foreign affairs to their own 
 ambition. The proposals at their private councils were reported, 
 exaggerated, and envenomed in every possible way. 
 
 During the interval of the courier's journey, the King had begun 
 to treat M. de Choiseul and his friends coldly ; this coldness turned 
 into positive dislike on his return, and during the three or four days 
 preceding their disgrace, they could obtain neither word nor letter 
 from him. So much so, that M. le Due de Choiseul, who had 
 in his portfolio the account of the expenses of both his depart- 
 
 ' Charles III., King of Spain, son of Philip V. and Elizabeth Farn^se, born in 
 1716. He reigned first of all over Parma, which he had inherited from his mother 
 (1731), then the kingdom of the two Sicilies (1734). In 1759, he was called to the 
 throne of i^pain by the death of his brother Ferdinand VI. He died in 1788. 
 
 ^ Alexander, Comta O'Reilly, born in Ireland about 1730, first entered the 
 Spanish army, then passed into that of Austria, where he served under the command 
 of his compatriot Lacey (I7S7) ; afterAvards entered the French service, and finally 
 returned to Spain, where he obtained the rank of colonel. He became successively 
 Governor of Madrid, Inspector-General of Infantry and Captain-General of Anda- 
 lusia. On the death of Charles III. he fell into disgrace (1788). He was about to 
 part to take command of the army against France when he died (1794). 
 
374 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 ments for the year 1 770, could not get it approved or signed by 
 the King, and thus lost nearly fifteen hundred thousand francs 
 of unexpended funds, which the King, according to his custom, 
 always gave him as a gratuity at the end of each year's service. 
 
 At last, on the 23rd December, 1770, the King having 
 summoned up courage, just as he was going out hunting, 
 sent M. de la VriUiere with a very curt letter to M. de 
 Choiseul banishing him to Chanteloup, and another, a little less 
 severe, to M. de Praslin, directing him to retire at once to Praslin. 
 During the whole of this day the King was so lost in thought, 
 and kept looking at his watch so often, that it was easy to see 
 something extraordinary was taking place. He did not seem 
 at his ease until he heard, on his return to Versailles, that his 
 orders had been carried out before mid-day, and that he had three 
 offices to give away. 
 
 Then it was that Madame du Barry really began to play the 
 great part of favourite. Through the Prince de Conde's influence, 
 she got M. de Monteynard ^ an old lieutenant-general, a very 
 mediocre officer and still more mediocre minister, appointed to 
 the War Department. The navy, through Chancellor de 
 Maupeou's interest, was confided to M. de Boynes,^ a State 
 Councillor, who had submitted the scheme of replacing Parliament 
 by the Grand Council ; and the Foreign Department, which she 
 could not at once give to the Due d'Aiguillon, was provisionally 
 placed in the feeble hands of M. de la Vrilliere. The Abb6 de la 
 Ville, who from his seat in the office saw all these changes and 
 departures, did not yet give up all hope. But two months later, 
 when Madame du Barry succeeded in overcoming the King's 
 dislike to M. d'Aiguillon, he was very thankful to receive as a 
 reward the bishopric in partibiis of Triconium, together with an 
 abbey. The King did not wish him to quit the office where he 
 thought he was necessary. 
 
 ' Louis Francois, Marquis de Monteynard, born in 1716 at the Chateau de la 
 Pierre, in Dauphine, of an old noble family of that province. Major-General in 
 1748, Inspector-General of Infantry and Lieut. -General in 1759. Secretary of State 
 for War (1771-1774). 
 
 "- Etienne Fran9ois Bourgeois de Boynes, master of requests, Attorney-General 
 attached to the royal household 1753, Intendant of Franche-Comte, first President of 
 the Besan9on Parliament 1757 ; State Councillor 1761 ; Minister of Marine 1771. He 
 retired in 1774, and died in 1783. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 375 
 
 Thus ended this Ministry, which may be called a reign of 
 eleven years, and which has left some individual names, but few 
 actual facts for history. A short 7-isuni^ of it and the characteristic 
 traits of those persons who had some influence or took some 
 part in the affairs of that time, will assist in deciding the 
 importance which should be assigned to this period in our 
 annals. 
 
 The treaty of 1 756, which occupies a very prominent part, had 
 been effected with inconceivable rapidity, and exhibits throughout 
 the impulse given by the tenor of the treaty signed in the preceding 
 January between England and Prussia. Want of thought shows 
 itself in every one of the Articles. Truly, if the treaty of 1756 
 had been more carefully planned, if it had been drawn up by 
 cooler heads, if the danger that France ran, by uniting herself at 
 that period with a Power that had so many subjects for quarrels 
 on the Continent, had been more fully recognized, the principal 
 condition of the treaty, namely that the war which was just then 
 breaking out between France and England, was to be excepted 
 from the casus foederis, would never have been agreed to. France 
 would never have been duped by that appearance of reciprocity, 
 which the mutual guarantee established, when that very guarantee, 
 only extending to the possessions which the contracting parties 
 owned in Europe, assured to Austria all her territory, and yet 
 permitted France, exhausted by the continental war, and without 
 having committed any act of violation, to lose all her finest colonies. 
 But it is only fair to state, that M. de Choiseul was not consulted, 
 and that he did not assist at any of the conferences at which the 
 conditions of this famous treaty were drawn up. He was at 
 Rome, busy with the affairs of the Rota, or the quarrels of the 
 Jesuits, when M. TAbbe de Bernis and M. de Stahremberg 
 negotiated it at Versailles. M. de Choiseul did not come back 
 from Rome until the end of that same year, 1756. It is necessary 
 therefore to absolve his memory from signature of the treaty, 
 while leaving it to bear the weight of a great number of its 
 results and fatal consequences. 
 
 Carried away, as he was, by the whirlwind of the affections 
 and the interests of Madame de Pompadour, he identified 
 himself with the new policy, flattering himself that he would be 
 
376 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 able to avert all danger by a constant supervision, of which the 
 carelessness of his nature rendered him quite incapable. He 
 would have required the constant attendance of M. PfeffeP 
 to draw his attention incessantly to the almost imperceptible 
 encroachments by which the Court of Vienna, skilled in such 
 matters, daily increased its influence, by causing the recognition 
 of her claims in all questions touching the Germanic Constitu- 
 tion, whilst the guarantor of this great charter, the protector 
 of the treaty of Westphalia, in a word, the King of France, 
 without even perceiving it himself, became the instrument of the 
 enterprises and successes of this growing ambition. 
 
 It would, however, be a mistake to think that what I most 
 object to in the treaty of 1756, is the new scheme of alliance 
 which it established, and the new direction it gave to 
 French policy. The French, so long accustomed to regard 
 Austria as a rival power and natural enemy, whom France 
 must always have cause to fear, would look upon an alliance with 
 her as something monstrous, something absolutely unnatural. 
 Prejudice greatly influences the manner in which a thing of 
 this kind is looked at ; one would probably have to search for its 
 origin in the personal rivalry of the sovereigns who fought over 
 the dominion of Italy, rather than in the rivalry of two Powers 
 founded on the same basis ; but even in our day, this prejudice 
 is so strong and so widely spread, that I feel the necessity 
 of fully explaining my views on this subject. 
 
 All alliances whose object is conquest are injurious, first 
 to those against whom they are directed, and finally to those 
 who have made them. But whatever the result, they could 
 never be durable for a thousand reasons ; some of these I have 
 already mentioned. Such alliances therefore can in no case form 
 a political system, and it is useless even to speak of them. 
 
 But alliances can be formed whose object is not to make 
 
 ' Christian Frederick Pfeffel, son of Jean Conrad Pfeffel, a German lawyer and 
 diplomatist. Bom at Colmer in 1727, he was First Secretary at the Embassy in Saxony 
 1754. In 1758, he was called to Paris by Cardinal de Bemis, who nominated him 
 Councillor to the Legation at Ratisbon, and subsequently Chargi d' Ajfaires ad 
 interim at the Diet. In 1 761, he entered the service of the Due de Deux Fonts, who 
 nominated him Resident in Bavaria. Again recalled to Versailles in 1768, he was 
 attached to the Foreign Office as King's Counsel. He retained this place until the 
 Revolution ; dismissed in 1792, he re-entered the service of the Due de Deux Fonts, 
 and died in 1807. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 377 
 
 war, but to re-establish and maintain peace ; not to acquire 
 fresh provinces, but rather to assure to each contracting party the 
 preservation of its own possessions — not to imperil the safety 
 and tranquillity of other States, but to prevent each State from 
 threatening the security of another. No one can deny that 
 alliances, the conditions of which are calculated to attain this 
 end, present incalculable advantages. But very few Powers can 
 contract such alliances. The Great Powers, or rather Powers of 
 the first rank, can alone do so. 
 
 Then also it is necessary that their geographical position 
 should be no obstacle to the development of their means of 
 influence. Thus Spain could not with any benefit enter into 
 such an alliance ; for, unless the alliance applied specially to 
 maritime relations and interests, she could only bring a much 
 lesser influence to bear than her actual strength would seem to 
 promise. 
 
 This influence would in fact be almost null. 
 
 Prussia is geographically a Power so badly constituted, 
 that she cannot help being animated with a spirit of conquest 
 and cannot fail to be dependent upon it. With a very ex- 
 tended frontier, powerless to create a navy, seeing that her 
 limited revenue barely suffices to keep up her land forces, she 
 must always in this respect be at the mercy of England, who could 
 at any moment ruin her whole trade. Obliged to keep her 
 troops dispersed over a long and narrow frontier, she must 
 always be dependent on Russia, who could invade the Duchy of 
 Posen or Silesia before a Prussian army could be got together. 
 
 Yet, notwithstanding a frontier, which would seem to demand 
 peace, or preclude the possibility of departing from it unless 
 compelled by foreign aggression, the feeling of self-preservation, 
 makes it almost a necessity for Prussia to be continually bent 
 on making conquests. A State whose configuration is such, 
 that the result of a single battle may so dismember it as to 
 intercept all communication between its several parts, is in too 
 dangerous and precarious a position, not to seek constantly to 
 alter it, and it seems certain that, either the Prussian Power must 
 speedily come to an end, or she must unite under her rule a con- 
 siderable portion of Germany. 
 
378 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 It is very true, that at the period of which we are now speak- 
 ing and before the division of Poland,^ she was not exposed to the 
 same dangers, because she did not occupy the same rank ; but if 
 she owes more eclat to the ambition of the famous prince who 
 conquered for her the position she now occupies, she owes him 
 nothing for rendering her permanent existence more solidly 
 assured. 
 
 Russia until she took a place in the political system of Europe, 
 never had any continuous relations with France, neither had she 
 had any intimate ones unless it be recently, when all the natural 
 relations of the different States were upset, and when these two 
 Powers, being the only ones remaining intact on the Continent, 
 formed an alliance together, the one in order the more easily to 
 make further conquests, the other in the hopes of participating in 
 them.^ Such views could not fail to bring these two allies speedily 
 into collision. In the struggle that took place, Russia ran but a 
 very slight risk. We still feel the results of the dangers to which 
 France was then exposed. She even now bears the penalties of 
 that ambition which brought her nearer to Russia. The same 
 motive could alone unite these two countries again in the future. 
 The old relations between the different European States, have 
 either been re-established or have been replaced by fresh ones. 
 But France and Russia have still no joint interests whatever ; 
 those that divided them formerly, must continue to do so, 
 if possible, still more in the future ; and if, against all the 
 warnings of prudence, a day should arrive, when France will 
 a second time seek this alliance, the inevitable and immediate 
 effect would be to produce close and intimate relations 
 between Austria and Prussia, who, having risen again to the rank 
 from which they had fallen, are now in a position to look after 
 their own preservation, and are no longer reduced to waiting 
 patiently for uncertain chance combinations to afford them 
 protection. However little security an alliance with Prussia 
 might present, Austria, having no longer a choice, would fain 
 
 ' Poland has been divided three times, in 1772 — 1773, in 1793, and in 1795. In 
 1773 Prussia obtained the country of Warmia, and the Palatinates of Pomeria and of 
 Kulm. In 1793, Dantzig, Thorn, Czenstochan, and the best part of Great Poland. 
 In 1795 that portion of the Palatinates of Podlachia and Masovia, situated on the 
 right bank of the Bug, on the north extended as far as the Nieman. 
 
 s Treaty of Tilsit. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 379 
 
 have to content herself therewith. France would then be placed 
 in so false a position, that the most to be feared for her 
 would be that Austria and Prussia should not succumb. For 
 were this to happen, the same causes, which have already changed 
 into enemies, allies so little suited to one another, would very soon 
 separate them again, and the success of the fresh struggle that 
 would take place between them, would be less doubtful than 
 the former which France began, whilst compelling the troops 
 of nearly the whole of Europe to fight beneath her flag. The 
 establishment of friendly relations between the three Northern 
 Powers, at the expense of France, could not fail to be brought 
 about, and we should soon see a repetition of the events of 1 8 1 3 
 and 1 814, probably with even far more serious results. 
 
 Everything considered, I do not see that France and Austria 
 could form an alliance, except with the object I have just pointed 
 out. Their size, their power, and their riches are such, that they 
 have no reason to envy anyone, and they have nothing to wish 
 for but to keep possession of what they have. They have the 
 necessary strength to maintain peace all round them by their 
 concord. As the strongest Powers of Central Europe, they would 
 also be the strongest in the whole of Europe, if, during the last 
 century, another Power had not risen in the North, whose terrible 
 and rapid progress must make one dread that the numerous 
 encroachments by which she has already signalised herself, are 
 but the prelude of still further conquests, which will end in 
 swallowing up everything. The common danger with which this 
 Power threatens both Austria and France, must be a further tie 
 between these countries and ought indeed to be the strongest of 
 those which must unite them. One of them is more exposed 
 to it, but from the moment that she falls, the other must necessarily 
 follow, and with her all the rest of Europe. 
 
 By this it will be seen how much harm, especially for the 
 future, has been done by the man, who by forcing Austria to 
 throw herself into the arms of Russia, has probably advanced 
 by several centuries the sway which this latter Power will 
 exercise. God grant that the Cabinets of Europe may be suffi- 
 ciently enlightened not to bring it about sooner 1 
 
 Too little attention was paid in the last century to the giant 
 
38o THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 strides of Russia, as soon as she once began to come to the front. 
 Because, for several centuries, her name was almost, as it were, 
 unknown, no one imagined there was anything to fear from her. 
 Russia was only looked upon as a country which, from its enor- 
 mous size, and vast steppes and the rigour of its climate, which 
 rendered it secure from all invasion, had great advantages over 
 other countries ; no one realised that having nothing to do for its 
 defence, it might unite all its efforts for attack. The almost 
 savage people who inhabit it, combining a fierce courage and a 
 coarse physique which doubled its strength, trained to absolute 
 submission and passive obedience, having but few wants, and 
 those never going beyond the barest necessaries, were an instru- 
 ment in the hands of the Government, as easy to handle as it 
 was formidable. Although all this was palpable, no one thought 
 anything of it ; the small vanity of some philosophers having 
 been flattered, nothing more was needed to make them sing the 
 praises of Catherine II., her Government, her people, and even her 
 conquests. These were taken for granted without further 
 question, and it soon became the fashion to admire what one 
 knew nothing about, and what ought only to have inspired fear. 
 And yet, what after all was and still is this nation, this people, 
 this Government, which the philosophers of the eighteenth century 
 so thoughtlessly set to work to laud 1 It is certainly rather 
 curious to notice, that at the very time these latter became the 
 accusers of all the Governments of civilised Europe, which they 
 represented as absolute and oppressive, and as having usurped the 
 rights of the people, they should have reserved all their praise for 
 a Government, despotic by nature ; that they should have grown 
 eloquent with regard to the pretended slavery of a civilised 
 people, already freed some time back from the old tie of servi- 
 tude, whilst they had nothing to say as to the fate of a whole 
 nation of serfs. For in Russia there is no middle class, only a 
 small number of masters and a multitude of slaves.^ This fact 
 alone will suffice to prove the great distance there is between 
 that country and others. 
 
 It will be seen that nothing which constitutes the real glory 
 
 1 The enfranchisement of the serfs in Russia only dates from 1861. It was the 
 work of the Emperor Alexander II. 
 
M. LE DUC BE CHOISEUL. i8l 
 
 of a nation can be found there ; that where almost the whole of 
 the subjects are the property of a few, there can be neither 
 generosity or noble feeling. And as a fact, high-toned feelings 
 are not remarkable in this people, either among the masters or 
 the serfs. Some people talk a little about the goodness of the 
 former, of their kindness to their peasants, and the happiness which 
 the latter enjoy. But it needs all this kindness and this happiness 
 to prevent the serf from being constrained by too much misery to 
 think of the possibility of changing his mode of existence. This 
 therefore is but a very slight matter for praise. But be that as it 
 may, whatever opinion one may have as to the inherent virtues and 
 vices of such a social organization, what must be quite apparent 
 to everyone, is, that the influence on the rest of Europe, of a still 
 completely barbarous nation, no matter what form or what tone 
 its Government takes, would be a great calamity. What then 
 would be the result of its dominion .'^ 
 
 As will be seen, it is not the alliance with Austria in itself, for 
 which I blame the treaty of 1756, for such an alliance, in my 
 opinion, is the sole means of averting or least retarding the period 
 of this calamity. It is the small motives which brought about 
 the making of this treaty, the narrow ideas that prevailed, the 
 little results that were counted on, the puny passions by which 
 all were led away ; for everything was small in this matter. 
 
 Neither is it for having allowed this treaty, of which he was 
 not the author, to subsist so long, that I blame M. de Choiseul ; 
 it is because he did not once, during the whole time of his 
 long and all-powerful administration, dream of giving a really 
 useful direction to this new policy of alliance, — because he 
 adopted this policy and never even attempted to see how he 
 might turn it to advantage. One of the most serious reproaches 
 
 1 When this portion was written in 1S16, Austria did in truth appear to be the 
 natural barrier to oppose to a threatening sava3;ery. But since that jioriod, amid 
 the numerous startling events which took place on all sides, and amid the fiebh com- 
 binations whicli freed the minds of men as well as countries, Austria remained 
 stationary ; she remained antiquated and isolated in the midst of Europe, whilst 
 the North made real progress and freedom was at last introduced into all branches 
 of administration and political relations. Prussia, from being protected, became pro- 
 tectress. France gave herself a form of government which consecrates all th.it liberty 
 against which Austria makes a stand. Henceforth, natural alliances will never be the 
 same, for what will in future form the basis of all durable treaties, will be that which 
 creates, extends, and consecrates the benefits of civilization (1829). (Note by Prince 
 de Talleyrand). 
 
382 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 M. de Choiseul has deserved, is assuredly that he never noticed 
 what was passing in the North ; that he never foresaw what was 
 gradually preparing, and that consequently he made no provision 
 for anything. This alone would justify what I have said, as to 
 his carelessness, his want of forethought, and the shallowness of 
 his views. 
 
 Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that careless people who 
 are clever, sometimes originate or adopt useful ideas, provided they 
 are not given thereby too much work in details. M. de Choiseul, 
 foreseeing the judgment that history would pronounce upon him, 
 was desirous to mark his Ministry by a political act which would 
 have some eclat and which seemed to balance the Austrian alliance. 
 He therefore conceived the project of the family covipact with 
 the King of Spain and the other sovereigns of the House 
 of Bourbon. We willingly recognize that this compact, signed 
 15th, August I76i,was a conception truly worthy of a statesman. 
 It offered immense advantages to those Powers whom this 
 important act united. By assuring to France the complete 
 security of her Pyrenean frontier, it gave her greater freedom of 
 action on her other frontiers ; it also gave her the support of the 
 Spanish Navy, which in its turn received that of the French 
 Navy, and both found resources in the ports of Naples and 
 Sicily. Lastly, this union of the three branches of the House of 
 Bourbon, gave them the almost exclusive dominion of the 
 Mediterranean. 
 
 But in order that this family compact should really benefit 
 the three associated Powers, it ought to have been formed at the 
 beginning of the Seven Years' war, and not at a period when 
 France, already exhausted by the disasters of that war, must 
 inevitably drag Spain down with her, and thus hasten the 
 decadence of this latter Power. Besides, as we have already 
 said, the most evident result to France from her close alliance 
 with Spain at this time, was having to give Louisiana up to her, 
 in order to indemnify her for the loss of Florida. 
 
 If we investigate the other acts of M. de Choiseul's Ministry, 
 which history has collected, we find first the occupation of the 
 county of Avignon, a proceeding possessing neither utility nor 
 glory. A mere fad made them take it, and the fear of the devil 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 3S3 
 
 made them give it up. No pretence whatever was made to justify 
 either its invasion or restoration.^ 
 
 The conquest of Corsica,^ which dates from the same period, 
 must be considered important, if we shut our eyes to the num- 
 ber of men it cost us to take, and the amount of money to 
 keep. The advantages hoped for for the navy have so far been 
 almost nil, but it forms a French province in the Mediterranean, 
 of which the English, until they got possession of Malta, were verj- 
 envious. There is a possibility that this possession may yet be 
 of use to us in the future. 
 
 A matter of home discipline, and one which cannot fail to mark 
 M. de Choiseul's Ministry, was the destruction of the Order of 
 the Jesuits.^ He fancied that he had often encountered their 
 influence in ecclesiastical matters as well as in parliamentary 
 quarrels ; and although with a clergy so enlightened and 
 mingling so much with the great world as that of France, the 
 work of the Jesuits would prove less objectionable, than it would 
 with a narrower minded and less consistent clergy, he was perhaps 
 right in seeking to circumscribe the power of the Order, or even 
 to crush it. But I will not go into that question, it would 
 lead me too far afield from my subject. Nevertheless, it is but 
 right to say, that a monarchical government such as that of 
 France at that date, might have found more help than danger in 
 allowing the guidance of family education, and up to a certain 
 
 ^ Avignon was occupied by French -troops in 1768. M. de Choiseul was at that 
 time at issue with the Court of Rome about the Jesuits. Pope Clement XIII. had 
 condemned, as attempts "against the liberty of the Church, the cause of God, and the 
 rights of the Holy See," the edicts by which the Jesuits had been expelled from the 
 Catholic States. All the Powers resisted, making common cause one with another. 
 Naples took possession of Benevento and Ponte-Corvo — France occupied Avignon. 
 Clement XIV., Clement XIIl's successor, having signed the pastoral letter of sup- 
 pression, Avignon wis immediately after evacuated (1773). 
 
 ^ The Genoese ceded Corsica to France with full sovereignty, for the sum of two 
 millions. Treaty of Versailles, May isth, 1762. 
 
 s Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the Jesuits found themselves 
 attacked by all the Catholic Powers. Portugal gave the signal (1759); France 
 followed suit (1762-64), then Spain (1766), Naples, Parma (1767), Venice, Modena, 
 and Bavaria. Lastly, Maria Theresa herself joined the general movement. Soon 
 after (July 20th, 1773), Pope Clement XIV. ordered the suppression of the Order. 
 In France, the struggle, begun on the occasion of a casual incident, was energetically 
 supported by Choiseul and the Parliaments, the King allowing himself to be led by 
 them. In 1762, the Parliaments of Paris, Rouen, Bordeaux, Rennes, Metz, Pan, 
 Perpignan, Aix, and Toulouse, burnt all the statutes of the Society, and ordered its 
 members to quit the territory under their juris-liction. Finally, in November, 
 1764, a royal proclamation entirely suppressed the .Society. 
 
3S4 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 point of public opinion, to remain in the hands of the Jesuits. 
 In support of this opinion, I may remark, that in 1789, not a 
 single member of the young nobility had been brought up by the 
 Jesuits. But M. de Choiseul, supremely careless, and an enemy 
 to all power which did not emanate from himself, destroyed the 
 Jesuits solely because he thought he had not complete influence 
 over them. It was in reality a State question, but he made it a 
 question of intrigue. 
 
 M. le Due de Vauguyon ^ and M. le Dauphin - supported 
 them ; M. de Choiseul intrigued to attack them. Later on he 
 made war against the philosophers (in the comedy he got Palisot' 
 to write) because they took from him some portion of that 
 empire over which he wished to reign supreme during his day. 
 No motives of a high order determined his course ; he saw men 
 who were capable of forming many opinions, and it was to the 
 interest of his self-love to get rid of them all. 
 
 M. de Choiseul's hatred to the Jesuits was also the chief 
 cause of the disastrous expedition to Cayenne at the beginning 
 of 1764. He arranged all the details in accordance with the 
 memorandums given him by M. de Prefontaine.* This latter, a 
 man of some ability and intrigue, by means of a few philan- 
 thropic phrases, and some insinuations against the Jesuits, whom 
 
 1 Antoine-Paul-Jacques de Quelen, Due de la Vauguyon, born January 17th, 1706. 
 Became a colonel in 1733, and a brigadier in 1743. ^°'^ his gallant behaviour during the 
 retreat from Prague. Major-general after Fontenoy (1745)! lieutenant-general in 174S. 
 He had been nominated mcnin to the Dauphin in 1745- I'l '758 he was made 
 Governor to the Due de Bourgogne's eldest son, and successively Governor to his other 
 three sons. The Dauphin died in his arms in 1765. He himself died in 1772. 
 
 ■■^ Louis, Dauphin, son of Louis XV., born in 1729, died in 1755. He was twice 
 married: in 1745 to Maria Theresa of Spain, who died the following year without 
 issue, and in 1747 to Marie-Josephe of Saxony, by whom hehadfour sons ; the Due 
 de BourTOgne died young, and the other three sons were Louis XVI., Louis XVHL, 
 and Charles X. 
 
 3 Charles Pallisot de Montenay, a French poet, born at Nancy (1750). He was 
 the son of a Councillor of the Due de Lorraine. He wrote several comedies and 
 various poems. He died in 1S14. The author alludes here to the campaign which 
 Pallisot waged against the philosophers ; he never ceased attacking them, both on the 
 stage and in his poems, notably in the Cerclc, a comedy in which he made an attack 
 on Rousseau (l755), Lcs Philosophcs (1760) ; Lcs Pditcs Lettres siir de grands 
 Philoso/'hes (1757), directed against Diderot ; and La Dunciade ; oti. Guerre des Sots, 
 a satirical poem (1764), &c. 
 
 ■• M. Bruletout de Prefontaine had lived in Guiana for twenty years, when he came 
 to Paris in 1762, and laid before the Due de Choiseul a scheme for an agricultural 
 colonization of that country. The Minister accepted it, and sent him back to 
 Cayenne with the brevet of lieutenant-colonel. His scheme failed, and he died 
 in 3786. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 385 
 
 M. de Choiseul wished to deprive of all their large and rich pos- 
 sessions in the Colonies, succeeded in getting his scheme accepted. 
 
 By the treaty of 1763, France had ceded Canada and Acadia,'^ 
 in perpetuity to the English. The inhabitants of these Colonies,, 
 especially Acadia, exhibited a great attachment to France. On 
 the other hand, the fate of the negroes was beginning to arouse 
 some interest. M. de Choiseul got the King's Council to decide, 
 that in the midst of the negro colonies, settlements should be 
 formed, in the cultivation of which only white people were to be 
 employed. With this view, about three thousand Aceidians 
 were shipped to St. Domingo, two thousand to Martinique,, eight 
 thousand to Guadaloupe ; the whole expedition started for 
 Cayenne. Two hundred and thirteen vessels of every tonnage 
 left France, carrying about ten thousand five hundred persons. 
 Acadia furnished eight thousand, and two other vessels arrived at 
 the same time from other Colonies. M. de Chauvalon ^ was 
 made Superintendent ; M. de Behague ^ Military Commander, 
 and the Chevalier Turgot* who had been consulted, was 
 appointed Governor-General. Never was improvidence and care- 
 lessness pushed to a greater extent Twenty thousand people 
 were landed on a shore, where they found neither houses, shops, 
 doctors, nor hospitals, not even shelter from the intense heat of 
 the sun, which at 4°.5S' is fatal to persons not acclimatized, 
 if the necessary precautions taught by experience are neglected. 
 
 As a result, in the course of a fortnight, half those who had 
 landed died, and at the end of five months, only three hundred 
 
 ^ Acadia belonged to the English since the treaty of Utrecht (17 13). 
 
 ' Jean-Baptiste-Thibauld de Chauvalon, bom in Martinique in 1725, was a pupil 
 of Reaumur and of Jussieu. In 1757 he was sent to Guiana as superintendent- 
 general. Arrested on his return to France, he was condemned to perpetual imprison- 
 ment for embezzlement (1767) ; he succeeded in getting a fresh trial, and was acquitted 
 in 1776. Made commissary-general of the colonies, he died in 1783. 
 
 ' Antoine, Comte de Behague belonged to a noble Dutch family. A lieutenant- 
 colonel in 1761, he was made military commandant at Guiana (1763), major- 
 general in 1771, lieutenant-general in 1791, and Governor of Martinique, where 
 he re-established order after the insurrection. Obliged to quit the island in 
 1793) he went to England, whence the Comte d'Artois sent him to Brittany to head 
 the insurrection. He died in England in 1802. 
 
 * The Chevalier Etienne Turgot, Marquis de Cousmont, brother of the celebrated 
 statesman, belonged to an old Norman family. His father had been Provost of 
 Merchants at Paris. He was first a Knight of Malta and commanded a galley. 
 Brigadier in 1764, he was made Governor of Guiana. It was through him that the 
 Superintendent Chauvalon was recalled to France ; arrested himself on his return to 
 France, he was speedily released ; after this he lived in retirement, and died in 1789. 
 
 VOL. V. C C 
 
385 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 remained out of the whole expedition. But all this happened 
 far away, and the magic circle that surrounded M. de Choiseul 
 prevented all access to the truth. 
 
 In his administration of the War Department, M. de 
 Choiseul caused endless worry to the army. Fresh changes 
 were introduced every year. New kinds of instruction, new 
 manoeuvres, new tactics, new uniforms, all these delighted the 
 young French noblesse, who ever active and brave, admired the 
 Minister who abandoned old-fashioned notions, and, it was said, 
 perfected those tactics by which it was thought that the 
 Prussians had covered themselves with glory. As if the good or 
 evil success of military achievements does not always depend 
 upon the talents of the general. The art of war varies in 
 Europe every ten years. Sometimes one Power has a finer 
 infantry, sometimes the cavalry decides the fate of a battle, or 
 else the artillery proves more efficient. No fixed rules can be 
 laid down as to this ; everything depends upon the genius of 
 ,him who commands. 
 
 M. de Choiseul's influence extended also in a very disastrous 
 .manner over the finances, owing to the unfitness of those whom 
 he induced the King to appoint. He named M. de Silhouette ^ in 
 order to please the Due d'Orleans. This Minister began by 
 having the silver plate of all private persons, even that of the 
 King, brought to the Mint ; whereas the Court of Vienna, for 
 whom, France had ruined herself, had a gold set made and 
 gloried in displaying it at the gorgeous marriage of the Arch- 
 duke Joseph with one of the Princesses of Parma.^ 
 
 M. de Silhouette, having shown symptoms of insanity whilst 
 
 1 Etienne Silhouette, born at Limoges on the 5th July, 1709, died 1769. 
 Councillor of the Parliament of Metz, Master of Requests, Stcrliaire <ks Comtnand- 
 ments, then Chancellor to the Due d'Orleans, Royal Commissioner of the Indian 
 Company and Comptroller-Generalln 1759. He provoked a great outcry against him- 
 self by suspending the State debts for a whole year, and was forced to retire after 
 being in office for eight months. It is perhaps not generally known that this Minister 
 gave his name to those drawings which represent a profile traced round the shadow of 
 a face. It is indeed asserted that one of his chief amusements was tracing such por- 
 traits on the walls of his chateau, which were soon covered with them. Society did 
 not fail to turn this little diversion into ridicule, and called the drawings by the name 
 of their author, a name which they have always retained. 
 
 - The Archduke Joseph, son of the Empress Maria Theresa, afterwards Emperor 
 Joseph II., married on the 6th October, 1760, the Princess Isabella of Parma, 
 daughter of the Duke of Parma, and niece of King Charles III. of Spain. He died 
 without issue in 1763. 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 387 
 
 at the King's Council, was replaced by M. de Lavordy.^ a simple 
 Councillor of Parliament, only distinguished as being one of 
 those who most strongly opposed the registration of pecuniary 
 edicts which everyone disliked. He was supposed to have weight 
 with his party. So he had when he was opposed to the Court ; 
 but he had none when he wanted to support it. M. de Lavordy 
 proving useless, he was dismissed, and M. de Choiseul ap- 
 pointed M. d'lnvault^ in his place, and with his usual careless- 
 ness, gave as a reason for this choice, that he had always liked 
 him and been at school with him. 
 
 It may be asserted that of all the selections due to M. de 
 Choiseul's influence, there was only one good one, namely 
 that of the Due de Praslin. His lucky star aided him on that 
 occasion. It has often been thought that in making this 
 choice, he had only sought for an assistant who would submit to 
 his caprices. Instead of which, M. de Praslin proved to be 
 a man possessed of great strength of mind ; he had a decided 
 and noble character with healthy views, which he expressed 
 even with some brusqueness. But his naturally fine abilities 
 were often rendered useless by the wretched state of his 
 health ; there was not a quarter of an hour in the day, in 
 which he could devote himself entirely to his woik. When- 
 ever he felt well, he never hesitated to oppose his cousin, and 
 often blamed him severely. He was both esteemed and feared 
 by his family. Madame de Gramont knew how to conceal her 
 character before him ; and as, notwithstanding his heavy brows 
 and plain severe countenance, he possessed a vast fund 
 of affection, he had allowed himself to grow so fond of the Due de 
 Choiseul, that after he had pointed out his errors to him, he felt 
 really grateful if the latter corrected them, and even when 
 M. de Choiseul persisted in them, M. de Praslin was disposed to 
 excuse and defend them 
 
 The portrait I have just drawn of M. de Praslin, leads me 
 naturally to speak of M. de Choiseul's appearance. Nature had 
 
 1 Clement de L'Avordy or Lavordy, bom in 1723, Councillor of Parliament, and 
 Comptroller-General in 1763. He only remained in office a few months, and then 
 lived in retirement ; he died on the scaffold in November 1793. 
 
 - Etienne Maynou, Seigneur d'invault, born in 1721 ; Councillor of Parliament, 
 1741, Comptroller-General and Minister of State 1768. He was only a short lime 
 in office. 
 
