r CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY' BOUGHT "WITH THE INCOME OR THE SAGE ENDOWMENT FUND GIVEN IN 189I BY HENRY WILLIAMS SAGE O 171.H98dT""""""*'"-"'"^ Darwiniana :essays /by Thomas H. Huxley. 924 012 238 394 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924012238394 DARWIN lANA E-^^SAYS BY THOMAS H. HUXLEY NEW YORK D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 1894 Authorized Edition. PKEFACE I HAVE entitled this volume "Darwiniana" because the pieces republished in it either treat of the ancient doctrine of Evolution, rehabilitated and placed upon a sound scientific foundation, since and in consequence of, the publication of the " Origin of Species ; " or they attempt to meet the more weighty of the unsparing criticisms with which that great work was visited for several years after its appearance ; or they record the impression left by the personality of Mr, Darwin on one who had the privilege and the happiness of enjoying his friendship for some thirty years ; or they endeavour to sum up his work and indicate its enduring influence on the course of scientific thought. Those who take the trouble to read the first two essays, published in 1859 and 1860, will, I think, do me the justice to admit that my zeal to secure fair play for Mr. Darwin, did not drive me into the position of a mere advocate ; and that, while doing justice to the greatness of the argu- Vi PKEFACE ment I did not fail to indicate its weak points. I have never seen any reason for departing from the position which I took up in these two essays ; and the assertion which I sometimes meet with nowa- days, that I have " recanted " or changed my opinions about Mr. Darwin's views, is quite unin- teUigible to me. As I have said in the seveuth essay, the fact of evokition is to my mind sufficiently evidenced by palaeontology ; and I remain of the opinion ex- pressed in the second, that until selective breeding is definitely proved to give rise to varieties infertile with one another, the logical foundation of the theory of natural selection is incomplete. We still remain very much in the dark about the causes of variation ; the apparent inheritance of acquired characters in some cases; and the struggle for existence within the organism, which probably lies at the bottom of both of these phenomena. Some apology is due to the reader for the repro- duction of the " Lectures to Working Men " in their original state. They were taken down in shorthand by Mr. J. Aldous Mays, who requested me to allow him to print them. I was very much pressed with work at the time ; and, as I could not revise the reports, which I imagined, moreover, would be of little or no interest to any but my auditors, I stipulated that a notice should be pre- fixed to that effect. This was done ; but it did not PREFACE. vii prevent a considerable diffusion of the little book in this country and in the United States, nor its translation into more than one foreign languasre. Moreover Mr, Darwin often urged me to revise and expand the lectures into a systematic popular exposition of the topics of which they treat. I have more than ores set about the task : but the proverb about spoiling a horn and not making a spoon, is particularly applicable to attempts to remodel a piece of work which may have served its immediate purpose well enough. So I have reprinted the lectures as they stand, with all their imperfections on their heads. It would seem that many people must have found them useful thirty years ago ; and, though the sixties appear now to be reckoned by many of the rising generation as a part of the dark ages, I am not without some grounds for suspecting that there yet remains a fair sprinkling even of " philosophic thinkers " to whom it may be a profitable, perhaps even a novel, task to descend from the heights of speculation and go over the A B C of the great biological problem as it was set before a body of shrewd artisans at that remote epoch. T. H. H. HODESLEA, EaSTBOTJENE, April 7th, 1893. CONTENTS I PAGE THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS [1859] 1 II THE OHIGIN OF SPECIES [1860] 22 CRITICISMS ON " THE OEIGIN OF SPECIES " [1864] ... 80 IV THE GENEALOGT OF ANIMALS [1869] 107 V MR. dabwin's critics [1871] 120 VI EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY [1878] 187 X CONTENTS VII PAOH THE COMING OF AGE OF "THE OEIGIN OF SPECIES " [1880] 227 VIII OHAELES DARWIN [1882] 244 IX THE DARWIN MEMORIAL [1885] 248 X OBITUARY [1888] .....*" 253 XI six lectures to working men " on our knowledge of the causes of the phenomena op organic nature" [1863] 803 I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS [1859] The hypothesis of which the present work of Mr. Darwin is but the prehminary outline, may be stated in his own language as follows : — " Species originated by means of natural selection, or through the preservation of the favoured races in the struggle for life." To render this thesis intelligible, it is necessary to interpret its terms. In the first place, what is a species ? The question is a simple one, but the right answer to it is hard to find, even if we appeal to those who should know most about it. It is all those animals or plants which have descended from a single pair of parents ; it is the smallest distinctly definable group of living organisms ; it is an eternal and immutable entity ; it is a mere abstraction of the human intellect having no existence in nature. Such are a few of the significations attached to 2 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I this simple word which may be culled from authoritative sources; and if, leaving terms and theoretical subtleties aside, we turn to facts and endeavour to gather a meaning for ourselves, by- studying the things to which, in practice, the name of species is applied, it profits us little. For practice varies as much as theory. Let two botanists or two zoologists examine and describe the productions of a country, and one will pretty certainly disagree with the other as to the number, limits, and definitions of the species into which he groups the very same things. In these islands, we are in the habit of regarding mankind as of one species, but a fortnight's steam will land us in a coimtry where divines and savants, for once in agreement, vie with one another in loudness of assertion, if not in cogency of proof, that men are of different species; and, more particularly, that the species negro is so distinct from our own that the Ten Commandments have actually no reference to him. Even in the