The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030494557 
 
Cornell University Library 
 JN548 1883 .B14 
 
 Essays on parliamentary reform. 
 
 olin 
 
 3 1924 030 494 557 
 
ESSAYS 
 
 PARLIAMENTAKY BEFOKM 
 
WORKS BY- THE SAME AUTHOR. 
 
 Seventh Edition, trown Svo, price Is. 6(2. 
 
 LOMBARD STREET : a Description of the Money Market. 
 
 *The subject is one, it is almost needless to say, on which Mr. Bagehot writes 
 with the authority of a man who combines practical experience with scientific 
 study.' — Saturday Review. 
 
 Third Edition, crown Svo, price Is. 6d. 
 
 THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. With an Introductory Disser- 
 tation on Recent Changes and Events. 
 
 * No writer before Mr. Bagehot had set out so clearly what the efficient part of 
 the English Constitution really is.' — Pall Mall Gazette. 
 
 * A pleasing and clever study in the department of higher politics.' — Guardian. 
 
 Sixth Edition, crown Svo, price 4s. 
 
 PHYSICS AND POLITICS: Thoughts on the Application of the 
 Principles of ' Natural Selection ' and ' Inheritance ' to Political Society. 
 
 * Full of shrewd suggestions and argumentative subtleties.' — British Quarterly 
 Review. 
 
 ' No one will be able to turn over its pages without having his mind stirred by 
 many of tbe most interesting subjects of human thought.' — Examiner. 
 
 'Mr. Bagehot writes in a graceful style, and has much to say upon political 
 topics that is well worth attention. We can recommend tbe book as well de- 
 serving to be read by thoughtful students of politics.' — Saturday Review. 
 
 ' A work of really original and interesting speculation.' — Guardian. 
 
 Svo, price 5s. 
 
 SOME ARTICLES ON THE DEPRECIATION OF SILVER 
 
 and Topics connectpd with it. The Articles are those contributed to the 
 Economist on the Silver Question, by Mr. Bagehot, with a Preface written 
 by himself, shortly before his death, in view of this publication. 
 
 KEGAN PAUL, TEENCH & CO., 1, PATERNOSTER SQUARE. 
 
 Second Edition, 2 vols. Svo, price 2Ss. 
 
 LITERARY STUDIES. Edited, with a Prefatory Memoir, by RrcnAnn 
 Holt Hutton. With a Portrait from a Photograph printed by the Woodbury 
 process. 
 
 Uniform with the above. Svo, price 10s. 6d. 
 
 ECONOMIC STUDIES. Edited by Richard Holt Hutton. 
 
 Uniform with the above. Svo, price 12s. 
 
 BIOGRAPHICAL STUDIES. Edited by Richard Holt Hutton. 
 
 Svo, price 2s. 
 
 INTERNATIONAL COINAGE. A Practical Plan for assimilating 
 the English and American Money, as u step towards a Universal Money. 
 Reprinted from the Economist. 
 
 LONDON : LONGMANS & CO. 
 
ESSAYS 
 
 PAELIAMENTAEY EEFOKM 
 
 BY THE LATE 
 
 WALTBE BAGEHOT 
 
 M.A. AND FELLOW OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON 
 
 LONDON 
 
 KEGAN PAUL, TEENCH & CO., 1, PATERNOSTER SQUARE 
 
 1883 
 
 BS 
 
'UNiV^S'TY 
 
 (77jc rights of translation and of reproduction are reserved.') 
 
ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 Two of the essays here republished were first written 
 in 1859 and 1860 for the National Review of that day — 
 a very different periodical in political tendency from the 
 Review of the same name lately commenced by the 
 English Conservatives. The third essay was prefixed to 
 the second edition of Mr. Bagehot's book on 'The English 
 Constitution,' and first published in 1872. It contained 
 a review of the Reform Act of 1867, and a forecast of the 
 results to be expected from it. It may be thought by 
 some that portions of the first two essays are now 
 a little out of date. But the three taken together 
 contain so comprehensive a discussion of what Mr. 
 Bagehot held to be the true principles of parliamentary 
 representation, and put so forcibly what may now be 
 regarded as the Whig, not to say the Conservative - 
 Liberal side of the question, that it has been thought 
 
VI ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 well to republish them, if only as contributing at least 
 very important elements for the discussion which may 
 be expected during the next twelve months on the 
 subject of the Redistribution of Seats and the County 
 Franchise. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAHK 
 
 Parliamentary Reform (1859) ... ... ... 1 
 
 The History of the- Unreformed Parliament, and 
 
 its Lessons (1860) ... ... ... 1U7 
 
 The Reform Act of 1867; and the Function of the 
 
 House of Peers (1872) ... ... ... 183 
 
PAELIAMENTAEY REFORM. 1 
 
 (1859.) 
 
 We shall not be expected to discuss in a party spirit the 
 subject of Parliamentary Eeform. It has never been 
 objected to the National Review that it is a party organ; 
 and even periodicals which have long been such, scarcely 
 now discuss that subject in a party spirit. Both Whigs 
 and Conservatives are pledged to do something, and 
 neither as a party have agreed what they would do. We 
 would attempt to give an impartial criticism of the elec- 
 toral system which now exists, and some indication of 
 the mode in which we think that its defects should be 
 amended. It is possible, we fear, that our article may be 
 
 1 On the Electoral Statistics of the Counties and Boroughs in England 
 and Wales during the Twenty-Five Tears from the Eeform Act of 1832 to 
 the Present time. By William Newmarch, one of the Honorary Secretaries 
 of the Statistical Society. Bead before the Statistical Society, 16th June, 
 1857, and printed in the Journal of that Society, Vol. XX. Parts II. and 
 III. — We cannot speak too highly of these most admirable statistics. No 
 pains have been spared to make them complete, and extreme judgment 
 has been shown in the selection. When it is not otherwise stated, all 
 our electoral statistics are from this source. 
 
 ; 
 
2 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 long, and that our criticism on existing arrangements 
 may appear tedious. But a preliminary understanding 
 is requisite; unless we are agreed as to what is to be 
 desired, we cannot hope to agree as to what is to be done : 
 a clear knowledge of the disease must precede the remedy. 
 In business, no ingenuity of detail can compensate for 
 indistinctness of design. 
 
 There is much that may be said against the Eeform 
 Act of 1832; but, on the whole, it has been successful. It 
 is a commonplace to speak of the legislative improve- 
 ments of the last twenty-five years, and it would be 
 tedious to enumerate them. Free trade, a new colonial 
 policy, the improved poor-law, the encumbered-estate act 
 in Ireland, the tithe commutation, municipal reform, the 
 tentative but most judicious support of education, are 
 only some of the results of the reform of the House of 
 Commons. Scarcely less important is the improvement 
 which the Eeform Bill has introduced into the general 
 tone of our administration ; our executive has become 
 purer, more considerate, and more humane, and it would 
 be difficult to show that in its ordinary and beneficial 
 action it is much weaker. Nor is this all. So much of 
 agreement in opinion as we see around us is perhaps 
 unexampled in a political age; and it is the more singular, 
 because the English nation is now considerably less homo- 
 geneous in its social structure than it once was. The 
 prodigious growth of manufactures and trade has created 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 3 
 
 a new -world in the north of England, which contrasts with 
 the south in social circumstances and social habits : yet at 
 no former time was there such a difference as there now 
 is between Lancashire and Devonshire. It is impossible 
 not to ascribe this agreement to the habit of national 
 discussion which the Reform Act has fostered. The 
 scattered argument, the imperfect but perpetual influence 
 of the press and society, have made us, perhaps even to 
 an excessive degree, unanimous. Possibly we are all too 
 much disposed to catch the voice which is in the air. 
 Still, a little too much concord is better than a little too 
 much discord. It is a striking result, that our present 
 constitution has educed from such dissimilar elements so 
 much of harmony. 
 
 Beneficial, however, as are these incidental results of 
 the Reform Bill, they are not the most important parts 
 of its success. This measure has, to a considerable extent, 
 been successful in its design. The object which its framers 
 had in view was, to transfer the predominant influence 
 in the State from certain special classes to the general 
 aggregate of fairly instructed men. It is not perhaps 
 very easy to prove upon paper that this has been, at least 
 in a very great degree, effected. The most difficult thing 
 to establish by argument is an evident fact of observation. 
 There are no statistics of opinion to which we can refer, 
 there is no numerical comparison which will establish the 
 accordance of parliamentary with social opinion. We 
 
4 PAELIAMENTAEY EEFOEM. 
 
 must trust to our eyes and ears, to the vague but conclu- 
 sive evidence of events. If, indeed, public opinion had 
 always been as unanimous as it now is, we should have 
 some difficulty in ascertaining the fact. When everybody 
 thinks the same, there is no saying which is the stronger 
 party. But during the last twenty-six years there have 
 been many periods at which public opinion was much 
 divided and strongly excited. The great legislative 
 changes which have been mentioned were not effected 
 without long and animated party dissension. The policy 
 of a great country like this has continually required the 
 determination of critical questions, both at home and 
 abroad; its ramified affairs have been a never-failing 
 source of controverted topics. What would have been 
 the sign if the expressed opinion of Parliament had been 
 contrary to the distinct opinion of the country ? In the 
 present state of the country we should not have been long 
 in learning it. We should have had political meetings, 
 not of one class but all classes, clouds of petitions from 
 every quarter, endless articles in newspapers; the cry 
 would only have died away when the obnoxious decision 
 was reversed, and the judgment of Parliament submitted 
 itself to the will of the nation. The inclination of the 
 House of Commons is evidently not to oppose the country. 
 On the contrary, we all know the power, the undue power, 
 possessed by that part of the press whose course is sup- 
 posed to indicate what is likely to be the common opinion. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 5 
 
 So far from our legislators dissenting too often from the 
 expressed judgment of the country, they are but too much 
 swayed by indications of what it probably will be. The 
 history of our great legislative changes of itself shows that 
 the opinion of Parliament is, in the main, coincident with 
 that of the nation. Parliament and the country were 
 converted at the same time. Even the history of the 
 corn-law agitation, which is often referred to as indicating 
 the contrary, proves this conspicuously. It succeeded 
 almost at the moment that impartial people, who had no 
 interests on either side, were convinced that it ought to 
 succeed. Mr. Cobden liked to relate, that when he first 
 began to dream of agitating the question, a most ex- 
 perienced nobleman observed to him, 'Repeal the Corn- 
 laws ! you will repeal the monarchy as soon.' The noble lord 
 was right in estimating the tenacity and intensity of the 
 protectionist creed ; but he did not know, and Mr. Cobden 
 did, the power of plain argument on the common mass 
 of plain men, and the certainty that their opinion, if 
 really changed, would suffice to change the course of our 
 legislation, even in opposition to strong aristocratic in- 
 fluence and very rooted prejudice. It has been said that 
 Sir Robert Peel owed his success in life to ' being con- 
 verted at the conversion of the average man ; ' the same 
 influences acted on his mind that acted on the minds of 
 most other people throughout the nation, and in much 
 the same measure. He was, therefore, converted to new 
 
6 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 views at the same time that most other people were con- 
 verted to them. The same may be said of the present 
 Parliament. Nobody would call the reformed House of 
 Commons original ; it is never in advance of the higher 
 order of cultivated thought : but every one would agree 
 that it is pre-eminently considerate, well-judging, and 
 convincible ; and when people say this, they mean that 
 its opinions commonly coincide with their own. 
 
 In no respect is the reality of the accordance in opinion 
 between Parliament and the nation so convincingly shown 
 as in the sympathy of Parliament with the eccentricities 
 of public opinion. We are constantly acknowledging 
 that 'the English mind' is exclusively occupied with 
 single questions; sometimes with one, and sometimes 
 with another, but at each time with one only. If Parlia- 
 ment did not share the same influences as the general 
 body of fairly educated men, there would every now and 
 then be a remarkable contrast between the subjects which 
 interested Parliament and that which occupied the nation. 
 The intensity of our peculiar sympathies makes this more 
 likely. Satirists say that the English nation is liable to 
 intellectual seizures ; and so exclusive and so restless is 
 our intellectual absorption, so sudden its coming, so quick 
 sometimes is its cessation, that there is some significance 
 in the phrase. We are struck with particular ideas, and 
 for the time think of nothing else. It will be found that 
 Parliament, if it be sitting, thinks of the same. No 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 7 
 
 instance of this can be more remarkable than the parlia- 
 mentary proceedings on Mr. Roebuck's motion for an 
 inquiry into the conduct of the Crimean campaign. There 
 was great excitement in the nation at the moment; it 
 has enabled the present generation to understand what 
 historians did not before understand — the fate of poor 
 Admiral Byng. The English nation cannot bear failure in 
 war. If there had been any one to hang at the time Mr. 
 Roebuck made his motion, and he could have been hanged 
 directly, certainly he would have been hanged. On 
 the other hand, the authority of statesmanlike opinion in 
 Parliament, the weight of political connection, the legiti- 
 mate disinclination to break up a government during a 
 dangerous crisis, and — what is more remarkable — the 
 great preponderance of sound argument, were united to 
 influence Parliament not to grant even an inquiry. The 
 result showed that the opinion of our leading statesmen 
 was right, and that the arguments they produced were 
 incontrovertible. Few investigations that have been 
 commenced with so much outcry have ever had so trivial 
 an effect. Yet, in opposition to all these influences, 
 usually so omnipotent, — in opposition to the combined 
 force of personal feeling and abstract argument, — the 
 House of Commons so far accurately represented the senti- 
 ment of the country as to grant, and even to insist on 
 granting, the inquiry. This parliamentary episode appears 
 to be an instantia lucifera on the subject ; it shows that, 
 
8 PARLIAMENTABY REFORM. 
 
 even when we could wish it otherwise, the House of 
 Commons will echo the voice of the nation. 
 
 After all, there can be no more conclusive evidence of 
 the substantial agreement between Parliament and the 
 nation than the slight interest which is taken by the 
 public in all questions of organic reform. Every one 
 knows how the Reform Act of 1832 was carried; no one 
 doubted that the public mind was excited then ; no fair 
 person could doubt what the decision of the nation then 
 was. The ' insurrection of the middle classes/ as it has 
 been called, insured the success of the ' Bill.' It was 
 alleged by its most reasonable opponents ' that the mea- 
 sure could not be final; that those on whom it was 
 proposed to confer the franchise would, even after the 
 passing of the measure, be but small in comparison with 
 those from whom it would be still withheld; that in a 
 few years a similar agitation would recur, and a similar 
 necessity of yielding to agitation ; that the storm of 1832 
 would be a feeble prelude to that of 1842/ etc. These 
 prophecies were not without a species of probability, but 
 they have not been realized. No excited multitude 
 clamours for enfranchisement ; the reality is the reverse 
 of the anticipation. 
 
 Two defects, however, may be discerned in the general 
 accordance of parliamentary with national opinion. The 
 Parliament certainly has an undue bias towards the senti- 
 ments and views of the landed interest. It is not easy 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 9 
 
 to trace this in immediate results. We have said that 
 we scarcely think that it is proved by the history of the 
 free-trade agitation ; that agitation was successful, nearly 
 if not quite, as soon as it should have been. We may, 
 indeed, speculate on the results which might have occurred 
 if the Irish famine had not happened, and if Sir R Peel 
 had not formed a statesmanlike judgment upon its con- 
 sequences ; we may believe that there would in that case 
 have been an opposition between an educated nation 
 converted by reasoning to the principles of free trade, 
 and a majority in Parliament wedded by prejudice and 
 interest to protection. Stili, as this is but conjecture, we 
 cannot cite it as conclusive evidence. Nor is the partiality 
 to real property in matters of taxation which is occasion- 
 ally dwelt on, very easy to prove in figures. The account 
 is at best a complicated one. The exemption of land from 
 probate duty is partly compensated by the succession 
 duty, by the land-tax, by the more severe pressure of the 
 
 income-tax, and still more by the necessary incidence of 
 
 v 
 much local taxation on this kind of property. Still, a 
 
 fair observer, closely comparing the opinion of the House 
 
 of Commons with that of the public out of doors, will 
 
 certainly observe some signs of a partiality towards the 
 
 landed interest among our legislators. We cannot ascribe 
 
 this to any obvious preponderance in number of the 
 
 county over the borough seats. Taking population as a 
 
 test, it is otherwise. There are in England and Wales 
 
10 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 159 county members, more than double that number 
 (viz. 335) of borough members; the population of the 
 represented boroughs is 7,500,000, that of the counties 
 10,500,000, consequently the represented boroughs have 
 not as many inhabitants as the counties, though they 
 elect twice the number of members'. This test is, of course, 
 a most imperfect one ; but it may serve to show that 
 in mere arithmetic the counties are not extravagantly 
 favoured. ' The real cause is the peculiar structure of our 
 county society. A county member is almost of necessity 
 one of the county gentry ; he must not only possess land, 
 but it must be land in that place : no one else is ' entitled 
 to stand.' On the other hand, boroughs return a very 
 miscellaneous class of members. Many important land- 
 owners sit for them. So great is the variety, that no 
 class is excluded from them altogether. This contrast 
 must affect the distribution of parliamentary power. The 
 county members form a peculiar class in the House of 
 Commons, and exercise a steady influence there out of 
 proportion to their mere members. Besides, so much 
 more of social influence belongs to the territorial aristo- 
 cracy than to any other class, that its weight is in- 
 definitely increased. Not a few men enter Parliament 
 mainly to augment their social importance, and over these 
 the unquestioned possessors of social rank necessarily 
 have great power. A third circumstance contributes its 
 effect. ' The ministers of the crown are generally large 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 11 
 
 landowners. By imperious social usage, they must be 
 men of large property; and all opulence gravitates to- 
 wards the land. Political opulence does so particularly. 
 Until recently there was much difficulty in finding other 
 investments not requiring sedulous personal attention, 
 and not liable to be affected by political vicissitudes. It 
 is of essential importance that ministers of State should 
 be persons at ease in their worldly circumstances, and it is 
 quite out of the question that they should have any share 
 in the administration of commercial enterprises; they 
 have enough to do without that. Their wealth, too, should 
 not be in a form that could expose them even to the 
 suspicion of stock-jobbing, or of making an improper use 
 of political information. We have now many kinds of 
 property debentures, canal shares, railway shares, etc., 
 which have these advantages in nearly an equal degree 
 with land itself ; but the growth of these is recent. It 
 may hereafter have important consequences, but it has 
 not as yet had time to achieve them. Accordingly the 
 series of cabinet ministers presents a nearly unbroken 
 rank of persons who either are themselves large land- 
 owners, or are connected closely by birth or intermarriage 
 with large landowners. This combination of circum- 
 stances gives to real property an influence in our political 
 system greater than in strict theory we should wish it to 
 have. It is true that the owners of much land are men 
 of much leisure, and the possession of such property has 
 
12 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 a sedative influence, which in moderation may not be 
 undesirable ; but the effective representation of national 
 opinion requires the selection of members of Parliament 
 from men of various occupations, various tendencies, and 
 various sympathies. Public opinion in a composite nation 
 is formed by the action and reaction of many kinds of 
 minds ; and abstractedly it seems a defect that the solid 
 mass of county members, on whatever side of the house 
 they sit, should present features so marked and uniform. 
 The second defect in the accordance of parliamentary 
 with national opinion is but another phase of the same 
 fact. Too little weight is at present given to the growing 
 parts of the country, too much to the stationary. It 
 appears that the county constituencies in England and 
 Wales have only increased, in the twenty years between 
 1837 and 1857, from 473,000 to 505,000, that is, at about 
 six per cent.; the borough constituencies, in the same 
 period, have increased from 321,000 to 439,000, or at the 
 rate of seventeen per cent. And it further appears, as 
 we should expect, that the principal increase, both in the 
 case of counties and boroughs, is not in the purely agri- 
 cultural districts, but in the great scenes of manufacturing 
 industry and in the metropolis. The growth of con- 
 stituencies, according to the present franchise, is a much 
 better test of relative importance than the mere growth 
 of population ; it indicates the increase of property, and 
 therefore of presumable intelligence. These figures plainly 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 13 
 
 indicate, if not an existing defect, yet a source of future 
 defect in our representative system. If there was a just 
 proportion between the two halves of England in 1832, 
 there is not that just proportion now. In the long run, 
 public opinion will be much more influenced by the grow- 
 ing portion of the country than by the stationary. It is 
 an indistinct perception of this fact that stimulates what- 
 ever agitation for reform at present exists. The manu- 
 facturers of Leeds and Manchester do not give levees and 
 entertainments to Mr. Bright from any attraction towards 
 abstract democracy ; the rate-paying franchise which Mr. 
 Bright desires would place these classes under the irre- 
 sistible control of their work-people. What our great 
 traders really desire is, their own due weight in the com- 
 munity. They feel that the country squire and the 
 proprietor of a petty borough have an influence in the 
 nation above that which they ought to have, and greater 
 than their own. A system arranged a quarter of a century 
 ago presses with irritating constraint on those who have 
 improved with half-magical rapidity during that quarter 
 of a century, — is unduly favourable to those who have 
 improved much less or not at all. 
 
 Subject, however, to these two exceptions, the House 
 of Commons of the present day coincides nearly — or 
 sufficiently nearly — in habitual judgment with the fairly 
 intelligent and reasonably educated part of the com- 
 munity. Almost all persons, except the avowed holders 
 
14 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 of .the democratic theory, would think that this is 
 enough. Most people wish to see embodied in Parliament 
 the true judgment of the nation ; they wish to see an 
 elected legislature fairly representing — that is, coinciding 
 in opinion with — the thinking part of the community. 
 What more, they would inquire, is wanted ? We answer, 
 that though this is by much the most important requisite 
 of a good popular legislature, it is not absolutely the 
 only one. 
 
 At present, the most important function of the 
 representative part of our legislature — the House of 
 Commons — is the ruling function. By a very well- 
 known progress of events, the popular part of our 
 constitution has grown out of very small beginnings to 
 a practical sovereignty over all the other parts. To 
 possess the confidence of the House of Commons is all 
 that a minister desires; [the power of the Crown is 
 reduced to a kind of social influence ; that of the House 
 of Lords is contracted to a suspensive veto. For the 
 exercise of this ruling function, the substantial con- 
 formity of the judgment and opinion of the House of 
 Commons with that of the fairly cultivated and fairly 
 influential part of the people at large is the most important 
 of possible conditions — is, in fact, the one condition on 
 which the satisfactory performance of that function 
 appears to depend. No legislature destitute of this 
 qualification, whatever its other merits may be, can create 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 15 
 
 that feeling of diffused satisfaction which is the peculiar 
 happiness of constitutional countries, or can ensure that 
 distinct comprehension of a popular policy which is the 
 greatest source of their strength. Nothing can satisfy 
 which is not comprehended : no policy can be popular 
 which is not understood. This is a truth of every-day 
 observation. We are, nowadays, so familiar with the 
 beneficial results of the ruling action of Parliament, that 
 we are engrossed by it ; we fancy that it is the sole duty 
 of a representative assembly: yet so far is this from 
 being the case, that in England it was not even the 
 original one. 
 
 The earliest function of a House of Commons was 
 undeniably what we may call an expressive function. 
 In its origin it was (matters of taxation excepted) a 
 petitioning body ; all the early statutes, as is well known, 
 are in this form : the Petition of Right is an instance of 
 its adoption in times comparatively recent. The function 
 of the popular part of the legislature was then to repre- 
 sent to the king the wants of his faithful Commons. 
 They were called to express the feelings of those who 
 sent them and their own. Of course, in its original form, 
 this function is obsolete ; and if something analogous to 
 it were not a needful element in the duties of every 
 representative assembly, it would be childish to refer to 
 it. But in every free country it is of the utmost impor- 
 tance — and, in the long run, a pressing necessity — that 
 
16 PAELIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 all opinions extensively entertained, all sentiments widely 
 diffused should be stated publicly before the nation. We 
 may attribute the real decision o£ questions, the actual 
 adoption of policies, to the ordinary and fair intelligence 
 of the community, or to the legislature which represents 
 it. But we must also take care to bring before that 
 fair intelligence and that legislature the sentiments, the 
 interests, the opinions, the prejudices, the wants, of all 
 classes of the nation ; we must be sure that no decision 
 is come to in ignorance of real facts and intimate wants. 
 The diffused multitude of moderate men, whose opinions, 
 taken in the aggregate, form public opinion, are just as 
 likely to be tyrannical towards what they do not realize, 
 inapprehensive of what is not argued out, thoughtless of 
 what is not brought before them, as any other class can 
 be. They will judge well of what they are made to 
 understand ; they will not be harsh to feelings that are 
 brought home to their imagination ; but the materials 
 of a judgment must be given them, the necessary 
 elements of imagination must be provided, otherwise the 
 result is certain. A free government is the most 
 stubbornly stupid of all governments to whatever is 
 unheard by its deciding classes. On this account it is 
 of the utmost importance that there should be in the 
 House of Commons some persons able to speak, and 
 authorized to speak, the wants, sentiments, and opinions 
 of every section of the community — delegates, one might 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 17 
 
 almost say, of that section. It is only by argument in 
 the legislature that the legislature can be impressed ; 
 it is by argument in the legislature that the attention of 
 the nation is most easily attracted and most effectually 
 retained. 
 
 If, with the light of this principle, we examine our 
 present system of representation, it seems unquestionable 
 that it is defective. We do not provide any mode of 
 expression for the sentiments of what are vaguely but 
 intelligibly called the working classes. We ignore them. 
 The Reform Act of 1832 assumed that it was expedient 
 to give a representation to the wants and feelings of those 
 who live in ten-pound houses, but that it was not ex- 
 pedient to give any such expression to the wants and 
 feelings of those who live in houses rated below that sum. 
 If we were called to consider that part of this subject, we 
 should find much to excuse the framers of that Act in the 
 state of opinion which then prevailed and the general 
 circumstances of the time. It was necessary to propose 
 a simple measure ; and this numerical demarcation has a 
 trenchant simplicity. But if we now considerately review 
 our electoral organization, we must concede that, however 
 perfectly it may provide an appropriate regulator for our 
 national affairs, it omits to provide a befitting organ of 
 expression for the desires and convictions of these parti- 
 cular classes. ' 
 
 The peculiar characteristics of a portion of the working 
 
 c 
 
18 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 classes render this omission of special importance. The 
 agricultural labourers may have no sentiments on public 
 affairs ; but the artisan classes have. Not only are their 
 circumstances peculiar, and their interests sometimes 
 different from those of the high orders of the community 
 — both which circumstances are likely to make them 
 adopt special opinions, and are therefore grounds for a 
 special representation — but the habit of mind which their 
 pursuits and position engender is of itself not unlikely to 
 cause some eccentricity of judgment. Observers tell us 
 that those who live by manual ingenuity are more likely 
 to be remarkable for originality than for modesty. In 
 the present age — and to some extent, we must expect, -in 
 every age — such persons must be self-taught ; and self- 
 taught men are commonly characterized by a one-sided 
 energy and something of a self-sufficient disposition. The 
 sensation of perfection in a mechanical employment is of 
 itself not without an influence tending towards conceit ; 
 and however instructed in definite learning energetic 
 men in these classes may become, they are not subjected 
 to the insensible influences of cultivated life, they do not 
 live in the temperate zone of society, which soon chills 
 the fervid ideas of unseasonable originality. Being cooped 
 up within the narrow circle of ideas that their own energy 
 has provided, they are particularly liable to singular 
 opinions. This is especially the case on politics. They 
 are attracted to that subject in a free country of necessity ; 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 19 
 
 their active intellects are in search of topics for reflection; 
 and this subject abounds in the very atmosphere of our 
 national life, is diffused in newspapers, obtruded at elec- 
 tions, to be heard at every corner of the street. Energetic 
 minds in this class are therefore particularly likely to 
 entertain eccentric opinions on political topics ; and it is 
 peculiarly necessary that such opinions should, by some 
 adequate machinery, be stated and made public. If such 
 singular views be brought into daily collision with ascer- 
 tained facts and the ordinary belief of cultivated men, 
 their worth can be tested, the weakness of their fallacious 
 part exposed, any new grain of truth they may contain 
 appreciated. On some subjects (possibly, for example, on 
 simple questions of foreign policy) the views of self-taught 
 men may be very valuable, for their moral instincts some- 
 times have a freshness rarely to be found. At any rate, 
 whatever may be the abstract value of the special senti- 
 ments and convictions of the operative classes, their very 
 speciality is a strong indication that our constitution is 
 defective in providing no distinct outlet for their ex- 
 pression. 
 
 A theorist might likewise be inclined to argue that 
 the Reform Act of 1832 was defective in not providing 
 an appropriate organ for the expression of opinion of the 
 higher orders of society. ' It selects a ten-pound house- 
 holder for special favour. In large towns, nay to a certain 
 extent in any town, the more cultivated and refined 
 
20 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 classes, who live in better houses than these, are practic- 
 ally disfranchised ; the number of their inferiors renders 
 valueless the suffrage conferred on thern. We remember 
 some years ago hearing a conversation between a foreigner 
 and a most accomplished Englishman, who lived in Eussell 
 Square. The foreigner was expatiating on the happiness 
 of English people in being governed by a legislature in 
 which they were represented. The Russell-Square scholar 
 replied, 'I am represented by Mr. Wakley and Tom 
 Duncombe.' He felt the scorn natural to a cultivated 
 man in a metropolitan constituency at the supposition 
 that such representatives as these really expressed his 
 views and sentiments. We know how constantly in 
 America, which is something like a nation of metropolitan 
 constituencies, the taste and temper of the electors excludes 
 the more accomplished and leisured classes from the legis- 
 lature, and how vulgar a stamp the taste and temper of 
 those elected impresses on the proceedings of its legislature 
 and the conduct of its administration. Men of refinement 
 shrink from the House of Representatives as from a parish 
 vestry. In England, though we feel this in some mea- 
 sure, we feel it much less. Other parts of our electoral 
 system now afford a refuge to that refined cultivation 
 which is hateful to and hates the grosser opinion of the 
 small shopkeepers in cities. Our higher classes still 
 desire to rule the nation ; and so long as this is the case, 
 the inherent tendencies of human nature secure them the 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 21 
 
 advantage. Manner and bearing have an influence on 
 the poor ; the nameless charm of refinement tells ; personal 
 confidence is almost everywhere more easily accorded to 
 one of the higher classes than to one of the lower classes. 
 From this circumstance, there is an inherent tendency in 
 any electoral system which does not vulgarize the govern- 
 ment to protect the rich and to represent the rich. Though 
 by the letter of the law, a man who lives in a house 
 assessed at £10 has an equal influence on the constitution 
 of the legislature with a man whose house is assessed at 
 £100, yet, in truth, the richer man has the security that 
 the members of Parliament, and especially the foremost 
 members of Parliament, are much more likely to be taken 
 from this class than from a poorer class. 
 
 We may therefore conclude that there is not any 
 ground for altering the electoral system established by 
 the Reform Act of 1832 on account of its not providing 
 for the due representation of the more cultivated classes. 
 Indirectly it does so. But we must narrowly watch any 
 changes in that system which are proposed to us, with 
 the view of seeing whether their operation might not 
 have a tendency to impair the subtle working of this 
 indirect machinery. We must bear in mind that the 
 practical disfranchisement of the best classes is the ascer- 
 tained result of giving an equal weight to high and low 
 in constituencies like the metropolitan. 
 
 These considerations do not affect our previous con- 
 
22 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 elusion as to the lower orders. We ascertained that, 
 however perfectly the House of Commons under the 
 present system of election may coincide in j udgment with 
 the fairly educated classes of the country, and however 
 competent it may on that account be to perform the ruling 
 function of a popular legislature, it was nevertheless 
 defective in its provision for the performance of the 
 expressive functions of such a legislature ; because it pro- 
 vided no organ for informing Parliament and the country 
 of the sentiments and opinions of the working, and espe- 
 cially of the artisan classes. 
 
 Another deficiency in the system of representation 
 now existing is of a different nature. It is not only 
 desirable that a popular legislature should be fitted to 
 the discharge of its duties, but also that it should be 
 elected by a process which occasions no unnecessary moral 
 evils. A theorist would be inclined to advance a step 
 further. He would require that a popular assembly 
 should be elected in the mode which would diffuse the 
 instruction given by the habitual possession of the fran- 
 chise among the greatest number of competent persons, 
 and which would deny it to the greatest number of unfit 
 persons. But every reasonable theorist would hasten to 
 add, that the end must never be sacrificed to the means. 
 The mode of election which is selected must be one which 
 will bring together an assembly of members fitted to dis- 
 charge the functions of Parliament. Among those modes 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 23 
 
 of election, this theoretical principle prescribes the rule 
 of choice ; but we must not, under its guidance, attempt 
 to travel beyond the circle of those modes. A practical 
 statesman will be very cautious how he destroys a 
 machinery which attains its essential object, for the sake 
 of an incidental benefit which might be expected from a 
 different machinery. If we have a good legislature, he 
 will say, let us not endanger its goodness for the sake of 
 a possible diffusion of popular education. All sensible 
 men would require that the advocates of such a measure 
 should show beyond all reasonable doubt that the ex- 
 tension of the suffrage, which they recommend on this 
 secondary ground, should not impair the attainment of 
 the primary end for which all suffrage was devised. At 
 the present moment, there certainly are many persons of 
 substantial property and good education who do not 
 possess the franchise, and to whom it would be desirable 
 to give it, if they could be distinguished from others who 
 are not so competent. ' A man of the highest education, 
 who does not reside in a borough, may have large pro- 
 perty in the funds, in railway shares, or any similar 
 investment ; but he will have no vote unless his house is 
 rated above £50. But, as we have said, we must not, 
 from a theoretical desire to include such persons in our 
 list of electors, run a risk of admitting also any large 
 number of persons who would be unfit to vote, and thereby 
 impairing the practical utility of Parliament. No such 
 
24 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 hesitation should, however, hold us back when peculiar 
 moral evils can be proved to arise from a particular morle 
 of election. If that be so, we ought on the instant to make 
 the most anxious search for some other mode of election 
 not liable to the same objection : we ought to run some 
 risk ; if another mode of election can be suggested, ap- 
 parently equal in efficiency, which would not produce the 
 same evils, we should adopt it at once in place of the 
 other. We must act on the spirit of faith that what is 
 morally wrong cannot be politically right. 
 
 This objection applies in the strongest manner to one 
 portion of our electoral system,namely,the smaller borough 
 constituencies. We there intrust the franchise to a class 
 of persons few enough to be bought, and not respectable 
 enough to refuse to be bought. The disgraceful exposures 
 of some of these boroughs before election committees make 
 it probable that the same abuses exist in others : doubtless, 
 too, we do not know the worst. The worst constituencies 
 are slow to petition, because the local agents of both 
 parties are aware of what would come to light, and fear 
 the consequent penalties. Enough, however, is in evi- 
 dence for us to act upon. Some of these small boroughs 
 are dependent on some great nobleman or man of fortune ; 
 and this state is perhaps preferable to their preserving a 
 vicious independence : but even this state is liable to very 
 many objections. It is most advantageous that the no- 
 minal electors should be the real electors. Legal fictions 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 25 
 
 have a place in courts of law ; it is sometimes better or 
 more possible to strain venerable maxims beyond their 
 natural meaning than to limit them by special enactment : 
 but legal fictions are very dangerous in the midst of 
 popular institutions and a genuine moral excitement. We 
 speak day by day of ' shams ; ' and the name will be for 
 ever applied to modes of election which pretend to intrust 
 the exclusive choice to those who are known by every- 
 body never to choose. The Reform Act of 1832 was 
 distinctly founded on the principle that all modes of elec- 
 tion should be real. 
 
 We arrive, therefore, at the result that the system of 
 1832 is defective, because it established, or rather per- 
 mitted to continue, moral evils which it is our duty to 
 remove, if by possibility they can be removed. However, 
 in that removal we must be careful to watch exactly what 
 we are doing. It has been shown that the letter of the 
 Reform Act makes no provision for the special representa- 
 tion of wealth and cultivation ; the representation which 
 they have is attained by indirect means. The purchas- 
 able boroughs are undoubtedly favourable to wealth ; the 
 hereditary boroughs to men of hereditary cultivation; 
 and we should be careful not to impair unnecessarily the 
 influence of these elements by any alteration we may 
 resolve upon. 
 
 We can now decide on the result which we should try 
 to attain in a new Reform Bill. If we could obtain a 
 
26 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 House of Commons that should be well elected, that should 
 contain true and adequate exponents of all class interests, 
 that should coincide in opinion with the fair intelligence 
 of the country, we shall have all which we ought to desire. 
 We have satisfied ourselves that we do not possess all 
 these advantages now ; we have seen that a part of our 
 system of election is grossly defective ; that our House of 
 Commons contains no adequate exponents of the views of 
 the working classes ; that though its judgment has, as yet, 
 fairly coincided with public opinion, yet that its constitu- 
 tion gives a dangerous preponderance to the landed 
 interest, and is likely to fail us hereafter unless an addi- 
 tional influence be given to the more growing and energetic 
 classes of society. 
 
 We should think it more agreeable (and perhaps it 
 would be so to most of our readers) if we were able at 
 once to proceed to discuss the practical plan by which these 
 objects might be effected ; but in deference to a party 
 which has some zealous adherents, and to principles which, 
 in an indistinct shape, are widely diffused, we must devote 
 a few remarks to the consideration of the ultra-democratic 
 theory ; and as we have to do so, it will be convenient to 
 discuss in connection with it one or two of the schemes 
 which the opponents of that theory have proposed for 
 testing political intelligence. 
 
 As is well known, the democratic theory requires that 
 parliamentary representation should be proportioned to 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 27 
 
 mere numbers. This is not, indeed, the proposition which 
 is at this moment put forward. The most important sec- 
 tion of democratic reformers now advocate a rate-paying 
 or household franchise ; but this is either avowedly as a 
 step to something farther, or because from considerations 
 of convenience it is considered better to give the franchise 
 only to those whose residences can be identified. But it 
 is easy to show that the rate-paying franchise is almost 
 equally liable with the manhood suffrage to a most im- 
 portant objection. That objection, of course, is, that the 
 adoption of the scheme would give entire superiority to 
 the lower part of the community. Nothing is easier than 
 to show that a rate-paying franchise would have that 
 effect. In England and Wales — 
 
 The number of houses assessed at £10 and above 
 
 is computed to be 990,000 
 
 at £6 and under £10 572,000 
 
 under £6 .... 1,713,000 
 
 3,275,000 
 
 More than half the persons who would be admitted by the 
 rate-paying franchise are, therefore, of a very low order, 
 living in houses under £6 rent, and two-thirds are below 
 £10, the lowest qualification admitted by the present law. 
 It therefore seems quite certain that the effect of the pro- 
 posed innovation must be very favourable to ignorance 
 and poverty, and very unfavourable to cultivation and 
 intelligence. 
 
28 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 There used to be much argument in favour of the 
 democratic theory, on the ground of its supposed con- 
 formity with the abstract rights of man. This has passed 
 away ; but we cannot say that the reasons by which it 
 has been replaced are more distinct: we think that 
 they are less distinct. We can - understand that an 
 enthusiast should maintain, on fancied grounds of immu- 
 table morality, or from an imaginary conformity with a 
 supernatural decree, that the ignorant should govern the 
 instructed ; but we do not comprehend how any one can 
 maintain the proposition on grounds of expediency. We 
 might believe it was right to submit to the results of 
 ,such a polity ; but those results, it would seem, must be 
 beyond controversy pernicious. The arguments from 
 expediency, which are supposed to establish the propo- 
 sition, are never set forth very clearly ; and we do not 
 think them worth confuting. We are, indeed, disposed to 
 believe, in spite of much direct assertion to the contrary, 
 that the democratic theory still rests not so much on 
 reason as on a kind of sentiment — on an obscure con- 
 ception of abstract rights. The animation of its advocates 
 is an indication of it. They think they are contending 
 for the ' rights ' of the people ; and they endeavour to 
 induce the people to believe so too. We hold this opinion 
 the more strongly, because we believe that there is such 
 a thing, after all, as abstract right in political organiza- 
 tions. We find it impossible to believe that all the 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 29 
 
 struggles of men for liberty — all the enthusiasm it has 
 called forth, all the passionate emotions it has caused in 
 the very highest minds, all the glow of thought and 
 rustle of obscure feeling which the very name excites in 
 the whole mass of men — have their origin in calculations 
 of advantage and a belief that such and such arrange- 
 ments would be beneficial. The masses of men are very 
 difficult to excite on bare grounds of self-interest ; most 
 easy, if a bold orator tells them confidently they are 
 wronged. The foundation of government upon simple 
 utility is but the fiction of philosophers; it has never 
 been acceptable to the natural feelings of mankind. There 
 is far greater truth in the formula of the French writers, 
 that ' le droit derive de la capacite'.' Some sort of feeling 
 akin to this lurks, we believe, in the minds of our 
 reformers ; they think they can show that some classes 
 now unenfranchised are as capable of properly exercising 
 the franchise as some who have possessed it formerly, or 
 some who have it now. The five-pound householder of 
 to-day is, they tell us, in education and standing but 
 what the ten-pound householder was in 1832. The 
 opponents of the ■ theory are pressed with the argument, 
 that every fit person should have the franchise, and that 
 many who are excluded are as fit as some who exercise 
 it, and from whom no one proposes to take it away. 
 
 The answer to the argument is plain. Fitness to 
 govern — for that is the real meaning of exercising the 
 
30 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 franchise which elects a ruling assembly — is not an 
 absolute quality of any individual. That fitness is relative 
 and comparative ; it must depend on the community to 
 be governed, and on the merits of other persons who 
 may be capable of governing that community. A savage 
 chief may be capable of governing a savage tribe; he 
 may have the right of governing it, for he may be the 
 sole person capable of so doing ; but he would have no 
 right to govern England. "We must look likewise to the 
 competitors, for the sovereignty. Whatever may be your 
 capacity for rule, you have no right to obtain the oppor- 
 tunity of exercising it by dethroning a person who is 
 more capable. You are wronging the community if you 
 do : for you are depriving it of a better government 
 than that which you can give to it. You are wronging 
 also the ruler you supersede ; for you are depriving him 
 of the appropriate exercise of his faculties. Two wrongs 
 are thus committed from a fancied idea that abstract 
 capacity gives a right to rule irrespective of comparative 
 relations. The true principle is, that every person has a 
 right to so much political power as he can exercise voith- 
 out impeding any other person who would more fitly 
 exercise such power. If we apply this to the lower orders 
 of society, we see the reason why, notwithstanding their 
 numbers, they must always be subject — always at least 
 be comparatively uninfluential. Whatever their capacity 
 may be, it must be less than that of the higher classes, 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 31 
 
 whose occupations are more instructive and whose 
 education is more prolonged. Any such measure for 
 enfranchising the lower orders as would overpower, and 
 consequently disfranchise, the higher, should be resisted 
 on the ground of ' abstract right ; ' you are proposing to 
 take power from those who have the superior capacity, 
 and to vest it in those who have but an inferior capacity, 
 or, in many cases, no capacity at all. If we probe the 
 subject to the bottom, we shall find that justice is on the 
 side of a graduated rule, in which all persons should 
 have an influence proportioned to their political capacity ; 
 and it is at this graduation that the true maxims of 
 representative government really aim. They wish that 
 the fairly intelligent persons, who create public opinion, 
 as we call it, in society, should rule in the State, which is 
 the authorized means of carrying that opinion into action. 
 This is the body which has the greater right to rule ; this 
 is the felt intelligence of the nation, ' la legitime aristo- 
 cratic, celle qu'acceptent librement les masses, sur qui elle 
 doit exercer son pouvoir.' * 
 
 It is impossible to deny that this authority, in matters 
 of political opinion, belongs by right, and is felt to belong 
 in fact, to the higher orders of society rather than to the 
 lower. The advantages of leisure, of education, of more 
 instructive pursuits, of more instructive society, must 
 and do produce an effect. A writer of very democratic 
 1 M. Guizot, Essai sur les Origines du Gouveinement repre'sentatif. 
 
32 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 leanings has observed, that 'there is an unconquerable, 
 and, to a certain extent, beneficial proneness in man to 
 rely on the judgment and authority of those who are 
 elevated above himself in rank and riches, from the 
 irresistible associations of the human mind ; a feeling of 
 respect and deference is entertained for a superior in 
 station which enhances and exalts all his good qualities, 
 gives more grace to his thoughts, more wisdom to his 
 opinions, more weight to his judgment, more excellence 
 to his virtues. . . . Hence the elevated men of society 
 will always maintain an ascendency which, without any 
 direct exertion of influence, will affect the result of 
 popular elections ; and when to this are added the capa- 
 bilities which they possess, or ought to possess, from their 
 superior intelligence, of impressing their own opinions 
 on other classes, it will be evident that if any sort of 
 control were justifiable, it would be superfluous for any 
 good purpose.' 1 There are individual exceptions ; but 
 in questions of this magnitude we must speak broadly : 
 and we may say that political intelligence will in general 
 exist rather in the educated classes than in the less 
 educated, rather in the rich than the poor ; and not only 
 that it will exist, but that it will, in the absence of 
 misleading feelings, be felt by both parties to exist. 
 
 "We have quoted the above passage for more reasons 
 
 1 Bailey on Representative Government; quoted in Sir G. Lewis's 
 ' Essay on the Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion,' p. 228. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 33 
 
 than one. It not only gives an appropriate description 
 of the popular association of superiority in judgment 
 with superiority in station, but it draws from the fact of 
 that association an inference which would be very impor- 
 tant if it were correct. It says, in substance, that as the 
 higher orders are felt by the lower to be more capable of 
 governing, they will be chosen by the lower, if the latter 
 are left free to choose ; that, therefore, no matter how 
 democratic the government — in fact, the more democratic 
 the government, the surer are the upper orders to lead. 
 But experience shows that this is an error. If the 
 acquisition of power is left to the unconscious working 
 of the natural influences of society, the rich and the 
 cultivated will certainly acquire it ; they obtain it 
 insensibly, gradually, and without the poorer orders 
 knowing that they are obtaining it. But the result is 
 different when, by the operation of a purely democratic 
 constitution, the selection of rulers is submitted to the 
 direct vote of the populace. The lower orders are then 
 told that they are perfectly able to judge; demagogues 
 assert it to them without ceasing : the constitution itself 
 is appealed to as an incontrovertible witness to the fact ; 
 as it has placed the supreme power in the hands of the 
 lower and more numerous classes, it would be contra- 
 vening it to suppose that the real superiority was in the 
 higher and fewer. Moreover, when men are expressly 
 asked to acknowledge their superiors, they are by no 
 
 D 
 
34 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 means always inclined to do so. They do not object to 
 yield a mute observance, but they refuse a definite act of 
 homage. They will obey, but they will not say that 
 they will obey. In consequence, history teaches that 
 under a democratic government those who speak the 
 feelings of the majority themselves, have a greater chance 
 of being chosen to rule, than any of the higher orders, 
 who, under another form of government, would be 
 admitted to be the better judges. The natural effect of 
 such a government is to mislead the poor. 
 
 We have no room to notice the specific evils which 
 would accrue from the adoption of an unmixedly demo- 
 cratic constitution. One, however, which has not been 
 quite appreciated follows naturally from the remarks we 
 have made. There is a risk of vulgarizing the whole 
 tone, method, and conduct of public business. We see 
 how completely this has been done in America ; a country 
 far more fitted, at least in the northern States, for the 
 democratic experiment than any old country can be. 
 Nor must we imagine that this vulgarity of tone is a 
 mere external expression, not affecting the substance of 
 what is thought, or interfering with the policy of the 
 nation. No defect really eats away so soon the political 
 ability of a nation. A vulgar tone of discussion disgusts 
 cultivated minds with the subject of politics ; they will 
 not apply themselves to master a topic which, besides its 
 natural difficulties, is encumbered with disgusting phrases, 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 35 
 
 low arguments, and the undisguised language of coarse 
 selfishness. We all know how we should like to inter- 
 fere in ward elections, borough politics, or any public 
 matter over which a constant habit of half-educated dis- 
 cussion has diffused an atmosphere of deterring associ- 
 ations. A high morality, too, shrinks with the inevitable 
 shyness of superiority from intruding itself into the 
 presence of low debates. The inevitable consequence of 
 vulgarizing our Parliament would be the deterioration of 
 public opinion, not only in its more refined elements, 
 but in all the tangible benefits we derive from the appli- 
 cation to politics of thoroughly cultivated minds. 
 
 We can only allude briefly to the refutation of the 
 purely democratic theory with which the facts of English 
 history supply us. It is frequently something like pedan- 
 try when reference is made to the origin of the House of 
 Commons as a source of data for deciding on the proper 
 constitution for it now. What might have been a proper 
 constitution for it when it was an inconsiderable part of 
 the government, may be a most improper one now that it 
 is the ruling part. Still, one brief remark may be advanced 
 as to the early history of our representative system, which 
 will have an important reference to the topic. ' Whilst, 
 writes one of our soundest constitutional antiquaries, 
 'boroughs were thus reluctant to return members, and 
 burgesses disinclined to serve in that capacity, the 
 sheriffs assumed a right of sending or omitting precepts 
 
36 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 at their pleasure. Where boroughs were unwilling or 
 unable to send representatives, the sheriff, from favour or 
 indulgence, withheld the precept, which in strictness he 
 was bound to issue, and thus acquired a discretionary- 
 power of settling what places were to elect, and what 
 places were not to elect, members of Parliament. In his 
 return to the writ of summons, he sometimes reported 
 that he had sent his precept to a borough, but had 
 received no answer to it. Sometimes he asserted, with- 
 out the slightest regard to truth, that there were no 
 more cities or boroughs in his bailiwick than those 
 mentioned in his return. At other times he qualified 
 this assertion by adding that there were none fit to send 
 members to Parliament, or that could be induced to send 
 them. No notice seems ever to have been taken of these 
 proceedings of the sheriffs; nor is there the slightest 
 ground for suspecting that in the exercise of his dis- 
 cretionary power he was directed by any secret instruc- 
 tions from the king and council : " I have never seen or 
 heard," says Brady, " of any particular directions from 
 the king and council or others to the sheriffs, for sending 
 their precepts to this or that borough only and not to 
 others." Provided there was a sufficient attendance of 
 members for the public business, the government seem to 
 have been indifferent to the number that came, or to the 
 number of places from which they were sent.' 1 The 
 1 Allen on Parliamentary Reform, 1832. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 37 
 
 public business of that time was different from the public 
 business which is now transacted by Parliament ; but we 
 may paraphrase the sentence into one that is applicable 
 to us. Provided we have a House of Commons coinciding 
 in opinion with the general mass of the public, and con- 
 taining representatives competent to express the peculiar 
 sentiments of all peculiar classes, we have provided for 
 our ' public business ; ' we need not trouble ourselves 
 much further, we shall have attained all reasonable 
 objects of desire, and established a polity with which we 
 may be content. 
 
 The most obvious way of attempting this is, to re- 
 present, or attempt to represent, intelligence directly. 
 The simplest plan of embodying public opinion in a 
 legislature, is to give a special representation in that 
 legislature, to the politically intelligent persons who 
 create that opinion. To attain this end directly is, 
 however, impossible. There is no test of intelligence 
 which a revising barrister could examine, on which 
 attorneys could argue before him. The absurdity of the 
 idea is only rendered more evident by the few proposals 
 which are made in the hope of realizing it. Mr. Holyoake 
 proposes that the franchise should be given to those who 
 could pass a political examination ; an examination, that 
 is, in some standard text-book — Mill's Princijrtes of 
 Political Economy, or some work of equal reputation. 
 But it does not need to be explained that this would 
 
38 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 enfranchise extremely few people in a country. Only a 
 few persons give, or can give, a scientific attention to 
 politics; and very many who cannot, are in every 
 respect competent to give their votes as electors, and 
 even to serve as representatives. It is probable that the 
 adoption of such an examination suffrage, in addition to 
 the kinds of suffrage which exist now, would not add one 
 per cent, to the present constituencies; and that if it 
 were made a necessary qualification for the possession 
 of a vote, we should thereby disfranchise ninety-nine 
 hundredths of the country. A second proposal with the 
 same object is, to give votes to all members of 'learned 
 societies.' But this would be contemptibly futile. There 
 is no security whatever that members of learned societies 
 should be really learned. They are close corporations ; 
 and the only check on the admission of improper persons 
 in future is the discretion of those who have been admitted 
 already. At present most members of such societies un- 
 doubtedly have an interest in the objects for which they 
 were formed ; but create a political motive, and a skilful 
 parliamentary agent will soon fill the lists with the 
 names of persons not celebrated for scientific learning, 
 but who know how to vote correctly upon occasion. The 
 idea of a direct representation of intelligence wholly fails 
 from the non-existence of a visible criterion of that in- 
 telligence. All that can be done in this direction must 
 be effected by a gradual extension of the principle which 
 
PAELIAMENTAEY REFORM. 39 
 
 has given members to our Universities. No one can 
 obtain admission to these bodies without a prolonged 
 course of study, or without passing a strict examination 
 in several subjects. This is a kind of franchise not to be 
 manufactured; it is only obtained as a collateral ad- 
 vantage, by persons who are in pursuit of quite different 
 objects. Such bodies, however, are obviously few, and 
 such kinds of franchise are necessarily limited. But they 
 should be extended as far as possible ; and as many such 
 bodies as can be found will tend to supply us with an 
 additional mode of giving a representation to cultivation 
 and refinement — an object which we noticed as one of 
 the desirable ends apparently least provided for by the 
 letter of our present system. 1 
 
 The criteria by which a franchise can be determined 
 must have two characteristics. They must be evident 
 and conspicuous — tests about which there can be no 
 question. Our registration courts cannot decide meta- 
 
 1 In relation to this subject, we must call special attention to the 
 claims of the University of London and of the Scotch Universities to 
 representation in Parliament. The former University had a distinct 
 pledge from the government which founded it that it should be placed 
 on an equality in every respect with Oxford and Cambridge. And such 
 Universities would not only introduce additional representatives of 
 intellectual culture into the House of Commons, but representatives also 
 olfree intellectual culture, as distinguished from the representatives of 
 the ecclesiastical culture of the older Universities. Mr. Bright has re- 
 proached the members for Oxford and Cambridge Universities with their 
 habitual antagonism to Eeform. This is, we fear, a true accusation. At 
 a time when educational questions are engrossing a larger and larger share 
 of public attention, an adequate representation of liberal intellectual culture 
 is most desirable in the House of Commons. 
 