 C C 2 
 
388 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 also been very chary in her gifts to him ; he was plain and his 
 hair was red, though, thanks to the arts of the toilet, he had 
 succeeded in changing it to blonde ; the outlines of his face and 
 bead were very ordinary. His eyes were bright and intelligent, 
 he was well built, and he derived a great advantage from the 
 beauty of his hands, which were small, slender, white, and 
 finished off with exquisite nails. His haughty carriage, his 
 full face and high forehead, formed a complete contrast to the 
 overhanging hair, pallid complexion and retiring air of M. de 
 Praslin — never were two men more entirely dissimilar, both 
 morally and physically. 
 
 Madame de Pompadour had very little mind ; her blue eyes, 
 possessing neither brilliancy nor vivacity, betrayed the emptiness 
 of her head. Although she had been brought up and had lived 
 in the financial society of Paris, which at that time was rather 
 distinguished, her style was bad, and her language was vulgar, 
 faults which she was not able to correct even at Versailles. She 
 differed in every way from Madame du Barry, who though less 
 well educated, had succeeded in acquiring a sufficiently pure style 
 in conversation. Madame du Barry's eyes were not so large, but 
 Ihey were intelligent ; her face was well formed and her hair was 
 extremely beautiful; she liked conversation,^ and had caught 
 the art of telling a story brightly ; they both possessed the art 
 of lying, to perfection. 
 
 Madame de Gramont, despite the family likeness, had in 
 her youth possessed what is known as la beauts du diable. She 
 was plump, with a pink and white complexion ; her character 
 was exalted, and her mind was open and strong. She would 
 have been eloquent, if the disagreeable tone of her voice had 
 permitted it. She wrote well. There was something specially 
 attractive in her manner, notwithstanding its decision. In her 
 salon, only one opinion was allowed to prevail ; all those who 
 liked M. de Choiseul were gladly welcomed there ; any others 
 gained no admittance. She perfectly worshipped her brother, and 
 was devoted to his friends. Love affairs only claimed her 
 attention for a brief period in her youth. The day she entered 
 
 ^ And also writing. Some pages of recollections written by her, and entrusted to 
 Morande, author of the Gazctiier CuirassJ, notwithstanding their brief length, are not 
 wanting in grace and interest. {Note by tht Prince de Talleyrand.') 
 
M. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 389 
 
 into society, she took the highest position and this she retained 
 to the day of her death. 
 
 Among the men who played a notable part under M. de 
 Choiseul's Ministry, the Chancellor Maupeou seems to deserve 
 separate mention. He was a man full of invention, and intelli" 
 gence, and at the same time, malicious, and fawning ad nauseam. 
 Vulgar men and men of bad style, delighted in him, but in all 
 good society he was disliked. This however did not trouble him. 
 He followed the course he had traced out for himself, and never 
 once deviated from it. Had he lived in Louis the XL's time, 
 he would have been his Prime Minister and most intimate 
 servant. 
 
 M. d'Aiguillon, like M. de Choiseul, began his career as a 
 favourite of fortune. He had been very successful, having entered 
 the world with far greater advantages ; he was born a rich man, 
 had inherited high honours, and possessed a very handsome person. 
 But he had neither nobleness nor elevation of character. To 
 politics he was an utter stranger ; he had read little, he had never 
 travelled, and only knew Europe from what he heard of it in 
 Paris. The quarrels of countries, states, and parliaments together 
 with a few military studies, had been the whole work of his life. 
 The great political fault for which he has been blamed was having 
 ignored the first partition of Poland, before it was completed, but 
 this error dated further back than him ; it resulted from the 
 mysterious manoeuvres of the Court of Vienna not having been 
 understood by the Ministry of his predecessor, and it was 
 one of M. de Choiseul's lucky strokes of fortune, that he 
 did not remain six months longer in office ; for it is more 
 than doubtful whether he would have gained any advantage 
 therefrom. 
 
 M. de Choiseul's downfall differed in many very notable ways 
 from the other Ministerial disgraces which occurred during the 
 reign of Louis the XV. Prior to him, none of the Ministers 
 exiled by that monarch, received either tokens of sympathy or 
 marks of affection and gratitude from anyone but their own 
 families, and even then permission to visit them was asked for 
 with much precaution and only in cases of illness. The Cardinal 
 de Bernis at Soissons, M. d'Argenson at Les Ormes, M. de 
 Machault at Arnonville, M. de Maurepas at Bourges, and to go 
 
390 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLE YRAND. 
 
 Still higher, even M. le Due ^ himself at Chantilly, had remained 
 completely isolated. No one dared to mention their name in the 
 presence of the King, who flattered himself by thinking that he saw 
 in this complete silence around him universal approbation of the 
 decision he had taken. This, however, was not the case as regards 
 M. de Choiseul. The tone in good society during his long 
 Ministry, was rather to be the courtier of the Minister than the 
 courtier of the King. 
 
 It was the fashion for people to identify themselves with M. 
 de Choiseul's interests during the struggle which took place 
 between his influence and that of the favourite. Madame du 
 Barry's circle had never risen to so high a level as that of 
 Madame de Pompadour ; her charms, the women, the men, and 
 the Ministers who surrounded her, shone but feebly compared 
 with the numerous and powerful supporters of M. de Choiseul. 
 
 The habit that had sprung up of speaking of the King with a 
 want of respect ; the contempt which it was customary to express 
 with impunity respecting the friends of Madame du Barry, had 
 established in men's minds a sort of independence which the 
 age and the weakness of the King had licensed. Some of M. de 
 Choiseul's friends, young men on whom he had bestowed early 
 favours, ventured to ask permission to visit him at Chanteloup. 
 Those surrounding the favourite made a mistake, when they 
 counselled her to treat these first requests with contempt ; their 
 number increased, and soon it was no longer possible to refuse 
 them. Several ladies set the example of going to Chanteloup 
 without permission. Many men, who were not attached to the 
 Court by ties of service, ventured to follow their example. Ere 
 long there assembled at Chanteloup, a crowd, a kind of Court, 
 which almost seemed to rival that of Versailles. 
 
 The mediocrity of the new Ministers, the want of consideration 
 for those who remained,^ the utter indifference displayed by the 
 King in the most important matters, deprived the decisions of 
 the Council of all character of durability. Hence arose a kind of 
 insubordination which destroyed the prestige of constituted 
 
 ' Louis Henri, Due de Bourbon, granrisonof the great Conde, Chief of the Council 
 of Regency during the minority of Louis XV., and Prime Minister after the death of 
 the Kegent (1723). He was exiled to Chantilly in 1726 by the young King. 
 
 2 Those Ministers who continued in ofSce were La Vrilliere, Terray, and 
 Maupeou. The new Ministers were M. d'Aiguillon, M. de Montevnard, and M. de 
 Boynes. 
 
.'>/. LE DUC DE CHOISEUL. 391 
 
 authority. This may be looked upon as the commencement of that 
 spirit of opposition, which manifested itself so startlingly during 
 the subsequent reign. They went so far as to erect a pyramid 
 in the gardens of Chanteloup, on which vanity inscribed the names 
 of all those who came to pay fashionable homage to the illus- 
 trious exile ; and when one sees that these same names are found 
 again twenty years later, on the famous list of emigres, one is 
 perhaps better able to judge of the inconsistency and the thought- 
 lessness of the actions of the French nobility at this period, and also 
 of the injustice of its judgments. Moreover, that mocking, gay, 
 heedless, and ever wild spirit in the French nobility, reappears con- 
 stantly in our history. It is met with at Madame de Longueville's, 
 and also at Coblentz. But there is also another spirit which 
 although it belongs to another class of society, is no less French ; 
 it needed a Henry IV. to subdue the old leaguers and burgesses 
 of Paris ; in 1 791, they showed that they could become masters. 
 
 M. de Choiseul's personal affairs soon began to feel the 
 enormous expense to which this sort of celebrity subjected him ; 
 the reckless magnificence in which he had lived at Versailles, 
 was kept up in his brilliant retreat, and as the salaries of War 
 Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Colonel-General of the Swiss 
 Guards, and Postmaster-General, as well as the private gifts which 
 were annually made to him, could no longer be counted among his 
 receipts, he was obliged to supplement these by living on his 
 small patrimony and the fortune of Madame de Choiseul ; her 
 devotion was rewarded by the pleasure she felt in offering the 
 whole of it to his memory, by paying his debts after his death. 
 
 It had been fully expected, and everything led to the belief, 
 that on the death of Louis XV., public opinion would oblige the 
 new King, to recall to the head of affairs a minister whose 
 downfall had apparently been so generally disapproved of But 
 five years of absence from the Court, had much diminished 
 popular favour. True, the spirit of criticism and even opposition to 
 the Government, after the happy trial it had made of its strength 
 on the occasion of M. de Choiseul's exile, had gained much 
 greater confidence, and increased in strength more and more, but 
 its direction was changed. Less decided and more vague in its 
 object, the opposition looked farther ahead and aimed higher. 
 The interest in M. de Choiseul had died out. Notwithstanding, 
 
392 THE MEMOIRS OF PRINCE TALLEYRAND. 
 
 therefore, the weakness of Louis the XVI., and the influence and 
 support which the Queen gave to the hopes and ambitions of M. 
 de Choiseul, her entreaties only succeeded in cancelling his exile. 
 The prejudices of the young King, fostered by Mesdames his 
 aunts ^ gained the day. The feelings and interests of the Court 
 were no longer the same as at the close of Louis XV.'s reign. 
 New Ministers, new hopes, and growing ambitions presented them- 
 selves on all sides ; the old courtiers withdrew or died out. The 
 Queen was not consulted in the choice of the Prime Minister. 
 This choice once made, it was no longer possible to go back 
 from it, and recall M. de Choiseul to the only office which he 
 could well accept. Thus died out the eclat of this brilliant 
 career, more remarkable for its social successes, than famed in 
 history for characteristic traits of real merit and actual glory. 
 M. de Choiseul ended his life with the discredit which always 
 attaches to a man who is persecuted by his creditors, and whose 
 time is solely occupied in staving off their attacks. Grief, 
 aggravating a slight malady, caused his death. He died without 
 regrets and without much notice. To history, M. de Choiseul will 
 only be a man who governed France for eleven years with the 
 despotism which was the fashion of the day. No victories gained, 
 no grand treaties, or useful measures were ever associated with his 
 name ; he paved the way for great evils, felt even down to our 
 day, by the arbitrary proceedings he introduced into the different 
 administrative departments, and by the spirit of criticism and 
 want of consideration for Royal Authority, which he en- 
 couraged to the last day of his life. 
 
 M. de Choiseul did not realise that this spirit of criticism 
 under an arbitrary government, and without legal redress, be- 
 comes at once a most serious decomposing element. The 
 Revolution, so long prepared for by everything that could and 
 ought to have prevented it, is a terrible proof of this. Henri 
 IV. was the last of our Kings who knew when to give in and 
 when to resist. 
 
 ' Louis XV. had eight daughters : 
 Louise Elizabeth (1727-1759), married to the Due de Parma ; Anne (1727-1752) ; 
 Marie (1728-1733); Adelaide (.1732-1800); Victoire (1733-1799) ; Sophie (1734- 
 1782) ; Therese (1736-1744); Louise (1737-1787). Madame Louise became a 
 Carmelite nun. — Mfsdaturs Adelaide, Victoire, and Sophie did not marry, and spent 
 their life at the Court of their nephew, Louis XVI. It is to them that the above 
 allusion is made. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Aberdeen, Lord, letter to Talleyrand, 
 iii. 229 ; interview v/ith Talleyrand, 
 232 ; King of Netherlands, 234, 235 ; 
 conversation with Talleyrand on wishes 
 of the French Government, 239 ; 
 affairs in Portugal, 243 ; fixed date for 
 Conference in London, 255 ; attends 
 Conference, 257 ; Conference delayed, 
 268 ; convoked by, 270 ; armistice 
 between Dutch and Belgians con- 
 cluded, 275 ; speech in the House of 
 Lords, iv. 171 ; proposes a motion in 
 the House of Lords, 237 
 
 Aboville, Count de, iii. 171, 172 
 
 Absac, M. d', i. 7 
 
 Acada, v. 381 
 
 Adair, Sir Robert, iv. 187 
 
 Addington, Henry (Visct. Sidmouth), i. 
 
 213 
 
 Addington, Mr. H. U., v. 144, 161 et seq. 
 
 Adrianople, Treaty of, v. 151 
 
 Agoult, Antoine Jean, Marquis d', i. 156 
 
 Agoult, Hector d', ii. 353 
 
 Aiguillon, Due d', iii. 296, v. 367 
 
 Aix, Archbishop of (Jean-de-Dieu R. de 
 Boisgelin), i. 20, 24, 77 
 
 Aix la Chapelle, Congress at, iv. 91, 251 
 
 Alhani, Cardinal, iv. 292 
 
 Albaret, M. de, i. 38 
 
 Albufera, Due de, ii. 21 ; iii. 171 
 
 Alcudia, Duchess of, i. 2S4 
 
 Alembert, Jean L. d', i. 63 
 
 Alexander, Emperor, i. liii ; reconciliation 
 with Napr.Ieon, 230 ; Treaty of Tilsit, 
 237, and Napoleon, 240 ; communica- 
 tion to Talleyrand, 242 ; Erfurt, 290 ; 
 Napoleon's designs, 294-5 ; Ottoman 
 Empire, Wallachia, Moldavia, 297 ; 
 Napoleon's influence over, 305 ; arrival 
 at Erfurt, 310; meeting with Napo- 
 leon, 315 ; meetings with Talleyrand, 
 323 ; Erfurt Convention, 324 ; at the 
 
 Princess of Tour's, 325 ; interview 
 with Talleyrand on Napoleon, 328 ; 
 fascinated with Napoleon, 335-6 ; in- 
 terview with Talleyrand regarding 
 Napoleon's marriage, 337 
 ii. Conversations with Grand Duchess 
 Stephanie of Baden, III; interview 
 with M. de Vitrolles, 1 14 ; enters 
 Paris, 122 ; visit to Talleyrand, ib. ; 
 on the Government, ib. ; meeting 
 with Talleyrand, 128 ; letter from 
 Talleyrand, 155 ; the Chatillon Con- 
 gress, 186 et seq. ; the treaty formu- 
 lated at the Congress, 192 ; conversa- 
 tion with Lord Castlereagh, 223 ; 
 delays seeing Talleyrand, ib. ; inter- 
 view with Talleyrand, 234 ; wishes 
 his brother to be King of Poland, 
 250 ; visit to Wagram, 252 ; his de- 
 signs on Poland, 255-6, 259 ; Warsaw, 
 272 ; interview with Talleyrand, 274, 
 275 ; his schemes, 285 ; complains of 
 Metternich, 289 ; his decision, 295 ; 
 complains of injustice, 302 ; intended 
 journey to Trieste, 305 ; Poland , 306-8 ; 
 conversation with the King of Prussia, 
 311 ; opposition of Austria, 313 ; con- 
 versation with Talleyrand, 318, 320 ; 
 Treaty with Denmark, 319 ; discussion 
 on Poland and Saxony, 348 ; interview 
 with Prince Metternich regarding 
 Saxony, 354 : reproaches Duke of 
 Coburg, 364 ; demands the abandon- 
 ment of all Saxony or preservation of 
 a portion of that kingdom, 365 ; in- 
 corporation of Saxony with Prussia, 
 
 374- 
 iii. General Pozzo, 3 ; Due de Berry's 
 marriage, 23 ; Duke of Wellington, 
 34 ; interview with Talleyrand about 
 Naples, 46 et seq. ; the affairs of Arch- 
 duchess Marie Louise, 58 ; prepara- 
 tions for departure of, 63 ; Duchy of 
 Warsaw, 64 ; the army of, to draw 
 
394 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 near Oder and Elbe, 71 ! receives 
 tidings of Bonaparte from King of 
 Wuriemburg, 78 ; at'.ends Conference, 
 80 ; Valtelline, Bormio, and Chia- 
 venni, 81 ; Poland, 84 ; conversation 
 with Talleyrand, 88 ; enthusiastic on 
 destruction of Bonaparte, 93 ; offended 
 with King Louis XVIII., 112 ; article 
 in the Gazette de Francjort^ II7 » ^^' 
 tervicw with Talleyrand, 124 ; Fouche, 
 162; annoyance of, 188; resignation 
 of Talleyrand a relief to, 203 ; Talley- 
 rand on character of, 219 
 
 Alexander VIII,, ii. 34 
 
 Algiers, iii. 2S9 ; v. 92 
 
 Alien Bill, i. 173 
 
 Aligre, Etienne F. d', i. 69 
 
 Alix, General, iii. 171 
 
 AUeyne, M., iv. 25 
 
 Alost, the household troops at, iii. 98 
 
 Althorp, Lord, iii. 274 ; v. 272, 277, 291 
 
 Altamira, Don J. N. de M. de, v. 259 
 
 Altieri, Abbe, iii. 108 
 
 Amblimont, Madame d', v. 360 
 
 America. See United States 
 
 American Commissioners (bribery), i. xlix. 
 
 Amiens, Treaty of, i. 60, 213, 214 
 
 Animecourt, M. d', i. 141 
 
 Ancillon, M., iii. 247, 276; iv. 251, 259 ; 
 V. 12, 16, 87, 105, 331 
 
 Ancona, ii. 36; iv. 276, 2S1 etseq.; v. 
 181 
 
 Ande, Comte Fabre de la, iii. 171 
 
 Andre, M. d', ii. 350, 352 
 
 Andrinwitch, Christopher, iii. 253 
 
 Andreossy, General, iii. 16, 159 
 
 Angely, Regnauld de Saint Jean d', iii. 
 171 
 
 Anglas, M. Boissy de, iii. 159, 171, 172 
 
 Angles, M. de, hi. 98 
 
 Angouleme, Ducde, ii. 105, 108, no, ill ; 
 iii. 86, 97, 103, 119, 169 
 
 Angouleme, Duchesse de, ii. 223 ; iii. 14 
 
 Anne, Grand Duchess, i. 316 ; iii. 24 
 
 Anstedt, Baron von, ii. 295, 312 
 
 Antonio, Infante Don, i. 277, 279, 280, 
 
 Antwerp, Prince of Orange, iii. 268 
 possibly offered to England, 285 
 possible reunion with France, 305 
 rising blockade of, iv. 10, 13, 22, 
 loi ; aggressions of, 123 ; reopening 
 of the Scheldt, 200 ; probable siege 
 of, v. 24, 45 et scq. ; capitulation, 54 
 
 Appony, M. d' v. 87, 323, et scq. 
 
 Arcamball, Marquis de, v. 363 
 
 Arapiles, battle of, ii. 23 
 
 Ai'cana, iii. 302 
 
 Arenberg, Duke of, ii. 161 
 
 Arenenburg, Duchesse de, iv. 121 
 
 Argenson, Marquis d', v. xii 
 
 Argenson, Marc-Pierre de V. Comte de, 
 
 V. 342, 390 
 Argout, M. d', V. 7 
 Aries, Archbishop of (M. Dulan), i. 23, 
 
 24 
 
 Armansperge, Comte d', v. 290 
 
 Army, discipline of, i. 91 
 
 Armand, Abbe F., i. 35 ; v. 362 
 
 Arnault, M., iii. 171 
 
 Arnold, General, i. 174 
 
 Arnould, Mademoiselle (actress), i. 126 
 
 Arras, Bishop of, i, 41, 46 
 
 Arrighi, Comte d', iv. 8 
 
 Arschot, M. iii. 171 ; iv. 81, 175 
 
 Art, iii. 162 et seq, 
 
 Arta, iii. 302 
 
 Artois, Comte d', i. 47, 78, 94 ; note of 
 M. de Bacourt on interviews with 
 Talleyrand on the quelling of the 
 revolution, 104 ; in Switzerland, ii. 
 Ill ; meets M. de VitroUes, 114; 
 Lieutenant-General, 127 
 
 Asseline, Jean Rene (theologian), ii. 29 
 
 Aston, Sir A., v. no, 152 
 
 Astros, Abbe d', ii. 57, 58 
 
 Asturias, Prince of the. See Ferdinand 
 VII. 
 
 Ath, iv. 245, 268 
 
 Auckland, Lord, iii. 274; v. 273, 277 
 
 Auers-Perge, Princess d', v. 3.16 
 
 Augustus, King Frederick, i. 239 
 
 Austerlitz, battle of, i. 225 ; ii. 36 
 
 Austria, king and kingdom of, i. war with 
 France, 168 ; treaties, 192 ; reconcili- 
 ation with France, 209 ; battle of 
 Marengo, 211 ; treaties, 212 ; in 
 arms, 222 ; loss of Italian possessions, 
 227 ; Polish possessions, 235 ; position 
 of, 245 ; treaty of Erfurt, 307 ; Czar 
 Alexander, 328 
 ii. Napoleon's marriage, 6 ; position of, 
 116; treaties between nations, 131 
 et seq. ; the house of Carignan, 167 ; 
 interview with M. de Vitrolles, 189 ; 
 treaties between nations, 192 eiseq. ; 
 Saxony, 208-9 ! recovery of posses- 
 sions, 211 ; military league with 
 Bavaria and France, 256 ; Russia and 
 Poland, 261 ; Saxony, 267, 272, 280, 
 289, 296, 301 ; hospitality of the 
 Court, 305 ; Jacobin feeling, 310 ; 
 army, 312; determined not to re- 
 move Murat, 362 ; fears allayed, 374; 
 text of secret treaty between Austria, 
 France, and England, 3S9-392 
 iii. Retrocessions demanded by, 42 ; in- 
 decision of, ifi. ; Metternich's project, 
 43 ; cession of Valtelline to, 47 ; affairs 
 badly managed, ib. ; treaties of 
 
INDEX. 
 
 395 
 
 Reichenbach and Tbplitz between 
 Austria, Russia, and Pnissia, 53 ; Re- 
 trocessions demanded by, 55 ; declara- 
 tion against Murat, 57 ; Salzburg, 63 ; 
 orders to remove Joseph Bonaparte 
 from French frontiers, 76; Valtelline, 
 Bormio, and Chiavenna, 81 ; news 
 from Italy of Murat, 110, ill; the 
 son of Archduchess Marie Louise to 
 have an establishment in, 116 ; success 
 of the troops in Italy, 119; com- 
 plaints by Bourrienne of the bad 
 behaviour in France of the troops of, 
 168-9 J Commissary-General of the 
 army of, 1 74 ; plenipotentiaries of, 
 188 ; represented at the Conference in 
 London, 256 ; alarmed at revolution 
 in France and disturbances in Bruns- 
 wick, Saxony, and Hesse, 275, 276 ; 
 represented by Prince Esterhazy, 277 ; 
 under English influence, 314. 
 iv. Interference of, 50 ; no desire to 
 kindle war in any part of Europe, 97 : 
 France about to declare war against, 
 104 ; Court of Vienna, 260 
 V. Refuses to join the mediation, 80 ; 
 views repecting Switzerland, 88 ; 
 Russia and Prussia and Austria's 
 action in Italy, 181 et seq. ; Luxem- 
 bourg, 261 ; treaty with France, 351 ; 
 alliance with Prussia, 360 
 Austria, Empress of, ii. 222, 380 ; iii. 14 
 Auzely, M. de, i. 36 
 Avesnes, iii. 193, 195 
 Avian, Comte de — Archblhhop of Bordeaux, 
 
 q.v, 
 Azauza, Don Jose Miguel de, i. 269, 277 
 Azyr, Felix Vicq d', i. 102 
 
 B 
 
 Backhouse, Mr., v. 282, 284 
 
 Bacourt, Mons. de, directions to, i. xii. ; 
 preparation of Memoirs, xiii. ; will of, 
 ib. ; fictitious Memoirs, xvi., xviii., 
 xix. ; on the interviews of Prince Tal- 
 leyrand with the Comte D'Artois, 104 
 et seq. ; letter from Baron de Vitrolles, 
 io5 ; note by, ii. 112, 192 ; sent to 
 assist Talleyrand, iii. 271 ; illness of, 
 iv. 85 ; MS. of the Memoirs, v. xv. 
 et seq. 
 
 Baden, Elector and Electorate of, iii. 209 
 et seq. 
 
 Baden, Prince of, i. 312 ; ii. 348 
 
 Bagot, Sir Charies, iv. 186 
 
 Baliviere, Abbe de, i. 47 
 
 Baltimore, i. 177 
 
 Bank of Discount, i. 42, 67 
 
 Barante, Baron, v. 53 
 
 Barral, Comte de, iii. 171 
 
 Barras, Comte Paul de, i. 188-190, 192- 
 205 
 
 Barrere, M. , iii. 171 
 
 Barrot, M. Odilon, iv. 56, 163, 178 ; v. 10 
 
 Barry, Comte Jean du, dissipated life, v. 
 361 et seq. ; intrigues with Made- 
 moiselle L'Ange, 363 ; hoaxing the 
 king, 364 ; Corsica, ii. ; consulted 
 regarding le Due de Choiseul's 
 schemes, 370 ; explains to his sister- 
 in-law, 371 ; the king's letter to 
 Charles III., 372 
 
 Barry, Comtesse du, v. 363 ; introduced to 
 the king, 364, 366 ; becomes a 
 favourite, 366 ; jealousy of the others, 
 ii. ; holds court, 367 ; becomes in- 
 terested in politics, 368 ; Due de 
 Choiseul's schemes, 370 ; speaks to 
 the king regarding them, 371 ; the 
 king's letter to Charles III., 372 ; in- 
 fluence in appointing ministers, 374 
 
 Barthe, M., iv. 201 ; v. 7 
 
 Barthes, J., i. 27 
 
 Basel, Prince, Bishop of, ii. 344, 346 
 
 Basel, project for exchange of, ii. 359 
 
 Basle, iii. 192 ; iv. 28 
 
 Bassano, Madame de, i. 227 
 
 Bastille, taking of, i. 95 
 
 Bathurst, Lord, ii. 108 ; iii. 31 
 
 Baudraud, General Comte, iii. 227, iv. 182, 
 185 
 
 Bauer, Herr von, i. 312 
 
 Bauffremont, Duchesse de, iv. 219 ; v. 126 
 
 Bavaria, King Charles of, iii. 289, 303 
 
 Bavaria, Duke William of, i. 312 
 
 Bavaria, Prince Otto of, iii. 266, 303 ; iv. 
 7 etseq., 28, 1 46, 28 1 ; iv. 28 1 ; v. 303 
 
 Bavaria, King and Kingdom of, i. 313 ; 
 ii. 257, 267, 270, 290, 318 ; iii. 13, 
 14. 42, S3. 55. 63, 121, 266 ; iv. 5 
 
 Bayanne, Cardinal de, ii. 83 
 
 Beam, Comtesse de, v. 366 
 
 Beauhamais, Eugene de, i. 30: ; ii. 3, 11 1, 
 116 ; iii. 260 
 
 Beauharnais, Francois, Marquis de, i. 254 
 et seq., 269, 270, 271, 275 
 
 Beaumetz, M. de, i. 176, 186 
 
 Beausset, Louis de, i. 305 
 
 Beauvan, Madame de, i. 45 ; v. 360, 361, 
 366 
 
 Beauveset, Pierre Robbe de, v. 363 
 
 Beahgue, Comte de, v. 385 
 
 Bechtolsheim, Baroness, i. 327 
 
 Bedford, Duke of, v. 359 
 
 Bedoyere, M. de la, iii. 100, 171 
 
 Beira, Princess de, v. 283 
 
 Belabre, Marquis Leevigreux de, i. 70 
 
 Belgian National Congress, iii. 263, 265, 
 
396 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 267, 284, 303, 320 ; iv. 8, \-j et sej., 
 25. 30. 35. 39. 46 ri seq., 96, 1 18, 134, 
 137. 150 et ^eq., 166 
 
 Belgium, events in, iii. 235 et seq. ; Talley- 
 rand on, 256 ; to be separated from 
 Holland, 259 ; Louis Philippe on 
 state of, 262 ; Monarchical and Repub- 
 lican parties, 267 et seq. ; affairs of, 
 275 ; division of, 285 ; independence 
 of, 294 ; conferences to be held in 
 Paris, 316 
 iv. Choice of a sovereign still undecided 
 4; reunion advocated with France, 
 5 et seq. ; new candidate for throne of, 
 7; blockade of Antwerp, 10, 13, 22, 
 loi ; King of Holland desires war 
 with, 13; thirteen fortresses of, 15; 
 affairs in, 16 et seq. ; neutrality of, 21 ; 
 Talleyrand in favour of Prince Leo- 
 pold as sovereign for, 30 ; Due de 
 Nemours proclaimed King of, 33 ; af- 
 fairs in, 34 et seq. ; determination of 
 the boundaries of, 52 ; Regent of, 63 ; 
 judged rightly, by the Conference, 79 ; 
 not to disturb the peace of other 
 nations, 82 ; choice of a sovereign for, 
 84 ; great interest of France for, 105 ; 
 position of as regards France, 109 ; 
 conference respecting, 122 ; Prince 
 Leopold elected King of, 138 ; arrival 
 of French army in, 175, 182 ; ashamed 
 of her defeat, 191; Louis Philippe on 
 the safety and independence of, 193 ; 
 reopening of the Scheldt, 200 ; two 
 routes for introducing merchandise 
 into Germany for, 216 ; treaty with 
 the five powers, 226 ; demolition of 
 the fortresses of, 237 ; the people 
 weak and false, 253 
 V. 13 ; probable siege of Antwerp, 24, 
 45 et seq. ; entry of French troops into, 
 39 ; reimbursements aslted from, 43 ; 
 capitulation of Antwerp, 54 ; as an in- 
 dependent state, 68 ; new phase in the 
 affairs of, 1 29 et seq. ; King Leopold's 
 scheme of succession, 267 ; Madame 
 Adelaide on the foregoing, 268 ; letter 
 from King Louis Philippe to King 
 Leopold, 269 ; Talleyrand on the suc- 
 cession, 270 ; Lord Palmerston on the 
 succession, 275, 276; territory, 319; 
 free navigation of the Scheldt, 321 ; 
 Due de Broglie on and M. le Comte 
 d'Appony on, 323 
 
 Bellechasse, i. 25 
 
 Belliard, Comte, iii. 1 72 ; iv. 64, 76, III, 
 129, 132, I'i^etseq., l^'^etseq., 180 
 
 Belle-isle, L. F. , Due de, v. xii. 350 
 
 Benac, M. de, i. 7, 8 
 
 Benoit, XIV. ; v. 340 
 
 Bentham, Jeremy, i. 171 
 
 Bentinck, Lord William Cavendish, ii. II,, 
 3i6 
 
 Beobachter, iii. 22 
 
 Beresford, Viscount, ii. 107 
 
 Berg, Grand Due de (Murat), i. King of 
 Cleves and Berg, 229 ; deputation at 
 Warsaw, 233 ; Napoleon's arrival 
 there, 234 ; representing Napoleon in 
 Madrid, 269-272 ; the Prince of the 
 Peace, 284-5 
 ii. Napoleon's marriage, 6 ; King of 
 Naples, 9 et seq. ; Napoleon's in- 
 dignation against, 92 ; the position 
 of Italy, 103 ; treaties with Aus- 
 tria and England, 175 ; conversa- 
 tion with Baron Louis, 186 ; ruin of, 
 213 ; his supporters in Italy, 304; 
 cause of, 332 ; army of, 340 ; corre- 
 spondence with Bonaparte, 368 
 iii. Mistake of French journals, 34 ; ex- 
 pulsion of, 45 ; conversation between 
 Czar and Talleyrand on, 49 ; declara- 
 tion of Austria against, 57 ; entered 
 the Papal States, 93, III ; disap- 
 pointed in an insurrection in Italy, 120 
 
 Berlin, iii. 276, 316 ; iv. 142, 217, 250 ; 
 V. 52, 104, 107 
 
 Bermudez, iii. 247 
 
 Bemadotte, ii. Ill, I16; iii. II, 36 
 
 Bernis, Abbe de, v. 341, 342, 349 et s q. 
 
 390 
 Bernstorff, M. de, iii. 247, 276 ; iv. 142, 
 
 251 ; V. 87 
 Berry, Due de, iii. 23, 86, loi, 106, 119 ; 
 
 iv. 49 
 Berry, Duchess de, ii. 369 ; iv. 299 ; v. 36, 
 
 112 
 Berryer, M., v. 24 
 Bertazzoli, ii. 83 
 Bertin, Honori, v. 367 
 Berthier, Marshal Alex., i. 232, 239 ; ii. 
 
 7 ; iii. 172 
 Bertrand, Abbe, i. 35 
 Bertrand, M. Pierre, v. viii. xvi 
 Besnardiere, Comte de la, ii. 102, 103, 
 
 121, 153; iii. 159 
 Bessieres, Marshal, i. 277; iii. 172 
 Bestucheff, Comte de, v. 356 
 Bethlehem (America), i. 177 
 Bethmann, Herr, i. 510 
 Beugnot, Jacques Claude, Comte, ii. 17, 
 
 350. 352 
 Bianchi, iii. 65 
 
 Bianchetti, Comte Caesar, iv. 80 
 Bignon, L. P. E., Baron, iii. 22S ; v. 206 
 Biron, M. de, i. 120, 159, 167 
 Bissy, Comte de, v. 362 
 Bitche, iii. 193, 195 
 Blacas, Comte de, ii. 305 
 
INDEX. 
 
 397 
 
 Blanchard, Abbe Pierre Louis, ii. 31 
 Bligh, Sir John, v. 201 
 
 Blot, Madame de, i. 46, 47 
 
 BlUcher, Marshal, iii. 83, 84, 159, 187 
 
 Bois, le Comte M. de, iii. 263 ; v. 92 
 
 Boisgelin, Jean-de-Dieu, R. de (Archbishop 
 of Aix), i. 20, 24, 77 
 
 Boisgelin, Abbe de, i. 38 
 
 Bolingbroke, Lord, i. 28 
 
 Eombelles, Marquis de, iii. 120 
 
 Bonaparte, Eliza, ii. 125, 126 
 
 Bonaparte, Jerome, i. 238; ii. l6, 125, 
 126; V. 264 
 
 Bonaparte, Joseph, treaties, i. 213 ; King 
 of Naples, 228 ; King of Spain, 290 ; 
 entry into Naples, ii. 8 ; speaks ill of 
 Napoleon, 20 ; Naples, 36 ; at Blois, 
 122; provision for, 125-126; con- 
 ducted to Gratz, iii. 73 ; in London, 
 V. 264 
 
 Bonaparte, Louis, i. 229; ii. 15, 125, 126; 
 iv. 120 
 
 Bonaparte, Liicien, i. 336 ; iv. 120 ; v. 264 
 
 Bonaparte, Napnileon — see Napoleon 
 
 Bonaparte, Pauline, ii. 125, 126 
 
 Boquet, Dom Martin, i. 19 
 
 Bordeaux, Archbishop of ( Prince de Rohan- 
 Guemenee), i. 20, 77 ; ii. 78 
 
 Borel, M. Fauche, iii. no 
 
 Borghese, Princess, i, 316 
 
 Borgo, Pozzo di. General. See Pozzo, 
 General 
 
 Bornos, Count de, i. 263 
 
 Bose, Count von, i. 310 
 
 Bouchain, iii. 193, 19S 
 
 Boufflers, Chevalier de, i. 47 
 
 Boufflers, Madame de, i. 33 
 
 Bouille, M. de, iv. 25 
 
 Bouillon, Due de, iii. 32 
 
 Bouillon, Princesse de, i. 122 
 
 Bouillon, iii. 264; iv. 83 
 
 Boulogne, Etienne Antoine de — Bishop of 
 Troyes, q.v. 
 
