ANNEX 
 LIBRARY 
 
fyxMll Wimvmii^ JilrtMg 
 
 THE GIFT OF 
 
 
 Uvoi-vvi^^U^ UxiyK- (\.^.d.L/)^.. 
 
 A, 
 
 -1./J7//I ■ 3LoJlf^!f 
 
CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
 
 3 1924 071 174 332 
 
A Cornell University 
 9 Library 
 
 The original of tliis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924071174332 
 
THEORIES OF THE WILL IN THE 
 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
BY THE SAME AUTHOR 
 
 A THEORY OF CONDUCT. 12ino $1.00 
 
 SOME PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 12mo . $1.00 
 
THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 HISTOKT OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 BT 
 
 AECHIBALD ALEXANDER 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 
 
 1898 
 

 COPYRIGHT, 1898, BY 
 CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 
 
 Norajooll 53riBS 
 
 J. B. Ouahing & Co. — Berwiok It Smitb 
 
 Norwood Masa. U.S.A. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 In the following chapters will be found a concise 
 account of the development of the theory of the 
 will, from the earliest days of Greek thought down 
 to about the middle of the present century. It is 
 not sufficiently comprehensive to be called a his- 
 tory, for it includes only the theories of the more 
 important philosophers, and does not by any means 
 exhaust the literature of the subject. In addi- 
 tion to contributing something to the history of 
 philosophy, it has been my purpose to introduce 
 in this way a constructive explanation of voluntary 
 action. After some years of study in the prepara- 
 tion of such a constructive theory, I am confirmed 
 in the opinion that a historical treatment is indis- 
 pensable to a proper presentation of the subject ; 
 and this essay is the first of a series. The account 
 closes with the theory of Lotze, chiefly as this is 
 contained in his earlier treatise, Medicinische Psy- 
 chologie. This termination is not altogether arbi- 
 trary. During the last quarter of a century, as all 
 readers of philosophy are aware, the methods of 
 
 V 
 
VI PBEPACB 
 
 psychology have been greatly modified, if not revo- 
 lutionized. It is a change which has been brought 
 about by several causes. Without doubt, the most 
 eificient of these has been the rise and increasing 
 importance of the theory of natural evolution, as 
 presented by Darwin, and as adopted or modified 
 by his successors. Whether we admit the princi- 
 ple, wholly, or in part, or not at all, it will hardly 
 be denied that the effect of the emphasis laid 
 upon evolution has been to regard no psychical 
 states as self-explanatory, but rather as a result of 
 antecedent conditions, possibly as a compound of 
 simpler elements. This has been manifested con- 
 servatively in the tendency to seek the germs of 
 psychical states in the adult, in the conscious life 
 of the infant; it has been manifested more radi- 
 cally in the attempts made to find at least analo- 
 gies, if not connecting links, between the psychoses 
 observed indirectly in the lower animals and those 
 observed directly in man. In the same way, the 
 tendency to seek in the lower species initial stages 
 in that process of which man's body is the present 
 result, has led to the special study of the human 
 brain from the point of view of comparative anat- 
 omy and animal physiology. The union of such 
 methods with older methods which had led to the 
 localization of mental functions in the organs of 
 
PREFACE Vll 
 
 the central nervous system, while beset by many 
 difficulties, is likely to produce important results. 
 It is not unreasonable to expect that the genesis of 
 conscious volition may be explained not only by 
 the more rudimentary processes in the child, but 
 also by the phenomena presented in the lower 
 animals. 
 
 In this account of the earlier theories, I have 
 tried to avoid intruding my own opinions as much 
 as possible. But it may appear that speculation 
 and the introspective method of studying the will 
 have almost reached their limits. The state of 
 contemporary psychology makes this equally ap- 
 parent. I have ventured to express an individual 
 judgment only on matters of doubtful interpreta- 
 tion, and it is hoped that where the interpretations 
 of higher authorities are questioned, there is justi- 
 fication for at least a difference of opinion. 
 
 In some cases the chronological order has been 
 disregarded, in order to exhibit more clearly the 
 logical relations of certain doctrines to each other. 
 The doctrines of the wUl in Christian Theology 
 have been considered in a separate chapter, al- 
 though they form a part of the development of 
 systematic thought. I have used the term will 
 with and without the definite article ; and neither 
 use is to be understood as implying or justifying 
 
VUl PREFACE 
 
 any particular theory of faculties. I make no 
 apology for the extensive quotations from certain 
 authors, without translating them into English. 
 Especially in the case of the German writers, the 
 advantage of quoting the original is self-evident. 
 
 A. A. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 • PAGE 
 
 Intboduction 1 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 Theories of the Will in the Socratic Period 23 
 
 CHAPTER n 
 Stoic and Epicurean Theories of the Will 55 
 
 CHAPTER m 
 Theories of the Will in Christian Theology 76 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 Theories of the Will in British Philosophy 
 FROM Bacon to Reid 158 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 Continental Theories of the Will from 
 
 Descartes to Leibnitz .... 215 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 Theories of the Will in German Philosophy 
 
 from Kant to Lotze 256 
 
 ix 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Nemesis follows philosophers in their efforts to 
 use language with precision. A writer may coin 
 words to define his scientific doctrine, or may adopt 
 words from ordinary speech, and give them a special 
 meaning. Like the coinage of money, the coinage 
 of words must represent some recognized standard. 
 The technical terms must be redeemable in language 
 which can be understood, or there will be obscu- 
 rity and pedantry. Unfortunately ordinary words 
 adapted to philosophical uses carry their popular 
 associations with them, and are often inadequate 
 to convey distinct impressions. Conversely the 
 language of philosophy finds its way very soon into 
 the speech of every day, and its original meaning 
 is lost. In addition to this, language has been 
 used ambiguously by philosophers themselves. An 
 author will often use a word in more than one sense, 
 and two or more authors will often use the same 
 word in different senses. This misfortune has been 
 all the greater, because of the interchange of philo- 
 sophical conceptions among nations speaking differ- 
 ent languages. There was less confusion from this 
 cause when Latin was in general use, although com- 
 plaints might be made of what Lucretius calls 
 egestatem linguae. But philosophy now speaks the 
 
Z THEOKIES OF THE WILL 
 
 languages of all civilized nations, and in the trans- 
 lation of terms there is wide opportunity for error. 
 The philosophy of the Absolute translated literally 
 into English, furnishes an example of such con- 
 fusion. The word will is an example of this unfort- 
 unate ambiguity. Among some writers on psychol- 
 ogy there is reluctance to use it, and a tendency to 
 resort to various devices in order to escape equivo- 
 cation. The ambiguity extends to many words 
 often used in connection with the subject; such as, 
 motive, choice, freedom, and necessity. A definition 
 of will involves a consideration of the history of 
 theories; it involves criticism, and even contro- 
 versy. Some writers have defined the term, others 
 have thought it indefinable. It has been used in a 
 general psychological sense, to denote the whole 
 character and disposition of man, together with the 
 expression of these in action. It has been used in 
 a special sense to describe the Jiat of the mind 
 in effecting action, an intellectual affirmation or 
 denial, an impression, a muscular feeling, or a ner- 
 vous impulse. It has further been used to denote 
 a general metaphysical or moral principle, as in 
 the systems of Kant and Schopenhauer. Moralists 
 have fixed its meaning in conformity to their prac- 
 tical needs; metaphysicians have sometimes dis- 
 cussed it, with very little reference to the facts of 
 consciousness. Above all, the whole subject has 
 been confused by that interminable dispute usually 
 called "the free-will controversy." Probably the 
 most fruitful source of obscurity has been the readi- 
 ness of both learned and unlearned men to launch 
 
INTEODUCTION 3 
 
 themselves upon this debate -without determining 
 the nature of the will, before discussing its free- 
 dom. 
 
 While, at the outset, it seems inadvisable for 
 me to attempt to define the will, a provisional state- 
 ment may be made in order to point out the general 
 field which is to be traversed. Will is a general 
 term, applicable to certain psychical events, and is 
 primarily an object of psychology. These events 
 are not all of the same kind. They cannot be called 
 conscious states or acts, for some philosophers hold 
 that there is unconscious volition. They cannot be 
 said to be peculiar to man, for theologians treat of 
 the will of God; and there are no good grounds for 
 denying that there is will in the lower animals. 
 They cannot be said to be altogether deliberate, for 
 there is a distinction between impulsive volition, 
 and volition with a purpose. However we may in- 
 terpret the proposition, I will, there is substantial 
 agreement as to that which is to be interpreted. 
 But theories of the will in the history of philoso- 
 phy vary so widely, that any definition given now 
 would be inadequate to comprehend them all. 
 
 The student of philosophy is concerned chiefly 
 with the human will. The will of God, either 
 transcendent or immanent, is more properly an 
 object of theology. The will as an ontological 
 principle, not identified with God, calls for inci- 
 dental notice, although this conception has not 
 been of frequent occurrence in Western thought. 
 The physiological aspects of subject have not been 
 of importance until the present century. I shall 
 
4 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 therefore consider principally the psychological and 
 ethical doctrine of the will in the history of phi- 
 losophy. 
 
 Like some other conceptions of psychology and 
 ethics, a doctrine of the will cannot be merely 
 descriptive ; it involves explanatory discussion. 
 It is closely related to problems of ontology, the 
 theory of knowledge, and logic. In successive sys- 
 tems, there have been various methods of inter- 
 preting this relation. Some philosophers deduce 
 their theory of the will from general principles; 
 others are satisfied with the results of the empirical 
 method, or an appeal to consciousness ; others draw 
 conclusions as to what the will is, by setting out 
 with a moral theory of what the will ought to be. 
 
 The historical method of introducing this subject 
 has certain serious disadvantages. It leads the 
 student through chapters of unprofitable contro- 
 versy. The history of the doctrine has been to a 
 great extent a history of the dispute about freedom 
 and its opposite, which has an unpleasant notoriety. 
 Any one who troubles himself or others with this 
 subject is popularly looked upon as the victim of une 
 idSefixe, and consigned to the class of zealots who 
 have hopes about the quadrature of the circle. 
 Few will agree with Milton that discourse upon 
 necessity and free will is to be reckoned among 
 the joys of Paradise. Many will remember with 
 approval that Laud forbade his clergy to preach 
 about predestination. There are legends of those 
 who have been driven to suicide by the mysteries 
 of Calvinism or the Third Kantian Antinomy. But 
 
INTEODUCTIOlf 6 
 
 aside from the question of utility, almost every 
 thoughtful man has "views " about the will, which 
 may affect the tenor of his life. In such individual 
 opinions are to be found every kind of conception, 
 from the crudest fatalism to the most extreme 
 doctrine of contrary choice. Still, the disputes of 
 the past have not been fruitless, and there is 
 no good reason why "the problem of the will" 
 should be thought insoluble. 
 
 The development of the doctrine of the will is 
 an example of the progress from the homogeneous 
 to the heterogeneous; or, to use an older phrase, 
 the genus will has been differentiated into its spe- 
 cies. For at the beginning will was not distin- 
 guished from other states of mind. The actions 
 of men were ascribed to sense or feeling or reason. 
 The earliest philosophers made no clear distinction 
 between willing and doing, wherein they were 
 nearer the truth than many modern writers have 
 been. In the system of Aristotle, will, was distin- 
 guished from other states of the soul, and different 
 species were described. In the theology of the 
 Christian Fathers the term acquired a more general 
 significance, as is fairly represented in the words 
 of Augustine: "We are nothing else than wills." 
 From the time of Descartes, the intension of the 
 term began to decrease; and Spinoza, for example, 
 recognizes no distinction between will and intel- 
 lectual affirmation or denial. Hume and those 
 who follow him deny the primacy of the will, and 
 apply the term to a species of impression. Theo- 
 logians have for the most part followed the Patristic 
 
6 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 usage ; and the same may be said of Kant and many 
 German philosophers since his day. The principle, 
 however, upon which the doctrine has developed 
 may be called evolution, or a process of alternate 
 analysis or synthesis, or successive generalizations 
 and specifications. The mind was analyzed into 
 distinct faculties or states; these elements were 
 studied, until the necessity arose for a new synthe- 
 sis. At the same time, I may be permitted to enter 
 a caveat against any artificial construction of the 
 progress of thought. The growth and decay and 
 revival of doctrines cannot be proved to be an 
 organic process, like the development of a single 
 complex organism. It is analogous rather to the 
 irregular appearance of vegetation over a wide 
 tract of country. All the plants there are not of 
 the same height, or of the same species, and do not 
 bear fruit at the same season. The history of 
 philosophy is still an inductive science, and schema- 
 tismus is here likely to cause dislocation and dis- 
 order. For not only are objections present to such 
 an artificial arrangement in the general history of 
 philosophy, but especially in the arrangement and 
 'classification of theories of the will. In philosophy 
 generally, there is usually a certain logical and real 
 relation between method and principles, between 
 principles and their application. But particular 
 doctrines of the will are not necessarily implied in 
 the theories of philosophers about other principles. 
 We may not infer that Epicurus was a determinist 
 because of his materialism; nor that, because the 
 Stoics taught a doctrine of self-control, they be- 
 
INTKODUCTIOIT 7 
 
 lieved in free will. The teaching of the Critique 
 of Pure Eeason does not consistently apply to the 
 Critique of Practical Eeason. There is an em- 
 pirical theory of knowledge, but it does not imply 
 necessarily any particular theory of the will. 
 Empirical principles may lead logically to a 
 certain view of volition, but we shall find no his- 
 torical justification for saying that they have always 
 done so. I shall therefore first simply consider the 
 origin of the doctrine of the will in Western thought, 
 and then proceed to give an account of a series of 
 typical examples. 
 
 Attention was attracted to some of the phe- 
 nomena of will at a comparatively early period. 
 Without repeating the familiar story of the rise of 
 systematic philosophy out of the primitive mythol- 
 ogy and cosmogony of Greece, there are two ideas 
 which first emerged, and which may be first dis- 
 cussed. 
 
 I. The Principle of Fate in relation to human 
 
 action; 
 
 II. The Opposition discovered between Reason, 
 
 or Understanding, and Feeling. 
 
 In relation to these two ideas a theory of the 
 will was developed. It need not be asked which 
 came first in order of time. In the earlier litera- 
 ture they were synchronous. In each of them a 
 conflict is implied, — in the one case between a 
 supernatural principle and a natural order; in the 
 other, between a rational tendency and the feel- 
 ings. To adjust the conception of man's autonomy 
 
8 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 to belief in the irresistible power of Pate was 
 the first problem. In solving it, or attempting 
 to solve it, the science of ethics was born. Thus 
 volition was first distinguished as a principle of 
 ethics. 
 
 There should be caution in making psychological 
 inferences from the free and naive language of the 
 early poets, — such as the terms used in Homer to 
 denote different states of mind. They have little 
 more scientific significance than his well-known 
 localization of psychical functions in organs of 
 the body. Germs of subsequent philosophical 
 opinion are doubtless to be found in his epics; 
 as, for example, where he is cited by Plato 
 as a witness to the difference between the rational 
 and emotional elements in man.* The characters 
 of the Eiad and of the Odyssey are distinctly 
 drawn, while the souls of gods and heroes are por- 
 trayed as an arena upon which feelings are contend- 
 ing for the mastery. Where it is not explicitly 
 stated, it is at least implied that the reason can 
 control the passions ; but the crude psychology of 
 the poet need not be further noticed. We find in 
 Homer, however, a plain recognition of divine 
 supremacy, particularly the supremacy of Fate. 
 This conception is characteristic of almost all 
 Greek thought and Greek literature, down to the 
 time of the Alexandrian schools. It is a concep- 
 tion which has philosophical importance. The 
 term Fate is used indifferently in the singular and 
 plural. The Greek terms Moipa and Eijuap/ierij refer 
 1 See Homer, Od. III. 272, 342, 398. 
 
INTK0DI7CTI0N 9 
 
 to that -which has been actually allotted or ordained. 
 The Latin equivalent is Parcae, used in the plural 
 only. According to Hesiod, the Fates, three in 
 number, have an origin; yet Moipa from the earliest 
 times was looked upon as an independent principle, 
 and sometimes as superior even to Zeus. Aristotle 
 is inclined to identify the fatal principle -with God, 
 to whom many names are given. One of these 
 names is Fate, another is Necessity. ^ The Fates 
 are originally the decrees or allotments of the gods, 
 especially of Zeus. In the literature before Aris- 
 totle there had been two views taken of the relation 
 between Fate and God. On the one hand, Fate 
 was a decree, dependent for its effectiveness upon 
 the divine will. On the other hand, it was personi- 
 fied, and conceived of as an in,dependent principle 
 controlling the acts of gods and of men. The 
 former view is that of Aristotle also, and he is thus 
 free from the inconsistency of the popular myths 
 which sometimes left the relation of Fate to Zeus 
 undetermined. Du Maistre has said that Greece 
 was born divided. It was natural that the patron- 
 age and influence of the gods should be associated 
 with the fortunes of individual men and commu- 
 nities. The defeat of one city by another, the 
 successes and disasters of particular families or 
 persons, was ascribed to the agency of the gods. 
 A god had conferred or withdrawn his favor. The 
 plans of one deity had been thwarted by another. 
 The power of the lesser gods was merely relative. 
 The vicissitudes of Greeks and Trojans in the 
 
 1 Aristotle, De Mundo, 401, b. 20 f. 
 
10 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 Iliad were ascribed to the alternate successes 
 and failures of protecting divinities. . But the inter- 
 vention of Zeus was always sufiElcient to decide the 
 conflict. Defeat or victory came at his bidding. 
 He had local temples, but was not a local divinity. 
 He was without fixed prejudices. He had unlim- 
 ited power. In the council of the gods, the plans 
 of Zeus are law. In the changes of war, the gods 
 appeal to him. He is king of mortals and im- 
 mortals.* He is the god of kings. Even in the 
 tragedies his sovereignty is recognized. None of the 
 gods is eternal. In Hesiod's Theogony we are 
 left in doubt as to the beginning of divine existence, 
 unless we regard the eternal universe as the parent 
 of all deities. In the old polytheism, therefore, 
 there is the inconsistency of a Supreme God who 
 has an origin in time. Evidently in allusion to 
 the mystery of their influence, the Eates, like sleep 
 and death, are children of Night.'' The distinction 
 noticed by Hesiod between the fatal three was 
 adopted by later writers, explicitly by Plato and 
 Aristotle. It is seldom that the decrees of Zeus are 
 considered as subject to the control of Eate. There 
 is a notable exception in the Iliad, where Sarpe- 
 don's life is in danger. Zeus is summoned to inter- 
 fere, but refuses on the ground that the hero's death 
 had been ordained by Eate.' In the Prometheus 
 of ^schylus it is said that Eate is above Zeus, but 
 
 1 Homer, D. I. 525, 554; XII. 241, 242; Od. IV. 78, 237. 
 ^schylus, Suppl. 589 f. ; Prom. 550. Sophocles, Electra, 174, 
 175; Antigone, 604, 610. 
 
 2 Hesiod, Theogon. 217. » Homer, II. XVI. 433 f. 
 
INTRODUCTION 11 
 
 the surprise and horror of the chorus at the 
 speaker's irapiety show that this sentiment was 
 not in harmony with the ordinary belief.* The 
 harmony of both views is evident, if it be remem- 
 bered that the decrees of God were thought to be 
 fixed as soon as uttered. They could not be re- 
 called. This is the interpretation of Seneca, who 
 finds consolation in the inevitable necessity of Fate 
 which governs both gods and men. Jupiter ipse 
 omnium conditor ac rector inscribes the Fates, yet 
 follows them." The Latin writers followed the 
 Greek in their conception of the fatal principle. 
 Thus even the conceits of the old mythology have 
 a philosophical meaning. This belief in a mythical 
 principle, which was afterwards to assume an ab- 
 stract form, was an article of the popular religion. 
 The old creed was deeply fixed in the mind of the 
 people. The frequent comments on the poets in 
 the writings of philosophers, and the respectful 
 attitude of historians, show how firm a hold the 
 earlier epics and stories had acquired. The 
 persistence of this religious faith is further exhib- 
 ited by the success of Neo-Platonism, in which an 
 abstract and metaphysical polytheism was presented 
 in speculative dress. Negatively it is evident that 
 Augustine, when at a late day he attacked the old 
 Eoman religion in his Be Civitate Dei, was re- 
 ferring to opinions still firmly held by his contem- 
 poraries. 
 
 The idea of Fate is one of the marks of the 
 transition from the mythical to the philosophical 
 
 1 ^schylus, Prom. 513-520. " Seneca, De Provid. V. 
 
12 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 conception of nature. It shows, at any rate, a 
 tendency to reach a principle of unity higher than 
 the gods. At length the mythical idea of Tate was 
 exchanged for that of fatal necessity as a principle 
 of philosophy. This doctrine of fatal necessity 
 prevailed in a great part of ancient thought. It 
 was rejected, however, by the later Academy, and 
 by the Epicureans; and Cicero declares: anile sane 
 et plenum superstitionis fato nomen Ipsum.^ 
 
 According to Hegel, Fate was the necessary prin- 
 ciple which controlled generally the acts of gods 
 and men. The gods were creatures of the popular 
 imagination. The fatal principle had its own 
 sphere, and interfered when there was a collision 
 of interests.* Comte, regarding polytheism as a 
 development from fetichism, and monotheism as 
 a transition to a positive view of nature, shows 
 that polytheism, when fully developed, introduced 
 under the name of Fate or Destiny a general concep- 
 tion to serve as a fundamental principle of invari- 
 able natural laws. To the primitive man, nature 
 seemed arbitrary and irregular ; experience revealed 
 the uniformity of natural law. To the ancient 
 world. Fate was the principle of unchangeable uni- 
 formity, the necessary corrective of polytheism. « 
 This view is consistent with that of Aristotle, to 
 which reference has just been made. 
 
 The relation of this principle to human action, 
 as well as to the purposes of the gods, was also 
 considered by Greek and Eoman writers. How- 
 
 1 Cicero, De Divin. II. 7. = Hegel, X2, 100. 
 
 » Comte, Phil. Pos. UI. 308, 309. 
 
ISTTEODUCTION 13 
 
 ever genial and attractive the earlier polytheism 
 may have been, a minor note is audible in all classi- 
 cal literature. There is a point at which human 
 effort and human action are in vain. While it is 
 expressed in the earlier epics, and recognized by 
 some of the elegiac and lyric poets, the principle 
 of Fate appears most prominently and significantly 
 in the tragedies. The stories or legends upon 
 which these were founded were well adapted to 
 illustrate the subjection of man to this higher 
 power. There is a difference which is very sug- 
 gestive, between the view of this taken by ^schy- 
 lus and Sophocles respectively. The Tate of the 
 former is less blind and arbitrary. The events are 
 inevitable, but they follow each other with some 
 show of justice. The moral questions are less per- 
 plexing. The rebellion of Prometheus is the ground 
 of his torture and perdition. It is necessity which 
 makes the retribution inevitable; but there is no 
 intimation that necessity impelled him to steal the 
 heavenly fire, or to defy the power of Zeus. The 
 PerscB preaches resignation to the evils sent by 
 the gods.^ The Septem declares that submission 
 is the parent of beneficence ; " the Agamemnon, 
 that justice will be done to the poor and humble ; the 
 Choephori connects the Furies with retribution," 
 while the Eumenides presents an impressive pict- 
 ure of deities pleading in the court of Areopagus. 
 It is chiefly in the Prometheus that the moral 
 difficulty of divine omnipotence is raised. We ask 
 
 1 iEsohylus, Pers. 285. « Id., Sept. contr. Theb. 206. 
 
 « Id., Choeph. 636 f. 
 
14 THEOBIES OP THE WILL 
 
 whether a man, who has defied God for the benefit 
 of his fellows, should be found guilty. The divine 
 supremacy is vindicated at the expense of justice 
 and mercy. The catastrophes in the other trage- 
 dies of jEsehylus are of another kind. Clytem- 
 nestra, with her guilty love for .aigisthus, is not a 
 very suitable instrument for executing celestial 
 justice, and avenging Iphigenia's death. But Cly- 
 temnestra perishes by the hand of Orestes. If the 
 sacrifice of Iphigenia was justifiable, Agamemnon 
 was unjustly slain; but if Agamemnon was justly 
 slain, the vengeance of Orestes was unjust; if the 
 vengeance of Orestes was unjust, he was unjustly 
 acquitted by Athene, but if just, the torments in- 
 flicted by the Furies were unjust. Such are some 
 of the alternatives suggested. The moral of these 
 tragedies is that punishment follows crime. Fate 
 makes the punishment inevitable. Justice is allied 
 with Fate, and the Furies are their ministers.* 
 The subjective states of the dramatis personae are 
 of secondary importance. 
 
 The moral issues raised by Sophocles are even 
 more perplexing. The blind and arbitrary work of 
 Fate is vividly set forth in the familiar story of 
 Laius. A series of inevitable catastrophes over- 
 whelm the unconscious agents. CEdipus, for exam- 
 ple, leaves the oracle aware of his criminal destiny. 
 He kills his father at the trivium, not because of par- 
 ricidal feelings, but in ignorance of his parentage. 
 He is a victim of events in which he has been the 
 chief but most unconscious actor. It is repugnant 
 
 1 ^schylus, Eamen. 324. 
 
INTHODUCTION 15 
 
 to ordinary conceptions of responsibility. It is 
 quite in accordance with Greek ideas that the con- 
 sequences of his acts should pursue him. The 
 suicide of his mother, and his own self-inflicted 
 blindness, are the beginnings of the misfortunes 
 which are continued in the (Edipus Coloneus and 
 in the Antigone. The same relentless Fate ap- 
 pears in the pathetic story of Philoetetes, whose 
 bravery is rewarded by the persistent tortures of 
 his wound, and in the Ajax, where the hero has 
 sacrificed his honor in a fit of madness. Of Sopho- 
 cles one may say with the scholiast: "He would 
 af&rm that neither the things done in heaven, nor on 
 earth, nor in the sea happen, except according to 
 Fate." ' It is this which determines the death of 
 Laius,* the crimes of (Edipus, the madness of Ajax, 
 the sorrows of Philoetetes, and the vengeance of 
 Orestes and Electra. There is a collision between 
 the individual purpose and the divine order. 
 
 The form of the French classic drama, borrowed 
 from the Greek, illustrates the same kind of 
 ideas. Carlyle has compared this unfavorably 
 with the conceptions of English and German 
 dramatic writers.* But in the latter, although the 
 effects are not always attributed to Fate, the prin- 
 ciple appears disguised in psychical and ethical 
 forms. Faust may deliberately and freely bind 
 himself to the devil, but after the compact has 
 once been made, there is no retreat. The "Fate 
 
 1 Scholia, Sophocles, Antigone, 951. 
 s Sophocles, CEdip. Rex, 711-714. 
 8 Carlyle, VU. 154. 
 
16 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 aud metaplaysical aid " * of Macbeth and his con- 
 sort is unscrupulous ambition, so uncontrolled as 
 to become the " insane root that takes the reason 
 prisoner." Even the irresolution of Hamlet seems 
 to be inevitable and to produce inevitable results. 
 It is the manifestation of a character which he is 
 unable to overcome. He is an example of the Pyr- 
 rhonist, who submits to the order of circumstances, 
 rather than resist the course of events and oppose 
 a sea of moral troubles. In the modern drama the 
 determination of actions is ascribed to subjective 
 states. Fatalism holds that certain results will be 
 effected, whatever may be willed to prevent them. 
 The ordinary theory of moderate predestination is 
 kindred to this ; the purpose of God will be accom- 
 plished, whatever may be willed to the contrary. 
 Logically the fatalist should say that the will is 
 determined by means of motives. There is an 
 obvious difference between the assertion that an 
 end will be attained because men are determined 
 so to will, and the assertion that an end will be 
 attained whatever men will. It was possibly the 
 idea of the fatal order as divine which gave the 
 ancient tragedies their religious importance. If 
 we remember the fear and reverence of the gods in 
 the Greek and Roman world, the recognition of 
 divine supremacy and human dependence, we can 
 understand the significance of the Epicurean revolt 
 against the popular theology, and the substitution 
 of chance for necessity in spite of a materialistic 
 philosophy. We may also understand why Lucre- 
 1 Shakespeare, Macbeth, 1. 5. 
 
INTBODUCTION 17 
 
 tius thought belief in the gods to be one of the two 
 great evils, and preferred to imagine them as remote 
 from all human interests. And yet the fatalism 
 of the Stoics was not altogether in harmony with 
 the ethics of the Greek theatre. The Stoics were 
 impressed by the needless display of passion on 
 the stage. In reacting against emotional tenden- 
 cies, they taught the wisdom of apathy, of submis- 
 sion to the fatal or natural order, which could not 
 be changed, which should be endured. 
 
 Belief in a fixed supernatural order of events is 
 related also to man's curiosity concerning the 
 future. The ancient fatalism, like the modem, 
 was a motive to seek knowledge of what was about 
 to happen. In the absence of a prophetic class, 
 such as was to be found in ancient Israel, the 
 Greeks and Eomans consulted oracles at the seats 
 of the gods, examined the entrails of animals, ob- 
 served omens and prodigies, in order to gain knowl- 
 edge of the future. Aside from the repeated 
 references by historians to these practices, the 
 treatise of Cicero, De Divinatione, presents the ar- 
 guments employed in their favor, but argues that 
 these practices are unnecessary and useless. Divi- 
 nation was favored even by the Emperor Julian, 
 who himself assumed the functions of an augur. 
 The oracular sayings were usually so ambiguous as 
 to justify the idea that the future was contingent. 
 But it is logical to infer that if coming events can 
 be foretold, their occurrence must have been pre- 
 viously determined. If the prophecy or oracular 
 prediction could be reversed by human agency, the 
 
18 THEOBIES OF THE WILL 
 
 information acquired might be useful, but would 
 prove to be untrue. This contradiction is well 
 represented in the famous dilemma of the croco- 
 dile, which so amused the ancient authors.^ 
 
 The crocodile promises to return the child which 
 he has taken, on condition that the parent is able 
 to say truly what the animal has decided to do. 
 If the parent says that the child is about to be 
 returned, when the crocodile has determined to 
 devour him, then the child will be lost; but if the 
 parent says that the child is not about to be re- 
 turned, when the crocodile has determined to return 
 him, then the child will likewise be lost. The 
 crocodile will adhere to his determination in any 
 event, and it is this which creates the diificulty. 
 
 Fatalism and indeterminism have one point in 
 common. Both minimize the importance of ante- 
 cedent causes in relation to human action. What 
 Pate accomplishes, irrespective of human volitions, 
 that is effected by liherum arbitrium, when the action 
 of the will is undetermined. The problem of the 
 freedom of the will in its philosophical sense was 
 not suggested until the subjective side of man's 
 nature had become an object of inquiry. The 
 philosophical theory of fatal necessity recognized 
 the determination of the will by necessary causes, 
 but did not apprehend the psychological process 
 involved. A merely theological or metaphysical 
 answer is insuflScient. The problem is chiefly 
 psychological. 
 
 1 See Lucian, Yit. Auct. 22 ; Heimot. 81 ; and Lotze, Logik, 
 33T. 
 
INTRODUCTION 19 
 
 Having thus noticed the antithesis between Eate 
 and human action, as suggesting the questions about 
 the will, I shall turn to the other antithesis, be- 
 tween the emotional and rational elements in man's 
 nature. 
 
 The psychology of all the Socratic philosophers 
 was undeveloped, and their moral teaching was 
 independent of their metaphysical and physical 
 theories. Our sources of information show that 
 their view of the will was only rudimentary, if 
 indeed they can be said to have had the subject 
 before them at all. The ethics of the period be- 
 fore Socrates were didactic, and were commonly in 
 the form of maxims. In no instance is there any 
 scientific treatment of human conduct. In the 
 primitive Pythagorean doctrine, attention was di- 
 rected to the relation of the body to the soul. The 
 soul was said to be imprisoned in the body; its 
 activity is hampered and hindered by this connec- 
 tion.* This view was in accordance with the as- 
 cetic morality of the order. The object of the 
 Pythagorean discipline was to attain to commun- 
 ion with the gods. To this religious end, all the 
 exercises of soul and body are directed. The limi- 
 tation of the soul by the body is a conception 
 which does not involve a theory of volition, but its 
 relation to such a theory is obvious. The direc- 
 tions given for the attainment of this end imply a 
 belief that, although the body limits the soul, it is 
 itself subject to voluntary restraint. The Pythag- 
 oreans insisted upon the control of the appetites, 
 1 Plato, Phaedo, 62. 
 
20 THEORIES OP THE "WILIi 
 
 the observance of stated periods of silence, and 
 temperance. In their psychology, they are said to 
 have anticipated the Platonic partition of the soul 
 into the rational and irrational,^ as well as the 
 threefold division of the parts of the soul, and the 
 specification of the different kinds of knowledge. 
 Plato objects to the Pythagorean doctrine that the 
 soul is a harmony, on the ground that by this the 
 body is made the master of the soul. The philos- 
 ophy of Heraclitus, in which may be discerned 
 germs of Stoic doctrine, lays emphasis upon the 
 worth of the rational, as distinguished from the 
 sensual or emotional life. Virtues such as orderly 
 living and contentment are placed above conformity 
 to the lower appetites.'' Empedocles notices feel- 
 ings of pleasure and pain in relation to human 
 action. The object of the will is pleasure, and the 
 will itself is said to be formed of a mingling of 
 elements ; * but his conception of the faculty is 
 very indefinite. Just as his theory of similia sim- 
 ilibus percipiuntur maintains a certain likeness be- 
 tween the knowing power and the thing known, so 
 we may here suppose that there is a correlation 
 between appetite and will on the one hand, and the 
 object sought after on the other. The psychology 
 of the early Atomists is likewise imperfect. While 
 the Epicureans, who taught the freedom of the will, 
 derived their physics from Democritus, the early 
 Atomists show no signs of holding any such doc- 
 trine. Nothing exists except atoms and empty 
 
 1 Cicero, Tusc. IV. 5 ; Theognis. V. 1053. 
 a Zeller, PliU. d. Gr. I. 660. » Plutarch, Plac. V. 28. 
 
INTRODUCTION 21 
 
 space, and the soul is composed of atoms. There 
 is no beginning of motion, and Aristotle says that 
 the philosophers of this school never investigated 
 the origin of motion. Whatever happens, happens 
 of necessity. The soul which is composed of atoms 
 must come under this general law.* In his prac- 
 tical teaching, Democritus observes the distinction 
 between the happiness which comes from within 
 by the rational ordering of the soul, and that which 
 comes from external causes, preferring the former 
 to the latter.'' A like disparagement of outward 
 or sensible good is found in the doctrine of Anax- 
 agoras, who is said to have attached value rather 
 to the contemplation of the structure of the uni- 
 verse, than to the satisfaction of the appetites. 
 Thus the Eleatic distinction between the world of 
 sense and the world of reason has its ethical cor- 
 relative in most of the Pre-Socratic philosophy, in 
 the antithesis between the moral life of the reason 
 and that of the appetites. Among the Sophists, 
 the theory of Prodicus of Ceos alone has special 
 reference to the will. He is the author of a fable 
 on the choice of Hercules,' in which a distinction 
 is implied between desire for pleasure on the one 
 hand, and moral purpose on the other. It is plaia 
 from this famous story that where attractive ob- 
 jects lure the appetite, the moral agent has it in 
 his power to resist and refuse them. 
 
 This antithesis between the rational principle on 
 the one hand, and the sensual principle on the other, 
 
 1 Lange, Geschichte des Materialismns, Art. Atom, 
 s Fragm. I. 2, 8. » Aristotle, Eth. Eud. I. 1215, b. 6. 
 
22 THEORIES OP THE WILL 
 
 which appears in the early philosophy, has never 
 disappeared from moral science. It is recognized 
 in modern language as well as in modern thought. 
 We say that a man is overcome with grief, is over- 
 powered by anges", or is under the dominion of 
 appetite; we do not say that he is a victim to 
 reason, or a slave to any cognitive process. And 
 in the pathology of the mind we recognize emo- 
 tional insanity, where the feelings are of such a kind 
 or of such intensity as to set at naught the rational 
 processes. The appetite belongs to its subject as 
 really as the train of thought or reasoning, but it 
 is recognized that self-control is the control of the 
 passions by the reason. It may be added, however, 
 that of late years psychologists have been made 
 familiar with an obsession of the mind by sugges- 
 tion, — some intellectual phenomenon, a fixed idea, 
 which is sufficient to govern the normal passions 
 and the normal process of knowledge. There is 
 therefore justification in philosophy for Goethe's 
 words : — 
 
 Zwei Seelen wohnen ach 1 in meiner Brust. 
 
CHAPTER FIEST 
 
 THBOEIBS OP THE WILL IN THE SOOKATIC PEKIOD 
 
 In the accounts of the teaching of Socrates, we 
 find that he dealt with the doctrine of the will upon 
 its moral side. In some respects it is difficult to 
 distinguish between his views upon this subject, 
 and those which were held by Plato. While the in- 
 terest in practical questions was not so pronounced 
 as in the period after Aristotle, the leading phi- 
 losophers of this era were deeply interested in 
 questions of theoretical ethics. In treating of the 
 theories of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle under the 
 general head of the Socratic period, I would not be 
 understood as supposing that they held any par- 
 ticular theory of the will in common. While there 
 is a general likeness between the doctrines of Soc- 
 rates and Plato, the views of Aristotle on this 
 subject are radically different. All three philoso- 
 phers represent the highest development pf Greek 
 thought, and with them philosophy becomes a 
 science. 
 
 The moral teaching of Socrates was generally 
 
 influenced by the conditions surrounding him ; the 
 
 popular religion and the literature of mythology 
 
 did not satisfy the minds of thoughtful men, nor 
 
 23 
 
24 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 sufficiently explain the universe. The demand for 
 a more systematic treatment of such questions, 
 especially questions of ethics, may be inferred from 
 the inadequacy of the previous philosophy, and from 
 the moral dilemmas of the Greek tragedies already 
 noticed. 
 
 Just as Empedocles had found a correlation 
 between will and pleasure, or rather between pleas- 
 ure and the demands of the organism, so Socrates 
 regarded the good as correlative to the will.' That 
 which is willed is the good ; the good is that which 
 is willed. It appears from the account given by 
 both Xenophon and Plato, that Socrates believed 
 man would follow what he thought to be good. The 
 aim of Socrates was not to correct the will, but to 
 inform the understanding. Virtue is not acquired 
 by voluntary practice. Virtue is knowledge.^ It 
 is therefore teachable. It is because virtue is 
 knowledge that it is teachable.' It is not know- 
 ledge of particular good things, such as an individ- 
 ual pleasure or utility; it is knowledge of the 
 universal good. This shows it to be in relation to 
 the Socratic theory of conceptions.* Just as true 
 science consists in such a knowledge as will make 
 possible a definition of the thing known; so true 
 ethical science consists in such a knowledge as will 
 enable one to define the good sought. If the object 
 sought is definable, it will be related to the genus 
 good, and the knowledge of the genus is virtue. 
 
 1 Xenophon, Mem. UI. 9, 4 ; IV. 6, 6. 
 
 2 Aristotle, Eth. Nic. VI. 1144, b. 17. Plato, Laches, 194. 
 8 Plato, Meno, 87, 89. <Id., ib. 74. 
 
IN THE SOCEATIC PERIOD 25 
 
 When the man knows the good he ■will do it. 
 Pleasure is not the good, although the good is the 
 useful.^ The virtuous principle is intellectual, not 
 emotional, or voluntary. If he who knows the good 
 will do it, and only the ignorant are vicious, then it 
 is knowledge which determines the will. This is 
 the conclusion which must be deduced from the 
 ethics of Socrates. 
 
 Of the Socratic schools, the Megarics alone made 
 the will an object of inquiry. But for certain rea- 
 sons, the Megaric theory may be more conveniently 
 considered in connection with the teaching of the 
 Post-Aristotelian philosophers. 
 
 Plato 
 
 Plato distinguishes between voluntary and in- 
 voluntary actions. He discusses them in their 
 psychological and ethical relations. The theory 
 fundamental 1;o his whole philosophy is the Dialec- 
 tic, the theory of Ideas. The question may there- 
 fore be raised at the outset : what relation, if any, 
 have the Ideas to the voluntary actions of man. 
 
 The Ideas are universal essences, in this sense, 
 that they are the real being by virtue of which all 
 things are what they are. They are the forms or 
 archetypes of which all existing things bear the 
 image. The object of sense is what it is, not only 
 because it participates in the universal essences, 
 but also because it is a copy of a perfect pattern." 
 The Ideas are, further, the noumena as distinguished 
 
 1 Plato, Protag. 368. 
 
 2 Id., Timaaus, 28; Repub. VI. 501 ; IX. ad fin. 
 
2& THEOEIBS OF THE WILL 
 
 from the phenomena. The latter are unreal, and 
 transitory; the former are real, and abide. The 
 individual objects of the phenomenal -world are 
 known by the senses, and by opinion ; ^ the eternal 
 essences are known by the reason only. The Ideas 
 are sometimes represented as dynamic essences, as 
 forces, which produce effects in the phenomenal 
 world ; " and in the later philosophy of Plato, the 
 Ideas are described as numbers, in conformity to 
 the Pythagorean doctrine that the apxv of the uni- 
 verse is number. All the Ideas have an essential 
 connection with the Idea of the good ; which is in 
 accordance with the optimism and ethical character 
 of the Platonic philosophy. This is the Platonic 
 realism, which the schoolmen epitomized m the 
 phrase unvoersaMa ante. rem. It has been said that 
 realism involves determinism, and that to hold the 
 logical doctrine necessitates a denial of the freedom 
 of the will. If this be admitted, Plato's doctrine 
 of the will should be deterministic. If the Ideas 
 be regarded in their dynamic aspect, it might be 
 held that their relation to individual volitions ex- 
 cluded the idea of freedom. It is, however, im- 
 possible to rest satisfied with such inferences. For 
 the chief obstacle to a clear understanding of Plato 
 is the obscurity which surrounds his doctrine of the 
 way in which the objects of sense and opinion are 
 related to the Ideas. The former are said to share 
 or participate in the latter; but the term used is 
 not sufficiently explained for us to reach any par- 
 
 1 Plato, Repub. V. 477, X. 59G; Timseus, Bl. 
 »I(J.,Ph8Bdo, 76. 
 
IN THE SOCEATIC PEEIOD 27 
 
 ticular conclusion as to the relation between man's 
 volition and the Ideas.' At times, however, the 
 Dialectic is so closely related to thfe psychological 
 and ethical theories, that complete separation of the 
 two is impossible. In the Phmdrus, for example, 
 the soul is said to be immortal and self-moving, and 
 immortal because self-moving.'' While the context 
 discusses the nature of indvidual souls, it is prob- 
 able that the earlier part of the passage refers to 
 the soul as Idea or universal. It is the divine as 
 well as the mortal soul which is said to be the 
 source and first principle of all motion ; and it can- 
 not be the individual human soul which is meant, 
 where it is declared that if it did not exist, the 
 whole heaven and all created things would stand 
 still. In this universal soul the particular souls of 
 gods and men participate. Particular souls are in 
 a state of preexistence in the realm of Ideas ; and, 
 guided by some god, each of them is led to the con- 
 templation of eternal truth. They are compared to 
 winged creatures which ascend to this ideal vision. 
 But among those who are so guided, there are some 
 which lose their feathers, and are unable to behold 
 the truth. These fall, and in consequence of their 
 fall are united to mortal bodies. In the Timcaus^ 
 the manner of the union of soul and body is thus 
 described : The offspring of God received froto him 
 the immortal beginning or principle of the soul, to 
 which they joined the body as its vehicle. In addi- 
 tion to the immortal principle, a mortal soul was 
 
 I Plato, Parmeu. 130, 131. S. Thomas Aq. 1. 1. Q. V. 2. 
 3 Plato, PhsBdrus, 215. < Id., Timsus, 41. 
 
28 THBOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 placed witliin the body. The latter -was subject to 
 passion, swayed by pleasure and pain, by rashness 
 and co-wardice.* Each of these souls had its place 
 in a certain part of the body. The immortal prin- 
 ciple was put in the head ; while the mortal soul 
 was divided into two parts, the emotional soul, and 
 the sensual or appetitive soul. The former was 
 fixed in the region above, the latter in the region 
 below the diaphragm. Both were subjected to the 
 sway of the reason. The control of the appetites 
 was effected by the immortal reason, which was 
 reflected upon the shiny surface of the liver. The 
 emotions were governed through the blood which 
 passed from the head into the cavity of the thorax. 
 This fanciful account is presented by Plato as a 
 mere probability, and as founded on divine revela- 
 tion. The threefold partition of the soul is further 
 discussed in the Phcedrus and the Republic. 
 
 In the former of these dialogues the doctrine of 
 Preexistence is asserted, but there is no intimation 
 that the emotional and appetitive principles are 
 mortal. The elements or parts of the soul are 
 compared to two winged steeds and a charioteer.* 
 The latter is the reason, while the two former are 
 the emotional and appetitive principles. The con- 
 trol of the horses by the driver is evidently only 
 relative, for it is shown that the black horse which 
 represents the appetites can bring the chariot to 
 ruin by rebellious behavior. The souls of the 
 gods are also compared to two-horse chariots, al- 
 though neither horse is said to be unruly, and the 
 1 Plato, Phffldrus, 245, 246 f . 
 
IN THE 90CKATIC PERIOD 29 
 
 charioteer meets witli no misliap. If we nnite the 
 statements of the Timceus and of the Phoedrus, we 
 have the inconsistency of the emotional and appe- 
 titive souls in the gods, which souls are elsewhere 
 declared to be mortal. But in the Phcedrus it 
 is expressly stated that the gods have these three 
 souls, and that the two lower souls are parts of 
 the mortal principle. One of these parts is the 
 more noble, which is the emotional; the other is 
 less noble, which is the sensual part. In agreement 
 with the Timceus the PJimdrus declares that the 
 lower souls are swayed by the reason. The 
 steed which represents appetite, upon seeing the 
 object of pleasure, becomes excited, and unless 
 steadily controlled, will bring the charioteer to 
 grief. In the impulsive soul there is a rational 
 element, and it is more obedient to the command 
 of the charioteer. In each of the three souls there 
 is an element of knowledge, for the appetitive soul 
 has a knowledge of the pleasurable object, and the 
 emotional soul has an apprehension of that which 
 excites its anger or courage or ambition or fear. 
 In each of the three souls there is also will, as well 
 as knowledge. That which wills the satisfaction 
 of appetite resides in the lowest soul ; that which 
 wills the facing of danger, the avoidance of cow- 
 ardice and rashness, resides in the emotional soul. 
 Will in a higher sense, as deliberate, conscious pref- 
 erence, is in the reason. This threefold division 
 is explicitly recognized in the BepuUic.^ The 
 reason is the instrument of knowledge, or learn- 
 
 i Plato, TimsBus, 69 f . » Id., Repub. IV. 440 f . 
 
30 THEOJlIES OF THE WILL 
 
 ing; the emotional soul is subject to anger, fear, 
 courage, and the noble emotions; the lowest soul 
 desires the satisfaction of the appetites. The act 
 of volition is compared to answering a question by 
 assent ; this assent, in the case of appetite, may be 
 forbidden by the reason. There may be a collision 
 between the assent of the appetite and that of the 
 reason; or between the assent of the emotional 
 soul and the reason. The emotional soul is like- 
 wise at times in conflict with the appetite, because 
 it is on the side of the rational principle. The 
 emotional soul is naturally good, but may be cor- 
 rupted by education. The reason issues its com- 
 mands to the 6uj«,o's,' dictating what it should follow 
 or fear ; just as in the state, the philosophers con- 
 trol the lower classes of citizens. The reason rules 
 by virtue of its knowledge. And just as in the 
 state, the control of the laboring class is disas- 
 trous, so in the soul, disaster follows the dominion 
 of the appetitive part. 
 
 Plato rejects the Pythagorean doctrine that the 
 soul is the harmony of the body, on the ground 
 that it implies the control of the soul by the body.* 
 In the Phoedo however, the discourse of Socrates 
 includes a statement of the relation of soul and 
 body, which bears much likeness to the Pythagorean 
 teaching. So far is he from supposing that the 
 body is an advantage to the soul, in knowledge and 
 virtue, that he views the relation as a misfortune for 
 the soul, as a limitation and imprisonment of its 
 powers. And in the tenth book of the Eepuhlic, 
 1 Plato, Timaaus, 70. ^ i^., Phjedo, 86, 94. 
 
IN THE SOCRATIC PEKIOD 31 
 
 the lower part is said to belong not to the essence 
 of the soul, but to be incidental to its disfigured 
 existence in the body.^ We are not to conceive of 
 Plato as teaching any doctrine of an Ego, or of one 
 psychical principle acting by means of the three 
 parts, as if these were faculties. The three parts 
 are compared to the high, middle, and low musical 
 notes of the scale. When the soul is harmonious, 
 each of the three has its proper proportion in the 
 acts of man. But the essence of the soul is rational ; 
 the conflict between reason and appetite is not a 
 civil war in the soul, but rather a war of the higher 
 soul with invaders. If we consider will in its 
 aspect as an energy, power, or impulse, we may 
 identify the emotional soul, ^u/nos, with that faculty ; 
 if, op the other hand, we consider will in its de- 
 liberative, decisive, aspect, as arbitrium, we may 
 place the will in the rational principle of Plato's 
 psychology. 
 
 But will in its more general sense cannot be 
 attributed to one part to the exclusion of the others. 
 In some passages Plato speaks as if the appetite 
 swayed a man against his will. A man may be 
 thirsty, and yet unwilling to satisfy his thirst.^ 
 There is something within him which invites him, 
 but there is also something in him which prevents 
 him. The different species of knowledge described 
 by Plato all imply a certain activity of the soul. 
 Opinion (Sd^a) is the pursuit of knowledge by the 
 soul." Intelligence (vdijo-ts *) is the longing of the 
 
 I Plato, ib. Repub. X. 603, 610 et passim. 
 
 2Id.,lb. IV. 439. s Id., Cratyl. 420. *Id., ib. 411. 
 
32 THEOEIES OP THE WILIi 
 
 soul after what is novel or unknoivn. To will 
 (^ov\i<T$ai) is said to iavolve the idea of taking aim, 
 and deliberating; the voluntary (eKowtov) is con- 
 trasted with the resistance of necessity.* It is the 
 yielding of the soul to the movement of the will, 
 and not opposing it. Necessity is spoken of as 
 that which opposes our will, and things done from 
 necessity imply mistake and lack of knowledge. 
 The emotional soul (o ^u/ios) is a rushing impulse ; " 
 and thus the same term stands for the act as for 
 the faculty. The practical working of the triple 
 soul is further discussed in the Republic. Emotion, 
 which is a kind of desire, is also to be found 
 contending on the side of the reason. Both of 
 these principles may combine to keep in subjection 
 the appetites ; the reason deliberates, and the emo- 
 tional soul fights under the reason as its com- 
 mander. Where the lower parts of the soul are 
 deficient in knowledge, the deficiency is supplied 
 by the superior knowledge of the reason. The 
 latter is that which decides ; and it is when reason 
 is asleep that the appetites are awake.' In this 
 account of the relation of voSs to imOvfuia, we find 
 the germs of that theory of the will which views it 
 as executing the commands of the understanding; 
 as subject to the control of the reason, and carry- 
 ing out its intentions. But it is only the germ 
 and we are left in doubt as to whether acts in 
 obedience to appetite which imply the overpower- 
 ing of the reason are to be considered voluntary 
 or whether only deliberate acts should be thought 
 1 Id., ib. 420. 2 Id., ib. 419. « M., Eepub. IX. 671. 
 
IX THE SOCRATIC PERIOD 33 
 
 to deserve the name. Certainly tlie ethical teach- 
 ing of Plato leads us to accept the latter alterna- 
 tive. 
 
 If we turn to the moral teaching of Plato, we 
 find that his doctrine of virtue is essentially that 
 of Socrates. It consists in knowledge.* Know- 
 ledge is its source, and it is manifested in the har- 
 mony of the soul. As has been shown, the pristine 
 state of the soul was one in contemplation of the 
 eternal Ideas, and the ethical end is to rise once 
 more to a knowledge of these, particularly to a 
 knowledge of the Idea of the good.^ "When the 
 good is known, it will be realized in the individual 
 life and in the community. The realization of the 
 good in this sense is virtue. Virtue is not a habit 
 of the will, nor does it depend upon conformity to 
 a given moral standard. Its essence is knowledge. 
 That which a man does is determined by that which 
 a man knows. No one who does wrong does it 
 voluntarily,* and so there are no voluntary actions 
 which are bad. The threefold division of virtue 
 corresponds to the threefold division of the soul. 
 Each part of the soul has its own appropriate 
 virtue.* But each of these virtues is due to know- 
 ledge. Temperance and courage, like wisdom, 
 depend on proper knowledge. ° It must then be in- 
 ferred that the intemperate man and the cowardly 
 man are involuntarily vicious, for they would be 
 
 1 Plato, Meno, 87, 89 f., 97, 99; Kepnb. YH. 518. 
 
 " Id., Phffidrus, 2-17 ; Eepub. VI. 500, 505, 516, 517 ; Timiens, 3T. 
 
 » Id., Protag. 356 ; Legg, IX. 860. 
 
 <Id.,Eepub. IV. 440f. 6 m., Laches, 195. 
 
 D 
 
34 THEOBIES OF THE WILL 
 
 temperate and brave if they had the proper know- 
 ledge. The knowledge of the particular good, the 
 good of mere opinion, which is derived from the 
 senses, is not sufl&cient. There must be knowledge 
 of what Socrates called the general good, that is, 
 of the Idea. If, then, knowledge of the good is 
 imparted to man, his will is determined by that 
 knowledge. It would follow that in such a case 
 he would practically have no choice ; deliberation 
 would be superfluous. The will is determined by 
 knowledge, not as mere motive, but as necessary 
 cause. 
 
 It is significant of the equivocation which belongs 
 to discussions about the will, that philosophers 
 have differed with respect to the relation existing 
 between knowledge on the one hand and will on 
 the other. According to some, the more perfect 
 the knowledge, the greater the freedom; while, 
 according to others, it is only ignorant acts which 
 can be called free acts. Knowledge has a causal 
 relation to the will, they say, and it determines 
 the will. The conclusion to be accepted will de- 
 pend very much on the meaning which is given 
 to the term freedom. If the Platonic doctrine 
 be true, it would seem that willing the good de- 
 pends on knowing the good, and the will in well- 
 doing is absolutely determined by knowledge which 
 in so far as it is knowledge is involuntary. Plato 
 does not raise the question whether knowledge is 
 voluntary or not. Still, he does not define virtue 
 as a willingness to know, but as knowledge. It is 
 conceivable that a man should refuse to be taught 
 
TS THE SOCKATIC PEBIOD 35 
 
 and if the refusal is involuntary, the refusal is not 
 vicious^ but the ignorance which causes the refusal 
 is vicious. If the refusal is voluntary, then it is 
 virtuous ; for no one voluntarily does wliat is -wrong. 
 Taking this doctrine in connection with that con- 
 cerning the teachableness of virtue, it is difficult to 
 see in what sense Plato can be said to have taught 
 the freedom of the will. 
 
 In addition to the psychological and ethical view 
 of the will, one may notice also the stress laid by 
 Plato upon the relation of native character, and 
 education to virtue. There is perhaps nothing 
 more modern than the teaching regarding this 
 which is to be found in the Sepublic. Just as it 
 is maintained in other dialogues that virtue is teach- 
 able, so in the Republic it is said that education 
 is necessary in order to morality. Eules are laid 
 down for the proper training of those who are mem- 
 bers of the community. Periodical siftings and 
 promotions occur. The warriors of the state must 
 be chosen and set apart from the laborers, and the 
 rulers must be selected from the warriors. All men 
 are not capable of being thus educated, and some 
 remain in the lowest and least virtuous class through 
 their defective apprehension. Still fewer are ca- 
 pable of becoming philosophers, and of rising to the 
 highest kind of virtue.^ The famous figure of the 
 cave,' in which Plato represents men as bound, with 
 their faces towards the shadows, and away from the 
 light, illustrates the natural condition of a majority 
 of men. To say that virtue is teachable does not 
 
 1 Plato, Kepub. n. 376 et se^. ; X. 618. ^ ib. VU. 514. 
 
36 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 mean that all men can be taught. It is in one 
 respect the fault of native character and breeding. 
 For this reason directions are given with respect to 
 the procreation of offspring in the ideal state. It 
 is taught that character is largely dependent on 
 inherited characteristics.' But even in the pre- 
 existent state of the soul the character is decided, 
 and we are thus led to consider the Platonic view 
 of the will in relation to the principle of necessity. 
 Necessity in the Platonic sense is only another 
 name for fatal necessity, and is not to be under- 
 stood in the more modern logical and metaphysical 
 sense. In the tenth book of the Republic, a 
 myth is narrated with some elaboration of detail.* 
 The distaff of Necessity, or the distaff which re- 
 volves on the lap of Necessity, is a centre about 
 which are gathered the three Fates, Lachesis, Clotho, 
 and Atropos. These are called the daughters of 
 Necessity; and clothed in white robes, they sing in 
 harmony with the warning sirens. Clotho sings 
 of the present, Lachesis of the past, and Atropos of 
 the future. A prophet approaches and takes from 
 Lachesis the lots or apportionments of life. He 
 then proclaims the decree of Lachesis. He ad- 
 dresses the preexistent souls of mortals. He sets 
 before them a choice of virtue. Virtue does not take 
 them, but they must take virtue. The choice of the 
 life to be lived will determine the destiny of each 
 soul. The choice is free. He who chooses is re- 
 sponsible for his choice, and God is not responsible. 
 The destiny taken, determines the future character 
 1 Plato, Repub. V. 460. 2 Id., ib. X. 616. 
 
IN THE SOCKATIC PERIOD 37 
 
 of each one. The preexistent soul is thus free in its 
 choice, and determines its own character. Upon 
 making their choice, the souls go in order to Lache- 
 sis, who sends them to Clotho, who in turn conducts 
 them to Atropos. The latter spins the threads of 
 their destiny, and it is thenceforth irreversible. 
 That the doctrine here presented is a doctrine of the 
 freedom of choice in a preexistent state, there can 
 be no doubt. Plato teaches that the preexistent 
 soul is free, but has its character determined irre- 
 versibly before its union with the body. Just as 
 Christian theology teaches that Man in a state of 
 innocence was free, but lost his freedom by the fall 
 of Adam, so Plato would afiirm that the preexistent 
 soul is free, until it has chosen its lot in life. If 
 it be asked, what makes one soul choose a bad, and 
 another a good character, there is no answer in 
 Plato. If it is the badness of the soul which makes 
 the choice bad, then the character of the soul is 
 determined antecedent to the choice of the char- 
 acter, and the latter becomes a useless formality. 
 To explain why a soul with a character which is 
 neither good nor bad, chooses one destiny rather 
 than another is, however, impossible. 
 
 Plato ordinarily employs the myth to explain 
 what is otherwise inexplicable. Whether this 
 particular allegory is to be construed as containing 
 his philosophical doctrine of character or not, 
 the fact that it is introduced, shows the determin- 
 istic nature of his system. It is probable that he 
 found it necessary to account in some way for the 
 differences among men, in matters of morality. 
 
38 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 For an inconsistency is manifested in tlie Repub- 
 lic, "where the instability of the ideal state is 
 referred to.* The decay of such a state is owing 
 to the degeneracy of the citizens; but it is hard 
 to understand why the virtuous should become 
 vicious, if virtue depends on knowledge, or is 
 one with knowledge. Upon such a principle a 
 ruler becomes corrupt because he has forgotten the 
 good, not because he wills the evil ; for vice is in- 
 voluntary. If the warrior becomes cowardly, it 
 must be likewise due to forgetf ulness ; for coward- 
 ice is involuntary, and he who knows the good, will 
 be courageous. A disordered people would thus be 
 logically a forgetful people, if at any time they had 
 been virtuous. It is not to be understood, however, 
 that such conclusions were actually drawn by Plato 
 or any of his school. 
 
 If the Sippias Minor be a genuine work of Plato, 
 a view of the will is there presented which is 
 inconsistent with the account which has just been 
 given. There Socrates defends the opinion that 
 voluntary wrong-doing is better than involuntary. 
 But if the contention in the other dialogues is well 
 founded, that no man does wrong voluntarily, it is 
 idle to discuss the question whether voluntary or 
 involuntary wrong-doing is worse. Aside from the 
 doubtful authenticity of the Hippias Minor, the 
 manner of Socrates at the close of the argument is 
 so ironical, and his words so hesitating, that he 
 may well be believed to reject the conclusion into 
 which he seems to be forced. 
 
 1 Plato, Eepul). VUI. 
 
IN THE 80CBATIC PERIOD 39 
 
 But as I have said, I am always wandering up and 
 down about these things, and never abide in the same opin- 
 ion. Nor is it surprising that I, nor that common men, do 
 this, if vrise men like yourselves also wander about. But it 
 is dangerous to us, if when we have oome to you, we do 
 not cease to wander.i 
 
 It seems to me, therefore, that if compelled to 
 choose between the statement of the Protagoras 
 and that of the Hippias Minor, it is more reason- 
 able to consider the former the true Platonic doc- 
 trine. 
 
 Aristotle 
 
 In the philosophy of Aristotle there is both a 
 psychological and an ethical doctrine of the will. 
 Will is considered as a faculty of the soul and as 
 an element in all moral action. In the writings of 
 Plato, opinion and knowledge are called faculties, 
 but his conception, as we have seen, is that of parts 
 or kinds of soul, and the word faculty is seldom 
 employed. With Aristotle there is a connection 
 between his theory of faculties and his definition 
 of the soul itself. 
 
 Soul is defined as the first entelechy of a natural 
 organized body.'' By entelechy ° is meant imper- 
 fect realization or actualization. Entelechy is mid- 
 way between potentiality and completed actuality. 
 Aristotle speaks both of faculties,* and of different 
 species of souls ; but he rejects the idea of parts. 
 There is a nutritive soul, which is the entelechy of 
 
 1 Plato, Hipp. Min. 376. « Id. 412, a. 22 ; 1050, a. 23. 
 
 3 Aristotle, 412, a. 19 f . ; 412, b. 5. * Id. 414, a. 29 et al. 
 
40 THEOEIES OF THE WILIi 
 
 plant life; there is a sensitive soul, •which, is the 
 entelechy of the sensitive animal; there is a de- 
 siring or motive soul, which is the entelechy of the 
 emotional and moving animal body; and there 
 is a rational soul, which is the entelechy of the 
 intellectual and rational human being. ^ Some of 
 the faculties are common to man and the lower 
 animals, others are peculiar to man. Like Plato, 
 Aristotle set forth no doctrine of personality. It 
 is therefore not explained in what way the several 
 faculties are related to the subject of thought, nor 
 how they are related to one another. But with the 
 operation of these faculties in conformity to the 
 end (reAos) of each, entelechy becomes energy. 
 
 That which distinguishes man from the lower 
 animals is the reason. The universal reason is 
 God, but in man there is an individual reason. 
 The relation of the particular to the universal 
 reason in Aristotle's system has caused some dis- 
 pute among commentators. Some prefer taregard 
 his philosophy as pantheistic, but it seems more 
 probable that Aristotle taught a theistic doctrine. 
 "While, according to his Logic, the universal is in 
 each of the particulars, the substance of everything 
 is individual. And it is not justifiable to interpret 
 logical realism as pantheism, however close the 
 connection between them may be thought to be. 
 God is the first mover, but the soul is also said 
 to move itself. As the soul is said to be moved 
 by appetite, desire, and understanding, as well as 
 by the image of external objects, the self -moving 
 1 Aristotle, ib. 
 
EST THE SOCKATIC PEEIOD 41 
 
 of the soul is to be construed as signifying spon- 
 taneity. For in the individual soul there is no 
 absolute beginning of motion. God is not universal 
 substance, for the only substances are singular sub- 
 stances. He is a substance along with other sub- 
 stances, and not the substance of substances. But 
 in the first mover is the source of all other motion 
 and the thought of thought. 
 
 There is a theoretical and a practical reason.' 
 The former is always passive. It receives know- 
 ledge, but originates nothing. It is not a faculty of 
 immediate knowledge, except in so far as the appre- 
 hension of first principles or axioms is concerned. 
 The highest principles are not deductions; for all 
 deductions rest ultimately upon certain evident 
 truths {KJxLvcpd), and these are known by the reason. 
 The practical reason is not passive, but active 
 and creative. Thus in Man the reason is both 
 receptive and spontaneous. As theoretical it is 
 tabula rasa, and receives the writing of experience.' 
 When experience ceases, the writing must cease, 
 and the passive reason is not immortal.* The 
 theoretical reason knows what is true or false ; the 
 practical, what is good or bad. The practical 
 reason may both deliberate and act. Its delibera- 
 tion takes the form of the practical syllogism. The 
 major of this is a universal in which the desirable- 
 ness of some object or end is set forth. The minor 
 is a particular in which some act is said to be sub- 
 
 1 Aristotle, 430, a. 18 ; 432, b. 27. 
 
 2 Id. 430, a. 1 ; ir ypait/uLTelv V l>^8ir {nripxa IrreXex^^f 
 yeypamjUmr. ' Id. 430, a. 22. 
 
42 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 sumed under tlie general conception. Tlie conclu- 
 sion whicli follows is a decision that the end is to 
 be sought.^ The intellect (Atavoia), which is some- 
 times used to denote the opposite of body, is often 
 synonymous with reason, for in the De Anima, 
 practical intellect is used interchangeably with 
 practical reason.^ 
 
 In the soul there are two moving principles, — 
 desire and reason.' Desire is caused by an object, 
 and the object of desire is the occasion for the 
 praxis of the reason. The praxis of the rea- 
 son is its act when something is declared to be 
 either pleasurable or painful. When the object is 
 declared to be pleasurable, the reason pursues it; 
 when painful, it avoids it. While desire and 
 reason are the moving principles within the soul, 
 Aristotle finds the remote cause of action in the 
 object of desire. But desire is the immediate 
 cause of motion. It may be either irrational, in 
 which case it is called appetite (i7rL0v/iLa),* or it 
 may be of a certain end, in which case it is called 
 will. There are, however, two kinds of will, — 
 the will of an end and the will of means to an end. 
 The lower desires, or appetites, are common to man 
 and the lower animals. When there is a general 
 will for an end, the means to the end are willed by 
 a union of desire and reason, which may be trans- 
 lated deliberate choice (Trpoaipecrts). Desire may 
 therefore be a will for an end, or a will for the 
 means to an end. It is not necessary that there 
 
 1 Aristotle, 434, a. 16. s Id. 433, <i. 9. 
 
 2 Id. 433, a. 13. nd. 433, a. 21 ff. 
 
IN THE SOCRATIC PEEIOD 43 
 
 should be deliberate choice in willing, but wherever 
 there is deliberate choice, there must be a will of 
 the end.^ 
 
 Will in the general sense (BovXtjo-k) is said to be 
 constituted or stationed in the reason." The rea- 
 son does not desire or will, but desire cooperates 
 with reason; and the lower species of desire, the 
 appetite, may contradict the reason. The means 
 by which the object desired is effective on the desire 
 may be either the practical syllogism already re- 
 ferred to, or may be a mental image or phantasm. 
 In the former case, it is not necessary that the 
 premises and conclusion should be fully and ex- 
 plicitly stated. The practical syllogism often has 
 the form of an enthymeme. The highest form of 
 knowledge possessed by the lower animals is the 
 image-making faculty. Neither reason nor phan- 
 tasy (<^avTa<rta) are motive without desire. 
 
