iT'iiV-t.kri;^ i^-^i'JT^f^^L'^ji UJ..M11GQX. 3 1924 092 359 011 Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924092359011 CLAEK'S FOEEIGN THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY. MULLER ON yoL I. EDINBUEGH: T. & T. CLAEK, 38 GEOEGE STREET. 1885. PRINTED BV MORRISON AND GIBB, FOB T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH. LONDON, . . . HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO. DTTBLIN, .... GEORGE HERBERT. NEW YORK, . . . ^ SCRIBNER AND WELFORD, THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF SIN. DE. JULIUS MULIBE, PKOFESSOE OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF HALLE. Cranslateb from t\z ^zxrmn of t^e Jfiftlj (Sbition BY THE Eev. WILLIAM URWICK, M.A. IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. L EDINBURGH: T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET. 1885. TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. Dr. Julius Muller, the author of the present work, was born at Brieg, in the government of Breslau in Prussia, on the 10th April 1801. He was a student at the Gymnasium in his native town, and at the Universities of Breslau, Got- tingen, and Berlin. From the study of law, which he first pursued, he passed to that of theology, and attended the lectures of Tholuck, Strauss, and Neander. In 1825 he was appointed minister of the Lutheran Church at Schonbrunn and Eosen, where he remained six years, and wrote a clever brochure entitled " Zur Beurtheilung der Schrift : Die Kath. Kirche Schlesiens." In 1831 a new era of his life began, when he was nominated second University preacher at Got- tingen, where he gave lectures on theology and education. The spirit of his labours there appears in a volume of sermons, " Das christliche LebeUy seirie Kanvpfe uTid seine VoUendung" In 1834 he was called to the chair of theo- logy at Marburg, where for four years he lectured upon Dogmatic Theology and Ethics. In 1839 he was called to the University of Halle, where he still resides. The first edition of his great work, " Die christliche Lehre von der Silnde" was published in 1839. With it his fame is chiefly identified.* This profound and comprehensive work is of great and acknowledged value to the theologian. It has passed * See the Conversatiom Lexicon. vi translator's preface. through five large editions ; it has become a text-book in many of the Universities of Germany ; and it has been much studied by Biblical scholars acquainted with the language in England, France, and America. These facts suffice to prove its worth as a storehouse of thought and learning, of practical theology and heart anatomy for Christian students, pastors, and teachers. The subject of which it treats lies at the foundation of all Christian conviction and Gospel truth. It is an acknowledged fact that the doctrine of sin, the unfolding of its nature, its origin, its spread, its aggravation in the individual and in the world, has become a topic of dis- course often ignored in the latitudinarian preaching of our time, and to this fact may be attributed the indistinct and inadequate views of many concerning our Lord's atonement. For the great and central doctrine of Eedemption can be fully grasped by those alone who have felt the reality and the loathsome- ness of sin in its essence and its effects. A deep conviction of sin goes hand in hand (in the individual and in the Church) with a thorough estimate of Christ's redemptive work. But it is not so generally known that Dr. Mtiller's work claims a prominent place in the Philosophical contro- versies of our day. The bearing of the " Philosophy of the Conditioned " (as that theory is strangely called which denies the possibility of philosophy) upon the great truths of God's infinite and absolute Being, Will, and Knowledge, and upon human freedom, was only hinted at by Sir W. Hamilton. He was content with the declaration that, if the Kantian Criticism be carried to its legitimate issue in Morals and Eeligion, the doctrine of Moral liberty cannot be made conceivable, and that " all that remains for Philo- sophy is to erect an altar with this inscription, ' To the unknown and unknowable God.' " But his disciple. Pro- fessor Mansel, in his famous Bampton Lectures, has developed Sir W. Hamilton's principles, and has boldly argued out translator's preface. vu the conclusion, that of the Infinite and Absolute (which nevertheless we must allow God to be) we know and can know nothing. Into " the abyss of the Negative Absolute " (to use an expression of Dr. Mtiller's) Mr. Mansel, like Strauss, would plunge us ; though unlike Strauss, he would rescue us again from this abyss by the force of authority and irrational faith. Dr. Miiller, on the contrary, maintains that " a purely philosophical investigation, pursuing an independent course, necessarily leads to the conception of a personal God, who is the only real Absolute," and " that we are no longer obliged to distinguish between the Absolute and God." Miiller's argu- ment (chiefly stated in Book III. part i. chap, iv) contains, as if in anticipation, a triumphant refutation of all that Mr. Mansel has advanced upon this subject. More than one able philosopher of our day has observed that the question of human liberty is the question of the future ; and any one who is acquainted with the philosophy of Comte, now so fashionable, and the Determinism to which it leads, will feel the truth of the remark. " Let me," it is said, " unerringly know a man's character and antecedents, and I will unerringly predict his moral acts." Mr. John Stuart Mill has become a very able champion of this doc- trine, which he would call " Invariability," in his " Exami- nation of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy" (chapter xxvi.). This great question of human liberty Miiller argues out with a master-mind, and in the present work freedom is philoso- phically established. Miiller shows that Determinism, even in its finest form, is really predeterminism, and that philoso- phically and practically it is utterly untenable. His disserta- tions on formal and real freedom in the beginning of Book III. take up the argument where Mr. Mill leaves it, and vindicate man's responsibility and guilt as a free agent, in triumphant opposition to philosophical Determinists, whether they be Spinoza's followers or Comte's, The writer begs to add, that the present English version is VIU TRANSLATORS PREFACE. not a revision of that of Mr, Pulsford, but is a new translation, and from a later edition. He is not unaware how great an amount of criticism has been expended on Miiller's work, and how much has been said of the difficulties it presents. His aim has been (to use the expression of an able reviewer) " not merely to translate words, but to interpret thought," and to present to EngHsh readers Miiller's laborious work in plain and perspicuous English. Instead of the long, dreary table of contents at the beginning of each volume, he has divided each chapter into sections, has inserted Marginal ;N"otes throughout, has occasionally added Eeferences of his own in the Footnotes, and has appended a copious Index, which will make the work more accessible as a book of reference. June 1868. CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME. Extract fkom the Preface to the First Edition, Preface to the Fifth Edition, PAGE 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION. § 1. Twofold mode of procedure, § 2. "What Speculation is, § 3. Rotlie's theory of Speculation, § 4. True starting-point of all Speculation, § 5. Relation of Philosophy to Christian truth, § 6. The Dogmatic Monograph, 5 7 11 17 23 26 BOOK I. THE REALITY OF SIN. PART L THE NATURE OF SIN. CHAPTER I. Sin as TRANsaRESsiON of the Law. § 1. The fact of evil, § 2. Evil as opposition to Law, § 3. Is all evil a violation of the moral Law ? 28 40 45 C CONTENTS. PAGE 4. "Works of Supererogation, . . . .52 5. Is everything that falls short of the Law evil ? . 59 6. Does the Law precede or follow evil ? . 69 CHAPTER IL Sin as Disobedience against God. 1. Kant's autonomy of the Will, ... 72 2. The elements of Personality, . . 76 3. Proofs that the Law necessarily points to God, . . 82 4. Etymology of the word ** sin," . . 89 CHAPTER III. Sin as Selfishness. Division A, The Real Principle oj tht\Moral Law. § 1. Evil presupposes good, .... 94 §2. Real principle of the Law identical with its motive, . . 108 § 3. A system of Ethics based on the principle of love, . . 124 Division B. The Real Principle of Sin. % 1. Positive view — man's estrangement from God, , . 129 § 2. Negative view— Distinction between self-love and selfishness, . 138 § 3. Testimonies confirming our theory, . . .142 § 4. Derivation of various forms of sin from selfishness, . 147 § 5. Habitual and actual sin, ... . 182 PART II. THE IMPUTATION OF SIN. CHAPTER I. Guilt ; and the Consoiotjsness of Guilt. § 1. Distinction between good and evil, evil involves guilt, . I93 § 2. Degrees of guilt, ... -203 § 3. The consciousness of guilt, . . . 210 CONTENTS. XI CHAPTER II. Man's Guilt and his Dependence upon God. PAGE § 1. The sense of sin and the problems it suggests, . . 215 § 2. The providence of God, , . . . .219 § 3. The witness of Scripture concerning guilt, . 233 § 4. Doctrine of a final judgment implies guilt, . . 238 § 5. Redemption implies human guilt, . . . 251 § 6. Historical theories concerning guilt, . 257 BOOK II. EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPAL THEORIES IN EXPLANATION OF SIN. Introduction, . . . 268 CHAPTER I. Derivation of Sin from the Metaphysical Imperfection of Man. § 1. Outline of this view as developed by Leibnitz, , . 271 § 2. This theory opposed to the phenomena of life and experience, . 277 § 3. The doctrine of evil as privation, .... 286 § 4. Privative view of evil by the Fathers, . . . 288 CHAPTER II. Derivation of Sin from Man's Sensuous Nature. § 1. Statement of the theory, . . . 295 § 2. Kew development of this theory, ♦ . . 302 § 3. This theory tested by the phenomena of sin, . 308 § 4. Consequences of this theory, . . . 310 § 5. Bearing of Scripture upon this theory, meaning of crdpl, 315 Appendix, Kant's view of the origin of evil, . 334 XU CONTENTS. CHAPTER III. Schleiermacher's view of the Essence and Oeigin of Sin. PAGE § 1. Does Schleiermaeher derive sin from sense ? . . 341 § 2. ScTileiermacher resolves sin into the consciousness of sin, . 346 § 3. Schleiermaclier's theory of the relation of sin to God, . . 351 CHAPTER IV. Derivation of Sin from the Contrasts of Individttal Life. § 1. Statement of the theory, .... 359 § 2. Historical account of this theory, ancient and modem, . 365 § 3. Our moral life needs not evil as its complement, . . 372 § 4. Sin is an operative principle, and not merely external, . 379 § 5. Evil in relation to the race as a whole, . . . 386 § 6, The Hegelian theory of evil, .... 390 CHAPTER V. DtTALisTic Derivation of Evil. 1. Dualistic theories described, .... 407 2. Their untenableness proved, , , . .412 EXTRACT FROM THE PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. The Author of this Treatise deems it unnecessary to offer any lengthened vindication of the present undertaking. It is a pleasing sign of the times that the theological claims of Chris- tian Doctrine are beginning again to be fairly recognized ; but it would be well if there were not such a craving after novelty in the exposition of Christianity as a systematic whole. We by no means undervalue the attempts made in some recent works to present Christian truth in a new light ; but we feel persuaded that what is most needed is the provision of mate- rials drawn from the inexhaustible mine of Holy Scripture, and from Christian consciousness, together with comprehensive trea- tises upon separate points of doctrine, and, above all, upon each of the main doctrines of Christianity. The present work, accord- ingly, treats of a subject the paramount importance of which no one will deny. From the time when the author sat as a scholar at the feet of the beloved and revered Neajstder, the convic- tion has been deeply rooted in his mind, that Christianity is a practical thing, that everything in it is connected more or less directly with the great facts of Sin and of Eedemption, and that the plan of Redemption, which is the essence of Christian- ity, cannot be rightly understood until the doctrine of Sin be adequately recognized and established. Here certainly, if any- where, Christian theology must fight pro axis et focis, repelling deistical attenuations and pantheistic evaporations of its teachings. Is there any ground whatever for the fear that inquiry upon this subject will end only in making what we seek to explain VOL. I. A 2 EXTRACT FROM PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION. more inexplicable and involved than ever ? Is it really more prudent to leave the dark mysterious form of sin to lurk in the obscurity of inner feeling and consciousness ? It has, indeed, been affirmed by a distinguished writer of our day, that when we examine it minutely, the terrible contradiction in our being, which we call sin, really disappears, and that instead of a pro- found mystery we find only an empty word — the horror of sin wliich a religious mind feels being shown to be ungrounded. But is this really so ? It might, indeed, be so were our specu- lations based upon mere notions of the intellect, and not upon facts of experience. It might be so were we to begin our speculations by denying that sin is sin. But a consideration of sin, based upon the testimony of Christian faith, cannot possi- bly lead to the extinction of our religious horror of it, unless we presuppose this horror to be a wrong feeling, or according to Eousseau's maxim, that r homme en commengant a penser cesse de sentir. Healthy Christian Feeling has no need to fear thought and investigation, nor has healthy Thinking any reason to alienate itself from feeling ; Feeling freshens and deepens Thought, and Thought in turn explains and confirms Feeling. PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION. In again presenting my Treatise upon the Doctrine of Sin to the theological public, in an essentially unaltered form, I feel that a few words of explanation are due. The scientific inves- tigations of this great anthropological problem, which have been carried on since the first issue of my work, in the theological treatises of Heppe, Schenkel, Hofmann, Thomasixjs, Philippi, Plitt, Kahnis, and in the monographs of Ernesti upon " the Origin of Sin according to St Paul's teaching," of Bruch upon " the Doctrine of Freewill and its Relation to Grace," of Paul upon "Kant's doctrine of Radical Evil;" these, contain- ing as they do, attacks upon my endeavour to solve the pro- blem, not only urge me strongly to avail myself of the oppor- tunity afforded by a New Edition to explain and set myself right with them, but justify my opponents in the expectation that I should do so. Incumbent upon me as this duty is, I must abandon the idea of it ; because the affliction which it has pleased God to lay upon me is not yet sufficiently removed to enable me to undertake afresh, a thorough investigation of the subject ; and I have therefore determined upon a reprint of the last edition of my work, with a few alterations and additions, rather than attempt a revision, which, considering the profoundness of the subject, and its breadth, would not have satisfied me, much less my readers. Halle, 21th September 1866. INTRODUCTIOK An exposition of the Christian doctrine of sin, which would o J Twofold ^^^ ^^^y inform the reader concerning the teach- mode of pro- ing whether true or false, of the Christian ce ure. Church upon the subject at different times, but would furnish as far as possible a true view, may adopt one or other of two methods. First, it may endeavour to ascertain the doctrine of Christ and His Apostles in the New Testament : but he only will do this successfully who, with a ready recognition of the distinctive phase of thought peculiar to each of the sacred writers, combines the power of grasping their manifoldness as a whole, and of perceiving their inner unity. Or, secondly, it may take as its starting-point the pre- sent consciousness of the Church in her living members whom the Spirit of her founder has not forsaken, and systematically develop therefrom the doctrine of sin in all its essential features. In adopting the latter course we gain the advantage of being able to exhibit the various theological and other differences of thought and opinion current in our day, in their bearings upon the subject. For while the primary aim of all scientific treatment of Christian doctrine is to hold the mirror up to Christian consciousness, and to show it its own contents, — its elements and principles, and their inner connection, — it is necessary, in order to this, clearly to define and explain the intellectual apprehension of Christian faith in its relation to other prevailing modes of thought, so far, at least, as it touches upon the same province with them. Of these two methods, the first should be prosecuted The second separately, and wholly by itself, without in any method, -w^ay encroaching upon the second. Any such en- croachment would be hazardous ; it would tend to sully the INTRODUCTION. purity, and to distort the simplicity, of the critical and historical inquiry, closely connected as this is with every problem of Scripture and Theology. As to the second method, the case is different. Here — more especially upon the principles of Protes- tant theology — our consideration of the first is at the very outset presupposed, and its conclusions are adopted. The scientific exposition of any doctrine from the springs of Chris- in its relation ^ian consciousness stands in this twofold relation to Scripture, to the New Testament ; it is, on the one hand, a further development of the germ of doctrine therein contained, and, on the other, it finds therein its criterion and corrective. Still, being a development of the scriptural germ, and having progressively to determine what hitherto had been undeter- mined, it cannot be expected that every particular conclusion or inference shall have some express scriptural testimony or text for its foundation. On the contrary, we can easily under- stand how, while recognizing the fundamental relation we have named, the more exact definitions of any point of doctrine, though opposed to each other, may alike claim — with equal propriety or impropriety — the sanction of Holy Scripture. Perfect coincidence is already excluded by the recognition of the fact that the New Testament transmits Christian doctrine to us, not systematically, but as reflected in the several minds of the Apostles, and tinged with the individuality of each ; and no one who recognizes a plurality of apostolic phases of doctrine as compatible with one determinate spirit and meaning, will expect a literal coincidence in each and every representa- tion. Nevertheless Holy Scripture as a whole, and in its main teachings, will ever abide as the touchstone of Christian thinking, the standard by which the Christian philosopher will measure all conclusions : never will he assume the truth of these until he is satisfied that they are ratified by Holy Scripture, or at least in harmony with it. Christian conscious- ness is indeed the inner and immediate spring from which he draws, but this consciousness itself requires a rule and standard such as Scripture, because though genuine in the living mem- bers of the Christian fellowship, and in them alone, it possesses no immunity against the mixture of foreign and disturbing elements. Our apprehensions of theological truth will easily impart to consciousness a bias contrary to its true nature, if the INTRODUCTION. / scientific settlement of any doctrine have no objective sanction or ground of appeal whereby the accuracy of its conclusions may be tested. The data of our reUgious consciousness, on which this settlement of doctrine is based, do not assert them- selves immediately as the inward witness and experience of the heart ; they are themselves begotten in the human spirit by God's scriptural Eevelation. How, then, could the theological development of these data wander with impunity from the original testimony of that revelation ? *"' In adopting the second mode of procedure in our present inquiry, we must pause at every new sta^e of our method adopt- investigation to ascertain our latitude, and to set work *^^^ ourselves right by the contents of Holy Scripture, and thus to satisfy ourselves that we are not erring from the right way. This second method of treatment calls upon us to contem- plate the Christian doctrine of sin in an aspect of it which is quite lost sight of in its narrower treatment, to contemplate, I mean, its speculative bearings. For the inner nature of the doctrine itself, and its connection with the great whole of which it forms a part, alike witness that it has a philosophic or specu- lative side. No author in the present day can expect his readers to un- derstand the view he takes of the relation between Christian Doctrine and Speculation, unless he explains to them what he means by Speculation. It is a great mistake to suppose that Speculation denotes something fixed and settled, upon which all are agreed. Men's views regarding it necessarily vary according to the various principles which actuate the spirit world of thought. No theory of Speculation can reconcile or annul these individual differences : our theory itself is de- pendent on them. Notwithstanding the divergencies thus arising as to what § 2. What is speculative thinking really is, there is one common Speculation, ground on which all are agreed. All look upon * For a more exact explanation of this relation between the theological data of Christian consciousness and Scripture, see Domer's acute exposition of the bearing of the material principle of Protestantism upon its formal principle in his work entitled " Das Princip unserer Kirche nach dem innern VerhdltnisH sdner beiden Sdten.^'' 1841. 8 INTRODUCTION. Speculation as something distinct from Eeflection, from that mental process which deals with certain data, with phenomena which it appropriates and makes its own by continual analysis or synthesis. If this distinction between Eeflection and Specu- lation be well founded, it follows that speculative thinking must not start from certain data as its subject matter, but from determinations, which thought finds in itself as the necessary and original principles of all being, as well as of all thinking. In this sense, it follows that all speculative thinking is of an a priori, and all reflective thinking of an a posteriori charac- ter. Empiricism accordingly, which finds the origin of our knowledge solely in experience, is necessarily the antithesis not only of this or that speculative system, but of Speculation as such ; it starts from perceptions and observations, and does not admit of deductions from principles certified only to the spirit, and independent of experience ; it has certainly a claim to the name philosophy, so long as it makes the knowledge of what is universal and necessary, not indeed its starting point, but withal its goal; still it essentially follows the reflective method. More minute definitions of the nature of speculative know- ledge will greatly vary according as they are based upon the principles of Pantheism on the one hand, or of Theism on the other. The strongest current in our German literature is undoubtedly that which takes its rise in the springs of Panthe- istic thought ; its influence is apparent, not in philosophy alone, but in other sciences, chiefly perhaps in the literature of art ; indeed, the religious and political agitations of our time abun- dantly show how deeply these modes of thinking have pene- trated our national life. Since deistical Rationalism ceased to be a power, at least in scientific and aesthetic literature, Pan- theism has assumed the right of inheritance, and spurious forms of the older Eationalism have in vain disputed its pos- session. It has succeeded in accommodating itself to the pre- judices of the age, and thus it rids itself of the unpleasant necessity of criticizing and controverting other modes of thouoht disconnected with its own principles, and it measures solely by its own established standard, as if its right to do so were a matter of course. ISTow Pantheism can only explain Speculation, (with its main INTRODUCTION. ^ problem concerning relation between the infinite and the finite), Pantheistic according to the category of immanence, or more whatSpecula- Correctly of substantial identity between God tion is. and the world. It makes the essence of Speculation to consist in seeing everything in the absolute, deriving every- thing from the absolute, tracing everything back to the abso- lute, and resolving all the antitheses of the intellect into a higher unity in the Absolute. Its Absolute is not therefore an existing thought and a thinking being free of all relation, resting in itself and in itself perfect ; it is nothing more than the necessary world-principle, which realizes its own absoluteness in the world process ; — the absolute world-unity. From the category of immanence thus understood, it further fol- lows that Speculation must demand an inviolable Necessity and a rigid continuity in the derivation of all finite being from the original principle, and in developing determinations, mutu- ally dependent, attaining completeness, and having one com- mon centre. This demand has hitherto been a mere postulate „ . in pantheistic systems, or if claimed to be fulfilled, a SpmOZa. ^ J ^ rm r\ • mere assertion that it is so. Thus Spinoza main- tained that from the infinite nature of God, all things proceed with the same necessity, and in the same manner as it follows from the very nature of the triangle, {ex natwra trianguli), that its three angles are equal to two right angles. But what is this but vain and unmeaning grandiloquence, seeking the honour of Speculation in the degradation of God's infinite nature ? — the modi or qualities of the substance being all that exists, and it being utterly inexplicable how the substance comes to have ^ any modi. Or fares it better with this Necessity in the pan-logical system of Hegel, according to which, every proposition must spring from the preceding so as to form an indissoluble chain, and which knows no logical way of com- ing to Nature, save by the despairing decision of the logical Idea " to dismiss itself from itself ? " Notwithstanding the failure of these attempts, the demand Christian above referred to well indicates the spirit and design avoTdThis^^ of this pantheistic tendency; and Christian Theism theory. suffers itself to be drawn into its magic circle when it unwittingly recognizes this demand as an axiom of all specula- tion, in the deluded belief that it concerns only the method, 10 mXRODUCTION. and not the subject matter. Were Speculation, according to the true conception of it, bound by this law, we should be obliged, upon the principles of Christian Theism, to conclude that the derivation of finite being from the Absolute, cannot be a fact of speculation at all, but is a matter of faith only, and that we can know nothing whatever on this point, save what God has told us by positive revelation. It would indeed be vain presumption to make the limits of our speculative think- ing the limit of God's power, and to argue that it is impossible or inconceivable for Him to make the transition from Himself to another being by a free act of will, because, forsooth, He thus would disturb the circle of our school metaphysics, and would break the sequence of that logical process without which our Speculation would be worthless. Upon such a theory, all hope of reconciling Eeligion and Speculation would be taken away, because religion, at the very outset, refuses to enter- tain the notion of a Deity destitute of those spiritual attributes by whose activity the world is made. The effort and aim of religion really is, to look upon the world as God's world, and upon God in His relation to the world ; the temper of mind actuating it is the conviction that it has to do, not with an Object that must let itself be known because its very existence is con- tingent upon its being known, but with the Object in relation to whom we are truly Subject, dependent upon Him and wait- ing till He manifest Himself. Eeligion demands of us this humility and devoutness, lest priding ourselves upon the irresistible power of our intellectual formulae, and fancying thus to grasp the treasures of knowledge, by a strange and divinely-ordained irony we lay hold of burning coals instead of gold. Happily it is only by a feeble narrowing of its true conception, that Speculation can thus be fettered to this so-called principle of " immanence." It may be shown, not indeed from anything this principle has actually achieved in philosophy, but from its very nature, that, based upon it, speculation becomes nothing more than an isolated chain of perfectly uniform and similar elements of knowledge, a series progressing uninterruptedly and after the same method from beginning to end. And who can guarantee that this monotonous series reaUy corresponds with what is objective in nature and reality ? Who shall answer INTllODUCTIOK. H for it that the mind shall not by this method of procedure merely reflect itself in a world of its own creation, seeing moreover, that it will allow what is objective to discover itself according to this one phase or aspect exclusively ? That alone is genuine philosophy which prizes truth immeasurably above scientific formulae, which makes up its mind to throw up each scheme in turn and begin the structure afresh so soon as it finds that its entire plan and scope is too narrow for the reality of things. ROTHB in the Introduction to his Ethics (§ 2) thoroughly s 3 Roth ' discusses the nature of speculative knowledge, and theory of distinguishes between philosophical and theological Speculation, speculation. He adopts, however, a standing point of personal faith so decidedly Christian, that we are con- strained to say, — " this speculative theologian would turn his back upon all Speculation, yea, would be content to know nothing save the Catechism, rather than confide in a method which in its results might rob him of a personal God, the Thou of our prayers." According to him, it is essential to all right speculative knowledge that it shall start from one primary datum which it is warranted to adopt as immediate and cer- tain, and from this to develop by strict logic a system of thought consecutively evolved. " This system," he says, " of thought generated a priori, must, if speculation is to answer its end, be an exact and faithful counterpart or image of the universe — using this word in the widest sense, as including God ; — but the speculative process is carried on without any consideration whether or not such a universe really exists, or how the system thus constructed stands related to the universe : it goes straight on, turning neither to the right hand nor to the left, following merely the necessity of logic, whereby each newly attained con- ception, in virtue of its relation to the rest, and from its own inner fruitfulness, gives birth in its turn to new concep- tions." The distinction (according to Eothe) between philoso- phical and theological Speculation consists merely in the difference of the primary data from which they respectively start ; that of philosophy being self-consciovsness, and that of theology God-comciousness, The method is the same in both ; theological speculation is bound equally with philoso- 1 2 INTRODUCTION. phical, by the same unvarying logico-dialectic law, and by this alone. The speculative process must, even in theology, be conducted wholly apart from religious considerations and in- terests ; while still incomplete there must not be a single reference to religious convictions ; but when it is concluded, its results must be compared with the religious consciousness, in order that, if not coincident with it, it may be demolished, and a new speculative structure be begun. In considering how far we can adopt this theory of specula- Eothe right ^ion we find ourselves at one with Eothe in the in saying belief that all speculative knowledge must proceed that specuJa- ^. t , t> tion must be upon a self-consistent and connected system. ±sut systematic. ^j^^g jg j^^^ peculiar to Speculation. Experimental knowledge, provided it be not simple sensation or perception, but really knowledge, tacitly presupposes the systematic con- nection of all its parts ; without such a connection individual experience could never of itself lead to conclusions conformable with connected thought. It must be allowed, however, that this specially holds true of speculative knowledge, not only because systematic connection of thought is presupposed from the very outset, but because this connection must be made clear to consciousness in order that the relation of each particular to the great whole, of which it is a part, may be demonstrated. But when Eothe makes this systematic knowledge exclusively a priori, and a product of the logical process— as if it could ^ , not be systematic save on this condition, — we Kothe errs in , , . • • i t . i • making its must, cven on his own principles, regard this data a priori notion of what System is, as an unjustifiable limiting of speculative knowledge, and logically speaking, as reasoning in a circle. He holds that this systematic know- ledge obtained by Speculation is a true reflection and copy of the universe ; nay, more, he considers the empirical reality of things to be the touchstone whereby the legitimacy of the Speculation is to be tested. But what if the Speculation fail in its coincidence with the reality of things, fail just because in the actual relations of existence there are living syntheses which mock necessary thought, turning points where new principles appear whose activity cannot be explained by mere logic ? Is speculative thought to persist in standing wholly INTEODUCTION. 