 Bourbon, Abbe de, i. 38 
 
 Bourbon, Le Connetable de, i. 36 
 
 Bourbon, Louis Henry Joseph, Due de, 
 i. 154, 155 ; iii. 87, 103 ; v. 390 
 
 Bourgoing, Jean Frangois, Baron de, i. 310 
 
 BouijoUy, Mile., i. 312 
 
 Bourlier, Jean Baptiste, Comte (Bishop of 
 Evreux), i. 39 
 
 Bourmont, M., v. 169 
 
 Bourrienne, M. de, iii. 168 
 
 Bo vara, M., ii. 77 
 
 Boynes, E. F. B. de, v. 374 
 
 Boyer, General, i. 304 
 
 Brabant, Dutch, iii. 263 
 
 Brandenburg, House of HohenzoUem, 
 ii. 99 
 
 Braganza, Due de, v. 138 
 
 Braganza, Duchess de, v. 170 
 
 Breda, iii. 263 
 
 Bresson, Comte Charles, made first secre- 
 tary of Talleyrand's embassy, iii. 239 ; 
 return to Brussels, 271 ; closing of 
 the Scheldt, 307 ; Luxemburg, 319 ; 
 House of Nassau, M. Van de Meyer, 
 320, 321 ; Belgium, 19 ; Prince of 
 Orange and Prince Leopold, 20 ; Due 
 de Nemours, 36 ; Polish revolution, 
 37, 38 ; Treaty between Holland and 
 Belgium, 251, 252; Prussia, 258; 
 Russia, 259 ; Treaty of Dutch pleni- 
 potentiaries, 280 ; Belgian Congress, 
 318; France and Prussia, v. 12, 13, 
 16 ; France and England, 87 ; at 
 Berlin, 261 
 
 Breteuil, M. de, i. 19, 70, 71 
 
 Breteuil, Abbe Theodore de, i. 150 
 
 Breteuil, L. A. C.T., Baron de, i. 46, 69, 
 78, 149; V. 356 
 
 Bridge of Jena, i. xxxv ; iii. 1 60, v. xiv 
 
 Brielle, J. S. de, v. 351 
 
 Brienne, Comte de (Archbi.^hop of Tou- 
 louse), i. 21, 37, 45, 70, 78, 81, 82 
 
 Brienne, L., M. de, i. 83 
 
 Brighton, iv. 11, 227 
 
 BrignoUes, M. de, ii. 304 
 
 Brionne, Madame de, i. 33, 46 ; ii. 209 ; 
 iii. 58, 84 
 
 Brissot, Jean Pierre, i. 166 
 
 Bristol, Marquis of, iv. 220 
 
 Bristol, riot at, iv. 232 
 
 Britain — see England 
 
 Brittany, women of, i. 41 
 
 Broglie, Due de. Memoirs, v. xii; the satisfac- 
 tory state of France, 1 1 ; the expedition 
 to Antwerp, 17, 18; exchange of rati- 
 fications, 27 ; Talleyrand's treaty, 32 ; 
 outrage in Paris, 30 ; Belgian govern- 
 ment, 40 et seq. ; siege of Antwerp, 
 47 ; Sir Stratford Canning's mission, 
 65 ; Eastern affairs, 75, 81, 92, 93 ; the 
 Due d'Orleans' journey, 99 ; Eastern 
 question 107, et seq., 121 ; customs 
 question, 128-9 ; Portuguese business, 
 137 ; Eastern question, 147 ; state of 
 affairs in Portugal, \<,2ciseq., 172, 184; 
 Austria's action in Italy, 184 et seq. ; 
 Talleyrand's proposed treaty of alliance 
 with England, 187 et seq. ; sends 
 Talleyrand draft of the treaty, 197 ; 
 difficulties regarding it, 198; rumour 
 of retirement, 206 ; Dutch affairs, 
 226; resignation, 229, 231; Lord 
 Holland and Lord Brougham on, 231 ; 
 on Dutch affairs, 319 et seq. ; closing 
 of the Scheldt, 321 ; interview with 
 Comte d'Appony on Belgian affairs, 
 323 et seq. 
 
398 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Broglie, Due de, Editor of Memoirs, v. 
 vii et seq. 
 
 Brouckere, M. De, iv. loo 
 
 Brougham, Henry Lord, iii. 261, 273, 315, 
 318 ; iv. 232 ; V. 231 
 
 Broussais, Doctor, iv. 294 
 
 Bruix, Admiral Eustache, i. 192 
 
 Brunswick, disturbances in, iii. 276 
 
 Brussels, Talleyrand at after the Battle 
 of Waterloo, iii. 129 ; National Con- 
 gress of, 262 et seq., 283 ; M. de 
 Langsdorf at, 288 ; English and 
 French Commissioners at, iv. 6 ; new 
 candidate for the Belgian throne, 7, 
 8 ; Talleyrand on affairs in, 30, 31 ; 
 M. Bresson at, 35 ; Declaration at, 
 39, 40 ; General Belliard at, 64 ; Lord 
 Ponsonby recalled from, 68 ; declara- 
 tion, 85 ; disturbances in, 122; Lord 
 Ponsonby's return to, 129; deputa- 
 tion from Antwerp, 14S ; Chartres and 
 Nemours at, 175 ; Marshal Gerard 
 sent to, 229 
 
 Bubna, M. de, iii. 85 
 
 Bucholz, Count and Countess von, i. 313 
 
 Buchon, M. de, iv. 231 
 
 Buffon, M. de, i. 51 
 
 Buffon, Madame de, i. 153 
 
 Biilow, Baron de, iii. 278 ; iv. 69, 78, 90, 
 96, 142, 290 ; v. 26 et seq., 219 
 
 Bunbury, Sir Henry Edward, ii. io6 
 
 Burdett, Sir Francis, iv. 2S8 
 
 Burgos, Don F. X. de, v. 259 
 
 Bussy, Francois de, v. 351 
 
 Bute, Earl of, v. 358 
 
 Cabre, Abbe Sabatier de, i. 70, 135, 136, 
 144-147, 149, 155 
 
 Cadaval, Due de, v. 138, 140, 146 
 
 Cadore, Due de, iii. 171 
 
 Cagliostro, i. 125 
 
 Cailhava, Jean, v. 362 
 
 Caisse d'Escompte, i. 42, 67 
 
 Calonne, Charles Alexander de, i. 31, 33, 
 46, 68, 69, 71, 72, 75, 78, 79 et seq. 127 
 
 Cambaceres, Jean Jacques-Regis de, i. 
 218 ;ii. 6 
 
 Cambray, proclamation of King Louis at, 
 iii. 156, 193 
 
 Cambresis, Chateau, iii. 150, 155 
 
 Cambridge, iv. 103 
 
 Campbell, Colonel, v. 85 
 
 Campo, Chiaro Due de. Memorandum re- 
 garding Talleyrand's action, iii. 54 
 
 Campo-Formio, Treaty of, i. 193 
 
 Campomanes, Don Domingo Fernandez 
 " de, i. 263 
 
 Canada, v. 385 
 
 Canclaux, Comte de, iii. 171, 172 
 
 Canning, George, i. 170; iii. 272, 281, 
 
 315 ; iv. 78 
 Canning, Sir S., ii. 29S ; v. 43, 64, 68, 95 
 
 216 
 Canonville, M. de, i. 305, 309 
 Capefigue, Raymond, iv. 231 
 Caprara, Cardinal, ii. 33 
 Cara'man, M. de, ii. 312 
 Carignan, House, of, ii. 167, 176, 215. 
 
 298, 333, 343 
 
 Carlisle, Earl of, v. 273, 293 
 
 Carlo?, Dukeof San, i. 271, 277, 2S0, 281, 
 289 
 
 Carlos, Infante Don. See Don Carlos 
 
 Carlsruhe, iii. 2U et seq. ; iv. 25 
 
 Carnot, General, v. xv 
 
 Carnot, Lazare, i. 192, 211 ; iii. 171 
 
 Caroline, Queen, ii. iii 
 
 Cartwright, Mr., iii. 258, 271 ; v. 290 
 
 Casabianca, Comte de, iii. 171 
 
 Caselli, Cardinal, ii. 59, y& 
 
 Casenove, M., i. 175 
 
 Casimir, M., iii. 228 
 
 Castellane, Michel Comte de, v. 348 
 
 Castellar, Marquis de, i. 273 
 
 Castelsicala, Prince de, iii. 315 
 
 Castlereagh, Lord, i. xxxv 
 
 ii. At the Congress of Vienna, 202 ; 
 pleases Talleyrand, 223 ; preliminary 
 conferences, 230 ; project of declara- 
 tion, 238-243 ; projects of Prince 
 Metternich and Talleyrand, 247 ; 
 public law, 248 ; false views regard- 
 ing Saxony, 255 ; audience from the 
 Czar, 259 ; mistaken policy, 270 ; 
 Russia and Warsaw, 273 ; opposition 
 to France, 278 ; Poland, 291 ; Russia, 
 Saxony, and Prussia, 296 ; Switzer- 
 land, 29S ; Russia's frontier, 301 ; 
 assembly of congress, 303 ; Warsaw, 
 310; Poland, 311; embarrassed by 
 Lord W. Bentinck, 316 ; conversation 
 between the Czar and Talleyrand, 
 320 et seq. ; consultation with Talley- 
 rand, 329 ; Prussia and Russia, 333 ; 
 imbued with prejudices against France, 
 339 ; discussion on Poland and Saxony, 
 348 ; ordered to back up Saxony, 354 ; 
 Poland, 356-8 ; commission to verify 
 the accounts furnished by Austria and 
 Pru.ssia, 377 
 iii. Won over by Talleyrand, 3 ; ignor- 
 ance of, IS ; recalled to England, 27 ; 
 on Saxony, 29 ; departure of, 33 ; 
 salutes at sea, 39 ; the expulsion of 
 Murat, 45 ; slave trade of France, 50 ; 
 memorandum to Prince Talleyrand 
 respecting art galleries, iSo ; letter 
 
INDEX. 
 
 399 
 
 from Talleyrand, 184, 186 ; conversa- 
 tion with Talleyrand, 203 
 Castries, C. de la Croix, Marquis de, i. 
 
 33> 41. 46 
 
 Cathcart, Lord William, il. 288 ; iii. 75. 
 
 Catherine of Russia, Empress, i. 198 
 
 Caulaincourt, Louis de, French ambassa- 
 dor in Russia, i. 241 ; the Ottoman 
 Empire, 296 et seq. ; conversation 
 with Talleyrand, 309 ; at Erfurt, 316, 
 325 ; influence with the Czar, 32S ; 
 at the Congress of Chatillon, ii. 102 ; 
 M. VitroUes' visit to the allies, 112; 
 Napoleon's overthrow, 124 ; the 
 Chatillon Congress, 192 ; endeavours 
 to secure better conditions, 195 et 
 seq.\ orders from First Consul, iii. 212; 
 letter from Talleyrand, 212, 213 
 
 Cavallero, Joseph, Marquis de, i. 263, 265, 
 271, 276 
 
 Cavanac, Madame de, i. 38. 
 
 Cavendish, H. i. 64 
 
 Celles, Comte de, iii. 256, 285, 304, 309 ; 
 
 iv. 5. 5°. 73. 215 
 Cevallos, Don Pedro, i. 265, 268, 271, 
 
 277, 282 ; iii. 237, 241 
 Cevallos, Senor de, ii. 369 
 Chabannes, Comtesse de, i. 81 
 Chalabre, i. 47 
 Chalais, Madame de, i. $ 
 Chalais, visit to, i. S 
 Chalais Castle, custom at, i. 7 
 Challaye, M. ii. 153 ; iii. 239 
 Chambery, iv. 28 
 Chambre des Comptes, i. 20 
 Chamfort, S. i. 28, 35, 47 
 Chamillard, Marie Elisabeth, i. I 
 Chamillard, M. de, i. 7 
 Champagny, Jean Baptiste Nompere de, i. 
 
 242, 247, 283, 304 
 Chamronde, Marie de V. v. 338 
 Chaptal, Antoine, i. 218 
 Charlemagne, Mademoiselle, i. 5. 
 Charlemont, iii. 189, 193, 195 
 Charles, Archduke, i. 202, 224 ; iii. 268, 
 
 288, 322 ; iv. 33 
 Charles IIL v. 373 
 Charles IV. i. 248, 252, 256, 258, 265 
 
 et seq., 275, 284, 285 
 Charles X. iii. 225 et seq., 240, 246, 313 ; 
 
 iv. 56 
 Charter, the constitutional, iii. 193 
 Chartres, Due de M. See Due d'Orleans 
 Chasse, General, iv. 147 ; v. 41 
 Chastellux, Chevalier de, i. 36 
 Chateaubriand, M. de, iii. 98, IJS 
 Chateaubrun, Jean-Baptiste N. de, i. 1 14 
 Chatel, Antoinette C. du, v. 338 
 Chatel, L. F. C, Marquis de, v. 338 
 Chatellet-Lolmont, L. F. de, v. 348 
 
 Chatham, Earl of, v. 351 
 
 Chatillon, Congress of, ii. io2, 104, 108, 
 186, 192 
 
 Chaumont, Treaty of, ii. 113 ; iii. SS ; iv. 
 230 
 
 Chauveron, M. de, i. 7 
 
 Chauvalon, J. B. F. de, v. 385 
 
 Chauvelin, Chevalier de, v. 361 
 
 Chenier, Marie Joseph, i. 186 
 
 Chenoise, M., iii. 259 
 
 Chevert, M. Fran9oi.'i de, i. 91 
 
 Chevreux, Duchesse de, i. 227 
 
 Choiseul, Due de (M. de Stainville), 
 Talleyrand introduced to, i. 33 ; at 
 Madame d'Hericourt's, 35 ; official 
 positions, 46 ; the house of Choiseul, 
 V. 337 et seq. ; his youth, 338 ; un- 
 favourable opinion of, ib. ; intrigues, 
 
 339 ; inclined to an embassy in Rome, 
 
 340 ; in Rome, ib. ; in favour with 
 the Pope, il>. ; society of Jesuits, 
 ii. ; return to Ver.sailles, 3.11 ; war, 
 343 ; slighted by M. de Kaunitz, 345 ; 
 the Empress, 346 et seq. ; created Due, 
 347 ; ambition, 348 ; Madame de 
 Pompadour, 349 ; foreign minister, 
 350 ; treaty with Austria, 351 ; nego- 
 tiations with England, 351, 352 ; po- 
 litical blindness, 355 ; contempt for 
 Russia, 356 ; end of the seven years' 
 war, 360 ; death of Madame de Pompa- 
 dour, ii. ; zenith of his career, 361 ; 
 Madame du Barry and the king, 366 
 et seq. ; jealousy of the ministers, 367 ; 
 Madame du Barry, 36S ; prospect of 
 Spanish war, 369 ; upholds the Span- 
 ish cause from personal motives, ib. ; 
 growing disfavour of the king, 373 ; 
 banishment, 374 ; Talleyrand's criti- 
 cism of his ministry un'ler the treaty 
 of 1756, 375 et seq. ; Talleyrand on 
 the destruction of the order of the 
 Jesuits, 383 ; the cession of Canada 
 and Acada, 385 ; never returns to 
 position, 392 
 
 Choiseul-Beaupre, Francois, Comte de, v. 
 
 339 
 Choiseul, Cesar, Comte de, v. 348 
 Choiseul-Gouffier, Comte August de, i. 
 
 10, 17, 26, 28, 50 
 Chokier, Baron Surlet de, iv., 63, 167 
 Chouan, i. 194 
 Chuquet, M., v. vii 
 Ciprey, Baron Alleye de, v. 290 
 Cisalpine Republic, i. 217 
 Clairault, Alexis, i. 63 
 Clancarty, Earl of, ii. 288, 316, 375 ; iii, 
 
 7S. "5 
 Claparede, Comte de, i. 304 
 Claremont, iii. 322 ; iv. 124 
 
400 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Clarke, General Comte, i. 230 
 
 Clausel, M., iv. 178 
 
 Clergy, assembly of, i. 18 ; proposal to 
 tax property of, ib. ; Talleyrand ap- 
 pointed agent-general of, 32 ; condi- 
 tion of, 40 ; influence of philosophers 
 on, 65 ; tax on, 77 ; and States-General, 
 84 ; action of National Assembly, 103 
 
 Clermont, Mile, de (Madame de Sillery) i. 
 124 
 
 Cluys, M., iii. 171 
 
 Cobenzl, Count Louis von, i. 212 
 
 Coburg, Duke of, ii. 363, 364 ; iv. 10 
 
 Cocq, M.Le, i. 313 
 
 Coinage, i. 72 
 
 Colchen, Comte de, iii. 171 
 
 CoUorido, Jerome, iii. 65 
 
 Colomarde, F. S., v. 292 
 
 Comacchio, Bishop of, ii. 78 
 
 Comedie Fran9aise, i. 302 et seq., 32^ et 
 seq., 330. 
 
 Comminges, Bishop of, 1. 37 
 
 Compiegne, iv. 301 ct seq. 
 
 Concordat, the, i. 214 ; ii. 25 et ieq. 
 
 Conde, Prince de, i. 134, 154, '55 5 '"■ 189. 
 
 193 
 Condillac, E. B. de, 1. 65 
 Condorcet, M. Caritat, Marquis de, i. 65, 
 
 102 
 Confederation of the Rhine, i. 229, 234, 
 
 ii. 261 
 Conflans, Marquis de, i. 120 
 Congeliano, Marshal due de, iii. 171 
 Coningham, Marquis of, v. 273 
 Coningham, Marchioness of, iii. 2S0 
 Consalvi, Cardinal, ii. 90 
 Constant, Benjamin, ii. 123, 189. 
 Constantin, Grand Duke, i. 305, 310 ; ii. 
 
 309, 312, 363 
 Constantinople, iv. 103 
 Constituent Assembly, i. xxxviii, xli, 
 
 xlvii, Ii, 169 
 Consulate, appointment of, i. 205, 207, 
 
 209 
 Convention, decree of the, i. 186. 
 Convents, closing of, i. 21 
 Cook, Col. H., ii. 109 
 Cook, Edward, ii. 266 
 Coppin, M. de, iii. 257 ; iv. 324 
 Corcelles, M. iv. 112 
 Cordova, v. 138, 168 
 Cormerey, M. de, i. 80 
 Comudet, Comte, iii. 171 
 Cornwallis, Lord, i. 213 
 Corsini, Signor de, ii. 344 
 Courland, Duchess of, ii. 3 
 Courier de V Europe, i. 53 
 Courier Francois, iv. 137 
 Courtenvaux, Marquis de, v. 342 
 Courtin, M., iii. 171 
 
 Couturier, Abbe, i. 16 
 
 Creidemann, Councillor, i. 310 
 
 Creutz, Count Gustavus von, i. 35 
 
 Croix, Comte de, iii. 171 
 
 Czartoryski, Prince, ii. 224, 237, 275, 311, 
 
 348, 356, 358 ; "i- 64. 
 
 Cumberland, William Augustus, Duke of, 
 
 V. 343 
 Cumberland, Duchess of, v. 1 1 2 
 Curten, Maurice de, v. 338, 344 
 
 Dalberg, Charles Prince of, i. 312 
 
 Dalberg, Emeric Joseph, Baron von, at 
 Erfurt, i. 312; France, ii. 126; 
 French plenipotentiary at Vienna, 152 ; 
 Emperor Alexander, 186 ; M. de 
 Vitrolles' mission, i?>6 et seq. ; Sv?itzer- 
 land, 302 ; naval commission, 362 ; 
 member of commission on statistics, 
 375 ; Treaty of Paris, iii. 75 ; Re- 
 presents France at a commission, 126 ; 
 note in reply to propositions made by 
 the allies, 199 ; French ministry, Bel- 
 gium, 230, 231 ; Belgium, Poland, 
 Greece, iv. 24, 25 ; riot in Paris, 49 ; 
 Conference in London, 50 ; French 
 emigres, 56; state of France, 64 ; new 
 Cabinet formed at Paris, 75 j Bona- 
 parte, Poland, 95 ; Austria's action in 
 Italy, 113 ; hereditary peerage, 137-8 ; 
 Dutch invasion, 177, 178; Cologne, 
 Switzerland, Poland, 211, 212, 1213 ; 
 Dutch business, 214; Eastern affairs, 
 217; Reform Bill, 224; HoUando- 
 Belgian affairs, 230 ; Bristol, 232 ; 
 Germany, ib. ; Luxemburg, 250 ; 
 foreign affairs of France, 251 
 
 Dalhousie, Lord, ii. 107 
 
 Dalmatie, Due de. See Marshal Soult 
 
 Damas, Alexandrine de, i. I 
 
 Dambray, Vicomte de, ii. 130 
 
 Damour, M., iii. 18 
 
 Dande, i. 44 
 
 Dantzig, Marshal Due de, iii 17I 
 
 Dantzig, i. 236 
 
 Darmstadt, Prince of, i. 312 
 
 Darn, Comte de, i. 304 
 
 Daun, Leopold Comte de, v. 342^ 
 
 Daunon, Pierre, i. 1S6 
 
 Davoust, Marshal, i. 304 ; iii. 107 
 
 Dawkins, Mr., iii. 302 
 
 Dazincourt, Joseph Albouis, i. 301 
 
 Deaut, Eville Chevaher de, v. 348 
 
 Dechen, M. de, i. 313 
 
 Declaration of Independence of the United 
 States, i. 52 et seq. 
 
 Dedel, M. S., v. 62, 113, 134, 219 
 
INDEX. 
 
 401 
 
 Dejean, Francois Andre, Baron, ii. 58 ; iii. 
 171 
 
 Delille, Abbe, i. 27, 35, 47 
 
 Demaryay, M., iv. 112 
 
 Denbigh, Lord, v. 68 
 
 Denon, M., i. 234 
 
 Denmark, King of, ii. 319 
 
 Derfermont, M., iii. 171 
 
 Desaix, General, i. 211 
 
 Descartes, i. 63 
 
 Desfomeaux, iii. 169 
 
 Desportes, Felix M., iii. 171 
 
 Dessau, Prince of, i. 311 
 
 Dessoles, Comte de, iii. 102 
 
 Deux Fonts, iii. 48 
 
 Devaux, M., iv. lit 
 
 Diamond necklace, affair of the, i. 69 
 
 Diebitch, General, iii. 276 ; iv. 213 
 
 Dijeon, General, iii. 74 
 
 Dillon, Arthur de (Archbishop of Nar- 
 bonne), i. 20, 23, 26, 37, 77, ii. 29 
 
 Dillon, Arthur, Comte de, i. 121 
 
 Dino, Duchesse de, see also Duchesse de 
 Talleyrand and Sagan, i. xi, xviii ; iii. 
 233.317, 319 ;iv. "5. 121 ; V. 8 
 
 D'Invault, E. M., v. 387 
 
 Dirat, M., iii. 171 
 
 Directory, the, i. 188 et seq. ; 197, 200 et 
 seq. 205 
 
 Dolgorouki, Prince George, i. 313 
 
 Dombrowski, General Jean, i. 233 
 
 Dominique, Louis, i. 68 
 
 Dona, Maria, v. 65, 139, 140, 154 et seq., 
 170, 171, 173, 17s, 327 
 
 Donai, Merlin de M., iii. 171 
 
 Don Carlos, Infante,sent to meet Napoleon, 
 i. 274; Napoleon's intentions regard- 
 ing, 280; defeat of, v. 260, 261; 
 expelled the Peninsula, 277, 279 ; 
 arrival at Portsmouth, 280 ; negotia- 
 tions with, 282 ; intentions of, 284 ; 
 in London, 291 ; return to Spain, ib. ; 
 nevfs of, 294 ; in Spain, 296 et seq., 
 
 30s 
 Doria, Cardinal, ii. 83 
 DouhofF, Comte de, v. 16, 20 
 Drouet, iii. 171 
 Ducas, Comte Roger, i. 207 
 Duchatel, M. , v. 230, 233 
 Ducrest, Chas. Louis, Marquis, i. 129, 
 
 'S4 . , .. o 
 
 Dugnani, Cardmal, 11. 83 
 
 Duka, General, ii. 301 
 
 Dulau, Jean-Marie (Archbishop of Aries), 
 
 i. 23, 24 
 
 Dulord, iv. 160 
 
 Dumolard, Bouvier M., iii. 169, 171 
 
 Dumont, Pierre, i. 170 
 
 Dumoulin, General, v. 226 
 
 Dumouriez, D. F. P., i. 220, iii. 211 el seq. 
 
 VOL. V. 
 
 Duncannon, Lord, v. 293 
 Dundas, H. (Lord Melville), i. 173 
 Dupin, M., iii. 228 ; iv. 17 ; v. 10 
 Dupont, General Pierre, i. 240 ; iii. 350, 
 
 352 
 Duportail, M., L 52 
 Durant, iv. 305 ; v. S3 
 Duras, Mar^chale de, i. 3 ; v. 362 
 Duras, Amed^e, Due de Durfort, ii. 127 ; 
 
 V. 362 
 Durbach, M., iii. 171 
 Durfort, Madame Etienne, ii. 188 
 Durham, Lord, iii. 274 ; v. 16, 210 
 Duroc, General, i. 222, 247, 286, 300, 
 
 30s 
 Dutch affairs. See Netherlands, Belgium, 
 
 Holland, King Leopold 
 Duval, Prof. Pierre, i. 63 
 Duvoisin, Jean-Baptiste, Baron — Bishop of 
 
 Nantes, q.v. 
 Dwerincki, Joseph, iv. 147 
 
 East Indies, Talleyrand proposes to visit, 
 i. 186 
 
 Ecclesiastical Commission, ii. 38 ; ques 
 tions on the interests of Christianity 
 generally, 39 ; questions which con- 
 cern France especially, 41 ; questions 
 which concern the Churches of Ger- 
 many, of Italy, and the Bull of Excom- 
 munication, 51 ; Napoleon appoints a 
 second commission, 59 ; the according 
 of dispensations, ib. ; are papal bulls 
 indispensable to canonical confirm- 
 ation, 60 
 
 Economic, philosophers, i. 65 
 
 Economique, Tableau, i. 65 
 
 Edleshiem, M. le Baron de, iii. 209, 212 
 et seq. 
 
 Egloffstein, Augustus, Baron von, i. 311 
 
 Egypt, expeditions to, i. 198, 204 ; v. 90, 
 120, 205, 285, 286 
 
 Einsiedel, Baron, i.311 ; ii. 2ii 
 
 Elba, ii. 125, 162, 182, 190 ; iii. 16, 66 
 
 Elizabeth, Empress, i. 315 ; v. 356 
 
 Ellenborough, Earl of, iv. 297 
 
 EUice, E., V. 273, 277 
 
 Emery, Jacques- Andre, ii. 30. 39, 59 
 
 Enghien, Due de, i, 221 ; iii. 206 et seq. 
 
 England, Talleyrand's expulsion from, i. 
 Iii ; revolution, ib. ; Commercial 
 Treaty with France, 28 et seq. ; dis- 
 content of Normandy at the treaty, 
 30 ; quarrel with American Colonies, 
 52 ; sects, 62; Due d'Orleans' journey, 
 126 ; he is refused permission to visit 
 
 D D 
 
402 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 England, 132 ; letter from Louis, 
 XVI., 166 ; Talleyrand's scientific 
 mission to London, 169 — 170; ex- 
 pelled from England, 173; negotia- 
 tions with France, 193 ; letter from 
 Napoleon, 209 ; treaty with France, 
 213 ; declaration of war with France, 
 220 ; Napoleon's proposed invasion, 
 222 ; Prussia, 229 ; Peninsular War, 
 291; Treaty of Erfurt, 306, 340 
 
 ii. War in Spain, 25 ; protest of the 
 bishops against the Concordat, 28 ; and 
 a general peace, 106 ; Treaty with 
 France, 131 et seq., 147 ; Congress of 
 Vienna, 183 ; treaty formulated at 
 the Congress of Chatillon, 192 ; the 
 fate of Saxony, 207 ; secret alliance 
 with France and Austria against 
 Russia and Prussia, 209 ; policy of, 
 269 ; and Prussia, 273 ; treaty of 
 peace with United States, 382 ; text of 
 secret treaty between Austria, France 
 and, 389—392 
 
 iii. Represented by Duke of Wellington, 
 188 ; recognizes the new French 
 government, 227 ; government recog- 
 nizes principles on non-intervention, 
 234 ; reply from Paris to the overtures 
 of the government of, 239 ; affairs of 
 Portugal, 240 ; opening of Parliament, 
 254 ; Conference in London, 256 ; ar- 
 rival of Prince of Orange and an agent 
 from Belgium in London, 260 ; Whig 
 government for, 272 ; General Sebas- 
 tiani on, 286 et seq. ; not well dis- 
 posed towards Greece, 301 
 
 iv. Choice of a sovereign for Belgium 
 still undecided, 4 ; dilatoriness of 
 English people, 10 ; Prince of Orange 
 acceptable to, 37 ; armaments of, 41 ; 
 desires settlement of Belgian affairs, 
 54 ; special treaties with Portugal, 74 ; 
 agent to be sent to Italy, 80 ; dispute 
 with Portugal, 98 ; a prey to most vio- 
 lent agitation, 102 ; indifferent to 
 Poland, 168; General Baudraud, 185 ; 
 the ministry occupied with "reform," 
 205 ; events in Bristol and London, 
 232 ; union with France necessary, 
 258 
 
 V. Mission to the government from Dom 
 Pedro, 44 ; custom house tariffs in, 
 74 ; Portuguese question, 95 ; Due de 
 Broglie vexed with, 107 ; difficulties of 
 the ministry in, 128 ; Church Bill, 
 135 ; position as regards Portugal, 
 138 ; Donna Maria's marriage, 156 ; 
 relations with Spain and Portugal, 
 171-17S ; Talleyrand's proposal for 
 treaty of alliance with France, 186, 
 
 187 et seq. ; dissensions in the minis- 
 try, 209 ; and Russia, 212 ; Count 
 Nesselrode's information as to Russia's 
 military measures, 213 ; Lords Pal- 
 merston and Stanley on France and, 
 225 ; proposed treaty between Eng- 
 land, Spain and Portugal, 241 ; 
 Talleyrand's proposed Treaty not ac- 
 cepted, 242 ; movements of fleet, 284, 
 285, 287 ; changes in ministry, 291, 
 292 ; negotiations with France, 352 ; 
 Spain and the Falkland Isles, 369 
 
 Eon, Chevalier de, v. 359 
 
 Equality, doctrine of, i, 90 et seq. , 98 
 
 Erfurt, i. 240 ; negotiations for meeting at, 
 300 ; Napoleon desires a. brilliant 
 journey to, 301 ; plays to be performed 
 at, 302-303 ; journey announced in 
 Moniteur, 304 ; Napoleon's military 
 retinue, ib. ; Napoleon discloses his 
 projects, 305 ; text of Convention, 
 306 ; list of personages present at, 
 310; Napoleon's arrival, 314; general 
 enthusiasm, ib. ; alterations in text 
 of Convention, 316 ; Austria's fears, 
 317; performances at the theatre, 
 320, et seq. ; alterations in treaty, 
 324 ; text of the treaty, 340 ; to be 
 ceded to Prussia, iii. 22 
 
 Eriong, M, d', arrest of, iii. 102, 171 
 
 Escoiguiz, Don Juan de, i. 248, et seq. 263, 
 271, 277, 2S0, 281, 284, 285 
 
 Esparbes, Madame d', v. 360 
 
 Espresmenil, Jean Jacques du Val, i. 142, 
 
 156. 157 
 Essling, Marshal Prince de, iii. 171 
 Esterhazy, Prince Paul, iii. 277 ; iv. 55, 
 
 70, 78, 90, 94, 96, 160, 277 ; v. 200, 
 
 204 
 Esterhazy, Princess Marie, iiL 65 
 Estissax, Duchesse de, i. 3 
 Etoila, iii. 302 
 Etruria, King and Queen of, i. 275, 285 ; 
 
 ii. 164, 176, 251, 270, 332, 344, 372; 
 
 iii. 42, 43, 59 
 Ettenheim, iii. 2i\ et seq. 
 Eugene, Prince, ii. 75, 92 ; iii. 48, 109 
 Eure, Dupont de 1', iii. 228, 248 
 Evreux, Bishop of, i. 39 ; ii. 39, 59, 82, 88 
 Exchequer, state of the, i. 76 
 Exelmans, General, iii. 171 ; iv. 20 
 Eylau, Battle of, i. 236 
 Eyragues, M. de, v. 109 
 
 Fabert, Abraham, i. 91 
 Fabvier, General, iv. 20 
 Faenza, Bishop of, ii. 67, 82 
 
INDEX. 
 