 The feelings are excited through the senses, and 
 where there is sensation there may be either pleas- 
 ure or pain. We feel the pleasure and pain as good 
 and bad; so that the object of desire is the good, 
 either real or imagined." 
 
 These doctrines, which are to be found in the 
 Aristotelian psychology, are further noticed in his 
 Ethics. It has thus far been shown : — 
 
 1. That God is the first mover, but that the 
 reason in man is spontaneous. 
 
 2. That the reason alone is not will, except so 
 far as deliberation and judgment are will. 
 
 1 Aristotle, Eth. Nic. UI. 4; 1111, b. 4 fE. 
 » Id. 432, b. 5. 8 Id. 434, a. B. 
 
44 THEOKIES OF THB^ 'WILL 
 
 3. That it is desire which moves the soul, and 
 that this is determined by the object desired. 
 
 It is impossible logically to conclude that Aris- 
 totle taught indeterminism in his psychology. The 
 springs of action are proximately desire and rea- 
 son; remotely, the spring of action is the object 
 desired. The knowledge of the theoretical reason 
 is not voluntary; the knowledge of the object which 
 awakens the desire is not voluntary. The practical 
 reason alone cannot move to action, and both prac- 
 tical reason and desire are moved by the object 
 of desire. 
 
 The faculty of deliberate choice is spoken of as 
 something lying between the reason and the de- 
 sires, but partaking of the nature of each.^ The 
 dominant principle of action is either desire or 
 deliberate preference, and there is no choice where 
 there is no act of intellect. Things which happen 
 through deliberate choice are likewise distinguished 
 from those which happen according to fortune. 
 But some light is thrown upon the psychological 
 doctrine by a passage in which will and thought (1/ 
 vmyo-ts) are represented as different aspects of the 
 same conception.'' Thought determines desire; 
 and, on the other hand, desire is excited by the 
 object which is presented to thought.' 
 
 This view of the will is still further developed 
 in the Ethics. All practice and all deliberate 
 choice are directed toward some good. There are 
 
 1 Aristotle, 1065, a. 32 ; 700, b. 18, 23. 
 
 2 Id. 406, b. 25. aid. 701, a. 36. 
 
IN THE SOCBATIC PERIOD 45 
 
 relative or intermediate ends to which man's action 
 is directed, but these in turn are only means for 
 the ultimate attainment of the good. The good 
 does not seem the same to all men, for it may be 
 either real or apparent. The chief good is happi- 
 ness, and there will be as many kinds of goods as 
 there are kinds of men, according to character and 
 disposition. There is a good which is the end of 
 appetite, but appetite is irrational. Yet, although 
 it is irrational, it has a capacity to submit to the 
 reason.* It is obedience to the reason which con- 
 stitutes the virtue of appetite. The intellect also 
 has its virtues. Corresponding to the distinction 
 between the desires and the intellect is the distinc- 
 tion between ethical and dianoetic virtue. Wisdom 
 and prudence are dianoetic, while liberality and 
 temperance are ethical virtues.'' 
 
 In relation to the will, the conditions of a virtu- 
 ous act are as follows : — 
 
 1. It must be an intelligent act. 
 
 2. It must be a deliberate act, proceeding from 
 7r/ooatjO£<Tis.' 
 
 3. It must be performed upon some fixed prin- 
 ciple. 
 
 Thus the feelings are neither virtuous nor vicious. 
 There must be deliberate choice of a course of action 
 before there can be virtue or vice. Nor are the 
 virtues faculties or powers. They are acts of de- 
 
 i Id. 1102, b. 13. 
 2 Id. 1103, a. 4. 
 
 8 At' aira, for the sake of an end. 
 
46 THBOBIES OF THE WILL 
 
 liberate choice, or at least they are not -without 
 deliberate choice. Virtue is a habit. It is a habit, 
 not of knowing, but of willing; or, to speak more 
 precisely, it is a habit of deliberate choice before- 
 hand. That which is to be willed or chosen before- 
 hand is the mean between extremes. This mean 
 is determined, not by feeling, nor by passion, but 
 by the reason. Thus while virtue is essentially 
 dependent on the will, the object of virtuous action 
 is fixed by the reason. "Ea-nv apa ij aperrj l^ts 
 TTpooiptTiK-q, iv /i£(70T7jTi ov(Ta Ty TTpoi ^juaf, wpia/Jievri 
 Xoy^ Koi los av 6 <^povifi.o<s opCcre.ia'. 
 
 In this definition the rational element is twice 
 emphasized. The act is not only deliberate, which 
 implies a rational process, but it is defined by 
 reason (Xoyos) and by prudence (<^pow/«)s), which 
 refers to an intellectual virtue. 
 
 In the third book of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
 the nature of voluntary actions is more specifically 
 discussed. The distinction is here expressed by the 
 adjectives : iKova-iov and aKovcriov. Involuntary ac- 
 tions are those which are done either through com- 
 pulsion, or through ignorance." In the former case, 
 the coercion is from without, and in spite of man's 
 wish. But actions which are performed because of 
 threats (under duress) are mixed. They resemble 
 voluntary actions, however, for when they are per- 
 formed there is an act of will, and the end of the 
 action is related to opportunity (Kara t6v Kaipov).' 
 The will moves the body, and the beginning of the 
 
 1 Aristotle, 1106, b. 36. 
 2 Id. 1109, b. 35. 8 Id. 1110, a. 14. 
 
IN THE SOCBATIC PERIOD 47 
 
 movement is from within the man himself. > In 
 connection with this, Aristotle notices the question 
 whether a man may be coerced by desirable objects, 
 such as honor or pleasure. He decides that actions 
 from such motives are not compulsory. They are 
 performed because they are pleasurable; so that a 
 man cannot complain that outward circumstances 
 forced him to take a pleasurable course. Compul- 
 sion refers to the external force, and Aristotle's 
 argument is that no act is virtuous which is forced 
 upon a man from without. 
 
 Actions done through ignorance may be due to 
 ignorance in general, or ignorance of what one 
 should do under certain circumstances . ' A drunken 
 man, or an insane man, or a vicious man, acts 
 through one kind of ignorance, in the sense that 
 he does not know what he ought to do ; but his acts 
 are not involuntary. Yet a man may act under a 
 misapprehension, by mistaking a friend for a foe, 
 by doing something which is forbidden, in ignorance 
 that it was forbidden, as in striking another acci- 
 dentally when trying to assist him. These are 
 involuntary actions. Thus the essence of the vol- 
 untary act lies in the person or doer himself. An 
 act, however, does not have to be rational in order 
 to be voluntary, for there are purely emotional or 
 appetitive acts which are voluntary (from 6u/tios or 
 
 As has already been said, deliberate choice is 
 a species of will, and is essential to moral action. 
 
 1 Aristotle, 1110, a. 11. ■h ipxh ^^ ''V TpdrroiTt. 1110, b. 4. 
 3 Id. 1110, b. 18. 8 Id. nil, a. 25. 
 
48 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 Children and the lower animals have will, but no 
 deliberate choice.* The will in moral acts is there- 
 fore different from /SouA-ijo-ts or Ov/jlos or kiriOvitia. 
 The will or wish for the end may be directed to an 
 object which it is impossible to attain, as well as 
 to possible objects ; deliberate choice is always of 
 the possible, and of the possible only. Appetite is 
 likewise opposed to deliberate choice ; it is directed 
 towards the pleasurable, but deliberate choice is not 
 necessarily so directed. Will or wish in general 
 is of the end, while deliberate choice is of the means 
 to an end. The latter is not emotion, for it has a 
 rational element; it is not mere opinion (So^a), for 
 opinion refers simply to what is true or false, not 
 to the faculty of taking or choosing. As Aristotle 
 says, deliberate choice partakes of reason and intel- 
 lect, and a choice of some things rather than a 
 choice of others.^ The object of irpootpEo-ts is an ob- 
 ject of both deliberation and desire. In relation 
 to the practical reason, the decision reached by the 
 deliberate act of the faculty of choice is the same 
 with the conclusion of the practical syllogism.' 
 
 Aristotle does not agree with Plato that vice is 
 involuntary. According to him the power to do 
 involves also the power not to do. That virtues 
 and vices are within the power of the moral agent 
 is proved by the fact that men are held responsible 
 
 1 Aristotle, 1111, b. 9. 
 
 2 ^ y&p vpoalpeffis /ieri \6yov Kal Siavoias, i'n-oirrjiiahetv S' 
 ^otKe Kal Tovvofjui &ii ov Tpb iripwv alperbv. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 
 1112, a. 15. 
 
 ° Ik toO PovKeinairSat yip KphavTei 6pey6ii£$a Kari, r^v 
 pov\(V(rtV' 1113, £1. 11. 
 
IN THE SOCBATIC PERIOD 49 
 
 and punished for their misdeeds, unless these are 
 done under external compulsion. Even faults com- 
 mitted through ignorance are punished, when the 
 agent had it in his power to acquire the requisite 
 knowledge. Plato was wrong in supposing that 
 men were involuntarily depraved and vicious; for 
 when a man becomes intemperate or indulges in 
 other vices, he does so voluntarily. In ethical 
 virtue the habit of willing may make the act in- 
 voluntary, but volition was necessary to form the 
 habit. But Aristotle does not meet the possible 
 objection, that the morality of the virtuous act 
 done on account of habit, is at variance with his 
 definition of moral action, which involves deliberate 
 preference. From his point of view it would seem 
 that all acts proceeding from ethical virtue were 
 moral only in the beginning, when the habit was 
 voluntarily formed. That the term " in our power " 
 does not necessarily refer to the so-called freedom 
 of the will is evident from the identification of that 
 which is voluntary with that which is in our power. ' 
 It may be said that all men strive after the apparent 
 good, and are not masters of the imagination or 
 phantasy which places before them the object de- 
 sired. But Aristotle replies that a man is the 
 author of his own habits, and is also the cause of 
 his own imagination. Both of these are within 
 him, and are not external to him. The phantasy 
 is thus placed on the same footing as the will, — 
 both are in our power; and a man is as responsible 
 for his imagination as for his will. Aristotle re- 
 1 Aristotle, 1111, b. 20 ft. 
 
50 THEOEIES OP THE WILL 
 
 plies also to Plato, who taught that some men were 
 virtuous and some vicious by nature. To this the 
 answer is made that if a man be born with a know- 
 ledge of virtue, just as he is born with a power to 
 see, so that he cannot be anything but virtuous, 
 then virtue is as involuntary as vice. 
 
 Still, the Etliics of Aristotle do not seem to me 
 to affect the conclusion which I have drawn with 
 respect to his psychology, — that he held a doc- 
 trine of determinism. It must be remembered that 
 in the defence of the voluntary character of virtue 
 and of vice, he is not arguing in favor of any form 
 of the doctrine of freedom. He had, rather, two 
 definite objects in view. 1. He wished to refute 
 the Platonic theory that vice is involuntary, and 
 that no man would do wrong voluntarily. Virtue 
 is to him a habit of willing ; but the habit is deter- 
 mined by the intelligence (Aiavoia),^ which is a 
 faculty of knowledge, and by prudence, which is a 
 dianoetic virtue. So, while virtue is theoretically 
 a habit of the will, in order that the habit may be 
 acquired, the intellect must know the mean between 
 the extremes, as well as the fact that virtue con- 
 sists in such action. The intellect so far deter- 
 mines the virtuous act. 2. He wished to establish 
 his ethical theory for the sake of his Politics. 
 The chief good is a political good, and the truly 
 virtuous man is the truly virtuous citizen. The 
 good to be aimed at is political, and all other goods 
 are means to that end. At the very outset of his 
 Ethics he declares that they are subordinated to 
 1 Aristotle, 1113, b. 3 &. 
 
IN THE SOCHATIC PERIOD 51 
 
 Politics. The acts of the citizen which are to be 
 called moral are those which he does voluntarily, 
 without external compulsion, and irrespective of 
 legal penalties. Consequently, while there is no 
 sign of the modern issue which is debated by deter- 
 minists and their opponents, the declaration that 
 only voluntary actions are virtuous or vicious does 
 not imply indeterminism. It is not the action 
 which is determined by motive, or effected by 
 causes, or dependent on character, which he op- 
 poses to voluntary actions; but those which are 
 done by compulsion or through ignorance. It 
 may be added that the term " in our power " was in 
 use among the Stoics,* who were certainly not in- 
 determinists. 
 
 Aristotle does not, like the Atomists, attribute 
 everything and every event to necessity. While 
 he identifies God with fate and necessity, he recog- 
 nizes an element of fortune or chance in the world. 
 Although some uncertainty surrounds Plato's view, 
 he had maintained that the development of the state 
 seemed to be due to chance or fortune, but that a 
 necessary principle had really brought it into being. 
 Aristotle employs the term necessity as an equiva- 
 lent of force, and from this point of view voluntary 
 actions are of course not necessitated. The essence 
 of the voluntary act is that it is in our power, and 
 due to deliberate choice or to spontaneity. If we 
 accept the doctrine that God is the first mover, 
 that he is one with Necessity, and that he is 
 the form-giving principle, the first eflScient and final 
 1 Spictetus, Encbir. I. 
 
52 THEOKIES OF THE WILL 
 
 cause, it is difficult to exclude the will from his con- 
 trol. The action towards an end is determined. 
 There is, however, a sphere in which the casual and 
 fortuitous play a part. This may be shown most 
 plainly by considering Aristotle's opinion con- 
 cerning the principle of contradiction in relation 
 to necessity. While the logical principle of con- 
 tradiction is very conspicuous in his Organon and 
 Metaphysics, he takes a peculiar view of the re- 
 lation of this principle to future time. It applies 
 absolutely to past and present events. It ap- 
 plies to the future only under certain limitations. 
 The past is necessarily what it is. The present is 
 what it is necessarily. But Aristotle denies that 
 all things which are about to happen are about to 
 happen necessarily, and he endeavors to demon- 
 strate this by an examination of the disjunctive 
 proposition. He holds that there is a beginning 
 of future things, and a possibility of their being 
 or not-being. Their being is not necessary, even as 
 their not-being is not necessary. Things are not 
 brought about necessarily, for that would leave 
 no place for chance. All things, then, do not 
 come into being of necessity ; being must of neces- 
 sity be when it is, and not-being when it is not; 
 but it is not necessary that being should be, nor 
 that not-being should not be. It is necessary that 
 a naval battle shall happen or not happen to- 
 morrow. It is not necessary that the battle shall 
 occur, nor is it necessary that it shall not occur. 
 It is only necessary that it either shall or shall 
 not occur. It is, in other words, a contingent or 
 
IN THE SOCRATIC PERIOD 53 
 
 fortuitous event. Chance is in antithesis to na- 
 ture, which is something fixed and invariable. 
 Chance is introduced to explain the variations due 
 to deliberation and other contingencies. It is 
 evident that Aristotle did not shrink from apply- 
 ing necessity to the will, except in so far as to 
 maintain that if the future were necessarily de- 
 termined, man would be unwilling to deliberate.* 
 Nature is regular and may be predicted ; but 
 chance is irregular, and its events cannot be 
 foreseen. Specifically, it is evident that Aris- 
 totle regards mere spontaneity as contingent, and 
 actions directed towards an end as determined. 
 As future events, the acts of the will are not 
 necessary, but necessity, in a limited sense, ap- 
 plies to events which are past. Like many phi- 
 losophers, Aristotle confounded the objective with 
 the subjective in his treatment of modality, as 
 may be seen still further in his opposing the neces- 
 sary to the possible, so that some necessary events 
 might seem to be impossible. He ascribes the con- 
 tingent to fortune. It may intervene in voluntary 
 as well as involuntary acts, in an external or in an 
 internal manner. The problem left unsolved by 
 Plato is not solved by Aristotle. Admitting that 
 virtue is a habit, its beginning is not habitual, and 
 the habit must have a beginning. Virtue is a habit 
 of willing a mean between extremes, and so vir- 
 tuous action must be determined by knowledge. If 
 virtue is voluntary, the knowledge of the mean 
 between extremes must be either voluntary or not. 
 1 Aristotle, 18, 19. 
 
54 THEOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 If this knowledge is voluntary, it is not explained 
 by Aristotle why some men have Siavoia of the mean 
 and some have not. If the knowledge is involun- 
 tary, there is a contradiction in Aristotle's theory 
 of virtue. 
 
CHAPTER SECOND 
 
 STOIC AND EPICUBEAN THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 In these two schools, theory is subordinate to 
 practice, and the problem to be solved is the prob- 
 lem of life and of character. This may have caused 
 that specialization of the conception of the will 
 which we find in their writings. Voluntary acts 
 were now discussed in relation to the principle of 
 fatal necessity, moral responsibility, and certain 
 logical categories. In this discussion Megaric and 
 Academic philosophers also had a part ; and their 
 doctrines will be considered incidentally in this 
 notice of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophy. 
 Both Stoics and Epicureans recognize three parts 
 of philosophy, which may be generally described 
 as, 1. Physics, including Theology; 2. Logic; 
 3. Ethics. Their theories about the will are re- 
 lated to all of these parts. But I shall reserve for 
 special treatment their discussion of voluntary ac- 
 tions in connection with logical principles, and shall 
 first consider the physical and ethical principles of 
 the two schools. 
 
 The Stoics were materialists ; for they denied that 
 anything exists except the corporeal. They were 
 also pantheists, in that they identified the universe 
 66 
 
56 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 ■with. God. Particularly among the later philoso- 
 phers of the school, however, language ■w'as used 
 which was quite consistent with belief in a personal 
 God. They aifirmed that even abstract notions 
 were material. Some writers of the school identify 
 God with a primitive material principle, but all 
 recognize that there is a governor of the world : — 
 
 KvSurr' ieaviruv, iro\v(ivviie, irafKparh aUl, ZeC, <j>va-eut 
 ipXVy^t vbiutv liira ir&ma KV§epvCiti.^ 
 
 And Seneca says : — 
 
 sed eimdem quem nos Jovem intelligunt, custodem recto- 
 remque universi, animum ac spiritum, mundani hujus operis 
 dominum et artiflcem, cui nomen omne convenit. Vis ilium 
 fatum vocare? Non errabis. Hie est ex quo suspensa 
 sunt omnia, causa causarum. Vis ilium providentiam 
 dicere? recte dices. Est enim cujus consilio huic mundo 
 providetur, ut inoonfusus eat, et actus suos explicet. Vis 
 ilium naturam vocare ? Non peccabis. Est enim ex quo 
 nata sunt omnia, cujus spiritu vivimus. Vis ilium vocare 
 mundiim? non falleris. Ipse enim est, totum quod vides, 
 totus suis partibus inditus, et se sustinens visua.* 
 
 From this doctrine of God the Stoics drew the 
 logical inference that all events were determined 
 by him. As they found no difiSculty in supposing 
 the soul of man to be material, so they attribute to 
 the material universe ■npovoia. and providential The 
 old doctrine of Eate becomes the doctrine of fatal 
 necessity to which all things are subject. 
 
 The soul is defined as irvev/ta or breath, the Latin 
 
 1 Cleanthes, in Stobaeus, Eol. I. 30. 
 
 2 Seneca, Nat. Qu. II. xlv. 
 
 » Cicero, De Nat. Deor. II. 5, 22, 29; I. 8. 
 
STOIC AND EPICXTEEAN 57 
 
 spiritus. It is corporeal, and embraces and pervades 
 the entire body. It is one and not many ; and the 
 Stoics insisted on this unity more emphatically than 
 did any of their predecessors. The soul has facul- 
 ties. These are variously enumerated by different 
 writers.* All knowledge originates with the senses, 
 and there is nothing in the understanding which 
 was not previously in the sense. It was not con- 
 sistent with their view of the origin of knowledge 
 that they should ascribe spontaneous activity to the 
 soul in the act of knowledge." Impressions are 
 made upon the soul through the senses, and cause 
 phantasms, which are apprehended ; and the know- 
 ledge is preserved in the memory (ftv^/u.ij). From 
 single perceptions are formed general ideas {koivoX 
 evvoiat). The assent of the mind to knowledge thus 
 received is voluntary. It may reject or accept that 
 which is presented to it. Opinion of the truth or 
 falsity of that which originates in the sense, is not 
 compelled but is voluntary.^ The ruling principle 
 in Man which is sometimes identified with the soul 
 itself is TO ■^yc/ioviKov.* 
 
 Instead of separating the rational, sensual, and 
 emotional principles and faculties in man, as Plato 
 and Aristotle had done, the Stoics taught that the 
 affections and appetites, as well as the reason and 
 the will, reside in the ruling principle. But they 
 distinguish various stages in volition, as follows : 
 1. Purpose ; 2. Impulse ; 3. Preparation ; 4. Appre- 
 
 1 TertuUlan, De Anim. 14. 
 
 2 Plutarch, Plac. IV. 11. 
 
 » Cicero, Acad. I. 14, 40. * Cicero, Nat. Deor. II. 11. 
 
58 THEORIES OF THE WII/Ii 
 
 hension ; 6. Choice ; 6. Deliberate preference ; 
 7. Will of the end; 8. Decision {arbitrium)} 
 
 The soul comes open-handed into the world, and 
 grasps first partially and then wholly the objects 
 which are presented to it. The activity of the 
 emotional states is attributed to the universal life 
 of Nature, and yet these affections and impulses do 
 not constitute virtue or happiness. To follow these 
 is not the object of the virtuous man. Pleasure 
 and pain are not the criteria of moral conduct. The 
 virtuous life is not emotional, but rational ; and the 
 virtuous man must cultivate not the passions (nddrj), 
 but apathy (diro^eia), which is indifference to both 
 pleasures and pains.^ In the unvirtuous man, the 
 ruling faculty or principle is the seat of the affec- 
 tions and impulses, which are opposed to virtue. 
 In the virtuous man, it is the ruling principle, free 
 from emotion and passion, which controls. While 
 the ^ycfioviKov is the seat of emotion and passion, it 
 is both a rational and a voluntary power. So far it 
 corresponds with the Nov? of Plato and Aristotle. 
 The will is a principle not of emotion or passion. 
 It is a principle of apathy. The voluntary ele- 
 ment in both knowledge and action is natural to the 
 soul. The Stoics held that virtue is voluntary, and 
 also agreed with Socrates that virtue is teachable. 
 The union of these two doctrines raises a difficulty 
 which the school did not attempt to remove. If 
 virtue is teachable, it is manifest that most men are 
 unvirtuous from an incapacity to learn, rather than 
 from an unwillingness to act. Yet the Stoics held 
 
 1 StobseuB, Eel. II. 162. a Diogenes, VII. 117. 
 
STOIC AND EPICURBAir 69 
 
 that knowledge, i.e., assent, is Toluntary. Chrysip- 
 pus declared that man's nature predetermines the 
 ■will to assent, and the -will to act. The will is like 
 a cylinder which is made so as to be capable of re- 
 volving, and has this capacity as part of its nature. 
 It revolves when it is set in motion. It would not 
 revolve from its shape alone, nor from its motion 
 alone. 
 
 But the idea of a virtuous aristocracy which was 
 characteristic of the systems of Plato and of Ar- 
 istotle, is apparent in the teaching of the Stoics. 
 They did not share the exclusive sentiment of the 
 earlier philosophers, but sought to abolish the bar- 
 rier which separated Greek and Eoman from Bar- 
 barian. Yet the virtuous man is the exception, 
 not the rule. In one sense virtue is voluntary, be- 
 cause the ruling faculty can control the affections 
 and passions ; yet, on the other hand, man's actions 
 are determined, not only by overruling nature or 
 fatal necessity, but by circumstances, by disposi- 
 tion and education. The individual volitions are 
 determined, as well as the causes which lead to the 
 willing of a particular end. Chrysippus maintained 
 that law forbade the performance of bad actions to 
 foolish men, but made to them no positive com- 
 mands, because such persons were incapable of 
 doing what is right.' The peculiarity of the Stoic 
 determinism is its intellectual character. While 
 the unvirtuous man has his will determined by his 
 feelings and passions, the wise or virtuous man is 
 theoretically he who resists his feelings, and rises 
 
 1 Flutaich, Stoic. Repugn. 23, 21. 
 
60 THEOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 superior to pleasure and pain. Thus the will of 
 the wise man is determined, not by the desires or 
 affections, but by ratio recta} The doctrine that 
 knowledge is voluntary, that the soul is one and 
 not many, and that both knowledge and will belong 
 to the rjyf.iJ,oviKov, does not seem to have been thought 
 inconsistent with the denial of freedom. 
 
 The supremacy of the ruling faculty or principle 
 is well set forth by Cicero, who says : — 
 
 Natura est igitur, quae contineat mundum omnem, eum- 
 que tueatur, et ea quidem non sine sensu atque ratione. Om- 
 nem enim naturam necesse est, quae non solitaria sit, neque 
 simplex, sed cum alio junota atque connexa, habere aliquem 
 in se prinoipatum, ut in homine mentem, in bellua quiddam 
 simile mentis, unde oriantur rerum appetitus. In autem 
 arborum et earum rerum quae gignuntur e terra radicibus 
 inesse prinoipatus putatur. Prinoipatum autem id dico, 
 quod Graeoi riyefioi/m6i/ vooant : quo nihil in quoque genere 
 nee potest nee debet esse praestantius. Itaque necesse est, 
 illud etiam, in quo sit totius naturae prinoipatus, esse om- 
 nium optimum, omniumque rerum potestate dominatuque 
 dignissimum.''^ 
 
 The opposition which was noticed in the phi- 
 losophy of Plato and of Aristotle, between the 
 rational and emotional elements of the soul, is here 
 described as taking place within the ruling prin- 
 ciple itself. In the vicious as well as in the virtu- 
 ous man, it is the ■^yefioviKov which controls. The 
 difference between the virtuous and the vicious is 
 that, with the former the rational principle or ele- 
 ment is in the ascendant, while with the latter the 
 
 1 Cicero, Tuac. IV. 16, 34. 2 Id., Nat. Deor. II. 11. 
 
8T0I0 AND EPICUEEAN 61 
 
 emotional principle or element controls. Accord- 
 ing to Plutarch, the Stoics taught that the rational 
 control by the ■^yefivoiKov effected virtue, and that 
 this ruling principle was exposed to invasion by 
 the sensual, bestial, and unreasonable passions. 
 They become the masters of a man's actions. 
 When the reason becomes corrupt, the judgments 
 in moral matters become perverted. False opinion 
 (Sd^a) is at the root of all vice. The soul is moved 
 in opposition to virtue, by what the Latins called 
 perturbationes, and when such emotions control, 
 false opinion arises. This explains why Epictetus 
 and others declared that pain and pleasure depend, 
 not on things themselves, but only on our opinions 
 about them. The perturbationea and the false opin- 
 ion are to be corrected by recta ratio. Chrysippus 
 denied what was afterwards called the liberty of in- 
 difference, holding that it was repugnant to nature 
 to suppose that there could be any effect without a 
 cause. And in this statement we find, for the first 
 time, this historic argument against indetermin- 
 ism. He illustrated his meaning by the balance 
 which is weighed down, now on one side, now on 
 the other, but always in consequence of some active 
 cause. There may be no manifest cause for a given 
 volition, but there are always causes, which may be 
 hidden, which secretly move and induce men, and 
 so determine their volitions. In the face of this 
 statement, he maintained, however, that certain 
 volitions may be due to chance, that is, may be 
 fortuitous. 
 That man should have natural emotions and pas- 
 
62 THEORIES OP THE WILL 
 
 sions at all is due to misapprehension ; and so the 
 Stoics virtually accepted the Socratic doctrine that 
 no man errs voluntarily. They agree also with 
 Aristotle that emotions may be awakened by an 
 exciting phantasm, or image. The contradiction 
 in the Stoic ethics may be partially reconciled, if 
 we regard them as making virtue depend on both 
 knowledge and volition. Whichever element be 
 emphasized the result is the same. If strength of 
 will be required for self-restraint, the strength is 
 necessarily predetermined; and if knowledge be 
 required to prevent the control of passion, man errs 
 through ignorance, although the connection of as- 
 sent with voluntary elements does not warrant one 
 in drawing the same conclusion as was reached 
 with respect to the determinism of Socrates. While 
 assent is voluntary, it does not follow that all 
 knowledge is voluntary, and that the virtue of 
 prudence which is intellectual is controlled by the 
 will. Self-control and prudence were, according to 
 Stobseus, identified by the Stoics; and Seneca makes 
 virtue a habit of the will depending on recta ratio, 
 which is dependent on right knowledge. The 
 moral quality of conduct belongs not to the acts 
 of a man per se, nor is it conditioned by freedom 
 in willing. Acts are virtuous or not, according 
 to the intention of the agent. Whether the act 
 be performed or not, the intention to perform it is 
 sufficient to constitute a virtuous action. 
 
 In the Stoic philosophy, there is the same con- 
 ception of man as being in slavery to passion which 
 was characteristic of the older ethics. When 
 
STOIC AND EPICUREAN 63 
 
 Seneca arraigns the race for its wickedness, and 
 enslaving passions, he is painting a picture of the 
 age of Nero, and is expressing faithfully the gen- 
 eral Stoic pessimism with respect to the rarity of 
 virtue. The whole school was not successful in 
 explaining how it was that a vicious man could 
 ever become virtuous. By some of them it was 
 described as a sudden change, like the " immediate 
 conversion" of Christian theology. Yet it was 
 not demonstrated that a man who was vicious 
 could become virtuous. It was evident that a man 
 could not always be taught to be virtuous, so that 
 the will as well as the knowing faculties were 
 involved ; yet to suppose that the will was amen- 
 able to recta ratio was to suppose that the man was 
 already virtuous, and was living in rational con- 
 formity to nature. The practical result of the 
 Stoic discipline was to produce apathy amid the 
 changes and fortunes of life. It would not be true 
 to affirm that there is a necessary relation between 
 such an attitude and a theory of predeterminism ; 
 yet it is interesting to notice that this apathy or 
 ataraxia is characteristic of those oriental systems 
 which combine pantheism with a doctrine of fatal 
 necessity. The Christian doctrine of resignation 
 to the will of God resembles the Stoic apathy, and 
 yet very few of those who have been conspicuous 
 examples of resignation have denied the freedom 
 of the will. Self-abnegation has been thought rather 
 to be an admirable illustration of free submission. 
 The idea that a providence or fatal necessity has 
 predetermined all that is to come agrees well with 
 
64 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 the practical submission to the course of nature, 
 which can be neither averted, nor resisted. 
 
 Chrysippus endeavored to reconcile this deter- 
 minism with man's moral accountability. He held 
 that, while men do right or wrong because they 
 are fated to do right or wrong, in either case they 
 act according to their, own character. While he 
 defined Fate as "sempiterna quaedam et indecli- 
 nabilis series rerum et catena, volvens semetipsa 
 sese et implicans per aeternos consequentiae ordines, 
 ex quibus apta connexaque est,"^ he illustrated the 
 property of man in his own acts, by supposing a 
 stone which is thrown from a height. It falls, not 
 because of the impulse alone, but because of its 
 property thus to fall. The man born with an evil 
 character wills evil, in accordance with that char- 
 acter, just as the stone falls because it is heavy. 
 As Cicero says : " Dum autem verbis utitur suis 
 delabitur in eas difficultates, ut necessitatem fati 
 confirmet invitus." ^ 
 
 The fact that the physics of the Epicureans are 
 derived from the Atomists might lead one to expect 
 that they would adopt also the Atomic doctrine of 
 necessity. On the contrary, Epicurus avoided this 
 by an ingenious device, and maintained that the 
 will is free. He was without doubt led to this 
 position by the subordination of theory to practice 
 in his philosophy. The doctrine of indeterminism 
 may have been accepted in order that moral quality 
 might be attributed to the motion of the soul in 
 
 I A. Gellius, VI. 2. a Cicero, De Fato, 17. 
 
STOIO AND EPICUKEAN 65 
 
 the direction of pleasure. While accepting the 
 Atomic materialism, that nothing exists except 
 atoms and empty space, Epicurus attributes the 
 world not to any necessity, but to a fortuitous con- 
 gressus of atoms. The soul itself is composed of 
 atoms, but the will is free. This is only one of a 
 number of inconsistencies in the Epicurean phi- 
 losopy. There are gods, but they are not related to ■ 
 the universe, and are indifferent as to its welfare; 
 the pleasures of the mind are to be preferred to 
 those of the body, and yet pleasure is the only good 
 and pain the only evil. The test of truth is sensible 
 perception, and yet it is true that there are invisible 
 gods, and there are atoms which cannot be detected 
 by any of the senses. If only atoms and the vacuum 
 exist, the motion of the atoms in all its variety is 
 hard to explain. While this is ascribed to chance, 
 it would seem that chance was only a name for the 
 mode in which the atoms affect one another, so that 
 worlds rise and are dissolved. 
 
 In emancipating the universe from supernatural 
 causation, Epicurus and his followers were not so 
 successful in gettting rid of causality in the atoms 
 themselves. Democritus had taught that the fall- 
 ing of the atoms through empty space, together 
 with the whirlings and reboundings, produced the 
 universe. But the Epicureans saw that it must 
 be explained how, from this inevitable flux of 
 things, free will could emerge. For here was a 
 lifeless, uncaused universe, which was bound by 
 no unchangeable principle, and yet was as likely 
 as not to go on as it had begun. There was no 
 
 F 
 
66 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 reason why it should go on without deviation, and 
 yet no reason why it should deviate. To introduce 
 any outside cause to account for irregularities or 
 peculiarities of volition would have been contrary 
 to the principle of the school, ex nihilo nihil fit. 
 The Epicureans attempted to meet this difficulty 
 by, first, a modification of the old Atomip theory, 
 and, second, a denial of the logical principle of 
 contradiction. 
 
 They agree with Democritus that the soul is com- 
 posed of atoms, and their further description of its 
 structure need not here be repeated.^ The soul is 
 a principle of rest and of motion ; and it is some- 
 times defined as rrveC/ia. When the body is dis- 
 solved, the soul perishes. All knowledge is derived 
 from the senses, and the test of truth is reality to 
 the senses. " This was virtually the doctrine of Pro- 
 tagoras, and there is a sceptical element in the 
 Epicurean logic. 
 
 The ethical end of conduct is pleasure, and pru- 
 d^ence is needed in order that a man may employ 
 -the best means for attaining pleasure.' In the 
 I choice of such means, the will is free. The early 
 itomists had regarded the universe as under the 
 control of necessity; but the Epicureans, in order 
 to avoid the conclusion that necessity would upon 
 this principle govern voluntary action, modified the 
 Atomic philosophy./ In the falling of the atoms, 
 according to Epicurp, there is a deviation (declina- 
 tio) from their straight line of descent. And that 
 
 1 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, III. 216 f. 
 * Cicero, Acad. II. 32. a Diogenes Laertius, 128. 
 
STOIC AND EPICUREAN 67 
 
 this deviation is possible is a ground for the doctrine 
 that the will is free. 
 
 Sed Epicurus decllnatione atom! vitari fati neoessitatem 
 putat. Itaque tertius quidam motus oritur extra pondus 
 et plagam, cum declinat atomus interrallo minitno. . . . 
 Sequitar enim, ut si alia ab alia nunquam depellatur, ne 
 con tin gat quidem alia aliam : ex quo effloitur, ut jam si sit 
 atomus, eaque declinet, declinare sine causa. Hanc ratio- 
 nem Epicurus induxit ob eam rem, quod veritus est, ne, si 
 semper atomus gravitate ferretur natural! ac necessaria, 
 nihil liberum nobis esset, cum ita moveretur animus, ut 
 atomorum accipere maluit, necessitate omnia fieri, quam 
 a corporibus individuis naturales motus avellere.i 
 
 This accommodation of the original theory of the 
 Atomists to his practical conclusions does not ex- 
 hibit Epicurus as a consistent teacher. It is, in 
 fact, a denial of some of the more important prin- 
 ciples of Democritus, and sets aside the idea of 
 a reign of law in nature. If there exists nothing 
 except atoms and empty space, and if it is due to 
 gravity that the motions of the universe occur, 
 then it must be inferred that the decUnatio is 
 uncaused, or else the leading Atomic doctrine 
 must be abandoned. The connection of the Epi- 
 curean physics with the doctrine of the will, and 
 the Epicurean theory of indeterminism, is thus 
 set forth by Lucretius : — 
 
 Denique si semper motus connectitur omnis, 
 Et vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo. 
 Nee declinando faciunt primordia motus 
 Principium quoddam quod fati foedera rumpat, 
 
 1 Cicero, De Fate, X. 
 
68 THBOEIES OF THE 'WILL 
 
 Ez infinito ne causam causa sequatur : 
 
 Libera per terras unde haec animantibus extat, 
 
 Unde est haec (inquam) fatis avolsa voluntas, 
 
 Per quam progredimur, quo duoit quemque voluptas ? 
 
 Declinamus item motus, nee tempore certo, 
 
 Nee regione looi certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens. 
 
 Nam dubio prooul his rebus sua cuique voluntas 
 
 Principium dat. ^ 
 
 The atoms of the soul, then, are exceptedjrom 
 the law of cause and effect, just'as the^hysicar^ 
 atoms may decline or deviate in the universal 
 descent, according to the law of gravity. This 
 is the unexplained wandering of the atom. It 
 is due to no principle of the soul apart from the 
 atoms. And this is the Epicurean theory of free- 
 dom. 
 
 Eeference has been already made to a discussion 
 in the Post- Aristotelian period with respect to the 
 relation of voluntary actions to certain logical prin- 
 ciples. This discussion originated at an earlier 
 day, and was at first a debate about the principle 
 of contradiction, that a thing cannot both be and 
 not be at the same time. Aristotle mentions the 
 denial of this principle by certain philosophers, 
 and the reference is supposed to be to Heraclitus.' 
 By Euclid, the founder of the Megaric school, the 
 possible and the actual were identified, for he 
 maintained that whatever is possible is. Diodorus 
 of the same school, and one of the most acute of 
 the ancient dialecticians, taught more specifically 
 
 1 Lucretius, De Eerum Natura, 11. 251 et seq. 
 
 * Aristotle, Met. 1005, b. 25: rtvis ofo;'Toi 'Kiyei.v 'HpiiKXeiToi'. 
 
STOIC AND EPICUREAN 69 
 
 that the possible is not only that which is, but also 
 that which is about to be. And, he added, that 
 which is about to be is necessary. According to 
 Diodorus, nothing impossible can follow from the 
 possible.^ It is impossible that any past event 
 should be other than it already is. If such a thing 
 had been possible at any earlier time, something 
 possible would have given rise to something im- 
 possible, which is absurd. For in this case the 
 event was never possible. Consequently it is im- 
 possible that anything should ever occur except the 
 actual. No act of man could have been differently 
 performed, and no act which has been performed 
 could have remained unperformed. All has been 
 determined in the past. The future is also prede- 
 termined, and all events that are about to happen 
 are about to happen necessarily. Aristotle had 
 denied the necessity and affirmed the contingency of 
 the future.' In this he was followed by Chrysippus, 
 who held that only events which had already oc- 
 curred were necessary.^ They are necessary because 
 they are immutable, and whatever has been true in 
 the past cannot be changed from true to false. But 
 the future is contingent. Events are possible which 
 are never about to happen. The actuality of future 
 events is dependent upon certain contingencies ; as, 
 for example, it is predetermined that a certain man 
 will be drowned if he goes to sea, but it is not pre- 
 determined whether he will go to sea or not. The 
 
 1 See Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. II. 230. 
 
 2 Aristotle, De Interp. 19, b. 5. 
 • See Cicero, De Fato, 6 et seq. 
 
70 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 drowning being contingent upon his going to sea, 
 and his going to sea being a contingent event, his 
 drowning is also contingent. Chrysippus is of the 
 opinion that even predictions of a divine oracle are 
 not about to be fulfilled necessarily. The only pre- 
 determination, then, is contingent predetermina- 
 tion. The practical inference from this doctrine 
 is that no man can say that because a certain end 
 is predetermined, he need not employ means to 
 further or defeat the end. Nor is the fact that one 
 of two alternatives is predicated of the future a 
 ground for affirming that one of the two will neces- 
 sarily be true. One of the alternatives is true only 
 under certain contingencies. If I say I shall either 
 die or recover from this illness, I am not at liberty 
 to conclude that action on my part is useless. 
 Either alternative is predetermined only contin- 
 gently ; and the end is fixed only conditionally on 
 the means to the end being realized. In opposition 
 to both Diodorus and Chrysippus, the Epicureans 
 denied the principle of contradiction. According 
 to Cicero, Epicurus feared that if he should admit 
 this principle, he must also admit that all things 
 are determined by fatal necessity. Chrysippus had 
 followed Aristotle in insisting upon the importance 
 of this principle, and he speaks of it as an axiom. 
 He feared that if he should deny it, his doctrine 
 that all things are accomplished by fate would not 
 be tenable. The supposition that there was a 
 swerving aside (declinatio) of the atoms, was used 
 by Epicurus in support of his denial of fatal neces- 
 sity. In this way, he implied first of all that events 
 
STOIC AND EPICUBEAN 71 
 
 can happen without a sufficient external cause; sec- 
 ond, that fatal necessity does not control events; 
 and, third, that the will of man is free. While 
 Chrysippus made a distinction between antecedent 
 and necessary causes, and held that only the former 
 control the volitions, Epicurus seems to have ex- 
 cluded from his theory of volition whatever could 
 be interpreted as moving cause. 
 
 Carneades ^ of the New Academy differs with both 
 Stoic and Epicurean, yet is far removed from the 
 position of Diodorus. While he agreed with the 
 conclusion of Epicurus, he feared to adopt the theory 
 of declination, lest he should seem to deny the prin- 
 ciple of cause and effect. He preferred to appeal 
 to the fact of free voluntary actions in order to 
 disprove the doctrine of necessity. His argument 
 against the Stoics is thus stated by Cicero : if all 
 things are accomplished by antecedent causes, all 
 things are bound together and are dependent on 
 one another. If that be so, then necessity is the 
 efficient cause of all things. And if that be true, 
 nothing is in our power. Carneades therefore 
 denies the consequent, and holds that inasmuch 
 as there are certain things within our power, all 
 things are not effected by fatal necessity. Car- 
 neades affirms that not even Apollo can predict 
 the future. But he does not deny the principle of 
 cause and effect. The cause of the volition is in- 
 trinsic not extrinsic; because it is in the nature of 
 the will to be free from the law of external causa- 
 tion and external necessity. 
 
 1 Cicero, De Fato, 11. 
 
72 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 Whether voluntary actions are necessarily deter- 
 mined, and -whether the principle of contradiction 
 is applicable to future events, are two separate 
 questions, and, as Bayle has shown, the connection 
 of voluntary action with the disjunctive proposi- 
 tion was irrelevant.* 
 
 In general, it may be said that of course the past 
 must remain as it is, and that there is no possibil- 
 ity of the present being other than it is. Whether 
 the past might have been different under certain 
 contingencies is another question which need not 
 here be considered. Whether the principle of 
 contradiction is applicable to the future may be 
 easily seen in connection with any disjunctive 
 proposition where the alternatives exclude one 
 another. If I say : either James or John will die 
 to-morrow, both of these alternatives may be true 
 and both may be false, or either one may be true, 
 while the other is false. By accepting one alterna- 
 tive I have not rejected all other possible cases. In 
 logical language, the disjunction is not complete. 
 But if I say : James will either die or not die to- 
 morrow, the negative alternative embraces all other 
 cases or conditions except the death of James. 
 The proposition is equivalent to saying that if 
 James does not die, he will live, that he cannot 
 both live and not live, nor die and not die. It is 
 not implied that he must die ; it is not implied that 
 he must live. It is not even implied that it is fixed 
 whether he must live or must die. Nothing is said 
 about either of the alternatives taken by itself. It 
 i Bayle, Diet. Ait. Epicure. 
 
STOIC AND EPICTTBEAW 73 
 
 ■was therefore unnecessary for the Epicureans to 
 dispute the validity of the principle of contradic- 
 tion in order to establish their indeterministic 
 doctrine. But if the Epicurean contention was 
 unnecessary, the Stoic doctrine is inconsistent with 
 itself. Let it be assumed that James will be 
 drowned if he goes near the water, and that this 
 has been predetermined by fate. If we understand 
 by fate the operation of necessary causes, then I 
 mean not that James will be drowned in spite of 
 anything that he may do, but only that by a series 
 of inevitable causes and effects the last effect will 
 be the drowning of James. Either the end is pre- 
 determined or it is not predetermined; if it is, then 
 the means to the end are predetermined, and con- 
 tingency is excluded. To say that inaction on 
 James's part is unnecessary because one of two 
 alternatives must come to pass, is to assume that 
 the true alternative is known. If it is not known, 
 then by his inaction, if he escapes drowning, his 
 escape will be effected; and by his action, if he is 
 drowned, his death will be effected. To say that 
 by venturing on the water he predetermines his 
 death by drowning, is either to deny that his drown- 
 ing is predetermined, or else to afiirm that his vent- 
 uring on the water is predetermined.^ In addition 
 to this, the whole argument between these various 
 philosophers illustrates the effect of regarding 
 
 1 Compare Lessing, JDer Freigeist, I. 3. Dageht Er nun und 
 Bpintisirt von dem was ist, . . . von der Nothwendigkeit, der 
 halben und ganzen, der uothwendigen Nothwendigkeit iind det 
 niclit notliwendigen Nothwendigkeit. 
 
74 THEOKIES OI" THE Vm/L 
 
 necessity, possibility, and actuality as purely ob- 
 jective categories. 
 
 While the philosophy of Carneades is sceptical, 
 other ancient sceptics carried their doubt to a 
 greater extreme. The atheism and the denial of 
 fate and necessity among philosophers of the later 
 Greek schools were unfavorable to a belief in de- 
 terminism. The sceptics did not hold that nature 
 is genetrix omnium, but were disposed rather 
 towards an individualism and subjectivism out of 
 harmony with philosophical tradition and the popu- 
 lar religion. In particular, some of them denied 
 the principle of cause and effect. They did not, 
 as some modern philosophers have done, simply 
 deny the connection between effect and cause, but 
 they held it to be impossible that causes and effects 
 should exist at all. ^nesidemus, of Cnossus, a 
 contemporary of Cicero, was one of those who thus 
 disputed the reality of causality.^ It is probable 
 that indeterminism was held by all the Greek scep- 
 tics. As an illustration of the connection between 
 their theory of knowledge and their theory of voli- 
 tion may be mentioned their so-called suspension 
 of judgment with respect to the events of life. 
 Pyrrho had recommended apathy and indifference, 
 because there is nothing certain. And if nothing 
 is certain, nothing is either good or shameful. He 
 was followed in this by Timon of Philus, his suc- 
 cessor. Carneades, as we have seen, defended the 
 
 1 Sextus Emp. Hypotyp. Pyrrh. I. 180. It may be added that 
 Seztus himself denied the possihility of causes and effects. Adv. 
 Math. 207 f. 
 
STOIC AND EPICUEEAM 75 
 
 freedom of the will, and the conclusion -which he 
 drew was that apathy (airoBeui, aTapaiia) was the 
 proper attitude for the philosopher. Besides the 
 suspending of judgment, the sceptics of the more 
 extreme class also recommended the suspension of 
 volition.* The combination of this conclusion with 
 their denial of fatal necessity is worthy of con- 
 sideration. The objection which had been brought 
 to the determinism of Chrysippus was that human 
 action is useless, if all is necessarily predeter- 
 mined; and it has been seen how the objection 
 was answered. The later sceptics maintained that 
 human action is useless, because knowledge is 
 uncertain, although the will is free. While one 
 must accept with caution the extravagant stories 
 which are told of the extremes to which the sceptics 
 were led by their doubts, their philosophy was un- 
 doubtedly far more practical in its results than is 
 the scepticism of more modern times. 
 
 ^'A4>aala and 'AxaraXii^fa. 
 
CHAPTEE THIRD 
 
 THEORIES OP THE WILL IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 
 
 In Christian theology, doctrines of the will have 
 been complicated with doctrines relating to the 
 prescience of God, the predestination of all events, 
 original sin, and grace. Possibly, owing to these 
 complications, the discussions concerning the nature 
 and freedom of the will have been far more exten- 
 sive and far more animated among theologians 
 than among philosophers. Even if it be denied 
 that these theological discussions have contributed 
 much to our positive knowledge of the will, it must 
 be admitted that they have often brought out very 
 clearly, not only the different species of volition, 
 but also the issues involved in the free-will debate. 
 
 The consideration of the will in Christian the- 
 ology has prominence, because of the Christian con- 
 ception of God as the personal and moral governor 
 of the world, and because of the ethical character 
 of Christianity as a system. The Christian concep- 
 tion of God is derived directly from the religion of 
 Israel. Jehovah is rarely conceived of as a distant 
 creator and first cause only. He is an active and 
 intelligent power, who interferes repeatedly and 
 directly in the events of nature and history. And 
 76 
 
IN CHEISTIAN THEOLOQT 77 
 
 he interferes in order to carry out to the end a pre- 
 conceived and prearranged plan. In the execution 
 of his designs, God is represented as acting either 
 through human agency or without human agency. 
 His purpose is accomplished, sometimes in conform- 
 ity to natural laws, at other times by supernatural 
 interposition or miracle. He is often represented 
 as forming and executing his plans, contingently 
 upon the acts of his creatures. But this anthro- 
 morphism is evidently not fundamental to the 
 Hebrew idea of God. The prevailing conception in 
 the old faith is of a God who governs all events, 
 either by permissive decree or by positive agency. 
 The call of Abraham, the choice of Isaac, the apos- 
 tasy of Esau, the commitment of the divine reve- 
 lation to the chosen people, the required ritual of 
 tabernacle and temple, the rise and fall of kings, 
 the fortunes of war, — all these are attributed to 
 God's almighty power, and all are parts of the 
 divine plan. This is also the conception of the 
 New Testament writers ; but in the Old Testament 
 this theory of divine omnipotence and sovereignty 
 is not brought into opposition with any scientific 
 view of the will, and it remained for Christian 
 writers first to notice this opposition. The germs 
 of the great discussions of later theologians are con- 
 tained only indirectly in the recorded sayings of 
 Jesus Christ. It is in the Epistles of Paul that 
 the first explicit suggestions of the great contro- 
 versy are to be found. From his time down to a 
 comparatively late date, theological interest has 
 been attracted to questions which grow out of the 
 
78 THEORIES OP THE WILL 
 
 old Hebrew conception of God's sovereignty, — the 
 questions of predestination, of sin, and of grace. 
 
 St. Paul 
 
 If any excuse were needed for including a notice 
 of the doctrines of Paul in explaining the develop- 
 ment of philosophy, it might be found in the in- 
 fluence which his writings have had upon European 
 thought. Like Plato and Aristotle, he has been 
 cited as an authority in many differing schools. 
 The Gnostics and the Manicheans appealed to his 
 writings in support of their opinions ; his views de- 
 termined the course of Patristic and Scholastic 
 thought; the sources of both Catholic and Protes- 
 tant teaching are in his Epistles. While he taught 
 no theory of systematic philosophy, there are impli- 
 cations of some modem philosophical doctrines in 
 his teaching ; and it is possible that his influence 
 upon later philosophy has been too little considered. 
 
 Attempts have been made to trace a very close 
 connection between the teaching of Paul and the 
 Greek philosophy. In spite of the distinguished 
 names connected with this attempt, I can find no 
 proof of such a relation. The impression conveyed 
 by the text of the Epistles is, that of a man who has 
 a religious message to deliver, which he puts into 
 words such as wUl be readily understood by those 
 to whom they were first addressed. Prom a strictly 
 philosophical point of view, Christianity is to be 
 coordinated with those systems of practical philos- 
 ophy which arose in the Post-Aristotelian period. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 79 
 
 which sought a standard of conduct, and practical 
 rules of living. With these forms of philosophy, 
 the teaching of Paul has some affinity, especially 
 with the Stoic ethics ; and there are also analogies 
 between his thought and that of Plato. But the 
 psychological terms used by Paul are mostly to be 
 found in the LXX. translation of the Jewish Script- 
 ures, and some are common to him and the Jewish 
 philosophers of Alexandria. Beyond this, there is 
 very little reason to believe that he was indebted 
 for his ideas to any of the Greek philosophers. 
 Where he uses terms of philosophy, he does it with 
 a certain independence, and in a way peculiar to 
 himself and other Christian writers. And yet no 
 very definite psychology can be found in his writ- 
 ings. The most that one can hope to do, is to trace 
 in his thought some elements which entered into 
 the theories of fathers, and schoolmen, and re- 
 formers, and which indeed have not disappeared 
 from scientific philosophy. 
 
 The object of Christianity as a practical system 
 is, according to Paul, to make men righteous or 
 holy.^ The aim of his teaching is thus similar to 
 that of the Greek ethical schools, which was to make 
 men virtuous. The need of a solution of Paul's 
 problem is evident from his own statement that the 
 race of man is corrupt, and is dead in sin.' This 
 theory, which is known as the doctrine of original 
 sin and human depravity, underlies all Christian 
 theories of the will down to the seventeenth cen- 
 
 1 Titus, n. 11-14; Kom. XH. 1. 
 
 a Bom. 1. 18 f. I III. 9-18; Eph. n. 1. 
 
80 THEOBIES OF THE WILL 
 
 tury. What effects original sin has produced may 
 be best determined if we turn to the psychological 
 language of Paul's Epistles. 
 
 I. Tlie Psychological Terms of the Epistles. The 
 most general of these is the heart (xapSux), which is 
 a Hebrew rather than a Greek form of expression.' 
 It has both an intellectual and a moral meaning. 
 It is a principle of thought, of intention, of desire, 
 and of faith, as well as of deliberate choice.^' It 
 is emotional, for the love of God is shed abroad 
 in it ; ' it is a moral faculty, for the law is written 
 upon it.* It is the abode of Christ and the princi- 
 ple of inner character. It does not necessarily con- 
 note any moral quality, for there may be a bad 
 heart, as well as a good. The term soul (yjrvxq) is 
 less often used than heart. It refers both to life, 
 and to that which in man is distinct from the body.' 
 The term reason occurs more frequently than soul. 
 It may denote a theoretical or a practical faculty.' 
 With (yi/uJjuiTj) it is used to indicate a fixed way of 
 thinking or a conviction ; it may mean the mind 
 or the moral faculty in man. It has both a good 
 and a bad connotation, according to the way in 
 which it is qualified. It is the " law of my mem- 
 bers " which wars against the " law of my mind " 
 (vols) ; but there are men with a " reprobate mind " 
 (voSs).' 
 
 The word body (<r5/ia), so often used by Paul, 
 
 » LXX. Gen. VI. B, VIH. 21; Eccl. VIH. 11. 
 
 2 Bom. X. 1, 6, 8, 9, 10; 1 Cor. II. 11, TV. 6. 
 
 » Rom. V. 5. 1 Rom. II. 15. 6 Rom. II. 9, XI. 3. 
 
 eRom. VII. 23, XH. 2; 1 Cor. 1. 10, II. 16, XIV, 19, 
 
 7 Rom. I. 28. 
 
IN CHBISTIAN THEOLOGY 81 
 
 presents no difficulty of interpretation, in spite of 
 conclusions which haye been drawn from his lan- 
 guage. It is the ordinary mortal and natural body 
 of man, and it does not connote any bad moral 
 qualities.* Paul speaks of the mortal body, of the 
 appetites of the body, declares that it is subject to 
 redemption, and that it is to be changed so as to 
 become like the glorified body of Christ. Absence 
 from the body is presence with God.' 
 
 More difficult is the interpretation of the terms 
 flesh (a-dpi) and spirit (wv^fia). The former is not 
 derived from Greek philosophy, but from the Hebrew 
 writers.' In the writings of Paul, it has the general 
 traditional yeaning of human nature, or mankind. 
 But because human nature is corrupt, and is dead in 
 sinj to be in the flesh is ipso facto to be sinful and 
 morally dead. That it is not used in this unfavor- 
 able sense everywhere, is proved by the references 
 to Christ who was made of the seed of David ac- 
 cording to the flesh; * there is the circumcision of the 
 flesh ; ' Christ came in the likeness of sinful flesh." 
 In one instance it is used to denote not merely 
 human, but also animal nature of every kind.' But 
 theologically it has a bad meaning. It is the unre- 
 generate principle in man. They that are in the 
 flesh cannot please God. To be carnally minded 
 is death. Flesh is the seat of the lower appetites 
 
 1 Rom. I. 24, VI. 12, VII. 24, Vni. 23, XII. 1 ; 1. Cor. VI. 18, 
 XII. 12. 
 
 "Phil. m. 21; 2Cor. V. 8. 
 » LXX. Gen. VI. 13, VU. 21 ; Is. XL. 6, 6. 
 «Rom. I. 3. SRom. 11. 28. «Rom. VIII. 3. 
 
 ' 1 Coi. XV. passim. 
 a 
 
82 THEORIES OP THE WILL 
 
 (to imOviJ.'qTiKSv of Plato). In it dwells no good thing ; 
 it wars against man's higher nature ; it cannot in- 
 herit the kingdom of God.^ But ethically it is not 
 to be identified with body ; nor put in. antithesis to 
 soul. 
 
 Another more peculiar term is spirit (irveSpi). 
 It may denote the Spirit of God or the soul of 
 man. In the latter application, it is the regenerate 
 part of man. It cannot be clearly distinguished 
 from mind and heart. It is apparently the self- 
 conscious spirit, the principle of real inner life. It 
 is the true opposite of body (o-S/ia), and is only 
 once distinguished from the reason. Most com- 
 monly it is opposed to flesh, simply jjecause the 
 Spirit of God acts upon the soul, and not immedi- 
 ately upon the body. When the soul is regenerated, 
 it is antithetical to the corrupt nature, whether the 
 latter be corporeal or incorporeal." Elesh does not 
 apply to body alone as the Manicheans supposed ; 
 for to be carnally minded, not merely to be in the 
 flesh, is moral death, and the carnal Ego is sold 
 under sin.' The adjective spiritual (uTtv/oaTiKos) 
 refers to the regenerate soul and all its concerns.* 
 The law of God is spiritual. There is the law of 
 the spirit of life in Christ Jesus ; Christians walk 
 not after the flesh but after the Spirit. There are 
 spiritual gifts, and those who have them are 
 
 1 Rom. VIII. 3, 5, Xm. 14; 1 Cor. I. 26, XV. 50. 
 
 2 Rom. I. 9, VII. 6, Vm. 10, 11; 1 Cor. II. 4, 11, V. 3, 5, 
 XIV. 14, 15. s Eom. VIII. 6, VII. 14. 
 
 i But compare wpis ri, vnevfiaTtKi, ttjs irovriplas. Eph. 
 VI. 12. 
 
IN CHEISTIAN THEOLOGY 83 
 
 TTvevnariKot, although this term is evidently not 
 indicative of a caste or esoteric circle within the 
 Church.i 
 
 II. Sin and Ghace. From what has just been 
 said, it will have been seen that all or nearly all 
 the psychical principles in man are corrupted by 
 sin. And Paul teaches that this condition is due 
 to the fall of Adam. The death of man in sin 
 brings upon him the curse of God, involving guilt 
 and punishment ; while subjectively man is unable 
 to keep the moral law. The will is determined 
 to evil by the birth of man in sin. This is of 
 great importance in relation to later philosophy. 
 For here is the origin of the doctrine taught for 
 many centuries, that the human will is in slavery 
 to sin, and that there is no free will in the sinner. 
 Naturally the will is determined to sin because the 
 character is sinful, and man cannot change his 
 character. The change which enables man to 
 escape the curse and to obey the law is effected by 
 the grace of God. Grace produces faith, and Paul 
 expressly says : (1) that man is justified by faith ; 
 (2) that man is saved by grace through faith.^ 
 Theologians are not at one as to what is meant by 
 faith. It is not necessary that I should offer 
 any particular interpretation either of the term 
 justification or of the term faith, about which there 
 has been so much dispute. But it is perfectly 
 plain that Paul regards faith to be instrumentally 
 the cause of justification, and grace to be efficiently 
 the cause of faith. God is the author of faith, 
 
 1 1 Cor. XIV. 1, XII. 1. a Rom. V. 1 ; Eph. II. 8. 
 
84 THEORIES OB' THE VTILL 
 
 and man is the recipient. Jesus Christ is the 
 object of faith. The breach between man and God 
 is healed through faith, and the holy life begins 
 with faith. Grace and original sin are antitheti- 
 cal. Just as birth into the human race carries 
 with it the sin and corruption of the flesh, so the 
 new birth by which faith is given to man enables 
 him to live a holy life, and carries with it the 
 beginnings of obedience to the moral law. The 
 will which in the unregenerate is predetermined to 
 siaful acts, in the regenerate is predetermined to a 
 holy life. 
 
 III. The Conflict of the Will. For the first 
 time in the history of thought, Paul presents from 
 a subjective point of view the conflict of a man 
 between two moral alternatives. While the aspects 
 of this conflict are chiefly theological, it is evident, 
 I think, that the subject involves principles of 
 philosophy of no ordinary interest. Among inter- 
 preters, discussion has arisen as to the place which 
 should be assigned to that part of Paul's writ- 
 ings in which this conflict is described.* Does it 
 represent the man in a state of sin struggling to 
 obtain grace and righteousness; or is the picture 
 that of a man who has known the effects of grace, 
 and who is seeking to attain to holiness, agonizing 
 to overcome the corrupt principle which rebels 
 against the changed character? It is perhaps 
 needless to settle this question in interpreting 
 Paul's conception of the will. If the chapter be 
 taken in connection with the context, it would seem, 
 lEom.Vn. 14ff. 
 
IN CHEISTIAN THEOLOGY 85 
 
 however, that in the person of Panl is represented 
 the man who has been already justified by faith, 
 and who is at peace with God. In the sixth 
 chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, the question 
 discussed is whether such a man, who has escaped 
 the unequal warfare with God, is obliged to keep 
 the moral law. But in the seventh chapter, the 
 question is not, must man keep the moral law, but 
 why is he so incapable of keeping the moral law ? 
 The struggle is thus, apparently, not in the soul of 
 the unregenerate man who is supposed to be dead 
 in sin, but in the soul of the regenerate man who 
 has been pardoned and is endeavoring to keep the 
 law. In a state of sin, the will is determined 
 towards the bad; in a state of grace, the will is 
 determined towards righteousness ; but not wholly 
 so, for the flesh is not at once subdued, and there 
 is a war between the good and the bad principles 
 of action in the soul of him who has been pardoned. 
 The conflict is described in a soliloquy, in which 
 there is some confusion of psychological terms. A 
 series of good principles is enumerated in opposi- 
 tion to a series of bad principles. It is not the 
 Ego warring with a principle of evil, nor is it the 
 war of grace with the unregenerate Ego. It is 
 the law which is spiritual (vo/ios ttvct/mitikos) in 
 conflict with the carnal Ego CEyai o-apictKos); it is 
 the Ego hating one course of action, and yet per- 
 forming it; willing one course of action, and per- 
 forming another. It is the Ego which serves the 
 law of God, warring against the Ego which serves 
 the law of sin, the Ego as rational (iv t<5 vot) 
 
86 THEOBIES OF THE -Wllil. 
 
 in conflict with, an Ego which is carnal. It is 
 opposition between the law of my mind or reason, 
 and the law or principle of sin which is in my 
 members (/^cX^). The Ego is apparently the agent 
 in either case, whether the spirit or the flesh con- 
 quers. There can be no doubt that Paul regards 
 the attainment of holiness as progressive and not 
 instantaneous, and so the conflict thus described is 
 theologically free from difficulty. Philosophically, 
 it is impossible that the Ego should be ranged on 
 either side exclusively in this inner conflict. But 
 it is ranged first on one side, and then on 
 another; it is evident that there is something 
 more than a mere impersonal conflict between two 
 principles, good and bad. If we eliminate as im- 
 possible the idea that Paul was setting forth the 
 modern psychological theory of a double person- 
 ality, it is plain that he views the will as de- 
 termined by one or the other of two conflicting 
 motives, and acknowledges that without prede- 
 termining grace, it will be predetermined by sin 
 which is resident in human nature even after 
 grace has been imparted. 
 
 This interpretation of the seventh chapter of 
 Romans is further justified by the continuation of 
 the discussion in chapters eighth and ninth. The 
 antithesis between the carnal and the spiritual is 
 again emphasized. The carnal mind is enmity 
 against God ; it cannot obey the law of God. They 
 that are in the flesh (ev aapKi) cannot please God.^ 
 The subjection of the creature to the vain principle 
 1 Rom. VIII. 7, 8. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 87 
 
 of the flesh is not voluntary, and the creature -will 
 be freed from the slavery of corruption. To those 
 who are freed from the bondage of the flesh, a hope 
 of glorification is offered.' If it be asked who are 
 to be glorified, it is found that whom he did fore- 
 know, he also did predestinate, and whom he pre- 
 destinated, them he also called, and whom he 
 called, them he also justified, and whom he justi- 
 fied, them he also glorified.'' If this should be 
 thought consistent with an indeterministic view of 
 the human will, it is difficult to explain why in the 
 ninth chapter Paul should be at pains to answer 
 objections to determinism. It is quite irrational to 
 defend indeterministic doctrine against objections 
 which have force only against deterministic doc- 
 trine. It seems equally irrational to employ posi- 
 tive arguments which lead to determinism, if the 
 proof of indeterminism be the end in view. 
 
 If those who are glorified are those who have 
 been predestinated, then there has obviously been an 
 election or choice of those who are predestinated, 
 called, justified, and glorified. Not all the chil- 
 dren of Abraham were elected, but only Isaac ; not 
 all the sons of Isaac, but Jacob only. The elec- 
 tion was unconditional, for it was made before the 
 birth of the children, and the election was not 
 according to works, but according to the mind of 
 God. This is not merely the choice of a nation, 
 for not all are Israel which are of Israel; neither 
 because they are Abraham's seed are they all chil- 
 dren ; but in Isaac shall thy seed be called. But 
 1 Kom. Vin. 20. « Eom. VIII. 29. 
 
