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 George Cannng and his times; 
 
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GEOEGE CANNING 
 AND HIS TIMES 
 
c^i,&7?Z' -m^ ^.01-^ia^A^ 
 
GBOEGB CANNING 
 
 AND HIS TIMES 
 A POLITICAL STUDY 
 
 BY J. A. E. MAEEIOTT, M.A. 
 
 new college, oxford. 
 
 lecturer in modern history and economics at worcester 
 
 colleoe; secretary to the university 
 
 extension delegacy. 
 
 LONDON 
 
 JOHN MUEEAY, ALBEMAELE STEEET, W. 
 1907. 
 
PiBST Edition . . . February, 1903 
 PoPULAB Be-isstjb . . May, 1907 
 
 LONDON : 
 PBINTED BT WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIUITED, 
 DnSE STBSBT, SIAUFOBD SIBBET, S.E. ; AND OBEAT WIHDUILL STBSET, 
 
PREFATOEY NOTE. 
 
 I DESIRE that these pages should be read less 
 as a biography of Canning than as an "appre- 
 ciation" of his policy, and particularly of his 
 foreign policy. They contain a transcription 
 and expansion of the notes of a lecture delivered 
 at Cambridge, and I have not always been care- 
 ful to eliminate, though I have not striven to 
 preserve, the original lecture form. 
 
 The scope of this little book forbids regular 
 references, but I have mentioned in the text or 
 in notes most of the authorities to whom I 
 am specially indebted. For the earlier part 
 of Canning's career the Malmesbury Papers, 
 the GrenviUe Memoirs, and certain Reports of 
 the Historical MSS. Commission are the most 
 valuable of the original authorities; for the 
 later the Wellington Despatches contain a mine 
 of wealth. 
 
 My warm thanks are due to my friends, 
 Mr. Arthur Hassall, of Christ Church, and Mr. 
 H. A. L. Fisher, of New College, for kindly 
 
vi PREFATORY NOTE. 
 
 reading the proofs, and for several valuable 
 suggestions ; to the Governing Body of Christ 
 Church for permission to reproduce Sir Thomas 
 Lawrence's portrait of Canning ; and to Mr. 
 Murray for the interesting information, never 
 before made public, as to Canning's connection 
 with the Quarterly Review. 
 
 J. A. R. MARRIOTT. 
 
 WoECESTER College, Oxford. 
 December, 1902. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAoe 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Introductory . ' . . 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Parentage and Early Liee (7 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 The Disciple op Pitt. 1793-1801 13 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 OppoairrioN and OFricE, 1801-1807 , . . . , 33 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1807-1809 . 46 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 1809-1822 . 66 
 
viii CONTENTS. 
 
 FAGB 
 
 CHAPTER Vn. 
 
 At the Foreign Office, 1822-1827 74 
 
 (a) The Holy Alliance 75 
 
 (b) Old and New Spain 91 
 
 (c) PoHugal 109 
 
 (d) The Eastern Question 116 
 
 CHAPTER Vni, 
 
 Prime Minister (ApRiL-AtrausT, 1827) .... 136 
 
 APPENDIX 145 
 
GEORGE CANNING AND HIS TIMES. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTOEY. 
 
 In the history of EngUsh statesmanship, Canning 
 occupies a place which is peculiar, if not unique. 
 In sheer intellectual ability he has had, by general 
 consent, few, if any, superiors. But some critics 
 would none the less demur to his being admitted 
 to that select first-class to which Walpole and 
 Chatham, Pitt and Peel, indisputably belong. He 
 has some affinities of temper and of gifts with 
 the Carterets and Shelbumes, to whom Disraeli, 
 in the brilliant political dissertation prefixed to 
 ' Sybil,' refers as " the suppressed characters of 
 History." But his positive achievements were 
 incomparably beyond theirs. His position in 
 regard to the Tory party was not unlike that 
 of Henry S. John, Lord Bolingbroke, and of 
 Disraeli himself; for he must certainly be ac- 
 counted as among its most eminent " educators. 
 Bolingbroke, of course, can claim a place in the 
 
2 INTRODUCTORY. [chap. 
 
 history of English literature, to which Canning 
 has no pretensions. ' The Oracle ' and ' The Anti- 
 Jacobin ' were brilliant jetix d' esprit, but even in 
 the domain of satire they have no special dis- 
 tinction, whereas Bolingbroke's contribution to 
 the development of English prose is inferior only 
 to that of Dryden. As a statesman, on the other 
 hand. Canning is as much above Bolingbroke as 
 he is below him as a man of letters. But of all 
 the statesmen I have named, with the exception 
 of the "suppressed characters," Canning has 
 received least attention frona historical critics. 
 Augustus Stapleton, his friend and Private 
 Secretary, devoted four bulky volumes to the 
 memory of his chief. This work remains, and 
 will remain, the principal authority for Canning's 
 political career ; but it is a pious monument 
 rather than a critical biography. Canning is 
 the subject of one of Brougham's short sketches, 
 and he figures as " the Brilliant Man " in Sir H. 
 Lytton Bulwer's 'Historical Characters.' His 
 ' Speeches ' were published in six volumes, edited 
 by Therry in 1828, and short biographies have 
 since appeared at long intervals.* In the stand- 
 ard works on the nineteenth century — notably 
 in Sir Spencer Walpole's admirable 'History* — 
 Canning's figure, of course, looms large ; and 
 there are innumerable references to him in the 
 
 * One by Mr. Eobert Bell in 1846, another by Mr. F. H. Hill 
 in 1887. 
 
I.] INTRODUCTORY. 3 
 
 ' Lives ' of his contemporaries, in those of Lord 
 Castlereagh, Lord Liverpool, Spencer Perceval, 
 Lord Eldon, and others ; and in the Memoirs and 
 Diaries of Lord Malmesbury, Charles GreviUe, 
 Lord Colchester, John Wilson Croker, and 
 William WUberforce. But of Canning himself 
 no biography, at once adequate in scale and 
 critical in tone, exists. 
 
 In this, as in many other respects. Fate has 
 been singularly wayward in its dealings with 
 Canning. His rise to political fame was almost 
 as rapid as that of the younger Pitt, and far 
 more remarkable. The son of a disinherited 
 father and a penniless mother ; without means ; 
 practically without connections; unaided save by 
 a brilliant reputation acquired at Eton and 
 Christ Church, he was brought into the House 
 of Commons as soon as he left Oxford, and 
 became an Under-Secretary at six-and-twenty. 
 His wife brought him £100,000 and an assured 
 position in society; he was indisputably the 
 ablest of Pitt's lieutenants, and perhaps the 
 greatest Foreign Secretary of the nineteenth 
 century. But, despite his great position and his 
 magnificent abilities, despite his briUiant oratory 
 and his skiU in diplomacy. Canning never fully 
 enjoyed the confidence of his contemporaries, 
 and in the estimation of posterity occupies a 
 place which is, I venture to think, far below his 
 real deserts. 
 
 B 2 
 
4 INTRODUCTOEY. [chap. 
 
 Is there any satisfactory explanation of this ? 
 His career, undoubtedly, is full of paradoxes, his 
 character is full of contradictions ; and about 
 both there hangs a certain haze of mystery 
 which historical criticism has not yet penetrated. 
 But no attentive readers of the memoirs and 
 papers of his contemporaries can fail to be 
 struck by the fact that, be the explanation what 
 it may. Canning was never entirely liked or 
 trusted even by men of his own party. Many 
 of them — perhaps most of them — preferred 
 Castlereagh's leadership to that of Canning, and 
 some of them (including the Sovereign) even 
 preferred Addington's. Perceval attained to the 
 first place in the Party twenty years before him ; 
 Lord Liverpool excluded him from it for fifteen. 
 Not one of these men could compare with him in 
 abilities, and none of them were more fortunate 
 in their opportunities. But they were more liked 
 and less mistrusted. Conscious — perhaps over- 
 conscious — of his own abilities, and supremely 
 impatient of stupidity in others. Canning never 
 learnt the first lesson essential to one who 
 aspires to lead a Party — to suffer fools gladly. 
 Irritable in temper and curiously devoid of tact, 
 he impeded his own advancement by over-anxiety 
 and unwillingness to bide his time. Worst of 
 all, he got the reputation, deserved or not, of not 
 " running straight," of faithlessness to colleagues, 
 and a fondness for intrigue. "It is Canning's 
 
I.] INTRODUCTORY. 5 
 
 misfortune," said John Wilson Croker, "that 
 nobody will believe that he can take his tea 
 without a stratagem." " By an unhappy per- 
 version of mind," writes a Quarterly Reviewer, 
 " he would always rather have obtained his 
 end by a crooked path than a straight one." 
 " Canning," said a third, " can never be a gentle- 
 man for more than three hours at a time." 
 How^ever exaggerated and even untrue these 
 statements may be, they serve partially to 
 account for Canning's unpopularity with his 
 colleagues and his contemporaries generally. 
 
 But there were other reasons. There is 
 nothing so fatal to success in the House of 
 Commons as a reputation for exceptional in- 
 tellectual brilliancy. In a free lance, sparkUng 
 wit is not merely tolerated but demanded. But 
 on the Treasury bench the " MarshaUs and Snel- 
 groves " inspire more confidence. Both with 
 tongue and pen Canning's wit was too nimble to 
 be popular. No one knew whose turn would 
 come next. " He rarely," it was said, " delivers 
 an important speech without making an enemy 
 for life." Since he could not be duU, men thought 
 him superficial; and, as often happens, mistook 
 intellectual wit for levity of character. His own 
 conduct, it must be confessed, not infrequently 
 gave weight to these imputations. Diplomacy is 
 a game, but it has to be played with an attempt 
 at seriousness. Canning, however, was from 
 
6 INTRODUCTORY. [chap. 
 
 first to last incorrigible. His despatch to Sir 
 Charles Bagot, our Ambassador at the Hague, 
 has often been quoted as an instance in point. 
 The crisis was an acute one, and the despatch 
 was in cypher. With infinite pains the attaches 
 unravelled it thus : 
 
 " Dear Bagot, in commerce the fault of the Dutch 
 Is giving too little and asking too much ; 
 So since on this policy Mynheer seems bent, 
 We'll clap on his vessels just 20 per cent." 
 
 But although Canning was only half trusted and 
 even less liked by contemporaries, his place in the 
 history of English statesmanship is, as I shall 
 attempt to show, of exceptional interest and of 
 first-rate importance. 
 
11.] 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 EARLY LIFE. 
 
 Geoege Canning was born in London on April 
 11th, 1770, the year which marked the definite 
 beginning of that Tory supremacy which was 
 practically unbroken for sixty years. But 
 " though I was accidentally hotn in London, I 
 consider myself an Irishman." So Canning 
 wrote to Sir "Walter Scott in 1825. An Irishman 
 he was, both by temperament and by blood. 
 His father — also George Canning — was the eldest 
 son of Stratford Canning of Garvagh, a property 
 in the County Londonderry, which had been 
 granted to a cadet of the Cannings of Foxcote 
 (Warwick) in the days of James I. The Irish 
 Cannings had the usual fortune of Ulster Pro- 
 testants in the seventeenth century. They lost 
 a son in the Rebellion of 1641 ; they were at- 
 tainted by James II.'s Parliament in 1689, and 
 restored by that of William III. in 1691. Can- 
 ning's father was the eldest son of the house, 
 but he came over to London in disgrace in 1757, 
 married Mary Anne Costello, a penniless beauty, 
 and having sold his birthright for a mess of 
 
8 EARLY LIFE. [chap. 
 
 pottage, died on the first anniversary of his son's 
 birth— April 11, 1771. The son of the disgraced 
 and disinherited heir of Garvagh lived to see a 
 peerage bestowed upon the cousin who supplanted 
 him. 
 
 Mrs. Canning, with little but her beauty to 
 depend upon, went on the stage, but achieved a 
 very moderate measure of success. She subse- 
 quently married an actor named Reddish, and 
 after his death, in a madhouse, she took a third 
 husband, in 1785, in the person of Mr. Hunn, a 
 respectable but stage-struck tradesman at Ply- 
 mouth. Reddish was an actor of some merit, 
 but personally a dissolute and worthless sot; 
 and it might have gone ill with his step-son but 
 for the kindly intervention of a fellow-actor, 
 Moody. The latter was struck by the bright 
 promise of the lad, and earnestly appealed to an 
 uncle, Stratford Canning, to rescue him from his 
 miserable surroundings. Stratford Canning — a 
 wealthy banker in London — agreed to receive 
 the boy, who was now seven or eight years old, 
 into his home ; procured for him an allowance of 
 £200 a year from his Irish relations, and gave 
 him an excellent educatic^n. George Canning, it 
 may be added, though more or less separated 
 henceforth from his mother, never ceased to 
 regard her with the most tender devotion and 
 solicitude. He wrote to her, it is said, without 
 fail, every week — even at the busiest periods of 
 
11.] EARLY LIFE. 9 
 
 his official career, and as soon as he had earned 
 a pension, begged that it might be settled upon 
 her. Not a few of the most envenomed attacks 
 upon Canning to be found in contemporary 
 satire have reference to this act of filial piety. 
 Mrs. Canning, or Mrs. Hunn, as she ultimately 
 became, lived to be over eighty, and survived 
 her son. That something of her fondness for 
 the footlights descended to the son there seems 
 to be little doubt. Nor can it be denied that the 
 histrionic strain in his temperament weakened 
 his position in the House of Commons. The 
 very finish of his declamation contributed to the 
 impression that Canning was an " actor." " The 
 orator," said Brougham, " never seemed to forget 
 himself and be absorbed in his theme ; he was 
 not carried away by his passions, and he carried 
 not his audience along with him. An actor 
 stood before us, a first-rate one, no doubt, but 
 still an actor, and we never forgot that it was a 
 representation we were witnessing, not a real 
 scene." * Brougham's judgment is as unfair as 
 it is characteristic. To many Englishmen, there 
 is no surer sign of intellectual insincerity than 
 technical perfection in the art of oratory. 
 
 Thanks to his uncle Stratford and the Irish 
 annuity, Canning had the advantage of a first- 
 rate education. He was sent first to the Hyde 
 Abbey School, Winchester, then kept by a Mr. 
 * ' Statesmen of George III.' Firat Series, p. 285. 
 
 C 
 
10 EARLY LIFE. [chap. 
 
 Richards^a pedagogue who was subsequently 
 rewarded by his distinguished pupil with a pre- 
 bendal stall at Winchester. Thenee he passed 
 to Eton, where his first conspicuous triumphs 
 were won. In the school-games he took no 
 part, but, notwithstanding this, he made many 
 friends, and achieved a remarkable reputation. 
 Sir Spencer Walpole goes so far as to assert that 
 he "was, perhaps, the most distinguished boy 
 ever known at Eton." Be this as it may, it is 
 certain that he became a scholar of real distinc- 
 tion, and impressed masters and boys alike with 
 a sense that he was destined for greatness. One 
 definite, and perhaps unique achievement, stands 
 to his credit as a schoolboy. Together with his 
 friends, John and Robert Smith, and Hookham 
 Frere, he started a school paper, the numbers of 
 which mirabile dictu have been frequently re- 
 printed. For its copyright — stUl greater marvel 
 — a publisher, Mr. Knight, was found willing to 
 pay £50 in hard cash. Canning's contributions 
 to the 'Microcosm' are still read by the curious, 
 and it may safely be said that time might be less 
 profitably and less pleasurably spent. Few school- 
 boys write so well in the Addisonian style. 
 
 From Eton, Canning went to Christ Church, 
 where he matriculated on November 22, 1787. 
 Christ Church was, at that time, ruled by one of 
 the greatest of its deans — Dr. Cyril Jackson — 
 who seems to have been a wise counsellor and 
 
11.] EDUCATION. 11 
 
 constant friend to Canning. Among other 
 friendships made or confirmed at Oxford were 
 those with Jenkinson (afterwards Lord Liver- 
 pool), Lord Holland, Lord Morpeth (afterwards 
 Carlisle), Sturges Bourne, and, above all. Lord 
 Boringdon (afterwards Lord Morley), to whom 
 so much of the correspondence printed by 
 Augustus Stapleton is addressed. For the rest, 
 it may be mentioned that Canning won the 
 Chancellor's Latin Verse in 1789, founded a 
 "Speaking Society" at Christ Church, took his 
 B.A. degree in June, 1791, and his M.A. on 
 July 6, 1794. It is worthy of note that he was 
 so far recognised by his Uniyersity as among 
 the greatest of her statesman-sons that the 
 honorary D.C.L. was conferred upon him at 
 perhaps the nadir of his political fortunes — in 
 1814. And it is, perhaps, not less significant 
 that the most distinguished of the political clubs 
 among the undergraduates of Oxford still bears 
 his name. Canning left Oxford as he had left 
 Eton, with a unique reputation as " the brilliant 
 man." But to him, as to many Etonians, Oxford 
 meant less than it does to boys from less famous 
 and less favoured schools, and before he had 
 taken his Degree he seems to have been eager 
 to make his plunge into the larger world. 
 
 He entered as a student at Lincoln's Inn, but 
 so far from practising at the Bar was never even 
 called to it. From the outset of his career, it 
 
 c 2 
 
12 EARLY LIFE. [chap. 
 
 was on political success that his ambition was 
 fixed. It is a common-place to assert that the 
 old close - borough system afforded a better 
 chance to brilliant youngsters without fortune 
 than the open system of to-day. And it is 
 probably true. At any rate, it is certain that 
 many a man who subsequently rose to high 
 office in the State was in this way brought into 
 the House of Commons at four or five and 
 twenty, whereas to-day he would have to plod 
 away at the Bar or in trade for twenty years 
 before he could afford the expense, diminished 
 though it be, of contesting and still more retaining 
 a popular and enfranchised constituency. What- 
 ever his fortune or connections, a young man 
 who left Eton and Oxford with a reputation such 
 as Canning's would not be lost sight of by the 
 party leaders of the day. As a matter of fact. 
 Canning was not entirely without family con- 
 nection. His uncle, Stratford Canning, was a 
 staunch Whig, and his house was a resort of 
 many of the leaders of the newly-formed Radical 
 wing. With Sheridan and Fox in particular the 
 young George Canning was brought into fre- 
 quent if not familiar contact, and it seems to 
 have been generally assumed that when he en- 
 listed in the political army it would be under 
 their banner. That a Whig seat was offered to 
 him by the Duke of Portland seems tolerably 
 certain; but the offer, if made, was declined. 
 
II.] CHOICE OF SIDES. 13 
 
 Canning was introduced to Pitt, and in 1793 he 
 was brought in for Newport (Isle of Wight) in 
 the Tory interest, and as an avowed supporter 
 of the Government. 
 
 There are various indications that this decision 
 was unexpected. As evidence of this. Colonel 
 Pitzpatrick's epigram, often quoted, may be 
 quoted once again : — 
 
 " The turning of coats so common is grown, 
 That no man would think to attack it ; 
 But no case until now was so flagrantly known 
 Of a schoolboy turning his jacket." 
 
 Sheridan, too, had alluded in a speech in the 
 House of Commons not obscurely and, as events 
 turned out, much too confidently, to Canning as 
 " a young friend of mine, whom I soon hope to 
 hear answering the honourable gentleman " 
 (Jenkinson, Canning's Oxford friend) "who has 
 just distinguished himself : a contemporary 
 whom he knows to possess talents not inferior 
 to his own, but whose principles, I trust, are 
 very different from his." Sheridan spoke in all 
 good nature, but he reckoned without his host. 
 It may be that his words helped to hasten a 
 decision already forming in Canning's mind. 
 Even at three-and-twenty Canning was the last 
 man in the world to allow his hand to be forced ; 
 but he seems to have thought it due to Sheridan 
 to call upon him and explain the decision at 
 which he had arrived. Lord Holland was 
 
14 EARLY LIFE. [chap. 
 
 present at this interesting interview, arid told 
 Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer (who tells the story) 
 that "nothing could be more respectful, affec- 
 tionate, and unreserved than the manner in 
 which the ambitious young poUtician gave his 
 reasons for the change he was preparing to 
 make or had made ; nothing more warm-hearted, 
 unprejudiced, and frank than the veteran orator's 
 reception of his retiring proteges confession: nor, 
 indeed, could Mr. Sheridan help feeling the appli- 
 cation when he was himself cited as an example 
 of the haughtiness with which ' the Great Whig 
 Houses ' looked down on the lofty aspirations of 
 mere genius." The last words suggest a further 
 and interesting reason for the decision at 
 which Canning had arrived. The Whig party 
 was still under the domination of the " Revolu- 
 tion families." High office was regarded as a 
 monopoly of the Pelhams, Grenvilles, Bentincks, 
 Russells, Cavendishes, and a few other great 
 houses. To enlist under their banner was to 
 court the fate of Burke and Sheridan himself. 
 The Tories offered a more promising opening to 
 a young man of talent and ambition. Canning's 
 irritable temper may have played him false as 
 years went on (notably in 1809), but there was 
 no lack of calculation and circumspection in the 
 initial stages of his career. 
 
 In 1793 he entered Parliament as an avowed 
 disciple of Pitt. 
 
III.] 15 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Pitt's disciple. 
 
 Canning's decision to throw in his lot with the 
 Tory party, though influenced doubtless by per- 
 sonal reasons, was due primarily to broad con- 
 siderations of public policy. The year 1793 marks 
 a turning-point in Pitt's career, and in English 
 history. On February 1, 1793, the French Re- 
 public declared war on England. That declara- 
 tion closed Pitt's career as a domestic adminis- 
 trator, and compelled him to play a part for 
 which he was not exceptionally qualified. For 
 ten years he had been at the helm of the State — 
 years of ceaseless but congenial activity. He 
 had carried through a series of fiscal reforms 
 which proved him to be the loyal disciple of 
 Adam Smith, and the legitimate successor of 
 Sir Robert Walpole. He had extricated the 
 finances of the country from the confusion in 
 which the American War had involved them, 
 and had placed them on a thoroughly sound 
 footing. He had given to Canada — or rather to 
 the two Canadas — a large instalment of local 
 autonomy ; he had assented to the repeal of all 
 
16 PITT'S DISCIPLE. [chap. 
 
 the worst provisions of the penal code in Ireland, 
 and had done his utmost — not without risk to 
 his position in England — to secure for Ireland 
 the advantages of commercial equality with 
 Great Britain. In regard to India he had suc- 
 ceeded where Fox had failed ; he had established 
 the " dual system," and had placed the constitu- 
 tional relations of England and her great Indian 
 dependency on a footing which endured until 
 the Mutiny. His commercial treaties with France 
 and Russia anticipated the work of Husldsson 
 and Cobden and Peel, while his BiU of 1785 
 proved him to be the first English Minister who, 
 while in office, appreciated the pressing import- 
 ance of the question of Parliamentary Reform. 
 
 But in 1793 the outbreak of war with the 
 French Republic suddenly arrested his work as 
 a domestic reformer, diverted his activities into 
 a less congenial channel, and greatly dimmed 
 his reputation. Pitt's defects as a War Minister 
 have been absurdly exaggerated ; but it must be 
 patent to the most superficial critic that for the 
 first ten years of his official life he was immersed 
 in work entirely congenial to himself, and that 
 for the last ten years he was not. How the 
 legend arose that Pitt plunged this country 
 recklessly into war with France it is difficult 
 for a modern critic to understand. It is now 
 obvious, on the contrary, that he hoped against 
 hope that the revolutionary flames would burn 
 
III.] FRENCH REVOLUTION. 17 
 
 themselves out in France and would not involve 
 Europe in the blaze ; and that even when war 
 had broken out on the Continent he struggled 
 hard to keep England a mere spectator. Inflam- 
 mable materials on both sides the Channel ren- 
 dered the hope illusory and the struggle fruitless. 
 But it may be confidently said that the great 
 war which ensued was not of Pitt's choosing. 
 
 It was the rapid development of events in 
 France which led Canning to separate from his 
 early friends and definitely ally himself with 
 Pitt. His reasons are fully explained in a letter 
 addressed to his friend, Lord Boringdon, and 
 dated December 13, 1792. So long as the French 
 were struggling for Constitutional liberty, Can- 
 ning's sympathies, like those of most Englishmen, 
 were entirely with them. " I wished most piously 
 and heartily for the total overthrow and destruc- 
 tion of every impediment that should be thrown 
 in the way of their exertions." And the reason 
 is characteristic — a " thorough persuasion that 
 the right of a nation to choose for itself its own 
 constitution is a right which they claim from 
 God and nature alone, and for the exercise of 
 which to God and nature alone they are amen- 
 able." It is youthfully and extravagantly put ; 
 but the principle was one to which Canning was 
 constant throughout his political career — the 
 right of a nation to determine its own form of 
 government. He confessed also— and a youth 
 
 D 
 
18 PITT'S DISCIPLE. [chap. 
 
 of two-and-twenty may well be forgiven — ^to 
 "a sort of speculative fondness for the idea 
 of a representative republic ; " and a desire to 
 ascertain by the experience of a neighbour, 
 without being at any of the risk or expense of 
 the experiment at home, how far such a form 
 of government would increase or diminish the 
 freedom and happiness of a people." But 
 from this philosophic enthusiasm for abstract 
 republicanism (at a neighbour's expense), he was 
 rudely recalled by the " first use made by France 
 of her emancipation." To set up a repubhc within 
 her own borders was one thing; to attempt to 
 upset every existing government in Europe, and 
 to promote the " cause of freedom " at the point 
 of the bayonet was another. With a revolutionary 
 crusade Canning had no sort of sympathy, and 
 so it came that he entered the House of Commons 
 as the supporter of Pitt. 
 
