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'UT "-TX-TUS HOMI-NXJM, TTA S I M^rLACRA. VULTUS IMDECILLA 
 \C 110RTALL_\ SXrN"T : rORMA VuTLNTIS ^F.TBPLNA: QITAM 
 TH-NTEP^E ET EXPRTMI-:R'E VUi: PER ALIEtTAM MATERIAM 
 ET ARTEM, L-ED TTJIS TFSE MOB.IBLT s p Q S S I S '" 
 
 Tacit Ag-ric, 
 
 r tn. l!>'=Cbv TJl.WznLJijr^. 
 
 ^f-lrM!LL.iW 
 
 ■ Jji-'^OON & C^'illBJlIDGE. :r',:,5. 
 
SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
 FOUXDRD ox 
 THE TEACHING OF THE LATE 
 
 SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE: 
 
 BY THE LATE 
 
 JOSEPH HENRY GREEN, F.R.S. D.CL. 
 
 EDITED, 
 WITH A MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR'S LIFE, 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHN SIMON, F.R.S. 
 
 Medical Officer of Her Majesty' s Privy Council^ 
 and Surgeon to St. Thomas's Hospital. 
 
 VOLUME I. 
 
 M A C M I L L A N AND CO. 
 
 1865. 
 
'UKn-rnsiTY 
 
 Lll 
 
 
CONTENTS OE VOLUME I. 
 
 PART FIRST. 
 
 OF THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES AND PROCESSES WHICH ARE 
 CONCERNED IN THE INVESTIGATION OF TRUTH. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Section I. — The Speculative Reason and its work ... 1 
 
 „ II, — The Understanding, or Discourse of Reason . 4 
 
 Subsection A. — The Sense and Senses 18 
 
 „ B. — Generalization 20 
 
 „ C. — Reasoning or Sylloge 32 
 
 D.— Induction 100 
 
 PART SECOND. 
 
 OF FIRST PRINCIPLES IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Chapter I. — Introductory and Recapitulatory ..... 165 
 
 „ II.— The Will, as the ultimate fact of Self- 
 Consciousness .... 179 
 
IV CONTENTS. 
 
 PAET SECOND {continued). 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Chapter III.— Ideas , ; 194 
 
 „ IV. — Dialectic, or the Polar Logic, and its office in 
 
 the conversion of Conceptions into Ideas . 245 
 
 jj V. — The Soul, as the total sphere of being of 
 
 the Will 283 
 
MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR. 
 
MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR'S LIFE. 
 
 Mrs. Geeen has done me the honour of desiring me to 
 see through the press the following posthumous work of 
 mj very dear friend and master, her late husband. And it 
 is part of her wish that, in introduction to the work, and 
 in explanation of the circumstances under which it was 
 written, I should briefly tell the story of the Author's life, 
 and describe, so far as I can, what influence he aimed at 
 exerting in his generation, and what manner of man he 
 seemed to those who had the happiness of being nearest 
 to him. 
 
 Joseph Henry Green was born in London on the 1st Birth and 
 of November, 1791 ; and after seventy-two years of life, ®** * 
 during which his powers and virtues won for him the 
 highest honours possible to his particular career, he died 
 at Hadley, Middlesex, leaving no issue, on the 13th of 
 December, 1863. 
 
 He was the only son of his parents. The father. Parentage. 
 Joseph, was a merchant of high standing in the city 
 of London.* The mother, Frances, was sister of 
 
 * Eventually he was known as the head of the firm of Green and 
 Ross, of Martin's Lane, Cannon Street ; but in 1791 he was carrying 
 on his business without a partner at No. 11, London Wall, where also 
 he then had his residence, and where the subject of this memoir was 
 born. 
 
 VOL. L b 
 
11 MEMOra OF THE AUTHOR S MFE. 
 
 Mr. Cline ; who, at the end of the last century, had 
 already attained the place, which he long afterwards 
 held, in the very foremost rank of English surgeons.* 
 
 From at least one side of this parentage, Mr. Green 
 may well have inherited more than common qualities of 
 mind. His father, indeed, though, said to have been 
 ardent and vigorous in what he had to do, is more 
 emphatically described to me as having been one of 
 the kindliest of men, and quite child-like in the sim- 
 plicity and unworldliness of his nature. But the mother's 
 character was certainly of exceptional strength. Even 
 to the end of her very long life, her conversation and 
 aspect (the latter strikingly like her son's) conveyed 
 the impression, not only of intelligence and education, 
 but of a naturally firm, self-possessed, reflective, tran- 
 quil mind. And in her brother, Mr. Cline, there 
 were marked qualities of the same class ; not only 
 the intellectual gifts which suflSced for his professional 
 success ; but a certain grand composure and elevation of 
 character, which filled his friends and pupils with an 
 almost religious faith in him, and which, when all who 
 remember him have passed away, will still be on record 
 in one of Chantrey's favourite works — that admirable bust, 
 which Coleridge, when he was talking of the origin of 
 mankind, was often glad to apostrophise f as in itself a 
 sufficient refutation of Lord Monboddo. 
 
 * Mr. Joseph Green died in 1S34, at the age of sixty-nine; but his 
 widow lived to complete ninety yeai-s of age, and died only ten years 
 before her son. Mr. Cline by his own marriage, as well as by bis 
 sister's, was closely connected with the Green family, having married 
 a half-sister of Mr. Joseph Green. 
 
 t "And did that man's ancestor dwell in trees — ? " &c. 
 
MEMOIR OF THE ATJTHOK S LIPE. HI 
 
 From birth onward, the boy had all the educational Early 
 
 educa^ 
 
 and other advantages which ample wealth can command, tion. 
 Both because he was his parents' sole child, and also 
 because he was born of exceedingly delicate constitution, 
 his young life was the object of supreme care. But the 
 vigilance of his parents was as great for his moral and 
 intellectual, as for his bodily, well-being ; and doubtless 
 in the former respects they found that nature had given 
 them a very apt soil for cultivation. For health-reasons 
 he was sent to Ramsgate to get his first years of schooling. 
 Afterwards he was for some years at the Reverend Dr. 
 Attwood's, at Hammersmith, — a school which in those 
 days was held in very high repute. And then, at the age 
 of fifteen, he went for further education to Germany, 
 where he studied in various places (chiefly in Hanover) for 
 about three years. In illustration of the care which his 
 parents had for him, it may be noted that during these 
 three years his mother also resided in Germany, joined 
 only at intervals by her husband ; and that, according to 
 her son's educational movements, she changed her resi- 
 dence from place to place, so as always to reside in the 
 town where he was lodging with his teacher. Concerning 
 the details of his primary education I know nothing ; but 
 I know that the result was to make him at an early age 
 remarkable for his information and accomplishments, and 
 to give him those habits of methodical industry and deli- 
 berate reflection and conscientiousness which marked him 
 till the end of his career. 
 
 Towards the close of 1809, retummg to England, he was Medical 
 ,_ ,^n n CH it' 1 education 
 
 apprenticed at the Royal College ot burgeons to his uncle, and its 
 
 f ii*PTiTn 
 
 Mr. Cline. Mr. Cline was Surgeon to St. Thomas's Hospital, stances. 
 
 b 2 
 
iv MEMOIK or THE AUTHOR S MFE. 
 
 And so the apprentice began his medical studies at that 
 hospital, of which afterwards he was himself to become 
 the honored head and ornament. Better security could 
 not have been found for his future professional eminence, 
 than that he should thus begin technical work with the 
 advantage of a first-rate preliminary education, and follow 
 it under the judicious and vigilant guidance of one who 
 was himself a great master,* 
 
 Mr. Cline knew enough of the freemasonry of fellow- 
 studentship to be anxious that his nephew's first ac- 
 quaintances at St. Thomas's should be of the right sort. 
 And the first thing which he did for him, in taking him to 
 the hospital, was to introduce him to an elder student, 
 a " dresser " of his own, of whom he had a high opinion, 
 which the young man's after-career well justified. The 
 fellow-student to whom the beginner was thus particularly 
 introduced, and with whom he soon formed the closest of 
 friendships, was William Hammond, son of a surgeon of 
 the same name then in large practice at Southgate and 
 Whetstone. And the friendship was an eventful one to 
 the subject of the present memoir ; for, through it, Mr, 
 Green became intimate in the family-circle of his friend, 
 and there had the good fortune of learning to know, in his 
 friend's sister, the lady who afterwards became his wife. 
 
 Mftrriage. There had been till about this time a rule at the College 
 of Surgeons that no apprentice of the College might marry. 
 But in 1813 the rule was opportunely repealed. And on 
 the 25th of May of this year, Mr. Green (whose term of 
 
 * Li 1813 Mr. Cline resigned his surgeonship at St. Thomas's, and 
 was succeeded by his son, Mr. Heniy Cline, who from that time, so far 
 as the hospital was concerned, undertook the direction of his father's 
 
 apprentices. 
 
MEMOIR or THE ATJTHOK's LirE. V 
 
 apprenticeship was as yet little more than half out) was 
 married to Miss Anne Eliza Hammond. From this event 
 he dated the more than fifty years of perfect domestic 
 happiness and serenity which best favoured the peculiar 
 tenor of his life. From it he also gained what to him (an 
 only son) was the very great incidental advantage of 
 alliance with a large and most estimable family ; with the 
 members of which many of his happiest hours of relaxa- 
 tion were henceforth to be passed ; and among whom 
 and whose descendents, he, till the end of his life, was 
 entirely loved and trusted and reverenced. 
 
 For more than two years after his marriage, Mr. Green, Early pro- 
 still a student and dresser at the hospital, lived at his iffe?°^^ 
 father's business-house, No. 6, Martin's Lane. But on 
 the 1st of December, 1815, he obtained the diploma of 
 the College of Surgeons, and now began the practice of 
 his profession in Lincoln's-Inn Fields, — where (first at 
 No. 22, and afterwards at No. 46) he lived for the next 
 twenty years of his life. 
 
 In 1816 he obtained his first ofl&cial connexion with the 
 school of St. Thomas's Hospital, by being appointed to 
 the junior and unpaid post of Demonstrator of Anatomy. 
 Tenure of that nominally small office involved, fifty years 
 ago, far more than it now involves. Mr. Green, besides 
 giving his own anatomical demonstrations, had often, in 
 the absence of his seniors, to deliver part of the sys- 
 tematic course of lectures on Anatomy and Surgeiy. And 
 moreover — as the Hospital had not then any regularly- 
 appointed Assistant-Surgeon, he was often called upon to 
 represent in the wards or operating theatre some one of 
 the surgeons who was absent. 
 
VI 
 
 MEMOIR OP THE ATJTHOK S LIFE. 
 
 Course of In the summer of 1817, there was au episode in his life 
 at Berlni/ which, in connexion with the present publication, deserves 
 particular notice. Then, namely, he made an excursion to 
 Berlin, for the purpose of haying from Professor Solger a 
 private course of reading in philosophy.* And through 
 one of the circumstances of that excursion I am enabled 
 to give a picture of him as he appeared at that period of 
 his life to one who was well qualified to judge him, Ludwig 
 Tieck, then in his forty-fifth year, and having in German 
 literature an influence which was only second to Goethe's, 
 had been paying a visit to London ; and the circumstances 
 of Mr. Green's expedition to Berlin are told in a letter which 
 Tieck wrote to Solger on the subject, and which happens 
 to be in print among Solger s literary remains.f " My chief 
 " object in writing to you now (Paris, July 26) is a matter 
 " about which I would have written from London, but 
 '^ that the end of my stay there was spent in the utmost 
 ** confusion, and without a minute's leisure or quiet. My 
 " point is this. I made acquaiutance in London Avith a 
 " young man of the name of Green, who sought me out, 
 " and at once fastened on me with a fine kind of faith. He 
 " is full of a noble eagerness for knowledge, has studied 
 " German philosophy as far as his youth and his distance 
 '' from us would permit, and is now just in that stage of 
 " development which is the most interesting and the most 
 *' critical in life. It had been his wish to go to Germany, 
 " in order to see things for himself, and especially to get 
 
 * It is probably superfluous for me to state,— but for fear of any 
 possible uncertainty I think it well explicitly to do so,— that always, 
 except where inconsistent with the context, I use the word philosophy 
 in its widest sense, as co-inclusive of theology and ethics. 
 
 t Solger's nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel ; herausgegeben 
 von L. Tieck und P. v. Eaumer, vol. i. pp. 550—52. See also p. 557. 
 
MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR S LIPE. VU 
 
 " more exact information about the history of our modern 
 " philosophy ; but, having been appointed a teacher of 
 " anatomy in London, he had resigned himself to deferring 
 " for years the realisation of that hope. In the talks 
 " which I had with him, your name very naturally was 
 " mentioned ; and what I said about you, and your book 
 *' which I showed my young friend, all filled him Avith the 
 " most enthusiastic desire of knowing you in person. 
 " Suddenly he made up his mind that before October lie 
 *' would go to Berlin to see you. Meanwhile I had to go 
 " for a trip into the country, and when I came back after 
 '' a fortnight's absence, he, to my surprise, had already 
 " started — so strong was his attraction towards Germany 
 ** and yourself We had agreed that I was to give him a 
 " letter to you, to explain what he had at heart, and par- 
 " ticularly to ask you if you could not perhaps manage to 
 " give him a course — privatissimtim — in the history of 
 " philosophy. I am now more than a day after the fair, 
 " but even if I had written from London (which was quite 
 *' impossible) my letter would hardly have reached you 
 " before his arrival. Of course before now you have made 
 " acquaintance with this loveable young man, and I 
 " heartily hope you have, somehow or other, been able 
 " to satisfy his burning thirst for knowledge. Few men 
 " are as much in earnest about it as he is ; and with 
 " him this is the more noticeable because so few of his 
 " countrymen can understand one's caring a bit about 
 " the matter unless for some collateral object. I entreat 
 " you to do what you can towards fulfilling his wishes, for 
 " I feel sure that no one but you — -with your largeness, 
 " solidity, and clearness — can help him. Green can at 
 " least get thus much, that afterwards he will be able to 
 
viii MEMom oe the author s mee. 
 
 " work at home with more confidence and success ; and, 
 " believe me, he is worth a good and wise man's taking 
 " trouble for him. This is what I had to beg of you. 
 " You must forgive me if I am tempted to send you 
 ^' young men. There are so many occasions when it 
 " comes naturally to me to speak to them of my reverence 
 " for your intellect, and of my friendship and love for you. 
 " How your book has delighted me !" 
 
 In this expedition to Berlin, Mr, Green was accompanied 
 
 by his wife ; and on their way back to England they loitered 
 
 a little, in order to renew, both together, the pleasant 
 
 associations which he had formed during his former long 
 
 stay in North Germany. Meanwhile the object of the 
 
 visit to Berlin (where Tieck had afterwards joined them) 
 
 had been well attained.* 
 
 First ac- And here I may note that before this time Mr. 
 
 with^cX.^ Green's acquaintance with Coleridge had begun, though 
 
 "*^^®* certainly as yet it was not intimate. I cannot learn 
 
 the exact date or circumstances of its commencement. 
 
 But Tieck's visit to England (during which he and Cole- 
 
 * That Mr, Green produced on Solger the same sort of impression as he 
 had produced on Tieck, may be gathered from a slight allusion to him 
 which Solger makes in a letter to Tieck shortly after the breaking-up of 
 their party : — " Not long after you left us, who should come but a 
 " ^Frenchman — M. Cousin, Professor of Philosophy at the University of 
 " Paris, who was making a philosophical tour through Germany, in 
 " order to learn here for himself something of our state of affairs. It 
 " was a sore change from our gallant Green, who had left us the day after 
 " you went. One of M. Cousin's first questions was — Monsieur, quel 
 " est voire systeme ? He was often with me during the week or fort- 
 " night of his stay, and I found it the very devil to have to philosophise 
 " with him in Erench, Yet I didn't dislike his being here. He was 
 " more earnest than most IVenchmen, and told me lots of interestino' 
 " things about politics and literature in France." 
 
MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOK S LIFE. IX 
 
 ridge met more than once at Mr. Green's house) must 
 greatly have promoted the intimacy, if it did not actually 
 occasion the first acquaintance, between Coleridge and 
 his future disciple. 
 
 Early in 1820 Mr. Henry Cline (who, eight years before, Promotion 
 had succeeded his father as Surgeon to St. Thomas's Thomas's 
 
 Hospital. 
 
 Hospital) died unexpectedly when only 39 years old. On 
 the 27th of May Mr. Green was elected to the vacant 
 Surgeonship, and thereupon became associated with Sir 
 Astley Cooper as joint Lecturer on Anatomy and Surgery. 
 Already his Demonstratorship of Anatomy had brought 
 him before the profession as a writer; for he had pub- 
 lished (first anonymously, under the title of Outlines of 
 a Course of Dissections, and afterwards, with his name, 
 under the title of The Dissector's Manual) two editions 
 of a handbook of dissecting-room anatomy. This book — 
 which, by-the-bye, is remarkably compendious and exact, 
 and is illustrated by plates of more than average useful- 
 ness, has long been superseded by other more developed 
 works of the same kind ; but it deserves notice that 
 Mr. Green's manual was the first of such attempts to 
 provide in our literature for a very evident want of the 
 medical student, and that it became the pattern to a long 
 and valuable train of successors. The concluding para- 
 graph of the preface is, I think, worth quoting here as an 
 illustration of the tone of Mr. Green's teaching at that 
 period of his career: — ''In whatever age or country the 
 " knowledge of Anatomy has been absent, medical science 
 " has existed in one or other of two extremes : it has either 
 " groped in detail with a blind empiricism, or blundered 
 "by wholesale with a dreaming and presumptuous arro- 
 
X MEMOIR OP THE ArTHOu'S LIEE. 
 
 "gance ; in the one case sinking below experience ; in the 
 ^' other, soaring above it into the empty regions of ab- 
 " straction. That we are enabled to take the middle path, 
 " we owe to the courage and industry of the great anato- 
 '* mists before us, more than to any other single cause. 
 *'But there is one use to be derived from the study as at 
 *' present pursued, which is negative indeed, but of scarcely 
 " less importance to the students as men, than the other 
 "and positive uses are to them as medical practitioners. 
 ''By serious reflection on what Anatomy has not taught, 
 " and what no Anatomy ever can teach us, the great laws 
 ''of life, we learn not to over-value the senses so as to 
 *' forget the higher faculties of our nature, at the very time 
 " that we are most sensible that it is only by combining 
 "these with the exercise of the senses, that we can exert 
 " ourselves to any purposes of utility or of duty in that 
 ''world of the senses which is the appointed sphere of 
 "both." 
 
 Profes- Mr. Green's merits now began to make rapid way in 
 
 gress. procuring him the confidence of his profession and the 
 
 pubHc. In 1824 he was appointed Professor of Anatomy 
 to the Royal College of Surgeons, and delivered twelve 
 lectures at the College — the first section of a compre- 
 hensive course (to be extended over four years) on the 
 Comparative Anatomy of the Animal Kingdom. In 1825 
 he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society, Also in 
 1825 he was appointed Professor of Anatomy to the 
 Royal Academy, and in the last months of that year 
 delivered in Somerset House, where the Academy then 
 had its rooms, the first of a long succession of annual 
 courses (to which I shall presently again refer) on Anatomy 
 
MEMOm or THE AUTHOR S LIEE. XI 
 
 in its relation to the Fine Arts. Ere now, too, lie had 
 acquired a considerable and increasing share in the private 
 practice of his profession. 
 
 Before I speak in detail of the courses of lectures which Schism 
 date from 1824 and 1825, I am obliged to note in passing Borough 
 that the year 1825 had one less pleasant association. In school. 
 January, in the middle of the medical session, Sir A. 
 Cooper (influenced, I believe, by some unfounded alarm 
 as to the state of his health) had abruptly resigned his 
 share of the anatomical and surgical lectures at St. 
 Thomas's Hospital, and had proposed to obtain for his 
 nephews, Mr, Key and Mr. Bransby Cooper, the suc- 
 cession to his share of this important "partnership." But 
 though Mr. Green seconded Sir Astley's recommendations 
 in the matter, the authorities of the Hospital would not 
 appoint Mr. Bransby Cooper to the share proposed for 
 him in this arrangement. Hereupon Sir Astley Cooper, 
 getting very angry in his disappointment, determined, with 
 his nephews, to create at Guy's Hospital (which had 
 hitherto been practically one with St. Thomas's) a separate 
 lecturing establishment in rivalry with the school which 
 he had left ; and, as a museum was necessary for this 
 purpose, he proposed to carry away from St. Thomas's 
 half of the partnership-museum which was there as the 
 necessary apparatus of instruction. In his anger he 
 forgot that the articles of agreement, under which he had 
 been lecturing for the last two-and-twenty years, were 
 framed with very particular stringency against any division 
 of the museum; i.e. the museum was to "form one in- 
 separable collection," and, if either of the two proprietors 
 died or became incapable of teaching, his share in the 
 
Xii MEMOIR OP THE AUTHOU'S LIFE. 
 
 museum was to devolve on the survivor, and be paid 
 for by a fixed sum of money. That Sir Astley's claim was 
 altogether untenable under the agreement, and that it 
 was one which could not properly be conceded, was, I 
 think, what any dispassionate person might have seen at 
 a single glance. But Sir Astley and his nephews were 
 not dispassionate. And they wrote and said a great deal 
 which they must soon have wished unwritten and unsaid. 
 And the quarrel extended to the governments of the two 
 hospitals. And at last Mr. Green, after months of ex- 
 treme provocation borne with the utmost patience, had no 
 alternative but to publish a pamphlet,* in which, with 
 
 * The pamphlet is entitled, A Letter to Sir Astley Cooper, Bart. 
 F.R.S. ^c, on certain, 'proceedings connected with tlie establishment oj 
 an Anatomical and Surgical School at Guy's Hospital. The last page of 
 the letter is so characteristic of the writer, that (as it can not now hurt 
 any one's feelings) I think I may properly subjoin it. " Most anxious 
 "as I have been," he says, "throughout this letter, to avoid every 
 " unnecessary reference to myself, and my own feelings, I yet cannot 
 " conclude it without indulging a complaint that I should thus have 
 " been forced into a contest, alien from my habits and disposition ; and 
 " which, not only without provocation on my part, but in spite of my 
 " most solicitous efforts to prevent or arrest it, has distracted my 
 " attention from my professional duties, and the tranquil pursuits that 
 " would qualify me for their honourable fulfilment. Erom my first 
 " admission into the profession, it has been my deepest conviction that 
 *' there exist but two ways by which the high rank which our pro- 
 " fession now enjoys in the estimation of the coimtry can be main- 
 *^ tained ; first, its intimate connexion with the hberal sciences, cultivated 
 " without hire or compulsion, on the score of their own worth and dig- 
 " nifying influences ; and secondly, by the correspondent conduct and 
 " character of its individual members. It was these that first acquired 
 " for us the title and privileges of Gentlemen : and by these alone can 
 " we hope to retain the name. Without these adjuncts, surgery itself, 
 " great and irresistible as its claims are on the ground of utility, would 
 " still be what it once was, and its name still implies — Chirurgery, 
 
MEMOIR OP THE AUTHOR S LIFE. XIU 
 
 admirable temper and dignity, he fully vindicated his own 
 position in the matter, and took Sir Astley Cooper very 
 gravely to task for the course which he had followed. 
 This pamphlet was left unanswered, and was in fact 
 unanswerable. I believe that at last the justice of Mr. 
 Green's view was conceded even by his opponents. At 
 all events, after some years, perfectly cordial relations 
 were re-established between him and them ;* — Sir Astley 
 always treating him with marked distinction, and Mr. 
 Bransby Cooper in particular always evincing the warmest 
 liking as well as respect for him. 
 
 Of Mr, Green's Lectures on the Animal Kingdom, deli- Lectures 
 vered at the Royal College of Surgeons in the years 1824 — College of 
 1827, I cannot from my own knowledge venture to speak. 
 
 " Handicraft, a Trade. Skill in a trade, however great it may be, can 
 " confer no claim to the name of Gentleman on men whose conduct 
 " gives proof that their motives and objects are those of mere tradesmen. 
 " But we, Sixj have pledged ourselves by a pubKc and solemn oathj thus 
 " addressed to us : — ' You swear that you will demean yourself honour- 
 " ably in the practice of your profession; and, to the utmost of your 
 " power, maintain the dignity and welfare of the college. So help you 
 " God!' And I can most truly affirm that I have written this letter 
 " under the conviction that the verdict which society shall give on our 
 ^' fidehty and strict adherence to this oath, is the most important and 
 " sole permanent result of the pubHcity by which this dissension has 
 " been so injudiciously aggravated, in opposition alike to the wishes and 
 " judgment of J. H. G." 
 
 * I have reason to believe that the reconcihation was effected under 
 circumstances equally creditable to both parties. My friend Dr.Whiteley, 
 of Cannes, a St. Thomas's student of those days, who had opportunity 
 of knowing the facts, tells me that the first move towards reconciliation 
 was made by the Coopers in 1827, under influence of the enthusiasm of 
 admiration to which they were moved by Mr. Green's opening of his last 
 set of lectures at the College of Surgeons. 
 
xiv MEMom or the authou s life. 
 
 They were given long before I was even a student of the 
 profession; and with exception of some fragments, hereafter 
 to be mentioned, nothing of them has appeared in print ; 
 nor in manuscript have I seen more of them than the 
 two eminently interesting lectures which related to the 
 Natural History of Man. But my own want of information 
 on the subject is far more than compensated by my having 
 the opportunity of inserting here the following extract 
 from a letter with which Professor Owen has had the 
 kindness to favor me, stating his recollection of the 
 lectures. " With reference to the course of Lectures which 
 " that noble and great intellect raised and honoured our 
 " Surgeons' College by delivering in its theatre, the first 
 " characteristic (in the use of the Historian of Zootomy) 
 "of this course — extended over 4 years — is that it em- 
 " braced the entire range of the Science. For the first 
 " time in England the comparative Anatomy of the whole 
 " Animal Kingdom was described, and illustrated by such 
 "a series of enlarged and coloured diagrams as had never 
 " before been seen. The vast array of facts was linked by 
 " reference to the underlying Unity, as it had been advo- 
 " cated and illustrated by Oken and Carus. The Compa- 
 "rative Anatomy of the latter was the text-book of the 
 " course. Dr. Barclay had given summer courses on Com- 
 "parative Anatomy, at Edinburgh, aiming at completeness 
 " but fragmentary in the Invertebrate part. Mr. Green gave 
 " the first complete course in this country, commencing in 
 
 " 1824 I heard the first as a Medical Student, and 
 
 "the two last [Aves and Mammalia) as an Assistant, 
 "being then attached to the Museum. 
 
 "Every previous Professor of Anatomy liad given some 
 " part or fragment of Zootomy in relation to his special 
 
MEMOIR OE THE AUTHOU'S LIFE. XV 
 
 " physiological or teleological views : Mr. Green's course 
 " combined the totality, with the unity of the higher philo- 
 " sophy, of the Science ; so far as the latter had been then 
 "based upon embryological and other researches. To 
 " such researches, facts or bodies of facts, I am not aware 
 " that Mr. Green added anything notable. Many dissections 
 "were made by his Assistants (Cane, Canton, W. H.Clift, 
 " and myself in 1826 and 1827) but they were to illustrate 
 "known organizations, or as subjects for the diagrams. 
 " The then want of knowledge of the species which 
 " Hunter had dissected, and derived preparations from, 
 "was keenly felt; and the general terms * sea-slug,* 
 " * priapism,' 'Banks's odd fish,' &c. &c., were quaintly 
 " and characteristically quizzed by Green, while thoroughly 
 " appreciating and admiring the perspicuity of the ex- 
 " position of structures in the preparations ; and he used 
 " to lament that he could make so little use of the physio- 
 " logical series in its then uncatalogued state. Green 
 " illustrated in this grand Course (12 Lectures per annum) 
 " Caeus rather than Hunter : the dawning philosophy 
 " of Anatomy in Germany, rather than the teleology which 
 " Abernethy and Carlisle had previously given as Hun- 
 " terian, not knowing their master." 
 
 Of Mr. Green's lectures at the Royal Academy (where Lectures 
 he retained his professorship till 1852) I can speak from Royal 
 my own recollection, as having attended several of the ^ ^"^^* 
 courses ; and to this I am glad to add that all the more 
 important lectures which I heard are still existing in 
 manuscript.* 
 
 * Two of them, on Beauty and ExpressioDj were published in the 
 AtJienoium, of Dec. 16th and Dec. 23d, 1843. 
 
Xvi MEMOIK OF THE AUTHOU's LIFE. 
 
 His teaching at the Royal Academy, like all his teaching, 
 was characterised by a very deep-going and comprehensive 
 treatment of his subject. He recognised of course that 
 the details of anatomy (even of mere artistic surface- 
 anatomy) could not be adequately spoten of, much less 
 conveyed, in the six formal lectures which he had annually 
 to deliver. He knew, on the contrary, that the art- 
 student who would learn anatomy must do so, if not 
 with actual dissection, at least with reiterated mani- 
 pulation, as well as inspection, of his model, — helped 
 perhaps by familiar interchange of question and answer 
 with his teacher, but essentially advanced by dwelling 
 for himself prolixly on part after part, and by scruti- 
 nizing for himself again and again with eye and hand 
 every fact of form and texture. And seeing all this, he 
 did not attempt what would have been impossible, nor 
 aim at sending away the more superficial of his auditors 
 with a belief that in six short lessons they had learnt 
 what only long personal study could give them. Pre- 
 eminently he sought to impress on the art-students who 
 listened to him the spirit rather than the diagrams, the 
 hermeneutics rather than the chapters and verses, of 
 anatomy. Not indeed that he omitted to survey, or 
 surveyed otherwise than admirably, the composition and 
 mechanism of the human body ; and perhaps no mere 
 anatomist ever taught more effectively than he, what are 
 the bodily materials and arrangement which represent 
 the aptitude for strength and equipoise and grace, or what 
 respective shares are contributed by bone, muscle and 
 tegument, to the various visible phenomena of fonn and 
 gesture and attitude and action. But to this he did not 
 confine himself. Specially in the one or two introductory 
 
MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR S LIFE. XVll 
 
 or closing lectures of each course, but at times also by 
 digression in other lectures, he set before his hearers tliat 
 which to them as Artists was matter of at least equal 
 concern — the science of interpreting human expression 
 and appreciating human beauty. His discourses on 
 these subjects were very deeply considered. Necessarily 
 they were of wide philosophical range. And they were 
 enriched with numberless illustrative references to the 
 history of Art, and to the master-works of ancient and 
 modern sculpture and painting. Thus at one time, going 
 to the very root of Esthetics with a thoroughness which 
 is not too familiar to English ears, he would discuss the 
 conditions, objective and subjective, under which the 
 sense of beauty arises, and particularly the mental 
 faculties which are concerned in artistic production and 
 enjoyment. At another time, having to speak pathogno- 
 mically of the human emotions and passions, having 
 to follow them one by one in their operance — first as 
 affecting the vital organs of breathing and blood-moving, 
 and then as producing (through those organs) the re- 
 spective changes of expression which outwardly mark their 
 domination, — he would begin by speaking as a Psychologist 
 of the normal balance of the human soul, and of the 
 conditions of its excitability in pain or pleasure, and of the 
 dynamics of its disturbance or self-control. And in such 
 a lecture he would help and quicken his argument, 
 perhaps by quoting as illustrations the aptest word-pictures 
 of emotion from Shakspeare and Milton, or perhaps by 
 analysing the pathognomical merits of Lionardo's master- 
 piece which hung in copy before him. At another time, 
 lecturing on the sesthetical significance of the proportions 
 of the human body, but not counselling a revival of 
 VOL. T. c 
 
XViii MEMOIU OF THE AUTHOH'S LIFE. 
 
 the so-called Canon of Polycleitus, he would derive from 
 the Greek Pantheon all the illustrations of his lecture, 
 and, going to the spiritual roots of the mythology, would 
 discuss what various conceptions of power and beauty 
 and enjoyment underlay the Attic Sculptor's endeavour to 
 represent the " fair humanities " of his religion. 
 
 Mr. Green's courses of lectures at the Royal Academy 
 were always attended by very large and very attentive audi- 
 ences, and, to all but the least intelligent of his hearers, 
 must, I think, have been sources of most valuable in- 
 formation and suggestion. On more than one occasion (as 
 I see by memoranda which he left) he contemplated pub- 
 lishing a revised selection of them as a System of Artistic 
 Anatomy. And though exactly that thing might not now 
 be feasible, yet doubtless the finished papers which he has 
 left would furnish a very interesting volume of lectures. 
 
 Connexion In 1830, when King's College was established, Mr. 
 
 with 
 
 King's Green was nominated Professor of Surgery in that in- 
 ° * stitution. He thereupon resigned his chair of Surgery 
 (though he retained his post as Surgeon) at St. Thomas's 
 Hospital, and in 1831, when the College began to receive 
 pupils, commenced his first course of lectures at the 
 College. He held his professorship there till 1836, when, 
 resigning it, he was elected a member of the governing 
 Council of the College, which position he retained till his 
 death. In connexion with his professorship at King's 
 College, it devolved upon him in 1832 to deliver, on 
 behalf of the professorial body, the opening address of 
 the medical session. This address (afterwards published) * 
 was in great part founded on the views concerning the 
 * London, B. Tellowes, 1833; pp. 43. 
 
MEMOIK OI' THE AUTHOE, S LIFE. XIX 
 
 Clerisy or National Church which Coleridge had then 
 recently advanced in his work on the Constitution of 
 Church and State. It treated of the three chief pro- 
 fessions — the Legal, Ecclesiastical and Medical, in their 
 respective relations to the three corresponding sciences of 
 Jurisprudence, Metaphysics (theological and ethical) and 
 Physiology ; and it aimed at exhibiting, both in history 
 and in idea, the relations of the professions to one another, 
 and their joint dependence, through their respective 
 sciences, on the one common trunk and root of Philosophy, 
 — ** by whose unobstructed sap they can alone retain the 
 ''characters of life and growth." From this basis the 
 speaker proceeded to insist on the supreme desirability 
 of having the professions taught in Universities ; — where 
 should be cultivated Philosophy before particular sciences, 
 as the sciences before their respective professions ; — where, 
 as brethren of one household, the alumni should be bred 
 in one common law of honour, and of self-respect, and 
 of respect for each other as fellow-collegians, and of 
 contempt for all tricks and shams and shows ; — and where, 
 by the sense of a common derivation, and the fraternising 
 habits of a common training, the candidates of all the 
 liberal professions would be prepared for future re-union 
 as a national learned class, " every member and offset 
 " of which will be enabled and disposed to regard the 
 "practitioner of another profession in the same district 
 " as a brother — as a co-operator in a different direction 
 " to the same end, whose authority and whose influence, 
 " whenever rightly exerted, he is bound by duty, and pre- 
 " pared by impulse, to support and render effectual." By 
 those who heard it, this address is likely to be still re- 
 membered as a wonderful oratorical display. It seemed 
 
 c2 
 
XX 
 
 MEMOIK OF THE AXJTHOB's MI^E. 
 
 one 
 
 _„_ continuous flow of lofty argumeDtatire eloquence, and 
 the delivery of it was singularly earnest and eflfective. 
 To the youths who then first heard Mr. Green, it was 
 as the opening of a new world. The writer of the present 
 Memoir was among them— then a very unformed lad, 
 looking forward to become in another year one of Mr. 
 Green's surgical apprentices. To him, though now nearly a 
 third part of a century has since elapsed, the impression is 
 still vivid that there was his momentous first perception of 
 noble faculties being nobly exercised. And though so many 
 years have passed, he still turns with delight to the printed 
 pages of that address, not only for its momentary power 
 to conjure back, as in bodily presence, the honoured 
 teacher who spoke it, but ever also for the thoughts 
 which are in it — comprehensive and wise and elevated. 
 
 The five courses of Surgical Lectures which Mr, Green 
 delivered at King's College were models of systematised 
 technical teaching. With admirable method and lucidity 
 and completeness, and with the nice discrimination and 
 guardedness which his own large experience suggested to 
 him, he taught us, up to the knowledge-level of the hour 
 when he spoke, the principles of Surgical Pathology and 
 Practice. And this was not all. In an editorial article which 
 on occasion of Mr. Green's death appeared in one of our 
 medical journals, and which I probably am not wrong in 
 attributing to a gentleman, now of standing in the pro- 
 fession, who was formerly among the most intelligent 
 students in the medical school of King's College, — the writer 
 truly observes : — ^" It is impossible to overrate the influence 
 " for good which such a teacher must have exerted over the 
 " minds — say, rather, over the whole hearts and being of 
 " the hundreds of young men who flocked to his teaching* 
 
MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR S LIFE. XXI 
 
 " Whilst ostensibly learning the principles of surgery, they 
 " were imbibing lessons of life and manners, taste, philo- 
 " sophy and morals ; they were taught the awful responsi- 
 " bility of their calling ; they were indoctrinated with 
 " sentiments of the highest honour."* 
 
 Postponing for the present any mention of certain im- CouncU- 
 portant non-professional influences which were now tending th?Cone<Te 
 to affect Mr. Green's future career, I may here conveniently Lons^ 
 advert to his participation (which began in 1835) in the 
 disciplinary government of his branch of the Medical Pro- 
 fession. In 1835, the Council of the Royal College of 
 Surgeons voted him (and it was for life) into their body. 
 In 1846 he succeeded to a seat, which was also for life, at 
 the Board of Examiners at the College, Twice in after- 
 years he filled the annual office of President of the College, 
 —namely in the years 1849-50 and 1858-9. Twice also, 
 namely in 1840 and 1847, he appeared before the College 
 as Hunterian Orator. 
 
 Of the part taken by him in the councils of the College 
 during the eighteen years for which he had a voice in 
 them, I can speak only in the most general terms. The 
 meetings of the College Council are held in private ; and, 
 whatever I may have heard of differences of opinion at 
 those meetings, I have no means of which I c^n publicly 
 avail myself for separating Mr. Green's individual conduct 
 there from the overt official acts of the body. For reasons 
 which members of my profession can well appreciate, I 
 wish that I could exhibit such a separation. As it is, 
 I must content myself with referring to his published 
 opinions in matters of medical polity ; — for no one who 
 * Medical Times and Gazette, Pecember 19th, 1863, 
 
Xxii MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR's LIFE. 
 
 had any acquaintance with him will doubt but that in the 
 secret Councils of the College his voice was uniformly 
 raised in the sense of those published opinions. Particu- 
 larly I may refer to a pamphlet which he published in 
 1841, under the title of Touchstone of Medical Reform, 
 containing three letters addressed by him to Sir Robert 
 Harry Inglis, then member for the University of Oxford ;* 
 and I may also refer to the opinions which on various 
 occasions he expressed before such Parliamentary Com- 
 mittees as were taking evidence on questions of medical 
 reform. Always he will be seen holding up to the pro- 
 fession and to the public the highest conceivable standards 
 of professional excellence, and always advocating means 
 by which the medical profession might be raised in its 
 education and moral tone. Some of the wishes which 
 lie thus expressed were eventually in part realized, and 
 this, no doubt, much through his exertions. Thus, — that 
 decent preliminary education should be required of all 
 persons purposing to enter the medical profession, was a 
 need which he had earnestly represented for years before 
 it was practically recognised. And again, the amendment 
 which the constitution of the College of Surgeons received 
 from its charter of 1843 was in almost exact accordance 
 with suggestions which he had made, in his pamphlet of 
 1841, for the establishment of a class of Fellows w^ho 
 
 * This was Mr. Green's third appearance as a writer on the subject 
 of Medical Reform. In 1831 he had pubHshed, under the title of 
 Distinction without Separcdion, a Letter to the President of the College 
 of Surgeons, on the then state of the Profession. And in 1834 he pub- 
 lished Suggestions respecting the intended plan of Medical Re/orni, 
 respectfully offered to the Legislature and the Profession. The pam- 
 phlet of 1841, to which I have referred in the text, contains, I think, 
 all that was of permanent interest in the two earher publications. 
 
MEMOIK OF THE AUTHOR S LIPE. XXlll 
 
 (with higher professional qualifications than the mass of 
 Members) should in future be the electors of the Council. 
 Often, on the other hand, his wishes and endeavours were 
 doomed to disappointment. Against those fragmentary 
 professional qualifications, which constitute titles to prac- 
 tise Medicine or Surgery in the United Kingdom, and 
 which distinguish our professional system from that of 
 other civilised countries, — so that we may have Surgeons 
 with no rudiments of medical knowledge, and Physicians 
 or Apothecaries with no rudiments of surgical knowledge, 
 — against this, he, from first to last, protested in vain. And 
 thus, too, I feel sure it must have been in a matter which 
 more specially concerned his own College. For I know it 
 to have been against his judgment, that the Council of 
 the College of Surgeons, charged with the high trust of 
 providing for the due qualification of persons who by that 
 portal shall enter the medical profession, persisted in 
 regarding its own ranks as the only source from which to 
 appoint examiners for this important purpose ; — a view, 
 in which, alas! it still persists, though involving the 
 absurdity and scandal, that persons the most removed 
 from contemporary scientific research (superannuated 
 hospital-surgeons, and the like) are thus the College's sole 
 examiners in those daily-growing sciences of Physiology 
 and Pathology which the College affects to promote in 
 the interests of the profession and the public. 
 
 Among the positive fruits of Mr. Green's Councillorship Huuterian 
 at the College of Surgeons, must be counted his two 
 Hunterian Orations, of which I have now to speak. For 
 the hearing of them, there came together perhaps the 
 most crowded assemblages, which any of our great pro- 
 
XXIV MEMOIR or THE AUTHOR S LIPE. 
 
 fessional ceremonies could attract, of educated and in- 
 fluential persons- And Mr. Green would not willingly 
 waive any so good opportunity of making known what 
 were his views of the broad principles of professional 
 polity and ethics. On both occasions, accordingly, he 
 reminded his hearers what obligations of study, and what 
 moral obligations, have to be fulfilled by the man whose 
 profession is to be distinguishable from a trade. And 
 on both occasions the anniversary permitted him not 
 inaptly to remind the College, that to imitate the unmer- 
 cenary spirit of Hunter's scientific labours is the one 
 effective condition for keeping in force the charters and 
 statutes by which the profession of Surgery has been dis- 
 incorporated from amid the Guild of Barbers. But on 
 neither occasion was it his main object to speak of matters 
 like that, nor could he do so otherwise than in a few 
 emphatic perorational sentences. For each Oration dis- 
 tinctively had its own philosophical object. And con- 
 cerning these respective special objects, I may the rather 
 be allowed to speak here in some detail, as the Orations, 
 in their published form, have now for a long time been 
 out of circulation. 
 
 First Hun- ^ ^^^ ^"^^^ Oration (subsequently published,* with 
 Oratron. Preface and appendices, under the title of Vital Dy- 
 namics) the main object was to discuss the mental 
 faculties and processes which are concerned in scientific 
 discovery, and especially to insist on the import of the 
 pure Reason as the light by which Nature is to be under- 
 stood. He wished (he said) to reconcile the study of 
 Nature with the requirements of our moral being, and to 
 
 * London, Wm. Pickering, 1840; pp. 165. 
 
MEMOIU OP THE AUTHOU S MEE. XXV 
 
 connect science — " which even as the noblest offspring of 
 our intellect is but a fragment of our humanity" — with 
 the philosophy of Coleridge, — a philosophy, he continued, 
 " which, as far as my knowledge extends, pre-eminently, if 
 " not alone, gives life and reality to metaphysical pursuits, 
 " by showing their birth, growth, and requisite foundation 
 " in the whole man, head and heart." The Oration of 
 course included a statement of the doctrine of Ideas, 
 This word, he said, may sound strangely to those for 
 whom " Idea " has no other meaning than that with 
 which Locke used it, as ^^ whatsoever is the object of the 
 understanding when a man thinks ;" but the advantage 
 of changing it would be equivocal, — " since this term, or 
 " some substitute less authorized by philosophical usage, 
 " is imperatively required in dynamical philosophy in 
 " order to designate powers as predetermining and con- 
 " structive, as intelligential acts, hvvdfiei<i voepaX koL 
 " vo7)Tal, and as /ormce formantes or laws." And pro- 
 posing in his Oration to determine " the import of Ideas 
 in connexion with the powers of nature," he employed 
 the term " to designate those energic acts of omnipotent 
 " wisdom which as laws of nature (formse formantes) are 
 " at once creative and conservative of a nature, ever 
 " changing and yet ever essentially the same." Only when 
 interpreted in their relations to Laws and Causes, could he 
 admit the phenomena of nature to be matter of scientific 
 experience. And to interpret them in those relations (he 
 argued) is not a necessary fruit of the heaping together, 
 however industriously, of sense-impressions however nume- 
 rous, — is not a mere act of generalisation and abstraction 
 of like and unlike, — is not a function of the human under- 
 standing as a " faculty judging according to sense," — but is 
 
XXVI MEMOIR OP THE AUTHOR S LIFE. 
 
 sometliing which derives its essence from sources super- 
 sensuous and impersonal. Expounding then in a sense 
 widely different from the popular one the gist of the 
 Baconian philosophy, and insisting that the famous irv- 
 quisitio formarum aimed at " somewhat other and more 
 " than the mental substantiation of facts under whatever 
 *' degree of generality," he calls Bacon to witness that the 
 power by which men attain to the interpretative insight of 
 nature is "the lux intellectHs, the Iwmen siccurn, the 
 " pure and impersonal reason, freed from all the various 
 " idols enumerated by our great legislator of science, the 
 " idola trib4s, speeds, fori, theatric — that is, freed from 
 " the limits, the passions, the prejudices, the peculiar 
 ** habits of the human understanding, natural or acquired, 
 " but, above all, from the idola intellectAs, from the 
 " arrogance which leads man to take the forms and 
 " mechanism of his own mere reflective faculty as the 
 " measure of Nature and Deity." And presently he thus 
 sums up the essentials of his own creed in the matter : — 
 " Man finds, in examining the facts of his conscious- 
 " ness, and as the essential character of his rationality, 
 " the capability of apprehending truths universal, neces- 
 " sary, absolute ; the grounds of which being underived 
 " from, must be antecedent, and presupposed in order, 
 " to experience :— man finds in himself the capability of 
 " inferring the reality of that which transcends his 
 *' sensuous experience, and of contemplating causality, 
 " efficiency, permanent being, law, order, finality, unity: — 
 ** man finds in himself the capability of apprehending, 
 " in a world of relations, the supra-relative ; in a world 
 " of dependencies, the unconditional ; in a world of flux 
 " and change, the immutable ; in a world of imperfec- 
 
MEMOIE. OF THE AUTHOK's LIPE. XXvii 
 
 " tions, the perfect ; — man recognises in himselfj as the 
 " privilege and need of a rational mind, the capability 
 " of enlarging his thoughts to the universe, infinite as 
 " the Omnipresence of God * upholding all things by the 
 " word of his power ; ' the capability of raising his mind 
 " to the Supreme as the Absolute Will, causative of all 
 " reality in the eternal plenitude of being. And it is 
 " in meditating on the conditions and cause of this 
 " capability, that man becomes conscious of an operance 
 " in and on his own mind, of the downshine of a light 
 " from above, which is the power of Living Truth, and 
 " which, in irradiating and actuating the human mind, 
 " becomes for it Reason ; — yea ! which is the revelation 
 " of those divine acts, at once causative and intelligential, 
 " which he recognises as first principles, ultimate truths, as 
 " ideas for the human mind, and constitutive laws in nature. 
 " It is by virtue of this Reason, that we hear the voice 
 " and legislative words of the Creator, sounding through 
 " the universe ; and it is in the sabbath stillness of our 
 " intellectual being, when the busy hum of the world 
 " is hushed, that the strains of this divine music penetrate 
 " the soul attuned by meditation to move responsive to 
 '* its harmony." 
 
 By way of illustration of the above-described argu- 
 ment, Mr. Green stated his conception of the Laws 
 which govern the constitution of the animal kingdom, 
 and determine the mutual similitudes and dissimilitudes 
 of its various component forms, and regulate the suc- 
 cessive phases of individual organic development. Also, 
 of course, he abundantly illustrated his argument by 
 references to the history of science, — especially to the 
 discoveries of Newton, Dalton, and Faraday, and (as 
 
XXVUl MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR S LIFE. 
 
 beseemed the occasion) to the labours of John Hunter. 
 He claimed it to be Hunter's peculiar and eminent merit, 
 " that he had raised his mind to the apprehension of 
 " life as a law, in aid of a science of Vital Dynamics, 
 " and as the means of giving scientific unity to the 
 " facts of living nature. In what other sense can we 
 " understand either his assertion that ' life is a principle 
 " independent of organization,' or the purport of the 
 " magnificent commentary on his system, the Hunterian 
 " Museum ? ... By contemplating life (as Newton had 
 " taught the mechanic philosophers to contemplate gravi- 
 " tation) not as a thing, nor as a spirit, neither as a 
 " subtle fluid, nor as an intelligent soul, but as a law, 
 " he laid the foundation of sciemtific physiology ; and 
 " in that very conception of a law taught us that life 
 " is a power anterior in the order of thought to the 
 " organization, which it animates, sustains, and repairs, — 
 " a power originative and constructive of the organiza- 
 " tion, in which it continues to manifest itself in all 
 " the forms and functions of animated being. This great 
 " Idea never ceased to work in him as his genius and 
 " governing spirit ; and if in his printed works the one 
 " directing thought seems occasionally to elude his grasp, 
 " yet in the astonishing preparations for his Museum we 
 '* find him constructing it for scientific apprehension out 
 ^' of the ' unspoken alphabet of nature ' and exhibiting 
 ^^ the legislative idea in the ' mode and measure of its 
 *' working,' by bringing together the significant forms 
 "and types of life and organic existence." Again^-"if 
 " Himter left the physiological part of his great work 
 " incomplete, it was only because in obedience to the 
 ** more pressing exigencies of the profession to which 
 
MEKOIB OF THE AtTTHOU's LIFE. XXix 
 
 " he belonged, he projected a revolution in Pathology, 
 " of carrying into the obscure recesses of disease the torch 
 " of the same philosophy, by which he had already 
 " successfully shed a light upon the hitherto mysterious 
 " agencies of vitality. . ^ . And if the attribute of inven- 
 " tive genius be his, who unequivocally establishes a 
 " principle, as including, anticipating, and explaining all, 
 " and even its possible and yet unknown results, we 
 " venture to claim this distinction for Hunter, in extend- 
 " ing to Pathology the same principle which had happily 
 " guided his physiological researches, by treating disease 
 " as a problem of Vital Dynamics, and by seeking its 
 " intelligibility in the unity of the law of life. ... I 
 " do not hesitate to affirm that one of the main aids 
 " in constructing a science of Pathology will be by 
 " adopting as its ground the principle thi^oughout implied 
 " in Hunter's researches ; that is, by recognising in life 
 " a power as of an agent at once contrariant to, and 
 " coerced by, the law which actuates and directs it ; 
 " and by treating disease as a problem, the solution of 
 " which is to be sought in the great laws of life, as 
 " perturbations indeed of the order which these laws 
 " maintain, derived from the imperfection of the subject, 
 ** but perturbations to be explained by laws, which, like 
 " those of the solar system, at once permit and correct 
 " the deviations. And if after witnessing the tain strivings 
 " of this contrariant agency, betrayed in disorder, deformity, 
 " degeneracy, and disease, the medical philosopher medi- 
 " tates on the laws which produce the order, permanence, 
 " regularity, and beauty of organic life, he will feel as 
 *' if, after the toils, vexations, and annoyances of the 
 *" day, he had withdrawn with the astronomer to his 
 
XXX MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR S LIFE. 
 
 " observatory, and in the hushed stillness of some balmy 
 " night, directing his delighted gaze to the serene spectacle 
 " of his star-lit sky, contemplated the mystic planetary 
 " dance, which reveals more sensibly, though not more 
 " certainly than animated being, the eternal and un- 
 " changeable laws impressed on nature by nature's 
 " Architect and Creator. Thence turning back to his 
 " own pursuits, he will accord to Hunter the high merit 
 *' of being at least the Kepler of his science, which only 
 " awaits its Newton in order to complete the scientific 
 " unity, already instinctively anticipated by Hunter's 
 " genius." 
 
 The above-described Oration in its printed form has 
 some of its arguments further developed in the Appendices 
 which (as I have stated) were published with it. First, 
 with reference to notions of cause and efficiency, there is 
 a paper on the Evolution of the Idea of Power. Next 
 come three papers respectively relating to Transcendental 
 Anatomy, to the Chcadation of Animal Life, and to 
 the Characteristics of Man's Bodily Frame, — the last 
 being the substance of a Lecture which the Author had 
 given at the Royal Academy, and the others being either 
 taken from or founded on Lectures which he had given 
 as Professor of Anatomy at the College of Surgeons. 
 Fifthly, there is a paper discussing, more fully than the 
 limits of the Oration itself had permitted, the spirit of 
 Hunter's Pathology. Sixthly, there is a discourse on 
 Instinct, which originally formed part of one of the 
 Author's lectures at the College of Surgeons, and to which 
 Coleridge had referred in his Aids to Reflexion as agreeing 
 with his own views of the matter. And lastly, in expansion 
 of some of the physiological arguments of the Oration, 
 
MEMOIR OP THE AUTHOU S LIFE. XXXI 
 
 there is a Recapitulatory Lecture of the last course 
 which the Author had given at the College of Surgeons. 
 
 Of the second Hunterian Oration (subsequently pub- Second 
 lished,* -with Appendices, under the title of Mental Oration. 
 Dynamics) the main object was to show — and generally 
 on Coleridgian principles — what are the proper aims and 
 means of that so-called Liberal Education by which the 
 mind is best prepared for the scientific following of a 
 profession. Here, as in all true education, it is (he main- 
 tained) the teacher's ultimate aim, not to have merely 
 infused certain prepared materials of information, but 
 rather to have awakened the feculties of the intellect, and 
 to have disciplined them in habits of conscious reflexion ; 
 and not even genius f is an exception to the rule, that by 
 cultivation ^' we may preserve the freshness, improve the 
 " vigour, and favour the originative faculties of the mind." 
 Premising then that the first business of the teacher is to 
 educe and exercise those elementary factors of thought 
 
 * London, Wm. Pickering, 1847 ; pp. 65. 
 
 f " Instead, then, of treating Genius as a mysterious endowment and 
 " occult faculty, I would say that it far rather designates the healthy 
 " balance and proportionate development of aU the powers and faculties 
 " that are essentially human, and their harmonious constitution to one. 
 " Hence a more correct and significant expression for what we mean by 
 " Genius would be Lidividuality ; since hereby we understand that union 
 *' of Tree-will and E^ason, by which man consciously affirms his Per- 
 " sonahty, and thereiu continuously asserts his sphere of thought and 
 " act : — and it would be at least difficult to discover a more appropriate 
 " meaning for genius than the achievement of this individuality accord- 
 " ing to the idea, or the approximation to its excellence, which consists 
 " in a higher potentiation and happier combination of the human powers, 
 " intelligent and active, by the animating, modifying, and intensive 
 " energy of the sole font of original power within us, which we name free 
 " or moral Will." 
 
XXXn MEMOIB OF THE ATJTHOR S LIPE. 
 
 which we name Abstraction and Generalization, he showed 
 how this may be done in an early attentive use of words, 
 and glanced at the metaphysical beliefs which are implied 
 in the simplest grammatical forms, and which these forms 
 may suggest for speculation. He followed the same line 
 of argument with regard to yarious other matters which 
 may be part of a liberal early education ; — to the various 
 branches of Natural History, as popularly studied, — to 
 Human History, ''exhibited as the great scheme of Pro- 
 *' vidence, which has been, and ever is, operative in the 
 " moral education of man, considered as the mind and 
 " soul of the planet," — to Mathematics, as, according to 
 Plato, " the first purification of the soul by abstracting 
 the attention from the accidents of the senses," — to Logic, 
 as " the art of conclusive discourse," and " the process by 
 which we deduce from known truths all that they legiti- 
 mately comprehend," — to Literature, as " enabling a man 
 " to collect into his own individuality the discoveries, the 
 " mental wealth, the ennobling affections, and the models 
 " of the wise and great of countries and states under the 
 '^ most auspicious circumstances," — and to Languages, 
 whereof each additional one mastered would be to its pos- 
 sessor " as it were a new limb without the deformity;" — 
 and he shewed how, during various of these studies and 
 by their aid, not only Abstraction and Generalisation, but 
 highel' mental faculties, and especially the Judgment, 
 might be developed and consciously exercised. And 
 finally, he spoke of the pure Reason, and of the Ideas 
 which philosophical meditation might bring into distinct 
 consciousness for the student, and of the relations of the 
 pure Reason to Science. 
 
 Among the Appendices with which this second Oration 
 
MEMOIK OF THE AIJTHOK'S LIFE. XXXiil 
 
 was published, is a paper in which the Author discusses 
 the subject of Self -Consciousness, and incidenttilly also 
 discusses what are the main difficulties which have hitherto 
 opposed themselves to the establishment of a sound philo- 
 sophy; — "difficulties, implying doctrines so incompatible 
 " with the natural expectation that philosophy is (or ought 
 " to be) the complement of common sense, as to deter men 
 " in general from the pursuit." That enumeration of the 
 influences which Mr. Green deemed most hostile to true 
 philosophy might perhaps usefully be read in intro- 
 duction to the following work ; but it will be seen that 
 he himself has quoted it at the end of the first chapter 
 of his second part, and I therefore refrain from inserting it 
 here. 
 
 For the convenience of keeping together in narrative the Continued 
 
 studies in 
 
 matters to which my last few pages have related, I have philoso- 
 reserved till now the mention of a sort of second life, to 
 which, for very long before the years of which I have last 
 spoken, Mr. Green's common professional life had been 
 gradually becoming more and more subordinate. So far 
 back as 1817? when he was not yet twenty-six years old, 
 we saw him so imbued with a passion for speculative 
 philosophy, that, notwithstanding all other claims on his 
 strength, he must needs spend his autumn holiday in a stu- 
 dious visit to the stronghold of German Transcendentalism. 
 We saw, too, that probably at about the same time he first 
 came within near range of Coleridge's fascinating genius. 
 And now we have to trace the influence which, from 
 then onwards, was exerted on his life by the powerful 
 and increasing undercurrent of his love for abstract 
 philosophy, 
 
 VOL. L d 
 
XXXIV MEMOIK OF THE AUTHORS LIFE. 
 Inter- Whatever may have been (and I do not know them) the 
 
 c ours 6 
 
 with Cole- steps of his first intimacy with Coleridge, a time soon 
 began when he was an habitual and frequent visitor to 
 Highgate. And this he continued to be during the 
 remaining term of Coleridge's life. Even in the years of 
 his heaviest professional labour — even in those years (from 
 1824 onward) when he was doing an amount of professional 
 work which nothing but his extreme mental discipline and 
 method could have enabled him to accomplish and live, — 
 even then his collateral studies in philosophy were con- 
 tinued. From his lectures, of which he was giving some- 
 times as many as eleven in a week, and from his private 
 practice, of which he was getting more and more, and from 
 his hospital-practice, which he was conducting with eminent 
 energy and success, — ^from these aggregate occasions of 
 an almost exhaustive fatigue, he turned thirsting, as for 
 recreation and vigour, to the " fountains of divine philo- 
 sophy," Invariably he spent with Coleridge — they two 
 alone at their work^many hours of every week, in talk of 
 pupil and master. And so, year after year, he sat at the 
 feet of his Gamaliel, getting more and more insight of the 
 teacher's beliefs and aspirations, till, in 1834, two events 
 occurred which determined the remaining course of his 
 life. On the one hand, his father died, and he thus 
 became possessed of amply sufficient means for his pro- 
 fession to be no longer needful to his maintenance. On 
 the other hand, Coleridge himself died* And the lan- 
 Merid'^^e's ^"^^® ^^ Colcridge's last will and testament, together no 
 death and doubt with Verbal communications which had passed, 
 
 bequests. ' t -mt /-a ir ? 
 
 imposed on Mr. Green what he accepted as an obligation 
 to devote, so far as necessary, the whole remaining strength 
 and earnestness of his life to the one task of systematising, 
 
MEMOIR OF THE ATJTHOK S LITE. XXXV 
 
 developing and establishing, the doctrines of the Cole- 
 ridgian philosophy.* 
 
 Influenced by these circumstances, he shortly deter- Retire- 
 
 • 1 1 o t • • /» 1 • Tnent from 
 
 mined to withdraw from the prirate practice of his pro- private 
 fession. His steps in fulfilment of this resolve were taken 
 in 1836. It was then (as I have stated) that he resigned 
 
 * To Mr. Green, as trustee for Coleridge's children, Coleridge (by will 
 dated Sept. 17tli, 1829) leaves for sale, in order to investment, all, 
 except trifles, of wHch he dies possessed, including books and manu- 
 scripts. But as regards the books — "inasmuch as their chief value 
 win be dependent on his possession of them"— Mr. Green is to "have 
 " the option of purchasing the same at such price as he shall himself 
 " determine." And his discretion is to determine whether " to publish 
 " any of the notes or writings made by me in the same books or any of 
 " them, or to pubhsh any other manuscripts or writings of mine, or any 
 " letters of mine should any be hereafter collected from or supplied by ny 
 " friends and correspondents." A codicil dated July 2d, 1830, contained 
 the following paragraph: — "On revising this my will, there seemed at 
 " first some reason to apprehend that in the above disposition of my 
 " books as above determined, I might have imposed on my executor a 
 "too delicate office; but on the other hand, the motive from the 
 " pecuhar character of the books is so evident, and the reverential 
 " sense which all my children entertain of Mr. Green's character, both 
 " as the personal friend of their father and as the man most intimate 
 " with their father's intellectual labours and aspirations, I believe will 
 " be such as will I trust be sufficient to preclude any delicacy that might 
 " result from the said disposition.'* It may be convenient here to men- 
 tion, as the direct results of the provisions of this will; — first, that Mr. 
 Green added to his own already lai'ge hbrary the books to which Coleridge's 
 bequest referred — books often abundantly annotated by their late pos^ 
 sessor ; and secondly, that from the annotated books and other writings 
 which thus passed into Mr. Green's possession there came the publica- 
 tion of Coleridge's two posthumous works — The Literary Remains, in 
 four volumes, and the Confessions of cm Inquiring Spirit, — to the latter 
 of which works (in its second edition) Mr. Green prefixed a preface of 38 
 pages, relating particularly to the question of the author's originality in 
 points where he was in accord with Lessing. 
 
 d2 
 
XXXvi MEMOIR or THE AUTHOU'S LIFE. 
 
 his professorship of surgery at King's College. Then, too, 
 he gave up his London house — only retaining chambers in 
 it for his occasional use when in town, and established his 
 home at Hadley, at the house known as The Mount, 
 where he continued resident till his death. 
 
 Retirement from private practice was no loss to Mr. 
 Green. Doubtless he might have continued to make from 
 it a large and increasing income — might, on at least equal 
 terms, have divided its highest metropolitan honours with 
 only some two or three elder, though not abler, competitors. 
 But to him, wealthy as he now was, the emoluments of 
 private practice were no adequate set-off against its re- 
 straints and obligations. Probably for many years he had 
 been (to say the least of it) very indifferent to that form of 
 professional success ; and of late he had scarcely disguised 
 that it was irksome to him. To the profession, however, 
 this retirement of his was a great loss ; and I remember 
 to have heard the late Sir Benjamin Brodie, at a large 
 professional meeting, publicly lament it as such. For, so 
 great are the temptations, to which the junior members of 
 the medical profession are exposed, to do acts of unworthy 
 competition and claptrap, that it is of signal importance 
 to our entire body, that those of us w^ho are most in the 
 public eye, as the leaders of private practice, should be 
 spotless examples of honour as well as the highest stan- 
 dards of mere technical ability. 
 
 Further 
 subordi- 
 nation of 
 surgical 
 to philo- 
 sophical 
 pursuits. 
 