40 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 physical niceties ; our machinery must be tough, if it is 
 to stand the wear and tear of eager contests. Secondly, 
 as we have explained, such criteria must be difficult to 
 manufacture for a political object. Our tests must not 
 be counterfeited, and they must be conspicuous. These 
 two requirements nearly confine us to a property quali- 
 fication. Property is, indeed, a very imperfect test of 
 intelligence ; but it is some test. If it has been inherited, 
 it guarantees education ; if acquired, it guarantees ability. 
 Either way it assures us of something. In all countries 
 where anything has prevailed short of manhood suffrage, 
 the principal limitation has been founded on criteria 
 derived from property. And it is very important to 
 observe that there is a special appropriateness in the 
 selection. Property has not only a certain connection 
 with general intelligence, but it has a peculiar connection 
 with political intelligence. It is a great guide to a good 
 judgment to have much to lose by a bad judgment. 
 Generally speaking, the welfare of a country will be most 
 dear to those who are well off there. Some considerations, 
 it is true, may limit this principle : great wealth has an 
 emasculating tendency; the knowledge ithat they have 
 much at stake may make men timid in action, and too 
 anxious, for the successful discharge of high duties : still 
 the broad conclusion is unaffected, that the possession of 
 property is not only an indication of general mind, but 
 has a peculiar tendency to generate 'political mind. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 41 
 
 Similar considerations limit the kinds of property to 
 be selected. Our property qualification must be con- 
 spicuous and uncreateable. Real property — houses and 
 land — on which our present qualification is based, possess 
 these elements in a pre-eminent degree. We think, 
 however, that they are not the only kinds of property 
 which now in a sufficient degree possess these require- 
 ments. They probably were so formerly ; but one of the 
 most important alterations in our social condition is the 
 change in the nature of much of our wealth. The growth 
 of what lawyers call personal property has of late years 
 been enormous. Railway shares, canal shares, public 
 funds, bank shares, debentures without number, are only 
 instances of what we mean. Great industrial under- 
 takings are a feature in our age, and it is fitting that a 
 share in them should give a franchise as much as an 
 estate in land. Two conditions only would be necessary 
 to be observed. First, the property must be substantial, 
 as it is called ; that is to say, it should be remunerative. 
 Property which does not yield an income is not sufficiently 
 tangible for the purposes of a qualification : men of 
 business may say it is about to yield a dividend ; but 
 this is always open to infinite argument. It would be 
 necessary to provide that the business property to be 
 represented should have been for a moderate period — say 
 three years — properly remunerative ; no one should 
 register for such property unless it had for that period 
 
42 PAKLIAMENTAEY REFORM. 
 
 paid a regular interest. Secondly, such property should 
 have been in the possession of the person wishing to 
 register an account of it for at least an equal previous 
 period. This is necessary to prevent the creation of 
 fictitious votes. Keal property is, indeed, exposed to this 
 danger ; but the occupancy of houses and lands is a very 
 visible fact, and acts of ownership over the soil are 
 tolerably well known on the spot. It is therefore some- 
 what difficult to create fictitious tenancies or freeholds. 
 In the case of share-property there is no equal check. 
 The only precaution which can be taken is, to make the 
 pecuniary risk of those who try to create such votes as 
 large as possible. If it be required that the property be 
 registered for a moderate period in the company's books 
 as belonging to the person who claims to vote in respect 
 of it, that person must have during that time the sole 
 right to receive the dividends, and the shares will be 
 liable for all his debts. If a real owner chooses to put a 
 nominal one in this position, he does it at the risk of 
 both principal and income. 
 
 We have, then, arrived at the end of another division 
 of our subject. We have shown that the democratic 
 theory is erroneous, and that the consequences of acting 
 upon it would be pernicious. We have discussed the 
 most plausible schemes which have been suggested for 
 testing political intelligence, and we have found reason 
 to think that a property qualification is the best of those 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 43 
 
 modes. It has incidentally appeared that the property 
 qualification which at present exists in England is de- 
 fective, because it only takes cognisance of a single kind 
 of property. We may now resume the thread of our dis- 
 cussion, which we laid aside to show the errors of the 
 democratic theory. We proceed to indicate how the 
 defects which have been proved to be parts of our existing 
 system of representation can be remedied without im- 
 pairing its characteristic excellence, without destroying 
 a legislature which is in tolerable conformity with in- 
 telligent opinion. 
 
 The first defect which we noticed was, that the ex- 
 isting system takes no account of the views and feelings 
 of the working classes, and affords no means for their 
 expression. How, then, can this be supplied ? It is 
 evident that this end can only be approached in two 
 ways ; we may give to the working classes a little influence 
 in all constituencies, or we may give them a good deal of 
 influence in a few constituencies. By the conditions of 
 the problem they are to have some power in the country, 
 but not all the power ; and these are the only two modes 
 in which that end can be effected. 
 
 The objection to the first plan is in the nature of a 
 dilemma. Either your arrangements give to the working 
 classes a sufficient power to enable them to decide 
 the choice of the member, or they do not. If they do, 
 they make these classes absolute in the State. If the 
 
44 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 degree of influence which you grant to them in every 
 constituency is sufficient to enable them to choose the 
 representative for that constituency, you have conferred 
 on these inferior classes the unlimited control of the 
 nation. On the other hand, if the degree of influence 
 you give to the poorer classes is not sufficient to enable 
 them to control the choice of any members, you have 
 done nothing. There will be no persons in Parliament 
 inclined by nature and empowered by authority to ex- 
 press their sentiments ; their voice will be as much 
 unheard in Parliament as it is now. If the poor are to 
 have a diffused influence in all constituencies, it must be 
 either a great one or a small one. A small one will 
 amount only to the right of voting for a candidate who 
 is not elected ; a great one will, in reality, be the establish- 
 ment of democracy. 
 
 We shall see the truth of this remark more distinctly 
 if we look a little in detail at one or two of the plans 
 which are proposed with this object. Perhaps the most 
 remarkable of these is that which is at present in opera- 
 tion in Prussia. The suffrage there is very diffused ; it 
 amounts to something very like manhood suffrage. But 
 the influence of the lower classes is limited in this way : 
 the constituency is divided into classes according to the 
 amount of direct taxation they respectively pay. The 
 names of those voters who pay the highest amount of tax 
 are put together till a third part of the whole amount 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 45 
 
 of direct taxes paid by the electoral district has been 
 reached. These form the first class. Again, as many 
 names are taken as will make up another third of the 
 same total taxation ; and these form the second class. 
 The third class is formed of all the rest, and each class has 
 an equal vote. By this expedient a few very rich persons 
 in class 1, and a moderate number of moderately rich 
 persons in class 2, have each of them as much influence 
 as the entire number of the poorer orders in class 8. In 
 Prussia a system of double representation has also been 
 adopted, and for that purpose the constituency is divided 
 into sections. But we need not confuse ourselves with 
 prolix detail ; the principle is all which is to the purpose. 
 The effect of the plan is evident; it is equivalent to 
 giving to the working classes one-third of the influence 
 in every constituency, and no more than one-third. But 
 it is evident that this arrangement not only gives no 
 security for the return of a satisfactory spokesman for the 
 lower orders, but that it provides that no such spokesman 
 shall be returned. The two superior classes are two- 
 thirds of the constituency, and they will take effectual 
 care that no member animated solely with the views of 
 the other third shall ever be elected. So far as class 
 feeling goes, the power given to the loAver orders is only 
 the power of voting in a perpetual minority. Un- 
 doubtedly, in case of a division between the two superior 
 classes, the lower orders would hold the balance ; they 
 
46 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 would have the power in all constituencies of deciding 
 who should and who should not be the member. But 
 this is not the kind of influence which we have shown 
 it to be desirable that the lower orders should possess. 
 Nothing can be more remote from their proper sphere 
 than the position of arbitrator between the conflicting 
 views of two classes above them. We wish that they 
 should have a few members to express their feelings ; 
 we do not wish that they should decide on the critical 
 controversies of their educated fellow-subjects — that 
 they should determine by a casting and final vote the 
 policy of the nation. 
 
 Another plan suggested is, that the lower orders 
 should have a single vote, and that persons possessed of 
 property should have a second vote- But statistics show 
 that the power which this would give to the lower orders 
 would be enormous. For example, if it should be enacted 
 that all persons living in houses rated at less than £10 
 shall have one vote, and that those living in houses rated 
 at more than £10, two votes, we should have — 
 
 990,000 living in houses of £10 and more ) . ,, n noA AA „ 
 
 tha ° £10 I with 1,980,000 votes, 
 
 2,280,000 living in houses under £10 . . • with 2,280,000 votes ; 
 
 giving a clear majority throughout the country to the 
 lowest class of rate-payers; and that majority would of 
 course be much augmented if we conferred (as the ad- 
 vocates of manhood suffrage propose) a vote on every 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 47 
 
 adult male in the country, whether he paid rates or not. 
 The inevitable effect of this plan would be to give an 
 authoritative control to the poorer classes. We might, 
 indeed, try to obviate this by giving a still greater 
 number of votes, say three or four, to the richer class ; 
 but then we should reduce the poorer class to an im- 
 potent minority throughout the country. In the first 
 case, they would have the power of returning nearly all 
 the members of the legislature ; in the second, they would 
 not as a class, or with an irresistible influence, return 
 any. 
 
 Another scheme, proposed with this object, at least in 
 part, is the ' representation of minorities,' as it . is com- 
 monly called. This is to be attained by the ingenious 
 device of making the number of votes to be possessed by 
 each constituent less than the number of members to be 
 returned by the constituency. 1 The consequence is in- 
 evitable : an ascertainable minority of the constituency, 
 by voting for a single candidate only, can effectually 
 secure his election. Thus, if the number of members is 
 three and the number of votes two, any fraction of the 
 constituency greater than two-fifths can be sure of re- 
 turning a member, if they are in earnest enough on the 
 matter to vote for him only. The proof of this is, that a 
 minority of two-fifths will have exactly as many votes to 
 
 1 This was the scheme actually adopted in the Eeform Bill of 1867, in 
 the case of all constituencies returning more than two members. — Ed. 
 
48 PARLIAMENTAKY REFORM. 
 
 give to one member as the remaining three-fifths have to 
 give to each of three members. If the constituency be 
 5000, a minority of two-fifths of the electors, or 2000, 
 would have 2000 votes to give to a single candidate ; the 
 remaining 3000 would have only 6000 votes to divide 
 between three candidates, which is only 2000 for each. 
 A minority at all greater than 2000, therefore, would, if 
 it managed properly, be certain to return a member. 
 The objection to this plan is, that it would rather tend 
 to give us a Parliament principally elected by the lower 
 orders, with special members among them to express the 
 sentiments of the wealthier classes, than a Parliament 
 generally agreeing with the wealthier classes, and con- 
 taining special representatives for the lower : the principal 
 representation is almost by express legislation given to 
 the more numerous classes ; a less to the minority. It 
 would not solve the problem of giving a certain power to 
 the lower orders, and yet not giving them a predominant 
 power. In the case which we have supposed of a con- 
 stituency with three members and two votes, the minority 
 also would be a larger one than the richer classes can 
 permanently hope to constitute in the country. Two- 
 fifths of a great town must necessarily include many of 
 the poorer, less cultivated, and less competent. We must 
 remember, also, that the disproportion in number between 
 rich and poor, even between the decidedly poor and the 
 rather wealthy, tends to augment. Society increases 
 
PARLIAMENTABY EEFOEM. 49 
 
 most rapidly at its lower end ; the wide base extends 
 faster than the narrower summit. At present persons 
 living in ' ten-pound houses/ or upwards, are something 
 like 21 per cent, of the adult males in the nation, and 
 about 30 per cent, of the rate-paying population. But 
 in process of time the inevitable increase of the humbler 
 orders will reduce them to a far more scanty proportion. 
 The operation of the plan might become even more de- 
 fective if it were combined, as is often proposed, with an 
 increase of the number of members returned by the con- 
 stituencies to which it is to be applied. If four members 
 were given to a populous constituency, and each elector 
 were to have three votes, it would require that the 
 minority should be more than three-sevenths 1 of the 
 constituency, to enable it to be certain of returning a 
 candidate. The rich and educated cannot expect to 
 remain so large a fraction of the nation as this ; they are 
 not so now. 
 
 The most plausible way of embodying the minority 
 principle in action would be to give only one vote to each 
 person, and only two members to the constituency. In 
 this case, any minority greater than one-third of the con- 
 stituency would be sure of returning a member ; and as 
 
 1 The rule is, that a minority, to be oertain of electing its candidate, 
 must he more than that fraction of the constituency, which may be 
 expressed as follows : — 
 
 The number of votes. 
 
 The number of members + the number of votes. 
 
 E 
 
50 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 this fraction is smaller than those we have mentioned, it 
 would evidently be more suitable to^ the inevitable few- 
 ness of the rich and intelligent. But even this plan 
 would give half the members of the country to the lejast 
 capable class of voters ; and it would have the additional 
 disadvantage of establishing a poor-class member and 
 rich-class member side by side in the same constituency, 
 which would evidently be likely to excite keen jealousy 
 and perpetual local bitterness. 
 
 We believe, indeed, that it was an after-thought in the 
 advocates of 'minority representation,' to propose it as 
 a means of giving some, but not too much, representation 
 to the poor. Its name shows that it was originally de- 
 vised as a means of giving a representation to minorities 
 as such. The extreme case used to be suggested of a 
 party which had a very large minority in every con- 
 stituency, but which had not a majority in any, and had 
 not therefore any share in the representation. It cannot 
 be denied that such a case might occur : but if the con- 
 stituencies be, as they should be, of varied kinds, it is 
 very unlikely ; and in politics, any contingency that is 
 very unlikely ought never to be thought of ; the problems 
 of practical government are quite sufficiently complicated, 
 if those who have the responsibility of solving them deal 
 only with difficulties which are imminent and dangers 
 which are probable. But in the actual working of affairs, 
 and irrespectively of any case so extreme as that which 
 
PAELIAMENTABY EEFOEM. 51 
 
 is put forward, the elimination of minorities which takes 
 place at general elections is a process highly beneficial. 
 It is decidedly advantageous that every active or intelli- 
 gent minority should have adequate spokesmen in the 
 legislature ; but it is often not desirable that it should be 
 represented there in exact proportion to its national im- 
 portance. A very considerable number of by no means 
 unimportant persons rather disapproved of the war with 
 Kussia ; but their views were very inadequately repre- 
 sented in the votes of Parliament, though a few able men 
 adequately expressed their characteristic sentiments. 
 And this was as it should be. The judgment of the Par- 
 liament ought always to be coincident with the opinion of 
 the nation ; it is extremely important that it should not 
 be less decided. Very frequently it is of less importance 
 which of two courses be selected than that the one 
 which is selected should be consistently adhered to and 
 energetically carried through. If every minority had 
 exactly as much weight in Parliament as it has in the 
 nation, there might be a risk of indecision. Members of 
 Parliament are apt enough to deviate from the plain 
 decisive path, from vanity, from a wish to be original, 
 from a nervous conscientiousness. They are subject to 
 special temptations, which make their decisions less simple 
 and consistent than the nation's. We need a counteract- 
 ing influence ; and it will be no subject for regret if that 
 influence be tolerably strong. It is, therefore, no dis- 
 
52 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 advantage, but the contrary, that a diffused minority in 
 the country is in general rather inadequately represented. 
 A strong conviction in the ruling power will give it 
 strength of volition. The House of Commons should 
 think as the nation thinks ; but it should think so rather 
 more strongly, and with somewhat less of wavering. 
 
 It was necessary to discuss this aspect of the minority 
 principle, though it may seem a deviation from the inves- 
 tigation into the best mode of giving a due but not an 
 undue influence to the working classes. The advocates 
 of that principle generally consider its giving a proper, 
 and not more than a proper, degree of power to the poor 
 as a subordinate and incidental advantage in a scheme 
 which for other reasons ought to be adopted; it was 
 therefore desirable to prove that no such other reasons 
 exist, as well as that it would very imperfectly, if at all, 
 tend to place the working classes in the position we 
 desire. 
 
 Some persons have imagined that the enfranchisement 
 of all the lower orders may be obtained without its 
 attendant consequence, the disfranchisement of other 
 classes, by means of the system of ' double representa- 
 tion,' which gives to the primary electors only the power 
 of nominating certain choosers, or secondary electors, who 
 are to select the ultimate representative. This proposal 
 was made by Hume many years ago ; it formed part of 
 more than one of the earlier French constitutions ; and 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 53 
 
 it is now being tried, as we have observed, in Prussia. 
 We have an example of its effects likewise in a part of 
 the constitution of the United States. Although, there- 
 fore, we may not have quite so full a trial of the proposed 
 machinery as we could wish, we have some experience of 
 it. The most obvious objection to it is, that it gives to 
 the working classes the theoretical supremacy as much as 
 a scheme of single representation. Whether the working 
 classes choose the member of Parliament, or whether they 
 choose an intermediate body who are to choose the mem- 
 ber, their pov, dr of selection will be equally uncontrolled, 
 the overwhelming advantage derived from their numbers 
 will be the same. It is alleged that the working classes 
 will be more fit to choose persons who would exercise an 
 intermediate suffrage ; that they could choose persons in 
 their own neighbourhood well known to them, and for 
 whom they had a respect ; and that the ultimate repre- 
 sentative nominated by these local worthies would be a 
 better person than the working classes would have nomi- 
 nated themselves at first. And in quiet times, and before 
 a good machinery of electioneering influence had been 
 organized, we are inclined to believe that such would be 
 the effect. The working classes might, in the absence of 
 excitement and artificial stimulus, choose persons whom 
 they knew to be better judges than themselves ; and, in 
 accordance with the theory of the scheme, would give to 
 them a bond fide power of independent judgment. But 
 
54 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 in times of excitement this would not be the case. The 
 primary electors can, if they will, require from the second- 
 ary a promise that they will choose such and such mem- 
 bers ; they can exact a distinct pledge on the subject, and 
 give their votes only to those who will take that pledge. 
 This is actually the case in the election of the President 
 in the United States. As a check on the anticipated 
 inconveniences of universal suffrage, the framers of the 
 federal constitution provided that the President should 
 be chosen by an electoral college elected by universal 
 suffrage, and not by the nation at large directly. In 
 practice, however, the electoral college is a ' sham.' Its 
 members are only chosen because they will vote that Mr. 
 Buchanan be President, or that Colonel Fremont be 
 President; no one cares to know anything else about 
 them. There is no debate in the college, no exercise of 
 discretionary judgment : they travel to Washington, and 
 give their vote in a ' sealed envelope,' and they have no 
 other duty to perform-. According to- these votes the 
 President is elected. Such, indeed, appears the natural 
 result wherever the lower orders take a strong interest 
 in the selection of the ultimate members for the constitu- 
 ency. They have the power of absolutely determining 
 the choice of those members; and when they care to 
 exercise it, they will exercise it. In Prussia, as it would 
 appear from the newspaper narrative of the recent elec- 
 tions, a real choice has been exercised by the Wahl- 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 55 
 
 manner — the secondary electors. But a few years of 
 experience among a phlegmatic people are not a sufficient 
 trial ; there are as yet no parliamentary agents at Berlin. 
 In this country, as in America, an effectual stimulus 
 would soon be applied to the primary electors. If twenty 
 intermediate stages were introduced, the result would be 
 identical : a pledge would be exacted at every stage ; the 
 primary body would alone exercise a real choice, and the 
 member would be the direct though disguised nominee of 
 the lower orders. This scheme would everywhere, in 
 critical times, and in electioneering countries at all times, 
 give to the democracy an uncontrolled power. 
 
 An expedient has, it is true, been proposed for pre- 
 venting this. It has been suggested that the secondary 
 electors — the electoral college in the American phrase — 
 should have other duties to perform besides that of elect- 
 ing the representative. Suppose, for example, that the 
 electors at large chose a municipal town council, and that 
 the latter elected the representative of the town in the 
 legislature; it is thought that persons with good judg- 
 ment would be chosen to ensure the due performance of 
 the municipal duties, and that a good member of Parlia- 
 ment would be selected by the bond fide choice of those 
 persons with good judgment. The scheme would be far 
 too alien to English habits and traditions to be seriously 
 proposed for adoption by this country even if its abstract 
 theory were sound; but there is an obvious objection of 
 
56 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 principle to it. The local duties of a municipal council 
 are too different from that of selecting a parliamentary- 
 representative to be properly combined with them. We 
 should probably have a town council of political parti- 
 sans, as was the case before the Municipal Reform Act ; 
 and the uninteresting local duties would be sacrificed to 
 the more interesting questions of the empire. In the real 
 operation of the scheme very much would depend on the 
 time at which the town council was elected. If it were 
 elected simultaneously with the general election of mem- 
 bers of Parliament, nobody would think of anything but 
 the latter. The town councillors would be chosen to vote 
 for the borough member, and with no regard to any other 
 consideration. We should have a fictitious electoral col- 
 lege, with the added inconvenience that it would be 
 expected to perform duties for which it was not selected, 
 and to which it would be entirely ill-suited. On the 
 other hand, if the town council were elected when the 
 parliamentary election was not thought of, we might, in 
 times of fluctuating opinion, have a marked opposition 
 between the opinion of the town council and the opinion 
 of the constituency. In an excitable country — and every 
 country which takes a regular interest in politics becomes 
 excitable — no such opposition would be endured. It 
 would be monstrous that the member for London at a 
 critical epoch, say when a question of war or peace was 
 pressing for decision, should be nominated by a town 
 
PARLIAMENTAKY REFORM. 57 
 
 council elected some time before, when no such question 
 was even thought of. There used in the ante-Reform 
 Bill times to be occasional riots when the close corpora- 
 tions, with whom the exclusive suffrage in many boroughs 
 then rested, made a choice not approved of by the popu- 
 lation of the town. If this was the case when the borough 
 councillors were only exercising an immemorial right, it 
 will be much more likely to be so when they are but 
 recently nominated agents, deriving their whole authority 
 from the dissentients, and making an unpopular choice in 
 the express name of an angry multitude. We may there- 
 fore dismiss the proposed expedient of double representa- 
 tion with the remark, that if the intermediate body be 
 elected with little reference to its electoral functions, it 
 will be little fitted for such functions ; and if it is elected 
 mainly with reference to them, it will have no independ- 
 ent power of choice, but be bound over to elect the exact 
 person whom its constituents have decided to favour. 
 
 A much more plausible proposal is suggested by the 
 recommendation which we made some pages back — that 
 the principle which assigns the franchise to those who 
 can show a property qualification should not be confined 
 to real estate, but be extended to every kind of property 
 that yielded an income and was owned bond fide. A 
 considerable number of the working classes possess 
 savings; not large, it is true, when contrasted with 
 middle-class opulence, but still most important to, and 
 
58 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 most valued by, those who have hoarded them during a 
 lifetime. The total accumulation is likewise very large 
 when set down in the aggregate. It has been suggested 
 that a suffrage conferred on the owners of moneyed pro- 
 perty would of itself enfranchise the most thrifty and 
 careful of the working classes ; and that, as these would 
 probably be the best judging of their class, it would be 
 needless to inquire as to the mode in which any others 
 could obtain the franchise. There may be a question 
 whether we do wish simply to find representatives for the 
 best of the working classes. "We are not now seeking 
 legislators who will exercise a correct judgment, but 
 rather spokesmen who will express popular sentiments. 
 We need not, however, dwell on this, as there is a more 
 conclusive objection to the plan proposed. Unfortunately, 
 the savings of the working classes are not invested in a 
 form which would be suitable for political purposes. The 
 most pressing need of the poor is a provision for failing 
 health and for old age. They most properly endeavour to 
 satisfy this by subscribing to ' benefit societies ' or other 
 similar clubs, which, in consideration of a certain periodi- 
 cal payment, guarantee support during sickness, or a sum 
 of money in case of decease. Now this life and health 
 insurance wants all the criteria of a good property quali- 
 fication. There is no test of its bond fides. Simulated 
 qualifications might be manufactured by any skilful 
 attorney. The periodical payment might be easily repaid 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 59 
 
 on pretence of sickness ; and it would be perfectly impos- 
 sible for any revising barrister to detect the fraud. There 
 would be no security that the periodical premium even 
 belonged to the poor man ; it might be lent him, and 
 with little risk, by his richer neighbour. Electioneering 
 has conquered many difficulties. It would be easy to 
 have an understanding that the secretary to the society, 
 the clerk of the electioneering attorney, should see that 
 the premium was soon repaid, in name to the poor sub- 
 scriber, and in fact to the vote-making capitalist. The 
 finances of some of these societies have never been in the 
 best order; and there would be very great difficulty in 
 tracking even a gross electioneering fraud. Perhaps no 
 practical man will question but that the manipulation of 
 a borough attorney would soon change the character of a 
 ' benefit society ; ' it would cease to be, as now, the 
 repository of the real savings of the best working men ; 
 it would become a cheap and sure machinery for creating 
 votes in the name of the most corruptible. So large a 
 portion of the savings of thrifty operatives are most pro- 
 perly laid by in these insurance associations, that it is 
 scarcely likely that a moneyed property qualification 
 would give a vote to' a considerable proportion even of 
 the very best of them. A few would be admitted by 
 giving the franchise to those who left a certain sum in a 
 savings-bank for a certain time ; but, to prevent fraud, 
 that time must be considerable, and careful returns, pre- 
 
60 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 pared for Lord John Russell's Reform Bill, are said to 
 show that the number enfranchised -would be even fewer 
 than might have been expected. At any rate, it would 
 not be safe to rely on such a franchise for creating a par- 
 liamentary organ for the lower classes. Those enfran- 
 chised by it would be scattered through a hundred con- 
 stituencies. There would be no certainty that even one 
 member in the House would speak their sentiments. 
 Moreover, we have doubts whether a constituency com- 
 posed only of operatives who had a considerable sum in 
 the savings-bank after providing, as in all likelihood they 
 would have done, for the wants of their families in case 
 of their death and sickness, would not rather have the 
 feelings of petty capitalists than of skilled labourers. 
 Those who have just risen above a class can scarcely be 
 relied on for giving expression to its characteristic 
 opinions. However, as it would be scarcely possible to 
 create such a constituency, there is no reason for prolong- 
 ing an anticipatory discussion on its tendencies. On the 
 whole, therefore, we must, though rather against our 
 wishes, discard the idea of creating a working-class fran- 
 chise by an extension of the suffrage qualification to all 
 kinds of property. A careful examination appears to 
 show that we could not obtain in that way a characteris- 
 tic expression for the wants of the masses. 
 
 These are the principal schemes which have been 
 proposed for adding to the legislature some proper 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 61 
 
 spokesmen of the -wants of the lower classes by giving to 
 those classes some influence in every constituency. Our 
 survey of them has confirmed the anticipation with 
 which we set out. The dilemma remains. Either the 
 influence is great enough to determine the choice of the 
 member, or it is not: if it is not, no spokesmen for 
 the working classes will be elected ; if it is, no one not 
 thoroughly imbued with the views and sentiments of the 
 lower orders would be chosen, — we should have a 
 democracy. 
 
 As this, the first of the only two possible expedients, 
 has failed us, we turn with anxiety to the second. 
 Since it does not seem possible to procure spokesmen for 
 the working classes by a uniform franchise in all con- 
 stituencies, is it possible to do so by a varying franchise, 
 which shall give votes according to one criterion in one 
 town, and to another criterion in another town ? It 
 evidently is possible. Whether there are any counter- 
 vailing objections is a question for discussion, but of the 
 possibility there cannot be a doubt. If all the adult 
 males in Stafford have votes, then the member for 
 Stafford will be elected by universal suffrage ; he will be 
 the organ of the lower orders of that place. Supposing 
 that place to be subject in this respect to no important 
 local anomaly, the lower orders there will be like the 
 corresponding classes elsewhere. By taking a fair 
 number of such towns, we may secure ourselves from the 
 
62 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 mischievous results of local irregularities ; we can secure 
 a fair number of spokesmen for the lower orders. 
 
 The scheme is not only possible, but has been tried, 
 and in this country. Before the Keform Bill of 1832 
 there was a great disparity in the suffrage qualification 
 of different constituencies. ' A variety of rights of 
 suffrage,' said Sir James Mackintosh, in 1818, 1 ' is the 
 principle of the English representation ; ' and he went 
 on to enumerate the various modes in which it might 
 be obtained — by freehold property, by burgage tenure, 
 by payment of scot and lot, etc. The peculiar circum- 
 stances of 1832 made it necessary, or seemingly necessary, 
 to abolish these contrasted qualifications. Great abuses 
 prevailed in them, and it would have been difficult to 
 adjust remedies for the removal of those abuses. The 
 great requirement of the moment was a simple bill. 
 During a semi-revolution there was no time for nice 
 reasonings. Something universally intelligible was to be 
 found. The enthusiasm of the country must be concen- 
 trated ' on the whole bill and nothing but the bill.' We 
 must not judge the tumult of that time by the quietude 
 of our own. 
 
 At a calmer moment the more philosophic of liberal 
 statesmen were, however, aware of the advantages of the 
 machinery which they were afterwards compelled to 
 
 1 Edinburgh Review, No. LXL, article ' Universal Suffrage ; ' an 
 admirable essay, singularly worth reading at present. 
 
PAELIAMENTAET EEFORM. 63 
 
 destroy. The essay of Sir James Mackintosh, to which 
 we have referred, appeared in the Edinburgh Review, 
 and was considered at the time as an authoritative 
 exposition of liberal doctrine : and almost the whole of 
 it is devoted to a proof that this system of varying quali- 
 fication is preferable, not only to universal suffrage, but 
 to any uniform ' right of franchise.' On the point we 
 are particularly considering, he says : ' For resistance to 
 oppression, it is peculiarly necessary that the lower, and 
 in some places the lowest, classes should possess the right 
 of suffrage. Their rights would otherwise be less pro- 
 tected than those of any other class : for some individuals 
 of every other class would generally find admittance into 
 the legislature ; or, at least, there is no other class which 
 is not connected with some of its members. Some same- 
 ness of interest, and some fellow-feeling, would therefore 
 protect every other class, even if not directly represented. 
 But in the uneducated classes, none can either sit in a 
 representative assembly, or be connected on an equal 
 footing with its members. The right of suffrage, there- 
 fore, is the only means by which they can make their 
 voice heard in its deliberations. They also often send 
 to a representative assembly members whose character 
 is an important element in its composition — men of 
 popular talents, principles, and feelings; quick in sus- 
 pecting oppression, bold in resisting it ; not thinking 
 favourably of the powerful; listening, almost with 
 
64 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 credulity, to the complaints of the humble and the feeble ; 
 and impelled by ambition, where they are not prompted 
 by generosity, to be the champions of the defenceless. 
 It is nothing to say that such men require to be checked 
 and restrained by others of a different character; this 
 may be truly said of every other class. It is to no 
 purpose to observe, that an assembly exclusively com- 
 posed of them would be ill fitted for the duties of 
 legislation ; for the same observation would be perfectly 
 applicable to any other of those bodies which make 
 useful parts of a mixed and various assembly.' Sir 
 James had evidently the words of the member for 
 Westminster sounding in his ears. His words are not 
 an expression of merely speculative approbation ; they 
 are a copy from the life. 
 
 An authority still more remarkable remains. Lord 
 John Russell, in 1821, expressed a very decided opinion 
 on the advantages of having a different scale of pro- 
 perty qualification in different places, and rather boldly 
 grappled with an obvious objection to it. We quote the 
 passage : ' All parts of the country, and all classes of the 
 people, ought to have a share in elections. If this is not 
 the case, the excluded part or class of the nation will 
 become of no importance in the eyes of the rest : its 
 favour will never be courted in the country, and its 
 interests will never be vigilantly guarded in the legis- 
 lature. Consequently, in proportion to the general 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 65 
 
 freedom of the community will be the discontent excited 
 in the deprived class by the sentence of nullity and 
 inactivity pronounced upon them. Every system of 
 uniform suffrage except universal contains this dark blot. 
 And universal suffrage, in pretending to avoid it, gives 
 the whole power to the highest and the lowest, to money 
 and to multitude ; and thus disfranchises the middle 
 class — the most disinterested, the most independent, and 
 the most unprejudiced of all. It is not necessary, how- 
 ever, although every class ought to have an influence in 
 elections, that every member of every class should have 
 a vote. A butcher at Hackney, who gives his vote 
 perhaps once in twelve years at an election for the county 
 of Middlesex, has scarcely any advantage over another 
 butcher at the same place who has no vote at all. And 
 even if he had, the interest of the State is in these matters 
 the chief thing to be consulted ; and that is as well served 
 by the suffrage of some of each class, as by that of all of 
 each class.' The necessary effect of the Act of 1832 has 
 been to make us forget the value of what the authors of 
 it considered a most beneficial part of our representative 
 system. That such great statesmen should have pro- 
 nounced such panegyrics on the diversity of qualifications 
 in different constituencies, when it was a living reality 
 before their eyes, shows at least that it is practicable and 
 possible. 
 
 The plan is, indeed, liable to several objections : it is 
 
 F 
 
66 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 not to be expected that in a complicated subject any 
 scheme which is absolutely free even from serious incon- 
 veniences could be suggested. By far the most popular 
 objection is that which Lord John Russell noticed in the 
 passage we have just cited. There is a sense of unfair- 
 ness in the project. Why should an artisan in Liverpool 
 have a vote, and an artisan in Macclesfield no vote ? Why 
 " should the richer classes in one constituency be disfran- 
 chised by the wholesale admission of their poorer neigh- 
 bours, and the richer classes in another constituency not be 
 so disfranchised ? The answer is suggested by a portion 
 of our preceding remarks. No one has a right, as we have 
 seen, to any portion of political power which he cannot 
 exercise without preventing some others from exercising 
 better that or some greater power. If all the operatives 
 in the great towns were enfranchised, they would prevent 
 the higher classes from exercising any power : and this is 
 the reply to the unenfranchised artisan in Macclesfield. 
 If there were no representatives of the working classes 
 in Parliament, its measures might be less beneficial, and 
 its debates would be imperfect; the higher classes in 
 some great towns must have less power than in some 
 other great towns, because a uniform suffrage impedes 
 the beneficial work of Parliament, and prevents the 
 ruling legislature from exercising its nearly omnipotent 
 power well and justly. To have a good Parliament, we 
 must disfranchise some good constituents. Perhaps, 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 67 
 
 indeed, the whole difficulty is overrated. We see every- 
 day that, so far as the middle classes are concerned, it is 
 of no perceptible consequence to the individual whether 
 he has a vote or not : it is of great consequence to him 
 that the supreme legislature should accord with the views 
 of his class and himself ; but whether he has voted for 
 any particular member of that legislature is a trifle. We 
 never dream in society of asking whether the person we 
 are talking to has a vote or not. Both live, and live 
 equally, in the atmosphere of politics. Similarly, it is 
 of great importance to the lower classes that their feelings 
 should be sufficiently expressed in Parliament; but 
 which of them votes for the person who should express 
 them is of no consequence at all. The non-voter ought 
 to take as much interest in politics as the voter. When 
 all of a class cannot exercise power without impeding a 
 more qualified class, we may select, from considerations of 
 convenience, those members of the less qualified class who 
 are to have power. There is no injustice in allowing expe- 
 diency to adjust the claims of persons similarly entitled. 
 It may also be objected that this plan of representing 
 the lower classes does not give them the general instruc- 
 tion 'which the exercise of the suffrage is supposed to 
 bestow. An unenfranchised artisan in Macclesfield is 
 not educated by giving the suffrage to an artisan in 
 Manchester. But it is a mistake to suppose that there 
 is much, if any, instruction in the personal exercise of 
 
68 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 the franchise. Popular elections have no doubt a didactic 
 influence on the community at large ; they diffuse an 
 interest in great affairs through the country; but the 
 elevating effect of giving a vote is always infinitesimally 
 small. Among the lower classes it is a question whether 
 the risk of moral deterioration does not quite balance 
 the hope of moral elevation. Popular institutions educate 
 by the intellectual atmosphere which they constantly 
 create, and not by the occasional decisions which they 
 require. And were it otherwise, intellectual instruc- 
 tion is but a secondary benefit of popular government ; 
 and we must not throw away, in the hope of increasing 
 it, the primary advantage of being well governed. We 
 believe too that, in fact, mere existence under a good 
 government is more instructive than the power of now 
 and then contributing to a bad government. 
 
 We are more afraid of the objection that this in- 
 equality of suffrage in otherwise similar constituencies 
 is an anomaly which may grow up imperceptibly, as it 
 did before the Reform Bill, but cannot now be created 
 de novo. We admit the difficulty : we are well aware 
 that this inequality, like every other expedient in polities 
 to which the objections are apparent and the advantages 
 latent, is far easier to preserve than to originate. But 
 when great interests are at stake, we should only give 
 up that which is impossible; what is merely difficult 
 should be done. Moreover, a little examination will, we 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 69 
 
 think, show that the obstacles are far slighter than they 
 might seem at first sight. 
 
 From this point of view it is worth remarking, that 
 the inequality of suffrage qualification to a certain extent 
 i still exists. The effect of the Reform Act has been 
 to hide and diminish, but not to annihilate, the in- 
 equalities which existed before. The constituencies in 
 which these inequalities existed were naturally opposed 
 to their abolition, and a compromise was effected. All 
 persons duly qualified to vote on the 7th of June, 1832, 
 were to retain their right for life, subject to certain 
 conditions of residence and registration. In all boroughs, 
 likewise, in which freedom of the borough, whether 
 acquired by birth or servitude prescriptively, gave a 
 vote, that franchise was to a certain extent retained. 
 The freemen of such boroughs have votes now just as 
 before, and freedom can be acquired in the same way : 
 no change on this point was effected in 1832, except that 
 a borough franchise so obtained is forfeited by non- 
 residence in the borough. The number of these anomalous 
 votes is still very considerable. Mr. Newmarch has 
 shown that in 1853 it amounted to 60,565, which is more 
 than one-seventh of 400,000, the number (or nearly so) 
 of borough electors at that time. We have therefore 
 a very considerable amount of inequality in our present 
 system ; we should scarcely propose to increase it, but to 
 distribute it more usefully. 
 
70 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 The freemen of Coventry, Derby, Leicester, are not 
 a class of whom we wish to undertake the defence ; and 
 in many towns the existence of those old rights is a 
 recognized nuisance. We are not prepared to approve all 
 anomalies in our representation. Our principles are 
 especially opposed to the enfranchisement of favoured 
 individuals in minor towns — few enough to be bought, 
 corruptible enough to wish to be bought; who are not 
 in general the majority of the constituency, but who 
 exercise important influence because they can throw in a 
 purchasable balance of votes on critical occasions ; who 
 are in no respect fair representatives of the working 
 classes, who do not return to the house a single fit person 
 willing to be spokesman for them. We argue merely that 
 the effect of the Act' of 1832 has only been to diminish 
 the inequality of suffrage qualification before existing ; 
 and by no means to establish, even if a single act of Parlia- 
 ment could have so done, the erroneous principle that 
 there is to be no inequality. 
 
 But the most effectual way of 'showing that it is 
 possible to create de novo a beneficial variety of property 
 qualifications, is to point out how it can be done. 
 If it be admitted that we should found working-class 
 constituencies, it is clear that we should found them 
 where the working classes live. This is of course in the 
 great seats of industry, where work is plentiful and 
 constant. Those whe reside in such towns are likewise 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 71 
 
 the most political part of the class : the agricultural 
 labourers, scattered in rural parishes, with low wages and 
 little knowledge, have no views and no sentiments which 
 admit of parliamentary expression ; they have no political 
 thoughts. If we wish to give due expression, and not 
 more than due expression, to the ideas of the democracy, 
 we must select some few of the very largest towns, 
 where its characteristic elements are most congregated. 
 It would have been more fortunate if these towns had 
 acquired such a franchise prescriptively ; but it would 
 have been all but miraculous if such had been the case. 
 Many of our greatest towns are situated in what, in 
 more purely agricultural times, were very uninfluential 
 districts ; we must not expect an hereditary franchise for 
 newly-created interests. As it is necessary to have a 
 rule of selection, the best which can be suggested is the 
 rule of population ; we would propose, therefore, that 
 in the very largest towns in England * there should be 
 
 1 It may, indeed, be objected that these large constituencies are just 
 the ones in which a rate-paying franchise would have the most conclusively 
 democratic effect ; and that if we concede it as to these, it is not worth 
 while to resist it with respect to others in which we might hope, by the 
 influence of wealth and social standing, to counteract more or less its 
 democratic tendency. But facts show that in an immense number of 
 constituencies these influences could not control that tendency effectually. 
 If an Act giving votes to all rate-payers be ever passed, it will probably 
 be accompanied by a readjustment of the electoral districts on a democratic 
 principle, which would augment the influence of mere numbers. But 
 we need not consider this, since the introduction of the rate-paying 
 franchise into our present constituencies would introduce a new element, 
 much too large to be easily managed by indirect influences. It is of 
 course not known exactly how large that new element would be; but 
 
72 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 what Mr. Bright advocates for all towns, a rate-paying 
 franchise. If this were extended to all towns having 
 more than 75,000 inhabitants, it would include at present 
 London, Liverpool, Manchester, the Tower Hamlets, 
 Marylebone, Finsbury, Bristol, Birmingham, Lambeth, 
 Westminster, Leeds, Sheffield, Wolverhampton, Southwark, 
 Greenwich, Bradford, Newcastle-on-Tyne, and Salford. 
 If there were a bond fide representation of the working 
 classes in these towns, they could not complain of a class 
 disfranchisement; there would be adequate spokesmen 
 for them. A member speaking the voice of places where 
 such numbers of operatives are congregated, could speak 
 the sentiments of that class with authority. No one 
 could be unaware that the constituency in these large 
 towns was ultra-democratic. The representation of the 
 lower orders would be conspicuous as well as effectual. 
 
 Nor would the number of representatives so given to 
 the lower classes be sufficient to deteriorate the general 
 character of the legislature. It would not amount to 
 forty for England and Wales, or to fifty for the United 
 
 very careful tables have been compiled of the number of inhabited 
 houses in our present boroughs ; and as the number of women rated in 
 respect of them is no doubt small, all but a minute fraction of such 
 houses would give a qualification to a male voter. Now it appears that in 
 all except ten borough constituencies the number of inhabited houses was in 
 1852, and doubtless is still, more than double that of the present electors ; 
 and consequently the new element which would be introduced would 
 greatly preponderate over, and in fact disfranchise, the old. It is 
 evident that it would be very difficult to manage so many new voters by 
 any indirect influences. 
 
PAELIAMENTAET REFOBM. 73 
 
 Kingdom; a considerable number, no doubt, but not 
 sufficient to destroy the representative character of a 
 house of 658 members. The House of Commons would 
 still represent the educated classes as a whole ; its opinion 
 would still be their opinion ; the performance of its 
 ruling function would be unimpaired; and that of its 
 expressive function would be improved. 
 
 We have dwelt so long on this part of our subject, that 
 we shall not be able to devote as much space as we could 
 wish to the explanation of the mode in which we think 
 the remaining defects of our representative system should 
 be remedied. We can only state briefly a few of the 
 most important considerations. 
 
 The first of those defects, which we specified at the 
 outset, is the existence of small boroughs, which are 
 either in the hands of individual proprietors or have 
 become in the process of time nests of corruption. We 
 need not specify examples ; the fact is sufficiently familiar. 
 Indeed, all small boroughs in the course of years must 
 rapidly tend towards one or other of these fates. A 
 great deal of wealth in this country seeks to invest itself 
 politically. A small borough of this sort necessarily 
 contains a considerable number of corruptible individuals ; 
 year by year skilful parliamentary agents ascertain who 
 these individuals are, and buy them. The continual 
 temptation is too much for shop-keeping humanity ; with 
 every election the number of purchasable votes tends to 
 
74 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 increase : one would not have yielded, only he wanted a 
 new shop-front ; another, who is proof against plate-glass, 
 desires money to put out his son in the world. Gradu- 
 ally an atmosphere of corruption closes over the borough, 
 and men of the world cease to expect purity from it. The 
 only way in which this sort of retail purchase can be 
 escaped is by a wholesale purchase. A rich proprietor 
 may buy a large majority of vote-conferring properties in 
 the borough, and so become despotic in the town. Each 
 presentation (to borrow a phrase from the church) is not in 
 that case sold on the day of election, because the advowson 
 has been bought before by some one who has a use for it. 
 We may escape, then, the necessity of ascertaining the 
 electoral corruption of particular boroughs, and lay it 
 down as a general condition of permanent purity that a 
 constituency should contain a fixed number — five hundred, 
 suppose, electors. It is quite true that this remedy is 
 not certainly effectual : there are many boroughs, where 
 the enfranchised constituency exceeds this number, in 
 which the elections are not at all what we should wish. 
 But the tendency of such a measure is plain. It prevents 
 the wholesale purchase by the neighbouring proprietors, 
 because it makes the property too large for ordinary 
 wealth to buy. It tends to prevent the retail purchase 
 by increasing the supply of votes— which always lessens 
 their market value, and in very many cases reduces it 
 below the price which will tempt ordinary voters to 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 7,5 
 
 corruption. The expedient is not a perfectly effectual 
 one, but at least it is a considerable palliative. 
 
 What, then, is to be done with boroughs below the 
 prescribed limits? There are in England and Wales 
 about sixty-seven members; elected by forty-two of such 
 boroughs. What course would it be wisest to take with 
 respect to such seats ? The most easy plan in theory is 
 to annihilate them at once, to have a new schedule A of 
 places disfranchised. But it is easier to write such a 
 recommendation in an essay than to carry the enactment 
 in practice. These seats have the protective instincts of 
 property. Money has been spent on many of them for a 
 course of years : in all of them the present electors would 
 vote nearly as a man against the abolition of 'them- 
 selves.' The strenuous resistance of the members for 
 such seats must be expected to any bill which should 
 propose to abolish them in toto. And such resistance would 
 be the more effectual, because in all likelihood it would 
 be indirect. The interested members, unless a sinister 
 policy were unusually wanting in its characteristic acute- 
 ness, would not risk a division on the unpleasant question 
 of abolishing or not abolishing their own seats. They 
 would throw the probably decisive weight of their votes 
 into the scale most inconvenient to the government pro- 
 posing that abolition ; would combine with every strong 
 opposition to it ; in the present state of parties, would 
 soon reduce it to a minority. A proposal to disfranchise 
 
76 PARLIAMENTARY RKi'ORM. 
 
 many boroughs would soon issue in the resignation of 
 the proposing government. 
 
 We must therefore assume that for the present, to 
 some considerable extent, the influence of such boroughs 
 must continue to exist. In 1832 there was a popular 
 feeling which carried everything before it. Now all we 
 can hope to carry is a compromise. As a compromise, 
 the best expedient which we can suggest is to combine 
 such boroughs. The English respect for vested interests 
 would preclude the popularity of a sweeping Act; but 
 the English liking for a moderate expedient would be a 
 strong support to any measure that could be so called. 
 The effect of such a combination would probably be in 
 great part to set the joint constituency free from the yoke 
 of great proprietors. If Lord A is supreme in borough 
 a, and Mr. B in town b, a and b combined will probably 
 be controlled by neither. The local feeling of b will 
 resist Lord A ; that of a would be rigid to the entice- 
 ments of Mr. B. If one of the boroughs should be 
 ' independent,' that is to say, purchased voter by voter 
 at each election, its inhabitants would probably rather 
 be purchased by any one than by the proprietor of the 
 antagonistic borough. We are aware that these are not 
 very attractive considerations ; but what are we to do ? 
 lis ont des canons. We must make the best terms we 
 can with constituencies which we cannot hope entirely 
 to destroy. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 77 
 
 We shall be asked why we group these existing 
 boroughs with one another, instead of combining them 
 with new towns not now possessed of the borough 
 franchise, which are therefore at present comparatively 
 uncorrupt. We admit that, in some individual cases, 
 there may be conclusive reasons for taking the latter 
 course ; but we think that there are political arguments 
 which should disincline us from adopting it in general. 
 
 We saw reason to believe that the principal defects of 
 our House of Commons, as a ruling assembly, were an 
 excessive bias to the landed interest, and an insufficient 
 sympathy with the growing interests of the country. 
 On this account it is desirable not to take from the 
 county constituencies all the liberalizing element which 
 they at present possess; on the contrary, it would be 
 desirable, if possible, to increase it. We should, however, 
 weaken that liberal element very materially if, in our 
 extreme desire to remedy borough corruption, we 
 extracted from the constituency of the counties the 
 inhabitants of all their larger towns. The effect of Mr. 
 Locke King's proposal to reduce the county franchise from 
 £50 to £10, if it should be adopted, as it probably will 
 be, will be to augment the county influence of the towns 
 which have no borough member. We must not counter- 
 act this tendency. As we think it desirable to diminish 
 the sectarian character of our county members, we 
 must not adopt the most effectual of all schemes for 
 
78 PAELIAMENTAEY EEFOEM. 
 
 preserving it unimpaired — we must not absorb into the 
 boroughs all other influences save those of the country 
 gentlemen. 
 
 Our second reason for preferring to combine the very 
 small boroughs with one another rather than to unite 
 each of them with some town at present unenfranchised 
 is, that we wish to diminish the number of seats for such 
 constituencies. If we annexed new elements to each of 
 them, there would be a plausible argument for not 
 diminishing their number. But, as has been explained, 
 we wish to provide a more ample representation for the 
 growing districts of the country ; and there is a very 
 general and well-grounded opinion that the House of 
 Commons is already quite sufficiently numerous. In 
 order, therefore, to increase the representation of the 
 progressive parts of England in the proportion which 
 seems desirable, we must take from the decaying or 
 stationary towns of the less active parts of the country 
 the right of sending members which they have now. On 
 a great scale, the same plan was adopted in 1832 : it was 
 then necessary to remedy a great evil ; and therefore it 
 was necessary that the number of seats disfranchised 
 should be great, and the number of newly enfranchised 
 towns considerable also. As we have shown, no such 
 enormous evil remains at present to be remedied. The 
 judgment of Parliament coincides fairly, if not precisely, 
 with the opinion of the nation. All we have to correct 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 79 
 
 is, a slight bias in one direction, and a perceptible but 
 not extreme deficiency of sympathy in another. The 
 changes we have to make, therefore, may be slight in 
 comparison with those of 1832 ; still, so important is it 
 that Parliament should really coincide in opinion with 
 the nation, that we should take account of the beginnings 
 of a discrepancy; while the topic of reform in our 
 electoral system is definitely before the public, we should 
 take the opportunity of correcting the undue inclination 
 of the legislature towards the less active, and its contrast 
 of feeling (which though slight is real) to the more active 
 part of the community. 
 
 We are the more certain that it is advisable to make 
 some such change as this, because, as we have before 
 observed, we believe this uneasy consciousness of the 
 less perfect representation of the progressive elements in 
 the nation, as compared with the unprogressive, to be the 
 secret source of almost all the slight popular enthusiasm 
 which now exists in favour of reform. The external 
 form of what is proposed is, indeed, different; the princi- 
 pal, as well as the most popular, suggestion is one for the 
 representation of the working classes. We have no 
 doubt that those who are at the head of that movement, 
 as well as those who join in it, quite believe that such is 
 their true object. But it is at least an odd undertaking 
 to be headed by master manufacturers. Whatever view 
 we may take of the effects of universal or of rate-paying 
 
80 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 franchise on other parts of the nation, there can be little 
 question that its influence would be detrimental to the 
 power of opulent capitalists. We must alter the world 
 before there ceases to be some opposition of feeling (there 
 is often a momentary opposition of interest) between the 
 mill-owner and his work-people. In the days of the 
 short-time agitation both parties understood this perfectly. 
 Even now a Parliament of capitalists would probably 
 propose to repeal the ten-hours' bill; a Parliament of 
 working men would very likely desire to extend its 
 principle. To say the least, it is strange that the 
 characteristic men of one class should be so ready to 
 throw all power into the hands of the other. 
 
 A letter from Mr. Bright himself to a Manchester 
 association puts the matter in a different light. ' On a 
 great occasion,' he tells us, ' like the one now before the 
 country, there will be differences of opinion. Some think 
 one extent of franchise better than another. Some are 
 for a £6 rental ; some are for a £5 rental ; you are for 
 the extension of the right of voting to every man. Now 
 I prefer to establish the parliamentary suffrage on the 
 basis which has been tried for some centuries in our 
 parishes, and which has been adopted at a recent period 
 in our poor-law unions and in our municipal govern- 
 ments; with some needless restriction, with regard to 
 the municipal franchise, which I would not introduce 
 into our parliamentary franchise. The more public 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 81 
 
 opinion is freely and honestly expressed, the more dis- 
 tinctly will a government, engaged in preparing a Keform 
 Bill, be able to discover which is the point likely to be 
 most satisfactory to the public. I consider these differ- 
 ences of opinion on the subject as of trifling importance 
 when compared with the question of the distribution of 
 seats and members. This is the vital point in the coming 
 bill; and unless it be well watched, you may get any 
 amount of suffrage, and yet find, after all, that you have 
 lost the substance, and are playing merely with the 
 shadow of popular representation.' 
 