 During his first Session he wisely held his 
 tongue, but on January 31, 1794, the "great 
 event," as Canning, writing to Lord Boringdon, 
 describes it, took place. This maiden speech was 
 in favour of the subsidy to the king of Sardinia. 
 The text of it can be read in Therry's edition of 
 Canning's speeches. According to Bulwer it was 
 a failure ; possessing " in an eminent degree all 
 the ordinary faults of the declamations of clever 
 young men. Its arguments were much too 
 refined f its arrangement much too systematic ; 
 
I.] FRENCH WAR. 19 
 
 cold, tedious and unparliamentary, it would have 
 been twice as good if it had attempted half as 
 much." The critic expected too much. Canning 
 himseK was satisfied : " my success was equal to 
 my most sanguine hopes." It was at any rate 
 sufficient, for in the following Session he was 
 selected to second the address. 
 
 Meanwhile the ship of State found itself in 
 stormy waters. The first coalition against France 
 went rapidly to pieces. Prussia had her eyes 
 from the first fixed rather on Poland than on 
 France, and after the accomplishment of the 
 second and third Partitions, came to terms with 
 the French Republic and concluded peace at 
 Basle in 1795. For ten years Prussia ceased to 
 count in European politics. Spain retired from 
 the coalition a few months later, and after a, 
 year's interval was compelled to declare war on 
 England. Holland over-run by French troops 
 was transformed into the Batavian Republic, 
 and added another to the Powers with whom 
 we were at war. Howe's great victory in the 
 Channel (June 1, 1794:), was the first of many 
 successes at sea; but on the Continent French 
 arms carried everything before them ; even 
 Austria was forced to her knees ; and by the end 
 of 1797 England was left alone to confront France 
 
 At home commercial distress was followed by 
 active political discontent. The financial panic 
 of 1793, alleviated though it was by Pitt's wisdom 
 
 D 2 
 
20 PITT'S DISCIPLE. [chap. 
 
 and courage, necessarily disorganised trade ; 
 successive failures of the harvest caused much 
 distress among the poor; the reckless adminis- 
 tration of relief still further accentuated their 
 sufferings ; and oil was poured upon the flames 
 by a group of radical incendiaries led by Thomas 
 Hardy, Home Tooke and others. 
 
 Under these critical circumstances Pitt wisely 
 sought to strengthen and to broaden his adminis- 
 tration. Some of the leading Whigs accepted 
 oifice under him ; the Duke of Portland took the 
 Home Office ; Windham became Secretary at 
 War, and Fitzwilliam went to Ireland. In 1796 
 Canning was appointed to serve his official 
 apprenticeship under Grenville as Under-Secre- 
 tary for Foreign Affairs. This early promotion, 
 he owed, of course, to Pitt. The terms on which, 
 even at this time, he stood with the Prime 
 Minister may be inferred from a passing refer- 
 ence in a letter (August 21, 1790) ; " he (Mr. Pitt) 
 seldom leaves town without giving me such a 
 map of his proceedings as enables me to follow 
 him, whenever I find or can contrive for myself 
 an evening of leisure — an advantage which I 
 seldom fail to take whenever his destination is 
 to Hollwood. I have seen him much there, and 
 for the most part alone, and I think I have never 
 left him without Uking him better than before. 
 I could not admire or love him more, even if I 
 had no obligations to him." 
 
III.] THE ANTI-JACOBIN. 21 
 
 During the next few years Canning devoted 
 himself assiduously to his departmental duties, 
 intervening but rarely in the debates in Parlia- 
 ment, and finding his recreation in writing 
 political squibs for The Anti-Jacobin. 
 
 The first number of this famous "weekly" 
 appeared on November 20, 1797. Despite the 
 critical labour which has been expended of late 
 years upon the subject, it is still impossible to 
 say which of the pieces may with certainty be 
 ascribed to Canning himself, and which to his 
 coadjutors in the enterprise, George Ellis, John 
 Hookham Frere and William Gifford. The last 
 named was chosen by Canning td edit the paper, 
 and contributed certainly to the prose pieces if 
 not to the verse. The object of the whole enter- 
 prise was to kill Jacobinism by ridicule and con- 
 tempt. The main body of the Whigs had gone 
 over with the office-bearers to the side of the 
 Government in 1794, but the left wing, with 
 some fifty adherents in the House of Commons, 
 was stiU strong in the possession of debaters like 
 Erskine and Sheridan, and, above all, Charles 
 James Fox. Mackintosh was a foeman worthy 
 of Burke's steel, while Godwin and Tom Paine 
 wielded a pen with more than common effective- 
 ness. Despite the debating skill of some of its 
 leaders, the Whig remnant was so shrivelled 
 and discredited in Parliament that, in 1797, it 
 virtually seceded from the House of Commons. 
 
22 PITT'S DISCIPLE. [chap. 
 
 But, powerless in Parliament, the extreme Whigs 
 might stiU do mischief in the country, and to 
 circumvent this no weapons could be so effective 
 as those of ridicule and satire. Gillray devoted 
 his pencil to the cause, Canning and his friends 
 devoted their pens. "The popular idea of Fox 
 is to this day largely formed," as one of his 
 biographers * has truly said, " upon a vague re- 
 membrance of Gillray's caricatures." Coarse, 
 and sometimes even brutal, in conception, they 
 did their work as far as Fox was concerned. 
 To the people he became known as a second 
 Guy Fawkes, ready with the torch of the Rights 
 of Man to blow up the King and the House of 
 Lords; as a traitorous agent anxious to betray 
 London to the French ; as a masked headsman 
 preparing for the execution of George III. 
 
 Hardly less savage than the caricatures of 
 Gillray is the satire of The Anti-Jacobin. 
 
 Here, for example, is Canning's burlesque of 
 one of Brskine's perorations supposed to have 
 been delivered at a meeting of The Friends of 
 Freedom at the Crown and Anchor Tavern : 
 
 " Mr. Erskine concluded by recapitulating, in 
 a strain of agonising and impressive eloquence, 
 the several more prominent heads of his speech. 
 He had been a soldier and a sailor, and had a 
 son at Winchester School ; he had been called by 
 special retainers, during the summer, into many 
 
 * Wakeman, p, 180. 
 
III.] THE ANTI-JACOBIN. 23 
 
 different and distant parts of the country — 
 travelling chiefly in post-chaises; he felt him- 
 self called upon to declare that his poor faculties 
 were at the service of his country — of the free 
 and enlightened part of it, at least ; he stood 
 here as a roan ; he stood in the eye, indeed in 
 the hand, of God, to whom (in the presence of 
 the company and waiters) he solemnly appealed ; 
 he was of noble, perhaps royal, blood; he had 
 a house at Hampstead ; was convinced of the 
 necessity of a thorough and radical reform ; his 
 pamphlet had gone through thirty editions, skip- 
 ping alternately the odd and even numbers ; he 
 loved the Constitution, to which he would cling 
 and grapple ; and he was clothed with the in- 
 firmities of man's nature ; he would apply to the 
 present French rulers (particularly Barras and 
 Reubel) the words of the poet : 
 
 "Be to their faults a little blind, 
 Be to their virtues very kind ; 
 Let all their ways be unconflned, 
 And clap the padlock on their mind." 
 
 " And for these reasons, thanking the gentle- 
 men who had done him the honour to drink his 
 health, he should propose ' Merlin, the late 
 Minister of Justice, and trial by Jury.' " 
 
 That seems to me a burlesque worthy of the 
 author of the Yellow-Plush papers, and not dis- 
 similar to them in style. In ' The Friend of 
 Humanity and the Knifegrinder,' we have a 
 
24 PITT'S DISCIPLE. [chap. 
 
 specimen of political and social satire of the 
 highest order — of an order which, however rare, 
 is never out of date. I forbear to quote it only 
 because it is one of the few pieces in The Anti- 
 Jacobin which finds a place in most satirical 
 anthologies. There are some admirable passages, 
 too, in ' New Morality,* one line of which, at any 
 rate, has w^on immortality, though few, perhaps, 
 who quote it know whence it comes : 
 
 " Save, save, oh! save me from the candid friend 1" 
 
 The whole passage is well worth quoting : 
 
 " Much may be said on both sides. Hark! I hear 
 A well-known voice that murmurs in my ear — 
 The voice of Candour. Hail ! most solemn sage, 
 Thou drivelling virtue of this moral age ; 
 Candour, which softens party's headlong rage, 
 Candour, Which spares its foes, nor e'er descends 
 With bigot zeal to combat for its friends ; 
 Candour, which loves in see-saw strain to tell 
 Of acting foolishly but meaning well ; 
 Too nice to praise by wholesale, or to blame, 
 Convinced that all men's motives are the same, 
 And finds, with keen discriminating sight, 
 Black's not so black, nor white so very white. 
 Fox, to be sure, was vehement and wrong ; 
 But then Pitt's words, you'll own, were rather strong. 
 Both must be blamed, both pardoned ; 'twas just so 
 With Fox and Pitt full forty years ago. 
 So Walpole, Pulteney; factions in all times 
 Have bad their follies, ministers their crimes. 
 
 " Give me the avowed, the erect, the manly foe. 
 Bold I can meet, perhaps may turn his blow ; 
 But of all plagues, good heaven, thy wrath can send. 
 Save, save, oh ! save me from the candid friend." 
 
III.] THE ANTI-JACOBIN. 25 
 
 Canning, like many other people, had a pro- 
 found contempt for those sickly and invertebrate 
 cosmopolitans who, under the guise of universal 
 philanthropy, love to vilify their own country- 
 men. But it is not given to everyone with equal 
 vigour and f eUcity to — 
 
 'Lash the vile impostures from the land 
 
 As in the following : 
 
 " First, stern Philanthropy — not she who dries 
 The orphan's tears, and wipes the widow's eyes ; 
 Nor she who, sainted Charity her guide, 
 Of British bounty pours the annual tide ; 
 But French philanthropy, whose boundless mind 
 Glows with the general love of all mankind — 
 Philanthropy, beneath whose baneful sway 
 Each patriot passion sinks, and dies away. 
 
 ' Taught in her school to Imbibe her mawkish strain, 
 Condorcet filtered through the dregs of Paine ; 
 Each pert adept disowns a Briton's part. 
 And plucks the name of England from his heart." 
 
 It is safe to say that Canning's contributions 
 to The Anti-Jacobin were at least as valuable 
 to the administration in which he served as his 
 work at the Foreign Office. 
 
 But neither service was prolonged. The Anti- 
 Jacobin made its last appearance on July 9th, 
 1798, and in March, 1799, Canning resigned his 
 Under-Secretaryship, being succeeded in that 
 office by his friend, John Hookham Frere. 
 Canning was at once appointed an Indian Com- 
 
 E 
 
26 PITT'S DISCIPLE. [chap. 
 
 missioner, and in July, 1800, he became Joint- 
 Paymaster of the Forces. 
 
 The four years he had spent at the Foreign 
 Office had constituted, no doubt, a valuable 
 apprenticeship ; but for some part of the time 
 there had been considerable friction between 
 Pitt and Grenville; and Canning's position as 
 the friend of the former and the official sub- 
 ordinate of the latter had been far from pleasant. 
 More particularly was this the case during the 
 peace negotiations carried on in 1797 at Lille. 
 Pitt was sincerely desirous, not for the first 
 time, of coming to terms with the French Re- 
 public. There was much in the situation to 
 justify the effort. Our command of the sea was 
 stiU, it is true, unbroken. St. Vincent and St. 
 Lucia had been recovered by Abercrombie in 
 1796 ; Hoche had failed in the same year in his 
 attempted descent upon the South of Ireland; 
 Nelson, early in 1796, had prevented the junction 
 of the French and Spanish fleets by his victory 
 off Cape St. Vincent, and some eighteen months 
 later Duncan won the great victory of Camper- 
 down. But though at sea we still more than held 
 our own, in all other directions the outlook was 
 black. In Ireland the association of the United 
 Irishmen had rapidly developed revolutionary 
 tendencies, and many parts of the country were 
 on the verge of rebellion; in England itself 
 there was some social discontent and much real 
 
III.] PEACE-NEGOTIATIONS. 27 
 
 distress ; the constant drain of specie led to a 
 financial panic which resulted, in 1797, in the 
 suspension of cash payments at the Bank ; consols 
 fell to 48 — the lowest point touched ; and, worst 
 of all, mutinies in the fleet at Spithead and at 
 the Nore made men tremble for the stability of 
 the first line of defence. On the Continent there 
 was no longer a soldier in arms against France. 
 The rapid rise of Napoleon and the magnificent 
 campaign against Austria and Sardinia in North 
 Italy (1796-97) shattered the last remnants of 
 the First Coalition ; Austria sued for peace and 
 obtained it at Campo Formio ; Belgium was incor- 
 porated in France, and the greater part of North 
 Italy was converted into the Cisalpine Republic, 
 in close dependence upon its powerful neighbour. 
 But Pitt had stronger grounds for negotia- 
 tion than the annihilation of his allies. The 
 Reign of Terror was ended; Hubert, Danton, 
 and Robespierre had in turn fallen victims to 
 various phases of the progressive of reactionary 
 movement ; and a constitution with some promise 
 of stability had, in 1795, been promulgated. The 
 Directorial consitution was destined to go the 
 way of its predecessors ; but that could not at 
 the time be foreseen, and Pitt, acutely conscious 
 of the distress at home, was surely right in 
 attempting to come to terms. Negotiations were 
 opened in the spring of 1796 through Wickham, 
 the English envoy in Switzerland, but they came 
 
 B 2 
 
28 PITT'S DISCIPLE. [chap. 
 
 to nothing. A similar result attended the more 
 elaborate efPorts of Lord Malmesbury in the 
 autumn of the same year. Despite these failures, 
 and despite the determined opposition and formal 
 protests of his own Foreign Secretary, Pitt per- 
 sisted in reopening negotiations in 1797. Canning 
 writes in terms of the utmost despondency to 
 EUis, who was on Lord Malmesbury's staff. 
 " We cannot and must not disguise our situation 
 from ourselves. If peace is to be had, we must 
 have it. I firmly believe that we must, and it 
 is a belief that strengthens every day. When 
 Windham says we must not, I ask him : ' Can 
 we have war? ' It is out of the question ; we 
 have not what is of all means the most essential, 
 the mind. If we are not at peace we shall be at 
 nothing." The letter (printed in the Malmesbury 
 Correspondence, iii. 397) was a private one, and 
 we have no absolute warrant for assuming that 
 Canning here represents the views of Pitt. But 
 that Pitt was sincerely — nay, passionately — 
 desirous of peace, there can be no doubt. The 
 war was on his conscience, if not on his nerves. 
 " I feel it my duty," he declared to Grenville, " as 
 an English Minister and a Christian, to use any 
 effort to stop so bloody and wasting a war." 
 Lord Malmesbury was accordingly sent to Lille. 
 His correspondence and Diaries reveal the extra- 
 ordinary and, indeed, humiliating position in 
 which he was placed during the negotiations 
 
III.] PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. 29 
 
 which ensued. " You must have perceived," he 
 writes to Canning, "that the instructions and 
 opinions I get from the Minister (Lord Grenville) 
 under whose orders I am bound to act, accord so 
 little with the sentiments and intentions I heard 
 expressed by the Minister (Pitt) with whom I 
 wish to act, that I am placed in a very disagree- 
 able dilemma." Lord Malmesbury, in fact, was 
 hardly less anxious for peace than Pitt himself. 
 But the terms even of the peace party in France 
 were ridiculously high, while the war party was 
 anxious only for a final rupture of the negotia- 
 tions. The reconstruction of the Directory, and 
 the coup d'6tat of 18th Fructidor completely 
 destroyed all hopes of an immediate peace. 
 Lord Malmesbury received his passports, and 
 was ordered, none too courteously, to leave 
 France within twenty-four hours. Thus ended 
 Pitt's last overture for peace. 
 
 Canning's position at home had been hardly 
 less delicate than that of Lord Malmesbury. He 
 alone, apart fromGrenville and Pitt, was cognisant 
 of the actual course of negotiations. The Cabinet 
 was kept in the dark ; the despatches from Lille 
 were intentionally copied in so vile a hand as to 
 be undecipherable by the ministers. Meanwhile 
 the tension between the two leading ministers 
 was acute, and Canning's position became daily 
 more difficult. The situation was relieved by 
 the renewal of the war, but it can never have 
 
30 PITT'S DISCIPLE. [chap 
 
 been more than tolerable, and Canning must 
 have been unfeignedly glad in 1799 to exchange 
 the Foreign Office for an Indian Commissioner- 
 ship. In 1800 he became Joint Paymaster of 
 the Forces, and in 1801 he resigned office with 
 Pitt, and went into violent opposition against 
 Addington. 
 
 Pitt's resignation, it need hardly be said, was 
 due to his inability to gain the assent of the 
 King to his Irish policy. In that policy, in its 
 entirety, Canning heartily concurred. Like Pitt 
 he regarded the Act of Union as being under the 
 circumstances inevitable. The many weaknesses 
 revealed by experience in the " Grattan Constitu- 
 tion " ; the dangerous divergence of the two 
 Legislatures on constitutional questions of the 
 first importance ; the miscarriage of Pitt's wise 
 poUcy in regard to Irish commerce ; the intrigues 
 of Tone and Fitzgerald with the enemies of 
 Great Britain ; finally, the outbreak of rebellion 
 in 1798, rendered it impossible to prolong the 
 experiment of Legislative Independence. But 
 neither Pitt nor Canning ever intended that the 
 Union should stand alone. "The word Union," 
 wrote Lord Comwallis, " wiU not cure the evils 
 of this wretched country ; it is a necessary pre- 
 liminary, but a great deal more remains to be 
 done. That, as his most brillant biographer 
 points out,* was Pitt's view. He meant the 
 * See Lord Bosebery's ' Pitt,' p. 198. 
 
III.] IRISH POLICY. 31 
 
 Union to be accompanied or immediately fol- 
 lowed by a complete and final removal of 
 Catholic disabilities ; a large scheme for the 
 endowment of their clergy and the aboUtion of 
 tithes. " "Who will say," as Lord Rosebery per- 
 tinently asks, " that followed up by large spon- 
 taneous and simultaneous concessions of this 
 kind the policy of the Union might not have 
 been a success ? " But Pitt and Canning reckoned 
 without their King. The King refused any 
 concession to the Irish Catholics, and in 1801 
 Pitt resigned. Canning went out with his 
 chief. 
 
 It may be convenient in this place to add that 
 Canning was at one with Pitt in thinking that 
 so long as foreign affairs continued critical the 
 Cathohc question should be shelved. So long as 
 George III. retained a semblance of sanity it 
 remained on the shelf. But in 1810 the King 
 finally went mad, and thenceforward Canning 
 became the staunch champion of the Catholic 
 claims in Parliament. It was he who in 1812 was 
 in charge of the motion for the consideration of 
 the laws affecting the Roman Catholics, a motion 
 which was carried by an immense majority in 
 the House of Commons. Again it was Canning 
 who in 1822 introduced and carried the second 
 reading of a Bill to enable Catholic Peers to sit 
 and vote in the House of Lords. He died two 
 years before the final triumph of the cause in 
 
32 PITT'S DISCIPLE. [chap. 
 
 1829, but in nothing did Canning show himself 
 more conspicuously the true disciple of Pitt than 
 in his fearless and uncompromising advocacy of 
 a measure which both statesmen regarded as the 
 necessary complement and corollary of the Act 
 of Union. 
 
IV.] 33 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 OPPOSITION AND OFFICE, 1801-1807. 
 
 The period between his resignation with Pitt and 
 his final resumption of office in 1822 must be re- 
 garded as the least satisfactory in Canning's career. 
 Until 1801 he might fairly be looked upon as a 
 promising and brilliant youngster; and as such 
 a certain levity and flightiness of conduct and 
 temper might well be forgiven to him. But he 
 was now emerging from the period of apprentice- 
 ship, and his intellectual powers were rapidly 
 ripening into maturity. In the House of 
 Commons he had found his feet, and was 
 generally recognised as a parliamentary orator 
 of the front rank ; he had had administrative 
 experience in three separate offices ; while his 
 marriage with Miss Joan Scott (July 8, 1800) had 
 given him an assured position in society, and had 
 finally redeemed him from the ranks of political 
 adventurers. Never, it would seem, did Fortune 
 smile more kindly upon a young and ambitious 
 statesman. But the record of the next few years, 
 is, on the whole, more than disappointing. Two 
 
 F 
 
34 OPPOSITION AND OFFICE, [chap. 
 
 years of incessant intrigue, of querulous and 
 factious opposition; two years of subordinate 
 office under Pitt ; a year of opposition to the 
 " Talents " ; two years of real power and success 
 at the Foreign Office ; a disastrous quarrel with 
 a colleague, followed by seven years of weary 
 wandering in the shades of opposition while his 
 own party was in power ; then four years in an 
 office which he would have scorned to accept ten 
 years earlier; finally, another two years' seclusion. 
 Such is Canning's record during the period which 
 should have been his political prime. It must be 
 confessed that it is disastrously disappointing. 
 Not until, in 1822, the death of Castlereagh, re- 
 opened to him the Foreign Office, did Canning 
 regain the place in English politics which but for 
 faults of temper he niight have filled continuously 
 for nearly twenty years. 
 
 From 1801 until 1804 the Premiership was 
 held by the late Speaker, "Doctor" Addington. 
 During this time Canning found the serious 
 business of life in incessant intrigue against 
 Pitt's successor, and his recreation in the manu- 
 facture of second-rate squibs to be fired off 
 against the " Doctor." 
 
 Addington as an object of abuse and ridicule 
 was irresistible to Canning. Absurdly conse- 
 quential and egotistical in temper, pompous in 
 nianner, and mediocre in ability, he was just 
 the man to provoke the ill-natured contempt and 
 
IV.] ADDINGTON. 35 
 
 sarcastic humour of the brilliant Irishman. 
 Canning's poetical effusions of this period 
 originally appeared for the most part in 'The 
 Oracle,' but they were reprinted in the 'Spirit 
 of the Public Journals,' and have been largely 
 quoted in more than one biography. I select 
 one or two specimens of this not very delicate 
 satire. 
 
 Here is a parody of Douglas : — 
 
 " My name's the Doctor. On the Berkshire hills 
 My father purged his patients — a wise man, 
 Whose constant care was to increase his store, 
 And keep his eldest son — myself — at home. 
 But I had heard of politics, and longed 
 To sit within the Common's House and get 
 A place ; and luck gave what my sire denied." 
 
 The following are the concluding lines of a piece 
 
 entitled " Good Intentions." 
 
 " 'Twere best, no doubt, the truth to tell, 
 But still, good soul, he means so well! 
 Others, with necromantic skill. 
 May bend men's passions to their will. 
 Raise with dark speUs the tardy loan. 
 To shake the vaunting consul's throne ; 
 In thee no magic arts surprise. 
 No tricks to cheat our wondering eyes ; 
 On thee shall no suspicion fall 
 Of sleight of hand or cup and ball ; 
 E'en foes must own thy spotless fame, 
 TJnbranded with a conjurer' a name t 
 Ne'er shall thy virtuous thoughts conspire 
 To wrap majestic Thames in fire! 
 
 " Hail, then, on whom our State is leaning! 
 O Minister of mildest meaning! 
 Blest with such virtues to talk big on. 
 With snch a head (to hang a wig on), 
 
 F 2 
 
36 OPPOSITION AND OFFICE, [chap. 
 
 Head of wisdom, soul of candour, 
 
 Happy Britain's guardian gander, 
 
 To rescue from the ' invading Gaul ' 
 
 Her ' commerce, credit, capital 1 ' 
 
 While Rome's great goose could save alone 
 
 One Capitol — of senseless stone." 
 
 The reference in the following lines is to the 
 fact that Addington had appointed his brother 
 Hiley, Secretary at War, and his brother-in-law, 
 Bragge Bathurst, Treasurer of the Navy. 
 
 " How blest, how firm the Statesman stands 
 (Him no low intrigue can move) 
 Circled by faithful kindred bands. 
 And propped by fond fraternal love. 
 When his speeches hobble vilely. 
 What ' Hear him's ' burst from Brother Hiley ; 
 When his faltering periods lag. 
 Hark to the cheers of Brother Bragge. 
 
