Cornell University Library 
 UA702 .A92 1869 
 
 The military institutions of France / 
 
 olin 
 
 3 1924 030 727 287 
 
a Cornell University 
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 The original of tliis book is in 
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THE 
 
 MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
LONI>ON : PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, BTAMFOUD STKEKT 
 AND CHA.IUN& CROSS. 
 
THE 
 
 MILITARY INSTITUTIONS 
 
 OF 
 
 FRANCE, 
 
 BY HIS EOYAL HIGHNESS 
 
 THE DUG D'AUMALE. 
 
 {WITB TEE AUTHOR'S CONSENT) 
 BT 
 
 CAPTAIN ASHE, 
 
 KIKG*a DRAGOON GCABJ)S. 
 
 LONDON: 
 CHAPMAN AND HALL, 193 PICCADILLY. 
 
 1869. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The following pages were written at Aldershot 
 nearly two years ago ; various causes have 
 delayed their publication. 
 
 To the kindness of Lieutenant-Greneral the 
 Honourable Sir James Yorke Scarlett, K.C.B., 
 the Translator is greatly indebted for access to 
 some rare and useful military works of reference 
 in French and German, contained in the Prince 
 Consort's Library. 
 
 The problem of army administration promises 
 to open as wide a field for discussion in our own 
 
vi -PBEFAr'E. 
 
 country as it has done in France ; and it is 
 to be hoped that this Enghsh version of the 
 Due d'Aumale's work, published by permission 
 of His Royal Highness, may not be unaccept- 
 able to those who have not read it in its 
 original form. 
 
 Cambridge House, Picoadillv, 
 March 20, 1869. 
 
THE 
 
 lEITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 LOUVOIS — CARlSrOT — SAINT CTR. 
 
 About a hundred years ago Europe was some- 
 what surprised to learn that she possessed an 
 additional military power, and that this power 
 had crept into the front rank. It was not, as in 
 the days of Grustavus Adolphus, a dazzling 
 meteor flashing across an universal chaos only to 
 disappear, after having filled the world with its 
 brilliancy ; it was the smallest, poorest, youngest 
 of monarchies, fighting in succession the most 
 celebrated armies. Not only did she gain vic- 
 tories, and know how to profit by them, but she 
 was able, without entirely succumbing, to lose 
 occasionally several points in the terrible game 
 of war : she could bear up against reverses, 
 
 B 
 
2 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 renew tbe struggle after defeat, and finally call 
 back victory to her colours. 
 
 In the eighteenth century, when the solution 
 of the most difficult problems was freely sought 
 after, a phenomenon so remarkable could not 
 ap]3ear without giving rise to the most diverse 
 commentaries. In addition to those who simply 
 paid homage to the genius and tenacity of 
 Frederick, or who recognized in him a crowned 
 philosopher, there were advocates for all the 
 details of Prussian organisation and tactics; 
 some praised the "oblique formation," others 
 tbe iron ramrod ; while some profound minds 
 decided, that if we used the cane to our soldiers, 
 we need never again fear the humiliation of 
 Eosbach. All these were, to a certain extent, 
 right and wrong; severe discipline, scientific 
 evolutions, improved arms— all had their share in 
 the success of the Prussian armies ; but these 
 were merely the elements, the component parts 
 of a great whole ; and it was this whole which it 
 was necessary to grasp and study. The truth 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANCE. 3 
 
 was, that the large intellect of Frederick had 
 found a powerful instrument, in the system of 
 military institutions, merely sketched out by his 
 predecessors, and which he developed, completed, 
 and adapted to his age and country. 
 
 And when, in 1866, we saw the same power 
 suddenly rise from a repose of fifty years, bring 
 into play springs of action of which certain 
 superficial observers doubted the elasticity and 
 force, and finally obtain the most brilliant tri- 
 umph that history had for years recorded, we 
 began to exaggerate, after the victory, what, 
 before it, we had undervalued ; and appreciatory 
 opinions were expressed, analogous to those 
 called forth by the Seven Years' War. Many 
 changes, of course, have taken place ; that pain- 
 ful contortion which, but lately, was the despair 
 of recruit and instructor, "the oblique step," 
 is no longer in use ; the "iron ramrod " is suited 
 only for an antiquarian museum ; and who now 
 would venture to talk of using the cane ? But 
 still, in the present day, according to some 
 
4 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANCE. 
 
 critics, success is only obtained by the practice of 
 wheeling movements, by the electric telegraph, 
 and by railroads : according to others it . is the 
 needle gun which has done all : " No more 
 standing armies" is repeated by a numerous 
 chorus ; " we only want a landwehr." 
 
 ISTow, as it was a hundred years ago, our 
 judgments err from being too exclusive, and, if 
 we take only one side of a question, we see it 
 imperfectly. It is simply requisite to start from 
 too narrow a point of view to arrive at a false 
 conclusion, and in the present case the error 
 might carry us very far. It is unreasonable to 
 attribute the recent victories of the Prussians to 
 any particular branch of their military organi- 
 sation ; and it would be doing an injustice to 
 the conqueror to seek in the excellence even of 
 a system, the sole explanation of the events of 
 last summer. The issue of the campaign of 
 1866 is attributable to many very different 
 causes, of which some are obvious, others not 
 sufficiently known, and which need not now be 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 5 
 
 dilated upon. What it concerns us to observe, 
 and wtat we believe to be true, is, that if 
 Prussia was able to bring, almost instantaneously, 
 a considerable army into the field, well drilled, 
 well commanded, completely provided, and, in 
 default of experience, animated with the liveliest 
 sentiment of honour ; if she could operate simul- 
 taneously on the Elbe, on the Maine, and in 
 Thuringia, and, while dispersing the levies of 
 the Germanic Confederation, could invade Bo- 
 hemia with troops, superior in number and 
 organisation to the valiant and trained legions 
 which Austria opposed to her, she owes this 
 great result to mihtary institutions which had 
 been maintained, reorganised, and developed 
 during peace. 
 
 Military institutions neither give nor guarantee 
 victory ; they supply the means of fighting, of 
 conquering, or of supporting reverses. Without 
 them, as long as the present state of European 
 society exists, until we shall see that golden age, 
 pax perpetua, which, according to Leibnitz, exists 
 
6 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANOE. 
 
 only in " God's acre " — without them, we say, 
 there is neither security nor true independence 
 for nations. How are they founded ? By what 
 modifications can they be adapted to the age, 
 and to the intelhgence of the masses ? How are 
 they strengthened or weakened, purified or cor- 
 rupted ? How can they become an insupport- 
 able burden, an instrument of tyranny, or, 
 assimilated to the customs of a people, be asso- 
 ciated with public liberty, and form the ground- 
 work of national power ? We will endeavour to 
 study this in the history of our country. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 Louvois laid the foundation of our military 
 system. Before Mm, no doubt, France did pos- 
 sess armies, valiant, national, often well com- 
 manded, and frequently victorious ; but we may 
 say that the French Army did not exist. For 
 more than two hundred years the old feudal 
 organisation had disappeared, without being 
 replaced in any definitive manner. Charles YII. 
 had instituted the "gendarmerie"* and the 
 
 * Up to the reign of Charles VII. the French cavalry was com- 
 posed entirely of the nobility, called together as occasion re- 
 qnired; but the many long and costly wars had rendered it lat- 
 terly more difficult for the king to bring a sufficient number into 
 the field. He therefore, in 1445, wishing to possess a corps avail- 
 able on every occasion, formed fifteen companies of men-at-arms, 
 chosen for personal bravery and experience. Each company con- 
 sisted of 100 lances, and each lance was attended by five fol- 
 
8 THE MILITABY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 " francs archers ;"* but the remarkable edifice of 
 ordonnances, built up by the house of Valois to 
 mature these creations, soon crumbled away in 
 the religious wars. The inventive and restora- 
 tive genius of Henry IV. exerted over the 
 military institutions of France the same salutary 
 influence as over other branches of the public 
 service. He was, however, cut off by death before 
 he could put the finishing touch to his work, and 
 army and regulations disappeared with him. In 
 the month of May, 1610, he had brought toge- 
 ther in Champagne 60,000 infantry, formed in 
 compact regiments of 4000 men ; his artillery 
 
 lowers ; viz., three archers, a " cutler,'' and a valet, maMng in 
 each company 600 mounted men, and the fifteen companies form- 
 ing a total of 9000 horsemen. To each company was appointed 
 a captain, a lieutenant, an ensign, a standard-bearer, and a 
 quartermaster. Thus officers and men numbered 9075. These 
 officers were nobles of distinction, and the men-at-arms were 
 gentlemen. 
 
 * The " francs archers," or free archers, so called from their 
 exemption from taxation, were formed by Charles VII.' in 1448, 
 and broken up by Louis XI. in 1481. They were all, or nearly 
 all, gentlemen; their duties were about the household of the 
 sovereign ; they were replaced in the reign of Louis XI. by the 
 Swiss Guard. 
 
TEE MILITART INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 9 
 
 was the most numerous, the most transportable, 
 that had as yet been seen. His cavalry were 
 well drilled and well mounted, and the fortresses 
 and frontiers were munitioned. Before the end 
 of the year, there remained but skeletons of regi- 
 ments, pillaging bands, and empty arsenals : 
 like snow in the sun, all had melted under the 
 dissolving influence of court rivalry and intrigue. 
 Then came Eichelieu : without altogether com- 
 pleting anything, he provided for many defi- 
 ciencies, and the reforms which he planned were 
 vigorously carried out. In the midst of checks, 
 reverses, and treasons, he continued his task, 
 making trial of, and displacing, generals and 
 administrators, until he found the instruments 
 that suited him. His administration was marked 
 by the suppression of the office of Constable, 
 a useless encumbrance which hampered the 
 supreme power of the prime minister ; by the 
 creation of comptrollers of justice and finance, 
 who were the representatives, in the army, of 
 order and law ; by sound regulations regarding 
 
10 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANCE. 
 
 pay and duration of service; by severe mea- 
 sures against " passe- volants/'* afterwards called 
 "hommes de paille" (men of straw), deserters, 
 thieves, &c. But after him, disorders, which he 
 had not altogether stifled, reappeared. We 
 still, indeed, continued victorious during the 
 agitated regency of Anne of Austria, for Mazarin 
 understood war as well as diplomacy, but his 
 authority was too much disputed to allow him 
 to administrate well. His hands were not very 
 clean ; he feared, and yet had need of the gene- 
 rals ; he flattered, but did not wish to see them 
 too powerful : it suited him to overlook many 
 things, and a little confusion was not altogether 
 displeasing. In short, Mazarin regulated no- 
 thing, founded nothing ; and, under his govern- 
 ment, the military institutions of Eichelieu fell 
 into desuetude. 
 
 About 1660, the king's guards, the squadrons 
 of gendarmerie, and some regiments of infantry 
 
 * A " passe-Yolant " was a supposititious or borrowed soldier 
 falsely mustered, in order that his pay might be drawn. 
 
TEE MILITAST INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 11 
 
 called " les vieux," * composed the only standing 
 army ; the other corps of cavalry and infantry 
 were formed at the commencement of each war, 
 and given to the enterprise as a sort of con- 
 cession. Formed for a special ohject, destined 
 to serve on certain frontiers, often tmder the 
 feudal authority of a particular prince or gene- 
 ral, these regiments remained incorporated in 
 the army only until the end of hostihties, or 
 until an economical necessity caused them to be 
 disbanded. To move them was a formidable 
 undertaking. When, in 1643, the Due d'Bnghien 
 succeeded in leading the army of Flanders into 
 Germany, he gained almost as much applause as 
 for the victory of Eocroi or for the taking of 
 Theonville ; and in 1 647, Turenne appealed 
 vainly to the Weymarians,f who had been under 
 
 * The six corps called " vieux " were the regiments of Picardy, 
 Piedmont, Navarre, (Jhampagne, Normandy; and the Marines. 
 The &st three were formed in 1562, the regiment of Champagne 
 in 1575, that of Normandy in 1616, and the Marines in 1626. 
 
 t The Weymarians were a body of foreign troops consisting of 
 Swedes, Danes, and Germans, chiefly cavalry, the remnant of the 
 army of Gustavus Adolphns. Some years after the death of that 
 
12 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANGE. 
 
 his orders for many years. He was actually 
 corapelled to charge down upon them to make 
 them follow him from Grermany into Flanders. 
 Leaders of all ranks traded without shame, 
 and in the same way, colonels, captains, and 
 generals became contractors. In equipping a 
 regiment, in maintaining an army, with what 
 the king gave, many ruined themselves ; others 
 made large profits. Of those who benefited — 
 the most scrupulous, or those who cared most 
 for the public welfare, employed their profits 
 for the good of the service ; the majority, how- 
 
 hero they entered the French service, under the command of Duke 
 Bernard of Saxe Weimar ; hence their name. Turenne had served 
 with them in his youth, and, after the death of Duke Bernard, they 
 came under his command. In 1647, although much reduced ia 
 numhers by a long war, they still formed about one-third of Tu- 
 renne's army. He was well known to them, admired and beloved; 
 but when he ordered them to follow him from Germany to Flanders, 
 they emphatically declined to obey, cooUy packed up their bag- 
 gage, saddled their horses, and officers and men, with their 
 standards, left him in a body. Turenne allowed them to go, 
 then called his French troops to arms, went on their track, and, 
 waiting till he saw them marching carelessly through a defile, 
 suddenly charged down on them. After some few were killed, 
 finding themselves surrounded, they submitted. 
 
14 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 men, all civilians, who held themselves bound 
 by none of the duties of the military profession. 
 If a siege had to be undertaken, captains and 
 lieutenants who happened to possess a little 
 knowledge or aptitude were sought in the in- 
 fantry ; they traced the attacks, and aided the 
 general to direct the works and place the bat- 
 teries. In return for this special duty they were 
 merely exempted from their ordinary guards : the 
 siege over, if neither killed nor wounded, they 
 returned to their usual regimental duties. Some- 
 times, as an extraordinary recompense, they re- 
 ceived a company in a veteran regiment ; but a 
 general, enjoying court favour, was alone able 
 to obtain such a reward for those whom Vauban 
 styled " Infantry-martyrs." For sole reserve, 
 there was the communal militia, which existed 
 little more than in name, and the " arriere ban,"* 
 
 * " Arriere ban," the convocation of the king's vassals for ser- 
 vice. It was ordained by proclamation that all who owed alle- 
 giance to the crown were to appear on a fixed day, either mounted 
 or on foot. Francis I. fixed their term of service at three months i 
 within the kingdom and forty days out of it. In the time of 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 15 
 
 or general levy of the nobles ; the last vestige of 
 a time for ever gone by. These were, in moments 
 of danger, two very precarious resources, on 
 which, long ere this, no reliance was placed. 
 Everything regarding the army remained as an 
 imperfect sketch. One only of Richelieu's insti- 
 tutions survived him : the office of Secretary of 
 State for War was retained. This was the lever 
 of which Louvois made use to accomplish a com- 
 plete revolution. He threw the whole military 
 power into the king's own hands. Between the 
 chaos which existed before him and the order 
 which he created the distance was immense ; his 
 work has been durable, and the military system 
 which he founded was still in existence in 1792. 
 This great reformer was not quite, however, 
 what in the latter days of the Roman aristocracy 
 
 Charles VII., and for long after, the office of Captain-General of 
 the arriere ban existed : it was suppressed in 1576 by Henry III., 
 re-established soon after, and finally done away with under 
 Henry IV. ; at least there is no mention of the office duiing the 
 reign of Louis XIII. The arriere ban was called out for the last 
 time in 1674, under the command of the Marquis de Eochefort. 
 
16 TEE MILITAR7 INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 would have been called a novus homo ; and, when 
 he set himself to his task, he had neither insult 
 to avenge nor hatred of caste to satisfy. His 
 family success, however, was of a recent date ; 
 his grandfather, a petty tradesman, and commis- 
 saire of one of the Parisian districts, had received 
 from Mayenne, as a reward for his devotion 
 to the League, the appointment of Maltre des 
 Comptes ;* but his father was Secretary of State, 
 and so much in favour, that in 1655 the young 
 Frangois Michel Letellier, the future Marquis de 
 Louvois, was promised the reversion of his 
 father's office. He was not yet fifteen, and was 
 therefore, in some degree, educated for the 
 duties he was destined to fulfil ; and from 
 childhood he had prepared himself for them by 
 energetic apphcation. In 1662, after the dis- 
 grace of Fouquet, he was authorized to sign 
 himself Secretary of State. From this time the 
 elder Letellier gradually retired, relinquishing 
 
 * " Maitre des Comptes," a judge in the court for the roTision 
 of public accounts — " La cour des comptes.'' 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 17 
 
 to his son the conduct of military affairs. From 
 study Louvois passed on to action, and his 
 administration commenced. He began with 
 settled opinions and technical knowledge of an 
 enlarged nature, but did not bring with him 
 any ready-made system. Without endeavouring 
 to form all at once the army and its different 
 branches, he applied himself to modify, sup- 
 press, and regulate, as fast as necessity arose ; 
 making use of all the instruments at his dis- 
 posal, and not changing them until they were 
 found worthless or worn-out; proceeding with 
 method^ having always a definite object in view, 
 and not destroying merely to reconstruct. 
 
 If we cannot recognize in him a military 
 Sieyes, neither can we put him on the same 
 rank with Richelieu ; the latter would be as- 
 signing to Louis XIV. a part not his own. 
 There are certain premature apotheoses, ephe- 
 meral flatteries, of which history keeps no 
 account ; but the epithet of " great," so often 
 lavished by hired panegyrists, she has granted to 
 
18 THE MILITART INSTITUTIONS OF FRANGE. 
 
 few men, but when thus given, she has recorded 
 the title incontestably. — Posterity continues to 
 say, " Louis the Great," and it is a decision we 
 may accept as final. 
 
 Sharing his master's ideas, animated by the 
 same passions, carried away by the same ten- 
 dencies, Louvois was more than a clerk, never 
 more than a minister. Sometimes a disagree- 
 able servant, too often a complaisant one, mer- 
 ciless to rogues, pitiless to the people; brutal, 
 cruel, but incorruptible ; he established, in the 
 military profession, that centralisation which 
 influenced all France. His first care was to 
 consolidate his own powers ; the contracts for 
 lodging, pay, rations, and hospitals had been 
 hitherto in the charge of the Comptroller-Ge- 
 neral ; were taken from him : the fortification 
 department, hitherto divided among the various 
 Secretaries of State, he concentrated also in his 
 own hands : at a later period he created the 
 Military Eecord OflSce ; and for his own glory, 
 never did his love of order and method give 
 
TEE MILITAET INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 19 
 
 him a better inspiration. Had he not ordered 
 the mass of despatches and minutes which accu- 
 mulated to be preserved and classified, we should 
 not have had the admirable work M. Eousset 
 has devoted to him, and which has made us 
 so intimately acquainted with the man and his 
 labours. Two Directors-Greneral, Saint Pouange 
 and Ohamlay, shared the details of the adminis- 
 tration, of the personnel,^ and of the military- 
 operations. The confusion which existed be- 
 tween the different branches of the profession 
 ceased, and it may be said, that, for the first 
 time, the principle of division of labour was 
 applied to war. The artillery were formed 
 in troops ; the deputies of the " Grrand Maltre "f 
 were appointed oflScers, and the engineers were 
 
 * A branch of the War Office corresponding somewhat to the 
 department iinder the supervision of the Military Secretary in 
 England. 
 
 t The office of " Grand Maitre de FArtUlerie," created under 
 the Valois, was a direct charge from the crown, and analogous to 
 the office of " Master-General of Ordnance," which existed in the 
 English army up to the 25th of May, 1855. This department 
 was then amalgamated with the Horse Guards. 
 
20 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANGE. 
 
 organised. With or without special title, each 
 arm of the service had its Inspector-General, 
 who established and maintained uniformity in 
 the duties and instruction. Martinet for the 
 infantry, Fourille for the cavalry, Dumetz for 
 the artillery, and for fortification, he whose 
 name our readers must have already anticipated 
 — he whose friendship (as M. Eousset has well 
 said) protects the memory of Louvois; the man 
 of genius, and pre-eminently good man, Vauban. 
 Discipline was maintained in every grade of 
 the military hierarchy. Not only were deserters, 
 " passe volants," and other obscure defaulters, 
 hunted down with a severity which the new or- 
 ganization rendered more efficacious, but even 
 the higher ranks were subjected to regulations 
 hitherto unknown, and which, at all times, are 
 diflScult to enforce. When several marshals 
 happened to be present in the same army, they 
 were compelled to obey one selected by the 
 king ; immediate disgrace served as an example 
 to those who were reluctant to submit. The 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANOM. 21 
 
 general officers were promoted by seniority, 
 and took their duties according to the " roster." 
 Whoever has opened a volume of Saint Simon 
 will remember all the lamentations that such 
 measures called forth from the pride of duke 
 and peer. Making every allowance for the 
 prejudices and bitterness of a discontented 
 noble, it must be admitted that his criticisms 
 were not without foundation. Convenient for 
 the ruling power, that found itself thus freed 
 from all importunities and embarrassment, this 
 system had practically many grave inconve- 
 niences ; it was favourable to mediocrity, re- 
 sponsibility was divided, the duration of com- 
 mand was uncertain, and, while putting an end 
 to disorder, the principle was carried too far. 
 The colonels-general were abolished, or deprived 
 of prerogatives which had become exorbitant ; 
 no more officers were appointed, except under 
 the king's seal, and all ranks found themselves 
 under the surveillance of the minister. Written 
 accounts of the behaviour and ability of each 
 
22 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 ofiScer were kept at the "War Office ; and while 
 protected from the caprice of their superiors, acts 
 of trickery or oppression, of which they them- 
 selves were guilty towards their soldiers, were 
 severely punished. The axe being once placed 
 to the root of the tree, Louvois should have struck 
 with more force ; he should have suppressed the 
 purchase of promotion; hut he allowed it to 
 remain. Contenting himself with taxing each 
 rank, and with exacting certain conditions of 
 admission, he must have wished to open the 
 door of military honours to the middle classes, 
 and to close it to the more ignorant of the 
 nobility. He even tried an institution which 
 would somewhat correspond to our military col- 
 leges, and he instituted companies of cadets, the 
 entrance to which was rendered easy. Here 
 were taught professional details, drill, and ma- 
 thematics. Time, however, was wanting to the 
 minister to develop those ideas, or to superin- 
 tend their execution : they resulted in nothing, 
 and the companies were disbanded"; a sort of 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 23 
 
 Dovitiate, however, was imposed- on all wlio 
 aspired to the rank of colonel, and the accident 
 of birth exempted none. To attain to this grade 
 a service of at least two years was necessary 
 either in one of the corps which were considered 
 as models, and the direct command of which the 
 king reserved to himself, in the regiment of 
 infantry which bore his name, or in his military 
 household.* 
 
 * It had long been the custom of the kings of France, when- 
 ever a new militia was raised, to attach a portion of such to the 
 Eoyal Guard. Charles VII. retained for this piwpose two com- 
 panies of the new Gendarmerie. He also took two companies of 
 another militia, called the Chevaux Legers, to form the French 
 and Scotch archers of the guard. Henry IV., in the same man- 
 ner, placed in his guard a company of Gendarmerie and a com- 
 pany of Ohevaux Legers. Under the same king the militia called 
 the Carabins was augmented, and Louis XIII. formed the cele- 
 brated Mousquetaires from a company of the latter corps. Under 
 Louis XIV. the " Maison du Eoi" consisted of the Gardes du 
 Corps, the Gendarmes, the Chevaux Legers, the Mousquetaires, the 
 Gendarmerie, and the Grenadiers a cheval. These were all essen- 
 tially horsemen, and, with the exception of the last corps, aU 
 gentlemen. The Gardes Frangaises and Gardes Suisses were 
 special infantry regiments, and might theoretically belong to the 
 royal household, but the "Maison du Eoi" virtually consisted of 
 the troops above mentioned. The Cent Suisses did only internal 
 duty in the palaces. 
 