88 THEORIES OF THE WILI. 
 
 if God thus unconditionally decides yrho are to be 
 elected, it is possible that a man may say that 
 God is unrighteous. The Apostle's protest is not 
 against the doctrine of unconditional predestina- 
 tion and determinism, but against the man who 
 regards such a theory as impugning the righteous- 
 ness of God. Moses received a manifestation of 
 divine glory, not from anything which he had 
 done to deserve it, but out of God's unconditioned 
 determination. Pharaoh was not one of the chosen 
 race, and God hardened his heart; the reprobation 
 of Pharaoh as well as the election of Moses is 
 expressly taught. Almost every objection which 
 can be made to the doctrine here laid down is 
 stated and answered ; and the writer intimates that 
 human criticism is out of place: who art thou, O 
 man, that repliest against God ? Why doth he yet 
 find fault, for who hath resisted his will? The 
 clay cannot find fault with the potter, unless it has 
 authority to legislate for the potter. The vessel is 
 not made dishonorable, but it is made a vessel unto 
 dishonor. In the case of Pharaoh, which excited 
 great attention in most of the later Christian theol- 
 ogy, Paul seems to say : God is not the cause of 
 evil in the mind of Pharaoh ; but in any event God 
 is the cause of Pharaoh's existence. And indeed it 
 might be urged that if God foreknows the dishonor 
 of Pharaoh, and yet brings Pharaoh into the world, 
 the objection made to the doctrine of unconditional 
 election applies also to that of conditional election. 
 It is possible that so strict an interpretation of a 
 passage, which is in the main practical and hortar 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 89 
 
 tory, should not be offered; and it may be urged 
 that Paul probably had no definite conception of 
 the philosophical bearings of what he was affirm- 
 ing. Even admitting the force of this objection, 
 the fact remains that in all theories of the will in 
 the history of Christian theology the doctrines of 
 Paul have been so extensively interpreted that I 
 have been unable to give any account of the one, 
 without a notice of the other. 
 
 The Greek Fathers 
 
 The earlier part of the Patristic age was a period 
 in which Christian writers were chiefly engaged in 
 defending the faith against Anti-Christian oppo- 
 nents, such as the Neo-Platonists and the Gnostics. 
 Christianity was in conflict also with the old poly- 
 theism of the Greek and Roman religion. In this 
 earlier period, emphasis was laid upon the unity 
 of God, as opposed to the many deities of pagan 
 religion and the Gnostic dualism. The govern- 
 ment of the world was held to be in the hands of 
 providence, and not under fatal necessity. To 
 avoid the Gnostic conclusion that God is the cause 
 of evil, the early Fathers contended that God had 
 simply permitted evil, and that the free will 
 of angels and of men was responsible for sin. 
 This raised the question, first, as to the way in 
 which man came to sin by his own free will ; and, 
 second, as to what effect the fall of man had upon 
 the race. This became the subject of debate be- 
 tween Augustine and the Pelagians. Consequently 
 
90 THEOBIBS OP THE WILL 
 
 the theories of tlie eaxlier Fathers were indetermin- 
 istie, and the pronounced determinism of Augustine 
 was a result of the rise into prominence of the 
 doctrine of original sin. 
 
 The greater part of the later period of the Pa- 
 tristic age was occupied with purely theological 
 disputes, first, as to the Holy Trinity, and then as 
 to the person and nature of Jesus Christ. When 
 such doctrines had been defined by general councils, 
 the subject of man became a centre of interest. 
 And this engaged the attention of the Latin 
 Fathers in their opposition to the Pelagians. 
 
 The tendency of the Eastern Fathers to hold an 
 indeterministic theory of the will arose from the 
 fact that they were obliged to meet in controversy 
 the pagans who believed in fatal necessity, and the 
 Gnostics who made God the author of evil. While 
 there were Gnostics who taught explicitly a doc- 
 trine of freedom, the views of the school regarding 
 matter and the body were not favorable to a 
 belief in indeterminism. The limitation of the 
 soul by evil matter, which was a principle of both 
 Gnostic and Manichean, would lead some to the 
 logical conclusion that under such bondage the 
 volitions of man must be determined by this 
 corrupting influence. It was the Christian doctrine 
 of original sin which was the chief cause for the 
 appearance in theological discussion of the problem 
 of the will. "This is that hereditary corruption 
 which the Fathers called original sin, meaning by 
 sin the depravation of a nature previously good 
 and pure ; on which subject they had much conten- 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 91 
 
 tion, nothing being more remote from natural reason 
 than that all should be criminated on account of 
 the guilt of one, and thus sin become common; 
 which seems to have been the reason why most 
 ancient doctors of the church did but obscurely 
 glance at this point, or at least explained it with 
 less perspicuity than it required. Yet this timidity 
 could not prevent Pelagius from arising, etc."^ 
 Even Augustine was at first little disposed to de- 
 velop a doctrine of the will in accordance with the 
 theory of original sin. His earlier opponents were 
 mostly Manicheans and pagan philosophers; and 
 from a letter written by him shortly before the 
 outbreak of the Pelagian controversy, it is plain 
 that he had hitherto paid no particular attention to 
 the questions which Pelagius had raised in Eome. 
 
 Justin Martyr, the earliest of the Patristic writers, 
 teaches that God foreknows all that is about to come 
 to pass, and that prophecy will most certainly 
 be fulfilled. But he opposes the fatal necessity of 
 the Stoics. While angels and men were created to 
 obey the law of God, their punishment is fore- 
 told, because God foreknew that they would sin. 
 Por angels and men were created with free will, 
 capable of virtue or vice, and therefore subject 
 to reward or blame. It is not the fault of God 
 that they have sinned.^ Man was not made like 
 the quadrupeds and other lower beings. He is 
 endowed with freedom, without which he would 
 have been undeserving of punishment and un- 
 
 1 Calvin, Inst. II. 1, 6. 
 
 * Justin Martyr, In Apol. I. 28, 43. 
 
92 THEOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 •worthy of reward. Justin, however, does not define 
 will, nor give any psychological explanation of it. 
 Irenaeus, who was one of the chief opponents of 
 the Gnostics, teaches a doctrine of general predes- 
 tination, and the unity of the divine plan, in dis- 
 tinction from dualism. He criticises those who 
 attribute the creation of the world to angels, and 
 declares that God alone is creator, who has predes- 
 tinated all things according to his pleasure, by his 
 word.^ Man is endowed with reason, and in this 
 respect is like God. He has free will, that is, he 
 has power over his own actions. He is said to be a 
 cause unto himself." This expression which origi- 
 nated with Justin Martyr was afterwards adopted 
 by Spinoza in his definition of God. If the theol- 
 ogy of Irenaeus be separated from his anthropology, 
 his language when he refers to the sovereignty of 
 God will be found to be as decided as that of 
 Augustine. The Son of God is the revealer of the 
 Father's will, and reveals the Father to whom he 
 wills. Without the good will of the Father, and 
 the agency of the Son, no man can know God.' 
 One chapter of his work against heresies is de- 
 voted to a consideration of the freedom of the will. 
 In this he presents a form of indeterminism. Man 
 is called upon to obey freely, and not by any exter- 
 nal or internal compulsion. God has commanded 
 obedience, and the law has sanctions. Men are 
 judged, not by their natures, but by their actions. 
 They deserve no praise for having a good nature, 
 
 1 Irenfflus, Adv. Hseres, II. 2. 
 « Id., ib. IV. 4. 8 Id., ib. rv. 6, 7. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 93 
 
 nor blame for having a bad nature. Obedience is 
 possible to the commands of God, whether tha 
 nature of man be bad or good. Irenaeus defends 
 the singular theory that if God had created devils 
 and men who were predetermined to resist his will, 
 it would argue impotence in God. The opposite of 
 this has sometimes been held by advocates of pre- 
 destination, that if a man has free will, the omnipo- 
 tence of God is limited. It is interesting to find 
 Irenaeus taking a contradictory view. The man 
 who does not obey the commands of God, is the 
 cause of his own disobedience. Those who do not 
 see the light are blind through their own fault, 
 for the light is there. The fault is not God's but 
 man's; he has been created a free agent with 
 power over himself.' 
 
 Hippolytus, a disciple of Irenaeus, and another 
 opponent of the Gnostics, criticises Plato for his 
 "fatalism," directing his attack against the Pla- 
 tonic statement that vice is involuntary. He crit- 
 icises also the Stoics for their doctrine of fatal 
 necessity, and the Epicureans for their belief in 
 chance.* A treatise on the freedom of the will is 
 attributed to Methodius, but is of doubtful authen- 
 ticity, and of small importance. It teaches that 
 man was created free, so that it might be possible 
 for him to obey or to disobey the commands of 
 God. Evil has come into the world as the effect 
 of disobedience. Having originally had power, 
 man has enslaved himself. While this exhibits 
 
 1 Irenaeus, Adv. Hseres, IV. 37. 
 « Hippolytus, Refut. 1. 1&-19. 
 
94 THEORIES OP THE WILL 
 
 some signs of the Pauline doctrine of inability, it 
 is doubtful whether the writer of the treatise in- 
 tended to speak except figuratively of the slavery 
 of the will. 
 
 The ablest theologians among the Eastern 
 Fathers, were Clement of Alexandria and Origen. 
 Although they opposed the Gnostics, there are 
 signs of Gnosticism in some of their own opinions. 
 Clement attacked the theory that God is in any 
 way the author of evil. He was the first to intro- 
 duce a distinction which ever since his day has had 
 a prominent place in theological literature. He 
 affirms that God is not the cause of evil, but 
 that God permits the existence of , evil.* There 
 was a purpose which God set before him, and 
 which required for its accomplishment the creation 
 of man." When man sinned, God simply did not 
 interfere to prevent the occurrence. Not to pre- 
 vent an event, is different from causing an event. 
 God is therefore not the cause of evil, except in so 
 far as he did not interfere to prevent it. God fore- 
 knows all that is about to happen. The ground of 
 predestination is this foreknowledge. Foreknow- 
 ing, for example, that certain men will be right- 
 eous, God predestinates them unto eternal life. The 
 devil had free will and was the cause of sin, and 
 God is not responsible for the volitions of the 
 devil.' Sin is the result of free inclination and 
 choice. Yet while God permits evil, he overrules 
 it for good. As God is not the cause of sin, so also 
 
 1 Clement, Strom. 1. 17. 
 !> Id., ib. I. 3. a Id., ib. 1. 17. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 95 
 
 he is not the cause of the will to become righteous. 
 Christ saves men by drawing to himself those who 
 are willing to be drawn. Everything which did 
 not hinder man's free choice, God rendered auxili- 
 ary to well-doing, in order that the divine goodness 
 might be revealed. ^ 
 
 More specifically, Clement teaches that self- 
 determining choice has been imparted to the soul.' 
 Voluntary actions are of three kinds: (1) those 
 which are done according to desire; (2) those 
 which are done by choice; (3) those which are 
 done intentionally. There is a corresponding 
 threefold division of evils into (1) sins, (2) mis- 
 takes, (3) crimes. Both of these divisions are 
 obscurely drawn. Sins and mistakes are said to 
 be merely errors ; voluntary sins are crimes.* To 
 commit sin lies within man's power, and depends 
 upon his volition. Will takes the precedence of 
 all other human powers, and the intellect is its 
 servant. In this Clement departs from the Plar 
 tonic tradition, and defends the primacy of the 
 will. * God has set before men good and evil 
 objects of choice. Men are not made originally 
 virtuous or vicious. Sin is dependent on the will ; 
 and faith as well as the intellectual powers is 
 subject to will. 
 
 Origen, like the other Greek Fathers, defends 
 indeterminism, although his doctrine of providence 
 is in accordance with belief in predestination. Ac- 
 cording to him none of the events which happen to 
 
 1 Clement, Strom. VI. 6. 
 aid., ib. II. 4. » Id., ib. II. 15. < Id., ib. II. 17. 
 
96 THEOKIES OF THE WILL 
 
 man, happens by accident. All occurs in accord- 
 ance with a plan so stupendous, and yet so care- 
 fully considered, that even the hairs of the head 
 are numbered.^ Nor does Origen shrink from 
 admitting that some men perish in accordance 
 with the wUl of God ; as in the case of Pharaoh, 
 whose heart God hardened. His less general treat- 
 ment of the will forbids the supposition that he 
 believed it to be determined. He makes a dis- 
 tinction between objects which have a cause of 
 motion from without, and those which are moved 
 from within. To the latter class belong animals, 
 plants, possibly metals, fire, and fountains. Most 
 animate things are moved by a phantasm spring- 
 ing up within them, which incites to effort. But 
 the rational animal is incited to effort by 
 something in addition to phantasm. There 
 may be some external cause which incites the 
 reason, but it is the latter which determines what 
 the action shall be. It is not possible to distin- 
 guish the reason and the will completely in the 
 writings of Origen. The incitement of the reason 
 is not irresistible. In the presence of the same 
 temptation one man will resist, another will yield. 
 The action is not dependent solely on the external 
 cause. Men are not dragged about as slaves ; nor 
 is the action of the will determined by the consti- 
 tution of the body. In opposition to the Gnostics, 
 Origen holds that the reason sits as a judge over 
 all external incitements. It is probable that he 
 means that choice is a function of the reason. In 
 I Origen, De Princlp. II. 11. 
 
IN CHBISTIAN THEOLOGY 97 
 
 a fragment of Origen found in Jerome's epistle to 
 Avitus, it is said that all men have free will, and 
 that it lies with each one to improve or to degrade 
 his life.* 
 
 The most striking aspect of Origen's psychology- 
 is his theory adopted from Plato, of the pre- 
 existent soul. The conduct of man is determined 
 not by the Creator, but by the will of man as 
 a rational creature. When it is said that men 
 are created to dishonor, it is meant that this is on 
 account of their preSxistent characters and conse- 
 quent free actions.^ This suggests the theory of 
 the Platonic myth, that it lies in the power of pre- 
 existent souls to choose their own destiny. It may 
 be noticed that this explanation is not sufficient to 
 account for the preSxistent character of the soul, 
 nor does it prove that acts of free will determine 
 the character. This view of the will is to be found 
 repeated throughout Origen's theology. He dis- 
 cusses the case of Pharaoh, and maintains that the 
 statement of the Bible is quite in harmony with 
 free will. It had been argued that if God hardened 
 Pharaoh's heart, then Pharaoh's will was not free. 
 In opposition to this Origen maintains that if 
 Pharaoh had an earthy nature, so that he disobeyed 
 God because of such a nature, there was no need 
 that his heart should be hardened. If he had not 
 an earthy nature, God would not have hardened 
 his heart, because God would not cause a man 
 to sin, unless the man's character was bad. Origen 
 
 1 S. Hieron, Epist. ad Avit. 
 » Origen, De Princip. II. 10. 
 
98 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 therefore does not hold the doctrines of original 
 sin and depravity. The origin of repentance is in 
 the heart of man. When men come of their own 
 free will to God, he removes the stony heart. 
 This view is enforced by the quotation of many 
 practical exhortations from the Scriptures.' 
 
 The soul of man in its present state is one of 
 three principles in man. Human nature is made 
 up of spirit, soul, and body. Each part has its 
 own will. It is difficult to determine in which 
 of these three, the unity of the will is to be 
 found. The psychical will is the most important 
 morally. For the will of the soul is said to obey 
 either spirit or body of its own free choice. It is 
 better that the soul should follow altogether the 
 will of the flesh, than that it should waver. For 
 in such an extreme condition, there is a more 
 favorable prospect of reformation. Men fail to 
 come to God, not because of God's inability to draw 
 them, but because of their wayward wills.' 
 
 The Latin Fathers 
 
 tbetullian. 
 
 The thought of the Latin Fathers is so well 
 represented in the writings of Augustine that it 
 will not be necessary to consider their theories in 
 great detail. Among them there is no more inter- 
 esting writer than TertuUian. "While in time, he 
 
 1 Origen, De Princip. in. 1. 
 
 2 See particularly Origen Ilepi toS Airelouo-iou, I. 1-7 ; De 
 Princip. III. i i Contra Gels. VI. 57. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 99 
 
 belongs to the age of apologies, his doctrine has not 
 been without positive influence on Christian theol- 
 ogy. Yet his frequent inconsistencies, his declamar 
 tory manner, and his arbitrary distinction between 
 matters of reason and matters of faith make it 
 difficult to present a satisfactory account of his 
 philosophical opinions. 
 
 His chief psychological treatise contains no syste- 
 matic account of the soul. It is for the most part 
 a fierce polemic against the theories of the Greek 
 and Eoman philosophers. His teaching has more 
 affinity to the philosophy of the Stoics than to that 
 of any of the Greek schools. 
 
 He rejects the Platonic theory of preexistence, 
 and holds that the soul is generated and propagated 
 with the body. In conformity with this principle, 
 he teaches that the soul is corporeal in its nature. 
 He speaks even of God as corporeal.^ While many 
 have interpreted these expressions as evidence that 
 Tertullian was a materialist, it seems more rational 
 to regard them as manifestations of impetuous and 
 inconsistent speculation. For he attacks the Gnos- 
 tic doctrine that matter is coeternal with God. 
 
 The soul cannot be called an animal body {corpus 
 cmimale) nor a non-animal body (corpus inanimale). 
 For it is that which makes a body animal by its 
 presence, and non-animal by its absence. In op- 
 position to those who hold that the soul is incor- 
 poreal, from the fact that the soul can be moved 
 from without by bodily objects, and can itself 
 produce motion of bodies, it is proved that it ia 
 1 Tertullian, De Anim. XXI. 
 
100 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 corporeal in its nature. Conatus ejus extrinsecus 
 foris parent. Hands, feet, eyes, and tongue are 
 moved by the soul.^ Tertullian opposes also the 
 Platonic threefold division of the soul, holding that 
 there is reason in appetite and emotion, as well 
 as in the thinking principle." 
 
 The Traducian theory held by Tertullian does 
 not, according to him, exclude the possibility of a 
 subsequent change in the nature of the soul. A 
 bad character will necessarily effect bad actions; 
 yet, to use his language, divine grace can change 
 stones into the children of Abraham, and a genera- 
 tion of vipers into the fruit of penitence : vis divinae 
 gratiae potentior utique natura, habens in nobis sub 
 jacentem sibi liberam arbitrii protestatem quod to 
 avTc^ouo-iov dicitur. This is the term used by the 
 Greek Fathers to denote free will. It is a native 
 power of the soul. Thus the nature of man is 
 not fixed in evil, as some of the Gnostics taught, 
 but can be changed by grace. Tertullian empha- 
 sized the e£B.ciency of grace more than any of the 
 Greek Fathers had done. Grace is more powerful 
 than nature ; and free will is drawn under the sway 
 of supernatural power. Free will, however, is part 
 of the essence of the souJ. It belongs both to 
 fallen and to unfallen man. God not only made 
 man a free master of his actions, but also imposed 
 laws upon him. This would not have been done, 
 had not man had it in his power to disobey as 
 well as to obey. The reason why exhortation 
 and persuasion are effective is because of man's 
 
 1 Tertullian, De Anim. I.-V. a Id., lb. XVI. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 101 
 
 free will. The original liberty of man was a 
 manifestation of the goodness of God; for man 
 was made in the image and likeness of God, a part 
 of which is free choice. The sin of man is no re- 
 flection upon the goodness of the Creator.' In 
 opposition to Marcion, Tertullian argues that if 
 God had intervened to prevent the fall of man, and 
 to keep the serpent away, Marcion might have said 
 that it was a faithless Lord who abridged the liberty 
 which he had first bestowed. The same free will 
 which succumbed to the temptation becomes at 
 length the conqueror of the devil, by obedience to 
 the law of God. Man is responsible for his use 
 and misuse of freedom. Yet the predetermination 
 of events is stated very distinctly: nihil origine 
 sua prius est in agnitione, quia nee in dispositione. 
 Subito filius, et subito missus est, autem dispositum. 
 ... At quin nihil putem a Deo subitum, quia nihil 
 a Deo non dispositum. 
 
 St. Jbeome 
 
 The theory of Jerome deserves notice more on 
 account of his prominent part in the Pelagian con- 
 troversy than because his opinion has intrinsic im- 
 portance. In his writings, there is a departure 
 from the indeterminism of the earlier Fathers and 
 an approach to the position afterwards occupied by 
 Augustine. His psychological views are rare, and 
 always unsystematically expressed. His references 
 to the will are for the most part theological. These 
 
 1 Tertulliau, Anti Marc. II. 6, 6. 
 
102 THEORIES OF THE WII.I- 
 
 are scattered throughout his formal treatises and his 
 letters. All the Patristic writers agree that Adam 
 was originally endowed with free choice of good 
 and eyil. The only question is whether the will 
 of fallen man is free, without freedom being given 
 by the grace of God. This, as has been already 
 said, unites the theological discussion of the will 
 to the doctrine of grace. Jerome's theory is theo- 
 logically defended by reference to the New Testa- 
 ment rather than to the reason. 
 
 1. He teaches a doctrine of providence in har- 
 mony with predestination. All things are con- 
 trolled and directed by the providence of God. It 
 was owing to the divine foreknowledge and predes- 
 tination that the prophets were enabled to see the 
 future, as if it were already past, and to make 
 truthful predictions. Predestinatio is different 
 from propositum. The former refers to the inten- 
 tion of God a long time prior to the event deter- 
 miaed. The latter is applied to a plan in the 
 immediate future : — 
 
 de quo . . . Paulus ait ; ut autem venit plentitudo temporis, 
 rmsit Deus Filium suum ; qui ante venire non potuit nisi 
 mysterium temporis impleretur.i 
 
 Jerome reproves those who seek to discover why 
 God has willed as he has." But he wavers between 
 the theory of conditional and that of unconditional 
 predestination. Among several strong passages in 
 his commentaries is one in which he interprets the 
 words secundum propositum suae voluntatis, in the 
 
 1 S. Hieron, Opera, IV. I. 330. » Id., ib. IV. ii. 604. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 103 
 
 Epistle to the Ephesians, as meaning, according to 
 the purpose of God, independent of the -will of 
 man. And he explains the words in the Romans, 
 his qui secundum propositum vocati, etc., by saying 
 that men believe because they have been predesti- 
 nated to eternal life. To the objection of the Pela- 
 gian that if God predestinates all human actions, 
 he is commanding certain things which are impos- 
 sible for man to perform, Jerome replies, that 
 many things are ordained as lawful and proper, 
 but that it is not the duty of every man to do 
 them all.* Some commands do not apply to all men. 
 Throughout his works, however, Jerome refers to 
 the mystery which surrounds this subject: a me 
 sententiae et dispositionis Dei causas requiris? 
 
 2. He teaches also a doctrine of indeterminism. 
 While his defence of freedom is not in harmony 
 with many of his statements concerning grace, he 
 asserts very emphatically the doctrine of free 
 will : — 
 
 sed liberum dedit arbitrium Beus, quod aliter liberum non 
 erit, nisi feoero quod voluero.^ Liberum arbitrium dat 
 liberam voluntatem, et non statim ex libero arbitrio homo 
 facit, sed Domini auzllio.s 
 
 While Jerome asserts that man has fallen, is in 
 a state of sin, and cannot of himself do any good, 
 the part that grace performs in man's obedience is 
 not quite clear. Man is free, because he has grace. 
 On the one hand it is said : — 
 
 1 S. HieroD, Opera, IV. n. 497. 
 « Id., lb. IV. u. 478. 8 Id., ib. IV- n. 481. 
 
104 THEOBIES OF THE WILL 
 
 Bed si quid in me boni habeo, illo suggerente et adjuvante 
 completur,^ 
 
 which is in harmony with a moderate degree of 
 freedom even in fallen man. On the other hand, 
 the freedom of the will is ascribed wholly to grace : 
 
 nt enim liberum possideamus arbitrium, et vel ad bonam 
 vel ad malam partem deolinemus propria voluntate, ejus 
 est gratiae, qui nos ad imaginem et simitudiuem sui tales 
 condidit.'' 
 
 This difficulty arises in more than one of the Patris- 
 tic theories. The will in fallen man seems to be 
 determined to evil. It is freed by grace. If grace 
 is given in consequence of man's will to have it, 
 then freedom is not wholly lost in the fall; and if 
 not, then the questions are raised, — first, is the sin- 
 ner responsible for his sins, and, second, is the man 
 in a state of grace responsible for his holy actions? 
 These questions were discussed more fully by 
 Augustine. The obscurity of Jerome's theory is 
 further increased by his remarks on the harden- 
 ing of Pharaoh's heart. Here he represents God 
 as acting conditionally and not unconditionally. 
 Pharaoh's heart was hardened not through the direct 
 agency of God, but because of its native character, 
 just as certain substances are not softened by the 
 warmth of the sun : — 
 
 Alicquin unus est solis calor, et secundum essentius sub- 
 jacentes, alia liquefaoit, alia indurat, alia solvit, alia con- 
 stringit. Liquatur enim cera, et induratur lutum : et tamen 
 
 1 S. Hieron, Opera, IV. n. 485. « Id., IV. n. 486. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 105 
 
 caloris non est diversa natura. Sio et bonitas et dementia 
 Dei, vasa irae quae apta svint in interitum, id est populum 
 Israel, indurat.i 
 
 The same difficulties reappear from time to time 
 in later theological discussions of the wilL Some 
 of the inconsistencies of the earlier Fathers are 
 corrected in the philosophy of Augustine. 
 
 St. Augustine 
 
 Augustine's interest in the will is chiefly theo- 
 logical. He treats of predestination, sin, grace, 
 and their effects, but contributes very little to the 
 psychological doctrine of volition. In this respect, 
 he falls behind some of his predecessors, notably 
 Aristotle. 
 
 I. The Nature of the Will. Two terms are used 
 by him to denote the faculty of will. The first of 
 these is voZwriias; the second, arhitrium. Voluntas, 
 in addition to its executive signification, compre- 
 hends also the character, incliaations, and affec- 
 tions of man. In many cases it is synonymous 
 with arhitrium. The latter denotes the will as a 
 decision of the soul. Its primary meaning is pres- 
 ence — the presence of judges in a court. It was 
 then applied to judicial decisions, and was adopted 
 into philosophy to denote a decision of the soul or 
 mind. Augustine sometimes speaks of arbitrium 
 voluntatis, possibly to distinguish will from arbi- 
 trium intellectus. Yet Lucretius uses arbitrium to 
 
 I S. Hieron, Opera, IV. 1. 182. 
 
106 THEOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 denote the act of tlie mind which executes the in- 
 tentions. 
 
 According to Augustine, the creature is endowed 
 with will by a creative act of the Trinity.^ 
 Whether he held that the individual soul was the 
 result of a creative act, or was transmitted by the 
 laws of ordinary generation, cannot be directly de- 
 cided, nor is it of much importance to the present 
 inquiry that it should be decided. Beings which 
 have will, even if the will be evil, are to be ranked 
 higher than those which have none. The will is 
 defined as an act of the soul, either towards the not 
 losing or towards the gaining of something without 
 coercion, — voluntas animi actus, cogente nullo, ad 
 aliquid vel non amittendum vel adipiscendum.* 
 This act or motion is not physical. But it is felt 
 far more intimately than any other fact. The will 
 is almost the same with the person, — voluntas est 
 quippe in omnibus : immo omnes nihil aliud quam 
 Toluntates sunt.' The soul is present in every part 
 of the body, and is moved by the will spontane- 
 ously, and by nothing foreign to itself. Certain 
 Manicheans had affirmed that the soul is moved ab 
 extra, and had inferred that man is not responsible 
 for his deeds. Augustine holds that every volition 
 belongs to the man who wills, and that he is there- 
 fore responsible for his actions.'* 
 
 It might be demonstrated that Augustine's doc- 
 
 1 S. Augustin. Opera, III. Part I. 242. (The references are 
 to the Benedictine edition of 1685.) 
 
 2 I. 24 ; of. VIII. 71, 85 1 X. 1261, 1263. 
 
 8 VII. 354 ; X. 610. < 1. 13, 613 J X. 717 ; II. 8T4. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 107 
 
 trine of the will was modified at different parts of 
 his career, according to the theological opposition 
 by which he was confronted. He had been early- 
 trained in the philosophy of the Academy, and by 
 education would be disposed to indeterminism. 
 But he had afterwards become a Manichean, and 
 his conversion from Manicheism to Catholic Chris- 
 tianity had produced in him a strong reaction against 
 that heresy. With the Academic teachings he never 
 altogether lost sympathy ; but during his ecclesias- 
 tical life the Manicheans were among his most for- 
 midable antagonists. It is, however, interesting 
 to remember that Augustine and his followers were 
 accused of Manicheism by the Pelagians. During 
 his earlier life as a Christian, he was also opposed 
 to the doctrines of the Greek determinists and fatal- 
 ists. There was nothing in the theories of these 
 adversaries which made the defence of predestina- 
 tion and original sin essential to Augustine's 
 apologetic. It was not until the Pelagian heresy 
 arose, and agitated both East and West, that those 
 principles which have since been called Augustinian 
 were clearly formulated in Latin theology. And 
 even after Pelagian doctrines had spread through- 
 out the Church, we find Augustine expressing igno- 
 rance of the nature of the controversy.^ In order 
 to understand Augustine's theory of the will in 
 relation to the doctrines of predestination and 
 original sin, it is proper that some account should 
 be given of the points in this dispute, which ex- 
 cited the whole Church to lively debate, and caused 
 1 Vit. S. Augustini, ed. Bened. VII. c. vin. 
 
108 THEOBIES OF THE WILL 
 
 the interference of the Holy See and of the Eoman 
 Emperor. 
 
 II. The Pelagian Doctrines. Prom the fact that 
 Pelagius was a British monk, and had been at least 
 familiar with the religion of the Druids, if not 
 himself a Druid, it has been sometimes said that 
 his doctrine of indeterminism was Druidic. There 
 seems to be no necessity for such an inference, 
 especially as there had been an indeterministic 
 tendency among the Eastern Fathers prior to his 
 own time. As he left no writings, it is difficult 
 to say what he actually and uniformly taught. He 
 made several recantations of his heresy, as did also 
 his chief follower, CoBlestius, and it is not known 
 to what form of doctrine they adhered. Pela- 
 gianism was without doubt primarily an ethical 
 movement, which afterwards became a theological 
 revolution. At Eome, at Carthage, and in the East 
 the Pelagians contended that predestination led 
 first to determinism and then to lawlessness. This 
 opinion afterwards prevailed in the Semi-Pelagian 
 monastery of Adrumentum. A powerful moral and 
 theological impression was made upon the Christian 
 Church, from Eome to Carthage, and from Carthage 
 to Jerusalem. 
 
 In general, the Pelagians taught: that Adam's 
 death was not a consequence of his sin; that the 
 sin of Adam was not imputed to his descendants ; 
 that there is no original sin; that all sin is actual, 
 and is the result of volition ; that the will in each 
 man is undetermined towards the bad or the good ; 
 and that even without the help of divine grace man 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 109 
 
 can avoid sin. Men are thus the authors of their 
 own salvation; the unaided will is sufficient for 
 righteousness, and there is the liberty of indiffer- 
 ence in every man. It follows, to cite the famous 
 dilemma of Ccelestius: Si necessitatis est, pec- 
 catum non est; si voluntatis, vitari potest.* In 
 the East the Pelagians encountered Jerome, and in 
 the West they encountered Augustine. 
 
 III. Tlie Doctrine of Predestination. This had 
 already been taught by the Greek Fathers, but 
 Augustine presented it in a much more decided 
 form. According to him, all events are foreknown 
 to God, because he has predetermined them." The 
 causes of predestination lie hidden from human 
 sight, and man cannot discover them. In the same 
 way, the righteousness of the divine plan is beyond 
 the criticism of men. Eeasoning from the omnipo- 
 tence of God, it is shown that all events are either 
 predestinated or permitted by him. Even the 
 actions of the wicked are included in the divine 
 plan, so that they may serve as lessons for the good. 
 Erom the conception of God are deduced his im- 
 mutability and the necessary counsel of his will." 
 So inclusive is the predestinating purpose of God, 
 that in it are comprehended all inner and outer 
 events, from the creation to the fall of man, and 
 from the fall, to the beatijBcation of the elect, and 
 final punishment of the unjust. God's purpose 
 is thus described in a classic passage from De 
 Civitate Dei: — 
 
 1 X. 168. 2 IV. 1501 ; VII. 410 ; X. 17, 18. 
 
 s IV. 1479. 
 
110 THEORIES OP THE WILL 
 
 Verumtamen omnipotenti Deo, summo ao Bumme bono 
 creator! omnium naturarum, voluntatum autem bonarmn 
 adjutori et remuneratori, malarum autem reliotori et damna- 
 tori, utrarumque ordinatori, non defuit utique consilium, 
 quo certum numerum oivium in sua sapientia predestina- 
 tum etiam ex damnato genere humano suae Civitatis im- 
 pleret : . . . Cur ergo non crearet Deus, quos peccaturos 
 esse praesoivit ; quando quidem in eis et ex eis, et quid eorum 
 culpa mereretur, et quid sua gratia donaretur, posset osten- 
 dere, nee sub illo creatore ao dispositore perversa inordinatio 
 deliquentium rectum perverteret ordinem rerum ? i 
 
 This leads to the consideration of Augustine's 
 doctrine of the will in relation to original sin and 
 grace. It is virtually his answer to the Pelagians. 
 
 IV. The Doctrine of the Will in Relation to Origin 
 ncd Sin and Grace. If God has predetermined 
 all events, this must be made to harmonize with the 
 doctrine of the origin of sin. Augustine's method 
 of reconciliation is founded on two general prin- 
 ciples. The first is deduced from the character of 
 God. Because God is good, he is not the author 
 of sin.^ Whatever idle speculations men may make 
 about God, and whatever inferences they may be 
 tempted to draw from the nature of sin, the fact 
 remains that God is good, and that evil cannot be 
 attributed to him.' Sin is not the result of the 
 will (voluntas) of God. It is the effect of God's per- 
 mission, and of a defect (defectxis), that is, a failure 
 on the part of God to will certain positive results. 
 God is negatively, not positively, the cause of evil. 
 But evil wills are said to have no ef&cient cause. 
 
 1 VII. 377. 2 VI. 234. 
 
 8 IV. 1244. See De Libero Arbitrio, Liber II. ad init. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 111 
 
 The second of these principles is that sin is origi- 
 nally due to the free will of man. This has some 
 importance in the philosophical theory of Augus- 
 tine. For in predestination he finds no contradic- 
 tion of the freedom of unfallen man. 
 
 Animae rationali quae est in homine, dedit Deus liberum 
 arbitrium. Sic enim posset habere meritum, si voluntate, 
 non necessitate bonl essemus. Cum ergo oporteat non ne- 
 cessitate sed voluntate bonum esse, oportebat ut Deus animae 
 daret liberum arbitrium.i 
 
 Original freedom was lost at the fall of Adam. 
 Since then, man has been the slave of sin ; of him- 
 self he is unable to avoid sin and attain to holiness. 
 No external obstacle hinders him. The cause lies 
 within him ; for his will is corrupt. Without the 
 will, there is no sin." Augustine speaks of a good 
 will and a bad will, meaning in general the dis- 
 position and affections of a man. The natural will 
 of man in this sense is predetermined to evil, be- 
 cause of original sin. Good and bad wills are com- 
 pared to the roots of trees. The good will is the 
 root of the good tree, and the bad will is the root 
 of the bad tree. The fruits are good or bad ac- 
 cording to the quality of their roots. The root 
 although called voluntas, includes much more than 
 the mere volition. 
 
 In permitting man to sin, God had an occasion for 
 the exhibition of his glory in the work of redemp- 
 tion. This doctrine, which is one of the leading 
 conceptions of Calvinism, has also been adopted in 
 
 1 VIII. 98. * Vni. 101. 
 
112 THEORIES OT THE Wltl- 
 
 effect by later optimists, who, instead of deducing 
 God's moral qualities from tlie phenomena of the 
 world, explain the existence of evil by causes lying 
 beyond the will of God and outside of his character. 
 The remedy for the evil of original sin is found 
 by Augustine, even as by Paul in divine grace. 
 When this is imparted to a sinful man, it may be as 
 the effect or consequent of an outward as well as of 
 an inward call (yocatio)} Grace is given to man, 
 and man responds freely. Man is separated from 
 God by sin, and cannot return of his own will. 
 He must seek a physician who can heal him, and 
 not try to heal himself.^ This return to God lies 
 in his power, only by the help of God (arbitrio ad- 
 jutorio Dei). If men remain without vocatio, it is 
 the depravity of their own minds which makes them 
 sin. For that the grace of God enables a man to re- 
 turn to God, does not mean that man's will has no 
 part in the act. The return is voluntary. Free will 
 is not taken away by grace, but is established.' The 
 foreknowledge of God is held not to be inconsistent 
 with this view. Those who have been predestinated 
 to be delivered from sin have this grace.'' They 
 are made free, because they have been chosen ; and 
 their own choice is the effect of God's choice. Sed 
 quia electi sunt elegerunt ; non quia elegerunt electi 
 sunt.^ Inclinations and feelings are changed by 
 the grace of God, and so the volitions are changed. 
 Predestination is said to be the preparation for the 
 gift of grace; and grace the gift itself. But the 
 
 1 X. 717, 834. 2 V. 352c « X. 114. 
 
 4 X. 839, 840 ; VII. 124 ; V. 762. « X. 738, 812. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 113 
 
 affirmation of efficacious grace does not involve the 
 denial of second causes. The order of causes in 
 the world has been fixed and foreseen by God. 
 The will is a cause in the order of nature: — 
 
 et ipse quippe nostras voluntates in causarum ordine sunt, 
 qui oerus est Deo ejusque praescientia continetur ; quoniam 
 et humanae voluntates humanorum operum causae sunt. 
 Atque ita qui omnes rerum causas praesoivit, profecto in 
 eis causis etiam nostras voluntates ignorare non potuit, 
 quas nostrorum operum causas praescivit.i 
 
 The so-called fortuitous causes of the Greek and 
 Roman philosophy are called by Augustine lor 
 tentes ; it is not denied that natural causes are 
 efficient. They proceed ultimately from the will 
 of God. They cannot be altogether separated from 
 the will of him who is the author and founder of 
 nature. Augustine explicitly rejects the concep- 
 tion of Fate, and that of fatal necessity. With re- 
 spect to a decree of God, it may be said, however, 
 fatum est. If it be held that our wills are con- 
 trolled by necessity, so that we cannot will what we 
 please, experience proves the contrary : — 
 
 necesse est ut ita sit allquid, vel ita flat, nesoio cur earn 
 timeamus, ne nobis libertatem auferat voluntatis.'* 
 
 It is God's grace which operates (operare); it is 
 man's will which cobperates (co-operare).^ The 
 change of will is experienced subjectively as a 
 change of feeling or desire; so that even as man 
 freely desires, so he chooses the good. 
 
 1 VII. 123. ^ VII. 124. 
 
 » De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, 33 ; at. Y. 832. 
 
 I 
 
114 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 Is the will thus transformed, free or not ? This 
 is one of the obscure points in Augustine's doctrine. 
 On the one hand grace restores the liberty which 
 was lost at the fall of Adam ; for Adam originally- 
 had free will.' On the other hand grace determines 
 the will to what is good, just as before it had been 
 determined by original sin. Augustine speaks of a 
 freedom from righteousness, as well as a freedom 
 from sin. The will to righteousness is effected by 
 the grace of God. Whether Augustine's theory is 
 compatible with freedom in the modern psychologi- 
 cal sense, is doubtful. The perplexity and contro- 
 versy which his doctrines have caused in the history 
 of theology are a sufficient commentary on the 
 difficulty of interpreting them consistently. There 
 are parts of Augustine's writings in which he im- 
 plies that the effect of grace is to restore the reason 
 (ratio) to its lost supremacy in the soul. For he 
 describes it as in the citadel of the soul,^ swaying 
 its movements, controlling its evil affections, and 
 furthering righteousness of character and life. 
 
 As has been said above, men are held responsible 
 for their actions. Those who deny that they are 
 responsible, because their wills are determined by 
 the grace of God, are accused of pride and irrever- 
 ence. But those who have been predestinated and 
 elected, and moved by grace, will persevere, and 
 can never relapse iato the state of depravity from 
 which they have emerged.^ Those who have simply 
 the outward call, but are not predestinated, will not 
 be saved. 
 
 1 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, X. 765. » VII. 370. » X. 195. 
 
IN CHKISTIAN THEOLOGY 115 
 
 St. Anselm 
 
 In general Anselm's theory of the will is the 
 same with that of Augustine. Like the latter, he 
 considers it principally in relation to original sin, 
 grace, and righteousness. Like Augustine he lays 
 emphasis upon the doctrine of predestination. 
 
 He does not define the term will as, according 
 to him, it is equivocal. It may mean the instru- 
 ment of willing (instrumentum volendi), or an affec- 
 tion of that instrument (affectio ejiisdem instrumenti), 
 or a use or practice (usus). It is placed on an 
 equality with the reason, and priority is given to 
 neither. There is something higher than both, 
 which employs both as instruments. This higher 
 something is the immaterial soul. As affection, 
 the will is potential, and partly instinctive. The 
 mother is said to will to love her child, not because 
 she is always actually having the feeling of love, 
 but because the feeling is not against her will, and 
 will arise and become actual when an occasion is 
 presented. The will belongs properly to man 
 alone ; the lower animals are subject to the appe- 
 tites of the flesh (appetitus camis). It may have 
 either the just or the expedient as its object. But 
 the will of what is just, is not innate, and is not 
 always found in man. The unjust man does not 
 will what is just ; and the affection of willing what 
 is just is not an inseparable property, for just 
 men sometimes will what is unjust. But from the 
 affections of willing justice and of willing in- 
 justice, man wills whatsoever he wills. The object 
 
116 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 of volition may be either an end or a means to an 
 end; one may will righteousness in order to 
 be saved, or may will to be saved. The will 
 may be either positive or negative, that is, a man 
 may will to have or not to have. There is, further- 
 more, the ef&cieut, the approving, and the permit- 
 ting will. In relation to God, this distinction is 
 introduced to explain the existence of evil in the 
 world. In the philosophy of Anselm, the wUl 
 occupies a position midway between the two dispo- 
 sitions in man, the spirit and the flesh, the nature 
 which tends upward, and that which tends down- 
 ward. When the will joins itself with the carnal 
 nature, the soul is degraded ; when it joins itself 
 with the spiritual nature, the soul is elevated.^ 
 
 That which decides between two alternative 
 courses of action, is called by Anselm liberum 
 arbitrium. Following the doctrine of Augustine, 
 he holds free will to be a property of God and 
 of unfallen angels. The consideration of this 
 subject leads us from Anselm's general conception 
 of the will to his particular views respecting free- 
 dom and necessity. 
 
 I. Freedom. The conception of freedom may 
 be treated of in studying Anselm, either in relation 
 to the doctrine of sin, or in relation to the doctrine 
 of grace. By the freedom of the will he does not 
 mean the liberty of indifference, or the power of 
 contrary choice. He means : — 
 
 a. The liberation of the soul from sin, or the 
 preservation of righteousness in the unfallen. 
 
 1 Anselm, De Voluntate libera. 
 
IN CHEISTIAN THEOLOGY 117 
 
 6. The responsibility of the agent for his self- 
 originated actions. 
 
 By freedom of the will is not meant the power 
 of sinning or not sinning, inasmuch as God and 
 the good angels have free will, and yet have no 
 power of sinning. On the contrary, that will is 
 said to be the most free, which has the least power 
 of falling into sin.^ Freedom is defined as power, 
 and the greater the power, the greater the liberty. 
 
 Quoniam omnis libertas est potestas ; Ula libertas arbitril 
 est potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter Ipsam 
 reotitudlnem.2 
 
 The power to retain original righteousness shows 
 a greater freedom than a power to either retain or 
 desert it at pleasure. Sin was due, however, not to 
 the curtailment of human freedom by any external 
 coercion, but the willing to sin was within the souls 
 of those who sinned, and thus the liberty of retaining 
 original righteousness was lost. The act was spon- 
 taneous {sponte)? Losing the power to retain 
 righteousness, man lost the power of willing what 
 was right. The freedom which was lost was freely 
 lost, and not forcibly taken away by temptation. 
 It may be well to call attention at this point to the 
 inconsistency of Anselm who finds liberty to consist 
 in the power to retain righteousness, and who yet 
 aflELrms that this righteousness was lost by an act 
 of free will. In so far as the will sinned, accord- 
 ing to his principles, it was not free, and freedom 
 to sin is on these principles a contradiction of 
 
 1 Anselm, De Libero Arbitrio, I. 2 Id., ib. III. » Id., ib. U. 
 
118 THEOBIES OF THE WII/L 
 
 terms. The will is so identified witli a man that 
 temptation is simply an occasion for the exercise 
 of a will which in the fallen state has an intrinsic 
 tendency to sin.' 
 
 There are two kinds of freedom, first, that which 
 is neither caused by another, nor received from 
 another, and which is possessed by God alone; 
 secondly, that which is given by God and received 
 from him. This belongs to angels and men. The 
 Tinfallen angels had righteousness and freedom, and 
 they preserved it; the others had it and lost it. 
 Further, righteousness may be held separably or 
 inseparably. It was held by all angels, separably, 
 before the bad angels fell, and before the good 
 were confirmed after the fall. It was held sepa^ 
 rably by man. It is held inseparably by God ; and 
 also by elect angels, and by men ; by the former after 
 the ruin of the fallen angels, by the latter after 
 death.^ From these principles we may conclude 
 that free will consists in determination to right- 
 eousness, and the impossibility of doing anything 
 but righteousness. Yet, Anselm does not adhere 
 consistently to this view. The power to will 
 anything but what is right is a weakness. It is 
 only in a special and limited sense that we may 
 afBrm that Adam sinned of his own free will. If 
 his will had been absolutely free, even as that 
 of God is free, he would have had no power to 
 sin. As in the doctrine of Augustine, it is grace 
 which restores liberty to the fallen will. Without 
 grace, the will is not free, and man is the slave of 
 
 1 Anselm, De Libero Arbitrio, Ill.-V. 2 Id., ib. XIV. 
 
IN CHEISXIAN THEOIiOQT 119 
 
 sin. In what way the slavery of sin limits the 
 free will of man may be seen by the following 
 passage from Anselm : — 
 
 Sine repugnantia et servus est, et liber. Nunquam enim 
 est ejus potestatis, rectitudinem capere, cum non habet ; sed 
 semper est ejus potestatis, servare cum habet. Per hoc, 
 quia redire non potest a peocato, servus est : et per hoc, quia 
 abstrahi non potest a rectitudine, liber est. Sed a peccato et 
 ejus servitute, non nisi per alium potest reverti : et recti- 
 tudine vero non nisi per se potest averti : et a libertate sua 
 nee per se, ueo per alium potest privari. Semper enim 
 naturaliter liber est ad servandam rectitudinem, gi earn 
 habet : etiam quando, quam servet non habet. ^ 
 
 With Augustine, Anselm teaches also, that grace 
 comes from God, and neither freedom nor right- 
 eousness has its source in man. A man may have 
 it in his heart to hold the truth, because he knows 
 it to be right to hold it. He has a right will (reo 
 tam voluntatem) and righteousness of will {rectitu- 
 dinem voluntatis). If such a man be threatened 
 with death, unless he consent to lie, he deliberates 
 whether he shall sacrifice the right for the sake of 
 his life or not, and makes a decision. The act of 
 making the decision is arbitrium, and it is free. 
 The man cannot have a right wUl, however, with- 
 out the grace of God. That his will is right is due 
 not to himself, but to God. If the will in the sense 
 of voluntas, that is the disposition, be wrong, then 
 the decision, or arhitrium, will be wrong. The 
 wrongness of arhitrium, as of voluntas, is caused by 
 the absence of grace. But a wrong decision is not 
 1 Anselm, De Libero Arbitrio, XI. 
 
120 THEORIES OP THE WILL 
 
 given against the will : velle autem non potest invi- 
 tus, quia velle non potest nolens velle ; nam omnis 
 volens ipsum suum velle vult.^ 
 
 Actual sin is always a matter of the will. It is 
 only potentially that sin is original. Original sin 
 is manifest by its effects. Anselm defines it as 
 follows : — 
 
 Originale igitur peocatum non aliud intelligo, quam quod 
 est in infante, mox ut animam habet rationalem ; quicquid 
 prius ia corpora nondum sic animato factum sit, vel post 
 sive in anima, sive in oorpore, futurum sit.^ 
 
 Thus deprived of all righteousness {justitia) and 
 consequently of all true happiness, men are, in the 
 exile of this life, subject to sins which always con- 
 front them, unless the divine grace intervenes for 
 their relief. Original sin has been transmitted 
 from generation to generation, and the realism of 
 Anselm implies the fall of the whole race really in 
 the person of Adam. Episcopius seems to have 
 been right when he associated realism with deter- 
 minism to this extent, that whatever qualities as a 
 sinner Adam once possessed, are really the qualities 
 originally possessed by all sinners descended from 
 him. If these qualities determine the will, the 
 character is determined irrespective of the will, and 
 the will is determined by the character. There is 
 no sin actually in the person jser se; but to sin one 
 must will. The sinfulness of the will is due to the 
 sinfulness of the character. In this sense the will 
 
 1 Anselm, De Libero Arbitrio.V. 
 
 2 Id., De Concept. Virg. et Orig. Pecc. XXVII. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 121 
 
 of fallen man is determined to evil. There is some 
 difficulty in reaching a conclusion as to the extent 
 to which the -will is determined by the grace of 
 God. If such power were at once given to the 
 regenerate man that he could not fall again into 
 sin, then it would be plain that freedom was com- 
 pletely restored by grace. To regain the power to 
 do what is right, and to lose the power to do what 
 is wrong are, according to Anselm's first principles, 
 the highest kind of freedom. The grace of God 
 does not make any one perfect in this life, and so 
 the freedom of the will in this sense is not regained 
 until after death. But a limited freedom is 
 regained; for it becomes possible for a man to 
 avoid sin, although actually he may not cease 
 altogether from sinning. In so far as it is possible 
 for him to sin, his sin must be determined by his 
 sinful character, and in so far as he wills what is 
 right, his right willing must be determined by the 
 grace of God. What, then, is his responsibility for 
 his evil deeds as a sinner, and what is his merit for 
 his right deeds, done through the grace of God? It 
 has been seen how this difficulty was met by Paul 
 and by Augustine. Anselm's definition of liberty 
 or freedom makes another kind of answer necessary. 
 The fact that original sin is inherited, and only 
 actual sin is committed by the will, does not free 
 the agent from responsibility. This is shown by the 
 punishment of sin. All actual sins are sins of the 
 will, and all punishments are punishments of the will.' 
 
 1 Anselm, De Concept. Virg. et Orig. Pece. IV. ; cf . Froslo- 
 gium, IX. X. 
 
122 THEORIES OP THE WI!.!. 
 
 The realism of Anselm raises the question, why 
 the other parts of man should be punished for 
 that which is done by the will; and he replies, 
 that the acts are punished not by the punishment 
 of the person who commits them, but by the 
 punishment of the will which has made the sins 
 actual. All punishment is of the will, because all 
 punishment is contra voluntatem. Voluntas is here 
 used for the desires, and not merely for the decid- 
 ing or executing power of the soul. Eesponsibility 
 does not belong to infants who, although they have 
 original sin, have no will ; and only sins of the will 
 are punished.^ When men become intelligent, they 
 become responsible. If it be asked why sin, even 
 sin of the will is punishable, the answer is, because 
 it is personal. That which makes righteousness 
 righteous, and sin sinful, is that it belongs to a 
 person who wills. Sin is a negation; it is really 
 nothing. And if it be objected that it is unjust to 
 punish nothing, the answer is that the punishment 
 is not on account of the presence of nothing, but 
 because of the absence of something, namely, 
 righteousness. Nor is man excusable because he 
 claims inability to do what he ought, just as a 
 servant is not relieved of responsibility by his 
 master for presenting such an excuse. 
 
 II. Predestination arid Necessity. Prescience and 
 predestination have no meaning in so far as they 
 are related to God's view of the future ; for to him 
 all is present, and there is no past nor future. The 
 knowledge of that which is about to be, the pre- 
 1 Anselm, De Concept. Virg. et Orig. Pecc. I. n. 
 
IN CHEISTIAN THEOLOGY 123 
 
 determination of all events, and the call of men, 
 are all events in the present. But as God fore- 
 knows, he predestinates.^ Anselm here differs 
 from Axigustine in holding that the prescience of 
 God is the cause of predestination. And he quotes 
 in proof of this the words of Paul: "whom he 
 did foreknow, he also did predestinate." Two 
 questions rose before the mind of Anselm, which 
 were an inheritance from the ancient philosophy 
 and from the earlier theology. The first was, 
 what relation has predestination to necessity ? 
 and, second, what relation has predestination to 
 free will? 
 
 Anselm says that the term necessary is often 
 applied to that which is brought about by no force : 
 saepe dicimus necesse esse quod nulla vi esse cogitur; 
 et necesse non esse quod nulla prohibitione remove- 
 tur. When it is said that God is necessarily im- 
 mortal, or necessarily just, we mean that no force 
 obliges him to be immortal or just ; when it is said 
 that a man will necessarily sin, it does not mean 
 that he will be forced to sin. The chief peculiarity 
 about Anselm's view of necessity is in the distinc- 
 tion which he makes between necessitas praecedens, 
 and necessitas sequens. The distinction is derived 
 from one already made by Aristotle, who held that 
 necessity could not be predicated of future, but only 
 of present and past, occurrences. The difference is 
 that Anselm would regard any event which is about 
 to happen, as about to happen necessarily, but 
 would deny that any event could be said to be neces- 
 1 Anselm, De Concord., etc., Q. I. fi. 
 
124 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 sarily about to happen.^ While the distinction is 
 not a valid one, and while it is apparently introduced 
 only to save from necessity the future free volitions 
 of men, it deserves notice as a significant part of 
 Anselm's theory. He sets out with the proposition 
 that God neither foreknows nor predestinates any 
 man to be just, ex necessitate; for without free will, 
 which is opposed to necessity, there is no justice or 
 righteousness. Still, it is admitted that all things 
 which are foreknown and predestinated happen 
 necessarily : necesse sit fieri quae praesciuntur, et 
 quae praedestinantur. Yet certain things which are 
 foreknown and predestinated do not happen with 
 that necessity which precedes and effects, but with 
 that necessity which follows the event: quaedam 
 tamen praescita et praedestinata non eveniunt ea 
 necessitate quae praecedit rem et facit, sed ea quae 
 rem sequitur.^ As predestination does not precede 
 but follows foreknowledge, God who foreknows all 
 contingent events does not predestinate them before 
 they are foreknown. He is thus put, according to 
 Anselm's theory, in the position of one who consents 
 to events, not after they have happened, but after he 
 has known that they are about to happen. Nothing 
 is predestinated, therefore, which is not foreknown. 
 The free or spontaneous acts of men are foreseen 
 to be about to happen ; the foreknowledge does not 
 make them necessary, for they are foreseen as 
 
 1 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I. xvii. Est namque neeessitas 
 praecedens, quae causa est ut sit res ; et est neeessitas sequeus, 
 quam res facit. 
 
 2 Id., De Concord, etc. Q. II. 3; of. De Voluntate Dei, V. 
 
IN CHEISTIAN THEOLOGY 125 
 
 about to happen according to freedom. It is like- 
 wise seen that a necessity will follow them, even 
 if there is no antecedent necessity. For the con- 
 ception of antecedent necessity is inconsistent with 
 free will, inasmuch as all necessity is either coactio 
 or prohibitio. Necessity can be predicated of future 
 events only hypothetically, and not absolutely. 
 Of any future event, it is not said that it will 
 occur necessarily, but only that if it occur it will 
 occur necessarily. This, according to Anselm, is 
 only a conclusion from the principle of contradic- 
 tion, that a thing cannot be and not be at the same 
 time; if, therefore, the event will occur, it is 
 inconceivable that it should not^' occur at the same 
 time, and this constitutes the necessity of the 
 future. The fact that it is foreseen, or predes- 
 tinated, does not affect it either in the way of 
 coaction or prohibition. Without discussing the 
 logical validity of such a position, about which 
 there is grave doubt, it may be said that An- 
 selm's treatise De Concordia, etc., fails to give a 
 consistent account of the determination of the bad 
 will in original sin, and of the foreknowledge and 
 predestination which are so explicitly divorced 
 from necessity. 
 
 Necessitas seqvens has no particular meaning 
 in relation to future events. To know that an 
 event which is about to occur will occur necessarily, 
 is an afl&rmation either that the event is foreknown 
 as about to occur, in which case it is impossible 
 that it should not occur; or else it is foreknown 
 that it is about not to occur, in which case 
 
126 THEOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 there is no necessitas sequens. But it is di£B.cult to 
 see that Anselm has proved that necessitas sequens 
 is distinguishable from necessitas praecedens, if it be 
 held that God foreknows and predetermines the 
 future. Psychologically, the man not knowing 
 whether the event is predetermined or not, may 
 regard it as not yet necessary, and consequently 
 the supposed necessity of the future will not affect 
 his action. That on which Anselm rests necessity 
 is not so much the principle of contradiction as 
 that of identity, as appears from his conclusion : — 
 
 Necessitate ergo omne futurum, futurum est; et si est 
 futurum, futurum est, cum futurum dicitur de futuro ; Bed 
 necessitate sequente, quae uiLil esse cogit. > 
 
 St. Thomas Aquinas 
 
 The philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is the most 
 perfect result of mediaeval scholasticism. While 
 his theory of the will in some respects resembles 
 that of Augustine and Anselm, he surpasses both in 
 the scientific treatment of the subject. His system 
 is characterized by uniformity of method, coherence 
 of parts, variety and precision of distinctions, and 
 extraordinary logical consistency. His theory of 
 the will, like that of Spinoza and that of Hegel, 
 can hardly be stated, except in relation to the 
 other parts of his philosophy. The terms of 
 his psychology are equivalents, for the most part, 
 of terms used by Aristotle. His definition of the 
 soul as the actus or actuality of an organic body is 
 1 Anselm, De Concord., etc., II. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 127 
 
 Aristotelian, and so also is his conception of the 
 faculties and their relation to the essence of the 
 soul. But his doctrine of the will is far more com- 
 plete than that of Aristotle, and has had a very- 
 remarkable influence, not in the Catholic Church 
 alone, but also in the theology of the Eeformers. 
 
 I. Tlie Soul and its Faculties. He rejects the 
 theory of preexistence, and aflBrms that the soul 
 first has its esse in the body. Traducianism he 
 regards as heresy.* The soul is not situated in 
 any particular part of the body, but is the life and 
 energy of the whole body, — est tota in qualibet 
 parte corporis sui.'' The body is both its object 
 and instrument. It is united to the body as form 
 and mover, — forma et motor.' Instead of making 
 the vegetative, sensitive, and other principles, differ- 
 ent souls, as was done by Aristotle, he regards these 
 several principles as genera of mental powers ; and 
 of these there are five, — the same with those men- 
 tioned by Aristotle, and in certain places called by 
 the latter Awa/i«s. The soul is that which makes 
 the body real, and it is also the esse animattim.* 
 Where there is soul, there is life. In its lower 
 genera it is to be found in the lower animals ; but 
 not the rational soul. The Gnostics and Mani- 
 cheans had claimed a knowledge for the lower 
 animals, so that they had attributed to these 
 rational faculty, and had even maintained that 
 beasts might pray. Thomas Aquinas teaches that 
 the soul of man alone is rational among corporeal 
 
 1 Summa Theol. I. Q. XC. 2, i. 2 id. i. q. ym. 2. 
 
 » Id. I. Q. LXXV. 3 ; Q. LXXVI. 1. < Id. I. Q. LXXVI. 3. 
 
128 THEOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 beings. And reason and intellect differ only 
 secundum perfectum et imperfectum. As individual 
 substances, souls are persons. And by substances 
 is here meant, not tbe Greek Oia-ux, but the Latin 
 subjectum, quod substitit in genere substantim. 
 The soul as subjectum is one person. There is, 
 however, a plurality of faculties, and the soul 
 differs from its own faculties or powers, so that 
 the latter have a real existence, though not as sub- 
 stances. All the powers of the soul have their 
 roots in its essence; and when the attention is 
 attracted to the operation of one power, it is with- 
 drawn from the operation of another, because the 
 soul can have but one intention.^ 
 
 Of the five genera of powers enumerated by 
 Thomas Aquinas, those which are chiefly related 
 to his doctrine of the will are the appetitive and 
 the intellective.^ 
 
 Intellect is active and not passive.' It moves 
 itself; but it may be either speculative or practical. 
 These are not two faculties, but one.* The first is 
 contemplative, and the second is externally opera- 
 tive. The speculative intellect per extensionem is 
 the practical. Appetite is a faculty or power of 
 the soul. It seeks that which the soul does not yet 
 possess, and delights in this. Its movement is 
 either towards or away from some object. There 
 are three kinds of appetite : the natural, the sensi- 
 tive, and the intellective or rational. The first of 
 these is a more general name for the property of all 
 
 1 Summa Theol. I. ii. Q. XXXVII. 8 la. i. q. liv. i. 
 
 2 Id. I. Q. LXXVin. 1. 1 Id. I. Q. XIV. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 129 
 
 the faculties in so far as they pursue any object : 
 appetitus naturalis est inclinatio cujaslibet rei in 
 aliquid ex natura sua.* It may be said to accom- 
 pany every operation of the soul. But appetite 
 has not necessarily a bad meaning, for appetitur 
 summum bonum, id est Deus. There are two kinds 
 of motive power in the soul: one of these com- 
 mands, and the other executes motion; one is vis 
 appetitiva, the other is vis motiva. One of these 
 moves the body, and the other is that whose act is 
 not to move, but to be moved (cujus actus non est 
 movere, sed moveri).^ The sensitive appetite is 
 moved by thought and also by imagination. But 
 appetite alone is directly motive. Cognition can- 
 not effect motion except through appetite. The 
 sensitive appetite pursues all objects which appear 
 good to the senses. Its acts are called passions. 
 It may be either concupiscibilis or irascibilis, but in 
 either case is subject to the control of the reason.' 
 The rational appetite is the will," and its acts are 
 called volitions. The object of the rational appe- 
 tite is the good simpliciter. Distinguished from 
 the will (voluntas) is the intellect or understanding 
 (intellectus). There is no will without reason or 
 intellect; those things which are without reason 
 tend towards an end, on account of natural inclina- 
 tion. Both intellect and will are natural properties 
 of the soul, and the soul cannot be without them. 
 The intellect tends towards things as they are in it, 
 
 1 Summa Theol. I. Q. LXXVin. 1. 
 
 s Id. I. Q. LXXV. 3. 8 W. I. Q. LXXXI. 1, 3. 
 
 i Id. n. I. Q. I. 2; n. I. Q. vin. 1. 
 
 K 
 
130 THEORIES OP THE WItL 
 
 but the will as they are in themselves, — intellectus 
 is also necessary to voluntas. 
 
 II. TJie Distinction between Voluntary and Invol- 
 untary. As has just been said, will is a rational 
 appetite. Following John of Damascus, Thomas 
 Aquinas defines voluntary action as motion and 
 action from one's own inclination, that is, action 
 from an internal principle : motus et actus a propria 
 inclinatione, id est quod agere sit a principio in- 
 trinseco.* It does not involve any external result, 
 and may be wholly within the soul. In order that 
 action should be voluntary, there must be action 
 with reference to some end. The action must be 
 intrinsic, and not effected from without. The begin- 
 ning of volition lies within the soul, and in this 
 consists the spontaneity of man: et ideo Cum 
 utrumque sit ab intrinseeo principio, scilicet quod 
 agunt, et quod propter finem agunt, horum motus, 
 et actus dicuntur voluntarii." But in order that 
 there should be intrinsic action ad finem, there 
 must be knowledge. The greater the knowledge 
 of the end which is sought, the more voluntary will 
 be the action. In saying that the principle of 
 voluntary action is intrinsic, Thomas Aquinas does 
 not mean that it is the first principle, so that it is 
 not moved from without or caused. It is a first 
 principle in genere appetitivi motus. There is action 
 towards an end even in the lower animals, who act 
 according to intrinsic causes ; but voluntary actions 
 belong, properly speaking, to rational beings. 
 
 The act of will is either mediate or immediate. 
 1 Summa Theol. I. ii. Q. VI. 1. « Id., lb. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 131 
 
 Immediate volition is the act itself of willing; 
 mediate is effective only through some medium, as 
 in willing to walk, in which the body is the medium. 
 In the first case it is simply a certain inclination 
 proceeding consciously from some intrinsic prin- 
 ciple, while natural appetite is unconscious. Vio- 
 lence and coaction cannot be applied to the will, 
 since the very nature of the latter is that it is not 
 coerced from without. It acts from inclination, 
 not from force. When it is moved by some appe- 
 tite according to its own inclination, the movement 
 is voluntary and not violent. The two terms are 
 antithetical.^ Actions done through fear are mid- 
 way between voluntary and involuntary. Per se 
 the act performed through fear is not voluntary, 
 but it becomes voluntary in the avoiding act to 
 escape the evil which is feared. Acts done through 
 fear are therefore not necessarily compulsory." 
 Acts done through concupiscence, however, are 
 voluntary. The object of such desire is a supposed 
 good; and will is an appetite which seeks the good, 
 either real or imagined. More important is the 
 doctrine of actions done through ignorance. Aris- 
 totle had said that actions done through ignorance 
 are involuntary, and with this Thomas Aquinas 
 agrees.' That cannot be willed in actu which is not 
 known. And this doctrine is complementary to 
 one already stated, that intellect is essential to will. 
 III. The Will and the Motive. 1 use motive 
 here in a very general sense, as meaning that which 
 
 1 Sumina Theol. I. n. Q. VI. 4. 2 Id. I. ii. Q. VI. 7. 
 « Id. I. n. Q. VI. 8 ; of. Aristotle, Eth. 1110, b. 18. 
 
132 THEOEIBS OP THE WILL 
 
 moves the will, because a large part of the theory 
 of Thomas Aquinas is devoted to explaining the 
 relation, in this respect, of the various powers of 
 the soul to volition.* 
 
 1. The Intellect as Motive. As has been said 
 above, there is no actual will without intellect, 
 and there must be an end in view as object of the 
 will." The object to which the will tends is pre- 
 sented not by the will itself, but by the intellect. 
 The volition is compared in this to the art which 
 must be known in order to be practised. The 
 helmsman must know how to steer in order to guide 
 the ship.' It rules the will not by inclining it; 
 for the will is itself an inclination towards the 
 real or apparent good. It rules the will by demon- 
 strating to it the object which is good, and by 
 ordering or governing it; but there is no will in 
 the intellect, although the latter is active. Nor is 
 the intellect subject to the will, except that the 
 former may be directed by the latter. In order 
 to will there must be intellect, and the latter is 
 superior to the former. The will is, however, mis- 
 tress of her own actions, and comprehends both 
 velle and non velle.* It therefore has power to 
 move itself. Just as the intellect moves from 
 premises to conclusions, so the will, in that it 
 desires the end, moves itself towards willing the 
 means to secure the end : — 
 
 Manifestum est autem quod intellectus per hoc quod oog- 
 noscit principium, reducit seipsum de potentia in actum, 
 
 1 Summa Theol. n. Q. IX. 1. s Id. H. i. Q. VIII. 
 
 2 Id. II. I. Q. IX. 1. * Id., lb. 
 
IN CHEISTIAN THEOLOGY 133 
 
 quantum ad cognitionem conclusionum ; et hoc modo movet 
 seipsamet similiter voluntas per hoc quod vult finem, movet 
 seipsam ad volendum ea qua quae sunt ad finem. i 
 
 The moving of the will by the intellect, and the 
 moving of the will by itself, are different; by the 
 intellect the will is moved according to the nature 
 of the object; by itself, according to the reason of 
 the end. In this respect there is an analogy be- 
 tween the intellectus of Thomas Aquinas and the 
 practical reason of Aristotle. 
 