1 3 aloof from the reality of things in order to beget a universe wholly out of itself ? Away with philosophy if it is not to teach us more clearly to understand reality ! When Rothe insists that Theological Speculation must avoid Theological ^^1 reference to Christian piety — all " glancing at speculation {^ " even — until its system be complete, we allow Christian that every development of determinate knowledge piety. proceeding from some parent thought as its germ, must pursue its own course, and must not continually be in- terrupted by comparing its elements with the affirmations of the religious consciousness or the declarations of Holy Scrip- ture. This is not peculiar to speculative thinking ; the same necessity is felt even in a consideration of Christian Doctrine, as far removed from Speculation as it can be, whenever it enters upon an actual development of thought. During this opera- tion the mind's whole attention is directed to the meaning and inner sequence of the several successive thoughts, and not till a conclusion is arrived at does it compare this with what is externally certain, in order, if the external fact contradict it, to reject it. But Eothe would have us construct an entire system of speculative theology without once stopping to institute such a comparison. This idea seems to us an artificial and forced abstraction of the schools, which can never practically be carried out. Do Speculation and Christian piety lie apart from each other in separate compartments of our minds ? Is not the germ of Christian consciousness, where it really exists, the all- penetrating, all-inspiring principle of the spirit's life ? If so, we cannot speak with any propriety of " glancing at " Christian piety in our theological speculation. The inquiry must immediately and unavoidably occur to the thinker whether the system he is forming be in harmony with his Christian belief or opposed to it. , In a healthy Christian consciousness, moreover, the question concerns the relation of speculative thinking not merely to indistinct " Christian sentiment," but. to determinate Christian knowledge and belief. This is some- thing already developed and definite ; it includes convictions upon subjects which Speculation defines according to its own principles. How, then, can speculative thinking and Christian belief ignore one another ? 14 INTRODUCTION. Eothe must allow us to entertain an estimate not quite so Kinship of high, as his own of a bare system of logical concepts Chnstian ^s leading to a knowledge of the truth * What different really cxcitcs and urges us forward in speculative systems. thinking is not the law of logic, but concrete thoughts and imaginings. Hence it is that every system of philosophy bears the imprint of the mental individuaUty of its author. This fact certainly ill accords with the strange notion of a self-acting process of thought evolving all truth out of itself by necessary reasoning, so that the thinker has to keep it alone before him. We are persuaded that even Eothe him- self does not believe in such a chimera. The logical construc- tion of a system furnishes us simply with a network of thought, a web comprehensive enough to embrace, and elastic enough * Contradictory expressions upon this are to be found in Rothe's own work. At p. 8 he says, that "a system of a priori thought must, in order to succeed, be the exact and conformable image of the universe, including in this an ade- quate knowledge of God." But at p. 10 he calls it '* a vain opinion, which no clear head for Speculation will entertain, that any one can construct a perfect sj'stem of the universe by speculation alone." AVe are quite atone with him here, and on this very account we hold that the speculative thinker should not thus define his task ; for he is certain beforehand that its perfect accomplish- ment is impossible, that it can only be partially performed, for we are not speaking of a mere gymnastics of the mind, but of real knowledge. If he be ''deeply convinced that all our knowledge is partial," this need not hinder his giving his whole energies to advance it, but it certainly does forbid his under- taking to give, by means of Speculation, a perfect image of the universe, — an account of it which is not "partial." It is an obvious contradiction to set ourselves a task with the consciousness that it is unsolvable, for in this case it is not really a task at all. Ko analogy can fairly be drawn between this and the apparently similar ideal of piety — the task of sanctification : the Christian knows that he really will at length reach this ideal in the perfection of the kingdom of God ; but as to the task of constructing a system of abstract thought which shall be a perfect copy of the universe, he knows that it never can be done, neither in this world {as Rothe grants) nor in that which is to come ; for tJiere — instead of our present kind of knowledge— speculative knowledge, know- ledge per speculum, 1 Cor. xiii. 11 — we shall have sight. Or, as the threaten- ing, yet logical, issue of all one-sided a priori systems, is it there also to be our task, even to the end, to work out the satisfaction of the mind's logical and systematizing impulse in a scientifically constructed whole, whose value con- sists not in its relation to truth, but merely in its own completeness ? Once more ; we have no right to put God and the world together in our concep- tion of the universe, for then the world must be regarded as the complement of God, and this contradicts the idea of the Absolate. God is a universe in Himself, whether the world exists or not. INTRODUCTION. 1 5 to adapt itself to the contents of our consciousness. And we cannot for a moment suppose that it is otherwise in a system of ethics, which has to blend so many different voices in one harmonious whole. The mind that has not lost its own inner unity will trust its logical operations just as it trusts the life of which it knows it is a partaker. It must be allowed, indeed, that the cultivation of an accurate and comprehensive system of thought tends to rouse the mind to beget new knowledge by bringing to light the gaps in knowledge still needing to be filled ; but its pre-eminent value wOl ever consist in the criti- cal detection and rejection of antagonistic elements within its own sphere. We must abandon the notion of the abstract in- dependence of the speculative function, if we would explain the curious phenomenon that philosophical systems starting from very different and even opposite principles, the further they penetrate into the sphere of the concrete, the nearer as a rule do they approach each other ; the spiritual life of their authors holds fast the fellowship which the abstract principles of their respective systems deny. But while Eothe thus on the one hand overrates the a 'priori Rothe virtu- character of Speculation, on the other hand he dershis^a^' "^^^^ down principles wholly subversive of it, at ■priori theory, least in its application to theology. According to him, theological speculation differs from philosophical specula- tion generally, in the primary datum from which it starts, namely, our consciousness of God. But this primary datum is for us not the bare consciousness of God, it is " the Christian, pious, yea, evangelical consciousneps," (see Eothe, p. 23, 24). But this is not a simple and primary datum presenting a start- ing-point for the theologian's speculative thought, and presup- posing no other starting-points ; on the contrary, it is the title and superscription of a whole body of divinity, a fulness of con- crete elements ; and we cannot conceive how a process of thought, which makes this evangelical and Christian conscious- ness its fundamental and necessary axiom, and proceeds from it to further determinations, can be called speculative Theology, or Speculation in any true sense. Speculation, properly so called, unquestionably consists in the knowledge of the univer- sal, and of the particular or special in and through the univer- sal ; in the knowledge of the abstract, and of the concrete and 1 6 INTRODUCTION, particular in and from the abstract ; but in this case, the most? concrete elements would be made express presuppositions, and would occupy the place of the abstract. Least of all is such a theological speculation, — which, however, we may remark in passing, we cannot find in this theological system of ethics, — justified in boasting that its primary datum is fuller than that of philosophy (see p. 17). Philosophy would reply, "that may be very convenient for you, but it is a draw- back to the scientific worth of your speculation." It is easy to detect the confusion into which Eothe has fallen, in mak- ing what is immediately and absolutely certain to the theo- logian or Christian, the primary datum of theological specula- tion. The subjective certitude which needs no further proof, is mistaken for the objective certainty, which is primary, necessary, and axiomatic. Speculation, whether in philosophy or theology, must adopt as its axiom, not what is most certain to the thinking subject, but what proves itself axiomatic by a rigid necessity of thought. We shall presently see whether there be any really fixed Rothe wrong distinction between theological and philosophical in his data of Speculation ; on a difference of starting-point, as speculation. p^^^-^^ j^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^ distinction can be based. Xot only is it inadmissible to bind philosophical speculation to self-consciousness alone, and theological speculation to God-con- sciousness, as their data respectively ; neither the one datum nor the other, can be looked upon as the starting-point of any Self-con- _ kind of Speculation. Self-coTtsdovsness cannot ; sciousness is p • p m> • , .t • not a primary **^^ ^^^ consciousness of Self, IS not somethmg pn- datum. mary, which presupposes nothing else as necessary to its possible existence ; on the contrary, we find ourselves conditioned in our self -consciousness ; yea, our self-consciousness is realized only when we, in the very same act, become con- scious of something else, a non-ego from which we distinguish ourselves ; and must not this consciousness also, that there is something existing without us, have an equal claim to be the starting-point of speculation ? Descartes is usually — m the history of philosophy, and indeed by Eothehimself, — esteemed the discoverer of this starting-point, but no one can maintain that he really established it as a tenable starting-point of thought. His cogito ergo sum, is just as un- INTRODUCTION". 17 assailable as any other tautology, but as his own unequivocal explanations testify, he did not take it as presenting a starting- point for all necessary thinking, nor for metaphysics generally, but simply as affording a decisive transition from the region of hare conceptions into that of real existence^ in opposition to universal scepticism. Descartes, moreover, does not really gain anything by this transition ; for what boots it clearly to prove, as he thus does, that there is a Subject for the thinking activity, and that I am conscious of myself as this Subject, if all progressive thought be tied to this starting-point, viz., that various ideas are already involved in this act of thought, (repre- sentation, according to Descartes* language), whose reality is collectively dependent upon the one supreme idea, which of itself, witnesses its own reality ? Such a principle as this might just as well be inferred directly from the act of thinking, from the cogito, without the circuitous reasoning concerning the existence, the ergo sum, of the thinking Subject. From what has already been said it is moreover evident, XT -.1 • that our God-consciousness cannot be regarded as JS either is ° God-consci- a starting -point for speculative thought. Our con- ousness. ception of God is much too complex to be made a primary axiom ; it would, so to speak, anticipate the main point, the goal of the inquiry. It belongs to the very essence of Speculation, that it shall have an a priori starting-point ; and, apart from the question whether the existence of God is demonstrable a priori, to make our consciousness of God in all its fulness this a priori starting-point, would be utterly unjustifiable in a speculative point of view. Speculation cannot assume for its starting-point anything § 4. True more than the bare conception of the absolute of*all°pe^u^-'^ ^^ ^^^ abstract and negative sense, the abso- lation. lute as the indefinite, wherein as yet there are neither contrasts nor distinctions, but which implies the possi- bility of all contrasts and distinctions. This conception, like all concepts, requires other concepts for its explanation ; but in its self-completion as an act of thought, it is independent of all other concepts, and really precedes them."^^ As a starting-point * Miiller here evidently adopts the starting-point of Schelling's philosophy, i.e., the Absolute as the '* indifference point" of the subjective and objective B 18 INTRODUCTION. of thought, however, it must be logically justified — i.e., it must be proved to be logically the first of all metaphysical concep- tions, and the presupposition of all save itself. That it has but few distinguishing marks, and is meagre in its logical de- termination, arises from its position in the series of metaphysi- cal concepts. For the same reason, its contents cannot at the outset be regarded as actually existing ; yet no one acquainted with the history of philosophy, Gnosticism, and Mysticism, — especially in its Pantheistic form, within and without the sphere of Christianity — will deny its intensely real significance for the inner life of mankind. The manner of progress from this starting-point is un- Manner of questionably the logical a priori. For if specula- progress, tive thinking be possible, reason must possess certain necessary and universal concepts, and possessing these, it must make use of them in constructing a universal system of knowledge : it is the essence of speculation that all know- ledge proceed from these beginnings, and be kept in strict logical connection therewith. In his Dissertation upon the relation of theology to philosophy,* Stahl remarks that " the " true method of scientific inquiry is not, as is commonly sup- " posed, to start from known data, and with logical sequence to " arrive at the hitherto unknown, but rather to underlay known " phenomena with some hypothesis as yet uncertain, and to try " whether it will explain them/' We assent to this statement, provided it be applied only to the primary conception of a comprehensive train of thought ; its method, if it be of a specu- lative character, will still be the same, and if it be systematic, it must begin with the simplest determinations, — determinations which in the very necessity of thought take precedence of all others. But as we have already said, we are very far from be- whence the ego and the non-ego are evolved, that ultimate and merely negative concept which denotes what is as yet utterly indefinite, answering to what Spinoza called "substantia." The absolute in this sense, is widely different from the absolute in the sense attached to it by Sir W. Hamilton and Professor Mansel. The former, in his Discussions, p. 13, speaks of the ambiguity of the term, and gives it a threefold signification. Its meaning as used by Miiller here, is perhaps as much akin to the third as to the first signification assigned to it by Hamilton ; certainly it is totally different from Hamilton's second signification, wherein he says that he exclusively uses the term, and wherein Professor Mansel also uses it.— ^r. * Fundamenten einer christlichen Philosophie, p. 178. INTRODUCTION. 1 9 lieving that when these determinations are laid down, they will begin, like automata, to move of themselves, and, as if by an inner logical necessity, towards an unknown goal, so that the speculative thinker must resign himself blindly to them, saying with Esther, " If I perish, I perish." '"' They move only as the thinker himself puts them in motion, i.e,, only when elsewhere in his consciousness he entertains a definite problem which they must be made to solve. This problem is the eeality of THINGS in its widest range, including the highest of all realities, Eeligion. This they must help him to understand. In advancing towards this goal, each concept does not of Connection of itself give birth to another, and this other to a successive third, and so on in inexhaustible fecundity. Our concepts m ' ... speculation. Concepts do not possess this prolific power in the shadowy realm of logico-metaphysical thinking, nor can any principle of negativity, as if with dialectic spell, give to them this power. In advancing from one determination to another, the laws of logic, strictly taken, furnish only analyses of the concepts we already have, or negations, i.e., descriptions of what must, according to preceding determinations, be excluded from the following. Of course these following determinations annex themselves to those preceding, though they be really more than a repetition of them ; but they do not annex themselves unless their possibility — i.e., conceivableness — be already im- plied. In this combination all that is required is, that the new determinations be not directly contradictory to those preceding ; the principle of sufficient reason in the sphere of logic possesses only this analytic import.t This bare negativity of necessary thought it is which gives it such a destructive power over everything positive and actual, when- ever it is made the all-embracing and paramount principle of knowledge ; when it is thus exalted, nothing will save the thinker from the abyss of Nihilism but his own inconsistency in shrinking from it. Conscious of this negativity of all necessary thought, he can avoid this destructive result by taking care not to demand of it what it cannot really supply, — as, for instance, * Esther iv. 16. t "These tests (the principles of contradiction and sufficient reason) may be employed to bring our thoughts into harmony with each other, but are wholly inadequate to ascertain whether our thoughts accurately represent the world around us. They belong to pure Logic alone." — Thonison^s Laws of Thought, p. 296.— Tr. 20 INTEODUCTION. the production of new and positive elements of knowledge, — and by setting due bounds to the influence of logical proof in this sphere. Is there then no guarantee that the progressive determining „ t f ^^ ^^^ mind shall give us any real knowledge of truth in the truth ? that this speculative thinking is really specu ation. ji^qj^q than mere dreaming, more than a mere ima- gining or persuasion, based upon a subjective necessity and without objective reality ? Such a guarantee is to be found in two things. First, the connection of all these successive concepts forms a compact and systematic whole, which by its organic harmony supports and confirms each particular link in the chain, determining it more accurately, receiving determinations from it, and growing with it into a more exact and conclusive unity. Secondly, this systematic whole authenticates itself by serving as a key to the fuller understanding of the reality of things, and it thus is confirmed by what we already know con- cerning the reality af things from other sources. Here the objection, is raised that speculative thinking is thus given a second presupposition besides the starting-point above named, namely, a belief in the reality of things in the consciousness of the thinker. Eightly understood, this is not to be denied ; but it never can be the terminus a quo for the speculative method, it is only the terminus ad quern. In this reality of things a principle appears which in a very distinctive manner limits the range of The fact of t . / .^ t .i • • i ^ freedom in logical necessity, — I mean the principle oi feeedom relation to — ajj^^j inasmuch as freedom, being an active prin- speculation. .in, ■-,-, p ciple, can be conceived or only as the will of a personal being, the principle of personality likewise. All speculation that aims at discovering the true principles of reality is logically carried on from the starting-point already named, the negative conception of the Absolute — to the idea of absolute Personality. When once this principle of freedom is recognized, the concepts of a priori metaphysics and logic will no longer suffice to define what it involves : our concep- tion indeed of divine and human freedom would be a mere mockery, if it meant nothing more than the power of realiz- ing what is already necessarily involved in the very constitution of the being in whom it is. Other concepts must be received, concepts which have meaning only when predicated of personal- INTRODUCTION. 2 1 ity, if the course of thought is to follow and to embody the law (now altered in its nature qualitatively) according to which all acts in this sphere are contingent upon the Personality itself. Freedom indeed, when it does not break away from the true ideal of the being in whom it is, — when, as in God, such a violation cannot occur, — does not negative the necessary connection ; it rather takes it up into its own sphere, and elevates it to a higher range. Leibnitz, if I am not mistaken, was the first (in the preface to his Theodic6e '" and elsewhere) clearly to point out this distinction. Between the metaphysical, logical, and geometric necessity to which Hobbes and Spinoza reduce all things, and the arbitrariness of will from which Bayle and some modern philosophers (Cartesians) derive the laws of action, Leibnitz discovers the law of fitness {convenance) The law bv ^^-sed upon the principle of the best. This law of which free- fitness is, according to him, the rule by which free- om wor 3. j^^ works ; whereas on the principle of irrational necessity which excludes alike choice and moral good and intellect, and on the principle of arbitrariness, freedom is utterly excluded.t This distinction is in the main as just as it is suggestive, though we cannot altogether assent to the application its discoverer makes of it. It here con- cerns the principle of design, apparent in nature, forming a network of teleological relations above the web of aiteolo- gical considerations, and reigning supreme in the sphere of mind and in history. But the Love which designs, and the Wisdom that realizes the design, are conceivable only as the attributes of a free Being. And, conversely, if the divine in- telligence, in virtue of its absoluteness, be conceived of as raised far above the distinguishing of means and end, free will and personality when predicated of Him lose all their mean- ing. In this case, remembering that a personal Subject alone is properly speaking a Subject at all, possessing the attributes predicated of it, we have, as the ultimate solution of the pro- blem, the abortive notion of a thinking without a thinker. But to allow that God has a plan in the creation and government of the world, that He ordains means to ends, that everything " 0pp. philosophica, ed. Erdmann, vol. i. 473, 477. The principal passage in the Theodicee is §§ 345-347. f This resembles the distinction between necessitas and convenientia, of which the Schoolmen, and Thomas Aq^uinas in particular, made such frequent use. 22 INTRODUCTION. in the world is by no means alike means and end to Him, that the mind of God does not rest in the changeful world as it is, but only when His purposes are attained, — to recognize all this is to think of God, not only more humanly, but more divinely, than we could do by determining His relation to the world upon the principle of metaphysical necessity, or according to the esthetic analogy of artistic creations. It would be ut- terly inconsistent with the living and. motive energies of divine love and wisdom, if our reason (for the sake of preserving at any price the logical a ipTiori method in this sphere) deduced God's government of the world by His Wisdom and Love, by necessary sequence from the bare concepts of those attributes. The divine plan, when manifest, witnesses that it springs from love as its principle ; but if, according to Plato, wonder is an emotion appropriate to the philosopher, still more is it appro- priate to the religious man. The end which divine love de- signs as the final goal of all souls yielding to its influence is so vast, and so transcends the ideas and hopes of man, that the thought of it, when apprehended by the religious convic- tions, awakens new wonder and new awe. " Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him." Still less shall we think of anticipating, by inferences from general ideas of wisdom, the manifold wisdom of God. True knowledge is here possible to us only as we follow God's wisdom in its working ; and in order to this, there must be an inner connection between God's wise workings and all the knowledge already attained as well as what is assured to us as a 'priori true ; otherwise the new knowledge could not really become our own. The conclusions of metaphysical and necessary thinking may be likened to the Law which precedes the Gospel of this concrete knowledge ; but the gospel must never be explained merely by the law, though in all points it be essentially conditioned by the law. We cannot, therefore, regard speculative knowledge in a ^ . religious and ethical sense as merely a priori : its Speculation . i i t- • . i . f^ blends a priori method ot progress IS rather a contmual and alter- \}it\i a posteri- ^^^6 determining and harmonizing of a priori and on knowledge. . i i i i i ' " "-^^^ experimental knowledge. Of these two factors the experimental element becomes INTRODUCTION. 23 especially prominent when evil appears, and in connection with the divine plans and acts which presuppose its existence. This is the stone of stumbling upon which mere a 'priori speculation must inevitably be shipwrecked ; and by the in- vestigations of the present treatise, I hope to prove that to determine to arrive at a knowledge of evil by an a priori pro- Cess is to destroy the true conception of evil altogether. That the champions of a priori speculation should be scandalized by the more thorough investigation of this topic is only what might be expected. It throws a stumbling-block in their path, the very existence of which they find it necessary to ignore. But are we to regard it as a special characteristic of philo- ^ ^ ^ , . sophical as distinct from theological Speculation § 5. Relation , . , . i p • of philosophy that it takes no cognizance whatever or experience to Chris- jj^ j^g great facts of personality, sin, redemption ? If so, philosophy would be placed in this dilemma : either it must altogether renounce that knowledge which breathes the warm breath of life into all other knowledges, and must shut itself up in an inaccessible castle of abstractions apart from all reality, or it must make it its distinctive province to establish and maintain conclusions which contradict the reality of its object matter, i.e,y to err. The attempt rightly to distinguish between philosophy on the one hand, and Chris- tian science and theology on the other, and to reconcile them, will be fruitless so long as we assign to the latter its own dis- tinctive method, without reference to the spirit and principle of the former. But it is equally true that philosophy must not ignore the objects of theology, nor must it be left to its own bare judgment as to what it shall make the object of its know- ledge, and what it shall reject. It is the unquestionable glory of Philosophy, according to the original and true idea of it, that it shall be the universal science, excluding nothing and embrac- ing all— the science of sciences ; — and the idea of Fichte was perfectly just, though his exposition failed through partiality and meagreness in its principles, when he called the system of all true philosophy, "Wissenschaftslehre," the Doctrine of Science. As the antithesis between the philosophical and theological or practical spirit is real, their agreement and harmony is real too. A philosophy which, by its own theory and the conse- 24 INTRODUCTION. quent laws of its own method, can never do justice to person- ality and freedom as principles of real life, is the born foe of Christianity and Theology, and excludes the idea of their har- monious progress or their mutual enlargement. And conversely, a philosophy which truly realizes the principle of personality in God and in man is the natural ally of Christianity, though at times it may lead to differences and contradictions concern- ing isolated doctrines. 