24 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 The remodelling of the maison du roi was 
 one of Louvois' most ingenious conceptions. The 
 corps composing it were not restricted to the 
 simple duties of escort and ante-chamber. They 
 were increased to about 4000 men, although, in 
 spite of the luxury of the court, 800 was suffi- 
 cient for the King's Gruard. It was, at the 
 same time, a cavalry of elite, a training-school 
 for officers, and an institution which replaced the 
 last remnants of feudalism. The " arri^re ban " 
 had been called out only once under Louis XIV., 
 and seemed to have been mustered , merely to 
 show its inefficiency. It was only a mob, badly 
 mounted, scarcely armed, incapable of either 
 obeying or of fighting, and there was nothing left 
 but to disband it immediately. As regards the 
 military power, this was the end of the old regime, 
 and, to deal it a final blow, Louvois replaced the 
 obligatory service— the shallow pretext for many 
 an aristocratic privilege — by a fiscal measure of 
 exoneration. To those who preferred paying 
 with their blood, the " King's Household " was 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FEANOE. 25 
 
 still open. They entered the Musketeers, Body 
 Guard, or G-endarmes. The tests for admission to 
 these corps were not very severe ; in fact, one of 
 them, the " Grenadiers k cheval," was composed 
 of veteran soldiers ; patricians and plebeians were 
 here united in a fellowship of arms. The house- 
 hold troops did not retain all the characteristics 
 with which Louvois wished to endow them ; but 
 to the end of their career they distinguished 
 themselves by every form of courage. The same 
 drawing-room exquisites, who carried Yalen- 
 ciennes in broad daylight by an act of unheard-of 
 audacity, held their post at Senef as stoically as 
 the most tried veterans. " The insolent nation !" 
 exclaimed the Prince of Orange, on seeing at 
 Nierwinden the line of red and blue squadrons 
 stagger under the storm of bullets, and close up 
 without giving way. At Steenkirk the same 
 troops decided the battle, and, when bad times 
 came, at Malplaquet, their charge swept through 
 the three lines of the enemy. The last brilliant 
 victory of the old monarchy was also their last 
 
26 TBE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. \ 
 
 feat of arms : it was they who at Fontenoy threw 
 themselves into the breach opened by Lally's 
 cannon, and overthrew the powerful column of 
 the Duke of Cumberland. 
 
 The household troops formed an efBcient re-- 
 serve to the cavalry of the line, but a national; 
 light cavalry was still wanting. Louvois sup- 
 plied this deficiency by the dragoons, to whom 
 he added troops furnished with rifles. The^ 
 dragoons and carabineers of to-day would hardly j 
 recognize their military ancestors. The propor- 
 tion of mounted troops, although still consider-; 
 able, was decreased. In 1678, out of a total 
 effective of about 280,000 men, there were 50,000 
 cavalry and 10,000 dragoons. The muster-roll 
 of infantry was always on the increase : it was 
 this branch that Louis XIY. and his minister 
 wished not only to augment, but to raise and 
 improve. The king had decided on inscribing 
 himself on the list of colonels ; his regiment, we 
 have said, and the Gardes Frangaises were in- 
 tended to serve as models for the instruction of 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FEANGE. 27 
 
 the rest of the service. They had several bat- 
 tahons, and their companies were strong ; cir- 
 cumstances, however, did not permit the general 
 application of these two principles : other regi- 
 ments remained with one battalion, and rather 
 weak companies, but they became permanent; 
 were restricted by regulations in their clothing, 
 and, above all, in their arms, which were much 
 improved, although the great reform, the adop- 
 tion of the bayonet musket, was not accomplished 
 until later. Almost a third of the infantry were 
 Swiss and Germans ; but the former had for two 
 centuries been in a manner incorporated with our 
 ranks ; while the latter, inhabiting the Ehenish 
 provinces, had in France the rights of denizens. 
 At that time, with the exception of some insig- 
 nificant and immaterial privileges, neither the 
 foreign regiments, nor those of the king, the 
 princes, nor the guards, were distinguished from 
 the other corps : they performed the same duties, 
 obeyed the same generals. The real elite of the 
 infantry remained in their respective regiments. 
 
28 THE MILITABY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. \ 
 
 On the right of each battalion, under the com- 
 mand of an officer of fortune, were placed the 
 bravest and most robust soldiers ; they wore on 
 the shoulder that piece of red worsted since ren- 
 dered illustrious by so many actions, and which 
 they wear to this day : these were our Grrena- 
 diers. The same discipline was applied to all, 
 and the minister's hand was even seen in all the 
 details of regimental interior economy. The time 
 had not yet arrived when all this could be done 
 directly by the state. Commanders of corps still 
 retained that responsibility which made them to a 
 certain extent contractors ; but, so strict was the 
 surveillance exercised over them that, actual 
 profit was no longer possible, while for the poor 
 or negligent ruin was almost certain. This seve- 
 rity of the minister was, of course, bitterly com- 
 plained of. With the funds sent by the king for 
 pay, with distributions in kind, and a contribution 
 which, under the name of " ustensile,"* was im- 
 
 * "Ustensile ''was the accommodation due by the landlord to 
 each soldier billeted upon him. Sometimes " ustensile " was 
 
THE MILITAET INSTITUTIONS OF FBANCE. 29 
 
 posed upon such communities as were compelled 
 to lodge the troops, the colonels and captains 
 had to victual, clothe, and equip the men, and to 
 pay them every ten days. Woe to those who 
 illegally retained any portion of such funds, 
 or who, on review days, borrowed men or arms 
 for the sake of concealing the weakness of their 
 effective, or the bad state of their companies ! 
 This was not all : recruits had to be found ; but 
 on this point Louvois was not troublesome ; to 
 enlist them officers could, almost with impunity, 
 resort to either violence or roguery. The mo- 
 ment those so-called volunteers were brought 
 under the colours, they had to remain four years. 
 There was no restriction as to height — it was 
 sufficient that neither vagabonds, children, nor 
 impostors were presented, and, at a later period, 
 even greater facilities were afforded. It was 
 necessary to resort to " bataillons de salades,"* 
 
 farnislied in money, and paid by the inhabitants of the place 
 where the troops were quartered. 
 
 * The " bataillons de salades " were originally the regiments of 
 proviacial militia called out to defend the frontier in 1668. This 
 
30 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 "levees d'enfants," and " pauvres petits mise- 
 rabies," to thus reap the young generations in 
 the bud. Louvois himself lived long enough to 
 see the inefficiency of the system of " racolage,"* 
 or " crimping." He had not from the beginning 
 held in much esteem the ancient institution of the 
 militia, the system of which he found badly de- 
 fined, looked upon as forgotten, and placed on a 
 par with the " arri^re ban." On this account he 
 had willingly accepted the money which the 
 estates of Languedoc and others offered instead of 
 
 sobriquet was applied to them by the old soldiers from the sa- 
 lades, or casques of their fathers, with which many of them were 
 equipped. The proportion was fixed at one man in every dis- 
 trict paying 2000 livres in. taxes. Later, to complete the requi- 
 site number, mere boys were often furnished. Hence the expres- 
 sions " Levees d'enfants " and " Pauvres petits mis6rables." 
 
 * By a decree in 1692 Louis XIV. ordained that no soldier 
 should be enrolled except by voluntary enhstment. The offlceis 
 were compelled, however, to resort to all sorts of subterfuges to 
 obtain recruits. Deceit, debauch, and even force, were employed. 
 Men were entrapped during the day and hidden in places called 
 " fours " until the night, when they were taken and handed over 
 to the captains. The Quai de la Perraille, in Paris, was long 
 celebrated for racolage, as this species of kidnapping was called, 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 31 
 
 contingent ; but when war broke out everywhere, 
 north and south ; men, and the framework of 
 corps, were wanting for the hne. The provinces 
 supphed regiments of mihtia, composed at first 
 of unmarried volunteers, and afterwards com- 
 pleted by drawing lots, clothed and equipped by 
 their own parishes, and commanded by country 
 gentlemen. This gave from 25,000 to 30,000 men, 
 who served principally in Italy, and behaved 
 creditably. In the eyes of the minister this 
 calling out of the militia was but an expedient ; 
 it is very doubtful whether he ever thought, by 
 making it permanent, to find therein the elements 
 of any reorganisation of our military system ; 
 but whatever were his projects, he was not 
 allowed time to execute them : he died almost at 
 the moment when Catinat for the first time led 
 the provincial troops into action. 
 
 If, in spite of his energy and boldness, Louvois 
 seemed to hesitate in employing certain radical 
 measures to complete his work, he recognized 
 no obstacles to the impulse given to two ser- 
 
32 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 vices •whicli in his hands became united — the 
 supreme administration of war and the depart* 
 ment of fortification. With the advice and con- 
 currence of Vauban, with the assistance of 
 several superintendents, active, ingenious, vigi- 
 lant, and uncompromising as himself — such men 
 as Robert, Jacques, and Berthelet — he was not 
 content with only reforming, he created. The 
 frontier provinces, both old and new conquests, 
 were covered with citadels, magazines, barracks, 
 and hospitals ; their resources in numbers, pro- 
 visions, and material of all kinds, were confis- 
 cated, sometimes cruelly, often harshly, but 
 always promptly and methodically. Each 
 country entered by our columns, was imme- 
 diately taken possession of by the engineers and 
 commissariat ; provisions were seized and accu- 
 mulated ; old buildings thrown down, and others 
 raised. The scourge of war appeared heavier 
 to the people, and if the evils it broughtl 
 with it were not everywhere aggravated, their 
 weight was felt more continuously and more uni- 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 33 
 
 formly. The condition of the soldier, however, 
 was improved — his food, clothing, and shelter 
 were thought of; this was a new state of things. 
 Meanwhile the augmentation in numbers, and 
 the concentration of the troops, brought hack 
 some of the sufferings which foresight had 
 hitherto provided for. The reports of the in- 
 spectors speak constantly of soldiers ^'half 
 naked, without shoes, and lodged like pigs ; 
 alarmingly thin and wan." But some progress 
 was made, for these evils were noticed and 
 remedies sought for. While on this point, we 
 must not forget that Louis XIY. and Louvois 
 saved the infirm and wounded soldiers from 
 misery, and opened to them the Hotel des Inva- 
 lides. Points d'appui, solid bases and well pro- 
 vided depots were now found in military opera- 
 tions. The latter attained a magnitude and 
 duration hitherto unknown. We could, at the 
 commencement of a campaign, threaten on all 
 sides, choose our point of attack, begin by deal- 
 ing the most unexpected blows, advance or retreat 
 
 D 
 
34 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 without perishing of hunger, find shelter in case 
 of reverse, or check the progress of a victorious 
 enemy. We no longer possess all the fortresses] 
 constructed or rebuilt in the reign of Louis XIY. ; 
 many that are still in our possession have no 
 longer the same importance ; but vre owe grati- 
 tude to those who encircled our frontier with this 
 formidable belt. No ! the money employed by 
 Vauban, with so much probity and genius, has 
 not been thrown away on ornament. Let those 
 who have any doubt on this subject peruse 
 again the history of the campaigns of 1713 
 and of 1793 ; twice have our strongholds saved 
 France. 
 
 We have summed iip, in a few pages, the 
 work which it took thirty years of unremitting 
 labour to accomplish. We have said enough to 
 explain with what toil this great mechanism 
 was first put together, how complicated were its 
 wheels, and by what tie every part of it was 
 connected together. As far as could be seen, 
 there were, in this great whole, certain portions, 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 35 
 
 already perfect, others only in the rough, many 
 germs yet undeveloped, some excessive mea- 
 sures, and several important deficiencies. It 
 would be superfluous to go further into details. 
 We will endeavour, however, to show as briefly 
 as possible what such an instrument became in 
 the hands of a prince and of a minister who 
 knew no curb to their will, whatever use or 
 abuse they made of it. 
 
 Their first important enterprise was the war 
 in Holland. Louvois had already, for ten years, 
 directed the war administration, when, on 
 the 17th of February, 1672, he placed in the 
 king's hands a detailed statement, of which the 
 total amounted to 91,000 foot soldiers, 28,000 
 cavalry, and 97 guns ; it was the state of a 
 complete army, liberally provisioned; ready to 
 march and to fight. A few days later this impos- 
 ing mass was put in motion. By a happy com- 
 bination of administration and diplomacy, ra- 
 tions and magazines were provided in advance, 
 and never before had there been such a display of 
 
36 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 power and ability united. Holland, invaded and 
 conquered, soon asked for peace, and offered 
 conditions which surpassed even the patriotic 
 dreams of Henry IV. or of Richelieu. But the 
 same arrogance, the same passions, inflamed both 
 king and minister ; they understood each other 
 too well — the one counselled, and the other 
 decided, to reject every proposal. This was i he 
 inauguration of that policy of extremes which 
 under other leaders was one day to prove so 
 fatal to us. It is true the punishment was less 
 terrible, but the lesson was severe and soon 
 given. The Dutch recovered themselves by a 
 heroic sacrifice : our troops having to struggle 
 against the waves, the inhabitants, and the 
 rigours of winter, retired, in a ruined state; 
 Europe came to the rescue of the oppressed as 
 soon as the latter had repulsed the aggressor, 
 and Prance found herself opposed by a coalition. 
 She was not exhausted, showed a bold front 
 to the storm, and fought six campaigns, the 
 most brilliant perhaps of our history ; a dazzling 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FEANOE. 37 
 
 testimony to the value of Louvois' creations. 
 In the first instance our army was concentrated, 
 reorganised, and reinforced. The enemy fell 
 into a mistake, and misjudged this retrograde 
 movement. The allies thought themselves al- 
 ready in the heart of the kingdom ; and they 
 already talked of feting the ladies at Versailles ; 
 they had a well-merited confidence in their 
 troops, and in their generals, William and 
 MontecucuUi, To these great men, Louis XIV. 
 opposed worthy adversaries, Conde and Turenne. 
 The one unmasked the great plan of the allies, 
 and by force of a well-chosen position, held for 
 a long time the Prince. of Orange in check; 
 finally, took him in fiagrante delicto, and para- 
 lysed him by the sanguinary battle of Senef. 
 The other, opposed to one of the coolest calcu- 
 lators, and most subtle intellects that Italy 
 ever produced, undermined all his plots and 
 baffled his schemes; prudent by temperament, 
 and become audacious by calculation, he marched 
 incessantly; crossing and recrossing the Ehine 
 
38 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 and the Yosges ; covering himself sometimes by 
 river, sometimes by mountain ; gaining battle 
 upon battle and combat after combat — Sin- 
 zheim, Entzheim, Mulhouse, and Turckheim ! 
 When these two heroes quitted the scene, 
 Turenne to descend into the vault of Saint 
 Denis, Oond6 to shut himself up in his retreat, 
 Crequi and Luxembourg succeeded their teachers, 
 and marched in their footsteps, but without en- 
 countering the same difficulties. The allies had 
 become more diffident ; they now stood upon 
 the defensive. Louis XIY. took a number of 
 towns ; this had become the great object of 
 the war, for now everybody thought of peace ; 
 the army worked for the diplomatists who, like 
 chess players, wanted to clear the board and 
 hold the pieces in their hands ; above all, it was 
 necessary to put the frontiers in a ring fence 
 (Jaire le pre carre*) . Men and means were fully 
 
 * " Faire le pr6 carr6," literally, to make the meadow square, 
 the great desideratum with all small French freeholders. It was 
 Vauban who applied this expression to the kingdom, saying on 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITpTIONS OF FRANCE. 33 
 
 supplied to engineers or generals. The effec- 
 tive strength in 1678 had reached 280,000 
 men; not one place could resist Yauban, and 
 those he had remodelled became almost impreg- 
 nable. Everything justified the foresight of 
 Louvois. Our cavalry, who had felt some ap- 
 prehension of the Emperor's cuirassiers, now 
 charged them wherever they met. Our infantry 
 was unequalled : surprised at Saint Denis, near 
 Mons, overwhelmed by numbers, they sustained 
 and recovered the battle by their steadiness. 
 This gloomy struggle was the last episode of 
 the war : it was fought by two generals who 
 had each in his possession the news of the 
 peace. Battle was offered by William with the 
 savage hatred he bore to the French, and 
 accepted by Luxembourg with that cold-blooded 
 indifference which then tarnished all his brilliant 
 qualities. A trumpet sent with a white hand- 
 
 one occasion to Louvois, " The king ought to think only of making 
 his meadow square." 
 
40 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANCH. 
 
 kerchief would have saved the lives of five or 
 six thousand men. 
 
 Humanity was not learnt in the school of 
 Louvois ; not that he was the originator of those 
 horrible devastations, the memory of which has 
 been associated with his name : the " degat,"* 
 as it was called, was long ere this customary in 
 the practice of war, and the burning of the 
 Palatinate does not surpass in horror the 
 ravages committed in Burgundy by the army of 
 Gallas during the invasion of 1636 ; but the minis- 
 ter of Louis XIY. inaugurated another system in 
 the art of destruction, and which he carried out 
 everywhere. It was part of his administration — 
 and the commissaries, to whom it became as 
 natural to ruin a province as to subsist a regi- 
 ment, manifested the same blind zeal in the 
 execution of barbarous orders as they showed in 
 the accomplishment of their habitual duties. 
 
 * The term " d^gat," in the old French wars, was often used to 
 express the laying waste of an enemy's comitry. The word " in- 
 cendie " has been applied more to the devastation of the Pala- 
 tinate." 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 41 
 
 Easy-going generals like Luxembourg laughed 
 freely at a "biulerie;" while the more serious, 
 like Turenne, and even the austere Catinat, 
 pejmitted siich things without remark ; one only, 
 to his eternal honour, protested : this was Cond6. 
 There were several unfortunate countries, such 
 as the Palatinate, Waes, and Breisgau, parti- 
 cularly marked out for such miseries ; and 
 Louvois looked on complacently at these horrors. 
 Two months before the peace of Nimeguen, on 
 his return from a journey beyond the Rhine, he 
 sent word to his father, with a sort of ferocious 
 satisfaction, " Nothing can equal the ruin of this 
 country which the king restores to the emperor : 
 it is entirely desert and laid waste. Out often 
 villages there scarcely remain two^ containing 
 one or two inhabited houses," Alas ! it was not 
 only against himself that Louvois, by such acts, 
 aroused just maledictions ; he sowed throughout 
 Europe a bitter hatred to the French name. 
 
 To the cruelties of war succeeded the rapacity 
 of peace. What our government were not able 
 
42 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FMANCE. 
 
 to obtain by the treaty of Nimeguen it laid hold 
 of by means of " reunions," " pacific executions." 
 They would be called in these days " annexations," 
 "federal executions," "seizures of material gua- 
 rantees." In this manner Louvois took possession 
 of Strasbourg (let us forgive him for that), of 
 Oasal, of Luxembourg, &c. One of the reasons 
 which induced him to occupy, either perma- 
 nently or temporarily, so many places, was the 
 necessity of providing for a deficiency which, 
 already at that time, came under the head of 
 " extraordinary," omitting only the single word 
 " budget." The mode of covering military dis- 
 bursements by loans was not yet customary ; the 
 great art was to make the enemy, or at least a 
 foreign country, support such burdens. With- 
 out, however, disorganizing anything, even 
 while retaining the means of executing the 
 mock decrees of the Metz Parliament, or of the 
 Supreme Council of Brisach, the expenditure 
 could have been diminished and the effective 
 reduced. How, therefore, were so many troops 
 
THE MILITAJRT INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 43 
 
 employed ? — In turning the ri\er Eure and in 
 " dragonnades.'"* 
 
 To what extent can men drawn for, or 
 enlisted as, soldiers be employed in other 
 duties than those strictly military ? In those 
 which relate even to fortifications or military 
 roads ; what is the limit, especially during 
 peace ? It is a difficult problem to solve. 
 If we allow that this work gains for the troops 
 better pay, a more liberal scale of diet, or 
 an increase in vigour or welfare, the question 
 need not be so thoroughly sifted ; at least the 
 principle may be more willingly admitted ; but, 
 when we see a whole army kept for two years 
 in marshes, where they are decimated by fever, 
 to make ornamental waterworks, we seem carried 
 back to the time of the Pharaohs. As to the 
 " dragonnades," this word alone recurring 
 
 * " Dragonnades," a term applied by the Protestants to the 
 persecutions they experienced under Louis XIV. and his suc- 
 cessors, in consequence of the dragoons being the first soldiers 
 billeted amongst the Protestant communities to enforce the mea- 
 sures taken against their faith. 
 
