Mliilii^iia 7F 1^14 CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY FROM The 'Esta.te of preserved Smith LJAIK :Uue t\..3nL£LMM L, MAR^ W^f^ ^ _„j»r— ---'*---■— rif'i r> V\ — j»^^^ m wr& M-JT a,«s»3^=- WJ^^ Jiu-i* ^1313 • • '-*«*«»* mtihl^'' ^"™*"' ^^^S^SS^I^^ W^ ■ f JF223 .L9ri9l4""'""'>' '"""''^ olin 3 1924 032 635 009 Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924032635009 AMERICAN CITIZEN SERIES EDITED BY ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, LL.D. PUBLIC OPINION AND POPULAR GOVERNMENT A. LAWRENCE LOWELL AMERICAN CITIZEN SERIES Edited by Albert Bushnell Hart, LL.D. Outline of Practical Sociology; with Special Reference to American Conditions. By Carroll D. Wright, President of Clark College. With Maps and Diagrams. Crown 8vo. Actual Government as Applied under American Conditions. By Albert Bushnell Hart, LL.D., Eaton Professor of the Science of Government in Harvard University. With 6 Colored Maps and ii other Illustrations and Diagrams. Crown 8vo. Financial History of the United States. By Davis R. Dewey, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Eco- nomics and Statistics in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. With Diagrams. Crown 8vo. Constitutional Law in the United States. By Emltn McClain, LL.D., sometime Lecturer on Consti- tutional Law at the State University of Iowa. Crown 8vo. Principles of Economics; with Special Reference to American Conditions. By Edwin R. A. Seligman, Ph.D., LL.D., McVickar Professor of Political Economy in Columbia University. With 6 Colored and 22 other Diagrams. Crown 8vo. Organized Democracy; An Introduction to the Study of American Politics. By Frederick A. Cleveland, Ph.D., LL.D. Crown 8vo. Public Opinion and Popular Government. By A. Lawrence Lowell. President of Harvard Uni- versity. Crown 8vo. LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO.: NEW YORK ametican Citifen ^erieiS Public Opinion and Popular Government BY A. LAWRENCE LOWELL PRESIDENT OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY NEW EDITION LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO, FOTJKTH AVENUE & 30TH STREET, NEW YORK LONDON, BOMBAY. AND CALCUTTA 1914 /\7^) ^^ Two laws based upon initiative were enacted by the legislature and ratified at the referendum. §88] Results of Initiative in Switzerland 201 In Schwyz the only initiative was a proposal for a total revision of the constitution which was accepted by a light vote; but the constitution so framed was rejected by more than two to one at the largest popular vote polled in the canton on any measure. In St. Gall three measures were so proposed, of which one was adopted. It reduced the rate of interest on mortgages to four per cent., but three years later a law restoring the rate to four and a half per cent, was ratified at the referendum. Curiously enough, in a couple of cantons that make little use of the referen- dum the initiative has been comparatively frequent. Geneva, which has used the referendum only on ten measures in more than thirty years, voted on initiatives six times, and in two cases with success. One forbade a man to hold certain public offices at the same time; and the other provided for the election of judges by the people. In Basle City, where the referendum has not been used at all, the initiative has been set in operation twelve times and has been successful in two instances; one of which provided that the legislature should be chosen by proportional representation, and the other that non- residents should be charged tuition fees in the schools. In none of the other cantons has any attempt been made to use the initiative. 88. Tendencies in Switzerland An examination of the list shows that, except for the federal act on the slaughtering of cattle, there is nothing very peculiar about any of the laws enacted by this process. People may well differ about their 202 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 88 wisdom, as about that of any legislation, but they were certainly not eccentric. The election of the executive council in Aargau, and of the judges in Geneva, by the people does not strike Americans as extraordinary; and, on the other hand, a study of the tables in Appendix A will prove that the really radical, imusual, or doctrinaire proposals were rejected by overwhelming majorities. A declaration, for exam- ple, of the duty of the state to furnish laborers with work was defeated in the Confederation by nearly four to one; a proposal in Geneva for the separation of church and state and for old age pensions was rejected by more than two to one (although when later separated the first part of this measure was ratified on a referendum), and an initiative in the same canton for compulsory mutual fire insur- ance was defeated more than four to one. Even proportional representation, although on the whole becoming more and more popular, has been rejected a number of times, and was accepted in Basle City only by a vote of 5,290 to 5,280. In short, the Swiss have shown themselves in the use of this instrument, as in that of the referendum, an eminently conservative people. • The most notable fact about Swiss experience with the initiative is the small amount of legislation it has produced. Even the attempts to use it have not been very frequent. The total output of federal legislation from that source in a score of years has been two measures, or one in ten years. In the cantons the result has been smaller still. In the eighteen, or in some cases twenty, years § 89] Results of Initiative in America 203 covered by the tables only fifteen measures have been enacted in this way by all the eighteen cantons that possess the procedure, or an average of less than one measure per canton in twenty years; while in Bern, the most prolific of them all, the average is only one measure in five years. The Swiss people certainly do not appear to crave any considerable amoimt of legislation which their rep- resentatives are unwilling to enact. This is the more striking because in strong contrast with the experience of the American states, where the initia- tive has been used more freely than the referendum. 89. Results of the Initiative in America Although the initiative was adopted in South Dakota in 1898, it was not used in any state until 1904, when it was put into operation by Oregon, which has, indeed, applied it more frequently and with greater positive results than all the other states that possess it put together.^ Apart from constitutional amendments passed by the legislature and submitted as of course to the people, Oregon has had, through 1912, popular votes by referendum on eleven laws or appropriations, six of them being rejected. But by initiative twenty-eight constitu- tional amendments have been proposed, of which sixteen were adopted by the people; and forty-eight other laws, of which seventeen have been accepted ' All the states, except New Mexico, that have the general refer- endum have also the initiative, at least for ordinary laws. Nevada, however, adopted the former in 1904, but did not adopt the initiative until 1912. In Michigan the legislature has power to refer laws to the people, and there is an initiative for constitutional amendments. 204 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 89 in this way. The number of measures so proposed has increased steadily, but at the last four biennial elections the number adopted has remained nearly constant.^ Truly the output is not meagre. In Oregon alone it is now four times as rapid as in the Confederation and all the cantons of Switzerland added together. In Colorado the institution, for the single year in which it has been in operation, has been equally prolific; for in 1912 twenty meas- ures were proposed by that means and eight of them adopted. With such a number of laws enacted by petition and popular vote, the advocates of direct legislation are certainly right in believing that, if the votes express the real opinions of the people, the representatives in these two states are out of touch with their constituents; and if this is a permanent condition, representative democracy there has not been highly successful. The other states have found the initiative less productive. In Maine, where it has existed several years, only one measure has been proposed and that was adopted. In Missouri six measures, all constitutional amendments, have been proposed, and all of them were heavily defeated. In Montana it was not used until 1912, when four acts were proposed and accepted by large majorities. In Oklahoma ten measures have been proposed, four ' Year Proposed 1904 2 2 1906 10 7 1908 11 8 1910 25 8 1912 28 8 One other measure proposed in 1912 was not on the ballot. §90] Laws Enacted by Initiative 205 of them being accepted; but the special election at which one of these was ratified was afterwards declared unconstitutional. It may be observed, however, that another of the measures received a majority of the votes cast thereon, but not a majority of all the votes cast at the election, which is required by the constitution. In South Dakota only three measures have been so proposed, of which only one was accepted; and that one, although proposed by initiative, was in fact enacted by the legislature. Of the states in which the initiative did not come into operation until the election of 1912, Colorado has already been mentioned. For the rest, one measure, extending the suffrage to women, was proposed and adopted in Arizona. In Arkansas, on the other hand, six measures were proposed and three adopted. In California three were proposed and rejected; while New Mexico made no use of the institution. 90. Nature of the Laws Enacted by Initiative The people of those American states which have established direct legislation have certainly been more attracted by the initiative than by the refer- endum, for they have used it more frequently. An examination of the various measures enacted thereby will throw light upon the working of the institution. Many of them have been of a purely political character; that is, they have dealt with the structure and powers of the state government or the forms of procedure. Twenty-two of the fifty-five so carried, or about two fifths, fell within that category. They 206 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 90 related to such matters as the method of amend- ing the constitution, direct nominations, length of legislative sessions, recall of public officers and of judicial decisions, ballots at elections, expenditures by candidates, proportional representation, woman suffrage, and disfranchisement of negroes. Nearly a score more concerned other public affairs, such as civil service reform, judicial procedure, aid for schools, the limit of debt for roads, state printing, state institutions, the employment of convicts, free passes on railroads for members of the legislature, the kinds of property to be taxed and the rates thereon. Some of the measures in Oregon dealt with specific matters, like the adoption of a particu- lar normal school by the state, and the imposing of a tax on the gross earnings of telegraph, telephone, and sleeping car companies. Other successful uses of the initiative related to local government. Of this nature were laws establishing local option in the sale of liquor, giving to cities power to create their own organization, providing for the referendum and initiative therein, regulating their debts, and in one case in Oregon creating a new county by special act. Only nine of the laws adopted in this way con- cerned directly the conduct of private persons. Three of them regulated the taking of fish; three related to the hours of labor in public work, in mines, and of women; one to the liability of employers for accidents; one fixed freight rates; and another was a mothers compensation act. Of these nine, six were adopted in Oregon, and the other three in Colorado. §91] Nature of Proposals Rejected 207 91. Nature of t>roposals Rejected The measures proposed and rejected are, perhaps, not less illuminating. Passing by for a moment the fertile soil of Oregon, we find, as in the case of the laws adopted, a great preponderance of measures of a political character; the only proposals relating primarily to the conduct of private persons being a number of attempts to secure prohibition in the sale of liquor and one to license horse-racing and forbid betting. A few proposals there were upon the border line; such as the creation of commissions to regulate public service corporations, a provision for trial by jury in cases of contempt of court, and perhaps we should add the maintenance of an immigration bureau. All the rest of the measures proposed and rejected dealt with the organs of government and their functions. They related to elections, local government, public education, high ways, taxation and the like, many of the meas- ures rejected being similar to those adopted in other states. Turning now to Oregon, the greatest of labora- tories for experiments in direct legislation, we find that the laws proposed by the initiative cover a range of miscellaneous objects as wide as those which come before a state legislature. Nor, con- trary to the usual assumption, did they proceed wholly from those who advocate lawmaking by popular vote, but in no inconsiderable share from its opponents. In other words, the measures brought before the people in this way have not been 208 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 91 by any means always radical, or all in one direc- tion. Measures have been brought forward, for example, to enlarge and to restrict the operation of the referendum and the initiative. The questions of prohibition and taxation have been the subject of proposals and counter proposals seeking directly contrary ends; and so has the question of author- izing or limiting indebtedness for building roads. Some of the proposals, moreover, that have been adopted by the people, were not the radical ones. The House of Commons has been compared to an elephant's trunk which can lift a tree or pick up a pin, and the initiative in Oregon seems to emulate that versatility. One proposal involved a reconstruction of the whole state government, abolishing the Senate, introducing proportional repre- sentation into the remaining House, making the Governor and all his defeated rivals ex officio mem- bers thereof, forbidding appropriations except on the recommendation of the Governor, etc.; while no less than ten special acts were proposed to create particular new counties or change the boundaries of existing ones. Save for one measure in 1908 creat- ing a county these last proposals were rejected by overwhelming majorities. Attempts have also been made to transfer to the state a toll road and particu- lar normal schools, in the case of one of the latter with success. Other proposals which were rejected dealt with woman suffrage, the law of elections, the apportionment of state taxes, the establish- ment of an official state periodical, a state highway department, a state hotel inspector, with state §92] The Initiative and Public Opinion 209 printing, a state license for selling stocks and bonds, with the government and support of the state University and the Agricultural School, with the areas of local government, with the abolition of capital punishment, with the prohibition of boy- cotting and picketing and of meetings on pubKc land without the consent of the mayor. 92. The Initiative and Public Opinion An examination of the measures proposed by the initiative in Oregon makes it appear improbable that the public could have had a real opinion on all of them. No doubt there was a very genuine opinion on some of them which were well understood, such as woman suffrage, prohibition, and others. But this can hardly have been true of all the rest, on account of the number of questions submitted to popular vote at one time. In addition to the choice of many pubUc officers, the people were asked to vote on thirty-two different measures in 1910 and thirty-seven in 1912. Now if any candid man who is not in active politics, but takes a serious interest in public affairs, will consider on how many of the candidates for office, constitutional amendments and other questions on which he votes (quite apart from the general referendum and initiative) he has a real personal opinion formed by personal judg- ment, he will be shocked if he is not already aware of his own ignorance. In a lamentable proportion of cases he acts upon an impression, a prejudice, or upon the advice of some person or party that he trusts; and if he is as intelligent and conscientious 14 210 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 92 as the average citizen, he may assume that the other voters are mostly in the same condition as himself. But the opinion of the whole people is only the collected opinions of all the persons therein. Even assuming that every citizen reads a pamphlet of over two hundred pages, with brief arguments on both sides of a part of the questions, it is unlikely that he will form a personal judgment on all of them. The fact that he votes on them all may prove only that he follows what he believes to be a good lead; and the fact that the people discriminate, not adopt- ing or rejecting everything coming from a certain source, proves only that a fraction of the people act independently, rather than that they all have opinions of their own. Yet this is the assumption on which the initiative is based, and it becomes less accurate as the number of questions to be decided by popular vote exceeds the capacity of the ordinary busy man to decide for himself. We have seen that such questions in Oregon are far more numerous than in any of the Swiss cantons, even those with both initiative and compulsory referendum on all laws. Among the laws, moreover, proposed by initiative in Oregon there were some requiring for the formation of an intelligent opinion a familiarity with facts not of common knowledge. This is true, for example, of the question which, if any, of three competing normal schools ought to be supported by the state. Others required informa- tion about local conditions, as in the case of the eight proposals of 1910 to create new counties or change the boundaries of existing ones. The people §93] Complex Subjects and the Initiative 211 seem to have recognized this in their rejection of all the eight; but if so, the vote was an expression of opinion, not on the merits of the measures them- selves, but on the popular incompetence to decide them, and on the principle that such measures ought not to be proposed in this way. 93. Complex Subjects Presented by Initiative Then some of the measures presented by the initiative in Oregon — that on judicial procedure in 1910, for example, and those changing radically the structure of the state government in 1910 and 1912 — were very comprehensive and complex, of a nature to require profound and prolonged study. Even the advocates of direct legislation assert that the issue in the case of the constitutional pro- posal of 1910 was confused. Their organ. Equity, quotes Mr. Alfred D. Cridge to the effect that, out- side of the cities, the provision seeking to estab- lish proportional representation was not understood, and that if it had not been combined with dis- tinctly unpopular matters, and if the People's Power League has been able to place a few speakers in the field, it would have been carried by a large majority.^ The judicial procedure amendment of 1910, although not very long, contained a series of provisions about trial by jury and about the power of the Supreme Court of the state to deal with appeals in cases where verdicts have been rendered. This is a highly technical subject in which it is easy to lose one's way. One of the objects of ' Equity, January, 1911, p. 42. 212 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 93 the measure was undoubtedly to prevent the vexa- tion of a new trial where substantial justice can be done without it.^ The provision reads: "Sec. 3. In actions at law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of this State, unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict. Until otherwise provided by law, upon appeal of any case to the Supreme Court, either party may have attached to the bill of exceptions the whole testimony, the instructions of the court to the jury, and any other matter material to the decision of the appeal. If the Supreme Court shall be of opinion, after consideration of all the matters thus submitted, that the judgment of the court appealed from was such as should have been rendered in the case, such judgment shall be affirmed, notwith- standing any error committed during the trial; or if, in any respect, the judgment appealed from should be changed, and the Supreme Court shall be of opinion that it can determine what judgment should have been entered in the court below, it shall direct such judgment to be entered in the same manner and with like effect as decrees are now entered in equity cases on appeal to the Supreme Court. Provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the Supreme Court to find the defendant in a criminal case guilty of an offence for which a greater penalty is provided than 1 Official Pamphlet, 1910, p. 177. §93] Complex Subjects and the Initiative 213 that of which the accused was convicted in the lower court." One of the leaders of the Oregon Bar is of opinion that this empowers the Supreme Court of the state to enter judgment contrary to the verdict of the jury.^ In view of the first sentence of the section, forbidding reexamination of facts tried by a jury, and the last sentence, which assumes that a prisoner may be found guilty of an offence for which he was not convicted by the verdict of the jury if the penalty is not greater, the construction of the powers conferred on the Supreme Court in the body of the section appears, to a lawyer bred in another part of the country, open to doubt. Is it probable that the bulk of the voters of Oregon had an opinion on this intricate point of law; and if not, can they be said to have had an opinion in favor of investing the Supreme Court with powers that they did not understand.'' No doubt they had an opinion upon another section which provides for verdicts in civil cases by three quarters of the jury; but the question what the court shall do when the verdict is incon- sistent with the testimony does not seem to have occurred even to the framers of the amendment, who were apparently thinking only of avoiding new trials on technical grounds.^ Yet whatever the provision may mean, it obviously goes farther than this. The object of the initiative being to form and '■ Address of Frederick V. Holman, President of the Oregon Bar Association, at its meeting, November 15, 1910, p. 39 et seq. ' See their argument in the Officiai Pamphlet, 1910, p. 177. 214 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 94 elicit a real public opinion, and to separate the issues presented to the people from general party consider- ations, the questions presented ought to be simple and single; whereas under a general initiative it is possible to present a complicated measure, diflS- cult to understand, and sugar-coat it by some provision obvious and attractive at first sight. Thus in Oregon the amendment of 1910, repeal- ing the constitutional provision about equality of taxation and giving to local bodies authority to regulate taxes, contained a provision abolishing the poll tax. The amendment was adopted by 36.7 per cent, of the citizens who took part in the election, 35 per cent, voting against it, and 28.3 per cent, not voting on it at all. A change of 1023 votes would have changed the result, and there may well have been more than that number who thought of the poll tax alone. I do not for a moment wish to insinuate that the provision was inserted to make the measure more palatable, or distract attention from the main issue, but the occurrence points to a possible danger in the unrestricted use of the initiative; and it is noteworthy that a repeal of the whole of the amendment, save the abolition of the poll tax, was ratified at the next election by a popular majority of 16,731. 94. Close Votes and Public Opinion The doubts about the existence of a real public opinion arising from the closeness and small size of the vote apply, of course, to the initiative as well as the referendum. With what confidence, for § 94] Close Votes and Public Opinion 215 example, can we say that the people of Oregon did not want an income tax when at the election of 1912, 38.75 per cent, of those who went to the polls voted for it, and 38.92 voted against it. In other words, the decision was made by 0.17 per cent, of those who took part in the election, while 22.33 per cent, of those present did not vote on it, and probably as many more were absent altogether. Several cases in Colorado in the same year are even more striking. The proposal to publish an official pamphlet containing arguments on the measures to be submitted to the people was defeated by a vote of 14.30 per cent, in its favor against 14.65 per cent, against it, while 71.05 per cent, of those who took part in the election abstained from voting either way on the question. On the other hand the law to place all appointed public officers under civil service rules was adopted by 14.61 per cent, against 13.42 per cent., 72 per cent, of those present not voting; and the laws to give home rule to cities, to forbid lists of party candidates on ballots, and to make eight hours a day's labor in mines were carried by only slightly larger margins. It must be remembered that the percentages of votes on these measures are of the votes actually cast for presidential electors at the same time, so that the proportions of registered voters were smaller still. In such cases it seems an exaggera- tion to speak of the result as a real expression of public opinion. 