'Not only is such a philosophy influenced by the history of Christianity as a power in the world, but philosophical systems whose principles are anti-Christian are impelled onwards by the very goads against which they kick. All true philosophy, however, finds in Christianity its posi- tive realization, the confirmation and completion of its scientific principles. When this harmony between philosophy and theology is Modern sys- restored, philosophical development will regain terns of pMlo- the quiet and discreet bearing which it has lacked sop y- ^j^ modern times, owing to reckless changes in prevailing systems and to ways of thinking borrowed from radically different principles. Changes which not only affect the external aspect of the edifice of Christianity in certain parts, but pull down the very pillars on which it rests, cannot be esteemed either right or wise, save by a scepticism which has degraded the mind, or by that theory tanta- mount to scepticism, which, indifferent or hostile to facts as stubborn things, makes the reality of the ideal to consist in the logical process and its inherent negativity. Every- one else will recognize in these changes only a ludicrous satire of success in the avowed object of science, "viz., to trace all knowledge to its ultimate principles, and thus to a sure foundation, and to safe paths. He especially who re- gards the living fellowship of philosophy with other sciences — none of which would exchange their sure method of progress for this game of contradictory principles — as consonant with nature, as a fellowship which does not confuse, but strengthens and illumines the natural sciences, he, I say, will not esteem this strange development of philosophy a sign of health, but will regard it as a token of unnatural strain. Philosophical systems have fallen foul of Christianity, and have failed to take root in our modern spiritual life, because they cannot attach INTRODUCTION. 25 themselves to its deepest and strongest convictions. If philosophy succeeds in finding that foundation in Chris- tianity which cannot be shaken, it will still have tasks to perform which will not let it pause in the perfecting of its system, and in its ever deepening penetration into the several ranges of knowledge ; but it will no longer, like Penelope, have to begin its weaving over and over again. Such a philosophy does not of course provide a foundation for Christian faith ; Christian faith possesses within itself the most satisfactory ground of certainty, and must already have vanished if it were content to borrow its proof and sanction from philosophy. A philosophy which would pretend to provide a foundation for Christian faith, as if faith without it were groundless, really aims at destroying Christianity, and at setting up itself in its place. The service which philosophy may render to faith, con- sists in its endeavour to gather and arrange the contents of the human mind, which have their root in its tendency towards God or towards the world into one complete whole. Its per- fection lies in its attesting to Christian faith the developed perception of its harmony with all those other elements of life which have an equally true place as constituent parts of human nature. Tor " the union of Faith with all the forma- Phiiosophv ^^^® forces of the age, so far as these are true properly so and contain living germs of the future, consti- ^^ ^^' tutes PHILOSOPHY properly so called. The affec- tions can only be at rest when religion is the standard and measure of all truth, and religion receives its final solution when unchanged as to its inner truth — for it is indeed un- changeable and independent of all the vicissitudes of time — it takes up into itself all wisdom and all life." "^^* In virtue of this unstrained and natural alliance between such a philosophy and Christianity, we may call it the philosophy of Christian Theism or Christian philosophy, provided that it never ceases to be a free philosophy, and never binds itself to a theo- logical datum as its starting-point. When such a philosophy of Christian Theism shall be found, — a philosophy which shall give full expression to the idea of Personality, and shall preserve at the same time the certain results of scientific culture in its progress — conditions which, * Steffens in his Christlichen Religionsphilosophie, part i., p. 12. 26 INTKODUCTION. without depreciating any honest inquiries, we must regard as postulates, — then Dogmatic Theology may omit many elements which it has now to include within its sphere, but it will not forfeit its position as a distinct science, side by side with philosophy. Its task would be to present, in the form of in- struction, the great facts of the Eedemption which God has revealed, and of the inward work He carries on in humanity, without having to enter upon the development of the more general elements of religious knowledge which it presupposes. We can never dispense with the monographic and separate g g rpj^g ^ treatment of the several Doctrines of Christianity ; matic Mono- for it is only by a thorough investigation of each ^^^^ ^' part of the Christian system that we can attain a satisfactory exhibition of the whole, — an exhibition of it I mean, free from all formahsm, and based upon clear and defi- nite conceptions. A Monograph must investigate its theme scientifically, keeping in view the systematic whole of which it is a part ; for each part of Christian Doctrine is conditioned by the whole, just as the whole is conditioned by each particular part. A Monograph, if it be in true conformity with the system of Christian Doctrine, is a member of the organic whole ; for while it is itself a relatively independent whole, possessing a completeness of its own, every step in its argument has a bearing upon the greater whole of which it forms a part. If, again, a Monograph include the speculative treatment of its theme, there should be, on the part of its author, an under- standing of the more remote premisses of speculation, even in their simplest elements ; though the connection of these with the subject immediately in hand be not fully developed, but only indicated in a rudimentary way. The method, however, which the Monograph adopts in the Its method speculative consideration of its subject, is the very opposite of that pursued in the comprehensive ex- position of speculative theology as a whole. Whereas, in the latter case, the progressive or synthetic method is followed, in the former — the Monograph — the retrogressive or analytic:- method is pursued. While theological speculation starts from the most abstract metaphysical principles, in order, step by step, to arrive at fuller and more concrete knowledge, the INTRODUCTION. 27 Monograph begins with some one determinate Doctrine, — per- adventure, as in our case, a Doctrine the substance of which is found deep-seated in the consciousness of every developed life, — and endeavours, by analysis, to discover the general concepts and principles which constitute the hidden basis of that Chris- tian truth in the sphere of speculation. Convinced that truth never can contradict itself ; that what is true in theology can- not be false in philosophy, it undertakes to prove what must be the answer given to philosophical questions which involve the interests of religion, if that answer is to be in harmony alike with the essence of Christianity, and with the necessary facts of moral consciousness on which Christianity depends. It is obvious that the inquiry must not arbitrarily alter philoso- phical principles in order to accommodate them to some prac- tical end or subjective want ; it must proceed scientifically, so far as to prove from the very nature of those principles, that in proportion as they are universally necessary and true, they naturally find their place in a train of speculative thought corresponding to the express contents of Christianity. From what has now been said it will be seen that the object of this work is not exactly to exhibit the Protestant Doctrine of Sin with its attendant truths, as it is categorically stated and developed by our older theologians in the Symboli- cal Books of our Church. It will, we hope, be apparent that our inquiries are cbnducted in a Protestant spirit ; but, by a Protestant spirit we mean something widely different from the interpretation of the term now-a-days fashionable, which makes it the denial of all settled Doctrine and a protest against Chris- tian Protestantism. That only can we call a really Protestant spirit, whether in science or in life, which embraces the vital religious principles of the Protestant Churches with the con- viction of the mind and the affection of the heart. But in order to the Protestant character of a dogmatic investigation, a perfect coincidence with all our Church Symbols and Con- fessions is by no means necessary. It is quite possible, we believe, to rejoice and glory in the great dogmatic works of a Gerhard or a Quenstedt, as imperishable monuments of scientific Protestantism in Germany, without relinquishing the hope of one day making our Protestant theology a still purer and more living exponent of systematic Christian Doctrine. BOOK L THE REALITY OF SIN. PART I. THE NATUEE OF SIN. CHAPTER I. Sin as Transgression of the Law. It requires no special profundity of reflection but only a moderate degree of moral earnestness to prompt Fac/^f Evil ^^ thoughtfully to pause before ONE GREAT Phe- nomenon of human life, and ever and anon to turn towards it a scrutinizing look. I refer to the phenome- non of Evil ; the presence of an element of disturbance and discord in a sphere where the demand for harmony and xxmtj is felt with peculiar emphasis. It meets us at every turn as the history of the human race in the course of its develop- ment passes before us ; it betrays its presence in mani- fold forms when we fix our eyes upon the closest relationships of society ; and we cannot hide from ourselves its reality when we look into our own hearts. It is a dark and dismal niffht- shade, casting a gloom over every department of human life, and continually pervading its fairest and brightest forms. They, indeed, make very light of their philosophical percep- tions who fancy they can dismiss the greatest riddle iVn^ed.^^ of the world, the existence of evil, simply by forbid- ding it serious thought. They speak of the dis- agreeableness of reflections so studiously directed towards the dark side of life ; they find that it is on]y " according to .; Sm AS TEANSGEESSION OF THE LAW. 29 nature," that the more steadily you fix your eyes upon the darkness, the more immeasurable does it appear ; and they advise us for our own sakes to turn away from the question of evil, because our troubhng ourselves about it will be of no avail save to plunge us into gloomy melancholy.* How gladly should we follow this advice if only Novalist were right in his bold promise,' — which expresses the mind of Carpocrates the Gnostic,J and that perhaps of Tichte also, — that, " if a man suddenly and thoroughly persuaded himself that he was moral, he would really be so." Were it true, that if a man with firm resolve shook off " that old and grievous delusion of sin," as a wild and empty dream, he would be free from sin, who would not in so easy a manner be released ? But as the well- known device of the ostrich does not save it from the weapon of the hunter, so the mere shutting of our eyes to the reality of evil does not make it vanish, but delivers us only the more surely into its power. In order to be conquered, the enemy must first of all be known ; and the very complaints of the disagree- from other ableness of such reflections strongly witness how troubles of dangerous it is to shrink from them. When other liffi. . things indeed disturb and hinder us, we consider it an honourable effort on a man*s part to disregard them ; and yet we feel we ought to abhor this plan as mischievous in the case of moral troubles. Bodily pain and physical evil we have in common with all living beings ; they pertain to the lower and physical part of our nature, and the prevailing power of the spirit appears doubly noble in rising above them. But moral *" We find this advice (very like what some modern philosophers give) in the celebrated work of Boethius, (born at Kome, 445, beheaded 526), De Consola- Hone Philosophiae : — *' Vos haec fabula respicit, Quicunque in superAm diem Mentem ducere quaeritis. Nam qui Tartareum in specus Victus lumina flexerit, Quidquid praecipuum trahit, Perdit, dum videt inferos." t Novalis, born 1772, in Mansfield, died 1801. See his Schriften, vol. % p. 248. X Carpocrates lived during the first half of the second century, at Alexandria. 30 THE REALITY OF SIN. [booK I. PART I. evil, wickedness, belongs to man alone of all living creatures in nature ; it has its seat in the spirit, in the Will ; and if this discord has penetrated the spirit itself, what else has man within him whereby to rise above it ? Wickedness is not the only source of disturbance in the spiritual life, and yet it stands quite alone in the manner in which it works upon our consciousness. If man discovers any striking defects in his mental organization, or unavoidable hindrances to a more per- fect culture and a more vigorous perception, he is pained at it, but he does not reproach himself for it ; let him be conscious of willing what is wrong, and he immediately knows that he is without excuse. If our earthly life be fettered with many hard conditions, a thorough and comprehensive reflection will teach our iiature^° ^® ^^^ ^^ reconcile these with our higher nature and our great destiny ; evil alone is excluded as absolutely alien from and repugnant to our nature : no higher ground of contemplation, no clearer perception can ever recon- cile us to it. To the problem with which the youth struggled hard, the man of mature age returns ; but the stern experience of real life which he has acquired, and his deeper knowledge of mankind, have only increased the difficulty of solving it. Some philosophic modes of thought may boast of having, by a speculative theory, quite resolved moral evil into a general necessity, and so of having transformed the dark background of existence into light and clearness ; but real life strides on unconcerned alike about the false self-exaltation of the schools and the self -degradation which would forbid the consideration of the subject. The advocates of this opinion are, in fact, refuted by their own experience and conduct, for wrong-doing always awakens in them a feeling altogether distinct from that with which they contemplate the unavoidable limitations and un- toward circumstances of this our individual life ; and, moreover, they actually deal with wrong-doing in a manner wholly dif- ferent from their treatment of the inevitable imperfections of humanity. This theory does not explain the real facts of our moral life and consciousness ; it gives them the lie, and the facts avenge themselves by taking no notice of the theory. But the moral nature with which evil is so boldly and strik- ingly contrasted, as an element alien and repugnant to it, is CHAP. I.] SIN AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. 31 not that which prevails in real life ; nor does it correspond with the actual state of mankind generally. Evil, with its manifold ramifications, has so intimately intertwined itself with, and grown into human nature, that judging by appear- ances we might conclude it to be part and parcel of that nature. It is a higher truth concerning our nature, a truth perceived only by a more profound reflection that enables us to judge of evil as a perversion which, though we cannot destroy it, ought to be rejected as an intruder. In this consciousness there is, I say, a truth unveiled which Q - rules our life with unlimited authority, so far as moral obliga- the moulding of it is in our own hands ; i.e., so ^^^^' far as our life is conditioned by our conscious self- determination. The power which, by self-determination, we possess of deciding our own state and its influences upon others is denominated will. The true conception of will is, not the bare act of choice or decision only. This we must allow to be possessed, in a certain sense, by creatures without intelligence, and as existing in the organic life of nature by virtue „ of its development from its own principles.''^ Self- determination only beconies will when it is conscious of itself, and when the subject of it is able, beforehand, to think upon that which by self-determination he realizes. The deeper truth of our nature expresses not that which actually is, but that which OUGHT to be ; an ought which is intended to pass into act — i.e., to be realized or obeyed ; but which, though not yet realized, does not cease to assert itself as an obligation, a rule of life, a necessity limiting our will. This inner practical truth of our nature does not of necessity realize itself immediately, carrying into effect the duty im- posed. This belongs to the sphere of spirit, and only through the spirit can it be realized. Accordingly, the physi- cal possibility of a deviation therefrom, is not excluded from the self-action of the will. The necessity with which it first appears is itself a moral one, and it has elasticity enough to admit of that possible deviation ; still it has unconquerable energy enough ever to assert its authority, notwithstanding actual contradiction. "^ " In a certain sense," for strictly speaking there can he no mention of self determination where there is no real Self. 32 THE REALITY OF SIK. [bOOK I., PART I. This practical truth which absolutely governs and yet does The moral ^lot compel the human will, is the moral law. law. The moral law as the rule of the human will, is none other than moral good. Hence, it is clear, that the con- ception of the law presupposes the conception of the good ; and f if an ethical system follows the true order, this latter concep- ] tion must be deduced prior to the former, and independently of I it. The impression of sublimity and of majesty which the moral law makes upon the mind that contemplates it, provided its sensibilities are still unblunted, does not arise from its form merely as an unconditional command, but from the very nature of its contents, upon which the form itself depends. Kant in his moral system directly reverses this order, maintaining that the conception of the good is to be determined after the law and by the law ; and then he enthusiastically apostrophizes the great name of Duty.* Schleiermacher justly objects that such a glorification of duty must be taken as applicable even to the ethics of Eudemonism for example, because a merely formal conception of duty cannot be refused a place even in that system.t ' If in our present exposition we depart from the true and genetic order which ranks the conception of the good and right before that of law, it must be remembered that our business is not to set up a system of morality, but to take cognizance of the DISTURBANCE of our moral life in all its sad reality. In order to arrive at this knowledge, our mode of procedure must, from the very nature of the subject, be first of all descriptive . This disturbance of our moral nature must be reflected in the mirror of our contemplation in the very form in which it pre- sents itself to the inner perceptions of mankind generally. We must begin with the phenomena in order to search out its inner nature. The moral law embraces the whole of human life, so far at The moral law ^^^^^ ^^ *^^^^ ^^^® ^^ dependent on the will ; but it in the ab- does this by occupying the highest place above it. stract. g^ j^^^y .g -^g throne, that as we take our stand there and look abroad, all the minor varieties of moral duty * Kritik der praktischeu Vernunft, 6th Ed. pp. 91, 125. t Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sitteiilehre, p. 180. (1st Ed.) CHAP. I.] SIN AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. 33 in the several spheres of human life and stages of human de- velopment vanish, and fundamental moral truth presents itself in simple yet majestic outlines. And yet as we descend, every thing that is of a moral character in all those various spheres and stages must find a place within these outlines, and must prove itself to be in due perspective and harmony there- with. Thus there is a wide distance between the moral law far above us and our moral life here below in its concrete limi- tations, (wholly apart from the question of harmony or discord between the two,) a barrier so to speak of wide extent, which ai-ises from the very nature of law. The principles of the law demand the obedience of man in every moment of his life, and yet they never descend to the minute moral circumstances of his position ; they can never tell him in detail and exhaus- tively how he is to demean himself in relation to them. Tar above the minutise of actual life, the majestic greatness of the law appears, great in its uniformity, great also in its reserve. This sublime elevation, which the moral law sustains towards Causes of this ^^® actual life of man, even when that life deve- abstract lops itself and acts according to its commands, is e eva ion. owing mainly to two things. The first is indivi- duality in the widest import of the word. A moral act, viewed as the determinate outgo of actual life, is never simple and isolated, it is complex and many-sided, and its real moral import, both as to contents and to form, depends partly upon the distinctive character and idiosyncrasy of the doer, and partly upon the special nature of the social relations in which he is placed. Now, as the law presents only a general outline of the normal condition of man*s will and life, of what ought to be applicable alike to all, the distinctive duty of each individual could not be detailed therein. The second consideration more closely concerns our present investigation. As to the first, it is impossible for the moral law accurately to define individual duty ; this is a task which even ethical science with its wider appliances can only approximately perform. Between its con- ceptions and principles on the one hand, and the circumstances of the individual on the other, there must always be a dispro- portion, or at least a gap which no rules can obviate or fill up. What alone can do this is the conscience of the man himself, asserting itself and acting in the manner of an immediate VOL. I. c 34 THE REALITY OF SIN. [booK I. PART I. feeling or moral instinct. The second thing to which the ab- stract position of the law, as the rule of our life, is owing, is the MORAL CONDITION OF MAN ; this is the presupposition and starting-point, the basis and source, of all effort to fulfil the law. We cannot here consider the diversities of this condi- tion ; suffice it to say, that even when this starting-point has undergone a radical conversion and renewal of the moral life, the endeavour after harmony with the moral law is still a con- tinual conflict with inward and outward hindrances. Even in this case, man still requires a moral instructor to take him by the hand, inclined as he is to sin and error though he has been " apprehended " by the divine principle of the law, and to teach him to know the moral process whereby he may progressively realize the moral law in his life. The law itself, however, does not become his instructor, but overlooking the changes and stages of the intermediate course, it contents itself with pointing out to him the right and perfect as his goal. What then are the intermediate conceptions wherewith Rothe's Ethics fills up the interval and applies the moral relative^ ^^^ ^^ ^^^ given circumstances of actual life ? It morality. must not do this by lowering the standard of the moral law, accommodating it to the ability of sinful man, renewed though he may be by the redemptive work of Christ, and prescribing for him only a relatively normal moral con- duct. Yet this is the solution of the question proposed by Eothe, who, in his Theological Ethics, investigates the true con- ception of the moral law with his wonted acuteness.""'^ The moral law would, by this explanation, be deprived of the ideal authority which, (even according to the scientific language used by Eothe to describe it), really belongs to it, and that dictum of * Among other places, see book iii. §§ 806-809. Here Rothe distinguishes between the moral law in a wider and in a narrower sense. By the first he un- derstands the original and perfect standard of human conduct, the morality of which, according to his theory, consists in the absolute subjection of material nature to personality. But he does not look upon this simple principle as actual law, he would rather call it a moral standard or ideal pattern. It is, indeed law for the Saviour, but not for the Christian. In his view the moral law is strictly speaking, "that formula for human guidance in virtue of whose re- straining power the actual performance of moral duty is rendered possible to sinful man, and guaranteed for him through that divine grace of which by redemption he is made a partaker." — P. 13. CHAP. I.] SIN AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. 3 5 Kant, " I can, because I ought," in its reverse form, " I cannot, and therefore I ought not," would become the canon deter- mining what the moral law should be for us. * Such a limita- tion of the true conception of law in its moral bearing, is not in harmony with the language of Holy Scripture regarding it ; indeed, it compromises the entire system of morals and the true and adequate knowledge of sin, as will appear in our progressive inquiry. It may further be remarked, that no ethical system can include in the conception of the moral law, those individual- izing contingencies which arise from the given conditions of actual life, and which vary according to nation, age, and person, t In this case, we should have to treat the moral law itself as mutable according to circumstances, and this would directly contradict its ideal import. The older Theology, that of the Middle Ages, and that of the True idea f Protestant Church, was perfectly right in consi- the moral dering universality, equality for all, and un- ^^' changeahleness as determinations inseparable from our conception of the moral law. Its most essential and distinguishing attribute, viz., its unconditional authority, depends upon these. It is quite out of place therefore, at least in the accurate and scientific use of words, to speak of different Moral Laws, one moral law for heathens, another for Jews, and a third for Christians. The only allowable dis- tinction here, is that of a more or less perfect exhibition of the one Moral Law ; and what is called the Christian moral law * That Eothe's conception of the limits of the moral law really implies this, is clear from the grounds upon which he refuses to recognize " the moral standard " as a moral law for us in our actual state as sinners. It cannot be directly bind- ing upon us, because in consequence of natural depravity, we are not in a posi- tion wherein conformity to it would be possible. At p. 12, for instance, he says, **it demands an absolute normal obedience, but even with the help of divine grace, we can only render an obedience relatively normal." But this may with equal truth be asserted of any of the commandments, e.g.^ of that which Christ calls the first and great commandment, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength." Indeed, according to the explanation of the Christian moral law which Rothe gives, it would follow, that even this precept cannot rigidly be considered God's practi- cal law for man. + That Rothe does this likewise, is evident, for he holds that the moral law in the range of its concrete determinations, is in a state of continual change. -§§ 820 f. 36 THE REALITY OF SIN. [bOOK I. PART I. is only the pure and perfect embodiment of that one law.* This embodiment of the law does not necessarily presuppose the sinfulness of the being to whom it directs its commands ; the prohibitive form of some of these commands is only the inseparable exclusion of what is contrary to the right and good denoted, and this necessarily presupposes, not the reality, but only the possibility of the sin forbidden. From the universality of the law in the abstract, and its sameness for all, there necessarily arises a range of special limitations which bring it into closer connection with man as he is, in actual experience of life, within the confines of time and space, having various claims imposed upon him by his own wants and the wants of others, whether persons or communities, fettered moreover and hindered by sin without, and by a hard conflict within. This complicated series of particular commands and duties, is evolved from the relation of the universal moral law to the given circumstances of the individual, but its only sure objective basis is that high and authoritative original. In this intermediate range arises also what is ordinarily Collision of Called the collision of duties. This collision or duties. clashing of definite moral precepts, arises generally from the circumstance, that a man has claims laid upon him for the performance of several simultaneous and perhaps con- * Hence, of course, we disagree with Rothe wlien he says that "neither the moral character of our Lord, nor the moral precepts of the New Testament, can be made the Christian's standard." His argument is, that the morality of our Lord was absolutely normal, whereas ours, even when perfect, can be only re- latively normal ; and moreover, that the moral precepts of the New Testament presuppose a moral condition and circumstances wholly different from our own. "We, on the contrary, affirm that the morality of our Lord is a standard for us for the very reason that it was absolutely normal. Rothe would make Christian morals, as they actually appear in each particular age and sphere of life, the stan- dard of Christian morality for that time. But so far from claiming the title of " reformer of Christian morality," the Protestant Christian will recognize the standard of Christian morality in vogue at any given time as law, only so far as it is in harmony with the standard of morality laid down in the New Testament, i.e., in no wise as really law. How could any changeable form of Christian mor- ality, variously defined in various circumstances, possess that divine authority, which even according to Rothe, resides in what is really the moral law? This readiness to recognize an unconditionally valid standard for our conduct in the objective reflection which the passing stage of the world's history casts upon the mirror of our moral consciousness, is only in keeping with the pantheistic bias from which the speculative principles of this system are not free ; a bias necessarily arising from Rothe's views, concerning speculative method, to which we referred in the Introduction. CHAP. I.] SIN AS TEANSGEESSION OF THE LAW. 37 flicting duties in every moment of his conscious life, claims far more numerous than he can possibly fulfil, considering his finite nature and his multifarious moral relations. Strictly speaking, this " collision of duties " always exists ; but he notices it only when the conflicting claims press upon him with special live- liness, and seemingly with equal moral force. Having thus distinguished these two great momenta, the ^ n : , . universal moral law, and the particular moral obli- Dehnite duty. _ . . ' • ^ ■ ^ i GATION, there is, m the series, a third stage where- in the moral standard is actually transferred to and embodied in the experience of the individual, I mean the definite duty. Herein is pointed out to man the moral conduct becoming him at any given time, and in any given relations, excluding every other wish or act on his part. We may venture to adopt the words of Schleiermacher here, though not in precisely the same sense as he, that every determinate and fixed duty is a distinguishing between conflicting duties.