Mm TLdA. 1^ AiJ-. Cornell University Library D 378.V21C3 1874 Central Asia and the Anglo-Russian front 3 1924 027 822 596 olin \^i ■'^. Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924027822596 CENTRAL ASIA. CENTRAL ASIA AND TH£ ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER ': QUESTION : A SERIES OF POLITICAL PAPERS BY ARMINIUS YAMB^RY, Ordinary Professor of Oriental Languages and Literature in the Royal University of Pesth. TRANSLATED BY F. E. BUNN£:TT. LONDON: SMITH, ELDER, & CO., 15 WATERLOO PLACE. 1874. . PRINTED BY BALLANTYNE AND COMPANY EDINBUKGH AND LONDON PREFACE The following reasons have induced me to collect and publish my political writings, chiefly relating to Central Asia, which appeared in the columns of Unsere Zeit In the first place, hitherto in Germany, and in fact throughout Europe, so little has been written during the last ten years on the events going on in the Oxus territory, and recent events have so greatly astonished every one, that, for the sake of the information and explanation necessary, the remotest recesses of travel- literature have been ransacked and investigated, and the following pages may therefore perhaps be of use to many. In the second place, these papers contain a chronological and somewhat detailed delineation of those events which have produced, in slow but sure course, the question at issue between England and Russia — a question which has already become a subject of general attention, and will in future be certainly still more so, as, in the advancing course of events in these very districts of Central Asia, that die will soon be cast on which is inscribed, not the words Oxus and Indus, Etrek and Herat, but the significant motto — " Dominion over Asia." VI PREFACE. In the third place, apologising for my want of modesty, I must myself produce evidence in these pages, by referring to Count Schuwaloff's mission and the controversy waged between the English and Rus- sian press, that the political opinions which I have expressed since my return from Central Asia were not based on chimeras and empty visions, and were, more- over, not the emanation of any Magyar, and consequently anti-Russian feelings, but were founded on facts, and on perceptions resulting from long study and practical experiences. My political opinions were in nowise too bold and fanciful, as my adversaries asserted, but just the contrary, as has now been proved ; for what, nine years ago, I still doubted, namely, Russia's designs upon India, recent events have convincingly proved to me. Gladly, after the course of another ten years, would I be convicted of having entertained erroneous views, and be designated as a false prophet ; yet, with the present political circumstances in the Mussulman East, and with Russia's feverish thirst for territory and boundless ambition, possessing as she does scope enough for her mission of civilisation, and yet ever desiring conquest, it is indeed difficult to foresee how the con- vulsing collision in Asia of the two Christian colossal powers is to be avoided. A. V. Pesth, May 8, 1873. CONTENTS. PAGE The Rivalry of Russia with England in Central Asia (1867)- General Survey from 1864, . . . . . i 1. Russia's Conquests in Central Asia within the last Three Years, ...... 7 2. The Future Policy of Russia, . . . . 17 3. Russia's Designs upon India, and the English Optimists, 26 4. The Advantages of the Russian and the Disadvantages of the English Policy, . . . .36 5. Advice to England for the Averting of the Danger, . 42 6. The General Interest of the Question, . . .51 Supplement — Prince Gortschakoflfs Despatch, . 62 Fresh Advances of Russia in Central Asia (1868), . . 67 . Persia and Turkey (1868), ..... 167 VUl CONTENTS. PAGE Herat and the Central Asiatic Question (1869), . . 198 Social Transformations in the Interior of Asia (1870), . 219 The Position of Russia in Central Asia, and the Revision of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 (1870), . . . 240 The Latest Aspect of the Central Asiatic Question (1871), 269 A Mohammedan Conqueror in Asia (1873), . . . 298 The Russian Campaign against Khiva (1873), , . 340 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. THE RIVALRY OF RUSSIA WITH ENGLAND IN CENTRAL ASIA (1867). GENERAL SURVEY FROM 1864. It is now three years since, in the concluding chapter of my "Travels in Central Asia," I expressed my astonishment and disapproval at the indifference of England to the advance of the Russians in Central Asia. I pointed both to the Russian line of operations on the Yaxartes, and to the ever-increasing influence of Russia on the territory adjacent to British India. Intentionally refrainmg from all intricate political sophistries, I was as brief and concise as possible, and I scarcely imagined that the unpretending words of a European just returned from Asia would be deemed worthy of closer attention. Nevertheless, almost every organ of the English and Indian press, from the Times to the Hirkaru Bengahc, repeated and discussed these few lines. Only a small number of these different i_i 2 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE journals sympathised more or less with my ideas ; the majority rejected my good advice ; and without exactly making my remarks ridiculous, a loud Hosanna was proclaimed on all sides at the happy change in English politicians, who, no longer so short-sighted as they had been thirty years before, when the advance of the Russians had been regarded only as a hostile event, now- awaited it even joyfully, and wished them good speed on their march to the south over the snow-covered summits of the Hindukush and the Himalaya. Much has changed, however, within these three years. Far from wishing to exult at the fulfilment of my prophecies, I cannot forbear pointing out the line to which the Russian forces had advanced at the time that I drew attention to their position. When I was in Central Asia, the furthest outposts of the Cossacks were at Kale-Rehim, thirty-two miles from Tashkend. Forts I, 2, and 3 on the Yaxartes had not yet passed into certain possession, though they had been actually conquered. In the north of Khokand, and in the west of the Issikkol and the Narin, the Court of Petersburg had but small traces of success to show. The Kirghises were exasperated and provoked at the foreign intruder, and the Ozbeg population of the northern frontier of Khokand might even at that time have regarded a Russian occupation as synonymous with the end of the world, so thoroughly were the infidels hated and repudiated. Three years have passed away, and what has happened in the interval } Not only in Hazreti-Turkestan has Khodj a- Ahmed- Yesevi, the most holy patron of the Kirghises, become a Russian subject; not only has Tashkend, the most important trading town ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 3 and emporium of the commercial Intercourse between Russia and Central Asia and China, become incorporated in the Northern Colossus ; not only does the Russian flag float on the citadel of Khodjend, the second city of importance in Khokand, but the Russian standard is apparent also on the small fortresses of Zamin, Oratepe, and Djizzag. The dreaded Russian has established himself as patron saint in the Eastern Khanate of Turkestan ; and the Hazret, the Khan, no less than the Hazret, the high-priest of Namengan, strives to acquire the favour of a power which a few years ago even to dream of would have excited deadly fear. In fact not only Khokand, but the Tadjik population of the whole of Bokhara and Khiva, the greater part of both the free and subject Sclavonians, as well as the richer merchants of Moultan and other parts of India, who once trembled before the Ozbeg power, now pro- claim from ear to ear with joyful satisfaction the fact that Russia is slowly advancing, and that Ozbeg supremacy and arbitrary rule is near its end. It is three years ago since these changes in the oasis-lands of Turkestan were conducted with a sure and certain hand from the banks of the Neva. Hav- ing travelled in these countries formerly, and having from my youth felt great interest in them, I had always, even though from afar, kept a watchful eye upon all that was taking place on the banks of the Yaxartes. I devoured the statements in the papers, as well as the scanty notices which were sent me by my Hadji friends in Turkestan, through their brethren travelling westward. It will not surprise any one that I took a warm interest in everything, nor that the 4 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE expressions of the English press during these events, and the steps of the Indo-British diplomatists, claimed my full attention. Neither of these parties called to mind my prophecies ; the tone of satisfaction begun three years before was uninterruptedly continued; they were now no longer contented with the bare assertion that the advance of Russia in Central Asia was a thing to be desired, but they ventured to prove tjiis assertion by representing the success of the Musco- vite arms as increasingly advantageous to the interests of England. In order to solve this problem still more surely, and to convince the thinking world in England still more unanswerably of the advantages of Russian success, the question for discussion was placed in a light which must have been acceptable to each different class of society. The scientific world heard from the learned President of the Royal Geographical Society what extraordinary service would be rendered to our cos- mology by the Russian trigonometrical, geographical, and geological societies. Russian voyages of discovery were extolled above all others, Russian scholars were deified, and even the great gold medal was recently bestowed on the Vice- Admiral Von Butakoff for his discoveries on the Sea of Arah Social reformers were led to compare Tartar rudeness with Russian civilisation and the picture which I had myself sketched of Central Asia was placed in contrast to that of the young Russia of the present day ; the emancipation of the serfs, the efforts of Russia for the enlightenment of her people, the great change in customs, the Russian ideas of civilisation in their approximation to the English, ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, S were brought prominently forward, and in every thread of the fabric thus woven, expression was given to the great utility of Russian supremacy in Asia. The com- mercial world was shown the advantages which must result from safe roads of communication, such as Russian arms are about to level to India through the inhospi- table steppes of Turkestan. Indeed, certain papers in their eagerness went so far as to prove to the honest man- ufacturers of Birmingham, Sheffield, Manchester, &c., that on the new Russian commercial highway to Central Asia none but English wares would be exported, and nothing but Enghsh capital would return. Even the military profession caught the whisper of a friendly word ; Russian aggression in India was represented to the sons of Mars as a ridiculous bugbear. Such an aggression was declared an impossibility in a strategical, physical, and moral point of view. How was Russia to overcome the great bulwark of the vast unwatered steppes ? How was she to subdue the warlike Afghan race, or to traverse the dreaded Bolan or Kheiber Pass.'* And if she even succeeded in all this, what reception would she meet from the British lion calmly awaiting the foe in its luxurious palankeen ! Even the Church, that almighty lever in England, was lulled to rest by a cradle song. The desire of the Russian orthodox Church for union with the Anglican was pointed out. Dr Norman Macleod's appeal, ''The Greek Church is not yet lostl'' awakened hopes in the hearts of many ; and learned ecclesiastical dignitaries looked forward with delight to the moment when the Greek triple cross on the Neva would extend a fraternal embrace to the proud dome of St PauFs in London, O CENTRAL ASIA AND THE and when these united Churches would become one mighty defence against the ideas of the Papacy. Independent pamphlets and stormy newspaper ar- ticles repeated in turn the arguments mentioned. The warning voice of the small minority could not venture to appear against the optimists — against these apostles of the new political dogma. Sir Henry Rawlinson, indis- putably the best versed in the affairs of that country — a man who combined practical experience with theoretic judgment — alluded, it is true, here and there, in able articles in the Quarterly Review, to the erroneous mode in which matters were viewed ; and although doubt- ing any actual aggression upon India on the part of Russia, he advised against all active interference, and only blanled the indifference above mentioned ; yet his words passed away without effect upon the multitude. I might, indeed, assure myself, that where such an autho- rity has little weight, I should gain but little with my present words. I have for this reason long delayed to speak ; still, having studied this important question in all its phases — having tested it on all points with an impartial eye — I have felt myself able to prove, not only to English politicians, but to the whole of Europe, that the Cabinet of St James has fatally erred in its mode of viewing the matter, and that the indifference so cherished is not only injurious to the interests of England, but is in truth the deadly weapon with which Great Britain is committing an act of suicide unprece- dented in history. Why I, who by birth am neither English nor Russian, should take up the subject with such warmth, rests principally in the fact that I regard the collision of these ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 7 two colossal powers in Asia less from the point of their mutual rivalry, than from that of general European interest Whether England or Russia has the advan- tage in Asia — which of the two will be the great arbiter of the destinies of the Old World — can never be indif- ferent to us ; for just as much as these two powers differ from each other in their character as channels of Western civilisation, just so much do they vary also in their future appreciation of the fruit of the contest. A hasty glance on the one side at the Tartars who have been under Russian rule for two hundred years, and on the other at the millions of British subjects in India, would be sufficient at once to inform us on this point. We will, however, set this comparison aside for subse- quent examination, and for the present only authenti- cate the fact that the question of the rivalry in Central Asia between these two north European powers concerns not only Englishmen and Russians, but every European, and that in truth it deserves to be watched with inte- rest by every thoughtful man of the present century * I. THE CONQUESTS OF RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA WITHIN THE LAST THREE YEARS. In the first place, we will mention the historical facts of the Russian scheme of conquest within the last three * Up to the present day the Revue des Deux Mondes is the only jour- nal of the whole Continental press that has alluded to the subject, and this has produced two special articles on Central Asia. The first, without betraying any partisanship, points only to the critical circumstance of the approaching collision ; the second, which is pervaded with Russian feeling, sings the song of the English optimists, and I should not find fault with it if the writer had not quoted several passages from my book on Central Asia as his own property. 8 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE years. Instead of entering into the details of Peroff- sky's, Tschernajef's, and Romanoffsky's campaigns, which have been discussed \n Mitchell's book, *'The Russians in Central Asia,'^ and also in several able articles in the Quarterly and Edinburgh Review, or into the scanty notices which find their way to the public from the Russian State Cabinet, or into the still more scanty statements made by the dearly-paid English spies Jn Central Asia, we will only cast a hasty glance on the events generally, in order to make the reader acquainted with the present condition of the Russian forces in Central Asia. The Russian operations in Central Asia began most successfully by the apparent subjection of the Kirghises, The conquest of Khokand was then immediately begun in order to secure a firm footing in the three khanates. In this eastern part of the three oasis-lands of Turkestan there had always prevailed, comparatively speaking, the least social order, the feeblest religious culture, and the greatest repugnance to warlike undertakings. With this were combined great internal disturbances; for while the Khodjas, by their inroads into the Chinese terri- tory on the east, always exposed the khanate to the danger of a collision with China, which had, indeed, fre- quently ensued in the past centuries, the covetous emirs of Bokhara on the west had ever cruelly laid waste the land in their desire of conquest. The advancing columns of the mighty Russian in the north had, until the cap- ture of Ak-Mesjid, but little occupied all tongues at the bazaars of Namengan and Khokand; for the con- test for the crown, which Alemkul, the Kiptchak chieftain, was carrying on with Khudajar-Khan, had at 1 1 ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, g that time absorbed the general interest. At the period of the unsuccessful Peroffsky expedition, Mehemmed- Ali-Khan was on the throne. He was beloved and extolled ; and the infatuated multitude were far better pleased with the ideas of conquest than in contemplat- ing a defence against the threatening enemy in the north, or in considering Conolly's projected alliance with Khiva. It was not till after Mehemmed-Ali's death that the fall of Ak-Mesjid took place — that first dangerous wound in the existence of the khanate ; and success was all the easier to the Russians, as, just at that time, on the one side, the most violent contest was going on in the interior of the khanate between the Kirghises and the Kiptchaks ; and on the other, the first attempt of the Weli-Chan-Tore against Kashgar was paralysing the warlike powers. The columns of the Russians which advanced against the Khokand for- tresses on both banks of the Yaxartes could scarcely be accused of cowardice, although the thousands of Khok- and warriors, of which Russian reports speak, seem to argue a somewhat exaggerated measurement. After the taking of the last-named place, or, to speak more correctly, after the systematic establishment of the chain of fortresses along the Yaxartes, on the waters of which the steam-vessels of the Aral fleet could now freely move, the Russian power increased with the same giant strides as that of Khokand retrograded, owing to the continuance of the causes before mentioned. The line of forts afforded not only security against Turke- stan, but it was also a powerful defence against the Kirghises, who, now surrounded on all sides, would find some difliculty in upholding an Izzet, as the last anti- 10 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Russian chief during the Crimean war was styled. The work of occupation was therefore carried on by the Court at Petersburg with its wonted energy ; and not until the two forces united which were carrying on operations from the Chinese frontier towards the Issik- kol, and from the Sea of Aral along the Yaxartes, extending, therefore, from the north-east and north- west southwards to Aulia Ata (Holy Father, a former resort of pilgrims) — not until then did the Russian diplomatists consider it necessary to state in a despatch, signed by Prince Gortschakoff, on the 2 1st November 1864, that the Government of the Czar had now fulfilled its long-cherished desire of removing the boundary line of the Russian possessions from the uncertain soil of the Sandy Desert to the inhabited part of Turkestan ; that all aggressive policy was herewith concluded ; and that the behaviour of the Government would have but one aim in future — namely, to prove to the neighbouring Tartar states, with the utmost respect for their indepen- dence, that Russia was free from all hostility and all designs of conquest, &c.* It is readily imagined that the Cabinets, with the exception of the English, placed as little reliance on these assurances as did the Russian minister himself. The history of states impelled into ever new conquests is sufficiently known — we have examples of it in every page of the history of the world, in every age in which any single power has been on the increase. Just as the English exculpate themselves in vain respecting the annexation or incorporation fever of Lord Dalhousie, so * See the original text of the despatch in question at the close of this paper. ANGLO'R US SI AN FR ON TIER Q UES TION, 1 1 all the Russian memoranda, drawn up in the same spirit, are superfluous. It is the natural progress of things ; and the Court of Petersburg was right, and in fact could not have acted otherwise than to follow the southern course of the Yaxartes after the establishment of the gubernium of Turkestan ; and as the inhospitable steppes had been before no tenable frontier, the thinly- peopled neighbourhood of Ichemkend and Hazret were scarcely a better one. A well-cultivated region was needed, in order not merely to be dependent for pro- visions on the highway of communication from Orenburg to Semipalatinsk. For this reason it was absolutely necessary to incorporate Tashkend — the rich and fertile Tashkend — in the Russian territory. It would therefore be a useless waste of time were we to attempt to allege as the main cause of the Russian occupation of the last-mentioned town on the 25th June 1865, the touching story of the petition of the Tash- kend merchants, and of the numerous deputations who came imploringly into the Russian camp in order to entreat the shelter of the two-headed eagle, called by the tribes of Central Asia the Ashder dragon, or the Karakush vulture, a bird not otherwise held in much favour. Tashkend, which since time immemorial had lived in feud with the rulers of Khokand, had been latterly especially indignant that its favourite, Khudajar, should have been twice expelled from the throne. It v/as very agreeable, therefore, to . its authorities to damage the prevailing influence of the Kiptchaks by Russian supremacy ; still it is not quite probable that the latter was generally desired. Russia took possession of Tashkend because it 12 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE seemed indispensable to her as a strong basis for fur- ther operations, and not in order thus to acquire a pro- tecting barrier for possessions already gained. Through Tashkend, however, the Court of Petersburg had en- tangled itself in hostihties with the Khanate of Bokhara. As is well known, the Emir, by his campaign of 1863, had gained the nominal right of sovereignty over the western parts of Turkestan ; and although after his departure everything returned into the old track of Kiptchak despotism and party strife, he imagined, nevertheless, that he had vindicated his right over the whole of Khokand. He wrote, therefore, a threatening letter to the commandants of the newly-conquered town, demanding the evacuation of the fortress. This troubled the Russian general but little ; and as he heard that Colonel Struve, whom he sent to Bokhara to arrange the matter amicably, had been taken prisoner there, he set out on the 30th January, crossed the Yaxartes at Tashkend with fourteen companies of infantry, six squadrons of Cossacks, and sixteen can- nons, intending to proceed direct to Bokhara, and to punish the Emir for having ill-treated his envoy. This project, however, failed. The Russians were obliged to retire, but they did so in the greatest order ; and although countless masses of Bokhariots swarmed around them on all sides, their loss was, nevertheless, too inconsiderable to agree with the bombastic accounts of victory which the Bokhariots trumpeted forth through- out the whole Islam world, and which even found their way to Europe through the Levantine press. General Tschernajef exculpated himself by asserting that his hasty advance was alone intended to impede the steps ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTIOiY. 1 3 of some secret English emissaries who were eagerly- engaged in forming an alliance between England and Bokhara, and who had been, moreover, the chief cause of the imprisonment of his envoy, Colonel Struve. Nevertheless, the authorities in Petersburg could not pardon his military error; he was suspended from his high command, and General Romanoffsky succeeded to his post The latter advanced forwards with slow but all the more cautious steps. On the 12th April a flock of 15,000 sheep, guarded by 4000 Bokhariot horsemen, was captured ; arid a month afterwards there was a warm engagement in the neighbourhood of Tchinaz, generally called **the battle of Irdjar," in which the Tartars were totally defeated. On the 26th May the small for- tress of Nau fell into the hands of the Russians, and soon after Khodjend, the third city in the Khanate of Khokand, was taken by storm, and that after a hard contest, in which the Russians left 133 dead and wounded on the field, and the Tartars certainly ten times as many. Nevertheless, the prize was well worth the hard contest, for this place had better fortifications than Tashkend and all the other towns in the khanate. It was the second resting-point of the Russian arms on their progress towards the south; and although the Russian Invalide asserted, in an official statement with regard to further plans, that the conquest of Bok- hara, separated as it was by steppes from all other possessions, could not be the object of the Russian operations, but, on the contrary, was utterly fruitless, still the forces advanced over Oratepe, through the small towns of Djam Zamin, as far as Djizzag, leaving important garrisons behind everywhere. 14 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE The events that were passing in the Khanate of Khokand itself during the victorious march of the Russians are no less worthy of our attention. The inhabitants, consisting of nomad tribes, Ozbegs, and Tadjiks, or Sarts, were just as much divided in their Russian sympathies and antipathies as they differed from each other in nationality, rank, and occupation. The warlike, powerful, and influential Kiptchaks, the old enemies of the often-intruding Bokhariots, who wanted to force upon them the hated Khudajar-Khan, were not signalised by any special opposition. Their friendship was an important acquisition for the Russians, and the approximation must have begun as early as the time that the north-east army corps, marching from Issikkol, came into contact with them ; for if this had not been the case, the advance on this line would cer- tainly have been more dearly purchased. The Ozbegs, as the ruling race, defended themselves as much as possible; yet, with their well-known lack of valour, decision, and perseverance, they could effect but little, and as it was a matter for consideration whether Russian supremacy was after all a worse evil than the everlasting war with Bokhara or internal disturbances, they did well to submit to their unavoidable fate. Only a few exasperated Ishans and Mollas were driven by an unfounded fear to Bokhara, as, for example, the de- scendants of Khodja-Ahmed-Yesevi in Hazreti-Tur- kestan, who, however, will probably soon return to the bones of their sacred forefathers, as the Russians will certainly not, hinder them in gathering in the pious gifts of their pilgrims. The Russian occupation ap- peared, however, desirable and advantageous only to the ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 1 5 rich merchants of Tashkend, to the Sarts or Tadjiks, and to the small number of Persian slaves ; for as the former expected considerable benefit from the incorpo- ration of their native city into the Russian territory, so the latter hoped to be freed from their oppressed posi- tion by the decline of Ozbeg supremacy. As we see from a correspondence addressed by General Krischan- ofsky to a Moscow paper, it was these very Sarts who were most helpful to the Russians. Their Aksakals, and not those of the Ozbegs, were the first who were presented with posts of importance by the Russians. They appear in public always at the side of the Russian officers; they harangue the people; and while Russian churches are being built, they have disseminated the report that his Majesty, having been converted to Islam- ism by a nocturnal apparition, is on the very point of making a pilgrimage to Hazreti-Turkestan. For a long time in commercial intercourse with Russia, many of the Tadjiks, especially those at Tashkend, are familiar with the Russian writing and language ; they act as interpreters and mediators ; and as several of them have attained high positions in the Mehkemes (courts of justice) and other offices, the main inducement for their adherence is easily understood. Such is the state of things on the main line of oper- ations in the Khanate of Khokand. At the adjacent points, also, east as well as west, the work of transforma- tion has been silently going on. Of Chinese Tartary we hear that since the year 1864 the Chinese garrisons have been removed, and have been replaced by a national government. First there were the disturbances of Tunganis, then followed the emancipation of Khoten, 1 6 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Yarkend, Aksu, and Kashgar ; and although the tra- ditional love of pillage that distinguishes the Khokand Khodjas may lie at the foundation of these disturb- ances, yet many know with certainty that the Court of Petersburg favoured these revolutionary movements, and indeed that the Kiptchaks, who are now in pos- session of Kashgar, acquired it with Russian arms. This is the usual prelude to Russian intervention. For some time these independent towns are allowed to be hostile and to make war upon each other ; yet it is easy to foresee that their hostilities will appear dangerous to the repose of the Russian frontier, remote as it may be ; and if the Court of Pekin does not hasten to restore order, the Russians will certainly anticipate their pro- ceedings. The English press consoles itself with re- marking that the insurmountable barrier of the Kuen- Luen range renders a further advance toward Cash- mere impossible, and that this Russian diversion at any rate would be advantageous to the commerce of Central Asia. We will, however, defer the discussion of this question for the present, and rather cast a glance at that part of Central Asia lying to the west of Khokand. Although entangled in the war with Bokhara, Russia, up to the present time, has not attacked the real Bokhara territory ; for Djizzag is the lawful boundary between the former and Khokand. Nothing but a few diplomatic skirmishes have as yet shown themselves, and foremost among these stands the revolution of Shehri-Sebz, that notorious focus of the contests with Bokhara. For if the Russian press were to deny a thousand times all interference in it, the appearance of the Shehri-Sebz Aksakal in Tashkend cannot be ANGLO'ieUSS/AN FRONTIER QUESTION. \*J regarded as devoid of meaning, and this all the more as Djuna-Bei, the prince of the country, is at the present moment at war with Bokhara. Comparatively speaking, we are least aware of the Russian plans in Khiva. Russian influence has not yet affected the inhabited part of that khanate, and in the north alone, since the destruction of the fortress of Chodsa-Nijaz on the Yaxartes, a few wandering hordes of Cossacks and Karakalpaks along the eastern shore of the Sea of Aral have been made Russian subjects. 2. THE FUTURE POLICY OF RUSSIA. The sketch of the proceedings of Russia in Central Asia shows in itself in what manner the policy of the Petersburg Court will pursue its plans in the immediate future. The most southern, and therefore most advanced, outposts are at Djizzag. This word signifies in the language of the country a hot, burning place, and its position in the deep valley of the Ak-Tau range per- fectly justifies the name. In consequence of its ex- tremely unhealthy climate and the great lack of water, the number of the inhabitants in this station on the highway to Khokand is very small, and I cannot believe that the Russians have chosen it as a place of permanent abode and as a halting-point, in spite of the assertion in the Russian Invalide before mentioned, or the opposite opinion of the learned writer of the article " Central Asia " in the Quarterly Review of October 1866. Not only is it an unhealthy and scarcely tenable B 1 8 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE post, but any lengthy sojourn there must be considered extremely unpolitic. The gentlemen on the banks of the Neva know well what Bokhara is in the eyes of the whole Central Asiatic world, and indeed, I might say, of the whole Mohammedan world. They know that on the Zerefshan is to be sought the true source of the religious ideas and thoughts, not only of all Central Asiatics, but also of the Indians, Afghans, Nugai Tartars, and other fanatics. To accomplish any grand coup, there- fore, the Emir, who styles himself Prince of all orthodox believers, must be brought to acknowledge the supre- macy of the white Czar ; and the sacred and noble Bok- hara, where the atmosphere is perfurned with ,the aromatic odour of Fatihas and Koran recitations, must do homage to the power of the unbelievers ; and the multi- tude of frantic fanatics and religious enthusiasts must acknowledge that the influence of the saint resting beneath their soil is not strong enough to blunt the Russian bayonets. The fall of Bokhara will be a fright- ful example to the whole Islam world, and the, dust of her ruins will penetrate into the far distance as a mighty cry of warning. This must, and wjll most certainly be, the aim of the Court of Petersburg. From this point of view it is therefore very probable that the greatest attention will be directed in future to the line of operations extending through Tashkend, Khodjend, and Samarkand. The conquest of the whole Khanate of Khokand may indeed follow in time, for such a scheme presents no special difficulties ; but the main interest is the maintenance and security of those highways of communication, which will afford the advanc- ing army a road provided with an uninterrupted succes- ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. I9 sioii of Springs, with strong garrisons in the now strongly- fortified Tashkend and in the more northern forts, besides the guberniums of Orenburg and Semipala- tinsk. The Emir may use all possible means to acquire the friendship of Russia, a matter which he has not at present done ; he may send to Constantinople as many messengers of bad news as he will ; he may despatch as many friendly invitations as he likes to the Vice- Regent of India, but it will all avail nothing. The town of Bokhara must, either without him or with him, be governed by an Isprawnik ; for the Russians dare not and cannot rest until the old Samarkand and Nachsheb (Karshi), or the entire right bank of the Oxus, are incorporated with the gigantic possessions of the house of Romanoff. That this catastrophe, this final hour of the independence of Transoxania, will not be brought about with such ease as the former military achieve- ments in Central Asia is indeed obvious. I see already in imasfination the frantic hordes of the Mollas and the Ishans, and of thousands of students, preaching the cause of the Djihad (religious war), and wandering with holy fury through the khanates, among Afghans, Turkomans, and Karakalpaks, calling down the curse of God upon the intruding stranger, and presenting spec- tacles of the deepest and most devout contrition. The fatal contest will be a mighty though not a useless one. So far as I know the Khivans and the Afghans, I con- sider the idea of a common alliance with Bokhara as utterly impossible; for if they were inclined for such a thing, it must have been formed sooner. No selfish feeling, no political combination, nothing but the utmost want of character and the absence of all calculation for 20 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE the future, will keep them in repose till Hannibal no longer stands at the gates. Not only in Central Asia, but among all the other peoples of the East, we look in vain for an effort after a common aim. As the warlike Afghans could combine in forming a well-ordered aux- iliary force, so also it would be possible for the Khan of Khiva to join the army of the Emir with 20,000 or 30,000 horse ; yet neither the one nor the other will do this. To unite them under one command would alone be possible to a Timur or a Djengis, and even then, the smallest booty might awaken rancour and discord in their ranks. The hundred thousands also of well- mounted Turkomans who inhabit the great steppes on the other side of the Oxus as far as the Persian frontier, are of no use at all as regards the safety of the holy city. Their Ishans will indeed do their utmost, if summoned by the Emir or by the members of their order in noble Bokhara, to induce the wild sons of the desert to join in the holy contest. Yet I know the Turkomans too well not to be aware that they will only take part in the Djihad so long as the Emir gives them good pay and the prospect of still better booty ; and just as they have occasionally entered the Afghan- Persian service, it is highly probable that the Russian im- perials will speedily make them the best comrades of the Cossacks. Enthusiasm for the religion of the Prophet, in my opinion, only existed for the first century — in fact, I might say, only for the first fifty years. All that Islamism subsequently achieved in Anatolia, in the empire of Constantine, in the islands of the Medi- terranean, in Hungary and in Germany, was the result of a wild thirst for booty and treasure, and of an inch- ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 21 nation for adventure. Where these motives are lack- ing, zeal is also lacking; and I repeat, that though the contest will be a hard one, there is not the least doubt of the speedy victory of the Russian arms in Bokhara. With the fall of this most influential and strong part of Turkestan, Khokand will of itself exchange apparent sovereignty for the protection of the white Czar. Khiva, however, to all appearance, not intimidated by the example, will nevertheless resume the contest. The conquest of Khahrezm, moreover, although easier than that of Khokand, is subject to important difficulties. With the exception of two cities, the inhabitants of which are better acquainted with Russia through com- mercial relations, the Ozbeg population of this khanate already abhor the name of Russia. They stand far higher than the Khokands and Bokhariots in valour, and, assisted by the soil of their country, they will give the Russian troops a good deal to do with their Turko- man mode of warfare. I must, as before, oppose the opinion maintained by many geographers and travellers, that the Oxus will form a highway for the expedition. This river, from its great irregularity, and from the sand which it carries with it, is difficult of navigation to small vessels, to say nothing of ships of war. Not a year passes that it does not change its bed for some miles in the loose soil of the steppes, and if the Russians were not accurately convinced of this circumstance, the small steamers of the Aral Sea fleet, built for river navigation, would have begun their advance into the interior of the country on the Oxus rather than on the Yaxartes. For although the smaller fortresses, such as Kungrat, 22 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Kiptchak, and Mangit, which are built on fortified heights on the left bank of the river, might do damage to an advancing fleet, they are scarcely to be taken into consideration in the deplorable condition of the Khiva artillery. Attempts to navigate the river from the mouth as far as Kungrat, where the stream is deepest and most regular, have been also already set on foot > yet that they have been attempts only is an excellent proof that the navigation of the Derjai Amu (Oxus), although not quite impossible, is a difficult task. These are, however, only secondary hindrances ; and as in Bokhara, so also in Khiva, the white Czar will contrive his elevation to the throne of the Khahrezm princes — not, indeed, by the greybeards of the Tcha- gatai race, but by his own bayonets and cannons. When once the acquisition of the entire right bank of the Oxus is secured, when the whole tract of land from Issikkol to the Sea of Aral has passed into the posses- sion of Russia, richly provided with excellent commis- sary stores, then the diplomatic game will begin with Afghanistan. The Court of Petersburg will not suddenly appear among the Afghans with an armed force, and this not because of the warning given by the failure of England in 1839, but because such a proceeding is once for all not the custom of the Russians. Such an act, moreover, would be partly superfluous and partly injudicious, with the proverbial dissension prevailing among the descendants of Dost Mohammed ; where brother rages against brother in the bitterest feud, where intrigues are ever arising from covetousness and vanity, a secret agent, a wise word, a few friendly lines are of greater use than any armed invasion. Up to the ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 23 present time, Abdurrahman-Khan, in his family dispute with Shir- Ali- Khan, has entered into no communication with Russian agents, although he made a semblance of so doing, in order to intimidate the English Munschi (agents) in Kabul. That he would be much inclined to such a step, I do not doubt in the least ; yet the Rus- sians have given him no occasion for doing so. For if the Afghan party adverse to Shir-Ali-Khan, the Emir accredited by England, had received even the slightest sign from the Neva, they would certainly have held no parleying with Sir John Lawrence in Calcutta. Not only chiefs and princes, but every Afghan warrior and every shepherd on the Hilmend is familiar with the idea of Russian commerce, and I have convinced myself a hundred times how readily, and indeed how gladly these people would enter into a Russian alliance against the nobles of Peshawur. Whether the result of this friend- ship would be salutary, and would promote the interests of Afghanistan, never occurs to any one. The Afghan, like every other Asiatic, only perceives the interest of the moment ; he only sees the evils which his race has suffered in Cashmere and Sindh from English supre- macy ; he vividly remembers the last occupation of the red coats in Kabul and Kandahar, and although every one knows that the Muscovite Kafirs are not much better than those of Western Europe, still, impelled by feelings of vengeance, he prefers, and ever will do so, the alliance with the north to any English approximation. Hence nothing but friendly sentiments, nothing but an alliance, supported not by treaties, but by a strong power on the Oxus, can be the future aim of the Rus- sians in Afghanistan. 24 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE The same state of things is also to be aimed at in Persia. Here also the Court of Petersburg has played a very successful game within the last few decades. Russian influence has passed through various phases in Iran from the appearance of the Muscovite ambassador at the brilliant Court of the Sefevis, at the time of Chardin, until the present day. Formerly ridiculed and despised, the Russians have risen to be the most power- ful and dangerous adversaries of Iran. While England and France in the time of Napoleon I., desirous of assert- ing their influence at the Court of Teheran, rivalled each other in rendering service to the Shah and some of his grandees, Russia, as " inter duos certantes tertius gau- denSj" silently made the way for the conquest of Trans- caucasus, and achieved the advantageous treaties of GuHstan and Turkmantshaj. And while the two West- ern powers were persisting in their policy, the Northern Colossus had taken up such a position both on the Cau- casus and on the Caspian Sea, that the shadows of it stretched not only over the northern edge of Iran, but far into the interior of the country. At the time of Sir Henry Rawlinson's embassy, English influence was on the point of gaining the ascendancy, but from that period it has been gradually sinking ; for the English policy in Iran was just as lavish in Malcolm's time in gold and favours, as it has been cold and indifferent from M'Neil downwards. The Shah as well as his ministers seemed constrained by necessity to receive the Russians as their Mentor. It is from no conviction of a better future that they have cast aside the embraces of the English lion and thrown themselves into the arms of the northern bear ; and the Shah, whether he ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 2$ likes it or no, has to dance to every tune which the latter growls to him. Having thus depicted the condition of Russian power and policy in Central Asia, if we now cast a glance upon the frontier line stretching for 1300 wersts from the Sea of Japan to the Circassian shore of the Black Sea, along which Russia is in constant contact with such various races of different origin and different religion, over whose future her aggressive policy hangs like the fatal sword of a Damocles, we shall soon see that although the most southern outposts in Asia are on the Araxes, yet the point at which they meet a European power in their further advance is alone to be found m Central Asia. Twenty years ago, separated from the northern frontier of British India by the great Kirghises hordes and by the three khanates, the present distance between Djizzag and Peshawur, though the laborious pass of the Hindukush lies between, amounts to no more than fifteen days' journey and scarcely 120 geographical miles. This pass, difficult indeed, but not insurmountable to an army, is peculiarly adapted to the furtherance of politi- cal influence ; and however much England may regard the snow-capped summits of the Hindukush as the mighty bulwark of her frontier, she forgets the ease with which a Russian propaganda from the shores of the Oxus might make a way from here to the northern Sindh ; in fact, from the moment that the Russian flag floats over Karshi, Kerki, and Tchardjui, England may regard this power as her nearest neighbour. 26 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE 3. RUSSIA'S DESIGNS UPON INDIA, AND THE ENGLISH OPTIMISTS. Does Russia, then, really entertain serious designs upon British India ? will she attack the English lion in its rich possessions ? does her ambition really go so far that she desires to wave her mighty sceptre over the whole con- tinent of Asia, from the icy shores of the Arctic Ocean down to Cape Comorin ? This is a question which must be of interest not only to an Englishman, but to every European. The statesmen on the banks of the Thames, as well as those m Calcutta, have of late answered this question negatively ; for their official and ncn-official journals perceive in the extreme danger of approxima- tion nothing but a vicinity of frontier and no aggression — a vicinity which, far from endangering the interests of England, will be even advantageous to them. Unhap- pily these gentlemen are much mistaken ; for the spirit of the traditional policy of Russia, the tenacious adher- ence to preconceived plans, the boundless ambition of the house of Romanoff, the great resources which stand at their disposal for the success of their designs, — all these proclaim a certain prospect of the prosecution of an object once conceived. Russia's designs on India are of three kinds: in the first place, in the far future to insert these rich pearls in the splendid diadem of her Asiatic possessions — these pearls, for the acquisition of which she so long and with so much expenditure has been making her way across the most inhospitable steppes of the world ; in the next place, as the possessor of India has attained in the eyes of the Mohammedans the non ANGLORUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 2/ plus ultra of power and greatness, her design is to increase to the utmost, by this very acquisition, her influence over the whole world of Islam, whose greatest and bitterest foe she now is ; and lastly, by subduing the British lion on the other side of the Hindukush, to be able with greater ease to realise her intentions on the Bosphorus, in the Mediterranean, and indeed throughout Europe ; for no one at the present day will any longer doubt that the Oriental question can be solved with greater ease on the other side of the Hindukush than on the Bosphorus : and had Russia had her present posi- tion on the Yaxartes at the time of the Crimean war, when Nana Sahib's brother was worshipped at Sevas- topol, the designs of the Emperor Nicholas upon Con- stantinople would not so easily have been buried under the ruins of the Malakoff. These vast plans are perhaps not the work of the next ten years, and especially not that of the reign of the peace- ful and good-natured Alexander; yet who can assure us that the latter may not be succeeded on the throne by a Nicholas, or by a still severer type of autocrat, who will oppose the desire of a Timur or a Nadir to appear as the conqueror of the entire Asiatic world ? Every one knows well enough, and the English statesmen among the rest, what a Russian autocrat can do in the present constitution of Russia, and in the present social condition of her subjects, which is likely, moreover, to be a permanent one. It is therefore all the more striking that these very statesmen allow themselves so readily to disregard the contingencies just mentioned, and will dis- pute with such superficial arguinents the question of the possibility of a Russian invasion of India. They gener- 28 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE ally bring forward the inaccessible glaciers of the Hin- dukush and the Himalaya range, and the multitudes of hostile tribes who would impede a power advancing from the north in its way to the south. They console themselves with the great distance, which would bring an invading army weary and exhausted to the frontiers of India, while the English troops, stronger in military tactics and ardour, calmly expecting the foe and ready for battle, would be eagerly awaiting the encounter. Do these gentlemen, however, believe that Russia, if she really entertained such designs, would despatch the invading army direct from Petersburg, Moscow, or Arch- angel ? Of what use are the southern Siberian forts ? of what use are Tashkend, and Khodjend, and subse- quently, we may be sure, also Bokhara and Samarkand ? and what is the good of the Persian- Afghan alliance ? What have the Cossacks and the Russian troops of the line done at Gunib and in the rugged mountains of Cir- cassia ? Did they in these instances arrive exhausted at the station ? And these mountains are not so much further from the capital on the Neva than Peshawur is from the above-mentioned cities of Transoxania ! And why should it even be assumed that Russia would select alone the difficult road across Belkh to Kabul, and from thence over the Kheiber Pass, in preference to any other ? Apart from the fact that this might have been so fatal only to the English army of 1839, when fleeing in fear .and disorder, for the march thither had cost no special sacrifice, the route across Herat and Kandahar, the real caravan-road to India through the Bolan Pass is far more convenient. The latter, 54 or 55 English miles long, has indeed cost the Bengal corps of the Indus ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 29 army several days* labour, still we learn from a reliable English author that the transport of 24-pound howitzers and 18-pound cannons caused no special difficulties. Or why should not the Russians take the Gomul or Guleri Pass, which the Lohani- Afghans use as the main route of communication to Burnes, and which presents no peculiar difficulties at all? It is truly too difficult to share the sanguine views of the English optimists with regard to the strength of their imagined bulwarks. The road by Kabul, they assert, must be taken only in case of necessity ; for the main points at which Russia can conveniently approach the frontiers of India are Djizzag and Astrabad — by the first in a southern, and by the second in an eastern direction. Both routes from time immemorial have already frequently led armies to the object of their desires ; for both, although bounded by great deserts, pass through well-cultivated and indeed fruitful lands, which could feed without difficulty several thousands of soldiers. In fact, even the issue of a possible war is greatly over-estimated in England. It is true their present army in India, which numbers 70,000 British troops besides the strong contingent of the Sepoy, is not to be compared with their former military forces in that country. To transport an equally strong number across Afghanistan* into the Punjaub would certainly be a difficult task for Russia ; still we must not forget what firm support an invading army would find in a Persian-Afghan alliance, and in the great discontent which prevails in the Pun- jaub, in Cashmere, in Bhotan, and especially among the fanatical Mohammedans of India. The railway network 30 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE gradually extending over India may indeed expedite and assist in a concentration of forces, yet the main source of military support on the Thames or in the islands of the Mediterranean, is not much nearer for India than that of the Russians, especially when we con- sider that more than 300 vessels which pass up the Volga considerably facilitate all transport to the south- ern shores of the Caspian Sea. A great; army could be brought in a short time to Herat and Kandahar by this route, through the well-peopled part of Northern Persia — on the one side through Astrabad, Budjnurd, and Kabushan, and on the other by the railway to Meshed, which as yet is only in prospect. The Czar is construct- ing this railway nominally to facilitate the pilgrimage to the tomb of Imam Riza, yet other non-religious plans appear in the Russian promise of the subsidies. Or does England consider the political arrangements which the above-mentioned power has made in its own favour m the field of European diplomacy, in connection with the scarcely doubtful possibility of a Russian design upon India ? The Russian-French alliance of Napoleon I. and Alexander I., which left behind such sensible traces in Teheran, would be far more easy to enter into now than then, owing to the preponderating influ- ence of France in Egypt and Syria on the formation of the Suez Canal. And apart from this, may not the ever- increasing entente cordiale between Washington and Petersburg be of importance in the designs of Russia ? We laugh at the idea of the Republican cap of the Yankee being entwined with the Russian knout ; yet are not the banquets on the Neva, at which American brotherhood is stoutly pledged — the journey ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 3 1 of the Czar's son to New York — the powerful appearance of America in China and Japan, where she threatens to transform the quiet ocean into an American lake, — are not these causes enough to discover symptoms of the greatest danger to England in a Russian-American alliance? In fact, in the decisive moment of action, Russia will be able to make use of so many ways and means, which in the eyes of English statesmen have scarcely been considered worthy of attention, but which have been carefully and noiselessly prepared. Nevertheless, we will allow that the effective collision will take place in a very distant future, and we are ready to submit to the designation of a false prophet; how, however, will English statesmen explain as harmless the now undoubted approach of their northern rival ? how will they conceal and palliate the threatening danger of her intentions ? The political party in England which is friendly to Russia is wont to answer, so often as this question is brought on the tapisy that the vicinity of a well-ordered state is more agreeable to them than that of wild nomad races living in anarchy and rapine. An English- man once even asked me, whether I should not prefer sitting by the side of an elegantly-dressed and refined man than of a rough and dirty peasant. We wish success with all our heart to the Muscovite vicinity, yet it is never clear to my mind why those gentlemen should wish a crafty and powerful adversary as a neighbour, instead of a barbarous, but, in truth, powerless foe ^ The events that once took place in America, in the south of Africa, and even on Indian soil, between the growing power of England on the one side and the declining 32 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE power of Holland and Portugal on the other, have often been repeated on the pages of history, and will be repeated still oftener. Just as in ordinary life two strong egotistic individuals seldom prosper on one and the same path of life, so is it utterly impossible with two states ; and this fact is well proved by the long war between France and England for superiority in India. Even if guided by the best intentions, will Russia, supported at the back by the gigantic power of the entire Asiatic continent, and having pursued with such persistency and expenditure her policy of a hundred years* standing, will she be able to resist following out her own plans, and listening to the insinuations of her abettors ? Will she have forbearance enough not to wish to use the favour- able opportunity which places in her hand more than thirty millions of the Mohammedan population of India ? The last-named — the most fanatical of all the followers of Islam — are filled with inexpressible hatred against British rule. Their religious zeal, fostered on the one side by Bokhara, and on the other by the Wehabites, goes so far that in order to quaff the cup of martyrdom they often murder an innocent British officer walking in the bazaar, and then give themselves up to the axe of the executioner. In India, where religious fanaticism has at all times found the most fertile soil, Islamism dis- plays itself in the most grotesque forms. The fraternities introduced in the time of the Timurides are here more vigorous and of greater importance than elsewhere ; and not only Swat, but every place can produce its Achond, whose summons to the Djihad is readily obeyed by thousands. In spite of the various benefits which the English Government has bestowed on the Mohamme- ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIEI? QUESTION, 33 dans, it is nevertheless they alone who form the focus of revolutions — they alon« who in the late disturbances most supported the rebels — they alone who chiefly delight in the combinations of a Russian occupation, and who every- where proclaim the advantages of Muscovite supremacy. And who can help also calling to mind the Arme- nians, who, scattered over Persia and India, form sepa- rate rings of the chain by which the Court of Peters- burg conducts the electric current of its influence from the Neva to the Ganges, and indeed to the shores of Java and Sumatra ? The rich aspiring Armenians, who in their religious feelings are more Catholic than the Pope, and are more Russian and orthodox than the Russian Czar himself, will certainly not commend the Protestant Church and Protestant power to the natives of India, to the injury of the most Christian Russia. How many zealous subjects of the British rule in Cal- cutta, Bombay, and Madras are registered at Petersburg as still more zealous promoters of Russian interests ? Every member of this Church in Asia may be con- sidered a secret agent of the Muscovite policy ; and were the decisive moment to appear, the Enghsh would be astonished to see into what this religious, moral, peace- ful, and industrious people have developed. How, therefore, can England regard the fact with indifference, to say nothing of desiring it, that in a country where such easily inflammable elements exist, a great and certainly not friendly power should be her neighbour.? Trade will increase, I hear said on all sides ; yet it seems to me that the prospects of the commercial advantages which the British statesmen see in the approach of Russia, and in the removal of c 34 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE the anarchical condition in Central Asia, is rather a feigned consolation than a true conviction. It is indeed striking enough that people of such practical minds as the English, can even for a moment indulge in the hope that any good can result for England from the designs which Russia has for years pursued with labour, cost, and sacrifice, and that English wares will carry the day in the markets of Central Asia as soon as they are under Russian rule. Mr Davies, with his commercial reports, may point to the consider- able sum which the export trade with Central Asia, through Peshawur, Karatchi, and Ladak, can show within the last few years ; he must, however, confess that it would be ten times larger if it were supported by English influence on the other side of the North Indian frontier. And so also it will decrease again in the same proportion as the Russian eagle spreads its wings over these countries. The Petersburg Cabinet gave its apparent consent to the plan of Lord WiUiam Hay to make a commercial highway through Ladak, Yarkend, Issikkol, and Semipalatinsk ; but in reality no one would support the plan, and it will not occur to any Russian statesman to do so. The Chinese are far superior in mercantile spirit, not only to the Russians, but even to the English, and nevertheless they trade along the great commercial highway from Pekin through southern Siberia only as far as Maimatchin, and from Kiachta most of the Chinese exports pass through Russian hands to Petersburg and Europe. And how was it with the Italian silk-traders, who repaired to Bokhara under Russian protection, and were arrested there and de- prived of their property } One of them (Gavazzi) AN G LOR USSIAN FRONTIER Q UES T/ON. 3 5 allows it to be strongly felt in his report that he could never give full credence to the Russian letters of recom- mendation, in spite of all the subsequent intercession from Petersburg. The productions of the English manu- facturing towns are wont everywhere to drive Russian fabrics out of the market. The merchants of Khiva and Bokhara bring even now Russian articles with them from Nishni-Novgorod and Orenburg, which they sell in Central Asia under the name of Ingilis mali (EngHsh goods), as the preference is always given to these. It is forgotten in England that candour will long be want- ing to Russian policy, and that on the commercial high- ways opened by Russian arms, equal hindrances, though not of the same nature, will be placed in the way of foreign interests as those now encountered on the hio-h- ways to the Oxus through Afghan rapacity and Ozbeg anarchy. In the years 1864-65 America sold in India alone more than fifteen million pounds sterling of linen and cotton goods, which of course was possible alone under the free institutions of England. Do the gentle- men in Calcutta expect perhaps similar conduct on the part of the Russians ? Unfortunately the measures are but temporary which are taken in England with respect to the future policy of Russia as regards India. Just as the fabric of security which the present statesmen in Downing Street weave in their imagination may be thoroughly shattered, so the arguments also of a future entente cordiale are very shallow. Instead of useless refutation, we would rather point to errors committed, and we would rather mention the means by which the danger might be avoided, even now, of a direct collision, and of beginning a game so fatal to the interests of England. 36 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE 4. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE RUSSIAN POLICY, AND THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE ENGLISH. In order to understand accurately the errors of the English politicians with regard to their Russian rivals, it is necessary that we should state the advantages which the latter have always possessed in the field of action, and which they possess still. In Europe we are wont to look with astonishment at the gigantic empire of Russia in Asia, yet the means essentially used in its acquisition occur to no one. The Russians are Asiatics, not so much in consequence of their descent, as of their geographical position and their social relations ; and it is only because they combine the laisser-aller of the Asiatics with the perseverance and resolution of Euro- peans, that they are for the most part a match for the Asiatic tribes. In their contact with Chinese, Tartars, Persians, Circassians, and Turks, they have always shown themselves Chinese, Tartars, Persians, and so forth, according to the circumstances of the case. An English historian says, if not without rancour, at any rate with some justice, that the advance of the Russians was always like that of a tiger, *' first crawling cautiously and creeping along cowardly in the dust, until the favourable moment permits the fatal spring. With the peaceful smile of friendship, and with the smooth and sweet words of their emissaries, they have often lulled all fear and all precaution, until the security of their plans have made all fear useless and all precaution vain. Infatuated and perfidious must that Government be which can slumber as the Russians approach its frontier, ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 37 however slow this approach may be, and however great may be the distance between the conqueror and the aim of his endeavours." As Asiatics, they are not wont to stand in such harsh contrast to their neighbours in manners, customs, and mode of thought as the English do, to whom, with their higher degree of culture, such a renunciation would be a sacrifice, and would be incompatible with their efforts at civilisation. They offend but rarely against the notions of the different tribes, and they adapt themselves to them with the utmost ease when their interests demand it. In England the Government has until now considered it beneath its dignity to place itself in direct communication with the Emir of Bokhara, for all that has hitherto passed be- tween the capital on the Zerefshan and the British Cabinet has been through the medium of the Governor of India. In Russia the feeling has been different, and even the proud Nicholas, that strict autocrat, who long refused to give the French Emperor the title of " mo7i frirCy' demeaned himself in his dealings with the Tartar /princes in Central Asia, not as an Emperor of all the Russias, but as a Khan on the Neva. The consequence of this conduct is, that we find at the present day, all along the frontier line of Russia in Asia, nomads or settled tribes, Buddhist or Mohammedan races, in such a degree of intimacy, if not even friendship, with the Russians, as is the case nowhere else in the foreign possessions of a European power. These advantages of Asiatic feeling — the appropriation of which we may indeed designate as special cunning and craftiness — are, however, in political intercourse also of far greater use than the language of openness and 38 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE justice, which the English have on principle always em- ployed. None but the enemies of Great Britain in Europe, none but the enviers of her power, can reproach the Enghsh for their conduct in India ; yet any one who is accurately acquainted with their political collisions with the native princes and with the frontier tribes, or any one who is thoroughly familiar with the character of the Asiatics, will see that in the utter want of these faults lies the error of the English statesmen. . From the great territory on the Amur to the smallest possessions which Russia has recently acquired on Asi- atic soil, we find ever the same proceedings of intrigues and artifices, the scattering of the seeds of discord, and all the bribery and allurement by the lowest means which precede an invasion. They first come into contact with the foreign elements in their commercial relations ; the smallest disputes are easily converted into casus belli. Where these fail, the soil is undermined by emissaries, the chiefs are allured by presents, are intoxicated by a rich distribution of wodki (Russian brandy), and are drawn into the fatal magic circle. A well-founded cause for war and invasion would nowhere be readily discovered, and the gigantic empire of the house of Romanoff has been certainly raised more by the artifice of its Asiatic politicians than by the power of its arms. Moreover, Russia, in consequence of the last-mentioned quality, is far better acquainted with the relations of Asiatic tribes, and far better informed of everything that is passing in the frontier states than the English are, or any other Euro- peans. It is owing to the great watchfulness of her emissaries, and to the unwearied zeal of her diplo- matists, that her cabinet is informed of the most secret ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 39 events in the adjacent countries, often more speedily and more thoroughly than the Government of the country itself. Apart from the fact that in Petersburg a society of the most able men can turn to account their experi- ences respecting the different parts of Asia, here and there a Khirghise, a Buriate, a Circassian, or a Mongol, after having been trained in Russian principles, is con- verted into the most useful instrument with regard to his subjected native land. In England we meet everywhere with the greatest contrast to all this. Any one who knows the great ignorance of pubhc opinion in England respecting events in India, respecting the relations of the neighbouring states to these vast possessions — any one who, during the course of a year, has registered the absurd and ridi- culous reports and telegraphic dispatches of the English press, which are sent through Bombay and Calcutta to Europe and England — any one who knows the limited number of the English statesmen who, accurately in- formed on Asiatic matters, can pronounce a sound judg- ment on the questions of Eastern policy — must truly be astonished how Great Britain established her foreign possessions, to say nothing of how she has retained them up to the present day. Just as, among the English public, even those who have sojourned for some time in Asia, have, in conse- quence of their national character, kept aloof from the natives, and are but rarely acquainted with their language and habits, so the English Government has not been able to assign to Englishmen, but only to naturalised Levan- tines, such important posts of legation as, for example, that of dragoman at Constantinople, that essential organ 40 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE of mutual intercourse. While Russia, France, and Austria have long had oriental academies for embryo diplomatists, England, with her rich endowment of col- leges, schools, and universities, has never yet thought of an institution of the kind. Thus even in the Legislature as well as in the Ministry, where often the smallest ques- tions have each their own department, only a very few men are competent as regards the important affairs of Asia ; and even these men are rarely allowed, in conse- quence of the nepotism that prevails, to bring their experiences forward. This indifference must surprise every stranger ; yet still more astonishment is excited when we hear men of the Liberal party exclaim, ** What does Asia concern us.'* that mass of barbarous tribes, who bring us more trouble than good, and that rich India, the revenues of which do not cover the expenses, to say nothing of the cost of the conquest!" I have often heard remarks of this. kind made by the most famous heads of this party ; the sin- cerity of their confession is indubitable ; nevertheless I have never received an answer when I have inquired what would compensate for the loss of the political influence arising from the great colonial empire. They seem wholly to forget that a great number of young Englishmen of all classes find a political and military career in India ; they seem to ignore the fact that many of the sons of the clergy and officers, to whom the narrow scope of their insular home affords no sphere of activity, grow rich on the Ganges and Indus in lucrative appointments, and consume at home in their peaceful old age the earnings of their youthful years ; they seem to leave wholly out of account the enormous number of ANGLO'RUSS/AN FRONTIER QUESTION. 4I merchants who live on their large Asiatic estates, and carry on the most extensive commercial interests, in whose hands EngHsh capital is increased by millions. Short-sighted indeed are these Liberals, to whom the possession of such a colony as India appears indifferent and even unnecessary. That they prefer to see the great- ness of their country based on the flourishing condition of her inland manufactories, and not on the dominion over foreign races, cannot in the present day, when more than ;^6o,ooo,oo.o sterling are expended on Indian railways, be any longer regarded as the general feeling prevailing in England ; for that the industry of the manufactories, as well as the enterprising spirit of the English merchants abroad, flag when not supported by English sovereignty, is a fact plainly to be perceived from the British commercial relations in Algiers, Cen- tral Asia, and other non-British possessions. It is these erroneous views which place all the excel- lences of the English character at a disadvantage when compared with that Russian policy which ever works on with perseverance and consistency. To this it is to be ascribed that Russia has in an incredibly short time grown into a powerful rival, and has approached so close to the Achilles heel of Great Britain. With her position on the Aral and Caspian Seas, with her entire conquest of the Caucasus, with her enormous advantages in Cen- tral Asia, it would be useless at the present time to try to repel the monster power. It is far too late now to attempt all that could have been done twenty years ago with no especial difficulty; and if England wishes to avoid the common lot of commercial states, the fate of Carthage, Venice, Genoa, Holland, and Portugal, there 42 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE is but one way left — namely, a policy of strict watchful- ness, and a speedy adoption of the measures still stand- ing at her disposal. 5. ADVICE TO ENGLAND FOR THE AVERTING OF THE DANGER. To advance in open hostility to the increasing Russian power would, at the present day, be as great an error on the part of the English as the striking inaction which England has for the last twenty-five years shown in all events taking place on the other side of the Hindu- kush. Russia will establish herself on the right bank of the Oxus, she will incorporate into her territory the three Khanates, and perhaps also Chinese Tartary, and everything which is Ozbeg will be obliged to acknow- ledge her supremacy. This is no longer to be pre- vented ; yet only so far and no further must the Eng- lish allow their rivals to proceed. All that lies between the Oxus and the Indus must remain a neutral possession. Afghanistan, from its phy- sical condition, from the warlike character of its inhabit- ants, and more especially from their diplomatic inclina- tion, would be thoroughly suitable for the purpose of forming a military and political barrier, thus rendering the collision of the two colossal powers impossible. This land would cost the conqueror, whether he came from the north or the south, a tenfold harder contest than the Caucasus. The possession of it, moreover, would not for a long time compensate for the expensive war, and although the constant disturbances which prevail in the ANGLO'RUSS/AN FRONTIER QUESTION, 43 mountainous home of the Afghans can be of little advantage to the two neighbours, the danger is never- theless not so great as to justify designs of conquest on one side or the other. How, then, shall England preserve the neutrality of Afghanistan, if Russia continues her aggressive policy? What must she do, without coming forward as a con- queror, in order, by her influence, to present a firm check to her rival ? This is the work of a skilful diplomatic transaction,, the work of an uninterrupted communication by means of, agents, who, well acquainted with the Afghan char- acter, and avoiding the English mode of thought, can assume an Asiatic demeanour if necessity requires it. The error which Lord Auckland committed in 1839 in actually interfering in Afghan affairs, may on a far greater scale be laid to the charge of his successors in their utter abstinence and indifference with regard to the affairs of the neighbouring state. The EngHsh are like a child, who, when it has once burnt itself at the fire, will not for a long time venture to go near the warmth. The catastrophe of the Afghan campaign, and the thirty millions sterling which it cost, are even at the present day, after the lapse of the quarter of a century, still so terribly alive in the memory of every Briton, that he trembles even at the idea of political influence beyond the Hindukush. Are not these two opposite extremes? First of all, armed to the teeth in order to support the cause of such an unpopular prince as Shah Shedja, and then, after the annexation of the Punjaub, to think scarcely more of Kabul ! And \^hy should the bound- ary line beyond Peshawur be such a dangerous barrier 44 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE to all Englishmen and Europeans ? If yearly some thousands of the Kakeri, Luhani, Gilzi, and Zusufzi tribes of Afghanistan cross the northern frontier of Hin- dostan, either for mercantile purposes or to graze their flocks, why should not the British traveller also be allowed to venture over the Hindukush, and even wan- der a few hours' distance beyond Peshawur? Afghan merchants carry on a flourishing trade with Moultan, Delhi, and Lahore ; why should not one or another Eng- lish house of business repair to Kabul for the same purpose ? In truth, this state of things has always surprised me, and still more so when I heard that the officer whom Sir John Lawrence sent to Kabul to congratulate Shir- Ali-Khan, could only show himself accompanied by a strong division of troops, in order not to expose himself to the fury of a fanatical populace. This is truly an erroneous as well as ridiculous attempt to instruct Asi- atics in European magnanimity and in European love of justice. England, who has long dealt with Asiatics in this manner, is like a man endeavouring with all his might to make a blind man perceive the beauty of one of Raphael's cartoons. In this respect Russia is far more practical. She knows that such proofs of magnanimity and humanity are only ridiculed by the Orientals ; that far from taking example from them, they only misuse them for their own aims; and instead of lavishing moral sermons upon them, England would do more wisely to make use of the same weapons, and to treat Orientals in Oriental fashion, At the time that the martyrs Conolly and Stoddart were languishing in cruel captivity, from which they ANGLChRUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 45 were subsequently to be freed only by the headman's axe, there were Bokhariots, Khokandians, and other Asiatics to be found on the British territory, by whose arrest the lot of the English officers in Bokhara might have been alleviated and their lives saved. Russia is wont in such cases to extricate herself at once from the dilemma by the right of retaliation. England does not do this. She prefers to do the magnanimous — yet what is gained by it ? When I was in Bokhara, I heard how this very act of British generosity had missed its object. The Bokhariots asserted that England did not venture to arouse the anger of the Emir of Bokhara, and that weakness impelled her to moderation. Do the gentlemen in Calcutta imagine that the Afghans think otherwise ? No, no ; they, too, say — ** Protected by the power and greatness of Islam, our indigo and spice traders and our camel-owners may repair unhurt to British soil, while not a single soul of the unbelievers dares show himself among us !" In truth, this unpardonable weakness was again shown in 1857 by the Viceroy. of India (Sir John, now Lord Lawrence), when he was sent to Peshawur by Lord Can- ning, in order, in conjunction with Edwards, to conclude an alliance offensive and defensive with Dost-Moham- med-Khan, who had just appeared there. The Afghans were at that time hardly pressed. They needed money and arms : the hoary Barekzi chief, accompanied by his sons, made this apparent at every word, and neverthe- less his desires were fulfilled in every point without his complying in the least with the main demands of Eng- land. Four thousand pieces of arms (bayonets, sabres, and cartridge-boxes) and twelve lacs of rupees yearly 4^ CENTRAL ASIA AND THE were promised to them so long as Great Britain was at war with Persia. Even after the conclusion of peace in Paris they received a considerable portion of this important sum ; and, nevertheless, the main object of the negotiations in Kabul and Kandahar — namely, to be allowed to have a permanent English representative — was not obtained. Dost-Mohammed-Khan declared, as Kaye tells us in his " History of the last Sepoy Revo- lution," that he could not take upon himself the respon- sibility of such a step; that he could not protect English agents against Afghan fanaticism, and that every step would be one of peril, &c. It is inconceivable to me how Sir John Lawrence, who is one of the few men acquainted with the character of the Orientals, could accept the protestations of the Afghan wolf, and how he could believe his false apprehensions. If Dost-Moham- med-Khan himself said that an Enghsh mission might remain unattacked in Kandahar, why should this have not been the case also in Kabul } The British commis- sioners greatly erred when they doubted for a moment the power of the Afghan chief. . It would have required only a little more persistency in order to have procured the English, who had at the time come forward as helpers in the hour of need, not only two, but several diplomatic posts. The Afghans would have soon grown accustomed to their presence, and the diplomatic con- nections, once formed, could have been permanently maintained. Sir John Lawrence is now endeavouring in a semi- official article, which appeared in the Edinburgh Review Qan. 1867), to prove how difficult and useless it is to enter into diplomatic relations with such wild and ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 47 ungovernable neighbours as those with which India is on all sides surrounded. Still I do not understand why the Viceroy does not take example from Russia, who, surrounded by similar elements, nevertheless sends am- bassador after ambassador, contrives to procure respect and security for them, and thus advances perpetually forwards towards the desired object. Why does not England pursue the same policy which she once began in China, Japan, and other Asiatic countries? It seems to me that the English are less convinced of the difficult execution of this project than of the amount of good arising from it ; or are these gentlemen really ignorant of what a permanent representation in Afghanistan might effect, both for the interests of England and for the benefit of the Afghans themselves. The diplomatic conduct of Sir Henry Rawlinson in Kandahar, who could successfully maintain himself there for so long a period in the most dangerous position and at the most critical time, is a brilliant proof that even the rudest Asiatics are to be managed. And if this officer could effisct so much with the threatening position of a conqueror, what might not be achieved by political acute- ness and friendly persuasion 1 The manifest results of an uninterrupted diplomatic intercourse would be, if we mistake not — I. Greater advantage to trade; for as English goods have for a long time enjoyed a high reputation in Central Asia, English productions, if imported direct from England, might certainly drive similar and less-valued Russian products out of the market. This, of course, is not at present the case, for at the present time, in the bazaars of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and other places, 48 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE far more is sold of many Russian articles — as, for example, iron utensils and tools, coarse cotton and cloths — than of the English, only because the former, at the lower prices at which they are exposed for sale, do not amount to so much as the originally dearer English goods, the cost of which is doubled by the transit. Moreover in Bokhara, occasionally in Khiva, and in Karshi, Russian merchants themselves may be found who, guaranteed by the energy of their Government, are better able to promote their own interests than foreign commercial employes. We should in vain seek for a better apostle or a better pioneer of civilisation than commerce, and we should in vain search for a better converter to our own mode of thought than the mute bales of goods which are imported from Europe. Apart, moreover, from all commercial interests, England should also, for the sake of humanity, facilitate trade in Central Asia. 2. The Afghans, who up to the present day know, under the name of Ingilis or Frengi, only an armed power and a conquest-loving neighbour, will, in the peaceful garb of diplomatic intercourse and well-intended advice, be easily undeceived. In the year 1808, when the Afghans but little feared an English invasion, the ambassador Mountstuart Elphinstone, with a numerous suite, the escort of which amounted to only four hundred Anglo-Indian soldiers, was well received everywhere in Afghanistan, for alarm and mistrust had at that time not taken root. Up to the beginning of the present century, a similar state of things was to be met with in all parts of the Osman empire. Europeans and foes were regarded as identical, and now, after our ambassadors and con- ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 49 sulates have, in spite of the resistance of the Porte, insinuated themselves into various places, Osmans and Arabs no longer entertain the same ideas. They have clearer notions with regard to the collective name Frengi, and they know accurately, that, for example, Russia is as hostile to the Porte as England is friendly, and that the designs of the one Government are different to those of the other. Without consulates this could never be effected. And thus the Afghans also, so long as they are not brought into closer and peaceful intercourse with Englishmen, will never understand what England or Russia may be able to do for their weal or woe, and which friendship may be more conducive to their good. 3. The Afghans, being the most warlike people of all the races of Central Asia, could, by the vigorous support of English advice, be easily developed into an important military power. . All that the instructeurs militaires effected in the army of Sultan Mahmud and Mehemmed All Pacha, all that the English officers achieved in the troops of Abbas-Mirza, would be nothing in comparison to the success of a similar undertaking among the Afghans, out of whom, so far as we can judge from the military bearing and drill of a few Kabul regiments trained by Sepoy deserters, a regular body of troops might most easily be formed. A similar success might also be obtained with regard to the fortresses of Herat and Kandahar, the fortifications of which, if a second Pottinger were to inspect them, would assuredly present a far less easy prey to the Russian besiegers than if they were left only to Afghan strategy. 4. The principal advantage, however, which we per- ceive in a permanent representation is, that England, D so CENTRAL ASIA AND THE accurately informed of the events in Central Asia, and of the military and political movements of Russia, will no longer be exposed to the danger of seeing herself suddenly surprised out of one hold or another, and of being unable to take precautionary measures, owing to her constant uncertainty respecting the true condition of things. At the present day, the Viceroy maintains, it is true, some Munchis, without any official character, in Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat ; Munchis, i.e,^ clerks, and these Mohammedan, who, sometimes well paid, are bound to furnish occasional reports. Besides these, on special occasions, spies or secret emissaries are despatched in one direction or another, passing through Turkestan in the incognito of a merchant or pilgrim, in order to give an account of the political events. Apart from the fact that I consider both these classes of employes incap- able of such an office, for the very reason that, admitted nowhere, they only register in their note-books bazaar rumours and caravan politics, I should be inclined, as one who for years has had intercourse with Orientals, to give the slightest possible credit to these very people. Have the authorities in Calcutta ever considered what Mohammedan fanaticism is ? Do they know that by no amount of gold has it ever been achieved that one Mus- sulman can be used against another Mussulman to the advantage of the Frengi ? Apparently these emissaries and spies will exhibit the greatest allegiance, the ut- most loyalty, and the most extreme readiness ; but in the interior of Central Asia they will side with those religious comrades who visit the same mosque and who prostrate themselves on the same carpet, and will fulfil the directions of their order. The Anglo-British states- ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. S I men will certainly not agree with me in this, yet this* is the very reason why they are so badly informed of the events in Central Asia, why the most absurd reports with regard to India are spread over Europe, and why they can see the affairs of the khanates only in the light which Russian diplomacy has kindled. Far removed from wishing to assume the post of a political counsellor, I consider that these unassuming words of advice alone indicate the means by which Afghanistan can be safely neutralised, and placed as a powerful barrier against the further advance of Russia in Central Asia. In such an important question as to how the possession of East India can tend to the great- ness and permanence of English power, it would be dangerous to seek a false protection in palliative measures. Political errors, however unimportant, form in time separate rings of an unbroken chain of misfor- tunes — a chain which subsequently the utmost efforts and the most acute political judgment endeavour in vain to break. 6. THE GENERAL INTEREST OF THE QUESTION. We have still to answer the one question, Why we cannot look on with indifference at the danger threat- ening English interest through Russian ascendancy, and what is the real cause that the decline of the power of England appears to us just as disadvantageous as the too great influence of Russia seems to us a check to the progress of the spirit of the age ? The answer to this question is a very simple one. 52 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Russia was Asiatic, she is Asiatic, and she will lon^ continue Asiatic. We cannot, moreover, for a moment resign ourselves to the consoling prospect that the body of the Russian power, stretching too widely, must, according to the laws of nature, subsequently break asunder into two or several parts, and that a dismem- berment of this kind will lessen the threatening danger ; we need only look at the character of Russian policy, at her social relations, at the position of the people compared to the higher caste of the Government circle, at the general degree of culture, and at the mental con- dition of the people, and we shall see how thoroughly everything about them is Asiatic, and indeed barbar- ously Asiatic, and how, in spite of the long effort after European civilisation, they have, comparatively speak- ing, appropriated to themselves so little of what we call a European or Western character. Without wishing to apply the hackneyed old saying, " Scrape the Russian and you will discover a Tartar," it is, nevertheless, im- possible for us not to perceive — partly from personal ex- perience, and partly from the reports of recent and indeed Russia-loving travellers — that there is still much to be found on the Neva, in holy Moscow, and in other great cities of Russia, of that appearance of civiHsation which is employed with advantage by many Asiatic govern- ments for the delusion of short-sighted Europe. Un- doubtedly this civilisation fraud in Petersburg is carried on with more success by a Government strongly inter- mingled with Christian and European elements than it is in Cairo, Constantinople, and Teheran. The Russian nobleman, to all appearance a cultivated European, thoroughly versed in our languages, manners, and modes ANGLO'R USSIAN FRONTIEI^ QUESTION, 5 3 of thought, will of course cut a far better figure than the half-Europeanised Efendi on the Bosphorus or the Mirza in Persia. The Government which attracts to itself with great expense so much scientific and artistic talent — which has recently eagerly promoted the foun- dation of schools, universities, and scientific societies — which has its emissaries in Europe to trumpet out the progress of Russian culture, will of course be able to obtain better credit than the Porte or the Persian mini- stry, who are occupied in maintaining their own lan- guishing existence, and cannot expend so much on the pageantry necessary. It is no wonder, therefore, if Russia seems to the superficial observer more European and more pervaded with the spirit of our civilisation, and thus can easily obtain the sympathies of those who desire to love her with all their might. Nevertheless, let us for once attempt impartially to remove the outer covering, and let us look into the interior of high Russian society, and what shall we see } It is disappointment, utter disappointment, which meets us at every step when we endeavour to discover among the majority of the Russian people those signs of progress which are said to exist, according to the statements of the Russian contributors to the European press. The Englishman who in 1865 attempted to inform the English public in a similar spirit, in a pam- phlet entitled *' Russia, Central Asia, and British India," and pointing to the extent of innovations as, for ex- ample, the emancipation of the serfs and the introduction of various reforms, held out the prospect of a trans- formation such as even Russian authors like J. A. Herzen and Dolgorukoff are still inchned to doubt; 54 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE this Englishman would probably have himself thought otherwise had he drawn the parallel, not between mem- bers of the civilised world, but between the Russian people and the Asiatics. Everywhere along that gigantic frontier line at which Russia touches Asia, we find that the Russians are at a very low degree of civilisation, and in refinement of habits are far behind those Asiatic races to whom we wish to evidence the advantages of our modern Euro- pean civilisation compared with their old Asiatic con- dition. Alexander Michie, a traveller from Pekin to Petersburg, and so disposed towards Russia that he calls Siberia a second paradise, and speaks of the exiled Poles as enviably happy, cannot, nevertheless, forbear, wherever he finds Chinese holding intercourse with Russians, from proclaiming loudly the superiority of the former. But this is not the case only in Maimadschin and Kiachta ; it is so also among the Mussulmans. The Russian, as a Northern, will exhibit far more activity than the Asiatic de pur sang ; still his strikingly dirty exterior, his love of drink, his religion bordering on fetichism, his servility, his coarse ignorance, and his rude unpolished manners, are characteristics which reveal his affinity to the smooth, courteous, and keen-sighted Oriental. Just as in Bokhara, I heard a cultivated Islam Tadjik speak- ing with contempt of the ignorance of the Russians, whom he ranked but little above the Kirghiz hordes, the same would probably be done in Transcaucasus by every Chinese and Persian, and in Kasan by every better-cultivated Tartar. And what, moreover, are these races to learn from them } Are the forms of government, perhaps, to awaken ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 55 envy among the Asiatic tribes ? The bribery of the civil functionaries, their tyrannical and arbitrary con- duct under Nicholas, the condition of more than 50,000,000 peasants, who occupy the lowest position, in contrast to the caste of the nobles and officials, cannot truly be particularly attractive to those with whom autocratic institutions, though of the most barbarous character, are combined with patriarchal mildness. In truth it is difficult, not only as regards the present, but even far into the future, to perceive in Russia's love of conquest any prospect of an advantageous trans- formation in the social life of the Asiatic tribes ; that is, of a transformation in the European spirit. If we ask ourselves what is become of the Tartars who have been more than two hundred years under Russian guardian- ship } what of the great number of Siberian tribes, such as the Bashkirs, the Woguls, the Tseremissians, and the Wotjaks, who have been incorporated into the Russian nation, or are on the point of incorporation } must we not regard " Russification *' as the greatest result attained ? Russification is of course a step from Asia to Europe. As the government of an Alexander 11. has hitherto acted, it may even be called a transition point ; yet who can blame us if we prefer the English system of civili- sation to this tedious process, the results of which ever appear doubtful, while, up to the present time, this other system has such brilliant and surprising results to exhibit in India and in every place where it has come in contact with Asiatics. No one will doubt that the tribes of India, of that land which is the cradle and the birthplace of the S6 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Asiatic Civilisation which we pronounce to be incapable of existence, adhere with great obstinacy to their old usages and their old modes of thought ; and yet, how has India been transformed even since the beginning of the last century ? I think even the greatest enemies of Great Britain will not be able to ignore the fact, that the caste system of the Hindoos and their numerous inhuman customs have suffered a strong check through English influence ; no one will be able to deny how astonishingly these wild Asiatics, in spite of all their obstinacy, have advanced on the paths of our civilisation. We find even now in India a vast number of people who are thoroughly convinced of the beneficial influence of their conquerors ; numerous schools and institutions spread the light of the European world among all ranks of the population ; not only are many men well versed in English, but they even take a lively interest in our ^ scientific discussions, coming forward as members of \ European literary societies, and indeed here and there taking up the pen with success, and occupying a place among the authors of the West. Rajah Radhakant Deva Bahadur, Maharadja Kali Krishna Bahadur, Babu Rajendra Lala Mitra, several Pendits (clergymen) and other learned private individuals, are to be found on the list of the French, German, and English Asiatic societies, and are well known by their works in their respective circles. Strengthened in their own national feeling, the Hindoos have at the present day such a knowledge of their language, history, and philosophy, as they certainly never formerly possessed under their native princes. Societies are formed, as in England, for the extirpation of certain prejudices, for the abolition of various perni- ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION 5/ cious habits and usages, and for the promotion of social intercourse ; and if we take into consideration how much the reading world increases from day to day, and what wide circles the Hindustani papers, such as the Hirkaru Bengalu (the Hirkari Messenger), the Suhe'ili Pendschab (the Punjaub Morning Star), the Oiidk Achhar (the Oude News), the Chair chah Pendschab (the Punjaub Well-wisher), and others, have procured for themselves among the natives, and how much the press is rising from day to day as a powerful Europeanising agent, we shall be obliged to confess that the races conquered by England not only are more advanced in culture than those conquered by Russia, but than many Russians themselves. How Russia, therefore, under such circumstances, can come forward as the suitable apostle of the doctrines of the European world among the people of Asia, it is diffi- cult to conceive. Only in Central Asia, that old nest of wild fanaticism and rude avarice and tyranny, can the transplantation of Russian civilisation in the place of the native elements be called beneficial ; and this not even in all parts and among all the tribes of Asia. The conquest of Turkestan by Russian arms is, as we have already repeatedly remarked, a happy event for the inhabitants. If England could have taken upon herself the same part, it would certainly have been more advantageous. Still, as this was not the case, she may not hinder her rival in the exercise of her duty, and must only be on her guard against further plans of attack. If we only add to the incapabilities of Russia already mentioned to be the civiliser of Asia, the important circumstance that, by the annexation of half a quarter 5 8 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE of the globe, and by the blending of several millions of Asiatics into her own body, she really assumes a threatening position, not only towards Great Britain, but even towards the whole of Europe, we shall see proportionally far more disadvantage arising to Our own existence from this gigantic superiority than advan- tage to be gained by the Tartar tribes of Asia. Ru?so- phobia is nonsense, it is said. I wish myself to believe it to be so. Yet it is difficult, when we perceive the mighty influence of the twofold Russian eagle in all parts of Asia ; when we consider how the Court of Petersburg will, by its position on the Hindukush, solve the Orien- tal question on the Bosphorus to its own advantage, it is difficult, I say, to feel perfectly easy respecting the future fate of our quarter of the globe. The present diplomacy, which often does homage rather to fashion than to bon senSy tries to turn into ridicule the Napoleonic pro- phecy with regard to a Cossack supremacy in Europe. Yet they forget, in so doing, what can be done with our present means of communication by a power extending from Kamtschatka to the Danube, or perhaps to the shores of the Adriatic — from the icy zone of the Northern Ocean to the burning banks of the Irawaddi. Though to many it may appear visionary, it is in no wise impos- sible that some huridred thousands of the wildest horse- men in Asia may follow the summons of such a power into the very heart of Europe. At the beginning of this century the Don Cossacks on the banks of the Seine have shown the possibility of such a march a la Djengis or Timur, and why should it not be repeated in the present day, when there are railroads and steamers at command } Our European tactics would ANGLO-IiUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 59 indeed check this rude power : no member of the house of Romanoff could long play amongst us the part of a Djengis or a Timur. Still a contest of this kind, how- ever brief, must be followed by melancholy consequences, and now, while precautionary measures still stand at our disposal, it is urgently necessary to prevent the occur- rence of such an event. Yet setting aside this vast political combination, can any one doubt that the greatness and power of England is of more use to the general interests of Europe than Russian supremacy ? England has many enemies, or perhaps we might better say many enviers. Certain voices, swayed by passion, in the Continental press, will constantly perceive in her proceedings egotism, avarice, and pride ; fanatics will see the blindest materialism in every trait ; but men must be peculiarly blind and prejudiced to desire to ignore those acquisitions which, through English greatness, English capital, and English perseverance, have been of benefit to our civilisation and to our scientific researches. Is it not England alone whose mighty flag has opened Eastern Asia to our com- merce ? Is it not English travellers whose bold spirit of inquiry has penetrated to the remotest regions in order to enrich our geographical and ethnographical know- ledge ? And what is happening on the Thames, what in all the other cities of this stirring and busy island ? Have those high-flown writers, who are continually find- ing fault with English materialism, ever taken into con- sideration that these brokers, in spite of their Hvely interest in trade and gain, contribute after all most of all to the promotion of science and to the enlightenment of the world ? Where is there a country in which the 60 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Government so readily gives millions for an institution such as the Kensington Museum ? Where else are hundreds of thousands of pounds expended only on the catalogue of a library with such liberality as has recently been the case in London ? What other Government im- mediately equips vessels and expeditions in search of an endangered traveller, as has just been done for Living- stone? ' Yes, in spite of all her faults, and no country is free from these, we must confess that England, whether it be in consequence of this strongly-blamed materialism or of her often-censured love of power, stands nevertheless at the head of European civilisation ; for if Germany and France are indispensable helpers in the dissemina- tion of the light of our high civilisation, England alone is, notwithstanding, the principal agent. With her flag appears the dawn of a better era in every zone and in every quarter of the world. All that the curious de- tractors of Great Britain relate of her tyrannical pro- ceedings is for the most part only an untruth. Not at the writing-table and in the soft easy-chair, but in the provinces of Asia, these sentimental accusers ought to inform themselves of England's doings ; and when they see how the banner of our Western civilisation drives away the vices of the old Asiatic rule, how it seeks to uplift the right of humanity so long trampled in the dust, and leads millions towards a better future, in freeing them from the caprice of a single tyrant, truly they cannot remain indifferent to England's influence in the foreign quarters of the globe. And would it not be lamentable if Muscovite supe- riority were, to be injurious to such a state.'* On the ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 6l Thames, the mighty will of a free people holds sway ; on the Neva, the ambition of an Asiatic dynasty, pro- ducing a government system whose capability for future reform remains doubtful, while its great perniciousness in the present is beyond a question. In fact, it is only in Russians approach towards India, towards that Achilles-heel of British interests, that the infallible tokens of danger to England are to be dis- covered. The British lion is now awaiting in the north a harder contest than that which it had to endure in the south with the French when it established its power on the Ganges. The French foe, weaker in numbers and in endurance, had only a small fleet, a sea at that time unnavigable in its rear, and could easily be conquered. The Russian, on the contrary, will be supported by an unbroken chain of fortresses, garrisons, and secure roads ; its weapons are boundless ambition, the blind devotion of millions of subjects, and the sympathy of the rude adjacent states. Victory with such a foe will be no easy thing, and the consequences of defeat will be far greater. On your guard, therefore, Britannia ! For should the star of your long good fortune here begin to be eclipsed, the various zones will no longer be able to join in the verse — " The nations not so free as thee. Must in their turn to tyrants fall, While thou shalt flourish great and free. The dread and envy of them alll " 62 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SUPPLEMENT. PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF'S DESPATCH. (See p. 10.) (( Les joumeaux Russes ont rendu compte des demieres operations mili- taires executees par un detachement de nos troupes, dans les regions de I'Asie centrale, avec un succes remarquable et des resultats importants. " II etait k prevoir que ces ev^nements exciteraient d'autant plus I'atten- tion du public etranger qu'ils se passent dans des contrees a peine connues. " Notre auguste maitre m'a ordonne de vous exposer succinctement, mais avec clarte et precision, la position qui nous est faite dans I'Asie centrale, les interets qui servent de mobile a notre action dans ces contrees, et le but final que nous y poursuivons. " La position de la Russie dans I'Asie centrale est celle de tous les etats civilises qui se trouvent en contact avec des peuplades k demi-sauvages, errantes, sans organisation sociale fixe. "II arrive toujours, en pareil cas, que I'interet de la securite des fron- ti^res et celui des relations de commerce exigent que Fetat plus civilise exerce un certain ascendant sur des voisins que leurs moeurs nomades et turbulentes rendent fort incommodes. '* On a d'abord des incursions et des pillages k reprimer. Pour y mettre un terme, on est force de reduire h. une soumission plus ou moins directe les peuplades limitrophes. " Une fois ce resultat attaint, celles-ci prennent des habitudes plus tran- quilles. Mais elles se trouvent h. leur tour exposees aux aggressions des tribus plus eloignees. L'etat est oblige de les defendre contre ces depre- dations et de chatier ceux qui les commettent. De la la necessite d'expedi- tions lointaines, couteuses, periodiques, contre un ennemi que son organisa- tion sociale rend insaisissable. Si I'on se borne ci chatier les pillards et qu'on se retire, la le5on s'efface bientot, la retraite est mise sur le compte de la faiblesse ; les peuples asiatiques en particulier ne respectent que la force visible et palpable ; la force morale de la raison et des interets de la civili- sation n'a point encore de prise sur eux. La tache est done toujours k recommencer. " Pour couper court a ces desordres permanents, on etablit quelques points fortifies parmi les populations ennemies ; on exerce sur elles un ascendant qui, peu k peu, les reduit k une soumission plus ou moins forcee. " Mais au-dela de cette seconde ligne, d'autres peuplades plus eloignees encore viennent bientot provoquer les memes dangers et les memes repressions. " L'Etat se trouve done dans I'alternative ou d'abandonner ce travail ANGLQ-KUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 6^ incessant et delivrer ses fronti^res h. des desordres perpetuels qui y rendent toute prosperite, toute s^curite, toute civilisation impossibles, ou bien d'avancer de plus en plus dans les profondeurs de contrees sauvages oii, a chaque pas qu'il accomplit, les distances accroissent les difficultes et les cliarges auxquelles il s'expose. " Tel a ete le sort de tous les pays qui ont ete places dans les memes conditions, les ]£tats-Unis en Amerique, la France en Algerie, la HoUande dans ses colonies, I'Angleterre aux Indes; tous ont ete inevitablement entraines k suivre cette marche progressive oil Tambition a moins de part que rimperieuse necessite, et ou la plus grande difficulte consiste h. savoir s'arrSter. " C'est aussi la raison qui a conduit le gouvemement imperial k s'etablir d'abord d'un cote sur la Syr-Daria, de I'autre sur le lac Issyk-Koul, et k consolider ces deux lignes par des forts avances qui, peu h. peu, ont penetre au cceur de ces regions lointaines, sans cependant parvenir ^^tablir au-deli la tranquillite indispensable k la securite de nos fronti^res. *' La cause de cette instabilite resida d'abord dans le fait qu'entre les points extremes de cette double ligne il y a un immense espace inoccupe oil les invasions des tribus pillardes continuent k paralyser toute colonisa- tion et tout commerce par caravanes ; ensuite dans les fluctuations perpe- tuelles de la situation politique de ces contrees oil le Turkestan et le Kokand, tantot reunis, tantot separes, toujours en guerre, soit entre eux, soit avec la Boukharie, n'offraient une possibilite de relations fixes ni de transactions regulieres quelconques. ** Le gouvemement imperial s'est done vu plac^ malgr^ lui dans I'alter- native que nous avons indiquee, c'est-^-dire ou de laisser se perpetuer un etat de desordre permanent qui paralyse toute securite et tout progres, ou de se condamner k des expeditions codteuses et lointaines sans aucun rcsultat pratique, et qu'il faut toujours recommencer, ou enfin d'entrer dans la voie indefinie de conquetes et d'annexions qui a conduit I'Angleterre a Tempire des Indes, en cherchant k soumettre I'un apres I'autre, par la force des armes, les petits Jfctats independants dont les mceurs pillardes et turbu- lentes et les perpetuelles revokes ne laissent ^leurs voisins ni treve ni repos. " Ni I'une ni I'autre de ces alternatives ne repondait au but que s'est trace la politique de notre auguste maitre, et qui est non d'etendre hors de toute proportion raisonnable les contrees soumises a son sceptre, mais d'y asseoir sa domination sur des bases solides, d'en garantir la securite et d'y developper I'organisation sociale, le commerce, le bien-etre et la civilisation. " Notre tache etait done de rechercher un systeme propre k atteindre ce triple but. " A cet effet, les principes suivants ont et^ poses >— 64 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE " I. II a ete juge indispensable que les deux lignes fortifiees de nos fronti^res, Tune partant de la Chine jusqu'au lac Issyk-Koul, Tautre par- tant de la mer d'Aral le long de la Syr-Daria, fussent reunies par des points fortifies, de maniere a ce que tous nos postes fussent a meme de se soutenir mutuellement et ne laissassent aucun intervalle par oil pussent s'effectuer impunement les invasions et les depredations des tribus nomades. "2. II etait essentiel que la ligne ainsi completee de nos forts avances fut situee dans une contree assez fertile non-seulement pour assurer leurs approvisionnements, mais aussi pour faciliter la colonisation reguliere, qui seule pent preparer au pays occupc un avenir de stabilite et de prosperite, en gagnant ^ la vie civilisee les peuplades avoisinantes. ^'3. Enfin, il etait urgent de fixer cette ligne d'une maniere definitive, afin d'echapper aux entrainements dangereux et presque inevitables qui, de repressions en represailles, pouvaient aboutir a une extension illimitee. Dans ce but, il fallait poser les bases d'un systeme fonde non-seulement sur la raison, qui peut etre elastique, mais sur les conditions geographiques et politiques, qui sont fixes et permanentes. "Ce systeme nous etait indique par un fait tr^s-simple resultant d'une longue experience, c'est a dire que les tribus nomades qu'on ne peut ni saisir ni chatier, ni contenir efficacement, sont pour nous le voisinage le plus incommode, et que, par contre, les populations agricoles et com- mer9antes, fixees au sol et dotees d'un organisme social plus developpe, nous offrent la chance d'un voisinage tolerable et de relations perfectibles. La ligne de nos frontieres devait done englober les premieres, elle devait s'arreter a la limite des secondes. "Ces trois principes donnent I'explication claire, naturelle et logique, des demieres operations militaires accomplies dans I'Asie centrale. " En effet, la ligne primitive de nos frontieres le long de la Syr-Daria jusqu'au fort Perovsky d'un cote, et de I'autre jusque au lac Issyk-Koul avait I'inconvenient d'etre presque a la limite du desert. Elle etait inter- rompue sur un immense espace entre les deux points extremes ; elle n'offrait pas assez de ressources ^ nos troupes, et laissait en dehors des tribus sans cohesion avec lesquelles nulle stabilite n'etait possible. Malgre notre repugnance a donner a nos frontieres une plusgrande etendue, ces motifs ont ete assez puissants pour determiner le gouvemement imperial a etablir la continuite de cette ligne entre le lac Issyk-Koul et la Syr-Daria, en fortifiant la ville de Tschamkend, recemment occupee par nous. " En adoptant cette ligne nous obtenons un double r^sultat : d'un cote, la contree qu'elle embrasse est fertile, boisee, arrosee par de nombreux cours d'eau ; elle est habitee en partie par des tribus Kirghises qui ont deja reconnu notre domination ; elle offre done des elements favorables i la colonisation et 4 I'approvisionnement de nos gamisons. De I'autre eUe ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 6$ nous donne pour voisins imm^diats les populations fixes, agricoles et com- mergantes de Kokand. " Nous nous trouvons en face d'un milieu social plus solide, plus com- pacte, moins mobile, mieux organise; et cette consideration marque avec une precision geographique la limite ou I'interet et la raison nous prescri- vent d'arriver et nous commandent de nous aiTeter, parce que, d'une part toute extension ulterieure de notre domination rencontrant desormais non plus des milieux inconstants comme les tribus nomades, mais des Etats plus reguli^rement constitues, exigerait des efforts considerables et nous entrainerait, d'annexion en annexion, dans les complications infinies ; et que, d'autre part, ayant desormais pour voisins de pareils !^tats, malgre leur civilisation arrieree et I'instabilite de leur condition politique, nous pouvons neanmoins assurer que des relations regnli^res pourront un jour se substituer, pour I'avantage commun, aux desordres permanents qui ont paralyse jusqu'ici Tessor de ces contrees. ** Tels sont, monsieur, les interets qui servent de mobile k la politique de notre auguste maitre dans I'Asie centrale, tel est le but final que les ordres de Sa Majeste Imperiale ont trace i Taction de son cabinet. *' Vous 6tes invite a puiser dans ces considerations le sens des explica- tions que vous fournirez au gouvemement aupr^s duquel vous etes accredite, si vous etes interpeUe ou si vous voyez s'accrediter des suppositions erronees quant a notre action dans ces contrees lointaines. " Je n'ai pas besoin d'insister sur I'interet evident que la Russia a ne pas agrandir son territoire, et surtout k ne pas se creer aux extremites des com- plications qui ne peuvent que retarder et paralyser son developpement interieur. *' Le programme que je viens de tracer rentre dans cet ordre d'idees. *'Bien souvent, durant les demieres annees, on s'est plu a assigner pour mission i la Russie de civiliser les contrees qui I'avoisinent sur le continent Asiatique. "Lesprogres de la civilisation n'ont pas d' agent plus efficace que les relations commer9iales. Celles-ci, pour se developper, exigent partout I'ordre et la stabilite ; mais en Asie elles reclament une transformation profonde dans les moeurs. II faut avant tout, faire comprende aux peuples asiatiques qu'il y a plus d'avantage pour eux i favoriser et assurer la com- merce des caravanes qu'a les piller. "Ces notions elcmentaires ne peuvent penetrer dans la conscience publique que la oil il y a un public, c'est a dire un organisme social et un gouvemement qui le dirige et le represente. ** Nous accomplissons la premiere partie de cette tache en portant notre frontiere h. la limite ou se rencontrent ces conditions indispensables. " Nous accomplissons la seconde en nous attachant desormais k prouver E 66 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE aux Etats voisins, par un sysl^me de fermete quant i la repression de leurs mefaits, mais en meme temps de moderation et de justice dans I'emploi de la force et de respect pour leur independance, que la Russie n'est pas leur ennemie, qu'elle ne nounit ei leur egard aucune vue de conquete et que les relations pacifiques et commerciales avec elle sont plus profitables que le d^sordre, le pillage, les represailles et la guerre en permanence. ** En se consacrant \ cette tache le cabinet imperial s'inspire des interets de la Russie. II croit servir en meme temps les interets de la civilisation et de rhumanit^. II a droit de compter sur une appreciation equitable et loyale de la marche qu'il poursuit et des principes qui le guident. (Signe) GORTSCHAKOFF. Saint Petersbourg, le 21 Novemhre 1864." ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 6j FRESH ADVANCES OF RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA (1868). I. When an event of world-wide importance is taking place on the boards of the political stage, an event such as the present rivalship between England and Russia in Asia, it is well worth the trouble for us to give our undivided attention to the separate scenes and acts. The European reader, perhaps too occupied by the petty contests and disputes which fascinate his gaze near at hand, will only follow us with reluctance into the regions of old Asia, and will probably, if he be neither English nor Russian, speedily find an excuse for his indifference ; yet I repeat what I have already once said, that the contest going on between these two giant powers is no ordinary drama, no everyday event. Civi- lised Europe dares not look on with indifference at the spectacle of these two powers wrestling with each other for their superiority in Asia. Both have been nurtured on the common intellectual bounties of our own world ; both would exercise a mighty influence on our present destiny, and as victor in old Asia, either of them can come forward in the immediate future in the character of a mighty umpire in Europe. Will it and can it therefore be called obtrusive in us if we turn with 6S CENTRAL ASIA AND THE curiosity to the East and inquire, what is the position in Asia of England and Russia ? Why I should venture to speak on this matter, why I should presume to look forth again and again from my peaceful and unpretending sphere of labour upon the battle-field of the contending colossal powers, is a ques- tion that can be most simply answered. What I said in 1865, at the close of my first book on Central Asia, was entirely realised by 1867. The Russians at that time were surrounding Djizzag, and were encamped in the hot valley of the Atalan range. I asserted that they could not remain there, and, in truth, in 1868 Samarkand was already occupied by them, and they were on their way to Bokhara, which has now also sworn allegiance to them. In a word, the Russian outposts will soon have reached the right bank of the Oxus, that very frontier which I at that time pointed out as the object of their march. After such coincidences I might assume, perhaps, some right to point to the fulfilment of my prophecies. I should do this if the ordinary course of things, the inevitable and easily-recognisable consequences of the Russian policy, deprived my former remarks of even the least pretension to political acuteness. For is it necessary perhaps to be among the prophets, in order to be able to say, at the sight of a mountain torrent rushing down from the height, that it will carry away with it this or that rock lying in the way 1 Bokhara, Khiva, and Khokand are nothing but rocks of this kind, which the surging waves of the slowly but surely rushing current of Russian occupation are threatening. Their ruin was easy to foresee, though not the details and ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 69 consequences of the act : with these we will here occupy ourselves. When in August 1863, on my way from Bokhara to Samarkand, seated in a rattling Tartar cart, I reached that height from whence I saw the old capital of Timur, that city wrapped in the magic veil of Central Asiatic culture, with its gilded and blue-glazed domes, with its fine imposing ruins and fantastically scattered groups of houses close at the foot of the cone - like Tschoban- Ata mountain, I could not really have believed that Samarkand, the proud fort which has done homage to no foreign ruler since the assault of Djengis-Khan, would now be found furnishing a Russianised German with the order of St George ! Probably General Kaufmann at that time had not himself imagined it. That this most eastern point of my wanderings, where even the remembrances of the West and of Christian elements seemed a perfect dread to my brain, should now be frequented by Russian soldiers, and soon most certainly will be haunted by Rus- sian priests, who will sweep along with haughty step where I, pressing down the heavy turban over my brow, only ventured to look round with pious awe, sounds to me really too fabulous, and is too extraordinary for me readily to accustom myself to the reality. Nevertheless it is so ! Samarkand Firdusmanend — Samarkand the Paradise- like — has become a Russian possession ! I am very far from sounding elegiac laments over the Tartars, That this nest of barbarous despotism will be despoiled by Russian bayonets and cast to the ground, may not and cannot grieve me. Just as Mohammed regarded himself as the seal on the ring of divine 70 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE messengers to earth — Le.y that with himself the succes- sion of prophets was for ever concluded — so may I also regard myself as a humble signet on the ring of Central Asiatic travellers. Samarkand hovered before me in my youth as a magic picture, and although I found a wide cleft of distinction between the image of my ex- cited imagination and the miserable reality of the old Timur capital, yet this city, even after I had been un- deceived in it, possessed such great interest for me, that the tidings of its fall agitated me deeply. With my readers this will certainly not be the case. To them the short narrative of the recent events in Turkestan will of course be welcome, as, although facts belonging to a short period of time, they are of great importance. Russia once having gained a firm footing on the Yaxartes, and now strongly established there, has begun to cast covetous glances in two directions. The right eye is turned to Bokhara, to the territory on the other side of the Oxus and Afghanistan ; the left eye is looking along the Narin, across the Terek Pass to Kashgar. We purpose to speak at length of the two directions, and to describe the status quo^ and the most recent history of the lands lying in both quarters. We will begin with Bokhara, because it lies nearer to us, it is better known, and also on the Russian side it forms the starting-point of operations. Let us, in the first place, cast a glance at the Russian army of occupation after the taking of Djizzag. That just this point, the unfavourable climate of which we have already mentioned, should have been chosen as a temporary station, is only to be regarded as a step rendered obligatory by circumstances. The army of ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, J I occupation in the province of Turkestan, the numerical vastness of which we do not even now accurately know, seems at that time in nowise to have possessed sufficient strength duly to defend, in the first place, the line extending from the north along the Yaxartes as far as Zerefshan, and in the second, the lands watered by the Narin and the Issikkol, and at the same time to pursue plans of further occupation. On the one side there were bands of Bokhariots and Turkomans emerging at dift'erent points ; on the other, wild Kirghises and Kip- tchak hordes, which caused great trouble ; it was, there- fore, indispensably necessary to procure an auxiliary army from the far north, and as this is not so easy to effect, owing to the still defective means of communi- cation in the southern part of Russia, especially the long march through the Orenburg desert of four or five weeks' duration, even under favourable circumstances, the lapse of a greater time and the continuance at an unsuitable halting-place are readily to be explained. In fact, the rumours which at that time reached us from Bombay, the usual channel of all news, with regard to the conclusion of peace between Bokhara and Russia, bear the date of this period. One incident only, namely, the appointment of General Kaufmann in the place of the usually successful General Romanoffsky, is not quite clear ; still a change of persons in Russian plans is of no special signification. Any one remaining always the head would have been obliged to wait till troops, money, and ammunition had arrived to such an extent as to render possible the adoption of a peaceful or warlike tone towards the Emir of Bokhara. This is the cause why the Russian Invalide informs 72 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE US that General Kaufmann did not enter into an inter- change of diplomatic communications with the Emir of Bokhara respecting peace negotiations until the Septem- ber of 1867. Whether this pacification was seriously intended on either side is much to be doubted, from the tedious interchange of diplomatic negotiations which was kept up, and which was submitted to on the part of the Russians. Emir Muzaffar-ed-Din sent indeed his Mirachor, Musa-Beg, with a diplomatic mission to Tash- kend. The same person had been employed on a similar mission to Orenburg, yet neither from the tenor of the credentials he brought with him, nor from a conference carried on with General Kaufmann, is it possible to con- clude what tokens of the peaceableness of the Emir existed. The Russian general (for the reporter of the Russian Invalide has an indubitably semi-official cha- racter) was justly astonished at the ambiguity, the stupid lies, and the constant change of pretext in this same Bokhara ambassador ; yet, as an honest soldier, he may be pardoned the want of ethnographical acquaintance with the lands of Central Asia. They spoke to the Bokhariot of peace stipulations, ratifications, and other legal expressions, which were utterly unknown to Tartar diplomacy. Cunning was not indeed lacking at Bok- hara, yet, like the cunning of all Asiatics, it is often too childish to be of any avail against an armed adver- sary. Musa-Beg was given repeatedly to understand that they desired to know why he had not long ago brought back a ratified copy of the peace contract sent to Bokhara ? why, now that peace negotiations were going on, it was allowed on the part of Bokhara to make inroads into Russian territory 1 In fact, why such an ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION^ 73 outrage had been committed as to take prisoner a Rus- sian officer and three privates, compelling the former to embrace Islamism and to drill the Bokhariot army. Musa-Beg answered with empty evasions and shameless lies, which subsequently came to light after the eman- cipation of the above-mentioned Russian prisoners and the arrival of another envoy from Bokhara. Whoever, therefore, is of opinion that the Russian commander only put a good face on this irritating con- duct of the Emir, because he desired to maintain peace at any price (in fact, that, in confirmation of this opinion, he was even on the point of undertaking a journey to Petersburg), I will on no account shake his belief in the peaceableness of the Russians. For my own part, how- ever, I cannot forbear saying plainly, that just as little as the Emir, a man of genuine Islam virtue, wished to enter into a compact with the unbeliever, so the sub- servience and lamb-like patience of the Russian general, and his desire to instruct the Emir in international law, were nothing else than a pretext for awaiting the favour- able moment. During the winter the transmission of troops across the inhospitable steppes of Central Asia, if not quite impossible, was yet tolerably difficult ; yet scarcely had the first spring month reached its close than Russian pohcy cast aside its mantle of peace. Five hundred Cossacks, accompanied by a corresponding