 This at least is an intelligible doctrine. A redistribu- 
 tion of seats in proportion to population would indis- 
 putably be most advantageous to Mr. Bright and his 
 associates. Some of their school have made a calculation 
 that sixty-three boroughs, returning eighty-five members, 
 have not, taken together, as many electors as Manchester, 
 which returns but two. And, independently of extreme 
 cases, it is quite indisputable that the large towns and 
 crowded populations of Lancashire and the West Riding 
 would, in any grouping based on electoral numbers, 
 assume a proportionate magnitude that would be quite 
 different from that which they have at present. If such 
 a readjustment could be carried, and the present franchise 
 retained, the followers of Mr. Bright would be one of the 
 most numerous divisions of the House of Commons. It 
 is true that the advantage of their success must be shared 
 
 G 
 
82 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 with the class most antagonistic to them in feeling. The 
 county representation would have to be extended if elec- 
 toral numbers, or any mere numbers, were to be taken as 
 the guide to a new adjustment. But Mr. Bright probably 
 does not fear a conflict with Mr. Newdegate. We can 
 well understand that he should esteem the lowering of 
 the franchise, which would impair his power, less impor- 
 tant than a reapportionment of members, which must 
 increase it. 
 
 We can spare but a few words to show the unsound- 
 ness of the principle on which the proposed readjustment 
 is to be based ; and we would hope that only a few words 
 are needed. Mr. Bright considers it an obvious absurdity 
 that a constituency of 1000 electors should return a mem- 
 ber, and that another constituency with 5000 should 
 return but one member also. Such a variety is never- 
 theless prima facie beneficial : it would be a probable 
 sign of the complete imperfection of an electoral organi- 
 zation if every constituency in it were equally numerous. 
 All such systems must tend to give undue preponderance 
 to some classes, and to deny, not only substantial influ- 
 ence, but even bare expression, to the views of other 
 classes. If the nation be homogeneous, equal patches of 
 population will tend to return similar members. The 
 more numerous the constituency, the more likely is this 
 to be the result. Thousand A may differ from Thousand 
 B ; but Million A will assuredly be identical with Million 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 83 
 
 B. The doctrine of chances forbids us to expect con- 
 trasted representatives from constituencies with a family 
 likeness. If, indeed, the nation should not be homogene- 
 ous, but should contain two very numerous classes of 
 unlike tendencies, whose harmony is preserved by the 
 continual arbitration of less numerous classes intermedi- 
 ate between them, the result of an equal division of elec- 
 toral districts would be different, and it would be worse. 
 Each of the intermediate classes would be merged in one 
 of the larger. We may, however, look at the living 
 operation, and not at the bare theory. We have mentioned 
 the contrast between Mr. Bright and Mr. Newdegate. 
 What is it that prevents the continual disturbance of 
 parliamentary peace between two classes of men so dis- 
 similar as the members for counties — especially purely 
 agricultural counties — and members for manufacturing 
 cities ? Obviously the existence of the intermediate 
 elements, of members sent up by agricultural towns, 
 which contain industrial elements, arid by smaller manu- 
 facturing towns, which have no notion of being offered in 
 sacrifice to the populace of great cities. An electoral 
 system composed of ' population sections ' would not give 
 us a representative assembly adapted to the performance 
 of either of its two functions. A House of Commons so 
 elected would not represent the public opinion of the 
 country, and therefore could not rule it as it should be 
 ruled. The impartial and arbitrating element would be 
 
84 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 deficient. And, as has been explained, this complete 
 deficiency in the qualities necessary to a ruling legisla- 
 ture would not be compensated by any excellence in the 
 qualities necessary to secure a good expression of the 
 grievances and opinions of all classes. Old English good 
 sense selected a town to send representatives separately 
 from a county in which it was situated because it saw 
 there the conspicuous focus of separate feelings, separate 
 interests, possibly separate complaints. Our new re- 
 formers would undo this wise arrangement. They would 
 (at least, such is the logical tendency of their argument) 
 destroy those bounds and limits to constituencies which 
 secure a character to the constituency; they would repre- 
 sent the shipping interest by throwing Hull into the 
 county of York and Grimsby into the county of Lincoln : 
 distinct definition is all that is necessary to disprove 
 such ideas. 
 
 Paradoxical as it may sound, the evident untenable- 
 ness of Mr. Bright's views gives them a claim on our 
 attention. It is an indication of social unsoundness that 
 men of ability and energy sincerely advocate very absurd 
 theories, and are able to collect considerable audiences to 
 applaud those theories. We may speak of our national 
 contentment; but the answer comes, What, then, do 
 these people complain of? We must not rest satisfied 
 with a mere refutation of the doctrines which are avowed, 
 or an exposition of the mischievous consequences of the 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 85 
 
 plans proposed. There are certain theories of political 
 philosophy which supply ready arguments against almost 
 every state of society which has been able to maintain a 
 long existence. These heresies float among the most 
 ordinary ideas of mankind, and are ready without the 
 least research to the hand of whoever may believe that 
 he wants them. Latent discontent with the existing 
 form of government catches hastily at whatever justifies 
 it ; it seeks in these old forms of false doctrine a logical 
 basis for itself. One of these heresies is the purely demo- 
 cratic theory of government ; it has very rarely indeed 
 been adopted as a guide to action, but its existence is 
 nearly as old as political speculation. In every age and 
 country a class which has not as much power as it thinks 
 it ought to have snatches at the notion that all classes 
 ought to have equal power. Such an ' uneasy class ' 
 believes that it ought to have as much power as the class 
 which is in possession ; and not liking to put forward 
 even to itself a selfish claim of individual merit, it tries 
 to found its pretensions on the ' equal rights of all man- 
 kind' Mr. Burke described the first East Indian nabobs 
 as " Jacobins almost to a man,' because they did not find 
 their social position ' proportionate to their new wealth.' 
 We cannot fail to observe that the new business wealth 
 of the present day (of which Mr. Bright is the orator and 
 mouthpiece) has a tendency to democracy for the same 
 reason. Such a symptom in the body politic is an indi- 
 
86 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 cation of danger. So energetic a class as the creators of 
 Manchester need to be conciliated ; their active intelli- 
 gence has rights -which assuredly it will make heard. 
 The great political want of our day is a capitalist con- 
 servatism. If we could enlist the intelligent creators of 
 wealth in the ranks of those who would give their due 
 influence to intelligence and property, we should have 
 almost secured the stability of our constitution ; we 
 should have pacified its most dangerous assailants ; we 
 should count them among our most active allies. If the 
 transfer of a moderate number of seats in Parliament 
 from boroughs, which scarcely profess to exercise an 
 independent choice of representatives, to large and grow- 
 ing towns would only in a subordinate degree conduce to 
 this effect, such a transfer should be made. There would 
 still be enough of smaller constituencies for all purposes 
 that are useful. 
 
 We have, therefore, completed our task. We have 
 shown the defects which our present system of represen- 
 tation seems to contain; and we have endeavoured to 
 indicate the mode in which those defects might, we 
 think, be remedied. The subject is one of great com- 
 plexity and extent, and very difficult to discuss within 
 the limits of an article. To be considered profitably, it 
 must be considered as a whole ; and it will be evident 
 from our own pages how much space any attempt to dis- 
 cuss the entire topic necessarily requires. Whatever 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 87 
 
 errors of detail may be found in our opinions, we cannot 
 doubt that our general purpose has been correct. A real 
 statesman at the present day must endeavour to enlarge 
 the influence of the growing parts of the nation, as com- 
 pared with the stationary ; to augment the influence of 
 the capitalist classes, but to withstand the pernicious 
 theories which some of them for the moment advocate ; 
 to organize an expression for the desires of the lower 
 orders, but to withstand even the commencement of a 
 democratic revolution. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 18th February, 1859. 
 There are some points suggested by the previous discus- 
 sion which I was unable, from want of space, to treat as 
 I should have wished ; and some, too, which have been 
 brought out more clearly by the events of the last few 
 weeks. I gladly, therefore, make use of the opportunity 
 afforded me by the republication of the foregoing essay 
 to make some additional remarks. 
 
 A striking and most healthy symptom in the public 
 
88 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 mind in reference to Reform just now is its freshness. 
 In former times the Tory party never thought about the 
 matter. One of their traditional tenets, as a party, was 
 an opposition to Reform ; and all who desired a further 
 change than that of 1832 were in their eyes Radicals and 
 Democrats. The subject was not one for argument. The 
 Liberals, on the other hand, had a vague kind of abstract 
 idea that the franchise must be extended some time or 
 other. They would have been shocked to hear themselves 
 called Democrats ; but when they talked about Reform, 
 their language, as far as it had a meaning at all, had 
 a democratic meaning. It was imagined that as soon as 
 the ' masses ' had acquired a certain minimum of educa- 
 tion, they would have a claim of right to be enfranchised ; 
 and it was overlooked that in practice this would be 
 equivalent to the disfranchisement of all other classes, 
 and would give the lower orders the uncontrolled guid- 
 ance of the community. At present the state of public 
 opinion is infinitely more hopeful. The Tories have been 
 stimulated to the consideration of the subject. As a 
 government of their own is to propose a Reform Bill, it 
 is impossible any longer to regard the topic as beyond 
 the range of permitted speculation. The Liberals like- 
 wise have been rather rudely awakened to the unpleasant 
 consequences of their former ideas. Mr. Bright, more 
 than any one else, should have the credit of arousing the 
 present liberal reaction against democracy. He has pro- 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 89 
 
 pounded in a definite plan what was before an intangible 
 idea. The subject has come within the range of practi- 
 cal English thought almost for the first time; and, as 
 usual, the tone of habitual discussion on it has deepened 
 and improved. A feeling of sympathy for intelligent 
 working people is perhaps stronger than ever, and there 
 is every wish that they should, if possible, have some 
 power in the community; but there is a distinct and 
 settled determination that they shall not have all the 
 power. 
 
 I have dwelt so fully on this part of the subject in 
 the preceding essay, that it is not necessary for me now 
 to resume the general discussion of it. The public mind 
 is in a much more likely mood to entertain what appear 
 to me to be just ideas than it ever was before, or that I 
 could have hoped it would be now. There are one or 
 two incidental remarks, however, which it is necessary 
 to make on the subject. 
 
 The most telling objection to the expedient suggested 
 in the foregoing essay for representing the working 
 classes — viz. that of lowering the qualification so as to 
 include them in the great seats of industry, but not 
 elsewhere — is, that it sacrifices the political power of the 
 higher classes in those important places. The higher 
 classes in Manchester cannot be expected to like that 
 they should be disfranchised by the wholesale enfran- 
 chisement of the working men in Manchester. That it 
 
90 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 should ever be pleasant, it would be impossible to hope ; 
 but there are some considerations which tend, I think, to 
 make it less unpleasant than might be imagined at first 
 sight. 
 
 In the first place, a great deal of the anticipated 
 calamity has happened, and is being endured. The 
 creators of the wealth of Manchester — and when I speak 
 of Manchester, I only do so because it stands out in the 
 public mind as a type and symbol of cities of the class — 
 are not the ten-pound householders who return its 
 members. These are the small shopkeepers and petty 
 dealers, who swarm and congregate about every great 
 commercial place; but who bear to the merchants and 
 manufacturers of those places much the same relation that 
 the sutlers of a camp bear to its disciplined army. In 
 London, where the geographical division of industrial 
 pursuits is unusually evident, there are whole consti- 
 tuencies composed nearly exclusively of these rather 
 mean attendants on commercial civilization. The Tower 
 Hamlets contain very little else ; and any one can see by 
 walking through them how little their population has of 
 the cultivated energy and enlarged acuteness commonly 
 to be found in a great merchant. In other towns — 
 Liverpool is a strong contrast in this respect to London — 
 this attendant community of inferior dealers resides in 
 the closest proximity to the most important mercantile 
 offices — in the focus of business transactions. The effect 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 91 
 
 of the Act of 1832 has been to throw the representa- 
 tion of the large trading towns into the hands of these 
 inferior traders, whose vicinity to the greater ones is 
 inevitable, and whose numbers are overwhelming. A 
 portion of the higher class of traders sympathize in the 
 views of the lower ; this portion assume to be the leaders 
 of the place, and give to persons at a distance an idea 
 of its tendencies quite different from what would be 
 desired by the higher citizens in general. There has 
 always been an anti-Manchester party at Manchester. 
 The school which Mr. Bright represents has not the 
 undisputed lead among the manufacturing and mercantile 
 men of the north which they are commonly thought to 
 have. The most cultivated people there are perhaps 
 generally opposed to it. The highest and best class 
 of the traders in great commercial towns are already 
 disfranchised, and it would, in reality, be better for them 
 that it should be thoroughly understood to be so. At 
 present the world imagines that their present represen- 
 tatives express their feelings, and state their opinions. 
 If the representation of such places were avowedly and 
 constitutionally in the hands of the working classes, it 
 would be understood that the higher traders had no voice. 
 Those of them — and they are a very large number — who 
 have none now would be great gainers, because they 
 would no longer have the vexation of being thought to 
 sympathize with persons to whom they are emphatically 
 
92 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 opposed. The reason is different with respect to the 
 prevailing party in those boroughs, but the conclusion is 
 the same. So far are Mr. Bright's followers from pro- 
 testing against the wholesale admission of the class of 
 voters just below them,, that they are clamorous in 
 favour of that admission. If the adoption of a rate- 
 paying franchise is supported by any part of the country, 
 it is by the constituencies of the very largest towns. 
 There is no hardship in giving to them the boon which 
 they demand for every one. 
 
 If, however, it should be found that the higher classes 
 of the largest towns exceedingly disliked the evident 
 disfranchisement which would be the certain consequence 
 of extending the borough franchise in such towns to the 
 lower orders, it would not be by any means impossible to 
 find practicable plans of preserving to them an effectual 
 franchise. The first of these plans is the creation of 
 what may be called suburban constituencies. The greater 
 part of our merchants and traders, even the higher part 
 of our shopkeepers, have long since deserted the strait- 
 ened dwellings over the shop and the counting-house 
 which contented their fathers. They have residences in 
 country districts near their places of business ; all round 
 our largest cities there is a network of them. Many 
 constituencies could be found in the environs of our great 
 cities where the rich, comfortable, and intellectual busi- 
 ness classes reside in very great numbers, and where they 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 93 
 
 would be far more likely to predominate, and to have an 
 effectual voice in the selection of members of Parliament, 
 than under the present suffrage system they are, or can be, 
 in the great seats of industry themselves. Such classes 
 would benefit exceedingly by conceding to the working 
 classes the undisputed command of the representation of 
 the great town itself, if they could thereby obtain a real 
 representation for themselves at their own homes. That 
 which they have now — so numerous are the meaner house- 
 holders — is rather a vexing mockery than a desirable 
 reality ; what they would obtain would be a substantial 
 and effectual influence on the legislature. If it were 
 necessary, it would be easy to provide that the represen- 
 tation should be really in the hands of the higher class 
 by fixing the property qualification for a vote at a higher 
 point than usual (at £20, suppose) ; but I rather appre- 
 hend that this expedient, though quite defensible, and 
 by no means intrinsically undesirable, would not be 
 absolutely necessary, as the number of the higher classes 
 residing in well-selected suburban constituencies would 
 give them, under a ten-pound franchise, an effectual 
 superiority. 
 
 A second plan, which is not inconsistent with the 
 first, but rather supplementary to it, is a development of 
 the suggestion that personal property should be made 
 the basis and criterion of a qualification as well as real 
 property. The first step to carry this into practice raises 
 
94 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 the question, For what constituency is this qualification 
 to give a vote ? Kailway debentures and the public 
 funds have no locality ; if they are to give a vote, they 
 may do so for one place as well as for another. I would 
 propose to give the voter himself a choice on this point. 
 If he had the power of registering himself on the ground 
 of a monied-property qualification within a certain circle 
 of constituencies — say to any one situated at not more 
 than fifty miles from his usual place of abode — he could 
 transfer his vote to that one where it was most wanted, 
 and would be most effectual. The higher classes in the 
 largest constituencies — practically disfranchised as they 
 almost are now, and as they would be quite if the sug- 
 gestions I have ventured to make were adopted — might 
 find a satisfactory refuge in the smaller constituencies of 
 the neighbourhood, whose numbers they would augment, 
 and whose composition they would materially improve. 
 In general, too, the creation of a transferable constituency, 
 by conferring the suffrage on the possessors of non-local 
 wealth as such, would be a material strengthening of the 
 educated classes as opposed to the non-educated, because 
 it would give the former an opportunity of concentrating 
 their power where it would tell most, while the power of 
 the lower classes would be dispersed, and inseparably 
 attached to certain places. 
 
 Both of these are expedients for giving to the dis- 
 franchised upper classes of the most numerous constitu- 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 95 
 
 encies power elsewhere than in these constituencies ; two 
 other expedients may be mentioned, by which they might 
 still retain considerable influence in them. 
 
 The first of these is a modification of the 'minority 
 principle.' It has been shown in the preceding essay, by 
 arguments which are to my own mind conclusive, that this 
 ingenious expedient would not of itself solve the problem 
 of giving to the working classes a certain number of 
 spokesmen in Parliament without conferring on them the 
 supreme authority in the State. The working classes are 
 the enormous majority in the country ; if the franchise is 
 universally lowered so as to include them in every con- 
 stituency, they will be masters of the country. By means 
 of the minority principle a certain power may be pre- 
 served to some fraction more or less of the constituency, 
 according to circumstances ; but the great preponderance 
 will be with the majority still. In the case usually sup- 
 posed of a constituency with three members, in which each 
 constituent has nevertheless but two votes, a minority at 
 all greater than two-fifths of the constituency could 
 return one member, if they pleased it, with complete 
 certainty ; but the corresponding majority of a trifle less 
 than three-fifths would return two members with equal 
 certainty. The influence of the majority would still be 
 double the influence of the minority. So far from this 
 principle giving to the working classes a few members and 
 no more, it gives the greater number to them, and only a 
 
96 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 few in comparison to the rich. But though this expedient 
 does not of itself give the solution of the problem of 
 which we are in search, it gives us the means of alle- 
 viating the inconvenience attaching to what we have found 
 to be one solution of that problem. We may by means 
 of the minority principle give a voice to the rich in the 
 exceptional constituencies in which it has been proposed 
 to lower the franchise so as to include the working men. 
 In these constituencies we only wish to give the rich 
 some power; it is the principle of the proposal to give 
 the greater power to their inferiors. 
 
 One of the modes in which the minority principle 
 might be made use of for this purpose has an appearance 
 of equality which would be, I should imagine, attractive 
 to consistent democrats. It is proposed that, no matter 
 what the number of members for the constituency may 
 be, no elector shall have more than one vote. As has 
 been previously pointed out, this is by far the most 
 efficacious form of the minority principle, because the 
 minority to which it gives a member is smaller than it is 
 under any other modification of that principle. If there 
 were only two members for a constituency, a minority 
 at all exceeding one-third might be certain of return- 
 ing a single member. I cannot, indeed, imagine that in 
 this form the principle could ever be adopted or even 
 seriously advocated. No one would say that one-third 
 plus one of the nation was entitled to as much voice 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 97 
 
 in its deliberations and decisions as two-thirds minus 
 one of it. A small minority, as such, and no matter 
 how composed, could never claim to have as much 
 power as a large majority, the members of which 
 might, for aught which appears, be equally intelligent. 
 Nor, even if we supposed the minority to be the rich 
 and educated, and the majority the poor and ignorant, 
 would the result be satisfactory. The error would 
 then be in the other direction : the ignorant majority 
 would in that case have as much power as the in- 
 structed minority, which is exactly what we desire that 
 they should not have. Like all other modifications of 
 the minority principle, this one fails as an anti-democratic 
 expedient applicable to the whole country. It would be 
 most dangerous to lower very greatly the franchise 
 throughout the country, in reliance on its efficacy in pre- 
 cluding a despotism of the uneducated. But if the 
 franchise be only extended to the working classes in 
 certain exceptional constituencies, the adoption of the 
 rule that no elector should have more than a single vote 
 might in them be very beneficial. Suppose that three 
 members were assigned to such constituencies, and that 
 no elector possessed more than a single vote, a moderate 
 fraction (one-fourth of the constituency plus one) could 
 always be sure of returning a member, and the remaining 
 part of the constituency (three-fourths minus one) would 
 return the other two. If the higher classes of a great 
 
 H 
 
98 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 town were really united, and used their legitimate in- 
 fluence with zeal, they could always command somewhat 
 more than a quarter of the constituency : they would be 
 secure of returning a representative to the legislature as 
 well as their inferiors. 
 
 The same end would be reached by the adoption of 
 what is called the ' cumulative vote ' in these exceptional 
 constituencies. By this is simply meant that the elector 
 should be permitted to give all his votes to a single 
 member if he pleases : thus, if the members to be elected 
 for the constituency be three, and each elector have three 
 votes, he would be enabled to give all his votes to any 
 one candidate, instead of being compelled, as at present, 
 either to distribute them among three candidates, or abstain 
 from using some of them. By means of this expedient 
 also, a minority at all greater than one quarter could with 
 certainty return a member ; and the effect in that respect 
 would be of course the same as if that result had been 
 attained by the other expedient. I cannot but think, 
 however, that the latter mode is very preferable in other 
 respects. Mr. J. S. Mill says very justly that the principle 
 of giving the elector fewer votes than there are members 
 to be elected must always be unpopular, ' because it cuts 
 down the privileges of the voter;' while, on the other 
 hand, the adoption of the cumulative vote increases them, 
 and has in consequence a tendency to be popular. Mr. 
 Mill justly observes also that the expedient of the 'cumu- 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 99 
 
 lative vote' has another great advantage: it enables 
 voters to indicate not only their preference for a candidate, 
 but the degree of their preference. Instead of voting 
 mechanically for all the candidates put forward by their 
 party, it enables them to select the one whom they really 
 themselves most approve, and to support him only. This 
 would tend to secure to eminent and trusted statesmen a 
 secure position in their respective constituencies, which 
 is one of the most important among the minor excellences 
 of a representative system. 
 
 By one or other of these two schemes, it would be 
 possible to give a real representation to the working 
 classes in the -large towns in which they live, and to 
 preserve a portion of influence and a share in the local 
 representation to the higher classes of the town. Both 
 schemes are, however, liable to the very considerable ob- 
 jection that they permit, or rather provide for, the election 
 in the same place of a member for the poor and a member 
 for the rich, which is very likely to cause local ill-feeling, 
 and may sometimes irritate the poor into momentary 
 turbulence. On this ground, it seems to me preferable 
 that the higher classes in the large towns should be con- 
 tent with such indirect compensation for their local 
 disfranchisement as would be afforded by the two plans 
 which were noticed first. But popular impression has an 
 incalculable influence in such questions ; and if the higher 
 classes in these first-class constituencies would feel it a 
 
100 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 stigma or an injustice to have no share in their local 
 representation, such a share must be reserved to them, 
 although we are thereby compelled to allow of the elec- 
 tion of two contrasted kinds of members for the same 
 town. 
 
 It may likewise be objected to the creation of such 
 exceptional constituencies as I have proposed, that their 
 exceptional character could not be permanent. If you 
 once lower the qualification in one constituency, it may 
 be said there will be no rest from agitation until it has 
 been lowered to the same extreme point in all constitu- 
 encies. But this appears to me to assume that the demo- 
 cratic tendencies of the country are far more powerful 
 than they really are. The extension of the suffrage, 
 especially a very large extension of it, is not very popular 
 with the existing constituencies. If we give to such 
 privileged bodies a good argumentative defence, the oli- 
 garchical tendencies of human nature will go far to ensure 
 their maintaining their privileges. Nothing tends to the 
 longevity of a public benefit so much as its being also a 
 particular private advantage to some one who will look 
 after it. Such a defence the existing constituencies will 
 really have if we assign to the working classes some real 
 representation in Parliament ; but while the most nume- 
 rous class have no means at all of making their voice 
 heard, there will always be an uneasy feeling that they 
 are unduly depressed and unfeelingly disregarded. So 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 101 
 
 far, then, from the creation of exceptional constituencies 
 tending to weaken the arguments in favour of the general 
 structure of the present constituencies, it is the only way 
 of removing the most telling argumentative objection to 
 our existing arrangements. 
 
 An exceptional character in particular constituencies 
 is, it should be observed, an essential element in every 
 system of class representation. If you lay down the 
 principle that there shall be persons in Parliament qualified 
 and authorized to speak the sentiments of special classes, 
 you must take care that in certain electoral bodies those 
 classes shall predominate, that the member for such bodies 
 shall be their member. You can only secure speciality in 
 the member by a speciality in the constituency. This is 
 the very ground on which borough populations were 
 originally selected for a separate representation. It was 
 believed that places differing so much from the rural 
 districts in which they were situated would have distinct 
 interests to advocate, distinct opinions to maintain, 
 possibly distinct grievances to state. In a word, it was 
 believed that they would send a special representative, 
 with something to say different from that which an 
 ordinary county representative would ever say. By 
 selecting for particular representation towns occupied 
 in all the important kinds of trade, we have secured 
 an expression to the opinions and sentiments of all 
 kinds of capitalists. By giving special representa- 
 
102 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 tives to the Universities, we have provided, perhaps 
 not adequately, but still to some extent, for the cha- 
 racteristic expression of the peculiar views of the 
 cultured classes. I believe that the principle of special 
 representation should be extended to the lower classes 
 also, who, from an improvement in education, have now 
 in the larger towns opinions to state, and perhaps, in their 
 own estimation, grievances to make known. If a special 
 representation is given to such persons, it can only be in 
 the same way that special representatives are given to 
 other classes by creating constituencies with a corre- 
 sponding speciality. 
 
 It is to be observed, that the necessity for creating 
 such exceptional constituencies would not be obviated by 
 the recommendation which Mr. Mill has made of giving 
 one vote to every man, whatever be his education, and 
 additional votes in a rapidly-ascending scale to persons 
 of greater education. The object of this recommendation 
 is to keep the principal authority in the state in the hands 
 of educated men. The scale of votes is avowedly arranged 
 for that purpose. By the adoption of this scheme, you 
 would give to the working classes no characteristic ex- 
 pression in the legislature; you would give them an 
 influence in every constituency in appearance considerable, 
 but which would be of no practical avail to them as a 
 class, because on all characteristic points their voice would 
 be neutralized, and whenever there were class candidates 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 103 
 
 theirs would be rejected, by the more numerous votes 
 given for that very purpose to the more educated classes. 
 
 I must have wearied every reader with this part of 
 the subject; and my only excuse is the strong conviction 
 which I feel of its importance, and my wish not to omit 
 to make any observation which may serve to throw it 
 into what seems to me the true light. 
 
 As far as the nomination boroughs go, I have no 
 wish to say a word in their defence. In former times 
 there may have been a certain advantage in the ex- 
 istence of such seats. Young men of promise were then 
 occasionally brought into Parliament by the patrons of 
 such constituencies, and great statesmen sometimes 
 found a refuge in them during moments of unpopularity. 
 But these advantages belong to past times. Before 
 the Beform Act of 1832 the borough proprietors had 
 boroughs to spare ; such was the plenty of such seats, that 
 there were some left for the public, after providing for 
 the relations and personal friends of the proprietor. But 
 the fact is otherwise at present. There are not now 
 enough of such boroughs to provide for the personal con- 
 nections of those who own them ; and the public derive 
 almost no advantage from their continuance. 
 
 As I have explained, all very small boroughs tend 
 to become either dependent or corrupt, and therefore all 
 very small ones should be abolished. But this is no 
 ground for abolishing a great number of constituencies 
 
104 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 which, though not very large, are still large enough to be 
 fairly independent and fairly uneorrupt. There can be 
 no ground for disfranchising every place which has not 
 10,000 inhabitants. If we look to abstract principle as 
 our guide, no measure would be more undesirable. We 
 have seen it to be desirable not only that there should be 
 special representatives for every class in Parliament, but 
 likewise that the predominant tone and temper of Par- 
 liament should be despotically controlled by no class or 
 sect of persons — that it should coincide with the feeling 
 of the nation itself. The accordance of the opinion of 
 Parliament with that of the country is the principal 
 condition for the performance by Parliament of its great 
 function of ruling the country. This can only be secured 
 by the continuance in Parliament of many members 
 representing no special interest, bound down to state the 
 ideas of no particular class, themselves not markedly 
 exhibiting the characteristics of any particular status, but 
 able to form a judgment of what is good for the country 
 as freely and impartially as other educated men. It is 
 impossible to expect that such persons will be com- 
 monly sent to Parliament by the counties and the 
 large towns. A good deal has already been said of the 
 sectarian character of the county members. I fear it 
 must be allowed that the better class of members for 
 large towns are at least as sectarian ; they are capitalists, 
 men of business, representing the views and opinions of 
 
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 105 
 
 the ten-pound householders. I am not speaking of such 
 members as stray in occasionally for such constituencies 
 as the Tower Hamlets. A low class of demagogue will 
 now and then be returned by every very large con- 
 stituency; but the characteristic tendency of the large 
 towns is to return men of business of mature age, and 
 of a certain very recognizable, if not very describable 
 tendency of sentiment and opinion — a kind of member 
 as marked, as peculiar, and as distinct from all others 
 as any county member can be. I cannot but think that 
 we shall impair the proper working of our parliamentary 
 constitution if we greatly augment the number of class 
 " representatives, whether for the large towns or the 
 counties. Whatever other defects may be alleged to 
 exist in the smaller boroughs, the objection that they 
 return exclusively the representatives of a class cannot 
 be made to them. Every species of member sits for some 
 of them. A list of persons more unlike one another 
 could hardly be found than the list of the representatives 
 for our smaller boroughs. When we consider how ex- 
 ceedingly important it is that the judgment of Parliament 
 should be alloyed by no class prejudice or class interest, 
 that its decisions should be in accordance with the real 
 and deliberate decision of the nation, we shall, I hope, 
 pause before we abolish constituencies so likely to con- 
 tribute to effect this result. It is not possible for human 
 skill to apportion to each special interest the exact 
 
106 PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. 
 
 number of representatives which it ought to have, and 
 to compose a Parliament exclusively of such special 
 representatives. It would require more skill than any 
 statesman can claim to establish a coincidence of opinion 
 between Parliament and the country solely by the 
 definite allotment of particular members to particular 
 classes. There is no criterion to tell us with accuracy 
 how much each class contributes to the formation of 
 public opinion. The sole expedient for securing the 
 result which we wish to obtain, is that by which it 
 has actually been obtained. We have a Parliament, 
 subject to two slight objections, fairly coincident in 
 judgment with the reflecting part of the community. 
 This inestimable coincidence of judgment is largely due 
 to the immemorial existence of very many impartial con- 
 stituencies. We have class advocates in Parliament, it is 
 true ; but many unbiased judges, many national repre- 
 sentatives, are to be found there likewise. Perhaps no 
 course could be more dangerous for the country than to 
 diminish the number of the latter, and so lose, possibly at 
 a very critical moment, the incalculable benefit of their 
 impartial intelligence. 
 
THE HISTORY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT, 
 
 AND ITS LESSONS. 1 
 
 (1860.) 
 
 Perhaps no subject of historical research should be so 
 interesting just now as the practical working of our 
 system of parliamentary representation before 1832. The 
 principles of representative government are again about 
 to be brought under discussion ; a new proposal for Par- 
 liamentary Reform must be announced before many 
 weeks are past. The more that subject is discussed, the 
 more do all thoughtful persons wish to consult the lessons 
 of experience with respect to it. We feel more than we 
 
 1 The Rise and Progress of the English Constitution. By E.-S. Creasy, 
 M.A. Fourth edition, revised and ■with additions. London : Richard 
 Bentley, 1858. 
 
 The Representative History of Great Britain and Ireland : heing a 
 History of the House of Commons, and of the Counties, Cities, and 
 Boroughs of the United Kingdom, from the earliest Period. By T. H. B. 
 Oldfleld. In six volumes. London : Baldwin, Cradook, and Joy, 1816. 
 
108 THE HISTOET OF THE TJNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 used to do the difficulty of the question ; we distrust 
 more the tenets of pure democracy ; we know more of 
 the complexity of a cultivated community ; we know the 
 necessity of giving to each class the weight which it 
 ought to have, and no greater weight : in consequence, 
 we feel more than formerly the intellectual prudence of 
 recurring to the facts of experience. But unfortunately 
 there are very few such facts. Of all important 
 political expedients, representation is by far the newest ; 
 and our experience with respect to it is therefore scanty 
 and limited. The continental nations who have made 
 trial of representative government, have done so almost 
 always under exceptional circumstances, and in each ca'se 
 the national character of the particular nation which 
 made the trial has very greatly affected the result of it. 
 The experience of America is, from many causes, difficult 
 to apply to the times in which we live. The difference of 
 circumstances, both economical and social, is a perpetually 
 modifying force, which tends to make a sweeping deduction 
 almost necessarily unsound. The contrast between a new 
 country and an old ; between a State in which there is 
 an endowed church and a landed aristocracy, and one 
 in which there is neither ; between a society in which 
 slavery exists and one in which it does not ; — is too great 
 to be unimportant, and too pervading to be eliminated. 
 Nor is it easy to derive effectual instruction from the 
 working of the system which is in operation now. At 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 109 
 
 least, it is difficult to derive instruction which others 
 will think satisfactory. "We may, and do, make out 
 points sufficiently clearly to ourselves ; but in the heat 
 of controversy, and in the confusion of contemporary 
 events, others, in fact, derive from the same data the 
 contrary deductions. We are therefore thrown back on 
 our own history for such instruction as it may give us ; 
 and the break made by the Keform Act of 1832 is, at 
 least in this respect, useful. We can draw lessons from 
 the times preceding it with the calmness of history, and 
 nevertheless those times may yield us instruction. They 
 are far enough from our own age to be dispassionately 
 considered ; they resemble it enough to suggest analogies 
 for our guidance. Nor is this history in itself un- 
 interesting. The unreformed system of representative 
 government is that which lasted the longest ; which was 
 contemporary with the greatest events ; which has de- 
 veloped the greatest orators, and which has trained the 
 most remarkable statesmen. No apology, therefore, 
 seems to be needed for writing upon the subject at 
 present, even if we should write at some length. 
 
 To give an exact account of the old English system 
 of representation is, however, no easy task. At present 
 the statistical information which we possess respecting 
 the electoral system which exists is exceedingly abundant. 
 We can tell the number of voters in every borough and 
 every county ; we know by what right of suffrage they 
 
110 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 are entitled to vote, and how many of them have chosen 
 in any case to exercise their right at each successive 
 election. Compendious works specify what lord or com- 
 moner has influence in such or such a town : they say 
 whether it is preponderant and all-powerful, or only 
 moderate and sometimes resisted ; they tell us in which 
 town money has overwhelming influence, and enumerate 
 the occasions upon which the use of that influence has 
 been proved before the proper tribunal. We can hardly 
 hope to obtain better information as to the actual 
 working of a system than that which we have as to the 
 system under which we are living. A hundred years 
 ago our ancestors were nearly destitute of all such infor- 
 mation. They had no means of telling the number of 
 voters in any borough or county ; no register existed 
 from which it could be discovered ; the right of voting 
 in different places was exceedingly different, and the 
 decisions of the House of Commons respecting them had 
 been very confused. From political motives, indeed, 
 these decisions were often contradictory ; they were 
 made to suit the requirements of the moment and the 
 commands of the minister of the day, and a judicial 
 spirit was, while the decision lay with a committee of the 
 whole House of Commons, scarcely even affected. Sir 
 Eobert Walpole used to say that in election committees 
 there ought to be ' no quarter ; ' and the final fate of 
 his long administration was determined by a division on 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. Ill 
 
 an election petition from Chippenham. As the deciding 
 power respecting electoral rights was so inconsistent, it 
 would perhaps hardly have been worth while to collect 
 its decisions ; and no one did so. A hundred years ago, 
 the constant reference to precise numerical data which 
 distinguishes our present discussions was by no means in 
 use ; and even if the number of the electoral body had 
 been more easy of ascertainment, no one probably would 
 have ascertained it. The government had not yet 
 established a census of its subjects, and would not per- 
 haps have liked to have the voters who chose it 
 counted. At any rate, no one did count them ; and a 
 very general notion respecting the practical working 
 of our representative system was all which could be 
 formed at the time, or that can be formed now. 
 
 The representation of England and Wales was 
 formerly, as now, in the hands of counties and boroughs. 
 The number of counties was the same as it now is ; but 
 they were as yet undivided for the purposes of repre- 
 sentation. The number of boroughs was very consider- 
 able, and this of itself led to difficulty. 
 
 It is evident that in early times, when population 
 was small and trade scanty, it would be difficult to find 
 very many boroughs that would be fit to elect proper 
 members of parliament. We know by trial that a town 
 constituency, to be pure and to be independent, must be 
 of fair size, and must contain a considerable number of 
 
112 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 better-class inhabitants : unless it be so, it will assuredly 
 succumb to one of two dangers ; it will fall under the 
 yoke of some proprietor who will purchase the place as 
 a whole, or it will be purchased, vote by vote, at each 
 election. Nothing, both experience and theory explain 
 to us, is so futile as to expect continued purity and 
 continued independence from a small number of persons 
 who have something valuable to sell, and who would gain 
 what is an object to them by selling it. But of con- 
 siderable towns the number was once exceedingly few. 
 Internal commerce and foreign trade have made such 
 enormous strides in England recently, that we hardly 
 realize the poverty of former times, or the small number 
 of people who lived where we live now. Statistics, 
 though they may give us a statement of the fact, do not, 
 and cannot, fill our imaginations with it. We may get 
 a better notion of what England was in numbers and 
 wealth from travelling in the purely agricultural, the 
 less advanced and poorer parts, of the Continent, than 
 we can from figures and books. We shall in that way 
 gain a vivid impression that it would be impossible in a 
 rude age and country to find a very great number of 
 towns large enough to elect representatives indepen- 
 dently, and rich enough to elect them uncorruptly. 
 
 In the system which prevailed a hundred and fifty 
 years ago our ancestors had much aggravated this diffi- 
 culty. They had not selected the most considerable 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 113 
 
 towns to be parliamentary constituencies ; they had not 
 taken all the largest, and they had taken several of the 
 smallest. We need not now explain why this happened. 
 We have no room to discuss the antiquities of the old 
 boroughs ; we cannot tell in many cases why some were 
 chosen which were chosen. But two facts are incon- 
 testable : of which one is, that there was probably much 
 original caprice in the selection of town constituencies. 
 The sheriff had at first a certain discretionary power, and 
 we do not know very precisely how he exercised it. 
 The boroughs themselves were anxious, not to obtain the 
 right, but to evade the obligation, of sending members to 
 parliament. Provided a respectable number of borough 
 members appeared in their places to assent to the 
 requisite taxes, and to indicate by their demeanour, if 
 not by their votes, the popular feeling on the topics of 
 the day, the early rulers of England, those rulers who 
 laid the foundations of our representative system, were 
 satisfied. They felt no nice scruples as to the exact 
 magnitude of the towns which did not send members, or 
 of those which did so. In the times of the Tudors, and 
 a little later, the Crown exercised its prerogative of 
 creating new boroughs; and as the popular spirit had 
 then begun to be a subject of dread, and the voice of the 
 House of Commons was already of some importance, we 
 need not hesitate to imagine that the statesmen of the 
 time regarded the ' loyalty ' or subservience of the 
 
 I 
 
114 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 boroughs they created, rather, than their precise size. 
 English statesmen look to the wants of the day, and 
 especially to the wants of their own administration, 
 much more than to complex figures ; they do so even at 
 the present day, when statistical tables will be paraded 
 against them : how much more did they not improbably 
 do so in the reigns of the Tudors, when there was no 
 check upon them in any matter requiring much research 
 or information ; when, if they chose to disregard numerical 
 data, no one else could know, far less prove, that they 
 had done so ! Nor was original caprice the only cause 
 that had given representatives to many boroughs which 
 in the eighteenth century seemed scarcely fit to choose 
 them, and which denied them to others which appeared 
 to be much more fit. In the contest between the Stuarts 
 and the people, the Crown lost its old prerogative of 
 creating boroughs; the moment there was a contest 
 between the House of Commons and the sovereign, it 
 became clear that the sovereign must be victorious if he 
 could add members to the former at his pleasure. Ac- 
 cordingly the House of Commons impugned the validity 
 of the so-called prerogative; their resistance was suc- 
 cessful, and it was exercised no longer. In consequence 
 the old boroughs remained, and no new ones were added ; 
 and as, in a changing country like this, many places which 
 were formerly large gradually became small, and many 
 small ones on the other hand became large, the distribu- 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE TJNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 115 
 
 tion of wealth and numbers came in process of time, and 
 by a process which no one watched, to be altogether 
 different from the distribution of parliamentary influence. 
 Nor was this the only way in which the inherent 
 difficulty of finding good town constituencies in poor and 
 rude times was artificially aggravated in our old system 
 of representation. Not only were the best boroughs not 
 chosen to be constituencies, but the best persons in those 
 boroughs were not chosen to be electors. The old and 
 complex rights of suffrage in different boroughs are anti- 
 quarian matters, on which we have not a single line of 
 space to bestow ; but they differed very much. Origi- 
 nally, perhaps, the right or duty had belonged or attached 
 to all rate-paying householders ; but this simple definition, 
 if it ever existed, had long passed away, and the rights 
 of suffrage had become most various. No short descrip- 
 tion, much less any single definition, would include them. 
 We give those which existed in the boroughs of two 
 counties, Somersetshire and Lancashire, to show how 
 great the diversity was, and how many ' permutations 
 and combinations ' it embraced. 
 
 Somersetshire. 
 
 Bristol . . . Freeholders of 40s. and free burgesses. 
 
 Bath .... Mayor, aldermen, and common councilmen only. 
 
 Wells . . . Mayor, masters, burgesses, and freemen of the seven 
 
 trading companies of the said city. 
 Taunton . . Potwallers, not receiving alms or charity. 
 
116 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 Bridgewater . Mayor, aldermen, and twenty-four capital burgesses 
 of the borough paying scot and lot. 
 
 Ilchbsteb . . Alleged to be the inhabitants of the said town paying 
 scot and lot, which the town called potwallers. 
 
 Minehead . . The parishioners of Dunster and Minehead, being 
 housekeepers in the borough of Minehead, and not 
 receiving alms. 
 
 Milboen Port . The capital bailiffs and their deputies, the number of 
 bailiffs being nine, and their deputies being two 
 in the commonalty, stewards, their number being 
 two ; and the inhabitants thereof paying scot and 
 lot. 
 
 
 Lancashire. 
 
 Lancaster 
 
 . Freemen only. 
 
 Wigan . 
 
 . Free burgesses. 
 
 Clitheroe 
 
 . Freeholders, resident and non-resident. 
 
 Liverpool 
 
 . Mayor, bailiffs, and freemen not receiving alms 
 
 Preston 
 
 . All the inhabitants. 
 
 Generally speaking, we may perhaps say that the 
 original scot and lot (or rate-paying) qualification had 
 been submitted to two opposite forces of alteration. By 
 one it had been restricted to certain inhabitants of the 
 town who, by virtue of some corporate right or municipal 
 office, assumed to themselves to be its most important 
 and chief inhabitants. These principal persons were 
 usually few, and they prudently contrived that their 
 number should not be augmented. They formed them- 
 selves into self-renewing corporations : at every vacancy 
 the remaining members filled up the place as they deemed 
 best, and they took care no one should have votes for the 
 borough but themselves. On the other hand, by a second 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 117 
 
 process, the borough suffrage had been widened so as to 
 include all freemen, or all inhabitant householders not 
 receiving alms ; everybody, in short, who could be included 
 in it. The process of extension, as was natural, was of 
 the two the older process. While the right of electing 
 members was attended by the duty of paying them, it 
 was an onerous burden, and the chief people in the place 
 tried to extend it as far as they well could; in later 
 times, when members were no longer paid, and political 
 advantages were to be obtained by the skilful use of a 
 vote, the influential people of a borough tried as much as 
 possible to keep the parliamentary suffrage to themselves. 
 In the last attempt they generally succeeded. The 
 boroughs in which the people at large elected the members 
 were, in the eighteenth century, far fewer than those in 
 which a few persons of one sort or another elected them. 
 The tendency of the House of Commons itself, from 
 various causes, was rather to confine than to extend the 
 right of suffrage. But in whichever direction the pro- 
 gress of time had altered what we may suppose to have 
 been the original right of franchise, whether it had 
 restricted it or had extended it, the effect upon the 
 constituency was almost equally bad. If it was much 
 narrowed, it fell into the hands of a very small number 
 of persons, who used for their own benefit what had 
 become a very marketable privilege ; and if the franchise 
 had been very much extended — especially if it became,- 
 
118 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 as in several places it did, nearly equivalent to universal 
 suffrage — we may readily conceive in what manner it 
 was used, when we remember that many of the boroughs 
 were small, that in that age corruption was thought far 
 less disgraceful than at present, and that the poorer 
 classes were much poorer and much more ignorant than 
 they now are. 
 
 We need not further explain the general causes which 
 impaired the independence and purity of the ancient 
 boroughs. As it would have been somewhat difficult to 
 find in old times enough boroughs that were proper to 
 choose representatives ; as the best had not been chosen 
 — perhaps had not been searched for ; as in the actual 
 boroughs the best people to be voters had not been 
 selected as such ; as in most of them the electing con- 
 stituency was very small; — it is no wonder that most of 
 these boroughs fell more or less under the control of rich 
 men who considered the franchise of the borough a part 
 of their own property. 
 
 With the counties the case was somewhat different ; 
 as yet there was no Chandos clause, the forty-shilling 
 freehold was as yet the only title to a vote. Yeomen 
 with such freeholds were as yet numerous, in many 
 counties very numerous, and were still sturdy and in- 
 dependent. The inferior gentry were not always much 
 disposed to submit to the dictation of lord or duke. In 
 the last century, the county franchise was always con- 
 
THE HISTOKY OF THE UNEEFOEMED PAELIAMENT. 119 
 
 sidered as the free and independent element ; those who 
 wished to purify the legislature, always proposed to 
 augment that element, and saw no other means of obtain- 
 ing what they wished for. 
 
 But even the counties were in former times far less 
 independent than, from the nature of the legal franchise — ■ 
 from the paper description of it — we should suppose. Our 
 county society has always been an aristocratic society ; 
 and in the last century aristocracy was a power of which 
 it is difficult in these days of free manners and careless 
 speech to realize the force. Society had then, far more 
 than now, a simple, regular, recognized structure ; each 
 class had its place : it looked up to the classes above 
 it ; it would have thought it wrong to vie with them, or 
 even to imitate them. Each class was to a certain 
 extent independent; each went its own way on its 
 own affairs, attended to the transactions of its own 
 calling and the details of its own life : but each had 
 a tendency, such as we can hardly now imagine, to be 
 guided, impelled, and governed by those who were above 
 them on all questions and in all matters which concerned 
 or seemed to concern all classes equally. The real dis- 
 tinction between classes, too, was then an infinitely 
 greater one than it now is. The aristocratic class was 
 the most educated class, had access to the best society ; 
 was, as a whole, by far the most polished and cultivated 
 class in the nation. For good and for evil, noblemen 
 
120 THE HISTORY OF THE UNEEFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 had a power then to which there is nothing comparable, 
 scarcely any thing analogous, now. Amusing illustrations 
 of this occur in the documents of the time. Thus Burke, 
 in a memorandum on East Indian affairs, addressed to the 
 noblemen and gentlemen who composed the Rockingham 
 party, proposes the following scheme : ' With regard to 
 the Bank [of England], which is the grand instrument of 
 the Court on this occasion, might it not be proper (if pos- 
 sible) that some of you of the greatest property should 
 resolve to have nothing to do with their paper ? There are 
 five or six of you that would frighten them.' If the terri- 
 torial influence of the aristocracy was supposed to be so 
 powerful in Threadneedle Street, we may easily suppose 
 what it must have been in their own counties, at their 
 own doors. The county contests of the last century had 
 a continued tendency to become family conflicts between 
 one noble house and another. The political questions of 
 the day were merged in the intensity of the aristocratic, 
 and perhaps hereditary feud. 
 
 Such was the representation of England ; and it seems 
 restricted enough ; but that of Scotland was even more 
 restricted still, and more subject to illegitimate influence. 
 Even the stoutest defenders of the old system of repre- 
 sentation before 1832 used to own that the Scotch system 
 could only be defended as 'part of a whole,' and that 
 taken by itself it was absurd. There were in theory in 
 Scotland thirty county members and fifteen borough 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 121 
 
 members; but the franchise had in both of them been 
 narrowed to an almost inconceivable extent. In 1812 
 the whole county constituency only amounted to 1235, 
 and the whole borough constituency to 1253. The 
 franchise in the counties was restricted to the tenants- 
 in-chief of the crown ; all proprietors (the feudal law in 
 theory still prevailed) who held from a subject were 
 disfranchised, though a very large portion of the county 
 was owned by them. The result was much about the 
 same as if in England the county member had been 
 chosen, not by the 40s. freeholders, but the lords of the 
 manor. The franchise was practically as confined in 
 Scotland as that restriction would have made it here. 
 The borough franchise, too, was possessed by the mem- 
 bers of the town councils of the various boroughs ex- 
 clusively; no other persons had a share in it. The 
 burghs were, as now, divided into districts ; in each 
 district the town council of each burgh contained in it 
 named a delegate, and by the majority of these delegates 
 the member for the district was chosen. Edinburgh 
 alone had the honour of a separate representation ; and 
 its constituency amounted in number to thirty-three. 
 
 What degree of independence such small constituencies 
 may have possessed in England or in Scotland, we cannot 
 now accurately know. Even to those who knew the 
 places best, it must have been sometimes difficult to 
 determine it with accuracy. Influence is in its very 
 
122 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 nature somewhat secret j we cannot tell whence it pre- 
 cisely comes, by what exact channels it acts, or in what 
 direction it is tending. Any estimate which can be formed 
 of the degree in which the constituencies of the last 
 century, such as we have described them, were either 
 dependent or independent, must be very vague. The 
 public at large knew very little on the subject ; and no 
 one took the trouble to note down in detail and with 
 precision, that which they did know. A general notion 
 of the practical results may, however, be easily formed. 
 In the year 1773, Dean Tucker observed in a letter to 
 Lord Shelburne : 
 
 ' Your lordship lias the command of two boroughs already ; and 
 the public shrewdly suspect that you would have no qualms of con- 
 science against commanding two more, or even twenty-two. Mr. Pox 
 and Lord Holland's family command one ; the late Marquis of Rock- 
 ingham had at least two, which he might, and did, call his own ; and 
 were I to proceed after the same manner throughout the peerage and 
 the great landed interest, also the commercial and the manufacturing 
 interest of the realm, perhaps I might enumerate not less than two 
 hundred, namely boroughs and cities, and even counties, whose voters 
 choose representatives and return members to parliament more accord- 
 ing to the good-will and pleasure of those who have the ascendency 
 over them than according to their own private judgments or personal 
 determinations.' 
 
 As there were at that time no Irish members, the 
 number of members of parliament was 558; and as 
 almost all constituencies had then two members each, 
 this estimate would give about 400 to the class of 
 nominated and dependent members, and about 158 to 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 123 
 
 that of the independent. This calculation, rough as it 
 evidently is, and imperfect as the data for making it 
 evidently were, corresponds sufficiently well with a very 
 elaborate calculation made forty years later : 
 
 Members returned by 87 peers in England and Wales . . 218 
 
 „ „ 21 „ Scotland 31 
 
 „ „ 36 „ Ireland 51 
 
 Total returned by peers 300 
 
 Members returned by 90 commoners in England and Wales 137 
 
 „ 14 „ Scotland .... 14 
 
 » „ 19 „ Ireland .... 20 
 
 „ nominated by government 16 
 
 Total returned by commoners and government . 187 
 
 Total returned by nomination 487 
 
 Independent of nomination 171 
 
 Total of the House of Commons 658 x 
 
 Whatever doubts might be suggested — and doubtless 
 some might be suggested — as to the details of this 
 estimate, its main conclusion may be considered to 
 be certain. A large preponderant majority of the 
 members of the House of Commons were, in one way 
 or in another, nominated by noblemen and gentlemen ; 
 and only a minority were elected by the popular con- 
 stituencies. The majority of the House of Commons 
 
 1 The above estimate is taken from Dr. Oldfleld's Representative 
 History, a work in many respects entitled to respect, but by no means 
 impartial. The representation of Ireland, though not free from great 
 defects, had been exceedingly improved at the time of the union with 
 England. 
 
124 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 represented the views and feelings of a particular and 
 peculiar class ; the minority only were elected by con- 
 stituencies which could be supposed to choose repre- 
 sentatives for all the other classes. 
 
 Such was in bare outline the old electoral system of 
 England ; and we may describe it by a startling phrase : 
 it was a representation, so to say, of select constituencies. 
 This is not the light in which we have been used to 
 regard it. We speak by tradition of borough-mongers 
 with dislike, and of rotten boroughs with contempt. 
 From circumstances which we shall soon see, neither have 
 left a good name in history. Most of us are the children 
 of those who destroyed them ; the leaders of our great 
 parties are still those who were foremost in doing so. 
 We naturally do not think well of them. But what 
 were they ? They were proprietary constituencies ; they 
 were, in truth, higher class constituencies ; they gave a 
 representation to persons of greater wealth, of greater 
 education, and presumably, therefore, of greater political 
 capacity, than the mass of the nation. We have, ap- 
 parently at least, the best means of judging of their 
 effects. Being, as we have seen, the preponderant ele- 
 ment in the electoral system, the members chosen by 
 them were the preponderant element in the House of 
 Commons. They were the ruling power in the State. 
 How, then, did this system, so singularly and irregularly 
 composed, in fact work ? We have the general results 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNEEFORMED PARLIAMENT. 125 
 
 in history. The only difficulty, and it is not a slight one, 
 is to understand them rightly and explain them briefly. 
 