 " Each a gentleman at large, 
 Lodged and fed at public charge, 
 Paying (with a grace to charm ye). 
 This the Fleet, and that the Army," 
 
 All this is pretty fair fooling ; but it did 
 Addington little harm, and it did Canning no 
 good. To speak plainly, it did him an infinite 
 amount of harm both at Court and in the House 
 of Commons. People refused to believe that 
 Canning was anything more than a brilliant 
 jester. "He is unquestionably very clever," 
 wrote Lord Malmesbury so late as 1807, "but 
 he is' hardly yet a statesman, and his dangerous 
 habit of quizzing (which he cannot restrain) 
 would be most unpopular in any department 
 
IV.] CANNING'S LEVITY. 37 
 
 which required pliancy, tact, or conciliatory 
 behaviour." Lord Malmesbury was a friend and 
 admirer. Sydney Smith was neither ; but it can 
 hardly be doubted that he expressed a very 
 general opinion when, writing in the character 
 of Peter Plymley, he said : " It is impossible to 
 hear him upon any arduous topic without per- 
 ceiving that he is eminently deficient in those 
 solid and serious qualities upon which, and upon 
 which alone, the confidence of a great country 
 can properly repose. . . . Providence has made 
 him a light jesting, paragraph-writing man, and 
 that he wiU remain to his dying day. When he 
 is jocular, he is strong ; when he is serious, he is 
 like Samson in a wig ; any ordinary person is a 
 match for him; a song, an ironical letter, a 
 burlesque ode, an attack in the newspaper upon 
 NichoU's eyes, a smart speech of twenty minutes 
 fuU of gross misrepresentations and clever 
 turns, excellent language, a spirited manner, 
 lucky quotation, success in provoking dull men 
 .... these are your friend's natural weapons : 
 all these things he can do ; here I allow him to 
 be truly great ; nay, I will be just, and go still 
 farther — if he would confine himself to these 
 things, and consider the facile and the playful 
 to be the basis of his character, he would, for 
 that species of man, be universally allowed to be 
 a person of a very good understanding : call him 
 a legislator, a reasoner, and the conductor of the 
 
38 OPPOSITION AND OFFICE, [chap. 
 
 affairs of a great nation, and it seems to me as 
 absurd as if a butterfly were to teach bees to 
 make honey." Moreover, as regards Addington, 
 Canning made the grievous blunder of seriously 
 underrating his opponent. " Pitt is to Addington, 
 as London is to Paddington." This famous tag 
 may contain a just estimate ; the comparison was 
 no doubt mathematically accurate. Addington 
 was no genius ; but he was no fool ; and he was 
 a persona grata in the House of Commons (which 
 Canning never was), and a persona gratissima at 
 Court (which Canning was still less). Finally : 
 Addington was responsible for a peace which, 
 though by no means glorious, was exceedingly 
 popular, alike in Parliament and in the country. 
 
 Negotiations, begun in 1801, resulted, in 
 1802, in the signature of the Treaty of Amiens. 
 Napoleon, nominally First Consul of the French 
 Republic, really master of France, wanted time 
 to put his new property in order, and therefore 
 accepted peace. We restored to France, Holland, 
 and Spain all the cojaquests which we had taken 
 from them, except Ceylon and Trinidad : we sur- 
 rendered, sensibly enough, the title of King of 
 France, a title borne by all our sovereigns since 
 1340 ; and we promised to restore Malta to the 
 Knights of S. John, a promise which, for adequate 
 reasons, we never fulfilled. 
 
 Pitt warmly welcomed the conclusion of this 
 peace ; he doubted its permanence, but he 
 
IV.] PEACE OF AMIENS. 39 
 
 thought that the country needed four or five 
 years of peace to recover breath for the next 
 bout with Napoleon. Nor was he unwilling to 
 come to terms with Addington. Canning was 
 anxious to get Addington out, by fair means or 
 foul, and to reinstate Pitt. Pitt was compelled 
 to restrain the ardour of his disciple, and, more 
 or less formally, to disavow his policy; but he 
 was none the less eager to get back to power. 
 To effect this object he was willing to surrender 
 to the King's prejudices on the Catholic Ques- 
 tion. Pitt's conduct in this matter has been 
 very severely criticised. The resignation of 1801 
 had been, it is suggested, a mere form — a tribute 
 to political decency — or, still worse, an oppor- 
 tunity for escaping the odious necessity of an 
 inglorious peace. I cannot take this view. Pitt 
 was always, I believe, sincerely anxious to do 
 justice to the Irish Catholics. To have remained 
 in office after the conclusion of the Union to 
 which he had won their assent by something 
 like a pledge, when that pledge could not be 
 redeemed, would have been impossible. But 
 his resignation had undoubtedly imperilled not 
 merely the sanity, -but the life of the King. 
 Moreover, Pitt believed, and rightly, that he had 
 a duty to perform hot only to Ireland but to 
 England. Was he, at a grave crisis, to persist 
 in a policy which would have involved his per- 
 petual exclusion from the councils of the nation? 
 
40 OPPOSITION AND OFFICE, [chap. 
 
 It is said, in reply, that the King would have 
 been forced to give way if Pitt had stood firm. 
 But is that certain? What does appear to be 
 certain is that the King would not have given 
 way without a struggle which would undoubtedly 
 have cost him his reason, and probably his life. 
 In either case, the crown would have devolved 
 upon the Prince Regent. Was that a contin- 
 gency which Pitt could face with a light heart ? 
 Besides : the position as regards France was be- 
 coming, almost daily, more grave. On March 8, 
 1803, the King sent a message to both Houses 
 advising that precautionary measures should be 
 taken in view of the military preparations in 
 France and Holland. A week later. Napoleon 
 grossly insulted our ambassador in Paris, and it 
 became obvious that we were on the brink of 
 war. Addington at once made overtures to Pitt, 
 but had the impertinence to suggest that they 
 should serve together as Secretaries of State 
 under the leadership of a third person — perhaps 
 Lord Chatham. Pitt, however, made it clear 
 that, if he came in at all, it must be as First 
 Minister and Master of the Cabinet, and on no 
 one's sufferance. " I had not," he told a friend, 
 " even the curiosity to ask what I was to be." 
 
 War was declared in May, 1803, and for 
 nearly twelve months Addington was compelled 
 to conduct it ; but the King at last surrendered, 
 though with a sufficiently bad grace, and Pitt, 
 
IV.] TREASURER OF THE NAVY. 41 
 
 admitted after three years' exclusion to the 
 King's presence, was charged with the formation 
 of a Cabinet. Pitt pressed for the inclusion of 
 Lord GrenviUe and Charles James Fox. The 
 King ungraciously assented to the former, and 
 agreed to admit some of Pox's friends, but at 
 Fox himself he drew the line. Fox, at this junc- 
 ture, behaved admirably, and urged his followers 
 to go in with Pitt ; Grrenville, however, refused 
 ojBBce without Fox, and Pitt, therefore, was com- 
 pelled to take office with a Cabinet which was 
 virtually Addington's old administration recon- 
 structed and rearranged. Addington himself 
 was for the moment excluded, but, within less 
 than twelve months, was readmitted to the 
 Cabinet. Canning frankly disliked the whole 
 arrangement, and made it clear that he was 
 not anxious to join the new Government. Pitt 
 refused to press him, but offered him his choice 
 between two non-Cabinet offices — the Secretary- 
 ship at War, and the Treasurership of the Navy. 
 Canning ultimately agreed to take the latter. 
 
 Meanwhile, as we have seen, this country 
 was once more at war, and was joined, in 1805, 
 by Russia, Austria, and Sweden, in what is 
 generally known as the Third Coalition. The 
 Coalition itself lasted little more than a year, 
 but it was a year memorable in the annals of the 
 Napoleonic wars. For many months past Napo- 
 leon had been engaged in elaborate preparations 
 
 G 
 
42 OPPOSITION AND OFFICE, [chap. 
 
 for the invasion of England. In the summer of 
 1805 the great enterprise was launched. Success 
 depended on Napoleon's getting command of the 
 Channel for twenty-four hours. That command 
 he never got, and Nelson's great victory at Tra- 
 falgar rendered it for ever impossible that he 
 should. But while Great Britain was supreme 
 at sea, Napoleon was triumphant on land. On 
 October 19, 1805, two days before Trafalgar, the 
 Austrians were compelled to capitulate at Ulm, 
 and on December 2 the combined armies of 
 Russia and Austria were absolutely crushed at 
 Austerlitz. Austerlitz forced Austria to her 
 knees ; the last phantom remnants of the Holy 
 Roman Empire which, as Voltaire says, had 
 long since ceased to be either holy, Roman, or 
 an empire, were dissolved; Austria itself was 
 dismembered, and, by the formation of the 
 confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon became 
 virtually master of Germany. 
 
 To England, also, Austerlitz was disastrous. 
 The news of the battle is said to have killed 
 Pitt. Perhaps the impeachment of his friend 
 and colleague, Lord Melville, did at least as 
 much to hasten his end ; but, be that as it may, 
 in the first days of 1806 Pitt passed away. His 
 death was followed by the dissolution of his 
 Ministry, and by a long period of political con- 
 fusion, intrigue and unrest. Each successive 
 political generation is apt to ' imagine that, as 
 
IV.] DEATH OF PITT. 43 
 
 regards personal jealousies and party intrigue, 
 there has been no previous experience parallel 
 to its own. To any who may be inclined to take 
 this view I would commend the correspondence 
 Tinearthed by the Historical Manuscripts Com- 
 mission from the archives of Lowther and Drop- 
 more.* There we have a pretty picture of petty 
 intrigues in which, I am bound to confess. 
 Canning seems to have played some consider- 
 able part. 
 
 On Pitt's death, Lord Hawkesbury was asked 
 to form a Government, but declined. Grenville 
 was sent for and consented, but only on con- 
 dition that he might include^ Fox. The King's 
 obstinacy was at last broken down, and Fox, 
 for the brief remainder of his life — only a few 
 months — was in office and in power. GrenviUe's 
 ministry, including, as it did, Erskine, Grey and 
 Windham, besides, of course, Fox and himself, 
 was known as "All the Talents," though the 
 appellation, as Fox handsomely observed, was 
 not truly applicable to any Government from 
 which Canning was excluded. But thdugh 
 Canning was out, Addington (now Lord Sid- 
 mouth) was in. Sidmouth, said Canning, is like 
 the small-pox, since everybody must have him 
 once in their lives — an observation which seems 
 to shed equal lustre upon "Doctor" Addington 
 
 * Hist. MSS. Commission. Thirteenth Eeport. Dropmore 
 jPapers, vols. i. ii. iii. ; Appendix, Part vii. Lonsdale MS. 
 
 G 2 
 
44 OPPOSITION AND OFFICE, [chap. 
 
 and Doctor Jenner. Grenville would have been 
 glad to include Canning as well; but Canning 
 conceived himself to be bound to the Pittites, 
 and refused to come in except with his friends. * 
 Grenville's ministry lasted little more than a 
 year. Fox, after holding the seals of the 
 Foreign Office for only eight months, died on 
 September 13, 1806, sincerely regretted by his 
 Sovereign. "Little did I think," said the King 
 to Lord Sidmouth, "that I should ever live to 
 regret Mr. Fox's death." After Fox's death there 
 was again a reshuffling of places ; offers were 
 renewed to Canning, but again Canning refused 
 to come in except with the body of Pitt's friends, 
 and the negotiation fell through. But early in 
 March, 1807, Grenville's ministry foundered on 
 the rock of the Catholic Question ; not on the 
 main rock, but on an outlying one. A Bill was 
 introduced in 1807 to permit Roman Catholics to 
 hold office in the Army. In deference to the 
 King's wishes, the Ministry consented to with- 
 draw the Bill, but the King then required a 
 pledge that they would never, at any future 
 time, propose to him any concession to the 
 Roman Catholics. Refusal to give the required 
 assurance was followed by resignation. " This," 
 said Sheridan, " is the first administration which 
 not only ran its head against a wall, but actually 
 
 * See Beports of Historical MSS. CommiBsion, cit. sup. 
 
IV.] PORTLAND MINISTRY. 45 
 
 built a wall for the purpose of running its head 
 against it." 
 
 The formation of the new Government was 
 committed to the Duke of Portland, never a 
 strong man, and now broken by disease. But 
 his ministry had in it some elements of strength : 
 Perceval was Chancellor of the Exchequer; Lord 
 Hawkesbury took the Home Office ; Castlereagh 
 became Secretary for the Colonies and War; and 
 Canning, for the first time, entered the Cabinet 
 as Foreign Secretary. 
 
46 FOEEIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 SECRETAEY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1807-1809. 
 
 Canning now found himself at the age of thirty- 
 seven in what was, at the moment, unquestion- 
 ably the most responsible and onerous office 
 under the Crown. 
 
 It is necessary to recall the main features of 
 the situation with which he was confronted. 
 
 We had now reached the most critical 
 period of the struggle against Napoleon. The 
 Third Coalition had been shattered by Ulm and 
 Austerlitz; Austria had been crushed and dis- 
 membered; the old Empire of the West had 
 been finally dissolved to make room for the 
 " new Charlemagne," who was already, thanks to 
 the Rhenish Confederation, virtually Emperor of 
 Germany. A significant illustration of Napoleon's 
 supremacy had been afforded by his insolent and 
 high-handed treatment of his Prussian "ally." 
 With the object of embroiling Prussia in war 
 with England, Frederick William III. was com- 
 pelled to accept Hanover at the hands of Napo- 
 leon, and to close his ports against English 
 
v.] JENA. 47 
 
 commerce. Consequently, in April, 1806, Fox 
 declared war on Prussia. To this war Canning 
 was opposed. He strongly insisted on the view 
 that our true policy was to recognise that 
 Prussia was yielding to f(yrce majeure, and to 
 ignore an act of unwilling hostility. " Prussia," 
 said Canning (speaking in the House of Commons, 
 December 19, 1806), " unable to resist the power 
 of France, encroached on us ; we had, however, 
 the option to pass over the just cause of com- 
 plaint which we possessed in consequence, and 
 to leave untouched the only Power in Europe 
 which appeared capable of being the germ of a 
 hostile alliance against France. But the conduct 
 of his Majesty's Ministers has been the converse 
 of this policy. By this policy, Prussia has been 
 compelled to act without our advice and assist- 
 ance, and to plunge into a war of which, if our 
 advice could not have prevented it, our assistance 
 might have meliorated the termination." 
 
 At last, after ten years of inglorious neu- 
 trality, the Prussian worm had turned against 
 its tormentor, and, very pluckily though very 
 inopportunely, Frederick William III. had on 
 October 1, 1806, declared war against Napo- 
 leon. Just a fortnight later (October 14) he 
 fought and lost the great battle of Jena. Jena 
 was a crushing defeat for Prussia. Napoleon 
 occupied Berlin, and, after issuing the first of 
 his famous Decrees, marched thence into Poland. 
 
48 FOEEIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 But the campaign of 1807 was less triumphant. 
 Napoleon suffered a distinct check at the hands 
 of the Russians at Eylau (Fehruary) ; and al- 
 though decidedly victorious at Friedland (June), 
 he determined to come to terms with the Czar 
 Alexander. On June 25, 1807, there took place 
 in a floating pavilion, moored in the middle of 
 the Niemen, the historic and memorable inter- 
 view between the Czar of Russia and the 
 new Emperor of the West. The issue of that 
 conference was the famous Treaty of Tilsit. 
 It is essential to an understanding of Canning's 
 policy at this juncture to realise clearly the nature 
 of the situation thus created. In brief, the Treaty 
 of Tilsit registered the determination of the two 
 Emperors to crush Prussia, to ruin England, and 
 to divide the world between them. As far as the 
 Continent was concerned, there seemed to be no 
 insuperable obstacle to the realisation of this 
 scheme. Absolute master of France, King of 
 Italy, and President of the Confederation of the 
 Rhine, Napoleon was now doling out tributary 
 kingdoms to his kinsmen and successful mar- 
 shals. Joseph Bonaparte was installed in the 
 kingdom of Naples, Louis in that of Holland 
 (1806), and in 1807, Westphalia was erected into 
 a kingdom for Jerome. But while the Continent 
 was thus prone at Napoleon's feet, England was 
 still untouched and erect. Foiled in his attempt 
 at direct invasion, but bent, now as always, on 
 
v.] THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM. 49 
 
 her ruin and humiliation, Napoleon decided upon 
 more devious methods of attack. The scheme 
 which he devised was large and comprehensive, 
 but well compacted in all its parts. Impreg- 
 nable at sea, the British Empire must be at- 
 tacked by land. A Franco-Russian army was to 
 be marched through Turkey and Persia, and 
 was to deliver the assault on the North- Western 
 Frontier of India. " That Napoleon should have 
 seriously contemplated marching across Europe 
 and half Asia to invade the territory of an island 
 within twenty miles of the French coast, that he 
 should have thought it, on the whole, less im- 
 practicable to send a force from the Danube or 
 Constantinople to Delhi, is certainly," as Sir 
 Alfred Lyall* observes, "a remarkable illustra- 
 tion of the impregnability of effective naval 
 defence." Meanwhile, British commerce was to 
 be strangled by the Continental System, and a 
 strenuous attempt was to be made to equalise 
 the conditions of the naval struggle by the 
 seizure of the fleets of Denmark and Portugal. 
 
 This last resolution was fraught with moment- 
 ous consequences for Napoleon, and is of primary 
 interest to the student of Canning's foreign 
 policy. It not only led to one of the boldest 
 and most dramatic acts of Canning's official life, 
 but constituted the real beginning of the move- 
 ment which ultimately involved the downfall of 
 
 * ' British Dominion in India,' p. 241. 
 
 H 
 
50 , FOREIGN SECEETARY. [chap. 
 
 Napoleon. This being so, I must deal with the 
 episode in some slight detail. 
 
 The famous meeting between Napoleon and 
 the Czar took place, as we have seen, on June 25. 
 On July 16, Canning received, from three separate 
 quarters, warnings as to the Franco-Russian alli- 
 ance and the threatened attack upon Denmark. 
 On the receipt of this grave intelligence he acted 
 with the utmost promptitude. On July 22, he 
 wrote to Brooke Taylor, who was proceeding as 
 our envoy to Copenhagen, that he had received 
 direct intelligence from Tilsit as to Bonaparte's 
 "proposal for a maritime league against Great 
 Britain, to which the accession of Denmark was 
 represented by Bonaparte to be as certain as it 
 was essential. . . . The confidence with which 
 Bonaparte spoke of the accession of Denmark 
 to such a league, coupled with other circum- 
 stances and particulars of intelligence which 
 have reached this country, < makes it absolutely 
 necessary that his Majesty should receive from 
 the Court of Denmark some distinct and satis- 
 factory assurances, either that no such proposi- 
 tion has been made to that Court by France, or 
 that, having been made, it has been rejected, and 
 some sufficient security that, if made or repeated, 
 it will meet with the same reception." The recent 
 publication of the secret articles of the Treaty 
 of Tilsit has proved up to the hilt the substantial 
 accuracy of Canning's information. How that 
 
v.] TILSIT. 51 
 
 information was obtained is still a matter of 
 conjecture.* But the main fact is no longer in 
 dispute. If Great Britain refused the terms 
 to be offered to her, the two Em^perors had 
 definitely agreed to "Summon the three Courts 
 of Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Lisbon to close 
 their ports to the English and declare war against 
 England. That one of the three courts which 
 refuses shall be treated as an enemy ; and in the 
 case of Sweden refusing, Denmark shall be com- 
 pelled to declare war against her." 
 
 Canning lost not a moment. Denmark was 
 informed that it must accept an immediate alli- 
 ance with England, and must hand over the 
 whole of its fleet to England as "a sacred deposit 
 and with a solemn convention as to its restora- 
 tion at the conclusion of the war." In this event 
 England would agree to pay to Denmark £100,000 
 a year as interest on the " deposit," and to restore 
 it, at the conclusion of a general peace, "in 
 the same condition and state of equipment as 
 when received under the'protection of the British 
 flag." 
 
 The sequel is well known. Canning's demand 
 was refused, and we were under the very dis- 
 agreeable necessity of bombarding Copenhagen 
 
 * Much light has been thrown upon this dark episode by the 
 researches of Dr. J. Holland Kose. Cf. especially 'Life of 
 Napoleon I.' vol. ii. and 'English Historical Review,' vols. xi. 
 xvi. I have made free use of Dr. Rose's discoveries at the Record 
 Office, and wish to acknowledge my obligations to him. 
 
 H 2 
 
52 FOEBIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 (September 8, 1807), and effecting the seizure of 
 the fleet by force. 
 
 From that day to this, the policy of Canning 
 and the action of the British Government have 
 been criticised (as was to be expected) with ex- 
 treme acerbity. "This shameful deed of high- 
 handed violence must be laid," says a distinguished 
 American critic,* "at Canning's door." "High- 
 handed " the deed indubitably was ; but was it 
 "shameful"? I venture to think, on the con- 
 trary, that an exceptionally bold policy was 
 entirely justified by exceptionally critical circum- 
 stances. The necessity of employing force to- 
 wards a small State must of course be regretted ; 
 but Denmark could not at this time urge any 
 plea for specially indulgent treatment at the 
 hands of England. On the contrary, as Dr. J. H. 
 Rose points out, " her leanings had of late been 
 so notoriously favourable to France, that in the 
 Russo-Prussian Treaty of Bartenstein (April 1807) 
 to which we were accessories, the Courts of 
 St. Petersburg and Berlin had proposed to use 
 force to compel her to join the coalition against 
 France." Nor can we forget that the gravity of 
 the crisis was beyond all power of words to 
 exaggerate. Between England and Napoleon 
 the struggle was one of life and death. There 
 was no room for neutrality. " If England refuses 
 to accept the Russian mediation," so Napoleon 
 * Dr. Sloane. 
 
v.] THE DANISH FLEET. 53 
 
 wrote to Bernadotte on August 2, 1807, "Den- 
 mark must declare war against her, or I must 
 declare war against Denmark." That sentence 
 is a concise summary of the situation, and an 
 ample justification for Canning. Even had 
 Denmark been anxious to preserve neutrality, 
 it is absolutely certain that she could not have 
 done so. Her fleet had to fall into the hands of 
 England or France, and we at least may be for- 
 given for believing that England could offer 
 better security for the temporary " deposit." To 
 my thinking, it is beside the mark to argue, as 
 some critics (e.g. Mr. Fyffe,*) have done, that the 
 acquisition of the Danish fleet by Napoleon 
 would have been insufficient to turn the scale 
 against the victors of Trafalgar. Possibly not. ■ 
 But the moment was not one at which we could 
 afford to run any risks ; and twenty ships of the 
 line, eighteen frigates, nine brigs, and a number 
 of gun-boats would have been beyond question 
 substantial reinforcement for the French Navy. 
 
 Finally: Canning's action has the justification 
 of unquestioned and complete success. The con- 
 spiracy of Tilsit was checkmated ; an essential 
 part of Napoleon's scheme was frustrated, and 
 the Emperor himself (as we learn from Fouch^) 
 was driven into transports of rage. We incurred, 
 indeed, the lasting enmity of Denmark, but we 
 earned respect in a more important quarter. 
 * ' History of Modern Europe,' vol, i. p. 345. 
 
54 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 "It was one of the recommendations of the 
 enterprise to me," wrote Canning in a private 
 letter to Lord Boringdon, "that it was sure, if 
 successful, to stun Russia into her senses again. 
 It has done so." And for once Castlereagh's 
 opinion coincided with Canning's. "The tone 
 of the Russian Cabinet," he wrote to Lord 
 Cathcart, "has become much more conciliatory 
 to us since they heard of your operations at 
 Copenhagen." No one regretted more sincerely 
 than Canning the necessity for harsh and " high- 
 handed " measures towards a small, if unfriendly, 
 power ; but every fresh scrap of evidence which 
 has leaked out from the Continental Archives, 
 from that day to this, has tended to substantiate 
 more and more completely the soundness of his 
 intuition, if not the accuracy of his information. 
 Thus imminent danger was averted in the 
 North. Two months after the British bombard- 
 ment of Copenhagen, a French army under 
 Junot occupied Lisbon (November, 1807). This 
 was another instalment of the Tilsit scheme. 
 Portugal was suddenly ordered to adopt the 
 Continental System, to close aU its ports to 
 English commerce, and to confiscate aU the 
 property of English merchants resident in 
 Portugal. Portugal was no more in a position 
 to disobey the dictates of Napoleon than Den- 
 mark; but for a century her connectiod with 
 England had been close, and her attitude to 
 
v.] PORTUGAL. 55 
 
 this country was as friendly as that of Denmark 
 was the reverse. Here, again, neutrality was 
 impossible. "You must break either with 
 England or France." Such was the language 
 employed by Napoleon to the Portuguese am- 
 bassador on, August 2, 1807 — ^just a month before 
 the bombardment of Copenhagen. Before the 
 end of August forty thousand men were massed 
 at Bayonne, ready to enforce Napoleon's decree. 
 The Portuguese hoped against hope that the 
 threatened blow would be averted by a general 
 peace. The hope was vain, and the blow 
 descended upon the devoted victim. The Portu- 
 guese Court fled to Brazil, and in 1808 England 
 and France were face to face in the Peninsula, 
 as, in 1807, they had been face to face in the 
 Baltic. 
 
 But the French occupation of Lisbon was of 
 wider significance than the English bombardment 
 of Copenhagen. It marks the real beginning of 
 the anti-Napoleonic reaction among the peoples 
 of the Continent. 
 