44 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 I'evives indignation that seemed exhausted. It 
 is necessary, however, to go into the question ; 
 Louvois had, by a reprehensible perversion of his 
 powers, connected the war department with the 
 affairs of the " reformes ;" and it must be remeni' 
 bered what, in a military point of view, were 
 the consequences of the revocation of the Edict 
 of Nantes. It caused 80U0 or 9000 of our best 
 sailors, 5000 or 6000 good officers, 19,000 or 
 20,000 of our most tried soldiers, to go over to 
 the enemy. This was not all ; the regiments, 
 broken up to convert or chastise the Protestants, 
 soon degenerated into mere bands. In this 
 Louvois' conduct was inexcusable : free from 
 all religious zeal, from all ardour of proselytism ; 
 actuated only by the fever of despotism, he was 
 an urgent instigator, a passionate instrument. 
 He advised the measure, furnished the means, 
 caused the exile and the military persecutions ; 
 and this great disciplinarian so far forgot him- 
 self as to recommend to the soldiers " as much 
 disorder as possible." 
 
TEE MILITAUT INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 45 
 
 It was witli the maKngerers taken from the 
 camp of Maintenon, with the plunderers brought 
 back from Poitou and Languedoc, that he had 
 to face a coalition, the fruit of our insolent 
 policy, to fight on the Rhine, in Flanders, and in 
 Ireland (1688). The commanders requested to 
 know what they were to do with troops " who 
 would melt away at the first trial." The min- 
 ister paid no attention to^ those remarks. He 
 would not see that he had undermined the edi- 
 fice erected with his own hands : in addition to 
 which, he hoped to inaugurate a new system 
 of war, free from hazards, battles, and forced 
 marches ; where would be seen only encamp- 
 ments laid out beforehand, sieges calculated at 
 a fixed hour, bombardments and devastations. 
 He placed a boundless reliance on the merits of 
 centralization, which no doubt he had done well 
 in applying to military affairs (there at least no 
 one can blame him), but in which, however, he 
 ended by going too far. He could not bear 
 being brought into contact with generals worthy 
 
43 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 of the name ; he was not satisfied with keeping 
 them in subjection ; he wished to annihilate 
 them, and resented their opposition to the direct 
 relations which he wished to establish with their 
 subaltern officers, and their resistance to the un- 
 limited powers with which he had armed the com- 
 missaries. Freed from Turenne by a bullet, and 
 from Conde by gout ; he saw the doors of the Bas- 
 tille close upon Luxembourg, who had retained a 
 certain independence of manner justified by his 
 birth and genius. Crequi, who was also to be 
 thought of, had just died. Louvois never seriously 
 contemplated replacing any of them. Infatua- 
 tion, and the partiality for subservient men, 
 those two canker-worms of despotism, warped 
 his judgment. With the Cabinet tacticians, 
 engineers, purveyors, and generals who were 
 his mouthpieces at the head of the troops, he 
 thought nothing more was wanting. Two 
 years' experience taught him the truth of this 
 well-known axiom, that the plans of a campaign 
 can only be tested by their execution. Every- 
 
TUE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 47 
 
 thing went badly. Fortunately our prestige still 
 protected us, and some few feats of arms consoled 
 our amour propre, but we gave way on all sides ; 
 our danger increased each day with the number 
 of our enemies, who were augmented by fresh 
 alliances, and by the fury of the inhabitants, who 
 flew to arms to revenge our burnings and devas- 
 tations. It was necessary to put the kingdom 
 under pressure ; to use double violence in 
 finding men and money ; it was requisite, in 
 short, to put Luxembourg again on horseback, 
 and to thank the minister's lucky star that 
 enabled him to lay his hand upon Catinat. 
 
 Freely, boldly interpreted by these two illus- 
 trious captains, instead of being taken hterally, 
 as they had been by Messieurs d'Humi^res, de 
 Lorges, or de Duras, the instructions sent from 
 Versailles produced other results. Staffarde 
 and Fleurus, names dear to France, were added 
 to the hst of our victories (1690). These 
 were the last joys of Louvois. He died the 
 following year, broken down by toil, by cares, 
 
48 TEE MILITABY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 and by the burden of an enormous respon- 
 sibility. 
 
 He was not spared the hatred which he merited, 
 for he had inflicted great evils ; but the clamours, 
 the echoes of which still pursue his memory, are 
 not all genuine. With the mournful cries of 
 exiled Huguenots, trampled nations, devastated 
 provinces, were united the calumnies of exposed 
 intriguers, of discontented nobles, and detected 
 rogues. He was also regretted, for his succes- 
 sors did not rise above mediocrity; and it was 
 imagined that, had he lived, many calamities 
 would have been spared to the nation. He had, 
 however, more than any one, contributed to the 
 misfortunes of the reign. By his home and 
 foreign policy he had compromised the results 
 of his administration. In pursuing the chimera 
 of religious unity he had disturbed national 
 union. More than Jacobite infatuation, more 
 than the quarrel of the Spanish succession, his 
 usurpations, and the contempt he openly mani- 
 fested for all rights, had raised Europe against 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 49 
 
 US ; and if Louis XIY. in his old age employed 
 " generals from predilection, fancy, or caprice ;" 
 and if he allowed himself to be too often 
 influenced by their " adulation, servility, and, 
 above all, apparent self-abnegation,"* this was 
 the consequence of habits formed by his minister 
 of state. The crushing despotism everywhere 
 pursued lowered the standard of humanity and 
 broke the springs of individuality. But in the 
 midst of many errors, Michel Letellier had 
 given to the army so strong a framework, had 
 surrounded our ill-defined frontier with so solid 
 a rampart, that the fury of our enemies ex- 
 hausted itself against the resistance of France. 
 The institutions of Louvois gave to Louis XIV. 
 and to Villars the means of repelling invasion. 
 This we can never forget. 
 
 * The words between inverted commas are from Saint Simon's 
 Memoirs. 
 
CHAPTER 11. 
 
 LoTJVOis created tlie royal army, Carnot con- 
 stituted the national one. We have not to judge 
 the acts of his political life, our task is simply 
 to recall his services. He gave the widest hasis 
 to our mililary institutions, and put in practice 
 principles, which, sooner or later, must be 
 adopted. He " organised victory " without sa- 
 crificing liberty, and, in spite of his faults, we will 
 not deny to him that sublime eulogium, which 
 he had accustomed the French soldier to consider 
 as the highest reward : " He has deserved well 
 of his country,"* 
 
 * " II a bieu merite de la patrie " was the formula of the de- 
 crees by which the Convention acknowledged the services of mili- 
 tary men. 
 
THE MILITARY IN8TITUTI0NB OF FEANOE. 51 
 
 A few touches added to the picture we have 
 drawn of the army of Louis XIY. will be suf- 
 ficient to describe that of Louis XVI. The 
 reform so boldly, and at first, so happily tried 
 by the latter prince in the monarchical system 
 generally, did not extend to the military 
 branches of it. Louvois' institutions still re- 
 mained, improved, no doubt, in certain parts, 
 but attacked by a sort of general decline, and 
 infected by new abuses.* The system of racolage 
 was not yet abandoned ; the provincial militia 
 which, during the Seven Years' War, had re- 
 ceived a certain development, and had rendered 
 real service, had been again neglected ; besides 
 this, the arbitrary manner in which the drawing 
 by lot was practised had rendered this institution 
 unpopular, and the greater number of the requests 
 of the States-Greneral called for its suppres- 
 sion. The 166 regiments of the line, in- 
 
 * The " Cahiers des Etats g&eraux " were a species of memo- 
 randa given by the electors to the deputies, showing the points 
 which the former wished to be brought forward for deliberation 
 ia the Assembly. 
 
52 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 fantry and cavalry, presented but a weak effec- 
 tive ; these troops, however, were well drilled. 
 An excellent code of regulations, elaborated 
 at the camp of Saint Omer, promulgated in 
 1791, and, though perhaps too servilely copied 
 since then, still serves as the foundation of our 
 present manoeuvres, and the instructors formed 
 at this time were found of great service at a later 
 period. Generals and superior officers were 
 far too numerous ; some few were well taught 
 and painstaking, but nearly all without expe- 
 rience. For a long while peace had only been 
 disturbed by the American war, which was of a 
 peculiar character, and gave employment but 
 to few. In the corps of artillery, and that of the 
 engineers, nothing was left to be desired, and the 
 material formed by Gribeauval was the best in 
 Europe. The military schools, organised for fifty 
 years, and maintained during all kinds of vicis- 
 situdes, had profited peculiarly in these special 
 branches, while they at the same time raised 
 the standard of knowledge in the whole service. 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 53 
 
 The spirit of caste whicli reigned among the 
 officers was more than ever exclusive. With 
 perhaps certain exceptions which proved the 
 rule, the door of military honours was closed to 
 those who were not, or who did not claim to 
 be, gentlemen ; notwithstanding which, this bril- 
 liant aristocracy, always brave, generous, and 
 devoted, had, during the eighteenth century, 
 furnished fewer generals than at other epochs 
 of the Monarchy : hence a certain discredit, 
 widely spread, but in many respects unjust, was 
 attached to it, and touched it in its most sen- 
 sitive point. 
 
 It will be understood what an effect the thun- 
 derclap of 1789 produced in an army thus com- 
 posed ; into what disorder it was thrown, on 
 one side by revolutionary agitations, and on the 
 other by emigration. The privileged corps, 
 the regiment of French Guards at Paris, and 
 that of the king at Nancy, gave an example 
 which had many imitators. The Constituent 
 Assembly had every intention of maintaining 
 
J 4 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 discipline ; but, in the heat of the struggle, this 
 illustrious body could not always act in accord- 
 ance with its principles, and it was powerless to 
 re-establish order. It was proclaimed that all 
 grades were open to every Frenchman, but no 
 effective measures were taken to reorganise the 
 regimental staffs and officers. The question of 
 recruiting was agitated ; but out of respect for 
 individual liberty, obligatory service was not 
 imposed upon the citizens, and recruiting by 
 bounty was retained.* Absorbed in other duties, 
 and placing their confidence in the recent institu- 
 tion of the National Gruard, the deputies gave 
 but little attention to military affairs. Mean- 
 while war broke out, and it became necessary 
 to recognize the weakness of the army and the 
 inefficiency of its mode of recruiting. The 
 
 * Among other arguments, the opponents of obligatory re- 
 cruiting brought to notice that aptitude for military duties was 
 by no means uniform throughout the French population ; in fact, 
 in the iifteen northern districts, one soldier was found in every 
 149 inhabitants, and in the sixteen districts of the south one only 
 in every 279. 
 
THE MILITABT INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 55 
 
 Assembly called upon the nation, who responded 
 enthusiastically by furnishing volunteers. 
 
 At the commencement of the revolutionary 
 war the forces of France were as follows : — 
 
 One hundred and five regiments of infantry 
 of the line, of two battalions each. 
 
 Fourteen .battalions of chasseurs (light in- 
 fantry). 
 
 Two hundred battalions of volunteers. 
 
 Fourteen battalions of artillery, to which 
 must be added a few troops of light ar- 
 tillery. 
 
 Twenty-four regiments of heavy cavalry. 
 
 Eighteen regiments of dragoons. 
 
 Twelve regiments of chasseurs a cheval 
 (light cavalry). 
 
 Six regiments of hussars. 
 
 The above represented many regiments, but 
 few men ; the artillery in particular, numerically 
 small but excellent, had preserved their corps of 
 officers almost intact. The troops of the line 
 
56 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 were, we have said, well drilled ; they were 
 principally commanded by their former non- 
 commissioned officers. The volunteers, re- 
 cruited from all classes, were the flower of the 
 nation, their officers, chosen by election, gave 
 much hope for the future : some of them had 
 seen service, and many were men of action and 
 merit; but for the time, military habits and 
 instruction were equally wanting in the soldiers 
 and in most of the officers. Distinguished by 
 a higher rate of pay, and by their blue uniforms, 
 the National Gruard on active service, obtained 
 in their noviciate little assistance from the line, 
 who manifested towards them a certain amount 
 of jealousy. Among the generals placed at 
 the head of the armies, some were too old, 
 while others owed their employments to political 
 intrigues; very few of them were accustomed 
 to service^ or possessed the confidence of their 
 subordinates. The ensemble, as we see, was far 
 from homogeneous, and the first incidents of the 
 war proved disastrous ; panics and revolts sue- 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 57 
 
 ceeding each other with alarming rapidity. In 
 spite of this, however, the regiments of the line 
 regained their equilibrium, and at the camp of 
 Maulde the volunteers learned the elements of 
 their new calling. In a short time the happy 
 audacity of Dumouriez, the firmness of Keller- 
 mann, and the steadiness of the troops at Valmy, 
 arrested the first onslaught of the enemy. The 
 Prussians fell back, and the French profited by 
 the confusion into which this retreat threw the 
 coalition. The Austrians were beaten at 
 Jemmapes, Belgium and Savoy were conquered, 
 the tricolour floated over the walls of Mayence, 
 and the memorable year 1792 ended in the 
 midst of successes as brilliant as unexpected. 
 
 There are not wanting those who would wish 
 to drop the curtain after the entry of Dumouriez 
 into Holland,, and that of Oustine into Frank- 
 fort. Let us suppose, for example, that some 
 good genius had terminated all at this glorious 
 period — that Prussians and Austrians had hence- 
 forth held themselves irretrievably vanquished. 
 
58 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANOE. 
 
 With a little effort of imagination, and putting 
 aside certain essential circumstances, we might 
 then believe that a warlike people could, by the 
 force alone of their enthusiasm, repel an unjust 
 invasion, and carry the war into the territory of 
 the aggressor. As a logical consequence we 
 should abrogate the laws for recruiting and pro- 
 motion, and reduce the peace establishment to 
 the maintenance merely of a certain amount of 
 stores, and of a few thousand soldiers by pro- 
 fession. Should danger menace, a skilled general 
 would appear as the Deus ex machine, the 
 IsTational Guard would not fail him, and for the 
 rest, " Let God protect France !" 
 
 But let us glance at the opening of the 
 following campaign, and nothing remains of 
 this Utopia. From the beginning of 1793, 
 the army of the Ehine was thrown back on the 
 Lauter, and that of the North was driven 
 out of Belgium. With reverses and defections 
 came back distrusts and distinctions of origin ; 
 the attempts at promotion, according to " seni- 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 59 
 
 ority of service," produced the most curious 
 results. No progress was made in organisation 
 or cohesion ; the proscription was blind, and the 
 changes in the command were frequent ; there 
 was a continuous shower of generals, more and 
 more feeble. Within a short space of time, the 
 army of the Rhine had for its chief, a pro- 
 visional commander who refused to issue any 
 order, and whom neither entreaty nor threat 
 could induce to abandon an absolute silence; 
 then an old captain brought from a dep6t, whose 
 plan of campaign was confined to drawing up 
 battalions from right to left in numerical order ; 
 and finally another, who to every question 
 replied, " The march of the troops must be 
 majestic and in mass," he himself never march- 
 ing at all. Add to this the revolutionary 
 armies in rear, and the continual intervention, 
 often inopportune, of the " representants/' com- 
 missioned by the Assembly, and an idea may be 
 formed of the confusion which existed. 
 
 "What was most serious was the daily diminu- 
 
60 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANCE. ' 
 
 tion in the effective strength. On the 1st of 
 January, 1793, in the eight armies of the Eepublic 
 there was scarcely to be found 150,000 men 
 present under arms. It is an essential feature of 
 special corps of volunteers not to renew them- 
 selves ; while at the same time the very existence 
 of these troops completely stopped recruiting for 
 the line. In addition to which, the patriots of 
 1791, being only engaged for one year, felt them- 
 selves free to return home, and 60,000 quitted tlie 
 ranks. Men were immediately required, and on 
 the 20th of February the Convention made a re- 
 quisition for 300,000 National Gruards. This con- 
 tingent was assessed upon the departments by 
 the executive power, upon the districts by the 
 departmental administration, and on the parishes 
 by the district directors. In default of a sufficient 
 number of volunteers, the parishes took measures 
 to furnish the complement, who were to be drawn 
 from bachelors, and widowers without children, 
 from eighteen to forty years of age. This mea- 
 sure did not produce the anticipated result ; the 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANCE. 61 
 
 vague limit as to age and the uncontrolled powers 
 left in the first place to the parishes, and after- 
 wards conceded to the commissioned " repre- 
 sentants," gave rise to a host of abuses and be- 
 trayals of trust. On the one side the requisition 
 became the means of persecuting those who were 
 suspected of aristocratie or moderantism ; on the 
 other, all that was required was a certificate of 
 civism, and the only care was to keep up the revo- 
 lutionary army, even with the assistance, if 
 necessary, of bounty money ; Paris will long 
 remember the " heroes of 500 livres." Finally 
 the sum total of those who joined the armies on 
 service was found to be considerably less than 
 the anticipated number. Besides which, many 
 were found to be so unfit for the profession of 
 arms that, although they were not as yet sub-r 
 jected to very close inspection, it was found 
 necessary to discard a great number. From a 
 statement found in the portfolio of Saint Just, 
 the force maintained on the 15th of July, 1793, 
 amounted to 479,000 men. From this total must 
 
62 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 I 
 i 
 
 be deducted, first the gendarmerie, then the 
 depots, reserve battalions, &c. But more re- 
 mains to be said : The army of the North, which 
 showed on this statement 92,000 men, had then 
 but 40,888 present under arms, and, fifteen days 
 later, 33,338 only answered to the roll-call. The 
 situation of our armies may be judged from this ! 
 Meanwhile the West was in arms, Lyons in in- 
 surrection, Toulon in the power of the English ; 
 all our frontiers were invaded, and, if the barrier 
 of Vauban's fortresses had not retarded generals, 
 happily for us, too methodical, possibly the evil 
 would have been irreparable. 
 
 It was at this moment of supreme peril that 
 Carnot became a member of the Committee of 
 Public Safety. (August 14, 1793.) Six days later 
 the general levy (" levee en masse") was voted by 
 the National Convention — it differed essentially 
 from the requisition ; more severe in appearance, 
 it was in reality less vexatious and less crushing. 
 The law of the 20th February held every citizen 
 from eighteen to forty, years old (for a time even 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 63 
 
 from sixteen to forty-five) amenable to an arbitrary 
 call, and subjected tbem to tbe wbims of a repre- 
 sentative, a mayor, or a police agent : that of 
 tbe 20tb August put an end to a capricious ad- 
 ministration ; taking only men from eighteen to 
 twenty-five ; but within this limit there was no 
 exemption, and it was accepted by the good 
 sense and patriotism of the nation. In six months 
 all the apparatus of the Reign of Terror had failed 
 to bring together the 300,000 soldiers called for 
 in February, while, in three months, the " levee 
 en masse" was completed, without having en- 
 countered any serious resistance. Let it no more 
 be said that the guillotine saved Prance !* On 
 
 * The following is a biograpMoal instance that puts in a tole- 
 rably good light the different systems of recruiting in the years 
 1792 and 1793. One of the bravest cavalry generals of the old im- 
 perial army has frequently recounted in my presence the early 
 incidents of his career. Enlisting as a volimteer, in 1791, he re- 
 turned home at the end of a year without being in any way trou- 
 bled or questioned. Called out by the requisition, he did not 
 rejoin ; taken again by the " levee en masse," but disliking infantry 
 service, he avoided the corps to which he was ordered, but entered 
 a regiment of " Chasseurs a cheval," where he gained his first pro- 
 motion at the point of the sword. 
 
64 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANGE. 
 
 the 1st January, 1794, the general strength had 
 remounted to 770,932 men: by deducting the 
 armies of the West, of the coasts, of the interior, 
 the depots, and the ineffective, we may estimate 
 in round numbers that France at that period, 
 attacked by 400,000 of the allies, brought into 
 the field against them 500,000 combatants ; an 
 imposing total which we believe to be exact, 
 although it may be inferior to the estimates of 
 Oambon, and which, up to this day, has never 
 been surpassed in any army exclusively com- 
 posed of national troops.* 
 
 Arms and military stores were wanting as 
 well as men, but here prodigies were performed : 
 guided by science, and assisted on all sides, a 
 new species of industry was improvised ; France 
 became a vast workshop, where cannon, muskets, 
 and powder were manufactured. It was one of 
 those efforts that cannot be often required of the 
 
 X 
 
 * In September, 1794, the m-usteftoU showed an effective of 
 1,169,000 men, but the total of men present did not go beyond 
 750,000 inclusive, which does not modify the average total ol 
 combatants in the field which we have given. 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANCE. 65 
 
 people, whicli tliey will not always grant, and 
 which the foresight of government should spare 
 them. There were, however, in the midst of the 
 fever with which France was then seized, mea- 
 sures created worthy of surviving this generous 
 movement, and of becoming permanent in our 
 military establishment. While raising and arming 
 the soldiers, it was necessary to organise them, 
 for it was impossible to allow any longer the exist- 
 ence of distinctions of origin among the corps. 
 Many generals had already tried to efface such, 
 without being able to overcome resistance founded 
 on acquired rights, or formal guarantees. The 
 soldiers of the line cherished the traditions of 
 their regiments ; they held to their white uni- 
 forms, which they thought were more feared by 
 the enemy, and the volunteers were jealous of 
 their privileges. Each day difficulties and incon- 
 veniences were multiplied. The " levee en masse" 
 was about to throw into the .army five hundred 
 and forty-three new battalions, of which the 
 officers were chosen by election. A radical 
 
 F 
 
66 TEE MILITABI INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 measure became necessary, and Oarnot knowing 
 how to devise and execute it, was equal to the 
 occasion. In the first place the staff of the " levee 
 en masse " was disbanded ; sergeants and officers 
 relinquished stripes and epaulets, and mingled 
 with their late subordinates. They were incor- 
 porated on an equal footing in the old battalions 
 of volunteers. Then succeeded the " amalgam :" 
 it was the word of the period. Effective National 
 Gruards of 1791 and 1792, soldiers of the requisi- 
 tion of 1793, former soldiers of the line, men of 
 the north and south, citizens, or countrymen — all 
 were blended together ; the penal laws, dis- 
 cipline, pay, and conditions of service were 
 equalised for all. No more rivalries of depart- 
 ments, no more traditions of the past ; farewell 
 to the old illustrious names — Picardy, Cham- 
 pagne, " Navarre sans peur," " Auvergne sans 
 tache." But the numbers of the demi-brigades 
 
 * " Navarre sans peur," " Auvergne sans tache," were the 
 mottoes and war-cries of these two regiments, one of which could 
 trace its origin to the bands of infantry commanded by Bayard, 
 ■• jju cnevalier sans peur et sans reproche." 
 