 The nearly twenty-eight years which Mr. Green lived 
 after his removal to Hadley were years of devoted student- 
 ship in fulfilment of his adopted duty. Not that in 
 entering upon his new life he relinquished his interest in 
 the practical aspects of his profession, or his care for 
 
MEMOIR OP THE AUTHOR S LIFE. XXXVll 
 
 the amendment of its institutions. On the contrary, for 
 seventeen years afterwards^ he retained his surgeonship 
 at St. Thomas's, — where, as within a ring-fence, he had all 
 that he could need to keep himself genuinely a surgeon ; 
 and during no less than ten years of this time, at the 
 Tery urgent and somewhat unreasonable solicitation of the 
 then managers of the school, he held again (though re- 
 luctantly and without satisfaction to himself) a share of 
 the course of lectures on surgery. In the government of 
 the College of Surgeons, too, his participation, instead 
 of having ended in 1836, had then barely begun, and 
 (as I have already related) was for many years to go 
 on continuously increasing. Also, his principal exertions 
 in matters of professional reform were in times long 
 subsequent to 1836. No doubt, however, but that from 
 1836 onward all such objects as tlie above were secondary 
 in his mind to the one object of his philosophical studies. 
 Especially, as he became more and more absorbed in them, 
 he had to limit the total of work which he could afford for 
 other matters. And thus, as the College of Surgeons got to 
 claim more and more of his time, his connexion with the 
 practice of St, Thomas's grew more and more superficial. 
 Yet there was extreme unwillingness in our school that ^yf^^^^ 
 
 ° retirement 
 
 even this thread should be severed ; and it was not till 1853 f^om St. 
 
 Thomas's. 
 
 that he finally ceased to hold active office with us. In the 
 summer of that year he exchanged his post of surgeon for 
 the honorary appointment (then first made) of Consulting- 
 Surgeon to the Hospital ; receiving at the same time from 
 the Governors of the Hospital the compliment of being 
 nominated of their body. And on the 23d of June, at our 
 annual distribution of prizes, with a voice which not even 
 his strong will could keep from faltering with emotion, he 
 
XXXViii MEMOIR OP THE AUTHOK-'s LIFE. 
 
 bade public farewell to the collea^es who held him in 
 unmeasured regard and esteem, — to the place which was 
 dear to him with memories and associations even from 
 the days of his boyhood, — to the office, which any man 
 might hare been proud to hold, but which his successors 
 may prize more highly than ever in remembering that it 
 was filled by him, 
 
 l^ature of The Scheme of labour which he was endeavouring to 
 *^ich he 1*^^1126 at Hadley was one of colossal dimensions. Out- 
 had under- sicJers, who knew in general terms that he had undertaken 
 
 taken. ^ 
 
 some literary responsibilities in fulfilment of Coleridge's 
 will, may have supposed him engaged in merely editorial 
 duties, with an abundant publishable written text to 
 his hand. Coleridge himself had doubtless contributed 
 to the existence of such a delusion: for he, with his 
 ardent imagination, had an inveterate mental habit of 
 magnifying the projected into the "half-done," and the 
 begun into the " almost ready for publication : " and 
 expressions which had been uttered by him in that 
 sanguine spirit led admirers after his death to suppose 
 that he must have left behind him in a relatively perfect 
 state some Opus Magnum in philosophy, with which 
 the utmost that Mr. Green could have to do would 
 be to fill a few gaps, to supply a few explana- 
 tions, to harmonise a few apparent discrepancies, to 
 illustrate a few applicabilities, and so forth. But in 
 truth the existence of any such work was mere matter 
 of moonshine. Coleridge had not left any available 
 written materials for setting comprehensively before the 
 public, in his own language and in an argued form, the 
 philosophical system with which be wished his name to 
 
MEMOm OF THE AUTHOR S LIFE. XXXIX 
 
 be identified.* Instead of it there were fragments — for 
 the most part mutually inadaptable fragments, and begin- 
 nings, and studies of special subjects, and numberless 
 notes on the margins and fly-leaves of books. True, that 
 in unambiguous terms he had sounded the key-note of 
 his philosophy. And there was the tradition of his oral 
 teachings. And many of the written fragments were in 
 the highest degree interesting and suggestire ; such as 
 those which were successively published, under Mr. Green's 
 authority, in the four volumes of Literary Remains 
 and in the so-entitled Confessions of an Inquiring 
 Spirit. But here was no system of philosophy, nor even 
 the raw materials for a system. In that point of view 
 Coleridge's written remains could have no value except 
 in their relation to a general plan and in methodical 
 correlation among themselves. Evidently if they were 
 to be made conducive to a system of Coleridgian philoso- 
 phy, it could but be in a very subordinate degree. The 
 system itself must first exist in a logical form. And in 
 order to its existence in that form, Mr. Green must 
 himself thus produce it ; — he, with his indefatigable in- 
 dustry, guided by an unique knowledge of Coleridge's 
 conceptions and purposes. 
 
 This task Mr. Green had taken upon himself Though Work at 
 at first I heard little of it as having so comprehensive a its^reiation 
 scope, later events satisfied me that from the first he had ^^^^ ^^J^' 
 resolved to do as much as his remaining quantum of life 
 
 * With reference to this and some other assertions in the text, I beg 
 to refer to a paper which Mr. Green, in answer to some questions on the 
 subject of Coleridge's Remains, pubhshed (June 10, 1854) in No. 241 
 of I^otes and Queries. See also foot-note, p. xlii. 
 
Xl MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOU's LIFE. 
 
 would allow towards putting forth the Coleridgian philo- 
 sophy, in utmost elaboration, as a complete and coherent 
 SYSTEM ; and that, in purposing, if possible, to deliver as 
 Coleridge's legacy to the world a system of Coleridgian 
 philosophy, he had accepted the words " system of philo- 
 csophy" in their most exactive and obligatory sense. A 
 system of philosophy (he always insisted) does not deserve 
 its name, unless it virtually include the law and explana- 
 tion of all being, conscious and unconscious, and of all 
 correlativity and duty, and be applicable, directly or by 
 deduction, to whatsoever the human mind can contemplate 
 — sensuous or supersensuous — of experience, purpose, or 
 imagination. In this spirit he set to work to systematise 
 the Coleridgian doctrines ; and in this spirit, subject to 
 some necessary qualifications, he, for well-nigh thirty 
 years, was at work with them. If he could not hope to 
 establish the system in all the world-wide applications of 
 which it claimed to be capable, at least, so far as his life- 
 time would allow, that should be the aim and tendency of 
 his work ; and he would for himself, before final publication, 
 test the applicability of the system in the largest possible 
 sphere of study. Theology, Ethics, Politics and Political 
 History, Ethnology, Language, ^Esthetics, Psychology, 
 Physics and the Allied Sciences, Biology, Logic, Mathe- 
 matics, Pathology, — all were thoughtfully studied by him 
 in at least their basial principles and metaphysics, and 
 most were elaborately written of as though for the divisions 
 of some vast cyclopaedic work.* Even on knowledges which 
 could only be remotely conducive to his main end, he spent 
 
 * The ''Vital Dynamics'' and "Mental Dynamics^' are illustrations 
 of that soi-t of work, and this fact will account for the frequency with 
 wUiclrMr. Green refers to them in the followiug pages. 
 
MEMOIU OF THE ATJTHOR's LIFE. xll 
 
 sometimes a good deal of labour. Thus, at an early period 
 he thought it convenient to increase his familiarity with 
 Greek ; — subsequently, when more than sixty years old, he 
 busied himself with learning to read Hebrew ; — and at a 
 still later period, with particular reference to philology, he 
 sought at least some acquaintance with Sanskrit. Here- 
 with, however, he kept himself well au courant of the 
 common talk of his own time. In it he habitually sought 
 opportunities for testing his philosophical principles. 
 And it was characteristic of him that, with no view to 
 publication, but simply for practice in the detailed uses 
 of his philosophy, he would often very carefully think out, 
 and sometimes discuss in writing, questions which were at 
 the moment undergoing newspaper-criticism, — electoral 
 reform, or capital punishment, or pleas of insanity in 
 criminal cases, or the American schism, or some recent 
 novel, or what not. 
 
 In such work as the above, especially when it is fre- Lapse of 
 quently interrupted by avocations of a different nature, 
 years glide away like weeks. And as Mr Green continued, 
 even till the end of his career, to hold himself to a con- 
 siderable extent at the call of his profession, so, occasion- 
 ally, there were long spells of time when he could make 
 but little progress at home. 
 
 Too soon, however, a period arrived when he felt that 
 he might not prudently trust to a much longer continu- 
 ance of life. As he neared seventy years of age (though 
 with mind as vigorous as ever, and with eye still as cloudless 
 as a child's) it became evident that his health was deeply 
 undermined. From his father he had inherited gout. And of 
 late that versatile disease, not as mere occasional foot-ache, 
 
Xlii MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOK'S MEE. 
 
 but in its most troublesome ^' irregular " forms, had been 
 gradually sapping his strength, and giving him almost con- 
 stant inconvenience and suflfering. It was irremediable. 
 So now, he calmly said to himself, he must wind up those 
 affairs of his trust. Whether subsequently he might 
 have opportunity to utilise further the long succession of 
 philosophical treatises which he had prepared in apparent 
 readiness for publication, he would leave for time to de- 
 termine. But at least one thing should be made sure. 
 He would at once complete in a compendious form a work 
 which should give in system the doctrines, especially the 
 theological and ethical doctrines, which he deemed most 
 distinctively Coleridgian,* To this object he accordingly 
 devoted what in effect proved to be the whole available 
 remainder of his life. And the result is the two volumes 
 now before the reader, 
 
 Religio It must not, howcver, be supposed that Mr. Green had 
 
 Laici. ^^ 
 
 left to the precarious end of his life a work which for 
 thirty years he^had deemed to be of supreme importance. 
 On the contrary, his first act in the matter after Cole- 
 ridge's death had been to compose (though necessarily in 
 a form which he hoped by after-work to supersede as 
 
 * Coleridge's aspiration in the matter of religious teaching is expressed, 
 in the form of an unfulfilled promise, in the following passage of Ms 
 Aids to Reflection, 4th Edit. p. Ill : — " The whole scheme of the 
 Christian Eaith, including all the articles of belief common to the Greek 
 and Latin, the Koman and the Protestant Churches, with the threefold 
 proof, that it is ideally, morally, and historically true, will be found 
 exhibited and vindicated in a proportionally larger work, the principal 
 labour of my life since manhood, and which might be entitled. Assertion 
 of Religion J as necessarily involving Revelation; and of Christianity ^ as the 
 only Revelation of permanent and universal validity" 
 
MEMOIR OI' THE AUTHOR' S LIFE. xliii 
 
 comparatirely crude and fragmentary) a work of the same 
 main intention as the present one, — an exposition of the 
 religious doctrines which Coleridge would have most 
 wished to see vindicated. This (so to speak) provisional 
 compendium was entitled Beligio Laici,^ It was only after 
 having completed it, that he undertook the prolonged and 
 various studies which I have described ; partly with the view 
 of developing as fully as he could the philosophical basis of 
 the religious doctrine, and partly with that of rendering 
 the same philosophical principles fruitful for other depart- 
 ments of human speculation and conduct. And the work 
 now published — which, in the first heading of his manu- 
 script, he termed " Argument of the Spiritual Philosophy, 
 revised " — is, as it were, his re-cast of the Beligio Laiciy 
 — a re-cast which is enriched (so far as consists with its 
 scheme) by all the fruits of his subsequent studies, and 
 represents as near an approach as the duration of his 
 life permitted him to make to Coleridge's and his own 
 conception of a system of religious philosophy. 
 
 Coleridge's position — that Christianity, rightly under- Aim of the 
 
 present 
 stood, is identical with the highest philosophy, and that, book, 
 
 apart from all question of historical evidence, the essential 
 
 doctrines of Christianity are necessary and eternal truths 
 
 of Reason — ^truths which man, by the vouchsafed light of 
 
 Nature, and without aid from documents or tradition, 
 
 may always and anywhere discover for himself, — this, 
 
 it seems to me, is the position which Mr. Green has always 
 
 considered it his principal obligation to defend. In the 
 
 unpublished Beligio Laid, which represents his first 
 
 action in fulfilment of Coleridge's wishes, I find that he 
 
 * With it he wrote, as though for its introduction, a criticism, which 
 still remains in manuscript, of Coleridge's Hfe and genius. 
 
Xliv MEMOIR OF THE ATJTHOB's LIEE. 
 
 confined himself to the assertion and immediate defence 
 of that Coleridgian view of Christianity. In the second 
 stage of his labours, when he was giving to his under- 
 taking the cyclopaedic extension of which I have spoken, 
 the Religio Laid seems to have been for the most part 
 superseded by a very large theological section (of some 
 six or seven hundred foolscap pages) entitled Spiritual 
 Being. In the present work, the first volume is devoted 
 to the general principles of philosophy ; but the second 
 volume is entirely theological, and especially aims at vin- 
 dicating (i priori (on principles for which the first volume 
 has contended) the essential doctrines of Christianity, 
 With reference to his main object, Mr. Green would 
 doubtless have considered his first volume as mere esta- 
 blishment of introductory philosophical positions ; — but 
 the reader will of course observe that, while, in this sense, 
 the second volume essentially rests upon the first, the 
 first (as relating to general philosophy) may, for merely 
 logical purposes, be deemed a work independent of the 
 second. Had Mr, Green's life lasted long enough for a 
 full execution of his enterprise, the larger work which he 
 hoped to publish would have differed in its composition 
 and proportions from the present one :— the Prima 
 Philosophia would have been discussed and illustrated 
 with infinitely greater amplitude ; and the application 
 made of it to Christian Theology would have been but 
 one (though, no doubt, still the most elaborate) of a 
 series of deductive applications made of it in aU the most 
 important provinces of thought. 
 
 The book If Schlegel be right in his weU-known dictum as to the 
 
 in its con- t . . « 
 
 troTersml division of the world between Platonists and Aristotelians, 
 obviously one section of thinkers will dissent from the 
 
MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOU'S LIFE. xlv 
 
 fundamental principles on which the Spiritual Philosophy 
 is made to rest. And even of those who accept as the 
 sole right course the Platonic method of philosophising, 
 there may be many who will more or less dissent from 
 applications which have here been made of it. For this, 
 Mr. Green was prepared ; but, had he lived, he would not, 
 I am sure, have sought to anticipate the objections in de- 
 tail. That I, on this occasion, should attempt from his 
 notes to do for him any such thing, is, for various reasons, 
 impossible. I will only venture, on his behalf, to claim for 
 the Spiritual Philosophy that candid and patient con- 
 sideration which at any time would be due to the fruits 
 of life-long and conscientious labour in matters of highest 
 human interest, and which particularly at present (more 
 perhaps than at any previous moment in the theological 
 life of this coimtry) is due to such philosophical works 
 as honestly purport to review the grounds of the national 
 religious belief. 
 
 My duties in editing the work have been but of the State in 
 humblest description. Such as the work came into my book was 
 hands, such, with none but clerical alterations made, it ^^ ' 
 now stands before the reader. Had Mr. Green lived to 
 see it through the p'ress, he would have inserted re- 
 capitulatory sections, one at the end of each division of 
 the work, and one in general conclusion ; — but obviously 
 these are not necessary to the book, and I have not 
 deemed it within my competence to attempt any substi- 
 tution of my own. Some less methodical repetitions of 
 the text which the reader will notice (for instance, in the 
 several references which are made to the doctrine of the 
 Trinity) Mr. Green would probably have struck out in a 
 
Xlvi MEMOIR OF THE ATJTHOR's LIFE. 
 
 final revision of the work ; but, in the absence of the 
 intended recapitulatory sections, I have thought it better to 
 leave those repetitions as they stand. With regard to one 
 section of the work — the fourth chapter of the third part, 
 it will be observed that Mr. Green, instead of completing 
 that section of his new manuscript, referred to two other 
 papers from which the materials of the section were to 
 be got. On consideration, and especially because the 
 section is one of much theological interest, I have thought 
 it best not to attempt the adaptations which he would 
 have made, but rather to print in extenso, as appendices, 
 the two papers to which his memorandum refers. 
 
 I am able confidently to say that Mr. Green regarded 
 the book as, in every important respect, completed. In 
 one of the last days of October, 1863, I spent an hour of 
 chat with him before going abroad for my yearly vacation ; 
 and he then,'^telling me that the work was in efiect done, 
 off'ered me it to take with me for reading in travel. Little 
 presaging that I was never again to see him — for he 
 appeared to be in fully the average health of his later 
 years, I told him that his papers must not incur chances 
 of shipwreck, and that I hoped to read them with him 
 on my return. From that day probably he never touched 
 them. And a few weeks later, at Rome, I heard at once of 
 his illness and his death. Mihi, prceter acerbitatem erepti, 
 auget moestitiam, quod adfSidere valetudini, fovere 
 deficientem, non contigit,^ On the 1st of November, 
 he had been taken with acute illness, to which he had 
 very nearly succumbed at once. He had rallied, however, 
 from the attack, and for some time afterwards had seemed 
 to be slowly improving in health. Six weeks had passed, 
 * Taciti Af^ricola. 
 
MEMOIE OP THE AUTHOR.' S LIFE. xlvii 
 
 and hopes had been entertained that he would soon 
 resume, at least in part, his former habits and occupations. 
 But suddenly, on the evening of the 13th of December, 
 he had been anew seized with acute suffering, which had 
 almost directly terminated in death. 
 
 In concluding my account of Mr. Green's life, I must Laststagei 
 
 IT • p 1 • of public 
 
 revert for a moment to the public portion of his career, life, 
 
 in order to mention that from that source, during his last 
 years, there had come to him some additional honours 
 and labours.* In 1858, at the installation of Lord Derby 
 as Chancellor of the University of Oxford, Mr. Green 
 received the honorary title of D.C.L. in that University. 
 Later in the same year, when the Medical Act brought 
 into existence (for the educational and disciplinary govern- 
 ment of the medical profession) a so-called General 
 Council of Medical Education and Registration, the 
 Royal CoUege of Surgeons elected Mr. Green to serve as 
 its representative on that Council. Two years later, when 
 
 * Por completeness, too, I may here mention some of the less im- 
 portant professional posts to which he had been appointed at earlier 
 stages of his career. !From 1819 to 1844 he was a member, and for the 
 later years of this time, the President, of the Board of Examiners of the 
 Royal Veterinary College. In 1841, he and Sir Benjamin Brodie were 
 appointed (instead of Lord Arden and Sir Astley Cooper) to be of 
 the Trustees of the Hunterian Museum ; and this office he held till his 
 death. In 1842-3 he was one of the Royal Commissioners appointed, 
 under Sir Robert Peel's Government, to inquire into the state and 
 management of the North-Leach and Gloucester prisons. In 1846 (in 
 place of the Duke of Richmond) he was appointed one of the Com- 
 missioners for Government of the Pentonville Prison, but within a year 
 or two resigned the office, ^d in 1851, on occasion of the first Inter- 
 national Exhibition, he was Chairman and Reporter of the Jury on 
 Surgical Instruments, 
 
Xlviii MEMOIE OF THE ATJTHOR's LIFE. 
 
 the post of President of the Council became vacant by the 
 resignation of Sir Benjamin Brodie, who had first filled it, 
 the Council unanimously elected Mr. Green to the office. 
 In it he continued, with the warmest regard and con- 
 fidence of his constituents, for the remaining three years 
 of his life. And thus— so far as the medical profession 
 of the United Kingdom may be said to have an integral 
 existence, — so far (that is to say) as its internal organi- 
 sation and discipline are concerned, Mr. Green, from the 
 date of that appointment till the date of his death, was 
 his profession's acknowledged head and representative. 
 
 Green's ^^ attempting to describe Mr. Green's character, I will 
 
 character, hq^ attempt to disguise that I write as with the affection 
 of a son. And whatever may be my disqualifications for 
 the task, I am not sure that this ought to be counted 
 among them. For to love a good and great man is the 
 natural result of having intimately known him. And if 
 that result vitiates one's testimony concerning him, from 
 whom is the better testimony to come? Yet, so to 
 pourtray Mr. Green's character that strangers might have 
 the same image of him as appeared to us who were most 
 about him, would indeed require a greatly more skilful 
 pen than mine. The men who are easily described are 
 the men who have partial prominences of character ; and 
 commonly any such obvious traits are but signs that the 
 main body of character is below its normal level. With 
 Mr. Green there was nothing of this kind. Beyond any 
 man I have knoAvn he had a proportioned, balanced nature, 
 — one which was, perhaps as nearly as man's can be, in 
 seipso totiis, teres atque rotundtvs. But in difi'erent rela- 
 tions of life different quantities of the character were seen. 
 
MEMOIR OF THE AITTHOU's LIFE. xlix 
 
 To persons who could not measure his intellect, and incom- 
 whose contact with him corresponded only to their need of 
 his assistance, he would have seemed simply one of the 
 kindest of men ; — for he was full of pity and compassion 
 for all kinds of weakness and suffering, and did not 
 cultivate the convenient economy of helping only people 
 who can help themselves. Again, to numbers of persons 
 with whom he had frequent superficial intercourse — to per- 
 sons, for instance, with whom he habitually travelled to and 
 fro beween London and Hadley, his seeming would chiefly 
 have been that of the pleasantest of casual companions, — 
 so good-humoured and sociable, so ready to chat on 
 whatever might turn up for conversation, so informed of 
 common things, so full of anecdote, so patient and kindly 
 a listener, so various in his interests, so singularly un- 
 affected and unassuming and unaggressive. Even for little 
 children he had always friendly winning ways, and women 
 he never failed to treat with a respectfulness which was 
 peculiar and noble* His manners indeed were in a very 
 marked degree those of a high-bred gentleman — emi- 
 nently courteous and polite, and considerate for persons 
 whom they concerned. His education had cast them 
 somewhat in that statelier, more reserved and ceremonious, 
 type, which belonged rather to the last generation than 
 to the present one ; and thus, with his life of strict study 
 and meditation, he might easily have seemed cold or self- 
 absorbed. But nature was too strong in him for this. 
 His infinite geniality and kindliness, his unaffected hii- 
 mility, his deep feeling of duty to others, — these shone 
 out even in unfamiliar intercourse, and, especially in later 
 years, gave an exquisite graciousness to his deportment. 
 It seemed to me that persons who knew him best, and saw 
 VOL. I. €, 
 
1 MEMOIR OF THE ATTTHOB'S LITE. 
 
 most of his strength of intellect, never lost that impres- 
 sion of his amenity, — that, rather, it continually grew on 
 them. For the charm of it did not depend on any film of 
 politeness, but represented, as I have said, the outcropping 
 and surface-show of his true nature. And the more 
 deeply that nature was stripped, the more clearly did 
 one see that its substratum was an inexhaustible central 
 source of humane and graceful conduct. Yet, while fami- 
 liarity thus increased rather than diminished one's per- 
 ception of what was genial in his character, not less 
 certainly did every one who had to do with him in grave 
 affairs find that he had commensurate moral and intel- 
 lectual strength. But of that hereafter. 
 
 As a In Mr. Green's public manner a point of some pro- 
 
 minence was his very rare skill of elocution — elocution, 
 I mean, as distinct from eloquence. In youth he had 
 made it part of his discipline for after-life to educate 
 himself carefully in that respect, and had regularly 
 practised under Thelwall. He started with great natural 
 advantages for oratory, in his extremely tall and marked 
 but manageable figure, and in voice and countenance which 
 could lend themselves to any purpose of his speaking. 
 Thus, when he appeared as an orator, the matter of his 
 speech was always most effectively delivered. As he 
 stood ready to begin — acknowledging and half depre- 
 cating the affectionate clamour of hands and voices that 
 welcomed him, his aspect of noble benignity and wisdom 
 was the ideal presence of a great teacher of men. And 
 then for the hour or more during which he spoke, " drawing 
 audience and attention still as night," not a sentence was 
 uttered but with the skilfullest elocutionary management, 
 
MEMOm OE THE AUTHOR's LIPE. H 
 
 never a syllable slurred, never a whisper lost, never a 
 passage without rhythm, never a discord between sense 
 and emphasis ; — so that, even in the longest and most 
 involved sentences of argument, the logical process always 
 appeared unambiguous, while, in sentences of passion and 
 imagination, the emotional effect of the eloquence was 
 heightened to the utmost by appropriate modulations of 
 voice and action. To his audience there was much 
 fascination in this mere outward of his public addresses. 
 But I have doubted whether, to himself, that great 
 elocutionary power was not in one respect disadvan- 
 tageous, — whether, namely, it did not make him less 
 sensible than he otherwise would have been of the pos- 
 sible obscurities of written language, and perhaps bias 
 him somewhat unduly towards that oratorical style which 
 has its type " when the skilful organist plies his grave and 
 fancied descant in lofty fugues." And I have an object in 
 saying this here. For it may help the reader of the fol- 
 lowing work to an easier understanding of its difficult 
 passages, if he will remember that Mr. Green oftener 
 argued with his voice than with his pen, and that he 
 writes as it were for an audience. 
 
 Mv knowledge of Mr. Green as a surgeon was of course As a snr- 
 almost exclusively in the career of hospital-practice, and 
 this not till after the years when he took most interest in 
 it. In 1833, when I became his apprentice, he naturally 
 seemed to me, and I still believe him to have been, as 
 perfect a master as could be found of the surgery which 
 then was. In operating he was very skilful, very delibe- 
 rate, and singularly imperturbable. Nothing ever seemed 
 to take him by surprise, or to affect either his courage or 
 
 e 2 
 
lii MEMOIR or THE AUTHOU'S LIFE. 
 
 his temper. On the very rare occasions when he made 
 a false step, he recovered himself with consummate cool- 
 ness. It is a memorable fact that his almost matchless 
 presence of mind under circumstances of danger and diffi- 
 culty was not an original gift of nature, but was the fruit 
 of gigantic diligence and self-control. Moreover, whenever 
 he operated, everything had been well considered before- 
 hand, and his faculties were on guard for whatsoever diffi- 
 culty or accident or novelty the progress of his operation 
 might let loose upon him. Thus, though many men could 
 do easy operations more quickly than he chose to do 
 them, very few men could equal the celerity with which 
 he finished difficult operations. His lithotomy was, in my 
 opinion, far superior to any I have seen, and, when 1 went 
 to the hospital, there was a tradition that the first patient 
 whom he had lost there after that operation was the 
 fiftieth on whom he had publicly performed it. Judged by 
 the standard of the present day (when chloroform allows a 
 somewhat wider latitude to the practice of experimental 
 operations) it may be said that his surgery was marked 
 rather by caution than by enterprise ; — but the result of 
 that peculiarity was, that, of unsuccessful and useless 
 operations, probably very few great surgeons can have had 
 a smaller proportion than was his. Of his demeanour to 
 the sick, it seems superfluous to say more than that it 
 was characteristic of him : — it revealed the wise man, full 
 of gentleness and commiseration, administering his art 
 under the deepest sense, both of its dignity, and of his 
 own brotherhood to the sufferers. 
 
 ^t^Uect ^^ ^^* Green's intellect in its relations to speculative 
 
 and intel- philosophy, I do not here presume to speak. For in that 
 
 habits. 
 
MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOU's LIFE. liii 
 
 respect T can have no pretensions to forestall the judg- 
 ment which the reader will form for himself, — having 
 before him, in these volumes, the work to which Mr. 
 Green undoubtedly devoted his utmost powers of philo- 
 sophical thought. 
 
 It is only in other respects that I will venture to speak 
 of his intellect. It was an intellect, naturally strong 
 and swift and subtle, developed in all its faculties by 
 incessant discipline and cultivation, enriched by extensive 
 stores of knowledge and learning, and sure always to use 
 common sense with a very uncommon sagacity. So far as 
 it was exhibited in ordinary grave affairs of life, I may 
 perhaps most nearly express my opinion of its quality, 
 when I say that it seemed to me peculiarly such as is 
 adapted for judicial work, and for some of the higher 
 functions of legislation : — for though of course certain 
 moral qualities have infinitely much to do with that 
 aptitude of mind, its intellectual qualifications are also 
 special. It was characteristic of Mr. Green (as it is, I 
 suppose, of all first-class minds) that, in serious discussion, 
 he was never to be found wasting talk or thought on the 
 shell of the matter, never dwelling on its inessential 
 circumstances and accidents of time and place and per- 
 son, but always going right to the true gist and core and 
 substance of his question. In this he showed such skill 
 and discernment as I have scarcely ever seen equalled. 
 With a few preliminary words he would set aside col- 
 lectively all questions which he deemed irrelevant to the 
 issue, — ^waiving them in such impartial language as not to 
 provoke others to revert to them ;— and then, for measuring 
 any right or wrong under discussion, he would put forward 
 what he deemed to be the very standard of right ; or, for 
 
liv MEMOm OP THE AUTHOR S LIEE. 
 
 measuring any expediency under discussion, he would put 
 forward such considerations of ultimate aim as he deemed 
 to be the true tests of the expediency. And so in common 
 conyersational criticism, whether the talk related to art or 
 to science or to political or private conduct, always his 
 mind saw the thing or act according to what he deemed to 
 be its endeavour, tendency, spirit, and intention ; and 
 where these could be well justified, never was he to be 
 found carping at the details' of a short-come execution. 
 Those who knew him could trace always as his under- 
 current thought, — what, for this thing or action, is the 
 very iSea of being ? And no incongruity of circumstances 
 would derange that habit of his mind. His imagination 
 was not chained by them. Dicit tanquam in Platonis 
 TToXtreta, non tanquam in Romuli fcece, sententiam,^ 
 
 * Cato as described by Cicero. I remember once to have seen Mr. 
 Green's idealising habit illustrated under circumstances of quite comical 
 incongruity. He was winding up his second Hunterian Oration in the 
 theatre of the Royal College of Surgeons. His concluding argument 
 (so far as I need here describe it) was that the medical sciences 
 might be Ijest taught in Universities, and (said he) in Universities 
 identified with the National Church. No sooner had he uttered those 
 last two words (and they seemed, though they were not, almost paren- 
 thetical) than the meeting showed signs of a sensation. "National 
 Church ! " and there ! ! Some thought of church-rates, others of pew- 
 rents, others of surplices, others of Articles, others of Laud, others of 
 Athanasius, and a feeble minority began to groan and hiss, and an over- 
 whelming majority (though not aU unperplesed) shouted applause, and 
 for a moment discord seemed possible ; — when the Orator, by one stately 
 movement of head and hand, silenced the whole meeting so that a pin- 
 fall could have been heard, repeated Ms words with an emphasis so 
 resolute and yet so concihative that not one murmur resented them, and 
 then, in language which might have been Plato's, concluded his sentence 
 and Oration, — "with the NiTiONAi Church. . . . asthe universal organ 
 " according to tlie Idea, for educing^ Iiarmonizing^ and applying all those 
 
MEMOIK OF THE AUTHOK'S LIFE. Iv 
 
 The effectiveness of Mr, Green's intellectual powers Of ins 
 depended in my opinion in a very great degree (as I must charac- 
 already have implied) on the noble moral qualities with which 
 they were conjoined. That his was a mind in which no mean 
 or impure thought could arise or for a moment linger^ — 
 that he was a man of absolutely spotless honour and in- 
 tegrity, — that his great mental powers were never used 
 for selfish ends, — that in all kinds of co-operative action 
 he was, in the highest possible degree, loyal and sincere, — 
 that he was, in all finest senses of the word, liberal, — 
 that he was of temper exquisitely stable and uniform, 
 without moods and humours and caprice, — that he was 
 consummately self-controlled and deliberate, — that espe- 
 cially he was cautious fully to measure beforehand 
 the effect of words and acts, and scrupulous never to 
 speak beyond his knowledge, or act beyond his inten- 
 tion, — ^that both in sympathies and in tolerance he was 
 most large-hearted, — that he was firm, but with firmness 
 would never cease to be gentle and moderate, — that his 
 judgments of others were invariably indulgent, but that 
 his moral appeal was always to broad impersonal prin- 
 ciples of right and wrong, and that his own life was 
 strictly guided by those principles, — all this was almost 
 
 " eUfiients of moral cultivation and intellectual progress ^ of which Religion 
 "prescribes the aim and sanctifies the use" Yet notvathstandrng Mr. 
 Green's idealising habits of mind, and even wHle his habitual medi- 
 tations were as high as Milton's, or as abstruse and unpractical as 
 Hegel's, no mere merchant or lawyer could take to commonest matters 
 of business with greater apparent facility than was his ; and it may serve 
 as an additional illustration of his activity in common life, if I mention 
 that for many of his latter years he was chairman of the Board of 
 Directors of a first-class Life Assurance Company with which he had 
 been long'connected. 
 
Ivi MEMOIR OF THE ATITHOu's LIFE. 
 
 on the surface of his character, and could not escape any 
 one*s perception who had even moderate intimacy with 
 him. Doubtless it was by the obvious, or in great part 
 obvious, union of these qualities with his remarkable vigour 
 of intellect, that he acquired his strong personal influence. 
 And waiving any further mention of his public relations 
 (to which I have sufficiently referred) I may say that in 
 common afikirs of life I have never known a man looked 
 up to with fuller, with more entire, faith. It was not only 
 that his opinions when he expressed them seldom failed 
 to satisfy the judgment. Always also there was the feeling 
 that the strength which he put forth was but a sample of 
 that which was in reserve. And beyond this there was 
 the confidence, such as scarcely any other man could 
 inspire, in his absolute steadfastness, — the certainty that, 
 where we left him to-day, there, to all moral intents and 
 purposes, we should find him (life lasting) till the end of 
 
 time ; — 
 
 " To shame invulnerable ; 
 
 Like a great sea-markj standing every flaw. 
 And saving those that eye him." 
 
 Nor was it only by reverence that we were bound to 
 him. There was the love for him which dwelt side by side 
 with the faith. For all the movements of his mind were 
 generous, and his nature was no less aflectionate than 
 strong. To his oldest age he was still young in the hap- 
 piest instincts of youth — in frank and clean-hearted readi- 
 ness to admire and enjoy, in sensibility to the claims of 
 fellowship, in unsuspicious ungrudging trust, in enthusiasm 
 for the heroic and beautiful. The only two or three occa- 
 sions on which I remember to have heard him spoken of 
 as angry, he was defending others against what he deemed 
 to be mean attack. And surely in this place it is not 
 
MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR'S LIFE. Ivii 
 
 irrelevant to cite, as an illustration of his character, that 
 filial, but not the less chiyalric, loyalty, with which he 
 was well content to spend his best powers in the comple- 
 tion of another man's work, and to merge all his own 
 hopes of fame in the ambition of winning acceptance for 
 his teacher. 
 
 To me, from the time when I first grew able to appre- influence 
 
 hend him, the sense of his wisdom and goodness and sophy ou 
 
 . . 1.11 . . his life, 
 
 magnanimity was a sense which always went on increasing. 
 
 With all his rare union of powers and virtues, with all 
 his alternate readiness for meditation and for action, he 
 seemed to me the almost ideal philosopher, — never pur- 
 suing philosophy at the expense of his common duties as 
 citizen, but always so pursuing it as to gain from it more 
 aptitude for those duties, and to adorn his hourly life 
 with the very best fruits which it could aflbrd. How great 
 a happiness, how great a good it was, to have frequent 
 familiar access to him, is what I need hardly say. From 
 an outside world, troublous and sad with the million cares 
 and wrangles of the battle of life, — from atmospheres 
 redolent of mean thoughts — egotisms and jealousies and 
 low ambitions and vanities, — that kindly presence, when 
 one entered it, ah ! it was Sio<; aldr^p^^ For, dominant 
 there over all other impressions which it gave, was the 
 
 * Again and again, as I think of times when I have thus gone to 
 Mm, there come to my memory those beautiful lines in which Lucretius 
 tells of the influence of his master's teaching : — 
 
 " Apparet Divum numen sedesque quietse ; 
 Quas neque concutiunt venti, neque nubila nimbis 
 Adspergunt, neque nix acri concreta pruina 
 Cana cadens violat ; semperque innubilua sether 
 Integit, et large difiuso lumine ridet." 
 
 Rer.Nat.vT. 18—23. 
 
stances. 
 
 Iviii MEMOIR OP THE AUTHOR's LIFE. 
 
 sense of lofty and luminous calm, — not the calm which 
 corresponds to inertia, but the calm which tells of power 
 and proportion. And in this calm, more than in aught 
 else, the whole noble nature of the man was expressed. 
 
 His supe- His circumstances may indeed seem to have favoured 
 
 riority to . . , . , 
 
 circum- the development of that particular tone m his character ; 
 but I believe that under any circumstances it would have 
 been the same. It was not a mere semblance of equa- 
 nimity which he had, — nor even a mere superiority to 
 petty cares and fussiness and irritability. He had that 
 higher power which is equal to both extremes of fortune — 
 that power of constancy and fortitude " which looks on 
 tempests and is never shaken," Of late years he was 
 habitually subject to severe physical suffering, and often 
 went about with his heart's action so disordered that he 
 must have doubted whether life would last him to get 
 home again. Yet this abated nothing of his composure, 
 nothing of his kindliness, nothing of his attention to 
 public affairs, nothing of his home-industry. And instead 
 of voluntarily dwelling on it in his talk, he would, even 
 when talk about it was necessary, pass to other matters 
 as quickly as possible — pass, perhaps, with some joking 
 allusion to the ovk l^ tjiuv of Epictetus. Surely, what- 
 ever may be on others the influence of his speculative 
 teaching, at least in his own life, and to the inmost core 
 of his being, he was a true and devout philosopher, — 
 submitting himself with faith and humility to the general 
 government of things, glad to forget his own momentary 
 lot in the contemplation of eternal laws, and as incapable 
 of murmuring against what he had to suffer as of remon- 
 strating against tides and seasons. 
 
MEMOIR or THE AUTHOB's LIFE. Hx 
 
 To talk in much detail of his last scenes of life would How he 
 
 met 
 
 be to violate the reserve in which every self-respectful death. 
 man claims to hold his inmost domestic and religious 
 relations. Only so far as I may, without infringing that 
 principle, add to my illustrations of his character, I would 
 show that not even the last sudden agony of death ruffled 
 his serenity of mind, or rendered him unthoughtful of 
 others. ISTo terrors, no selfish regrets, no reproachful 
 memories, were there. The few tender parting words 
 which he had yet to speak, he spoke. And to the servants 
 who had gathered grieving round him, he said — " While I 
 have breath, let me thank you all for your kindness and 
 attention to me." Next, to his doctor who quickly entered 
 — his neighbour and old pupil, Mr. Carter, — he signifi- 
 cantly, and pointing to the region of his heart, said^ — 
 " congestion," After which, he in silence set his finger to 
 his wrist, and visibly noted to himself the successive 
 feeble pulses which were but just between him and 
 death. Presently he said — " stopped." And this was 
 the very end. It was as if even to die were an act of his 
 own grand self-government. For at once, with the warn- 
 ing word still scarce beyond his lips, suddenly the stately 
 head drooped aside, passive and defunct, for ever. And 
 then, to the loving eyes that watched him, "his face was 
 again all young and beautiful." The bodily heart, it is true, 
 had become mere pulseless clay ; — broken was the pitcher 
 at the fountain, broken at the cistern the wheel ; — 
 but, for yet a moment amid the nightfall, the pure 
 spiritual life could be discerned, moulding for the last 
 time into conformity with itself the features which thence- 
 forth were for the tomb- 
 
 JoHN Simon. 
 
 LoTidon, 1865, 
 
SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 PAUT EIRST. 
 
 OF THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES AND PROCESSES 
 
 WHICH ARE CONCERNED IN THE INVESTIGATION 
 
 OF TRUTH. 
 
 Section I. 
 The Speculative Reason and its work, 
 
 § 1, The aim and object of all Philosophy part l 
 is to attain to the insight of First Principles — ^^' 
 or Ideas — yea, to the insight of the Absolute 
 Pirst Principle, from which whatever is must 
 be derived, and in which whatever is must have 
 the intelligible ground of its Being. 
 
 § 2. There exists in man, as the essential 
 characteristic of his Humanity, a power or 
 faculty of Intelligence, best named the Reason^ 
 which discloses to him the need, and enables 
 him to fulfil the inherent desire, of contempla- 
 ting his manifold knowledges in their absolute 
 integrity. 
 
 § 3. The contemplation of such absolute 
 integrity will have been obtained by the con- 
 scious possession and insight of an Idea: — that 
 is, of a causative Principle, containing, predeter- 
 
 VOL. I. B 
 
2 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. mining, and producing its actual results in all 
 
 their manifold relations in reference to a final 
 
 purpose; and realized in a whole of parts, in 
 which the Idea, as the constitutive energy, is 
 evolved and set forth in its unity, totality, 
 finality, permanent efficiency and integrity of 
 Being. 
 
 § 4. The requisite insight of such causative 
 principles is derived from the idea of the Will 
 as revealed in human self-consciousness. Will 
 is contemplated universally as the inseparable 
 union and perpetual distinction of Intelligence 
 and Originative Power, and as the sole and 
 sufficing ground of the intelligibility of all 
 causative powers. 
 
 § 5. The distinction, in the Will, of Intelli- 
 gence and Causative Power implies also the 
 distinction of the Speculative and Practical 
 Reason. The Speculative Reason is Intelligence 
 considered abstractedly from the agency of the 
 Willi with which in truth it ever constitutes 
 an indivisible living totality; — it is the Light, 
 lumen siccum, the pure intelligence or intellect, 
 considered apart from the total life, of which 
 it is an integral constituent. The Practical 
 Reason^ on the other hand, is the Intelligence^ 
 which in union with power is necessary to inform 
 the Will and to direct and guide its operance 
 in the light of a definite aim and purpose. 
 In other words it is the enlightened Will ; and 
 so Eeason is the constituent without which Will 
 
THE SPECULATIVE REASON. I 
 
 is inconceivable as the causative of reality in paut i. 
 
 the integrity of Being. It might be said that '-^ 
 
 Life is the perpetual process of the realization 
 of the Will in and by the light of Reason, and 
 that Reason is the light of the life. Ex. gr., 
 it is the Reason which enlightens the hnman 
 Will to become a Conscience, and thereby confers 
 on the individual man the power of realizing, 
 or of striving to realize, the Idea of his spiritual 
 Integrity, that is, his Humanity. 
 
 § 6. The Reason, considered as pure intelli- 
 gence or as the Speculative Intellect, is the 
 appropriate organ of Philosophy, and therein 
 the faculty of beholding and of attaining to 
 the insight of Ideas, or first principles, as 
 Truths of Reason, which, transcending the scope 
 of the empirical faculty, appertain to the con- 
 templation of the integrity and integration of 
 Spiritual Being. The Reason imposes on the 
 mind of man the necessity, and aids him in 
 securing the mental possession of those Ideas, 
 by which unity, totality, finality, permanent 
 efficiency and integrity are supplied to all his 
 knowledges. It reveals itself by its own light, 
 and confers on the human mind the power of 
 apprehending such Truths or Ideas as Verities 
 that are at once subjective Truths and objective 
 Realities, and of beholding them in their full 
 perfection and complete integrity. By means 
 of Reason, and by it alone, the human mind 
 may become a conscious mirror, in which is 
 
 b2 
 
4 SPIUITTJAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. imaged an epitome of the universe, physical 
 
 '—^ and moral, as the work of God, — yea, in which 
 
 is revealed the spiritual image of the Divine 
 Author himself. The Speculative Eeason is 
 then that to which we appeal as the standard 
 by which we are to measure all things, as that 
 which is to give light and intelligibility to all 
 things, and finally as the fundamental principle 
 of a Spiritual Philosophy/, that is of a System 
 of Realism, in which "Will" is contemplated 
 as the causative ground of all reality. 
 
 Section II. 
 The Understanding, or Discourse of Reason. 
 
 § 7. In order to complete the positions on 
 which a Spiritual Philosophy is founded, it is 
 necessary to distinguish from the Speculative 
 Reason that form of Intelligence which may 
 most conveniently be designated the Understand- 
 ing, It is the faculty of Experience^ sensible and 
 psychical. Its office is to generalize whatever 
 specific impressions may have been consciously 
 received, by including them under generic con- 
 ceptions and by naming them in generic terms, 
 
 Further, as the function of the Understanding, 
 or Empirical Paculty, is to bring all impressions 
 derived from facts and phenomena under the 
 conditions of Reason — to raise the empirical 
 into the rational, the subjective and particular 
 
THE UNDERSTANDINa. - 
 
 into objective and universal Truth, — so the part i. 
 
 Reason (and here the Speculative Reason) sup- 
 
 plies the universal and necessary Forms of Con* 
 cipiency, otherwise known as the Categories or 
 Moulds of the Understanding, namely : — 1. 
 Cause und Effect; — 2. Subject and Attributey 
 sometimes called Substance and Accident ; — and 
 3. The JFhole and its Farts, 
 
 § 8. In establishing the distinction between 
 the Reason and the Understanding, it may be 
 borne in mind that Truths of Reason vindicate 
 their distinctive stamp and character by the 
 fact, hereafter to be proved, that they are 
 immediate, intuitive, a priori, certain, necessary, 
 universal, immutable, absolute,— that they con- 
 tain their own evidence, or are revealed by their 
 own light, — and that they are demonstrable, 
 apodictic and seK-authoritative, by reason of 
 their evidentness. 
 
 On the other hand, Truths of the Under- 
 standing^ as contradistinguished from truths of 
 Reason, must be authenticated by facts of 
 sensible or psychical experience, are only to be 
 inferred from empirical data, and require logical 
 proof conducted according to the rules of 
 mediate reasoning supplied by the Canon of 
 formal Logic. 
 
 § 9. That the " Conditions^' designated in § 7 
 as Forms of Goncipiency^ under which Truths of 
 the Understanding may become Truths of Rea- 
 son, are essentially of the nature of, and derived 
 
6 SPIUITUAIi PHIIiOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. from the Reason, will be admitted,— if Reason 
 '''' be (as the postulate requires) the power of be- 
 holding any whole of Being, particular or uni- 
 versal, with all its diverse parts and manifold 
 relations, in the unity of the Principle which 
 at once produces and sustains the totality in 
 its integrity, — and if (as will be shown here- 
 after) Reason cannot contemplate such totality 
 in its integrity, except under the "conditions" 
 above specified. They are the indispensable ex- 
 ponents of the realization of a causative Principle 
 which, considered as predetermining its actual 
 results, involves necessarily as its factors Cau- 
 sality, Self-substantiation, the Manifestation of 
 the same substance in all the relative realities 
 ■v\hich constitute its sphere of Being, and the 
 Totality of all as a Whole animated by the One 
 pervading and Conservative Principle which 
 gave it birth and being. It will be found that 
 these unimpeachable positions are Truths of 
 B,easou and Axioms of Rational Integration ; — 
 truths and axioms which are immediately seen 
 and consciously recognised in the primary 
 Principle, from which they are derived and of 
 which they are essential constituents; — indis- 
 pensable exponents of the Idea of Rational or 
 Spiritual Integration^ which a priori (that is, 
 originally and inherently by virtue of the light 
 of Reason) is operative, and even instinctively 
 and unconsciously operative, in the human mind, 
 and is discovered in and by spiritual intuition 
 
THE UNDERSTANDING. ^ 
 
 under reflection of the individual on the facts Part i. 
 
 n t • . Sect. 2. 
 
 01 nis consciousness. 
 
 § 10. That the universal forms of Conci- 
 piency, or so called Categories, are the indis- 
 pensable aids to the acquirement of Experience, 
 or of scientific Knowledge founded on faith in 
 an inviolable order of nature, will appear more 
 fully in the following §§ relating thereto : — 
 
 § 11. Cause and Effect. Whatever requires 
 a satisfactory explanation of its production, its 
 occurrence or recurrence, — that is, whatever is 
 or begins to be, or has existence, and in that 
 existence undergoes change, requires for its 
 explanation the assignment of an antecedent 
 Condition which under the name of " Cause " is 
 adequate to account for, or render intelligible, 
 the product, consequent, or " EflPect." And the 
 only adequate conception of such " antecedent 
 condition" is that of a Power, Eificient or 
 Agent, which works and in working is the ex- 
 ponent of the process under consideration, and 
 without which the relation of dependency be- 
 tween antecedent and consequent cpuld have no 
 meaning. 
 
 It is true that the conception of '' Power," 
 as antecedent condition in the order of thought, 
 is derived not from sensible experience, whose 
 limits of cognition it transcends, but from the 
 self-consciousness of Will. But, without ad- 
 mitting Causative Power to be the " antecedent 
 condition" of all production, the facts and phe- 
 
8 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. nomena of sensible experience would forfeit all 
 
 '—^ claim to the real connexion supplied, or intended 
 
 to be supplied by the alleged relation of Cause 
 and Effect. Without the assignment of a Prin- 
 ciple, upon whose operance any whole of phe- 
 nomenal facts, simultaneous or successive, may 
 be shown to depend for their occurrence and 
 recurrence our knowledge could be neither 
 certain nor predictive. And their combination 
 depending only upon the mental association of 
 the observer, they would be left as unexplained 
 and inexplicable data, or as causata non causata ; 
 namely, by substituting subjective association 
 for causal, i.e. objective, connexion. In other 
 words, the attempt to solve the problem would 
 defeat its own purpose- 
 Corollary. The human mind recognises a 
 Lawy wherever it attributes Unity to a manifold 
 of facts and phenomena, contemplates the rela- 
 tion of each and all as necessary, regular, and 
 invariable, and is thereby rendered capable of 
 anticipating and predicting a constant order 
 of succession or of simultaneous co-operation 
 in their recurrence. But, in the recognition of 
 a Law so defined, it is impossible for the human 
 mind to refuse its assent to the position that 
 such Law must have been already fixed and 
 predetermined, — and, if predetermined, must 
 have existed in the causative and operant Power, 
 or antecedent condition of Efficiency, by which 
 the results are obtained; — a Power, which 
 
THE UNDEKSTANDIN&. \ 
 
 having originated^ preconstituted, and prede- part i. 
 
 termined the relations of existential Being, '—^ 
 
 enforces the obedience necessary to maintain 
 their constant order and regularity. In fine, 
 the originant Power is what is properly called 
 "Cause;" and the predetermined form of its 
 agency is named " Law." A glorious instance 
 of the establishment of a law, answering to 
 this definition, we owe to our immortal country- 
 man Newton.^'' 
 
 § 12. Substance and Accident, or Subject and 
 Attributes. In thinking, or forming a concep- 
 tion, of an object of sensible or psychical ex- 
 perience, a distinction is necessarily made be- 
 tween its attributes, properties, qualities or 
 accidents, and the " Substance " in which 
 they iQhere ; and, although some are more 
 permanent than others and all may be more 
 or less changeable, the Thing itself must be 
 considered to be essentially the same. The 
 distinction is unavoidable between permanent 
 "Substance" and changing "Accidents," be- 
 tween an Idem which constitutes the identity 
 of a Thing amid the changing and exponential 
 Alter of its sensible manifestations. Without 
 this concipiency of Substance and Accident, 
 without this assumption of Idem et Alter, in 
 all existential Being, without this attributing 
 a somewhat which is permanent and abiding 
 amid all change in the outward facts and phe- 
 
 * Comp. Vital Dynamics^ p. 16, on the law of Gravitation, 
 
10 SPIRITUAIi PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Pakt I. nomena of existence, the Subject could not be 
 
 Sect 2. 1 
 
 ■ identified as that which gives unity and objective 
 
 reality to our experience of the phases of ex- 
 istence, and the phenomenal exponents would 
 be dissolved into mere unconnected particulars 
 of sense. What is the real nature of " Sub- 
 stance," will be explained under the head of 
 Self-consciousness, though it may be here stated 
 that its true significancy is that of Will or 
 Spirit : but it is evident that the concipiency, 
 which it represents, is an indispensable aid to 
 Experience. Thus it is of the very condition 
 of scientific knowledge to recognise Iron as the 
 same "substance" under the variously modified 
 forms of Oxides, Rust, Plumbago^ Oast Iron^ 
 and Steel. But whatever may be the true 
 philosophical justification of the Concipiency 
 in question, the fact taken on trust by the 
 empirical mind remains the same : — He who 
 distinguishes a Metal by its properties of weight, 
 brilliancy, lustre, colour, ductility and the like, 
 or who by difference of such properties distin- 
 guishes Gold from Iron, or who has noted 
 with its bare branches the Tree which puts 
 forth its rich green foliage under the vernal 
 sun, — he cannot but apprehend the necessity 
 of the distinction between the permanent sub- 
 stance of a thing and its changing accidents. 
 
 Corollary 1. But the concipiency or cate- 
 gory, above described, is the ground of another 
 and important element of empirical knowledge 
 
THE UNDERSTANDING. 11 
 
 when applied to scientific purposes. The term part i. 
 
 *^ Substance" may be used not merely in the < — ^ 
 
 sense of an assumed or unkno"\vn supporter of 
 phenomena, but may be employed as significant 
 of actual Being. That is, " Substance " may be 
 considered as realized in a specific and charac- 
 teristic form of Being, which may be fitly 
 called a Type^ and may be regarded as that 
 which gives an unity by likeness to many 
 objects notwithstanding subordinate differences of 
 each. The Empiricist can neither deny nor reject 
 such specific and characteristic form of Being, 
 when it constitutes a Type or Pattern,* by 
 means of which he is rendered capable of con- 
 necting and uniting in his thoughts whatever 
 may be assimilated in his conscious experience 
 as modifications of one and the same common 
 type of being. All generalization and classi- 
 fication for scientific purposes imply the recog- 
 nition of Likeness with Difference; and the 
 empirical faculty would be powerless without 
 adopting the conception of a permanent Type^ 
 of the Modifications of which Experience takes 
 cognizance in the forms of actual existence. 
 This subject will meet us again under the heads 
 of Generalization and Classification : but it is 
 plain that no naturalist could claim the title 
 who failed to recognise the same organic Type 
 in all the modifications of which the Eera or 
 predaceous animal is the model, whether it be 
 
 * Darwin on Selection of Species. 
 
12 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. exhibited in the Lion, Tiger, Dog, Cat, or other 
 
 Sect. 2. . 
 
 ^- variations. 
 
 Corollary 2. The Concipiency or Category 
 of Substance and Accident would be justly 
 deemed incomplete without adverting to the 
 Sub-categories of Quality and Quantity. 
 
 A. Quality. It will be observed that Acci- 
 dents and Qualities may be taken to mean 
 nearly the same, since they furnish the marks 
 by which we acquire or certify our knowledge 
 of the being of our so-called "Substances" 
 or seK-subsistents, and which we predicate of, 
 or attribute to, these. By "Quality" we mean 
 any sort or kind of impression which any object 
 is calculated to produce, or any specific and 
 constant mode of operance by which any object, 
 agent or agency, may or does affect a percipient. 
 When we assign to the object or agent that by 
 which the percipient is affected, we regard the 
 object or agent as a Subject^ and call the cause 
 of the impression on the percipient an Attribute 
 of the subject contemplated as agent. And it 
 will be remembered that here we are not speak- 
 ing of what the realities are in the nature of 
 things, but of what our Thoughts of such things 
 and their qualities are, — that here we are, and 
 necessarily are, treating our subject-matter from 
 a subjective point of view. 
 
 B. The other sub-category of Quantity is a 
 subject far too large to be here discussed, if we 
 are to comprehend in it the consideration of 
 
THE UNDERSTANDING. 13 
 
 the wliole of mathematical science and its Part i. 
 philosophy : but a brief account of its main — !li_i_ 
 characteristics may not be omitted. " Quantity " 
 has been defined as that attribute of objects or 
 things under which they may be conceived as 
 subject to increase or diminution. But we dis- 
 tinguish two kinds of quantity, namely, the 
 Continuous and the Discrete. A continuous 
 quantity or magnitude is primarily the limi- 
 tation or bounding of Space, determining a 
 certain amount of extent, and secondarily the 
 quantity of space occupied by any solid body, 
 or the extent of any phenomenon in space. 
 But when we have to measure a space thus 
 bounded, or to count spaces, we begin to num- 
 ber, and require the aid of Discrete Quantities 
 or Numbers. 
 
 Passing over the distinctions which belong 
 to Dimension and Mensuration, it will be 
 noticed that by Discrete Quantities we mean 
 the numbering of the separate or dividuous 
 as we find it expressed by the ordinary Nu- 
 merals ; — and in this numbering we are under 
 the necessity of considering the things num- 
 bered as the same in kind. And thus, as in 
 the process of Generalization, by noting the 
 Like in the Different, we represent the manifold 
 of Experience in Classes of dissimilar objects, — 
 so, in the process of Numeration, we arrange 
 objects of the same sort or kind as classes of 
 similar objects. Hence, in respect of the logical 
 
14 SPIRITTJAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Pakt I. use of Numeration, we class dissimilar objects 
 
 Sect 2 
 
 '— by tliat which they have in common, or the 
 
 like; and we class similar objects, by that 
 which constitutes their only difference, namely 
 Nv/mbers, 
 
 In all numeration we ought to contradis- 
 tinguish the Unity ^ and the JJnits which make 
 up, or are contained in, the Unity. In counting 
 the strokes of a clock we do not simply mark 
 the repetitions or units of beat; but we count 
 till the number of the repeated strokes has made 
 up the unity, which we have been expecting 
 or wishing to ascertain. Two, Three, Four, are 
 as much unities as One, and indicate the second, 
 third, or fourth hour. All systems of Arith- 
 metic exhibit this principle, and although ours 
 is a Decimal System, yet we find a Binary and 
 a Duodecimal System; and similar indications 
 of recognised Unities in the Groat or four con- 
 sidered as Unity, in the Pair, the Triad, the 
 Leash, the Dozen, the Score and the like. 
 
 If we inquire into the origin and nature of 
 Numbers it may be shown that the ultimate 
 ground and foundation is the idea of Unity 
 and Distinction, and therefore essentially derived 
 from the Reason. But, secondly, if we investi- 
 gate the conditions under which the Idea be- 
 comes realized in and by the human mind, we 
 shall find th at the fundamental element of 
 Number is to be sought in the sense of Time 
 as the inseparable associate of all our mental 
 
THE UNDEUSTANDINa. 15 
 
 processes ; but that this sense of time would Part i. 
 
 be a mere continuous flux, if without distinction '—^ 
 
 of Parts or Moments ; and that the Distinctive, 
 consisting in part of repeated acts of attention, 
 is completed by any regular recurrence of a 
 stronger act of attention however induced. 
 
 Apply this in any case in which you have 
 the opportunity of marking, or are induced to 
 mark by the state of the attention, a succession 
 of beats, in which there is a regular recurrence 
 of a strong beat followed by a certain number 
 of lighter beats or strokes, — you will have then 
 what is called Shythm, or a Thesis and Arsis, 
 which corresponds to a succession of heightened 
 or lowered acts of Attention, and furnishes us 
 with the units and unities which we call Nti- 
 merals, 
 
 Finally, in considering the nature of arith- 
 metical operations, in which there is a constant 
 comparison of the Ratios and Proportions of 
 Numbers, it will become more and more evident 
 that all nmnhers, or the numerals as their repre- 
 sentatives, are in effect and significancy an ex- 
 haustive scheme of Ratios. 
 
 § 13. Whole and Farts. We cannot form 
 an intelligible conception of any whole in the 
 physical or moral world, except as an Unity 
 of interdependent Parts. It must be reserved 
 for future explanation to show what is the 
 origin and true foundation of this Concipiency ; 
 but after what has been already said the Reader 
 
16 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. will anticipate that it is derived from the facts 
 — ^-^ of Self-consciousness, which exhibit the realiz- 
 ation of a Will. The Empiricist no doubt 
 will repudiate such explanation when offered; 
 nevertheless he must accept the category as a 
 needful form of thinking and as an indispen- 
 sable mould of his thoughts in acquiring his 
 experience, although it must remain for him 
 an unexplained datum. Observe however that 
 empiricism leads to an inadequate view of this 
 concipiency, and is prone to believe that a 
 Whole is merely that which is equal to the 
 sum of the parts ; but this view, besides being 
 erroneous in itseK, is not even a necessary part 
 of the empirical use of the category. Say that 
 (as in the palseontological researches of a Cuvier) 
 it were important to reconstruct the structure 
 of a total animal out of a few fossil remains, 
 it might be of some predaceous animal : — here 
 even the Empiricist, in order to the work re- 
 quired of the scientific imagination, could not 
 but consult the Type of animals to which simi- 
 lar parts are found to belong, and could not 
 but infer, for instance, that laniary teeth and 
 curved claws are evidences of their having be- 
 longed to a predaceous quadruped. But it can- 
 not be doubted that he would thus call to his 
 aid, in constructing mentally the total creature, 
 somewhat other and more than a sum of parts. 
 He might have learnt from sensible experience 
 what the parts are which make up the sum 
 
THE UNDERSTANDING. 17 
 
 or visible whole of such a creature. But even part i. 
 
 the logical process implies and requires that he 1-^ 
 
 should found his inference upon a generic con- 
 ception whichj although derived from experience, 
 may be used as a Type for determining the unity 
 of the visible components. And this unity is not 
 a mere sum total or aggregate of the parts, but 
 includes the superadded insight of the inter- 
 dependency of the constituents, as reciprocally 
 needing and implying each other, and of their 
 conspiration to the accomplishment of the one 
 constructive aim which the organic whole pre- 
 sents. Hence then this Category may be fitly 
 described as requiring for empirical knowledge 
 that every Whole in the physical or moral world 
 shall be regarded as an Unity of interdependent 
 Parts, and as such by virtue of a generic Con- 
 ception, or Type, which in providing the Unity 
 in one dominant and comprehensive Thought, 
 determines the relations of the Parts, as specific 
 and integral constituents of the conceptual 
 whole ; — that is, the one dominant conception, 
 which gives intelligibility to the Whole, re- 
 appears in each and all as the specific opposed to 
 the generic. 
 
 Without the category of Whole and Parts, i.e. 
 without the correlation and opposition of Whole 
 and Parts, in respect of logical Wholes as cor- 
 responding to real Wholes, no unity of Being or 
 Existence in the manifold could be apprehended, 
 and no distribution or classification of particulars 
 
 VOL, I. c 
 
18 SPIUITTTAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part t. could be accomplished. Thus, in respect of the 
 distinctions here insisted upon, we discern in 
 every organic Body the parts or members of which 
 it is composed; and in like manner in every 
 art-construction, as a Ship, a Windmill, a Steam- 
 engine, we are under the necessity of investi- 
 gating the relations of the parts to each other, 
 and to a Whole in which every "part" derives 
 its significance from the Whole of which it is a 
 component. A mere knowledge of Farticulars 
 without the Unity ^ upon which their intelKgibility 
 and meaning depend, could have no claim to in- 
 tellectual insight of any kind. Thus again by 
 the same indispensable aid we are enabled to 
 classify and distribute the objects of empirical 
 knowledge under the exhaustive heads of Genera 
 and Species^ or other convenient divisions ; as 
 witnessed in the classificatory Sciences, such as 
 Botany, Zoology, Mineralogy and the like. 
 
 In adopting the above it is necessary however 
 to bear in mind the distinction made by logical 
 writers of Logical and Physical Division^ ex- 
 plained hereafter in § 33. 
 
 Section II, (continued,) 
 
 Subsection A, The Sense and Senses. 
 
 § 14. In the foregoing §§ on the Discourse 
 of Pi^eason, theConcipiencies of the Understanding 
 have been discussed as necessary conditions of 
 Experience. And we have next to point out 
 
THE SENSE AND SENSES. 19 
 
 whence and how the materials are acquired , part i. 
 which, cast in the moulds of the Understanding, Subsect.A. 
 are elaborated into empirical knowledge. 
 
 These mental materials, which are to be 
 wrought into Thoughts, may be described as 
 Impressions which adequately excite the con- 
 scious Attention. They are of two kinds, viz. : — 
 1. Those which affect the Inner Sense ^ such as 
 Emotions, Eeelings, Volitions, or any psychical 
 change of state : — 2. Those which affect the Outer 
 Sense and consist in the affections of the several 
 Senses. When such impressions are referred 
 only to the state of the subject they are called 
 Sensations. When such impressions are referred 
 to outward objects or agents supposed to pro- 
 duce the impressions, they are called Percep- 
 tions : — that, under the appropriate conditions, 
 they are unavoidably so referred, and are affirmed 
 to be ab extrd^ depends mainly upon the con- 
 viction that the subject affected by them has no 
 power to produce, change, or control them by any 
 act of his volition ; — and hence his unutterable 
 assurance of the existence of an outward world. 
 