 In the first great quality of a representative govern- 
 ment, we may say boldly that, up to a late period of its 
 existence, and with an exception or two which we shall 
 specify, this system worked very well. The first requisite 
 of a representative system is, that the representative 
 body should represent the real public opinion of the 
 nation. Nor is this so easy a matter as some imagine. 
 There are nations which have no public opinion. The 
 having it requires what a pedantic writer might call the 
 coordination of judgments. Some people must be recog- 
 nized to be wiser than others are. In every district there 
 must be people generally admitted by the judgment of 
 their neighbours to have more sense, more instructed 
 minds, more cultured judgments, than others have. Such 
 persons will not naturally or inevitably, or in matter of 
 fact, agree in opinion ; on the contrary, they will habitu- 
 ally differ: great national questions will divide the 
 nation ; great parties will be formed. But the cha- 
 racteristic of a nation capable of public opinion is, that 
 those parties will be organized ; in each there will be a 
 leader, in each there will be some looked up to, and many 
 who look up to them : the opinion of the party will be 
 formed and suggested by the few, it will be criticised 
 and accepted by the many. It has always been the 
 peculiarity of the history of England, that it has been 
 
126 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 capable of a true public opinion in this its exact and 
 proper sense. There has ever been a structure in English 
 political society : every man has not walked by the light 
 of his own eyes ; the less instructed have not deemed 
 themselves the equals of the more instructed ; the many 
 have subordinated their judgment to that of the few. 
 They have not done so blindly, for there has always 
 been a spirit of discussion in our very air : still they have 
 done so — opinions have always settled down from the 
 higher classes to the lower; and in that manner, when- 
 ever the nation has been called on to decide, a decision 
 that is really national has been formed. 
 
 On the whole, the English constitution of the last 
 century, in its best time, and before the occurrence 
 of changes which we shall soon describe, gave an excellent 
 expression to the public opinion of England. It gave a 
 ruling discretion to those whom the nation at large most 
 trusted ; it provided a simple machinery for ascertaining 
 with accuracy the decisions at which the few had arrived, 
 and in which the mass concurred. 
 
 This constitution was submitted to no ordinary test. 
 We have so long outlived the contests of the last century, 
 that we have forgotten their intensity. We look on it as 
 a very quiet time ; and we contrast it with the apprehen- 
 sive, and changeful, and anxious period in which it seems 
 to us that we are living. Of the middle of the eighteenth 
 century this is a true idea, at least of part of it ; but the 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 127 
 
 English Government during the early part of the century 
 was tried by what is probably the severest of all trials to the 
 foundations of an hereditary and constitutional govern- 
 ment — by a struggle between two claimants to the throne, 
 each of whom represented a principle. We know well 
 the arguments of the side which has gained ; but we do 
 not always remember the moral strength of the side which 
 lost. The Jacobites had much in their creed which ap- 
 pealed to the predominating principles of the English 
 nature : — an hereditary family, which claimed the Crown, 
 not on arguable considerations of policy, but on ascertain- 
 able claims of descent which embodied, not a speculation, 
 but a fact ; which had prescription in its favour, and was 
 in harmony with a country almost all whose other insti- 
 tutions were prescriptive ; which had on its side the 
 associations with the maintenance of order and the security 
 of property, as claimants by prescription must have ; 
 which appealed to the Conservative instinct, which is 
 always so strong in a people over whom the visible world 
 rules so much; which appealed to the loyal instincts, 
 which have a great influence over a people in whom a 
 strong but impressed imagination profoundly works ; — 
 such a family must have had a singular hold on the 
 popular attachments of England. History proves that 
 they had that hold ; and that they only lost England by 
 an incapacity for action, and an inherent perversity of 
 judgment, that seem to have been hereditary in the race, 
 
128 THE HISTOEY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 In the last act of the drama, during the first few years of 
 the House of Hanover, the Stuart dynasty had still great 
 influence in the country. They were not, indeed, in pos- 
 session ; and as the strength of their adherents was among 
 the most Conservative classes, they could not regain 
 possession ; but if we could fancy them, by an}*- freak of 
 fortune, to have been reinstated, there would have been 
 incredible difficulty in expelling them once more. Pos- 
 sibly it could not have been done, certainly it could not 
 have been done if the fanatical hatred of the majority of 
 Englishmen to Popery had not cooperated with the attach- 
 ment to freedom — if a sentiment which actuated the 
 masses had not been on the same side with the convictions 
 which influenced the few. If the hereditary heir to the 
 Crown had been once seated on the throne, and had 
 consented to be converted, or to seem to be converted 
 to Protestantism, the chances of the Hanoverian family 
 would have been small and feeble. 
 
 Just before the demise of Queen Anne, the prospects 
 of the Jacobite party had much to captivate sanguine and 
 shortsighted men. The female favourite of the Queen — 
 the reigning favourite we may call her — was indisputably 
 on their side : the Queen, who had the strongest motives 
 to be decidedly opposed to them, was not so ; her sup- 
 pressed inclination — perhaps her latent conscience — was 
 in their favour : the first ministers of the Crown, if they 
 had no 'settled intention,' to use Bolingbroke's distinction, 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 129 
 
 had floating notions and vague ' views ' on the same side. 
 In the nation at large, the inferior gentry — those of whom 
 the Tory foxhunter of Addison is an admirable memorial 
 — were half Jacobite ; the real clergy (the Whig historian 
 calls them ' a curse rather than a blessing to those over 
 whom they were set ' *) were more than half Jacobite ; 
 the lower class of the people — the No-Popery antipathy 
 apart — would perhaps have inclined more to the house of 
 Stuart than to the house of Hanover. Legitimacy is a 
 popular title, loyalty touches the heart ; the rule of a single 
 monarch is an intelligible thing; the least educated can 
 and do understand it ; but the rule of Parliament, and the 
 idea of a constitution, are difficult to imagine ; the lower 
 orders of people hardly ever understand them or compre- 
 hend them. The only classes over whom the attachment 
 to the Act of Settlement and to the constitution, such as 
 it then existed, was really strong, were two : the higher 
 gentry, including the nobility in that word; and the 
 mercantile and trading classes — the ' fundholders,' as the 
 Tory squires of that age called them, and fancied that 
 they were. 
 
 It is evident that a very peculiar parliamentary con- 
 stitution was required to give an expression to the real 
 will of the nation, when the classes composing it were so 
 divided, and when the very principle and nature of the 
 government of the country was in dispute. What, indeed, 
 
 1 Hallum. 
 
 K 
 
130 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 it may be said, was the will of the country ? The classes 
 which have been specified did not agree in opinion, nor 
 would one of them avowedly and explicitly agree to yield 
 to the opinion of the class opposed to it. The squire 
 would never have admitted that the fundholder was wiser 
 than himself, nor would the fundholder have paid the 
 least deference to the notions of the squire. The faet of 
 the one having an opinion, would rather have tended to 
 prevent the other from adopting it. How, then, was a 
 national decision — a truly national decision — possible ? 
 It was possible in this way. The dissentient classes, as 
 we may call those over whom Jacobitism and the extreme 
 Toryism had the greatest influence — the rural gentry and 
 the rural clergy — both yielded deference and homage, 
 and to a certain extent confidence, to the higher gentry 
 and the nobility, under whom, it may be said, they lived, 
 near whose estates they were born, and who were the 
 unquestioned heads of all the society to which they be- 
 longed. On political topics this was especially the case. 
 Rugged prejudice of course existed, and ' my lord ' was 
 not always liked ; still it could not but be felt that he 
 knew more of the world, had access to better information, 
 had enjoyed more of what were then the rare opportuni- 
 ties of travelling and education, than the lower gentry 
 had. He possessed all the means of judging which they 
 had, and others too. A certain deference was paid then 
 to rank which is not paid to it now, because the inherent 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 131 
 
 difference between the highest orders and others in man- 
 ners and in mind was much greater than any that exist 
 at present. A national decision was then possible, and 
 was then attained, because the classes who were the most 
 likely to dissent, and who in reality did dissent, from 
 what the rest of the nation wished, were precisely the 
 classes most under the control of, and most likely to sub- 
 mit to, the moral influence of those who were above them. 
 Such being the state of the nation in the earlier part 
 of the last century, there was an evident difficulty in 
 giving a just expression to it. Scarcely any of the 
 ordinary modes of government which theorists have sug- 
 gested, or which continental nations have tried, would 
 have succeeded in giving it. The most intelligent classes, 
 those who were disposed to support the House of Hanover 
 and the principles of liberty, were, as we have explained, 
 the trading classes and the higher gentry. The class most 
 confided in by the nation was the higher gentry and the 
 nobility. Fortunately, the most trusted class was a por- 
 tion of the most intelligent class : the chosen leaders of 
 the country were a part at least of those whom it was 
 best for it to choose for its leaders ; the actual guides 
 were some of the best guides who could be found. But 
 what constitutional arrangements would be adapted to 
 give them by law that guidance ? In what manner could 
 the indefinite and vague deference of the people be shaped 
 and fashioned into a polity ? 
 
132 THE HISTORY OE THE TTNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 Any system of democratic suffrage, we may at once 
 say, would have been unfitted for that end. The classes 
 into whose hands it would have thrown the power were 
 the lower classes, who could not be expected to have 
 any intelligent appreciation of freedom, and in fact had 
 none. Anything like universal suffrage would have 
 been an enormous addition to the influence of the rural 
 clergy and the smaller squires. These two classes, being 
 resident in the country, being known to the lowest 
 classes, distributing all the casual advantages which they 
 had any chance of receiving, adjudging all the petty 
 penalties of the local law which they had any risk of 
 incurring, must have had preponderating influence over 
 the rural population. They would have brought down 
 from scattered villages and petty hamlets regiments of 
 voters for the Stuart dynasty, who knew nothing of the 
 real merits of the controversy to be decided, who were 
 utterly ignorant of the very meaning of constitutional 
 government, who could have given no account of the 
 very nature and structure of Parliament, but who knew 
 that the only educated persons they ever met, the only 
 influential persons they ever saw — the parson of their 
 own village, and the squire of it — had told them to do 
 that which they were doing. We should have then seen 
 in England that which we now see in France. The un- 
 educated majority would have pronounced their decision ; 
 the country would have been forced to recognize it ; the 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNEEFOBMED PAELIAMENT. 133 
 
 law would have been compelled to enforce it. Instead of 
 living under the constitution which we now have, we 
 might, and probably should, have been living under a 
 Jacobite despotism, sanctioned by the preponderant, we 
 might say almost by the unanimous, vote of the rural 
 population. 
 
 It may be objected, however, that the deference which 
 we have admitted that the rural clergy and the lesser 
 squires bore to the higher gentry would have prevented 
 this result. It may be said that, although they would 
 have by law possessed the power of influencing in the 
 last resort the national destiny and deciding on the 
 national constitution, they would not in practice have 
 done so ; that they would have given up their own judg- 
 ments, and would have been guided by the opinions of 
 the classes whom they knew, and whom they admitted, 
 to be their superiors. But experience shows that this is 
 an error, and that those who entertain it have a mistaken 
 view of a very important part of human nature. If you 
 give people uncontrolled power, real, bond fide, tangible, 
 felt power, they will exercise it according to their own 
 notions. Of course this is only true of classes which have 
 notions. An. ignorant peasantry, for example, have none ; 
 if you give them nominal political power, you do not 
 give them anything they can understand, or appreciate 
 or use. It is not real power to them ; it has none of the 
 effectiveness of power in their hands : it is an instrument 
 
134 THE HISTORY OF THE UNEEFOEMED PAELIAMENT. 
 
 they cannot employ to obtain any preconceived result; 
 they are bewildered about its nature ; they do not know 
 what they are doing when they are exerting it ; it is not 
 anything they can prize, and use, and enjoy. But a class 
 of gentry or clergy — a moderately educated class of any 
 sort— is not in this position. It has views, opinions, wishes 
 of its own : those views may be narrow, those opinions 
 erroneous, those wishes foolish; but they have them. 
 They are attached to them. If power is put into their 
 hands, they will try to carry them out in action. Under 
 a constitution which did not give them predominant 
 power, the Tory squire and the Tory clergy were ready 
 to give up their vague opinions and their floating predi- 
 lections ; but if they had been invested with a constitu- 
 tional authority and a legislative omnipotence, they would 
 never have given those opinions and predilections up, or 
 imagined that they could give them up ; they would have 
 stiffened them into a compact creed, and tried to realize 
 them under the despotism of the Stuarts. 
 
 It is therefore certain that no system of universal 
 suffrage, or of very diffused and popular suffrage, would 
 have secured the maintenance of the House of Hanover 
 and the security of English liberty. The lower classes 
 would themselves probably have been on the other side ; 
 and whether that be so or not, the persons who had the 
 greatest, the surest, and the most diffused influence over 
 them were indisputably on the other side for the most 
 part. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 135 
 
 It is certain, too, that no system of uniform but not 
 universal suffrage which would have been endured by the 
 country would have given at that time a real expression 
 to the will of the country. As we have explained, the 
 real opinion of the country was in accordance with the 
 opinion of the wealthier trading and mercantile classes. 
 They were zealous for the House of Hanover ; the nation, 
 though not zealous for it, was favourable to it. By 
 establishing a high and uniform qualification for votes in 
 large boroughs, and by giving a very considerable number 
 of members to those large boroughs, it would have been 
 possible, though it would have been difficult, to secure a 
 Parliament with an opinion substantially in accordance 
 with the decision of the nation. It would have been 
 difficult, for the great towns were then few and scattered ; 
 the north of England, which now teems with them, was 
 then a poor district, not only in comparison with what it 
 now is, but also with many parts of the south as it was 
 at that time. Still, by such a system as we have sug- 
 gested, it would have been possible to throw the leading 
 authority of the nation into the hands of the large towns, 
 and into the hands of the richer persons in those towns. 
 In practice, however, no such constitution would have 
 been endured. The Tory gentleman would not have 
 endured to be put under the yoke of the ' fundholder ' or 
 the manufacturer. The clergy would never have endured 
 a subjection to the class among whom Dissent had the 
 
136 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 greatest hold, and possibly a preponderating influence. 
 To have attempted to have placed the country under the 
 rule of the commercial classes in towns and cities, would 
 have been a greater revolution than the change of the 
 dynasty itself; it would have shocked the prejudices of 
 the nation at large; it never suggested itself even to 
 those very classes themselves. 
 
 Thus all ordinary systems of suffrage bring out one 
 or other of two results. They would either have thrown 
 preponderating and conclusive power into the hands of 
 the lesser gentry and the clergy, or they would have 
 thrown an equal and similar power into the hands of the 
 manufacturers and merchants. The first result would 
 have been easy : England was then a predominantly 
 agricultural country, and it would have been very easy 
 to frame a system of suffrage which would give the ordi- 
 nary squire and the ordinary clergyman — the ruling 
 classes in agricultural society then as now — a large pre- 
 dominance. Any system which gave what would seem 
 in theory its due weight to the counties would have had 
 that effect. A system might have been suggested which 
 would have given enormous power to the large towns. 
 But both these systems would have been inadequate to 
 the end desired. That which gave preponderance to 
 the ordinary landholder would have represented rather 
 the tradition of Toryism than the present decision of the 
 living nation ; that which gave a preponderance to manu- 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 137 
 
 facturers and traders would have been offensive to almost 
 all the country; it would have been unendurable by 
 many classes of it ; it would not have been, in fact, a 
 government, for it could not have governed a country in 
 which it had no root, and to whose keenest prejudices it 
 was adverse. 
 
 The system which was in fact adopted obviated these 
 defects. Its peculiar nature threw preponderant power 
 into the hands of the higher gentry and the nobility. 
 The smaller boroughs had fallen by a kind of necessity 
 of nature into their hands ; their influence in the counties 
 was preponderant,' if not overwhelming. As we have 
 explained, this class was the one most trusted by the 
 nation, which was universally believed to have the great- 
 est political intelligence, whose opinions in matter of fact 
 were coincident with those of all the most intelligent 
 classes. Under any other system of representation, it 
 would not have been possible to give to this class prepon- 
 derant power. It is not in the nature of any extended 
 system of suffrage to give to a small upper class any very 
 considerable amount of power. Their numbers are few, 
 and their votes are immeasurably outnumbered by the 
 votes of their inferiors. It is not possible to establish in 
 any country a system of uniform suffrage so narrow and 
 so high as to give to this small upper class a preponderant 
 authority in the country. It seems ridiculous in a popu- 
 lar government to give votes to a very few persons only ; 
 
138 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 and as soon as any uniform system of suffrage is extended 
 beyond those few, it gives decisive predominance to the 
 many, and on that very account withdraws it from the 
 less numerous but more educated orders. 
 
 In this way, therefore, we think it certain that in the 
 earlier part of the last century the old system of repre- 
 sentation, by throwing into the hands of a peculiar and 
 influential class the predominant authority in the state, 
 was more beneficial to the nation than a more diffused 
 and popular system would have been. The materials for 
 the creation of constituencies both numerous and intelli- 
 gent, both well educated and influential, did not exist. 
 The practical choice was between an uninstructed number 
 and a select few : our constitution gave the preponderance 
 to the latter ; and in the great struggle between the House 
 of Stuart and the House of Hanover — between the prin- 
 ciple of legitimacy and the principle of freedom — the 
 consequences were beneficial and were decisive. It not 
 only secured the authority of a free government, but the 
 ease with which it did so has disguised from us the diffi- 
 culties with which it contended. The victory was so 
 complete, that the recollection of the conflict is confused. 
 
 With that struggle, however, the singular usefulness 
 of the old system of representation certainly ended. We 
 do not think that, in the remaining part of the history of 
 the eighteenth century, it gave at all a better expression 
 to the national opinion than any other system would have 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE TJNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 139 
 
 done. Various writers have made charges against the 
 English government on account of the wars which 
 marked the period; but we think unjustly. On the 
 whole, no nation of equal strength, of equal courage 
 and of equal pride, has ever in the history of the world 
 pursued a course so tranquil. We were entangled in a 
 Spanish war ; we were induced by our Hanoverian con- 
 nections to intermeddle unnecessarily in Germany; we 
 were at war occasionally, as in every century we have 
 from time to time been, with France : but none of these 
 wars were wars of ambition. We wished when at war 
 for national glory : we were not sorry to go to war 
 because we thought we might gain glory in it ; but we 
 never went to war with a distinct desire for territorial 
 aggrandisement. We have never had in our national 
 character any principle of aggression. We have no such 
 settled inciting motive. On the contrary, we wish that 
 every one shall have his own — shall retain whatever he 
 has already by right or by prescription ; though we are 
 jealous — jealous even to slaying — of any one who by hint, 
 allusion, or suggestion, throws a doubt upon our own title 
 to anything which we already have. We are by nature 
 unwilling to relinquish, though we are not desirous to 
 acquire. 
 
 The actual government of the last century carried out 
 these principles fairly and well ; but it is probable that 
 any other government which the English people would 
 
140 THE HISTORY OF THE UNEEFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 have borne would have done so equally. A more demo- 
 cratic government would perhaps have been more war- 
 like ; but an English democracy will probably never be 
 very warlike ; it will never engage in a continued series 
 of intentional aggressions ; least of all would it have done 
 so in the last century, when there was no struggle in 
 Europe which could arouse the popular passions, and no 
 cause which could interest profoundly the popular imagi- 
 nation. The wars of Protestantism had passed away, 
 and the wars of Jacobinism had not yet begun. It is 
 possible that a more democratic government would, with 
 its inherent aggressive instincts, have interfered some- 
 what more in the petty wars of circumstance and occasion 
 which complicate the history of the last century, and 
 make it so tedious to us now. But we did interfere a 
 good deal in them as it was. For an aristocracy, ours 
 has never been a pacific aristocracy. It is in many ways 
 their boast, their pride, and their merit, that they have 
 less of the distinctive peculiarities of an aristocracy than 
 any other which has ever existed ; they claim justly to 
 have a more popular interest, and a more vigorous sym- 
 pathy. The blame that attaches to them is similar : they 
 have shown the same qualities in the defects of their 
 government; they have had but little of the refining, 
 calculating, diplomatic habit which usually characterizes 
 the policy of an hereditary class that has much to lose 
 in war, and much to enjoy in peace. The English aris- 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNEEFOEMED PARLIAMENT. 141 
 
 tocracy is the most warlike of great aristocracies, and the 
 English nation is the least warlike of free nations. Few 
 of the many threads of union which so richly pervade 
 our social system have been more influential than this 
 one. We have had much of martial manliness where we 
 should have expected but little ; we have had much of 
 apathetic indifference where we might have looked for 
 an aggressive passion. The warmth above has been 
 greater, and that below less, than a theorist would have 
 expected ; and therefore our social fabric has been more 
 equable in temperature than we should have ventured to 
 predict. 
 
 In the quiet times, therefore, of the middle part of , 
 the eighteenth century there is no particular reason for 
 believing that our old system gave a much better or aj 
 much worse representation to the national voice than/ 
 any other system might have been expected to give. In 
 the more troubled times of the American war and the 
 French war, there is even less reason to think that any 
 other system would have varied much the course of our 
 policy. We should have tried to conquer America under 
 any government ; and we should have tried to resist the 
 aggressive proselytism of France under any government. 
 We may form our own opinions now of the expediency, 
 the justice, or the possibility of these attempts ; we may 
 think that the American war showed national narrow- 
 mindedness, and the French war showed national irrita- 
 
142 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 bility; but the indubitable fact remains, that both the 
 one and the other were popular in their day, and that 
 both were thoroughly acceptable to the community at 
 large as well as to the aristocracy. 
 
 There is, however, great and conclusive reason to 
 believe that, during the later period of its existence, the 
 old system of representation had an inherent defect pecu- 
 liar to itself, which, if it did not disqualify it altogether 
 for giving a correct embodiment to national opinion, made 
 it much less likely than most other systems of represen- 
 tation to do so perfectly. The social condition of England 
 had undergone a series of very extensive changes between 
 the time of the accession of the House of Hanover and 
 the year 1832. A new world — a world of industry and 
 manufacture — had been created ; new interests had 
 arisen ; new modes of thought had been awakened ; new 
 habits of mind had been engendered. The mercantile 
 and manufacturing classes, which had risen to influence, 
 were naturally unrecognized by the ancient constitution ; 
 they lived under its protection, but they were unknown 
 to its letter ; they had thoughts which it did not take 
 account of, and ideas with which it was inconsistent. 
 The structure of English society was still half feudal, and 
 its new elements were utterly unfeudal. It was im- 
 possible to subject Lancashire, such as it became, to the 
 dominion of any aristocracy, however ancient and long- 
 descended it might be. Such rulers were not fitted for 
 
THE HISTOKY OF THE TJNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 143 
 
 such subjects, nor were such subjects fitted for such 
 rulers. Between the two classes there was a contrast 
 which made the higher unintelligible to the lower, and 
 the lower disagreeable to the higher. Education, more- 
 over, was diffusing itself. The political intelligence of 
 the aristocratic classes was no longer so superior to that 
 of other classes as it had formerly been. The necessary 
 means of information were more widely accessible than 
 they had been, and were very extensively used. The 
 contrast between the constitution of England and 
 England itself in consequence became day by day greater 
 and greater, and at last became unendurable. We have 
 not space to go into detail on this part of the subject, 
 and it is not necessary to go into detail about it. If it 
 had not been for the terror excited throughout Europe 
 by the French revolution, the old system of parliamentary 
 representation could hardly by possibility have lasted as 
 long as it did. In the end it passed away ; and the 
 recollection of the evils of its latter time has obscured 
 the remembrance of its former usefulness. As we have 
 shown, it long gave us a Parliament coincident in 
 judgment with the nation ; it maintained upon the throne 
 the dynasty under which we live, and secured the 
 foundations of English liberty. It long worked well, 
 and if at last it worked ill, the excuses for its doing so 
 were many. It had survived all that was akin to it, 
 and was in contact with everything which was most 
 
144 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 discordant to it. A constitution which was adapted to 
 the England of 1700 must necessarily have been un- 
 adapted to the England of 1832. Changes so momentous 
 as there had been between those years in our society 
 required and enforced an equivalent alteration in our 
 polity 
 
 Such is the general result of this long examination of 
 our old system of representation in the main quality of a 
 representative system — that by which above all others 
 it must stand or fall — its coincidence with the real 
 national opinion. We see that this is a mixed and a 
 complicated, but not on the whole an unsatisfactory one. 
 We will now shortly examine our old system in three 
 other respects. Did it give a means of expression to the 
 views of all classes ? Did it secure to us really strong 
 administrations ? Did it train for us efficient statesmen ? 
 If we can in any way answer these questions, it will, we 
 think, be admitted that we have discussed the most 
 important part of the subject, and examined our former 
 system of representation by the tests that are most 
 stringent and satisfactory. 
 
 In the second requisite of the representative system, 
 that which existed in England in the last century must 
 be considered to have been successful. It gave a means 
 of expression to all classes whose minds required an 
 expression. The mercantile and trading class had not, 
 as we have just explained, their due weight in the 
 
THE HISTORY OP THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 145 
 
 system of government ; they did not regulate all that 
 they should have regulated, or control all that they 
 should have controlled ; but they had always the means 
 of expressing their sentiments. They had not, especially 
 in the later times, a representation proportioned to their 
 intelligence and their influence ; but they always had 
 some representation. The gentry were not only repre- 
 sented, but over-represented. Especially during the 
 closing years of the eighteenth century and the first few 
 years of the nineteenth, their influence was unreasonably 
 great, and their despotism absolute. They ruled the 
 country without check and without resistance; they 
 were subject only to a weak and modified remonstrance; 
 they had bat to listen in the House of Commons to the 
 speeches of those whom they could immeasurably outvote ; 
 they had but to quell out of doors the unrecognized 
 murmurs of an unorganized multitude, which had long 
 obeyed them, which was still ready to obey them, which 
 did not know its own power. 
 
 With respect to the lowest class of all, the working of 
 our own system of representation is peculiarly instructive. 
 That system, by its letter, attempted to throw a good 
 deal of power into their hands. In a great number of 
 boroughs the suffrage, as we have seen, was practically 
 all but universal; all inhabitant householders not re- 
 ceiving alms very frequently had votes. What is now so 
 much desired, the representation of the working-classes 
 
 L 
 
146 THE HISTORY OF THE TJNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 then really existed. In Stafford, in Coventry, and in 
 other places, the lowest classes were preponderant. 
 Those classes had then the means of making their voice 
 heard, and their sentiments known in Parliament. They 
 had some influence in the State, though they did not rule 
 the State. In theory our constitution was at that time 
 in this point perfect. As we read the description of it, 
 we believe that nothing could be better. In practice it 
 was a failure. The trial of the experiment demonstrated 
 that it is useless to provide means for expressing the 
 political thoughts of classes who have no such thoughts. 
 The freemen of Stafford and Coventry did not send to 
 Parliament members who really and truly expressed the 
 opinions and sentiments of the working-classes, because 
 the working-classes had no opinion on matters of legisla- 
 tion and administration, and had only vague ideas of 
 what was passing in their time. For the most part, they 
 used the power which was given to them, not as an 
 opportunity of influence, but as a source of income. 
 They did not think of it as something by which they 
 could control the rich, but as something which they 
 could sell to the rich. Sheridan has left an amusing 
 document as to the constituency of Stafford. They 
 probably did not expect that so unbusinesslike a person 
 should have preserved so businesslike a document ; but 
 it is as follows : — 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE TJNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 147 
 
 It. B. Sheridan, Esq. Expenses at the Borough of Stafford for 
 Election anno 1784. 
 
 248 Burgesses, paid £5 5 each .... £1302 
 
 Yearly Expenses since. 
 
 £ s. d. 
 House-rent and taxes . . 23 6 6 
 Servant at 6s. per weekl -ic io 
 
 board wages . . . . j 
 Ditto, yearly wages ... 880 
 Coals, etc 10 
 
 57 6 6 
 
 Ale-tickets 40 
 
 Half the member's plate . . 25 
 Swearing young burgesses . 10 
 Subscription to the Infirmary 5 5 
 Ditto clergymen's widows .220 
 Ringers 4 4 
 
 86 11 
 
 One year 143 17 6 
 
 Multiplied by years . . 6 
 
 863 5 
 
 Total expense of six years' parliament, exclusive 
 
 of expense incurred during the time of election • — — 
 
 and your own annual expenses .... £2165 5 
 
 Corruption of this kind, and perhaps sometimes 
 greater in degree, prevailed in almost every town in 
 which the suffrage was very extended. As the wealth 
 of the country grew, the price of votes became greater. 
 If the old system of representation had endured till now, 
 we can scarcely estimate how great it would by this 
 time have become. Experience proved what our theories 
 
148 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 suggest, that the enfranchisement of the corruptible is in 
 truth the establishment of corruption. 
 
 In one respect, however, the representation of the 
 working classes which we formerly had in this country- 
 may be considered to have been successful. The towns 
 in which the suffrage was practically universal at times 
 sent to the House of Commons, not spokesmen of their 
 own grievances, but spokesmen of grievances in general. 
 Sir Francis Burdett is but the type, and the best-known 
 instance, of a whole class of members who, in former 
 times, were always ready to state any one's complaints, 
 without much inquiry whether they were true ; to bring 
 forward a case, without much asking whether it were 
 very well founded ; to make a general declamation about 
 the sufferings of the country which was a kind of caveat 
 against abuses in general, and might be construed as a 
 protest against any particular one which chanced to 
 occur. Such undis criminating and vague invectives had 
 their use. They prevented gross instances of admini- 
 strative harshness — -at least they tended to prevent them. 
 They prevented the air of politics from becoming stag- 
 nant; they broke the monotony of class domination. 
 But it may be questioned whether, on the whole, their 
 influence was beneficial. These reckless orators had but 
 little moral weight ; they were too ready with their 
 statements to get them trusted, they were too undis- 
 criminating in their objections for those objections to 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE TTNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 149 
 
 have influence. A weak Opposition is commonly said to 
 be more advantageous to a government than no Opposition 
 at all ; it gives an impression to the public that all 
 which can be said against the plans of the Cabinet has 
 been said ; it gives an impression that what is unchecked 
 is checked, that what is uncontrolled is controlled. It 
 diminishes the practical responsibility of an administra- 
 tion, by diminishing the popular conception of its power. 
 In the same way, the vague demagogues who occasionally 
 appeared in the old House of Commons did not weaken 
 the substantial power of the classes that ruled there. 
 They were ' his majesty's ' objectors. It was their 
 province to say that whatever was done was done wrong. 
 It was not therefore of much consequence what the 
 administration did. They were sure of its being opposed, 
 they were sure of its being carried ; and they had there- 
 fore the advantage of complete power without the odium 
 of enforcing silence. A despotism disguised in this 
 manner is perhaps more uncontrolled than any other 
 despotism : — such, however, was the mode in which the 
 attempt of our old system of representation to give 
 special members to the lowest classes really operated. 
 It failed in what may be considered its characteristic 
 function. The ideas of the lowest classes on politics 
 were still unheard in the legislature, because those classes 
 had no ideas. A confused popular feeling sometimes sent 
 popular orators to Parliament. But the kind of indis- 
 
150 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 criminate objection and monotonous invective which 
 those orators made use of without ceasing, seem to have 
 been rather an assistance than an obstruction to the 
 governing classes. The lesson of the whole history in- 
 dubitably is, that it is in vain to lower the level of 
 political representation beneath the level of political 
 capacity ; that below that level you may easily give 
 nominal power, but cannot possibly give real power; 
 that at best you give a vague voice to an unreasoning 
 instinct, that in general you only give the corruptible an 
 opportunity to become corrupt. 
 
 It jk often said, and commonly believed, that the old 
 system of representation secured, under almost all 
 circumstances, the existence and the continuance of what 
 is called a strong government : it is believed that under 
 that system the administration of the day had almost 
 always the power to carry any legislative measure which 
 it deemed beneficial, and to do any executive act which 
 it might think fit. History, however, when it is accu- 
 rately reviewed, affords little or no confirmation of this 
 idea. Many parts of the history of England during the 
 existence of our old constitution bear, on the very face of 
 them, the most conspicuous evidence that there was then 
 no security for the existence of a strong executive govern- 
 ment. Many administrations during the last century, so 
 far from being preeminently powerful, were not mode- 
 rately coherent. The earlier part of George the Third's 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 151 
 
 reign is simply the history of a series of feeble govern- 
 ments, which had little power to act as they intended, or 
 to legislate a3 they desired. The traditional notion of 
 this strength of governments in former times is founded 
 upm the enormous strength of the administrations which 
 sutcessively directed the long struggle with France and 
 Napoleon. The French revolution frightened the English 
 ration ; it haunted the people of that generation so much, 
 tiat they could not look anywhere but they imagined 
 tiat they saw the traces of it. Priestley interpreted the 
 pophecies by means of it ; Mitford wrote Grecian history 
 b; the aid of it. If its effect was so striking in the out- 
 oithe-way parts of literature, in politics its effect might 
 wll be expected to be extreme. It was extreme. The 
 Eglish people were terrified into unity. They ceased to 
 be divided into parliamentary sections, as their fathers 
 wee divided, or as their grandchildren are now divided. 
 Th process by which the unanimity of the nation created 
 a orresponding unanimity in the House of Commons 
 ws simple and was effectual. The noblemen and gen- 
 tleien who had the greatest influence in the counties, 
 an a certain number of whom were proprietors of 
 boughs — the class which, as we have seen, had a 
 de)otic control over the House of Commons as it then 
 w£ — felt the antipathy to French principles as much as 
 an other class ; perhaps they did not feel it more, though 
 sob persons have thought they did, than the rest of the 
 
152 THE HISTORY OF THE UNEEFOBMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 nation ; but they undoubtedly did not feel it less. The 
 Parliament was as united in its dislike to Jacobinism, aij/d 
 in its resistance to Napoleon, as the nation was ; and it 
 could not be more so. The large majorities, therefore, 
 of the administrations of Mr. Pitt and Lord Liverpool, 
 are not attributable to any peculiar excellence in me 
 parliamentary constitution of that period ; any tolerable 
 system of parliamentary representation would equall; 
 have produced them ; the country was too united f 
 even an approximate representation of it not to be so. 
 It is undoubtedly, however, believed by very m 
 persons that the old system of representation contain^ 
 a peculiar machinery for securing the strength of tie 
 executive. This theory, it has been well observed, con- 
 stituted the ' esoteric doctrine of the Tory party. Tie 
 celebrated question asked by the Duke of Wellingtm, 
 "How is the king's government to be carried on if lie 
 bill passes ?" which has since received a practical answr, 
 indicates without concealment the real view of Englsh 
 government entertained by him and his party. Tl y 
 held that if the majority of the House of Commas 
 consisted of persons not nominated by great boroi;h 
 proprietors, but freely chosen by genuine popular electi n, 
 the government could not be carried on. They belie' )d 
 it to be necessary that a government should repose ui >n 
 an immovable phalanx of members for close boroug 3 ; 
 and that the members returned for open seats should >e 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 153 
 
 a minority, who would confine themselves to criticising 
 the government in their speeches, without being able to 
 shake its stability by their votes.' * In this conception 
 there was, indeed, an obvious difficulty : it provided that 
 a large majority in Parliament should be always main- 
 tained by the close union of the members for the smaller 
 boroughs. But who was to keep those members them- 
 selves united ? They represented only the proprietors of 
 their respective seats, and who was to keep either them 
 or those proprietors always of one mind ? If the nation 
 at large was divided, why should not these persons 
 partake of the division ? The advocates of this theory 
 had a ready answer ; they said that the proprietors of 
 the boroughs, and the members for them, were to be kept 
 on the side of the government by means of the patronage 
 of the government ; they thought that places should be 
 offered to the borough owners and to the borough members 
 for their friends and for themselves; and that in this 
 way they might be kept united, and be always induced 
 to support the administration. This theory was not a 
 theory merely ; it was reduced to practice by several 
 prime ministers — by the Duke of Newcastle, by Sir 
 Kobert Walpole, and by others. Those who tried it had 
 undoubtedly a great advantage ; they had the materials 
 that were needful, they had the patronage. We have no 
 space to inquire how the establishments of the last 
 1 Edinburgh Review, Jan. 1859. 
 
154 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 century came to be so cumbrous ; but most cumbrous 
 they were. We are amazed nowadays at the names of 
 the old sinecures, at the number of half-useless places, at 
 what seems the childish lavishness of the public offices ; 
 but this profusion, though not perhaps created for a pur- 
 pose, was used for a purpose. Old feudal offices, which 
 had once served to mark the favour or the gratitude of 
 the Crown, were employed as a kind of purchase-money 
 to buy the adhesion of parliamentary proprietors : peer- 
 ages, too, were used to the same end ; all the avail- 
 able resources of the age, were, in truth, concentrated 
 upon it. In part this consistent exertion of very great 
 means of influence was effectual ; sometimes it really did 
 make a government strong ; and some writers, who have 
 not duly weighed the facts of history, have believed that 
 it always must do so : but there are in its very nature 
 three fundamental defects, which must always hinder its 
 working for a long period with constant efficiency. 
 
 In the first place, the theory of this machinery is that 
 the patronage of the Crown is to be used to purchase 
 votes. But who is to use the patronage ? The theory 
 assumes that it is to be used by the minister of the 
 day. According to it, the head of the party which is 
 predominant in Parliament is to employ the patronage of 
 the Crown for the purpose of confirming that predomi- 
 nance. But suppose that the Crown chooses to object to 
 this; suppose that the king for the time being should 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 155 
 
 say, ' This patronage, is mine ; the places in question are 
 places in my service ; the pensions in question are pen- 
 sions from me : I will myself have at least some share in 
 the influence that is acquired hy the conferring of those 
 pensions, and the distribution of those places.' George 
 III. actually did say this. He was a king in one respect 
 among a thousand : he was willing to do the work of a 
 Secretary of the Treasury ; his letters for very many 
 years are filled with the petty details of patronage ; he 
 directed who should have what, and stipulated who 
 should not have anything. This interference of the 
 king must evidently in theory, and did certainly in fact, 
 destroy the efficiency of the alleged expedient. Very 
 much of the patronage of the Crown went, not to the 
 adherents . of the prime minister, because they were his 
 adherents, but to the king's friends, because they were 
 his friends. Many writers have been very severe on 
 George III. for taking the course which he did take, and 
 have frequently repeated the well-known maxims which 
 show that what he did was a deviation from the consti- 
 tution. Very likely it was; but what is the use of a 
 constitution which takes no account of the ordinary 
 motives of human nature ? It was inevitable that an 
 ambitious king, who had industry enough to act as he 
 did, would so act. Let us consider his position. He was 
 invested with- authority which was apparently great. 
 He was surrounded by noblemen and gentlemen who 
 
156 THE HISTORY OF THE T7NREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 passed their life in paying him homage, and in professing 
 perhaps excessive doctrines of loyal obedience to him. 
 When the Duke of Devonshire, or the Duke of Bedford, 
 or the Duke of Newcastle approached the royal closet, 
 they implied by words and manners that the king had 
 immeasurably more power than they had. In fact, it was 
 expected that he should have immeasurably less. It was 
 expected that, though these noblemen daily acknowledged 
 that he was their superior, he should constantly act as if 
 he were their inferior. The prime minister was, in reality, 
 appointed by them, and it was expected that the king 
 should do what the prime minister told him ; that he 
 should assent to measures on which he was not con- 
 sulted ; that he should make peace when Mr. Grenville 
 said peace was right ; that he should make war whenever 
 Mr. Grenville said war was right; that he should allow 
 the offices of his household and the dignitaries of his 
 court to be used as a means for the support of cabinets 
 whose members he disliked, and whose policy he dis- 
 approved of. It is evident that no man who was not 
 imbecile would be content with such a position. It is 
 not difficult to bear to be without power, it is not very 
 difficult to bear to have only the mockery of power ; but 
 it is unbearable to have real power, and to be told that 
 you must content yourself with the mockery of it ; it is 
 unendurable to have in your hands an effectual instru- 
 ment of substantial influence, and also to act day by day 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 157 
 
 as a pageant, without any influence whatever. Human 
 nature has never endured this, and we may be quite sure 
 that it never will endure it. It is a fundamental error 
 in the ' esoteric theory ' of the Tory party, that it 
 assumed the king and the prime minister to be always of 
 the same mind, while they often were of different minds. 
 A still more remarkable defect in the so-called 
 strength procured under the old system of representation 
 by the use of patronage, was the instability of that 
 strength. It especially failed at the moment at which it 
 was especially wanted. A majority in Parliament which 
 is united by a sincere opinion, and is combined to carry 
 out that opinion, is in some sense secure. As long as 
 that opinion is unchanged, it will remain ; it can only be 
 destroyed by weakening the conviction which binds it 
 together. A majority which is obtained by the employ- 
 ment of patronage is very different ; it is combined 
 mainly by an expectation. Sir Robert Walpole, the 
 great master in the art of dispensing patronage, defined 
 gratitude as an anticipation of future favours ; he meant 
 that the majority which maintained his administration was 
 collected, not by recollection, but by hope ; they thought 
 •not so much of favours which were past as of favours 
 which were to come. At a critical moment this bond of 
 union was ordinarily weak. If the minister of the day 
 should fail, he would confer favours no longer; the 
 patronage that was coveted would pass into the gift of 
 
158 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 the minister who succeeded him. The expectation upon 
 which a minister's strength under the old system of re- 
 presentation was based, varied, therefore, with the proba- 
 bility that he would succeed. It was most potent when it 
 was certain that the minister would be victorious ; it was 
 weak and hesitating when it was dubious whether he 
 might not be beaten and retire. In other words, that 
 source of strength was prolific when it was not wanted ; 
 when it was wanted, it was scarcely perceptible. In a time 
 of doubt and difficulty every member of such a majority 
 inevitably distrusted his neighbour. If others deserted 
 the government, his support would be useless to the 
 minister, and pernicious to himself. A man who wanted 
 places would wish to support, not the administration 
 which was about to go out, but the administration which 
 was just coming in. A curious example of this tendency 
 is preserved in the memoirs of Lord Rockingham. ' I 
 will go through,' said the Duke of Newcastle, the 
 minister who was just going out — ' I will go through the 
 elections as well as I can, and endeavour to see what they 
 (the Court) really intend. I think it is too late for them 
 to do any mischief. They may be disagreeable, and 
 defeat some of our friends, and act directly contrary to 
 what they promised ; but they can't now alter the tone 
 and complexion of the new Parliament : that is all 
 settled, and so far my staying in to this time has been 
 of use.' On the above letter the second Lord Hardwicke 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE XJNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 159 
 
 has made the following remark : — ' Notwithstanding the 
 choice of the Parliament, which the Duke of Newcastle 
 piques himself upon, they forsook him for Lord Bute 
 when his standard was set up.' Lord Bute was of course 
 the minister who was about to come in, and who, after 
 a very brief interval, did come in. In like manner, 
 much of the strength of Sir Robert Walpole passed to 
 Mr. Pelham, and Mr. Addington succeeded to much of 
 Mr. Pitt's. In these cases, as soon as it became pretty 
 clear that the minister of the day would soon cease to be 
 such, almost all the parliamentary following, which was 
 procured by the expectation of receiving from him 
 places and pensions, very rapidly melted away. 
 
 It was, of course, still more certain that when the 
 minister of the day had really ceased to be minister, 
 and was not likely to return, no one thought much 
 about him. The power that was gained by the use 
 of patronage was not only unstable in the popular 
 sense of being weak and easily overthrown, but it 
 was unstable also in the peculiar sense in which the 
 mathematicians use that word, for when overthrown, it 
 was very difficult to set it up again. It had not any 
 intrinsic tendency to return of itself to the state of 
 equilibrium. The best example of this is to be found in 
 one of the features of the old system of representation 
 which is most frequently regarded as strengthening the 
 government. There were certain boroughs called Treasury 
 
160 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 boroughs, in which there were dockyards or other govern- 
 ment establishments, and in which the administration 
 for the time being had, as such, a predominant influence. 
 These boroughs ensured the minister who was in power 
 at each parliamentary election some sixteen votes. But 
 the singular insecurity of such a source of strength is 
 very clear. The existence of it was a premium upon 
 dissolutions. A new administration could certainly count 
 in a new Parliament on diminishing their adversaries' 
 strength by a considerable number of votes, and on aug- 
 menting their own strength by the same number of votes 
 also. When parties were equally divided, such a foun- 
 dation of power could not but be weak. A minister might 
 possess it to-day ; but if his adversary should come in 
 and dissolve, it would cease to aid him, and begin to aid 
 that adversary. 1 
 
 1 The following is the list given of the government boroughs : — 
 Treasury. 
 
 Dartmouth 2 
 
 Dover .1 
 
 Harwich . . 2 
 
 Bythe . . .... 2 
 
 Windsor 1 
 
 Hampshire 2 
 
 Yarmouth (Norfolk) ] 
 
 11 
 
 Admiralty. 
 
 Queenhorough 1 
 
 Rochester .1 
 
 Sandwich . . 2 
 
 4 
 
 Ordnance. 
 Qucenborough X 
 
 Total number of members returned by government in 
 
 England and Wales only 16 
 
 The whole representation of Scotland was in much the same position. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 161 
 
 This characteristic instability of a majority procured 
 by patronage inevitably weakened the confidence of a 
 prime minister in a struggle with the Crown. Theoretical 
 writers have often blamed the successive prime ministers 
 of George III. for permitting him to interfere with the 
 distribution of what was, by the ordinary theory of the 
 constitution, their patronage. But they could not help 
 it. The king had at critical moments the power of saying 
 who should be minister. He could at least, in times 
 when the divisions were close and the government was 
 weak, at any moment transfer the purchasing power from 
 the head of the administration to the leader of the oppo- 
 sition. It was in consequence impossible for any minister 
 on dubious occasions to refuse the king a share in the 
 patronage. If he did not concede some of it, he would 
 in all likelihood lose the whole of it. 
 
 A third inherent defect in the administrative strength 
 obtaine'd by the use of patronage is its certain unpopu- 
 larity. Mankind call it corruption. Refined reasoners 
 may prove, or fancy they prove, that it is desirable ; 
 they may demonstrate that it is possibly in some degree 
 inevitable ; but they will never induce ordinary men to 
 like it. Of all governments, it is the least impressive to 
 the popular imagination. It seems not only to have vice 
 for its adjunct, but vice for its principle. All govern- 
 ments are feeble which cannot appeal with confidence to 
 the moral instincts of their subjects; but it appears 
 
 M 
 
162 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 almost impudent in this one to attempt to do so. It 
 exists because it has successfully applied bad motives to 
 men susceptible of bad motives. As the secret of its 
 power appears to be base, it loses its hold over the loyalty 
 of mankind. We have seen this exemplified in a con- 
 spicuous instance in France. The monarchy of Louis 
 Philippe was weak because it was believed to be main- 
 tained by bribery and to be supported from immoral 
 motives. The same cause long weakened, and was at 
 last the chief agent in destroying, the long, prosperous, 
 and able ministry of Sir Robert Walpole. It was to no 
 purpose that he governed well ; it was to no purpose 
 that he administered general affairs consummately, or 
 that he regulated the finances wisely; it was to no 
 purpose that he showed that those who opposed him were 
 impelled to do so by very mean motives : no defensive 
 considerations availed him. It was believed that his 
 government was maintained by corruption, and a kind of 
 disgust gradually grew up towards it, long impaired, and 
 at length annihilated it. Every government under the 
 old system of representation that continued long in office 
 was sure to contract this stain ; that of Lord Liverpool 
 did not escape it. There were sure to be some instances 
 of misapplied patronage, which inevitably incurred the 
 censure and irritated the feelings of thinking men. This 
 unpopularity is a source of more continued weakness to 
 a government than would be at first sight imagined. It 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 163 
 
 might be thought that an administration with plenty of 
 votes would have plenty of courage ; but it is not so. A 
 certain timidity belongs to all oligarchies, and to an 
 unpopular oligarchy — to an oligarchy that is believed to 
 rest upon corruption — above all. It is timid at every 
 outcry, and it yields whenever it can. In the plenitude 
 of power Sir Robert Walpole did not press his excise 
 scheme, though it was a wise one, and though he was 
 sure that it was so ; he felt that at a crisis he was weak, 
 that the popular odium was not compensated by parlia- 
 mentary support. Make what refined devices we may, 
 in every free government any strong opinion that pos- 
 sesses the multitude will be powerful ; it will not be 
 least powerful where the government is conscious that it 
 rests upon a basis which is odious to common men, and 
 which therefore shuns a popular scrutiny. 
 
 For these reasons, therefore, we think, when the 
 subject is accurately examined, the supposed strength 
 which the administrations of the last century are com- 
 monly said to have derived from the employment of 
 patronage was a strength rather seeming than substantial. 
 It added to the strength of administrations otherwise 
 strong, and that did not need it ; but it was not in its 
 nature to strengthen those which were weak, or to aid, 
 as it is sometimes believed to have aided, tottering 
 administrations in a fatal division. 
 
 But even for this strength, such as it was, the 
 
164 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 people of the last century paid a very heavy price. 
 They purchased it by the almost total sacrifice of 
 efficiency in administration. We can hardly at the 
 present day conceive how utterly feeble that admini- 
 stration formerly was ; nor have we space to go into the 
 details of the subject. But one test on the subject may 
 be easily used; we mean the test of success. Our 
 administrative system was subjected in the last century 
 to three of the most searching tests of efficiency. It was 
 tried by a prolonged riot in the capital, by a rebellion 
 within the island, by the resistance of our greatest colonies. 
 If any events can bring out the latent vigour of an 
 administration, these would probably bring it out. They 
 did not, however, do so. We all know the utter feeble- 
 ness and miserable inefficiency with which the mobs of 
 1780 were resisted, if resistance it can be called. We 
 know that London was then almost as much at the 
 mercy of its worst inhabitants as Paris has ever been. 
 But it is not so generally known that similar events nearly 
 as bad, though not quite as bad, had happened before ; 
 but they did happen. In Hume's Correspondence there 
 is a curious description of the riots of 1765 : ' Another 
 very extraordinary event is the riot which the silk- 
 weavers have made for some days past. They got a bill 
 passed in the House of Commons to prevent more effec- 
 tually the importation of foreign silks, which the Duke 
 of Bedford threw out in the House of Lords. The next 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 105 
 
 day, above ten thousand of these people came down to 
 the House, desiring redress, with drums beating and 
 colours flying. They attacked the Duke of Bedford in 
 his chariot, and threw so large a stone at him, that if he 
 had not put out his hand, and saved his head by having 
 his thumb cut to the bone, he must have been killed. 
 He behaved with great resolution, and got free of them ; 
 since which time he has remained blockaded in his own 
 house, and defended by the troops. Yesterday the same 
 number of weavers assembled again at the House of 
 Lords, where the horse and foot guards were to secure 
 the entry for the peers. The mob were ranged before 
 the soldiers, and their colours were playing in the faces 
 of his majesty's troops. The degree of security with 
 which these people commit felony seems to me the most 
 formidable circumstance in the whole : they carry in 
 their whole deportment so much tranquillity and ease, 
 that they do not seem apprised of the illegality of their 
 proceedings. It is really serious to see the legislature of 
 this country intimidated by such a rabble ; and to see the 
 House of Lords send for Justice Fielding, to hear him 
 prove for how many reasons he ought not to do his duty. 
 The Duke of Bedford is still in danger of his life if he 
 goes out of his house ; and we expect to see the same 
 number of people assembled every day, till something 
 more vigorous is done than any one has yet chosen to 
 propose. The spirit of robbing has gone forth in this 
 
166 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 nation to a degree that we have not experienced this 
 century past, and it will not be found so easy a matter 
 to quell it ' (pp. 55, 56). 
 
 No description can be more graphic of the weakness 
 of a feeble administration, unmoved by evident danger. 
 We need not dwell on the other instances of inefficiency 
 to which we have alluded. In 1745, the administration 
 of the day — a divided and discordant administration, 
 it is true — permitted a small body of half-disciplined 
 Highlanders to advance into the centre of England. 
 So imperfect were their arrangements, that some good 
 judges of evidence have thought that if Charles Edward 
 had pushed on towards London, he might have succeeded 
 in taking it. The war with our North-American Colonies 
 was conducted with as little wisdom and energy ; it could 
 not be with less. The whole strength of the empire was 
 never put forth ; and historians have often wondered at 
 the series of petty expeditions and inconclusive conflicts 
 with which so great a country as England endeavoured 
 to reduce so great a country as America. Lord North's 
 government was perhaps somewhat feebler than many 
 of the governments of the last century ; but even if so, 
 it is only because it exhibits the characteristic defects 
 belonging to them all in a conspicuous and aggravated 
 form. It was not exceptionally inefficient, but charac- 
 teristically inefficient. 
 
 The explanation of this inefficiency is simple. It 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 167 
 
 was caused by the abuse of patronage ; or rather, to 
 speak the language of the old Tory theory, by the use 
 of it to bribe members of parliament and proprietors of 
 boroughs. George II. is reported to have said to Sir 
 Robert Walpole, ' I won't have my army jobbed away 
 for your members : it shan't be.' It had been, however ; 
 and the state of the English army at the commencement 
 of the long war with France is -a conclusive proof of it. 
 Burke, in his speech on economical reform, has explained 
 this point with more humour than is usual with him : 
 
 ' There was another disaster far more doleful than 
 this. I shall state it, as the cause of that misfortune 
 lies at the bottom of almost all our prodigality. Lord 
 Talbot attempted to reform the kitchen ; but such, as 
 he well observed, is the consequence of having duty 
 done by one person, whilst another enjoys the emolu- 
 ments, that he found himself frustrated in all his designs. 
 On that rock his whole adventure split — his whole 
 scheme of economy was dashed to pieces ; his depart- 
 ment became more expensive than ever ; the Civil List 
 debt accumulated — why ? It was truly from a cause 
 which, though perfectly adequate to the effect, one 
 would not have instantly guessed — it was because the 
 turnspit in the king's kitchen tuas a member of par- 
 liament} The king's domestic servants were all undone ; 
 
 1 Vide " Lord Talbot's speech, in Almond's Parliamentary Register, 
 vol. vii. p. 79, of the proceedings of the Lords." 
 
168 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 his tradesmen remained unpaid and became bankrupt — 
 because the turnspit in the king's kitchen was a member 
 of parliament. His majesty's slumbers were interrupted, 
 his pillow was stuffed with thorns, and his peace of 
 mind entirely broken — because the king's turnspit was 
 a member of parliament. The judges were unpaid ; the 
 justice of the kingdom bent and gave way; the foreign 
 ministers remained inactive and unprovided ; the system 
 of Europe was dissolved ; the chain of our alliances was 
 broken ; all the wheels of government at home and 
 abroad were stopped — because the king's turnspit ^vas a 
 member of parliament.' The efficiency of the public 
 offices was sacrificed, in order that the best posts in 
 them might be better used as parliamentary purchase- 
 money. It would have been a heavy price to pay, even 
 for a government that was really strong. 
 