THE MILITAST INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 67 
 
 soon won their own halo of glory. "Who would 
 not have been proud to belong to the "in- 
 vincible" 32nd, to the "terrible" 57th, to the 
 " intrepid " 106th ? and others even better, which 
 I omit. The whole of the infantry assumed 
 the blue coat, and were formed in demi-bri- 
 gades of three battalions. There were in each 
 a chef de brigade, three chefs de bataillons, and 
 the staff of twenty-seven companies, three of 
 which were grenadiers. It was almost the type 
 of an infantry regiment of the present day. The 
 cavalry preserved its old organisation, which it 
 had never lost ; reinforced in men and horses ; 
 it was good, and did great service, but did 
 not receive a development proportional to 
 that of the infantry. In our republican armies 
 it was not employed in mass as it had been by 
 Frederic, and as it was later by Napoleon. 
 
 The artillery of the line comprised seven regi- 
 ments, to which must be added the flying artillery, 
 formed in the early period of the revolution, and 
 already become a just subject of pride in ou|- 
 
68 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 armies ; besides which, a considerable number of 
 gunners served the pieces attached to the in- 
 fantry, which were in the proportion of two to 
 each battahon, a disposition which had often a 
 happy effect, and which Napoleon adopted and 
 relinquished at various epochs, but which did 
 not appear to have formed part of the regular 
 organization. The military engineers were placed 
 in command of their own troops ; the sappers 
 and miners united for the first time in one corps : 
 it was left for an officer of engineers to realize 
 thus the dream of Vauban. 
 
 In regard to the " special arms,"* the important 
 and most difficult point was, with the ideas of the 
 period, to maintain among the officers the scien- 
 tific traditions which had long distinguished them. 
 The establishments founded for thispurpose by the 
 monarchy had been overthrown or disfigured by 
 the whirlwind of revolution, and it became neces- 
 sary to reconstruct them on a new plan. To the 
 
 * " Armes sp^ciales " is the general name applied in tie French 
 army to the artillery and engineers. 
 
TSE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 69 
 
 great benefit of science, and of the public service, 
 that which had been hitherto separate was united 
 in a common bond. A system was estabhshed 
 which was composed of a central preparatory 
 school (shortly afterwards called the Poly- 
 technic), the common nursery of all the learned 
 bodies, civil and military, and of schools for the 
 particular studies requisite for each profession. 
 The students entered by competition into the 
 first, receiving there theoretical instructions of a 
 superior nature, quitting it as officers or en- 
 gineers, and proceeding afterwards to acquire in 
 the second the practical knowledge necessary to 
 the exercise of their various professions.* 
 
 Prompted by Mange, his former tutor. Oar- 
 not, himself a mathematician of the first order, 
 laid the foundation of that admirable system 
 which exists up to the present day. He also 
 tried to endow the service with an analogous 
 institution, but exclusively military ; here he 
 failed. The Ecole de Mars existed but a few 
 
 * Decrees of September 28, 1794, and September 1, 1795. 
 
70 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANCE. 
 
 months. The officers of the infantry and cavalry 
 were supplied exclusively from the ranks; all 
 that was done was to regulate the promotion. 
 The absurd principle of " seniority of service " 
 was abandoned^ and a stop was put to the 
 caprices of the commissioned representatives, 
 who too often took advantage of urgent circum- 
 stances to place themselves beyond the juris- 
 diction of all law. A considerable share of 
 promotion was still reserved to seniority of rank, 
 and the principle of election was maintained only 
 for a certain number of subaltern appointments* 
 The greater number of superior officers were 
 nominated by the executive power ; neither the 
 government nor the soldier electors could exercise 
 their power of choice except within clearly de- 
 fined limits. These measures had a salutary 
 influence in the composition of the regimental 
 executive ; but the condition of the staff above all 
 called for reform, a perilous task, for the pre- 
 judices and passions of the day had to be en- 
 countered. If too great facilities existed in 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANOE. 71 
 
 bringing some of the generals before tbe revo- 
 lutionary tribunal, it was less easy to unseat 
 tbose who most deserved dismissal. Carnot 
 allowed many victims to be sacrificed. His hav- 
 ing applied the epithet of " cowardly vociferator " 
 to Robespierre dead, does not justify his having 
 given a carte blanche to Robespierre living ; and 
 after having put his name to so many terrible 
 decrees, the declaration that they were signed 
 without being read cannot be accepted as ex- 
 onerating him from all responsibility.* Still we 
 must admit that Carnot did not instigate any 
 sanguinary acts. He succeeded in deposing 
 many who were unworthy, and in placing the 
 higher military functions in the hands of men 
 capable of making proper use of them. 
 
 Shortly after his advent to power, Jourdan 
 was at the head of the army of the north, Hoche 
 commanded that of the Moselle, Pichegru that 
 of the Rhine, Kleber and Marceau were in La 
 Vendee, Du Grommier and Buonaparte before 
 ' Speech of the 9 Prairial, HI. year. 
 
72 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 Toulon. What was of equal importance to the 
 selection of men, was that the duties were 
 defined, and the desideratum vainly sought after 
 by Louvois was at last found. To the " day's 
 duty " succeeded the formation of " brigades " and 
 " divisions," and the staff (adjutants-generaux, 
 adjutants-commandants) . Instead of receiving in 
 their turn a sort of delegated chief command, and 
 taking the temporary duties alternately, the 
 generals employed on active service were given 
 henceforth, while their duties were fixed and con- 
 stant, a defined responsibility. With the excep- 
 tion of those who had some special service to 
 perform (staff, engineers, or artillery), each one 
 was in command of a certain body of men, always 
 the same, whom he knew, and by whom he was 
 known. Formerly the general-in-chief was 
 obliged to delegate his powers, and to communi- 
 cate his ideas to one of his lieutenants, who was 
 changed every day. Now he had his chief of 
 the staff at hand to transmit his orders, and his 
 divisional officers to execute them. Free from 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANGE. 73 
 
 the cares of detail, lie could better grasp the 
 whole. He was no longer compelled by a direct 
 impetus to move the mass of his army : he found 
 his battalions united in demi-brigades, the latter 
 in brigades, and the brigades in divisions. The 
 first step of this admirably-proportioned ladder 
 was the battalion, representing the unity of 
 tactics, and the highest was the division, show- 
 ing the unity of strategy. 
 
 We have thus seen the enrolment by bounty 
 and arbitrary recruiting abolished, obligatory 
 service imposed on all and accepted without 
 resistance, the unity of the army re-established, 
 and stamped with the national seal ; the system 
 of promotion regulated by law ; scientific and 
 military instruction assured to officers of each 
 special arm, the duties of the generals marked 
 out, the principles which should govern armies 
 on service laid down and put in practice, and 
 the Roman Legion resuscitated in the French 
 division ; such was the progress accomplished 
 under Oarnot's administration. All this was 
 
74 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 not exclusively his own work ; but lie had the 
 merit of carrying out everywhere that which 
 had hitherto been tried with success only in 
 certain points, and extending to all the benefits 
 of an experience so quickly and dearly bought 
 by some. In this immense work, begun in the 
 midst of defeat, sketched out in one or two 
 days, and completed in a few months, he was 
 assisted by Robert Lindet, and by Prieur de la 
 Cote d'Or, his old comrade of engineers. These 
 three formed, in the midst of the redoubtable 
 committee, the group of workers. Chief of this 
 administrative triumvirate, Carnot exercised an 
 incontestable superiority : himself become the 
 actual minister of war (for the office itself had 
 been suppressed), he could look upon his two 
 colleagues as directors-general, to whom he 
 confided certain prerogatives. He reserved 
 exclusively to himself the conduct of military 
 operations, which were expected to keep pace 
 with the reorganisation of the army, and of 
 which the success, however, depended on this 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 75 
 
 very reorganisation. He substituted harmony 
 and method for the absence of plan and waste 
 of labour. Convinced that the wish to be pre- 
 sent everywhere resulted in universal weakness, 
 he ordered the generals-in-chief to diminish their 
 front of operations ; indicated to them the point 
 which he judged decisive, and ordered them to 
 bear upon it with the mass of their force. Dun- 
 kirk was soon relieved by the battle of Honds- 
 choote. Adding example to precept, Carnot 
 hastened to Jourdan, took part in the victory 
 of "Wattignies, and raised the blockade of Mau- 
 beuge. Meanwhile, the army of the Ehine 
 advanced with cries of " Landau or death," and 
 by an heroic effort relieved this fortress, which 
 had formerly belonged to France. After 
 this triple onslaught a change was made in the 
 distribution of the armies. We possessed five 
 between the sea and the great river ; they were 
 reduced to three ; on the left, the army of the 
 North, on the right, that of Ehine and Moselle, 
 under the same command, in the centre. 
 
76 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 that of Sambre and Meuse, destined to play 
 the principal part, formed from the former army 
 of the Ardennes, and by divisions taken from 
 the two wings : this disposition, conceived with 
 sagacity and executed with boldness, astonished 
 the enemy, foiled his plans, and the finishing 
 stroke was given in the plains of Fleurus by a 
 victory which saved France. The last days of 
 the year 1*794 saw our armies border the Rhine 
 from Basle to Dusseldorf, penetrate into Hol- 
 land, and crown the heights of the Pyrenees 
 and Alps. On the 4th March, 1795, Carnot, 
 speaking before the Convention, could recapitu- 
 late the results of an administration of eighteen 
 months by a picture which equals the most 
 eloquent peroration: "27 victories, of which 
 8 were pitched battles, 120 combats, 80,000 of 
 the enemy killed, 91,000 prisoners, 116 for- 
 tresses or important towns taken, of which 
 36 were after a siege or blockade, 230 forts or 
 redoubts carried, the capture of 3800 guns, 
 70,000 muskets, 1,900,000 pounds of powder, 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 11 
 
 and 90 colours." In descending from the 
 tribune, Carnot left the Committee of Public 
 Safety. A month later he became Chef de 
 Bataillon by seniority ; he had been a captain 
 in the engineers and Chevalier of St. Louis 
 before the revolution. 
 
 What he was not able to describe in this fare- 
 well oration, was the noble and manly bearing 
 of this victorious army. By its example, and 
 by the spirit which inspired its deeds, Carnot 
 had in no small degree contributed to develop 
 in all ranks, civic and military virtues. To 
 borrow an expression from the phraseology of 
 the epoch that has tainted so many things, but 
 which did not always err, he had made courage, 
 self-abnegation, and disinterestedness the order 
 of the day. Of course I do not allude to the 
 hordes whose excesses prolonged the civil war 
 in the interior, and made the chouannerie succeed 
 to the heroic Vende'e. Kleber and Marceau, 
 the true soldiers whom the chances of their 
 career had rendered for a time witnesses of 
 
78 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 these horrors, tore themselves, as soon as they 
 could, away from this hideous spectacle, leaving 
 the field open, alas ! to the inventor of infernal 
 columns, and to the other whom I will not name, 
 who killed women after having violated them. 
 On the contrary, to those who had repelled the 
 invasion, humanity returned with other warlike 
 virtues ; the soldiers refused to perform the 
 office of executioners, and constantly allowed 
 the emigrants who fell into their hands to 
 escape; the generals, in spite of the most 
 terrible threats, no longer paid any attention to 
 the orders of the Convention, who condemned to 
 death the commandants of the garrisons left 
 behind in some of our fortresses by the retreat- 
 ing allies. Moreau, in promulgating the decree 
 forbidding quarter to be given to any English- 
 man or Hanoverian, added : " I have too good 
 an opinion of French honour to believe that 
 such an order can be executed," and it was not 
 executed. It was the only case in which the 
 law was allowed to be violated ; for the armies 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 79 
 
 we have seen at the outset, valiant certainly, but 
 impressionable, mistrustful, subject to panic, and 
 often in revolt, became steady and subordinate. 
 Discipline ceased to be irritating or offensive ; 
 it was firm, and on rare occasions, when repres- 
 sion was called for, severe. I was reading a 
 short time ago the journal kept by an inhabitant 
 of the Rhenish provinces, an account purely 
 German and in no way French, and yet it 
 showed the feeling of astonishment and admira- 
 tion called forth by the conduct of the Repub- 
 licans. These dreaded men were seen entering 
 towns with their clothing in ribbons, often with 
 wooden shoes on their feet, but preserving a 
 soldier-like gait, halting in the open places in 
 the midst of the trembling population, eating, 
 close to their piled arms, the black bread 
 brought with them, without quitting their 
 ranks, waiting for the orders of their leaders. 
 There were, it is true, exactions, but they were 
 committed by the administration which followed 
 the army, and were unworthy of it. It was 
 
80 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANGE. 
 
 also the carelessness of the administration which 
 sometimes led to marauding, but never pillage. 
 During the severe winter from 1794 to 1795, 
 which the army of the Ehine passed before 
 Mayence, the soldiers, reduced to the last extre- 
 mities, stole nothing but bread. At sowing 
 time, they watched the peasants in the daylight, 
 and at night opened the furrows with their 
 bayonets, to feed upon the seed they dug up. 
 According to those who had been through both 
 campaigns, the sufferings were as great then as 
 in 1812. A great number of men died of 
 hunger and cold, but the survivors did not quit 
 their colours : if, indeed, they wandered in search 
 of food — and such food ! often wild berries and 
 poisonous roots — they returned at the sound of 
 the first cannon-shot. The officers shared the 
 hardship and privation of the men ; all lived in 
 the same frugal manner, and from choice or 
 necessity, practised the same self-denial. 
 
 Doubtless, at that time, the uniform concealed 
 rivalries, jealousies, and ambition, all passions 
 
THE MILITABT INSTITUTIONS OF FBANOE. 81 
 
 great or small ; bnt self-abnegation was general, 
 and imposed upon the most unwilling, A diffi- 
 culty was often found in filling up vacant ap- 
 pointments. I knew a man who had received 
 an education sufiiciently good to qualify him to 
 become head of an important ofiice connected 
 with the forests, sufficiently robust to go 
 through seven years of this species of war, 
 knapsack on back, musket on shoulder, and brave 
 enough to merit a sword of honour, yet he 
 never would accept promotion : commencing as 
 a private he finished as one. He readily told the 
 names of many of his comrades, who, like him, 
 persisted in remaining in obscurity. Saint Cyr 
 tells us that he only accepted the rank of 
 general after having twice refused it, and then 
 only under the threat of being placed under sur- 
 veillance. This hesitation seems natural enough 
 when, in the following page of the same me- 
 moirs, we read the account of the council to 
 which the new general was summoned by the 
 representatives ; the first object which met his eye 
 
 G 
 
82 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 being a guillotine, placed in front of the window ! 
 But we must again repeat, for the honour of 
 human nature, that the fear of the scaffold never 
 inspired one noble action. The bloody rule 
 which weighed upon France came so quickly to its 
 paroxysm, that if ever it had an object, that object 
 was soon exceeded, and the number of victims 
 was such, that every one expected to see his own 
 turn arrive, and prepared for the sacrifice with 
 an indifference which prolonged the duration of 
 the scourge. Saint Cyr hastens to add, that the 
 hideous apparatus exhibited by the representa- 
 tives produced a contrary effect to that intended, 
 and cooled the zeal of the most ardent. It was 
 indeed from the source of the purest patriotism 
 that our generals and our soldiers were inspired. 
 Each one deemed it sufficient reward if the name 
 of his division, or the number of his demi-bri- 
 gade, was mentioned in the ' Moniteur.' " Bar- 
 rere k la tribune !" was shouted at the moment 
 of charging ; for it was Barrere who used to read 
 to the Convention the bulletins of our victories. 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANOE. 83 
 
 It is not to break the monotony of onr narra- 
 tive that we have tried to sketch the principal 
 traits of this grand feature of the time, — the re- 
 pubhcan soldier. We have thought it requisite 
 to show how the army, remodelled, reformed by 
 sound laws, and by a good system of recruiting, 
 while led by patriot chiefs, became purified and 
 strengthened by war, instead of being weakened 
 and corrupted by it. 
 
 We cannot consider military institutions as 
 a simple arithmetical problem to solve; to 
 pronounce upon them it is necessary to observe 
 the moral influence which they exercist 
 no less than their material results. With 
 this view we must remember that the events 
 of that period have given a complete refutation 
 to those who accused the French of being unable 
 to bear up against reverses. And this is an 
 essential point ; for no nation can hope that the 
 fortune of war will be always favourable, nor that 
 its troops will always be led by infallible generals. 
 
 If the repulses of 1795 were bravely borne, 
 
84 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FHANCK 
 
 it may also be said that the operations were 
 of no great duration, and that the theatre of war 
 on which they were concentrated was restricted. 
 But in 1796 the ordeal was terrible : both start- 
 ing from the left bank of the Rhine, Jourdan 
 and Moreau had pushed on, the one to the 
 confines of Bohemia, the other as far as the 
 mountains of the Tyrol. The Danube and a 
 wide extent of territory separated them ; faults 
 of execution aggravated the disadvantages of the 
 eccentric direction of their movements; and 
 the young opposing commander, the Archduke 
 Charles, was too able a captain to let such an 
 opportunity escape. Avoiding Moreau, he fell 
 with all his force upon Jourdan, beating him at 
 Amberg, at Wurzbourg, and driving him back to 
 the Ehine. And now, after a long march to the 
 front, culminating in two defeats, a still longer 
 march to the rear, where each day had its 
 combat ; without rest, succour, or magazines, the 
 army of Sambre and Meuse, which had left the 
 environs of Dusseldorf with 71,000 soldiers. 
 
THE MILITARl INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 85 
 
 showed on its return 60,000 under arms ; the 
 dead, wounded, and prisoners only were wanting. 
 Exposed to the enemy by his comrade's misfor- 
 tune, Moreau could not maintain his isolated and 
 advanced position near Augsburg ; he rendered 
 his retreat illustrious by the victory of Biberach, 
 and by the boldness with which he threw him- 
 self into the Yal d'Enfer. But let us permit 
 one of his lieutenants, who never indulges in 
 the picturesque, and rarely gives himself up to 
 enthusiasm, to describe to us in what state the 
 army of the Ehine returned. " Six months of 
 continued bivouacking had attenuated both men 
 and horses ; clothing as well as shoes were 
 totally destroyed; one-third of the soldiers 
 marched with bare feet, and no vestige of uni- 
 form could be seen upon them except their 
 belts. Without the rags which covered them, 
 their heads and shoulders would have been 
 exposed to all the inclemency of the weather. 
 It was in this state I saw them defile over 
 the bridge of Huninguen, and yet, notwith- 
 
86 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 standing, their appearance was imposing ; at no 
 period have I seen anything more martial."* 
 
 It was again Carnot who directed the cam- 
 paign of 1796. Recalled to power as a member 
 of the Directory, after some months of inaction, 
 he gave himself np almost entirely to the 
 conduct of military operations. He was the 
 author of the plan which failed in the valley 
 of the Danube, and which has been justly criti- 
 cised. Nevertheless, at the same time this plan 
 was crowned in Italy with the most dazzling 
 success; if Jourdan vanquished was screened 
 from blame by the orders of the Directory, the 
 instructions sent from Paris had no share in the 
 victories of Bonaparte. Here all was due to 
 the general, and from the outset his far-seeing 
 ambition had given to the army under his orders 
 a peculiar stamp. Remember that proclamation 
 which all the world know by heart, you will not 
 find in it one word of country or of liberty. 
 "What does he promise to his troops ? Grlory 
 
 * Memoirs of Gouvion Saint Cyr. 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANCE. 87 
 
 and riches. A new horizon opened upon our 
 soldiers — to our generals in particular; other 
 customs succeeded to the rude and severe mode 
 of life. When, in 1797, the future Duke of Cas- 
 tiglione, appointed to the command of the army 
 of the Rhine, arrived at Strasbourg covered 
 with embroidery from head to foot, and followed 
 by his wife in a gilded coach, the simple lieu- 
 tenants of Hoche and of Moreau, with difficulty 
 distinguished from the crowd by the thin braid 
 which bordered their coats, could scarcely believe 
 their eyes. 
 
 By a contrast which is very apparent, while 
 the taste for luxury spread in the army of 
 Italy, purely revolutionary ideas seemed to 
 acquire a greater intensity. Bonaparte wished 
 his soldiers Jacobins, and encouraged the same 
 railleries against austere republicanism which 
 was professed in other quarters against the 
 " Messieurs " of the army of the Rhine. At 
 the approach of the 18 Fructidor he encou- 
 raged in the ranks the most lively demonstra- 
 
88 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE, 
 
 tions against the " Constitutionalists ;" and he 
 accompanied the addresses to the troops hy a 
 significant letter : " Call upon the armies, and 
 burn the presses," he wrote to the Directory. 
 When Hoche, in spite of his advanced opinions, 
 recoiled from the service demanded of him by the 
 Parisian leaders, it was Bonaparte who sent the 
 general to execute the coup d'etat. His aspirations 
 were realized ; the blossoms of liberty were 
 nipped in the bud, and the army replaced the 
 mob as a revolutionary instrument. In a sort 
 of mockery, Carnot, " le votant,"* the colleague 
 of Saint Just, was proscribed, as having con- 
 spired for the re-establishment of royalty. He 
 was, indeed, guilty, for he believed that a legal 
 regime might be established in France, and that 
 the sole mission of the army was to defend the 
 country and its laws. 
 
 ' " Les votants " were those wlio had voted the death of the 
 kiBg. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 Even before Napoleon attained to supreme 
 power, when first he appeared npon the scene, 
 he alone occupied it ; his acts, proceedings, and 
 opinions absorb the attention of all who, even 
 from one point of view, have studied military 
 history ; and yet it is impossible to associate his 
 name with any great changes in the French 
 army. In regard to the special questions which 
 now occupy us, in spite of wide discrepancies, 
 we cannot separate the republican from the 
 imperial periods : they are to a certain extent 
 united in an indissoluble continuity. Moreover, 
 none of the fundamental institutions of which 
 the emperor in warfare made so grand and yet 
 so fatal a use, belonged properly to him ; he 
 
90 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 borrowed them either from the monaichy or the 
 revolution. He was certainly gifted with the 
 creative power, and no man ever carried to a 
 greater extent the art of endlessly varying ad- 
 ministrative combinations. To repeat a quotation 
 lately somewhat abused, no one was more capable 
 than he to build up the nation with the strongest 
 cement (" ma^onner la nation a chaux et a sable "), 
 but it is well known how little he realized the desire 
 he expressed in this metaphor. The necessity of 
 constantly improvising prevented his founding 
 anything durable, and his prodigious talent in 
 developing resources was only equalled by the 
 frightful prodigality with which he exhausted 
 them. In facility for creating armies, in rapidity 
 for bringing them into the field, he is without a 
 rival. In this regard, as in other respects, he is 
 even superior to the five captains whom general 
 opinion has placed at the head of all the great 
 warriors of history. 
 