calm region of entomology, where, if anywhere in this sinful world, passion and prejudice should fail to stir the mind, one learned coleopterist will fill ten attractive volumes with descriptions of species of beetles, nine-tenths of which are immediately declared by his brother beetle-mongers to be no species at all. The truth is that the number of distinguishable living creatures almost surpasses imagination. At least 100,000 such kinds of insects alone have been I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 3 described and may be identified in collections, and the number of separable kinds of living things is under-estimated at half a million. Seeing that most of these obvious kinds have their accidental varieties, and that they often shade into others by imperceptible degrees, it may well be imagined that the task of distinguishing be- tween what is permanent and what fleeting, what is a species and what a mere variety, is sufficiently formidable. But is it not possible to apply a test whereby a true species may be known from a mere variety ? Is there no criterion of species ? Great authori- ties affirm that there is — that the unions of members of the same species are always fertile, while those of distinct species are either sterile, or their offspring, called hybrids, are so. It is affirmed not only that this is an experimental fact, but that it is a provision for the preservation of the purity of species. Such a criterion as this would be invaluable ; but, unfortunately, not only is it not obvious how to apply it in the great majority of cases in which its aid is needed, but its general validity is stoutly denied. The Hon. and Rev. Mr. Herbert, a most trustworthy authority, not only asserts as the result of his own observa- tions and experiments that many hybrids are quite as fertile as the parent species, but he goes so far as to assert that the particular plant Crinum capense is much more fertile when crossed by a 4s THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I distinct species than when fertilised by its proper pollen ! On the other hand, the famous Gaertner, though he took the greatest pains to cross the Primrose and the Cowslip, succeeded only once or twice in several years ; and yet it is a well- established fact that the Primrose and the Cow- slip are only varieties of the same kind of plant. Again, such cases as the following are well estab- lished. The female of species A, if crossed with the male of species B, is fertile ; but, if the female of B is crossed with the male of A, she remains barren. Facts of this kind destroy the value of the supposed criterion. If, weary of the endless difficulties involved in the determination of species, the investigator, contenting himself with the rough practical distinction of separable kinds, endeavours to study them as they occur in nature — to ascertain their relations to the conditions which surround them, their mutual harmonies and discordancies of structure, the bond of union of their present and their past history, he finds himself, according to the received notions, in a mighty maze, and with, at most, the dimmest adumbration of a plan. If he starts with any one clear conviction, it is that every part of a living creature is cunningly adapted to some special use in its life. Has not his Paley told him that that seemingly useless organ, the spleen, is beautifully adjusted as so much packing between the other organs ? And 1 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 5 yet, at the outset of his studies, he finds that no adaptive reason whatsoever can be given for one- half of the peculiarities of vegetable structure. He also discovers rudimentary teeth, which are never used, in the gums of the young calf and in those of the foetal whale ; insects which never bite have rudimental jaws, and others which never fly have rudimental wings ; naturally blind creatures have rudimental eyes ; and the halt have rudimentary limbs. So, again, no animal or plant puts on its perfect form at once, but all have to start from the same point, however various the course which each has to pursue. Not only men and horses, and cats and dogs, lobsters and beetles, periwinkles and mussels, but even the very sponges and animalcules commence their existence under forms which are essentially undistinguishable ; and this is true of all the infinite variety of plants. Nay, more, all living beings march, side by side, along the high road of development, and separate the later the more likei they are ; like people leaving church, who all gd down the aisle, but having reached the door, somJ turn into the parsonage, others go down thq village, and others part only in the next parish.? A man in his development runs for a little while parallel with, though never passing through, the form of the meanest worm, then travels for a space beside the fish, then journeys along with the bird and the reptile for his fellow travellers ; 6 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I and only at last, after a brief companionship with the highest of the four-footed and four-handed world, rises into the dignity of pure manhood. No competent thinker of the present day dreams of explaining these indubitable facts by the notion of the existence of unknown and undiscoverable adaptations to purpose. And we would remind those who, ignorant of the facts, must be moved by authority, that no one has asserted the incom- petence of the doctrine of final causes, in its application to physiology and anatomy, more strongly than our own eminent anatomist. Professor Owen, who, speaking of such cases, says ("On the Nature of Limbs," pp. 39, 40)— " I think it will be obvious that the principle of final adaptations fails to satisfy all the conditions of the problem." Butjif the^doctrine of fin al causes will n ot help us to comprehend the anomalies ^pf living structure, the principleof_ad^MitiQli- must surely lead' us to understand why certai n liv ing beings are found in certain regions of jdie_jwqrld and not in others,^ The Palm, as we know, will not grow in our climate, nor the Oak in Greenland. The white bear cannot live where the tiger thrives, nor vice versd, and the more the natural habits of animal and vegetable species are examined, the more do they seem, on the whole, limited to particular provinces. But when we look into the facts established by the study of the geographical I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 7 distribution of animals and plants it seems utterly hopeless to attempt to understand the strange