number of infantry and artillery, were despatched from Tashkend to strengthen the frontier army encamped around Djizzag. General Kaufmann endeavoured to quiet the Emir with regard to this fact in a Russian document dated March 26, in which he assured him that they only desired to check the inroads which Bokhariot 74 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE troops were making on Russian soil. Yet in the very same document the news was communicated that a divi- sion of troops was to be sent for reconnoitring purposes to the northern decHvity of the Nur-Ata mountain, a proceeding which was, of course, utterly unintelligible, as this object and the repulse of a few bands required no such important concentration of forces. Indeed, the fact that this division, which was commanded by Major Grippenberg, subsequently fell in with the troops of the governors of Kettc- Kurgan and Tchelek, is a distinct proof of the assertion we before expressed. Neither a conclusion of peace nor an accurate definition of frontier could have been much desired by the Russians. To stop at the Zerefshan after the advantages obtained was im- possible. Russia knows too accurately what moral good she can derive from the fall of Bokhara. She knows, however, also no less the weaknesses of the foe opposed to her ; for it is truly astonishing how easily her mere presence there creates tabula rasa, and how easily the dreaded name of Russian can bring everything there into confusion. I have never doubted that the unprecedented obstin- acy of Bokharian self-love, and of hypocritical confi- dence in the sacred character of noble Bokhara, will never give way even beneath the roar of Russian cannon, though these might have shattered a part of her clay- built walls. Any one who has listened to the bombastic narrations of the tribes on the Zerefshan of the miser- able campaigns, or rather predatory excursions, of their Emir against Khokand, which resulted in his own ruin, will be able to form some idea of the arrogance of a people sunk in barbarism. When the Emir asked me ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 75 whether the Sultan of Turkey possessed such splendid troops as he? whether he had such long and deep-mouthed cannon as those which I saw lying on the sand of the Rigistan in Bokhara ? and lastly, whether it were such an easy matter for his brother on the Bosphorus as it was to him to summon hundred thousands of soldiers at the stamp of his foot ? I had a tolerably sure presentiment of what is happening at the present day in Bokhara. Still I had never imagined that matters would take such a sudden turn, and that the relation between ruler and ruled would assume the form which it has done. The first blow which shook the loyal feeling of the Bokhariots towards their ruler was the taking of Tash- kend, which, injurious as it was to the interests of Khud- ajar-Khan, a prince much beloved in Bokhara on account of his piety, must have been very displeasing to the inhabitants of the noble city. This conquest, moreover, gave rise to that mistrust which subsequently showed itself more and more decidedly. It must have visibly increased with the fall of Khodjend, and the unfor- tunate skirmish at Irdjar; yet symptoms of discon- tent did not show themselves publicly until the Emir, compelled by circumstances, was obliged — in order to replenish his coffers, exhausted as they were by war — to have recourse to means which were most offensive to the Tadjik population of Bokhara ; that is to say, until, besides imposing heavy miHtary contributions, he gathered in the coin most in circulation, called tenge, of the value of about one franc, and subsequently issued it again at the value of two francs. If we add to this evil state of things the dulness of trade, and the utter stagnation of all commercial intercourse between Russia, 76 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE China, and India, Afghanistan being also for the last three years the seat of constant war, we shall easily gain an idea of the melancholy condition into which the com- mercial and industrial "part of the population of Bokhara had fallen. The hardest lot was of course that of the agriculturist or the dwellers in the country. Apart from the fact that the constant warfare kept him far from house and home, as he had to accompany his liege- lord into the field, the members of the family who remained at home could not sell the produce of the soil at any price, not even at the lowest. This was most felt in cotton, raw silk, dried fruits, and colouring plants, which generally were exported in great quantities to Russia, but which were now quite worthless. And when we trace the main source of all this misfortune to the con- stant pressure which the governors exercised on all classes in the name of the Emir and of the hardly- pressed Government, the forced change in the public feeling will become at once obvious to us. Nevertheless the people had not yet come forward with the expression of their discontent, and would not have done so if the Emir had not seized the secularised property of the influential Ulemas, and if he had not laid under contribution some mosques and religious institutions, the flourishing state of whose coffers was a secret to no one. Of course, these temporal sacrifices would not have fallen so heavily on the learned world of Bokhara if their Islam piety had been really as true as it assumed to be. Yet the servants of religion on the banks of the Zerefshan cling to all that is earthly just as much as do their brethren on the Tiber and the Seine, In vain were they told that their contributions ANGLO-KUSSIAN FJ^ONTIEU QUESTION. *jy were designed for the defence of the faith against the Russians — in vain it was explained to them that their refusal was analogous with apostasy ; it was all useless. The Emir had scarcely placed his hands on the money of the mosques and colleges than he was himself decried as an unbeliever and a recreant. It is, indeed, incon- ceivable how such a change could take place in the minds of the Bokhariots. I am seized with indescrib- able astonishment when I look back to the reverence and the profound respect with which the people spoke of Muzaffar-ed-Din. The Ba-Devlet (the most blessed), the Emir-el-Mumenin (Prince of orthodox believers), this radiant model of Islam virtue three years ago, is at the present day decried as an unbeliever by the Ulemas, who had just been extolling his high virtues to me I However it may be, the opinion of the capital speedily found a lively echo in the surrounding country. Not only did the governor of Karakol make common cause with the Turkomans, and incited them not to join the standard of the Emir without exorbitant pay — a pay which the Emir, growing daily poorer, could not give, and the Turkomans in consequence refused their inter- est ; but discontent in the formerly well-ordered state exhibited itself everywhere. The nomad tribes of Khitai- Kiptchak, whom I have mentioned in my "Reisen," p. 163, revolted against the Emir. They were at first accused of secret understanding with the Russians, but this is a calumny ; for a genuine Ozbeg race, such as the Khitai-Kiptchaks are, would scarcely allow themselves to be guilty of such a crime. In consequence of the great number of horsemen who were recruited from among them, they had always formed the vanguard of 78 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE the Bokhara army ; and on this occasion, just as at other times, they only revolted because their services were too much required. Lastly, the district of Shehrl-Sebz, lying in the south, and always on a hostile footing with Bokhara, also gave the Emir much trouble just at this difficult time. Djura-Beg, who stood at the head of the revolted pro- vince, had made, indeed, hitherto no common cause with the Russians, although emissaries from Tashkend had of course not omitted to insinuate themselves, if only morally, in the southern points of the Oxus territory. For Ozbegs are, even in revolt, still honest Ozbegs; and the most essential injury that the Emir of Bokhara endured was, that, in the first place, 8000 to 10,000 of the bravest Ozbeg horsemen withdrew from him ; and that, secondly, the revolted Shehri-Sebz served as a place of refuge to his dangerous enemies, amongst whom was one of his nearest relatives, whom the offended Ulemas in Bokhara had brought forward as a pretender to his throne. Much evil had gathered over the head of the Emir. Most ridiculous, however, are and will ever be the demands which the people, goaded by the priests, pre- sented to their ruler; they required of him that he should proclaim the Djihad or Gaza, the religious war, and that he should attempt a new engagement with the Russians, though all former ones had only brought him misfortune. Whether the Emir, conscious of his weak- ness and of the superiority of the opposing enemy, allowed himself to be forced into an open declaration of war, I am still inclined to doubt. He relied on some Mohammedan alliance, or on the improvement of his ANGLChRUSS2AN FRONTIEI^ QUESTION, 79 warlike preparations. Be that as it may, he resisted with much energy during the last winter the demands of the public feeling ; indeed, he would not have allowed him- self to be forced to the step even in the spring had not every way of escape been cut off to him by the Russians on the one side, and on the other by the priests, who published several rivajets (quotations from the Koran) relating to the duty of religious wars. He saw that he must yield, and must decide on war. Before setting out, he was on the point of visiting the tomb of the sacred Beha-ed-Din, aft^r the usual Mohammedan fashion, when his enemies in the city spread the report that, from fear of the war, he was going to flee. Great multitudes assembled at the Mezar gate in order to pre- vent his exit, but meanwhile he was already in the vil- lage Beha-ed-Din, and, in fact, was returning from his pilgrimage. Seeing the impatient masses, entrance into the city seemed impossible to him, and so, accompanied by their imprecations and curses, he took his way to the second saint of the kingdom, Khodja-Abdul-Khalik, whose native place is at Gidjdovan, a small town in the north of the Khanate. Here also he was threatened by the mob and exposed to invectives, and it was only with the promise that he would drive away the Russians as soon as possible from the sacred soil of Turkestan that he was allowed to repair to the army at Samarkand, along the usual route through Kermineh. The Djihad was declared in the closest sense of the word ; yet as Bokhara did not venture to take the defen- sive, and proposed planning a surprise after the fashion of true Tartar tactics, the Emir was obliged for a time to watch the movements of the enemy. He had already 80 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE • occupied the heights of Nur-Ata, Daul, and Kette-Kur- gan, when the Russians, on the 14th May, after having spent some time in small attacks and skirmishes, set out from Tasch Kopriick, a stone bridge between Jengi Kur- gan and Samarkand, to take the latter place. So far as I can remember the country, the Russians had no spe- cially favourable ground compared with their enemies on the heights ; they had, in the first place, to cross the Karasu, a small tributary of the Zerefshan, and then to wade through the latter river itself, which is not par- ticularly high at this season of the year, but from its marshy banks it presents considerable difficulties to an army advancing to attack. Still a regular troop of Russians was not to be deterred by impediments of this nature; they had, besides, a well-concentrated force at their disposal ; for 21 companies of infantry, 450 Cossacks, 16 cannons, were drawn up in battle array. We may from this satisfactorily conclude how great was the number of the centre and the reserve. It is easily comprehensible, therefore, that they success- fully overcame the difficulties of the ground, drove away the Bokhariots at their mere appearance, and soon after took possession of the city of Samarkand in consequence of the invitation of its nobles. Neither Colonel Abramoff, nor Major-General Golowascheff, nor even the general commanding, had any occasion to employ any special strategical skill in accomplishing this victory. The result was easily to be foreseen, and in the whole catastrophe there are only a few details which may be brought for- ward. In the first place, the Samarkandians, after the unsuc- cessful issue of the engagement, closed their gates to their ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 8 1 fleeing countrymen, and even to their ruler himself, in order, as may be readily imagined, to prevent the hard- ship of a possible siege by Russian artillery. How this act of infidelity could take place in Samarkand, the summer residence and favourite resort of Muzaffar-ed- Din, is truly astonishing, and speaks plainly for the baseness of the character of the Tadjiks, who, here as in Bokhara, form the majority of the population, and who, in spite of all the Islam fanaticism upon which they pride themselves more than even the Ozbegs do, undoubtedly form that fraction of the population which is most inclined to undermine the power of the Emir and to destroy their own faith and independence. The second and still more remarkable circumstance is that on this march to Samarkand, those Afghan soldiers fought under the Russian standard who had only a month previously gone over to the Russians in consequence of a dispute with the Emir of Bokhara, to whom Afzal-Khan had sent them from Belkh as aux- iliary troops. These Afghans whom, as model troops, Afzal-Khan had sent to the Emir to train his army, had quarrelled with the Emir on account of the irregu- larity with which their pay was remitted to them. Naturally the vindictive Afghans had never stood on a footing of special friendship with the inhabitants of Bokhara ; still that Mohammedan fanatics, such as the Afghans are, should combine with the unbelieving Russian against the noble Bokhara, the seat of all Islam knowledge, and that Iskender-Khan, a son of Azim-Khan and grandson of Dost Mohammed-Khan, should be found at the head of these deserters, is a fact F 82 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE which may in nowise be overlooked by the Anglo-Indian Government. Samarkand was taken. The tidings of victory sur- prised Europe, the Court of Petersburg, and even the Russian general ; for I will impute it alone to this surprise, that, dissatisfied with the splendid booty of his contest, he marched on the next day but one through the gate of Shah Zinde, for the sake of continuing his conquests on the very road to Bokhara which the fugi- tive army of the Emir had taken. In order not to leave the smallest number of foes in the rear, two different divisions of troops were despatched, one to the citadel of Tchilek situated towards the north, and the other to that of Orkud on the south-west. The former place surrendered itself readily ; the latter only yielded after a desperate engagement, in which, as the Russians tell us, more than 15,000 Bokhariots took part, 1000 of whom were left on the field of battle. General Kauf- mann himself, during this flank movement, had con- tinued his way to Kette-Kurgan, a place strongly forti- fied. It surrendered, however, without resistance, and the march against the capital would certainly have been continued, if a strong force of Bokhariots had not mean- while assembled and begun to dispute with the Russians the ground lying between Kette-Kurgan and Samarkand. It is clearly manifest that, under such circumstances, it was urgently necessary to thin the close ranks in order not to lose the chain of communication with the Russian possessions. The Russian general, therefore, attacked the enemy at Sere Bulak on the 14th June, with eighteen companies of infantry, six bodies of cavalry, and four cannons, as the well-informed Saturday Review tells us, ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. S^ defeated it utterly, as may easily be imagined, and not only thus rescued himself from a dangerous position, but again liberated Samarkand from the insurgent popu- lace who had meanwhile cruelly distressed it. The Ozbegs, supported by a numerous army from Shehri-Sebz, commanded in person by Djura-Beg, had secretly entertained the design of reconquering their second capital. While the Russians had with- drawn from the citadel in order to pursue their victory, and had left behind only a feeble garrison together with the sick and wounded, several troops of Ozbegs had surprised the citadel, which, so far as I remember, though well situated, was only weakly fortified. The contest, as we have learned from Russian sources, must have been a very obstinate one, for even the sick and wounded left their beds ; indeed, all who could discharge a pistol or handle a sword came forward to repulse the besieging enemy. The Tartar startegy of occupying the attention of the general commanding by an apparent attack on Kette-Kurgan, and of preventing immediate assistance, would have certainly succeeded in a remarkable manner, if the well-known cowardice of all Orientals and the absence of true heroic spirit had not here also been clearly manifested. That a band of several thousand warriors, heated by wild religious fanaticism, could not scale a wall at the most twelve feet high, defended by a few hundred Russians, and these to a great extent incapable of fighting, and could not take the citadel, sounds truly almost like irony ; and yet so it was ! The Muscovite garrison, whose valour stands out brilliantly compared with the cowardly con- duct of the Tartars, had endurance enough to continue 84 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE the contest, until General Kaufmann, informed of their condition by spies, hastened to assist the besieged, scattered the enemy like chaff, and took possession of the threatened Samarkand. Whether the Emir or one of his generals led the Bok- hariots in these operations against the mighty adver- sary, is a question which constantly forms a subject of curiosity to our European journalists, and which cannot with certainty be stated. The Emir was indeed the ruling head, but his power consisted principally, in the first place, in the troops directly subordinate to him, which were paid by him from the public treasury, and which, for the most part, were commanded by Persian soldiers, who had come to Bokhara either as deserters or as Turkoman prisoners ; and in the second place, in the contingents furnished by the different governors, Hakim-Begs, who indeed, according to the rules of the constitution, were to be unconditionally subject to the orders of their ruler ; but at this time, as we may conclude from the events, were fighting more on their own account, and were not so anxious about their common fatherland as pro aris et focis. We see, therefore, only the Hakim-Begs of Kette-Kurgan, Ker- mineli, and the Khitai-Kiptchak districts actively en- gaged at this time. A united opposition, such as the dangerous position of things demanded, we have never yet met with, although a general summons, and, indeed, an urgent appeal from the Emir was certainly not lacking. The contrary even was the case, for while the Emir was fighting hotly with the Russians, the Beg of the northern district of Nur-Ata had risen in rebellion aeainst his lord. ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 85 Yet even if united co-operation had been possible, what forces could the extremest effort on the part of the Bokhariots produce ? I need only recall to mind the picture of the solemn victorious entry of the Emir of Samarkand; I need only remember the Karakol and Karshier troops with their miserable broad-swords, guns, and daggers, to declare all the utmost efforts of the Tartars, however united, as unavailing. Twenty, ay, even thirty Tartars may oppose a single Russian, yet victory will remain with the latter. The Bokhariots, although so fabulously superior in numbers, lack, in the first place, all idea of strategy ; their military authorities, such as Sharuch-Mirza, a cousin of the present King of Persia, Zeinel-Beg, and other Persians, who have fled thither as a refuge and have been brought thither as captives, have too slight a knowledge of our military science to be able to act as teachers; there are none of those Afghan-Hindoo instructors who have fled from the ranks of the Anglo- Indian army across the Indus, leaving behind them perceptible traces of the system of English drill. In addition to all this, they are deficient, as we have frequently said, in valour and endurance, so that, as we have before pointed out, the victory of the Russian arms in Central Asia is certain, and can in nowise be prevented. But we will return to the course of events. After Samarkand had been again taken, and probably for ever, and the victorious Russians had advanced as far as Kermineh, along the valley of the Zerefshan, on a good road that had been used by the greatest armies of the Middle Ages, it was suddenly declared that the now completely humbled Khan of Bokhara, submitting to S6 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE the Wish of the White Czar on the Neva, had entered into negotiations for peace. The treaty in question stated, in the first place, that the Emir would pay the Czar yearly one and a half laks tillah in gold ; secondly, that he would allow fortresses to be built in Karshi, Ishikardjin, and Kermineh ; thirdly, that the Emir, if he faithfully fulfilled his promises, was to receive Samar- kand back again ; fourthly, that he would permit the Russians to erect fortresses, at their pleasure, on the Zerefshan, or in the north of Samarkand, and construct a road to Bokhara at the Emir's expense, &c. — points in which the Anglo-Indian press perceived a dangerous move against her interest in India on the chessboard of the present contest, and against which, as may be readily conceived, she raised an outcry. Whilst in Europe the authenticity of this document was much discussed, General Kaufmann, the proud conqueror, accompanied by a numerous staff, travelled through Orenburg to Petersburg. His journey to the Muscovite capital fur- nished in the first place the best proof of the temporary pause in Russian warfare in Turkestan ; and in the second place, he wished to introduce a new race of Asiatics to the great ruler of half Asia — namely, the Afghan prince, Iskender-Khan, the new mercenary of the Russian Imperial force, who accompanied General Kauf- mann on his journey both to see and to be seen. There is no doubt that this scion of the Bareksi house — this grandson of Dost Mohammed — the first Afghan at a Christian European court, will be ardently admired by the ladies in Zarskoe-Selo. The Afghans, although not such Adonises as English authors allege them to be, are, nevertheless, very stately-looking personages. I envy. ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, S7 him the pleasure which many a young Russian will exhibit, as, at the sight of the fantastic and romantic- looking Afghan turban, he dreams of the Czar's dominion on the Hilmend and in the valleys of the Hindukush. But Iskender-Khan will have also much to see. The splendour of Indian viceroys, of which the grandees in Kabul have heard, can be easily eclipsed on the Neva. He will see fine military reviews ; he will visit arsenals, &c. ; he will bring back with him rich presents — in a word, on his return to his cousins at homCj he will have much to tell of the White Czar, of his power, his greatness, and his goodness, and he will thus contribute in making the name of Russia beloved among the Afghans. Whether, therefore a cessation of arms or a peace occurs, we see that Russia never ceases to struggle morally — just as in the last year, so also in this, the pause is very necessary ; and just as in this year, so in the spring of the next, the contest will be continued. In Bokhara, meanwhile, to make the misfortune com- plete, the flame of discord had burst forth between Muzaffar-ed-Din and his son Abdul Melik Mirza. This son, the unworthy child of a father distinguished for gentleness of character, pursued by misfortune, and plunged into calamity through his erroneous views, had been three years before governor of Samarkand, a post which, according to the custom of the country, belongs to the successor to the throne, just as Tebris belongs to the Veliahd of Persia, or Dauphin^ to the eldest prince in France. It was murmured even at the time of my journey that he was not living on the best terms with his father, who was well known to be a pious Mussul- SS CENTRAL ASIA AND THE man, and who wished to preserve his son also on the path of strict belief. Though I am far from wishing to cast the least suspicion upon him with regard to the catastrophe at Samarkand, where this very son was at the head of his troops, and first took to flight, still it \^ certain that this Torekelan (the word signifies elder, greater prince, and is not to be regarded as a proper name, as it is used in the journals), supported by his uncle, who was among the insurgent Shehri-Sebzans, would not have made the least scruple, even without the consent of his people, in entering into a peace with the Russians, or coming to a mutual understanding with them, if the court of Petersburg had manifested the slightest wish for transactions of the kind. Yet the Russians cherished no such intentions ; they cannot and dare not desire peace ; for whilst in the last year the reaching of the right bank of the Oxus was regarded, according to the Russian plan, as the nonplus ultra of a successful issue, late events in the lands lying between the Oxus and the Yaxartes have raised their hopes and wishes far higher. What need is there now of a garrison in Tchardjui, Kerki, or by the ferry of Khodja-Salih? Many other things are now rendered possible; the Russian Cossacks may now longingly stretch out their hands towards the cream-pots for which old Herat is famed. In fact, the present aim of the Muscovites is directed towards Meimene Belkh and Herat — to that Herat, the ancient title of which, "the chief gateway of Central Asia," has been recently con- tested d toutprix by the great English diplomatists, and which now, nevertheless, will serve as the gateway through which the Russian eagle, in its bold flight ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 89 towards the south, will probably take them by sur- prise. All that has rendered the execution of this plan feasi- ble, and has made it a necessity in the arrangements of Russian policy, must form the subject of our present considerations. During the victorious campaign of twelve months in Turkestan, especially during the march from Khodjend to the gates of Bokhara, events of great importance have taken place not only in the neigh- bouring khanates, but on the other side of the Oxus, in Afghanistan. Russia has tolerably smoothed the diffi- culties apparently insurmountable in the eye of her rival ; she is now not only mistress of the interior country and of the territory on the Zerefshan, but she holds equal sway over the adjacent khanates, and, moreover, she has entered into relations with Afghanistan from which she must speedily obtain a certain and not insignificant reward. That Khokand has lost for the present its actual inde- pendence, and not its nominal at once also, is to be ascribed not so much to the moderation of Russian policy, as perhaps to the circumstance that the complete annexation of the khanate would require a garrison of three times the number of troops, even though no Rus- sian institutions were at first introduced in its interior organisation. To take Khokand, Namengan, Mergolan, and other eastern places of importance, would have been a very easy matter for the governor of Turkestan, but not so the watch over an enemy always on the look- out for an opportunity. This inhabited part of the khanate was, moreover, situated beyond the marching route of the Russian plan. In order to arrive at Kash- 90 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE gar, Fort Vernoe and the territory of the Narin river had been secured ; the fortified communication from Tashkend and Khodjend led to Bokhara ; and as it was known with tolerable certainty that Khokand, so lovingly surrounded on all sides, would not subsequently be able to resist the somewhat ungentle embrace of the Russian bear, it was desirable, in order to give a new colouring to the long-expressed desire for a peaceful policy, to leave Khokand for a time in its present condi- tion, and in order to show the Khan of Khokand that he was treated as a reigning prince, or more justly, to remove all fear of possible danger. General Kaufmann had not delayed, even before the outbreak of formal hostilities against Bokhara, to conclude a treaty of peace with Khudajar-Khan, the ruler of Khokand, of which the following is the purport : — i. All the towns and villages of the Khanate of Khokand, without exception, are open to Russian merchants, and all Russian markets are accessible to traders from Khokand. 2. The Russian merchants are at liberty to have their caravanseries, in which they alone can store their goods, in any towns of Khokand that they may please. 3. For the control of regular commercial intercourse and the lawful levying of duty, the Russian merchants are allowed the right of having commercial agents in all the towns of the khan- ate if they wish. The merchants from Khokand have the same right in the towns in the Turkestan territory. 4. All goods brought from Russia to Khokand, or pass- ing from Khokand into European and Asiatic Russia, are subject to the same duty as in the Turkestan terri- tory — i.e., 2\ per cent, of their value, in each case no higher duty than that demanded from the Mussulmans ANGLChR US SI AN FRONTIER Q UES TION, 9 1 who are Khokand subjects. 5. The Russian merchants with their caravans have free and safe passage through the Khokand territory into the adjacent countries, and the caravans from Khokand are in like manner to pass freely into Russian territory. These engagements were confirmed, and on the 29th January 1868 were signed and sealed in Tashkend by the Governor- General of Turkestan, and by the commander of the troops in the Turkestan military district, the adjutant-general of Kauf- mann. As a token of the acceptance of these engage- ments by the Government of Khokand, Seid-Mohammed- Khudajar-Khan ratified them at Khokand on the 13th February 1868 with his seal. These precautionary measures were, however, not at all necessary. Surrounded on all sides, humbled by the defeats suffered, enfeebled by internal discord and want of money, and recently especially threatened by the ruler of the " Six Cities," a former vassal, the Khan of Kho- kand, even without this treaty, would not have felt the slightest desire to rise against the Russians, from whom he was now only awaiting his deathblow. Indeed, his views on the matter are best expressed in the answer which he gave to the powerful ruler of the *' Six Cities,'' when the latter invited him to make common cause with him against the Russians. " Yakub Kushbegi must first give the Russians an essential blow, and then I will join myself to him ; in the contrary case, I should be the first upon whom the retaliation would fall." A similar opinion prevails also in Khiva, which, from fear of the approaching storm on the lower stream of the Oxus, remains as quiet as a mouse. It is, indeed, pos- sible that this striking repose in the warlike elements 92 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE of Khiva, which has the bravest Ozbegs in its army, besides having more than 60,000 Turkoman horse- men at its disposal, is influenced by the fleet on the Sea of Aral. The gentlemen in Petersburg will pro- bably be of this opinion ; still, I believe that the fearful tidings of the catastrophe in Bokhara and Khokand are far more serious to Khiva than the threatening position at the mouth of the Oxus. Moreover, Khiva has never allowed the guilt of self-admiration to amount to such an extent as Bokhara ; the people are more homely but more earnest ; they are quieter, but steadier, than on the banks of the Zerefshan. No one in Khiva ignores the fact that the independence of the Ozbegs is threatened with immediate danger, yet it is not for a moment doubted that the Russian soldiers will not find victory here very easy ; for although the Turkoman races of the khanates — I mean the Tchaudors and the Yomuts — will desert their countrymen for the smallest trifle, and will march arm-in-arm with the Russians, the taking of Khiva alone will cost nearly as much time and sacrifice as the conquest of the whole of Bokhara and Khokand. Moreover, the absolute and immediate possession of the khanate on the lower Oxus is all the less an urgent necessity, as a temporary intimidation, supported by the before-mentioned outposts on the Sea of Aral, may pro- cure them a position in Old Khahrezm analogous with that at Khokand — i,e,, they may here also obtain neu- trality for a time without any actual conquest, and without thus frustrating the means of subsequently over- coming their prospective and much-surrounded prize. And why, when we are speaking of the e-^sy practica- ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION 93 bllity of Russian plans, should we not take into con- sideration those political powers which have been an important assistance to every conqueror on the left bank of the Oxus, and must be so also to the Russians ? 1 refer to the petty Khanates of Kunduz, Aktche, Shiborgan, Andchoi, and Meimene, which altogether can furnish scarcely more than 40,000 horse, but which separately can be of great use to the advancing power, by the constant and unrelenting feuds that prevail among them. Through these Tartar Lilliputian princes, who now acknowledge Afghan sovereignty, though not Af- ghan commands, both Yar Mohammed Khan and Dost Mohammed Khan have recently succeeded in rendering themselves masters of the Paropamisus in the north, and in becoming dangerous rivals of the Emir of Bokhara ; in fact,^ we could almost admit that even the rulers on the Zerefshan were only powerful when their policy was able to procure them authority on the other side of the Oxus — that is, in the places we have before mentioned. It is to me as if I saw already the Ozbeg princes who have been driven away by Afghan power, and possess- ing a nationality which, strongly mingled with Sartish and Tadjik elements, has been far from preserving that genuine and pure Ozbeg character which distinguishes their brethren on the lower stream of the Oxus,- — it is to me as if I saw these princes, suddenly emergmg from their corners of concealment, join the columns of the Russian army, and march delightedly towards the moun- tains of Afghanistan, in order to avenge themselves on their old adversaries, if the Afghans do not get the start of theni^ and sooner solicit the Russian alliance, the probability of which we have also already pointed out. 94 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Or is it perhaps the Turkomans who will stand in the way of the Muscovites ? I have already expressed myself distinctly as to their untrustworthy character, and only for the sure convincing of my political adver- saries I will observe, that the Turkomans, although an important power, are very different at the present day in the eyes of all Asiatics from that epoch when they appeared as mighty agents in history ; as, for example, under the Timurides, the Sefevides, and Nadir. It is indeed true that the Ersaris, and especially the numer- ous Tekes, the brave Salors, and the rash Sariks, could occasion any Asiatic power, even at the present day, much trouble ; yet what can a body of troops effect, however courageous the horsemen and fleet the horses, against the iron wall of a square of Russian bayonets ? The Asiatic is well acquainted with warfare as regards impetuous attack or feigned flight ; but to stand firm, awaiting the fatal bullet, to trust his personal courage to the strategic guidance of another, this is unknown to him ; and although the Turkomans are far more brave and resolute than the Ozbegs, all their efforts against the Russians have ever been vain and fruitless. Apart from this deficiency in physical superiority, the condemnatory testimony of every traveller as to the morality of the Turkomans is sufficient pledge that this people, among whom neither religion nor nationality, nor even principle takes root, will be the first to enter the Russian service. They are not only to be employed against the khanates or against the Afghans, as is best proved by their recent depredations upon Tchardjui and Karakol, places which they laid utterly waste, but they will act against their own races ; and difficult as ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, Q5 it will be to the Court of Petersburg to subdue these wild sons of the west, and to treat them like the Kir- ghises, it will be easy to make their services available to its own ends. However much I may endeavour to avoid falling into repetition, it is almost impossible to me here, when speaking of the most recent movements and the Russian projects in Central Asia, not to make mention again of Persia, whose conduct is of such great im- portance in the question now under discussion. In my paper, *' Persia and Turkey," * I have already pointed out the condition of Russia's influence in Teheran, and the errors of the British diplomacy in the same place. I should have remained satisfied with this glance, if during the course of this year events had not occurred which cast a distinct light upon my former insinuations. I mean, in the first place, Persia's quarrel with the Porte, which has not indeed yet given occasion to an open feud, but which, like a spark hidden under the ashes, is only waiting the moment to burst into a flame. Ottoman and English interests are regarded as com- pletely identical in Persia ; the English ambassador is designated in derision the Frengi Sunnite, and the Otto- man the Sunnite Frengi ; even the daily intercourse between the two palaces of the Embassy is far more close, firm, and brotherly in the capital at the foot of the Demavend than it is elsewhere, so much so, that I cannot imagine an attack on Khanikein (Ejalet Bagdad) without a secondary design upon Herat or vice versd. Whatever the Sultan likes, that is decidedly hated by the Shah ; wherever the latter goes, the former keeps * Cf. " Unsere Zeit," new series, iv, I. 767-780. 96 , CENTRAL ASIA AND THE away; hence the disappointment of Napoleon III. not to be able to receive the successor of the Darians in his capital at the time of the great " Exposition ; '* for although the Shah had accepted the invitation earlier, he despatched a letter of excuse to the banks of the Seine as soon as the definitive journey of the Sultan was made known. In the second place, I cannot conceal my astonish- ment when the visit occurs to me, which Nasreddin Shah, this shadow of God upon earth, this radiant climax of humanity, p^id to the Russian Grand Duke, when the latter on his tour visited the Caspian fleet and the Russian Caspian coast-lands. I will not here dis- cuss what the sovereign of Persia thought as he tra- versed the blue waves of the sea once belonging to him, on which he now cannot even send out from the shore a fishing-boat for his amusement ; for we cannot doubt for a moment that he had his special thoughts in the conference, the hearty friendly character of which we learn from the newspapers of the time. Herat, the rich and golden Herat, where the best cream in Central Asia flows, where the most beautiful women are to be found, where the fields, according to the statement of the aborigines, need only to be tilled by children in order to bear rich fruit — this Herat is a place after which Persian rulers in every age have longed, and with only a slight promise on the part of the Grand Duke to cede Herat with the adjacent annexed lands — I mean Ferrah, Sebzevar, and Gurian — to the Persians, the Shah would at once pledge himself not only to allow the Russian army to pass, if it desires to repair to Herat along a good road, through Astrabad, Kabushan, and ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 97 Meshed, but to support most vigorously the Court of Petersburg in all its plans on the territory on the other side of the Oxus. If the politicians in the council of the Persian king would take into consideration the subsequent consequences of a Russian alHance, if they would cast a glance at the map, and attentively consider the precarious position of their country from the Russian line of frontier enclosing it on the north-west and north, and now also on the north-east, they would certainly lose all desire to increase the vicinity of Russia; for with the extension of Russian influence in Armenia and Kurdistan on the one side, and in Turkestan and Afghanistan on the other, the future of Iran is already endangered ; the bond may eventually pass into the sweetest feeling of friendship, but Iran cannot escape being absorbed by the gigantic body of the Northern Colossus. Unfortunately, however, the Persians, those clever children of the East, are far enough from ponder- ing upon future plans of the kind ; they care alone for the accomplishment of plans which afford present ad- vantage. A Russian alliance gives a better prospect of wars, of diplomatic disorders, and therefore, also, of a certain influx of bribes and peculations for ministers ; and as, besides, the youthful Nasreddin Shah wishes at any rate to adorn the old Keiwan crown with the laurels of fresh victories, it is resolved, once for all, that Iran under any circumstances must take the same path as Russia, and support this empire in her plans upon the adjacent territory of Afghanistan. If I have not deceived myself in these conjectures, the Court of Petersburg has furnished the surest and clearest evidence that, in its advance to the south of Central Asia, G 98 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE it has in view not only to gain a firm footing on both banks of the Oxus and Yaxartes, but that the aim of its endeavours is at present to smooth and prepare the way for a future plan which has long been traced out. If Khokand and Khiva are maintained as sovereign states, the whole tract of land from Tashkend to Kerki is nothing but the highway on which the advance will be made, from Andchoi and Meimene to Herat, and from thence to Afghanistan ; and the gentlemen in Peshawur will scarcely have time to inspect with their telescopes, on the summits of the Hindukush, the movements of the Russians, before the latter will have taken possession of Herat, and will, perhaps, have reached with their out- posts the banks of the Hilmend. If the optimists and adversaries of my views in Eng- land or India doubt the possibility, or at any rate the speedy possibility, of an unexpected move on the part of the Russians, I will point to the fraternisation which the above-mentioned Iskender-Khan so easily entered into with the Russian general at Tashkend, and I will draw attention to the fact that in all engagements which took place near Samarkand, there were regiments of Afghan cavalry and infantry taking part in the contest against the Emir. At the present moment, Azim-Khan^s star in Kabul as well as in the whole of Afghanistan is as rapidly sinking as the fortune of the once-oppressed Shir-Ali-Khan is on the ascendant. The latter has not only marched into Kabul as a victorious prince, and has not only obliged his brother to fly to Belkh, but he has converted a great part of the troops of his enemy into friends, and is on the point — so says a vague report which speaks of important Russian subsidies, with the help of ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 99 which he is thus vigorously carrying on operations — of consolidating his throne by Muscovite support, in the same way as his father did so by the help of English arms. I only ask the wise gentlemen in the Indian Council, will Iskender-Khan, who has already given such splendid proofs of his vengeance, be able to forbear taking revenge on the arch-enemy of his father, when he enters Afghanistan supported by a great power? Or will he, forming probably a part of the Russian advanced guard, not at once come forward as the bitterest enemy of Shir-Ali-Khan and of England ? I beUeve none will doubt such an event. There is no need to be a Mount- stuart Elphinstone or an Alexander Burnes ; the slight- est knowledge of the Afghan character is sufficient to render apparent that the fraternal contest which has been going on among the descendants of Dost-Mohammed- Khan is just as advantageous to the success of the Rus- sian plans, as it is critical, and perhaps dangerous, to the interests of England. If some thousand Afghans who have been despatched for the protection of a threat- ened neighbouring sovereign, a relative, moreover (for the readers of my *' Reisen " will probably remember that the two eldest daughters of the Emir are married to Afghan princes, former governors of Serepul and Aktche), and for the defence of an endangered faith, can so revolt, on account of the faulty receipt of their pay, that they pass over to the enemy, and indeed soon after join him in attacking their brethren in religion, — why should it sound so fabulous when we say that the fallen party of Mohammed-Azim-Khan, who was never on very good terms with England, will now, in order to take twofold revenge, with open arms give place to 100 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Russian intrigues and Russian auxiliaries ? And is it not striking that England, in this open hostility to one Afghan party, cannot stand on the best footing also with the other? The fugitive Mohammed-Azim will turn his glance towards Peshawur with threatening ges- ture from his summer residence in Mezar, and will say — " You may wait, Inglis Kafir ; you have not helped me I " But Shir-Ali-Khan also, this pretended proteg6 and par- tisan of England, cherishes deep resentment in his heart. Not only did England, at a time when he was pursued by misfortune and was in the utmost necessity, not only not give him a farthing, nor lavish on him a word of comfort, but the Viceroy wrote the following lines, in a letter dated from Simla, the nth June 1866, addressed to Afzal-Khan, who had implored his friendship : — " My friend, — England associates herself only with the real sovereigns of Afghanistan, If your Highness is in a position to consolidate your power in Kabul, and you are deeply animated with feelings of friendship for Eng- land, I will gladly receive your Highness as a friend and ally." Are these words of friendship, or would the Anglo- Indian politicians persuade themselves that, amid Afghan court intrigues, the contents of the letter in question would remain unknown to Shir-Ali ? Of course, no one would think of this ; in fact, I go further, and assert that the rumours of the understanding between Shir-Ali and Petersburg, if they have any foundation, are only to be ascribed to the reasons we have mentioned. It would really be too naifve if the English diploma- tists in India or London endeavoured to ignore that the Afghans, this warlike race, averse to all culture and ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. lOI Civilisation, and consequently still strongly biassed by the childish ideas of the Orientals, would trouble them- selves particularly with the consideration of vast politi- cal plans. Every Afghan knows that they can endanger English interests by manifest inclination towards Russia; yet whether Afghan interests would thrive in conse- quence of an alliance with the north or with the south is a matter about which there is as little concern in the mountains of the Hindukush as in Teheran. In the time of Dost-Mohammed-Khan a demonstrable and suc- cessful attempt at unity existed ; but at the present day the pay-loving soldiers are anxious only for battle and feud, and whoever promises them the nearest opportunity for either is most welcome to them — they are ready to fight under his standard, and so long as his star of for- tune is true to him., i.e.y so long as he can pay, they will remain faithful to him. In this lies the cause of the changeful fortune of the leaders. in the present fraternal contest — in this also lies the possibility that the advanc- ing Russian general may be able to purchase a large number of ready Afghan blades for ready imperials ; for in such a service there is, moreover, an old feeling of revenge — a feeling which every Afghan, whether Durani or Yusufzi, whether Gilzi or Kakeri, blindly obeys. At the time that the twilight of Islam sanctity still sur- rounded me, more than one Afghan has with pious pride introduced himself to me as a former warrior against the unbelievers, i.e., as a slayer of Englishmen — of course, in order to gain the favour of the supposed saint. This con- test, although five years have now passed since it occurred, still lives with incredible freshness in the memory of every Afghan. Every family is distinguished by some proud 102 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE remembrance — every spot in the neighbourhood of Kandahar, Kabul, and Djelahabad is marked by some memorable heroic deed ; and Akbar-Khan, the treacher- ous murderer of MacNaughten, has been so glorified even after his death, that his son, Djelal-ed-Din-Khan, is more highly considered among the Ulemas than any other Afghan prince. Djelal-ed-Din knew this long ago; but in order to ingratiate himself still more with the people, he made a pilgrimage to Mecca ; indeed, this Hadshi-Djelal-ed-Din-Khan will, it seems to me, yet play a conspicuous part, if the civil war raging in Afghanistan should bring about Russian influence, for no one will think of asserting that the Cossacks will have to be dragged by force to the banks of the Hilmend. I can never agree, therefore, that the Persians, the Eng- lish, or the Russian Christians would be simply indiffer- ent to the Afghans, as Sir Charles Trevelyan endeavours to show in his letter published in the Times, and dated 20th January 1868. This has been proved sufficiently by the above-mentioned Iskender-Khan; it has been proved by the propaganda of the recent adventurer, Firuz-Shah, who, with his anti-Anglican tendencies, is sufficiently well known to the pious Mohammedans of Peshawur and Yarkend ; and it will probably be proved most clearly in the immediate future. Sir Charles Trevelyan, whoir the Times, ill-informed as it is in Oriental matters, proclaims to be a great authority, is much mistaken if he thinks that the Indian Government will gain the sympathy of the Afghan nation by peaceful intercourse and by the promotion of commerce. He cites Rohil- cund as a once flourishing Afghan colony. He points ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION IO3 to the extensive trade which Kabul and Kandahar mer- chants carry on with India ; yet he seems to me to know very Httle of the true character of the Afghans, when he imagines that the position of tea, spice, and indigo merchants exercises the sHghtest influence on the war- loving chiefs who, par excellence^ constitute the nation ! I need not draw the attention of the English Secre- tary of War to the thorough description of the Afghan character by Mountstuart Elphinstone, nor to the con- stant wars which will draw many a peaceful caravan- knight, and, indeed, many a shepherd, beneath the military banner, as soon as war holds out to him the prospect of gain ; he need only see an Afghan hidalgo walking about the bazaars of Herat, Kandahar, or Kabul, armed with shield, spear, pistols, gun, sword, and yatagan, which he never lays aside if he goes ten paces from his dwelling; or Sir Charles Trevelyan need only linger in the neighbourhood of many an idyllic Lohani, bearing at night, in his romantic valley, a gun bound round his neck with an iron chain, that it may not be cut off, and he will perceive that the furtherance of trade and agriculture is not particularly dear to the Afghans, and he will see why the policy of Lord William Bentinck met with encouragement from the Emir of Sint and from Rendj id-Singh, and why the commercial- and peaceful mission of Sir Alexander Burnes to Kabul was followed by the calamitous Afghan war. Yet why this continual controversy? The Afghans are a mountain race, devoted to warfare, and as, if there is a lack of foreign enemies, they make war upon each other, as history and the present time prove, we can . 104 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE easily imagine with what haste and eagerness each Pashtu will seize the straight, two-edged sabre, when such a fortunate occurrence as the prospect of a Russian- Afghan alliance offers itself to him for the execution of his favourite idea. At the time of the Sepoy revolution in India, the iron hand of Dost-Mohammed-Khan, who was bound by the golden fetter of English rupees, restrained the war-loving Afghans from invading India and joining the rebels ; but now the iron hand of Russian ambition impels them forwards, and will they be forbearing ? It is curious to observe how the English Government has recently behaved with regard to these events Whilst, during the year 1867, the whole press, or at any rate the greater part of the press in England, and the official papers in India, indulged in somewhat violent expressions against my political views, and the Pall Mall Gazette honoured me even with the title of chief alarmist ; now, after the lapse of a year, since my paper upon the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia has appeared in the columns of Unsere Zeit^ a strange turn has taken place in political views — a turn which sur- prised me as much as it will do many of my readers. While the Tunes of January 1867 applauded the Indian Viceroy's policy of " masterly inactivity," and ridiculed the plan then entertained of occupying Herat, we read in the same paper of loth July the opinion : '' It would be difficult for any one to prove that the Russians had no designs on British India ; " it is as if I were hearing the echo of the words expressed by myself in 1864, and at that time ridiculed by this very Times, which spoke of me as an Hungarian, and therefore a foe to Russia — ANGLO-RUSSIAN FI^ONTIER QUESTION. I05 as a traveller, and therefore a man of exaggerated ideas ; and expressed its satisfaction that the English of 1864 were no longer those of 1840, who, alarmed at the phantom of Russia's advance towards India, at once prepared for arms. Not only the Times of London and Calcutta, but others, some English, some Indian daily, weekly, and monthly papers, did not join in the chorus of the song, " Fiirchte dich nicht, mein knablein," and the helpless infant of English diplomacy slumbered truly, though it was plain to perceive that sleep did not so easily weigh down its eyelids. It slumbered till the cannon roar sounded in its ears from the Yaxartes, the noise of which was made still more threatening by the chatter in the Kabul bazaars. It was the beginning of April 1868 that the slumbering lion began to show signs of waking. To send a diplo- matic inquiry to Petersburg they neither could nor would ; for the English papers, and indeed the Govern- ment organs, had before screamed themselves hoarse in asserting that Russia was most welcome as a neighbour on our north-west frontier in India — of course, far more wel- come than the hordes of fanatical Afghans, Beludje, and others ; that she was forced by circumstances into an aggressive policy in the south of Central Asia, just as we had ourselves once been to the incorporation of a dozen Indian kings. They could not, therefore, make much ado ; yet, as the report of the advance of Russian Cossacks and of their brilliant victories drew nearer and nearer, and a feeling of uneasiness, as we may well imagine, was aroused in Calcutta, they were compelled to deviate from their boasted path of indifference and strict neutrality, in order, as we now see, to adopt an I06 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE entirely opposite course, namely, one of defensive, and, if appearances do not deceive us, of even offensive policy. Of course, the public feeling in India itself, besides the events on the Oxus, have greatly contributed to bring about this change of conduct. The Anglo- Indians are, as my readers know, almost entirely Russophobists, They live among the Indian people ; they know their modes of thought ; they are also toler- ably well acquainted with the neighbouring races ; and we cannot therefore be surprised if they are rather more alarmed at the approach of the Russians to India than the official world on the Hooghly, who join in the refrain of the Viceroy, or than the politicians on the Thames, who understand but little of Asiatic policy. These Anglo-Indians have been reproached with desiring the policy of intervention, not from patriotism or political conviction, but from love of adventure and of military excitement — in fact, there was a regular dispute beween both parties ; and when we take into consideration the passion with which this war with the pen was fought out, we shall then first perceive how great the danger must have been which obliged the gentlemen on the Hooghly t@ surrender to their irritated adversaries. Yet, what are the symptoms, I shall be asked, from which I perceive this change in the policy of England towards Russia t The answer to the question is very simple. The first is the withdrawal of the Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence, from the supreme direction of affairs, and the appointment of the Earl of Mayo, the Irish Minister, as his successor. The papers tell us, indeed, that Sir ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 10/ John Lawrence was compelled to leave the injurious Indian climate on account of his health, and that he required physical refreshment Natural as this may sound, it is scarcely intelligible to me, that a thorough Anglo-Indian, who had for years lived in India, must suddenly and at such a conjuncture retire from the harmful influences of the climate, which, as is well known, after the first few years of trial, agrees well with every Briton for the rest of his life. Sir John Lawrence, up to the present time, has not only been beloved in London, but he has been even petted, so that I regard his withdrawal from affairs as identical with the withdrawal of the policy alluded to. We will speak presently of the mistake in the appoint- ment of his successor, that is, in the choice of a man who has hitherto had nothing to do with Indian affairs. In the second place, the change of policy is also recognisable from the tone of the press. The Times, the Spectator^ and their whole genus from within and without the boundaries of Great Britain, have latterly remarkably forborne to inveigh against the so-called " Alarmists " — in fact, without intending it, they have become alarmists themselves ; and if they have not directly advised intervention, they have entered upon dangerous questions, such as, Would it be better to attack Russia on this side or on that side of the Indus } How could Afghanistan be neutralised } How could Persia be made an ally t &c. In the third place, some steps have been already taken which confirm our assertion. The order has been* given for the rapid completion of the railway from Delhi to Peshawur, and also for the completion of the I08 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE railway in the valley of the Indus, in order thus to expe- dite the communication from Calcutta and Bombay. A corps of engineers has been despatched to survey the Bolan and Kheiber passes, and to construct there, at suitable places, fortresses, arsenals, and provision maga- zines. Lord Napier of Magdala has to turn aside from the apotheosis of the English, and to undertake the command of the Bombay army in India, whither he goes accompanied by the best hopes of the British people. In fact, they go still further, and intend to renew the old fortifications in Quetta and Beludjistan, and to fill them with English garrisons. These are, without doubt, important steps, indicating no indifferent political views. But what most essentially confirms us in our opinion is the already adopted initiative of an offensive war, intimated by the recent tidings which have come to us of the revolt in Agror. Ever since the campaign of Sittana and Bhotan, it has been univer- sally known that the line of English military posts is not in the securest state in this north-east frontier of India, which swarms with such easily inflammable elements. Here, moreover, are to be found those colonies of wild, fanatical Mohammedans, who, from their inexorable hostility to the regime of the Kafir, are securely banished to these mountainous districts, and who, under the direction of chiefs such as the Achond of Swat, the temporary saint, and the adventurer Firuz- Shah, who asserts himself to be the last scion of the royal house of Delhi, endeavour to create constant disturbances, in order to turn them to their own material advantage under the pretext of intellectual efforts, and thus frequently to perplex the governor of Peshawur. ANGLO-EUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, I09 Every one will understand that, under such circum- stances, there is rarely a lack of skirmishes and depreda- tions ; and the tidings that on the loth August a troop of the Tchigerzai race had attacked the guard of Agror in this very Hezareh district, and had been put to flight by Colonel Rothney, would certainly not have excited our attention to the same extent, if the Indian papers had not given extraordinary importance to the circum- stance, and depicted the threatening danger in the most glaring colours. After the band had been repulsed as quickly as it had advanced, it was suddenly reported that the Tchigerzai and Hassanzai were mighty descend- ants of those Pathanes who form the dreaded Swat con- federation, and that the Government would do well to concentrate a strong force in this quarter. Of course, the statement of the threatening reports is exaggerated in England, and it is even asserted thaj; not only in the north of Peshawur, but also in the south — for instance, among the Bezutis — symptoms of disorder are showing themselves ; and no one is astonished suddenly to see in Peshawur an army of observation, consisting of 10,000 men, under the command of General Wilde, in order to extinguish the flame as speedily as possible. It is also stated that a great part of the troops who had served in Abyssinia are ordered to the north-west corner of India not far from Peshawur. Whether these Tchigerzais in Hezareh are in anyway allied with the Afghans is much to be doubted, yet no one will deny that this concentration of English troops is not directed against the bands of booty-loving adven- turers, however much Mohammedan fanaticism may lie at the background of their plans. The English army of I rO CENTRAL ASIA AND THE observation, which is to be still more strongly reinforced, stands on the frontier of India, to watch the events of Central Asia and Afghanistan. It has been observed that the show of peaceful inclinations and neutrality is useless in reconnoitring ; a telescope of cannons has therefore been adopted, for of late John Bull prefers to cast his amorous glances upon his Russian rival through the mouths of several thousand gun-barrels. I do not, therefore, think I am mistaken, when, from the tokens I have mentioned, I infer a decided politi- cal change -in the English Ministry ; and when I inform my readers that the Conservative Ministry on the Thames, through their representative on the Hooghly, are noting down a new air in place of the old and vari- ously played '* Etudes sur laisseraller,"-^an air which can very easily be played with the thunder of cannons and other sensational accessories, to the accompaniment of a Turkish Banda. If this be really the case, only a few questions are left for us to make. In the first place, what are the steps which England has to take against her powerful adver- sary } In the second place, what are the results which may be expected from the future measures of Great Britain on the other side of the Indus and in the villages of the Hindukush 1 No one will or can condemn a return to the path of necessary activity and a renunciation of this long inac- tion, although a change of policy three months ago would have been far more beneficial to the interests of India and far less dangerous to England. To be able to assert that Russia will mistake the true object of the concentration of troops round Peshawur, and will not ANGLChRUSSIAN FJ^ONTIEJd QUESTION. 