 It was with one and the same army that 
 Alexander conquered all the countries comprised 
 
THE MILITAET INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 91 
 
 between the Mediterranean and the Indus : with 
 the army brought from Spain Hannibal gained 
 his great victories, and maintained himself for 
 eight years in Brutium : the legions organised in 
 the Grallic wars enabled C^sar to deprive Pompey 
 and his lieutenants of the Roman empire. The 
 troops led by Grustavus Adolphus, over all Ger- 
 many, survived the Swedish hero ; and if Frederic 
 bore up against great reverses, he did so with 
 the skeletons of the same regiments, incessantly 
 recruited, which followed him from 1742 to 
 1763 ; but Napoleon, this Saturn of modern 
 times, how many armies has he begotten and 
 devoured ! Let us follow him from Montenotte 
 to "Waterloo, and endeavour to reckon them up. 
 
 The army of Italy, when he took command of 
 it, was, in spite of its destitution, firmly consti- 
 tuted and reinforced by troops which, in conse- 
 quence of the peace with Spain, were not 
 required in the Pyrenees : it was composed of 
 soldiers first taught in the camps of instruction, 
 and afterwards trained by several years of moun- 
 
92 TBE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FEANCH. 
 
 tain warfare ; petty warfare perhaps, but an 
 excellent scliool for the development of individual 
 courage and intelligence, and for accustoming 
 subordinate ranks to responsibility. The in- 
 fantry was subdivided into four strong divisions, 
 which had for some time been under command 
 of experienced and energetic leaders ; clever 
 tacticians, young in years, but old in service. 
 The cavalry division, small in number, but ex- 
 cellent, had just been placed under the orders of 
 one of Dumouriez' companions, a man of Grerman 
 origin, who had escaped the revolutionary tri- 
 bunal by a miracle, and who is described in one 
 of the most glowing passages dictated at St, 
 Helena, as the type of a hght cavalry general. 
 Bonaparte made no changes in this organisa- 
 tion ; he did not interfere with it except for any 
 special operations (such as the siege of Mantua 
 and the invasion of the legations, or to replace 
 generals killed in battle — La Harpe and Stengel). 
 It was into these divisions that he drafted the 
 contingents furnished by the army of the Alps, 
 
TEE MILITABT INSTITUTIONS OP FBANGE, 03 
 
 or sent from the interior : it was with them 
 that he achieved, in a few months, what seem 
 the most rapid and complete operations ever 
 recorded in the annals of war ; with them 
 he defeated CoUi's Piedmontese, and the 
 Austrians of Beaulieu, Wurmzer, Alvinzi, and 
 the Archduke. It was only at the end that he was 
 able to add to these divisions a fifth and superb 
 one taken from the army of the Rhine, and 
 selected by Moreau with a care which, under 
 analogous circumstances, has found few imitators. 
 If the campaigns of 1796 and 1797 placed 
 Bonaparte above all the captains of his time, 
 the expedition to Egypt was about to show in 
 him faculties of another order. On this occasion 
 he himself chose his troops, regulated their 
 number, selected the generals, superintended all 
 the preparations, and combined all the means in 
 his power, military, maritime, and administrative. 
 Nothing more prompt or more perfect could be 
 imagined. Still the formation of the expeditionary 
 corps took the flower of our armies, and weakened 
 
94 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANCE. 
 
 them all, that of Italy in particular, which was 
 menaced by a terrible blow, for it was about to 
 have on its hands both Austrians and Eussians, 
 Of the 36,000 chosen men who embarked at 
 Toulon in the month of May, 1798, how many 
 were destined never again to see the shores of 
 Prance ! 
 
 The G-eneral-in-Ohief came back first and 
 seized the power. 
 
 Free from all trammels, and surrounded by 
 assemblies whose support he could count upon 
 without having to dread their control, Bona- 
 parte henceforth gave full scope to his genius 
 for organisation : men, money, material, — the 
 entire nation and its wealth were in his hands. 
 He moulded and used both at his will. He 
 found great confusion in the interior affairs 
 of the nation, and a position abroad, difficult, in- 
 deed, but not seriously compromised. The great 
 peril which threatened France had been avoided ; 
 the victory of Zurich had caused the plans of the 
 coalition to miscarry ; the Anglo-Russians had 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 95 
 
 just been beaten in Holland ; Switzerland, wbicb 
 we occupied, stood out like a bastion between 
 the two Austrian columns, one of wbicli was 
 clofeely pressing us before Huninguen, and the 
 other blockading us in Grenoa. The First Consul 
 debouched by the flanks of this bastion in 
 rear of the two hostile armies. To penetrate 
 into Suabia, the army of the Ehine, always in 
 excellent condition, was all that was wanted ; it 
 only required a leader and some reinforcement : 
 this was provided for, and it was placed under 
 the command of Moreau ; but to make a descent 
 upon Italy it became necessary to create a new 
 army. This was Napoleon's first improvisation. 
 Bringing to light resources, the existence of 
 which was not even suspected, he concentrated 
 and amassed them with infinite art, and without 
 allowing his intention to be disclosed. 
 
 From liberated Holland, from pacified La 
 Vendee, from garrisons no longer required, and 
 from the depots of the army of Egypt, he collected 
 veteran soldiers and the staffs of regiments. Him- 
 
96 TEE MILITABY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE, 
 
 self an oiEcer of artillery, he increased the effi- 
 ciency of this arm by placing the trains in the 
 hands of gunner drivers. To re-establish order in 
 the military administration, he restored the In- 
 tendants of the old Monarchy under the name of 
 " Inspecteurs aux revues" (reviewing inspectors), 
 and by the formation of a waggon train he gave a 
 military element to the transport service. These 
 measures, and some others of minor importance, 
 but no less useful, assured to him a partial in- 
 crease of strength. He completed the work by 
 calling out all the conscripts belonging to the 
 class of the seventh republican year. 
 
 We must pause a moment to explain the 
 meaning of these words " class " and "conscript," 
 at that time new. 
 
 Fourteen months before the 18 Brumaire,* 
 the Eepublican Chambers passed a law which, 
 while giving a normal character to the measures 
 taken in 1793 at the time of the vote for 
 tbe "levee en masse," but applying in a less 
 * 19 Fructidor of tlie year VI., Stli September, 1798. 
 
THE MILITABY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 97 
 
 rigid manner the principles then set forth, 
 devoted to the defence of the country all 
 the youth of France, even while economising the 
 treasury and the population. Every French- 
 man,' in case of national danger, was liable to 
 military service. Except in this extreme case 
 the land army was made up by voluntary enlist- 
 ment, and by means of the " conscription," 
 which comprised all citizens from the age of 
 twenty to twenty-five, with the exception of 
 some dispensations and exemptions afterwards 
 determined on.* The " conscript defenders," 
 according to the accepted expression, were di- 
 vided into five " classes " — the first composed 
 of all those who on the first day of the current 
 year (1st Vendemiaire, 22nd September) had 
 attained the age of twenty ; the second of those 
 who at the same period had completed their 
 twenty-first year, and so on by an ascending 
 scale. The legislative power fixed the number 
 of the contingent, and the executive commenced 
 
 * 28 Mvose of tlie year "VIE., 19th January, 1799. 
 
 H 
 
98 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANGE. 
 
 tlie levy by first calling out the youngest men. 
 The succeeding classes were not to be resorted 
 to until the first was exhausted. Whether 
 called out or not, the conscript defenders were 
 erased from the list five years after their in- 
 scription, and, except under extraordinary cir- 
 cumstances of war, then obtained their final 
 release. When not on active service, they pre- 
 served all their political rights. Let us add that 
 voluntary enrolment was required to be gra- 
 tuitous, and that re-enlistment alone gave a right 
 to high pay, and we can thus obtain a slight 
 insight into what was called the law of the year 
 VI., or of Jourdan (who was its originator), but 
 which law was even better known by the name, 
 at that time popular, but at a later period de- 
 tested, of " the conscription," Its details were 
 imperfect, and its arrangements incomplete, hut 
 in its ensemble the law was efficacious and just, 
 as long as its practice was regulated by free and 
 vigilant^efissemblies. The First Consul at once 
 asked for and obtained from the legislative body. 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 99 
 
 not only a contingent, but the whole of the first 
 class. He did not limit himself to this : in the 
 enactment,* which, allowing for all casualties, 
 called out for service more than 100,000 men, 
 he inserted articles which greatly modified the 
 organic law. The object of these changes, de- 
 veloped by a consular decree, was to limit the 
 number of exemptions, and, above all, to put a 
 stop to evasion (" Tinsoumisgion "),f which had 
 attained alarming proportion's, paralysing re- 
 cruiting, and troubling public order. Of these 
 measures some were fiscal : heavy fines were in- 
 flicted upon those who were refractory ; a contri- 
 bution was imposed upon all who obtained a 
 dispensation, and was levied upon property in 
 possession or prospective. The other regula- 
 tions, necessary, perhaps, under the circum- 
 stances, but in principle much to be regretted, 
 placed all the population under surveillance, and 
 
 * Law of the 17tli Ventose the year YH. (March 7th, 1800). 
 t The act of one who does not present himself for conscrip- 
 tion, or who does not join his regiment when drawn. 
 
100 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 gave to general oflScers extraordinary powers, and 
 some of the functions of a police. The most im- 
 portant measure was that authorising "substi- 
 tution," which, although formerly tolerated in 
 the formation of the militia, and sanctioned by 
 the rules of the requisition, was prohibited by 
 the law of the " levee en masse," and by that of 
 the year VI. The privilege of presenting a 
 " substitute " was accorded to those called out 
 who " were incapable of bearing the hardships 
 of war, or who were allowed to be of more use 
 to the state, by the prosecution of their labours 
 or their studies, than by joining the army." To 
 the sous-prefets the task was delegated of pro- 
 nouncing upon the fitness of the young men, and 
 of deciding whether they should be allowed to 
 find substitutes. Nothing could be more arbi- 
 trary or more favourable to trickery. 
 
 Whatever might be the absolute merit or moral 
 value of those arrangements, they certainly 
 gave to the conscription an eificiency which it 
 had not possessed at its commencement. Certain 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 101 
 
 of leaving behind him well-furnished depots, the 
 First Consul was enabled to set in motion the 
 army of reserve, and, four months after the vote 
 for the law of the year YIII., he had gained 
 the battle of Marengo. 
 
 It is not our province to give the details of 
 that glorious day, nor to show the admirable 
 strategic combination, which was executed with 
 such perfect precision. We bring to notice only 
 that, if the courage displayed by the conquerors 
 of Marengo renders them worthy of their 
 country's gratitude, the details of the action will 
 not allow this army to be considered equal in any 
 respect to those which for many years had served 
 the republic. It was slightly deficient in cohesive 
 power. The number of young soldiers was far 
 from exceeding a reasonable proportion ; but 
 many of the regiments were of recent organiza- 
 tion, and they- contained too many men accus- 
 tomed to depot life : a lengthened garrison service 
 does not enhance the value of the soldier. 
 
 The treaties of Luneville and Amiens as- 
 
102 THE MILITABT INSTITUTIONS OF 'FRANCE. 
 
 sured a glorious peace to France. By founding 
 a fourth dynasty, the Emperor — for we may 
 anticipate a little the Senatus Consultum of 1804 
 to give him this title — ^the Emperor wished to 
 give a permanent stamp to the revolution of 1789. 
 Sometimes with a little disguise, often quite 
 openly, he adapted old monarchical usages to 
 the new regime. The Legion of Honour was 
 created, military honours reappeared : the mar- 
 shal's baton once more became the badge of 
 superior command, and gave our most celebrated 
 generals undisputed authority over their less 
 fortunate or less illustrious comrades. Purely 
 honorary titles (colonel, general, &c.), court 
 appointments, large emoluments, and grants in 
 money, completed the system of which the germ 
 was to be found in the proclamation of the 
 young general of 1796. The numbers of the 
 demi-brigades were changed and replaced by 
 the old regimental names. An attempt was 
 even made to restore the white uniform to the 
 infantry ; but Napoleon possessed too much tact 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 103 
 
 to persevere where experience showed that his 
 efforts were futile or badly received, and the 
 blue coat was retained. He took more serious 
 measures to destroy the republican spirit which, 
 in spite of the character of the coup d'etat, was 
 effaced less quickly in the army than in the 
 nation. Those generals and officers suspected 
 of attachment to the institutions overthrown on 
 the 18th Brumaire were kept in inferior or 
 obscure positions, or placed on half-pay. The 
 drafts of troops to Saint Domingo and the colo- 
 nies were the medium for keeping at a distance 
 corps, fractions of corps, and military men of all 
 ranks, who were tainted with the old vice and 
 reputed dangerous. The " correspondence of 
 Napoleon I." does not throw as much light as 
 would have been expected upon the organization 
 of these expeditions.' The instructions given to 
 the Minister of War regarding the formation 
 of detachments are not as much alluded to as 
 the simple embarkation orders of the Minister 
 of Marine. This is one of those omissions to be 
 
104 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 regretted in a publication so valuable to history, 
 and in every way so instructive. We have had 
 the opportunity, however, of consulting written 
 authorities, and of collecting authentic informa- 
 tion from those whom particular circumstances 
 had placed in a position to understand in all its 
 details this episode of the early Empire, or who 
 themselves were among the rare survivors of 
 these distant and sanguinary expeditions. No 
 doubt is entertained by either witnesses of or 
 actors in this sinister drama regarding the 
 policy displaved in the selection of a con- 
 siderable portion of the 40,000 "or 45,000 men 
 sent beyond the seas during the years 1801 
 and 1802. 
 
 To fill up vacancies and to replace dis- 
 charged soldiers the conscription continued 
 in force, but in a degree 'suited to an armed 
 peace establishment. The law of the 28th 
 Floreal of the year X. (May 17, 1802) for five 
 years consigned to the same corps the conscripts 
 of each arrondissement, divided into two por- 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 105 
 
 tions the 120,000 soldiers required from the two 
 classes of the years IX. and X., and left in 
 reserve half of this contingent. The conscripts 
 voted by the municipalities to form the reserve 
 were to be periodically called out and exercised 
 by oflScers detached for this purpose. We may 
 observe that this arrangement was not carried 
 out : during a peace of three years and a half 
 the army had only for reserve undrilled con- 
 scripts. Attention was no more paid to the 
 regulation providing for recruiting by arron- 
 dissements. Finally, the law of the 8th Nivose 
 of the year XII. (28th December, 1803) re-esta- 
 blished the plan formerly adopted in the formation 
 of the militia, that of " drawing by lot," which, in 
 spite of its undoubted disadvantages, was far 
 superior to the eccentric and variable plan of 
 calling out, put in practice during the last five 
 years. This change in, the regulations happened 
 just in time to facilitate new levies, the inevi- 
 table result of the rupture of the peace of 
 Amiens. The classes of the years XIl and XII. 
 
106 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 were ordered to furnish their contingent, and, by 
 a sort of liqiiidation, Napoleon obtained some 
 of the conscripts in arrear who belonged to the 
 preceding classes. The effectives amounted to 
 450,000 men, of whom 300,000 were disposable 
 for the coasts and the Rhine. These 300,000 
 made up an army which has never yet been 
 equalled, the army of the camp at Boulogne. 
 Owing to a happy combination of monarchical 
 regulations and republican institutions, military 
 instruction and administration had attained to 
 a rare degree of perfection. The personnel was 
 incomparable ; as well able to mancBuvre as the 
 grenadiers of Frederick, and the soldiers mingled 
 with enthusiasm for their glorious chief a rem- 
 nant of the Promethean fire of Jemmapes and 
 Fleurus. The youngest were already robust 
 and well drilled ; and the oldest, still in their 
 prime, could mimber their years of service by 
 their campaigns. The regimental officers and 
 the general staff were worthy of commanding 
 such soldiers. The Emperor had retained the 
 
THE MILITABT INSTITUTIONS OF FBANOE. 107 
 
 formation of brigades and divisions; and the 
 divisions were united in corps d'armee. This 
 last arrangement was not altogether a novel 
 one : already our armies in Grermany had been 
 distributed in grand masses, which often were 
 called wings and centres, and the First Consul 
 had in this manner distributed the army of 
 Marengo. What was new was the multiplica- 
 tion of the corps d'armee, and, above all, the 
 creation of special corps of cavalry destined to 
 act in mass. "With such a leader as Napoleon, 
 and lieutenants who bore the names of Davoust, 
 Lannes, Soult, Ney, Augereau, Bernadotte, and 
 Murat, this new system must have worked mar- 
 vellously well and produced extraordinary effects 
 on the field of battle. 
 
 As a last reserve the Emperor had his guard. 
 Our kings had always troops attached to 
 their person ; the National Assemblies, the in- 
 heritors of sovereign power, imitated their 
 example, and Napoleon continued it. The grena- 
 diers who protected the national representation 
 
lOS TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 SO well during the day of the ISth Brumaire 
 had formed the nucleus of the consular guard, 
 and was the little battalion which had crossed 
 the Alps in 1800, and, by its heroic conduct, had 
 retarded the offensive demonstration of the Aus- 
 trians on the plain of Marengo. To the grena- 
 diers were joined the chasseurs a pied, the chas- 
 seurs a cheval, and 24 guns ; the whole forming 
 a body of 7000 men. Nevertheless, Napoleon 
 was theoretically in no way an advocate for 
 corps d'elite, and he looked upon this creation as 
 " a sacrifice made to the majesty of his vast 
 empire and to the interests of his old soldiers."* 
 The Emperor was severe upon himself when he 
 formed this judgment. The normal state of 
 Prance becoming one of war, the existence of 
 the Imperial Guard could challenge criticism 
 as long as its proportions were restrained in due 
 limits, and while it remained under the orders of 
 a sovereign who was at the same time the best 
 general in battle. 
 
 * Letter to Joseph of the 22nd April, 1808. 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 109 
 
 Such was the army which, by its exploits 
 more than by its numbers, will always be " the 
 grand army." Such it was at Ulm, Austerlitz, 
 Jena, Aurstadt, Eylau, and at Friedland. 
 Cruelly decimated by its victories, but organised 
 with suflScient strength to preserve its charac- 
 teristics, and to give their stamp to the recruits 
 who were added to its ranks ; such it was when 
 goiag forth to be scattered and swallowed up in 
 the gulf of the Peninsular War. 
 
 The grand army entered Spain to repair the 
 first disaster which had befallen the Empire. A 
 bitter experience had just been acquired. The 
 conscripts drafted into regiments of the camp 
 at Boulogne became formed soldiers in a few 
 days, but the " Legions " consisting of conscripts 
 placed under the command of officers and non- 
 commissioned officers taken from all parts, were 
 exposed to sad mischances. The exigencies of 
 politics did not allow Napoleon to take into 
 account the lesson received at Baylen, The 
 march to Yienna in 1809 necessitated the same 
 
110 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANOE. 
 
 improvisations which had been called for in the 
 march on Madrid in 1808. Grlance over the 
 volumes recently published of the correspondence 
 of Napoleon, you will find in each page the words 
 " provisional division," " regiment on march," 
 "provisional battalion," "legion of reserve." 
 These numerous designations have a similar 
 meaning ; they signify a number of soldiers and 
 officers unknown to each other, whose chacos 
 bore different numbers ; collections of men 
 brought together for temporary purposes, but to 
 which necessity soon gave a permanent cha- 
 racter. One after the other the regiments 
 were scattered between the mouths of the Cat- 
 taro and the Texel, between Hamburg and 
 Tarente, between Cadiz and the Oder. New 
 creations were necessary to disguise the loss of 
 strength, and also, alas! the expenditure of 
 men which resulted from this perpetual march- 
 ing and countermarching. Fourth and fifth 
 battahons were formed to avoid disclosing to 
 what state the three first were reduced. In 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. Ill 
 
 order that the absence of so many regiments 
 might not be remarked, fresh names were given 
 to those which replaced them : Fusiliers, 
 Flankers, Biflemen, Skirmishers, &c. The 
 guard was enormously augmented. In 1806 
 Napoleon considered a corps d'elite of 7000 
 men a sacrifice; in 1812 he raised it to 47,000 
 men, and yet in the intervening years he had 
 learnt the nature of the disputes which, in his 
 absence, inevitably resulted from the contact of 
 troops of the line with privileged corps. At 
 Fuentes d'Onor, Massena, reinforced in the 
 evening by a portion of the guard, naturally 
 wished to make use of it ; but the artillery 
 could not advance, the cavalry could not charge, 
 nor the waggons bring up cartridges without a 
 special order from their own commandant, who 
 was never to be found at the opportune mo- 
 ment ; and the fortune of the day, which might 
 have belonged to France, remained with the 
 English army. In accordance with the system 
 established by Napoleon, and with the cha- 
 
112 THE MILITABT INSTITUTIONS OF FBANGE. 
 
 racter which he had introduced into the army, 
 he should have been ubiquitous. From the 
 habit of speaking only of the Emperor's service, 
 the service of the country was not always suflS- 
 ciently thought of, and, when not under- the 
 dreaded eye of the master, things were occa- 
 sionally taken easily. There was Httle inclina- 
 tion shown either to obey or to assist each other. 
 The day was past when Moreau placed himself 
 under the orders of Joubert, who was but a 
 colonel, while his new lieutenant had com- 
 manded the army of the Rhine. And when in 
 the court of the Tuileries in 1815, Napoleon 
 raised the old cry of Vive la Nation ! forgotten 
 for sixteen years, the Federals alone responded. 
 Around the Emperor, this anachronism was not 
 understood. 
 
 Let us return to 1809. In the midst of in- 
 creasing confusion, Napoleon was still himself. 
 Thanks to his memory, his vigilance, and his 
 rare versatility, no detail was forgotten. He 
 could follow the smallest detachment from one 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 113 
 
 end of Europe to the other, but — he could not 
 steal fire from heaven; he could not transmit 
 to others his own genius and ardour, nor ani- 
 mate, with his breath alone, the clay of the con- 
 scription which he fashioned so incessantly, A 
 simple Senatus Consultum now sufficed to bring 
 this formidable engine into play ; first one, then 
 two classes were called out in advance ; then two, 
 and three in arrear, and men who had thrice 
 found substitutes, were eventually obliged to 
 join the ranks. When it came to the Emperor's 
 knowledge that the elder son of any great 
 family was, in spite of the facilities for promo- 
 tion, kept at home by parental authority, to 
 avoid the military schools, an officer's commis- 
 sion was sent him — a singular lettre de cachet. 
 To obtain men, anything was allowable ; even 
 boys were called out and placed in " the velites " 
 and " the pupilles." While the guard was aug- 
 mented by regiments not less brave, but as 
 young and inexperienced as the generality, it 
 was necessary to break up Oudinot's celebrated 
 
114 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANOE. 
 
 grenadiers — tliis non-privileged corps d'elite— 
 and to disperse them among thirty-six 4th batta- 
 lions which came from the depots with soldiers 
 raised within a few months. In other battalions 
 still less cared for, the epaulet of the "grena- 
 diers " or " voltigeurs " (flank companies) was 
 even bestowed on those conscripts who had most 
 quickly learnt to handle their weapons. 
 