and apparently capricious relations which they exhibit. O ne would be- -inHinetLl o suppose a . yriori that every country must be naturally peoj)le(lby_those a.n,iTT ;ia1s t.hai. -a.ra_fittpatj;2_li^ and thrive in it. And yet how, on this hypothesis, are we to account for the'^bsence of cattle in the Pampa s of South America,, when those parts of the New Wor ld were discovere d ? Iji_is_notthat they were unfit for cat tle, for millions of cattle now run wild there ;~and the like., holds good of Australia and^ ^e w Zealand. It is a curious circumstance", m tact, that the animals and plants of the Northern Hemisphere are not only as well adapted to live in the Southern Hemisphere as its own autochthones, but are, in many cases, absolutely better adapted, and so overrun and extirpate the aborigines. Clearly, therefore, the species which naturally inhabit a country are not necessarily the best adapted to its climate and other conditions. The inhabitants of islands are often distinct from .^any other ¥nown ^Jpec^§._ of an imal or ^^nts, (wit^qg^ our recent examples froin the ^work of Sir EmersoTr~Tennent, on Ceylon), and yet they have almost always a sort of general family resemblance to the animals and plauta uf — tAre-jaeaa-e gtr iSamland ^ Un the other hand, there is hardly a species of fish, shell, or crab common to the opposite sides of the narrow SO 8 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I isthmus of Panama.^ Wlierever_ws_Ji>J3k,_then, living nature_offCTS_us-iiiMks-iD£-.difficuK "'irwe'~sup£ose_tJiat-JV-hat_5Ke ^ee is all that can be~lmo55uo£-*fer- . Vat our knowledge of life is not confined to the existing world. Whatever their minor differences, seologists are agreed as to the vast thickness of the accumulated strata which compose the visible part of our earth, and the inconceivable immensity of the time the lapse of Avhich they are the imperfect but the only accessible witnesses. Now, through- out the greater part of this long series of stratified rocks are scattered, sometimes very abundantly, multitudes of organic remains, the fossilised exuviae of animals and plants which lived and died while the mud of which the rocks are formed Avas yet soft ooze, and could receive and bury them. It would be a great error to suppose that these organic remains were fragmentary relics. Our museums exhibit fossil shells of immeasurable antiquity, as perfect as the day they were formed ; whole skeletons without a limb disturbed ; nay, the changed flesh, the developing embryos, and even the very footsteps of primaeval organisms. Thus the naturalist finds in the bowels of the earth species as well defined as, and in some groups of animals more numerous than, those which breathe the upper air. But, singularly enough, the majority of these entombed species are wholly 1 [See page 60 Note] I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 9 distinct from those that now live. Nor is this un- l ikeness~without i^ rule~anc r ordel\ ~ As a bro ad ' fa^ L the further w e go bacFln t |me_thgjftss Jjtp._ buried sg ecies are like existing forms ; and, the fur- the r apart the se ts "f ftYtiruvt-. creaturesare, the less they are like one another. ._ In lO^^er words, there has been a regular succession of living beings, each younger set, being in a very broad and general sense, somewhat more like those which now live. It was once supposed that this succession had been the result of vast successive catastrophes, destructions, and re-creations en masse ; but catastrophes are now almost eliminated from geological, or at least palseontological speculation ; and it is admitted, on all hands, that the seeming breaks in the chain of being are not absolute, but only relative to our imperfect knowledge ; that species have replaced species, not in assemblages, but one by one ; and that, if it were possible to have all the phenomena of the past presented to us, the convenient epochs and formations of the geologist, though having a certain distinctness, would fade into one another with limits as undefinable as those of the distinct and yet separable colours of the solar spectrum. Such is a brief summary of the main truths which have been established concerning species. Are these truths ultimate and irresolvable facts, or are their complexities and perplexities the mere expressions of a higher law ? 10 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 1 A large number of persons practically assume the former position to be correct. They believe that the writer of the Pentateuch was empowered and commissioned to teach us scientific as well as other truth, that the account we find there of the creation of living things is simply and literally correct, and that anything which seems to con- tradict it is, by the nature of the case, false. All the phenomena which have been detailed are, on this view, the immediate product of a creative fiat and, consequently, are out of the domain of science altogether. Whether this view prove ultimately to be true or false, it is, at any rate, not at present sup- ported by what is commonly regarded as logical proof, even if it be capable of discussion by reason ; and hence we consider ourselves at liberty to pass it by, and to turn to those views which profess to rest on a scientific basis only, and there- fore admit of being argued to their consequences. And we do this with the less hesitation as it so happens that those persons who are practically conversant with the facts of the case (plainly a considerable advantage) have always thought fit to range themselves under the latter category. The majority of these competent persons have up to the present time maintained two positions — the first, that every species, is, within certain de- fined limits, fixed and incapable of modification; the second, that every species was originally pro- I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 11 duced by a distinct creative act. The second position is obviously incapable of proof or disproof, the direct operations of the Creator not being subjects of science ; and it must therefore be regarded as a corollary from the first, the truth or falsehood of which is a matter of evidence. Most persons imagine that the arguments in favour of it are overwhelming ; but to some few minds, and these, it must be confessed, intellects of no small power and grasp of knowledge, they have not brought conviction. Among these minds, that of the famous naturalist Lamarck, who possessed a greater acquaintance with the lower forms of life than any man of his day, Cuvier not