1 1 1 see in it an act of hostile opposition, one must either be an extreme optimist or but little acquainted with the Oriental cunning and suspicious policy of the Petersburg Court. Whilst these measures could have been taken before the occupation of Samarkand without exciting the slightest suspicion among the Russians, it is hardly pos- sible in the present day to avoid a diplomatic correspon- dence between Petersburg and London on Central Asiatic questions. For Russia, circumspect Russia, cannot help seeing at the first glance, in this movement of the Britons, an hostility to her own designs on the Oxus territory. To the Afghans, also, a decided step on the part of England, instead of her constant tardiness, would have been far more helpful than it is now. Whilst the English Government, as the Mohammedans say, halted prayer- less between two mosques, Shir-Ali, at least so report informs us, when no subsidies came from Calcutta for the recovery of his throne, procured them in Petersburg. I repeat, this rests only on report. Yet would it not have been better if England, when she saw Azim-Khan's star declining — and a watchful state should observe everything — had half-secretly, half-openly offered her hand to the courageous, ambitious, and ardent Shir-Ali- Khan, who is no Shah Shedsha, and, as the support of the house of Dost-Mohammed-Khan is almost tradi- tional on the part of England, had helped him with arms and money on his way to Kabul ? For that Shir-Ali- Khan, who was trying all possible means to bring the gentlemen of Calcutta to his side, would have accepted money, ay, gladly accepted it, every one in India knows well, and Sir John Lav^rence best of all. Would it not have been better to be now seeing the supplanted son of 112 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Dost-Mohammed-Khan arriving before Kabul with the help of English money ? Would not the prospects be far more satisfactory if he had placed the royal Afghan mesned (throne) under English protection, and his son, Serdar-Yakub, had gained English defence for the cita- dels of Bala-Hissar, and if he had been able to maintain his conquest only by looking to the further support of the Frengi ? No one will certainly answer this in the negative ; and in order, therefore, not again to fall into further errors, in order to step onwards with success upon the beaten path, England has most speedily laid aside the suicidal weapon of irresolution. The favourite maxim, ^' What do the adjacent, wild, barbarous hordes concern us ? We wish to have no new entanglements, we wish for no new Abyssinia," must be given up. Eng- land must act, must act speedily, and she must act with united powers. Above all, the errors committed must be compensated for, and Shir-Ali-Khan must be made the friend of Eng- land. If the friendly union begun after the death of his father is relied upon, and no third party interferes, the renewal of an offensive and defensive alliance between Afghanistan, who needs money and arms, and England, who possesses both, is no particularly difficult task. A diplomatist well acquainted with the locality and full of practical and theoretic knowledge would now be especially valuable. Shir- Ali-Khan's attention should be drawn to the critical position of his future — 2>., to the possible alliance of his rival with Russia ; in fact, he ought to be convinced of this, and the English alliance should be proposed as a suitable counter-balance. No ANGLORUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 1 1 3 one will for a moment doubt that, if such an initiative were successfully carried out, he would gladly comply with the desire of England, namely, that he would com- mence diplomatic relations, and would erect a few forts destined for his own protection and occupied for his comfort by a mixed garrison ; in a word, that he would be far less opposed than his father to an open and sure approximation to British India. If this, however, is not the case, if Shir-Ali, as report tells us, owes his present success really to Russian and Persian influence, and shows himself hostile to all English insinuations, then nothing is left but by force to give advice to this child of Afghan diplomacy, since he will not see the threatening danger from which he cannot save himself alone. The armed intervention, which would have been avoidable in the year 1867, is no longer so under the present circum- stances ; the English must make themselves masters of the two chief stations on the easy way to India (I mean Herat and Kandahar) ; they must regard these as the advanced works of their frontier fortifications, and must as such defend them. I, for my part, lay great weight on this road, for the far shorter way from Herat to Kabul across the Hezareh Mountains, which the English have so often sent to explore, and with which the Russians also wish to acquaint themselves, yet which the scientific traveller Nicholaus von Khanikow was not allowed to visit, is very impracticable ; in fact, it is almost inaccessible to an army, and this has been plainly shown during the recent campaign of Shir-Ali- Khan against his brother. The former had the He- zarehs on his side, and yet in his contest with his rival, he chose the circuitous route through Kandahar and H 114 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Gizne. Unfortunately this armed intervention, the results of the errors of English diplomacy, is now the lesser evil to choose from. England has no other expedient. It is all the same whether the English flag waves on the battlements of Herat and Kandahar, and whether English influence predominates in Kabul ; something must be done to show the Court of Petersburg that the approach of the Cossacks to India is in nowise regarded with indifference, but rather with the utmost mistrust. Had this taken place sooner, Russia would certainly have advanced more cautiously and slowly in her hostile move, although she would not have wholly given up her plan, than she has advanced under the shelter of English indifference. The Russians, although unprecedented in the tenacity with which they carry out their plans, are never wont, as history teaches us, to step forward with surprising movements. Like the mole under ground, whose movements are manifested on the surface of the clod, often standing still to gather up its strength for further advance, so the Russians — as, for example, now with regard to Bokhara, whose capture would be only the work of a few hours — are wont to give themselves up to a temporary repose, in order to arrive at their aim with surer success. They do not indeed turn back when they are attacked, but they are more cautious ; and it is this caution which leaves the enemy time to prepare for the encounter which will and must ensue. We have spoken of the forcible entry into Afghanistan — a proceeding which at once brings to the mind of every Englishman ghastly and terrible images — to every Englishman who remembers Lord Auckland's rash ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 1 1 5 policy and its melancholy results. Still I think, with the gifted and clever English writer who has published the best papers on this question in the Friend of India and The Englishman, that it is time no longer to regard this catastrophe, which was rather a consequence of the incapability of the general commanding, or the English inexperience of the country, with the feeling of panic- fear, but with the eye of testing criticism. So much has been already said of the unexampled valour and heroic behaviour of the Afghans, that the world looks upon each individual one as a knight sans peur, though not sans reproche. Yet much, very much is exaggerated. The Afghans are, like the Sikhs, braver than the Ozbegs, the Persians, the Turks, and the Arabs. They arc moun- tain races, accustomed to murder and rapine, trained in labour and privation, averse to luxury and effeminacy; still they are ever Asiatics, who talk of the butchery of days, of Niagara-like cataracts of blood, of heaps of corpses high as Mount Elbrus, of the battle roar, compared with which the thunder is a soft whisper, when, after a fierce contest of days, after an engagement on both sides, no more than a hundred or two hundred bodies cover the field. Konigratz and Magenta, even under Timtir and Djengis, whatever Oriental historians may say, would never have been conceivable in the East, and could never have occurred. The Emir of Bokhara was in Khokand in 1863 with almost 8000 soldiers. The campaign lasted four or five months, and the number of the slain, of those smothered in the tumult, and of those who perished by immoderate tea-drinking, amounted to no more than sixty ! Or is it credible that the Bok- hariots who fell in the recent contests were all killed by 1 1 6 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE the Russian guns ? I would wager that the half perished by flight. Indeed when we ourselves talk of these famous Afghans, who amongst us has seen the battle- fields of the fierce fraternal contest on the Hilmend, where they tell us of a hundred and often of a thousand slain ? The British soldiers who perhaps make so much of Afghan and Sikh valour, in order to cast a halo on themselves, will pardon me if I whisper confidentially in their ear that much in this respect isbosch (nonsense) ; and that if the English policy were compelled to inter- pose by force in Hindostan, Snider rifles and Armstrong cannons would do their duty satisfactorily, if managed by English and not Sepoy hands ; weapons which, in the Afghan campaign of 1839, overcame with astonish- ing ease apparently gigantic difficulties. Afghans are certainly not much better than the Marabuts under Abd-el-Kader, or the Absache and Tchetchenzes under Shamil ; and yet the former were conquered by Frenchmen, and the latter by unskilful Russians. It would therefore now not only be unsuitable, but highly dangerous to exhibit fear. The Northern Colossus, which is gigantic even in its plans, is threatening British India in two directions ; the first, that on the north- west, has formed the subject of our preceding remarks ; the second, that on the north-east, a route comparatively still vaguely dim, passing to India through East Tur- kestan through the Karakorum Pass, we will discuss in the next paper. ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION 1 1/ II. From Bokhara and Khokand, from this comparatively better known and more discussed part of Central Asia, owing to the crowd of recent events, I will now take my readers to a region only scantily mentioned by the ablest geographers — to a region which, even since the visits of the enterprising Venetian Marco Polo and the zealous Catholic brother Goes, has been brought so little nearer the eyes of the West, that a thicker obscurity envelops it as regards ourselves, than prevails over any of the remote parts of Africa or Australia. As the name indicates, this is the eastern part of that region of Asia which was formerly known under the name of Tartary or High Tartary, and which now bears the name of Central Asia or Turkestan. East Turkestan is also called Tartary by many Chinese, because Chinese rule extends over the Tartars there. Formerly it was also named Little Bucharia. In Central Asiatic docu- ments it is often called Alti-Shekr, Alti-Tchakan, the '' Six Cities,'^ or Yiti-Shekr, the " Seven Cities." The oddest thing, however, is that the natives themselves have no special name by which to designate their home. I, at least, have only heard of Kashkarlik, Kashkarians, Yarkendlik, Yarkendians, and others ; and, if I do not mistake, there is no especial denomination in the ordi- nary popular tongue : the before-mentioned European and Asiatic names are at any rate unknown there. Although nameless in itself, this part of Asia, which we will designate by the most suitable name of East Turkestan, is nevertheless of great interest. Surrounded on three sides by lofty, and for the most part snow- 1 18 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE covered mountains, it has m the centre a fathomless plain of sand — namely, the western point of the vast and fearful Gobi Desert. On the north, Turkestan is sepa- rated from Khokand, Russia, and the Chinese province Hi or Dsungaria by the southern branches of the Thien- Shan, or, according to the native dialect, Tengri-Ula (the Celestial Mountain). This boundary is in many parts like a steep rocky wall, rising higher and higher until it reaches the Muzart, which is covered with per- petual snow and ice, at about 42"^ 28' north lat. and 80° 38' east long. On the east, it \s> separated from the wild and unappropriated district of Bedachshan by the Bolurtag (Crystal Mountain), also called Boluttag (Cloud Mountain), and the tableland of Pamir, which is desig- nated in Central Asia as Bamidiinja (the Roof of the World). On this high plateau is the lake Sarikol (Yel- low Lake), in which the bold English traveller Wood discovered the source of the Oxus ; and at the south- eastward runs the lofty mountain range of Pushti-Khar, according to recent English measurement 19,000 feet above the level of the sea. To the south stretches the mountain chain of Kiin-Ltin or Kuen-Lun, some of the peaks of which are known, as Dsing-Lin, Mustak, and Karakorum, and which, according to W. H. Johnson's statement, contains vaster plains, at a height of 17,300 and 16,700 feet, than the less lofty mountain range of the Himalayas. Lastly, on the east, the Gobi Desert, also called the Belikava Desert, forms a barrier, if we may so designate it ; a desert which, in some parts — as, for example, from Karashehr to Turfan and Komul, or from Kultcha to Khoten — is only a field for the most fearful stories of hobgoblins and phantoms, a region to ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 1 19 which just as little attention is given by the natives as the Deshtikuvir in Persia, or similar trccts of land in Turkestan and Arabia. There is a remarkable fabulous story told of three great cities which are said to have stood in the place of the present Khoten, but which sub- sequently were so completely buried by a tremendous sand-storm that at the present day it is only in extra- ordinary storms that some of the buildings appear above the sand. I call this a fabulous story, but that places have been buried under the sand is proved by the suc- cessful excavations which have brought a number of objects to light, a fact frequently mentioned by Mr Johnson. In the nature of its soil East Turkestan is, on a smaller scale, somewhat similar to the present Iran, which like- wise is surrounded on three sides by mountains, and has a large desert in its centre. On the other hand, it is com- paratively more watered and fertile, although not so in- dustriously cultivated as the lands of the King of Persia. From the high mountains, both those on the north as well as on the west and south, flow many brooks, streams, and rivers, frequently wildly swollen by the melting snow from the heights, but rarely, in fact never, dried up. We will not weary our readers with the names of these streams and rivers, because those at present geographi- cally established are in my humble opinion as faulty as possible. The Yarkendian calls the brook flowing through his district the Yarkend-Deryah ; so also the Kashkarian, the Aksuan, and the Khotenian all name the stream after their own town, as is the case in many places in the East, where the same river has a difl'erent name in almost every district • we shall therefore be more distinct and intelli- 1 20 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE gible if we state that the masses of water flowing from the three sides mentioned into the lower basin of the central part of East Turkestan unite into one important river. This river is called the Tarim, which means fer- tility in the language of the country. It falls into the Lopnur — i,e., the Dragon Lake — after having passed through a large tract of barren land. Besides this important river-system, East Turkestan is traversed by a still greater number of artificial and natural canals, called Oestek and Yap in the language of the country, which give extraordinary fertility to the vigorous soil along their banks. Added to this we must mention the favourable climate of the country, which renders it possible for more manifold and more various productions to thrive in a small district than can be cul- tivated in other tracts of land five or six times larger in extent. Whilst in Aksu the winter is rude and severe, and the ground is for three months covered with snow, we find near Yarkend and Khoten a perfectly southern temperature, and rice, cotton, and silk flourish in luxuriant abundance. Vegetation, therefore, although the heights are less woody than in Khokand, is, so far as I can speak from acquired information, more rich and beautiful, as the recent Russian traveller there, Captain Welichanoff, described it to be: the wheat and barley are finer than in Bokhara and ^Khiva. There is a great abundance of fruit and kitchen produce ; and although there is no trade carried on in these articles with the adjacent countries, the fact that the population can recover in an unusually short time from the sore wounds of constant civil war and discord, furnishes the surest testimony to the wealth and fertility of the soil. ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION 1 2 1 Equally little has Turkestan to complain of its animal kingdom, both as regards quality and quantity. Horned cattle are indeed but rare here as elsewhere in Central Asia, but the sheep are the best of their kind ; indeed, the fine Cashmere wool, which we assign to the valleys of the Himalaya, comes from Khoten, Yarkend, and Aksu, from whence — as we learn from a pamphlet recently published by T. D. Forsyth, who, for the sake of making some commercial observations, spent some time on the borders of Cashmere — it is yearly brought, especially from Yarkend, over the Karakorum Pass, to Cashmere, and is there prepared. The horses, although not so beautiful as those of the Turkomans, are strongly built, and are very cheap in the country. They are as much in request for the transport of goods as the camels, which, according to the statement of my former travelling companions, surpass even the famous breeds of Andchoi and Belkh. Lastly, we must also mention the goats, which are larger and stronger here than elsewhere, and about Yarkend are employed as beasts of burden. As regards the mineral kingdom, we have only scanty or vague information ; nevertheless, almost all travellers speak of the abundance of gold, which is obtained not from mines, but from the sandy shores of the rivers. There is reference to this also in Herodotus' fabulous statement of the gold-dust of these regions, which the old Father of History tells us is dug up by ants as large as dogs. There is, besides, much silver, iron, tin, copper, saltpetre, and brimstone ; especially famous, however, is a kind of stone, which is highly valued in China, called by the English yade — ?>., Ya-stone, and by the natives 122 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Yadatashi ; it is considered an antidote to dangerous snakes and scorpions, and is held in high esteem through- out Central Asia, and especially in China. Space fails us here for a more accurate description of the nature of the soil and the products of Turkestan ; yet I had sufficient opportunity, from the prosperity of my travelling companions — all, comparatively speaking, belonging to the lowest class — to infer the wealth of the land. Enthusiastic as these men were as to the excellences of one district or another through which I travelled with them, they allowed, nevertheless, that no tract of land, either in Turkey or in Persia and Central Asia, could dispute the palm with their native country, and both Khokandians and Bokhariots agreed with them. That Turkestan is not more flourishing, under such favourable circumstances, may simply be ascribed to her constant civil wars and unceasing contests with the Chinese sovereign. The places of importance at the present day are Kashgar, the most considerable of the six cities or districts, the presumptive capital of the whole of East Turkestan, containing more than 15,000 houses built of coarse clay, seventeen medresses, several kervan-serails, which in time of peace swarm with Bok- hariots, Khokandians, Afghans, Jews, and people of Cash- mere, who carry on an important trade, but not till after they have, at great expense, gained the necessary privi- leges for so doing from the Chinese magistrates. Kash- gar is less famous for its schools and mosques than for the burial-place of Apak-Khodja, about a mile from the town, over whose remains stands a high dome, covered with blue glazed tiles, in form and size rather like the ANGLO'R U SSI AN FRONTIER Q UES TION. 1 2 3 tomb of Hazreti-Shah-Zinde in Samarkand* It is also famous for its citadel — a structure more dreaded than beloved — which formerly lodged a Chinese gar- rison 5000 men strong, and in which can be had, as my gastronomical friends assured me, not only the strongest lashes, but the best mantuis, a kind of minced meat. The latter is certainly more highly esteemed than the former by the good people of East Turkestan. All round Kashgar there are a great number of villages and small isolated farms, the most important of which are Feizabad and Khanarik. The entire district is uninter- ruptedly well cultivated, and the journey to Yarkend can be made through an unlimited succession of fields and gardens. On the way to Yarkend lies the Yengi- Hisar, called also Yengi-Sheher district, with a capital of the same name, and about 8000 houses (according to Welichanoff). The territory of this province is compa- ratively small, but, nevertheless, it is tolerably well cul- tivated. The town has gained a reputation from the fact that here the best lac is prepared for embellishing saddles; still the inhabitants, owing to their limited mental capacity, hold a very doubtful reputation even among the races of East Turkestan. And this is, indeed, an extraordinary testintonmin faiiperiatis ! From here the way lies to Yarkend, the most popu- lous city in East Turkestan, situated on both banks of a river which rushes by with the speed of an arrow. The town is said to contain about 32,000 houses ; it is the residence of the Chinese and Mohammedan governors. It carries on considerable trade ; among others, a despi- cable slave-trade, which here lies in the hands of the * See my *' Reise in Mittelasien," p. 165. 124 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Bedachshans. These import their goods from the mountainous district of the Kafirs, or Siah-Pushs (the black-dressed), and also from the ranks of the Wacha- vivs^ ; * but, nevertheless, they have acquired an odour of sanctity among the native races. As this place is a main emporium for the trade going on between East Turkestan and Southern Siberia on the one side, and between Cashmere and India on the other, Yarkend may in time, if political affairs should become settled there, grow into a place of commercial importance, as Tashkend has recently done ; for it has enjoyed at all times a reputation of great wealth, just as Kashgar has been known by its intelligence and piety. The important places of the district are Maral- Bashi in the north ; Yularik and Kargalik in the south. Khoten, or Iltchi, as it has recently been called, may be reckoned as the fourth district. It is situated \n the extreme south, and in old times was famous throughout the whole Islam East for its excellent musk. At the present day, it is, however, remarkable for the manu- facture of various silk materials, which are even to be met with in the bazaars at Constantinople ; it is no less distinguished for the Ya-stone before mentioned. The capital contains about 40,000 houses. There is a good bazaar, and on Thursdays a weekly market is held. By the name *^ bazaar," my readers must not imagine anything but an ordinary row of low, clay huts, the roofs of which are fastened with cane-mats ; and they must not imagine streets arched over, only scanty remains of which are to be found in the East of the present day. Equally poor are the fortifications of * Q^ my " Skizzen aus Mittelasien," p. 266, ANGLO'KUSSIAN FRONTIEIi QUESTION. 12$ Khoten, as well as of the other towns of East Turkestan. In Bucharia they are proud if a wall is built twelve or fifteen feet high, of clods of earth three feet broad, inter- mingled with chaff. Walls of this kind are regarded as iron fortresses ; for, in Chinese Tartary, as I have been repeatedly told, no single wall is more than eight feet high and two feet broad. Other places of importance are Kargalik, Baza, Kilian, Bish-Arik, and Melik Shah, all. situated on the road leading over the Karakorum Pass to Cashmere. If my readers, whom I have wearied against my will with Tartar nomenclature, will now accompany me through the desert of Gobi, across the Tarim to the north, they* will arrive at the north-west frontier of Turkestan in the Usch district. The capital is Turfan, more frequently called Usch Turfan. This capital is no better than a poor village of 4000 or 5000 houses ; famous for its excellent tobacco, for its extensive pas- tures, and perhaps also for the historical fact that in 1765, during a revolt, all the inhabitants were massacred by the Chinese. The eastern boundary is formed by the rich, large, and important province of Aksu, with its capital of the same name, in which a lively trade is carried on with southern Russia over the Thien-Shan IVTountains. Here the caravans yearly meet on their way to Kizil-Djar (Petropawloffsk) and Pulad (Semi- palatinsk). They are far larger, especially the spring caravans, than those of Tashkend, as this road is used for all the demand for Russian productions not only in East Turkestan, but even in Cashmere and Thibet. Aksu also prides itself not a little on its learning and piety. My great friend, Hadji-Bilal, who is not 126 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE unknown to the readers of my ^* Relse in Mittelasien," estimated the number of the eager students of the Koran by thousands, and often boasted that in the six- teen mosques of his native city there were more prayers offered than in the two hundred mosques of Constan- tinople, which is already becoming half apostate. Like every other place, Aksu also has its speciality ; here it is excellent grease, good bread, and the strikingly low value in which women are held. This does not astonish me, for the industrious and busy inhabitants of this province are famous for the fact that two-thirds of their offspring are always female, and only one-third male ; and, moreover, the women are strikingly deficient in physical charms. Many people, as, for example, the above-mentioned Welichanoff, are accustomed to reckon the provinces Bai, Sairam, and Kutche as belonging to Aksu, thus rounding off the territory of the Six Cities ; yet this seems to me rather a geographical idea than an actually existing distribution. The present inhabitants of East Turkestan will no longer recognise the expression Alti- Shehr, for, according to their statement, the three last- mentioned places, as well as the more easterly dis- tricts of Karashehr, Turfan, and Komul — in a word, the whole of the Celestial Empire which the Chinese desig- nate as one province by the name of Thien-Shan-Nan- Lu — belong to their native land ; and were it not that the communication eastwards is impeded by strict political measures, we should annually meet with as many Komulians, Karashehrians, and Turfanians on the pilgrims' route to Mecca, as is the case among the inhabitants of the first-mentioned six provinces, who are ANGLOR USSIAN FRONTIER Q UES T/OiV. 12/ firmly attached to the great Islam body in West Turice- stan. So, as matters now are, or rather, to speak more correctly, as they were at the time of my travels in Central Asia, only a few East Turkestanians had ven- tured, or even can venture, to penetrate to Komul ; still my ever- restless friend, Hadji-Bilal was there, and he told me that the whole tract of land of forty days' journey was thickly peopled and cultivated, so that in a journey of more than a month, few days elapsed on which the traveller could not offer prayer in a regularly- built mosque, or in one raised on terraces on the high- way. It is a remarkable fact, communicated to me on good authority, that the Komulians, on their pilgrimages to the Mussulman west, either travel through the pro- vinces of Shen-Si and Hu-Peh to Canton, therefore without touching Peking, or through Thibet and India — so strictly is all intercourse with the Western brethren of the faith forbidden. This little sketch of East Turkestan would certainly be still more incomplete than it already is if we did not mention the routes by which this part of Central Asia communicates with the adjacent lands. These routes run in four different directions to all the four quarters of the heavens. The route leading to Bokhara or to the west generally, passes through Kash- gar, across the Terek Pass to Osch, and thence to Khokand. This is a very old, almost the oldest road, by which the inhabitants of the Celestial Empire had intercourse with Western Asia and with Europe by land. Here those silk goods and articles of luxury were transported which were sent to Rome, and which excited to such a great extent the indignation of the 128 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE philosophers on the banks of the Tiber. This highway also, comparatively speaking, is the safest and the easiest. It is usually traversed in sixteen days, and the time would certainly have been considerably shorter if some narrow and slippery mountain roads on the steep' declivities of the Terek Pass did not impede com- munication ; for although the predatory Karakirghises abound in these districts, it is very rarely that we hear of acts of violence committed on caravans. Southward from this Terek highway there is a road leading from Samarkand to Kashgar, which, passing through Wachan, Bedachshan, and Khulm, to the northern point of the Pamir plateau, is half as short again as the road from Samarkand through Khokand to East Turkestan. As I am informed by eye-witnesses, nothing but the before-mentioned predatory nomads prevent this shorter way from being used ; yet this seems to me to be a mistake. The road through Bedachshan to the Oxus was never a frequented one ; not in consequence of the predatory nomadic tribes, but far rather on account of the lofty, steep, and in- accessible heights of the Bolur mountain.* There are two great highways in the north: — one passes through Aksu eastward from the lake Issikkol to Kizil-Djar (Petropawloffsk) and is taken chiefly by caravans proceeding to Russia ; it is, moreover, the favourite route of all those pilgrims who intend to halt among the Nogai-Tartars on their way to Constan- tinople. * My opinion on this point has recently been refuted by the personal experiences of the Yarkend traveller, Mr Shaw. Mr Shaw asserts that the road through Tchitral to Yarkend may be indeed a circuitous one, but it is far more practicable than any other route whatever across the Kuen-Lun. ANGLChRUSSIAN FRONTIEIi QUESTION. 1 29 From Aksu, besides this road, there is another towards the right to the province of Hi, and to its capital, Kultsha ; but this is chiefly used by Chinese and by the Tarandjis settled there. From one point to the other it measures about 417 English miles; it passes, however, through the most mountainous part of the Thien-Shan mountain, across the ridge Muzart, famous for its high glaciers. This is one highway in the north ; the other, likewise frequented by Chinese and Mongols, leads from Komul through Turfan and Ur- umtchi to Dsungaria. In the Middle Ages this Urumtchi, at that time called Bischbalik, was a place of great importance, and the eastern capital of the Khanate of Tchagatai. At the present day it is famous only for its strong Chinese garrison, its great tea emporium, and the great horse- market. If we turn towards the south, Cashmere and India can be reached from two different points ; namely, from Yarkend, as well as from Khoten, across the Kuen- Lun mountain through the Karakorum Pass. The former road, namely, the Yarkend, is the most frequented, although the cold is often insufferable on the heights of the pass mentioned. In fact, an Englishman, Mr John- son, never ventured to sleep on his way to Khoten in November ; and he tells us that he rode for a long time in the morning sun with his head covered with icicles. The other, namely, the Khoten road, joins the former only on the banks of the Karakash, and so far it is also tolerably safe. From thence to the foot of the mountain, the traveller is much exposed to the predatory nomads. These, if I mistake not, are the Karakirghises, who in a remarkable manner extend their excursions as far as I 130 • CENTRAL ASIA AND THE the south- easterly point of Turkestan. The inhabi- tants of East Turkestan, especially the pilgrims and merchants, for the most part take the road past Yarkend to Leh, the chief place in Ladak or Central Thibet ; and although the accounts of moving plains and hills, which have hurled whole caravans into deep mountain abysses, of benumbing cold, and other things, alarm travellers, still the Yarkend-Kilan and Karakorum route is the most frequented, and is traversed in twenty-five or thirty days, while that leading to Khoten, although much shorter, is comparatively less used. Recently, however, the way through the Tchang-, Tchenmo Pass has taken the place of all former ones, although this is also not practicable at all seasons of the year. It begins at Leh in Ladak, passes through the Masimik Pass (18,784 ft), the Tchang-Tchenmo Pass (17,501 ft), and the Tchang-Lang Pass (18,839 ft-)» across the lofty plain of Lingsi Teng (17,164 ft), with its chilly winds ; it then takes a north-westerly direction to Tchong-Tasch, from whence the traveller can proceed in a straight line across the Dipsikul to ShaduUa, the southern boundary of East Turkestan, arriving there far more rapidly than by any of the ways known hitherto. From Shadulla (11,951 ft.) there is of course still a very difficult road to the plain of East Turkestan, yet this . route is increasingly taken in consequence of the favour with which the English regard it. The eastern road, that to Peking, has been already mentioned in my " Reise in Mittelasien," p. 318. The traffic on it was never very lively, if we except the tea- caravans, which repair from the middle of the Celestial Empire to East Turkestan, and the transmission of ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 1 3 I troops ; but at the present time, since the outbreak of the revolution in these districts, it has wholly ceased. As regards the present inhabitants of East Turkestan or Chinese Tartary,we must preface their characterisation with the remark, that they are undoubtedly the descend- ants of that part of the great Turkish race which distin- guished itself earliest above the other races by a poli- tical life and by pure Turkish social relations ; in short, that they are the remains of the oldest Turkish race in the world. This East Turkestan — that part which stretches from the Chinese province of Kansu, that is, from Yu-Tchou, the most western portion of the Chinese wall, to the eastern edge of the Pamir plateau — has been inhabited by Turks from time immemorial, at any rate as far back as historical records take us. Western Europe was first acquainted with them through the Nestorian mission- aries, who repaired hither in the second century after Christ. Subsequently, that is, in the time of the French traveller Rubruquis, they were first called Uigurs ; but this is not their correct denomination. They were Uigurs, because they belonged to the Uigurian race of the Turks, which is still in existence ; yet they called themselves Turks ; their language was the Turkish dia- lect, and the name Uigur is as little to be found in their documents as the special denomination of the nation, as any other branch or family designation of the Ozbegs is to be met with when the entire Ozbeg or Turkish race is in question. It does not belong to my present task to examine the statements of my learned predecessor on this subject, the gifted author of ''Western China" {Edinburgh Review , April 1868), who considers the 132 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Uigurs to speak the Chinese language. It is sufficient to mention that the Uigurs have played a very remark- able part in the history of the civilisation of Central Asia, and perhaps for this reason are not wholly unwor- thy of the attention which I have bestowed on them in my work, " Uigurische Sprachmonumente und das Kudatku Bilik." The influence of their culture has asserted itself from the beginning of our era to the appearance of Djengis Khan — on the one side, in the north, far into the Mongolian steppes ; and on the other side, to the east, to the banks of the Zerefshan. The first Christian missionaries found them zealous followers of the doctrine of Buddha, which, from their vicinity to Thibet, that old seat of the Buddhist religion, they had re- ceived unalloyed. Subsequently, Christianity also made considerable advances among them ; for, as the learned Colonel Yule informs us, there was in Kashimgar, probably the Kashgar of the present day, even in the fourteenth century a bishopric of the Nestorian Church, which sounds all the more strangely, as the Arabs made no small merit of having converted this region only by the flash of Kuteibe's sword. The most important traces of the civilising influence of the Uigurs were to be perceived among the Mongols. After Djengis Khan united their separated olosse (races) into one nation, they adopted the written characters of the Uigurs. Uigurian writers and accountants were placed in all parts of the gigantic empire ; indeed, even in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when the Uigurs had ceased to exist as a nation, their language and written characters remained as eloquent monuments of past culture, not only in their old home, Turkestan, but ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 1 33 as far as the shores of the Sea of Azov and the Crimea ; indeed, among all the Turkish races acquainted with the art of writing, except the Osmanlis and Azabeidshanians. They never seem to have formed a great independent power, so far as we can give credence to historical tradi- tion. Even before the time of Djengis, it was only the prestige of their past that preserved their importance, and subsequently this also vanished. The original inha- bitants of East Turkestan became so intermingled in language and physiognomy, owing to new-comers from West Turkestan and from kindred nomadic races, such as the Kirghises and the Kasaks, and, on the other side, by affinity with their Persian Mohammedan neighbours, the Sarts, that, in the place of the old original Turkish or Uigurian characteristics, we find those general Turke- stan marks which belong to all the inhabitants of pre- sent Turkestan. At the present day, therefore, the difference between the inhabitants of the Six Cities and those of the rest of Turkestan may be traced to the following points. For want of special physiognomical characteristics, we shall divide the inhabitants of East Turkestan into north and south. The northern races, those of the Aksu and Usch- Turfan provinces, are smaller but broader of stature, and have strikingly Kirghese features, especially exhi- bited in their small, fiery eyes ; while the southern races, those of Yarkend and Khoten, although plainly betray- ing the Mongol type, yet in their slender stature and black complexion and hair exhibit unmistakably the influence of a southern climate, or perhaps more justly that Cashmere-Mohammedan influence which has ex- isted there at all times. 134 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Their attire is in the fashion, but in the old fashion of Bokhara, with strikingly clumsy over-garments, somewhat like wadded smockfrocks, which are made of linen and cotton. They wear large, awkward boots, and the only mark of their East Turkestan costume is a fur cap with a turned-up brim, rather like that which now forms a part of the Hungarian gala dress, and which we see on the petrified heads of Huns still found in Switzerland. Blue is hated by them as a colour which is worn by the Kafirs (the unbelievers), that is, by the Mandju Chi- nese magistrates and garrisons. Their food is the same as in the other parts of Central Asia, with a slight addi- tion of Chinese dishes. Their drink consists exclusively of green and black tea ; spirituous liquors, although imported from Khokand, are only consumed there by Khokandians and Cashmerians. With regard to character, the East Turkestan people — I mean that part of the population speaking Turkish — are strikingly simple, and it would be difficult, looking at a Turfanian, Kashgarian, or Aksuan, to imagine that these are the descendants of the most civilised Turkish race in, antiquity. In fact, from the heavy rule of the Chinese, which has burdened them for centuries, they are intellectually more crippled than the wild nomad races on the steppes. Their religious feeling is far stronger, and certainly deeper, than in other parts of Central Asia. Khodjas (descendants of the Prophet), even if they have com- mitted the most disgraceful crimes, are honoured as holy, and are half deified, as we shall subsequently have occasion to see ; and touching was the description which my Aksu friend gave of the reception of the first Muy- ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION I35 mubarek (sacred hair from Mahomet's beard) which arrived at Aksu. The poor believers, without taking- food or drink, remained praying for hours, and even days, before the receptacle of the relic, although it may easily have fared with them as with other Turkestanians, and they have been made game of by some swindler return- ing from the West, who passed off a hair from some grey ass as a hair of the Prophet* This religious fanaticism evidences itself in every part of their social and domestic life ; and my readers will be able to understand something of the Mohammedan zeal of the East Turkestanians when I tell them, that not only Constantinople, Mecca, Damascus, Sec, but even Bokhara and Khokand are no longer regarded by the present devotees of Kashgar as the pure fountain of Islamism. Besides the religious zeal and the before- mentiored simplicity of the East Turkestanians, we must mention their remarkable cowardice — a cowardice which is alway^s a consequence of long-suffered tyranny, but which cppears nowhere in such glaring colours as among the inhibitants of the Six Cities. Next to the natives of Turkestan, the Tongens or Tunganis, as they are erroneously called, occupy the most conspicuous place. These Tongens, in their origin their language, and their physiognomy, are Chinese, but in religion they are Mohammedans ; and having had much to endure from the Chinese magi- strates in consequence of their apostasy from the * Tte true tokens of the genuine hairs of the Prophet are, that they cast no shdow if held in the light, and that as soon as the words "Allah Ekber" are thrice repeated before them, they make of their own accord a most himble reverence. 136 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE doctrines of Kon-Fut-Tse, they cherish the bitterest hatred both against their Chinese brethren and the Mandju population of their province. Their home is in the province of Kansu and in a few parts of Dsungaria. The former they inhabit in masses ; in the latter they appear sporadically, although considerable colonies of them are to be found in the Six Cities. According to the statement of my Kashgar friends, these Tongens * were converted in the time of Timur ; others assign their conversion to an earlier period ; others, agkin, think that the introduction of Islamism proceedec^ from the southern province of Yunnan and Setchuen tpwards the north. ! Be that as it may, the Tongens remain a remark- able member of the great Islam body ; they profess themselves mostly as belonging to the sect pf the Shafeis, which has only a few adherents amcng the Western Islamites ; and though they are ony dis- tinguished from the Chinese by the growth of the mustache and the generally scanty beard, stij they feel themselves greatly offended if they are eter re- garded as true sons of the Celestial Empire ; for they assert that the Nul-ul-Islam (correctly Nur-ul-IsUm, the light of Islam) should be at once discovered on their countenances, and their Arabian descent f shouli be * Hence the name Tongen (the converted), from Tong-mek (to coi So also in the Osmanli dialect, Donme — a renegade according o our notions. The word Tungani, used recently in Europe, is a corrupion of the original word, caused both by the Russians and the Tadjik, who have no " o " in their language. + Similar claims to Arabian origin are also advanced by the Qinese Mohammedans in the provinces of Yiinnan and Setchuen, by thelTad- jiks in Central Asia, and by some of the Circassian races. ■ ivert). ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 1 37 at once guessed in spite of their snub noses and slanting eyes. That, with the remarkable indolence of the religious feelings of the Chinese, their apostate brethren the Tongens should be prosecuted by the usually tolerant Government, is only to be explained by the fact that these members, separated from the great body of the Chinese nation, adhere firmly together, and, from their industry and sobriety, enjoy a far better state of pros- perity than the opium-eating Chinese and the lazy Mand- jus. The Tongens have given considerable sums to pious institutions, not only in the Six Cities and in some places in the provinces of Shen-Si and Kansu, but also in Mecca and Medina, without the local authorities in these towns having been informed of the Chinese origin of the dispensers ; for most curiously all Tongens are regarded in Turkey as Cashmerians, while the Moham- medans of Yunnan and Setchuen parade at the tomb of the Prophet as true Chinese without pigtails, though with long hair. Nevertheless it is a curious fact that they do not stand on the most intimate footing with the East Turkestanians ; indeed, intermarriages rarely take place between them. The reason of this, however, rests with the T5ngens themselves ; for as the hired soldiers of the Chinese governors, they have made themselves hated by their brethren both in creed and race. Beside their strict adherence to Mohammedanism, the Tongens are known by their honesty in trading with the Russians, who are glad to make use of them in their transactions with the native Mandjus or Chinese. Small in number, but of importance in the commercial. 138 -CENTRAL ASIA AND THE > social, and religious affairs of East Turkestan, are the Sarts — a race with which the readers of my " Reise " and of my "Skizzen aus Mittelasien " are already acquainted. The word Sart, as I lately discovered from a manu- script, signified *' merchant " even in the time of the Uigurs ; this denomination, therefore, was applied to Persians of Central Asia who were engaged in trade. Just as in ancient times Persian thirst for gain drove the inhabitants of East Iran among the warlike and predatory Turks, so is it still at the present day. The Tadjik or Sart thinks of no danger, no distance. He is to be met with everywhere where trade promises him gain ; from Salar (the chief city of the province of Kansu) to the remotest north among the Mongols and Kalmucks in East Turkestan. The Cashmere race furnish a considerable contingent to the population of Yarkend, and are to be found in no small number in Kashgar and Khoten. The people of Kabul, only a few of whom live in the kervan-serails at Kashgar, Yarkend, and Khoten, are no longer so enterprising as they were, and rarely come in contact with Aksu and Turfan, A retrospective glance at the past history of the Six Cities, of the Uigurs, and the adjacent Dsungaria, presents a lamentable succession of internal confusion, disputes, and attacks on the part of the Chinese, the Mandjus, the Kalmucks, and occasionally also of the Kirghises and the Khokandians. We will give a hasty sketch of these historical reminiscences of East Turke- stan, because it is indispensable to the understanding of the state of things at the present day. In the time of the Uigurs — and by this we mean the ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 1 39 period about 600 years after our era — the western part of East Turkestan, ?>., the Six Cities, stood chiefly under national rule, acknowledging as temporary suzerain either the Chinese Emperor or the princes of the Dsun- garians ; they professed partly Buddhism and partly the Christian religion, which had been introduced there by the Nestorians. In the ninth century Mohammedan emissaries made their way into East Turkestan, amongst whom Sheik-Hassan-Basri and Eban-Nassar-Samain are the most famous, and they contrived to procure a firm footing for their doctrines even at that time in Kashgar. These were carried by force in 105 1 by Bokra-Khan into the eastern districts of Turfan and Komul; and although Togluk-Timur-Khan, a Djengis- ide, embraced Islamism in 1376, and compelled several Mongolians as well as Uigurs to follow his example, it was not till the sixteenth century that Islamism obtained a complete victory over Buddhism. From that time East Turkestan became ever more and more the seat of that extravagant Mohammedan religious zeal which spread itself from Bokhara over the whole of Asia. As is the case everywhere, the saints had here also only worldly interests in view. Apak-Khodja, however, by his disputes, soon drew Galdan, the chief of the Dsungarian Kalmucks, into the quarrel. In the year 1678 the latter conquered East Turkestan, and placed Apak, with sovereign power, upon the throne. Yet the way was thus opened to foreign interference. The con- test between Kalmucks, Mongolians, and Kashgarians lasted long, until at length the powerful Chinese inter- fered, and took both Dsungaria and East Turkestan into their possession. 140 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE It is readily conceivable that, after the Chinese con- quest, those princely saints, the Khodjas, were obliged, as chief causers of the constant disputes of the Six Cities, to flee to Khokand ; still they considered their sojourn there only as temporary, and they were always en- deavouring to recover their lost power by making attacks on the Chinese territory, supported partly by the Khokand people and partly by the rulers of Khokand and Bokhara. It would be unnecessary to describe the series of contests which these intruders carried on against the Chinese, at the head of the war-and-plunder-loving races of Central Asia. Scarcely did the barometer of Chinese influence begin to fall, than the Khodjas appeared ; and scarcely had it risen again, than the Khodjas, hardly allowing themselves time to collect their treasures, took to flight. The last inroad of im- portance took place in 1825, under the direction of a certain Djihangir-Khodja, who attacked the Chinese with much success, made the whole of East Turkestan independent, and is said to have commanded an army of more than 200,000 men. In spite of this he was overcome by the Chinese, who attacked him with a con- siderable force ; he was taken prisoner, and put to death with great cruelty at Peking as a traitor. After him, Welichan-Tore revolted. His rule, which did not last long, is held to us in sad remembrance from the fact that the brave German traveller Adolf Schlagintweit fell a victim to his barbarity, and his head was placed as an ornament on a hill of skulls. This bloodthirsty libertine soon made himself so hated by his unprecedented cruelty, that the freed inhabitants of East Turkestan longed for their former masters, the ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. I4I Chinese. In the year 1858 everything was again in its former order ; and although a small part of the inhabi- tants of the Six Cities preferred the Chinese yoke to the Khodja disputes, the great mass were nevertheless eager for perfect freedom. Stimulated by Bokhara and Khokand, negotiations were constantly going on with the predatory adventurers of Khokand, in spite of the strict severity of the Chinese police. In the beginning of the year 1861, two high Chinese Mohammedan officers, and a great number of the people of East Turkestan, fell victims to the political intrigues. In Kashgar, several members of the Apak family were thrown into prison, which of course led to still greater exasperation, and increased the longing looks directed to Mergolan and Namengan. This was the state of political matters in East Turke- stan when the smothered fire of revenge, fired by events in the neighbouring provinces and countries, burst anew into a flame. In the west, the restless Khodja ele- ments had found opportunity enough in the disputes of Khudajar-Khan with the Kiptchaks in Khokand on the one side, and in the war of Khokand with Bokhara and Russia on the other, to arm themselves secretly, and to gather together a considerable number of freebooters, adventurers, and booty-loving fanatics, partly from the warlike Kiptchaks, and partly from the cities of Na- mengan, Mergolan, and Osch. With these adherents not only Buzurg-Khan, the son of that Djihangir- Khan executed in Persia, but also many other Seids thirsting for Djihads (religious wars), waited for some time on the frontier, watching the first opportunity for surprising Kashgar, and for beginning the often- 142 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE attempted task of expelling the Chinese, and of estab- lishing a dominion of a few months' duration. It is remarkable that these plans, which were forbidden even in Khokand, in consequence of a treaty with the Chinese authorities, and were therefore kept secret, penetrated, notwithstanding, borne by the telegraphic current of voluble Hadji tongues, as far as Samar- kand, where my travelling companions from East Turkestan related them to each other with percepti- ble consternation. Indeed Hadji-Bilal was of opinion that affairs in his home had assumed such a form that he would not long remain watching the impending disputes in his native city, but that in the following spring he would start on a second pilgrimage through Yarkend and India. I recall this accurately to mind. The fears of my friend were not groundless; they were realised, not in the course of the same winter, but in the following spring, and this not through Kho- kand and the Khodjas, but from a totally unexpected direction. That the Taiping revolution in China would penetrate into all the veins of the gigantic and feeble body of the Ce- lestial Empire, and leave behind in many places traces of dangerous excitement, was to be foreseen from the first ; and it was still more confirmed when the bold navigators of the Yang-tse-Kiang — I mean Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Sarel, Dr Alfred Barton, and Captain Thomas Blakiston — after having advanced with indescribable difficulty as far as Ping-Shan, were obliged to give up their pro- posed plan of travelling through the province of Yunnan, through Burmah to China, because both Setchuen and Yunnan, being full of revolutionary unrestraint, forbid ANGLChRUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. I43 all passage through them. Just as the raging storm in the midst of the ocean is only evidenced on the shore by a succession of billows, so the revolutions which are taking place in the interior of China are only manifested by the outbreaks which meet our eye in the frontier lands. The spies of the Viceroy of India have pro- bably long heard in the bazaars in the towns of Nepaul and Burmah of the revolt of the Mohammedan Chinese in Yunnan, yet they could know nothing for certain until a proclamation of the newly-elected Sultan, which was circulated in Lhassa, fell into their hands. In this document, drawn up in Arabic, the same style prevails in which the tidings of the victories of a Sultan Selim, of a Mohammed II., and of a Shah Thamasp, were pro- claimed. As the author of the article " Western China" informs us, it is written in excellent Arabic ; the Sultan calls himself as just as Abu-Bekr and as brave as AH, and announces the immediate overthrow of the idola- trous Chinese power. How much reality there may be in this bombast, any one can readily guess who is even slightly acquainted with the Eastern mode of expression. It is, moreover, not our task to speak of the power and character, and of the accomplishment of the plans of the Mohammedan ruler in Tali-fu who calls himself Soliman, but who is called Tuventsen by the Chinese. How long he will carry them on it is difficult to foresee ; but one fact speaks in his favour, namely, that he has now survived the twelfth year of his independence of Peking. This independence has on the one side greatly injured the English, as it has almost entirely impeded the trade which was carried on with China through Mandelay and 144 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Bamu, and along the Irawaddi through Yunnan ; it has injured Russia also, who, by a roundabout way through Siberia and Peking, exported Russian cloth to Mandelay. It has been, however, most injurious to China herself, as the flames of rebellion not only spread over a number of provinces, but the dangerous spark being scattered in the extreme west of the Celestial Empire, caused a conflagration, by which the weakened but still selfish Chinese were to lose the province of East Turkestan and Hi, not for a short period, as had formerly been the case, but for ever. The tidings of the victory of the insurrectionary Mohammedan inhabitants in Yiinnan and Setchuen could not remain a secret to the Tongens in the north. As they had never been contented with the Mandju Government, but had always been a thorn in the eye of the Chinese, the victories of the Taipings were likely to fill them with malicious delight at the losses of the ruling dynasty. The heart of the fanatical Tongens beat quickly, therefore, when they got a sight of the before-mentioned proclamation of the Sultan of Yunnan, for that they did get a sight of it cannot be doubted ; reports find their way everywhere — in Europe, by rail- roads and telegraphs — in China, after Chinese fashion. I am, therefore, in nowise inclined to ascribe the first outbreak in Singan-fu, the capital of the Shen-si pro- vince, in the year 1862, altogether to a dispute which took place between a Tongen and a Mandju mer- chant. The germ, the strong germ, of discontent was there ; the Government, severely weakened on the one side by Taiping, Yunnan, and Nien-fu rebellions, and on the other by the Anglo-French invasion, was not to be ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION I45 dreaded. The revolt of the Tongens increased to an astonishing extent ; it advanced towards Kansu, where a certain Sochum-Djan, in Salar, placed himself at its head, proclaimed a religious war, and, with the utmost severity towards his own people, began the bitterest contest against the hated and idolatrous Chinese. A communism, such as certainly had not existed at the time of the first beginning of Islamism, was introduced : all goods and chattels, all gain and booty, were held in common ; strict laws against rapine, theft, and other crimes were instituted ; Buddhist temples were laid even with the ground ; Buddha worshippers were compelled to profess Islamism, and to efface every trace of their Chinese origin ; even the Chinese costume was exchanged for the Bokhariot. It is therefore not surprising that in this state of things Chinese troops, even those which were 40,000 men strong, could effect nothing against the insurgents. Holding the town of Salar or Sutchau in possession, the stream of revolt surged over Komul, Urumtchi, and as far as Dsungaria. In these places the garrison was fortunately formed by almost 60,000 Tongens, whose valour was never doubted by the Mandju authorities. In Urumtchi the mercenaries soon made common cause with their brethren in the faith, compelled the Sarts there to join their party, killed the whole Mandju population, and after the unhappy town had been utterly reduced to ashes, owing to an accidental fire, they ad- vanced forwards in two columns, one of which marched to the north-west, and the other to the south-west. The Tongen insurgents proceeding to the north- west, made a rich capture of artillery guns on their 146 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE way through Kirkara-su ; and their success in the pro- vince of Hi, in taking from the Chinese the two chief towns of Kuldja and Tchugutchak, of which Kuldja especially, according to the statements of Radloff, was inhabited principally by merchants, simple artisans, and a great number of Imams and Mollas, must be ascribed chiefly to those 6000 Tartar families who, sepa- rated from their race in the Six Cities, and living here under Buddhist elements, among Kalmucks and Chinese, did not, of course, idly look on at the invasion of their brethren in the faith ; but, indeed, as we are told, joined them with every man capable of bearing arms. The contest also drew into its vortex the neighbouring nomad races, such as the Kalmucks and Kirghises, who had always entertained hostile feelings to each other ; and as the former are considerably the superior in number in those districts, their appearance produced a most fearful slaughter among the Kirghises. All the cattle and the entire booty were moved to Tchugut- chak, and nothing was left behind on the steppes but 1500 dogs, which, feeding on the corpses of their own masters, were subsequently, in their want of food, so dangerous to travellers in these districts, that a mountain- way there, according to the statement of the Russian district overseer, was not safe for a solitary horseman. After the changeful fortunes of battle, both citadels, with their garrisons, fell at length into the hands of the Tongens ; and although they suffered some defeats in the East from the Chinese troops sent from Peking, and lost the town of Komul, the whole of Dsungaria is nevertheless at the present day under their dominion. Whether they can long hold out against the wariike ANGLORUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. I47 inclinations of the nomads of that district, and still more against the Russian authorities, who in their present position in Fort Wernoe, and indeed along the whole chain of the Ala-Tau Mountains, are watching oppor- tunity for intervention, the future will decide. The revolt has produced a transformation of things in East Turkestan, and by it the Six Cities have probably been lost for ever to the Chinese. The division of Tongen insurgents proceeding from Urumtchi to the south-west, had scarcely reached Kuld- ja, when the Mohammedan population joined them, and slaughtered the small minority of Chinese living there. A Khodja, enveloped in the odour of sanctity, was placed at the head of affairs — a matter of course among the Chinese Tartars, as in their eyes the Khod- jas were workers of miracles, and indeed demi-gods whose superhuman powers could be doubted by none. The name of the Kuldja prince is Rashid-ed-Din. Under his direction the towns of Aksu, Osh-Turfan, and Lai-Mesdjid were taken ; and although the Chinese in the capitals of Yarkend and Kashgar, informed of the approaching storm, did not delay to take the necessary measures for defence, they could not defend themselves against the ever-increasing flames of revolt. The mis- fortune for the Chinese commandants of these places was, as usual, that their soldiers consisted exclusively of Tongens, from whom, instead of succour, they feared their own destruction ; and even when here and there, as in Khoten and Kashgar, the attempt was made to remove them by treachery, the Tartar inhabitants, usually so pacific, encouraged by the distant cry of victory from their brethren in the faith, had nevertheless energy 148 CENTRAL ASIA AND. THE enough to fall upon their foreign rulers and to annihilate them. It is true the author of ** Western China," whom we have often quoted, tells us that Rashid-ed-Din- Khodja, with 7000 horse and 250 guns, hastened to the assistance of the oppressed Yarkendians ; yet I am of opinion that the catastrophe occurred in . all these places without any succour of the kind, for the con- fusion of the Chinese magistrates at every outbreak of the repeated contests in East Turkestan was only equalled by the exasperated fury of the Mohammedans, which, like a lighted straw, flamed up high at first, but was as speedily extinguished. Will this be the case even now ? Will the Chinese once again become masters of the Terek Pass ? That is the question which is of interest to us, and which we must discuss for a few moments. Intentionally avoiding the details of the contest in Kashgar, Yarkend, and Khoten, we cannot forbear recalling the name Buzurg-Khan-Khodja to the re- membrance of our readers. This debauchee, with whose servants I travelled for several months, needed only to show himself in Kashgar in the spring of the year 1864, with five hundred horse, for the most part Kirghises and Kiptchaks, in order to induce the popu- lation to besiege, under his direction, the strongly- fortified citadel. The siege lasted a year. Buzurg-Khan meanwhile occupied himself more with the conquest of yielding female hearts, than with the taking of the citadel. Aware of the great consequence to the people of East Turkestan to ally themselves with a Khodja, and, ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION I49 yet desirous to withdraw from the slightest semblance of the cares of government, he surrendered the reins of power entirely into the hands of his Kushbegi (vizier) — a Kushbegi whom he had received at the beginning of his undertaking as an available servant from the Kiptchak chief Alem-Kul, and as such he really proved himself The Kushbegi, by name Yakub-Beg, now of course Yakub-Padishah, is of Persian descent — i.e.