* And from this it will immediately appear that properly speaking there is no such thing as a collision of duties. The true harmony of the several parts in the unity of the moral law, and the uncon- ditional and commanding authority which characterizes its pre- cepts, are restored again in the positive duty now defined and settled, so that the end of the series coincides with its be- ginning. But in the interval, between the ideal starting- point and the practical goal, the moral law passes through a multitude of moral relationships, with their respective claims upon the individual mutually limiting and narrowing each other, so that it often requires the unravelling of a tangled web of duties in order to ascertain what is the individual's duty at any particular time. It is evident therefore, that ethical science can never decide what is a man's clear and definite duty in any given circumstances, by progressive and logical in- ferences from its primary principles. The final and completing decision must be left to the conscience of the man himself. The internal perception of the moral law as a rule uncon- The inner ditionally binding, is so essential a part of human witness of consciousness, that were it wholly wanting in any one, we should be compelled to doubt the complete- ness of his humanity. It never is wholly absent ; — indeed it is a * System der Sittenlehre, heraxtsg. von A. Schweizer, § 327. See also Rothe's remarks on this point, pp. 63-75. 38 THE REALITY OF SIN. [bOOK I. PART I. fact of great significance, a wonderful witness to the original nobility of the human spirit, that even in the very densest dark- ness of sin there still linger some elements of the highest know- ledge, and still glimmer some sparks of ideal truth. At the lowest depth of this moral darkness we may find moral apprehensions so perverted as to be almost irreconcilable with the first prin- ciples of this knowledge ; but cases such as these can only be looked upon as isolated exceptions from the universal rule. Even the most uncivilized man will recognize the dictates of justice as valid and binding, when brought to bear upon the behaviour of others towards him ; and only when they are applied to his own conduct, do they sometimes become dark and doubtful. The moral law also verifies itself practically as an objective Embodied in power in history, because its principles form the human law. p^^e and living germ of all the various rights and duties of man in the family, in the state, and in society generally. Thus, as an objective power, the law may be said to compass man about, onwards from the very first moment of his life, with an authority silent indeed, but never wholly to be slighted, and obliging him in some degree to yield to its demands. But the subjective motive of this compliance is not only in innumerable instances wholly undeveloped, it may even be in many cases positively perverted. It is evident from the hints here given regarding the rela- The Mosaic tion of the moral law to the consciousness of Law. man, that its elevation to an ever-increasing clearness of subjective conviction depends upon the progressive development of the human spirit generally ; and it also follows that it must be exposed to disturbance and darkening in individuals and nations, through the force of propensities and tendencies of the will that strive against it. Hence it comes to pass that a positive revelation of the moral law — a oivino- of the law — appropriately finds its place in the series of God's historical revelations to man. The Law of Moses is clearly in its moral precepts nothing more than a republication of the moral law in its intrinsic truth, suited to the wants of the Israelites ; and, in order to preserve the knowledge of it in the midst of the darkening and perverting influence of human wilfulness and sin, it was necessary to have it committed to CHAP. I.] SIN AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. 39 writing as an actual standard of appeal * But as the moral law was in this case embodied in a code, clothed with outward political authority and interwoven with ritualistic and civil laws, it had to accommodate itself both to the character and historical relations of the Israelites, and to the requirements of the stage of moral culture which the age had then reached. The exposition of it as a whole had therefore to be limited, and its moral principles are exhibited only in the broadest outlines. An unprejudiced consideration of the Mosaic law obliges us to allow that while it announces the eternal principles of true morality, and is ever calculated to beget the knowledge of sin and repentance, there is in the Christian Church, through the power of the pattern of holiness in Christ and of the divine Spirit, a far more developed and deeper knowledge of the law than could possibly have been given to the Israelites through Moses.t This view of the moral law cannot be subject to the reproach Practical ^^ reducing it to an abstract ideal, hovering over power of the mankind in powerless and inactive transcendancy. There must, indeed, to a certain extent, be a leav- ing out or renunciation of the idea of immediate fulfilment and realization in our conception of the moral law. It rules the will, and yet must so far stand aloof as to allow to the will the ability of resisting its rule. But though the individual for himself may overrule the binding authority of the law by his arbitrary will, this cannot be done to any extent in a community ; — so closely are some of its principles interwoven with the very existence of society, that the denial of their authority would be the ruin of society itself. The person even who refuses to direct his will any longer by the law, cannot free himself wholly * Augustine very beautifully says, regarding the Lex scripta (Euarr. in Ps. Ivii. 1), '' Quia homines appetentes ea quae /oris sunt j etiama se ipsis exules facti sunt, data est etiam conscripta Lex ; non quia in cordihus scripta non erat ; sed quia tufugitivus eras cordis tuij ah illo qui uhique est comprelienderis et ad te ipsum intra revocaris. " + It in some degree confuses the questions arising from the continual obliga- tion of the moral law upon the Christian, when the older theology of our Churc]i, in the Formula ConcordiaCj part ii., chap, vi., de tertio legis divinae usu, usually fixes its eye exclusively upon the Mosaic Law in its moral bearings. The asser- tion, for instance, that all that Christ announces in His Sermon on the Mount as rs'X'^pua-ts tov vofiov is only the real and immediate import of the Old Testa- ment commands, is on the face of it an arbitrary one. 40 THE EEALITY OF SIN. [bOOK I. PART I. from its sway. The repudiated law follows him in his self- perversion, and will not suffer him wholly to rid himself of the sense of an inner discord. But how could the violation of the moral law, proceeding from a will which renounced it, cause an inward strife and variance in the very consciousness of the man if the law itself were not inherent there ? In conformity with these conclusions we find that our con- „ 2 g sciousness presents to us the evil which is in our OPPOSITION TO will, in the form first of all of opposition to the ^^^^" law. The man now for the first time becomes morally conscious of a demand requiring of him the uncon- ditional submission of his will to its authority, and obliging him to give up everything rather than refuse olDedience. He perceives it at first by a kind of higher instinct of the reason as an instantaneous feeling, yet not less real than when it takes the form of a developed insight discerning its inner necessity. From this moment the man becomes conscious of evil as evil, as opposition to a demand unconditionally binding, and as actual rebellion against a law whose sanctity ought never to be called in question. And who can deny that in this inward perception there Hes The truth im- ^ deep truth 1 that thus there may be imprinted plied in this, q^ the mind, though only in a relative and indis- tinct manner, a strong conviction that evil may be overcome and put away ? In opposition to the universal and impartial authority and to the holy necessity of the moral law, man in evil doing manifests a principle of subjective choice and unbounded arbitrariness of will. This arbitrariness is not the less real because it hides itself conveniently under the guise of a moral accommodation to, or compliance with one's nature, which claims an exceptional law and a privileged tribunal of judgment. The demand so often made in our day, that the moral law must modestly retire before powerful natures, strong passions, complicated relations, and make way for them, does not spring from a healthy sentiment, but from a feeble deification of mere power. True strength consists in submitting the will to the recognized call of duty, in spite of the fierce impulse of one's own nature, and the pressure of circumstances. It would be conferring upon man a very CHAP. I.] SIN AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. 41 poor honour indeed, if, in the last instance, he must follow the rule which amid conflicting powers of nature assigns the right to the strong. It is clear certainly, from what has already been said, that the positive moral duty of any one in any given case cannot be decided by the moral law alone ; that duty depends not only upon the drift of the law, but also upon the distinctive individuality of the Subject himself, and the distinctive peculiarities of his position. Hence arises a pheno- Spontaneous menon continually to be met with in human obedience. experience. It is this. If we examine the springs of moral action in daily life we shall find, in thousands upon thousands of cases, that even where the moral act bears the impress of the law, there has been no conscious reference to the law or its general requirements. Without any resort to general principles, the man in his decisions obeys the calls of particular circumstances, whose moral import and binding power he has become once for all assured of, and his individu- ality gives to his acts a form of their own, distinct from the acts of any one else. But herein the particular duty is not apart from the universal law nor opposed to it, on the contrary it is included in it and subject to it. The individuality has itself become false and perverted, and the circumstances illegiti- mate, if they can no longer be subordinated to the moral law.* If individuality be not blended with reverence for that impartial and unerring law which is the same for all, the more energetic it becomes the more ruinously will it operate. And if these definite circumstances and relationships of common life press upon the man with all the weight of moral power, this arises from the moral law which dwells within the heart — the original source of their just claims. If these rela- tions, in the forms which they assume, break loose from their true and primary source, they can impose themselves upon the * It is clear that we do not here refer to Jacobi's polemic (especially in liis Sendschreihen an Fichte) against the attempts of the philosophies of Kant and Fichte to bring all moral life nnder the dominion of one formula ; because Jacobi himself in his Allwill has expressly combated the principle of moral com- pliance with nature and its pretence to self-legislation. Kevertheless he cannot be said to have solved the autonomy involved in this — the apparent contradic- tion, I mean, between the sovereignty of personality over the abstract law, as affirmed in his first-named treatise, and the subjection of personality to the universality of divine commands as affirmed in his last-named work. 42 THE REALITY OF SIN. [BOOK I. PART L man and fetter him, only through the blind and precarious force of habit, or by the interests of selfishness. If this be the true import of the moral law, then — however abstract our conception of it-^ evil in all its ramifications and individual manifestations may be described as a violation of it. It cannot be denied that sin usually presents itself to us in Sin obiec- ^^ objective form. Whether we take as our stan- tively con- dard — the violation of which constitutes the essence of sin — the Mosaic law, the pattern of Christ, and the precepts which He and His Apostles gave us, or Conscience alone, it is, in our very conception of it, independent of our wishes and subjective fancies, and binding on us in virtue of a higher authority. And it need not in the least confound us that subjective fancies, even the most morally perverted, have often been put forth as the decisions of conscience ; for what truth, however sacred, is there, which may not similarly be misunderstood or wilfully misinterpreted by infatuation or hypocrisy ? But if we analyse our conception of sin, we shall find that it is never entirely without a subjective element dement''^'''' likewise. It would be quite impossible for us to define the moral law, even in its broadest outlines, as distinguished from the laws of nature, without specifying its exclusive reference to beings possessed of will. No one could for a moment think of charging the lower animals with transgression of the law ; indeed, we can only speak of " the sins " of children in a potential sense, as possibilities, not actualities, so long as will and the moral law exist in them in 2Mentid only.^^ Neither can the charge of breaking the moral law * Upon the same grounds Augustine fully recognizes this freedom from sin, propriae vitae in the case of very young children (see his Treatise, De pecc. mer. et remiss,, lih. i. 64, 05). But some Pelagians, in order to avoid the argument for original sin from the practice of Infant Baptism, attributed actual sin to new-born children to account for the necessity of baptism. The elder Lutheran theologians on the contrary were compelled, chiefly by their principle that origi- nal sin where it existed must be embodied in actual sin, to attribute peccata actualia to new-born children (see Hutter, Loci Communes, art. s.., cap. i. 3 ; and Quenstedt, who has a distinct qucestio [the 14th in the polemic section of the chapter De peccato], An in infantes usu rationis destitutos cadant peccata actu- alia?) Here the inference seems almost forced upon us, *'If an aipso-/; ufiapT^Zv (plural) be appropriated by the new-born child in baptism, he must alieady be guilty of actual sin." CHAP, ij SIN AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. 43 be brought against the, man whose conscious self-determination and will, though present, has been deranged by some physical cause. I say physical, for if the connection between self- determination and action be disturbed only by the unrestrained power of the lower impulses, the validity and force of the moral requirement would not be done away. The will must be lord within its own house, and that preponderance of the lower impulses is something that ought not to be. But in the face of any necessity of nature and against its power, the ought of the law has no significance. Insanity, again, severs the connection ; as also do the severest types of feverish diseases and the like. In such cases the iniquity which lies hidden in the heart may be exposed to view, but actual sin cannot be committed. This subjective element of free will is necessarily involved in the very essence of sin. Whenever anything free wuT^^ °^ ^^ ^^® ^^^^ ^^ ^ being who determines his conduct consciously is found to be in opposition to the moral law, it is, according to this principle, characterized as SIN ; — without examining how it may have originated, or in what relation it may stand to the moral consciousness of the Subject, and to the degree of his present development and power. Taking this description of sin as in the main just^, though it does not sufficiently unveil for us its inner nature, we must nevertheless recognize and allow that all further deter- minations and inferences, essentially pertaining to sin, will be found wherever violation of the moral law objectively occurs. Holy Scripture likewise defines the conception of sin in this sense, when it declares j? afMaprla iarlv t) avofjLia{ 1 John Scrip^re.^' ° ^- ^)' "^^^^ expression occurs in the course of an argument against the laxity which, recognizing the general authority of the divine law, did not take it as applying to several sinful practices, because, forsooth, they were not ex- pressly forbidden by the letter of the Decalogue.* In opposition to this depraved sentiment the apostle, in the preceding words (Tra? o TTotMV rrjv afxaprlav koI ttjv avofMiav nroiel), inculcates the truth that a partial obedience will not satisfy the claims of a l^w which demands perfect purity both of will and deed. He * See Liicke's Commentary on the Epistle of John, and Neander, " Pflan- zung dev Kirche,'' p. 144. 44 THE EEALITY OF SIN. [BOOK I. PART I. shows the blameworthiness of everything sinful, in contrast with the purity spoken of in verse 3, (dyvov elvai), by describing it as opposition to the law of God. When to the declaration — Tray 6 irotSyv Tr)v dfiapriav koi ttjv dvofitav iroielj " every one that committeth sin also committeth transgression of law " — he adds, Koi 7} dfiapTia iarXv 17 dvofiiaj " and sin is transgression of law " — his intention, certainly, is to define the conception of sin thus : — " And herein consists the nature of sin, sin is a repudia- tion or violation of the law." The first proposition, viewed by itself, might be understood as meaning only that transgression of the law is one out of many elements in the true conception of sin : but the second defines the thought more accurately, because it puts the two concepts side by side as co-extensive and logically convertible.* The elder Dogmatists of our church were wont to support their definitions of sin by this text.t In order more fully to define the nature of evil in relation Three Ques- ^^ ^^^ moral law, THREE QUESTIONS must be TioNs PRO- answered. First, Is all evil a violation of the pobED. moral law ? or does the law apply only to outward act, and not to inner motive, not to the prevailing state of the inner life and character ? Secondly, Does evil denote that only which positively contradicts the law, or that also which fails to satisfy the fuU claims of the law ? Thirdly, may not the law and our consciousness of it be really the consequence * If with Kostlin, ("Der Lehrbegriff des Evangeliums und der Briefe Johan- nis," p. 246), we adopt Lachmann's reading, xa) a^a^r/a Utiv « aw^/a, it would appear, considering St. John's usual accuracy in the use of the article, that a.(i.ttf>ria. should be taken as the predicate, **and violation of law is sin." But this would be a very weak and unmeaning proposition in relation to the words immediately preceding, and is not bettered by the exposition, "sin is really sin because it is included in the conception of avoftia, but this avo/t/a is really sin." As the words occur in this passage, a,vafi.U is clearly the stronger, and kfia^Tia, the weaker and less determinate. Even with this reading, therefore, and in spite of the omission of the article, we should have to take a^a/ir/a as the subject. t Melanchthon : defectus vel incUnatio vet actio pugnans cum lege Dei. {Loci Theol. depeccato, 1569, p. 97.) Gerhard : discrepantia, aberratio, dejlexio a lege, Calovius : illegalitas seu difformitas a lege. Baiek : carentia conformitatis cum lege. BuDBEUs : violatio seu transgressio legis divince. Baumgarten : transgressio legis seu absentia conformitatis cum lege. CHAP. I.] SIN AS TEANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. 45 of evil, and not, as we have represented it, its presupposition or basis ? As to the first of these questions, Schleiermacher maintains S3 ThbFirst ^^^^ ^^® ^^^ immediately applies to action only,* Question and that it does not of itself require us to look CONSIDERED. ^^^^ ^-^^ outward deed to the inward motive.t This view is manifestly akin to that of Kant, though Schleier- macher draws a very different inference from it. Kant infers that the moral law is a standard for the government of action, and for the several distinct decisions of the will ; whereas Schleier- macher, in conformity with his more thorough and comprehen- sive view, holds that the knowledge of right and wrong in morals ought not to be put in the form of law or command.^ He considers that law is insufficient to produce the knowledge of sin, and to present to us the goal of perfect holiness. Schleiermacher accordingly declines to adopt the definition Schleier- of sin as " transgression of the law."§ For if the law macher's view. qj{[j bears upon the outward act and not upon the life, i.e., the habitual character of the man, moral goodness in its fulness must be more than the fulfilling of the law, and the proposed definition of evil is essentially imperfect. Much that a high sense of rectitude will unhesitatingly pronounce evil, — e.g., habitual depravity of mind, perverted inclinations, passions that have attained so fearful a predominance, that the will, having so often listened to them, does not act but is driven, — could not, according to such a definition, be included in our con- ception of evil. Are these internal disorders to be considered evil only because they manifest themselves in perverse acts when opportunity offers ? Certainly not ; on the contrary, no sooner does the consuming flame of selfish inclinations and passions begin to burn in a man's heart, than he falls under the power of evil, though these inward feelings may never be realized in corresponding crimes. This is Schleiefmacher's view, and, to a certain extent, we How far accept it as true. If the law as moral, contains a correct. call to duty, if the form of command essentially * Kritik der Sittenlehre, p. 179. t Glaubenskhre § 112, 5 (vol. ii. p. 250, 2nd ed.)- X System der {allgemeinen) Sittenlehrej § 93 (p. 65, Schweizer*s Ed.), § Glauhenslehre, § 66, 2 (vol. i. p. 399). 46 THE REALITY OF SIN [bOOK I. PART I. belongs to it, in so far as it addresses the will in order thereby to be realized in human life, it certainly has to do primarily with the self-movement of the will to a decision^ Accord- ingly the act, — which must not be taken in its narrow sense as How far referring only to the outward part of it — the act, wrong. I say^ as a whole, is the primary object or aim of the command. Still, however, everything in the man's life which really springs out of his act, is its derived or secondary object. Thus the limits within which Schleiermacher would confine our conception of law, are already broken through. The law overrules, not only the deed, but the very being of the man, because it begins with the inner part of the act, the senti- ment, which includes the fixed and habitual tendency of the person's will, his motives and state of feeling, his likes and dis- likes ; so far as these again are determined by the prevailing tendency of the will.t It is unquestionably essential that these internal and abiding impulses of life should be harmoniously governed in order to the attainment of that moral perfection which no one would ever think of finding in the mere outward conformity of action to law. Thus there is nothing in the true conception of the law which excludes its bearing upon the pre- vailing moral state of the individual ; and taking it in its pure and full import, we may describe it in a general way as the presentation of the moral ideal in the form of a com- mand."^ * The full explanation of this position will find its appropriate place in the course of our inquiry concerning the Freedom of the Will in the third Book. + There are indeed many men of note among theologians and philosophers who have pronounced this growth of a man's real nature (as far as moral character is concerned) from the will as its source, to be impossible. Thus Harless (Christ- lichen Mhikj 6th Aufi. p. 25), viewing inclination as part of a man's being, says : — "I do not know that I am what I am through my will ; but I know that I cau will through that which I am." I would here confine myself to the remark, in passing, that while I fully allow the latter or affirmative portion of this pro- position, I cannot admit its negative part. For we may with a just discrimina- tion say both '*I am what I am through my will," and "I will, through that which I am." "As I will so lam" and '' As I am so I will," + Lactantius had this import of the law clearly in his mind when he called Christ viva proisensque lex (Institt. Div. 1. iv. c. 17, 25), and so had Augustine when he said ''Lex Domini ipse est, qui venit legem implere, non solvere " (Enarr. I. in Ps. xviii. ), and Christ Himself refers to the same relation especially in Matt, xi. 28-30. That the demands of the law extend to perfect holiness, is well sho>vn by Augustine, De spiritu et littera, c. 14, 36, CHAP. I.] Sm AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. 47 The law thus dwelling in the spirit of man is a matter of knowledge, more or less clear ; and blended with theTaw ^^ ° *^is knowledge, in virtue of man's moral nature, prompts to its is an inner instigation towards its fulfilment. For since moral good is understood to be law for the will, it is also recognized in its bearing upon practice, and in its authority making obedience incumbent upon us ; and such a recognition of it cannot be imagined without some impulse, however weak, to bring the will into harmony with it. Wliere such an impulse is wholly wanting there can hardly be any knowledge of the moral law, worthy of the name. It has been reserved for that no longer human but diabolical hatred of God, which is the most horrible of all the horrible pheno- mena in the moral life of our day, to dissolve or pervert this connection between the law of God and man's sense of obliga- tion. It discerns nothing in the moral law beyond the arbi- trary will of God as a lawgiver demanding the submission of man, and accordingly, it refuses to discern any moral obliga- tion to obey that command. There is nothing, however, in this inner impulse to fulfil the law blended with the knowledge of it, to give the man power to realize it in a single step of his own development ; on the contrary it requires of him that he shall have this power in himself. In accordance with what we have already said, we rea.dily „, , grant that the most perfect presentation of the The law em- ° _ _ ^ T . • i ■,-, i bodies the moral law cannot exhaustively express all the l)erfection of fundamental principles of morality, nor the various moral bearings of every act of will. But the law does present the perfection of moral life in its main outlines, and in relation both to our moral being and our moral acts. And from this it is evident that what some are wont to call '' legality " as distinct from morality, is properly speaking any- thing but perfect coincidence with the moral law ; in other words, this notion of legality has no place whatever in the sphere of morals. Even in the case of national law, obedience does not consist in the bare outward act ; it is not satisfactory unless that springs from a true national sentiment which adopts the principle of the law ; for even the practical in its true nature has a moral basis. 48 THE REALITY OF SIN. [bOOK T. PART I. Holy Scripture abundantly witnesses to this comprehensive Testimony of significance of the moral law, understanding there- Scripture, by, as it usually does, the Old Testament exposi- tion of it. When, indeed, the apostle Paul (Eom. x. 5 ; Gal. iii. 12) so strongly insists o iroi'^a-a^ avra ^TJaerat iv auroi^, he seems to favour the limitation of the commands of the law to the mere act. A close examination however shows us that he has here in his mind the contrast not between outward action and inward sentiment, but between a righteousness wrought out laboriously by our own endeavours and the righteousness of faith. Again, when he says (Phil. iii. 6), regarding his early life, " touching the righteousness which is of the law blameless," and adds that he was dissatisfied with that righteousness (verses 7 and 8), it is clear that he makes the assertion according to a human, or, more strictly speaking, a Jewish judgment, which looked only to the outward works (elf Tt? hoKel aXko^ ireTToiOevai iv aapKl, iyo) fidWoVy ver. 4) ; he has no idea whatever of glorying in a real fulfilment of the law in his previous life (compare Eomans vii. 8-23). The apostle shows us how far removed that narrow view of the law was from his present belief by an expression which he uses in Eom. vii. 14, where he describes the vofio^ as irvevfxartKo^, that is, coincident as to its contents with the will and mind of the Spirit of God. If the commands of the law had no bearing upon the inner man — upon his affections and motives — Paul would not have been justified in deriving from it the piercing knowledge of sin, the inrlyvcoo-i'i dfiapriw; spoken of in Eom. iii. 20. It would be in direct contradiction to such passages as Eom. ii. 13, viii. 7, Gal. V. 22, 23, to suppose that the apostle held that even when a man had perfectly fulfilled the demands of the law he would not necessarily be St/cato?, and an object of the divine approval, because even in that case the sentiments of his heart (which God's judgment always looks to, Eom. ii. 29 ; 1 Cor. iv. 5) might not be in keeping with his outward conduct.* This * This is Schleiermacher's view. In a sermon preached in 1830 {Predigten, in der Ausg. seiner sammtlichen Werke, vol. ii,, p. 655) he says: "As law concerns outward conduct only, God, when He judges according to law, must recognize actions as legal which spring from a heart that is still alien to every God-pleasing sentiment. "We are wont to say that no flesh can be justified by the works of the law because no one can perfectly keep the law ; but we may with equal propriety also say that no flesh can be justified by the works of the law CHAP. I.] SIN AS TKANSGRESSION OF THE LAW, 49 would lead to the conclusion that the cause of man's inability under the dominion of mere law to attain the BiKatoavvTj ©eov is to be found in the objective character of the law itself, and not in man, not in moral state into which sin has brought him and which now renders the law a dead and " death-working " letter. But this would be contrary not only to such declara- tions as we find in Rom. vii. 12, 14, viii. 3 (iv w rjaOevei Sia rij? (rapK6<;), but to the fundamental views of the apostle as to the relation between the Old Testament economy and the New ; views which recognize the truth that the law in itself would be a way to righteousness and life (Rom. ii. 13, vii. 10) provided that man in his natural state could satisfy its demands. St. Paul accordingly does not hesitate to declare it as the aim of the work of redemption " that the requirements of the law might be fulfilled in us," Rom. viii. 4. What he finds wanting in all law is not the perfect exhibition of moral goodness for our information, but the power of communicating moral life (Gal. iii. 21). It cannot help men to the possession of right- eousness because the cdp^ (Rom. viii. 3) hinders their perception of it and checks the natural impulse associated therewith to fulful it.