 403 
 
 Fain, Franyois, i. 304 
 
 Falck, M., iii. 258, 270, 293 
 
 Falkenstein, Major von, i. 312 
 
 Falkland Isles, v. 369 
 
 Family Compact, Treaty of the Bourbons, 
 i. 274 ; ii. 270 ; v. 382 
 
 Fane, John, Lord Burghersh, iii. 66 
 
 Farge, M., v. vii 
 
 Famese, Queen Elizabeth, iii. 59 
 
 Fauconnerie, N. de Catinat de la, i. 91 
 
 Favier, J. L., i. 44 
 
 Felix, M., iii. 171 
 
 Feltre, Due de, i. 291 ; ii. 82 ; iii. loi 
 
 Ferdinand IV., i. 228; ii. 213; iii. 45, 
 120 
 
 Ferdinand VII. of Spain (Prince of the 
 Aslurias), increasing power, i. 248 ; 
 regent, 249 ; his schemes, ib. ; pro- 
 posed marriage with Dona Maria 
 Theresa, ib. ; designs against Charles 
 IV., 250; manifesto, 252; message 
 from Napoleon, 254 ; French am- 
 bassador, 255 ; letter to Napoleon, 
 257 ; complaints by his father, 259 ; 
 arrested for high treason, 263 ; trial, 
 264 ; found not guilty, ib. ; pro- 
 posed flight of Charles IV., 265 ; 
 quiets the populace, 267 ; abdication 
 of Charles IV., 268; Ferdinand's 
 ministry, 269 ; goes to Madrid, ib. ; 
 approaching arrival of Napoleon, 270 ; 
 privy council, 271 ; proposes meeting 
 Napoleon, 272 ; sends Uon Carlos to 
 meet Napoleon, 274 ; goes to Burgos, 
 275 ; Charles withdraws his abdica- 
 tion, ib. ; entrusts the government to 
 a Junta, 277 ; arrives at Burgos, ib. ; 
 receives letter from Napoleon, ib. ; 
 mobbed, 278 ; without French escort, 
 279 ; goes to Bayonne, ib. ; in Napo- 
 leon's power, ib. ; visit from Napo- 
 leon, 280; Napoleon's designs, 280- 
 281 ; offer of Kingdom of Navarre, 
 ib. ; renounces Crown of Spain, 282 ; 
 discussions of plenipotentiaries, 283 ; 
 letter from Charles, 284 ; territory of 
 Navarre, 285 ; reaches Valen9ay and 
 entertained by Talleyrand, 286 ; every 
 day life at Valen9ay, 286-287 ; leave- 
 taking with Talleyrand, 289 ; Talley- 
 rand's interest in, 290; returns to 
 Madrid and cruel proceedings towards 
 his supporters, 292 
 
 Feria, Marquis of, i. 274 
 
 Feman-Nunez, Count of, i. 275, 278, 280 
 
 Ferraud, Antoine, F. C, Comte, ii. 130 
 
 Fesch, Cardinal, ii. 38, 59, 73, 75, 78 
 
 Feuillant Ministry, i. 165 
 
 Feuillet, v. 264, 273 
 
 Figaro, Lt Manage de, L 36 
 
 Figuelmont, C. L., Comte de, v. 183 
 
 Filangieri, Charles, Prince, ii. 319 
 
 Fitz-James, M. de, I2i 
 
 Fitz- James, Duchessede, i. 17 
 
 Flahaut, M. de, iii. 109, 284, 290; iv. 6, 
 21, 42, 44 et seq., 206, 229, 255, 293 
 
 Flahaut, Countess, i. Ii, 187; v. 17 
 
 Flaugergues, M. de la, iii. 159 
 
 Fleche, Madame de la, ii. 18 
 
 Fleury, Abbe Claude, ii. 30 
 
 Fleury, Cardinal de, v. 350, 360 
 
 Fleury, Duchesse de, i. 3 
 
 Fleury, M. de, i. 46 
 
 Fleuty, Marquise de, i. :22 
 
 Floras, Marquis de Casa, ii. 272 ; iii. 8 
 
 Florida-Blanca, Comte de, v. 223, 225, 
 _ 237, 240, 243 
 
 Foere, I'Abb^, iv. 100, 102 
 
 Fontainebleau, Treaty of, i. 246 ; text of, 
 259 
 
 Fontanes, M. de, i. 326 ; ii. 126 
 
 Fontanta, Frangois Louis, ii. 39, 54 
 
 Fontenelle, De, i. 51 
 
 Forell, Baron von, i. 270 
 
 Forest, Antoine, Comte de la, i. 222, 290 
 
 Formond, M. de, ii. 153 
 
 Formont, M., iii. i8 
 
 Foster, A. J., v. 267 
 
 Foucemagne, Etienne de, i. 1 14 
 
 Fouche, M., i. 203; ii. in, 190; iii. 158, 
 161, 162, 169, 170, 172, 174 
 
 Foulon, J. F., i. 44, 46, 68, 74; v. 370 
 
 Fourqueux, Michel Bouvard de, i. 8t 
 
 Fox, Charles, i. 171, 230, iii. 289 
 
 France, Commercial Treaty with England, 
 i. 28 et seq. ; colonies, yi et scq. 62 ; 
 state of, 83, III; finances of, 127; 
 loan of jf 16,000,000, 132 ; lits de 
 justice, 136 ; Europe proclaims war 
 against, 169 ; treaty with Austria, 
 193; negotiations with England, ib.; 
 state of Europe towards, 198 ; treaty 
 with Austria, 212 ; treaty with United 
 States, 213 ; treaty with England, 
 ib. ; recovers her colonies, ib. ; treaty 
 with Turkey, 216 ; importance of, 
 ib. ; England declares war against, 
 220 ; situation of, at the close of the 
 year 1807, 244 
 ii. Coming war in Spain, 104 ; govern- 
 ment of, 122 ; position of, on Napo- 
 leon's fall, 130; treaties of peace, 131 
 et seq. ; plenipotentiaries of, at the 
 Congress of Vienna, 201 et seq. ; 
 situation of, 293 ; and Switzerland, 
 298 ; position of, at the Congress, 
 334 ; prejudice against, at Congress, 
 338 et seq. ; proposal to exclude 
 French ambassadors from a commis- 
 sion on statistics, 375 ; army of, 387 ; 
 
 D D 2 
 
404 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 text of secret treaty between Austria, 
 France, and England, 389-392 
 iii. Napoleon's entry into, 78 ; accedes 
 to treaty of Chaumont, 80 ; extreme 
 disorder of, 97 ; arrival of Archduchess 
 Marie Louise in, 98 ; the downfall of 
 Bonaparte desired, 108 ; news from, 
 113; Talleyrand's idea about, 157; 
 art in, 160; home affairs of, 161; 
 Talleyrand on, 164 et seq. ; Lord 
 Castlereagh on, 181 et seq. ; Louis 
 XVin. on the wars in, 1S5 ; Pontar- 
 lier, Lauterbourg, and Weissembourg 
 to belong to, 191 ; to resign any claim 
 to keep a garrison in Monaco, 192 ; 
 proposals by Allied Powers, 193 ; 
 state of ferment of, ib. ; reply to the 
 Allies by the plenipotentiaries of, 194- 
 199 ; reply of the ministers of the 
 Allies, 200 ; Talleyrand's love for, 
 205 ; copy of report of First Consul 
 from Minister of Foreign Affairs to, 
 2C9 ; friendly feeling of the Elector of 
 Baden towards, 209 ; Talleyrand on 
 the cause of the Revolution of 1830, 
 
 226 ; another government for, 227 ; 
 government recognized by England, 
 
 227 ; Talleyrand sent as ambassador 
 to London, 228 ; views of English 
 ministry regarding France, 231 ; state 
 of agitation in, 245 ; represented at 
 the Conference in London, 256 ; de- 
 termined to maintain her engagements, 
 250 ; to have a portion of Belgium, 
 285 ; General Sebastiani on, 286 et 
 seq. ; position of, 291 ; representatives 
 to arrange affairs in Greece, 299 ; 
 faithful to Greece, 301 ; affairs im- 
 proving in, 313 
 
 iv. Union with Belgium advocated, 4 ; 
 Belgium, 16 et seq. ; neutrality of Bel- 
 gium, 21 et seq. ; Talleyrand on, 27 et 
 seq. ; Talleyrand's anxiety for home 
 events in, 31 ; refuses to recognize the 
 protocol, 40 ; Due de Dalberg on 
 position of, 64 ; Talleyrand on, 77, 7^ ; 
 government decides to accept the 
 protocol, 85 ; affairs in Paris more 
 satisfactory, 94 ; brilliant successes of 
 the Poles, 97 ; about to declare war 
 with Russia and Austria, 104 ; great 
 interest in the welfare of Belgium, 
 105; affairs more satisfactory, 112; 
 to recognize Prince Leopold as King 
 of Belgium, 153 ; Prince Leopold on, 
 157 ; Prince Leopold and the forces of 
 France, l8o; navy necessary for, 214; 
 close union of England with, 259 ; 
 Lord Grey in favour of, 271 ; internal 
 state not satisfactory, 272 
 
 v. Prussia jealous of the intervention 
 with Belgium, 12; the army of, 22; 
 feels the good effect of the capture of 
 Antwerp, 68 ; custom house tariffs 
 in, 74 ; intervention of, 86 ; Donna 
 Maria's marriage, 157 ; Talleyrand's 
 proposed treaty with England, 186, 
 187 et seq. ; treaty with United States 
 rejected, 229; treaty with Austria, 
 35 1 ; negotiations with England, 352 ; 
 treaty of Fontainebleau 359 
 
 Francis, Emperor, i. 317, 337 ; ii. 51, 52, 
 354. 374 ; "i- 21, 27, 83, 121 
 
 Francisco, Infante Don, i. 253, 285 
 
 Fran9ois, Comte de Mercy-Argenteau, i. 
 69 
 
 Frankfort, iv. 23, 63, 69, 79, 90, 96 ; v. 
 97 
 
 Frederic, Prince of the Netheriands, iii. 
 239 ; iv. 211 
 
 Frederick William, iii. 247 
 
 Frenchman's Bay, i. 180 
 
 Fressinnet, M., iii. 171 
 
 Fr^teau, de St. Just E., i. 70, 143, 140 
 
 , '55 
 Freville, M. de, v. 134 
 Frias, Due de, v. 259, 27S 
 Friedland, battle of, i. 236 
 Frijas, Duke of, i. 274, 280 
 Frimont, General, iii. 65 
 Froude, i. m 
 Funck, Baron von, i. 310 
 
 Gablenz, Chamberlain von, i. 310 
 
 Gabrielle, General Jules, ii. 37 
 
 Gagarin, Prince, i. 310 
 
 Gage, Sir William, v. 284 
 
 Galaiziere, Marquis Chaumont de la, i. So 
 
 Gall, Baron von, i. 311 
 
 Gallican church, ii. 25 et seq. 
 
 Gallois, General, iv. 2S5 
 
 Garrau, M., iii. 171 
 
 Gaschet, Abbe, ii. 32 
 
 Gascoigne, General, iv. 99 
 
 Gassendi, Comte, iii. 171 
 
 Gazettier, Cuirasse, i. 53 
 
 Gendebun, M., iii. 257, 306 
 
 Genevois, Due de, ii. 166 
 
 Genlis, 'Comtesse de. See Marquise de 
 Sillery 
 
 Genoa, questions regarding, at the Congress 
 of Vienna, ii. 315 et seq. arrange- 
 ments with respect to, 343 ; affairs end ed 
 and adjusted, 344, proposal concerning, 
 346 ; iii. 47 
 
 Genonde, Antoine, iv. 297 
 
 Gentz, Herr von, at the Congress oi 
 
INDEX. 
 
 40s 
 
 Vienna, ii. 202 ; "Allied Powers," 203, 
 204 ; Reports of a Conference, 227 ; 
 project for convocation of the Con- 
 gress, 245 ; "public lav/," 248 ; Lord 
 Castlereagh and the Czar, 302 ; funeral 
 ceremonial iii. 21, 22 
 
 George II., v. 358 
 
 George III., ii. ijo, v. 358 
 
 Georgel, Abbe J. F., i. 70 
 
 Gerard, General, iii. 248, 309 ; iv. 173, 180, 
 229 ; V. 22, 44, 52, 296 
 
 Gerbier, P., i. 80 
 
 Gerlache, M. de, iv. 138 
 
 Germanic Confederation, iv. 96, 105, 119, 
 I2S, 141, 240, 247, 316 ;v. 132 
 
 Germany, the spirit of reformation, i. 62 ; 
 Treaty of Presburg, 229 ; the French 
 Court, 19 ; treaty between Allied 
 Powers, 137 et seq. ; position of, 177; 
 the confederation, 216 ; revolutionary 
 spirit, 257 ; Saxony, 261 ; Confedera- 
 ation, 297 ; Conferences suspended, 
 347 ; preservation of Saxony, 355, 
 363 ; affairs in south of, iii. 40 : re- 
 trocessions demanded by Austria from 
 Bavaria, 42 ; territorial arrangements 
 concluded for north of, 109 ; Metter- 
 nich, 188 ; changes with regard to, 
 189 : Landau to belong to, 191 ; 
 demolition of fortified places, 192 ; 
 discords in, 276 ; foolishness of the 
 people in, iv. 232 
 
 Gerry, Elbridge ^American Commissioner) 
 L xlix 
 
 Gervais, Councillor, i. 310. 
 
 Gex, portion of the district of, ii. 344 ; ex- 
 change of, 346, 359 
 
 Ghent, Bishop of, ii. 59, 79, 80 
 
 Ghent, King Louis at, iii. 95 et seq., iv. 
 20, 37 
 
 Ginlay, Count Ignatius, i. 227 
 
 Girac, Madame de, i. 45 
 
 Giraldo, Don Pedro, i. 253, 263 
 
 Girondists, i. 166 
 
 Givet, iii. 189, 193, 195 
 
 Gleichen, Herr von, i. 312 
 
 Goblet, General, iv. 217, 239, 248 ; v. 13, 
 33, 260, 261, 262 
 
 Goderich, Lord, iii. 274 
 
 Godoy, Don Diego, i. 250 
 
 Godoy, Manuel. See Prince of the Peace 
 
 Goethe, Herr, i. 311, 318, 325, 331 
 
 Gogel, Alexander, ii. 14 
 
 Goislard, de Monsabert M., i. 156 
 
 Goldberg, M. , ii. 14, 
 
 Goltz, Count von, i. 237, 313 
 
 Gordon, Sir R., iv. 323 
 
 Gorlitz, Baron von, i. 313 
 
 Gourieff, M. de, iii. 252 
 
 Gournay, M. de. i. 81 
 
 Gourville, M. de, i. 7 
 
 Gouvernet, Marquis de la T. du P., ii. 153 
 
 Gouvion, M. de la, i. 52 
 
 Gouvion, Marshal, iii. 161 
 
 Goy, "My Lord Goy," v. 363 
 
 Graham, Sir James, v. 96, 271, 273, 293 
 
 Gramont, Madame de, i. 33 ; v. 360, 361, 
 366, 387 
 
 Grand Chamber of Judges, i. 141 
 
 Grant, Lord, iii. 318 
 
 Grant, Sir John, v. 278 
 
 Granville, Earl, iv. 16, 59, 62, 181, 262 
 300 ; V. 12, 187, 243, 248 et seq. 
 
 Great Britain — see England 
 
 Greece, iii. 289, 299 et seq. iv. 25, 32, 
 35, 74, 123, 146, 261, V.66, 146, 211, 
 220 
 
 Grenville, Earl, i. 166, 209, 230 
 
 Gresset (Comic poet), v. 338 
 
 Grey, Earl, head of Whig party, iii. 269, 
 272 ; Madame de Lieven, 281 ; con- 
 versation with Talleyrand and Lord 
 Palmerston on Prussia, 288 ; at 
 Claremont with Prince Leopold, 322 ; 
 interview with Talleyrand, iv. 11, 12 ; 
 King Louis Philippe's speech to the 
 Belgian deputies, 61 ; at the London 
 Conference, 102 ; interview with 
 Dtttch plenipotentiaries, 157 ; Poland, 
 164 ; reply to Lord Aberdeen's speech, 
 171; his ministry, 180, 192; events 
 in Bristol, 232 ; Lord Aberdeen's 
 motion, 237 ; Belgian fortresses, 239, 
 245; France, 270; conversation with 
 Talleyrand, v. 15 ; meeting at East 
 Sheen, 19 ; Talleyrand in praise of, 
 38 ; siege of Antwerp, 55 ; King of 
 England's government, 87 ; Algerian 
 business, 93, ij6|; 97 ; M. de.Rezende's 
 mission, 170 ; Eastern affairs, 199, 
 202, 205 ; Due de Broglie, 208 ; 
 Belgian succession, 275 ; change of 
 English ministry, 277 ; resignation of, 
 291, 292, 293 
 
 Grey, Lady, v. 17 
 
 Grimaldi, Due de, v. 359 
 
 Grodno, i. 235 
 
 GroUmann, General, iii. 39 
 
 Grote, G., v. 272 
 
 Guadaloupe, ii. 140 
 
 Guibourg, M. de, v. 37 
 
 Guillemont, General, iv. 103, 108, 114, 224 
 
 Guizot, M., iii. 228, 249 ; iv. 17 ; v. 7, 29, 
 230 
 
 Gustavus III. King of Sweden, i. 71 
 
 Gustavus IV. King of Sweden, ii. 271 
 
 Gutschmidt, Baron von, i. 310 
 
 Gutstadt, Battle of, i. 236 
 
4o6 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 H 
 
 Hagenau, iii. 187, 188 
 
 Hague, Prince of Orange at the, iii. 257, 
 268 ; accepted the proposal of an ar- 
 mistice, 283 ; delay in Belgian affairs 
 at the, iv. 4 ; despatch of M. de 
 Mareuil, 123; legation at the, 130: 
 cession of Luxemburg, 141 ; M. de 
 Wessenberg at the, 1 65 ; delay of a 
 courier from the, 216 ; Comte Orloff 
 sent to the, 275, 286 ; Marquis de 
 Dalmatie at the, 305 ; letters of M. de 
 Donhofffrom the, v. 21, 26 ; despatch 
 from the, 117 
 
 Hamburg, Talleyrand arrives at, i. 187 
 
 Hamilton, General Alexander, i. 181, 184, 
 187 
 
 Hammerstein, Baron von, i. 311 
 
 Haugwitz, Count von, i. 227, 228, 231 
 
 Hanno, M. v. 226-7 
 
 Hanover, iv. 48 
 
 Hanover, Elector of, ii. 150, 162, 268 
 
 Hanover, King of, treaty of alliance, iii. 53 
 
 Harcourt, College d', i. 10 
 
 Hardenburg, Prince von, ii. 202, 230, 233, 
 
 296, 342; iii- 13, 14. 75 
 Hardi, Abbe, i. 11, 12 
 Harel, M., iii. 171 
 Harispe, J. I., Comte, v. 305 
 Harpe, I. Fr. de la, i. 103 
 Harpe, M. Frederic Cesar de la, i. 215 
 Harrowby, Lord, campaign with Lord 
 
 Wellington, iii. 98 
 Harvelay, Madame d', i. 82 
 Hastings, Marquis of, i. 1 70 
 Hauterive, A. M. B., Count de, ii. Ill 
 Havre, Due de, iii. 169 
 Haytesbury, Lord, iv. 81 
 Heilsberg, victory of, i. 236 
 Helena, Grand Duchess, iv. 165 
 Helvetia, iii. 191 
 Helvetius, C. A., i. 65 
 Henin, Madame de, i. 48 
 Henri IV., v. 354 
 Henri, Lieut.-Col., i. 277, 286 
 Henry II., society in the time of, i. 50 
 Henry III., society in the time of, i. 50 
 Henry IV., society in the time of, i. 50 
 Henry of Prussia, Prince, i. 48 
 Herault, President, i. 51 
 Herda, Baron, i. 311 
 Hericourt, Madame d', i. 35 
 Hesse, iii. 276 
 Hesse-Cassel, Electorate of, ii. 16 et seq., 
 
 150, 162 
 Hesse Homburg, Prince von, L 311 
 Hesse Philippsthal, Prince of, i. 313 
 Hesse Rothenburg, Prince of, i, 312 
 Heydecoper, M., i. 176 
 
 Hijar, Duke of, i. 274, 278 
 
 Hildbourghausen, Prince de, v. 344 
 
 Hill, Lord, iii. 318 
 
 Hitroff, General, i. 310 
 
 Hobhouse, Sir John, v. 293 
 
 Hoff, Karl von, i. 311 
 
 Hoffmann, Herr von, ii. 375 
 
 Hohenlinden, i. 212 
 
 Hohenlohe, Prince of, L 313 
 
 Hohenzollem-Hechingen, Prince of, i. 312 
 
 HohenzoUem-Sigmaringen, Prince of, i. 
 312 
 
 Holbach, P. Thiry, Baron von, i. 65 
 
 Holland, Lord, iii. 274 ; iv. 208 ; v. 1 7, 
 199, 231 
 
 Holland, re-establishment of Stadtholder- 
 ship, 1. 83 ; Louis Bonaparte pro- 
 claimed King, 229 
 ii. Napoleon's principle of government, 
 13 et seq. ; House of Orange, 140 ; 
 Treaty of Paris, ib. ; revolution of 
 1830-32, 215 
 iii. Population, 36 ; separation from Bel- 
 gium, 257, 259 ; character of the king 
 an obstacle to progress, 294 
 iv. Question of war, 6 ; king's desire for 
 war, 13 ; Belgium, 34 ; blockade of 
 the Scheldt, 43 ; Belgium, 52, 68, 
 73 ; Prince of Orange, 79 ; Belgium, 
 loi ; King consents to boundaries 
 fixed by conference, 118; Lord Pon- 
 sonby on, 123 ; dissatisfaction of the 
 king as to Luxembourg, 130 ; Prince 
 de Talleyrand on, 165 d seq. ; treaty 
 with Belgium, 182 ; Belgium, 215 ; 
 treaty with Belgium, 228 ; obstinacy 
 of the king, 235 ; king consents to 
 boundaries fixed by conference, 236 ; 
 ratifications from Austria, Prussia, 
 and Russia, 261 ; navigation, 270 ; 
 Comte Orloff, on, 286 ; king refuses 
 to sign treaty, 299 
 V. the coasts blockaded, 15 ; Limburg 
 and Luxembourg, 25, 26; Netherlands, 
 61 ; illness of the king, 100 ; nego- 
 tiations with the King of the Nether- 
 lands, 125 ; Limburg and Luxem- 
 burg, 131, 132 ; king and the Lon- 
 don Conference, 174 
 
 Hooghworst, Baron de, iii. 257, 268 
 
 Hopital, Marquis de I', v. 356 
 
 Hortense, Queen, ii. 125, 126 ; iv. 120 
 
 Hovel, Herr von, i. 312 
 
 Howe, Earl, v. 68 
 
 Howick, Lord, v. 293 
 
 Hugon, Admiral, v. 119 
 
 Hullin, General, iii. 171 
 
 Humann, M., v. 7, 230 
 
 Humboldt, Herr von, i. 34 ; ii. 202, 230, 
 233, 248, 290 ; iii. 75, 247, 278 
 
INDEX. 
 
 407 
 
 Hume, David, v. 359 
 Hiiningen, iii. 189, 192, 195 
 Huskisson, Mr. William, v. 74 
 Huy, iv. 19 
 Huys, E. D. de 1', v. 226 
 
 Joubert, General, i, 204 
 
 Jourdan, Marshal, iv. 66 
 
 Joux, Fort of, iii. 191, 195 
 
 Jouy, Antoine R. , Comte de, v. 340 
 
 Junot, General, i. 240, 248 
 
 Ideville, Leborgne de, iii. 171 
 
 Inda, Abbe, ii. 104 
 
 Independence of United States, declaration 
 of, i. 52 rf seq. 
 
 Infantado, Duke of, i. 251 et seq., 263, 
 269, 271, 272, 277, 280, 281 
 
 Innocent XI., ii. 34 
 
 Innocent XII., ii. 34 
 
 Institute of Arts and Sciences, i. 187 
 
 Ionian Islands, iii. 301 
 
 IphigMe, play performed at Erfurt, i. 
 320-321 
 
 Ireland, contemplated invasion of i. 197 
 
 Isabey, M., iii. 18 
 
 Istria, Count Capro de, ii. 298 ; iii. 300 ; 
 iv. 25, 123 
 
 Italy, King of Naples a refugee, i. 200; 
 Napoleon crowned King of Italy, 
 ii. 36 ; Ferdinand IV. 172; Congress 
 of Vienna and, 214 ; disputes regard- 
 ing, 297 ; Prince Mettemich and 
 Naples, 304 ; Talleyrand's scheme of 
 organisation, 313 ; affairs concerning 
 Genoa, 347 ; unionists, 381 ; affairs 
 of, iii. 16 ; troops marching towards, 
 65 ; compensation for, 81, 120, 125, 
 1 75 ; affairs of, iv. 50 ; revolution in, 
 62 ; Lord Palmerston on, 71 ; affairs 
 serious in, 80 ; non-intervention de- 
 cided upon, 95 ; capture of Ancona, 
 281 
 
 Ivrea, Bishop of, ii. 78 
 
 Izquierdo, Don, i. 247, 276 
 
 Jacob, Admiral, v. 230, 266 
 
 Janson, Forbin M., iii. 171 
 
 Jesuits, the, v. 340, 383 
 
 Jardins, Les, i. 36 
 
 Jaucourt, Marquis de, ii. 126, 252; iii. 90, 
 
 no, 125, 161 
 Jauregin, Don Thomas, i. 250 
 Jena, Battle of, i. 231 
 Jena, Bridge of, 1. xxxv. ; iii. 160 v. xiv 
 Jersey, Lady, iii. 316 
 Jolivet, Jean Baptiste Comte, ii. 17 
 Jolly, M., iii. 257 
 Jordan, Herrvon, ii. 375 
 Josephine, Empress, i. 223, 315, 336 ; 
 
 ii. s 
 
 K 
 
 Kalitcheff, M. de, i. 120 
 
 Kalkreuth, Fredk. Adolphus, Count von, 
 
 i- 237 
 Kaunitz, Comte de, v. 343, 345 
 Keller, Louis Christopher, Count von, i. 
 
 312 
 Kellerman, General, i. 211 
 Kersabic, Mademoiselle, v. 37 
 Kersalaun, Comte de, i. 130 
 Kettelhutt, Herr von, i. 312 
 Kloest, Count Jacobi, iL 25 1 
 Knesbeck, Baron, iii. 80 
 Knights of the Swan (Madame de Sillery), 
 
 i. 123 
 Kotzebue Augustus von, i. 320 
 Kourakin, Field-Marshal Prince, i. 237 
 Kriidener, Baron, iii. 72 ; iv. 53, 54, 63 
 Kriidener, Madame von, i. 62 
 
 Labenski, M., i. 310 
 
 Laborie, M. Roux, iii. 222 
 
 Labrador, Marquis de, leaves Madrid, i. 
 277 ; Napoleon's opinion of, 283 ; at the 
 Congress of Vienna, ii. 201 ; declara- 
 tion at the Congress, 204 ; invitation 
 to attend private conference of Prince 
 Mettemich, 227, 229 ; reproached by 
 ministers of the four courts, 264 ; 
 conversation with the King of Bavaria, 
 270; Genoa, 317; Queen of Etruria, 
 332, 344 ; proposal on Imperial fiefs, 
 361 ; dismissa,! of M. de Casa Florez, 
 iii. 8 ; Treaty of Paris, 75 
 
 Lacepede, Comte de, iii. 171 
 
 Laclos, P. A. C. de, i. 158 
 
 Lacroix, Charles de, i. 190 
 
 Laevestine, iii. 309 
 
 Lafitte, M., iii. 228, 230, 248, 254, 298 ; 
 iv. 24, SI, 56, 66, 75, 323 
 
 La Fayette, M. de, i. 52 ; iiL 265 ; iv. 17, 
 25, 65, 213 ; V. 266. 
 
 Lagrange, Joseph-Louis, i. 102 
 
 Laharpe, iii. 63 
 
 Lallemand, arrest of, iii. 102, 171 ; iv. 20 
 
 Lalley Tollendal, M. de, iii. 98 
 
 Lamb, Sir Frederick, iv. 102 ; v. 135, 200, 
 205, 228, 263, 332 
 
 Lamarque, General, iii. 171, 230, 305 
 iv. 5, 90, 213 
 
4o8 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Lamballe, Madame de, i. 47, 122 
 
 Lamballe, Prince de, i. 120 
 
 Lambert, Charles G., i. 143 
 
 Lamoignon, Marquis de (Keeper of the 
 Seals), i. 139, 143, 148 
 
 Landau, iii. 189, igi, 195, 306 
 
 Landrecies, iii. 193, 195 
 
 Langlois, M. de, i. 12, 25 
 
 Langsdorf, M. de, iii. 288, 319 
 
 L'Ange, Mademoiselle. See Madame du 
 Barry 
 
 Lannes, Marshal, i. 227, 304 ; ii. 7 
 
 Lansdowne, Marquis of (W. Petty), i. 170 ; 
 iii. 273, 284 ; V. 24, 292 
 
 Laplace, M. de, i. 62 
 
 Latouche, Mehu, M., iii. 171 
 
 Lauderdale, Lord, i. 230 
 
 Launay, Bernard Jourdan de, i. 95 
 
 Lauraguais, L. de, i. 28 
 
 Lauriston, Marquis de, i. 304 
 
 Lauterbourg, iii. 191 
 
 Lauzun, Due de. See M. de Biron 
 
 Laval, Mathieu P. L. de Montmorency, 
 i. 121 
 
 Laval, Vicomtesse de, i. 17, 82 
 
 La Vendee, iv. 310 et seq. 
 
 Lavordy, Clement de, v. 387 
 
 Lavouisier, L., i. 102 
 
 Lebeau, M. iv. 128, 134, 137, 324 
 
 Lebel, v. 363, 365 
 
 Lebrun, Charles, ii. 6 
 
 Lebrun, Denis Ecouchard, L 78 
 
 Lebrun, Madame, i. 38 
 
 Lecoigneux, Abbe, i. 143 
 
 Leczinska, Marie, Queen, i. 2 
 
 Lefebvre, Marshal, i. 9, 277 ; iii. 94 
 
 Lehon, Bishop of, v. 283 
 
 Lehon, Mr., iv. 139, 152, 315 ; v. 267 
 
 Leikam, H err von, i. 312 
 
 Lemos, Gil de, i. 271 
 
 Lemouville, M. and Madame de, i. 131 
 
 Leopold, Prince, of Saxe Coburg, after- 
 wards King of Belgium ; at Erfurt, i. 
 310 
 ii. Saxony, 280 
 
 iii. Elected by the Belgians, 292 ; refuses 
 the crown of Greece, 301 ; at Clare- 
 mont, 322 
 iv. Belgian affairs, J ; Talleyrand on, 10; 
 correspondence with M. Van de Weyer, 
 ib. ; as a possible king for Belgium, 
 30, 83, 100 ; Belgium boundaries, 102 ; 
 conversation with Lord Grey, 103 ; 
 conversation with Talleyrand on 
 Belgian affairs, 107 ; Luxembourg, 
 109, 115; Louis Philippe on, 117; 
 Russia objects to, 125 ; conversa- 
 tion with Talleyrand on Belgian 
 affairs, 127 ; General Belliard on, 132 ; 
 elected King of Belgium, 138; Talley- 
 
 rand on, 143, 144; conference, IS3; 
 receives the Belgian deputation, ib. ; 
 speech to the Belgian deputies, 154; 
 Belgian fortresses, 162 ; Madame Ade- 
 laide d'Orleans on, 167 ; accepts the 
 crown, 168 ; conduct towards France, 
 170 ; Madame d'Orleans on, 171 ; re- 
 call of Dutch troops, 173, 174 ; French 
 troops to aid, 176, 180 ; General 
 Sebastiani on, 186 ; King of Holland, 
 France, and England, 216, 217; 
 Madame Adelaide on, 228 ; Talley- 
 rand on, 236 ; declaration of, 239 ; 
 exclusion from Germanic Confedera- 
 tion, 242 ; Madame Adelaide on, 243 ; 
 King Louis Philippe on, 246, 249, 
 299 ; interview with King Louis 
 Philippe on King of Holland, 303, 
 304 ; Madame Adelaide in, 306-7 
 V. Due de Broglie on, 13, 27 ; Talley- 
 rand on, 127 ; scheme of succession 
 to Belgian throne, 267 ; Madame 
 Adelaide on, 268 ; letter from King 
 Louis Philippe, 269 ; Talleyrand on, 
 270 ; Lord Palmerston and Belgian 
 succession, 275, 276 
 
 Leopold, Prince, of Sicily, iii. 121 
 
 Lepelltier, M., iii. 171 
 
 Lerchenfeld, Count von, i. 313 
 
 Lerlo, Giuseppe Count, ii. 9 
 
 Lerond, Nuase, i., 11 
 
 Lescy, Comte de, v. 345 
 
 Lessart, Antoine de Valdec de, i. 166 
 
 Lessons in morals for children (Madame de 
 Sillery) i. 123 
 
 Leuchtenberg, Due de, iii. 266, 268, 322 : 
 iv. 6, 19, 29, 33, 40, 44 ; V. 154, 162 
 et seq., 1 70-1, 173 
 
 Leudon, Baron de, v. 344 
 
 Leyen, Prince von, i. 313 
 
 Liancourt, Franjois de la Rouchefoucauld, 
 Due de, i. 36, 47, 121 
 
 "Liberty, equality, fraternity," i. 194 
 
 Lichtenstein, Prince Johan von, i. 227 
 
 Lieberich, Baron von Mack von, i. 223 
 
 Liege, iv. 19, 82, 198 
 
 Lieven, Prince de, Russian representative 
 at the London Conference, iii. 254, 
 278 ; Poland, 291 ; conference with 
 Talleyrand and Lord Palmerston on 
 Greece, 303 ; M. de Kriidener, iv. 
 54 ; choice of a sovereign for Bel- 
 gium, 55 ; M. de Kriidener's journey, 
 63 ; Greece, 74 \ Russia v. 68, 89, 
 201 ; England and Russia, 212 ; 
 Greek loan, 220 ; Eastern affairs, 244 ; 
 recalled to Russia, 267 
 
 Lieven, Madame de, iii. 279, 315 ; iv. 11, 
 164 ; V, 106 
 
 Ligue, i. Ill 
 
INDEX. 
 
 409 
 
 Lille, M. de, i. 116 
 
 IJma, L. A. de A. e, v. 291 
 
 Limburg, v. 31, 132 
 
 Limon, Marquis Geoffroy de, (Intendant 
 of Finances), i. 135, 154. 
 