^ in the Turkish language a Sart, as is customary throughout Central Asia in appointments in which the knowledge of writing is a conditio sine qua non. His birthplace was Pishad, m the Kurama district, in Khokand ; and as he possesses the cunning, the mental activity, the energy, and the perseverance of his race in a high degree, it was an easy matter for him, under the rule of Mehemed- Ali, to raise himself in a short time from the position of an ordinary secretary, or rather accountant, to that of a Divandji (head receiver of customs). In the year 1847 he was governor in Ak-Mesdjid, the Fort Peroffsky of the present day, where he entered into forbidden transactions with the Russians, and ceded to the Russians a lake situated near this fort, named Balik- Kol (Fish Lake), for the sum of 12,000 tillah, =^7800 sterling. He was subsequently appointed Ponsad by Alem-Kul — a military rank, combined with the supreme command of five hundred men. In this capacity he was sent to Buzurg-Khan. Buzurg-Khan made him his vizier. So long as the field was uncertain, and the means for obtaining dominion were scanty, he contented himself with this rank ; yet scarcely had he learned the extent of the devotion felt by the East Turkestan people for 150 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE the affairs of Buziirg-Khan, than, gaming over to his side the chief of the Apakian family, he speedily con- vinced the whole Molla world of Kashgar of the sinful conduct of their favourite, and saying, like Nadir Shah, " What, then, becomes of me ?" he plotted in the face of his master with such success that the people of Kashgar, perhaps also compelled by the threatening position of the cunning Sart, deified the new leader, completely let fall Buzurg-Khan, and placed the Kushbegi in his stead at the head of affairs. Yakub-Padishah, who at the very first would suffer no rival far or near, after he had felt himself tolerably established in Kashgar and the separate rebel divisions had gained successes over Chinese supremacy, had nothing to do but to attack in order to place himself at the head of everything. He first attacked Yarkend. The inhabitants of the city were divided into three different parties. One, the most powerful, consisted of Tongens, who, after the extir- pation of the Chinese, had retained for themselves the Chinese citadel, which they had before occupied as the garrison of the Emperor of Peking, and by their mihtary superiority they stood rather in the way of the others. The second party consisted of Mohammedans from Cashmere, who had come hither to settle themselves from the territory of Maharadja- Golab- Sing (Prince of Kashgar), and who constituted a consifderable por- tion of the Yarkend population. Lastly, there was a third party — namely, Khokand fugitives and Khodjas, who had come hither from Kashgar. This was the one which was joined by Yakub-Padishah. The contest was long; but in 1866 Yakub took Yarkend from the Tongens, and added this important town to his possessions. ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 1 5 I Of course these constant advances in power and greatness were not made without recourse to some dishonourable means. Wearied, probably, of despatch- ing military forces and money subsidies, Yakub-Padi- shah proposed to bring over to his side, by cunning, the southern town of Khoten, which was comparatively weak. At that time, in 1865, a certain Habib-Ulah was ruling there — a jnan who, under the Chinese, had held the post of Kazi-Kelan (head Kadi), and who after their expulsion had exchanged the highest hierarchical dignity for the highest political position. When Johnson, an oflficer of the Indian Trigonometrical Survey, visited him, he was an old man of eighty years of age, of a tall and noble figure, fine complexion, and of a somewhat imposing appearance, with his silk upper garment and Asiatic turban. Having in his earlier years visited the sacred places of Islam, and therefore become a Hadji, he had had opportunity on his journeys to become acquainted with English government and Eng- lish order. He expressly remarked to the above- mentioned English officer, that the inhabitants of India were far happier than the other subjects of any kingdom whatever, and were not to be compared with those of Russia, who were tortured by cruel functionaries, and were compelled to perform military service in the re- mote distance. That the good old man placed at that time great hopes upon an alliance with England, and wished ardently to bring it about, is a plain proof that he early perceived the danger approaching in the person of Yakub-Padishah. Yakub-Padishah began, after the taking of Yarkend, by immediately imprisoning the political agents of the 132 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Khoten prince, in order to extort from him, by violence, information as to the condition of the army, the ex- chequer, and the political feelings of the people. After these successful attempts, he set out on the way to Khoten ; and when two days' journey distant, he de- spatched assurances of friendship to the old Khan of Khoten, who at first refused to give a hearing to them, but subsequently, nevertheless, allowed himself to be deluded by them. The Khan entered the Yarkend camp, and there was compelled to call upon his subjects to capitulate. The town was taken, with everything that it contained. The former Kushbegi found a large treasure of gold and silver, and speedily returned to Yarkend, whither he took with him the captive Habib-Ulah and his son, and where he soon after ordered both to be put to death for a remarkable reason, and one which seems to us by no means cogent. This reason, a matter which rarely occurs in the history of the East, arose from a catastrophe produced by the numerous harem of the old Habib-Ulah. The women of this harem, after the taking of the town, were distributed among Yakub's principal officers. But scarcely had these ex-maitresses found their new masters in a de- fenceless condition, than they fell upon them and murdered them. If this be true, it furnishes a striking evidence of the resolution of the women of East Turke- stan, who have won by it certainly a higher reputation for valour than their own husbands. Immediately after the complete subjugation of Khoten, Yakub-Padishah set forth with a troop of 15,000 men to incorporate the northern part of East Turkestan, where at that time the reins of power were in the hands of the ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 153 Tongens in union with a few Khodjas. Aksu surren- dered itself without difficulty. He advanced soon after- wards upon Kuldja, defeated the enemy in three engagements, and routed them in an easterly direction as far as Kune-Turfan. He pursued them, and after having taken Sairum, Shah-Yar, and Ish-Turfan, he returned to Kashgar. Of course great watchfulness and energy w.ere required to hold together these rude elements; thus, for example, the conspiracy in Kuldja, where one of the governors left behind, named Mirza- Ahmed, revolted against his master, and the Kushbegi effected the restoration of his authority by the slaughter of several thousand rebels; yet at the present day he possesses in an unlimited manner the whole of East Turkestan, with a population amounting in number to more than one and a half millions, who, in spite of the detestation felt there, as throughout Central Asia, against people of Sartish origin, recognise him as the only support of the Mussulman rule in East Turkestan, or perhaps fear and honour him in consequence of the great power he has obtained. He has gained large resources, partly by levying contributions, partly by booty taken ; for, as we are told, not only Chinese and Tongens, but even the rich merchants of Cashmere in the bazaars of Yarkend and Kashgar, have been laid under contribu- tion: indeed, even the simple natives have not been spared : and in addition to the fact that many have voluntarily given up their possessions for a cause that was declared sacred, the former Kushbegi has seized upon the religious institutions of the towns, and is undoubtedly far better equipped and prepared for every chance than were his predecessors in East Turkestan. 1 54 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE The circumstance, however, that has been of most advantage to him, is the late Russian occupation in Khokand. However much we may extol the extension of Russian conquest in these regions as a means of advancing civilisation — however much a few Sarts and peaceful merchants may have ardently desired the settlement of affairs, still a considerable number of the Khokand people, especially fanatical Mohammedans, Seids, and other religious heroes, are to be found, who flee from the shadow of the Russian standard. Western Bokhara was long ago pointed out as a quarter where the Russian wind blew ; and although no one would resolve to utter the impious prophecy of impending ruin, still the zealous people of Khokand preferred mov- ing to the east rather than to the west, and they have escaped to Chinese territory rather than to Bokhara. It is easy to imagine that it is of great importance to these people to maintain their new home, and to keep it secure. It is these people — and they form a consider- able and influential portion of the half-conquered khan- ates — who rendered essential help to the ambitious Yakub-Padishah, and compelled him to assume such a position with regard to the Chinese as hitherto has been assumed by no rebel in the valleys of the Thien-Shan range. It is not pohtical combinations nor vast plans — these I have always denied among Orientals, and shall ever deny — which compel this Nadir of modern times to resolute resistance. He cannot return to Khokand, as the once successful period of the Khodja invasion is long past, and Russia would certainly prevent the appearance of a foreign power on the banks of the Yaxartes. In the south, east, and north there is no ANGLO' R US S IAN FRONTIER Q UES TION. 1 5 5 possibility of escape ; nothing, therefore, is left for him but to strengthen himself in the Six Cities, to consoli- date his dominion, and to frustrate, once for all, any- future pretensions of the Chinese to these territories. All this Yakub - Padishah, the former Kushbegi, is doing. From China, therefore, there is little or nothing to fear. There is but one thing that can disturb the crafty- conqueror in his possessions, and that is Russia ; and that he already perceives the danger in the distance is evident from his laborious efforts at self-defence, and from the iron force by which he is endeavouring to grasp the bond of unity. Russia, as we have before pointed out in the course of these pages, stands with watchful eye at the western frontier of the Chinese Empire, at that part which stretches from the sources of the Irtish to the south-eastern point of the tableland of Pamir. Long ago master of all the passes and roads in the province of Semipalatinsk which led across the Ala-Tau range to Dsungaria, he is yet forbidden, by Chinese mis- trust, to send his merchants to Kuldja and Tshugut- shak. Indeed, as the learned German philologist Radloff, who travelled through these districts as a Russian officer, informs us, he was not allowed to re- main in Kuldja more than three days, in spite of all the difficulties of the long journey. Not venturing any open step in the north against the feeble, but never- theless important power of China, those parts of the frontier must be approached where Chinese authority is weaker and interior anarchy greater — namely, the banks of the Issikkol, in the north of which Fort Wernoe was built, and in the west Fort Tokmak— in order here, on 156 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE a comparatively surer basis, to await the events of the future. In the strategic plans communicated to the world, it is universally said that the advance in this neighbourhood is a flank attack on Khokand, and that the two different armies of occupation will sub- sequently meet on the Yaxartes. This, moreover, is not quite a fabrication. The force on the Issikkol has rendered good service, but its essential success rests in the fact that Russia has approached very close to her feeble neighbour in this region also. Indeed she stands ready to take possession of the heritage she has ap- pointed for herself even before the actual death of the future testator. Yet the question will be asked, What are the Russians to do with the Chinese Tartars ? Have they not enough of the Tartar element among themselves } Russia herself would not be able to give a decided answer to this question ! Still it must not be forgotten that the matter in question here is not the possession of a thousand square miles and some millions of inhabi- tants, but rather the revival of the great old commercial highway from the interior of China to the west, which was in a flourishing condition up to the end of the middle ages ; and the formation of it into a powerful and fruitful channel, carrying blessing and fertility through the great body of the Russian Empire. This is no chimera. If for centuries in succession Chinese products were conveyed into Europe through Komul, Kashgar, Samarkand, Belkh, Tebris, and Constanti- nople ; or through Bokhara, Astrakan, and Nishni Novgorod, why should not this be the case now } Are not facilitated communication and the security of dry ANGLO'R U SSI AN FRONTIER Q UES TION I 3 / land to be preferred to the treacherous waves of the sea ? It is indeed true that Russia has already com- pletely appropriated to herself a path of communication from Peking to Petersburg ; yet this is never a frequented one, owing to the rude Siberian winter and the inhos- pitable steppes of Gobi, and is valueless compared with the road from east to west, which leads along a highway from Peking, used centuries ago, from the banks of the Yang-tse-Kiang, through the provinces of Shensi, Kansu, and East Turkestan. As everything indicates, the accomplishment of this design is of great consequence to the Court of Peters- burg. Russia wishes to get the start of England, who likewise has perceived the importance of a commercial highway by land to the interior of the Celestial Empire, and in spite of the sleepiness of the present Indian Government, has sent out a surveying party for the construction of a road through Burmah from Assam to the province of Yunnan, Of course, in this instance also, the English have been, as usual, beaten by the Russians. The expedition was obliged to return with- out having effected its object ; and the English semi- official report of the Viceroy states that it was not at all a pity that this step, though undertaken with authority, has failed. If they were as languid on the Neva as they are on the banks of the Hooghly, Russia would have paused after the taking of Fort Wernoe ; but the men of the icy zone are more vigorous than Britons, exhausted by the heat of the Indian sun, for they will not remain in Fort Wernoe, and it will probably not be long before we hear that Russian Cossacks are on the point of cross- IS8 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE ing the Terek Pass on a visit to Yakub-Padishah. It is therefore for the present a matter of conjecture at what point the attack will be made on the part of Russia, whether in Dsungaria — that is, near Kuldja — or whether through the Terek Pass, in the Kashgar terri- tory. That serious plans, however, are entertained, is proved by the ten sotnias of Cossacks — each numbers one hundred men — by the eight battalions of infantry, and the twenty cannons which are stationed at the eastern parts of the Issikkol, and which, nevertheless, are probably not intended to be used against the wan- dering tribes of the Karakirghises to be found there ; also by the doubly-strong army of observation occupy- ing the same territory, only to the west of the Issikkol. We may therefore certainly expect some advance, and it will, if I mistake not, first be made in the south- eastern part of the frontier mentioned — that is, on the present territory of Yakub-Padishah. This new ruler of the Six Cities is, as we perceive from Russian statements, not on the most friendly footing with the Khan of Khokand, his neighbour and former suzerain ; for no one will probably have forgotten that Buzurg-Khan received, though secretly, the most important subsidies for his attack from Alem-Kul, and therefore indirectly from Khudajar-Khan. What the cause of this breach of friendship is, it is easy to explain. Yakub-Padishah, who has the disposal of a better filled exchequer than the Khan of Khokand, has recently taken all the war-loving Kirghises into his service, men who in the first place had renounced obedi- ence to the ruler of Khokand, their lawful master, and in the second place had plundered his own frontier, and ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 1 59 in fact — and this is more fatal to all parties — had endangered Russian subjects and Russian caravans. Moreover, Yakub - Padishah plainly refused to pay Khokand the yearly tribute for the Six Cities, a duty which his proudest Chinese neighbours had discharged ; and as he knows only too well the weakness of the neighbouring Khokand, we cannot feel surprised if he now, as the stronger power, threatens Khokand with conquest and annexation. He has little to fear from Khudajar-Khan, the present prince of Khokand — he can intimidate him so long as he will. This is not the case with the Russians ; and the attacks which his Kirghiz mercenaries are making on the Narin, or on the banks of the Issikkol, will probably cost him dear, if they do not lose him his entire independence. How the usually cunning Kushbegi can go so far as to provoke the Russians, whose power he so well knows, is inconceiv- able to me, yet undoubtedly it was he who gave cause for quarrel. In the beginning of this year two Russian caravans were proceeding from Tashkend to East Turkestan : one belonged to Mons. Michseel Chludoff, and was visiting the eastern bank of the Issikkol ; it intended reaching Aksu through the Zauker Pass. The first arrived hap- pily at Kashgar, where it was at once seized by Yakub- Padishah ; all the goods were paid back in silver,* and any further appearance of Russian subjects on his territory was forbidden with the severest threats. The second caravan, proceeding to Aksu, had of course heard nothing of this threat ; and scarcely had Chludoff arrived at his place of destination than he and his com- * Cy. my " Skizzen aus Mittelasien, " p. 317. l60 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE panlons were blindfolded, robbed of their goods, and thrown into prison, where they were obliged to remain until an advancing Russian force liberated them. While this alone aftbrds a sufficient reason for the march of the Russians to the Six Cities, the step must certainly have been accelerated by the fact that the present ruler of East Turkestan strongly fraternises with the Kirghises on the Issikkol, who are under Russian sway, and that he gives plenty of work in consequence to the Cossack garrisons stationed there. General Kalpakoffski, the commander of Tokmak, has been disquieted several times by the appearance of Kashgar troops ; and as Yakub-Beg stands on friendly terms with the Emir of Bokhara, the Russian conjecture that a diversion in favour of the hardly-pressed prince on the Zerefshan is to take place here, is not unfounded, or at any rate it is a cogent reason for the approach of the Russian bayonets to the Terek Pass. Thus we again see how completely the Russians will be compelled to plant their standard on the citadels of Kashgar, Yarkend, and Khoten ; for it will never occur to any one that the people of East Turkestan can place more hindrances in the way than the other inhabi- tants of Central Asia. In fact, if a single battle were to take place to Yakub-Padishah's loss, the East Turkestanians would be at once compelled to lay down their arms, and submit. The yoke of the unbelievers is, as is well known, no utterly foreign matter here — whether Buddhist or Christian, both bear the title of *' Kafir ; " and Europe, perhaps even Russia herself, will be amazed at the small cost and sacrifice with which this important and rich part of Central Asia has ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, l6l fallen into her hands. We need hardly say that after the taking of the Six Cities, Dsungaria, which is in the possession of the Tongens, will not long be able to maintain its freedom. Russia, who has long observed with keen eye this north-western part of the Chinese Empire, and has glanced longingly at the commercial towns of Tchugutchak and Kuldja, has in her pos- session all the roads and passes in the province of Semi- palatinsk leading to these very towns. Moreover, the Kalmucks, as declared enemies of the Kirghises, and as powerful opponents of the Tongen revolt, are favourable to the Russian plans. Russia, besides, will find these districts indispensable as a second highway of communi- cation with the Six Cities ; so that if East Turkestan falls into her possession, the Trans-Ili district, stretching to the north of the Thien-Shan Mountains, may be regarded as included in the conquest. Apart from the utility, already pointed out, of a great commercial highway from the interior of China, we must not overlook the advantage which the Court of Petersburg obtains by the possession of a soil so fertile and so rich in metals as that of East Turkestan. The idea of an extension in this direction is as little new as all the other plans on Central Asia ; in fact, the encouragement which was given on the part of the Russian Government to the Kirghiz-Russian traveller Welichanoff in 1852, on his incognito tour to Kash- gar and Aksu, was not wholly free from political designs, although the journey was taken under the banner of the Russian Geographical Society, and thus for scientific purposes. The Anglo-Indian Government has recently begun, by the advice of Captain T. G. L 1 62 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Montgomery^ to send highly - cultivated natives to foreign regions inaccessible to Europeans. Russia has long ago made use of this strategy ; and the experiences of the Russianised Kirghises, only a harmless abstract of which is imparted to the world, have been lying for many years in the archives of the Russian military staff as a safe guide to Turkestan. If we now take into consideration both the distance and the importance of the interests which stimulate Russia in her relations to East Turkestan, and measure also the distance and the interest which arises to England from her possessions on the Himalaya, and from her political position in Cashmere, Nepaul, and Thibet, with regard to the Six Cities, the thoughtful reader will at once ask why the Viceroy at Calcutta has not got the start of the Russians ? why, when mighty commercial interests call him also to East Turkestan, he has not placed him- self in communication with these outposts of Indian power before the Russians have done so, who come forward as avengers of offences, while he apparently receives friendly invitation, and would be received both by the people and the courts with open arms ? Apart from my personal experiences, according to which the Indian Government is regarded by the people of East Turkestan as a model of justice and order, ranking even high above the Chinese, and the Moham- medan-Bokhara rule — an opinion evidenced by the fact that two-thirds of the Turkestan pilgrims to Mecca, instead of taking the convenient road through Bokhara, prefer to cross the dangerous and difficult Karakorum Pass, and to traverse the long circuitous road through India and across the Persian Gulf to Arabia, — apart ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 163 from this, I say, we cannot ignore the indisputable proofs in favour of our assertion. Not only does the old Habib-Ulah most courteously invite Johnson to Khoten, entertain him hospitably, and send him back to the Viceroy with messages and presents, but invita- tions of the same kind have been made to him even by Yarkend ; the possession of the town was indeed pro- posed to him. The bold traveller was ridiculed in Calcutta; Sir John Lawrence's semi-official papers declared plainly that any one who led British attention in this direction was **an enemy to his country." Yet I cannot understand how an assertion of this kind can be combined with the true mission of the Ministry in Calcutta, to whom the extension of English commercial interests should be the object desired. Or did Sir John Lawrence perhaps not know how much Turfan wool is yearly sent to India — that is, to Umritsir, for the manufacture of Cashmere shawls, and that within the last ten years ;^ 5 00,000 sterling have been annually realised in the sale of this article } Or ought he not to endeavour to procure a certain and easy market in Turkestan for the tea-plantations on the Himalaya, which since Robert Fortune's mission to China have cost the Anglo-Indian Government so much, and are still a heavy expense to it } Long ago this article of food, so indispensable to the people of East Turkestan, found its way through Komul to Aksu and Kashgar, and fetched of course a high price, so much so that I remember paying fourteen tenge in Samarkand for the green tea imported from China — tea for which I after- wards paid only six tenge at Meshed to a Kabul merchant who was importing green Indian tea of the 164 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE same quality to Persia. If the difference of price in times of peace is so considerable, why should the Eng- lish Government not try to procure introduction for their teas, universally in favour, as they are, in the Six Cities, now that the commercial highway through Komul is completely closed ? This could very easily have been done if the system of Aksakals (commercial consuls), which had existed for centuries, had been adopted, and if, following the example of Cashmere, Khokand, Thibet, and Kabul, an English Aksakal, either a native or an Englishman, had been placed in the commercial towns of the first rank ! Was this, perhaps, a matter not worth the trouble ? Or did Sir John Lawrence ignore the entire statement of Dr Henry Cayley ? This officer was despatched by Sir Richard Temple to inquire into the commercial affairs of these districts, and he communicated to us the following opinion respecting the Kushbegi : " The Kush- begi, he says, is, without doubt, a brave, energetic, and clever soldier ; an able, although not very conscientious, ruler. It is said that he maintains strict discipline in his army, that he punishes the smallest fault ; but, on the other side, he treats the soldiers well, and rewards them generously. He is friendly, also, in his conduct to merchants ; the taxes imposed by him are not particularly oppressive, and he is certainly feared and honoured by his subjects. The fact that he unites all the provinces of Turkestan under his sway, is of great advantage both to this country and to the adjacent lands, and is very beneficial to himself ; and I think it would produce the best results if we were to send an accredited envoy to the Kushbegi at Yarkend, in order ANGLO'RUSS/AN FRONTIER QUESTION, 1 65 to give him a true statement of our wishes and in- tentions. There is no doubt that he is very anxious to remain on a friendly footing with us ; still we are a little suspicious to him as to our motives, and since he receives only false and distorted intelligence upon political matters, he can never feel true confidence until we have taken the steps necessary for mutual explana- tion." * Unfortunately Sir John Lawrence is wont to discover the germs of subsequent complications in every attempt at a mutual understanding with the adjacent lands. He desires as far as he can to remain in the favour of the tax-paying English public, still he seems to forget that it is better to spend a penny at the right time than to be obliged afterwards to spend a pound. That by disregarding the commercial interests so strongly de- fended by the English in all times, and obstinately refusing to exert the necessary political influence, he has neglected to turn his attention to East Turkestan, he may for a time justify by that principle of inactivity which is asserted as the essence of wisdom. But what will he do when the Russian bear, resting comfortably on its paws, begins to blink at Ladak from the summit of the Karakorum Pass .^ or if he is allowed to exchange friendly glances with the ruler of Cashmere, whose fidelity towards the English Government is still very questionable ? For at the present day, so long as Yakub-Padishah stands in his way, and the Russian * For further details with regard to Yakub-Kushbegi, see the paper, "Ein Mohammedanischer Eroberer in Asien," which was ivritten five years later, and the dates of which are more reliable in consequence of the travels of Shaw, Hayward, and Forsyth. 1 66 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE merchant cannot proceed to Cashmere, the approxi- mation is certainly difficult ; but observing other politi- cal combinations going on in East Turkestan, it seems scarcely conceivable that a Russian-Cashmere alliance will not ultimately be effected. No one will, however, persuade me that the gentlemen on the Hooghly will regard it with friendly eyes, or will shout applause, when the ruler of Cashmere, now forced into a loving union with India, extricates himself from British em- braces to rush into the open arms of the Muscovite power I ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. l6j PERSIA AND TURKEY (1868). Nothing manifests so much the dedine of Islamism, nothing proves so thoroughly its shght prospect of a lasting future, as the sensible want of all unity of idea, the want of an instinctive feeling, which could lead to common defence against the foe, growing, as he is, into a threatening phantom. Whether tendencies of this kind have ever existed in the complex states of the Islam world, no one can assert with absolute certainty. It is long ago that the followers of the doctrine of the Arabian Prophet, gathering under a common standard, were led along one path by the bright torch of their common faith. This torch burned only under the first Caliphs, during the Crusades, and in a few places, at the time that the unrestrained Mongol hordes from the officina gentium of Central Asia were making towards the West, bringing with them destruction and desolation. In fact, we should be almost inclined to assert that with the awakening of the spark of life in the Western world, the light of unity kindled by the Koran declined in the same measure as the other light increased in power in the far horizon of its present sphere of bright- ness. 1 68 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE If we look at the gigantic empire of Islam, from the interior of China over the whole of Asia and Africa, as far as the western shores of the Atlantic Ocean, this lack of unity of idea will nowhere astonish us so much as in Turkey and Persia. These countries, justly called the Great Islam States, contain a compact mass of about thirty millions of orthodox believers — thirty millions of beings who regard Mohammed as the God-sent Prophet and his doctrines as the one path to blessedness — ; thirty millions who must look with horror upon Europe! as the primeval nest of infidelity, the first duty imposed! upon them being to make war with all holding a different creed. We Europeans, in the intoxication of our certain victory over the East, never think of entering into combinations against the forces proceeding from a possible aUiance; our Cabinets, in their diplomatic transactions, have never taken into consideration the result of a step of the kind. Nevertheless, the last efTort of the Mohammedan nations struggling in death, were they but once united, might disappoint them mightily. Although weakened, the prostrate foe could convulsively collect its strength, and could be no in- considerable adversary. Of course, as recent affairs have taught us, all precautionary measures of this kind were unnecessary. I ascribe this not so much to the great wisdom of our statesmen, as to their false sense of security, which is supported by the foolish conduct of the great states above mentioned. Deeply pene- trated with the idea that Western civilisation is far more elevated and far more beneficial than that of the East, we have no desire to render the task of Europe in Asia more difificult by giving proof of the erroneous policy ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 169 by which Turkey and Persia have long, and especially recently, distinguished themselves. That which is to happen will happen ! Our influence will ever be directed against these two lands with increasing force ; yet it is in the interest of that all-important balance of power that we wish to see one strong united barrier, instead of separate and isolated forces, opposed to the ambitious and greedy efforts of one over-large European power. A good understanding between the Courts of Constantinople and Teheran would in nowise disturb the advance in the new era. It might, indeed, aid the design of well - meaning Europe just as much as it might impede the intrigues and grasping plans of the Court of Petersburg. It may seem surprising to many that we can believe in the unity of such heterogeneous elements as Turks and Persians. It is true the national, social, and religi- ous differences are great — far greater, indeed, than any to be found in social and political conditions in the West. The present population of Iran — a motley mixture of the original inhabitants of the country, of Turks, Ara- bians, Beludjans, and Kurds, and various ingredients of Asiatic tribes — have preserved, nevertheless, in spite of their chameleon-like origin, the stamp of old Persian civilisation in their exterior. They are supple, quick both in mind and body, courteous, and full of imagi- nation ; at times submissive, at others arrogant and proud ; remarkably active, without meriting the epithet '' industrious," — in a word, a great mixture of vice and virtue, and neither in detail nor as a whole showing any affinity with the characteristics of the Turks. The Turks, who are nothing else than an amalgamation of I7Q CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Seldjukish adventurers, Greeks, Armenians, Slavoni- ans, Kurds, Arabians, &c., being a powerfully ruling race, have been able to disseminate the qualities of their national character : this is everywhere sharply stamped ; their indolence, heaviness, want of wit, and external grace stand out in such strong contrast to the qualities of their neighbour, that on closer consideration Turks and Persians must really appear as elements which not only have no affinity^ but have never come into any contact with each other. That in consequence of these original qualities the two states must have been differ- ently formed is indeed obvious. The Persian, whether belonging to migrated races or to the original inhabi- tants, has always regarded himself as the model of Islam civilisation. He has considered himself a master in poetry, music, philosophy, and other sciences ; and he has looked upon the Turks as the representatives of rude power, and as barbarians. This is an old-established custom, which is justified by history, since the destroyers and devastators of Iran were mostly Turks ; and al- though the old state of things no longer exists, still the Persians, like true Orientals who cling tenaciously to old opinions, are not inclined to alter their ideas on this point. Their Western neighbour never could in- spire them with respect ; nor could they inspire it in return, for the Turks look upon them as cunning and cowardly, as devoid of truth and without principle. The constant change of dynasty in Iran, and the civil wars in consequence, have produced wild tyranny, and, this again has called forth cunning and deceit. Not only have all the provinces rarely formed a compact whole, but party disputes have separated single races ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, I /I and families, each having in view his own immediate interest, and being little, or not at all, intent on the welfare of the country generally. In Turkey, where tyranny is weaker and the fear of Christian elements stronger, the Osmanlis, whether de pur sang or descen- dants of proselytes, have always firmly united against internal or external foes. The adherence also to the ruling house, which has never changed since the empire was founded, has been far stronger than in the adjacent country ; and this difference is to be found even at the present day in all the institutions, and in all the customs and habits of the two nations. It was religion, however, which mostly sowed the seed of discord, and prevented every possibility of unity of feeling. It must not be imagined that the schism occasioned by the disputed succession of the first Caliphs, or by the justice or injustice of All's pre- tensions, produced such a cleft as that which we now find between the two sections of believers ; this was only widened in course of time by the ambition and egotism of hierarchical or temporal princes. Shiism was declared to be identical with Iranism. In every approximation to Sunnite elements the independence of Iran was considered endangered even in the time of the Dilemites ; we cannot therefore be surprised if the two sects, after niore than a hundred years of effort in this direction, have brought matters so far that they scarcely consider each other any longer as fellow- believers, and this is especially the case as regards the Persians. Trifles, such as the form of ablutions, prayers, dress, and externals of this kind, have an almost in- credible weicrht with Orientals. That the Persian uses 1/2 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE at prayer the pentagonal tile instead of carpet ; that iri his pious ablutions he washes the arm not from the elbow to the hands, as the Sunnites do, but from the hand to the elbow ; * that he regards every one who does not follow the Koran as impure and polluted, and not, as the Sunnite, simply as an unbeliever ; that in prayer, instead of turning towards the south-east, to Mecca, he prefers turning towards Kerbela and Ned- jef; — these are not only simple religious usages, but mighty vital questions producing a religious schism marked by wilder animosity than was the case in Europe even in the earliest beginnings of Protestantism. No one can deny the existence of this difference of faith and the mighty breach it has produced. We cannot be astonished that, in order to effect the latter, every possible lever was placed in motion during the past century. At that period Islamism had no danger- ous adversary, Russia and Europe existed only in name, Islamism was itself the aggressor, and had no need to think of defensive measures. All the more does it now surprise us, especially since the beginning of the nine- * This custom reminds me of a droll incident which occurred to myself during my incognito in Bokhara. As is well known, the difference in the washing of the arm produces apparent consequences. On this part of the body among the Sunnites, in consequence of ablutions five times a day from earliest youth, the points of the hairs incline towards the palm of the hand. Among the Shiites, on the contrary, they incline towards the elbow ; and hence from the appearance of the hairs the religious sect of the individual may be inferred. The astonishment of some Bokhariots may be imagined when they discovered that my hairs neither inclined upwards nor downwards, but grew all round my arm. * ' A remarkable Mussulman that ! " they said ; " an unknown race!" And I am certainly regarded by many, even at the present day, as an abortion in the Islam growth of hair. ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 1 73 teenth century, that Turks and Persians, fully convinced as they are that Russian plans are hanging over their head like some fatal Damocles' sword, persist in main- taining their former position of brooding discord and disunion. That they, having learned with the clearest perception in their early years the '* divide et im- pera" of Lokman's fable of the lion and the two fighting oxen, should nevertheless not perceive that all the tendencies of the Court of Petersburg aim at their common ruin, is all the more striking, as in Teheran and in Constantinople, using the boastful tone of Euro- pean civilisation, there is much said of diplomacy, of diplomatic intrigues, and political combinations. That this behaviour of the respective courts, especially of the Court of Teheran, is not the way for safety, and that the policy of the Sefevides must be now given up, has been sufficiently proved to us by Nadir Shah in his otherwise vain attempt to heal the breach between the Sunnites and the Shiites. It was the expedition of Peter the Great to the Caucasian shores which sug- gested to him the advantage of the alliance of the two great powers. At his death the idea was again totally relinquished, and the dynasty of the Kadjars have since their accession to the throne, in spite of their Turkish origin, and in spite of all the hatred to which they have been exposed on the part of their genuinely Persian subjects, not only neglected to approach the house of the Ottoman prince, their old relative, but it is the Kadjars exclusively who not only have neglected every possible opportunity of extirpating the hatred of the people, but who, even since the beginning of the nineteenth century, have most contributed to fan the 174 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE flame of discord, unmindful of the fact that this flame will light the victorious march of their common foe just as much as it threatens Iran itself with the most fatal injury. From the time when General Olivier was sent by Napoleon to Turkestan, in order to effect an alliance between Persia and Turkey again'st Russia — attempts which were frustrated in spite of the strong efforts of Aga Mohammed Khan, founder of the Kadjar dynasty, against the aggressive power of Russia— up to the present day, when Russia has gained a footing on the Araxes, and has raised fortresses on the eastern shore of the Black Sea and in the Circassian Mountains, many opportunities have presented themselves to Turkey and Persia for placing considerable hindrances in the way of their common foe. It is remarkable that this important question of a federation not only has not occurred to either of the two countries, but that all conceivable occasion for dispute is sought for. It was chiefly the frontier question which, both under Feth-Ali-Shah and Moham- med Shah, as well as subsequently under Sultan Mahmoud and Sultan Abdul-Medjid, disturbed all idea of union. As is well known, from the Oriental mode of government, that province lying furthest from the central point of administration is the worst ruled and is the most exposed to anarchy and unrestraint, so that the want of communication not only impedes the transport of goods, but even the transmission of the orders of the Government. In fact, just as in ordinary life the courtier and civil functionary trembles in the presence of his lord, while at a comparative distance ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, I75 from the threshold of the splendid palace he loses his exaggerated reverence and slavish submission ; so the civil functionaries, removed from the controlling hand of tjieir superior, not only soon lose all respect, but behave themselves as arrogant and sovereign vassals. This state of things is chiefly the case on the frontier provinces of Turkey and Persia, in that portion of land which stretches from Bayazid to the Sea of Basra. The Eyaletes of Kurdistan and Arabist^n were thirty years ago regarded rather as fiefs by the Turks; and the Pashas who were sent there as governors, acted always independently, and occupied themselves very little with political combinations. This is the case at the present day with the Walls, who were sent from Teheran to the west frontier of the kingdom. Since appointments fall here, as in old times, to the highest bidder, the respective Khans, who only desire their own enrichment and not the administration of the provinces, trouble themselves but little about peaceful agreement, or about the unity of Islamism. At the present day the Shah is of far less importance here than the Sultan was thirty years ago. It is no wonder, therefore, if, at all points where these great states come into contact as frontier neighbours, constant disputes arise. It is no wonder if at every moment, from the continual friction of the civil functionaries, sparks arise, which, from unskilful or capricious management, speedily burst forth into the bright flames of dissension. Passing over all petty disputes and disturbances, we will only speak of the wars which took place in the first half of this century. In the year 1821 (1236 from the Hegira) the governors of Erzeroum and Azerbayd- 176 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE shan entangled the two Islam states in a quarrel. Just as in the present day the Kurdish nomad tribes were the cause of it. Abbas-Mirza overstepped the frontiers of Iran, and took Toprakkale, Diadin, Bidlis, and other frontier towns of Turkestan. The Turks meanwhile were attacking Kirman-Shah in Persia, but were re- pulsed and beaten by the Persians ; and if the Persian general in command had not died of his wounds, Bagdad would certainly have fallen. In the north, also, the Persian arms were successful. Abbas-Mirza, the brave son of Feth-Ali-Shah, utterly defeated the gover- nor of Erzeroum, until at last peace was concluded after much bloodshedding on both sides ; and with the exception of the great booty which the avaricious sons of Iran took into possession, everything remained as before. Peace for some time reigned between the two parties, a peace which was not caused by any pacific disposition, but by the hard struggle which Persia was carrying on with Russia ; for scarcely had Feth-Ali- Shah died, after a reign of thirty-seven years, and had been placed in the splendid mausoleum at Kum, than Mohammed Shah, or more truly, his vizier, who had been advanced from the post of private tutor to that of Prime Minister, conceived the strange idea of desiring to test in open battle the productions of his cannon- foundries, in which the former pedagogue and scholar was eagerly interested. In the year 1843, when the bombardment and massacre of Kerbela was deeply wounding the hearts of the Shiite Persians, and was exciting a strong feeling of hatred and revenge against the Sunnites and their representative, the Sultan of Constantinople, the war- ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 1 77 loving Cabinet of Teheran would have actually soon entered into a war with Turkey had not the ambitious zeal of the strange vizier been somewhat damped by the unfortunate issue of the war with Afghanistan. As is well known, the city of Kerbela, situated only a few days' journey from Bagdad, early became the shrine of Shiite zealots, from the fact that it contains within its precincts the remains of Imam-Hussein, the beloved national martyr of Iran. A hundred thousand Shiites annually make their pilgrimage to his tomb in this city. Even the dead like to be brought here for their long sleep ; and this is in nowise annoying to the Turks, since living and dead are only admitted on payment of a considerable tribute. The people of Iran had long thirsted for the possession of this Kerbela and Nedshef ; they felt that it belonged to the tragic character of the history of the house of Ali, that the resting-place of the martyr, so severely persecuted in life, should remain even after his death in the hands of their arch-enemy. This is laid especial stress on in numerous elegiac poems ; and if we take into consideration the constantly precarious position of Turkey in this part of its do- minion, it seems indeed as if the Persians had not wrested Kerbela and Nedshef from the Osmanlis just for the sake of imparting an intenser colouring to the tragic and romantic epopees, in which their national and religious humbug is so rich. The Persians have only once had this place in their possession, and then only for a short time. Nevertheless, both people and Government are for ever striving in this direction. There are always crowds of Persians in Kerbela. Freely and openly revolutionary plans are devised M 1/8 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE against the Turkish Government, and in spite of the fact that the latter may be regarded as a model of endurance, it nevertheless now and then agrees to an act of chastise- ment. The immense massacres and heavy taxations inflicted on the refractory Persians may be regarded, therefore, as the natural consequence of such a state of things. In the year above mentioned, nearly 18,000 Persians forfeited their lives in a few hours. It must have been a fearful carnage, the remembrance of which, even at the present day, awakens the wildest feeling of revenge in the breast of every Persian. In addition to this, disputes were still going on, which had existed for some time, but had subsequently increased with unrestrained vehemence, relative to the frontier of Kurdistan, a province which, divided between Turkey and Persia, has produced unspeakable mischief. The Kurds under Ottoman rule are Sunnites, those under Persian sway are Shiites. Still, as both parties really own no rule, and religious differences are only employed as a justifiable pretext for rapine, murder, and plunder, anarchy has at all times produced so much misery in the romantic valleys of lovely Kurdistan, and especially at this period, that the loud cry and lamentation of the sufferers, which remained unheard at Constantinople, penetrated even to the banks of the Seine, the Thames, and the Neva. Whether impelled by peaceful motives, or in pursuance of certain pohtical tendencies, France, England, and Russia have no longer been able to look on calmly at this state of things, especially since the infamous Bedr- Khan-Beg has made himself conspicuous by his war of extermination against the Nestorian Christians. In a ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, I79 conference at Erzeroum it was decreed that delegates furnished by these states, in conjunction with Persian and Turkish functionaries, should settle the frontier disputes, and should reconcile the great Islam states engaged in them. The preliminaries alone for peace lasted five years, and it was not till the year 1 848 that the respective delegates — namely, Dervish Pasha for Turkey, Mirza- Dj afar- Khan for Persia, Colonel Williams for England, and Colonel Ktchirikoff for Russia — began to discuss a more accurate line of frontier, which was to stretch from Basra to Mount Ararat. This difficult task was com- pleted in the year 1852. This was followed by an apparent peace between the Courts of Teheran and Constantinople, a peace which was not brought about by any sincere understanding on both sides, but rather by foreign wars and by the internal disorders of the respective states. Persia was occupied with the wars in Chorassan and Afghanistan, and with the repression of the Eabis ; Turkey was employed by the Crimean war ; and although on the part of both states causes for quarrel were not lacking, the outbreak of war has been prevented up to the pre- sent time. On the accession of the youthful Nasreddin Shah, it was universally believed that the Court of Teheran would adopt the path of reasonable policy, and introduce the era of peaceful relations with Turkey. But it was not so. Nasreddin, who may be justly regarded as the true reformer of Iran, since the introduction of European institutions and the entrance into the European con- federacy of states has really begun under his rule, was nevertheless unfortunately so blinded, partly by the 1 80 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE vehemence of his youthful character, and partly by the traditional policy of all Persian rulers, and especially those of the house of Kadjar, that he too has disdained on principle this only means of self-preservation, and has preferred turning to Petersburg instead of to Con- stantinople. That by so doing he went himself into the very den of the lurking lion never occurred to him. Although religiously educated, he preferred to give a hearing to the Persian Achondes (clergy), who were thriving from the Shiite and Sunnite disputes, and were constantly whispering to him that a league with the blackest unbeliever would be more advantageous to Iran than that with a Sunnite power, acknowledging in truth one and the same Koran, and one and the same Prophet. Russia, cunning and watchful Russia, did not of course delay skilfully to turn this great error to her own advantage. The Court of Teheran was thoroughly ensnared ; the representatives of the Court of Petersburg, Prince von Dolgoruki and Mons. von Anitschkoff, who since the assassination of the Russian ambassador Gri- bayedeff have resided in the royal palace, were treated as members of the royal family, and were held by the Regent in high regard as the sincerest friends of the Kadjar interests; in fact, it is a matter of wonder how Anglo-French insinuations contrived during the Crimean war to prevent a collision between the Persian forces and the Turkish, since the Court of Teheran, even at that time, was meditating an alliance with the Russians against Sultan Abdul-Medjid. Of course in the Shah's Cabinet there were a few sober ministers who dissuaded from a proceeding of this kind, and in whom the am- bassadors of France and England found an essential ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, l8l support. After the fall of Sevastopol, this party for peace exulted at their discretion ; and much as might have been learned from the great danger which had threatened Islamism in the West, no sooner had the sound of the cannon-shots of Alma and Inkerman died away than the foolish work of dispute went on as before. In the last ten years Persia has done her utmost on the one side to stir up the hatred to Turkey at home, and on the other to intrigue against the Turks by new European diplomatic intercourse, and to show that the Persians, an old, civilised people, are far more in affinity with the spirit of the nineteenth century than the Turks with their janizaries. In spite of these assertions, the Shiite ecclesiastics, with the Regent at their head, desire to increase the rude worship of Ali, which already borders on fetichism. This Caliph has been, as is well known, elevated by one sect, not only above Mohammed, but even above God, This sect is called Ali-Ullahs, and I mention them only to show that there was no necessity existing to give the worship of Ali an official expression ; yet the worship of Ali is identical with painful regrets at the misfortunes of the Fatimites; this regret is identical with hatred of the Sunnites ; and this, again, with revenge against the Turks, and against the Turkish Government. Such is the chain of reasoning in Te- heran ; and in order to carry out this principle con- sistently, the Shah had a miraculous discovery made in a remote part of India for the edification of his subjects. This was the portrait of Ali painted on canvas with oil colours. Hitherto this Caliph had only been known, or rather had not been known, by 1 82 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE a portrait which represented him thickly veiled. A picture was desired, portraying his sacred features. If only to prove that painting had not been forbidden by Islamism, in spite of all the counter-assertions of the Sunnites, a picture of this kind must have appeared as a direct evidence. The picture was solemnly conveyed to Teheran ; an order (Timsal) set with diamonds was instituted in its honour, and this is only bestowed on the highest dignitaries, and never on an unbeliever. Indeed, the idea was entertained of sending the grand cordon of this order as a mark of distinction to the Sultan of Constantinople. No less offensive to the representatives of the Porte at the Court of Teheran are the constant efforts of the Persian Government to invest their festivals with a certain splendour, involving the glorification of Shiite grandees, and public insult and childish derision of the Sunnites. Of these festivals we will first mention that of Omer Suzani (the burning of Omer), in which this brave Caliph and founder of Islamism, whom the Shiites especially hate, is carried round the towns by day in the form of a figure stuffed with straw, which by night is filled with powder, and is blown up into the air by a rocket inserted at the back. So far as I remember, Haydar Efendi, the Turkish ambassador, protested against this in Teheran during the time of my residence there. It was therefore publicly abstained from, but the boisterous noise outside the town was all the more wild ; and how thoroughly demonstrations of this kind bear upon them the character of hostility to the Turks is plainly proved by the act of Count Gobineau, at that time the ambassador of Napoleon, who, in order ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 1 83 to give expression to his anti-Turkish feelings, blew up an Omer into the air himself, as representative of most Christian France. It must be obvious to every one that the gaping wound produced by the fanaticism of old Islam tendencies, instead of healing, would be more and more cruelly laid open. In the same manner, in the dramatic Passion plays, in which the tragic end of Hussein and Ali Egber is represented, an unbelieving Frank envoy, indignant at the barbarousness of the Sunnite Yezid, becomes a partisan of the Shiites ; and thus in daily life such a bias is given to popular feeling, that the masses in Persia are more friendly in their sentiments towards Europe, or rather to the Christian element, than to Turkey, their fellow-believer and neighbour for more than a hundred years. The word Efendi {avSevrr)^), the absolute, in the language of the Osmanlis, borrowed from the Greek only after the taking of Constantinople, and given to the usurping Caliphs as a title of derision, is identical with Anti- christ ; Osmanlis and Britons, whose alliance is not unknown here even among the people, are set down as wild followers of Beelzebub, compared with v/hom Russians and French have even the preference ; and as the Persians in former times had really much to suffer from Turkish anarchy in their pilgrimages to Mecca, Jerusalem, and Bagdad, which is now no longer the case, the remembrance of past sufferings, combined with the wilfully - cherished hatred of the present, excites feelings of animosity which admit of no recon- ciliation. As regards their diplomatic intrigues and plans of rivalry, the Persians, though without any special 184 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE advantage, have adopted the deceptive conduct and dissimulation of our own diplomatists. In order to imitate Turkey, which ever since the time of Sultan Mahmoud had carried on uninterrupted diplomatic intercourse with Europe, the Persians also desired to enter into an exchange of envoys with the West. Ferruch-Khan, an ambassador gifted with re- fined Persian manners and stately appearance, was just the man suited to deceive many a shallow European minister with Persian dissimulation of desire for civilisa- tion and of longing for European customs. Morier's Hadji-Baba was already forgotten ; the ostentatious bragging was accepted as pure coin, and it was French superficiality especially that was deceived. Not only did the above-mentioned Persian succeed in forming diplomatic alliances with most of the European states, but he even obtained from Napoleon the title of Em- peror for his master in Teheran, a title which Napoleon at once granted him, and the King of Persia occa- sionally styles himself as actually Empereur de Perse. The importance of our diplomatic posts on the Bosphorus has always been obvious to me, 3^et I have all the less been abl^ to understand the ridiculous behaviour of these officials at Teheran. These petits rois in the East, both at the Court of the Shah and at that of the Sultan, as soon as there is any lack of soirees, receptions, congratulations, and representations, make a question politique out of the smallest disputes that occur in their household, in order to assume the most important political appearance just when there is least to do. What England, Russia, and Turkey seek in Teheran is no longer a matter of doubt to any ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 185 one, in consequence of direct and indirect neighbourly- relations ; but what France desires in Teheran is and ever will be a riddle to me. That Napoleon III. can make constant and important mistakes has been proved by recent history; yet it is almost inconceivable what advantage the imperial policy can derive from the fact that its representative signalises himself by constant intrigues in a capital where France has no political or commercial objects to advocate. Not even as an inactive spectator can I find the French minister in his place at Teheran. As the bearer of the policy of his Cabinet, he ought, as in Teheran the matter at stake can be only the Oriental question and Central Asia, to draw the Shah to one side or to another, according as circumstances require. He ought either to support Russia against Turkey and England, or both of these against Russia ; he cannot carry on purely French policy, and he has none, moreover, to carry on. That a mediating position of this kind does not become a great nation, I will not deny; it is, more- over, an utterly useless one, for the Persians know well how far they need side with France in this respect. They place, besides, not the slightest importance on the fact whether they stand on a good or bad footing with the French ambassador; for however much the latter may consider himself an influential adviser, as was the case, for example, with Count de Gobineau, the Court of Teheran regards French mediation very much as an innocent amusement. Valueless as French influence in the Persian capital is as regards the Government to which it belongs, it is very disturbing to European or Western interests 1 86 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE generally. As the absorbing of the whole Islam East by Russia cannot and may not once for all be justi- fied by Europe — and hence the frustration of all the efforts of the Court of Petersburg tending towards this end is imposed as a primary duty upon every right- thinking European state — the mediating position of a French diplomatist in Teheran can alone be advan- tageous when the latter, combined with England and Turkey, is inclined to lead the Persian king to a course opposed to the plans of Petersburg. Unfortunately, this one beneficial service is but little or rarely afforded ; not, perhaps, from a fixed inclination to Russian in- terests, but from want of a guiding principle at all. The representatives of the great nation like to be held in honour at any price. They are satisfied when they can send to Paris bombastic statements and highly important news ; they are enchanted at a hare sent by the sport-loving Persian emperor into the ambassadorial kitchen, and at other trifles of a similar kind ; and thus their vocation, consciously or unconsciously, is wholly neglected. French influence sometimes appears in favour of the Russians, and sometimes against the Russians, but always in an undecided tone ; we cannot, therefore, be astonished when the Persians, famed as they have ever been for intrigue and cunning, say of the French, ^^ Fransiz Jiitsch reng nedared'' (The French have no colour). The English Embassy, who may be regarded here rather as the extreme outpost of India than as a regular representative, is required chiefly on account of the Afghan disputes; but in spite of the constant turmoils, the affairs of Herat, and the frontier disputes ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 1 8/ of Sigistan, it has never neglected to do its utmost towards the restoration of a better state of harmony between Turkey and Persia. John Bull walks always arm-in-arm with the Sunnite representatives at the Persian Court. This alliance exists sometimes secretly, as, for instance, in the time of Sir Henry Rawlinson, who, in order to please the Persians, forbade all open intercourse with the Sunnites ; at other times it is quite free and open, as, for example, at the present day, when Charles Alison is called the Christian Efendi by the Persians, on account of his striking adherence to the Turkish Embassy. Of course personal interest dictates an entente cordiale of the kind, and it may almost be regarded as certain that English insinuations would not only produce peaceful feelings between Turks and Persians in the Persian capital, but would consider- ably support the latter in their progress in European civilisation, if Russia, who desires anarchy and strife at any price, and who has aimed at it from the time of Peter the Great up to the present day, did not here come forward and check our common task in the East. That Russia behaves in such a manner will not appear new to any one ; it is only surprising that the Persians, arch-intriguers as they are. Orientals innately accustomed to every diplomatic device possible, do not perceive the fatal character of this policy, when, not only at home and in every question, but even at foreign European courts, they appear in brotherly concord with the Russians, their future patrons. Persia is represented in Constantinople, London, Paris, and Petersburg ; in Constantinople the longest, and in Petersburg only recently. When I mention that Mirza- 1 88 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Husein-Khan, the present plenipotentiary of the Shah on the Bosphorus, not only one of the most gifted, but decidedly the most gifted diplomatist the Persians possess, in spite of his residence at an Islam court, lives on terms of closer friendship with Prince Labanoff or General Ignatieff, than with the gifted Fuad-Pasha or Ali-Pasha, I shall be told that it is a usual custom for the ambassador to attach himself rather to his diplo*- matic colleagues than to the civil functionaries of the Government to which he belongs ; still is it not a striking circumstance that a similar state of things exists in Paris, London, and Petersburg ? Why do not the representatives of the Shah and the Sultan, at any rate, keep more closely together, when the pre- servation of their interests against a common adversary is involved ? And why should the tall fur caps of the Persians be more seen in Baron Budberg's ambassa- dorial palace on the Seine than in the Rue Presbourg with Mehemmed-Djemil- Pasha ? Why should the subjects of the Shah in foreign countries where there is no Persian representative, be consigned rather to the protection of the Russian Embassy or the Russian Consulate, than to a Turkish ? It is remarkable that the Turkish and Persian ambassadors carefully avoid each other even at public soirees. I have seen with repugnance, both in Paris and London, how the representatives of the great Islam states, although meeting under the hospitable roof of the same host, intentionally avoid each other. Without much political acuteness, it is easy to see that this outward behaviour is only a consequence of thoroughly hostile feelings. The Persian will vote and ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 