excepted, and was a good botanist to boot, occupies a prominent place. Two facts appear to have strongly affected the course of thought of this remarkable man — the one, that finer or stronger links of affinity connect all living beings with one another, and that thus the highest creature grades by multitudinous steps into the lowest ; the other, that an organ may be developed in particular directions by exerting itself in particular ways, and that modi- fications once induced may be transmitted and become hereditary. Putting these facts together, Lamarck endeavoured to account for the first by the operation of the second. Place an animal in new circumstances, says he, and its needs will be altered ; the new needs will create new desires, and 12 THE DAEWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I the attempt to gratify such desires will result in an appropriate modification of the organs exerted. Make a man a blacksmith, and his brachial muscles will develop in accordance with the demands made upon them, and in like manner, says Lamarck, "the efforts of some short-necked bird to catch fish without wetting himself have, with time and perseverance, given rise to all our herons and long-necked waders." The Lamarckian hypothesis has long since been justly condemned, and it is the established prac- tice for every tyro to raise his heel against the carcase of the dead lion. But it is rarely either wise or instructive to treat even the errors of a really great man with mere ridicule, and in the present case the logical form of the doctrine stands on a very different footing from its substance. If species have really arisen by the operation of natural conditions, we ought to be able to find those conditions now at work ; we ought to be able to discover in nature some power adequate to modify any given kind of animal or plant in such a manner as to give rise to another kind, which would be admitted by naturalists as a distinct species. Lamarck imagined that he had discovered this vera ccm^a in the admitted facts that some organs may be modified by exercise ; and that modifications, once produced, are capable of hereditary transmission. It does not seem to have occurred to him to inquire whether there is I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 13 any reason to believe that there are any limits to the amount of modification producible, or to ask how long an animal is likely to endeavour to gratify an impossible desire. The bird, in our example, would surely have renounced fish dinners long before it had produced the least effect on leg or neck. Since Lamarck's time, almost all competent naturalists have left speculations on the origin of species to such dreamers as the author of the " Vestiges," by whose well-intentioned efforts the Lamarckian theory received its final condemnation in the minds of all sound thinkers. Notwith- standing this silence, however, the transmutation theory, as it has been called, has been a " skeleton in the closet" to many an honest zoologist and botanist who had a soul above the mere naming of dried plants and skins. Surely, has such an one thought, nature is a mighty and consistent whole, and the providential order established in the world of life must, if we could only see it rightly. be consistent with that dominant over the multi- form shapes of brute matter. But what is the history of astronomy, of all the branches of physics, of chemistry, of medicine, but a narration of the steps by which the human mind has been com- pelled, often sorely against its will, to recognise the operation of secondary causes in events where ignorance beheld an immediate intervention of a higher power ? And when we know that living 14 THE DAEWINIAN HYPOTHESIS thin-s are formed of the same elements as the thmgs are lor ^^^^^ ^^ inorsanic world, that tnej' ^ ^ ^ . . bound by a thousand ties of natural piety is r probable: nay is it possible, that they, and the^ alone should have no order m their seemmc disorder, no unity in their seeming multiplicity should suffer no explanation by the discover} of some central and sublime law of mutua connection ? Questions of this kind have assuredly often arisen but it might have been long before they receivec such expression as would have commanded th( respect and attention of the scientific world, hac it not been for the publication of the work which prompted this article. Its author, Mr. Darwin inheritor of a once celebrated name, won his spurs in science when most of those now distinguishec were young men, and has for the last twentj years held a place in the front ranks of Britist philosophers. After a circumnavigatory voyage undertaken solely for the love of his science, Mr Darwin published a series of researches which al once arrested the attention of naturalists anc geologists ; his generalisations have since received ample confirmation and now command universa assent, nor is it questionable that they have hac the most important influence on the progress o: science. More recently Mr. Darwin, with i. versatility which is among the rarest of gifts turned his attention to a most difficult question o: I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 15 zoology and minute anatomy ; and no living naturalist and anatomist has published a better monograph than that which resulted from his labours. Such a man, at all events, has not entered the sanctuary with unwashed hands, and when he lays before us the results of twenty years' investigation and reflection we must listen even though we be disposed to strike. But, in reading his work, it must be confessed that the attention which might at first be dutifully, soon becomes willingly, given, so clear is the author's thought, so outspoken his conviction, so honest and fair the candid expression of his doubts. Those who would judge the book must read it : we shall endeavour only to make its line of argu- ment and its philosophical position intelligible to the general reader in our own way. The Baker Street Bazaar has just been exhibit- ing its familiar annual spectacle. Straight-backed, small-headed, big-barrelled oxen, as dissimilar from any wild species as can well be imagined, contended for attention and praise with sheep of half-a-dozen different breeds and styes of bloated preposterous pigs, no more like a wild boar or sow than a city alderman is like an ourang-outang. The cattle show has been, and perhaps may again be, succeeded by a poultry show, of whose crowing and clucking prodigies it can only be certainly predicated that they will be very