 § 16. But the Sense, both inner and outer, is 
 exercised only under the inherent " conditions," 
 which are designated as Space and Time. It 
 would be hopeless to attempt, in this summary of 
 the arguments upon which a spiritual philosophy 
 is founded, to enter upon an analysis of the 
 questions connected with these forms of Sense ; 
 and I must, instead of quoting at length my 
 
 c 2 
 
20 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 paut I. papers on the subject, content myself with oflFer- 
 Subsect.A. ing the following results of my investigation : — 
 Space and Trnie are not mere products of 
 empirical Knowledge. They may be regarded as 
 forms of sensuous intuition. But, as containing 
 grounds of universal and necessary truths (viz. 
 those of Mathematical Science) these forms of 
 Sense may be best, or most philosophically, re- 
 solved into Laws of Sensible Distinction. Space 
 is the form of universal Objectivity : Time is the 
 form of universal Subjectivity; — both are in- 
 herent forms of realization and of reality in a 
 world requiring sensible distinctions. And the 
 laws of sensible distinction are to be finally 
 traced up to the Sciential Reason, as the ground 
 and source of all Unity and Distinction when 
 contemplated as the revelation of the Divine 
 Intelligence and Wisdom, 
 
 Section II. {continued.) 
 
 Subsection B. Generalization. 
 
 § 16. Pursuing the course indicated in § 14, 
 namely the explanation of the process required 
 by philosophy in raising the notices of the 
 Sense, inner and outer, into Thoughts^ considered 
 as Generic Conceptions substantiated by means 
 of Words, — we are, in truth, introducing the 
 Header into the science of formal Logic : — but, 
 in order to avoid the complexities of so large 
 an inquiry, it will be our duty to select such 
 
GENERALIZATION. 21 
 
 parts only as a lucid account of the Eeasoning part i. 
 employed in tlie Spiritual Philosophy may need Subsect/B 
 and require. 
 
 The work of the Understanding, as the em- 
 pirical faculty, § 7, may be described as Gene- 
 ralization in conformity with the Rules of 
 formal Logic; and by Generalization is meant 
 the mental process of bringing the notices of the 
 sense^ or the facts and phenomena by which 
 we have been consciously impressed, sereraUy 
 under their appropriate Kinds or " Oenera^^ each 
 Genus being distinguished by a Name or de- 
 scriptive designation. 
 
 § 17. But the process of Generalization im- 
 plies a correspondent process of Abstraction. 
 " Abstraction designates the process by which in 
 contemplating any object our thoughts are di- 
 rected to some one part or property exclusively, 
 withdrawing our attention from the rest. Gene- 
 ralization indicates the process by which the 
 mind occupies itself with like parts or proper- 
 ties in dissimilar objects, and in consequence of 
 the likeness includes them in one genus or kind." 
 By noticing the Different in the Like, and the 
 Like in the Different, these elementary factors 
 of thought. Abstraction and Generalization^ are 
 the indispensable aids to the naming, sorting 
 and classing of all the materials of which sen- 
 sible and conscious experience are composed. 
 The propensity to look for resemblances amid 
 differences in the multitudinous objects and 
 
22 SPIUITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 paut I. agencies by which we are influenced may be 
 Subse'ctR. regarded as one of the earliest and most uni- 
 versal characteristics of the human mind. 
 
 § 18. But, although these processes are the 
 indispensable conditions under which the facts 
 and phenomena, from which conscious expe- 
 rience is derived, are raised into human thoughts 
 and conceptions, a distinction should be made 
 between what may be csilled Associative Thoughts 
 and Logical Thoughts or Conceptions, An as- 
 sociative thought is one which recalls a resem- 
 blance : a logical thought or conception is one 
 which requires a definition, or such a description 
 as would justify generic inclusion. A seaman, 
 who had been a voyage to the Arctic seas, might 
 give a sufficiently intelligible description to his 
 townsmen of a Whale, which they had never 
 seen, by its resemblance to objects with which 
 they might be familiar ; but in order to convey 
 an accurate conception of the logical kind or 
 genus, he would be obliged to distinguish it at 
 least as an inhabitant of the deep which breathes 
 by lungs and suckles its young. 
 
 § 19. The primary form then, as pointed out 
 above, in which the Generalization of Experience 
 meets us, and this in its logical acceptation, is 
 that in which the mind occupies itself with like 
 parts or properties in dissimilar objects, and in 
 consequence of the likeness includes them in one 
 genus or kind. Say that the herdsman in the 
 rudest state of society distinguishes his cloven- 
 
GENERALIZATION. 23 
 
 footed flock of sheep and goats from the wild part i. 
 animals armed with sharp pointed teeth and su^^sect.* 
 curved claws, which seize tear and devour those 
 of which he is the guardian. If he has thus 
 distinguished them he has already the means of 
 making the serviceable generalizations, which in- 
 clude his herd and other grazing animals under 
 the generic conception " cloven-footed/' and their 
 enemies, who prey upon them, under the genus 
 or kind " with laniary teeth and curved claws." 
 
 Thus, when we think of objects by means of 
 their like character, that is^ of what is common 
 to many in the impression produced upon us, we 
 say that we think of them by means of a common 
 or generic conception. But this generic thought, 
 by which we include many and different objects 
 in one conception, would be evanescent and in- 
 determinate, unless we had the power of limiting 
 and fixing it ; and this we do by the contrivance 
 of Language, Every generic conception may be 
 designated by an appropriate Term^ which in- 
 cludes and is significant of all the objects to 
 which the term is applicable in its generic sense. 
 " When a person speaking to us of any particular 
 object or appearance refers it by means of some 
 common character to a known class, which he 
 does in giving it a name^ we say that we under- 
 stand him, i.e. we understand his words." (Aids 
 to Reflection, p. 222.) 
 
 § 20. Propositions. The logical acts already 
 noticed are Abstraction and Generalization; and 
 
21i SPIBITUAIi PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. it will be readily inferred that they imply Com- 
 Subsect.B. parison, or the act by which the objects under 
 consideration are brought into mental juxta- 
 position, in order to note in what they agree or 
 disagree in respect of a proposed common or 
 generic mark. And to these we may add Be- 
 flection or the act of turning inward, and of 
 weighing how far the impressions produced by 
 the objects fit them, or do not fit them, to be 
 combined to one Conception in the unity of 
 conscious Thought. But, lastly, an act of 
 Judgement is required by which we decide that 
 a generic mark, otherwise called a Predicate^ 
 does, or does not, apply throughout to the 
 genus, sort or kind, which it is intended to 
 designate. And thus we form Conceptions, — that 
 is, comprehend in an unity of thought a multi- 
 tude of impressions, psychical or sensible ; and 
 thus we are enabled to collect and register the 
 results of our experience. 
 
 It is then an act of Judgement, when we afiirm 
 or deny that any object or appearance is included 
 in any generic conception or designation. IS^ow 
 the expression of such an act of logical Judge- 
 ment in Terms is called a Proposition ; and that 
 of which the generic Term is affirmed or denied 
 is called the Subject of the proposition, whilst 
 the generic term affirmed or denied is named 
 the Predicate ; — the Terms or Exponents of 
 the proposition being connected by the verb 
 substantive "is'' and this connexion is called 
 
GENERALIZATION. 25 
 
 the Copula. Thus we say : — " Grass is green," part i. 
 *^ Assassins are cowardly," " Whales are not SubsectB. 
 Pish." ~ 
 
 "We are not, however, to suppose, as might be 
 perhaps expected, that the subject of a proposi- 
 tion is always its substantive part, and that the 
 predicate is that which (as an adjective) de- 
 signates its property or attribute. See, respect- 
 ing terms, § 22, 
 
 § 21- Not an unimportant question, connected 
 with the nature of a Judgement as expressed in 
 a Proposition, is that of the nature of the rela 
 Hon between Subject and Predicate . It involves 
 indeed the larger question of the significancy of 
 the scope and aim of Logic itself, considered as 
 the science of reasoning. 
 
 The question may be in a considerable measure 
 ventilated by attending to the meaning of the 
 word "is," which, as we have seen, is the copula 
 between subject and predicate. And we learn 
 that it may be used in several senses. Thus it 
 may mean simply " is like^'^ — e.g., " a whale is 
 (sc. like) a fish :" — or it may stand for " is desig- 
 nated by the term^^ — e.g., " the appropriation 
 of what belongs to another man is (sc. desig- 
 nated by the term) Theft :" — or it may be equi- 
 valent to "is recognised by the property ^"^ — e.g. 
 *^ vinegar is (sc. recognised by the property) of 
 acid taste :" — or its meaning may be " is de- 
 scribed as" — e.g., "a bird is (sc. described as) 
 that which has aptitude for flight:" — or its 
 
26 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. power may be " is defined as," — e.g., 
 SubsectB. (sc. defined as) a rational Being:" — or, accord- 
 ing to some logicians, it answers to " agree- 
 ment ;' that is, expresses that the subject agrees 
 with the predicate or vicevers^,, — e.g., " the tem- 
 perature of 100*^ P. is (sc. agrees with the de- 
 scription) hot :" — or again, the explanation of 
 the word " is" may be "is equivalent or equal 
 to^' — e.g., " an excuse is (sc. equivalent to) an 
 admission or confession of the fault charged : — 
 or lastly, the value of the " is " may be " is in- 
 eluded or contained in^' — e.g., " the Tiger is 
 (sc. included in the generic term) predaceous." 
 But if we examine each of these several meanings, 
 it will be found that in each the expression used 
 may be changed to the affirmation that the 
 Subject of the proposition is included in or con- 
 tained under the Predicate as the inclusive 
 generic designation. When we say that Aris- 
 totle was a Logician, that an appropriator of 
 other men's property is a Thief, that a bird 
 is a flying animal, and the like, we mean in 
 each case that the predicate is applicable to, 
 designates as a generic term, and contains under 
 it the subject specified. It is not necessary that 
 we should regard the subject as one of many 
 species, all of which make a generic whole of 
 which the predicate is the name. We merely 
 mean to say that the subject is one, perhaps of 
 otherwise very different sorts, which is con- 
 tained under and may be designated by the 
 
GENEKALIZATION. 27 
 
 Predicate, as the means of marking the subiect part i. 
 
 ' ^ •^ Sect. 2. 
 
 by a right attribute, without special reference Subsect.B. 
 to the class in which it may be contained. 
 I conceive then the fundamental position to be, 
 that a Proposition affirms or denies that tlie 
 subject is contained under , or included by^ the 
 Term which stands for the Predicate, and that 
 the use and value of the Copula are truly 
 significant of this logical relation. But it 
 may be properly alleged that in the use of the 
 proposition to express the relation of Subject 
 and Predicate, we may distinguish Attribution 
 and Inclusion : — in the former, attention is only 
 directed to the application of a right attribute 
 or designation of the subject; in the latter the 
 attention is directed to the variety and num- 
 ber of the species included in the genus desig- 
 nated by the predicate, — e.g., " all animals that 
 chew the cud, such as the ox, the goat, the sheep, 
 the deer, are included in the genus Ruminant." 
 
 § 22. There are some other considerations 
 with respect to Propositions, which, though re- 
 quiring only a brief notice here, may not be 
 altogether passed over. 
 
 1. Propositions differ in Quality and Quantity. 
 In respect of quality they are affirmative or 
 negative. In respect of quantity or extent they 
 are said to be Universal or Particular. A uni- 
 versal proposition is one of which the predicate 
 is affirmed or denied of the whole of the subject. 
 Its usual signs are " all," '' every," " none," &c. 
 
28 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPfiY. 
 
 paut I. A particular proposition is one of which, the pre- 
 Subsect.B. dicate is affirmed or denied of only part of the 
 subject: — its usual signs are "some/' "many," 
 " few," " several ; " and " all " or " every," if the 
 copula be negative. To these may be added the 
 Singular Proposition, or one of which the subject 
 is an individual : but as singular propositions 
 predicate of the whole of the subject, they fall 
 under the rules which govern universals. 
 
 2. Propositions are said to be either Categorical 
 or hypothetical. A categorical proposition de- 
 clares a thing (Karijjopet) absolutely, "I am," 
 " Judas was a traitor." But there may be, besides 
 the pwe categorical, modal categoricals, namely 
 those which assert the mode or onanner^ of the 
 agreement and disagreement between subject and 
 predicate: and the "modes" usually distinguished 
 are Necessary^ Possible, and Contingent. Thus, 
 as Watts' Logic, p. 161, says: "It is necessary 
 that a Globe should be round : That a globe be 
 made of Wood or Glass is an unnecessary or 
 contingent thing : It is impossible that a Globe 
 should be square : It is possible that a Globe 
 may be made of water." The Hypothetical Pro- 
 position is subdivided (?) into Conditional and 
 Disjunctive. A conditional hypothetical proposi- 
 tion consists of two or more categoricals united 
 by a conjunction called the Copula. It asserts, 
 not absolutely, but under an hypothesis or con- 
 dition. Such propositions are denoted by the 
 conjunctions used in stating them ; — e.g., " if 
 
GENERALIZATION. 29 
 
 man is fallible, he is imperfect." A disjunctive part i. 
 hypothetical is denoted by the disjunctive con- SubsectB. 
 junction "either"; — e.g., " it is either day or 
 night," Comp. Wesley, Logic, p. 6. 
 
 3. Terms, The terms of a proposition are the 
 Subject and Predicate ; they are the words which 
 limit and express the meaning of the proposition. 
 It is not necessary that the distinctions, which 
 logicians have made in the use of terms, should 
 be here explained : but it is to be remembered 
 that the Subject of a proposition is not always 
 its substantive part ; nor does the Predicate (as 
 an adjective) always designate some property or 
 attribute. These terms, Subject and Predicate, 
 have merely a logical meaning and relative use 
 in respect of each other. If we say " Green 
 is a colour," the property expressed by the 
 adjective "green" is used as the Subject, and 
 the substantive "colour" as the Predicate of 
 the proposition ; and we aflB.rm thereby that 
 "green" is included or classed under the con- 
 ception "colour." 
 
 But the example we have chosen leads to 
 another distinction in Terms of no mean im- 
 portance : — we are using the term " colour " 
 abstractedly from all the qualities or properties 
 which constitute its sensible and real character. 
 It is substantiated for our mind, as that which 
 is always present when we receive the impression 
 of any specific colour, but which may be con- 
 sidered abstractly and for itself in the absence of 
 
30 SPIUITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 paut I. every specific colour. It is not so when we use 
 Subsect.B. a term, wnicn expresses any objective reality, 
 say a " house," a " tree," a " man ; " — these are 
 so named, or derive a name in consequence of 
 their having produced a total hnpression on the 
 senses, each of which comprehends various pro- 
 perties contained in that total impression, or 
 suggested by it. Hence the distinction between 
 Abstract and Concrete Terms. The first are 
 those to which there is no corresponding sensible 
 object, but only a mental substantiation and 
 an abstract from the similar sensible impression 
 which the generic term includes and suggests ; — 
 such are the terms Virtue, Wisdom, Courage, 
 Humanity and the like. On the other hand, 
 Concrete Terms correspond to the total impres- 
 sions of actual objects within the sphere of our 
 sensible Experience, and include or suggest 
 various dissimilar properties, under each of 
 which the subject may be classed. 
 
 4. Definition, It will be easily seen then how 
 important is a right use of Terms or Words in any 
 act or process of Judgement, in order that we our- 
 selves know, and express to others our meaning 
 correctly, definitely and unequivocally. In order 
 to attain to a right use of Terms, the meaning 
 of every proposition requires to be accurately 
 weighed in respect of the relation between the 
 Subject and Predicate : — namely, that what is 
 predicated of the subject is objective, true and 
 correctly expressed. The most complete attain- 
 
GENEBALIZATION. 31 
 
 ment of this object is that by means of a so- p^rt i. 
 called Definition; and this will be appreciated Subsect.B. 
 if we take Kant's account of the requisites of 
 a successful definition, viz : — " Conceptus rei 
 adsequatus in minimis terminis complete deter- 
 minatus." (The adequate conception of a thing 
 fully determined in the fewest terms.) Logicians 
 say, and I quote the following from Wesley's 
 Logic (see Index and Vocabulary) : "Definition 
 is such an explanation of a term as separates it 
 like a boundary from every thing else." It is 
 divided into : — 1. Nominal^ which explains only 
 the meaning of the term by an equivalent ex- 
 pression, that may happen to be better known, 
 as Decalogue is (equivalent to) the ten com- 
 mandments : 2. Meal^ which explains the na- 
 ture of the Thing. (Eor further particulars see 
 the passage referred to.) The test of a sound 
 Definition is that the Terms of a Proposition 
 should be convertible. But as this can only be 
 done when the terms of a proposition are of 
 exactly the same extent^ we have frequently to 
 resort to what is technically called " Accidental 
 Defijaition," — that is, to a Description of the sub- 
 ject by assigning to it, or predicating of it, its 
 Properties and Accidents. 
 
 Under this head might be conveniently con- 
 sidered the Conversion of Propositions^ but I pass 
 it by for the present as not needful to the object 
 we have in view. 
 
 5. And lastly I may observe, that, as every 
 
32 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pakt I. logical proposition aims at truth, such truth 
 subse*ct.'B. should bc severely tested : — 
 
 1. In Be, as correspondent to objective 
 
 truth, — that is, as existing for our ap- 
 prehension in the nature of things. 
 
 2. In Dictione, as in conformity with the 
 
 right use of Terms or Words. 
 
 3. In Argumento, or in the argument as a 
 
 right conclusion from correct premisses 
 expressed or implied. This last con- 
 dition of a true Proposition remains to 
 be explained, and we proceed to do so 
 in the following. Subsection. 
 
 Section II. (continued,) 
 
 Subsection 0. Measonmg or Sylloge. 
 
 § 23. I have now to claim the reader's ad- 
 mission of the position advanced in § 16, that, 
 exclusive of the explanatory details which I 
 have thought it desirable to introduce in the 
 preceding subsection, I have in the one word 
 Generalization stated the essential character of 
 all Logic ; as that, namely, by which the Under- 
 standing performs its oflB.ce of collecting and 
 sorting all impressions on the sense, inner and 
 outer, of substantiating them as Thoughts or 
 Logical conceptions by means of Terms or 
 Words, and of registering them as acts of 
 Judgement in the form of Propositions. 
 
 § 24. We have now to consider the process. 
 
REASONING. 33 
 
 by means of which the Conclusions are arrived part i. 
 at, of which the Propositions are the record. Subsect/c. 
 And it will be our business to show that what 
 we call Reasoning^ Discourse of Reason, or Logic, 
 consists essentially in Inference — that is, in in- 
 ferring some truth from another, known or 
 accepted, and couched in a Proposition of the 
 kind described. 
 
 § 25. And herein will be found the state- 
 ment of what constitutes E^easoning, and the 
 Principle of Reasoning. In however ques- 
 tionable a shape a problem may present itself, 
 and whatever contrivances may have been sug- 
 gested for aiding and correcting the constant 
 business of reasoning in all the daily concerns 
 of life, there is only one and universal principle 
 of Reasoning. This principle or Law — the dis- 
 covery of which we owe to Aristotle, the father 
 and founder of scientific Logic, is generally 
 known under the phrase Dictum de Omni et 
 NullOi and it may be thus expressed : " What- 
 ever may be predicated affirmatively (de Omni) 
 or negatively (de NuUo) of a whole class or 
 kind may be predicated in like manner of all 
 and every one of the particulars which the 
 class or kind contains. ' ' Thus, if all men 
 without any exception are mortal, each man 
 must be mortal. As we have seen the Predi- 
 cate "mortal" is the designation of the class 
 or genus; and if it include all men, it cannot 
 fail to include every man. The truth of this 
 
 VOL. I. D 
 
34 SPIRITIIAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. position it is impossible to deny, since every par- 
 subsect. c. ticular belongs to the class, of which it forms 
 a part, by virtue of the common mark which 
 constitutes the class ; — just as the owner of a 
 flock of sheep marks each, and, recognising the 
 components of his flock by the mark, knows 
 which are his, and is enabled to separate from 
 them any strange sheep as having either no 
 mark, or a mark other than his own. 
 
 I repeat then that, in the statement of the 
 Principle just enunciated, we have found the 
 whole sum and substance of what is called 
 Logic* But it is quite true that, for the due 
 application of the principle, certain forms and 
 rules will be found convenient, if not necessary. 
 The most felicitous contrivance for this purpose 
 is what is denominated the Aristotelicm Syllo- 
 gism^ for it enables the reasoner to know by 
 the form itself whether the reasoning be correct. 
 But more must not be attributed to the form 
 than a form deserves. It does not constitute 
 the principle or law of Reasoning ; but, as the 
 regular form, it supplies a test, and in any 
 doubtful case may be resorted to as a criterion, 
 of the correct performance of the process : and 
 though it would be impossible in practice for 
 men to reduce all their reasonings to this 
 
 * The law of reasoning', above enunciated as the discovery of Aristotle, 
 is itself a self-evident trutb ; — every act of reasoning can be explained 
 by itj and no act of reasoning can be explained without it. And as the 
 rather of Logic himself said — As the human hand m relation to the body, 
 so Logic in relation to the human mind is "the instrument of instruments." 
 
llEASONINe. 35 
 
 strict measure of formal syllogism, it Beverthe- part i. 
 less provides and lays down certain rules wMch Subsect.'c. 
 are of indispensable value. Least of all, how- 
 ever, can it be supposed to be any effective 
 substitute for native Judgement or what has 
 been called common sense and mother-wit. 
 
 § 26. The model of syllogistic reasoning is 
 the so-called Categorical Syllogism^ and of this 
 we proceed to give the Reader an account as far 
 as the shortness of our canvas permits. Trite 
 examples will be best suited to our purpose, 
 since thereby the attention of the student will 
 be more directed to the Form than to the 
 matter ; and we offer the following as familiar 
 illustrations, the first as establishing an affirma- 
 tive and the second a negative conclusion : — 
 
 (1.) All men are mortal ; a King is a man ; 
 therefore a King is mortal; — 
 
 (2.) No man is immortal ; a King is a man ; 
 therefore a King is not immortal. 
 
 In these, as in all similar instances, the validity 
 and evidentness of the Argument are best se- 
 cured by the formal conditions of syllogism. 
 And it will be found that in this form we have 
 to distinguish three Propositions and three 
 Terms. 
 
 The three Propositions are respectively named: 
 — Major Premiss; — Minor Premiss; — and Con- 
 clusion. And the mutual relations under which 
 they constitute an Argument, or process of 
 reasoning, may be explained as follows. 
 
 n 2 
 
36 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 paet I. 1. In the major premiss the Subject is affirmed 
 subsect.*c. to be included in the class, which the Predicate 
 
 designates, as : " All men are (included in the 
 
 class) mortal." 
 
 2. In the minor premiss the Subject (or that 
 concerning which the argument is raised, here 
 "A King") is affirmed to be included in the 
 Predicate of this premiss, or, what is tanta- 
 mount, in the subject of the major, here in the 
 sort or kind "Man;" — for the Subject of the 
 major, and the Predicate of the minor, premiss 
 are the same, and are so employed in order to 
 establish the position that the subject of the 
 minor is contained in, or is a part of the 
 subject of the major premiss, and therefore in- 
 cluded in its Predicate. Thus, our minor premiss 
 is "A King is (included in the sort or kind 
 'man') a man." 
 
 3. In the Conclusion^ the Subject of the minor 
 premiss having been legitimately included, by 
 means of the Predicate of the minor, in the 
 subject of the major, the necessary consequence 
 is announced by affirming that the Subject of 
 the Minor is included in the Predicate of the 
 Major, or according to our example, "A King 
 is (included in the class designated by the Pre- 
 dicate) mortal." 
 
 On the other hand, as seen in the second or 
 Negative Example^ it is affirmed in the Major 
 Premiss that no " Man " is included in the Class 
 designated by the Predicate "immortal." But 
 
REASONING. 37 
 
 if the whole class (" man ") is excluded from the paet i. 
 
 ^ ^ , Sect. 2. 
 
 Predicate "immortal/' every part contained m Subsect.c. 
 the class must necessarily be excluded there- 
 from ; and the object and unavoidable use of the 
 second or Mmor Premiss is to establish the posi- 
 tion that its Subject, here " a King," is con- 
 tained in the rejected sort or kind named 
 " Man." And hence in the Conclusion it is 
 announced as incontestable, that as no Man is 
 immortal, so '^ A King is not immortal." * 
 
 It may be added, however, that, although the 
 Syllogism is the most convenient and trustworthy 
 form of establishing a truth, it contributes 
 nothing to the force of the argument, and that, 
 after all, the validity of any inference depends 
 upon the principle — that a Predicate or logical 
 
 * Or, syllogism may be illustrated and analysed as follows : — 
 
 Major Premiss J— M is contained in P ; — 
 
 Minor Premiss, — S is contained in M ; — 
 
 Conclusionj — S is contained in P. 
 
 M = Middle Term. P = Predicate. S = Subject. 
 Tbese constitute an Argument or a valid process of Keasoning, when 
 they are related to each other according to the following Rule : — 
 That the Predicate in the major premiss includes the Subject of the 
 same, namely M ; — that the Subject of the major premiss, M, being 
 made in the minor premiss the Predicate, includes the Subject or S ; and 
 that this S, or the Subject, (regarding which the argument has been 
 raised, having been proved in the minor premiss to be included in the 
 class or kind which the subject of the major M designates) is shown in 
 the Conclusion to be necessarily included in the Predicate of the major 
 premiss. In short the validity of the Argument consists in this :— 
 That S is contained in P, because it is contained in M, and M is con- 
 tained wholly in P ; that is, if P contains M, and M contains S, S must 
 be contained in P. Or, negatively: — That S is not contained in P, 
 because it is contained in M, the whole of which, and every part and 
 portion of wliich, are excluded from and denied to be contained in P. 
 
38 SPIUITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. term, which rightly designates, or which includes, 
 Subsect.c. a Class, rightly designates or includes whatever 
 that Class contains. Or a logical term, which 
 excludes a whole class, excludes whatever the class 
 contains. This may be, however, illustrated by 
 the consideration of the three Terms which have 
 to be distinguished, as we have noticed above, 
 in every syllogism. 
 
 The three Terms so distinguished are : 1. The 
 Major Term or Predicate^ which, if legitimately 
 employed in the major premiss to include, or 
 designate, the class constituting the Subject of 
 the same premiss, may be employed in like 
 manner in the Conclusion to include or designate 
 a part of the Class in question. 2. The Minor 
 Term is the Subject of the minor premiss and 
 of the Conclusion, and designates the Part of 
 the Class concerning which the argument is 
 raised. 3. The Middle Term appears as the 
 Subject of the major and as the Predicate of 
 the minor premiss. It is the hinge and very 
 pivot of the whole argument ; for it is the term, 
 which designating the Subject of the major as 
 the Class included by the Predicate, must, in its 
 assumed oflS.ce of Predicate of the minor premiss, 
 be shown to include the Subject of the same, 
 as expressing the Part of the Class concerning 
 which the argument has been raised. 
 
 The Middle Term therefore plays a very promi- 
 nent part in every Argument; for it is the 
 term, which, performing the double oflfice of 
 
REASONING. 39 
 
 including the Minor term or Subject and of paet i. 
 causing it to be included in the Major term or subsekc. 
 Predicate, proves the case required by showing 
 that the Subject, regarding which the Argument 
 has been raised, is necessarily contained in the 
 class designated by the Predicate ;— and this is 
 the question at issue. Thus, to find a Middle 
 Term is often of the highest importance, and 
 one of the first considerations in cases, in which 
 we have to bring a particular case under a 
 general rule or generalization. Say our great 
 Newton, in his anticipation that " the Diamond 
 is combustible," but without the means of sub- 
 jecting it to experiment, was obliged to test the 
 opinion by reasoning on facts already known. He 
 would seek a Middle Term designating a class 
 which should include the Subject "Diamond," 
 and be included in the Predicate " Combustible." 
 Now this middle term he would have been 
 enabled to obtain by his own researches in 
 the refraction of light, which showed that 
 " Whatever refracts light beyond the ratio of its 
 density is combustible : " — and hence Newton's 
 argument might be vepve^ented formallt/ thus : 
 
 Whatever refracts light beyond the ratio 
 of its density is combustible : 
 
 The Diamond refracts light beyond the ratio 
 of its density : therefore — 
 
 The Diamond is combustible. 
 It will be seen then that every argument 
 reduces itself to the valid relation of three 
 
40 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. terms, whether this be expressed formally as a 
 subsect.'c. Syllogism or not. The question is, whether the 
 given Subject is, or is not, included in the Predi- 
 cate. And the answer required is: That the 
 subject belongs to a class (designated by a middle 
 term) which is affirmed or denied to be included 
 in the Predicate. And this brings us back to 
 the Dictum of the founder of Logic : " What- 
 ever may be predicated affirmatively (de Omni) 
 or negatively (de NuUo) of a whole class or kind 
 may be predicated in like manner of all and 
 every one of the particulars which the class or 
 kind contains." 
 
 § 27. The above applies to all Mediate Mea- 
 sowing. And all Logical Reasoning is mediate^ 
 that is, consists in the position that a proposition 
 being true, or admitted to be true, another pro- 
 position may be legitimately inferred from it. 
 I do not stop here to inquire whether the dis- 
 tinction between mediate and immediate judge- 
 ments be just or not, or whether there are 
 Truths which may be properly called self- 
 evident .•* — though it may be safely asserted that 
 every major premiss is either a self-evident 
 truth or a foregone conclusion, and that it is 
 only to the former that the appellation " im- 
 mediate judgement" can really apply. But in 
 respect of the validity of an Argument, the 
 determination of which is now before us, it is 
 
 * Aristotle's dictum is an instauce of a self-evident trutli : — " "What- 
 ever is predicated of all is predicated of each of the same class.'' 
 
REASONING. 41 
 
 necessary to observe that certain Precautions pakt i. 
 must be observed, in order to render the reason- Subsect/c. 
 ing, whether in the form of a Syllogism or not, 
 such as may be accepted to be true and to defy 
 the charge of "Paralogism." And it is the 
 more necessary to warn the student against the 
 neglect of such precautions, because the form 
 of the Argument may have been correctly ob- 
 served, and the conclusion may be true, though 
 the reasoning may be wrong and hence the argu- 
 ment invalid. 
 
 In directing the attention of the reader to 
 the Rules for avoiding Paralogism we propose 
 however to confine our observations to what 
 have been called Logical Fallacies. It will be 
 found that a paralogism will take place in 
 three cases of violation of the cardinal rules 
 of sound conclusion, viz. those called by logical 
 writers, 1. Undistributed Middle ^ 2, Illicit _pw- 
 cess of the Major Term, 3. Illicit process of the 
 Minor Term. And the three cases have this in 
 common, that a Term (middle, major or minor) is 
 surreptitiously used as universal, where, accord- 
 ing to the regular syllogistic form, it can be 
 legitimately only used for, or applied to, a part 
 of its significates. 
 
 1. Undistributed Middle Term. As we have 
 seen in the preceding § the middle term M is 
 to include the Subject S, and with it to be 
 included in the Predicate P; but if M is 
 undistributed— that is, does not stand for all its 
 
42 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. sigxuficates, but only for a part of them, the 
 subsect/c. subject may or may not be included in the 
 part, and the conclusion will be invalid or 
 not necessarily consequential. Thus if it were 
 argued : " Some boys are manly, John is a boy, 
 and therefore John is manly : " the conclusion 
 would be false in consequence of the middle 
 term " boys " being undistributed, and learing 
 it therefore uncertain whether " John" the sub- 
 ject belongs to that part which is designated 
 by " some boys." In order to prove that John 
 is manly, the premiss ought to have been "All 
 boys are manly," that is, the class "boys" 
 should have been taken universally.* But this 
 surreptitious use of the middle term as uni- 
 
 * Wtately (Lessons on Reasoning, p. 36) says : " Again, take such 
 an instance as tbis : Eood (M) is (P) necessary to life ; Com (S) is 
 (M) food ; therefore Com (S) is (P) necessary to life. Here P, 'neces- 
 sary to life/ is affirmed of 'food/ but not universally; for every one 
 would understand you to be speaking not of 'all food/ but of 'some 
 food ' as being ' necessary to life.' — The Rule has not been compKed 
 with ; since that which has been affirmed not of the whole of a certain 
 class, (or not universally) but only of a part of it, cannot on that 
 ground be affirmed of whatever is contained under that class." In 
 respect of Mr. Hume's argument against miracles^ which Whately thus 
 states : Testimony (M) is a kind of evidence more likely to be false than 
 a miracle to be true ; the evidence on which the Christian miracles are 
 beheved is (M) Testimony ; therefore the evidence, on which the Chris- 
 tian miracles are beheved, is more likely to be false than a miracle to be 
 tme : he says, " Here it is evident that what is spoken of in the first of 
 these premisses, is 'Some testimony ;' not 'all testimony' (or any wJmt- 
 ever^ and by 'a witness' we understand, '•some witness,* not ''everg 
 witness : ' so that this apparent argument has exactly the same fault as 
 the one above." Ibid. I may note, however, that if Hume's M means 
 All human testimony ^ his argument, whatever its value, has not on that 
 interpretation been fairly stated by Whately. 
 
HEASONING. 43 
 
 versal, when it in trutli has only a partial sig- part i. 
 niflcance, may not appear on the face of the Subsekc. 
 argument as above. I take the following in- 
 stance from Whately, Logic, p. 163, though the 
 syllogism is in the 2nd Figure hereafter to be 
 explained. It is an instance in which the con- 
 clusion might be valid, or true, if deduced from 
 suitable premisses, and hence the paralogism 
 might easily escape detection. 
 The argument is this : — 
 
 All wise rulers endeavour to civilize the 
 people ; 
 
 Alfred endeavoured to civilize the people ; 
 
 Therefore he was a wise ruler. 
 Here the middle term, M, is ^^ endeavour 
 to civilize the people." It appears in both 
 premisses ; it is that term which is to include 
 the subject "Alfred," and with it to be included 
 in the Predicate "All wise rulers," But the 
 statement of the Argument does not warrant the 
 conclusion. The middle term " endeavour to 
 civilize the people" is afilrmed to include "All 
 wise rulers," and in the minor premiss it is 
 affirmed that the subject AKred is also contained 
 in the same middle term : but it does not follow 
 that the subject " Alfred" is contained in that 
 part which is affirmed to be included in the 
 predicate, namely, " All wise rulers." Because 
 a Subject belongs to two classes designated by a 
 common name, it does not follow that one class is 
 contained in the other ; to adopt such a fallacy 
 
44 SPIKITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. would lead only to such absurdities as may be 
 Subsect.'c. illustrated by tbe following : — 
 
 All vegetables grow ; 
 
 An animal grows ; therefore 
 
 An animal is a vegetable. 
 The fault here exposed is then that which has 
 been called by Logicians the undistributed Middle 
 Term. That is, the middle term, if undistributed 
 or not taken universally in one of the premisses, 
 does not, under the condition of the argument, 
 include that part of the class to which the subject 
 belongs. In order to a sound conclusion, the 
 middle term ought to contain the whole, or every 
 one of the class, of which the subject is part ; 
 and then the subject may be rightly included 
 in the Predicate containing the class of which the 
 middle term is the designation. 
 
 There is however a defect of the middle term, 
 which, although not belonging to the logical 
 form, may be here conveniently considered, 
 namely, that in which the middle term is ex- 
 pressed by an ambiguous word. It is unneces- 
 sary to say that an Ambiguous Middle Term is 
 calculated to vitiate the reasoning, by allowing of 
 the use of the term in one sense in the major pre- 
 miss, and in another sense in the minor. This 
 may happen in any case in which the term has not 
 been defined as far as the meaning is concerned 
 in the argument in which it is employed.* 
 
 * Comp. Whately on ambiguities in language. Logic, p. 176 ; and at 
 p. 235 he says, "There are several kinds of joke and raillery wMch will 
 
REASONING. 45 
 
 2. Illicit process. The rule against illicit pro- paut i. 
 cess is : — No term must be "distributed" (stand SuiDsect.'c. 
 for all its significates) in the conclusion, wbich 
 was not " distributed" in one of the premisses ; 
 — because you would then employ the whole of a 
 term in the conclusion, when you had employed 
 a part of it only in the premiss, and thus intro- 
 duce a fourth term. The violation of this rule is 
 called an illicit process of the major or minor 
 term. 
 
 The following is an example of illicit process 
 of major term. 
 
 All quadrupeds are animals; 
 
 A Bird is not a quadruped ; therefore 
 
 It is not an animal. 
 
 Here the major term or Predicate "animal" 
 is not distributed in the major premiss; it 
 does not stand for all its significates, and may 
 include not only quadrupeds, but other kinds 
 of animals. But the predicate "animal" is 
 distributed in the Conclusion by the word 
 " not ; " for it means, Whatever is not in- 
 cluded in the predicate or major term is not 
 "animal," and the predicate therefore stands 
 for all its significates, for "animals," including 
 all sorts and kinds of animated beings, and 
 amongst them " birds." Observe the minor 
 premiss affirms only that a "Bird" is not 
 
 be found to correspond with tlie different kinds of fallacy : the Pun (to 
 take the simplest and most obvious case) is evidently, in most instances, 
 a mock argument founded on a palpable equivocation of the middle 
 Term."— Compare De Morgan, Logic, p. 338. on Fallacies. 
 
46 SPIUITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Pakt I. included in "quadruped," but it does not say 
 subse'ctc. and cannot say that a "bird" may not be 
 included in other kinds contained in the major 
 term "Animal." Therefore to afiirm that a 
 "bird" is not an animal is the unwarranted 
 conclusion, that, because the subject is not 
 contained in one sort which the major term 
 designates, it is not contained in some other 
 sort, which the major term may equally include 
 in its meaning. The example we have above 
 given is then an instance of the illicit process 
 of the major term; — this term is used in a 
 double sense, in the major premiss to signify 
 a part only of its significates, in the conclusion 
 to imply the whole of the class of things 
 which it is intended to designate. 
 
 The illicit process of the Minor term^ that 
 is the Subject of the Conclusion, may be thus 
 exemplified; (though it is to be observed that 
 the Syllogism is in the 3rd Figure, of which 
 more anon) — 
 
 All beasts of prey are (P) carnivorous; 
 
 All beasts of prey are (S) animals; there- 
 fore 
 
 All (S) animals are (P) carnivorous. 
 Here the minor term, or subject, is tmdis- 
 tributed in the minor premiss, and nevertheless 
 is taken tmiversally, i.e. as All animals, in the 
 conclusion. In the premisses it is affirmed 
 that all beasts of prey are included in the 
 class of carnivorous animals ; but it cannot 
 
REASONINa. 47 
 
 follow that, because "carnivora" includes all part i. 
 
 Sect. 2. 
 
 such animals as are beasts of prey, it therefore Subsect. c. 
 includes all animals. In the conclusion then, 
 the subject or minor term is illicitly made to 
 stand for "all animals." If the aboye syllogism 
 be ^^reduced^^ to the 1st figure, the illicit process 
 wiU be exposed by showing that the argument 
 requires " some animals," thus : — 
 
 All beasts of prey are carnivorous; 
 
 Some animals are beasts of prey ; therefore 
 
 Some animals are carnivorous. 
 It appears then that in the above cases a 
 Term, middle, major or minor, is made surrep- 
 titiously to apply as universal, where, according 
 to the regular form of sylloge, it can only be 
 legitimately used for, or applied to, a part of 
 its signiflcates. The inviolable rule is that, if 
 the major term include the middle, it includes 
 all that is included in the middle term, but no 
 more. 
 
 § 28. What has been incidentally mentioned 
 in the preceding § in respect of " figure " 
 requires the notice here of the so-called Mgu/res 
 of the Categorical Syllogism, They may be said 
 to be four in number, and are distinguished 
 from each other by the relative position of the 
 three terms, as may be shown by the following 
 diagram ; observing that P = Predicate or major 
 term, M = middle Term, and S = Subject or 
 minor Term. 
 
48 
 
 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 Sect. 2. 
 Subsect. C. 
 
 %. IsL 
 
 Fit/. 2d. 
 
 Fi^. Sd. 
 
 Fi^. m. 
 
 M — P 
 
 P — M 
 
 M - P 
 
 P-M 
 
 S — M 
 
 S — M 
 
 M — S 
 
 M — S 
 
 S — P 
 
 S — P 
 
 S — P 
 
 S — P 
 
 Such interchange of the position of the 
 Terms, and such only as is exhibited in the 
 four figures, permits in each case of a valid 
 argument. But, although it may he more 
 convenient to adopt one of these figures rather 
 than another according to the particular occa- 
 sion requiring it, yet it ought to be borne in 
 mind that the first figure is best fitted for 
 general use and the most reliable against 
 paralogism ; that the second figure is only 
 suited to negative conclusions ; that, by the 
 third, particular conclusions only can be drawn ; 
 and that the fourth, rej ected altogether by 
 some logicians, is capable only of exhibiting 
 the partial inclusion of the subject in the 
 predicate. 
 
 But how little the diflferent figures are 
 required for logical purposes will be at once 
 apparent, when the fact is stated that the three 
 latter figures are only disguises of the first, 
 and that they may be reduced to the form of 
 the first; rendering " it always possible to deduce 
 in the first figure either the very same con- 
 clusion as the original one, or another from 
 which the original one is deducible by illative 
 conversion, that is, by equivalence in meaning. 
 
REASONINa. 49 
 
 See § on conversion of Propositions. It may part i. 
 be satisfactory to the reader to have before Subsect.'c. 
 him an example or two of '* Ostensive Reduc- 
 tionr Thus : Pig. 2. 
 
 "Whatever corrupts the moral character of 
 
 a people injures the State; 
 No just war injures the State; 
 No just war corrupts the moral character. 
 Reduction to Pig. 1. 
 
 What is not injurious to a State is what- 
 ever does not corrupt the moral cha- 
 racter ; 
 A just war is not injurious to a State; 
 A just war is what does not corrupt the 
 moral character. 
 Another example may be offered in the third 
 Figure : — 
 
 Some desires are not blameable ; 
 All desires are liable to excess ; 
 Some things liable to excess are not blame- 
 able. 
 Thus "reduced" to Pig. 1. 
 
 All desires are liable to excess ; 
 Some things not blameable are desires; 
 Some things not blameable are liable to 
 excess. 
 The "Reduction" has been here effected by 
 converting the major premiss by negation, and 
 then transposing the premisses. The conclusion 
 is the converse by negation of the original one. 
 § 29. It will be convenient to the student, 
 
 VOL. I. E 
 
50 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. before quitting the subject of Categorical Syllo- 
 Subsect.c. gisms, to iuterpose some remarks on the Uses 
 of Beasonmg, as far as the principles of reason- 
 ing already established may be concerned. The 
 primary form in which the Generalization of 
 Experience meets us, and this in the logical 
 acceptation of Conception^ is that in which the 
 mind occupies itself with like parts or pro- 
 perties in dissimilar objects, and in consequence 
 of their likeness includes them in one class or 
 generic Conception. Incalculable is the advan- 
 tage of having thus the means of briefly 
 recording our empirical knowledge, and of so 
 classing its details as to be enabled at once 
 to take a comprehensive survey and to select 
 whatever part may be required for present 
 application. 
 
 It will be readily seen that the process of 
 forming generic conceptions depends upon the 
 law of reasoning expressed in the Aristotelian 
 Dictum^ " Whatever may be affirmed, or denied, 
 of all (that is, of every one of any kind) may 
 in like manner be affirmed or denied of each 
 of the same kind;" — a dictwm^ which approves 
 itself by its self-evident truth. But it will 
 also be seen that the process of Conception 
 in question can be exercised only under the 
 logical rule or canon of the Syllogism — and I 
 speak here with special reference to the Cate- 
 gorical — as may be shown by any familiar 
 example. Supposing a conversation turned on 
 
REASONING. 51 
 
 the pyramids of Egypt, how should a child, Paut l 
 
 Sect 2 
 
 or other ignorant person, know what was meant Subse'ct. c. 
 by "pyramid" unless previously explained? 
 But when he learns that it is a solid body, 
 which, from a square, triangular or other, base 
 rises up diminishing to a point, — he obtains 
 the conception of a class in which the "pyramids 
 of Egypt" may be included, and draws a 
 conclusion to that effect : — he has reasoned 
 syllogistically, whether the Syllogism be expressed 
 in a regular form or not. He has performed 
 the three acts, which are indispensable to an 
 Argument, namely Seclusion, Inclusion, and 
 Conclusion : * — 1. Seclusion^ by means of a 
 proposition in which the class is defined or 
 described, and whose predicate may include 
 whatever may be the subject for our judge- 
 ment. Thus ""Whatever body has a square, 
 triangular or other base, &c., &c., is a Pyramid." 
 
 2. Inclusion, He then includes the subject 
 submitted to his judgement, here namely the 
 "pyramids of Egypt," in the class secluded by 
 its characteristic marks, namely, "The pyramids 
 of Egypt have these characteristic marks." 
 
 3. Conchmon, He infers that "they (whose 
 name and nature he did not before * under- 
 stand') are Pyramids." 
 
 But if the foregoing be true, and the truth of 
 the position may be safely asserted, it follows 
 that what have been considered "immediate" 
 
 * Compare S. T. C/s Logic. 
 
 e2 
 
52 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Pakt I. iudffements, such as those which enunciate any 
 Subsect.c. immediate impression on the senses, nave no 
 valid claim to the title, and are really mediate 
 judgements. And the reason is simply this, that 
 the subject of the proposition must, in order to 
 he a logical thought, be shown to be included in 
 a generic conception or class. And it may be 
 added that the propositions, which are supposed 
 to express immediate judgements, are in truth 
 foregone conclusions. Nevertheless I do not, and 
 cannot, deny that those propositions, which ex- 
 press self-evident truths^ must be regarded as 
 immediate judgements, whatever may be the pre- 
 paratory process, by means of which we are 
 enabled to enunciate them as such : — they be- 
 come then Truths for which no further reason 
 can be given, since they are expressions of Reason 
 itself, and are amenable only to the test of the 
 Principium Identitatis et Contradictionis — ac- 
 cording to which any proposition rests upon its 
 self-evidentness, and it is seen that the assertion 
 of the contradictory would involve self-contra- 
 diction. Thus : " What is all black cannot be all 
 wHte." 
 
 After the foregoing observations on the pro- 
 vince of reasoning, we may readily and securely 
 deduce from the principle of all logic, namely, 
 " Whatever may be aflBLrmed or denied, of all, i.e. 
 of every one, of any class, or generic kind, may be 
 affirmed or denied, of each of the same class or 
 kind," — under the authority of this self-evident 
 
REASONING. 53 
 
 truth we may deduce, I say, the several uses in paut i. 
 reasoning, to which logic may be applied, takiag Subsect.'c. 
 Measonmg to mean the mference of one truth 
 from (mother. 
 
 1- Perhaps the most simple case, and that 
 which may be called Simple Gefieralizatiofis is 
 the process of forming a sort or kind by a 
 "colligation" of like facts or phenomena in 
 consequence of such likeness, and this likeness 
 expressed by a common designation or generic 
 term. It is a case of "mediate" reasoning, 
 because is must be inferred that the "subject " 
 of the reasoning, in consequence of a like at- 
 tribute, belongs to a kind of which the attribute 
 is the characteristic mark. The reasoning is so 
 simple that it may pass unobserved as if merely 
 a case of notmg any given likeness ; but that it is 
 a logical process, if it is to have a logical value, 
 will appear from the following statement, which 
 is only another version of the Aristotelian jDictttm, 
 
 Whatever objects have like parts or pro- 
 perties may be designated by the mark or marks 
 which denote the parts or properties common to 
 them, or may be affirmed to be included in, or 
 belong to the same Genus, Thus, — Sheep, Goats 
 and Oxen have the same common property, viz. 
 "cloven feet;" therefore they may be included 
 in the same Genus, of which "cloven feet" is 
 the mark. Or, — All cloven-footed animals be- 
 long to the same class ; Sheep, &c. have cloven 
 feet ; therefore they belong to the same class. 
 
54 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 paetl ' Proceeding with the use to which reasoning 
 Subsect. c. may be applied, we may state as 
 
 2nd. Simple Inclusion. In principle this does 
 not of course differ from the former, but it ex- 
 hibits more distinctly the inference of one truth 
 from another ; as we may infer that, because all 
 known cloven-footed quadrupeds are ruminant, 
 therefore some newly discovered cloven-footed 
 animal is ruminant : — or that, because all our 
 doiags which are defective in a right spirit are 
 nothing worth, therefore " all our doings with- 
 out charity are nothing worth." 
 
 3rd. BwempUfication. Thus we may exemplify, 
 or give an example that, as patriotic self-devo- 
 tion is the highest excellence of a citizen, so 
 Regulus is an example of such excellence : — 
 and it may be added that exemplification is 
 scarcely less than indispensable in order to 
 render an abstract proposition intelligible. 
 
 4th. Application of a Rule to a Particular 
 Case ; as when we have to bring any case under 
 some established rule of practice, or under some 
 accepted result of our generalized experience. 
 Say, a prisoner is to be tried for murder, and 
 the rule of law is, "All malicious homicide is 
 murder." It will be for the judge and jury to 
 apply the rule in the particular case, and to 
 decide whether the case at issue may be justly 
 brought under the class of " malicious homicide." 
 In this case we proceed as in No. 2, namely 
 from the general proposition or major premiss to 
 
KEASONING. 65 
 
 establish the minor 5 which contains, or expresses, part i. 
 the new instance or that which is to be included. Subsect. c. 
 But there is also a second description of In- 
 ference, in which we have to proceed from the 
 conclusion to the premisses, from which it has 
 been deduced. And this we may call 
 
 5th Froof. Eor instance, if it were asserted 
 that " Julius Csesar crossed the Channel," and 
 proof were required of the fact, it would demand 
 the statement of some such argument as the 
 following : " Whatever is stated by credible 
 historians may be accepted as true ; that Julius 
 Caesar crossed the Channel is stated by credible 
 historians ; therefore that Julius Csesar crossed 
 the Channel may be accepted as true." 
 
 6th. It may be required to disprove an assertion 
 such as "The ancient Germans were Savages," 
 For an argument, of which the conclusion would 
 be, "The ancient Germans were Qiot Savages," it 
 would be necessary to find a class containing 
 " the ancient Germans," which is excluded from 
 or denied to be contained in the predicate 
 ''Savages;" and perhaps such a class may be 
 found in "Those who have the use of metals." 
 The argument may be conveniently stated in the 
 2nd figure of syllogism, thus : 
 
 No Savages have the use of metals ; 
 
 The ancient Germans had the use of metals ; 
 
 Therefore they were not Savages. 
 This illustrates the use of the second Figure, 
 and shows in what arguments (negative) it may 
 
56 SPIRITTJAL PHIIiOSOPHT. 
 
 Part I. most Conveniently be used ; but that the parti- 
 subsect. c. cular form is not necessary, i.e. that the Predicate 
 and Middle term exchange places, may be shown 
 by the conversion of the major premiss thus : — 
 All who have the use of metals are not 
 Savages ; 
 The ancient Germans had the use of metals ; 
 Therefore they were not Savages.* 
 
 * Whately, Logic, p. 88. " Wlien we liave to disprove somethiiig tliat 
 has been maintained or is likely to be believed, our arguments will 
 usaally be foimd to take most conveniently the form of the second 
 figure : viz. we prove that the thing we are speaking of cannot belong to 
 such a class, either because it wants what belongs to the whole of that 
 class (Cesare) or because it lias something of which that class is destitute 
 (Camestres) : — e.g. 'No impostor would have warned his followerSj as 
 Jesus did, of the persecutions they would have to submit to ;' and again, 
 ' An enthusiast would have expatiated, which Jesus and his followers did 
 not, on the particulars of a future state.' " He adds that the third 
 figure " is the form into which most arguments will naturally fall that 
 are used to establish an objection (Enstasis of Aristotle) to an oppo- 
 nent's premiss, when his argument is such as to require that premiss to 
 be universal: — e.g. if any one contends that 'tliis or that doctrine ought 
 not to be admitted, because it cannot be explained or comprehended,' 
 his suppressed major premiss may be refuted by the argument that ' the 
 coiniexion of body and soul cannot be explained or comprehended, &c.' " 
 I cannot however feel assured that I understand Whately^s position- 
 It appears to me that in his first illustration the argument stands 
 thus ; — 
 
 P M 
 
 E No impostor would have predicted persecutions ; 
 
 S 
 A Jesus did predict persecutions ; 
 E Therefore Jesus was no impostor. 
 If then "predict persecution" be the class designated by the middle 
 term, the subject " Jesus " is affirmed to " have" or to belong to a class 
 which is destitute of " Impostors." 
 On the other haud, if the argument be — 
 
 A Enthusiasts expatiate on a future state. 
 . E Jesus did not ; therefore 
 E Jesus was not an Enthusiast. 
 
 [Here 
 
REASONING. 57 
 
 But the object of the present § was to exhibit, part i. 
 as far as ordinary circumstances might require Subsectc. 
 it, the Uses of Reasoning or Inference. And the 
 result of the brief survey teaches us, as far at 
 least as the categorical syllogism is concerned, 
 that Formal Logic consists in Generalization^ 
 that is, the logical process of bringing the facts 
 and phenomena of Experience under their ap- 
 propriate kinds or Genera ; and that in all cases 
 Generalization is a logical process implying Syl- 
 logism, or that the proposition, in which the 
 Conclusion is couched, is the expression of a 
 Mediate Judgement. Nay, it must be added 
 that all propositions are conclusions, and con- 
 sequently that all major premisses, excepting 
 those which are self-evident truths, are really 
 foregone conclusions, and are therefore not 
 exempt from the condition of proof when re- 
 quired. 
 
 § 30. It will be seen then that the result 
 of a whole train of reasoning may be comprised 
 in a single proposition categorically stated, in 
 
 Here it appears to me tbat the argument turns on showing that the 
 Subject wants what belongs to the class. Just as we should say: 
 Animals that have four legs are quadrupeds ; a Bird has not ^^ wants 
 four legs ; therefore it is not a quadruped. 
 
 Probably the subject wants re-consideration. Perhaps the following 
 might exemplify the Enstatic Argument in the Third figure. 
 
 M — P "1 
 
 ^ o ( Whatever cannot be explained is inadmissible. 
 
 S — P J What cannot be explained is the connexion of Body and 
 
 Soul. 
 And as the conclusion would be absurd and contrary to the fact, it 
 shows that the major premiss is inadmissible. 
 
58 
 
 SPIRITITAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Paet I. which somewhat is predicated of a mven " sub- 
 Subsect. c. ject;" — and provided the due relations of the 
 three terms, Predicate, Middle Term, and Sub- 
 ject, be preserved, the Argument will be valid, 
 notwithstanding any informality in the state- 
 ment. Indeed it would be a thankless task and 
 an unprofitable labour to exhibit our arguments 
 in series of syllogisms. But it is a logical duty 
 to bear in mind (and equally with regard to our 
 own reasoning and to that of others) what the 
 proposition is, which it is intended to establish, 
 and whether the establishment is legitimately 
 effected by means of a suitable middle term \ — 
 And in like manner, when we are looking for 
 the rule which is to give general or universal 
 validity to the "Subject," whose Predicate is still 
 problematical, that we select a middle term best 
 fitted to justify the predicate and include or ex- 
 clude the subject. Thus, by way of example, 
 take Paul's Epistle 1 Cor. ch. 13, of which 
 the subject is the praise of Charity. We may 
 suppose that the proposition intended to be 
 established is : " Charity is the highest ex- 
 cellence." Here "Charity" is the Subject, and 
 ' ' highest excellence ' ' the Predicate, and we 
 want to find the middle term, which working 
 in Paul's mind, justified him in coming to 
 the conclusion, which he draws. It is not 
 improbable that the following, or somethin g 
 tantamount, may have been the middle term 
 which was tacitly adopted by him, Aiz. : — 
 
REASONINa. 59 
 
 " Whatever in human society best promotes pakt i. 
 
 ^ ^ , Sect. 2. 
 
 amity, suppresses enmity, and thereby binds Subsect. c. 
 each to each and each to all;" and by the ad- 
 dition "is the highest (social) excellence" the 
 suppressed major premiss would have been com- 
 pleted. The minor premiss would then have 
 been "Charity best promotes amity, &c.," and 
 therefore " Charity is the highest excellence." 
 But, in order to display the fulness of Paul's 
 argument, the minor premiss must be amplified 
 by the special illustrations which Paul gives of 
 the work of charity; such as it "beareth all 
 things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, 
 endureth all things," together with the other 
 attributes specified which will be found to be 
 conditions under which amity is promoted and 
 enmity suppressed. But something more was re- 
 quired in order to vindicate the claim of charity 
 to the "highest" dignity; and accordingly the 
 argument is furnished with the supplement well 
 expressed in the Collect for Quinquagesima Sun- 
 day, viz. : " All our doings without charity are 
 nothing worth ; and thus faith, knowledge, pro- 
 phecy, even martyrdom, if without charity, are 
 nothing worth." The argument is summed up 
 by the statement: — "That which is perfect alone 
 endureth ; Charity is that which is (always) per- 
 fect ; and therefore it alone endureth." 
 
 § 31. The object of the foregoing § has been 
 to show that there exists no real difficulty in 
 attaining to a clear logical scheme of an Argu- 
 
60 SPIIMTirAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. ment, as far as may be necessary to test or to 
 subsect.'c. derive aid from the rules of Logic^ without the 
 necessity of setting out formally the syllogisms 
 which are implied. But in so doing we ought 
 ever to be on our guard against the Fallacies m 
 Reasoning^ the danger of which continually be- 
 sets us, and which may easily escape detection 
 without constant yigilance. Of the logical fal- 
 lacies we have already spoken in § 27 ; and to 
 those we added that arising from the use of an 
 ambiguous middle term. But others, which have 
 been considered by Logicians as Extra-logical, 
 also deserve attention, though our space does not 
 permit us to discuss them in detail in conformity 
 with the objects here in view. We may here 
 however notice a few, and for the rest refer the 
 student to the writings of professed teachers of 
 Logic. 
 
 I subjoin the following from De Morgan's 
 (Logic, p. 241) account of the Aristotelian Sys- 
 tem of fallacies. It consists of two subdivisions. 
 In the first, which are m dictione or in voce, the 
 mistake is said to consist in the use of words : 
 in the second, which are extra dictionem, or w 
 re, it is said to be in the matter. 
 
 Of the first set, in dictione, six kinds are 
 distinguished, as follows : — 
 
 1. Equivocatio or Somonymia; giving really 
 no middle term (if the middle term be in ques- 
 tion) or a term in the conclusion which is not 
 the same name as that used in the pi'emiss. Ex. 
 
REASONING, 61 
 
 " Finis rei est illius perfectio ; . mors est finis paut i. 
 
 ^ . Sect. 2. 
 
 vitse; ergo mors est vitse perfectio." Here tlie Subsect. c. 
 ambiguity may be thrown on finis or perfectio. 
 See other examples, especially those in which 
 the ambiguity arises from changes in the mean- 
 ing of words. 
 
 2. Fallacia amphiboUce differs in nothing 
 from the last, except in the equivocation being 
 in the construction of a phrase, and not in a 
 single term (doubtful construction). The ex- 
 ample may be the oracle delivered to Pyrrhus : 
 
 " Aio te iEacide E^omanos vincere posse," which 
 may be construed, " That thou shalt conquer the 
 Romans," or "That the Romans shall conquer 
 thee." 
 
 Or, "Quod tangitur a Socrate illud sentit; 
 columna tangitur k Socrate; ergo columna sen- 
 tit." In the major proposition "sentit" means 
 he, i.e. Socrates, feels. In the conclusion, the 
 same word means "feels Socrates." 
 
 3, 4. Fallacia compositionis, ^nA fallacia dims- 
 ionis^ consist in joining or separating those 
 things, which ought not to be joined or sepa- 
 rated: — f. compositionis, when what is proposed 
 in a dwided sense is afterwards taken collectively/, 
 as "Two and three are even and odd; five is 
 two and three ; therefore five is even and odd : — 
 f. divisionis, when what is proposed in a col- 
 lective, is afterwards taken in a divided, sense, as 
 " The planets are seven ; Mercury and Venus are 
 planets; therefore Mercury and Venus are seven." 
 
62 SPITHTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 paeti. 5. Fallacia prosodice or accentus was an ambi- 
 
 Sect. 2. . . 
 
 Subsect.c. guity arising from pronunciation. De Morgan 
 says : "A very forced emphasis upon one word 
 may, according to usual notions, suggest false 
 meanings. Thus, "thou slialt not bear false 
 witness against thy neighbour," is frequently 
 read from the pulpit either so as to convey 
 the opposite of a prohibition, or to suggest 
 that subornation is not forbidden, or that any 
 thing false except evidence is permitted, or that 
 it may be given for him, or that it is only against 
 neighbours that false witness may not be borne." 
 
 6. Fallacia figurce dictionis, when, from any 
 similitude of words, what is granted of one is by 
 a forced application predicated of another; as, 
 " Projectors are not fit to be trusted, therefore 
 he who has formed a project is not fit to be 
 trusted." Whately. 
 
 All these fallacies come under the head of 
 ambiguous language, and amount to nothing but 
 giving the syllogism four terms, two of them 
 under the same name. 
 
 The fallacies extradictionem or in Re are set 
 down as follows. 
 
 1. Fallacia accidentia ; and, 2, Fallacia d dicto 
 secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. The first 
 of these ought to be called that of d dicto 
 simpliciter ad dictum secundumfi quid, for the two 
 are correlative in the manner described in the 
 two phrases. The first consists in inferring of 
 the subject with an accident that which was 
 
KEASONINa. 63 
 
 premised of the subject only: the second in p^^^i. 
 inferring of the subject only that which was subsect. o. 
 premised of the subject with an accident. Of 
 the first we may give the instance " Wine is 
 pernicious, therefore it ought to be forbidden." 
 The expressed premiss refers to wine used im- 
 moderately : the conclusion is meant to refer to 
 wine however used. Of the second the trite 
 example is : "What you bought yesterday, you 
 eat to-day ; you bought raw meat yesterday ; 
 therefore, you eat raw meat to-day." The major 
 premiss refers to anything bought, the con- 
 clusion regards meat with the accident "raw." 
 
 " All the fallacies, which attempt the substi- 
 tution in one form for the sa/me thing (as it is 
 called) in another, belong to this head : such as 
 that of the man who claimed to have had one 
 knife twenty years, giving it sometimes a new 
 handlcj and sometimes a new blade." — "More 
 serious difficulties have arisen from the attempt 
 to separate the essential from the accidental, 
 particularly with regard to material objects." 
 Cartesian doctrine adduced p. 252, ibid. 
 
 3. Petitio Principii. It is translated by the 
 phrase begging the question, that is, assuming the 
 thing which is to be proved. This is also called 
 reasoning in a circle:, coming round, in the 
 way of conclusion, to what has been already 
 formally assumed, in a manner expressed or im- 
 plied. Thus " if a Papist should pretend to 
 prove that his religion is derived from Christ 
 
64 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Pauti. and his Apostles because it agrees vnth the 
 Siibsect. c. doctrine of all the ^Fathers of the Church, all the 
 holy martyrs, and all the christian world through- 
 out all ages (quod semper ubique et ab omnibus) 
 he would be met by the objection, that the great 
 point in contest is, whether his religion does 
 agree with that of all the ancients and the 
 primitive christians, or no." "Watts's Logic, 
 p. 315. He has assumed what he had to prove. 
 De Morgan says (p. 256) that Aristotle " by the 
 word prmcipivm distinctly means that which 
 can be known of itself (* principium ' being the 
 major). He lays down five ways of assummg that 
 which ought to come out of a self-known prin- 
 ciple of which begging the question is the first." 
 Comp. loc. cit. p. 256. 
 