 " But now, rous'd slowly from her opiate bed, 
 Lethargic Europe lifts the heavy head ; 
 Feels roimd her heart the creeping torpor close, 
 And starts with horror from her dire repose." 
 
 These contemporary lines may have small merit 
 as poetry, but they express an important his- 
 torical fact. 
 
 It is no part of my purpose to tell the story 
 
56 FOREIGN SECEETARY. [chap. 
 
 of sordid and sinister intrigue which led to the 
 outbreak of the Peninsular War. Any who will 
 may read it in the graphic pages which Mr. Oman* 
 is now giving to the world. Enough to note 
 here that after a long-drawn intrigue between 
 Napoleon, the Spanish Minister, Godoy — the 
 " Prince of the Peace," and the heir to the Spanish 
 throne Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, the 
 Treaty of Fontainebleau was concluded (Octo- 
 ber, 1807). Under this treaty Portugal was 
 to be partitioned between France and Spain, 
 In March, 1808, Murat occupied Madrid, and 
 Charles IV. was forced to abdicate in favour of 
 Prince Ferdinand. In May, the wretched Ferdi- 
 nand was forced to abdicate ; in June, Joseph 
 Bonaparte was seated on the throne of Spain, 
 and Murat was sent in his place to Naples. It 
 was not difficult to dispose of the Spanish princes, 
 but Napoleon had characteristically left out of 
 account the Spanish people. In Spain, however, 
 the people counted for a good deal ; and herein 
 lies the significance of the new chapter opened 
 by the events thus roughly summarised. " Spain," 
 as Professor Seeley f points out, " was Spain, but 
 those Italian and German States were not Italy 
 and Germany, but only in Italy and Germany. . . . 
 It was evident that the one thing needful was 
 
 * 'History ol the Peninsular War,' by Professor Charles 
 Oman. 
 
 t 'Life of Stein,' vol. ii. pp. 19, 24. 
 
v.] SPANISH RISING. 57 
 
 found, and a new idea took possession of the 
 mind of Europe. That idea was not democracy 
 or liberty ; it was nationality. It was the idea 
 of the nation as distinguished from the State; 
 the union by blood as distinguished from the 
 union by interest." Unlike Westphalians or 
 Neapolitans the Spaniards were not minded to 
 be tossed contemptuously to a kinsman of the 
 Emperor of the "West. National committees or 
 Juntas were rapidly organised in all parts of 
 Spain, and before Joseph had been in Madrid 
 raany weeks the news reached Napoleon that 
 twenty thousand Frenchmen under Dupont had 
 been surrounded by the Spanish insurgents at 
 Baylen and compelled to lay down their arms 
 (July 21). 
 
 Pitt had long ago asserted that only a war of 
 peoples could save Europe, and just before his 
 death had predicted to Lord Wellesley that " this 
 war would begin in Spain." Canning was not slow 
 to realise that the moment of the fulfilment of 
 his great master's prediction had arrived. From 
 the outset he clearly perceived the significance 
 of the new factor which had entered into the 
 European problem. He declared with emphasis 
 that any nation which would oppose France — 
 " the common enemy of all nations " — " becomes 
 instantly our essential ally," and he insisted that 
 vigorous efforts should be made to encourage and 
 to sustain the resistance of the Spanish people. 
 
58 FOEEIGN SECEETARY. [chap. 
 
 Arms, money, and military stores were sent out 
 to Spain, and in July a force was despatched 
 under Sir Arthur "Wellesley. Wellesley landed 
 in Portugal on August 1, and successfully drove 
 back the French from Rolica on the 17th, and 
 four days later inflicted a crushing defeat upon 
 Junot at Vimiero. But the fruits of that great 
 victory were snatched from his hand by the in- 
 opportune arrival of Sir Harry Burrard ; who, in 
 his turn, was superseded by Sir Hew Dalrymple. 
 Dalrymple immediately concluded with Junot 
 the Convention of Cintra. 
 
 Under that strange Convention the French 
 agreed to evacuate Portugal, but they them- 
 selves, their guns, and their baggage, were to be 
 sent back to France on British ships. A howl of 
 indignation greeted the announcement of these 
 terms both in England and Spain. This indigna- 
 tion was shared alike by Sir Arthur Wellesley 
 and Canning ; and the fact that the Convention 
 was approved in the Cabinet during the latter's 
 absence suppUed, as we shall see presently, one 
 of the grouds of dissension between himself and 
 his colleagues, particularly Castlereagh. The ap- 
 pointment of Sir John Moore to the command of a 
 fresh expeditionary force still further emphasised 
 the split. Moore was a fine soldier, but a man 
 of despondent temper.* " Remember, my lord," 
 
 • Cf. Quarterly Review, No. 3 (August, 1809), an article by 
 Canning and George Ellis on Moore's expedition. 
 
v.] SIR JOHN MOORE. 59 
 
 he said to Castlereagh when setting out for his 
 command, "I protest against the expedition, 
 and foretell its failure." Canning may well be 
 forgiven his indignant outburst when he heard 
 the story from Castlereagh's lips,: " Good God ; 
 and do you really mean to say that you allowed 
 a man entertaining such feelings with regard to 
 the expedition to go out and command it ? " The 
 sequel is known to all. With a force ridiculously 
 insufficient, Moore was ordered to advance from 
 Lisbon to the support of the Spaniards at 
 Salamanca. Moore himself was under no illu- 
 sions. "I mean to proceed bridle in hand, for 
 if the bubble burst and Madrid falls, we shall 
 have a run for it." The bubble did burst. Three 
 hundred thousand French troops were concen- 
 trated in Spain; Napoleon in person assumed 
 the command ; the Spaniards were scattered like 
 chaff before the wind ; Napoleon marched on 
 Madrid, restored Joseph to the throne, turned 
 on Moore, but, called away by the impending 
 war with Austria, left the pursuit to Soult and 
 Ney. After a retreat, which has generally been 
 described as masterly,* Moore reached Corunna, 
 and there, on January 16, was compelled to fight 
 the action in which he fell. 
 
 Moore's forced retreat, coming on the top of 
 
 *The latest authority on the Peninsular War (Professor 
 Chailes Oman) strongly dissents from the received judgment 
 (Cf. vol. i. pp. 598-601) on Moore's retreat. 
 
 I 2 
 
60 FOREIGN SECEBTARY. [chap. 
 
 the Convention of Ointra, led to a loud outcry in 
 England in favour of the abandonment of the 
 Peninsula. Canning stoutly resisted these timid 
 counsels. Even in a military sense the situation 
 seemed to him far from hopeless. It was 
 ridiculous to expect the raw and undisciplined 
 insurgents to withstand, in pitched battles, the 
 seasoned veterans of France, but they might 
 still seriously embarrass Napoleon by guerilla 
 warfare. Besides, the question was more than 
 a military one. To keep a hold on Spain was, 
 under the circumstances, a political necessity. 
 Canning realised this to the full, and carried 
 his point with his colleagues and the country. 
 The two Wellesleys were sent back to the Pen- 
 insula ; Lord Wellesley as the accredited agent 
 to the Supreme or Central Junta ; Sir Arthur to 
 command the troops ; to lead them to victory at 
 Oporto, at Talavera, at Busaco, and on many 
 another historic field. To Canning and the 
 brothers WeUesley not England alone, but 
 Europe at large owes an imperishable debt. 
 But, for the moment, the solid success, iachieved 
 by English arms and English diplomacy in the 
 Peninsula, was neutralised by bungling and 
 incompetence elsewhere. Chatham and Castle- 
 reagh were an offset to Wellesley and Canning, 
 and the disastrous expedition to Walcheren 
 dimmed the glories of Oporto and Talavera. 
 The scheme of an expedition to Walcheren 
 
v.] WALCHEREN. 61 
 
 had long been in Castlereagh's mind ; and there 
 was much to be said for it. If successful, it would 
 not only encourage the German people in resist- 
 ance to Napoleon,* but would inflict a crushing 
 blow upon the embryo French fleet at Antwerp. 
 It is open to question whether it was wise, in 
 view of Wellesley's operations in the South, to 
 direct so large a British force to the Scheldt ; but, 
 after all, it was the execution, not the conception, 
 which was chiefly at fault. Everything went 
 wrong with the ill-fated expedition. First, there 
 was delay owing to the scandal about the Duke 
 of York ; Napoleon's victory at Wagram (July, 
 1809) dissipated the hope of a general rising in 
 "Germany ; the troops were decimated by disease ; 
 while disaster was finally assured by misunder- 
 standings and quarrels between the commanders. 
 The oft-quoted epigram is as accurate as it is 
 scathing : 
 
 " Lord Chatham, with his sword drawn, 
 Kept waiting for Sir Bichard Strahan ; 
 Sir Richard, eager to be at 'em, 
 Kept waiting, too, for whom? Lord Chatham." 
 
 At home, recriminations in regard to the Wal- 
 cheren fiasco brought to a head the long simmer- 
 ing dissensions between the two leading members 
 of Portland's ministry. 
 
 Canning had, long ago, made up his mind that 
 
 * Cf. Quarterly Heview, No. 2 (May, 1809), an article by 
 Sharon Turner and Canning on the Austrian Kising of 1809. 
 
62 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 Castlereagh was over- weighted at the War Office . 
 and on April 2, 1809, he wrote to the Duke of 
 Portland intimating that unless Castlereagh were 
 removed he must himself resign. Portland con- 
 sulted the King, and the King seems to have 
 suggested that if Canning would hold his hand 
 Castlereagh might be transferred to another 
 department at the close of the Session. To 
 Castlereagh himself Portland said not a word, 
 and thus, by his timidity, laid Canning open to 
 charges of duphcity, intrigue and bad faith, 
 which, certainly for the naoment, and perhaps 
 permanently, damaged his reputation. The Ses- 
 sion ended in June ; Canning again pressed his 
 point, but nothing was done, and not until 
 September — and then by accident — did Castle- 
 reagh hear a word about the matter. His very 
 natural indignation knew no bounds. He de- 
 manded satisfaction from Canning ; a duel was 
 fought, and Canning was' slightly wounded. 
 Meanwhile, both statesmen had retired from the 
 Ministry. 
 
 The whole business was unfortunate to the 
 last degree.* Damaging to the Government and 
 to the country; to Canning it was disastrous. 
 The country, at a critical moment, lost its two 
 ablest administrators ; Canning lost a position in 
 
 * The whole of the documentary evidence— published state- 
 ments by Canning and Castlereagh, etc. — may be read in the 
 ' Annual Eegister ' for 1809. 
 
v.] QUARREL WITH CASTLEREAGH. 63 
 
 English politics which it took him twelve years 
 laboriously to regain. That Castlereagh had 
 grievous cause to complain is not to be denied ; 
 but on a careful review of the evidence it is 
 obvious, I think, that the blame which fell upon 
 Canning was wholly disproportionate. That 
 Canning had a perfect right to demand Oastle- 
 reagh's removal was frankly admitted by the 
 latter. " I have no right, as a public man, to 
 resent your demanding, upon public grounds, 
 my removal from the particular office I have 
 held, or even from the administration as a 
 condition of your continuing a member of the 
 Government." What Castlereagh complained of 
 — and justly — was, that he was kept in total 
 ignorance of Canning's sentiments and demands, 
 and that he was permitted " in this state of delu- 
 sion to continue to conduct the entire manage- 
 ment of the campaign and to engage in a new 
 expedition of the most extensive, complicated, 
 and important nature under the full persuasion, 
 not that Mr. Canning had supplanted him in 
 office, and possessed in his pocket a promise for 
 his dismissal, but that he really enjoyed (as 
 during the period he in outward show and daily 
 concurrence experienced) Mr. Canning's sincere, 
 liberal and bona fide support as a co-operating 
 and approving colleague." It is not astonishing 
 that such a charge, from such a quarter, should 
 have seriously damaged Canning's reputation 
 
64 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 for straightforwardness and good faith. On the 
 other hand, Canning's own contention has equal 
 force. Holding, as he did, that the national 
 interests demanded the removal of Castlereagh 
 from the War Of&ce, he had the courage to state 
 his views to " the King's minister to be laid by 
 that minister before the King." At the same 
 time he tendered his own resignation as an 
 alternative. Neither the Prime Minister nor the 
 King would allow him to resign, and both pro- 
 mised that a change should be effected at the 
 War Office, but pressed for delay. In delay. 
 Canning, reluctantly and for the time, acquiesced; 
 but never, he asserts, in concealment. Discovering 
 at the end of June that no communication had 
 been made to Castlereagh, he protested to Port- 
 land "in terms of the strongest remonstrance," 
 and again pressed the acceptance of his resigna- 
 tion. On a distinct assurance that Castlereagh 
 should be informed, he once more acquiesced in 
 postponement, but on September 6, on learning 
 that nothing had been done, he resigned. Bear- 
 ing in mind the critical circumstances of the 
 time and the country, I confess myself unable to 
 perceive wherein Canning was to blame. From 
 the first he took " the regular, effectual, and 
 straightforward course," by laying two alterna- 
 tives before the Prime Minister. Believing that 
 one had been accepted he withdrew the other. 
 The blame must rest — so it appears to me — partly 
 
v.] RESIGNATION. 65 
 
 on the timidity and procrastination of the Duke 
 of Portland, and partly on the ill-advised inter- 
 vention of the friends of Lord Castlereagh. 
 
 But I should not have dwelt at such length 
 upon the incident had it not involved a larger 
 issue. Canning's retirement at this juncture was 
 little short of a national disaster. He had held 
 the seals of the Foreign Office little more than 
 two years ; but in those two years he had entirely 
 altered the political situation in Europe. When 
 he took office in 1807 everything hung in the 
 balance ; when he resigned in 1809 the scale was 
 slowly but surely turning against Napoleon. 
 With a weak man at the English Foreign Office 
 the Franco-Russian conspiracy might well have 
 triumphed ; Tilsit might have marked not the 
 fatal turning point but a step in the ascent ; 
 Denmark and Portugal — their fleets in French 
 hands — might have been absorbed into the 
 Napoleonic system ; and the Spanish rising might 
 have added but one more chapter to the history 
 of splendid but futile insurrections. 
 
 Thanks to the promptitude and intrepidity of 
 Canning the situation was saved ; the Danish 
 fleet was secure in English keeping, and Portugal 
 was preserved as an effective basis for expedi- 
 tions which led slowly but inevitably to the final 
 overthrow of Napoleon. 
 
 K 
 
66 1809-1822. [chap. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 1809-1822. 
 
 Canning's quarrel with Lord Castlereagh sud- 
 denly interrupted his official career at a sin- 
 gularly interesting point. That interruption 
 unquestionably involved a serious misfortune 
 to the country, and played terrible havoc with 
 the political fortunes of Canning himself. For 
 the next twelve years (1810 to 1822) Canning, 
 now in the very prime of his political life, was 
 absent from the inner Councils of the nation. 
 He came back, it is true, to the Cabinet in 1816, 
 but he was never really in power again until 
 1822. For this exclusion Canning, it must be ad- 
 mitted, was himself largely responsible. Before 
 the resignation of the Duke of Portland there 
 had been some discussion as to the succession to 
 the Premiership. Canning said bluntly that he 
 would not serve under Perceval ; but, with 
 equal frankness, said that he could not expect 
 Perceval to serve under him. Possible rois 
 faineants were mentioned ; but then came the 
 crisis of the quarrel with Castlereagh ; Portland 
 
VI.] OUT OF OFFICE. 67 
 
 resigned; Canning was out; Spencer Perceval 
 was in, and in as Prime Minister. Canning's 
 haughty and impatient temper had played him 
 false not for the first nor for the last time. Had 
 he consented, in 1809, to serve under Perceval, 
 his succession to the Premiership, three years 
 later, could hardly have been disputed. The 
 blunder was bitterly regretted by his friends. 
 "As for Canning," wrote Sir "Walter Scott, 
 "with his immense talent, wit, and eloquence 
 he unhappily wants prudence and patience, and 
 in his eager desire to scramble to the highest 
 point is not sufficiently select as to his asso- 
 ciates." In 1812, Perceval was assassinated, and 
 Lord Liverpool came in. Again Canning had 
 his chance, and again he lost it by his unyielding 
 temper. "Aut Ccesar aut nullus." He would 
 accept, as yet, no office which did not carry 
 with it at least the leadership of the House of 
 Commons, if not the nominal headship of the 
 Government. In 1812 he received from Lord 
 Liverpool and Lord Castlereagh an offer which 
 he himself described " as perhaps the handsomest 
 ever made to an individual." Castlereagh offered, 
 while retaining the leadership of the House, to 
 resign to his great rival the Foreign Office. 
 Without the leadership Canning declined office. 
 Had he accepted it, the great diplomatic settle- 
 ment of 1815 would have been in his hands 
 instead of in those of Lord Castlereagh, and the 
 
 K 2 
 
68 1809-1822. [chap. 
 
 whole course of European affairs might for a 
 generation have been altered. To speculate 
 on historical " might have beens " is an occupa- 
 tion as fascinating as it is futile. But it is im- 
 possible to avoid unavailing regret that in the 
 last years of the great war and the first years of 
 the great peace the destinies of England and of 
 Europe were not committed to Canning. 
 
 Gradually, however, the proud spirit was 
 broken. In 1814, Canning, having arranged to 
 go in a private capacity to Lisbon with his son, 
 was induced by the Government to accept the 
 Embassy in that capital. It was another great 
 blunder, and Canning afterwards recognised it 
 as such. " In all probability," he said to Staple- 
 ton, " I should have had the most influential post 
 in the Government in the House of Commons if 
 I had not fallen into that error." The appoint- 
 ment was attacked, not unreasonably, as a gross 
 job, and Canning's prestige received a damaging 
 blow, from which it did not soon recover. 
 
 Two years later, in 1816, he returned to the 
 Cabinet as President of the Board of Control. 
 The office was, of course, both honourable and 
 important, but its acceptance shows how far 
 the proud spirit had been humbled : in 1812 to 
 refuse the Foreign Office without the lead of 
 the House ; in 1816 to accept an office barely of 
 Cabinet rank. 
 
 The Presidency of the Board of Control under 
 
VI.] BOARD OF CONTROL. 69 
 
 old John Company was a very different thing 
 from the Secretaryship of State under the rule 
 of the Crown. And it cannot be said that 
 Canning made any special mark during his four 
 years' tenure of the post. It may be claimed, 
 perhaps, that he put no obstacle in the way of 
 Lord Hastings' brilliant and beneficent adminis- 
 tration in India, and that his tenure was coinci- 
 dent with the final destruction of the tyrannous 
 and extortionate power of the Mahrattas and 
 Pindarees. More cannot truthfully be said. 
 But in 1820 Canning retired from the Govern- 
 ment. English politics were at that time en- 
 tirely overshadowed by the sordid and unseemly 
 squabble between George IV. and his unhappy 
 but imprudent Queen. Canning had long been 
 a friend of the latter, and when, in 1820, the 
 King's accession and his determination to obtain 
 a divorce raised the whole unsavoury question 
 afresh, he felt that he ought not to be a member 
 of the Government which had to settle it. The 
 King, though he never liked Canning, behaved to 
 him, at this juncture, with exceptional consider- 
 ation, and all his colleagues parted with him, it 
 would seem, with genuine regret. Stapleton 
 prints letters from his former enemies, Sidmouth 
 and Castlereagh, which seem to prove that the 
 old bitterness between them and Canning was 
 largely assuaged, and which in point of cordiality 
 leave nothing to be desired. 
 
70 1809-1822. [chap. 
 
 In one respect, however, Canning's reputation 
 was not enhanced by his inclusion in the Cabinet 
 during these four years, though I cannot help 
 feeling that Sir E. Lytton Bulwer makes too 
 much of the matter. "It is impossible," he 
 says, "to look back to these years and to 
 consider the conduct of Mr. Canning without 
 deep regret. The most eloquent and plausible 
 defences of the un-English policy which prevailed 
 were made by him." In regard to this judgment 
 a word of explanation must be offered. 
 
 The years immediately following the Great 
 Peace of 1815 comprised a period of exceptional 
 commercial depression and terrible social dis- 
 tress. During the later years of the war 
 England had enjoyed a virtual monopoly not 
 only of the carrying trade, but of the manu- 
 facturing industry of the world. No other 
 country had as yet had an opportunity to 
 adopt the new methods of production and ex- 
 change which in the aggregate are known as 
 the "Industrial Revolution." In the inflated 
 prosperity which ensued upon the Revolution 
 all classes shared. Rents bounded up ; profits 
 were enormous; and wages rose, though less 
 rapidly. But with the peace there came a 
 terrible reaction. Commercial dealings were 
 restricted ; prices fell rapidly ; poor rates threat- 
 ened to absorb rents; innumerable failures were 
 announced ; taxation pressed with undoubted 
 
VI.] BOARD OP CONTROL. 71 
 
 severity on all classes ; while traders, great and 
 small, were still further distracted by currency 
 disturbances. No element of confusion was 
 lacking to the economic situation. The deepest 
 depression settled down alike upon agriculture 
 and manufactures. The answers sent in to a 
 circular letter issued by the Board of Agriculture 
 in 1816 show that the aggregate fall in rental 
 was not less than £9,000,000, while from all sides 
 came the tale of farms thrown up, and farmers 
 bankrupt, of mills closed, and furnaces blown 
 out. Close on the heels of economic distress 
 came social disorder and political discontent. 
 Rick-buming in the country, machine-breaking 
 in the towns became epidemic. The "Luddite 
 riots" in Nottingham; the Spa Fields riots in 
 London, the "March of the Blanketeers " ; the 
 Derbyshire " Insurrection " ; were merely symp- 
 tomatic of general unrest. 
 
 The Government relied on two panaceas : for 
 economic distress — protection ; for social discon- 
 tent — coercion. The Habeas Corpus Act was sus- 
 pended in 1817, and in 1819 the famous Six Acts 
 were passed. Sidmouth, Oastlereagh, and Eldon, 
 the High Tory members of the Government, are 
 the men generally held accountable for this purely 
 restrictive policy. And perhaps with justice. But 
 Canning, the disciple of Pitt, and the apostle of 
 the doctrines of Adam. Smith, must, of course, 
 take his share of whatever blarae attaches to 
 
72 1809-1822. [chap. 
 
 the Cabinet. Their sins and shortcomings have 
 been painted in lurid colours — painted, I cannot 
 help thinking, with grotesque exaggeration. It 
 is easy to be wise after the event and to say that 
 timely political reform and fiscal readjustment 
 would have cured the disease in 1820. Canning 
 was as strongly in favour of fiscal reform as he 
 was opposed to political reform. And in both 
 cases his view was, in one sense, justified by 
 events. Nothing did more to embitter and 
 exaggerate Chartism than the Reform Act of 
 1832; Peel's budgets of 1842-1846 took all the 
 sting out of it. But the truth is that, though he 
 was ready on occasion to employ his debating 
 skill in defence of the Cabinet in which he 
 sat. Canning took only a languidly philosophic 
 interest in purely domestic politics. It was in 
 foreign poHcy that his genius found free play. 
 
 After his retirement from the Government in 
 1820, Canning, for a time, went abroad, feeling 
 it better to be out of the way while the Queen's 
 business was under discussion. In 1822, to the 
 surprise of many of his friends, he accepted the 
 Governor-Generalship of India. 
 
 Before he could sail to take up his post, 
 the death of Castlereagh by his own suicidal 
 hand opened up to Canning the position he had 
 so long desired. Both the vacant of&ces were, 
 with little delay, placed at his disposal by Lord 
 Liverpool, and thus, in 1822, at the age of fifty- 
 
VI.] DEATH OF CASTLEREAGH. 73 
 
 two, Canning became for the second time Foreign 
 Secretary — ^for the first time leader of the House 
 of Commons. 
 
 Of his unfortunate predecessor one word may- 
 be said. His powers were as seriously under- 
 rated by his great rival as they have been, as a 
 rule, by historical critics. He was, it is true, a 
 miserable debater — he could hardly put two sen- 
 tences together in an intelligible form — but he 
 was a man of real force of character, of con- 
 spicuous courage, of immense industry, and of 
 distinct administrative capacity. But at last 
 Castlereagh was gone ; the stage was clear for 
 Canning; and the next five years may be con- 
 sidered as his reign. He had waited impatiently 
 for his kingdom, and he now came into what he 
 had long regarded as his own. . 
 
74 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. . 
 
 SBCRBTAEY OF STATE FOB FOKEIGN AFFAIRS, 
 
 1822-1827. 
 
 When Canning returned to the Foreign Office in 
 1822, the counter revolution was in full tidej and 
 Metterhich was the dictator of European politics. 
 So severe was the reaction in Continental Europe 
 that it earned the designation of the " White 
 Terror," But within the last two years there 
 had heen on many sides manifestations of im- 
 patience with the policy of simple reaction. In 
 Spain, in Portugal, in Southern Italy and in 
 Greece, insurrections had actually hroken out. 
 The European monarchs, alarmed by these 
 fresh dangers, placed themselves unreservedly 
 in the hands of Mettemich. On Italy, Austria 
 herself laid a heavy hand; crushed out with 
 severity the northern rising at Novara ; and by 
 force restored the wretched Bourbon to his 
 throne at Naples. France, under the rule of 
 Villfele, and with the full concurrence of the 
 European Concert, prepared to do the same in 
 Spain. 
 