1S9 intrigue against Turkish interests whenever it is possible to him ; indeed, with sparkling irony he will place the Osmanli ahvays in the shade that he may distinguish himself at his expense. Yet, after all, is the conception of European civili- sation greatly different in these two Mussulman govern- ments ? What the simple, honest Osmanli understands by the expression " a la Franca " is tolerably well known from the recent changes in Constantinople ; from the institutions which have been formed there, and are yet to be formed there ; and, in fact, from all the works of the Turks which evidence a friendliness towards Europe : but what the Persians comprehend under that mighty elixir, " civilization europeenne," is far less transparent, and it will not be superfluous to explain what it means. The Persian — the Asiatic who prides himself on his wit and genius, who was called even in bygone times, *' le Frangais de I'Orient " (a title not very flattering to either) — like many other gifted scholars, without troubling himself with the elements of study, desires to be at once learned, at once European. Instead of acquainting himself with languages or other normal-school subjects, the military pupil sent to Paris wishes at once to study engineering and strategy, he wishes at once to become an able general ; and just because at any price he desires to be different in every- thing from the Turks, the forerunners of European instruction, we often meet with the strangest mistakes committed in this branch of study on the part' of the Persian Government. Apart from the many thousand ducats which the otherwise penurious Government of the Shah expends in the establishment of looms, 1 90 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE cannon-foundries, and glass-manufactories, which, how- ever, soon go to ruin for want of workers and from a superabundance of fraud, the way is strangely blocked up in Iran to the introduction of European articles of industry. Thus, when on one occasion, in some military arrangements, the ministers found that, in consequence of certain commercial circumstances, the price of but- tons rose too high, they despatched some Persian students to Paris to be instructed in the noble art of button-making. It was on my return to Trapezunt that I met these accomplished artisans on the Persian fron- tier. The Parisian student-life was still plainly apparent in them, and I could not refrain from laughing when the young Persians began to inform me of the spirited conduct of their Government, which did not spend money like the Turkish Government for the theoretic cultivation of its sons, but turned them into practical men — ue,, button-makers. Similar, and still greater mistakes, are perceptible also in the native schools, in which the Persian youth, who are really naturally gifted, are said to be instructed in Western culture and science. Persia is more remote than even China, in conse- quence of the difficult land journey which separates it from Europe. The number of European fortune-hunters is smaller here than elsewhere, and thus the choice of teachers, instructors, etc., is far more difficult. Shall we be astonished, therefore, if the , Government employs many an honest artisan from the West as a doctor and district physician t if many a simple photographer here becomes a professor of chemistry } if many a brave and adventurous swordsman rises to be an engineer officer, or a general high in command } ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. I9I Similar metamorphoses were to be met with through- out the East during our present century. They are not to be avoided at first, and they are only animadverted on among the Persians, because, unconscious that they are in the shade compared with other Mussulman nations, they consider themselves the first and best of their kind. The observer of the differences between Persia and Turkey will not be surprised, if he has attentively followed the unbroken chain of provocation, hostility, and childish rivalry, to see by the daily press that the outbreak of a Turkish and Persian conflict is closely impending. This outbreak is to be feared, as in ancient times, on the western frontier of Iran, just where it borders on the Pashalik of Bagdad, in that province which has been always one of the most sacred spots in the Ottoman State, and, moreover, the quarter in which the Ministry of the Interior in Turkey has committed most errors. Apart from the fact that the governors of Bagdad have to act sometimes with the Bedouin races, the Benilam, and the Montefidsch, who roam over the Arabian peninsula, and whose subjection under the Porte is much the same as the dominion of the Turkomans under the rule of the Shah, and that at other times they are en- tangled in open feud with the Kurds, those restless adventurers in the north, it is nevertheless the frontier disputes with the Persian Government which prove the most difficult to the administration. Up to the present day it has been almost impossible radically to remedy the evil. From the possession of unlimited power, the caprice and avarice of the civil functionaries in question have placed the Porte in constant embarrassment. When 192 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE the idea was entertained of limiting their authority, and sanctioning all their arrangements from Constantinople, the immense distance and the want of communication appeared at once as an impediment. Gentle governors were just as quickly circumvented by the Persians as passionate and warlike ones, and even occasionally came into hostile collision. Thus the administration of the famous Serdar Ekrems Omer-Pasha was a true time of terror to the Persians. While the name Omer in itself was thoroughly hated by them, all possible malice against the Shiite believers was imputed to him as a renegade ; and although the Porte appointed after him as governor of Bagdad the sleepy, aged, and naturally inactive Serkiatib Mustafa Pasha, his successor, Namik-Pasha, a man passionate by nature, a fanatical Sunnite, and a Mohammedan zealot, was obliged to destroy every possibility of a good understanding in his efforts to repair the errors of his predecessors. During the whole period of the rule of Namlk-Pasha, who was summoned to Constantinople as Minister ot War, not a month elapsed in which a diplomatic corre- spondence full of the grossest invectives did not pass between these two Governments through the Ottoman Embassy in Teheran on the one side, and the ambassador at Constantinople on the other. Sometimes the point in question was the violation of some frontier line, some- times it was to excuse the irruption of some Kurdish hordes ; sometimes an official or prince proscribed in Persia had fled to Turkish soil, sometimes a Turkish officer accused of theft or breach of faith had escaped to the Iran territory. These political renegades were care- fully welcomed on both sides; in fact, they even laboured ANGLO'RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 1 93 to surpass each other in munificence. Not inconsiderable is the sum which the respective Governments expend on such individuals in the form of a pension. The green book of the Persians which appeared in May 1868, and which was sent to the foreign ambassadors at Teheran (a ridiculous imitation on the part of a government which not only has no idea of a constitution, but not even of government generally), may place the matter in as strong an anti-Turkish light as possible, although neither of the two disputants can wash his hands of all offence ; nevertheless, it is not to be doubted that the Court of Teheran alone, and its policy, instigated as it is on the part of the Russians, is unceasingly scattering the seeds of discord, and is endeavouring with its utmost power to effect an open outbreak. All that I hear said of fortifying Teheran, of concen- trating troops on the frontier, and, in a word, of warlike preparations, seems to me to be over- hasty. The youthful Nasreddin Shah, thirsting for laurels, in which his reign, moreover, is not very rich, may well feel some desire to compete with the Turks, a desire which will certainly cost him dear, owing to the miserable condition of his army ; still the Turkomans, and the civil war raging on his frontier in Afghanistan, will preserve him from mis- fortune. If Russia were a second time to attempt to settle the Oriental question by a Crimean war, Persian neutrality would not be as certain as it was in 1854. But it is not only in the recent disputes that I would lay the blame of disturbing the peace upon the Court of Tehe- ran; it deserves this blame all through, and on every occa- sion. It is alone the fault of the Persians that the religious breach between the two sects has become a political cleft, N 194 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE as we pointed out at the beginning of this paper. This is best proved by the fact that Persians, who inundate all the commercial towns of the Ottoman Empire, are not half so much hated by the Sunnite Turks as the Turks are hated by them ; for in Iran every subject of the Sultan is not only exposed to all possible ignominy on the part of the rude mob, but in many places is com- pelled to pay a shameful tribute called the Sunnite tax. Subjects of the Persian king live from Belgrade to Cairo, from Basra to Antivari, without any oppression or constraint ; indeed, the simple Osmanli is far rather so friendly in his feelings to the Persian that he enters into relationship with him as far as his religion allows him. What would the Persians do with a Sunnite in Shiraz, in Yezd, or in Kerman, where the latter would be far from the protecting power of the Ottoman ambassador? Neither the magistrates of the place nor the Shah, nor' any human power whatever, could protect him from malice and fanaticism ; his continuance there would be an impossibility. Is not this want of regard for equality of treatment in itself a crying injustice in pohtical life ? Does not such a voluntary or involuntary intolerance sufficiently denote barbarism? This arrogant behaviour on the part of the weak Iran towards the Ottoman Empire, which in every respect is more strong and power- ful, plainly manifests the want of political maturity and sense of justice in the self-conceited ministers of the Shah. Yet we can bring forward a second and still more impor- tant fact, which must not be overlooked by the impartial observer of East Mohammedan affairs. In the whole dominion of Islamism there is only one point at which it comes in contact with its foe, Christianity — only one ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 1 95 point at which, weakened and humbled, it is exposed to the attacks of its powerful enemy. This point is Turkey, If only one spark of unity existed among the different Mussulman states, they would altogether, and with com- bined power, aim at the protection and guardianship of this one point ; for they must know that if this bulwark received a breach, or was broken down, they would all be abandoned to the will of an invincible power. That Turkestan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Morocco, and the other infinitesimal states of Mussulman faith, have never thought of this, and do not wish to think of it, is injuri- ous enough to them, but in their condition of barbarism it is not to be wondered at. All the more, however, is the fact astonishing on the part of Persia. Since that land possesses the oldest political tie of all, it ought most to perceive the common danger, and yet it most of all presses with hostile feeling against this one point, with which its safety is interwoven. I have before remarked that in the Crimean war, when the Western knights of the Cross entered the lists on behalf of the Crescent, the Persian sun and lion inclined rather towards the north, and were only with difficulty restrained from entering into a Russian alliance. But not only was this the case then, but on all occasions when Turkey is attacked by Christian foes we see the subtle but thoroughly infatuated Persians joining the enemies of the Crescent. Ever since the time of Peter the Great,'Persia has directly or indirectly supported all Russian plans : it coquetted with Mehemmed-Ali at the time of the in- surrection ; it attempted to make common cause with every recreant vassal of the Porte; and I am firmly convinced, that if the Oriental question were to draw 196 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE nearer the critical moment of its solution, the Persians would join those who voted most eagerly for the expul- sion of the Turks from Europe. Truly a laughable parody of Persian sagacity and diplomatic wisdom ! What the Turks lack refers not so much to Persia alone as to all other Mussulman states. Just as the rulers of the Osman house were speedily lulled into sweet sleep by the delicious sound of the waves of the Bosphorus when once they had held them in possession, giving up all vast political ideas, and only here and there seeking an alliance in Eastern Asia, as appears recently from a correspondence of Sultan Murad with the She'f- bani dynasty in Bokhara; so, not from contempt, not from hate, but far rather from lack of governing principles and from cold indolence, they have made but few advances towards Persia. Only since the regular diplomatic alliance with Europe was entered into have they sent embassies in exchange for Shah-Benders (consuls) ; but even in this they have been too sparing. Iran has consuls and agents in Bagdad, Basra, Erzeroum, Trape- zunt, Constantinople, Smyrna, Beirut, Alexandria, Bel- grade, and Salonica ; Turkey has only an ambassador at Teheran, a consul at Kirman-Shah, and this of the Shiite religion, and in Ispahan the shadow of an agent. Is not this a strange circumstance, showing in all its nakedness the slsepy character of the Osmanli } Indolence, there- fore, and not an hostility on principle, must be assigned as one cause why the Persian disputes which arise from time to time are not at once adjusted on the part of the Turks. In Teheran the Persian authorities are occupied with empty intrigues, and with still more empty progress ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. TQ/ in civilisation ; and quietly dwelling in the interior of the continent, they seem to wish almost to ignore what the Turks have to suffer from the diplomatic communications of accredited ambassadors, from the momentous questions in Crete and Epirus, from their ever-increasing pecuniary embarrassments, and from compulsory plans of reform, &c. Turkey is fully occupied, whether it is her own fault or no. Truly Persia would accomplish far more in her own interest if she would guard as much as pos- sible against the provocation of her neighbour, and would aim at peaceful unity. At present, thoughtful discretion may still avail ; but if once the neighbour's house is in flames, it will assuredly be too late. 198 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE HERAT AND THE CENTRAL ASIATIC QUESTION (1869). To speak of Herat is considered, in the eyes of the new political school of Anglo-Indian statesmen, as no longer Seasonable, and, indeed, as utterly fruitless. The policy of Lord Auckland's time is condemned as narrow, in order to impart all the greater lustre to the more recent views of so - called indifference. To speak of Herat as the gate of Central Asia has become downright dangerous. I venture, nevertheless, to designate the old seat of the magnificent and science-loving Hussein- Mirza-Baikara by this epithet, and this simply from personal experience and actual evidence that the city on the Heri-Rud, forms on the one side towards the banks of the Oxus, the true gate to the vestibule of Turkestan, by which I mean the northern chain of the Paropamisus range and the Khanates of Meimene and Andchoi ; and on the other side the true gate to the vestibule of India, by which I mean Afghanistan. Any one who has passed Herat on the way from or to Bokhara will have perceived this for himself. On the way from north to south, from Kaisar to Meimene, the ever- increasing ascent becomes more and more perceptible ; ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION I99 arrived at Murgab, the traveller has lofty mountains before him ; and in Kale-No his path is impeded by steep walls of rock and mountain ranges more than 8000 feet high, on the summit of which the snow rests even in the midst of summer. I shall never iforget the fearful evening which I spent on these heights, when I found in September the snow of the previous year 8 feet high. The declivity is equally rapid, and when from the foot of the mountain the eye rests on the town and environs of Herat, situated in a luxuriant plain, and enjoying a soft climate, owing to its protection from the northern winds by the gigantic natural screen, one readily agrees with the natives when they say that God chose Herat as a resting-place, both for those who are hastening forwards to the toils of burning India, and for those who are passing on to the torments of rude Turkestan. It is true I have heard that fear of the Salar Turko- mans has created this Central Asiatic highway over these steep mountains, and that Herat can be reached more quickly and easily in going from Meimene towards the west. Yet, strikingly enough, we have no historical data respecting this highway; for even in past centuries, as the ruins of caravanseries sufficiently testify, the road lay in its present direction. Herat, however, is not a resting-place created by nature ; but it has ever been a mighty emporium for the commercial relations of Persia and India. When the gates of Herat are closed, trade on the Indus, in Bokhara, and in Ispahan will stagnate. To pass Merv is impossible, or at any rate most unpleasant, not only on account of the predatory Turkomans, but also on account of the barren steppes ; and I can well 200 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE understand how, at the time of the last siege of Herat by Dost - Mohammed, caravans preferred to endure a quarantine of two years at Meshed, than, by evading Herat, to choose another route. However much, therefore, the before-mentioned diplo- matists of the Anglo-Indian school, both in Calcutta and London, have struggled against the acceptance of this fact, the Orientals have always known this city as possessing the characteristics we have denoted ; they have perfectly seen its importance ; and how much the neighbouring states have contended for its possession is proved by the more than fifty sieges which Herat has had to endure — sieges which have taken place not so much for the sake of the rich soil that surrounds it, as on account of the desire for conquest with which it has inspired sometimes India and sometimes Central Asia. With the exception of Baber, almost all the conquerors of India and Transoxania have placed great importance on Herat ; in a similar sense it forms at the present day the apple of discord between Persia and Afghanistan, or more justly, indirectly ^that between Russia and England. It can therefore surprise no one if Russia, who is quite Oriental in Asia, shares the same views with the Orientals as far as regards the importance of Herat. The contests under Mehemmed Shah, under whose command Russian engineer officers actually took part in the siege, are too recent for a recapitulation of the events to be necessary. Ever since a strong interest has been felt on the banks of the Neva for the city on the Heri. Previous to 1840, the Russian ships of the line had never felt themselves quite at home in the ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 201 southern waters of the Caspian Sea ; at the present day a firm footing has been gained in Ashurada, and paid Turkoman chieftains have paved the way for Russian propaganda, not only among the Yomuts, but also among the Goklens. The Russian consul in Astra- bad sends presents to the Kurdish chieftains of Kabu- shan, as well as to the grey-bearded sheiks of the Teke-Turkomans. And if armed bodies of Cossacks are to follow the pioneering propaganda, our self- satisfied English diplomatists will be utterly astonished to find in what a short time a Russian force landed at Astrabad can repair to Herat along the northern frontier of Persia. The distance from Astrabad to Meshed is reckoned generally as somewhat more than sixty geographical miles, a journey which can be easily accomplished through a fertile region within eight or ten days, so that even an army of more than 30,000 men need not be perplexed as to its commissariat. From Meshed to Herat a caravan goes in ten days, and an army travels the distance in eight days ; here also there is no lack of food and water for the animals, and nothing but the unreliable character of the population, since it forms the highway for Turkoman attacks, renders it necessary that pro- visions should be taken for the two or three days from Djam or Meshhedi-No. A regular army, therefore, even if endangered by Turkoman hordes, can be trans- ported within twenty days at most from the Russian vessels to Herat. Moreover, the transport is combined with less fatigue than on any other route in Central Asia. From what we have here said it will probably astonish no one that the Russian diplomatists, not 202 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE sharing the ideas of their English colleagues, consider Herat, this true gate of Central Asia, on the one side, as the advanced work of the difficulties to be fought with on the banks of the Indus ; and on the other, they regard it as a secure starting-point for their plans on the south, besides being a strong defence against a possible surprise upon the acquisitions they have al- ready made in Transoxania ; hence it will not appear superfluous to any one to become better acquainted with the fate of this city since the death of Dost- Mohammed, to learn something of the political opinions of its inhabitants, and to consider the important part which is reserved for it in the future. When in June 1863, Dost-Mohammed-Khan sur- rounded Herat with a rather considerable and well- equipped body of troopS; the Shah of Persia had to be restrained by force — so, at least, the Persians would have us believe — from not hastenins: to the assistance of his oppressed vassal. Sultan Ahmed-Djan, with the forces kept ready in the neighbourhood of Meshed. It is true Sultan Ahmed was much devoted to the Court of Teheran. Nasreddin^s name shone on the Herat coins ; Nasreddin's name resounded in the Herat mosques at the prayer for the welfare of the ruler ; the Shiite Persians carried their heads high in the old capital of Chorassan, the richest offices were in their hands ; the King of Persia had therefore cause enough to stake life and property for Herat, which he already regarded as a rich pearl in his diadem. Notwithstanding, he did not do so. The conclusion of the Peace of Paris in 1856, according to which his actual participation in the Herat affairs was to be regarded as a casus belli against ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION 203 England, kept back his army on the frontier at Mah- mudabad ; and while Sultan Murad-Mirza, the governor of Chorassan and the commander of the army of observation, an uncle of the Shah, was sending alarming information to Teheran of each small success on the part of the grey-haired Dost-Mohammed, the ruler of Kabul, at ninety years of age, was not only hardly pressing the city on the Heri-Rud, but was even turning his threatening glance to the banks of the Zerefshan. He cherished a feeling of animosity against the father of the deceased Prince of Bokhara — the son was to suffer for it. Muzaffar - ed - Din early perceived the danger that threatened him; he allied himself, there- fore, with the Dost, but it was of no avail. The old Barekzi had settled his own measures, and whether the Emir liked it or not, he was very near crossing the Oxus with Afghan bayonets. In fact, Herat, according to the plan of the unwearied Afghan prince, was to be the centre of new plans of occupation ; an Oriental at ninety years of age, and forming new plans — what an extraordinary phenomenon ! And yet so it was. Dost- Mohammed actually designed to extend the Afghan kingdom in the north not only eastward as far as Belkh, but even westward as far as Tchihardjui — a plan the execution of which had become all the more easy as the minor khanates, such as Meimene, Andchoi, Aktche, &c., were either disputing with each other, or were already tributary to the Afghans. On the other side of the Oxus he had thought of no solid conquests ; his object here was to give a thorough rebuke for an outrageous offence which the dissolute Nasrullah, with whom he had once taken refuge at a time of misfortune, 204 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE had committed not so much against him as against his pretty beardless boy. It was known in Bokhara that this royal misbehaviour would have to be indemnified by heavy lakhs of gold ; nor did the old Afghan aim at anything more, for his eagle eye was resting on far other lands. He desired nothing less than to pay the King of Persia an armed visit ; all English dissuasions and threats could not shake him in this intention. He knew that as soon as he crossed the frontier of Iran, the gentlemen in Peshawur would withhold the yearly support in arms and money ; still Afghan vengeance is intimidated by no combination of circumstances, and his death was the only reason that prevented his invad- ing Iran with a force far superior to the Persians. It was evening when Herat, after a most obstinate defence, fell into the hands of Dost-Mohammed. On the following morning, at ten o'clock, he intended making his entry into the city, when death unexpect- edly surprised him. A violent altercation which had arisen between him and a common Afghan soldier caused the slight colic which had troubled the Dost for some time to turn into a dangerous and fatal illness. He died in the early morning, in perfect possession of his senses, just as he was about to begin his morning devotions. Instead of making his entry on his splendid battle-horse, surrounded by a brilliant suite, he was carried in on his bier, and was followed by a mourning multitude. Had he entered the city alive, he would just as little, in consequence of the devastating balls of his artillery, have found a shelter there as now, when his corpse, for want of one uninjured mosque, was obliged to lie in the open street, surrounded by pious ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 20$ Ulemas. It was hastily borne to Khodja-Abdullah- Ansari ; and the last clod of earth thrown upon his grave may be regarded as the black seal which con- signed to death for a long time, if not for ever, the future of a united and great Afghan kingdom. Herat was taken, the power of the Afghans had reached its zenith, and the members of the family of the deceased Dost-Mohammed had not met for the funeral feast, the libations for the funeral meal were not prepared, when the ambitious son, grandsons, and great-grandsons began to kindle those sparks of dispute, the flames of which are still blazing destructively on the banks of the Hilmend and in the valleys of the Hindu- kush. At the time that I was in Central Asia, the dispute between Shir-Ali, the successor designated by the Dost, and Afzal-Khan, the governor of Belkh, or Turkestan, as it is called by the Afghans, a man never loved by his old father, and always regarded with sus- picion, had already broken out. Not only did Afzal- Khan refuse to render to Shir- AH the usual marks of allegiance, but he was even preparing for actual hostili- ties, by making war and devastating the Khanates of Meimene and Andchoi, in spite of his, Shir-Ali-Khan's, persuasions. Whilst the caravan route between Bokhara and Kabul was closed through Belkh, Herat merchants were allowed free passage through Meimene and And- choi. In fact, Shir-Ali knew very well, perhaps even before his father's death, what his brother intended, and he would certainly have obliged him to act differently, if the mesned (throne) had not been so feebly m his grasp in other parts also of the Afghan kingdom. He desired first of all to come to an arrangement with the Persians. The 2o6 . CENTRAL ASIA AND THE report of the taking of Herat — a copy of which I hap- pened to see with the governor of Meshed — was richly- sprinkled with the customary rose-water, denoting hearty friendship ; and although Persia could have known nothing definitely as to the continuance of the Anglo-Afghan alliance after the death of Dost-Mo- hammed, the authorities were moderate enough to accept the offered friendship. In reply to the report of the victory, the ambassador Mehemmed-Bakir-Khan was sent to Herat in the beginning of September 1863. Shir-Ali received him with great friendship ; distinc- tions were conferred upon him such as had never been conferred on any Shiite by the wild Sunnite Afghans ; and although the friendly ceremonials were interspersed with grand manoeuvres and reviews of troops — the splendid Risalez troops and the martial Paltans being brought from Kabul in order to give the Persian an idea of Afghan power — still there was truly a great effort made to show the King of Persia that Dost-Mohammed's successor had adopted a different policy to that of his father with respect to Persia, and that at any rate he desired to remain at peace with that country. Sherbet, robes of honour, splendid horses, and reviews had the desired effect : Mehemmed-Bakir-Khan returned to Meshed fully reconciled ; the Persian army of observa- tion was recalled from the frontier; and Shir-Ali was secure from his most dreaded western adversary. After the termination of this successful strategy, he speedily returned to Kabul; and as a proof of the security he felt, he gave the command of the important frontier city of Herat to his son, Mehemmed-Yakub-Khan, a boy scarcely eleven years of age, whose amusing meeting ANGLORUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 20/ with myself is well known to the readers of my ^' Reisen in Mittelasien." After Herat was thus secured by the desired under- standing with Persia, by the neutrality of the Khanates Meimene and Andchoi, and by the officious service of the Hezare-Djemshidi chiefs, there only remained the Turkomans, who acknowledged no superiority, no com- pact, and no treaty of peace, from whose attacks the town and environs of Herat had to be protected ; yet this was not done until after a combined predatory excursion on the part of the Tekke and Sarik tribes was repulsed in 1865 by the governor of Gurian. The marauders of the desert diminished, the commercial highways were more frequented, and Herat, which recovered from its wounds in an incredibly short time, soon raised itself from the miserable condition in which I had found it. The town and environs flourished, and this under the direction of the before-mentioned youthful prince, who, exerting mind and body, formed such an able champion in the frontier city that he speedily won a name in several battles as the right hand of his father and a skilful general. Herat was now at any rate to be recognised as Afghan property ; and such is still the opinion both of the Court of Kabul and of its neighbour on the other side of the Indus. Both of these regard the present status quo in Herat as a sufficient bulwark against Persia and Russia; but I will prove in the following remarks that both are mistaken. That Herat, up to the present time, has not been able to distinguish itself by a strong adherence to Afghanistan, which for more than three centuries has been wooing it 208 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE — that indeed it has perhaps signalised itself, on the contrary, by the fact that it has ever desired to stand as an independent whole, and has wished to know nothing of the gentlemen at Kabul, rests rather on the ethno- graphical character of its inhabitants than on its political antecedents. The Afghans are in a very small minority there : the whole tract of land stretching from the banks of the Murgab to Ferah, a tract almost seventy miles from north to south, is regarded by the Orientals as belonging to Herat ; the inaccessible Hezerah range is considered by them as the eastern boundary, and that portion of land where the territory of the Shiite Persians begins as the western. On this whole territory, forming almost the fourth part of the Afghan kingdom, there are few or no Afghans ; and the real population — that is, the inhabitants of the towns, who have received from the Afghans the name Parsivan, or, more correctly, Fars- Zeban, i.e., people of the Persian language — are, from remembrance of the past greatness of Herat, most averse to Afghan rule, regarding, as they do, the Afghans as the main destroyers of their national independence, and in this they are tolerably right. It is no wonder, there- fore, that in spite of all religious hatred, the Parsi vans, who are chiefly Sunnites, should incline to the Shiite Persians, their brethren in race and language ; and this, moreover, from the fact that, in the first place, they feel themselves far more comfortable under the sovereignty of Iran than under the rude yoke of the Afghans ; and secondly, be- cause Iran, which is really satisfied only with the shadow of supremacy, interferes but little with the autonomy of Herat. I impute it to this circumstance that Iran's influence has been steadily increasing there for the last ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION 209 few years, and that several of the villages lying round Herat contain at the present day a considerable number of Shiites, who, on one side relying on Persia, and on the other cultivating intercourse with the Hezerahs, are the best emissaries in the service of the Shah. Far higher, however, than their esteem for Persia is the value placed by the people of Herat upon those princes under whom they could enjoy a certain indepen- dence, although they may be of Afghan descent. Every one, even the simplest peasant, has somewhat to tell of one of these ; and I could enter into their feelings when, at the time of my sojourn in the city, I heard them speak with extraordinary reverence of Sultan Ahmed-Djan, and of his two sons, while they loaded the deceased Dost and his present successor with epithets of ignominy, although both were really Afghans, and were, moreover, related. The ruins in the Mossalla (place of prayer) and the other parts of the neighbourhood called to mind too vividly that flourishing epoch of Sultan Hussein, the Timuride, and the powerful influence which he had exer- cised from his seat on the Heri to the borders of India on the one side, and to the shores of the Caspian Sea on the other, for the people of Herat to desire any foreign rule, however superior to their own. This con- vulsive clinging to political independence has passed in a remarkable manner from the people themselves to those princes, who, as has often been the case of late, have been sent here as vassals. This explains the cir- cumstance that Herat has a history of its own, even under the Afghan rule forced upon it. Immediately after the fall of Herat, the successor of 210 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Dost-Mohammed had nothing else to do but to render the two sons of the deceased Sultan Ahmed- Dj an — the younger of whom was named Iskender-Khan, the elder Shah-Nuwaz — harmless as regards his future plans. Shah-Nuwaz was at once sent to Kabul as a prisoner, and the people of Herat told me with tearful eyes of the heavy chains with which the son of their former prince was loaded. Iskender-Khan had time to escape ; he fled to Belch, and from thence entered into the service of the Emir of Bokhara. He subsequently became notorious from the fact that he was the first Afghan who was faithless to his brethren in the faith, and who went over to the Russians. The fate of this renegade was not unknown in his native city, and most remarkably, as I hear, he was not in the least blamed ; they imputed nothing else to him than that he had sworn allegiance to the Muscovites in order by their help to succeed in regaining his paternal heritage. And although the means were displeasing to a few wild fanatics, the majority of the discontented inhabitants of Herat, to whom the blessing of European rule had been known from the influence exercised by Major Todd, could not be angry at such a step. These two princes were, and still are, the idols both of the Parsivan population and of the numerous Persians who reside in the town and its environs, so that Azim-Khan might very easily have inflicted a great loss upon his enemy Shir-Ali-Khan by the seizure of Herat, if he had not been supporting one of these sons of Sultan Ahmed-Djan in the recovery of that city. That this did not take place, is, in the first place, to be ascribed to the want of sufficient con- fidence with which the children of Ahmed-Djan inspired ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION 2 1 1 the pretender to the throne of Afghanistan, on account of their well-known Persian sympathies ; in the second place, it was impossible to the rival of Shir-Ali, because on his march to Herat he had first to fight his way- through Meimene, Andchoi, and many thousands of the nomad tribes there. Yet the political combinations were not this time very favourable to the wishes of the people of Herat. The expelled sons of their last prince are still outside the frontier of their native soil ; and one, while I am writing these lines, is probably an object of admiration to the Russian ladies in Zarskoe-Selo, since General Kaufmann, as is well known, took him with him to Petersburg. The town and fortress of Herat have not only remained strictly Afghan, but they even became the refuge of Shir-Ali, when, driven from Kabul and Kandahar, he had to flee thither. The citadel, in consequence of this, has been completely restored ; the walls are renewed ; and if I am rightly informed, Dervaze-Irak, the gate opening into the highway that leads to Meshed, has been strengthened with stone breastwork like the Dervaze- Kandahar. In fortifications of this kind, as in all other matters of a military nature, essential use is to be fcnnd in the numerous Anglo-Indian Sepoy deserters who, both at the time of the Sepoy revolution as well as after it, have fled over the Kheiber Pass and entered the Afghan service. Their number is considerable, and although they are inferior in capability to the European instructors in Turkey and Persia, they are of greater use ; for, as Orientals, they are better suited than Europeans for the training of Orientals. Besides the fortification of Herat, still more strength 212 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE has been imparted to this portion of the Afghan frontier territory by a close league with Persia. Whether Shir- Ali-Khan has received actual help from Nasreddin Shah in resuming the civil war, I much doubt ; still a kind of compromise has taken place between them — a compro- mise which was effected on the occasion of the visit of Serdar-Yakub-Khan to Meshed, when he met the Persian king there in the past summer. An unconditional cession of Herat seems not to have ensued : the Shah pro- nounced himself satisfied for this time with a portion of the Afghan Siistan ; for, as is well known, the frontier line of Iran in this quarter was a very weak one, the nomad inhabitants, chiefly Beludjans, having sometimes joined one side and sometimes another. Neither Iran nor Afghanistan was a match for them ; and if the latter, by the cession of this province, thought to make a trifling concession to the former, it was very much mis- taken. Five years ago the Persians had scarcely ventured to set foot on the western territory of the Zare lake. At the present day Persia has already erected some forts on the east ; and it can, if it pleases, by this position in the south, quickly threaten Herat by an attack on Ferrah, a matter which would have been very difficult without the possession of Ferrah. At the present day, while the way is being silently prepared for the great political events in Central Asia, and when Persia, in im- plicit obedience, stands waiting the watchword from the Neva, the ruler of the house of Kadjar will be cautious in taking a step which may even remotely encroach upon the Paris Peace. The friendly and cordial understand- ing will remain for some time undisturbed ; yet, on account of the present calm (May 1869), we have turned ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 2 1 3 our glance In that direction, and we will endeavour, in a few feeble sketches, to discuss the strategic and political value of the city — of that city which, without doubt, within the next ten years, will play a far more important part than was assigned to it in the time of the Afghan war. In the year 1868 my readers may have seen in the English press the expression of indignation with which certain short-sighted politicians met the attempt of the Indian Government — an attempt, perhaps, not even seri- ously intended — to fortify and occupy Herat. The expense was computed at four million pounds sterling, of course a sum ridiculously exaggerated, and certainly only devised because by such a colossal amount it was intended to frighten the tax-paying public at home. The entire Afghan war, in which, five years before and five years after the outbreak, large subsidies and gifts in land and princes, had to be paid to the remotest environs, and in which an army had perished, had scarcely cost twenty miUions ; and now it was wished to make the world believe that the equipment of this town with a garrison would consume in one year the fifth part of the same amount. I will therefore only express, that much as I was astonished at the computation mentioned, yet I was agreeably affected by the idea of such a project, and, unfortunately, it has hitherto gone no further. England ought and must retain Herat, of course in accordance with the Afghans ; for the value of its possession is con- siderably greater than the gentlemen in Calcutta at the time of Pottinger and Todd imagined, and infinitely greater than the gentlemen in Calcutta imagine at the present day. 214 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE That Herat is the gate, in fact the very key to India, will be best proved by a glance at its natural position. I. The two highways, both from the north and north- west, leading to the southern Hilmend and Indus, inter- sect each other here ; for, as we have already remarked, the road through Kabul is dangerous, and is but rarely taken. As the Persian and Central Asiatic merchant, trading to India and Afghanistan, rests at Herat, and considers Herat as the cross-road for caravans, so the army marching from the banks of the Oxus, or from the Caspian Sea, must halt here also. Herat is, I might almost say, the point at which the traveller has to undergo a change of climate in passing from the north- ern to the southern zone. This natural route has, more- over, up to the present day, never been avoided, and can never be so ; the eastern outlet would lead the traveller into the rude Hezerah Mountains, the western into the inhospitable districts of Siistan : for any one proceeding from north to south, nothing therefore is left but to take the old highway, trodden for centuries by caravans, free- booters, and conquerors, which has its starting-point at Herat. 2. Herat has the position of a place surrounded on all sides by nomadic tribes, and may for that reason be considered a secure rampart by the countries both to the south and north of it, as its possessors, by a wise policy, can obtain thousands, and indeed hundreds of thousands of nomad tribes, and other warlike elements, and this has actually been done by the distinguished princes of Herat in past times. It is easier than else- where to negotiate from Herat with the Turkomans, Hezerahs, Djemshids, and Ozbegs of Meimene. The historical importance of Herat is plainly apparent to all ANGLO'R US SI AN FRONTIER Q UES TION, 215 these tribes ; and the sovereign on the banks of the Heri who can make the chiefs of these nomad tribes his vassals, possesses a by no means despicable power Against foes advancing from the north or east. 3. The richness of tie soil, for which Herat was always famous, must not be forgotten. Djolgei-Herat (the plain of Herat) is justly famed as the granary of both Afghanistan and tie northern districts ; and it would be difficult to find a second place in the whole of Central Asia, not except- iig even Persia, where a great, ay, a very great army, could be maintained with such little difficulty as here. Eistern historians tell us of the immense bodies of troops wiich, both under the Timurides and the Sefevides, ard even in Nadir's time, had their winter quarters here. Itwould have seemed almost incredible, if the fact that I lave myself observed — namely, that a great part of the Tirkomans derive their supplies of corn and rice not so inich from Sarrachs and Deregoz as from the plain of lirat — did not strikingly speak in favour of our asser- ti., British) rule in India, which sooner or later must happen, the Mohammedans would at any rate play the principal part" — certainly no rose-coloured conviction as to the future of the so-called Indian Em- pire. And, with such perceptions, will they, lulled in the sleep of security, await the approach of the Rus- sians on the Indus } with forty millions of restless spirits, who for the most part represent the proletariat of India, — for the lazy Indian Mohammedan has only to be idle under the native Mussulman Government, and nevertheless can live, — will they enter into a contest with such a power as Russia } English statesmen might spare themselves the trouble of trying to persuade us to believe such fables. For that they themselves do not believe them, and that the fatal question presents itself ANGLORUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 295 to them with increasing distinctness, is sufficiently proved, partly by the adoption of secret preventive measures, and partly by the tone of mind prevailing among the Anglo-Indians themselves. We will only mention the following instance in rela- tion with this subject : — When, after the brilliant victory of the German arms in France, the clever satire of John Michal Trutz-Baumwoll, in the style of the " Battle of Dorking," appeared in the supplement of the Augsburg Allgemeiner Zeitung, and an English author produced in reply the clumsy work, *' The Second Armada," the English journalists felt that they ought not to remain behind with seasonable papers, and consequently there appeared in the Pioneer a lively and cleverly-written sketch, entitled, "The Battle on the Sutlej." On the banks of the Sutlej, which, as is well known, is the boundary river between India and the Punjaub, the author depicts a battle between Russia and England, in which two hundred thousand Russians are engaged, consequently twenty thousand more than the whole Indian army. While British satirists of this kind almost always make the arms of Albion to triumph at last, the contrary is here the case. The Russian generals have at their disposal a skilled and numerous troop of horse ; and although John Bull fights with his northern rival with his usual perseverance and tenacity, the bad equip- ment and the treachery of the native troops give his enemy the advantage. Russia remains victorious, and annexes the Punjaub as well as Sinde to Afghanistan, which has long been in her possession. I repeat, the whole thing is only a jest, but it is yet characteristic enough of the future policy of the Anglo-Indians. That, 296 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE nevertheless, a similar, though not yet open course of proceeding is aimed at by the Cabinet of St James, is evident from the lead which the Gladstone Ministry has recently taken in the construction of a railway com- munication between England and India. When Colonel Chesney, some years ago,* came forward with the project of the Euphrates line, he was decried in England as an enthusiast. At the present day the Government itself is willing to promote the project of a railroad of 531 1 English miles ; and the press both in England and India speaks warmly of the whole proceeding. As Parliament sent out a committee to examine into the matter, detailed plans gradually came in, with estimates of expenses, the highest of which has at present been stated at ^^41, 600,000 sterling. These expenses are to be borne, not by any single nation, but by all the countries generally through which the line of railroad would pass. We will speak of the ethnographical and political importance of this design in due time, in a paper given to the subject. For the present, we will only remark, that the execution of the gigantic project in England itself, although apparently for the promo- tion of commercial interests, would be in truth under- taken from strategic and political considerations. Russia, with her network of railways, is approaching ever more and more the Central Asiatic lands, and as England does not wish to remain behind in these regions, she is striving to shorten considerably the journey from Lon- don to Calcutta. Hitherto it has taken somewhat less than one month to arrive on the banks of the Thames in an uninterrupted journey from the shores of the Hooghh. Should the projected railway be accomplished, ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 29/ the same journey, according to the plan of Mr WiUiam Low and Mr George Thomas, could be accomplished in seven days, thirteen hours, and twenty-two minutes. In spite of the apparent repose and the sense of security displayed by London poHticians, many things could be mentioned which evidence a perfect consciousness of an inevitable contest and timely measures of defence. Yet Russia also is not standing still, as we have shown. And when we again speak of the position of the Cen- tral Asiatic question, the reader will have no occasion to be surprised at the rapid progress of events. 2q8 central ASIA AND THE A MOHAMMEDAN CONQUEROR IN ASIA (1873). Perceiving the manifold influence which the Christian West exercises on the adjacent Mussulman East in all spheres of political and social life, we must not be sur- prised if in Turkey, Arabia, Persia, in a word, in the whole of Western Asia, we look in vain for those dazzling apparitions, which, like a fata morgana^ emerge from the barren monotony of Eastern everyday life. Our European civilisation, our mental and physical supe- riority, and, lastly, our restless temperament, which de- sires to penetrate and investigate everything, has once for all taken away from the Turks, Arabs, and Persians, and other nations with a famous past, all desire to revel on the field of political and religious adventure. These men with their broad, high, and thick turbans, with their melancholy and submissive expression and sad languishing looks, see themselves interfered with everywhere in all theit movements, and in their whole mode of thought, by the European consular agents and missionaries who surround them. They lack the courage for any freedom of action. No longer the muse, boldly spreading its wings, soars upwards with bombastic song ; ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIEIi QUESTION. 299 no picture exuberant with metaphor is now created ; and as no one any longer ventures to mount the unruly Pegasus of the Eastern Muses, — for the present poetry of Islam is a miserable echo of past melodies, — so no one has the courage to leave the rugged and worn-out path of prosaic everyday life, and through some extra- ordinary deed to attract the attention of those near and distant. Only in the more remote depths of Asia, where our footprints are still rarely to be found, has the charm of a past mode of life still maintained itself; only there was it possible in recent times for a man to arise who has accomplished deeds extraordinary under the circum- stances allotted to him, and who two hundred or even a hundred years ago would have found a place in Asiatic traditions by the side of Djengiz and Timur. In the village of Pishbek, also called Pisked, in the Kurama district, in a part of the Khanate of Khokand lying between Khodjend and Tashkend, about forty-five years ago, Mehemmed-Yakub was born, the son of a Khokand custom-house officer, or more correctly, of a clerk. Like all men of Iran descent, who, under Ozbeg rule, are for the most part entrusted with the work of the pen, as the Ozbeg considers himself alone created for that of the sword, Mehemmed-Yakub, in his earliest youth, held the office of a clerk, sometimes with one, and sometimes with another Khokand Sipahi. " Ability breaks through stone walls," says the Oriental ; and so it happened that he soon became remarkable by his intellectual quick- ness, and was promoted by the deceased Mehemmed- Ali-Khan to the post of a Diwandji (chief collector of customs); in 1847 ^^ was raised by the Kiptchak 300 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE chief, Alim-Kul, to be Pansad Bashi (officer command- ing five hundred men), and entered the rank of the Sipahis. As he was called as a Tadshik to exchange the pen for the sword, it is pretty certain that Mehem- med - Yakub had contrived to distinguish himself in both mental and physical power, and nothing proves the amount of confidence placed in him better than his appointment as commandant of the fortress of Ak- Meshid at a time when the Russian columns were advancing on the right bank of the Sir, with slow but sure step. Praise from an enemy is always the most elo- quent, and so we give far more credence to the Russian statement, according to which Mehemmed-Yakub-Beg is said to have defended with rare heroism the fortress entrusted to him, than tci the ^^hokand report, which reproaches him with having entered into forbidden nego- tiations with the Russians, and with having ceded to them for 12,000 Tillah = 7800 pounds sterling, a lake named Balik-Kol (fish lake) in the neighbourhood of the fortress. After the Russians had taken the fortress in question, Mehemmed-Yakub-Kushbegi seems notwith- standing to have enjoyed the undivided favour of Alem- Kul, then ruler of Khokand ; for as just at that time the Endidjan Khodjas, led by Kodja-Buzurg-Khan, were preparing for an expedition to East Turkestan, and required, at any rate, the moral support of Alim-Kul, the latter placed our hero at the side of the adventurous Khodja, in the capacity of Kushbegi, or Grand Vizier, as it is called in Western Asia. Before, however, we speak of the march of Khodja Buzurg, and Yakub -Kush- begi to the eastern part of the Islam world, it is unavoid- ably necessary to delineate in a few short touches the ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 3OI positon of East Turkestan or Alti-Shehr (the kingdom of the Six Cities) at that time, in order that we may be acquainted with the scene of action open to the new Asiatic conqueror. As early as 1863, when I was at Samarkand, I saw one day my travelling companion, Hadji Bilal, return- ing from the bazaar with pale face and troubled ex- pression. He had received very gloomy news from his home, and as in the course of our intimacy he had con- stantly told me of the fatal desire for conquest possessed by the Khodjas, and had stigmatised these as the main scourge, and, indeed, as the destruction of East Turkes- tan, I supposed from his repeated exclamations, ** Those miserable Khodjas ! those good-for-nothing robbers ! " that another inroad had been made, or that a new civil war had broken out. Nevertheless Bilal himself and I also were greatly mistaken : the blow which on this occa- sion had struck the western part of the Celestial Empire, emanated not from Khokand, but from China itself. Islamism, the arch-enemy of the Buddhist doctrines, which is ever more and more driven back by the mighty influence of our Western civilisation in the west of the Old World, whose period of power there has long ago expired, and who only enjoys the bread of charity, this Islamism will and must conquer for itself fresh territory in the remote East, in consequence of the pressure in the West. It recedes from the one part in order to gain firmer footing in the other ; and it is indeed extremely remarkable how the sparks of the religious doctrines of the Arabian prophet can still grow into a burning flame even on the remote Chinese soil, where indifference in religious matters has always prevailed. It is only lately 302 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE that we have become aware of the fact that China, in its western part, still numbers nearly forty millions of Mohammedans, who for the most part inhabit regions which have long remained concealed to the curiosity of the European traveller ; for it is only most recently that, through the accounts of Baron von Richthofen, Mr T. T. Cooper, and the French expedition to the interior of China, we have been enlightened to any extent with regard to the influence, the powerful position, and the number of the Chinese Mohammedans. The revolution of the Taepings, which greatly undermined the already decaying structure of the Chinese state, must have served to encourage the rebellious inclinations of other non-Buddhist subjects of the Chinese Emperor. In the provinces of Kan-su and Shen-si there is scarcely one place of importance where the Mohammedans were not known as the representatives of prosperity, and as an active united body ; in the south-west province of Ylin- nan they were to be met with in numbers, and they constituted the greater part of the population. And although China is distinguished for its exceeding tolera- tion of all religions, and had certainly never interfered with these Islamites in matters of faith, yet considering the ardour of these Mohammedan fanatics, it appears remarkable enough that it was not till about the middle of the century that they rebelled against their Chinese masters, who, to the horror of the Mussulman, eat swine's flesh, worship idols, and commit other abomina- tions. In the year 1855, the elder of Li-Kian-fu sum- moned the faithful to arms ; this summons was supported by the other elders, and speedily the insurrection spread over the whole western province of Yunnan. ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 303 That in an insurrection in the south-west, the true focus of it must increase in extent, and that the flames would spread to the north-west, where there was no lack of inflammable material, was to be foreseen. There had always existed a connection, both mental and material, between the Mohammedans of Yunnan and the Mohammedans of Shen-si and Kan-su. The latter, who, from a cause hitherto not satisfactorily ex- plained, bear the name Dunganes or Tunganes, had, in consequence of their less settled life, and perhaps also on account [of the greater tract of country over which their dwellings extended, shown far less cour- age against the Buddhist Chinese than their brethren by race and faith had done in the remote south. The Dunganes, the greater part of whom were living in the towns of the old land of the Uigures, Komul, Barkul, Turfan, Urumtchi, Manassi, and Kir-Kara-Usu, were the true medium of the commercial relations be- tween the Chinese and the East Turkestanians, as well as the true channel of the social intercourse between the rulers and the ruled ; the Mandarins could approach them on account of their Chinese nationality, and the East Turkestanians on account of their Islam faith. Moreover, the Court of Pekin could all the sooner em- ploy them as civil and military functionaries, both in Alti- Shehr and in the eastern districts, as the Turkish-Mo- hammedan subjects could carry on business with them far more easily than with the Buddhist-Chinese, whose intercourse with the faithful was impeded by so many causes. That the Dunganes, conscious of their impor- tance to the Chinese state, had ever been distinguished for a specially submissive character, we have never 304 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE heard. In spite of the exceedingly peaceful disposition which has always characterised them, the Dunganes were, on the contrary, ever those who incited the East Turkestanians to reject one order or another given by the anti-Islam Government. Thus, for example, when the magistrates consisted of Dunganes, the picture of the Emperor was not exhibited for public adoration ; they winked at the prohibited growth of the mustache ; the Chinese might not let their swine go about publicly, and many other things of a similar kind. The Dun- ganes were, moreover, zealous^ and indeed fanatical Mohammedans. Without any knowledge of the Arabic language, there were many among them who knew the Koran entirely by heart. Their Mollahs cast the insult- ing epithets of ^' ignorant and unbeliver " as readily at their other Turkestan colleagues as the Bokhariot does at the Osmanli. And that they did not obey the reli- gious law of the Gaza (war against unbelievers), and had hitherto taken no step towards shaking off the Chinese yoke, can only be explained by the fact that, like every son o-f the Celestial Empire who regards with contempt all who are not Chinese, they saw in the East Turkestanian, with his Turkish or Persian language, nothing but a barbarian and a being unworthy of their alliance. The case was quite different with their reli- gious brethren in Yunnan, and not only because they wished to follow their example, but in the hope of pos- sible help, the Dunganes, in 1864, rose as at a given signal in the towns of Urumtchi, Turfan, Kara-Shehr, and Kutcha (more correctly Kotche), massacred the Chinese authorities, who were present only in small numbers, and proclaimed the restoration of a Moham- ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 305 medan rule. That this insurrection could only have been produced by contagion with the eastern provinces of Kan-su and Shen-si, is beyond doubt, although we are completely uncertain respecting the details of events there. All that we know of the Dunganes* insurrection relates only to the before-mentioned towns ; and the first and most important of the successes mentioned is the surprise of Kutcha, where about a thousand Dun- ganes fell upon the Chinese garrison, killing and plunder- ing all who did not confess themselves Mussulmans. As the political disputes in the west of the Chinese Empire in this century had only extended to the frontier towns of Yarkend, Kashgar, and Aksu, and this more remote part had been spared, the Chinese functionaries, in their sleepy carelessness, must have been all the more sur- prised by the Dunganes ; for nothing could resist the excited current of the Dunganes' religious fury ; and in an astonishingly short time they had seized upon the sove- reign power in the territory at the foot of the Thien- Shan mountain, as far as the " Six Cities." In consequence of this unexpected success, the Dun- ganes were now obliged to follow suit with regard to their behaviour towards the native inhabitants of East Turkestan. If Yunnan had not been so distant, and the danger of Chinese chastisement had not been so near, a union of operations would certainly never have been effected; but the Dunganes on this occasion thought better of it, and at the very outset drew the Turkish population in that province into their interests — in fact, in order to render them still more enthusiastic for the success of the insurrection, they placed them- selves under their command. In the Six Cities — for the U 306 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE course of the insurrection was now to take this direction — everything remained in the greatest repose, for the fear of Chinese vengeance, after the unfortunate insur- rection under Weli-Khan-Tore, still pressed heavily on the inhabitants of all these towns; and the East Turke- stanians, a peacefully-inclined people, were, apart from the one fact of religious unsuitability, not so much dissatisfied with the rule of the Chinese as to expose themselves to the danger of a new insurrection. So the people thought ; but their leaders, the Khodjas, descendants of the Prophet in the true meaning of the word, and in reality temporal rulers, or, at any rate, aspirants to be such, were of a very different opinion. The thirst for power and the eagerness for booty in this class of idlers allowed no rest to the oligarchical rulers, veiled in the mantle of religion, and reverenced with idolatry by the simple people. Under the Chinese rule they had to be satisfied with the pious alms which pilgrims placed on the rich graves of their ancestors ; crowns and wealth were now hovering before their eyes ; why should they delay any longer } Little enticement was required with the Khodja-Burhan-ed-Din of Kutcha on the part of the Dunganes, to induce the pious man to mount his horse at the mosque where the deputation found him in the deepest devotion, to unfurl the stan- dard of insurrection at the head of the movement, and, in alliance with the Dunganes, to overthrow the Chinese dominion in the other Six Cities. The pigtailed Mohammedans had indeed hit the right nail on the head. Led by Khan-Khodja (so the before- mentioned Burhan-ed-Din was called), the Dunganes continued their way from Kutcha to Kara-Shehr, and ANGLO-HUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 307 from hence to Turfan, which was taken in August 1863. Soon afterwards they proceeded to Aksu, where the peaceful inhabitants, for the most part Turks or Sarts, surrendered themselves after two days' resistance. The Chinese also in the citadel were speedily obliged to capi- tulate : Uschturfan met with a similar fate ; and the victorious Khan-Khodja then repaired to Yarkend, where the citizens readily joined him, after having put to the sword the Chinese garrison, amounting to two thousand men. We have the particulars of the taking of this town from the English traveller Robert Shaw * According to his account, the Chinese wished at first to come to an understanding with the Dunganes, and to arrange that they should retain a third of all immuni- ties and revenues, with the exception of the supreme command. The Dunganes would not consent to this ; and, as they had assured themselves of the sympathies of the inhabitants, they had only during the night to set the Chinese quarter of the town on fire in several places, in order to make the consternation and anarchy general. All the Chinese who saved themselves from the flames were pitilessly massacred. Nevertheless, the greater number succeeded in gaining possession of the citadel Yengi-Shehr, from whence they offered the most obstinate resistance. A successful diversion, in which about eight hundred Mohammedans lost their lives, was made; but at length the exasperation of the Moham- medans increased to such an extent that they did not shrink from the greatest sacrifices in the siege. The * With regard to dates, Shaw differs from the other authorities. He places the insurrection of the Dunganes in the spring of 1863, while others designate the autumn as the time of the insurrection. 