* In accordance with this view of the law Christ refers the young man who came to Him asking, " What good thing shall I do that I may inherit eternal life ? " to the keep- ing of the commandments (Matt. xix. 27). And who can for a moment doubt that He speaks of a sentiment pervading the entire inner life when He expounds the true significance of the Law in the Sermon on the Mount, and in Matt. xxii. 37—40 (in which latter place there is special reference to the Mosaic because a man might perfectly fulfil it and yet would have no claim to the approval of God." But here Schleiermacher contradicts his own better judgment as stated in Der Kritik der Sittenlehre, p. 181 f., where, notwithstanding his theory of the exclusive relation of the law to action, he will not allow that any act can be in an ethical sense conformable to law if it does not spring from pious motives. Dr. Schmid discusses this point very thoroughly in his instructive Weihnachtspro- giamm for the year 1832 — De notione legis in theologia morali rite cojisiituenda. * See Neander, Planting, &c. , p. 658. This very testimony to the weakness of the law (Rom. viii. 3) shows that Paul recognised this inner impulse to obedience as indissolubly involved in the knowledge of the law. "Were it a matter of mere theoretical knowledge without constraining power, it would be quite out of place to speak of its being " weakened by the flesh " as the reason why it fails to lead man on to its fulfilment. It gives the knowledge, it awakens the impulse ; but it is shorn of its power through the flesh. VOL. I. D 50 THE REALITY OF SIN. [bOOK I. PART I. law) ? How again could He designate the love of His disciples to one another, which should correspond to His love towards them, as a new commandment (John xiii. 34), if in the very conception of the law there were an exclusive reference to the mere outward act ? * If we now inquire what it was that led Schleiermacher to Ground of ^^^® limited apprehension of the moral law, we find, Schleierma- as he himself intimates, that it was this : he c er s view. believed that man's inner nature and his moral sentiments could neither be defined nor measured by any law.t That they cannot be generated by the law we allow ; but why the law should be unable to describe their perfect form we cannot see. There is nothing in the form of command insepar- able from law to prevent its defining perfect morality in its inward and spiritual as well as in its outward form — the motive as well as the act. According to Schleiermacher's ethical principles, the law cannot give this exposition of perfect duty ; on the contrary, laws have no plea in ethics save "to express the external action of the reason upon nature." J We can only remark in passing that this is quite in keeping with Schleiermacher's notion that a system of ethics should be constructed according to the analogy of natural science. § In the sphere of nature we elevate our deductions as to the method of her working into laws of nature, when and so far only as they are realized in nature's life ; and it is thus that Schleiermacher would regard law in the sphere of morals likewise. If this were so it certainly would not be consistent to take law as the expression of moral perfection, and to make the recognition of its contents (though as based upon the ideal they carry with them the evidence of their own truth and necessity) independent of the * In proof that the fundamental views of the Reformers as to the nature of the moral law coincide with our own, we will only quote the definition which Melanchthon places at the beginning of the section De Lege Divina in his great dogmatic work : * ' Lex Dei est doctrina a Deo traditUy praecipiens, quales nos esse et quaefaceret quae omittere oportet." + Glaubenslehre, § 112, 3. t System der Sittenlehre, § 95. How this action is to be understood may be gathered from the preceding sections, §§ 92-94. § ^bid, §§ 62, 63. Compare, too, the conclusion of the dissertation upon the difference between the laws of nature and those of morals in the Schriften der Berliner Akademie der Wissensch. 1825, CHAP. I.] Sm AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. 51 degree in which that perfection is realized by humanity at large or by its most select and noblest specimens. Indeed according to Schleiermacher's view, the category of " the ought " stands in as close a relation to the sphere of nature as to that of morals.* But would not the science resulting from these principles be a philosophy of history rather than a system of ethics, bearing the same relation to history that speculative physical science bears to experimental physics ? t The view Schleiermacher takes of freedom is evidently traceable to the same source. He takes it to be merely an inspiring and strengthening liveliness of nature, and he makes the acts of free will subordinate to the general course of nature, just as the action of the powers of nature generally are subor- dinate thereto.;]; * Ibid. § 63. Here, among other things, it is said, "What ought to be and what is are non-coincident (airw^cro-wTw) in both spheres ; in the sphere of morals perhaps the approximation seems to be greater." The dissertation upon the difference between the laws of nature and those of morals further carries out this thought. t Twesten has similarly expressed himself in his admirable introduction to Schleiermacher's Qrundi'iss der philos. EthiJc, pp. xviii, xlviii., evidently with- out intending to find fault with Schleiermacher's treatment of ethical science. J G-laubenslehre, § 49, § 81, 2. It is easy to see how closely these contrasted views are connected with the question concerning the significance of evil and its influence upon human development. The vacillations of opinion regarding the relation of ethics to the moral distinctions of good and evil so accurately indi- cated by the editor of Schleiermacher in § 91 and elsewhere of the System der Sittenlekre, are very striking. This relation was thus described by Schleier- macher at an earlier date : '* The contrast of good and evil denotes the positive and negative factors in the process of the growing unity of reason and nature (which process it is the province of ethics according to Schleiermacher to ex- plain) ; or Ethics is the development of the contrast of good and evil, or the exposition of good and evil in their co-existence." Now this corresponds with the fundamental view of the nature of morality indicated above. But when, in the most recent revision of his Ethics, Schleiermacher totally excludes the con- trast of good and evil as beyond its sphere, and will admit no ethical element into the science save under the conception of moral good, and not even good as opposed to evil, but good as denoting the union of reason and nature by the activity of reason ; when, moreover, in the same connection he distinguishes so decidedly between the contrast of perfect and imperfect and that of good and evil ; these determinations manifestly violate the principles of that view, and in their logical results would have obliged him essentially to modify his doctrine of free will, of law, and of evil. Erom this change of opinion in his Lectures upon morals in 1832 we venture to conclude that his noble and profound spirit was engaged anew in the investigation of the problem of evil in the last years of his life. 52 THE KEALITY OF SIN. [boOK T. PART I. We must not here overlook a question of undeniable im- , _. portance in ethics which comes within the range of § 4. WOKKS ^ . T . 1 P .1 J- • OF SuPEBERo- our inquiry. It is that oi the opus super erogatwms, GATioN. jf^ besides deficiencies in the form in which moral truth is presented in the law, moral perfection be not expressed in its contents, it is clear that moral performances are possible which go beyond its demands ; and conversely, if there be such performances the law does not express moral perfection. It is precisely on this ground that the boldest and best informed of modern controversialists in the Eoman Catholic Church under- takes the defence of the so-called works of supererogation. MoEHLER maintains "'' that he who is sanctified in Christ and filled with His Spirit feels himself always superior to the law, " It is," he says, " the nature of that love which springs from G-od, and which stands higher, infinitely higher than mere law, never to rest satisfied with its present manifestations, and ever to be fertile in devising new ones ; so that Christians of this stamp are often looked upon as enthusiasts, visionaries, or fanatics, by men who adopt a lower standard." Bellarmine has arrayed together a large number of The Catholic quotations from the works of the Fathers in order View. to show that Origen, Basil the Great, Gregory ISTazianzen, Chrysostom, Cyprian, Ambrose, Jerome, and Gregory the Great, allowed the possibility of works which more than satisfy the claims of the law, maintaining this in connection, with the very old distinction between a higher and an ordinary virtue.t It was, however, during the Middle Ages that this conception received its more exact elaboration, and its established place in the system of Church doctrine. The coTisilium evangelicum corresponds with the opus supererogationis ; the general vows of monachism — poverty, chastity, and obedience — ■ are treated of in both; and the sacraments apart, it was chiefly by these vows that the contents of the gospel law were exalted above the commands (praecepta) of the Mosaic and the natural " SymboUk, 3rd ed., p. 214. Moehler died at Munich in 1838. t De membris EccUsiae militantis, lib. ii., De Monachis, u. xii. {Disputt. de controvv. chr.fidei, torn. ii.). Bellarmine (born 1542, died 1621) adduces other testimonies, but they are insufficient. He has at the same time passed by the oldest Christian witness for this view — that which occurs in the Shepherd of Kermas, lib. iii. similit. v. 3 : "Sipraeter ea, quae mandavit Dominies, aliquid honi adjecerisy majorem dignitatem tibi conquireSf'^ dx. CHAP. I.] SIN AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. S3 law. Christianity does not, it is said, enjoin these vows, it only advises and recommends them ; and it is evident that the divisions and subdivisions of directions by which these works of supererogation are prescribed under the conception and designation even of a law {lex evangelica) must be very in- definitely meant as such * The essence of law, as bearing upon the will, is not to recommend but unconditionally to command ; that only is moral law which possesses the character of moral necessity. The scholastic theologians, however, do not treat the ques- The Scholas- ^^^^ ^^ exactly the same way as Bellarmine and tic View. modem Catholicism. Thomas Aquinas, who upon this topic is the most accurate of them, puts the concilia evangelica and the opera supererogationis in the sphere of ASCETICISM. In his view they serve very well as means (in- strmnenta) the better and more easily to lead men on to the perfection of moral life and blessedness ; t but he is far from regarding these renunciations and performances as essential steps towards this perfection, a perfection which he defines as a perfection of love, in accordance with that summary of the law which Christ Himself gave. Matt. xxii. To the question, moreover, whether perfection depends upon the commandments or upon the counsels, he replies, " It consists prineipaliter et essentialiter in praeceptis, sectmdario et instrv/mentaliter in consiliis." | Indeed, Bellarmine himself seems to coincide with Thomas Aquinas in this his view of the matter. He not only expressly refers to it in his criticism of the Liber Concordiae,§ but he uses similar language in the beginning of his book De Monachis.\\ But the further development of his conception of the opvs supererogationis by no means confines itself within the limits of that modest view. In order not to differ with his master, Bellarmine distinguishes a twofold perfection, the one necessary, * For Thomas Aquinas (born 1227, died 1274) also thus defines "principali- ter " the conception of the lex nova : It is " ipsa gratia Spiritus sancti in corde fidelium scripta." — Summa Theol. Univ. Prima Secundae, qu. 106, art. 1. t Ibid., ii. 1, qu. 108, art. 4. Thus the deliberative and hypothetical form in which these moral determinations are stated by Thomas Aquiaas gives to them 3, better foundation on which to base them. t Ibid., ii. 2, qu. 184, art. 3. § Judicium de libro Cone, sextumm^ndacium (Disputt. de controw., torn, iv., p. 1185, ed. Paris). || Cap. 2. 54 THE REALITY OF SIN. [boOK I. PART I. the other beneficial ; the one necessary ad esse, the other necessary ad hene esse : the one needful in order to blessed- ness generally, the other to a higher degree of glory in the kingdom of God. The latter perfection is the portion of those only who perform more than is commanded by fulfilling the evangelical counsels.* But as Bellarmine also must recognize the avaice^a'Kaloxn'i of all divine commands in the declaration of Christ in Matt, xxii., to what monstrous inferences is he driven ! In order to show that man may do more than " love God with all his heart, with all his soul, and with all his mind," he tries to weaken the sense of this command by exegetical artifices, or to extract from it a lower sense as well as a higher ; venial sins are said not to contradict it ;t and he who loves God with all his heart is not obliged to do all that God counsels, but merely what he commands.^ In these inferences we have the most striking refutation of the principle from which they spring. Is that to be regarded as genuine love, corresponding to the divine command, which so discreetly weighs what in the strictest sense it owes, in order forsooth not to do too much, and which sets itself up before God with the cool explanation, " Thou admonishest me indeed to consecrate my whole life to thy service, but I am under no obligation to obey thy warnings and counsels, but only thy commands " ? If there really were a higher moral perfection in the manner of life which those evangelical counsels enjoin, and were man really more acceptable in God's sight by observing them, then he certainly would be bound to strive after them, and not thus to strive would be sin.§ It is perfectly absurd that man should possess a moral power which transcends his moral obligation. On the other hand, it is easy to understand why the Catho- Inconsistency ^^^ Church has never ventui^d to make what she of Catholic recommends as the true perfection of man's life teac mg. ^^ earth a general command. For wherein con- sists this higher perfection but in the abandonment of certain spheres, which have their necessary place in the great whole of * De Monachis, cap. vi., vii., ix., xii. f Ihid, cap. xiii. + Ibid, cap. ix. § Peter Martyr (Vermigli, born 1500, died 1562) urged this objection in his exposition of 1 Cor. ix. Bellarmine quotes him in his De Monachis^ u. xiii. ' ' Promoveri nolle est delinqueref " says Tertullian (Z>e ExhortcUione Caatitatis, cap. 3). CHAP. I.] SIX AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. 55 free human life, as being morally impenetrable ? Had this renunciation been made a universal duty, the marked variance between this one-sided church morality and the general moral duties of human life would be brought to light. The evil, however, is not remedied by avoiding such an extreme as that. If to withdraw one's self from active spheres of life be recog- nized as a higher degree of holiness, then any participation in them is darkened by an insurmountable profanity, which, as history testifies, cannot be removed by raising one of these spheres, that of marriage, to the dignity of a sacrament ; as if an obvious contradiction of the theory could be a corrective of it. ^ While shrinking from essential parts of our moral duty in- dicates a false timidity and anxiety, the belief that we can excel the law is no less a proof of false confidence, and of a self- delusion almost inconceivable in men of any moral earnestness and experience. Our astonishment at such self-confidence is very much lessened when Bellarmine informs us that the full discharge of works of supererogation may be carried on by a man simultaneously with acts of sin, i.e., venial sin."^ And here is exposed to view that pernicious root of this Root of the whole system, and of many other errors of Catholic Ethics, the piecemeal and anatomical treatment of morals in relation to the idea of " good works and merit." This moral anatomy has reached its climax in Jesuitical morality, the chief doctrinal errors of which arise from its prin- ciples of philosophic sin, of moral acting according to proba- bility, of good intention, which justifies the worst means, and of mental reservation. If this be the moral import and worth of the doctrine of works of supererogation, we cannot give up, for the sake of it, the ideal character of the moral law, according to which perfec- tion alone fully satisfies its perfect demands, t * De MonachiSj c. xiii. In Mohler there is often apparent a play upon dif- ferent ideas which are confounded with each other, c.gr., '* love stands infinitely higher than law," which can be taken only subjectively. Then he says, **tho free impulse of love produces a far better righteousness than the mere conscious- ness of the law — of its express and immediate command." In this sense the principle is undoubtedly true, but contains nothing that is not fully recognized in the doctrine of the Reformers. t Compare the clever criticism of this representation in Batjr's work Gegen- 56 THE REALITY OF SIN. [booK I. PAKT I. As to the Scripture testimony regarding works of superero- „, , . ^ gation, no passage has been so frequently urged Teaching of '^ ' i i • ^ i i • e Scripture ; by CathoUc theologians as the declaration or our Matt. XIX. 21. £qj.^ ^q ^jjg ^^^Yi young man ; — a declaration which is said to have decided Antonius, the founder of monasticism, and Francis of Assisi, in taking upon them an ascetic life ; — " If thou wilt he perfect^ go arid sell that thou hast and give to the pooVy and thou shalt have treasure in heaven, and come, follow nie" (Matt. xix. 21). The young man, in reply to his question regarding the way to eternal life, was iirst re- minded by Christ to keep the commandments, and thereupon had expressed his belief that he had kept them all — a belief which Christ does not contradict. To what then could the words cited refer, save to a higher perfection far above the bare fulfilment of the law, which by self-imposed poverty he was to attain ? This explanation of the words el Se ffiXec^s reXeio? elvat is untenable, because, according to the words of Christ immediately following (v. 23, 24), the refusal of the young man deprived him (at least for the present) of participation in the kingdom of God, and of possession of eternal life ; — unless indeed, we were to adopt the arbitrary distinction of the Pelagians between the kingdom of God and eternal life. Accordingly, the fulfilment of the law on the young man's part was as yet in Christ's judgment imperfect,"^^ and the injunction was not intended as if to point him to a perfection transcending the keeping of the law, but to show him the idols which he was really worshipping in violation of the very first commandment of the Decalogue. It is therefore plain that Christ's require- ment was by no means meant as a counsel which the young man might have neglected with impunity. satz des KathoUcismus u. Protestanthmus, 2d ed. p. 301 ff. Baur refutes it on the ground of the ideal nature of the law ; this is affirmed in answer to the instances of works of supererogation there adduced. * See the exposition of the words by Neander (Lehen Jesu, 4th ed., pp 589- 592). We need not stop to prove that the «yar»!(riv auTov of Mark (x. 21) simply expressed Christ's good will and approval of the young man's earnestness, considering his limited knowledge of himself and God. And it is further plain that the words wanting in Matthew, but given by Mark and Luke, 'iv trot vo-Ttpu — In h (Tot >.j/cr», require in the due connection of the sentence the addition '* in order to obtain eternal life," and if authentic, favour the interpretation above given. CHAP. 1.] SIN AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. 57 Catholic theologians next refer us to the case of the Apostle Paul (1 Cor. ix. 12-18), who made it a matter of 12-18. ^^' ^^^^^ ^^^ ^^ boasting, that instead of preaching the gospel as an hireling, he exercised his apostolic office with love and unremunerated. We may here refer to the thorough development of that passage in its true meaning by ISTeander/'^ The fact that the apostle expressly says (v. 18), that if he did less, it would be an " abuse " of his power in preaching the gospel, shows how little he thought he was doing more than was actually required of him by the special relation he was placed in, and his individual responsibility. It is curious that the very text which Protestants in ancient T , .. ,^ and modern times adduce as the weightiest witness Lukexvii. 10. . . T 1 ■ i_ against the opus supererogahoms, and which spe- cially troubles CathoHc controversialists in the vindication of their doctrine,t contains, when closely examined, the greatest apparent sanction that can be cited from the New Testament for the possibility of works of supererogation. I refer to Luke xvii. 1 0. If he who has merely done all that is commanded him is to esteem himself " an unprofitable servant " because he had done nothing more than his duty, the question occurs, Are we to apply this judgment to the perfection of a moral life ? If we reply in the affirmative, it would follow that Christ Him- self must have included His own holy life in the conception of the Sov\o<; d-)(^p€to^. But if this cannot be entertained, how shall we avoid the inference that a kind of Adrtue must be possible which does more than what the law demands ; — an opus sicper- erogationis, though in a far more spiritual and inward sense than the Catholic Church usually apprehends ? In answer to this difficulty it must be remembered that our Lord's expression refers to the Jewish view of the law, which regarded obedience to the outward letter only. He is not there- fore speaking of a fulfilment of the law according to its full import. His aim is to humble the selfish and self-righteous spirit that would keep the law merely for the sake of the re- * "Pflanzung der Kirche," p. 746, + An interesting collection of the manifold objections urged by Catholic theologians against the Protestant application of this passage is given by Ger- HAKD, Gonfessio GathoUca, lib. ii. , art. xxiii. , cap. yiii., Deper/ect. et meritis opp. It is only Salmeron (born 1515, died 1585) who usually hits the right point. 5S THE EEALITY OF SIN. [boOK I. PART L ward, and which, boasting of right and service, would demand payment (v. 9). Man must remember that as far as merit is concerned, with all his fidelity and exactness of obedience, he is still only a servant — '* an unprofitable servant." ^^" Such a position, however, is left far behind when he becomes no longer a servant but a child of God.t Modern Catholic theologians, justly feehng the insufficiency Adroit reply of. the scriptural argument, have endeavoured by a of Komanists clever tum to make this very weakness of the doc- to the argu- . « , -, ment from tnne of the evangelical counsels and works of super- Scnpture, erogation the means of its strength, by representing it very plausibly as a freer development of Christian ethics in contrast with the strictness of the older Protestantism. While Protestantism does not recognize any ethical determinations which cannot be traced back to the express words of the law as contained in Holy Scripture,| the Catholic Church seems to afford freer scope for the development of the Christian piety, because it considers that pious impositions are justifiable and right, though they cannot be proved from the letter of Scrip- ture, provided that they tend in a legitimate manner towards the goal of perfection set before us therein.^ When we come to look more closely into it, however, this seemingly free de- velopment turns out to be itself another code of laws, prescribed * 'Axp^i'os in classical Greek usually means aimless, useless, unserviceable ; so in Matt. 29, 30. But this meaning of the word is quite inappropriate in the passage, however it be interpreted. For the meaning usually adopted here the LXX. in 2 Sam. vi, 22 is the only precedent ; where the Hebrew ^B6^' T T ' low, humble, is rendered by otp^^itosj though usually by TetTmns. t Taking this view of the passage, we should more naturally suppose that Christ was addressing the Pharisees and not His disciples. And verses 7 and 8, both in the external relations referred to, and in their tone of thought, make this very probable. The fact that in verses 1-6 Christ is speaking to His dis- ciples is no argument against this view ; for it is very difficult to prove any real connection between those six verses and the parable following, unless we resort to an artificial exposition, such as Neander {Leben Jesu, p. 642) and De Wette (in ioc.) recognize in Schleiermacher and Olshausen. i Compare the numerous sayings of Luther and the dogmatic statements of our symbolical books. Also, regarding the Mandatum Dei as the condition of every good work, Chemnitz's Examen Cone. Trid. de bonis operibus, qu. 2 ; Ger- hard's Confessio Caiholicaj lib. ii, art. xxiii. cap. 7, de norma bonorum opp. Quenstedt's Theol. didactico-polemica, p. iv, c, ix. sect. 2, qu. 2, Quae sit norma bonorum operum directrix, § Bellarmine, De Monachis, c. ix. CHAP. I.] SIN AS TEANSGEESSION OF THE LAW. 59 and enforced by the authority of the Church, though always put in the form of a good counsel. When, moreover, our older theologians rightly protested that whatever was to be imposed as a pious ordinance in the Church should be in strict confor- mity with the express words of Holy Scripture, they by no means exempted the private Christian from the duty of matur- ing his own moral knowledge, and of moulding his manner of hfe upon the foundation and plan of Holy Scripture, yet freely developing its contents in his own principles and character. Having found the untenableness of the doctrine of works of § 5. The supererogation, we are naturally brought to our QussTi*oN second inquiry. The moral law, regarded in its CONSIDERED, truc import, demands nothing less than perfect obedience ; is everything that falls short of this to be described as moral evil ? Taking the question in its widest range, it manifestly amounts to this, is the concept freedom from evil, i.e., moral integrity and spotlessness, identical with the concept moral perfection ? It is of course obviously understood, that when we speak of moral integrity, we have to do only with beings possessing a moral nature. Of lower existences in nature, we can predicate neither moral purity nor immorality. Bellarmine and other controversial writers of the Eoman Komanist Catholic Church, answer this question in the nega- view. ^Iyq^ They allow that the law demands moral perfection, but they deny that when a man endeavours with all his powers to fulfil the law, his shortcomings arising from natural weakness are to be regarded as transgressions of the law, Bellarmine, following Thomas Aquinas,*^ makes a distinc- tion between obligatio ad fmein and ohligatio ad media, meaning by the one, the obligation to perfection, and by the other, the obligation to the most earnest and persevering efforts towards perfection. He only who fails to fulfil the latter obli- gation is a transgressor of the law.t * Thomas Aquinas lays down the principle, '* Quilibet tenetur tender e ad per- fectionem, non autem tenetur esse perfectus" see his Secunda Secundae, quaest. 186, art. 2. t De Monachis, cap. xiii. De amissiorie graiiae et statu peccati, lib. v., c, x. Compare Andradius ortkodoxae explicationes (1564), lib. v. p. 396 if. In sup- port of his view Bellarmine quotes Augustine, who expressly recognizes this distinction between moral perfection and sinlessness, e.g. De libero arhitrio. 60 THE REALITY OF SIN. [BOOK I. PART I. The early theologians of our Church, on the other hand, give Protestant ^0 *^is question an affirmative reply. They look theory. upon every act or state which does not ade- quately embody moral perfection, as SIN or transgression of the law."^^ The design which Catholic theologians have in view in making the distinction I have named, is to prove the possibi- lity of an adequate fulfilment of the law by human effort, and the working out of a meritorious righteousness of our own in the sight of God ; and Bellarmine makes special use of it in his endeavour to prove that the precept forbidding concupis- centia belongs only to the dbligatio ad finmi. We can very well conceive how greatly our Protestant theologians would dis- trust a distinction made on purpose to prop up an erroneous dogma, the more so, as they saw their opponents inferring therefrom such destructive conclusions as those of Bellarmine, that " venial sins are committed not so much contra legem but praeter legem, and are sins not absolutely, but only rela- tively," t or, as that of Stapleton, " the precept which requires lib. iii. c. 22 : '^^NonproptereaDeusanimammalamcreavitjqulanoTidumtantaest, quanta ut proficiendo esse posset accepit ; " and afterwards in his treatise, De spi- ritu et Uttera, c. 36, where he distinguishes between the perfect righteousness of God and a minor justitiay and adds, ' ' Neque enim si esse nondum potest tanta dilectio Dei, quanta illi cognitioni plenae perfectaeque debetuvj jam culpae depu- tandum est. Aliud est enim totam, a^sequi caritatem, aliud nullam sequi cupidita- tern" But Augustine is not always true to the insight here indicated. In his De morihus Manichaeorumy c. 6, he had before made the mutari in Tnelius identical with the reverti a pervertendo in pejus, the logical inference from which would be that evil is the negative condition of all moral development. To the same effect, he says, still more plainly, Ep. 167 (Benedictine arrangement), ad Hieronymum : ^*plenissima (caritas), quae jam nonpossit augeri^ quamdiu hie homovivit, est in nemine ; quamdiu autem augeri potest, pro/ecto illud, quod minus est quam debet, ex vitio est " (opp., tom. ii. p. 897). The Stoics of old discussed this question, and as they would not make a distinction between virtue not yet perfect and vice, they were logical enough to deny the possibility of such a thing as an increasing virtue. (See the references given by Tennemann, Geschichte der Fhilosophie, v. 4, pp. 104, 105.) * Kg. Chemnitz (b. 1522, d. 1586), Examims Concilii Tridentini, p. 1, De re- liquiis pecc. orig. post bapt. (p, 243, ed. 1590) ; De bonis operibus, qu. 3. Gerhard (b. 1582, d. 1637), Loci Theol. De pecc. act., c. 10, §§ 42-45 ; De lege Dei, c. 4, §§ 10, 183 ; De bonis operibus, c. 10, § 1. Quenstedt takes exception to Melanch- thon's definition of sin, ** Jnclinatio, appetitus, cogitatum, dictum, factum pug - nans cum lege Dei." He thinks the pugnans too narrow a word, sanctioning the Romish view. See his Theol. didactico-polemica, p. ii. cap. ii. sect, ii, qu. 3, dist. 4. t De justif., lib. iv- c. 12, 14 ; in accordance with Thomas Aquinas, Prima Secundce, qu. 88, art. 1. See also Melanchthon's i^oci theol. Depecc. actualibus, p. 117, ed. 1569. CHAP. I.] SIN AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. 