216 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 95 96. Stability as Evidence of Opinion Persistence in the result of popular votes on a subject has an important bearing on the question of public opinion in two ways. If the people vote differently at short intervals it increases the prob- ability that in one or other of the cases the majority was due to chance, or rather to something other than a deliberate opinion on the measure presented; and if the people really change their opinions in a short time, those opinions are of the less value as a basis for legislation. The public sentiment that should rule is one which is serious, deep-rooted, and stable. Now Oregon is the only American state that has made use of direct legislation long enough to measure the stability of the vote, and the residts are not wholly reassuring. A constitutional amend- ment giving women the right to vote was brought forward and rejected with ever increasing majorities in 1906, 1908, and 1910, and was adopted by a small margin in 1912. The sale of liquor has been the subject of constant agitation. In 1908 a measure providing for local option was rejected by a sub- stantial majority. At the next election in 1910 a similar proposal was made which was said by its opponents to be "the most impudent affront to the intelligence of Oregon voters," an attempt "to foist into the Constitution in a new dress, the Reddy Bill, which was defeated at the last state election " ^ ; but it was carried. Again, it is charged from an entirely different quarter that the constitutional • Offlcicd Pamphlet, 1910, p. 78. §96] Defects of the Initiative 217 amendment on taxation proposed by initiative in 1910, and adopted, had substantially the same object as an initiative of 1908 which had been defeated by a majority of nearly two to one.^ The amendment of 1910 gave to the counties power to levy taxes in any way they pleased, and at the same time abolished the poll tax; but the next legislature passed an amendment to repeal the whole of the amendment of 1910 except the abolition of the poll tax, and this in turn the people ratified by a vote half as large again as that which had been cast against the measure adopted in 1910. A stranger cannot form an opinion of any value on the merits of these questions, but when leading citizens of the state on opposite sides allege that the people changed their mind at short intervals without adequate reason, he must admit that there is some ground for their statements. 96. Defects of the Initiative Connected with this matter of stability of laws under the initiative is that of constant repetition of the same proposal. If a popular vote expresses a real opinion, an enduring opinion, of the electorate, it ought to be accepted as final until such time as the people may reasonably be supposed to have had good ground for changing their convictions. It is hardly wise to overburden the people by enlarging the list of measures they must decide with questions needlessly repeated. When they 1 Chicago Civic Federation BuUetin, No. 3, Remarks of Frederick V. Holman, pp. 16-17. 218 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 96 are weary of the subject, it may by accident be carried by default because they think the result certain. This is quite different from the repetition of a bill in the legislature, which is bound to discuss it, at least in committee, before acting upon it. It might be well to provide that the same question shall not be proposed by initiative afresh until after a certain lapse of time. There is also some objection to constitutional amendment by the ordinary initiative. This tends to incorporate, in the constitution matters that have no proper place there. The object in resorting to it is to make the law a little more difficult to change; but if the people can be trusted, there is no sufficient reason for that. If there be any difference between constitutional and other laws, the former ought surely to require a greater degree of consideration and, therefore, a more deliberate procedure. Really fundamental institutions do not need to be changed in a hurry, and it is noteworthy that several of the states which have adopted the initiative have not applied it to constitutional questions. Another practical difficulty arises from the lack of a thorough examination of the measure proposed. There may, or there may not, be an active discussion upon it in the press or among the people; but there is no one whose business it is to study it, to criticise it, or to hear evidence upon it; and in a democracy that which is anybody's business is apt to be neglected. We have already seen how small a proportion of the measures brought forward by §97] Impossibility of Amendment 219 initiative in Oregon have been argued on both sides in the Official Pamphlet, and how many have not been argued there at all. In order to remedy this defect in the procedure some states have provided that initiated measures must first be presented to the legislature for debate and public hearing, and if that body sees fit it may submit to the people, alongside of the original proposal, an amended bill of its own. Such a provision for discussion, espe- cially if accompanied by public hearings, may be a great benefit. 97. Impossibility of Amendment The initiation of laws by private persons, instead of by public authority, has some practical incon- veniences. The proposal is framed by men who are earnestly in favor of it, and there is no chance to amend it. In some states a referendum may be demanded against part of a statute. That has, no doubt, an objectionable side, because it mutilates a plan that may be acceptable only as a whole. But in the case of the initiative nothing of the kind is permitted. The people must accept or reject as a whole what is oflfered them, no matter how much they might prefer a different measure, for the public has no control over the questions it will answer. When a measure is proposed by initiative there is no chance for compromise with those who perceive objections to some of its provisions. Compromise, as we have already remarked, connotes evil things in the popular imagination, but it is the life-blood of healthy and enduring legislation, for it is the 220 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 98 means by which the centre of gravity of pubhc opinion is found. Under the initiative there is a pecuhar danger of bad drafting of laws. The drafting of bills is none too good in our legislatures, but there the bill must at least pass two houses, and be read more or less critically by a number of people while oppor- tunity is still given to amend it. Whereas a bill framed by popular initiative practically cannot be altered after signatures have begun to be collected, in other words after it passes out of the hands of its framers and first friends; and whatever grave defects of drafting it may contain cannot be touched after the petition for a popular vote has been filed, that is, after its opponents have a chance to criticise it. The judicial procedure amendment of Oregon is an example of bad drafting that would certainly be less likely to occur if the bill had been submitted to the examination of a committee on the judiciary in the legislature. A still worse case was that of the law forbidding free passes on railroads for members of the legislature, which contained no enacting words and was therefore without effect.^ There would certainly be nothing inconsistent with the principle of the initiative in requiring all pro- posals to be submitted to a legislative draftsman for criticism and suggestion. 98. Does the Public Initiate? We speak of the initiative as a method whereby the people can propose laws, and we are inclined ' Cf. Political Science Quarterly, December, 1908, p. 600. §98] Does the Public Initiate? 221 to attach some pecuhar importance to a bill be- cause it originates directly with the public. Let us consider a moment precisely what we mean by that. In comparing the English criminal procedure, in which the offender is commonly prosecuted by private persons, with the system prevailing in other countries, where the matter is in the hands of a public prosecutor. Professor Maitland insisted that the English plan is really public prosecution because any member of the public can instigate it; whereas according to the accepted usage the term is applied to prosecution only at the instiga- tion of a public oflScer. If we look at legislation in the same way, we may ask ourselves whether the initiation of laws is properly called public when conducted by private persons, or when intrusted to representatives chosen by the public for the purpose. A discussion of the meaning of words is futile except so far as it throws light upon the principles involved. Now the initiative enables a number of private and irresponsible persons to propose any legislation they please without regard to the wishes of the general public. Often that is unobjectionable, because the people can simply reject the law; but the art of government consists in reconciling and smoothing over differences, as well as in deciding them. There are many questions, of a religious or racial character, for example, which the good sense of the community refuses to raise, but which fanatics are anxious to bring forward. Is it better that the representatives of the public in the legislature should have power to suppress 222 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ 98 such proposals, or that a fraction of the citizens should have a right to provoke a popular vote upon them even when public opinion is against permitting this? From the point of view of expediency there is much to be said on both sides. On the one hand the inflaming of anti-Semitic feeling in Switzerland by the proposal to forbid the manufacture of kosher meat was probably a misfortune; but, on the other hand, a legislature which has power to dismiss such questions may suppress others that ought to be dis- cussed. Whether expedient or not it is hard to see how the right of a small minority to raise issues uncomfortable for the majority is giving effect to public opinion. May not the public properly de- mand evidence that the proposal issues from a really considerable popular demand."* For this reason there is a tendency in some of the states adopting the initiative to require a larger percentage of voters to bring forward a law than appears in the earlier practice. The more eager advocates of direct legislation resent any suggestions for restrictions upon the use of the initiative. But in this they seem unwise. New ideas ought to struggle against opposition, to prove their worth against a fire of criticism, before they are victorious; otherwise they may be adopted in haste and lead to repentance at leisure. A slow progress under the gradual pressure of a growing public sentiment does more for the advance of civilization than a more rapid movement followed by reaction. Nor is the danger only that measures will be adopted incautiously, for the premature §98] Does the Public Initiate? 223 forcing of a popular vote upon an excellent proposal may result in a defeat which will retard its ultimate adoption. The most valuable institution is not that which bears the earliest, but that which bears the best, frxiit. CHAPTER XV REFLECTIONS ON OmECT LEGISLATION It has been said that the initiative corrects the legislature's sins of omission, the referendum its sins of commission.^ The objects of the two are quite distinct. The referendum may prevent laws that the people do not want, but it produces no legislation; while the initiative gives an opportunity to enact measures the people may desire, but it hinders no bad laws. Each of them has its merits and defects, its advantages, its dangers and its proper limitations. Hence under the conditions of any community it may be that one of them will prove beneficial and the other not, or that they may be wisely applied to different subjects and with different restrictions. Yet there are some general considerations that apply to both, especially in relation to the question how far, and under what conditions, a popular vote upon a measure is an accurate expression of a real public opinion. 99. Trustworthiness of the Restilt We have observed that the vote on measures is almost invariably smaller, often very much smaller, than the vote for the chief elective officers; and if we may assume that the size of the vote indicates ' Professor L. J. Johnson, The Initiative and Referendum, an Effec- tive Ally of Representative Government, p. 5. 224 §99] Trustworthiness of the Result 225 the number of persons who have a serious opinion on the question, it bears upon the probability of a true pubKc opinion in the community as a whole. We have noted cases where the majority by which the question was decided has been exceedingly small, and where the number of citizens who did not vote on the measure at all was as large, or even much larger, than the votes cast for or against it. The necessity for a decision in such a case may require that the majority, however minute, have their way, and those who do not vote may well be held not to object to the law; but it seems like an abuse of terms to speak of the result as an expression of a public opinion. The well-known fact that there is almost always a larger vote for representatives than for measures would appear to show that there is more truly a public opinion on the choice of men than on laws; yet the reason commonly given for direct legislation is that the representa- tives do not reflect the opinion of the people. Cases of narrow majorities on small votes may not be frequent, and there can be no doubt that a popular vote often expresses public opinion, but the immediate question before us is whether it always does so, and for this we are not confined to specu- lations about probabilities. The possibility that a popular vote may not express the real views of the electorate is apparent from the sudden changes of opinion in Oregon to which reference was made in the last chapter. Another example was given in Massachusetts some years ago. In 1903 the legislature passed an act, 15 226 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§ XOO known as the Luce Law, to create direct primaries, with a provision that it should go into effect in any town if adopted by vote of the inhabitants. A number of towns adopted it at once, and repented almost as quickly. They went to the legislature the next year, declared that they had acted hastily without appreciating the effect of the measure, and asked to be relieved from the consequences of their votes. One representative asserted that half of his fellow-townsmen had supposed they were voting on the question of local option in the sale of liquor. It so happened that when these appeals were made, the House of Representatives was ringing with oratory in favor of a constitutional amendment for a general referendum, and the spectacle of towns begging the legislature to undo by statute what they had done by popular vote, contributed largely to the rejection of the amendment.^ 100. Delay of Legislation by Popular Votes Even if it could be assumed that the popular vote always expressed a real public opinion, there would be some disadvantages to be balanced against the benefits. We have seen that the initiative may be used to bring forward proposals which, though rejected, arouse bitter religious or race animosities that had better not be stirred; and so in the case of the referendum although the people ratify the act referred the mere delay in enactment may do harm to the commimity. 1 " Direct Legislation," by W. Rodman Peabody, in the Politieal Science Quarterly, September, 1905. § 100] Delay of Legislation by Popular Votes 227 A case of this kind occurred in Oregon. A referendum was filed against the appropriation made by the legislature in 1905 for the support of the state university. The act was ratified at the next election in 1906, but in the meanwhile the professors were exposed to the danger of receiving no pay for the services they were rendering. The next year the legislature doubled the appropriation, and again a referendum was filed, which was voted upon by the people in 1908 with the same result and the same treatment of the instructing staff. Finally in 1911 a special increase was made and on that occasion the popular vote went against the act, as well as against a special appropriation for a uni- versity library. In the first two cases the vote was in favor of the grants, and it may be argued that as the professors were willing to take the risk, and eventually received their pay, no harm was done. But this is not true. Apart from the unfairness of placing faithful public servants in such a position as the professors were forced into, the university itself suffers, and will continue to suffer, from the occurrence. Every institution of learning depends for its excellence upon the high quality of its teachers, and risks of this nature which make one university less desirable than others, tend to deter the best men from accepting or retaining chairs therein. A referendum on the increase is clearly a very different thing from one on the whole appropriation, which enables a small minority of the citizens to stop a branch of the public service altogether or impose upon the em- 228 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§101 ployees a danger of intolerable loss of pay. For this reason it is provided in Missouri, for example, that the referendum shall not apply to acts making appropriations for the current expenses of the state government, for the maintenance of state institu- tions or for the support of the public schools. 101. Indirect Effects of Direct Legislation The more remote consequences of any political institution are often of greater importance than its immediate results. Opponents of direct legisla- tion insist that it will reduce the importance and therefore the character of the legislature, while its advocates claim that it will tend to exert a greatly beneficial influence upon the representatives. In explaining the fact that a popular vote was not demanded on any law in South Dakota for a number of years after the right was created, the Governor of the State wrote, "Since this referendum law has been a part of our Constitution we have had no charter-mongers or railway speculators, no wild-cat schemes, submitted to our Legislature. Formerly our time was occupied by speculative schemes of one kind or another, but since the referendum has been made a part of the Constitution these people do not press their schemes upon the Legislature; hence, there is no necessity of having recourse to a referendum."^ If such a change is permanently accomplished it means an improvement of the first magnitude in a number of states; but last- ing results are not produced at once, and many ' Quoted in the Arena, Aug. 1902, p. 124. § 101] Indirect Effects of Direct Legislation 229 years must pass before the final account can be made up. We turn naturally to Oregon, as the state that has made the greatest use of direct legislation, to inquire the effect upon the representative body. We have opinions upon the subject expressed by the leading opponent and advocate of the insti- tution. Mr. Frederick V. Holman remarked in February, 1911, "In reply to the contention that this 'reserve' power would improve the character of the legislature I will state, without fear of con- tradiction that there has been no substantial change in the kind of legislators since the adoption of this amendment." ^ On the other hand Mr. William S. U'Ren, speaking of the legislative session of 1911, said, "Taken altogether, the session was the most complete demonstration we have had in Oregon of the need for a proportional system of electing members of the legislature, and for a complete reorganization of the state government for the pur- pose of getting business results instead of politics. . . . The members of the legislature were a very fair lot of men individually and above the average of intelligence, but the session was one of the worst Oregon has had for log-rolling, hasty action and partisan voting, with small consideration for the merits of bills. The legislature was not at all representative of the people." ^ This is not so en- couraging, although some allowance may be fairly made for exaggeration by men who are urging a 1 Chicago Civic Federation Bulletin, No. 3, pp. 11-12. 2 EquUy, July, 1911, p. 113. 230 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§101 new reform on the one hand, or extolUng the merits of one they have achieved on the other. A reform often works better at the outset than it does later, because the moral impulse that carries it through causes good men to take part in adminis- tering it. The real test comes later when the first enthusiasm has cooled, when the reformers are busy with other things, and the professional politician, whose trade depends on being at work while others are not, has had a chance to try his hand at the new machinery. We do not know that a combination of the boss and special interests will not be able to control the smaller popular vote cast on measures as completely as the larger popular vote cast for representatives. It will take time, as it took time to control elections, but the intrinsic difficulties are not necessarily greater in one case than in the other. It has been said that reformers can succeed only by changing the political machinery faster than the professional politicians can learn to manip- ulate it; but that is a confession of failure for democracy. The real question is .whether direct legislation is so adjusted to the means of forming a real public opinion that the people can decide mtelligently all the questions presented to them without unusual effort, and without the aid of people who find a profit in steering them. Badly adjusted machinery is the opportunity of the boss and the combination. Professional politicians ob- tained control of elections because the people were called upon to do more than they could do without help, and the more the people are asked to decide § 102] Measures Suited for Popular Votes 231 questions in which they are not as a whole seriously interested, the greater will be the opening for the boss and his allies. 102. Measures Suited for Popular Votes All this does not mean that the referendum and initiative will not prove valuable when used in the appropriate way. It means simply that they are not so perfect as some of their advocates appear to assume, and that they ought to be used with a careful attention to the conditions in which they can be successfully applied. The earlier use of the referendum in America was restricted to constitu- tional questions and to certain specified matters, for the most part of a kindred nature; but in the recent adoption of a general referendum no serious attempt has been made to consider upon what classes of questions a genuine public opinion can be readily formed and to confine popular votes to these. One inherent difficulty lies in the fact that the people are asked to vote upon a complete statute, which is usually hard to understand, however well it may be drawn, because it involves many facts connected with the application of the general principle. Of these the public is more or less ignorant, as well as of the reason for provisions made to meet valid objections. Such a difficulty is especially great in acts affecting public service companies or granting franchises, and involving in the main applications of principles, on which there is often no dispute, to cases where most people 232 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§102 have strong prejudices on both sides but know very Httle. The class of measures in which legislators delib- erately defy public opinion is that which involves jobbery, but this is a class about which the people at large are little competent to form opinions; and therefore the referendum is least likely to furnish a trustworthy remedy in the cases where the repre- sentative body most grossly misrepresents the public. If the people cannot, by election or other- wise, provide a body that can be trusted to deal with such matters honestly and wisely, then a popular vote, however ignorant, however far from expressing a real public opinion, is better than jobbery; but it is at best an imperfect instrument for the purpose. So strong is the distrust of the legislature in affairs of this kind, that in some states — as in Maine, for example — it is provided that a vote of emergency withdrawing an act from the referendum shall not be used on acts granting franchises, a precaution that may be required by the conditions. If it be true that the people are more capable of forming opinions on general principles and moral issues than on a mass of details, then the referendum would appear to accomplish its object better in questions of the former class, and details should be referred to popular vote as little as the trustworthi- ness of the public servants will permit. In referring to Swiss examples in this connection we must remember that everywhere in continental Europe the statutes go into detail less than they do in the § lOS] Will not Bring the Millennium 233 United States; that much which is embodied in the text of an American act is left in Europe to be completed by executive ordinance. The objections to submitting to popular vote a comprehensive and complex law, or one requiring an accurate knowledge of unfamiliar facts is even greater in the case of the initiative, and could be prevented without impairing seriously the object of that procedure. 