VII.] THE HOLY ALLIANCE. 75 
 
 Such was the situation by which Canning 
 was confronted. How had it arisen? A few 
 retrospective words are necessary to make this 
 clear. 
 
 (a) The Holy Alliance, 1815-1822. 
 
 On the final overthrow of Napoleon, in 1815, 
 Europe was face to face with problems of im- 
 raense complexity. The solution of them was 
 committed to a Conference at Vienna. For the 
 settlement which emerged from their hands the 
 diplomatists have been severely blamed. Nor is 
 it difficult to justify the censures they have 
 incurred. It goes without saying that the 
 monarchs and ministers of 1815 — the Alexanders 
 and Frederick Williams, the Humboldts and 
 Hardenbergs, the Oastlereaghs and Metternichs 
 —were purblind and stupid, particularly as 
 viewed from the lofty elevation of historical 
 criticism. But the diplomatists had to deal 
 with the facts, and the critics have only to 
 deal with the diplomatists. And the facts 
 at that time were unusually awkward. The 
 whole European States-system was in ruins : 
 devastated by the Napoleonic flood. But when 
 the waters subsided, the old land-marks re- 
 emerged. The architects had to rebuild, but 
 they had to rebuild, more or less, on the 
 old sites. And that, it is imderstood, is an 
 awkward thing to do. Moreover, they had, in 
 
 L 2 
 
76 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 mere self-defence, to erect the strongest possible 
 barriers against a recurrence of the flood. It is 
 easy to criticise, and difficult to defend the char- 
 acter of the structure which they raised. On 
 rotten and effete foundations they reared a 
 fabric top-heavy and ungainly. Look where 
 you will, the same ugly features meet the eye. 
 Nothing could have been worse, for example, 
 than the settlement of Italy. Its re-partition 
 and morcellement was not only a crime but a 
 blunder. But unified Italy, it is only fair to 
 remember, was a Napoleonic monument — a 
 legacy of revolution. The diplomatists of 1815 
 could not look back upon '48, '59, '66 and '70. 
 We can. And looking, we can see that the 
 Napoleonic occupation of Italy was a step to- 
 wards the goal of good. Had we berai at Vienna 
 in 1815, we should probably have regarded it as 
 a step towards the abyss of revolution. 
 
 The union of Holland and Belgium was even 
 more foolish, and much more, short-lived. The 
 two peoples were utterly opposed in temper, in 
 race, in historical tradition, and in creed. But 
 a robust middle kingdom, a good stout barrier 
 between France and Germany, had been the 
 dream of ages ; 1815 might well seem a con- 
 venient moment for its fulfilment. Poland, 
 again, has not relished absorption into Russia, 
 but it had to be absorbed by somebody. Then 
 as to the Rhine frontier. Alsace and Lorraine 
 
VII.] THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. 77 
 
 were German, and Hardenberg was unquestion- 
 ably justified in urging that the moment was a 
 convenient one for effecting their restoration to 
 Germany. France had undoubtedly used those 
 Provinces not as a defensive barrier, but as a 
 stepping-stone for aggression, and as an instru- 
 ment for retarding the unification of Germany. 
 In the court of historic judicature France stood 
 condemned, and might justly be sentenced to for- 
 feit any rights she had by occupation acquired. 
 But, on the other hand, it was impossible to 
 ignore the force of the Duke of Wellington's plea : 
 " Against what have you been fighting all these 
 years? Not against France, but against revolu- 
 tion incarnate. Revolutionary France is more 
 likely to distress the world than France, however 
 strong in her frontier, under a regular govern- 
 ment." But to send back the Bourbons to 
 France stripped of the Rhine Provinces would 
 be, from the outset, to associate the restored 
 monarchy with territorial dismeraberment, and 
 would fatally weaken its prestige. Thus, despite 
 the memorable and prescient protest of Harden- 
 berg, Alsace and Lorraine were restored to 
 France, and the just rectification of the Rhine 
 frontier was deferred for half a century. 
 
 It is true that ,here, as elsewhere, the outlook 
 of the diplomatists was exceedingly narrow and 
 contracted ; it is true that new forces had been 
 generated in the last twenty years destined to 
 
78 FOREIGN SEOEETARY. [chap. 
 
 remould the politics of Europe ; and it is obvious 
 that the rulers failed to recognise them. They 
 were still dominated by the outworn ideas of 
 the eighteenth century — the principle of the 
 balance of power, and the supremacy of dynastic 
 interests. Thus the Congress of Vienna appro- 
 priately miarks not the beginning of the new 
 century ; but the close of the old one ; and the 
 settlement it effected was foredoon;ied. . 
 
 But its authors, small blame to them, wanted 
 to give it the best chance they could, and to 
 this end established the European Concert, first 
 known to diplomacy as the Holy Alliance.* 
 
 This "Alliance," which dominated European 
 politics from the fall of Napoleon until the ac- 
 cession of Canning, was primarily the work of 
 Alexander of Russia. The Czar's idea was to 
 establish what we should now call the Concert of 
 Europe on the basis of " the sublime truths of 
 the religion of God our Saviour." The territorial 
 arrangements established at Vienna were to be 
 permanently guaranteed, and wars of aggression 
 summarily arrested. This was to be done by an 
 " international High Court of Sovereign Judges." 
 The principle was irreproachable. Unfortunately, 
 in practice, it turned out that the alliance, in- 
 tended, in all good faith, to inaugurate a reign 
 of peace and righteousness on earth, rapidly 
 
 * On this subject c/. Mr. Alisou Phillips's ' Modem Europe,' 
 to which I wish to acknowledge my obligations. 
 
VII.] THE HOLY ALLIANCE. 79 
 
 degenerated into a " sort of European police for 
 the suppression of all liberal movements." 
 
 Li the Holy Alliance England had no formal 
 part. It was an alliance of sovereigns ; and 
 "sovereign" the Prince Regent was not. But 
 he wrote to his " brothers " to express his cordial 
 sympathy with the " sublime principles " of the 
 allies. The attitude of his Ministers, on the con- 
 trary, was from the first suspicious. Castlereagh 
 regarded the whole thing as a piece of mysticism 
 and nonsense. Canning clearly realised the 
 dangers which lurked in it. "Where was the line 
 to be drawn ? The " Alliance " was to guarantee 
 the international status quo. But as Canning 
 saw " it was but a short step from interfering 
 with the external relations of a sovereign state 
 to interfering in those of its internal relations 
 which might be supposed to exercise an external 
 effect." * His suspicions w^ere soon justified, and 
 justified abundantly. 
 
 The Eoyalist Restorations of 1815 were quickly 
 followed by a perfect "orgy of reaction" — ^in 
 France, partial and comparatively cautious ; in 
 Spain and in Italy, avowed and unrestrained. 
 But the debauch was too violent to last. The 
 wretched Ferdinand VII. of Spain — one of the 
 poorest specimens of a wretched stock — soon 
 found himself embroiled, not only with his 
 subjects at home, but with the Colonies in South 
 
 * Alison Phillips. 
 
80 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 America, From Spain, this revolutionary con- 
 tagion spread (1820-22) to Portugal and to 
 Southern Italy. Meanwhile the members of the 
 Holy Alliance had become thoroughly alarmed ; 
 and in October, 1820, on the invitation of Prince 
 Mettemich, they had* assembled in conference 
 at Troppau. The Emperors of Austria and 
 Russia were present in person ; Hardenberg re- 
 presented Prussia; Sir Charles Stewart (Castle- 
 reagh's brother) watched the proceedings on 
 behalf of England, but took no formal part in 
 them. On the 19th of November, 1820, a formal 
 Protocol was issued over the signatures of Austria, 
 Russia and Prussia. The terms of this document 
 are of some importance : " States which have 
 undergone a change of government due to re- 
 volution, the results of which threaten other 
 States, ipso facto, cease to be members of the 
 European Alliance, and remain excluded from it 
 until their situation gives guarantees for. legal 
 order and stability. . . If, owing to such altera- 
 tions, immediate danger threatens other States, 
 the Powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, 
 or if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty 
 State into the bosom of the Great Alliance." 
 
 To this Protocol France, in general terms, 
 adhered ; but Castlereagh, on behalf of Eng- 
 land, protested against it with some warmth, 
 and declared that the principle on which 
 the Allies proposed to act was in " direct 
 
VII.] THE LAIBACH CONGRESS. 81 
 
 repugnance to the fundamental laws of the 
 United Kingdom." 
 
 From Troppau the Conference adjourned to 
 Laibach, a small town in Austrian Camiola. At 
 Laibach, Ferdinand of Naples was summoned to 
 attend and to give an account before the august 
 tribunal of the Holy Allies of his dealings with 
 his Neapolitan subjects. Before leaving Naples, 
 the King was compelled once more to declare 
 on oath his determination to maintain the 
 "Spanish" Constitution. To this Constitution 
 he had already (in 1820) sworn his adhesion, 
 with a parade of special solemnity. The old 
 King, having heard Mass, approached the altar, 
 and, in presence of the court and the ministers, 
 took the prescribed oath. Then fixing his eyes 
 upon the cross, he cried : " Omnipotent God, 
 who with infinite penetration lookest into the 
 heart and into the future, if 1 lie, or if one day 
 I should be faithless to my oath, do Thou at 
 this moment annihilate me." No sooner, how- 
 ever, w&s he fairly on his way to Laibach, than 
 he issued a letter to the sovereigns declaring 
 that the Constitution had been extorted from 
 him by force, and that his adhesion to it — despite 
 his blasphemous professions — was null and void. 
 So prudent and honourable a prince was sure 
 of a warm welcome from the Holy Allies at 
 Laibach. To the latter the Neapolitan " Revolu- 
 tion " was a God-send — a-n admirable opportunity 
 
 M 
 
82 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 for applying in practice the principles adopted at 
 Troppau. A message was despatched to Naples, 
 nominally addressed by King Ferdinand to his 
 son, stating that the Allies would not counte- 
 nance a Constitution which was the fruit of 
 revolution, and that complete submission would 
 alone avert war. Meanwhile Austria was en- 
 trusted with the congenial task of restoring order 
 and legitimate authority in Southern Italy. 
 
 On February 6, 1821, orders were given to the 
 Austrian army to cross the Po, and six weeks 
 later fifty thousand troops marched, practically 
 without resistance, into Naples. Stern vengeance 
 was exacted from all who had had part or lot in 
 the Constitutional movement ; the principles of 
 legitimacy were triumphantly re-asserted, and a 
 system of government was established which 
 was subsequently — ^and with accuracy — described 
 by Mr. Gladstone as " an outrage upon religion, 
 upon civilisation, upon humanity, and upon 
 decency." 
 
 Against this monstrous interference in the 
 domestic concerns of an independent State, one 
 protesting voice only was raised. That voice 
 was Castlereagh's. Castlereagh's foreign policy 
 has been most unfairly judged. Stapleton, in 
 particular, is responsible for stories which have 
 done naaterial damage to his reputation. Those 
 stories are now shown to have been mere un- 
 founded gossip. Castlereagh may have lacked 
 
VII.] CASTLEREAGH'S POLICY. 83 
 
 vigour in action, but nothing could be more 
 emphatic or more explicit than his repudiation 
 of the principles of the Holy Allies, or more 
 correct than his definition of the attitude of Great 
 Britain. In language virtually identical with 
 that employed by Canning two years later, 
 Castlereagh protested against the Laibach doc- 
 trines : " England," he wrote, " stands pledged to 
 uphold the territorial arrangements established 
 at the Congress of Vienna. The invasion of a 
 weaker State by a stronger State for the pur- 
 poses of conquest would demand our immediate 
 interference. But with the internal affairs of 
 each separate State we have nothing to do. We 
 could neither share in nor approve, though we 
 might not feel called upon to resist the inter- 
 vention of one ally to put down internal dis- 
 turbances in the dominions of another. We have 
 never committed ourselves to any such principle 
 as that, and we must as a general rule protest 
 against it." 
 
 It was Castlereagh, and Castlereagh alone, 
 who prevented the international acceptance of 
 the doctrine of interference which, promulgated 
 at Aix la Chapelle (1818) by Alexander, formed 
 for some years the basis of the policy of the Holy 
 AUies. For the time being, however, that doc- 
 trine was triumphant. 
 
 But while Austria was finding congenial em- 
 ployment in Italy, news of infinitely greater 
 
 M 2 
 
84 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap, 
 
 significance reached Laibach from another 
 quarter. The Congress learnt that the Greeks, 
 flinging off at last the sloth of centuries, had 
 raised the standard of revolt against the Turks. 
 That news meant the opening of a new chapter 
 in the politics of modern Europe. 
 
 The "Eastern Question" has taken different 
 forms at different times. In one sense it has 
 existed ever since the Ottoman Turks encamped 
 in Europe. In another it dates from the Treaty 
 of Kutchuk — Kainardji (1774) ; in a third — ^the 
 more generally accepted sense — it may be said 
 to open with the Greek Revolt of 1821. 
 
 For four hundred years the Greeks had sub- 
 mitted, almost without a murmur, to the yoke 
 imposed upon them by their Moslem conquerors ; 
 as a nation they had long ceased to exist ; as a 
 people they were almost blotted out. And now, 
 to all appearance suddenly and without prepara- 
 tion, and certainly without warning of any kind, 
 the silence of centuries was broken, and the 
 Greeks, uprising on every side, raised the stand- 
 ard of an insurrection which was not subdued 
 until they had once again asserted their right to 
 a place in the European Commonwealth as a 
 recognised and virtually independent nation. 
 The heroic knight-errantry of Church and the 
 poetic enthusiasm of Byron have — ^for English- 
 men at least — cast over the Greek revolt a 
 glamour which historical criticism finds it diffi- 
 
VII.] THE GEBEK REVOLT. 85 
 
 cult to dispel. Stripped bare of sentiment, and 
 related in sober historic prose, the story reveals 
 an extraordinarily confused medley of ignominy 
 and glory, of conspicuous heroism and con- 
 summate cowardice, of sordid self-seeking and 
 splendid self-sacrifice. 
 
 But whatever the character of the leaders, 
 and whatever the conduct of the people, the 
 movement itself was of first-rate importance in 
 the history of modern Europe. One illusion 
 must be dispelled at once. Only in a partial 
 sense was the rising sudden, and in no sense was 
 it unprepared. Many things combined to render 
 possible and even probable a revival of Greek 
 nationality : the large measure of local auto- 
 nomy permitted and even encouraged by the 
 Porte ; the existence of a local Christian militia ; 
 the conspicuous success of the Greeks in com- 
 merce, and their rapid accumulation of wealth ; 
 the maintenance of maritime activity; a marked 
 intellectual revival in the last years of the 
 eighteenth century; and above all, the con- 
 tinued vitality of a Church strong in the devo- 
 tion of its parish priests and intensely nationalist 
 in sympathies. The events of the French Re- 
 volution profoundly stirred the Greek mind, 
 and in 1814 the secret society of the PhiUke 
 Hetairia was formed with the avowed object of 
 expelling the Ottomans from Europe and re- 
 establishing the Byzantine Empire. The char- 
 
86 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 acter, the influence, and the political significance 
 of this famous society, have been very variously 
 estimated by different writers ; but there can be 
 no reasonable doubt that it was the existence of 
 the Philike Hetairia which gave unity and cohe- 
 sion to the loose and scattered aspirations, by 
 which so many Greeks were animated in the 
 early years of the nineteenth century. 
 
 It was under the impulse derived from this 
 society, and from the recent insurtectionary 
 movements in Spain and in Southern Italy, that 
 the Greek revolt began. The opportunity was 
 found in the pre-occupation of the Porte in 
 regard to the successful insurrection of Ali 
 Pasha of Albania. In March, 1821, a band of 
 Greeks, under the leadership of Prince Alexander 
 Hypsilanti, raised the standard of revolt in Mol- 
 davia. Moldavia was, no doubt, selected as the 
 scene of the initial rising in the hope of enlisting 
 the sympathy and, perhaps, the assistance of 
 Alexander of Russia. But the Czar's position 
 was embarrassing. As Emperor of Russia, as 
 head of the Greek Church, as the patron of the 
 Slav nationality, as the hereditary foe of Turkey, 
 as a member of the Tilsit conspiracy, as the ad- 
 vocate of Turkish dismemberment, he was im- 
 pelled to the championship of Greek indepen- 
 dence. But, on the other hand, as the associate 
 and partner of Prince Metternich, as the head 
 and director of the European " police system," as 
 
vii] THE CZAR ALEXANDER. 87 
 
 the joint-repressor of liberal movements, above 
 all, as the founder of the Holy Alliance, he was 
 the sworn foe of revolution wherever it might 
 rear its ungainly head. At the Czar's side as 
 Foreign Minister was Capodistrias, the obvious 
 and the destined champion of Greek nationality. 
 But any doubts as to the Czar's attitude were 
 qmckly set at rest. A proclamation was issued 
 in which Hypsilanti and his companions were 
 ordered to repair immediately to Russia and 
 there await the good pleasure of Alexander; 
 while the Moldavians were bidden to return at 
 once to their obedience to their legitimate rulers 
 as the only means by which they might escape 
 the punishment which the Imperial Court would 
 inflict upon all who persisted in aiding the re- 
 volt. Without help from Russia, the movement 
 in Moldavia had no hope of success, and in June, 
 1821, it entirely collapsed. 
 
 The Moldavian rising was a mere flash in the 
 pan. Far different was the character of the 
 movement which, almost simultaneously, mani- 
 fested itself in the Morea, and in the islands of 
 the jEgean. The Turks were taken wholly un- 
 prepared, and the rebels were repeatedly vic- 
 torious in the field. On both sides the struggle 
 was conducted with horrible ferocity. The 
 murder of the Greek Patriarch in Constanti- 
 nople was followed by a wholesale massacre of 
 the Christian population in Macedonia and Asia 
 
88 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 Minor. Amid these atrocities it was impossible 
 for the Czar to stand aloof. Moreover, Russia 
 had grievances of her own against the Porte 
 apart from the question of Greece or the out- 
 rages upon Christian ecclesiastics. Russian 
 ships had been fired upon in the Dardanelles, 
 and the Turks, in defiance of Treaty obligations, 
 instead of restoring the rule of the Hospodars, 
 continued to administer Moldavia and Walla- 
 chia by martial law. Accordingly, in July, 
 1821, the Russian Ambassador at Constanti- 
 nople was instructed to present the following 
 demands land to require an answer within eight 
 days : — 
 
 1st. That the Greek Churches, destroyed or 
 plundered, should be immediately re- 
 stored and rendered fit for the celebra- 
 tion of Divine worship. 
 
 2nd. That the Christian Religion should be 
 restored to its prerogatives by granting 
 it the same protection it formerly en- 
 joyed, and by guaranteeing its inviola- 
 bility for the future, thus to console 
 Europe in some degree for the murder 
 of the Patriarch. 
 
 3rd. That an equitable distinction should be 
 made between the innocent and the 
 guilty, and a prospect of peace held out 
 
VII.] THE EASTERN QUESTION. 89 
 
 to those Greeks who should hereafter 
 submit within a given time. 
 
 And lastly, that the Turkish Government 
 should enable Russia, by virtue of 
 existing treaties, to contribute to the 
 pacification of the Principalities of 
 Wallachia and Moldavia. 
 
 Agreeing to these terms was "the only means," 
 it was stated, " by which the Turks would be 
 able to avoid their utter ruin." As the answer 
 was not forthcoming within the specified time, 
 the Ambassador demanded his passports, and 
 war between the two Powers seemed imminent. 
 
 What was the attitude of the other Powers 
 towards this further development of the Eastern 
 Question ? > 
 
 France was fully occupied at the moment 
 with the affairs of Spain ; but both Austria and 
 Great Britain were anxious to avert war between 
 Russia and Turkey. In the fate of the Greeks, 
 neither Metternich nor Castlereagh was specially 
 interested ; but both Statesman laboured with 
 assiduity to prevent the re-opening of the whole 
 Eastern Question- in the form which a Russo- 
 Turkish war would necessitate. They therefore 
 brought all possible pressure to bear upon the 
 Porte to induce the latter to agree with its 
 adversary quickly. Alexander was not anxious 
 to push matters to extremities ; the Porte was 
 
90 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 induced to yield a point and to evacuate the 
 Danubian Principalities ; war was for the time 
 being averted ; and Metternich could congratu- 
 late himself upon another signal triumph for 
 Austrian diplomacy. 
 
 The time was now approaching for the re- 
 opening of the European Congress. The results 
 of the Laibach meeting had been so entirely 
 satisfactory to the august Allies that the Con- 
 ference, on the conclusion of its first session, was 
 adjourned and not dissolved. It re-assembled at 
 Verona in September, 1822. But before it met, 
 an event fraught with momentous consequences 
 to European diplomacy had taken place. Lord 
 Castlereagh had arranged to attend the Con- 
 ference in person, but in the very midst of pre- 
 parations for his departure he was seized with 
 the illness which led to his death, and before 
 many weeks his sceptre had passed into the 
 hands of Canning. 
 
 Before his fatal seizure, Castlereagh had 
 drawn up, for his own guidance at the Congress, 
 a memorandum, which had been approved by 
 his colleagues and the King.* This memoran- 
 dum goes far to vindicate Casllereagh's reputa- 
 tion as a statesman, and to prove the essential 
 identity of his policy with that by which Canning 
 has won undying fame. Castlereagh, as I have 
 hinted, has been hardly judged. "Two more 
 
 * ' WeUington Despatches ' (Supplementary), vol. i. 285. 
 
VII.] OLD AND NEW SPAIN. 91 
 
 years of life, two more years of change, in the 
 relations of England to the Continent, would 
 have given Castlereagh," as Mr. FyfPe justly 
 remarks, " a different figure in the history both 
 of Greece and America." * 
 
 But whatever the merits of Castlereagh, and 
 however much historical research may tend to 
 vindicate his memory and to dissipate damaging 
 preconceptions, popular instinct is unquestion- 
 ably right in regarding Canning's succession to 
 the Foreign Office as inaugurating a new era in 
 English policy. 
 
 Canning, on taking office, was immediately 
 confronted by two problems of first-iate iin- 
 portance : the Greek insurrection and the affairs 
 of Spain and her South American Colonies. To 
 these was subsequently added a third : the 
 position of the House of Braganza in Portugal 
 and Brazil. It was the Spanish question upon 
 which the deliberations of the diplomatists at 
 Verona were chiefly concentrated, and which 
 was the first therefore to demand Canning's 
 attention. 
 
 (b) Old and New Spain. 
 
 In no country in Europe had the royalist 
 reaction been more violent or unrestrained than 
 in Spain. Ferdinand VII. was personally one of 
 
 ♦ 'History of Modem Europe,' ii. 211. 
 
 N 2 
 
92 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 the most contemptible of men, a weak compound 
 of bigotry, sensualism and superstition. But in 
 1814 he was welcomed back to the throne of his 
 fathers with limitless enthusiasm. Without a 
 moment's delay he embarked upon the work of 
 "restoration." The Cortes of 1812 were dis- 
 solved ; the Inquisition was restored ; the nobles 
 were reinstated in all their old oppressive 
 privileges ; the Jesuits flocked back in crowds ; 
 and aU the adherents of the Bonapartist regime 
 were persecuted with relentless severity. Even 
 for Spain the reaction was too violent. The 
 royalist reign of terror provoked resistance. The 
 provinces were soon honeycombed with secret 
 societies, largely recruited from the army. 
 Isolated revolts were crushed with barbarous 
 cruelty, and for six years the terror reigned 
 supreme. But in 1820 the flag of revolution was 
 unfurled, and Ferdinand, as despicably feeble as 
 he was cruel, gave way. From one extreme the 
 Spaniards characteristically rushed to the other. 
 The Constitution of 1812 was restored ; the 
 Cortes was summoned ; a Liberal ministry was 
 installed in office ; the monasteries were dis- 
 solved ; the Inquisition was suppressed, and 
 rapid progress was made with an ambitious 
 programme of radical reform. The moderates of 
 both parties were pushed aside and a factious com- 
 bination of radicals and reactionaries prevented 
 the establishment of a constitutional regime. 
 
vii;] OLD AND NEW SPAIN. 93 
 
 France, meanwhile, was burning to interfere 
 in Spain on behalf of the Spanish Bourbons. A 
 terrible outbreak of yellow fever in Spain gave 
 France the excuse for massing an army of 100,000 
 men on the Pyrenean frontier for the purpose of 
 establishing a Cordon Sanitaire. But Alexander 
 of Russia was also anxious to have a finger in 
 the Spanish pie. The Hussian army was bitterly 
 disappointed that it was not to be let loose upon 
 the Turks. Some compensation for its enforced 
 inaction in the East might, perhaps, be found in 
 employment in Spain. This suggestion placed 
 Mettemich on the horns of a dilemma. That 
 the condition of Spain denaanded the interference 
 of the Allies he could not decently deny ; but at 
 the same time he could hardly contemplate with 
 equanimity the march of 150,000 Russian troops 
 into Western Europe, and their establishment 
 as an arnay of observation in Piedmont. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Congress of 1822 had assem- 
 bled first at Vienna and later at Verona. The 
 French representative, M. de Montmorency, for- 
 mally propounded to his colleagues the following 
 embarrassing queries : 
 
 I. " In case France should find herself under 
 the necessity of recalling her Minister 
 from Madrid, and of breaking off all 
 diplomatic relations with Spain, would 
 the high courts be disposed to adopt 
 
94 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 the like measures, and to recall their 
 respective missions ? " 
 
 II. " Should war hreak out hetween France and 
 Spain, under what form, and by what 
 acts, would the high powers afford to 
 France, that moral support which would 
 give to her measures the weight and 
 authority of the Alliance, and inspire a 
 salutary dread in the revolutionists of 
 all countries ? " 
 
 III. " What, in short, was the intention of the 
 high powers, as to the extent and the 
 form of the effective assistance {secours 
 mat4riels) which they would be disposed 
 to give to France in case active inter- 
 ference should, on her ^demand, become 
 necessary ? " 
 
 The Czar Alexander was ready with his answer 
 in the shape of 150,000 men ; but this sugges- 
 tion, as we have seen, did not please Metternich. 
 Still less was it agreeable to Canning. 
 