61 of US perfect love to God, is not ohligatorium but only doctri- nale et informatorium." ^'^ Upon closer consideration, however, we find that what made our older theologians reject this doctrine, was not merely the abuse of it and its grievous perversion, but the suspicion that it was contradictory to their views regarding man's state by nature, and the principles connected therewith. And can we for a moment hesitate to adopt the view of our Th P t s- older theologians, which in its high moral and tant view the ideal features stands out in striking contrast with true one. ^-^^ pliant accommodating theories of the Catholic Church ? The law demands moral perfection, and with the con- sciousness of this demand, an impulse of the heart to realize it is indissolubly connected ; if the man therefore, in whom this consciousness is awakened, comes short in fulfilling the demand, what can be the cause of this but a tendency within him op- posing the law and his impulse to fulfil it, in other words the power of evil ? If, for example, he loves his neighbour less than himself, while the law tells him to love his neighbour as himself, to what can this be owing save to the power of selfish- ness working in him in greater or less degree ? The old maxim therefore holds true in this case as else- . where, Omne minus honum hahet rationem mal% ate sphere Were it otherwise, should we not have to say : between right « the law does indeed demand perfection, yet it does not refuse what is imperfect ; but if it re- cognizes and accepts this, it surely cannot be in earnest in its primary demand '* ? And must there not in this case be granted an intermediate sphere between the will and deed which perfectly corresponds with the law and that which directly contradicts it ? ' Schleiermacher has triumphantly combated the notion of the permissible, understanding thereby that class of actions which may be called natural and spon- taneous, neither in conformity with duty nor opposed to it, but morally indifferent ; t for an objective and moral import can- not be attributed to such acts without undermining every * Stapleton (b. 1535, at Henfield, Sussex, died 1598), Dejustific.,\\h. vi. c. 1. t Kritik der SUtenlehre, p. 185 fF. "Concerning the concept of the Permis- sible, "jS'amTnf^icAe Werke, dritte Ahtkeilung, v. 2, p. 418 ff. Wuttke, in his Hand- huch der Ghristlichen SUtenlehre (v. 1, p. 297), shows that the concept of the " permissible " must be wholly distinct from that of the morally indifferent, and that " the permissible " properly belongs to the morally good, and thus has its root in the just and true maintenance of distinctive personality. 62 THE REALITY OF SIN. [bOOK 1. PART I. consistent and comprehensive view of man's moral life. But if there be such an intermediate sphere embracing those deter- minations of the will which neither correspond fully with the law nor directly contradict it, what is this but a modified form of the same error ? And yet we must give up a great deal if .we reject this distinction. First of all it is clear that every gradation of moral goodness Difficulties of must vanish which does not arise from participa- this view. ^[q^ j^ successive degrees of evil — every gradation or shade of difference among pure moral beings, and of moral condition. This must apply even to Christ the Holy One. How great soever the holy love must have been which actu- ated Him, it, too, had its boundary where evil begins, border- ing so close upon it, that had it been in the slightest degree less strong, it would have transgressed that boundary. This will be no stumbling-block to those who recognize therein the sublimity of the moral law, determining every act upon one absolutely simple principle, and condemning what- ever falls short of its demand as a contradiction arising from an opposite principle. But can we assent to the further logical consequences ? Are we prepared to allow that the conception of a purely moral development is a contradiction ? — that evil is the negative condition of all moral development ? — and to admit that this development must cease as soon as evil is wholly eradicated from the subject of it, and that a continuous progress in moral goodness implies a continuous though decreasing sinfulness ? All this logically follows from the denial of the distinction between blamelessness and perfection. If this distinction be sacrificed to the canon : omne minus honum hdbet rationem mal% it will follow that all moral de- velopment having its goal still before it, and involving a pro- gress from the imperfect to the perfect, must necessarily, and at every point, have evil clinging to it, though in an ever- decreasing ratio. The possibility of a sinless development cannot be vindicated by saying that the inner germ of it in its beginning was sinless, and that its advance consists in the outward growth of this pure germ throughout the various departments of life. In the department of morals, the inward and the outward cannot be separately and abstractedly con- sidered, and we cannot imagine a prolonged growth in objec- CHAP. I.] SIN AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. 63 tive goodness, without a corresponding enhancement and deepening of goodness within. And on the other hand, the principle of holiness in human life cannot attain its full inward strength and firmness so long as the external sphere of its exercise is not apprehended and penetrated by it. Once more ; if there be no distinction between moral perfection and moral blamelessness, between imperfection and sin, then progress in goodness must involve the gradual casting away of the evil still clinging to the life. The objection, too, may be urged from quite a different quarter, — Is not that conception which you now development apply to moral development true of all real de- urged against velopment in human life ? Does not development always involve a self-renovating rejection of what- ever is inimical to its nature ? A strong development advances not by means of feeble contrasts which are not seriously opposed to each other, but by means of the strongest contradictions. The stimulus which alone is sufficient to urge it forward is the discrepancy between the ideal of life and its reality as experience witnesses. Without this the spring necessary to energetic progress is wanting. The development languishes and dies away, and with it life itself, which is finite, had its being therein. Confidently entertained as this notion of development is This theory now-a-days by some philosophers, it requires but a sf^lf-contra- small degree of observation to discover how self- ^^ °^^' contradictory it is. The effort of the individual to free himself from uncongenial circumstances is said to be the mainspring of the development. This is clearly a negative de- scription of his effort to obtain congenial circumstances. And yet he cannot attain these without putting an end, not only to his development, but to his actual existence — in other words, without self-destruction. It is, therefore, clear that this can- not really be the goal towards which he strives. Herein lies the contradiction which modern NihiKsm involves ; it explains the development wherein life consists as a continual disease, and annihilation as the final goal towards which life tends. This absurd notion is not altogether new. Fichte's principles, starting from a different theory, necessarily lead on to the well-known Progressus adj infinitum^ to that 64 THE REALITY OF SIN, [bOOK I. PART I. everlasting movement of the Ego towards a goal which it never really reaches, because it is infinitely remote ; and this infinitely distant goal — every movement towards which is not only an everlasting approach to it, but an everlasting departure from it — is none other than the entire " annihilation of the individual and his absorption into the absolute Pure-Eeason, or into God." '''^ And yet we cannot af&rm that this representation of human Yet some development has no truth whatever at its founda- truth in it. ^^^^^^ j^ characteristically describes human develop- ment as it is, the present manner of its progress, which has to overcome the general hindrance caused by evil, and to extir- pate every disturbing element. But it is a slavish subserviency to a limited empiricism whose inductions never get beyond the sphere of nature to take the present form of development as if it were its true essence. That, on the contrary, is alone a true development which, as it advances, loses nothing of what it has already attained, because it has nothing to cast away ; at no point does there appear anything to disturb the due determi- nation of the self -developing life. The question, however, is by no means settled by Normal de- *^^® distinguishing normal development from velopment that abnormal progress which involves dis- progressive. turbances and hindrances. Even in the sphere of normal development the existence of several stages can- not be overlooked. So long as its inner impulse consists in the desire of progress from imperfection to perfection, so long may it be characterized as teleologicaL It aims for a goal lying before it, and it is not satisfied until that goal be actually reached. The very conception of this teleological development involves the truth that in all its stages, before it reaches the goal, the state of the individual is not yet in perfect conformity with its ideal, and that the starting-point must be very far removed from the perfection which forms the goal. But pro- vided this development is normal there cannot be anything in , * System der Sittenlehre, p. 194 and the preceding pages. ** The entire anni- hilation of the individual, " it is there said, ' ' is certainly the ultimate goal of the finite Reason ; but it is not possible in time. " Thus ends this philosophy with its Tantalus-like striving after an unattainable summum bonum — and this highest good is annihilation ! .CHAP. I.] SIN AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. 65 it contradictory to the ideal. The starting-point cannot lack moral blamelessness or integrity, for were it in any way evil it would lie outside the path leading to completeness, and would not therefore belong to the development. This blamelessness or integrity necessarily implies an unlimited capability pro- gressively to realize perfect conformity with the ideal, and so far the starting-point is itself in conformity therewith ; though it must be left behind in order that the reality absolutely answering to the ideal may be reached. Proceeding, then, from this point, we find that in every normal development towards the goal of perfection, the moral state of the being in whom it is carried on will always be in conformity with what the moral ideal imposes in order to its progressive realization ; though, of course, this state would not yet be absolutely that of the ideal. In every action dependent upon conscious self- determination, a moral motive would be present and active if only in the form of an instinct for rule and order ; but in pro- portion to the comprehensive clearness of the moral sense, the energy of the moral impulse would be susceptible of many suc- cessive degrees. Progress, therefore, from imperfection towards perfection cannot be separated even from normal development ; and thus it is plain that evil cannot be predicated of the mere difference between perfection and imperfection, nor of the necessary difference between the ideal and the empirical reality."*^ Here, then, we have the true answer to the question just now raised, viz. ; " Prom what can any minus, any deficiency Trurnature ^^ relation to the perfection demanded by the law of normal de- arise, save from the power of an opposing principle vflopment. gomehow associated with it ? " The necessity for such a mimes in the beginning of man's course arises simply * This is recognized even by Schleiermacher, notwithstanding the peculiar view he takes of evil. In his System der SUtenlehre {% 199), he says, " Critically speaking, the contrast between good and evil must be viewed as something positive, evil being itself a positive activity of nature, causing corresponding pain to the Reason. Not until this action of evil is removed have we the simple contrast of perfect and imperfect. Imperfection can be predicated only of that which is not evil, and there only can advance be made towards perfection." It is certainly very dangerous in Ethics to speak of **an activity of nature," the continuance of which causes the difference between the antithesis of good and evil, and that of perfect and imperfect ; and we need not be surprised if in VOL. I. E 66 THE REALITY OF SIN. [bOOK I. PART I. from the fact that the realization of moral perfection is a tosh assigned him, the full performance of which in virtue of his very nature he can only accomplish in successive moments of time. It follows, therefore, as a matter of course, and not on account of sin, that it must be beyond man's power at the outset absolutely to fulfil the demands of the moral law in its entire range, and that this following on after the law is moral imper- fection, but not sin. If it were sin, sin would be the necessary outgo of finite human nature in the state in which it is created. To designate as sin that moral imperfection at the outset Perfect which unavoidably arises from man's mental and development moral Constitution, so far from quickening and progressive. deepening his consciousness of sin, really does away with it. These observations of course apply only to a teleological development whose real aim is to reach the goal of moral perfection. When the goal is reached it becomes a development purely representative. The teleolo- gical development involves at every stage of it an energetic disclaimer of itself, the disavowal of what has already been attained as unsatisfying ; but the representative development advances in a purely affirmative manner. If the name develop- ment be objected to as inappropriate to a state of human existence in which there is only the manifestation of inward and uncreated fulness of life in perfect fellowship with God, we willingly give it up ; we only wish to maintain that there is still a living and progressive movement in man when perfection is attained, though this movement may be wholly different from what we see in the imperfection of our present state. Schleiermacher we meet with contradictory assertions arising from the vacilla- tion of opinion apparent in § 91 of his Sittenhhre to which we have already- referred (see p. 53, note). Thus in his Olaubmshhre^ § 63, 3 (vol. i. p. 387), he says :— " As the energy of our consciousness of God is never absolutely perfect, there is in it a limiting want of power or weakness which is certainly sinful." Compare with this his Sittenhhre, p. 62, where he says, "Moral activity can never do away with the contrast between reason and nature, for this contrast is the pre-supposition and condition of moral action," an assertion the full import of which is apparent when we recollect that according to his theory a contrast between Nature and Reason is a suffering on the part of Reason, and that this suffering is itself an evil, CHAP. I.] SIN AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. 67 But if there be a moral development which advances not from evil to good, but only from good to better, — True answer ®^^^ ^^^ instance as Holy Scripture describes in to the second Christ during His youth, how He was " strong in ques ion. spirit " and " increased in wisdom, and in favour with God and man" (Luke ii 40, 52), — it is clear that there is a moral integrity or blamelessness distinct from moral per- fection, a state which does not perfectly correspond to the ideal, and yet does not contradict it, and that the true conception of evil is not that of something which does not wholly come up to the perfection which the law demands, but must be defined as contradiction of the law. In order to guard against the dangerous inferences above Difference referred to, which might be drawn from this con- between law elusion, we must give our attention more closely and duty. ^^ ^-^^ distinction already named (p. 37), between the two conceptions law and duty. It may here put us upon the right track, if we observe that Lawob' t* ^^ ethics, the conception of duty and not that dutysubjec- of law is usually spoken of in immediate rela- *^^^' tion to the individual. We say, " my duty is so and so," not " my law;" if the law be spoken of, the phrase is, " the law is so and so/' Thus, in our conception of duty, personality comes prominently forward, whereas in our conception of law it recedes. The very derivation of the German word pflicht from pflegen/'' indicates the personal and subjective character of the conception thus expressed. In the ordinary use of language, we include under the term duty, all that the law contains, and without further definition, we use the word law to denote the obligations of the individual. Thus apprehended, duty is simply the application of the moral law to the individual, as that which is to determine his conduct in the form of the imperative — ■" thou shalt." " We ought to respect the freedom, the property, the honour of our fellow- men," — in this and similar sayings, the moral and obligatory bearing of the law upon the man — the fact of its being binding upon him, which is already implied in the conception of law, * In like manner, tbe Englisli duty from due, and ought from owe, — Tr, 68 THE REALITY OF SIN. [bOOK I. PART I. is actually expressed and prominently brought forward. In this general sense it may even be said, " It is the duty of man to obey the moral law, to obtain a clear knowledge of its re- quirements," and so forth. In this way of speaking, the con- ception of duty bears unmistakably a merely formal character ; it involves no special and individual applications of moral truth. But besides this general use of the term, there has been formed Duty implies ill the scientific development of ethical science since present action, ^]yQ f^jj^Q Qf ^j^g Eeformation, especially since a philo- sophic treatment of our conceptions of right was brought to bear upon moral science by Gkotius and Puffendorf, a more exact apprehension of the conception of duty, far more suggestive and -significant. According to this, duty is that determinate moral claiTn which addresses itself to any person a t any given moment. Duty in this sense is always something which imme- diately lies before us to be done, in opposition to self- chosen and far-fetched occupation, to what Fichte cleverly calls " a virtue which seeks adventure."* The moral conduct which this definite duty requires, may be altogether inward, it may be mere endurance, or abstinence from action ; but as in any case it implies a movement of the will (otherwise the duty, being confined to one particular moment, would really claim nothing, would not be a duty at all), we may say that conduct or action of some kind is the subject matter of all duty. Duty is the individualized claim of the law ; it takes into consideration varieties of character and relation- ships, and makes these its presupposition ; whereas the moral law as such does not enter upon those individualizing circum- stances. By this very definite claim which duty in its immediate And explains bearing upon action makes upon the man, its the ohligatio morally necessitating power encloses the will within me lum. ^^^ narrowest limits. The distinction between perfection and blamelessness finds no place here ; if the act of the will falls short of the duty, it is so far opposed to duty. If, on the contrary, it obeys the immediate call of duty, we are not able from this to infer that the entire moral state of the • System der Sittenlelire, p. 391. CHAP. I.J SIN AS .TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. 69 man is absolutely ia harmony with the standard of the law, i.e,, that it is perfect. But it is evident, that the intermediate sphere lying between the state which perfectly reflects the law and embodies the moral ideal, and the state which is in opposi- tion thereto, is the distinctive and appropriate sphere of duty. And as the conception of duty implies the immediate pressure of a moral claim in every moment of life and action, this must certainly involve a lowering, or at least an accommodation of the standard to this particular case. The demand of duty does not regard perfection itself, which is the goal of the develop- ment, but only the simple and determinate exercise of the moral energies (in the widest sense of the word) which lead towards that goal ; and if after the awakening of the moral sense there be any lack of acquiescence or of earnestness, we must look for the cause of it in the fettering power of a posi- tively counteracting principle. In this way, we may adopt the distinction before referred to, made by Thomas Aquinas and Bellarmine, between ohligatio ad finem and dbligatio ad medium. Our conception of law relates to the former ; our conception of duty to the latter. Upon the principles evolved by this investigation, it will not § 6. The be difficult to answer the third of the questions we TWN coNsi^" ^^^® proposed, viz., does not man's consciousness DEEED. of a moral law follow rather than precede his fall from moral goodness ? In modern times, a profound examination of moral facts and truths has often led to an affirmative reply. As law generally addresses its commands to that which opposes it, the moral law, in particular, may have for its presupposition a disturbance which has already taken place in moral life. That which originally constituted in the highest sense the life of the created spirit, attends him now that he has fallen from his original state, as the conscious- ness of a commanding law. This is the view of Baadee,* STEFFENS,t and to some extent even of Schleiermacher.J If * Baadee (b. 1765, d. 1841), PMlosoph. Scliriften, v. 1, p. 17 ff. t Steffens, see chiefly Ms Anthropologies v. i. p. 391 ; v. iL p. 357 f., see also his Karikaturen des Heiligsten, v. i. p. 45 f. X In the first edition of his Glaubenslehre we find this passage {v. ii. p. 378), "a law can find place only where there is a discrepancy between the whole and 70 THE REALITY OF SIN. [BOOK I. PART I. it be true, it is obvious that it is at least a varepov irporepov to define sin as opposition to the law. It would be beyond our province here to trace the particular relations in which the moral law stands to the successive stages of man's inner development, revealed as this is in the history of divine revelation. We take the conception of law in its widest acceptation. Wherever a rule determining his will presents itself to a personal created being with the true claim of unconditional validity, there is law. It has been already shown (p, 34), that the moral law as Law does not s^ch loses its f orce in the case of the man who, in imply evil, \^\^ moral development, has reached the goal of perfect holiness. The expression SiKat(p v6^o<; ov Kurai, consi- dering where it occurs (1 Tim. i. 9), can hardly be interpreted otherwise than thus ; the Mosaic law, according to the distinc- tive nature of its contents, is not designed for those who in Christ have become righteous, but for the unrighteous and the wicked, for a people of hard heart and stiff neck. But if we take StW^o? absolutely, as meaning the completeness of sanctification, we may understand the removal of the law in its strict and full sense. The law certainly has a bearing upon but only in- the man who is still imperfect, otherwise morality completeness, could not present itself to him as an ought — in an imperative form, and as an objective rule in consciousness. But as we have already seen, we must not confound this state of incompleteness with which man has to begin, with that positive disturbance of moral life which is caused by evil. Why should only this disturbed moral development which has to overcome what contradicts the law be under the law's con- trol ? Why should not the undisturbed progress, the advance from the imperfect to the perfect also be ruled by the law and our consciousness of it ? * The imperative of the law, " thou the individual." (Compare the 2d ed. v. ii. p. 147.) Rothb also holds (part 3 § 817), that the imperative of the law implies resistance of its demand in the Subject. Weisse takes rather a different view ; in connection with his singular theosophy, he apprehends the law in a double light as ** spiritual and springing from God as to its ultimate source, but tainted with the principle of depravity through the fleshly nature of the creature," PhilosopJikche DogmatiJc, v. ii. §761. * Even Harless in his Christl. Ethih, p. 81 (6th ed.), lays down the principle : CHAP. I.] SIN AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW. Yl shalt," viewed objectively, denotes that moral duty, while it does not realize itself in the manner of physical necessity, by a must instead of an oiight, is by no means a matter of option for man, but an unconditional moral necessity, which he is ab- solutely bound to realize. Our conception of duty, so far from being a mere abstraction, derives its contents from the ideal, and tells directly upon conduct ; so that the imperative simply expresses the determination of the law to pass into act. It by no means follows that the imperative " thou shalt " presupposes a violation of the law on the part of the being to whom it addresses itself, in virtue of which it might be argued, " man is commanded to be righteous, there- fore he is unrighteous ; " to maintain this would be to confound the imperative with the obligation, thou shalt with thoio shouldest or oughtest,"^ When felt as an obligation in the con- sciousness, it certainly does imply a difference between it and the man's present state, viz., that he has not yet attained the perfection of the law ; for if what the man is perfectly cor- responded with what he should &e, consciousness could not make this into a command which has yet to be fulfilled, t But the imperative does not necessarily imply on man's part any actual contradiction of moral necessity. Were the develop- *' Conscience presents to me the commandments of God in an imperative form, not merely to set before me the divine will ohjectively, but to make clear to me the discrepancy between my will and God's." Should these two things be separated from each other ? Is it not by showing me the discrepancy between my will and God's that my conscience sets God's will objectively before me ? I do not hold that " the spirit imposes on conscience the stereotyped image of the morally perfect man" (p. 85). Conscience accompanies the several acts or omissions of the man as the consciousness of a rule according to which they are to be ordered, and thus it is necessary in order to enforce the imperative; but it has its foundation in the conception of moral perfection, and it does not rest till this is realized in the Subject. Regarding this obligation, this determination of moral aim, inherent originally in human nature and implanted there by God, see Uleici GoU und die Natur (1862, p. 571 ff.); also his GoU und der Mensch (1866, pp. 629 ff., 691 ff., 720 f.). * We must not be misled here by another use of the word soUen, wherein it is not taken in its ethical import, but as meaning what anything is good for or intended for. It is sometimes thus used to denote a merely subjective ideal. + The Holy One of God applies to Himself the "thou shalt" of the divine law, to ward off a temptation assailing Him from without ; and this brought into view that possibility of sinning which already was present, Matt. iv. 6, 10. 72 THE REALITY OF SIN. [bOOK I. PART I. ment normal, every " thou shall,'* every definite command, the moment it entered consciousness, would awaken activity in order to its realization. The law would be in force until per- fection was realized, and yet there would be no slavery under the law/^ The incompleteness of human development in its beginning necessarily involves, as we shall hereafter see, the possibility of evil ; and we must therefore allow that this possibility is implied also in the very presence of the law in conscience ; but we cannot look upon this possibility as a germ of evil, we cannot regard it as itself evil, unless we are prepared to sur- render the freedom of the will, and to regard evil as a necessary link in the chain of human development. CHAPTER II. Sin as Disobedience against God. According to Kant's Practical Philosophy of Criticism, the § 1. Kant's essence of true morality depends upon the principle Autonomy of that the will is subject to its own law alone, and that the source of this law is nowhere to be found but in the practical Eeason. This autonomy of the will, according to the moral system of Kant, is fundamentally opposed to any limitation of the will arising from the nature of its objects ; and upon the principle of this philosophy — which takes no account of the essential difference between that which comes to the human spirit from dbovey from its own original (God), and that which comes from helow, from nature, but abides by the abstract conception of the erepov, z.e., of what is external and foreign to the will — it follows further that the * Rom. vi. 14-22. See Wuttke as before, part i., pp. 385 ff., § 79. CHAP. 11.] SIN AS DISOBEDIENCE AGAINST GOD. 73 derivation of the moral law from the Will of a supreme and perfectly holy Being must be rejected as an heteronomy, the introduction of an alien law interfering with the autonomy or self-government of the will, and thus as subversive of all morahty.* Such an autonomy of the human will seems on the face of Contradiction ^^ ^^ involve a Contradiction, Where law is, it involved in clearly must stand above the being who is bound ^^^^' by it and is subject to it. That this is true in reference to the moral law — that so long as we have no higher authority than the law, our relation to it is not that of inclina- tion towards it arising spontaneously from our inner life, nor of immediate union with it, but that of submission to its com- manding authority, — of self-constraint towards obedience, — this, I say, is a position which Kant himself lays down as the basis of his ethical system,t and which he has insisted upon in opposition to Schiller in his Dissertation upon " Grace and Dignity ; *' and certainly with the preponderance of truth on his side, viewing the human race as it is, and apart from what it may become by Eedemption. | Kant, therefore, as he makes ^ Grundlegung zur Me'oph. der Siiten^ pp. 73, 79. 92. Kritik der prdkt. Ver- nunftj 6th ed., p. 184, Metaph. Anfangsgrunde der RechtslehrCf 2nd ed., Intro- duction, p. xvi. It is the TpMTov -v^iuSoj of the theoretic and practical philosophy of Kant, that he always regards God as utterly foreign to the spirit of man. He thus has become the real father of modern Deistical theology. It is at the same time quite in keeping with this, that (according to this theory) man, morally considered, has all fundamentally in himself, viz. : 1, the Law; 2, Evil; 3, Free- dom from evil, — elements which mutually exclude each other, — the second excluding the possibility of the first, and the third that of the second. f Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, i. part i., book 3 ; chapter concerning the motives of the pure practical Beason. X Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der hlossen Vernun/t, part i., p. 10. It must ever be esteemed a strange obliquity of a noble mind that Kant could entertain the belief that true virtue has nothing to do with sympathetic goodwill towards men, or with the interest the heart feels in their welfare ; that it can reveal itself in its purity only where it is uninfluenced by any longing toward the objects of the will. Yet inferences such as these could not be avoided when once the essence of morality was made to consist in reverence for the law of morality, because it possesses the formal character of universal validity. Schiller's treatise Anmuth und Wutrde, in combating this rigorism so hardening in its effects upon the moral life, contains striking presentiments of Christian truths ; but as it does not abandon the general principles of the Kantian morality, it can neither maintain these truths nor avoid self-contradiction, e.