 It is curious, that though under our old constitution 
 so heavy a price was paid for parliamentary support, 
 and so little support was at critical moments obtained 
 for that price, the governments of that day did very little 
 with the strength which they so bought, after they had 
 bought it. We nowadays consider that the first use 
 which a prime minister will make of a large majority, 
 is to legislate with it. In the last century men did not 
 think so. Lord John Russell justly said in the House of 
 Commons, that there was no statute, no act of legislation, 
 which we can connect with or can trace to Lord Chatham, 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 169 
 
 who was the most celebrated minister of England during 
 the last centurj*-. There have been a greater number 
 of important Acts of Parliament passed in the last 
 twenty years than in the previous hundred and twenty. 
 The people of England, a hundred years ago, and their 
 Parliament also, were habitually satisfied with their 
 existing institutions : they did not care to abolish any 
 of these, or to introduce any new ones. Accordingly, 
 when the minister at that time had bought his majority, 
 he had nothing to do with it except to keep himself 
 minister. 
 
 On the whole, therefore, we do not think that our 
 old system of representation is entitled to the credit 
 which it has often received for causing and maintaining 
 strong administrations. The ingenious devices which 
 it contained seem to us to have failed whenever they 
 were really wanted ; and we conclude, from the entire 
 history of the last century, that governments were then 
 only strong when public opinion was definite and de- 
 cided, and when that is so they will be strong now. 
 
 The only one of our questions as to our old system 
 of representation that is still unanswered is, What was 
 the degree of its suitability for training and developing 
 statesmen ? Lord Macaulay has in more than one part 
 of his writings expressed a doubt whether all repre- 
 sentative systems are not in this respect defective. 
 They require, he says, that an influential statesman 
 
170 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 should be an orator, and especially a ready and debating 
 orator; and this, he considers, is inexpedient. He 
 appears to believe, both that the practice of debating 
 injures the intellect, and that the conviction of its 
 necessity makes a statesman prize and practise qualities 
 which are not essential to his true calling in preference 
 to those which really are so. He believes that the 
 statesman is induced to think more of the House of 
 Commons, and of the effect which his measures would 
 produce there, than is desirable ; and also, that the habit 
 of defending those measures by very questionable argu- 
 ments disorganizes the intellect of a statesman and 
 renders it much less fit than it would otherwise be for 
 the investigation of important truths. There is doubtless 
 some truth in these ideas ; the practical working of a 
 representative government often tends to produce these 
 hurtful effects upon the minds of the statesmen who are 
 eminent under it. And not only so. All free govern- 
 ments are to some extent unfavourable to much originality 
 of mind in their influential statesmen. They necessitate 
 an appeal to the people ; and the mind of the people is 
 almost by definition ordinary and commonplace. The 
 opinions of the majority of mankind necessarily partake 
 of these qualities ; and those who have to please that 
 majority must in all ages, to some extent, cultivate them. 
 And these are serious disadvantages. But, on the other 
 hand, it may be fairly believed that no system which has 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 171 
 
 yet been devised secures for the most eminent statesmen 
 in a nation so large a number of great qualities as are 
 necessary for the prime minister under a well-developed 
 system of parliamentary government. It is true, that a 
 man who is eminent in that position may not be in the 
 least eminent in abstract or original reflection ; it is 
 possible that he may be beneath the average capacity 
 of men in that respect. But, on the other hand, this 
 defect is not peculiar to a parliamentary system of 
 government. No device has yet been suggested for 
 securing the supremacy in the state to persons capable of 
 original thought. A prime minister under a parliamentary 
 constitution must have a very great number of other 
 great qualities. He must be a man of business long 
 trained in great affairs ; he must be, if not a great orator, 
 a great explainer; he must be able to expound with 
 perspicuity to a mixed assembly complicated measures 
 and involved transactions ; he must be a great party 
 leader, and have the knowledge of men, the easy use of 
 men, and the miscellaneous sagacity, which such emi- 
 nence necessarily implies; he must be a ready man, a 
 managing man, and an intelligible man : and under no 
 other system of government with which we are ac- 
 quainted is there any security that all these, or an equal 
 number of other, important qualities will constantly be 
 found in the ruler of a nation. All these qualities the 
 system of representation which existed in England 
 
172 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 during the last century secured to the utmost. We might 
 easily run over the names of the eminent statesmen 
 whom it produced, but it is needless; we know that 
 they were eminent, and we know that they were many. 
 
 A claim has often been made on behalf of the old 
 close boroughs, that the number and the greatness of 
 these statesmen is due to them. A very long list of the 
 names of the statesmen who were brought into Parlia- 
 ment during the last century by those boroughs is set 
 forth, and it is alleged that the excellence of these great 
 statesmen was a conspicuous advantage which resulted 
 from the machinery that introduced them to public life. 
 But to this argument there will be found, when the 
 subject is narrowly examined, to be several important 
 qualifications. 
 
 In the first place, a great number of remarkable men 
 undoubtedly came into Parliament under the old system 
 of representation by means of the close boroughs, simply 
 and solely because that was at that time the readiest and 
 simplest mode of coming in. If any other mode had 
 been the readiest, they would have availed themselves 
 of that instead. Take the case of Sir Robert Walpole. 
 Had any man that ever lived more of the qualities, the 
 good and the bad qualities, of a great popular candidate ? 
 He was genial, sagacious, and unsensitive. He would 
 have managed the mob, and managed the attorney, and 
 managed the electors, better almost than any other of 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNEEFOEMED PAELIAMENT. 173 
 
 our remarkable statesmen; yet he came in for a close 
 borough. Circumstances threw that mode of entering 
 public life into his path, and he took advantage of it 
 immediately; but if the system of representation then 
 prevailing in England had been a different one, he 
 -would have taken advantage of that also. We must not 
 give the close boroughs a peculiar credit for all the 
 eminent statesmen who entered into the House of 
 Commons by means of them, but only for such of the 
 great statesmen as, from the nature of their mind and 
 the peculiarity of their circumstances, would most likely 
 not have entered Parliament in any other way ; and 
 these are not many. 
 
 This is one great qualification. A still more impor- 
 tant one remains. A great number of able men came 
 into Parliament formerly who do not appear there now, 
 because there was a motive to enter it at that time 
 which does not now exist. Public life was in the last 
 century not only a career, but a livelihood. It was 
 possible to make a subsistence, and even a fortune, by it. 
 Take the case of the first Lord Liverpool : he was a man 
 of no extraordinary genius or unequalled abilities ; he 
 was simply a man of plain, strong, ordinary understand- 
 ing ; he had good sense, and good habits of business : he 
 had no qualities which a very great number of young 
 men in every generation may not be sure that they have. 
 Nevertheless he began life with scarcely any money, he 
 
174 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 passed a long life in the service of the State, he lived in 
 affluence, and he provided amply for his family. The 
 possibility of such a career could not but render public 
 life in the highest degree attractive. Fortune as well as 
 fame were, it was evident, to be obtained in it by sound 
 abilities and good management. In consequence, a very 
 great number of young men were glad to enter Parlia- 
 ment ; and if the same incentives had been continued to 
 the present day, when education is so much more general, 
 and social advantages so much more diffused, it is diffi- 
 cult to say how much that number might not have been 
 by this time augmented. If the places and pensions, the 
 patent offices and the sinecures, from which the profit- 
 ableness of public life was derived, were still in existence, 
 very many of the ablest, the most cultivated, and the 
 most interesting young men in every generation would 
 be desirous to enter Parliament. They would throng 
 any avenue which was open for their purpose; they 
 would address, and perhaps not unsuccessfully, the 
 electors of boroughs, whether small or large ; they would 
 attempt to gain a share of our county representation, 
 exclusive as that still in some degree is. We perhaps 
 are not likely to see again in England a time when public 
 life will afford the means of subsistence, as well as the 
 opportunities of ambition. We do not, on the whole, 
 regret the change that has taken place. We do not say 
 that it should be lamented ; but it has its disadvantages. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE TJNEEFORMED PARLIAMENT. 175 
 
 The public cannot expect to be so well served by its 
 statesmen now that it is served gratuitously, as it was 
 when it paid highly for their services. Instead of the 
 number of remarkable statesmen who were introduced 
 into the House of Commons by means of the close 
 boroughs being so great as to excite our wonder, we may 
 rather be surprised that it was not greater. The in- 
 centives to a public career were then so strong, that we 
 may wonder that more remarkable persons did not 
 enter upon it. The close boroughs must have been 
 almost as much an impediment as an aid, or the number 
 of statesmen attracted in the last century to the service 
 of the nation must have been much larger than in fact 
 it was. 
 
 Such was in part the case. The close boroughs did 
 not, in truth, introduce conscientious and scrupulous men 
 to an attractive position in public life. The position of 
 a member nominated to the representation of a close 
 borough by its proprietor was a position of dependence. 
 He was an employ^. He had to vote as often as, and 
 just as, the owner of the borough told him. If he did not 
 do so, he might at the next election be excluded entirely 
 from public life, or be obliged to search through the list 
 of the borough owners for a new patron. Even when the 
 member for a close borough was permitted to exercise 
 his own judgment, the public would scarcely believe that 
 he was so. They attributed all which he did to the 
 
176 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 influence of the proprietor of his seat ; and if there 
 chanced to be an apparent difference of opinion, they 
 were more disposed to attribute some sinister design to 
 the owner of the borough than any substantial indepen- 
 dence to the member for it. The votes of a nominated 
 member were not regarded as his own, even when in fact 
 they were so. As we might expect, persons of high 
 character and sensitive nature shrank from this depen- 
 dence. They could not endure that it should be said 
 that they had no control over the course which they 
 adopted in politics ; the possibility of the supposition 
 that they must vote according to the edict of some one 
 else was nearly as odious as the having so to vote. A 
 curious example of this inevitable tendency in men of 
 high and susceptible natures may be found in the life 
 of Sir Samuel Romilly. He avowedly preferred the 
 purchase of a seat to a position in which he might be 
 imagined to be dependent. He preferred to be the 
 member for a borough which was publicly known to be 
 commonly venal, to being the member for a borough 
 of which a nobleman or gentleman who took a genuine 
 interest in politics was the proprietor. He preferred its 
 being known that he had bought his seat, to the possi- 
 bility of a suspicion that he held it upon a tenure of base 
 service. In very many cases, which cannot now be 
 known by us, an analogous feeling must have prevented 
 shrinking and delicate men from occupying the seats 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE XJNREFOEMED PARLIAMENT. 177 
 
 for rotten boroughs, or from associating with the great 
 noblemen who owned them. Aristocratic patronage 
 is never very pleasant to men of this character ; and it 
 is unendurable to them that such patronage should be 
 the basis of their career, and an essential pre-requisite to 
 habitual life. Exceptional instances apart, the close 
 boroughs were rather an obstruction than an opening to 
 persons of original minds and delicate dispositions. 
 
 Nor was it natural that the owners of boroughs should 
 commonly desire to introduce such men. If these pro- 
 prietors had views of their own, they selected men who 
 would give effect to those views ; and these would 
 ordinarily be men of pliant characters and unsuggestive 
 intellects. If such proprietors had no opinion, they 
 ordinarily put the seat up to auction in the market, and 
 got as much money as they could get for it. Nor, in the 
 few cases in which noblemen introduced men of the 
 highest order of minds into Parliament, and in which 
 they treated them with tenderness and delicacy, were 
 they by any means disposed to admit them to an equality 
 with themselves, or with the near connections of great 
 families. They reserved high office as much as possible 
 for themselves, and for those who mingled by right of birth 
 in their own society ; and believed that they had done 
 much in giving the opportunity of a public career and 
 the profit of a minor place to able men of humbler station 
 whom they had brought into the House of Commons. 
 
178 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 The Rockingham party, the best party that ever was 
 composed of the associated proprietors of close boroughs, 
 thus treated Mr. Burke, who was the greatest man who 
 ever sat for a close borough. We cannot but be indignant 
 at such conduct ; we cannot help saying that it showed 
 high-bred exclusiveness, and aristocratic narrowness of 
 mind : but we also cannot help perceiving that it was 
 natural. The same thing would be sure to happen again 
 in any similar circumstances. The owners of seats in- 
 evitably believed that they were theirs ; that they, and 
 that men of their family and their station, had an evident 
 right to enjoy whatever was most desirable in the con- 
 sequences of them. They believed that they had a right 
 to their own, and to all it produced. Historians may 
 lament that Lord John Cavendish was preferred to Mr. 
 Burke; but if the old system of representation were 
 once more reestablished, a similar phenomenon would 
 happen again : the near connections of the large pro- 
 prietors of parliamentary property would again be pre- 
 ferred by those proprietors to all others. The universal 
 tendencies of human nature ensure that it should be so. 
 
 On the other hand, although the close boroughs did 
 not aid men of able minds and sensitive natures in the 
 entrance to public life, they did aid men of able minds 
 and coarse natures. The latter were willing to be de- 
 pendents, and were able to be serviceable dependents; 
 they were inclined to be slaves, and were able to be 
 
THE HISTOKY OF THE UNEEFOEMED PAELIAMENT. 179 
 
 useful slaves. The pecuniary profits derivable from a 
 public career, the places and pensions open to and readily- 
 obtainable by an able public man, brought a large number 
 of such men into Parliament. We need not cite many 
 instances, for the fact is evident. The entire history of the 
 last century is full of such men — as Mr. Rigby, as the first 
 Lord Holland, as Budd Doddington. The suspicion of 
 dependence, and the reality of aristocratic patronage, 
 were easily endured by men of covetous dispositions and 
 vulgar characters : they only desired to have as much 
 as possible of whatever profits were obtainable, and what- 
 soever the path to great profits might be, that was the 
 road for them. And independently of these extreme 
 cases, the close boroughs tended to fill the House of Com- 
 mons with men of commonplace opinions and yielding 
 characters, who accepted the creed of their patrons very 
 easily, and without, in all ordinary cases, any conscious 
 suppression of their own. Their preferences were so 
 languid, that they were not conscious of relinquishing 
 them. The facile flexibility of decorous mediocrity is 
 one of the most obvious facts of human nature ; and it 
 is one of the most valuable facts, for without it the 
 requisite union of great political parties would scarcely 
 be attainable. 
 
 Such and so great seem to us the deductions which 
 are to be made from the common belief that the close 
 boroughs tended to open the House of Commons to men 
 
180 THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 of original minds and refined dispositions. They are so 
 great, as to make it dubious whether that observation has 
 even a nucleus of truth ; they indisputably show that in 
 its ordinary form it is an extreme exaggeration; and 
 they suggest a doubt whether as much or more may not 
 be said for the very opposite of it. 
 
 We have now, therefore, completed our long investi- 
 gation. We have inquired whether our old system of 
 parliamentary representation did or did not give us a 
 Parliament substantially accordant with the true public 
 opinion of the English nation ; whether it gave, to all 
 classes who had political ideas to express, the means of 
 expressing them ; whether it had any peculiar tendency 
 to produce great and original statesmen. What, then, 
 are the results which we have learned from this investi- 
 gation ? What are the lessons which this remarkable 
 history, when it is examined, tends to teach us ? 
 
 First, we should learn from it to distrust complicated 
 expedients for making strong administrations, and refined 
 expedients for producing wise and able statesmen. The 
 sole security upon which we can depend for a strong 
 government is a consistent union in the nation. If we 
 have that, we shall have a strong government under 
 any tolerable parliamentary system ; and if we have not 
 that, we shall not have under any a really strong 
 government on ordinary occasions. The true security for 
 having a sufficient supply of good statesmen is to main- 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNREFOEMED PARLIAMENT. 181 
 
 tain a sufficient supply of good constituencies. We 
 need not regret the rotten boroughs, if we have instead 
 of them an adequate number of tolerably educated and 
 not too numerous constituencies, in which the great 
 majority of the voters are reasonably independent and 
 tolerably incorrupt. There is nothing in either of these 
 two respects very valuable in our old system of repre- 
 sentation. It did not secure to us an unusual number 
 of coherent and powerful administrations ; it did not of 
 itself give us an exceptionally great number of able and 
 honest statesmen. 
 
 Secondly, we should learn from the history of the 
 last century that it is perfectly idle to attempt to give 
 political power to persons who have no political capacity, 
 who are not intellectual enough to form opinions, or who 
 are not high-minded enough to act on those opinions. 
 This proposition is admitted in words; everybody says 
 it is a truism. But is it admitted in reality ? Do not 
 all the ordinary plans for a uniform extension of the 
 suffrage practically deny it ? Will not their inevitable 
 effect be, in the smaller and poorer boroughs at least, to 
 throw, or to attempt to throw, much power into the 
 hands of the voters who are sure to be ignorant, and who 
 are almost sure to be corrupt ? 
 
 Lastly, the events of the earlier part of the last 
 century show us — demonstrate, we may say, to us — the 
 necessity of retaining a very great share of power in the 
 
182 THE HISTOEY OF THE UNREFORMED PARLIAMENT. 
 
 hands of the wealthier and more instructed classes — of 
 the real rulers of public opinion. We have seen that we 
 owe the security of our present constitutional freedom to 
 the possession by these classes of that power : we have 
 learned that under a more democratic system the House 
 of Stuart might have been still upon the throne ; that 
 the will of the numerical majority in the nation would 
 probably have placed it there, and would probably have 
 kept it there ; that the close boroughs of former times 
 gave, in an indirect form and in an objectionable manner, 
 the requisite influence to the instructed classes ; and we 
 must infer, therefore, that we should be very cautious 
 how we now proceed to f ound a new system, without any 
 equivalent provision, and with no counterbalancing 
 weight, to the scanty intelligence of very ordinary persons 
 and to the unbridled passions of the multitude. 
 
 If we duly estimate the significance of these con- 
 clusions, we shall perhaps think that to have been once 
 more reminded of them, at a critical instant, is a result 
 of sufficient significance to justify this protracted investi- 
 gation, and an adequate apology for the detail which has 
 been necessary to render it intelligible. 
 
THE REFORM ACT OF 1867; 
 
 AND THE 
 
 FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 
 (1872.) 
 
 It is too soon as yet to attempt to estimate the effect 
 of the Reform Act of 1867. The people enfranchised 
 under it do not yet know their own power; a single 
 election, so far from teaching us how they will use that 
 power, has not been even enough to explain to them that 
 they have such power. The Reform Act of 1832 did not 
 for many years disclose its real consequences ; a writer 
 in 1836, whether he approved or disapproved of them, 
 whether he thought too little of or whether he exagge- 
 rated them, would have been sure to be mistaken in 
 them. A new Constitution does not produce its full 
 effect as long as all its subjects were reared under an old 
 Constitution, as long as its statesmen were trained by 
 that old Constitution. It is not really tested till it comes 
 to be worked by statesmen and among a people neither 
 of whom are guided by a different experience. 
 
 In one respect we are indeed particularly likely to be 
 
184 THE REFORM ACT OP 1867; AND 
 
 mistaken as to the effect of the last Reform Bill. Un- 
 deniably there has lately been a great change in our 
 politics. It is commonly said that ' there is not a brick 
 of the Palmerston House standing.' The change since 
 1865 is a change not in one point but in a thousand 
 points ; it is a change not of particular details but of per- 
 vading spirit. We are now quarrelling as to the minor 
 details of an Education Act ; in Lord Palmerston's time 
 no such Act could have passed. In Lord Palmerston's 
 time Sir George Grey said that the disestablishment of 
 the Irish Church would be an ' act of Revolution ; ' it 
 has now been disestablished by great majorities, with Sir 
 George Grey himself assenting. A new world has arisen 
 which is not as the old world ; and we naturally ascribe 
 the change to the Reform Act. But this is a complete 
 mistake. If there had been no Reform Act at all there 
 would, nevertheless, have been a great change in English 
 politics. There has been a change of the sort which, 
 above all, generates other changes — a change of genera- 
 tion. Generally one generation in politics succeeds 
 another almost silently; at every moment men of all 
 ages between thirty and seventy have considerable in- 
 fluence; each year removes many old men, makes all 
 others older, brings in. many new. The transition is so 
 gradual that we hardly perceive it. The board of 
 directors of the political company has a few slight 
 changes every year, and therefore the shareholders are 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 185 
 
 conscious of no abrupt change. But sometimes there 
 is an abrupt change. It occasionally happens that 
 several ruling directors who are about the same age 
 live on for many years, manage the company all 
 through those years, and then go off the scene almost 
 together. In that case the affairs of the company are 
 apt to alter much, for good or for evil; sometimes 
 it becomes more successful, sometimes it is ruined, but 
 it hardly ever stays as it was. Something like this 
 happened before 1865. All through the period between 
 1832 and 1865, the pre-'32 statesmen — if I may so call 
 them — Lord Derby, Lord Eussell, Lord Palmerston, re- 
 tained great power. Lord Palmerston to the last retained 
 great prohibitive power. Though in some ways always 
 young, he had not a particle of sympathy with the 
 younger generation ; he brought forward no young men ; 
 he obstructed all that young men wished. In con- 
 sequence, at his death a new generation all at once 
 started in life; the pre-'32 all at once died out. Most 
 of the new politicians were men who might well have 
 been Lord Palmerston's grandchildren. He came into 
 Parliament in 1806, they entered it after 1856. Such 
 an enormous change in the age of the workers necessarily 
 caused a great change in the kind of work attempted 
 and the way in which it was done. What we call the 
 ' spirit ' of politics is more surely changed by a change 
 of generation in the men than by any other change 
 
186 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 whatever. Even if there had been no Reform Act, this 
 single cause would have effected grave alterations. 
 
 The mere settlement of the Reform question made a 
 great change too. If it could have been settled by any- 
 other change, or even within any change, the instant 
 effect of the settlement would still have been immense. 
 New questions would have appeared at once. A political 
 country is like an American forest : you have only to cut 
 down the old trees, and immediately new trees come up 
 to replace them ; the seeds were waiting in the ground, 
 and they began to grow as soon as the withdrawal of the 
 old ones brought in light and air. These new questions 
 of themselves would have made a new atmosphere, new 
 parties, new debates. 
 
 Of course I am not arguing that so important an in- 
 novation as the Reform Act of 1867 will not have very 
 great effects. It must, in all likelihood, have many great 
 ones. I am only saying that as yet we do not know what 
 those effects are; that the great evident change since 
 1865 is certainly not strictly due to it ; probably is not 
 even in a principal measure due to it ; that we have still 
 to conjecture what it will cause and what it will not 
 cause. 
 
 The principal question arises most naturally from a 
 doctrine on which I have insisted in my book on the 
 English Constitution. I have said that cabinet govern- 
 ment is possible in England because England was a 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 187 
 
 deferential country. I meant that the nominal consti- 
 tuency was not the real constituency ; that the mass of 
 the 'ten-pound' householders did not really form their 
 own opinions, and did not exact of their representatives 
 an obedience to those opinions ; that they were in fact 
 guided in their judgment by the better educated classes ; 
 that they preferred representatives from those classes, and 
 gave those representatives much license. If a hundred 
 small shopkeepers had by miracle been added to any of 
 the '32 Parliaments, they would have felt outcasts there. 
 Nothing could be more unlike those Parliaments than 
 the average mass of the constituency from which they 
 were chosen. 
 
 I do not of course mean that the ten-pound house- 
 holders were great admirers of intellect or good judges of 
 refinement. We all know that, for the most part, they 
 were not so at all : very few Englishmen are. They were 
 not influenced by ideas, but by facts ; not by things 
 impalpable, but by things palpable. Not to put too 
 fine a point upon it, they were influenced by rank and 
 wealth. No doubt the better sort of them believed that 
 those who were superior to them in these indisputable 
 respects were superior also in the more intangible quali- 
 ties of sense and knowledge. But the mass of the old 
 electors did not analyse very much : they liked to have 
 one of the ' betters ' to represent them ; if he was rich 
 they respected him much; and if he was a lord, they 
 
188 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867 ; AND 
 
 liked him the better. The issue put before these electors 
 was which of two rich people will you choose? And 
 each of those rich people was put forward by great 
 parties whose notions were the notions of the rich — whose 
 plans were their plans. The electors only selected one or 
 two wealthy men to carry out the schemes of one or two 
 wealthy associations. 
 
 So fully was this so, that the class to whom the great 
 body of the ten-pound householders belonged — the lower 
 middle class — was above all classes the one most hardly 
 treated in the imposition of the taxes. A small shop- 
 keeper, or a clerk who just, and only just, was rich 
 enough to pay income tax, was perhaps the only severely 
 taxed man in the country. He paid the rates, the tea, 
 sugar, tobacco, malt, and spirit taxes, as well as the in- 
 come tax, but his means were exceedingly small. Curiously 
 enough the class which in theory was omnipotent, was the 
 only class financially ill-treated. Throughout the history 
 of our former Parliaments the constituency could no 
 more have originated the policy which those Parliaments 
 selected than they could have made the solar system. 
 
 As I have endeavoured to show in the volume above 
 mentioned, the deference of the old electors to their betters 
 was the only way in which our old system could be main- 
 tained. No doubt countries can be imagined in which the 
 mass of the electors would be thoroughly competent to 
 form good opinions ; approximations to that state happily 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEEHS. 189 
 
 exist. But such was not the state of the minor English 
 shopkeepers. They were just competent to make a selec- 
 tion between two sets of superior ideas; or rather — for 
 the conceptions of such people are more personal than 
 abstract — between two opposing parties, each professing 
 a creed of such ideas. But they could do no more. Their 
 own notions, if they had been cross-examined upon them, 
 would have been found always most confused and often 
 most foolish. They were competent to decide an issue 
 selected by the higher classes, but they were incom- 
 petent to do more. 
 
 The grave question now is, How far will this peculiar 
 old system continue and how far will it be altered ? I 
 am afraid I must put aside at once the idea that it will 
 be altered entirely and altered for the better. I cannot 
 expect that the new class of voters will be at all more 
 able to form sound opinions on complex questions than 
 the old voters. There was indeed an idea — a very 
 prevalent idea when the first edition of that book was 
 published — that there then was an unrepresented class 
 of skilled artizans who could form superior opinions on 
 national matters, and ought to have the means of ex- 
 pressing them. We used to frame elaborate schemes to 
 give them such means. But the Reform Act of 1867 did 
 not stop at skilled labour ; it enfranchised unskilled 
 labour too. And no one will contend that the ordinary 
 working man who has no special skill, and who is only 
 
190 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 rated because lie has a house, can judge much of intel- 
 lectual matters. The messenger in an office is not more 
 intelligent than the clerks, not better educated, but, 
 worse ; and yet the messenger is probably a very superior 
 specimen of the newly enfranchised classes. The average 
 can only earn very scanty wages by coarse labour. They 
 have no time to improve themselves, for they are labour- 
 ing the whole day through ; and their early education 
 was so small that in most cases it is dubious whether 
 even if they had much time, they could use it to good 
 purpose. We have not enfranchised a class less needing 
 to be guided by their betters than the old class ; on the 
 contrary, the new class need it more than the old. The 
 real question is, Will they submit to it, will they defer 
 in the same way to wealth and rank, and to the higher 
 qualities of which these are the rough symbols and the 
 common accompaniments ? 
 
 There is a peculiar difficulty in answering this ques- 
 tion. Generally, the debates upon the passing of an Act 
 contain much valuable instruction as to what may be 
 expected of it. But the debates on the Reform Act of 
 1867 hardly tell anything. They are taken up with tech- 
 nicalities as to the ratepayers and the compound house- 
 holder. Nobody in the country knew what was being 
 done. I happened at the time to visit a purely agricul- 
 tural and Conservative county, and I asked the local 
 Tories, ' Do you understand this Reform Bill ? Do you 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 191 
 
 know that your Conservative Government has brought 
 in a Bill far more Radical than any former Bill, and that 
 it is very likely to be passed ? ' The answer I got 
 was, ' What stuff you talk ! How can it be a Radical 
 Reform Bill ? Why, Bright opposes it ! ' There was no 
 answering that in a way which a ' common jury ' could 
 understand. The Bill was supported by the Times and 
 opposed by Mr. Bright; and therefore the mass of the 
 Conservatives and of common moderate people, without 
 distinction of party, had no conception of the effect. 
 They said it was 'London nonsense' if you tried to 
 explain it to them. The nation indeed generally looks 
 to the discussions in Parliament to enlighten it as to the 
 effect of Bills. But in this case neither party, as a party, 
 could speak out. Many, perhaps most of the intelligent 
 Conservatives, were fearful of the consequences of the 
 proposal ; but as it was made by the heads of their own 
 party, they did not like to oppose it, and the discipline 
 of party carried them with it. On the other side, many, 
 probably most of the intelligent Liberals, were in conster- 
 nation at the Bill ; they had been in the habit for years 
 of proposing Reform Bills; they knew the points of 
 difference between each Bill, and perceived that this was 
 by far the most sweeping which had ever been proposed 
 by any Ministry. But they were almost all unwilling to 
 say so. They would have offended a large section in 
 their constituencies if they had resisted a Tory Bill 
 
192 THE REFORM ACT OP 1867; AND 
 
 because it was too democratic ; the extreme partizans of 
 democracy would have said, ' The enemies of the people 
 have confidence enough in the people to entrust them 
 with this power, but you, a " Liberal," and a professed 
 friend of the people, have not that confidence ; if that is 
 so, we will never vote for you again.' Many Radical 
 members who had been asking for years for household 
 suffrage were much more surprised than pleased at the 
 near chance of obtaining it; they had asked for it as 
 bargainers ask for the highest possible price, but they 
 never expected to get it. Altogether the Liberals, or at 
 least the extreme Liberals, were much like a man who 
 has been pushing hard against an opposing door, till, on 
 a sudden, the door opens, the resistance ceases, and he is 
 thrown violently forward. Persons in such an un- 
 pleasant predicament can scarcely criticise effectually, 
 and certainly the Liberals did not so criticise. We have 
 had no such previous discussions as should guide our 
 expectations from the Eeform Bill, nor such as under 
 ordinary circumstances we should have had. 
 
 Nor does the experience of the last election much help 
 us. The circumstances were too exceptional. In the first 
 place, Mr. Gladstone's personal popularity was such as 
 has not been seen since the time of Mr. Pitt, and such as 
 may never be seen again. Certainly it will very rarely 
 be seen. A bad speaker is said to have been asked how 
 he got on as a candidate. ' Oh,' he answered, ' when I 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 193 
 
 do not know what to say, I say " Gladstone," and then 
 they are sure to cheer, and I have time to think.' In 
 fact, that popularity acted as a guide both to consti- 
 tuencies and to members. The candidates only said they 
 would vote with Mr. Gladstone, and the constituencies 
 only chose those who said so. Even the minority could 
 only be described as anti-Gladstone, just as the majority 
 could only be described as pro- Gladstone. The remain?, 
 too, of the old electoral organisation were exceedingly 
 powerful ; the old voters voted as they had been told, and 
 the new voters mostly voted with them. In extremely 
 few cases was there any new and contrary organisation. 
 At the last election, the trial of the new system hardly 
 began, and, as far as it did begin, it was favoured by a 
 peculiar guidance. 
 
 In the mean time our statesmen have the greatest 
 opportunities they have had for many years, and likewise 
 the greatest duty. They have to guide the new voters in 
 the exercise of the franchise ; to guide them quietly, and 
 without saying what they are doing, but still to guide 
 them. The leading statesmen in a free country have 
 great momentary power. They settle the conversation of 
 mankind. It is they who, by a great speech or two, 
 determine what shall be said and what shall be written 
 for long after. They, in conjunction with their coun- 
 sellors, settle the programme of their party — the 'plat- 
 form,' as the Americans call it, on which they and those 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
lOi THE REFORM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 associated "with them are to take their stand for the 
 political campaign. It is by that programme, by a com- 
 parison of the programmes of different statesmen, that 
 the world forms its judgment. The common ordinary 
 mind is quite unfit to fix for itself what political ques- 
 tion it shall attend to; it is as much as it can do to 
 judge decently of the questions which drift down to it, 
 and are brought before it; it almost never settles its 
 topics ; it can only decide upon the issues of those topics. 
 And in settling what these questions shall be, statesmen 
 have now especially a great responsibility if they raise 
 questions which will excite the lower orders of mankind ; 
 if they raise questions on which those orders are likely to 
 be wrong ; if they raise questions on which the interest 
 of those orders is not identical with, or is antagonistic to, 
 the whole interest of the State, they will have done the 
 greatest harm they can do. The future of this country 
 depends on the happy working of a delicate experiment, 
 and they will have done all they could to vitiate that 
 experiment. Just when it is desirable that ignorant 
 men, new to politics, should have good issues, and only 
 good issues, put before them, these statesmen will have 
 suggested bad issues. They will have suggested topics 
 which will bind the poor as a class together; topics 
 which will excite them against the rich ; topics the dis- 
 cussion of which in the only form in which that discus- 
 sion reaches their ear will be to make them think that 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 195 
 
 some new law can make them comfortable — that it is 
 the present law which makes them uncomfortable — that 
 Government has at its disposal an inexhaustible fund out 
 of which it can give to those who now want without also 
 creating elsewhere other and greater wants. If the first 
 work of the poor voters is to try to create a ' poor man's 
 paradise/ as poor men are apt to fancy that Paradise, 
 and as they are apt to think they can create it, the great 
 political trial now beginning will simply fail. The wide 
 gift of the elective franchise will be a great calamity to 
 the whole nation, and to those who gain it as great a 
 calamity as to any. 
 
 I do not of course mean that statesmen can choose 
 with absolute freedom what topics they will deal with 
 and what they will not. I am of course aware that they 
 choose under stringent conditions. In excited states of 
 the public mind they have scarcely a discretion at all ; 
 the tendency of the public perturbation determines what 
 shall and what shall not be dealt with. But, upon the 
 other hand, in quiet times statesmen have great power ; 
 when there is no fire lighted, they can settle what fire 
 shall be lit. And as the new suffrage is happily to be 
 tried in a quiet time 1 , the responsibility of our statesmen 
 is great because their power is great too. 
 
 And the mode in which the questions dealt with are 
 discussed is almost as important as the selection of these 
 questions. It is for our principal statesmen to lead the 
 
196 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867 J AND 
 
 public, and not to let the public lead them. No doubt 
 when statesmen live by public favour, as ours do, this is 
 a hard saying, and it requires to be carefully limited. I 
 do not mean that our statesmen should assume a pedantic 
 and doctrinaire tone with the English people ; if there is 
 anything which English people thoroughly detest, it is 
 that tone exactly. And they are right in detesting it ; 
 if a man cannot give guidance and communicate instruc- 
 tion formally without telling his audience ' I am better 
 than you ; I have studied this as you have not,' then he 
 is not fit for a guide or an instructor. A statesman who 
 should show that gaucherie would exhibit a defect of 
 imagination, and expose an incapacity for dealing with 
 men which would be a great hindrance to him in his 
 calling. But much argument is not required to guide 
 the public, still less a formal exposition of that argument. 
 What is mostly needed is the manly utterance of clear 
 conclusions ; if a statesman gives these in a felicitous way 
 (and if with a few light and humorous illustrations, so 
 much the better), he has done his part. He will have 
 given the text, the scribes in the newspapers will write 
 the sermon. A statesman ought to show his own nature, 
 and talk in a palpable way what is to him important 
 truth. And so he will both guide and benefit the nation. 
 But if, especially at a time when great ignorance 
 has an unusual power in public affairs, he chooses to 
 accept and reiterate the decisions of that ignorance, he 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 197 
 
 is only the hireling of the nation, and does little save 
 hurt it. 
 
 I shall be told that this is very obvious, and that 
 everybody knows that 2 and 2 make 4, and that there 
 is no use in inculcating it. But I answer that the lesson 
 is not observed in fact : people do not so do their poli- 
 tical sums. Of all our political dangers, the greatest I 
 conceive is that they will neglect the lesson. In plain 
 English, what I fear is that both our political parties 
 will bid for the support of the working man ; that both 
 of them will promise to do as he likes if he will only tell 
 them what it is ; that, as he now holds the casting vote 
 in our affairs, both parties will beg and pray him to give 
 that vote to them. I can conceive of nothing more 
 corrupting or worse for a set of poor ignorant people 
 than that two combinations of well-taught and rich men 
 should constantly offer to defer to their decision, and 
 compete for the office of executing it. Vox populi will 
 be Vox diaboli if it is worked in that manner. 
 
 And, on the other hand, my imagination conjures up 
 a contrary danger. I can conceive that questions being 
 raised which, if continually agitated, would combine the 
 working men as a class together, the higher orders might 
 have to consider whether they would concede the measure 
 that would settle such questions, or whether they would 
 risk the effect of the working men's combination. 
 
 No doubt the question cannot be easily discussed in 
 
19S THE REFORM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 the abstract; much, must depend on the nature of the 
 measures in each particular case ; on the evil they would 
 cause if conceded ; on the attractiveness of their idea to 
 the working classes if refused. But in all cases it must 
 be remembered that a political combination of the lower 
 classes, as such and for their own objects, is an -evil of 
 the first magnitude ; that a permanent combination of 
 them would make them (now that so many of them have 
 the suffrage) supreme in the country; and that their 
 supremacy, in the state they now are, means the supre- 
 macy of ignorance over instruction and of numbers over 
 knowledge. So long as they are not taught to act 
 together, there is a chance of this being averted, and 
 it can only be averted by the greatest wisdom and the 
 greatest foresight in the higher classes. They must 
 avoid, not only every evil, but every appearance of evil ; 
 while they have still the power they must remove, not 
 only every actual grievance, but, where it is possible, 
 every seeming grievance too ; they must willingly concede 
 every claim which they can safely concede, in order that 
 they may not have to concede unwillingly some claim 
 which would impair the safety of the country. 
 
 This advice, too, will be said to be obvious ; but I 
 have the greatest fear that, when the time comes, it will 
 be cast aside as timid and cowardly. So strong are the 
 combative propensities of man that he would rather fight 
 a losing battle than not fight at all. It is most difficult 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 199 
 
 to persuade people that by fighting they may strengthen 
 the enemy, yet that would be so here ; since a losing 
 battle — especially a long and well-fought one — would 
 have thoroughly taught the lower orders to combine, and 
 would have left the higher orders face to face with an 
 irritated, organized, and superior voting power. The 
 courage which strengthens an enemy and which so loses, 
 not only the present battle, but many after battles, is a 
 heavy curse to men and nations. 
 
 In one minor respect, indeed, I think we may see 
 with distinctness the effect of the Reform Bill of 1867. 
 I think it has completed one change which the Act of 
 1832 began ; it has completed the change which that 
 Act made in the relation of the House of Lords to the 
 House of Commons. The literary theory of the English 
 Constitution is on this point quite wrong as usual. Ac- 
 cording to that theory, the two Houses are two branches 
 of the Legislature, perfectly equal and perfectly distinct. 
 But before the Act of 1832 they were not so distinct ; 
 there was a very large and a very strong common element. 
 By their commanding influence in many boroughs and 
 counties the Lords nominated a considerable part of the 
 Commons ; the majority of the other part were the richer 
 gentry — men in most respects like the Lords, and sympa- 
 thising with the Lords. Under the Constitution as it 
 then was the two Houses were not in their essence 
 distinct ; they were in their essence similar ; they were, 
 
200 THE REFORM ACT OF 18G7; AND 
 
 in the main, not Houses of contrasted origin, but Houses 
 of like origin. The predominant part of both was taken 
 from the same class- — from the English gentry, titled and 
 untitled. By the Act of 1832 this was much altered. 
 The aristocracy and the gentry lost their predominance 
 in the House of Commons ; that predominance passed to 
 the middle class. The two Houses then became distinct, 
 but then they ceased to be co-equal. The Duke of 
 Wellington, in a most remarkable paper, has explained 
 what pains he took to induce the Lords to submit to 
 their new position, and to submit, time after time, their 
 will to the will of the Commons. 
 
 The Eeform Act of 1867 has, I think, unmistakably 
 completed the effect which the Act of 1832 began, but 
 left unfinished. The middle class element has gained 
 greatly by the second change, and the aristocratic element 
 has lost greatly. If you examine carefully the lists of 
 members, especially of the most prominent members, of 
 either side of the House, you will not find that they are 
 in general aristocratic names. Considering the power 
 and position of the titled aristocracy, you will perhaps 
 be astonished at the small degree in which it contributes 
 to the active part of our governing assembly. The spirit 
 of our present House of Commons is plutocratic, not 
 aristocratic ; its most prominent statesmen are not men 
 of ancient descent or of great hereditary estate; they 
 are men mostly of substantial means, but they are mostly, 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 201 
 
 too, connected more or less closely with the new trading 
 wealth. The spirit of the two Assemblies has become far 
 more contrasted than it ever was. 
 
 The full effect of the Keform Act of 1832 was indeed 
 postponed by the cause which I mentioned just now. 
 The statesmen who worked the system which was put up 
 had themselves been educated under the system which 
 was pulled down. Strangely enough, their predominant 
 guidance lasted as long as the system which they created. 
 Lord Palmerston, Lord Russell, Lord Derby, died or else 
 lost their influence within a year or two of 1867. The 
 complete consequences of the Act of 1832 upon the 
 House of Lords could not be seen while the Commons 
 were subject to such aristocratic guidance. Much of the 
 change which might have been expected from the Act of 
 1832 was held in suspense, and did not begin till that 
 measure had been followed by another of similar and 
 greater power. 
 
 The work which the Duke of Wellington in part 
 performed has now, therefore, to be completed also. 
 He met the half difficulty; we have to surmount the 
 whole one. We have to frame such tacit rules, to 
 establish such ruling but unenacted customs, as will 
 make the House of Lords yield to the Commons when 
 and as often as our new Constitution requires that it 
 should yield. I shall be asked, How often is that, and 
 what is the test by which you know it ? 
 
202 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 I answer that the House of Lords must yield when- 
 ever the opinion of the Commons is also the opinion of 
 the nation, and when it is clear that the nation has made 
 up its mind. Whether or not the nation has made up its 
 mind is a question to be decided by all the circumstances 
 of the case, and in the common way in which all practical 
 questions are decided. There are some people who lay 
 down a sort of mechanical test ; they say the House of 
 Lords should be at liberty to reject a measure passed by 
 the Commons once or more, and then if the Commons 
 send it up again and again, infer that the nation is 
 determined. But no important practical question in real 
 life can be uniformly settled by a fixed and formal rule 
 in this way. This rule would prove that the Lords 
 might have rejected the Keform Act of 1832. Whenever 
 the nation was both excited and determined, such a rule 
 would be an acute and dangerous political poison. It 
 would teach the House of Lords that it might shut its 
 eyes to all the facts of real life and decide simply by an 
 abstract formula. If in 1832 the Lords had so acted, 
 there would have been a revolution. Undoubtedly there 
 is a general truth in the rule. Whether a Bill has come 
 up once only, or whether it has come up several times, 
 is one important fact in judging whether the nation is 
 determined to have that measure enacted ; it is an 
 indication, but it is only one of the indications. There 
 are others equally decisive. The unanimous voice of the 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 203 
 
 people may be so strong, and may be conveyed through 
 so many organs, that it may be assumed to be lasting. 
 
 Englishmen are so very miscellaneous, that that which 
 has really convinced a great and varied majority of them 
 for the present may fairly be assumed to be likely to 
 continue permanently to convince them. One sort might 
 easily fall into a temporary and erroneous fanaticism, but 
 all sorts simultaneously are very unlikely to do so. 
 
 I should venture so far as to lay down for an approxi- 
 mate rule, that the House of Lords ought, on a first-class 
 subject, to be slow — very slow — in rejecting a Bill passed 
 even once by a large majority of the House of Commons. 
 I would not of course lay this down as an unvarjdng 
 rule; as I have said, I have for practical purposes no 
 belief in unvarying rules. Majorities may be either 
 genuine or fictitious, and if they are not genuine, if they 
 do not embody the opinion of the representative as well 
 as the opinion of the constituency, no one would wish to 
 have any attention paid to them. But if the opinion of 
 the nation be strong and be universal, if it be really 
 believed by members of Parliament, as well as by those 
 who send them to Parliament, in my judgment the Lords 
 should yield at once, and should not resist it. 
 
 My main reason is one which has not been much 
 urged. As a theoretical writer I can venture to say, 
 what no elected member of Parliament, Conservative or 
 Liberal, can venture to say, that I am exceedingly afraid 
 
204 THE KEFORM ACT OF 18G7; AND 
 
 of the ignorant multitude of the new constituencies. I 
 wish to have as great and as compact a power as possible 
 to resist it. But a dissension between the Lords and 
 Commons divides that resisting power; as I have ex- 
 plained, the House of Commons still mainly represents 
 the plutocracy, the Lords represent the aristocracy. The 
 main interest of both these classes is now identical, 
 which is to prevent or to mitigate the rule of uneducated 
 numbers. But to prevent it effectually, they must not 
 quarrel among themselves ; they must not bid one 
 against the other for the aid of their common opponent. 
 And this is precisely the effect of a division between 
 Lords and Commons. The two great bodies of the 
 educated rich go to the constituencies to decide between 
 them, and the majority of the constituencies now consist 
 of the uneducated poor. This cannot be for the advan- 
 tage of any one. 
 
 In doing so besides the aristocracy forfeit their 
 natural position — that by which they would gain most 
 power, and in which they would do most good. They 
 ought to be the heads of the plutocracy. In all countries 
 new wealth is ready to worship old wealth, if old wealth 
 will only let it, and I need not say that in England new 
 wealth is eager in its worship. Satirist after satirist 
 has told us how quick, how willing, how anxious are 
 the newly-made rich to associate with the ancient rich. 
 Bank probably in no country whatever has so much 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEEES. 205 
 
 'market' value as it has in England just now. Of 
 course there have been many countries in which certain 
 old families, whether rich or poor, were worshipped by 
 whole populations with a more intense and poetic 
 homage ; but I doubt if there has ever been any in 
 which all old families and all titled families received 
 more ready observance from those who were their equals, 
 perhaps their superiors, in wealth, their equals in culture, 
 and their inferiors only in descent and rank. The 
 possessors of the ' material ' distinctions of life, as a poli- 
 tical economist would class them, rush to worship those 
 who possess the immaterial distinctions. Nothing can 
 be more politically useful than such homage, if it be 
 skilfully used ; no folly can be idler than to repel and 
 reject it. 
 
 The worship is the more politically important because 
 it is the worship of the political superior for the political 
 inferior. At an election the non-titled are much more 
 powerful than the titled. Certain individual peers have, 
 from their great possessions, great electioneering in- 
 fluence, but, as a whole, the House of Peers is not a 
 principal electioneering force. It has so many poor men 
 inside it, and so many rich men outside it, that its 
 electioneering value is impaired. Besides, it is in the 
 nature of the curious influence of rank to work much 
 more on men singly than on men collectively; it is an 
 influence which most men — at least most Englishmen — 
 
206 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 feel very much, but of which most Englishmen are 
 somewhat ashamed. Accordingly, when any number 
 of men are collected together, each of whom worships 
 rank in his heart, the whole body will patiently hear — 
 in many cases will cheer and approve — some rather 
 strong speeches against rank. Each man is a little afraid 
 that his ' sneaking kindness for a lord,' as Mr. Gladstone 
 put it, be found out; he is not sure how far that weakness 
 is shared by those around him. And thus Englishmen 
 easily find themselves committed to anti-aristocratic 
 sentiments which are the direct opposite of their real 
 feeling, and their collective action may be bitterly 
 hostile to rank while the secret sentiment of each 
 separately is especially favourable to rank. In 1832 the 
 close boroughs, which were largely held by peers, and 
 were still more largely supposed to be held by them, 
 were swept away with a tumult of delight; and in 
 another similar time of great excitement, the Lords 
 themselves, if they deserve it, might pass away. The 
 democratic passions gain by fomenting a diffused excite- 
 ment, and by massing men in concourses; the aristocratic 
 sentiments gain by calm and quiet, and act most on men 
 by themselves, in their families, and when female in- 
 fluence is not absent. The overt electioneering power 
 of the Lords does not at all equal its real social power. 
 The English plutocracy, as is often said of something yet 
 coarser, must be 'humoured, not drove;' they may 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 207 
 
 easily be impelled against the aristocracy, though they 
 respect it very much ; and as they are much stronger 
 than the aristocracy, they might, if angered, even 'destroy 
 it ; though in order to destroy it, they must help to 
 arouse a wild excitement among the ignorant poor, 
 which, if once roused, may not be easily calmed, and 
 which may be fatal to far more than its beginners intend. 
 
 This is the explanation of the anomaly which puzzles 
 many clever lords. They think, if they do not say, 
 ' Why are we pinned up here ? Why are we not in the 
 Commons where we could have so much more power ? 
 Why is this nominal rank given us, at the price of 
 substantial influence ? If we prefer real weight to 
 unreal prestige, why may we not have it ? ' The reply 
 is, that the whole body of the Lords have an incalculably 
 greater influence over society while there is still a House 
 of Lords, than they would have if the House of Lords were 
 abolished ; and that though one or two clever young peers 
 might do better, in the Commons, the old order of peers, 
 young and old, clever and not clever, is much better 
 where it is. The selfish instinct of the mass of peers 
 on this point is a keener and more exact judge of the real 
 world than the fine intelligence of one or two of them. 
 
 If the House of Peers ever goes, it will go in a storm, 
 and the storm will not leave all else as it is. It will not 
 destroy the House of Peers and leave the rich young 
 peers, with their wealth and their titles, to sit in the 
 
208 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 Commons. It would probably sweep all titles before it 
 — at least all legal titles — and somehow or other it would 
 break up the curious system by which the estates of 
 great families all go to the eldest son. That system is a 
 very artificial one ; you may make a fine argument for 
 it, but you cannot make a loud argument, an argument 
 which would reach and rule the multitude. The thing 
 looks like injustice, and in a time of popular passion it 
 would not stand. Much short of the compulsory equal 
 division of the Code Napoleon, stringent clauses might 
 be provided to obstruct and prevent these great aggrega- 
 tions of property. Few things certainly are less likely 
 than a violent tempest like this to destroy large and 
 hereditary estates. But then, too, few things are less 
 likely than an outbreak to destroy the House of Lords — 
 my point is, that a catastrophe which levels one will not 
 spare the other. 
 
 I conceive, therefore, that the great power of the 
 House of Lords should be exercised very timidly and 
 very cautiously. For the sake of keeping the headship 
 of the plutocracy, and through that of the nation, they 
 should not offend the plutocracy ; the points upon which 
 they have to yield are mostly very minor ones, and they 
 should yield many great points rather than risk the 
 bottom of their power.- They should give large donations 
 out of income, if by so doing they keep, as they would 
 keep, their capital intact. The Duke of Wellington 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 209 
 
 guided the House of Lords in this manner for years, and 
 nothing could prosper better for them or for the country, 
 and the Lords have only to go back to the good path in 
 which he directed them. 
 
 The events of 1870 caused much discussion upon life 
 peerages, and we have gained this great step, that whereas 
 the former leader of the Tory party in the Lords — 
 Lord Lyndhurst — defeated the last proposal to make life 
 peers, Lord Derby, when leader of that party, desired to 
 create them. As I have given in my book on the English 
 Constitution what seemed to me good reasons for making 
 them, I need not repeat those reasons here ; I need only 
 say how the notion stands in my judgment now. 
 
 I cannot look on life peerages in the way in which 
 some of their strongest advocates regard them ; I cannot 
 think of them as a mode in which a permanent opposi- 
 tion or a contrast between the Houses of Lords and 
 Commons is to be remedied. To be effectual in that way, 
 life peerages must be very numerous. Now the House of 
 Lords will never consent to a very numerous life peerage 
 without a storm ; they must be in terror to do it, or they 
 will not do it. And if the storm blows strongly enough 
 to do so much, in all likelihood it will blow strongly 
 enough to do much more. If the revolution is powerful 
 enough and eager enough to make an immense number 
 of life peers, probably it will sweep away the hereditary 
 principle in the Upper Chamber entirely. Of course one 
 
 p 
 
210 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 may fancy it to be otherwise; we may conceive of a 
 political storm just going to a life peerage limit, and then 
 stopping suddenly. But in politics we must not trouble 
 ourselves with exceedingly exceptional accidents ; it is 
 quite difficult enough to count on and provide for the 
 regular and plain probabilities. To speak mathemati- 
 cally, we may easily miss the permanent course of the 
 political curve if we engross our minds with its cusps 
 and conjugate points. 
 
 Nor, on the other hand, can I sympathise with the 
 objection to life peerages which some of the Radical party 
 take and feel. They think it will strengthen the Lords, 
 and so make them better able to oppose the Commons ; 
 they think, if they do not say : ' The House of Lords is 
 our enemy and that of all Liberals ; happily the mass of 
 it is not intellectual; a few clever men are born there 
 which we cannot help, but we will not "vaccinate" it with 
 genius ; we will not put in a set of clever men for their 
 lives who may as likely as not turn against us.' This 
 objection assumes that clever peers are just as likely to 
 oppose the Commons as stupid peers. But this I deny. 
 Most clever men who are in such a good place as the 
 House of Lords plainly is, will be very unwilling to lose 
 it if they can help it ; at the clear call of a great duty 
 they might lose it, but only at such a call. And it does 
 not take a clever man to see that systematic opposition 
 of the Commons is the only thing which can endanger 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 211 
 
 the Lords, or which will make an individual peer cease 
 to be a peer. The greater you make the sense of the 
 Lords, the more they will see that their plain interest is 
 to make friends of the plutocracy, and to be the chiefs of 
 it, and not to wish to oppose the Commons where that 
 plutocracy rules. 
 