unlike the aboriginal Phasianus gallus. If the seeker after 16 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I animal anomalies is not satisfied, a turn or two in Seven Dials will convince him that the breeds of pigeons are quite as extraordinary and unlike one another and their parent stock, while the Horti- cultural Society will provide him with any number of corresponding vegetable aberrations from nature's types. He will learn with no little surprise, too, in the course of his travels, that the proprietors and producers of these animal and vegetable anomalies regard them as distinct species, with a firm belief, the strength of which is exactly proportioned to their ignorance of scientific biology, and which is the more remark- able as they are all proud of their skill in origmat- ing such " species/' On careful inquiry it is found that all these, and the many other artificial breeds or races of animals and plants, have been produced by one method. The breeder — and a skilful one must be a person of much sagacity and natural or acquired perceptive faculty — notes some slight difference, arising he knows not how, in some individuals of his stock. If he wish to perpetuate the difference, to form a breed with the peculiarity in question strongly marked, he selects such male and female indi- viduals as exhibit the desired character, and breeds from them. Their offspring are then carefully examined, and those which exhibit the peculiarity the most distinctly are selected for breeding ; and this operation is repeated until the desired amount I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 17 of divergence from the primitive stock is reached. It is then found that by continuing the process of selection — always breeding, that is, from well- marked forms, and allowing no impure crosses to interfere — a race may be formed, the tendency of which to reproduce itself is exceedingly strong ; nor is the limit to the amount of divergence which may be thus produced known ; but one -thing is certain, that, if certain breeds of dogs, or of pigeons, or of horses, were known only in a fossil state, no naturalist would hesitate in regarding them as distinct species. But in all these cases we have human interfer- ence. Without the breeder there would be no selection, and without the selection no race. Before admitting the possibility of natural species having originated in any similar way, it must be proved that there is in Nature some power which takes the place of man, and performs a selection sua sponte. I t is the cla im of Mr. Darwin tha,t h e pro fesses to have disco" TOreTlhe existence and th e modusoperwnM^^g(_^^\&'l natural selec tion," as he terms it ; and, if he be right, the process is per- fectly gimpla and "(JOfHpr^hensible, and irresistibly (Jedllcilble from very~1amLlIaf but well nigh_for- g otten TaHs. ^WhoTTor^nstance, has duly reflected upon all the consequences of the marvellous struggle for existence which is daily and hourly going on among living beings ? Not only does every animal 18 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 1 live at the expense of some other animal or plant, but the very plants are at war. The ground is full of seeds that cannot rise into seedlings ; the seedlings rob one another of air, light and water, the strongest robber winning the day, and ex- tinguishing his competitors. Year after year, the wild animals with which man never interferes are, on the average, neither more nor less numerous than they were ; and yet we know that the annual produce of every pair is from one to perhaps a million young; so that it is mathematically certain that, on the average, as many are killed by natural causes as are born every year, and those only escape which happen to be a little better fitted to resist destruction than those which die. The individuals of a species are like the crew of a foundered ship, and none but good swimmers have a chance of reaching the land. Such being unquestionably the necessary con- ditions under which living creatures exist, Mr. Darwin discovers in them the instrument of natural selection. Suppose that in the midst of this in- cessant competition some individuals of a species (A) present accidental variations which happen to fit them a little better than their fellows for the struggle in which they are engaged, then the chances are in favour, not only of these individuals being better nourished than the others, but of their predominating over their fellows in other ways, and of having a better chance of leavino- I THE DAEWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 19 offspring, which will of course tend to reproduce the peculiarities of their parents. Their offspring will, by a parity of reasoning, tend to predominate over their contemporaries, and there being (sup- pose) no room for more than one species such as A, the weaker variety will eventually be destroyed by the new destructive influence which is thrown into the scale, and the stronger will take its place. Surrounding conditions remaining unchanged, the new variety (which we may call B) — supposed, for argument's sake, to be the best adapted for these conditions which can be got out of the original stock — will remain unchanged, all accidental devia- tions from the type becoming at once extinguished, as less fit for their post than B itself. The tend- ency of B to persist jvill grow with its persistence through successive generations, and it will acquire all the characters of a new species. But, on the other hand, if the conditions of life change in any degree, however slight, B may no longer be that form which is best adapted to with- stand their destructive, and profit by their sus- taining, influence ; in which case if it should give rise to a more competent variety (C), this will take its place and become a new species ; and thus, by natural selection, the species B and C will be suc- cessively derived from A. That this most ingenious hypothesis enables us to give a reason for many apparent anomalies in the distribution of living beings in time and space^ 20 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I and that it is not contradicted by the main phen- omena of life and organisation appear to ns to be unquestionable ; and, so far, it must be admitted to have an immense advantage over any of its prede- cessors. But it is quite another matter to affirm absolutely either the truth or falsehood of Mr. Darwin's views at the present stage of the inquiry. Goethe has an excellent aphorism defining that state of mind which he calls " Tluitige Skepsis " — active doubt. It is doubt which so loves truth that it neither dares rest in doubting, nor extin- guish itself by unjustified belief ; and we commend this state of mind to students of species, with respect to Mr. Darwin's or any other hypothesis, as to their origin. The combined investigations of another twenty years may, perhaps, enable naturalists to say whether the modifying causes and the selective power, which Mr. Darwin has satisfactorily shown to exist in Nature, are com- petent to produce all the effects he ascribes to them ^jij^whether, on the other hand, he has been led t(^^«^^imatg.the value of the principle of natural selectroir,-~-as!lffr5a;tly. as Lamarck over- estimated his vera causa ofm^diAcation by exercise. But there is, at all events, one advantage pos- sessed by the more recent writer over his pre- decessor. Mr. Darwin abhors mere speculation as nature abhors a vacuum. He is as greedy of cases and precedents as any constitutional lawyer, and all the principles he lays down are capable of being I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 21 brought to the test of observation and experiment. The path he bids us follow professes to be, not a mere airy track, fabricated of ideal cobwebs, but a solid and broad bridge of facts. If it be so, it will carry us safely over many a chasm in our knowledge, and lead us to a region free from the snares of those fascinating but barren virgins, the Final Causes, against whom a high authority has so justly warned us. " My sons, dig in the vineyard," were the last words of the old man in the fable : and, though the sons found no treasure, they made their fortunes by the grapes. II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES [1860] Mr. Darwin's long-standing and well-earned scientific eminence probably renders him indiffer- ent to that social notoriety which passes by the name of success ; but if the calm spirit of the philosopher have not yet wholly superseded the ambition and the vanity of the carnal man within him, he must be well satisfied with the results of his venture in publishing the " Origin of Species." Overflowing the narrow bounds of purely scientific circles, the " species question " divides with Italy and the Volunteers the attention of general society. Everybody has read Mr. Darwin's book, or, at least, has given an opinion upon its merits or demerits ; pietists, whether lay or ecclesiastic, decry it with the mild railing which sounds so charitable ; bigots denounce it with ignorant invective ; old ladies of both sexes consider it a II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 23 decidedly dangerous book, and even savants, who have no better mud to throw, quote antiquated writers to show that its author is no better than an ape himself ; while every philosophical thinker hails it as a veritable Whitworth gun in the armoury of liberalism ; and all competent natural- ists and physiologists, whatever their opinions as. to the ultimate fate of the doctrines put forth, acknowledge that the work in which they are embodied is a solid contribution to knowledge and inaugurates a new epoch in natural history. Nor has the discussion of the subject been restrained within the limits of conversation. When the public is eager and interested, reviewers must minister to its wants ; and the genuine littdrateur is too much in the habit of acquiring his knowledge from the book he judges — as the Abyssinian is said to provide himself with steaks from the ox which carries him — to be withheld from criticism of a profound scientific work by the mere want of the requisite preliminary scien- tific acquirement ; while, on the other hand, the men of science who wish well to the new views, no less than those who dispute their validity, have naturally sought opportunities of expressing their opinions. Hence it is not surprising that almost all the critical journals have noticed Mr. Darwin's work at greater or less length ; and so many dis- quisitions, of every degree of excellence, from the poor product of ignorance, too often stimulated by 31 24 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II prejudice, to the fair and thoughtful essay of the candid student of Nature, have appeared, that it seems an ahiiost hopeless task to attempt to say anything neAv upon the question. But it may be doubted if the knowledge and acumen of prejudged scientific opponents, and the subtlety of orthodox special pleaders, have yet exerted their full force in mystifying the real issues of the great controversy which has been set afoot, and whose end is hardly likely to be seen by this generation ; so tliat, at this eleventh hour, and even failing anything new, it may be useful to state afresh that which is true, and to put the funda- mental positions advocated by Mr. Darwin in such a form that they may be grasped by those whose special studies lie in other directions. And the adoption of this course may be the more advisable, because, notwithstanding its great deserts, and indeed partly on account of them, the " Origin of Species " is by no means an easy book to read — if by reading is implied the full comprehension of an author's meanincr. We do not speak jestingly in saying that it is Mr. Darwin's misfortune to know more about the question he has taken up than any man livino-. Personally and practically exercised in zoology, in minute anatomy, in geology ; a student of geogra- phical distribution, not on maps and in museimis only, but by long voyages and laborious collection ; having largely advanced each of these branches of II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 25 science, and having spent many years in gathering and sifting materials for his present work, the store of accurately registered facts upon which the author of the " Origin of Species " is able to draw at will is prodigious. But this very superabundance of matter must have been embarrassing to a writer who, for the present, can only put forward an abstract of his views ; and thence it arises, perhaps, that notwith- standing the clearness of the style, those who attempt fairly to digest the book find much of it a sort of intellectual pemmican — a mass of facts crushed and pounded into shape, rather than held together by the ordinary medium of an obvious logical bond ; due attention will, without doubt, discover this bond, but it is often hard to find. Again, from sheer want of room, much has to be taken for granted which might readily enough be proved ; and hence, while the adept, who can supply the missing