30S CENTRAL ASIA AND THE number of the Chinese meanwhile diminished more and more ; and, as they were no longer sufficient to defend the walls, the fortress was taken by the infuriated Mussulmans. At the same time a frightful explosion was heard : the Amban (the Chinese governor) preferred to abandon himself with his people to destruction rather than fall alive into the hands of the Mohammedans. So frightful was this catastrophe, that some fragments of bodies were even hurled into the old town, and the atmosphere was darkened for hours by the whirling clouds of dust. After such heroism, Yarkend fell into the hands of the Dunganes, and remained almost a year under their authority. Kashgar alone, the real capital of East Turkestan, in the midst of this universal insurrection, had never yet displayed the standard of revolt. It is true here also the Dunganes endeavoured to deceive their Buddhist coun- trymen ; yet the plans of the conspiracy were still kept secret, when the Chinese governor, feigning carelessness, and even friendship, invited them to the citadel, and had them all massacred there during the festivity. The cries and death-groans of the victims speedily found an echo in Kashgar; yet the inhabitants, humbled by Chinese supremacy, did not venture alone to attempt to loosen their fetters. The greatest influence had long been enjoyed here by the numerous descendants of the Khodja-Apak, usually known under the title of Hasret- Majesty. I have lived for months with a scion of this family, and am convinced of the feelings of hostility and rivalry which separate the Kashgar Khodjas from their so-called kindred in Kutcha. Had this not been the case, Burhan-ed-Din, after his success in Aksu, would ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 309 certainly have appeared here also as a conqueror ; yet the Kashgars would know nothing of him ; and, in full consciousness of their extremely critical condition, the leading Mollahs, in conjunction with the members of the Hasreti-Apak family, could do nothing else than secretly turn to the Khodjas of Endidshan, and remain quiet till their arrival. This is the reason that Kashgar at the first remained spared from the flames of revolt rising in all the other towns. In the midst of these expectations from the West, a very different armed power unfortu- nately appeared in this direction. Kashgar is, as is well known, situated on the spur of that high land wliich is bounded on the north by the mountain range of the Thien-Shan, and in the west by the lofty Alai moun- tain and the Pamir plateau. From times past these valleys have been the resort of the cattle-breeding Karakirghises, who, fond of plunder and depredation, like the rest of their race, are distinguished, moreover, by rare boldness. At that period Sadik-Bai was the most important greybeard among them ; and whether the tidings of the threatening anarchy, or the demands of some Kashgar faction may have determined him, at any rate he attacked the Kashgar territory with his wild horde, and indeed for several months kept the town in a state of siege. And after the poor inhabitants had had to undergo all the horrors of famine, and had be- come incapable of resistance, the wild nomads succeeded in penetrating into the town and giving it up to the most unprecedented destruction. Under these circumstances, the Khodjas from Kho- kand were approaching the unfortunate Kashgar ; and here begins the active career of our hero. 3IO CENTRAL ASIA AND THE How the restless Khodjas of Endidshan or Khokand, thirsting for adventure, and awaiting the invitation of their partisans in Kashgar, could have delayed till now to set out for East Turkestan, is inconceivable. Just at this time in Central Asia, from the rapid advance of Russia on the Yaxartes, and the successive defeats which the faithful had suffered at the hands of the Uruss, every one had been thrown into the greatest con- sternation. Khiva did not venture to stir, Bokhara trembled, and Khokand, where Alem-Kul held the reins of government, may even at that time have perceived its fate of dependence on the White Czar on the Neva as a dark phantom on the sky of its future. We do not wish to assert that a sauve qui pent was the order of the day ; yet the conviction was universal that, to compete with the unbelieving Russian would bring no golden fruit. And as East Turkestan had ever been a profit- able field for adventure, it required no special energy on the part of Khodja-Buzurg to penetrate with a small but courageous little troop across the Terek Pass into Kashgar, and there to try his fortune. Khokand, which had always supported these warlike descendants of the former Prince of Kashgar, was not now backward with advice and action. Alem-Kul gave arms and money, but the greatest help he afforded was in sending our hero ; for not only Buzurg-Khan himself, but the whole troop of war-loving Kiptchaks and Khokandians looked with especial confidence on the person of Mehemmed- Yakub, who, experienced in battle, and skilled in arti- fice, had competed with the Russian, having such dia- bolical power at his disposal. He corresponded, indeed, at his first appearance, with the expectations placed ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 3 1 1 in him. The Endldshanians had scarcely arrived un- der the walls of Kashgar than the horde of plundering Kirghises were driven back in wild flight. Their ring- leaders fell alive into the hands of the enemy, and Sadik-Bei himself was amongst those executed. It was an enthusiastic reception which was given by the Kash- gars to the brave little band of Endidshanians ; for now for the first time in this western city of East Turkestan, with the feeling of freedom there was awakened also that of revenge against their Buddhist rulers. The ranks of the Endidshanians increased in a short time in a marvellous manner. At the tidings of the first success, stragglers had joined them from Khokand to the number of five hundred, most of them Kiptchaks ; and Yakub- Kushbegi, who, it was said, had appeared before Kash- gar with only eighty men, had, in the course of two months, such a force at his disposal that he was able not only to surround the citadel of Yengi-Shehr, distant from Kashgar somewhat more than a German mile, but to annoy the Chinese in every way. The laurels were now naturally not so easily gathered as the enthusiastic troop of Mussulmans with their leaders had imagined. The Chinese had never gained the reputation of especial valour, and least of all when opposed to Tartars ; yet the pigtailed sons of the Celestial Empire now made an exception ; it seemed as if they had a consciousness of the decisive nature of the contest — as if they had fore- ' boded that these valleys of the Thien-Shan range would not so speedily see again the dragon standard ; for they defended themselves with a lion -like courage, which would have redounded to the honour of the bravest in any nation. Fourteen months long, the Chinese garri- 312 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE son, oppressed on all sides, offered resistance. When the Amban saw the inevitable end of the drama ap- proaching, he called his chief officers together under the pretext of taking counsel with them respecting the sur- render of the place to Yakub-Kushbegi. The officers gave their consent. They were agreeing together about the presents which should be given to the conqueror, and the Amban, who, surrounded by his daughters, was sitting in his arm-chair smoking his pipe, ordered tea to be handed round by his sons to his assembled officers. The furious battle-cry, " Allahu ekber ! " ('' God is the greatest ! ") was already sounding in the ears of the com- pany, already the wild outcry of the besiegers was heard, when the Amban composedly took his pipe from his mouth and shook the lighted ashes at the opening of a powder mine laid under his chair ; this mine was in connection with the lower story, and with the powder magazine kept there. While the officers were taking counsel together, the mine exploded, and with it the house, the Amban, the family, and all present were blown up into the air. With the fall of Kashgar, the most important, if not the largest town of East Turkestan, the triumph of the Mohammedans over the Chinese was quite complete. Buzurg-Khan, who assumed the position of a new ruler, was for a time satisfied with the government of the town and its environs, and poHtical and military affairs were entrusted to the Kushbegi, who was no less crafty than he was brave. From the lack of hierarchical dignity, the sovereigns at all times, especially in Central Asia, could indulge in the unrestraint of a worldly life ; and while Buzurg-Khan, giving himself up to every excess, caused himself to be honoured as a saint by the populace of ANGLO-A'USS/AN FRONTIER QUESTION. 3 1 3 Kashgar, his energetic Vizier spared no trouble by examples of rare self-sacrifice, by generosity, and by a remarkable sense of justice, to secure the love and adherence of the better classes. From the uncertain and insecure state of East Turkestan at that time, it was evident that, if the direction of affairs were to fall into the hands of an energetic man, he would be able to effect extraordinary things. Yakub-Kushbegi perceived this state of things at the very outset ; on his first appear- ance on the battle-field of events, the plan of his con- quests over all the Mohammedans of the north-west of China stood ready in his mind. The band of bold Endidshanians were still lying before the walls of the Chinese citadel in Kashgar, when Yakub-Kushbegi set out for Yarkend with a few desperate soldiers, though on this occasion he only made himself master of the small town of Yengi-Hissars. Yet at this time he lacked a firm halting-point, for Kashgar was not yet taken ; and continuous communication with the north of East Turkestan, where the Khodjas were still carrying on operations with the Dunganes in Yarkend, seemed too dangerous. Only when Kashgar was taken in the man- ner lately mentioned, did Yakub-Kushbegi begin to advance towards the realisation of his real design, by entering into open hostility with the Khodjas. If the latter had been strong enough to forestall the Endid- shanians in Kashgar, the career of our hero would have become impossible ; yet at that time the whole revolu- tion along the northern chain of mountains from Komul to Utchturfan was in its earhest phase. The Chinese kept the Dunganes in check, and as the latter could not hasten to the assistance of the Khodjas in alliance with 3 14 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE them, Yakub-Kushbegi found the field in the west open, and after conquering the Chinese, he turned his arms towards his Mohammedan rivals. The Khodjas natu- rally saw through the reasons of the hostility. Scarcely had Kashgar passed into the possession of the Khokandians, than an army of Dunganes and Khod- jas, joined also by several Yarkendians, was on the point of marching to Kashgar. At Khan-Arik, or, according to others, at the river Kizil, both Mohammedan armies met in battle for the first time, Yakub-Kushbegi gaining the victory, owing to the valour of his Kiptchak auxi- liary troops, or, probably, to his own superior military ability. The Yarkendians, it was said, were the first to take flight ; the Dunganian soldiers made a long resist- ance, and were enticed over to Yakub-Kushbegi's side by presents and other promises ; in fact, they allowed themselves even to be used as tools, in inducing their brethren, who had remained in the Yarkend fortress, to surrender to the conqueror. This, of course, led to no lasting result, for the inevitable antagonism between the two parties who desired to succeed to the Chinese power in East Turkestan, namely, between the Khodjas of Kutcha and the Khodjas of Endidshan, was at this time an undeniable matter ; both were thoroughly convinced that the victory of the one must bring about the over- throw of the other, and with this feeling the utmost possible efforts were made. Judging from the circum- stance that the Dunganes were always considered as foreigners in the land, and that they were regarded as men who had yielded themselves as willing tools of the Chinese tyrants, their fate was sealed from the first. Yarkendians no less than Kashgarians could place little ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 3 I S confidence in them, nor in their allies, the Khodjas of Kutcha, who, it is true, justly behaved as the national party, and had, indeed, acquired much merit in the expulsion of the Chinese. Kashgarians aad Yarkendians all along awaited help alone from the west, and the able Yakub-Kushbegi had only to appear on the field, and secretly all were favourable to him. It happened, more- over, that, in his plan against Yarkend, he was secretly informed of the movements of the Dunganes by a certain Niaz-Beg, who held a prominent position in the fortress ; it was no wonder, therefore, under such circumstances, that a month's siege placed him in possession of this largest city of East Turkestan. This was about the spring of 1865. Master of the two most important places in East Tur- kestan, the bold adventurer of Khokand, whom success had made popular, came forward all the more freely in his efforts after sovereign power. Buzurg-Khan, of whom we have already spoken, was only the shadow of a king ; he kept aloof from events, and was aroused from his careless life in the very first weeks of his arrival at Kash- gar by the growing importance of Yakub-Kushbegi, And although he did not venture to interfere with his Vizier out of fear of being removed by violence, the latter nevertheless, to prevent possible disorders, set aside his master ; he had him placed in honourable con- finement, and subsequently, at the request of others, this was exchanged for free dismissal, with the condition, however, that Khodja-Buzurg, as became a pious descen- dant of the prophet, would prepare for a pilgrimage to distant Arabia. The Khodja in consequence, only accompanied by a few followers, quitted that land in 3l6 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE the dress of a Hadski which he had shortly before entered with such plans of sovereignty ; and although, instead of going to the plains of sunny Arabia, he took a circuitous route through Kabul and Bokhara to his home in Endid- shan, there was a complete end of his sovereignty. The Orientals have always been accustomed to recognise the immediate accomplisher of power as the true possessor of power. This, in earlier times, was the relation between Timur and the Tchagataish prince of Samarkand ; cen- turies later between Nadir-Kuli-Khan and the mock prince Thamasp ; and this relation existed all the more between Yakub-Kushbegi and Khodja-Buzurg, as the former was the real organiser of the army, the conqueror of the foe, and the restorer of order. In this capacity he was acknowledged not only by the Turkestanians, but even by many of the former adherents, and even rela- tions, of the Khodja ; and had he not raised himself to the throne after the taking of Kashgar and Yarkend, the enthusiastic troops in conjunction with the Turkestanians would have forestalled him in the choice of a sovereign. Thus Yakub-Kushbegi was sovereign of part of East Turkestan. In Khokand, of course, where Alem- Kul meanwhile had been killed by his enemies, and where Khudajar-Khan was endeavouring by the successes of the Khodjas under his protection to recover from the losses he had suffered from the Russians, Yakub- Kushbegi could in nowise reckon on unanimous ad- miration. For apart from the fact that he would not hear of any connection with the Mohammedan state on the west, he had, moreover, by the deposition of the Khodja, removed the channel of mediation, and was now left to himself. It is not to be denied that, in ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 317 establishing his power, he not only employed extra- ordinary caution, but craftiness; and when circum- stances required it, he even made use of unscrupulous barbarity. In order to secure his position in the con- quered towns of Kashgar and Yarkend, Yakub-Kush- begi had won over to his interest the greater part of the Khokand Khodjas, by bestowing on them lucrative appointments ; he had drawn the natives to his side by strict measures of public order and of jurisdiction, and especially by adhering to the duties of religion. His sovereign power was scarcely a few months old, when, feeling himself secure in the rear, he could repair to the south, to Khoten, to continue his conquests. Khoten, or Iltchi, as the Turks call it, had likewise, towards the close of the year 1863, thrown off the Chinese yoke, and at the same time had chosen as its sovereign a Khodja of high importance, named Hadji- Habi- bullah. The venerable old man, eighty years of age, had only returned two years before, through India, from a pilgrimage to the holy cities of Arabia ; and he had striven heartily against his elevation to the throne, just as much as he had against the modest badge of Islam learning, the delight of the band of believers placed under him. He it was who in 1866 gave such a warm reception to the English officer W. H. Johnson, the first European who had visited Khoten. The English- man, who had been attracted by a love of adventure to this south-eastern part of the Six Cities, had, it is true, soon to pay for his rashness by a long involuntary sojourn there, as the old Khan conceived the wonderful idea of not letting him go until the English furnished him with troops and arms against the attack he was 3l8 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE fearing on the part of the Chinese and Khokandians ; but this, of course, was not done. Johnson returned home, happily; but the fears of the old Habibullah proved themselves, as regards the Endidshan, Yakub-Kushbegi, not at all groundless. Immediately after the taking of Yarkend, the latter entered into negotiations with the aged priestly sovereign, in which he still entitled him "pater venerabilis," and in this way allured him into his trap. For a time the old man resisted, in conse- quence, we are told, of the suggestions of his two sons. The matter was protracted for two years, and as Yakub- Kushbegi perceived that letters effected nothing, he repaired in person to Khoten, in order, it was said, to express his fraternal esteem for the great sovereign, but, in truth, to appear there as a conqueror ; for, for this object he took with him ten thousand men, a suite in nowise necessary for a visit of courtesy. Compliments followed compliments, and when the good Habibullah was trustful enough to appear in the camp of his guest, he was at once arrested, and was made to sign in the camp, with the signet ring on his finger, the pseudo- summons to submit to Yakub-Kushbegi. A great part of the people obeyed. The Endidshanians meanwhile approached the town, took possession of it in spite of its resistance, and Khoten, with its seat of government, its treasures, and the numerous harem of the Habibullah family became the booty of Yakub-Kushbegi, It may be mentioned, as an interesting episode, that the women distributed among the conquerors revenged themselves terribly for the treachery committed against their aged master. They surprised their new husbands in the night, murdered them all and themselves — an act of ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 319 vengeance which came very opportunely to Yakub- Kushbegi, for the poor Hadji HabibuUah, with all his sons and principal relatives, under the pretext of being the authors of the treachery, were obliged to atone for it by their lives. This inhuman act of Yakub-Kushbegi occurred to- wards the end of 1866. The result procured for the conqueror, at any rate, a considerable increase of power. For Kashgar, Yarkend, and Khoten numbered alone more than seventy thousand houses or families. And if Yakub- Kushbegi had even had the best intentions of remaining at peace with his rival in the north, the fact that the Khodjas of Kutcha, who desired to form the national party of the country, could in nowise consent to let their influence flag, stood in the way of any future peace. The conqueror had, as we have before observed, fully estimated this fact, and when he had completed his work in the south-east of Turkestan, and saw his rear secure from Kashgar to the lofty chain of the Kuen-Luen mountains, nothing else was left to him than to turn his arms against the Mussulman adversary in the south. The contest which the new sovereign of East Turkes- tan was entering upon with the Khodjas in the north, was for this reason far more serious and more doubtful in its issue, inasmuch as it was no Gaza or religious war, but solely a matter of personal ambition. Yet a successful adventurer in the East knows how from the first to gain over the minds of others to his own advantage, and the faithful can often even incite to deeds which stand in the most direct opposition to the maxims of Islamism. Thus it happened that Yakub-Kushbegi met with the 320 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE greatest assistance, and even with true enthusiasm, for his cause from the East Turkestanians. It seemed as if the old contest between the Montenegrinian and Montal- banian Khodjas, which raged in this region more than three centuries ago, was animated anew ; for it need scarcely be said that it was the Endidshan strangers who were the most eager for the contest, and Yakub- Kushbegi was wise enough to turn this to his own ad- vantage. Matters were not very favourable with the Khodjas. It is true the alliance which they had con- cluded with the Dunganes was still in full force ; still the latter at this time were not their own masters, and they could not at all assist their western confederates. Bur- han-ed-Din, surnamed the Khan-Khodja, was looking in vain on all sides for help, and so great was his hatred of Yakub-Kushbegi, that he did not shrink from even asking the assistance of the Russians. In 1865, at the time when the Khokand adventurer was employed in estab- lishing his power, the northern priestly sovereign had perceived danger, and had sent a certain Mollah-Latif to the Russian governor on the Issikkol frontier with the understanding that he would in any way assist the Muscovite eagle, if he received some succour against his arch-enemy in Kashgar and Yarkend. Russia, who had not then perceived a fitting conjuncture for interfering in the affairs of the East Turkestanians, naturally refused to afford help, and the good old man was left to him- self. Among the natives of the land, also, this so-called national party found but little concurrence. It was tolerably indifferent to the East Turkestanians in the val- leys whether they remitted their taxes to Burhan-ed-Din or to Yakub-Kushbegi ; and the Tarandjis in the Trans- ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 32 1 111 district were just then too much intoxicated with their recently-acquired freedom to desire to occupy themselves with future plans. The two adversaries therefore confronted each other alone. In the year 1866, Yakub-Kushbegi attacked the town of Ushturfan, the west point of tlie territory of the northern Khodjas. A certain Mohammed-Emin had provoked the inhabi- tants against himself by reprisals and by a dissolute life — for these pious people, as is well known, are the most notorious debauchees. They applied to Kashgar, where the helper stood ready for combat, only awaiting the opportunity. Ushturfan was soon taken ; shortly after- wards Aksu also fell into his hands ; and Burhan-ed-Din had scarcely time to look round him before his enemy was marching to Kutcha, his capital. It seemed as if the northern Khodjas had placed extraordinary confi- dence in their armies, for they advanced half-way from the last-mentioned place to meet the conqueror ; but this did not prevent them from being totally defeated in open battle, and being obliged to retire in all haste to their citadel. Yakub-Kushbegi followed them, and although Kutcha was pretty strongly fortified, the one defeat had taken from them the courage for further resistance. They surrendered at discretion. Twenty of the highest Khodjas were carried prisoners to Kashgar, where for a time they were strictly watched over. Subsequently, if report does not err, becoming reconciled with their fate, they entered the service of the conqueror. Other rest- less minds preferred to go to Mecca ; for the holy tomb has been at all times the resort of those hot heads to whom fortune has not been favourable in their earthly career. The Dunganes' prince alone, Su-Mollah, who 322 .CENTRAL ASIA AND THE would not surrender to the Khokand adventurer, with- drew to- the eastern town of Turfan, where he died some years afterwards. The power of the Khodjas was consequently broken. Yakub-Kushbegi had indeed no longer to fear the Khod- jas on the field., but all the greater was his apprehension with regard to the Dunganes, who had still a consider- able force in the north-west, in the neighbourhood of Urumtchi, and who, convinced that a collision was inevi- table, were actively engaged in preparing for it. For three years, however, the peaceful disposition lasted. Yakub- Kushbegi had meanwhile more and more established his dominion in East Turkestan. His army, which received all those restless spirits who had lost all scope for their adventures by Russia's conquests on the Yaxartes and Zerefshan, had swelled to a great size, and from the circumspection, energy, and perseverance of the con- queror, had acquired a discipline superior to any that had for a long time existed in Central Asia. The Kiptchaks and Karakirghises of Khokand were paid troops. These received a salary of three tillas per month, and arms, clothes, and provisions both for them- selves and their horses. On the other hand, they had to submit to the strictest subordination, and they were regarded as the choice troops of the new conqueror. The second part of the army was formed by the East Turkestanians themselves. Each family was obliged to send into the field one or two men, according as circum- stances required ; these only received daily rations now and then, when the distance from home made commu- nication impossible or difficult. This part of Yakub- Kushbegis army had always been distinguished for ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 323 special devotion to its leader, and it is indeed remark- able how the East Turkestanians, who possess only a small amount of military ability, could have been made such serviceable soldiers. The third part of the army consisted of former Chinese and Dunganese soldiers, who, at the taking of Kashgar,Yarkend, and Khoten, had been forcibly placed in the ranks under the conqueror's standard, and were either employed as garrisons in the towns or as frontier guard against Russia and Khokand. The civil administration of the new sovereign also left nothing to be desired. As after the overthrow of the Chinese rule all bands were loosened, a strict and indeed barbarous regime could all the less be avoided, as the East Turkestanians had for centuries been only thus kept in check. Yakub-Kushbegi gave this regime a national Mohammedan air ; and the Draco-like law with which he treated all disturbers of the public peace, all violation of the laws of religion, and, lastly, all disobe- dience, is almost unprecedented, even in the annals of Central Asia. For a long time the gallows at the gates of the cities in East Turkestan had not beeil so active as they were now under this national Mohammedan prince. The steahng of a fowl, the neglect of a single prayer, indeed the slightest refractory conduct, was punished with death; and that the East Turkestanians did not stig- matise such a despot as a tyrant, and did not abandon the conqueror with terror, must be ascribed to the fact that Yakub-Kushbegi was distinguished on the other hand for strict love of justice and generosity. The governors of a town or province had only to appear two days later with the amount of tribute, and they were at once deposed and their property confiscated, and fre- 324 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE quently they were even deprived of life. On the other hand, the slightest complaint of oppression was sufficient to subject the officer concerned to a strict examination, and woe to him who was found guilty ! Even the personal - relativesand the first companions in arms of the conqueror — as, for example, Yunis Beg, the Dadchah of Yarkend — trembled before their master. As under such circum- stances, in spite of the constant war with the Russians, peace and repose prevailed in the principal cities of East Turkestan, it is easy to imagine that the subjects, in per- fect contentment, only bless the iron hand ruling over them. In the other Khanates also, with the exception of Khokand, the opinion was favourable with regard to the new conqueror. Khiva had sent three embassies to congratulate him on his military successes, while Muz- affar-ed-Din-Khan, the ruler of Bokhara, whom Russian bayonets had humbled, gave the new warrior of the faith (Gazi) the title of an Atalik, which corresponds pretty nearly to the European one of viceroy. This is the reason why the new ruler of East Turkestan received from his subjects, and indeed throughout Central Asia, the name of Atalik-Gazi, and thus he was also styled by the English in Europe. How the deeply fallen sove- reign of Bokhara could give a title to a man far superior to him in power and importance may well surprise many ; yet we have already repeatedly drawn attention to his spiritual authority, and the ruler of Zerefshan, although fallen, still ever considers himself the prince of all the faithful in Central Asia. At length the year 1870 approached. The Dunganes, who hitherto, from fear of disturbing commercial inter- course with the western part of East Turkestan, had ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 325 remained in their defensive position, became increasingly- anxious at the growing power of their enemy ; and in the February of the year above mentioned, they set out from the towns of Turfan, Komul, and Urumtchi, with an army 7500 strong, and directed their march towards Kutcha. When they arrived there, after some days of laborious march, they found the inhabitants of the place strength- ened by a garrison from Kashgar ; this, however, was thrown into disorder by the Dunganes, who, after having entered the city, remained there twelve days, during which time rapine and plunder held their orgies. A similar fate overtook Kurli, as well as the numerous small towns in the neighbourhood. At the time that Yakub-Kushbegi received information of these events, he was at Kashgar, and here he left his eldest son with a small garrison, and set out himself for Kurli. In April he entered the town with an army of eight thousand men, and remained there about eight days, in order to secure the commercial roads of the district; and on this account he promised the Dunganes to restore their property to them if they would grant him their assistance. A reinforcement of five hundred freebooters arrived from the mountain chain of the Thien-Shan. Yakub- Beg was delighted with their help, as they possessed a thorough knowledge of the country, with which a great part of the inhabitants themselves were not acquainted. On his further advance, Yakub-Kushbegi found Kara- Shehr desolate and forsaken ; for Tocksun, which is thirteen miles distant from Turfan, was the first point at which the enemy had again collected its forces. Never- theless Yakub-Kushbegi took possession of the town, and 326 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE remained there fourteen days. As he meanwhile heard that the enemy was approaching, and was concentrating its forces, he fortified himself as quickly as possible, and as he perceived that they remained inactive, he assumed the offensive, and despatched two thousand men against them. As these were however repulsed, Yakub-Kushbegi set out with his central force, and after a hot fight, drove the enemy back to Turfan with a loss of eight hundred men. Yakub-Beg advanced still further, and entrenched him- self on the banks of the river Yar. After resting here for a week, he was attacked by a troop of Dunganes ^v^ thou- sand strong. At first the Sarts, forming the vanguard of the Kashgar army, took to flight, and it required all Yakub-Kushbegi's energy to induce them to turn back ; the remainder of the army however held their ground, and the Dunganes were put to flight. The latter were never- theless not discouraged by this. After a pause of eight days, they again entered into an engagement, but were driven back, and were obliged to seek refuge m Turfan. In this battle the Dunganes lost about two thousand, and the Kashgarians about a thousand men. Upon this Ya- kub-Beg blockaded the town of Turfan, and both armies remained in their respective positions for two months. The fortifications were not so strong as was imagined, and the Dunganes made constant sorties. In one of these, in June, it happened that, under cover of night, they pene- trated into the middle of the enemy's camp, but were nevertheless repulsed. The garrison meanwhile, which amounted to more than six thousand souls, suffered much from hunger ; for this reason, Si-Yanshai, the governor of the fortress, was desirous to come to terms with the Kashgarians. Three times the negotiations were drawn ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION 327 up, and as many times set aside by the Sarts, although they had numerous relations in the Kashgar camp. In this manner the siege was prolonged for three months. Yakub-Beg's troops were however accustomed .to a hard life. Their food consisted of millet bread and occasionally boiled rice, and even this was served out to them only in small quantities. Notwithstanding they were satisfied, and thus proved their thorough discipline; and as Yakub-Beg had only to maintain his Khokand, Kirghiz, and Kiptchak troops, his success was sure. When the Dunganes in Urumtchi perceived that the fall of Turfan could not be long delayed, they began to fear for their own safety, and all the more as the plunder- ing bands of freebooters from the Thien-Shan became increasingly frequent. Yakub-Beg at once saw that now was the favourable opportunity for attacking his enemy with energy. He despatched a trusty officer with seven hundred men, in order to unite with the freebooters in a guerilla war. Their first encounter was at a village named Mambel. As it happened during the night, they could easily surprise the Dunganes, who were sleeping in the open air, and had no time to seize their arms. Many of the wives and children preferred suicide rather than cap- tivity. About fifteen thousand head of cattle fell into the hands of Yakub-Beg ; at the same time he liberated a hundred freebooters who had been taken prisoners by the Dunganian army. The Dunganes made several attempts to avenge themselves, and at last they rushed upon the entrenched camp of the Kashgarians in the mountains, and drove back its outposts, but they were attacked with violence, and were repulsed with great loss. Among the slain on the field of battle was the governor 328 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE of the town of Manassi, who mistook the Kashgar camp for that of the Dunganes : after the discovery of his mis- take, he defended himself with great valour, and was only with difficulty overcome. This was the last important event in this guerilla war. As the garrison of Turfan now perceived their hope- less condition, they resolved to enter into an accommo- dation. After Si-Yanshai, the governor, had placed himself in Yakub-Beg*s power, he was received with great respect, and was rewarded with the command of a fortress — a duty which he discharged with great zeal under the direction of his former enemy. The taking of Turfan was a dearly purchased victory to Yakub-Beg. His loss amounted to six hundred men, while that of the enemy was three or four times as great. The moral effect of it, however, was such that the Dun- ganes in Urumtchi expressed the wish to come to terms with Yakub-Kushbegi. As the latter placed implicit confidence in Si-Yanshai, he was despatched as envoy to the fortress. He did his utmost to convert his countrymen and brethren in the faith, pointing to the army of his new master, which was twenty thousand strong, fourteen thousand of which had been sent by the Sultan to Kuldja ; while Russia, he assured them, also promised help. Through these and other argu- ments he induced the Dunganes to surrender their fortress. Yakub-Beg consented not to transport any Kashgar troops there, and he was satisfied with their assurances of friendship. He however received indemni- fication for the merchants who had been interfered with by the pillage of Kutcha ; this amounted to seven thou- sand jambus of silver (metal bars of the value of forty ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 329 double ducats), two camels laden with gold, fifty-four with tea, and twenty with silk stuffs. He took [for his army seven hundred horses, an equal number of sheep and cattle, seven hundred sacks of flour, twenty wag- gons, and other property. In order to prevent any dissatisfaction, Yakub-Beg entrusted the newly conquered province to Si-Yanshai, with the order to leave everything in its former con- dition. Turfan was, however, again fortified, and Hakim-Bei from Aksu, with a force of eight hundred Kashgarians, received the command ; the same occurred also at Kutcha. Special attention was given to the fortification of Aksu and of the Muzart Pass, for at that time Russia had already carried her victorious colours into Dsungaria, and it was in expectation of such events that Yakub-Beg was constantly endeavouring to subdue the Dunganes, though without any permanent success ; for, as the latest tidings inform us, a revolt has again broken out among them. The restless conqueror of East Turkestan has, how- ever, succeeded, if recent tidings are to be relied on, in repressing the second insurrection. It is possible that subjection will make a third and even a fourth attempt necessary ; but at length the energy of this extra- ordinary man will overcome all difficulties, and his despotic command will undoubtedly extend over all the Mohammedans dwelling on the southern slopes of the Thien-Shan mountain, from the interior of China to Khokand.* The idea, carried out with such iron perse- * This supposition is fully confirmed by the most recent events in East Turkestan, The Atalik has completely broken the power of the Dun- ganes, and has gained a firm footing in Komul. 330 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE verance, of concentrating all Mussulmans living between ^ the frontier of the Buddhist Chinese and Turkestan pro- per, is the mainspring of that enterprise which Yakub- Kushbegi undertook in the winter of 1869 against the western territory of Sarikol. This region, in the north- east of the Pamir highlands, which is almost unknown to Europeans, is, it is true, not very fertile, and still less peopled ; yet it forms a very important point for the defence of East Turkestan. And a single glance from Kashgar at this frontier, with its high walls of rock, will convince us that the possession of Sarikol, this mighty battlement of the great natural bulwark, may be of ex- treme importance. Babish-Beg, the last independent prince of this country, which was only partially visited by Wood, died in 1866. In the contest for the throne, one of his sons, named Alaf-Shah, fled to Yarkend. Yakub- Kushbegi assisted him in gaining the throne, and esta- blished him as sovereign ; and as Alaf-Shah, as is usually the case in Asia, after he had regained power and influence, rebelled against his protector, the Atalik- Gazi had no choice left him but to conquer the country afresh, in order to subject it entirely to his sceptre. And thus the outposts of the fortunate ad- venturer are now stationed in the west, watchincr with keen' eye the dangerous approach of the Russian columns, as well as in the north from Aksu to the open- ing of the Muzart Pass, where important and expensive fortifications have been raised, since the Russians have anticipated the Atalik-Gazi in the conquest of Kuldja and the whole Trans-Ili district. This pre-appropriation of the laurels on the field of conquest must, moreover, have been very unpleasant to Yakub-Kushbegi. Even in ANGLORUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 33! 1866, before he took the field against the Dunganes, he had begun to make advances to Abil Oglan and Daud-Khalifa, the temporary sovereigns of the Tarand- jis and Dunganes on the northern heights of the Thien-Shan range. Yet he feared but little resistance there, and he wished first to get the better of his mighty adversaries near Urumtchi. The Russians of course must have had an inkling of this from the beginning, for Yakub-Kushbegi's army was still near Barkul when General Kolpakoffsky, under colour of the never-failing dispute between Kalmucks and Kirghises, surprised Dsungaria, and, as may easily be imagined, made a tabula rasa there — a real happiness for that district, for, as RadlofTs recent paper in the Russian Revue^ second year, No. 3, shows us, the. country had presented a terrible appearance after the fall of the Chinese. We are now arrived at the point at which we may reflect upon the political position of the new conqueror, and may take into consideration the possible prospects of his future plans. As regards the former, it must above all be remem- bered that Yakub-Kushbegi, fully acquainted as he is through his early military- career with the extraordinary designs of Russia upon Central Asia, and with the power of this Northern Colossus, on his very first appear- ance in Turkestan dreaded the disturbing interference of a foreign rule, not from the East, but from the North. It is indeed true that China, in former times, lost her possessions in East Turkestan repeatedly through revolutions, and, nevertheless, with her usual snail's pace, approached them and incorporated them afresh, and by strict measures secured to herself the dominion^ 332 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE for a long period. At the present day, however, this is impossible to conceive, for the Celestial Empire has not as before to do only with barbarous tribes, but with a great and extremely strong European power. Russia, by her conquests in the Turkestan Khanates, by her position on the Narin, and, lastly, by her efforts to extend her commercial relations with the Govern- ment of Semipalatinsk, through Dsungaria and Kir- kara-Usu, to the interior of China, can no longer see with indifference the political and strategetical designs of the Chinese. For this reason it was, as we have seen, that Kuldja was admitted into the Russian confederacy, although it was the Court of Petersburg which, for three years after the outbreak of the revolution in East Turkestan, had designated Yakub-Kushbegi and all the insurgents as faithless rebels, with whom no one would enter into negotiation, in order not to wound the feelings of his neighbour, the Emperor of China. How, after these events, the continuance of a friendly inter- course between the Chinese Court and the Russian Mission at Pekin is still possible, is truly an enigma ; we can only suppose that the Russian occupation of Dsungaria is either utterly ignored in Pekin, or that it is regarded as the friendly act of a temporary posses- sion. Of course Yakub-Kushbegi is of a very different opinion. He knows well that the Chinese will scarcely raise again the yellow standard of the dragon in this part of their former empire. But he knows also that his own interests are most endangered by this very power, which has diverted from him the danger of Chinese retaliation. He knows, and he has long known, that Russia cannot look calmly at the consolidation of ANGLO'R U SSI AN FRONTIER Q UES TION. 333 a Mohammedan power in her immediate vicinity, that sooner or later a war is inevitable between the two, and he has in consequence, immediately after the taking of Kashgar, Yarkend, and Khoten, looked about for a third power, which has, it is true, also interests to defend in Central Asia, but which is hindered from making material conquests by the gigantic bulwark of a natural wall, such as the southern chain of the Kuen-Luen mountains. This power the crafty Khokandian has justly discovered in England. Had Yakub-Kushbegi's career occurred in the time of Lord Auckland or Lord Dalhousie, he would not have had to send various embassies to the banks of the Hooghli for the sake of entering into friendly relations. But the Great Britain of the present time seems to feel herself most comfortable in the sleep of indifference, and it was not till the Atalik-Gazi had received with ceremony in Yarkend Mr Robert Shaw, a private merchant, and had hospitably entertained him, and given him the most striking proofs of his desire to enter into friendly relations with England, that the Anglo-Indian Government considered it seasonable to enter into con- nection with this new conqueror in the remote Mo- hammedan East. It was desired, as is almost always the case, to promote in the first place commercial ob- jects, and Mr T. D. Forsyth was sent to Yarkend, in the year 1870, at the head of a mission consisting of several Europeans and Asiatics. I repeat, the English felt themselves compelled to take this step. The act was obnoxious to them, and equally imperfect were the preparations for carrying it out, and the futility of the whole mission. Mr Forsyth, a distinguished judge of 334 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Central Asiatic matters, and a diplomatist of the highest kind, left nothing wanting as regards personal ability, but his hands were fettered in every possible wa)^ The budget of the mission — about £1416 — was ridiculously small. Moreover, Mr Forsyth was enjoined to speak only of trade, and not at all of politics ; and lastly, he received the order to stay in East Turkestan only for a definite time, and no longer — just as if express trains were returning over. the Himalayas, or as if the Court of Yarkend stood in the same category with the Court of Brussels. Of course, Mr Forsyth, as already mentioned, could effect nothing; for, as he could not wait, he did not even obtain an interview with the sove- reign of East Turkestan; and as he returned home without having obtained his object, the English turned away with indignation from the valleys of the Thien- Shan, as if the failure of their plans had not been their own fault* Russia, who ever goes more rationally and sensibly to work, has here also anticipated the heavy John Bull. In Petersburg, not in the least deterred by the tempo- rary hindrance of the vague uncertainty which at one time hovered over the fate of Yakub-Kushbegi, the authorities acted just as circumstances might require : sometimes holding back, sometimes bold and energetic, * At the present time, the Anglo-Indian Government is engaged in preparing a second embassy to East Turkestan, at the head of which Mr Forsyth is again placed, and as this time the whole mission is under- taken with far greater earnestness (;2^ 10,000 is the estimate of the expense attending it), the results may be all the more successful, as the Atalik him- self took the initiative by the extraordinary embassy of his nephew to Calcutta. ANGLO-R U SSI AN FRONTIER Q UES TION 335 and sometimes pursuing a policy which made its way with the sweet smile of friendship. Between 1864 and 1868, when the Russian position on the Yaxartes, on the Oxus, and especially on the Narin, was not yet satisfac- torily established, Yakub-Kushbegi and his successes were almost entirely ignored. It was not till the end of the last year mentioned that Lieutenant-Colonel Rein- thai received the order to repair to Kashgar with an embassy, under the pretext of claiming some Russian subjects who, fleeing from deserved punishment, had been hospitably received in Kashgar, but in truth to procure the right of having an agency business in East Turkestan — a right which had been conceded to the Court of Petersburg in the last treaty of peace with China. That the new sovereign neither gave a hearing to the one request nor to the other, and, without mani- festing stubborn hostility, showed no special complai- sance towards the Russians, is readily to be explained. Lieutenant-Colonel Reinthal remained twenty-one days in Kashgar in nominal captivity. He was scarcely allowed to leave his house, and he probably breathed anew when he was able to leave the city uninjured. This cold be- haviour was, however, no open hostility, for otherwise Yakub-Kushbegi would not have sent Shadi-Mirza, his diplomatist par excellence^ who superintended a regular courier service between Calcutta and Petersburg, to the latter city in reply to the first part of the mission. The Russians, who only feel aggrieved when it seems suit- able to them to be so, entirely disregarded the cold treatment which Mons. Reinthal had met with, Shadi- Mirza was received in the most distinguished manner, and was everywhere feted. He was shown all the 33^ CENTRAL ASIA AND THE remarkable objects, and, as may be readily imagined, especially the great armories and arsenals ; in a word, everything which could make this thorough Oriental — or, more justly, his master — both astonished and afraid of the power of his Northern neighbour. All this was, however, quite superfluous. Yakub-Kushbegi had already long known the power of Russia. This was the main reason why he trembled at her hostility, and had always directed his gaze towards the south. As, how- ever, as we have already related, he saw himself wholly deceived in his hopes with regard to England, and as, on the other side, since the taking of Kuldja, he be- lieved that he could no longer avoid the embraces of the Russian diplomatists, the crafty Atalik-Gazi was at length obliged to yield, and at Russia's repeated solici-- tation, for the present, to sign a commercial treaty, according to which Russia was allowed to trade freely in the towns of East Turkestan, and to cross at will the country from one end to the other with her caravans. This treaty was concluded at Kashgar, through Baron Kaulbars, in May 1872. Soon afterwards an ambas- sador from East Turkestan conveyed the ratified docu- ment to the Governor-General Von Kaufmann in Tash- kend ; and Russia, without having shed a drop of blood, ^ had secured to herself here almost the same advantages as she had obtained in Bokhara and Khokand only after obstinate fighting ; and at the same time she had not only humbled the political influence of England in East Turkestan, but had inflicted such a blow upon her commercial interests that, however easily the optimist Ministry on the Thames might be able to suppress its vexation, the English tax-paying merchant would with ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 2>Z7 difficulty do so. As we have thus touched upon the injured commercial relations of England, we may remark incidentally that Russia, by her late advantages in Central Asia, has inflicted a very sensitive blow on British commerce in all the three Khanates, and even in Afghanistan. Formerly, about ten years ago, in spite of the disputes in Afghanistan and the anarchical state of things on either side of the Oxus, there had always been a comparatively vigorous caravan traffic between the north-west commercial towns of India on the one side and the principal markets of Central Asia on the other. A great number of coloured cottons, muslins, and silk stuffs, besides cloth and iron goods, were sent from India, partly through Kabul and partly through Kandahar,' to Bokhara, Barshi, Samarkand, and even to Khokand. At the present day this has much decreased ; and any one who compares the commercial returns from the Punjaub ten years ago, which have just been fur- nished by Mr Davies, with those of the present day, will be immensely astonished at the great injury caused by Russian supremacy in Central Asia. Russia has not indeed been able officially to exclude the British mer- chant from Turkestan, and she will never do so. Yet the advantages of security and protection which she has procured for herself in her treaties with Bokhara and Khokand are specially intended only for Russian mer- chants and Russian travellers, and Russia will take care that these remain in exclusive possession of the monopoly. But let us return to the history of our hero, the Atalik- Gazi, and let us examine what career is yet before this man, in case the Muscovite thirst for territorial aggran- 33^ CENTRAL ASIA AND THE disement does not stand in the way of his ambition. Such conflicts appear to us almost inevitable, as Russia's position on the Narin, at the Muzart Pass, and indeed throughout Central Asia, is one which makes all inde- pendence apart from her impossible ; and, on the other hand, Yakub-Kushbegi can only with difficulty avoid a quarrel. There cannot, of course, be the least idea of a successful resistance to Russia, as even the ablest Asiatic conqueror, and the largest forces that are at his disposal, are nothing when opposed to the arms and strategy of the West. Yet for the moment Yakub-Kushbegi is ab- solute master of East Turkestan ; his country extends from the heights of the Pamir steppes to the remote Komul, and is at least three times as large as France. The number of the inhabitants who obey his sovereign word can, at the boldest computation, scarcely exceed five or six millions. His army, however, taken all to- gether, amounts to nearly 50,000 men, who, well armed, well disciplined, and thoroughly trained in the school of war, can make little or no impression on a European foe, but are most imposing to a native — ?>., an Asiatic — adversary. Had the shadows of the icy north not yet touched the snow-covered summits of the Alaj and the Thien-Shan range, it would have been difficult to fore- see how far ability, military success, and political com- binations might have brought this new conqueror into the remote regions of Asia. In the west of China every- thing is out of joint, nothing but the loose tissue of the traditions of the past still, in some measure, sustains the Chinese rule ; for although we may not care to attach to the independence of the new Mohammedan state in Yiinnan the importance which is generally given to it, we ANGLORUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 339 cannot fail to see that the doctrines of Islam, oppressed and limited as they are in the West, are on the point of conquering a new soil for themselves in the remote East at the expense of Buddhism, and of obtaining new fuel for the expiring flame. Power, perseverance, but above all, enthusiasm, which is utterly wanting in the lands lying nearer to Europe, can still work wonders in those remote regions of the East not yet affected by the influ- ence of the West. It requires only an animating mind and a vigorous spirit to make the flame burn brightly ; in one word, a man who, smiled on by fortune, can con- stitute himself the leader of the Eastern Islam world. And such a man exists in the person of Yakub-Kush- begi. He possesses in himself everything which has helped the Asiatic conqueror of the past to the zenith of fame, and if the European advance so often men- tioned did not stand in the way, it would be in nowise diflicult to him, by uniting all the Mohammedans of Cen- tral Asia and Western China, and supported by a force of more than forty millions, to march with his standard over the steppes of Central Asia towards the west of the continent. Thus, at least, was it in bygone times ; thus did the career of a Djengis, a Timur, and a Nadir begin. Yet at the present day all is changed, and as the mighty but prosaic Christian West, as we intimated at the begin- ning of our sketch, stands, directly or indirectly, in the way, of all Eastern progress, and of all unusual display of power in Asia, even in the remotest corner of this old quarter of the globe, so the Atalik-Gazi will remain nothing more than the ordinary Turkestan Khan whom the fortunes of war have favoured. The age of mighty convulsers of the world is now once for all past. 340 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN AGAINST KHIVA (1873). I. Whoever has given any attention to the events in Central Asia, must have come to the conviction that Russia can only completely establish her power in Tur- kestan, and her influence on the internal progress of Asia, when the intimidation and subjection of all the three Khanates is reckoned among acts accomplished. It is true the gentlemen in Petersburg have hitherto judged it prudent to annex only the valley of the Yaxaftes, in the Khanate of Khokand, and only a part of the country on the banks of the Zerefshan, in that of Bokhara ; and that a shadow of independence is left to the remainder of the two Khanates, is explained by the very admissible reason that, in the first place, the admi- nistration of this vast but thinly^peopled tract of land, apart from all dangers and difficulties^ would bring less profit than was to be expected from the comparatively great expenditure. Russia, moreover, seems for a time to be satisfied with the aim reached, that, namely, of ANGLORUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 2>/\.l having procured a safe passage for her commercial rela- tions, although the results hitherto shown do not wholly justify such an assumption. Mons. Rajeffski states in a paper published in the GoloSy that Russian caravans and Russian merchants cannot always proceed unhindered in the so-called suzerain states — in fact, they are exposed to the same hatred and the same enmity as before. Unquestionably this circumstance aroused in many minds the idea that the Court of Petersburg, by its con- quests in Turkestan, has hitherto only desired to secure a kind of highway which was possibly to serve as a line of communication in acquiring greater extension of power, and al§o as a passage to the south, strategically and politically secure. Be that as it may, we cannot and will not raise the veil of possible future plans. It is for the present a settled matter that the Russians desire, directly or indirectly, to rule over all three Khanates. Russia, moreover, has a perfect right to do so ; and since, as we have already mentioned, she has accom- plished her plan in the ^north, east, and south, she must now turn her eye towards the west ; to that west where, as is well known, a hundred years ago, her first begin- nings were made, but where all attempts hitherto, either from ignorance of the country, or from insufficient pre- parations, have proved abortive. That Russia felt herself, so to speak, compelled of late to adopt an aggressive policy towards Khiva, the reader will understand from the following circumstances. In the first place, it could not be supposed that after the humi- liation of Khokand and Bokhara, the small insignificant Khiva should proudly stand with head erect, for such a demeanour would have been interpreted by the Central 342 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Asiatics not as forbearance, but as weakness ; they are accustomed to see in Khiva the warlike neighbour par excellence, and in their eyes the large number of Turkoman nomads between the lower stream of the Oxus and the Caspian Sea is regarded as a military force of no ordinary size. In the second place, the inde- pendence of Khiva is not only dangerous to the Russian power in Turkestan itself, but even the Russian authority in the north and east of the Caspian Sea is thus limited ; for Khiva hospitably receives the seditious tributary Kasaks of the Little Horde, whom Russia has long ago admitted into the list of her subjects, and even seduces them to rebellion and unruliness. It is true the Russian authority over the Kirghises, and all other nomad tribes wandering on the steppes, is still very questionable, and is as doubtful as the relation in which the Arab races of Beni-lam and Muntefitch, in Mesopotamia, stand to the Turks, and many North African tribes to the French. It must not, moreover, be ignored that Khiva, just as much as Russia, has had for centuries a legiti- mate claim on the nomads mentioned. These poor people have, however, often had the good fortune of being protected by two masters — that is, they have been annoyed both on the north and south. Still, consider- ing that Russian influence can certainly have a far more beneficial effect on their rude mode of life than that of Khiva, we in Europe must plead for the Russian posses- sion of this people, and must designate as Russian subjects those groups of nomads who wander without a master from the Emba, on the west of the Sea of Aral to the Uest-Yort, or from the left bank of the Yaxartes to the eastern shore of the Sea of Aral. Of course the ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION 343 Khan of Khiva has no right to receive them hospitably as Russian subjects, but still less has he the right to incite them against the authority of his nomadic neigh- bour. Russia can, moreover, justify her attack on Khiva, by the fact that this land, like all uncivilised Asiatic countries, is an impediment in the way of regular Euro- pean trade, and, hke all Asiatics, lays down the sense- less principle : " My people may pass unhindered through your kingdom with their caravans and bales of goods ; we can go in and out among you as it pleases us, but if you dare to set foot on our soil, you are the children of death." If such an interpretation of international law would scarcely be submitted to by any other state, Russia of course would least of all see with indifference the encroachment upon her commercial interests, and the captivity of her subjects while following their peaceful employments. We will grant that the protection of the Kasaks, owning as they did a doubtful sovereignty, could afford no well-founded cause for a declaration of war ; yet, on the other hand, it must not be overlooked that several Russian fishermen and merchants, venturing east- ward into the country from the Bay of Guryef, or from some point of the Mertwikultuk, had been very con- stantly taken prisoners without any cause, and had been sold as slaves to Khiva. That the true delinquents — namely, some fugitive Kirghises, or tribes belonging to the Turkoman races of Tchaudor, Igdir, and Abdal — had as little to do with the dominion of Khiva as with that of Russia, and that therefore the prince of the former country could not be called to account for their crime, is 344 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE a question which Russia never undertook to examine closely. It was enough that Khiva was guilty of having purchased Russian slaves, and for this reason she was to be punished. It would be difficult to bring forward proofs that the Government in Khiva had seduced the nomad tribes mentioned to commit this shameful crime against Russia. Rapine and plunder have ever belonged to these races, and the fact alone that the in- jured party was a Kafir — i,e., an unbeliever — may have given some encouragement to the nomads in their sense of the public feeling at Khiva. The Government itself, so far as I know, has carefully avoided all collision with the Russians ever since the time of AUah-Kuli-Khaii. On the whole, however, these circumstances lessen but little Russians right of complaint with regard to the third point, and this, therefore, may be designated as the most cogent reason for inducing the Government of Peters- burg to take energetic measures against Khiva. That in Khiva itself, after they had been eyewitnesses of the Russian successes in the East, they looked forward with cheerfulness to the gloomy days of the future, it would be difficult to assert. Eloquent proofs of the sad tone of feeling, and even of the fear that prevailed, may be seen, indeed, i'n the messengers who in the name of the Khan of Khiva traversed Kho- kand, Bokhara, and even remote Turkestan, imploring the sovereign for help, and gaining sums from the people for the holy war against the infidel ; no less is this fear evidenced by the embassy sent to India, in order to obtain from the English a friendly word in favour of Khiva, or, what would have been still more agreeable to the Khan, an armed interference. The ANGLORUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 345 anxiety felt on the lower stream of the Oxus is testified also by the despatch of an ambassador to the Sultan of Constantinople. This ambassador last winter went in and out among the great dignitaries of the Porte on the shores of the Bosphorus, without, as is readily expli- cable, being able to obtain any real result to his endea- vours. The fear with which the inhabitants of Khiva looked forward to the future was, moreover, well justi- fied. Had the small province on the lower stream of the Oxus had at its head a prince of energy and judgment, the success of the Russian arms would certainly have been far more difficult than can be the case under the present circumstances. Khiva has, in the first place, 30,000 horse, recruited from the ranks of the Ozbegs, the settled and ruling class of the land ; and although provided with the most primitive arms, they may still be called, to a certain extent, courageous and serviceable, and, indeed, they far surpass in bravery, if I may use the word, the Ozbegs of Bokhara and Kho- kand. A wise prince, such as Allah-Kuli-Khan and Mehemmed-Ali-Khan, would have made the nomad tribes of the surrounding country enthusiastic for the cause of the land, and thus have placed no unimportant stone of stumbling in the way of the intruding foe. Among the nomads who belong to the dominion of Khiva, the northern Yomuts may be mentioned in the first place ; their habitations stretched, in the form of a crescent at the back of the western part of the Khanate, from Kotsche to Hezaresp, and at the smallest computation they could send from 8000 to 10,000 horse into the field. These Yomuts belong to the Sheref- Djuni race, and form the branches of the Okiis, Solak, 34^ CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Ushak, Podjuk, Mesprik, and Yimreli. In the second place, the Tchaudors deserve to be mentioned ; they inhabit the southern inland country between the Cas- pian Sea and the Sea of Aral, and they are to be found in the neighbourhood of Altiirgentch, Buldumsas, and Koktchege. The best known names of their sub- divisions are Abdal, Igdyr, Essenlu, Karatchaudor, Bosadji, Burundjuk, and Sheich; and the number of their effective horse is generally computed at 10,000 strong — a power considerable in itself, for the Tchaudors, as regards warlike matters, have no equal but the Tekkes among all Turkomans. In addition to these nomadic forces, Khiva could also enlist the Kasaks in her cause, a considerable number of whom rove over the steppes without a master, wishing to avoid the tribute which is required from them as legitimate Russian subjects. There are, however, besides, several thousand huts, especially among the Mangish- lakian Kasaks, which have long and openly acknow- ledged the supremacy of Khiva ; and that they are not disturbed by the Russians in this disposition is best shown by the fact that they are the real medium of communication on the Mangishlakian highway, which, it is true, is but little frequented. In fact, if Khiva went to work with adroitness, she could win over to her cause the numerous' troops of the Tekketur-komans in the neighbourhood of Merv. A united movement on the part of these different nomad races has hitherto, so far as history tells us, only taken place in the time of able rulers. These Turkoman auxiliaries really form the choice part of the forces of famous conquerors ; and I am taking but a very small number, when I assert ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. ^47 that the Khan of Khiva, if he goes sensibly to work, can mount more than 50,000 of these nomads for the contest against Russia. If these 50,000 tolerably well- armed, well-mounted, and well-trained warriors are in themselves invaluable against an intruding enemy, only partially acquainted with local circumstances, on the other side, the territorial conditions of Khiva, whether in the south, west, or north-east, are no less valuable as a wall of protection, such as has stood at the disposal of no other Central Asiatic Khanate hitherto subjected. We will point out some of the advantages of this natural bulwark, by mentioning the highways leading to Khiva from the west, north, and north-east. i. From the left bank of the Oxus to the shores of the Caspian there is a road of about 100 miles, leading on the one side to Tashkal (the "stone fortress"), or to the Russian Fort Alexandroffsk, and on the other side through Mangishlak to the town of Karagan, on the inlet of the ^ same name. This highway, though frequented by cara- vans in very early times, cannot be called practicable for an army ; for at one part there is a tract of land of more than three days' journey, where no drinkable water is to be met with; the country, moreover, is covered with countless swamps and morasses ; and lastly, the snowstorms and the terrible cold in winter are as unsufferable as the torturing heat and killing thirst in summer. 