 Canning was determined to resist with all his 
 might the principle of concerted intervention in 
 the donaestic affairs of independent States. By 
 the mouth of Wellington, who on Castlereagh's 
 death had gone in his place to Verona, Canning 
 bluntly told the Powers that "there was no 
 sympathy and would be none between England 
 and revolutionists and Jacobins," but that 
 
VII.] THE POWERS AND SPAIN. 95 
 
 England did emphatically insist on "tHe right 
 of nations to set up over themselves whatever 
 form of Government they thought best, and to 
 be left free to manage their own affairs so long 
 as they left other nations to manage theirs." 
 Further : the Duke was instructed in the event 
 of the adoption of any resolution in favour of 
 joint intervention in Spain ; " Come what might, 
 to refuse the King's consent to become a party 
 to it, even if the dissolution of the Alliance 
 should be the result of the refusal." " It was in 
 truth," as Stapleton justly observes, " high time 
 to convince the members of the Alliance that 
 England w^ould take whatever course she thought 
 right, independently of their will and pleasure ; 
 for, to such a pitch of confidence had they 
 arrived, that only two days before this despatch 
 was written, the Ministers of the four Courts 
 called in a body on Mr. Canning, to remonstrate 
 with him against the appointment of Sir William 
 k Court as the King's Minister to Madrid, on 
 account of the countenance that his presence 
 would give to the Constitutional Government." 
 Needless to say that Canning treated this im- 
 pertinent request with good-natured contempt. 
 
 At Verona the Duke of Wellington's emphatic 
 protest was successful in preventing joint inter- 
 vention in Spain. " All notion of what is called 
 an European army," he wrote on October 18, "is 
 at an end." But two dangers still remained: 
 
96 FOEEIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 first, the danger of a French attack ; and secondly, 
 the danger that the armed intervention of France 
 would he supported by diplomatic pressure from, 
 the Allies. Canning could boast with justice 
 that the primary and "immediate object of 
 England had been accomplished," that we had 
 been able to "hinder the impress of a joint 
 character from being affixed to the war — ^if war 
 there must be — with Spain ; to take care that 
 the war should not grow out of an assumed 
 jurisdiction of the Congress ; " but more than 
 this neither Wellington nor Canning could 
 accomplish. The allies agreed that their respec- 
 tive ministers "at Madrid should present a 
 separate note of the same tenor and drawn up 
 on the same principles," and that in the event 
 of the French minister being withdrawn from 
 Madrid, the ambassadors of the other Powers 
 should be withdrawn at the same time. Against 
 this decision Wellington entered one more firm 
 but ineffectual protest.* " His Majesty's Govern- 
 ment are of opinion that to animadvert upon 
 the internal transactions of an independent 
 State, unless such transactions affect the essential 
 interests of his Majesty's subjects, is inconsistent 
 with those principles on which his Majesty has 
 invariably acted in all questions relating to the 
 internal concerns of other, countries ; that such 
 animadversions, if made, must involve his Majesty 
 * See ' Despatches,' vol. i. p. 559. 
 
VII.] POLICY TOWARDS SPAIN. 97 
 
 in serious responsibility if they should produce 
 any effect, and must irritate if they should not ; 
 and that if addressed, as proposed, to the Spanish 
 Government, are likely to be injurious to her 
 best interests, and to produce the worst con- 
 sequences upon the probable discussions between 
 France and Spain. The King's government must, 
 therefore, decline to advise his Majesty to hold 
 a common language with his Allies upon this 
 occasion." Unless England were prepared to 
 declare war upon the Allied Powers in the 
 interests of one of the many conflicting parties 
 in Spain, or rather, perhaps, in defence of the 
 non-intervention principle, there was for the 
 moment no more to be done — in Europe. But 
 acting on a hint from Louis XVIII. dropped to 
 the Duke of Wellington, on his way home through 
 Paris, Canning made one more effort to avert 
 war between France and Spain. A special mis- 
 sion was despatched to Spain ; not as from the 
 Government of England, but from one of her 
 own Grandees: from the man to whom Spain 
 owed her independent national existence : from 
 the great Duke himself. The object was to induce 
 the Spaniards to come to an amicable settle- 
 ment with their own sovereign, and thus avoid 
 foreign intervention. But the attempt came too 
 late; the French Ambassador was withdrawn from 
 Madrid; the other ambassadors, in accordance 
 with the agreement of Verona, also left Spain ; 
 
 o 
 
98 FOEEIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 and at the opening of the French Chambers in 
 1823, Louis XVIII. addressed the members in 
 words that have become historic : " One hundred 
 thousand Frenchmen, commanded by a prince of 
 my family, by him whom my heart delights to 
 call my son, are ready to march, invoking the 
 Grod of St. Louis, for the sake of preserving the 
 throne of Spain to a descendant of Henry IV., of 
 saving that fine kingdom from its ruin, and of 
 reconciling it with Europe. ... If war is inevit- 
 able I wiU use my utmost efforts to confine its 
 circle, and to limit its duration ; it will be under- 
 taken only to conquer peace which the state of 
 Spain would make impossible. Let Ferdinand VJI. 
 be free to give to his people the institutions which 
 they cannot hold but from him, and which by 
 securing their tranquillity would dissipate the 
 just inquietudes of France. HostiUties shall cease 
 from that moment. I make, gentlemen, before 
 you a solemn engagement on that point." * 
 
 This extraordinary speech re-echoed the very 
 language of the Laibach Circular that " changes 
 in the administration of States ought only to 
 emanate from the intelligent and well-weighed 
 conviction of those whom God has rendered 
 responsible for power." With almost sublime 
 impudence, the French King's speech was offici- 
 ally communicated to Canning, with the expres- 
 sion of a hope thfl't peace might still be pre- 
 * Quoted in Stapleton's ' Life of Canning,' 1. 249. 
 
VII.] POLICY TOWARDS SPAlN. 99 
 
 served, and that success might crown " the good 
 services of the British Government in producing 
 that accommodation," 
 
 Canning still declined to abandon the hope of 
 peace ; but he declared with emphasis that our 
 efforts to that end could only be continued if 
 France were willing to repudiate the obvious 
 sense of the King's speech. If, on the other 
 hand, the speech meant (what is said) that 
 "the free institutions of the Spanish people 
 could only be legitimately held from the spon- 
 taneous gift of the Sovereign first restored to 
 absolute power, and then divesting himself of 
 such portion of that power as he might think 
 proper to part with," then it was a principle " to 
 which the Spanish nation could not be expected 
 to subscribe, nor could any British statesmen up- 
 hold or defend it." Nor could the British Govern- 
 ment advise any people "in adopting changes, 
 however beneficial, to admit the principle on 
 which (according to this latter construction) the 
 speech of the King of France would be under- 
 stood to prescribe them. It was, indeed, a 
 principle which struck at the root of the British 
 Constitution." "The British Government does 
 not presume to hold out its own political institu- 
 tions as the only practical system of national 
 happiness and freedom. It does not presume 
 to question the freedom and happiness which 
 France enjoys under institutions emanating 
 
 o 2 
 
100 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 from the will of the Sovereign, and described 
 as octroy4es from the throne. But it could 
 not countenance a pretention on the part of 
 France to make her example a rule for other 
 nations, and still less could it admit a peculiar 
 right in France to force that example specifically 
 on Spain, in virtue of the consanguinity of the 
 reigning djmasties of those two kingdoms. This 
 latter reason would, on the contrary, suggest 
 recollections and considerations, which must 
 obviously make it impossible for Great Britain 
 to be the advocate for pretensions founded 
 on it." 
 
 The reference to the Family Compacts shows 
 the touch of the diplomatic artist. But no skill 
 or firmness could avert war, and on April 6, 1823, 
 the Due d' Angouleme at the head of one hundred 
 thousand men crossed the Bidassoa. 
 
 It is unnecessary to follow the fortunes of the 
 Franco-Spanish war. It is enough to say that 
 within a few months Ferdinand was restored 
 to his throne and his authority, and that the 
 French troops remained in occupation of Spain 
 until 1827. Their presence relieved Ferdinand 
 of the last shred of responsibility to his people, 
 and enabled him to take a terrible vengeance on 
 his opponents. Against the barbarous cruelties 
 which he practised upon them, even his protector, 
 the Due d' Angouleme, protested ; but protested 
 in vain, 
 
vii.] THE SPANISH COLONIES. 101 
 
 To the European concert Old Spain was a 
 matter of the highest concern ; Great Britain, on 
 the other hand, was far more interested in the 
 condition of New Spain. And it was there that 
 Canning found the card with which to trump 
 the trick of the Holy Allies. 
 
 " Was there no other mode of resistance ? " 
 asked Canning in reviewing these events in 1826, 
 "than by a direct attack upon France, or by a 
 war to be undertaken on the soil of Spain?. 
 What if the possession of Spain might be rendered 
 harmless in other hands — harmless as regarded 
 us — and valueless to the possessors. Might not 
 compensation for disparagement be obtained, 
 and the policy of our ancestors vindicated, by 
 means better adapted to the present time ? If 
 France occupied Spain, was it necessary, in order 
 to avoid the consequences of that occupation, 
 that we should blockade Cadiz? No. I looked 
 another way — I sought materials of compensa- 
 tion in another hemisphere. Contemplating 
 Spain such as our ancestors had known her, I 
 resolved that if France had Spain, it should 
 not be Spain with the Indies. I called the New 
 World into existence to redress the balance of 
 the Old." 
 
 The language is a trifle magniloquent ; but the 
 fact which it emphasised was of unquestioned 
 significance. The latter day history of the South 
 American Republics has not tended to exalt them 
 
102 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 in the eyes of commercial nations ; but the recog- 
 nition of their independence by Canning was not 
 only a singularly effective counterstroke to the 
 policy of the Holy Alliance, but was of great 
 importance to the trading interests of this 
 country. 
 
 Ever since Napoleon's intrusion into Spanish 
 politics the condition of affairs in South America 
 had been going steadily from bad to worse. 
 Every year it became more and more obvious 
 that Spain was incapable of governing her vast 
 empire in the new world ; every year the anarchy 
 in the colonies became more pronounced ; and the 
 injuries thereby inflicted upon English trade more 
 and more intolerable. A conflict between Spain 
 and the United States had been averted in 1817 
 by the sale of the Floridas to the latter for the 
 sum of five million dollars. Relieved of one 
 source of weakness, and provided with a little 
 ready money, Spain made one more effort to 
 grapple with her Colonial problem. But Old 
 Spain was too far gone, and the effort served 
 only to bring to a head the insurrectionary move- 
 ment at home. 
 
 The position of England in regard to Old and 
 New Spain respectively was one of some delicacy, 
 not to say embarrassment. It is graphically 
 depicted in a letter from Canning to Sir Charles 
 Bagot (January 3, 1823) : " We ... are in a course 
 of amicable and furious correspondence with 
 
VII.] THE SPANISH COLONIES. 103 
 
 Spain ; amicable so far as relates to Europe 
 in which quarter of the world we defend her 
 against invasion ; furious in relation to America 
 where we have a squadron now employed in 
 seeking forcible redress for grievances. To 
 keep these two strains operating simultaneously 
 upon the nerves and feelings of the Spaniards ; 
 to hold a shield before them with one hand 
 and to punish them with the other, has been 
 and still is a matter of no small delicacy and 
 difficulty. But I hope we may manage it." 
 
 In Europe Canning's " management " failed ; 
 in South America it succeeded perhaps beyond 
 his expectations. But meantime the commercial 
 interests of Great Britain were suffering severely. 
 From Spain we could obtain no satisfaction for 
 outrages unnumbered ; from the Spanish colonies 
 we could not demand it. " The archives of the 
 British Mission at Madrid contained a long list 
 of such grievances, sometimes justified or palliated 
 by the Spanish Ministers, sometimes admitted 
 and regretted, but in no one instance satisfactorily 
 redressed. The mere existence of such a cata- 
 logue of injuries committed against the subjects 
 of a friendly Power, and that Power the one 
 to whose exertions and sacrifices the Spanish 
 Monarchy owed its preservation, was as discredit- 
 able to the Government which had inflicted or 
 connived at them, as it would have been to that 
 which, after having exhausted every amicable 
 
104 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 effort to obtain justice, should have continued 
 patiently to submit to the denial of it." * 
 
 In 1821 matters were brought to a head. A 
 Spanish privateer captured a British vessel, the 
 Lord Collingwood, and carried her into Porto 
 Rico. The Spanish Government justified the 
 capture on the ground that the vessel was 
 " found trading with the rebels of Buenos 
 Ayres." On October 18, 1823, therefore, our 
 ambassador was instructed to demand " instant 
 atonement." No redress was forthcoming. The 
 case of the Lord Collingwood was only one of 
 hundreds ; and Canning therefore expressed the 
 opinion that " neither the pride, nor the interests, 
 nor, after a fair time allowed for the effect of 
 representations, the patience of this country 
 ought any longer to bear such outrages." 
 
 Orders were accordingly issued to British 
 commanders in the Southern Seas to have re- 
 course to reprisals : " to land wherever . . . the 
 haunts of the pirates were to be discovered, and 
 to take signal vengeance for the outrages which 
 had in so many instances been committed by 
 them against the commerce, persons, and lives 
 of his Majesty's subjects." The step was a 
 strong one ; but it was clearly justified on the 
 ground of the "growing magnitude of the evil 
 and the evident want on the part of the Spanish 
 Government either of the will or the power 
 * Stapleton, iii. 167. 
 
vii.] FRANCE AND SPAIN, 105 
 
 to suppress it." And stronger steps were to 
 follow. 
 
 Spain was a negligable quantity ; but France 
 was not. And France had for some time been 
 manifesting suspicion and jealousy of English 
 relations with the Spanish colonies. In 1823 
 there were ugly rumours that France intended 
 to extend her intervention from the Old Spain 
 to the New. Such intervention England coiold 
 not permit. "I confess I long to tell M. de 
 Villele (were this the moment) that we will 
 trade with the late Spanish-American colonies, 
 whether France likes it or not ; that we will not 
 respect the Spanish guarda castas, which attempt 
 to interdict that trade to us ; and that, if France 
 sends a large fleet to help the guarda castas, we 
 will send a larger to watch (at least) their opera- 
 tions. The truth seems to be that having got 
 the three Continental Powers at their back the 
 use which M. de Villele intends to make of them 
 with Spain is not against Spain but against us. 
 He will say, or probably has said to Spain : " See, 
 we have all Europe ready to fall upon you. "We 
 can crush you in a moment; but give up aU 
 connection with England and we will spare you ; 
 nay, more, we will help you to do her and her 
 commerce all manner of harm." 
 
 So Canning had written to Wellington on 
 December 13, 1822. In the same month the 
 Spanish Government was informed of the in- 
 
106 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 tention of Great Britain to send consuls to the 
 several provinces of Spanish America to protect 
 the British trade in those countries. Before the 
 end of 1823 most of the consuls were appointed, 
 and on their way to their respective stations. 
 At the same time, special commissioners were 
 sent out to Columbia and Mexico to report on 
 the political situation. 
 
 Meanwhile, in October, 1823, France was 
 informed with great frankness of the settled 
 policy of Great Britain in regard to South 
 America. Briefly stated, it came to this : the 
 recovery of the colonies by Spain seemed to be 
 hopeless ; if Spain thought otherwise, by all 
 means let her try ! "We had no designs upon 
 those colonies ourselves, but the world in general 
 and France in particular must clearly understand 
 (i.) that if Spain could not subdue the colonies 
 herself, no other Power would be allowed to do 
 it for her ; (ii.) that England " could not wait 
 indefinitely," and "could not consent to make its 
 recognition of the New States dependent upon 
 that of Spain " ; (iii.) that Spain's " pretension to 
 interdict all trade with these colonies" was in 
 our opinion obsolete, and, even if maintained 
 against other Powers, could not (under the 
 Treaty of 1810) be enforced against us ; (iv.) that 
 we would not submit our claims to a European 
 congress. Canning had reason for mistrusting 
 the action of congresses, and expressed his 
 
VII.] THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 107 
 
 mistrust to Bagot. " We protested at Laibac^h ; 
 we remonstrated at Verona. Our protest was 
 treated as waste paper ; our remonstrances 
 mingled with the air." Though France did not 
 like Canning's communication, she made no 
 official protest; and help came to us from an 
 important but unexpected quarter. The United 
 States (to whose Minister a similar communica- 
 tion had been made) offered effective support to 
 Canning's doctrines. On December 2, 1823, Presi- 
 dent Monroe sent to Congress the famous message 
 in which he declared "that any interference on 
 the part of the Great Powers of Europe for the 
 purpose of oppressing or controlling the destiny 
 of the Spanish American States, which had de- 
 clared their Independence, would be dangerous to 
 the peace and safety of the United States, and 
 would be considered as the manifestation of an 
 unfriendly disposition towards them." Such was 
 the historic origin of a "doctrine" of which a 
 good deal has recently been heard. 
 
 Spain made one further but unavailing effort 
 to retain by diplomacy what she could no longer 
 retain by force. At her request a Conference 
 took place in Paris between the ambassadors of 
 the Continental Powers ; but Great Britain held 
 aloof, and nothing came of it. On January 1, 
 1825, the Powers were informed that Great 
 Britain had at last recognised the independence 
 of "those countries of America which appear to 
 
 p 2 
 
108 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 have established their separation from Spain," 
 viz. Buenos Ayres, Columbia, and Mexico. "It 
 cannot be concealed," as Canning said, •' that we 
 have hurt many feelings, run against many 
 interests, shocked many prejudices, and caused 
 many regrets ; but it is my sanguine hope that 
 we shall remain with our point gained, and the 
 peace of the world undisturbed." Canning's hope 
 was in one sense amply fulfilled. Our point 
 was gained, and without war. The Courts of 
 Austria, Prussia, and Russia expressed their 
 deep regret at our action, " since it ga^(se a final 
 blow to the interests of Spain in the New World, 
 and tended to encourage the revolutionary spirit 
 which it had been found so difficult to restrain 
 in Europe." With or without the intervention 
 of England, the interests of Spain in America 
 were probably doomed ; but was there no force 
 in the latter part of the complaint ? It is true 
 that there has been an immense development of 
 commercial intercourse between England and 
 South America, and that English capital has 
 there found profitable, if precarious, employ- 
 ment; but can it be denied that these results 
 have been secured at the expense of our "en- 
 couragement to the revolutionary spirit" mani- 
 festing itself on an enormous scale? To this 
 question the history of the South American 
 Republics during the last half century must 
 be allowed fpr itself to reply. 
 
VII.] POETUGAL. 109 
 
 Over the Holy Allies Canning had won a 
 signal victory; and for their protests he cared 
 nothing. England must, as he said, "move 
 steadily on in her own orbit, without looking 
 too nicely to the conduct of the Powers in 
 alliance with her; must be content with her 
 own glory, and by its example excite other 
 nations to arrive at the same advantages which 
 her peculiar system has bestowed upon her." 
 
 Not so lightly could he disregard the opinions 
 of his own colleagues. And those opinions were 
 far from being unanimous. Wellington, in 
 particular, was strongly opposed to Canning's 
 Spanish policy. Canning threatened resigna- 
 tion. This disaster however was averted by the 
 tact of the Prime Minister and the submission 
 of the Cabinet. Canning therefore remained in 
 office to deal with two other questions of the 
 first magnitude, that of Portugal and that of 
 Greece. 
 
 (c) Canning and Portugal. 
 
 Canning's policy in regard to Portugal was 
 not less prompt and emphatic than his poUcy 
 towards Spain. The situation in Portugal, 
 thdugh serious and complicated, was not devoid 
 of elements of humour. Napoleon, as we have 
 seen, had, in 1807, issued an edict that the 
 " House of Braganza had ceased to reign." The 
 royal family had, however, made their escape in 
 
no FOREIGN SECEETARY. [chap. 
 
 time, and had transferred the seat of govern- 
 ment to Brazil. After the Restoration, the 
 former Regent, now King John VI., declined to 
 return to Europe. But he appointed as Regent 
 Lord Beresford, the former commander of the 
 English troops in Portugal, and proclaimed the 
 union of the Portuguese dominions imder the 
 title of the " United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, 
 and the Algarves." Portugal thus became to all 
 intents and purposes a dependency of Brazil, 
 This naturally caused a considerable amount of 
 discontent, and the Spanish Revolution of 1820 
 brought matters to a head. The Regency was 
 deposed ; a Provisional Government was estab- 
 lished; and John VI. was persuaded to return 
 reluctantly to Lisbon. His son, Don Pedro, was 
 left as Regent in Brazil, and was instructed at 
 all hazards to preserve Brazil to the House of 
 Braganza ; " and in case of any unforeseen cir- 
 cumstances which should make the continuance 
 of the union between Portugal and Brazil im- 
 practicable ... to place the crown upon his 
 own head, and to take especial care that it 
 was not left to fall upon the head of an 
 adventurer." The King's precaution was justi- 
 fied. The Brazilians, in 1822, declined to submit 
 to the orders Of the Cortes at home ; declared 
 their country independent ; and proclaimed Don 
 Pedro as Constitutional Emperor. Meanwhile, 
 in Portugal things swayed from one side to the 
 
VII.] PORTUGAL. Ill 
 
 other. In 1821, John VI. contentedly accepted 
 a Liberal Constitution. But, in 1823, the re- 
 actionary contagion reached Portugal from 
 Spain; the Queen (herself a Spanish Bourbon) 
 and her second son, Don Miguel, strongly 
 favoured the reaction ; the King was compelled 
 to yield; a new ministry took office, and abso- 
 lutism was once more triumphant. 
 
 A fierce diplomatic struggle then ensued at 
 Lisbon ; the English party being supported by 
 M. de Palmella, the Foreign Minister ; the French 
 by M. de Subs^rra, the Prime Minister. The 
 former immediately applied to Great Britain for 
 the "aid of a body of troops to give strength 
 and stability to the Government" of Portugal. 
 No petition could have been more embarrassing 
 to Canning. He was unwilling to refuse the 
 request of a Government connected by so many 
 ties with our own ; but to accede to it would 
 have been a direct contravention of the prin- 
 ciples which we had long, though unsuccessfully, 
 urged upon the absolutist Courts of the Conti- 
 nent. Moreover, there was not a single regiment 
 in England available for foreign service. The 
 demand for soldiers was, therefore, refused : but 
 a squadron was despatched to the Tagus "to 
 confirm in the eyes of the Portuguese nation the 
 strict intimacy and good will subsisting between 
 the two Crowns. The expedient adopted had 
 two obvious advantages: the British ships would 
 
112 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 afford ' a certain asylum ' to the King were his 
 life endangered, but they were not capable of 
 being employed as an instrument of domestic 
 police, or as an agent in civil discussions." 
 
 The ships were found useful when, in April, 
 1824, Don Miguel effected a coup d'4tat in the reac- 
 tionary interest, arrested the leading ministers, 
 and virtually superseded his father. John VII. 
 went on board the Windsor Castle and from that 
 vantage ground succeeded in re-establishing his 
 authority. The struggle between the English 
 and French parties went on for another twelve 
 months; but in 1825 Canning won a distinct 
 diplomatic victory. He got the most prominent 
 Gallophils deposed, and he had the further and 
 great satisfaction of bringing about a final 
 settlement of the dangerous and long-standing 
 difficulty between Portugal and Brazil. 
 