 It is true that a completely new House of Lords, 
 mainly composed of men of ability, selected because they 
 were able, might very likely attempt to make ability the 
 predominant power in the State, and to rival, if not con- 
 quer, the House of Commons, where the standard of 
 intelligence is not much above the common English 
 average. But in the present English world such a House 
 of Lords would soon lose all influence. People would 
 say, ' it was too clever by half,' and in an Englishman's 
 mouth that means a very severe censure. The English 
 people would think it grossly anomalous if their elected 
 assembly of rich men were thwarted by a nominated 
 assembly of talkers and writers. Sensible men of sub- 
 stantial means are what we wish to be ruled by, and a 
 peerage of genius would not compare with it in power. 
 
 It is true, too, that at present some of the cleverest 
 peers are not so ready as some others to agree with the 
 Commons. But it is not unnatural that persons of high 
 rank and of great ability should be unwilling to bend 
 to persons of lower rank, and of certainly not greater 
 ability. A few of such peers (for they are very few) 
 
212 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867 ; AND 
 
 might say, ' We had rather not have our peerage if we 
 are to buy it at the price of yielding.' But a life peer 
 who had fought his way up to the peers, would never 
 think so. Young men who are born to rank may risk it, 
 not middle-aged or old men who have earned their rank. 
 A moderate number of life peers would almost always 
 counsel moderation to the Lords, and would almost 
 always be right in counselling it. 
 
 Kecent discussions have also brought into curious 
 prominence another part of the Constitution. It would 
 very much surprise people if they were only told how 
 many things the Queen could do without consulting 
 Parliament, and it certainly has so proved, for when 
 the Queen abolished Purchase in the Army by an act 
 of prerogative (after the Lords had rejected the bill 
 for doing so), there was a great and general astonish- 
 ment. 
 
 But this is nothing to what the Queen can by law do 
 without consulting Parliament. Not to mention other 
 things, she could disband the army (by law she cannot 
 engage more than a certain number of men, but she is 
 not obliged to engage any men) ; she could dismiss all 
 the officers, from the General Commanding- in-Chief 
 downwards ; she could dismiss all the sailors too ; she 
 could sell off all our ships of war and all our naval 
 stores ; she could make a peace by the sacrifice of Corn- 
 wall, and begin a war for the conquest of Brittany. She 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 213 
 
 could make every citizen in the United Kingdom, male 
 or female, a peer ; she could make every parish in the 
 United Kingdom a ' university ; ' she could dismiss most 
 of the civil servants ; she could pardon all offenders. In 
 a word, the Queen could by prerogative upset all the 
 action of civil government within the government, could 
 disgrace the nation by a bad war or peace, and could, 
 by disbanding our forces, whether land or sea, leave us 
 defenceless against foreign nations. Why do we not fear 
 that she would do this, or any approach to it ? 
 
 Because there are two checks — one ancient and coarse, 
 the other modern and delicate. The first is the check of 
 impeachment. Any Minister who advised the Queen so 
 to use her prerogative as to endanger the safety of the 
 realm, might be impeached for high treason, and would 
 be so. Such a minister would, in our technical law, be 
 said to have levied, or aided to levy, ' war against the 
 Queen.' This counsel to her so to use her prerogative 
 would by the Judge be declared to be an act of violence 
 against herself, and in that peculiar but effectual way 
 the offender could be condemned and executed. Against 
 all gross excesses of the prerogative this is a sufficient 
 protection. But it would be no protection against minor 
 mistakes ; any error of judgment committed bond fide, 
 and only entailing consequences which one person might 
 say were good, and another say were bad, could not be 
 so punished. It would be possible to impeach any 
 
214 THE EEFOEM ACT OF 1807 J AND 
 
 Minister who disbanded the Queen's army, and it would 
 be done for certain. But suppose a Minister were to 
 reduce the army or the navy much below the con- 
 templated strength— suppose he were only to spend upon 
 them one-third of the amount which Parliament had per- 
 mitted him to spend — suppose a Minister of Lord Palmer- 
 ston's principles were suddenly and while in office con- 
 verted to the principles of Mr. Bright and Mr. Cobden, 
 and were to act on those principles, he could not be im- 
 peached. The law of treason neither could nor ought to 
 be enforced against an act which was an error of judg- 
 ment, not of intention — which was in good faith intended 
 not to impair the well-being of the State, but to promote 
 and augment it. Against such misuses of the prerogative 
 our remedy is a change of Ministry. And in general this 
 works very well. Every Minister looks long before he 
 incurs that penalty, and no one incurs it wantonly. But, 
 nevertheless, there are two defects in it. The first is that 
 it may not be a remedy at all ; it may be only a punish- 
 ment. A Minister may risk his dismissal ; he may do 
 some act difficult to undo, and then all which may be left 
 will be to remove and censure him. And the second is 
 that it is only one House of Parliament which has much 
 to say to this remedy, such as it is; the House of 
 Commons only can remove a Minister by a vote of 
 censure. Most of the Ministries for thirty years have 
 never possessed the confidence of the Lords, and in such 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 215 
 
 cases a vote of censure by the Lords could therefore have 
 but little weight ; it would be simply the particular 
 expression of a general political disapproval. It would 
 be like a vote of censure on a Liberal Government by 
 the Carlton, or on a Tory Government by the Eeform 
 Club. And in no case has an adverse vote by the Lords 
 the same decisive effect as a vote of the Commons ; the 
 Lower House is the ruling and the choosing House, and 
 if a Government really possesses that, it thoroughly pos- 
 sesses nine-tenths of what it requires. The support of 
 the Lords is an aid and a luxury ; that of the Commons 
 is a strict and indispensable necessary. 
 
 These difficulties are particularly raised by questions 
 of foreign policy. On most domestic subjects, either 
 custom or legislation has limited the use of the pre- 
 rogative. The mode of governing the country, according 
 to the existing laws, is mostly worn into a rut, and most 
 Administrations move in it because it is easier to move 
 there than anywhere else. Most political crises — the 
 decisive votes, which determine the fate of Government 
 — are generally either on questions of foreign policy or 
 of new laws ; and the questions of foreign policy come out 
 generally in this way, that the Government has already 
 done something, and that it is for the one part of the 
 Legislature alone — for the House of Commons, and not 
 for the House of Lords — to say whether they have or have 
 not forfeited their place by the treaty they have made. 
 
216 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 I think every one must admit that this is not an ar- 
 rangement which seems right on the face of it. Treaties 
 are quite as important as most laws, and to require the 
 elaborate assent of representative assemblies to every 
 word of the law, and not to consult them even as to the 
 essence of the treaty, is prima, facie ludicrous. In the 
 older forms of the English Constitution, this may have 
 been quite right; the power was then really lodged in 
 the Crown, and because Parliament met very seldom, 
 and for other reasons, it was then necessary that, on a 
 multitude of points, the Crown should have much more 
 power than is amply sufficient for it at present. But 
 now the real power is not in the Sovereign, it is in the 
 Prime Minister and in the Cabinet — that is, in the hands 
 of a committee appointed by Parliament, and of the 
 chairman of that committee. Now, beforehand, no one 
 would have ventured to suggest that a committee of 
 Parliament on Foreign relations should be able to commit 
 the country to the greatest international obligations 
 without consulting either Parliament or the country. 
 No other select committee has any comparable power ; 
 and considering how carefully we have fettered and 
 limited the powers of all other subordinate authorities, 
 our allowing so much discretionary power on matters 
 peculiarly dangerous and peculiarly delicate to rest in 
 the sole charge of one secret committee is exceedingly 
 strange. No doubt it may be beneficial ; many seeming 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 217 
 
 anomalies are so, but at first sight it does not look 
 right. 
 
 I confess that I should see no advantage in it if our 
 two Chambers were sufficiently homogeneous and suffi- 
 ciently harmonious. On the contrary, if those two 
 Chambers were as they ought to be, I should believe it 
 to be a great defect. If the Administration had in both 
 Houses a majority — not a mechanical majority ready to 
 accept anything, but a fair and reasonable one, predis- 
 posed to think the Government right, but not ready to 
 find it to be so in the face of facts and in opposition 
 to whatever might occur; if a good Government were 
 thus placed, I should think it decidedly better that the 
 agreements of the Administration with foreign powers 
 should be submitted to Parliament. They would then 
 receive that which is best for all arrangements of 
 business, an understanding and sympathising criticism, 
 but still a criticism. The majority of the Legislature, 
 being well disposed to the Government, would not ' find ' 
 against it except it had really committed some big and 
 plain mistake. But if the Government had made such 
 a mistake, certainly the majority of the Legislature 
 would find against it. In a country fit for Parliamentary 
 institutions, the partizanship of members of the Legisla- 
 ture never comes in manifest opposition to the plain 
 interest of the nation ; if it did, the nation being (as are 
 all nations capable of Parliamentary institutions) con- 
 
218 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867 J AND 
 
 stantly attentive to public affairs, would inflict on them 
 the maximum Parliamentary penalty at the next election 
 and at many future elections. It would break their 
 career. No English majority dare vote for an exceedingly 
 bad treaty ; it would rather desert its own leader than 
 ensure its own ruin. And an English minority, in- 
 heriting a long experience of Parliamentary affairs, would 
 not be exceedingly ready to reject a treaty made with 
 a foreign Government. The leaders of an English 
 Opposition are very conversant with the school-boy 
 maxim, ' Two can play at that fun.' They know that 
 the next time they are in office the same sort of sharp 
 practice may be used against them, and therefore they 
 will not use it. So strong is this predisposition, that 
 not long since a subordinate member of the Opposition 
 declared that the ' front benches ' of the two sides of the 
 House — that is, the leaders of the Government and the 
 leaders of the Opposition— were in constant tacit league 
 to suppress the objections of independent members. 
 And what he said is often quite true. There are often 
 seeming objections which are not real objections ; at 
 least, which are, in the particular cases, outweighed by 
 counter-considerations ; and these ' independent mem- 
 bers,' having no real responsibility, not being likely to be 
 hurt themselves if they make a mistake, are sure to blurt 
 out, and to want to act upon. But the responsible heads 
 of the party who may have to decide similar things, or. 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 219 
 
 even the same things, themselves will not permit it. 
 They refuse, out of interest as well as out of patriotism, 
 to engage the country in a permanent foreign scrape, to 
 secure for themselves and their party a momentary home 
 advantage. Accordingly, a Government which negotiated 
 a treaty would feel that its treaty would be subject 
 certainly to a scrutiny, but still to a candid and lenient 
 scrutiny ; that it would go before judges, of whom the 
 majority were favourable, and among whom the most 
 influential part of the minority were in this case much 
 opposed to excessive antagonism. And this seems to be 
 the best position in which negotiators can be placed, 
 namely, that they should be sure to have to account to 
 considerate and fair persons, but not to have to account 
 to inconsiderate and unfair ones. 
 
 At present the Government which negotiates a treaty 
 can hardly be said to be accountable to any one. It is 
 sure to be subjected to vague censure. Benjamin Franklin 
 said, ' I have never known a peace made, even the most 
 advantageous, that was not censured as inadequate, and 
 the makers condemned as injudicious or corrupt. " Blessed 
 are the peace-makers " is, I suppose, to be understood in 
 the other world, for in this they are frequently cursed.' 
 And this is very often the view taken now in England of 
 treaties. There being nothing practical in the Opposition 
 — nothing likely to hamper them hereafter — the leaders 
 of Opposition are nearly sure to suggest every objection. 
 
220 THE EEFOBM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 The thing is done and cannot be undone, and the most 
 natural wish of the Opposition leaders is to prove that if 
 they had been in office, and it therefore had been theirs 
 to do it, they could have done it much better. On the 
 other hand, it is quite possible that there may be no real 
 criticism on a treaty at all ; or the treaty has been made 
 by the Government, and as it cannot be unmade by any 
 one, the Opposition may not think it worth while to say 
 much about it. The Government, therefore, is never 
 certain of any criticism ; on the contrary, it has a good 
 chance of escaping criticism ; but if there be any criticism 
 the Government must expect it to be bitter, sharp, and 
 captious — made as an irresponsible objector would make 
 it, and not as a responsible statesman, who may have 
 to deal with a difficulty if he make it, and therefore will 
 be cautious how he says anything which may make it. 
 
 This is what happens in common cases ; and in the 
 uncommon — the ninety-ninth case in a hundred — in 
 which the Opposition hoped to turn out the Government 
 because of the alleged badness of the treaty they have 
 made, the criticism is sure to be of the most undesirable 
 character, and to say what is most offensive to foreign 
 nations. All the practised acumen of anti-Government 
 writers and speakers is sure to be engaged in proving 
 that England has been imposed upon — that, as was said 
 in one case, 'The moral and the intellectual qualities 
 have been divided ; that our negotiation had the moral, 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEEKS. 221 
 
 and the negotiation on the other side the intellectual,' 
 and so on. The whole pitch of party malice is then 
 expended, because there is nothing, to check the party 
 in opposition. The treaty has been made, and though 
 it may be censured, and the party which made it ousted, 
 yet the difficulty it was meant to cure is cured, and the 
 opposing party, if it takes office, will not have that 
 difficulty to deal with. 
 
 In abstract theory these defects in our present practice 
 would seem exceedingly great, but in practice they are 
 not so. English statesmen and English parties have 
 really a great patriotism ; they can rarely be persuaded 
 even by their passions or their interest to do anything 
 contrary to the real interest of England, or anything 
 which would lower England in the eyes of foreign 
 nations. And they would seriously hurt themselves if 
 they did. But still these are the real tendencies of our 
 present practice, and these are only prevented by qualities 
 in the nation and qualities in our statesmen, which will 
 just as much exist if we change our practice. 
 
 It certainly would be in many ways advantageous to 
 change it. If we require that in some form the assent of 
 Parliament shall be given to such treaties, we should 
 have a real discussion prior to the making of such 
 treaties. We should have the reasons for the treaty 
 plainly stated, and also the reasons against it. At 
 present, as we have seen, the discussion is unreal. The 
 
222 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867 ; AND 
 
 thing is done and cannot be altered; and what is said 
 often ought not to be said because it is captious, and 
 what is not said ought as often to be said because it is 
 material. We should have a manlier and plainer way 
 of dealing with foreign policy, if Ministers were obliged 
 to explain clearly their foreign contracts before they 
 were valid, just as they have to explain their domestic 
 proposals before they can become laws. 
 
 The objections to this are, as far as I know, three, 
 and three only. 
 
 First, that it would not be always desirable for 
 Ministers to state clearly the motives which induced 
 them to agree to foreign compacts. 'Treaties,' it is 
 said, ' are in one great respect different from laws, they 
 concern not only the Government which binds, the 
 nation so bound, but a third party too — a foreign country 
 — and the feelings of that country are to be considered 
 as well as our own. And that foreign country will, 
 probably, in the present state of the world be a despotic 
 one, where discussion is not practised, where it is not 
 understood, where the expressions of different speakers 
 are not accurately weighed, where undue offence may 
 easily be given.' This objection might be easily avoided 
 by requiring that the discussion upon treaties in Parlia- 
 ment like that discussion in the American Senate should 
 be 'in secret session,' and that no report should be 
 published of it. But I should, for my own part, be 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 223 
 
 rather disposed to risk a public debate. Despotic nations 
 now cannot understand England ; it is to them an 
 anomaly ' chartered by Providence ; ' they have been 
 time out of mind puzzled by its institutions, vexed at 
 its statesmen, and angry at its newspapers. A little 
 more of such perplexity and such vexation does not seem 
 to me a great evil. And if it be meant, as it often is 
 meant, that the whole truth as to treaties cannot be 
 spoken out, I answer, that neither can the whole truth 
 as to laws. All important laws affect large 'vested 
 interests ; ' they touch great sources of political strength ; 
 and these great interests require to be treated as 
 delicately, and with as nice a manipulation of language, 
 as the feelings of any foreign country. A Parliamentary 
 Minister is a man trained by elaborate practice not to 
 blurt out crude things, and an English Parliament is an 
 assembly which particularly dislikes anything gauche or 
 anything imprudent. They would still more dislike it if 
 it hurt themselves and the country as well as the speaker. 
 I am, too, disposed to deny entirely that there can be 
 any treaty for which adequate reasons cannot be given 
 to the English people, which the English people ought 
 to make. A great deal of the reticence of diplomacy had, 
 I think history shows, much better be spoken out. The 
 worst families are those in which the members never 
 really speak their minds to one another ; they maintain 
 an atmosphere of unreality, and every one .always lives in 
 
224 THE REFORM ACT OF 18G7 J AND 
 
 an atmosphere of suppressed ill-feeling. It is the same 
 with nations. The parties concerned would almost 
 always be better for hearing the substantial reasons 
 which induced the negotiators to make the treaty, and 
 the negotiators would do their work much better, for 
 half the ambiguities in treaties are caused by the nego- 
 tiators not liking the fact or not taking the pains to put 
 their own meaning distinctly before their own minds. 
 And they would be obliged to make it plain if they had 
 to defend it and argue on it before a great assembly. 
 
 Secondly, it may be objected to the change suggested 
 that Parliament is not always sitting, and that if treaties 
 required its assent, it might have to be sometimes sum- 
 moned out of season, or the treaties would have to be 
 delayed. And this is as far as it goes a just objection, 
 but I do not imagine that it goes far. The great bulk of 
 treaties could wait a little without harm, and in the very 
 few cases when urgent haste is necessary, an Autumn 
 session of Parliament- could well be justified, for the 
 occasion must be of grave and critical importance. 
 
 Thirdly, it may be said that if we required the con- 
 sent of both Houses of Parliament to foreign treaties 
 before they were valid we should much augment the 
 power of the House of Lords. And this is also, I think, 
 a just objection as far as it goes. The House of Lords, 
 as it cannot turn out the Ministry for making treaties, 
 has in no case a decisive weight in foreign policy, though 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 225 
 
 its debates on them are often excellent ; and there is a 
 real danger at present in giving it such weight. They 
 are not under the same guidance as the House of Com- 
 mons. In the House of Commons, of necessity, the 
 Ministry has a majority, and the majority will agree to 
 the treaties the leaders have made if they fairly can. 
 They will not be anxious to disagree with them. But 
 the majority of the House of Lords may always be, and 
 has lately been generally an opposition majority, and 
 therefore the treaty may be submitted to critics exactly 
 pledged to opposite views. It might be like submitting 
 the design of an architect known to hold ' mediaeval prin- 
 ciples ' to a committee wedded to ' classical principles.' 
 
 Still, upon the whole, I think the augmentation of 
 the power of the Peers might be risked without real fear 
 of serious harm. Our present practice, as has been ex- 
 plained, only works because of the good sense of those 
 by whom it is worked, and the new practice would have 
 to rely on a similar good sense and practicality too. The 
 House of Lords must deal with the assent to treaties as 
 they do with the assent to laws ; they must defer to the 
 voice of the country and the authority of the Commons 
 even in cases where their own judgment might guide 
 them otherwise. In very vital treaties probably, being 
 Englishmen, they would be of the same mind as the rest 
 of Englishmen. If in such cases they showed a reluct- 
 ance to act as the people wished, they would have the 
 
 Q 
 
22G THE REFORM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 same lesson taught them as on vital and exciting questions 
 of domestic legislation, and the case is not so likely to 
 happen, for on these internal and organic questions the 
 interest and the feeling of the Peers is often presumably 
 opposed to that of other classes — they may be anxious 
 not to relinquish the very power which other classes are 
 anxious to acquire ; but in foreign policy there is no 
 similar antagonism of interest — a peer and a non-peer 
 have presumably in that matter the same interest and 
 the same wishes. 
 
 Probably, if it were considered to be desirable to give 
 to Parliament a more direct control over questions of 
 foreign policy than it possesses now, the better way 
 would be not to require a formal vote to the treaty 
 clause by clause. This would entail too much time, and 
 would lead to unnecessary changes in minor details. It 
 would be enough to let the treaty be laid upon the table 
 of both Houses, say for fourteen days, and to acquire 
 validity unless objected to by one House or other before 
 that interval had expired. 
 
 II. 
 This is all which I think I need say on the domestic 
 events which have changed, or suggested changes, in the 
 English Constitution since my book on it was written. 
 But there are also some foreign events which have illus- 
 trated it, and of these I should like to say a few words. 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 227 
 
 Naturally, the most striking of these illustrative 
 changes comes from France. Since 1789 France has 
 always been trying political experiments, from which 
 others may profit much, though as yet she herself has 
 profited little. She is now trying one singularly illus- 
 trative of the English Constitution. When the first 
 edition of my book on the Constitution was published I 
 had difficulty in persuading many people that it was 
 possible in a non-monarchical State, for the real chief of 
 the Executive — the Premier as we should call him — to 
 be nominated and to be removable by the vote of the 
 National Assembly. The United States and its copies 
 were the only present and familiar Republics, and in 
 these the system was exactly opposite. The Executive 
 was there appointed by the people as the Legislative 
 was too. No conspicuous example of any other sort of 
 Republic then existed. But now France has given an 
 example — M. Thiers is (with one exception) just the chef 
 dn pou voir exe'cut if that I endeavoured more than once 
 in that book to describe. He is appointed by and is 
 removable by the Assembly. He comes down and 
 speaks in it just as our Premier does; he is responsible 
 for managing it just as our Premier is. No one can any 
 longer doubt the possibility of a republic in which the 
 Executive and the Legislative authorities were united 
 and fixed; no one can assert such union to be the 
 incommunicable attribute of a Constitutional Monarchy. 
 
223 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 But, unfortunately, we can as yet only infer from this 
 experiment that such a Constitution is possible ; we can- 
 not as yet say whether it will be bad or good. The 
 circumstances are very peculiar, and that in three ways. 
 First, the trial of a specially Parliamentary Republic, of 
 a Republic where Parliament appoints the Minister, is 
 made in a nation which has, to say the least of it, no 
 peculiar aptitude for Parliamentary Government; which 
 has possibly a peculiar inaptitude for it. In the last chapter 
 but one of my book on the Constitution I have tried to 
 describe one of the mental conditions of Parliamentary 
 Government, which I call ' rationality,' by which I do not 
 mean reasoning power, but rather the power of hearing 
 the reasons of others, of comparing them quietly with one's 
 own reasons, and then being guided by the result. But 
 a French Assembly is not easy to reason with. Every 
 assembly is divided into parties and into sections of parties, 
 and in France each party, almost every section of a party, 
 begins not to clamour but to scream, and to scream as 
 only Frenchmen can, as soon as it hears anything which 
 it particularly dislikes. With an Assembly in this 
 temper, real discussion is impossible, and Parliamentary 
 Government is impossible too, because the Parliament 
 can neither choose men nor measures. The French 
 assemblies under the Restored Monarchy seem to have 
 been quieter, probably because being elected from a 
 limited constituency they did not contain so many sec- 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEEES. 229 
 
 tions of opinion; they had fewer irritants and fewer 
 species of irritability. But the assemblies of the '-18 
 Republic were disorderly in the extreme. I saw the last 
 myself, and can certify that steady discussion upon a 
 critical point was not possible in it. There was not an 
 audience willing to hear. The Assembly now sitting at 
 Versailles is undoubtedly also, at times, most tumultuous, 
 and a Parliamentary Government in which it governs 
 must be under a peculiar difficulty, because as a sove- 
 reign it is unstable, capricious, and unruly. 
 
 The difficulty is the greater because there is no check, 
 or little, from the French nation upon the Assembly. 
 The French, as a nation, do not care for or appreciate 
 Parliamentary Government. I have endeavoured to ex- 
 plain how difficult it is for inexperienced mankind to 
 take to such a government ; how much more natural, 
 that is, how much more easy to uneducated men is 
 loyalty to a monarch. A nation which does not expect 
 good from a Parliament, cannot check or punish a Par- 
 liament. France expects, I fear, too little from her 
 Parliaments ever to get what she ought. Now that 
 the suffrage is universal, the average intellect and the 
 average culture of the constituent bodies are excessively 
 low ; and even such mind and culture as there is has 
 long been enslaved to authority; the French peasant 
 cares more for standing well with his present prefet 
 than for anything else whatever; he is far too ignorant 
 
230 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867 J AND 
 
 to check and watch his Parliament, and far too timid to 
 think of doing either if the executive authority nearest 
 to him does not like it. The experiment of a strictly 
 Parliamentary Republic — of a Republic where the Par- 
 liament appoints the Executive — is being tried in France 
 at an extreme disadvantage, because in France a Par- 
 liament is unusually likely to be bad, and unusually 
 likely also to be free enough to show its badness. 
 
 Secondly, the present polity of France is not a copy 
 of the whole effective part of the British Constitution, 
 but only a part of it. By our Constitution nominally 
 the Queen, but really the Prime Minister, has the power 
 of dissolving the Assembly. But M. Thiers has no such 
 power ; and therefore, under ordinar} 7 circumstances, I 
 believe, the policy would soon become unmanageable. 
 The result would be, as I have tried to explain, that the 
 Assembly would be always changing its Ministry, that 
 having no reason to fear the penalty which that change 
 so often brings in England, they would be ready to make 
 it once a month. Caprice is the characteristic vice of 
 miscellaneous assemblies, and without some check their 
 selection would be unceasingly mutable. This peculiar 
 danger of the present Constitution of France has how- 
 ever been prevented by its peculiar circumstances. The 
 Assembly have not been inclined to remove M. Thiers, 
 because in their lamentable present position they could 
 not replace M. Thiers. He has a monopoly of the 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEEKS. 231 
 
 necessary reputation. It is the Empire- — the Empire 
 which he always opposed — that has done him this kind- 
 ness. For twenty years no great political reputation 
 could arise in France. The Emperor governed and no 
 one member could show a capacity for government. M. 
 Eouher, though of vast real ability, was in the popular 
 idea only the Emperor's agent ; and even had it been 
 otherwise, M. Eouher, the one great man of Imperialism, 
 could not have been selected as a head of the Govern- 
 ment, at a moment of the greatest reaction against the 
 Empire. Of the chiefs before the twenty years' silence, 
 of the eminent men known to be able to handle Parlia- 
 ments and to govern Parliaments, M. Thiers was the only 
 one still physically able to begin again to do so. The 
 miracle is, that at seventy-four even he should still be 
 able. As no other great chief of the Parliament regime 
 existed, M. Thiers is not only the best choice, but the 
 only choice. If he were taken away, it would be most 
 difficult to make any other choice, and that difficulty 
 keeps him where he is. At every crisis the Assembly 
 feels that after M. Thiers ' the deluge,' and he lives upon 
 that feeling. A change of the President, though legally 
 simple, is in practice all but impossible ; because all know 
 that such a change might be a change, not only of the 
 President, but of much more too : that very probably it 
 might be a change of the polity — that it might bring in 
 a Monarchy or an Empire. 
 
232 THE REFORM ACT OF 18G7; AND 
 
 Lastly, by a natural consequence of the position, 
 •M. Thiers does not govern as a Parliamentary Premier 
 governs. He is not, he boasts that he is not, the head of 
 a party. On the contrary, being the one person essential 
 to all parties, he selects Ministers from all parties, he 
 constructs a cabinet in which no one Minister agrees with 
 any other in anything, and with all the members of which 
 lie himself frequently disagrees. The selection is quite 
 in his hand. Ordinarily a Parliamentary Premier cannot 
 choose ; he is brought in by a party ; he is maintained in 
 office by a party ; and that party requires that as they 
 aid him, he shall aid them ; that as they give him the 
 very best thing in the State, he shall give them the 
 next best things. But M. Thiers is under no such 
 restriction. He can choose as he likes, and does choose. 
 Neither in the selection of his Cabinet nor in the 
 management of the Chamber, is M. Thiers guided as a 
 similar person in common circumstances would have to 
 be guided. He is the exception of a moment ; he is not 
 the example of a lasting condition. 
 
 For these reasons, though we may use the present 
 Constitution of France as a useful aid to our imaginations, 
 in conceiving of a purely Parliamentary republic, of a 
 monarchy minus the monarch, we must not think of it 
 as much more. It is too singular in its nature and too 
 peculiar in its accidents to be a guide to anything except 
 itself. 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 233 
 
 In the book above-mentioned I made many remarks 
 on the American Constitution, in comparison with the 
 English; and as to the American Constitution we have had 
 a whole world of experience since I first wrote. My great 
 object was to contrast the office of President as an 
 executive officer and to compare it with that of a Prime 
 Minister ; and I devoted much space to showing that in 
 one principal respect the English system is by far the best. 
 The English Premier being appointed by the selection, 
 and being removable at the pleasure, of the preponderant 
 Legislative Assembly, is sure to be able to rely on that 
 assembly. If he wants legislation to aid his policy he can 
 obtain that legislation; he can carry out that policy. 
 But the American President has no similar security. He 
 is elected in one way, at one time, and Congress (no 
 matter which House) is elected in another way, at another 
 time. The two have nothing to bind them together, and 
 in matter of fact, they continually disagree. 
 
 This was written in the time of Mr. Lincoln, when 
 Congress, the President, and all the North were united as 
 one man in the war against the South. There was then 
 no patent instance of mere disunion. But between the 
 time when the essays were first written in the Fort- 
 nightly, and their subsequent junction into a book, Mr. 
 Lincoln was assassinated, and Mr. Johnson, the Vice- 
 President, became President, and so continued for nearly 
 four years. At such a time the characteristic evils of the 
 
234 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 Presidential system were shown most conspicuously. The 
 President and the Assembly, so far from being (as it is 
 essential to good government that they should be) on 
 terms of close union, were not on terms of common 
 courtesy. So far from being capable of a continuous and 
 concerted co-operation they were all the while trying 
 to thwart one another. He had one plan for the paci- 
 fication of the South and they another ; they would have 
 nothing to say to his plans, and he vetoed their plans as 
 long as the Constitution permitted, and when they were, 
 in spite of him, carried, he, as far as he could (and this 
 was very much), embarrassed them in action. The 
 quarrel in most countries would have gone beyond the 
 law, and come to blows ; even in America, the most law- 
 loving of countries, it went as far as possible within 
 the law. Mr. Johnson described the most popular branch 
 of the legislature — the House of Representatives — as a 
 body ' hanging on the verge of government ; ' and that 
 House impeached him criminally, in the hope that in 
 that way they might get rid of him civilly. Nothing 
 could be so conclusive against the American Constitution, 
 as a Constitution, as that incident. A hostile legislature 
 and a hostile executive were so tied together, that the 
 legislature tried, and tried in vain, to rid itself of the 
 executive by accusing it of illegal practices. The legis- 
 lature was so afraid of the President's legal power that 
 it unfairly accused him of acting beyond the law. And 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 235 
 
 the blame thus cast on the American Constitution is so 
 much praise to be given to the American political 
 character. Few nations, perhaps scarcely any nation, 
 could have borne such a trial so easily and so perfectly. 
 
 This was the most striking instance of disunion be- 
 tween the President and the Congress that has ever yet 
 occurred, and which probably will ever occur. Probably 
 for very many years the United States will have great 
 and painful reason to remember that at the moment of 
 all their history, when it was most important to them to 
 collect and concentrate all the strength and wisdom of 
 their policy on the pacification of the South, that policy 
 was divided by a strife in the last degree unseemly and 
 degrading. But it will be for a competent historian 
 hereafter to trace out this accurately and in detail ; the 
 time is yet too recent, and I cannot pretend that I know 
 enough to do so. I cannot venture myself to draw the 
 full lessons from these events ; I can only predict that 
 when they are drawn, those lessons will be most import- 
 ant and most interesting. 
 
 There is, however, one series of events which have 
 happened in America since the beginning of the civil war, 
 and since the first publication of my book, on which 
 I should wish to say something in detail — I mean the 
 financial events. These lie within the scope of my pecu- 
 liar studies, and it is comparatively easy to judge of them, 
 since whatever may be the case with refined statistical 
 
236 THE EEFOBM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 reasoning, the great results of money matters speak to 
 and interest ail mankind. And every incident in this 
 part of American financial history exemplifies the con- 
 trast between a Parliamentary and a Presidential Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 The distinguishing quality of Parliamentary Govern- 
 ment is, that in each stage of a public transaction there is 
 a discussion; that the public assist at this discussion; that 
 it can, through Parliament, turn out an administration 
 which is not doing as it likes, and can put in an adminis- 
 tration which will do as it likes. But the characteristic 
 of a Presidential Government is, in a multitude of cases, 
 that there is no such discussion ; that when there is a 
 discussion the fate of Government does not turn upon it, 
 and, therefore, the people do. not attend to it ; that upon 
 the whole the administration itself is pretty much doing 
 as it likes, and neglecting as it likes, subject always to 
 the check that it must not too much offend the mass of 
 the nation. The nation commonly does not attend, but if 
 by gigantic blunders you make it attend, it will remember 
 it and turn you out when its time comes ; it will show 
 you that your power is short, and so on the instant 
 weaken that power; it will make your present life in 
 office unbearable and uncomfortable by the hundred 
 modes in which a free people can, without ceasing, act 
 upon the rulers which it elected yesterday, and will have 
 to reject or re-elect to-morrow. 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. . 237 
 
 In finance the most striking effect in America has, on 
 the first view of it, certainly been good. It has enabled 
 the Government to obtain and to keep a vast surplus of 
 revenue over expenditure. Even before the civil war it 
 did this— from 1837 to 1857. Mr. Wells tells us that, 
 strange as it may seem, ' there was not a single year in 
 which the unexpended balance in the National Treasury 
 — derived from various sources — at the end of the year, 
 was not in excess of the total expenditure of the pre- 
 ceding year; while in not a few years the unexpended 
 balance was absolutely greater than the sum of the entire 
 expenditure of the twelve months preceding.' But this 
 history before the war is nothing to what has happened 
 since. The following are the surpluses of revenue over 
 expenditure since the end of the civil war : — 
 
 Surplus. 
 Year ending June 30. £ 
 
 1866 5,593,000 
 
 1867 21,586,000 
 
 1868 4,242,000 
 
 1869 . ... 7,418,000 
 
 1870 . . . 18,627,000 
 
 1871 16,712,000 
 
 No one who knows anything of the working of Par- 
 liamentary Government, will for a moment imagine that 
 any Parliament would have allowed any executive to 
 keep a surplus of this magnitude. In England, after the 
 French war, the Government of that day, Avhich had 
 brought it to a happy end, which had the glory of 
 
238 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 Waterloo, which was in consequence exceedingly strong, 
 which had besides elements of strength from close 
 boroughs and Treasury influence such as certainly no 
 Government has ever had since, and such perhaps as no 
 Government ever had before — that Government proposed 
 to keep a moderate surplus and to apply it to the re- 
 duction of the debt, but even this the English Parliament 
 would not endure. The administration with all its power 
 derived both from good and evil had to yield; the income 
 tax was abolished, with it went the surplus, and with the 
 surplus all chance of any considerable reduction of the 
 debt for that time. In truth taxation is so painful that 
 in a sensitive community which has strong organs of ex- 
 pression and action, the maintenance of a great surplus is 
 excessively difficult. The opposition will always say that 
 it is unnecessary, is uncalled for, is injudicious; the cry 
 will be echoed in every constituency ; there will be a 
 series of large meetings in the great cities ; even in the 
 smaller constituencies there will mostly be smaller meet- 
 ings ; every member of Parliament will be pressed upon 
 by those who elect him ; upon this point there will be no 
 distinction between town and country, the country gentle- 
 man and the farmer disliking high taxes as much as any 
 in the towns. To maintain a great surplus by heavy taxes 
 to pay off debt has never yet in this country been possible, 
 and to maintain a surplus of the American magnitude 
 would be plainly impossible. 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEEKS. 239 
 
 Some part of the difference between England and 
 America arises undoubtedly not from political causes but 
 from economical. America is not a country sensitive to 
 taxes ; no great country has perhaps ever been so unsen- 
 sitive in this respect ; certainly she is far less sensitive 
 than England. In reality America is too rich; daily 
 industry there is too common, too skilful, and too pro- 
 ductive, for her to care much for fiscal burdens. She 
 is applying all the resources of science and skill and 
 trained labour, which have been in long ages painfully 
 acquired in old countries, to develop with great speed the 
 richest soil and the richest mines of new countries ; and 
 the result is untold wealth. Even under a Parliamentary 
 Government such a community could and would bear 
 taxation much more easily than Englishmen ever would. 
 
 But difference of physical character in this respect is 
 of little moment in comparison with difference of political 
 constitution. If America were under a Parliamentary 
 Government, she would soon be convinced that in main- 
 taining this great surplus and in paying this high tax- 
 ation she would be doing herself great harm. She is not 
 performing a great duty, but perpetrating a great in- 
 justice. She is injuring posterity by crippling and dis- 
 placing industry, far more than she is aiding it by re- 
 ducing the taxes it will have to pay. In the first place, 
 the maintenance of the present high taxation compels 
 the retention of many taxes which are contrary to the 
 
240 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867 ; AND 
 
 maxims of free trade. Enormous customs duties are 
 necessary, and it would be all but impossible to impose 
 equal excise duties even if the Americans desired it. In 
 consequence, besides what the Americans pay to the 
 Government, they are paying a great deal to some of 
 their own citizens, and so are rearing a set of industries 
 which never ought to have existed, which are bad specu- 
 lations at present because other industries would have 
 paid better, and which may cause a great loss out of 
 pocket hereafter when the debt is paid off and the 
 fostering tax withdrawn. Then probably industry will 
 return to its natural channel, the artificial trade will be 
 first depressed, then discontinued, and the fixed capital 
 employed in the trade will all be depreciated and much 
 of it be worthless. Secondly, all taxes on trade and 
 manufacture are injurious in various ways to them. You 
 cannot put on a great series of such duties without 
 cramping trade in a hundred ways and without diminish- 
 ing their productiveness exceedingly. America is now 
 working in heavy fetters, and it would probably be better 
 for her to lighten those fetters even though a generation 
 or two should have to pay rather higher taxes. Those 
 generations would really benefit, because they would be 
 so much richer that the slightly increased cost of govern- 
 ment would never be perceived. At any rate, under a 
 Parliamentary Government this doctrine would have 
 been incessantly inculcated ; a whole party would have 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 241 
 
 made it their business to preach it, would have made 
 incessant small motions in Parliament about it, which is 
 the way to popularize their view. And in the end I do 
 not doubt that they would have prevailed. They would 
 have had to teach a lesson both pleasant and true, and 
 such lessons are soon learned. On the whole, therefore, 
 the result of the comparison is that a Presidential Govern- 
 ment makes it much easier than the Parliamentary to 
 maintain a great surplus of income over expenditure, 
 but that it does not give the same facility for examining 
 whether it be good or not good to maintain a surplus, and, 
 therefore, that it works blindly, maintaining surpluses 
 when they do extreme harm just as much as when they 
 are very beneficial. 
 
 In this point the contrast of Presidential with Par- 
 liamentary Government is mixed; one of the defects 
 of Parliamentary Government probably is the difficulty 
 under it of maintaining a surplus revenue to discharge 
 debt, and this defect Presidential Government escapes, 
 though at the cost of being likely to maintain that sur- 
 plus upon inexpedient occasions as well as upon expedient. 
 But in all other respects a Parliamentary Government 
 has in finance an unmixed advantage over the Presiden- 
 tial in the incessant discussion Though in one single 
 case it produces evil as well as good, in most cases it 
 produces good orily. And three of these cases are illus- 
 trated by recent American experience. 
 
 E 
 
242 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 First, as Mr. Goldwin Smith — no unfavourable judge 
 of anything American — justly said some years since, the 
 capital error made by the United States Government 
 was the ' Legal Tender Act/ as it is called, by which it 
 made inconvertible paper notes issued by the Treasury 
 the sole circulating medium of the country. The tempta- 
 tion to do this was very great, because it gave at once a 
 great war fund when it was needed, and with no pain to 
 any one. If the notes of a Government supersede the 
 metallic currency medium of a country to the extent of 
 #80,000,000, this is equivalent to a recent loan of 
 #80,000,000 to the Government for all purposes within 
 the country. Whenever the precious metals are not 
 required, and for domestic purposes in such a case they 
 are not required, notes will buy what the Government 
 want, and it can buy to the extent of its issue. But, 
 like all easy expedients out of a great difficulty, it is 
 accompanied by the greatest evils; if it had not been 
 so, it would have been the regular device in such cases, 
 and the difficulty would have been no difficulty at all ; 
 there would have been a known easy way out of it. As 
 is well known, inconvertible paper issued by Government 
 is sure to be issued in great quantities, as the American 
 currency soon was ; it is sure to be depreciated as against 
 coin ; it is sure to disturb values and to derange markets ; 
 it is certain to defraud the lender; it is certain to give 
 the borrower more than he ought to have. In the case 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 243 
 
 of America there was a further evil. Being a new 
 country, she ought in her times of financial want to 
 borrow of old countries ; but the old countries were 
 frightened by the probable issue of unlimited inconvertible 
 paper, and they would not lend a shilling. Much more 
 than the mercantile credit of America was thus lost. 
 The great commercial houses in England are the most 
 natural and most effectual conveyers of intelligence from 
 other countries to Europe. If they had been financially 
 interested in giving in a sound report as to the progress 
 of the war, a sound report we should have had. But as 
 the Northern States raised no loans in Lombard Street 
 (and could raise none because of their vicious paper 
 money), Lombard Street did not care about them, and 
 England was very imperfectly informed of the progress 
 of the civil struggle, and on the whole matter, which was 
 then new and very complex, England had to judge with- 
 out having her usual materials for judgment, and (since 
 the guidance of the 'City' on political matter is very 
 quietly and imperceptibly given) without knowing she 
 had not those materials. 
 
 Of course, this error might have been committed, and 
 perhaps would have been committed under a Parlia- 
 mentary Government. But if it had, its effects would 
 ere long have been thoroughly searched into and effect- 
 ually frustrated. The whole force of the greatest in- 
 quiring machine and the greatest discussing machine 
 
244 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 which the world has ever known would have been 
 directed to this subject. In a year or two the American 
 public would have had it forced upon them in every 
 form till they must have comprehended it. But under 
 the Presidential form of Government, and owing to the 
 inferior power of generating discussion, the information 
 given to the American people has been imperfect in the 
 extreme. And in consequence, after nearly ten years of 
 painful experience, they do not now understand how much 
 they have suffered from their inconvertible currency. 
 
 But the mode in which the Presidential Government 
 of America managed its taxation during the Civil War, is 
 even a more striking example of its defects. Mr. Wells 
 tells us : — 
 
 ' In the outset all direct or internal taxation was 
 avoided, there having been apparently an apprehension 
 on the part of Congress, that inasmuch as the people had 
 never been accustomed to it, and as all machinery for 
 assessment and collection was wholly wanting, its adop- 
 tion would create discontent, and thereby interfere with 
 a vigorous prosecution of hostilities. Congress, therefore, 
 confined itself at first to the enactment of measures 
 looking to an increase of revenue from the increase of 
 indirect taxes upon imports ; and it was not until four 
 months after the actual outbreak of hostilities that a 
 direct tax of #20,000,000 per annum was apportioned 
 among the States, and an income tax of 3 per cent, on 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 2-io 
 
 the excess of all incomes over $800 was provided for ; 
 the first being made to take effect practically eight, and 
 the second ten months after date of enactment. Such 
 laws of course took effect, and became immediately- 
 operative in the loyal States only, and produced but 
 comparatively little revenue ; and although the range of 
 taxation was soon extended, the whole receipts from all 
 sources by the Government for the second year of the 
 war, from excise, income, stamp, and all other internal 
 taxes, were less than $42,000,000 ; and that, too, at a 
 time when the expenditures were in excess $60,000,000 
 per month, or at the rate of over $700,000,000 per annum. 
 And as showing how novel was this whole subject of 
 direct and internal taxation to the people, and how com- 
 pletely the Government officials were lacking in all ex- 
 perience in respect to it, the following incident may be 
 noted. The Secretary of the Treasury, in his report for 
 1863, stated that, with a view of determining his re- 
 sources, he employed a very competent person, with the 
 aid of practical men, to estimate the probable amount of 
 revenue to be derived from each department of internal 
 taxation for the previous year. The estimate arrived at 
 was $85,000,000, but the actual receipts were only 
 $37,000,000.' 
 
 Now, no doubt, this might have happened under a 
 Parliamentary Government. But, then, many members of 
 Parliament, the entire opposition in Parliament, would 
 
246 THE REFORM ACT OF 1867; AND 
 
 have been active to unravel the matter. All the principles 
 of finance "would have been worked and propounded. 
 The light would have come from above, not from below — 
 it would have come from Parliament to the nation instead 
 of from the nation to Parliament. But exactly the 
 reverse happened in America. Mr. Wells goes on to 
 say:— 
 
 ' The people of the loyal States were, however, more 
 determined and in earnest in respect to this matter of 
 taxation than were their rulers ; and before long the 
 popular discontent at the existing state of things was 
 openly manifest. Everywhere the opinion was expressed 
 that taxation in all possible forms should immediately, 
 and to the largest extent, be made effective and impera- 
 tive ; and Congress spurred up, and rightfully relying on 
 public sentiment to sustain their action, at last took up 
 the matter resolutely and in earnest, and devised and 
 inaugurated a system of internal and direct taxation, 
 which for its universality and peculiarities has probably 
 no parallel in anything which has heretofore been recorded 
 in civil history, or is likely to be experienced hereafter. 
 The one necessity of the situation was revenue, and to 
 obtain it speedily and in large amounts through taxation 
 the only principle recognized — if it can be called a prin- 
 ciple — was akin to that recommended to the traditionary 
 Irishman on his visit to Donnybrook Fair, " Wherever 
 you see a head hit it." Wherever you find an article, a 
 
THE FUNCTION OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS. 247 
 
 product, a trade, a profession, or a source of income, tax 
 it ! And so an edict went forth to this effect, and the 
 people cheerfully submitted. Incomes under $5,000 
 were taxed 5 per cent., with an exemption of $600 
 and house rent actually paid ; these exemptions being 
 allowed on this ground, that they represented an amount 
 sufficient at the time to enable a small family to procure 
 the bare necessaries of life, and thus take out from the 
 operation of the law all those who were dependent upon 
 each day's earnings to supply each day's deeds. Incomes 
 in excess of $5,000 and not in excess of $10,000 were 
 taxed 2| per cent, in addition ; and incomes over $10,000 
 5 per cent, additional, without any abeyance or exemp- 
 tions whatever.' 
 
 Now this is all contrary to and worse than what would 
 have happened under a Parliamentary Government. The 
 delay to tax would not have occurred under it: the 
 movement by the country to get taxation would never 
 have been necessary under it. The excessive taxation 
 accordingly imposed would not have been permitted 
 under it. The last point I think I need not labour at 
 length. The evils of a bad tax are quite sure to be 
 pressed upon the ears of Parliament in season and out of 
 season; the few persons who have to pay it are thoroughly 
 certain to make themselves heard. The sort of taxation 
 tried in America, that of taxing everything, and seeing 
 what everything would yield, could not have been tried 
 
248 THE REFORM ACT OF 1SG7. 
 
 under a Government delicately and quickly sensitive to 
 public opinion. 
 
 I do not apologize for dwelling at length upon these 
 points, for the subject is one of transcendent importance. 
 The practical choice of first-rate nations is between the 
 Presidential Government and the Parliamentary ; no State 
 can be first-rate which has not a Government by dis- 
 cussion, and those are the only two existing species of 
 that Government. It is between them that a nation 
 which has to choose its Government must choose. And 
 nothing therefore can be more important than to compare 
 the two, and to decide upon the testimony of experience, 
 and by facts, which of them is the better. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 FEINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON ANU BliCCLES. 
 
A LIST OF 
 
 KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH & CO.'S 
 PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 2-85 
 
i , PaUrnostti Square, 
 
 London. 
 
 A LIST OF 
 
 KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH & CO.'S 
 
 PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 
 PAGE 
 2 
 
 Military Works. 
 
 PAGE 
 • 33 
 
 . 21 
 
 
 
 • 23 
 
 Works of Fiction 
 
 . 42 
 
 tific 
 
 Books for the Young 
 
 • 43 
 
 ■ 30 
 
 
 
 Ceneral Literature. 
 Parchment Library . 
 Pulpit Commentary . 
 International Scientific 
 Series . . 
 
 GENERAL LITERATURE. 
 
 A. K. H. B. — From a Quiet Place. A Volume of Sermons. 
 Crown 8vo, 5^. 
 
 ALLEN, Rev. R., M.A.— Abraham ", his Life, Times, and 
 Travels, 3800 years ago. With Map. Second Edition. 
 Post 8vo, 6s. 
 
 ALLIES, T. W., M.A.— Per Crucem ad Lucem. The Result of a 
 Life. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, 25-r. 
 
 A Life's Decision. Crown 8vo, "js. bd. 
 
 ALLNATT, F.J. 3., £.£>.— The "Witness of St. Matthew. An 
 Inquiry into the Sequence of Inspired Thought pervading the 
 First Gospel, and into its Result of Unity, Symmetry, and Com- 
 pleteness, as a Perfect Portrait of the Perfect Man. Crown 8vo, 5^. 
 
 AMOS, Professor Sheldon. — The History and Principles of the 
 Civil Law of Rome. An aid to the Study of Scientific and 
 Comparative Jurisprudence. Demy 8vo. 16s. 
 
 Ancient and Modern Britons. A Retrospect. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, 
 24J. 
 
Kegan Paid, Trench & Co.'s Publications. 3 
 
 ANDERDON, Rev. W. .#.— Fasti Apostolici ; a Chronology of &.t 
 Years between the Ascension of our Lord and the Martyrdom 
 of SS. Peter and Paul. Second Edition. Enlarged. Square 
 8vo, $s. 
 
 Evenings -with the Saints. Crown 8vo, 51. 
 
 ANDERSON, David; — "Scenes" in the Commons. Crown Svo, 5*. 
 
 ARMSTRONG, Richard A., B.A.— Latter-Day Teachers. Six 
 
 Lectures. Small crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 A USER TIN, J. J.— A Flight to Mexico. With Seven full-page 
 
 Illustrations and a Railway Map of Mexico. Crown 8vo, "]s. 6d. 
 
 BADGER, George Percy, D.C.L.— An English- Arabic Lexicon. 
 
 In which the equivalent for English Words and Idiomatic 
 
 Sentences are rendered into literary and colloquial Arabic. 
 
 Royal 4to, 80*. 
 BAGEHOT, Walter. — The English Constitution. New and 
 
 Revised Edition. Crown 8vo, "]s. 6d. 
 
 Lombard Street. A Description of the Money Market. Eighth 
 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, Js. 6d. 
 Essays on Parliamentary Reform. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 Some Articles on the Depreciation of Silver, and Topics 
 connected with it. Demy 8vo, 5-r. 
 
 BAGENAL, Philip H. — The American-Irish and their In- 
 fluence on Irish Politics. Crcwn Svo, $s. 
 
 BAGOT, Alan, C.E.— Accidents in Mines: their Causes and 
 Prevention. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 The Principles of Colliery Ventilation. Second Edition, 
 
 greatly enlarged. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 The Principles of Civil Engineering in Estate Manage- 
 ment. Crown 8vo, Js. 6d. 
 BAKER, Sir Sherston, Bart. — The Laws relating to Quarantine. 
 Crown Svo, \2s. 6d. 
 
 BALDWIN, Capt. J. fl.—The Large and Small Game of 
 
 Bengal and the North-Western Provinces of India. 
 
 With 20 Illustrations. New and Cheaper Edition. Small 4to, 
 
 10s. 6d. 
 BALLIN, Ada S. and F. L.—A Hebrew Grammar. With 
 
 Exercises selected from the Bible. Crown 8vo, Js. 6d. 
 
 BARCLAY, Edgar.— Mountain Life in Algeria. With numerous 
 Illustrations by Photogravure. Crown 4to, 16s. 
 
 BARLOW, James H.— The Ultimatum of Pessimism. An 
 Ethical Study. Demy 8vo, 6s. 
 
 BARNES, William.— Outlines of Redecraft (Logic). With 
 English Wording. Crown 8vo, 3^. 
 
4 A List of 
 
 BAUR, Ferdinand, Dr. Ph.— A Philological Introduction to 
 Greek and Latin for Students. Translated and adapted 
 from the German, by C. Kegan Paul, M.A., and E. D. 
 Stone, M.A. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 BELLARS, Rev. W.— The Testimony of Conscience to the 
 Truth and Divine Origin of the Christian Revela- 
 tion. Burney Prize Essay. Small crown 8vo, y. 6d. 
 
 BELLAS1S, Edward.— -The Money Jar of Plautus at the 
 Oratory School. An Account of the Recent Representation. 
 With Appendix and 16 Illustrations. Small 4to, sewed, 2s. 
 
 BELLINGHAM, Henry, M.P.— Social Aspects of Catholicism 
 and Protestantism in their Civil Bearing upon 
 Nations. Translated and adapted from the French of M. le 
 Baron de Haullevili.e. With a Preface by His Eminence 
 Cardinal Manning. Second and Cheaper Edition. Crown 
 8vo, y. 6d. 
 
 BELLINGHAM, H. Belsches Graham.— Vps and Downs of 
 Spanish Travel. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 BENN, Alfred W. — The Greek Philosophers. 2 vols. Demy 
 8vo, 28s. 
 
 BENT, J. Theodore.— Genoa : How the Republic Rose and Fell. 
 With 18 Illustrations. Demy 8vo, l8.r. 
 