 Nevertheless, this army, thus hastily consti- 
 tuted, had already taken Ratisbonne, and 
 marched down the Danube. One corps alone, 
 that of the conqueror of Auerstadt and Bck- 
 muhl, retained its original organisation. To give 
 a unity and an impulse to the others, Massena 
 and Lannes were on the spot, and Macdonald 
 marched side by side with the brave and modest 
 Eugene. The troops were proved at Essling, 
 and conquered at Wagram ; but Providence 
 did not withhold its warnings from Napoleon. 
 He himself owned that he could no longer 
 attempt what he had risked with the soldiers of 
 Austerlitz. Engagements were more obsti- 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 115 
 
 nately disputed, and generals were compelled 
 to expose themselves greatly. When at this 
 same battle of Wagram, Massena's corps changed 
 front to the left to cover the repulse of Boudet's 
 division, and when the army of Italy replaced 
 it in the centre, the latter advanced in deep 
 order of battalions, deployed one behind the 
 other, " at distance of mass," in the same 
 order which was destined to be afterwards so 
 fatal to the corps d'Erlon on the 18th June, 
 1815. Long after, Marshal Macdonald ex- 
 plained the motives which induced him to adopt 
 this disposition, since so criticised. He had ob- 
 served alarming symptoms ; the roll-call, fre- 
 quently repeated, shoWed an increasing propor- 
 tion of absentees, not explained by the losses 
 caused by the enemy's fire. "What!" ex- 
 claimed an interlocutor, " do you mean to say 
 that our soldiers were no longer brave ?" The 
 Marshal, after a moment's reflection, replied in 
 his simple and honest manner : " Yes ; they were 
 as brave, but they were no longer welded together." 
 
116 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 In the same way that the grand army was 
 exhausted in Spain, the army of "Wagram was 
 destined to be buried beneath the snows of 
 Russia. "We only require to speak of this 
 colossal expedition as far as relates to the cha- 
 racter of its organisation. It was a crusade 
 with more method and less faith. The military 
 force of Europe followed the Emperor while 
 execrating his power. The purely French 
 troops who crossed the Niemen in 1812 were in 
 better condition than at the commencement of 
 the war in 1809. To make use of Macdonald's 
 expression, they were more firmly " welded 
 together ;" but they were in a manner hampered 
 by being mixed up with foreign troops. There 
 were entire corps of Bavarians, Saxons, and 
 Westphalians ; there were foreign divisions in 
 every French corps ctarmSe, and, in nearly every 
 French division, there were battalions of different 
 languages and nationalities — Badois, Spaniards, 
 Dutch, Croats, Hanseatics, &c. "While bowing 
 to the impenetrable motives which prompt the 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 117 
 
 resolutions of genius, common sense demands 
 what confidence could be inspired by such a 
 motley assemblage ; and it is astonishing to 
 find as many as 60,000 malcontents incorpo- 
 rated in our ranks — ^men who seemed collected 
 together only to bring with them an element 
 of insubordination and dissolution. It is above 
 all startling when, at the essential points, the 
 two wings of tliis immense line of battle, already 
 so incongruous, we find the Prussians on one 
 side and the Austrian s on the other. Infatua- 
 tion could not go to the extent of believing that, 
 in case of disaster^ either would make any great 
 efibrts to protect the flanks of the French 
 column. What happened is well known. 
 
 The brilliant illusions which dazzled the mind 
 of Napoleon on his departure for Moscow seem 
 to have given place to some after-thoughts 
 which perhaps he would not admit even to 
 himself. No doubt he did not foresee disaster, 
 but he endeavoured to guard against the same 
 accident which took place in his rear in 1809, 
 
118 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 such as the landing of the English at Walchereii, 
 and the attempts of Major Schill and the Duke 
 of Brunswick. With this view he established 
 a corps cfdrme'e on the Oder, and left behind 
 him instructions for calling out the 140,000 
 conscripts of 1813, of which a justly popular- 
 romance has given us the type. He also 
 ordered the formation in " cohorts" of about 
 100,000 National Guards from the ages of 
 twenty-two to twenty-seven, the residue of 
 the oldest classes of the conscription ; these men 
 were arbitrarily brought together under the 
 promise of being only employed for the defence 
 of the country. After his sudden return from 
 Smorgoni, Napoleon therefore found about 
 240,000 men under arms in France. A decree 
 of the Senate sufficed to form the National Guard 
 into regiments and to do away with the special 
 conditions under which they were embodied. 
 By recalling officers from Spain and taking 
 from our ports the men no longer required for 
 our phantom navy — by employing several ex- 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 119 
 
 pedients already in use at ofher periods, and of 
 which the form alone was changed — Napoleon 
 was enabled to bring together on the Elbe, in 
 the month of April, 1813, not 265,000 men, as 
 were shown in adding up his resources on paper, 
 but 195,000 at the utmost. To such an extent 
 had the loss, usual in the formation of armies, 
 been increased by the peculiar elements of 
 which this one was composed. When all the 
 levies were united, the total of this armament 
 in this fatal year amounted to 360,000 soldiers — 
 a miracle of creative power ! But the miracles 
 iof even the greatest men have a limit, and the 
 people are taught by cruel lessons to measure 
 the distance which separates men boasting to be 
 sent by Providence from Providence itself. 
 
 In the month of November, 1813, 44,000 
 combatants, the dehris of the disaster of Leipzig, 
 halted before Mayence, and a few days later, 
 they retired before the immense armies of the 
 allies. Invasion, and how to repel it ! The Em- 
 peror called out 550,000 men who ought to 
 
120 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 have been taken from the thirteen classes of 
 1803 to 1815 : it was a magnificent plan, al- 
 though much more tyrannical than any decree 
 of the Convention ; but it was only a chimera. 
 A few thousands of conscripts, to pour into the 
 regiments that came from Spain, or to be com- 
 manded by invalided officers, this was all the 
 nation could give. By the abuse which he had 
 made of every military institution. Napoleon 
 had broken their springs of action, and rendered 
 them sterile ; they were now but machines in- 
 capable of working or which had no material 
 to work upon. The corps d'armee were but 
 weak divisions ; the necessary fortresses were 
 neither repaired nor munitioned — not a ditch 
 round Paris, not a fortification erected to help 
 the movements of the army — nothing, or almost 
 nothing, at Laon, Soissons, Langres, or Lyons ; 
 scarcely any muskets ; and those to whom the 
 few remaining arms were given did not know 
 how to load them. 
 
 It was in the open field, with 60,000 or 70,000 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 121 
 
 heroes, harassed by fatigue, or scarcely arrived 
 at manhood, that the Emperor, in 1814, stayed 
 for three months, the march of the 300,000 
 picked soldiers with which Europe pressed on 
 exhausted France, 
 
 When he returned from the isle of Elba in 
 1815, he found himself in command of a mili- 
 tary power far more numerous, and far differ- 
 ently constituted. 
 
 The return of prisoners, and of remote garri- 
 sons, had brought back to our ranks many 
 inured veterans ; and, with the exception of the 
 deplored change of cockade, and of the unfortu- 
 nate formation of the " maison du roi," all the 
 measures put in effect with regard to the army by 
 the first restoration were worthy of eulogium. 
 No disbanding, the old guard retained, the regi- 
 ments of the line remodelled under new numbers, 
 but reformed with care ; those of the infantry to 
 the number of 105, in three battalions; 56 regi- 
 ments of cavalry, 15 of artillery; thus giving, 
 counting the soldiers absent on furlough, an 
 
122 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 effective of 230,000 good and well-ofEcered 
 soldiers. 
 
 By seeking out men who had quitted the service 
 without a regular discharge ; by demanding from 
 the conscription a contingent ; by making a call 
 upon the National Gruard, more in unison with 
 the Supplementary Act, added to the Constitu- 
 tion (" I'acte additionnel "), than with the past 
 conduct and present manner of the sovereign, 
 Napoleon calculated on obtaining 800,000 com- 
 batants. However, notwithstanding his pro- 
 digious activity, his intellect, as inventive as pro^ 
 found, his imperious mode of proceeding, he was 
 in three months only able to obtain an effective 
 of 300,000 men. He brought together 124,000 
 of them to invade Belgium ; superb troops, in 
 excellent condition and well commanded. 
 
 It would be impossible to imagine a more 
 accomplished chief of the staff than Marshal 
 Soult. Who was better able to lead a large 
 body of infantry than Gerard, Lobau, or Eeille ? 
 What might not be expected of a cavalry com ■ 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANGE. 123 
 
 manded by Pajol, Kellermann, Excelmans, 
 Milhaud ? and, to animate all, " the bravest of 
 the brave " (Ney) was with the Emperor. 
 
 But as M. Thiers has justly observed in that 
 
 fine work which cannot be too much studied, 
 
 the army was wanting in calmness and unity ; 
 
 the spirit of all the leaders did not respond to 
 
 the ardour of the soldiers ; generals and officers 
 
 met for the first time, or found themselves again 
 
 together, after having been long separated, no 
 
 less by distance than by ideas and by habits 
 
 contracted in different countries, and in very 
 
 different wars. The conduct of each man during 
 
 the recent events was severely judged, each 
 
 one observed and mistrusted the other. This 
 
 absence of harmony, this want of good feeling, 
 
 was manifested on every occasion during these 
 
 short operations, and gave a peculiar stamp to 
 
 the campaign of 1815. We will not enter into 
 
 the inexhaustible controversy which this gloomy 
 
 episode of our history has evoked, and which 
 
 fifty years of discussion does not seem to have 
 
124 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANGE. 
 
 exhausted. We will give a resume of it in 
 a few words. Never did captain strike 
 more truly at the weak point of his enemy's 
 breastplate ; never were chiefs or soldiers 
 more valiant ; never was disaster more complete. 
 Napoleon's last army succumbed at Waterloo; 
 with it were destroyed the military institutions 
 of France. For the survivors of so many 
 battles, for the glorious "brigands of the 
 Loire," there remained but the task of giving 
 an admirable example of patriotic resignation. 
 They understood the necessity of sparing their 
 country the evils which had always followed 
 the disbanding of large bodies of troops, thus 
 practising at the last hour the civic virtues 
 which inspired the armies born of the revolu- 
 tion, and which the splendour, as well as the 
 calamities, of the Empire had for a time thrown , 
 into the shade. 
 
CHAPTER lY. 
 
 France was disarmed and compelled to accept 
 the conditions imposed by the conqueror. Our 
 military institutions were now not only shaken 
 and distorted, but utterly destroyed. It was no 
 longer a question of reform, it became neces- 
 sary, under the most unfavourable circum- 
 stances, to undertake a completely new creation, 
 a task even more diflScult than that accom- 
 plished in Prussia from 1808 to 1813 by Stein 
 and Sharnhorst. While, like the Prussians, we 
 had to bear the humiliation of foreign occu- 
 pation, and the burden of war taxes — while, like 
 them, we were deeply imbued with a feeling 
 of patriotism, in the French character this noble 
 sentiment assumed many forms ; it did not stifle 
 
126 TEE MILITAE7 INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 hostile passions nor efface differences of opinion ; 
 in some natures it showed itself, by the wish 
 to destroy every vestige of what was then 
 called the revolutionary spirit ; while in a great 
 number it displayed itself in hatred of. the new 
 government. Many of the constitutional party 
 regarded with little favour the re-establishment 
 of the permanent army ; they looked upon it as 
 an obstacle to the development of public liberty. 
 Finally the mass of the nation entertained a deep 
 antipathy for the conscription, at the same time 
 manifesting a platonic regret for the legendary 
 man who had rendered this conscription so fatal 
 an abuse to the country. 
 
 The difficulties of this complex position were 
 of a nature to discourage the boldest ; they did 
 not deter Gouvion Saint Cyr. P'irm at all 
 times, liberal under the Empire, and from this 
 cause little regarded by Napoleon, who always 
 judged severely the marshal's fierce temper, he 
 could, without renouncing anything, profess con- 
 stitutional opinions, at the same time recalling 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 127 
 
 with some pride memories of glorj-, and showing, 
 without reserve, a Hvely sympathy with the 
 veteran soldiers. The movement of 1792 had 
 launched him into the military profession at an 
 age when, generally, all thought of entering it 
 is given up (at twenty-eight) ; and he at once 
 distinguished himself by a rare mixture of steadi- 
 ness and enthusiasm, and by his clear, imagi- 
 native, and well-balanced mind. He brought 
 these same qualities to bear in the management 
 of affairs. Accustomed to weigh the chances of 
 battle dispassionately and resolutely, he looked 
 at the obstacles which surrounded him with 
 the same calm and courageous forethought 
 which animated him on the field of battle, 
 and he manoeuvred on this new ground with 
 the ability and method which formerly called forth 
 the exclamation from the soldiers of the army 
 of the Rhine, " Look at Saint Cyr going to play 
 at chess with the Austrians !" Uniting a know- 
 ledge of modern communities to a wide experi- 
 ence, strengthened by meditation and study, he 
 
128 THE MILITABY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANCE. 
 
 prepared the law of 1818, "which might he 
 said to be inspired by the genius of France 
 as, if we may believe Vegacius, the institution 
 of the Roman legion was, by a god."* With 
 the sanction of the king he brought it before 
 the Chambers. " A sight unequalled in the 
 history of the world !" he exclaimed ; " a national 
 and free government discussing its power and 
 miUtary system in the presence of the armies 
 of Europe still occupying its territory !" 
 
 The law of Saint Oyr was in effect a complete 
 system ; it determined the mode of recruiting, 
 the effective strength of the army, the. com- 
 position of the national reserve, and the rules 
 for promotion. This method of legislating in 
 a single act upon different subjects was not 
 without its inconveniences. All the items could 
 not be treated with the clearness and precision 
 desirable, and these imperfections neutraUzed 
 the efficacy of some of the arrangements; but 
 under existing circumstances this law had the 
 • Speech of General Eicard, 1824. ^ 
 
TEE MILITABT INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 129 
 
 advantage of quickly coming to tlie pith of 
 essential questions, now considered as settled, 
 but at that period warmly contested, and of at 
 once laying the foundation of a military organiza- 
 tion which, be it remembered, had to be entirely 
 reconstructed, and of finally passing in the 
 ensemble measures which would never have been 
 accepted in detail. 
 
 The first article showed a verbal artifice called 
 for by public feeling and by the previous declara- 
 tions of Louis XVIII. The word conscription 
 was omitted ; voluntary engagement appeared 
 as the principal element of recruiting, and the 
 " call " as a subsidiary measure. The effective 
 in peace was fixed at 240,000 men, and was to 
 be made up by annual levies, not to exceed 
 40,000. The contingent was drawn from the 
 departments, arrondissements, and cantons, in 
 proportion to the strength of their population, 
 and formed by means of drawing lots among the 
 young men of twenty, the minimum height 
 being 1" 57'. Exemptions and dispensations 
 
130 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 were wisely defined and left to the discretion 
 of a revisionary council, who gave to the State, 
 and to those interested, sufficient guarantees. 
 Engagements were obliged to be gratuitous, 
 bounties were forbidden, and re-engagements 
 alone gave a right to higher pay ; substitution 
 was authorized, without the intervention of the 
 authorities, except to certify to the fitness of the 
 substitute. The man thus replaced was held 
 responsible for one year, in case of desertion. 
 The length of service was six years, counting 
 from the 1st of January of the year in which the 
 enlistment took place ; the period of discharge 
 was fixed for the 31st of December, except in 
 extraordinary circumstances of war. Those called 
 out, or their substitutes, were all incorporated, 
 but might be left at their homes to be brought 
 on active service as they were required. In 
 cases of more extreme necessity special laws 
 were to be provided. 
 
 Such were the principal provisions contained 
 in the three first clauses of the law of the 10th 
 
THE MILITAJRT INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 131 
 
 March, 1818. We have thought fit to enu- 
 merate these in detail, for most of them still 
 appear in the laws which provide for the re- 
 cruiting of the army. Clause TV. instituted the 
 " veterans," and brought together under this 
 name discharged non-commissioned officers and 
 soldiers ; and while leaving them full liberty 
 " to marry," " to form establishments," imposed 
 a territorial service which was to last six years, 
 but was not to be exacted except in time of 
 war : even in this case a law was required to 
 oblige them to march beyond the boundary of 
 their military divisions. This institution, de- 
 scribed in the terms we have just quoted, had 
 an immediate object, which might be changed 
 in the future. In the designs of several cabinets, 
 hostility against France seemed to survive the 
 fall of the Empire ; a new collision might be at 
 hand, and Saint Cyr was desirous of assuring to 
 our young army the co-operation of 240,000 sol- 
 diers accustomed to war, whom the events of 1815 
 had sent back to civil Hfe. He immediately 
 
132 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 composed his reserve by going back to the class 
 of 1807, and calculated on providing for it by 
 replacing successively proved soldiers by men 
 who in default of experience of war had at least 
 all the military instruction which can be ac- 
 quired in time of peace. This was most 
 assuredly a profound idea and a clever project ; 
 but its wording was obscure, and the mode of 
 execution was not traced with sufficient clear- 
 ness for this great experiment to be fully carried 
 out. What was " territorial service ?" Were 
 the veterans to be placed under military rules ? 
 Were they to be formed in separate corps ? How 
 were they to be officered ? These questions and 
 many others were not solved.* Deeply impressed 
 as he was with the wisdom of the principle, 
 was the Marshal himself quite certain as to its 
 mode of application ? Did he wish only to make 
 allowances for deep prejudice and strong mis- 
 
 • The distribution of these veteran legions in cantonal com- 
 panieSj proposed by the minister but rejected by the Chambers, 
 had, above all, an administrative character, and did not give 
 a military constitution to the reserve. 
 
TEE MILITABT INSTITUTIONS OF FEANOE. 133 
 
 trust, and to take into account the assurances 
 given to soldiers of the army of the Loire at 
 the time of their disbandment — assurances which 
 Marshal Macdonald, in touching language, 
 recalled to the Chamber of Peers ? In any 
 case the fundamental idea contained in the 
 law remained enveloped in considerable ob- 
 scurity. 
 
 Clause Y. had reference to penal provisions, 
 and Clause VI., devoted to promotion, laid down 
 rules, the equity of which is now so universally 
 acknowledged that it seems superfluous to recall 
 them. Henceforth no one could be an officer 
 if he had not passed a sufficient time in the 
 ranks, or submitted to the test of the military 
 schools, open only to competition ; a third of 
 the second lieutenancies was reserved for the 
 non-commissioned officers of corps. For pro- 
 motion to other ranks, a happily maintained 
 balance gave to the executive power the means 
 of rewarding good service or of facilitating the 
 rise of merit, while at the same time admitting 
 
134 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 the claims of seniority, and setting a limit to 
 favouritism, if it were hopeless to exclude it 
 absolutely. 
 
 The principle of levies found many oppo- 
 nents : one orator who had for fifteen years 
 commanded a brave regiment formed " at sixty 
 livres a man," did not think that anything 
 better could be invented, and he found an echo 
 among his auditors ; but attacks upon this point 
 were soon parried. M. Royer Collard claiming, 
 in magnificent language, which our liberalism 
 of to-day might envy, the right of the Chambers 
 to fix the annual contingent, carried few with 
 him. The opposition concentrated its efforts 
 upon the Clauses lY. and VI. ; this, it was said, 
 was revolution incarnate in the army, the an- 
 nihilation of the royal power, a permanent plan 
 of conspiracy against the throne ! However, 
 the sincere support given by the king, M. de 
 Richelieu, and other ministers, to the Marshal, 
 assured success, and, in spite of the strong dis- 
 content which the proposal of the law caused 
 
THE MILITABT INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 135 
 
 among the leaders of the allied armies, it was 
 carried in almost the same terms proposed by- 
 Saint Cyr. A few days later the foreign troops 
 recrossed the frontier, and the facility with 
 which the first levies of the contingent was 
 executed imposed silence upon critics. France 
 hberated was restored her army, and the army 
 had its charter. 
 
 To obtain this great result, Saint Cyr was 
 obliged to make a sacrifice. According to his 
 idea, privileges, no matter how disguised or 
 lessened, were not to be revived in our consti- 
 tutional army, but he found it necessary to tem- 
 porise on this point. The old guard, which it 
 would have been so desirable to retain, had 
 ceased to exist ; he did not think it possible to 
 re-establish it : above all, he believed that a 
 numerous corps delite would in time of war 
 be productive of much confusion, slightly com- 
 pensated for by some advantages, and that 
 during a long peace its disadvantages alone 
 would be manifest. All the incidents of the 
 
136 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 revolution and of the wars of the Empire were 
 engraved upon his observant mind, and he 
 professed the same opinion upon the utiHty of 
 privileged corps as that held by most French 
 military men who have discussed this question 
 in an independent spirit. But from the first 
 attempts to reorganise the army, the allied 
 sovereigns or their ministers, fancying they saw 
 the dreaded spectre of our old phalanxes, enter- 
 taining, or feigning to entertain, lively appre- 
 hensions for the stability of the throne of Louis 
 XYIIL, wished to put an absolute veto upon the 
 new legislation. From 1815^ the period of his 
 first ministry, the Marshal had to encounter 
 these obstacles, and which the exigencies of the 
 time did not permit him to ignore ; he found it 
 necessary, also, to induce the king to abandon 
 the vast military household with which he had 
 surrounded himself or allowed himself to be 
 surrounded in 1814. Saint Cyr temporized re- 
 luctantly : he maintained four companies of the 
 garde du corps, and created the garde royale. 
 