(/., in the 74 THE REALITY OF SIN. [boOK I. PAKT I. man his own moral lawgiver, claims for him the contradictory power of separating himself from himself, in order to submit himself to himself. There seems to be for Kant a very simple explanation of Attempted ^^^s contradiction in the Dualism of man's rational solution. and sensational nature. If with him we venture to distinguish between man as he is the subject of this legislat- ing function in his Eeason, and as he is the object of it in his intellectual and physical nature, we may without contradiction say that, as his own lawgiver, he submits himself to himself. But this solution leads us to results still more paradoxical. For if the moral law be prescribed by the Eeason to the sensational nature, the feeling of reverence for duty which is the root of all virtue, must reside ^'' in this latter, and our conceptions of that morality and virtue whose office it is not to give but to maintain laws, must denote states, not of our spiritual life, but of our sensational nature ; — a conclusion which no serious person can receive, least of all Kant himself, who in this case would have to give up his principles concerning the way in which the sensational nature as distinct from the definite charge brought against Kant's system of morals, viz., that humanity is impeached and degraded by the imperative form of the moral law ; the fact being that this imperative form essentially belongs to the law in its relation to freedom, Schiller was, moreover, on a false track when he hoped for the eleva- tion of servants into "children of the household," not as Christ did (John viii. 35, 36), by the redemption wrought by the Son, but by an aesthetic culture ; and when he attribiites to '* beautiful souls" what the Holy Ghost alone can work. (See the close of the 9th letter concerning the festhetic culture of man.) Unacquainted with the positive solution of the problem given in the gosjiel, he tries to tone down the sternness of the Old Testament law by blending with it the Greek religion of art. But just as the amalgamation of Judaism with Hellenistic heathenism failed to advance Christianity, and gave birth only to a Jewish-Alexandrine culture which never could have regenerated the world, this union of the idea of beauty with that of the moral law is a poor substitute for the divine principle of redeeming love. * Schiller expressly recognizes this in his treatise above referred to. He holds that this reverence arises from the relation of the sensational nature to the de- mands of the pure practical Reason, and he says that " its object is the Reason and its subject the sensational nature." Reverence for duty is according to this a sensuous feeling, and virtue has its foundation in the sensuous faculties alone. CHAP. IlJ SIN AS PISOBEDIENCE AGAINST GOD. 75 Eeason in man is acted upon, and, indeed, to give up his entire system.''' This also is certain : it is not man's sensuous nature but his Other spirit, Strictly speaking it is the Will which has to attempts at submit itself to the moral law ; and in its different explanation, movements good and evil have their root.t There is, however, another way whereby perhaps this autonomy may be saved from self-contradiction. The spirit gives the law in so far as it is cognizant of it ; it submits to the law so far as it determines action. But whither will this lead us ? This view, according to which man's spirit gives the law to his sensational nature, presupposes a kind of external relation between the spirit and the sensational nature ; and though this may to a certain extent be recognized as true regarding the beginning of human development (1 Cor. xv. 45-47), it introduces a principle of separation in the inner life of the spirit itself. Eeason reveals its august authority in the setting up of a law which, because it is a law to the will, and demands its submission, comes to it as if from without, from another being. "We by no means deny that there really is this dualism between the understanding and the will arising from the variance of human nature with itself brought about by sin. But in this theory it is something which has its foundation originally and essentially in the spirit of man, and thus viewed it cannot for a moment be entertained. And further, if the giving of the law is to be distinguished from the cognizance of the law, this distinction must chiefly be explained by the fact that the lawgiving activity denotes an act of the will, an active and energetic recognition of the authority of the law. Kant, therefore, justly considered that the assumed * Neither could Ahistotle have .adopted such a conclusioD, though Thomas Aquinas attributed this view to him regarding the two virtues of avSpiee. and tr/u^poffuvv, because he says of them [Mthica Nicom. lib. iii. u. 10), 'hoKou(ri tuv aXoytuv fiipuv ecSvai ihott xi aptrai. That this expression is to be otherwise understood is evident from lib. i., c. 13 ; lib. ii., c, 1. + Kant himself distinctly allows this ; for in his " Doctrine of Radical Evil," he demands that evil must have an intelligible or ideal basis, and he expressly derives the imputation of evil from its source in the freedom which belongs to man as noumenon. 76 THE REALITY OF SIN. [bOOK I. PART f. power of the spirit of man to give to itself moral laws should never be separated from his will. If, accordingly, we cannot dispense with the formula that the rational will of man gives laws to itself, — man being himself the lawgiver and the law receiver, — the contradiction we have named recurs.* Personality is usually described as including self-conscious- s 2 The ele- ^^^^ ^^^ self -determination, and this is correct if mentsofPer- taken simply to denote the elementary functions which together make up the conception of person- ality. Two fundamental tendencies accordingly are presented * Schleiermacher also touches upon this question, though in a different con- nection, in his treatise upon the difference between the law of nature and the moral law : — Sdrmntliche Werke, 3rd part, b. ii., pp. 401-403. See also Romang on the Freedom of the Will and Determinism, p. 139 f. Zeller in his Dissertations upon the freedom of the Will, Evil, and the Zeller's Moral Order of the World (Theol. Jahrbiicher von Baur u. Vindication Zeller, 1846, p. 3 ; 1847, p. 1, 2), makes many references to our of Kant's present investigation, and objects that the contradiction here doctnne. referred to is to be found in every living being ; for each indi- vidual is a type of the species it belongs to, has in it the law of its species, and yet as an individual does not wholly correspond thereto. Now, as this contra- diction is realized by the very conception of individuality ^ which as a type of its species represents and yet does not fully represent it ; so here it is realized in the conception of personality, which includes both the nature common to man- kind and its own distinctive features ; and accordingly the consciousness of the transcendent ideal of humanity is included in that of the imperfect individual (pp. 32, 33). This objection anticipates the course of our inquiry, for we have not argued against the Autonomy of the will on the ground of its want of con- formity with the law, — we prove the unallowableness of this representation from the principles which the conception of the moral law involves. We may, however, yield to this anticipation, for it is a fact of experience that the human will does oftentimes oppose the moral law ; and as we may assume that though it does so the law still remains in consciousness, it is still more obvious that our will cannot derive the law from itself. That the same contra- Hegelian diction of the individual with the species to which it belongs is •'' evident in nature, and that in consequence such individuals dis- appear, is a principle of the Hegelian logic as favourite as it is untenable. If we make the general conception of the species a law of nature, we can attribute to it only those determinations which distinguish the higher genus and the differentia of the given species — those characteristics which all individuals of this species must possess if they are to be reckoned as belonging to it. Now it is obvious that individual existences in nature — if we except monstrosities, which themselves are in accordance with certain laws of nature, arising usually from the encroachment of the law of another species — do entirely correspond CHAP. II.] SIN AS DISOBEDIENCE AGAINST GOD. 77 to US in human personality, the one theoretic, the other prac- tical, — knowing and doing. If we apprehend these as we find them in the innermost sphere of self, they appear as the ego existing for itself and throiigh itself. In the one tendency, the Subject in the given determinateness of its being is its own object ; in the other tendency, the Subject is itself the power which conditions this determinateness of its being. The fine- ness of this distinction between the two tendencies shows how nearly they are one. Self-determination is what its name denotes only as it is self-conscious ; and again, man could never in self-consciousness separate himself with distinctness and certainty from the world, he could not hold fast the identity of the ego through all the changes of heterogeneous circumstances, if his real being were wholly determined by the world, if he did not possess the power of determining himself. If we more closely examine the first of these tendencies, viz., SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS in man, we perceive in it many limi- with the law of their species. If indeed, in order to this correspondence of the individual with its species, it be required that the conception of the species as such, and what is common to all the individuals of the same class, shall be em- bodied apart from individual features in one individual existence, the individual not satisfying this demand will naturally be in contradiction with its species ; but the demand is itself unreasonable. As little can it be maintained, after what we have said regarding our conception of species, that every such concep- tion requires a perfect exemplar as its adequate embodiment in nature, and that as this can nowhere be found, all individuals must in some way be in contradic- tion with their species. Such a requirement is not at all included in our con- ception of species, which here is nothing more than a subjective and aesthetic ideal that can hardly define itself even. To make it a law of nature is an unwarrantable transference of ethical rules for free beings into the sphere of nature where there is no moral freedom. Nature knows nothing of this fancied contradiction between the individual and its species, and even if it did, it would not be easy to see how it could be solved by merely naming the very notion from which it springs — the notion of individuality. "What Zeller further advances in support of the doctrine of the Autonomy of the Will is answered in the course of our argument further on. When he thinks that in rejecting this doctrine, nothing remains for us but to assume that what now seems immoral could by a fiat of God's will be made permissible and even obligatory, and that we could not legitimately contradict the assertion that this is now true in particular instances — that acts morally deserving of abhorrence, murder, theft, lying, violence, and so forth, might become laudable if done for God's glory, he must have paid but very little attention to our argument. This very point is the express topic of our inquiry in the first section of the next chapter. 78 THE REALITY OF SIN. [boOK I. PART I. tations. Its inner derivation we reserve for consideration in the third book (part i. chap. 3). Here we shall simply de- scribe it as it presents itself to us. To become conscious of himself, man must distinguish him- The limits of ^®^^ from the external world, must exclude from seif-consci- himself another existence which is not himself. ousne&s. jj^ cannot think of himself without at the same time thinking of another, a non-ego. But as he cannot con- ceive of himself without this strict exclusion of all other than himself, he discovers that he is obliged to include that other in his self-consciousness. For the determinate being that forms the contents of his self -consciousness is never absolutely independent, but is somehow always co-determined with an- other. This relativity of man's self -consciousness, arises partly from his necessary relation to a nature which is relatively external to himself, and partly from the fact, that it has itself no reality save in the personal individual who finds himself face to face with other individuals. But as the self-consciousness of man, however it may accom- Self-consci- plish the act of self-apprehension, cannot avoid tlie ousness entrance of something else, a non-ego, co-deter- enve . mining its contents (I say contents, for as merely formal, as pure or abstract self- consciousness, it has no reality), it cannot be absolute and original, but must somehow be con- ditioned or derived. Could the limitations which beset human self-consciousness be regarded as merely accidental, its origin- ality might, strictly speaking, be vindicated by the supposition that it limited itself by an act of its own, or that the limita- tion was the unforeseen consequence of its own act, the result of its own free self-perversion. But these limitations are essential to man's self-consciousness, they are inseparable from it, not only in experience, but in the very conception of it ; so inseparable, that we cannot imagine human self-consciousness without them. Hence it necessarily and logically follows, that the self-consciousness of man has not in itself the principle of reality and existence, but finds it in another. This other, this non-ego, cannot be nature, for nature cannot The nrni-ego give what it does not possess, nature cannot beget must be God. what is toto genere different from itself ; in the sphere of nature, the canon holds good, " like only can produce CHAP. II.] SIN AS DISOBEDIENCE AGAINST GOD. 79 like." Self-consciousness cannot be explained by w?iconscious- ness but only by self-consciousness, nor can nature make this new beginning far above itself ; that personal power alone can produce it, which from the very beginning raised far above nature, sets in motion the whole development and sustains it, itself the creative principle of all other beginnings. If, therefore, self-consciousness exists, an absolutely original and uncon- ditioned self-consciousness must also exist. Daily experience, indeed, regarding the origin of particular existences, and science (the scientific history of the earth) bearing upon the origin of the human race, may teach us that human self-consciousness in its realization has for its presupposition the existence of nature, and raises itself above it as its foundation. But it can do this only because there is an Eternal Self-consciousness overruling this process, that stoops to plant the divine spark of personal spirit in the dull material of nature, and preserves it there in still concealment until it can kindle itself into the bright flame of human self-consciousness. The Mosaic account of the creation does not fail to describe nature as preceding the first beginnings of this self-consciousness in time, just as darkness preceded light ; but it also represents the original light of the DIVINE self-consciousness as eternally and abso- lutely preceding all. Thus the consciousness of God reveals itself to us in the Self-consci- depths of our s6Z/-consciousness as its hidden back- volves G?od- g^o^^d, and the descent into our inmost hearts is consciousness, at the same time an ascent up to God. Whenever we reflect closely upon ourselves, we break through the outer crust of mere world-consciousness which separates us from the innermost truth of our being, and come face to face with Him in whom we live and move and have our being. We know nothing absolutely and originally of any finite object ; as finite objects are in their essence derived, so also is our knowledge of them ; originally and immediately we are conscious only of God. Self-determination (or Will), the second element of our Limits of personality, is no more unlimited than is our self-deter- self-consciousness. We have already learned in mina ion. ^^^ previous investigations, the original standard by which, as by a sacred necessity, it is bound ; it is the moral 80 THE REALITY OF SIN. [booK I. PART t. laiv in the consciousness of man. As we cannot become con- scious of ourselves without becoming conscious of God also, so we cannot thoroughly see the reality of our self-determina- tion without discovering conscience as the rule for the move- ments of our will. We have also proved (in chapter 1) how this formal apprehension of the moral law as a limit for self- determination becomes higher and more real. The will only realizes its true ideal when it identifies itself with the contents of the law, and makes the law the continual germ of its own manifold and changeful purposes. These two fundamental activities which together constitute God-con- human personality, are thus joined to each other soiousness and ■ ^^ indissoluble Unity, and the principles by which conscience _ -^ ' r r j one. they are limited cannot be disconnected. Expe- rience witnesses to their inner and mutual relationship. Every awakening of the consciousness of God is in the pious man an impulse for his Conscience, and every warning in turn which Conscience gives, awakens his consciousness of God. He who interprets the consciousness of God in the human spirit as a delusion, will soon be logically led to regard the moral law also as the product of benevolent narrowness or crafty calcula- tion ; the degeneracy or decay of religion in a nation, is always accompanied with the deepest deterioration of its moral life, and no one ever stifles the voice of his conscience without perverting his religious consciousness in unbelief or supersti- tion. The first way in which man becomes conscious of a higher ^ , , union between morality and religion, is by recog- author of the nizing God as the Author of the moral law and moral law. ^^^ Surety of its validity, and by acknowledging the moral law to be the rule according to which the divine Will guides his life. Leibnitz, in his " Nouveavx Essais sur Remark of L' EnteTulement humain"^ says : " God is the only Leibnitz. immediate and outward (i.e., distinct from the Sub- ject) Object of the soul — exteriial objects of sense are but mediately and indirectly known.*' This thought of Leib- nitz's is clearly in keeping with his system of fore-ordained * II. 1, § 1. See also Leibnitii Epistolce, ed. Korthold, vol. iii. p. 67. CHAP. II.] SIN AS DISOBEDIENCE AGAINST GOD. 81 harmony ; but as genius has often discovered truth when the premisses from which it thought to arrive at it were false, this remark still contains a deep truth though its subjective pre- suppositions have long since been overthrown. What we have said concerning the relation of our self-consciousness and world-consciousness to our consciousness of God,has its founda- tion in the thought thus uttered by Leibnitz. If Leibnitz is right, God is also the only immediate object of our moral obli- Reiicdous gation,thefoundation of all other obligations ; every import of our moral duty is a duty towards God, and whatever mor u y. truly binds us in our conscience is the will of God ; obedience to the law is obedience rendered to the living God, " of whom, in whom, and to whom " we are. The relation in which the rational creature stands to God his Creator, when it is true and normal, is the first and closest ; from Him all moral life springs, on Him it depends at every point of its development, and to Him it ever returns from its manifold de- terminations as to a fixed centre, — " from Him, in Him, and to Him." In this relation we become conscious of moral obliga- tion, not as an autonomy, not as an heteronomyy but as a Theonomy.* All morality is recognized as unconscious reli- gion, and true religion proves itself to be the consciousness of morality. Hence it will appear that this divine source of the moral Significance l^w in US cannot be explained merely as expressive of the law. Qf ^q general dependence of all created beings upon God. The law serves to exhibit the threads in the labyrinth of our consciousness (so far as it does not imme- diately relate to God), which lead out of its mazes into free- dom and space, even unto God ; and to bring to light the undeniable indications of a higher power ruling in us and over us. Had it only the above-named significance as expres- sive of dependence, every objection that has been urged against the so-called proofs of the existence of God derived from the law of causality might with equal propriety be urged ao;ainst it. * Christianity is not to blame, but the contempt of Christianity— the rigid exclusiveness of the finite et/o, — if to many this Theonomy is nothing more than a Heteronomy. VOL. I. F 82 THE EEALITY OF SIN. [bOOK I. PaKT I. § 3. Proofs In order still more fully to understand the necessity that the Law ^-^ ^-j^q sphere of morals which leads us from the law iiiicessai'ilv points to to God, we must inquire how the matter stands in ^°^- the sphere of nature. Kant, in his Dissertation concerning the only possible The laws of ground of demonstrative proof of the existence of SowThey ^rod, tells the story, how he had explained to an affect us. intelligent scholar that well-known property of the circle which makes the figure a key to the solution of a difficult and seemingly complicated mechanical problem ; where- upon the scholar, when he clearly understood it, was filled with amazement and admiration, as if it had been some wonder of nature that he beheld. Such, too, is the deep joy which takes possession of us when for the first time we behold and clearly see any of the simple and inexhaustibly suggestive laws of nature, as, for instance, Kepler's laws concerning the motion of the planets round the sun, or the laws which determine the meta- morphosis of plants and of animals. What is the secret cause of this joy ? It is, in the first place, simply the fact that the spirit of man is itself reconciled to and understands the sphere of nature which at first sight seemed strange to him. The law of nature, its unchanging rule amid the varied and perplexing changes of phenomena, the harmonious chain traceable amid manifoldness, the inherent conformity to the end in view, whereby what is apparently isolated and scattered is united and blended, — all this is congenial to and in accord with man's spirit ; he discerns in this conformity to law, a power of thought and of intelligence overruling the forces of nature, just as Plato recognized herein a witness for his derivation of nature from ideas. Law is not the one and all in nature ; a living and individual development inexhaustibly rich and varied springs up before us from nature's depths, and to this it is that nature owes its amazing power over our feeling and imagina- tion. And yet this silent spell whereby nature enchains us, though it does not manifest itself in reflection upon nature's laws, but in an immediate and natural feeling, is nevertheless conditioned by the dominion of law. Imagine this dominion removed, and we behold nothing but a chaotic waste, a heav- ing and drifting sea ; nature can give birth to individual CHAP. il.J SIN AS DISOBEDIENCE AGAINST GOD. 83 and distinctive life in so far only as rule and order prevail within her. But if law be a power of Thought over Being, it certainly Nature's laws ^^^^^^ ^^ist originally and inherently where it imply con- exists unconsciously ; and thought in nature with- scioiisness. ^^^ ^ thinking Subject is a mere phantom. The laws of nature presuppose a real power of thought guiding her active energies, and they must have their origin and basis in a free and conscious Being. Laws can be given only by an actual Will, and no will is real that is not self-conscious ; indeed, thought itself does not become a real power until it is united to will. Undoubtedly there is nothing contradictory in the supposition of an unconscious and instinctive working of nature according to the laws of inherent conformity to the end in view, such as is involved in our conception of an organism. But this only proves a Consciousness above nature, as the original seat of this thought and the author of its determin- ing power, by whose will it becomes law. If the coincidence of the active powers of nature with their law be unconscious, it must be determined or decreed from without ; real self- determination and unconsciousness mutually exclude one another.* May not this But wherein lies the necessity of removing this be^n Nature^ consciousness as the essential seat of law beyond herself? the Sphere of nature ? Why should we not regard * In another connection, J. H. Fichtb (in his profound dissertation upon Speculative Theology in the Zeitschriftfur Philosophie und Spelculative Theologk, new series, v. i., part 2, p. 200) has clearly shown that "this unconscious yet active wisdom of nature itself requires explanation, and it is only arbitrariness or indolence of thought that rests satisfied with it as the absolute." See also Fichte's Speculative Theology, § 33, 34, and the skilful exposition of this inher- ent Teleology of nature in the " Logischen Untersuchungen " (part 2, chap, vii.) of Trendelenburg. He says (p. 24), regarding this unconscious confoimity, that *' it is indeed a fact iu formative nature, but if we imagine we have solved the riddle by thus stating it we are greatly mistaken," In like manner ScHWARZ (F. H. C, b. 1766, d. 1837), in his Wesen der Religion, i., p. 175 ff., points out the contradiction of supposing a world-aim, without a conscious principle appointing that aim ; but it is illogical not to infer from this the con- ception of a Divine personality. For that God must in this case "separate Himself as an individual from other individuals " (p. 191), is not involved in the concept of personality, but only in that of personal individuality, in so far as individuality is correlative of species. 84 THE REALITY OF SIN. [BOOK I. PART I. nature herself as the subject of it ? and seek in her that which gives life and soul to the whole visible world as her cor- poreal frame ? Why does such a supposition contradict the true conception of nature which necessarily involves dependence and impersonality ? Is it because experience and observation con- firm this view of nature, and teach us 4;o regard her, whether as a whole or in her several parts, as an object upon which we act, — and without any power to act on us, save as an impersonal law, with blind purposeless necessity resisting our determina- tions ? But how narrow is the range of our experience of nature in comparison with the immeasurable circumference of the whole ! Why should it be inconceivable that the spirit which actuates and inspires nature, merely condescends to allow man to indulge his harmless strivings upon the surface of one of her smallest organs ? And what is the appeal to some presupposed conception of nature based upon such limited experience but a manifest petitio principii ? But if this were so ; if this self-conscious intelligence, this Ko ; it must inventress of nature's laws — this mighty will that be personal, guarantees their validity, were also recognized as a personal subject in nature, what would follow ? She could not have submitted herself to these laws as a spirit and personality, but could only have realized them in her manifestation and operation. And by this conformity to law, not only the life of nature, but its relation to the spirit of man must have been prearranged. In both cases the arranging intelligence proves itself to be, while inherent in nature, distinct from nature, while subject to nature, yet free from its power, and even its mistress. Beginning with the notion of a blindly working and conformable order of nature, this method of representation leads on to a more spiritual view, and whatever its former value, the issue would be to force this law of nature above the sphere in which it rules into a higher sphere, yea, back to an intelligent author. Even they who, in explaining the order of nature as conformable to the end in view, abide firmly by an uncon- scious power of nature that forms and organizes it, and reject the notion of a creative intelligence, unintentionally contradict themselves ; for they attribute to this power of nature what could only belong to such an intelligence. CHAP. II.] SIN AS DISOBEDIENCE AGAINST GOD. 85 Strauss, instead of removing this contradiction, only Contradiction ^o^^l^s it when he speaks of man's spirit as having in Strauss' originally been an unconscious spirit of nature ^^^^' ordering the relations of the heavenly bodies, form- ing earth and metals, controlling the organic structure of plants and animals ; and as now, by investigation, reflection, and knowledge of nature's laws, ever awakening the recollec- tion of how it ordered all at first* The first contradiction here is, that the spirit of man is represented as having once been an unconscious spirit of nature ; the second is, that this unconscious spirit is said to have accomplished what can only be attributed to a conscious being. And supposing it com- patible with the conception of spirit^ and that spirit a finite spirit, to predicate of it such a creative yet unconscious power, — being an unconscious power, it could only be the organ of a still higher spirit working through it. In applying these conclusions to the laws of the will, we Difficulty of i^^st bear in mind that the cases are by no means applying this analogous. The thought of law cannot have its original abode in nature, which is the sphere of unconsciousness ; but why should we go beyond the self-con- scious spirit of man in order to find a higher consciousness still as the original seat of this law of moral freedom ? Why ? Surely no one could suppose that the moral law Law has not has its primary source in the wills of individuals indivilual^ themselves ; such a doctrine would not explain, it will. would do away with the topic of our inquiry, it would deny the law as a universal power legislating over the will by which man feels himself bound. And is not the ideal of morality clearly a power which asserts its authority in human life independently of man's will, yea, in spite of its opposition ? It does this distinctly in two ways. First, in the individual ; for even when a man has thrown off its authority in sentiment and maxims, it still asserts itself, if not as an actual conscious- ness of guilt, yet as a vague sense of the vanity of his strivings. And secondly, in society with its varied ramifications, which is carried on in harmony with law, and even by instruments who are themselves in heart estranged from the law. But may not • Christl. Gla-ubenslehre, vol. i. p. S.'il. 86 THE REALITY OF SIN. [boOK I. PART I. these laws and their authority have their origin in the univer- sal will of mankind collectively, which being really one, and part of the essence of man, determines the individual will by means of its unity ? This is quite natural, and does not oblige us to resort to a superhuman cause as the source of law, for this universal will itself seems to the individual as a law established over him. True ; — but we must not forget what we have already proved, that the origin of the law must be a self-conscious will. A universal will without a willing subject is an empty meaningless abstraction, like thought without a thinking subject ; and he who would pass off upon us such formulee as this, verily offers us stones for bread. There is nothing left for us therefore, on this hypothesis, but to describe this universal will as a personal Subject, as a real and hypo- static ideal type of humanity, existing as a personal individual, yet beyond and above personal individuals in whom it is empi- rically realized. This reminds us of the attempt of modern speculative Christology to escape from its dilemma between species and individual by means of the scholastic realism, whereby theology not only mistakes this realism, but has to adopt a new kind of polytheism into the bargain. Besides, it would ever be quite a futile straining, not indeed of speculative thought, for we dare not impose such an undertaking upon it, but of imagination, to conjure up before itself a universal will, including all the wills of individuals, and yet possessing a distinct personal existence in virtue of which it gives them laws. It is clear that we can only find the source of the moral Law must law, whose demands we hear in our inmost hearts, so^ui^celn ^^ ^ Being in relation to whom the law of the will God's will. is not something imposed — is not strictly speaking law ; because He has in Himself the contents of the law in a perfect and immediate manner, because He is Himself the absolute good. Needing no law for Himself, subject to no law, His will can lay down laws for the wills of all other beings, even as He is the principle of their existence. And here we have unveiled to us the universal import and It has necessity of the law. It belongs to God alone to rell^ous ^ ^^"^^ ^^^® ^^ Himself ; every other being possesses significance, it not in itself, but in God, and' receives from Him CHAP. II.] SIN AS DISOBEDIENCE AGAINST GOD. 87 the rule for the development and manifestation of its life. In the ease of unconscious nature, law immediately determines and fulfils itself in the working of its powers. In the case of free self-conscious nature, the divine law is a command which does not exclude the possibility of a resisting will. This con- ception of law has essentially a religious import. If the so- called *' autonomy " of the spirit of man were not se^-contra- dictory, it would contradict the true conception of man as a created being. The truth of his being as a creature, consists in his continued dependence upon the Creator ; the truth of his being so far as it is conditioned by his will is revealed to him in the moral law. This makes still clearer and confirms what we have already seen (in the preceding chapter), that the rule to guide created personality, cannot have arisen from the perversion of its rela- tions to God. That rule is really involved in the very nature of this relation from the beginning, and onwards until it be glorified in perfect union with God, wherein He will be " all in aU," 1 Cor. xv. 28. The original source of the moral law as thus traced out, fur- XJncondi- nishes the only adequate explanation of that uncon- rity o\\he^°' ^^^'^'^^^ authority wherewith its claim makes itself law. felt in consciousness, notwithstanding the caprice and opposition of human desires and passions. The uncondi- tioned Thou shalt ! abides firm even before the will that will not will ; its imperative form impUes the actual existence of a higher Will appointing the law, and the unconditional autho- rity of its demand witnesses that this will confronting man's will is the will of God. Kh iartv 6 vo/xo6eT7j^j James iv. 12. Man may indeed make any rules and maxims he likes for his own guidance, and keep them unvaryingly so long as the force of passion does not become too strong for them, but he cannot originate law in the true sense of the word, which abides unchangeable and unflinching amid the inconstant caprice of opinion and choice, and which claims his reverence even in his violation of it. So strictly and universally is this true, that even in the or- Even social dainments of social and national life, all true law •!;!!,.or'1,!