2. From the Saraitshik station, on the lower part of the Ural chain, there is a road of a 1000 wersts in length, according to Wenjukoff, along which the unfortunate expedition of the Bekowitsch Tscherkoffsky passed in 17 17, and which was also used by the Hetman Netchay in the seventeenth century. This road begins 34^ CENTRAL ASIA AND THE in the lowlands of the Sagish, and then takes a diagonal direction towards the plateau of Uest-Yort, through Barsa-Kilmez, along the western shores of the Sea of Aral, and terminates at Kungrat, and only for a third of the whole way is there any grass or drinkable water to be met with. 3. There is a road from Orenburg, on the upper part of the Emba, in the direction of Fort Embinsk, which was erected in 1839 against the incur- sions of the Khivans ; and here, also, " little fodder, little water, no fodder at all, and no water," appear as items of the notices of various routes. This road is 139s wersts long, and it likewise terminates at Kungrat, after going round by the Ay-bogiirsee (erro- neously called Aibugir by the Russians). 4. There is a road from Orsk to Kazalinsk, and from thence to Khiva, along the eastern shore of the Sea of Aral. The distance between the two first-named places is 739 wersts, and from Kazalinsk to the capital is con- sidered 770 wersts — in all, 1509 wersts. This is, of course, a very indirect way ; yet the traveller, so long as he keeps to the Bokhariot caravan route, is not annoyed by its circuitousness, as he is passing through a country greatly frequented by nomad tribes, and which, therefore, does not possess the character of fearful desolation. From Kazalinsk, moreover, as far as Gorlen, where the road enters the Khanate, the traveller has to fight with all the difficulties and hard- ships of clayey, arid, or sandy steppes. Herr Wenju- koff, the learned Russian geographer, tells us that the unspeakable difficulties of this road were the main reason why the Russians have latterly tried to dis- cover a new way to Khiva from Fort Peroffsky, or ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 349 from the old Ak - Mesdjid ; this attempt, however, failed, for here also the district of Kiitchki-Tengiz (Little Sea), as far as Daukara, is filled with all the horrors of a desert country. Equally bad and unusable are the other roads starting from other points on the left bank of the Syr ; for here we come upon the great sand steppes of Kizil-kum and Batkak-kum, or red sand and marshy sand — a designation which thoroughly accords with the nature of the soil ; for I have sufficiently convinced myself of the horror of the steppes which separate the Khanates of Bokhara and Khokand from each other in the north, as it was my fate to travel through a southern tract of this soil in the so-called Chalata desert. The readers of my book of travel will remember the descrip- tion of this region. Still worse is the aspect of things in the south-west. Here the Khanate of Khiva is pro- tected by the Hyrcanian steppes, across which no high- road has ever existed, and which I myself traversed in its full length, and can only describe as a region where art and industry might in some measure alleviate the lot of the traveller, but which will ever be a tract of land subject to the curse of nature. Political enthusiasts of the future greatness of Russia considered it possible in time, perhaps in about three years, to bridge over these steppes with a railway — namely, from the Balkan range to the banks of the Oxus ; and when I, from personal experience, turned this plan into ridicule, the Russian press assailed me with a storm of invectives. At the present day the subject is better appreciated, for the Russian scientific expedition of Messrs Stebnitzki and Radde has penetrated far into the country from Fort Krasnowodsk, and they also declare the project, as far 350 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE as regards a settlement and future plans of commerce, as an empty phantom and as a complete mirage. Khiva^ therefore, in the strictest sense of the word, \s a tract of country surrounded by dangerous and inaccess- ible steppes; and thus, defended as she is by natural bulwarks, she could all the more easily remain in the defensive, if she possessed the power of exercising a suf- ficient influence on the nomadic forces before mentioned, and if she could add to the dangers of nature those also of surprises on the part of the nomad tribes well ac- quainted with these steppes. Thus, for example, on the road to Mangishlak, the united army of the Tchaudors and Kasaks might not only extremely impede the movements of the Russians, but in some places they might render them impossible on the Hyrcanian steppe. Yomuts and Tekkes, by a flank attack, might place a numerous and well-drilled force, perfectly familiar with the tactics of war, in a very critical position. During the march an invading army of this kind would not only always have to proceed in thick masses, but with match- lock ready and guns cocked, if not with lowered bayonet ; and how such a march could be accomplished, either in the freezing cold of the winter or in the burning heat of the summer, is not an easy problem. That in the north and north-east there is no great security for the Russian invading army is evident from the fact that the Russians would have in their rear a hostile though feeble power, and that, moreover, the Kirghises and Karakalpaks from the banks of the Kisil-Derya, or from the neighbourhood of Dankara, would scarcely take trouble to facihtate the Russian march. As we have delineated the resources which the Khan- ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 35 I ate of Khiva could have at her disposal against the advancing enemy, we will now cast a glance at the offensive measures of Russia, and draw attention to those points at which her attack will be made, or perhaps is already made. Russia has occupied three strong points in opposition to the three Khiva bulwarks — namely, to the south of Orenburg, in the fortifications on the Emba, between the Caspian Sea and the Sea of Aral ; secondly, in Fort Alexandroffsk, in Mertwikultuk ; and thirdly, the position recently taken in the inlet of Krasnowodsk, and in Tchekishlar, which last-mentioned point, at the time of my journey, was known among the Turkomans as a favourite summer residence, at the mouth of the Etrek, and which was occupied by the Russians about two years ago, without obtaining the consent of Persia to the step, though the contrary is asserted by the notice of the secret treaty respecting the valley of the Etrek. To these may be added the fortified positions on the upper Zerefshan and in the valley of the Yaxartes, from which points a diversion might be made upon Khiva by going round by Bokhara. It is possible, and even extremely probable, that the Russians will attempt this way, though no prognostics of success can be held out to the enterprise ; for the difficulties of communication, apart from the hostile nomads mentioned above, would hinder all movements. As regards the mental and material advantages which Russia possesses over her enemy, we must above all recognise the superiority of her arms and tactics, and especially the season at which the Russians will at three different points approach the little country situated on the lower stream of the Oxus. If signs do not deceive us, the attack will take place 35 2 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE neither m midsummer nor in winter, but in the spring. The lesson of 1840, which AUah-Kuli-Khan, or, more justly, winter, gave to the invading enemy, has not been forgotten in Petersburg, and care will now be taken to prevent the loss of the several thousand men who at that time perished from cold and scurvy and other diseases. Across this part of the Uest-Yort, or on the plateau of the Hyrcanian steppe, the north wind blows with unfettered fury. Captain James Abbott, in his volume of travels (i. 230), speaks of this wind as follows: *^ Those only can form an idea of the bitter coldness of this north wind who have wintered on a vast continent. The human breath hangs in icicles from the pillows and coverlets even within the tents. Towels which are hung to dry in some small space by the fire, or in the open air by the sun, suddenly freeze, and water freezes at a dis- tance of three feet from the fire.'* We do not doubt that the Russian infantry employed in this expedition would be able to cope with the severity of a hard winter. The terrible climate is rendered insufferable only because it has to be endured on a vast inhospitable steppe, exposed to an enemy accustomed to single contests. That Russia is now avoiding this season and choosing the spring, when many otherwise arid tracts are covered with grass, and when the rain is collected in natural cisterns in the hollows of the hard soil (]zali), is the pledge of a favour- able result. Added to this, moreover, is the possibility that Russia may, perhaps, by intrigues among the Turkomans, win over to her side one or another race, or even branch of a race, by which she may perhaps not only completely break up the united band of nomad tribes, but may cast ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 353 among them the torch of the bitterest hostility. The success of such a step against Khiva, of course, depends chiefly on the position which these nomad tribes are inclined to assume towards an invading power. Had we not learned by experience that the Turkomans could only exceptionally be gathered under one standard by great Mohammedan princes, and that in general they are split by constant feud and their power paralysed, it would, perhaps, be possible for them even now to arouse themselves at the threatening danger of total ruin, and to set aside the national character that pervades their race. Yet the Turkomans, who are but loosely held in the bonds of Islamism, and to whom the bright gold pieces of Russian subsidies are more alluring than the fluttering standard of a religious war, will be all the more easily bribed by Russia, as the present Government of Khiva has no authority over them, and, moreover, offers them no real decoy. Recent past events have shown that the Russians could win over to their own interests a grey- bearded chief of the Yomut race, and subsequently the influential leader of the Ata-Bai tribe. The position taken at Tchekishlar seems, moreover, not entirely to have been accomplished by force of arms ; for although the Russian reconnoitring corps, in its expeditions to the south, especially near Etrek, meeting with opposition, was obliged to destroy the Turkoman tents, it is not yet proved that these were exclusively Yomuts, or that one tribe or another was not carrying on friendly relations with them. The case is the same in the neighbourhood of Alexandroffsk as in the vicinity of Krasnowodsk, and I repeat that, by partially obtain- ing the sympathies of the Turkomans, the danger which 354 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE might arise from these otherwise troublesome nomads will be considerably diminished. After this general sketch, in which we have attempted to give the reader as distinct an idea as possible of the position of things, it is time that we should return to our starting-point of the Russian war against Khiva. We have already mentioned that this Khanate, after the successful issue of the Russian war in Khokand and Bokhara, did not feel herself entirely on a bed of roses. The youthful Prince Seid- Mehemmed- Rehim, now scarcely twenty-four years of age, who, if I am rightly informed, ascended the throne only three years ago, had, moreover, the misfortune, like many of his prede- cessors on the throne of Khahrezm, of being drawn into a w^ar with the neighbouring Turkomans, especially with the Tchandor, Igdir, and Yomut tribes — a fresh evidence of how little he could have relied on these races in a Russian invasion. Like all Oriental princes, the young man is, moreover, eager for war, and is blindly submis- sive to the counsels of his chief vizier, Mohammed- Murad-Bai, who is always flattering him with the hope of speedy success. Towards the end of 1 871, after the successful overthrow of the rebellious nomads, the un- pleasant tidings reached him that the Russians had already advanced as far as the Sari-Kanish marsh, at the most two days' journey from the Altiirgentch, This was the expedition of Col. Markusoff, which had ex- tended its inroads to this point, after a march of fifty-two days from Krasnowodsk. Whether this Russian enterprise intended an attack or no, is for the moment difficult to de- cide. Col. Markusoff, who had advanced to the Ortakuja station (central springs) along the same road by which I ANGLO-R USSIAN FRONTIER Q UES TION, 355 travelled In 1863, was obliged to retire before the immense body of the enemy, and is said to have lost three hundred camels and several horses ; yet the flash of the Russian bayonets in such threatening vicinity had frightened the Khan, and the fear of internal disorders induced him on this occasion, in spite of his youthful thirst for action, to adopt a reconciliatory course. At this time, ^a Turkoman named Nur-Mohammed, who was about to make a pilgrimage to Mecca, happened to be in Khiva. Nur-Mohammed, as an elder of the Tchandor tribe, is not wholly unknown to the Russian authorities at Alexandroffsk ; for we are told he was once introduced to the Grand Duke, the Governor- General of Tiflis, and even to the Emperor himself. His char- acter affords us a proof that the Russians may easily overcome any danger threatened by the nomad tribes — in fact, we meet with this pious greybeard again as a Russian emissary in the old capital of Khahrezm. How on a journey to Arabia from Astrakan, Khiva, which is quite out of the way, should be reached, is in itself unintelligible. Nur-Mohammed only wished to fathom the state of things there ; and after he had succeeded in procuring admittance to the Khan, he contrived, by his influence, that two conciliatory embassies should be despatched to Russia to mediate a friendly relation on the part of Khiva. The one, which arrived at Alexan- droffsk on the 27th February, old style, consisted of six persons, and was headed by Mohammed-Emin, the Kazi-Kelan, a high dignitary of the Church. The aim of their journey was Tiflis, where they intended to de- liver to the Grand Duke the expressions of their master's friendship, with the promise that the Russian slaves 3S6 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE now in Khivan captivity should speedily be set at liberty. Besides this influential priest, of whom it is reported that the Khan does not venture to sit or to smoke in his presence, there was in the embassy another man, Kul-Mohammed, a son of the before-mentioned Nur-Mohammed, who, like his father, has shown already many acts of friendship to the Russians, and was to pro- mote the interests of Khiva with the powerful infidel as persona grata. The embassy numbered still some other notabilities, and although tolerably well received by Col. Lamakin, the officer commanding at Alexandroffsk, it did not obtain its real object, for it could not advance further than Temir-Khan-Shura, in Dagestan, and was obliged to return to Khiva without having effected its purpose. No better was the fate of the second embassy, which the alarmed prince on the lower stream of the Oxus sent to Petersburg, under the direction of Atalik- Irnazar, the governor of the Karakalpakian district. This envoy was the bearer of several presents for the Czar, among others, of a pair of excellent horses, valued at one thousand roubles, and he was likewise to promise that all the Russian captives in Khiva should be set at liberty as soon as possible. The embassy quitted Kungrat on thirty camels at the end of March; but it was detained at Orenburg by the Governor-General Krischanoffski, and Atalik - Irnazar, like his diplomatic colleague at Dagestan, was obliged to return without having effected anything. What Russia designed by this harsh rebuff and de- cided rejection of all reconciliation, may indeed appear doubtful to many ; yet we must be just, and confess that the Government on the Neva, or the executors of its ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION 35/ power in the interior of Asia, acted with tact. The Russians have indeed not allowed themselves to be deceived as to the value of the promise of an Asiatic prince, and still more of one in Turkestan ; for as the Khan of Khiva only disposed himself for friendly inter- course in his anxiety at the reconnoitrings from Kras- nowodsk and the steppes of Batkak-Kum, so there was certainly no idea of any voluntary restoration of the slaves, and of the commencement of friendly or com- mercial relations, as soon as the Northern neighbour ceased from further threatenings. The circumstances which justified Russia in beginning a war with Khiva date from an early period. Formerly forbearance and delay were the result of circumstances ; at the present day, however, it was wished to bring matters to a ter- mination, an attack must be made, and the chastisement, and possibly the subjection, of Khiva must at length be resolved upon. Such was the state of things at the beginning of November 1872. Khiva had also indulged in no further delusions ; and while the Russians were employed in pre- paring their army of occupation in Orenburg, a troop of nine thousand men, chiefly Ozbegs, Karakalpaks, and fugitive Kirghises, had extended their expeditions along the west shore of the Sea of Aral as far as the small forts on the Emba, while another troop, consisting of four thou- sand men, had taken the direction to Fort Alexandroffsk. These expeditions seem to have made the whole district from Fort Emba to the upper stream of the Irgis insecure, for at the end of November the post across the steppes failed to appear at Orsk for several days, and the delay was rightly attributed to a hostile attack. This informa- 3SS CENTRAL ASIA AND THE tion comes to us of course from Russian sources, the true facts of the case are therefore difficult to ascertain* Yet from whatever side the attack may have come, so much is certain that General Krischanoffski at once put his army in motion, and despatched Colonel Kolotnischeff with one thousand Kossacks across the Irgis, in order to oppose the Khivan incursions. It was decreed by a council of war that light cavalry were to be employed for a time instead of infantry, owing to the advanced season of the year ; and in consequence the order was at once issued to Kazalinsk (a fort on the south-east shore of the Sea of Aral), that the Kossacks dismissed from Turkestan, who were now on their way to Orenburg at the expira- tion of their term of service, should at once be brought back to the scene of action. So much is known to us of the operations in the north. In the south and south- east, the second corps, which at the lowest computation must have been five thousand strong, was approaching the left bank of the Oxus over a part of the way which I myself have traversed on the Turkoman steppes, and indeed the very same tract which it had reconnoitred in the previous year. It was reported that this corps was to be led in person by the royal Governor-General of the Caucasus, yet this intention was departed from, and an experienced general was placed at the head. He was obliged to leave the steppes either at Kohne-Uergentch or at Yilali, and a difficult task lay before him ; for although he cannot have begun his march until after the before-mentioned partial co-operation of the Turkomans, he was in nowise secured by this from a flank attack. More than five thousand men belonging to the regular troops stand at his disposal, and yet his task is most ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 359 difficult As regards the third division, this was to set forth from the part of Turkestan already conquered — namely, from Samarkand and Khodjend — and after suc- cessfully crossing the Kiselkum, it was to reach the right bank of the Oxus, probably in the neighbourhood of Hezaresp or Shurachan, crossing this river on pontoons brought with it. According to a vague report, this third division was to be led by General Kaufmann himself, and was not to begin its march from Samarkand and Khod- jend, but from Kazalinsk, or rather from the lower part of the Yaxartes. Yet whoever may be the commanding officer, so much is certain, that the three different divisions of the army, after having' crossed the river, were to be concentrated on its left bank, in order that they might carry out the plan of subjection with combined forces. Until events have arrived at this point, any occurrence may cause a delay of the plan : yet there can be no idea of its utter destruction or frustration ; for it may with certainty be predicted that the Russian expedition against Khiva in 1873 will not be as unfortunate as that of 1840, and that the soldiers of the '* White Czar " will bring this contest to a victorious issue. 11. As regards the political and commercial value which Khiva can possess for the great Russian Empire, we will touch upon a few points as briefly as possible. Khiva is not only fertile, but it may be called the most fertile part of Turkestan. The excellence and the variety of its natural productions I have already pointed out in my '* Skizzen aus Mittelasien." Judged from a 360 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE commercial point of view, the opening of the whole ' Oxus river will be of an importance not to be too highly appreciated ; and as regards the scope for her political influence, Russia will only secure a sure basis for her position in the interior of Asia when she sets up her pillar of power on one side in the alpine regions of the Thien- Shan range, and on the other at the mouth of the Oxus. No one would envy the mighty empire for this favour of fortune. The campaign against Khiva might have come to a close, like all former campaigns, without making a great commotion in the political world, if by it a somewhat delicate international question had not been affected — namely, the position of the Northern Colossus with regard to her English rival in the south, who, by this recent movement, has been startled out of the slumber of indifference in which she has lulled herself for years. By the dominion of Russia over Khiva, the Northern Colossus will have passed from the left to the right bank of the Oxus, and will have again a frontier terri- tory before her, the exact definition of which is as difficult as was the case with the territory on the right bank of the Yaxartes previous to 1864. From that period to the present time England has always said that she may not, cannot, and will not disturb Russia in her new designs of conquest, since she brings wild anarchy into order, which is indeed no small service rendered to humanity, — since she opens trade and traffic, and enriches our geography and ethnography with the most valuable facts, — since, by her given word, she only intends to advance to the right bank of the Oxus and no further, in order to mark out Afghanistan, lying, as it does, between India and Turkestan, as neutral and ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION 361 unapproachable territory. So long as these statements met with general credence, and Russia gave no cause to shake this belief, the optimist politicians of Great Britain, and many like-minded politicians on the Conti- nent, were tolerably justified in their opinions on this question. The recent movements, however, have neces- sarily produced a change of feeling, and each one now questions whether, if Prince Gortschakoff laid down the assertion in his diplomatic communication of November 1 864, " that the fleeting grains of sand of the steppes are incapable of forming a frontier line, and that only the inhabited and arable part of the country is suitable for a solid line of demarcation," it may not now be further said that the Uest-Yort and the Hyrcanian steppes are likewise insufficient as a boundary to the south-west Turkestan territory, and that this must be formed by the mountainous northern edge of Iran from Astrabad to Merv and Herat ? And truly Russia would justly defend such an opinion. If the govern- ment of the Kirghise hordes in the' north of the Yaxartes is constantly impeded and endangered, how will it be possible to keep in check the hundredfold wild and predatory Turkomans, without enclosing them entirely ? The Russians may talk as they please of the adventu- rous spirit of the Kasaks of the ''Great and Little Horde ; " these Kasaks are harmless people when we compare them with the Achal-Tekke Turkomans, with the Sariks and the Salors. To curb the latter, and to bring them to obedience, will be in itself a gigantic work, but it would defy every effort if Russia could not possess herself of a secure network of communication by a firm position on the Merv and in the neighbourhood of 362 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE Herat. Whether such a necessity is agreeable or disagree- able to the Court of Petersburg may indeed be doubt- ful for the moment ; but that it justly awakens great suspicion in the English mind, and arouses misgivings which for years were purposely avoided, is beyond a doubt. It was in consequence of these misgivings that the London Cabinet, in December 1872, inquired for the first time of the Court of Petersburg respecting Russia's intentions towards Khiva. The report of this diplo- matic step was for a long time persistently denied on both sides. At length, however, it proved correct ; and in order, in some measure, to sooth the excited temper of the British leopard. Count Schuwaloff, the adjutant of the Russian Emperor, repaired direct to the Thames. As for his conciliatory words, they produced the best result with the Gladstone Ministry, disposed as they are to peace at any price. England can reconcile herself, as before, to the explanations of her rival. No one will, however, take it amiss if we plainly declare that Russia, though she may be animated by the best intentions, is not able to fix the bounds of a " Hitherto shalt thou come and no further ! " We have already shown that this halting-point is not possible in the immediate neighbourhood of Khiva ; but that it is impossible also on the plain of Merv and on the banks of the Murgab will be proved by the immediate future. As hitherto almost everything has been fulfilled which I have presaged with regard to the Russian advance southwards, my last assertion will probably be realised also ; for it is not only unrestrained thirst for conquest which impels the Russian eagle towards the south, but there are local, ethnological, and political reasons ANGLOKUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 363 which prevent it from standing still. A power, although partially civilised, can with difficulty maintain the status quojNh^n it has for its neighbour a barbarous state dis- tracted by anarchy. Serious complications are not to be avoided with the utmost patience ; and thus we have only the one alternative left, either entirely to withdraw from contact with a barbarous neighbour, which Russia will never do, or to stride over that neighbour until the vicinity of some civilised and well-regulated people affords a halting-point. But let us return to Schuwaloff's mission, and see what turn matters have meanwhile taken on the Thames, and what has been obtained by the first alarm of the Anglo- Russian altercation. In the labyrinth of the various reports circulated with regard to the, result of Schuwa- loff's mission, that interpretation was asserted most obstinately which declared that the Gladstone Cabinet was satisfied for the time with the Russian promise that the whole expedition against Khiva had no other design than to give a little lesson to the Khan, and to induce him to conclude a commercial treaty ; in a word, to compel him, if not to express feelings of affection, at any rate to enter into friendly relations with the Court of Petersburg. This was confirmed, moreover, by the purport of the official document recently published, which was laid before the English Parliament. How it can occur to any one in the world that this compulsory bond of friendship with the polar and shaggy beast of the North can aim at any lasting and positive result, and that Khiva, when she throws herself into the arms of Russia, will abandon herself to the slumber of repose and contentment, is indeed inconceivable. And yet the 364 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE leaders of Liberal England seem now willing to walk on Russian ice, and to see in these protestations of the Muscovite that back-gate by which they can easily leave the oppressive demand for manly and decided conduct, and perhaps even for serious conflict. This self-deceiv- ing policy, that marks the present Cabinet on the Thames, is equally unwise as it is unpractical, and it may bring the vessel of the British state on a sandbank of no ordi- nary difficulty. In the first place, Mr Gladstone and his colleagues would do better to weigh the value of Russian promises, and especially to recall to remem- brance the historical course of those diplomatic negotia- tions which were carried on more than thirty years ago between Count Nesselrode and Lord Palmerston with regard to the Central Asiatic question, in which it was often enough proved that the words spoken on the Neva could not always be brought into perfect harmony with the actions of the representatives of the Czar in the East ; in fact, they sometimes betrayed double-deal- ing and evident deceit. The not very enviable part which in dissimulations of this kind devolved upon General Simonisk, the Russian ambassador at Teheran, must repeatedly be accepted by Russian agents ; and that treaties are only considered binding so long as cir- cumstances require it, has been well shown by the revision of the treaty of 1856, a work of the most criminal compliance, and in which the English states- men have the lion's share. If, therefore, the confidence placed on Russian pro- mises rests in itself on no granite basis, the fact must not, on the other hand, be forgotten that Russia in the present case, however much she may now be stimulated ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 365 by the noblest disinterestedness, cannot keep her pro- mise of a subsequent evacuation of Khiva, and, more- over, dare not do so, unless she chooses to be obliged by temporary re-occupation of the whole country on the lower Oxus, and therefore by new and considerable sacrifice, to procure the desired commercial intercourse and peaceful neighbours. It was Russian diplomacy and the Russian press which endeavoured to prove to the world that treaties with barbarous states were only of value so long as they could be impressed by the direct influence of power — z>., so long as they were compelled by force to adhere to the promise given. This is a view, the truth of which no one will deny, for the treaties with Khokand, Bokhara, and East Turke- stan might have been confirmed by a hundred seals and oaths on the part of the Ozbegs, but they would have been null and void if the mouths of the Russian cannons on the Syr, the Narin, and the Zerefshan had not inter- posed to inspire respect. The appreciation of the rights of nations, the fidelity and sincerity which are not found, nor are ever expected to be found, in Khokand and Bokhara, under more regular governments — does Russia expect to find these qualities in nomadic Khiva, where there is really no government at all ? and does she persuade the English that by the subjection of the Khanate, after conquering the Ozbegs, the Turko- mans, the Karakalpaks, and the Kirghises, she will at once withdraw from all points of a land conquered with so much blood and money, as soon as Khan-Seid-Me- hemmed-Rehim has signed and ratified the treaty ? That the author of " Juventus Mundi," who has recently manifested his love of the Homeric poetry, and therefore 366 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE of the Homeric age, can give perfect credence to such an innocent and primitive view of things, I do not doubt for a moment, and probably none will doubt who know Mr Gladstone and his writings. Equally little can it be held impossible that the Liberal English Ministry, which hitherto has shown sometimes a lamentable policy, sometimes a ridiculous one, but in most cases no Asiatic policy at all, will now be cautious enough to avoid the Russian snare. In order not to come forward in earnest, the Whigs will be satisfied with any evasion ; yet the English people as a whole may conceive this Central Asiatic question with their soberness and practical spirit, and may formally compel the Government to give no credence to the Russian promise with regard to the sub- sequent evacuation of Khiva, since the fulfilment of such an intention could never occur to the Russians, and never has occurred to them. With this chess move, if it is successfully carried out, Russia gains an impor- tant step in advance of her English rival; for, if she once obtains possession of Khiva, she will consolidate her entire position on the east coast of the Caspian, from Tchekihlar to the Todten Bay, which is now only provisionally the case ; and by a march against Chorassan and Herat, along that road which Burnes partly reconnoitred in 1832, on his return from Bokhara, and found traversable, she will procure herself a firm and lasting basis. The Russian army will then sooner or later be compelled by circumstances to inspire respect among the wild predatory Tekke and Sarik Turkomans in the south-east of the Hyrcanian steppes, to draw nearer to the arable land on the slopes of the Paro- pamisus — i.e,^ to choose at Merv, or perhaps still further ANGLO-RUSS/AN FRONTIER QUESTION, 36/ to the east, a station suitable for holding a defensive position ; for, just as impossible as it is to induce the Khan of Khiva from afar to fulfil certain obligations, equally impossible is it to think of even guarding the possession of Khiva from Khiva. In order from thence to proceed to the eastern province of Chorassan, three different routes are at the disposal of the Russians : (l.) the road before mentioned along the northern fron- tier of Iran ; (2.) the road from Hezaresp to Deregoz, which can be traversed in ten or twelve days on camels through a sandy desert, in parts very bad, and void of water ; and (3.) the road of Kabakly or Karayap, chiefly used by the Khivans in their expeditions against Merv, which the English diplomatist Thomson took in the year 1843. This road has drinkable water almost the whole way ; it leads through Hat (nomadic tribes), and it occupies with small marches no more than twelve days. If, therefore, the Russian diplomatists succeed in per- suading the English that the possession of Khiva is only provisory, and should this possible possession not be met from the first by preventive measures, it will be an easy thing for the Russian army to march to the north- west frontier of Afghanistan at a time when Great Britain, far from anticipating such a movement, is stand- ing unprepared, and in the utmost calmness, on her line of defence on the Indus and at the passes of the Sulei- man. I do not mean to say by this that Russia designs any surprise, and that England generally has to fear such an attack. No; the result of this chess move will only be that Russia will arrive sooner on the true arena of subsequent events, and this precedence must not be allowed on the part of England if it is a settled 368 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE fact that Russia's immediate vicinity on the north-west frontier of India is dangerous, and therefore, under any circumstances, is to be guarded against. We have thus then reached the most important point of the Central Asiatic question — namely, a political state of things which once threatened with mighty fury, and at another time was regarded as a ridiculous nightmare — in fact, the troubled sleeper blushed at having shrieked so loudly — and which now again is emerging like a cloud, the fatal character of which few would dispute. We will therefore look at this question closely, and I am permitted in the columns of this journal briefly to explain again the reasons, already mentioned in detail, why I consider the immediate vicinity of Russia to India dan- gerous to the interests of Great Britain, (i.) In the first place, a government, whose ruling principle is extension of frontier, and^ which sees itself, so to speak, carried along in the rapid stream of conquest by local and ethnographical circumstances, called forth by this very principle, cannot come to a pause until some mighty hindrance bars the way, i,e., the waves of Russian ag- gression, flowing from north to south, can sooner or later be checked alone by the dam of British power. (2.) Russians mere approximation on the north-west of India is dangerous to England, chiefly from the fact that this part of the great peninsular empire is peopled by Mo- hammedan, and still more by fanatical Mohammedan tribes, who, sitting on the ruins of a throne of power and grandeur, but recently overthrown, breathe vengeance against their oppressors and against all unbelieving Christians. We in nowise assert that these Mohamme- dans, impelled to temerity by Wehabism, entertain the ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 369 idea of a change of masters, and that they would give the preference to the Russian rule ; all that these races care for is war and anarchy, blood and flames, and by whomsoever the helping hand were held out to them, they would grasp it eagerly, even though the new heap of ruins buried their last hope. (3.) Russia can use her threatening position on the Indus for the furtherance of her other plans with reference to the west of Asia, and England, who is also greatly interested in the state of things on the Bosphorus, in Asia Minor, and in Arme- nia, must not allow her rival in any place or in any manner to get the advantage. These reasons could be multiplied three and fourfold, yet the duty of stating them ceases so soon as the Eng- lish statesmen, having arrived at a just perception of things, as Schuwaloff's mission sufficiently indicates, no longer play the part of indifferent spectators of Russia's farther advance. It has ceased to be said, '* We would rather have the cleanly-dressed, though only half-civil- ised Russian as a neighbour than the dirty and barbarous Afghan." It is no longer asserted that the two great European powers in Asia were only rivals on the field of geographical discoveries, of commerce, and of the disse- mination of Western culture. It is now confessed that a contest with regard to supremacy is here involved, and indeed that a vital question is at stake : and for this reason we will, in the first place, mention the means by which the chances of a collision, which must be fatal to both parties, can be averted, and perhaps even entirely removed. That the neutralisation of Afghanistan would best correspond with this object, as I pointed out more than 2 A 370 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE six years ago, is at the present day acknowledged by all the world, and the opinion has to all appearance taken root also in the Cabinets of London and Petersburg. Afghanistan is to be the centre of neutrality, and the intermediate body between the Oxus and the Indus, from ywhich the two powers are to rebound in violent appioximation. Had this country, which is for the most part mountainous, possessed more organised state relations than it does, if it had not been for centuries shattered by the most bitter internal feuds, and if its inhabitants, in consequence of this circumstance, had not become the most restless and warlike of people, the accomplishment of such an idea would be an easy mat- ter. Yet we must take the Afghan country as it is, and we must not forget : (i.) That Shir-Ali-Khan does not hold perfectly undisputed the possession of his paternal heritage. He has a considerable number of nephews and uncles, who, as members of the numerous posterity of the old Dost-Khan, are not without claims, not wholly unjust, if not to the throne, at least to the government of some province, and who are always ready to over- throw him on the first occasion, or at any rate to cause him as much embarrassment as possible. (2.) The Af- ghans in themselves are the most disobedient and unre- strained people in the world. The chiefs of the different tribes have at no time willingly submitted to the supre- macy of one sovereign ; and as the land may in general be called poor, the sword has ever had more followers than the plough, and trade has been and is exclusively in the hands of the Persians and the Tadjiks, z>., of a foreign race. Repugnance to supreme authority is increased by the fact that Shir-Ali-Khan has attempted ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 371 innovations, and has tried to put an end to anarchy; and this has made the true Orientals still more hostile in their feelings, and still more stubborn. He can therefore rely- on them but little if at all, and we see that even his nearest relatives, indeed- his own son, are always brooding rebel- lion and aspiring after the crown. (3.) The annexed provinces of Afghanistan are too loosely attached to the mother country to impart strength to it ; in fact, they are even a considerable hindrance, and at a time of danger they would certainly far rather hold out a hand to the foe without than to the friend within. Herat, for ex- ample, where the eldest son of the king, Sirdar-Mehem- med-Yakub-Khan, is at the head of affairs, is attached to Kabul only by a very thin thread of dependence. There has been a dispute for years between father and son, and the fact that Yakub-Khan maintains a larger army than his father allows him, and indeed behaves m a most independent manner, was always unintelligible in Kabul, and has given cause for the most different conjectures. We will not give credence to the report spread abroad by the Afghans, that he even receives secret subsidies from Persia or Russia. Still the young man is at any rate not to be relied on, and he justly causes his father much anxiety. The small principalities of Meimene, Andchoi, and the country of the Hesarek and the Djemshids, are in connection with Herat. The former, situated on the highroad to Bokhara, and num- bering about 300,000 inhabitants, has always wavered in its choice of a protector between Kabul and Bokhara ; and since it only inclined by preference to the ruler on the Zerefshan, and the latter has now become powerless to carry on any foreign policy, it is always on the look- 372 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE out for malcontents, in order to withdraw from depen- dence on Kabul. Aktche, Shiborgan, Khulm, Kunduz, Kulab, and Belch, known under the common denomina-, tion of Afghan Turkestan, also stand on no firmer footing of subjection to the successor of Dost-Moham- med-Khan. Here, for instance, the sons of Azim-Khan and Afzal-Khan possess a considerable influence, and the slightest commotion from without would be sufficient to sunder this important province from Afghanistan. Bedachshan and Wachan also, which the king of the Afghans at the present day calls his property, are very weak, and not at all attached to Kabul. His entire dominion over them consists in the payment of a yearly tribute of 15,000 rupees by the prince of this poor and mountainous country ; and the land on the banks of the Pendje, the Surchat, and the Kohtche, the principal tributaries of the upper Oxus, may in truth be desig- nated at the present day as without a master, as well as the whole of the adjacent district of the highlands of Pamir. It is true it cannot be denied that Shir-Ali- Khan's claims to Bedachshan rest rather on the force of arms than on the free choice of the inhabitants, for after the death of Dost-Mohammed-Khan, Djandar-Shah, the prince of the country at that time, wished to swear allegiance to the Emir of Bokhara, and I met the em- bassy sent for this purpose when I was at Kerki in the summer of 1863. Subsequently, however, Djandars nephews acquired the dominion by means of Afghan help, and as they are still ruling in Bedachshan under the protection of Kabul, it is only just that Shir-Ali- Khan should exercise his full sovereign authority there. That, under such circumstances, Afghanistan can ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION 2>7'i scarcely be transformed into a trustworthy neutral pro- vince, when its prince is being assisted in consolidating his own power, need scarcely be stated. For this office, this kindly service, has been undertaken by England when she, entered into a sort of offensive and defensive alliance with Shir- Ali- Khan, and for the security of his throne and the regulation of his internal affairs, allowed him yearly the sum of ;^ 1 20,000 sterling, and consider- able presents of arms besides. In the last few years, the jealous adversaries of Russia in England have, it is true, expressed the opinion that the British ought to cross the Kheiber Pass, conquer Afghanistan, and in this way form an advanced work as a defence for her Indian empire. This opinion, which is entertained by a small minority in England, and those chiefly belonging to the army, may however be designated as thoroughly errone- ous, and it can and will in nowise be pursued by English politicians. England, made wiser by the fatal campaign of 1840, dare not and will not again march into Kabul as an enemy. Such a policy is opposed, moreover, to sound human judgment, for it would require immense sacrifice, and after all miss its object ; since the Afghani- stan country, subjugated by England, would not only not serve as a bulwark to India, but, on the approach of the Russians, would be far more dangerous than the Punjaub, Sind, or the whole of the north-west of India. The conquest and annexation of Afghanistan is, there- fore, the most fatal idea for England that can be con- ceived. Afghanistan must be left in its independence if it is to be useful to English interests. Such a proceeding, however, need not at all exclude precautionary measures ; it does not render superfluous all improvements of the 374 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE position which England has to take along the whole frontier line, from Peshawur to Karatchi. I must in this respect agree with Colonel Sir Henry Green, or more cor- rectly with General Jacob, and express my approval of the opinion that the English frontier of Yacobabad ought to be removed to the other side of the Bolan Pass, i,e,y to the northern termination of this mountain road. If we examine the entire north-west line, we shall find that, judging from a strategical point of view, it is not completely fortified. The valley of Peshawur, where the English have as neighbours a hardy and fanatical moun- tain race, has at the present time a garrison of about ten hundred men, who are quite sufficient for the place, and are also able to guard the Kheiber Pass. Further to the south, at the Pass of Kokat, the garrison consists only of native troops. Further on, from Bannu along the frontier stations of Dera-Ismail-Khan, Deregaz-Khan, Radjanpur, Yacobabad, and Karatchi, a distance of nearly twelve hundred miles, there is a garrison of twelve thousand irregular troops, to which may be added the guard detachment of two thousand men on the Sind frontier, and the garrison of Karatchi. This is no in- considerable number, and, moreover, if occasion required, in consequence of the facilities of communication, it could be greatly increased. In the selection of the diffe- rent garrisoned places, however, a change ought to be made as far as possible. It is readily conceivable that it would be of great advantage to the Anglo-Indian interests to remove the frontier station of Peshawur to Djelalabat, 2>., to the other side of the Kheiber Pass ; yet this would be connected with very great difficulty, and might indeed almost be designated as impossible. ANGLChR US SI AN FRONTIER Q UES TION. 375 If England, therefore, cannot dispose of one of the so- called two principal gates of her empire in the north-west, she must take care to acquire possession of the key to the other, /.., from the town of Hazreti- Imam, as far as Kerki ; this latter river is at the present time actually designated as the northern boundary of Afghanistan. Yet we must not stop here, but prolong the boundary along this river as far as Tchikardjui ; for apart from the fact that the petty Khanates on the upper course of the Oxus, as well as Kerki and Andchoi, may be regarded to a certain extent as belong- ing to Afghanistan, many disputes in Central Asiatic politics would be averted by the annexation of these restless little states. These points form, moreover, the main highway across the Oxus territory towards the south, i.e.y to India ; and if Belch, on the highway over the Hindukush is in the hands of the Afghans, why should not Kerki be so also, through which the road to Herat passes, and which, from the political decline of Bokhara, has remained entirely without a master ? From Kerki to Tchihardjui, the coast lands inhabited by the peacefully disposed Ersari-Turkomans might, with- out much difficulty, be subjected to Afghan authority ; the only difficulty would be in the exact settlement of the frontier between Tchihardjui and Herat, as here, on the western branch of the Paropaneisus mountains, we are met by an inhospitable desert, and by the Kara, Alikli, Sarik, and Salor Turkomans, who rove over it ; against whom a power like Afghanistan is no match, and who could only be intimidated by the black eagle of Russia. The settlement of the west frontier of Af- ghanistan, namely, the effecting of peaceful relations between the Afghans and Persians, a work of con- ciliation which has for two years been undertaken by ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION, 3/9 Great Britain, could now all the more easily be brought to a happy termination, if the Court of Teheran were freed from the obnoxious importunities of Russia, and were placed on a free footing. Iran is at the present time thoroughly Russian ; yet we must not believe that this is a consequence of any peculiar affection for the Northern Colossus. Iran sympathy with Russia is the result of English indifference. The Government of the Shah must only be made to perceive that the indepen- dence of Iran is the aim of Great Britain, since in an independent position it can more easily remain neutral, and I do not doubt that the authorities in Teheran will endeavour to free themselves from the obnoxious tute- lage of Petersburg. All that we have said as to the exact settlement of the frontiers of northern Afghanis- tan, as well as every security which Great Britain will give with regard to the consolidation of the interior affairs of this country, and which by her assent to Gortschakoff's diplomatic communication of the 31st January 1873, she has already given, can, however, only then answer the desired object, if England is not dis- couraged from the direct control of affairs on the other side of the Kheiber Pass, and if in these places, namely, Kabul, Belch, and Herat, she allows herself to be repre- sented by agents who, enjoying due esteem, and ac- quainted with the Afghan character and with that of Central Asiatics generally, are able to procure British influence its full authority. 3. Russia must define her frontier on the north in such a manner that, exonerating herself from the suspi- cion of insatiable thirst for territory, she may quietly and leisurely proceed to that work of civilisation which, 380 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE according to her own assertion, she has undertaken in rude and uncivilised Turkestan. Her frontier in the south of her newly acquired possessions follows, at the present time, almost throughout, the right bank of the Oxus. Her position in Khokand, by which is under- stood the principality of Karategin, in Shehri-Sebz, and in the Khanate of Bokhara, is indeed such that she has not yet reached the yellow waters of the Amoor. Yet this will, sooner or later, be the case ; it must, moreover, be the case, since it lies, indeed, in the interest of humanity that the Khanate, now only partly subjugated, should be entirely incorporated. By this, Russia will procure advantages for herself, for the present Russian state expenses in Turkestan are almost three times as large as the receipts, and it is undoubtedly just that a state should derive a certain benefit from her efforts for the civilisation of the interior of Asia, and this, of course, can only be obtained when the main point of the Tur- kestan trade, namely, Bokhara, is placed in the hands of Russia. Similar also are our views with respect to Khiva.' We have before pointed out the probability that Russia, after a successful termination of the cam- paign, will not retire from the territory on the lower course of the Oxus ; that, moreover, she cannot retire, and that she ought not. If we would have rest in the remote future, there must be a thorough setting in order in the present, and this can only be done when the anarchical state of things in Khiva is once for all termi- nated. A chastisement and provisory occupation of this country would only mitigate the evil for a short period. After the lapse of a few years, the present situation of things would be resumed, Russia would equip herself ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 381 anew, and England would be again suspicious. Is it not, therefore, more expedient, if Russia at once, after having accomplished the conquest of the country, leaves behind a strong Russian garrison at several points, as, for instance, at Hezaresp, Khiva, Gorlen, Kiptjak, and Kungrat, taking the southern line of demarcation formed by the empty bed of the Oxus, which stretches in a south-east direction from Hezaresp to the Balkan range, terminates her possessions at Khiva, and gradually sub- jects the whole country to her sceptre? Whether diffi- cult or easy, whether combined with great expense and difficulties or not, the annexation and thorough conquest of Khiva will, at any rate, cost far less trouble than the repeated attempts to chastise the country. Much would thus be cleared up, and the main result, namely, the removal of English apprehensions, would be materially promoted. Closely connected with such a policy is the relinquishing of all those strong points hitherto occupied by Russia on the east coast of the Caspian Sea. At the time when she is engaged in war against Khiva, and in its subjection, the maintenance of a Russian garrison in Krasnowodsk and in Tchekishlar is explained, because these are to serve as a basis for her operations. But when once Russia has finished with Khiva, every glance which the Russian eagle casts on the south-east shores of the Caspian, could and must be suspected only as a secret design upon northern Chorassan. No other object could be pursued by Russia in this direction, in which the island of Ashurada may be reckoned, and Great Britain would be perfectly justified in conjecturing an attack on Herat in every Russian movement on the east coast of the Caspian Sea.. 382 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE 4. Persia, as we have before pointed out, must be strengthened and rendered more secure, especially in the mountainous parts of her northern frontier. The northern boundary of Iran must therefore be considered the banks of the Etrek, while on the east the left bank of the Murghab must be designated as the natural boundary, and by the re-annexation of Merv that frontier would be obtained which Iran possessed thousands of years ago, and which has been disputed only since the overthrow of the Lefides by the Turke- stan hordes of Central Asia. It is true a great stone of stumbling in all these arrangements is afforded by the Turkomans, amounting to nearly 450,000 men, who render the great Hyrcanian steppes insecure in all directions from Andchoi to Astrabad, and from Heza- resp to Deregos. They can, and they will, moreover, for a time trouble the three contiguous states, and will much impede the accomplishment of peaceful harmony. Yet we must not forget that the wings of the Turko- mans will be almost entirely broken by the powerful position of Russia in the Turkestan Khanates. Their principal means of livelihood, the main stimulus to their predatory excursions in. the adjacent countries of Iran and Afghanistan, namely, the slave trade, would be entirely paralysed by a Russian occupation of Bokhara and Khiva. I hear that this horrible trade of human beings has recently already lost much of its lucrative- ness ; and should it be subsequently repressed, even by a tolerably regular government in the Khanates, but few adventurers among the Tekkes, Sariks, and Yomuts would be found who, to the peril of their own lives, would make inroads into the above-mentioned countries, ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION 383 stealing defenceless men from the plough and from their homes, and dragging them away as slaves. For his own use the Turkoman requires no slaves ; he scarcely finds bread for himself and his family, and he has hitherto practised his robber trade only in the service of the Khanate. And why should it not be possible to put down such a trade ? Scarcely fifty years ago the Kirghises of the Central Horde were just as dangerous on the highway between Bokhara and Orenburg as the Turkomans, for their Barantas (predatory excursions) in Southern Siberia j have cost more than one Russian his liberty ; and if the gradual advance of the Russian outposts brought order here, and transformed the Kir- ghises into harmless cattle-breeders, why should not this be the case under similar circumstances with the Turkomans ? At the present day, these sons of the desert are the most restless, covetous, and unprincipled robbers in the world ; but a consolidation of the power of the state in Afghanistan, in Iran, and in the Khanates, must and will put an end to their infamous doings. We should here have concluded our humble sug- gestions with regard to the peaceful settlement of the Central Asiatic question. We must however observe, that the measures proposed can only have the hoped-for effect if Russia seriously intends a peaceful settlement ; and if, relinquishing her desire for immediate vicinity to the British possessions in India, she is really striving only for the restoration of repose in the Khanates, and for the promotion of her own commercial interests. Nothing but a frank and honest policy, and an open and unequivocal course of conduct, can solve this fatal Central Asiatic question ; and as Great Britain desires 384 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE no extension of frontier beyond the Suleiman range, and entertains no vast political plans in connection with this extension, it is Russia alone on whose behaviour the maintenance of peace depends, and who can avoid the mighty collision of the two great European powers in Asia, just as it also lies in her hand, to provoke it. As the diplomatic correspondence just concluded between London and Petersburg with regard to the Central Asiatic question informs us, England still ever places perfect confidence in the words of her northern rival, and feels herself not a little flattered that Prince Gortschakoff has yielded to the desire of Lord Granville with respect to the difference of opinion concerning Bedachshan. The Russian Chancellor of State says in his despatch of the 31st January, "Russia consents to the demarcation of frontier at Bedachshan pre- scribed by England, because it is difficult to ascertain the state of the case m those remote countries ; because England has more opportunity of gathering accurate information ; and, lastly, because it is unnecessary to attach greater importance to this question than really belongs to it." Truly no insignificant proof of gentle- ness on the part of the Russian bear ! If a single glance at the map of Turkestan did not prove to us that Russia can hitherto have pursued only very secondary plans in Bedachshan, and that the west frontier of Afghanistan is of more importance to her, we might still justify John Bull's proud self-consciousness. But as matters actually stand, this pleasure is very childish, and at any rate unfounded. This whole line of demar- cation, so far as it defines the northern boundary of Afghanistan, has too much the character of a provisory ANGLO-RUSSIAN FRONTIER QUESTION. 385 ■* performance ; and as Russia in all probability, after the conclusion of the campaign against Khiva, will express herself definitively on the subject, we will postpone our reflections on the matter until that time, and will keep in view the progress of that campaign which Russia, as Count Schuwaloff affirmed in London, has undertaken with only four and a half battalions of regular troops. THE END. 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In Seven Volumes, each containing Four Illustrations. Price 3s. 6d. each, bound in cloth. CONTENTS OF THE VOLUMES. Vol. I.— WIVES AND DAUGH- I Vol. II.-NORTH AND SOUTH. TERS. 1 Vol. III.— SYLVIA'S LOVERS. Vol. IV.— CRANFORD. Company Manners — The Well of Pen-Morpha— The Heart of John Middleton— Traits and Stories of the Huguenots— Six Weeks at Heppenheim — The Squire's Stoiy — Libbie Marsh's Three Eras— Curious if True — The Moorland Cottage— The Sexton's Hero- Disappearances— Right at Last— The Manchester Marriage — Lois the Witch— The Crooked Branch. Vol. v.— MARY BARTON. Cousin Phillis — My French Master— The Old Nurse's Story — Bessy's Troubles at Home- Christmas Storms and Sunshine. Vol. VI.— RUTH. The G-rey Woman— Morton Hall— Mr Harrison's Confessions— Hand and Heart. Vol. VII.- LIZZIE LEIGH. A Dark Night's Work— Round the Sofa— My Lady Ludlow— An Accursed Race— The Doom of the Griffiths- Half a Life-Time Ago — The Poor Clare— The Half Brothers. 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