links in the evidence from his own knowledge, discovers fresh proof of the singu- lar thoroughness with which all difficulties have been considered and all unjustifiable suppositions avoided, at every reperusal of Mr. Darwin's preg- nant paragraphs, the novice in biology is apt to complain of the frequency of what he fancies is gratuitous assumption. Thus while it may be doubted if, for some years, any one is likely to be competent to pronounce judgment on all the issues raised by Mr. Darwin, 26 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES « there is assuredly abundant room for him, who, assuming the humbler, though perhaps as useful, office of an interpreter between the " Origin of Species " and the public, contents himself with endeavouring to point out the nature of the prob- lems which it discusses ; to distinguish between the ascertained facts and the theoretical views which it contains ; and finally, to show the extent to which the explanation it offers satisfies the re- quirements of scientific logic. At any rate, it is this office which we purpose to undertake in the following pages. It may be safely assumed that our readers have a general conception of the nature of the objects to which the word " species " is applied ; but it has, perhaps, occurred to a few, even to those who are naturalists ex professo, to reflect, that, as com- monly employed, the term has a double sense and denotes two very different orders of relations. When we call _a_group__of animals^-or-of-jjlants, a species, we may imply thereby, e ither that aj j, these animals ofplants havesome common peculij^ arity of form &r struc ture ; or, we may mean^at they possess some common_functional character. That part of biological science which deals w^th form and structure is called Morphology — that which concerns itself wi^h^jfu notion, Physiqlogy — so that we may conveniently speak of these two senses, or aspects, of " species "—the one as mor- phological, the other as physiological. Eegarded II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 27 from the former point of view, a species is nothing more than a kind of animal or plant, which is distinctly definable from all others, by certain constant, and not merely sexual, morphological peculiarities. Thus horses form a species, because the group of animals to which that name is applied is distinguished from all others in the world by the following constantly associated characters. They have — 1, A vertebral column ; 2, Mammas ; 3, A placental embryo ; 4, Four legs ; 5, A single well-developed toe in each foot provided with a hoof; 6, A bushy tail; and 7, Callosities on the inner sides of both the fore and the hind legs. The asses, again, form a distinct species, because, with the same characters, as far as the fifth in the above list, all asses have tufted tails, and have callosities only on the inner side of the fore-legs. If animals were discovered having the general characters of the horse, but sometimes with cal- losities only on the fore-legs, and more or less tufted tails ; or animals having the general char- acters of the ass, but with more or less bushy tails, and sometimes with callosities on both pairs of legs, besides beinof intermediate in other re- spects — the two species would have to be merged into one. They could no longer be regarded as morphologically distinct species, for they would not be distinctly definable one from the other. However bare and simple this definition of species may appear to be, we confidently appeal to 28 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES H all practical naturalists, -whether zoologists, botan- ists, or pateontologists, to say if, in the vast majority of cases, they know, or mean to affirm, anything more of the group of animals or plants they so denominate than what has just been stated. Even the most decided advocates of the received doctrines respecting species admit this. " I apprehend," says Professor Owen, ' " that few naturalists nowadays, in describing and proposing a name for what they call ' a new species,' use that term to signify what was meant by it twenty or thirty years ago ; that is, an originally distinct creation, maintaining its primitive distinction by obstructive generative peculiarities. The proposer of the new species now intends to state no more than he actually knows ; as, for example, that the diffia-ences on which he founds the specific character are constant in individuals of both sexes, so far as observation has reached ; and that they are not due to domes- tication or to artificially superinduced external circumstances, or to any outward influence within his cognizance ; that the species is wild, or is such as it appears by Nature." If we consider, in fact, that by far the largest proportion of recorded existing species are known only by the study of their skins, or bones, or other lifeless exuviae ; that we are acquainted with none, or next to none, of their physiological peculiarities, beyond those which can be deduced from their structure, or are open to cursory observation ; and that we cannot hope to learn more of any of those extinct forms of life which now constitute no inconsiderable proportion of the known Flora and * " On tho Osteology of the Chimpanzees and Orangs "; Transactions of the Zoological Society, 1858. II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 29 Fauna of the world : it is obvious that the defini- tions of these species can be only of a purely structural, or morphological, character. It is probable that naturalists would have avoided much confusion of ideas if they had more fre- quently borne the necessary limitations of our knowledge in mind. But while it may safely be admitted that we are acquainted with only the morphological characters of the vast majority of species — the functional or physiological, peculiari- ties of a few have been carefully investigated, and the result of that stu(]y forms a large and most interesting portion of the j)hysiology of reproduc- tion. The student of Nature wonders the more and is astonished the less, the more conversant he becomes with her operations ; but of all the perennial miracles she offers to his inspection, perhaps the most worthy of admiration is the development of a plant or of an animal from its embryo. Examine the recently laid egg of some common animal, such as a salamander or newt. It is a minute spheroid in which the best microscope will reveal nothing but a structureless sac, enclosing a glairy fluid, holding granules in suspension.