*^ lias its source in God ; it is reverenced not as God. devised by man, but as ordained of God, and in 8 3 THE REALITY OF SIN. [bOOK I. ■ PART I. obeying it, tlie individual submits not merely to himself or to his fellow-men, but to God (Rom. xiii. 2).* And accordingly, any so-called lawgiver, or more properly law-proclaimer among men, fulfils his calling more perfectly, the less he presumes to devise or to enact anything by his own caprice, the more he feels bound by a higher necessity, endeavouring to be only the simple instrument whereby the Divine world-ordainments are proclaimed, and the more carefully he regards and is ouided by the real revelations of God's mind in the eternal laws of morality, in the distinctive spirit of the people, and in the course of history. Human legislation, if we trace back its enactments to their beginnings, which were coincident with the formation of society and of a body politic, never can have had the task of deciding what was to be right, but must itself have been subject to higher rules of rectitude, either eternal and unchangeable, or historically evolved. It is a dreadful error when the will of a people, embodied for instance in a representative assembly, regards itself as the last and absolutely independent source of what is to pass for right and law among them ; as if forsooth the vulgar 2J0%oeT of establishing what it liked, perhaps at the risk of making itself the offscouring of liistory, could also confer the right ! Now, as the moral law receives a higher sanction when it is Evil therefore recognized as the revelation of God's will to a finite is sin against being, evil in the same proportion is enhanced when we become conscious of it not only as trans- gression of the law, but also as disobedience against God, as a violation of the relation of dependence essential to the crea- ture. * "We find the discernment of this truth that the source of social ordain- ments and laws lies far above the caprice of man— a truth which many in our time have quite lost sight of— in Augustine, De libero arUtrio, lib. i., cap. 6 ; earlier still in Cicero, De LegihuSf lib. ii. c. 4, 5 ; see also the passage quoted with deserved encomium from Cicero's De Repuhlica, lib, iii., by Lactantius, Div. Institt. lib. vi., c. 8 ; in Sophocles also, though only in reference to a, single class of these ordainments, in the beautiful words of Antigone concerning "the unwritten yet unchangeable decrees of the gods, none of which are of to- day merely or of yesterday, but which ever live, and no one knows how long it is since first they were revealed."— ^n^/f/owe, 455-457 ; see also (Edipus Tyran- nus, 863-872. CHAP. II.] SIN AS DISOBEDIENCE AGAINST GOD. 89 This reference to God in human consciousness it is, that con- verts evil into sin. Por whatever the true etymology of this word may be, it is in all languages the religious designation of moral evil. Our German word Silnde is often derived from silhnen, " to § 4 Etymo- expiate," as if it meant that which made man need LOGY OF THE a Suhm, " an expiation," — that which has to be WORD Sin. expiated. This is Schenkel's view.* But in the old German and the high German of the middle ages, silhnen has a long vowel — suonan, suonen, suenenj " to level," then " to reconcile," t whereas Silnde is in old high German Suntia, in high German of the middle age Sunte, J. Gkimm, who considers the derivation from suonan, through the Gothic saun, at least possible, thinks nevertheless that the most probable derivation is from the old Norse expression s^n, synjar, which means " an apology in court,'' and also, " the vindication of a person for non-appearance at court in answer to a summons ; " and thus through the successive meanings, " checking," " going astray," in the sense of " error," " defect," it may have come to mean " sin." ;]; But would Christian missionaries (whom we must suppose to have been the originators of this use of the term) have chosen so weak a word to designate sin, a word which originally had a good meaning, for Syn was among the heathen the goddess of justice and truth, synja in Gothic being synonymous with akrjOeia ? Much more probable is the derivation (also sanctioned by Grimm) of the word Silnde, " sin," from the Latin sons (sonts), a derivation which is given by the latest philologists, R von * Die christlicke Dogmatik, vol. ii. p. 184. t Raumer, in his work on the Influence of Christianity upon the old high German tongue (p. 368), supposes that the German suona may have been de- rived from the same root as the Latin sanus, sanare, in which case the primary meaning would be '* to make good or repair an injury, to indemnify." Pictet's observation regarding the derivation of the word suitd corresponds with this, " sund hisund {sanus) from suona." See KiTHN, Zeitschri/t fur verglelchende Sprachforschtmg, b. 5, p. 39. t Or, conjectures Grimm, Siincie may directly mean txaisatio, in the sense quod excusandum, exculpandurn est = culpa, causa. — Ahstammung des Wortes Swide, Stud. u. Krit. 1839, p. 3. 90 THE EEALITY OF SIN. [boOK I. PART I. Eaumer * Leo Meyer,! and Lottnek.J Aufrecht § explains som, as Testus does, by nocens, "As nocere alicui means nothing less than neci esse alicui^ to be the cause of the death or ruin of any one, so sotis means primarily destroying, kill- ing." The further derivation of the word sotis from KTAN seems to me very doubtful.|| 'AjjLapria, whatever may be its derivation and original mean- Greek words ing, is according to New Testament usage the for sin. general term for any kind of transgression of the divine command. When sin is named in the Old Testament, we often find its relation to God distinctly expressed ; this occurs only once in the Kew Testament, Luke xv. 18, 21; but this relation, though not always expressed, is always pre- supposed. All men are dfiapTaXoi; the d<}>€o-L<; afxapriMV, of sins in human consciousness arising from the actual relation of the man to God, is offered to every one without exception. Acts ii. 38, iii. 19, X, 43, etc. ; but men are divided into the irovrjpol (KaKoi) and the djadoi, Matt. v. 45, xxii. 10.1F In like manner TrapaTTTcofia from irapaTriirro) (meaning originally the case of one who slips from the path) is used not only for sins of infirmity, but for every kind of transgression of the divine command, Matt. vi. 14, xviii. 25 ; Eom. iv. 25, v. 15-20, xi. 11, 12 ; 2 Cor. V. 19 ; Gal. vi. 1 ; Eph. i. 7, ii. 1 ; Col. ii. 13 ; James v. 1 6. This transgression of the divine law is distinctly expressed when sin is designated irapaKorj^ Eom. v. 1 9 ; 2 Cor. x. 6 ; Heb. i. 2. Uapd^aatf; has the same meaning, it is the act by which a divine command is broken, whether that given to the first * As before, p. 384. t KuHN, Zeitschrift far vergl. SpradiforscJiung, v. 5, p. 381. t Ibid. V. 7, p. 188. § Ibid. v. 8, p. 73 ff. II The derivation of the Latin peccare, peccaturrij is doubtful. It cannot be, as Salmasius assumes, from pecus {more pecudum agere), nor as Doderlein sup- poses (Lateinische Synonyme u. Etymologien, part ii. p. 140), from the root pevj in which case perversion would be the fundamental thought ; nor, as Grimm hints is possible, from pioy which would bring us back to the notion of expiation. The etymology suggested by Doderlein further on (part 6, p. 260), which brings the word into connection with ^tt^vst "thick," " duU," is more probable. IT Measured by the absolute standard of rectitude, man is ^ovtjpog in God's sight even when in discipleship to Christ, Luke xi. 13. iJawpev tTvat, however, means not only moral evil (wickedness), but natural evil also ; thus Eph. v. 16 ; vi. 13 {-nfiipet vevnpx) ; Gal. i. 4 {aiuv vrovnpos) ; Matt. vii. 17, 18 {xafi'x'oi ^ovnpoi) ; so also xaxav, Luke xvi. 25, Acts xvi. 28, xxviii. 5 ; kuxoZv, Acts vii. 6, 19, xii. 1, xviii. 10 ; whereas afiaprla refers only to moral evil. CHAP. II.] SIN AS DISOBEDIENCE AGAINST GOD. 91 man, 1 Tim. ii. 14; Eom. v. 14; or that given by Moses, Eom. ii. 23 ; Heb. ii. 2, ix. 15 {irapa^dri]% B.om. ii. 25, 27 ; James ii. 9, 11); or that written in man's heart, Gal. iii. 19. Finally, dvofita denotes practical apostasy or alienation from the law of God ; it sometimes occurs with the same meaning as dfiapria, or side by side with this word, Titus ii. 14 ; Heb. x. 1 7 ; it oftener denotes the determinate forms of sin and of the sinful state. Matt. vii. 23, xiii. 41, xxiii. 28, xxiv. 12 ; Eom. vi. 19 ; 2 Cor. vi. 14 ; and in the second Epistle to the Thessa- lonians it is the name given to the perfect and conscious antagonist to the divine law and its author, 2 Thess. ii. 7, 8 ; {dvofiosi). The apostle Paul and the evangelist Luke translate V^^WB, Eom. iv. 7, Luke xxii. 37 (compare Ps. xxxii. 1 ; Isa. hii. 12), and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews trans- lates y?^, Heb. i. 9 (compare Ps. xlv. 8) — by ai/o/to?, dvofxia. As to the etymology of dfiaprdpccv dfiapTia, according to BuT- mann's supposition they are derived from fj,ipo^ fxeipeiVj hence dfiipSetVj to make separate, i.e. to deprive ; dfjuapTGcv, intransi- tively, to become separate, i.e, not to arrive at, to miss one's aim ; the change of the aspirate being not without analogy. * This supposition is very probable ; much more so at least than that suggested in the Mymologicum magnurriy viz., from fxdpTTTciVj to seize, to hold, with a privativuTn ; and than that also which Eeiche thinks possible, viz., from dfMapa, a drain or sewer, t The missing of the marJc was accordingly the original representation, but whether this meant the goal of the traveller, the target of the arrow, or the destined arm of the spear, we do not venture to decide. Homer often uses dixaprdveiv, d(f>afiapTdp€iv of the arrow or spear which misses its aim, e.g., Hiad, iv. 491, v. 287; (^/A^/30Te9, ovic eVuj^e?) viii. 119, 302, 311; X. 372 ; xvii. 609 ; (also the derived d^pord^etv, Iliad J X. 65, of men who miss each other in the dark). But who can certify to us that this representation was the primary and original one in the use of the word among the Greeks ? — Whichever of them be preferred, there -lies in these etymologies the deep conviction that man in sinning has never attained * LexilogvJi^ i. 137. t Erklarung des Br, a. d. Eijmer, i., p. 359. 92 THE EEALITY OF SIN. [boOK I. PART I. what he sought, that sin is essentially a disappointment, a delusion, and a fraud. It is not, indeed, intimated that the sinner's aim or goal is in itself wrong; sin here appears only as an act which errs in the choice of means to its end.* «i^n " to sin," with its derivative noun forms, ri«an, n&5i3n, Kt?n " sin," KDn » sinner" (i^«^n " sinner " fm%, Amos words for sin. i^- ^^\ ^^^ <^^^®^ occurs side by side with the similar word P^'S, W^ ; e.g,, Jos. xxiv. 1 9 ; Job xiii. 23 ; Ps. xxv. 7 ; Isaiah xliii. 25 ; Amos v. 12 ; and also with 11 V; e.^., Psj xxxii. 5, xxxviii. 29; Isaiah vi. 7, xliv. 22, liii, 5 ; Jer. v. 25. We find all three words used together fully to express the sum of human sin ; e.^., Exod, xxxiv. 7 ; Job xiii. 23 ; Ps. xxxii. 1, 2, 5, li. 4, 5, cvi. 6 ; Jer. xxxiii, 8. Glaring offences — murder, 2 Sam. xii. 1 3 ; blood-red sins, Isaiah i. 18 ; the sin of the sons of Korah, Num. xvi. 21 ; idolatry, Ex. xxxii. 21, 30-32 ; the vice of unnatural debauch- ery, Gen. xviii. 1 ; Isaiah iii. 9 ; Lam. iv. 6 ; — are denoted by riK^n. Sinning against God and disobedience are fre- quently expressed by the verb fe^on or its cognate noun ; e.g., Gen. xiii. 13, xx. 6, xxxix. 9, Exod. xxxii. 33 ; Jos. vii. 20 ; 1 Sam. ii. 25, vii. 6, xii. 23 ; 2 Sam. xii. 13 ; and especially Psalm li. 6, where the expression " against Thee, Thee only, have I sinned," should, as De Wette and Hupfeld remark, be ex- plained as indicating the intensity of the feeling which, forgetting other bearings of the offence, realizes its one great and highest reference to God. t Umbeeit | thinks that HKiari denotes the inward, and jiV the outward act of sin, but judging from the above references we cannot look upon this as established. Indeed, in the very first place where the word occurs, Gen. iv. 7, the outward realization of the passionate desire is denoted by the word nxi^n. The primary meaning of NtJC* so far as it can be traced in * Compare the different view of Weisse, Philos, Dogmatihi part 2, p. 392 f. t Henostenberg, who finds fault with De Wette'a reference of the expres- sion to the inward feeling, gives no other explanation himself, save that David sees God in the man whom he had injured, so that his whole sin is transformed into a sin against God. Commentary on the Psalms in loe. t Die Sunde. Beitrag zur Theologie des Alten Testaments, p. 50. CHAP. II.] SIN AS DISOBEDIENCE AGAINST GOD. 93 the Hebrew language, is that of " stumbling on the way to a goal," Prov. xix. 2 ; in which is implied a missing of the thing sought for, Prov. viii. 3 6 ; and thus it is used literally of slingers who miss the mark, Judges xx. 16, when the verb is in Hiphil, and used just like the Homeric afiaprdvetv. Accord- ingly niK^n were sins of infirmity, errors arising from haste and from passion darkening clear consciousness. But the word occurs in this sense in only a few passages, e.g. Num. xii. 11, where Aaron calls the sin of Miriam ^37fe arises from an important misunderstanding erroneous of the nature of freedom, concerning which the notion. Theodic4e of Leibnitz, however inadequate its treat- * Schelling's -words, in his treatise iXher das We^en der menschlichen Freikeit; Werkej erste Abtheilung, vol. vii., p. 396. CHAP, m.] SIN AS SELFISHNESS. 101 ment of the topic may be in relation to God and creation, may be read with great benefit/"* The idea is, that the freedom of an act of will is limited in proportion as the subject may deter- mine his own choice, by the principles which knowledge pre- sents to him. Now we maintain, on the contrary, that the True con- ^^^ ^^ ^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^^y ^^ ^^^^ ^^* ^^ ®^^ doing, is ception of the more free, the more clearly the actor knows freedom. ^^^^ ^^ ^.jj^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^. jj^ . ^^^ ^-^^ j^gg ^^ wills merely for the sake of willing, the more will his whole spiritual life, whatever its condition may be, be concentrated in the act of will. An arbitrary act, in the merely formal sense of the term, as denoting indifference, is one in which the person acting gives himself up to the blind force of chance, and thus of outward circumstances. If a man resolves upon an act arbitrarily and without reasons, indifferent as to its import, he does not properly speaking determine himself, but he allows himself to be influenced and determined by what is external to him, — perhaps by an impression which the outer world happened to make upon him at the moment of his choosing, and which gave just this direction to the action now originating within, — or by whatever means the unconscious realization of the act may be brought about. Thus the most trifling occurrences may become masters of the emerging action, because it is in its birth wholly destitute of energetic and conscious will. If this be the true nature of an arbitrary action, so far as such a thing deserves the name of ccctwn, it is evident that while it may be possible (a positive ability it cannot strictly speaking be, for it is only a negation) for a personal created being, it is impossible for God, While in the creature the union between knowing and choosing may be broken, in God it is indissoluble ; and herein it chiefly is that the perfection of the divine will consists, it always reflects with unvarying precision the absolute per- fection of divine thought in its truth, its wisdom, and its righteousness. * Part 2, § 175 f., § 191 f., § 225 f., Part 3, § 318 f., &a We have already referred (p. 21) to the acute distinction between a metaphysical and a moral necessity, the latter name being applied by Leibnitz, not without danger of misunderstanding, to the necessity implied in the moral attributes of God. 102 THE EEALITY OF SIN. [BOOK I. PART I. The notion of an eternal law existing independently of God, Notion of a ^^^ revealing itself to man in moral consciousness lex seterna. ^^g ^ natural moral law, which would be recognized as such even (as Wolf "^ puts it) if there were no God, is alto- gether false and even nonsensical. This view has often been attributed to the scholastic philosophers, but where have they propounded it? Alexander von Hales (d, 1245), Thomas Aquinas, Antoninus, Archbishop of Tlorence (d. 1459), upon whom especially this reproach rests, following in the steps of Augustine,t speak of a lex sterna that constitutes the eternal standard of all movements and acts ; but they do not regard this as something existing independently of God or above Him, they place it in the divine tmderstanding itself ; and in thus doing they are right, however they may have failed in the amplification of details. They explain the natural moral law and all that is truly right and conformable thereto in human laws as a participatio legis mternae, and when they maintain that there is for man a per se honestum vel twrpe antecedenter ad voluntatem divinam, they are far from sanctioning a god- less foundation of Ethics ; their aim is simply to guard against that representation which bases our conceptions of what is good and evil in an act of divine arbitrariness in God*s will as separate from the mens divina.^ They are only to be blamed for describing that eternal basis of the law in the divine imder- standing, the ideas of things eternally existing in Him, in view of which God has given His law to the world, as itself a law ; whereas it can only become law by an act of the divine will * Verniinftige Gedanken von der Menschen Thun und Lasstn, p. i., ch. 1, § 20. t Delibero ArbitriOf lib. i. cap. 6(16); Contra FausL ManicJu, lib. xxii., c. 27. 28 ; and many other places. J Alexander v. Hales, Summa tlieolog. univers., p. i., qu. 35, membr. 3 ; q^u. 27, membr. 2, 3. Thomas Aquinas, Prima Secundae, quaest. 91, art. 1, 2 ; quaest. 93. Antoninus, Summa theologica, p. i., tit. 11-20. The real defect of the scholastic doctrine concerning the law is, that notwithstanding its prolixity, it dwells too much upon generals, and does not sufficiently consider the relation of the law to the present fallen condition of man. The view which Leibnitz in his Theodic^e developes (especially in §§ 175-192), is very similar to that of Aquinas, as to the relation of the moral law to the divine understanding, save that Leibnitz here also introduces that outward notion of the dependence of the divine M'ill upon the divine knowledge which Aquinas, without denying the distinction between the two, endeavours to avoid. CHAP. III.] SIN AS SELFISHNESS. 103 and in relation to real existence external to God, a want of accuracy which did not escape the acuteness of Thomas Aquinas, but which, through reverence for Augustine, who had intro- duced the expression into the dogmatic phraseology of the Church, he did not venture to correct."^ But when the state- ment incidentally occurs in the works of Aquinas, as also in Grotius and Leibnitz after him, that the moral law would not cease to be binding upon man, etsi daretur Detim non esse, this must be carefully distinguished from the opinion similar in form above condemned, for it really means nothing more than that the destruction of our directly religious consciousness would not necessarily involve the extinction of our moral con- sciousness likewise.! It is an often repeated fact, that even the most emphatic deniers of the true and personal God, cannot entirely rid themselves of the warnings of His law in conscience. And must we not discern herein the holy and gracious ordainment of God, that even when a man has en- tirely severed the bond of conscious fellowship with Him, there should still remain another bond, whereby, through the striking alarm of an inner discord, the wanderer might be restored ? The doctrine that the foundation of morality is to be wholly Texts which sought in the arbitrary will of God, seems to be seem to sanctioned by some expressions of St. Paul, accord- sanction the . 1 ■ 1 . 11 . p 1 doctrine of mg to which it would appear as if there could be arbitrariness, gjj^ ^j, blameable violation only when there is law. If that which is condemned by the moral law be not evil in itself and anterior to the law, it would also follow, that what * Prima secundae, quaest. 91, art. 2. t Rothe, in his Ethics, vol. i. p. 191, charges me with making morality pos- sible only on the basis of religion. But the passage which he cites in proof is taken from the first edition of this work, and was expunged from the second edition. That I do not thus determine the relation, my honoured friend will see, if he considers the importance I attach to conscience even in the religious life ; conscience I say according to my conception of it, which certainly differs somewhat from his. I can fully subscribe to what he says in the place referred to, for Rothe himself allows that the idea of morality cannot be truly conceived and understood without the idea of God, that morality necessarily involves onr relation to God, and that, ceteris paribus, the more fully it is penetrated by this, the more perfect it becomes. 104 THE BEALITY OF SIN. [boOK I. PART I. the law approves, is not in itself and anterior to the law essentially good. But it appears on the face of it very improbable that Paul should maintain that the law originated sin and even moral goodness, when, as we have already seen, the very opposite error which would make sin the cause of all law was supposed to have a champion in Paul. And yet it would appear from the words of the Apostle, Eom. iv. 15, 6 v6fio<; opyfjv Karepyd^erai* ov yap (Se) oifK eart vofw^, ovhe 7rapd^a(TL<;, logically to follow that the revelation of the divine law first introduced a distinction between human ac- tions alike and in themselves indifferent, in virtue of which the class in conformity with the law presented itself to man's con- sciousness as good and necessary, while the other class being transgressions of the law appeared as evil and blameable, bringing upon man the opji] — the displeasure and punishment of God. And the Apostle's words in Eom. v. 1 3 seem to coincide with this, if eXXoyetTac there is to be understood of divine imputation. For the words, «%/3i y^p vofiov dfiapria ^v iv tcoa-fi^' dfiapria Se ov/c iK\oyetTat,fii) ovto^ vo/jlov, must be rendered, "For before the law (of Moses), that was in the world which we now regard as sin, but so long as there was no law it was not imputed to us by God, i,e., not in the light of sin ; " and, consequently, as God sees things only as they in reality are, it was not really sin. The Apostle's words in Eom. v. 20 are in unison with this ; " the law came in (irapeia-ipi.de) between the promise and its fulfilment that sin might abound." All this seems to coincide with the notion that God, having resolved to lead mankind on to their destination by means of a redemp- tion and by the removal of a contrast (" the slaying of an enmity "), He had first to bring them into a state of inward contradiction by means of the law, which, by awakening in them a sense of the need of redemption, might be their school- master to bring them to Christ. And must not this be re- garded as the doctrine of Paul as stated in Eom. iii. 19, 20, and Gal. iii. 22-24 ? The recollection that the vofio^ here spoken of is throughout the Mosaic law, — indeed, prominently so in the main text, Eom. iv, 15, — only confirms the inference that it is the law of God alone which introduces the difference between right and wrong. For if in the wider sphere of actions CHAP, mj Sm AS SELFISHNESS. 105 generally, what is done without a knowledge of the Mosaic law can in no true sense be sin, how much less can there be any sin in the much narrower sphere of those actions which are gone through without any consciousness of the law in the inward man ? The plausibility of this view cannot be denied. Let us, Criticism of however, examine more closely the context of the Eom. iv. 15. main passage, Eom. iv. 15. The Apostle had just shown that Abraham was made partaker of the promise " that he should be heir of the world, not by the law, but by the righteousness of faith." ' For,' he continues, * if they who have the law (and fulfil it, Eom. ii. 13) are to be heirs, faith loses its significance, and the promise is annulled.' Why ? Because it rests upon conditions which man cannot perform. ' For it is attested by universal experience that the law instead of lead- ing men to righteousness awakens within them the conscious- ness of wrath, of God's holy displeasure on account of their sinful state.' Paul now gives us the general reason for this fact, generalizing the concept of law by leaving out the article, — ' for where there is no law in the consciousness of the man sinning, sin is not regarded by him as transgression/ nor can it awaken in him the consciousness of God's wrath. If this be the meaning of the 15th verse, if the KaTcpyd^eaBat opyijv and the 7rapd0aa-cva-€L opyrj^y and of John iii. 36, where the wrath of God is said to abide (fMevec) upon the man who believes not on the Son. The oifK iXXoyecTat in Eom. v, 13 is to be understood only of the self -imputation of sin as sin, in the consciousness of the sinner. In opposition to the view above described, the Apostle (in Eom. v. 13, 14) shows that though mankind, beyond the range of the positive law of God, are not wont to bring sin to consciousness as it really is, and to impute it to themselves, yet from the universal sway of death over those who have transgressed no positive and revealed law, we must infer the presence of sin before the Mosaic legislation. It thus becomes self-evident that Eom. v. 20 contains nothing about the original introduction of ' the offence,' and that we cannot 106 THE EEALITY OF SIN. [boO?: I. PART I. adopt the interpretation of the Apostle's chain of thought above described. But the Apostle not only did not teach — he expressly com- st Paul ex- l^^ted any such representation of the origin of sin pressly rejects from the law, whether it be that the law for the e no ion. ^^^^ ^^^ forbids some out of the mass of indiffer- ent acts, and thus makes these wrong, or that by its prohibi- tions it necessarily provokes the will, pure in itself, to opposition. The passage which seems more to sanction such a representa- tion is Eom. vii. 5 where the lusts of sin are described as ra Bta Tov vofiov ; and, accordingly, Paul takes pains to prove (Eom. vii. 7-16) that the law is not to blame for the state of inner discord and misery (6dvaro<;) into which the man sinks when he becomes conscious of its demands. It is, he says, in itself "holy and just and good" (v. 12) ; it is calculated in itself to bring life to man (v. 10) ; and it is only indwelling sin in the man, though still latent and slumbering, which takes occasion by the law to slay him. Not only is the consciousness of in- dwelling sin awakened in the man, and the inner discord made objective by the law, but the indwelling sin is provoked to break out with greater energy in particular acts of sin — sinful lusts (v. 8), by the opposing restraint of the law, which is too weak in itself to bring the will into harmony with it. It is per- fectly clear that the Apostle throughout his argument — not only in Eom. vii. 7-23, but in vii. 5, iv. 15, v. 13, 20 — has in his mind the relation of the law, not to man in his primi- tive perfection, but to a state in which sin is already present as an indwelling bias and tendency. St. Paul confutes the repre- sentation we have named from another point of view in Eom. viii. 7. We must leave the inquiry as to the meaning of a-dp^ for the present ; but these two things are certain, viz., that with Paul p6v'r]fia t^? aaptco'; is a general designation for a sinful being ; and that he includes in it a definite tendency of human life, a series of lusts and endeavours governed by one and the same bias. Now the Apostle says concerningthis^/aoi/Ty/ia T>79 aapfc6