103. Direct Legislation will not Bring the Millennium That direct popular action upon laws, when wisely and scientifically applied, will prove highly useful in certain conditions of society we may well believe without expecting it to usher in the millen- nium. All theories based on the assumption that the multitude is omniscient are fallacious, and so are all reforms that presuppose a radical change in human nature. It is easy enough to prove that any form of government will work like a charm if everyone who has a share in the public authority is spotless in wisdom and character; and there has probably never existed a political system of which men have not tried to demonstrate the perfection. Mankind is, and so far as we can see is likely to be, composed of some very good people, some very bad ones, and a large number who are well meaning, but more or less indolent and indifferent when their personal sympathies or interests are not touched; and the test of any institution is the fruit it will bear in a community of that kind. People are constantly expecting the millennium from some political contrivance that proves after- 234 Methods of Expressing Public Opinion [§103 wards disappointing, and Americans from their love of machinery are perhaps peculiarly susceptible to this feeling. One panacea of promise in its day was representative government; another was universal suffrage; a third, the checks and balances of the American constitutional system. The de- basement of party government in the United States has been traced to the state and national nominat- ing conventions, which replaced the party caucuses in the legislatures and in Congress;^ but in fact the convention was adopted because the legislative caucus was thought undemocratic. Let us not be led astray by generalizations. Each institution has its limitations and will work well only within those limits. It is a significant fact that the demand for the referendum and initiative is as a rule strongest in those states where the constitutions are longest and most elaborate in their restraints upon the legisla- ture, where that body has been most severely limited in the frequency and duration of its sessions; just as the recall of judges is urged with the greatest earnestness where they are popularly elected for short terms, rather than where they are appointed for life. In short the demand has generally been loudest where the reliance upon the integrity and capacity of the representatives has been least. Now if direct legislation were advocated on the ground that while representative democracy had been a suc- cess this would be better still, well and good; but ' Memorial Relative to a National Initiative and Referendum, May 25, 1908. Senate Doc., 60 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 516, pp. 4-5. § 103] Will not Bring the Millennium 235 if it is urged as an attempt to retrieve a failure by the people to work representative institutions, then it is the result not of confidence, but of distrust in the capacity of the people, and does not augur well for the future of popular government. Part IV The Regulation of Matters to which Pubhc Opinion Cannot Directly Apply Part IV The Regulation of Matters to which Public Opinion Cannot Directly Apply CHAPTER XVI REPRESENTATION BY SAMPLE The fundamental assumption of popular govern- ment is that public opinion should be carried into effect, provided, of course, that it is an enduring opinion, not a mere passing whim liable to be soon reversed; and there are two reasons why this should be done. The first is based, not on any supposition that the opinion of the people is always right, but on the belief that it is on the whole more likely to be right than the opinion of any other person or body which can be obtained. The second reason is that contentment and order are more general, and the laws and public officers are better obeyed, when in accord with popular opinion, than otherwise. It is unnecessary to discuss here the validity of these reasons, for we are dealing, not with the theoretical merits, but the methods of operation, of democracy. It is enough for us that these principles are the assumptions on which popular government rests. In the preceding chapters we have considered 239 240 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 104 under what conditions a genuine public opinion can exist, by what means and to what extent it can be faithfully expressed; and we have seen that there are many matters on which the public can have no real opinion. How can these be regulated in a democracy? 104. Three Methods of Delegating Authority The power to deal with questions which the people do not decide directly must be committed to some authority selected for the purpose, and the persons so designated may be intended to act in any one of three ways. (1) They may be chosen to express the opinion of the public, when there is one; (2) they may be appointed to exercise their own peculiar knowledge or skill in acting^ upon the questions that come before them; (3) they may be set apart to use their judgment as fair samples of the people, on the supposition that their opinion will be the same that the public itself would form if it could spend time enough to examine the matter thoroughly. Of course these objects are not rigidly separated in practice. An officer of state may be expected to act in two, or it may be in all three, ways. He may be in some matters the mouthpiece of public opinion, in others he may exercise his special professional skill, and in still more he may act as any intelligent citizen would; but it is only by keeping the three objects distinct in our own minds that we can have clear ideas about them. Let us, therefore, take examples where each of them stands alone. § 104] Methods of Delegating Authority 241 A member of the electoral college for the choice of the President is selected solely to express the opinion of the voters. He is not to use his own peculiar knowledge, or to make up his mind as an impartial citizen upon the evidence he hears, but simply to cast his vote in accordance with the mandate he received at the polls. Of this function of expressing the popular will nothing more need be said here, because it has already been treated in the discussion of representative government. The problem before us now is that of dealing with mat- ters upon which the public has no opinion, and these must be delegated to persons who are to use their own special qualifications or to act as samples of the people. As an example of a person selected to use his own peculiar capacity we may take the case of a surgeon at a city hospital. He is certainly not intended to carry out the popular opinion in operating on a patient, nor is he supposed to act as an average member of the community might be expected to do with the same facts before him. On the con- trary he is employed to use his personal knowledge and skill, and he is selected because his professional opinion is believed to excel, and therefore to differ from, that of the unskilled man. The same principle applies to a general and a judge. In conducting a campaign or deciding a point of law they ought not to listen for the signs of popular applause, nor do we appoint civilians as generals, or laymen as judges. Everyone would be shocked if generals were ignorant of tactics, or 16 242 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 105 if judges were not lawyers by profession and failed in deciding cases to apply the science of the law. This function of special qualifications in government will be discussed more fully in the chapters on the use of experts in the public service. 105. The Jury a Sample of the Public Of the third method, that of public opinion by sample, we have a singularly good illustration at hand in the Common Law jury — an institution used for matters about which the people at large cannot form a real opinion based upon familiarity with the facts. Service on a jury is irksome; to sit on more than one jury at a time is impossible; to read the evidence in all the cases that are tried in a single populous county is beyond the powers of any citizen; and therefore the whole people cannot by any stretch of the imagination be sup- posed to possess knowledge enough of the evidence in all the cases in court to have an intelligent opinion of them. But the jury-men are a sample of the great and general public, whose verdict may be taken to express what the opinion of the whole people would be if everyone heard the evidence; and they are drawn, as we draw a sample from a bale of merchandise, by a process designed to secure average, not selected, specimens. Of course the sample must not only be a fair one, but it must remain so. It must not be open to corrupting influences or pressure, and that condition might prevent the use of the jury in some countries. The assertion has been made, for example, that it § 106] The Object of Rotation in Office 243 cannot be adopted for the natives in India, because they would not convict rich offenders. Even with all our traditions, all our inherited experience, the ]ury is not a perfect instrument; and everyone knows that it would be a mere mockery if it were not encompassed by elaborate safeguards to in- sure an impartial hearing, deliberate consideration, and a judicial attitude. The jurors are brought into the court room, and solemnly instructed in their dutjes by the judge; they are seated together, apart from other people, while the case is being tried; they are compelled to hear all the evidence, and permitted to hear no evidence whose tendency to cause a bias is out of proportion to its proper probative value; newspapers are restrained under penalty of contempt of court from prejudging the case during the trial; the questions at issue, which have been carefully defined, are argued by counsel for each side; then the judge charges the jurors gravely; and finally their verdict must be unani- mous.^ Moreover, the judge can order a new trial if anything irregular or improper has occurred. 106. The Object of Rotation in Office Public opinion by sample has played a larger part in popular government than is commonly recognized, and many devices have had that end more or less consciously in view. This is probably true, for example, of the principle of rotation in oflfice. No doubt jealousy, and a conviction that everyone in ' Cf. Graham Wallas, Human Nature in Polities, pp. 209-10 on the impressiveness of the formalities surrounding the jury. 244 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply ,[§ 107 turn has a right to enjoy the sweets of authority, had something to do with it; but we must not fail to observe also the feeling that a new man, coming fresh from the people, will be in closer touch with popular opinion and will be free from official habits, or, in other words, a fairer sample of the public. This is the reason that jury-men serve short periods and are constantly replaced by a fresh panel. To show that this phenomenon was perfectly natural, not due to the " political cussedness " of our forefathers, as many good people would seem inclined to imply, an example may be cited of very recent occurrence and far removed from politics. Some years ago a wave of democratic sentiment, of more than ordinary strength, swept over the under- graduates at Harvard College; and one of its first results was the adoption of a rule that no class president should hold office for two successive years. From the standpoint of utility this was a misfortune, for the president of a class is a public-spirited officer of great importance, who has the welfare of his classmates very much at heart and whose value grows as he comes to know them better. Nor was it a case where the number of men who could hope to fill the place was considerable; but it seems to have been felt, somewhat blindly, to be in accord with democratic principles. 107. The Use of the Lot Another device of the same kind has been the selection of public officers by lot. Commentators have expended much ingenuity in trying to explain § 107] The Use of the Lot 245 why Aristotle and his contemporaries regarded the use of the lot as democratic; and on the part of writers in the English language this is the more remark- able because they have had the example of the Com- mon Law jury staring them in the face. No doubt election in Greece involved a danger of the choice of rich men, and with party lines drawn as they were that meant a peril to the existing form of govern- ment in a democratic state. It is not improbable, however, that one reason for using the lot to fill the public offices at Athens was the same that has caused it to be used for centuries in the case of the jury. Mr. Headlam remarks that "mediocrity in office was its object, because this was the only means of ensuring that not only the name but also the reality of power should be with the Assembly." ^ Mediocrity, or in other words an average sample of the public, is cer- tainly the object in drawing a jury by lot, for im- partiality could be secured, as in the case of judges, by other means. Mr. Headlam is no doubt right that one object in seeking mediocrity was to insure the supremacy of the Assembly; but may not the Greeks, like our own ancestors when insisting on rotation in office, have felt the need of selecting the public officers from men on a level with the ordinary citizen, and of keeping them on the same plane. The lot was used freely in the mediaeval cities also, and notably in Venice where it had its most celebrated application in the machinery for the election of the Doge. The first step was the appoint- 1 Election by Lot at Athens, Cambridge Hist. Essays (No. IV.), p. 32. 246 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 108 ment by the Great Council, of a committee which was then alternately reduced by lot and enlarged by cooptation until its membership depended very much on chance; and thus the choice of the Doge was placed in the hands of a body whose composition could not be determined by the personal or party factions in the Council. To cut off the political parties from activity in the election of the chief magistrate of the country may seem strange, but we must remember that the mediaeval Italian states were torn by factions based upon family quarrels, rather than divided into parties by differences of opinion on general policy. 108. Selected Samples of the Public The Doge was elected by what may be called a sifted or selected sample of the Great Council; and this brings us to another point. A sample of the public, in order to accomplish its purpose, is not necessarily an average sample, but may be a selected sample, or a sample from a selected body. The English special jury is drawn from persons with some property qualification, and of late years it has been growing in popularity with litigants, who have a right to demand it if they please. Such a jury is intended to represent, not the average public, but the average of the better educated part of the public; and in the same way public officers, not appointed by lot, but elected by the people and therefore presumably chosen for some superiority of intelli- gence, experience, or character, may in fact be used as selected samples of the public. The question § 108] Selected Samples of the Public 247 whether they act in this way, or as men designated to exercise special personal qualities, depends on their attitude towards their duties as well as on the method of selection. A general or a surgeon who endeavored to act as a man of good sense, but without special training, might act under the circum- stances would be unfit for his place; but this is not true of a member of the legislature or even of a governor. In fact a large part of their work consists in doing that very thing, and in so far as they do it they are acting as samples, as selected samples no doubt, but still as samples of the general public. The vast number of questions on which the public cannot form an opinion must, as we have seen, be referred to someone for decision; and when, as com- monly happens, the difficulty consists not in a lack of technical knowledge or fitness, but simply in a lack of familiarity with the facts, the matter may properly be referred, not to an expert, but to a sam- ple, and preferably a selected sample, of the public. No doubt expert assistance is usually needed, but the decision can often be confided to the good judg- ment of intelligent and faithful men without profes- sional qualifications. This is true, for instance, in applying general principles of legislation to local and private matters, where the main problem is to deter- mine whether the facts in the particular case justify the appHcation of the principle. The persons in- trusted with that duty are performing substantially the function of a selected jury, and their conclusion may be supposed to be that which the intelligent pub- lic would reach if it could conduct the investigation 248 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 109 directly. But in order that the result may be satis- factory the persons selected must be impartial, must act, not on their own knowledge, but on evidence, and the procedure must be such as to insure a full and fair presentation of the question. 109. Private Bill Committees in Parliament The select committees to which private and local bills are referred in the British Parliament furnish an example of such a procedure. Until about sixty years ago these committees were made up in large part of known advocates and opponents of the measures to be considered, in order that they might be able to urge their views; but first in the Lords, and afterwards in the Commons, a practice was adopted of composing them of a small number of wholly impartial members, whose duties should be of a judicial character. The committee sits like a court, and hears evidence and argument presented by barristers retained on behalf of the promoters and opponents of the bill. The hearing is in effect a trial of a cause between contending parties, who seek to prove their claims as they would in a suit at law. In that trial the members of the committee play the part of jurors, save that being men of broader education and experience than ordinary jury-men, and being fortified by the august traditions of Parliament, the members do not need to be surrounded by the same safeguards. In its composition an English private-bill committee is essentially a sample of the House. For chairman, indeed, a man is selected who has had experience in § 110] Committee Hearings in America 249 work of this kind, but the rest of the members are chosen from the body of the House without regard to special fitness, simply to go through a mass of facts which Parliament itself could not undertake to examine; and it is because they are a fair sample that the House almost always ratifies their con- clusions. 110. Committee Hearings in America The same function is performed to a less extent by the committees of American legislatures. The members, no doubt, are by no means all selected on the basis of impartiality. As in the old committees of Parliament on private bills some of them hold decided views on the policy to be pursued, and an effort is made to appoint men to the committees on the subjects in which they are interested. Still many of the members are impartial in regard to the bills that come before them, and this cannot fail to happen where every member of the legislative body must be given a seat on some committee. More important is the fact that the committees often give public hearings, and in doing so act in a semi-judicial character. The subject of public hearings by American legis- lative 'committees has hitherto received far less attention than it deserves. They do not seem to have been described or discussed in any book until the recent work of Professor Reinsch on American Legislatures, and he devotes to the subject less than one page.^ Yet they perform a service highly 1 P. 174. 250 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 111 beneficial in some states, and capable of increasing usefulness in others. They are an American institu- tion which exists in no other country. In England a private bill committee hears evidence presented by the parties who have a legal interest in the matter, but it hears no one else; while a select committee on a public bill examines only the witnesses it chooses to summon, and although a person of sufficient prominence would no doubt be summoned if he wished to appear, that is not at all equivalent to a public hearing where everyone has a right to be present and state his views. Nor has the writer ever met with anything of this kind in any other legislative body in the world. 111. Public Hearings in Massachusetts The public hearing is a familiar institution through- out American political life, being used not only by legislative bodies, but occasionally also by councils, committees and administrative officers of all kinds; and in fact a request for it is hard to refuse. It has been developed very completely in the legislature of Massachusetts, where it has become so much a regular part of the procedure that every committee always gives a public hearing on every bill if any- one wants to be heard. The hearings are regularly advertised in the newspapers, and in the case of any particular bill a special notice is sent to a person who asks for it. Ordinarily everyone has a chance to express his opinions; but when the number of people attending is large — and it may run into the hun- dreds — a lawyer is usually employed on each side § 111] Public Hearings in Massachusetts 251 by the chief supporters and remonstrants. He is recognized by the committee as counsel for his clients, and takes charge of the case, presenting the evidence and arguments as he thinks best. In fact the hearing is conducted much like a trial in court, save that the strict legal rules of evidence are not applied. In American legislatures every bill when presented is regularly referred to one of the many standing committees, and in Massachusetts all the commit- tees of that kind, except those on the Judiciary, on Ways and Means, and on Elections, are joint bodies representing both branches of the legislature. Even the few separate committees often sit jointly, so that a hearing before a single body almost always suffices for both houses,^ a condition which tends to enhance the importance of the hearing. The figures for a session will show how universally hearings are granted in Massachusetts, and how freely the public uses the privilege.^ In the year 1910, the bills and petitions referred to committees numbered 1634. On 33 of them no hearing took place, either because they were sent to some com- mission for consideration, or because they were introduced late in the session and pushed through in haste. On the remaining 98 per cent, hearings were given on one or more days, in 1432 cases the hearing being finished at the first sitting, in 138 a 1 Of the 1634 bills and petitions referred to committees in 1910, only thirty-five were considered separately by a committee representing one house. . r -a -nr * These statistics were compiled for the author by Mr. Henry W. Cleary from the weekly editions of the Bulletin of Committee Hear- ings issued by the legislature. 252 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ ill second day being required, in 19 a third day, in 10 four days, in 4 five days, in 4 six days, in 3 seven days, while one measure consumed twelve days. It must be observed that this procedure applies to bills of all kinds, public, private, and local, and is thus a part of the regular machinery for legislation of every class. On matters of a purely local or private nature the people who appear are, of course, mainly those interested therein, but on public measures leading citizens of the state constantly attend and express their opinions. This is true of questions political, philanthropic, educational, and in fact of all matters touching the general welfare. Nor is the attendance by any means confined to officers and members of organizations formed to promote a public object, but extends to people of all sorts, and thus the legislature has a chance to learn the state of mind of the community in all its phases. By this process of hearing evidence and argument the committee acquires a semi-judicial attitude. It comes to look on itself as sitting in judgment upon the matters presented to it, rather than as acting on its own initiative; and this to an extent that is at times surprising. Some years ago a most high- principled member of the Massachusetts House, in talking about a bill which he thought very bad, remarked that the legislature could not be blamed for passing it if the citizens who objected to it would not oppose it before the committee. In the best sense the procedure is extremely democratic, for it gives the whole people a chance to take part in legislation at the formative stage. § 111] Public Hearings in Massachusetts 253 But it is by no means democratic in the false sense that the opinions of all men are given equal impor- tance. The views presented are weighed, in accord- ance with the knowledge of the subject shown by the witnesses and with their standing in the community. The people who address the committee are not regarded as so many voters to be conciliated, be- cause they cannot be constituents of more than one or two of the members, and may very well not be constituents of any of them. A committeeman from New Bedford, for example, may have the greatest respect for the opinion of a prominent citizen of Boston, but he does not ordinarily care a straw for his vote. So far as he is conscientious and disinter- ested his object, after listening to the testimony, is to discover what ought to be done. One is, therefore, justified in speaking of the committee as a sample of the legislature, set apart to hear evidence which the whole body could not hear, and which without such a procedure could not be presented at all. If in the case of local and private matters the committees could be freed from all interested motives and all improper influence, and still more if, like the English committees on private bills, they could be so formed as to escape wholly from the suspicion of such things, they would be even more valuable than they are. America is the only country where questions that do not affect the whole community, and require for their decision a careful study of details, are thrown into the vortex of legislative politics. On the con- tinent of Europe they are habitually regarded as falling into the province of administration, and de- 254 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 112 cided by the executive, while in England, though treated as legislative matters, they are subjected to a special procedure of a wholly different character from other bills. The practice of public hearings opens a road to a system of that kind which might well be carried farther. 