 Lisbon, fighting in, iv. 56 ; embargo laid by 
 Dom Miguel on all Portuguese ships in 
 the port of, 134; V. 137 ; news from 
 
 139 
 Liis de justice, i. 136 ei seq., 145 
 Liverpool, Lord, iii. 31 
 Lobau, General, iii. 171 
 Lobo, iii. 75 
 London, iii. 257, 276, 312 ; iv. Ii, 61, 76, 
 
 79, 80, 105, 139, 228. 
 London, conference in ; first meeting on 
 Netherland affairs, iii. 257 et seq. ; 
 Talleyrand insists on conclusion of 
 Dutch and Belgian affairs, 275 ; fre- 
 quent meetings, 295 ; previous con- 
 ference, 299 ; tardy progress, iv. n ; 
 obstructive action of the King of Hol- 
 land, 13 et seq. ; provisional mercan- 
 tile measures, 31 ; adjustment of 
 Belgian territory, 34; M. Bresson, 
 38 et seq. ; declaration by French 
 government, 38 et seq. ; Talleyrand's 
 instructions, adjustment of Belgian 
 boundaries, 52 ; Belgian sovereignty, 
 55 ; siege of Maestricht, 62 et seq. ; 
 desire for permanence in European 
 affairs, 79 ; Belgium, 85, 90, 93 ; 
 Luxembourg, 105 ; Belgium, 109, 116 
 et seq. , 1 29 ; Luxembourg and Belgium, 
 134; Greece, 150; Belgium, 150 et 
 seq., 160, 166, 183 ; Holland, v. 14, 
 18 ; Prussia, 26 ; Greece, 66 ; Rus- 
 sia and the Porte, 135 ; Hollando- 
 Belgian affairs, 136 ; Belgian affairs, 
 180; Talleyrand's proposed alliance 
 between France and England, 196 ; 
 views of English ministers on Russia's 
 advances to France, 211 ; Dutch 
 affairs, 218 ; discussion as to Greek 
 loan, 220 
 Londonderry, Lord, v. 304 
 Longwy, iii. 193, 195 
 Lorraine, Charles, Prince oi, v. 343 
 Lotteries, abolition of, i. 39 
 Louis XIV., i. 2; and the clergy, 41 ; 
 society in the time of, 51; liberty 
 of the Church, ii. 34 
 Louis XV. and Madame de Pompadour, i. 
 2 ; society in the time of, 51 ; Madame 
 du Barry, v. 363 et seq. ; Madame du 
 Barry on the Due de Choiseul and 
 Spain, 371 ; interview with the Abbe 
 de la Nille, 372; letter to King of 
 Spain, ii. 
 Louis XVI. i. Ii ; coronation, 17 ; society 
 
 in the time of, 51, 55, 74, 81 ; inter- 
 view with Comte d'Artois, 104 : and 
 M. de Voyer, 118 ; intrigues against, 
 
 128 ; memorial from Due d'Orleans, 
 
 129 ; refu.-.es permission to Due 
 d'Orleans to visit England, 132 ; 
 attends parliament, 1 39 ; public pro- 
 test against orders of, by Due d'Or- 
 leans, 146 ; speech to parliament on 
 exile of Due d'Orleans, 151 ; Due 
 d'Orleans forgiven, 155 ; dangers 
 threatening, 165 ; letter to King of 
 England, 166 ; imprisonment of, 168 ; 
 anniversary service of death of, 205 
 
 Louis X VIII. , letters of, i. xxxv. ; opinion 
 of Talleyrand, xl ; becomes king, 105 ; 
 action of Napoleon against, 217 
 
 ii. Restoration, 98 ; "legitimate King of 
 France," 124 ; interview with Talley- 
 rand, 127; entry into Paris, 128 ei 
 seq. ; treaties of peace, 131 et seq. ; 
 appoints Talleyrand ambassador to 
 Vienna, 152 ; his instructions, 157 ; 
 at Ghent, 216 ; correspondence with 
 Talleyrand, 218 et seq. ; the Kings of 
 Naples and Saxony, 226 ; on Russia 
 and Prussia, 254 ; possibility of war, 
 281 ; congratulatory letter to Talley- 
 rand, 294; letter on Duke of Welling- 
 ton and Prince Metternich, 306 ; 
 letter on Saxony, 315 ; letter on the 
 general state of affairs, 331 ; letter on 
 general alliance, 343; dissatisfied with 
 the state of affairs, 349 ; announces a. 
 change in the ministry, 350 ; difference 
 with Duke of Wellington, 351 ; letter 
 on Canton of Aargau, 358 ; letter to 
 Talleyrand on intrigues of Murat and 
 marriage of Due de Berry, 369 ; letter 
 on questions before the congress, 372 ; 
 letter on treaty of peace, 382 ; letter 
 on Prince Mettemich's letter. Lord 
 Castlereagh, Queen of Etruria and M. 
 de Butiakin, 383-4 
 
 iii. Letter on the progress of affairs, 6 ; 
 congratulatory letter from, 9 ; letter on 
 Prussia and Swedish question, 10, 11 ; 
 letter on some of the plenipotentiaries, 
 12 ; letter on Duke of Wellington and 
 Jules de Polignac, 27 ; letter on the 
 cession of Erfurt, 32 ; letter on Lord 
 Wellington, on the Fmperorof Austria, 
 King of Naples, Duke of Wellington, 
 38 ; letter on King of Saxony and 
 Lord Wellington's conduct, i;i-2; 
 attack of gout, 57 ; on abolition of 
 slave trade, re -establishment of Ferdi- 
 nand IV. on the throne at Naples, 57 ; 
 letter from, on Lord Castlereagh, 
 Nearolitan matter?. Prince Metier- 
 
410 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 nich and Murat, 58-9 ; letter on M. 
 de Mettemich's declaration and 
 Napoleon's escape, 68-9 ; letter of 
 confidence to Talleyrand, 69 ; reaches 
 Menin, 86 ; letter on troops in France, 
 87 ; letter on treaty of March 2Sth 
 and Lord Wellington, 95-6 ; goes to 
 Ghent, 97 ; speech to assembly of 
 two chambers, 102 ; reaches Abbe- 
 ville, 104 ; return to Menin, 105 ; 
 fresh sorrows of, 106 ; forced to leave 
 France, ib. ; letter from, on Napo- 
 leon, termination of the Congress and 
 DucdeCampoChiaro, 111-112 ; letter 
 on proclamation to satisfy the sove- 
 reigns, 123 ; receives report of work done 
 at the congress from Talleyrand, 130 e^ 
 seq. ; proclamation given at Cambray by, 
 156 ; letter on Prussians at the Bridge 
 of Jena, 160; goes to Paris, 165 ; pro- 
 clamation dissolving the chamber of 
 deputies, 165, 167 ; proclamation of 
 chamber of peers, signed by, 171 ; ar- 
 gument with Talleyrand against here- 
 ditary peerage, 1 72 ; on tumults in the 
 south, 173 ; letter to Talleyrand on the 
 conduct of the allied armies and his re- 
 tirementfrom the kingdom, 176 ; regard 
 for, 181 ; promises by the four Powers 
 to, 190-194; consents to the payment 
 of an indemnity, 199 ; conversation 
 with Talleyrand on the reply of the 
 ministers of the allies, 202 ; wishes the 
 past to be buried in oblivion, 221 
 Louis Philippe anxious to get his new 
 government of France recognized by 
 England, 226 ; letter to Talleyrand, 
 228 ; demonstration in England in 
 favour of, 255; statement of Belgian 
 question drawn up by, 262 et seq. 
 iv. Refuses crown for Due de Nemours, 
 44 ; letter to Talleyrand on Holland and 
 Belgium, 183 ; letter on the safety and 
 independence of Belgium, 192 ; letter 
 on treaty between Holland and Bel- 
 gium, 198 ; letter on the Treaty of 
 London, 228 ; letter on the demolition 
 of the Belgian fortresses, 240 et seq. ; 
 letter on M. de la Tour Maubourg's 
 mission and Prince Leopold, 246 et 
 seq. ; letter on the deplorable treaty of 
 December 14th, 264 et seq. ; letter on 
 the ratifications of the five Powers, 
 2-2-3 ; letter on Talleyrand's diplo- 
 macy, 299; letter on conversation with 
 King of the Belgians, 303 letter on 
 disturbance in Paris, 310 
 V. Letter to Talleyrand on Bridge of Jena, 
 xiv ; congratulatory letterto Talleyrand, 
 29, attempt to take the life of, 40 ; letter 
 
 on the kind reception of his son in Eng- 
 land, 117-8; letter to King Leopold 
 on succession to Belgian throne, 269 ; 
 his views on the condition of Spain, 
 300 ; letter to Talleyrand on his resig- 
 nation, 315 ; displeased at progress of 
 the Conference, 328 
 
 Louis, Baron, i. 68 ; ii. loi, 186 ; iii. 161, 
 176, 199, 228 
 
 Loul^, Marquis de, v. 153 
 
 Louvois, Marquis de, iii. 169 
 
 Lowenhielm, Herr von, ii. 247 ; iii, 34, 75 
 
 Lucca, Metternich's project, iii. 43 
 
 Lucchesini, Herr von, i. 232 
 
 Ludolf, Comte de, v. 291 
 
 Luis, Infant Don, i. 249 
 
 Liinberg, iii. 263 
 
 Luneville, Treaty of, i. 212, 246 ; iii. 209, 
 210 
 
 Lurde, M. de, v. 156, 165 
 
 Luxembourg, Duchesse de, v. 348 
 
 Luxembourg, Chevalier de, i. 125 
 
 Luxembourg, Marechale de, i. 27 
 
 Luxembourg, Duchy of, given to Prince of 
 Orange, iii. 41 ; otherwise remains 
 German, 42 ; restrictions regarding, 
 260 ; incorporated in the German 
 confederation, 263, 284 ; claimed by 
 Belgium, 298 ; M. Van de Weyer, 
 323 ; on the neutrality of Belgium, 
 16 ; delays, 34 ; M. van de Weyer, 
 37 ; Talleyrand on, 69 ; Belgian 
 Regent's proclamation, 76 ; difficulties 
 regarding, 90 ; entry of troops, 96, 
 loi ; M. de Merode on, 105 ; Ger- 
 manic confederation and the King of 
 Holland, 107 ; troops, 109 ; Belgium 
 and Holland, 123 ; dissatisfaction of 
 the King of Holland, 130 et seq., 214 ; 
 insurrection in, 253 ; cession of, by 
 Belgium, v. 33 ; re-arrangement of 
 territory, 132 
 
 Luynes, Duchesse de, i. 17 
 
 Luynes, Madame de, i. 3 
 
 Lynch, Jean Baptiste, Comte, ii. 107 
 
 Lyndhurst, Lord, iv. 297 
 
 Lyons, entry of Napoleon, iii. loi ; insur- 
 rection in, iv. 223 
 
 M 
 
 Macaiiaz, Don Pedro, i. 274, 278 
 Macdonald, Alexandre, i. 202 ; iii. 71, 100 
 
 et seq. 
 Machaul, Jean Baptiste de, i. 18, 19; v. 
 
 342, 390 
 Machias (port oO, i. 180 
 Maclagan, Mr. iv. 17 
 Maastricht, iii. 263 ; iv. 10, 13, 43, 54, 61, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 411 
 
 70, 89, 122, 132, 134, 198, 214; V. 
 
 Mahomet, play performed at Erfurt, i. 322 
 
 Mairan, M. de, i. 51 
 
 Maison, Genl. i. xxxv ; iii. 250, 256, 259 
 et seq., 274 ; v. 220, 262 
 
 Malcolm, Admiral, v. 31, no 
 
 Malesherbes, Chretien-Guillaume de L. de, 
 i. 32 
 
 Malines, Archbishop of, ii. 82, loi 
 
 Malraesbury, Lord, i. 193 
 
 Malonet, Pierre- Victor, Baron, i. 54 
 
 Malta, L 210 
 
 Mannheim, the allied sovereigns at, iii. 
 136 
 
 Marbois, Franfois, Marquis de Barbe, i. 
 226 
 
 Marbot, General, iii. 171 
 
 Marchand, General, iii. 74 
 
 Marck, Comte de la, v. xvi et seq., 
 
 Marcolini, Count, i. 310 
 
 Mardinier, M. de (broker), i. 72 
 
 Marengo, Battle of, i. 2 1 1 
 
 Maret, Mons. i. 305 ; iii. 209 
 
 Mareuil, M. de, iv. 123, 141, 287, 297, 
 299, 305; V. 16, 52, 55 
 
 Maria Dona. See Dona Maria 
 
 Marie Louise, Empress, promised in 
 marriage to Napoleon, ii. 7 ! reception 
 at St. Cloud, 75 ; in the Pope's apart- 
 ment, 89 ; abdication of Emperor, 
 1 10 ; the Emperor's movements in 
 warfare, 115 ; settlement of allowance, 
 125, 126 ; affection of Empress of 
 Austria for, 223 ; Prince Mettemich's 
 claim for, 297, 310; change of arms, 
 332 ; Prince Mettemich's claim for, 
 372 ; pension, iii. 16, 42 ; Emperor of 
 Russia and her affairs, 58, 59 ; letter 
 from Napoleon, 84 ; approaching 
 arrival in France, 98 ; will not return, 
 116 
 
 Marie-Antoinette, Queen, i. 47, 69, 134, 
 167 
 
 Marienberg, iii. 189, 195 ; iv. 16, 238 et 
 seq., 266, 268 
 
 Mariepoix, Marechale de, v. 366, 390 
 
 Mariotti, Chevalier, ii. 357 
 
 Markoff, M. de, i. 120 
 
 Marmontel, Jean Frangois, i. 35 
 
 Marmont, Marshal, ii. 121, 133 ; iii. 106 
 
 Marrac, Chateau of, i. 280 
 
 Marsan, Madame de, i. 3 
 
 Marshall, John (American commissioner), 
 i. xlix 
 
 Martin, Baron de, ii. 375 
 
 Martinez, M., v. 250 
 
 Marxhansky, Herr von, i. 310 
 
 Masserano, Carlo Ferrero-Fieschi, Prince, 
 i. 258 
 
 Massias, M. iii. 211 
 Mastin, Abbe de, v. 362 
 Matthieu, General Maurice, iii. 72 
 Matusiewicz, M. de, iii. 247, 250, 254, 
 
 278, 288, 315 ; iv. 26, 63, 160 ; V. 
 
 104, 107 
 Mauberg, iii. 19J, 195 
 Maubourg, Comte Latour, iii. 171 ; iv. 
 
 114, 186, 205, 216, 239, 243, 246 ^/ 
 
 seq. ; v. 33, 52 
 Maubreuil, M. Marquis de, iii. 206, 221 ; 
 
 iv. 277 
 Mauguin, M. iii. 230, 305 ; iv. 5, 17, 114, 
 
 201, 213 
 Maunay, M. de (Bishop of Treves), i. 38 
 Maupertuis, Moreau de, i. 63 
 Maupeau, Chancellor de, v. 367 
 Maurepas, Jean Phelypeaux, Comte de, i. 
 
 32, 118 
 Maurrique, Don Jos^, i. 248 
 Maury, Cardinal, ii. 38, 56, 59 
 Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Duke of, i. 311 
 Mecklenburg- Strelitz, George Fredk. of, i. 
 
 311 
 
 Medem, M. de, v. 80 
 
 Medina-Cceli, Duke of, i. 275, 280 
 
 Mehemet Ali, v. 81 et seq. 
 
 Meilban, G. S. de, i. 46, 68 
 
 Melbourne, Lord, iii. 274 ; v. 291, 292-3 
 
 Mellinet, M. iii. 171 ; iv. 70 
 
 Melville, Lord (H. Dundas), i. 173 
 
 Meizi d'Eril, Fran9ois, i. 218 
 
 Memoirs, directions as to publication of, i. 
 X ; preparation of, xiii ; fictitious, xv ; 
 sketch of, XX. et seq. ; object of, xlvi. ; 
 title to, Ivi ; the source of true history, 
 no; MS. deposited with Biblio- 
 theque Nationale, v. vii ; authenticity 
 oiib. et seq. ; end of MS. 258 
 
 M'emoires Historiques sur la Rhiolution 
 (T Esfagne, i. 279 
 
 Meneval, Fran9ois de, i. 304 
 
 Merilhon, iii. 248 
 
 Merlin de Douay, Madame, i. 197 
 
 Merode, Count Felix de, iii. 265, 266, 267, 
 268, 322 ; iv. 8, 100, 105 ; v. 261 
 
 Mesnard, Comte Louis Charles V. 37 
 
 Methuen, Treaty of, i. 29 
 
 Metternich, Prince, ii. restoration of Monar- 
 chy in France, 113, 187 ; the Chatillon 
 Congress, 192 ; the position of affairs, 
 195 ; the Congress of Vienna, 201 ; 
 " Allied Powers," 202 ; King of 
 Saxony, 209 ; politeness to Talley- 
 rand, 223 ; private conference, 227 ; 
 preliminary conference, 229 ; pleads 
 Murat's cause, 239, 240 ; Talleyrand's 
 letter to Lord Castlereagh, 243 ; the 
 position of affairs, 256 ; secrecy of 
 action, 259 ; Saxony and Prussia, 
 
412 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 266, 269 ; gives a ball, 270 ; Russia 
 and Germany, 273 ; project of declara- 
 tion, 283 ; interview with the Czar on 
 Poland, 288 ; Talleyrand on, 295 ; 
 desirous of gaining time, 301 ; Austria 
 and her interests, ib. ; desires to be 
 in Talleyrand's confidence, 302 ; 
 business of the Congress, 303 ; ap- 
 proves Lord Castlereagh's advice 
 regarding Warsaw, 310 ; Poland, 31 1; 
 concessions to Prussia, 312 ; Poland 
 and Saxony, 313 ; conversation be- 
 tween the Czar and Talleyrand, 320 
 et stq. ; Queen of Etruria, 332 ; 
 Murat's army, 340 ; illness of, 349 ; 
 interview with Emperor Alexander 
 regarding Saxony, 354 ; information 
 regarding Napoleon, 357 ; causes 
 d elay in the progress of affairs at the 
 Congress, ib. ; declares that the 
 kingdom of Saxony must be preserved 
 intact, 365 ; perplexed by Lord 
 Castlereagh's letters on Saxony, 366 ; 
 incorporation of Saxony, 374 ; presi- 
 dent of commission on statistics, 375 
 
 iii. Sardinia, 13 ; Prince de Harden- 
 berg's scheme regarding Prussia, 15 ; 
 on Saxony, Prussia, and Austria, 2i ; 
 proposals on Parma and Etruria, 40 ; 
 regarding settlement of affairs, 43 , 
 note from Neapolitan minister, 54 ; 
 mysterious conduct of, 56 ; Presburg, 
 70 ; conference with Comte d' 
 Einsieldel, ib. ; signs ""declaration 
 against Bonaparte, 75 ; news from 
 Milan, 79 ; messages from Bona- 
 parte's party to, 108 ; conversation 
 with M. de Montrond, 109 ; account 
 of conversation between the Czar and 
 LordCIancarty by, \if,etseq. ; treaty 
 for assistance to be given by Sicily in 
 the war against Murat signed by, 121 ; 
 secret correspondence with Fouche, 
 162 ; Talleyrand on, 188 ; resignation 
 of Talleyrand, 203 ; Talleyrand on, 
 276 
 
 iv. seconds the wishes and hopes made 
 known to him by the King's Govern- 
 ment, 94 ; to support, 212 
 
 V. Remonstrances on the part of, 16 ; 
 views about Switzerland, 88 ; satis- 
 faction at the failure of Rubsian 
 events, 92 ; desires to withdraw the 
 centre of negotiation from London, 
 98 ; project of, loi ; proposal to hold 
 a kind of congress in Vienna to dis- 
 cuss Eastern affairs, I2I ; meeting 
 of Russian, Prussian and Austrian 
 sovereigns, 181 et seq. ; Turkey and 
 Russia, 201 ; Eastern Question, 203 ; 
 
 incident at Luxembourg, 226 ; on the 
 Ottoman Empire, ib. ; on the Hol- 
 lando-Belgian affair, 263 ; Talley- 
 rand's treaty, 266 
 
 Meurthe Boulayde la M., iii. 171 
 
 Michiels, iv. 128 
 
 Miguel, Dom, his government of Portugal 
 iii. 241 ; insurrection in Portugal, 
 iv. 56 ; unrecognized by the Powers, 
 74 ; English complaints against Portu- 
 gal, 98 ; he accedes to English de- 
 mands, 121 ; lays embargo on ships in 
 Lisbon, 134 ; differences between him 
 and France, 140 ; fresh cruelties by, 
 205 ; the regency, 293 ; the Portuguese 
 civil war, v. 64 ; Austria desires his 
 recognition as king, 71 ; the affairs 
 of Dona Maria and the Peninsula, 
 151 et seq. : Due de Broglie on the 
 situation, 172; the civil war, 175, 238; 
 his expulsion by treaty, 241 ; capitu- 
 lation, 275-6 ; expelled the Peninsula, 
 277 ; agrees to convention, 278 ; 
 possibility of return, 294 
 
 Mina, M., ii. 272 
 
 Minto, Lord, v. 13, 15, 87, 165, 286 
 
 Miollis, Fran9ois, Comte, ii. 36 
 
 Mirabeau, Honore-Gabriel R. de, i. xli., 
 xlii. 28 ; relations with Court of 
 Louis XVI., V. xvi, 258 
 
 Miraflores, Marquis de, v. 279, 280, 282, 
 299, 306, 308 et seq. 
 
 Miromesuil, A. H. de, i. 69, 78 
 
 Mitkridate, i. 325 
 
 Modena, outbreak in, iv. 50 ; conduct of 
 people in, 114 
 
 Mole, M., iii. 172, 228, 230, 237, 246, 
 249. 255, 257, 312, 316; iv. 231; 
 V. 230 
 
 Mollendorff, Field-Marshal Count von, i. 
 
 233 
 MoUien, Comte, ii. 7 
 Moltke, Baron von, i. 313 
 Mon, Don Arias, i. 263 
 Monarchy, hereditary, i. 9 8 
 Moncey, General, iii. 211 et seq. 
 Moncrif, F. P. de, v. 362 
 Money, recoinage of 1726, i. 72 
 Mons, iv. 245, 268 
 Monge, Gaspard, i. 102 
 Moniteur, i. 304 ; ii. 75, 85, 286, 318 ; iii. 
 
 17, 228, 321 ; iv. 77 ; V. 7, 12, 36, 
 
 112, 128, 296 
 Monod, M. Sustane, v. vii 
 Monsieur (the King's eldest brother), i. 
 
 78 ; ii. 131, 189 
 Montaigne, i. 62 
 Montalivet, Comte de, iii. 248 
 Montauset, M. de, i. 19 
 Montazet, M. de, i. 19 
 
INDEX. 
 
 413 
 
 Montbazon, Due de Rohan, iii. 69 
 
 Mont de Milan Bank, ii. 25 1 
 
 Montebello, Due de, iii. 172 
 
 Montebello, Duchess of. See Marechale 
 Lannes 
 
 Montinay, C. Pallisot de, v. 384 
 
 Montesquieu, M. de, i. 51 ; iii. 83, 315 
 
 Montesquiou, Abbe de, ii 129, 154 
 
 Montesquiou-Fezensac, Count Pierre de, 
 i. 300; iii. 171 
 
 Moiitesson, Madame de, i. 33, 37, 45 
 
 Monteynard, L. F. Marquis de, v. 374 
 
 Montfort, Comte de (M. Jerome Bona- 
 parte) V. 264 
 
 Montgelas, Baron von, i. 313 
 
 Monthion, General, i. 275 
 
 Montmorency, Madame de, i. 226 
 
 Montmorin, Comte A. de, i. 78, 155 
 
 Montrond, M. de, iii. 108 
 
 Monville, Baron T. B. de, i. I2i 
 
 Morande, Charles Thevenot de, i. 53 
 
 Moravian brethren, i. 177 
 
 Moreau, Victor, i. 20i, 204, 211,220; 
 iii. 17, 208 
 
 Moreno, General, v. 292 
 
 Morier, Sir Robert, v. 286 
 
 Morris, Mrs. R., i. 180 
 
 Mart de Cesar, i. 323, 330 
 
 Mortemart, Marquise de, i. 227; iv. 25, 
 63. 74, 81,92, 152, 217 
 
 Mortier, Marshal, i. 304 ; ii. 121 ; iii. 
 100 et seq., 321 ; v. 258, 274, 290 
 
 Mosbourg, Comte de, ii. 10 
 
 Mos, Marquis de, i. 265, 271 
 
 Mosloy, Comte de, i. 213 
 
 Mounier, Baron, iv. 250 
 
 Mouravieff, General, v. 79 
 
 Mucey, iii. 208 
 
 Mulinen, M., iii. 68 
 
 Mulgrave, Lord, v. 293 
 
 Miiller, Friederich von, i. 331 
 
 Miiller, Johan von, i. 233, 326, 334 
 
 Miinster, Count von, ii. 185, 253, 261, 
 
 354. 357, 365, 375 
 Murat. See Due de Berg. 
 Musquiz, Don, i. 277 
 
 N 
 
 Nalet, v. 363 
 
 Namur, iv. 19 
 
 Nausouty, Etienne Champion, Comte de, 
 
 i. 304, 327 , „ 
 
 Nantes, Bishop of, friend of Talleyrand s, 
 i. 39 ; Napoleon's struggle with the 
 Pope, ii. 33 ; Ecclesiastical Commis- 
 sion, 38, 54, 59; should have been 
 Minister of Public Worship, 63 ; in- 
 fluence with the Emperor, 65 et seq. ; 
 
 Napoleon at St. Cloud, 75 ; the com- 
 mission, 78 ; address to the Emperor, 
 78, 82, 86 ; the Pope, 88 
 
 Napier, Captain, v. 134 
 
 Naples, ii. 174, 212, 226, 233, 330, 340, 
 365 ; iii. 46, 54, 266 
 
 Naples, Prince Charles of, iii. 266 ; iv. 5 
 et seq. 29, 35, 40, 49, et seq., 55, 
 
 83 
 Napoleon Bonaparte, plot to assassinate, i. 
 xli. ; Spanish policy, xliv. ; Austria, 
 liii. 193 ; lost letter to Talleyrand, 
 196 ; interview with Talleyrand, ib. ; 
 declines to invade Ireland, 197 ; ex- 
 pedition to Egypt, 198, 204 ; incident 
 in Paris at night, 206 ; appointed 
 Consul, 207 ; could he be made a tem- 
 porary sovereign, 208 ; position of 
 First Consul, 209; letters to King of 
 England and Emperor of Austria, 
 ib. ; Russian prisoners, 210 ; treaty 
 with Russia, ib. ; crosses the Alps, 
 211 ; treaty with Austria, 212 ; the 
 Concordat, 214 ; attention to Home 
 affairs, 216 ; Cisalpine Republic depu- 
 tation at Lyons, 217 ; adopts mistaken 
 policy, 219 ; resolution to form here- 
 ditaiy monarchy, 220 ; becomes Em- 
 peror, 221 ; crowned King of Italy, 
 ib. ; proposes invasion of England, 
 
 222 ; attacks Austria, ib. ; has a fit, 
 
 223 ; victory of Ulm, ib. ; at Schoen- 
 brunn, 224 ; enters Moravia, ib. ; 
 treaty with Austria, 227 ; annoyed 
 with Talleyrand, 228 ; designs on 
 Holland, 229 ; intended assassination 
 of, 230 ; the restitution of Hanover, 
 231 ; Battle of Jena, ib. ; Spain, 232; 
 Treaty of Tilsit, ib. ; goes to Posen, 
 233 ; meets deputation from Warsaw, 
 ib. ; pictures at Dresden, 234 ; goes 
 to Warsaw, ib. ; Prince Joseph 
 Poniatowski, ib. ; Madame Anastase 
 Walewska, 235 ; Battle of Eylau, 
 236 ; Battle of Friedland, ib. ; inter- 
 view with Emperor Alexander, 237 ; 
 treaty with Russia, ib. ; The Queen 
 of Prussia, 238 ; returns to Paris, 239 ; 
 designs on Spain, 240 ; arranges meet- 
 ing with Emperor Alexander, ib. ; 
 returns to Paris, 242 ; at Finkenstein, 
 244 ; love of deceit, ib. ; Spanish 
 affairs, 245 ; alliance with Spain 
 against Portugal, 246 ; his armies en- 
 ter Spain, 248 ; projected marriage of 
 his niece with the Prince of the 
 Asturias, 250 ; letter from the Prince 
 of the Asturias, 257 ; letter from King 
 of Spain, 258 ; text of the Treaty of 
 Fontainebleau, 259 ; text of secret 
 
414 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 convention with Spain, 261 ; Spanish 
 people regard him as a disinterested 
 protector, 262 ; his army advances 
 further into Spain, 264; projected 
 flight of the Royal Family of Spain, 
 265 ; Ferdinand VII., 270 ; change 
 of Spanish opinion, 272 ; message 
 from King of Spain, ib. ; demands 
 the person of the Prince of the Peace, 
 
 273 ; nev?s of his arrival at Bordeaux, 
 
 274 ; letter from King of Spain, ib. ; 
 agreement regarding Spanish terri- 
 tory, 276 ; letter to Ferdinand, 277 ; 
 unmasks his designs, 279, 280 ; visits 
 Ferdinand, 280 ; explains his de- 
 termination to change the Spanish 
 dynasty, ib. ; offers Ferdinand the 
 kingdom of Etruria, 281 ; replies by 
 the Spanish nobles, ib. ; Napoleon 
 obdurate, 284 ; calls upon Ferdinand 
 to renounce the crown, 284 ; grants 
 Navarre to the Spanish Princes, 285 ; 
 offended with Talleyrand, 288 ; rup- 
 ture wilh Napoleon, 289; "Sire," 
 ib. ; meets the Emperor of Russsia, 
 290 ; Treaty of Valenfay, ib. ; fail- 
 ure of his designs, 292 ; holds out a 
 bait to Russia, 294 ; Turkey, Wal- 
 lachia, Moldavia and Silesia, 295 ; 
 letter to Alexander, ib. ; negotiations 
 at Erfurt, 300 ; confidence in Talley- 
 rand, ib. ; desires a brilliant journey, 
 and to dazzle the Germans, 301 ; the 
 Comedie Fran^aise to go to Erfurt, 
 302 ; the artists summoned, 303 ; the 
 military retinue, 304; discloses his pro- 
 jects to Talleyrand, 305 ; text of con- 
 vention and his objection to certain 
 expressions, 306 ; inserts clause 
 directed against Austria, 308 ; arrives 
 at Erfurt, 314; meets Emperor 
 Alexander, 315 ; precautions against 
 Austria, 316 ; lifeat Erfurt, 317 ; con- 
 versation vpith Goethe, 318 ; private 
 interview with Alexander, 324 ; invites 
 Goethe and Wieland to luncheon, 
 325 ; topics of conversation, 326 ; on 
 Christianity, ib. ; conversation vrith 
 Wieland, ib. ; at a ball at Weimar, 
 331 ; conversation with Wieland on 
 Tacitus, ib. ; returns to Erfurt, 335 ; 
 confidential interview with the Czar 
 and Talleyrand, 335 ; wants a divorce, 
 ib. ; Czar's opinion of, 336 ; interview 
 between Napoleon and the Czar, 338 ; 
 at the theatre, 339 ; opinion of ideo- 
 logists, lib. ; Christianity, ib. ; leaves 
 Erfurt, ib. 
 
 ii, Marriage of Talleyrand's nephew, 3 ; 
 speech at extraordinary Council on his 
 
 own marriage, 5 ; becoming involved 
 in difficulties, 7 ; Murat endeavours to 
 free himself from, 9 ; Government of 
 Holland, 13-15 ; Rupture with Louis 
 Bonaparte, 15 ; Electorate of Hesse 
 Cassel, 16 ei sej.; absurd luxury of 
 Courts, 19 ; irritation against Joseph 
 Bonaparte, 20 ; feeling against in 
 Spain, 2Z ; differences with Pope Pius 
 VII. 25 et seq. ; "Organic articles," 
 32 ; Cardinal Caprara, 33 ; consecra- 
 tion, 34 ; crowns himself King of Italy, 
 36 ; places his brother Joseph on the 
 throne of Naples, ib. ; occupation of 
 Rome, ib. ; annexation of the legations 
 of Urbino, Ancona, Macerata, and 
 Camerino, 37 ; imprisonment of several 
 cardinals, ib. ; disarms Papal guards, 
 ib. ; annexation of Papal States, ib. ; 
 the King of Rome, 38 ; Ecclesiastical 
 Commission, 38 et seq. ; right of nom- 
 ination, 55 ; the Senatus Consultum, 
 ib, ; nomination of Archbishop of 
 Florence, 57; Bishopric of Asti, 58 ; 
 severe measures against Pius VII. 58 ; 
 appoints a second Ecclesiastical Com- 
 mission, 59 ; intervention of the Bishop 
 of Nantes, 63 ; negotiates with the 
 Pope, 66 ; thoughts on the assembly 
 of Bishops, 74 ; meeting of the As- 
 sembly, ib. ; attack on Cardinal Fesch, 
 75; "I am Charlemagne," 77; dia- 
 tribe against the Pope, 78 ; refuses to 
 receive address from the Council, 79 ; 
 threatens to dismiss it, 80 ; Council 
 dissolved, ib. ; reconstitution of 
 Council, ib. ; propositions, 8l ; re- 
 turns the Pope's brief, 85 ; Talleyrand 
 on his inconsistency, 86 ; treatment of 
 the Pope, 88 ; interview with the Pope, 
 89 ; signs treaty with the Pope, ib. ; 
 the Pope's retractation, 91 ; Talley- 
 rand on his political blunders in the 
 negotiations with the Pope, 93 ; his 
 political faults continued, 97 ; why he 
 could have given Europe equilibrium, 
 99 ; personal explanation by Talley- 
 rand regarding, 100 ; TallejTand as 
 foreign minister, 102 ; incident with 
 Murat, 103 ; plotting against himself, 
 104 ; expectation of peace with, 108, 
 no; abdicating, 109; course to be 
 adopted by allied sovereigns, in ; at 
 Arcis, 1 14 ; follows the allied armies, 
 115; Talleyrand on the position of, 
 116; interview with M. de la Besnar- 
 diere, 121 ; return of the Bourbons, 
 ib. ; island of Elba, 125 ; allowance 
 to, 126 ; empire of, destroyed, 127 ; 
 responsible for his country's calamities, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 415 
 
 150; remark of Baron Louis, 186: 
 account of the Congress of Ch^tillon, 
 ib. ; letter to, on the sovereignty of 
 Elba, 190 : the treaty formulated by 
 the Chaullon Congress, 192 ; desires 
 more favourable conditions, 195 ; re- 
 turn of, 209 ; denounced as a usurper, 
 216 ; intended removal from Elba, 
 252 ; the Arores, 271 ; correspondence 
 with Murat, 368 
 iii. Escape from Elba, his probable 
 movements, 66 et seq. ; repulsed by a 
 cannonade at Antibes, 71 ; entry into 
 France, 78 : treaty directed against, 95, 
 96 ; entry into Lyons, loi ; Burgundy 
 and Auxerre, 102 ; the downfall of 
 desired by people of France, 108 ; 
 endeavour to nationalize the war, 1 14 ; 
 his attempts to establish relations with 
 Foreign Powers, repulsed and proved 
 abortive, 122, 179 ; opinion of the 
 Allied Powers on the enterprise of, 
 197 ; sends for Talleyrand, 210 ; re- 
 proaches M. R^al and Talleyrand, 
 211 ; filled with apprehension, ib. ; 
 orders arrest of all emigres on Baden 
 territory, 212 ; Poland, 296 ; Maxim 
 
 of, 317 
 
 Napoleon, J^r6me, i. 313 
 Napoleon, Princess S ephanie, i. 312 
 Narbonne, Archbishop of (Arthur de 
 
 Dillon), L 20, 23, 26, 37, 77 ; ii. 29 
 Narbonne, Louis de, i. 28, 35 
 Narbonne, Comtesse de, i. 74 
 Nassau, Prince of, i. 199 ; iv. 10, 146 ; v. 
 