 For the following remark the author of 
 this work is alone responsible. The fallacy of 
 begging the question regards Proof; and when, 
 for proof, the conclusion is passed off in the 
 major premiss (only repeated in general terms) 
 the fault is committed ; and equally, when the 
 conclusion is merely a repetition of the major 
 proposition in the form of a particular case. 
 Thus it would be a petitio principii to say 
 " Whatever is, is right," as proof of the right- 
 ness of any species of wrong, as : — 
 
 Whatever is, is right ; 
 
 Dishonesty is ; therefore 
 
 It is right. 
 In such cases it will be found that there is 
 
REASONING. 65 
 
 really no inference, and therefore no argument ; Paut i. 
 it is but the re-statement of the same proposition, Subsect. c. 
 varied by general or specific terms, — a repetition 
 of the same thing in other words, and not an 
 inference of one truth from another. 
 
 The above might have claimed the character 
 of reasoning, if stated thus : — 
 
 Whatever is, or exists, in conformity with 
 
 the laws of Providence is right ; 
 Evil is, or exists, in conformity with, &c. ; 
 Evil is right. 
 
 Though, not to mislead the student, I ought 
 to add that the principium or major premiss is 
 false, and that Evil is not in conformity with 
 the laws of Providence. 
 
 4. The Ignoratio Elenchiy or ignorance of the 
 refutation, is what we should now call answer- 
 ing to the wrong point, or proving something 
 which is not contradictory of the thing asserted. 
 Wesley (Logic) calls it "an argument that in- 
 dicates ignorance of the point in dispute ; an 
 irrelevant conclusion." Watts (Logic, p. 314) 
 says " it is a mistake of the question ; that is, when 
 something else is proved, which has neither any 
 necessary connexion or consistency with the 
 thing inquired ; as if the question be proposed 
 whether excess of wine can be hurtful to him 
 that drinks it, and the Sophister should prove 
 that it revives his spirits, it exhilarates his soul, 
 it gives a man courage, and makes him strong 
 and active, and then he takes it for granted that 
 
 VOL. I. i' 
 
66 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. he has proved his point. But the respondent 
 
 subsect. c. may easily show that tho' wine, may do all this, 
 
 yet it may be finally hurtful to the soul and body 
 
 of him that drinks it to excess." See De Morgan's 
 
 remarks on proving a negative^ ibid. p. 260. 
 
 5. Fallacia Consequentis (now very often called 
 a non sequitur) is the simple affirmation of a con- 
 clusion which does not follow from the premisses. 
 
 6. The non causa pro causa. This is the mis- 
 take of imagining necessary connexion where there 
 is none, in the way of cause considered in the 
 widest sense of the word. 
 
 Any further investigation of the sources of 
 fallacy in a work of this kind would be out of 
 place. I therefore forbear to speak of the 
 fallacia plurium interrogationum, which con- 
 sists in trying to get one answer to several 
 questions at once ; of the Extreme Case^ 
 though it is often the only test by which an 
 ambiguous assumption can be dealt with; of 
 the different modes of Evasion; and of the 
 fallacies which depend upon wrong notions of 
 the Quantity of propositions. 
 
 finally, let it be remembered in taking a 
 retrospect of categorical reasoning, that formal 
 logic can do no more than give the rules for 
 drawing a valid conclusion, assuming the pre- 
 misses; but that the premisses may be right 
 or wrong, and that they require for determining 
 their truth the sound judgement which belongs 
 to an understanding enlightened by Reason. And 
 
UEASONING, 67 
 
 if any criterion be required in following up our Pabt i. 
 reasonings to their first principles {apxai) it may subsectb. 
 be found in the condition that the only major 
 premiss, which does not, and cannot, require 
 proof, is a proposition containing the statement 
 of a self-evident truth, and to suppose the con- 
 tradictory of which would be self-contradictory. 
 
 Continuation of Subsection C. 
 Hypothetical Syllogism. 
 
 § 32. Hypothetical Judgements are those 
 which express a relation of connexion between 
 two propositions, or of dependency of one on 
 the other, as in the case of cause and effect, or 
 of condition and conditioned; — ex. gr., if alcohol 
 inebriates, it is unwholesome; — if the tempera- 
 ture is high, the thermometer rises. 
 
 The connexion between the two propositions 
 is assumed to be necessary, and this necessary 
 connexion is expressed in a major premiss, of 
 which the prior proposition is termed the Ante- 
 cedent, and the latter the Consequent : and the 
 argument is that "if" the fij*st be granted, the 
 second inevitably follows. But in order to com- 
 plete the syllogism or judgement, the antecedent 
 must be affirmed or the consequent denied, and 
 this constitutes the minor premiss. Without this 
 aflftrmation or denial, the ground only of the 
 judgement would have been stated, and the 
 point at issue left undetermined. But by affirm- 
 
 p 2 
 
68 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. ing the antecedent, or denying the consequent, 
 Siibsect'c. the conditions are fulfilled by which the Con- 
 clusion^ in respect of the connexion or depen- 
 dency of the propositions, may be drawn, and 
 expressed by an affirmative or negative propo- 
 sition. Syllogisms in which the antecedent is 
 granted are called Constructive (modo ponente.) 
 Syllogisms, in which the consequent is denied, 
 are called Destructive (modo toUente). 
 
 Examples. 
 Major. If A is B; C is D. If rain has 
 
 fallen, the ground is wet. 
 Minor. But A is B. But rain has fallen. 
 Conclusion. C is D. The ground is wet. 
 
 If A is B, is D. If rain has fallen, 
 
 the ground is wet. 
 But is not D. But the ground is not wet. 
 Therefore A is not B. Therefore rain 
 
 has not fallen. 
 
 The rules then are : 1. The antecedent being 
 granted, the consequent may be inferred. 2. 
 The consequent being denied, the antecedent 
 may be denied. 
 
 By denying the Antecedent, or affirming the 
 Consequent, nothing can be inferred, because 
 the same consequent may follow from other 
 antecedents. Bain may not have fallen, and 
 yet the ground may be wet ; * or the ground 
 may be wet, and yet no rain have fallen ; 
 
 * Here the antecedent is denied. 
 
REASONING. 69 
 
 because dew, or an inundation would produce partI. 
 
 ' ^ Sect. 2. 
 
 the same effect.* Subsectc. 
 
 Thomson (Laws of Thought, p. 154) speaking 
 of hypothetical judgements remarks that there 
 are only five arrangements of the terms, in 
 four of which there are but three terms, and 
 in the fifth four. Of the last—" if A is B, C is 
 D " he gives the example : " If the moon exerts 
 her attractive force in the same line as the 
 sun, the tides are at the highest." On this, 
 he observes, " that the fifth alone expresses two 
 separate facts, brought together as cause and 
 effect, while in all the rest, from the recurrence 
 of a term in both clauses, it is impossible to 
 separate entirely the two things stated. This 
 leads to the observation of a real difference in 
 their nature. "Without attempting to examine 
 the origin of our idea of cause and effect, we 
 may state, as a thing generally admitted, that 
 all men are accustomed to regard some one 
 fact as the necessary result of another, which 
 they have observed invariably to precede or 
 accompany it; and. that they may learn, how- 
 ever different in nature the two facts may 
 appear, to identify them so far as invariably 
 to expect the effect where they have observed 
 the cause." — "And when the connexion between 
 them (the two facts) is stated, in a hypothetical 
 (that is, a conditional) judgement, the truth 
 of the statement will entirely depend upon the 
 
 * Here the consequent is affirmed. (Comp. Wesley, Logic, p. 44.) 
 
VO SPIRITUAIi PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. correctness of onr observation, since there can 
 
 Sect. 2. .1/. 
 
 subsect.c. be nothing in the statement itself to serve as 
 a criterion of its truth." That, if A is B, is 
 D, is a statement for which "we have no test 
 but the application of our idea of cause and 
 effect to the facts for which these letters stand." 
 — But, in respect of the cases, in which there is 
 a term repeated or only three terms (as If A is 
 B, A is C) " we appeal not to the idea of cause 
 and effect, but to a categorical judgement of 
 which the materials are before us. ' If A is B, 
 A is ' will be true, provided ' All B is C ' be 
 true. * If this be an equilateral triangle, it is 
 also an equiangular ' must be tried by the rule 
 'AH equilateral triangles are equiangular-' Here 
 is no notion of a cause; but a statement of 
 a rule, with the supposition that some one case 
 comes under it. It really means, not that one 
 event is caused by another, but that a con- 
 ception has certain marks ; which is the function 
 of the categorical judgement," The whole pas- 
 sage is highly deserving of the student's con- 
 sideration. 
 
 It would appear then that the genuine 
 characteristic of the hypothetical judgement 
 is that of bringing two distinct facts, or state- 
 ments of facts, into the relation of, or cor- 
 respondency to, the category of cause and 
 effect. And it will be seen that the statement 
 in the Major premiss, " If A is B, is D " 
 exactly agrees with the empirical use of the 
 
REASONINGS. 71 
 
 category in assigning in any case the Antecedent part i. 
 and the Consequent; and that as a necessary SubsJct-C. 
 connexion is assumed or implied, the name of 
 the category would be correctly stated as that 
 of Dependency^ that is, of the dependency of 
 the Consequent on the Antecedent. It may 
 be noted, however, that this "Dependency" is, 
 in respect of empirical knowledge, the work 
 of mental attribution ; for although, as Thomson 
 says, "the truth of the statement will entirely 
 depend upon the correctness of our observation," 
 the two facts would never " be inseparably 
 linked together in our minds as a cause and an 
 effect," unless our minds supplied the "neces- 
 sary connexion " which in any invariable se- 
 quence of events we are justified in assuming. 
 
 I have made the above quotations from 
 Thomson's "Laws of Thought," in order to 
 strengthen my own similar views, which I 
 ventured to advance long before I read his 
 observations. And I refer here to a paper (un- 
 published) wherein I say : — " Whatever may 
 be thought of the position, it is clear that 
 the distinctive character of the Hypothetical 
 argument differs from that of the Categorical 
 or the argument by Inclusion, in that it is 
 essentially based upon the principle in the 
 human mind of a Causal Nexus^ or that of 
 the relation of Cause and Effect." 
 
72 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 subsecfc Subsection {continued). 
 
 Disjunctive Syllogism. 
 
 § 33. A disjunctive Syllogism consists of two 
 or more categorical propositions so stated as to 
 imply i\mi some one of them at least is true, and 
 generally that but one can be true; as "It is 
 either day or night." 
 
 By denying one of the categoricals of a dis- 
 junctive proposition, if there be but two^ you 
 may infer the truth of the remaining one; as, 
 "It is either day or night: but it is not day; 
 therefore it is night." By denying one of them, 
 if there be several, you may infer the truth 
 of some one of the remaining ones ; as, " It is 
 either Spring, Summer, Autumn or Winter ; but 
 it is not Spring ; therefore it is either Summer, 
 Autumn, or Winter." By denying all but one, 
 you will infer the truth of that one ; as, " It is 
 neither Spring, Summer, nor Autumn ; therefore 
 it is Winter." 
 
 When it is implied that only one of the cate- 
 goricals can be true, by affirming one, you of 
 course deny the rest ; as, " It is either Spring, 
 Summer, &c. ; but it is Spring ; therefore it is 
 neither Summer, Autumn, nor Winter." Wesley, 
 Logic, p. 45.* 
 
 So far we proceed upon the ground of ordinary 
 logic. But the argument of the disjunctive syllo- 
 
 * For an account of the Dilemma tlie reader is referred to the manuals 
 of Logic, ex. gr. Wesley's p. 47, or Watts's p. 303. 
 
UEASONINa. 73 
 
 ffism has a far wider range, and is one of the pakt i. 
 
 ^ . ° ' Sect. 2. 
 
 principal instruments of the process which we Subsect. c. 
 may call Distribution. Thomson (Op. cit. p. 
 150) in speaking of Definition " as any con- 
 ception, which from having precisely the same 
 sphere as another conception, may be used to 
 ascertain its nature and mark out its limits " — 
 Thomson, I say, mentions, in speaking of the 
 sources of definition, two ; — that from Division^ 
 and that from Colligation. The first, " where we 
 define the subject by enumerating its dividing 
 members ; as Britons are those who dwell in 
 England, Scotland, or Wales.'' He adds, "All 
 the judgements called Disjunctive are under this 
 head." The latter or Colligation is "the exact 
 reverse of the last ; where the dividing members 
 of a conception are enumerated in the subject, 
 and the divided conception itself added to define 
 them; as "historical, philosophical and mathe- 
 matical sciences are the sum (i.e. are all or equal) 
 of human knowledge." 
 
 If the reader will refer to ^ 13 he will find 
 that we have here to re-consider the category of 
 " the Whole and its parts" in the logical form 
 of the Disjunctive Syllogism. Thus I there 
 say : — " Every whole in the physical or moral 
 world shall be regarded as an Unity of interde- 
 pendent Parts^ and as such by virtue of a generic 
 conception, or Type, which, in providing the unity 
 in one dominant and comprehensive Thought, 
 determines the relations of the Parts, as specific 
 
74 SPIBITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. and integral constituents of the conceptual 
 Subse'ct.'c. Whole; — that is, the One dominant, or funda- 
 mental. Conception which gives intelligibility to 
 the whole, reappears in each and all of the parts 
 as the Specific opposed to the Generic." Why 
 the category of the Whole and Parts should he 
 intimately connected with, or resolve itself into, 
 the Disjunctive form of Judgement will be ap- 
 parent, if we reflect on the primary rules for 
 the Division or Distribution of a Subject into 
 its component parts or members: — viz., — "the 
 Parts of the Division ought to exhaust the 
 whole Subject which is to be divided ; " and " the 
 several parts of a Distribution ought to be so 
 opposed, distinctively to each other, that one 
 species or kind, m the sa/me ranh of division^ shall 
 not contain or include another." Hence it will 
 be seen that the several parts, in relation to 
 each and all others, imply the test of a dis- 
 junctive judgement expressed as, "It is either 
 A. or 'R or Q or .... Z." 
 
 The Rules ordinarily given for logical Division 
 (see Wesley, index in verbo) are three. 1st. " Each 
 part singly taken must contain less (i. e. have 
 a narrower signification) than the whole. Thus 
 ^ Weapon ' could not be a division of the term 
 ' Sword.' 2nd. All the parts collectively must be 
 exactly equal to the subject divided, or as the 
 logicians say, the parts of a division ought to 
 exhaust the whole of the subject which is divided. 
 
 * Comp. also Thomson, op. cit. p. 2-47. 
 
REASONING. 
 
 76 
 
 In dividing the term 'Weapon' into 'Sword,' paktI. 
 
 * Pike/ ' Gun,' &c., we must not omit anything Subsect. c. 
 of which * Weapon ' can be predicated, nor in- 
 troduce anything of which it cannot. 3rd. The 
 
 parts or members must be opposed^ i.e. must not 
 be contained in one another. ' Book ' must not 
 be divided into ' Quarto,' ' Prench;' for a Trench 
 book may be a quarto, and a quarto Erench. 
 N.B. You must always keep in mind the Frin- 
 ciple of Division with which you set out, ex. gr. 
 whether you begin to divide ^Books' according 
 to their size, language y matter^ or other head." 
 
 " It may be observed that a distinction has been 
 made between Logical and Physical Division, 
 In the former you may predicate the divided 
 whole of every dividing member. Thus * Wea- 
 pon ' may be predicated of ' Sword,' * Pike,' 
 
 * Gun.' This cannot happen in the case of 
 physical division. ' Gun ' cannot be predicated 
 of Hhe Lock,' 'the Stock,' or the ^Barrel.'" 
 Ibid. Thus a " Tiger's claw" cannot be termed 
 a species of the genus Tiger; but still the 
 division is logical, for, although a part of the 
 physical whole termed " Tiger," it is a species of 
 the genus '^claw," and amongst other "claws" 
 it is a "Tiger's claw." 
 
 The category of "the Whole and its Parts" is 
 really founded, as I shall hereafter show, on the 
 Idea of the Integration of an exhaustive Mani- 
 fold of Distinctive relations of Being in the 
 Unity of Type out of which they sprang and are 
 
76 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. derived. And this view will find its lustifyinff 
 
 Sect. 2. J .r o 
 
 subsect. c. ground in the " Idea of the Will, considered as 
 the Absolute Cause of all Reality." The diflPer- 
 ence between the conceptual category (or mould 
 of concipiency) of the Understanding, in aid of 
 empirical Knowledge, and the " Idea" of Reason 
 above adverted to, is — that the former proceeds 
 from the data of experience, and does not, like 
 the ^^ Idea^'' contemplate the genetic development 
 of the Manifold contained in the Principle or 
 causative Law. The procedure of the Under- 
 standing is to generalize, that is, to bring the 
 facts of Experience under appropriate genera; 
 and hence it will be seen that the main business 
 of the Understanding, working according to the 
 category of the "Whole and its parts," is that 
 of Classification in aid of the Sciences which 
 have been called " Classificatory." 
 
 I have already in § 21 pointed out the dif- 
 ference between Attribution and Inclusion in 
 respect of the relation between Subject and Pre- 
 dicate ; — that, in the former, attention is directed 
 only to the appKcation of a right attribute or 
 designation of the Subject; while in the latter 
 the attention is directed to the variety, number 
 and difference of the species included in the 
 Genus designated by the predicate : — ex. gr. All 
 animals that chew the cud, such as the ox, goat, 
 sheep, deer, are included in the genus Ruminant. 
 
 In further prosecuting the account of the work 
 of Classification the reader may be reminded of 
 
REASONING. 77 
 
 the nature and relation of classes, the principle part i. 
 
 Sect. 2. 
 
 of which has been already described as that Subsect. c. 
 of Likeness and Difference ; and the following, 
 principally adopted from Whewell (Philosophy of 
 Inductive Sciences, p. 460) will show briefly the 
 means of the *^ logical ^^ application of the prin- 
 ciple in question. '^ Porphyry wrote an Intro- 
 duction to the Categories of Aristotle, which is 
 entitled ^ On the five Words.'' The *flve Words' 
 aregf enus^ species^ difference^ property ^ accident. 
 Genus, and Species are superior and inferior 
 classes, and are stated to be capable of repeated 
 subordination. The 'most general genus' {ge- 
 nus supremum) is the widest class, the ^most 
 special species' (species infima) the narrowest. 
 Between these are intermediate classes, which are 
 genera with regard to those below, and species 
 with regard to those above them (subalternans). 
 Thus Being is the most general genus; under 
 this is Body ; under Body is Living Body; under 
 this again Animal; under Animal is Rational 
 Animal or Man; under Man are Socrates and 
 Plato, and other individual men.^ 
 
 " The Difference is that which is added to the 
 
 * " It will be seen that Genus and Species are the only two distinctions 
 recognised by logicians for the purpose of sorting kinds, but naturalists 
 finding the difficulty of grouping the multifarious details of their branches 
 of science have adopted other terms for the gradation and subordination 
 of genera, and the most common are : — Classes^ Orders^ Genera and 
 Species, in which we have others interpolated as Sub-genera or Section 
 of Genera. The expressions Family and Tribe are commonly appro- 
 priated to natural groups ; and we speak also of the Vegetable, Animal 
 and Mineral Kingdom" Whewell. 
 
78 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. Genus to make the Species ; thus Rational is the 
 Subsect.G. Difference by which the genus Animal is made 
 the species Man ; the Difference in this technical 
 sense is the ' Specific/ or species-making Differ- 
 ence. It forms the Definition for the purposes 
 of logic, and corresponds to the * Character' (spe- 
 cific or generic) of the natural Historians. 
 
 " Of the other two words, the Property is 
 that which, though not employed in defining the 
 class, belongs to every part of it : ^ What happens 
 to all the class, to it alone, and at all times ; as 
 to be capable of laughing is a property of a man.' 
 
 "The Accident is that which may be present 
 and absent without the destruction of the Sub- 
 ject, as to sleep (?) is an Accident (a thing which 
 happens) to man." 
 
 I subjoin from the same author the following 
 remarks (Op. cit. p. 457) on the Gradation of 
 Kinds^ or classes indicated by common names 
 in virtue of some resemblance which individual 
 objects possess. " Common names then include 
 many individuals associated in virtu!e of resem- 
 blances, and of permanently connected proper- 
 ties ; and such names are applicable as far as 
 they serve to express such properties. These col- 
 lections of individuals are termed Kinds, Sorts, 
 Classes. But this association of particulars is 
 capable of degrees. As individuals by their re- 
 semblances form Kinds, so Kinds of things, 
 though different, may resemble each other so as 
 to be again associated in a higher class; and 
 
REASONING. 79 
 
 there may be several successive steps of such parti. 
 classification. Mcm^ horse^ tree^ stone^ are each subsect. c. 
 a name of a kind ; but animal includes the two 
 first, and excludes the two others; living thing 
 is a term which includes animal and tree, but 
 not stone; body includes all the four." Compare 
 Thomson, Laws, &c. p. 100, 
 
 " Characters of Kinds. — When we have a 
 series of names and classes, we take for granted 
 irresistibly that each class has some character^ 
 which distinguishes it from other classes in- 
 cluded in, the superior division." — " We entertain 
 a conviction that there must be, among things 
 so classed and named, a possibility of defining 
 each." "Our persuasion that there must needs 
 be characteristic marks by which things can be 
 defined in words, is founded on the assumption 
 of the necessary possibility of reasoning,^' 
 
 " The reference of any object or conception 
 to its class without definition, may give us a 
 persuasion that it shares the properties of its 
 class, but does not enable us to reason upon 
 those properties. When we consider man as an 
 animal, we ascribe to him in thought the appe- 
 tites, desires, affections, which we habitually 
 include in our notion of animal ; but except we 
 have expressed these in some definition or ac- 
 knowledged description of the term animal, we 
 can make no use of the persuasion in ratiocina- 
 tion. But if we have described animals as 
 * beings impelled to action by appetites and 
 
80 SPIMTTJAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. passions/ we can not only think, but say, ' man 
 Subsect. c. is an animal, and therefore he is impelled to act 
 by appetites and passions.' And if we add a 
 further definition, that * man is a reasonable 
 animal,' and if it appear that * reason implies 
 conformity to a rule of action,' we can then 
 further infer that man's nature is to conform 
 the results of animal appetite and passion to 
 a rule of action. 
 
 Difficulty of Definitions. — " But though men 
 are, on such grounds, led to make constant and 
 importunate demands for definitions of the terms 
 which they employ in their speculations, they 
 are in fact far from being able to carry into 
 complete effect the postulate on which they 
 proceed, that they must be able to find definitions 
 which by logical consequence shall lead to the 
 truths they seek. The postulate overlooks the 
 process by which our classes of things are formed, 
 and our names applied. This process consisting, 
 as we have already said, in observing permanent 
 connexions of properties, and in fixing them by 
 the attribution of names, is of the nature of the 
 process of induction, of which we shall afterwards 
 have to speak. And the postulate is so far true, 
 that this process of induction being once per- 
 formed, its result may usually be expressed by 
 means of a few definitions, and may thus lead 
 by a deduction to a train of real truths." Com- 
 pare § 22 ante, on Definitions ; not forgetting the 
 distinction between Essential and Accidental 
 
REASONING. 81 
 
 Definition, and that Essential Definition consists part i. 
 logically in substantiating whatever is to be Subsect.c. 
 defined by declaring in terms its genus and diffe^ 
 rence as indispensable to its cognition, — ex. gr., 
 " Man is a rational animal." 
 
 It cannot have escaped the attention of the 
 reader that the work of Definition is intimately- 
 connected with the process of categorical reason- 
 ing, and that, in order to vindicate the position of 
 any part or member of a scheme of Classification, 
 it will be necessary to resort to categorical syllo- 
 gism. Whewell has above rightly referred to 
 the claim of Induction in the process of Defi- 
 nition, as based upon the results of empirical 
 knowledge ; but it will be seen from the example 
 which he has given in the former paragraph, 
 how large a share reasoning has in the process. 
 Thus :— 
 
 Whatever beings are compelled to act by 
 appetites and passions are animals ; 
 
 Man is compelled so to act ; therefore 
 
 Man is an animal. 
 Or if we are to justify the further definition 
 which he gives, it would, or might, stand thus : — 
 
 Whatever animal acts in conformity to a 
 rule of conduct is rational ; 
 
 Man acts in conformity to a rule ; therefore 
 
 Man is rational, or a rational animal. 
 § 34. It now remains that something should 
 be said on the subject of Artificial and Natural 
 Classifidation, or, in other words, on the exercise 
 
 VOL. I. G 
 
82 SPIMTUAX PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. of the Hnder standing in that specific Eorm of 
 
 Sect. 2. o i 
 
 Subsect.c. Concipiency which is called ^'the category of the 
 Whole and its Parts." 
 
 It would appear that our first attempts at 
 Classification of the products of nature — and the 
 same holds good with respect also to the classifi- 
 cation of mental objects and psychical phenomena, 
 — that the first attempts at classification are 
 those which have the same origin as aU our 
 thoughts of things, and depends upon a comparison 
 by which we note the Resemblances and Diffe- 
 rences of the objects offered for our Attention. 
 And further that, in order to give such attempts 
 the character of Science, we are under the 
 necessity of giving Definitions, or adequate De- 
 scriptions, of the meaning of the generic con- 
 ceptions and terms employed, and of proceeding 
 according to the Rules of technical Logic. Thus 
 far the procedure may be correctly described as 
 the method of Artificial Classification. At the 
 same time, it has been justly observed by Dr. 
 Whev^ell that in arranging the products of nature 
 there are always reasons, which oblige the natu- 
 ralist to conform his distribution to characters 
 strictly of a natural kind and founded in rerum 
 natnrd. In his XO. aphorism he observes : — 
 " An artificial System is one in which the smaller 
 groups (genera) are natural; and in which the 
 wider divisions (classes and orders) are con- 
 structed by peremptory application of selected 
 characters (selected however so as not to break 
 
REASONINa. 83 
 
 up the smaller groups)." It may be further parti. 
 observed that attempts have been made to en- Suijsect.c. 
 large and rectify the divisions of the artificial 
 method by rendering the characteristics of each 
 more comprehensive. Thus Adanson, dissatisfied 
 with the narrow base on which the sexual system 
 of Linnseus is founded, adopted the method of 
 " making many artificial systems, in each of 
 which plants were arranged by some one part, 
 and then collecting those plants which came 
 near each other in the greatest number of these 
 artificial systems, as plants naturally the most 
 related." Whewell, Op. cit. vol. i. p. 483. So 
 Hunter arranged the animal kingdom in as many 
 ways as there are organic functions ; — considering 
 each organ by itself, he formed, by pursuing its 
 modifications, a series of groups characterised by 
 that organ alone. See Owen's preface to the 
 4th vol, of Hunter's works, 8vo edit. But, 
 although a plan of this kind may be calculated 
 to assist in the formation of a natural classifica- 
 tion by facilitating comparison, it yet fails in 
 the main requisite, by leaving undetermined the 
 law of the proportional development of the several 
 organic systems, in their relation to each other, 
 by varying conditions of co- and sub-ordination, 
 in order to the constitution of the fixed types 
 of living being. 
 
 But if we are to go beyond the merely logical 
 or artificial method of classification — as indeed 
 by our constitution as rational beings we are 
 
 g2 
 
84 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. bouud to do — and at all events to approximate 
 
 Sect 2. ^^ 
 
 Subsect. c. as far as we are able to a method of Natural 
 Classification^ that is, one coincident with the 
 laws of nature impressed thereon by the Creator, 
 we have to discover principles, which though not 
 superseding the use of logic, transcend the 
 boundaries of empirical knowledge. "With this 
 view Whewell has directed our attention to 
 the ^Hdea of natural affinity ^^ of which he 
 says (Op. cit. 519) : — " I tappears that our idea 
 of Affinity involves the conviction of the coin^ 
 cidence of natural arrangements formed on 
 different f mictions ; and this rather than the 
 principle of the subordination of some characters 
 to others, is the true ground of the natural 
 method of classification." Further on, p. 529, 
 he says : — " The correspondence of the inclina- 
 tions is the criterion of Natural Classes ; and 
 this correspondence may be considered as one 
 of the best and most characteristic marks of 
 the fundamental idea of Affinity. And the 
 maxim by which all systems professing to be 
 natural must be tested is this : — that the 
 arrangement obtained from one set of characters 
 coincides with the arrangement obtained from 
 another set.^^ Or as I should prefer to express 
 it : — that, in seeking insight of the laws by 
 which the Creator has regulated the systematic 
 unity and diversity of the organism and oeco- 
 nomy of His creatures, it will be our business 
 to proceed by investigating the conditions of 
 
REASONING. 85 
 
 natural affinity : and that in this investigation part i. 
 we may safely adopt the rule: — that the more Subsect.c. 
 numerous the resemblances and coincidences in 
 character, habits, properties, organization, func- 
 tions and agencies, of groups and components 
 of groups, the safer will be the inference of 
 their natural affinity, and the greater the surety 
 of the identification of the Idea, or genetic 
 Type out of which they have proceeded, and 
 consequently the more secure the ground upon 
 which to found a Natural Method of Classifi- 
 cation. 
 
 But in this process of investigating the forms 
 {formcB formantes) of nature, our final aim, and 
 that which an acquaintance with the facts and 
 phenomena of nature, even when they are made 
 mental acquisitions by means of the logical 
 faculty, does not attain, — our final aim is to dis- 
 cover the Type^ the Key-stone of the arched fabric 
 of nature's works. Whewell, Aphorism XCIII. 
 says justly : — "A natural group is steadily 
 fixed, though not precisely limited; it is given 
 in position, though not circumscribed; it is 
 determined, not by a boundary without, but by 
 a central point within ; — ^not by what it strictly 
 excludes, but by what it eminently includes ; — 
 by a Type not by a Definitions^ We are in short 
 no longer within the precincts of the faculty 
 judging according to experience, but are appeal- 
 ing for light and insight to the higher faculty 
 of Reason. It is hence only that is revealed 
 
86 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. to US the Type as the antecedent and genetic 
 Siibsect.'c. unity, which confers the essential and abiding 
 character on any and every group, and which, 
 whilst preserving the unity, manifests itself in 
 the diversity of forms or products, of which 
 the group consists, at once entire in each and 
 in all : — and it will be our business to find in 
 every relative and subordinate type that which 
 connects it with some higher type, until, proceed- 
 ing from lower to higher, we arrive finally at 
 the highest and absolute Archetype^ even the 
 Divine Humanity, who is Deus Alter. The 
 proof of this sublime contemplamen must 
 indeed be reserved for a more fitting place than 
 the present; but meanwhile let it be remarked 
 that a class founded on a generic conception is 
 an empirical abstract, whereas a class founded on 
 a Type or Idea is a causative principle. Thus 
 if we interpret the facts of Embryology accord- 
 ing to the typical principle, we find Life working 
 according to a pattern; and we arrange the 
 phases of operance in a graduated and con- 
 nected Series of evolutions, anticipated from 
 the beginning and achieving finally the perfected 
 result. 
 
 An attempt to realize and carry out these 
 principles has been made in my Hunterian 
 Oration entitled "Vital Dynamics." Eor the 
 exposition of the Idea I may refer the reader 
 to that part of the work, which begins at p. 30, 
 and I shall content myself here with the follow- 
 
REASONING. 87 
 
 ing quotation, in aid of the intelligibility of the paut i. 
 principle asserted : — " Growth, Motion and Feel- Subsect.b. 
 ing: — such are the universal characters, under 
 which animated being is alone conceivable. 
 And it is in contemplating these functions as 
 forces of one subject or power, that we learn 
 the aim and purpose of the actuating Idea in 
 the development of an organism, as intending 
 a living Body, — that is, a sphere of act and 
 existence, as the indispensable medium and con- 
 dition of the manifestation and working of that 
 which in and of itself is essentially supersen- 
 suous — a living subject or power. But if 
 growth, motion and feeling, constitute the uni- 
 versal characters of animated beings, and must 
 therefore be predicated of the lowest, we shall 
 find, in bringing before our minds the different 
 orders of creatures and ranks of animals, that 
 these are differenced by a relative subordination 
 of these forces. If in the germ the living 
 subject exists in and from itself; if in a higher 
 form of development, first of growth, and then 
 of growth with instinctive motion, it exists for 
 others; and if in the form of sensibility it 
 exists for itself; — by comparing, I say, the 
 various groups of the animal kingdom, we shall 
 find that they may be ranged in an ascending 
 scale, of which the degrees are marked by a 
 relative balan.ce and proportion of the vital 
 forces, and in which the ascent is determined 
 by the evolution of life into Sensibility, and 
 
88 SPIRITTJAIi PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. by the superordination of Sensibility, as the 
 subsect.c. highest force and most essential form of living 
 existence." 
 
 § 35. In order to complete the account of the 
 category of "Whole and Parts," and to render 
 it as far as possible auxiliary to the acquire- 
 ment by Generalization of empirical knowledge, 
 I may observe that it is founded on the follow- 
 ing Axiom : — " Wherever in any group of pheno- 
 mena, sensible or psychical, we may affirm the 
 existence of Unity in Diversity^ we apprehend 
 and bring it under the category of Whole and 
 Parts." To this may be added the following 
 Corollaries : — 1. The greater the number and 
 diversity of the Parts, the greater will be the 
 Intensity of the Unity, and so the more perfect 
 the Totality. — 2. Whatever may be affirmed 
 to connect, adapt, amalgamate, assimilate, or 
 bring into relation with each other, under the 
 conception which is common to all, any pheno- 
 mena or group of phenomena that may be 
 deemed Parts of a Whole, contributes to the 
 Unity aimed at. 
 
 The Axiom in question cannot however be said 
 to approve itself as a generalized educt of the 
 faculty judging according to experience. It is 
 indeed derived from, and disclosed by, a know- 
 ledge of the unique facts of spiritual self-con- 
 sciousness, in the examination of which it will 
 have to be vindicated, and will be verified. But 
 the category of "Whole and Parts" may be 
 
REASONINa. 89 
 
 adopted, in the collection and moulding of onr part l 
 experience, as tlie form of the following more or Subsect.o. 
 less indispensable concipiencies : — 
 
 1. Formality, the prevalence of some simple 
 regular form, by which all the visible parts of an 
 object are seen as One, — e.g., in a Globe, an Egg, 
 a Pyramid. 
 
 2. Regularity, the arrangement of similar or 
 diverse parts, which are more or less discrete or 
 separately discernible, — such as the facets of a 
 crystal, or the sides and hexagonal shape of the 
 wax-cell. 
 
 3. Symmetry, including the "regular" dis- 
 position of parts. This may be deemed a step 
 higher, since it implies the prominence or super- 
 ordination of some parts with the subordination 
 of others, — e.g., the petioles of flowers, the 
 limbs of animals placed in pairs, the contri- 
 vances in architecture (dome, cupola, spire, wings, 
 and the like) to break up into diverse forms, and 
 thereby animate, the mass of the edifice. 
 
 4. Vnity by Orowping, — that is, wherever the 
 parts are too numerous and varied to comprehend 
 them in any one simple plan, to form and 
 associate them in lesser Wholes, and these again 
 brought mediately into larger Wholes, under the 
 common Unity which characterises the Whole 
 and constitutes the Totality, This is especially 
 the business of the Pine Arts: but we have 
 plentiful illustrations of this mode of combina- 
 tion in the various genera, families, orders, and 
 
90 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pakt I. other modes of grouping the animal, vegetable, 
 Subsect. c. and mineral kingdoms. 
 
 5. Proportion, — in greek a-vfifierpla : — ^bnt the 
 english " symmetry" may be distinguished from 
 "proportion," in that the former relates to the 
 disposition of parts and the latter rather to their 
 relative quantity ; though I do not aver that the 
 distinction has been recognised. I would further 
 distinguish two sorts of proportion, namely. 
 Sensible and Dynamic. Of the first, perhaps 
 the best definition would be : — " Measurable 
 fitness of the parts (in space or time) in relation 
 to each other and to the Whole, of which they 
 are the components, and with especial reference 
 to the form of the total design." This would 
 apply to objects of nature, such as the forms 
 of animals and plants : and to objects of fine 
 art, such as the Orders of architecture, and the 
 forms represented by drawing or sculpture; — 
 though it must be confessed that a rule or 
 canon has not hitherto been satisfactorily estab- 
 lished. And we may add musical composition, 
 based as it is on a peculiar science of pro- 
 portion. On the other hand we might render 
 Disproportion intelligible by what is called 
 *^ Caricature," which consists in exaggerating 
 peculiarities or particularities which disturb the 
 balance and harmony of the total effect. 
 
 But I have said there is also what may be 
 called " Dynamic Proportion," by which I mean 
 a relation of the comparative intensity of forces, 
 
REASONING. 91 
 
 such as the relative balance of the centripetal part i. 
 and centrifugal forces. The conception of pro- subsect.'c. 
 portion enters largely, into the determination of 
 scales of degrees applied to the measurement of 
 the varying intensity of forces ; but it will be 
 found that the measurableness of degrees of 
 intensity is only possible where we have been 
 enabled to represent them by quantitative equi- 
 valents of motion in space. It may be observed^ 
 however, that there is always implied a latent 
 reference to Quantity, even under circumstances 
 in which no rule of mensuration has been, or 
 can be, established ; for how shall we estimate 
 by measure the various quanta or degrees of 
 benevolence, patriotism, heroism, and the like 
 psychical qualities ? And I say this without 
 metaphor, for the comparative value cannot be 
 dispensed with in our judgements concerning 
 those qualities. 
 
 Finally we may say, that, wherever there is ade- 
 quate evidence that there is such quantitative 
 relation of the parts of any group or assemblage 
 of phenomena — by adaptation, fitness, subordina- 
 tion, co-ordination, and conspiration — as shall be 
 in congruity with some end proposed, or with 
 some conception which shall give an intelligible 
 unity to all the components, we may assign to 
 such assemblage that character of diversity in 
 unity, which we call a Whole and its Parts. 
 
 6. Unity by Series is that in which the 
 facts in any assemblage of phenomena may be 
 
92 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. SO arranged, or present themselves so arranged, 
 Sutsect.o. as to constitute a regular and continuous suc' 
 cession of steps or parts combined to a totality. 
 The lowest form in which the conception meets 
 us is the repetition of similar beats in succession, 
 as on a drum : and in the animal kingdom the 
 Annelids are those animals, which leaye on us the 
 least impression of organic wholes. But as a step 
 higher in the scale of serial unity, we may notice 
 Rhythm; of which we need say no more here 
 than that the fundamental conception of the 
 same is the repetition of successive beats of 
 sound or motion at regular intervals in cadences 
 of equal duration, by which equal metre we 
 measure the time, or divide it into aliquot parts. 
 With this may be combined an almost endless 
 variety; and so the melody which we call a 
 Tune is a repetition of a regular succession of 
 varied notes. And it may be noticed that when 
 a Tune is played or sung we have the additional 
 notion of a Cyclical Series. In this, as in many 
 other instances, the completion of a Series is 
 certified by the evidence of a Cycle — that is, when 
 the series terminates where it began, and recom- 
 mencing passes through the same steps in the 
 same consecutive order, so that the present 
 recals the past and anticipates the future, and 
 thereby combines the diverse parts to a whole 
 or unity. 
 
 But we may say : — Any series of events, the 
 succession of which is determined by some in- 
 
REASONING. 93 
 
 telligible purpose, or the steps of whicli may parti. 
 be scliematized and explained by some definite subsect.c. 
 conception, is the safe indication of a diversity in 
 unity, or of a Whole of Parts realized in nature. 
 Thus, where there is sufficient ground for attri- 
 buting to an assemblage of facts the character of 
 Frogresswe Bevelopmenty — whether we ascertain 
 the transient but actual phases of the process 
 of evolution, or contemplate them as results of 
 the process retained as parts of the whole, we 
 are entitled to assign to the process the cha- 
 racter of diversity in unity, and to designate 
 it a "Whole and its Parts." No set of facts 
 is better calculated to illustrate this position 
 than the comparatively recent discoveries in 
 Embryology, (See Vital Dynamics, p. 39, and 
 Appendix to same on Transcendental Anatomy, 
 p. 56.) A no less instructive example may be 
 offered in the idea by the light of which the law 
 of the metcmiorpJiosis of plants rose up before 
 the mind of the poet Gothe. (Ibid, p. 26.) The 
 law, however, generally accepted, that in naturd 
 nan datv/r saltus requires correction, — this 
 namely, — that under the auspices of the Logos, 
 or divine Reason, those links of the chain may 
 disappear which are unimportant to the intel- 
 ligibility of the idea contained in the total 
 construction. It is not indeed necessary, as 
 may be inferred from the preceding remarks, 
 that every Series should be that of develop- 
 ment or evolution, provided that the series 
 
94 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pakt I. consists of connected links in and to a Whole. 
 subsect.b. The scale of a Thermometer is distinguished 
 into degrees of expansion of quicksilver cor- 
 responding to the grades of temperature through 
 which the quicksilver passes under the increase 
 of Heat, say from Zero to the boiling point of 
 water. So an Alphabet may be said to be a 
 Series of the articulate sounds of a language, 
 arranged as guttural, palatine, nasal and labial 
 elements, together with their modifications; — 
 and it thus forms a serial totality. 
 
 7. There is another heading to which I attach 
 considerable importance, namely, Mnal aim or 
 Ftirpose, For, notwithstanding what has been 
 in many respects correctly objected to the doc- 
 trine of final purposes or causes, as tending to 
 divert men's minds from efficient causes as the 
 true objects of scientific inquiry, nevertheless 
 there seems to be in many cases no possible sub- 
 stitute for this object in our study of nature, — 
 for the object, namely, of determining as far as 
 the inquiry permits. Why or for what purpose 
 such or such an adaptation of parts, or such and 
 such combination of parts to a whole, has been 
 provided. In other words we search for proofs 
 of Design in order to render certain assemblages 
 of facts intelligible, and this where other sources 
 of intelligibility fail us. That any Axiom which 
 may guide us is founded on our rational nature, 
 and is not generalized from experience, cannot be 
 doubted ; and this may be here taken for granted 
 
BEASONIN(^. 96 
 
 if we consider that any and every will-act, legiti- ^/■^'^ J- 
 mately entitled to the name, must have a definite Subsect.c. 
 aim and purpose, to which the means (as parts 
 of a connected whole) are to be subordinated as 
 the conditions of its achievement and success. 
 And under this impression, I submit, as the 
 guide to empirical knowledge, in this respect 
 the following Axiom : — Wherever there are 
 marks of Design^ and evidence of the adaptation 
 of means in order to a final purpose, as if proposed 
 under the exercise of human intelligence, we 
 legitimately assume, in aid of our empirical 
 knowledge, the operance ia nature of a similar 
 intelligence in order to the completion of an 
 organic whole, and of organic wholes, according 
 to the category of diversity in unity, or of a 
 Whole and its Parts. 
 
 A better comment on the Axiom cannot be 
 ofiered than in the words of the celebrated Cuvier : 
 — " Oelui qui poss6derait rationellement les lois 
 de r economic organique pourrait refaire tout 
 Tanimal." Or when he says (Anat. Comp. Vol. I. 
 p. 47), " Tout etre organist forme un ensemble, 
 un systeme unique et clos, dont les parties se 
 correspondent mutuellement, et concourent a la 
 lueme action definitive par une action r^ciproque. 
 Aucune de ses parties ne pent changer sans que 
 les autres changent aussi; et par consequent 
 chacune d'elles, prise separ^ment, indique et 
 donne toutes les autres." It would be vara to 
 attempt any improvement of this lucid and sue- 
 
96 spiBiTUAL philosophy- 
 
 Part I. cint statement of what we have throughout aimed 
 Subsect.c. at expressing in our account of the category 
 of the Whole and its Parts, — equally applicable 
 as it is to every whole, whether in nature or art, 
 in poetry, science, or in theology, as the aim 
 which the philosophic student ought ever to have 
 in view. 
 
 It is not necessary to recal the reader's atten- 
 tion to the subject of classification and distri- 
 bution already discussed, though it might have 
 furnished one of my present headings. But it 
 would be a grave omission to pass over without 
 notice that of which classification may be con- 
 sidered as a species, and which may in a certain 
 sense be said to be the guiding light of the 
 Understanding in comprehending to unity the 
 wealth of particular knowledges of which expe- 
 rience consists — ^namely. Method, 
 
 8. Method, Any attempt, however, on my part 
 to investigate the subject has been rendered 
 superfluous by the masterly Essay on Method 
 by S. T. Coleridge, beginning at the 4th ch. of 
 vol. 3rd of "the Priend," to which the reader 
 is referred as exhibiting a treatment at once 
 popular and profound. And I shall content 
 myself here with the following instructive quo- 
 tations : — " The absence of method, which cha- 
 racterises the uneducated, is occasioned by an 
 habitual submission of the understanding to mere 
 events and images as such, and independent of 
 any power in the mind to classify and appropriate 
 
:reasoning. 97 
 
 them. The general accompaiiiinents of time and paet i. 
 place are the only relations which persons of Subsect/c. 
 this class appear to regard in their statements. 
 As this constitutes their leading feature, the 
 contrary excellence must be referred to the con- 
 trary habit. Method, therefore, becomes natural 
 to the mind which has been accustomed to con- 
 template not things only, or for their own sake 
 alone, but likewise and chiefly the relations of 
 things, either their relations to each other, or 
 to the observer, or to the state and apprehension 
 of the hearers. To enumerate and analyse these 
 relations, with the conditions under which alone 
 they are discoverable, is to teach the science 
 of Method." 
 
 After noticing the opposite faults of want 
 of generalization and excess of generalization, 
 and also that defect of generalization which 
 "retains the outward form only," — and having 
 happily furnished illustrations from Shakspeare's 
 plays, he says: — " Thus ' exuberance of mind, 
 on the one hand, interferes with the forms of 
 method; but sterility of mind, on the other, 
 wanting the spring and impulse to mental 
 action, is wholly destructive of method itself. 
 Por in attending too exclusively to the relations 
 which the past or passing events and objects 
 bear to general truth, and the moods of his 
 own thought, the most intelligent man is 
 sometimes in danger of overlooking that other 
 relation , in which they are likewise to be 
 
 VOL. I. H 
 
98 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. placed to the apprehension and sympathies of 
 Subsect/c. his hearers. His discourse appears like soliloquy 
 intermixed with dialogue. But the uneducated 
 and unreflecting talker overlooks all mental 
 relations, hoth logical and psychological; and 
 consequently precludes all method which is not 
 purely accidental. Hence the nearer the things 
 and incidents in time and place, the more 
 distant, disjointed and impertinent to each other, 
 and to any common purpose, will they appear 
 in his narration : and this from the want of a 
 staple, or starting post, in the narrator himself; 
 from the absence of the leading thought^ which, 
 borrowing a phrase from the nomenclature of 
 legislation, I may not inaptly call the initiative. 
 On the contrary, where the habit of method is 
 present and effective, things the most remote 
 and diverse, in time, place and outward circum- 
 stance, are brought into mental contiguity and 
 succession, the more striking as the least ex- 
 pected." — "Thus, as 'the lunatic, the lover 
 and the poet' suggest each the other to Shak- 
 speare's Theseus, as soon as his thoughts present 
 him. the one form of which they are but varie- 
 ties; so water and flame, the diamond, the 
 charcoal, and the mantling champagne with its 
 ebullient sparkles, are convoked and fraternized 
 by the theory of the chemist." And with re- 
 gard to Shakspeare's works, "we may define 
 the excellence of their method as consisting 
 in that just proportion, that union and inter- 
 
REASONING. 99 
 
 penetration^ of the universal and particular^ pakt r. 
 which must pervade all works of decided genius Subsect.o. 
 and true science. Eor method implies a pro- 
 gressive transition, and it is the meaning of 
 the word in the original language. The Greek 
 fi€0oBos is literally a way or path of transit. 
 Thus we extol the Elements of Euclid, or So- 
 crates' discourse with the slave in the Menon of 
 Plato, as methodical^ — a term, which no one who 
 holds himself bound to think or speak correctly, 
 would apply to the alphabetical order or arrange- 
 ment of a common dictionary. But as without 
 continuous transition there can be no method, so 
 without a pre-conception there can be no trans- 
 ition with continuity. The term method there- 
 fore, otherwise than by abuse, cannot be applied 
 to a mere dead arrangement, containing in itself 
 no principle of progression." 
 
 It will be readily anticipated that the ^^prin- 
 ciple of progression," the "mental initiative to 
 all method," of which the author speaks, belongs 
 no further to the faculty judging according to ex- 
 perience, but to the higher light within us, which 
 (§ 1) we have called Reason, or in its narrower 
 sense the Speculative Reason, as the source of 
 Eirst Principles. But for the consideration of 
 such first principles or Ideas we shall find here- 
 after a more appropriate place and occasion. 
 
 h2 
 
100 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Pakt I. 
 
 Subject b. Section II. {continued). 
 
 Subsection D. Induction, 
 
 §36. The term "induction" does not mean 
 merely the record of the results of Experience ; 
 but the process of inferring, of inducing upon 
 our empirical knowledge, the apprehension and 
 insight of the Causes and Laws which govern 
 the universe, moral and physical. 
 
 § 37. Thus in the Induction of Causes and 
 Laws^ we may say : — Wherever the human mind 
 attributes unity to a manifold of facts and phe- 
 nomena, contemplates the connexion of each and 
 all in relation to the same as necessary, regular, 
 and invariable, and is thereby rendered capable 
 of anticipating and predicting a constant order 
 of succession, or of simultaneous co-operation, in 
 their recurrence, it recognises a Causative Law. 
 
 § 38. It will be manifest however that, before 
 the human mind can have attained to such 
 causative law or laws, it must have been pre- 
 pared thereto by passing through various stages 
 of toilsome inductive ascent. And it has been 
 with this view that we have placed before the 
 reader the inevitable conditions of acquiring 
 empirical knowledge. Of those conditions we 
 may again name specifically, — first, Space and 
 Time, the inalienable Forms of Sense^ — and, 
 
 * "Cause" is law operative, and "Law" is cause regulative. See 
 Vital Dynamics, p. 15, and the example. 
 
INDUCTION. 101 
 
 secondly, the essential Forms of Concipiency^ part i. 
 or Conceptual Moulds, of the Eaculty judging Subsectb. 
 according to Experience, from the constitution 
 and exercise of which they are inseparable — 
 namely, the three so-called categories of " Sub- 
 ject and Attribute," "Cause and Effect," "Whole 
 and Parts." 
 
 § 39. We have seen how the indispensable 
 business of naming, sorting, connecting, and ar- 
 ranging our empirical knowledges is committed 
 to their charge, and how each category is em- 
 ployed in its respective work and special voca- 
 tion. But in order to determine the conditions 
 of the process of Induction^ in specific relation 
 to the purposes of Science^ it will be necessary 
 to take a comprehensive survey of the means, 
 resources, and circumstances of Experience, 
 which is to terminate not only in the highest 
 generalizations of empirical knowledge, but in 
 the direct aspect and beholding of the wisdom 
 and power which framed the worlds, in those 
 energic acts, ideas or laws, which constitute the 
 divine operance.* " He spake the word, and 
 they were made ; He commanded, and they were 
 created. He hath made them fast for ever and 
 ever : He hath given them a Law, which shall 
 not be broken," Psalm 148. 
 
 § 40. It is hardly necessary to remind the 
 reader that the first indispensable step in the 
 acquirement of empirical knowledge is that of 
 
 * See Vital Dynamics, p. li). 
 
102 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. Generalization, implying a correspondent act of 
 Subsect.b. Abstraction; by wbicb processes we note tlie 
 Like in the Different and the Different ia the 
 Like ; and of wbicb the results are registered in 
 Generic Conceptions, and expressed in Proposi- 
 tions of more or less generality. Nor need I add 
 that such conceptions expressed in general pro- 
 positions must be in the ^^forms^^ prescribed by 
 the constitution of the faculty judgiag according 
 to experience, that is, in. the forms of sensuous 
 intuition, or of logical concipiency made and 
 provided for its specific purpose. 
 
 § 41. In addition, however, to what has been 
 said in respect of these mental forms or moulds, 
 which are part and parcel of our intellectual 
 constitution, it may be desirable for the reader 
 to consider briefly (as only is consistent with our 
 purpose) some of the principal Rules^ which have 
 been laid down by the best authorities — and 
 I would here mention the names of Sir J. Her- 
 schel, of Mr. J. S. MiU, and of Dr. Whewell— for 
 successfully instituting investigations in behoof 
 of Inductive Science. 
 
 § 42. Meanwhile it may be observed that the 
 scientific interest which attaches to inductive 
 science, is mainly, if not altogether, centred in 
 the diagnosis or discernment of Laws, at once 
 causative and regulative : — that is, considered 
 from the point of view of the understanding, the 
 mind is engaged in ascertaining a constant re- 
 lation of dependency between empirical facts, 
 
INDUCTION. 103 
 
 SO that any B shall not happen without the parti. 
 necessity oi assigning some A as its cause, or Subsectn. 
 antecedent condition. And, as the empiricist 
 repudiates the notion of power or force, the term 
 "antecedent condition" would be preferable in 
 respect of empirical knowledge, as signifying 
 that in the mind of the observer a certain fact 
 B is invariably associated with another fact A 
 as the indispensable condition of B. Doubtless, 
 it may be justly objected that A so conceived 
 carries with it no satisfactory explanation of its 
 connexion with, and its production of, B ; but it 
 is true that these conceptions lie beyond the 
 precincts of empirical knowledge. It may like- 
 wise be premised that the inquiry is set on foot 
 by seeking to discover the antecedent condition 
 of a given effect. That is, in the phenomena and 
 their changes, which challenge our observation, 
 we are led to ask — What are the causes, or 
 conditions, which may account for, or explain, 
 as their effects, the observed changes. Although, 
 when a cause has been once satisfactorily ascer- 
 tained, the corresponding inquiry is naturally 
 suggested : — What are the different effects, which 
 may be produced by, or be consequent upon, the 
 same cause. 
 
 § 43. To return, however, to the promised 
 exposition of the main Rules which may claim 
 to be adequate exponents of a Method of Induc- 
 tive Science; — it will be obvious that the first 
 Rule will be that of noting in any case, which 
 
104 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Pakti. offers the inducement to the inquiry, or in all 
 Subsect.b. similar cases, the constant and invariable asso- 
 ciation of one fact or phenomenon with another, 
 for the purpose of determining the Dependency 
 of the one on the other in the relation here con- 
 templated of cause and effect, or rather (as we 
 have said in the empiiiical sense) of a condition 
 and that which is conditional upon it. These 
 relations have been also called Antecedent and 
 Consequent ; but without qualification such lan- 
 guage would lead to error; for no one would 
 think of considering in the constant sequence 
 of day and night that the one is the cause or 
 the effect of the other, the condition of the 
 change being the diurnal revolution of our 
 planet. 
 
 The instances, which establish the fact of the 
 Dependency in question, may be termed Affirm- 
 ative; and their constant recurrence and repe- 
 tition are a continual verification of the relation 
 assumed. Take among many examples which 
 may be adduced in connexion with our daily life, 
 the fact of the changes in Water (its freezing 
 into a solid, its liquefaction, its boiling and 
 conversion into steam) under the influence of 
 increased heat, and its return through the same 
 stages under the abstraction of heat; and the 
 evidence of the dependency of the changes on 
 Heat, as the cause or antecedent condition, is 
 complete and satisfactory. In this however as 
 in other cases, though the most casual observa- 
 
INDUCTION. 105 
 
 tion is sufficient to test the genuineness of the p^-^t i. 
 facts: yet the scientific inquirer is called upon Subsectb. 
 to determine the conditions of the changes more 
 accurately. He ascertains that the relative in- 
 crease or diminution of heat is as that marked 
 by a Fahrenheit's thermometer at 32"^ for the 
 freezing point, above which every increase of 
 temperature is marked by a corresponding rise 
 of the thermometer until having reached 212^, 
 or the boiling point, it remains stationary and 
 the boUing water begins to escape in steam. It 
 will be seen that the phenomenal changes invite 
 further investigation, and may set other inqui- 
 ries on foot; but meanwhile that Observation 
 has been sufficient to note the invariable fact of 
 Heat as the antecedent condition of the changes 
 in water. Moreover it will be found further 
 that, should any doubt remain, the changes may 
 be renewed at the pleasure of the inquirer, or 
 that an Experiment^ or Experiments, may be 
 instituted, by which the fact in question may 
 be verified^ and the question fijially set at rest. 
 And wherever this is the case, and the circum- 
 stances permit the trial of the assumed cause 
 by experiment, we have the additional and in- 
 fallible test of the dependency of a change on 
 a specific cause or condition, and of the existence 
 of a causal relation. 
 
 § 44. But as we may and do have affirmative 
 instances which establish a dependency of one 
 fact or phenomenon or another, so likewise we 
 
106 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pakt I. may have Negative instances^ which are decisive 
 
 Sect, 2. 
 
 SubsectD. evidence against any causal relation that may have 
 heen hastily taken for granted, though perhaps on 
 the faith of many aflGlrmative instances. It is not 
 necessary to refer to the old adage, " Sublatd 
 causa tollitur effectus^'^ to be aware that in aU 
 cases if the cause be removed the effect cannot 
 but cease, and that, if the effect continue after 
 the removal of the influence of the supposed 
 cause, a wrong cause must have been assigned. 
 Ex. gr. If the question were : What is the cause 
 or antecedent condition of the transmission of 
 Soimd to the organ of Hearing. The answer 
 would be the Air : — and this would be ade- 
 quately proved by the Negative instance, fur- 
 nished by striking a bell in the exhausted receiver 
 of an air-pump, and finding that no sound would 
 be heard ; and further that sound would be pro- 
 duced, and would be increased, in proportion to 
 the admission of air. 
 
 In order to turn the distinction of af&rmative 
 and negative instances to the best account in 
 tracing, from an empirical point of view, the 
 relation of cause and effect, it will be necessary, 
 not only to note the cases of the invariable 
 sequence, or concomitancy, of two or more phe- 
 nomena in any given assemblage of facts, but 
 in addition to institute a comparison between the 
 results of the presence and of the absence of 
 any circumstance, which may be supposed to be 
 the indication of the causal condition without 
 
INDrCTION. 107 
 
 which the effect would not take place. In this part i. 
 we proceed as in other cases of generalization : — Subsect.b. 
 we abstract from the different circumstances, 
 under which a remarkable phenomenon, or phe- 
 nomenal change, or effect, occurs, whatever in- 
 variably recurs as its antecedent, and which 
 therefore may be presumed to be its causal 
 condition or the exponent of its Cause ; and 
 we then are entitled to infer, that all like cases 
 agree in the existence of the same dependency 
 and warrant a like designation. Thus we may 
 affirm that All cases of dangerous or fatal 
 interruption to breathing, whether by hanging, 
 drowning, or suffocation by noxious or unfit air, 
 depend upon the absence of the principle neces- 
 sary to aerate the blood. 
 
 But, wherever possible, such cases of agree- 
 ment are to be contrasted with, and tested by, 
 other cases of the like kind but under varied 
 conditions, and we have to compare the same set 
 of phenomena in two opposite relations, and to 
 observe in what the difference of the effect or 
 result consists under the presence and under the 
 absence of any given "condition" supposed to 
 be essential to the effect. It is obvious, namely 
 that. Whatever material circumstance can be 
 eliminated is not the causal condition ; whatever 
 cannot be eliminated, without interrupting the 
 effect, is the cause or at least one of the causes. 
 We have then to examine, and if the trial on 
 hand admit of experiment the requisite evidence 
 
108 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. is most easily obtained, — we have to examine 
 subsectb. instances of Difference, tliat is cases in which 
 "~~~ all other circnmstances being alike, we may by 
 varying the circumstances ascertain the effect 
 of the abstraction of any alleged or supposed 
 cause ; and if by a decisive fact or by repeated 
 trials we can reduce the possible conditions to 
 a single one, that is one which if present is 
 invariably attended by the effect, and which if 
 abstracted is invariably attended by the absence 
 of the effect, we may legitimately conclude it 
 to be the exponent of the " causal condition/' 
 
 Thus, in investigating the Cause of the deposit 
 of Dew (concerning which Dr. "Wells's induction 
 may be studied) we observe under what circum- 
 stances dew is deposited, or collect the affirmative 
 instances, and under what circumstances dew is 
 not deposited, or coUect the negative instances. 
 That in which all the cases invariably agree, and 
 which cannot be eliminated, is the causal con- 
 dition. "It thus appears that the instances in 
 which much dew is deposited, which are very 
 various, agree in this, and so far as we are able 
 to observe, in this only, that they either radiate 
 heat rapidly or conduct it slowly : qualities 
 between which there is no other circumstance 
 of agreement, than that by virtue of either the 
 body tends to lose heat from the surface more 
 rapidly than it can be restored from within." 
 Mill's Logic, vol. i. p. 495. Thus again, as we 
 have seen, a bell struck in air rings audibly ; 
 
INDUCTION. 109 
 
 but when struck in the absence of air, namely part i. 
 in the exhausted receiver of an air pump, no Subsectb. 
 sound is heard — the causal condition of the 
 transmission of sound, that is the medium of air, 
 having been removed. The single circumstance 
 of the presence or absence of air justifies the 
 inference of the dependency of the propagation 
 of sound on air as the medium. 
 
 I have said above, "we proceed in these as in 
 other cases of generalization^'' that is, we note 
 the Like in the different, and the DiflPerent in 
 the like : — in the first, that is in tracing the 
 Like in the different, in respect of Causation, 
 we have to note the like indications of Depen- 
 dency under different circumstances : — in the 
 latter, that is in tracing the Different in the 
 like, we note the difference produced by the 
 absence or abstraction of any supposed cause, 
 all other circumstances being alike. Ex. No. 1. 
 The Vertebrate animals agree in having a skele- 
 ton ; but, under this common character of like- 
 ness, they differ remarkably in being hot- or 
 cold-blooded. — Ex. No. 2. Cases of a bell sound- 
 ing in air, and not sounding in vacuo, consti- 
 tute the essential characters of Difference with 
 Likeness in other respects. 
 
 § 45. Any number of affirmative instances would 
 of course have no weight in establishing an abso^ 
 lute, or tmiversalf affirmative proposition lohen 
 opposed to amy negative instance^ or instances : — 
 thus, though all instances may have agreed in 
 
110 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. the invariable association of some fact as the 
 
 Sect 2. . 
 
 Subsect.D. causative condition of some change, as far as 
 commensurate experience warrants the assump- 
 tiouj yet further investigation may produce irre- 
 fragahle testimony to the contrary. We have 
 a striking example of this in the case of the 
 so-called Acidifying Principle assumed by La- 
 voisier. It had been found that a numerous 
 class of bodies are distinguished by the character 
 of Acids ; and it was satisfactorily ascertained 
 that various substances such as Sulphur, Nitro- 
 gen, Carbon, Arsenic would become Acids simply 
 by their combination with Oxygen. The change 
 admitted of the generalization that in all such 
 cases— and the number was large — the acidity 
 is invariably associated with the presence of 
 Oxygen ; and thus, as far as the examination of 
 the facts studied by Lavoisier warranted the in- 
 ference, he was justified in assuming that Oxygen 
 is the cause, or should be mentally assigned as 
 the precondition, of Acidity. Further researches 
 in chemistry, however, raised up negative in- 
 stances^ and exposed the fallacy of his opinion. 
 Most of the acids contain, indeed, oxygen as one 
 of their elements : but, as Turner (Chemistry, 
 p. 629) says — " Acids may and do exist which 
 contain no trace of oxygen, nor does its presence 
 necessarily give rise to acidity. The compounds 
 of oxygen are frequently alkaline instead of 
 acid; and in many instances are neither acid 
 nor alkaline." And thus it appears that there 
 
INDUCTION. Ill 
 
 are two classes of cases, which effectually nega- part t. 
 tive the hypothesis of an universal cause of Subsect.b. 
 acidity, namely, — (1) that of acids that con- 
 tain no trace of oxygen, and (2) that of com- 
 pounds of oxygen which are not acids. And, 
 adds Turner, — "The progress of science seems to 
 justify the opinion that there is no body to 
 which the term acidifying principle is strictly 
 applicable." 
 