112. Public Hearings ia Other States All people in Massachusetts, who are well qualified by experience to form an opinion ascribe much of the merits of the legislature to the custom of public hearings. But on this subject Professor Reinsch says: "The potential influence of committee hear- ings to bring to bear upon legislative action the opinions and desires of the public in a truly demo- cratic manner, has scarcely been realized outside of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In that state, committee hearings are a very important part of legislative action . . . but the General Court of Massachusetts is in all respects nearest the people, and most responsive of any American legislature to intelligent public opinion." ^ So far as this last remark is true, a reason for it, as Professor Reinsch observes, is to be found in the fact that Massa- chusetts is one of the states whose capital is in the largest city. This has the double advantage of making a sojourn at the legislature attractive to its members, and making it easy for citizens to attend committee hearings. The first advantage is subtle, though real, and applies everywhere; for even the charm of a seat in the House of Commons ' American Legislatures, p. 174. § 112] Public Hearings in Other States 255 would be much reduced if Parliament sat at Not- tingham instead of London. The second advantage is more obvious. To go to Albany or Harrisburg, or Springfield for a commit- tee hearing involves a day's journey, and the most public-spirited citizen cannot be expected to under- take it often. But from their residences, or places of business, about half the citizens of Massachusetts can reach the State House in less than an hour, and perhaps a quarter of them in twenty minutes; so that public opinion or special knowledge can be brought to bear on the legislature with a very small expenditure of time and eflfort on the part of the community. One who has made a far less thorough study of legislative action outside of Massachusetts than Professor Reinsch must hesitate before questioning his conclusion, and yet it may be suggested that he goes too far in speaking of the influence of committee hearings as scarcely realized outside that common- wealth. No doubt there are other states where matters determined in Massachusetts by committees, on the evidence presented to them, are settled by a boss or a private conference of political chiefs; but that is by no means true everywhere, nor are all questions so disposed of anywhere. No doubt committee hearings are in more general use in Boston than in most of the state capitals, yet extensive inquiries conducted by the writer seem to make it probable that the practice is not wholly unknown in any of our legislatures, while in many of them pubhc hearings before committees are not uncommon and 256 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 113 have a distinctly beneficial effect. Their use and the extent of their influence vary, of course, with the nature of the subject, and hence the answer one is likely to receive will differ with the class of question in which the person speaking happens to be interested. In matters like education, which are not closely connected either with politics or with private interests, public hearings have the best chance of playing an important part; but in many places they are by no means confined to subjects of that char- acter. They are probably growing in use and destined to gain in importance. In Wisconsin, for example, a! deliberate attempt is being made to encourage them. They are, indeed, a highly valu- able element in popular government; and this is the more true because with the elimination of thorough discussion from our representative bodies, due partly to the increase of legislative business, partly to the cutting down of time, and partly to the large propor- tion of new members, most of the real work must be done through public opinion by sample in the form of committees, and committees without public hearings are cut off from their best source of light. 113. The Three Objects that Public Officers Serve are Often Combined We have considered separately the three functions that public officers are intended to fulfil, and we have passed in review pure examples of each of them; but as we saw at the outset all three duties are in prac- tice constantly combined in the same office. This is true to a greater or less extent of all the members § 113] Objects that Public Officers Serve 257 of legislatures and elected councils, and of all presidents, governors, and other potentates chosen by popular vote. Elections for any of these positions are partly an expression of public opinion on certain issues that have become prominent; partly a selec- tion of persons peculiarly fitted by their knowl- edge or experience to exercise their own judgment; and partly a choice of persons to represent the ordinary good sense of the community, and bring to bear on the questions that arise, not expert knowl- edge, but the general qualities whereby any healthy public opinion is formed. On different occasions one or other of these aspects of a political office may be given special prominence, but it is rare that any of them is wholly absent. A large part of the work of men in legislative or executive positions, and, indeed, of all officials who are not experts, consists in dealing with the questions presented to them as any other sensible man might do. That is the reason why good sense is usually more important in public posts than remarkable talent. In ordinary times it is not essential, nor always desirable, that the holder of a great office should have genius or originality, that he should possess the imagination required for eminence in literature, art, science, invention or industrial enterprise. What is needed is quick apprehension, broad sympathy, and sound judgment, for the public officer should be rather the balance-wheel than the mainspring of government. Genius and originality often make mistakes. Many inventors and leaders in commercial ventures, although discoverers of a 17 258 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 114 path to future wealth, have died bankrupt, because in innovation there is risk. The road of progress is paved with failures that have made the way possible for others, and the risks which have caused them are quite justified in private life; but it is not right to speculate with public interests. Innovators are invaluable to the state, if they are under control, and the men who control them ought to represent the general good sense of the community. The fact that the different classes of functions are so frequently combined, and must inevitably be so, makes it important to surround the performance of each with the safeguards appropriate to that function. When a legislator or officer is acting as a sample of the public he should be placed in the full light of publicity, made to feel that his duties have a judicial character, and should receive the kind of information to be derived from a well-conducted hearing. Such a hearing is quite different in its object from a cabinet council or a business transaction, and nothing but evil can come from blending the forms of different kinds of proceedings together. • 114. Selection of Different Kinds of Officers We are in the habit of speaking as if the election of public officers were the easiest thing in the world. It requires the voter only to mark his ballot, and drop it into a box. Yet the value of the vote depends, not on the mechanical act, but on the intelligence of the choice; and it is sometimes strange to compare the readiness with which the whole people elect a governor and the painful solicitude of the managers § 114] Selection of Diflferent Officers 259 of some large concern in selecting a man for an office certainly not more important. Examples from com- mercial life are now anathema, but there is no harm in observing how often the trustees of a college or university search long and anxiously for a president. Do we not recognize enough the greater difficulty of choosing good public officers in some cases than in others.? To revert for illustration to the comparison made in an earlier chapter between Parliament and an American legislature; in both countries new ques- tions arise which the representative, guided neither by public opinion nor by special knowledge of his own, must decide by the light of ordinary common sense, questions, in short, that place him in a position where he must act as a good sample of the public. But those cases arise with very different frequency in the two bodies. Owing to the exigencies of the parliamentary system, a member of the House of Commons almost always follows his party leaders on questions of a public nature, save in some peculiar case where the interests of his constituents are manifestly opposed. The election of a member of Parliament is, therefore, mainly an expression of opinion on certain broad issues, and the choice of a man who will support the leaders of one of the political parties. The voter does not select those leaders. He does not designate them in a primary, caucus or convention, or prepare a platform for them. They are developed in the warfare of the House, and come before him with their issues formed. In short the people have the simplest of all political decisions 260 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 114 to make, that of choosing between two wholly framed alternatives by voting for one or other of the candi- dates for a seat where personality is of secondary consequence. In America, where the representative is far more free to act on each question as his judgment dic- tates, the selection of the man is more important. The machinery for nomination and for a declara- tion of policy, which has given us so much trouble, becomes very serious, for thereby the people take in reality a much more onerous part in government than they do in England. The selection of adequate representatives and pubUc officers is, therefore, a very difficult matter in America, more difficult per- haps than anywhere else in the world, and yet we mul- tiply the difficulty with a light heart by increasing unnecessarily the number of elective officers, and complain that they are not so good as we are entitled to have. Moreover, we do not confine elections to those kinds of officers that the people are most likely to choose wisely. A distinction may be roughly drawn between three classes of public servants according to the functions they are chiefly intended to per- form: those who are chosen to express the opinions of the people; those who are appointed to use their own personal knowledge or skill; and those who are intended to act as fair samples of the public on the questions that may be brought before them. The people can certainly choose a man to express the opinions they have already formed, or to act as a sample of the public on questions that may § 114] Selection of Different Officers 261 arise, far better than they can select a man, tech- nically trained, to use his own expert judgment. They know their own opinion, and they can easily ascertain whether a candidate for office will express it honestly. They recognize a fair sample of the public, gifted with common sense, when they see him; but they know little about experts. A prudent President or Governor in appointing a technical officer does not ordinarily rely on his own impres- sions; but seeks advice which is not within reach of the public. The people are not in a position to obtain or weigh such advice, and hence are poorly qualified to choose the general for an army, the sur- geon for a city hospital, or a judge. The election of judges by popular vote would not, indeed, work so well as it does, were it not for the great influence of the legal profession throughout American politics; and every sensible man will admit that to choose a general or a surgeon by popular vote would be a grave mis- take. As Chief Justice Ryan tersely expressed it: "Where you want skill you must appoint; where you want representation, elect," and that will remain true unless we are to push to its logical extreme the dogma of popular infallibility. CHAPTER XVII EXPERT ADMINISTRATORS IN POPULAR GOVERNMENT A DISCUSSION of the proper method of appointing technical oflBcers opens the great subject of the function of experts in popular government. Presi- dents, governors, and mayors cannot be experts in all the matters with which they are called upon to deal, nor as a rule are they thoroughly expert in any of them; and in fact this is generally true of oflScers elected to administer public affairs. We cannot, therefore, avoid the question whether they do, or do not, need expert assistance if the government is to be efficiently conducted. The problem is not new, for the world struggled with it two thousand years ago. The fate of institutions has sometimes turned upon it, and so may the great experiment we are trying today — that of the permanence of democracy on a large scale. Americans pay little heed to the lessons taught by the painful experience of other lands, and Charles Sumner expressed a common sentiment when he remarked sarcastically his thank- fulness that they knew no history in Washington. Our people have an horizon so limited, a knowledge of the past so small, a self-confidence so sublime, a conviction that they are altogether better than their fathers so profound, that they hardly realize the difficulty of their task. We assume unconsciously, 262 Experts in Popular Government 263 as a witty writer has put it, that human reason began about thirty years ago; and yet a candid study of history shows that the essential qualities of human nature have not changed radically, that men have little more capacity or force of character than at other favored epochs. Some improvement in stand- ards has, no doubt, taken place, and certainly the bounds of human sympathy have widened vastly; but there has been no such transformation as to jus- tify a confidence that the men of the present day can accomplish easily and without sacrifice what to earlier generations was unattainable. We have already observed that a means of making democracy on a large scale possible in the modern world, although it had not proved so in the past, was thought to have been found in the device of repre- sentation. This was supposed to enable a large country to govern itself as small communities alone had hitherto succeeded in doing. But we have seen also that the faith in representative government as a universal means of solving political problems has markedly declined of late, and that the conditions under which it has worked must be improved or it will not by itself bring us to our goal. It is well then to inquire whether there were not other defects in the older forms of democracy which are still with us, and which a calmer judgment, an imimpassioned study of political phenomena, may help us to remove. In doing so we ought not to forget that the century during which democracy on a large scale has endured is a brief span in history, and offers no conclusive proof of the deeper currents of human destiny; that 264 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 115 in seeking to solve the riddle of man's social organi- zation we must take long views, and not allow ourselves to be overwhelmed by the clamor, the complaints, and the enthusiasms of the moment in which we live. 116. Lack of Experts in Athens No profound knowledge of history is needed to perceive that the republics of the ancient world made very httle use of experts in the public service. The two of which we know by far the most are those of Athens and of Rome, and in some important respects their methods of dealing with public office were similar, since in both the officers were appointed, as a rule, for a single year, and were practically not reeligible. The theories of democracy, as then understood, were carried farthest in Athens, where most of the offices were collegiate and many of them were filled, not by election, but by lot, every free citizen being deemed fit to occupy any civic position in the state. Under these conditions, an official could have no expert knowledge of the work to be done in his department, however familiar he might be with the discussion of political questions in the assembly; nor could he in the short space of a year acquire any considerable experience in the man- agement of his office. In short, the administration was conducted by amateurs. Nor were these men assisted by expert subordinates or advisers. There were, no doubt, slaves in the service of the state, to do the purely routine work of keeping accounts and the like, and sometimes, at least, a professional § 116] Lack of Experts in Athens 265 architect was appointed to plan a pubHc building; but as a rule all administrative work involving the exercise of discretion was performed by citizens holding office for a year only, without any aid from experts or persons familiar by experience with the duties of the position. There appear to have been no government engineers for constructing roads, no naval architects, no professional generals, no expert financial officers. The collection and expenditure of the revenues, the direction of a war, and the fitting out of the fleet, were intrusted to unskilled men selected in most cases by lot. Such a system, as we have seen, was considered by the Greeks themselves essential to democracy, for it tended to proclaim and preserve the equality of all the citizens. It did not work badly in a simple community where the various branches of the public service involved few things with which an ordinary citizen might not be familiar in his daily life, and of course it worked well while a Pericles directed the affairs of state outside of public office, as a sort of glorified boss. But the system was hardly equal to a severe strain, and we may safely assume that it contributed to the downfall of Athens before the blows of a highly organized monarchy of the same race under Philip of Macedon. 116. Expert Administrators in Rome The Romans carried both the theory and the prac- tice of democracy less far than the Greeks, yet the principle of rotation in office was rigidly apphed, and the result, very different from that in Athens, has a more direct lesson for us. Under the republic, 266 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 116 the officials were chosen only for a single year, and as a rule were not reelected. It is true that the government was in the hands of a ruling class, and that no one could hold a higher magistracy who had not previously filled the lower ones in the official ladder, so that the higher officers had enjoyed some experience in public affairs; but no single office was held by anyone more than one year, and there was nothing remotely resembling a permanent civil ser- vice. Every man was quite new to the administrative office he might fill, and left it before he had time to learn much more than he knew when he came in. This constitution worked well enough so long as Rome was a small Italian state with simple industries and few foreign complications; but when she acquired dominions beyond the seas, when the contact with the East destroyed her old traditions of discipline, when instead of governing a small town and an agricultural district, her people were called upon to rule a huge metropolis, to administer vast provinces, to regulate the commercial affairs and control the political destinies of the western world, the system broke down. After the lack of experts in the public service began to be of serious consequence Rome, unlike Athens, came into conflict with no people at all her match in political or military qualities, and the republic was brought to an end, not by external forces, but by internal weakness and constitutional instability. Of course there were other causes contributing to its downfall; of course it is easy to point to particular men at whose hands the constitution suffered vio- § 116] Expert Administrators in Rome 267 lence; of course it is impossible to distinguish sharply between the occasion and the underlying cause; but surely it is abundantly clear that government by a succession of amateurs, without expert assistance, had proved itself hopelessly incapable of maintaining an orderly administration on so gigantic a scale. The state had outgrown its machinery, and the empire by creating a new organization prolonged its life. Augustus and his earlier successors had no idea of setting up a bureaucracy to administer their domin- ions. In the main they merely took over, as each exigency arose and without a definite plan, those matters that were in sore need of attention. The former transitory ofl&cials of the senatorial class being unable to cope with the great problems of the day, one duty after another passed into the control of the head of the state and his personal subordinates; and it took three centuries to complete the process. Meanwhile the administrative machinery for dealing with these matters was being gradually developed; 'but again, not on a deliberate systematic plan, but in the earlier stages, at least, by adopting the means nearest at hand. During the century following Augustus, the Emperors used for this purpose to a great extent the freedmen attached to their own households and trained to conduct their private affairs on a large scale; but as time went on these were replaced by free citizens, drawn for the upper grades of the service from the order of knights, and thus a permanent civil service grew up, which men of ability entered young and followed for life as a 268 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 117 career.^ It is this administrative system, apparently derived in part from the practice of the Egyptian monarchy, that produced and crystallized the forms of Roman law and government. The preservation of the Roman dominions for so long a period, as well as the far longer life of the Eastern Empire, must be attributed in great part to the adoption of the imperial form of government with its large use of trained expert officials; and to the same source must be ascribed also the overmastering influence of Roman civilization upon the modern world. 117. Experts in Monarchies and Democracies Throughout the Middle Ages, and indeed until a hundred and fifty years ago, democracies were small, or turbulent and ephemeral. Venice was, no doubt, a powerful and prosperous republic for many centu- ries, but, far from being democratic, was an aristoc- racy of a restricted type, and furnishes no exception to the general rule that democracies have in the past been small or short-lived. At the close of the Middle Ages the great states of modern Europe • began to assume their present form, and in every case they were ruled by monarchs who employed, not officials appointed for short terms and replacing one another by rotation, but men whom they retained permanently and who were skilled in the art of administration. The new monarchies meant govern- ment by experts, and that was one of the chief secrets of their efficiency and predominance. ' Die Kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten bis auf Diocletian. Otto Hirschfeld. 2d ed., 1905. See especially the concluding chapter. § 117] Experts in Monarchies 269 Now the fact that monarchies have habitually employed permanent administrators, while democ- racies have shown a preference for rotation in office, is not an accident. It is a natural result of the different principles on which the two forms of government are based. The use of experts is as normal in a monarchy or an aristocracy as it is foreign to the genius of a democracy. A monarch tends to retain in office the men he has learned to know and trust, who have become experienced in carrying on his business. If he is jealous, irritable, or captious, he may quarrel with them from time to time, or if something goes wrong he may make a scapegoat of one of them; but in the long run he saves himself trouble and worry by keeping about him the servants whom he has found faithful and efficient; and he does so whether he is himself good or bad. If he is good, he retains good men; if bad, men who will carry out his evil designs; but in any case men faithful to him. The head of a great industrial enterprise would not think of changing his subordi- nates every year or two. Whether honest or corrupt, whether generous or oppressive, he wants under him men who have proved themselves efficient for his purposes; and a monarch is in the same position. He keeps his servants so long as he is satisfied with them ; and if one of his chief officers dies he is inclined to fill the place with a man who has made his mark in a lower post. His ministers, being permanent, are prone for the same reason to retain their own sub- ordinates, promoting them to higher places as they show the ability, or subservience, required; and 270 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 117 thus a monarchy tends to produce a corps of expert administrators in every department, its public ser- vice becoming a career which a man enters young and follows through life. The service is not always good; it may become stagnant or rigid, and its members negligent, oppressive, or corrupt. There have been admirable bureaucracies, and there have been execrable ones, but even the worst of them have shown a certain durability derived from the expert character of their members. In spite of the gravest vices, they have given to the governments they have served a permanence beside which the democracies that existed on a large scale until a hundred years ago have seemed ephemeral. Permanence in the tenure of public oflBce is, on the other hand, unnatural to a democracy. The habit of repeated reelection is, indeed, occasionally found — especially where a strong infusion of aris- tocratic feeling persists under popular forms, as in some of the rural cantons of Switzerland — but in general democracies tend, as in Athens, to frequent changes in ofl&ce. That is partly because the people are afraid of losing their power or freedom under permanent oflScials. In this connection, indeed, it is interesting to compare in America the pop- ular distrust of permanent administrators with the absence, until the last few years, of any widespread popular distrust of professional politicians; a differ- ence largely due to the fact that the politicians mix with and court the people, taking pains to appear on a level with them, while the permanent official stands apart and remote. A boss, it is true, some- § 118] The Need of Experts Today 271 times holds himself aloof, but at least he distributes favors and is regarded as a benign special providence. Another reason for the democratic dislike of permanence of tenure grows from an insistence upon equality, demonstrated by giving every man a sub- stantial chance to take part in the administration of public affairs. Men desire not only to be well governed, but also to feel that they are governing themselves, and the readiest way of reaching this result is to throw the offices open to all aspirants. We do not need to go back to the ancient world to learn a common principle of human nature. We can look about us. Among our forefathers, as among the Greeks, rotation in office was a corollary of democracy, and while the word has become obnoxious the practice has not lost its attractions. Rotation in office is based upon the same principle as the use of the lot in Athens, for it purports to give each man an equal chance at office, and to insure the control of public affairs by public opinion. It is, perhaps, the simplest, but not necessarily the sole or the best, method of securing that control, and one may wisely inquire whether it is not inconsistent with efficiency, and whether some more effective method of attaining the result cannot be found. 