 2. The Sensitive Appetite as Motive. The object 
 of the will is the good, either real or apparent. 
 The sensitive appetite is an inclination towards 
 the good, and so is capable of moving the will per 
 modum objecti. It sets a good end in view, towards 
 which the will may be directed. To say that the 
 sensitive appetite may move the will is equivalent to 
 saying that the will may be moved by the passions. 
 But this is not to be understood as meaning that 
 the sensitive appetite can dictate to the will : — 
 
 Voluntas igitur simpliciter praestantior est quam sensi- 
 tivus appetitus ; sed quoad ilium iQ quo pa-ssio dominatur, 
 inquantum subjacet passioni praeeminet appetitus sensi- 
 tivus.* 
 
 3. An External Pi'inciple as Motive. In one 
 
 sense external principles may move the will, but 
 
 only indirectly. Between the object which moves 
 
 the will and the act of the will itself deliberation 
 
 must intervene: hoc autem non potest facere nisi 
 
 consilio mediante.* For example; when one wishes 
 
 1 Summa Theol. I. n. Q. IX. 3. 2 Id. I. n. Q. IX. 2. 
 8 Id. I. n. Q. IX. 4. 
 
134 THEORIES OP THE WILL 
 
 to be cured of a disease, he deliberates as to how 
 this may be accomplished, and concludes that he 
 has need of a physician. He wills according to 
 this conclusion. It cannot be said that he has 
 willed to have the volition to have the physician 
 or to be cured, for this would proceed ad infinitum. 
 The motive in the first instance is the external 
 object, but the will is not compelled by the external 
 object, because there has been intermediate delib- 
 eration. For it is the will itself which wills, 
 although it may be moved to will by something 
 beyond it. The motion would be violent (violentus), 
 if it were contrary to the will; but in that case the 
 action would be not voluntary but involuntary. 
 
 4. God as Motive. By the doctrine that God is 
 motive, I mean the answer of Thomas Aquinas to 
 the question whether God moves the will. God is 
 both cause of the will and cause of the movement of 
 the will. The existence of will as a power of the 
 rational soul is owing to God, and each will is 
 ordained to the willing of the good in general. 
 God may move the will, not only towards the good 
 in general, but also towards a particular good. To 
 will anything by nature, is to will according to the 
 tendency of the inclination in the direction of the 
 good. As a natural motion, the motion of the will 
 is intrinsic, that is, it is according to its own 
 nature. Even in moving a stone the motion is in- 
 trinsic, that is, it is according to the nature of the 
 stone ; it is not natural to the stone to move, but, 
 being moved, it is moved in accordance with its own 
 nature.* 
 
 > Summa Theol. I. ii. Q. IX. 6. 
 
IN CHBISTIAN THEOLOGT 135 
 
 Predestination is a certain foreordination by 
 God from all eternity of those things which, by 
 the grace of God, are to be accomplished in time.* 
 The term grace is in the definition, not because it 
 is of the essence of the act, but betSiuse of its 
 intimate relation to the result.^ Predestination 
 is a part of the providential gorernment of God. 
 Strictly speaking, it is applied only to the fore- 
 ordination of the good; and the contrary term, 
 reprobation, is applied to the predetermination of 
 the bad. Predestination cannot be originated by 
 man nor obstructed by man. It may be furthered 
 and assisted by human instrumentality, by second 
 causes, such as good works and the prayers of the 
 saints. The cause of predestination is found not 
 in man but in God. It is not because their merits 
 are foreseen that men are predestinated.' The 
 will of God is the efficient cause of predestination. 
 It is eternal. It does not impose necessity on 
 events nor remove contingency. Reprobation is a 
 permissive act of God by which some men are per- 
 mitted to fail of salvation. In the mind of God, 
 predestination is active ; but the mind of the pre- 
 destinated is passive to the act of God. The free 
 will of man is responsible for acts done when the 
 man has been reprobated and deserted by grace.* 
 He who is thus reprobated cannot obtain grace. 
 
 It pertains to providence to order things to an 
 end. Necessary causes are prepared for necessary 
 events, and contingent causes for contingent events; 
 
 1 Summa Theol. m. Q. XXIV. 1. » Id. I. Q. XXin. 5. 
 « Id. I. Q, XXin. 2. * W. I. Q. XXIII. 3. 
 
136 THEOKIES OF THE WILL 
 
 but the providence of God is eternal. He sees all 
 things as present. The future is therefore as cer- 
 tainly fixed as the past ; but the voluntary actions 
 of men are contingent.* 
 
 Grace may be either operative or cooperative, 
 prevenient or subsequent. These distinctions are 
 Augustinian. God is the cause of operare, and 
 moves the soul ; but the soul moves and is moved 
 by cooperating grace. There is also a prevenient 
 grace which is antecedent to man's voluntary act, 
 and subsequent grace which comes as the result 
 of man's cooperation with prevenient grace. The 
 doctrine of Thomas Aquinas cannot therefore be 
 reconciled with the Jansenist interpretation of 
 Augustine. If the soul be prepared for the recep- 
 tion of grace, this preparation is the effect of 
 grace. ' 
 
 IV. Voluntas and Liberum Arbitrium. There is 
 a general analogy between intellectus and ratio on 
 the one hand, and voluntas and liberum arbitrium 
 on the other. To know (intelligere) means the sim- 
 ple acceptance (acceptionem) of anything. Hence 
 principles especially are said to be known. And 
 this knowledge is direct, sine collatione. The know- 
 ledge of reason (ratiodnari) is the passing from one 
 principle to something else, that is, to the know- 
 ledge of something else.' Analogically, there is the 
 will of an end, which seeks something on its own 
 account; and there is choice, which seeks the means 
 to an end (voluntas de fine qui propter se appetitur, 
 
 1 Samma Theol. I. Q. XXII. 4. 2 Id. II. i. Q. CXI. 2, 3. 
 8 Id. I. Q. LXXIX. 8. 
 
IN CHBISTIAN THEOLOGY 137 
 
 and eligere est appetere aliquid propter aJterum con- 
 sequendum). The choice is an act of liberum 
 arhitrium. But just as intellect and reason are 
 not two faculties, but one, so voluntas and liberum, 
 arhitrium, are the same faculty in different acts.* 
 Pree will (liberum arbitrium) is a faculty (facultas), 
 for it has potestatem expeditam ad operandum ; et 
 sic facultas ponitur in definitione liberi arbitrii. 
 It is a power (potentia) in so far as it can operate 
 (utpotens operari), and it is also a habit (habitus) 
 in so far as it is fitted or adapted to operate (ut 
 aptus ad operandum bene vel male).^ 
 
 It is an appetitive not a cognitive power, although 
 it is said that the free judgment is an act of the free 
 will. Any design is determined first by the opinion 
 of the reason (jper sententiam rationis), and, second, 
 by the acceptance of the appetite {per acceptionem 
 appetitus).' In so far as we apprehend, the facul- 
 ties are intellect and reason; in so far as we are 
 appetitive, the faculties are will and liberum arhi- 
 trium. The essence of free will is its power of 
 choice.* If man did not have this, advice, precept, 
 prohibition, would be in vain. The lower animals 
 have an action naturali judicio, which takes place 
 without any deliberation about alternative courses. 
 Man acts, however, by free decision (libera judicio), 
 and chooses between alternate volitions : quia per 
 vim cognoseitivam judicat aliquod esse fugiendum 
 vel prosequendum. The free will is not subject to 
 the control of the passions or to the sensitive appe- 
 
 1 Summa. Theol. I. Q. LXXXHI. 4. » Id. I. Q. LXXXITI. 3. 
 » Id. I. Q. LXXXin. 2. * Id. I. Q. LXXXIV. 3, 
 
138 THEOKIES OF THE WILL 
 
 tite in general. Such inclinations are under the 
 sway of the reason, and are obedient to the reason. 
 But free will holds itself in a state of indifference 
 with respect to choosing well or ill: liberum 
 arbitrium indifferenter se habet ad bene eligendum 
 vel male. There seems to be a circle in the reason- 
 ing of Aquinas with respect to free will in relation 
 to intellect. As has been shown, intellect moves 
 the will, and without intellect there is no will. It 
 has also been shown that will moves the intellect, 
 while intellect is implied in every act of will. The 
 motion of the will ab intrinseco is not inconsistent 
 with either of these statements ; but where the will 
 is not moved ah intrinseco, it is moved either by 
 an object or by the representation of an object. The 
 sensitive appetite may rebel against the reason, but 
 the will as an appetite is always rational.' 
 
 What is called choice (electio) consists in a cer- 
 tain motion of the soul towards the good, as its 
 object. It is not a deliberative syllogism concern- 
 ing the good which is to be willed; it involves com- 
 parison, but the comparison is made by the intellect, 
 and choice is the result of the comparison. Ignorant 
 choice is made, when there is no knowledge of that 
 which is to be chosen.* Choice is not subject to 
 necessity. A man is able to will or not to will, 
 to act or not to act. The conclusion which moves 
 the will is not a necessary conclusion, because the 
 premises are not necessary; it is only under cer- 
 tain conditions that choice is necessary; and the 
 fact that choice is necessary only under certain 
 
 I Summa Theol. I. Q. LXXXIII. 1. » Id. I. n. Q. XII. 1. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 139 
 
 conditions is the ground for affirming that it 
 is contingent. Where the conditions attending 
 either alternative to be chosen seem equal, there 
 is nothing to prevent the intrusion of some condi- 
 tion which will overbalance choice of one alterna- 
 tive and effect choice of the other.* 
 
 It seems hardly necessary, after the full state- 
 ment of the doctrine of sin in the theories of 
 Augustine and of Anselm, that much should be 
 said of this aspect of the theology of Thomas 
 Aquinas. Like other Catholic theologians, he 
 maintained that sin may be original as well as 
 actual. It affects not the faculties or powers of 
 the soul, but the essence of the soul itself. By 
 sin man lost free will (liberum arbitrium). This 
 was the loss not of natural liberty, which is the 
 effect of coaction, but of liberty from fault and 
 from misery. The result is that free will is not 
 sufficient for righteousness unless it is moved and 
 assisted by God. The choice of the good is deter- 
 mined by ourselves : supposito tamen divino 
 auxilio. 
 
 V. NeceasUy in Relation to the Will. Necessity 
 is either material or formal. According to another 
 division, it is necessity either of coaction or of the 
 end. In general, that is said to be necessary which 
 is not able not to be (ffuod non potest non esse). 
 Material necessity is from some intrinsic principle, 
 as when it is said that a compound of contraries is 
 corruptible; formal necessity is of another kind, as 
 when it is said that the angles of a triangle are 
 1 Summa Tbeol. I. ii. Q. XIU. 6. 
 
140 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 equal to two right angles. Necessity of the end is 
 another name for utility, as when without a certain 
 thing a certain course cannot be taken, on account 
 of some extrinsic cause. Necessity of the end. is im- 
 plied, when it is said that food is necessary to life, 
 or a horse for a journey ; but the extrinsic cause may 
 be some agent; the will may be forced by this ex- 
 trinsic influence; and this is the necessity of co- 
 action. This last form of necessity is altogether 
 opposed to voluntary action. The essence of will 
 is that it should be an inclination, and inclination 
 cannot be coerced. Necessity of coaction removes 
 all merit from an action. But the necessity of 
 obedience to a precept is not a removal of obli- 
 gation or merit.* 
 
 The contingent is the opposite of the necessary, 
 for it is that which can either be or not be : quod 
 potest esse et non esse. There is an element of 
 necessity in every contingent event. When, for 
 example, Socrates is said to run, his running is 
 contingent, but it is necessary that Socrates should 
 be moved if he runs. Actions of the will are in- 
 cluded in the predetermining purpose of God, but 
 are not absolutely determined, for choice is con- 
 tingent. And because choice is not necessarily 
 determined, but is contingent, the will is free, 
 although the future is certain. 
 
 While Thomas Aquinas has expressed himself 
 with regard to the will in a manner which it is diffi- 
 cult to misunderstand, he has been variously inter- 
 preted. There is certainly no Pelagian nor Semi- 
 
 l Summa Theol. I. Q. LXXXII. 1. 
 
IN CHEISTIAN THEOLOGY 141 
 
 Pelagian doctrine in his theology; nor, on the other 
 hand, is there any justification for the statement of 
 a modern critic, that he makes God a relative being, 
 discourages the individual, and reduces him to 
 despair or to moral indifference.^ 
 
 The doctrine of Thomas Aquinas was opposed by 
 the leading philosopher of the Franciscan order. 
 Duns Scotus. He denied the primacy of the intel- 
 lect, and aifirmed the primacy of the will. In his 
 theology there is a tendency towards a Pelagian 
 view of the human will in its relation to God and 
 to original sin. This opposition did not cease with 
 the death of the two leaders of the conflicting 
 schools, and the debate was continued by a succes- 
 sion of Dominican and Franciscan doctors, who 
 were called respectively Thomists and Scotists. 
 According to Duns Scotus, the will determines it- 
 self, and is not determined by the intellect. Acts 
 of the will are contingent, and there is the power 
 of contrary choice ; the intellect, however, is neces- 
 sarily determined. The will has, indeed, an ofBce 
 in knowledge, cooperating with man's receptive 
 capacity. In this doctrine Duns Scotus seems to 
 have anticipated what Kant afterwards explicitly 
 taught, that in the act of knowledge the spontane- 
 ous activity of the understanding must supplement 
 the mere receptivity of the sensibility. In his 
 practical philosophy, Duns Scotus is far from hold- 
 
 1 D'une part, en effet, 11 fait de Dleu lui-m§me un gtre relatif , 
 dont la volont^ est I'esclave de I'intelligence. D'autre part, 11 
 fait plus que d'humilier I'lndividu : il decourage et le r^duit au 
 desespolr ou k I'lndifierence morale. — A. Weber, MUt. de la 
 Fhilosophie Europ. 241. 
 
142 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 ing the doctrines of predestination and determinism, 
 even in the moderate form in which they were pre- 
 sented by Thomas Aquinas, and yet the former, by 
 insisting on the primacy of the will in God, goes 
 so far as to maintain that everything which exists 
 outside of God has its origin in the will of God. 
 God wills necessarily only his own essence; all 
 else is secundario volitum?- 
 
 Calvin 
 
 Questions concerning the will, which among the 
 later Schoolmen had chieiiy a theoretical interest, 
 became of vital importance among the Protestant 
 Reformers and their opponents. Scarcely had the 
 disputes between the Thomists and the Scotists 
 begun to die out, when a controversy arose be- 
 tween the leader of the Reformers and the most 
 eminent scholar of the revival of letters. Luther's 
 work, De Servo Arbitrio, was followed by the 
 Tractatus De Libera Arbitrio, of Erasmus. The 
 doctrine of Justification taught by the Reformers 
 explains in some degree their theories of the will. 
 In the Reformed theology, justification is not a 
 process which goes on within the soul of man, but 
 is an act of God; it does not imply that man is 
 made just or righteous, but only that he is putsr 
 tively righteous, owing to the grace of God. It is 
 God who justifies by imputing righteousness to the 
 believer, and the condition or instrumental cause 
 of justification is faith. Instead of winning par- 
 
 i Compare Erdmann, Grundr. der Gesch. der Phil. I. 417-419. 
 
tN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 143 
 
 don by means of the sacraments and good works, 
 the soul acquires pardon by au act of faith. And 
 faith, the Reformers taught, is imparted by the 
 free grace of God. Inasmuch as they supposed 
 this grace to be bestowed antecedent to any act on 
 the part of the individual soul, it was necessary 
 that they should explain why some men are 
 justified and led into holiness, while others are 
 left in sin and misery. Logically they were obliged 
 to maintain that the justification, sanctification, 
 and perseverance of man must be attributed to the 
 sovereign will of God. Any more ultimate expla- 
 nation than this, they did not seek to give. The 
 choice of some to the exclusion of others, to be the 
 recipients of this saving grace, was thought to be 
 a secret of the divine plan. This choice was called 
 by the theologians election, and the doctrine of 
 election in the early Eeformation as well as in 
 later times has sometimes been made a shibboleth 
 of party. Eightly or wrongly the Eeformers 
 believed that they were logically obliged to lay 
 great emphasis on this doctrine. Universal pre- 
 destination involves a predestination of means as 
 well as of ends. And among certain of the Re- 
 formers the importance of the human will was 
 minimized, while great emphasis was laid upon the 
 grace of God. There were some advocates of the 
 doctrine of election who were reluctant to attrib- 
 ute the reprobation of the non-elect to the will of 
 God, either as permissive or efficient cause. But 
 the more logical writers in taking the first position 
 were compelled to take the second. To say that 
 
144 THEORIES OP THE WILL 
 
 man could will to be saved only by the grace of 
 God, and without the grace of God would be lost, 
 was to establish a certain causal relation between 
 the favor of God, and the will to be saved. And 
 the violent and exaggerated expressions of Martin 
 Luther, his scornful allusions to human righteous- 
 ness, and his bold statements concerning the effi- 
 cacy of grace doubtless encouraged Antinomianism, 
 and libertinism, and made many rest with fatalistic 
 complacency upon the divine purpose, and look 
 upon their own conduct as non-essential. 
 
 Erasmus, in the treatise just referred to, opposed 
 the extreme doctrine which had been expounded 
 by Luther, and taught a moderate theory of pre- 
 destination, which was not greatly at variance with 
 that of many Catholic theologians. Tor other 
 reasons, his teaching was held to be repugnant to 
 the Catholic faith, and his work was condemned 
 by the Council of Trent. There is, however, no 
 necessary opposition between an extreme doctrine 
 of predestination and the leading dogmas of the 
 Catholic Church. At first sight it would appear 
 that a departure from the Augustinian position 
 with respect to predestination and grace harmo- 
 nized better with the Latin view of justification. 
 If a man believes that he is freely justified without 
 any sacramental means, and without good works, — • 
 in short, simply through faith, and that saving 
 grace has been bestowed anterior to any good work 
 of his own, he will have no difficulty in harmoniz- 
 ing that view with extreme predestination. If on 
 the other hand a man believes that he is justified 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 145 
 
 by works, he will be less inclined practically to the 
 view that his justification and perseverance have 
 been predetermined before the foundation of the 
 world. Yet there .is really no logical difference 
 between the two men in their relation to predestina- 
 tion. If the first man has been predestinated to 
 have faith, he will have faith, and will persevere ; 
 and if the second man has been predestinated to 
 be baptized and to do good works, he will be bap- 
 tized and will do good works. There is no more 
 difficulty in supposing the predestination of a 
 sacramental act, and of a good work, than there is 
 in supposing the predestination of faith and per- 
 severance. If a failure to lead a holy life in one 
 case imperils the soul, or loses the soul, it is a sign 
 that the man was not predestinated to eternal life. 
 If a man who has professed faith, does not show 
 signs of sanctification, it may be inferred that he 
 has not been elected. But in both theories, whether 
 election be conditional or unconditional, the elect 
 are held to be known only to God. Upon this last 
 point all schools of theology which teach election are 
 at one. The Catholic Church has indeed always 
 been very circumspect in its teaching concerning 
 predestination. If, on the one hand, Augustine and 
 Thomas Aquinas are decided in their doctrine, 
 Jansenism was condemned by the same high 
 authority which silenced Pelagius. It is in a 
 certain school of Protestant theology that the most 
 extreme form of predestination has been taught. 
 Into the refinements of this discussion during the 
 sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it is not 
 
146 THE0EIB8 OF THE WILL 
 
 necessary for me to enter. Nor is it of especial 
 importance that any further notice should be taken 
 of the issue between Luther and Erasmus. The 
 dispute between Calvin and the Arminians, how- 
 ever, has an important bearing on the theory of 
 the will. This brings us to the opening of the 
 period of modern philosophy; but the discussion 
 is as old as the Apostolic age. It has made an 
 immense literature, which is less read than for- 
 merly. The different shades of opinion involved, 
 and the wide geographical extent of the dis- 
 pute, make it impossible, even if it were advis- 
 able here, to do more than trace in outline the 
 doctrine of the will in the works of John Calvin, 
 and in those of Episcopius perhaps the ablest 
 Arminian theologian. 
 
 The psychology and ontology of Calvin, in spite 
 of his rejection of a great deal of Catholic dogma, 
 are not radically different from those held by some 
 of the Fathers and Schoolmen. He distinguishes 
 the essence of the soul from the essence of the body, 
 and gives a classification of mental faculties. Al- 
 though man was made in the image of God, his 
 soul is distinct from the essence of God. In gen- 
 eral the soul has two faculties : intellect or under- 
 standing, and will.^ 
 
 Sic ergo habeamus, subesse duas humanae animae partes, 
 quae quidem praesenti instituto conveniant, intelleotum et 
 Toluntatem. Sit autera officium intellectus, inter objecta 
 discernere, prout unumquodque probandum aut improban- 
 
 1 Calvin uses appetiius as a synonym of voluntas (appetitus 
 teu voluntas), Inst. II. n. 2. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 147 
 
 dum visum fuerit : voluntatis autem, eligere et sequi quod 
 bonum intellectus diotaverit, aspernari ao fugere quod ilia 
 improbaverit.! 
 
 Thus it is the office of the intellect or under- 
 standing to discriminate between objects, and to 
 decide whether they are to be approved or dis- 
 approved; it is the office of the will to follow and 
 to choose what the understanding declares to be 
 good. It is the intellect which governs the soul, 
 and the will is subject to knowledge. Avoidance 
 and pursuit in the appetite resemble affirmation and 
 negation in the intellect. 
 
 Ergo animan hominis Deus mente instruxit, qua bonum 
 a malo, justum ab injusto discerneret : ac quid sequendum 
 vel fugiendum sit, praeeunte rationis luce videret, unde 
 partem banc directrioem TiyenonKdn dixeront philosoplii. 
 Huic adjunzit penes quam est electio.' 
 
 Will is therefore used by Calvin, not only as a 
 synonym for the act of volition, but for the appetite, 
 whether sensitive or intellective. The first man 
 had these two faculties, intellect and will in per- 
 fection ; and his will was free. Had he so chosen 
 he might have had eternal life. Adam fell because 
 his will was capable of being inclined in either of 
 two ways. His choice of good and evil was free. 
 Calvin disposes summarily of the objection that 
 God might have made man incapable of falling into 
 sin. He replies that God was under no necessity 
 to give man any other kind of will. Adam had the 
 power to remain righteous had he chosen to exer- 
 
 1 Oalvin, Inst. I. xv. 7. " Id., ib. I. xv. 8. 
 
148 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 cise it. But he freely fell. Tlie sin of Adam has 
 polluted the nature of his posterity and all the 
 powers of men are depraved. In this way all the 
 volitions have become corrupt. Defending this 
 extreme doctrine, Calvin opposes those who regard 
 the free will as arbiter between the dictates of the 
 reason and the appetite, as if man were capable 
 of choosing the good and avoiding the bad ; and he 
 denies that virtue and vice are in our own power, 
 inasmuch as original sin has taken away our power, 
 and has even corrupted the faculty by which good 
 and evil are recognized. This view of free will 
 which he opposes, he attributes to all philosophers 
 {haec ergo philosophorum omnium sententiae summa 
 est) and he blames theologians who have adopted 
 the same opinion. The Patristic teaching generally 
 meets with his disapproval. He criticises Chrysos- 
 tom for his defence of free will ; and even the Anti- 
 Pelagian arguments of Jerome fail to satisfy him, 
 for the latter taught that man begins and God 
 completes : liberum arbitrium quid esset, quum 
 in omniun scriptis identidem occurrat, pauci de- 
 finierunt.' 
 
 According to Peter Lombard, there are three 
 kinds of Freedom: 1. Freedom from necessity, 
 2. Freedom from sin, 3. Freedom from misery. 
 Calvin criticises this arrangement on the ground 
 that no distinction is made between necessity and 
 coaction. According to him original sin necessarily 
 determines the will to evil, but this necessity acts 
 upon the will, not against the will. Grace deter- 
 
 1 Calvin, Inst. II. ii. 4. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 149 
 
 mines the will to good, but this again is necessary- 
 determination, and not involuntary nor coercive. 
 
 Calvin opposes another distinction which was 
 adopted by the Schoolmen, — that between operative 
 and cooperative grace. He regards this distinction 
 as obscuring the fact that a good will comes alto- 
 gether from the grace of God, for the term co- 
 operate implies a good will, and this again implies 
 that the grace of God is not essential to such a will. 
 Calvin would therefore deny absolutely the ability 
 of the will to will what is good, unless determined 
 necessarily thereto by the grace of God. And to 
 speak of the will cooperating with grace, accord- 
 ing to him, implies that the will may resist the 
 grace of God. He admits that when men sin they 
 sin voluntarily ; but to call this free will is to say 
 that man has control over his whole heart and 
 mind, so that he is able to incline to whatsoever he 
 please. On the contrary, Calvin, in insisting that 
 man is depraved, holds that this depravity makes 
 man unable to will what is good ; for it has affected 
 the faculties of knowing as well as those of acting. 
 The emotions are depraved as well as the delibera- 
 tions : — 
 
 Quum ergo ratio, qua disoernit homo inter bonum et ma- 
 lum, qua intelligit et judicat, naturale donum sit, non potuit 
 in totum deleri : sed partim debilitata, partim vitiata fuit, ut 
 deformes ruinae appareant.i 
 
 Sio voluntas quia inseparabilis est ab hominis natura, non 
 periit : sed pravis cupiditatibus devincta fuit, ut nibil rectum 
 appetere queat.' 
 
 I Calvin, Inst. IT. n. 4. 
 3 M., ib. II. II. 12. 
 
150 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 Calvin places choice in the will, however, and not 
 in the understanding. Choice depends on right 
 reason, that is, on right deliberation. Man natu- 
 rally desires what is good, according to his natural 
 inclination, which does not involve deliberation. 
 It is therefore no argument in favor of freedom 
 that man naturally desires what is good. He must 
 know what is good according to the right reason, 
 and when he knows it, he must choose it, and when 
 he has chosen it, he must pursue it : — 
 
 Nihil ergo hoc ad arbitril libertatem, an homo sensu natu- 
 rae ad bonum appetendum feratur: sed hoc requiritur, ut 
 bonum recta latione dijudicet, cognitum eligat, electum per- 
 Bequatur.i 
 
 The inability of the natural will towards the good 
 is removed by grace. This grace is not prevenient 
 merely, but irresistible. There is no power in 
 man to resist or oppose efficacious grace ; although, 
 as has been said, it does not force man against 
 his will. The sacred Scriptures are appealed to 
 by Calvin to support this position. 
 
 The most ingenious and original part of Calvin's 
 theory is that in which he opposes those who pre- 
 sent objections to this deterministic doctrine. To 
 the Pelagian objection that unless sin is of the will 
 there is no sin, and if sin is avoidable it is volun- 
 tary, Calvin replies that the essence of sin is not in 
 its being freely committed, but in its being volun- 
 tary, and that determinism does not deny the fact 
 but only the freedom of will. Another Pelagian 
 1 Calvin, Inst. II. Ii. 26. 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 151 
 
 objection was that unless virtues and vices are 
 voluntary, there is no ground for rewards or pun- 
 ishments, because there is no merit nor demerit. 
 Calvin replies that punishments are justly inflicted 
 because those who sin are gailtj of evil actions by 
 their own will. Rewards, on the contrary, do not 
 depend upon our own merit, but on the divine be- 
 nignity. This is closely related to that other affir- 
 mation of Calvin, that men are good because they 
 are elect, and their election is due, not to their own 
 efforts, but to the mercy of God. Another objec- 
 tion raised, is that all exhortations and warnings 
 are in vain unless man has free will. The burden 
 of Calvin's answer to this is taken from Scripture 
 and from the writings of Augustine; but the ra- 
 tional argument is that exhortations and warnings 
 are secondary causes which determine the will. 
 Calvin's attempt to strengthen his case by an ap- 
 peal to the writings of Augustine is only partially 
 successful, even if we accept the authority of the 
 latter as decisive, for, as has already been shown, 
 the teaching of Augustine concerning the will is by 
 no means free from ambiguity.* 
 
 Although there is no direct evidence that such 
 was the case, I believe that the theory of the will 
 afterwards defended by Hobbes was in great part 
 derived from the works of Calvin. The similarity 
 of language, as well as the similarity of doctrine, 
 points to this, especially in those passages in which 
 determinism is defended against the objections of 
 opponents. In the ease of Hobbes the subject is 
 
 1 Calvin, Inst. II. in. 
 
152 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 discussed with greater regard to psychological prin- 
 ciples, and more weight is assigned to the emotional 
 elements in man. While Hobbes had no theologi- 
 cal purpose to serve, there is a striking parallel 
 between his scriptural citations and those of Calvin. 
 With respect to Calvin's doctrine of Predestinar 
 tion, very little need be said. In most points it 
 covers the same ground which has been already 
 traversed in connection with the theories of Paul 
 and Augustine. According to Calvin, however, 
 the prescience and predestination of God should be 
 sharply distinguished. To God, the past, the pres- 
 ent, and the future are as one ; all is present. Pre- 
 destination is decretum Dei. By this decree is 
 determined what shall happen to every man. Some 
 are predetermined to salvation ; some are predeter- 
 mined to damnation. Each man being created for 
 salvation or for damnation is predestinated to either 
 life or death. By an immutable and eternal decree, 
 God has fixed the salvation or the perdition of 
 every man once for all. Calvin admits that this 
 view is unpopular ; but God, he maintains, is a law 
 unto himself, and cannot be held accountable to 
 any other law, much less to human law. God 
 owes nothing to any man. The most striking part 
 of this discussion is that in which Calvin rejects 
 the traditional dogma of the " permissive decree," 
 which aflB.rms that God did not predetermine, but 
 only permitted the fall of man, and the perdition of 
 the non-elect. It is absurd, he maintaids, to say 
 that God did not determine positively the destiny 
 of his principal creation. And in reply to those 
 
IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 153 
 
 who contend that such a doctrine makes men indif- 
 ferent about their moral conduct, he shows the actual 
 results produced by such teaching.^ 
 
 Such ambiguities as were to be found in this 
 extreme theology of Calvin were effectually re- 
 moved by some of his most acute disciples, and 
 while some interpreters are disposed to find the 
 theory of Calvin himself less uncompromising than 
 I have shown it to be, there is no ambiguity what- 
 ever in the writings of such men as Beza, Twiss, 
 Edwards, and others of the supralapsarian school. 
 
 Episcopius 
 
 Opposition to the doctrines of the school of Calvin 
 arose among the Reformers of Holland. The leader 
 of these was Arminius, and their views are best 
 represented in the writings of Episcopius. Accord- 
 ing to these early Arminians, the distinctive doc- 
 trines of Calvin and of Beza are nothing less than 
 an affirmation of fatal necessity. 
 
 According to Episcopius, the term will is used in 
 three ways : (1) as a faculty, facultas volendi ; (2) 
 as the act of willing, ocJms volendi; (3) as the thing 
 willed, res volita.^ The mistake of the determin- 
 ists has been that they have distinguished faculties 
 which should not be separated. These faculties 
 are judgment and will, or, to speak more precisely, 
 intellect and will. These are not two faculties, 
 but one. Will without intellect is brute will 
 (brutam voluntatem). Will is not merely active, 
 1 Calvin, Inat. HI. xxi. " Episcopius, Disput. I. VI. 
 
154 THEOKIBS OF THE WILL 
 
 it is also intellectual. Voluntatem et intellectum 
 non esse duas animae potentias realiter ab ea et a 
 se distiactas ; ex hac distinctione orta esse omnes 
 circa doctriaani de libero arbitrio diflcultates.^ 
 
 Voluntas enim non est faoultas quaedam distinota necdum 
 diversa ab intellectu, uti neque intellectus f acultas aut poten- 
 tia quaedam est diversa a vita divina . . . vita enim divina, 
 et anima humana immediatum sint turn intellectionis turn 
 volitionis principium . . . quia si voluntatis est potentia 
 distincta aut diversa ab intellectu turn necesse est ut volun- 
 tas et volitio omnia caeca sit, et stulta sive irrationalis, prout 
 BUG tempore demoustrabimus fusius.^ 
 
 Episcopius was led to insist upon this identificar 
 tion of the will with the intellect, in order to oppose 
 a prevalent doctrine that the will was determined 
 by the intellect. He wished to restore the primacy 
 of the will, not by raising it altogether above the 
 intellect, but by recognizing it as intellect. In so 
 doing, he brought back the will to a closer relation- 
 ship with the moral agent. He would make the 
 will not the slave of the intellect, which waits until 
 another faculty has determined whether or how it 
 shall act. Wni is a self-determining principle, 
 just as the intellect is a self-determining principle. 
 If this doctrine can be established, then there is of 
 course no servitude of the will to the intellect, and 
 so far the freedom of the will is defended. But the 
 defence of indeterminism is simply removed to 
 another arena. It must be shown that the acts of 
 the intellect are voluntary. The only other alterna- 
 
 1 Episcopius, Tract, de Lib. Arbit. II. 
 
 2 Id., Inst. Theol. IV. n. 20. 
 
IN CHEISTIAN THEOLOGY 155 
 
 tive is, that the dictates of the intellect are offered 
 to the will, which has power to decide freely and 
 intelligently, prior to action. This would involve 
 the contradiction of two principles of intellect in the 
 soul, one voluntary, and the other involuntary. It 
 is probable that Episcopius wished to avoid such a 
 contradiction. He would identify intellect and will, 
 not in order to show that intellect is voluntary, but 
 that volition is intelligent. Hence the statement 
 that will without intellect is brutam voluntatem. 
 It is worthy of notice that his countryman, Spinoza, 
 not long afterwards, followed the example of Epis- 
 copius, in af&rming the unity of intellect and will. 
 But Spinoza drew another conclusion, holding that 
 the identification of the two faculties was a reason 
 for denying the freedom of the will. 
 
 Will, according to Episcopius, is free or has 
 liberty. And by liberty is meant the dominion of 
 man over the acts of intellect and will : per hominis 
 libertatem intelligi dominium ejus in actiones volun- 
 tatis et intellectus quarum aliae sunt familatrices et 
 imperatrices.^ Free will is that which is able to act 
 or not to act, or to do this or that, when all things 
 requisite for action are present : liberum arbitrium, 
 quod positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, agere 
 potest aut non agere, vel hoc vel illud agere.^ It 
 will have been seen that Episcopius does not adhere 
 to the principle that the will and the intellect are 
 one ; for he distinguishes in the former of these two 
 passages the act of one from that of the other. 
 The contradictory of freedom is necessity. It is 
 1 Episcopius, Tract, de Lib. Arbit. I. 2 i,j.^ ib. 
 
156 THEORIES OE THE WILL 
 
 therefore not sufficient to define liberty as freedom 
 from external coercion. The objects of free choice 
 are goods (bona) either real or apparent.^ 
 
 In connection with this theory of Freedom, Epis- 
 copius denies the doctrine of Original Sin : corrup- 
 tionis istius universalis nulla sunt indicia nee signa ; 
 imo non pauca sunt signa ex quibus colligitur na- 
 turam totam humanam sic corruptam non esse. 
 The cause of sin was the free will of man: fuit 
 ipsa hominis libera voluntas spontaneo et libero 
 motu sese determinans, et convertens ad objectum 
 a mente seducta propositum et affectui desidera- 
 tum.' And as the free will of man is the cause 
 of sin, so it is this free will which makes him re- 
 sponsible. Into many of the theological implica- 
 tions of this teaching, it is not necessary to enter. 
 But Episcopius argues especially against the opinion 
 that future events are necessary because they are 
 certain, and so are known to God. He admits that 
 there is foreknowledge and prediction of future 
 events; but this does not determine them neces- 
 sarily. They are foreknown as contingent.' Of 
 two alternatives, one is certain; but because the 
 end is certain, it does not follow that the means 
 are determined necessarily. Thus the foreknow- 
 ledge of our actions on the part of God does not 
 determine them. God is not the cause of sin, but 
 simply permits it. On this point Episcopius op- 
 posed Socinius.* The latter denied the prescience 
 of God, on the ground that this would exclude con- 
 
 1 Episcopius, Tract, de Lib. Arbit. VI. 8 Id., ib. IV. ii. 17. 
 
 2 Id., Inst. Theol. IV. v. 2. < Id., Bod. Inept. VIII. 
 
IN CHBISTIAN THEOLOGY 157 
 
 tingent events. In like manner Calvin insisted 
 that the future was necessary because it was fore- 
 known by God. While there is less uniformity 
 among the Arminians than among th* Calvinists 
 in the matter of doctrine, the opinions of Episco- 
 pius were adopted and taught by many noted 
 divines upon the Continent, among whom the most 
 important were Courcelles, of Amsterdam, Lim- 
 borch, a relative of Episcopius, and Le Clerc. The 
 Arminians might claim in their favor the traditions 
 of the early Patristic age; while the principles of 
 Calvin with respect to original sin, and the deter- 
 mination of the will, are more closely related to 
 the views of %iugustine and Anselm. 
 
CHAPTER FOURTH 
 
 THBOEIES OP THE WILL IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHT 
 FROM BACON TO BBID 
 
 At the beginning of the modern period, the grad- 
 ual emancipation of philosophy from scholasticism, 
 and the change of method are not very evident in 
 the treatment of the will. Writers on psychology 
 and ethics were still inclined to confine their atten- 
 tion to the theological aspects of the subject. They 
 continued to discuss it in connection with the doc- 
 trine of predestination. The revolution in meta- 
 physics and psychology was not immediately 
 apparent in the philosophical consideration of 
 human agency. That which had been disputed 
 with so much energy among the Reformers, at 
 length became an object of purely philosophical 
 interest. Whether we look at the thought of the 
 Continent or at that of Great Britain, we find 
 everywhere the conception of will governed by 
 theologicai opinion. It was not until the publi- 
 cation of Locke's Essay and Spinoza's Ethics that 
 the subject of voluntary action became actually 
 independent of theology. 
 
 The methods of English philosophy, derived 
 directly or indirectly from Bacon, did not effect 
 uniform results. The period after Locke, which 
 158 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 159 
 
 includes the English writers of the eighteenth cen- 
 tury, in -which the prevailing method was empiri- 
 cal, was noisy with the disputes of those who 
 affirmed and those who denied the freedom of the 
 will. Until the time of Hume, there was no radi- 
 cal departure from the earlier views of the nature 
 of the will ; and the discussion of freedom was for 
 the most part theological. From what has been 
 said of the rise of Calvinism and Arminianism, it 
 may be inferred that the issue between the two 
 was likely to appear in philosophy itself. In Eng- 
 land during the sixteenth and seventeenth centu- 
 ries, when the public policy was largely affected 
 by theological interests, it is not surprising that 
 matters of theology should intrude upon scientific 
 discussions. Thus we find Hobbes justifying his 
 doctrines by appealing to Scripture as well as to 
 reason. The final cause of Berkeley's metaphysi- 
 cal theory was the refutation of atheism and mate- 
 rialism. Even Hume is associated in the popular 
 mind with attacks on religion, more than with his 
 valuable services to the advance of philosophy. 
 
 In the period from Bacon to Hume, there is 
 a development from empiricism to scepticism. 
 Bacon defined the method ; Hume showed its logi- 
 cal results. All subsequent philosophy is related 
 af&rmatively or negatively to the principles of 
 Hume. Affirmatively he is the father of later 
 English associationalism and agnosticism, and of 
 French positivism. Negatively, his works form 
 the starting-point of the later German philosophy, 
 and of Scottish thought from Eeid to Hamilton. 
 
160 THEORIES or THE ■WILI. 
 
 Francis Bacon 
 
 Bacon is the apostle of a method, rather than 
 the founder of a school. He applies this method 
 to the realm of nature, and pays less attention to 
 that of mind. His psychology is fragmentary, his 
 ethics are unsystematic, and in metaphysics he 
 shows a dislike for the subtleties of the mediaeval 
 Schoolmen. He lays emphasis, however, upon the 
 regularity and universality of causation. He criti- 
 cises those who speak of fortune rather than of 
 Pate. He finds fault with Epicurus for preferring 
 the idea of chance to that of a single principle 
 under which all phenomena may be united.^ There 
 is a Providence or divine purpose concerned with 
 the most minute events. 
 
 In classifying facultates animae, he distinguishes 
 will from intellect, reason, phantasy, memory, and 
 appetite.^ The science of the will is a part of ethics. 
 Intellect and will are twins. Both fell in the fall 
 of man. Intellect lost its original illumination, and 
 will lost its freedom. The action of the will is de- 
 termined by the understanding. It is the function 
 of the latter to determine, of the former to act. 
 Voluntary motion may be incited by imagination, 
 and the latter faculty may control the reason. The 
 freedom lost by man, according to Bacon, is the 
 moral not the natural freedom of the will, — as was 
 taught by the theologians. Through divine grace, 
 the will becomes an instrument in the attainment 
 of virtue.' 
 
 1 Bacon, De Augmentis, 11. xni. 
 2 Id., lb. IV. in. « Id., ib. VH. i. 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 161 
 
 While these statements might have been made by 
 a philosopher of almost any school, they have a cer- 
 tain interest as the opinions of one whose influence 
 was felt in all subsequent English philosophy. 
 
 Thomas Hobbbs 
 
 It has often been denied that Hobbes was a fol- 
 lower of Bacon in anything except in time. There 
 is, it is true, hardly any mention of Bacon in his 
 works; his method is not Baconian, but analytic 
 and deductive; he attaches very little value to 
 experiments in natural science; and his respect 
 for older systems is quite different from the hostil- 
 ity of the author of the Novum, Organum. It is, 
 moreover, difScult to show that any actual influ- 
 ence was exercised by Bacon on the mind or on 
 the philosophy of Hobbes. It is known, however, 
 that the two philosophers were friends ; that both 
 of them were profoundly affected by the revival of 
 interest in natural science during the sixteenth 
 century ; and that the problem before each of them 
 was the interpretation of nature. Bacon's view of 
 nature was general, and his attention was not con- 
 fined to any particular department of knowledge. 
 Hobbes would interpret human nature, and his 
 philosophy is concerned chiefly with the interpre- 
 tation of man as an individual, and of men collec- 
 tively in civil society. In order to ask and answer 
 the political question, he first asks and answers the 
 anthropological question. He will first examine the 
 body natural, and then proceed to examine the body 
 
162 THEOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 politic. Like Bacon, he disregards authority as a 
 test of truth, although the political and religious 
 character of his age made it important that he 
 should show the accordance of his doctrines with 
 the Scriptures. But this is different from saying 
 that his doctrines are derived from a religious 
 source. Unlike Bacon he employs the syllogism 
 in his philosophical discussions, but he insists that 
 the premises shall be well established in order 
 that the conclusions may be valid. But just as 
 Locke from the psychological porat of view 
 sought to reconstruct human knowledge on a nat- 
 ural basis, so Hobbes from a political point of view 
 seeks to explain the foundation of civil society. 
 While he does not recognize his own method as 
 empirical, it is evident that his appeal is mainly 
 to experience. Next to his political theory, his 
 teaching concerning the will is the most important 
 part of his philosophy. 
 
 Like Bacon, Hobbes emphasizes the principle 
 of causation. Every effect has a necessary cause, 
 and the cause is always sufficient to produce 
 the effect.^ The object of the philosopher is to 
 seek the causes of given effects, and the effects of 
 given causes. 
 
 The passions of the mind are of two kinds : (1) 
 appetites, (2) aversions. The " small beginnings of 
 motion within the body of a man, before they ap- 
 pear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visi- 
 ble actions, are commonly called endeavor." ^ When 
 the endeavor proceeds towards a definite object by 
 
 1 Hotbes, 1. 108. a id. ni. 39. 
 
IN BBITISH PHILOSOPHY 163 
 
 which it has been excited, it is called appetite or 
 desire. Appetite is the approach of the soul to 
 a desired object; while aversion is the retiring 
 from that which is not desired.* He- criticises the 
 Schoolmen for supposing that there could be mere 
 appetite without actual motion. Some appetites 
 are innate, others are acquired. Living creatures 
 have sometimes appetite and sometimes aversion to 
 the same thing, as they think it wUl be for either 
 their good or their hurt. Prior to the actual satis- 
 faction of the appetite there may be a "vicissitude" 
 of appetites and aversions, — a hesitation between 
 two courses of action. This vicissitude Hobbes calls 
 deliberation.^ This lasts as long as the agent has it 
 in his power to obtain what is desired, or to avoid 
 what is not desired. In order to action there 
 must be one last appetite which is satisfied, or in 
 accordance with which the action is performed. 
 This last appetite is will.^ Accordingly, the will 
 is defined as " the last appetite in deliberating." 
 Two conditions of an action about which there is 
 deliberation are laid down : (1) it must be future, 
 and, (2) there must be some possibility of the action 
 being done. Hobbes expresses his meaning clearly 
 when he says : " It is all one, therefore, to say will 
 and last will ; for though a man express his 
 present inclination and appetite concerning the 
 disposing of his goods, by words or writings, yet 
 shall it not be counted his will, because he hath 
 still liberty to dispose of them other ways; but 
 
 1 Hobbes, I. 407 f . 2 m. 408. 
 
 s Id. 409. 
 
164 THEOBIES OF THE WILL 
 
 when deatli taketh away that liberty, then it is his 
 will." 
 
 Actions are voluntary, or involuntary, or mixed. 
 A voluntary action is that which has its beginning 
 in wiU. All others are involuntary or mixed. An 
 involuntary action is one which is done " by neces- 
 sity of nature," as when a man falls or is pushed. 
 A mixed action is partly voluntary, partly involun- 
 tary ; as when a man goes to prison. He may 
 walk voluntarily, but he walks to prison involun- 
 tarily.^ 
 
 Hobbes is the first philosopher to investigate 
 the train of thought in relation to the will. Our 
 thoughts proceed in two ways : either without de- 
 sign, and under no control of will, or else regulated 
 by some desire or design.^ In the former case the 
 links are bound together by the principle of associa- 
 tion ; in the latter case, the course is directed to a 
 certain end. There is also a distinction made be- 
 tween spontaneous and voluntary actions. All vol- 
 untary actions that are not done through fear are 
 spontaneous,' and are said to be done of a man's 
 own accord. In such actions there is no necessity 
 for deliberation. It may be added that Hobbes 
 would call voluntary, even the automatic movements 
 of the body as in walking. 
 
 The will is not the effect of any other faculty, 
 that is volitio is not the effect of voluntas. Neither 
 is will the cause nor the effect of appetite : voluntas 
 non est appetitus causa, sed ipse appetitus.* The 
 
 1 Hobbes, III. 48, 120, 138, 19T. « Id. IV. 243. 
 
 2 Id. III. 13, 50, 61. ■" Id. II. 95 (Latiu). 
 
IN BKITISH PHILOSOPHT 165 
 
 Schoolmen were mistaken who defined the will as 
 a rational appetite. For, according to this defini- 
 tion, there could be no voluntary act against reason. 
 The will is an appetite " resulting from- a precedent 
 deliberation." * 
 
 The power of an agent and ef&cient cause are 
 the same. Power and act thus correspond to cause 
 and effect." Cause refers to that which has already 
 produced a result. Power refers to the future. 
 There is also passive power which is to be identi- 
 fied with material cause. Active and passive power 
 together constitute the entire cause. The effect 
 follows just so soon as the cause is entire. The 
 action in like manner follows just so soon as the 
 "power is plenary." Where the power is not 
 plenary, the act is impossible. 
 
 Setting out from these metaphysical and psy- 
 chological statements, Hobbes treats of the will in 
 relation to the ideas of necessity and freedom. 
 He sets forth the doctrine that the will is neces- 
 sarily determined. Like Calvin and others, he 
 seeks to establish this by an appeal to the Script- 
 ures. But his argument is principally philosoph- 
 ical. And his writings upon this subject are probar 
 bly the most important that have appeared in 
 defence of determinism. 
 
 Hobbes deals with a question which vexed the 
 later Greek philosophers. With respect to disjunc- 
 tive judgments concerning the future, one of the 
 alternatives must be true. If it shall either rain 
 or not rain to-morrow, one of the alternative events 
 1 Hobbes, I. 409. * Id. 1. 127. 
 
166 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 will happen necessarily. That the alternative is 
 indeterminate and contingent, means only that we 
 do not know which of the two alternative events 
 will come to pass. To say that a thing is, and to 
 say that it is contingent is one and the same. But 
 Hobbes maintains that contingent causes are, prop- 
 erly speaking, no causes at all. They can effect 
 nothing without concurrent causes. There is noth- 
 ing casual ; for even events like the fall of dice are 
 to be attributed to necessary causes. A contingent 
 event is only one for which we do not perceive 
 the cause. These principles are applied to volun- 
 tary actions. The will is an effect among other 
 effects. It is determined by necessary causes. 
 There are no contingent acts of will. If it be 
 asked whether will may not be excepted from this 
 law, an answer may be found in the psychological 
 part of Hobbes's theory. 
 
 The importance which Hobbes gives to the prin- 
 ciple of causation underlies his whole view of vol- 
 untary action. His determinism rests not on the 
 rather vague relation of the will to the predeter- 
 mination of God, but to the union of all events by 
 virtue of this general law. In this respect he 
 effected a radical change in philosophy, and since 
 his day a principal point of controversy has been 
 whether the will is an effect among other effects, 
 governed by necessary causes, or whether its action 
 is an exception to the law. But Hobbes is not con- 
 tent to defend his determinism upon metaphysical 
 grounds alone ; he founds a great part of his argu- 
 ment upon principles of psychology, and recognizes 
 
IN BRITISH PHIIiOSOPHT 167 
 
 the questions of responsibility involved by his 
 denial of freedom. These various aspects of his 
 theory may be given in order. 
 
 1. All causes are effects of a first cause, and all 
 effects so proceeding from this first cause are neces- 
 sary.^ That is said to be necessary " which is im- 
 possible to be otherwise, or that which cannot 
 possibly otherwise come to pass. Therefore neces- 
 sary, possible, and impossible have no significance 
 in reference to time past or time present, but only 
 time to come." ^ A sufficient cause is one in which 
 nothing is wanting to produce the effect. The same 
 is a necessary cause. If an act of the will has " a 
 sufficient cause, it is necessarily produced." ' From 
 this point of view, all events are necessary, and no 
 events are contingent. Even chance events are 
 caused necessarily.* 
 
 2. Hobbes is not satisfied with a mere dialectical 
 defence of his theory of determinism. In a truly 
 Baconian passage he appeals to experience. In the 
 last analysis determinism must be proved empiri- 
 cally. Having already shown that the will is the 
 last appetite after deliberation, and that volitions 
 proceed from the will and from nothing else, he 
 seeks to demonstrate psychologically that the will 
 is determined. By liberty or freedom is meant 
 that which is unhindered, as water which is free to 
 flow so long as it is not prevented from flowing, and 
 as will which is free, except in so far as it is forci- 
 bly restrained. " Liberty is the absence of all im- 
 
 1 Hobbes, IV. 261. s h. iv. 274. 
 
 2 Id. V. 105. * Id. IV. 276. 
 
168 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 pediments to action that are not contained in the 
 nature and intrinsical quality of the agent."* A 
 spontaneous action is one which is not preceded by 
 deliberation. A free agent is one who can either 
 act or refrain from acting ; " and his freedom con- 
 sists in the absence of external impediments to 
 action. Voluntary actions can be called free only 
 in the sense that they are not prevented. The de- 
 liberation which precedes the action is not will, for 
 will is the last appetite after deliberation. The 
 contention of Hobbes that will is an appetite, and 
 that the appetite is necessarily determined, shows 
 him to have been far from holding a theory of " self- 
 determination." To resolve to do a thing, is to will 
 to do it after deliberation.' But no man can deter- 
 mine his own will ; for the will is an appetite. In 
 this respect it is like hunger. No man can deter- 
 mine whether he shall be hungry or not. There is 
 some confusion in Hobbes's doctrine at this point. 
 He affirms that it is within man's choice whether 
 he shall eat or not eat ; but that he has no liberty 
 whether he shall be hungry or not. He holds that 
 the appetite of hunger is caused necessarily ; it is 
 therefore not apparent why he considers the appe- 
 tite of the will, which effects eating or not eating, 
 to be less determined than the appetite of hunger. 
 Trom his arguments elsewhere, it is plain that he 
 regards all choice as determined ; and in close con- 
 nection with the doctrine just stated he affirms that 
 " if a man determine himself, the question will still 
 remain, what determined him to determine himself 
 
 I Hobbes, lU. 196 ; IV. 273. 2 Id. IV. 240,275. » Id. V. 34 
 
IN BEITISH PHILOSOPHY 169 
 
 in that maimer."^ This contradiction is not ex- 
 plained. 
 
 While there is no question of the freedom of the 
 will to act, there is no freedom to act in a particu- 
 lar way. The will cannot suspend itself, that is, it 
 is impossible to will not to will. Furthermore, the 
 will is always related to the present. Future pur- 
 pose is not will. 
 
 Except in his statement that some appetites are 
 native to the soul, Hobbes does not explain why it is 
 that extrinsic motives produce different effects in 
 different men. For the theory which attributes 
 acts of the will to necessary causes should espe- 
 cially seek to explain why in any particular case cer- 
 tain causes effect certain volitions. Hobbes does 
 not dwell upon intrinsic causes of volitions. It is the 
 natural efficiency or effaciousness of external objects 
 which affect the appetite, and determine the acts of 
 voluntary agents. The last dictate of the under- 
 standing is something which, as it were, tips the 
 scale, and effects the particular action. " The last 
 dictate of the judgment, concerning the good or bad, 
 that may follow on any action, is not properly the 
 whole cause, but the last part of it, and yet may be 
 said to produce the effect necessarily, in such a man- 
 ner as the last feather may be said to break a 
 horse's back, when there were so many laid on be- 
 fore as there wanted but one to do it." ^ 
 
 3. The moral consequences of this theory are 
 also discussed by Hobbes. In fact, the particular 
 attention which he gave to voluntary action arose 
 
 1 Hobbes, V. 31. 2 id. ly. 268. 
 
170 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 from a dispute with Bishop Bramhall concerning 
 the relation of the will to the will of God and to 
 certain moral principles.. Bramhall, as is well 
 known, was an Arminian bishop of the English 
 Church. In the presence of the Marquis of New- 
 castle, he disputed with Hobbes, and the dispute 
 was continued in writing. In the long and able 
 defence of his opinions, Bramhall thus enumerates 
 the consequences which he supposes follow logi- 
 cally from the doctrine taught by Hobbes. His 
 objections are not all of equal force; but they 
 summarize quite fully the main arguments which 
 were once employed in opposition to determinism.^ 
 
 a. That the laws which prohibit any action will 
 be unjust. Hobbes replies that it is the will to 
 break the law which makes the act unjust, and not 
 the necessity of the act. If any one justifies his 
 failure to keep the law, on the ground that he was 
 necessitated to break it, his punishment will act as 
 a cause that others are deterred from crime. 
 
 6. That all consultations are vain. It is replied 
 that deliberation or consultation is a necessitated 
 means to a necessitated end, and is therefore not 
 superfluous. 
 
 c. That admonitions to men of understanding, are 
 of no more use than to children, fools, and madmen. 
 The same answer is here given as was given to h. 
 
 d. That praise, dispraise, reward, and punishment 
 are in vain. Praise and blame, reward and punish- 
 ment, are not in vain, says Hobbes ; for they are all 
 causes which determine the volitions. 
 
 1 Hobbes, IV. 252. 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 171 
 
 e,/. That councils, acts, arms, books, instru- 
 ments, study, tutors, medicines, are in vain. As in 
 his reply to 6, Hobbes here holds that because an 
 effect shall necessarily come to pass, it does not 
 follow that it shall come to pass without any cause. 
 Nor -will there be neglect of religious duties, and of 
 prayer, in case determinism be accepted. These 
 depend for their efficacy upon the power of God, 
 because all things proceed from his eternal will. 
 That -which gives moral quality to acts is not the 
 freedom of the agent in willing. Sinful acts are 
 sinful not because they are free, but because they 
 are voluntary.* Hobbes departed from the ancient 
 theological opinion that freedom of the will con- 
 sists in freedom to do right, or follow the good. 
 According to him, there is no freedom to do right 
 or to do wrong. Right and wrong actions are neces- 
 sarily determined, and are right and wrong because 
 they are voluntary. 
 
 4. His theological doctrine requires some con- 
 sideration, in so far as it is related to philosophy. 
 All causes are the effects of prior causes, until the 
 fii'st cause is reached, which is God: Deus ergo, 
 qui videt et disponit omnia necessitatem videt 
 omnium actionum a sua ipsius voluntate proficis 
 Gentium. . . . Nisi enim voluntas Dei necessitatem 
 voluntati humanae imponeret, et per consequens 
 actionibus omnibus ab ea dependentibus ; libertas 
 voluntatis humanae omnipotentiam et omniscien- 
 tiam et libertatem Dei toUeret.^ The acts of God are 
 said to proceed from his power rather than from 
 
 » Hobbes, IV. 259. » Id. III. 160 (Latin). 
 
172 THEORIES OP THE WILL 
 
 his will. Like the ancient Fatum, the divine 
 decree is described as verbum Dei. While Hobbes 
 was an opponent of political liberty, and while his 
 theories of the state were opposed by the Puritans, 
 we find him in theology taking up a position like 
 that of the Calvinistic Eeformers. He regards the 
 doctrine of free will and the denial of predestina- 
 tion to be modern inventions of the Catholic theo- 
 logians, particularly of the Jesuits. He holds that 
 the foreknowledge of God is not the cause of any- 
 thing, but that God simply foreknows that which 
 has been already determined. He faces without 
 flinching the problem as to the origin of evil. 
 God is the author of all causes and effects, but is 
 not the author of sin. God cannot commit sin, for 
 the reason that it ceases to be sin if it is the will 
 of God that it should happen. But lest it should 
 appear that he is denying the reality of sin, Hobbes 
 makes a distinction between the author and the 
 cause of sin. The author of a thing is one who 
 orders it to be done ; and in this sense God is not 
 the author of sin. But God is the cause of sin. 
 If it be objected that men are unjustly condemned, 
 Hobbes would reply that this objection still leaves 
 the difficulty, why God elected some, and did not 
 elect others ; and yet punished them in advance of 
 their doing good or ill.^ 
 
 He does not think that his theory is inconsistent 
 with the idea that God is moved by the prayers of 
 pious men.^ Such prayers do not alter the eternal 
 decrees of God ; but just as the gift bestowed has 
 
 1 Hobbes, III. 501 (Latin). 2 Id., II. 124. 
 
IN BKITISn PHILOSOPHY 173 
 
 been predetermined, so it has been predetermined 
 that it should be bestowed in answer to prayer. It 
 is like the slave of Zeno who pleaded that he was 
 predetermined to commit theft, but who had also 
 been predetermined to be beaten for it. The means 
 are predetermined as well as the ends.^ It may be 
 added that Hobbes's doctrines commended them- 
 selves as little to the Calvinists as to the Arminians, 
 and to this day it is often ignorantly said that he 
 was both a materialist and an atheist. 
 
 Locke 
 
 The inconsistencies and ambiguities of Locke's 
 philosophy cause some difiBculties of interpretation. 
 Theoretically, his method is empirical; but the 
 results reached cannot be derived from experience 
 alone. A more rigorous application of his method 
 gave rise to the philosophy which began with Vol- 
 taire and Condillac, and ended in the French mate- 
 rialism of the eighteenth century. A more liberal 
 interpretation of Locke's theory of ideas found 
 expression in the philosophy of Berkeley, and in- 
 directly in the scepticism of Hume. The first 
 principles of L^cke are that experience is the 
 source of all ideas; that ideas are the objects of 
 the understanding when a man thinks; that the 
 channels of experience are two in number, sensa- 
 tion and reflection; one is outward, the other in- 
 ward. The mind is tabula rasa, and there is 
 nothing in the understanding but what was previ- 
 
 1 Hobbes, IV. 551. 
 
174 THEOKIES OF THE WILL 
 
 ously in the outer and inner sense. Setting out 
 from such principles, it was inevitable that Locke 
 should encounter difficulties in explaining the activ- 
 ity of the soul. In spite of his avowed method, he 
 is far from teaching consistently that the mind is 
 a mere passive surface, upon which experience 
 writes its records. Experience gives, it is true, 
 simple ideas of sensation, such as color and sound, 
 but there is also the experience of reflection. 
 Among the ideas of the inner sense are certain 
 faculties or powers. These faculties exhibit the 
 soul as spontaneous and active. Locke holds, in- 
 deed, that the faculties are simply the powers of 
 the one mind, which is working in different ways. 
 The power is receptive as well as productive. There 
 is spontaneous activity * in the formation of complex 
 ideas, such as space, time, cause and effect, and sub- 
 stance. The faculties of the mind may be referred 
 to two genera : perception or thinking, and volition 
 or willing.' The latter is enumerated among the 
 simple ideas of reflection. 
 
 Locke's theory of the will comprehends a con- 
 sideration of power and of freedom. 
 
 I. Power. This is a simple idea derived from 
 sensation and reflection.' We olvfcain it from our 
 observation that we can, at will, move the several 
 parts of our bodies, and that other bodies produce 
 changes upon each other. In general, the idea of 
 power is caused by our experience of change. The 
 possibility of anything having any of its simple 
 
 ^ Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. II. xii. 
 2 Id., ib. Bk. II. VI. 8 Id., ib. Bk. II. vii. 
 
IN BEITISH PHILOSOPHY 175 
 
 ideas changed is power. By simple ideas in this 
 sense are meant the qualities of that which is 
 changed. Power is thus passive as well as active. 
 It is, moreover, "a principal ingredient" in our 
 idea of substances.' It involves the complex idea 
 of relation, although it has been defined as a simple 
 idea. But in this doctrine Locke shows a dispo- 
 sition to associate power with the conception of 
 cause. He holds, also, that the mind receives a 
 better idea of power from reflection on its own 
 operations than from external sensations. All 
 actions of which we have any idea reduce them- 
 selves to two, thinking and motion, which are 
 apparently correlative to the faculties already 
 mentioned, — perception and volition. 
 
 It having been affirmed that the mind has the 
 idea of power, it is next shown that we find within 
 ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or 
 end, several actions of our minds, and motions of 
 our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the 
 mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding, the 
 doing or not doing such or such a particular action. 
 This power is the will. Its particular exercise in 
 any direction is volition or willing.^ The forbear- 
 ance of that action consequent to such order or 
 command of the mind is called voluntary. And 
 whatsoever action is performed without such a 
 thought of the mind is called involuntary. Else- 
 where he adds that volition is an act of the mind 
 knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to 
 
 1 Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. II. xxi. 
 »Id.,ib. Bk. II. XXI. 4, 5. 
 
176 THEORIES OP THE WILL 
 
 have over any part of the man, by employing it in, 
 or withholding it from, any particular action. It 
 is the power of the mind to determine its thought. 
 Stripped of all disguises, will is nothing but the 
 power or ability to prefer or choose.' 
 
 In these statements there is some confusion of 
 definition. Locke seems to hesitate whether to 
 define as volition the executive act of the mind, or 
 the acts of decision and choice. But he holds 
 that one faculty does not determine the action of 
 another." For example, the understanding does not 
 determine the will, nor the will, the understanding. 
 It is the mind which determines the will. 
 
 In order that there may be volition, the object 
 of the will must be in our power. Deliberation 
 precedes the will, but does not determine the will, 
 unless a feeling of uneasiness be excited: "We are 
 seldom at ease, and free enough from the solicita- 
 tion of our natural or adopted desires; but a con- 
 stant succession of uneasinesses out of that stock, 
 which natural wants or acquired habits have heaped 
 up, take the will in their turns ; and no sooner is 
 one action despatched, which by such a determina- 
 tion of the will we are set upon, but another un- 
 easiness is ready to set us on to work." ' There 
 will be a constant rise of alternative desires, some 
 of which will claim immediate satisfaction, and the 
 main uneasiness which would otherwise determine 
 the will may be kept waiting; but this at last 
 " stands upon fair terms with the rest, to be satis- 
 
 1 Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. II. xxi. 14. 
 3 Id., ib. XXI. 19. 8 Id., ib. xxi. 45. 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 177 
 
 fied ; and so, according to its greatness and pressure, 
 comes in its turn to determine the will." Locke 
 maintains, rather inconsistently, that the mind may 
 suspend volition, and decline to prosecute a desire, 
 until it has further deliberated.' According to his 
 own principles, such a suspension of the will would 
 be an act of will, and this would imply that some 
 particular uneasiness had prevailed. 
 
 II. Freedom. From the account just given, 
 Locke's determinism is manifest. He draws a 
 strange distinction between will, and liberty or 
 freedom. Liberty, according to him, does not be- 
 long to the will. For liberty is itself a power, 
 and belongs to agents, not to the powers of agents. 
 It is not the will but the agent which may be prop- 
 erly called free. The question is, therefore, not 
 whether the will, but whether the man, is free. 
 To ask whether the will is free would be like ask- 
 ing whether one power had another power. Ac- 
 cording to Locke, man is free, in so far as he can 
 choose the existence or non-existence of an action 
 by the direction or choice of his mind. Wherever 
 there is preference or choice of what lies within 
 the power of a man to perform or not to perform, 
 the man is free. If it be asked whether man, then, 
 wills what he pleases, the answer must be affirma- 
 tive.'' For freedom consists in being able to act 
 or not to act, according to choice.' The action 
 must be externally possible, however, and the con- 
 trary action must also be possible. The power of 
 
 1 Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. 11. xxi. 47. 
 " Id., ib. XXI. 14r-24. ' Id., ib. xxii. 27. 
 