 It is evident indeed that we have no safe 
 test of the Dependency^ which the assignment of 
 " cause and effect" implies and requires, but that 
 the effect is invariably present or absent with 
 the presence or absence of the assigned cause or 
 causal precondition. What cannot be abstracted 
 cannot be regarded otherwise than as cause or at 
 least a concurrent cause ; and thus in the question 
 touching the cause of the transmission of sounds 
 it is found that in the absence of air no sound is 
 transmitted, and that in its presence sound is 
 invariably produced. On the other hand, it may 
 be certainly inferred that whatever can be elimi- 
 nated from the "conditions" under which any 
 change is produced, cannot be regarded as a 
 causal condition of that change. As above stated, 
 what cannot be eliminated ts the cause; and 
 whatever can he eliminated is not the cause. Of 
 the latter no better illustration can be offered 
 than the reform, which the art of prescribing 
 remedies for disease has undergone by reducing 
 the farrago of ingredients, adopted by older phy- 
 
112 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. sicians, to ingredients of undoubted efficacy. " It 
 Subse'ctD. is ouly witMu a few years (says Dr. Paris, Phar- 
 macologia, p. 41) that Theriaca Andromache in 
 its ancient absurd form, has been dismissed from 
 the British Pharmacopoeia." It consisted of 
 seventy-two ingredients, and was, as Dr. Paris 
 states, essentially a preparation of the extract 
 of opium, of which every other ingredient might 
 have been eliminated without impairing its me- 
 dicinal virtue, and of which the curative cause 
 consisted solely in the opium. 
 
 § 46. The most satisfactory assurance of the 
 reality of a causal condition is that derived from 
 a Crucial Experiment^ — that is, where the cir- 
 cumstances of the case permit the decision to be 
 referred to a single issue, and the result furnishes 
 the required proof. Such was the experimental 
 evidence offered by Dr. Haighton that the restora- 
 tion of the function of a Nerve is dependent upon 
 the regeneration of its tissue* The division of 
 a certain pair of Nerves, called Pneumo-gastric 
 from their influence on the functions of breath- 
 ing and digestion, deprives an animal of life : — 
 but if these nerves be divided consecutively, and 
 at such intervals as to allow time for union and 
 reparation, death will not result from the twofold 
 operation, for the nerve-function will apparently 
 have been restored. It remained however a 
 question, whether the nervous influence was 
 transmitted through the uniting medium of the 
 divided nerve, or found a substitute in other 
 
INDUCTION. 113 
 
 channels for its current. Dr. H., after allowing part i. 
 time for the union of the divided nerves, made SubsectD. 
 the second division on both sides at once, and 
 the animal died, as it would have done had the 
 nerves been in their original condition. And 
 thus satisfactory proof was afforded that the 
 nervous current had been transmitted, and trans- 
 mitted only, through a portion of nerve which 
 had been divided and regenerated. 
 
 § 47. It is not, however, always within our 
 power to submit a case of doubtful causation to 
 the test of an Experiment, in which we can at 
 pleasure determine the influence of the presence, 
 or absence, of a supposed or reputed cause. In 
 such cases we have no other help than the 
 observation and comparison of such instances of 
 invariable concomitancy as are furnished by 
 nature. I take the following illustration from 
 MiU's Logic, vol. i. p. 462 : " Thus, if it be true 
 that all animals which have a well-developed 
 respiratory system, and therefore aerate the 
 blood perfectly, agree in being warm-blooded, 
 while those whose respiratory system is im- 
 perfect do not maintain a temperature much 
 exceeding that of the surrounding medium, 
 we may argue from this twofold experience, 
 that the change which takes place in the blood 
 by respiration is the cause of animal heat." 
 
 § 48. The only proof of causal relation that 
 can be deemed completely satisfactory is that in 
 which the affirmative instances of dependency 
 
 VOL. I. I 
 
114 SPIRITUAIi PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. agree invariably in one circumstance or condition, 
 subsect/n. and in one only; or in which the negative in- 
 stances agree in nothing but the exclusion of the 
 same. (See J. 8. Mill, op. cit. p. 462.) But 
 though, as Mill avers, it would be in vain to 
 expect to obtain evidence so conclusive, yet we 
 may approach, if we cannot reach what is here 
 aimed at. For instance, making use of the 
 example offered in § 44 as proof that Sound is 
 not propagated except by a medium, and that the 
 ordinary one is the atmospheric air, we may 
 reason according to Mill's canon of the Method of 
 Difference, p. 455 ; — If the Propagation of Sound 
 occurs in air, and does not occur in vacuo^ all 
 other circumstances being the same, save the 
 presence of air in the former instance, — the 
 circumstance, in which alone the two instances 
 differ, namely the presence of air, is the cause, or 
 condition, of the propagation of Sound. And it 
 may be added that the negative instances, in 
 which Soumd is not propagated^ agree in nothing 
 but the exclusion — not indeed of air only, but of 
 a mediumi of which air is only a species : — so that 
 the reasoning in respect of air being the sole con- 
 dition would be invalid, and in this case further 
 experience would be necessary. 
 
 § 49. But our researches into the causal con- 
 nexions of the phenomena of nature are not 
 unfrequently balfled, or at any rate rendered diflB.- 
 cult, by the presence and influence of causal con- 
 ditions, which, modifying each other, may produce 
 
INDUCTION. 115 
 
 a complex result, or obscure the apprehension of part i. 
 the principal causal relation. In considering these Subsectb. 
 Modify mg Causes^ we may adopt the distinction of 
 Concurrent and Counteracting conditions^ though 
 it may be diificult in many instances to determine 
 to which class they may belong. " A familiar in- 
 stance (of such modifying causes) is that of a body 
 kept in equilibrium by two equal and contrary 
 forces." " Again, a body solicited by two forces 
 in directions making an angle with each other 
 moves in the diagonal." See the observations 
 by J. S. Mill, vol. i, p. 520. Such cases may be 
 called either concurrent or counteracting accord- 
 ing to the end aimed at ; but that two forces, so 
 applied as in the latter instance, may be con- 
 current can not but be admitted, when we know 
 that this is the very case of the law under which 
 the planetary bodies preserve their orbits. If 
 however we look to the causal conditions of many 
 of the phenomenal changes which are offered to 
 our notice, it will not be difficult to discover 
 that the effect of the essential cause is aided or 
 interrupted by modifying influences- Thus says 
 Turner, Chemistry, p. 172 : — " Of the conditions 
 which are capable of promoting or counteracting 
 the tendency of chemical attraction the follow- 
 ing are the most important ; cohesion, elas- 
 ticity, quantity of matter, and gravity. To these 
 may be added the agency of the imponderable." 
 And of these he gives instructive examples. 
 Look again to the facts of Physiology^ and the 
 
 i2 
 
116 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pakt l instances are numberless in which the perform- 
 SubsectiD. ance of the functions of the living body is 
 heightened or depressed by the influence of 
 collateral agencies. No better illustration can 
 be given of the value of estimating the effect of 
 counteracting causes than the conditions under 
 which alone Vaccmation can be successfully 
 accomplished. 
 
 § 50. J. S. Mill has devoted an interesting 
 chapter of his work already cited to the " Plu- 
 rality of Ccmses cmd Intermixture of Effects.''^ 
 
 On the first head he observes (loc. cit. p. 513) 
 as follows : — " We must consider it (plurality 
 of causes) as a case actually occurring in nature, 
 and which as often as it does occur, our methods 
 of induction ought to be capable of ascertaining 
 and establishing. Por this however there is 
 required no peculiar method. When an effect is 
 really producible by two or more causes, the 
 process for detecting them is in no way different 
 from that by which we discover single causes. 
 They may (first) be discovered as separate se- 
 quences, by separate sets of instances. One set 
 of observations or experiments shows that the 
 sun is the cause of heat, another that friction is 
 a source of it, another that percussion, another 
 that electricity, another that chemical action is 
 such a source. Or (secondly) the plurality may 
 come to light in the course of collating a number 
 of instances, when we attempt to find some cir- 
 cumstance in which they all agree, and fail in 
 
INDUCTION. 117 
 
 doing so. We find it impossible to trace in all the part i. 
 
 ° ^ Sect. 2. 
 
 cases, in which the efiect is met with, any com- Subsectp. 
 mon circumstance. We find that we can elimi- 
 nate all the antecedents ; that no one of them 
 is present in all the instances, no one of them 
 indispensable to the effect. On closer scrutiny, 
 however, it appears that, though no one is always 
 present, one or other of several always is. If, on 
 further analysis, we can detect in these any 
 common element, we may be able to ascend from 
 them to some one cause which is the really 
 operative circumstance in them all. Thus it 
 might, and perhaps will, be discovered that in 
 the production of heat by friction, percussion, 
 chemical action, &c., the ultimate source is one 
 and the same. But if (as continually happens) 
 we cannot take this ulterior step, the antecedents 
 must be set down as distinct causes, each sufficient 
 of itself to produce the effect." 
 
 In reference to his second head — that of 
 "Intermixture of Effects," Mill says: — "We 
 have now to consider according to what method 
 these complex effects, compounded of the effects 
 of many causes, are to be studied ; how we are 
 enabled to trace each effect to the concurrence 
 of causes in which it originated, and ascertain 
 the conditions of its recurrence, the circum- 
 stances in which it may be expected again to 
 occur." Of this second head I cannot profess to 
 give an intelligible abridgement, and must refer 
 the reader to Mill's work, loc. cit. p. 524. But I 
 
118 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. may direct the attention of the student to the 
 si^'secti). following results. Mill says, " The conditions of 
 a phenomenon which arises from a composition of 
 causes may be investigated either deductively or 
 experimentally." And after rejecting altogether 
 the experimental method, and showing its in- 
 efficiency by a lengthened illustration from medi- 
 cal science of the futile attempt to determine 
 the modus operandi and curative properties of 
 Mercury, he says there remains only the Deduc- 
 tive Method^ — " that which considers the causes 
 separately, and computes the effect from the 
 balance of the different tendencies which produce 
 it : in short the deductive, or a priori method." 
 P. 533. To this method of investigation he 
 would assign the inquiries in physiology, politics 
 and history, in which, he says, "Plm^alityof 
 causes exists in almost boundless excess, and the 
 Effects are, for the most part, inextricably inter- 
 woven with one another." And he adds (p. 532) 
 "The vulgar notion that the safe methods on 
 political subjects are those of Baconian induc- 
 tion, that the true guide is not general reasoning 
 but specific experience, will one day be quoted 
 as among the most unequivocal marks of a low 
 state of the speculative faculties in any age in 
 which it is accredited." * 
 
 * " Induction/' in the ordinary sense of the temij means essentially no 
 more than Generalization applied to the investigation of Causes, or of 
 the unconditional Dependency of phenomena on each other as fai* as can 
 be ascertained by empirical observation :— it meaiis the collection of 
 Imtances of any like dependency under a general head, or generic term 
 
INDUCTION. 119 
 
 The Deductive Method, he goes on to explain, paet i. 
 consists of three operations : the first, one of di- SubsectD. 
 rect induction ; the second, one of ratiocination ; 
 and the third, one of verification. " The problem 
 of the Deductive Method is, to find the law of an 
 eifect, from the laws of the diflferent tendencies 
 
 designating a class, so that the fact of the dependency in question may 
 be expressed in a uniTersal affirmative proposition. Ex. " Whatever 
 falls gravitates, i.e. obeys the law of gravitation.'' But I venture here 
 to af&rm, that " Induction" in its proper sense signifies, not the empirical 
 cohigation of the uniform sequences of certain phenomena, but the pro- 
 cess prescribed for the establishment of some universal law of the causes 
 operative in nature, — not merely the work of the human mind in such 
 inquiries, but the investigation, and haply the discovery, of the laws 
 impressed on nature by its Creator. 
 
 " Deduction/' on the other hand, consis.ts in the suhsumption of any 
 fresh instance of dependency under the law previously established and 
 expressed in its appropriate proposition. We deduce from the proposition, 
 as a major premiss, that a given case is one, which may be legitimately 
 included in the Hule or Maxim, which it expresses. And thus we may 
 deduce directly from the above proposition that bodies in falling, either 
 from want of support or loss of equilibrium, obey the law of equilibrium, 
 or indirectly that the rise in the barometer, or the paradox of a body 
 rolling up an acchvity, is also a case of the law of gravitation. But it 
 may be properly asked. What is the i^roof of the proposition, that 
 whatever falls obeys the law of gravitation ? Tor though used as a 
 major premiss it is by no means self-evident, and therefore requires proof. 
 We have elsewhere seen that the proof demanded requires some such 
 self-evident premiss as " Whatever invariably occurs is a law of nature." 
 The minor then would be some such as " Obedience to the law of gravi- 
 tation in faUing bodies is what invariably occurs." Here the minor 
 would require the evidence of observation and experiment, i.e. the 
 induction of instances in support of the truth affirmed. And then we 
 legitimately conclude, or deduce from the major premiss that " Obedience 
 to the law of gravitation in faUing bodies is a law of Nature." 
 
 It wiU be seen then, by this example, that, for the completion of the 
 Proof required for the estabhshment of a Law of nature, we have to 
 adopt both deductive and inductive reasoning — deductive^ in as far as we 
 subsume the case under an estabhshed major premiss ; inductive^ in as 
 far as we cstabhsh the minor premiss by the inductive generalization of 
 the facts at issue. 
 
120 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. of whicli it is the loint result. Tlie first requi- 
 SubsectD. site, therefore, is to know" (by Induction) **tlie 
 laws of those tendencies ; the law of each of the 
 concurrent causes ; and this supposes a previous 
 process of observation or experiment upon each 
 cause separately; or else a previous deduction, 
 which must also depend for its ultimate pre- 
 misses upon observation or experiment. Thus 
 if the subject be social, or historical, phenomena, 
 the premisses of the Deductive Method must 
 be the laws of the causes which determine 
 the class of phenomena ; and those causes are 
 human actions, together with the general out- 
 ward circumstances under the dominion of which 
 mankind are placed and which constitute man's 
 position in the world." 
 
 " To ascertain, then, the laws of each sepa- 
 rate cause which takes a share in producing the 
 effect is the first desideratum of the Deductive 
 Method. . . . When the laws of the causes have 
 been ascertained, and the first stage of the great 
 logical operation now under discussion satisfac- 
 torily accomplished, the second part follows, that 
 of determiniag from the laws of the causes, 
 what effect any given combination of those 
 causes wiU produce. This is a process of cal- 
 culation, in the wider sense of the term; and 
 very often involves processes of calculation in the 
 narrowest sense. It is a ratiocination ; and when 
 our knowledge of the causes is so perfect, as to 
 extend the exact numerical laws which they ob- 
 
INDUCTION. 121 
 
 serve in producing their effects, the ratiocination part l 
 may reckon among its premisses the theorems SutsectD. 
 of the science of number, in the whole immense 
 extent of that science. Not only are the most 
 advanced truths of mathematics often required 
 to enable us to compute an effect, the numerical 
 law of which we already know ; but, even by the 
 aid of those most advanced truths, we can go but 
 a little way. In so simple a case as the common 
 problem of three bodies gravitating towards one 
 another, with a force directly as their mass and 
 inversely as the square of the distance, all the 
 resources of the calculating have not hitherto 
 sufficed to obtain any general solution but an 
 approximate one. In a case a little more com- 
 plete, but still one of the simplest which arise in 
 practice, that of the motion of a projectile, the 
 causes which affect the velocity and range (for 
 example) of a cannon-ball may be all known 
 and estimated ; the force of the gunpowder, the 
 angle of elevation, the density of the air, the 
 strength and direction of the wind ; but it is one 
 of the most difficult of mathematical problems 
 to combine all these, so as to determine the 
 effect resulting from their collective action. 
 
 " Besides the theorems of number, those of 
 geometry also come in as premisses, where the 
 effects take place in space, and involve motion 
 and extension, as in mechanics, optics, acoustics, 
 astronomy. But when the complication increases, 
 and the effects are under the influence of so many 
 
122 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. and such shifting causes as to give no room 
 SubaectD. either for fixed numhers, or for straight lines and 
 regular curves, (as in the case of physiological, to 
 say nothing of mental and social phenomena,) 
 the laws of number and extension are applicable, 
 if at all only on that large scale on which 
 precision of detail becomes unimportant ; and 
 although these laws play a conspicuous part in 
 the most striking examples of the investigation 
 of nature by the Deductive Method, as for 
 example in the Newtonian theory of the celestial 
 motions, they are by no means an indispensable 
 part of every such process. All that is essential 
 in it is reasoning from a general law to a par- 
 ticular case, that is, determining by means of 
 two particular circumstances of that case what 
 result is required in that instance to fulfil the 
 law. 
 
 " Thus in the Torricellian experiment, if the 
 fact that air has weight had been previously 
 known, it would have been easy without any 
 numerical data, to deduce from the general law 
 of equilibrium, that the mercury would stand in 
 the tube at such a height that the column of 
 mercury would exactly balance a column of the 
 atmosphere of equal diameter, because otherwise 
 equilibrium would not exist. 
 
 " By such ratiocinations from the separate 
 laws of the causes, we may, to a certain extent, 
 succeed in answering either of the following 
 questions : Given a certain combination of causes, 
 
INDrCTION. 123 
 
 what eflPect will follow ? And, what combina- J^art i. 
 
 Sect 2. 
 
 tion of causes, if it existed, would produce a SubsectD. 
 given effect ? In the one case, we determine 
 the effect to be expected in any complete circum- 
 stances of which the different elements are 
 known ; in the other case we learn, according to 
 what law — under what antecedent conditions — a 
 given complex effect will occur." 
 
 In the above long quotation there are two 
 parts to which I would direct particular atten- 
 tion ; — first, the account which Mill gives of 
 the aid to be derived from Mathematics; and, 
 secondly, the account which he gives of "all 
 that is essential " in the deductive method. 
 
 ^' But it may be asked," he proceeds, " are not 
 the same arguments by which the methods of 
 direct observation and experiment were set aside 
 as illusory when applied to the laws of complex 
 phenomena, applicable with equal force against 
 the Method of Deduction?" These objections, 
 he admits, would be unanswerable, were there 
 no test by which we may judge whether an error 
 had been committed or not : and such a test he 
 affirms to exist, and its application forms under 
 the name of Verification^ the third essential com- 
 ponent of the Deductive Method. "To warrant 
 reliance upon the general conclusions arrived at 
 by deduction, these conclusions must be found, 
 on a careful comparison, to accord with the 
 results of direct observation wherever it can be 
 had .... To the deductive method thus charac- 
 
124 SPHMTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. terised the human mind is indebted for its most 
 Subsectb. glorious triumphs in the inyestigation of nature. 
 To it we owe all the theories by which vast and 
 complicated phenomena are embraced under a 
 few simple laws, which, considered as the laws 
 of those great phenomena, could never have been 
 detected by their direct study. "We may form 
 some conception of what the method has done 
 for us in the case of the celestial motions." 
 P. 646. 
 
 I am tempted to add to the above an extract 
 or two from Mill's chapter on "The Explanation 
 of Laws of Nature." " An individual fact is said 
 to be explained by pointing out its cause, that is, 
 by stating the law or laws of causation, of which 
 its production is an instance." At p. 558 he 
 says, " There are three modes of explaining laws 
 of causation. Pirst, when the law of an effect 
 of combined causes is resolved into the separate 
 laws of the causes together with the fact of their 
 combination. Secondly, when the law which 
 connects any two links, not proximate, in a 
 chain of causation, is resolved into the laws, 
 which connect each with the intermediate links.* 
 Both of these are cases of resolving one law into 
 two or more ; in the third, two or more are 
 resolved into one, when after the law has been 
 shown to hold good in several different classes of 
 
 * Compare Herscliel, Nat. Phil. p. 88. on " the analysis of complex 
 phenomena'' :— and, on the subject of this paragraph generally, the 7th 
 Chap, of the same work; p. 190. 
 
INDUCTION. 125 
 
 cases, we decide that what is true in each of parti. 
 these classes of cases, is true under some more subsectb. 
 general supposition, consisting of what all those 
 classes of cases have in common." 
 
 The last or third mode, to which only I desire 
 particular attention, he thus describes, p. 555 ; — ■ 
 "The third mode is the subsvmption (as it has 
 been called) of one law under another ; or (what 
 comes to the same thing) the gathering up of 
 several laws into one more general law which 
 includes them all. The most splendid example 
 of this operation was, when terrestrial gravity 
 and the central force of the solar system were 
 brought together under the general law of gravi- 
 tation." (See the example detailed, p. 556, with 
 the observations thereon.) 
 
 In conclusion, I may observe on Mill's views 
 above quoted, that although it has been gene- 
 rally admitted that the process of gathering up 
 the results of experience is at once mductive and 
 deductive^ the testimony of so decided an empi- 
 ricist to the pre-eminent value of Deduction is 
 worthy of all note. I do not indeed take for 
 granted that he would concede to me what I 
 have claimed for the Reason as speculative phi- 
 losophy in universalizing human knowledge. 
 But if, as is undoubtedly the case, empirical 
 facts are to be treated "inductively," yet, for 
 the interpretation of the generalizations arising 
 therefrom (or, in Bacon's phrase, in order that 
 man may become interpres natnrce) we have to 
 
126 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 PaetI. appeal to first principles which are part and 
 Subsect.'D. parcel of our rational nature. Above all this 
 appeal will be obligatory, when we have to con- 
 sider the laws of causation which affect the moral 
 agency of man. 
 
 I might begin another paragraph with the 
 heading " Successive Generalization." But as 
 this subject has been anticipated above in the 
 account of the " Subsumption of one law under 
 another/' I pass it by with one remark. I no- 
 wise subscribe to the statement, advanced by 
 modem natural philosophers, that the inductive 
 process which Lord Bacon recommends consists 
 entirely of "generalizations, commencing with 
 the most circumstantially stated particulars, and 
 carried up to universal laws and axioms, which 
 comprehend in their statements every subordi- 
 nate degree of generality;" — and thus that a 
 law is only a generalization from the facts and 
 phenomena of sensible experience, a mere result 
 of, and belonging to^ the human understanding. 
 My reasons for protesting against this doctrine 
 will be found at p. 11, Vital Dynamics. 
 
 § 51. It is now high time to turn our atten- 
 tion to the aid which the process of induction 
 derives from mathematical science in determining 
 the laws of Quantity ; — for according to Bacon, 
 " Optime cedit inquisitio naturalis, quando phy- 
 sicum terminatur in mathematico." I cannot 
 however better bring the subject before the mind 
 of the reader than by a few quotations from 
 
INDUCTION. 127 
 
 Herscliers Nat. Phil. Thus at p. 122 he says: parti. 
 — " In all cases which admit of numeration or subsect.D. 
 measurement, it is of the utmost consequence to 
 obtain precise numerical statements, whether in 
 the measure of Time, Space, or Quantity of any 
 kind." — "It is the very soul of science; and its 
 attainment aifords the only criterion, or at least 
 the best, of the truth of theories, and the cor- 
 rectness of experiments." — " Chemistry is in the 
 most pre-eminent degree a science of quantity : 
 and to enumerate the discoveries which have 
 arisen in it from the mere determination of 
 weights and measures, would be nearly to give 
 a synopsis of this branch of knowledge. We 
 need only mention the law of definite proportions, 
 which ficses the composition of every body in 
 nature in determinate proportionate weights of 
 its ingredients." Compare Whewell on Lavoisier, 
 Induct. Phil. vol. i. p. 398. Again Herschel, op. 
 cit. p. 123. " Indeed it is a character of all the 
 higher laws of nature to assume the form of 
 precise quantitative statement." Nor shall we 
 wonder that man has acquired insight into nature, 
 in proportion as he has been enabled to reduce 
 her laws to distinct quantitative statements, and 
 has brought them within the mental construc- 
 tions of mathematical science, if as in the in- 
 stance before us, "the observed relations among 
 the data of physics show them to be quantities 
 not arbitrarily assumed, but depending on laws 
 and causes which they may be the means of 
 
128 SPIUITUAX PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. disclosing." Need we remind the reader of the 
 Subseko. speculations of the Pythagorean school, or of the 
 sublime saying, Numero, pondere et mensurd gene- 
 rantur cceli et terra? Vital Dynamics, p. 22. 
 " Thus (as Herschel says, loc. cit.) the law of Gra- 
 vitation^ the most universal truth at which the 
 human reason has yet arrived, expresses not 
 merely the general fact of the mutual attraction 
 of all matter ; not merely the vague statement 
 that its influence decreases as the distance in- 
 creases ; but the exact numerical rate at which 
 that decrease takes placer; so that, when its 
 amount is known at any one distance, it may be 
 calculated exactly for any other. Thus too the 
 laws of crystallography y which limit the forms 
 assumed by natural substances, when left to their 
 own inherent powers of aggregation, to precise 
 geometrical figures, with fixed angles and pro- 
 portions, have the same essential character of 
 strict mathematical expression, without which 
 no exact particular conclusions could ever be 
 drawn from them." 
 
 In speaking of the verification of an induction 
 of facts, Herschel, Op. cit. p. 168, says, " In the 
 verification of a law, whose expression is qtmnti- 
 tative^ not only must its generality be established 
 by the trial of it in as various circumstances as 
 possible, but every such trial must be one of 
 precise measurement." See the illustrations, 
 ibid. And I need not add how much such trials, 
 conducted with all the precision of mathematical 
 
INDUCTION. 129 
 
 science, must contribute to tlie exactness of our paut i. 
 knowledge of the facts submitted to the inductive Subsect d. 
 process and to the accuracy of the induction 
 itself. 
 
 But if the verification of empirical laws is 
 greatly aided by the exact methods of mathe- 
 matical science, and by their expression as laws 
 of quantity, it will be found no less that the 
 Deductive Method is armed thereby with powers 
 which render it a most effectual instrument for 
 enlarging our sensible experience. When laws 
 of nature of subordinate generality have been 
 resolved into some universal law, or when the 
 steps of a laborious inductive ascent have been 
 happily anticipated by some unpremeditated dis- 
 covery, it will be found that a host of minor laws, 
 which had been obtained only by toilsome in- 
 ductive processes, may now be satisfactorily 
 deduced by a priori reasoning from the funda- 
 mental law, of which they are at once the con- 
 sequences and proofs ; — a result, which would be 
 inconceivable, unless grounded on quantitative 
 conditions^ and calculable under the constant 
 relations which they supply. Thus the great 
 laws of the planetary motions, announced by 
 Kepler, were the results of inconceivable labour 
 of calculation and comparison ; but, as Herschel 
 (Op. cit. p. 179) says, " they amply repaid the 
 labour bestowed on them by affording afterwards 
 the most conclusive and unanswerable proofs of 
 the Newtonian system;" — and it may be added, 
 
 VOL. I. K 
 
130 SPIUITUAIi PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. that, according to its indispensable requirements, 
 SubsectD. the laws of Kepler were found to be rigorously 
 deducible from the law of gravity established by 
 Newton. But the conditions, under which New- 
 ton established the law, were strictly quantitative ; 
 and thus he was enabled "to show all the 
 celestial motions known in his time to be con- 
 sequences of the simple law, that every particle 
 of matter attracts every other particle of matter 
 in the universe with a force proportional to the 
 product of their masses directly, and the square 
 of their mutual distance inversely, and is itself 
 attracted with an equal force." For the celestial 
 motions explaiaed by, and deduced from, the 
 law of gravitation, see Herschel, Op. cit. p. 272. 
 "It is a remarkable and happy fact, (says 
 Herschel further. Op. cit. p. 179) that the shortest 
 and most direct of all inductions should be that 
 which has led at once, and almost by a single 
 step, to the highest of all natural laws, — we mean 
 those of motion and force. Nothing can be 
 more simple, precise, and general than the enun- 
 ciation of these laws; and as we have once 
 before observed, their application to particular 
 facts in the descending or deductive method is 
 limited by nothing but the limited extent of our 
 mathemdiics. It would seem, then, that dy- 
 namical science were taken thenceforward out 
 of the pale of induction, and transformed into 
 a matter of absolute a priori reasoning ; and so 
 it would be were our mathematics perfect and 
 
INDUCTION. 131 
 
 all the data known." Compare J. S. Mill on Parti. 
 
 Sect 2 
 
 the same subject. Op. cit. vol. i. p. 541. But, Subaect/p. 
 it may be added, that, as the laws of quantity- 
 contain a priori all the possible cases which 
 may be deduced from them, so they necessarily 
 are calculated to draw attention to facts and 
 consequences which might otherwise have es- 
 caped the investigation of physicists, or have 
 been left to the casual and uncertain notice of 
 observers in natural science. 
 
 § 52. It remains that we bring before the 
 notice of ^he reader the Method of Residues^ 
 of which Herschel (Op. cit. p. 156) says, — " It is 
 by this process, in fact, that science in its present 
 advanced state is chiefly promoted. Most of 
 the phenomena which nature presents are very 
 complicated ; and when the eflPects of all known 
 causes are estimated with exactness, and sub- 
 ducted, the residual facts are constantly appear- 
 ing in the form of phenomena altogether new, 
 and leading to the most important conclusions. 
 Eor example : the return of the comet pre- 
 dicted by Professor Encke, a great many times 
 in succession, and the general good agreement 
 of its calculated with its observed place during 
 any one of its periods of visibility, would lead 
 us to say that its gravitation towards the sun 
 and planets is the sole and sufficient cause of its 
 orbitual motion : but when the effect of this 
 cause is strictly calculated and subducted from 
 the observed motion, there is found to remain 
 
 K 2 
 
132 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. behind a residual phenomenon, which would 
 subse'ct-D. otherwise never have been ascertained to exist, 
 which is a small anticipation of the time of its 
 reappearance, or a diminution of its periodic 
 time, which cannot be accounted for by gravity, 
 and whose cause is therefore to be inquired tuto. 
 Such an anticipation would be caused by the 
 resistance of a medium disseminated through 
 the celestial regions; and as there are other 
 good reasons for believing this to be a vera 
 causa, it has therefore been ascribed tp such 
 a resistance." Other instructive examples will 
 be found in the same part of the work cited, but 
 which it is unnecessary to repeat here : and the 
 reader may advantageously compare it with Mill 
 on the same subject ; vol. i. p. 504. 
 
 § 53. Before quitting the subject of induction 
 it will be incumbent on us to state with more 
 clearness than has hitherto been done the prin- 
 ciple of the Inductive Logic, This principle, 
 in contradistinction to that of the logical Canon, 
 has been generally described as an inference a 
 particulari ad universale, and we may well ask, 
 whether a principle so entirely at variance with 
 logical reasoning can be admitted? And yet 
 it would seem as if men, in generalizing the 
 results of experience, and in proceeding from 
 particular to general truths, were constantly and 
 unavoidably engaged in such a process of reason- 
 ing ; nay, that it is the process, as it seems, by 
 which they arrive at the highest generalizations 
 
INDUCTION. 133 
 
 of Science, and at the rules and maxims (regulse part i. 
 maximse) on which they rely for the guidance SubsVct-D. 
 of their conduct in the ordinary affairs of life. 
 "We have then to explain these discrepancies, 
 and to vindicate, or repudiate, the claims of in- 
 ductive logic to the special principle of reason- 
 ing, said to be characterised by inferring from 
 the particular to the universal. 
 
 Now, although I conceive with Archbishop 
 Whately that, in these cases of so called mductio 
 d partieulari ad universale^ we do virtually con- 
 form to the logical canon by reasoning with a 
 suppressed major premiss, yet I cannot agree with 
 him in thinking that it is such a one as that 
 which he proposes for proving that " All men 
 are mortal;" — namely, "Whatever is true of 
 John, Peter, Thomas, &c. is true of all man- 
 kind;" — I cannot agree with him, because it 
 violates the fundamental law of reasoning, and 
 has the manifest logical fault of concluding 
 from a particular to an universal proposition. 
 But it will be naturally and fairly asked — If we 
 do conclude, as admitted above, from particular 
 to universal propositions, and can only in such 
 wise generalize our experience, how we can 
 avoid the paralogism and escape the paradox ? 
 And in reply to this question, I venture to say, 
 that admitting as true the above statement, the 
 difficulty has yet to be solved. And I say this 
 notwithstanding that Mr. Mill, after offering 
 unanswerable objections to Whately's view, has 
 
134 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 paet I. himself attempted an explanation, — wMcli, how- 
 subse'ct.D. ever, in my judgement, has not adequately, nor 
 I think rightly, solved the logical problem. 
 
 The question is. What is the implied, or 
 according to Whately the "suppressed" major 
 premiss, which enables us to conclude legiti- 
 mately that the particular facts, which we have 
 gleaned and gathered from experience, may be 
 affirmed "universally" — taking the term in its 
 logical sense? And in supplying the answer, 
 I will do so in the form of the above example 
 stated in the proposition : " All men are mortal." 
 Now I venture to think that the major premiss, 
 which is to ^^ prove'' this proposition, is not the 
 hypothesis proposed by Mill of an "uniform 
 course of nature," even when verified, as he 
 supposes it may be, by induction; but that it 
 must refer to the conditions, under which we 
 exercise and achieve experience, and might be 
 expressed in some such terms as the following : — 
 Whatever has been the result of invariable 
 experience may be regarded and anticipated 
 as the uniform course of nature : 
 That all men are mortal has been the result 
 
 of invariable experience : — therefore 
 
 That all men are mortal may be regarded 
 
 and anticipated as the uniform course of 
 
 nature. 
 
 If such be the correct statement of the form 
 
 of reasoning virtually adopted, even where not 
 
 recognised, it will be seen that the conclusion is 
 
INDUCTION. 135 
 
 drawn from an universal major premiss to the parti. 
 particular case contained in the conclusion, in Subsect.D. 
 strict conformity with the rate of the logical 
 canon which Mill affects to despise, whilst he 
 admits the necessity of a major premiss. 
 
 Meanwhile, however, it is quite true that a 
 process of reasoning from the particular to the 
 universal does take place in framing a syllogism 
 of this nature ; — and in this sense, namely ; that 
 the subject of the minor premiss includes the cases 
 derived from experience, and the subsumption of 
 these under the class designated by that subject 
 must be accomplished by an inductive process 
 of reasoning, that is, by generalizing every par- 
 ticular fact or case or seeing that they are 
 rightly included in the class designated by the 
 subject and rightly included in the predicate 
 of the minor premiss. Thus in the above syl- 
 logism, that "All men are mortal" is afl&rmed 
 to be "the result of invariable experience;" 
 and the particular fact is made universal by in- 
 cluding it under the class of "the invariable 
 results of experience," because, in the major 
 premiss we have established the warranty that 
 " whatever has been the result of invariable 
 experience may be assumed to be, or is un- 
 avoidably assumed to be, the uniform course 
 of nature." 
 
 Or the truth, at which we aim, might be thus 
 expressed: — That the "subject" of the minor 
 premiss contains the cases which are brought 
 
136 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ART I. under the " subject" of the major premiss, and 
 Subsectb. thereby included in the major term; that is, the 
 case that " all men are mortal" is the " subject" 
 of the minor premiss, and contains the cases 
 of the mortality of each and every man as 
 ascertained empirically : — but this collection of 
 cases, in which the mortality of all men is 
 affirmed,* is brought under the subject of the 
 major premiss, as " the result of invariable 
 experience ;" it is thereby included in the major 
 term, since " the results of invariable experience " 
 may be regarded as the uniform course of 
 nature : — and we conclude then universally that 
 the empirical fact of men's mortality, being in- 
 cluded in the class of "results of experience" 
 is included in the class designated as " the uni- 
 form course of nature." But it is to be observed 
 that the logical justification of the procedure 
 implies that the sub sumption of the particular 
 cases derived from experience is effected by an 
 inductive process of reasoning, that is by gene- 
 ralizing the particular facts under the predicate 
 of the minor premiss, or in other words including 
 
 * With reference to the collection of caseSj Wesley (LogiCj p. 58) has 
 the following note to "Induction." "The term 'Induction' is some- 
 times employed to designate the process of investigating and coUectmg 
 facts; which is not a process of argument, but ^ preparation for it" 
 I cannot however but consider, as I have stated it, that there is always 
 a process of reasoning in so collecting facts that they may be brought 
 under the class of facts of invariable experience ; and in each and evei'y 
 particular case, that we necessarily irffer, in conformity with a rule or 
 major premiss that whatever phenomena are invariably associated are in 
 the relation of dependency, called Cause and Effect. 
 
INDUCTION. 137 
 
 them in the class "the results of invariable Parti. 
 
 ,, Sect. 2. 
 
 experience. Subsect.D. 
 
 Thus, then, the minor premiss in all such 
 syllogisms contains the collection of particular 
 facts, which expresses, or ought to express, the 
 unimpeachable results of empirical investigation, 
 and affirms them to be "results of invariable 
 experience." And the conclusion founded there- 
 on, in respect of such empirical facts, is universal; 
 — supposing always that its validity is guaran- 
 teed by a legitimate induction, that the par- 
 ticular facts have been certified to be results 
 of invariable experience. And it may be added 
 that this induction d particulari ad universale is 
 justified logically; but it is justified only by a 
 major premiss, which affirms the indispensable 
 conditions, under which the induction is made 
 and the universal conclusion established. 
 
 Such, I apprehend, is the true account of 
 empirical logic; and the major premiss above 
 indicated, or one of the same significancy, is that 
 which is implied, or expressed, though for obvious 
 reasons of convenience usually suppressed. It will 
 be observed, however, that in the minor premiss 
 facts will have to be expressed, which are not so 
 universally known or admitted as that " men are 
 mortal;" though in this case, if the grounds 
 of the affirmation needed statement, we might 
 append to the subject of the minor premiss the 
 requisite evidence — saying, for instance, " that 
 men are mortal, as shown by the deaths of all 
 
138 SPIBITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pakt l preceding generations, of whom no one is left to 
 Subsect.b. testify to the indefinite prolongation of life, and 
 by the daily recurrence of this common even- 
 tuality." This confirmation of a premiss by an 
 incidental proposition is what logicians call an 
 JEpichirema, or a syllogism of which the pre- 
 miss in question is the conclusion. Thus, in the 
 instance before us, " All men are mortal" is the 
 conclusion of the following syllogism : — •" What- 
 ever living creature is subject to death in all 
 past and present generations is mortal : all men 
 are so subject : therefore all men are mortal." 
 But it will be at once apparent that in many, or 
 indeed in most, cases of inductive generalization 
 such an appendage or " pro-sjllogism " will be 
 absolutely requisite in order to bring before the 
 mind of those whom it may concern (in con- 
 sequence of their want of information or belief) 
 the Proofs of the soundness of the conclusion, 
 and as such the convincing evidence of the steps 
 of the inductive process, by which the inquirer 
 had arrived at the generalization or empirical 
 law enunciated. 
 
 And this would bring us again to the " Con- 
 ditions'^ or Rules i under which legitimate in- 
 ductive generalization may be made, and empirical 
 laws established. Such rules or conditions of 
 experience have been, however, already sufficiently 
 discussed in the preceding pages ; and I have 
 only here to remind the reader of the important 
 distinction before made between inductive " gene- 
 
INDUCTION. 139 
 
 ralizations," or " empirical laws," and what with part i. 
 
 ^ , . Sect. 2. 
 
 exclusive propriety may be called the induction Sutsect.D. 
 of laws of nature — laws, revealed by Reason and 
 attesting the power and wisdom of the Creator. 
 (Compare Vital Dynamics, p. 16.) " A law not 
 only implies what is, and must be, the result of 
 universal experience according to the essential 
 constitution of the human mind, but that more 
 excellent knowledge of an operance, which would 
 be real and eflPeetive whether man contemplate 
 its effects in the works of nature or not, and 
 which is constitutive in mature." 
 
 It would be an unnecessary occupation of the 
 reader's time and attention to pursue the subject 
 into further details ; — though as an instructive 
 exercise he may refer to the example before 
 given of Dr. "Wells's investigation of the pro- 
 duction of Dew. (See § 44, and the fuller state- 
 ment of the case in Mill's Logic, 1. c.) I cannot 
 but think that the reader will be convinced 
 that in all cases of inductive reasoning the 
 argument may be thrown into, and virtually 
 consists of, a Syllogism ; of which the major pre- 
 miss states the condition or rule, under which 
 the conclusion may be valid ; of which the minor 
 premiss is the statement of the particular fact or 
 facts under consideration; and of which the 
 conclusion is the proposition which raises the 
 particulars into the generality, or universal law, 
 contemplated in the problem at issue. 
 
 § 54. We have now learnt that the process of 
 
140 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. gathering empirical knowledge, and of consti- 
 SubsectD. tuting thereby our Experience, is both mductwe 
 and deductive; — bearing in mind always, how- 
 ever, that such inductive process is for the pur- 
 pose of ^Hnducing^' upon empirical knowledge 
 the insight of the universal laws impressed by 
 the Creator on the physical and moral universe ; 
 — that the first, or inductive generalization, is 
 the work of the subjective mind, and consists 
 of man's thoughts (i. e. generic conceptions) of 
 the agencies of the universe ; but that the latter 
 is the achievement of the objective mind, or that 
 which is coincident with, and the operance of, 
 the universal mind. And the reader will be 
 pleased to recollect that we have vindicated the 
 assumption of such objective mind by presenting 
 the Idea of the Season as the Intelligence, which 
 is at once human and divine. We have indeed 
 made a distinction between Season speculative 
 and practical ; and, until we have investigated 
 the moral nature of man, the reader cannot 
 receive the full assurance that the assumption 
 of such an intelligence is essentially true. But 
 at the same time the character of the speculative 
 Reason has been so enunciated as to bespeak 
 acquiescence in its reality, and especially in the 
 fact (partially at least demonstrated) that its 
 truths cannot but be acknowledged as containing 
 their own evidence. Por what is self-evident must 
 be true, and to demand a reason for reason would 
 be absurd. Awaiting, however, the appropriate 
 
INDUCTION. 141 
 
 occasion for the full exposition of the truths of part i. 
 
 Sect % 
 
 Reason, it may be here observed that it is by Subsect/o. 
 means of the universal light of Reason that we 
 are enabled to raise up Axioms of Experience, 
 and to show that experience is built up on the 
 foundation of truths of Reason, which attest 
 their derivation by their self-evident nature. It 
 has been, indeed, already justly claimed for the 
 so-called Categories, or moulds of Experience, 
 that they are original, inherent and indispensable 
 furniture {KaraaK^vrj) or equipment of the human 
 mind by virtue of their being Forms of JReason. 
 And now, consistently with the character assigned 
 to them of being the " conditions " of Reasoning, 
 when Reason is applied to gather empirical 
 knowledge, and to raise it into the eternal 
 truth of divine Reason, we have to embody them 
 as Axioms expressed in universal propositions. 
 And, in oflPering them, it may be affirmed that 
 they are indispensable conditions, without which, 
 expressed, or understood, or unconsciously 
 acted upon. Experience would not be possible. 
 Thus :— 
 
 1. Whatever phenomena, in facts or events, 
 claim to be regarded as results of experience 
 must be generalized under one or other of the 
 categories or mental " conditions " of experience, 
 namely Subject and Attribute, Cause and Effect, 
 Whole and Parts. 
 
 2. Whatever phenomena are generalized under 
 the head of Subject and Attribute must be con- 
 
142 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part t. ceived as Appearances (^aLvofieva) belonging to 
 Subsect.D. permanent and abiding " Substance/' so named, 
 •wbich is considered as the Noumenon, and of 
 which the appearances are the sensible mani- 
 festations. 
 
 3. "WTiateyer phenomena are generalized, or 
 have to be generalized, under the head of Cause 
 and JSffecty must be conceived as invariably asso- 
 ciated in consequence of an unalterable condition 
 of Dependency. 
 
 4. Whatever phenomena are generalized or 
 have to be generalized under the head of TPTiole 
 and Parts must be conceived as interdependent 
 in relation to each other, and to constitute a 
 totality by virtue of some conception which gives 
 unity to all. 
 
 5. If we add to these the principal condition 
 of experience, or the form of reasoning (i. e. 
 syllogism) by which we conclude that the results 
 of experience may be assumed to be laws of 
 nature, namely: "whatever has been the result 
 of invariable experience, and may have been in- 
 fallibly predicted, must be assumed to be in 
 conformity with the immutable laws of the uni- 
 verse : " — ^with this, I say, we may be said to 
 have completed the list of the main Axioms, or 
 self-evident truths, of experience. And I repeat 
 that wherever phenomena are to be generalized 
 (and generalized they must be in order to ex- 
 perience) they must, and can only, be brought 
 into logical connexion under one, or other, or 
 
INDUCTION. 143 
 
 all, of these essential conditions, — conditions, ^J-^'^}- 
 namely, of Reason in that form of working Subsect.D, 
 which has been called the enlightened Under- 
 standing. 
 
 § 55. It would appear then, as the final result 
 of our investigation of the process of Induction, 
 that, as far as the work of the Understanding is 
 concerned, this process of collecting the mate- 
 rials of Experience, and of transmuting the 
 impressions on the senses and the notices of 
 changes in our inward state into the conscious 
 realities of human Thought, — this Induction 
 may be described as essentially " Generaliza- 
 tion^^^ that is, as the conversion of the materials 
 of experience into " Generic Conceptions " which 
 may be defined in universal propositions. In 
 such generalization we have, however, to distin- 
 guish from those, which are suggested only by 
 the ordinary occasions of life, those which have 
 a scientific aim and purpose, and require to be 
 subjected to the rigorous methods which science 
 implies and imposes. Of these methods we have 
 attempted a summary in the preceding pages. 
 There is, indeed, no art of Discovery^ no method 
 by the use of which scientific truths can be re- 
 vealed : but every person engaged in the pursuit 
 of science, whatever may be his qualifications 
 and advantages mental or circumstantial, cannot 
 with impunity transgress the appointed "con- 
 ditions, under which alone knowledge can be 
 won and truth achieved." We demand, and the 
 
144 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. rational mind cannot be satisfied with less, that 
 
 Sect. 2. 
 
 Siibsect.D. the facts, phenomena, and changes, which form 
 the sphere of onr sensible and psychical expe- 
 rience shall be rendered intelligible to, and ra- 
 tionally accounted for by, our mind. Compare 
 Vital Dynamics, p. 9.* 
 
 Now if we inquire what may be the ordinary 
 progress of scientific discovery, it will probably 
 be found that the attention of the inquirer has 
 been roused by some striking event, or perhaps 
 casual occurrence, the effect of which has been 
 aided by his pursuits, habits, and turn of mind. 
 Induced thereby to analyse the phenomena and 
 their change, he now proceeds, by abstracting 
 what he deems unessential, to insulate and scru- 
 tinize the leading fact and to generalize it, 
 i.e. bring it under some "generic conception" 
 which may explain, or account for, the change 
 in the phenomena which had prompted the inves- 
 tigation. Thus " the convulsions of a dead frog in 
 the neighbourhood of an electric discharge, which 
 originally drew Galvani's attention to the sub- 
 
 * 1 suspect, liowever, that in tlie foregoing account of Induction 
 I have unwittingly and too easily adopted the language and modes 
 of thought of the Empiricists, and have not sufficiently insisted upon the 
 truth that the rational insight of empirical knowledge depends upon 
 maintaining throughout the spiritual interpretation of the categories 
 or concipiencies ; — that no just view of " Subject and Attribute " can be 
 entertained without contemplating the *' noumenon " as substance in the 
 sense of supersensuous " Spirit," — nor of " Cause and Effect," without 
 regarding the true nature of the causative as Power rendered intelligible 
 by " Will " as the operant and originant agency, — nor of a " Whole and 
 its Parts," except by looking at the pervading Unity as antecedent 
 and indwelling Spirit, beyond the cognizance of the empirical faculties. 
 
INDUCTION. 145 
 
 ject," led to "the knowledge of a general fact, pakti. 
 that of the disturbance of electrical equilibrium Subsectb. 
 by the mere contact of different bodies." (See 
 Herschel, Nat, Ph., p. 336.) And the reader 
 may there learn how vast an amount of scien- 
 tific knowledge, and of our resources in explain- 
 ing changes in nature, may be derived from the 
 happy seizure of a leading or " general " fact. 
 
 It is true that in many, perhaps the majority 
 of, cases we must be content with far less insight 
 into the agencies of nature than that which has 
 accrued from Galvani's felicitous observation. 
 We have to be satisfied with being able only to 
 observe and record the invariable association of 
 facts under their respective heads of generaliza- 
 tion; and so, for the purposes of science, we adopt 
 what Dr. Whewell has called a " Colligation of 
 Eacts," and proceed to establish "Laws of Phe- 
 nomena," "Empirical Laws," or, as J. S. Mill 
 prefers to name them, " Uniformities of Nature." 
 But although instances so named, sorted and 
 classed, fail to give us the requisite insight into 
 the causative laws impressed on the universe 
 by the power and wisdom of the Creator, yet 
 these collections of instances (illustrating indeed 
 the use which Bacon assigned them, though 
 hardly justifying his proposal of accumulating 
 and tabulating such) ever remain as nutritive 
 materials ready to be taken up, digested, and 
 organized into the living body of science. 
 
 But, as I have said above, the immediate 
 
 VOL. I, Jj 
 
146 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. questioiij which the observer, in whose mind an 
 Siibse'ct-D. investigation has been started by some notice- 
 able change, cannot fail to propose to himself 
 when seeking to find the "generic conception," 
 under which he may best secure his acquisition, 
 is this : — " "What will best account for, or ex- 
 plain, the change, as the eflfect of some cause 
 which may be regarded as the universal agent 
 of such changes?" This mental operation of 
 referring a phenomenal change (as eflPect) to 
 some supposed cause, is so unavoidable in the 
 constitution of the human mind, that, as even 
 the history of science will inform us, extravagant 
 explanations have been more acceptable than 
 none. Our observer then at once probably forms 
 a notion, more or less satisfactory to his own 
 mind, of the case before him, and at all events 
 hazards a conception (i.e. generic conception) of 
 the class to which he shall refer the phenomenal 
 change which is the subject of his inquiry. Now 
 I repeat that the process is inevitable ; and if 
 the conception entertained be considered as a 
 preconception afterwards to be verified, the ia- 
 terests of truth are not likely to suffer. The 
 mind of man is so constituted that, whether its 
 conjecture be well or ill founded, it will, to the 
 best of its powers, assign the cause or causes 
 which may be supposed to explain, or account 
 for, any remarkable change as its effect. The 
 first attempt may be only a rude guess, as if it 
 were said that hybernation is the cause of the 
 
INDUCTION. 147 
 
 disappearance of swallows at the end of the pakti. 
 summer; but when conjecture has been enlarged Subse'ct/o. 
 and corrected by more searching inquiry (though 
 this nevertheless has failed in detecting any 
 satisfactory cause or condition which may ac- 
 count for a phenomenal change in question) and 
 especially where the observer is forearmed with 
 scientific knowledge, the conjecture will be then 
 converted into what is meant by an Hypothesis 
 of the causative relation. The Sypothesis pro- 
 fessedly does not amount to a certainty of the 
 conditions assumed, but has such probability as 
 a solution of the problem in question, that there 
 are sufficient grounds for attempting its " Veri- 
 fication " by scientific investigation, or for retain- 
 ing it until the further advancement of know- 
 ledge shall have enlarged the means of testing 
 its truth. In any such case it would take the 
 place of Bacon's ^^ prudens qucestio " of a deter- 
 minate problem, for the solution of which the 
 course of nature is referred to as the only ade- 
 quate test and guarantee : but in order to put 
 the question to nature, and in order to appre- 
 ciate the answer, it is necessary to know pre- 
 cisely what we mean to ask, and therefore that 
 the preconception, or hypothetical solution, 
 should have been strictly defined. It may be 
 quite true, as has been urged, that, in order to 
 exclude that logical legerdemain, against which 
 the Baconian induction is the legitimate and 
 acknowledged protest, scientific Definition should 
 
 L 2 
 
14iS SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. be the result, and not the preliminary, of cases 
 Subsect.D. tried in the courts of nature's laws. But it is, 
 nevertheless, indispensable for the purpose of 
 obtaining an intelligible verdict, that we should 
 have brought the indictment into court, and 
 should examine the witness under specific issues ; 
 and that, in conformity with this object, we 
 should have clearly stated and have accurately 
 " defined" the question, which is to be tried and 
 definitively adjudicated. Hence then it is neces- 
 sary to put the hypothetical case in the form of 
 an universal proposition; recollecting at the 
 same time that this proposition defines the con- 
 ception of what we anticipate the thing itself 
 may be, not the thing, or result, which is to be 
 the truth recorded as the final acquisition of our 
 experience. 
 
 In framing such Hypothesis, it is scarcely 
 less than essential to limit the selection to a 
 relation of Cause and Effect which is consonant 
 with our experience of the operations of nature. 
 ^' To such causes," says Herschel (Op. cit. p. 144) 
 *' Newton has applied the term verm causce ; that 
 is, causes recognised as having a real existence in 
 nature, and not being mere hypotheses or figments 
 of the mind. To exemplify the distinction : — The 
 phenomenon of shells found in rocks, at a great 
 height above the sea has been attributed to 
 several causes. By some it has been ascribed to 
 a plastic virtue in the soil ; by some to fermen- 
 tation ; bv some to the influence of the celestial 
 
INDUCTION. 149 
 
 bodies ; by some to the casual passage of pil- pakt i. 
 grims with their scallops ; by some to birds Subsect.b. 
 feeding on shell-flsh; and by all modern geolo- 
 gists, with one consent, to the life and death of 
 real moUusca at the bottom of the sea, and a 
 subsequent alteration of the relative level of the 
 land and sea." Then, after dismissing all but 
 the last, he proceeds : — " On the other hand, for 
 a shell-fish dying at the bottom of the sea to 
 leave his shell in the mud, where it becomes 
 silted over and imbedded, happens daily ; and the 
 elevation of the bottom of the sea to become dry 
 land has really been witnessed so often, and on 
 such a scale, as to qualify it for a vera causa 
 available in sound philosophy." (See other ex- 
 amples, ibid.) 
 
 Herschel, in speaking of the advantages of 
 Hypothesis, says, p. 196 : — " Hypotheses, with 
 respect to theories, are what presumed proximate 
 causes are with respect to particular inductions : 
 they afford us motives for searching into analogies; 
 grounds of citation to bring before us all the 
 cases which seem to bear upon them, for ex- 
 amination." I do not feel sure, in assenting to 
 the encouragement which Herschel bestows on 
 the use of hypotheses, that I understand whether 
 he intends a distinction between hypothesis and 
 theory, and if he does in what he makes the 
 distinction to consist. (See his Chap, vii., and 
 especially pp. 194 — 196.) It is quite foreign to 
 my purposes and wishes, if indeed any criticism 
 
150 . SPIUITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. be called for, to introduce any controversial 
 Subsect/D. matter in this essay : — but not to leave the 
 reader in doubt with regard to my opinions 
 on the subject, I have to propose the fol- 
 lowing distinction : — Hypothesis is, as I have 
 said, a preconception presumed to account for 
 a particular change or event in the course of 
 nature; it ought to have a better assurance 
 of truth in consequence of being founded on 
 scientific experience than a mere conjecture; but 
 it is only prospective, anticipative, and substi- 
 tutive tm tested and verified. On the other 
 hand, Theory is a generalization, or generic 
 conception, of all previous subordinate general- 
 izations of the same or a similar kind, and known 
 as particular empirical laws or proximate causes ; 
 so that, regarded from the higher generalization 
 as particular cases of some more or less universal 
 law, they may be deduced from this theoretically 
 established law. (Compare this description with 
 that of Herschel, 1. c. p. 190.) Thus the vibration 
 of a musical string may be regarded as the 
 proximate cause of the sound it yields, and the 
 conception of vibratory motion may be extended 
 to all sounding bodies, and so the propagation of 
 sound through the medium of the air gives rise to 
 various laws of subordinate generality : but, not- 
 withstanding the labours of Newton, the Theory 
 of the propagation of Sound, and of vibratory and 
 undulatory motions in general, is still so incom- 
 plete that ^' phenomena are constantly presenting 
 
INDUCTION. 161 
 
 themselves^ which show how far we are from pakti. 
 heing able to deduce all the particulars, even in subse"ct.i). 
 cases comparatively simple, by any direct reason- 
 ing from first principles." Herschel, p. 247. 
 
 Hypothesis may be, and probably often is, 
 the precursor of a theory. But when a sufB.cient 
 theory has been inductively established, the 
 hypothetical scaffolding may be removed, and 
 the hypothesis, which had served its preparatory 
 office, may be altogether dismissed, or ceases by 
 being merged in the theory which it had contri- 
 buted to establish. 
 
 On the other hand. Theory ought to be dis- 
 tinguished from "Law," when the latter term is 
 used in its true and only appropriate sense, 
 namely, as the immutable statute of the Creator. 
 A ^perfect theory — ^though we have seen in the 
 example cited above how difB.cult is its attain- 
 ment, might be regarded as a Law contemplated 
 subjectively^ that is, as a product of the human 
 mind and satisfying the conditions of human 
 intelligence. Eor which we might adduce as the 
 instance, the theory of Gravitation.* But the 
 too generally imperfect nature of theories, arising 
 from their human origin, is attested by the fact 
 that not unfrequently two or more theories may 
 be maintained. "Nothing is more common in 
 
 * Theory is indeed the product of the human mind, judging hy 
 experience ; and though it may be potentiated, or raised into a Law, 
 as in the case just cited of Universal Gravitation, it cannot he truly 
 called "Law,*' until it is found to be coincident with natura rerum 
 as the impress of the Author and Legislator of the order of nature. 
 
152 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Pakti. physics," says Herschel (Op. cit. p. 195) "than 
 Sabseet.D. to find two, or eveii many theories maintained as 
 to the origin of a natural phenomenon. Per 
 instance in the case of heat itself, one considers 
 it as a really existing material fluid, of such 
 exceeding subtlety as to penetrate all bodies, 
 and even to be capable of combining with them 
 chemically ; while another regards it as nothing 
 but a rapid vibratory or rotatory motion in the 
 ultimate particles of the bodies heated, and pro- 
 duces a singularly ingenious train of mechanical 
 reasoning to show that there is nothing contra- 
 dictory to sound dynamical principles in such a 
 doctrine. Thus again with light : one considers 
 it as consisting in actual particles darted forth 
 from luminous bodies, and acted upon in their 
 progress by forces of extreme intensity residing 
 in the substances on which they strike ; ano- 
 ther in the vibratory motion of the particles of 
 luminous bodies, communicated to a peculiar 
 subtle and highly elastic and ethereal medium, 
 filKng all space, and conveyed through it into 
 our eyes, as sounds are to oux ears, by the 
 undulations of the air." I would venture to 
 observe that these doctrines have more the 
 character of "hypothesis" than of "theory;" 
 though with some exceptions either may serve 
 for a solution of the phenomenal problems con- 
 cerned, or, perhaps I might say, for preserving 
 uniformity of language in their description with- 
 out supplying the causal connexions which may 
 
INDUCTIOK. 153 
 
 be said to account for the facts. It is perhaps part i. 
 
 . ^ ^ Sect 2. 
 
 more probable that the agencies of hght and Subsect.D. 
 the other imponderabilia await, for the explana- 
 tion of their nature, a sounder philosophy than 
 that of the physicists of the material school. 
 The view that light consists of " physical atoms " 
 has all the difficulties which inhere in the as- 
 sumption of such atoms. (Oomp. Vital Dynamics, 
 preface.) And considered as mere vibratory 
 motions or undulations, though they might be 
 supposed to excite the sense of vision, they fail 
 to explain the chemical properties of light, and 
 present light under the conditions which might 
 equally belong to darkness. The difficulties, 
 connected with the so-called imponderable agents 
 of nature, have been felt, though not surmounted, 
 in finding a material substratum for Gravitation. 
 And it may be asked, whether the solution of 
 the quwstio vewata does not lie in the following 
 postulate or unavoidable assumption, — that " ma- 
 terial" can mean only that which is subject to 
 the laws of space and time, while the only sub- 
 stratwm (or noumenon) in nature is what we 
 may call "Substance," thatj namely, of which 
 we derive the intelligibility from the primary 
 and fundamental fact of our conscious spiritual 
 being — the Will ? * 
 
 * Induction has three main objects, viz. : — 
 
 1. To find the right attribute for a subject-, 
 
 2. To find the right catcse for an effect. 
 
 3. To find the right principle of tlie interdependence of the parts of 
 a whole, in which each part is distinguished from, or logically excludes, 
 
 the 
 
154 SPIKITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. To proceed : — It has been universally ad- 
 SubsectD. naitted that to frame those general and com- 
 prehensive views, which we name hypothesis 
 
 the others, while all are included in the principle of interdependence, 
 vrhich constitutes their totality. But we have here to detennine the 
 meaning of the term " right/' and it is clear that, if the above use of it 
 is to be of any avail in the inductive process, it ought to be equivalent 
 to self-evidently trim. In order to satisfy this condition we have to 
 find "Axioms" which may serve as major premisses for the three 
 objects above specified, and may direct us to valid inferences, or 
 legitimate conclusions, in each of the cases supplied by Categories 
 of Experience. I propose then the following Etji^es, oe Axioms, op 
 Inducxion. 
 
 1. To find the fight attribute of a subject. 
 
 "Whatever predicate may be substituted for the subject of the 
 same proposition, according to the established rule of defi- 
 nition, in accordance with the conditions of objective reality, 
 (i. e. not depending upon any subjective and particular modes 
 of apprehension of the observer) — may be inferred to be a 
 right attribute.'' 
 Thus if it were asked, what is the right or essential property of 
 a circle? the question is readily answered by stating the usual defi- 
 nition : " A circle is a continuous curved Hue, of which aU the pomts 
 are equidistant from a point caEed the centre." But if it be further 
 inquired, what authorizes the definition and the reasoning which leads 
 to it ? then the foregoing rule may be adduced : — namely " a continuous 
 curved hue of which aU the points are equidistant from a centre" may 
 be substituted for " a circle," in accordance with the conditions of 
 objective truth ; therefore " a continuous curved line of which all the 
 points are equidistant from a centre " may be inferred to be " the right- 
 attribute." Again it is proposed that " Man is rightly defined as a 
 rational, sensuous, and emotional being." We call in the aid of oiir 
 rule as the major premiss, and we adduce as the minor " the properties 
 rational, sensuous and emotional may be substituted for, or are equivalent 
 to the subject Man ; therefore " they are the right attributes." 
 
 2. To find the right cause of an effect. 
 
 " Whatever, and what only, explains the unconditional dependency 
 
 of any change in a succession of phenomenal facts, is or may 
 
 be inferred to be a right cause." 
 
 Under this rule or major premiss, the minor premiss might be, for 
 
 instance, this : — " The attractive force of the moon, when exerted in the 
 
 same line as that of the sun, explains the unconditional dependency of 
 
INDUCTION. 155 
 
 or theory, physicists have with great advantage part i. 
 had recourse to the Analogies which may fre- Subsect.b. 
 quently be detected in the agencies of nature, 
 and which may be regarded as useful aids or 
 suggestions in following out to its completion 
 a process of Induction. Now "^^ Analogy ^^ is 
 said to exist whenever between things otherwise 
 different there is any circumstance in which 
 they agree or resemble each other ; thus 
 learning is said to enlighten the mind, because 
 it is to the mind what light is to the eye, 
 enabling it to discover things before hidden. 
 And thus we use terms or words analogically, 
 
 the highest tides as the effect of their combined forces of attraction :" 
 That the combined attraction of the moon and sun does explain the 
 high tides, requires indeed a deduction from the universal law of gravi- 
 tation, which may be exhibited in a subsidiary syllogism ; and it might 
 be said that this epichirema would be the proof of the causal relation. 
 Butj though it might or would estabhsh the particular instance, this 
 " combined attraction'' would not have been shown to be a case of the 
 legitimate attribution of cause imder the universal rule a priori for 
 determining a right cause ; and we supply what is wanting in the proof 
 by the conclusion from the premisses above stated: — Therefore "the 
 attractive force of the moon, when exerted in the same line as that of 
 the sun, in explaining the highest tides, is or may be inferred to be the 
 right cause of those tides." 
 