118. The Need of Experts Today The first question, therefore, is whether experts are as much needed in modern governments as they have been in large states in the past; and the answer must clearly be that they are needed much more. The habit of frequent changes of officials, which 272 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 118 means administration by persons without special skill in the public duties they undertake, may work well enough in a small, primitive community, such as Athens in her earlier days, or New England a century ago, or the Western frontier settlements at a later time, where the common experience of ordi- nary men was such as to fit them to deal intelligently with the plain questions that came before the public officer. It worked well enough under the conditions that enabled a private citizen to take up a new busi- ness at any time without previous preparation. In short, it is good under the same conditions, and to the extent, as government by sample, and it is good no farther. Now in private affairs we have reached a stage where the complexity of civilization, the growth of accurate knowledge, the progress of invention, and the keenness of competition which renders a high degree of efficiency alone profitable, have brought about the specialization of occupations. We no longer believe in America today that a man who has shown himself fairly clever at something else, is thereby qualified to manage a railroad, a factory, or a bank. Are we better justffied in assuming that an election by popular vote, or an appointment by a chief magistrate, confers, without apprenticeship, an immediate capacity to construct the roads and bridges, direct the education, manage the finances, purify the water supply, or dispose of the sewage of a large city; and this when it is almost certain that the person selected will not remain in office long enough to learu thoroughly a business of which he § 118] The Need of Experts Today 273 knows little or nothing at the outset? In industrial enterprise, in business concerns, the use of experts of all kinds is, indeed, constantly increasing. They have revolutionized some industries, and are indis- pensable in many more. Nor do we merely seek for men who have gained experience in practice. In one profession after another we have learned to train them carefully in the theory of their work, taking them young and educating them for it as a distinct career. Sixty years ago, for example, there was scarcely a school of applied science in the country, but now they are everywhere, and they can hardly turn out students fast enough to supply the demand. They are ever adding new departments, while our imiversities are creating new specialized schools, and thus adding to the number of professions. We are training men today for all services but that of the public. To the argument that the use of expert knowledge in private industries has been growing, and that the need thereof in the enlarging sphere of governmental action must be growing also, it will be answered that popular education has been greatly extended, and hence the capacity of the people to deal with public questions is larger than ever before. This is, of course, an important factor in the problem of popu- lar government. Elementary education is so nearly universal and compulsory today, that illiteracy is fast disappearing among the voters everywhere; and we may assume that as time goes on the schools will become more efficient and thorough, although probably more specialized, than at present. But 18 274 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 119 the bounds of human knowledge are growing faster than education. A Casaubon, who had mastered everything known in his day, has long been an impossibility; and with the vast progress of research in all fields, specialization in knowledge is daily becoming greater and greater. Hence we have every reason to believe that diffusion of information will not relieve the world of the need of experts; but that, on the contrary, the more men learn the more they will require the services of those who know the most about particular subjects. 119. Limited Use of Experts in American Government It will be answered also that experts are used now for all professional work; that only a lawyer is made a government attorney or corporation counsel, only a physician is appointed health officer, only an engineer is employed to design a steel bridge, only an architect to plan a public building. This is true; and it means that the great professions, which have secured general recognition in the community, have been strong enough to insist that strictly professional work must not be intrusted to men who have had no professional training or experience. So far as it goes that is good; but what do we mean by professional work.f* We do not in practice include all work requiring special knowledge or experience in order to be well done, for we apply the principle only in the case of a few leading professions. We do not insist or demand, for example, that our postmasters, our collectors of customs, our superintendents of streets, the administrators of our finances for the § 119] Experts in American Government 275 nation, state, or city, shall have any familiarity with the affairs they are to conduct, or any special quali- fications for their duties; and yet these matters are often nearly as complex, and require nearly as much technical knowledge, as some of the recognized professions. They require quite as great skill as many positions in private employ to which one would not think of appointing an untrained man. Are we wise in intrusting such duties to a periodically shifting body of oflficials drawn for political motives from an inexperienced public.'' The question is not meant to imply that the political heads of departments ought to be experts; for, as will be shown later, we need in the public service both expert and lay elements, and the latter may well take the form of a non-profes- sional head to a department, provided he has under him thoroughly competent, permanent experts. But in many branches of the public service, central and local, we have no experts at all, no permanent officials playing an important part in the administra- tion; and even in those matters, like legal, medical, or engineering work, where experts are regularly em- ployed, we rarely allow men to remain in office long enough to acquire that familiarity with their peculiar problems which confers efficiency and authority. We are slowly making progress in these ways. The scientific departments at Washington are filled with men of the highest attainments, whom we may hope to see retained in spite of political changes. We have made progress also in civil service reform. Yet this practice, which was derived from England, was applied at first only to positions of the lower 276 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 119' grade, where the work is mainly of a clerical or mechanical character. A vast benefit has been gained by taking these places out of the field of poUtical patronage and party spoils; but the system has been applied very little to posts requiring the exercise of considerable administrative discretion. We cannot estimate what we have suffered in our great public departments, like the Treasury and the Post Office, from the fact that we have not had per- manent under-secretaries, thoroughly familiar with the business and its needs, and striving through a long period of years to improve the service. No cabinet officer holding his post for a single adminis- tration, or less, can possibly supply that want. It may be noted also that the United States is the only great nation with a popular government today which has not permanent officers of that kind, and it is they who keep the machinery of government elsewhere in efficient working order. If democracy is to be conducted with the efficiency needed in a complex modern society it must over- come its prejudice against permanent expert officials as undemocratic. It might as well be alleged that skilled engineers and modern inventions were un- democratic in war; that a true republic ought to go into battle with bows and arrows against machine guns worked by trained soldiers. In fact, the disadvantage at which our cities fight with great public service corporations is largely due to the difference in the calibre of the officials employed. What chance, for example, has a city represented by a solicitor, who is perhaps changed at every § 119] Experts in American Government 277 election, and is paid a small salary, against a great corporation which retains the best legal talent and pays for it many times as much? And what is true in a legal contest is true also of comparative efficiency in all directions. A democracy, like every other community, needs the best tools that it can find, and the expert of high grade is the best living tool of modern civilization. CHAPTER XVIII EXPERTS IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 120. Cities in America are of Recent Growth The defects of American methods are most obvious in municipal government, for our failure there to attain anything approaching our ideal of democracy is beyond question. Future historians will have no difficulty in assigning a cause for American shortcomings in this quarter. They will point out that in Europe cities existed before the dawn of history; that the institutions of the Roman world developed in the main out of urban conditions, and were always deeply tinged with municipal ideas. They will note that in the Middle Ages, when the national organization was essentially feudal and rural, the cities had a vitality of their own and presented the nearest approach on a con- siderable scale to self-government. They will ob- serve, ia short, that urban administration is by no means a new thing in modern Europe. On the other hand, they will perceive that local government in America was at the outset almost entirely rural in character, and long continued to be mainly adapted to rural needs. The result is that while the problem of rural administration has given rise in the last half century to quite as serious consider- 278 § 120] Cities in America of Recent Growth 279 ation in Europe as the management of cities, this has been very far from the case in the United States, where local government, outside of the large towns, has followed a course so smooth that until scholars undertook a study of the subject, few men had any clear conception of rural institutions beyond their own section of the country. The very absence of general discussion of the subject shows that, while there is a great diversity in the rural organization in different parts of the nation, each system has grown normally from prevailing conditions, and is fairly well suited to local needs; whereas in the case of municipal government, where conscious imitation has been far more common, discontent is well-nigh universal throughout the land. In the charters of American cities the separation of executive and legislative organs, and the division of the latter into two branches, was copied from the state and national governments, although these principles had no proper application, because a city government is essentially an administrative, not a legislative, concern. Moreover, wide as the diver- gence is today between the forms of rural and urban government in Americ^, some principles appear to have been carried over from one to the other without regard to their fitness. The needs of a rural com- munity are comparatively simple, and are readily understood by any intelligent man. This was par- ticularly true half a century ago. The care of the roads and of elementary schools, the assessment of taxes on farms and live stock, the impounding of stray cattle, were matters within the knowledge of 280 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 121 everyone, and could be managed well enough by farmers of good sense chosen by their neighbors for the purpose. No special training was needed, no corps of experts; and rotation in office, if not too rapid, did not seriously interfere with efficiency. But such a custom is quite out of place in the administration of a large modern city, complicated as it must be by a variety of public services, most of which use the results of recent scientific discovery and mechanical invention. The problems arising in the supply of water, the disposal of sewage, the maintenance of streets and bridges with their numberless uses for wires and pipes as well as for travel, the provision for rapid transit, the elaborate system of public education, and the treatment of disease, pauperism, and crime, are not matters with which even the most intelligent citizen is made familiar in the pursuit of his ordinary vocation. They can be mastered only by special study or long experience, and they can be dealt with efficiently only by persons who have mastered them. 121. The Lesson of European Cities It is generally admitted that our large cities are less well governed than those of Europe, and many wise men believe that we can learn something from their longer experience. But transplanted political institutions are likely to be barren unless the roots are carried with them. There are said to be monkeys in Africa so imitative that they copy faithfully the huts of men, and then live on the outside of them instead of the inside. Political imitation is not free § 121] The Lesson of European Cities 281 from this danger of copying the obvious, while failing to perceive the essential, in the working of a foreign government. Now the vital difiference between American and European cities, more funda- mental than any outward form of organization, is the fact that municipal administration here is usually conducted by inexpert temporary oflScers, whereas in Europe it is virtually in the hands of permanent experts, controlled to a greater or less extent, but never suppressed, by elected councils. In Germany, a country where the bureaucracy does not seek shelter from the public gaze, the influence of expert officials in municipal government is self-evident. There is an elective city council, and the committees to which the various branches of the administration are intrusted contain unpro- fessional members; but the chief magistrate of the city, the burgomaster, is strictly a permanent pro- fessional administrator, and the business of the city is in the main conducted by him and by the other permanent officials for whom municipal work is a life-long career. In France and England the authority of the permanent officials is less apparent and one must look beneath the surface to see it. The statutes are, indeed, almost silent about their qualifications, their tenure, and their duties, but in practice their influence is little less powerful because concealed.^ In England the council and its com- mittees purport to do everything. Yet by working ' For the influence of the permanent officials see Professor W. B. Munro's The Gooemment of European Cities, and for the English cities see also the writer's Government of England, chap. xl. 282 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 122 througli these committees and their chairmen, the town clerk, the borough surveyor, the tramway manager, the engineers of the water and gas works, and their colleagues practically carry on the adminis- tration of the city; and in general it may be said that the excellence of the service is roughly in pro- portion to the strength of their influence. As in every other part of the British government, un- written conventions are more powerful than formal organization, and while the forms are carefully observed and even paraded, the real forces work unseen in the background. For this reason observers often discover the action of the permanent officials in the government of an Enghsh city today as little as Montesquieu perceived the effect of the cabinet in restricting the personal authority of the King. Even the British public servant does not talk of it, and perhaps does not think much about it, until con- fronted by a system in which it is lacking, and then the contrast strikes him forcibly. Mr. Dalrymple, the manager of the Glasgow tramways, reported to the mayor of Chicago that it was hopeless for the city to think of operating the street railroads so long as the officials were appointed for short terms from political motives. 122. The Model Charter Discourages Experts Until recently our municipal reformers have not appreciated the importance of this matter. They have fixed their attention mainly upon devices that would tend to promote the selection of good citizens for public office, and have not perceived clearly § 122] Model Charter Discourages Experts 283 enough that the best elective officers are in the long run as helpless without good permanent adminis- trators as the latter are with a bad mayor and council. The failure to grasp this point is evident from the model city charter prepared by the National Munici- pal League in 1899. Read in the light of reports which explain it, that plan was certainly intended to encourage permanence of tenure by the heads of departments^; and yet under the arrangement proposed, they were highly unhkely to be men who devoted their lives to administrative service as a career. They could be removed, it is true, only with a statement setting forth the reasons therefor, which must not be their political opinions; but everyone kno^v^s that such a provision does not prevent removal for political reasons where the mayor has unrestricted power to appoint the suc- cessor. What sort of a position were they intended to occupy.'' In a small city it is conceivable, though unlikely, that the mayor might be the sole executive officer who took part in politics, who held by an uncertain tenure, and that he should supervise a corps of permanent heads of departments. But in a large city, this would be beyond his powers, and although there have been occasional cases of heads of departments in our large cities who have held office continuously for long periods through changes of administration, such cases have, for obvious reasons, been extremely rare. It is not impossible for a mayor to have a cabinet of non-professional, 1 A Municipal Program, adopted by the National Municipal League Nov. 17, 1899, pp. 80, 82. 284 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 122 temporary lieutenants each of whom superintends one or more permanent officials in charge of depart- ments as the English cabinet ministers superintend their permanent under-secretaries. In such a sys- tem, however, it is essential to distinguish clearly the positions of the layman and the expert; not to prescribe their duties minutely by statute, for that cannot be done, but to make the distinction itself obvious, to make it clear, by the absence of a sub- stantial salary or otherwise, that the temporary or political chief is not to administer the department himself, but merely to see that it is properly ad- ministered and to keep it in touch with public opinion. Now the model charter did not do this. It apparently assumed that the head of a depart- ment was to be its real administrative officer. Under these conditions it would probably not be easy, after the first flush of the reform movement had passed, to find either experts or laymen com- petent and willing to fill the position. Experts of high grade would not be anxious to serve unless they had reason to suppose that they would remain during good behavior; and citizens of marked execu- tive capacity would make a great sacrifice in giving up their regular occupations and devoting their whole time to public work for an indefinite period. Professor Goodnow, one of the authors of the model charter, has himself pointed out that heads of city departments are likely to be recruited too frequently from professional politicians rather than professional administrators or men of proved executive talent.^ ' City Government in the United States, p. 191 et seq. § 123] City Government by Commission 285 He has treated this subject in a very interesting way, and suggests in the passage already cited that only by means of boards of commissioners can permanence of tenure and popular non-professional supervision be secured; that single-headed depart- ments will fall into the hands either of an official bureaucracy, or of men who make a living out of politics and from lack of adequate training are often not competent to fill these offices. In several notable instances, boards of commissioners, usually unpaid, but aided by paid permanent experts, have certainly succeeded in combining the two elements in a highly satisfactory way; although it may be doubted whether Professor Goodnow is right in thinking this the only means to the end. 123. City Govenuneiit by Commission One of the chief merits of the new plan of placing the whole city government in the hands of a com- mission is the opportunity it affords of maintaining a corps of permanent administrators working under the supervision of the members of a board; for an elected commission is well adapted to the purpose, and its operation in this way would not interfere in the least with the other merits rightly claimed for it.^ That, indeed, has been the course actually ' Mr. Ford H. MacGregor, in his City ■Government by Commission, pp. 25-26 lays down four essential features of the plan. First, a con- centration of all power and responsibility in a small body, instead of dividing it between an executive and a legislative branch. Second, elec- tion at large and not by wards. Third, the members of the commission the only elective officers of the city, with power to appoint all subordinate administrative officials. Fourth, the power to remove all such officials at will. None of these features is in the least inconsistent with the 286 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 123 pursued in Galveston, where the plan of government by commission had its origin and where its benefits have been most marked. The mayor receives a salary of $2,000 and is required by the charter to devote six hours a day to city work, but no such provision is made in the case of the other com- missioners who are paid only $1,200 and are said to give on the average two hours a day. They do not, we are told, undertake the actual management of the routine in their departments, which is done by the superintendents under them. They simply advise and direct, and thus men prominent in active business have been able and willing to serve the city as members of the commission.^ But in the later charters that excellent principle has not usually been followed. A feeling arose that the commissioners ought to be the actual administrators of their departments; and hence in Houston, the second city to adopt the plan, their salaries were doubled and they were expressly required to devote their whole time to the city.^ This idea has prevailed generally, and 'in most of the cities which have adopted government by commission, substantial salaries are paid to its members, intended apparently to be large enough to compensate them for their whole time. A few charters, indeed, such as those of Lynn, Massachu- existence of permanent expert officials m charge of departments which are supervised but not directly administered by the members of the commission. In fact all these features, except the election at large, exist in substance in the English cities where the administration by permanent officials prevails. ' MacGregor, op. cit, pp. 38-39. ^ Ibid., pp. 43-44i. § 123] City Government by Commission 287 setts, and Baker, Oregon, go so far as to provide that the commissioners shall be specifically elected by the people to take charge of particular departments. Now election by popular vote is a very poor way of selecting expert administrators, because however good judges the people at large may be of a man's general intellectual and moral capacity, they have neither the means nor the leisure for the careful scrutiny needed to estimate his professional qualifications. An appointing body, if it does its duty, examines more evidence and considers more candidates before making a selection than the public can possibly do, and the best experts are highly unlikely to be willing to undertake a campaign to obtain the place.^ Moreover, if expert adminis- trators could be chosen in this way, they could not be permanent, for that is in its nature inconsistent with representing a fluctuating public opinion as expressed in recurrent elections. Nor is it practi- cable to have expert administrators of high grade under commissioners chosen for the purpose of administering the departments directly and paid full salaries for so doing. It would be playing false to the people by taking pay for work not done, even if the double charge of full salaries to both commissioner and administrator were not prohibi- tive. Considerable salaries would, indeed, actually tend to eliminate men of large experience in affairs from the commission. A sense of civic duty will ' Mr. MacGregor {Oily Government by Commission, p. 49) remarks, "It is probably now generally recognized that it is easier to secure pro- fessional and technical men by appointment than by popular election." 288 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 123 induce many such men to devote their spare time to public affairs, but if they are expected to give up everything else they cannot afford it. The bigger the man, the more he earns in his private occupation, and the less adequate the compensation for his whole time; whereas a salary which involves a heavy sacrifice for him is very attractive to a smaller man. City government by commission has not yet been tried long enough to warrant a decisive estimate of its value. Every new plan works well for a time, because the movement for reform from which it springs brings good men to the front and places power in their hands. The real test comes in later years, when the momentum is exhausted, and the moral enthusiasm of the dawn has faded into the light of common day. The merit of the commission plan will probably depend upon the capacity it develops for providing expert administration; and this brings us to the delicate question of the proper relation between the expert who carries on the public service and the representative of the public under whom he serves.