 Bihle Folk-Lore. A Study in Comparative Mythology. Crown Svo, 
 \os. 6d. 
 
 BIRD, Charles, F.G.S. — Higher Education in Germany and 
 England. Being a brief Practical Account of the Organization 
 and Curriculum of the German Higher Schools. With critical 
 Remarks and Suggestions with reference to those of England. 
 Small crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 BLACKLEY, Rev. W. S.— Essays on Pauperism. i6mo. Cloth, 
 is. 6d. ; sewed, is. 
 
 BLECKLY, Henry. — Socrates and the Athenians : An Apology. 
 Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 BLOOMFIELD, The Lady.— Reminiscences of Court and Dip- 
 lomatic Life. New and Cheaper Edition. With Frontispiece. 
 Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 BLUNT, The Ven. Archdeacon. — The Divine Patriot, and other 
 Sermons. Preached in Scarborough and in Cannes. New 
 and Cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo, 4s. 6d. 
 
 BLUNT, Wilfred S— The Future of Islam. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 BODDY, Alexander A, — To Kairwan the Holy. Scenes in 
 
 Muhammedan Africa. With Route Map, and eight Illustrations 
 
 by A. F. Jacassey. Crown Svo, 6s. 
 
 BOOLE, Afarj'.— Symbolical Methods of Study. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.'s Publications. 5 
 
 BOUVERIE-PVSEY, S. E. ^.—Permanence and Evolution. 
 An Inquiry into the Supposed Mutability of Animal Types. 
 Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 BOWEN, H. C, M.A.— Studies in English. For the use of Modern 
 Schools. Seventh Thousand. Small crown 8vo, is. 6d. 
 
 English Grammar for Beginners. Fcap. 8vo, is. 
 
 Simple English Poems. English Literature for Junior Classes. 
 In four parts. Parts I., II., and III., 6d. each. Part IV., is. 
 Complete, 3^. 
 
 BRADLEY, F. If.— The Principles of Logic. Demy 8vo, 16/. 
 
 BRIDGET!, Rev. T. E.— History of the Holy Eucharist in 
 Great Britain. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, i8j. 
 
 BRODRICK, the Hon. G. C— Political Studies. Demy 8vo, i+v. 
 
 BROOKE, Rev. S. A.— Lite and Letters of the Late Rev. F. W. 
 Robertson, M. A. Edited by. 
 
 I. Uniform with Robertson's Sermons. 2 vols. With Steel 
 Portrait. Js. 6d. 
 II. Library Edition. With Portrait. 8vo, 12s. 
 III. A Popular Edition. In I vol., 8vo, 6s. 
 
 The Fight of Faith. Sermons preached on various occasions. 
 Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo, 7*. 6d. 
 
 The Spirit of the Christian Life. Third Edition. Crown 
 
 8vo, $s. 
 Theology in the English Poets. — Cowper, Coleridge, Words-, 
 
 worth, and Burns. Fifth Edition. Post 8vo, $s. 
 
 Christ in Modern Life. Sixteenth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5* 
 
 Sermons. First Series. Thirteenth Edition. Crown Svo, 5^. 
 
 Sermons. Second Series. Sixth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5.1. 
 
 BROWN, Rev. J. Baldwin, B.A.—The Higher Life. Its Reality, 
 Experience, and Destiny. Sixth Edition. Crown Svo, $s. 
 
 Doctrine of Annihilation in the Light of the Gospel of 
 Love. Five Discourses. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 The Christian Policy of Life. A Book for Young Men of 
 Business. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, y. 6d. 
 
 BROWN, S. Borton, B.A.—The Fire Baptism of all Flesh : 
 
 or, The Coming Spiritual Crisis of the Dispensation. Crown 
 
 8vo, 6s. 
 BROWN, Horatio /".—Life on the Lagoons. With two Illustrations 
 
 and Map. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 BROWNBILL, John.— Principles of English Canon Law. 
 
 Part I. General Introduction. Crown Svo, 6s. 
 BROWNE, W. R.—The Inspiration of the New Testament. 
 
 With a Preface by the Rev. J. P. Norms, D.D. Fcap. Svo, 2s. 6d. 
 
6 A List of 
 
 BURDETT, Henry C— Help in Sickness— "Where to Go and 
 What to Do. Crown 8vo, is. 6d. 
 Helps to Health. The Habitation— The Nursery— The School- 
 room and — The Person. With a Chapter on Pleasure and Health 
 Resorts. Crown 8vo, is. 6d. 
 
 BURTON, Mrs. Richard.— The Inner Life of Syria, Palestine, 
 and the Holy Land. Post 8vo, 6s. 
 
 BUSBECQ, Ogier Ghiselin de. — His Life and Letters. By Charles 
 Thornton Forster, M.A., and F. H. Blackburne Daniell, 
 M.A. 2 vols. ' With Frontispieces. Demy 8vo, 24J. 
 
 CARPENTER, IV. B., LL.D., M.D., F.R.S., etc.— The Principles 
 of Mental Physiology. With their Applications to the 
 Training and Discipline of the Mind, and the Study of its Morbid 
 Conditions. Illustrated. Sixth Edition. 8vo, 12s. 
 
 Catholic Dictionary. Containing some Account of the Doctrine, 
 Discipline, Rites, Ceremonies, Councils, and Religious Orders of 
 the Catholic Church. By William E. Addis and Thomas 
 Arnold, M.A. Second Edition. Demy 8vo, 2i.r. 
 
 CER VANTES. —Journey to Parnassus. Spanish Text, with'Trans- 
 lation into English Tercets, Preface, and Illustrative Notes, by 
 James Y. Gibson. Crown 8vo, 12s. 
 
 CHEYNE, Rev. T. K.—The Prophecies of Isaiah. Translated 
 with Critical Notes and Dissertations. 2 vols. Third Edition. 
 Demy Svo, 25J. 
 
 CHICHELE, Mary.— Doing and Undoing. A Stoiy. 1 vol. 
 Crown 8vo. 
 
 CLAIRAUT.— Elements of Geometry. Translated by Dr. 
 Kaines. With 145 Figures. Crown 8vo, 4s. 6d. 
 
 CLARKE, Rev. Henry James, A. ICC. — The Fundamental Science. 
 Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d. 
 
 CLAYDEN, P. fT.— Samuel Sharpe. Egyptologist and Translator 
 of the Bible. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 CLIFFORD, Samuel— -"What Think Ye of the Christ? Crown 
 8vo, 6s. 
 
 CLODD, Ed-ward, F.R.A.S.—The Childhood of the World : a 
 Simple Account of Man in Early Times. Seventh Edition. 
 Crown 8vo, 3s. 
 
 A Special Edition for Schools, is. 
 
 The Childhood of Religions. Including a Simple Account of 
 the Birth and Growth of Myths and Legends. Eighth Thousand. 
 Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 A Special Edition for Schools, is. 6d. 
 
 Jesus of Nazareth. With a brief sketch of Jewish History to the- 
 Time of His Birth. Small crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.'s Publications. 7 
 
 COGHLAN, J. Cole, Z>.2?.— The Modern Pharisee and other 
 Sermons. Edited by the Very Rev. H. H. Dickinson, D.D., 
 Dean of Chapel Royal, Dublin. New and Cheaper Edition. 
 Crown 8vo, Js. 6d. 
 
 COLE, George R. Fitz-Roy. — The Peruvians at Home. Crown 
 8vo, bs. 
 
 COLERIDGE, Sara. — Memoir and Letters of Sara Coleridge. 
 
 Edited by her Daughter. With Index. Cheap Edition. With 
 Portrait. 7^. 6d. 
 
 Collects Exemplified. Being Illustrations from the Old and New 
 Testaments of the Collects for the Sundays after Trinity. By the 
 Author of " A Commentary on the Epistles and Gospels." Edited 
 by the Rev. Joseph Jackson. Crown 8vo, Sj. 
 
 CONNELL, A. ^—Discontent and Danger in India. Small 
 crown 8vo, ■$$. 6d. 
 The Economic Revolution of India. Crown 8vp, 4s. 6d. 
 
 CORY, William.— A. Guide to Modern English History. Part I. 
 — MDCCCXV.-MDCCCXXX. Demy 8vo, 9s. Part II.— 
 MDCCCXXX.-MDCCCXXXV., 15?. 
 
 COTTERILL, H. B.—An Introduction to the Study of Poetry. 
 Crown 8vo, Js. 6d. 
 
 COUTTS, Francis Burdett Money.— -The Training of the Instinct 
 of Love. With a Preface by the Rev. Edward Thring, M. A. 
 Small crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 COX, Rev. Sir George W., M.A., Bart— The Mythology of the 
 Aryan Nations. New Edition. Demy 8vo, 16s. 
 
 Tales of Ancient Greece. New Edition. Small crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 A Manual of Mythology in the form of Question and 
 Answer. New Edition. Fcap. 8vo, 3^. 
 
 An Introduction to the Science of Comparative Myth- 
 ology and Folk-Lore. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. is. 6d. 
 
 COX, Rev. Sir G. W., M.A., Bart., and JONES, Eustace Hinton.— 
 Popular Romances of the Middle Ages. Third 
 Edition, in I vol. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 COX, Rev. Samiiel, D.D.— A Commentary on the Book of Job. 
 
 With a Translation. Demy 8vo, 1 5 J. 
 Salvator Mundi ; or, ^Is Christ the Saviour of all Men ? Ninth 
 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 The Larger Hope. A Sequel to "Salvator Mundi." Second 
 
 Edition. i6mo, is. 
 The Genesis of Evil, and other Sermons, mainly expository. 
 
 Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 Balaam. An Exposition and a Study. Crown 8vo, 5.?. 
 Miracles. An Argument and a Challenge. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
8 A List of 
 
 CRA FEN, Mrs— A. Year's Meditations. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 CRAWFURD, Oswald.— Portugal, Old and New. With Illustra- 
 tions and Maps. New and Cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Crime of Christmas Day. A Tale of the Latin Quarter. By the 
 Author of " My Ducats and my Daughter." IJ-. 
 
 CROZIER, John Beattie, M.B.—Tlie Religion of the Future. 
 
 Crown 8vOj 6s. 
 DANIELL, Clarmont.—T'h.e Gold Treasure of India. An Inquiry 
 
 into its Amount, the Cause of its Accumulation, and the Proper 
 
 Means of using it as Money. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 Danish Parsonage. By an Angler. Crown 8vo, 6j-. 
 
 Darkness and Dawn : the Peaceful Birth of a New Age. Small 
 crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 DAVIDSON, Rev. Samuel, D.D., LL.D— Canon of the Bible; 
 
 Its Formation, History, and Fluctuations. Third and Revised 
 Edition. Small crown 8vo, 5^. 
 
 The Doctrine of Last Things contained in the New Testa- 
 ment compared with the Notions of the Jews and the Statements 
 of Church Creeds. Small crown 8vo, $s. 6d. 
 
 DA VIDSON, Thomas.— The Parthenon Frieze, and other Essays. 
 Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 DAWSON, Geo., M.A. Prayers, with a Discourse on Prayer. 
 
 Edited by his Wife. First Series. Eighth Edition. Crown 
 8vo, 6s. 
 *„* Also a New and Cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo, 3^. 6d. 
 
 Prayers, -with a Discourse on Prayer. Edited by George 
 St. Clair. Second Series. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Sermons on Disputed Points and Special Occasions. 
 
 Edited by his Wife. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Sermons on Daily Life and Duty. Edited by his Wife. 
 Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 The Authentic Gospel, and other Sermons. Edited by 
 George St. Clair. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Three Books of God : Nature, History, and Scripture. 
 
 Sermons edited by George St. Clair. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 DE JONCOURT, Madame Marie.— Wholesome Cookery. Third 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 3^. 6d. 
 
 DE LONG, Lieitt. Com. G. XV.— The Voyage of the Jeannette. 
 The Ship and Ice Journals of. Edited by his Wife, Emma 
 De Long. With Portraits, Maps, and many Illustrations on 
 wood and stone. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, 36^. 
 
 Democracy in the Old World and the New. By the Author 
 of " The Suez Canal, the Eastern Question, and Abyssinia," etc. 
 Small crown 8vo, zs. 6d. 
 
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.'s Publications. 9 
 
 DEVEREUX, W. Cope, R.N., F.R.G.S.— Fair Italy, the Riviera, 
 and Monte Carlo. Comprising a Tour through North and 
 South Italy and Sicily, with a short account of Malta. Crown 
 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Doing and Undoing. A Story. By Mary Chichele. i vol. 
 Crown 8vo. 
 
 DOWDEN, Edward, LL.D.— Shakspere : a Critical Study of his 
 Mind and Art. Seventh Edition. Post 8vo, 12*. 
 
 Studies in Literature, 1789-1877. Third Edition. Large 
 post 8vo, 6s. 
 
 DUFFIELD, A. J.— Don Quixote : his Critics and Commen- 
 tators. With a brief account of the minor works of Miguel de 
 Cervantes Saavedra, and a statement of the aim and end of 
 the greatest of them all. A handy book for general readers. 
 Crown 8vo, 3.5. 6d. 
 
 DU MONCEL, Count— The Telephone, the Microphone, and 
 the Phonograph. With 74 Illustrations. Second Edition. 
 Small crown 8vo, 5^. 
 
 DURUY, Victor.— History of Rome and the Roman People. 
 Edited by Prof. Mahaffy. With nearly 3000 Illustrations. 4to. 
 Vols. I. II. and III. in 6 parts, 30J. each vol. 
 
 EDGEWORTH, F. Y— Mathematical Psychics. An Essay on 
 the Application of Mathematics to Social Science. Demy 8vo, 
 •js. 6d. 
 
 Educational Code of the Prussian Nation, in its Present 
 Form. In accordance with the Decisions of the Common Pro- 
 vincial Law, and with those of Recent Legislation. Crown 8vo, 
 2s. 6d. 
 
 Education Library. Edited by Philip Magnus :— 
 
 An Introduction to the History of Educational 
 
 Theories. By Oscar Browning, M.A. Second Edition. 
 
 y. 6d. 
 Old Greek Education. By the Rev. Prof. Mahaffy, M.A. 
 
 Second Edition. 3^. 6d. 
 School Management. Including a general view of the work 
 
 of Education, Organization and Discipline. By Joseph Landon. 
 
 Third Edition. 6s. 
 
 Eighteenth Century Essays. Selected and Edited by Austin 
 D0BS0N. With a Miniature Frontispiece by R. Caldecott. 
 Parchment Library Edition, 6s. ; vellum, "js. 6d. 
 
 ELSDALE, Henry.— Studies in Tennyson's Idylls. Crown 8vo, 5*. 
 
 ELYOT, Sir Thomas— The Boke named the Gouernour. Edited 
 from the First Edition of 1531 by Henry Herbert Stephen 
 Croft, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. 2 vols. Fcap. 4to, 50J. 
 
io A List of 
 
 Emerson's (Ralph "Waldo) Life. By Oliver Wendell Holmes. 
 English Copyright Edition. With Portrait. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Enoch the Prophet. The Book of. Archbishop Laurence's Trans- 
 lation, with an Introduction by the Author of " The Evolution of 
 Christianity." Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 Eranus. A Collection of Exercises in the Alcaic and Sapphic Metres. 
 Edited by F. W. Cornish, Assistant Master at Eton. Second 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, zs. 
 
 EVANS, Marti.— The Story of Our Father's Love, told to 
 Children. Sixth and Cheaper Edition. With Four Illustrations. 
 Fcap. 8vo, is. 6d. 
 
 "Fan Kwae" at Canton before Treaty Days 1825-1844. 
 
 By an old Resident. With Frontispiece. Crown 8vo, 5/. 
 
 FEIS, Jacob. — Shakspere and Montaigne. An Endeavour to 
 Explain the Tendency of Hamlet from Allusions in Contemporary 
 Works. Crown Svo, 5*. 
 
 FLECKER, Rev. Eliezer. — Scripture Onomatology. Being Critical 
 Notes on the Septuagint and other Versions. Second Edition. 
 Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 FLOREDICE, W. //.—A Month among the Mere Irish. Small 
 crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 FOWLE, Rev. T. Jf.— The Divine Legation of Christ. Crown 
 8vo, 7-r. 
 
 Frank. Leward. Edited by Charles Bampton. Crown 8vo, Js. 6d. 
 
 FULLER, Rev. Morris. — The Lord's Day ; or, Christian Sunday. 
 
 Its Unity, History, Philosophy, and Perpetual Obligation. 
 Sermons. Demy 8vo, lor. 6d. 
 
 GARDINER, Samuel R., and J. BASS MULLINGER, M.A.— 
 Introduction to the Study of English History. Second 
 Edition. Large crown 8vo, 9s. 
 
 GARDNER, Dorsey. — Quatre Bras, Ligny, and Waterloo. A 
 Narrative of the Campaign in Belgium, 1815. With Maps and 
 Plans. Demy 8vo, i6j. 
 
 Genesis in Advance of Present Science. A Critical Investigation 
 of Chapters I.-IX. By a Septuagenarian Beneficed Presbyter. 
 Demy 8vo. iar. 6d. 
 
 GENNA, E. — Irresponsible Philanthropists. Being some 
 Chapters on the Employment of Gentlewomen. Small crown 
 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 GEORGE, Henry.— Progress and Poverty : An Inquiry into the 
 Causes of Industrial Depressions, and of Increase of Want with 
 Increase of Wealth. The Remedy. Fifth Library Edition. 
 Post 8vo, ys. 6d. Cabinet Edition. Crown Svo, zs. 6d. Also a 
 Cheap Edition. Limp cloth, is. 6d. Paper covers, Is. 
 
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.'s Publications. n 
 
 GEORGE, Henry — continued. 
 
 Social Problems. Fourth Thousand. Crown Svo, $s. Cheap 
 Edition. Paper covers, is. 
 
 GIBSON, James Y. —Journey to Parnassus. Composed by Miguel 
 de Cervantes Saavedra. Spanish Text, with Translation into 
 English Tercets, Preface, and Illustrative Notes, by. Crown 
 8vo, 12s. 
 
 Glossary of Terms and Phrases. Edited by the Rev. H. Percy 
 Smith and others. Medium 8vo, 12s. 
 
 GLOVER, F, MI. A.— Exempla Lat.ina. A First Construing Book, 
 with Short Notes, Lexicon, and an Introduction to the Analysis 
 of Sentences. Second Edition. Fcap. 8vo, zs. 
 
 GOLDSMID, Sir Francis Henry, Bart., Q.C., ^/./".—Memoir of. 
 With Portrait. Second Edition, Revised. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 GOODENOUGII, Commodore J. G — Memoir of, with Extracts from 
 his Letters and Journals. Edited by his Widow. With Steel 
 Engraved Portrait. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, c,s. 
 
 GOSSE, Edmund. — Studies in the Literature of Northern 
 Europe. New Edition. Large crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Seventeenth Century Studies. A Contribution to the History 
 of English Poetry. Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d. 
 
 GOULD, Rev. S. Baring, M.A. — Germany, Present and Past. 
 New and Cheaper Edition. Large crown 8vo, Js. 6d. 
 
 GOWAN, Major Walter E. — A. Ivanoff's Russian Grammar. 
 (16th Edition.) Translated, enlarged, and arranged for use of 
 Students of the Russian Language. Demy 8vo, 6s. 
 
 GOWER, Lord Ronald. My Reminiscences. Cheap Edition. 
 With Portrait. Large crown Svo, Js. 6d. 
 
 GRAHAM, William, M.A.— The Creed of Science, Religious, Moral, 
 and Social. Second Edition, Revised. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 GREY, Rowland.— In Sunny Switzerland. A Tale of Six Weeks. 
 Small crown 8vo, 5^. 
 
 GRIFFITH, Thomas, A.M.— The Gospel of the Divine Life : a 
 Study of the Fourth Evangelist. Demy 8vo, 14^. 
 
 GRIMLEY, Rev. H. JV., M.A.~Treraa.doc Sermons, chiefly on 
 the Spiritual Body, the Unseen "World, and the 
 Divine Humanity. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 G. S. B. — A Study of the Prologue and Epilogue in English 
 Literature from Shakespeare to Dryden. Crown 
 Svo, 5-r. 
 
 GUSTAFSON, Alex.— The Foundation of Death. Third Edition. 
 Crown Svo, $s. 
 
12 A List of 
 
 HAECKEL, Prof. Ernst.— The History of Creation. Translation 
 revised by Professor E. Ray Lankester, M.A., F.R.S. With 
 Coloured Plates and Genealogical Trees of the various groups 
 of both Plants and Animals. 2 vols. Third Edition. Post 
 8vo, 32J. 
 
 The History of the Evolution of Man. With numerous 
 Illustrations. 2 vols. Post 8vo, 32s. 
 
 A Visit to Ceylon. Post 8vo, Js. 6d. 
 
 Freedom in Science and Teaching. With a Prefatory Note 
 by T. H. Huxley, F.R.S. Crown 8vo, 5s. 
 
 Half-Crown Series : — 
 
 A Lost Love. By Anna C. Ogle [Ashford Owen]. 
 
 Sister Dora : a Biography. By Margaret Lonsdale. 
 
 True Words for Brave Men : a Book for Soldiers and Sailors. 
 By the late Charles Kingsley. 
 
 Notes of Travel : being Extracts from the Journals of Count Von 
 Moltke. 
 
 English Sonnets. Collected and Arranged by J. Dennis. 
 
 London Lyrics. By F. Locker. 
 
 Home Songs for Quiet Hours. By the Rev. Canon R. H. 
 Baynes. 
 
 HARRIS, William.— The. History of the Radical Party in 
 Parliament. Demy 8vo, 15J. 
 
 HARROP, Robert.— Bolingbroke. A Political Study and Criticism. 
 Demy8vo, 14J. 
 
 HART, Rev. J. W. T.— The Autobiography of Judas Iscariot. 
 
 A Character Study. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 HAWEIS, Rev. H. R., M.A.— Current Coin. Materialism— The 
 Devil — Crime — Drunkenness — Pauperism — Emotion — Recreation 
 — The Sabbath. Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5*. 
 
 Arrows in the Air. Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5^. 
 
 Speech in Season. Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 Thoughts for the Times. Thirteenth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5*. 
 
 Unsectarlan Family Prayers. New Edition. Fcr.p. 8vo, 
 Is. 6d. 
 
 HAWKINS, Edwards Comerford. — Spirit and Form. Sermons 
 preached in the Parish Church of Leatherhead. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 HAWTHORNE, Nathaniel— -Works. Complete in Twelve Volumes. 
 Large post 8vo, p. 6d. each volume. 
 
 Vol. I. Twice-told Tales. 
 
 II. Mosses from an Old Manse. 
 
 III. The House of the Seven Gables, and The Snow 
 Image. 
 
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.'s Publications. 13 
 
 HA WTHORNE, Nathaniel— continued. 
 
 Vol. IV. The Wonderbook, Tanglewood Tales, and Grand 
 father's Chair. 
 V. The Scarlet Letter, and The Blithedale Romance. 
 VI. The Marble Faun. [Transformation.] 
 
 v Yly" \ Our Old Home, and English Note-Books. 
 
 IX. American Note-Books. 
 X. Frenxh and Italian Note-Books. 
 XI. Septimius Felton, The Dolliver Romance, Fanshawe, 
 and, in an Appendix, The Ancestral Footstep. 
 XII. Tales and Essays, and other Papers, with a Bio- 
 graphical Sketch of Hawthorne. 
 
 HA YES, A. A., Junr.—N&w Colorado, and the Santa Fe Trail. 
 With Map and 60 Illustrations. Square 8vo, qs. 
 
 HENNESSY, Sir John Pope.— Ralegh in Ireland. With his Letters 
 on Irish Affairs and some Contemporary Documents. Large crown 
 8vo, printed on hand-made paper, parchment, ios. bd. 
 
 HENRY, Philip.— Diaries and Letters of. Edited by Matthew 
 Henry Lee, M.A. Large crown 8vo, Js. 6d. 
 
 HIDE, Albert. — The Age to Come. Small crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 HIME, Major H. W. L., R.A.— Wagnerism : A Protest. Crown 
 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 HINTON, J.— Life and Letters. With an Introduction by Sir '\y. 
 W. Gull, Bart., and Portrait engraved on Steel by C. H. Jeens. 
 Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo, 8s. 6d. 
 
 Philosophy and Religion. Selections from the Manuscripts of 
 the late James Hinton. Edited by Caroline Haddon. Second 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, Sj. 
 
 The Law Breaker, and The Coming of the Law. 
 Edited by MARGARET HlNTON. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 The Mystery of Pain. New Edition. Fcap. 8vo, is. 
 
 Hodson of Hodson's Horse ; or, Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life 
 in India. Being extracts from the Letters of the late Major 
 W. S. R. Hodson. With a Vindication from the Attack of Mr. 
 Bosworth Smith. Edited by his brother, G. H. Hodson, M.A. 
 Fourth Edition. Large crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 HOLTHAM, E. G.— Eight Years in Japan, 1873-1881. Work, 
 Travel, and Recreation. With three Maps. Large crown 8vo, gs. 
 
 Homology of Economic Justice. An Essay by an East India 
 Merchant. Small crown 8vo, 5^. 
 
 HOOPER, Mary.— Little Dinners : How to Serve them with 
 Elegance and Economy. Eighteenth Edition. Crown 
 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
14 A List of 
 
 HOOPER, Mary— continued. 
 
 Cookery for Invalids, Persons of Delicate Digestion, 
 
 and Children. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 Every-Day Meals. Being Economical and Wholesome Recipes 
 for Breakfast, Luncheon, and Supper. Sixth Edition. Crown 
 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 HOPKINS, £7/z'«. — Work amongst Working Men. Fifth 
 Edition. Crown Svo, y. 6d. 
 
 HOSPITALIER, .£.— The Modern Applications of Electricity. 
 
 Translated and Enlarged by Julius Maier, Ph.D. 2 vols. 
 Second Edition, Revised, with many additions and numerous 
 Illustrations. Demy 8vo, 12s. 6d. each volume. 
 
 Vol. I. — Electric Generators, Electric Light. 
 
 Vol. II. — Telephone : Various Applications : Electrical 
 Transmission of Energy. 
 
 Household Readings on Prophecy. By a Layman. Small 
 crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 HUGHES, Henry— The Redemption of the World. Crown 8vo, 
 3*. 6d. 
 
 HUNTINGFORD, Rev. E., D.C.L.—The Apocalypse. With a 
 Commentary and Introductory Essay. Demy 8vo, 5^. 
 
 HUTCHINSON, #".— Thought Symbolism, and Grammatic 
 Illusions. Being a Treatise on the Nature, Purpose and 
 Material of Speech. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 IIUTTON, Rev. C. P.— Unconscious Testimony ; or, The Silent 
 Witness of the Hebrew to the Truth of the Historical Scriptures. 
 Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 HYNDMAN, II. M— The Historical Basis of Socialism in 
 England. Large crown 8vo, 8*. 6d. 
 
 IM THURN, Everard P.— Among the Indians of Guiana. 
 Being Sketches, chiefly anthropologic, from the Interior of British 
 Guiana. With 53 Illustrations and a Map. Demy 8vo, 18s. 
 
 JACCOUD, Prof. S.— The Curability and Treatment of Pul- 
 monary Phthisis. Translated and edited by Montagu 
 Lubbock, M.D. Demy 8vo, 15^. 
 
 Jaunt in a Junk : A Ten Days' Cruise in Indian Seas. Large crown 
 8vo, 7-r. 6d. 
 
 JENKINS, E., and RAYMOND, J.— The Architect's Legal 
 Handbook. Third Edition, revised. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 JENNINGS, Mrs. Vaughan.— Rahel : Her Life and Letters. Large 
 post 8vo, "js. 6d. 
 
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.'s Ptiblications. 15 
 
 JERVIS, Rev. W. Henley.— The Gallican Church and the 
 Revolution. A Sequel to the History of the Church of 
 France, from the Concordat of Bologna to the Revolution. 
 Demy 8vo, lis. 
 
 JOEL, L. — A Consul's Manual and Shipowner's and Ship- 
 master's Practical Guide in their Transactions 
 Abroad. With Definitions of Nautical, Mercantile, and Legal 
 Terms ; a Glossary of Mercantile Terms in English, French, 
 German, Italian, and Spanish ; Tables of the Money, Weights, 
 and Measures of the Principal Commercial Nations and their 
 Equivalents in British Standards ; and Forms of Consular and 
 Notarial Acts. Demy 8vo, 12s. 
 
 JOHNSTONE, C. F., AT. A.— Historical Abstracts: being Outlines 
 of the History of some of the less known States of Europe. 
 Crown 8vo, Is. 6d. 
 
 JOLLY, William, F.R.S.E., etc.— The Life of John Duncan, 
 Scotch "Weaver and Botanist. With Sketches of his 
 Friends and Notices of his Times. Second Edition, Large 
 crown 8vo, with Etched Portrait, gs. 
 
 JONES, C. A.— The Foreign Freaks of Five Friends. With 30 
 Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 JOYCE, P. W., LL.D., etc.—OlA Celtic Romances. Translated 
 from the Gaelic. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 KAUFMANN, Rev. M., B.A. — Socialism : its Nature, its Dangers, 
 and its Remedies considered. Crown 8vo, ys. 6d. 
 
 Utopias ; or, Schemes of Social Improvement, from Sir Thomas 
 More to Karl Marx. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 KA Y, David, F.R.G.S. — Education and Educators. Crown Svo, 
 •js. 6d. 
 
 KAY, Joseph. — Free Trade in Land. Edited by his Widow. With 
 Preface by the Right Hon. John Bright, M.P. Seventh 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 5^. 
 
 KEMPIS, Thomas a.— Of the Imitation of Christ. Parchment 
 Library Edition. — Parchment or cloth, 6s. ; vellum, Js. 6d. The 
 Red Line Edition, fcap. 8vo, red edges, 2s. 6d. The Cabinet 
 Edition, small 8vo, cloth limp, is. ; cloth boards, red edges, is. 6d. 
 The Miniature Edition, red edges, 32mo, Is. 
 *„* All the above Editions may be had in various extra bindings. 
 
 KENT, C. — Corona Catholica ad Petri successoris Pedes 
 Oblata. De Summi Pontiflcis Leonis XIII. As- 
 sumptione Epigramma. In Quinquaginta Linguis. Fcap. 
 4to, i^s. 
 
16 A List of 
 
 KETTLEWELL, Rev. S.— Thomas a Kempis and the Brothers 
 
 of Common Life. 2 vols. With Frontispieces. Demy 8vo, 
 
 30J. 
 *„* Also an Abridged Edition, in one volume. With Portrait. Crown 
 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 KIDD, Joseph, M.D.— The Laws of Therapeutics ; or, the Science 
 
 and Art of Medicine. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 KINGSFORD, Anna, M.D.— The Perfect Way in Diet. A 
 
 Treatise advocating a Return to the Natural and Ancient Food of 
 
 our Race. Small crown 8vo, zs. 
 
 KINGSLEY, Charles, M.A.— Letters and Memories of his Life. 
 
 Edited by his Wife. With two Steel Engraved Portraits, and 
 
 Vignettes on Wood. Fifteenth Cabinet Edition. 2 vols. Crown 
 
 8vo, 12.?. 
 
 * t * Also a People's Edition, in one volume. With Portrait. Crows 
 
 8vo, 6^. 
 
 All Saints' Day, and other Sermons. Edited by the Rev. W. 
 Harrison. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, Js. 6d. 
 
 True "Words for Brave Men. A Book for Soldiers' and 
 Sailors' Libraries. Eleventh Edition. Crown 8vo, zs. 6d. 
 
 KNOX, Alexander A. — The New Playground ; or, Wanderings in 
 Algeria. New and Cheaper Edition. Large crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 LANDON, Joseph. — School Management ; Including a General View 
 of the Work of Education, Organization, and Discipline. Third 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 LAURIE, S. S. — The Training of Teachers, and other Educational 
 Papers. Crown 8vo, "]s. 6d. 
 
 LEE, Rev. F. G., D.C.L.— The Other World ; or, Glimpses of the 
 Supernatural. 2 vols. A New Edition. Crown 8vo, i$s. 
 
 Letters from an Unknown Friend. By the Author of " Charles 
 Lowder." With a Preface by the Rev. W. H. Cleaver. Fcap. 
 8vo, is. 
 
 Letters from a Young Emigrant in Manitoba. Second Edition. 
 Small crown 8vo, 3^. 6d. 
 
 Leward, Frank. Edited by Charles Bampton. Crown 8vo, p. 6d. 
 
 LEWIS, Edward Dillon.— A Draft Code of Criminal Law and 
 Procedure. Demy 8vo, z\s. 
 
 LILLIE, Arthur, M.R.A.S.— The Popular Life of Buddha. 
 Containing an Answer to the Hibbert Lectures of 1881. With 
 Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 LLO YD, Walter.— The Hope of the "World : An Essay on Universal 
 Redemption. Crown 8vo, 5^. 
 
 LONSDALE, Margaret.— -Sister Dora : a Biography. With Portrait. 
 Cheap Edition. Crown 8vo, zs. 6d. 
 
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.'s Publications. ij 
 
 •LOUNSBURY, Thomas R.~ James Fenimore Cooper. With 
 Portrait. Crown 8vo, Sj. 
 
 LOWDER, Charles.— A Biography. By the Author of " St. Teresa." 
 New and Cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo. With Portrait. 3s. 6J. 
 
 LUCKES, Eva C. E.— Lectures on General Nursing, delivered to 
 the Probationers of the London Hospital Training School for 
 Nurses. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 LYALL, William Rome, D.D. — Propaedeia Prophetica ; or, The 
 
 Use and Design of the Old Testament Examined. New Edition. 
 With Notices by George C. Pearson, M.A., Hon. Canon of 
 Canterbury. Demy 8vo. 
 
 LYTTOJV, Edward Balwer, Lord. — Life, Letters and Literary 
 Remains. By his Son, the Earl of Lytton. With Portraits, 
 Illustrations and Facsimiles. Demy 8vo. Vols. I. and II., 32.1'. 
 
 MACAULAY, G. C— Francis Beaumont : A Critical Study. Crown 
 8vo, $s. 
 
 MAC CALLUM, M. W.— Studies in Low German and High 
 German Literature. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 MACHIAVELLI, Niccoli.— Life and Times. By Prof. Villarl 
 Translated by Linda Villaiu. 4 vols. Large post, 8vo, $s. 
 
 MACHIAVELLI, Niccoli.— Discourses on the First Decade of 
 Titus Livius. Translated from the Italian by Ninian Hill 
 Thomson, M.A. Large crown 8vo, \2s. 
 
 The Prince. Translated from the Italian by N. H. T. Small 
 crown 8vo, printed on hand-made paper, bevelled boards, 6s. 
 
 MACKENZIE, Alexander. — How India is Governed. Being an 
 Account of England's Work in India. Small crown 8vo, 2s. 
 
 MACNAUGHT, Rev. John. — Coena Domini : An Essay on the Lord's 
 Supper, its Primitive Institution, Apostolic Uses, and Subsequent 
 History. Demy 8vo, 14J. 
 
 MACWALTER, Rev. G. S.— Life of Antonio Rosmini Serbati 
 (Founder of the Institute of Charity). 2 vols. Demy 8vo. 
 
 [Vol. I. now ready, price 12s. 
 
 MAGNUS, Mrs.— About the Jews since Bible Times. From the 
 Babylonian Exile till the English Exodus. Small crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 MAIR, R. S., M.D., F.R.C.S.E.—Th.e Medical Guide for Anglo- 
 Indians. Being a Compendium of Advice to Europeans in 
 India, relating to the Preservation and Regulation of Health. 
 AVith a Supplement on the Management of Children in India. 
 Second Edition. Crown 8vo, limp cloth, 3^. 6d. 
 
 MAIDEN, Henry Elliot.— Vienna, 1683. The History and Conse- 
 quences of the Defeat of the Turks before Vienna, September 
 12th, 1683, by John Sobieski, King of Poland, and Charles ' 
 Leopold, Duke of Lorraine. Crown 8vo, 4s. (id. 
 
 C 
 
1 8 A List of 
 
 Many Voices. A volume of Extracts from the Religious Writers of 
 Christendom from the First to the Sixteenth Century. With 
 Biographical Sketches. Crown 8vo, cloth extra, red edges, 6s. 
 
 MARKHAM, Caft. Albert Hastings, R.M.—The Great Frozen Sea : 
 A Personal Narrative of the Voyage of the Alert during the Arctic 
 Expedition of 1875-6. With 6 Full-page Illustrations, 2 Maps, 
 and 27 Woodcuts. Sixth and Cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 A Polar Reconnaissance : being the Voyage of the Isbjorn 
 to Novaya Zemlya in 1879. With 10 Illustrations. Demy 8vo, \6s. 
 
 Marriage and Maternity ; or, Scripture Wives and Mothers. Small 
 crown 8vo, 4*. 6d. 
 
 MARTINEAU, Gertrude. — Outline Lessons on Morals. Small 
 crown 8vo, 2 s - 6d. 
 
 MAUDSLEY, H., M.D.—lBody and Will. Being an Essay con- 
 cerning Will, in its Metaphysical, Physiological, and Pathological 
 Aspects. 8vo, 12s. 
 
 McGRATH, Terence. — Pictures from Ireland. New and Cheaper 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 2s. 
 
 MEREDITH, M.A.— Theotokos, the Example for Woman. 
 Dedicated, by permission, to Lady Agnes Wood. Revised by 
 the Venerable Archdeacon Denison. 32mo, limp cloth, is. 6d. 
 
 MILLER, Edward. — The History and Doctrines of Irvingism ; 
 or, The so-called Catholic and Apostolic Church. 2 vols. Large 
 post 8vo, 2$s. 
 
 The Church in Relation to the State. Large crown 8vo, 
 •]s. 6d. 
 
 MINCHIN, J. G.— Bulgaria since the War : Notes of a Tour in 
 the Autumn of 1879. Small crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 MITCHELL, Lucy M.—A History of Ancient Sculpture. With 
 numerous Illustrations, including 6 Plates in Phototype. Super 
 royal 8vo, 42s. 
 
 Selections from Ancient Sculpture. Being a Portfolio con- 
 taining Reproductions in Phototype of 36 Masterpieces of Ancient 
 Art to illustrate Mrs. Mitchell's "History of Ancient Sculpture," 
 lSs. 
 
 MITFORD, Bertram.— -Through the Zulu Country. Its Battle, 
 fields and its People. With Five Illustrations. Demy 8vo, 14J. 
 
 MOCKLER, E. — A Grammar of the Baloochee Language, as 
 it is spoken in Makran (Ancient Gedrosia), in the Persia-Arabic 
 and Roman characters. Fcap. 8vo, $s. 
 
 MOLESWORTH, Rev. W. Nassau, M.A.— History of the Church 
 of England from 1660. Large crown 8vo, ?s. 6d 
 
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.'s Publications. 19 
 
 MORELL, y. .ff.— Euclid Simplified in Method and Language. 
 Being a Manual of Geometiy. Compiled from the most important 
 French Works, approved by the University of Paris and the 
 Minister of Public Instruction. Fcap. 8vo, zs. 6d. 
 
 MORRIS, George.— The Duality of all Divine Truth in our 
 Lord Jesus Christ. For God's Self-manifestation in the Impar- 
 tation of the Divine Nature to Man. Large crown 8vo, <]s. 6d. 
 
 MORSE, E. S., Ph.D.— First Book of Zoology. With numerous 
 Illustrations. New and Cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo, zs. 6d. 
 
 MULL, Mathias. — Paradise Lost. By John Milton. Books I — VI. 
 The Mutilations of the Text emended, the Punctuation revised, 
 and all collectively presented, with Notes and Preface ; also 
 a short Essay on the Intellectual Value of Milton's Works, etc. 
 Demy 8vo, 6s. 
 
 MURPHY, John Nicholas.— The Chair of Peter ; or, The Papacy 
 considered in its Institution, Development, and Organization, and 
 in the Benefits which for over Eighteen Centuries it has conferred 
 on Mankind. Demy 8vo, lis. 
 
 Nature's Nursling. A Romance from Real Life. By Lady Ger- 
 trude Stock. 3 vols. Crown 8vo, 31J. 6d. 
 
 NELSON, J. H., M.A.—A. Prospectus of the Scientific Study 
 of the Hindu Law. Demy 8vo, gs. 
 
 NEWMAN, Cardinal. — Characteristics from the "Writings of. 
 
 Being Selections from his various Works. Arranged with the 
 
 Author's personal Approval. Sixth Edition. With Portrait. 
 
 Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 *** A Portrait of Cardinal Newman, mounted for framing, can 
 be had, 2s. 6d. 
 NEWMAN, Francis William. — Essays on Diet. Small crown 8vo, 
 
 cloth limp, 2s. 
 New Truth and the Old Faith: Are they Incompatible? By n 
 
 Scientific Layman. Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d. 
 New Werther. By Loici. Small crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 NICHOLSON, Edward Byron.— The Gospel according to the 
 
 Hebrews. Its Fragments Translated and Annotated, with a 
 
 Critical Analysis of the External and Internal Evidence relating 
 
 to it. Demy 8vo, gs. 6d. 
 A New Commentary on the Gospel according to 
 
 Matthew. Demy 8vo, \zs. 
 
 NICOLS, Arthur, F.G.S., F.R.G.S.— Chapters from the Physical 
 History of the Earth : an Introduction to Geology and 
 Paleontology. With numerous Illustrations. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 NOPS, Marianne. — Class Lessons on Euclid. Part I. containing 
 the First Two Books of the Elements. Crown 8vo, zr. 6d. 
 
 Nuces : Exercises on the Syntax of the Public School Latin 
 Primer. New Edition in Tlvee Parts. Crown 8vo, each is. 
 *„* The Three Parts can also be had bound together, 3-r. 
 
20 A List of 
 
 OATES, Frank, F.R.G.S.—'M.aXahzlfi Land and the Victoria 
 Falls. A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Interior of South 
 Africa. Edited by C. G. Oates, B.A. With numerous Illustra- 
 tions and 4 Maps. Demy 8vo, 21s. 
 
 OGLE, W., M.D., F.R.C.P.—k.vvsXoW<i on the Parts of Animals. 
 
 Translated, with Introduction and Notes. Royal 8vo, \2s. 6d. 
 
 O'JLAGAN, Lord, K.P. — Occasional Papers and Addresses. 
 Large crown 8vo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 OKEN, Lorenz, Life of. By Alexander Ecker. With Explanatory 
 Notes, Selections from Oken's Correspondence, and Portrait of the 
 Professor. From the German by Alfred Ttjlk. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 CfMEARA, Kathleen. — Frederic Ozanam, Professor of the Sorbonne: 
 His Life and Work. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, "]s. 6d. 
 
 Henri Perreyve and his Counsels to the Sick. Small 
 crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 OSBORNE, Rev. W. A.— The Revised Version of the New Tes- 
 tament. A Critical Commentary, with Notes upon the Text. 
 Crown 8vo, 5s. 
 
 OTTLEY, H. Bic&ersteth.—The Great Dilemma. Christ His Own 
 Witness or His Own Accuser. Six Lectures. Second Edition. 
 Crown 8vo, 3.?. 6d. 
 
 Our Public Schools — Eton, Harrow, Winchester, Rugby, 
 "Westminster, Marlborough, The Charterhouse. 
 Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 OWEN, F. M.—John Keats : a Study. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Across the Hills. Small crown 8vo, is. 6d. 
 
 OWEN, Rev. Robert, B.D.— Sanctorale Catholicum ; or, Book of 
 Saints. With Notes, Critical, Exegetical, and Historical. Demy 
 8vo, i8j. 
 
 OXENHAM, Rev. F. Nutcomoe.—'VJha.t is the Truth as to Ever- 
 lasting Punishment. Part II. Being an Historical Inquiry 
 into the Witness and Weight of certain Anti-Origenist Councils. 
 Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 OXONIENSIS. — Romanism, Protestantism, Anglicanism. 
 Being a Layman's View of some questions of the Day. Together 
 with Remarks on Dr. Littledale's "Plain Reasons against join- 
 ing the Church of Rome. " Crown 8vo, y. 6d. 
 
 PALMER, the late William. — Notes of a Visit to Russia in 
 1840-1841. Selected and arranged by John H. Cardinal 
 Newman, with portrait. Crown 8vo, 8s. 6d. 
 
 Early Christian Symbolism. A Series of Compositions from 
 Fresco Paintings, Glasses, and Sculptured Sarcophagi. Edited 
 by the Rev. Provost Northcote, D.D., and the Rev. Canon 
 Brownlow, M.A. With Coloured Plates, folio, 42J., or with 
 Plain Plates, folio, z\s. 
 
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.'s Publications. 21 
 
 Parchment Library. Choicely Printed on hand-made paper, limp 
 parchment antique or cloth, 6s. ; vellum, 7^. 6d. each volume. 
 
 Selections from the Prose "Writings of Jonathan Swift. 
 With a Preface and Notes by Stanley Lane-Poole and 
 Portrait. 
 
 English Sacred Lyrics. 
 
 Sir Joshua Reynolds's Discourses. Edited by Edmund 
 Gosse. 
 
 Selections from Milton's Prose "Writings. Edited by 
 Ernest Myers. 
 
 The Book of Psalms. Translated by the Rev. T. K. Cheyne, 
 
 M.A. 
 
 The Vicar of Wakefield. With Preface and Notes by Austin 
 Dobson. 
 
 English Comic Dramatists. Edited by Oswald Crawfurd. 
 
 English Lyrics. 
 
 The Sonnets of John Milton. Edited by Mark Pattison. 
 With Portrait after Vertue. 
 
 ■French Lyrics. Selected and Annotated by George Saints- 
 bury. With a Miniature Frontispiece designed and etched by 
 H. G. Glindoni. 
 
 Fables by Mr. John Gay. With Memoir by Austin Dobson, 
 and an Etched Portrait from an unfinished Oil Sketch by Sir 
 Godfrey Kneller. 
 
 Select Letters of Percy Bysshe Shelley. Edited, with an 
 Introduction, by Richard Garnett. 
 
 The Christian Year. Thoughts in Verse for the Sundays and 
 Holy Days throughout the Year. With Miniature Portrait of the 
 Rev. J. Keble, after a Drawing by G. Richmond, R.A. 
 
 Shakspere's "Works. Complete in Twelve Volumes. 
 
 Eighteenth Century Essays. Selected and Edited by Austin 
 Dobson. With a Miniature Frontispiece by R. Caldecott. 
 
 Q. Horati Flacci Opera. Edited by F. A. Cornish, Assistant 
 Master at Eton. With a Frontispiece after a design by L. Alma 
 Tadema, etched by Leopold Lowenstam. 
 
 Edgar Allan Poe's Poems. With an Essay on Ins Poetry by 
 Andrew Lang, and a Frontispiece by Linley Sambourne. 
 
 Shakspere's Sonnets. Edited by Edward Dowden. With a 
 Frontispiece etched by Leopold Lowenstam, after the Death 
 Mask. 
 
 English Odes. Selected by Edmund Gosse. With Frontis- 
 piece on India paper by Hamo Thornycroft, A. R.A. 
 
22 A List of 
 
 Parchment Library — continued. 
 
 Of the Imitation of Christ. By Thomas X Kempis. A 
 revised Translation. With Frontispiece on India paper, from a 
 Design by W. B. Richmond. 
 
 Poems : Selected from Percy Bysshe Shelley. Dedicated to 
 Lady Shelley. With a Preface by Richard Garnett and a 
 Miniature Frontispiece. 
 
 *„* The above volumes may also be had in a variety of leather bindings. 
 
 PARSLOE, Joseph. — Our Rail-ways. Sketches, Historical and 
 Descriptive. With Practical Information as to Fares and Rates, 
 etc., and a Chapter on Railway Reform. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 PASCAL, Blaise. — The Thoughts of. Translated from the Text of 
 Auguste Molinier, by C. Kegan Paul. Large crown 8vo, with 
 Frontispiece, printed on hand-made paper, parchment antique, or 
 cloth, 1 2 j. ; vellum, 15-r. 
 
 PAUL, Alexander. — Short Parliaments. A History of the National 
 Demand for frequent General Elections. Small crown 8vo, 3^. bd. 
 
 PAUL, C. Kegan. — Biographical Sketches. Printed on hand-made 
 paper, bound in buckram. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, Is. 6d. 
 
 PEARSON, Rev. S.— "Week-day Living. A Book for Young Men 
 and Women. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 5s. 
 
 PESCHEL, Dr. Oscar. — The Races of Man and their Geo- 
 graphical Distribution. Second Edition. Large crown 
 8vo, 9s. 
 
 PETERS, F. H. — The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Trans- 
 lated by. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 PHIPSON, E. — The Animal Lore of Shakspeare's Time. 
 Including Quadrupeds, Birds, Reptiles, Fish and Insects. Large 
 post 8vo, gs. 
 
 PIDGEON, D. — An Engineer's Holiday ; or, Notes of a Round 
 Trip from Long. o° to 0°. New and Cheaper Edition. Large 
 crown 8vo, Js. 6d. 
 Old "World Questions and New "World Answers. Large 
 crown 8vo, Js. 6d. 
 
 POE, Edgar Allan. — "Works of. With an Introduction and a Memoir 
 by Richard Henry Stoddard. In 6 vols. With Frontispieces 
 and Vignettes. Large crown 8vo, 6s. each. 
 
 POPE, J. Buckingham. — Railway Rates and Radical Rule. 
 
 Trade Questions as Election Tests. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 PRICE, Prof. Bonamy. — Chapters on Practical Political 
 Economy. Being the Substance of Lectures delivered before 
 the University of Oxford. New and Cheaper Edition. Large 
 post 8vo, 5$. 
 
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.'s Publications. 23 
 
 Pulpit Commentary, The. (Old Testament Series.) Edited by the 
 Rev. J. S. Exell, M.A., and the Rev. Canon H. D. M. Spence. 
 
 Genesis. By the Rev. T. Whitelaw, M.A. With Homilies by 
 the Very Rev. J. F. Montgomery, D.D., Rev. Prof. R. A. 
 Redford, M.A., LL.B., Rev. F. Hastings, Rev. W. 
 Roberts, M.A. An Introduction to the Study of the Old 
 Testament by the Venerable Archdeacon Farrar, D.D., F.R.S. ; 
 and Introductions to the Pentateuch by the Right Rev. H. Cot- 
 terill, D.D., and Rev. T. Whitelaw, M.A. Eighth Edition. 
 1 vol., 15^. 
 
 Exodus. By the Rev. Canon Rawlinson. With Homilies by 
 Rev. J. Orr, Rev. D. Young, B.A., Rev. C. A. Goodhart, 
 Rev. J. Urquhart, and the Rev. H. T. Robjohns. Fourth 
 Edition. 2 vols., i8j. 
 
 Leviticus. By the Rev. Prebendary Meyrick, M.A. With 
 Introductions by the Rev. R. Collins, Rev. Professor A. Cave, 
 and Homilies by Rev. Prof. Redford, LL.B., Rev. J. A. 
 Macdonald, Rev. W. Clarkson, B.A., Rev. S. R. Aldridge, 
 LL.B., and Rev. McCheyne Edgar. Fourth Edition. 15J. 
 
 Numbers. By the Rev. R. Winterbotham, LL.B. With 
 Homilies by the Rev. Professor W. Binnie, D.D., Rev. E. S. 
 Prout, M.A., Rev. D. Young, Rev. J". Waite, and an Intro- 
 duction by the Rev. Thomas Whitelaw, M.A. Fourth 
 Edition. 15^. 
 
 Deuteronomy. By the Rev. W. L. Alexander, D.D. With 
 Homilies by Rev. C Clemance, D.D., Rev. J. Orr, B.D., 
 Rev. R. M. Edgar, M.A., Rev. D. Davies, M.A. Third 
 edition. 151. 
 
 Joshua. By Rev. J. J. Lias, M.A. With Homilies by Rev. 
 S. R. Aldridge, LL.B., Rev. R. Glover, Rev. E. de 
 Pressense, D.D., Rev. J. Waite, B.A., Rev. W. F. Adeney, 
 M.A. ; and an Introduction by the Rev. A. Plummer, M.A. 
 Fifth Edition. \zs. 6d. 
 
 Judges and Ruth. By the Bishop of Bath and Wells, and 
 Rev. J. Morison, D.D. With Homilies by Rev. A. F. MuiR, 
 M.A., Rev. W. F. Adeney, M.A., Rev. W. M. Statham, and 
 Rev. Professor J. Thomson, M.A. Fourth Edition. 10s. 6d. 
 
 1 Samuel. By the Very Rev. R. P. Smith, D.D. With Homilies 
 by Rev. Donald Fraser, D.D., Rev. Prof. Chapman, and 
 Rev. B. Dale. Sixth Edition. 15J. 
 
 3 Kings. By the Rev. Joseph Hammond, LL.B. With Homilies 
 by the Rev. E. de Pressense, D.D., Rev. J. Waite, B.A., 
 Rev. A. Rowland, LL.B., Rev. J. A. Macdonald, and Rev. 
 J. Urquhart. Fourth Edition. 15*. 
 
 1 Chronicles. By the Rev. Prof. P. C. Barker, M.A., LL.B. 
 With Homilies by Rev. Prof. J. R. Thomson, M.A., Rev. R.,' 
 Tuck, B.A., Rev. W. Clarkson, B.A., Rev. F. Whitfield, 
 M.A., and Rev. Richard Glover, iy 
 
24 A List of 
 
 Pulpit Commentary, The — continued. 
 