 N 
 
178 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 contrary willing cannot belong to a man, if its con- 
 templated object be impossible. Locke overthrows 
 all this doctrine, however, when he offers a defini- 
 tion of liberty " to the learned world." " Liberty," 
 he says, "is a power to act or not to act, as the 
 mind directs."^ This definition, although it is 
 supposed to refer to liberty in willing, shows the 
 inconsistency and confusion of Locke's thought. 
 Liberty in acting is confounded with liberty in 
 willing. 
 
 That which causes the mind to determine the 
 will, however, is some "uneasiness."' The term 
 is rather indefinite. Hobbes had made no generic 
 distinction between will on the one hand, and de- 
 sire or preference on the other. With this Locke 
 does not agree. He appeals directly to self -con- 
 sciousness to establish his view of volition. And 
 although he holds that the will and desire may be 
 opposed to one another, yet he defines the uneasi- 
 ness which moves the will as desire; and, con- 
 versely, calls desire the uneasiness of the mind on 
 account of some absent good. That which imme- 
 diately determines the will, from time to time, to 
 every voluntary action is the uneasiness of desire, 
 fixed on some absent good — either negative, as 
 indolence to one in pain, or positive, as enjoyment 
 of pleasure. The greater good does not determine 
 the will, for man may will the lesser good. Ac- 
 cording to Locke life would be unbearable were it 
 not that uneasiness carries with it its own remedy 
 
 ^ Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. 11. xxii, 71. 
 2 Id,, ib. Bk. 11. XXI. 29, 31 f. 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 179 
 
 by moving the will to act in avoiding it, and tak- 
 ing the first step in the way of happiness. The 
 desires are "springs of action" which have been 
 put in man as an endowment of the All-wise Maker, 
 " suitably to our constitution and frame, and know- 
 ing what it is that determines the will." It is, 
 however, the present desire rather than the con- 
 templation of the prospective good which most 
 easily determines the will. " A little burning felt, 
 pushes us more powerfully than greater pleasures 
 in prospect draw or allure."* In defending this 
 view, Locke criticises effectively the intellect- 
 ual theory of human action, according to which 
 the mere knowledge of an absent or prospective 
 good is sufficient to determine the will. The spring 
 of action is within us, not beyond us. It is not 
 the natural object which determines the will, but 
 the desire or uneasiness of the soul. When some 
 one spring of action is in control to the exclusion 
 of any other, the will is supreme. 
 
 Thus any vehement pain of the body, the ungovernable 
 passion of a man violently in love, or the impatient desire 
 of revenge keeps the will steady and intent ; and the will, 
 thus determined, never lets the understanding lay by the 
 object, but all the thoughts of the mind and powers of the 
 body are uninterruptedly employed that way by the deter- 
 mination of the will, influenced by that topping uneasiness 
 as long as it lasts ; whereby it seems to me evident that the 
 will or power of setting us upon one action in preference to 
 all other is determined in us by uneasiness.'' 
 
 1 Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. II. xxi. 34. 
 3 Id., ib. Bk. II. XXI. 38. 
 
180 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 Although Locke has previously said that one 
 faculty does not determine another, the above 
 passage implies that the will may determine the 
 understanding, and be in turn determined by the 
 feelings. Tor it is not the natural object -which 
 moves the will or effects the uneasiness. Yet 
 Locke says, also, that it is happiness which pro- 
 duces or determines the uneasiness. Where there 
 are conflicting desires and incompatible feelings, 
 the most pressing desire determines the will. In 
 the expression " most pressing desire " may be seen 
 an equivalent for what some later writers have 
 called "the strongest motive." 
 
 But if it is the mind which determines the will, 
 what is meant by mind? According to Locke, sub- 
 stance is a mere collection of qualities united by 
 the imagination. Power is one of these, " a prin- 
 cipal ingredient of substance," ^ volition is another. 
 The sum of these qualities is substance. If, there- 
 fore, the mind determines the will, it must be the 
 other qualities of various kinds which determine 
 the will. In any event the spring of action lies 
 beyond the will, and itself determines the mind to 
 will. Unless the mind were uneasy, it would not 
 will in one way rather than another. All that can 
 be concluded as to the determination of the will by 
 the spring of action, is that Locke finds the latter 
 to lie within not without the mind. Judgment, it 
 is true, may correct the desires ; there is no com- 
 pulsion of the mind in willing. But the conclusion 
 is clearly deterministic. This appears further from 
 
 1 Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. II. xxin. 7. 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 181 
 
 Locke's statement, that liberty may be hindered by 
 external obstacles, but that a man who ceases to be 
 a free agent by outward restraint recovers his lib- 
 erty when he recovers his understanding, and his 
 power to act or to forbear.^ Necessity in relation 
 to the will is found in cases where there is no power 
 to act or to forbear in accordance with the direction 
 of thought. Where there is no thought, there is 
 no freedom. But both thought and motion may be 
 present and liberty be absent. 
 
 If one were disposed to insist upon a strict inter- 
 pretation of Locke, it might be urged that the mind 
 should have no freedom, because it has no spon- 
 taneity. According to the principles of his method, 
 it would be difficult to prove the spontaneity of the 
 mind, which is tabula rasa. If we overlook this 
 inconsistency, it appears that while the mind may 
 arbitrarily move the will at discretion, it is itself 
 moved and determined to will by the uneasiness 
 which is the spring of action; and the uneasiness 
 is produced by an external object. In the Patristic 
 and Scholastic philosophy, the will was so identi- 
 fied with a man's character and inclination that 
 the depravity of the man involved the depravity of 
 the acts of will. Voluntary acts were determined 
 by original sin. The moment the will is separated 
 from the character as Locke separates it, and has a 
 place given to it of independence in the hierarchy 
 of mental faculties, it loses its identification with 
 the self, the true nature of the man, and becomes 
 
 1 Locke, Essay on the Human UndeTStanding, Bk. II. xxi. 9, 
 10, 11. 
 
182 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 subject to judgments and desires, which in their 
 nature are involuntary rather than voluntary. 
 Belief in freedom may be impossible, if it be sup- 
 posed that the character is enslaved by evil ; but 
 such a view is more easily harmonized with the 
 idea of freedom than with the doctrine that the 
 faculties of the mind are so many separate powers. 
 This is especially true, if these faculties collec- 
 tively constitute the substance of the soul. Cousin 
 saw this, and in his mistaken criticism of Locke 
 appealed to the self-consciousness of the reason to 
 refute the theory.* There is no more vital doctrine 
 in the Essay on the Human Understanding than 
 the doctrine of Substance. It is possible that Locke 
 himself felt the difficulties attending his meta- 
 physical theory when he suggested that God might 
 have endowed matter with a power of thinking. 
 And while this admission was vigorously attacked 
 by Stillingfleet, it was taken up by the French 
 school and taught as a dogma by the materialists. 
 In Great Britain, it was Locke's doctrine of sub- 
 stance which prepared the way for Hume. Accord- 
 ing to the French writers, the several faculties 
 were functions of a material unity in the brain; 
 according to Hume, the unity was an illusion, 
 for he failed to "catch" self in the act of per- 
 ception. 
 
 From Locke's meagre statements it is hard to 
 determine the relation of his theory of volition to 
 morality. Moral good consists in the conformity 
 of voluntary actions to some standard, with sanc- 
 
 1 V. Cousin, La Phil, de Locke, 155. 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 183 
 
 tions. The good or evil whicli attends upon such 
 actions constitutes reward or punishment respec- 
 tively. Such sanctions must be known, otherwise 
 the wills of men will not be determined to virtue. 
 He fails also to consider voluntary action in the 
 light of cause and effect. In the Essay his dis- 
 cussion of the causal relation is limited to the con- 
 sideration of the physical world. It need not be 
 said, therefore, that he does not follow Hobbes in 
 regarding will as a necessary effect. 
 
 The tendency to deny the primacy of will, as 
 well as sharply to distinguish the faculties from one 
 another, is henceforth apparent in British philoso- 
 phy. One faculty of the mind is set over against 
 another. The judgment is independent of the will. 
 The bond of union between them is not clearly ex- 
 plained. They are "united by the imagination." 
 Such a view shows a reaction against the scholastic 
 view. But the intellectualism which prevailed in 
 European philosophy through the powerful influ- 
 ence of Thomas Aquinas harmonizes at some points 
 with the conclusions of Locke. To say that the 
 intellect determines the will is to say virtually that 
 the idea of reflection, which is called judgment, con- 
 trols the idea of reflection, which is called volition. 
 In the former case the faculties are supposed to 
 have a real union in the spiritual substance of the 
 soul. In the latter case, the substance of the soul 
 is a congeries of qualities which are called either 
 ideas of reflection, or powers, or faculties. That 
 mere ontological principles do not lead to any par- 
 ticular doctrine of freedom is demonstrated by the 
 
184 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 fact that Spinoza, witli his monistic theory of sub- 
 stance, reached deterministic conclusions not far 
 removed from those of the English psychological 
 school. It was upon the general psychological 
 foundation of Locke that Collins and Priestley 
 built their extreme theories of necessity, to which, 
 however, I can only refer, without giving them 
 more extended consideration. 
 
 Before considering the theory of Locke's imme- 
 diate successor in British philosophy, I may call 
 attention for a moment to an interpretation of his 
 philosophy in France, which may be more appro- 
 priately mentioned here than in connection with 
 the development of the continental philosophy in 
 general. Voltaire and Gondillac are philosophically 
 responsible for the French misunderstanding of 
 Locke, and so indirectly responsible for the dog- 
 matic materialism of the philosophers just before 
 the Eevolution. Voltaire was an admirer of both 
 Newton and Locke. He brought their writings to 
 the notice of the French public. In his Traiti de 
 Metaphysique, Voltaire readily expresses his in- 
 debtedness to Locke; but he does not recognize 
 reflection as one of the sources of ideas, and main- 
 tains that all our knowledge is derived from the 
 senses.^ In another treatise, he teaches that the 
 present is born of the past, that the Great Being 
 who holds the chain of events cannot permit it 
 ever to be broken, and that inevitable destiny is 
 the law of all nature. He denies that man is free 
 to will, although he is free to do as he will. There 
 
 1 Voltaire, Tr. de Met. Chap. III. 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 185 
 
 must be a cause for every volition ; otherwise man, 
 and not God, would be master of the world : — 
 
 H est impossible qu'll veuille sans cause. Si cette cause 
 n'a son effet infaillible, elle n'est plus cause. ... II faudra 
 toujours reprimer les mfichants ; car s'ils sont dfitenninfe au 
 mal, on leur repondra qu'ils sont pr6destin§s au cMtiment. i 
 
 Condillac, while agreeing with Voltaire that all 
 knowledge is derived from the senses, affirms that 
 the will is free. In his Traiti des Sensations, 
 he compares man to a living statue, which comes 
 into being without any previous experience, and 
 receives knowledge wholly from without. Con- 
 dillac's dissertation on liberty is supplementary to 
 his Traiti des Sensations. He supposes that the 
 statue which has received the ideas of sensation 
 finds itself at length affected by desires which are 
 of equal force, so that no one of them can prevail 
 over the others : — 
 
 Elle flotte entre plusieurs objets, et elle se ports pas plus 
 k I'un qu'ii I'autre.* 
 
 Through experience, the statue finds that unless 
 it resists certain desires, it will suffer pain, and in 
 consequence of pain will feel remorse. It is there- 
 fore led to deliberate as to the preferable course 
 of action, when several alternatives are presented 
 to it. It resists some desires and follows others. 
 It may even choose that which it least desires ; ' and 
 when the feelings are violent, there will be no de- 
 
 1 Voltaire, II Faut Prendre un Parti, XIII. 
 
 2 Condillac, Diss, sur la Liberte, 2. 
 8Id., ib. 8. 
 
186 THEOBIES OF THE WILI. 
 
 liberation. In case the desires are moderate, there 
 will be deliberation : — 
 
 Or quelles que soient ses connalssances, nous avons vu 
 qu'elle en salt assez pour etre sujette au repentir : eUe en 
 salt done assez pour avoir occasion de d^liberer.i 
 
 The consequence of this deliberation will be that 
 in some cases the desire which most tempts the 
 statue will be that which is conquered or controlled. 
 Such an act is called choice ; and when choice has 
 once been made, the statue knows by experience 
 that it had the power to choose the opposite. Lib- 
 erty is the power of doing or not doing in order to 
 action. It is through liberty that choice is pos- 
 sible : — 
 
 Car la liberty n'est que le pouvoir de f aire ce qu'on ne fait 
 pas, ou ne pas faire oe qu'on fait.* 
 
 It is not a question whether one has the power in 
 general to will or not to will; but whether when 
 one wills there is also power not to will, and when 
 one does not will there is also power to will." But 
 without the act of deliberation there is no liberty 
 and no choice. Liberty, however, does not consist 
 in independent determinations, without reference 
 to the action of objects on the subject of the voli- 
 tion, following the terminology of Locke, Con- 
 dillac holds that an uneasiness (inquiitude) is caused 
 by the absence of desirable objects, and that through 
 experience choice is regulated so that the most use- 
 
 1 Condillao, Diss, sur la Liberty, 10. 
 2Id.,ib. 12. aid., lb. 14. 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHT 187 
 
 ful and desirable ends may be attained. Know- 
 ledge of the means is requisite to secure the end 
 sought. It is this which constitutes freedom, and 
 not the ignorant will of the end. Liberty is thus 
 the effect in determination of deliberation : — 
 
 Confiez la oonduite d'un vaisseau ^ un homme qui n'a 
 aucune connaissance de la navigation, le vaisseau sera la 
 jouet dea vagues. Mais uu pilote habile en saura suspendre, 
 arreter la course ; avec un mgme vent il en saura varier la 
 direction ; et ce n'est que dans la temp§te que le gouvemail 
 cessera d'ob6ir ^ sa main. Voil^ I'image de I'homme.i 
 
 The writers who afterwards drew materialistic 
 conclusions from Condillac's theory of knowledge 
 rejected the doctrine of Indeterminism which has 
 just been presented. They followed Voltaire in his 
 determinism, but their defence of the latter doc- 
 trine is not deserving of special mention. 
 
 Berkeley 
 
 As Locke's theory of ideas was ambiguous, it is 
 not surprising that Berkeley should have found in 
 it a justification for denying the existence of mat- 
 ter. It is not possible, however, to trace any con- 
 nection between Berkeley's theory of knowledge 
 and his doctrine of the will. He is an opponent 
 of determinism, and regards it as a consequence of 
 a false theory of the concept. So far there may be 
 some ground for considering his nominalism as the 
 cause of his indeterminism. Yet Hume, who held 
 
 1 Coudillac, Diss, sur la Liberty, 18. 
 
188 THEOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 substantially the same logical doctrine, was a de- 
 terminist. 
 
 The nature of the will is discussed incidentally 
 
 in the Principles of Human Knowledge, and the 
 
 problem of freedom in Tlie Minute Philosopher. 
 
 S^ceording to Berkeley, the only existences are God 
 
 s&nd created spirits. A spirit is one undivided 
 
 ^active being. In so far as it perceives ideas, it 
 
 \is called understanding, and in so far as it produces 
 
 \or otherwise operates about them, it is called will. 
 
 Berkeley will not recognize these as distinct from 
 
 each other nor from substance in general. Spirit is 
 
 known, not^er se, but only by its effects; but will, 
 
 soul, and spirit " do not stand for different ideas, 
 
 or in truth for any idea at all." * 
 
 He says : — 
 
 I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and 
 vary and shift the scene as oft as I thinli fit. It is no more 
 than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my 
 fancy : and by the same power it is obliterated, and makes 
 way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth 
 very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is 
 certain, and grounded on experience, but when we talk of 
 unthinking agents, or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, 
 we only amuse ourselves with words .^ 
 
 -Thus the activity of the soul is identified with 
 ^will, and the ideas themselves are attributed to 
 the voluntary agency of God. 
 
 In the seventh dialogue of The Minute Philoso- 
 pher, determinism is opposed by Euphranor, who 
 
 1 Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, XXVII. 
 
 2 Id., il>. xxvm. 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 189 
 
 represents the opinions of the author. The dis- 
 cussion grows out of a theological consideration of 
 the will in relation to divine grace. It is said that 
 there has been no more fruitful topic for controversy 
 than the doctrine of grace, which has engaged the 
 attention 0f~dfaaiSeniSf"5;nd Molinist, of Calvinisf 
 and Arminian. The question is raised as to 
 whether grace is a real influence, provided nomi- 
 nalism be true. The reply to this is ad hominem; 
 if grace cannot be real because it is an abstract, 
 then there is no real color, nor man, nor animal. 
 But all such general names stand as representative 
 of classes of ideas. Berkeley's indeterminism may 
 be best presented by arranging the arguments of 
 his opponents in a series, and then showing how 
 these are answered. 
 
 1. Corporeal objects strike on the organs of 
 sense, and the impression is conveyed to the brain 
 by the nerves. In consequence of this, there is an^ 
 outflow of motion, which is called volition. There- 
 fore so-called voluntary human actions are simply 
 mechanical. They are falsely attributed to a free 
 principle. There is then no foundation for praise 
 or blame, for reward or punishment. 
 
 2. Man is like a puppet; the threads or wires 
 are invisible, but he is not independent of them. 
 
 3. Subjectively the process of volition is as fol- 
 lows: (a) The understanding considers; (6) the 
 judgment decrees ; (c) this determines the will to 
 action; (d) the will executes. There is therefore 
 
190 THEORIES OP THE WILL 
 
 no freedom. In freedom there must be indiffer- 
 ence, a power to act or not to act, without pre- 
 scription or control. But no matter what moves 
 the judgment, the will is controlled by it and cannot 
 be free. Neither knowledge nor appetite is volun- 
 tary. And in addition to these reasons, the future 
 must be fixed, because God foreknows it.^ 
 
 II 
 
 The reply made by Berkeley to these assertions 
 and arguments is as follows: — 
 
 1. It is confounding two distinct ideas to affirm 
 that motion and will are the same. And if this 
 identity be denied, the first argument of the deter- 
 minist fails. 
 
 2. Certainty and necessity are not the same ; in 
 the former notion there is nothing that implies 
 constraint; it may be foreseen that an event is 
 about to happen, and yet be foreseen that it 
 is about to happen through human choice and! 
 liberty. 
 
 3. The abstractions of the determinist pervert 
 the truth. In ancient times, when philosophers 
 denied the possibility of motion, they were met by 
 those who walked before them. In the same way,^ 
 man is a free agent, because he freely wills. This 
 argument resembles that of Dr. Johnson in opposi- 
 tion to Berkeley's idealism. 
 
 4. It is not judgment that determines the will, / 
 1 Berkeley, The Minute Philosopher, VII. xix. 20. 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 191 
 
 but I, being active, determine my own will. Thus, / 
 although one may not be able to defend the abstract 
 idea of freedom, there is no doubt that the individ- 
 ual act is free. 
 
 6. A man is free in so far as he can do what he, 
 will. To act according to will is to be free. To 
 pursue the matter any farther is to assert that man 
 can will as he wills. Such subtleties are absurd, 
 for the notions of guilt and merit, justice and re- 
 wards, in the mind of man are antecedent to all 
 metaphysical disquisitions ; and according to those 
 received natural notions it is not doubted that 
 man is accountable, that he acts, and is self-deter- 
 mined.^ 
 
 6. The whole argument of the determinist, in 
 short, is an excellent illustration of the sophistry 
 of abstract ideas. One of the disputants remarks, 
 that all arguments which can be urged against lib- 
 erty are referable either to realism or materialism. 
 Yet human minds are far from being mere machines _ 
 or footballs, acted upon and bandied about by cor- 
 poreal objects, without any inward principle of 
 freedom or action. The only true notions of lib-^ 
 erty that we have, come from reflecting upon our> 
 selves and the constitution of our minds. 
 
 That Berkeley's attitude against determinism 
 was so decided may be partly ascribed to his em- 
 phatic opposition to materialism. The two doc- 
 trines were naturally associated in his mind, so 
 that in refuting the latter he was led to oppose the 
 former. 
 
 1 Berkeley, The Minute Philosopher, VII. xxn. 
 
192 theoeies of the will 
 
 Hume 
 
 The radical effects of Hume's scepticism are well 
 known. The originality of his views with respect 
 to the nature of the will is often overlooked. It is 
 interesting to find in his theory of the nature of 
 volition an anticipation of conclusions which have 
 been presented in our own time as the result of 
 psychological inquiry. 
 
 According to Hume, all the perceptions of the 
 mind may be divided into impressions and ideas. 
 The former are those which enter the mind " with 
 most force and violence." They include all our 
 sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make 
 their first appearance in the soul. The ideas are 
 " the faint images of these in thinking and reason- 
 ing." ^ Impressions are of two kinds, original and 
 secondary, or those of sensation and of reflection. 
 The first include all the impressions of the senses 
 and all bodily pains and pleasures ; the second are 
 the passions and other emotions resembling them." 
 The passions are either direct or indirect. Direct 
 passions are those which arise immediately from 
 good or evil, from pain or pleasure. ° " Of all these 
 direct passions, there is none more remarkable 
 than the will."* Properly speaking, it is not to 
 be included among the passions; but they cannot 
 be understood without a knowledge of it. In his 
 treatise on the passions, he thus defines the will; 
 
 1 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I. Part 1. 1. 
 
 2 Id., ib. Bk. II. Part 1. 1. 3 Id., ib. Bk. 11. Part I. 1. 
 « Id., ib. Bk. II. Part III. 1. 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 193 
 
 it is " the internal impression we feel, and are con- 
 scious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new 
 motion of our body, or new perception of our 
 mind." This is incapable of closer definition, 
 and any further description would be likely to 
 cause confusion. In order that Hume's theory of 
 voluntary action may be fully explained, it is ex- 
 pedient that his doctrine of cause and effect should 
 be recalled. 
 
 I. Cause and Effect. There is a natural princi- 
 ple of union in our ideas, which may be described 
 as the principle of association. An example of 
 such union is presented in the ideas of cause and 
 effect. Trom the empirical doctrine of knowledge 
 already laid down, Hume was unable to arrive at 
 any justification for the idea of power or of neces- 
 sary connection. A cause has no power to produce 
 an effect, and the effect is not necessarily connected 
 with its cause. "We have no other notion of 
 cause and effect but that of certain objects, which 
 have been always conjoined together, and which in 
 all past instances have been found inseparable.'" 
 Why they should be thus inseparable is something 
 which we cannot explain. We know only that such 
 is the case, and can give no reason for it. The 
 invariable succession of phenomena in the past is 
 the only warrant that we have for the same sequence 
 in the future. The invariable antecedent is cause; 
 the invariable consequent is effect. Any different 
 conclusion from this is excluded by Hume's doc- 
 trine that we know only impressions and ideas. It 
 1 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I. Fart III. 6. 
 o 
 
194 TIIEOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 is because we have no impression of any connection 
 between cause and effect, that we have no idea of 
 such a connection. The relation is one of ante- 
 cedent to consequent and no more.' 
 
 II. Power. All ideas are derived from impres- 
 sions or some preceding perceptions. If we have 
 any idea of power, therefore, there must be some 
 instances in which power is perceived to exert 
 itself. According to Hume, such instances can 
 never be discovered in body. It has been held by 
 some, he says, that there is an innate idea of God, 
 and that God is the cause of every change in the 
 material world. But haying rejected the theory 
 of innate ideas, Hume concludes that there is no 
 reason to suppose that there is any principle of 
 activity in the Deity. It is equally impossible to 
 derive any idea of power from matter. It is 
 found in none of the qualities of matter. We 
 deceive ourselves when we suppose that we have 
 any idea of efficacy or power. " All ideas are do- 
 rived from and represent impressions. We never 
 have any impression that contains any power or 
 efficacy. We never, therefore, have any idea of 
 power." * One other alternative, however, remains 
 to be considered, and that is whether we derive the 
 idea of power from the action of our wills. 
 
 III. Voluntary Action. Hume proceeds to exam- 
 ine the opinion that we feel an energy or power 
 in our own mind; and that, having in this man- 
 
 1 Hume, Treatise of Haman Nature, Bk. I. Part III. 2. 
 luquiry concerning the Human Understanding, I. 
 
 2 Id., Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I. Part. III. 14. 
 
IN BBITISH PHILOSOPHY 195 
 
 ner acquired the idea of po-wer, we transfer that 
 quality to matter, where we are not immediately 
 able to discover it. In accordance with the doe- 
 trine of cause and effect already explained, the 
 will is said by Hume to have " no more a discover- 
 able connection with its effects, than any material 
 cause has with its proper effect. So far from per- 
 ceiving the connection betwixt an act of volition 
 and a motion of the body, 'tis allowed that no effect 
 is more inexplicable from the powers and essence 
 of thought and matter." * Nor does the will seem 
 to have any greater power over our mind than over 
 the material object. The control which we have 
 over our thoughts is limited. We perceive a con- 
 stant conjunction of ideas in the mind, but no con- 
 nection between them which involves power or 
 efficacy. "No internal impression has an appar- 
 ent energy, more than external objects have." It 
 follows from this that there is no faculty of will; 
 and that what we suppose to be a feeling of power 
 over our bodies or minds is a mere impression, 
 which has no apparent energy. This might be 
 translated into the language of modern psychology 
 to mean that we have no knowledge of any control 
 of the body by the will except in the feeling which 
 arises when the body is voluntarily moved. 
 
 IV. The Necessary Determination of the Will. 
 The greater part of Hume's discussion of the will 
 is concerned with this particular aspect of the 
 subject. In spite of his empirical principles, he 
 asserts that necessity governs all material phe- 
 
 1 Hume, Treatise of Human I^ature, Bk. I. Fart. III. 11. 
 
196 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 nomena. "Every object is determined by an ab- 
 solute fate to a certain degree and direction of its 
 motion, and can no more depart from that precise 
 line in which it moves, than it can convert itself 
 into an angel or spirit, or any superior substance." ^ 
 Necessity governs also all mental phenomena. It 
 has been shown already that Hume denied the 
 necessary connection of cause and effect. It is 
 further evident that constant union of ideas, 
 together with the mind's inference, constitute 
 necessity. Wherever we discover these, there is 
 necessity. And such a necessity he observes in 
 the mind. His proof of this sho-^s some advance 
 in the inductive method as employed in psychology. 
 Like causes he finds produce like effects in the 
 history of mankind. 
 
 a. There is a difference in the physical qualities 
 of men; yet all are subject to substantially the 
 same physical causes. In like manner there is a 
 difference in the mental qualities, and again all 
 are subject to the same principle of union or causa- 
 tion. The only way of avoiding this conclusion is 
 to deny this general uniformity in human conduct. 
 " As long as actions have a constant union and con- 
 nection with the situation and temper of the agent, 
 however we may in words refuse to acknowledge the 
 necessity, we really allow the thing." ^ It may be 
 answered that necessity is regular and certain, 
 while human conduct is irregular and uncertain. 
 Yet when we observe apparent irregularities in the 
 
 1 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. H. Part III. 1. 
 
 2 Id., ib. 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 197 
 
 material world, -we do not deny the uniformity of 
 causes, but try to explain the irregularities by 
 referring to other causes which may have been 
 overlooked. We do not deny the principle of cause 
 and effect in the external world because of these 
 exceptions; and we have no more reason to deny 
 them in the case of the will. Madmen, it is ad- 
 mitted by all, have no liberty of will, and yet their 
 actions are far more irregular than those of men 
 who are supposed to be both sane and free. 
 
 b. The similarity in the characters of men gives 
 an assurance that their wills will be determined by 
 like causes. Just as a prince who makes laws ex- 
 pects the obedience of his subjects, or a general who 
 issues orders anticipates that they will be carried 
 out, so it is to be concluded that the actions of the 
 will are determined by causes ; for the latter doc- 
 trine is established by the same kind of moral evi- 
 dence. In judging of the actions of men, we rely 
 upon causation as much as we do in judging of the 
 phenomena of nature. Necessity is of the essence 
 of causation, consequently the belief in freedom, 
 by removing necessity, removes also causation, and 
 leads directly to belief in chance. "As chance 
 is commonly thought to imply a contradiction, and 
 is at least directly contrary to experience, there 
 are always the same arguments against liberty or 
 free will."' 
 
 If such inductive considerations lead to a belief 
 in the determination of the will, it is fair to inquire 
 why men so commonly affirm that voluntary actions 
 
 1 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. H. Fart. III. 1. 
 
198 THBOKIES OF THE WILL 
 
 are freely performed. To this Hume replies that, 
 in the first place, it is difficult for men who have 
 acted to persuade themselves that they might not 
 have acted differently. They are conscious that 
 their action has been spontaneous, that they have 
 not willed on account of any external compulsion, 
 and so they confound that which is opposed to vio- 
 lence with that which is opposed to causation and 
 necessity. "Few are capable of distinguishing be- 
 twixt the liberty of spontaneity, as it is called in 
 the schools, and the liberty of indifference ; betwixt 
 that which is opposed to violence and that which 
 means a negation of necessity and causes." In the 
 second place, men are deceived by the apparent 
 mobility of the will into supposing that what 
 seems so easy to think of, viz. an alternate course 
 of action, might have been easily carried out, and 
 so they imagine that this is the liberty of indiffer- 
 ence. There is "a false sensation or experience 
 even of the liberty of indifference, which is re- 
 garded as an argument for its real existence."^ 
 Hume considers this idea to be an illusion. No 
 matter how capricious and irregular the actions 
 may seem to have been, and no matter how we 
 may act so as to attempt to prove that we are 
 free, we are always bound by necessity. While we 
 imagine that we are acting quite freely, the spec- 
 tator can commonly infer what the motives of our 
 actions are, and what our character is, from the 
 actions themselves. And if he were acquainted 
 with all the elements of our situation and temper, 
 1 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. II. Part III. 2. 
 
IN BKITISH PHILOSOPHY 199 
 
 and our secret springs of action, lie would be as- 
 sured that our wills were determined necessarily. 
 
 Hume notices the prevailing tendency in philoso- 
 phy before him to place the reason in opposition 
 to the passions ; to make rational motives superior 
 to emotional motives. This doctrine he opposes. 
 
 Reason alone can never move the will. There 
 are two general processes of what he calls the 
 understanding: one of these is demonstration, the 
 other reasoning on probability. The former, which 
 is called abstract or demonstrative reasoning, does 
 not influence our actions directly, but only guides 
 our judgments with respect to causes and effects. 
 Nor does probable reasoning affect the will; it 
 shows only the causes and effects of emotions. 
 Reasoning alone cannot dispute with passion and 
 emotion or prevent the wUl. There is no conflict 
 between reason and passion ; for the former is really 
 subject to the feelings. It is a part of Hume's doc- 
 trine that passion is a more real element in the 
 nature of man than is any thought of the under- 
 standing. " ^Vhen I am angry I am actually pos- 
 sessed with the passion, and in that emotion have 
 no more reference to any other object than when 
 I am thin or sick, or more than five feet high."* 
 The passion is always an original, while a rational 
 process is a copy or representation. Furthermore, 
 the passions are unreasonable only on rare occa- 
 sions. Such occasions are, first, when it happens 
 that the facts about which the passion arises are 
 unreal; and, second, when wrong means are chosen 
 1 Hume, Treatise o£ Human Nature, Bk. H. Part IH. 3. 
 
200 THBOBIES OF THE WILL 
 
 to secure certain ends. In all other respects reason 
 and passion are in harmony. What is thought by 
 many to be the determination of the will by the 
 reason in opposition to passion, is in reality the 
 determination of the will by certain more tranquil 
 feelings, which from their tranquillity assume the 
 appearance of rational processes. Strength of mind 
 and self-control are thus only the predominance of 
 the calmer feelings in controlling the will. 
 
 It has sometimes been said that the denial of 
 free will is disadvantageous to religion. Hume 
 holds, on the contrary, that a belief in necessary 
 determination is indispensable to good morals and 
 religion.^ The doctrine of necessary determinism 
 teaches that there is a necessary relation between 
 a man's disposition and his actions. If the wills 
 of men were free, it would be absurd to punish evil- 
 doers. For it would be the infliction of punishment 
 on a man who was not responsible. " According to 
 the hypothesis of liberty, therefore, a man is as 
 pure and untainted after having committed the 
 most horrid crimes as at the first moment of his 
 birth, nor is his character any way concerned in 
 his actions, since they are not derived from it, and 
 the wickedness of the one can never be used as 
 a proof of the depravity of the other."" Hume 
 would, therefore, turn the tables on his adversaries 
 by showing the injustice of gauging moral actions 
 by the liberty with which they are performed. 
 
 Such are the main arguments by which he en- 
 
 1 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. II. Part III. 2. 
 
 2 Id., ib. Bk. II. Part. III. 2. 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 201 
 
 deavors to prove the determination of the will. I 
 do not think it worth while to point out the mani- 
 fest inconsistency of his theory with the principles 
 which he affirms in the beginning of his Treatise 
 of Human Nature. Those who recall his concep- 
 tion of the origin of knowledge, and his doctrine 
 of cause and effect, will be disposed to dispute 
 the cogency of his arguments. Upon Hume's own 
 principles, there is no good reason why the will 
 should be thought to be necessarily determined, 
 unless it is because such determination has always 
 been observed. For the denial of any necessary 
 connection between cause and effect leaves it pos- 
 sible that there should be volition unconnected 
 with motives and entirely disconnected with char- 
 acter. John Stuart Mill, who afterwards held with 
 few modifications Hume's theory of causation, de- 
 fended a like theory of determinism. 
 
 Eeid 
 
 The philosophy of Eeid may be considered both 
 as a dogmatic reply to Hume, and as the beginning 
 of the later development of Scottish thought. It 
 has especial importance because of the influence 
 which it has exerted not only in Great Britain but 
 also in America. In relation to the philosophy of 
 the Continent, Eeid may be placed at the head of 
 those who appealed to what the Germans called der 
 gesunde Menschenverstand ; he is a "common-sense" 
 philosopher. 
 
 He adopts the old division of the faculties of the 
 
202 THEOEIES OF THE WILJ, 
 
 soul into understanding and will.' The first of 
 these is a faculty of knowledge and speculation; 
 the second is a faculty of action. Consequently, he 
 speaks of intellectual and active powers. By the 
 Matter, as weU as by the former, man is distinguished 
 , from the brutes. The brutes follow the strongest 
 \impulse, and seem to have no capacity for self-gov- 
 H.ernment. They deserve, therefore, neither praise 
 \nor blame for what they do or fail to do. They 
 may be governed by discipline, but not by law. 
 Man, on the contrary, acts from motives of a higher 
 nature. He has a conception of duty, and feels 
 that when he does his duty, the action is meritori- 
 ous, and when it is left undone, the action is worthy 
 \ of blame.^ 
 
 I. The Conception of Active Power. Eeid criti- 
 cises Hume's definition of active power : it is not as 
 Hume said, "A lively idea related to or associated 
 with a present impression." While declining to de- 
 fine the conception, Keid explains it as follows : — 
 
 1. It is not derived from any of the external 
 senses, nor from self-consciousness. So far Hume 
 was right in opposing Locke. 
 
 2. Power is one of those things of which we have 
 only a relative and indirect impression; that is, 
 power is knovm not per se but only by means of its 
 effects. 
 
 3. Power is a mere quality, and has no existence 
 independent of the subject to which it belongs. 
 
 1 Beid, Active Powers, lutrodaction. 
 
 2 Id., ib. 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 203 
 
 4. But the degree of power belonging to any- 
 thing cannot be inferred from the effects produced, 
 for a given thing may not manifest the amount of 
 power which it possesses. 
 
 5. There are some powers which hare a con- 
 trary, and some which do not. Vice is the contrary 
 of virtue; but there is no contrary of power. There 
 are only conceptions of privations of power, such as 
 weakness or impotence.* 
 
 The exercise of active power is called action. 
 While all power is to be traced ultimately to God, 
 there is a relative power which the mind has over 
 its own operations. 
 
 II. Active Power and the Will. The only con- 
 ception which we get of active power in relation to 
 its cause is from the way in which our own active 
 power is exercised.' Every man is naturally led to 
 attribute free will to himself, and to regard volun- 
 tary acts as in his own power. Human power can 
 be exerted only by will. We cannot conceive of 
 any power to be exerted without will. We impute 
 our actions to ourselves, and consider ourselves to 
 be the causes of our own actions. 
 
 III. Definition of the Will. 
 
 Every man is conscious of a power to determine, in things 
 which he conceives to depend upon his determination. 
 To this power we give the name of will; and as it is usual, 
 in the operations of the mind, to give the same name to the 
 power and to the act of that power, the term will is often 
 
 1 Reid, Active Powers, 1. 1. 
 ,2Id., ib. I. 5. 
 
204 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 put to signify the act of determining, which more properly 
 IS called volition. 
 
 Volition, therefore, signifies the act of willing and deter- 
 . mining; and will is put indifferently to signify either the 
 power of willing or the act.* 
 
 It may be more briefly defined as the determi- 
 nation of the mind to do or not to do something 
 which we conceive to be in our power. 
 
 Eeid further explains the term, "to distinguish 
 it from other acts of mind, which from the ambi- 
 guity of words are apt to be confounded with it."^ 
 And the following characteristics are enumerated: 
 
 \ 1. Every act of the will must have an object. 
 ^2. The immediate object of the will must be 
 vsome action of our own. Desire and will are alike 
 in that there is an object before both. But they 
 differ in that the object of the will must be an 
 action, while desire may be directed towards the 
 object of appetite or affection or passion. 
 
 3. The object of the wUl must be something 
 within our power. 
 
 4. When we will to do anything immediately, the 
 volition is accompanied with an effort to execute. 
 
 If a man wills to raise a great weight from the ground by 
 the strength of his arm, he makes an effort for that purpose 
 proportioned to the weight he determines to raise. A great 
 weight requires a great effort ; a small weight a less effort. 
 Great efforts, whether of body or mind, are attended with 
 difficulty, and when long continued produce lassitude, which 
 requires that they should be intermitted. This leads us to 
 
 1 Eeid, Active Powers, II. 1. 
 
 2 Id., ib. II. 1. , 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 205 
 
 reflect upon them, and to give them a name. The name 
 effort is commonly appropriated to them ; and those that are 
 made with ease, and leave no sensible effect, pass without 
 observation and without a name, though they be of the same 
 kind, and differ only in degree from those to which the 
 name is given. This effort we are conscious of, if we will 
 but give attention to it ; and there is nothing in which we 
 are in a more strict sense active.^ 
 
 This view of effort which is here so plainly 
 expressed was for a long time prevalent in psy- 
 chology, but of late years has been vigorously 
 opposed. 
 
 Acts may be excited by instinct which do not 
 involve either understanding or will, as when a 
 man recovers his balance after stumbling, or plays 
 a tune without there being a special volition for 
 each particular note. Appetites, passions, and 
 desires without judgment may direct actions, and 
 such actions are not properly voluntary. While 
 passion may influence or control the will, there 
 may be involuntary passionate actions.' 
 
 Although the faculties of understanding and will 
 are easily distinguished in thought, they are rarely, 
 if ever, disjoined in operation. When understand- 
 ing and will are combined, there are three species 
 of volition, — attention, deliberation, and resolu- 
 tion.' Attention may be given to objects either of 
 sense or of intellect, in order to form a distinct 
 notion of such objects. Deliberation consists in 
 the forming of some judgment as to what ought to 
 
 1 Eeid, Active Powers, 11. 1. 
 2Id.,ib.n.2. 8Id.,ib.n.3. 
 
206 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 be willed, and the general rules of deliberation are 
 th.e axioms of morals. Eesolution does not imply 
 immediate action, but is used both for present and 
 future actions and volitions.* 
 
 IV. Motives. There are two parts in the human 
 constitution that may have influence upon our vol- 
 untary actions : these are passion and reason. They 
 are described by Eeid as motives, or as principles 
 of action, or as incitements to action. Reason influ- 
 ences the voluntary acts which man regards as his 
 own, while actions done through passion are thought 
 of as being alien to a man's true self.'' Thus we find 
 him following the ancient view already noticed 
 which puts passion in opposition to reason, and 
 regards the former as taking possession of the soul, 
 and so enslaving it. Eeid says : " What a man does 
 coolly and deliberately without passion is imputed 
 solely to the man, whether it have merit or demerit ; 
 whereas what he does from passion, is imputed in 
 part to passion. The demerit is removed in propor- 
 tion to the excess of the passion. It is judgment 
 which compares the principles of action, and decides 
 which is worthiest to be pursued." It is not neces- 
 sary that the incitement to action should be effec- 
 tive in order to be a motive, and so, as will be 
 seen, motives do not determine the will. Eeid 
 classifies principles of action as follows: (1) me- 
 chanical principles; (2) animal principles; (3) rar 
 tional principles.' Mechanical principles are such 
 as require no attention, no deliberation, and no 
 
 1 Eeid, Active Powers, II. 3. 2 Id., ib. UI. 1. 
 8Id.,il). III. 1. 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 207 
 
 will. They are of two kinds : instincts and habits. 
 An instinct is a natural blind impulse to certain 
 actions, without any end being in view, without 
 deliberation therefore, and very often without any 
 clear conception.^ A habit is the facility of doing 
 a thing, acquired by having done it frequently.* 
 Animal principles of action are such as operate upon 
 will and intention, but do not involve any exercise 
 of judgment or reason.' Among these are the appe- 
 tites, which are distinguished from other desires in 
 that they are accompanied by sensations of uneasi- 
 ness proper to them, and are not constant, but peri- 
 odical. Another kind of animal principles of actioti, 
 Eeid calls desires. These are without the marks or 
 properties which have just been described as belong- 
 ing to animal appetites. Other animal principles of 
 action are benevolent and malevolent affections, pas- 
 sions, disposition, and opinion. In speaking of dis- 
 position, Eeid gives a very superficial treatment of 
 that important principle, and does not refer to it 
 later in his discussion of freedom.* 
 
 Kational principles of action are so called because 
 they can have no existence in beings not endowed 
 with reason. They involve the exercise of inten- 
 tion, will, and reason. Eeid makes a distinction 
 between two kinds of rational function: it is one 
 function of the reason to regulate our belief, and 
 another to regulate our actions and conduct.' "What- 
 ever is rational commands our assent, and assent 
 
 I Eeid, Active Powers, III. 2. 
 
 2Id.,ib. 111.3. 4Id.,ib. in. 2-8. 
 
 » Id., ib. III. 1. « Id., ib. III. 1. 
 
208 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 influences our will. The notions of the good in 
 general, of duty, moral obligation, and rectitude, are 
 among the rational principles of action.* 
 
 V. Freedom. Eeid's discussion of the freedom 
 of the will is elaborate, although somewhat diffuse. 
 He defines the liberty of a moral agent as " a power 
 over the determination of his own will." * If the 
 determination of the wUl be the necessary conse- 
 quence of something involuntary in the state of the 
 mind, or of something external to the mind, then 
 the agent is not free, and not moral. He is con- 
 trolled by necessity. Such freedom presupposes 
 understanding as well as will ; and in free actions, 
 practical judgment is involved. Necessity is de- 
 fined, negatively, as the want of this moral liberty.' 
 Eeid objects to defining liberty as a power to act as 
 we will, which implies that we will to will, and so 
 on to infinity. He distinguishes three kinds of 
 liberty : (1) liberty as opposed to physical restraint ; 
 (2) liberty as opposed to obligation by law ; (3) liberty 
 as opposed to necessity.* 
 
 It is liberty of the third kind that is properly pred- 
 icated of wUl." Necessity is not a philosophical 
 notion only, but is a principle which the vulgar 
 have appealed to in every age to exculpate them- 
 selves and avoid being held responsible for their 
 acts. According to Eeid the advocate of necessity 
 lays stress chiefly upon motives. The strongest 
 motive prevails, and determines the will. And the 
 
 1 Eeid, Active Powers, HI. 2-7. 
 
 2 Id., ib., IV. 1. 1 Id., ib. 
 » Id., ib. 6 Id., ib. 
 
IN BEITISH PHILOSOPHr 209 
 
 advocate of necessity affirms that if man be free it 
 is impossible that he should be governed by regard 
 for rewards or punishments. To this objection 
 Eeid replies that aU rational beings are influ enced 
 b y motives, but these are not jijia cient to determ ine 
 thewilL They are not causes nor agents, they per- 
 suade or inform, bu t acts of will a.re not necessa ry 
 e ffects of them;.,-JVfot ives suppose liberty in th e 
 age nt, othe rwise they could have no influe nce at 
 all. Reid ridicules the idea of the Asi7ius BunSam, 
 and holds that the conditions of the problem are 
 contrary to experience. It is possible for men_ J;o 
 
 oMnna^ iri_a.Ti_eirhi rp. a.hap.nf'a nf Tnnt.iirpg, f\;n^ if. Pan 
 
 ne ver be proved that the moti v g determines t he 
 wilL. To hold such a deterministic opinion is to 
 affirm that men never act from wilfulness, caprice, 
 or obstinacy. Th ere is no way of tellin g what th e 
 strongest motive is, except by volition itself : — 
 
 How shall we know whether the strongest motive always 
 prevails, if we know not which is the strongest? There 
 must be some test by which their strength is to be tried, 
 some balance in which they may be weighed, otherwise, to 
 say that the strongest motive always prevails, is to speak 
 without any meaning.^ 
 
 The relation of opposing motives to the act of 
 will may be explained as follows : — 
 
 Contrary motives may very properly be compared to 
 advocates pleading the opposite sides of a cause at the bar. 
 It would be very weak reasoning to say, that such an advo- 
 cate is the most powerful pleader, because sentence was 
 given on his side. The sentence is in the power of the judge, 
 
 1 Raid, Active Powers, IV. i. 
 p 
 
210 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 not of the advocate. It is equally weak reasoning in proof 
 of necessity, to say such a motive prevailed, therefore it was 
 the strongest ; since the defenders of liberty maintained that 
 the determination was made by the man, and not by the 
 motive.i 
 
 The strength of the motives is apparent very 
 often by the effort which the mind makes and 
 makes successfully to resist them. So far the 
 defence of freedom is negative. Positively Eeid 
 argues in the foUowtag manner : — 
 
 1. The will is free, because there is a nat ural 
 conviction of its freedom. This is an appeal to the 
 common sense of mankind. And this mode of 
 argument is quite in harmony with Eeid's philosoph- 
 ical method in general. Thi s natural c onviction 
 is m anifest, from the exertions Which we mRkehy 
 thepowero f our will, from the deliberations which 
 presuppose a power to act freel y in accordance wit h 
 the result of them, from our resolutions to act. 
 
 imply a b elief m our liberty, and from our maki ng 
 •pr omises which imply belief in our ability to k eep 
 Jieai. Blame and praise also show the existence 
 of this natural conviction.* 
 
 2. The will is free,^ because man is morall y 
 acc ountabl e for his actio ns. Jp fact, Eeid affi rms 
 that the distinction between just and unjust implies 
 the freedom of the wUl.' 
 
 3. The will is free b ecause man has the power of 
 "carryi ng o n, wis ely and p rjidant^y, fl. system of 
 conduct, wiiich he has before conceived in his mind, 
 
 I'EeidTActive Powers, IV. 4. 
 
 aid., lb. IV. 6. 8M,, ib. IV. 7, 
 
IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY 211 
 
 and resolved to prosecute." This proposition, Eeid 
 defends, strange" to say, by an appeal to the princi- 
 ple of causality. 
 
 " Every indication of wisdom, taken from the 
 effect, is equally an indication of power to execute 
 what wisdom planned. And if we have any evi- 
 dence that the wisdom which formed the plan is 
 in the man, we have the very same evidence, that 
 the power which executed it is in him also." ' 
 
 And yet Eeid was seeking to prove, not the power 
 of the agent, but his liberty. His argument is more 
 ad rem in his criticism of Leibnitz. He objects to 
 the principle of sufficient reason as stated by the 
 German philosopher. For, according to Eeid, two 
 or more means may be equally fit for the same end ; 
 " in such a case there may be a sufficient reason for 
 taking one of the number, though there be no reason 
 for preferring one to another, of means equally 
 fit." ^ 
 
 He asserts that to apply the principle of suffi- 
 cie nt reason'To man's voluntary acts is to make 
 man a machine. If we suppose the priiociple to 
 be aftplied to a given action, we shall ask whether 
 there was a sufficient reason for this action or not. 
 Eeid admits that there was a motive, but not nece s- 
 sarily a mo tive sufficient to justify the actipri . He 
 admits also that there was a cause, but that if the 
 action was the man's, the man himself was the 
 cause. But he denies that it was necessarily pro- 
 duced. When, therefore, it is af&rmed that vol- 
 
 1 Keid, Active Powers, IV. 8. 
 a Id., ib. IV. 9. 
 
212 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 untary acts are effects necessarily produced, it 
 should be ansvrered that the cause of the volition 
 is the man who wills, and that the volition itself is 
 the necessary effect of nothing else. This argu- 
 ment Eeid follows up with a general attack upon 
 Hume for insisting that the will is an effect, while 
 denying the efficiency of causation. ^ 
 
 Eeid attaches more importance, however, to the 
 argument against freedom founded on the fore- 
 knowledge of God. "The most formidable argu- 
 ment of this class, ... is taken from the prescience 
 of the Deity." ^ 
 
 He analyzes the inference that because God 
 foresees every determination of the human mind, 
 that which he foresees must happen necessarily. 
 He distinguishes certainty from necessity. That 
 what will certainly be, will certainly be, he does 
 not dispute; but this differs from the assertion 
 that because an event will certainly be, therefore 
 its production must be necessary. He denies also 
 that prescience involves predestination, or that 
 there is a causal relation between God's foreknow- 
 ledge that an event will happen, and the necessity 
 that such an event must happen. If it be denied 
 that any free action can be foreseen, Reid would 
 say that such a denial involves the denial of God's 
 free agency, since God's future actions can be fore- 
 seen by men; also that while the Deity foresees 
 his own free actions, this does not determine those 
 actions necessarily. Lastly, he criticises Dr. Priest- 
 ley's doctrine of necessity and contingency. 
 
 i Keid, Active Powers, IV, 9. 2 m., ib. IV. 10. 
 
IN BEITISH PHILOSOPHY 213 
 
 Priestley had denied that a contingent event 
 could be an object of knowledge. His argument 
 had been as follows : — 
 
 As certainly as nothing can be known to exist but what 
 does exist, so certainly can nothing be known to arise from 
 what does exist, but what does arise from it, or depend 
 upon it. But according to the definition of the terms, a 
 contingent event does not depend upon any previous known 
 circumstances, since some other event might have arisen in 
 the same circumstances, i 
 
 B,eid replies that a thing may arise from what 
 does exist, either freely or necessarily. A contin- 
 gent event arises from its cause, not necessarily, 
 but freely. But another event might have arisen 
 from the same cause. Besides this, Priestley's 
 argument simply proves that a contingent event 
 cannot be known to arise necessarily from what 
 does exist, which, however, was not dispiited. The 
 whole reasoning is, according to Eeid, based on an 
 assumption, that nothing can be known to arise 
 from what does exist, but what arises necessarily 
 from it. The major premise, in which this assump- 
 tion is contained, is not proved, and so Eeid discards 
 Priestley's conclusion. 
 
 Any one who is familiar with the psychology 
 since the time of Eeid may be disposed to criticise 
 his doctrine of the will. But whatever estimate 
 be made of it, it should be remembered that he 
 published his essays on the Active Powers at a 
 time when British philosophy had been disturbed 
 
 1 Quoted by Keid, Active Powers, IV. 10. 
 
214 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 by the scepticism of Hume, and indirectly by the 
 determinism of Spinoza and Leibnitz. Eeid's argu- 
 ments with respect to freedom are instructive, par- 
 ticularly when compared with the theories of the 
 Post-Kantian metaphysicians. In his philosophy 
 of common sense, he attempted to reply to Hume's 
 theory of knowledge; and it is evident that the 
 same defects which made this reply insufficient, 
 are more or less manifest in his empirical treat- 
 ment of the will. While maintaining the objective 
 validity of the principle of causality, he at the same 
 time regards the subject which wills as practically 
 a first cause. By recognizing only the faculties of 
 the understanding and the will, he did not, like the 
 Germans, resort to the reason as a superior power 
 through which he might transcend the causal prin- 
 ciple, and so justify a belief in freedom. Just as 
 Butler's Analogy determined for many years the 
 method and principle of Christian apologetics, so 
 the philosophy of Eeid was for many years the 
 foundation of all indeterministic theories in Great 
 Britain and America. Like most Englishmen of 
 his time, he shows no sign of having been partic- 
 ularly impressed with the force of Spinoza's phi- 
 losophy ; and it may be doubted whether the latter 
 awakened much interest or found intelligent appre- 
 ciation during the eighteenth century, except on the 
 continent of Europe. It is probable, however, that 
 in Eeid's clear statements, and able reasoning, the 
 indeterminists may find their most adequate em- 
 pirical defence. 
 
CHAPTER FIFTH 
 
 CONTINENTAL THE0EIE8 OF THE WILL FROM DES- 
 CARTES TO LEIBNITZ 
 
 The metaphysical doctrines of the philosophers 
 on the continent during the seveateenth century 
 are in striking contrast to the more psychological 
 discussions of the writers in England and Scotland. 
 In the construction of their systems, the Cartesians, 
 and those more or less directly related to them, set 
 out from the idea of substance. There is little 
 uniformity, however, in their conclusions with re- 
 spect to either knowledge or will. The thought 
 of Great Britain, during this period, was almost 
 altogether emancipated from the traditions of the 
 mediaeval schools. But on the continent the de- 
 parture from the older methods is not so marked. 
 It is, of course, easy to observe the antagonism be- 
 tween the philosophy of Descartes and that of even 
 the most advanced schoolman, but his extensive use 
 of a deductive method, and the formal presentation 
 of his doctrine, remind one of the older writers. 
 Malebranche, in spite of his attacks on Aristotle, 
 is only a belated schoolman; the method of Spinoza 
 is scholastic ; and in Leibnitz especially are to be 
 found few signs that any very radical change has 
 passed over the methods of philosophy. 
 215 
 
216 THEOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 Descartes 
 
 The philosophy of Descartes is theistic and dual- 
 istic. While the English philosophers of the 
 seventeenth and eighteenth centuries •were con- 
 cerned primarily with the theory of knowledge, 
 and especially the nature and origin of ideas, 
 those on the continent set out from the ontological 
 doctrine of substance. The effects of the latter 
 method are apparent in the conclusions of the 
 leading writers of France, Germany, and Hol- 
 land, especially in the systems of Spinoza and of 
 Leibnitz. 
 
 According to Descartes, substance is either un- 
 created or created. The former is that which 
 depends on nothing else for its subsistence; the 
 latter is that which depends only on God for its 
 subsistence. There is one uncreated substance, 
 which is God. Created substances are mind and 
 matter. The essence of the former is thought; 
 that of the latter is extension. While the soul of 
 man is closely united to his body, it is distinct in 
 essence ; for it is of the essence of the soul to think. 
 The soul as extended substance resides in every 
 part of the body: l'S,me est v^ritablement jointe 
 k tout le corps.* For it is not only unextended, 
 but indivisible ; it cannot be separated, nor can it 
 separate itself when different parts of the body are 
 moved or affected. Besides this general connection 
 of the soul with the body, there is a particular point 
 of union between the two in the brain. By many 
 
 1 Descartes, Les Passions, I. 30. 
 
FEOM DESCAETE8 TO LEIBNITZ 217 
 
 preceding philosophers, it had been taught that the 
 centre of the soul's life in the body was the brain, 
 or the heart. Sometimes both organs were associ- 
 ated with the functions of knowledge and feeling. 
 According to Descartes, the point of union is the 
 pineal gland situated in the interior of the cere- 
 brum. The central situation of this part of the 
 brain, together with its mobility, led him to sup- 
 pose that it was the point where the affections of 
 the body were transmitted to the soul, and where the 
 volitions were transmitted to the members of the 
 body : toute Taction de I'Sme consiste en ce que la 
 petite glande a qui elle est dtroitement jointe se 
 meut en la faqon qui est requise pour produire 
 I'effet qui se rapporte a cette volontd.' The animal 
 spirits or nerves serve to connect this physiological 
 centre with the extended world beyond the body. 
 The will acting on the gland can produce move- 
 ments in various parts of the body. 
 
 The explanation given of this crude physiological 
 psychology need not be given in any detail ; it is 
 sufficient to observe that Descartes regards the 
 volitions as finding expression through the animal 
 spirits, either inwardly through the pores of the 
 cerebrum, or outwardly to the muscles : cette vo- 
 lonte fait que la glande pousse les esprits vers les 
 muscles qui servent k cet effet.* 
 
 The soul has no direct knowledge of what takes., 
 place in the gland. Will has simply the power to 
 move the gland in such a way as will propel the- 
 
 1 Descartes, Les Passions, I. 41. 
 » Id., ib. I. 42. 
 
218 THBOKIES OF THE ■WILL 
 
 ^nimal spirits towards the pores of the brain, as in 
 imagination, or in the act of attention ; it can also 
 expel the animal spirits to the muscles of the body, 
 3^s has jnst been said. It is, however, not always 
 the will to excite some motion within us, or some 
 other effect, which can make us excite it. Such 
 excitation takes place in accordance with changes 
 which nature or habit have diversely joined with 
 each thought. For example, in looking at a distant 
 object, there will be a particular will to enlarge the 
 pupil, and at a near object, to <jontract the pupil. 
 The will to enlarge or contract is useless; that 
 which effects the enlargement or contraction is the 
 movement of the pineal gland. The effect is indi- 
 rectly produced when the soul wills to look at a 
 distant or near object.' 
 
 This physiological hypothesis of Descartes was 
 afterwards severely criticised by Spinoza;' yet 
 however obscure and extravagant it may now 
 seem, it is a sign of interest in that aspect of 
 voluntary action which has led to the most consid- 
 erable results. 
 
 Thought in the Cartesian philosophy has a 
 general denotation. It includes various kinds of 
 knowledge, — sensations, phantasms, and ideas ; it 
 includes also the passions and the will. These 
 varieties of thought are attributed to several facul- 
 ties. The faculties do not constitute the essence 
 of the soul. The latter can be conceived as exist- 
 ing even ia the absence of the faculties; while 
 
 ^ Descartes, Les Passions, I. 44. 
 " Spinoza, Eth. V. Prsefat. 
 
FEOM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 219 
 
 they cannot be conceived as existing without the 
 soul. They appertain, or are attached, to a think- 
 ing substance : pour me servir des termes de I'^cole, 
 dans leur concept forniel, elles enferment, quelque 
 sorte d' intellection : d'ou je conQois qu' elles sont 
 distinctes de moi comme les modes le sont des 
 choses.^ There is a passive faculty which receives 
 ideas, and an active faculty which produces ideas. 
 Among thoughts, some are images of realities, and 
 others are only ideas. As examples of the former 
 are the images of those things which have been 
 perceived through the senses ; as examples of the 
 latter are those of which the self is the subject, 
 such as fear, desire, and conceptions. The latter 
 class may be divided into volitions or affections, 
 and judgments. 
 
 This brief account of certain general principles 
 in the Cartesian system will perhaps be of assist- 
 ance in the interpretation of the special theory of 
 volition. 
 
 I. Definition of the Will. The account given by 
 Descartes of the nature of the will is so ambigu- 
 ous, that it is dif&cult to know whether it is to be 
 classified as an action, or as a passion of the soul. 
 In a limited sense, it is that which directs the 
 'attention, and which moves and controls the body. 
 ^ht it also comprehends desire, aversion, assurance, 
 Henial, and doubt. " Yet desire is defined as a pas- 
 ^on, which rfij^rB.,to the future. In a letter to 
 Eegius, Descartes says : — 
 
 1 Descartes, Meditations, VI. 9. 
 
 2 Id., Prin. Phil. I. 32. 
 
220 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 Intelleotio enim proprie mentis passio est, et volitio ejus 
 actio ; sed quia nihil unquam volumus, quin simul intelliga- 
 mus, et vix etiam quidquam intelligamus, quin simul aliquid 
 Telimus, ideo non facile in iis passionem ab aotione distin- 
 guimus.i 
 
 From tHs and other parts of Ms philosopty, it 
 ■would appear that in a limited sense will is con- 
 sidered by Descartes as active, especially as it may 
 (control the passions.'^ But he also uses it in the 
 old general sense as equivalent to disposition and 
 its manifestations. 
 
 II. The Will and the Passions. The passions can- 
 not be directly controlled by an act of the will.' 
 They may, however, be excited or controlled indi- 
 rectly. Things which are associated with such 
 passions as we wish to arouse may be voluntarily 
 represented to the mind, or things which are re- 
 mote from the passions which we wish to avoid 
 may be voluntarily recalled; the effect will be to 
 excite or allay the feeling. A man, for example, 
 cannot will directly to be angry, but may volun- 
 tarily recall the objects which excite his anger. 
 He cannot will not to be angry, but may voluntar 
 rily recall considerations which dissipate the feel- 
 ing. But passions cannot be successfully resisted 
 by direct volition. During their intensity, they 
 have a reality like that of an object present to the 
 senses, which persists whether we will it to be 
 there or not.* 
 
 1 Descartes, Epistdae, Cin. 
 
 2 Id., Les Passions, I. 45, 46. 
 aid., ib. *ld.,ib. 
 
FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 221 
 
 Descartes alludes to the opinion that a conflict is 
 possible between the raferior and superior parts or 
 principles of the soul, — between the higher and 
 lower passions. Such a conflict, he believes, is un- 
 real. The opinion that it is real is due to a con- 
 fused idea of soul and body. Passions which have 
 a bodily origin are attributed to the lower principle 
 of the soul ; the supposed conflict is not in the soul, 
 but in two contrary impulses of animal spirits meet- 
 ing in the pineal gland. Some impressions are con- 
 ' ' veyed to the brain which do not affect the will, but 
 only move the body. The will, having no direct 
 control of the passions, is constrained to use in- 
 dustry in checking the latter, and to apply itself 
 successively to different expedients, which gives 
 rise to the view that there is a conflict between 
 the inferior and superior passions.^ 
 
 A weak will is one in which the volitions are con- 
 trolled by the passions; and a strong will is one 
 which is controlled by the judgment. 
 
 III. Tlie Understanding and the Will. The rela^ 
 tion of knowledge to volition is important ; for that 
 which distinguishes will, as a mere passion, from 
 will as a directing and controlling faculty, is its 
 relation to the understanding. By the understand- 
 ing alone, however, nothing is either affirmed or 
 denied. Its office is only to conceive the ideas of 
 things which may be either afibmed or denied. The 
 errors into which men fall are thus due partly to 
 the understanding and partly to the will.' 
 
 1 Descartes, Les Passions, I. 4T. 
 
 2 Id., ib. Meditations, IV. 7. 
 
222 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 Gassendi criticised Descartes for maintaining that 
 the sphere of the ■will was wider than that of the 
 understanding. The former maintained that the 
 two powers were of equal extent, puisque la vo- 
 lont^ ne peut se porter vers aucune chose que 
 I'entendement n'ait auparavant pr^vue. Descartes 
 insists, however, that the two powers have an un- 
 equal extension. We can will several things about 
 one and the same thing, although we may know very 
 little about the thing. And when our judgment is 
 defective, it is not because we will evil, but only 
 something which may have evil connected with it. 
 There is a will which is not joined with intelligence, 
 which acts on impulse and insufficient knowledge ; 
 and the motive for willing, as well as the conse- 
 quences of willing, may lie beyond our knowledge.* 
 
 The significance of this discussion can be better 
 appreciated in connection with Descartes's doctrine 
 of freedom. The participation of the will in the 
 errors of the understanding is quite foreign to the 
 conceptions of the earlier philosophy. And yet Des- 
 cartes, considering the errors of his mind as signs of 
 his imperfections, ascribes them first to the faculty 
 of knowledge, and second to the faculty of choice. 
 There is indeed, he maintains, nothing in the mind 
 which can be called error, provided the word error 
 be taken in a proper sense. On the one hand, will 
 is not the cause of my errors, for it is very ample 
 and perfect in its kind ; on the other hand, the under- 
 standing is not the cause, for I cannot be deceived 
 by the God who has given me the faculty. The 
 
 1 Descartes, Gassendi, Reponses, etc., 71. 
 
FEOM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 223 
 
 cause of error is to be found in the fact that the 
 "will is wider than the understanding, and instead 
 of confining volition -within the limits of what I 
 understand, I extend it to things which I do not 
 understand. Thus it easily wanders, and leads me 
 into mistakes.^ 
 
 IV. The Will and Freedom. Descartes uses the 
 term free will in a peculiar way. He makes a dis- 
 tinction between indifference and freedom. The 
 indifference of the will is due to ignorance. Having 
 maintained that the will has a wider field than the 
 understanding, indifferent volition comes from the 
 exercise of will in the absence of knowledge. When 
 the judgment does not determine it, it is indifferent. 
 Freedom, on the contrary, is in proportion to the 
 knowledge which determines the exercise of the 
 will./ The term indifference, says Descartes, has 
 been used in two ways : first, when the mind has 
 no knowledge concerning certain courses of action, 
 as to whether they are bad or good; and second, 
 when the mind wills to follow one course of action 
 in the presence of an alternative. In the latter 
 case there is freedom to choose the good and reject 
 the bad. But the latter use of the term indiffer- 
 ence he does not recognize. The latter case he 
 regards as an illustration of true liberty. The ex- 
 tent of our freedom consists in the knowledge which 
 determines our action. The greater the knowledge 
 the greater the freedom. Consequently our liberty 
 is better exhibited when we are commanded to fol- 
 low a certain course, and decline to obey the com- 
 
 1 Descartes, Prin. Phil. I. 6. 
 
224 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 mand, than when we are inclined by nothing either 
 within or without, to do one thing in preference to 
 another. By freedom, then, Descartes does not 
 mean freedom from determinaMOT^but only free;; 
 dSinTr'omTgnoraEce on the one hand j,nd constraint 
 on the other. The will is so free in its nature that 
 it cannot be constrained; but its freedom consists 
 in its determination by knowledge, i.e., by the intel- 
 lect. Unless this be the proper interpretation of 
 the theory of Descartes, he appears to teach that 
 our freedom is in proportion to our determination ; 
 but this is only to say that when we will according 
 to knowledge we are free, and it is knowledge which 
 determines the will.' 
 