 On August 29, 1825, a treaty was signed in 
 which John IV. "recognized Brazil to hold the 
 name of an independent Empire . . . and his best 
 beloved son Don Pedro as Emperor." The old 
 king was, under this arrangement, to retain 
 during his lifetime the imperial title. But he 
 survived the settlement only six months. On 
 his death the Emperor Pedro renounced his 
 rights of succession to the throne of Portugal 
 in favour of his daughter the Infanta Maria, 
 thus completing the severance between the two 
 crowns. The Infanta was a child of seven ; but, 
 
vn.] SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 113 
 
 with a view of reconciling irreconcilables the 
 poor child was betrothed to her uncle Don 
 Miguel. The partizans of Miguel were not in- 
 clined to wait ; the old factions broke out again ; 
 the reactionaries applied for help to Spain ; the 
 Regency in despair appealed to England. The 
 demand for succour reached Canning on Decem- 
 ber 3, 1826. He waited only for confirmation 
 of the action of Spain. This reached him on 
 Friday, December 8. On Monday the 12th, he 
 was able to announce to Parliament that troops 
 were on their way to Portugal. Not a moment 
 had been lost : 
 
 " The precise information, on which we alone 
 could act, arrived only on Friday last. On 
 Saturday the decision of the Government was 
 taken, on Sunday we obtained the sanction of 
 his Majesty, on Monday we came down to 
 Parliament, and at this very hour, while I have 
 the honour of addressing this House, British 
 troops are on their way to Portugal ! " 
 
 The speech in which Canning vindicated to 
 Parliament — and to the world — the action of the 
 Cabinet was perhaps the most eloquent, cer- 
 tainly the most effective, he ever made. "While 
 ruthlessly exposing the shuffling and equivo- 
 cating conduct of Spain he still expressed his 
 anxious desire for peace : for the war, if war 
 should come, will be a war, "not so much of 
 armies as of opinions." " It is," he exclaimed, " a 
 
 Q 
 
lU FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 war of opinion that Spain is now waging against 
 Portugal; it is a war which is commenced in 
 hatred of the new institutions of Portugal. ... 
 If into that war this country shall be compelled 
 to enter, we shall enter into it, with a sincere 
 and anxious desire to mitigate, rather than 
 exasperate, and to mingle only in the conflict of 
 arms, not in the n^pre fatal conflict of opinions. 
 But I much fear that this country (however 
 earnestly she may endeavour to avoid it) could 
 not, in such case, avoid seeing ranked under her 
 banners all the restless and dissatisfied of any 
 nation with which she might come in conflict. 
 It is the contemplation of this new power in 
 any future war which excites my most anxious 
 apprehension. It is one thing to have a giant's 
 strength, it would be another to use it like a 
 giant." 
 
 Canning's words re-echoed throughout Europe; 
 and bitterly as they were resented by the absolu- 
 tist Courts, they produced their intended effect. 
 Spain at once desisted from any further encour- 
 agement to the Portguese reactionaries ; France 
 condemned the whole enterprise as immoral and 
 insane ; the Portuguese, backed by the presence 
 of a British squadron in the Tagus, drove back 
 the invaders with ease, and the Liberal Con- 
 stitution was saved. It cannot be doubted that 
 Canning's bold words and prompt action had 
 nipped in the bud a movement which might 
 
VII.] ENGLISH INTERESTS. 115 
 
 easily, if paltered with, have developed into a 
 general and sanguinary war. He had thus done 
 an admirable service not to Portugal only, nor 
 to England, but to Europe at large. But he 
 was never ashamed to confess that it was the 
 interests of England which were his primary 
 concern : 
 
 "The language of modern philosophy is 
 widely and diffusely benevolent ; it professes 
 the perfection of our species and the amehora- 
 tion of the lot of all mankind. Gentlemen, I 
 hope that my heart beats as high for the general 
 interests of humanity, I hope I have as friendly 
 a disposition towards the other nations of the 
 earth as anyone who vaunts his philanthropy 
 most highly, but I am contented to confess that 
 in the conduct of political affairs, the grand 
 object of my contemplation is the interest of 
 England. Not, gentlemen, that the interest of 
 England is an interest which stands isolated and 
 alone. The situation which she holds forbids an 
 exclusive selfishness. Her prosperity must con- 
 tribute to the prosperity of surrounding nations 
 and her stability to the safety of the world." * 
 
 These were the principles on which Canning 
 had acted in regard to Spain and the Spanish 
 Colonies ; these were the principles which in- 
 spired his policy towards Portugal and Brazil; 
 these were the principles which he was again 
 * Cy. speech at Plymouth, 1823. 
 
 Q 2 
 
116 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 to apply to a solution of the complex Eastern 
 problem. 
 
 (d) Canning and the Eastern Question. 
 
 On April 4, 1826, eight months before the 
 despatch of the expedition to Lisbon, England 
 and Russia had signed a protocol for the settle- 
 ment of the quarrel between Turkey and Greece. 
 
 We have already sketched the history of the 
 Greek insurrection down to the death of Lord 
 Castlereagh. At the time when Canning took 
 office the position of affairs was as follows. The 
 initial rising of the Greeks under Prince Hypsi- 
 lanti in Moldavia had collapsed ; the Czar of 
 Russia, so far from encouraging, had sternly 
 condemned the enterprise, and Hypsilanti him- 
 self was a prisoner. But, foiled in Moldavia, the 
 Greeks had risen in the Morea and the ^gean 
 Islands, and had there met with a very different 
 measure of success. Taken unawares, the Turks 
 held their own with difficulty in the fortresses, 
 and in the open country were disastrously 
 defeated. 
 
 But, meanwhile, serious disputes had arisen 
 between Turkey and Russia. Though provoked 
 in one sense by the Greek revolt, and though 
 proceeding concurrently for seven or eight years 
 with it, this quarrel with Russia never actually 
 merged in the conflict with Greece, and ought 
 
VII.] THE EASTERN QUESTION. 117 
 
 strictly to be treated apart from it. The Czar 
 Alexander, and in a less degree, the Czar 
 Nicholas always regarded the Greeks as rebels ; 
 morally indistinguishable from the rebels in 
 Spain, in Portugal and in Naples, and as such to 
 be left to their deserved fate. But although 
 Alexander " discerned the revolutionary march 
 in the troubles of the Peloponnese " he had his 
 own quarrel with the Turk. 
 
 By the Treaty of Kainardji (1774), Russia had 
 acquired the right of commercial navigation in 
 the Black Sea ; had become virtually the protec- 
 tor of the Danubian Principalities, and had 
 assumed certain obligations in regard to the 
 Greek Church in Constantinople and elsewhere. 
 These latter were ill-defined and highly disputa- 
 ble. In 1821 Russian susceptibilities were, as we 
 have seen, aroused on each of these three points, 
 and war between the two powers was only 
 averted by timely though partial submission 
 on the part of Turkey, and by the anxiety of 
 Metternich and the Czar to give no sort of 
 encouragement to the Greek rebels. 
 
 Between 1822 and 1826 events moved rapidly 
 in South Eastern Europe, and more and more 
 tended to bring the two movements, in their 
 origin technically distinct — the Greek revolt and 
 the Russian disputes with Turkey — into closer 
 and eventually inextricable relations. 
 
 From the beginning to the close of his reign 
 
118 FOEEIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 at the Foreign Office, Canning pursued a clearly- 
 defined and consistent policy in regard to the 
 Eastern Question. He was far from insensible 
 to the claims of the Greeks. On the contrary, 
 he was ardently desirous that they should suc- 
 ceed in throwing off the yoke they had borne 
 so long. Nor was he, in any sense, a Russophil. 
 He was strongly opposed to the establishment of 
 Russia on the Dardanelles, or to the dismember- 
 ment of Turkey in her favour. From first to 
 last his object was to induce the Porte to grant 
 terms to the Greeks, and so prevent Russia from 
 utilizing the situation as a means to her own 
 territorial aggrandizement. Above all, he was 
 anxious to assert what he believed to be the 
 legitimate interests of Great Britain in the 
 Eastern Question, and to compel Russia to 
 recognize those interests in any final settlement. 
 So long as he lived he firmly retained control of 
 the situation ; but his untimely death, and the 
 weakness and timidity of his immediate succes- 
 sors, went far to neutralize the effects of his 
 consistent policy and allowed Russia to pluck 
 single-handed the fruits of her victories in the 
 field. 
 
 To return to the history of the Greek Revolt. 
 During 1822 and 1823 the Greeks more than held 
 their own against the Porte. In 1822 the Turks 
 captured the island of Chios and put its in- 
 habitants to the sword ; but they paid dearly 
 
VII.] THE GREEK REVOLT. 119 
 
 for their victory, the flower of their fleet being 
 destroyed by the Greek fire-ships. A determined 
 attempt to re-assert their position in the Morea 
 was equally unsuccessful; the Greeks reduced 
 the citadels of Athens and Corinth, compelled 
 the Turks to surrender Nauplia and to raise the 
 first siege of Missolonghi. Despite fierce inter- 
 necine feuds among the rebel leaders, the Porte 
 could make no headway against them. More- 
 over, the struggle of the Greeks, despite time- 
 serving treachery and sordid self-seeking, despite 
 personal jealousies and atrocities unnumbered, 
 had in it something of the heroic which could 
 not fail to attract generous sympathy. The 
 august Allies might decide at Verona that the 
 Greeks were rebels, and must be left to their 
 fate; but the peoples of Europe, and particu- 
 larly the English people, were of a different 
 mind. The efiforts of Lord Byron, Lord Cath- 
 cart, General Church and others, aroused an 
 intensely Phil-Hellenist sentiment among them, 
 and volunteers flocked in their thousands to the 
 assistance of the Greeks, not from England only, 
 but from Germany, from France and from the 
 United States. Considerable subscriptions were 
 raised in their behaK; success attended their 
 arms, and a growing interest in their political 
 fate manifested itself among the Powers. But 
 the year 1824 seemed, notwithstanding, likely to 
 prove a fatal turning point for the Greeks. In 
 
120 FOREIGN' SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 April, 1824, Byron porished in the swamps of 
 Missolonghi, and in July the Turks captured the 
 island of Ipsara. Though the latter victory was 
 neutralised by the success of the Greek fleet at 
 Mitylene, events were taking place elsewhere 
 destined to put a new complexion on the whole 
 struggle. 
 
 Mehemet Ali, the great vassal-ruler of Egypt, 
 had no mind to see the dismemberment of an 
 Empire which might some day be his own. His 
 step-son, Ibrahim Pasha, was accordingly des- 
 patched at the head of a powerful force, and in 
 April, 1824, captured and occupied Crete, with 
 the intention of using it as a base of operations 
 against the insurgent islands of the JEgean. 
 From Crete, early in 1825, Ibrahim crossed to 
 the Morea, and landed at Modon, at the head of 
 a force of nearly twenty thousand men. The 
 disciplined i Egyptian troops carried all before 
 them. Tripolitza and Navarino were taken, and 
 Ibrahim, "hurrying, devastating and slaughtering 
 in all directions," advanced through the Morea. 
 While the Egyptians attacked from the south- 
 west, the Turks delivered their assault on the 
 north-west. The two forces converged on the 
 devoted Missolonghi. In April, 1825, Redschid 
 Pasha invested the town by land and sea. Again 
 and again the assault was delivered ; again and 
 again it was repelled. Redschid himself was in 
 danger of being cut off by the Greek fleet ; but 
 
VII.] SIEGE OF MISSOLONGHI. 121 
 
 in November the Turkish forces were re-inforced 
 by Ibrahim. The efforts of the Egyptians were 
 as vain as those of the Turks ; the besiegers still 
 repelled every assault. At last, after more than 
 six months of siege, the assault was abandoned, 
 and the combined force of the besiegers sat down 
 to a blockade. The heroic defenders were starved 
 out ; and in April, 1826, after a close investment 
 of exactly a year, the whole population deter- 
 mined to make a sortie, and attempt, to cut their 
 way through. On April 22, every man, woman 
 and child — not physically disabled — assembled at 
 the gates prepared for the last desperate sally ; 
 only the infirm were left behind. The vanguard 
 cut their way through, and the gallant attempt 
 seemed on the point of complete success, when, 
 owing to a mistaken order, the force got divided 
 part advanced, part retired ; of the former, some 
 got through; the besiegers closed in upon the 
 latter ; hardly a man of them escaped ; most of 
 them died sword in hand ; the rest set fire to the 
 magazines and perished in the flames. Some 
 three thousand women and children, the sole 
 survivors of the siege, were carried off into 
 slavery. 
 
 From Missolonghi the victors marched on 
 Athens ; Athens in its turn was besieged, and 
 on June 2, 1827, despite the efforts of the Greeks 
 themselves, and despite the assistance of Lord 
 Cochrane, General Church and others, was com- 
 
 R 
 
122 FOEEIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 pelled to surrender. The Greek cause seemed 
 desperate. Unless help were forthcoming from 
 outside, the whole movement must collapse. In 
 despair the Greeks formally placed themselves 
 under British protection, and begged that Grieat 
 Britain -would send them a king. It was, of 
 course, impossible to accede to the request, and 
 Canning, though he received the Greek deputies 
 with cordiality, made it clear to theiii that we 
 could not depart from our attitude of strict, 
 though benevolent, neutrality. This negotiation 
 took place at the close of 1825. Just about the 
 same time an event happened which profoundly 
 modified the whole European situation. 
 
 On December 1, 1825, the Czar Alexander died 
 suddenly in the Crimea, and after a short in- 
 terval of uncertainty and confusion, was suc- 
 ceeded by his brother Nicholas. Nicholas was a 
 man entirely opposed in taste and temper to his 
 predecessor. Alexander was a curious mixture 
 of shrewdness and sentiment; Nicholas had none 
 of his Western veneer, and cherished none of his 
 illusions ; he was a Russian to the core. For the 
 Greeks he cared as little as Alexander ; but he 
 was even more indisposed to allow the Porte to 
 play fast and loose with ITussia. The questions 
 at issue between the two Courts were no nearer 
 a satisfactory settlement than when, some three 
 years before, Russia had broken off diplomatic 
 relations with Constantinople. Lord Strangford, 
 
VII.] THE POWERS AND GREECE. 123 
 
 the British Ambassador, had done all in his 
 power to bring about a settlement of the dis- 
 pute ; but he had no sooner, with infinite labour, 
 secured an adjustment on one point than another 
 had been raised. 
 
 On the accession of the new Czar, Canning 
 induced the Duke of Wellington to undertake a 
 special mission to St. Petersburg. His object 
 was twofold : (i.) to adjust, if possible, the out- 
 standing difficulties between Russia and the 
 Porte, and thus to avert the war, which at any 
 moment in the last four years might have been 
 regarded as imminent ; and (ii.) to arrive at a 
 common understanding with Russia on the Greek 
 Question. 
 
 For it was hardly possible that the great 
 Powers could much longer hold aloof. Metter- 
 nich, indeed, never wavered for an instant from 
 the attitude which he had from the first as- 
 sumed: the Greeks were rebels against legiti- 
 mate authority, and must be left to their fate. 
 Prussia adhered to the policy of Austria. In 
 France, however, the Phil-Hellenist sentinaent 
 was not powerless, and in England and Russia 
 it might at any moment get beyond the control 
 of the respective governments. More particularly 
 was this the case after the intervention of Ibrahim 
 Pasha in the Morea. Ibrahim has been described 
 as a " savage ; " and if he was not that, it must, at 
 least, be admitted that his methods of warfare 
 
 E 2 
 
124 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 were exceedingly repugnant to Western ideas. 
 Moreover, an ugly rumour had got abroad that 
 Ibrahim had formed a plan " to remove the 
 whole Greek population, carrying them off into 
 slavery into Egypt, or elsewhere, and to repeople 
 the country with Egyptians and others of the 
 Mahommedan religion." Canning regarded the 
 rumour, first communicated to him by Prince 
 Lieven, as incredible. But towards the end of 
 1825 he had appointed to the Embassy at Con- 
 stantinople his cousin, Stratford Canning ; a man 
 destined to undying fame, in the annals of 
 English diplomacy, as Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. 
 The first Reports sent home by the new am- 
 bassador were a cautious confirmation of Prince 
 Lieven's account. " If the statements which had 
 reached Mr. S. Canning were true, Ibrahim then 
 acted on a system little short of extermina- 
 tion . . . and there was room to apprehend that 
 many of his prisoners had been sent into Egypt 
 as slaves, the children, it was asserted, being 
 made to embrace the Mahommedan Faith." 
 
 Stratford Canning was instructed to satisfy 
 himself as to the facts, and if they should cor- 
 respond with the rumour, " to declare in the 
 most distinct terms to the Porte that Great 
 Britain would not permit the execution of a 
 system of depopulation." More than that, a 
 naval officer was to be despatched from the 
 Mediterranean fleet direct to Ibrahim, and to 
 
VII.] ENGLAND AND RUSSIA. 125 
 
 give "the Pasha distinctly to understand that 
 unless he should in a written document distinctly 
 disavow or formally renounce . . . the intention 
 of converting the Morea into a Barbary State by 
 transporting the population to Asia or Africa 
 and replacing them by the population of those 
 countries, effectual means would be talren to 
 impede by the intervention of his Majesty's 
 naval forces the accomplishment of so un- 
 warrantable a project." 
 
 Meanwhile the Duke of Wellington had, with 
 some difficulty, brought the Czar Nicholas into 
 line with Canning's policy on the Greek Question ; 
 had secured his promise to " co-operate with 
 Great Britain to prevent the execution of the 
 designs imparted to Ibrahim Pasha ; " and had 
 concluded with him the Protocol of St. Peters- 
 burgh. 
 
 By this Treaty,* the two Powers renouncing 
 any "augmentation of territory, any exclusive 
 influence" or any superior commercial advan- 
 tages for themselves, agreed to offer their media- 
 tion to the Porte. Greece, though continuing 
 to pay tribute to the Porte, was to become 
 a virtually independent State, to be governed 
 by authorities chosen by itself, and to enjoy 
 "entire liberty of conscience and commerce." 
 To prevent collisions in the future, the Turks 
 were to evacuate Greece, and the Greeks were 
 * Text in Stapleton, ii. 487. 
 
126 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 to " purchase the property of the Turks ... on 
 the Grecian Continent or islands." This protocol, 
 signed on April 4, 1826, must be regarded, as far 
 as it goes, as a conspicuous triumph for Canning. 
 And it went a long way to settle the Greek 
 Question. But as to the outstanding questions be- 
 tween Turkey and Russia it did nothing ; and it 
 was on these that the mind of the Czar Nicholas 
 was bent. Though professing his readiness to 
 treat of the matter with Wellington, the Czar 
 had already (March 17, 1826) despatched an 
 ultimatum to the Porte. It demanded the 
 immediate evacuation of the Principalities ; 
 the abandonment of the appointment of the 
 " Beshlis " or police ; and the instant despatch 
 of the plenipotentiaries to the Russian frontier. 
 
 These demands the Porte was not in a posi- 
 tion to refuse. For some time past the Sultan, 
 Mahmoud II. had been contemplating a radical 
 reform of his military system. The Janissaries 
 resisted the reform, and in June, 1826, broke 
 into open mutiny. For this the Sultan was 
 prepared, and the Janissaries — the historic force 
 upon which for centuries the Ottoman Sultans 
 had depended — ^were cut down to a man. For 
 the moment, therefore, there was nothing for it 
 but submission to the terms of Russia; and on 
 October 7, 1826, the Convention of Ackerman, in 
 which those terms were embodied, was signed. 
 
 Meanwhile, Canning felt that "the time had 
 
VII.] TREATY OF LONDON. 127 
 
 come to translate into facts the principles as- 
 serted in the Petersburg Protocol. The Pro- 
 visional Government of Greece had formally 
 applied for thb mediation of Great Britain, and 
 in the autumn of 1826 England and Russia agreed 
 to take common action in forcing their mediation 
 upon the Porte. If the Sultan continued obdurate 
 the two Powers agreed to intimate to him that 
 "they would look to Greece with an eye of 
 favour, and with a disposition to seize the first 
 occasion of recognising as an independent State 
 such portion of her territory as should have 
 freed itself from Turkish dominion." In the 
 meantime every effort was made to secure the 
 adhesion of the other Powers to this policy. 
 Prussia had no interest in the matter; but 
 Prince Mettemich left no stone unturned to 
 frustrate the policy outlined in the Protocol. 
 He even went so far as to use means at his 
 disposal for creating mistrust between the En- 
 glish Court and the Foreign Office. His efforts 
 were fortunately fruitless. France, on the other 
 hand, expressed its cordial concurrence in Can- 
 ning's policy, and in July, 1827, concluded with 
 Russia and Great Britain the Treaty of London. 
 The public articles of this treaty were sub- 
 stantially identical with the terms of the Peters- 
 burg Protocol. On the basis of these terms the 
 mediation of the contracting Powers was to be 
 offered to the belligerents, and "an immediate 
 
128 FOEEIGN SECRETARY. [chaP. 
 
 armistice" to be demanded. An additional and 
 secret article provided that the Porte should be 
 plainly informed that the Powers intend to take 
 " immediate measures for an approximation with 
 the Greeks " ; and that if within one month " the 
 Porte do not accept the armistice ... or if the' 
 Greeks refuse to execute it " the High Contracting 
 Powers should intimate to one or both parties 
 that " they intend to exert all the means which 
 circumstances may suggest to their prudence to 
 obtain the immediate effect of the armistice . . . 
 by preventing all collision between the con- 
 tending parties . . . without, however, taking 
 any part in the hostilities between them." It 
 was further provided that "instructions con- 
 formable to the provisions above set forth" 
 should be sent "to the admirals commanding 
 their squadrons in the seas of the Levant."* 
 
 This treaty may be regarded as the crown 
 of Canning's policy in regard to the Eastern 
 Question. The principles of that policy are 
 clear ; the Powers could not ignore the struggle 
 of Greece for independence : " a contest so 
 ferbcious (as Canning wrote to Lieven) leading 
 to excesses of piracy and plunder, so intolerable 
 to civihzed Europe justifies extraordinary in- 
 tervention, and renders lawful any expedients 
 short of positive hostility," On the other hand, 
 they could not consistently interfere by force ; 
 
 * A full text in 'Annual Register' for 1827, pp. 403-405. 
 
VII.] TREATY OF LONDON. 129 
 
 above all the Russian Czar must not be permitted 
 to utilise the Greek struggle, for which he cared 
 little, to attain objects for which he cared much. 
 This policy is clearly reflected in the terms of 
 the Treaty of London ; but its practical applica- 
 tion was not free from difficulty and ambiguity. 
 The Porte was notorious for sullen obstinacy. 
 How were the " high contracting parties " in the 
 all too probable event of a refusal of an armistice 
 by the Porte, to " prevent all collision between 
 the contending parties without taking any part 
 in the hostilities ? " Either the matter had not 
 been clearly thought out, or it was deliberately 
 intended to leave the Gordian knot to be cut by 
 the Executive Officers of the Powers, i.e., "the 
 admirals commanding their squadrons in the 
 seas of the Levant." Canning was obliged to 
 move warily ; but that he himself contemplated 
 the employment of force is clear from the fact 
 that the Dxike of "Wellington condemned the 
 Treaty of London on the ground that " it speci- 
 fied means of compulsion which were neither 
 more nor less than measures of war," 
 
 In August, 1827, the mediation of the three 
 Powers was offered to the " contending parties," 
 was accepted by the Greeks, and refused by the 
 Porte. 
 
 The game now passed from the hands of 
 diplomatists into those of sailors. The British 
 fleet in the Levant was under the command of 
 
130 FOREIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 Sir Edward Codrington. Codrington received 
 his instructions on August 7th ; but, not being 
 a diplomatist, he found them difficult of inter- 
 pretation. How was he "to intercept all ships 
 freighted with men and arms destined to act 
 against the Greeks whether coming from Turkey 
 or the coast of Africa," a,nd, at the same time, 
 prevent his measures from "degenerating into 
 hostilities ? " In a word was he, or was he not, 
 to use force? Such was the blunt question 
 which he addressed to our ambassador at Con- 
 stantinople. Stratford Canning's answer was 
 unequivocal : " the prevention of supplies is 
 ultimately to be enforced, if necessary, and 
 when all other means are exhausted, by cannon 
 shot." 
 
 Meanwhile, large reinforcements from Egypt 
 had reached Ibrahim who was still in the Morea ; 
 and a squadron of Turkish and Egyptian ships 
 was lying in Navarino Bay. Ibrahim was in- 
 formed that not a single ship would be allowed 
 to leave the harbour, and on making one or two 
 attempts to do so, he found that the admirals 
 were determined to enforce their orders. Foiled 
 in his attempt at naval operations, and instructed 
 by the Porte to prosecute the war on land with 
 all possible energy, Ibrahim proceeded to execute 
 his orders with merciless severity. All who were 
 found in arms were put to the sword, while the 
 miserable survivors were to be starved into sub- 
 
VII.] NAVARINO. 131 
 
 mission by the total destruction of every means 
 of subsistence. " It is supposed " wrote one eye- 
 witness, Captain Hamilton, " that if Ibrahini 
 remained in the Morea more than a third of its 
 inhabitants would die of absolute starvation." 
 Of the atrocities which were taking place the 
 allied admirals were all but eye-witnesses. 
 " Continual clouds of fire and smoke rising all 
 round the Gulf of Coron bore frightful testimony 
 to the devastation that was going on." The 
 admirals thereupon determined to "put a stop 
 to atrocities which exceed all that has hitherto 
 taken place," and for this purpose to sail into 
 Navarino Bay, and there renew^ their remon- 
 strances with Ibrahim. No hostilities were 
 intended " unless the Turks should begin." The 
 Turks, however, fired on a boat from the Dart- 
 mouth; th.e Dartmmith and the French flagship 
 replied ; the battle became general ; and before 
 the sun went down on October 20, the Turko- 
 Bgyptian ships "had disappeared, the Bay of 
 Navarino was covered with their wrecks." 
 