 3. To find the right principle of the interdependence of the parts of a 
 whole. 
 
 " Whatever, in any assemblage of phenomenal facts of the same 
 kind, determines what is common to all and distinctive in each 
 as a collective whole of parts, assigns to it a right principle 
 of interdependence as constitutive of Totality." 
 It will easily be seen that this rale is founded on the fundamental 
 distinction of Genus and Species, and that its use is systematic classifi- 
 cation under the logical conditions which have been already in the 
 mam explained and do not require here farther exposition. (Compare 
 Thomson, Laws of Thought, p. 132, p. 100.) 
 
156 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. namely, such as signify no resemblance in the 
 Subsect.D. things thcmsclves, but some resemblance which 
 we apprehend in the Relations under which we 
 conceive them : — the foot of an animal is the 
 lowest part, or that upon which it rests, and so 
 is the "foot" of a mountain with relation to 
 the mass, which rests upon the lowest part. 
 But here we have to deal with Reasoning or 
 Inference by Analogy in aid of Induction. And 
 it will be found that a very striking affinity, 
 or perhaps something more, exists between it 
 and the principle of reasoning by which 
 we form "generic conceptions," — as regards, 
 namely, the including in one genus or class all 
 things, however different, that agree in any one 
 attribute or property. And in this we find the 
 principle of reasoning or of drawing an inference 
 by analogy, of which the logical rule may be 
 thus stated : — 
 
 " AU resemblances between any two or more 
 objects, or associations of phenomena or facts, 
 otherwise different, that may be brought under 
 one kind or generic conception, in respect of 
 some material circumstance, warrant the in- 
 ference that the resemblance, or resemblances, 
 depend upon like conditions in both." 
 
 Thus in respect of the relation of Subject and 
 Attributes, or of a Thing and its Properties, 
 if we found an animal with horns we might 
 reasonably infer by analogy that it was a rumi- 
 nant ; because the resemblance may be brought 
 
INDUCTION, 157 
 
 under a generic conception, whicli involves like paut i. 
 
 .... •*■ Sect. 2. 
 
 conditions, namely, " all horned animals are Suhsect.D. 
 ruminants." And in all cases we may say tliat 
 whatever property, or properties are like in 
 different subjects, under varying circumstances, 
 they indicate so far a similar nature of the 
 subjects; — and it may be added, the greater 
 the number of like properties, the greater is 
 the probability of the subjects being like to 
 which they belong. It must be allbwed indeed 
 that analogy, as such, can never supply more 
 than a certain amount of probability ; — to obtain 
 the requisite inductive certainty or assurance 
 must be the result of appropriate tests of the 
 question at issue, and hence it is of the utmost 
 importance in the cause of truth not to push 
 the arguments of analogy beyond their just 
 limits, especially where more satisfactory evi- 
 dence can be obtained. Another interesting 
 illustration under the above head is furnished 
 by Newton's celebrated anticipation that the 
 diamond is combustible, grounded upon the 
 fact of the very high refracting power of the 
 diamond comparatively to its density ; a pecu- 
 liarity which had been observed to exist in com- 
 bustible substances. And on similar grounds 
 he conjectured that water, though not com- 
 bustible, contained a combustible ingredient. 
 This is perhaps one of the happiest instances on 
 record of reasoning by analogy ; and I can in 
 no wise understand how J. S. Mill can call it 
 
158 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. « a guess," when in the same sentence he asks 
 Subject. b. whether the '' guess ^^ was in truth a farsighted 
 *""" " anticvpation of a Law " afterwards to be dis- 
 covered. (Logic, vol. ii. p, 99, footnote.) 
 
 So again reasoning by analogy is often of 
 singular service as a pioneer in detecting the 
 relation of Cause and Effect, such as we have 
 described it in its empirical significancy. I have 
 great pleasure in quoting here a passage from 
 Herschel's Nat. Ph., p. 149, — the greater, that 
 it coincides with views which are strongly 
 opposed to the crass empiricism of able, though 
 misguided partizans. He says : — " Here then 
 we see the great importance of possessing a' 
 stock of analogous instances or phenomena 
 which class themselves with that imder con- 
 sideration, the explanation of one among which 
 may naturally be expected to lead to that of all 
 the rest. If the analogy of two phenomena 
 be very close and striking, while at the same 
 time the cause of one is very obvious, it Tsecomes 
 scarcely possible to refuse to admit the action 
 of an analogous cause in the other, though not 
 so obvious in itself, Eor instance, when we see 
 a stone whirled round in a sling, describing 
 a circular orbit round the hand, keeping the 
 string stretched, and flying away the moment 
 it breaks, we never hesitate to regard it as 
 retained in its orbit by the tension of the string, 
 that is, by a force directed to the centre ; for we 
 feel that we do really exert such a force. We 
 
INDUCTION. 159 
 
 have here the direct perception of the cause, pabti. 
 When therefore, we see a great body like the snbsect.b. 
 moon circulating round the earth and not flying 
 off, we cannot help believing it to be prevented 
 from so doing, not indeed by a material tie, but 
 by that which operates in the other case through 
 the intermedium of the string,— a fokce directed 
 constantly to the centre." In connexion with 
 this, see also the passage (Op. cit. p. 193) where 
 he says that "the agents" (i.e. causes) "em- 
 ployed by nature to act on material structures 
 are invisible, and only to be traced by the effects 
 they produce." The student's attention is also 
 especially directed to Herschel's " observations 
 on the framing of theories," especially (at 
 p. 197) paragraph 209 and the following ones ; 
 though their length forbids quotation. 
 
 § 56. I will take leave of my reader by a 
 quotation from Vital Dynamics, p. 13 ; — " Again, 
 does the history of the grand discoveries of 
 science offer any sufficient evidence that they 
 were only the result of a laborious collection 
 of facts and observations of particulars? If 
 indeed that great master-piece of the generalizing 
 faculty, the Ptolemaic System of Astronomy, still 
 retained its authority, it might be held up as a 
 triumphant proof of the success of the method ; 
 but, alas ! * its cycles and epicycles, orb within 
 orb,' have vanished like a summer morning's 
 mist before the piercing glance of him, who, 
 penetrating deeper than appearances, solem 
 
160 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. dicerc falswm ausus est, — have vanislied before a 
 subsect.b. reason, which can correct experience, and has 
 authority to annul the reports of the senses, and 
 the dicta of the faculty of judging according to 
 sense. ' What could he apparently more unpro- 
 fitable than the dry speculations of the ancient 
 geometers on the properties of the conic sections, 
 or than the dreams of Kepler, (as they would 
 naturally appear to his contemporaries) about 
 the numerical harmonies of the universe ? ' 
 Yet (says Sir John Herschel, from whom I 
 quote) ^ these are the steps by which we have 
 risen to a knowledge of the elliptic motions of 
 the planets and the law of gravitation, with all 
 its splendid theoretical consequences and its in- 
 estimable practical results.' The same high 
 authority tells us that Hhe law of definite pro- 
 portions (in chemistry), after the laws of me- 
 chanics, perhaps the most important which the 
 study of nature has disclosed, was announced at 
 once by Mr. Dalton in its most general terms, 
 without passing through subordinate stages of 
 painful inductive ascent.' 
 
 "A dispassionate inquiry into the orgin of the 
 discoveries of science will convince us that, so 
 far from being in general the offspring of a 
 generalization from particulars, they oftener 
 originate in observations apparently trivial and 
 accidental, in occurrences sudden and unex- 
 pected, frequently in the pursuit of fanciful 
 analogies, or in the trial and rejection of arbi- 
 
INDUCTION. 161 
 
 trary hypotheses, and are the result of a mind pakt i. 
 excited to react upon its experience, unsatisfied Sutseot.D 
 with the hitherto adopted connexion of facts 
 and their want of unity, and having its inventive 
 and originative powers thereby roused to enlarge 
 its apprehension beyond the perspective which 
 its own mechanism implies : and hence the dis- 
 covery of any great law of nature has uniformly 
 the character of felicity, and of a revelation, as 
 by a flash of divine light, of the legislative 
 wisdom of the Creator." 
 
 And without repeating all that I have there 
 written of the nature of divine laws in contra- 
 distinction to the results of inductive generaliza- 
 tion, let me here only bring again before the 
 reader this part of its philosophical doctrine : — 
 " Man recognises in himself, as the privilege and 
 need of a rational mind, the capability of en- 
 larging his thoughts to the universe, infinite as 
 the omnipresence of God, ^ upholding all things 
 by the word of his power ; ' the capability of 
 raising his mind to the Supreme, as the Abso- 
 lute "Will causative of all reality in the eternal 
 plenitude of being. And it is in meditating 
 on the conditions and cause of this capability, 
 that man becomes conscious of an operance in 
 and on his own mind, of the downshine of a 
 light from above, which is the power of Living 
 Truth, and which, in irradiating and actuating 
 the human mind, becomes for it (reveals itself as) 
 
 VOL. I. M 
 
162 SPIKITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part I. Reason ; — ^yea ! which is the revelation of those 
 
 Sect 2. "^ - 1 . 
 
 Subsect.D. divine acts, at once causative and mtelligential, 
 which man recognises as first principles or ulti- 
 mate truths. Ideas for the human mind, and 
 constitutive Laws in nature." 
 
PART SECOND. 
 
 OF FIEST PEINCIPLES IN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 M 2 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY AND RECAPITULATORY. 
 
 § 1. In the former Part of this work the part ii. 
 
 inteUectual Porms of knowledge were exhibited '—^ 
 
 and discriminated, as fully as the plan of a 
 "brief exposition" permitted. And whilst the 
 fundamental distinction of E-eason and Un- 
 derstanding was insisted upon, the Speculative 
 Reason was upheld as the proper organ of Phi- 
 losophy. But we have now to show, and to aid 
 the student in apprehending, that the work of 
 philosophy is somewhat other and deeper than 
 the attainment of speculative knowledge; and 
 that the aim and business of the philosopher, 
 who is in earnest in the pursuit of truth, is to 
 construct a sound system of Realism, of which 
 the principle is not only light but life. 
 
 § 2. It may be expected that every man, who 
 as a rational being is interested in the proposed 
 inquiry, will ask, "What is ^the end and aim 
 of Philosophy ? " And perhaps the most appro- 
 priate answer, among many that might be offered, 
 is, that its object is to discover First Pri/nciples, 
 
166 SPmiTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part il or in other words Ideas, or primary Trtitlis of 
 
 Chap. /. _ 3 r e7 
 
 — Reason. 
 
 In any and every department of human know- 
 ledge we cannot be said to have a philosophical 
 insight of the subject in question, until we have 
 attained to the Principle from which all the 
 facts may be deduced as dependent truths. We 
 may have arrived at an orderly arrangement 
 of correct generalizations derived from accu- 
 rately observed facts ; but philosophical insight 
 is first reached, when the Law, Principle or 
 primary Cause, has been satisfactorily esta- 
 blished, so that we can anticipate and predict 
 what will and must happen in all similar 
 cases. '^ Intellectual unity is indeed supplied 
 by Science; but science can be predicated only 
 of any scheme of knowledge, connected as a 
 chain of necessarily dependent truths, so that 
 any link of the chain being given, any other 
 may be deduced as a necessary consequence of 
 the principle, which determines the relations 
 of all, and which gives to its possessor the 
 power of anticipating and predicting its results 
 in any given cases. And if the essential cha- 
 racter of science consists in the necessary con- 
 nexion and dependency of the links in any 
 scheme of knowledge, it will be equally evident 
 that, in order to complete and perfect it as truth, 
 the principle which serves as the staple to the 
 chain must itself be established and vindicated. 
 This, however, is the business of Philosophy ; 
 
INTRODtTCTORT AND KECAPITTJLATORT. 167 
 
 the object of which is to investigate and deter- Part ii. 
 mine first principles, and to bring them into — ^'^' 
 the unity of the rational mind and of truth 
 one and universal. Principles are the postulates 
 of Science and the problems of philosophy." 
 (Vital Dynamics, p. 8, note.) 
 
 § 3. Thus, then, as before said. Philosophy in 
 its eminent sense and highest significancy is the 
 discovery and establishment of First Principles 
 or Ideas, — Truths, which, deriving their cha- 
 racter from the Reason, vindicate their claim to 
 this primary rank by their intuitive self-evidence, 
 certainty, necessity, and absolute and eternal im- 
 mutability. Nor can such truths be estimated at 
 less, if the Speculative Reason is, as we maintain 
 it to be, that power and condition of Unity, 
 by which we contemplate in the infinite mani- 
 fold of the Universe, physical and moral, the 
 One in All and All in One. This statement is 
 not made in the expectation that suflS.cing 
 grounds have been yet laid for its acceptance : 
 but on one of the characters of such truths, 
 namely " self-evidence," it may be desirable to 
 say that it is not meant that they are at once, 
 and at a first and superficial glance, intuitively 
 apprehended as self-evident, but that they are 
 ultimate truths, which may be traced to, and 
 derived from, Reason as their source, and which 
 have no higher proof nor evidence. They 
 may be demonstrated, but they are not to be 
 inferred, or logically proved ; and as the mind is 
 
168 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 PAP.T 11. compelled to give its assent in recognising them^ 
 
 '-^ when apprehended, hy a direct beholding of 
 
 truth, the propositions, in which they are stated^ 
 may be said to express " immediate judgements.'' 
 There will be abundant opportunity in the fol- 
 lowing pages to illustrate and establish the 
 position advanced, especially in exhibiting Prin- 
 ciples, which are Truths of Reason ; but we may 
 here, by way of example, remind the reader 
 of the mathematical axiom that, " A whole 
 must be greater than a part." It may be also 
 observed that Reason arms us with a test of 
 such truths ; for it will be found that when- 
 ever we affirm the contrary of the proposition, 
 in and by which they are stated, we contra- 
 dict ourselves. The principle, here appealed 
 to, is what has been called the " Principitmi 
 identitatis et contradictionis ; " for instance, 
 " What is all black cannot be all white." Comp. 
 Mansel. 
 
 § 4. Having, at the commencement of the 
 first part of this work, enunciated the proposi- 
 tion that " the aim and object of all philosophy 
 is to attain to the insight of First Principles or 
 Ideas — yea, to the insight of the Absolute First 
 Principle, from which whatever is must be de- 
 rived, and in which whatever is must have the 
 intelligible ground of its Being;" (Parti. § 1) — 
 and having also referred this work to the Specu- 
 lative Reason; — I feel it scarcely less than a 
 duty to my reader, before proceeding, to offer 
 
INTKODUCTORT AND RECAPITTJIiATORY. 169 
 
 to him some further explanations, that may aid Part ii. 
 
 his progress in reaching that highest vantage '—^ 
 
 ground of speculative philosophy, from which 
 he may be enabled to look back and comprehend 
 in one view all the steps of toilsome ascent 
 leading to the glorious pinnacle of ideal Truth, 
 Now if the Reason be contemplated merely as 
 "speculative," that is, merely in its intelli- 
 gential functions, and as the organ of philo- 
 sophy, inclusively of science, then it is the 
 light, but the light only, by which man ap- 
 prehends and comprehends divine and eternal 
 truths. But if, as the cause of truth urges us 
 to do, we are to regard the Reason not only 
 as Light, but as Life, not only as speculative 
 intelligence, but as a living and inexhaustible 
 source of reality, we must search for some 
 deeper and more vital principle than intelligence 
 — for some principle which shall at once enliven 
 and enlighten. 
 
 What this living principle is, which, whilst 
 it is itself enlightened, actuates and enlivens 
 the intelligence that directs and guides it, will 
 be made manifest by the investigation of the 
 facts of our own consciousness, as that ultimate 
 principle of our being which we call JVilL 
 But we have here to consider this principle, in 
 connexion with the attainment of Pirst Prin- 
 ciples, with the attainment of insight of the 
 Absolute Pirst Principle, regarded as the source 
 of all Principles and the fountain-head of Ideas 5 
 
170 SPIMTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pahtii. — we have here to consider this principle of 
 
 ^— living Light, or Reason, not as it exists in each 
 
 man, hut as necessarily to be accounted for as 
 existing universally in all men, and without 
 which universal presence it could not be the 
 one universal principle and power of Truth 
 which we require as the postulate of spiritual 
 philosophy. We shall, in short, have to vindi- 
 cate as philosophical, the doctrine which is 
 revealed by St. John: — "for, in truth, it is a 
 statement of the Christian doctrine, that the 
 Word, the Logos^ by whom all things were 
 made, is essential light and life to his creatures ; 
 
 — iravra ho avrov eyeveTo, kul xcopts avrov eyevero 
 ovo€ ev o yeyovev, shv avro) ^my 7)Vj /cat t) ^(ot) ijv t 
 
 ^ws TcSv dvOpwirwv,^^ (John, ch. i. v. 3, 4.) 
 
 This sublime truth may be, cannot but be, 
 and can only with adequate insight be, con- 
 templated by man with the aid of the specu- 
 lative Reason — the downshine of the true light, 
 the ^fSos TO a\7}6cvop, the light "which lighteth 
 every man that cometh into the world . ' ' 
 (Ibid. V. 9.) It is the business and duty of 
 speculative philosophy to raise itself to the 
 apprehension of this great truth, as the principle 
 and well-head of all truths, and as that which 
 gives the impress of unity to all mental con- 
 templamina. But that which confers on them 
 life and reality is the operance of the Divine 
 Word; and this will be duly acknowledged, 
 and then only, when we recognise philosophical 
 
INTRODUCTORY AND RECAPITULATORY. 171 
 
 truth as the work of the divine Reason in part it. 
 
 and on the Soul. And, although we do not —- 
 
 wish to anticipate what may be better left 
 to its orderly development, we may add that 
 the recognition will mainly depend on the 
 moral and spiritual condition of the intelligent 
 Will. 
 
 As will be shown hereafter, God exists for us 
 in as much, and in as far, as we are consciously 
 impressed by His living presence, and willingly 
 submit ourselves to His gracious aid and ope- 
 rance ; — and the test and measure of the divine 
 work is to be found in the growth and develop- 
 ment of an enlightened Conscience^ that is, 
 the individual Will, enlightened and enlivened 
 by the divine Reason, or by Him who is both 
 Light and Life to His creatures. 
 
 § 5. Whether in the progress of the argument 
 I shall be able to convince my Reader of the 
 soundness of my doctrine will much depend 
 upon his spiritual tendencies ; but I venture to 
 affirm, in the fullest faith derived from patient 
 meditation and investigation, that it is only in 
 and by such a Principle or Idea that a Method 
 or System of Realism in Philosophy can be 
 established and secured ; — a method, namely, by 
 which our thoughts of things in the physical 
 and moral universe become identified with those 
 realities whereof they are only the reflections 
 and representatives; and by which they may 
 be traced to an ultimate ground which is at 
 
172 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. once Supreme Intelligence and Absolute Power 
 '-^ causative of all reality. 
 
 In support and illustration of this view, differ- 
 ing as it does from the generally accredited 
 tenets of philosophical thought, I may here 
 quote a passage (pp. 57 et seq.) from the ap- 
 pendix to my second Hunterian Oration, entitled 
 "Mental Dynamics.' ' 
 
 "If it were asked what are the grand difficul- 
 ties, which have opposed themselves to the 
 establishment of a sound philosophy, and to 
 the building up of a speculative system upon 
 the basis of Realism, — difficulties, implying doc- 
 trines so incompatible with the natural expecta- 
 tion, that philosophy is, or ought to be, the 
 complement of common sense, as to deter men 
 in general from the pursuit and to regard the 
 study as a mere waste of time, — I think it 
 would not be difficult to enumerate the main 
 errors, which have deflected philosophy from the 
 right course, and to point out the remedies for 
 the aberrations of speculative philosophers. 
 
 " One of the greatest difficulties, in the way 
 of a true philosophy and of a well-grounded 
 system of Healism, is and has been the position, 
 maintained by Hume and Kant, that we have 
 no proper Self-consciousness or Knowledge of a 
 Self, and that what we call Self-consciousness 
 is the cognizance only of the mental presenta- 
 tions of that which we may infer indeed to be 
 a one mind, but of which we have no knowledge 
 
INTEODUCTOUY AND RECAPITTJLATORT. 173 
 
 beyond its manifestations in the consciousness — part ii. 
 
 its appearances or plisenomena. In other words '-^ 
 
 that consciousness is a looking-glass in which we 
 may see ourselves reflected, but only as the 
 images which the looking-glass presents ; or 
 that the conscious mind consists merely of a 
 multiform flux of thoughts, of the supporter, 
 substance, and inherent connection of which, we 
 are utterly ignorant. Thus all reality of a mind 
 or self, a substance or spirit, is at once destroyed, 
 and the soi-disant philosopher is left to deal only 
 with thoughts, with a representative shadow or 
 image of the thinker himself, or of a mind 
 which according to this view is beyond the limits 
 of knowledge. To this difficulty I have en- 
 deavoured to supply a solution, which (whatever 
 its success) may have at least the value of call- 
 ing the attention of the student of philosophy 
 to a problem worthy of the attention of all 
 lovers of truth. 
 
 " A second and no less pernicious error is the 
 view of the nature of Perception, which seems 
 to beset all attempts to overbridge the apparent 
 chasm between the mind of the percipient and 
 outward things or objects, and which has pressed 
 sorely on philosophy from the so-called Idealists 
 to the present time ; — the view, namely, that we 
 do not perceive external objects, but that we 
 are only cognizant of certain affections of our 
 own being, sentient and conscious, of the causes 
 of which we are ignorant; that what we call 
 
174 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part ii. things and outward realities are really and truly 
 
 '—^ only modifications of the percipient subject. 
 
 And thus, as in the former instance the self 
 was removed, so here the outward world vanishes 
 into shadows, and in both cases the reality 
 eludes our grasp. 
 
 " A third important defect, common to all 
 schemes of philosophy, is the utter want of any 
 living, organic principle, any source of reality 
 causative of being. We are continually referred 
 solely to the Intellect, and the method of philo- 
 sophy dwindles into Logic and logical processes. 
 Now the mere intellect, essential though it be 
 in constituting Porms and Relations, contains 
 in itself no life nor causativeness. This defect 
 has been supplied, and perhaps only it may be 
 said, by Coleridge in the fundamental principle 
 of his philosophy, "Will as deeper than, and 
 inclusive of, Intellect. 
 
 " But the fourth grievous impediment to philo- 
 sophy is the want of an adequate notion, and 
 in too many instances the utter ignorance, of 
 Reason, as contradistinguished in kind from 
 the Understanding and merely logical faculties, 
 as the peculiar gift to man constituting his 
 rationality, as the Light or influx common to 
 all men, manifesting itseK in Ideas, or those 
 principles in which the proper humanity essen- 
 tially consists. Reason is the potentiating force, 
 of which the spiritual or real man is the result. 
 It is the idealizing power ; — the power, instinct, 
 
intjroductort and recapitulatout. 175 
 
 and inherent tendency of man to contemplate all part ii. 
 his thoughts, feelings and strivings, in their — ^^' 
 perfection, integrity, unity, universality, totality, 
 absoluteness. It is the immediate revelation to 
 him of the spiritual image in which he was 
 created, and towards which he cannot but ac- 
 knowledge himself bound to strive: — it reveals 
 to him law, moral and physical, and with their 
 absolute necessity, the absolute principle of free- 
 dom, as identified therewith in the Supreme 
 Will, the absolute cause of all reality. 
 
 " Fifthly and lastly, we have to deplore 
 amongst the defects of philosophy, the sad for- 
 getfulness of the Quovy of the divine Spirit in 
 all and through all. That this arises from too 
 exclusive attention to the senses and to the 
 faculty judging according to sense, and to the 
 interests arising out of them, can scarcely be 
 doubted ; and this defection from his spiritual 
 nature can scarcely be otherwise than expected, 
 so long as man remains the avOpwrros -sfrvxtKos. 
 Something may likewise be attributed to the 
 erroneous schemes of theology, which on the 
 one hand confound God with the world, and end 
 in pantheistic atheism, and which on the other 
 separate God from the world, and by aiming at 
 a pseudo-monotheism resolve themselves into a 
 negative and lifeless abstract of spirituality, to 
 which there is no human correspondency. But 
 the main cause, I fear, must be attributed to the 
 too prevalent want of reverence — the neglect, in 
 
176 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 Part ii. the present day, of the sense of the superior, 
 
 '—^ and the absence of the habit of seeking and 
 
 contemplating in the higher that complement 
 to our own inferiority, which a just appreciation 
 of our manifold defects necessarily begets, to- 
 gether with feelings which are the very opposites 
 to self-conceit, arrogance, and presumptuous 
 ignorance. 
 
 " The rightly understood doctrine of the Logos 
 will be found an effectual antidote against these 
 mischievous consequences, and the sublime views 
 of John and Paul will still guide us into all 
 truth. And I may be, perhaps, permitted to 
 say, without being suspected of derogating from 
 the authority of the Catholic Church, that the 
 doctriae of the Trinity found in the writings 
 of those divinely gifted men, and implied 
 throughout the Scriptures of the New Testa- 
 ment, only needs to be apprehended in its full 
 and living import in order to claim its place as 
 a truth of Reason. It is not here the place to 
 caxry out this all-important investigation : — ^but 
 conceive the doctrine as affirming that the Deity 
 must be contemplated in three Relations ; — that 
 these however are not mere Relations, but Reali- 
 ties ; — not only Realities but the highest Reali- 
 ties ; — and again that these are not dividuous 
 entities, such as three individual men, but one 
 and the self-same Spirit in distinctive seK- 
 hypostatic acts ; — and you may then at least 
 begin to acknowledge the value of a doctrine, 
 
INTRODUCTORY AND RECAPITDLATORY. 177 
 
 which preserves for us the idea of God in its partii. 
 
 • . ., -^ -. 1 Chap. I. 
 
 integrity : — Pirst as One, above and nncon- 
 
 founded with nature and the world, as the safe- 
 guard against pantheism ; — Secondly, as the 
 Divine Alterity, the divine principle in all, and 
 through all, derivative being; the Humanity, 
 which worketh in all men ; as the eflPectual pre- 
 ventive against degrading anthropomorphism, 
 and the misty and unintelligible fancies of 
 abstract theism;— Thirdly, as the divine Life, 
 which in preserving the distinctness of the Rela- 
 tions unites and perpetuates them, as the neces- 
 sary integration of the idea, and the corrective 
 to the possibility of contemplating God other 
 than as indivisible Unity. 
 
 " But the extreme value and high importance 
 of the doctrine of tlie Logos will be brought 
 nearer to human interests and be made more 
 apparent if we contemplate it as exhibiting to 
 us the idea of the Humanity. The instincts of 
 Reason never permit us to rest until we have 
 evolved that perfect exemplar of man, which 
 exhibits him as the child of God. We become 
 conscious indeed of this high descent only under 
 the clear conviction of the degradation which 
 we have suffered, and in the conflict of the 
 double nature which the natural and spiritual 
 man presents : but as the doctrine above referred 
 to gives us the assurance of our heavenly descent 
 and birthright, so likewise it opens to us our 
 high destination, and the conditions under which 
 
 VOL. I. N 
 
178 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part ii. regenerate man may achieve his re-nnion with 
 
 Chap, I. 
 
 '— God. It sets before him at once His spiritual 
 
 being, as the alone true reality, and as that 
 standard according to which the worth of all 
 things is to be ju.dged : * Be ye perfect even as 
 your Father which is in heaven is perfect.' The 
 education of the moral being and the develop- 
 ment of the spiritual self, of which the end is 
 Holiness, are brought before us as the one thing 
 needful ; and as the Logos is the power, and 
 divine grace the condition, of effectuating this 
 living change in fallen man, so we have to pray 
 and strive to be made partakers of God's spirit 
 that we may finally become regenerate in Christ, 
 even in the image of God in which we were 
 created. Hence the fundamental idea of Chris- 
 tianity is the salvation of the world by the 
 Logos.* Christianity alone sets forth the full 
 and clear doctrine of man as a fallen creature, 
 and the power and means of his restoration — the 
 key to history and the only safe foim.dation for 
 individual life and conduct." 
 
 * tf / 
 
 ' Certuni propriumque fidei catholictB fundamentum Christus est" 
 — Augustini Encliirid. § 5. Compare Nitsch Christliche Lehre, p. 125. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE WILL, AS THE ULTIMATE FACT OF SELF- 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 § 1. (PuBFATORY.) The reader will, however, ^^^^ ii. 
 
 ^ Chap. 11. 
 
 expect, and will be warranted in expecting, the 
 
 fulfilment of the promise already given, that 
 the " causative power " which has been invoked, 
 shall, as far as the limits of this preparatory 
 essay permit, be shown to possess a sufficient 
 guarantee for its acceptance as a real principle, 
 the nature and intelligibility of which is derived 
 from the fundamental idea of the "Will. Nay ! 
 I am willing to renew the promise, and to 
 renew it in terms which shall show how essential 
 I consider its fulfilment to be to the aim and 
 purpose of the Spiritual Philosophy. Adopting, 
 as the final aim and object of spiritual philo- 
 sophy the discovery of a Principle which shall 
 secure to it the reality of living Truth ; and 
 accepting as the Postulate (afterwards to be 
 vindicated) that the required principle of the 
 Unity of the Manifold of the Universe phy- 
 sical and moral, shall be One, of all reality the 
 absolute cause, which, affirming and realizing 
 itself as its own abiding and self-sufficing ground, 
 
 N 2 
 
180 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. utters and reveals itself in the infinite manifold 
 of Being, entire in All, and entire in Each.; 
 adopting, I say, this as the indispensable postu- 
 late of philosophy, when contemplated in its 
 utmost height, breadth, and depth, — I venture 
 '^ to affirm, with the fullest confidence of establish- 
 
 ing its evidence, that the Principle sought for is 
 Will. 
 
 § 2. Now, in order to enable the student who 
 is earnest in the investigation of truth for its 
 own sake, and who regards its possession as 
 its own exceeding great reward,— in order, I say, 
 to enable the student to scale this alleged, or 
 supposed, inaccessible and transcendent height, 
 I have to refer him to the Facts of his own Con- 
 sciousness — sources of evidence, which are in 
 every respect open to his strictest scrutiny, but 
 in order to the due investigation of which, in 
 behoof of philosophical conviction, there can be 
 no substitute for the intellectual agent himself. 
 And I now invite his attention to the nature and 
 conditions of Self -consciousness. 
 
 In this work of Reflection on what is passing 
 in his mind, and in reviewing his thoughts, 
 feelings, and volitions, he will soon become aware 
 that in any and every act of conscious reflection, 
 he is under the necessity, in analyzing the pro- 
 cess, of distinguishing in the SeK two relations, 
 namely, subject and object, or the subjective and 
 objective relations. By the first, id quod jacet 
 sub, is designated that which may be inferred 
 
THE WILL. 181 
 
 by the mind, but is recognised only in its acts paet ii. 
 
 and results ; — by the latter, id quod jacet ob^ ' — '- 
 
 or qtdcqmd objiciiur mentis are meant those 
 mental presentations by which the subject knows 
 its own states, and by which it is itself known 
 or inferred. But no sooner will the self-investi- 
 gator have thus distinguished the thinking mind 
 from the thought which is the object of the 
 mind's thinking, than he unavoidably iden- 
 tifies, and becomes aware that they are but 
 relations of a somewhat which he is conscious is 
 the Self. 
 
 § 3. "What then, he will ask, is the reality, 
 which appears in his consciousness, now as sub- 
 j ective, now as obj ective, and which though 
 either, or both, is yet one, namely the Self, or 
 what each man calls Myself. He will surely 
 put the question to himself: '* Do we really 
 know no more of our own Self, substance or 
 being, than the thoughts, feelings and volitions, 
 which are its products and recognised in their 
 mental representations ? Do we only know the 
 Self or Soul in and by its conscious presentations 
 or psychical phcenomena ? ^^ Now I apprehend 
 the very reverse of this will be apparent to the 
 unprejudiced student, if he heedfuUy consider the 
 nature of Self-consciousness as disclosed by the 
 opposite yet correspondent relations subjective 
 and objective. Take the following example : 
 If I think of anything — say, for instance, that 
 I am engaged mentally with the proposition 
 
182 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pakt II. that man is mortal : — or if I will anything, say 
 
 Chap. II. \ ' .7 O' J 
 
 that I determine to visit a sick neighbour ; — or 
 
 if I am affected in any particular way, say that 
 I am pleasnrably affected by the sight of an old 
 friend; — in all these instances the act of con- 
 sciousness may be simply that of contemplating 
 myseK in the particular state or circumstance 
 specified of thinking, willing, or feeling, and this 
 objectively : — but in order to constitute it an act 
 of self-consciousness, of subjective apprehension, 
 I must be also distinctly conscious that it is I, 
 who am the Subject, I must know that it is 
 I, thinking, willing, feeling. 
 
 In order to solve this problem it is necessary 
 to turn our attention to the subjective relation ; 
 for here, if anywhere, will be the hope of dis- 
 covering the true nature of that relation, and 
 of the reality which it may truly import. Now 
 is there, we may ask, any principle or source of 
 agency, which being removed I should neither 
 think, will, nor feel, but which being assumed 
 we find so essential, that it satisfactorily accounts 
 for and explains the agency by which alone our 
 thoughts, volitions, and feelings can be realized ? 
 This, I apprehend, may be answered, by naming 
 the Will as the principle sought for? — if by 
 "Will" we mean as we cannot but do, a self- 
 determinant agency and the only source of 
 originative power. 
 
 § 4. It is true that the reality of the Will 
 must be proved in and by every man as a fact 
 
THE WILL. 183 
 
 of his own self-consciousness; — and so primary Paetii. 
 is the fact that if we resolve it into anything — - — '- 
 else it ceases to be what we mean by "Will. It 
 may be admitted doubtless that in willing an 
 act, or in any act of self-determination, I am, 
 or may be, induced by a variety of motives or 
 impulses ; — my will may be moved ; — but this 
 does not exclude the power of origination, for 
 the consent even to the outward inducement 
 or stimulus still requires this unique act of self- 
 determination in order to the energy requisite to 
 the fulfilment of the deed. The actuation of the 
 individual Will not only does not exclude self- 
 determination, but implies it — implies, that 
 though actuated, but actuated only because al- 
 ready self-operant, it is not compelled, or acting 
 under a law of outward causation. That it is so, 
 who shall doubt who is conscious of the power 
 of origination ? And if he can bring himself 
 to the belief that he has not this consciousness, 
 his acts will soon belie his belief Compare 
 Mental Dynamics, p. 54. 
 
 Without the Will any discussion of morals 
 would be idle and useless ; and hence it was that 
 Kant, notwithstanding his speculative convic- 
 tions, commences his ethical inquiries by as- 
 suming the human Will as the ground of man's 
 liberty and responsibility, and as a necessary 
 postulate of moral faith. It is easy to see that if 
 we have no cognizance of a Self, other than in 
 the changes which the self undergoes, we can 
 
184 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part 11. have HO knowledge of the operative cause of 
 
 '• — ' those changes, and the Will ceases to be a fact 
 
 for us : — if we only know that the self is changed, 
 and contemplated in a series of modifications 
 which can be regarded only as " psychical phse- 
 nomena," we have no knowledge of the subject 
 originant or of the cause of such phsenomena : 
 — and this must necessarily be the case, if the 
 facts of consciousness only disclose to us the 
 *' myself " in its objective relation. But the facts 
 of self-consciousness do disclose more than this ; 
 — they will be found by heedful scrutiny to reveal 
 to us the causative subject also. Taking our 
 former instance, the determination to visit a sick 
 neighbour, I am conscious of the determination 
 in myself, and that the act in question has been 
 willed. But if I proceed to inquire, how that 
 change has been wrought in myseK, the only 
 satisfactory explanation of the fact is that it is 
 the result of an operance or agency in myself, 
 and that of this operance of the self I am con- 
 scious as the subject willing it ; — in causing the 
 act I am conscious of being the cause of the 
 same, and in this unique instance of "spiritual 
 experience " I obtain a knowledge, otherwise 
 wholly incapable of authentication, of the causa- 
 tive as "Will, and of Will as the sole intelligible 
 ground of causation. Meanwhile, in stating the 
 result of our spiritual experience, the eflFect should 
 be carefully distinguished from the cause pro- 
 ducing it, — that which has been willed, from the 
 
THE WILL. 185 
 
 act of willing which preceded it, and which has part ii. 
 
 been its antecedent condition. I may be con- '■ — - 
 
 scious of Myself in bo^ relations, subjective 
 and objective ; but the result of the act should 
 be distinguished from the causative agency ; so 
 soon as the result becomes contemplated objec- 
 tively, the originative or causative act acquires 
 a new relation, and passes into the class of 
 psychical phcenomena. Thus, as I have said 
 (Mental Dynamics, p. 52) "Macbeth nerves 
 himself to the murder of the royal Duncan ; 
 he resolves, and in resolving he is conscious of 
 the predetermination of his Will and of his being 
 therein the author of the premeditated deed; 
 but, so soon as it has become a resolve, he con- 
 templates it objectively, as a mental presenta- 
 tion or thought : — in the first instance he knows 
 himself as a noumenon, in the latter as a phge- 
 nomenon." In order to constitute a moral act 
 I must be conscious of deliberating and resolving, 
 that is, conscious of a causative act of Will, 
 antecedent to the manifestation, and the pre- 
 condition of the result; — in other words I must 
 be cognizant of the Self as Will. 
 
 § 5. " What a world of false philosophy is 
 thus got rid of can only be appreciated by those 
 who have been bewildered by the scepticism of 
 Hume and Kant. It is indeed a fact of con- 
 sciousness, a truth of the inward man, which can 
 never be reached by those who wilfully exclude 
 the * spiritual, ' and contemplate the inward 
 
186 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. world of thought as they do outward objects ; — 
 
 '■ — - the outward husk can never exhibit to us the 
 
 * spiritual/ and if we regard the self only as an 
 outward object, we can never penetrate into that 
 which constitutes its essential and true being. 
 It is indeed a unique fact of the consciousness, 
 and one which each man must discover for him- 
 self; but, once seen, its light diffuses itself 
 over the whole sphere of mind and nature, and 
 the man, who has discovered this vital truth, 
 comprehends at once the spiritual being and 
 causative ground of all within and without 
 him. 
 
 " In relation to outward nature, if we mean 
 anything when we use the term ' Substance,' we 
 mean surely that which cannot be apprehended 
 by the senses ; — it is that which stands under, is 
 sub-posed, is only intelligible, and is the sup- 
 porter of the phsenomenal by which it is revealed 
 to us. Take any outward fact or phsenomenon 
 of sensible experience — we note its form and 
 changes; but we ask inevitably what has pro- 
 duced this complex being, and what preserves it 
 ever the same amid its changing but regular 
 phases ? The only answer is, somewhat beyond 
 the power of our cognizance by the senses, and 
 we infer a somewhat deeper and beyond our 
 sensible experience — call it Life, Spirit, Cause, 
 or Law. Here we necessarily infer the causative 
 and conservative principle. But whence do we 
 derive the means of solving the problem ? It is 
 
THE WILL. 187 
 
 by turning inward and reflecting on the facts of Paet ii. 
 
 our own consciousness. "Within ourselves we '- 
 
 become cognizant of a causative, an originative, 
 of a somewhat deeper and beyond that which is 
 the object of our thoughts; — it is the Subject, 
 the whl." * 
 
 § 6. Let the student, then, attend to himseK 
 resolving, determining, willing ; — he will surely 
 admit that he is conscious of a somewhat deeper 
 than the presentations which appear in his ob- 
 jective consciousness; he will know himseK as 
 originant and causative. He will have arrived 
 also at the knowledge of Substance, of a Nou- 
 menon, and will confess that the only intelligible 
 conception of Substance is Will or Spirit, and 
 that he has obtained this knowledge in and by 
 an act of self-consciousness. But, in this primal 
 act of consciousness he will also have learnt that 
 we are cognizant of our ^sse^ call it Will, Sub- 
 ject, Spirit, Substance, or (to use a phrase of the 
 Kantean philosophy) das Ding an sich. And he 
 will find no less that in this act we contemplate 
 the identity of Being and Knowing : — let him 
 enunciate the primal fact of his personal exist- 
 ence, "I am;" — he cannot but recognise that 
 in this act he knows his own being, knows it 
 because what he is morally is his own act, 
 knows that it is by his own act that he affirms 
 and constitutes his own being, or sphere of 
 agency, as a moral and personal Will. 
 
 * Mental Dynamics, pp. 53 — 4. 
 
188 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. Let me entreat the student to meditate ear- 
 — — — '- nestly on the subject, and I think he will be 
 convinced, as of a truth that reveals itself as 
 self-evident, that the individual Will cannot be 
 other than self-ponent in and by the act of 
 self-affirmation, conceived and expressed by ^'I 
 am," let the agent aim at or intend "to be" 
 whatever his inclinations may prompt, or his 
 sense of moral obligation dictate. This act of 
 self-ponency, made determinate only by a defi- 
 nite purpose in a more or less persistent agency, 
 is the indispensable condition of all moral re* 
 sponsibility, and of the freedom and autonomy of 
 the Will. " Moral " even in the larger sense of 
 the term, in which it means only that which 
 belongs, or must be attributed, to Will, with- 
 out denoting, in the narrower or stricter sense, 
 what is regulated by the Conscience, — the term 
 '^ moral," I say, in any and every case where 
 used as the attribute, or mark, of Will, and 
 where implying only self-determinant power, 
 cannot but mean and implicitly assert the pri- 
 mary and essential of the Will, by which it wills 
 itself, and is self-determinant of its self as a 
 moral agent, willing itself in and to its own 
 sphere of act and being. In short all Will must 
 primarily will itself as Will; and as all Will 
 implies seK-ponency, so Will is inconceivable as 
 a reality, except as a self-ponent Causator. The 
 individual Will without aim, or predeterminate 
 purpose, implying as they do self-conscious in- 
 
THE WILL. 189 
 
 telligence, would be no Will at all, and the very part ii. 
 
 supposition of a Will without a purpose, as of '■ — '- 
 
 a purpose without the conscious intelligence of 
 a personal Will, contradicts itself, " Will " 
 would lose all meaning except as causative and 
 originant, and would not be conceivable as causa- 
 tive except as constitutive of itself as Causator, 
 or as an originant Will, — would not be con- 
 ceivable, I say, except as an individual, personal, 
 and self-conscious agent, self-constitutive by the 
 perpetual act by which it secures its identity of 
 being in its manifold change of agency. " In 
 philosophical grammar the verb substantive is 
 the first or parent word, and expresses that act 
 in and by which the individual affirms, and in 
 affirming knows, himself to be a Person, * I 
 am.' In the nonage of individuality the child 
 speaks of himself in the third person ; — and how 
 few ever reach that epoch, at which the man 
 consciously affirms, that is, realizes by a conti- 
 nuous act, his completed individuality as a moral 
 being ! " (Mental Dynamics, p. 16.) 
 
 § 7. ^^Thus then in every complete act of 
 self-consciousness I not only contemplate my 
 thoughts, feelings, volitions, but I know that 
 they are the thoughts, feelings, and volitions 
 of myself. I know that I think, feel, will : — 
 but more than this I can abstract, from these 
 thoughts, feelings, and volitions. Myself as the 
 Subject : — I know Myself. Now in saying this. 
 What do I affirm ? Clearly this : I have at- 
 
190 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. tained to the knowledge of Substance, of Spirit- 
 
 '- — '- ual Being, of a Noumenon, of my own being as 
 
 a Spirit or Will. I recognise in myself the 
 identity of Being and Knowing. I have reached 
 the point in which I find my personal being in 
 affirming, nay realizing, that * I am.' " (Mental 
 Dynamics, p. 52.) Herein then, in the facts of 
 self-consciousness disclosed by our spiritual ex- 
 periences we have secured the unmovable ground 
 of a philosophy of Realism^ unassailable by the 
 sceptical position of Hume or of Kant. The 
 doctrine of these philosophers is, that we have 
 no proper Self-consciousness or Knowledge of a 
 Self, and that what we call Self-consciousness is 
 the cognizance only of the mental presentations 
 of that which we may infer indeed to be a one 
 mind, but of which we have no knowledge be- 
 yond its manifestations in the consciousness, its 
 appearances or phsenomena. On the other hand, 
 the Spiritual Philosophy offers to us a well- 
 grounded system of Realism ; — for in accord- 
 ance therewith, as we venture to assert, we have 
 incontestably shown that, "as man, in affirming 
 his Personality by the verb substantive I am^ 
 asserts, nay acquires the knowledge of his own 
 Substance as spiritual being, and thereby knows 
 what Substance truly and properly is, — so he 
 contemplates the outward, persons or things, as 
 subjects partaking of reality by virtue of the 
 same Substance of which he is conscious in his 
 own person, and meanwhile, under the sense of 
 
THE WILL. 191 
 
 power whicli arises simultaneously out of the n^^'^Yi 
 
 depth of his inward heing, he invests nature 
 
 with life, action, causality, spontaneity." (Ihid. 
 p. 16.) 
 
 § 8. But it may be objected that, although it 
 be admitted that man is subject to a logical 
 necessity of finding, or attempting to find, the 
 unity of his manifold knowledges, and in every 
 instance the principle which combines and unites 
 mentally his empirical observations and the facts 
 of his experience, yet that I am here rather 
 evading than establishing the principle of " Causa- 
 tive Power," although I have repeatedly insisted 
 upon it as the main element of sound philosophy. 
 I hasten therefore to reply to this objection, not- 
 withstanding that my business here is to antici- 
 pate evidences, reasonings, and results, and in 
 conformity with my plan rather to ask the 
 reader to accept as a postulate the solution of the 
 problem. I would say then — claiming the indul- 
 gence of suitable brevity — in explanation of the 
 true and real meaning of " Causative Fower^^' that 
 the notion infallibly presents itseK when a change 
 of phsenomena is impressed on our attention, 
 when the human mind is challenged to account 
 for a fact which had before no existence, whether 
 the fact had never been observed at all or only 
 not in the particular relation and connexion now 
 observed. Now two modes of view are possible. 
 The first regards the relation of Cause to Effect as 
 merely that of an antecedent to a consequent, the 
 
192 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. sequence having been the constant result of 
 — - — '- empirical observation. The second attributes 
 to the cause a power or efficiency ^ by which a 
 real connexion in rernm naturd between the 
 antecedent and consequent, an efficient and in- 
 telligible condition of dependence of the latter 
 on the former, shall be unavoidably established. 
 According to the latter view, then, a change in a 
 subject, which we may call X, from the state A 
 to the state B shall imply a causative connexion 
 between A and B, or such condition of depen- 
 dency, as that which causes A to become a B 
 which it was not before, and without which it 
 would have remained A. The whole gist of the 
 question evidently lies in the value and signifi- 
 cancy to be attached to the term Cause. The 
 Empiricist refers it solely to the empirical obser- 
 vation of the invariable association of the phaeno- 
 menon A with phsenomenon B : — the Kantean 
 means that the connexion between cause and effect 
 is the result of a subjective law of the understand- 
 ing, existing anterior to, and for the purpose of 
 acquiring experience : — ^while the Spiritualist, of 
 whatever grade or denomination, claims the 
 capability of the human mind to infer^ beyond 
 sensible experience, a somewhat which under 
 the name of causative power is a real and efficient 
 agency in rerum naturd^ which changes phseno- 
 menon A to phsenomenon B. 
 
 Now it cannot escape attention that the em- 
 piricist repudiates the knowledge of any real and 
 
THE WILL. 193 
 
 efficient connexion or influence, and gives np the part ii. 
 
 explanation of the invariable association which '■ — 1 
 
 he assumes to be the test of the causal connexion. 
 He deprives himself even of the claim to infer a 
 connexion, except as the result of a habit of 
 association in his own mind, and must admit 
 that for aught he knows to the contrary there 
 may be no connexion, and B may be merely sub- 
 stituted for A. But this view, it must be admitted, 
 can only be regarded as little less than a blank 
 contradiction of the conception of what a " Cause ' ' 
 is ; since at least it is universally meant to imply 
 a connexion so far partaking of a necessary in- 
 fluence, that an effect B must always be referred 
 to a cause A as the inevitable consequence of 
 some relation to A. And whether the Spiritu- 
 alist, when the grounds for a satisfactory judge- 
 ment shall have been laid before the reader, can 
 justify his claim to the possession of the idea so 
 conceived or not, thus much is at all events clear, 
 that he proceeds upon the clearly defined and 
 universally acknowledged problem of vindicating 
 the existence of causative power as the ground 
 of a real and efficient connexion, and as that 
 precondition, which is adequate to produce, ac- 
 count for, and explain or render intelligible, 
 the agency itself, by which any change, of which 
 there may be question, shall have been effected. 
 Hence then the postulate in view may be thus 
 stated : — Whatever becomes other than it was 
 before and acquires a change of attributes, or 
 VOL. I. o 
 
194 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. whatever must be contemplated as, or traced 
 
 Chap. ^^' J , , 
 
 to, a beginning de novo, cannot but imply the 
 
 productive efl&cient, by wbich. the change is 
 wrought and rendered intelligible, namely, the 
 "Causative Power," which is recognised in and 
 by the constant and unvarying character of 
 its effects. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 IDEAS. 
 
 § 1. Assuming that the distinction, hereafter paktII. 
 
 to be vindicated, between Understanding and ^^^^' ^ 
 
 Reason be well founded, and that the latter 
 implies, as its inalienable object. Truth absolute, 
 conceived as eternal, immutable, self-evident, one, 
 and in its unity all- comprehensive ; it will be 
 found that the Meason^ considered as Speculative 
 Intellect or Philosophy, in its search for abso- 
 lute truth, combines three distinctive forms of 
 operation. 
 
 i. In the contemplation of the manifold events 
 and appearances, which under ceaseless change 
 challenge observation and scrutiny, the human 
 mind finds no rest until it has discovered the 
 Cause^ or that Avhich satisfactorily accounts for 
 any observed change, and which may be assigned 
 as the power and agency capable of producing 
 the eflPect, and invariably operative in order to 
 the result in question. 
 
 ii. Purther, the mind seeks to discover that 
 which in any and every object, or collective 
 manifold, amid every variety and change of 
 attributes, properties and accidents, amid all 
 mutations or transformations of phsenomenal 
 
 o2 
 
196 SPIKITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. existence is itself permanent and abiding; that 
 — ?^^ — '- wMch. may be accepted as the reality, in contra- 
 distinction to the appearances, of things, and 
 constitutes their individual being ; that which is 
 the ground of the distinction between what a 
 thing is and what it has. It is obvious that the 
 distinction here intended is that recognised as 
 Subject and Attribute, Substance and Accident, 
 or whatever else may have been the mode of 
 expressing such relations ; but the only question 
 requiring solution, and the answer to which will 
 be found in the subsequent part of this essay, is, 
 whether the human mind legitimately affirms, 
 or unavoidably infers, that there is a substance 
 or subject, which in every case underlies phse- 
 nomena or appearances. 
 
 iii. The third, or last operative form of the 
 Reason, is manifested by the irrepressible desire 
 and striving after Vnity^ by the habitual effort 
 to bring whatever may be the object or objects 
 of knowledge and inquiry into the relation of 
 a Whole and its Farts. And if, as the Spiritual 
 Philosophy proposes, the totality is to be con- 
 templated as a real and effective Unity, the 
 requisite interdependence of the integral Parts 
 must be derived from an antecedent and causative 
 energy, which, as intelligent power, having pro- 
 duced a whole of parts, remains as its conserva- 
 tive principle. 
 
 § 2. While the Reason, as the light of the 
 Speculative Intellect, has, for the interpretation 
 
IDEAS. 197 
 
 of all our knowledges, the above-described three part ii. 
 operative forms, as the instruments and elements — '■ — '■ 
 of philosophy, those three forms, in relation to the 
 real and eflfective Unity which is required, can- 
 not but be regarded as the correlative elements 
 and exponents of the unity. Por the principle, 
 which we have invoked in behoof of philosophy, 
 may be described as a Causative principle, which, 
 combining both power and intelligence, contains, 
 predetermines, and produces its actual result in 
 all its manifold relations; and which, whilst 
 abiding as the Substance and as the self-sub- 
 sistent and self-affirmed energy, is realized in a 
 Whole of Parts, wherein the same principle, as the 
 Constitutive energy, is evolved and set forth in its 
 unity, totality, finality and permanent efficiency. 
 § 3. In the above description it may be said 
 that one of the main principles of the Spiritual 
 Philosophy and of the working of the Reason, 
 considered as Speculative Intellect, has been 
 offered to the student, — namely, what is meant 
 by an " Idea'^ For further light on the signi- 
 ficancy of this all but indispensable term to phi- 
 losophical insight, the reader is referred to the 
 preface of the Vital Dynamics, where he will 
 find various examples of its application and uses. 
 Thus it may be said that the Reason in man, re- 
 garded abstractly as speculati\re, prompts him to 
 search unceasingly for the Unity, insight of which 
 the Reason supplies for the comprehension of 
 his manifold knowledges ; and that, wherever this 
 
198 SPIKITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. is attainable by the discovery of a Principle ade- 
 — " quate to account for the many as a Totality pro- 
 ceeding from a One, and exhibited in an unity 
 of interdependent Parts, the human mind attains 
 to the possession of an " Idea.'" In saying this, 
 however, it is to be observed that the Speculative 
 Reason, considered as operant in and by Ideas, 
 implies somewhat more than the bare insight 
 of unity; — '^it is the idealizing power; — the 
 power, instinct and inherent tendency of man 
 to contemplate all his thoughts, feelings and 
 strivings in their perfection, integrity, unity, 
 universality, totality, absoluteness." (Mental 
 Dynamics, App. p. 59.) Por illustration compare 
 Pref. Vital Dynamics, p. xxiv. on the use of the 
 terms " Type, Pattern, Exemplar, Model, irapa- 
 BecjfiaJ' And thus it may be added that the func- 
 tion of speculative Reason in forming Ideas is In- 
 tegration ; and that every Idea may be expressed 
 as the Integral, *^ of which all the forms within 
 our experience are but approximations." (Ibid.) 
 § 4. It may be further noted that, as far as 
 the speculative intellect has yet carried us, the 
 conception of what Ideas truly are has been left 
 in that imperfect state, in which indeed the Form 
 has been logically secured, but without any 
 adequate assurance of a Heality, apart from the 
 subjective form derived from the requirements 
 of the speculative intellect. Now it may be 
 safely averred that the grand difficulty, which 
 has opposed itself to the establishment of a 
 
IDEAS. 199 
 
 soimd philosopliy has proceeded from the neglect part ii, 
 
 of building it upon the secure foundation of 
 
 Realism ; and perhaps no better occasion could 
 oflPer itself of vindicating the philosophical truth 
 of the doctrine of Realism, than the present one 
 of considering, so far as our purpose requires, 
 what are the grounds, upon which rests the 
 Reality of the conceptions of Cause, Substance, ' 
 
 Unity, and Totality in the speculative /brm of an 
 '' Idea." 
 
 I now invite this discussion with particular 
 reference to the Idea which I have stated to be 
 fundamental in the Spiritual Philosophy. The 
 required principle of the Unity of the Manifold 
 of the Universe physical and moral, must 
 (I said) be One, of all reality the absolute cause, 
 which, aflB.rming and realizing itself as its own 
 abiding and self-suificing ground, utters and 
 reveals itself in the infinite manifold of Being, 
 entire in All and entire in Each. And regarding 
 that to be the indispensable postulate of phi- 
 losophy, in its utmost height, breadth and depth, 
 I ventured to affirm with the fullest confidence 
 that the Principle sought for is WiiiL. 
 
 § 5. Now, I claim at once the acceptance of 
 this principle, as a primary Truth of Eeason, and 
 as one which contains and rests upon its own 
 evidence. Por, in order to that real and effective 
 unity, whereby the many, without ceasing to be 
 manifold, are constituted and contemplated as 
 One, we are under the unavoidable necessity of 
 
200 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 PvuTii. referring to " a causative principle, wliicli, com- 
 — ^^ — ^ billing both power and intelligence, contains, 
 predetermines and produces its actual result in 
 all its manifold relations, in reference to a 
 final purpose, and is realized in a whole of 
 parts, wherein the principle, as ■ the consti- 
 tutive energy, is evolved and set forth in its 
 unity, totality, finality, and permanent efficiency." 
 Such principle (that is, a principle combining 
 power and intelligence) has been already in- 
 troduced to the reader under the name of an 
 " Idea," But to what principle, other than 
 that of the Will, dare we attribute rational in- 
 telligence, predetermining and achieving actual 
 results in the antecedent unity of a final aim 
 and purpose ? or how otherwise shall we con- 
 ceive such Will than as a personal agent ? ^' In 
 the world do we not see everywhere evidences 
 of a unity which the component parts are so far 
 from explaining that they necessarily presuppose 
 the unity as the cause and condition of their 
 existing at all ? Every whole of parts, be it the 
 minutest crystal, a plant, an animal, the globe 
 which sustains us, the solar system of which it 
 is a part, or the universe itself, in the infinitude 
 of which that system is less than a mote, — every 
 Whole of Parts demands for its intelligibility 
 a cause or principle of each union, a power and 
 unity, antecedent in the order of efficiency, and 
 remaining present as the sustaining and con- 
 servative energy; it implies a legislative act, 
 
IDEAS. 201 
 
 predetermininff the result, compelling implicit part ii. 
 
 T. ^- A 1 A' 11 ^- Cfutp.IlL 
 
 obedience, and excludmg all contmgency; — an 
 
 act combining the foresight of wisdom and the 
 power of irresistible will as immutable purpose 
 and persistent function; and that (saith the 
 judicious Hooker) " which doth assign unto each 
 thing the kind, that which doth moderate the 
 force and power, that which doth appoint the 
 form and measure of working, the same we term 
 a law." Vital Dynamics, p. 18. 
 
 It is true that we have in the above quotation 
 introduced what to some minds will appear the 
 unwarrantable assumption of " causative power" 
 and " Will," and that this may appear to them 
 unnecessary for the purpose of achieving the unity 
 which the human mind demands. And it may 
 be observed that if reliance is placed solely on 
 empirical knowledge, the value of the conceptions 
 of Unity, Substance, Totality, maybe represented 
 merely as mental forms or subjective moulds of 
 the contemplant, and as such having no claim to 
 any objective validity in rerum 7iaturd. On the 
 other hand the advocates of the spiritual philo- 
 sophy affirm, and rightly affirm, that, in order to 
 any real and effectual unity, the conceptions of 
 causative power and Will are not only indis- 
 pensable to the fulfilment of the conditions 
 under which the human mind can only con- 
 template a real unity or organic whole, but are 
 securely attainable within the limits of human 
 consciousness. 
 
202 SPIKITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. § 6. Now I affirm that any Unity, in which 
 
 '■ — '- the comprehended many, without ceasing to he 
 
 manifold, are constituted, or have the constitution 
 of, One, is inconceivahle except as proceediag 
 from One, which already contains and pre- 
 supposes its final purpose ; — for otherwise, being 
 without aim, the proceeding would be futile, 
 objectless, and nugatory. Turther, this ante- 
 cedent One, or potential unity of the manifold, is 
 inconceivable except as predeterminate in aim 
 and object, and this predeterminate we may call 
 the " Type^'' or that to which whatever may be 
 deduced from the original One is to be referred 
 for its intelligibility ; — since, without this typical 
 paradigm, that requisite element of Likeness, 
 the recognition of which constitutes every com- 
 ponent of a whole a partaker of the pervading 
 One, will inevitably escape us. Thirdly, the 
 antecedent One must be conceived as realized 
 and existing in a Diversity of interdependent 
 parts and distinctive relations ; — for, without 
 such evolved and distinctive existence in all the 
 manifestation of being which the Type implies, 
 the parent One would have remained, or could 
 be conceived only, as an undifferenced, unintel- 
 ligible potentiality, and not as a real and evolved 
 product.* Fourthly, the original and typical 
 
 * Eor the empiricist this essential condition of unity wiU have no im- 
 portance, since he necessarily proceeds from the given manifold to the 
 principle, from which it is to derive its explanation and iiitelhgibihty, 
 and from which he may deduce it as fact or phsenomenon. 
 
IDEAS. 203 
 
 One must be present in each of the Manifold ; i^^i^t ii. 
 
 ^ . . Chap, III. 
 
 with a difference indeed, which constitutes the — — - 
 particularity of each for itself, but still whole 
 and entire in each, so as to modify and adapt the 
 particularity of each to its position and relation 
 in the AVhole of which it is a part : — since, with- 
 out the full and complete participation of each 
 in the Type, i.e. the design, purpose, paradigm, 
 which constitutes all parts of One indivisible 
 Whole, no part could be an integral component 
 or adequate representative of the whole of which 
 it is intended to be at once a relative part and a 
 partial integer. Fifthly, the same One, which 
 has been the antecedent Type, must reappear as 
 the Unity, or totality of all the members, in 
 order to the organic whole contemplated from 
 the beginning in the constructive principle : — for 
 otherwise the diverse manifold of the evolved 
 product would not be conceivable as the Totality, 
 which had been primarily projected ; whilst, on 
 the other hand, so conceived, the resulting unity 
 will reappear in a Totality, in which each and 
 all of the members, whilst maintaining their 
 several places and distinctive oflices, conspire to 
 the whole intended from the first, and bear the 
 impress each in its kind of one and the same 
 Type, which animates all in order to the per- 
 manence and eflB.ciency of the Unity aimed at. 
 Sixthly, whatever may be the nature of the 
 bond of unity in any such organic whole, or 
 whatever may be the real and effective character 
 
204 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. of the pervading Type, it must ensure the per- 
 -^ — '- manence of the assigned connexion ; and this we 
 can only represent to ourselves as a somewhat 
 which remains the same amid all change and 
 diversity : —since, without such effectual hond of 
 union, no totality would he conceivable, and the 
 uncemented parts would fall asunder, or remain 
 only as a heap of disjointed fragments. And it 
 is this indispensable unific somewhat, which the 
 human mind necessarily conceives as the Sub- 
 stance or Subject, which underlies and supports 
 whatever attributes may be assigned to it by the 
 contemplant.* 
 
 § 7. Under these sis heads we venture to 
 present to the student what may be called the 
 moments of Ideal Construction, or of the integral 
 process. And it will be found that they cor- 
 respond to, and are founded on self-evident 
 truths, which may be called Axioms of Rational , 
 or Spiritual^ Integration : — that is. Will, as 
 causative of reality, cannot be conceived or con- 
 templated in its integrity, or inherent tendency 
 thereto, except under such conditions of inte- 
 gration as are expressed in those axioms. It is 
 true, indeed, that we have to conceive Will in 
 
 * It waSj in tlie spirit at least of this paradigm of ideal logic, tliat 
 the saying of Cuvier's, to which I referred at page 95, was uttered : — 
 " Celui qui possederait rationellement les his de Veconomie organique, 
 pourrait refaire tout V animal" (Revolutions du Globe, p. 99.) "Por 
 what else does he assert, than that in the light of a law, or legislative 
 idea, acording to which the animated being was originally constructed, 
 we obtain insight into the forms and relations of organic structure, and 
 of their necessary interdependence." Vital Dynamics, p. 25. 
 
IDEAS. 205 
 
 the Idea, or ideally ; but abstracting, as this part ii. 
 
 ,. Chap. Ill, 
 
 mode of conception obliges ns, from all mci- 
 
 dental circumstances and extraneous influences 
 which detract from its completeness or inherent 
 tendency thereto, we submit the following as the 
 Axioms of National or Spiritual Integration. 
 
 § 8. Axiom 1st.* The postulate of all reality is 
 Willi as the principle, which is absolutely causa- 
 tive of reality, and by which alone all causality 
 is rendered intelligible. 
 
 Axiom 2d. All Will must primarily will itself, 
 that is, assert itself to be a Will, or to have 
 being as a Will.f In our own consciousness we 
 
 * It is to be observed that in calling this and the following proposi- 
 tions the " Axioms of National or Spiritual Integration/' we might have 
 equally named them "Ideas:" and as such they are dynamic truths, 
 which axea prioriy that is, are originally, inherently, and often more or 
 less unconsciously, operative in the human mind by virtue of the light 
 of reason therein : and which, by reflection on the facts of his self- 
 consciousness, every man may discover for himself as the results of 
 '' spiiitual intuition." 
 