 Descartes is here referring to will in its active 
 significance. If will be considered only as a pas- 
 sion, then it is absurd to ask whether or not it is 
 free ; nor can we ask whether the mind has control 
 over aversion, assurance, and doubt, if these be 
 species of will. This would be to ask whether we 
 can control the will by the will. But the power 
 of freedom is not only proportionate to the know- 
 ledge we may have of the object of volition; it is 
 also proportionate to the inclination which we may 
 have towards a given course of action. The more 
 settled our inclination, the greater our liberty, just 
 as the more distinct and the clearer our knowledge, 
 the greater our liberty. Freedom thus depends on 
 knowledge and inclination. Freedom consists in 
 being able to do or not to do a given thing, that 
 
 1 Descartes, R^ponses aux Bizi&mes objections par divers 
 the'ol. et phil. (II.) VI. 
 
FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 225 
 
 is, to afSrm or deny, to pursue or avoid, tlie objects 
 presented by the understanding. No external force 
 constrains the will ; for that to which there is the 
 greatest inclination is that which is willed, and we 
 are enabled by God to will in accordance with our 
 inclinations. Certain Patristic writers had looked 
 upon freedom as determination of a moral kind. 
 Descartes looks upon freedom as determination of 
 an intellectual kind. When the understanding 
 determines the will, the man is master of his own 
 acts ; and it is for this reason that he is worthy of 
 praise or blame. That the inclinations are not 
 altogether voluntary is proved by Descartes's state- 
 ment that it is nature which teaches the avoidance 
 of things which give pain, and the pursuit of those 
 which give pleasure. There is thus such a harmony 
 between our knowledge and our action, that we are 
 able to refer sensations to that part of the body 
 from which they produce their first effects, and 
 we take voluntary measures to avoid or encourage 
 the continuance of the feeling. If we had suffi- 
 ciently clear and distinct ideas of good and evil, 
 we should always pursue the former and avoid the 
 latter. 
 
 The doctrine of freedom is still further enforced 
 by an appeal to internal experience ' after the man- 
 ner of the Scottish psychologists. While indiffer- 
 ence and freedom may be incomprehensible, we are 
 conscious that they are real. Although we do not 
 will to deceive ourselves, it often happens that our 
 judgments are precipitate. When our knowledge 
 
 1 R^ponses aux cinq, objections de M. Gassendi (50), III. 
 Q 
 
226 THEORIES OF THE WILIi 
 
 is insufficient, that which is untrue is considered as 
 true, and ignorance determines the wUl. 
 
 The essence of the freedom of the will of God 
 differs from that of the human will. The will of 
 God is absolute, not only over all events, but over 
 all truth. God wills what is good or true; and 
 truth and goodness depend for their being on 
 the will of God. Thus an entire indifference in 
 God is looked upon as a proof of his power. He 
 wills absolutely, without any external reasons for 
 his will."^ 
 
 The indifference of God arises from his omnip- 
 otence and omniscience; that of man from his 
 impotence and ignorance. The actions of men 
 are simply second causes which operate in 
 order that what God has willed may be carried 
 out. God is not the author of sin ; for (a) sin is 
 nothing, and (b) whatever God wills is right, 
 because He wills it.^ Yet in a letter to the Princess 
 Elizabeth, Descartes hesitates to apply his theory 
 too rigorously to the action of God. When we 
 think of the infinite power of God, we are obliged 
 to believe that all things, even our own wills, 
 depend on his. For it is a contradiction, he 
 says, to hold that God has created men with 
 wills independent of His own, and so has limited 
 his infinite power. And yet we have experience 
 of our own freedom, and we should not let this 
 make us doubt the existence of God, but only 
 
 1 Rdponses anx sizi&mes objections par divers th^ol. et. phil. 
 (11.) VI. 
 
 » Descartes, Prin. Phil. I. 6, 23. 
 
FROM DESCAKTES TO LEIBNITZ 227 
 
 recognize that our actions are on this account 
 ■worthy of praise or blame, and that all men are 
 subject to God. This position of Descartes has 
 been taken since his day, by almost all those who 
 believe in predestination. 
 
 While Descartes added nothing of any great 
 importance to the science of volition, he raised 
 some questions which have a distinct bearing on 
 some of the more important problems of the pres- 
 ent. His statement that there are acts of the soul 
 •without knowledge, in response to affections of the 
 body, is an anticipation of the principle of reflex 
 action.* Still more suggestive are his denial that 
 the lower animals have any principle of intelli- 
 gence or will, and his explanation of all animal 
 movement upon mechanical grounds. It remained 
 for our own century to find in the motions of 
 animals one of the most valuable aids to the 
 explanation of the phenomena of will in man. 
 
 Malebeanche 
 
 The philosophy of Malebranohe may be regarded 
 as a link in the chain of development from the 
 dualism of Descartes to the monism of Spinoza. 
 It is, however, not this alone which makes a notice 
 of his theory desirable. His doctrine of the will 
 has a peculiar interest from its relation to the theory 
 of occasional causes. Together with principles de- 
 rived more or less directly from Descartes, Male- 
 branohe adopts elements of Augustine's philosophy, 
 
 1 Descartes, Les Passions, I. 47. 
 
228 THBOBIBS OF THE WILL 
 
 and modifies them to suit his own conclusions. His 
 system is at once a natural theology and an ontol- 
 ogy. While he deals psychologically with the will, 
 his special interest in it is connected with predes- 
 tination and grace. Instead of the extreme dualism 
 of Descartes he sets forth a peculiar species of 
 idealism, resembling in some points that of his 
 contemporary Berkeley, who was thought to have 
 borrowed from the French philosopher. 
 
 Malebranche divides the operations of the soul 
 into sense, imagination, understanding, inclina- 
 tions, and passions. The object of his principal 
 work, Recherche de la Viriti, is to show how these 
 several operations give rise to errors, and to pro- 
 vide a remedy. In his account of the passions he 
 is greatly indebted to Descartes. The following 
 points in his philosophy are comprehensive of his 
 treatment of will. 
 
 I. Faculties. The mind has two general facul- 
 ties, understanding and will. There is an analogy 
 between the properties of mind and those of mat- 
 ter. The properties of matter are that of receiving 
 impressions or figures, and that of being moved. 
 These correspond respectively to understanding, 
 which receives impressions, and will, which pro- 
 duces motion. He speaks of the capacity of the 
 will to receive inclinations, by which he means ap- 
 parently the power to will certain things.^ 
 
 II. Definition of the Will. Will is that impres- 
 sion or natural motion which carries us towards 
 universal and indeterminate good. Freedom is 
 
 1 Malebranche, Rocherche de la V^rit^, I. x. 
 
FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 229 
 
 considered as a power, as in the system of Locke. 
 It is the power which the mind has of turning 
 towards agreeable objects, and terminating our 
 natural inclinations upon some particular object, 
 which was previously indeterminate with reference 
 to will. Even the natural inclinations are volun- 
 tary. They are not free, however, in the sense of 
 having liberty of indifference. The liberty of in- 
 difference is simply the power of willing or not 
 willing; that is, willing the contrary of natural 
 inclination. The love of the good is voluntary, 
 for love proceeds from the will. Yet it is impos- 
 sible to force the inclination of love freely, just as 
 it is impossible to govern the will by force or con- 
 straint.* 
 
 III. Will and Understanding. Will is a blind 
 power, unless it is guided by the understanding. 
 In order that it may have some content, it must be 
 applied to the understanding. Por the latter is 
 subject to the control of the will. The power that 
 the will has to determine its inclinations is in- 
 volved in the ability to apply the understanding to 
 objects at will. In order to illustrate this rela- 
 tionship, Malebranche supposes the case of a man 
 who represents to himself an honor or preferment, 
 under the conception of the good, which he may 
 hope for. He wills the good directly. The impres- 
 sion which is continually carrying his soul towards 
 universal good inclines it towards the honor which 
 he represents to himself. This propensity towards 
 indeterminate good is fixed and natural; so far 
 1 Malebranche, Recherche de la Vdrite, I. i. 
 
230 THEOKIES OF THE WILL 
 
 there is no voluntary action or free action. But 
 the soul has choice as to whether it will or will 
 not identify this particular honor with any species 
 of the universal and indeterminate good. In this 
 consists its voluntary power. The soul may further 
 suspend both its judgment and affection with respect 
 to this particular object — this honor. It may do 
 this from a want of conviction that the particular 
 object desired comprehends all the good which the 
 soul is capable of loving. Malebranche adds that 
 the soul may compare all good things with each 
 other, may love them according to their order, and 
 in proportion to their excellence. It may consider 
 them with reference to that universal good which 
 contains all, and which alone is adapted to satisfy 
 the affections of the soul.' 
 
 It is a peculiar doctrine of Malebranche that the 
 understanding has no power of judging. The func- 
 tion of the understanding is to perceive. To judge 
 is a function of the will. All errors are therefore 
 voluntary. " The understanding perceives o aly sim- 
 ple things and their relations, and the relations of 
 these relations. It is the will which judges and 
 reasons. In this confused use of terms, Male- 
 branche has fortunately had few imitators. We 
 are said to attribute judgments to the understand- 
 ing, when the consent seems so evident that the 
 voluntary element remains unnoticed; but, as a 
 matter of fact, all judgments are voluntary. It is 
 only that the will in such cases seems to follow, 
 
 1 Malebranche, Kecherclie de la V^rit^, 1. 1. 
 
 2 Id., ib. I. II. 
 
FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 231 
 
 not to guide the understanding. The latter makes 
 the representation to the former, and when there 
 is easy acq[uiescence, the judgment is thought to be 
 involuntary. Yet the will may decline to consent 
 to what is represented by the understanding, and 
 in such cases the voluntary nature of judgment is 
 more easily recognized. Malebranche criticises 
 those who distinguish between assent to the action 
 of the understanding and consent to the good. He 
 holds, on the contrary, that the data of the under- 
 standing command our assent without awakening 
 doubt. The good may therefore be freely recog- 
 nized, and yet the will may not be fixed as to 
 whether the particular good represented is to be 
 loved. Consent of the will to truth is therefore to 
 be distinguished from consent of the will to follow- 
 ing the good. The reason why man consents so 
 readily to truth is that his interests are less nearly 
 involved. Truth which does not afEect the pas- 
 sions and inclinations of men is more readily 
 recognized than when man's selfish interests are 
 involved. 
 
 IV. Freedom. Man wills and determines his 
 own actions. It is God who causes him to will, 
 not directly, but indirectly. This view of the will 
 is a part of Malebranche's theory of occasionalism. 
 The efficiency of causes comes not from the action 
 of these causes alone. That which makes any cause 
 efficient is the concurrent action of God. Accord- 
 ing to Malebranche's epistemology, the soul sees 
 all things in God. And in like manner the soul 
 performs all actions by the concourse of God. I 
 
232 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 know that I will and that I will freely; and this 
 volition is the true cause of the movement of the 
 body. But there is no actual relation between 
 soul and body. Consequently, that the former may 
 have any effect on the latter, there must be, as it 
 were, a supernatural interposition through the 
 agency of God. There is no analogy between voli- 
 tion and motion. There is a physiological change 
 when the soul wills, and the animal spirits proceed 
 to the muscle which is to be moved; but I have no 
 share in this process. That the effort of the soul 
 becomes effective is due to the will of God, which 
 never fails of its effect.* It is singular to find 
 here a rapprochement to the view afterwards taken 
 by Hume. Like Hume, Malebranche fails to find 
 any efficiency in the mind acting as cause to pro- 
 duce the effect. No relation between the two 
 phenomena can be discovered which can be called 
 efficiency, or even necessary connection. There 
 are no efficient second causes. Malebranche admits 
 that there is a feeling of effort or endeavor which 
 is a concomitant of the volition, but, like Hume, 
 he denies that this is the efficient cause of the 
 movement. The motion of the arm, for example, 
 is performed at the very moment that the effort is 
 felt; but the soul has no knowledge of what nerves 
 must be excited in order that the movement may 
 be produced. The efficiency of the will in such a 
 case is owing to the efficiency of the will of God. 
 Volitions, like cognitions, are thus miraculous 
 events. 
 
 1 Malebranche, Becherche de la V^rit^, II. liv, VI. 3. 
 
FBOM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 233 
 
 What is true of tlie willing of movements, is true 
 also of the ■willing of ideas. It is only a prejudice 
 which leads to the belief that man originates his 
 own ideas. We overlook the action of God, because 
 he is an invisible spirit, and so we attribute our 
 ideas to our own desires.^ This general view is 
 further enforced by the argument that a contradic- 
 tion is implied in saying that men are the authors 
 of their own movements or ideas. For a true cause 
 is that between which and its effect the mind per- 
 ceives a necessary connection. But there is none 
 except the most perfect being between whose will 
 and its effects the mind can perceive such a con- 
 nection. The application of this to the theory of 
 knowledge is that the understanding is receptive, 
 not active; and particular volitions are only occa- 
 sional causes of ideas in the understanding. 
 
 Spinoza 
 
 In the philosophy of Hume volition was inter- 
 preted in terms of feeling; in that of Spinoza it is 
 interpreted in terms of intellect. In the systems 
 of these two philosophers the result is shown of that 
 gradual exclusion from the conception of will of 
 those elements which are not immediately related 
 to action. From his theory of knowledge Hume 
 was led to exclude the idea of abiding character, to 
 notice the result only of a process which the earlier 
 philosophy had identified with will. With him, 
 feeling as the effect of action is all that may be 
 
 1 Malebranche, lU. II. ; Liv. VI. 3. 
 
234 THEOEIES OF THE WILIi 
 
 called will. Will is not judgment, nor choice, nor 
 decision, nor an efferent impulse. It is an impres- 
 sion. By a totally different method, and upon 
 totally different principles, Spinoza likewise ex- 
 cludes from will any originative power and all emo- 
 tional elements. With him it is simply affirmation 
 and denial, for the will and the intellect are one. 
 
 The principle from which he sets out is that of 
 substance. It is not the dualism of Descartes. 
 His theory is not theistic, but pantheistic. Sub- 
 stance is that, the conception of which requires the 
 conception of nothing else for its subsistence : per 
 subtantiam intelligo id, quod in se est, et per se 
 concipitur : hoc est id, cujus conceptus non indiget 
 conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat.' 
 
 An attribute is that which the intellect perceives 
 concerning substance as constituting the essence 
 of substance: per attributum intelligo id quod 
 intellectus de substantia percipit, tamquam ejus- 
 dem essentiam constituens." God is the only sub- 
 stance. Instead of the created substances of 
 Descartes, we have here thought and extension de- 
 fined as attributes of this one substance. Neither 
 of these attributes is cause of the other. God is 
 the efficient cause of all things.^ As free cause, 
 he is called natura naturans. He is an immanent 
 and proximate cause of those things which are 
 determined by him.* They are determined to exist 
 by him in such a way that without him they can- 
 not be conceived of. They are related to him as 
 
 1 Spinoza, Eth. I. Def. 3. » Id., ib. I. xvi. CoroU. 1. 
 
 a Id., ib. I. Def. i. * Id., ib. I. xvn. et CoroU. 2 ; xxvm. Schol. 
 
FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 235 
 
 the properties of a triangle are related to the tri- 
 angle. All that proceeds necessarily from God is 
 called natura naturata. The attributes have a 
 unity in God, but there is no reciprocal action be- 
 tween them. There is, however, a correspondence 
 between these two attributes. The order of ex- 
 tended things, and the order of ideas, that is of 
 unextended things, is one and the same. This is 
 because potentia cogitandi in God is the same 
 v/ ith potentia agendt;^ one is considered under the 
 attribute of thought, the other under the attribute 
 of extension. A mode is an affection of substance, 
 or that which is in another by means of which it 
 is conceived : per modum intelligo substantiae 
 affectiones, sive id, quod in alio est, per quod 
 etiam concipitur.' Particular things (resparticu- 
 lares) are affectus of the attributes of God. They 
 are modes which express the attributes of God in 
 a certain and determinate manner. A mode is 
 either a body or a thinking thing {corpus or res 
 cogitans). The term affectus^ in Spinoza's phi- 
 losophy is almost equivalent to passion in the 
 philosophy of Descartes. He himself makes it the 
 same with the Greek op/xij, and he speaks also of 
 affectum seu passionem. Passions are affections 
 of bodies ; in relation to thought, or viewed under 
 the attribute of thought, they are ideas of affec- 
 tions. But the order of things and the order of 
 ideas is the same. By means of the affections, the 
 power of the body for acting is increased or dimin- 
 
 1 Spinoza, Eth. II. vii. et CoroU. i" Id., ib. I. Bet. 5. 
 < Id., ib. III. explic. ad fin. ; in. Vet. 3. 
 
236 THEOEIES OP THE WILL 
 
 ished.^ The mind of a man is res particularis, or 
 more specifically res cogitans. The mind is united 
 with the body, and the idea of the body is in the 
 mind. The two constitute one individual mode, 
 considered under the attribute of thought and under 
 the attribute of extension. When we are the cause 
 of our affections, they are called actions, otherwise 
 they are called passions. The former arise from 
 adequate, the latter ftom inadequate, ideas. The 
 essence of the mind consists in thought: mentis 
 essentia in cogitatione constitit? 
 
 I have recalled these fundamental definitions and 
 principles to the reader in order to prepare the way 
 for the special consideration of Spinoza's theory of 
 the will. 
 
 I. The Theory of Faculties. Spinoza's criticism 
 of this theory, which suggests some of the prob- 
 lems left unsolved by Aristotle, has had a very 
 extensive influence upon modern psychology, and 
 is of importance especially in relation to the science 
 of volition. In the mind there is no absolute 
 faculty of knowing, desiring, loving, or willing. 
 The so-called faculties are either convenient pre- 
 tences (Jictitias) or metaphysical abstractions, or 
 are universals such as we are accustomed to form 
 from particulars.* Intellect and will have the 
 same relation to this or that idea of the mind, that 
 lapideitas has to lapis, or homo to Peter or Paul. 
 They are not called mere names, by Spinoza, but 
 universal notions (notiones univer sales). The only 
 
 1 Spinoza, Eth. III. 1-3. 2 id., it. V. xxxviii. 
 
 8 Id., ib. I. Appendix; II. XLVin. SohoL 
 
FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 237 
 
 faculty of intellect, then, is the idea or the ideas 
 which the mind has as the objects of thought, and 
 there is no faculty called the will, but only this 
 or that volition. In mente nulla datur absoluta 
 facultas volendi et nolendi, sed tantum singulares 
 volitiones, nempe haeo et ilia afBrmatio, et haec et 
 ilia negatio.* Thus in Spinoza's philosophy one 
 faculty is not set over against another, nor is one 
 faculty determined by another. The soul is res 
 cogitans, and its cogitattones are individual ideas, 
 which are modes of the attribute of thought, which 
 in turn expresses the essence of God in a certain 
 and determinate manner. 
 
 II. The Nature of the Will. As has just been 
 shown, no absolute faculty is recognized. Both 
 intellect and will are modes belonging only to 
 natura naturata. Voluntas is only a certain mode 
 of thinking; and individual volitions are related 
 to the mind as the properties of the triangle are 
 related to the triangle. Concipiamus itaque sin- 
 gularem aliquam volitionem nempe modum cogi- 
 tandi, quo mens affirmat, tres angulos trianguli 
 aequales esse duobus rectis.^ For the sake of 
 making his meaning clear, however, Spinoza often 
 speaks of will and intellect as faculties; and so 
 he defines the will as a faculty of affirming and 
 denying, by which the mind affirms what is true, 
 and denies what is false. ^ It is not a desire by 
 means of which the mind pursues or avoids : facul- 
 tatem, inquam, intelligo, qua mens, quid verum 
 
 1 Spinoza, Eth. II. xlix. * Id., lb. 
 
 «Id.,il}. JJ. xLviii. Sohol. 
 
238 THEORIES OF THE WILI. 
 
 quidve falsum sit, afifirmat vel negat, et non cupi- 
 datem, qua mens res appetit vel aversatur.^ Voli- 
 tions are individually nothing but tlie ideas of 
 things; they are concepts of thought, cogitationis 
 conceptus.' To this radical view of volition, the 
 first natural criticism which might arise is that in 
 this case there is no difference between intellect and 
 will. But this conclusion is accepted by Spinoza, 
 who says: voluntas et intellectus unum et idem 
 sunt.' Descartes had held that, while will is infinite, 
 intellect is finite ; and Spinoza considers that this 
 might be urged as an objection to his affirmation of 
 their identity.' He replies that if by intellect is 
 meant a knowledge of clear and distinct ideas, then 
 the will is wider than the intellect ; but if reference 
 is had to perceptions of all kinds, then the field of 
 the will is not more extended than that of the 
 intellect ; for the will acts only in so far as there 
 is knowledge. According to the definition, it sim- 
 ply affirms or denies, and so is one with the intel- 
 lect. A second criticism which he supposes may 
 be made to his theory is, that the mind can suspend 
 judgment as to affirmation or denial; while intel- 
 lect in knowing, must affirm or deny. But Spinoza 
 denies that we can suspend judgment. When it 
 is said that we suspend judgment, the meaning is 
 that we do not adequately perceive the object. A 
 third supposed objection is that we do not seem to 
 
 1 Spinoza, Eth. n. XLVin. Schol. 2 ja.^ ii,. 
 
 8 Id., ib. II. XLix. CoroU; Korte Verhandeling, n. 16; Cog. 
 Met. II. 12. 
 
 * Id., ib. II. XLIX. 3cl)ol. 
 
FKOM DE8CAETES TO LEIBNITZ 239 
 
 need a greater power for affirming a thing to be 
 true which is true, than for affirming a thing to be 
 true which is false; but we perceive one idea to 
 have more truth and reality than another, which 
 proves that will and intellect are not the same. 
 Spinoza replies that the affirmation of truth is 
 related to the affirmation of falsehood as being is 
 related to nothing. Lastly, the objection is made 
 that if will be only affirmation or denial, a man 
 who is in a state of equilibrium, like the famous 
 Asinus Buridani, will die of hunger or thirst. 
 Spinoza replies, with some vivacity, that, under the 
 conditions assumed, death by starvation or thirst 
 will follow; but that it might be asked whether 
 such a man would be an ass or a man. He would, 
 for his part, say that he did not know what value 
 should be put on a man who suspended himself in 
 this way, nor did he know what value should be 
 put on the judgments of children, fools, and mad- 
 men: dico me nesoire, ut etiam nescio, quanti 
 aestimandus sit ille, qui se pensilem facit, et 
 quanti aestimandi sint pueri, stulti, vesani, etc.* 
 
 Many critics have called attention to the use of 
 the term conatus by Spinoza, and have objected 
 that he should have spoken of effort or endeavor, 
 if the will is only affirmation or negation. Con- 
 sidering his care in defining the terms of his phi- 
 losophy, itis prima facie improbable that Spinoza 
 should have fallen into an inconsistency in this 
 respect. The term conatus in his Ethics is 
 applied to body as well as to mind. It is either 
 
 1 Spinoza, Eth. II. xlix. Schol. ; Cog. Met. II. 12. 
 
240 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 an affection or the idea of an affection of the body. 
 He says: Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in 
 suo esse perseverare conatur.'^ It has been said 
 already that singular things are modes which 
 express the essence of God in a certain and 
 determinate manner. It follows from this that 
 nothing has in itself anything by which it could 
 be destroyed, but on the contrary is opposed 
 (opponitur) to everything which could deprive it 
 of existence. The conatus is simply the persist- 
 ence of modes of God, whether extended or non- 
 extended. It is therefore perfectly evident that 
 Spinoza does not use conatus as meaning a mere 
 phenomenon of consciousness, but as an objective 
 property of all modes of thought and extension. 
 The conatus of a stone is its persistence in being 
 a stone ; the conatus of the mind is its persistence 
 in being as a mode of thought. In the volition, 
 conatus is only the mind by affirmation, persisting 
 in its existence as res cogitans." 
 
 Because the conatus is such persistence in the 
 existence of res cogitans, it stands for its actual 
 essence.' That this interpretation of Spinoza's 
 doctrines is correct is evident from the statement 
 that the mind is conscious of conatus, in so far as 
 it has ideas, and endeavors to persevere in its own 
 being in a certain indefinite duration: mens tam 
 quatenus claras et distinctas, quam quatenus con- 
 fusas habet ideas, conatur in suo esse perseverare 
 
 1 Spinoza, Eth. III. vi, in Part III., prop. 6. 
 
 2 Id., ib. III. vi.-vni. and xxx. Compare Prin. Phil, Cart. lU. 
 Del. 3. 8 Id., ib. ni. VI. vn. 
 
FBOM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 241 
 
 indefinita quadam duratione, et hujus sui conatus 
 est conscia.' The conatus of mind alone is will; 
 the conatus of mind and body together is appetite : 
 hie conatus, cum ad mentem solam refertur, Vo- 
 luntas appellatur, sed cum ad mentem et corpus 
 simul refertur, vocatur Appetitus. Men follow 
 their appetites, which tend to their conservation as 
 men. Cupiditas, or desire, relates to men in so far 
 as they are conscious of their appetites. In one 
 place, conatus and cupiditas are used synonymously. 
 
 That there is no effective effort in the ordinary 
 meaning of the term is further proven by the argu- 
 ment that the mind does not determine the body, 
 nor the body the mind. As has been said already, 
 Spinoza regards God as the eificient cause of all 
 things, and as determining all things, as well as 
 all events. The ideas of the mind are thus not 
 caused by body, nor do the volitions of the mind 
 determine the acts and affections of the body. 
 Their relationship is in God, and not in reciprocal 
 action.'' 
 
 And inasmuch as both mind and body are one 
 and the same mode, one being perceived under the 
 attribute of thought, and the other under that of 
 extension, it would be absurd to say that either of 
 them determines the other. Nor are the passions 
 determined by the will. In so far as they are re- 
 lated to the mind, they can neither be coerced nor 
 removed, except by the idea of a contrary affection 
 of body, and by the affection of a stronger body. 
 But both mind and body are determined necessarily 
 > Spinoza, Eth, III. ix. > Id., ib. II. xs.i. xxn. 
 
 B 
 
242 THEOKIES OF THE WILL 
 
 by nature. Descartes is criticised for saying that 
 the mind has any power over its acts. Spinoza 
 gives some attention to the reasons which lead to 
 the belief that the body is moved by the mind, espe- 
 cially by the will. No one has yet had experience 
 as to what his body might do without his mind ; no 
 one understands the structure of the body well 
 enough to explain its action; yet the instinct of 
 the lower animals is in many respects superior to 
 the intelligence of man. To assert that the mind 
 is the only thing that can move the body is to 
 speak ignorantly. Spinoza asks what becomes 
 of the mind when the body is inert, as in sleep; 
 he shows the interdependence of mind and body, 
 and he affirms that so far from speech, appe- 
 tites, memory, and forgetting, being controlled by 
 the will, all these are beyond a man's control. 
 What has been called decretum mentis is not to be 
 distinguished from imagination or memory. It is 
 nothing except that affirmation which the idea 
 quatenus idea necessarily involves.-' 
 
 III. TJie Will and Freedom. Spinoza denies that 
 there are any contingent events. All things are 
 determined from the necessity of the divine nature, 
 so that they exist and act in a certain way. It is 
 of the nature of the reason to perceive things not 
 as contingent but as necessary ; and this is the very 
 necessity of the eternal nature of God. The term 
 contingent has only a relative meaning. *" Things 
 are regarded as contingent in so far as we find 
 
 1 Spinoza, Eth. III. n. Schol. 
 
 " Id., ib. IV. Def. III. and I. xxn. 
 
FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 243 
 
 nothing pertaining to their essence which neces- 
 sarily supposes their existence, or which prevents 
 their existence. Beal contingency cannot be pred- 
 icated of volitions. As has been already seen, they 
 are determined, not by the will of God, for God 
 has no will in the sense that man uses the term/ 
 but by the nature of God.^ A man can therefore 
 no more will freely, than a triangle can have its 
 three angles equal to more than two right angles. 
 God himself acts according to the necessity of his 
 nature, and has no free will. Still less can man 
 be called a free cause. His will acts necessarily. 
 Nothing which proceeds from God could have been 
 differently produced, and all is necessarily deter- 
 mined. The mind is determined to will this or 
 that by a cause, and this cause is determined by 
 another, and so on ad infinitum.^ Belief in free- 
 dom comes from the consciousness that men have 
 of their own actions, and their ignorance of the 
 causes by which they are determined : ratio doceat, 
 quod homines ea sola de causa liberos se esse cre- 
 dant, quia suarum actionum sunt conscii, et cau- 
 sarum, a quibus determinantur, ignari.' The decrees 
 of the mind {decreta mentis) are only the appetites, 
 which vary with the disposition of the body. The 
 only case in which man can be said to be free is when 
 his will is determined wholly by reason; and to act 
 from reason is to do those things which follow from 
 the necessity of our nature considered in itself alone. 
 
 1 Spinoza, Eth. I. xxix. Schol.; xxxn. 
 
 ^ Id., ib. II. XL VIII. and Epist. XX. 
 
 « Id., ib. III. n. Schol. ; Korte Verhandeling, II., xvn. 
 
244 THEOBIES 01" THE WILL 
 
 It is interesting to find repeated in Spinoza's 
 Ethics the same expressions of doubt concerning 
 the power of the soul to affect the body which 
 have been already noticed in connection with the 
 theories of Descartes and Malebranche. However 
 Unsatisfactory one may think the supposition of 
 Descartes as to the supposed function of the pineal 
 gland, or the miraculous theory of causation taught 
 by Malebranche, or the assertion of Spinoza that 
 will does not move the body, it will be found that 
 in all of these systems of philosophy there is an 
 anticipation of the problem of the will as it has 
 appeared in the psychology of our own day. Here 
 are the questions about feeling of effort, and inner- 
 vation-feeling in the germ. 
 
 Leibnitz 
 
 I. The Theory of Monads. — The first principles 
 of the philosophy of Leibnitz are contained in his 
 Monadologie. Like Spinoza, he proceeds from a 
 doctrine of substance; but his conception of sub- 
 stance differs in important particulars from that of 
 his predecessors. Substance is not one, but many ; 
 its essence is not in extension, nor in thought, but 
 in force. The plurality of substances which com- 
 pose the world are called monads. Of these there 
 is an infinite number, of which G-od is the highest. 
 A monad is a simple substance which enters into 
 all compounds.^ It is unextended and without parts. 
 It is therefore indivisible. Each monad has entele- 
 ^ Leibnitz, La Monadologie, 1. 
 
FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 245 
 
 chy, — a term which is not to be taken in the Aris- 
 totelian sense. By it Leibnitz means a primitive or 
 substantial tendency. Monads differ in proportion 
 to the clearness and distinctness of the perceptions 
 which they possess. For the nature of the monad 
 is spiritual, not material. Each is free from sub- 
 jection to any external influence. Changes occur 
 within the monad, but it is not altered from with- 
 out. The principle of change is internal, — the 
 inner activity of each monad. Yet while each is a 
 unit, it may have a plurality of affections ;" although 
 the substance remains one and iindivided. The 
 action of a monad consists in the changes of its per- 
 ceptions.* Perception is a term which is used 
 by Leibnitz in the most general way, denoting 
 thoughts of every kind. The principle of inner 
 change is designated by the term appetition.* 
 The soul may be defined as that which has percep- 
 tions and appetitions of this general kind. It is not 
 necessary that the soul should be conscious of these 
 perceptions and appetitions ; there are many changes 
 of the soul which are not the objects of consciousness. 
 The tendency of the soul in appetition becomes ac- 
 tion when it is not interfered with. Du vouloir et 
 dupouvoir joints ensemble, sont I 'action.^ The dis- 
 tinction between appetition and volition is that the 
 former is the result of unconscious perceptions, while 
 the latter is the result of conscious perceptions. 
 
 II. The Will and the Famlties. Leibnitz regards 
 the doctrine of independent faculties in the soul as 
 
 1 Leibnitz, La Monadologie, 15. 2 id.^ H). 15. 
 
 8 Id., Xouveaux Easais, II. xxi. 6. 
 
246 THBOBIES OF THE WILL 
 
 a logical deduction from realism ; and quotes approv- 
 ingly from Episcopius to show that such a logical 
 theory forbids a doctrine of freedom.^ It is not cor- 
 rect to say that the will is a superior faculty of the 
 soul, that it rules and orders all things, that it is 
 free or that it is not free, that it determines the in- 
 ferior faculties, that it follows the dictates of the 
 understanding. For the faculties are not agents 
 with distinct actions. It is not the qualities 
 or the faculties which act, but the substances by 
 means of the faculties. In the Nouveaux Essais, 
 Leibnitz follows closely the teaching of Locke with 
 respect to the will and freedom. Power (puissance) 
 is the possibility of change.'' It is of two kinds, ac- 
 tive and passive. Active power is faculty; passive 
 power is receptivity. Will may be defined as the 
 power to change the actions of body and mind. This 
 was the definition of Locke ; and Leibnitz would mod- 
 ify it, and say that the will is the effort (conatus) or 
 tendency to attain the good and avoid the bad : pour 
 parler plus rondement et pour aller peut-§tre plus 
 avant, je dirai que la volition est 1' effort ou la ten- 
 dance (conatus) d'aller vers ce qu'on trouve bon et 
 loin de ce qu'on trouve mauvais, en sorte que cette 
 tendance resulte immediatement de I'apperception 
 qu'on en a.^ The close connection between Leib- 
 nitz's conceptions of substance, of power, and of 
 will, is shown in his view of the spontaneity of sub- 
 stance. If all changes within the monad consist of 
 
 I Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais, II. xxi. 6. 
 s Id., ib. II. XXI. i. 
 » Id., ib. II. XXI. 5. 
 
FROM DESCABTES TO LEIBNITZ 247 
 
 the alternation of perceptions, and if the tendency of 
 the monad is towards action, there is no definite line 
 dividing knowledge from volition. Spontaneity is 
 of the very inner nature of the soul ; it belongs to 
 the soul because the principle of our actions is not 
 external to us, but is an inward principle.^ Exter- 
 nal things have, strictly speaking, no effect upon the 
 soul whatever. This spontaneity is common to all 
 substances, and in the substance which is free and 
 intelligent, it governs all actions. 
 
 Volition must, however, not be confounded with 
 desire. While it rarely happens that an action of 
 the will is produced in us, unaccompanied by some 
 desire, will and desire should not be confounded : 
 il arrive rarement qu'aucune action volontaire soit 
 produite en nous, sans que quelque ddsir I'accom- 
 pagne ; c'est pourquoi la volenti et le ddsir sont si 
 souvent confondus ensemble.'' There is an uneasi- 
 ness which excites desire, and there is an uneasiness 
 which moves the will. Wherever there is desire, 
 there is uneasiness ; but one cannot say that wher- 
 ever there is uneasiness, there is desire. In an act 
 of volition, in the true sense of the word, there is a 
 concurrence of several perceptions and inclinations. 
 And volition cannot subsist without desire or avoid- 
 ance. Yet sometimes a violent passion can act 
 upon the mind, without knowledge, and without 
 intervening volition : comme le vent le plus f urieux 
 agit sur nos corps.* 
 
 1 Leibnitz, Tli^odic^e, 59. 
 
 2 Id., JSTouveaux Essais, II. xxi. 39. 
 » Id., ib. n. XXI. 12. 
 
248 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 III. The Doctrine of Preestablished Harmony. 
 The freedom of the monad from all external affec- 
 tions, and the reflection in its consciousness more 
 or less perfectly of the entire universe, raise the 
 question of the possibility of such knowledge.^ 
 External objects are not known by their effects 
 upon the soul; nor does the soul see all things 
 in Grod, as Malebranche had supposed. Leibnitz 
 teaches that there is a correspondence between the 
 ideas in the consciousness of the monad, and the 
 ideas or events in the world without. The theory 
 resembles that implied in the statement of Spinoza, 
 that the order of ideas and that of things are 
 the same. This, according to Leibnitz, does not 
 arise from the unity of substance, but from the 
 harmony preestablished by God, between the world 
 beyond the soul, and the world within the soul : et 
 par son moyen I'univers entier, suivant le point de 
 Tue propre a cette substance simple; sans qu'elle 
 ait besoin de recevoir aucune influence physique du 
 corps: comme le corps aussi de son cot^ s'accom- 
 mode aux volont^s de I'ame par ses propres lois, et 
 par consequent ne lui obeit qu'autant que ces lois le 
 portent.^ The soul is thus so spontaneous that it 
 depends only on God and itself in its actions. 
 
 IV. The Principle of Sufficient Season. This 
 forms an important element in Leibnitz's theory of 
 the determination of the will. Two principles lie 
 at the foundation of all our reasoning: that of 
 contradiction, and that of suificient reason. The 
 following is the definition of the principle of sufB- 
 
 1 Leibnitz, La Monadol. 51 f. a Id., Th^odice'e, QI. 291. 
 
PEOM DESCAKTES TO LEIBNITZ 249 
 
 cient reason : there is nothing true or existent, no 
 real statement {enunciation), without there being a 
 sufficient reason why it should be so and not other- 
 wise, although the reasons cannot generally be 
 known to us. This principle does not exclude con- 
 tingency, because of the immense variety of things 
 in nature, and the division of bodies ad infinitum} 
 Specifically, there is an infinity of imperceptible 
 inclinations in the soul which enter into the final 
 cause of action. But this view of nature is not 
 mechanical, although each body is a kind of divine 
 machine or natural automaton. The machines of 
 nature differ from those of art, in that they are 
 related, not to a particular end, but to infinity : les 
 machines de la nature, c'est a dire les corps vivants, 
 sont encore machines dans leurs moindres parties 
 jusqu'4 I'infini.^ The principle of sufficient reason 
 implies that there is nothing dead, or sterile, or 
 useless in nature. 
 
 V. Tlie Will and the Idea of Freedom. The 
 term liberty, or freedom, is ambiguous. It does 
 not refer to liberty from external restraint. With 
 relation to the will, it is of two kinds : (a) when 
 the will is not constrained by the passions, i.e., by 
 the affections of the mind itself ; (6) when the will 
 is not constrained by necessity.' The first of these 
 is freedom in the sense of the Stoic philosophy. 
 But the relation of the will to necessity is of more 
 importance. Voluntary is not opposed to neces- 
 sary, but to involuntary. And volitions are not 
 
 1 Leibnitz, La Monadol. 32 t. 2 h., ib. 64. 
 
 8 Id., Nouveaux Kssais, II. xxi. 5. 
 
250 THEOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 necessary, but contingent. By the necessary Leib- 
 nitz means that of which the contrary is impossible, 
 or that which implies contradiction. Acts of the 
 will are only hypothetically necessary, which is the 
 same as saying that it is contingent, whether a cer- 
 tain action of the will is about to take place. If 
 we accept the above definition of the necessary, it 
 will follow that volitions, although they are deter- 
 mined, are not necessary.^ If it be asked then 
 what determines the will, the answer given is that 
 the mind determines the will ; but the mind is 
 determined by some uneasiness, and the latter is 
 the motive of volition. It is internal, not ex- 
 ternal. Leibnitz follows Descartes in holding 
 that freedom of the will is dependent on know- 
 ledge. When there are several desires before the 
 mind, the mind may consider them in succession 
 previous to the final volition. This is called delib- 
 eration, and in it consists liberum arbitrium in its 
 true sense. And this deliberation is not a defect, 
 but rather a perfection of our nature : vouloir et 
 agir conformement au dernier r^sultat d'un sin- 
 cere examen, c'est plutot une perfection qu'un 
 d^faut de notre nature.^ Our choice is not com- 
 pelled by our judgment, or by any antecedent 
 cause. It is said to be inclined, and not necessi- 
 tated : la prevalence des biens apergus incline sans 
 n^cessiter, quoique tout consid^r^ cette inclination 
 soit d^terminante et ne manque jamais de faire son 
 effet.* The desire, as has been said above, must 
 
 1 Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais, II. xxi. 11-13. 
 » Id., ib. II. XXI. 48. 8 Id., ib. U. xxi. 49. 
 
FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 251 
 
 not be confounded with the will. The former is a 
 kind of incomplete volition ; it is excited by happi- 
 ness, and inclines the will.' There is no power of 
 contrary choice. This is not inconsistent with the 
 contingency of acts of the will, for objectively the 
 certainty of these actions is assured. It is" some- 
 times said that we can will not only what we please, 
 but what we do not please to will. This Leibnitz 
 declares to be absurd : le choLx est toujours deter- 
 mine par la perception. The perception is not 
 always before consciousness. There are impulses, 
 accompanied by pleasure and pain, and all percep- 
 tions are either new sensations or imaginations 
 remaining from some past sensations, which renew 
 the inducements which these sensations have pre- 
 sented at former times. This renewal may be 
 either accompanied by memory or not, and is in 
 proportion to the vivacity of the imagination. The 
 prevailing effort (I'effort privalant) is the result of 
 all these impulses, which realizes the action of the 
 will. It is possible that the most pressing uneasi- 
 ness may not determine the will. This faUure 
 occurs when the other impulses taken together pre- 
 vent the decisive volitioa in accordance with the 
 otherwise strongest motive. Up to the time of the 
 volition, there is, as it were, a balancing of motives. 
 The order of determination will appear from what 
 has been said: it is happiness which excites the 
 uneasiness, and it is uneasiness which, in union 
 with the judgment, determines the will in accord- 
 ance with the inclination of the mind. Leibnitz 
 
 1 Leibnitz, Noureaux Essais, II. xxi. 30. 
 
252 THEOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 differs from Hobbes in that lie does not regard the 
 motives as efficient causes of volition. The voli- 
 tion is determined, not by an efficient, but by a final 
 cause. Efficient causes operate only in the cor- 
 poreal yorld, while the soul is governed by final 
 causes : les §,mes agissent selon les lois des causes 
 finales par app^titions, fins et moyens. Les corps 
 agissent selon les lois des causes efficientes ou des 
 mouvements. Et les deux rfegnes, celui des causes 
 efficientes et celui des causes finales, sont harmo- 
 niques entre eux.^ But from a more general point 
 of view, it is the principle of sufficient reason 
 which requires the affirmation that the will is 
 determined. The freedom of indifference is an 
 impossibility, if the principle of sufficient reason 
 be admitted. As for freedom, it consists only in 
 the power of deliberation which precedes the final 
 volition. In this Leibnitz is in agreement with 
 Locke. Considering the polemic which is carried 
 on in parts of the Nouveaux Essais, against the 
 principles of Locke's philosophy, it is singular that 
 the chapter on power and the will contains no im- 
 portant criticism of the English philosopher's doc- 
 trine. Like Spinoza and other preceding writers, 
 Leibnitz considers the problem of the Asinus Bu- 
 ridani." Bayle had maintained that under such 
 circumstances, which were quite possible, the ani- 
 mal would starve to death. Leibnitz denies that 
 such a case is possible ; but admits that if it were, 
 that result would follow. He is careful to explain 
 
 1 Leibnitz, La Monadol. 79. 
 * Id., Th&dieee, I. 49. 
 
FROM DESCAETES TO LEIBNITZ 253 
 
 that the determination of the -will does not conflict 
 with the spontaneity of the soul. He objects that 
 Hobbes and Spinoza have defended a doctrine of 
 absolute necessity which makes the will inactive 
 (la volonti paresseux)} The soul, he concludes, is 
 a kind of spiritual automaton ; although contingent 
 actions in general, and free actions in particular, 
 are not on this account necessary, with an absolute 
 necessity, which would be incompatible with con- 
 tingence. Samuel Clarke, who was engaged in 
 active controversy with Leibnitz, criticised the doc- 
 trine of the latter, holding that it conducted to 
 necessitarianism and fatalism. The activity which 
 Leibnitz admitted in the soul was urged by Clarke 
 as a proof of its freedom. The motive may be 
 external; it impresses the mind, which so far is 
 passive ; but when the mind is thus impressed, it 
 is aroused to action, and freely wills. The motive 
 is not " the principle of action ; " for the spring of 
 action is the free will. Clarke also raises the 
 rather formidable objection that absolute necessity 
 is the only true necessity, and that the hypothetical 
 or moral necessity of which Leibnitz speaks is a 
 mere figure. The question is whether the motives 
 are causes of volition or not. It may be added 
 that the death of Leibnitz prevented his replying 
 to Clarke's last criticism.^ 
 
 In the Thiodicie, the will is considered in relation 
 to God ; and most of the questions which engaged 
 
 1 Leibnitz, TModio^e, I. 67. 
 
 ^ Recueil de Lettres entre Leibnitz et Clarke. 4me ificrit de 
 M. L. 6me ^crit de M. L. Sme B^pliqus de M. C. 
 
254 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 the attention of the theologians of the seventeenth 
 and eighteenth centuries, with respect to grace and 
 original sin, were discussed by Leibnitz. God is 
 said to foreknow the future, because the future has 
 been predetermined. But Leibnitz declares that 
 there are two famous labyrinths in which our reason 
 wanders : one relates to the question of necessity 
 and freedom, including the problem of the origin 
 of evil ; the other has reference to the constitution 
 of matter. There is, he says, a good and a bad 
 kind of fatalism. The first is the imperfect fatal- 
 ism of the Mahometans ; the second is the philo- 
 sophical fatalism of the Stoic philosophy and the 
 Christian religion. The good doctrine teaches that 
 man should do his duty, and leave the result to an 
 overruling power. God permits evil, but is not 
 the positive cause. It is admitted, however, that 
 the permissive will of God has ef&caciousness in 
 bringing on evil. God's will is either antecedent 
 or consequent. The antecedent will of God is the 
 general willing of the best result among infinite 
 possibilities. The consequent will of God is a 
 single volition embracing the final effect of the 
 diverse evil and good willing in the contingent 
 world.^ 
 
 Down to the time of Kant, the theory of Leibnitz 
 prevailed in Germany. His determinism was 
 emphasized by WolfE, who gave the dogmatic phi- 
 losophy its German form. According to Wolff, the 
 soul of man has the power to present or to repre- 
 sent the universe to itself ; and from this representa- 
 1 Leibnitz, Th&dioee, Preface. 
 
FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNITZ 255 
 
 tion ( Vorstellung) arises an effort on tlie part of the 
 subject to change these presentations. This effort 
 may assume one of two forms: impulse or will. 
 There is in man a tendency to follow the good, and 
 avoid its opposite. If the idea of the good be 
 obscure, the effect is merely appetite ; if it be 
 clear, the effect is will. If a greater and a lesser 
 good be contemplated by the mind, the greater 
 good, or what seems to be the greater good, will 
 inevitably determine the will.' 
 
 1 WoliT, Verniinftlge Gedanken, etc., paaslm. 
 
CHAPTEE SIXTH 
 
 THEOEIES OP THE WILL IN fiEEMAH PHILOSOPHY 
 FEOM KANT TO LOTZB 
 
 Philosophy on the continent of Europe until 
 the time of Kant has no national peculiarity. The 
 development of doctrine from Descartes to Wolff 
 leads us from France to Holland, and from Hol- 
 land to Germany, and shows many traces of the 
 influence exercised by Hobbes and Locke. While 
 the development of the German philosophy, begin- 
 ning with Kant, was more or less due to the stimu- 
 lating effects of Hume's scepticism, the German 
 systems of the nineteenth century are distinctively 
 national; although of late years there has been a 
 free exchange of philosophical ideas between the 
 several European nations. Lotze forms a con- 
 necting link between the old and the new. His 
 predecessors had deduced their theories of the will 
 from their metaphysical doctrines. Lotze, while 
 eminent as a metaphysician, was among the first 
 to take the theory of the will out of the metaphysi- 
 cal domain, and consider it in the light of positive 
 science. Whatever estimate may be made of the 
 value of his conclusions, it can hardly be denied 
 that, since the appearance of his first psychological 
 256 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 257 
 
 treatise, no German philosoplier of importance has 
 been able to overlook the questions raised by hia 
 method and incLuiry. 
 
 Kant 
 
 In the system of Kant the psychological aspects 
 of volition are for the most part unnoticed, while 
 the metaphysical and moral aspects appear promi- 
 nently. Not the nature of the will as a psychical 
 act or process, but the freedom of the will as a 
 metaphysical or moral principle, is the prevailing 
 conception. And whereas the philosophy before 
 Kant had at length reached a point of specializa- 
 tion in which the extent of the will had been 
 limited to an act of the mind as a result of delib- 
 eration, or to the act of deliberation itself, Kant 
 returned in a measure to the older view of the will. 
 He uses it in its most liberal significance. It is 
 more than an act of affirmation or denial; it is 
 more than a feeling of effort or an executive faculty. 
 In the absence of any doctrine of an Ego, other than 
 the synthetic unity of apperception, and of any 
 definite theory of personality, he identifies the 
 practical reason with the will, and apparently with 
 the autonomous and spontaneous soul itself. Prac- 
 tically the will acts in obedience to certain laws, , 
 but it is its own lawgiver. It is not only a faculty, 
 but a fundamental faculty, the existence of which 
 does not have to be demonstrated, and the freedom 
 of which has to be postulated, in spite of the limita- 
 tions of speculative philosophy. 
 
258 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 In the philosophy of Kant there is both a theo- 
 retical and a practical doctrine of the will, in 
 accordance with the general Kantian method. The 
 first of these is contained in the Critique of Pure 
 Season. The second is already anticipated in that 
 theoretical work, and is explicitly presented in the 
 Critique of Practical Reason and in the Metaphysics 
 of Ethics. 
 
 I. Theoretical Doctrine of the Will. This is for- 
 mally set forth in the Third Antinomy of the Tran- 
 scendental Dialectic. In order that it may be the 
 better understood, certain fundamental principles 
 of the Critique of Pure Reason must be recalled. 
 
 1. Matter and Form. The matter of knowledge 
 must be distinguished from the form. The first 
 of these comes from experience, and is a posteriori; 
 the second is that which makes experience pos- 
 sible, but is not given by experience. It is a 
 priori. The matter of knowledge comes from the 
 outer and from the inner sense, in the sensible 
 intuition (Anschauung) . The forms of sensibility 
 are space and time. They are a priori, not a pos- 
 teriori, forms. In sensibility the mind is receptive. 
 Space is the form of external, and time of internal, 
 phenomena. A higher faculty than sensibility is 
 the understanding. This is not receptive, but spon- 
 taneous. It is the faculty by which the knowledge 
 of the intuition is thought in concepts or categories. 
 It is a formal faculty, and its a priori concepts or 
 categories are deduced from the forms of the logical 
 judgment, with respect to quantity, quality, rela- 
 tion, and modality. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 259 
 
 The problem of the Critique of Pure Season 
 is stated thus: how are synthetic judgments o 
 priori possible? This, in less technical language, 
 means : how do we reach a knowledge of necessary 
 truth? and the solution of the problem is to be 
 found in Kant's doctrine of a prior-i forms. The 
 necessary truths of science, whether mathematical 
 or physical, cannot be derived from experience. 
 The failure of empiricism had been proved by 
 Hume. " Experience teaches us, indeed, that any- 
 thing is created in such and such a way, but not 
 that it cannot be otherwise." It does not give 
 necessity : 
 
 Erfahrung lehrt uns zwar dass etwas so Oder so besohaffen 
 sei, aber uicht dass es nicht anders sein konne. Findet sich 
 also erstlich ein Satz, der zugleich mit seiner Notbwendigkeit 
 gedacht wird, so ist er ein TJrtheil apriori.^ Nothwendigkeit 
 und strenge AUgemeinheit sind also siohere Kennzeichen 
 einer Erkenntniss a priori, und geh5ren auch unzertrennlich 
 zu einander.' 
 
 It is the a priori forms which make the a priori 
 or necessary judgments possible. That is abso- 
 lutely necessary the opposite of which is in itself 
 impossible. All our conceptions of inner necessity 
 in the qualities of possible things, of whatever 
 kind, proceed from this, that the opposite involves 
 a contradiction.' Thus the doctrine of Hume is 
 denied, that the empirical cognition through the 
 force of custom or habit becomes necessary. 
 
 2. TJie Phenomenon and the Thing in itself. This 
 
 1 Kant, Werke [Hartenstein], III. 35. 
 "Id., II. 125. » Id., III. 34. 
 
260 THEOKIBS OF THE WILL 
 
 is the most important distinction in the Kantian 
 philosophy, and is at the foundation of the whole 
 system, both theoretically and practically. It is 
 said that we know only phenomena, and not things 
 in themselves : was die Gegenstande an sich selbst 
 sein mogen, wurde uns durch die aufgeklarteste 
 Erkenntniss der Erscheinung derselben, die uns 
 allein gegeben ist, doch niemals bekannt werden.^ 
 The phenomena themselves are not things, because 
 space and time are not given by experience, but 
 are a priori forms. We have, therefore, no assur- 
 ance that the forms of our intuition are forms of 
 the real world. To go beyond this is dogmatism. 
 That there are things in themselves (Dinge an sich) 
 is not denied; it is only affirmed that they are 
 unknown. This ignorance of the Ding an sich has 
 reference to the world in time as well as to the 
 world in space. The Ego, or self, according to this 
 doctrine, is unknown as thing in itself. Just as 
 we know only the phenomena of matter, and not 
 matter as thing in itself, so in like manner is our 
 knowledge of mind limited. In the Critique of 
 Pure Reason, instead of self, or Ego, there is the 
 formal principle which Kant calls the synthetic 
 unity of apperception (die synthetische Einheit der 
 Apperception.) In the proposition "I think" is by 
 implication contained an act of spontaneity. This 
 Kant calls "pure apperception" (reine^jjpej-ception). 
 While I am conscious of myself as identical with 
 respect to the manifold content of consciousness, 
 because I can call them my ideas, yet the manifold 
 1 Kant, in. 72. 
 
IN GEEMAN PHILOSOPHY 261 
 
 is not given by means of the Ego. But the highest 
 principle of the possibility of all intuition in rela- 
 tion to the understanding is that all the manifold 
 of the intuition stands under the conditions of the 
 original synthetic unity of apperception. The Ego 
 as Ding an sich cannot be an object of knowledge ; 
 and so, to account for the unity of the manifold, 
 and the identity of the subject in experience, Kant 
 presents the principle of synthetic unity of apper- 
 ception. This has a merely theoretical significance, 
 so that it is not a principle of volition, but only of 
 knowledge. In the Critique of Pure Reason, there 
 is likewise no definite doctrine of personality, 
 and one must go to the practical philosophy for an 
 explanation. The doctrine of the unity of apper- 
 ception is not put forward as an explanation of the 
 moral personality, but in order to establish the 
 important principle of the Ego cogito, for the sake 
 of the unity of thought: durch den allgemeinen 
 Ausdruck, ich denke, zusammenfassen kann.^ 
 
 Corresponding to this distinction between the 
 phenomenon and the noumenon, {Ding an sick) is 
 that between the sensible and intelligible world. 
 The value of the intelligible in relation to the doc- 
 trine of the will is first apparent in connection with 
 the Third Antinomy. 
 
 Kant's insufficient explanation of the Ego in his 
 
 1 Kant, III. 19. See, also : Ich bin mir also des identlschen 
 Selbat bewusst. In Ansehung des Mannigfaltigen der mir in 
 einer Anschanung gegeben Vorstellungen, well ich sie in- 
 gesammt meine Vorstellungen nenne, die eine ausmachen, III. 
 117, 118. 
 
262 THEORIES OF THE WILIi 
 
 Critique of Pure Reason has been justly criti- 
 cised, and undoubtedly leads to great confusion. 
 From the fact that we know only phenomena, it 
 is obvious that our knowledge of self can be only 
 phenomenal, and consequently it is difficult to 
 interpret the assertion that "I am conscious of 
 myself," however the term self be explained. In 
 Kant's theoretical philosophy, the Ego is identified 
 with none of the faculties of knowledge, and the 
 relation of the faculties to that which has or exer- 
 cises the faculties is quite obscure. I simply refer 
 to this in passing, as Kant's discussion of the will 
 in the first Critique is not essentially related to 
 any particular doctrine of the Ego. In another 
 work, he attributes autonomy not only to the prac- 
 tical reason, but also to the understanding and to 
 the faculty of Judgment (Urtheilskraft). 
 
 3. Causality. Causality is a category of relation 
 which is deduced from the hypothetical judgment. 
 It is not derived empirically, but is a condition 
 which makes experience of natural phenomena pos- 
 sible. Cause and effect form a sequence in time, 
 and a necessary sequence. The necessity of the 
 causal judgment comes from the a priori nature of 
 the category. Cause and effect are necessarily 
 connected, not because they are associated in experi- 
 ence as invariable antecedent and consequent, but 
 because they are thought in the understanding in 
 the category of causality, which is a priori, and 
 therefore necessary.^ 
 
 Like all other formal elements in our knowledge, 
 1 Kant. m. 174 ft. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 263 
 
 the category of causality is applicable only to 
 phenomena. Whether things in themselves are 
 thus causally connected we do not know, for we 
 know only phenomena, and not things in them- 
 selves. In the observation of phenomena it is 
 observed that a certain condition of things prevails 
 at one time, and another condition just before. 
 The two observations are combined in time. The 
 combination or conjunction is not effected through 
 the sensibility or through intuition, but is the 
 product of thought. The conception of their neces- 
 sary union is due to the understanding. The con- 
 ception is that of the causal relation. Effects are 
 thus observed as changes, and for every change a 
 cause is thought necessarily. Often the cause and 
 effect are simultaneously observed, but this does 
 not contradict the law of succession. The temporal 
 sequence of effects is required because the cause can- 
 not exercise its whole effect in one moment: hier 
 muss man wohl bemerken, dass es auf die Ord- 
 nung der Zeit, und nicht den Ablauf derselben 
 angesehen sei; das Verhaltniss bleibt, wenn gleich 
 keine Zeit verlaufen ist. Causality suggests action, 
 and action suggests force, and force suggests sub- 
 stance. But it may be added that substance, like 
 cause, is not given in experience, but is itself an a 
 priori concept or category.^ 
 
 4. Freedom and Causality. The Critique of 
 
 Pure Reason has to do with knowledge, not with 
 
 will. It deals with judgments, not volitions. The 
 
 latter are phenomena like other phenomena, are 
 
 1 Kant, III. 183, and cf. 144. 
 
264 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 known in the same way, and are subject to the 
 same laws. The volition is known, not as the Ego 
 choosing or deliberating or acting, but each voli- 
 tion is a change, is known as an effect, and is 
 conceived as necessarily determined by an ante- 
 cedent cause. The difficulties which this conclu- 
 sion suggests are discussed in the Transcendental 
 Dialectic. 
 
 The Transcendental Esthetic, which is the first 
 part of the Critique has to do with the a priori 
 forms of intuition; the Transcendental Analytic, 
 which is the first subdivision of the Transcen- 
 dental Logic, is the science of the a priori forms 
 of the understanding. The .^Esthetic shows how 
 mathematics as a science is possible; the Ana- 
 lytic shows how a science of nature is possible. 
 The Transcendental Dialectic, which is the 
 second part of the Logic, deals with the ques- 
 tion whether metaphysics as a science is possible. 
 According to Kant, metaphysics is the science of 
 the ideas of pure reason. An idea is a conception 
 of the totality of experience.^ The conceptions or 
 concepts of the understanding have no significance 
 unless their form is filled by the content which 
 comes from the intuition, which in turn comes 
 from experience, being known in the forms of space 
 and time. But the ideas of pure reason have no 
 corresponding empirical content. The being of 
 these ideas cannot be denied, and even if they are 
 illusions, they must be examined." The totality of 
 experience is the content of the idea, and we have 
 
 1 Kant, m. 261, 262. 2Id. lU. 247. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 265 
 
 no intuition of such a totality. In this respect 
 especially, the concept of the reason, that is, the 
 idea, differs from the concept of the understanding. 
 The reason is the faculty of reasoning. In this 
 process we are led from conclusion to premises, 
 and from these premises to other premises, from 
 which the former are conclusions. This process 
 may either proceed ad infinitum, or else a premise 
 may be reached which depends on no antecedent 
 premises. In either case the result is the uncon- 
 ditioned. In one ease, the series is unconditioned, 
 because unlimited; in the other case, the principle 
 is the unconditioned. In the Esthetic and 
 Analytic the unconditioned, or Ding an sich, was 
 simply a negative limit to knowledge. It was 
 that which is unknown. In the Dialectic, it has a 
 positive significance, for it is the idea of the reason. 
 Whether it is a valid conception or not, meta- 
 physics exists, and the validity of the science has 
 to be examined. 
 
 There are three ideas of the reason, which are 
 deduced from three forms of the syllogism, — .the 
 categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive. 
 From the first of these, by a regressus from predi- 
 cate to subject, and from this subject to another 
 subject, we arrive at last either at an infinite 
 series, or at a subject which is the predicate of no 
 other proposition.^ 
 
 The idea of the unconditioned subject is the idea 
 of the soul, which is the object of rational psy- 
 chology. The hypothetical syllogism leads us to 
 
 1 Kant, m. 262. 
 
2C6 THEORIES OP THE WILL 
 
 the idea of a proposition which is conditioned 
 by no antecedent. This is the idea of the world 
 which is the object of rational cosmology. The 
 disjunctive syllogism leads us to the idea of an 
 aggregate of members of a unity in the uncon- 
 ditioned, which is the idea of God, the idea of 
 rational theology. 
 
 It is only the second of these ideas of the reason 
 which need here be considered. 
 
 The idea of rational cosmology, as has just been 
 suggested, is derived from a regressus from each 
 antecedent to a preceding consequent, until a propo- 
 sition is reached which does not depend on any 
 other antecedent; or else the regressus is ad in- 
 finitum. The meaning of this, if we drop the lan- 
 guage of logic, is that either there is an infinite 
 regressus in the series of causes and effects, or else 
 a first cause is reached which is an effect of no 
 preceding cause.^ Either of these alternatives is 
 capable of demonstration, and the result is the 
 Third Antinomy. 
 
 The Third Antinomy 
 Thesis 
 
 Causality according to the Laws of Nature is not the only 
 [causality] from which the totality of the phenomena of the 
 world can be derived. There is another causality through 
 freedom, to be accepted as necessary for explaining these 
 [phenomena]. 
 
 (Die Causalitat nach Gesetzen der Natur ist nicht die 
 einzige aus welcher die Erscheinmigen der Welt ingesammt 
 
 1 Kant, III. 297. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHT 267 
 
 abgeleitet -werden konnen. Es ist nooh eine CausalitSt duroh 
 Freiheit zu Erklarung derselbeu anzanehmen nothwendig.) 
 
 Antithesis 
 
 There Is no Freedom, but everything in the world happens 
 altogether according to the Laws of Nature. 
 
 (Es ist keine Freiheit, sondern alles in der Welt gesohieht 
 lediglioh nach Gesetzen der Natur.i) 
 
 It -will be at once observed that the thesis is a 
 statement of the possibility of free will, and the 
 plain assertion that there is a causality through 
 freedom. The antithesis insists that all events 
 happen in the causal series, and that freedom is 
 impossible. Judged by the principles of the Ana- 
 lytic, the thesis has no scientific value; and the 
 problem raised in the Dialectic is : can there be an 
 exception to the laws of nature which have been 
 deduced in the Analytic ? It is fm-ther to be noticed 
 that the law of cause and effect as deduced from 
 the hypothetical judgment is a necessary law, and 
 to suppose that an effect can occur without a cause 
 implies a contradiction. Nevertheless, here the 
 necessary law is contradicted in the thesis. 
 
 In the presence of these two alternative conclu- 
 sions, one might be justified in holding that there 
 was no possibility of demonstrating the truth of 
 either freedom or its opposite, and the result would 
 be scepticism. This is not the attitude taken by 
 Kant. In the discussion of the Antinomy, we 
 find him seeking a reconciliation of these two con- 
 tradictory conclusions. If the conclusion of the 
 thesis is valid, however, then the results of the 
 1 gant, m. 316, 317. 
 
268 THEOHIES OF THE WILIi 
 
 critical method in the Analytic are not final. For 
 if there is freedom from the necessity of causal- 
 ity, then either freedom is not a phenomenon, or 
 else the law of causality is not necessary. Kant 
 takes the former alternative. Freedom is not phe- 
 nomenal. But, according to him, the freedom 
 affirmed in the thesis is not empirical, but tran- 
 scendental freedom. It refers to a spontaneous 
 beginning of a causal series, but not to a temporal 
 or chronological beginning. It is a noumenal, not 
 a phenomenal freedom, and is thus independent of 
 the form of time, which is a form of phenomena, 
 not of things in themselves.' It is independent 
 also of the category of causality, which is a form 
 of phenomena as well. To posit a free cause is to 
 supply a need of the reason. Kant admits that 
 the thesis is dogmatic," because freedom is predi- 
 cated of the Ding an sich, which according to the 
 critical method cannot be known. To believe in a 
 free cause, and to believe that I am free, are the 
 two foundation stones of religion and morality. It 
 is not a matter of mere speculative interest whether 
 the thesis or the antithesis be accepted as true. 
 There is a practical interest as well. The antithe- 
 sis fails to answer the question how the series of 
 
 1 Es wird aber immer merkwiirdig bleiben, dass Kant, nach- 
 dem er zuerst Dinge an sich von Erscheinungeu nur negativ, 
 durch die Unabhangigkeit von der Zeit, untersohieden, nachher 
 in den metaphysischen Eroterungen seiner Kritik der prakti- 
 selien Vernunf t Unabhangigkeit von dor Zeit und Freiheit wirk- 
 lich als correlate BegrifEe behandelt hatte, etc. Schelling, W. 
 I. vii. 351, 362. 
 
 2 Kant, III. 332. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 269 
 
 causes has begun, or whether it has had a begin- 
 ning. The thesis has popularity on its side; for 
 the ordinary understanding has no difficulty in 
 imagining a beginning of the series, or the freedom 
 of the will. Nor can the antithesis be denied by 
 the empiricist, for that would be empirical dog- 
 matism.^ The antithesis requires an infinite re- 
 gressus, which is a conception too great for a 
 synthesis of the properties of the universe. The 
 thesis is, moreover, the foundation of the concep- 
 tion of practical freedom, freedom in the practical 
 sphere is the independence of the will of necessity, 
 especially of the necessity of sensible causes." The 
 fact that a man does not have to obey the senses 
 and the sensible impulses, but can will in opposi- 
 tion to them, shows that he has a free faculty which 
 determines the act independent of these impulses. 
 The knowledge of freedom does not conflict with a 
 knowledge of natural causality; for the former is 
 " intelligible," ° the latter is phenomenal. The 
 freedom of the Ding an sich is intelligible, that is, 
 it is not derived from experience, nor is it condi- 
 tioned by the forms of experience. Kant's con- 
 tention is that the reason, which exists in neither 
 space nor time,* and which is itself transcendental, 
 is unconditioned, and can be conceived as a free 
 cause. Causality, while it is a category of phe- 
 nomena, is not a category of noumena. And 
 causality through freedom, while it cannot be 
 proved, cannot be disproved. 
 
 1 Kant, ni. 332 ff. 343 t. » Id. III. 374. 
 
 »Id. III. 3T1. nd. m. 382. 
 