 259 
 Nassau, House of, iii. 265, 267, 284, 320 ; 
 
 iv. S, 18, 49, 127,211 
 National Assembly, i. 24, 94, 98, 100, lOI, 
 
 103 
 Necker, M., i. 36, 45, 46, 71, 74, 84, 
 
 Nemours, Dupont de, i. 28, 80 ; iii. 268, 
 285, 30s, 321 ; iv. 4 et seq., 21, 29, 33, 
 40, i^et seq., 132, 175 
 
 Nesselrode, Count de, Councillor to the 
 Russian Embassy in Paris, i. 242 ; 
 Czar Alexander, ii. 122 ; M. de Vi- 
 troUes' mission, 188 ; conference at the 
 office of the Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs, 201, 243 ; Prussia, 247 ; 
 Saxony, 276 ; delegate for the Com- 
 mission of Italy, 362 ; signs Treaty of 
 Paris, iii. 75 ; conversation with M. de 
 Mettemich, 108 ; despatch to Comte 
 Matusievricz on the Netherlands, 251, 
 252, 253 ; General Pozzo, iv. 217 ; 
 military arrangements, v. 213 ; East- 
 ern question, 214 
 
 Nesselrode, Madame de, iv, 165 
 
 Netherlands, erection of the new realm of, 
 ii. 215 ; iii. 41, 188 ; territory, 189; 
 Talleyrand, on the kingdom, 234 ; 
 treaties creating the kingdom, 245 ; 
 Belgian war, 256, 275 ; proposed 
 division of the country, 285 ; Luxem- 
 bourg, 298 ; navigation of the Scheldt, 
 iv. 43 ; Luxembourg, 1 19 ; the throne 
 of Greece, 211 ; Ancona, 283 ; 
 Venloo, V. 13 ; territory, 27, 34 ; 
 blockade of the ports, 61 ; position of 
 the king, 114, 130 ; Luxembourg, 180, 
 218, 226 ; difficulties with the king, 
 319 «/ seq. 
 
 Neufchatel, Prince of, i, 280, 304 ; ii. 21 
 
 Neukomm, M., iii. 17 
 
 Neumann, Baron, v. 72, 92 
 
 Nevers, Bishop of (J. A. Tinseau), i. 20 
 
 Ney, Marshal, iii. 100, 103, 171 ; v. xiii 
 
 Nicolai, M. de, i. 19 ; iii. 257 
 
 Nicholas, Emperor, iii. 247, 254, 264, 
 321 ; iv. 37, 73, 217, 251, 258, 275 ; 
 V. 69, 124, 166 
 
 Nivernais, Due de, i. 144 
 
 Noailles, Comte Alexis, ii. 153, 316, 332, 
 
 343, 353 ; iii- i7, 34 
 Noailles, Comtesse Just de, ii. 3 
 Noailles, Vicomte de, i. 158 ; ii. 295, 
 
 296, 298, 300-1, 311-17 
 Nobility (manners of), i. 6, 35, 46 et seq. ; 
 
 86, 89 ; emigration of, 95 
 Normandy, discontent at treaty between 
 
 France and England, i. 30 
 Nostitz, Comte, iv. 212 ' 
 
 Notables, assembly of, i. 75, 82, 127 
 Nothomb, M., iv. 143 
 Novi, battle of, i. 204 
 Nyeweldt, M. Zulyen de, iii. 293 
 
 O 
 
 Ochs, Pierre, i. 215 
 
 Ochsenhausen, Prince von M. U., ii. 136 
 
 O'Donnell, General, v. 346 
 
 O'Farril, Don Gonzalo, i. 276, 277 
 
 Offalia, M. d', V. 48 
 
 Offenburg, iii. 208 et seq. 
 
 Olaguer, Don, i. 276 
 
 Olazabel, Don, i. 278 
 
 Oldenburg, Duchess of, ii. 245, 285 
 
 Oldenburg, Duke of, i. 311 ; ii. i6l 
 
 Ompteda, Baron d', v. 16 
 
 Orange, Prince of, cedes all right to Hol- 
 land, ii. 163 ; receives Luxembourg 
 and Limburg as an indemnity, iii. 42 ; 
 arrangements with the Belgians, 245, 
 257 ; his arrival in London, 260 ; as 
 a possible king for the Belgians, 262 
 et seq ; chances in Belgium, iv. \\ et 
 
4.i6 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 seq., 29, 36, 63 ; returns to Holland, 
 79; events in Belgium, 320, 321 ; v. 
 
 39 
 
 Ordiner, General, iii. 213 
 
 O'Reilly, Alexander, Comte, v. 373 
 
 Orgaz, Count d', i. 250, 263 
 
 Orleans, Madame Adelaide d', recoinage, 
 i. 74 
 iii. Defeat of revolutionary party, 297 ; 
 
 Charles X., Naples, Belgium, 314 
 iv. Greece and Belgian affairs, 36 ; 
 Belgium, Greece, ICing Louis Phi- 
 lippe, lis ^' ■^^?- ; Prince Leopold 
 and Dom Pedro, 166, 167 ; King of 
 Holland, 169 ; Lord Aberdeen on 
 France and Portugal, 17 ; demolition 
 of Belgian fortresses, 175 \ Poland, 
 200 ; Kin J of the Belgians, 202 ; Tal- 
 leyrand's treaty, 228 ; Belgium, Sebas- 
 tiani, 271 ; ratifications of Austria and 
 Prussia, 291-2 ; ratification of Russia, 
 M. Perier, 294 ; King Leopold, 
 Duchesse de Berry, 306-7 ; outbreaks 
 of revolution in Paris, 312-3 ; Belgian 
 affairs, Naples, 317 ; Belgium, 318, 
 322 ; Ancona, 326 
 V. Belgian Convention, 29 ; Duchesse 
 de Berry, 36 ; Antwerp, 37 ; attempt 
 to assassinate King Louis Phi- 
 lippe, 40 ; siege of Antwerp, 44 ; 
 death of Princesse de Vaudemont, 
 56 ; customs question, 75 ; Ibrahim 
 Pasha, 76 ; visit of Chartres to Lon- 
 don, 96 ; Belgian Convention, 127, 169, 
 176; social disturbances, Russo- 
 Turkish treaty, Austria, 222-3 ; Due 
 de Broglie's resignation, 229 ; begin- 
 ning of revolution of 1830, 240 ; fur- 
 ther outbreak, 244 ; on King Leo- 
 pold, 268 ; Spanish affairs, 279 
 Orleans, Due d', i. 83 ; lineage, 109 ; early 
 years and dispositions, 113 ; marriage, 
 IIS ; his associates, 115 1;^ seq. ; his 
 character influenced by M. de Voyer, 
 118; his selfish nature, 119; Prince 
 de Lamballe and his death, 120 ; 
 Marquis de Confians and his death, 
 120; other intimacies, 121 ; his liai- 
 sons, 122 ; Madame de Sillery, ib. ; 
 his speculations, 125 ; outrageous pro- 
 ceedings towards his treasurer, 126; 
 desirous of becoming grand admiral : 
 is made colonel-general of Hussars, 
 ib. ; Mademoiselle Amould, ib. ; 
 journeys to England and Italy, ib. ; 
 elected Grand Master of Freemasons, 
 ib. ; serious illness, ib. ; Assembly of 
 Notables, 127 ; intrigues against the 
 king, 128; his Chancellor, Marquis 
 Ducrest, 129 ; criticizes the ministry, 
 
 ib. ; seeks appointment of Superinten- 
 dent of Finances, 130 ; loan of 
 ;£'i6,ooo,ooo, 132 ; refused per- 
 mission to visit England, 132 ; 
 differences with the Queen, 134 ; 
 becomes the head of the mal- 
 contents, ib. ; estate of the 
 former Due d' Orleans, 13S ; Abbe 
 Sabatier de Cabre, ib. ; at- 
 tends parlement, 139 ; advocates re- 
 jection of edict of 1787, 142; public 
 protest against the king's orders, 146 ; 
 the protest entered on the registers of 
 parlement, 147 ; public enthusiasm, 
 148 ; criticism of Archbishop of Tou- 
 louse and the Keeper of the Seals, 
 ib. ; exile of, 149 ; pubhc sym- 
 pathy with, ISO ; intimacy with 
 Madame de Bufton, 153 ; parlement 
 insists on his recall, 155 ; forgiven by 
 the king, ib. ; no influence in parle- 
 ment, IS7 ; riot in the Faubourg St. 
 Antoine, 158 ; project of reforms, 159 ; 
 Talleyrand on the political part played 
 by him, 162 
 ii. the Government, 117 
 iii. At Peronne, 102 ; departure of, 
 107 ; elected to conciliate all 
 parties, 116 ; forced to accept the 
 crown, 313 
 iv. enters Brussels, 175, 202 
 V. In command of the French army, 
 46 ; Due de Broglie on the journey of 
 the, 99 ; arrival in England, 109 
 
 Orloff, Comte, iv. 275, 280 et seq. ; v. 127 
 
 Ormesson, H. L. d', i. 42 
 
 Orvilliers, Louis Guillouet, Comte d', i. 
 126 
 
 Osmond, Antoine, Baron de, ii. 57; iii. 
 
 Ostend, iii. 107 
 
 Oszarowski, Count, i. 310 
 
 Otrante, Due d', i. xxxv. See Fouche 
 
 Ottoman Empire. See Turkey 
 
 Otto, Guillaume, Comte de Mosloy, i. 213 
 
 Oubri, M. d', i. 230 
 
 Oudinot, Marshal, i. 304 
 
 Ouwaroff, Count Theodore, i. 310 
 
 Oxford, Lord, ii. 351, 357 
 
 Pacca, Cardinal, ii. 90 
 
 Pallain, M., Correspondence published by, 
 
 ii. 218 
 Palmella, Count de, ii. 230, 233, 247 ; iii. 
 
 75 ; iv. 205 ; V. 44, 134, 137 
 Palmerston, Lord, representative of the 
 
 Canningites, iii. 272 ; Talleyrand on, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 417 
 
 281 ; conversation with Talleyrand on 
 Prussia, 288 ; Greek matters, 302 ; 
 Prince Leopold, 304 ; at Claremont 
 with Prince Leopold, 322 
 iv. Duchy of Luxembourg, 16; communi- 
 cation from Talleyrand, 40; Prince 
 of Orange, 44 ; non-intervention, 53 ; 
 Italy, 70 ; events in Warsaw, 73 ; 
 France and Belgium, 78, 79 ; Austria's 
 action in Italy, 80 ; Poland, 8l ; Por- 
 tugal, 97, 98 ; at Cambridge, loi, 
 103, 106 ; notes from Dutch plenipo- 
 tentiaries, 140 ; Greece, 149 ; recall 
 of the Dutch troops, 1 73 ; caricature 
 on, 191 ; Belgian fortresses, 245 ; 
 Belgium, 259 ; memoranda from Aus- 
 trian, Prussian, and Russian plenipo- 
 tentiaries, 316; Brussels, 324; Hol- 
 land, 326 
 V. King of the Netherlands, 13 ; inter- 
 view with Talleyrand, 14 ; Talleyrand 
 on, 16 ; refuses to call the Conference 
 together, 18 ; France and Belgium, 19, 
 20 ; calls the Conference together, 26 ; 
 admiralty, 35 ; meeting at his house, 
 38 ; Eastern affairs, 42, 43 ; closing of 
 the Scheldt, 59 ; Greece, 66 ; Eastern 
 affairs, 67 ; Portugal, 71 ; Austria, 78 ; 
 illness of, 96 ; conference on Greek 
 affairs, 113 ; Eastern affairs, 120 ; Por- 
 tugal, 139, 153 ; Due de Leuchtenberg 
 and Dona Maria, 160 ; Spain, 171 ; 
 Eastern affairs, 202, 203, 205 ; Sal- 
 danha's entry into Leira, 212 ; Otto- 
 man rule, 214 ; feeling regarding 
 Russia, 216 ; conference on Dutch 
 aflFairs, 218 ; on political relations be- 
 tween France and Great Britain, 225 ; 
 interview with Talleyrand on Spanish 
 affairs, 237, 240 ; Talleyrand's pro- 
 posed treaty not accepted, 242 ; nego- 
 tiations connected with it, 247 et seq. ; 
 objections to text of the treaty, 250 
 et seq. ; letter to Sir W. Temple re- 
 garding it, 257 ; Prince Mettemich on 
 HoUando-Belgian affairs, 263 ; Belgian 
 succession, 275, 276 ; Portuguese 
 Princes, 279 ; Talleyrand's proposed 
 treaty, 280 ; on Don Carlos' intentions, 
 284 ; Switzerland, 286 ; Eastern ques- 
 tion, 287, 290 ; interview with Talley- 
 rand on Spanish affairs, 298 et seq., 
 301 et seq. ; the Spanish Government 
 and the treaty, 306 et seq. 
 
 Panchaud, M., i. 27, 44, 68 
 
 Parlements, i. 48 ; opinions in, 69, and the 
 diamond necklace, 69 ; coinage, 72 ; 
 become powerless, 82, 84, and As- 
 sembly of Notables, 128 ; opposition 
 of the Court, 131 ; registration of 
 edicts, 136; attendance of king, &c., 
 
 VOL. V. 
 
 139 ; opposition to demand for convo- 
 cation of States-General, 140 ; loan of 
 £16,000,000, ib.; edict of 1787 and 
 the Protestants, 140 et seq. ; the usual 
 form of session, 141 ; speeches, 141 et 
 seq. ; protest by Due d'Orleans, 146 ; 
 protest entered on the regi ters, 147 ; 
 action of, in respect to exile of Due 
 d'Orleans, Abbe Sabatier de Cabre, and 
 M. Freteau, 150 ; insists on their re- 
 call, 155 ; Archbishop of Sens, 155 
 
 Paris, Treaty of, ii. 149, 150 
 
 Parma, the state of, iii. 59 ; conduct of the 
 people in, 114 
 
 Parties, Conseil des, i. 42 
 
 Pasha, Namick, v. 54 
 
 Pasha, Ibrahim, v. 76, 86, 108, 118 
 
 Paskiewicz, Ivan, iv. 207 
 
 Pasquier, Baron, iii. 161, 165 ; iv. 24, 256 ; 
 V. 56, 70, IIS 
 
 Paul I. Emperor, i. 199, 210 
 
 Pavia, Archbishop of, ii. 82 
 
 Pays iTeiats, i. 45, 84 
 
 Pedro, Dom, iv. 143, 147, 165, 167, 181 ; 
 v. 44, 64, 72 et seq., 137, 140, 146, 
 \t,i,etseq., 175, 264, 295 
 
 Peel, Mr., iii. 261 
 
 Peissonel, M., i. 56 
 
 Penn, Wm., i. 177 
 
 Penthievre, Due de, i. 3 
 
 Penthi^vre, Mademoiselle de, i. 115 
 
 Peiiuelas, Don, i. 276, 277 
 
 Perier, A. C. V. L., v. 262, 275 
 
 Perier, M. Camille, iv. 268 
 
 Perier, M. Casimir Fils, iv. 158 
 
 Perier, M. Casimir, French minister, iii. 
 228 ; chief of the Perier ministry, iv. 
 67, 75. 86, 87 ; Belgium, 88, 89 ; 
 Belgian affairs, Austria, Russia, 92 ; 
 president of the council, 104 ; Belgian 
 and home affairs, 1 12 ; Due Dalberg 
 on, 114; General Belliard, 135 ; 
 Luxembourg, Prince Leopold of Saxe 
 Coburg, 136 ; Belgian affairs, 210 ; 
 choice of a sovereign for Greece, 211 ; 
 Dutch business, 214 ; France, 223 ; 
 Holland, 224, 233, 234 ; King Louis 
 Philippe on, 243 ; General Sebastiani, 
 249, 250 ; Belgian fortresses, Prussia, 
 255 ; interview with Lord Granville, 
 262 ; Holland and Belgium, 269, 270 ; 
 Belgian ratifications, 276 ; Ancona, 
 276-7 ; news from Vienna, 282 ; ex- 
 change of ratifications, 284-5 > illness 
 of, 288, 292 ; death of, 300 
 
 Perigord, Abbe de (M. de Talleyrand 
 known as), i. 27 ; ii. 3 ; v. ix 
 
 Perigord, Madame de, i. 3 ; ii. 153 
 
 Perrez (secretary to Talleyrand), i. xvi ; ii. 
 
 151 
 Persil, M., v. 230 
 
 E E 
 
4i8 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Pescatore, M., v. 41 
 
 Peter III. v. 356 
 
 Petion, Jerome, i. 167 
 
 Petty, Lord Henry, i. 171 
 
 Pfeffel, Baron, iv. 212 
 
 Pfefifel, C. F., V. 376 
 
 Philadelphia, Talleyrand arrives at, i. 175; 
 leaves, 176 
 
 Philippeville, iii. 189, 195, 264 ; iv. 16, 
 238 et scq. , 266, 268 
 
 Philosophy and Philosophers, i. 61 ; econ- 
 omic philosophers, 66 
 
 Piacenza, Bishop of, ii. 82 
 
 Pichegru, Chas., i. 201, 220, 221 
 
 Pichegru, George, iii. 208 
 
 Piedmont, Napoleon's mistaken policy re- 
 garding, i. 219 ; iii. 192 
 
 Pletro, Cardinal di, ii. 58, 90, 91 
 
 Pinckney, Chas. C. (American commis- 
 sioner), i. xlix 
 
 Piombius, ii. 174, 176 
 
 Pire, General, iii. 171 
 
 Pitt, Wm. i. 173, 230 
 
 Pius VI., Pope, i. 71 ; ii. 26 
 
 Pius VII., secret bond with Napoleon, i. 
 
 214 ; indulgence towards Talleyrand, 
 
 215 ; differences with Napoleon, ii. 
 25 et seq. ; libels against, 31 ; conse- 
 cration of Napoleon at Paris, 34 ; 
 leaves Paris, 35 ; arrives at Rome, 35 ; 
 refusal to recognize Joseph Bonaparte 
 as King of Naples, 36 ; protests against 
 Napoleon's violence, 37 ; conducted 
 to Savona, 37 ; Bulls, 38 ; Ecclesi- 
 astical Commission, 38 ct seq. ; refusal 
 of the bulls of confirmation, 43 ; right 
 of the Emperor of nomination, 55 ; 
 the Senatus Consultum, ib. ; grant of 
 extraordinary powers to bishops, 56 ; 
 brief against Cardinal Maury, ib. ; in- 
 consistency, S7 ; the Emperor nomi- 
 nates the Archbishop of Florence, ib, ; 
 and Bishop of Asti, 58 ; severe mea- 
 sures against, ib. ; second Ecclesiastical 
 Commission, 59 ; the according of dis- 
 pensations and canonical confirmation, 
 59, 60 ; Napoleon's negotiations, 67 ; 
 withdraws his bull of excommunica- 
 tion, 68 ; articles of agreement, 70 ; 
 on the question of nomination, 71 ; 
 maintenance of the Pope, ib. ; pro- 
 positions of Council, 81 ; deputation of 
 bishops, 82 ; approves of articles, 84 ; 
 transferred to Fontainebleau, 88 ; inter- 
 view with Napoleon, 89 ; signs treaty 
 with Napoleon, 90 ; retractation, 91 ; 
 returns to Rome, 92 
 
 Place, M. de la, i. 102 
 Plaisance, Due de, iii. 171 
 Poix, PhiUppe de Noailles-Mouchy, Prince 
 de, i. 48 
 
 Poland, Napoleon's organisation of, i. 
 235 ; incapacity of the governor, 236 ; 
 Russia and the re-establishment of, 
 ii. 179, 184 ; as a possession of Russia, 
 211, 224; interview between Talley- 
 rand and the Emperor Alexander on, 
 236 ; Czar's wishes regarding, 250, 
 255 ; Lord Castlereagh and the Czar's 
 wishes, 259, 260 ; Lord Castlereagh 
 and Talleyrand, 292 ; English opposi- 
 tion to the Czar's wishes, 306 ; delay 
 caused by Russia, Prussia, and Austria, 
 309 ; Russia, England, and Prussia, 
 311 ; Talleyrand and Prince Metter- 
 nich, 313; limitation of, 319; Talley- 
 rand and the Czar, 321 ; stationary 
 position of affairs, 348 ; Lord Castle- 
 reagh, 358 ; progress of affairs slow, 
 362 ; iii. 33 ; Talleyrand and the Czar, 
 47 ; M. de Flahaut, 290 ; re-establish- 
 ment of, 296 ; Madame Adelaide on, 
 321 ; desire to become a kingdom, iv. 
 37 ; English demands, 73, 81 ; France 
 and the Polish cause, 162 e/ seq. ; 
 sympathy of rioters with, 201 ; defeat 
 of the Poles, 213 
 
 Polignac, Count Jules de, iii. 27 ; iv. 56 
 
 Polignac, Madame de, i. 46, 47, 78 
 
 Political Economy, i. 66 
 
 Pommeruie), M., iii. 171 
 
 Pompadour, Madame de, i. 2 ; v. 339 
 ei seq., 34S, 349 ei seq. 
 
 Poniatowski, Prince Joseph, i. 234 
 
 Ponsonby, Colonel Frederick, ii. 109 
 
 Ponsonby, Lord, instructions as to the 
 Netherlands, iii. 291 ; Prince Leopold 
 of Saxe Coburg, 303, 304 ; closing of 
 the Scheldt, 307 ; at Brussels, iv. 10; 
 siege of Belgian fortresses, 18, 19 ; 
 declaration from the French Govern- 
 ment, 38 ; in favour of the Prince of 
 Orange, 44, 53 ; siege of Maestricht, 
 62 ; arrival in London, 122 ; Belgium, 
 124; return to Brussels, 129; Grand 
 Duchy of Luxembourg, 132 ; ordered 
 to Constantinople, v. 78 ; Eastern 
 affairs, 126, 127; English fleet, 284; 
 despatches from, 286 
 
 Pont, Comte de, i. 114 
 
 Pontarlier, iii. 191 
 
 Pont-Be-Veyle, A. de F., Comte de, v., 
 338 
 
 Ponte-coulant, Comte de, iii. 171 
 
 Poole, Mr. Wellesley, iii. 98 
 
 Porrentury, ii. 346 
 
 Portalis, ii. 57 
 
 Porte, 'The. See Turkey 
 
 Portugal ; philosophy and art, i. 62 ; 
 Napoleon's designs against Spain, 
 246 ; French invasion of, 291 ; slave 
 trade, ii. 361 ; iii. 19 ; Dom Miguel's 
 
INDEX. 
 
 4ig 
 
 regency, 240 ; English and French 
 grievances against, iv. 74, 98; Austria's 
 mediation on behalf of Dom Miguel, 
 V. 71 ; England disposed to recognize 
 him, 95 ; Due de Broglie on, 137 ; 
 Talleyrand on, 138 ; Dom Pedro, Dom 
 Miguel, Dona Maria, 155 et seq. ; 
 Dona Maria, 171 ; Spanish and Eng- 
 lish views on, 172 ; civil war, 175 ; 
 political situation of, 223-4 ; treaty to 
 expel Don Carlos and Dom Miguel, 
 241 ; text of the treaty, 255 ; on rati- 
 fication of treaty, 272 — 3 ; end of 
 civil war, 275 ; revolutionary scare, 
 283 ; ratification of treaty, 290 
 
 Potter, M. de, iii. 257-265 
 
 Pozzo, General di Borgo ; secretary of 
 state, ii. 156; Emperor of Russia, 189, 
 254 : France, 268 ; Saxony, iii. 4 ; 
 returns to Paris, 22 ; at Ghent, 93 ; 
 Brussels, 98, 99 ; Russia, no; French 
 armies, 154; refuses post of Keeper of 
 the Privy Seal, 165 ; Russian ambas- 
 sador in Paris, 240 ; Emperor Nicholas, 
 247 ; M. de Langsdorfs mission, 288 ; 
 Belgium, 316 ; Sebastiani, iv. 51 ; 
 French agents in Italy and Germany, 
 178; Dutch business, 214; Lisbon, 
 279 ; Berlin, Vienna, Munich, v. 31, 
 64 ; arrival in London, 68 et seq., 73 ; 
 Spanish affairs, 263 ; English squadron 
 in the Archipelago, 285 
 
 Prada, Don Benito Arias de, i. 263 
 
 Pradel, Comte de, iii. 165 
 
 Pradt, Dominique Dufour de, i. 279 ; ii. 
 101, 188 
 
 Praet, M. van, iv. 129 
 
 Praslin, Due de, iii. 17 ; v. 374, 387 
 
 Preameneu, M. Bigot de, ii. 77 
 
 Prefontaine, B. de, v. 384 
 
 Presburg, Treaty of, i. 228 ; ii. 36 
 
 Price, Richard, i. 170 
 
 Priestley, Joseph, i. 107 
 
 Prince, the (Machiavelli) ii. 120 
 
 Prince of the Peace (Manuel Godoy) i. 
 246 ; increasing power of, 248 ; re- 
 gent, 249 ; fears of the courtiers, 
 ib. ; proposes marriage of the Prince 
 of the Asturias, ii. ; confidence in, 
 250 ; intrigues against, 252 ; watch- 
 fulness over French embassy, 256; 
 letter to Napoleon, 258 ; in prison, 
 263 ; trial, ii. ; found not guilty, 
 
 264 ; explanations with France, 264 ; 
 projects flight of the Royal Family, 
 
 265 ; indignation against, it. ; house 
 sacked, 266 ; made prisoner, 267 ; 
 sent to Pinto, 269 ; message to 
 Napoleon regarding trial of, 272 ; 
 removed to Villa Vicusa, 273 ; 
 
 Napoleon demands his person, ii, ; 
 released, 284 
 
 Proclamation dissolving the Chamber of 
 Deputies, iii. 165 
 
 Protestants, edict of 1787 on, i. 140 
 
 Provincial assemblies, i. 22 
 
 Prussia, i. Napoleon's schemes, 222 ; 
 Austerlitz, 225-227 ; becoming em- 
 broiled with England, 230 ; German 
 confederations, 231 ; the Erfurt inter- 
 view, 296 
 ii. Treaties between nations, 131 ; 
 treaty with France, 148 ; Saxony, 
 184 ; the Chatillon Congress, 192 ; 
 Saxony, 207-209; Warsaw, 211 ; 
 Luxembourg and Mayence, 247 ; 
 Saxony, 272 ; the confederation, 290 ; 
 conversation between the King and 
 the Czar, 311 ; conversation between 
 the Czar and Talleyrand, 320 et 
 seq. ; incorporation of Saxony, 374 ; 
 conduct of, for the last sixty years, 
 376 ; pretensions on Saxony, 377 ; 
 incorporation with Saxony, 384 
 iii. Prince de Hardenberg's scheme, 13 ; 
 the Austrian scheme, 35 ; claim to keep 
 Leipzig, 39 ; treaty of peace with 
 Russia, 55 ; treaty of Reichenbach be- 
 tween Austria, Russia, and Prussia, 
 also treaty of Toplitz, 53 ; Val'elline, 
 Bormio, and Chiavenna, 81 ; favour- 
 able to King Louis XVIIL, 117; 
 mining the bridge of Jena, 160 ; pleni- 
 potentiaries of, 188 ; in concert with 
 England, 238 ; represented at the 
 conference in London, 256 ; king of, 
 276 ; to have a share of territory, 285; 
 under English influence, 314 
 iv. Conduct as regards Poland, 195 ; 
 Polish army in, 207 ; importance of 
 the ratification of, 251 ; promises to 
 follow Russia, 255 ; the Cabinet 
 greatly exercised, 258 et seq. 
 V. Jealous of the French intervention 
 with Belgium, 12 ; Prussia and Russia 
 and Austria's action with Italy, 181 
 et seq. ; Dutch affairs, 219 ; Talley- 
 rand's criticism of the government, 
 261 ; the king in battle, 343 ; Due 
 de Choiseul's policy, 356 et seq. ; 
 alliance with Austria, 360 
 
 Prussia, Queen of, i., 238 
 
 Pultusk, i. 235 
 
 Puysieux, M. de, i. 123 
 
 Quesada, v. 260 
 Quesnay, Le, iii. 193-195 
 
 E E 2 
 
420 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 R 
 
 Rabelais, i. 62 
 
 Radet, General, ii. 37 
 
 Radetzky, iii. 65 
 
 Radziwill, Prince, iii. 48 
 
 Raguse, Ducde, ii. 23, 133 
 
 Rampon, Due de, iii. 171 
 
 Raincy, Due d'Orleans at, i. 150 
 
 Rapporteur, post of, i. 141 
 
 Rastadt, congress at, i. 195 
 
 Rasumoffski, Count, ii. 2S8 
 
 Ravenna, Archbishop of, ii. 78 
 
 Ravez, Simon, ii. 108 
 
 Rawdon, Francis (Marquis of Hastings) i. 
 
 170 
 Raymond, M., drowning of, i. 189 
 Raynal, Guillaume-Thomas, Abbe, i. 54, 
 
 Rayneval, Comte de, iv. 65 ; v. 65, 68 
 et seq., 72 et seq., 82, 157, 160, 166 
 et seq., 175, 223, 258, 275, 280 
 
 Real, M. de, iii. 171, 211 el seq. 
 
 Rechburg, Comte Joseph de, iii. 168 
 
 Reform Bill, iv. 80, 94, 99, 105, 108, 191, 
 209, 215, 219, 277, 283, 303 ; V. 20 
 
 Reguier, Chief Justice, iii. 208, 209 etseq. 
 
 Reich, Madame de, iii. 213 
 
 Reichstadt, Due de, iv. 1 1 3 ?/ seq. 
 
 Reinhard, Chas. F. , Comte, ii. 18 
 
 Remusat, Auguste, Comte de, i. 223, 303; 
 iv. 302 
 
 Renaudes, Marshal Borge de, i. 39 
 
 Rennes, Bishop of, i. 45 
 
 Repecaud, General, iv. 129 
 
 Reperin, Prince, ii. 317, 327 et seq., 333 
 
 Restoration, the Second, iii. Talleyrand 
 points out where the first failed, and 
 suggests remedies for adoption on, 
 130 et seq. ; allied sovereigns at 
 Mannheim, 156 ; Richelieu refuses to 
 take office in France, 164 ; royal 
 proclamation dissolving the Chamber 
 of Deputies, 165 ; Chamber of 
 Deputies to France, 168 ; Chamber of 
 Peers, 172 ; hereditary peerage, 1 72 ; 
 dismissal of M. Fouche from the 
 ministry, 174 ; imperial, royal and 
 apostolic army of Italy, 175 ; allied 
 plenipotentiaries, 176 ; judges irre- 
 movable, trial by jury to be main- 
 tained, confiscation abolished, no 
 longer a revolutionary or tyrannical 
 dynasty in France, 179 ; art in 
 France, 182 et seq., 189 ; final ar- 
 rangement proposed to France by the 
 allied Powers, 189-194 ; note of 
 French plenipotentiaries in reply to 
 propositions made by allies, 194-199 ; 
 reply of the ministers of the allies. 
 
 200 ; Talleyrand's resignation and re- 
 tirement from office, 203-205 
 
 Reuss, Count von, i. 313 
 
 Reuss, XLI., Prince of, i. 312 
 
 Reuss EbersdorfF, Prince von, i. 311 
 
 Reuss-Greitz, Prince von, i. 311 
 
 Reuss, Lobenstein, Prince von, i. 311 
 
 Reuss-Schleiz, Prince of, i. 312 
 
 Reveillon, M., i. 158 
 
 Revolution, French, aristocracy during 
 years preceding, i. 46 et seq, ; pre- 
 monitory symptoms of, 51, 83; how it 
 might have been averted, 85 ; "born 
 of vanity," 87 ; outbreak of, 94 ; Bas- 
 tille taken, 95 ; flight of noblesse, i6. ; 
 interview between Talleyrand and the 
 Comte d'Artois on the quelling of, 
 104; forebodings of, 127 ; commence- 
 ment of, in the Faubourg St. Antoine, 
 157; origin and causes of, 163; defeat 
 of French troops on Belgian frontier, 
 167; Royalfamily in prison, 168; the 
 responsible authors of, 172; effect of 
 on commerce, 179; civil war, 1 94 ; 
 Catherine of Russia, upon, 198 ; Mon- 
 archy, 208; industrial arts, 217; 
 revival of, ii. 217; rich collections in 
 France before the, iii. 1S4 ; cause of 
 the, 226 ; Austria alarmed at the, 275 ; 
 Russia, Prussia, and Austria, 276 ; 
 victory of French government, 297 ; 
 Belgian affairs, iv. i. et seq. ; Due de 
 Dalberg, 211 ; indications of, 1830, v. 
 238 et seq. ; further outbreak, 244-6 
 
 Revolution, in Warsaw, iii. 321 
 
 Reyniere, Madame de la, i. 33, 46 
 
 Rezende, Marquis de, v. 170 
 
 Rheims, Archbishop of, i. 13 ; ii. 127 
 
 Ricard, General, ii. 388 
 
 Ricce, M. de, i. 187 
 
 Richelieu, Cardinal, i. i, influence of, on 
 society, 50 
 
 Richelieu, Due de, ii. 356, iii. 162, 163, 
 164, 204 ; V. 362, 364 et seq. 
 
 Richmond, Duke of, iii. 272, 274 ; v. 272, 
 273, 293 
 
 Rigny, Comte de, Sebastian!, iv. $1 ; 
 navy, 57 ; Sebastiani, 65 ; candidate 
 for Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 296 ; Belgian Affairs, 325 ; Minis- 
 ter of Public Instruction, v. 7 ; 
 Antwerp, 8, 9 ; Cherbourg, Hague, 
 33 ; probably to be nominated Minister 
 of Foreign Affairs, 230 ; successor to 
 Due de Brogiie, 233 ; congratulatory 
 letter from Talleyrand, 234 ; indica- 
 tions of revolution, 238; further out- 
 breaks, 244 ; letter to Talleyrand on 
 his proposed convention with England, 
 246 ; the negotations connected with 
 
INDEX. 
 