 Ezra, Nehemiah, and Esther. By Rev. Canon G. Rawlinson, 
 M.A. With Homilies by Rev. Prof. J. R. Thomson, M.A., Rev. 
 Prof. R. A. Redford, LL.B., M.A., Rev. W. S. Lewis, M.A., 
 Rev. J. A. Macdonald, Rev. A. Mackennal, B.A., Rev. W. 
 Clarkson, B.A., Rev. F. Hastings, Rev. W. Dinwiddie, 
 LL.B., Rev. Prof. Rowlands, B.A., Rev. G. Wood, B.A., 
 Rev. Prof. P. C. Barker, M.A., LL.B., and the Rev. J. S. 
 Exeix, M.A. Sixth Edition. I vol., 12s. 6d. 
 Jeremiah. (Vol. I.) By the Rev. T. K. Cheyne, M.A. With 
 Homilies by the Rev. W. F. Adeney, M.A., Rev. A. F. Muir, 
 M.A., Rev. S. Conway, B.A., Rev. J. Waite, B.A., and Rev. 
 D. Young, B.A. Second Edition. i$s. 
 
 Jeremiah (Vol. II.) and Lamentations. By Rev. T. K. 
 Cheyne, M.A. With Homilies by Rev. Prof. J. R. Thomson, 
 M.A., Rev. W. F. Adeney, M.A., Rev. A. F. Muir, M.A.,. 
 Rev. S. Conway, B.A., Rev. D. Young, B.A. 15-r. 
 
 Pulpit Commentary, The. (New Testament Series.) 
 
 St. Mark. By Very Rev. E. Bickersteth, D.D., Dean of Lich- 
 field. With Homilies by Rev. Prof. Thomson, M.A., Rev. Prof. 
 Given, M.A., Rev. Prof. Johnson, M.A., Rev. A. Rowland,. 
 B.A., LL.B., Rev. A. Muir, and Rev. R. Green. Fourth 
 Edition. 2 vols., 211. 
 
 The Acts of the Apostles. By the Bishop of Bath and Wells. 
 With Homilies by Rev. Prof. P. C Barker, M.A., LL.B:, Rev. 
 Prof. E. Johnson, M.A., Rev. Prof, R. A. Redford, M.A., 
 Rev. R. Tuck, B.A., Rev. W. Clarkson, B.A. Second Edition. 
 2 vols., 21S. 
 
 1 Corinthians. By the Ven. Archdeacon Farrar, D.D. With 
 Homilies by Rev. Ex-Chancellor Lipscomb, LL.D., Rev. 
 David Thomas, D.D., Rev. D. Fraser, D.D., Rev. Prof. 
 J. R. Thomson, M.A., Rev. J. Waite, B.A., Rev. R. Tuck, 
 B.A., Rev. E. Hurndall, M.A., and Rev. H. Bremner, B.D. 
 Second Edition. Price 15J. 
 
 PUSEY, Dr. — Sermons for the Church's Seasons from 
 Advent to Trinity. Selected from the Published Sermons 
 of the late Edward Bouverie Pusey, D.D. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 RADCLIFFE, Frank R. K— The New Politicus. Small crown 8vo, 
 2s. 6d. 
 
 RANK'S, Leopold von. — Universal History. The oldest Historical 
 Group of Nations and the Greeks. Edited by G. W. Prothero. 
 Demy 8vo, ids. 
 
 Realities of the Future Life. Small crown 8vo, is. 6d. 
 
 REND ELL, J. M.— Concise Handbook of the Island off 
 Madeira. With Plan of Funchal and Map of the Island. Fcap. 
 8vo, is. dd. 
 
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.'s Publications. 25 
 
 REYNOLDS, Rev. J. W.—The Supernatural in Nature. A 
 Verification by Free Use of Science. Third Edition, Revised 
 and Enlarged. Demy 8vo, 14s. 
 The Mystery of Miracles. Third and Enlarged Edition. 
 Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 The Mystery of the Universe ; Our Common Faith. Demy 
 8vo, 14*. 
 
 RIBOT, Prof. Th. — Heredity : A Psychological Study on its Phenomena, 
 its Laws, its Causes, and its Consequences. Second Edition. 
 Large crown 8vo, gs. 
 
 RIMMER, William, M.D.— Art Anatomy. A Portfolio of 81 Plates. 
 Folio, 70J. , nett. 
 
 ROBERTSON, The late Rev. F. W., M.A.—tAte and Letters of. 
 Edited by the Rev. Stopford Brooke, M.A. 
 I. Two vols., uniform with the Sermons. With Steel Portrait. 
 Crown 8vo, "]s. 6d. 
 II. Library Edition, in Demy 8vo, with Portrait, izr. 
 III. A Popular Edition, in 1 vol. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 Sermons. Four Series. Small crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. each. 
 The Human Race, and other Sermons. Preached at Chelten- 
 ham, Oxford, and Brighton. New and Cheaper Edition. Small 
 crown 8vo, 3-f. 6d. 
 Notes on Genesis. New and Cheaper Edition. Small crown 8vo, 
 
 3.?. 6d. 
 Expository Lectures on St. Paul's Epistles to the 
 Corinthians. A New Edition. Small crown 8vo, 5^. 
 
 Lectures and Addresses, with other Literary Remains. A New 
 
 Edition. Small crown 8vo, 5.5. 
 An Analysis of Tennyson's " In Memoriam." (Dedicated 
 
 by Permission to the Poet-Laureate.) Fcap. 8vo, 2s. 
 The Education of the Human Race. Translated from the 
 
 German of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. Fcap. 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 The above Works can also be had, bound in half morocco. 
 *„* A Portrait of the late Rev. F. W. Robertson, mounted for framing, 
 
 can be had, 2s. 6d. 
 
 ROMANES, G. J. — Mental Evolution in Animals. With a 
 Posthumous Essay on Instinct by Charles Darwin, F.R.S. 
 Demy 8vo, \2s. 
 
 ROSMINI SERB ATI, A., Founder of the Institute of Charity. Life. 
 By G. Stuart Mac Walter. 2 vols. 8vo. 
 
 [Vol. I. now ready, \zs. 
 
 Rosmini's Origin of Ideas. Translated from the Fifth Italian 
 Edition of the Nuovo Saggio SulV origine delle idee. 3 vols. 
 Demy 8vo, cloth, \6s. each. 
 
 Rosmini's Psychology. 3 vols. Demy 8vo: [Vol. I. now ready, \6s. 
 
26 A List of 
 
 Rosmini's Philosophical System. Translated, with a Sketch oi 
 the Author's Life, Bibliography, Introduction, and Notes by 
 Thomas Davidson. Demy 8vo, \6s. 
 
 RULE, Martin, M.A. — The Life and Times of St. Anselm, 
 
 Archbishop of Canterbury and Primate of the 
 
 Brltains. 2 vols. Demy Svo, 32V. 
 SAMUEL, Sydney M. — Jewish Life in the East. Small crown 
 
 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 SARTORIUS, Ernestine.— Three Months in the Soudan. With 
 
 1 1 Full-page Illustrations. Demy 8vo, 14J. 
 SA YCE, Rev. Archibald Henry. — Introduction to the Science of 
 
 Language. 2 vols. Second Edition. Large post 8vo, 2\s. 
 
 Scientific Layman. The New Truth and the Old Faith : are they 
 Incompatible ? Demy 8vo, ior. 6d. 
 
 SCOONES, W. Baptiste.— Four Centuries of English Letters: 
 A Selection of 350 Letters by 150 Writers, from the Period of the 
 Paston Letters to the Present Time. Third Edition. Large 
 crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 SEE, PROF. GERMAIN.— Ba.cillaTy Phthisis of the Lungs. 
 Translated and edited for English Practitioners by William 
 Henry Weddell, M.R.C.S. Demy 8vo. 
 
 SH1LLITO, Rev. Joseph.— "Womanhood : its Duties, Temptations, 
 and Privileges. A Book for Young Women. Third Edition. 
 Crown 8vo, y. 6d. 
 
 SHIPLEY, Rev. Orby, M.A.— Principles of the Faith in Rela- 
 tion to Sin. Topics for Thought in Times of Retreat, 
 Eleven Addresses delivered during a Retreat of Three Days to 
 Persons living in the World. Demy 8vo, I2.r. 
 
 SIDNEY, Algernon. — A Review. By Gertrude M. Ireland Black- 
 BURNE. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Sister Augustine, Superior of the Sisters of Charity at the St. 
 Johannis Hospital at Bonn. Authorised Translation by HANS 
 Tharatj, from the German " Memorials of Amalie von 
 Lasaulx." Cheap Edition. Large crown 8vo, 4s. 6d. 
 
 SKINNER, James— & Memoir. By the Author of ' ' Charles Lowder. " 
 With a Preface by the Rev. Canon Carter, and Portrait. 
 Large crown, "Js. 6d. 
 * 4 * Also a cheap Edition. With Portrait. Crown 8vo, 3.?. 6d. 
 
 SMITH, Edward, M.D., LL.B., F.R.S.— Tubercular Consump- 
 tion in its Early and Remediable Stages. Second 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 SPEDDING, James. — Reviews and Discussions, Literary, 
 Political, and Historical not relating to Bacon. Demy 
 8vo, lis. 6d. 
 
 Evenings with a Reviewer ; or, Bacon and Macaulay. 
 With a Prefatory Notice by G. S. Venables, Q.C. 2 vols. 
 Demy 8vo, iSs. 
 
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.'s Publications. 27 
 
 STAFFER, Paul. — Shakespeare and Classical Antiquity: 
 Greek and Latin Antiquity as presented in Shakespeare's Plays. 
 Translated by Emily J. Carey. Large post 8vo, 12s. 
 
 STATHAM, F. Reginald.— Free Thought and Truth Thought. 
 A Contribution to an Existing Argument. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 STEVENSON, Rev. W. F— Hymns for the Church and Home. 
 Selected and Edited by the Rev. W. Fleming Stevenson. 
 
 The Hymn Book consists of Three Parts : — I. For Public 
 Worship. — II. For Family and Private Worship. — III. 
 For Children. Small Edition. Cloth limp, lod. ; 
 cloth boards, is. Large Type Edition. Cloth limp, 
 is. 3d. ; cloth boards, is. 6d. 
 
 Stray Papers on Education, and Scenes from School Life. By B. H. 
 Second Edition. Small crown 8vo, 3^. 6d. 
 
 STREATFEILD, Rev. G. S.,M.A — Lincolnshire and the Danes. 
 Large crown 8vo, Js. 6d. 
 
 STRECKER- WISLICENUS.— Organic Chemistry, Translated and 
 Edited, with Extensive Additions, by W. R. Hodgkinson, 
 Ph.D., and A. J. Greenaway, F.I.C. Demy 8vo, 211. 
 
 Study of the Prologue and Epilogue in English Literature. 
 From Shakespeare to Dryden. By G. S. B. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 SULLY, James, M.A. — Pessimism : a. History and a Criticism. 
 Second Edition. Demy 8vo, 14J. 
 
 SUTHERST, Thomas— -Death and Disease Behind the Counter, 
 Crown 8vo, is. 6d. ; sewed, is. 
 
 SWEDENBORG, Eman.—T>& Cultu et Amore Dei ubi Agitur 
 de Telluris ortu, Paradiso et Vivario, turn de Pri- 
 mogeniti Seu Adaml Nativitate Infantia, et Amore. 
 Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 SYME, David. — Representative Government in England. Its 
 Faults and Failures. Second Edition. Large crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Tacitus's Agricola. A Translation. Small crown 8vo, zs. 6d. 
 
 TA YLOR, Rev. Isaac. — The Alphabet. An Account of the Origin 
 and Development of Letters. With numerous Tables and 
 Facsimiles. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, 36^. 
 
 TAYLOR, Jeremy. — The Marriage Ring. With Preface, Notes, 
 and Appendices. Edited by Francis Burdett Money Coutts. 
 Small crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 TAYLOR, Sedley. — Profit Sharing between Capital and 
 Labour. To which is added a Memorandum on the Industrial 
 Partnership at the Whitwood Collieries, by Archibald and 
 Henry Briggs, with remarks by Sedley Taylor. Crown 8vo, 
 2s. 6d. 
 
28 A List of 
 
 Thirty Thousand Thoughts. Edited by the Rev. Canon Spence, 
 Rev. J. S. Exell, and Rev. Charles Neil. 6 vols. Super 
 royal 8vo. 
 
 [Vols. I., II., and III. now ready, 16s. each. 
 
 THOM, J. Hamilton.— -Laws of Life after the Mind of Christ. 
 Second Edition. Crown 8vo, Js. 6d. 
 
 THOMSON,J. Turnbull. — Social Problems ; or, An Inquiry into 
 the Laws of Influence. With Diagrams. Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d. 
 
 TIDMAN, Paul P.— Gold and Silver Money. Part I.— A Plain 
 Statement. Part II. — Objections Answered. Third Edition. 
 Crown 8vo, it. 
 
 TIPPLE, Rev. S. A. — Sunday Mornings at Norwood. Prayers 
 
 and Sermons. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 TODHUNTER, Dr. J.—K. Study of Shelley. Crown 8vo, Is. 
 
 TRANT, William.— Trade Unions : Their Origin, Objects, and 
 Efficacy. Small crown 8vo, is. 6d. ; paper covers, is. 
 
 TREMENHEERE, Hugh Seymour, C.P.— A Manual of the. 
 Principles of Government, as set forth by the Authorities 
 ef Ancient and Modem Times. New and Enlarged Edition. 
 Crown 8vo, $s. 6d. 
 
 TUKE, Daniel Hack, M.D., F.R. C.P.— Chapters in the History 
 of the Insane in the British Isles. With Four Illustra- 
 tions. Large crown 8vo, izs. 
 
 TWINING, Louisa. — "Workhouse Visiting and Management 
 during Twenty-Five Years. Small crown 8vo, 2s. 
 
 TYLER, J.— The Mystery of Being: or, What Do We 
 Know ? Small crown 8vo, y. 6d. 
 
 UPTON, Major R. £>.— Gleanings from the Desert of Arabia. 
 
 Large post8vo, los. 6d. 
 
 VACUUS VIATOR.— Flying South. Recollections of France and 
 its Littoral, Small crown 8vo, 3*. 6d. 
 
 VAUGHAN, H. Halford. — New Readings and Renderings of 
 Shakespeare's Tragedies. 2 vols. Demy 8vo, 25*. 
 
 VILLARI, Professor,— Niccolo Machlavelli and his Times. 
 Translated by Linda Villari. 4 vols. Large post 8vo, 481. 
 
 VILLIERS, The Right Hon. C. P.— Free Trade Speeches of. 
 With Political Memoir. Edited by a Member of the Cobden 
 Club. 2 vols. With Portrait. Demy 8vo, 25J. 
 *„* People's Edition. 1 vol. Crown 8vo, limp cloth, zs. 6d. 
 
 VOGT, Lieut-Col. Hermann.— The Egyptian War of 1882, 
 A translation. With Map and Plans. Large crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 VOLCKXSOM, E. W. v.— Catechism of Elementary Modern 
 Chemistry. Small crown 8vo, 3*. 
 
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.'s Publications. 29 
 
 VYNER, Lady Mary. — Every Day a Portion. Adapted from the 
 Bible and the Prayer Book, for the Private Devotion of those 
 living in Widowhood. Collected and Edited by Lady Mary 
 Vyner, Square crown 8vo, S^. 
 
 WALDSTEIN, Charles, Ph.D.— The Balance of Emotion and 
 Intellect ; an Introductory Essay to the Study of Philosophy. 
 Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 WALLER, Rev. C. B. — The Apocalypse, reviewed under the Light 
 of the Doctrine of the Unfolding Ages, and the Restitution of All 
 Things. Demy 8vo, I2.r. 
 
 WALPOLE, Chas. George.— A Short History of Ireland from the 
 Earliest Times to the Union with Great Britain. 
 With 5 Maps and Appendices. Second Edition. Crown Svo, 6s. 
 
 WALSHE, Walter Hayle, M.D.— Dramatic Singing Physiolo- 
 gically Estimated. Crown 8vo, y. 6d. 
 
 WARD, William George, Ph.D.— Essays on the Philosophy of 
 Theism. Edited, with an Introduction, by Wilfrid Ward. 
 2 vols. Demy 8vo, 21s. 
 
 WARD, Wilfrid. — The "Wish to Believe, A Discussion Concern- 
 ing the Temper of Mind in which a reasonable Man should 
 undertake Religious Inquiry. Small crown Svo, $s. 
 
 WEDDERBURN,Sir David, Bart., M.P.— Life of. Compiled from his 
 Journals and Writings by his sister, Mrs. E. H. Percival. With 
 etched Portrait, and facsimiles of Pencil Sketches. Demy 8vo, 14s. 
 
 WEDMORE, Frederick.— -The Masters of Genre Painting. With 
 Sixteen Illustrations. Post 8vo, "]s. 6d. 
 
 What to Do and How to Do It. A Manual of the Law affecting 
 the Housing and Sanitary Condition of Londoners, with special 
 Reference to the Dwellings of the Poor. Issued by the Sanitary 
 Laws Enforcement Society. Demy 8vo, is. 
 
 WHEWELL, William, D.D.—Ris Life and Selections from his 
 Correspondence. By Mrs. Stair Douglas. With a Portrait 
 from a Painting by Samuel Laurence. Demy 8vo, 21s. 
 
 WHITNEY, Prof. William Dwight. —Essentials of English 
 ' Grammar, for the Use of Schools. Second Edition. Crown 
 8vo, 3*. 6d. 
 
 WILLIAMS, Rowland, D.D.— Psalms, Litanies, Counsels, and 
 Collects for Devout Persons. Edited by his Widow. New 
 and Popular Edition. Crown 8vo, y. 6d. 
 Stray Thoughts Collected from the "Writings of the 
 late Rowland Williams, D.D. Edited by his Widow. 
 Crown 8vo, 3^. 6d. 
 
 WILSON, Lieut.-Col. C. T. — The Duke of Berwick, Marshal 
 of France, 1702-1734. Demy 8vo, 15s. 
 
30 A List of 
 
 WILSON, Mrs. R. F.— The Christian Brothers. Their Origin and 
 Work. With a Sketch of the Life of their Founder, the Ven. 
 Jean Baptiste, de la Salle. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 WOLTMANN, Z>i. Alfred, and WOERMANN, Dr. Karl— History 
 of Painting. Edited by Sidney Colvin. Vol. I. Painting 
 in Antiquity and the Middle Ages. With numerous Illustrations. 
 Medium 8vo, 2%s. • bevelled boards, gilt leaves, y>s. 
 
 Word was Made Flesh. Short Family Readings on the Epistles for 
 each Sunday of the Christian Year. Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d. 
 
 WREN, Sir Christopher.— His Family and His Times. With 
 Original Letters, and a Discourse on Architecture hitherto un- 
 published. By Lucv Phillimore. Demy 8vo, \qs. 6d. 
 
 YOUMANS, Eliza A.— First Book of Botany. Designed to 
 Cultivate the Observing Powers of Children. With 300 
 Engravings. New and Cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 YOUMANS, Edward L., M.D.—K. Class Book of Chemistry, on 
 the Basis of the New System. With 200 Illustrations. Crown 
 8vo, Sj-. 
 
 THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC SERIES. 
 
 I. Forms of Water : a Familiar Exposition of the Origin and 
 
 Phenomena of Glaciers. By J. Tyndall, LL.D., F.R.S. With 
 25 Illustrations. Eighth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5^. 
 
 II. Physics and Politics ; or, Thoughts on the Application of the 
 
 Principles of " Natural Selection " and " Inheritance " to Political 
 Society. By Walter Bagehot. Sixth Edition. Crown 8vo, 4s. 
 
 III. Foods. By Edward Smith, M.D., LL.B., F.R.S. With numerous 
 
 Illustrations. Eighth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5-r. 
 
 IV. Mind and Body : the Theories of their Relation. By Alexander 
 
 Bain, LL. D. With Four Illustrations. Seventh Edition. Crown 
 8vo, 4J. 
 
 V. The Study of Sociology. By Herbert Spencer. Eleventh 
 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 5^. 
 
 VI. On the Conservation of Energy. By Balfour Stewart, M.A., 
 
 LL.D., F.R.S. With 14 Illustrations. Sixth Edition. Crown 
 8vo, ss. 
 
 VII. Animal Locomotion ; or Walking, Swimming, and Flying. By 
 
 J. B. Pettigrew, M.D., F.R.S., etc. With 130 Illustrations. 
 Third Edition. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 VIII. Responsibility in Mental Disease. By Henry Maudsley, 
 
 M.D. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5*. 
 
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.'s Publications. 31 
 
 IX. The New Chemistry. By Professor J. P. Cooke. With 31 
 
 Illustrations. Eighth Edition, remodelled and enlarged. Crown 
 8vo, 5*. 
 
 X. The Science of Law. By Professor Sheldon Amos. Fifth Edition. 
 
 Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 XI. Animal Mechanism : a Treatise on Terrestrial and Aerial Loco- 
 
 motion. By Professor E. J. Marey. With 117 Illustrations. 
 Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 5-r. 
 
 XII. The Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism. By Professor 
 
 Oscar Schmidt. With 26 Illustrations. Sixth Edition. Crown 
 8vo, 5s. 
 
 XIII. The History of the Conflict between Religion and 
 
 Science. By J. W. Draper, M.D., LL.D. Eighteenth Edition. 
 Crown 8vo, 5*. 
 
 XIV. Fungi : their Nature, Influences, Uses, etc. By M. C. Cooke, 
 
 M.D., LL.D. Edited by the Rev. M. J. Berkeley, M.A., F.L.S. 
 With numerous Illustrations. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 XV. The Chemical Effects of Light and Photography. By 
 
 Dr. Hermann Vogel. Translation thoroughly Revised. With 
 100 Illustrations. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5s. 
 
 XVI. The Life and Growth of Language. By Professor William 
 
 Dwight Whitney. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5s. 
 
 XVII. Money and the Mechanism of Exchange. By W. 
 
 Stanley Jevons, M.A., F.R.S. Sixth Edition. Crown 8vo, 5*. 
 
 XVIII. The Nature of Light. With a General Account of Physical 
 Optics. By Dr. Eugene Lommel. With 188 Illustrations and a 
 Table of Spectra in Chromo-lithography. Third Edition. Crown 
 8vo, 5J. 
 
 XIX. Animal Parasites and Messmates. By P. J. Van Beneden. 
 
 With 83 Illustrations. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 5-r. 
 
 XX. Fermentation. By Professor Schiitzenberger. With 28 Illus- 
 
 trations. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 XXI. The Five Senses of Man. By Professor Bernstein. With 
 
 91 Illustrations. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 XXII. The Theory of Sound in its Relation to Music. By Pro^ 
 
 fessor Pietro Blaserna. With numerous Illustrations. Third 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 XXIII. Studies in Spectrum Analysis. By J. Norman Lockyer, 
 F.R.S. With six photographic Illustrations of Spectra, and 
 numerous engravings on Wood. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 
 6*. (>d. 
 
 XXIV. A History of the Growth of the Steam Engine. By 
 
 Professor R. H. Thurston. With numerous Illustrations. Third 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 6.r. 6d. 
 
32 A List of 
 
 XXV. Education as a Science. By Alexander Bain, LL.D. Fourth 
 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 5-r. 
 
 XXVI. The Human Species. By Professor A. de Quatrefages. Third 
 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 5.5-. 
 
 XXVII. Modern Chromatics. With Applications to Art and In- 
 dustry. By Ogden N. Rood. With 130 original Illustrations. 
 Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 5s. 
 
 XXVIII. The Crayfish : an Introduction to the Study of Zoology. By 
 Professor T. H. Huxley. With 82 Illustrations. Fourth Edition. 
 Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 XXIX. The Brain as an Organ of Mind. By H. Charlton Bastian, 
 M.D. With numerous Illustrations. Third Edition. Crown 
 8vo, 5^. 
 
 XXX. The Atomic Theory. By Prof. Wurtz. Translated by G. 
 
 Cleminshaw, F.C.S. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 5*. 
 
 XXXI. The Natural Conditions of Existence as they affect 
 Animal Life. By Karl Semper. With 2 Maps and 106 
 Woodcuts. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 5j. 
 
 XXXII. General Physiology of Muscles and Nerves. By Prof. 
 J. Rosenthal. Third Edition. With Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 
 5s. 
 
 XXXIII. Sight : an Exposition of the Principles of Monocular and 
 Binocular Vision. By Joseph le Conte, LL.D. Second Edition. 
 With 132 Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 5.J. 
 
 XXXIV. Illusions : a Psychological Study. By James Sully. Second 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 5-r. 
 
 XXXV. Volcanoes : what they are and -what they teach. 
 By Professor J. W. Judd, F.R.S. With 92 Illustrations on 
 Wood. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 XXXVI. Suicide : an Essay on Comparative Moral Statistics. By Prof. 
 H. Morselli. Second Edition. With Diagrams. Crown 8vo, 5*. 
 
 XXXVII. The Brain and its Functions. By J. Luys. With 
 Illustrations. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, $s, 
 
 XXXVIII. Myth and Science : an Essay. By Tito Vignoli. Second 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 5-r. 
 
 XXXIX. The Sun. By Professor Young. With Illustrations. Second 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 XL. Ants, Bees, and Wasps : a Record of Observations on the 
 Habits of the Social Hymenoptera. By Sir John Lubbock, Bart., 
 M. P. With 5 Chromo-lithographic Illustrations. Seventh Edition. 
 Crown 8vo, 5-r. 
 
Kegan Paid, Trench & Co.'s Publications. 33 
 
 XLI. Animal Intelligence. ,By G. J. Romanes, LL.D., F.R.S. 
 Third Edition. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 XLII. The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics. By 
 J. B. Stallo. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 5*. 
 
 XLIII. Diseases of the Memory ; An Essay in the Positive Psycho- 
 logy. By Prof. Th. Ribot. Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 5^-. 
 
 XLIV. Man' before Metals. By N. Joly, with 14S Illustrations. 
 Third Edition. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 XLV. The Science of Politics. By Prof. Sheldon Amos. Third 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 XLVI. Elementary Meteorology. By Robert H. Scott. Third 
 Edition. With Numerous Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 5-r. 
 
 XLVII. The Organs of Speech and their Application in the 
 Formation of Articulate Sounds. By Georg Hermann 
 Von Meyer. With 47 Woodcuts. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 XLVIII. Fallacies. A View of Logic from the Practical Side. By 
 Alfred Sidgwick. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 XLIX. Origin of Cultivated Plants. By Alphonse de Candolle. 
 Crown 8vo, 5^. 
 
 L. Jelly- Fish, Star-Fish, and Sea-Urchins. Being a Research 
 on Primitive Nervous Systems. By G. J. Romanes. Crown 
 8vo, 5^- 
 
 MILITARY WORKS. 
 
 BARRINGTON, Capt. J. 7.— England on the Defensive ; or, the 
 Problem of Invasion Critically Examined. Large crown 8vo, 
 with Map, 7-r. 6d. 
 
 BRACKENBVRY, Col. C. B., R.A. — Military Handbooks for 
 Regimental Officers. 
 
 I. Military Sketching and Reconnaissance. By Col. 
 F. J. Hutchison and Major H. G. MacGregor. Fourth 
 Edition. With 15 Plates. Small crown 8vo, 4.C 
 
 II. The Elements of Modern Tactics Practically 
 applied to English Formations. By Lieut. -Col. 
 Wilkinson Shaw. Fifth Edition. With 25 Plates and 
 Maps. Small crown 8vo, qs. 
 
 III. Field Artillery. Its Equipment, Organization and Tactics. 
 By Major Sisson C. Pratt, R.A. With 12 Plates. Second 
 Edition. Small crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 D 
 
34 A List of 
 
 Military Handbooks — continued. 
 
 IV. The Elements of Military Administration. Firs) 
 
 Part : Permanent System of Administration. By Majoi 
 J. W. Buxton. Small crown 8vo. Is. 6d. 
 
 V. Military Law : Its Procedure and Practice. By Majoi 
 
 Sisson C. Pratt, R.A. Second Edition. Small crown 8vo, 
 4s. 6d. 
 
 VI. Cavalry in Modern War. By Col. F. Chenevix Trench. 
 Small crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 VII. Field "Works'. Their Technical Construction and Tactical 
 Application. By k the Editor, Col. C. B. Brackenbury, R.A 
 Small crown 8vo. 
 
 BROOKE, Major, C. K.— A System of Field Training. Small 
 crown 8vo, cloth limp, 2J. 
 
 CLERY, C, Lieut.-Col.— T&inor Tactics. With 26 Maps and Plans. 
 Sixth and Cheaper Edition, Revised. Crown 8vo, gs. 
 
 COLVILE, Lieut.-Col. C. F.— Military Tribunals. Sewed, 2s. 6d. 
 
 CRAUFURD, Capt. H. J.— Suggestions for the Military Train- 
 ing of a Company of Infantry. Crown 8vo, is. 6d. 
 
 HARRISON, Lieut.-Col. R.— The Officer's Memorandum Book 
 for Peace and War. Third Edition. Oblong 321110, roan, 
 with pencil, y. 6d. 
 
 Notes on Cavalry Tactics, Organisation, etc. By a Cavalry 
 Officer. With Diagrams. Demy 8vo, 12s. 
 
 PARR, Capt. H. Hallam, C.M.G.— The Dress, Horses, and 
 Equipment of Infantry and Staff Officers. Crown 
 8vo, ij. 
 
 SCHAW, Col. a.— The Defence and Attack of Positions and 
 Localities. Third Edition, Revised and Corrected. Crown 
 8vo, 3^. 6d. 
 
 WILKINSON, H. Spenser, Capt. 20th Lancashire R. V. — Citizen 
 Soldiers. Essays towards the Improvement of the Volunteer 
 Force. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 POETRY. 
 
 ADAM OF ST. VICTOR— The Liturgical Poetry of Adam of 
 St. Victor. From the text of Gautier. With Translations into 
 English in the Original Metres, and Short Explanatory Notes, 
 by Digby S. Wrangham, M.A. 3 vols. Crown Svo, printed 
 on hand-made paper, boards, 21s. 
 
 AUCHMUTY, A. C— Poems of English Heroism : From Brunan- 
 burh to Lucknow ; from Athelstan to Albert. Small crown 8vo, 
 is. 6d. 
 
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.'s Publications. 35 
 
 A VIA.— The Odyssey of Homer. Done into English Verse by. 
 Fcap. 4to, 15^. 
 
 BARING, T. C, M.I.—riie Scheme of Epicurus. A Render- 
 ing into English Verse of the Unfinished Poem of Lucretius, 
 entitled " De Rerum Natura." Fcap. 4to, Js. 
 
 BARNES, William.— Poems of Rural Life, in the Dorset 
 Dialect. New Edition, complete in one vol. Crown 8vo 
 Ss. 6d. 
 
 BAYNES, Rev. Canon R. R. — Home Songs for Quiet Hours. 
 
 Fourth and Cheaper Edition. Fcap. 8vo, cloth, 2s. bd. 
 
 BENDALL, Gerard. — Musa Silvestris. i6mo, is. 6d. 
 BEVINGTON, L. S.— Key Notes. Small crown 8vo, 5/. 
 
 BILLSON, C. J. — The Acharnians of Aristophanes. Crown 
 8vo, 3-r. 6d. 
 
 BLUNT, Wilfrid Scawen. — The, Wind, and the "Whirlwind. 
 Demy 8vo, is. (id. 
 
 BOWEN, H. C, M.A.— Simple English Poems. English Literature 
 for Junior Classes. In Four Parts. Parts I., II., and III., 6d. 
 each, and Part IV., is. Complete, 3s. 
 
 BRASHER, Alfred.— Sophia ; or, the Viceroy of Valencia. A Comedy 
 in Five Acts, founded on a Story in Scarron. Small crown 8vo, 
 2s. 6d. 
 
 BRYANT, W. C. — Poems. Cheap Edition, with Frontispiece. Small 
 crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 BYRNNE, E. Fairfax. — Milicent : a Poem. Small crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 CAILLARD, Emma Marie. — Charlotte Corday, and other Poems. 
 Small crown 8vo, 3^. 6d. 
 
 Calderon's Dramas : the Wonder- Working Magician — Life is a 
 Dream— the Purgatory of St. Patrick. Translated by Denis 
 Florence MacCarthy. Post 8vo, ioj-. 
 
 Camoens Lusiads. — Portuguese Text, with Translation by J. J. 
 Aubertin. Second Edition. 2 vols. Crown 8vo, 12s. 
 
 CAMPBELL, Lewis.— Sophocles. The Seven Plays in English Verse. 
 Crown 8vo, Is. 6d. 
 
 Castilian Brothers (The), Chateaubriant, Waldemar : Three 
 Tragedies ; a-nd The Rose of Sicily : a Drama. By the 
 Author of " Ginevra," etc. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Christian (Owen) Poems. Small crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 Chronicles of Christopher Columbus. A Poem in 12 Cantos. 
 By M. D. C. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d. 
 
36 A List of 
 
 CLARKE, Mary Cowden. — Honey from the "Weed. Verses. 
 Crown 8vo, Js. 
 
 Cosmo de Medici ; The False One ; Agramont and Beau- 
 mont : Three Tragedies ; and The Deformed : a Dramatic 
 Sketch. By the Author of " Ginevra," etc., etc. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 COXHEAD, Ethel.— Birds and Babies. Imp. i6mo. With 33 
 Illustrations. Gilt, 2s. 6d. 
 
 David Rizzio, Bothwell, and the "Witch Lady : Three 
 Tragedies. By the author of " Ginevra," etc. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 DAVIE, G.S., M.I?. — The Garden of Fragrance. Being a com- 
 plete translation Of the Bostan of Sadi from the original Persian 
 into English Verse. Crown 8vo, "]s. 6d. 
 
 DA VIES, T. Hart.— Catullus. Translated into English Verse. CrowH 
 8vo, 6s. 
 
 DENNIS, J.— English Sonnets. Collected and Arranged by. Small 
 crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. ■ 
 
 DE VERE, Aubrey.— Poetical Works. 
 
 I. The Search after Proserpine, etc. 6s. 
 II. The Legends of St. Patrick, etc. 6s. 
 III. Alexander the Great, etc. 6s: 
 
 The Foray of Queen Meave, and other Legends of Ireland's 
 Heroic Age. Small crown 8vo, 5j. 
 
 Legends of the Saxon Saints. Small crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 DILLON, Arthur. — River Songs and other Poems. With 13 
 autotype Illustrations from designs by Margery May. Fcap. 4to, 
 cloth extra, gilt leaves, \os. 6d. 
 
 DOBELL, Mrs. Horace.— Ethelstone, Eveline, and other Poems. 
 Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 DOBSON, Austin.— Old "World Idylls and other Verses. Fourth 
 Edition. i8mo, cloth extra, gilt tops, 6s. 
 
 DOMET, Alfred. — Ranolf and Amohia. A Dream of Two Lives. 
 New Edition, Revised. 2 vols. Crown 8vo, \zs. 
 
 Dorothy : a Country Story in Elegiac Verse. With Preface. Demy 
 8vo, 5j. 
 
 DOWDEN, Edward, LL.D. — Shakspere's Sonnets. With Intro- 
 duction and Notes. Large post 8vo, ys. 6d. 
 
 DUTT, Toru.—R. Sheaf Gleaned in French Fields. New Edition. 
 Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d. 
 
 EDMONDS, E. M.— Hesperas. Rhythm and Rhyme. Crown 8vo, 4*. 
 
 EDWARDS, Miss Belham.—'Poexn.s. Small crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
Kegan Paid, Trench & Co.'s Publications. 37 
 
 ELDRYTH, Maud.— Margaret, and other Poems. Small crown 8vo, 
 3s. 6d. 
 
 All Soul's Eve, "No God," and other Poems. Fcap. 8vo, 
 3-r. 6d. 
 
 ELLIOTT, Ebenezer, The Corn Law Rhymer.— -Poems. Edited by his 
 son, the Rev. Edwin Elliott, of St. John's, Antigua. 2 vols. 
 Crown 8vo, i8j. 
 
 English Verse. Edited by W. J. Linton and R. H. Stoddard. 
 5 vols. Crown 8vo, cloth, 5.?. each. 
 I. Chaucer to Burns. 
 II. Translations. 
 
 III. Lyrics of the Nineteenth Century. 
 
 IV. Dramatic Scenes and Characters. 
 V. Ballads and Romances. 
 
 ENIS. — Gathered Leaves. Small crown 8vo, 
 
 EVANS, Anne. — Poems and Music. With Memorial Preface by 
 Ann Thackeray Ritchie. Large crown 8vo, ys. 
 
 FORSTER, the late William.— -Midas. Crown 8vo, 5-r. 
 
 CINNER, Isaac B.— The Death of Otho, and other Poems. Small 
 crown 8vo, 5^-. 
 
 GOODCHILD, John A.— Somnia Medici. Small crown 8vo, 5*. 
 
 GOSSE, Edmund W.— New Poems. Crown 8vo, js. 6d. 
 
 GRAHAM, William. Two Fancies, and other Poems. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 GRINDROD, Charles. Plays from English History. Crown 
 8vo, "js. 6d. 
 
 The Stranger's Story, and his Poem, The Lament of Love : An 
 Episode of the Malvern Hills. Small crown 8vo, is. 6d. 
 
 GURNEY, Rev. Alfred.— -The Vision of the Eucharist, and other 
 Poems. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 A Christmas Faggot. Small crown 8vo, 5*. 
 
 HELLON, H. G. — Daphnis : a. Pastoral Poem. Small crown Svo, 
 3s. 6d. 
 
 HENRY, Daniel, Junr. — Under a Fool's Cap. Songs. Crown Svo, 
 cloth, bevelled boards, 5^. 
 
 Herman Waldgrave : a Life's Drama. By the Author of " Ginevra," 
 etc. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 HEYWOOD, J. C— Herodias, a Dramatic Poem. New Edition, 
 Revised. Small crown 8vo, 5*. 
 
 HICKEY, E. H.—A Sculptor, and other Poems. Small crown 
 8vo, 5-r. 
 
38 A List of 
 
 HONEYWOOD, Patty.— Poems. Dedicated (by permission) to Lord 
 Wolseley, G.C.B., etc. Small crown 8vo, 2s. bd. 
 
 JENKINS, Rev. Canon. — Alfonso Petrucci, Cardinal and Con- 
 spirator: an Historical Tragedy in Five Acts. Small crown 8vo, 
 3s. 6d. 
 
 JOHA T SON, Ernie S. W— Ilaria, and other Poems. Small crown 8vo, 
 y. 6d. 
 
 KEA TS, John.— Poetical Works. Edited by W. T. Arnold. Large 
 crown 8vo, choicely printed on hand-made paper, with Portrait 
 in eau-forte. Parchment or cloth, \2s. ; vellum, 15^. 
 
 KENNEDY, Captain A. W. M. Clark.— Robert the Bruce. A 
 Poem : Historical and Romantic. With Three Illustrations by 
 James Faed, Jun. Printed on hand-made paper, parchment, 
 bevelled boards, crown 8vo, 10s. 6d. 
 
 KING, Edward. — Echoes from the Orient. With Miscellaneous 
 Poems. Small crown 8vo, 3^. 6d. 
 
 KING, Mrs. Hamilton. — The Disciples. Sixth Edition, with Portrait 
 and Notes. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 A Book of Dreams. Crown 8vo, 3*. 6d. 
 
 KNOX, The Hon. Mrs. O. N.— Four Pictures from a Life, and 
 other Poems. Small crown 8vo, 3^. bd. 
 
 LANG, A.— XXXII Ballades in Blue China. Elzsvir 8vo, 
 parchment, 5-r. 
 
 Rhymes a. la Mode. With Frontispiece by E. A. Abbey. i8mo, 
 gilt tops, 5J-. 
 
 LAWSON, Right Hon. Mr. Jttstice. — Hymni Usitati Latine 
 Redditi : with other Verses. Small 8vo, parchment, $s. 
 
 Lessing's Nathan the Wise. Translated by Eustace K. Corbett. 
 Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Life Thoughts. Small crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 Living English Poets MDCCCLXXXIL With Frontispiece by 
 Walter Crane. Second Edition. Large crown 8vo. Printed on 
 hand-made paper. Parchment or cloth, 12s. ; vellum, 15s. 
 
 LOCKER, .F.— London Lyrics. New Edition. With Portrait, 
 iSmo. Cloth extra, gilt tops, 5s. 
 
 Love in Idleness. A Volume of Poems. With an Etching by W. B. 
 Scott. Small crown 8vo, 5*. 
 
 Love Sonnets of Proteus. With Frontispiece by the Author. Elzevir 
 8vo, 5*. 
 
 LUMSDEN, Limt.-Col. H. W.— Beowulf : an Old English Poem. 
 Translated into Modern Rhymes, Second and Revised Edition. 
 Small crown Svo, $s. 
 
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.'s PtMications. 39 
 
 Lyre and Star. Poems by the Author of " Ginevra," etc. Crown 
 8vo, $s. 
 
 MACGREGOR, Duncan.— Clouds and Sunlight. Poems. Small 
 crown 8vo, 5-r. 
 
 MACNUSSON, Eirikr, M.A., and PALMER, E. H., M.A.— Johan 
 Ludvig Runeberg's Lyrical Songs, Idylls, and Epi- 
 grams. Fcap. 8vo, 5-r. 
 
 M.D.C.— Chronicles of Christopher Columbus. A Poem in 
 Twelve Cantos. Crown 8vo, "]s. 6a?. 
 
 MEREDITH, Owen [The Earl of Lytlon\— Lucile. New Edition. 
 With 32 Illustrations. i6mo, 3*. 6d. Cloth extra, gilt edges, 
 4s. 6d. 
 
 MORRIS, Lewis. — Poetical Works of. New and Cheaper Editions, 
 with Portrait. Complete in 3 vols., 5.?. each. 
 Vol. I. contains "Songs of Two Worlds." Eleventh Edition. 
 Vol. II. contains " The Epic of Hades." Eighteenth Edition. 
 Vol. III. contains " Gwen " and " The Ode of Life." Sixth Edition. 
 
 The Epic of Hades. With. 16 Autotype Illustrations, after the 
 Drawings of the late George R. Chapman. 4to, cloth extra, gilt 
 leaves, 2\s. 
 
 The Epic of Hades. Presentation Edition. 4to, cloth extra, 
 gilt leaves, ior. 6d. 
 
 Songs Unsungt Fourth Edition. Fcap. 8vo, 6s. 
 
 The Lewis Morris Birthday Book. Edited by S. S. Cope- 
 man, with Frontispiece after a Design by the late George R. 
 Chapman. 32mo, cloth extra, gilt edges, 2s. ; cloth limp, 1*. 6d. 
 
 MORSIIEAD, E. D. A. — The House of Atreus. Being the 
 Agamemnon, Libation-Bearers, and Furies of jEschylus. Trans- 
 lated into English Verse. Crown Svo, Is. 
 
 The Suppliant Maidens of ^Eschylus. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 NADEN, Constance W. — Songs and Sonnets of Spring Time. 
 Small crown 8vo, 5j. 
 
 NEWELL, E. 7.— The Sorrows of Simona and Lyrical 
 Verses. Small crown Svo, 3.?. 6d. 
 
 NOEL, The Hon. Roden.—A Little Child's Monument. Third 
 Edition. Small crown 8vo, 3-r. 6d. 
 
 The Red Flag, and other Poems. New Edition. Small crown 
 8vo, 6s. 
 
 O'HAGAN, John.— The Song of Roland. Translated into English 
 Verse. New and Cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo, 5-r. 
 
 PFEIFFER, Emily.— The Rhyme of the Lady of the Rock, 
 and How it Grew. Small crown Svo, v- 6d. 
 
4° A List of 
 
 PFEIFFER, Emily — continued. 
 
 Gerard's Monument, and other Poems. Second Edition. 
 Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Under the Aspens : Lyrical and Dramatic. With Portrait. 
 Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 PIATT, J. J.— Idyls and Lyrics of the Ohio Valley. Crown 
 8vo, 5^. 
 
 RAFFALOVICH, Mark Andre. — Cyril and Lionel, and other 
 Poems. A volume of Sentimental Studies. Small crown Svo, 
 3-r. 6d. i 
 
 Rare Poems of the 16th and 17th Centuries. Edited W. J. 
 Linton. Crown 8vo, 5-s-. 
 
 RHOADES, James.— -The Georgics of Virgil. Translated into 
 English Verse. Small crown Svo, $s. 
 
 ROBINSON, A. Mary F.—A Handful of Honeysuckle. Fcap. 
 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 The Crowned Hippolytus. Translated from Euripides. With 
 New Poems. Small crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 ROUS, Lieut. -Col. — Conradin. Small crown 8vo, 2s. 
 
 Schiller's Mary Stuart. German Text, with English Translation on 
 opposite page by Leedham White. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 SCOTT, E.J. L.— The Kcloguesof Virgil.— Translated into English 
 Verse. Small crown 8vo, y. 6d. 
 
 SCOTT, George F. i?.— Theodora and other Poems. SmalJ 
 crown Svo, 3-s. 6d. 
 
 SEAL, W. H. — lone, and other Poems. Second and Cheaper Edition, 
 revised, crown 8vo, y. 6d. 
 
 SELKIRK, J. 5-Poems. Crown 8vo, ?s. 6d. 
 
 SHARP, William.— Kuphrenia : or, The Test of Love. A Poem. 
 Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 SKINNER, H. J.— The Lily of the Lyn, and other Poems. Small 
 crown 8vo, 3-r. 6d. 
 
 SLADEN, Douglas B. — Frithjof and Ingebjorg, and other 
 Poems. Small crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 SMITH, J. W. Gilbart— -The Loves of Vandyck. A Tale of Genoa. 
 Small crown 8vo, is. 6d. 
 
 The Log o' the " Norseman." Small crown Svo, 5j. 
 
 Sophocles ; The Seven Plays in English Verse. Translated by Lewis 
 Campbell. Crown Svo. 7j. 6d. 
 
Kegan Paid, Trench' & Co.'s Publications. 41 
 
 SPICER, Henry. — Haska ". a Drama in Three Acts (as represented 
 at the Theatre Royal, Drury Lane, March loth, 1877). Third 
 Edition. Crown Svo, 3^. 6d. 
 
 SYMONDS, John Addington.— Vagabunduli Libellus. Crown 
 
 8vo, 6s. 
 Tares. Crown 8vo, is. 6d. 
 
 Tasso's Jerusalem Delivered. Translated by Sir John Kingston 
 James, Bart. Two Volumes. Printed on hand-made paper, 
 parchment, bevelled boards. Large crown 8vo, 21s. 
 
 TAYLOR, Sir //.—"Works. Complete in Five Volumes. Crown 
 8vo, 30J. 
 
 Philip Van Artevelde. Fcap. Svo, 3^. 6d. 
 
 The Virgin "Widow, etc. Fcap. 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 The Statesman. Fcap. 8vo, 3.?. 6d. 
 
 TAYLOR, Augustus. — Poems. Fcap. 8vo, 5-r. 
 
 TAYLOR, Margaret Scott.— " Boys Together," and other Poems. 
 Small crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 THORNTON, L. Si.— The Son of Shelomith. Small crown 8vo, 
 y. 6d. 
 
 TOD HUNTER, Dr. J.— Laurella, and other Poems. Crown 8vo, 
 6s. 6d. 
 Forest Songs. Small crown 8vo, 31. 6d. 
 The True Tragedy of Rienzi : a Drama. ?,s. 6d. 
 Alcestis : a Dramatic Poem. Extra fcap. Svo, 5.?. 
 
 TYLER, M. C — Anne Boleyn. A Tragedy in Six Acts. Small 
 crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 WALTERS, Sophia Lydia— A. Dreamer's Sketch Book. With 21 
 Illustrations by Percival Skclton, R. P. Leitch, W. H. J. Boot, and 
 T. R. Pritchett. Engraved by J. D. Cooper. Fcap. 4to, 12s. 6d. 
 
 "Wandering Echoes.— By J. E. D. G. In Four Parts. Small crown 
 8vo, 5-r. 
 
 WATTS, Alaric Alfred and Anna Mary Howitt.— Aurora,. A Medley 
 of Verse. Fcap. Svo, bevelled boards, $s. 
 
 WEBSTER, Augusta.— In a Day : a Drama.. Small crown Svo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 Disguises : a Drama. Small crown 8vo, 5*. , 
 "Wet Days. By a Farmer. Small crown Svo, bs. 
 
 WILLIAMS, J.— A Story of Three Years, and other Poems. Small 
 crown 8vo, 3.?. 6d. 
 
 "Words-worth Birthday Book, The. Edited by Adelaide and 
 Violet Wordsworth. 32mo, limp cloth, is. 6d. ; cloth extra, 2s. 
 
 YOUNGMAN, Thomas George.— Poems. Small crown Svo, $s. 
 
42 A List of 
 
 YOUNGS, Ella Sharp. — Paphus, and other Poems. Small crown 8vo,. 
 3-r. 6d. 
 A Heart's Life, Sarpedon, and other Poems. Small crowri' 
 Svo, 3^. 6d. 
 
 WORKS OF FICTION IN ONE VOLUME. 
 
 BANKS, Mrs. G. L — God's Providence House. New Edition. 
 Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 HUNTER, Hay. — The Crime of Christmas Day. A Tale of the 
 Latin Quarter. By the Author ot "My Ducats and my 
 Daughter." is. 
 
 HUNTER, Hay, and WHYTE, Walter.— My Ducats and My 
 Daughter. New and Cheaper Edition. With Frontispiece. 
 Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 INGELOW, Jean.— Oft the Skelligs : a Novel. With Frontispiece. 
 
 Second Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 KIELLAND, Alexander. — Garman and "Worse. A Norwegian 
 Novel. Authorized Translation, by W. W. Kettlewell. Crowa 
 8vo, 6s. 
 
 MACDONALD, G — Donal Grant. A Novel. New and Cheaper 
 Edition. With Frontispiece. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Castle "Warlock. A Novel. New and Cheaper Edition. Crown 
 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Malcolm. With Portrait of the Author engraved on Steel. Sixth 
 Edition.' Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 The Marquis of Lossie. Fifth Edition. With Frontispiece. 
 Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 St. George and St. Michael. Fourth Edition. With Frontis- 
 piece. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 PALGRAVE, W. Gifford. — Hermann Agha : an Eastern Narrative. 
 Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 SHA IF, Flora L— Castle Blair ; a Story of Youthful Days. New and 
 Cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 STRETTON, Hesba.— Through a Needle's Eye ". a Story. New 
 and Cheaper Edition, with Frontispiece. Crown 8vo, bs. 
 
 TAYLOR, Col. Meadows, C.S.I., M.R.I.A.—Seeta.: a Novel. New 
 and Cheaper Edition. With Frontispiece. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Tippoo Sultaun : a Tale of the Mysore War. New Edition, with 
 Frontispiece. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Ralph Darnell. New and Cheaper Edition. With Frontispiece. 
 Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.'s Publications. 43 
 
 TAYLOR, Col. Meadows, C.S.I., M.R.I.A.— continued. 
 
 A Noble Queen. New and Cheaper Edition. With Frontis- 
 piece. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 ' The Confessions of a Thug, Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Tara : a Mahratta Tale. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 Within Sound of the Sea. New and Cheaper Edition, with Frontis- 
 piece. Crown 8vo, 6s. 
 
 BOOKS FOR THE YOUNG. 
 
 Brave Men's Footsteps. A Book of Example and Anecdote for 
 Young People. By the Editor of "Men who have Risen." With 
 4 Illustrations by C. Doyle. Eighth Edition. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 COXHEAD, Ethel.— Birds and Babies. Imp. i6mo. With 33 
 Illustrations. Cloth gilt, 2s. bd. 
 
 DAVIES, G. Christopher. — Rambles and Adventures of our 
 School Field Club. With 4 Illustrations. New and Cheaper 
 Edition. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 EDMONDS, Herbert— -"Well Spent Lives : a Series of Modern Bio- 
 graphies. New and Cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 EVANS, Mark. — The Story of our Father's Love, told to Children. 
 Sixth and Cheaper Edition of Theology for Children. With 4 
 Illustrations. Fcap. 8vo, is. 6d. 
 
 JOHNSON, Virginia^ W.— The CatskiU Fairies. Illustrated by 
 Alfred Fredericks. c,s. 
 
 MAC KENNA, S. J.— Plucky Fellows. A Book for Boys. With 
 6 Illustrations. Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo, y. 6d. 
 
 REANEY, Mrs. G. S.— Waking and "Working ; or, From Girlhood 
 to Womanhood. New and Cheaper Edition. With a. Frontis- 
 piece. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 Blessing and Blessed : a Sketch of Girl Life. New and 
 Cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 Rose Gurney's Discovery. A Book for Girls. Dedicated to 
 their Mothers. Crown 8vo, 3*. 6d. 
 
 English Girls ; Their Place and Power. With Preface by the 
 Rev. R. W. Dale. Fourth Edition. Fcap. 8vo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 Just Anyone, and other Stories. Three Illustrations. Royal 
 i6mo, is. 6d. 
 
 Sunbeam Willie, and other Stories. Three Illustrations. Royal 
 i6mo, is. 6d. 
 
 Sunshine Jenny, and other Stories'. Three Illustrations. Royal 
 i6mo, is. 6d, 
 
44 -A List of Kegan Paul, Trench & Co's Publications. 
 
 STOCKTON, Frank J?.— A Jolly Fellowship. With 20 Illustra- 
 tions. Crown 8vo, $s. 
 
 STORR, Francis, and TURNER, Hawes. — Canterbury Chimes; 
 or, Chaucer Tales re-told to Children. With 6 Illustrations from 
 the Ellesmere Manuscript. Third Edition. Fcap. 8vo, 3^. 6d. 
 
 STRETTON, J7esda.-Ha.vid Lloyd's Last Will. With 4 Illustra 
 tions. New Edition. Royal i6mo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 Tales from Ariosto Re-told for Children. By a Lady. With 3 
 Illustrations. Crown 8vq, 4^. 6d. 
 
 WHITAKER, Florence.— Christy's Inheritance. A London Story. 
 Illustrated. Royal l6mOj is. 6d. 
 
 PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BECCLES.