^ '■ One of the few direct encouragements in any American city charter to the use of experts in municipal government is to be found in the new charter of Boston, which provides that an appointment by the mayor shall not take effect unless the civil service commission of the state certifies that the appointee is an expert or a citizen qualified by his char- acter and experience for the position. This is not a very long step, and makes no provision for the proper use of experts; but it was designed, by drawing attention to the need of them, to promote their selection, and it has not been without effect. A very incisive discussion of the function of experts in municipal government is contained in the Baldwin Prize Essay for 1912 byAriiur Dexter Brigham. CHAPTER XIX CONTROL AND RECRUITING OF EXPERTS Napoleon was of opinion that as law is a science, based on eternal principles of justice, the laws of a nation ought to be made by a body of scientific jurists, and hence that for this purpose a representa- tive assembly was out of place. He did not see that the principles of justice depend upon the conditions of the existing civilization, and it is to give these expression that a representative assembly exists. Our danger Ues in an opposite direction. A democ- racy in giving effect to the popular will is liable to forget that running through all civilization there are eternal principles which cannot be violated with impunity. In fact there is a constant need of coop- eration and compromise between public opinion and expert knowledge. 124. Cause of the Distrust of Experts The American people distrust experts in public life for the same reason that the Athenians avoided officers chosen for long terms. They do not see how such men can be kept in touch with popular thought, and made amenable to public opinion. They dread bureaucracies like those created by monarchy in continental Europe; and of the English system of permanent officials under the control of 19 289 290 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 124 representatives of the people they are unaware because from its nature it conceals itself. The distrust is well founded to this extent, that if a modern popular government needs expert adminis- trators, it must also take care that they do not strangle it or thwart its wishes. Clearly the ordi- nary methods of keeping representatives in contact with public opinion, such as rotation in office and the prospect of a new election, or, in the case of appointed political officers, a change of incumbents following a change of party, are inapplicable, because they are inconsistent with permanence of tenure and expert service. Nor are they always effective in preventing the evils commonly attributed to bureaucracy. Do we not know that by reason of the inexperience of our removable officials the United States government is one of the worst debtors, one of the most uncomfortable concerns with which to do business, of all the well-meaning institutions in the world? Have we not all groaned at its grievous red tape? The fact is that an official who is new to his work, and does not feel secure in his position, finds his chief safety in making no departure from the established precedents of the office. Whatever the perils may be in countries which have inherited a self-sufficient bureaucracy from a monarchical past, there would be little danger here that permanent officials properly supervised by non-professionals would be more seriously out of touch with public sentiment than temporary officials supervised by professional politicians. The distrust of permanent experts has no rational § 125] Relation of Experts and Laymen 291 foundation if they can be kept in touch with public opinion through the control exerted over them by representatives of the people; and the constant practice in England shows that this is not in fact difficult, provided the proper relation between these two classes of officials is clearly understood and observed. But that is precisely the point on which at present we need to be educated. 126. Ignorance of the Relation of Experts and Laymen Unfortunately, we often find in America, even among men with a wide experience in affairs, a strange ignorance of the relation which ought to exist between experts and the persons to whom they are responsible. There are many charitable insti- tutions, for example, in which the paid adminis- trative head is not present at the meetings of the board of trustees; and one hears the practice de- fended on the ground that it might be awkward to discuss his conduct if he were there — as if his work could be properly discussed except in his presence. Can anyone conceive of a successful railroad where the president was regularly excluded from the board of directors.? No large or difficult enterprise can prosper without a permanent adminis- trative manager, and it is his function not only to carry out the policy laid down by his directors, but also to give them his advice, to suggest to them improvements, to convince them of the soundness of his views if he can; and this he is not in a posi- tion to do unless he appears in person and takes an active part in their debates. 292 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 125 Even in cases, therefore, where experts are employed, it is not uncommon to commit the blunder of not giving them a chance to exert a proper influence. An error of the opposite char- acter is often made by placing experts in positions which they ought not to fill. When our govern- ment undertook the construction of the Panama Canal the President, against his own better judg- ment, appointed engineers upon the commission to supervise the engineer in charge of the work.^ Shrewd observers prophesied at the time that trouble would ensue, and before long the commis- sioners were changed. Now, it is a fundamental principle that an expert ought not to be set to supervise another expert in the same line — unless as his superior officer. An expert on a board of directors is in danger of relying too much upon his own technical knowledge, instead of being guided by the closer information of the expert in charge of the work, and a paralyzing clash of opinions is likely to result. There are, of course, instances where any of these elementary rules can be violated with impunity on account of the character of the persons concerned. Some professional men have a sense of their duties so delicate that on a board of directors they avoid bringing their opinions on technical matters into conflict with those of their paid experts, but such men are rare, and the fact that they are occasionally found does not invalidate the general principle. ' Francis E. Leupp, Atlantic Monthly, June, 1912, p. 847. § 126] Examples of the Proper Relation 293 126. Examples of the Proper Relation These examples have been mentioned to show that, although our people may understand the use of experts in their own business, they are often unaware of the primary rules of the art in affairs outside of their daily experience. In our great private industries and educational institutions the true relations between experts and laymen have been worked out and applied. The president of a railroad and his subordinates are railroad men by profession, skilled experts, and if they were not, the road would not be eflSciently, progressively, or even safely, conducted; but the board of directors is composed of bankers, merchants, and other men of general business experience, who make no pretence to the technical knowledge required to manage the road. In fact they represent the business public — not by election, but by sample — and so far as the sample is not a fair one, and therefore the directors do not faithfully represent the business public, that public, and ultimately the railroad itself, is sure to suffer. In the same way, the presidents of colleges are experts, and most certainly the faculties are; but for boards of trustees they want, not professional educators, but broad-minded men of the world with scholarly sympathies. In public office we are constantly confusing these relations. We hear people complain, for example, that some candidate for the school board is not an expert in education, although the object of super- vision and control by the board is not to add to 294 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 126 the technical knowledge of the trained superin- tendent, but to supply the qualities which he lacks — the close touch with the popular point of view, and the sense of proportion that comes therewith. In some directions we have learned much within a generation, and in one service, that of education, we have seen a marked change in the attitude of the people toward their expert officials. To take an illustration from a single city, a score of years ago Boston had, indeed, a superintendent of schools who had been in office many years, but he was suffered to take little part in their management. He was not present at the meetings of the school board, and the most important of all functions, the selection of teachers, was performed by sub-com- mittees of the board, who conferred with the masters, but rarely consulted him. In fact it was said that his work consisted chiefly in writing an annual report. Now all this has changed. The superin- tendent is present at all the meetings, nominates the teachers, conducts the administration under the general direction of the board, and is the real executive head of public education, bearing to the board, as he should, a relation similar to that of the head of any industrial institution to the board of directors. A process of this kind has been quietly going on in many parts of the country, and thus the administration of the public schools, as well as the teaching of the children, is becoming a great profession, whose members have a permanent career in the public service — a career, by the way, as wide as tl;ie nation, for an officer who has made § 127] Examples of the Proper Relation 295 his mark in one place may be called to a position in another city. All this will greatly improve education; while, far from becoming bureaucratic, the administration of the schools has come into closer touch with the aspirations of the people. The teaching profession has become thereby more respected and more popular, as well as more in- fluential than ever before. If the other branches of city work could be put on a similar basis, the ques- tion of municipal reform would be wellnigh solved. Examples of expert management controlled by representatives of the public, are to be found through- out the political system of England, which was never that of an absolute monarchy, and has never become quite a democracy of the traditional type, but has ever carried the forms of one age over into the next and thus combined some of their virtues. The administration, national or local, is habitually conducted by a permanent oflBcial, who devotes his whole life to the career, and has under him a staff of permanent subordinates, professional like him- self, but acting under the constant supervision and control of a cabinet minister or a committee of the local council. The minister, or the committeeman, may learn much about the business if he remains long in office, but he rarely becomes, or pretends to be, an expert. 127. The True Relation between Experts and Representatives of the Public The relation which ought to exist between the expert in charge and the non-professional under 296 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 127 whose control he acts has never been more acutely discussed than by Bagehot in the chapter on "Changes of Ministry" in his English Constitu- tion. The pith of the matter is in his quotation from Sir George Cornewall Lewis, "It is not the business of a Cabinet Minister to work his depart- ment. His business is to see that it is properly worked." The expert is essentially the executive officer who carries on the administration, suggests improvements, advises his chief on all questions of policy that arise, but gives effect loyally to any policy which his chief decides to follow. His chief, representing the public, ought not to administer directly, but keep the office from getting into ruts, stimulate it when lethargic, and lay down the general poUcy to be pursued. In short, the expert is responsible to his chief for good service, the latter to the public for the poUcy pursued and the general result. In order that the chief who represents the public should control the administration, it is neither nec- essary nor wise for him to go much into details, because the public wants not means but ends, not methods but results; and the layman is at the mercy of the expert in matters of detail, whereas if he confines his attention to results and is a man of force and good sense, he will produce an effect. Nor is it necessary that public sentiment should be brought to bear at every rung of the official ladder. It is enough that it is brought to bear at the top with strength enough to affect the whole structure. To change the policy of a railroad, the § 127] Experts and the Public 297 president does not need to replace all the employees, or even the ones in the higher posts. If they are capable men, and not mutinous, he needs only to steer them on a different course; and in the same way experience shows how a vigorous English min- ister can guide his whole body of officials, although no new man, except himself, comes into the depart- ment. In fact, the railroad president and the minister find it easier to carry out their policies than they would if all the men holding positions that require discretion were replaced by others, however intelhgent, who were unfamiliar with their duties. The filling with politicians of all the im- portant posts in a national business, like the post office or the custom house, is not a means of bring- ing public opinion to bear on public work. It simply prevents any intelligent policy from being carried out. Apart from general questions of policy to be decided by the Postmaster General or the Secretary of the Treasury, what the public reaUy desires is simply the maximum efficiency in the ser- vice, and that can be attained only by a corps of highly trained men in high administrative positions. It is for this reason that the frequent shifting of English cabinet ministers from one department to another is not inconsistent with efficient manage- ment. If they were to conduct their departments directly, such changes would mean inexperience and bad administration, but if their function is merely oversight, a fresh eye is not necessarily an evil, and may, as Bagehot insists, even be an advantage. In this connection it may be observed that since one of 298 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 128 the effects of popular government, with its rapidly shifting party majorities, has been a more frequent change of the political executive officers, there is the greater need of expert administrators to carry on the public service with the efficiency that modern civilization demands.^ 128. Methods of Creating the True Relation The proverb that there are many ways of kill- ing a cat, and none of them always succeeds, is true of political machinery. The right relation between expert administrators and their political chiefs may exist under very different forms. It cannot be provided by law, because from their very nature the functions of the two classes of officers cannot be accurately defined. It is a distinction of influ- ence rather than of power. Nor can it be secured by adopting any particular organization. The impor- tant thing is to recognize the principle, and make use ' J. Ramsay McDonald, himself a socialist and a leader of the Labor Party in the House of Commons, says on this subject (Socialism and Oovernment, vol. ii, pp. 34-35), " The apparent incon- gruity of a Minister being at the Education Office one year and the Admiralty the next, disappears when examined at close quarters. The Cabinet is not a collection of experts on any one subject. Were that so its corporate responsibility for government would be unreal. It is a committee of men of good common sense and intelli- gence, of business ability, of practical capacity, in touch with public opinion, on the one hand, and by reason of that, carrying out a certain policy, and, on the other, it is the controller of a staff of experts who know the details of departmental work. The perma- nent officials obey their minister; he obeys public opinion. The Cabinet is the bridge linking up the people with the expert, join- ing principle to practice. Its function is to transform the mess- ages sent along sensory nerves into commands sent through motor nerves. It does not keep the departments going; it keeps them going in certain directions." § 128] Methods of Creating the True Relation 299 of forms that will tend to emphasize it. The ex- pert is permanent, irrespective of changes of party, and therefore he must keep clear of politics in his office and out of it, and as his duties are quite apart from the political questions which the people are called upon to decide, he ought never to be elected, but appointed without limit of time. The political chief, on the other hand, whose functions are dis- tinctly political, ought to be in close touch with public opinion, and should from time to time give account of his stewardship. Hence he ought to come up for reelection or reappointment at intervals long enough to show what he has done, not merely to promise what he will do. Another mode of giving emphasis to the distinction between the two classes of officials is furnished by the matter of salaries. The expert ought to devote his whole time, and, in fact, his whole life, to the public service, preferably being forbidden to follow any profession or business of his own, and he ought to be paid a liberal salary, large enough to attract able men into the career. But the political chief ought not to receive a compensation greater than the sacrffice he is expected to make. A cabinet officer who must leave his home and live at the capital, and the mayor of a large city whose time must be wholly engrossed by municipal work, ought to be paid full salaries; but a member of a city commission, or the political head of a city depart- ment ought not, as a rule, to manage the details of his office and the work of supervision ought not to take so much of his time as to prevent him from 300 Where Public Opinion Cannot Apply [§ 129 paying attention to his private affairs. He ought, therefore, to receive, if anything, only a compara- tively small compensation, and there is in such cases a distinct advantage in paying nothing because this tends to discourage the man who seeks office, not in order to render public service, but for the pay it brings. 129. Recruiting Experts for the Public Service The question of selecting permanent adminis- trative officials is by no means a simple one. From England we have taken the idea of civil service reform, the plan of appointment by merit instead of political pull, and we have thereby reduced enormously the field of party patronage and spoils, but hitherto we have adopted the system only in part. We have applied it mainly to places requiring work of a mechanical or routine character, and very little to the higher offices involving the exercise of discretion. Complaints are heard from Wash- ington that a position which is permanent confers no real authority, while one that gives any scope for initiative is not permanent. The civil service examinations are, indeed, adapted to that condition, for they are designed primarily to test the immedi- ate fitness of the candidate for the duties he will be called upon to perform; and this is easy to measme in the case of mechanical or routine work, but very difficult to ascertain when initiative, resourceful- ness, good judgment, and willingness to assume responsibility are in question. These are personal qualities which a written examination reaches but §129] The Recruiting of Experts 301 faintly. Civil service commissioners have, no doubt, authority to scrutinize the history of the candidates, with the reputation they have made in other posi- tions, and thus to ascertain their qualifications as any other employer might do; but so far as they exercise this function they occupy the place of appointing, rather than of examining, boards. In any case they are seeking to discover the immediate fitness of men already trained, not the future capacity of men still ignorant of the work. Yet this last is an important thing to do, because many branches of the public service have no counterpart in private affairs, and the knowledge they require can be obtained only by experience in the depart- ment itself. In great private industries employers do not seek mainly for persons already trained, but take promising yoimg men, promoting them as they show talent, and this is in fact the practice of the British Government. When the Crown, after the mutiny, took over from the East India Company the administration of India, a commission was appointed to consider the method of recruiting the civil service there, and Lord Macaulay, who wrote the report, laid down the principle that the com- petitive examinations for appointment ought not to cover the special subjects needed by an official in India, such as the native languages and the laws and institutions of the country, because ambitious young men with good prospects of a career at home .would not, on a mere chance of success in the com- petition, spend a year or two in studies that would 302 Where Public Opinion Cannot. Apply [§ 129 be useless in case of failure. The examination was therefore confined to the subjects ordinarily pursued at a university, leaving special training to be acquired after the selection was made; and the candidates have, in fact, been of excellent calibre. The system was applied later to the various departments of the English government, and is now in general use for recruiting the higher grade of permanent oflficials of the nation. The Dutch colonial office followed the opposite plan, examining the candidates upon the subjects they would need in Java, an arrangement which required them to study for a couple of years at the Indian Institute at Delft. But the class of men who did so was unsatisfactory, and after a careful inves- tigation, the plan was abandoned a dozen years ago. These examples show the advantages of a system which does not attempt to measure immediate fit- ness for the work to be done, but merely tests the general education and ability of young men who are expected to make their own way up the steps of the service by their usefulness after they have entered it. Few people would be rash enough to suggest that the English examinations should be copied here. For many reasons they are out of place. But it is not inconceivable that some method could be devised that would bring men into the public service young, would eliminate poUtics in their selection, and would offer them a prospect of a permanent career. That many ambitious and capable young men would be glad to seize the opportunity so offered no one who knows them well § 129] The Recruiting of Experts 303 will doubt. But first we must reach a conviction that we want them. If we recognize the need, the means will be found and the rest will follow. As Professor Goodnow said, in discussing the case of per- manent experts in the higher posts of the national service, "That this can be accomplished by any changes in the law may, perhaps, be doubted. That it will be accomplished, as soon as an educated and intelligent public opinion demands it, is a moral certainty." * Many people feel that because popular govern- ment is new it must be lasting. They know it is a vital part of the spirit of the age, which they assume to be permanent. But that is the one thing the spirit of the age never is. It would not deserve its name if it were; and when any spirit of the age has become universally recognized, it is time to scan the horizon for signs of a new era. Whether popular government will endure or not depends upon its success in solving its problems, and among these none is more insistent than the question of its capacity both to use and to control experts, a question closely interwoven with the nature, the expression, and the limitations of public opinion. ^Politics and Administration, p. 121. Appendix A Results of the Referendum and Initiative in Switzerland 20 306 Appendix A CO m 0! 80 ^ i> so © I-H 00 CO m 00 o< c Q< O e» 00 a . ""i ®1 »o «0 r-l g 2£ 1— 1 i> Wi GO ^t" o ^ ph" so Wi I-T 00 I-H r-t 00 to i (N 0< I— t r-t I-H I-H (N I-H I-H e< ti 05 OT OJ 00 i> Tj CO t- I-H «5 OS 1 o; 00 05 to «5 c ■* •4H o CO ef OT o" to ^ " o" i-I' oo' o" rH d O I-H 0« «3 ac t- so t- o o< h-f o« o< I-H l-t rH I-H r-t Q* (N I-H F^ V o O OJ c to 00 M fe s s< t- 00 o: OS CO to ■M s 00 «i e< CO OJ o_ rH (N Ph w oT <» o to" L<-I «+H «4- «fH 64-1 04- 04-4 ft4M 04-4 64-4 +J r- 1 cd ^ 01 a v v i. • s 1 3 1 .2 8 1 1 ■s 2" >5 3 & u 04 1 '3 1 a is 11 o Pi H eg a-g ° ii a. la J 2 «4H ;^ r c D ^ ~, O H c X +3 .4-. ft o o •4-J -6 g n t r II i a p ■6 e:5(S ^ 3 a- W5 0<. CO ,- 0( OJ . to c- I— 05 OS i-i 00 rH rH CO ts &: ? &: ? >>'> ss t- . . 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O o X "3 eS ^ " a ■« . O 3 «3 S a .-^-^ a tuD cs _a .a cS H n _ri a o U ^ 3 S o s a g J ii a o u -0 eS O ., ^ b ■SI a . O *J CiO a a to C3 to 1-1 50 OS ■* . OS H V3 f^ «5 "^ 0< OS . . CO i Appendix A 309 o ■* 00 i> 85 «5 TO «5 © b- rH 00 OS «5 «5 o) e i-H (H t- 00 00 ■* O (N r1 t- © rH «5 «5 ■* © © 00 00 e< s< © ®i ""1 015 l> © © i> 1-H «5 © © WJ © 015 © © 00 00 0<5 0<5 i-H 015 1> © © •* © © St o« St 00 © (N 1-1 0<5 O^ O ©_ 00 © lo" • oT o 0<5 0(5 CD 00 «5 © © © o ©* St o 0(5 © 00 «5 (3 Ph PhPh P^ Ph Ph P3 tftf (^ >g »S •s ^ g « 3 S3 " 8 > .g Si §>^ .a -a ■§ J 8= £ (U fl ci C t- H O 3 V ^ o e £ « S q d I o § ^ . ^ ■<-( ■ n, ^. ■^ I ■ s a ° S S o _» 00 rH a o- 5? a o ^ &i] a s S ■ ^ ..9 ..a U «4-l ill! IS 53 3 « Ja S o o -^-fa o 6csa f^ n* fl V oj « 55 ^ ii i t, « OS w T^ w *• [» ^ a „ a 5 o s o o V a BO .a -a o ^ eg -a "> a * o ^ a g a -^3 a _« o " "2 iJ a o v si) J § S 8|| 5 «> . a> o a « Jj o £ ft^ ft .£; S^ w • 'r! ■S '^ d H d s s i § P5 2 > ■s § -S © 2 00 s< ^ o .© °< 13 2 >. M © ^ © OS o '-' 310 Appendix A <3 I 00 o I— I m I u m m I— I &: en P4 W H ^ a w «s c: O) «: c !2 1 a«. oi ti t- ec ec «c © ■* rH o. o oc CT t- o 4-> OS o" wT "O i- ec ec IS !> 00 e< as Q< «c oc ■■a CO o 0* at ©1 O) Q< s ■g ^ 1— 1 r-t PH 1-^ «a t- i> eo > 1 «D O o» 00 Q) oc CT UJ «5_ o_ r-H t- l- ec 03 f^ 00 (S «3 t- t- a: »r OS* d m o» >o a ■* Q< OJ oo I-H ®1 eo ^ s CO o Q« ■* o- !-H o 'ji ■* a: cc O H o l> «5 «5 ec t- i> ™ 4J K ■> F K 00 i> !> !> i- 00 is -M B4-4 ■4-1 ■4^ ■4- «4- 4- «4_ •4-4 6 ^ ^ 'M ^ fS 1 pi ^ ^ ^ 1 T3 ;i 1 1 1 :| 1 «4H o 3 CiC • >i 60 1 n .2 a TS •■3 > ! d (2 o "3 * «4-l o ■g ■| u 1 CO 1 1 "O . 13 SJ c 1 •s Iff a o § < 1 1 1 § 1 i OS £ o « g 1 i o s V +■ C J •s 2 4- 1 J a o i ■5 >5 ^1 1 -4J > 4- r- o ,£5 ^6 4- ^ X a .£ . S §" M Sg OS «5 '^ C ^-=' •*• e c 3 5 -1 o I— 1 1 +3 o S s Appendix A 311 1-1 i> 05 ©*" CO 00 OS «5 »3 1-1 •* «o 55 CO GO CO °i o ■^ i-T o ■* CO o« o CO o oT 90 OD ^ tf »5 S tf O 1^ o ■ D 13 V o OP a -^ ■ 60 a s * " « .2 J3 -U =*! 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'.