 421 
 
 the proposed treaty, 247 et seq, ; on 
 condition of Spain, 296 et seq. 
 Ripon, Lord, v. 272, 273, 293 
 Ris, Comte Clement de, iii. 171 
 Robecq, Madame de, i. 82 j v. 348 
 Roche-Aymon, Cardinal de la, i. 13, 17, 
 
 25 
 Rochefoucauld, Cardinal de la, i. 23 
 Rochefoucauld, Due de, i. 167, 187, iii. 
 
 316. 324 . 
 
 Rochejacquelein, L. du V. Marquis de la, 
 ii. 106 
 
 Rocroi, iii. 193, 195 
 
 Rodenbach, iv. 324 
 
 Rodez, Bishop of, i. 37 
 
 Rodil, V. 260, 305 
 
 Rogett, M. Charles, iii. 257 
 
 Rogier, M., \v. 19 
 
 Rohan, Prince Victor de, iii. 95, 296 
 
 Rohan-Guim^n^e, Prince de (Archbishop 
 of Bordeaux), i. 20, 77 
 
 Romana, Marquis de la, i. 248, 276 
 
 Romans, Mdle. de, i. 38 
 
 Romanzoff, Comte Nicholas, i. 296, 297, 
 298, 309> 310. 316, 324 
 
 Romilly, Samuel, i. 170 
 
 Rosa, Martinez de la, v. 210, 238, 250, 
 265, 276, 278, 280, 281 
 
 Rosari, Giovanni, ii. 381 
 
 Rothschild, iii. 315 
 
 Rouchechouart, Comte de, i. 38 
 
 Rouen, M., iii. 18 ; v. 284 
 
 Roussin, Admiral, iv. 149; v. 91 et seq., 
 119, 122, 230, 266, 287 
 
 Roverella, Cardinal, ii. 83 
 
 Rovigo, Due de, iii. 206, ei seq.; iv. 138 
 
 Ruffo, Cardinal, ii. 83 
 
 Ruffo, Commander, iii. I2i, 124 
 
 Rulhi^re, C, i. 28, 35 
 
 Rumigny, Comte de, iv. 76, 213 ; v. 53, 
 28s, 286 
 
 Ruremoude, iii. 263 
 
 Russel, William, v. 138, 144 et seq., 165, 
 168 
 
 Russell, Lord John, iv. 67 ; v. 271 
 
 Russia. See also Emperor Alexander. 
 Position of, i. 199 ; treaty with, 230 
 etseq.; co-operation with France, 241; 
 wars with Sweden and Turkey, 245 ; 
 Napoleon's bait to, 294; prospective 
 partition of Turkey, ib. ; Silesia to 
 France as compensation for Wallachia 
 and Moldavia to Russia, 295 ; treaty 
 of Erfurt, 306 
 ii. Treaty with France, 131 etseq., 146 ; 
 considerations at Congress of Vienna, 
 179 ; and Poland, 184 ; Warsaw, 207 ; 
 secret alliance against, 209 ; com- 
 pelled to desist, 211 ; frontiers, 247, 
 301, 342 ; delegate for the commission 
 of Italy, 362 
 
 iii. Treaty of peace with Prussia, 53 ; 
 treaties of Reichenbach and Tbplitz 
 between Austria, Russia, and Prussia, 
 53 ; orders to remove Joseph Bona- 
 parte from French frontiers, 76 > 
 arrival of the troops of in Bohemia, 1 10; 
 plenipotentiaries of, 188 ; disposition 
 towards France, 254 ; represented at 
 the Conference in London, 256 ; dis- 
 positions of, 276 ; rising in Poland, 
 291 ; aids against invasion of, 297 ; 
 representatives sent from, 299 ; in- 
 terest in Greece gone, 300 
 
 iv. Refusal respecting the choice of a 
 sovereign for Belgium, 5 ; plenipoten- 
 tiaries of, agree to the protocols, 63 ; 
 Poland, 73 ; re-assuring accounts from, 
 92 ; France about to declare war 
 against, 104 ; Louis Philippe on, 248 ; 
 ratifications wanted from, 290 
 
 V. Talleyrand on declarations of, 36 ; 
 treaty of alliance with the Porte, 119 ; 
 offer of aid firom the Ottoman Porte, 
 148 ; Russia and Prussia, and Austria's 
 action in Italy, l8i ; attempt to pre- 
 vent alliance between England and 
 France, 210 ; England and, 212 ; 
 Nesselrode's details of military mea- 
 sures, 213 ; Talleyrand on Russian 
 interests, 217; convention with the 
 Porte, 221 ; England and France and 
 Eastern aifair.=;, 244 ; English fleet, 
 285 ; Eastern question, 287 ; Greece 
 and King Otto, 303 ; alliance with 
 Turkey, 329 ; Due de Choiseul's in- 
 difference, 356 et seq. 
 Russie, La Revolution de, i. 36 
 
 Saarlouis, iii. 189, 193, 195 
 
 Sagan, Duchess of, ii. 242 
 
 Sainte Aulaire, iv. 94, 163 ; v. 121, 200, 
 
 202, 265, 285, 331 
 St. Blancard, Charles de G. , Marquis, 
 
 i. 48, 121 
 St. Cloud, Legislature transferred to, i. 206 
 St. Cricq, V. 128 
 
 St. Denis, Talleyrand Abbe of, i. 25 
 Saint-Fargeau, M. Lepelletier de, i. 146 
 Sainte-Foy, i. 44 
 Saintes Gamier, de, iii. 171 
 Saint-Genis, N. de, i. 21, 80 
 Saint-German, Lieut. -General Comte de, 
 
 i. 92 
 St. John of Jerusalem, Order of, ii. 161, 181 
 St. Laurent, General Louis, i. 304 
 Saint Mars, iii. 18 
 St. Marsan, Marquis de, ii. 304, 357 ; iii. 
 
 71, 124 
 
422 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 St. Michael, iv. iSl 
 
 St. Petersburg, iii. 246, 250, 251, 297 ; 
 
 iv. 63, 152, 2^1, 250, 259] 
 Saint-Pierre, Abbe, v. 353 
 St. Simon, M. de, ii. 109 
 Saint- Sulpice, College, i. 14, 15 ; iv. 50 
 Saint- Sylvain, Auguste de, v. 292 
 Saint-Vincent, Boury de, iii. 171 
 Saint- Vincent, Robert de, i. 143 
 Saldanha, iii. 75 ; v. 140, 168, 212 
 Salerno, Prince Leopold of, iii. 1 19 
 Salieri, M., iii. 18 
 Salm Dyck, Count von, i. 313 
 Salm, Princes of, ii. 161 
 Salverte, M., iv. 113 
 Samos, iv. 98 
 Sampayo, M. de, v. 283 
 Sapieha, Prince Alexander, i. 301 
 Sardinia, L 168 ; ii. 168, 214, 353; iii. 
 
 13,80 
 Sardinia, King Victor Emmanuel I., ii. 
 
 150 ; iii. 67, 189 
 Sarmento, M. de, v. 238, 240, 243, 308 
 Savary, General Ren^, i. 274, 275, 277, 
 
 278, 304 ; ii. loi ; iii. 206 
 Savoy, ii. 167, 214 ; iii. 189 
 Saxe-Coburg, Ferdinand Charles Augustus, 
 
 ii- 363 . 
 
 Saxe-Coburg, Princess Julie Henriette 
 
 Ulrica, ii. 363 
 Saxe-Coburg, Prince Leopold of, after- 
 wards King of Belgium. See Leopold. 
 Saxe-Gotha, Duke of, i. 311 
 Saxe-Hildburghausen, Duchess of, i. 312 
 Saxe-Teschen, Duke of, iii. 62 
 Saxe-Weiraar, Duke of, i. 311 ; ii. 364 
 Saxe-Weimar, Duchess of, i. 334 
 Saxe-Weimar, Karl Augustus of, i. 311 
 Saxony, King (and kingdom of), at Erfurt, 
 i. 310; fate of, ii. 150; plenipoten- 
 tiaries at the Vienna Congress, 160 ; 
 Ought the kingdom to be preserved ? 
 177 ; Prussia's designs, 184, 205, 207 
 et seq. ; the king a prisoner, 205 ; 
 Louis XVIII. on, 226 ; the Czar on, 
 236 ; endeavour to preserve' the king- 
 dom, '247 ; Talleyrand and the Prus- 
 sian minister on, 251 ; Lord Castle- 
 reagh's false views, 255, 261 ; differ- 
 ence of views among nations regarding 
 267 ; demand of Prussia, 272 ; ef- 
 fect of the king's religion, 274 ; the 
 Czar of Russia's conversation with 
 Talleyrand, 277-8 ; Talleyrand and 
 Lord Castlereagh on, 292, 296 ; of 
 interest to Austria, 301 ; refusal to ab- 
 dicate, 309 ; military and civil organi- 
 zation, 312; Prince Metternich on, 
 313 ; Louis XVIII. on, 315 ; procla- 
 mation by governor, 317 ; Czar and 
 Talleyrand on, 320 ei seq. ; article on, 
 
 335 ; Lord Castlereagh's interview 
 with Emperor Alexander on, 348 ; 
 Prince Metternich's interview with 
 Emperor Alexander regarding, 354; 
 affairs of, 362 ; preservation of, 363 ; 
 Metternich demanded the abandon- 
 ment of all Saxony or preservation 
 of a portion of that kingdom, 365 ; 
 letter from Prince Metternich to Prince 
 von Hardenberg on, 371 ; pretensions 
 of the Prussians on, 377 ; affairs in a 
 better condition, 380 ; incorporation 
 with Prussia, 384 ; position of, iii. 29 ; 
 prejudice of English cabinet, 33 ; in- 
 habitants reduced of, 36 ; affairs defi- 
 nitely arranged, 39, 41 ; cession must 
 be made to Prussia, 68 ; families of, 
 266 ; disturbances in, 276 
 Saxony, Prince John of, iii. 256 ; iv. 12 
 Scheldt, iv. 13, 17, 43, 169; v. 14, 22, 59 
 
 et seq. 
 Schimmelpenninck, Roger Jean, Count, ii. 
 
 13 
 Schneider, General, iv. 123 
 Schonberg, Herr von, i. 310 
 Schouwaloff, General Coimt, i. 310 
 Schramm, General, v. 47 
 Schrant, M. de, iii. 85 
 Schroder, Herr von, i. 310 
 Schulenburg, Count von, ii. 270 
 Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Princes of, i.312 ; 
 
 ii. 122, 189, 301, 342; iii. 15, 21, 67, 
 
 80, 82, 121, 154 
 Schwarzenburg, Prince Felix, v. 138 
 Sebastiani, General Horace ; the Porte, i. 
 
 298 ; Minister of Marine, iii. 228, 248, 
 
 274 ; M. de Celle's plan, 285, 286 ; 
 
 Belgium, 298, 305, 323 ; Belgium, iv. 
 
 6 ; candidate for the Belgian throne, 
 
 7 ei seq. ; French Chamber of Deputies, 
 16; Prince of Orange, 17 ; Belgium, 
 18 ; Belgian and Dutch territories, 38 ; 
 conferences in London, 50 ; Due de 
 Dalberg on, 75 ; Belgium and France, 
 78, 79 ; Talleyrand, 91 ; Courier 
 Fran^ais, 137 ; King of Belgium, 159 ; 
 Russia, 160 ; Belgian fortresses, 176, 
 186 ; conference and London cabinet, 
 IQ4, 19s ; Madame Adelaide d'Or- 
 leans on, 201 ; Dutch business, 214 ; 
 Due de Dalberg on, 224 ; King Louis 
 Philippe on, 243 ; illness of 246, 271 ; 
 recovery of, 284 ; M. Perier, 289, 301 ; 
 King Leopold, 305 ; Belgian question, 
 319 ; M. Lafitte, Austrians, 323 ; 
 ambassador at Naples, 230 
 
 Seguin, treasurer to Due d'Orleans, i. 126 
 Segur, P. H., Marquis de, i. 91 ; iii. 171 
 Semele, General, iii. 74 
 S^monville, M. de, ii. 130 ; iv. 24, 113 
 Sens, Archbishop of (Comte de Brienne) 
 
INDEX. 
 
 423 
 
 formerly Archbishop of Toulouse, 
 
 Sens, m. 103 
 
 Sevigne, Madame de, i. 51 
 
 Sheldon, M., i. 121 
 
 Sheil, Mr. R. L., M.P., v. 225 
 
 Sicilies, King and Queen of, ii. 213, 319 
 
 Sickingen, Count von, ii. 208, 289 ; iii. 
 22 
 
 Sidmouth, Viscount, i. 213 
 
 Siklede Louis XIV. (Voltaire's) i. no 
 
 Sieyis Abbe E. J., i. 88, 159 et seq., 203, 
 207 
 
 Silhouette, E., v. 386 
 
 Sillery, Marquise de, i. 122 ei seq., 187, 
 226, 336 ; iii. 309 
 
 Simeon, J. J., Comte, ii. 17 
 
 Simiane, Madame de, i. 47 
 
 Six, M., ii. 14 
 
 Skinas, M., v. 220 
 
 Slave-trade, abolition of, as regards 
 France, i. 182 ; Portugal, 361 ; com- 
 mission to treat the question of, 367 ; 
 Portugal, Spain, and France, iii. 19 ; 
 abolition of, agreed to, 44 ; France 
 offered compensation for abolition of, 
 50 ; negro slavery in the West Indies, 
 V. 19 ; Denmark and the, 264 ; 
 Sardinia and the, 267 
 
 Smith, Robert, i. 170 
 
 Society in France during the years preced- 
 ing the Revolution, i. 6, 35, 46 et seq. ; 
 iii. 236 
 
 .Society of French i^migres, iii. 2io et seq. 
 
 Solano, Lieutenant-General, i. 264 
 
 Solar, Bailli de, v. 359 
 
 Solar, Don, i. 269 
 
 Solignac, General, v. 84 
 
 Songeon, General, iii. 84 
 
 Soiitag, M., V. 262 
 
 Sorhonne, Talleyrand enters the, i. 25 
 
 Sorel, M., V. vii 
 
 Soubise, Charles de Rohan, Prince de, i. 
 46 
 
 Soult, Marshal, in Germany, i. 304 ; loss 
 of Badajoz, ii. 23 ; successor to Comte 
 Dupont, 350, 352 ; General Ricard, 
 388 ; Bouillon, iii. 32 ; ordered to leave 
 Paris, 171 ; Belgium, 231 ; difficulties 
 vfith M. Perier, iv. 67 ; Due de 
 Rovigo, 138; Madame Adelaide d' 
 Orleans on, 202 ; French army in 
 Belgium, 206 ; President of Council, 
 and War Minister, v. 7 ; arrangement 
 of the Ministry, 230 ; resignation of, 
 295, 296 
 
 Sourches, Comte de, i. 3 
 
 Soutzo, Prince, iv. 149 
 
 Souza, M. de, i. 187 
 
 Spain. (See also King Charles, Ferdinand, 
 and Count Labrador), culture of, i. 62 ; 
 
 losses by vifar, 214 ; Louisiana, 216 ; 
 approaching defection of, 232 ; Napo- 
 leon's designs, 245, 291 ; Joseph 
 B^^naparte to be recognized as king, 
 
 307 
 ii. Joseph speaks ill of Napoleon, 20 ; 
 Napoleons mistaken actions, 20 et 
 snq. ; Lord Wellington, 23 ; Napo- 
 leon's political faults regarding, 98 ; 
 Saint Pe, 104 ; Spain victorious, 118 ; 
 the Congress of Vienna, 201, 204 ; 
 news not good from, 353 
 iii. Spanish refugees, 244 ; events in, 
 
 247 
 iv. Complaints against, 71 ; Dom Miguel, 
 
 144 ; in a very criiical position, 279 
 V. Succession in, 63 ; Government in 
 great perplexity, 157 ; relations with 
 England, 171 et seq., 175 ; fall of Zea 
 Ministry, 210 ; and Portugal, 223 ; 
 movements of army, 227 ; Talleyrand 
 and Lord Palmerston on Spanish 
 affairs, 237, 240 ; proposed treaty 
 between Spain, Portugal, and Eng- 
 land, 241 ; text of treaty signed by 
 Spain, Portugal, and England, 255-6 ; 
 disorder in the north, 263 ; Madame 
 Adelaide on, 279 ; decorations of 
 honour, 281 ; movements of troops, 
 281 ; Talleyrand on Spanish affairs, 
 295 ; complicated state of affairs owing 
 to Don Carlos's return, 296 et seq., 
 304 ; defeat of insurgents, 305 ; addi- 
 tion articles of treaty, 305 et seq. ; 
 expedition against Dom Miguel and 
 Don Carlos, 332 ; Falkland Isles, 369 ; 
 letter from King of France, 373 
 
 Speranski, M., i. 310 
 
 Spina, Cardinal, ii. 78 
 
 Sprengtporten, General von, i. 210 
 
 Spiing-Rice, T., v. 273, 277 
 
 Stadion, Count von, ii. 113, 187, 223, 301 
 
 Stael, Madame de, i. 47, 186, 188, 196 
 
 Slahremberg, Prince de, v. 342, 347 
 
 Stainville. See Choiseul 
 
 Stala, Abbe, i. 251 
 
 Stanley, E. J., afterwards Lord, v. 225, 
 271, 273, 293 
 
 Stassart, M., iv. 19 
 
 States-General, i. 21, 23, 24, 71, 82, 84, 
 85, <)Zetseq., 131, 156, 157 
 
 Stephanie, Grand-Duchess of Baden, ii. 
 Ill 
 
 Stephen III., ii. 35 
 
 Stephenswerdt, iii. 263 
 
 Stewart, Lord. &«Earl Vane 
 
 Stockelberg, Count von, ii. 288 
 
 Stockmar, Baron, iv. 216 
 
 Strasbourg, iii. 193, 208 et seq, 
 
 Strogonoff, Count, i. 268 
 
 Studnitz, Herr von, L 311 
 
424 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Suard, Jean Bapfiste, i. 326 
 
 Suchet, General, i. 304 
 
 Snchtelen, General, v. 222 
 
 Surgere, Comte de, i. 47 
 
 Surze, M. de la, i. 10, 12 
 
 Sweden, ii. 140 ; iii. 34, 297, 222 
 
 Switzerland ; Directory for sending troops 
 to, i. 200; the Directory, 202, 215; 
 treaty with Russia, ii. 138 et seq. ; 
 neutrality of, 168, 215 ; Lord Castle- 
 reagh on, 298, 299 ; affairs at the 
 Congress of Vienna, 302 ; incorpora- 
 tion of Genoa with Piedmont, 310 ; 
 affairs of, 320, 343 ; arrangements for 
 independence of the country, 346 ; 
 Canton of Aargau, 358 ; exchange of 
 Gex and Basel, 359 ; Talleyrand on, 
 iii. 5 ; affairs of, 14, 20 ; the Czar and, 
 47 ; the Valtelline and, 48, 55 ; Canton 
 of Berne, 63 ; affairs concluded, 68 ; 
 Valtelline, Bormio, and Chiavenna, 
 81 ; Allied troops in, 127; neutrality 
 extended, 192 ; Mauguin and ; iv. 213 ; 
 neutrality of, v. 88 ; refuge of revolu- 
 tionary spirits, 259, 262, 285 ; im- 
 provement of affairs, 289 ; civil war, 
 329 
 
 Tableau, Economique, i. 65 
 
 Tagliatzi, La, v. 346 
 
 Talleyrand, Charles Maurice Prince de, 
 sequel to will, i. vii ; rhtwi^ of his 
 political life, ix ; directions as to pub- 
 lication of memoirs, x ; codicil to 
 will, xi ; his secretary, xvi ; sketch 
 of his life and opinions, xx et seq. ; 
 x.xxvii ci seq. ; opinions of eminent 
 persons regarding him, xxxviii ; 
 events in his career, xl ; his manners, 
 xlii. ; on the liberty of the press, xlv. ; 
 bribery, xliii, xlviii ; visit to United 
 States, 1 ; scandals, Ii ; his birth and 
 parentage, i ; early years, 2 ; his 
 relatives, 4 ; goes to Paris, 4 ; accident 
 to foot, 4 ; visit to his grandmother at 
 Chalais, 7 ; return to Paris, 10 ; at 
 college, ib. ; small-pox, it ; goes to 
 Rheims, 13 ; is trained i^or the Church, 
 14 ; at Saint Sulpice College, ii. ; in- 
 cident with a lady, 16 ; leaves college, 
 17 ; Rheims, id. ; Coronation of Louis 
 XVL ii. ; becomes member of As- 
 sembly of Clergy, 18 ; Conference at 
 Versailles, 23 ; appointed promoter of 
 National Assembly, 24 ; enters the 
 Sorbonne, 25 ; residence at Belle- 
 chasse, ii. ; appointed Abb^ of St. 
 Denis, ii. ; discussions in his rooms, 
 27 ; commercial treaty between 
 
 France and England, 28 et seq. ; 
 appointed agent-general of the clergy, 
 32 ; reputation for wit, 33 ; readings 
 after dinner, 35; M. Necker, 36; 
 visits to Madame de Montesson, 37 ; 
 music, 38 ; on the abolition of lot- 
 teries, 39 ; on the condition of the 
 cler^^y, 40 ; the women of Brittany, 
 41 ; the I-iank of Discount, 42 ; speech 
 on credit, 43 ; on the French aris- 
 tocracy before the Revolution, 46 et 
 seq. \ on new countries, 55 ; France 
 and the Mediterranean, 56 ; French 
 colonies, 57 et seq. ; philosophy and 
 philosophers, 61 et seq. ; on economic 
 philosophers, 66 ; disfavour at court, 
 70 ; Cardinal, 71 ; opinion of M. de 
 Calonne, 79 et seq. ; preparation of 
 bills, 80 ; on the summoning of As- 
 sembly of Notables, 82 ; how the 
 Revolution might have been averted, 
 85 ; on M. Necker, 87 ; on the nobles 
 and plebeians, 89 ; equality, 90 ; army 
 discipline, 91 ; member of States- 
 General, 94 ; outbreak of Revolution, 
 ib. ; on the flight of nobles, 95 ; on 
 the action of the National Assembly, 
 100 ; on finance, 102 ; chosen conse- 
 crating prelate and consecrates the 
 first constitutional bishops, 103 ; re- 
 signation of bishopric of Autun, 104 ; 
 note by M. de Bacourt on interviews 
 with Comte d'Artois, 104 ; the lits de 
 justice, 136 ; estimate of Abbe Sieyes 
 159 et seq ; judgment of, on the 
 political part played by Due d' 
 Orleans, 162 ; the origin and causes of 
 the Revolution, 163 ; bearer of a letter 
 from Louis XVI. to King of England, 
 166 ; returns to Paris, 167 ; believes 
 the royal family could have been 
 saved, 169 ; scientific mission to Lon- 
 don, 169 ; his passport, ii, ; meets 
 celebrities in England, 1 70; absent 
 from France during the worst of the 
 Revolution, 171 ; expelled from Eng- 
 land, 173; starts for America, ib. ; 
 nearly wrecked, 174 ; meets General 
 Arnold, ib. ; wishes to go to Calcutta, 
 17s ; lands at Philadelphia, ib. ; 
 travels inland, description of the coun- 
 try, 176 ; importance of agriculture, 
 178; spirit of enterprise in America, 
 179 ; reminiscences, 180 ; on Ameri- 
 can competition and its results, 182 ; 
 first trading expedition to Bengal, 183 ; 
 devises new general code of the law of 
 nations, 183 ; American tariff of cus- 
 toms, 184 ; proposes to go to East 
 Indies, 186; return to Europe, ii. ; 
 arrival at Hamburg, 187 ; reaches 
 
INDEX. 
 
 42s 
 
 Paris, ib. ; National Initkute of Arts 
 and Sciences, ib. ; meets with Comte 
 de Barras, 188-190 ; drowning of M. 
 Raymond, 189 ; appointed Minister of 
 Foreign Relations, 190 ; why he ac- 
 cepted office, 191 ; lost letter from 
 Bonaparte, 196 ; first interview with 
 Bonaparte, ib. ; description of Bona- 
 parte, 196-197 ; retires from the 
 Cabinet, 203 ; position of Bonaparte, 
 205 ; incident in Paris at night, 206 ; 
 appointed Foreign Secretary, 207 ; on 
 re-establishment of monarchy, 208 ; 
 advice to First Consul, 209 ; the treaty 
 with Austria, 212 ; the Concordat, 
 214 ; his secularization, 215 ; Cisal- 
 pine republic deputation at Lyons, 
 217 ; Napoleon's mistaken policy, 
 219 ; Napoleon becomes Emperor, 
 221 ; accompanies Napoleon to Stras- 
 burg, 223 ; attends him in a fit, ib. ; 
 advice regarding Austria, 224 ; after 
 the Battle of Austerlitz, 225 ; leaves 
 Auslerlitz, 227 ; draws up the Treaty 
 of Presburg, 228 ; created Prince of 
 Benevento, ib. ; letter from Fox, 
 230 ; Napoleon and Spain, 232 ; 
 Treaty of Tilsit, ib. ; pictures at Dres- 
 den, 234 ; at Warsaw, 235 ; the gover- 
 nor of Poland, 236 ; at the interview 
 between the Emperors Napoleon and 
 Alexander, 237 ; the Queen of Prussia, 
 238 ; returns to Paris, 239 ; appointed 
 vice-grand-elector, ib. ; retires from 
 the ministry, ib.; suggests vie us to 
 Napoleon, ib. ; meeting between Em- 
 perors Napoleon and Alexander at 
 Erfurt, 240 ; M. de Caulaincourt, 241 ; 
 Emperor Alexander, 242 ; Napoleon's 
 deceitfulness, 244 ; on Spanish affairs, 
 24S ; endeavours to dissuade Napoleon 
 from a war with Spain, 247 ; ignorant 
 of the Treaty of Fontainebleau, ib. ; 
 Spanish intrigues, 248 e( seq. ; to en- 
 tertain Ferdinand VII. and Don 
 Carlos, 280 ; welcomes the Spanish 
 Princes, 286 ; attitude towards the 
 gendarmerie tfc-iitef ib. ; how he 
 treated the Princes, 286-287 ; sum- 
 moned to Napoleon, 288 ; Napoleon 
 offended, ib. ; rupture with Napoleon, 
 289 ; letter from Napoleon, ib. ; re- 
 called to Paris, ib. ; takes leave of 
 the Spanish Princes, ib. ; " By the 
 grace of God," ib. ; calls in the Duke 
 of San Carlos, 290 ; interest in the 
 Princes, ib. ; quotes the Emperor 
 Alexander, 297 ; conducts negotia- 
 tions at Erfurt, 300 ; confidence dis- 
 played by Napoleon, ib. ; Napoleon 
 discloses his projects, 305 ; draws up 
 
 treaty, 306 ; Napoleon's instructions, 
 306-309 ; arrives at Erfurt, 309 ; list of 
 personages met there, 310-313 ; reflec- 
 tions suggested by the general en- 
 thusiasm on Napoleon's arrival, 314 ; 
 introduced to the Czar, 315 ; meets 
 Austrian envoy, 317 ; with Goethe, 
 320 ; not in Napoleon's confidence, 
 324 ; conversation with Emperor 
 Alexander, 328 ; endeavours to defeat 
 the projects of Napoleon, 329 ; dinner 
 and ball at Weimar, 330 ; account of _ 
 Napoleon's conversation with Wie- 
 land on Tacitus, 332-334 ; interview 
 with Napoleon who wants a divorce, 
 335 ; takes leave of M. de Vincent, 337 ; 
 interview with Emperor Alexander, 
 ib. ; treaty of Erfurt, 339 
 ■ ii. Home life ; nephew's marriage, 3 ; 
 Foreign Minister, 4 ; on Napoleon's 
 marriage, 6 ; on the Bonaparte family, 
 19 ; Napoleon's consecration, 34 ; con- 
 siderations on the Ecclesiastical Com- 
 mission, 54 ; Napoleon and the 
 Assembly of Bishops, 74 ; on the incon- 
 sistency of Napoleon in his negotia- 
 tions with the Pope, 86 ; on the politi- 
 cal blunders of Napoleon in his 
 negotiations with the Pope, 93 ; and 
 his political blunders with Spain, 97 ; 
 apology for having left Napoleon's 
 service, 100 ; the Minister of Police, 
 loi ; again asked to become Foreign 
 Minister, 102 ; Napoleon's plotting 
 against himself, 103 ; Napoleon and 
 the allied sovereigns, 1 10 ; on the 
 situation, ib. ; his action at the time 
 of the Restoration, 116 ; on Napo- 
 leon's position, ib. ; on the Bourbons, 
 117; the legitimacy of governments, 
 119 ; visit of Czar and others, 122 ; 
 on the government, ib. ; at the head 
 of a provisory government, 126; meet- 
 ing with Louis XVIII. 127 ; Minister 
 of Foreign Affairs, 130 ; his work con- 
 nected with treaties of peace, 130 et seq. ; 
 secret treaties, 148 ; apology for his 
 action, 149; appointed plenipotentiary 
 at Vienna Congress, 152 ; selection 
 of assistants, 153; letter to the Czar, 
 155 ; instructions from Louis XVIII., 
 157 ; account of the Congress of Cha- 
 tillon, 186 et seq.; letter to on the fall 
 of Napoleon, 189 ; arrival at Vienna, 
 199 ; account of the deliberations of 
 the Vienna Congress, 2or et seq.; at- 
 tends first conference, 202 ; on the 
 " Allied Powers," 203 ; demurs to 
 claims put forward by Prussia, 206 ; 
 the principle of legitimacy, 207 ; meets 
 Madame de Brionne, 209 ; meets 
 
426 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 King of Saxony, 210 ; the Russian 
 minister and "legitimacy," 212; 
 created Due de Dino, 213 ; letters 
 from the King and Queen of the Two 
 Sicilies, 213 ; denounces Napoleon 
 as an usurper, 216 ; leaves Vienna, 
 217; his correspondence with Louis 
 XVIII., 218 rf j-f^. ; requests audience 
 of the Czar, 223 ; protestation at a pre- 
 liminary conference, 230 ; objects to 
 expression "Allies," 231 ; addresses a 
 note to the plenipotentiaries, 234 ; 
 interview with the Czar, ib. ; re- 
 proached for his note, 237 ; Lord 
 Castlereagh's project of declara i n, 
 238-243 ; his note again, 243 ; Met- 
 ternich's prject of declaration, 246; 
 stormy discussion, " public laws, " 248, 
 249 ; Jacobinism in Germany, 261 ; 
 the possibility of war, 263 ; on France 
 and England, 265 ; interview with the 
 Czar, 274, 275 ; with Prince Metter- 
 nich, 279 ; draft of the work of the 
 Congress, 282 ; discussion, 283 ; plan 
 for summoning the Congress, 291 ; 
 conversation with Lord Castlereagh 
 on Poland and Saxony, 292 ; con- 
 ference on the affairs of the Helvetian 
 Corporation and of Italy, 297 ; Prince 
 Mettemich desires his confidence, 302 ; 
 interview with Mettemich regarding 
 Poland and Saxony, 313 ; conversation 
 with the Czar, 318, 320 ; objects of 
 France at Congress, 339 ; appoints 
 commissioners, 362 ; on Saxony and 
 Poland, 371 ; fear that Austria had 
 declared in favour of Murat, 373; pro- 
 posals to exclude French ambassadors 
 from a commission on statistics, 375 ; 
 conduct of Prussia for last sixty years, 
 376; conversation with Lord Castle- 
 reagh, 377 ; conversation with Lord 
 Stewart, 378; "Allies," ib. ; causes 
 of coalition against France, destroyed, 
 