THE MILITABT INSTITUTIONS OF FBANGE. 137 
 
 It was composed of nearly 30,000 men, dis- 
 tributed among a regiment af artillery^ two 
 divisions of cavalry and two of infantry, of which 
 a brigade was Swiss. They were magnificent 
 troops, well officered, and would assuredly have 
 furnished in war time an excellent corps darmee, 
 but they were unable to fulfil the political mis- 
 sion assigned to them : the devotion of the brave 
 royal guard did not save the Bourbon throne, 
 and the revolution of July was accomplished 
 amidst cries of " Vive la Ligne !" 
 
 If the advocates of corps d'elite cannot fall 
 back upon the authority of Saint Cyr, neither 
 can those who would build a system of reserve 
 upon a basis of stationary regiments, recruited 
 in special localities, place him under their 
 banner. The organization of the infantry in 
 departmental legions furnished a simple and 
 quick method of grouping the military elements 
 scattered by the disbandment of 1815 ; it facili- 
 tated the reconstruction of the army. It was a 
 temporary measure which the Marshal had no 
 
138 THE MILITAET INSTITUTIONS OF FB-ANCE. 
 
 wish to render permanent. When, after he 
 went out of office, the regimental system was 
 restored, he did not disguise his approbation. 
 We need not dwell upon the injurious stagna- 
 tion which an indefinite residence in garri- 
 sons would entail upon the corps of our army, 
 nor upon the difficulties likely to be encountered 
 in the execution of the various services imposed 
 upon our troops. In its relation to the per- 
 sonnel this system was equally defective. Put 
 in practice during four or five critical years, it 
 left disagreeable traces behind. Those who a 
 short time ago were in the service may recollect 
 the petty and obstinate parochial jealousies 
 which divided certain corps of officers, and the 
 origin of which dated from the commencement 
 of the short-lived legions. In the history of 
 our army, the partisans of localized recruiting 
 cannot show a single really favourable precedent. 
 The members of the Supreme Council of War, 
 who, during the restoration, prepared a project 
 for dividing the kingdom into recruiting dis- 
 
THE MIZITABT INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 139 
 
 tricts, never allowed themselves to entertain a 
 similar idea.* 
 
 The names borne by the regiments under the 
 old monarchy did not necessitate the soldiers 
 being taken from particular provinces, and the 
 Eepublic only possessed a good army when all 
 the departmental battalions were fused into na- 
 tional demi-brigades. 
 
 Let us call to mind, that this generous and 
 inscrutable French people cannot be brought 
 under the absolute classifications which are so 
 much the fashion of the day. The French 
 race, an incomparable type of variety in unity, 
 is the product of the fusion of many races. 
 Herein lies the secret of its strength, and the 
 explanation of many of its weaknesses. This 
 fusion has not been made uniformly. On this 
 point analysis will show a preponderance of an 
 element in one place which elsewhere may be 
 wanting. Climates are as different as is the forma- 
 
 * See the speech of the General D'Ambriageac in the Chamber 
 of Peers, during the sitting of the 30th of January, 1832. 
 
140 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANOE. 
 
 tion of the soil. Hence it follows that physical or 
 moral aptitudes are not everywhere the same ^ 
 hence different species of courage. It is the 
 amalgamation of these aptitudes, of these differ- 
 ent kinds of courage in our various corps, which 
 give to our army its maximum of efficiency. 
 Besides this, the hardships of war are unequal ; 
 even on a day of victory one division may suffer 
 considerable losses — a regiment may be annihi- 
 lated. At Eylau all the officers of the Fourteenth 
 Regiment of the Line were killed, and the Corps 
 of Augerau was so reduced that the Emperor 
 was obliged to disband it. Imagine the conse- 
 quences of a similar calamity happening to a 
 departmental regiment, or to a corps d'armee 
 recruited from one district ! But it will be 
 answered. Look at Switzerland, Austria, Prussia ! 
 kSwitzerland is tied in the organization (other- 
 wise so remarkable and so worthy of stiidy) of 
 its militia by its federal constitution. Under 
 another form, the same may be said of Austria. 
 As for Prussia, it is uncertain whether she would 
 
THE MILITABT INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 141 
 
 not still further increase the power of her army 
 by mingling, for instance, the robust inhabitants 
 of Pomerania or Brandenburgh with the men 
 raised in the manufacturing districts ; she is, be- 
 sides, placed in an exceptional position by the 
 composition of her corps of officers, and by the 
 species of military aptitude inherent in the 
 German race. The French army also possesses 
 a peculiar idiosyncrasy which ought to be pre- 
 served. Nothing which takes place abroad 
 shows any necessity for changing an organiza- 
 tion hallowed by the experience of both war 
 and peace, and which is so well adapted to the 
 national temperament. 
 
 The temporary adoption of the departmental 
 system had meanwhile, as we have shown, one 
 result : it had facilitated the classification of the 
 numerous body M'^hich the catastrophe of 1815 
 had left unemployed. Severe measures and the 
 irritations of " half-pay " were lessened. It was 
 found possible to relieve many officers from a 
 position which at first had been so harshly thrnst 
 
142 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 upon them. After the first violent reaction, 
 with the exception of some whimsical proceed- 
 ings and exceptions to be regretted, the govern- 
 ment seemed generally disposed to be just in 
 regard to the distribution of military appoint- 
 ments ; but many embarrassments could not be 
 obviated. The great number of promotions of 
 1809 and 1813; the return of emigrants; the 
 batches of second lieutenants which filled the 
 Maison Rouge of 1814, loaded the army lists 
 with a very heavy weight. If we can trace 
 back to this period some few of the most illus- 
 trious careers to which our army pays homage, 
 we must also allow that creations so sudden, so 
 numerous, and so impromptu, did not always 
 turn out happily, and that they became a legacy 
 of future trouble to subsequent adminis- 
 trators. The evil was felt even after the Re- 
 volution of July, and it was only at the end of 
 twenty or twenty-five years that France was 
 enabled to reap all the advantages of the rules 
 which Saint Oyr, in the law of 1818 and in sub- 
 
■ TEE MILITART INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 143 
 
 sequent decrees, had laid down for the promotion 
 and formation of the corps of ofScers. First in 
 the Hst of institutions of this kind which the 
 French army owes to him comes the staff corps 
 and the college attached to it. Instead of being 
 surrounded by aides-de-camp as brave as elegant, 
 but nominated by favour or friendship, generals 
 now found near them officers acquainted with 
 special branches of information — men who had 
 acquired a knowledge of military geography, 
 who were initiated in the details of the different 
 arms; efficient intermediums between the ruling 
 powers and the troops. Thus one of the great 
 wants of military organization was provided for. 
 Saint Cyr himself, an active and vigilant ad- 
 ministrator, introduced many improvements in 
 the branches of the service which came under 
 his jurisdiction. Amongst other important mea- 
 sures, he had to carry out a decree passed 
 during the administration of the Due de Feltre, 
 which made the " military in tendance " fur- 
 nish the paymasterships of regiments and 
 
144 THE MILITART INSTITUTIONS OF FBANGK 
 
 the management of all brandies of the ad- 
 ministration, thus filling the offices of Review- 
 ing Inspectors, Comptrollers, and Commis- 
 sariat staff. Recruited from regimental officers, 
 the Intendance has since that time fulfilled 
 its multiplied functions with an efficacy which 
 is an honour to the probity and intelligence 
 of the corps. Perhaps, however, the problem 
 of army administration is not even yet com- 
 pletely solved. Shall we suggest the possi- 
 bility of reconciling the severity of an honest 
 supervision with something of the boldness 
 and fertility of resource which characterized 
 the old commissariat ? 
 
 In regard to the cavalry and to the parti- 
 cular arms of the service, they were placed on 
 a footing conformable to the existent state of 
 military science. The cavalry were categori- 
 cally divided into three classes; the artillery 
 into regiments of horse and foot. Let us at 
 once call to mind that, towards the end of 
 the Restoration, and under the enlightened ad- 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 145 
 
 ministration of General Yalee, this latter arm 
 received, besides improved materiel, a fresh 
 organization : the pontoniers alone were kept 
 separate, and each regiment of artillery became 
 a centre of instruction and organization, furnish- 
 ing, according to the requirements of the service, 
 batteries of different classes. We are now far 
 in advance of the materiel of 1829 ; but the 
 motives which, in 1860, led to the re-establish- 
 ment of the old separation of regiments of 
 artillery have not been generally understood. 
 
 Let us go back to 1824, immediately after the 
 Spanish campaign. The army formed under 
 the system of the law of 1818 proved to be 
 steady, active, disciplined, and brave. With the 
 exception of the miscalculation which necessitated 
 the intervention of M. Ouvrard, in spite of the 
 vexation caused amongst some people by the as- 
 tonishing success of this contractor,* everything 
 
 * I conversed lately with an officer who, knapsack on back, 
 had gone through the campaign of 1823 ; and who, since then, 
 had been on active service in Africa, Italy, and the Crimea. 
 "Never," he said, "were we as well provided for as in Spain." 
 
146 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 succeeded admirably. The formation, however, 
 of the corps of veterans did not fulfil the expecta- 
 tions formed of it. Those of the class of 1816 
 were alone called out : all of them did not obey, 
 and those who did respond to the call did not 
 disguise their discontent. These two facts are 
 explained by a general cause and by particular 
 reasons. In the first place it is always a difficult 
 matter to explain to a man who has to " serve 
 out his time" (sert pour son sort) — I must be 
 forgiven for making use of military slang — the 
 difference which exists between a provisional 
 leave and final discharge. As soon as the certi- 
 ficate of good conduct is placed in the tin case, 
 and he turns his back upon the barracks, he con- 
 siders his obligation ended. In 1823 this idea 
 had become even more deeply rooted in the 
 minds of the veterans who had then in their 
 possession, not their furlough only, but their dis- 
 charge. The war in Spain was not popular, nor 
 was it considered very serious ; the soldiers of 
 1816 were astonished at being called out for so 
 
TSE MILITAMT INSTITUTIONS OF FBANOE. U7 
 
 little, and, as the measure did not extend to the 
 other classes, their disgust was increased. Placed 
 upon the strength of the various regiments by a 
 wide interpretation of the law of 1818, they 
 were meanwhile retained at the depots out of 
 respect to the letter of the said law. To the 
 annoyance caused by their incorporation was 
 added the quasi-humiliation of " not being 
 allowed to go on service." This unfortunate 
 experience was not conclusive, but was received 
 as such. The government proposed to the 
 Chambers to repeal the fourth clause of the law 
 of 1818, and to increase the total of the annual 
 contingent to 60,000 men, and the length of 
 service to eight years. These two latter arrange- 
 ments were fully called for by the necessity of 
 replacing resources no longer to be counted upon 
 in consequence of the suppression of the veteran 
 corps and the falling away of the levies. In- 
 deed, if the number of malcontents diminished 
 daily, the increase of those exempted by physical 
 imperfections had exceeded the calculations, and 
 
148 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 could not fail to advance as recruiting claimed 
 the generations conceived amidst the great heca- 
 tombs of the empire. 
 
 The new duration of service was similar to 
 the old engagements ;* combined with the con- 
 tingent, it allowed the total of the army to 
 amount to 400,000 men, which, fixed by Saint 
 Cyr, and allowed by all authorities to be suffi- 
 cient, served as the basis for the framework of 
 regiments. In order to regulate the drain upon 
 the population; and to confine the effective to 
 the limits established by the Chambers, the 
 Crown had the right of leaving temporarily an 
 indefinite numbei' of young soldiers in their 
 homes. 
 
 Although Marshal Souchet, a very competent 
 advocate, may have, in the Chamber of Peers, 
 vaunted the success of the work of 1818, the 
 institution of the veterans was strongly, but 
 not argumentatively, defended by Saint Cyr : 
 it was also vindicated, but not warmly, in 
 » Decrees of 1776, 1791, and law of 1792. 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 149 
 
 the Chamber of Deputies by the left. The im- 
 portance of the reserve seemed greatly di- 
 minished as soon as it no longer included the 
 soldiers who had served through the last great 
 wars : and this time had arrived. This circum- 
 stance, on the contrary, obtained fresh partisans 
 for Clause I Y. ; the veterans vrere much esteemeed 
 by M. de la Bourdonnaye, since their ranks no 
 longer contained "those who had not always 
 fought under the stainless banner." The true 
 heat of the debate was brought to bear upon the 
 amendments. The right showed the greatest 
 animositv to Clause YI. of the law of 1818, rela- 
 tive to promotion, which it declared to be op- 
 posed to the charter, and which was lukewarmly 
 defended by the ministry by a plea in bar. The 
 right of primogeniture became also mixed up 
 with recruiting in the most singular manner. 
 The theories of the speakers of the right, and 
 the attitude of the government, gave a fine open- 
 ing to the trenchant sentences of M. Casimir 
 Perier and to the manly eloquence of Greneral 
 
150 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANGE. 
 
 Foy. The amendments were rejected, and the 
 law was passed. It was enforced without diffi- 
 culty until replaced by a new enactment in 1832. 
 The attitude of Europe, and the general feel- 
 ing in France, forced the government of July to 
 give serious attention to military affairs. The 
 necessity was apparent of organising our forces 
 with a due regard to the chances of a war which 
 might become general, and to the progress of 
 the constitutional education of the country. The 
 first question to examine was that of recruiting. 
 Since the latter end of 1830, the subject was in 
 the hands of a commission, presided over by the 
 conqueror of Fleurus, Jourdan, who was at the 
 same time the originator of the first law of the 
 conscription, the celebrated one of the year VI. 
 The scheme prepared in this assembly, and re- 
 modelled by the Council of State, was laid on the 
 table of the Chamber of Deputies by Marshal 
 Soult, in the month of August of the following 
 year. The law of 1818 was taken as a basis; 
 all that was not germane to the matter was first 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 151 
 
 expunged, among other things the famous Clause 
 YI., relative to promotion : the army, however, 
 did not lose the guarantees so wisely and ably 
 assured by Saint Cyr : they were preserved and 
 developed under a new enactment, and com- 
 pleted by arrangements which prevented arbi- 
 trary degradations, and made rank a proprietary 
 right. This legislation has given to France the 
 body of officers which she now possesses ; it is 
 its highest eulogium. The idea of fixing, by an 
 organic act, the relative peace or war effective 
 was renounced, thus leaving to temporary mea- 
 sures the care of determining the number, ne- 
 cessarily as variable as the data which regulated 
 it. The right of voting the annual contingent 
 was left to the Chambers. A system of assess- 
 ment, based not only on the total population, 
 but on the number of youths aged twenty who 
 were entered in the census — the definition of the 
 conditions of nationality requisite for admission 
 into the army — a few modifications in the councils 
 of revision — restrictions as to the right of exemp- 
 
152 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. ' 
 
 tion — stricter conditions laid down in regard to 
 substitutes, and the creation of regimental schools 
 — such were the new propositions which were 
 carried, either without difficulty, or giving rise 
 only to the requisite discussions. 
 
 The knotty point of the question was the 
 duration of service and the formation of the re- 
 serve. The subject was treated from every point 
 of view ; the most contradictory theories were 
 advanced. A weak contingent and long service; 
 a heavy contingent and short service ; a fixed or 
 variable reserve, formed from a single element 
 or from several elements destined to work 
 through the army (" serrer sur I'armee ") as 
 General Foy said, or separated with its indi- 
 vidual staff ; all these systems were brought for- 
 ward under the form of amendments, and were 
 the occasion of long and interesting debates, as 
 free from the political rancour of the day as 
 human nature will allow. The reader may find 
 in the " Moniteur " the details of these various 
 combinations, of which several have been repro- 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 153 
 
 duced in these latter days as novelties. Among 
 the oratoi^ whose ideas were not accepted, the 
 one who expressed his opinions with the greatest 
 force, and brought to bear the most correct cal- 
 culations, was Greneral d'Ambrugeac, the moiith- 
 piece, it may be said, in this case, of some of the 
 highest authorities in the army. He asked for a 
 fixed contingent of 60,000 men, all to be brought 
 under the colours, retained for five years on ser- 
 vice, then to be kept five years on the strength 
 of their corps, but being allowed to remain 
 during the latter period in their homes, for the 
 purpose of forming a regimental reserve, and 
 finally to receive their discharge at the end of 
 ten years. This scheme, of which we have given 
 the principal heads, inasmuch as it was the best 
 digested, the most methodical, and practical of 
 all those which owed their origin to a single in- 
 dividual, laboured under the disadvantage of 
 aggravating the hardships of the lottery system, 
 and of confining the army to too narrow a circle. 
 It failed in elasticity, and it robbed the legisla- 
 
154 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 tive power of one of its essential prerogatives. 
 The government had in the first place' proposed 
 for the contingent five years of actual service 
 and two of reserve. The discussion brought to 
 light the demerits of this too absolute division. 
 There is, in fact, between peace and war an in- 
 termediate state where, without wishing to have 
 recourse to a call upon the reserve, always some- 
 what sensational even when effected by a simple 
 decree, it may be desirable that the ranks of the 
 army be not composed of very young soldiers. 
 Besides which, it was necessary to bear in mind 
 that in a purely military point of view the legal 
 duration of service was nominal. The first year 
 being almost entirely taken up by the lotteries 
 and their revision ; by the formation and the 
 march of detachments ; by the embodying and 
 equipment of the men, and the commencement 
 of their instruction ; it is only after eighteen 
 months of legal service that, under ordinary cir- 
 cumstances, the infantry soldier can "join his 
 battalion," that is to say, commence his real 
 
TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 155 
 
 novitiate, and the soldier of any special branch 
 of the service is kept back even longer. These 
 considerations decided the commission of the 
 Chamber of Deputies to propose, by the mouth 
 of their leader, M. Passy, who united military 
 experience to the science of the political econo- 
 mist, and to the views of a statesman, a modified 
 system, which was supported by the ministry 
 and adopted by the Assembly. The duration of 
 service was fixed at seven years ; every man 
 called upon by law to form the annual contingent 
 was to be embodied ; the executive power had 
 the right of fixing the average of those who, 
 according to the order of their numbers, were to 
 be left at home, or who, according to the order of 
 their class, were to receive provisional leave. 
 These two categories formed the reserve, which 
 a royal ordinance could at all times call out, and 
 which the minister of war had the right of 
 bringing together and drilling. 
 
 It seems difficult to find organic arrangements 
 which would be at the same time more elastic 
 
156 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 and more efBcacious — which would better mark 
 the line between the prerogatives of the legis- 
 lature and those of the executive power — which 
 would raise military esprit and instruction to a 
 more just standard without enforcing the necessity 
 of "disciplining the country"- — which would, in 
 fact, place the youth of France more completely 
 in the hands of the state, while at the same time 
 allowing full latitude to retrench useless charges 
 to the treasury and to the people. The authority 
 of the legislative power is assured by the annual 
 vote for the contingent and for providing funds 
 for the war minister, and the executive power 
 has-a sufficient liberty of action in the privilege 
 of transferring men from actual service to the 
 reserve, and vice versd, without encountering 
 the embarrassments of a too decided classifica- 
 tion. To fix the annual contingent the Chambers 
 recognized no other limit than their own judg- 
 ment, and the number of citizens who attained 
 to the age of twenty without being physically 
 incapacitated, a number which no human power 
 
TSE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 157 
 
 is capable of changing,* while the government, 
 restrained only by the laws of finance and the 
 constitutional responsibility under which it 
 rested, disposed of seven entire contingents. It 
 was thought, in 1832, that with this legislation, 
 levies of 80,000 men and voluntary enlistments 
 would be sufficient to give a war strength of 
 500,000 men, and experience has proved that 
 this calculation was just.f It has since been 
 
 * A certain augmentation of this figure might, however, be 
 obtained by the adoption of the system of breech-loading, -which 
 would allow the standard of height in the service to be lowered. 
 " The departments where the standard is lowest," said General 
 Lamarque, in 1832, " are those in which there are the fewest 
 men rejected." And while upon this subject, may we not look 
 forward to the day when the show height required in certain 
 corps may be abandoned ? For artillery there are manoeuvres 
 where strength is required, for the engineers exceptional duties ; 
 for heavy and medium cavalry the weight of men, as well as that 
 of horses, augments the force of the shock ; but the Military 
 Train, the Hospital Corps, and Light Cavalry, especially, if it is 
 to be augmented, how long wiU it be so trammelled that we musi 
 place upon our httle horses men whose stature alone constitutes 
 a crushing weight ? 
 
 t The government of 1848, moderate in its acts but sometimes 
 warm in its language, thought it necessary to make a certain 
 outcry at the state of weakness in which it found the army ; and 
 yet, however, without disarranging the " cadres," without any 
 
158 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 necessary to increase the levies to 100,000, and 
 even to 140,000 men ; the law of 1832 has 
 rendered this possible ; it gives the means of 
 still further raising them until the utter ex- 
 haustion of what a woodman would call the 
 " possibility " of the nation.* 
 
 If the soldiers left at, or sent home on pro- 
 visional furlough were neither brought together 
 nor drilled, this state of the reserve was not, as 
 we have just seen, the result of a deficiency in 
 the legislation ; it was merely a question of 
 cadres. Marshal Soult applied his great intel- 
 lect and his power of application to the solution 
 
 new law, by merely working the present institutions, and by the 
 employment of the resources delegated to it by the monarchy of 
 July, by means of an expenditure of money inevitable in such a 
 case, it was enabled in three months to bring up the army from 
 a peace to a war-footing; and to raise the effective strength to a 
 total of 502,000 men : which would have given 340,000 combatants 
 on the frontiers. 
 
 * Continental foresters call " possibility" of a forest (or large 
 cover) the extreme limit to which felliag may be carried without 
 damaging the undergrowth of the copse and the general condition 
 of the wood. 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANOE. 159 
 
 of this problem : he wished to compose the 
 reserve exclusively of military men who had 
 served. In order that they might receive in 
 their regiments sufficient instruction, and be 
 afterwards disposed of within a reasonable time, 
 he wished the duration of service to be extended 
 to eight years, and he calculated on taking the 
 officers from the third battalions of our hundred 
 regiments for the purpose of devoting them to 
 the command of the reserve force. To this 
 general plan he added some excellent measures 
 against the abuse of the privilege of substitutes, 
 measures which unhappily disappeared in the 
 shipwreck of the proposed scheme. The failure 
 of this plan does not reflect on the wisdom of the 
 idea which inspired it. Without depriving the 
 reserve of its real character, which is to form 
 the complement of the army, its importance, and 
 efficacy can, and ought to be, above all at the 
 present time, augmented even while perhaps 
 reducing the restrictions which, multiplied by 
 the progressive increase of the calls for service. 
 