 The battle of Navarino did much to clear the 
 diplomatic atmosphere. Unfortunately, before 
 it was fought, the great statesman directly 
 responsible for the policy which led up to it, 
 had passed away. 
 
 After Canning's death the direction of the 
 affairs in England fell into the hands of the 
 Duke of Wellington. Wellington never liked 
 
 s 2 
 
132 FOEEIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 Canning, and strongly disapproved of the later 
 developments of his policy in the Eastern 
 Question. To him and his High Tory colleagues 
 the battle of Navarino, justly described by Lord 
 Althorp as " a necessary consequence of the 
 Treaty of London," was little short of a disaster. 
 In the King's speech it was described as a 
 " collision wholly unexpected by his Majesty," 
 and as "an untoward event;" while his Majesty 
 was made to " lament deeply " that " this conflict 
 should have occurred with the naval forces of an 
 ancient ally ; " and to express " a confident hope 
 that this imtoward event wiU not be followed 
 by further hostilities, and will not impede that 
 amicable adjustment of existing difficulties be- 
 tween the Porte and the Greeks to which it is 
 so manifestly their common interest to accede." 
 
 Language so fatuous could have but one 
 effect. It encouraged the Porte to persist in 
 conduct which was certain to provoke war with 
 Russia; and it permitted, if it did not compel, 
 Russia to proceed single-handed with the task 
 which she had espoused in common with our- 
 selves. Thus the two main objects of Canning's 
 policy were abandoned; and the results of six 
 years' careful and patient diplomacy were, in 
 a moment of folly, entirely dissipated. 
 
 The sequel must be told in a few words. 
 The Porte had the impudence to claim compen- 
 sation for "the revolting outrage" committed 
 
vu.] RUSSIA AND TURKEY. 133 
 
 at Navarino. This was refused; and the am- 
 bassadors of the three Powers withdrew from 
 Constantinople. At the end of 1827 the Porte 
 issued a solemn Hatti-Sheriff ; sunxmoned the 
 faithful to a holy war against the Infidels ; and 
 repudiated the Treaty of Ackermann. Russia's 
 opportunity — the opportunity so long postponed 
 by the wary and astute diplomacy of Canning — 
 had now^ come. On April 26, 1828, she declared 
 war on Turkey; and, in May, Wittgenstein, at 
 the head of one hundred and fifty thousand 
 men, crossed the Pruth. To the amazement of 
 Europe, the Russian Campaign of 1828 was far 
 from successful, and Metternich was thus en- 
 couraged to make one last effort to save the 
 Porte from annihilation. He found no support, 
 even in England, and in 1829 the Russians com- 
 pleted the work they had begun. Wittgenstein 
 was superseded in favour of Diebitsch. Diebitsch, 
 by a masterly march, crossed the Balkans in July, 
 and on August 19 appeared before Adrianople. 
 Adrianople surrendered at once ; Kars and Erze- 
 roum had already fallen ; and, on September 14, 
 1829, the Sultan decided to accept the terms 
 embodied in the famous Treaty of Adrianople. 
 
 In the history of the Eastern Question the 
 Treaty of Adrianople is inferior in importance 
 only to that of Kainardji — and perhaps to that 
 of Berlin. By its provisions, the local autonomy 
 of Moldavia and Wallachia was confirmed under 
 
134 FOEEIGN SECRETARY. [chap. 
 
 Russian guarantee ; their Hospodars were to be 
 elected for life instead of for seven years ; no 
 Mussulman was to reside in those provinces, and 
 all who possessed landed property were to sell it 
 within eighteen months ; Servia also was to be 
 guaranteed in the administration of its internal 
 affairs under similar protection; Russian mer- 
 chantmen were to have free rights of navigation 
 in the Black Sea, and to be free from all visitation 
 on the part of the Turks, even when in Turkish 
 harbours ; Russian traders in Turkey — a singular 
 and enormous privilege — were to be under the 
 exclusive jurisdiction of their own consuls ; 
 Russia was to obtain Georgia the other Cau- 
 casian provinces and the "great islands of the 
 Danube"; and her frontier on the south-west 
 was to be advanced to the Pruth. Finally, the 
 Porte accepted the Treaty of London in regard 
 to Greece, the settlement of whose affairs were 
 committed to a Conference in London. This 
 Conference subsequently decreed that the new 
 State should be ruled by a " Constitutional 
 Monarchy," and that its frontier should be 
 drawn at a line from the mouth of the river 
 Aspro on the west coast to the Gulf of Volo in 
 the east. This Hellenic kingdom, independent, 
 though circumscribed, may be regarded as the 
 fruit, and the sole fruit, of Canning's unremitting 
 toil ; for the Treaty of Adrianople was declared 
 by the Duke of Wellington to be "the death- 
 
VII.] TREATY OF ADRIANOPLB. 135 
 
 blow to the independence of the Ottoman Porte, 
 and the forerunner of the dissolution and extinc- 
 tion of its power." The Duke's prognostication 
 was somewhat premature ; but in so far as it 
 was accurate, its fulfilment was due to the 
 diplomatic weakness and timidity of the Duke 
 himself, and to his abandonment of the policy of 
 Canning. Canning was no more friendly to the 
 aggressive advance of Russia than the Duke of 
 Wellington ; but he saw clearly that the sooner 
 the contest was ended between Greece and the 
 Porte, the less opportunity would there be for 
 Russia to attain her ends. He held, further, 
 that the legitimate interests of Great Britain in 
 the Eastern Question could be most effectually 
 maintained by a frank understanding with Russia 
 and, if it might be, with the other Powers. So 
 long as he lived, Russia was not permitted to 
 regard the Eastern Question as one to be decided 
 between herself and the Porte, or to pose as the 
 sole defender of oppressed and unemancipated 
 nationalities. His death left the path open to 
 Russia, and the Treaty of Adrianople was the 
 result. 
 
136 PRIME MINISTER. [chap. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 PRIME MINISTER. 
 
 Canning's reputation must rest upon his Foreign 
 policy. I have, therefore, in this essay, concen- 
 trated almost exclusive attention upon his tenure 
 of the Foreign Office from 1807-1809, and again 
 from 1822-1827. But a few words must he added 
 here as to the events which were crowded into 
 the last few months of his life. 
 
 On February 17, 1827, Lord Liverpool was 
 seized with a paralytic stroke from which he 
 never recovered sufficiently to allow him to take 
 any further part in political life. He died on 
 December 4, 1828. Lord Liverpool was not a 
 great man, but he was an admirable Prime 
 Minister. During fifteen difficult and eventful 
 years he presided over his colleagues with dignity 
 and! success. It was said of him with truth by 
 an American minister to the Court of St. James' 
 that if he was not the ablest man in his Cabinet 
 " he was essentially its head." To find a successor 
 to him was no easy matter. No other living 
 statesman could be expected to hold together a 
 
VIII.] TORY DISRUPTION. 137 
 
 Cabinet composed of such discordant elements, 
 or to postpone a decision on the most pressing 
 of domestic problems — that presented by the 
 Catholic claims. 
 
 Of Lord Liverpool's colleagues Canning was, 
 of course, incomparably the ablest; but his 
 Catholic sympathies were not popular in the 
 country, his position in the House of Conunons 
 was far from strong, and to the Dukes * in the 
 Upper House his name and his policy were 
 anathema. But, despite his unpopularity, no 
 ministry could have survived at this time without 
 him, and in no ministry would he accept any 
 place except the first. Next to Canning the two 
 most powerful men in Liverpool's Cabinet were 
 Peel and the great Duke ; in some respects, of 
 course, they were more powerful than their rivaL 
 Canning was acutely conscious alike of his 
 personal claims and of his isolation in his own 
 party. " The language of the Tory party," wrote 
 Fremantle in 1824, " is universal and undisguised 
 abuse of Canning." Canning knew it; and on 
 being consulted by the King advised his Majesty 
 to form an Anti-Catholic Ministry, in which, of 
 course. Canning would have no place. The King, 
 however, declined to part with Canning, and, 
 through Peel, suggested that they should both 
 serve under the Duke. Canning objected to " the 
 
 * A remonstrance against Canning's appointment as Prime 
 Minister was signed by eight Dukes and presented to the King. 
 
 T 
 
138 PRIME MINISTER. Ichap. 
 
 superinduction of an Anti-Catholic First Minister 
 over his head, and, on April 10, 1827, the King 
 commissioned him to form a ministry. The 
 Anti-Catholics refused to join him, and the 
 resignation of the Duke of Wellington -was 
 followed by that of Peel, Lord Westmorelandj 
 Lord Bathurst, and Lord Melville. Canning was 
 thus compelled to look for general support to the 
 Whigs, though Lord Lansdowne was the only 
 prominent Whig included in the new Cabinet. 
 Canning himself became First Lord of the 
 Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer ; 
 Copley (raised to the peerage as Lord Lynd- 
 hurst) succeeded Eldon as Lord Chancellor ; 
 F. Robinson (created Lord Goderich) went to the 
 Colonial OfSce ; Lord Dudley to the Foreign 
 Office ; Sturgess Bourne to the Home Office ; 
 Palmerston, retaining the Secretaryship at War, 
 was admitted for the first time into the Cabinet : 
 the Duke of Portland became Privy Seal, and 
 Lord Harrowby, Lord Bexley, Huskisson and 
 Wynn retained their former offices. Lord Lans- 
 downe, at first without a portfolio, brought up 
 the number of Canning's Cabinet to twelve. 
 
 Canning was in very bad health when he 
 became Prime Minister, and the worries incidental 
 to Cabinet making did not tend to improve it ; 
 but he managed to struggle with increasing 
 difficulty through the Session. On July 2, a 
 Session remarkable for nothing except the dis- 
 
VIII.] CANNING'S DEATH. 139 
 
 play of bitter personal animosities was brought 
 to a close. Canning sought rest and change at 
 the Duke of Devonshire's villa at Chiswick, but 
 on Sunday, August 5, the public was informed 
 of his serious illness, and three days later, on 
 August 8, they learned that the Prime Minister 
 was dead. On August 16 he was buried in the 
 Abbey in a grave close to that of his master, 
 Pitt. That Canning w^as ever " popular " in the 
 ordinary sense is not true ; but his death, after 
 only four months of power as Prime Minister, 
 created a sensation almost tragic, and his funeral, 
 though technically private by the urgent desire 
 of his friends, was witnessed by a vast and deeply 
 sympathetic concourse. " All our kindly feelings, 
 all our respect for intellectual power, all our 
 admiration of high and successful exertion," wrote 
 a contemporary, "join in calling forth almost 
 involuntary regrets, that one who has just 
 earned a splendid and hard-earned prize should 
 be snatched from it for ever when he has scarcely 
 been allowed to grasp it. . . . Europe lost in 
 him the ablest statesman, and the Commons of 
 England the finest orator of his day." 
 
 A large subscription was raised for the purpose 
 of erecting a monument to his name, and a peer- 
 age was conferred upon his widow by the King. 
 
 This essay is concerned with Canning as a 
 statesman rather than with Canning as a man ; 
 
 T 2 
 
140 PRIME MINISTER. [chap. 
 
 but it is right to add that in aU the private 
 relations of life he was exemplary. Though 
 separated from his mother in early boyhood, he 
 was, throughout life, a dutiful and devoted son, 
 and incurred not a Uttle odium on her behalf. 
 Exceptionally fortunate in marriage, he was an 
 affectionate and considerate husband and a good 
 father. 
 
 Canning's place in the history of English 
 statesmanship I have already attempted to de- 
 fine. He stands, somewhat curiously, midway be- 
 tween the eighteenth century and the nineteenth. 
 As regards domestic policy, he belongs to the 
 former ; as regards foreign policy, to the latter. 
 Like a true disciple of Pitt, he was a genuine 
 believer in Reform ; but it was Reform of the 
 eighteenth-century, the pre-revolutionary type. 
 Such enthusiasm as it professed, was derived 
 from d, priori philosophical speculation, not from 
 democratic fervour or the doctrine of the rights 
 of man. Reform of this type was the gift of 
 enlightened kings and statesmen bestowed upon 
 ignorant, reluctant and frequently obstructive 
 peoples. Few countries in Europe escaped the 
 influence of this movement. In the Empire, 
 Joseph II. ; in France, Turgot ; in Prussia, 
 Frederick II. ; in Russia, Catherine II. ; in Spain, 
 Charles III. and D'Aranda; Pombal in Portugal; 
 Struensee in Denmark; all alike were attempting 
 in the spirit of enlightenment to benefit the 
 
VIII.] DOMESTIC REFORM. 141 
 
 people by wide-reaching reforms. Canning was 
 an eminent disciple of this school. With Wilber- 
 force he favoured the abolition of slavery ; with 
 Huskisson he promoted fiscal reform; on cur- 
 rency questions he was not only eminently 
 "correct," but exceptionally clear-headed*; above 
 all, he was really zealous for Catholic Emanci- 
 pation. It was characteristic of the man and of 
 his school that he was strongly opposed to an. 
 extension of the Parliamentary franchise, or to 
 any " tampering " with the existing distribution 
 of seats. Pitt's attitude on this question was 
 exceptional. The eighteenth century Reformers, 
 as a rule, understood "Freedom" rather in the 
 negative sense of "absence of restraint," than 
 as positive participation in the active rights of 
 citizenship. " Everything for the people, nothing 
 by the people," was a naaxim no less charac- 
 teristic of them than of the paternal despots of a 
 somewhat earlier period. Canning shared to the 
 full the prejudice, not uncommon among men of 
 exceptional intellectual brilliancy, against com- 
 mitting the delicate naachinery of Government 
 into untrained hands. But, in truth. Canning 
 w^as not greatly interested in questions of 
 domestic administration, with the exception of 
 that of Catholic Emancipation ; and his zeal for 
 this measure was inherited from his master, Pitt. 
 
 * Cf . Qiiarterly Beview, No. 8 (Nov. 1810), an article upon the 
 Bullion Committee by G. EUis, Canning and Huskisson. 
 
142 PRIME MINISTER. [chap. 
 
 It is one more instance of the waywardness of 
 his pohtical fortunes that the one measure of 
 dbmestic reform on which he felt strongly, 
 should have been carried into legislative effect, 
 within two years of his own death, by the 
 most bitter and inveterate of his personal 
 opponents, by the very man who prevented 
 the formation of a Tory administration under 
 his leadership. 
 
 But almost the whole of Canning's official life 
 was spent at the Foreign Office ; and it is on the 
 impulse and direction which he gave to our 
 foreign pohoy that his reputation must stand 
 or fall. As a Foreign Minister, Canning belongs 
 emphatically to the nineteenth century. During 
 his tenure of office under the Duke of Portland 
 (1807-1809) he gave a taste of his quality, but his 
 energies were necessarily concentrated upon the 
 struggle with Napoleon, and^ his efforts were 
 hampered and neutralised by incompetent col- 
 leagues. Not until his accession to power, in 
 1822, had he full opportunity to display his 
 genius for foreign policy on a sufficient scale. 
 In a sense, larger, perhaps, than he understobd, 
 he called a new world into existence to redress 
 the balance of the old. His rivals and contem- 
 poraries among the statesmen of Europe belonged 
 to the old era ; he himself belonged to the new. 
 It was his conspicuous merit to have perceived 
 and realised that the settlement laboriously 
 
VIII.] FOREIGN POLICY. 143 
 
 evolved at Vienna could not last; that the 
 diplomatic edifice was built upon a shifting 
 sand; that its basis was a mere negation of 
 forces and ideas which, despite the diplomatists, 
 were bound to have free play. More than this. 
 Canning understood that many of the ideas 
 which had been evoked by the revolutionary 
 upheaval were not in substance and reality 
 destructive, but essentially constructive, tending 
 to edification, not dilapidation. Of these ideas 
 incomparably the most potent was that of nation- 
 ality. A common creed and a common tongue; 
 a common race and a common history: all this 
 was involved in the pregnant idea of nationality; 
 and this was the force which, contemned and 
 derided at Vienna, which, repressed by the Holy 
 Allies, was destined to assert itself in the coming 
 age as the essentially constructive and conserva- 
 tive element in European politics. Nationality, 
 in fact, has proved to be, in the main, a unifying 
 and consolidating principle in the nineteenth 
 century. This truth Canning intuitively grasped. 
 To his contemporaries he appeared as a friend to 
 revolution. Nothing could be further from the 
 truth. He was a thorough believer in the hier- 
 archical system, social and political, and he 
 desired to maintain the established order. But 
 he perceived much which was hidden from states- 
 men like Metternich and Alexander, still more 
 from puny despots like Ferdinand VII. and 
 
lU PRIME MINISTER. 
 
 Bomba ; he understood that the old pre-revolu- 
 tionary order was gone, never to return, and 
 that the international system of Europe must 
 henceforward be based on something better and 
 bolder than negation and repression. 
 
 Canning did not give to English foreign policy 
 an entirely new direction. Castlereagh, though 
 lacking in executive vigour, was working on the 
 right lines. But with his firmer grasp and his 
 wider outlook he infused into its administration 
 a new spirit, and won for his country the respect 
 of the Continental Powers in a measure rarely 
 attained before or since. That Great Britain 
 should occupy a commanding place in the 
 councils of Europe was with Canning an article 
 of faith. At the time of his death, in 1827, she 
 enjoyed it beyond dispute. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Canning and the Quarterly Review. 
 
 By the kindness of Mr. Murray, I am enabled to add 
 a note as to Canning's connection with the beginnings 
 of the Quarterly Review. 
 
 Of the first twelve numbers no less than seven 
 contained articles which were largely inspired, and 
 in part written, by Canning. 
 
 No, 2 (May, 1809). Atistrian State Papers, by 
 Sharon Turner and Canning. Taking as its text the 
 Manifesto of the Archduke Charles to the German 
 people, this article contains an earnest appeal for 
 general support for the Austrian rising of 1809, and 
 the expression of a belief that even "this generation" 
 might witness the overthrow of Napoleon, " the terror 
 of Europe and the scourge of humanity." 
 
 No. 3 (August, 1809). Article on Spanish Affairs, 
 by G. Ellis and Canning, is a trenchant criticism 
 upon James Moore's attempted vindication of his 
 brother. Incidentally it warmly endorses the policy 
 of J. H. Prere at Madrid and condemns (though 
 temperately and considerately) Moore's retreat. 
 
 No. 4 (November, 1809). Remarks on the State of 
 Parties, by G. Ellis and Canning, is a brief but 
 scathing review of a pamphlet on the formation of 
 Perceval's administration. 
 
 IT 
 
146 APPENDIX. 
 
 No. 5 (February, 1810). On the Catholic Claims, 
 by Cannirig and George Ellis. Suggested by a volume 
 by Dr. Dingenan, a strong " Protestant " champion, 
 and by a letter from Lord Granville to the Earl of 
 Fingall. This article contains an admirable. Sum- 
 mary of Canning's position on the Catholic Question. 
 Ardently in favour of Catholic Emancipation, he 
 insists that the Catholics must accept conditions — 
 more particularly a Crown veto on the nomination 
 of Bishops. 
 
 No. 8 (November, 1810) and No. 9 (February, 1811). 
 Reviews by G. Ellis and Canning (aided as to the 
 first by Huskisson) of pamphlets by Sir John Sinclair 
 on the Currency Question. Sir John Sinclair held 
 the view that incontrovertible paper was the basis 
 of our recent commercial prosperity, and that a 
 resumption of cash payments would be fatal to its 
 continuance. The attack upon the economic heresies 
 of Sir John is at once highly diverting in style and 
 eminently " correct " in substance. 
 
 No. 12 (December, 1811) contains an exceedingly 
 mordant review by Canning (perhaps assisted by 
 Ellis) on Trotter's Memoirs of Charles James Fox. 
 The review exposes a worthless book, but throws 
 little independent light upon the career of Fox. 
 
 No. 38 (July, 1818) contains an elaborate and very 
 valuable article on Brougham's Committee on Educa- 
 tion. This contribution (inspired by Canning) throws 
 considerable light upon his views on the Education 
 Question, and should be studied with care by all 
 students of Canning's political and social views. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ACKERMAN, Convention of, 126. 
 
 Addington, 34 ; satirized by 
 Canning, 35 ; compared with 
 Pitt, 38 ; makes peace with 
 France, 38 ; overtures to Pitt, 
 40 ; declares war with France, 
 id.; enters Pitt's administra- 
 tion, 41 ; becomes Lord Sid- 
 mouth, 43. 
 
 Adrianople, Treaty of, 134. 
 
 Alexander, the Czar, 48, 50 ; 
 relations with Greece, 87 ; 
 death of, 122. 
 
 Amiens, Treaty of, 38. 
 
 Anti Jacobin, the, 21-23. 
 
 Athens, Siege of, 121. 
 
 Austerlitz, Battle of, 42. 
 
 Austrian invasion of Italy, 82. 
 
 Brazil ; independence declared, 
 110 ; severed from Portugal, 
 112. 
 
 Byron, Lord, 119, 120. 
 
 Canning, George ; character, 4 ; 
 birth, 7 ; parents, id. ; educa- 
 tion, 9; at Oxford, 10 ; friend- 
 ships, 11; enters at Lincoln's 
 Inn, id. ; elected to Parlia- 
 ment, 13 ; joins Tory Party, 
 
 ] 5 ; allies himself with Pitt, 
 17 ; his maiden speech, 18 ; 
 becomes Under-Secretary for 
 Foreign Affairs, 20 ; writes for 
 Anti-Jacobin, 21 ; burlesques 
 Erskine, 22 ; various writings, 
 22-25 ; resigns the Under- 
 Secretaryship, 25 ; Joint Pay- 
 master of the Forces, 26 ; 
 opposition, 30 ; champions the 
 Catholics, 31 ; marriage, 33 ; 
 satirizes Addington, 36 ; gives 
 way on the Catholic Question, 
 39 ; accepts Treasurership to 
 the Navy, 41 ; Foreign Secre- 
 tary, 45, et seq. ; policy against 
 France and Russia, 50 ; ex- 
 pedition to Denmark, 51 
 seizure of Banish Fleet, 53 
 efforts in the Peninsula, 58 
 resists counsel to abandon the 
 Peninsula, 60; demands Castle- 
 reagb's resignation, 62 ; fights 
 duel with Castlereagh, id. ; ac- 
 cused of duplicity, 63 ; resig- 
 nation, 64 ; effect of his foreign 
 policy, 65 ; offered office by 
 Lord Liverpool, 67 ; accepts 
 ambassadorship to Spain, 68 ; 
 President of Board of Control, 
 id. ; retires from the Govern- 
 
 u 2 
 
150 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 his administration, id. ; desir- 
 ous for peace with France, 26 ; 
 negotiations with the Be- 
 public, 27; their failure, 29; 
 resignation, 30 ; his Irish 
 policy, id. ; relation with Ad- 
 dington, 40 ; forms Cabinet, 
 41 ; death of, 42. 
 Portland, Duke of, 45 ; relations 
 with Canning and Castlereagh, 
 62 ; resignation of, 67. 
 
 Russia, and France, 48, et seq. ; 
 Bussian ultimatum to Turkey, 
 
 Scott, Sir Walter, his opinion 
 of Canning, 67. 
 
 Sheridan, B. B., 13. 
 
 Sidmouth, Lord. See Addington. 
 
 Smith, Sydney, opinion of Can- 
 ning, 37. 
 
 Spain, declares war on England, 
 19 ; revolution in, 92 ; threat- 
 ened by the Alliance, 93. 
 
 Spanish Colonies in America, 
 
 101, et seq. ,' British policy in 
 regard to, 106. 
 St. Petersburg, Protocol of, 125. 
 
 Third Coalition, the, 41. 
 Tilsit, Treaty of, 48. 
 Troppau, Conference at, 80. 
 Turkey, and the Greek Bevolt, 
 
 84, et seq. ; war with Bussia 
 
 averted, 90. 
 
 Vkrona, Conference at, 00, 
 Vienna, Congress of, 78, 
 
 Walchbren Expedition, 60. 
 
 "Wellesley, Sir Arthur, 58. See 
 Wellington. 
 
 WeUmgton, Duke of, prevents 
 intervention in Spain, 9o ; 
 opposes Canning's Spanish 
 policy, 109 ; threatens resig- 
 nation, id.; mission to St. 
 Petersburg, 123 ; success of, 
 125 ; condemns the Treaty of 
 London, 129 ; resignation of, 
 138., 
 
LONDON r 
 
 ■PEINTED BT WIU.IAM CLOWBS AND SONS, LIMIIKD, 
 
 DDEE STREET, STAUFOSD STREET, S.E., AND ORE AT WINDMILL STREET, 7.