 •f It is true indeed that this position will be conceded as an axiom, 
 conditionally only upon the assurance of the individual that he is con- 
 scious of himself as a Will. That assurance, as has been observed, 
 must be his own act and derived from the exertion of his own Will ; — it 
 is by exerting his Will that 'he becomes assm-ed of its reality, and of its 
 realization in himself. But if he has that assm-ance, it is manifestly 
 absurd to deny the truth of the. above primary axiom; since a Will can- 
 not but will its own Will, and cannot be or have being unless by the 
 persistent and continuous act, which we have called self-ponency, and 
 which constitutes his personal individuality as a moral agent. The iadi- 
 vidnal may, it is granted, deny that he is, or has a will, as the ground of 
 his beiag ; but ia the very act of denial he contradicts himself, since in 
 the exertion of the will, which it implies, he asserts what he denies. 
 Again, should he profess a sceptical inability to decide for himself the 
 momentous question, which involves that of the moral nature of man, he 
 does but confess to his incapacity for sounding the depths of philosophy ; 
 
 and, 
 
206 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Pakt it. find this primary act in the Self-aflarmation, 
 — ?^^ which is expressed by " I am/' as signifying the 
 ground of the personal being of the individual 
 derived from the act of his own Will, and the 
 assertion of his personal identity ; — and no less it 
 marks the identity of being and knowing, the 
 essential union of the ^^ principium essendi " and 
 '' prmcipium sciendi,'' And thus as all Self- 
 ponency implies Will, so Willis inconceivable as 
 a reality except as a self-ponent Oausator. If a 
 man is not what he is by his own act, in so 
 much he is not a Will, or free agent, in the ideal 
 sense of the term. Self-ponency is indeed con- 
 ditional upon the assurance, derived from the 
 self-consciousness, of Will ; but, having the assur- 
 ance, he cannot but affirm himself to be a Will, 
 and so begin his self-conscious existence by an 
 act of his own Will. This then is the first 
 relation. But, secondly, with the act of self- 
 
 and, "wliatever Ms professions may be, lie will always, as experience 
 abundantly testifies, act as if he had, or were, a WiU. 
 
 Tkns, as before said, Whatever manifold has Unity, — whether it be a 
 product of nature, or art, or (as germane to our present subject) the 
 conduct of a man, who in all his manifold purposes and deeds evinces a 
 consistency of moral character which can only spring from unity of 
 principle, — Whatever manifold, I repeat, may justly claim to possess 
 unity, must proceed from a Causative One, and find its only and 
 adequate intelligibility in the WiU. Our fundamental principle tlien 
 is that the postulate of all reaUty is Will, or that which is absolutely 
 causative of reahty. And the arguments we have advanced, not indeed 
 as proofs, but as appeals to what every rational being may find in his own 
 self-consciousness, justify us in demanding from him the concession of 
 the principle enunciated. This view will, however, receive additional 
 and clearer hght as we proceed in the statement of the " Axioms of 
 Rational Integration." 
 
IDEAS. 207 
 
 ponency, the Will cannot but will itseK in takt il 
 Alterity^ that is, in the manifold of act and re- — - — '- 
 cipiency, which constitutes its sphere of being 
 and agency in all its outward relations. Por 
 Will, considered merely in the relation of Sub- 
 ject, could be conceived only as a potential agency, 
 — such as would be an unevolved point under 
 the condition of a possible expansion, but still 
 awaiting solicitation from without and impulse 
 from within to rouse its dormant capability to 
 become an actual sphere and objective reality, 
 [Further, if, as we have asserted and now repeat, 
 the Will as the antecedent One is necessarily dis- 
 tinguished in and by the opposite relations or 
 correlatives. Subject and Object, and is ever idem 
 et alter^ we are under the like necessity of con- 
 ceiving that under its distinctive relations it 
 remains the self-same Subject, We accordingly 
 must supply the third, combinatory and comple- 
 tive relation, which, in preserving the distinction 
 of the correspondent opposites or correlatives, 
 secures their necessary Unity. Without the con- 
 ception of this Unity, the correlatives would fall 
 asunder, and the idea of Totality would altogether 
 escape us ; and yet if we are to contemplate any 
 assemblage of multiform distinctions as compre- 
 hended in One living individuality or organic 
 Whole, — say a plant, an animal, a community, 
 or any association of men formed with a definite 
 aim, — the idea of a constitutive unity is no less 
 than indispensable. 
 
208 SPIUITTTAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Paet II. We may say then, as the sum and substance 
 ''^^' of the preceding axioms, that any attempt to 
 conceive or contemplate a "Whole of manifold 
 parts otherwise than as proceeding from a Cau- 
 sative One: which realizes itself in its self-affirma- 
 tion, as the antecedent unity and typical paradigm 
 of the construction it proposes; which, on the 
 other hand, exhibits itself in all the multiform 
 acts and products which constitute its sphere 
 of being; and which finally reappears, as con- 
 summating the totality which had been proposed 
 and anticipated from the commencement of the 
 process : that any attempt, I say, to conceive 
 the genesis of a Whole except under these con- 
 ditions will be vain and nugatory. And, it may 
 be added, these relative acts are not to be dis- 
 severed as successive phases of agency, but to 
 be regarded as simultaneous, though distinctive 
 Moments of one and the same essential ope- 
 rance.* 
 
 * The reader will please to observe that tlie relations liere described 
 are the TiniTersal and indispensable elements of the ideal construction 
 derived from Will as the principle of every genetic process. And it will 
 be seen that they correspond to the distinctions, vrhich we were xma- 
 voidably led to in the account given in Chap. II. of Self-consciousness : — 
 Will is the ground inteUigeut and causative, wliich, as anteced-ent One, 
 distinguishes itself into the ^j^^05^V^ relations. Subject and Object, and 
 into the comhinatory relations which, in preserving the distinction of the 
 correspondent opposites or correlatives, secures their necessary unity. 
 To these distinctions we shall hereafter have to return in giving further 
 significancy to the paradigm of ideal construction thus enunciated ; not 
 forgetting however that the " Categories,'' which have been found to be 
 the " moulds of Experience," will be now seen to be the relations which 
 must be conceived as necessary to the realization of the Will as en- 
 lightened by Kcason ; — a truth, which cannot fail at once to strike the 
 
IDEAS. 209 
 
 § 9. In the previous section the fundamental part ii. 
 
 axioms of Rational Integration have been enun- '■ — * 
 
 ciated ; but their importance in the philosophical 
 problem, which we have undertaken to solve, 
 will require that we should regard them in other 
 aspects not less requiring attention in order 
 to the estimation of their true value. I ask 
 then the admission of the following axiom, which 
 relates especially to the intellig-ential character of 
 the construction : — 
 
 3rd Axiom. The Will (in any proper sense) 
 cannot be conceived otherwise than as insepara- 
 bly united with intelligence, and this ideally 
 as the Light of Reason ; and, so conceived, the 
 Will is guided and governed by a Purpose, or 
 Pinal Aim, which as Antecedent Unity contains 
 prospectively and potentially the realization of 
 what it proposes. A wiU, that does not operate 
 from the beginning according to a certain law 
 or idea, and does not predetermine its final 
 result and intention, cannot but be, as far as it 
 falls short of such idea or final purpose, ineffi- 
 cient and abortive in its acts. 
 
 This position involves the following corol- 
 laries : — 
 
 A. The SeK-ponency is a continuous and 
 
 reader, when he considers that the subjective relation expresses, or 
 rather implies, the category of Subject and Attribute or Substance and 
 Accident ; that the objective relation of the Will explains the category 
 of Cause and Effect ; and that the category of the whole and its parts is 
 founded on the antithesis and synthesis of these subjective and objective 
 relations. 
 
 VOL. L P 
 
210 SPIRITUAL PSILOSOPHY. 
 
 pakt it. persistent act, implying tliroughout tlie unalter- 
 — '■ — '■ able conviction of the truth, which directs it ; — 
 and this truth is to be conceived, not only as 
 final aim, but as the ideal type and predeter- 
 mined typical paradigm, of all that proceeds 
 from the act of self-ponency. That the self- 
 ponency must be conceived ideally as a con- 
 tinuous and persistent act, in order to the 
 requisite unity of abiding Being, and this by 
 the light of self-conscious intelligence, is mani- 
 fest ; since otherwise the primary act of Will 
 would be fragmentary, disconnected into fits and 
 starts, disturbed by sudden and crossing resolves, 
 purposeless, unmeaning, and thereby incapaci- 
 tated for achieving its individuality. It may be, 
 indeed, truly said: that "few ever reach that 
 epoch, at which the man consciously aflSrms, that 
 is, realizes by a continuous act his completed 
 individuality as a moral being!" (Mental Dy- 
 namics, p. 16.) " Various, indeed, may be the 
 forms, which reveal the essential idea of our 
 common Humanity, various the causes of de- 
 generacy, which render its growth imperfect or 
 abortive, various the forms of mental excellence 
 and of moral dignity, to which it gives birth : 
 but still it is the living and persistent energy of 
 the moral will, which gives the impress of cha- 
 racter and of genial power to a Luther, a Dante, 
 and a Milton, and stamps an indelible unity on 
 their aspirations and acts, their works and their 
 aims." (Ibid. p. 10.) 
 
IDEAS. 211 
 
 B. The original Type or Idea, impressed by part il 
 
 and derived from the self-ponency, shall be ever '- 
 
 present and operative in the Alterity, — ever active 
 wholly and fully, tofus et mtegei% in each and 
 every diverse relation of the manifold in and by 
 which the idea is manifested in acM ; so that, by 
 its light, each shall be adapted to each and to all, 
 in the unity of the first intention of a One-in-AlL 
 This tendency to individuality in the parts 
 (arising out of the repetition in each of the total 
 idea which gave it birth, and though ever vary- 
 ing the type yet representing it in alterity) is 
 manifestly indispensable to the true conception 
 of the Identity and Alterity of every ideal whole. 
 "Were it otherwise, it must be supposed that there 
 were parts derived from a diverse intention to 
 that of the whole in which they appear. Such 
 parts, being alien and foreign, could not harmonize 
 with others in the projected unity; and the result 
 would be an assemblage of incoherent parts — no 
 whole, but a heterogeneous heaping of material 
 without community: — ^^ inter heterogenea non est 
 eommunitas.^^ That the act of the causative of the 
 whole should be total in each of the components, 
 is not only compatible with the greatest variety, 
 but implies it. Take any product of nature, say 
 a predaceous animal, — and though teeth, claws and 
 motive apparatus are widely different from each 
 other as component parts, yet they are evidently 
 results of the same intention and purpose in the 
 total organization to which they contribute. 
 
 p 2 
 
212 SPIRITUAIi PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part 11. And the perception of this unity in diversity^ 
 
 of this One-in-All, is vouched for hy such 
 
 expressions as ^' Ex unque leonem^^ ^^ ex pede 
 Serculem^^ and the like. Not to mention the 
 scholastic maxim : — " TJhi anima est^ tola est, 
 tota in toto^ et tota in qudlihet parte T 
 
 0. But if in every organic Whole the final 
 aim appears in the process of construction or 
 genesis, it must reappear in the result as the 
 Totality y or All-in-One, which was contained in, 
 and projected by, the Will in the primary act 
 of Antecedent Unity; — the predetermined aim 
 and purpose is now to be contemplated in its 
 realized result and achievement. And this To- 
 tality implies that each part of the organic 
 Whole shall be adapted to each other and to all 
 oth^s in the unity of the first intention, in order 
 to the completion of the purpose which had 
 existed from the beginning. Without this result 
 it is manifest that the intention has not been 
 carried into eflfect, and that, so far as it has not 
 been accomplished, the act and process of the 
 Will, as originant, predeterminant, and operant, 
 is abortive and vain. 
 
 Thus the Axiom shows that in the realization 
 of any Totality or Diversity in Unity, an Idea, 
 as the Resolve of the Will or causative agent, 
 must have operated as antecedent unity or typical 
 paradigm, and that in the light of the same Idea 
 every component is adapted to each other and to 
 all, in order to the completion of the projected 
 
IDEAS. 213 
 
 whole. The axiom affirms that the Will, in any Paet ii. 
 process of ideal construction, requires to be — ^ — '- 
 throughout sustained and supported by the Idea 
 or final aim, which renders that process from 
 beginning to end one harmonious work of Reason. 
 Thus, — *^ every organic whole, from the polyp up 
 to man, indicates a higher and more effective 
 power of unity, and therefore of more perfect 
 individuality, in proportion as the parts are more 
 numerous, yet at the same time more various, 
 each having a several end ; while yet the inter- 
 dependence of each on the other, the subordina- 
 tion of the lower to the higher, and the intimate 
 of all to the constitution of One, shall be per- 
 fected in equal proportion." Vital Dynamics, 
 App. 0. p. 59. 
 
 § 10. But the former axioms would be de- 
 fective in the exhibition of their character as 
 truths of Reason, were there not superadded 
 another not less essential Axiom of Rational or 
 Spiritual Integration, namely, that which affirms 
 for every ideal process the necessity of its Inte- 
 gration. " Reason is the idealizing power — the 
 power, instinct and inherent tendency, of man, 
 to contemplate all his thoughts, feelings and 
 strivings, in their perfection, integrity, univer- 
 sality, totality, absoluteness." (Mental Dyna- 
 mics, p. 59). The 4th Axiom then might run 
 thus : — In the act of self-ponency, and in reali- 
 zing whatever is potentially contained, purposed 
 or projected, therein, whatever is willed cannot 
 but be willed in its fullest integrity ; — for what- 
 
214 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. evcr falls short of its ideal integrity falls short of 
 
 its aim and true reality. 
 
 It may be true that absolute, or ideal perfec- 
 tion, is unattainable, and that more cannot be 
 expected of human Will than to strive ever to 
 approximate to that goal which from its very 
 nature cannot be reached. But to aim at imper- 
 fection is absurd ; for it is virtually a resolve not 
 to accomplish what is aimed at. What, in every 
 construction or genesis, can be alone aimed at, 
 is the true reality ; and this true reality is ideal. 
 It is only by the aid of the Reason, that we are 
 enabled to discern the eternal Ideas, which are 
 the regulating types, standards and true causes, 
 of their approximate representatives in a nature 
 ever tending to lapse into the imperfect and arbi- 
 trary. (See Vital Dynamics, Pref. p. xxviii.) To 
 this subject, namely, the relation of the perfect 
 types of Eeason to their imperfect derivatives in 
 nature, in consequence of the pravity of the 
 latter, I shall have occasion to return. Mean- 
 while if it were asked, what constitutes the true 
 being of any product of nature within our ex- 
 perience, say a Rose, a Horse, a Tiger, a Man, — 
 we can only answer, amid the more or less 
 imperfect specimens offered to our notice, that 
 which most fully and completely corresponds to 
 its original design or ideal aim. This our ex- 
 perience only furnishes us with approodmatively. 
 It must be contemplated as Idea. 
 
 Under the head of the fourth Axiomi, which 
 
IDEAS. 215 
 
 to the essential conditions of ideal construction pabtii. 
 adds that of Integration, we have to supply the ^-^ — -' 
 following Corollaries : — 
 
 A. The Will, in the case of its self-ponency 
 and self-afflrmation in personal Being, cannot 
 but will itself in its perfect ideal integrity. 
 That every Will endowed with Reason should 
 aim ideally at its spiritual integration is mani- 
 fest from the axiom under which this corollary 
 appears. But I forbear to do more here than 
 indicate a subject, which involves a consideration 
 of the Principles of Ethics, and of the problem, 
 which is to enlighten us on the essential cha- 
 racter of the Humanity, and to determine the 
 relations of man to God as the eternal Idea of 
 absolute spiritual integrity and the moral In- 
 tegrant of his fallen creature. 
 
 B. A second corollary offers the truth which 
 cannot be severed from the former, that the 
 perfect integrity which the WUl affirms, or aims 
 at affirming, in the act of self-ponency, must be 
 affirmed or realized in the Alterity derived from 
 it, and this in all the diverse forms which ex- 
 hibit the capabilities, potentially or ideally infi- 
 nite, of a Will realizing itself outwardly in order 
 to achieve its sphere of being and agency. 
 
 This corollary is to be regarded under two 
 conditions ; one of which we may call particular^ 
 and the other universal. 
 
 The first would relate to the life and conduct 
 of an individual Will, — as of a Man who mani- 
 
216 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 p.vKT II. fests in all Ms thoughts, deeds, and words, the 
 — - — -* Principle, which, determining his self-ponency 
 and fixing his abiding "character" as a moral 
 agent, impresses itself on his eyery act, in due 
 order and proportion, and constitutes it a part 
 of his total sphere of agency. Loss of " cha- 
 racter" was felt even by the Greek tyrant, who, 
 being moyed to tears by a tragic scene, abruptly 
 left the theatre, exclaiming, "How scandalous 
 to yield to pity in witnessing ane death, when 
 I have been accessory without remorse to the 
 death of thousands ! " But how little dare we 
 expect consistency of character, when even the 
 best and wisest of mankind fail in preserving 
 its integrity. How bitter must have been the 
 reflections of our great reformer Cranmer in the 
 weakness which led him to recant the cherished 
 principles of his life, redeemed though it was by 
 the noble retractation which brought him to the 
 stake. 
 
 But in order to the full conception of Indi- 
 viduality in its integrity we have to regard the 
 Will in its universal as well as its particular 
 aspect : — since it will be found that true Indi- 
 viduality contains and conciliates the opposite 
 relations of the Universal and Particular. We 
 cannot conceive them, except by abstraction, 
 as single and separate. In respect of actual 
 Being, a mere Particular, or we might say a 
 part which is no part of a real whole, a particle, 
 or atom, would be no " part " of any thing, 
 
IDEAS. 217 
 
 and, if at all conceivable, not more distinguish- part ii. 
 
 able than the particular dust-atoms in a simoom '■ — 
 
 of the desert. On the other hand, the Universal, 
 in respect of any real existence, can only be 
 properly defined as a One-in-All : — without the 
 relation to an All of manifold distinctions, the 
 One becomes a mere abstract, and expresses a 
 One which is wholly " undiflferenced," that is, 
 which, being contemplated without relations, has 
 and can have no real Being. But, as I have 
 said above, Individuality in its appropriate sig- 
 niflcancy partakes both of the Universal and 
 Particular. The "individual" is to be conceived 
 as a lesser Whole in the larger Whole of which 
 it is a Part : — the tendency to integration in this 
 lesser or relative Whole is partly the result of 
 the one and universal tendency to integration, 
 which, in pervading and giving unity to all, 
 tends to integrate each; — partly, on the other 
 hand, it denotes in the Particular the common 
 tendency of all Will to integrate, and by its own 
 peculiarities to distinguish, itself. The first 
 tendency works to repeat in the Part what is 
 intended in the Whole, to make the lesser and 
 particular whole the reflex and representative of 
 the universal or larger whole; the second or 
 particularizing tendency, by opposite means, 
 though with similar aim, works to integrate the 
 self by diversifying and modifying the universal. 
 If illustrations were needed, the reader might be 
 referred to the personages devised by Shakspeare 
 
218 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. or other writers of fiction : — without the Hni- 
 
 Chap, III. rtjTT ' I / -\ ±1 
 
 ' versa! character of the humanity (and the super- 
 natural beings of fiction form no exception) they 
 would be so alienated from the sphere of our 
 being that they could excite no interest; but, 
 without the distinctive peculiarities which mark 
 the particular in each, they would cease to be 
 individuals, and would become lifeless abstracts 
 of the universal humanity. 
 
 What has just been said may serve to throw a 
 further light on the preceding paragraph touching 
 the individual ; but we have to beg the reader's 
 attention to some further observations on the 
 universal factor. I repeat that the Universal, 
 defined as the One-in-AU which gives unity and 
 connexion throughout, and contemplated in its 
 highest and largest sense, can be no other than 
 the Absolute Will causative of all reality ; and so 
 in every sphere of being, which constitutes a 
 relative whole in that larger Whole which com- 
 prehends all, and can no longer be considered a 
 part of any larger whole, the Will-act is totus et 
 integer^ whole and complete, in constituting its 
 sphere of being or Whole of Parts. To affirm 
 that the principle of all reality is other than 
 one, would be manifestly absurd; for if we 
 affirmed the reverse we should affirm the existence 
 of a plurality of discordant principles ; — I say 
 discordant ; because if they were accounted to be 
 accordant, the principle, by which they were so, 
 would drive the reasoner back to the unavoidable 
 
IDEAS. 219 
 
 admission of a source of unity, or of one fontal part ii. 
 principle. On the other hand, however, such a — ^^ — ' 
 '^One" can only be conceived as "differenced" 
 into a manifold of distinctive spheres of being ; 
 and (as before said) without relation to a manifold 
 of distinction, the One becomes a mere abstract, 
 which, conceived without relativity, can have no 
 real being. Hence then the Universe itself is to 
 be conceived as a Whole of Parts, but can only 
 be so conceived in its integrity as animated by 
 One WUl or Spirit, present and operative every- 
 where, and exerting itself totally in and to every 
 sphere of individual being : — if it were not opera- 
 tive, totus et integer, in every and each part, that 
 part in which its energy and operation were 
 wanting must inevitably fail in being an integral 
 constituent of the Whole, and would want what 
 is essential to make it a part — namely, participa^ 
 tion in the character of a Whole, as derived from 
 one and the same operance. 
 
 After this digression, to which we have been 
 led in explaining the last corollary (that the 
 integrity of a Will-act shall be realized in the 
 Alterity) it remains that we state our third 
 corollary. 
 
 0. All Will cannot but will that the manifold 
 of its distinctive acts should constitute a Totality, 
 a full, complete, and perfect Whole : — for, with- 
 out this consummation and unity of the All-in- 
 one, the result would not be totus et integer, the 
 act of one Will or Subject. 
 
220 SPIMTTTAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. "WTierever then we contemplate Will in its 
 
 '- Idea (that is, as causative of reality, and therein 
 
 actuated by the light of Reason), the Principles, 
 above described as axioms of rational integration, 
 will be found to be operant. Every rational 
 Will must have a final aim or intention, and 
 must in realizing that intention resolve to carry 
 it into effect fully and completely. And, though 
 this view of the Ideal Will is only approxima- 
 tively realized in the agencies of the world, yet 
 no Will can act under other conditions than those 
 expressed in the axioms above cited; and any 
 Will which fails in fulfilling these conditions — as 
 especially to intend without a definite aim, and 
 to resolve without the intention of carrying into 
 effect a final aim — forfeits the character of Will 
 according to the Idea, and becomes abortive by 
 self-contradiction. 
 
 I venture to assume that we have now found 
 an adec[uate paradigm of the Ideal Will in actA 
 wherever it is causative of reality : but in order 
 to carry out the Idea of Integration in the Will, 
 of which the main features have been pointed 
 out in the axioms already enunciated, it will be 
 necessary to regard this principle of integration 
 under other aspects than those yet presented, and 
 I propose to bring these considerations before the 
 reader in the ensuing paragraph. 
 
 § 11, 5th Axiom. Every "Will tends to be 
 absolute, or aims at absolute ponency, in the act 
 of willing. 
 
IDEAS. 221 
 
 The reader will be pleased to bear always in part ii. 
 
 mind that the problem before him is. How to '■ — - 
 
 contemplate the Idea of Will, that is, of Will in 
 its full and complete perfection of aim and resolve 
 of causative act, divested of all failings and hin- 
 drances in its purpose, I am speaking here, 
 however, of the Idea of the Will generally, and 
 therefore abstractedly ; that is, abstracted from 
 all incidental circumstances which detract from 
 its integrity or inherent tendency to integration, 
 Por. otherwise the term " absolute " could only be 
 affirmed of the Supreme and divine Will. And 
 of the human Will, as we actually find it, we can 
 only speak as of a Will in a state of "degeneracy." 
 The genus includes, it is true. Supreme Will as 
 one of its species, but does not designate it in 
 its highest specific instance as " Absolute Will 
 causative of all reality." But in all Will every 
 Will-act properly so called can be only truly 
 conceived as willing absolutely that which is 
 thereby willed ; for otherwise it would be an 
 imperfect and abortive act, and would want the 
 primary and essential condition of its own fulfil- 
 ment. If we consider such an act under its 
 empirical conditions of time and place, and under 
 circumstantial agencies of obstructive interfer- 
 ence and cumulative difficulties, the Idea may 
 escape us ; but abstract from these, and contem- 
 plate the Idea in its integrity, and it will be seen 
 that the Will-act of even a horse in leaping a 
 fence must be totus et integer in resolve and 
 
222 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part IT. purpose — ^ves, absolute. How much more then 
 
 Chap. II L ^ *^ 
 
 that of a rational being, who, as a Columbus or 
 
 Howard, never swerves from the realization of 
 an ideal aim and from his one absolute purpose, 
 whatever may be the difficulties and dangers of 
 his enterprise. Moreover every spiritual act, 
 having its ground and precondition in that which 
 is antecedent and transcendent to the conditions 
 of being and existence, namely the Will, is by its 
 very nature " absolute," that is, under no other 
 conditions or relations than those of its own 
 ase'ity^ or unconditioned originancy.* 
 
 But in the foregoing exposition I may perhaps 
 have incurred the risk of being misunderstood 
 by using the term "Absolute " in its ideal sense, 
 that is, as designating an object of conscious 
 thought^ apart from the conditions and relations 
 which limit and detract from its ideal integrity, 
 though not excluding them as necessary elements 
 of the actual being of the object contemplated. 
 To apprehend an object of thought " absolutely " 
 
 * A pleasant illustration of tlie tendency of all Will to be absolute 
 will be found in tlie story told in Grimm's Kinder nnd Haus-Mdrchen., of 
 tbe fisherman's wife, who, not content with having become successively 
 Baron, King, Emperor, and Pope, would needs arrogate to herself the 
 power of the Almighty. So true it is, as in this instance, that all the 
 great Ideas of our Humanity are found to be the widely-diffused iuherit- 
 ance and possession of "babes and sucklings," and transmitted from age 
 to age in nursery-tales aud children's stories. In such too the timeless 
 character of all Will and spiritual act is finely illustrated by the circum- 
 stance that the incidents and characters are of no age nor country, 
 though at home at all times and in every place ; — and this not as abstrac- 
 tions, but as vivid realizations of the spiritual nature of our common 
 humanity. 
 
IDEAS. 223 
 
 is to apprehend it in its idea ; but to apprehend Part ii. 
 
 it in its idea is necessarily also to apprehend it 
 
 "relatively;" — it implies the whole scheme of 
 relations in and by which the idea is manifested 
 in actual being. " Absolute " and " relative " 
 are, in truth, relative terms, which imply, each 
 the other. To divorce them from their inse- 
 parable union as correlatives and reciprocal cor- 
 respondents, each throwing light on the other, 
 would be to reduce them to mere conflicting 
 abstractions, exclusive of each other. Neverthe- 
 less, without setting aside their interdependence, 
 we may advantageously, nay in many instances 
 unavoidably, contemplate an object of thought 
 as absolved from all other conditions than those 
 which are essential to its integrity or ideal per- 
 fection. Indeed we must do so if we are not to 
 resign the indispensable privilege of a rational 
 being in fixing a Standard of excellence by which 
 to judge and to measure whatever falls short of 
 it. Without the possession of such an ideal 
 standard or pattern of moral integrity, how 
 would it be possible for us to realize practically 
 and approsimatively the divine command : "Be 
 ye perfect, even as your Eather which is in 
 heaven is perfect." 
 
 But, further, the use of the term " Absolute " 
 in the sense here assigned to it, namely, as the 
 opposite (not contrary) to the " conditioned " or 
 "relative," is not only sanctioned by our best 
 writers, but has obtained currency in general 
 
224 SPIIMTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Paktii. usage; — and this not only in respect of super- 
 
 '- sensuous objects, but of things within the sphere 
 
 of sensible experience. Thus a physicist would 
 not hesitate to speak of an " absolute " vacuum, 
 though he would be quite aware that it could 
 be only "relatively" produced. A pathologist 
 would find no difficulty in distinguishing " abso- 
 lute " and " relative " health. And no difficulty 
 attaches to conceiving in a progressive develop- 
 ment a terminus ad quem^ as a goal, which though 
 it may never be reached except " relatively," is 
 yet the " absolute " and final aim of the progress 
 towards its achievement. 
 
 But a difficulty has been recently imported 
 into the subject under discussion, which does not 
 appear to me to be inherent in the solution of 
 the problem. I advert, namely, to the contro- 
 versy, which has been raised by the doctrine of 
 Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mansel touching the 
 nature of the "absolute." They contend that 
 the "Absolute" is incogitable Sbud incognizable^ 
 and not subject to the conditions which alone 
 render consciousness possible. Their argument 
 may be thus stated in language which I quote 
 from a work entitled " Examination of the Prin- 
 ciples of the Scoto-Oxonian Philosophy" : — 
 " It is urged by them that consciousness in every 
 mode of its exercise necessarily implies relation. 
 In order that it may take place there must be 
 two correlative factors, a conscious subject or 
 person, and an object or thing, of which that 
 
IDEAS. 225 
 
 person is conscious. The absolute^ on the other part ii. 
 
 ^ Chap. III. 
 
 hand, is directly opposed to^ and exclusive of the 
 
 relative. When therefore we affirm an absolute 
 thing or being to be an object of thought, or of 
 any mode of consciousness, we at the same time 
 affirm of that thing, or being, relation and the 
 negation of relation ; and thus our affirmation in 
 its very terms destroys itself." 
 
 Now I have no desire to mix myself in this, 
 or any, controversial discussion, which involves 
 principles of philosophical reasoning so wholly 
 different from mine as those in question; but, 
 for the sake of the principles which I uphold, I 
 deem it a duty to vindicate the doctrine of the 
 Absolute I have advocated, and therefore (so 
 far at least as the occasion requires) to impugn 
 the statement just quoted from its opponents. 
 
 Thus if it be admitted, as they assume, that 
 the Absolute is the ^^ negation of relation^'' it 
 may be conceded that we could not conceive, 
 or have a conception of, what would be a non- 
 entity, no-thing,-^that what had no marks 
 whereby to conceive it could be no object of 
 conscious thought. But though, as an object, 
 it would be inconceivable and a mere negation, 
 yet at the same time Mansers opinion is more 
 than questionable ; for a negation, even though 
 nothing more, is still an act of the mind, and as 
 such is an object of conscious thought. This, 
 indeed, is only so far material to the point at 
 issue that, if the negation of relation is equi« 
 
 VOL. I. Q 
 
226 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part 11. valent, as Mansel assumes, to the negation of 
 
 '- limitation — [for he argues that we have no 
 
 power of conceiving what is otherwise than finite 
 and limited and that limitation is negation ; that 
 is, he adopts the erroneous view of the Germans, 
 derived from Spinoza, that all relation is limi- 
 tation and therefore negation] — it would be the 
 denial of the thing, or object of thought itself; 
 that is, if we deny that in which the being 
 consists, we deny that being itself. But as the 
 reader will recollect, I have affirmed, and rightly 
 I apprehend, that the removal of limitations is 
 the very condition of contemplating the subject 
 under consideration in its ideal or highest in- 
 tegrity. Here, however, it wiU be necessary to 
 moot another point, in which Mansel's reasoning 
 is erroneous. It appears to me at least that he 
 uses the term "Absolute" as a substantive de- 
 noting a self-subsistent devoid of relations, 
 whereas it is clear that it should be used as an 
 adjective or attribute, meaning " absolved from 
 all limitations or conditions." When therefore 
 used as the designation of Deity, or when it is 
 said that Grod is the Absolute, it surely is to be 
 understood as meaning that Being which is per- 
 fect and unconditional in respect of those attri- 
 butes under which Deity is conceivable, such 
 as absolute power, wisdom, and righteousness. 
 Hence I am quite at a loss to understand how 
 Mansel can attach to the term " absolute " any 
 such mea^itlg as exclusive or devoid of relations. 
 
IDEAS. 227 
 
 seeing that the attributes specified designate the pakt ii. 
 
 highest relations in which God stands to man '■ — '- 
 
 and nature, and without which any relationship 
 would be alike inconceivable and nugatory. 
 
 It is not indeed a difficult task to discover the 
 interest which has led Mansel into what I con- 
 ceive to be an error in religious philosophy, — 
 the paramount interest, namely, of exposing the 
 abuse of the phrase " the Absolute '' as the desig- 
 nation by the pantheists of Deity according to 
 their godless conception. But even here Mansel 
 appears to me to have failed in his reasoning : — 
 for I apprehend, speaking of pantheists m genere, 
 that ^"the Absolute" is with them the ground of 
 all relativity f and, though in and of itself un- 
 differenced, yet the One which is being always 
 differenced and ever and only manifested in its 
 relations — the abiding substance or Proteus of 
 endless transformations. 
 
 It is no less easy to see that Hansel's aim 
 from the beginning is to establish the necessity 
 of a revealed religion ; and surely his incon- 
 sistency of reasoning reaches its climax, when, 
 in order to prove the necessity of revelation, he 
 contends that we can be conscious of religious 
 truths only as finite relations, — that we can 
 believe but cannot conceive an Absolute God, — 
 that we can believe what transcends the con- 
 ditions of consciousness and conception. 
 
 It is evident indeed that Ideas are wholly 
 beyond Hansel's sphere of thought, and that his 
 
 q2 
 
228 SPIHITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. reasoiiiiiffs move only in the reffion of logical 
 
 conceptions : but we quit the subject here, as we 
 
 shall have a fitter occasion for its discussion in 
 treating of the relation of speculative philosophy 
 to religion, and in vindicating the position that 
 God, as Idea Idearum, is the Supreme Object of 
 Speculative no less than of Practical Reason. 
 
 § 12. 6th Axiom. The Will is ideally a prin- 
 ciple of Absolute Freedom. 
 
 If the Will be not essentially originative and 
 spontaneously causative, it ceases to be what we 
 mean by "Will" properly so called. It will 
 be seen hereafter what limitations it will be 
 necessary to impose in considering even human 
 Will ; but meanwhile abstracting from the Idea 
 what interferes with its integrity, it will be seen 
 that to say the Will is free is only to say that 
 the Will is WUl. It must, however be borne 
 in mind that, in conformity with the principle 
 of Spiritual philosophy. Will is only Will, avro- 
 vofj^s and to itself a law, when enlightened by 
 Reason, — that Will can only be truly conceived 
 as Will under the condition of containing a prin- 
 ciple which actuates, guid-es and directs it, — ^and 
 that this principle is the light of Reason which 
 enables it consciously to discern its final aim 
 and purpose. 
 
 But Reason, regarded as distinct from Will, 
 is the essential principle of Necessity; for Reason 
 is the principle of absolute, necessary and im- 
 mutable Truth, and as such is the foundation of 
 
IDEAS. 229 
 
 all Law^ — is itself that eternal Law, lex legwm^ part ii. 
 wliicli universally defends the Right, sternly for- — '■ — •' 
 bids the Wrong, and is ever the implacable foe to 
 all transgression of statutes which continually 
 declare its unalterable justice and equity. HencCj 
 in order to a true conception, of Will enlightened 
 by Reason, it is incumbent on us to provide 
 for the conciliation of the opposite conditions of 
 Spontaneity and Necessity. And it is not difficult 
 to show that such a conciliation or interpene- 
 tration of these principles really exists, and that 
 in all Will or Wills there is so far an identity of 
 freedom and necessity, that the Will (say, the 
 human) obeys the moral law under the sense of 
 obligation arising from conviction of its excel- 
 lence, and thus willingly and in freedom serves 
 the law which itself approves and would have 
 chosen. And, in a higher approach to the ideal 
 aim of this combination, we may expect that the 
 human Will would no longer need the conviction 
 of what is right, nor act from a sense of duty 
 or obligation, but that whatever indispensably 
 remains of the Necessity which attaches to Law 
 would be hidden in the spontaneous realization 
 of the Good. 
 
 In the Axiom which heads this paragraph 
 I have affirmed that "the Will is ideally a 
 principle of absolute Freedom,''^ But we have 
 learnt in the preceding investigation that, in 
 order to realize the Idea in its integrity, the 
 Will ought to be conceived as so far partaking 
 
230 SPIUITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Gh^^ni ^^ *^® necessary, immutable and inevitable, that 
 
 in any proper sense of the term it cannot be 
 
 disunited from the Reason; — and we regard 
 Reason as the Truth, Truth absolute, sub- 
 jectively the universal Intelligence and font of 
 Ideas, objectively the principle of all Being and 
 of the knowledge of all Being, contemplated in 
 its causes and laws. Thus actuated the "Will 
 cannot but will, and this willingly and spon- 
 taneously, whatever is in conformity with the 
 eternal Truth contained in the divine Reason — 
 hereafter to be more fully shown as the Word 
 of God, "whose service is perfect freedom." 
 
 § 13. 7th Axiom. The Will in its ideal in- 
 tegrity cannot but will what is wiiversal^ that 
 is, what may and ought to be the will of all 
 Wills. 
 
 If the individual Will wills only that which 
 cannot be more than particular — ^that is to say, 
 wills only its own selfish whims and arbitrary 
 caprices, it foregoes its universality for its own 
 selfish particularity, and thereby forfeits its claim 
 to ideal integrity. In order to be truly a Will, 
 the individual Will must wiU that its Will be 
 as unbounded and limitless as the Universe — 
 nay, as universal as the Divine Will, Nor is this 
 language extravagant: — for thus universal the 
 individual Will may be, provided that in claim- 
 • ing (as it ought to claim) such universality, 
 it affirms itself as Will and subjective moral 
 being in and by the Universal and Absolute 
 
IDEAS. 231 
 
 Will as the only ground of true Being and the Pakt ii. 
 sole Author of all reality. '■ — '- 
 
 § 14. 8th Axiom. The Will in its ideal in- 
 tegrity cannot but will that whi.h ever remains 
 the same under all change and diversity. 
 
 Essentially connected with the attributes of 
 Will already mentioned is its property, accord- 
 ing to the Idea, that every Will-act must be in 
 principle continuous, permanent and abiding ; — 
 that is, in as much as it is essentially connected 
 with the act of moral self-ponency. It may be 
 asserted generally that the operance which is 
 not sustained until the final accomplishment of 
 whatever the Will proposes and resolves to effect 
 is merely the exposure of weakness and the 
 confession of inefficiency, — that the want of 
 persistency marks the collapse and surcease 
 of a Will which can only have pretended to 
 possess moral integrity. But in the highest 
 sense, not only should every act be adequate 
 to the achievement of its purpose, but should 
 partake of the moral and spiritual integrity of 
 the primaiy and abiding act of self-ponency ; — 
 and it is this moral consistency in thought, 
 word and deed, which marks the character of a 
 man of undeviating rectitude and reliable in- 
 tegrity. We may indeed say that such a Will, 
 constituted according to its Idea, cannot but 
 will that which is Mernal, In using this 
 term I must however guard against any mis- 
 apprehension of my meaning by stating that it 
 
232 SPIEITUAIi PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. IS intended to designate that whicli, as essen- 
 
 ' tially ^'spiritual," transcends the conditions of 
 
 time and space, and of all the adventitious 
 circumstances with which they are associated 
 in the sphere of sensible and psychical expe- 
 rience. The term "eternal," refers us to spi- 
 ritual act and being, and to the laws of true 
 Being which, as spiritual, belong essentially to 
 Divine Being. And so conceived it may be 
 affirmed, that as every Will must will what 
 may be universal, so every "Will, in aiming at 
 its integral perfection of spiritual being, cannot 
 but will that which is eternal, and eternal 
 because it is the WUl of God. 
 
 But the Axiom enunciated at the commence- 
 ment of the paragraph tells us that the ideal 
 Will must ever remaia the same " under all 
 change and diversity." And in exhibiting the 
 perfections of such ideal Will, it is scarcely less 
 than evident that, although we justly require 
 the unvarying integrity of act which is ever one 
 and the same by reason of the constant unity 
 of its eternal principle, it will be demanded of us 
 to supply a correspondent and correlative factor, 
 in order to account for the multifarious diversity 
 of acts, which cannot but arise out of an essen- 
 tially causative and originant Will, especially 
 when considered in its complete perfections. 
 
 This factor is supplied when it is affirmed 
 that All Will, according to the Idea, is in- 
 finite. This attribute we can contemplate only 
 
IDEAS* 233 
 
 as fully refalized in the Absolute Will causative partii. 
 
 of all reality. And hence in the Non- Absolute '- — '- 
 
 Will we can only regard it as an infinite Po- 
 tentiality of being dependent upon the actua- 
 tion of the Divine Will. Nevertheless, by the 
 presence and operance of the Divine Will in 
 His universal agency — (an individuation of the 
 Universal Will being the one and sole ground 
 of individual reality) — every individual Will in 
 its self-affirmation affirms its infinite, though 
 potential, capability of repeating in the totality 
 of its own distinctive acts the whole of that In- 
 finitude of which it is itself a part. Every 
 Will, in order to be what it ideally aims to be, 
 must strive and resolve to manifest and exhibit 
 all that is necessary to the perfection of its spi- 
 ritual being. Less than this would be an imper- 
 fect willing, and a withholding from a defective 
 power of Will. Every Non-absolute Will is then 
 a process of endlessly realizing what is at once 
 and for ever contained in the Idea which it pos- 
 sesses, consciously or unconsciously, in and by the 
 inherent power and operance of what we have 
 called national or Spiritual Integration. 
 
 § 15, Hence then it may be affirmed upon d 
 priori grounds that, in the process of spiritual 
 integration, the Will (all Will and every Will) 
 inherently, and by the very nature of Will, tends 
 to realize a self-ponency which is at once free 
 and necessary, universal and individual, eternal 
 and infinite, and to be in all respects absolute. 
 
234 SPIKITUAJj PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. Thus it will appear, on a retrospect of the 
 '■ — Axioms we have established, that we may com- 
 prehend the truth they contain in a conclusire 
 Axiom to the following effect : — All Will cannot 
 but need and crave to be, or to fill a sphere of act 
 and being, and to integrate itself in that sphere, 
 that is, to integrate itself spiritually, or as "Will, 
 in its absolute integrity of being. 
 
 And we shall hereafter learn that the "ten- 
 dency" to absolute self-integration will have 
 been realized in proportion to the degree in 
 which the individual "Will conforms itself to, 
 and concurs with, the Absolute or Divine Will. 
 And in discussing this momentous topic we 
 shall have occasion to consider the hindrances, 
 which, by reason of the actual pravity of human 
 nature, oppose themselves to the progress and 
 achievement of the process of spiritual inte- 
 gration. 
 
 § 16. But finally we invite a retrospect of the 
 foregoing disquisitions on the necessary rela- 
 tions of the Will actualizing itself according to 
 the idea of its spiritual integration, for the pur- 
 pose of exhibiting the grounds on which we shall 
 seek to establish a principle therein implied, 
 which is of paramount importance to the further 
 prosecution of our speculative reasonings. This 
 principle may be named Polarity ; and its defi- 
 nition may be added as the conclusive Axiom 
 of Spiritual Integration: — "A One Power, which 
 manifests itself in opposite and correlative forces, 
 
IDEAS. 235 
 
 or in distinctive relations at once opposite and part ir 
 
 ^ ^ Clutp. III. 
 
 reciprocally complemental, and which thereby 
 
 perpetuates itself in living reality and totality 
 by distinction in unity. '^^ 
 
 Now all "powers" derive their intelligibility 
 from Will; and the foregoing positions, esta- 
 blished as Axioms in this chapter, testify to the 
 truth of the proposition advanced; siace we have 
 found in the investigation of the "Will the ground 
 and explanation of the relations here attributed 
 to all powers, and the derivation of these rela- 
 tions satisfactorily accounted for by the nature 
 and conditions of self-conscious Will as the 
 norm and origin of the conception of power 
 causative. 
 
 The requisite element for the construction of 
 that ideal Faradigm of Relations which exhibits 
 the principle of Polarity may be easily col- 
 lected from the Axioms already explained in 
 this chapter. And, in conformity with them, 
 we affirm as follows : — 
 
 i. The postulate of all reality is Will, or that 
 which is absolutely causative. As such we have 
 to regard it as supra-relative, but as containing 
 potentially the relations in and by which Will 
 is manifested. 
 
 ii. The Will, namely, cannot but will its self- 
 ponency, that is, affirm itself as Will, — on the 
 one hand in Personal Being expressed in the 
 " I am," and on the other as the Type or Idea 
 of that which it is to realize : — and herein it 
 
236 SPmiTUAIi PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 pakt II. must act as indivisibly one, since a divided "Will 
 
 Chap. III. , 
 
 is no W ill. 
 
 iii. Moreover, it must will itself in Alterity, 
 that is, in a diversity of acts; for without 
 Distinctions or distinctive relations, it would 
 remain an undifferenced identity of forces with- 
 out actual operance, and would be a mere and 
 unintelligible potentiality. But, in thus realizing 
 itself in an alterity of distinctive acts, the diver- 
 sity must ever be counterbalanced by the Unity 
 of the type out of which it proceeds. 
 
 iv. Again, when manifested in a totality of 
 acts which may be regarded as Parts of a Whole, 
 these parts are made to constitute the Totality 
 by virtue of the one Will which manifests its 
 indivisible integrity therein; and the Type or 
 antecedent unity, which has been the One-in-AU, 
 now takes the form of the AU-in-One. 
 
 V. But, lastly, if the Will be entire in the act 
 constitutive of the Whole, it must, in the oppo- 
 site relation, be entire in each and every Part ; — 
 that is, every Whole and each and every Part 
 must be actuated by the same one and undi- 
 vided wm. 
 
 § 17. Now it is by the combination of these 
 elements or factors, representing the necessary 
 or "polar" relations of Will actualizing, that 
 we are enabled to form a Paradigm of Ideal 
 Construction or genesis. And we will distinguish 
 these relations by the names Identity, Thesis, 
 Antithesis, and Synthesis, 
 
IDEAS. 237 
 
 Of Will (1) contemplated, as if yet imdiffer- part ii. 
 
 enced, in the identity of its elements, — and (2) of '■ — ' 
 
 WiU contemplated in the Alterity, or differenced 
 into its relations, as thesis and antithesis, namely 
 Subject and Object, — of these relations we have 
 spoken in the chapter on Self-consciousness. But 
 we have here to consider the Alterity of the "Will 
 in a larger sense, as the necessary form by which 
 all Will realizes itseK, causatively and produc- 
 tively, in the construction or genesis of a Whole of 
 Parts — be it a work of art, a poem, a picture, a 
 piece of mechanism, the Universe itself, or any of 
 the organic wholes which are its component. Pur- 
 suing then the topic of the Will in the relation 
 of its productive alterity, we have to assign to it, 
 as the principle of ideal construction, the "polar 
 relations" which constitute its factors or work- 
 ing forces. These we are led at once to consider, 
 without anticipating any objection, are the op- 
 posite, yet reciprocally complemental, factors of 
 Unity and Distinction ; — the former working in 
 the relation of the tendency to impress and 
 maintain throughout the process the identity of 
 the Idea which originates the construction ; the 
 latter working in the relation of the opposite 
 tendency to diversify and vary the constructive 
 Idea, by enriching it with all the possible forms 
 of being and modifications of agency which may 
 contribute to, without disturbing, the unity of 
 the primary purpose and final aim; — and thus 
 in the relations both of identity and diversity 
 
238 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. these Opposite, though correspondent, tendencies 
 
 '- — '- work the same Will in and to a product, in 
 
 which the unity of the Whole and the distinc- 
 tion of its component Parts are harmoniously 
 comhined. And such may be regarded as illus- 
 tration and application of the polar formula, 
 viz. Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis. It will, 
 however, be proper to advertise the reader that, 
 in having before him the relations of the para- 
 digm of ideal construction, he will find two forms 
 of Unity and two of Distinction, constituting 
 instead of a single polarity as above a double or 
 what may be called a bi-polarity ; — but thus ad- 
 vertised he may best await the explanation until 
 the relations themselves have been exhibited. 
 
 E/Csuming then the consideration of Will in 
 its productive Alterity, and at the same time 
 reminding the student that the process about to 
 be described is only the explication of the seK- 
 ponency of the Will, above considered in its 
 relations as Subject and Object, and now to be 
 regarded in its objective aspect, — I proceed to 
 designate and describe the opposite, yet corre- 
 spondent, factors of ideal construction. 
 
 i. The first relation is one of the forms of 
 Unity ; and it may be described as the antece- 
 dent unity, and designated as the Type of the 
 projected Whole now in process of construction. 
 Whatever the genetic Idea, considered both as 
 power and contemplamen, may be in respect of 
 its purpose and final aim, it operates in this 
 
IDEAS. 239 
 
 relation as the factor or tendency which in- paet ii. 
 delibly impresses the one and self-same Type on - — '- — ' 
 every part of the intended Whole, and ever main- 
 tains the typical Unity of the ideal "Whole amid 
 all diversity and every changing variety in its 
 evolution. 
 
 ii. The second and opposite Relation is one of 
 the forms of Distinction; and it may be desig- 
 nated as the Principle of Diversity, or the ten- 
 dency to re-produce the original type ever as 
 another, though the same, in all possible novelties 
 of form which are compatible with the retention 
 of the constructive Idea. Distinction implies 
 the explication and exhibition of all latent rela- 
 tions of any yet undeveloped Subject: — and 
 hence, as the unbalanced tendency to Unity 
 could produce only a monotonous sameness, it 
 is counteracted in this conspiration and an- 
 tagonism of forces by an equal tendency to 
 Distinction by diversifying the original Type. 
 
 iii. The third Relation, also a form of Distinc- 
 tion, but claiming a characteristic difference from 
 the last-described, may be named the Frmcipium 
 IndividuL Its tendency, or the tendency thus 
 named, is to integrate each act of diversity into 
 an Integer, dependent indeed upon the whole of 
 which it is a part, but claiming a relative self- 
 subsistency. It may thus become, or has the 
 capability of becoming, a Sub-Type of the original 
 Type, which it represents in a new form of exist- 
 ence, and may thus be transmuted to a secondary 
 
240 
 
 SPIUITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II centre of a whole, which, repeats under varied 
 
 Chap. III. , •*- 
 
 ' ' conditions its progenitor ; — and it may he added 
 
 that such successive cycles of being, ever another 
 though typically the same, alter et idem, may, 
 according to the Idea, be limitless. 
 
 In considering the function of the second form 
 of Distinction, it cannot but be seen that the ope- 
 rative factor which has been described as the main 
 element in totalising or completing a whole, namely 
 the Urdtive or Integrant, has here assumed the 
 form of the Distinctive, and works in the service of 
 Distinction. As we have had occasion to remark 
 in describing the second form of Distinction, the 
 Prmcipium Individui (as we have agreed to name 
 it) operates as the tendency to integrate each and 
 every act of diversity into a relative Integer or 
 Whole in itself — in other words an Individual : 
 but in so doing the individualizing tendency 
 would, if not counteracted, produce the separa- 
 tion of the individual from the whole of which it 
 is essentially a part, and thus convert the part 
 into a self-subsistent entity. The appointed and 
 adequate remedy for this illegitimate aberration 
 lies in the fourth relation of ideal construction, 
 to which we now invite attention. 
 
 iv. The fourth relation is again a form of 
 Unity, which, for want of a better name, 
 we may call the Frincipium or Lea? Continui. 
 It is the tendency to counterbalance, or to 
 counteract any excess of, the tendency to diver- 
 sity ; and this by the harmonious adaptation of 
 
IDEAS. 241 
 
 every component part to the whole originally partIT. 
 
 projected, and contemplated in the antecedent 
 
 nnity of the type out of which it proceeds. In 
 the primary relation we contemplate the Unity 
 as antecedent and prospective; in the present 
 relation as resultant, or operative to the resulting 
 totality. By the former we are enabled to 
 behold the unity of a causative type, which is 
 One-in-AU; by the latter the unity, which is 
 derived from the achievement of the AU-in-One. 
 
 But as, with reference to the antagonistic 
 relation, I had occasion to remark that, under 
 the influence of the Principium Individuiy 
 the Integrant or unific force becomes dis- 
 tinctive and assumes the office of Distinction, . 
 by potentiating the several diversities into 
 individualities, — so here, mutatis mutandis, 
 under the operation of the Lew Oontinui or 
 totalizing process, .the Distinctive force becomes 
 Integrant^ namely, by adjusting the relation of 
 each participant to each other, and of each to 
 all, according to the governing Idea which 
 regulates the rank and proportions the power 
 of the constituents. And thus the Lex Con- 
 tinuiy. even while heightening the distinctive 
 individuality, promotes the union and balanced 
 conspiration of the several and manifold parts to 
 a compact and coherent Whole. 
 
 V. The fifth relation, if it can be properly 
 so called, is the result of the interaction and 
 balanced operance of the four above described 
 
 vox. I. R 
 
242 SPIBITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Paktii. factors in the fourfold relation which con- 
 
 Chap. Ill, 
 
 -' stitutes their bi-polarity of opposite forces ; 
 
 operative, as we have seen, by the ever present 
 unity of a Type, whose oneness is continually 
 counterbalanced by a perpetual generation and 
 profusion of distinctive forms, and by the modi- 
 fying influence unceasingly exerted by the oppo- 
 site yet correlative processes of individualizing 
 and totalizing ; in order to the Synthetic Totality 
 of the organic Whole, in which the Typical 
 Idea, as the exponent of a fontal and causative 
 Will, reveals itself as a living reality in perpetual 
 unity and exhaustive distinction. 
 
 § 18. In a retrospect of the last paragraph it 
 will be acknowledged that the Paradigm of Ideal 
 Construction, such as we have exhibited it, is no 
 less a Paradigm of Spiritual and Rational Inte- 
 gration ; — that is, it shows convincingly in what 
 the ideal perfection of causative Will consists, as 
 guided and directed by the perfect law of Heason 
 in respect of the necessary and absolute form of 
 its operance. What the life and substance of 
 this "form" or formula of speculative Reason 
 may be, will appear hereafter connected with the 
 reality of the idea of rational Will already re- 
 cognised in and by the facts of self-conscious- 
 ness. That the scheme in question is that of 
 the Relations of Integration will be manifest 
 when we consider :-- that the first is Integra- 
 tion, by impressing an integral unity of Type 
 on every conceivable part of the whole pro- 
 
IDEAS. 243 
 
 ceeding from it; — that the second, or opposite paktii. 
 
 relation, is Integration, by the exhibition of the '- — 
 
 typical unity in the exhaustive diversity of Dis- 
 tinction ; — that the third, or individualizing 
 process, is Integration by the absolute tendency 
 in each to become a self-subsistent whole, or 
 Integer ; — -that the. fourth, or totalizing process, 
 in retort of the individualizing or separative 
 tendency, is Integration by the absolute tendency 
 to reduce all distinctive diversities to propor- 
 tional parts of the whole affirmed in the ante- 
 cedent unity of the typical Idea; — and thus it 
 will be acknowledged that the same Principle 
 of Integrity, which animates the genetic Type, 
 impels it to manifest itself in an exhaustless 
 progeny of Distinctions, and at the same time 
 is operative in each and all in order to achieve 
 and perfect the Totality, which is the counter- 
 part and living product of the parent Idea from 
 which it proceeds. 
 
 It will be seen, moreover, that those several 
 relative acts are all in principle the same, — each 
 of them, namely, being a Will-act in order to 
 realize in the moments what is purposed in the 
 total process^ unity in distinction and distinction 
 in unity. And it follows that each is thereby 
 rendered capable of becoming, or of being trans- 
 muted into, its kindred other. In Distinction 
 Unity becomes objective, and in Unity Distinction 
 becomes subjective. And whilst in the moment 
 of Individuality Unity becomes a form of Dis- 
 
 r2 
 
244 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part ii. tinction, in order to integrate the parts, in the 
 
 '• corresponding moment of Totality, Distinction 
 
 passes into a form of Unity, which is but the 
 reflux of the Unity which gave birth to the 
 Totality. Thus ever ^Hdem gignitur alter^^ and 
 the same Will, which appears differenced into 
 forms is recognised as the same abiding sub- 
 stance under all change. And I close with 
 the remark that these acts or moments, whether 
 simultaneous or successive, are essentially above 
 the conditions of Time, and are necessary "forms" 
 of spiritual integration, alike in the fontal and 
 highest Idea, and in all the ideal constructions 
 that may be derived from the Idea Idearum, 
 
CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 DIALECTIC, on THE POLAR LOGIC, AND ITS OFFICE IN 
 THE CONVERSION OF CONCEPTIONS INTO IDEAS. 
 
 § 1. It may be assumed that tlie formula of partii. 
 Polar Logic which we adopt from Coleridge's — - — '- 
 statement (Common Place Book No. 3) is an 
 adequate description of the Relations, or ele- 
 mentary factors, required in the Polar Logic in 
 order to the conciliation of Opposites and, in 
 perpetuating their distinctions to secure their 
 unity; viz : — 
 
 Identity. 
 Thesis . Indifference. Antithesis . 
 Synthesis. 
 
 It is true that in the preceding chapter the 
 full form of ideal construction has been pre- 
 sented to the reader as a bi-polarity ; but all 
 such constructions are fundamentally uni-polar, 
 and become bi-polar only by differencing the 
 opposites, and it will be found that uni-polarity 
 is sufficient for most of the purposes of "polar 
 logic." But it may be borne in mind that, in 
 the ideal construction which exhibits the ge- 
 netic development of a Principle, every new 
 distinction may call forth a new opposite, and 
 
246 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 PiKT II. therefore that which was primarily an uni-polarity 
 
 is calculated to be a multi-polarity or system 
 
 of correlatives. We are here, however, only con- 
 cerned with the opposition and conciliation of the 
 products of the imderstanding, which have been 
 designated as Conceptions. 
 
 And it may be added that the above formula, 
 as the Paradigm of Unity and Distinction,' is 
 the universal principle of all relativity; for 
 however many the relations into which a One. 
 may be differenced, all are but the modified 
 repetitions of the same original form. Compare 
 " Method of Spiritual Philosophy," MS. 
 
 § 2. It may be stated generally that, as long 
 as we move in the reasonings ruled by the logic 
 of the understanding. Dialectic or a conflict of 
 positions is inevitable. It will be found that all 
 such truths of the understanding, or conceptual 
 truths, when considered by the light of ideal 
 truth, are but half-truths. Truth in its integrity 
 embraces two sides or relations; but if these sides 
 or relations, instead of being regarded as rela- 
 tions complementary of each other, are assumed 
 to be exclusive opposites, the affirmation of either 
 of which is the denial of the other, we miss the 
 whole truth of which they are the components. 
 The Polar Logic is the instrument for disen- 
 tangling the mind from this Dialectic, which is 
 imposed upon it by the inalienable mechanism 
 of the understanding, as the faculty judging 
 according to experience ; and we are only relieved 
 
DIALECTIC. 247 
 
 from it by an appeal to the integral ■ Idea in part ii. 
 whicli the conflicting opposites have a ground — — — '- 
 of reality. 
 
 And notwithstanding that it would be diffi- 
 cult for a determined partizan to believe an 
 opponent, who holds views diametrically oppo- 
 site to his own, to be otherwise than absolutely 
 wrong, yet instances may be easily adduced of 
 a conciliatory solution of party strife, as far as 
 conflicting opinions are concerned, whether in 
 politics or religion. Thus "Whig " and "Tory," 
 " Liberal " and " Conservative," have been the 
 watchwords of parties engaged in perpetual 
 hostility ; but notwithstanding the apparently 
 extreme opinions (or "principles" as they would 
 call them) of both, it will be found, in tracing 
 the offensive watchwords to their ideal source, 
 that they really mean the two essential elements 
 or principles of every well-constituted state, and 
 which, each implying the other, are necessary 
 correlative factors of its weal and safety, — that 
 they represent, namely, the combined interests 
 of Fermcmence and Progress, Separate these 
 twin factors from their legitimate union, and 
 they become, to use an expression of Heraclitus, 
 "portals of death" in the forms of rigidity and 
 dissipation; — the one party perpetuating, or 
 tending to perpetuate, with what is excellent, 
 that which is perishable and worthless ; and the 
 other, if unchecked, tending to ceaseless inno- 
 vation and to the restless chase of untried and 
 
248 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. short-lived novelties. See the Idea further de- 
 — ~ — '- veloped in Coleridge's " Church and State." 
 
 § 3. The principle, under which the union or 
 combination of Opposite Relations is e£Fected, 
 is one of universal import. In looking to the 
 unintelligent powers of nature the law will be 
 found universal, that all powers manifest them- 
 selves in Opposite Eorces. Here, on the other 
 hand, we have to consider the like principle in 
 the form of intelligence itself, and as belonging 
 to self-conscious mind in the acts and process 
 of the Discourse of Reason. And, we might 
 designate the sort of logic now under considera- 
 tion the Logic of Reason. It is the process for 
 disentangling the mind from the inevitable 
 Dialectic imposed upon it by the forms and 
 mechanism of the Understanding^ —which, as the 
 faculty of reasoning by means of " Conception," 
 is opposed to Reason, as the faculty of reasoning 
 by means of " Ideas." 
 
 So true is the principle here implied, that, 
 without any conscious appreciation of the aid 
 derived from polar or ideal logic, it has reached 
 and influenced, as we should say by the force 
 of common sense, the ordinary judgements of 
 mankind. Nay, it would seem as if a certain 
 gratification, akin to the pleasure afforded by 
 a witty saying, attended the statement of a 
 truth as a paradox. Thus Fuller — a worthy 
 among "the worthies" he has so ably deline- 
 ated, in describing " the good Wife," teUs us 
 
DIALECTIC. 249 
 
 "She commandeth her husband in any equal paktii. 
 
 naatter by constant obeying him." He adds, '■ — - 
 
 "She never crosseth her husband in the spring- 
 tide of his anger, but stayes till it be ebbing- 
 water." The mode of conciliating the contrary 
 conceptions of "command" and "obedience," 
 so as to justify an unity of thought combining 
 both, is here sufficiently indicated. But it is 
 not difficult to conceive generally, that to op- 
 pose one, who has the power and will to enforce 
 mandates, issued under the red-heat of a fit of 
 impetuous self-will, or sullenly maintained under 
 the sense of offended dignity, would be not only 
 vain, but likely to increase, his resistance and_ 
 obduracy. And, on the other hand, it is to be 
 expected, that to wait patiently " till it be 
 ebbing waters," to bear meekly the insolent 
 provocations of fitful moodiness, and to culti- 
 vate the habit of yielding even to unreasonable 
 assertions of supremacy, cannot fail to beget in 
 the lordly claimant a confidence that the pride 
 of power and the jealousy of authority will not 
 be encroached upon by rebellious resistance, and 
 may favour occasions of cooler and calmer temper 
 for the exercise of those winning arts of per- 
 suasion which a loving wife knows how to use 
 and profit by, especially if aided by the regret 
 of a fond husband consequent upon a sense of 
 his abuse of power. And thus " the good Wife," 
 in learning to rule by submission, may teach us 
 to reconcile and unite the contrary conceptions 
 
250 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II, of Command and Obedience, with the iust ex- 
 
 pectation of a marital peace perpetually ratified 
 
 by mutual forbearance and concession. 
 
 Again, it is put forth as a maxim that " Cre- 
 dulity is the strength of a child." But to be- 
 lieve everything is mere Weakness : — how then 
 without contradicting ourselves can we say that 
 Weakness is Strength? We may be reminded, how- 
 ever, that to believe nothing would be analogous 
 to a case of congenital blindness; — the faculty 
 either of sight or intelligence, would be deprived 
 of the very conditions, under which it attains to 
 the due performance of its appointed ofiice. The 
 Child needs both the exercise and the materials 
 of thought in order to acquire vigour of intellect, 
 and the only conceivable mode of acquisition is 
 a belief, even to the excess of credulity, which 
 leads him to take on trust whatever is com- 
 municated to him. Doubt is, or ought to be, 
 the after-process ; for to begin by doubting is 
 to refuse our intellectual food, and to insist 
 upon intellectual inanition. But the polar logic 
 teaches us that, although Weakness as Credulity 
 is put in contradictory opposition to intellectual 
 Strength, the two opposite conceptions may be 
 united in the " Idea " of invigoration by indis- 
 pensable submission to the influences of nourish- 
 ment and excitants from without. 
 