160 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OP FRANCE. 
 
 are injurious to the development of public 
 wealth, and which contribute to the painful 
 stagnation of the population.* The following 
 are the reasons which, after four years of debate 
 and numerous changes, caused the propositions 
 of the war minister to end in one of those silent 
 miscarriages of which representative govern- 
 ments have the secret. 
 
 The Chambers found the advantages of the 
 system insufficient to warrant an aggravation 
 of the burden of recruiting and the overthrow of 
 a law to which the country was habituated ; the 
 prolongation of the length of service was therefore 
 rejected, and this destroyed the general economy 
 of the plan ; hence other arrangements lost their 
 importance, and, besides, it was discovered that 
 it would lead to considerable expense and serious 
 practical difficulties. It would be necessary to 
 
 * In the remarkable article of M. A. Cochut upon " Le Problems 
 de I'Armee," published in the "E^vue des Deux Mondes" of 
 February 1st, 1867. It throws a light particularly on this side 
 of the question ; which is also, in other respects, so completely 
 and so cleverly treated by the author of this work. 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 161 
 
 remodel the regiments, to change their idio- 
 syncrasies ; and there is nothing which should 
 be approached with greater prudence or reso- 
 lution. We do not allude to ephemeral dis- 
 contents which may be overcome by patriotic 
 feeling ; but we cannot afford to neglect financial 
 economy ; the regard due to position honourably, 
 often gloriously, acquired ; finally, and above all, 
 the essential condition of a good service must be 
 that the transition from a peace to a war footing 
 can be made without necessitating the creation 
 of new corps ; but to hope that it can be effected 
 without increasing the cadres is to dream of an 
 Utopia of which experience points out the 
 danger. To maintain during peace a dispro- 
 portionate quantity of officers — to keep them 
 stationary or to devote them incessantly to the 
 instruction of men who are continually leaving 
 them, is to lay the foundation of future diffi- 
 culties. Inasmuch as illusions produced by 
 deceptive effective strength are more fatal than 
 actual weakness in the effective, so a prepon- 
 
 M 
 
162 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 derance of officers disgusted or unused to com- 
 mand would be found more inefficient than a too 
 limited number. In 1841 France possessed a 
 good army ; the reserve was imperfect, but it 
 existed, it was attainable, and while still under dis- 
 cussion it was re-embodied. To guarantee in 
 the future the rudiments of instruction, was it 
 necessary, without relieving the country, to 
 weaken our military establishment ? It is abso- 
 lutely the antithesis to that which was done by 
 the Prussian government. During the four years 
 which preceded the last campaign it fortified the 
 army of the line at the expense of the land- 
 wehr. 
 
 The warlike organization of the most for- 
 midable of the Grermanic powers was not 
 then, any more than it is at this time an 
 impenetrable mystery; all its details were 
 known, often discussed in the Chambers, studied 
 at Ham as at the Tuileries. We could cite ' an 
 unedited memoir — unfortunately unfinished — 
 the fruit of personal observation and deep study. 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 163 
 
 inspired, not bj the love of conquest or the 
 hatred of foreign nations, but by a patriotism as 
 enthusiastic, as far-seeing, and by a feeling of 
 great responsibility ; the work of a searching 
 xnind, free from prejudice, a mind which would 
 have experienced but little surprise at the battle 
 of Sadowa. To insure the " defence of France," 
 the object of this work, the author above all 
 relied on the army given to us by the laws of 
 Saint Cyr, and improved in 1832 — an army 
 brave, united, active, disinterested, sober, intel- 
 ligent, and national; proved in wars which. had 
 exercised the happiest influence upon the com- 
 position of our staff and the officers generally, 
 as well as on the temperament of our regiments. 
 It was necessary, however, in case of a grand 
 struggle, to give to our army entire liberty of 
 action, and to assist it if necessary. For this ex- 
 treme case France herself possessed an institution 
 peculiar to her, and which recalled many glorious 
 souvenirs, la Grarde Nationale Mobile. The law 
 of the 22nd March, 1831, provided for the 
 
164 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANOE. 
 
 creation of the *' detached corps of the National 
 Gruard." All citizens aged from twenty to 
 thirty years could be called out on this service 
 according to their age, and by a series of cate- 
 gories which included successively bachelors, 
 widowers without children, married men with- 
 out children, widowers with children, and mar- 
 ried men with children. The detached corps 
 were only called out in virtue of a law or of a 
 royal ordinance converted into 'a law at the 
 next session, and the length of service was fixed 
 at one year. They were not specially retained 
 within the frontier. Any man belonging to 
 these corps had to be assimilated to the soldiers 
 of the line as regards pay, forage, and dis- 
 cipline. The ranks of non-commissioned officers, 
 ensigns, and lieutenants were given by election ; 
 all others were left to the selection of the king, 
 who could nominate them either from military 
 men on service, on half-pay, or from the National 
 Guard. We can understand what facilities 
 were afforded by this law for the regular forma- 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 165 
 
 tion of battalions of volunteers to insure the 
 defence of our coasts and fortresses, to protect 
 the flanks and rear of the army, and, finally, to 
 support it under reverses if fortune should be 
 faithless to us; but the digest of the articles 
 was affected by the baste with which they had 
 been compiled and voted under the pressure 
 of urgent circumstances. We must also allow 
 for a feeling shared by both Chambers. Several 
 peers and deputies remembered the outbreak of 
 the revolution ; many had been spectators of the 
 fall of the Empire ; all wished to prevent a 
 recurrence of the error which, in 1792, had 
 placed in the front rank a medley of National 
 Gruards and soldiers, and they wished to steel 
 the nation against the dangerous fascination of 
 the policy of Napoleon. Hence a certain pre- 
 disposition against placing " in the power of the 
 government a second conscription ;" hence a 
 series of precautions which in the event of a 
 pressing call would have raised obstacles to 
 the formation of detached corps, or would have 
 
166 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 led to their dissolution — perhaps at an inoppor- 
 tune moment. A better law might have been 
 passed ; but, such as it was, it distinctly laid 
 down the obligation imposed upon citizens. . 
 Without undertaking to meet all contingencies, 
 it regulated essential points, the formation of 
 cadres, and discipline, with a praiseworthy 
 firmness and a just confidence in the executive 
 power. 
 
 We do not require to recal the several mea- 
 sures taken successively by the government of 
 July to complete the provision for the defence of 
 France. The number of our infantry regiments 
 carried up to a figure which permits the fullest 
 development of their war strength ; the creation 
 of the Chasseurs a pied, and the improvement 
 in the arms and the fortifications raised around 
 Paris, Lyons, and other points, which the inva- 
 sion of 1814 found so cruelly unprotected. 
 Foreign nations were not unobservant of the 
 progress accomplished so unostentatiously. Duly 
 appreciated out of France, our military institu- 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FEANOE. 167 
 
 tions filled a role whicb. was not without gran- 
 deur, and by the respect Avhich they inspired, 
 contributed to avert from Europe the scourge of 
 war. The opinions of 1813 and 1815 were 
 still dormant in many foreign courts, but neither 
 when our army so proudly assured the indepen- 
 dence of Belgium, nor at the crisis of 1840 did 
 those feelings, inimical to France, lead to any 
 serious result. In 1831, Marshal Maison, then 
 ambassador of King Louis Philippe, was talking 
 with the heir of a great monarchy ; the conver- 
 sation, although very courteous, was, however, 
 interspersed with political allusions. In quit- 
 ting his interlocutor, the Prince said, in a semi- 
 ironical tone, "Ah, Marshal! what shall we see 
 in Europe in the next few years ?" " What we 
 have seen during the last few months, sir," 
 bluntly replied the old soldier ; " many bad 
 intentions but no action." 
 
CHAPTER Y. 
 
 It only remains for us to indicate summarily 
 the modifications carried out since 1848 in our 
 military institutions. The republican period, 
 being able only to sketch out projects, need not 
 delay us. We have, however, arrived at more 
 positive results since 1852. 
 
 The initiative taken by the head of the state 
 has led to the introduction of great improve- 
 ments in artillery materiel, of which the end is 
 not yet come. When we shall have attained to 
 the combination of light guns of a long range 
 and great precision, with the use of pieces calcu- 
 lated to produce crushing effects, the importance 
 of artillery, always increasing, will become still 
 
THE MILITAUY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 169' 
 
 more considerable, and the proportion of this 
 arm of the service will doubtless be augmented. 
 The infantry, that queen of battles, has been 
 increased in the number of its battalions of 
 Chasseurs a pied, regiments of Zouaves and 
 Algerian tiralleurs. The dehcate transforma- 
 tion in its armament seems to point to necessary 
 qhanges in its ordonnance, and will necessitate 
 new methods of transport to keep up the supply 
 of ammunition. 
 
 The attention due to the subject of reserve 
 forces will also bear strongly upon infantry 
 organization. Individual instruction and cavalry 
 remounts have been the objects of special care. 
 Many writers of the present day depreciate the 
 value of cavalry, and look upon it as doomed by 
 rifled cannon and the needle-gun. The utmost 
 they will accord it is but to play a secondary 
 part. While allowing here that many changes 
 are possible, we do not share this opinion. The 
 war in America, which advocates of improvised 
 armies quote too often in support of their 
 
170 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 thesis (for the United States was not entirely 
 without military institutions, and the struggle, 
 colossal though it were, was a civil war, sus- 
 tained on both sides by troops which, at the 
 outset, had the same faults of organization) — 
 the war in America shows some interesting ex- 
 amples of the new employment of large bodies 
 of cavalry. The movements of Stuart, and, 
 above all, of Sheridan, deserve to be studied. 
 In this respect also the campaign in Germany has 
 not been without its lesson. On the evening of 
 Sadowa the attitude of the Austrian cavalry 
 diminished the extent of the disaster ; and in 
 the encounter of regiments or brigades, where 
 courage was equal, the weight of men and 
 horses decided the success. "We were, therefore, 
 gratified on reading a recent decree, which, 
 while augmenting cavalry regiments of reserve, 
 reassured us as to the fate of our illustrious 
 cuirassiers, more ill-used lately by the press 
 than even on the battle-fields of Eylau or Boro- 
 dino. In spite of the novelty of " considerants," 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 171 
 
 which led to the creation of a troop on account 
 of the existence of its officers, those who still 
 believe in the Furia francese have applauded the 
 ^ result. It can scarcely be doubted that many 
 questions of the first importance occupy at this 
 moment the attention of the chiefs of our army, 
 and that, without falling into the dogmatical 
 errors into which Louvois allowed himself to be 
 dragged, or which so often has made the Aulic 
 Council of Vienna take a false line, they will 
 know how to imitate the care with which the 
 German nation prepared to bring into action all 
 its military power. We cannot reflect without 
 anxiety upon the means which must have been ' 
 necessary to maintain and put in motion these 
 immense armies, which seem a feature of the 
 times. The study of the use of railways, and of 
 all modes of communication ; of roads parallel 
 or perpendicular to our frontiers, should keep 
 pace with a new arrangement of magazines, 
 workshops, and depots, which would thus allow 
 each part of France to furnish, and to transport 
 
172 THE MILITABT INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 everywhere, its contingent in men, resources, 
 and materiel of every description. 
 
 Three reforms of a peculiarly organic cha- 
 racter have been accomplished under the present 
 government. Clause YI. of the Law of 1831, 
 relative to detached corps of the National 
 Guard, has been abolished in a formal manner 
 by the decree of the 11th of January, 1852 ;* 
 and the dispositions of this last Act, which 
 were not inspired by the spirit of former Legis- 
 latures, did not indicate any retrogressive move- 
 ment. During sixteen years there has not 
 existed in Prance any legal mode of convoking 
 or of organizing the " Garde Nationale Mobile." 
 Citizens who, during this period, satisfied the 
 Recruiting Law, and who at the present time 
 have passed the age of twenty, may consider 
 themselves free from the obligations imposed 
 
 * The Law of the 13th of June, 1851, relative to the National 
 Guard, said that a special law would be presented on the subject 
 of detached corps, but it strictly maintained the 6th Clause of the 
 Law of 1831, until the promulgation of a new measure on the 
 matter. 
 
THE MILITABT INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 173 
 
 upon them by the Law of 1831. A new com- 
 bination is talked of, destined to supply this 
 constitutional want. Doubtless it will be 
 stamped in some sort with a retrospective cha- 
 racter, for it professes to legislate as much for 
 present as future wants. All the measures taken 
 at the present time on the subject of recruiting, 
 or of the reserve, cannot fully take effect under 
 several years ; and if we may always calculate, 
 in case of danger, on the enthusiasm of the 
 nation, experience has proved the utility of 
 being able to direct this movement, and of being 
 in a position to perfect its result. 
 
 The Imperial Guard was re-established in 
 1854, in its proportion, its organization, and 
 even in the present day, in some of its details of 
 costume, recalling the Eoyal Guard of Charles X. 
 We have noticed the part played by the corps 
 d' elite in the history of our war institutions ; 
 we need not recur to it. 
 
 An opinion had often been expressed that 
 infantry required a reserve in action similar to 
 
17i THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANCE. 
 
 what the cavalry already possessed in the cuiras- 
 siers. If this want existed, which is not nniver- 
 sally admitted, perhaps it might have been 
 supplied in a manner less costly and more in 
 accordance with the general character of our 
 civil and military organization. Besides, by a 
 singular coincidence, on the day of Magenta, 
 which covered the division of grenadiers and its 
 leaders with so much glory, it was not exactly as 
 a reserve that these fine and steady troops were 
 engaged. The Imperial Gruard is worthy, on 
 every point, of taking the right of the French 
 army, and we are assured that nothing is 
 neglected to crush out the spirit of privilege ; but 
 it is difficult to entirely exclude it ; it is shown 
 even in certain details, in the habits of the offi- 
 cers, and the obligations which are imposed upon 
 them. Let us also call to mind that in a discus- 
 sion so comprehensive as that of 1832, in which 
 some of the first generals of the Republic, such 
 as Moncey and Jourdan, took part in, or were 
 present at, as well as many of Napoleon's most 
 
THE MILITAHY institutions of FRANCE. 175 
 
 illustrious lieutenants, Soult, Macdonald, Mor- 
 tier, Oudinot, Molitor; tte heroes of the final 
 imperial struggles, Glerard, Maison, Lobau, 
 .Clauzel; and men who were recognized authori- 
 ties in matters of organization, such as Matthieu 
 Dumas, Ambrugeac, or Preval, not one voice 
 was raised in favour of the re-establifehment of a 
 large corps d^ elite — of an army within an army. 
 
 Finally, the Law of 2t!th April, 1855, gave 
 exoneration instead of substitution, and put go- 
 vernment in the place of the former insurance 
 companies. We should briefly explain the origin 
 of this transformation. In 1824 General Foy 
 uttered one of those cries which, coming from 
 a soldier's heart, and delivered with eloquence, 
 remains stamped upon all minds : " The tax of 
 blood !" This expression contains a just and 
 striking image; and all who may have any 
 voice in the destiny of our armies should repeat 
 it daily ; but, reduced to its mathematical value, 
 it has led people to conclusions which we do not 
 believe to be correct— to consider the raising of 
 
176 THE MILITABT INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 men as an enforced contribution ; to materialize 
 a moral obligation ; to consider the refractory as 
 a debtor in arrears, and the deserter as a bank- 
 rupt. It wa-s also said, " Why not pour into 
 the coffers of the State the money absorbed to- 
 day by the profits of an immoral commerce?" 
 Here would be found a resource for the treasury 
 which, at certain times, might be most precious, 
 and more than this, would be a means of aug- 
 menting the welfare of our soldiers and increas- 
 ing the number of re-enlistments. This double 
 train of ideas gives birth to the system of 
 exoneration, or rather this system is resuscitated, 
 for it had several precedents which it is useless 
 to recapitulate. Brought forward in several 
 pamphlets, it was first found in an official form 
 in a report laid upon the table of the National 
 Assembly in 1849 by General Lamorici^re. But 
 the commission of which he was the mouthpiece, 
 were aware that being brought face to face with 
 the " tax of blood," exoneration could not be 
 upheld ; that the engagements, intended to re- 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 177 
 
 lieve the mass of the population, could not be 
 monopolised for the benefit of those citizens who 
 were in the easiest circumstances, and, that 
 without violating those principles of equality, 
 which for seventy years have formed the basis 
 of all our constitutions, it would be necessary 
 to establish a sort of capitation (as this word 
 did not please " cotisation" was employed) ; to 
 impose upon every Frenchman, aged twenty, 
 the obligation, either of serving a few years or 
 of paying a sum proportionate to his fortune or 
 to that of his parents ; and there was to be no 
 exemption, except in the case of the indigent 
 infirm. These ideas, which at the least were 
 logical, did not seem practical; the discussion 
 brought to light all their inconveniences, and 
 in spite of the efforts of the general, who pos- 
 sessed as much talent and method in the Senate 
 as upon the field of battle, the proposed plan, 
 when put to a final vote, could not be carried. 
 
 At the time when the army, the fruit of the 
 legislaton of 1832, and formed in the Africa 
 
178 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANOE. \ 
 
 wars, was showing in tlie Crimea the most 
 brilliant ensemble of warlike virtues, the legis- 
 lature of 1855, going back to a part of the fore- 
 going system, established exoneration without 
 adding to it cotisation, and instituted the reserve 
 fund and re-engagement bounties. We cannot 
 but approve of all that has been done to im- 
 prove the condition of our old soldiers, to 
 facilitate the payment of pensions ; but were 
 there no other means of arriving at this object? 
 From 1793 to 1855 all who took up the subject 
 of recruiting have been unanimous in rejecting 
 bounties ; they thought, with Greneral Foy, that 
 " the unj)resuming class of non-commissioned 
 officers of the old regime was extinct in 
 France," and that there were no hopes of re- 
 viving it by factitious means. Have the results 
 obtained in the last twelve years disproved 
 this ? Substitutes were to exist no longer. At 
 this moment more than 66,000 of our soldiers 
 serve under this name, without including those 
 who, figuring among the re-enlisted, entered the 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 179 
 
 army as substitutes ; for it must not be forgotten 
 that all partisans of exoneration, wHle repro- 
 bating substitutes, often unjustly, bave always 
 calculated, to insure tbe working of tbeir 
 system, upon tbe inducement of bounties, as a 
 means of retaining in tbe ranks tbese very men 
 so severely judged. Tbe calls upon tbe nation 
 were to be decreased. Tbey bave varied from 
 100,000 to 140,000 men; tbese are barely 
 found to be sufBcient.* Finally,- and above all, 
 in tbe only year wben tbe arms of France were 
 engaged in Europe, tbe number of tbe exone- 
 rated was 42,217 against 13,713 re-engaged. 
 
 * Again, it was urged, " the army will be moralised^' We are 
 among those who believe that, as the evil did not exist, no 
 remedy was to be sought, and that the army did not require any 
 moral reform. Among the general returns of the administration 
 of military justice no trace is to be found of any amehoration 
 resulting from the Law of 1855. The reports of the condemna- 
 tions among the effective are even increased. In 1835 there was 
 1 in 80 ; ui 1846 they went down to 1 ia 123 ; in 1851 they 
 mounted to 1 in 81 ; m 1855 they decreased to 1 in 168 ; and in 
 1865 they went up to 1 in 101. The actual year when the law of 
 exoneration was passed is the one when this- report went down 
 the lowest. 
 
180 TEE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 We will not dwell upon a point of such gravity ; 
 besides we cannot add to the following lines of 
 the ' Moniteur' of 12th December, 1866 : " A 
 day may arrive when the bounty fund may 
 have plenty of money, and the country not 
 enough of soldiers." It seems unreasonable to 
 limit the right of exoneration by a second 
 lottery ; this would be " to withdraw security 
 from families without giving them freedom."* 
 As to wishing .to revive the old system without 
 giving up the new, it would be to preserve the 
 inconveniences natural to each while sacri- 
 ficing a portion of their advantages. Is it not 
 time to go back to 1832 to consider military 
 service as a duty and not as a tax — substitution 
 as an indulgence and not a right ? To delay too 
 long to put an end to " an honest experience,"! 
 although unfortunate cannot be without dan- 
 
 * Eeport presented to the legislative body by M. de Belleyme, 
 1855. 
 
 t Speech of the Govemment Commissioner in the discussion 
 upon the contingent Law of 1861. Let us add, that the Law of 
 1855 has been repealed since the above was written. 
 
THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FBANCE. 181 
 
 ger, for we must not allow prejudices to become 
 inveterate. " The custom of exonerations from 
 military service by paying money is a custom 
 which, once allowed, may be difficult to 
 abolish."* 
 
 We have now arrived at the end of this long 
 treatise ; we have no conclusion to form — no 
 project to ventilate ; and we are ignorant of the 
 one which is being prepared in the high places 
 of the State. When the honour, the grandeur, 
 and the integrity of France are in question, we 
 are convinced that no one will think of an 
 evanescent popularity, or a successful opposition. 
 It would have been preferable if this species of 
 revision of our war establishment had been 
 accomplished at another time, after Solferino, 
 for instance, rather than after Sadowa ; but the 
 question having been mooted, the problem must 
 be worked out. If the reader shares our opinion, 
 he will believe that France is not as destitute 
 
 * Preamble of a projected law brought forward in 1850 by 
 General Hautpoul, Minister of War. 
 
182 THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE. 
 
 of military institutions as we have been led to 
 suppose ; what is principally needed is to restore 
 or preserve their entirety, unity, efficacy, and, 
 if we touch upon another point, to develop their 
 manhood in a national sense, by placing them 
 under the segis of liberty. The lessons of the 
 past need not be thrown away. The grand 
 creation of Louvois would have only been a 
 benefit to France, if the power of Louis XIV. 
 had been placed under a curb. Carnot deserves 
 praise for having roughly amalgamated the 
 National Guards and soldiers in one single 
 army ; but the improvidence which would 
 force a government to have recourse in the 
 present day to a similar measure would be in- 
 excusable. The Senate of 1813 cannot be blamed 
 for having sent " cohortes " into Saxony, since 
 it was in Saxony that the country then required 
 to be defended ; Napoleon, however, should have 
 been prevented from going to Madrid or to 
 Moscow. 
 
 Liberty doubles the power of military insti- 
 
THE MILITABY IXSTITVTIONS OF FBANCE. 183 
 
 tutions ; it regulates and moderates their use ; 
 it has nothing to fear from them so long as 
 the people do not abdicate their rights ; its 
 guarantee is in the strength of opinion, not in 
 the weakness of the military system. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 LONDON' : PRINTED ET W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET 
 AND CHARING CROSS,