^ e*-i o a o l|i .a "o a o u OS CO SJ V a 15 BO •I J3 3 C/2 ce a CO OS o CO i> ■* CO o) CO «5 X rH I— I o © o a „ o 2 Ji -3 2-2 2 I S ft 3 g S CO CO , rH p. p? •*3 § C3 3§tl 312 Appendix iV s c3 < o o o Eh u ■w St (V ■«< «5 1^ to »o o 00 a* )> I-H ■* lO f~ W5 rH OS o CO 00 00 •s *d 00 l-H o ^ T-H MS to 00 l-H ■* ®l to a 60 I^ ■* a> CO «5 f~ OS «5 00 ■* t^ on ici on i- J^ OS CO Ol ■* > CO o o «c no ■* (V I— 1 o> 00 ■* 00 > d . «4H e4H «+H «4H «*H 6+-4 =s "v V « 13 1 ra *^ .3 0. fe ^ s o o b '*-i +^ or ta , «" 4S Si) •« rl d o3 cd >5 hjpul 1^ Appendix A 313 si »t w at «s t- a< (o 00 00 CO 5- o of o" 9) KS O i-H (X « o "Jl rl 1-1 ISP OJ to •* Q« OS i^ o» ■* 00 ■* i-T rH 1-1 a« 00 O CO o ■* «o (S to ■* M5 «5 O to" of OT r-l a* 1-1 i> t- to O 00 00 00 o o< 00 1-1 o o> 0» p-l OJ 00 V V a tf W M ■H ID S -s a d o O T} o ea ^ a; CO h Fh O "S a _ 3 O ^ o 'G m o o _« a, o (U Oh tlD a s o O o 5 «S *> n a a d g o o <« ^ ^ « o a o g ft a .■tt ^ *3 S "^ S ^ «| g i s. 03 3 ti hj CC HJ .J2 s 3 a u a o -a OJ rt . . o o» 00 to - ^ S r,> »» '^ Z^ — *" S — V 00 1-1 o . ■* o» m 2 o OS ^ S *i 1^ (a, O (N 314 Appendix A 1 1 •4J < 27,389 12,029 6,820 S» t- r-l OS »0 O ■* 00 l> 1> MJ «5 rH ■*" ■*" os" r-( r-( rH i I-H 15,731 20,116 16,314 eo OS 1— I rH os" 00 •* 0« rH rH 0< I— t 19,983 14,182 11,958 25,837 22,718 14,499 11 Mi llll 3 III C4-4 «IH ^-S (3 o < o 12; O H :? I I I S rP-2 S o 0) a o g a I— I «*H ■rH M -3 5 ao 5j ^ C8 -^ -^ C^ fl d (, c3 cS O • ■ *4-l +J 4J ^ CO ce ^ a d 5 o o hJUU O- ■ jh n w Stag's i o o d ri ri OhJi-Ji-:! V o 4) d o d o d * CO *^ 0) 11^ CO Fh ' 03 (L> ^1 TO O ' TO TO flj -« w fl ''» ^j en "'oo-' . .os°» . . Appendix A 315 ■* »~ © rr, 00 1-H rh t- Q< ex 1— 1 J^ 1— ( 00 «5 00 SO I— 1 on T— 1 l-l i-f Q-t 00 I— ( <£> >n 'fl 1^ »^ O CN 05 (^ I— 1 (Ti 00* O* OS 1> I— 1 ®1 (N (N I— 1 rH 4-3 *t^ «4H , CM .3 «tf «tf SfS d o u u a -a H .s ^ JS o o o .9 S ri4 JS ail ■j-* « « OS SI'S II a I U I— I I -a ^ a o oJ K5 •* '-' OT >0 .O. .r^-' .0*0"^ 4JI-I o-di-i aj'd>-i 0) aa> ij HH OS fl M OS d CO 9 n o o d ■ ■-4 -M +3 4^ lU *>o 00 V OT :■ s« -1 ^ t- •F C8 ■* C4 :*3 i O flj d' m ^ •4J ;2 2 (U g I. 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CO o o< o 00 %t o e< ^ 00 «5 O* pq^ i> U5 l-H ii e4-4 4-3 CM f^3M . :3 5 +f rt . s.g .8.1 .9 a1^ o o S s «5 rH 0, Q< c Appendix A 339 © o« CO s« OS ol ■* CO 00 "O CO 00 OS «5 «0 O t- rH 05 O ■* ■* ■* t- IN to e« to CD T}! •-I CO O «S 00 o> 00 00 Sj "5 «5 "ji a< Q< 1-1 OS to to OS o 1-1 •* o» «5 to «3 00 OS 00 t- o o« o o o l> 00 t- r-C t- to O r-l 00 «5 1> MS r-l I— f •* «S i> t> CO CO 1— t I— t I-* i-t OS CO OS OS OS r-< O ■* CO of i> OS OS o o GO GO OS o 00 o o o WS W3 MS o o o s« o« ei o« ^1 ^ ^ ^ S« S< 0» Q< i i n 1 Mt M M W M W 340 Aj^iendix A 5 x■»~=II^-•■'^» = = ^<^ — — — ^■* ^ — - — — — -T, ■» ri — — '— ■arr; ■c •«; <; V •>■ •> i i^ a K — ;r =aiK_ ~w — Appendix A 341 >Q » sn rH Q< OS a! U5 •* OT a« 55 ot" rt i> rt t- © GO 00 T-( O O OS O rl t- t- OS t- J> w rH rH i> OS OS «o m CO OS °i SO 12 St a a V ^ fSfS 60 d •9 I o I > S IS ■" 0) o ^ V c« M •- ■' a; HJ h^ (S O a p I a o I O a s a V > o 1 a s. 1 > & & ll iS ^ M V §1 1^ ra flh-l f-OSo,05 feMOS c! r-l C8 P< rH STi-IlS "-I S 1^ OS !0 00 ^ CO so" rH 00 1-^ on !D (D eo ^ GO OS O OS^ OS OS^ M5 ■* Os" 5D Mj" 342 Appendix A c3 o O I :?; 1 o t- <0 lO s* O so o» ^ a» 05 l> ■* OT OJ 00 <-! s, 1-; O 1> «5 •* a l> oo ^ «« rH rH Q* rH CO ot" 00 g CO 03 O O) 00 o< 00 » > •* OS «5 O •* 00 rH OS CO > «5 s< 00 !0_ OT_ rH SI i- «D CO CO- 00 OT I-H t- «3 «o «3 «5 o< - § O o: CO <*! CO r~* 1-^ 1-i 04 CO OT_ OT_ •* (N i> t- t- I— 1 |o ■* is" I-H jC r-T i> i> l> CO I-H rH F-t m_ 00 .2^ t! 00 00 Q< OT 1-1 rH Reg tere Vote «o rH o ■* ■* ■* 00 03 oT o* o" ^ 0" I-H I-H I-H rH SI Q« o< S< Qt Char- acter efH e*H 64-^ 64-? «M .fj B4-4 «M «fH V <1> (U (U v ■3 4; V a3 tftf «P3« h5 tf « « e*H a; 1 ^^ O A 2 n ■3 03 1 «4-l o ■:| .3 c O a S 8 " a 2 H p cd "« s • ^ g O o^ ^M a . fl ■H „ 1 1 1 .■ . 1 1 i 1) i Is 1- 1 CM O 1 ^ ^ 1 : .1 =2 <1J 3 1 ■f I- 9. rs 6 a 13 •-§1 1 «*H "s ■ ^ 8 1 BO 1 1 o CO ■53 1 .11 — ' (U 1^1 1^ pjd +3 S o ji u o >s a cd D 4^ •*3 o o g ^ ^ 1 -*1 ^ n ^ o ■^^S 2 S •* i> (S< OO Oi 00 «? ■* . ^ «5 I-H . o t. o< •4-^ ^ en iH 1- 1 4J > o: P. o 00 i Appendix A 343 as OS 1> 00 CO o o to o 00 im ■* t- t- (N o< I> ■-H so 00 00 CO CO © SO so o eo l> 00 00 ■* 00 eo o a> O rH o i> so to «5 [- 05 i-H o^ 1> 00 80 •*" M3 o 00 00 o 1> 00 o so so 00 o« so 00 I— I eo «3 so i> so 00 00 o< i> o o ■* ■* (N e< oo of «5 «5 i-J" eo" CO a> o» o t- a> eo '"l. ® of of o« e< M5 00 t- of o( eo 1— t «5 of a> t- co of o<. o» ^ ^ ■■*! g ■2 • ;(i . 8 . . V . fl . M a . -M . o . e+H V O ■-S • !^ • ^ ■ J3 Xi 1 •h3 o • ?,:3 e*H • O Si > « • EO R-^ 'r a fH te O CO _d ^^^A S " ^ 5 « 3 .2 3 3 o V a S II r, *i o a •11 p. ■ >. «8 II 'S fl ft O ew 'V O CI CS •g?|' t» 0) .°o=S a> J « bo • 2J a S -§ I C (U w O ^ *J ^ 5^ Pi ^ c3 a> I -I a "3 Ssa i|§ CO ^ ca g = I S D< a sd add o o o 03 ri ca I— ( O »-H t- r-i X ®* SO CO _S>0O ^ ^ ■4" eo I— t > CO OJ s< CO 'G i-i I— t Q. SO OS ■* "-I . OJ o . ►^ O i^ o . 1-H 4> 344 Appendix A s ^ O U •M .9 m i> t- o< O OO e» !0 06 00 «5 t-H J> O I-H «5 O •* «5^ l-H i-H i> «5 r-i 00 «5 I-H J <1 t— < OS ^ > o> I-H o o 00 00 ■* o ■* t> r"* l> P-H O «5 o t- CO 00 ■* ■* 00 os" i> os" os" 00 00 ■*" JS I-H •* 05 «5 ^ T— < o oo oo _o ■§ "* «3 00 CO OS t- 00 00 «5 t- i> 00 i> 0°. "H CO ■* 00_ |U o rH «5 of r^ I— 1 of oo" 1— t I-H o" of I-H I-H w* gis- red ters ■* •* OS s« eo SI 00 CO o t- rH 00 U5 to OS 1> 00 00 00 00 «5 50 i-H OO GO oo «5 OJ 0) o r n «^> e< oo" QO 00 ■*" ■*" ■*" '^ ■* S( (N o» o< O* ®( e< e< o< i s; e^ e4-J •4-N «4H **H «4H «4H ^IH «4-4 CU V (U V O V ^^ V o § (4 tf tf « tf tf « S "s .a .a ■ ea 1 ■l 1 1 s ■ C8 § •1 0) -s § s § i " ^ g o c« ■*-» 1 1 •s 1 1) -.9 1 .a ^9| •3 1 i ' 1 § g. 1% 4J 3 o a -s 1. : 1 1 1 a 1 IS 1 g II u o o ndment of the law p ;ute on the collection on the oflScials and e 3 1 •1 1 ll -J 1 • 2 8 II § S 1 1 ^ ^ JJ 1 C3 ^ 1^ 5 s» Q< OO "-S i> 1> 0« «5 OS o <» CO 00 a !| i 132 O Jtii So 3 <1 O I-H 1 1» 1 Appendix A 345 t- O O !0 i> «5 i-H © «0 05 rH 00 © of «5 m «5 00 00 © "O © © i-H X CO © et © O i-H t- J> PH M5 © •>* © 05 tr- o ■* io «5 «5 «5 i> «5 rl © © I> 1> t- 00 00 ©" as oo © 00 © 00 © CO © 00 00 a* o» © o 00 1-1 1-H «5 "91 © © 00 M5 «5 © © © © «5 - V .-a Hi a o eg 2 " H h s ** * ■ fc< ^:g =2cc g| II u ^ (3 ^ -P SP C8 IS" S tn .a Is is" a hH .3 « .2.2 . o g . O CO 3 +3 to o 53 S 'SI) 9 ■S -a ^< » ° Si a -a a J ■ I o 5 o2^ « -3 H iS CS o em © s 15 "O ^ S s s i ■4H i i «4H «4H VM «M i 1 1:3 ■ la a a « *3 •3 o S " o ^ ax h-i )-:i HH H-l M © « O 346 Appendix A P o o tn O o H 1 .9 •* Oi oo 00 ®( s« 00 •o ■4-> eS «5 r-l ^ o< oo_ S «i! ■* ■* ■* I-H r- 4 S ;o t- 00 «o OO 1 > 00 «s o* l- (O t- oo OJ o 00 i> sT Ol wj" ■*" ^ i-H I— 1 1^ 00 m «o t- t- "5 oo oo © o =3j CO 1> «5 >n r~^ r-i I-H ^— ?^ CO 00 00 00 ■* a> 00 oo 00, °°. °°. 00, ^ B O «5 «5 in M5 '^ §j e4H ^ e4-H «4H e*H V (U V V tf tf P3 P3 rt jj . > o 1^ 1 •s 1 .2 V IS n o 11 .2^ capq •^"^ ^1 ■M 73 If M §1 g i 1— 1 ■3 fl "o .2 *o rH 03 ^ 00 o< a, G< e< C i £§ § 3 S Appendix A 347 03 no ®i oo ■* OS OS ■* ■* » o« ■* o ■*■*■* «> o oT oT of oT Q* 1-1 00 o<_ 0» (51 00 00 Oi o > > >0 St CO OS OS i-H CO e< OS CO co_ 00 oo_^ l> «5 o ;o to" CO «3 o 00 o 00 CO W3 "4-1 e4H e4H a^H 4J K p^ P4 pj >q P^ ^ PhPh Ph Ph o o H .a > * -2 O 3 .is o. "S a h "-^ «4-i ■!-> , r*s OS +^ L c; o +3 m ■Ei •- « ■^ bD ^ 2 « " eM "d °tt 'S '^ '3 S fl «s O OS (U :3 =3^ g o fl S^ fe ^ S I--S 03 » » d ■ 1) H ] y W Ci ■!-> .2 l»! a -^ m .a =8 .3 i-:ii-l ^ ^ i o Oi 00 X CO CO § . . . -' ^ e< * OS • T3 'O -O 4) 2 00 (3 M l-H M 13 =5 CO W5 . OS ^ 00 o -I 348 Appendix A .g ss s O I cm a ^ i> t- so O 05 St ©1^ m i> 15 o" «3 «5 00 GO ^ O !D 50 ■* GO ^ O GO •* «5 00 ^H GO ^ ■* to «5 to «5 GO ■* "* 00 00 0» 0< ^50 go" t> oo" © «o 05 O i> I-H GO «0 GO 1-1 CD O? i> t- V V ^ a ^ f5 tf e§ tf p5 V V O CI rH 05 rH t- © i-H SO © 00 <« pH c> M5 !> 00 Os" V V V a> pjpj pjpE^PJPtj t «4-t XI O s V ^ cd 3 n ^ i2 ^^^ •4^ •I-' S d a a •£ o O o fc ^ ^ ^ « si at c« i-Ji-lt-)i-3 si 00 3 HH 00 J3 --3 HH I— I 05 00 05 ■a Si 1^3*1 5 «g Appendix A 349 CO i^ eo OT 50 O »f5 CO «5 CO CO «5 CQ 00 St OS 00 o oo eo 00 oT 00 1-1 «5 o ■* 00 >o i-J •*" 00 00 o «5 00 »o CO 00 1-1 00 l> 80 t- 00 CO CO Oi CO eo 00 «5 CO rH «5 CO ■* «5 CO rH «5 >o © CO 1-1 •* OS V ^ a) 4) ^ W PS pq tf , § 3 O I i BO "o ,i5 . I o s ^ c; SS o V i ■ Ah O «4-t . V s 3 ■s ^ §•3 , GO a> o g^ 60 « o o II ■ ea •I 'a 3 9 2 «- S o ^ > & ft ao u o V § I m o _Cj 3 3 5 u « J) o o u 2 "^ Q • -^ d • 41 '.■3' . t - « o fl -3 *J — E? ■'^ -^ •n d «> ^ I § a; ^ -M ^■3 a 3 a V s.g t=B 3 d cs.g-^ .a.a-a S d«S ■^ .2 3 c3 *j d fe- ® d d "=« 2-2 ^ S 4J Oh -d ' 3 ■ u n • A BO BO.d 3g •5 a OJ CO " " « a> m d .2 ^ ii C3 S o£ o § «M O ® d S.2 a ^ M *^ g.2 ra TO J3 'S d 50 O* _■-<«, "^ CO o 00 i»< • 00 -- 350 Appendix A s P o Pi P 02 :3 CD 05 !> o e< GO O 015 OS 00 o c6' oT OS 0) 01 v 3 o a o 4-) i o 01 o a o s '3 en »o •* > r"* i> 00 n 00 I— t ^ I— I *2 OS o> — S «o Ob "*„ ^0 sf 00 I— 1 r— 1 » lo 05 ^ h -2 «5 t> Si 4J ■^ a ,3 C8 0) ^ ;a m 42 "S J2 M _g ts ft-c '■0 u S ci 3 '■^ BC ■" 4^ ^ .Sis ■s e^ S a 11 s 1i 1 ra ^ t— 1 iu -a M 1^ rH OJ "i «3 0« Tfl '-' -fj OS ; 0) a -1 OS a I— ( M Appendix A 351 «3 ■* 05 05 ui en 00 St o (N O «o OS o 1^ 50 ■<}l eO OT r-l 0< ra I- Xl 05 O CD_ » rt © i> «0 of t-H of ef ef of o CO CO rH -^ rH o< o oo !> CO a* of •* i-H «5 •* OT 1> CO o« © o» o« ■* © 0< ■* «3 00 00 © 00 00 f-T pH © rH ■* t- ©( I- ■* © ■>*i o © «o ©( © i-H 0» © ©^ © rH 00 !> ■* «3 "5 >rs" © © © © © ■^ I— I -^ © 00 W5 CO i> i> GO © GO «0 «5 i> © © © © © © o © ^^ ^" ^^ ^* 00 00 00 00 © © St © © © CO © 1-1 CO 00 so © o«^ 0< © © © © © © !> J> i> © CO © © ■* © CO O 1* © © © © © © Ml O -"Jl © © © ■*■*■* 00 00 00 J> 0«_ 'iP u^ «5 «5 © 00 © © © © 0« ©I O* Q< Ot 0< 1-1 © ■^ 1—1 CO ^ © © CO CO 00 © © CO V V V V Pi D V CJ 4^ CJ V tf M p5 W W W V V O o < +. o CO CO •* © p-l 00 t- «5 o< oo ■* ■* (N O t- 00 ■* •k3 *ffl 05 G< SO_ 0» 00 ■* 00 o o« ©. eS ^ 00 «5 «5 ■* of ef © -jT co" o« 1 rH g O «D ■* «5 00 00 00 OS ■* t- ^ > OS 1-1 i-H ^ 00 ^ CO 00 rt 00 t> r=* i-H m ffl i> CO 00 i-i 00 CD 0_^ E>^ r-T oT wj" a> ■* os" i-<" 1> >o ■* o» t- t- 1> (O CD 11 i> t- 50 t- "« OS OS OS ■* rjl » » tt)^ l-H Q< 00 00 GO OS OS_ d" Tjf Ta? i-H rH i> of of of OO" t» 1— 1 I-H 1— 1 i-H I— 1 ^^ r-i ■ CO «5 CD ^ 00 CO •g,"? J rH -^05 o< o» OS ■* "5 "* oq_ i> «i| CO W 00 CO 00 i a « 64^ e^^ e4^ e4^ aM e+H 4J e4H «4-4 «M C^^^^ n ^ »^ (^ ^^ w •3 ^ ■ s ■i; 3 V w o • 'S . . • § .s > -a ea o • ■ y ■S ■ 73 "d h tH s§ s a S W . rt I J 1 ^ S a ^ :a.2 ^-^ J ♦e ■M t2 S — ' '§ J • ^ 1 s +3 "3 4^ 8-21 i S -d *j -a 'is ^ a Cfi •§, 8 -S lu 1 till '^°o o o ll g ^-a* ^ ^ ^ ^ .3h3^h3 OS i> t- ■« 15 0( 0) ^ o* <3< '-' e* OO '-' . 1^ 1 S2 1— 1 . ^ OS fl LH r ■1 § h^ Appendix A 353 I O I U ■s © «j .| Ml G4 1 «5 < OS I-H to I-H o CO s< o > ?: (D > r" OS O 00 eo d 1— I ®( s o TO 11 o< a> 05 ■"*! S^ 00 05 m OT «5 i- 03'^ r-t o« m ■&" " o< o rt-^> g g II «4^ c3 Oi •M 4-3 ti c3 bo •s CI 1 1 1 -73 a cm ■^ 4-3 1 \a -0 ,a s fl cc 3 4^ CC ,o 1 ! o o & t 03 Ig Hi hJ 00 m Qt s< V e» «o . n I-H Sj O 4J rH S* Cfi CG 3[nfi[q JO pijcA ni JO ^naD jaj p o o u 63]0A pjpA paid^siSaj JO )nd3 J3J 00 «5 00 I- !2 I C8 OS o OS I-H OS IS 00 00 M C3 O 11 Q a a .. " .5 ■ « -S a IIU s s « _s a SS en 00 CO 00 00 CO 00 CO >o oo i-H CO CO a* OS OS OS 00 o o 00 00 i> o s u M p o o < n 00 CO o tQT3 t; "So o OS CO 00 cj a oo oo »* OS ^ 00 'pm o . ®' S si Appendix A 355 «5 as ei U5 00 1-5 «5 1> to o 00 05 OS OT O t- © (SO o s 1 i S I— t CO I— 1 1-1 I-H I-H 00 GO 0> «5 OS eo o •>* 03 o CO o «o cT oT 1-1 o» «5 «5 Oi O 00 «5 to "I i> CO 00 CO 00 eo i> eo^ o" CO to «3 CO OS GO ^ i> of eo (St «5 of eo QO OS ot o t- OS eo o« «5 O © © © OS 00 o< OS l> 00 OS a s s s 356 Appendix A c3 33 o I— H P CSJ O Eh B3JOA p!]BA Sni^EBO fiJ3}0A 00 !D ■* » t- 1> to lO p9Ja:ts!S3J 00 OT «D o< eo ws' lo »■ JO inaD ia J «5 5D «5 CO «o lO »r5 «5 IffBD noiIBq o l- •* I-H «o I-H Q* OS 3[a«[q JO pn^A d ■* ■* OJ «5 J> J> «5 -ni JO ^naD wj (N T^ o< rH i-c Q* 0» O! ■4J OJ t- 00 O OS ■^ o» 00 s OS o» 1-4 OS CO 00 o o ■s '3 05 I— ( 05 1-H_ OT OS ©^ .^. bo o" (S 00 •* I-H ■«l of !> 1 < i-H Q< o« eo Q< I-H 1-H g t- 00 «5 ~^ "o" o i> 5D ^ > o I— I OS l^ O^ Q* o< OS t> ^ o^ I-H «5 00 •* I-H 00 i-T ■* i-H rH ■* •* to ef ^ ■* OT o< Q< eo CO CO ■* 1^ 0* «5 «5 00 o «o a S °5, CO CO m" «5 1> i> 05 » 'd •T3 id > 13 "d -d P 92 cs M I-H I-H O I-H M I-H ^^ ;? Appendix A 357 I— t ^ to to 00 I-H «5 «5 e» l-H 0» CO Oi CO I-H e« s» o« OS © ® I-H 15 g; !0 1—t s; o I-H •o CO OS i> o OS CO o 1> o CO o" U5 50 rH O O o" i-i w o © CO CO <-< CO CO o CO CO CO CO o 00 CO CO CO 00 © 00 «5 00 OS CO i-i CO CO CD CO © 00 CO CO CO CO CO M5 ^ «-; *i •«• ^ «*H =«• (U -g dc CL> a> dJ Ph P3»3 Oh Ph « Ph rt. P4 PI 3 .9 -^ o 0^ i.a ^ «4H ^ S 8 g. ci is eS j3 o & i^ ■I s O oj w ■S a ■^.a:=J ° CO 60.2 . V en . O o -si cd ■a S a S - ■a 60 g-.s :5 * ■ ^ CO • ft a =*-' 2 o -a . CO c; 9 -^ . o -u a s ►^ 60 > 9 h O -g.s d o m a M '-H .a o a ■53 ^ 1 1 a a o ^ t-i p v ^-^ ^ T3 t£ 4= v o !> (1) a V) o h •J3 ^ s s g M h3 O C4 "o ■^.SP O -O « O w St U V '6 TJ OS >. op S '^ o 358 Appendix A S3;OA pifVA SI I-H ■* OS t- W5 t-; -f «5 1-^ CO OS «s 5' ^ •* •* IPBO eion^q SO «5 l- t-; ® OS «o OS S^QBiq JO pi^VA 1> 00 ©■ O 05 OS OS CO -ni 10 ^nao jaj i-H »o o* o< s« o< o* s» 1 (N 1-1 o «5 «5 e« "^ i> o« «D I— I O O (N OS ■* 'S T-H 1> J> OS t- i-H OT CO s M s» 00 ■* eo" 1> ^ ■»^ to 1 •«5 CO 1—1 r-t r^ r-t Q< I-) g m CO 1-t i> «5 l> OS o» o ^ e« t- «5 t- «3 00 o «5 > ^ >o SI t- 80 CO i> i> i> S 1-1 1— t ■* CO o< (N Q< CO sg- ll i> t- 00 i> 1> ■* 1 1" oT o» OS 1> o to •o ^ i-H 1— f CO w-0 S »o «5 ■* W CO o OS OS OS hH ^ ^ ^ 4-> 4-S •k" «4-4 ^ «*H Z7 <4H ;a S ^^ (« rt ^ ^ bo 1 1 •3 ■ O §1 1 1 2l 4) § 2 "S p. 1 (U 1 B 2 1 ! 1 en .a .4i 4-> CO •3 to 1 -a T3 Si f3 S3 fl O M .s§ 1 13 i i •s 1 1 i 1 '3 o *3 i J T3 1 s iff s 02 1 1 a 1 .3 1 a o 1 s i O -P 3 2 3 4-3 .P ;3 " 1 1 1 i Ml i g i.g "o 1 1 £; CO 0) t- o« 9S >. 1 S 3i "d 13 13 TJ T3 13 CO a I-H H-l M CO 3 I-H hH I-H rl 3 ■-'i-s l-B Appendix A 359 ■* ■* 00 o 00 l- i-l 00 OS OT ■* a< 00 «5 S © o 00 © 00 a> CO © © © of co o 00 © OS 00 I-H 00 so eo © © © 00 © © 00 00 00 PH GO ^ o« 00. eo 00 «5 OS OS © 00 00 OS OS of OS o» OS 00 © 360 Appendix A O I U S310A pifBA OJ O) o« m (N o; o ' p3J3)6lSaj I^ ® 1—4 »0 l-H «5 g? JO laao ja J IPBO Bioifsq o »n 09 e< •* 05 eo SJTTBjq JO pifBA oi o* ^' ■*■ 00 50 -ni JO ■\n3D J9J Ol I— rH Q< o< ?— < 00 -p •* «: O CX) eo e« o _e T— 4 c <*! 00 i> •* 00 rH 0<5 «5 °i ■* 00 '5 cS 3i of c «5 OS i> i> oT 1 < o» ■* M r—i 1-4 Q< § >» ur OT © t- ~^ ©1 % > 00 i> a> 00 00 05 > ^ i> Gl- I— 1 00 im >0 SO l> o- eo o" rH wi" I— 1 ►3 e« o» OT M o< (N 1'^ ■* oc "^ to OJ oc ^ (N OS i> «? «5 oT to «: to ■* 5D w: ■* I— t O ■* e< ^^ t- •* i> c; oS o wf w: »" «5 «■";> 03 a OJ OS ^ S3 Zj" e*- ftfH «4-4 «4-4 -M 3 cStf rt cS tf -^ 1 X D ■^ .s" v ^ , — ^ b b ^ ; ca-g O ^ :g I il a ^ 1^ 13 CQ ■1^ V 1 i "3 1 s ■^ >^ CO Pi "o I ■a o T3 1 & .2 O 1 •s 1 1 a 1 appointmen rict officials of the statu i V o -3 1 o i "S > 1 .a s 1 1 1 CO i e i 4) 1 1 a i §4 3 II ^ ^ 1 1 ^ J i 1 i o ^ T3 C3 1 "3 3 OJ 05 S< t- 1— 1 o« o« 1 8 5 S *5 "1 s f-1 1 3 3 ►5 Appendix A 361 i-H 60 CO «5 O 00 «5 CO o I-H Q< o» 80 OS CO ■o CO M5 1— 1 CO 1—1 00 1— t o 1-1 l-t en 0* CO eo o o o CO CO 00 1-1 o< O 00 O «3 o 00 «5 1-1 e< © ■* 1-1 eo CO CO CO of O W5 OS •* o i?- o o< o t- OS CO OS o CO M5 so CO ICS CO CO co" OS MS OS s< CO OS OS CO 00 CO OS P3 "3 I' tf tf I- § Q ^ 2 ■ 3 « TO _^ S o g C — BO +3 '3 s Ml " a >? $ g « tela M 3 • 60 s ■ a 2 3 4) 60 O PI a a C3 M O s a O 3 V -S3 3 42 0) j3 C) ,j3 en o — i a> a> o 2 "31" a ft o .S . O M a a ■ 2 s • .a-0 •r-l « • ? u V ;3 I (- D 000 "NO ^ O fl W m .2 «8 -S -d -a 42 » ^ o 5 1 -a 'I « o +3 u o a _ 3 o >C5 T3. © Sd «11 o O o CO «. OS W) 1-1 3 <1 362 Appendix A u Pi tsj o ;?; o es^oA pi]BA 00 ■*! 1-; o. OS CO * p3J3)Sld3J o © a* © 2 © JO ^nsD jaj IBTO S^OIfEq >o I— 1 I— ( 00 oo © SJDBjq JO pi|T?A o* GO o> t^ ui © -m JO VM3 jsj o< e« r^ 1— t l-H 4J ■* Oi i> •* © © o« 1-t ■* QO © o ■4J i> CO I-H I* •* 00 w ^ l> © CO of ®r oT 1 • «£> eo o CO t- 1—t > ^ «5 to ■* 05 ©_ o i-T CO* l> © OS oo" ^ Ol o< 1-t CO CO i-i Is ©, ^'^ Q* P3 t- i-fl 2 © fc; '5b ^ -2 00 u 6 o 1> «■"> OS 11 ZT T" •4-4 ^ CM •M q; V tf Ph tf Ph p:5 'M j. a 60 t>> 1) 1 fl •i -2 -0 J3 O a _•& J3 cd a o 4-> 1 O i 4J Si '. c8 i 1 1 $ 3 1 1 g 1 4J a i •43 i . II 3 3 .2 Oi 00 I— I e4.H 1 "3 .9 i ■4^ o 2 1 *3 CO a ^ ■ "3 1 O 1 1 I 1 s 1 1 tn 1 u 1 .s 1 a" 1 ■g a o •3 1 a 2iJ 11 tn oj u -^ § i 1 -A 1 1 1 o r-l 5 <« 00 ^ ^ 00 a © • ■w -d 2 A t: -c o> an hH M s § H-l I-H -5 i-s Appendix A 363 o» i> 50 ■* t- OT I-H e» ■* (S» OT o •O 1> 1> CO MS 00 J> «> (O ■* CO CO •* 00 CO ■* MJ m CO t- MS CO o 00 «s ■* «5 I-H OS co I-H J> 00 00 I-H ^ 00 «D KS Q« Ol MS ■* O CD a> 00 o to OS OS OT l-H 00 ■* •* MS OT «o rt MS I-H OS K n n •s 1-t >« T- 1— 1 »-H e« MS o oo" of 05 o< «5 OT o« •* I-H ■* o« I-H o« O ■* OS CD CO MS OS 00 i-H ot MS OT •* ■* .* o< OT 00 ot" co" I- os" «o t- t- MS t- MS l> o I-H OS MJ ■* et St t- OT ■* « US o OS_ MS ®1 i> 00 os" 00 o I-H OS OS OS OS o I-H o I-H , . ^ ^. ■^J «4-H «fH «M % 3 "i lu a P3 Ph I Ph tf Ph PiPi «4H O 1 1 1 J3 en i 1 1 1 d 1 •i CO ■l: 1 • ii op 1 1 1 : -§ • M : .at - §* I B a a 1 o< 3 -0 •s 1 1 1 t 0^ 1 CO 1 1 i X 1 1 1 § OS rH ©" OT 1 4-3 i 1 1 a 1 •s % e 3 solution for new buildings f o: mtonal school, the tech ;hool, and the university . . s } 1 I 1 a 1 1 1 3 1 c« a O 4) '3 £ ^;aa t J S' s hJ a A a « s % ^ IS P •a^ S5 *o o OT ^ cd"^ OS >. 1 3 3 3 o I-H 1 i-s o :a I-H P, < 3 364 Appendix A u M P O I < S310A pjfBA i> © i> m I-H s 00 so I-H ISBO Rjonuq 1— 1 (N 05 «5 00 HUDiq JO pijuA >o m so i> t> -at JO )Ud9 jaj 7^ rH 7-t rH •u s m SO I-H OS O so ■■f t- so »f5 •a a> rH o »n 0(_ A 1 i> oT 00 ■*" i> o < CO CO I-H rH 1-t S u 4: o r^ o« 1> M OS ^ & (O «5 i-H CO so > i-H SO IN CO so* «5 I-H QO" CO °1 00 *S^ ■* ■* o> o| O o o lO "5, °i. 1" »o «5 CO i> J> so t- l- 00 in "^ S 1> 1> i> *S> ■" i^ m CIJ i> ^St2 1— I of o rH of o ^s •ti •« •<-; •4H **^ _3 '*'^ ^ fS ^ ^ ^ :& "o a 1 h ^ .4^ .g 3 CO Cli a .2 si 1 1 •s i T3 g i u «4-l a i i 1 ft T3 iS a contracted debts to vote; red tion of ratio of members of legislature to population, etc.) 1 i 1 1 proportional representation at option of the communes, etc. Law on public days of rest replac the Sunday Law of 1882 . . Law (based on an initiative) amend the building law in citie 1 i S 1 l1 1 1 1 S S ■s c 1 ^ 3 3 M Appendix A 365 tH 00 O eo «d i> «5 ss (D «o >fl o< ■* 00 00 r-t i-H OS •o «3 o< o t- OS Its l- OS 00 1— f O CO M5 o< OS CO X © i> to o i-h" oo w o X o» «5 !0 1> t- 50 i- -* C *w e4- «4H (^ 4 p: (S §•3 i "3 0) o 60 n W ?-g 4^ S "S •r5 cd o to 1 1 1 =2 1 3 1 fl-2 o » a o "1 s ■M 1 s 'v 11 M 1 V g 1 ■§ a 3 eg § 1 g ii 1 1 1 13 1 1 HJ 1 «5 00 1-1 "d 2 (JJ tJ M r-l 1 M Appendix B Results of the General Referendum and Initiative in America 368 Appendix B 05 o SnjioA o» "? «o O I-H sj3)0A p3ja:)si ■*' d 00 00 sa «5 «o to auV\OA o< 1-i a. O ®( noTiDap ■ye bjs ■* 00 i> l> 00 (» M t» t» CQ ^psaa ^ >i ^ >^ ^ o> Si i> o o ■* Tjl 3 f— 1 a* t- CO »o m ■* rH i> 05 w (N o CO o H I-H 00 oT co" oo" oo" 05 eo o« i-H i-H I-H r~t I-H «5 o 2; CO e» of CO e< 00 t- 00 <3< t- co *o ^ (N °l a eo ■* (O "* «5 Wj" GO r-t I-H I-H I-H i-H it < < < *^.-s-^ SB d d U tJMU >-. -o >. TS ■S • -o • +j B -Q § . "o 58 "3 t 3 DQ o 0) 3 C8 o a d s rtj 1 2 1 a 1 ■d 3 £ ft CM O 1 1 3 . ? . o ■§:S 3 .SP "S "3 3 ■a +3 a -d 4J 1 eg -3 3 tH 4J 1 3 -g i ;. of thi inhabi sn the a > V I •4-1 Ci 1 3 ^ ID a i 3 a vote of the To give wom( office . . , H H 4J H ^H H e*H Appendix B 369 M5 o 00 «5 o o to o o» o OS i> 00 o eij « 0) CJ Pi v tf ce V t-i M V o s - .a a 0) ¥ ca > IS O P. C4 Q, la 3 > J) o Q 13 --Ma .2 >>!S o c« 9) a> ■I a ■| o o fill a II a s 3 d d tn II cS .£ 1- •a « (u a >^ P en c« CO o< I— ( 00 CO 00 OS «? o 1— t o> 00 OS 05 o« I-) e< 00 t- i> i> i> 00 00 00 en OQ CO K) ^ en tn en m 4) 4) >H >^ >H >^ >^ >H >^ >H oT CO CO CO co" 3 o ■4 n 130 .d o V -d o d o-a a. P 09 0) o 9 "g 3 " o d T3 - It Q A U i| » I § & Isg I— 4 ^ a « s S ■w o -a ■s-g § o. p S !» ■a '-O E d 3 ill n n o .3 S " il4 |la •do: :; <3 «. '•1 24 370 Appendix B I— I a: m ^ P5 2ui%oA nori to •* ■* "* o o 00 -oap %B Gia:ioA 05 05 «5 o rH i> ^ JO inaD J8J t- CO t- 00 00 t- t- ■4-3 o o o o (S s « :z; ;z; :z; iz; >< >H >^ OS «c to 015 «5 >o i> t- rs ■* ec a 1 OS CO CO CO ■* J O O V 00 CO ■* to CO ^ eS a «■ r-( t- to" 1> o o" to er >o S( CO CO CO CO , i-H 1- I— t 1—4 I-H I-H I— t I-H c ^ a* CO CO I-H 00 1 or c m •o OS s< , o O) r> w5 M5 I-H i> I-H n a er i-H Q< •* 00 ■* i- 00 i> !> CO «5 «3 tc «■ 1— 1 o» (N to 05 c a to 00 ■* ■* CO S oc a CO i> IN °i (J« k. j« t£ t- to" co" GO I-H to IT tc «5 to i-H I- t- "4- 4- 4J 4J .■^< ■■^< •t^-^ 1^ 0. PC ;s ;s '^ ^O ^O ^0 T3 • ? ■ i^ 3 i O •u a D . tS . ^ V "4) 3 ■3 CJ ■ M o 2 Xt . ^ m > o 9 o ■ o s ^o -M V & o .§ *3 > ■J3 .a u CQ u u ^ .a CO V O J 1 c c 1 "3 3 r 4) V «4H "3 a -s • s o -D 1 "t y 3 o ft^H V a, 1 1 1 C J e c u g 1 • 1 • II it o • I -I 1 3 en .a 3 •s 4J 1 1 ^ £ eS Appendix B 371 9ni)OA I— t (S !0 •* ■* q OS 00 Sjat^OA^ p3J3)8I ^ si o oj c CO o l-H -391 }0 ^UXi 13 j >* «5 .* 00 cr ■* W5 •* 3ai!)OA i- «1 «3 00 oc «o 00 l-H noi:p3ld :)B sja •* to OJ i> i> i> ■* l-H -r ;0 i> to ^ins9H s i c o o 1^ ;z; O Iz; 00 i> © OJ «5 O t- l-H ^ o ' -^ CO o< I— 1 e< i> CO ■* ■* eo oo ^ OT •« «o OS OS «o «; »o os^ ®1 TT H t- ©5 «5 ■* o" oT CT ■* of eo" 00 t> eo i-i o 00 OC •o o l-H a> to ■* «5 ■* CO cr ■* «5 ■* i—i «0 l-H I- OC «5 O OS r-t 00 «5 Q< to t- »o jO •* ■* o CO oc •* q^ OS 1? oo" rn" «5 ■* 5g o eo" CO o< i> «5 «5 1 00 «5 r-l 1-1 S« &« e< eo IN O r-l a> m ■* 80 c to ■* l-H a> ■* e* O O) t- to OJ 1 r—* •* a>^ CO t- q, 00 CO < l> m «5 "O Ol ■* OS OS M o ■* ■* CO ■^ t- ■* to ^ 0<5 CO rH I— 1 l-H 1-1 I-H Ph 1 t, < < hJ ^ > .o -d 00 CO OT 00 5 » 00 a •* ■* CO 1— 1 (-1 H e< m 0" ■*" I-H ■* 5Q 03 ■* •* o> © 00 OS S< 1— < i-i I— t PH •* 05 00 o« Q* "O i> OS I— 1 CO CO 1> 00 i> 1— 1 0^ I— ( •>* o« CO ;? sT 05" ©f ■* of ■* ©" I— 1 i> eo CO «5 «3 •0 r-H t- 1—1 l> T-H M5 •* >o «5 S 00 05 m m «5 tH 10 ■* 00" 0" o» 0" os" i> CO I-H w ■* eo CO s 1 1 WO 3 " s ° P V e j3 o *^ g ^ ■ -O « — D >- -a « m a, ^^ g a 3 C3 a. g g oj •s a a & «> u s s J ^ 0.2 Appendix B 373 00 ■*. in OT Q< ■* ■* t- eo «5 Tfl ■* © i> 00 ■* X5 O >o o © CO i-H o i-H t- eo w o_^ A ■*" eo" ■* CO eo" 05 of 00 as ffi l> i> i> t- X © 00 ■"*! •* t- «J © ■* l-H t- «o 00 «3 o» o © t- «5 »o 00 00 •n © •*" oT o 00 i-T 1-^ cS ©" •* eo ■* eo >* «5 eo >o CO © eo CO ^ ■<* © 00 a> SI ?-H 1— t eo © rH W5 CO ■* co_ "?, eo eo oT GO co" i> I-H i> eo" QO" •* «s CO eo eo o« ■* eo •1^: ■r: '3 "d ■lj a '3 WU MU M!J hH HHU M IJ iM i-HU s Ol 1 X • V V ■M __ >s ■ 1: CO 2 ■T3 a 1 8 • o 1 CO 1 8 EQ 1 8 T3 1 1 1 i 1 .3 • 4J i CO 3 1 T3 1 ■ «4H •3 • 3 1 1 •3. ■ 1 1 o ■ B «4-l O II 2 42 . •4J 3 1 "3 1 -3 • 1 ■4J d 1 13 . ;§ 8 x> 3'« 4J 1 3 n 1^ give home ,000 people 1 I -si 3 a 1 1 V 'J n a 3 ■i ca ^ 3 § C« .1 t ^- eS o ^^ 1 1 s eS- 1 a 8 ^ 8 374 Appendix B 03 o l-I o o ^i)OA noi) us !-H a» «o -oap ijB sia)OA o »j^ 06 oc ■* 06 00 JO ^nao J8 J ISO ■* (N 00 CO CO o< 1 iS 1 & 1 !> i> 00 e« OS I-H 1> 3 o c 00 Q» so e« j> CO 1© •"Jl I-H o H CO" 0" OT r- 05 0* «S Oi (N t- 00 t- >-H I— 1 T-t I-H o« t> I-H St © OJ i> 00 l> a> ■* o 00 00 o» t- 1— OS t- iz; o" i> «5 06 »o ©* J> •* 05 eo ■* ■* CO CO ;o t- to >o 00 OS i> t-t co s« ®I 00 00 .S •* CO ■* «I0 «5 • -"ji 80 >< »« of 00 si ■*' OS* i> «5 00 CO «j ■* to 00 1 *^ ■* «5 a "5 >o o Oi a> n «3 «0 os" O C(5 ®r o* !> OS oo" !0 00 i> J> t- t- J> t- 00 00 1-1 S» «D <© ■* 00 o» (H ■* i> 00 s« «o 00 rH Mi i-( s< CO s( 00 OT e« o CO a> o ;o o" 1-^ i> eo" oo -* «o «5 ■* 013 ■* ■>*l •* >o 05 X PH a> I-H 1> 00 Oi i—i o 2 to Bt » oo OJ ■* 00 ^ 00 o re «5. OT 05 o> "5, *3. t- S3 00_ o ot' »o of «5 s< 00 oT «o >n Q» 0« o< (N m eo o« s« oo 'ji >? . OJ «4H «4H i s < < Ref.t Legis latur V o en ■" o o, lU S V 1 -a a o ■^ .9 w. o « 0) c; 9 =« 2 a •43 «3 ta 43 > I O Hi 6 >< o a H O c4 BO -H Si .a -§•3 ^il - •a-S 3.S 60 " tJO ^3 ^3 I •a o o u 376 Appendix B 3ai'(OA noil j> CO ©( Dap i« sjaioA d 00 CO }o %aa3 jsj «3 eo OT .(-» "3 o o o i iz; 12; ;2; rt I— t CO ■* W5 «5 I-H «5 S« rH i> e< Ui o iz; 00^ 0(5 OJ rH a> OS «5 s o^ co_ e» >H rH o rH Oi +J I-H u "S "ai °ffi u tf P^ tf W 6 ^^ o S" t3 • -ejj ■2 g _ S ^ tandard relating intoxicating liqm Gorges 03 J •i3 • V " fl *H 13 s s- ° 1 -a o !5 i 1 uniform t ;e of alcoh h the tow ^ : o B DU CQ +J 1 to make percenta to establi ■L 2^ ■ £ J^ 1 < < *^'a o ^M > r^ 00 !0 en Q« «5 rH «5 CO 00 i> lO ^-' 1 l-H ■* 00 S( ■*■ CO 00 •* t- «5 o «o o os 135 T-^ i> o t- ■* 00 04 o t- ^ rH rH ■* (SO -*i O? 5- >« r—i i> 00 i> 7^ d r^ oo" s< «o ■* tm o «5 00 s« 7-i OS i> •* 00 o «5 Q» lo o* cS O? CO CO ^ 1 o O a ft O -H ti 2 •M ■{:> cj A) 3 O > Q P^ .a o Appendix B 377 r-l 00 00 a» S "O rH 00 ■* pt i> 1> i> OS ^ 15 i 1 "3 1— 1 «5 O OT SO eo !> c« O o J> o CO 00 I— t J> O 1> TO « S? Q< *l o o t- o» CO I-H I-H rH !0 «o to ^ 03 • -H ■* •* CO tlD W5 S- o Jh 00 '^^ 1 t- 00 © I-H 00 I-H § Q* OS o 1— t I-H h r-l X < 'k< •■s^ c tf d M ^d £u 5 ^ » ■ -4- 1 a • I-H % A QJ 1 : « ■5 •s 1 o . ^ . •M 1 ,2 1 CO ns ■ J: .2 1 § •4-1 ll 1 ■ +3 o 1 C c aj.2 0) • -3 ■ ^ : 1 1 % 11 ■V ■ h 1 •a 1 3| :l 378 Appendix B Sni:(OA noi) l-H »> oj i> 05 !-; 00 r^ to -oa]a' "iv 6J3)OA o< i> -^ 06 5D «i T-i 00 ^ 30 ^uao J9J QC i> J> t- i> 00 00 t- i> 1 000 Z 12; ^^z ;? ;z; ;z; "^ eo 0» OT 0» ■* o« 00 «5 -^ rH GO 00 1— < OS 00 to eo OS J (N CT t~__ -* <« t> rH I> H oT ^'' m" 00 0" i> •* oT to to o> t- ■* 0< «5 M OS i> ■* «5 tO «5 «5 «5 «5 •« «5 ■o «5 «5 ©( (N CO GO 00 i> rH »o GO eo t- 1-1 to OS GO K5 OS •* ■* OS Q< to ■-< T-H ■* °°- 12: i> i-H 00 «5 00 «5 00 rH to t> 00 t- ■4! m ■* ■* 00 CO «5 ■* 00 ■* 00 1— t ■* ■* !> I— 1 CO s» OS i-H OS ■* OS ■* l-H 1* us s t-H CD to OS «o_ OS ^w pH t- © 1-1 (N rH to to* l> •* s» ■* 0« 1> «! 00 OS OS «j I— 1 CN rH (— I I— ( 1— ( rH I— f OS r-l i fe cd -M < ■-p =^-s « e5-e3^I§ c5 1 Appendix B 379 05 -^l |> 00 (N 00 QO tj! Q« S) GO i-H i- i> t- t- l> 00 O 5R w t» m en !l tS ;S ►5* 00 ■"}! «D (N e< ^ CO t- 2 1-1 00 ;o 00 OS t- OS eo oj o GO CD Oi 0« OS l> 00 00 ■* 1> ffl «5 «5 «3 «o •* ■* ^ CO t- « o •>*1 1— 1 ^ --; o< 00 oT o« © ■"ji rt 1-1 PH PH 00 «5 1> i> o rH «i OS 05 eo (N ■< < GO rH -SI CO O 04 »t 1 ®l 1-1 o •* «5 50 ■>J< 1 I-l 0< Tjl -^ ■* "*< 00 1 Oi rH < ■4H -(J 4-5 4J *4H « ;s :s -^ 'c 1- a3 CO 1 1 t 1 eg 1 S to T3 a n g 1 i s E i 1 1 1 4J a; 1 > o ^ i^ ^ § > & -% O ^ -33 ■g s (H > , -J *i •S 1) J 1 ^ ^ 1 1 , ■P »H M ri >, o O o -d ^ t> H H pc< E>H -< 1 ^ 00 ■* o 00 o 00 o OS < 12; OS V '3 1 ;2 380 Appendix B I-H 8ai}0A noi} -09|3^«eJd)bA JO laSD J3J 54.9 54.0 50.4 54.1 48.7 1 >H>H >H >H >H H 20,031 10,983 10,809 10,101 10,844 9,763 1 1,027 1,173 1,683 2,241 1,504 1 9,956 9,636 8,418 8,603 8,259 Si 1 "o S Vote for presidential electors ... To introduce a general initiative for constitutional amendments and laws To subject all public officers, state and local, to recall All property given for education, and certain other funds, to be pledged for education, with provisions for investment, etc To make women eligible for offices of school super- intendent or trustee, and notary public Amendment of provision about indictment for crime, depriving of property without due process of law, etc, l-H 03 O «5 rH OO © 00 as CO CQ h o f-H rH X ■* l- CO eo » oc © CO ■* ■* ■* 00 00 I- CO o CO CO l> rH 1—i !0 CO to CO > ti o, & ft-d M h ■n X .sc o ^ -i ^^ Pi4 Appendix B 381 CO o O K 8ai:^OA noi) 05 I> OT j> 00 •DB\6 %V GJaijOA 00 1> W5 tft I-H JO inao ja J 00 J> l> s OO 4J 1 !