 ...38S 
 
 iii. Opinion of Lord Castlereagh, 15 ; 
 Saxony, Prussia, and Austria, 21 ; on 
 Due de Berry's marriage, 23 ; state 
 dinner in honour of Lord Wellington, 
 35 ; on Ferdinand IV. as King of Two 
 Sicilies, 45 ; the principle of legiti- 
 macy, 46 ; interview with Emperor 
 of Russia, about Naples, 46 et seq. ; 
 on mysterious conduct of Mettemich, 
 56 ; on Napoleon's escape from Elba ; 
 conference with Comte d'Einsiedel at 
 Presburg, 70 ; signs declaration against 
 Bonaparte, 75 ; on Murat's affairs, 
 76 ; the principles of legitimacy, 77 ; 
 conversation with the Czar, 88 ; the 
 principles of legitimacy, 121 ; inter- 
 
 view with Emperor Alexander, 124 ; 
 leaves Vienna for Ghent, 126; reaches 
 Brussels after the Battle of Waterloo, 
 joins the king at Mons, 129 ; insists 
 the king should not return to Paris, 
 130 ; reports to the king the work 
 done at the congress, 130 et seq. ; 
 lei ter from Mettemich on the necessity 
 of the king being in France, 154; 
 arrives at Cambray, 155 ; letter from 
 Duke of Wellington on the restoration 
 of works of art in foreign countries, 
 159 ; indignant at Wellington's letter, 
 160 ; on the home affairs of France, 
 161 ; as President of the Council, and 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs at Paiis, 
 ib. ; on Fouche, 162 ; on M. Pozzo 
 de Borgo, ih. ; on refusal of Due de 
 Richelieu, 163, 164 ; Prefets, 167 ; 
 meeting of Chambers of Peers, wanted 
 by, 170 ; list of peers drawn up by, 17 1 ; 
 conversation with Louis XVIII., ib. ; 
 arguments in favour of hereditary 
 peerage, ib. ; harsh measures by 
 M. Fouche, 172 ; request to the king 
 to dismiss Fouche from the ministry, 
 174 ; note from the allied plenipo- 
 tentiaries, 176; his answer to them, 
 I77> 179 > memorandum from Lord 
 Castlereagh respecting art galleries, 
 180 ; answer to Lord Castlereagh, 184, 
 1S6 ; brutal replyby Lord Wellington, 
 186 ; proposition made by the Four 
 Powers, 188 ; indignant at the demands 
 of the Four Powers, 194; noteinreply 
 to the propositions made by allies, 194, 
 199 ; on the revenge and rapacity of 
 foreign cabinets, 200 ; conversation 
 with Louis XVI 11. on the reply of 
 the ministers of the allies, 202 ; re- 
 signation tendered and accepted, 203 ; 
 on the character of the Czar, ib. ; re- 
 tirement from office, 204 ; his love for 
 France, 205 ; reply to the accusations 
 of the Due de Kovigo, 206 ; on 
 emigres in Offenburg, 208 ei seq. ; 
 summoned to presence of First Consul, 
 210 ; reproached by First Consul, 21 1; 
 attempts to soften the wrath of Consul, 
 is. ; letter to Baron d'Edelsheim on 
 the arrest of the society of French 
 emigres residing at Offenburg, 212; 
 letter to General Caulaincourt, 213 ; 
 the libel of M. Savaiy, duties of men 
 in official positions, 214 ei seq. ; letter 
 to King Louis, 219; silenced by 
 Louis XVIIIth's reply, 221 ; on 
 Maubreuil, 221 ; again takes part in 
 public affairs, the foolish step of 
 Charles X., 225 ; principles of legiti- 
 macy, 226 ; on the cause of the re- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 427 
 
 volution of July, 1830, ih. ; another 
 govemmfent for France, 227 ; sent as 
 ambassador to London, 228 ; letter 
 from M. Mol^ and Louis Philippe, 
 ib. ; letter from Lord Aberdeen, ib. ; 
 his arrival at Dover, contrasted with 
 previous one, thirty-six years before, 
 229 ; his wish to bring about an alliance 
 between France and England, ib. ; 
 reflections in England, 230; extract 
 from letter to M. Mole, on views of 
 English ministry regarding France and 
 his satisfactory interviews with Lord 
 Aberdeen and Duke of Wellington, 
 232, 233 ; revolution in Belgium, 233 ; 
 English government, 234 ; speech ad- 
 dressed to King of England, 235 ; 
 sketch of William IV., 236 ; re- 
 proaches from M. Mole, ib. ; extract 
 from reply to M. Mole, 237 ; acquaints 
 Lord Aberdeen with wishes of the 
 French government, 239 ; conversa- 
 tion with Duke of Wellington, ib. ; 
 on coming trial of the ministers of 
 Charles X., 240; affairs of Portugal, 
 241 ; unwise to quarrel with England 
 respecting Portugal, 242 ; account of 
 Portuguese affairs sent to Paris by, 243 ; 
 Belgian affair, ib. ; letter to Mol^ on 
 Charles X. , 246, 247 ; authorized by 
 the king to join the conference, 248 ; 
 the erroneous views of M. Mole, 250 ; 
 copy of Count Nesselrode's secret 
 despatch, 251, 253; followed King of 
 England to the palace, 255 ; attends 
 conference in London, 257 ; report of 
 conference sent to Paris, 257 et seq. ; 
 instructions from Paris, 259 ; state- 
 ment of Belgian question by Louis 
 Philippe, sent to, by Marshal Maison, 
 262 ; deeply struck by statement of 
 Belgian question, 267 ; Prince of 
 Orange, 268 ; regret at Wellington's 
 withdrawal from office, 269 ; Belgian 
 affairs, 270 ; formation of new Cabinet, 
 271 ; on the Whig government for 
 England, 272 ; armistice between 
 Dutch and Belgians concluded, 275 ; 
 Belgium, ib. ; Austria, Russia, Prussia, 
 276 et seq. ; sketch of the members of 
 the conference, 277 ei seq.; affairs at 
 conference, 283 ; M. de Flahaut, 284 ; 
 letter from General Sebastiani on peace 
 for Europe, 286, 288 ; rising in Poland, 
 261 ; peculiar position of France, 291, 
 292 ; dissolution of kingdom of Nether- 
 lands, 293, 294 ; letter from Madame 
 Adelaide, 298 ; independence of Bel- 
 gium, 299 ; independence of Greece, 
 300 ; account of conference on Greek 
 matters, 302 ; conversations with Lord 
 
 Grey and Palmerston, 304 ; letter from 
 General Sebastiani on the purpose of 
 making an attack on the French 
 government, 305, 306 ; affairs of 
 Netherlands and Belgium, 30S ; M. 
 de Celles, 309 ; letter from Madame 
 de Vaudemont, on the death of King 
 of England, 311 ; letter from Comle 
 Mole on Netherlands and Belgium, 
 
 312 ; improvement of affairs in France, 
 
 313 ; letter from Madame Adelaide on 
 Charles X. and Belgian affairs, 314, 
 31 S ; correspondence with Madame 
 Adelaide, and Madame Vaudemont 
 on general affairs, 316 ei seq. ; cor- 
 respondence with M. Bresson, on 
 question of Luxembourg, 319 ; con- 
 versation with Lord Palmerson, 322 
 
 iv. The choice of a sovereign for Belgium 
 still undecided, 4 ; account sent to 
 Paris, 5 ; letter from General Sebas- 
 tiani, 6, 7 ; new candidate for the Bel- 
 gian throne, 7 i letter to Paris on 
 Prince Otto, 8 ; letters to Madame 
 Adelaide on Belgian question, 9 et seq. ; 
 interview with Lord Grey, 11 et seq. ; 
 renewal of hostilities between Dutch 
 and Belgians, 13 ; correspondence with 
 General Sebastiani on the protocol of 
 the conference, IS et seq.; coirespon- 
 dence with M. Bresson, 18 et seq.; 
 letter from Due de Dalberg on Belgian 
 affairs, 24 ; on neutrality of Belgium, 
 27 ; still in favour of Prince Leopold 
 for sovereign of Belgium, 30 ; de- 
 spatches and letters received and writ- 
 ten on the choice of a sovereign for 
 Belgium by, 32 et seq. ; correspondence 
 with General Sebastiani, 57 et seq. ; 
 letter from Due de Dalberg on position 
 of affairs in France, 64 ; on general 
 affairs, 66 et seq. ; conversation with 
 Lord Palmerston on general affairs, 70 
 et seq. ; letter from Due de Dalberg on 
 new administration, 75 ; political views 
 of, 77 et seq. ; Reform Bill, 80 ; ques- 
 tions definitely settled in London, ib. ; 
 Poland, 81 ; on the choice of a sove- 
 reign for Belgium, 84 ; position of 
 Maestricht, 89 ; on M. Casimir Perier, 
 92 ; account of conference, 93 et seq. ; 
 Germanic Confederation, 96 ; hostile 
 treatment of Frenchmen in Portugal, 
 98 ; uncertainty as to the king's inten- 
 tions, 99 ; outbreaks in London, 105 ; 
 interview with Belgian deputies, 105 
 et seq,; conversation with Prince Leo- 
 pold, 107 ; letters to General Sebas- 
 tiani, 109; political destiny of, 113; 
 Bonapartism in France, 1 14 ; letter 
 from Madame Adelaide on Belgian 
 
428 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 affairs, 115 et seq.; conference re?;pect- 
 ing situation of Belgium, 122 ; Lord 
 Ponsonby's account of Belgian affairs, 
 124 ; conversation with M. Van Praet, 
 129 ; military strength of Holland, 
 131 ; opinions of the members of the 
 Belgian Congress, 132 et seg.; Prince 
 Leopold elected King of Belgium, 
 138 ; revolution in Brazil, 143 ; the 
 boundary question, 146 ; Conference 
 with Russian plenipotentiary on Greek 
 affairs, 149, 150 ; King of England 
 opening Parliament, 150 ; illness of, 
 ib. ; speech of Prince Leopold to the 
 Belgian deputies, 154; correspondence 
 with Prince Leopold, 155 ctseq.; letter 
 from M. Casimir Perier on Poland, 
 162 ; correspondence with Madame 
 Adelaide on general affairs, 1 6$ et seq. ; 
 on France, 188 ; anxious for a definite 
 treaty between Holland and Belgium, 
 190 ; "the lame leading the blind," 
 192 ; on ihe French ministry, 195 ; 
 on the serious disturbances in Paris, 
 203, 204 ; cruelties of Don Miguel, 
 205 ; Lord Londonderry's attack on, 
 208 ; Belgian affairs in Paris, 215 ; 
 Reform Bill rejected, 219 ; the uproar 
 in London, 2ig, 220 ; on the termina- 
 tion of Belgian affairs, 222 ; on the 
 treaty between the five Powers and 
 Belgium, 226 ; insurrection in 1 yons, 
 233 ; obstinacy ofthe King of Holland, 
 235 ; King of Holland accepts the 
 boundaries, 236 ; demolition of the 
 Belgian fortresses, 237 et seq. ; on 
 Sebastiani's mishap, 252 et seq. ; no 
 need for war in Europe, 256 ; on M. 
 Maubourg's mi.-sion, 258 ; a king for 
 Greece, 261 ; Prussian ratification, 
 267 ; declaration of January 23, 268, 
 269 ; " Plot of the Rue des Prou- 
 vaires," 273 et seq.; arrival of Comte 
 Orloff at the Hague, 275 et seq.; on 
 general affairs, 277-8 ; capture of 
 Ancona, 281 ; Reform Bill. 283 ; 
 Italian affaiis, 285 et seq.; waiting for 
 ratifications from Russia, 290- r ; rati- 
 fications exchanged with Russia, 296 ; 
 resignation of ministers, 297 et seq.; 
 death of M. Perier, 301 ; the journey 
 to Compiegne, ii. ; insurrection in 
 Paris, 314; leaves London for Paris, 
 316 ; on the arrival of M. de Flahaut, 
 
 V. Due de Broglie on the authenticity of 
 the Memoirs, vii et s-'q. ; letter from 
 Louis XVIII. on Bridge of Jena, xiv ; 
 general position of affairs in Europe, 
 5 ; interview with Lord Palmerston, 
 14; account of M. Maruiel's inter- 
 
 view with Lord Palmerston, 16 ; on 
 the intrigues of Madame Flahaut, 17 ; 
 the Cabinet Council, 18 ; summoned 
 to a conference, 21 ; convention 
 signed with Lord Palmerston, 23 ; 
 convention carried into effect, 25 ; 
 communication of M. Biilow, 26 ; 
 ratifications of the convention, 28 ; 
 note of the Russian plenipotentiaries, 
 30 ; surrender of Venloo, Limburg, 
 and Luxembourg, 33 ; on the declara- 
 tions of Russia, 36 ; on Lord Grey's 
 scheme, 38 ; on the delays respecting 
 the Antwerp expedition, 42 et seq. ; 
 on the new project, 51 ; on M. Durant, 
 S3 ; capture of Antwerp, 54 ; on the 
 death of Princess Vaudemont, 56 ; 
 conversation with Lord Palmerston on 
 the closing of the Scheldt, 59 et seq. ; 
 negotiations begun between France 
 and England and the Netherlands, 
 61 ; on Eastern affairs, 63 et seq. ; on 
 the present state of Portugal, 71 ; on 
 custom house tariffs, 73 ; Eastern 
 affairs, 77 et seq. ; on Continental 
 cabinets, 87 ; on the prudence of 
 English ministry, 88 ; Swiss affairs, 
 89 ; private audience with the 
 King, 89 ; Algerian question and 
 Admiral Roussin's conduct, 94 ; Por- 
 tuguese affairs, 95 ; communication 
 of Lord Grey, 97 ; insurrection in 
 Frankfort, ii. ; Metternich's project, 
 loi ; the HoUando-Belgian affairs, 
 102 ; general affairs, 103 et seq. ; 
 success of the Due d'Orleans in Lon- 
 don, 112 ; conferences with I^ord Pal- 
 merston and M. Dedel, 113 ; conven- 
 tion, 115; Greek loan, 117; ratifica- 
 tions from the Hague, zb. ; conversa- 
 tions with Lord Palmerston on Eastern 
 affairs, 120 ; note to the plenipoten- 
 tiaries, 124 et seq. ; difficulties of the 
 English ministry, 128 ; a rhume of 
 the new phase of the affairs in Hol- 
 land and Belgium, 129; on the ex- 
 pedition from Oporto, 134; first con- 
 ference on Dutch and Belgian affairs, 
 135 ; position of England with regard 
 to Portugal, 138; communication from 
 Lord Palmerston, 139 et seq. ; news 
 received from Portugal, 14.6 ; serious- 
 ness of the Eastern question, 151 ; 
 account of interview with Lord Pal- 
 merston, 159; on the marriage of 
 Dona Maria, 162 ; relations between 
 Spain and England, 171 ; anxious to 
 leave Vienna, 174 ; leave to return to 
 France, 176; invitation to visit Wind- 
 sor, ib. ; in England, 178 ; returns 
 to Paris, ib, ; re-entering public life, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 429 
 
 180 ; interview with king, iSl ; 
 Prussia and Russia and Austria's 
 action in Italy, 18 1 et seq. ; proposed 
 treaty of alliance witli England, 186, 
 187 tt seq. ; returns to England, 187 ; 
 receives draft of his treaty, 198 ; dif&- 
 culties regarding it, ib. ; interview 
 with Lord Grey on Eastern affairs, 
 199 ; also with Lords Grey and Pal- 
 merston, 202, 205 ; rumour of Due 
 de Broglie's retirement, 206 ; post- 
 ponement of his proposed treaty, 209 ; 
 General Saldanha, 212 ; interview 
 with Lord Palmerston on M. de 
 Nesselrode's despatch on England and 
 Russia, 212 ei seq. ; opinion, 215 ; 
 Lord Palmerston, 216; on Russian 
 interests, 217 ; conference on Dutch 
 affairs, 218 et seq. ; Convention be- 
 tween the Porte and Russia, 221 ; 
 loan to Turkey, 221-2 ; Dutch affairs, 
 226 ; arrest of M. Hanno at Luxem- 
 bourg, 226-7; congi-atulatory letter, 
 and explanation of his views on national 
 affairs, to Count de Rigny, 234-7 5 
 reference to his proposed treaty, 235 ; 
 interview with Lord Palmerston on 
 Spanish affairs, 237, 240 ; presses his 
 proposed treaty with England, 241 ; 
 not accepted, 242 ; letter to Comte de 
 Rigny on his proposed treaty and the 
 Revolution, 245 ; negotiations con- 
 nected with his proposed treaty, 247 
 et seq. ; objections to, and alterations 
 in text, 250 et seq. ; text of the treaty, 
 255-6 ; its relation to Spain, 257 ; 
 leaves London, 258 ; end of MS. 
 memoirs, ib. ; action of Prussia, 261 ; 
 Austrian proposal in the affair of 
 Luxembourg, ib. ; Prince de Metter- 
 nich on the Hollando-Belgian affair, 
 263 ; Dom Pedro's government, 264 ; 
 references to his proposed treaty, ib. , 
 265 ; Prince de Metternich's objections, 
 266 ; King Leopold's scheme of suc- 
 cession to Belgian throne, 270 ; Pro- 
 testant clergy in Ireland (redemption 
 of tithes), ib. ; Portuguese ratification 
 of treaty, 272-3 ; interview with Lord 
 Palmerston on the Belgian succession, 
 276 ; further delay in ratification of 
 treaty, 277 ; Don Carlos and Dom 
 Miguel expelled by treaty, 278 ; inter- 
 view with Lord Palmerston regarding 
 the princes, 279 ; Lord Palmerston 
 and the treaty, 280 ; receives Spanish 
 decoration, 281 ; Don Carlos at Ports- 
 mouth, 282 ; negotiations with, 282 
 et seq. ; Eastern question, 287 et seq. ; 
 fresh Portuguese ratification of treaty, 
 290 ; changes in English cabinet, 292 
 
 et seq. ; news of Don Carlos, 294 ; 
 Spanish affairs, 295 ; interview with 
 Lord Palmerston on Spanish affairs, 
 298 et seq., 301 et seq. ; Spanisii 
 government and additional articles in 
 treaty, 306 et seq. ; text of additional 
 convention, 310 ; resignation of, 312, 
 313 ; letter to King Louis- Philippe on 
 his resignation, 314 ; reply, 315 ; dis- 
 pleasure of the king, 328 ; on treaties 
 of permanent alliance, 352 et seq. ; 
 rlsumS of the Due de Choiseul's 
 ministry, 375 et seq. ; the Treaty of 
 1756, 375 ; on Prussia, 377 ; Poland, 
 Russia, 378, 380 ; aUiance with France 
 and Austria, 379 ; Austria, 381 ; the 
 Bourbon family compact, 382 ; Avig- 
 non, ib. ; Corsica, ib. ; Order of the 
 Jesuits, 383 ; the cession of Canada 
 and Acada, 385 ; Due de Choiseul's 
 administration of the War Depart- 
 ment, 386 ; the personalities of the 
 Due de Choiseul, Madame de Pompa- 
 dour, Madame de Gramont, 388 ; 
 Due de Choiseul's downfall, 389 ; 
 court affairs, 390 ; Due de Choiseul 
 never regains position, 392 
 
 Talleyrand, Auguste de, iii. 127 
 
 Talleyrand, D. M. de, i. i 
 
 Talleyrand and Sagan, Duehesse de, will 
 of, i. xii ; iii. 319 
 
 Talleyrand-Perigord, C. D. de, i. i ; ii, 29 ; 
 iii. 76 
 
 Talmont, Princesse de, v. 366 
 
 Tandeau, Abb^, i. 141 
 
 Tarente, Due de, iii. 100 et seq. 
 
 Taube, Count von, i. 313 
 
 Tavannes, Comte de Saulx, i. 3 
 
 Tellier, M. iv. 262 
 
 Temple, Sir William, v. 257 
 
 Terceira, Due de, iii. 237, 242; iv. 1S2 ; 
 V. 152 
 
 Terray, Abbe, i. 141 ; v. 367, 369 et seq. 
 
 Thannhausen, Count von Stadion, ii. 136 
 
 Thard, Henri, Comte de, v. 362 
 
 Theilmann, Jean Fran9ois de, iii. 265 
 
 Themnies, A. de L. de, i. 24 
 
 Theresa, Dona Maria, i. 249 
 
 Thibandeau, M., iii. 171 
 
 Thielemann, Major, i. 310 
 
 Thiers, M., iv. 24, 75 ; v. 7, 230 
 
 Thionville, iii. 193, 195 
 
 Third estate, the, i. 89, 93, 94, 98 
 
 Thirty Years' War (Schiller), i. 318 
 
 Thomassin, Father, ii. 31 
 
 Thorn, M. de, iv. 300 
 
 Thiimmel, Baron von, i. 311 
 
 Tilsit, treaty of, i. 232, 238, 294 ; ii. 162 
 
 Times, the, iii. 273 ; iv. 54, 179, 207 • 
 
 Tinseau, J. A. (Bishop of Nevers), i. 20 
 
 Tolly, General Barclay de, iii. 83 
 
430 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Tolstoi, Count, i. 295, 310 
 
 Tolstoi, General, i. 310 
 
 Toreno, Comte de, v. 281 
 
 Torres, Don Sebastian de, i. 263 
 
 Toulouse, Archbishop of (Comte de 
 Brienne), i. 21, 37, 45, 70, 78, 81, 82, 
 129, 148, 153, iss, 157 
 
 Toulouse, Battle of, ii. 109 
 
 Tour and Taxis, Prince and Princess, i. 
 312, 316, 321, 324, 325, 327, 336 
 
 Tour du Pin, Comte de la, ii. 282, 362, 
 372 ; iii. 14, 75. 85, 125 ; v. 362 
 
 Toumai, Bishop of, ii. 79, 80 
 
 Tours, Archbishop of, ii. 38, 54, 59, 67, 
 75. 78, 79.82, 88; iii. 171 
 
 Trantmansdorf, Prince von, ii. 237 
 
 Trebia, i. 202 
 
 Treves, Bishop of, i. 38 ; ii. 39, 54, 59, 67, 
 ^ 75, 79, 82, 88 
 
 Trevise, Due de, iii. 102 et seq., 171, 231 ; 
 iv. 76 
 
 Trianon, festivities at, i. 134 
 
 Tricoupis, S., V. 211, 303 
 
 Trident, iii. 208 
 
 Troubetzkoi, Prince, i. 310 
 
 Troyes, Bishop of, ii. 74, 79, So 
 
 Truchsess, Count von, i. 313 
 
 Truchsess, Frau von, ii. 18 
 
 Trudaine de Montigny, Ch. de, i. 81 
 
 Tudo, Dona Josepha, i. 265 
 
 Turgot, Chevalier, v. 385 
 
 Turgot, J., i. 32, 67,81 
 
 Turkey, Russia's designs, i. 199 ; treaty 
 with France, 216 ; partition of, 294-6 ; 
 Erfurt convention, 308 ; existence 
 should be assured, ii. 168 ; dismember- 
 of the empire, iii. 300 ; probable v^ar 
 with Russia and Austria, iv. 103 ; 
 invasion of Egypt, v. 66 et seq. ; Rus- 
 sian fleet in the Bosphorus, 119; 
 treaty, ib. ; views of European 
 countries on, 122 et seq. ; Talleyrand 
 and Lord Palraerston on the treaty, 
 177; approval of treaty, 204; Lord 
 Palmerston on the throne of, 214 ; M. 
 de Nesselrode on, ib. ; treaty between 
 Russia and, 221 ; views of Prince 
 Mettemich, 228 ; Egypt, 285, 286 ; 
 Russia, 322 ; alliance with Russia, 
 329 
 
 U 
 
 Ulm, victory of, i. 223 
 
 United States of America, correspondence 
 with Talleyrand, i. xlijc ; visit to, 1. ; 
 Declaration of Independence, 52 et 
 seq. ; the topic of conversation, 54 ; 
 Talleyrand goes to, 173 ; progress of 
 after the war, 175 ; description of the 
 country, 176 ; spirit of enterprise in, 
 
 179; commercial competition and its 
 results, 182 ; first trading expedition 
 to Bengal, 183 ; tariff of customs, 184 ; 
 treaty with France, 213 ; treaty of 
 peace with England, 382 ; treaty with 
 France rejected, v. 229 
 Unkiar Skelessi, treaty of, v. 140 
 
 Vaines, Madame de, i. 36 
 
 Valen9ay, i. 290 ; iii. 322 
 
 Valence, General, iii. 159, 171, 309 
 
 Valenciennes, iii. 193, 195 
 
 Valette, Marie Chamans, Comte de, i. 225 
 
 Vallejo, Don, i. 274, 278 
 
 Valmy, victory of, i. 168 
 
 Valont, Jean, iv. 76 
 
 Vane, Earl, Charles William Stewart, ii. 
 250, 253, 288, 302, 378; iii IS, 75, 
 "S. 203. 315 ; iv. 207, 214, 220 
 
 Vandamme, General, iii. 171 
 
 Van der Eupen, iii. 265 
 
 Van der Linden, iii. 257 
 
 Van der Noot, iii. 265 
 
 Van de Weyer, M., iii. 2^7, 304, 320, 
 323 ; iv. 10, 37, 47, 73, 191, 248, 
 270; V. 124- 275 
 
 Vaudemont, Madame de, letter from 
 Talleyrand on the expedition to 
 Algiers, iii. 310 ; correspondence with 
 Talleyrand on general affairs, 316 
 et seq. ; letter from Talleyrand on 
 Belgium and Holland, iv. 72; letter 
 from Talleyrand on French ministry 
 196 ; letter from Talleyrand, 204; letter 
 from Talleyrand on Belgian affairs 
 in Paris, 215 ; letter from Talley- 
 rand on general affairs, 219, 227 
 
 Vaudrouil, Joseph jde Rigaud, Comte de, 
 i- 35. 47 ; ii- 232 
 
 Vauguyon, Due de la, v. 384 
 
 Vaupalliere, i. 47 
 
 Vaux, Berlin de, iv. 51, 66 
 
 Van, Styrum M., ii. 14 
 
 Vendeen, i. 194 
 
 Venloo, iii. 263 ; iv. 103, 132, 214; v. 25, 
 28, 32. 33, 317, 318 
 
 Venningen, Frau von, i. 312 
 
 Verceil, Bishop of, ii. 39 
 
 Verdier, General, i. 277, 278 
 
 Vergennes, Comte de, i. 31, 330 
 
 Verhuell, M. de, i. 270 ; ii. 14 
 
 Vermond, Abbe de, i. 72 
 
 Versailles, conference at, i. 23 
 
 Verstolk, M., iv. 173 ; v. 134, 219 
 
 Verteuil, M. de, i. 7 
 
 Vesmeranges, M. de, i. 82 
 
 Vianes, M. de, i, 47 
 
 Vicence, Due de, ii. 103 ; iii. 94 
 
INDEX. 
 
 431 
 
 Vienna, congress of, i. xxv, xliii, xlvii 
 ii. the plenipotentiary required, 150-2 ; 
 Talleyrand appointed, 152 ; his 
 assistants, 153; his instructions, 157; 
 the representatives at the congress, 
 160 rf seq. ; questions before it, 169 
 et seq. ; considerations on the con- 
 ditions of various countries, 173; 
 slave trade, 182 ; the most important 
 points to France, 1S3 ; supplementary 
 instructions, 184 ; disposition of the 
 allies tovpards France, 199 ; account 
 of the deliberations of, 201 et seq. ; 
 intentions of the first-class powers, 
 201 ; first conference, 202 ; Talley- 
 rand's speech, 203 ; Count de 
 Labrador's speech, 204 ; embarrass- 
 ment of the plenipotentiaries, ib. ; 
 the Kingdom of Saxony and the 
 Duchy of Warsaw, 205 ; Prussia's 
 claims, id. ; Talleyrand demurs, 206 ; 
 England supports Russia and Prussia, 
 208 ; secret alliance between France, 
 Austria, and England, against Russia 
 and Prussia, 209; the King of Saxony 
 approached, 210 ; dispute between 
 Saxony and Prussia settled, 211 ; 
 Poland, ii. ; Naples, 213 ; Switzer- 
 land, 215 ;the German Confederation, 
 216 ; Napoleon denounced as an 
 usurper, ii. ; Talleyrand leaves, 
 217 ; correspondence regarding the 
 congress, 218 ei seq. ; situation of 
 affairs at, 227-229 ; protestations at 
 a preliminary conference, 230 ; note 
 from Talleyrand, 234 ; a conference 
 postponed, 237 ; situation of affairs, 
 ib. ; Lord Castlereagh's project of 
 declaration, 238-243 ; Mettemich's 
 project of declaration, 246 ; projects 
 read to conference, 247 ; stormy discus- 
 sion, 248 ; military league, 257 ; Lord 
 Castlereagh on the Czar's designs on 
 Poland, 259 ; feeling against Count 
 de Labrador, 264 ; France and Eng- 
 land, 265 ; f8tes, 267 ; the ambassadors 
 on the position of affairs, 274 ; court 
 ball, 278 ; conference, 282 ; Talley- 
 rand's draft of the work, ib. ; efiect 
 of the congress on the Czar's actions, 
 296 ; Helvetia and Italy, 297 ; 
 business of the congress, 303 ; the 
 general position of affairs, 332-5 ; 
 "principles," 337 ; prejudice against 
 France, 338 et seq. ; other members 
 of coalition against France, 340 ; 
 plan of campaign, 342 ; proposals to 
 exclude French ambassadors from a 
 commission on statistics, 375 ; deci- 
 sions of the commission to have the 
 force of law, 379 ; ceremonial service 
 
 on anniversary of the execution of 
 Louis XVL, 385 ; causes of the coali- 
 tion against France destroyed, 386 
 iii. Prospect of war, 4 ; work of 
 statistical commission, 5 ; funeral 
 service, 14 and 17; slave trade, 19; 
 funeral ceremony, 20 ; treaties entered 
 into, 52 ; laws ior navigation of the 
 Rhine, 61 ; games and amusements, 
 65 ; declaration signed, 73; attitude 
 of the plenipotentiaries, 79 ; urged to 
 take a positive stand against Murat, 
 ib. ; special conference of legations 
 summoned, ib. ; Valtelline, Bormio, 
 Chiavenna, 81 ; treaty of quadruple 
 alliance between Great Britain, 
 Austria, Prussia, and Russia, agreed 
 to and signed, 89 et seq. ; second 
 declaration of the, 95 ; two emissaries 
 sent from Bonaparte to, 108 ; 
 territorial arrangements for north of 
 Germany concluded, 109 ; Bonaparte, 
 110 et seq. ; treaty for assistance to be 
 given by Sicily in the war against 
 Murat, 121 ; arrangements with 
 Bavaria finished, ib. ; Talleyrand 
 leaves for Ghent, 126 ; act of con- 
 gress signed, 127 ; report of work 
 done at the, 130 et seq. ; M. de 
 Chateaubriand's letter, 155 ; Talley- 
 rand on interests of France at, 162- 
 192 
 
 Viguri, Don Luis, i. 250 
 
 Villaflor, General, iv. 181 ; v. 134 
 
 Villain, XIV., M., iv. 100 
 
 Villars, Madame de, i. 3 
 
 Ville, Abbe de la, v. 370 et seq. ; 374 
 
 Villele, M. de, iii. 220 
 
 Villena, Don Juan Manuelle de, i. 253, 
 263 
 
 Villeneuve, Alexandre L. Ducrest, v. 32 
 
 Villiers, George, v. 163, 175, 238, 276, 
 280 
 
 Vincent, Baron de, i. 235, 317, 321, 324, 
 328, 335, 337; iii. 60, 94, 120, 121, 
 
 154 
 Vincent, Herr von ; Austrian ambassador, 
 
 ii- 338 
 
 Viron, L. A. de G., Due de, v. 348 
 
 Virours, iii. 263 
 
 VitroUes, Eugene d'Amaud, Baron de, i. 
 105 ; letter to M. de Bacourt on Talley- 
 rand's interview witii the Comte d' 
 Artois, 106 ; mission to allied sove- 
 reigns, ii. 1 10 ; at the headquarters of 
 alhed sovereigns, ill et seq. ; sent to 
 Comte d' Artois, 127 ; account of his 
 mission to the allied sovereigns, 186. 
 
 Vittoria, Battle of, ii. 24 
 
 Volo, Gulf of, iii. 302 
 
 Volonsky, iii. 80 
 
432 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Voltaire, M. de, i. 51, 64, no 
 
 Voyer, Marc Rene, Marquis de, philosophy 
 
 of, i. 115 
 Vrilliere, Due de la, v. 367, 374 
 
 W 
 
 Waldeck, Prince von, i. 311 
 
 Walewska, Madame AnastMe, i. 235 
 
 Walterstorff, General, iii. I2i 
 
 Wangenheim, Baron, i. 311 
 
 Ward, H. G., v. 271, 272, 277 
 
 Warsaw, Duchy of, i. 244 ; ii. 150, 312, 
 321, 384 ; iii. 41, 321 ; iv. 73, 80 
 
 Watteville, M. de, iii. 68 
 
 Weights and measures, uniform system of, 
 i. 169 
 
 Weisse, Herr von, i. 312 
 
 Wellesley, Marquis of, iii. 318 
 
 Wellington, Duke of, Bridge of Jena, i. 
 XXXV. ; driven from Portugal, ii. 22 ; 
 capture of Spanish villages, 23 ; re- 
 enters Portugal, ib. ; at Saint-Pe, 104 ; 
 Battle of Orthez, 107 ; M. Lynch, 108 ; 
 Battle of Toulouse, 109 ; the Bourbons, 
 ib. ; Napoleon, no; Due d'Angou- 
 leme, HI; Saxony, 209; interview 
 with Comte de Blacas on Saxony and 
 Poland, 305-7 ; Saxony, 338 ; differ- 
 ence with Louis XVIII., 351 ; ap- 
 pointed ambassador to congress, iii. 
 27 ; arrival at Vienna, 34 ; eulogises 
 Louis XVIII., 35 ; note from Neapo- 
 litan minister, 54 ; at Presburg, 70 ; 
 signs Treaty of Paris, 75 ; Bonaparte's 
 entry into Grenoble, 79, 80 ; armies 
 under the orders of, 8z ; leaves Vienna, 
 90 ; King Louis XVIII. on, 96 ; at 
 Ghent, 97; south of France, 119; 
 Talleyrand on, 158 ; restoration of 
 works of art to foreign countries, 159 ; 
 Talleyrand on, 162 ; French works of 
 art, 186 ; cabinet presided over by, 
 229 ; conversation with Talleyrand on 
 France, 232 ; Belgian question, 239, 
 244 ; at the London Conference, 257 ; 
 resignation of, 269 ; Charles X., 314 ; 
 Talleyrand on, 316 et seq. ; asked to 
 become commander-in-chief, 318 ; 
 Talleyrand, iv. 208 ; uproar in London, 
 
 219 ; Lord Aberdeen's motion, 237 ; 
 
 change of ministry in England, 298 ; 
 
 House of Braganza, v. 125 
 Wessenberg, Baron von, ii. 282, 316, 375 ; 
 
 iii. 75, 277; iv. 26, 69, 290 
 Weissembourg, iii. 191 
 Werther, M. de, iv. 214 
 Westphalia, King of, i. 238, 313 ; ii. 15 
 Westphalia, Treaty of, iv. 272 
 Whamcliife, Lord, iv. 99 
 Wieland, Christopher Martin, i. 311, 318, 
 
 325. 326, 331 
 Will (Talleyrand's) sequel to, i. vii 
 William IV., iii. 236, 254, 255; iv. 14, 
 
 150 
 William, Prince, of Prussia, i. 313 
 Windischgraetz, Prince, ii. 244 
 Wintzingerode, Count von, i. 313; ii. nS 
 Wolkonski, Prince, i. 310 
 Wrede, Marshal von, ii. 270, 289, 290, 342 ; 
 
 iii. no ; iv. 212 
 Wurmser, Count de, iii. 175 
 Wurtemberg, Count von, i. 313 
 Wurtemberg, Duchess of, i. 313 ; ii. 373 
 Wurtemberg, King of, i. 313 ; ii. 375 ; iii. 
 
 78, 109 
 Wurtemberg, Prince of, ii. 18 ; iii. 323 ; 
 
 iv. 25, 165, 232, 261 
 Wurtemberg, Princess of, iii. 222 
 Wybicki, Count, i, 233 
 Wyn, Mr., iv. 69 
 
 Yarmouth, Lord, i. 230 
 Yvon, Abbe, i. 115 
 Ypres, iii. 106 
 
 Zastrow, Herr von, i. 232 
 
 Zea Bermudez, v. 63, 72 et seq., 95, 145, 
 
 157, 161, 163, 175, 210 
 Zerdeler, Louis, ii. 298 
 Zeugurtz, Herr von, ii. 279 
 Zichy, Count, ii. 280, 301 
 Zigesar, Herr von, i. 311 
 Zumalacarreguy, T., v. 260, 305 
 Zuylen, M., iv. 123 et seq. ; v. 21, 26,. 62, 
 
 226 
 
 THE END.