 We may not unfitly introduce here by way of 
 illustration the dictum of Aristotle, that. Every 
 virtue is the mean of two contrary vices; 
 
DIALECTIC. 251 
 
 ex. gr. : that courage is the mean of reckless- paet ti. 
 
 ness and cowardice. It may be said generally '~ 
 
 that a mean partakes of two things, or attri- 
 butes of things, opposed to each other, and 
 may supply a balance which tends to prevent 
 the excess of either. Over-daring easily passes 
 into recklessness of danger, and over-caution 
 into timidity ; but courage (when genuine, that 
 is) boldly confronts a danger, but duly counts 
 the cost of attack or defence, guards against 
 excess in either direction, and combines prudent 
 caution with unquellable daring. But it is to 
 be observed that the dicttmi of Aristotle is not so 
 to be understood, or so to be accepted if such 
 were his meaning, that courage (as the example 
 of virtue generally) is a combination of its 
 possible excesses; — it is not a "synthesis" of 
 recklessness and cowardice, but of two opposite 
 tendencies 3 each of which, if unbalanced by the 
 opposite and countervailing tendency, ^ would 
 necessarily become the excess which is designated 
 as a Vice. 
 
 § 4. Without entering further into the distinc- 
 tion which Coleridge has drawn between Reason 
 and Understanding, it may suffice to . quote 
 the following from his "Aids to Reflection;" — 
 "Understanding in its highest form of ex- 
 perience remains commensurate with the notices 
 of the senses; "—[or rather, I should say, with 
 the notices of the inner and outer sense;] 
 — " Reason affirms truths which no sense could 
 
252 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. perceivc nor experience confirm. Yea, this is 
 — - — - the test and character of a truth so affirmed, 
 that in its own proper form it is mconceivable. 
 Por to conceive is a function of the Under- 
 standing, which can be exercised only on 
 subjects subordinate thereto. And yet to the 
 forms of the understanding all truth must be 
 reduced, that is, to be fixed as an object of 
 reflection, and to be rendered ecopressible. And 
 here we have a second test and sign of a truth, 
 so affirmed, that it can come forth out of the 
 mould of the understanding only in the disguise 
 of two contradictory conceptions^ each of which 
 is partially true, and the conjunction of both 
 conceptions becomes the representative or ex- 
 pression (= exponent) of a truth beyond con- 
 ception and inexpressible. Examples : Before 
 Abraham was, I am. — God is a circle, the centre 
 of which is everywhere, and circumference no- 
 where. — The Soul is all in every part." * 
 
 § 5. In order to render the import of the 
 above quotation fully intelligible in its bearing 
 upon the whole argument, it will be desirable 
 to recal the reader's attention to the truth 
 already stated, that the so-called " Categories of 
 
 * It may be right however to apprise the reader that, as I have shown 
 in greater detail elsewhere, I do not accept the latter part of the extract 
 without considerable qualification; for if it be in the main true that 
 spiritual truths cannot, strictly speaking, be " conceived" {i.e. that they 
 are not " generalizations ") yet it is scarcely consistent to say, as Coleridge 
 does, that such truths must be conceived and yet are " beyond concep- 
 tion and inexpressible." (iSi?^ foot-note at page 258, and also § 11.) 
 
DIALECTIC. 253 
 
 the Understanding" are undeniably principles part ii. 
 
 of Speculative Reason. And the additional — 
 
 evidence, which I propose to offer, will better 
 enable the reader to satisfy himself how the 
 Dialectic in question arises, and how the Con- 
 tradictions, in which it consists, may be effectu- 
 ally resolved into truths of Reason. 
 
 Our argument throughout assumes and implies 
 that the Reason, as the organ of spiritual truths, 
 is the opposite or countervailing power to the 
 Understanding, and by its inherent tendency 
 to Ideal Integration turns at once from the 
 merely empirical to those truths which tran- 
 scend all experience sensible and psychical. 
 Reason contemplates, in that which is under 
 the conditions of Space and Time, that which 
 is boundless and eternal; in a world of flux 
 and change, the permanent and immutable ; in 
 ^ world of relations, the supra-relative; in a 
 world of dependencies, the unconditional and 
 absolute; in a world of imperfections, the in- 
 tegral and perfect. 
 
 It will not be out of place here to remark 
 that, in most of the above instances (and others 
 might be mentioned) the terms used are Nega- 
 tions of the empirical forms from which they 
 are derived. Nor is it to be wondered at that 
 the human mind should thus afford evidence 
 of its struggles to release itself from the bondage 
 of the senses, and from the tyranny of appear- 
 ances, in its aspirations after higher truth and 
 
254 SPIUITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. insiffht of true beinff. Thus in such terms as 
 
 Chap. IV. ^ ° 
 
 eternal, absolute, infinite, ineflFable, inconceiv- 
 able, incomprehensible, and the like, as they 
 apply to spiritual truths, the Reason assumes 
 a negative character : — but in its proper and 
 positive character, though here still considered 
 as speculative or simply intellectual, it is the 
 power of Integration, x>i beholding the Absolute 
 and Perfect, and of integrating thereby the merely 
 relative and imperfect forms of Experience. 
 
 § 6. It will be recollected that the so-called 
 Categories were introduced to the reader in 
 the first part of this essay as Concipiencies or 
 Forms of Conception, indispensable in the 
 acquirement of experience sensible and psy- 
 chical. And though it was then suggested that 
 they were in truth Forms of Reason, aud only 
 intelligible as supersensuous principles by its 
 light, we may now, after the investigation of 
 Will as the source of spiritual knowledge, 
 proceed with the confidence that the requisite 
 explanations will be fully comprehended. It 
 is then here again affirmed that the Categories 
 are really forms of Reason or speculative 
 truth; — that, when used in the service of the 
 understanding, they are only applicable to Con- 
 ceptions, as generalized from the notices of the 
 senses, or as derived from psychical changes ; 
 but that under the dynasty of Reason, to which 
 they properly belong, they assume the higher 
 potence or power of designating the modes of 
 
DIALECTIC. 255 
 
 conceiving Spiritual Realities and superse^tsuom part il 
 Verities, 
 
 Thus Substance and Accident^ as used by the 
 Understanding, is the concipiency of the co- 
 inherence of attributes or qualities, which we 
 attribute to any total impression conceived as 
 an Object and represented as an unity of thought 
 by means of a generic name. But, for the 
 Heason, Substance is a Noumenon^ a spiritual 
 and abiding ovala^ opposed to its manifold and 
 changing Fhcenomena : and as we have found 
 in the investigation of self- consciousness it is 
 derived from the Idea of "Will," recognised 
 in ourselves as the essential condition of our 
 spiritual reality, and contemplated by the Reason 
 as the universal ground of Being. 
 
 Again, the category or concipiency of Cause 
 and Effect is used by the Understanding as 
 the indispensable mode of conceiving an invari- 
 able connexion, dependency, or sequence of two 
 phsenomena, of which one is described as the 
 Antecedent, and the other as the Consequent.* 
 But, for the Reason, the Causative, instead of 
 being the expression of mere antecedency or 
 primacy in order of thought, is the essential 
 
 * The notion of Time in the relation of Antecedent and Consequent 
 has produced an unnecessary difficulty eyen from the point of view of 
 the Understanding: for the designations of Antecedent and Con- 
 sequent, properly conceived, are derived not from sequence in time but 
 from order of thought, that is, by assigning primacy to the antecedent, 
 and dependency to the consequent; — it is a question of rank and not of 
 time. 
 
256 SPIMTUAL PHIlLOSOPHY. 
 
 Part il Principle of Origination and absolute sponta- 
 
 '- — '- neity which we name " Will," opposed to 
 
 "Effects" which are the objects of experience 
 and the outward signs derived from the super- 
 sensuous originant. _It will be found then that 
 the Idea, indicated by "Cause" or the causa- 
 ' tive, is but another aspect of the same idea, 
 which we contemplate in "Substance;" and 
 that the spiritual truth, when ideally integrated, 
 is that which is enunciated in the position " Ab- 
 solute Will as causative of all reality." 
 
 Thirdly, the category of TVhole and Parts is 
 conceived by the Understanding as a sensible 
 Whole, the sum of whose parts constitutes its 
 Totality. Por the Reason, on the other hand, 
 a Whole is the result of a Power, or antecedent 
 Unity, which is productive and conservative of 
 the sensible sum total of parts, and is whole and 
 entire in each and every part.* It is for Reason 
 the great principle of Unity and Distinction^ of 
 which we have exhibited the factors in the 
 Paradigm of Ideal Construction and genesis 
 (Chap. iii. § 17.) And here again it will be 
 found that we are really contemplating, though 
 in another phase, the same great Idea as before. 
 In " Substance" we regarded it as the per- 
 manent and abiding ova-la^ in " Cause " as the 
 genetic and originant. And now in the " Whole 
 and Parts," we regard it as manifested and 
 
 * As tlie sclioolmen say, " Ubi anima estj fota est^ toia in ioto^ et 
 tota in qudlibet parted 
 
DIALECTIC. 257 
 
 realized in a sphere of organic being, in which part ii. 
 
 the Idea, as causative power, abiding substance, 
 
 and constitutive energy, is evolved and set forth 
 in its unity, totality, finality and permanent 
 eificiency. Vital Dynamics, Preface, p. xxv. 
 
 § 7. If then Reason is compelled to adopt the 
 language of the Understanding ; — and such is 
 unavoidably the case ; for we have no other 
 language than that which consists of Words 
 expressing Conceptions which are generalized 
 from the notices of the senses and from empi- 
 rically observed psychical changes ; — and if the 
 meaning intended to be conveyed have reference 
 to supersensuous truths, of which the Under- 
 standing can take no cognizance, except in its 
 own empirical forms, wholly unsuited to the ex- 
 hibition of spiritual truths ; — then, I say, it can- 
 not fail that, in the attempt to express what is 
 spiritual in language, which is suited only to 
 objects belonging to empirical cognition, contra- 
 dictions will arise. "And yet," as Coleridge 
 truly says, "to the forms of the Understanding 
 all truth must be reduced, that is, to be fixed 
 as an object of reflection, and to be rendered 
 expressible;" — in other words spiritual truths 
 must be submitted to the categorical moulds of 
 the Understanding, but in undergoing the pro- 
 cess "they come forth in the disguise of two 
 contradictory conceptions,^^ The Reason strives 
 to express, or to obtain the exponent of an Idea ; 
 but the Understanding or logical faculty can 
 
 VOL. I. s 
 
258 SPIItlTTJAL PHIIiOSOPHT. 
 
 Part ii. supply Only Conceptual forms ; and the Reason, 
 in order to obtain the exponent it needs, uses 
 
 conceptions, which, in contradicting each other, 
 
 suggest the ideal truth aimed at. 
 
 It may be remarked, however, that Coleridge* 
 
 * Coleridge's statement (tliat an "Idea" appears in tlie disguise of 
 two contradictory " conceptions," but is itself " inconceivable and in- 
 expressible ") seems to require elucidation ; especially wben coupled "with 
 a previous assertion that ideas must be conceived in order to be objects 
 of reflection, i.e. of thought. Perhaps C/s view might be more clearly 
 and correctly stated. 
 
 " To conceive " is a function of the Understanding, i.e. of the sub- 
 jective mind : — it is the universal and necessary form of " thinking," 
 of every intellectual act of conscious presentation : — to conceive is to 
 "generalize" and "name," that is, to refer to the proper genus or 
 kind whatever may be affirmed to be the result of experience. 
 
 The question to be considered is, in what relation does an Idea stand 
 to the Understanding so defined ? If we can only think by means of 
 " conceptions," it would necessarily include the thinking of Ideas and by 
 means of Ideas : htut this impHes that Ideas are " results of experience." 
 Is this so ? We have throughout repudiated the notion of an " idea " 
 being a result of experience, and have contended that it is a truth 
 of Reason a priorij and not empirical or a posteriori. 
 
 Now in order to obtain a sound view it must be borne in mind that if 
 every logical act be necessarily a " conception," and therefore would 
 include an " idea,'' and yet that an idea is not to be deemed a result of 
 experience, it may turn out that "experience" is here an equivocal 
 term, meaning, on the one hand, that which is empirically derived, and 
 on the other that which is spiritually derived. With this proposed dis- 
 tinction empirical experience would consist of conceptions representing 
 the impressions of the outward .senses and the notices of the inner 
 sense ; while spiritual experience would consist of conceptions, arising 
 from reflection on the formtB formantes, the a priori powers, which are 
 original and inherent in our mental and spiritual constitution. 
 
 Now what is, briefly, an "Idea"? It is a spiritual act of rational 
 WOl, which may be described as genetic and integrant, and which 
 depends upon the power communicated by the Logos to enlighten and 
 enliven the human mind thereto. We may be said to be inspired by the 
 divine Reason jui and by those specific acts which we call Ideas. They 
 are or operate in us, but are not derived from ourselves : but when they 
 act in us, we become conscious of their operance, they become objects- of 
 
DIALECTIC. 269 
 
 calls such a truth " beyond conception and inex- part ii. 
 
 pressible ; " which sounds paradoxical, and seems 
 
 inconsistent with the statement previously made, 
 that they must be "conceived" in order to be 
 objects of reflection : but although it is quite 
 true that such spiritual verities (Ideas) are in 
 their own form and proper force " inconceiv- 
 able " and " inexpressible," — for they are 
 ** spiritual truths spiritually discerned," and can 
 
 reflection, and this by being " conceived." We tbus bave, or form, a 
 conception of an Idea; bnt the Idea is not itself a conception, biit a 
 power of intelligencCj which exists independently of the human mind 
 conceiving it and actuated by it. 
 
 That we do so conceive of an Idea is a fact. Tor we have bad ex- 
 perience of it ; and we refer its operance and forms of operance to their 
 appropriate sorts and kinds under an appropriate name or designation. 
 Thus we recorded our "conception" of the Idea Kare^ox^v in the 
 Paradigm of Ideal Construction. But we have found that the forma 
 formantes of this ideal construction present themselves in the so-called 
 Categories, enumerated under the heads Substantiality, Causality, 
 Unity and Distinction ; and therefore (when understood spiritually) that 
 ideas must be -considered under one of these heads. 
 
 Thus when an Idea is conceived, it is thereby referred to its right 
 genus or kind, and so with respect to all spiritual truths or experiences : 
 But, although we must have a conception of an Idea in order to 
 "understand" it, the conception or thought of a thing is not the thing 
 itseK, not the reality, but the mental representative of that reality or real 
 thing. Hence, though we have a conception of an Idea, an Idea is not 
 a conception because a reahty, and in this sense may be said to be " in- 
 conceivable." Though I cannot but think that the term is at least 
 equivocal, since not to conceive it would be the unavoidable mode of not 
 understanding it, or of its not being an object of thought at aU. 
 
 But, according to Coleridge, when conceived, it comes out of the 
 moulds of the Understanding in the disguise of two contradictory con- 
 ceptions. True ! as our examples undeniably prove. That is, when 
 expressed as empirical conceptions, they conflict ; but when understood 
 spiritually, or as conceptions derived from spiritual experience, they 
 become correlative^^ or complements of each other. How this is to be 
 satisfactorily explained, is considered in a succeeding section. See \ 9. 
 
 s 2 
 
260 SFIBITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. be Only truly apprehended in and by the light 
 - — '■ — - of Reason, — yet, in as far as they are, and must 
 be, distinct objects of thought in the mind of 
 the subject reflecting upon them, they must be 
 "conceived," and they can be conceived only in 
 the forms afforded by the categories or concipi- 
 encies of the Understanding. But it is ever 
 to be borne in mind that the conflicting 
 conceptions so obtained are not real, that is, 
 irreconcileable contradictions. They are " in 
 the disguise" of contradictions; and as soon 
 as the categories are apprehended in their 
 spiritual signiflcancy, the contradiction vanishes 
 under the influence of the intermediating 
 Idea, and the hitherto apparently antagonistic 
 factors are reconciled as correlatives of the same 
 truth. 
 
 Hence then it may be affirmed with truth 
 that, in this Dialectic, a truth of Reason, when 
 expressed in the forms of the Understanding 
 (and only such are available), must be conveyed 
 by contradictory " conceptions ; " and that we 
 reach the apprehension or obtain the "exponent" 
 of that which in its own form is inconceivable 
 and inexpressible, by means of Opposites, which 
 would exclude each other, were they not com- 
 prehended in a higher truth which includes 
 them both. That the collision between con- 
 ceptions and ideas should take place in the appli- 
 cation and use of the Categories, is only what 
 might have been expected from the fact that 
 
DIALECTIC. 261 
 
 they are tlie forms at once of spiritual intuition Paet ii. 
 and of empirical and mediate cognition, in and — '■ — - 
 by which. (Ooncipiency being enlightened by 
 Reason) ideas become forms of conception, and 
 conceptions are converted into the ideas from 
 which they originated. 
 
 If then the Reason is compelled (and such, I 
 repeat, is the fact) to use the language of the Un- 
 derstanding in conveying its meaning, and this a 
 meaning which is opposed to that of the under- 
 standing, it cannot be otherwise than that con- 
 tradictions arise, which it is incumbent on the 
 Reason to correct. Thus, to take two of the ex- 
 amples which Coleridge has supplied, and which 
 relate to forms of Sense, namely. Time and Space. 
 The first is : — " Before Abraham was, I am :" — 
 in order to express in the language of Sense 
 that which is eternal, dxpovov, timeless and above 
 time, it must be said, the Eternal is that which is 
 at once Past, Present and Future, or that which 
 is ever Present in the endless Past and the end- 
 less Puture ; — a contradictory puzzle on which 
 the mind entangled in the mazes of the empirical 
 faculty might for ever muse, were it not for ideal 
 truths, which are under no conditions of time, 
 the same now, yesterday and for ever. The 
 second, to which I allude, relates to Space, and 
 is thus worded : — " God is a circle, whose centre 
 is everywhere and circumference nowhere. ' ' 
 Truly a magnificent account of an impossibly 
 circle, were it not that thereby the idea i^ 
 
262 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 Part IT. awakened of a Spiritual Omnipresence, whose 
 
 '■ — - power and operance transcend the conditions of 
 
 space. 
 
 § 8. Let us pass to the problems^ which are 
 offered by the Categories. 1st. Substantiality. If 
 I have to state what "Substance" is for the 
 apprehension of Reason in the language of the 
 Understanding, I might say, " It is that in which 
 the properties which constitute the conception of 
 a sensible Object, coinhere, but which is itself no 
 possible object of sense or cognition ; or I might 
 say, " It is that which remains as the Object after 
 all that makes it an Object has been removed." 
 Contradiction can scarcely go further : but for 
 Heason there is no contradiction in positions such 
 as these ; for if, as I have contended, Substance 
 be essentially Will, or derivatively from it a 
 principle of life, or any self-hypostatic power, it 
 would remain as the counterpart or correlate of 
 all sensible manifestations, even although these 
 were abstracted. The category in its spiritual 
 significance (see § 6) means that "Substance" 
 is a Noumenon, a spiritual and abiding Ousia, 
 opposed to its manifold and chsjigmg Phcenamena; 
 and, as we have found in the investigation of 
 self-consciousness, it is derived from the Idea of 
 Will, recognised in ourselves as the essential 
 condition of our personal reality, and contem- 
 plated by the Reason as the universal ground of 
 Being. 
 
 Hence the Idga of " Substance " in its spiritual 
 
DIALECTIC. 263 
 
 significance, as the universal ground of Being, partii. 
 
 reconciles the conflicting positions, in which '■ — '- 
 
 Noumenon and Phsenomenon, Substance and Ac- 
 cident, a Thing and its Properties, are put in any 
 exclusive opposition to each other : — for if the 
 Understanding says, "It is either," or "It must 
 be one or the other," Reason replies, "It is and 
 must be both." And thus too the often-quoted 
 adage " Alter et Idem^^ without offensive admix- 
 ture with the creed of Pantheism from which 
 probably it was derived, and although expressing 
 apparently the self-contradictory position that 
 "what becomes another remains the self-same," 
 is perfectly justified in the eyes of Reason under 
 the Idea of a Spiritual Ground, which necessarily 
 implies both. In the philosophical use of my- 
 thology, the God Proteus was aptly considered 
 to be the principle of all things, who under 
 ever-changing forms, remained in spite of all 
 mutations always one and the same self-modifying 
 base of being and existence. And without admit- 
 ting the incontrovertible truth which is contained 
 in the adage " Alter et Idem^' how could we 
 assure ourselves of our own personal Identity^ 
 or affirm our consciousness that amid the cease- 
 less change, corporeal and mental, in which we 
 are hourly becoming another Self, we yet pre- 
 serve in unchangeable identity the Self, which 
 as it came from, so will be restored to, the 
 heavenly Father in whose image it was originally 
 created. 
 
264 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pa^t II. 2d. Causality, Relying upon empirical facts, 
 the liuman mind cannot avoid tlie conclusion that 
 every event is necessitated hy an antecedent con- 
 dition, which we call "its cause." But, on the 
 other hand, the human Will, conscious of its 
 power, rebels against a doctrine so uncongenial 
 to its own nature, and under the sense of freedom 
 asserts the doctrine of its own spontaneity. 
 But in this assertion the Beason in man feels the 
 contradiction, which it involves, between Liberty 
 and Necessity ; and, whilst clinging to the belief 
 in his free will, man is sensible of the evidence 
 both in the moral and physical world of the ope- 
 rance of laws against which he vainly contends. 
 How then is this contradiction to be solved ? 
 If actuated by the Idea, which is calculated to 
 remedy it, he may express the discovery in the 
 enigmatical language of the understanding, in 
 saying that " Necessity is the indispensable con- 
 dition of Freedom ; " and the consideration, that 
 lawless spontaneity is the bane of rational free- 
 dom, would aid him in removing the obscurity 
 of the problem. The Idea, in which the appa- 
 rent contraries of Liberty and Necessity find 
 their reconciliation and unity and become veri- 
 table complements of each other, is that of Will 
 enlightened by Reason, Law in its highest form 
 of Necessity is Beason, and Beason is Truth 
 intuitive, self-evident, necessary. And it is in 
 the identity and unity of causative Will and 
 regulative Beason, that we contemplate Will 
 
DIALECTIC. 265 
 
 that is to itself a Law, that is, Freedom and part ii. 
 
 Ckap. IV. 
 
 Necessity identified. 
 
 Under the contemplation of this Idea all the 
 contradictions imposed by the Understanding 
 under this category may be satisfactorily solved 
 according to their order and degree. Through- 
 out the vast chain of physical causation^ in which 
 every link of dependency is rivetted to its ante- 
 cedent, Liberty is relatively potential and latent; 
 but yet, as we have found, in interpreting 
 causality according to the Idea, we are com- 
 pelled to assume the "idea of Power," as ren- 
 dered intelligible by Will ; and even in creatures 
 far below intelligence, the existence of spontaneity 
 must be assumed, as testified by their peculiar 
 susceptibiJities, and by correspondent impulses 
 to act under the excitement which provokes the 
 agency. Everywhere we find an analogon of 
 Will, if not rather the evidence of a spontaneous 
 agency, which is derived from Will as the uni- 
 versal ground of living nature. 
 
 In order to convey truly what Causation is 
 for the Reason, though expressed in the lan- 
 guage of the Understanding, I must say, where- 
 ever the question of the free agency of the Will 
 is implicated, and in order to rid myself of the 
 consequences of an invariable and necessitated 
 sequence, — I must say, that the sequence, though 
 considered as unalterable, must be conceived also 
 as a perpetual beginning de novo, that is, as a 
 necessity which is also a spontaneity. 
 
266 SPIRITXJAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. It is too in contemplating the universal con- 
 
 '■ — ~ ditions of physical causation that the question 
 
 again meets us in the form of a Mrst Ccmse, and 
 of the grounds of its assumption. The law of 
 causation in nature implies, as we have seen, 
 for the faculty j udging according to expe- 
 rience, a necessitated chain, an endless series, 
 without the possibility of integrating it by any 
 absolute beginning. The instincts of E/cason 
 lead the human mind, however, to attempt the 
 solution of the problem by assuming a "Pirst 
 Cause, ' ' originant and predeterminant. But 
 this primal Causative, being assumed only as the 
 first link in the chain of dependents, falls there- 
 fore under the law of causation, which it was 
 intended to rectify and complete ; and unless 
 causation is something other and more than 
 necessitated concatenation, the assumption is 
 tantamount to the assertion that the Originant 
 is the first necessitated link in the chain. It is 
 no doubt a palpable contradiction in terms, de- 
 rived from the language of the understanding, 
 and really says that the Antecedent is a Con- 
 sequent, But the position, when measured by 
 the Idea represented by it, means not only what 
 is perfectly compatible with truth, but conveys 
 the profound principle of " The Absolute Will, 
 causative of all reality, and there inclusively of 
 its own;" — and the reader, undeterred by the 
 fresh contradiction contained in the phrase causa 
 sui^ cause of itself, derived from itself, as it were 
 
DIALECTIC. 267 
 
 saying tliat a father is Ms own son, will only pakt ii. 
 
 find the exponent of the Idea of Will in the act '- 
 
 of self-ponency, and will see a striking illustra- 
 tion of the Dialectic now under consideration. 
 
 In like manner, if we turn our attention to 
 moral causation^ the links in any historical chain 
 of events may be explained by the historian as 
 each having its causes and conditions in the 
 preceding; but the links in this concatenated 
 series are truly moral agencies, and therefore 
 each link contains its own spiritual conditions 
 in the free will of the agent. Again in the 
 phrase, used in our Liturgy, "whose service is 
 perfect freedom/' there is a contradiction in 
 terms ; but when it is shown that true freedom 
 can consist only with entire obedience to the Will 
 of God, or under the universal conditions which 
 divine Reason imposes, it becomes a self-evident 
 truth that he only is free who voluntarily sub- 
 mits to these conditions, and that he who freely 
 wills is free. 
 
 In like manner it is only by an Idea that we 
 can reconcile the conception of the operance 
 of a Special Providence with that of Human 
 Free- Agency. It is said, and said truly, that the 
 very hairs of our head are numbered, and that 
 not a sparrow falls without the permission of 
 the all-wise Disposer of events. But how, may 
 we ask, can a government, which extends to the 
 shaping of the smallest event, be compatible 
 with individual freedom of Will ? Or on the 
 
268 V SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. other haiidj how could we conceive the perfect 
 - — ^ — - adjustment of a whole of moral agencies, in 
 order to a final purpose, unless guided and 
 governed by divine power and wisdom ? In 
 proposing these questions we seem to be pressed 
 under the weight of a dilemma, which bids us 
 decide, under the penalty otherwise of seK-con- 
 tradiction, that the affairs of this world are the 
 results either of Divine or Human Will. And 
 from this dilemma we should not be able to 
 extricate ourselves without the healing influence 
 of an Idea, which may conciliate and preserve 
 the claims of both. Por let me ask the reader, 
 what is human Will unless it concur and co- 
 operate with the Divine Will ? And this it 
 may, by obedience to a Will which is revealed 
 and made known by the light of Reason in the 
 conscience. If man act in concurrence with 
 the divine Will, he cannot fail to carry into 
 effect the designs of Providence ; but if, on the 
 other hand, he should lift his own self-will 
 against the almighty Disposer of events, and 
 vainly strive against Omnipotence, what else 
 can be the result but the baffled vanity and no- 
 thingness of the attempt ? Homo proponity Dens 
 ^disponit. 
 
 I do not pretend to remove the many diffi- 
 culties which are connected with this subject, in- 
 volving, as it does, the momentous topics of the 
 state of man, as fallen and probationary, of the 
 conflict of good and evil, and of the final con- 
 
DIALECTIC. 269 
 
 quest of the latter in the process of redemption part ii. 
 
 — topics, which will engage onr attention in a ' 
 
 future stage of our inquiry. But I venture to 
 insist upon the Idea (although offered here only 
 in the way of illustration) of Divine Will ; 
 which, as the "Providence" of the world, may 
 he regarded as the complementary fact or of 
 human Will ; but which otherwise could be con- 
 templated only as an unalterable destiny of man in 
 the tragic colouring of a " fixed fate," irrespective 
 of his moral exigencies as an individual Will. 
 
 3rd and last. Totality, This, as exemplified in 
 Coleridge's position, " that the Soul is all in 
 every part," belongs to our third category, or 
 that of the Whole and its Parts. Now in the 
 case which Coleridge has adduced, or in any 
 similar instance in which an Idea is and must 
 be expressed in the language of the Under- 
 standing, I am unavoidably under the necessity 
 of combining terms or conceptions which con- 
 tradict each other . I should be obliged to say 
 that the Idea of a Totality, or that which com- 
 bines Unity and "Distinction, is " a Whole which 
 is entire in every part." It is evident that, for 
 the faculty judging according to experience, 
 this is a blank contradiction ; since it is tanta- 
 mount to affirming that each part is equal to 
 the sum total of all the sensible parts. But 
 the light of Reason dispels the puzzle; for the 
 Idea of the Totality, which it reveals, is not an 
 empirical result, but an antecedent and living 
 
270 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Paet II. Unity, which, must act totally ^ in the whole 
 
 '■ — '- which it projects, and in every part which it 
 
 produces and disposes, as the One and indi- 
 visible Spirit, which pervades, and acts in, each 
 and all of the components. 
 
 Examples, suited to illustrate the principle 
 here in question, have been adduced elsewhere. 
 But let the reader bring before his mind the 
 familiar instances of constructive genesis which 
 daily meet his observation in the products of 
 living nature. In looking at the manifold and 
 interesting varieties of Plants and Animals, he 
 cannot but acknowledge that each various sort 
 is distinguished by its characteristic Type of 
 construction, and that this Type is, was, and 
 ever will be, the pattern according to which the 
 plastic agent works, both in the organic whole, 
 and in every component part; — and he will as 
 little hesitate to confess that the unity of purpose 
 contained in the type or pattern, in fashioning 
 the whole, cannot fail to mould every part in 
 harmony with the whole of which it is a con- 
 stituent, and that in so doing the same unity of 
 purpose must be whole and entire in each and 
 all. And thus, says the celebrated Cuvier: — 
 " Tout etre organist forme un ensemble, un 
 systeme unique et clos, dont les parties se cor- 
 respondent mutuellement, et concourent a la 
 m^me action definitive par une reaction r^ci- 
 proque. Aucune de ces parties ne peut changer 
 sans que les autres changent aussi : et par con- 
 
DIALECTIC. 271 
 
 Sequent cliacune d'elles, prise s^par^ment, in- partIi. 
 
 dique et donne toutes les autres." E6t. du '• — ' 
 
 Globe, p. 95. 
 
 § 9. Thus, then, as we have endeavoured to 
 show, when an Idea is expressed in and by 
 empirical conceptions, these conceptions conflict ; 
 but when the same conceptions are understood 
 spirituality or as conceptions derived from spi- 
 ritual experience, they become correlatives or 
 complements of each other. In order to the 
 satisfactory explanation of this seeming paradox, 
 let the reader be advised, that the Categories 
 or Ooncipiencies, so often adverted to, are used 
 in a twofold sense, as moulds of the understand- 
 ing, and as forms of Reason, viz : — 1st, in the 
 service and with the meaning of sensible and 
 psychical experience; — and 2ndly, in the service 
 and with the meaning of ideal or spiritual ex- 
 perience; that is, by minting conceptions re- 
 presentative of the intellectual formce for- 
 mantes which are inherent and d priori in 
 the Speculative Reason as a constituent of the 
 human mind. In the first case the conceptions 
 conflict, when they are used to express or re- 
 present truths which tran scend the faculty 
 judging according to sensible or psychical ex- 
 perience. In the second case (when these con- 
 ceptions are derived from spiritual experience, 
 that is, from the reflection of the mind on its 
 own inherent and original powers) they are 
 reciprocally the complements of each other. 
 
272 SPIRITTJAL PHUiOSOPHT. 
 
 Part II. And it is to be observed that the polar relations, 
 
 which mark the character of this correlation of 
 
 opposite conceptions, arise not out of the Under- 
 standing, but out of the necessary form of the 
 idea : — for Reason implies the Folar Form^ for 
 the indispensable purpose of securing what is 
 essential to its nature, namely, Unity and Dis- 
 tinction; and this will have been accomplished 
 when a genetic One distinguishes itself into the 
 correspondent factors. Integral and Differential, 
 and produces a Totality in which the Distinc- 
 tions are preserved whilst the Unity is ever 
 secured. And it may be added that, if we con- 
 template the Idea eminenter or at its absolute 
 height, the genetic One obtains its full signifi- 
 cancy and intelligibility in the identity of Will 
 and Reason ; this identity manifesting itself in 
 its dynamic co-factors or correlatives, as Thesis 
 and Antithesis ; Reason in the form of "Will, or 
 Distinction in Unity ; and correspondently there- 
 to, Will in the form of Reason, or Unity in Dis- 
 tinction : — or we might say as descriptive of the 
 first ^'Distinctio se cohibens in TJnitate^ and of 
 the latter " TJnitas se exhibens in Distinctione : " 
 — whilst in the Synthesis or Totality, we con- 
 template the living perpetuity of Unity in Dis- 
 tinction, and of Distinction in Unity. 
 
 § 10. But in thus claiming for the moulds of 
 the Understanding the prerogatives of Reason, 
 and in detecting in them (as we have shown here 
 and on former occasions) the unmistakeable aids 
 
DIALECTIC. 273 
 
 wTiich the liffht of Reason has implanted in man, part ii. 
 
 IT Ghap. IV. 
 
 in order to enable him to hehold and apprehend 
 
 intuitively the necessary and self-evident truths 
 which are the great privileges and essential cha- 
 racteristics of his Humanity, we may worthily 
 and fitly bring our investigation to the close 
 which our inquiries in this chapter may have led 
 the student to expect, by pointing out that the 
 Idea, which the eoncipiency of Substantiality 
 discloses, when interpreted in its spiritual sense 
 and signiflcancy, is that of the Will contem- 
 plated as the absolute ground of all-being ; — that 
 the Idea, contained in the eoncipiency of Caus- 
 ality, interpreted in like manner, is that of the 
 Will as absolute Causality ; — that the Idea, in 
 which the eoncipiency of Totality or of a Whole 
 and its Parts is grounded, is that of the Will as 
 the Realization of absolute Unity and exhaust- 
 less Distinction, It will not be necessary again 
 to remind the reader that the Idea of Will, so 
 conceived, whether as the absolute ground of 
 all being, or as absolute causality, or as both in 
 absolute Unity and Distinction, is the same Will, 
 and has for its indispensable condition the in- 
 separable union of causative and originative 
 Power with Reason as the highest form of in- 
 telligence; and that so conceived, and appearing 
 in the several phases above specified, there is 
 but one ultimate ground, namely the Will, as 
 the absolute Idea, and the sole and fontal Prin- 
 ciple, of Speculative Philosophy. 
 
 VOL. I. T 
 
274 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. § H. Before concluding this chapter, I owe it 
 
 — '- to the reader to state explicitly that I cannot 
 
 acquiesce altogether in the view propounded by 
 Coleridge in the quotation introduced in § 4 of 
 this chapter. It may be a question, indeed, 
 whether in comparing the statement with expla- 
 nations offered at other places in his works, it 
 ought to be taken so absolutely as it is here 
 affirmed; but, in saying that *^to the forms of 
 the understanding all truth must be reduced, 
 that is, to be fixed as an object of reflection, and 
 to be rendered expressible," and in then adding, 
 *'And here we have a test and sign of a truth 
 so affirmed, that it can come forth out of the 
 moulds of the understanding only in the dis- 
 guise of two contradictory conceptions, each of 
 which is partially true, and the conjunction of 
 both conceptions becomes the representation or 
 expression (=exponent) of a truth beyond con- 
 ception and inexpressible," — it can scarcely be 
 denied that the statement is at least paradoxicaL 
 With the aim, therefore, of rendering the state- 
 ment more exact, if not more true, and of 
 avoiding the paradox that a truth, which is in- 
 conceivable and inexpressible, must be conceived 
 in order to be expressed, and can only be con- 
 ceived by means of two contradictory concepr 
 tions, I have ventured to say, and have attempted 
 to show, that although an idea, or truth of 
 reason, must be " conceived " in order to be an 
 intelligible object of reflection and reasoning. 
 
DIAXEOTIC. 275 
 
 yet, if conceived under the form of the categories paet ii. 
 
 in their spiritual significance, such a truth may '■ — ^ 
 
 be conceived and expressed without contradic- 
 tion. I need not repeat that the contradiction 
 arises from the use of the categories to express 
 a spiritual truth by means of empirical concep- 
 tions, and that the categories or concipiencies 
 have a twofold sense, empirical and spiritual. 
 
 There is another point, also, in which I have 
 ventured to offer a different account to that of 
 my honoured master, — that, namely, of the nature 
 of the distinction between reason and understand' 
 ing ; though perhaps the difference does not 
 amount to more than respects the definition of 
 the logical term " kind." Pully agreeing with 
 him in the extreme importance of drawing a dis- 
 tinction betweto Reason and Understanding, yet 
 I hesitate to adopt unconditionally what he has 
 broadly stated in the " Aids to Reflection," 
 that the Reason differs in kind from the Under- 
 standing. For, although it may be true that 
 they do not fall under the same predicate, or 
 predicates, and may both be considered as species 
 of the genus "intelligence," we gain so little, if 
 indeed anything, by this merely logical treat- 
 ment, that it appears to me greatly preferable to 
 consider the Understanding as the " Discourse of 
 Reason," and as the form of intelligence which 
 is adapted to the purpose of acquiring and 
 moulding empirical knowledge, and this by 
 means of forms (categories) borrowed from the 
 
 T 2 
 
276 SPIUITUAL PHIIiOSOPHT. 
 
 Part il E/eason. And I dare hope that I have shown that 
 '■ — ' these forms are forms of Reason, and are essen- 
 tially forms of spiritual experience, that is, of 
 knowledge derived from reflection on the inhe- 
 rent powers of the conscious self, spiritual and 
 intelligent. Hence then it appears to me, that 
 the Reason is nat to be opposed "in kind" to 
 the Understanding, but is far rather to be con- 
 sidered as the supplement and complement of 
 the latter, and intended to correct the errors and 
 supply the deficiencies of the understanding, in 
 order to the integrity of human intelligence. If 
 we were to judge of supersensuous truth by a 
 faculty adapted only to sensible experience, and 
 were finally to rest on its decisions, we should 
 ignore and neglect the higher faculty of Reason, 
 which is intended to light us to the discovery 
 and contemplation of spiritual truths; and we 
 should reduce ourselves to a partial and abstract, 
 and consequently erroneous view, of those great 
 truths which it constitutes the essential cha- 
 racter of our humanity to possess. We cannot, 
 indeed, in " reasoning " upon such truths, forego 
 the use of the understanding, as the form and 
 canon of logical thinking; but, at the same 
 time we may convince ourselves of its inade- 
 quacy by the partial and contradictory results, 
 which only we are enabled to • obtain from a 
 faculty destined to serve, not usurp the office of. 
 Reason, 
 
 § 12. In .connexion with the foregoing, though 
 
DIALECTIC. 277 
 
 perhaps enough has been said on the subject, I pabt ii. 
 
 am tempted, before closing the chapter on Dialec- 
 
 tic, to make some further remarks on the alleged 
 conflict of the attributes of being ; in respect of 
 which, especially when applied to the Supreme 
 Being ^ some grievous mistakes, arising from 
 neglect of the principles of our Dialectic, have 
 been committed, and these to the detriment of 
 philosophy and religion. The attention of the 
 reader has been already drawn to the subject, 
 ex. gr. on the use of the term "Absolute," 
 Chap. iii. § 11 ; but its importance is a sufficient 
 apology for the additional notice here proposed, 
 even although some repetition may be unavoid- 
 able. The source of the errors here mooted is 
 that in some philosophical schools it has not 
 been observed that a certain class of terms, 
 which are significant of, or meant to designate, 
 what is above or beyond " relations," are in truth 
 " relative terms," and have no intelligible mean- 
 ing as applicable to realities, except when op- 
 posed to, and conjoined with, a correspondent 
 and correlative term. Such are "Absolute" and 
 its correlative " Conditional," " Transcendent " 
 and its correlative "Immanent," "Universal" 
 and its correlative ' ' Particular, " " Infinite ' ' 
 and its correlative " Einite," with some others of 
 like character. Nor is it difficult to see that it is 
 the faulty use of the understanding, to which the 
 error in question is chargeable ; namely, to treat- 
 ing an abstract conception, intended only for the 
 
278 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. use of the concipient, as the representative of a 
 
 Chap. lY. r ' r 
 
 somewhat real and existing. 
 
 The foregoing observations will be, I think, 
 fully justified by a brief analysis of the con- 
 ception of the ^^ Absolute y^ or of that which is 
 conceived to be "absolved from," and raised 
 above, all conditions^ It is scarcely necessary to 
 protest against the use of such a term as " the 
 Absolute ;" since grammar teaches us that, being 
 an adjective, it requires a noun substantive to 
 give it a consistent meaning. And yet when we 
 find in some schools of philosophy, of which the 
 Neo-Platonic and German are notable instances, 
 the attempt to conceive an absolute One Oround^ 
 which transcends all possible distinction in itself 
 of being and intelligence, it induces the belief 
 that the term has been employed in a sense, 
 which can only suggest the straining after a 
 notion of something incogitable. Without enter- 
 ing into details which are here unnecessary, but 
 referring to the " paradigm of ideal construc- 
 tion" given in Chap. iii. § 17, I may remind the 
 reader that the Idea of Will (i.e. Will enlightened 
 by Reason) necessarily implies the process and 
 result of evolution into a living and organic 
 Whole at the utmost conceivable height and 
 perfection of Unity and Distinction. But the 
 height at which nothing higher can be con- 
 cived or imagined implies a One (principle) 
 which is absolute; both as antecedent unity, 
 containing and producing the absolute fulness 
 
DIALECTIC. 279 
 
 of distinctions and distinctive relations, and at paktii. 
 
 the same time as the absolute integrant or '■ — '■ 
 
 nnific, throughout the process, of all the dis- 
 tinctions which it produces ; — and thus absolute 
 in unity and distinction, the intensity of the 
 former is always and ever counterbalanced by 
 the exhaustless character of the latter. Nor is it 
 of slight importance for the student to bear 
 steadily in mind the dynamic character of the 
 process, and that the factors are not to be con- 
 ceived as mere results or unexplained data^ but 
 as co-efficients and forces working always under 
 the condition of a balance; — for otherwise the 
 insuperable necessity of the correlation of the 
 factors, which we may call integral and differen- 
 tials would be inexplicable ; though, when the 
 factors are found to be forces, it is self-evident. 
 And thus, as I have said elsewhere, under the 
 idea of a necessary balance, " every organic 
 whole, from the polyp up to man, indicates a 
 higher and more eflfective power of unity, and 
 therefore of more perfect individuality, in pro- 
 portion as the parts are more numerous, yet at 
 the same time more various, each having a 
 several end." Vital Dynamics, App. p. 59. 
 
 But if, on the other hand, neglecting the prin- 
 ciple of ideal Dialectic, or ignorant of it, the 
 Understanding deals with the Absolute, it can do 
 no more according to its prescribed office than 
 form a conception or definition, thereof, as that 
 which is wholly unconditioned, and beyond all 
 
280 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. Conditions and relations in respect of itself and 
 —^ — 1 others. But should it impose this otherwise legi- 
 timate conception on philosophy as a principle^ 
 there may be readily anticipated what cannot 
 but arise from the adoption of an abstraction 
 which is a mere counterfeit — that philosophy, 
 in taking for a principle what is wholly undif- 
 ferenced and without recognisable distinctions, 
 has embraced a shadow, a blank unreality, equi- 
 valent to Null. Again, the understanding is no 
 doubt competent to deal with the distinctive 
 differences and relations which constitute the 
 conception of a Whole, as we have seen under 
 the category of a Whole and its Parts ; but here, 
 failing to discover the abiding substance and 
 connecting principle of the union, it leaves us 
 with the unanswered question, what is it from 
 which the manifold relations derive their meaning 
 and intelligibility. 
 
 Hence then it mil be seen that a One without 
 distinctions is as unintelligible as distinctive dif- 
 ferences without that which gives them unity, 
 and that the intelligibility and correspondent 
 reality of both depend upon the Idea which 
 combines them. Thus the "Absolute" becomes 
 or is a relative term, and only intelligible as the 
 correlative of the distinctive manifold of being 
 in which the undifferenced One is manifested. 
 And the "absolute," contemplated in this cor- 
 relation, may signify the " supra-relative," as 
 raised above all finite relations of Jbeing and 
 
DIALECTIC. 281 
 
 actual esistencej and may designate that essen- Part ii. 
 
 tial attribute or characteristic of Supreme Being 
 
 wliicli expresses its transcendency to all forms 
 of relative being; — every such form, under this 
 aspect, being considered a relative, conditional 
 and so far imperfect, representative of that 
 which, in the one Supreme Being, is absolute, 
 unconditional, and perfectly realized. 
 
 In connexion with the foregoing, it seems 
 obvious to inquire, whether a similar correlation 
 may not be found in the supposed antagonism of 
 *^ Immanent " and "Transcendent," as attributes 
 of Divine Being. In opposition to the doctrine 
 attributed to believers of the orthodox creed, 
 it has been strongly urged by German Pantheists, 
 that Deity is not "transcendent" but "imma- 
 nent;" — that is, that there is not a God, who, 
 as Creator and Legislator of the world, is to be 
 contradistinguished in personal being and attri- 
 butes from His creatures ; but that Deity, as the 
 ever indwelling and abiding Ground of the Uni- 
 verse, manifests itself wholly and perpetually iii 
 an infinite succession of changing and varied 
 forms of being. Against the Christian whose 
 convictions above all lead him to contradistin- 
 guish God from the world and not to confound 
 Him with it, the Pantheist urges that God's 
 transcendent operance would be an extraneous 
 element, incompatible with the required unity 
 of work and power, cause and effect. His doc- 
 trine is that the Universe is only a process of 
 
282 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. self-evolution, of which what is called Deity is 
 
 '■ — - the indwelliiig power and principle. The origin 
 
 of Pantheism is uncertain, and it has assumed 
 various forms ; but for its influence on modern 
 thought we need seek probably no further than 
 the powerful philosophy of Benedict Spinoza. 
 He, guided by the category of Substance and its 
 Accidents, explains the universe, moral and phy- 
 sical, upon the assumption that it consists wholly 
 of an unica substantia, whose attributes, Thought 
 and Extension, are adequate to account for all 
 modes of being and existence. To enter into 
 the controversy between Christian Monotheism 
 and Pantheism would involve the consideration 
 of Pantheism in its moral aspects, which we are 
 not prepared here to discuss. But it may be 
 observed that the controversy presents a case in 
 which truth requires the intervention of an Idea. 
 "Transcendence " and " Immanence " are terms 
 which, as regards God's relation to the world, 
 not only do not exclude, but (as will hereafter 
 appear) essentially require and imply, one 
 another, and find their reconciliation as correla- 
 tives in the Idea of that supreme relation. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE SOUL, AS THE TOTAL SPHERE OE BEING OE 
 THE WILL. 
 
 Ie the student shall have convinced himseK that part ii. 
 
 Chap, V. 
 
 the Will is the essential primary and living ■ 
 
 principle of Man's conscious being, intelligent 
 and moral, he may not at once see, or bring into 
 unity of conception, in accordance with the de- 
 mands of a consistent philosophy, the conditions 
 of the total and actual sphere of being and 
 agency, which the principle contains, compre- 
 hends, and animates. Now in the preceding 
 chapters we have spoken of Thoughts, Volitions 
 and Feelings, as distinctive states of the Will, 
 considered in its individual sphere of act and 
 being. These distinctions will (somewhat modi- 
 fied) answer our present purpose. Of Thoughts 
 it will be unnecessary to speak, since it is evident 
 that the Will in any proper sense would cease to 
 be what we mean, unless conceived as indissolu- 
 bly united with intelligence. But I may here 
 observe that as the Will cannot be conceived 
 without intelligence, so neither can the opera- 
 
28i spimxrAii philosophy. 
 
 pakt ii. tions of the mind be dissociated from acts of the 
 
 — ^ Will : — witness the indispensable co-presence of 
 
 Will in all acts of Attention, Recollection, Judge- 
 ment, and in onr Convictions of general truths. 
 And confessedly, a*s I need hardly observe, 
 Volitions are acts of Will. 
 
 But, in connexion with our present object, 
 we desire to draw the attention of the student 
 to the remaining distinction, namely the Feel- 
 ings ; — and if we consider these, in a general 
 sense, to be affections in which " the living sub- 
 ject must at least so far know as to find or feel its 
 own state," * we may conveniently conjoin with 
 their consideration that of the corresponding 
 Impulses^ in which the living subject is induced 
 or roused to more or less conscious and deliberate 
 acts of volition. Now in connecting Eeelings 
 and Impulses with the Will, as the causative 
 ground of the sphere in which they operate, let 
 me observe as a preliminary caution that we 
 dare not conceive even human Will as absolutely 
 originative of its sphere of being and agency, or 
 capable of originating any act imconditionallyy 
 that is, except under the conditions imposed 
 by man's creaturely dependence. Without this 
 indispensable reservation, we might be justly 
 charged with elevating man falsely and impiously 
 into the dignity of the Creator. Man can only 
 occupy a sphere of which the limits are prede- 
 termined. And hence, as the conditions under 
 
 * Vital Dynamics, p. 31. 
 
THE SOUL. 285 
 
 whicli he exerts the relatively causative or ori- part u. 
 ginant Will by which he asserts and maintains — ' — — 
 his sphere of act and being, we have to assign 
 to his WUl, in its self-ponency and agency, at 
 least these, — that, on the one hand, it requires 
 solicitation from without, and on the other, im- 
 pulse from within. We may extend this position 
 far beyond what human psychology requires : — 
 In every grade of being in that scale which 
 culminates in, and is throughout rendered intel- 
 ligible by, will and mind, the existence of the 
 living subject "must begin from itself — I do not 
 say caused by itself — and depends upon an appe- 
 tence to he^ or to fill a predetermined sphere; 
 — in other words, living existence implies a 
 subject, or power, which, actuated and directed 
 by the law or idea, becomes a causative agency 
 formative and productive; and this under the 
 condition of being excited to act, and at the 
 same time of resisting the excitant, as long as 
 it remains an alien power, either by repelling or 
 appropriating the same." (Comp, Vital Dyna- 
 mics, p. 30.) 
 
 I have elsewhere ventured to characterise these 
 tendencies, uader the names Excitability and 
 Hesistance^ as the correlative forces or factors 
 of lif e, — ^that is life p sy chical, and organic 
 as far it is psychical and for want of a better 
 name m=ay be called ^^ somato-psy chical P In 
 pursuing the investigation of these tendencies 
 in their psychological aspect we find the intel- 
 
286 SPIHITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. ligible ground of the distinction of Desires and 
 
 Chap. V. , -T^ . '1 T 1 J^ 
 
 Aversions. JJestre, excited by the sense or pro- 
 mise of gratification, is the disposition to appro- 
 priate, to have and to hold as its own, that 
 which the soul likes and lusts after : but if cupi- 
 dity by its temptations leads the soal so far out 
 of itself, that it begins to apprehend the loss 
 of the self by outward dissipation, resistance 
 assumes the form of Aversion^ and as it were by 
 a retractive effort recals the subject to its centre 
 in order to secure its being. But in this an- 
 tagonism another is implied, namely that of 
 Susceptibility and Mepellence> Susceptibility is 
 the disposition which tends to give force to the 
 impress of the outward excitant, but at the same 
 time tends to secure the self; since, under any 
 excess of excitement threatening danger, it ra- 
 pidly passes into fear of the hostile and alien, 
 and calls forth the reaction, which we have called 
 Repellence^ in order to resist or defeat the foe 
 or supposed assailant. Comp. ** Pacts of Con- 
 sciousness," p. 42. And if such be a true 
 account of the dispositions and tendencies of the 
 Psyche, we may sum up the preceding by say- 
 ing : — That the Will, contemplated in its essen- 
 tial character as the tendency to realize itself, 
 having been traced to its root as the Appetence 
 to be, we have found that the Feelings and Im- 
 pulses, by which the Appetence is necessarily 
 manifested, appear and may be best expressed 
 in the more general characters of Excitability 
 
THE SOTJIi. 287 
 
 and Resistance : and that these unavoidahly take part ii. 
 
 ^ Chap. V. 
 
 the fourfold form designated above as Desire and 
 
 Aversion, Susceptibility and Repellence. That 
 these are modes or forms of Will, as the source 
 of causative agency, can scarcely be doubted. 
 We recognise Will in its inalienable disposition 
 to realize itself, to be self-ponent ; — but this 
 self-ponency cannot be realized except in relation 
 to an Outward ; for which relation the only con- 
 ceivable conditions are the condition jof willing 
 to appropriate that which is congenial and has 
 excited the longing thereto, and the condition of 
 willing to resist or avoid that which threatens 
 or endangers the psychical sphere of agency. It 
 is true that, guided by spiritual experience, we 
 contemplate the Will no longer in its ideal free- 
 dom of agency : but we do no more than con- 
 sider it in its relatively active and passive states, 
 and this in consonance with data furnished by 
 facts of our conscious experience. 
 
 But having now explained, so far as our 
 present purpose renders necessary, under what 
 conditions we have to regard the Will as self- 
 ponent and constructive of its individual sphere 
 of being, I have to warn the student that he 
 must pursue this process of self-investigation by 
 a double method, which we may name or distin- 
 guish as the ideal and the empirical methods : — 
 that is to say, he will have to consider the 
 individual Will, or self-ponent Subject in respect 
 of the Will, as the principle of his Spiritual 
 being in its ideal integrity, divested of and 
 
288 
 
 SPIUITTTAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ^J^ ^F abstracted from all the Maidraiices and imper- 
 fections which practically obscure and limit, 
 though they do not obliterate, its essential 
 character ; and, on the other hand, he will have 
 to consider the Will under the actual psychical 
 conditions, which detract from the purity and 
 integrity of its ideal excellence, but still are 
 essential constituents of the actual sphere of 
 being. What we call the " Soul " is not perhaps 
 a term capable of very accurate definition, but 
 we generally understand by it, the immaterial 
 part of man, as contradistinguished from his 
 material and bodily part, which immaterial part 
 may survive the death of the corporeal and now 
 existing organism. But we have here to dis- 
 tinguish in the " Soul " so considered, at least 
 two states or spiritual conditions which, though 
 correlative, are opposed to each other. The one, 
 is that which derives its character from the life 
 and light infused by the Divine Spirit, and this 
 state of moral potentiation and dignity we may 
 name the Spiritual. The other state, not less 
 essential, is that which man has by nature — • 
 including understanding, the passions, feelings 
 and affections, which are common to man ; and 
 this state we may call the Natural, And we 
 may admit that the distinctions intended are 
 those which the Apostle Paul has happily 
 characterised under the terms " TrvevfiartKos^^ and 
 " fvxt'fcosi^ or, as translated in our version of 
 the scriptures, the spiritual and the natural 
 
TILE SOUL. 289 
 
 man. It may be however remarked in making paet ii. 
 
 these distinctions, that we do not forget that the 
 
 corporeal, or merely vital, is an essential element 
 of man's existence, and cannot be disjoined from 
 the Soul, when considered in a sphere of actual 
 living agency. Hence says St. Paul, with great 
 propriety, it is raised " in power," that is, with 
 the living principle of corporeal self- construc- 
 tion ; and if we consider the living body in 
 its manifold inter-agency with the mind and 
 soul, we may add to the former the designation 
 somatO'psycMcal^ as marking the blending of cor- 
 poreal life and mind. 
 
 Thus then, without attempting here either 
 proof or corroboration, we say that the Soul 
 is a Will, self-affirmed and self-ponent in its 
 individual sphere of agency. And although we 
 are not under the necessity of considering the 
 Soul or Spirit as incorporated, we have yet un- 
 avoidably to contemplate it in the two aspects 
 above mentioned. On the one hand, there is 
 the Spiritual or ideal view, furnished by contem- 
 plating in its ideal integrity the subject of our 
 self-consciousness, and presenting to us the Will, 
 when enlightened and enlivened by the Divine 
 Spirit, as the individual Conscience and as the 
 principle of moral Freedom, that is, of acting 
 in unison with the Will of God. On the other 
 hand, we have to contemplate the same Will 
 under the empirical aspect, derived from the 
 conditions of its present actual and temporal 
 
 VOL. I. XJ 
 
290 SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. existence ; and this aspect discloses to us the 
 
 Chap. V. 
 
 '—^ Will, under its impulses and aflfections, its desires, 
 
 passions, and propensities, as self-ponent in the 
 particularity of a self and its selfish particularity, 
 and hence in principle always, and in practice 
 ever more or less, at variance with, and in oppo- 
 sition to, the Divine Will. 
 
 Now if we turn our attention, in this all- 
 important distinction between the Spiritual and 
 Natural Man, to the state and condition of the 
 latter in respect of his moral or spiritual cha- 
 racter, it will be confessed that man by nature 
 (that is, as warranted by universal experience 
 of his present or temporal state of being) has 
 unmistakeably a propensity or proclivity to Evil 
 — a natural tendency to sully, alloy, or even 
 frustrate, the disposition to purity and goodness 
 which is no less implanted in him, and is de- 
 rived from a higher and better source — a 
 tendency and radical impulse to assert and 
 realize his self-will with all the unhallowed 
 desires of its selfishness. What the causes and 
 conditions of human pravity may be it is not 
 my purpose here to determine. Sufficient for us 
 now that it is a fact, deplorable indeed, but uni- 
 versally acknowledged ; and though we have 
 appealed to the authority of St. Paul in the 
 distinction drawn between the avdpmiros -sjrvxcKos 
 and irvevfidriKo^y the pravity in question is not 
 only a christian doctrine, but has been equally 
 accepted by. the thinking part of the Gentile 
 
THE SOUL. 291 
 
 world; — nay, in this distinction we recognise pahtii. 
 
 the foundation of the religious philosophy which 
 
 was one of the earliest growths of the human 
 Reason, namely the Zoroastrian, and which vin- 
 dicated its power not only in its influence on 
 Judaism and on the Gnostic perversions of 
 Christianity, hut retains its hold on heathen 
 worship to this day. 
 
 To some it may sound plausibly that vice and 
 moral corruption are the results and products 
 only of deteriorating influences acting on a 
 moral disposition originally pure and untainted 
 by evil. But a reflective mind will ask with 
 reason, what is then to account for the fact 
 of the contamination, and to explain the uni- 
 versal tendency to the pravity in question ? 
 More logical, indeed, is the denial of the exist- 
 ence of evil and wickedness conceived in any 
 sense as real efiicients ; and such denial is 
 doubtless more convenient to those who are 
 disposed to resolve the principles of moral good 
 and evil into mere statutory ordinances of the 
 Will of God, into human maxims of Utility, 
 into the results of human Feeling, or into 
 inevitable antagonisms in a scheme of pan- 
 theistic Optimism, all, however, under the im- 
 pression that there is nothing right or wrong, 
 just or unjust, by its own nature, and in and of 
 itself, according to the inviolable and eternal 
 principles and laws of the moral universe. The 
 sifting of the theories of Morals, or principles of 
 
292 SPIUITUAIi PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 partti. ethical science, forms too large a subject for 
 — ^ adequate discussion at this place, and could con- 
 tribute little to the establishment of the facts, 
 which here press for admission. Meanwhile, in 
 vindication of the existence of natural pravity, 
 alleged to be capable of verification not only in 
 the conduct of mankind, but in the breast of 
 every individual who has the honesty and re- 
 quisite discernment to put himseK to the test, — 
 I venture to affirm, in aiding the student to the 
 self-investigation here proposed, that, taking the 
 Will as the primal agent and source of agency, 
 he will be at no loss to discover, from the conduct 
 of others interpreted by reflection on himself, 
 that whenever man makes his own mere self-will 
 the sole arbiter of his conduct, and thereby 
 assumes the power and privilege of gratifying 
 his selfish lusts, he throws off all moral restraint 
 and gives loose to his natural pravity. Por taking 
 the extreme case as we are entitled to do, if the 
 propensity to the gratification of self be admitted, 
 it is impossible not to see that the selfish lusts, 
 in their various aspects of fraud, rapine and 
 violence, would acknowledge no bounds, and 
 could only end by producing an internecine 
 strife destructive of human society itself. Thus 
 then the conclusion, warranted by observation of 
 others and by self-examination, is, that the root 
 of human pravity is Selfishness^ and that, whether 
 in the individual or in mankind at large, the un- 
 restrained tendency thereto is, in respect of the 
 
THE SOUL. 293 
 
 necessarily social conditions of human life, abor- part ii. 
 
 ^ ' Chap. V. 
 
 tive and self-destructive. 
 
 On the other hand, the student in pursuing 
 his meditations, will no doubt consider, that 
 should the human Will submit to the condition of 
 willing only that which under like circumstances 
 may be tmiversully willed^ or, in other words, to 
 the condition of conforming his individual "Will 
 to the universal Will, that is (as we shall here- 
 after show) to the Divine Will and to God's 
 moral laws, it cannot but follow that the human 
 Will, eschewing all inordinate desires, evil pas- 
 sions, and vicious propensities, will cultivate 
 peace, meekness, moderation, humility, patience, 
 justice, charity, and the virtues which tend to 
 preserve society and maintain social harmony. 
 
 These considerations naturally suggest the 
 survey of man in his spiritual aspect. But, be- 
 fore proceeding to this necessary part of our 
 investigation, I may observe in this preliminary 
 account of the problem and results of Spiritual 
 Philosophy, I do not wish to go farther into the 
 question here mooted than to insist on the dis- 
 tinction between the natural and spiritual man, 
 as the opposed tendencies which will be found 
 in every man; — on the one hand, the tendency 
 of the Will to assert its own particularity as 
 absolute; and on the other, the tendency to 
 spiritual integrity, as the disposition of the 
 human Will, when enlightened and enlivened 
 thereto, to conform its selfish particularity to 
 
291 SPIRITTJAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Part II. the absolute and universal Will of the supreme 
 
 '—^ moral Governor of the world. And I offer the 
 
 foregoing and following observations as a satis- 
 factory exposition of the distinction proposed with 
 a view to the safe interpretation of the facts of 
 consciousness. I shall not however hold myseK 
 excused from a more searching inquiry into the 
 nature of Good and Evil, calculated to show 
 that the former is the principle of spiritual 
 health and life and integrity, the latter as the 
 principle of spiritual corruption, disintegration, 
 and death, whether in this world, or in that to 
 come. 
 
 According to the order which I have prescribed 
 for myself, I have now to direct the student's 
 attention to a survey of Man in his JSpiiHtual 
 Aspect ; and as I have said (pp. 287-8, ante) in 
 making this deliberate survey he will have "to 
 consider the individual Will, or seK-ponent sub- 
 ject in respect of the Will, as the principle of 
 spiritual being in its ideal integrity, divested 
 of and abstracted from all the hindrances and 
 imperfections which practically obscure and 
 limit, though they do not obliterate, its essen- 
 tial character." It will be evident that in the 
 investigation before us, we shall have to move 
 in the region appropriated to the Speculative 
 Reason as the source of Ideas. And (as the 
 next part of this work will show) I do not de- 
 spair of placing before the reader a Series of 
 Propositions, hi which the main trutlis of Ideal 
 
THE SOUL. 295 
 
 Integration are exhibited by the light of their paktii. 
 own evidence, and by means of which the nn- ^^^^' 
 avoidable demands of the speculative intellect 
 and of the rational mind may be satisfactorily 
 fulfilled and gratified. 
 
 END OP VOL. T. 
 
LONDOM : PRINTED BY 
 R. CLAY, SON, AND TAYLOR, BREAD STREET HILL. 
 
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