/} CO 1 00 »o S« «5 00 «5 3 oc 00 o> ■* ^, «5 a "1 i> 00 ;? I-h" oc i-T «5 o" e« « i- t- I-H I-H r-* o* ■* e« I-H Ui 03 § •o ■* Tfl u 013 or 00 ■* i> kT >^ «r ■^ o" 1> «r o ft ll 382 Appendix B o SapoA noi^ o o o JO luao la J o o I—I § § I-H 4-> 1 i S OS o> ;o V) «3 o 1 00 00 T-l «5 «5 CO OS OS o. OS as i> eS i-H 1— ( r-l i-h" i-H* as as ;o ■* •* U5 I— I I— I I-H o« (N CN ■ «s i-H o« o O o • W5 ^ >< «5 OS t-H ^^ ■ii< .ti-«i .ti o o > . .2 > ►-H s •43 ^-H -M 'S ^ a ^ ■S 3^ 3 o 3 o o ^ • H H c? HO*" H Appendix B 383 o r-< CO 80 00 OT rH OS OT «0 T^ CO i> t- «5 «5 O o o © so OS «5 «0 t- «o o 1^ o '^'^^^ o 12; 1^ &$ as fs to o «5 >0 05 ■* CO o ;o ■* is< « i> 00 CO ;o ■"jT 00 o 00 ■* eo (N I— t i-H i-H o oo 00 00 (SO CO to of o< «3 00 «0 •«( 00 (N «o o< !0 OS OS GO UO GO ft W5 GO t> !> 00 «D go" WS 1-1 rH O ■0 o» CO CO CD ■* o o CO 00 CO CO O GO r- 1 -^ CO M5 O CO ■ H ^ ^ Moo 5 HH Si •s C9 . B o u a o £?*•§ i-3 S m S 0) cS ? o ^ •!-> CO S fs. in I OS "5 1 < 13 (=1 s W -s P4 m ft- tn (8 :a =2 ^ Opq ^ =S rt^ t> ^ .H J Oi •g o 5 ^ 1 S 2 384 Appendix B o C6 o o o Sni^oA noil I— ( I— t -asp }« sjaioA CO JO jnra J8J ■fj "3 to on CQ 01 H >< ^ «5 OS ■* 5 p 1—4 «5 rH M >o «5 H OS of ot" 05 t- 00 •* 00 o «s OS 1 CO T— I ^ o" I— I •* >o to s? ?— i >s °1 oo to GO ws •* ^, 2 4-2 4-1 ■a J3 fH M o & ^ a ^ ■■§ ■4-9 ^ •*H o a; ■M 0) ^ S 5 ^ s 15 1 § 1 S u a d ^ •^ ? ft 4J & ^M rj ^^ cd 1) ce -«-> b u O • S o H »J o OS O l> CO OS ® CO os" 00 00 1> o o J iz; 12; >o OS I-H e» 1-H OS ■* CO 1> 00 «5 o« h to co" o" t- OS 00 00 t- 1— I ■* o i> •* to OS rH 00 to «J to" •* ■* 00 1> Q* . to" «5 o m CO t- •3^ 4-> ■{j a • "a 'cl wo h^ M «*-( o (X) p^ V en xn C) 4>3 4^ Q o o ft o •T3 O "S^ ^ o 1 .g 1 ^ 1 ■If t4 Ui JS o o o 'S > H fe ^ 4J Appendix B 385 v> to U5 00 o b; i> T-* 00 00 to «5 «i 00 to CO l- i> t- t- t- to to t- 52; (D 03 n Ui m cn CQ .*" lU >^ >H ^ >^ >^ tH >H o «5 O o a> t- t- to to i> «5 o OS 1—4 o» T-( M5 00 o« ■* i> t- ■* U5 OO «5 >o ■>*l i> «i_ OJ t- t^ 1> ■*" to to" cS o> 00* to' to ■* I— 1 1— t l-H I— 1 OJ >n «5 T-t Oi !> I-H 00 00 Ol TO 00 ■* to to t- I—l «5 to o* l> »o to_ » Oi r^ oT i> of ef i> t-" co" ^ o 5? 1^ 1 § 1 ■p 1 < K 386 Appendix B CO o O o o Sni^oA noi^ 05 t- t-. OS CO o CD X -aais :jB siaioA ^ c CO J> t- co' CO «5 JO ^nao J8J X i> t- t- t- j> t- t- 3 o ^ cn o § O •^ 00 t- CJO o CO oo oo •o rS 1— < CN 00 OQ eo t- 00 aa «5 ^ as «5 OS i> 00 •* «o 00^ 00 ^ » H CO MJ Ol 1-H o" o 00 oT CO I— 1 o: OS OS OS OS oo X X o I-H to e< oo o< (s X i t- t- •* to 00 OS o ■* ;o oc oo rH c X, o, 00 oo of rH c 00 I— t ■* «5 M3 Ol 00 CO oo «5 oo CO o» 00 00 I— t I-H t- S «o CO "Jl CO ■fl OS X o « c •* •^ CO oo_ «5 t>< «o » os" OS os" 00 OO m m CO CD r-l «5 oo 6^ < d i o ■Ha en >i -M o i? ^ M (U s • a 3 i p. m CO ■ 8 ■3 a ^ 1 f-l 1 1 i 1 c c 4- St U P ) 1 1 1 • 1 1 1 1 CO ■a 5 ".a 3 1 1 i E c *5 1 4- (-1 Act instructing legi Senator receiving CO g 3 «4-l O 1 1 o 1 a •4- 1 1 1 o H It 1 1 1 1 1 ^e3 a 1 Appendix B 387 i> o» ?-H «o IN (N (N o 00 o« © »o •* ■* ot CO o» r-t I-H oj OS © J> i> 1> t- t- i> 1> t- © © © o s 0!! s en 1) s S o S s >H >H f^ >H >H >H PH >^ >H e« e< O © eo 00 © CO ■* I-H © 50 o pH •o ■* OS ■* CO o o« Q< eo ■* ©_ oo_ <» 00 CO 1> i> « K 00 i> CO •*" •n •* of of © © ©" 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 CO 00 t- «o © J5 «5 I-H o 00 00 I-H i> 00 o o» 00 00 © © e< © OS 00 t- ■* i> «o CO •o I— 1 00 "3 ■* t- oT o* © ©" rH oo" ■*! o O 00 © M5 ■* CO •* CO I-H CO 'ji «5 Ol Ol o o< © «5 o» 00 00 >» CO ■* 00 M5 00 CO ■* o« © i> ■* rH • •* CO «5 I— ( I— < o i> 00 ro o< o< © 00 «D ffl -Jl ■* w oo" i-T © o< oo" -(N ■* «5 ■>* M5 © ^ ■* CO •o ■* t 4- •a 1— 1 4- 1- < < 1^ flu s : m 0) 1 ■■ B ; g S s V ' 1) i o ■a 1 ■s s 5 CO p. 1 i en 1 : 1 1 1 cS _d 2 ■73 § bO .1 CM ^ T3 9 00 •| a V ^ 1 d d d a tn & d •3 1: 3 '3< 1 8 i a BO 's 18 -0 ■3 ■ ■B a •3 . 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"=^•1 4J 1 P. d d c 1 s S = e2 > ^ ^ ^ 1 ^ l> eS ■S ^ 4- eS 1 388 Appendix B Sai^oA aoi) JO %uso jaj i~< «o «3 aj 00 00 00 00 «s i> t- O «5 •^^ «5 oi si t- t- t- 00 a> o 1^ o 01 ^>5 Si^ >i^ I El « U5 O (O o o «3 00 M to O OS oo i-H CO o» o o< OS r o oog 00 e< OS «o o» « to M5 00 00 o OS i> o «s W5 •* to o o »o OT rH «s ■* o o M US 'J •* «5 O OS^ 5D »» CO 00 to eo ■* •«( ©( o of oT o OS o o o «5 o« CO 00 «3 o ■* t- eo OS us Tj( I-H 4J +3 ^^ 4J 4J ^ 4J B • f3 "3 '3 '3 '3 '3 • "3 I— lyHH I-H I— IhHMHHUI-l Appendix B 389 o o o d 00 -^ rH I— t 00 00 to w >o «o * '^ jS;z;;2;>J ;z; iz; ^ o o o Iz;;?;^; l> 1> i> o» CO «5 i-H O OS ■* i-H I-H GO CO CO GO GO &{ 00 W 00 00 % 00 00 00 CO CO Q< ■>}< »0 ^ ?-H •* ■* 05 O^ O^ 00 1> i> i> ^ GO ©I o «0 «5 CO o CO OS OS i-H ■* i> i-H OS OS t- OS i> 0O_ «5 OS GO i-H os" ©" OS CO »0 GO O «5 GO 00 GO «5 of CO CO GO 00 ■>* CO ■* t^ r^ •* CO o o ■* i^ GO t- CO o ®< S fc GO o^ q_ of i> of CO rH GO +J «4-N ^-3 » v .0 s^ ■•S g 3 ■So S © g ftO, u b^ cn o s-o g - =s .2 o p -a si ce sil So*" gft® g-a-s 3 (u ;a K S .a a; H ea O 3 .3. ■ § 'U'^ g « o " 3 !>, 09 oo*j .„ ego ^ 3 -■ c8 e o . 2J « •g cs aj •n ^^ Eh T3. n si M O Ph V .. ft •^ d CO '^ o o si CO 'T3 g " O jj 13 o ■ o B a . & 09 ■ TS a ■ 3 o o :l .-^ 09 U) a J a 3 ■a d IS d V 4-> X V o Eh 1:3 3 §• ft u 09 • 2 O n 3 ft 1.^ -g V E o H .S-SH d 11 > S 04 I. *^ « S U S3 09 g « o b 390 Appendix B 3ni:^oA uoi^t ■*. »« rH i> CO q 09J9 ^"B Sia^OA «5 >o »o •o ■* ^ l-H 30 -^xxao jaj !D CD CO CO CD 1 rt ^ ;? ;? iz; :zi ;? ;? 00 ■» o« 00 I— I t- I— 1 ^^ OS t- »n t- 01 l-H ©i J «5 co ®l o_ t- OT co_ 00 00 00 03 i> t-" co" H i> &• i> i> t- i> i> 0* e* CO o« 2 o< 05 I— 1 »o 00 t- Oi ,0 i> e< -* I-H t- CD !2; ■* of ■*" ^H r-f ® CD "JS CO ■* CO ■* ^^ 00 ■* o co_ CO co_ >^ ■* «;" ■*" !> t> "O r- < •p* J— 1 I— I e» 1— t C15 I— 1 CO § ■tJ -M < -H m i ■t-3 1 ■ p, g J 1 3 1 1 1 ■3 ^ 5 1 Q ■s "S a °3 •3§ °o I 8 s 8 « p. 8 g 1 a; (S % a xn 1 4-3 '3 B 1 B c« .0 +j ■iS •P ■<^ •^ cS 4) g 8 C3 S (U S T) g s^s :3 (3 =e n EH H H H -^ H Appendix B 391 SnpoA IV Gia^OA JO :)n33 J3J 00 00 00 00 1-4 00 « ts^ i o o i-< 05 to s» o o o CO i-H «3 to to CO 00 «5 CO «5 e< to to T-T o to IQ 00 «5 -41 O of M5 00 00 00 CO CO CO i ^ to 392 Appendix B ■oaja v^ siaioA JO IT190 J3 J 00 "-I tr- ee Oi 3 ^ O o o 5 ^ o •* o so" iC 2 OS © 00 00 «5 (M 00 I-H 1— ( •* i> to !> O O O s o a I ■3 o J3 s en 00 CO 00 CO 03 «5 CO «5 05 00 CO W ;o =0 CN as t- «3 00 00 GO CO CO i> 00 «o" CO >o 00 05 a* CO ;ia Appendix B 393 I> i-H 00 o 00 a< 00 to CO eo «5 l- «5 00 « t- I- t- I- i> i> 00 O 1 1 >< i i^ & •o in to 00 o< 00 tr- OS rH to ?-< © oo eo o 00 «5 OS 00 OS e< i-l © «5 00 eo 03 M5 o o ■* n 00 i-( T-* to tH ■* 00 e» 50 T-H OS to o» 00 1-) t- WS o( o o I— 1 F-l o r-i o 1-1 o 1-i o I-l © © © I-H 1-i S» «3 00 00 s« 1-1 o t- o 00 Of M to ■* OJ i> OS CO OS •* 1-i «5 © ■* s» >« OS o ■ f~ «J CO o 00 to a< I-H «0 OS ■* «5 eo CO J> ■* to ■* «s «s «s M O 00 >o © 1- i> ei 1—1 00 © o» t- OS rH o 05 M3 t- 00 so 00 ■* to oo ■* W ■* 00 CO 1-4 © OS 00 t- © a» o CO rH 50 ■* t- t- CO «5 ■>*l «5 ■* «5 to o< OS 00 i> o o o o o 5?;^ ^^ Iz; OS o OS o< o Q» 00 l-H ;o <» 00 i> X5 •O «5 OS CO ■* O 0» 00 OS «0 IS !0 i> t- rH » t- l> o «5 0« 00 CO I^ OS 00 OS ■* CO l-H OS 00 OS l> ■* ■* ■* o« o« I-H 4J -^ ^j B4-4 i 3;a ;a« fS • en • CI • o ■ BD 5P-S J) O 3 3 HI cc a -s « ce ri S •a § s M.a *.a «^ a a -0 a a ■3 o.S ^^ - m nci "^ 4j O O O fe ■2-5 .2 S o i- -3 03 <1 H P O SnrjoA nop -oaja ^B sia^oA t- OS t- CO CO CO © CO MJ ■*(«■*■ !> CO 00 00 i> « ^ J OSS S o 1 ■* O «5 ■* ■* t- XS © 00 © i-H 00 •* -"SI a^ ■* ©_ CO oo^ co_^ OT CO o" OS i> CO of co" r^ 00 OS OS OS CO OS t— I 1 •O ■* ■* CO (J! t- © OS l> O CO CO ■* i> e» ©_ i> ■* i-T 00 o X i> 1-1 ■* J> rH O © Q<^ CO CO OS OS CO CO S ■* m ^ ii 4J 64-3 «+H **H ^ ^ • "a ^ ^ ^ ■ • fl w W Woo 1 1 Vote for Governor ... For licensing, restricting, and regulating manu- facture and sale of intoxicating liquo;-s .... Divorce Act For Dreservation of auail g 1 a, 1 1 1 .11 e5^ s II 396 Appendix B Per Cent Voting 05C(5U50INoqw5e»0»«00» 0'i>056000J05 0So6r-Ji-< OJOOOOOOXOOt-t-t-t-t-t- ■fj oogooooooooo ■ tf ;z; ^ ;S ^ ;^^ ^ ^ ;z; ;? ;? ;? ;? SI00O5Ss<»o»oi-i«5iot-oo» 1 oot-o3WWooooo^o'>'>oo tsi" of 00 i> ■* ■* 'j'' m" of in" «5 OOJ^OSOOMOOOOOOOOOOt-l- •o»05ot-oomo»!Oioc<5coo i •i>00<050(5-*«50SO«-*00-* OTt-0.nn«''»nn «5t--*O(05O«0*05t-O(C0i> .»0«5-*«3'*«i«5-*'*«i-*«3 'coOcsjsi^eciOoooooooi n •rHO«3OTi-lT-li£ltOO<(ni-lxr5 K? ■*OH r-H of >n oo" W5 t-" of of ■* to" a> to" i-" I— 1 • -sioo-^OTCoeoeoOTcooJOJr-i OHOOOOO< ooc c Appendix B 397 Q W H O 02 SnijoA noi} O «5 I- t- rH 1 -33]d fV GJsioA OJ I-H ij 00 o JO ^nao J3J i> i> I- to "^ ^ 1 I s I I s > >■ > > >^ o 5C «c !> •* m 3 o ■* ;c i- oo o c X X IT- to rH •>a o< rH 'S' 1— t 1 c O) t- I— t oc X c- X I— t tc x l- 1 to •* Q) Q) r^ O) o« SI ■* to o St K c «: •<* o o» ►2 er. r- OJ I-H a* >< e< rH «3 O CO 1 cc «5 to «s -*i 1 s s 1 1 t " •fj iJ s a !>, H a ■ ■S ^ o J2 o o «4H s 1 1 1 ^ Si ■ «•-( •s ■■^ a 1 o 1 1 1 a "S ai B i 1 ° ■ S3 0) 1 0) II 1 13 i;-^ . 02 32 1 ^ g 1 ill o O V ■si 1'^ lit Hi 398 Appendix B l-H P SopoA nor} ■* o «5 i> 00 «5 «j -OSja )C SJ9 JOA si d i-i ^ 06 00 00 os' JO IJUSD 13 J 015 CO 00 00 Q< ot o» SJ 1 O o O ^ :? ;5 ;z; iz; 12; 12; ;? "O OS ^ OS "3 05 o (N a> OS «5 •* I-i I-H o I-H 00, CO 1 i-T a> •* «5 ■* s< I-H I-H sT i-i CO 00 00 CO 00 eo CO 00 I-) o i-< ^ CO «5 00 ;o CO T? I-H I-H I-H «3 °°. i> ■^ o W5 (S l-H ■O •* «i CO o e* » ■* T-H ■* I-H >2 o j-< OS ■* OS_ OS >* « oT of CO m" ffl 00 I-H I-^ §1 ■ =2 1 1 3 1 1 13 3 ■ ■1-3 d o 3 -3 2 1: '0 ■ s ■ •43 ■ 3 II s a. 'a m s 04-* o i ■ T) BO ^0 •o o O i 1 8 1 ■43 • II 8 ^ ■*-> ts S 1 1 3. ^ II § •43 a> 43 tn ^ a> ^ "O 3 ^ ■s ^ a o ^^ ^^ a la t> O H H Index Inde X Aargau page ResiJts of referendum in 166, 311 Results of initiative in 200, 311 Advertisement This an age of 57-59 Arizona Referendum Adoption of 174 Results of 368 Initiative, results of 205, 368 Arkansas Referendum Adoption of 174 Results of 176, 370 Initiative, results of 205, 370 Athens Use of the lot in 47, 245 Lack of experts in public life 264 .Walter 296,.297 Basle, City Results of referendum in 315 Basle, Rural Results of referendum in 167,185,186,318 Results of initiative in 200, 318 Benaist, Charles 121 Bern Results of referendum in 166, 185, 186, 322 Results of initiative in 200, 203, 322 Boston Local referendum in 196-197 Boss, the Natural history of 103 A broker in private privileges 105 402 Index Boss, the (continued) page Sources of his power : . . . . 135, 137-138 (See also Parties and Politicians) Brigham, A. D 288 Brokers Need and influence of 60 Politicians act as 61, 64, 67 Bryce, James 7, 35, 37, 71, 104, 146 Bureaucracy Dread of in America 106, 109, 270, 289 Burhe, Edmund 66, 124 California Referendum Adoption of 174 Results of 177-182, 183, 371 Initiative, results of 205, 371 Civil Service Reform, Its limitation in America 107, 275-276, 300 Examinations in England 301 Colorado Referendum Adoption of . 174 Results of 183,184,189,190,372 Initiative, results of 204, 206, 215, 372 Commission City government by . . ... 285 Its relation to use of experts 286 Common Will Of Rousseau and public opinion ... 8 Compromise Prejudice against , . 52, 63 Consent As a basis of government. . 9 And force 10-12 Courts Power to hold statutes unconstitutional 9-10 Constitutional Restraints Merits of 9-10, 44-45 Corruption Causes of 104 Forms of 134-135 Index ' 403 Creeds page How far opinions 16 Cridge, Alfred D 211 Croly, Herbert 103 Democrcuyy Slowly learned 38 Meaning of 67 Its fear of experts 270 And opinion . . 26 y, A. V. 64 Dickinson, G. Lowes 42 Direct Primary. (See Primary, direct.) Dissent Freedom to express 37 Dupriez, Leon 123 Elections How far they express opinion 26, 71 et seq., 91, 113 et seq., 137-139 In Spain 113 Private influences in 137 England Theory of mandate 73 And United States 76 Difference in meaning of elections ... . . 76-79, 259 Solidarity of parties .... 78-79,92,118-120,125-128,132,139 Committees on private bills 248 Experts Growing use of in industrial life 49, 272 Lack of in Athens 264 Lack of in Home under the Republic 265 Their use under the Empire 267 In monarchies 268 Their absence in democracies 270 In English government 296,297 Need of in public life 49-60, 262, 271 Little used in American public life 274, 282 Use of in German cities . 281 Use of in English cities 281-282 The mimicipal program 283 Relation of conmiission government to 285 404 Index Experts (continued) page Control of 289 In public education 294 Proper relation to lay superiors 291 et seq. Method of creating it 298 Methods of recruiting 300 In England 302 In Holland 301 Facts Knowledge of 22-24 As basis of opinion 22-24 Difficulty in ascertaining 47 et seq. Examples 50 Farrand, Max 118 Farce As a basis of government 11 Ford, Henry J 70 Freedom To express dissent 37 To organize. . 39 In religion . 41-42 Freeman, E. A 12 Frontier Its effect on public life in America 109 Galveston Plan of commission government 286 Geneva Results of referendum in 167, 185, 186, 328 Results of initiative in . . . 201, 202, 328 Goodnow, F. J 284, 303 Grisons Results of referendum in 276, 330 Results of initiative in 200, 330 Habit Its loss of force 58 Badley, A. T 15 Harmony Of principles a basis of opinion 20 Index 405 . Harmony (continued) page Of interests 28-30 Doctrine of 28-30 Hart, A. B 104 Headlam, James W 47, 245 Hirschfeld, Otto 268 Eolman, Frederick V 213, 229 Hoist, H. von 72 Essential for public opinion 34-36 Houston Plan of commission government 286 Hughes, Governor His bill for direct primaries 150 Idaho Referendum, adoption of 174 Initiative Its nature 162, 198 In Switzerland Its tendencies 201 Its small use . . . 202 Results in the Swiss Confederation 199, 306 In Aargau . . . . 200, 311 In Bern 200, 203, 322 In Geneva 201, 202, 328 In Grisons 200, 330 In Lucerne 200, 333 In Rural Basle . 200, 318 In Schaffhausen 200, 336 In Schwyz 201, 338 In Solothurn 200, 341 In St. Gall 201, 334 In Thurgau 200, 347 In Valais 200, 350 In Vaud 186, 353 In Zurich 200, 353 In America Results in Arizona 205, 368 Arkansas 205, 376 California 205, 371 406 Index Initiative (continued) page Colorado iOi, 206, 215, 372 Maine 204, 376 Missouri . 204, 377 Montana . .... 204, 379 New Mexico 205, 380 Oklahoma 204, 381 Oregon 203, 204, 206, 207-217, 384 South Dakota. . 203, 205, 395 Utah 398 Laws enacted . 205 Proposals rejected . 207 Complex measures proposed . . . . ... .211 How far an expression of public opinion . 209 et seq., 224-226 Evidence from stability .... 216 Defects of .... 217 Is it public or private 221 Class of measures suited for 231 Not a panacea 233 Intetisity Of opinion 12-14 Its effect 12-14 Irreconcilables And public opinion _. 10-12, 32 And race feeling. . . 31 Cause of 34 Janissaries 17 Johnson, L. J 224 Jury A sample of the public 242 Safeguards surrounding it 243 Special juries 246 Landsgemeinde . . , 152, 164 Legislatures Recent distrust of 130 Its causes 131 Tendency to play politics 131-133 Local interests in 133^ 143 Private interests in . 134, 137-139, 143 Index 407 Legislatures (continued) page Defects exaggerated 139, 141 Hemedies in United States negative 144-146 Excessive restrictions in United States 145, 146 Leupp, Francis E 292 Leuris, Sir G. C 17, 50, 96, 296 Lobbying Different kinds of 135-136 Lodge,B..C 151 Log-roUing 134 Lot Use of in Athens 47, 245 Use of in Venice 245 Lowell, Francis C 104, 119 Lucerne Results of referendum in 168, 333 Results of initiative in 200^ 333 Macdondd, J. R. 158, 298 MacGregor, Ford C 285, 286, 287 Machine, the Its cg,uses . . . 140 (See also. Politicians and Parties and Boss) Referendum Adoption of 174 Results of .'.... 182-183, 189, 376 Initiative, results in 204, 376 Maine, Sir H.S.. 3,62,65,73 J/oi^and, F. W 221 Not enough for public opinion 4-7 Basis of their right to rule 9 Artificial nature of 61, 68 Mandate Theory of m England 73 Massachusetts Results of constitutional referendum 171, 187-188 The Luce Law 226 Public hearings 250 Its benefits 252 Means, D. McG 104 408 Index Michigan page Results of constitutional referendum 170, 188 Minghetti, Marco 108 Minority Duty to submit 11, 15, 44 In religion 42 Missouri Referendum, adoption of 174, 377 Initiative, results in 204, 377 Montana Referendum, adoption of 174, 379 Initiative, results in 204, 379 Municipal Oovernment In Europe 278, 280 In America 278-280, 282 (See also Commission) Munro, W. B 281 Mutual Confidence Lack of in America 141 Nebraska Referendum, adoption of .* . . 174 Nevada Referendum Adoption of 174 Results 178, 379 New Mexico Referendum Adoption of 174-189 Results of . •; 380 Initiative, results in 205, 380 OberhaUzer, E. P 173, 187 Oklahoma Referendum Adoption of 174 Results of 178-181, 182, 184, 381 Initiative, results in 204, 381 Opinion Not always rational 16, 18 Real if part of believer's philosophy 19 Index 409 Opinion (continued) page Otherwise must be based on facts 22 Opinion and desire 26 (See also Public Opinion) Oregon Referendtim Adoption of . 174 Use of emergency clause ... . . 176 Results. . . . . .178-179,182,189,190,227,384 State pamphlet of measures . 191-192 Eflfect on legislation 229 Initiative Adoption of 203, 204 Results in 206, 207-217, 384 Organization Its political effect 39-40 Distorts. public opinion 86 et seq. Ostragorski, M 104 Parties Causes of 64 et seq., 101 Organs for formulating opinions 66-67 Frame the issues 69 Confuse the issues ... 71, 75 Greater solidarity in England than in United States . . 76-79, 92 Multiplicity in continental Europe 79 Their nature 80 Slow changes 81 Causes of 81 Their effect 82-84 Cause a bias 86 Cause f abe lines of division 88-90 Distort public opinion 92 Influence of extreme elements 93, 95 Influence of moderate elements 93 Prevent popular vagaries 96 An obstacle to despotism 97 Unscientific criticism 99-101 Legislation by 102 Argument for 144 Dealing with private interests 158 410 Index Parties (continued) page In municipal government . . 87 Conventions in United States at first popular 140 (See also Politicians and Boss) Pasteur, Louis . . 57 People, the Can say only "Yes" or "No" 69,91 In America undertake too much 103,105-110,260 Politicians As brokers 61 Of public opinion 67 Of private privileges 64 Work through parties . 64 Cause of 103, 108 Popular Interest In man greater than in measures 53 Primaries, direct 68, 102, 149 Cost of 151 Private Bills In England . . 248 Proportional Representation 122-124 Public Hearings In America . . 249 Practice of in Massachusetts 250 Practice of in other states 254 Public Officers Three kinds of 240 Often combined . .... ... 256 DifiScuIty of selection 258 Methods of selection ... 260 Public Opinion Must be public 3 Majority not enough 4-7 Unanimity not required 7 Does not include irreconcilables 12 Case of the Southern States . 5,33 Effect of race feeling 31 Need of homogeneity 34-36 Effect of intensity 12-14 It involves freedom to express dissent 37 And to organize 39 It must be opinion 16 et seq. Index 411 Public Opinion (continued) page Conditions essential for. 28 et seq. Not necessarily rational 29 How far must be based on fact " . . 46 Knowledge of facts difficult 47 et seq. Examples 50 Limitation of in religion 41, 42 In other matters 42, 44 Uncertainty in predicting . . 53 Distortion by parties 86 et seq., 92 Methods of expressing 113 et seq. By elections 25, 71 et seq., 91 Direct expression 152 et seq. By the referendum 159 et seq., 181 et seq., 190 By the initiative 209 et seq., 224-226 Evidence from stability 216 Evils from failure to perceive its limits 142-144 Why given effect 239 Opinion by sample 242 Need of impartiality 136 (See Opinion, Representation) Race Feding 31, 35 Recall, the 147 Compulsory and optional . 164 Reasons for 155 Distrust of legislature 155 Separation of issues 157 Criticisms of 156 In England . 157, 158 How far an expression of public opinion 159 et seq., 181 et seq., 190, 224-226 Its effect negative .... 162 Results in Switzerland not radical . 168 In the Confederation 165, 306 In Aargau 166, 186, 311 In Bern 165, 185, 186, 322 In Geneva 167, 185, 186, 328 In Orisons 167, 330 In Lucerne 168, 333 412 Index Referendum (continued) page In Rural Basle 167, 185, 186, 318 In Schaffhausen 167, 186, 336 InSchwyz 167,186,338 In Solothurn 167, 185, 341 In St. Gall 167, 186, 334 InThurgau 166,186,347 In Valais 167, 185, 350 In Vaud 168, 185, 353 In Zurich 166, 185, 186 Its use in America . . 169 et seq. . On Constitution changes 169-170, 187 Results in Michigan 170, 188 Results in Massachusetts 171, 187-188 On special acts 171 On ordinary laws 173, 188 et seq. Use of emergency clause 174 Results in Arizona 176,368 Arkansas 176, 370 California 177,182,183,371 Colorado 177, 183, 184, 189, 190, 372 Maine 178,182,183,189,376 Missouri 174, 204-377 Montana 178, 379 Nebraska 174 Nevada 178, 379 New Mexico 178, 189, 380 Oklahoma 178, 181, 381 Oregon 178,182,189,190,191-192,384 South Dakota 179,180,183,189,190,395 Utah 398 Number of laws rejected ... 176 Character of laws rejected . 180 Smallness of the vote cast 184-191 Fines for not voting 191 State pamphlet of measures 192 The local referendum Its meaning 193-194 Its advantages . 196 Size of vote in Boston ... 196-197 Delay sometimes harmful .. 226 Eflfect on the legislation 228-230 Index 413 Referendum (continued) page Class of measures suited for 231 Not a panacea 233 Reinsch, Paul 156, 249, 2S4, 255 Representation Of the nation and of constituencies 116-llt la England 117-120, 125 In the United States 117-120,125 Of interests 121 Theories of delegation and personal judgment 124-128 Former faith in representation 129 Recent distrust of 130 Three kinds of 240 Often combined 256 By sample 242 The jury 242 Rotation in office 243 Use of the lot 244 Selected samples 246 Use of in public affairs 247 Private bill committees in England 248 Public hearings in America 249 Practice of in Massachusetts . 250 Practice of in other states 254 Difficulty of selecting officers 258 (See also Legislatures) Rohmer, Friedrich 66 Rome Lack of experts under the Republic ; 265 Their rise under the Empire 267 Rotation in Office Its object 106, 243 Rousseau, 3.3 ... 8, 28, 87 Ryan, Chief Justice 261 StQaU Results of referendum in 167, 186, 334 Results of initiative in 201, 334 Sample Public opinion by . . . _ 242 (See Representation) 414 Index Schaffhausen page Results of referendum in 167, 185, 186, 336 Results of initiative in 200, 336 Sehwyz Results of referendum in 167, 186, 338 Results of initiative in 201, 338 Shams Use of 3-4 In parties 89 Social Compact 8, 9 Solothurn Results of referendum in 167, 185, 341 Results of initiative in 200, 341 South Dakota Referendum Adoption of . 174 Use of emergency clause 174-175 Results 179-181,183,189,190,395 Effect on legislation . 228 Initiative, results of 203, 205, 395 Special Legislation Its evils in America 107, 119, 143 Log-rolling 133 Forms of corruption ... . 134-135 Amount of in United States. . . 146 Attempts to restrict .... 145 In England 144 Private bill procedure in England . . 248 Sumner, Charles ... 262 Swiss Confederation Results of referendum in 165, 186, 306 Results of initiative in 199, 306 Tarde, Gabriel 26, 30, 37, 65 Thurgau Results of referendum in 166, 186, 347 Results of initiative in 200, 347 Town Meeting . . 152 Its merits 153 Unanimity Not needed for public opinion 7 Index 415 United States page And England Difference in meaning of elections . . 76-79, 259 Differences of opinion within its parties 80, 118-120, 125-128, 132, 140 (See also Parties, Special Legislation, Referendum, Initiative, Experts, etc.) ITRen, W. S 229 Utah Referendum not in effect 398 Votes in Constitutional Amendments 398 Valais Results of referendum in 167,185,186,350 Results of initiative in 200, 350 Vaud Results of referendum in 168, 185, 353 Results of initiative in . 353 Von Hoist, H. (See Hoist, H. von.) Wallas, Graham 43 Referendum, adoption of 174 WendeU, Barrett 32 Zurich Results of referendum in 185, 186, 363 Fines for not voting 191 Results of initiative in 200, 353 RAILROADS, RATES AND REGULATIOl By WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, Ph.D. Nathaniel ^Ropes, Pbofessor off Economics in Habvabd Univebbitt With il diagrams in the text. Small Svo. Pp. xviii-659 Net $3.00 (by mail $3.20) FOR various reasons, railroads during the last ten years have occi pied a peculiarly prominent place in public attention in tl United States. Representing an investment of about one-fift of the nation's wealth, their affairs are a, matter of direct conceri through bankers, to thousands of holders of their securities all ov< the country. Every merchant and manufacturer, in connection wit the every day conduct of business, is bound, as a shipper, to be intei ested in their status. Several million o£Scials and employees ai dependent upon railroad welfare for their livelihood. The general pul lie, as consumers, is vitally concerned with the manner in which the are conducted; and now, since the advent of strict public control ( rates, in the outcome of that political experiinent. The legal profei sion is directly interested also — by way of the multitude of cases no' arising for settlement before the various federal and state railroa commissions. This treatise, more detailed and elaborate than a,(mei text-book, aims to set forth the nature of the railroad problems of th time, commercial, fiscal and political; while at the same time avoic ing the extreme technicalities of the narrow specialist. This first vol ume deals with the matter of rates and government regulation; whil a second, in preparation, will deal with matters of finance and corpc rate organization. Amply provided with footnotes and references, th text, nevertheless, deals with the subject in a manner comprehensibi to the ordinary reader. Over forty maps and illustrations in the firs volume alone serve to render the problems discussed more interestin and intelligible. It is a work which should appeal alike to banker! investors, railway officers and employees, lawyers and publicists, a well as to all students of economics and politics and the serious gei eral reader. " Professor Ripley is presenting the most exhaustive study of th railway problem in the United States that has yet appeared. By hi intimate knowledge of the whole field of railway operation and by hi attractive literary style, he has produced a book that is likely long t remain a standard authority on the subjects discussed. ... 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