270 5'HEOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 In holding that the freedom of the will is not 
 known empirically, Kant differs radically from the 
 majority of indeterminists. Their contention is 
 that consciousness informs us empirically that we 
 are free, while Kant holds that experience teaches 
 us that the will is determined. This is to be ex- 
 plained partly from the influence of Hume on Kant, 
 but more particularly from Kant's doctrine of cau- 
 sality in relation to the phenomenal world. While 
 apparently desirous of vindicating the validity of 
 the thesis of the Antinomy, he admits that it is 
 as easy to think of an infinite number of successive 
 changes, as to think of eternally existing sub- 
 stances. But the practical interest in the thesis is 
 that which triumphs in weighing the alternative 
 conclusions. The ideas of the pure reason are not 
 scientifically necessary, but they are indispensable 
 to practice. Indeed, Kant defines practical as all 
 that is possible by means of freedom: praktisch 
 ist alles, was durch Freiheit moglich ist.* But 
 freedom can be established, not as a constitutive 
 principle, but only as a regulative principle. It is 
 related to action, not to theory. Prom this point 
 of view, we have no longer to ask whether freedom 
 is possible. For practically we are brought to 
 recognize it as a canon of moral action.^ What 
 this freedom implies is left in some obscurity 
 by Kant. Transcendental freedom must mean, of 
 course, freedom from causes which determine the 
 will ; and it means also freedom from sensual im- 
 pulses. For we have a faculty which can postpone 
 
 I Kant. III. 629. 2 Id. in. 529 f. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 271 
 
 the reaction against the impulse, and can resist the 
 inclinations of sense.* 
 
 It need hardly be said that this Antinomy has 
 been a favorite point of attack for the critics of 
 Kant. Whether a defence of the thesis is con- 
 sistent with the validity of the results reached by 
 the critical method may be fairly open to doubt. 
 At all events Kant's practical philosophy awakens 
 in the reader a suspicion that the doctriue of regu- 
 lative principles introduced at the close of the first 
 Critique is advanced in order to admit practically 
 what had been excluded theoretically, and to save 
 ethics after the foundation of ontology had been 
 undermined. That the thesis is regarded as even 
 possibly true, opens the way for the practical 
 discussion of volition as contained in the Critique 
 of Practical Reason and in the Metaphysics of Ethics. 
 
 It is part of the irony of fate that Kant's practi- 
 cal philosophy should have been accepted by many 
 who have denied the validity of the Critique of 
 Pure Reason. He has often received high praise 
 as a defender of the rights of the moral law, of 
 conscience, and of free will, by those who found 
 their belief in freedom on an appeal to conscious- 
 ness, and who dissent altogether from the great 
 critical distinction between the phenomenon and 
 the Ding an sich. Such philosophers apparently 
 overlook two facts with respect to the Kantian 
 philosophy. The first of these is that Kant main- 
 tained that the empirical method leads inevitably 
 and logically to determinism ; and the second is that 
 
 I Kant, III. 531. 
 
272 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 according to Kant, unless the distinction between 
 phenomenon and Ding an sich be made, there is no 
 ground upon which the freedom of the will can be 
 defended. 
 
 II. Practical Doctritie of the Will. Certain affir- 
 mations made in the Critique of Pure Reason in- 
 troduce Kant's practical doctrine of the will. His 
 statements that there may be a causality through 
 freedom in the intelligible world, that freedom is 
 essential to morality, and that it is empirical 
 dogmatism to deny the existence of transcendental 
 freedom, introduce the principles of his practical 
 philosophy. 
 
 It is admitted that free will is not given empiri- 
 cally, and is therefore not subject to the principle 
 of causality. Everything in nature acts according 
 to laws, but the will is not subject to the laws of 
 nature. It gives its own laws ; it is autonomous.' 
 The introduction to the Kantian ethics is the 
 treatise on the Metaphysics of Ethics, in which 
 an attempt is made to discover the principles or 
 laws of a pure will. These laws are necessary; 
 they do not depend on empirical conditions. They 
 carry with them absolute necessity. They exclude 
 all contingency. Only a rational being has the 
 -faculty to act according to the idea of certain 
 principles. That faculty is will. The will is de- 
 .^ fined as a faculty of choosing only that which 
 , reason, independent of inclination, recognizes as 
 practically necessary. That which is practically 
 necessary is identical with the good.^ That which 
 
 I Kant, IV. 281, 284 ; V. 30, 35. 2 id, ly. 260. 
 
IN GEEMAN PHILOSOPHY 273 
 
 in all the world deserves to be called good, without 
 limit or qualification, is a good will. Its peculiar 
 characteristic or property is a good character. For ' 
 a good will is good per se, and not because of its 
 volitions or results.^ The nature of a good will is 
 made still plainer by the definition of duty. Duty 
 is the necessity of an action, out of respect for law.^ 
 If the will is determined by external necessity, it^ 
 cannot be called good. The good will is determined 
 by its own laws, that is, by subjective laws. Hence 
 it is both rational and free. Kant identifies these'^ 
 three conceptions, freedom, the will, and the prac-' 
 tical reason. Die Freiheit ist demnach, ein Vermo- 
 gen, welches zugleich praktisch und verniinftig 
 ist: sie ist Wille und praktische Vernunft.' The 
 will is a fundamental faculty (Grundvermogen), 
 it is therefore incapable of more exact definition 
 and explanation : nun ist aber alle menschliche 
 Einsicht zu Ende, sobald wir zu Grundkraften oder 
 Grundvermogen gelangt sind.* This fundamental 
 character of the will, or, to adopt a later term, this 
 primacy of the will, implies that it is a faculty 
 which controls all subjective moving causes. It i^ 
 Kant's doctrine, not only that the will is free from 
 external co-action, and free from the determination 
 of external motives, but is free from any causality' 
 of subjective states or processes. It is subject to 
 its own laws, and by virtue of this autonomy it is" 
 free. It is not determined by another, but is selS- 
 determined. The determinists of the seventeenth 
 
 1 Kant, IV. 242. « Cf. Id. IV. , 260 ; V. 16. '^ 
 
 2 Id. IV. 248, * Id. V. 50. 
 
 T 
 
274 THEORIES OP THE WILL 
 
 and eighteenth centuries, had taught that the mo- 
 tive is the efficient cause of the volition. Kant holds^ 
 that the will controls the motives, and determines 
 whether or not the volition shall be in accordance 
 with them. Thus the principle of every human 
 will is the unconditional law which it imposes upo^ 
 itself. This law, which is none other than the 
 moral law, is a priori, and therefore universal and 
 necessary. The principle of autonomy of the will 
 is distinguished from that of heteronomy. In the 
 heteronomy of the will there is no element of mo- 
 rality. In such a case the will is under an alien 
 law, and is neither good nor free: Autonomic ist 
 also der Grund der Wiirde der menschlichen und 
 jeder vernUnftigen Natur.' The Scottish moralists 
 of the sentimental school, and the French sensual- 
 ists of the eighteenth century had regarded moral- 
 ity as obedience to certain feelings of different 
 degrees of worth. Kant excludes the feelings from 
 his ethical principles, and regards volitions as abso- 
 lute when they are moral. We are free because we 
 are autonomous, and we are autonomous because^ 
 we are free.^ The only proof of this freedom is to" 
 be found in the demands of morality. The reason 
 why we believe that we are free, is that we believe' 
 in the imperative obligation to be moral. Antf" 
 conversely, the reason why we believe that the 
 obligation is imperative, is because we believe in 
 the freedom of the will. Yet freedom must be 
 postulated as ultimate, and cannot be proved. It 
 is incapable of any theoretical demonstration. It is 
 1 Kant, IV. 284. a Id. IV. 297, 298, 
 
IN GEBMAN PHILOSOPHT 275 
 
 the only idea of the reason, the possibility a priori 
 of which is known without comprehending how it 
 is the condition of the moral law. Treedom is 
 ratio essendi of the moral law ; and the moral law, 
 ratio cognoscendi of freedom.* 
 
 Kant says : — 
 
 Freiheit iat aber die einzige unter alien Ideen der specula- 
 tiven Vemunft wo von wir die Mbglichkeit a j)nori wissen, 
 obne sie doch einzusehen, well sie Bedingung des morali- 
 schen Gesetzes ist, welches wir wissen.* 
 
 Kant thus defends the freedom of the will in an 
 entirely novel manner. Pormer philosophers did 
 not so distinguish the phenomenal and noumenal 
 world, as to limit the application of the principle 
 of .causation to the former. They were unable to 
 explain how the will as phenomenon or as noume- 
 non or as both together in a world of causes and 
 effects, could be free from the law of causality. 
 Kant claims, and justly claims, thathe has discovered 
 a way of avoiding the difficulty. For by insisting 
 that the will as Ding an sich is not subject to the , 
 principle of causality, he virtually asserts its free- 
 dom. At least, he asserts that its freedom is not 
 unthinkable. He is able then to open the practical 
 consideration of the doctrine with a prima facie 
 case. It is, however, not empirical, but transcen- 
 dental freedom. It is the practical reason willing 
 as Ding an sich, in obedience to a moral law. It 
 wills, not according to desire or inclination, but be- 
 1 Kant, V. 4, note. » Id. V. 4. 
 
276 THEOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 cause of an imperative maxim.' While duty and 
 ^desire may coincide, the will does not conform to 
 duty because of desire, but because of the principle 
 "of " ought " (sollen) . Whereas in the natural order 
 of things the reason is determined by objects, and 
 has no freedom ; in the moral order the will deter- 
 mines the objects.' If we cannot prove conscious- 
 ness of freedom directly, still less can we show how 
 it is possible: wie nun dieses Bewusstsein der 
 moralischen Gesetze, oder welches einerlei ist, das 
 der Freiheit, moglich sei, lasst sich nicht welter 
 erklaren, nur die Zulassigkeit derselben in der theo- 
 retischen Kritik wohl vertheidigen.' The moral 
 law, which is absolute, is a law of causality through 
 freedom. It has a standing equal to the causal 
 necessity of the phenomenal world. Causality is 
 contained in the idea of will ; and in the conception 
 of pure will {reinen Wille), that is, of pure practical 
 reason, is included the idea of causality with free- 
 dom. From this idea of freedom is derived that 
 of personality. Personality consists in the free- 
 Mom of the whole soul from the mechanism of nat- 
 "ure. Man is peculiar in this respect that he is an 
 "fend to himself in moral action: nur der Mensch 
 "\ind mit ihm jedes vernilnftiges Geschopf, ist Zweck 
 an sichselbst. The requirement for personality is 
 susceptibility to respect for the moral law, as a 
 siifS-cient motive for the will.* 
 Kant's extreme conception of autonomy is espe- 
 
 1 Kant V. 93. a Id. V. 48. 
 
 s Id. V. 49. 
 
 * Id. V. 91 ; VI. 121. Compare Eosmini, Sistema. 206. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 277 
 
 cially apparent in his scornful treatment of the 
 determinism of Leibnitz. 
 
 He denies that the determinism of Leibnitz is con- 
 sistent with freedom in any true sense; for causality, 
 ■whether it be that of mind or of material objects, is 
 inconsistent with freedom. The determination of 
 the will by psychological causes takes the volition 
 out of the power of the agent, as much as material 
 causes would do. This Verkettung der Vorstel- 
 lungen der Seele gives what Kant calls "psycho- 
 logical freedom," which differs toto coelo from tran- 
 scendental freedom : und wenn die Freiheit unseres 
 Willens keine andere als die letztere (etwa die psy- 
 chologische und comparative, nicht transcendentale, 
 d. i. absolute zugleich) ware, so wiirde sie im 
 Grunde nichts besser, als die Freiheit eines Braten- 
 wenders sein, der auch wenn er einmal aufgezogen 
 worden, von selbst seine Bewegung verrichtet.' 
 
 The reality of transcendental freedom, according 
 to Kant, depends on the validity of the distinction 
 between phenomena and things in themselves. 
 Rational freedom is a quality of the causality of 
 living beings, in so far as they are rational. As' 
 free, the will is independent of every kind of cau- 
 sality except its own spontaneous and autonomous 
 determination. Therefore, as a rational being, Man 
 can never think of his own will except as a free 
 cause.^ 
 
 With respect to the liberty of indifference, it 
 would appear that Kant accepted the doctrine, and 
 was moreover disposed to lay very little emphasis 
 
 1 Kant, V. 101, 102. " Id. V. 300. 
 
278 THEOKIES OP THE WILL 
 
 upon the original badness or goodness of men. His 
 theory is Pelagian rather than Augustinian.^ 
 
 The Absolute Philosophy 
 
 In general there have been two interpretations of 
 the Kantian philosophy. In one case, the Critique 
 of Pure Reason has been interpreted in the light 
 of the practical philosophy, and an attempt has 
 been made to avoid the destructive results of 
 the first Critique by reconstructing a system on 
 the foundations of Kant's practical treatises. In 
 the other case, the conclusions of the second 
 Critique have been thought inconsistent Tpith those 
 of the first; and attempts have been made to 
 overthrow the practical doctrines by an appeal to 
 the speculative conclusions of Kant. In this way a 
 difference has arisen between two schools of thought, 
 both of which claim a Kantian justification. The 
 so-called philosophers of the Absolute, Pichte, 
 Schelling, and Hegel, represent the first of these 
 interpretations ; and the critical sceptics, like 
 Schulze and Maimon, represent the second. At 
 the present time these two classes still exist, and 
 the watchword of both is " Back to Kant." There 
 are those who maintain that to go back to Kant 
 is to go back also to the successors of Kant, who 
 are thought to be the philosophers of the Absolute. 
 But there are also those who recommend a return 
 to Kant, because they believe that the philosophers 
 of the Absolute do not exhibit a faithful develop- 
 
 1 Kant, VI. 114. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 279 
 
 ment of the Kantian principles. In few cases is it 
 urged that there should be a return to the results 
 of both the speculative and the practical philosophy 
 of Kant, and that his philosophy should be adopted 
 as he left it. Indeed if the critical method were 
 applied to Kant's practical philosophy, it might be 
 shown that there is a dogmatism in the latter, equal 
 to the dogmatism against which Kant primarily 
 rebelled. And if Kant himself could know the 
 results of his revolution in philosophy, as these 
 appear in the systems of the Absolute, he would 
 no doubt conclude that much of his labor had 
 been in vain. 
 
 There has, perhaps, been undue emphasis laid, 
 especially in England and America, upon the rela- 
 tion between the Critical and the Absolute philoso- 
 phy, and a tendency to regard the latter as an 
 inevitable and logical result of the former. This 
 misapprehension has not been shared, and has been 
 partially corrected by some of the leading historians 
 of philosophy in Grermany. It has been demon- 
 strated, for example, that Lessing, Herder, and 
 Jacobi were not without considerable influence on 
 Post-Kantian thought. It will be admitted that 
 there is as much of Plato as of Kant in the specu- 
 lations of Hegel. But almost as conspicuous as 
 the effect of Kant has been that of Spinoza on all 
 later German philosophy. This is evident, not 
 only in the unity of principles from which these 
 systems set out, but also in many points of method, 
 and in the prominence of the ethical element. 
 Much of this may be the result of tradition, descend- 
 
280 THEORIES OF THE WII.Ii 
 
 ing through Kant or apart from Kant, from the 
 earlier German dogmatism. But in spite of the 
 fact that Pichte is looked upon as an able opponent 
 of Spinoza's philosophy, it is not too much to say- 
 that the influence of the latter is as evident in 
 Die Wissenschaftslehre, as is that of Hume in 
 the Critique of Pure Reason. The indebtedness 
 of Schelling to Spinoza,' especially in the late period 
 of the former's career, is well kno^vn ; and it is not 
 without reason that Hegel regarded acquaintance 
 with Spinoza as requisite for the pursuit of philos- 
 ophy at all. That which differentiates these later 
 systems from the system of Spinoza is, however, 
 the emphasis laid upon the principle of evolution; 
 and this, it must be admitted, is altogether foreign 
 to the latter's conception of the universe. Instead 
 of a statical system founded on the doctrine of 
 substance, attributes, and modes, we find now a 
 dynamic philosophy, developed from a principle 
 which is active and essentially changing. It is a 
 process, not a mere subsistence. The Ding an sich, 
 which Kant had declared to be unknown, becomes 
 the first principle of philosophy in the systems of 
 his successors. It is this which is the principle of 
 principles in the systems of Fichte, Schelling, and 
 Hegel. 
 
 Fichte. 
 
 The first principle of the philosophy of Fichte is 
 a postulate or requirement ; it is not a hypothesis, 
 
 I On the contrast between Schelling and Spinoza, see Schell- 
 ing, Werke, I. vii. 348, 349. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 281 
 
 nor an assumption, nor a datum of experience. It 
 is not the result of observation or of proof. It is 
 the affirmation or position of the active Ego ; and 
 to affirm or posit the Ego is to become conscious of 
 myself. The first principle of the Wissenschafts- 
 lehre is not objective, but subjective, and as sub- 
 jective principle it is known not by sensible, but by 
 intellectual intuition. This is the Kantian Ding an 
 sich. It belongs, not to the sensible, but to the 
 intelligible world, and so the intuition by means of 
 which it is known is intellectual. 
 
 I. The Ego and the Non-Ego. Through the 
 positing or affirmation of the Ego, self -consciousness 
 arises ; the activity of the Ego is self -consciousness. 
 The activity and the self-consciousness go together, 
 and the cause of both is the will. Will is therefore 
 logically antecedent to knowledge. The activity of 
 the Ego, by which it is required to be self-conscious, 
 is voluntary activity. The beginning, middle, and 
 end of Fichte's system is the free activity of the 
 Ego. This activity is called Tliathandlung, which 
 means, literally, an activity which performs a deed.' 
 In the philosophy of Kant, a world of things 
 (Dinge a« sich) was affirmed as the limit of the 
 phenomenal universe, and in these was found the 
 reason (Orund) of all phenomena. In the phi- 
 losophy of Eiehte, the world of self-consciousness is 
 the only world ; it is the world of experience, and 
 as experience it proceeds from the Tliathandlung of 
 the Ego. The Ego corresponds to the practical 
 reason in the philosophy of Kant. The Ego is a 
 
 1 Fichte, I. 91. 
 
282 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 practical principle, and is theoretical only in so far 
 as it is practical. As subject, the Ego may be 
 regarded either as knowing or as active; as that 
 which knows, it is active intelligence, and as that 
 which does, it is active will. But both theory and 
 practice are the objects, not of two sciences, but of 
 one. 
 
 The Ego not only posits or af&rms itself, it also 
 posits or aifirms a Non-Ego, which is simply its 
 opposite. Without the Ego, there would be no 
 Non-Ego. The Non-Ego is, because the Ego is. 
 The Non-Ego is not Ding an sich, but has the 
 ground and origin of its being in the Ego. Daher 
 ist der Satz ; ohne Ich kein Nicht-Ich, gleich dem 
 Satze; das Ich setzt ein Nicht-Ich. The position 
 or affirmation of the Non-Ego is the affirmation of 
 the objective world, through the Thathandlung of 
 the Ego.^ 
 
 The Ego not only posits itself, and posits the 
 Non-Ego, but it also posits the reciprocal limitation 
 of Ego and Non-Ego. These are not to be con- 
 ceived of as two opposing principles, for there is no 
 dualism in Eichte's philosophy. The limitation of 
 the Ego by the Non-Ego to a certain extent cancels 
 or removes the activity of Ego, and this is know- 
 ledge of the objective world. The limitation of the 
 Non-Ego by the Ego is an overcoming of this limita- 
 tion, and corresponds to free action. This distinction 
 corresponds also to that between theoretical and prac- 
 tical philosophy. Neither of these processes takes 
 place alone. There is no activity of the Ego 
 
 1 Cf. Ficlite, Werke, I. 276. 
 
IN GEBMAN PHILOSOPHY 283 
 
 ■without passivity (Leiden), and no passivity without 
 activity. The objective activity results in passion 
 or affection, and this is known intuitively. It is 
 an intuition of the impossibility of the opposing 
 activity. It is a feeling of compulsion which is 
 represented to the imagination as compulsion, and 
 this is necessity: wird im Verstande fixirt als 
 Nothwendigkeit. In contrast to this activity which 
 is conditioned by passive affection, is free activity, 
 which may be presented to the imagination as an 
 alternation or hesitation (Schweben) between the 
 performance of one and the same action; and in 
 the understanding, this is possibility. Both species 
 of activity are joined in one synthesis; free activity 
 determines itself to self -affection, and freedom arises 
 from compulsion. Freedom in this sense is not 
 mere activity in vacuo, but is activity as a conse- 
 quence or concomitant of the compulsion exercised 
 by the Non-Ego upon the Ego in the process of 
 limitation.* The Ego, however, is independent, 
 and everything else depends upon it. The essence 
 of the Ego is in its activity, and this activity is 
 constitutive, not regulative.' Just as the source of 
 the influence of the Non-Ego on the Ego is to be 
 found in the latter, so there would be no activity 
 manifested in the latter without the former.' Thus 
 the causality of the Non-Ego does not consist in ac- 
 tion ( Wirkung) but in interaction ( Wechsehmrkung). 
 The original activity of the Ego is not determined 
 from without, nor are its inclinations and impulses 
 determined by the Non-Ego. In all its activity it 
 1 FicUte, I. 238 f . 276. » Id. I. 272. » Id. I. 239. 
 
284 THEORIES OP THE WILL 
 
 is spontaneous, and all the objects of its feelings 
 and inclinations are posited by itself. But freedom 
 and spontaneity are not the same. Before there 
 can be freedom there must be limitation; and the 
 process is endless — the limitation of the Ego by 
 the Non-Ego, and the ceaseless endeavor of the Ego 
 towards freedom, which is its ethical goal. 
 
 The force of the Ego is an object of feeling. The 
 feeling of force (Kraftgefuhl) is the principle of all 
 life. It is the transition from death to life. Force 
 is felt as impulsire (treibendes), but this impulse is 
 without causality upon the Ego ; it may furnish an 
 object for the exercise of free activity, but does not 
 itself originate any activity. This is a sufficient 
 statement of Eichte's general theory of the motive. 
 It is deduced from his doctrine of the relation 
 between the Ego and the Non-Ego. The motive 
 does not determine the free activity of the Ego ; it 
 is only feeling without self-consciousness. And 
 just as the Non-Ego is necessary to the exercise of 
 the free activity of the Ego, so, in order to volition, 
 there must be a presentation of the object of volition. 
 The two are in necessary reciprocity.* 
 
 II. The Will and Freedom. While Eichte some- 
 times refers to several faculties in the soul, he 
 regards it as unphilosophical to hold that the 
 Ego differs from its act and its product (seine That 
 und sein Product). It is not a substratum in which 
 activity as a mere faculty resides. The Ego is not 
 something which has a faculty ; it is itself not a 
 faculty, but an active, acting being: Das Ich ist 
 1 Fichte, I. 296, 372. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHT 285 
 
 nicht etwas das Vermogen hat, es ist ilberhaupt 
 kein Vermogen, sondern es ist handelnd ; es ist was 
 es handelt, und -wenn es nicht handelt, so ist es 
 nichts.' The will is, therefore, not a faculty of the 
 Ego, but is the Ego itself exercising its free activity ; 
 it is not in the Ego, but is a way in which the Ego 
 acts. In another way this relation is expressed by 
 Fichte, when he says that there are two manifes- 
 tations of substance: thought and will. "I find 
 myself as myself, only willing" (Ich finde mich 
 selbst als mich selbst, nur wollend).* This means 
 that I consider myself as one with the object 
 known; it is assumed that it is known what 
 volition means, and the volition is known through 
 the intellectual intuition. I am conscious of will- 
 ing, and this consciousness is immediately and 
 simultaneously related to a substance, which sub- 
 stance I am. The manifestation which alone I 
 originally ascribe to myself is volition. It is only 
 under the condition that I become conscious to 
 myself of it as such, that I am conscious of myself. 
 The volition is not an ideal activity; it is a real 
 self-determination of one's self through one's self. 
 Thus the expression "find myself" is equivalent 
 to "find myself willing." WhUe in philosophi- 
 cal abstraction, we may speak of will or volition in 
 general, in observation it is always singular and 
 determinate; it is the willing of some particular 
 object. An object of the Non-Ego is always pos- 
 tulated in all volition. But will in general, as this 
 abstraction, must be distinguished from the individ- 
 
 1 Fichte, III. 22. » Id. IV. 19. 
 
286 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 ual will, which is called Wollen} In general it is 
 characteristic of Fichte's teaching to emphasize the 
 supremacy of the will. It alone is said to be the 
 original expression of the reason. It is that which 
 effects the representation of the infinite in the 
 finite Ego. In positing myself as active, I posit a 
 determinate activity. More specifically it is the 
 will which has immediate causality in reference to 
 the body ; not that it directly creates the body, but 
 that it uses the body as an instrument.'' But the 
 relation of knowledge to volition is of such a kind, 
 that the former is necessary to the latter ; for the 
 volition is not volition in general, but, as has been 
 said already, volition (TFoZfe?i) and presentation 
 (Vorstellung) go together.' 
 
 From Fichte's teaching concerning the act of 
 will, it is easy to anticipate his theory of freedom. 
 Objectively considered, all being is necessary being, 
 and is not thought as the product of freedom. 
 But being must itself have proceeded from 
 thought ; and thought is the product of free activity. 
 Fichte refers with approval to Kant's statement, 
 that freedom is the power absolutely to begin a 
 new condition of things. But the doctrine of the 
 Wissenschaftslehre is necessary to explain this 
 beginning. For this shows how the Ego posits itself 
 as free activity. In positing myself as active, I 
 posit myself as rational, and in positing myself as 
 rational, I posit myself as free. The conception 
 of freedom involves before all, only the faculty of 
 
 1 Fichte, IV. 23-25. » Id. III. 21. 
 
 2 Id. IV. Voryede. x. and H. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 287 
 
 projecting conceptions of our possible activity, 
 through, absolute spontaneity : — 
 
 Im Begriffe der Freiheit liegt zuvorderst nur das Vermogen 
 duroh absolute Spontaneitat Begriffe von unserer moglicher 
 Wirksamkeit zu entwerfen ; und nur dieses blosse VennBgen 
 schreiben vernunftige Wesen einander mit Nothwendig- 
 keit zu.i 
 
 The Ego thinks itself as free, and thinks this 
 necessarily. Preedom is the only true being, and 
 is the basis of all other being. Belief in the sub- 
 jective validity of the phenomenon of freedom is 
 derived from the Thathandlung of the Ego. Belief 
 in the objective validity of the phenomenon of 
 Freedom is deduced from the consciousness of the 
 moral law. 
 
 I am really free, is said to be the first article of 
 belief which makes a transition to the intelligible 
 world possible, and offers a firm place to stand. 
 Doing is not the second idea, and being the first ; 
 but doing is the first, and being the second." For I 
 am conscious of myself as an independent free being. 
 This is not an inference from effects, but is imme- 
 diate. This fact is established in spite of the sub- 
 jection of nature to determining causes. Indecision 
 is the war of opposing forces; while it is of the 
 essence of freedom, not to he decided, but to decide. 
 I am therefore the author of my own thought, and 
 am free.' The difference between freedom and the 
 general spontaneity of the mind is carefully drawn 
 by Fichte when he says: Ein Act des Geistes, 
 
 1 Fichte, m. 8. 2 m, IV. 54 f. a Id. II. 187. 
 
288 THEOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 dessen wir uns als eines solchen bewusst -werden, 
 heisst Freiheit. Ein Act ohne Bewusstsein des 
 Handelns, blosse Spontaneitat. The freedom of 
 the will is freedom from mechanical necessity of 
 any kind ; and it is limited only by the content 
 of the volition.^ 
 
 While Fichte reiterates the doctrine of indeter- 
 minism in a great variety of forms, he does not 
 find it necessary to argue at length in opposition 
 to the contrary theory. This is because his doc- 
 trine is deduced from the principles of his philoso- 
 phy ; and if the latter be accepted, the possibility of 
 a denial of freedom is eliminated. If the universe 
 is the result of a Thathandlung of the Ego, there is 
 nothing which can limit the Ego unless it be the 
 Ego itself ; and so determinism extrinsically consid- 
 ered is excluded, and the only determinism is the 
 determination of the Ego by itself, which is free- 
 dom. On the contrary, the self-dependence and 
 freedom of the Ego are not given empirically ; they 
 are abstractions independent of the conflict between 
 inclinations, desires, and impulses. 
 
 Considered practically, the conception of freedom 
 determines the moral imperative. And because 
 other men are free like myself, I should treat them 
 as if they were free, while my own body should be 
 used as a means to freedom. However the motives 
 may conflict, in the free act the opposition ceases 
 because they are united in the same thought. In 
 the free act one does not feel his own will, but 
 feels the limitation of activity and its successful 
 
 1 Fichte, II. 217. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 289 
 
 removal. In the series of natural phenomena, 
 every member can be explained by some antecedent 
 member; but in the volitional series no such ex- 
 planation is possible : Jedes ist ein erstes und abso- 
 lutes.^ In the one case there is the principle of 
 cause and effect; in the other, that of substance. 
 The last member of the natural series is impulse 
 {Trieh), but this is not a cause. The impulse or 
 inclination does not cause the particular volition. 
 The volition is effected by my force : meine Kraft. 
 Belief in determinism is ascribed to defective in- 
 tuition; and its advocates are only discursive 
 thinkers: man muss gegen sie nicht disputiren, 
 sondern man sollte sie cultiviren, wenn man 
 konnte." In short, the will is absolutely free ; and 
 to deny this is an absurdity : Kurz der Wille ist 
 schlechtin frei; und ein unfreier Wille ist ein 
 Unding.' 
 
 SCHBLLING 
 
 It is customary to distinguish three stages in the 
 development of Schelling's philosophy. These are 
 a manifestation partly of an inner process of evo- 
 lution, and partly of external influences. He did 
 not teach three systems of philosophy, but in each 
 period the same system is exhibited with different 
 modifications. In the philosophy of Fichte, the 
 conception of the will was transferred from the 
 narrower psychological and ethical territory which 
 it had occupied in some of the theories of an ear- 
 lier time; it was no longer regarded merely as a 
 1 Fiohte, IV. 134. « Id. IV. 136. » Id. IV. 159. 
 
290 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 faculty or as a phenomenon. In the philosophy of 
 Fichte, and in that of Schelling and Hegel, the 
 will is a first principle. The Ego of the Wissen- 
 schaftslelire is the equivalent of Kant's practical 
 reason; it is formal will. And there is some jus- 
 tice in Schopenhauer's claim to have been the most 
 faithful interpreter of the Kantian philosophy, in 
 so far as he identified the Ding an sich with will. 
 In the first period of his philosophical career, 
 Schelling takes his departure from the principles 
 of Fichte, but differs from Fichte in his view of 
 the development of intelligence out of nature. In 
 the second period, he identifies subject with object, 
 and finds their unity in the absolute, which is higher 
 than both. In the third period his philosophy is 
 modified in accordance with ideas taken from Plato, 
 Bohme the German mystic, and Aristotle. There 
 is a greater diiierence between the philosophy of 
 the second and that of the third period, than there 
 is between the philosophy of the first and that of 
 the second period. The doctrines of the absolute 
 and the identity of subject and object are contained 
 implicitly in the writings of the earliest part of his 
 literary activity. Up to the time of his excursion 
 into mysticism, the gradual composition of his 
 system illustrates in many ways the development 
 of German philosophy from the point where Kant 
 left it to the more elaborate discipline of Hegel. 
 
 In considering Schelling's theory of the will, it 
 is more convenient to disregard the above threefold 
 division, and to notice his teaching as it is con- 
 tained in the writings of the first period and of 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 291 
 
 the third : on the one hand, in his Philosophy of 
 Nature and Transcendental Idealism; on the other, 
 in his treatise on human freedom. 
 
 I 
 
 According to Schelling there are two funda- 
 mental sciences. One sets out from the idea of 
 nature, and seeks to explain the development of 
 consciousness or intelligence; the other sets out 
 from the idea of intelligence, and seeks to explain 
 nature. The first of these sciences is the Phi- 
 losophy of Nature; the second is the Transcen- 
 dental Idealism. It is chiefly in the second that 
 his earlier view of the will is presented. 
 
 Nature, according to Schelling, is not dead, but 
 only unconscious. It is not being, but becoming. 
 It is a process, the end of which is intelligence. 
 According to Fichte, the objective world was the 
 Non-Ego which was affirmed or posited by the Ego; 
 according to Schelling nature is unconscious spirit. 
 In distinguishing conscious and unconscious spirit, 
 Schelling shows the influence of Leibnitz, and pre- 
 pares the way for von Hartmann. Nature is an 
 activity, and has the potentiality of consciousness 
 within it. The realization of consciousness is the 
 goal of its evolution. While the lower processes 
 in this evolution are mechanical, the unity of nature 
 is to be found in a world-soul. There are two prin- 
 ciples of force in nature, one positive, the other 
 negative; one progressive, the other limitative. 
 The unity of both is a formative and organizing 
 principle which is called the world-soul : — 
 
292 THEOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 Diese 1)61(1611 streit6nd6n Krafte zugleich in der Elnheit 
 und im Conflikt vorgestellt, ftilir6ii auf die Idee eines organi- 
 sirenden, die Welt zum System bildenden Princips. Bin 
 solciies wollten vielleicM die Alten durch die Weltseele 
 andeiaten.i 
 
 When the natural process is manifested in life, 
 individuation is the result, and individual beings 
 or organisms are determined according to a telos, 
 and are not merely mechanical. The highest stage 
 in this evolution is reached with man; but it cannot 
 be explained, or is not explained, how intelligence 
 is evolved from the unconscious. The individuality 
 of man as Ego is superior to the stream of causes 
 and effects in nature.^ 
 
 The beginning of all philosophy, according to 
 Schelling, is the postulate that there is a produc- 
 tive Ego which is both subject and object of an 
 intellectual intuition. The Ego is the identity of 
 being and production; it is both process and prod- 
 uct. By free activity, Schelling does not here 
 mean free choice, but only the active process by 
 which the Ego comes to a knowledge of itself. As 
 productive of being, it is not a conscious, but a 
 blind, unconscious activity; and so we are theo- 
 retically coerced in appearance, by knowledge which 
 limits the Ego's activity. In the objective world 
 we see our free activity conditioned by objects ; but 
 it is the same activity which limits itself, and yet 
 is unlimited. The active Ego, then, is not deter- 
 mined except by itself; it is both bestimmbar and 
 bestimmt. The distinction implied here may be 
 1 SeheUing, I. ii. 381. 3 Id. I. ii. 17. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 293 
 
 otherwise expressed by saying that, as activity, 
 the Ego is undetermined, but as being, it is deter- 
 mined: — 
 
 Aber ein Werden lasst sich nicht denken als unter Beding- 
 ung einer Begrenzung. Man denke eine unendlicli produci- 
 rende Thatigkeit als sich ausbreitend ohne Widerstand, so 
 ■wird sie mit unendlicher Sohnelligkeit produciren, ihr Produkt 
 ist ein Sein, nioht eln Werden. Die Bedingung alles Werdens 
 also ist die Begrenzung oder die Sohranke. Aber das Ich 
 soil nicht nur ein Werden, es soil ein unendliches Werden 
 sein.i 
 
 The productive activity and the activity of the 
 product imply one another; and so idealism and 
 realism imply one another. Theoretical phi- 
 losophy is idealistic; practical philosophy is real- 
 istic. 
 
 Ideas or presentations (Vorstellungen) arise 
 within us, proceeding from the world of thought 
 into the world of reality. The productive source 
 of these is the active Ego, and its activity is mani- 
 fested in acts of will. All free activity is produc- 
 tive; and the objective world is product of free 
 activity." For the proper understanding of the 
 conceptions of philosophy two things are neces- 
 sary : first, that we should be the productive causes 
 of presentations [Vorstellungen); and, second, that 
 we should be both the subject and the object of 
 the intuition (Anschauung) . Nothing can be predi- 
 cated of the Ego per se, excepting activity, which 
 is manifested as self-consciousness. And it is only 
 through a particular act of freedom that the Ego 
 1 SchelUng, I. lU. 383. » Id. I. m. 3i8. 
 
294 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 becomes the object of consciousness. An original 
 underired knowledge of the Ego is impossible, — 
 it is not an inference, nor demonstration, but an 
 intuition. It is an intellectual intuition, because 
 the Ego is at once the subject and the object of the 
 intuition : — 
 
 Die intellektuelle Anschauung ist das Organ alles tran- 
 soendentalen Denkens. Denn das transoendentale Denken 
 geht eben darauf, sich durch Freiheit zum Objekt zu 
 machen, was sonst nioht Objekt ist.^ 
 
 The intellectual intuition presents the Ego to us 
 as productive of itself as object, and is a free act. 
 The Ego, as both subject and object of an intel- 
 lectual intuition, is the principle from which one 
 must proceed in the transcendental philosophy. 
 
 In the Transcendental Idealism this process is 
 reversed, and the problem is to explain the produc- 
 tion of the object by the subject. In the Philoso- 
 phy of Nature, the first principle was the Non-Ego, 
 out of which the self-conscious Ego was supposed 
 to proceed; in the Transcendental Idealism, the 
 first principle, as in Fichte's philosophy, is the 
 Ego, the productive activity of which is manifested 
 in the objective world. In the Philosophy of Nat- 
 ure, certain problems were suggested, but were not 
 solved: whence is man, what is he, and what is 
 his meaning? If, on the one hand, man is a prod- 
 uct of nature, on the other hand he is himself the 
 beginning of a series of causes, and this is not the 
 effect of natural causes. It is this view which 
 
 1 ScheUing, I. m. 369. See Fichte, 11. 33, 38. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHT 295 
 
 makes the Transcendental Idealism necessary as a 
 complement of the Philosophy of Nature. 
 
 Like Fichte, Schelling makes a distinction be- 
 tween matter and form, which has a bearing on 
 his theory of will. Matter is determined, but form 
 is free. But both matter and form are so related, 
 that, if one be taken away, the other is also removed 
 {aufgehoben). That is, the free process of the Ego's 
 activity goes on, and its product is the matter of 
 knowledge. The world of the productivity of the 
 Ego is free, but the product, the world produced, 
 is determined.^ 
 
 The Ego is not to be understood as being a thing 
 {Ding) ; it is productive activity. The product of 
 this activity is a thing; but the latter is the nega- 
 tion of free activity. Knowledge depends on the 
 agreement between the objective and the subjective ; 
 that which is objectively a product of the evolution 
 of nature is subjectively the result of the produc- 
 tive activity of the Ego. The productive activity 
 of the Ego begins outside of all space and time, 
 and so is not thought in the category of causality; 
 it is absolutely free. The principle of causality 
 is only a principle of the succession of ideas; for 
 there is no arbitrary succession : — 
 
 Alia Kategorien sind Handlungsweisen, durch welohe una 
 erst die Objekte selbst entstehen. Es gibt fur die Intelligenz 
 kein Objekt, wenn es kein Causalitatsverhaltniss gibt, und 
 dieses Verlialtniss ist eben desswegen von den Objekten 
 unzertrennllch.' 
 
 1 ScheUing, I. i. 347, 348. 
 
 2 Id. I. m. 471. 
 
296 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 This shows that the activity of the Ego is prior 
 to the principle of causality ; and while this activity 
 is limited by the production of the object, and while 
 the object has a causal effect upon the activity of 
 the Ego, and limits it, the source of the causality, 
 like the source of the free activity, lies in the Ego 
 itself, and so there is no determination of the 
 transcendental will. 
 
 The beginning of consciousness can only be ex- 
 plained as self-determination, that is, as an act of 
 the intelligence upon itself. This self-determina- 
 tion is called volition, in the most general meaning 
 of the term : — 
 
 . . . eine Handlung, wodurch die Intelligenz sich selbst 
 bestimmt, ist ein Handeln auf sich selbst . . . Jenes 
 Selbstbestimmen der Intelligenz heisst WoUen in der allge- 
 meinsten Bedeutung des Worts.^ 
 
 In this act there is a combination of will as such, 
 in its free activity, and the will to effect a possible 
 object. It is the free Ego which determines the 
 object and the will towards the object. In pro- 
 ductive activity there was opposition between that 
 process and its product; in volition there is har- 
 mony, in that there is idealizing intelligence on the 
 one hand through freedom, and realizing intelli- 
 gence on the other hand through the product.' 
 The free act of the productive Ego is not itself 
 volition, but simply furnishes the object of volition. 
 Mere activity is not the willing of anything; and 
 in order to free volition, an object must be presented 
 » Schelling, I. m. 533. ^ Id. I. m. 546. 
 
IN GEKMAN PHILOSOPHY 297 
 
 as an occasion of volition. There is an object, and 
 an impulse towards an object, and the realization 
 of the impulse is volition. The activity of the 
 Ego is infinite, but a finite object is presented, 
 ■which serves as a point of departure for the vol- 
 untary act. There is a harmony preestablished 
 between the ideal and the real, for this is not the 
 effect of interaction: — 
 
 indem jenes von diesem und dieses von jenem so getrennt 
 ist, dass gar kein weohselseitiger Einfluss beider auf einander 
 mSglioh ware, wenn nieht duroh etwas ausser beiden Leigen- 
 des eine Uebereinstimmung zwisohen beiden gestif tet ware, i 
 
 Thus, as in the philosophy of Fichte, objects are 
 eternally presented to the free activity of the Ego, 
 which is so far limited by them ; yet by virtue of 
 its freedom it conditions these objects by which it 
 is itself only relatively conditioned. Eree will in 
 the individual is only a phenomenon of the abso- 
 lute will: — 
 
 also ist die Willktir die von uns gesuohte Ersoheinung des 
 absoluten Willens, nioht das ursprungliclie WoUen selbst, 
 sondern der zum Objekt gewordene absolute Ereiheitsakt, 
 mit welohem alles Bewusstein beginnt.* 
 
 It is evident that in Schelling's earlier phi- 
 losophy there is very little if any advance upon 
 the position occupied by Fichte. While the Phi- 
 losophy of Nature contains some elements which 
 did not enter into Fichte's purely subjective 
 idealism, the position of Schelling seems less logi- 
 
 1 ScheUing, I. m. 579, 580. » Id. I. ui. 576. 
 
298 THEOBIES OF THE WILL 
 
 cal and satisfactory than that of his predecessor. 
 Even assuming that the Philosophy of Nature 
 has successfully explained the evolution of con- 
 sciousness, and that the activity of the Ego has 
 successfully accounted for the presentation of an 
 object, the relation between the two points of view 
 is left in some obscurity. If the question be raised, 
 what is the ultimate relation between the uncon- 
 scious nature, from which we set out, and the un- 
 conscious Ego which freely produces the objective 
 world, only two answers seem possible : either sub- 
 ject must be derived from object and object from 
 subject, in an endless circle, or else their unity 
 must lie in some principle above them both. The 
 latter answer seems to be implied in the writings 
 of Schelling's first period, in which nature has its 
 unity in a Weltseele, and is productive of a con- 
 scious Ego. But in the writings of the second 
 period, the problem of the relation of the two 
 principles is solved by finding the identity of sub- 
 ject and object in the absolute. This part of 
 Schelling's system has great significance in the 
 general history of philosophy. In so far as the 
 theory of the will is concerned, it raises for con- 
 sideration some questions which did not occur to 
 Fichte, but which are discussed by Schelling in 
 the writings of his latest period. Just as Kant 
 left insufficiently explained the relation between 
 his theoretical and practical philosophy, so the 
 writings of Schelling's first period leave unex- 
 plained the relation of the Philosophy of Nature 
 to the Transcendental Idealism. But he does not 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 299 
 
 commit this explaiiation to his successors, and so 
 enters himself a region where it is difficult to 
 follow him. 
 
 II 
 
 Without discussing specially the doctrines of the 
 second period of Schelling's philosophical develop- 
 ment, I shall pass directly to the consideration of 
 the doctrine of the will contained in his treatise on 
 the Essence of Human Freedom (PliilosopJiische 
 Untersuchungen iiiier das Wesen der menschlichen 
 Fn-eiheit), which belongs to what has been some- 
 times called thei mystical period in the development 
 of his system. In his identity-philosophy he had 
 reached the unity of subject and object in a prin- 
 ciple which is the identity of both. Setting out 
 from this pantheism, his aim is to avoid the con- 
 clusion that God, the Absolute, is the cause of evil ; 
 and so he is led to explain the nature of freedom 
 and necessity, and the relation of the human will 
 to God. In the philosophy of identity, he showed 
 that the first principle of the universe is one ; in 
 the treatise just mentioned, he seeks to show that 
 the first principle of the universe is free. He is 
 more polemical in manner in this very interesting 
 work than in any of his other formal treatises. 
 While he adopts much from the philosophy of 
 Spinoza, he opposes many of his doctrines. He 
 finds fault with the doctrine of evil in the 7%^- 
 odicie of Leibnitz ; he criticises the subjective 
 idealism of Fichte. 
 
 According to Schelling, the opposition between 
 
300 THEORIES OF THE WHIi 
 
 necessity and freedom raises tlie inmost central 
 question of philosophy. Just as it had been shown 
 that the opposition between subject and object is 
 removed by the absolute identity of intelligence 
 and nature, so the opposition between freedom and 
 necessity is to be removed by showing their iden- 
 tity in the absolute. When it is said that God is 
 nature, or that freedom is necessity, the relation 
 between subject and predicate is that of antece- 
 dent and consequent, of implicitum and expUcitum; 
 and Schelling speaks severely of those who mis- 
 understand the significance of such propositions, 
 and draw absurd conclusions, as if subject and 
 predicate were exchangeable terms. He finds fault 
 also with those who maintain that the idea of free- 
 dom is incompatible with any systematic view of 
 the universe, and holds that it is only by defining 
 the term systematic incorrectly that freedom can be 
 excluded from such a consideration of philosophy.* 
 But he holds also that the will must be considered 
 from a point of view far wider than that of subjec- 
 tive idealism. The principle of the universe is not 
 the Ego nor the Non-Ego, but the absolute. He 
 would prefer to deny the existence of freedom to 
 affirming that only the Ego has will : — 
 
 Kiirzer oder entsoheidender ware, das System auch im 
 Wille oder Verstande des Urwesens zu leugnen ; zu sagen, 
 dass es liberhaupt nur einzelne Willen gebe, deren jeder 
 einen Mittelpunkt fur slcli ausmaclie, und naoh Fickte's 
 Ausdruok eines jeden loli die Absolut Substanz sei.'' 
 
 1 Schelling, I. vu. 336 £E. s Id. I. vii. 337. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 301 
 
 To solve the problem of the relation of freedom 
 to the system of the universe is the problem of 
 problems, and its solution is necessary if philosophy 
 is to have any value. But an opposition between 
 freedom and necessity is necessary : — 
 
 ohne den Widerspruoh von Nothwendigkeit und Freiheit 
 wUrde nicM Philosophie allein, sondem jedes hShere WoUen 
 des Geistes in den Tod versinken, der jenen Wissenschaften 
 eigen ist, in welohen er keine Anwendung hat.' 
 
 The problem is one from which Schelling does 
 not shrink; and he finds it as absurd to deny neces- 
 sity as to deny freedom. If it be said that panthe- 
 ism is necessarily fatalistic, Schelling is ready with 
 a denial. Yet by freedom we do not mean an abso- 
 lute power which in man is equal to that of God. 
 Infinite power extinguishes all lesser powers, as 
 the sun puts out the light of the stars. If absolute 
 causality be predicated of any one being, then all 
 other beings must be passive. It is here that it is 
 difiicult to prove the reality of freedom. But the 
 difficulty may be avoided if it be affirmed that man 
 exists, not outside of God, but in God: dass der 
 Mensch nicht ausser Gott, sondem in Gott sei, und 
 dass seine Thatigkeit selbst mit zum Leben Gottes 
 gehore.* 
 
 If it can be shown that such a view of man's 
 relation to God is in harmony with the possibility 
 of freedom, and if most men have a firm belief in 
 the reality of freedom, it may, Schelling thinks, be 
 said that such a solution is probably true. God 
 
 1 Schelling, I. vn. 338. « Id. I. vn. 339. 
 
302 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 according to his nature is eternal, and the indi- 
 vidual things exist only in so far as he exists, as 
 a consequence of his being. But things proceed 
 out of God, as the result of his self -revelation ; 
 they thus have a life and character of their own. 
 And man, as a manifestation of God, is God's repre- 
 sentative. The pantheism of Schelling differs from 
 that of Spinoza. The latter was realistic, while 
 that of Schelling is idealistic. The absolute of 
 Schelling is the God of Spinoza endowed with life 
 and energy: der Spinozische Grundbegriff, durch 
 das Princip des Idealismus vergeistert.^ The rela- 
 tion of things to God is of such a kind that their 
 very relationship involves their endowment with 
 life and freedom; for God is not the God of the 
 dead, but of the living. Individual freedom is 
 related to universal necessity as the eye is to the 
 rest of the organism. While the eye would not 
 exist without the rest of the organism, yet it has 
 a certain function and mobility of its own. The 
 relation of the human will to that of God is not 
 mechanical: wobei das Bewirkte nichts fur sich 
 selbst ist." God reveals himself in man, and man 
 must therefore resemble God. The individual man 
 is a derived absolute ; and this brings out an essen- 
 tial point in Schelling's theory. Immanence in 
 God and freedom are not contradictory. Only that 
 which is free, and in so far as it is free, is in God ; 
 and that which is not free, in so far as it is not 
 free, is necessarily outside of God : — 
 
 1 Schelling, I. vii. 350. 
 
 2 Id. I. vu. 347. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 303 
 
 So wenig widerspricht sich Immanenz in Gott und Frei- 
 heit, dass gerade nui das Freie, und soweit es frei ist, in 
 Gott ist, das Unfreie, und soweit es unfrei ist, notliwendig 
 ausser Gott.^ 
 
 The mechanical law of causality has no appli- 
 cation to that which exists in God. By his 
 idealistic pantheism, Schelling seeks to avoid the 
 determinism of Spinoza. The first principle of 
 Spinoza is a Ding, and all things in his system are 
 governed mechanically; but his pantheism is not 
 held responsible for this : — 
 
 Dieses System ist nioht Fatalismus, well es die Dinge in 
 Gott begriffen sein ISsst ; denn, wie wir gezeigt haben, der 
 Pantlieismus macht wenigstens die formelle Freiheit nicht 
 unmSglieh ; Spinoza muss also aus einem ganz andern und 
 von jenem unabhftngigen Grund Fatalist sein.'^ 
 
 The reality of freedom is an ultimate reality; for 
 ultimate being is nothing else than will : es gibt in 
 der letzten und hoohsten Instanz gar kein anderes 
 Sein als WoUen.' 
 
 Schelling proceeds to consider freedom in a more 
 special sense. According to him there is no liberty 
 of indifference. To suppose that freedom consists 
 in an equilibrium between two alternate courses of 
 action, so that there is equal inclination towards 
 either, and a possibility of free decision in favor 
 of one, is absurd. The problem of the Asinus 
 Buridani presupposes an impossible condition of 
 things. There is no exercise of volition without 
 
 1 Schelling, I. vii. 347. « Id. I. vn. 349. » Id. I. vn. 350. 
 
304 THEOEIES OF THE WILI. 
 
 some reason; and to suppose that there is liberty 
 of indifference is to suppose that the will in order 
 to be free must be irrational. It makes free voli- 
 tion equivalent to chance volition : — 
 
 Zufall aber ist unmoglich, widerstreitet der Vernunft wie 
 der nothwendigen Einhelt des Ganzen ; imd wenn Freilieit 
 nlcht anders als mit der ganzliohen Zuf aUigkeit der Hand- 
 lungen zu retten ist, so ist sie iiberhaupt nioht zu retten.i 
 
 But if freedom in such a sense is to be rejected, 
 so also, according to Schelling, is determinism to 
 be rejected, which regards all volitions as the 
 product of necessary causes. The mistake which 
 men have made is in supposing that only one of 
 these alternatives can be true, and in neglecting 
 that higher unity of necessity and freedom with 
 which Schelling's treatise is concerned. If the 
 will be determined at all, it must be necessarily 
 determined, and the modification of the theory of 
 necessity in the philosophy of Leibnitz is not jus- 
 tifiable. It is idealism which saves us from either 
 of these extreme conclusions. According to tran- 
 scendental and absolute idealism, the intelligible 
 essence of man is outside of time and beyond the 
 series of causes and effects : — 
 
 Das intelligibile Wesen jedes Dings, und vorzilglioh des 
 Menschen, ist diesem zufolge ausser allem Causalzusam- 
 menhang, wie ausser oder fiber aller Zeit." 
 
 Man's volition is determined by nothing which 
 goes before, and it makes all that follows it possible. 
 1 Schelling, I. vn. 383. a Id., lb. 383. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 305 
 
 The act of the will is free, because it has its origin 
 in the intelligible being of man, and proceeds from 
 it. It is determined only in so far as the nature 
 of the subject which wills determines it. This 
 determination is not effected by external causes, 
 nor through the inclination of the will by causes, 
 but by the essence or being (TFesen) to which the 
 will belongs. If it be said, however, that it is 
 determined by the nature from which it proceeds, 
 and yet that this nature is undetermined, it is 
 difficult to see wherein we have avoided the ab- 
 surdity of the liberty of indifference to which 
 Schelling has called attention. If it be held that 
 the free will of the intelligible essence acts with- 
 out a motive, then the free will must be indifferent, 
 which has been denied. Schelling replies that the 
 reconciliation of the determination and indeter- 
 mination of the will lies in the fact that it is the 
 very nature of the being which determines the will 
 to be itself indetermined. The result is deter- 
 mined, but the cause is not determined : — 
 
 Es ist ja kein bestimmtes AUgemeines sondem bestimmt 
 das intelligibile Wesen dieses Menschen ; von einer solchen 
 Bestimmtheit gilt der Spruch determinatio est negatio.^ 
 
 No matter how freely the intelligible nature may 
 act, it must act in accordance with its own nature ; 
 and so such action, although absolutely necessary, 
 is a manifestation of the highest freedom. 
 
 In this way, then, Schelling seeks to avoid the 
 absurdities of chance, and yet to save the freedom 
 
 1 Schelling, I. vn. 384. 
 
306 THEORIES OP THE WIH 
 
 of the will. It may be asked, •wherein lies this inner 
 necessity? If the intelligible essence were lifeless 
 being {todtes Sein), and the action were mechani- 
 cally produced, there would be an end of freedom ; 
 for the cause of the act would be external. But 
 the inner necessity is itself freedom. Necessity 
 and freedom are thus two aspects of one and the 
 same thing. As Fichte said : — 
 
 Das Ich ist seine eigne That. Bewusstsein ist Selbstsetzen 
 aber das Ich ist nichts von diesem verschiedenes, sondern 
 ehen das Selbstsetzen selber.^ 
 
 Intelligible being, then, is primitive volition. 
 The will is Ursein; and intelligible being is Ur-und 
 Gi-undwollen. Man determines himself, and the de- 
 termination happens before time, and not in time; 
 for man, although born in time, was created from 
 the beginning. As a product of nature, and as 
 existing in God, the life of man reaches back to 
 eternity; and man is from the beginning indeter- 
 mined.^ The conclusion from this is that when a 
 man is good, he is good not arbitrarily, but from 
 the necessity of his nature; and when he is bad, 
 he is bad not arbitrarily, or by chance, but from 
 the necessity of his nature. This does not mean 
 that he is good or bad against his will, but that he 
 wills the good or the bad because he is either good 
 or bad. Judas Iscariot betrayed his Master, but 
 no creature could have prevented him from willing 
 this act of treason. And yet he was not coerced, 
 but acted according to his inclination. The good 
 1 Sehelling, I. vn. 386. 2 Id., ib. 
 
IN GEEMAN PHILOSOPHY 307 
 
 man is not forced to be good, but even tbe gates of 
 hell cannot prevail to make him bad. The volun- 
 tary act does not perform itself; it is performed 
 by the man, and if performed by him, he is to 
 blame, or he has the merit of the act. He knows 
 also that he is accountable. Schelling supports this 
 conclusion by calling attention to the early manifes- 
 tation of character, so that even in infancy a certain 
 bias in a bad direction may be observed, without 
 any deliberate volition. 
 
 Schelling therefore agrees with Fichte in holding 
 that the will is not determined, but self-determined. 
 As to the origin of the character which determines 
 the will, he is scarcely less mystical or mythical 
 in his treatment than Plato. As has been already 
 shown, Plato accounted for character by supposing 
 that man had freely chosen his own destiny in a 
 preSxistent state. Schelling holds that the fault of 
 those who have taught the doctrine of predestina- 
 tion has been that they attributed the evil in the 
 world and in man to a decree of God in time, and 
 did not perceive that before time there was no 
 succession, but that man was born from all eter- 
 nity, and that his character had no beginning in 
 time. The determination of the wills of men is 
 not the effect of a special decree or act of God; but 
 this determination is the effect of their eternally 
 predestinated characters. As man acts here, so he 
 has acted from all eternity. Tor these reasons, no 
 choice more free could be demanded than that which 
 now belongs to man. 
 
 If it be further asked why some men necessarily 
 
308 THEOKIES OF THE WILL 
 
 determine themselves to will what is bad, and some 
 to will what is good, we have one of the riddles of 
 the universe suggested. Not content with the bold 
 attempt to harmonize necessity and freedom, Schel- 
 ling proceeds to grapple with the question of the 
 origin of evil. It would carry this exposition too 
 far away from the subject were I to enter into any 
 detailed consideration of this doctrine of Schel- 
 ling's philosophy, which is a remarkable speculative 
 achievement. Schelling himself regarded the prob- 
 lem of evil as the most difficult problem connected 
 with the doctrine of freedom. Having shown that 
 all things exist in God, he must now show that 
 God is not the cause of evil. He rejects the 
 optimism of Leibnitz, and draws a distinction 
 between existence and the ground of existence. It 
 is evident that God cannot be altogether viewed in 
 this twofold way ; for, as has already been shown, 
 all things exist in God, and the existence and the 
 ground of existence must therefore be included in 
 God. The ground (Grund) of the existence of God 
 is in absolute nature. Nature and God are in- 
 separable, but are distinguishable. There is a 
 circle in the principle of God and nature; that 
 which is produced produces the producer. The 
 ground of God's existence is not God as God, but 
 is in that which exists eternally with him. The 
 ground of God's existence is in the desire (Sehn- 
 sucht) which the Absolute has to beget himself. 
 And this Sehnsucht is to be interpreted as will. 
 Will is therefore the eternal principle of the uni- 
 verse and of God : — 
 
IN GEKMAN PHILOSOPHY 309 
 
 Der erste Anfang der Schopfung ist die Sehnsuoht des 
 Einen, sioh selbst zu gebaren, oder der Wille des Grundes.i 
 
 Following the longing of the One to beget itself, 
 is the second beginning of creation, which is the 
 will of love, by means of which God makes himself 
 a person. The first kind of will is not free in the 
 same sense in which the second is free. Tor the 
 first will {Der Wille des Grundes) is unconscious 
 and blind, and proceeds according to natural neces- 
 sity. The revelation of the second will is act and 
 deed (Handlung und That). In God is the union 
 of all living forces, and man is a part of this union 
 in so far as he remains good; but so soon as he falls 
 from this equilibrium of forces in the divine being, 
 and makes his own will the principle of his action, 
 then he becomes bad, and is in darkness. Where 
 God is, there is light. 
 
 This theory of the origin of evil was the occa- 
 sion of a letter written by Eschenmayer (1810), 
 in which he opposed Schelling's idea of God, to 
 which Schelling wrote a reply. Some years later 
 he found that in the development of his philosophy 
 he had made the idea of freedom less prominent 
 than he had at first desired, and he published his 
 treatise Ueber die Natur der PJiilosophie als Wis- 
 senscJiaft. In this he seeks to remove the contra- 
 diction between freedom and necessity by a species 
 of mysticism. The apparent contradiction between 
 the two is said to be removed by the soul rising in 
 ecstasy to a view of the union and harmony of the 
 two conceptions. 
 
 J Schelling, I. vii. 396. 
 
310 theories of the will 
 
 Hegel 
 
 The connection is very close between the general 
 principles of Hegel's philosophy and his doctrine 
 of the will. The will is explained in a statement at 
 the beginning of the Philosophie des Rechts ; but 
 the principles from which this statement proceeds, 
 and on which it depends, are found in the theo- 
 retical part of his system. For this reason I shall 
 notice, first, his idea of the Absolute ; second, his 
 theory of subjective and objective spirit, including 
 his view of the will in relation to the principles of 
 freedom and necessity. 
 
 I. The Absolute. Philosophy is defined as the 
 science of the absolute. The absolute is not sub- 
 ject alone, as in the philosophy of Fichte ; it is not 
 nature alone, nor God as distinguished from the 
 world. It is not the mere identity of subject and 
 object. It is best defined as spirit; it is also ab- 
 solute subject, an all-embracing principle, the first 
 principle of all thought and of all philosophy : — 
 
 diejenige Eegion, worin alle Rathsel der Welt gelost, alle 
 Widerspruche des tiefer sinnenden Gedankens enthilllt sind, 
 alle Sohmerzen des Gefiihls verstummen, die Region der ewi- 
 gen Walirheit, der ewigen Ruhe.i 
 
 On the one hand, the absolute is the negation of 
 all predicates ; on the other hand, it is the position 
 or afllrmation of all. It is therefore the most 
 formal contradiction {der formdlste Wider spruch)? 
 The absolute of Hegel differs radically from the 
 
 1 Hegel, XI. 3. i Id. XI. 179. 
 
IN GEKMAN PHILOSOPHY 311 
 
 God of Spinoza in that it is becoming as well as 
 being ; it differs from the Ego of Fichte in that it 
 is the identity and unity of subject and object ; it 
 differs from the absolute of Sohelling in that it is 
 not transcendent, but only immanent. Although it 
 is known by reflection, it is not known as a being 
 here and now, but as a becoming, a process, so that 
 the complete being of the absolute is a process and 
 a result (Besidtat). It is an evolution or develop- 
 ment, not in an infinite succession, but as a cycle of 
 self-movement (Selbstbewegung). The development 
 starts from the absolute an und fur sich ; this is the 
 first moment; the absolute as such is an implicit and 
 explicit principle. The second moment in the evo- 
 lution is the externalization of the absolute as nat- 
 ure (im Anderssein). The third moment is the 
 return of the absolute out of nature to itself, com- 
 pleting the cycle, and attaining to self-consciousness. 
 Logic treats of the first of these stages, the philoso- 
 phy of nature of the second, and the philosophy 
 of spirit of the third. The process which begins 
 with the absolute ends with the absolute. 
 
 The absolute cannot be adequately manifested in 
 nature ; its real manifestation is in the world of 
 finite spirits. The consciousness of finite spirits is 
 only a stage in the life of the absolute, in the pro- 
 cess towards that Besultat which the absolute is. 
 The end or last stage in the evolution of the abso- 
 lute is spirit, which is a return of the absolute out 
 of nature. Nature is bound by a necessary chain 
 of causes and effects ; but the essence of spirit is 
 freedom. Every system is a system of freedom and 
 
312 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 necessity, rreedom and necessity are ideal factors.' 
 They are not really in opposition. The absolute 
 does not posit itself exclusively as free ; nor exclu- 
 sively as governed by necessity. As an inner prin- 
 ciple, freedom is characteristic of the absolute ; in 
 so far as the absolute is externalized or manifested 
 as objective totality, necessity is characteristic of 
 it. Yet necessity belongs to intelligence in a cer- 
 tain sense,, just as freedom in a certain sense belonga. 
 to nature. Every form (Gestalt) of the intel- 
 ligence is conditioned by means of its opposite; 
 while the freedom of nature consists in the fact 
 that as becoming, it is posited by itself, and is not 
 produced by any extrinsic priaciple. The causes 
 of evolution are inner and free. In the possibility 
 of spirit manifesting itself, lies the possibility of 
 its return to freedom. Freedom and spirit are in- 
 separable conceptions : — 
 
 Das Wesen des Geistea ist deswegen formell die Freiheit, 
 die absolute Negativitat des Begriffes als Identitat mit sich.» 
 
 The absolute as the infinite and universal abides 
 as becoming ; but it is actualized in the fi.nite and 
 individual spirits which come and go. 
 
 The three moments in the life of the absolute 
 correspond with the three parts of Hegel's dialecti- 
 cal method. In this method, the concept is first 
 apprehended immediately (unmittelbar) as an und 
 fur sich. A second stage of the method is the cog- 
 nition of the concept as that which is not immedi- 
 ate and stable, but as mediate and fleeting, as the 
 1 Hegal, I. 266. > Id. VUa, 24, 25. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 313 
 
 negation or opposite of the first. The third stage 
 is the apprehension of the truth of the first in the 
 second, the union of the two moments, and the 
 cancellation (Aufhebung) of the opposition between 
 them. * 
 
 II. Subjective and Objective Spirit, in Relation to 
 Will. As was said just now, the absolute is best 
 defined as spirit ; and the adequate manifestation 
 of the absolute is not in nature, but in the succes- 
 sion of finite spirits. In this process is the 
 actuality of spirit. In subjective spirit, the actu- 
 ality of the absolute is manifested in knowledge 
 and will ; in objective spirit, in right (JRecht), the 
 state and history. The unity of these is absolute 
 spirit, with which we are here not immediately 
 concerned. 
 
 Hegel uses the term psychology in a wider ; 
 in a narrower sense. In a wide sense it 
 whole science of subjective spirit, and 
 anthropology, the science of the natD 
 (Seele oder Naturgeist), phenomenology, the scJ^ce 
 of consciousness, and psychology in the narrower 
 sense. In this sense, psychology is the science of 
 the self-determining spirit as explicit subject {Sub- 
 ject fiir sich). Anthropology treats not only of the 
 natural soul (die natiirliche Seele), but of feelings 
 and the actual soul. Phenomenology treats of 
 consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason, as 
 the three stages in the development of the subjec- 
 tive spirit. Psychology in the narrower sense 
 treats of the theoretical, the practical^ and the free 
 iHegel, VI2, 33, 40'ff. 
 
314 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 spirit. Tlie science of the natural, feeling, and 
 actual soul, -wliich is discussed in the anthropology 
 of Hegel, is conversant with soul in relation to 
 body, and includes a consideration of the influence 
 of various external influences, such as climate, 
 race, and magnetic forces. The phenomenology, 
 which is a name given also to Hegel's first im- 
 portant treatise, deals with the stages of develop- 
 ment in the subjective life, particularly with the 
 cognitive process.^ In the phenomenology, the 
 soul, through the negation of its corporeality, rises 
 to ideal identity with itself, and becomes an Ego. 
 But the Ego of the phenomenology is still implicit 
 (an sich), since its being is only in relation to 
 something else, that is, to something which is given 
 (ein Gegebenes). The freedom of the Ego is here 
 only an abstract, conditioned, and relative free- 
 dom, just as the Ego in the theoretical science of 
 Fichte was conditioned relatively by a Non-Ego. 
 That which conditions the Ego is the externaliza- 
 tion of the absolute, and so far the Ego does not 
 reach actuality and freedom. The activity of the 
 Ego consists in its filling up the vacuum of its 
 abstract subjectively, and in so doing it creates the 
 objective within itself, and makes the subjective 
 objective : — 
 
 Die Thatigkeit des ich besteht hier darln, die Leere 
 seiner abstraoten Subjectivitat zu erfullen, das Objective 
 in sioli liinein zu bilden, das Subjective dagegen objectiv 
 zu machen." 
 
 iHegel, Vila, 40ff. 
 2 Id. Vila 44. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 315 
 
 In consciousness the content of spirit becomes 
 objective, and in self-consciousness it becomes sub- 
 jective. This general self-consciousness is in itself 
 and for us {an sich und fur uns) reason ; but in the 
 third part of the science of subjective spirit, reason 
 becomes an object to itself. That part of the 
 science of subjective spirit which is especially 
 related to the will is psychology in the narrower 
 sense. Spirit and reason are related as body and 
 gravity, or as will and freedom, are related. The 
 reason forms the substantial nature of spirit. 
 Spirit, as including both the subjective and the 
 objective, posits itself subjectively as theoretical 
 and practical, that is, as knowledge and will.^ 
 That which the intelligence knows is the objective 
 concept, while the object loses the form of a con- 
 tent which belongs to the spirit itself. Psychology 
 treats of the forms of the theoretical and practical 
 spirit. The soul is a unity, and cannot be properly 
 split up into a number of faculties, or distinct 
 forces, or activities. It is a self-conscious, real 
 idea. It acts necessarily, but overcomes this 
 necessity, and attains to freedom. In the expres- 
 sion Ego = Ego, the principle of the absolute reason 
 and freedom is pronounced. Ereedom and reason 
 consist in this, that I raise myself to the form of 
 Ego=Ego: — 
 
 kurz darin, dass ich in Einem und demselben Bewusstsein 
 Ich und die Welt habe, in der Welt mioh selber Wiederfinde, 
 und umgekehrt in meinem Bewusstsein Das habe, was ist, 
 was Objectivitat hat.^ 
 
 1 Hegel, VII 2, 43-46. = Id. VH 2, 267. 
 
316 THBOEIBS OF THE WILL 
 
 This again resembles the doctrine of -Fiehte, the 
 affirmation or positing of the Ego by the Ego. The 
 Ego is known as such, not alone, but as a member 
 of a system: dass ich jedes Object als ein Glied in 
 einem Systeme Desjenigen fasse, was ich selbst 
 bin. 
 
 There are several steps or stages in the develop- 
 ment of knowledge. There is sense, which gives 
 a knowledge that objects exist; perception, which 
 gives a knowledge of theif' qualities ; understand- 
 ing, which gives a knowledge of the essence, and 
 laws of phenomena.^ 
 
 When, in the process of cognition, the theoretical 
 intelligence has reached thought, it attains to a 
 kind of freedom. The relation between the thought 
 and the object of thought is free. The intelligence 
 knows itself as determining the content, which is 
 determined as being, as well as being its own. 
 And this intelligence is will : Die Intelligenz sich 
 wissend als das Bestimmende des Inhaltes der 
 ebenso der ihrige, wie als seiend bestimmt ist, ist 
 Wille.^ Spirit as will knows itself as determining 
 itself in itself, and realizing itself out of itself: 
 Der G-eist als Wille weiss sich als sich in sich 
 beschliessend, und sich aus sich erfilllend.' The 
 inward determinateness of the will is iu its bring- 
 ing freedom into existence. The determinate 
 concept of the will is in its giving its own content 
 {Inhalt) ; and true freedom in the moral sense 
 consists in the will making the content not selfish, 
 nor subjective, but universal. In this HegePs 
 
 iHegel, VII 2,261 S. Md. VIIj, 358. » Id. Vila, 359. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHT 317 
 
 doctrine is derived from the Kantian impera- 
 tive. 
 
 Thouglit which forms the point of departure, as 
 it were, for freedom, is the last stage in the process 
 of the knowledge of theoretical reason. The first 
 stage is intuition or perception of an external world 
 in space, and of an inner world in time, after the 
 manner of the Kantian Esthetic. The second 
 is the presentation (Vorstellung) consisting of 
 memory, phantasy, and the reproduction of ideas. 
 The third is thought, in which the knowledge of 
 the two former processes is appropriated and made 
 object.* 
 
 Practical spirit is developed, in general, in three 
 stages, in practical feeling, inclination or impulse 
 {Trieb), and happiness. In the first of these 
 psychological stages, the will is in the form of 
 immediateness (Unmittelbarkeit'). It has not yet 
 posited itself as free, as objectively determining 
 intelligence. It only finds itself as objective deter- 
 mination : — 
 
 Zunaohst erscheint der Wille in der Form der Unmittel- 
 barkeit ; er hat sich noch niolit als frei und objeotiv bestim- 
 mende Intelligenz gesetzt, sondeni flndet sicli nur ala solohes 
 objectives Bestimmen.'' 
 
 Inclinations or impulses, and voluntary decision 
 between them, is the second stage. Whether the 
 desire agrees with the inner determination of the 
 will is only contingent. "When such an opposition 
 between desire and will exists, the will cannot 
 1 Hegel, VII a, 308. s Id. VH a, 360. 
 
318 THE0BIE8 OF THE WILL 
 
 remain satisfied, but asserts itself. Inclination or 
 impulse (Trieb), is more than desire. Desire is a 
 mere fact of self-consciousness, while impulse 
 requires satisfaction, and is a form of will. Yet 
 in so far as man is governed by impulse he is not 
 free. In relation to impulses, the will must be dis- 
 tinguished as thinking, and as free ; as a unity, it 
 reflects in the presence of a manifold of inclinar 
 tions. It decides between them; this is Willkur. 
 Er ist auf dem Standpunkt, zwischen Neigungen 
 zu wahlen, und ist Willkur. 
 
 In this sense it is explicitly (fur sich) free. But 
 it must be observed that such a wUl is merely the 
 realization of one inclination to the exclusion of 
 another. It is choice between inclinations, and not 
 necessarily a free, that is, a moral choice. As Kant 
 expressed it, the will is in this case heteronomous, 
 not autonomous. 
 
 Happiness is the representation of an abstract 
 universal of content, which ought to be, but is not. 
 The content becomes particularized, and is willed. 
 In such a determination of content, in which the 
 concept and the object are identical, and in which 
 the will determines itself, consists the freedom of 
 the will : — 
 
 Die Gluckseligkeit ist die mir vorgestellte, abstraote Allge- 
 meinheit des Inhalts, welehe nur sein soil. Die Wakrheit 
 aber der besondern Bestimmtheit, welclie eben so sehr ist, 
 als aufgehoben ist, und der abstraeten Einzelnheit, der 
 Willldir, welehe sich in der Gluckseligkeit eben so sehr einen 
 Zweck giebt als nicht giebt, ist die allgemeine Bestimmtheit 
 des Willens an ihm selbst, d. i. sein Selbstbestimmen selbst, 
 
IN GEEMAN PHILOSOPHY 319 
 
 die rreiheit. ... In dieser Wahrheit seiner Selbstbestim- 
 mung, worin BegrifE und Gegenstand identisch ist, ist der 
 Wille, — wirklioh freier Wille.* 
 
 Hegel is far from agreeing with Kant, however, 
 that the freedom of the will is simply a practical 
 postulate, which cannot be demonstrated theoreti- 
 cally. In his criticism of the Third Antinomy, his 
 chief objection is that Kant regarded the contradic- 
 tion of thesis and antithesis as absolute; whereas 
 it is only a contradiction which manifests the two 
 first stages in the dialectical method. The contra- 
 diction is cancelled in the absolute.' 
 
 The most difficult point of interpretation in the 
 Hegelian theory of the will is that in which it is 
 asserted that the will when free has freedom as its 
 content and object and end. In the interpretation 
 of Hegel's philosophy, it is always possible to mis- 
 apprehend his meaning, because of his peculiar use 
 of terms ; but if I have correctly stated his doc- 
 trine, it is difiicult to say in what sense the indi- 
 vidual will can be free. The evolution of the 
 absolute is a process of the free activity of the 
 absolute, and inasmuch as spirit and freedom are 
 as inseparable as body and gravity, the finite 
 spirit as well as the absolute spirit must be free. 
 It is admitted by Hegel that spirit is limited by 
 the content of the will, but as in the systems of 
 Fichte and Schelling, that which is limited is also 
 that which limits, and the contradiction is can- 
 celled. Moreover, when spirit reaches self-con- 
 
 1 Hegel, Vn a, 371, 372. » Id. VI. 105, 115, 118. 
 
320 THBOEIBS OP THE ■WILIi 
 
 sciousness, it knows itself as free. The ultimate 
 result of the development of the absolute is to 
 know itself as free spirit theoretically ; and practi- 
 cally to will its freedom. Whether such a doctrine 
 should be called deterministic or not, is a mere 
 matter of definition. 
 
 Der Geist, der sich als ifrei weiss und sioh als diesen seinen 
 Gegenstand will, d. i. seln Wesen zur Bestimmung und zum 
 Zwecke hat 1st zunaohst iiberhaupt der vemunftlge Wille, 
 Oder an sioh die Idee, darum nur der BegrlfE des absoluten 
 Gelstes.1 
 
 According to Hegel, the willing of freedom in a 
 moral sense seems to be the willing on a basis of 
 character, not of inclination. But if freedom is 
 realized through the will to be free, the inference 
 is that such volition is not yet free ; if freedom is 
 already possessed, it is a work of supererogation to 
 will to have it. The ever ready dialectic is at hand 
 to remove this contradiction, which disappears iu 
 the higher unity: — 
 
 Die Freiheit, zur Wirklichkeit einer Welt gestaltet, erhSlt 
 die Form von Nothwendigkelt, deren substautieUerer Zusam- 
 menhang das System der Freiheits-Bestimmungen, und 
 deren erscheinender Zusammenhang als die Macht, das 
 Anerkanntaein, d. i. ihr Gelten Im Bewusstsein ist.i 
 
 At the same time, it is doubtful whether Hegel 
 intended to affirm that the subjective spirit was 
 actually free, for he speaks of its freedom as a 
 Schein, or false appearance of freedom, and attrib- 
 
 iHegel, VII2, 359. »Id. VII2, 376. 
 
ZSr QEEMAN PHIL080PHT 321 
 
 utes true freedom to the objective spirit only, in 
 ■which personality is actaalized. 
 
 In any case the practical freedom of the will is 
 unambiguously asserted. In the Philosophie des 
 Bechts, it is said that -will -without freedom is an 
 empty -word ; and there is no freedom except that 
 of the -willing subject. Will is not antithetical to 
 thought. Man does not have -will in one pocket, 
 and thought in the other. The difference bet-ween 
 them is only the difference bet-ween practical and 
 theoretical conduct. Will is only a particular mode 
 of thought. It is thought translating itself into 
 existence. It is the impulse to give existence to 
 itself.^ When I think of an object, I make it a 
 thought, it becomes essentially and directly mine. 
 It is no longer something beyond me, but it is my 
 o-wn. To think is to make a thing universal. 
 The Ego is thought ; not a special thought, but a 
 general thought, empty, a metaphysical poiat, and 
 simple (Jeer, punktuell, einfach). The image of the 
 ■world is before me ; I make its content mine. So 
 much for the theoretical side. The practical side 
 is that the Ego posits itself as opposed to the world, 
 and determines an opposition between the world and 
 itself. This opposition and distinction are again 
 my own. I myself have made these determinations 
 and differences. Thus the theoretical is contained 
 in the practical. Eor there is no will without intel- 
 ligence. The theoretical intelligence is included in 
 the will. That which is willed is an object for me 
 (fur mich).' The will determines itself. 
 
 > Hegel, Vai. 33. « Id. YOl. 41-46. 
 
322 THEOKIES OF THE WILIi 
 
 Freedom is given as a fact of consciousness, and 
 must be believed. It is possible to prove the 
 reality of freedom ; but it is more convenient to 
 appeal directly to inner experience. The will 
 contains (1) the element of pure indeterminate- 
 ness. There is a will in general, expressed in 
 needs and desires immediately without any con- 
 tent. There is an absolute possibility of any de- 
 termination which I may find in myself. This, 
 however, is mere empty freedom. It is negative, 
 not positive. It is one-sided. The will contains 
 (2) the transition from this negative condition to 
 the determining of a particular content and object. 
 This content may either be given by nature, or may 
 be created and generated by the concept of the mind. 
 By affirming itself as determined, the Ego attains 
 to existence in general. This second moment, like 
 the first, is negative ; it is the negation of the first 
 negation. It is one-sided, for the will is posited or 
 affirmed as determined. This second moment is a 
 part of freedom, but does not constitute freedom in 
 the true sense. In the first moment, the will is 
 purely wUl, without the willing of anything in 
 particular. In the second moment, the will is a 
 will of something, but this something is limited, 
 and so the will is limited by its content. The will 
 is (3) the unity of these two moments. Neither 
 the first nor the second moment is the will in 
 the true sense. In the third, it is the Ego, not the 
 object nor the possible object, which determines 
 the will. This self-determination is freedom of the 
 will: — 
 
IN GEEMAN PHILOSOPHY 323 
 
 loh bestimmt sioh, insofem es die Beziehung der Negati- 
 yitiit auf sich selbst ist ; als diese Beziehung auf sich ist es 
 ebenso gleichgiiltig gegen diese Bestimmtheit, weiss sie als die 
 Beinige und ideelle als blosse Moglichkeit, durch die es 
 nicht gebonden ist, sondem in der es nur ist, weil es sich in 
 derselben setzt. — Diess ist die Treihelt des Willens.i 
 
 Thus we have on the one hand an abstraction 
 from all determinateness, which is the universality 
 of the wUl, and on the other hand a determinate 
 object and content, which is the particular wUl. 
 They are both moments of the understanding. 
 The true and speculative moment is reached, when 
 the concrete conception of freedom is attained, with- 
 out the universality on the one hand, and the par- 
 ticularity on the other. The will is at first pure 
 activity ; it then determines itself, and from being 
 universal becomes particular, because it has posited 
 a content. In the third moment, it does not cease 
 to retain the universal, although it is determined. 
 In this determinateness, man does not feel deter- 
 mined, for in the recognition of another, as another, 
 he attains to real self-feeling. 
 
 From the standpoint of the understanding, the 
 will is determined, not only as to matter or content, 
 but also as to form. As to form, the will is deter- 
 mined by the final cause. The final cause, which is 
 first an inner conception, is objectified, and made the 
 external object of the will. The content determines 
 the will, but the will is free, in that the possibility 
 exists of the content being different from what it is. 
 At fijst the will is a natural will, and is affected by 
 
 1 Hegel, Vm. 41. 
 
324 THEORIES OP THE WJLIi 
 
 the various inolinations and impulses; but it has 
 the power to make one object its content, to the 
 exclusion of other objects. It is not like the lower 
 animal will, subject wholly to the desires or appe- 
 tites. It is above these, and decides between 
 the desires. As was shown in the doctrine of sub- 
 jective spirit, true freedom of the will is not in 
 following one incliaation to the exclusion of an- 
 other.^ In such volitions, there is, an alien content. 
 True freedom consists in the willing of the will's 
 own realization. From the point of view of arbi- 
 trary volition between inclinations, freedom is an 
 illusion; for the will is reaUy determined. It is 
 the self-realiziag will which is free. In the wiU 
 between inclinations, the content is determined, not 
 by the nature of my will, but by contingency or 
 chance (ZufdlUgkeit). The will which follows an 
 inclination may be called free, but it is really de- 
 termined by its content. In the true act of free 
 will, the desire, that is, the finite content, is de- 
 stroyed or set aside, and the content is the product 
 of the will itself. The willing of itself is the will- 
 ing of the right,^ and so we reach in the end a point 
 in Hegel's theory where he is in substantial agree- 
 ment with Kant. What Kant lays down as a 
 postulate of morality, that Hegel reaches by the 
 application of his method to the evolution of the. 
 absolute. Free will according to such a view as 
 Hegel's must be viewed rather as an ideal than as 
 a reality. The natural will is the finite will which 
 is governed by inclinations. So we have also in 
 
 1 Hegel, VIII. 43 ff. » Id. VIII. 48-60. 
 
m GERMAN PHILOSOPHT 325 
 
 Hegel's philosophy a return to the Patristic doc- 
 trine, that the finite will is evU rather than good. 
 Fieedom is an ideal which the natural or finite 
 will has not, reached. 
 
 SCHOPBNHAUEB 
 
 In the philosophy of Schopenhauer the will is 
 both an universal principle and a faculty of man. 
 These two are ultimately the same. The world is ^ 
 will, but it is my will. The thing in itself (Ding 
 an8ich),ot the Kantian philosophy is not a mere 
 negative limit, but the sufficient reason of being 
 and knowledge. The thing in itself is will. 
 
 By many writers Schopenhauer is described as a 
 reactionist against the post-Kantian systems which 
 preceded him. This is partially true. His is a 
 philosophy of the understanding, not of the reason. 
 The idea of the absolute as spirit or nature, or as 
 the identity of both, is absent from his thought. 
 His interpretation of Kant, is radically different 
 from that of the absolute philosophers. He is a 
 pessimist, while the German philosophy before him 
 was optimistic. And yet, in spite of these and 
 other differences, there is a strong resemblance 
 between the system of Schopenhauer and those 
 which he attacks with so much spirit. While he 
 criticises the theory of the Ego in Mchte's phi- 
 losophy, as being a merely formal principle, his 
 own doctrine that the, world is my will is not essen- 
 tially different from Fiohte's conception of the 
 Tliathandlung of the Ego as the first principle of 
 
326 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 philosophy. Schopenhauer's modification of the 
 Platonic theory of ideas is not out of harmony 
 ■with certain phases of Schelling's thought. The 
 analogy between Schelling and Schopenhauer is 
 well illustrated in the philosophy of von Hart- 
 mann, who is indebted to them both. 
 
 In a system which begins and ends with the will, 
 it is difB.cult to separate the special from the more 
 general teaching. The philosophy of Schopenhauer 
 is preeminently a theory of the will. But I shall 
 here consider it, first, as one of the fundamental 
 principles of his philosophy; secondly, as a human 
 faculty or phenomenon of the soul of man; and, 
 thirdly, in relation to the principle of sufficient 
 reason. 
 
 I. The World as Will and Presentation. Accord-,, 
 ing to Schopenhauer, the world is my presentation, 
 and the world is my will. One side of the world 
 is knowledge; the other side is will. To say that' 
 there is anything which is neither presentation nor 
 will is absurd. ^Neither idealism alone nor ma- 
 terialism alone can explain the universe. The 
 explanatory principle is neither matter nor know- 
 ledge. It is will.' 
 
 The will is not the cause of the universe; it is 
 the universe. As it exists in neither space nor 
 time, it is not a cause, and it is not known in 
 causal relation with anything else." It is, how- 
 ever, the suificient reason of the world, and is 
 objectified in the presentation (VorsteUung). The 
 will as thing in itself cannot be defined. The term 
 1 Schopenhauer, II. 3-5. " Id. II. 166. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 327 
 
 indicates the inner essence of the nature of every- 
 thing. We know it better than we know anything 
 else.* Every cognition or conception is presenta- 
 tion, hut will is not presentation, but an inner 
 principle. It lies beyond the principle of suflScient 
 reason, and needs no explanation. The objectified 
 will is body. The latter is a presentation like other 
 presentations. It is an object among objects. The 
 subject, as distinguished from the object, finds itself 
 in the world as an individual. That is the subject 
 of knowledge. That to which the presentation is 
 made appears as an individual. It is the will which 
 determines the changes of the body; and body is 
 immediately known as will. Every movement of 
 the body is an act of will; they are not two differ- 
 ent acts, but they are one. These acts are given 
 in two ways, — first, by immediate knowledge; and 
 second, by the intuition {Anschauung) of the under- 
 standing. The act of the body is only objectified 
 will. 
 
 Die Aktion des Leibes ist nichts Anderes, als der objekti- 
 virte d. h. hi die Anschauung getretene Akt des Willens.* 
 
 The will is the cognition a priori of the body; 
 and the body is the cognition a posteriori of the^ 
 will. Deliberations about the future and resolu- 
 tions are rational acts, and not acts of will. Will- 
 ing and doing are the same. We may separate 
 them in reflection, but they are not actually sepa- 
 rable. Every act of will is an act of body; and 
 every effect upon body is an act of will. In so far 
 as the .body is known, the will is known. 
 
 1 Schopenhauer, II. 131, 132. 2 Id. II. 119. 
 
328 THEORIES OF THE WILIi 
 
 Ich erkenne meinen "Willen nicht im Ganzen, nicht als 
 Einheit, nicht vollkommen seinem Wesen nach, sondem ich 
 erkenne ihn allein in seinen einzelnen Akten, also in der 
 Zeit, welohe die Form der Erscheinung meines Leibes, 
 wie jedes Objektes ist: daher ist der Leib Bedingung der 
 Erkenntniss meines Willens.^ 
 
 The importance of body in Schopenhauer's phi- 
 losophy is manifest here. The corporeal -world, in 
 so far as it is not presentation, is will. The reality 
 or actuality of the will is the actuality of the body; 
 and the movements of the latter are visible acts of 
 the former. In like manner the so-called vital 
 forces, the various bodily functions, the members 
 and organs of the body, are expressions of the 
 will.' Will is the active principle in all nature,— 
 in the movement and changes of organic as well as 
 ihorganic bodies, in gravitation, heat, and light. 
 It is, however, one, and not manifold; the forces 
 of nature are its manifold appearance. 
 
 There are certain stages in the " objectivation " 
 of will. In its lowest stage, it is blind force or 
 tendency, which is not known immediately as will. 
 In organic nature it appears as impulse. In man 
 it comes to consciousness. In the objectivation of 
 will, man is the highest stage.' The nature of this 
 process of objectivation is difficult to understand. 
 It is the Schwerpunkt of Schopenhauer's otherwise 
 lucid philosophy. The will is said not to be the 
 cause of the phenomena; for as thing in itself, it 
 lies outside the causal series, and is not subject (as 
 Ding an sick) to the principle of sufficient reason. 
 
 1 Schopenhauer, II. 131. » Id. 1. 12T. ' Id. 11. 1T8, 179. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 329 
 
 Nor is the relation of the objectified will to the 
 intelligible will that of mode to substance, as in the 
 philosophy of Spinoza. The presentation is said 
 to be gewordene Wille,^ and yet the will is not its 
 cause. But while the will as intelligible is not in 
 the causal series, the will as phenomenal is an 
 effect among other effects. In his criticism of the 
 Kantian philosophy Schopenhauer says : — 
 
 Wenn von Ursach und Wirkung geredet wird, darf das 
 Verhaltnisa des Willens zu seiner Krscheinung (oder des 
 intelligibeln Chaorakters zum empiiisohen) nie herbeigezogen 
 werden, wie hier geschiet ; denn es ist vom EausalTerhaltniss 
 durchaus verschieden." 
 
 II. The Will as Phenomenon. The will is not 
 only Ding an sich. It is likewise phenomenon in 
 space and time. Individual acts of the will are 
 presentations (Vorstellungen) and so belong to the 
 empirical or phenomenal world. Man is the most 
 perfect manifestation of the will, and in man the _ 
 will comes to full self-consciousness. The relation 
 of will to intellect is that of Ding an sich to phe- 
 nomenon, and so Schopenhauer ascribes what he 
 calls primacy to the will over the intellect. 
 Spinoza is criticised by Schopenhauer because 
 he affirmed that will is an act of thought, an 
 intellectual affirmation or denial. Schopenhauer 
 takes an opposite view. It is will which is tl\e 
 original and primitive; knowledge is a phenome- 
 non of will and its instrument. Man does not 
 become what he is by means of knowledge. Will " 
 
 1 Schopenhauer, II. 199. > Id. II. 601. Cf. Id. 1. 133-13S. 
 
330 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 makes him what he is, and knowledge is only the 
 ~ manifestation of will.' The intellect is the instru- 
 ment of the will, just as the hammer is an instru- 
 Inent of the smith." 
 
 "■' The subject knows itself as willing, but not as 
 knowing. I know is an analytic proposition, while 
 I will is synthetic; for it cannot be said, I know 
 that I know. I will is a datum of experience; and 
 there are many gradations of will, from the mildest 
 inclination to the most passionate resolve. The 
 identity of the subject which knows, with the sub- 
 ject which wills, is something which cannot be 
 explained; it is der WeltJcnoten. 
 
 Die Identitat nun aber des Subjekts des WoUens mit dem 
 erkennenden Subjekt, vermoge welcher (und zwar nothwen- 
 dig) das Wort "Ich" beide einachliesst und bezeichnet, ist 
 der Weltknoten und daber unerklarlich. 
 
 But personal identity is founded on the identical 
 will and its unchangeable character: im Herzen 
 steckt der Mensch, nicht im Kopf.* 
 
 Will is not peculiar to man. There is blind, 
 impulsive will in the lower animals, but in man it 
 "comes to consciousness. It is not connected with 
 any particular part of the body, but is everywhere 
 present. It is not consciousness but will which 
 Constitutes the essence of the animal soul. The 
 latter remains after the body perishes ; but intellect 
 depends for its existence on the body. 
 
 III. The Will in Relation to the Principle of 
 Sufficient Reason. As phenomenon, but not as 
 
 1 Schopenhauer, III. 224. » Id. III. 253. e m. 1. 143. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 331 
 
 noumenon, the will is subject to the principle of 
 sufficient reason. Schopenhauer's treatise on this 
 subject is fundamental to his whole philosophy. 
 The principle is especially related to his doctrine 
 of motive. 
 
 As there is a reason for everything, the most 
 important of all scientific questions is expressed 
 in the word why. Why, says Schopenhauer, is the 
 mother of all the sciences.^ In it is implied the 
 principle of sufficient reason. This principle he 
 states in the form adopted by Wolff : Nihil est sine 
 ratione cur potius sit quam non sit (Nothing is, with- 
 out a reason why it is rather than is not).' All 
 our knowledge implies a subject which knows and 
 an object which is known. To' be object for the 
 subject, and to be presentation ( Vorstellung), is one 
 and the same. All presentations are objects for 
 the subject; and, conversely, all objects for the 
 subject are presentations. All our presentations 
 stand in relation to one another in a regular deter- 
 minate union {Verbindung), according to a priori 
 forms. Nothing in our knowledge is independent 
 and separable. The principle of this union is that 
 of sufficient reason. The expression of this prin- 
 ciple varies with different classes of objects. The 
 principle is the same, but its root varies.' 
 
 1. Principle of Sufficient Reason of Becoming 
 (jprincipium rationis sufficientis fiendi). Here it 
 appears as the law of causality. It is applicable 
 exclusively to changes, and to nothing else. Every 
 change is an effect, and every cause is an effect of 
 1 Schopenhauer, I. 4. ^ Id. I. 5. « Id. I. 27. 
 
332 THEOBIES OF THE WILL 
 
 some previous cause. The series has no beginning. 
 There has been much sophistry concerning the 
 definition of cause. Many difficulties are removed, 
 according to Schopenhauer, if it be shown that it 
 is not an antecedent object which constitutes a 
 cause, but the condition as a whole which precedes 
 any event or change : — 
 
 Bei genauerer Betrachtung hingegen flnden wir, dass der 
 ganze Zustand die Ursache des folgenden ist, wobei es im 
 Wesentlichen einerlei ist, in welcher Zeitfolge seine Bes- 
 timmungen zusammengekommen seien. 
 
 Ganz f alsch hingegen ist es, wenn man nicht den Zustand, 
 sondern die Objekte Ursache nennt.i 
 
 Cause brings nothing new into being; it involves 
 only change in that which has continuous existence. 
 The law is known a priori; it is transcendental and 
 valid for all possible experience. Given a first rela- 
 tive condition, a second determinate condition must 
 follow according to a rule. The relation is a neces- 
 sary relation. There is a succession in time usually 
 to be observed, with the cause as antecedent, and the 
 effect, as consequent; but sometimes the sequence 
 is so rapid that it can hardly be said which is cause 
 and which effect. In opposition to Kant and Hegel, 
 Schopenhauer declares that the category of reci- 
 procity ( Wechselwirkung) has no meaning. It rests 
 on the misconception that the effect is part of the 
 cause. 
 
 Aus dieser wesentlichen Verkniipfung der KausalitSt mit 
 der Succession folgt wieder, dass der Begriff der Wechsel- 
 wirkung, strenge genommen, nichtig ist. Er setzt namlich 
 
 i Schopenhauer, 1. 35. 
 
IS GBHMAIT PHILOSOPHY 333 
 
 Toraus, dass die Wirkung wieder Ursach ihrer Ursach sei, 
 also dass das Nachfolgende zugleioh das Vorhergehende 
 gewesen.i 
 
 It is the previous condition iu point of time 
 which constitutes the cause. There are three spe- 
 cies of causality: (1) cause in the narrow sense; 
 (2) stimulus (Beiz) ; and (3) motive. In the first 
 of these, the effect seems to be proportionate to the 
 cause. The second is the cause which operates in 
 the organic world, and in this case there is no pro- 
 portion necessarily between the cause and its effect. 
 The medium of motive, which is the third species, 
 is knowledge, and intellect is implied in its action." 
 
 According to Schopenhauer, Locke entertained 
 two false conceptions with respect to causality. 
 He taught that the action of the will on the body 
 was one type of causality, and that the other 
 type was the resistance offered by the body to 
 objects external to it. Schopenhauer agrees with 
 Hume in denying these propositions, and he holds 
 that there is no causal nexus between the act of 
 the will and the movement of the body. The move- 
 ment of the body is the actualization of the will. 
 They are immediately one and the same act, which 
 is perceived in a twofold way, — by self -conscious- 
 ness as an act of will, and by external intuition as 
 an act of body. Resistance as a sensation is not 
 an objective intuition, but merely a feeling which 
 of itself gives no idea of causality. That the re- 
 sistance is attributed to an external something 
 implies, but does not originate, the conception of 
 1 Schopenhauer, 1. 11, 12. ' Id. I. 46 1. 
 
334 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 causality. It is motive which difEerentiates the 
 will in man from that in the lower animals. 
 
 Schopenhauer's whole theoretical discussion of 
 the human will, and its relation to the intelligible 
 will which he regards as the first principle of the 
 world, shows that the Third Antinomy of the Kant- 
 ian philosophy forms the essential centre of all such 
 discussion. At the root of Schopenhauer's deter- 
 minism is his scepticism with respect to the know- 
 ledge of the reason. It was an appeal to reason 
 which saved the absolute philosophers from reach- 
 ing a like deterministic conclusion. But if all our 
 knowledge is in the form of presentation, then every 
 event known must be known as causally determined. 
 Any appeal to an intelligible freedom is an appeal 
 to something which is an illusion. The freedom as- 
 cribed by Schopenhauer to the will as Ding an sieh 
 is simply an activity which has no particular direc- 
 tion and no particular meaning. The only will 
 which is known to us is a determined will. 
 
 From this statement of the principle of sufficient 
 reason, it appears that the motive is the necessary 
 cause of the act of the will. The motive is that 
 without which there would be no volition. In what 
 way the effect is produced, we do not know. It is 
 a mystery. But our knowledge of the action of 
 the will is more intimate than our knowledge of 
 the action of external objects, because the motive 
 acts through cognition. Motivation is causation 
 viewed from within. In so far as there is voluntary 
 control and direction of knowledge, it is because of 
 the identity of the knowing with the willing sub- 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 335 
 
 ject. In knowledge which is controlled by will, 
 the sequence is so rapid that we do not distinguish 
 the cognition from the volition : — 
 
 Die Thatigkeit des Willens hiebei ist jedooh so unraittel- 
 bar, dass sie meistens nicht ins deutliolie Bewusstsein fSllt ; 
 und so sohnell dass wir uns bisweilen nicht ein Mai des 
 Anlasses zu einer also hervorgerufenen Vorstellung bewusst 
 ■werden, wo es uns dann soheint, als sei Etwas ohne alien 
 Zusammenhang mit einem Andem in unser Bewusstsein 
 gekommen.i 
 
 Thus every image which comes before conscious- 
 ness is due to an act of will, which act has a 
 motive; although neither motive nor volition may 
 have attracted notice. 
 
 Motives do not determine that I shall will, but 
 only what I shall will." The fact that the will as 
 Ding an sich is not subject to the principle of sufiB- 
 cient reason, has led to the belief that there is 
 freedom of the will.' Every man thinks before- 
 hand that he is free, and that in any given past 
 case he might have willed differently; but a pos- 
 teriori he must admit that his volitions have been 
 determined by motives. Acts of the will in so far 
 as they are known are controlled by causes, and so 
 are necessarily determined. While the principle of 
 sufficient reason does not control my will as intel- 
 ligible, that is, as Ding an sich, it controls necessarily 
 the manifestations of my will.* The only freedom 
 is the action of the will in general; the particular 
 direction is absolutely determined. It is not neces- 
 
 1 Schopenhauer, 1. 143-146. « Id. U. 133-135. 
 
 « Id. II. 12T. « Id. II. 195, 320. 
 
336 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 sary that the motive should be clearly before con- 
 sciousness, but the intelligible will works freely in 
 organic processes, and in the instinct of animals. 
 Freedom is a negative conception ; it is a concep- 
 tion of action in the absence of the principle of 
 sufficient reason. It is not only because the will 
 is thing in itself that man is persuaded of his free- 
 dom. The conflict of motives within him gives 
 him such an impression ; but in reality the strong- 
 est motive always triumphs, and is the cause of 
 the volition.^ 
 
 Character is an expression of the will, and when 
 once the will has been expressed in a man's char- 
 acter, the latter cannot be changed." Variations in 
 the will are effected by changes in the motive, and 
 these are effected by various kinds of knowledge 
 and different degrees of certitude. But persuasion 
 does not change the character or the will. It may 
 change the means which are to be willed for a cer- 
 tain end, but the character remains constant. The 
 will cannot be taught, and so virtue is not teach- 
 able. It is therefore absurd for a man to will to 
 be other than he is.' It is no argument in favor of 
 freedom for a man to assert that he can do what he 
 will. Freedom of the will is not to be confounded 
 with physical or intellectual freedom.* An appeal 
 to consciousness is not sufficient to establish the 
 freedom of the will. Self-consciousness is not 
 broad enough to give us the exact truth concerning 
 the relation of the particular volition to the motive 
 
 1 Schopenhauer, II. 336-341. = Id. II. 347. » Id. II. 361. 
 * Id. IV. 3-9 (Die Freiheit des Willens). 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHT 337 
 
 and the character upon -which it depends. While 
 the volition itself is given in self-consciousness, 
 the conditions of the volition are not given. The 
 act of will is first known as a movement of body. 
 There is no possibility of any of man's volitions 
 being other than it is. The supposed possibility 
 arises from the conflict of motives and desires. 
 Which of the conflicting principles is triumphant 
 can be known only after the fact of volition. 
 The possibility of alternate courses is a possibility 
 which is delusive : — 
 
 Ich kann thun was ich will : ich kann, wenn ich will, 
 AUes was ich habe den Armen geben und dadurch selbst, 
 einer werden, — wenn ich will ! — Aber ich vermag nicht, ea 
 zu woUen ; well die entgegen stehenden Motive viel zu viel 
 Gewalt ttber mich haben, als dass ich es kSnnte.^ 
 
 In thus including all conscious volitions in the 
 same class with natural phenomena, Schopenhauer 
 rejects definitely the doctrine of freedom, and 
 leaves no escape to those who would find in 
 the character a self-determining principle. The 
 variety of effects which similar motives will pro- 
 duce on different men is ascribed to differences 
 in character. Yet character is not known before- 
 hand, but only empirically. It is innate, and, as 
 has been said, cannot be changed.' If we say that 
 character is formed freely through acts of will, we 
 make all explanation of it impossible. To suppose 
 that the will is free is to suppose a miracle ; for 
 every uncaused event is a miracle. As for the 
 
 1 Schopenhauer, IV. 43 (jb.). » Id. II. 35T. 
 
338 THEORIES OP THE WILL 
 
 common consciousness of mankind, its affirma- 
 tion that we are free has no force with Schopen- 
 hauer, who holds that the ordinary understanding 
 is incompetent to grasp the truth of either idealism 
 or determinism.^ 
 
 Schopenhauer's view of necessity need not be 
 extensively considered, for, from what has been 
 said, it is plain that everything and every event 
 which is related to sufficient reason is neces- 
 sary, and so contingency is a negative idea. ISTor 
 need the moral aspects of his doctrine be discussed, 
 except in so far as to say that his pessimism led 
 him to oppose the principles of Kant's Practical 
 Philosophy. He finds a contradiction in saying 
 that man is under obligations to will in any par- 
 ticular way; and so far from accepting the fact of 
 freedom as a postulate of morality, he would prefer 
 to deny the possibility of morality, and so find the 
 determinism of the will in harmony with his prin- 
 ciples of ethics. 
 
 That which moves the will in the lower animals 
 is impulse, and there is no motive in the true 
 sense. In man the motives lie in thought; and 
 thus the will acts according to choice. In human 
 action there may be intention and purpose, with 
 deliberation according to a plan and according to 
 maxims : — 
 
 "Wenn gleioh die Handlungen des Menschen mit nicht 
 minder strenger Nothwendigkeit, als die der Thiers erfol- 
 gen ; so ist doch durcli die Art der Motivation, sofern sie 
 hier aus Gedanken besteht, welche die Walilentscheidung 
 
 1 Schopenhauer, IV. 45-47. 
 
IN GEBMAN PHILOSOPHY 339 
 
 (d. h. den bewussten Konflikt der Motive) mSglich machen, 
 das Handeln mit Vorsatz, mit Ueberlegung, naoh Planen, 
 Maximen, in Uebereinstimmung mit andern u. s. w.i 
 
 2. Principle of Sufficient Reason of Knowing 
 (jrrincipium rationis suffl,cientis cognoscendi). This 
 refers to the truth that all knowledge implies a 
 reason from which it is a consequence. The forms 
 of this root of the principle are the fundamental 
 laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded mid- 
 dle." 
 
 3. Principle of SuffiMent Reason of Being {prin- 
 cipium rationis sufficientis essendi) . This refers to 
 the ground or reasons of arithmetical and geometri- 
 cal propositions. For example, the relation of the 
 angles in a triangle is a principle of the relation 
 of the sides of the triangle.* 
 
 4. Principle of Sufficient Reason of Acting {prin- 
 cipium rationis sufficientis agendi). This refers to 
 the immediate object of the inner sense. This is 
 the subject of volition, which is object for the 
 knowing subject.* 
 
 IV. The Denial of the Will. Near the close of 
 his principal treatise, Schopenhauer suggests a way 
 by which the will may be freed from subjection to 
 the principle of sufB.cient reason, so that a general 
 quietive of volition (ein allgemeines QuietivY may 
 be possible. Having shown that the will as phe- 
 nomenon is determined by motives, that the object 
 of the will, even when attained, does not afford 
 
 1 Schopenhauer, I. 97. = Id. 1. 105, 106. « Id. I. 131, 133. 
 4 Id. I. 140. « Id. n. 477. 
 
340 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 satisfaction, and that the character cannot be 
 changed, he teaches that a recognition of the 
 will as Ding an sich, apart from the principle of 
 individuation, will free the individual from the 
 control of motives, and that the latter will cease 
 to be active and effective. This is the cancellation 
 of the motive and of the character in so far as their 
 influence on the volitions is concerned. He com- 
 pares such a result to the effect of regenerative 
 grace in the doctrine of Christian theology. This 
 is, in his opinion, the only true freedom of the 
 will: — 
 
 sle tritt erst ein, wenn der WUle, zur Erkenntniss seines 
 Wesens an sich gelangt, aus dieser ein Quietiv erhalt und 
 eben daduroh der Wirkung der Motive entzogen -wird, welohe 
 im Gebiet einer andern Erkenntnissweise liegt, deren Objekte 
 nur Erscheinungen sind.^ 
 
 This is the self-cancellation (Selhstaufhehung) of 
 the will. It is not explained, however, under what 
 conditions such a self-cancellation is possible. 
 There is no regenerative grace vouchsafed to effect 
 this change of knowledge, and we are left in doubt 
 as to whether the object of the volition in the will 
 to deny the will may not be as elusive as the phe- 
 nomenal object after which the will has striven, 
 but which it has failed to attain. 
 
 LOTZE 
 
 It has been said that Lotze's philosophy cannot 
 be systematically stated; and it must be admitted 
 
 1 Schopenhauer, II. 478. 
 
IN GEEMAIT PHILOSOPHY 341 
 
 ttat his doctrines are suggestive rather than con- 
 vincing. His indebtedness to Heibart is often 
 evident, especially in the importance which he 
 attaches to psychology. 
 
 I. The Soul and its Faculties. Among all people 
 there is a tendency to believe in a psychical unity, 
 as opposed to the mere variety of phenomena. 
 This belief tends also to separate the soul from 
 the ordinary course of nature, and to attribute to 
 it a self-determining energy. It is an immaterial 
 substance, and from its nature proceed the phenom- 
 ena of knowledge (Vorstellung), feeling, and will. 
 These are progressively developed as the result of 
 a reciprocity between the outer world and the 
 soul's inner activity. It is a mistake to think of 
 the soul under material forms, or to make it a mere 
 background or skeleton of psychical phenomena. 
 It is rather the source of certain known properties. 
 It is a centre of effects or activities, and is a sub- 
 stance. But whatever view be taken of the soul 
 per se, scientific interest is confined to the known 
 properties. And the plainest way of regarding 
 these properties is from the standpoint of mental 
 faculties, a conception which is antiquated, and 
 capable of being wrongly interpreted.^ 
 
 It is not to be supposed that the faculties exist 
 independent of any occasion of their exercise. The 
 theory of faculties rightly interpreted holds that 
 the reason for the activity of every manifestation 
 of the soul is the external stimulus. Upon the 
 
 1 Lntze, Medicinische Psychologie, Leipzig, 1868, 146-160; 
 Mikiokosmus, 1. 160. 
 
342 THEOKIES OP THE WILL 
 
 occasion of sucli stimulus, the soul may choose 
 between different and equally possible reactions in 
 response. The different expressions of the soul 
 in so responding do not depend on the nature of a 
 given stimulus, but on the soul's original nature 
 and capacities. A certain stimulation takes place, 
 the soul is in a certain state of receptivity, 
 and a third condition is the resultant of the two 
 former conditions. For such an explanation, 
 the theory of faculties is convenient. There are 
 secondary disadvantages in this conception, and 
 the hypothesis of faculties is somewhat barren. 
 They are, however, sources of explanation (Erkld- 
 rungsquellen) of the quality of their products : — 
 
 Die SeelenvermOgen dagegen sind nicht aus Massverhalt- 
 nissen psychischer Ersoheinungen, sondern lediglich aus 
 ihrer Qualitat abstrahirt; sie konnen daher auch nur als 
 Erklarungsquellen der Qualitat ihrer Erzeugnisse gelten.i 
 
 II. The Will. Although we seem to have the 
 power of moving our bodies, yet in this we are 
 often deceived. To will is not to perform. The 
 movement of our bodies is a part of the chain of 
 mechanical phenomena of the world. Although our 
 will is closely connected with these, the changes 
 in the organism in connection with an act of will 
 take place without our cooperation. Our own 
 part in the process is to furnish points of depart- 
 ure {AusgangspilnJcte) for these physical processes.' 
 The soul is not like an artisan who has constructed 
 the machine with which he performs his work, and 
 
 1 Lotze, Medicinische Psychologle, 151. 2 id., ib. 288. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 343 
 
 knows the reason and maimer of its working. It 
 is rather like one who has been taught by arbitrary 
 rule to manipulate a mechanism, the structure and 
 inner workings of which are unknown to him. 
 The soul is not identical with the body, but 
 is the master of the body: — 
 
 Das VerhAltnisB der Seele za dem Leibe ist nie das der 
 IdentiUt, sondem stete das einer Herrschaft.^ 
 
 There is a great variety in the responses of the 
 Boul to outward stimulus; and even if the latter 
 did not occur, it is not to be supposed that the body 
 would be motionless, as the condition of the nerves 
 in the absence of such stimulus would doubtless give 
 rise to movement. A variety of motions is pro- 
 duced, however, at the first moment of life. The 
 stated repetition of these movements is an occasion 
 for the development of voluntary activity. The co- 
 ordination of motions occurs automatically, with- 
 out our voluntary interference and without our 
 consciousness. When the stimulus does not reach 
 the soul itself, the action is reflex and mechanical. 
 The reflex-motor actions are not psychical in origin, 
 but purely mechanical. And too much stress must 
 not be laid upon the telos which they seem to in- 
 volve. The reflex movements are the letters of 
 the alphabet, the elements of further teleologic 
 activity. Having observed them in experience, 
 the soul can combine them and imitate them. But 
 it is to the advantage of the organism that they 
 
 1 Lotze, Medicinische Fsychologie, 289. 
 
344 THEOEIES OP THE WILL 
 
 should be mechanical, in so far as they tend to the 
 preservation of life and to defence : — 
 
 Nur die Beherrschung eines gegetenen Meohanismus kann 
 fitr die Seele von Werth. sein, ilm selbst hervorzubringen und 
 zu dirigen, wiirde nur eine lastige imd iiberfliissige Erschwe- 
 rung ihrer Aufgabe sein. Sind doch jene Bewegungen zum 
 Theil dazu bestimmt, als heilende Eeaotionen Bchadliche 
 Eeize zu entfemen, oder als niitzliche Triebe zur Erhaltung 
 des Korpers mitzuwirken. Aber wie schlecht wiirde es in 
 der That um unser Leben stehen, soUte die Ueberlegung es 
 vertheidigen, und niclit der Meobanismus.i 
 
 This passage was written some years before the 
 appearance of von Hartmann's Philosophy of the 
 Unconscious, and the question of a non-mechanical 
 but still unconscious activity in reflex phenomena 
 is not raised. 
 
 In automatic movements, like playing the piano, 
 the movements follow one another so rapidly that 
 it is inconceivable that they should be directed 
 or controlled by specific independent acts of will. 
 In such automatic processes, the soul exercises an 
 act of will at the beginning, while the succeeding 
 steps take place mechanically. In certain patho- 
 logical conditions movements take place with ap- 
 parent purpose, when any psychical control is out 
 of the question.^ 
 
 Many crimes likewise have an automatic genesis, 
 when there is no train of feeling sufficiently strong 
 to oppose them. The act takes place without real 
 deliberation or conscious volition. The transition 
 from idea to act is immediate. This does not free 
 
 1 Lotze, Medicinisclie Psychologie, 291, 292. 
 
 2 Id., ib. 293, 294. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 345 
 
 the agent from responsibility, because the idea of 
 the crime should have been resisted at an earlier 
 stage. But this does not apply to the insane. It 
 is only when the state of mind is intense; it is not 
 ■when it is abnormal. 
 
 Wholly different from these elementary reflex 
 phenomena are the voluntary employments of mus- 
 cular contractility, by which the will accomplishes 
 a purpose. Yet, like those acts already considered, 
 they are only voluntary combinations of involun- 
 tary elements. The will's efficiency is limited to 
 a certain self-chosen combination and succession in 
 the production of those inner psychical conditions, 
 as related to the origin of the movement: — 
 
 dasa auoh sie nur willktihrllche Combinationen unwillkuhr- 
 lioher Elemente sind, oder selbstgewaiilten Verbindung und 
 Reihenfolge jene innem psychisohen Zustande erzeugen, 
 an welohe die Organisation die Entstehung der Bewegung 
 geknlipft hat. I 
 
 Midway between reflex action and conscious and 
 intentional acts of the will is the blind impulse. 
 Motions which proceed from impulse seem to be 
 neither mechanical nor conscious. Impulse does 
 not reach its goal as the physical cause does, but 
 is an endeavor to reach a given end. The only 
 clear perception of this impulse is furnished in 
 the conscious voluntary endeavor. It may be 
 checked, and this gives rise to the feeling of 
 effort : — 
 
 Aber eben dieser Begriff des Strebens hat seine einzige 
 klare Anwendung, wo er identisoh mit dem bewussten 
 1 Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 296. 
 
346 THEOEIES OF THE WILL 
 
 ■WoUen einer Seele gefasst -wird ; die tlbrige Welt der 
 Ereignisse kennt nur ein Gesohehen, das sioh frei ent- 
 ■wiokelt, Oder in solches, das in der Erreiohung seines ihm 
 sonst gewolinlichen Erf olges gehindert wird, Der letztere Fall 
 ist es, wo wir glauben, dass die gehemmte Kraft sicli in ein 
 Streben verwandle und gegen das Hindemiss eiuen Druck 
 austtbe, den wir als eine absicbtliche Anstrengung zu seiner 
 Hinwegraumung deuten.i 
 
 When there are no obstacles, the effect of the 
 will's action is not attended with effort. There is 
 no more effort in the act of will than in the impulse 
 which is actualized. All these feelings of resist, 
 ance are purely physical in their origin. This 
 serves to make the nature of the impulse more 
 conceivable. 
 
 In every impulse there are three moments. The 
 beginning of the impulse as a whole consists of 
 certain bodily or mental occurrences {Ereignisse), 
 as, for example, nervous activity, or ideas which 
 may be a reason for motion. If the soul were con- 
 scious of these, it would be conscious of them as 
 disturbances only, but would not be awakened to 
 impulse. A second moment is in the case of these 
 occurrences awakening pleasure or pain; yet in this 
 there is no essential element of impulse. The first 
 excitation to impulse is the consciousness of a 
 peculiar position in which the soul finds itself, like 
 the uneasiness described by Locke. Experience 
 has taught us what to do when this occurs. The 
 peculiar feeling is removed by motion from the 
 uneasy position. Inclination and disinclination 
 
 1 Lotze, Medicinische Fsychologie, 296. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 347 
 
 are the result. These are characteristic of grow- 
 ing impulse {Triebwerdens), but are not impulse 
 itself. Thus impulses arise out of experience, and 
 ultimately are the result of feelings. Appetites, 
 such as hunger and thirst, are not impulses, but are 
 only disagreeable feelings of change in the nerves 
 which terminate in the intestine, by reason of cer- 
 tain deficiencies. In the lower animals the reaction 
 produced by these painful feelings is automatic. 
 This is true of certain higher feelings peculiar to 
 man. The poetic impulse has an automatic char- 
 acter, for it arises from a feeling which finds no 
 relief until it is satisfied, and yet its satisfaction 
 is not deliberate. The poetic impulse cannot be 
 exercised without experience.* 
 
 These impulses play a very prominent part in 
 our life. Impulsive actions are more common than 
 deliberate voluntary actions. 
 
 The act of will cannot be defined or explained. 
 It has to be experienced: — 
 
 Man wird nicht verlangen, class wir den Act des Wollens 
 schildem soUen, der so einfach eine GrundeTscheinung des 
 geistigen Lebens ist, dass er nur erlebt nicht erlautert 
 werden kann.' 
 
 There are, however, two mistaken views of this 
 act which must be corrected. One regards the will 
 as only a clear idea (Jelare Vorstdlung) ; the other 
 concentrates it in a dense atmosphere of a capacity 
 to act. The first makes the will do nothing; the 
 second makes it do everything. I will does not 
 mean I shall; to will to be happy is different from 
 
 1 Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 297-300. > Id., lb. 300. 
 
348 THEORIES OF THE WILL 
 
 a certain occurrence of happiness. One of these 
 mistaken conceptions confounds volition with the 
 thought of volition, while the other confounds voli- 
 tion with the bringing to pass of the thing which 
 has been willed : — 
 
 Wie nun die erwShnte Ansicht WoUen mit Vorstellen 
 des Gewollten, so verwechselt die andere Wollen und Voll- 
 bringen des Gewollten.^ 
 
 That which accomplishes the volition is only 
 bodily organization carrying out the purpose of 
 the will, and this is a purely mechanical process. 
 While, on the one hand, the thought of a future 
 act is different from the actual volition, so, on the 
 other hand, the will simply removes such psychical 
 obstacles as stand in the way of setting in motion 
 the process of the body. We are brought back to 
 the idea of the will as point of departure {Ausgang- 
 spunkf), as already explained. 
 
 In dealing with the important question whether 
 the feeling of effort is of central or peripheral origin, 
 Lotze holds that what we feel in a voluntary effort 
 is the effect of the impulse on the termination of the 
 nerve in the muscle. And although each muscle 
 must have its own nerve terminations, yet the mus- 
 cular feeling is a general one, like the sensation of 
 heat, and is so localized in the organism. The 
 feeling of effort, then, is not a feeling of the out- 
 going impulse, but of an effect of that impulse : — 
 
 Wir sohliessen daher, dass es nicht der WiUensimpuls, 
 Bondem seine Folgen sind, die das Gefuhl veranlassen." 
 
 1 Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 301. ^ Id., ib. 310. 
 
IN GEBMASf PHILOSOPHY 349 
 
 The ■will is not a function of the brain, but it is 
 of purely mental origin. The common control of 
 the various motor centres requires something more 
 than a mere physiological unity. 
 
 Lotze defends a doctrine of the freedom of the 
 will. There is a general belief that man has the 
 freedom of self-determination, — that there is a 
 free activity independent of the natural necessity 
 which governs natural conditions. All our spirit- 
 ual existence, all worth of our actions, and the value 
 of our own personality, are connected with the idea 
 of freedom. And yet it must be admitted that 
 empirically we do not gain such a knowledge of 
 freedom as the importance of the fact seems to 
 demand. While many of our voluntary move- 
 ments seem to be uncaused, yet most of them seem 
 to depend on antecedent states of stimulation and 
 irritation; so that reflection inclines us to the idea 
 that the will must be determined. This is at vari- 
 ance with our moral conceptions with respect to 
 the worth of our actions. But to make moral re- 
 quirements the ground of an argument in favor of 
 freedom is not sufficient, for there are those who 
 make moral requirements the ground of an argu- 
 ment in favor of necessity. Furthermore, the close 
 connection between states of body and states of 
 mind increases this suspicion that the will is condi- 
 tioned. Yet these mechanical antecedents do not 
 at all account for the variety of our inner life, and 
 so do not explain the determination of the will. 
 Materialistic determinism is unthinkable. In any 
 event the principle of the plurality of cause forbids 
 
350 THE0BIE8 OP THE WILL 
 
 US to suppose that the mental effect is due directly 
 to a material cause. ^ It must also be considered 
 that the mind itself has properties. We are prone 
 to attribute to will many mental phenomena which 
 are really involuntary, such as the change of ideas 
 in consciousness from one subject to another. Most 
 changes in the direction of thought and feeling are 
 involuntary, and are due to impulse, not to will. 
 Active volition is comparatively rare; the prevail- 
 ing principle of action is impulse from the senses, 
 or from the inner spiritual self. Impulse (Trieb) 
 is not free, but mechanical. Will is not inclina- 
 tion, which is common to man and the lower ani- 
 mals. It is free choice, and the conception of will 
 is almost coincident with that of freedom. The 
 fact of free will cannot be denied. But if we 
 attempt to defend it, or to reduce it to simpler 
 terms, this is found to be impossible. Lotze 
 opposes, on the one hand, the prejudice which 
 finds the freedom of the will inconsistent with the 
 order of nature; for freedom of the will does not 
 mean freedom to accomplish, and God, the author 
 of nature, is absolutely free. Nor does the invaria- 
 bility of causality interfere with the truth of free 
 will. So far from deducing determinism from the 
 law of causality, we should rather modify our law 
 of causality in order to reconcile it with the fact 
 of freedom." 
 
 In his Metaphysics, Lotze characterizes the doc- 
 trine of determinism as an opinion of the scien- 
 tific school (Meinung der wissenschaftslichen Schule), 
 
 1 Lotze, Mikrokosmus, 1. 162 £E. 2 Id., ib. I. 286-289. 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 351 
 
 and holds that the common sense of mankind is a 
 guarantee of the falsity of such a doctrine.* The 
 spirituality of the soul implies the freedom of the 
 will. Yet, while taking this position, he adds that 
 too much emphasis must not be laid upon freedom, 
 in case men lose the clew to the general course of 
 ideas in the active consciousness. The course of 
 nature in general determines the sphere of the 
 will's activity. It is seldom that any individual 
 is sufficient for solving the problems which the 
 general feelings and thoughts of the mass present 
 to him. The man of genius is not, however, the 
 child of circumstances, but is one who through 
 freedom overcomes circumstances. Thus, although 
 human progress is slow, it is changed and furthered 
 by the free voluntary acts of individual men. 
 
 Fechner, who was partly contemporary with 
 Lotze, made a still bolder defence of freedom, 
 which he sought to reconcile with an explicit 
 pantheism. According to him the universe is com- 
 posed of unextended atoms, which are simple in 
 their constitution. The substantial being of both 
 soul and body is made up of these atoms. God 
 and the world are not substantially different, but 
 are the inner and outer aspect respectively of the 
 same being ( Wesen). The world on the one hand 
 is a mass of atoms, and on the other hand is a col- 
 lection of individual self-conscious beings. But 
 all the latter are comprehended in God, and every 
 soul is immanent in the divine substance.' The 
 
 1 Lotze, Metapbysik, 473. 
 
 2 Fechner, Uebei die Seelenfiage, 204-210. 
 
352 THEORIES OP THE WILL 
 
 harmony between the individual and the divine 
 will is sustained by an appeal to certain facts 
 which Lotze had also noticed. Many of our 
 thoughts and feelings, as well as actions, proceed 
 not only independently of our will, but against our 
 will. If we, as voluntary agents, have so many 
 involuntary thoughts and feelings, a fortiori must 
 this be true of God; and just as our involuntary 
 acts are possible, so it is possible for beings which 
 are immanent in God to will without his will, or 
 even in opposition to his will. Freedom is as 
 conceivable upon the supposition that the soul has 
 its being in God, as if it is supposed to have an 
 independent existence. And as our wills are not 
 the same with the will of God, so God is not re- 
 sponsible for our misdeeds. As for the will of God, 
 it accomplishes not what is best for certain men 
 individually, but what is suitable for men collec- 
 tively. To use the phraseology of Bentham, God 
 wills "for the greatest happiness of the greatest 
 number." 
 
 The theory of Lotze brings ns virtually to con- 
 temporary philosophy. From about the middle of 
 the present century, the activity in subjective psy- 
 chology, the fruitful researches in the physiology 
 of the brain and other parts of the nervous system, 
 the restatement and new interpretation of the 
 ancient doctrine of natural evolution, have opened 
 new avenues, and have suggested new solutions of 
 many of the older problems. It is not my inten- 
 tion to anticipate in any way conclusions which may 
 
IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 353 
 
 hereafter be drawn with respect to the many points 
 which this progress has brought into prominence. 
 It is plain that no man can hope to defend 
 his doctrines without justifying them, not at the 
 bar of reason only, but also at the tribunal of posi- 
 tive science. For this reason, the work done by 
 Kant must not be forgotten, and yet the work done 
 by Kant must be done over again in a new way. So 
 long as there is a distinction drawn between reason 
 and understanding, so that the conclusions of the 
 latter are not valid in the domain of the former; 
 so long as psychologists are willing to regard the 
 soul as a creation and not a development; and so long 
 as the moralist dictates what we shall think about 
 freedom because of presuppositions as to what we 
 ought to think about freedom, — so long must the 
 way of progress lie through destructive criticism 
 to a clearer recognition of the facts and laws of 
 nature. It is to be hoped that the confusion which 
 a speculative philosophy has occasioned in psycho- 
 logical science, having been partly removed, may 
 eventually disappear. 
 2a . 
 
INDEX OF NAMES 
 
 Academy, The New, 12, 71, 82, 
 
 107. 
 ^nesidemua, 71. 
 iBscbylus, 10, 13, 14. 
 Anazagoras, 21. 
 Anselm, St., 116-126, 139, 157. 
 Aquinas, St. Thomas, 126-141, 
 
 142, 145, 183. 
 Aristotle, 6, 9, 10, 12, 20, 21, 22, 
 
 39-54, 57, 68, 59, 60, 62, 68, 69, 
 
 70, 78, 123, 127, 133, 215, 236, 
 
 290. 
 Atomists, The, 20, 61, 64, 65,66, 
 
 67. 
 Augustine, St., 6, 11, 89, 90, 91, 
 
 105-114, 115, 119, 121, 123, 126, 
 
 136, 139, 145, 157, 227. 
 Avitus, 97. 
 
 Bacon, 158, 169, 160-161, 162. 
 
 Bayle, 72. 
 
 Bentham, 352. 
 
 Berkeley, 173, 187-191, 228. 
 
 Beza, 153. 
 
 Bohme, 290. 
 
 Bramhall, 170. 
 
 Butler, 241. 
 
 Calvin, 90, 91, 142-153, 157, 
 
 165. 
 Carlyle, 15. 
 Carneades, 71, 74. 
 Chrysippus, 69, 61, 64, 69, 70, 71, 
 
 74, 76. 
 
 Chrysostom, St., 148. 
 
 Cicero, 17, 60, 64, 67, 70, 71. 
 
 Clarke, 253. 
 
 Cleanthes, 66. 
 
 Clement of Alexandria, 94-96. 
 
 Ccelestius, 108, 109. 
 
 Collins, 184. 
 
 Comte, 12. 
 
 Condillac, 173, 184, 186-187. 
 
 Courcelles, 167. 
 
 Cousin, 182. 
 
 DemocrituB, 20, 65, 66, 67. 
 Descartes, 6, 216, 216-227, 228, 
 
 234, 235, 242, 244, 250. 
 Diodorus, 68, 69, 70. 
 Dominicans, The, 141. 
 Dn Maistre, 9. 
 Duns Scotus, 141-142. 
 
 Edwards, 153. 
 
 Eleatics, The, 21. 
 
 Empedocles, 20, 22. 
 
 Epictetus, 61. 
 
 Epicureans, The, 6, 12, 16, 20, 
 
 55, 64-«8, 70, 71, 93, 160. 
 Episcopius, 120, 146, 153-167, 
 , 246. 
 
 Erasmus, 142, 144, 146. 
 Eschenmayer, 309. 
 EucUd, 68. 
 
 356 
 
 Fechner, 361-352. 
 
 Fichte, 278, 280-289, 290, 291, 
 
356 
 
 INDEX OF NAMES 
 
 297, 298, 299, 306, 307, 310, 311, 
 316, 319, 325. 
 Franciscans, The, 141. 
 
 Gnostics, The, 78, 89, 90, 93, 96, 
 99, 100, 127. 
 
 Hamilton, 159. 
 
 Hartmann, von, 291, 326, 344. 
 
 Hegel, 12, 278, 279, 280, 290, 
 
 310-325. 
 Heraclitus, 20, 68. 
 Herbart, 341. 
 Herder, 279. 
 Hesiod, 9, 10. 
 Hippolytus, 93. 
 Hobbes, 151, 152, 159, 161-173, 
 
 178, 183, 252, 253, 256. 
 Homer, 8. 
 Hume, 5, 159, 173, 182, 187, 192- 
 
 201, 202, 212, 214, 232, 233, 
 256, 259, 280. 
 
 Irenaens, 92-93. 
 
 Jacobi, 279. 
 
 Jansenists, The, 136, 145, 189. 
 
 Jerome, St., 97, 101-105, 109, 148. 
 
 Johnson, 190. 
 
 Justin Martyr, 91-92. 
 
 Kant, 5, 21, 141, 265, 256, 257- 
 278, 279, 280, 281, 286, 290, 
 298, 317, 318, 319, 324, 325, 
 329, 332, 334, 338, 353. 
 
 Laud, 4. 
 
 Le Clero, 157. 
 
 Leibnitz, 211, 214, 215, 24i-255, 
 
 277, 291, 299, 304, 308. 
 Limborch, 157. 
 Locke, 158, 162, 17.S-184, 187, 
 
 202, 246, 252, 256, 333, 346. 
 Lombard, Peter, 148. 
 Lotze, 256, 340-351. 
 Lucretius, 1, 16, 67, 105. 
 Lather, 142, 144, 146. 
 
 Maimon, 278. 
 
 Malebranche, 215, 227-233, 244, 
 
 248. 
 Manicheans, The, 78, 82, 90, 106, 
 
 107, 127. 
 Marcion,101. 
 Megarics, The, 25, 65, 68. 
 Methodius, 93. 
 Mill, 201. 
 Milton, 4. 
 Molinists, The, 189. 
 
 Origen, 94, 95-98. 
 
 Paul, St., 77, 78-89. 
 Pelagians, The, 89, 90, 101, 107, 
 
 108. 
 Pelagius, 91, 108, 146. 
 Plato, 8, 10, 20, 22, 24, 25-39, 
 
 40, 48, 49, 50, 57, 58, 59, 60, 
 
 78, 79, 93, 95, 99, 279, 290, 
 
 307. 
 Plutarch, 61. 
 Priestley, 184, 212, 213. 
 Prodicus, 21. 
 Protagoras, 66. 
 Pyrrho, 74. 
 Pythagoreans, The, 19, 20, 26, 
 
 30. 
 
 Regius, 219. 
 Beid, 201-215. 
 
 Schelling, 278, 289-310, 319, 326. 
 
 Schopenhauer, 2, 290, 325-340. 
 
 Schulze, 278. 
 
 Scotists, The, 141, 142. 
 
 Seneca, 11, 56, 62, 63. 
 
 Socrates, 22, 24, 26, 33, 34, 62. 
 
 Sophists, The, 21. 
 
 Sophocles, 13. 
 
 Spinoza, 5, 92, 126, 155, 158, 183, 
 214, 215, 216, 218, 227, 233- 
 244, 248, 252, 253, 279, 280, 
 299, 302, 303, 311, 329. 
 
 StlUingfleet, 182. 
 
INDEX OF NAMES 
 
 357 
 
 Stobaeus, 62. 
 
 Stoics, The, 20, 61, 53, 65-64, 71, 
 79, 91, 93. 
 
 TertuUian, 98-101. 
 Thomas Aquinas, St. See Aqui- 
 nas. 
 Thomists, The, 111, 142. 
 Timon, 74. 
 
 Twiss, 153. 
 
 Voltaire, 173, 184r-185, 187. 
 
 Wolff, 256, 256, 331. 
 
 Xenophon, 24. 
 
 Zeno, 173. 
 
MAR 7 '.90C 
 MAR 15 19O0 
 
 JAN 10 19 5