^ But strange possibilities lie dormant in that semi-fluid globule. Let a moderate supply of warmth reach its watery cradle, and the plastic matter undergoes changes 1 [When this sentence was %\Titten, it was generally believed that the original nucleus of the egg (the germinal vesicle) disappeared, 1893.] 30 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II SO rapid, yet so steady and purposelike in their succession, that one can only compare them to those operated by a skilled modeller uiaon a form- less lump of clay. As with an invisible trowel, the mass is divided and subdivided into smaller and smaller portions, until it is reduced to an aggregation of granules not too large to build withal the finest fabrics of the nascent organism. And, then, it is as if a delicate finger traced out the line to be occupied by the spinal column, and moulded the contour of the body ; pinching up the head at one end, the tail at the other, and fashioning flank and limb into due salamandrine proportions, in so artistic a way, that, after watching the process hour by hour, one is almost involuntarily possessed bv the notion, that some more subtle aid to vision than an achromatic, would show the hidden artist, with his plan before him, striving with skilful manipulation to jjerfect his work. As life advances, and the young amphibian ranges the waters, the terror of his insect con- temporaries, not only are the nutritious jjarticles supplied by its prey, by the addition of which to its frame, growth takes place, laid down, each in its proper spot, and in such due proportion to the rest, as to reproduce the form, the colour, and the size, characteristic of the parental stock ; but even the wonderful powers of reproducing lost parts possessed by these animals are controlled by the same governing tendency. Cut off the legs, the II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 31 tail, the jaws, separately or all together, and, as Spallanzani showed long ago, these parts not only grow again, but the redintegrated limb is formed on the same type as those which were lost. The new jaw, or leg, is a newt's, and never by any accident more like that of a frog. What is true of the newt is true of every animal and of every plant ; the acorn tends to build itself up again into a woodland giant such as that from whose twig it fell ; the spore of the humblest lichen reproduces the green or brown incrustation which gave it birth ; and at the other end of the scale of life, the child that resembled neither the paternal nor the maternal side of the house would be regarded as a kind of monster. So that the one end to which, in all living beings, the formative impulse is tending — the one scheme which the Archgeus of the old speculators strives to carry out, seems to be to mould the offspring into the likeness of the parent. It is the first gi-eat law of reproduction, that th e o8'spring_tgnda_ta.resem ble its p arent or parents, more closely than anything else. ._ Science will some day show us how this law is a necessary consequence of the more general laws which govern matter ; but, for the present, more can hardly be said than that it appears to be iu harmony with them. We know that the phae- nomena of vitality are not something apart from other physical phsenomena, but one with them ; 32 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II and matter and force are the two names of the one artist who fashions the living as well as the lifeless. Hence living bodies should obey the same great laws as other matter— nor, throughout Nature, is there a law of wider application than this, that a body impelled by two forces takes the direction of their resultant. But living bodies may be regarded as nothing but extremely complex bundles of forces held in a mass of matter, as the complex forces of a magnet are held in the steel by its coercive force ; and, since the differences of sex are comparatively slight, or, in other words, the sum of the forces in each has a very similar tendency, their resultant, the offspring, may reason- ably be expected to deviate but little from a course parallel to either, or to both. Represent the reason of the law to ourselves by what physical metaphor or analogy we will, how- ever, the great matter is to apprehend its existence and the importance of the consequences deducible from it. For^hiu gs whi ch are like to the same are like to one another ; and if, in a great series of generationsr''every~oHspring is like its parent, it follows that all the offspring and all the parents must be like one another; and that, given an original parental stock, with the opportunity of undisturbed multiplication, the law in question necessitates the production, in course of time, of an indefinitely large group, the whole of the mem- bers of which are at once very similar and are blood ir THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES S3 relations, having descended from the same parent, or pair of parents. The proof that all the members of any given group of animals, or plants, had thus descended, would be ordinarily considered sufficient to entitle them to the rank of physiological species, for most physiologists consider species to be de- finable as "the offspring of a single primitive stock." But though it is quite true that all those groups we call species viay, according to the known laws of reproduction, have descended from a single stock, and though it is very likely they really have done so, yet this conclusion rests on deduction and can hardly hope to establish itself upon a basis of observation. And the primitive- ness of the supposed single stock, which, after all, is the essential part of the matter, is not only a hypothesis, but one which has not a shadow of foundation, if by " primitive " be meant " indepen- dent of any other living being." A scientific definition, of which an unwarrantable hypothesis forms an essential part, carries its condemnation within itself; but, even supposing such a definition were, in form, tenable, the physiologist who should attempt to apply it in Nature would soon find himself involved in great, if not in- extricable, difficulties. As we have said, it is indubitable that offspring tend to resemble the parental organism, but it is equally true that the similarity attained never amounts to identity 34 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II either in form or in structure. There is always a certain amount of deviation, not only from the precise characters of a single parent, but when, as in most animals and many plants, the sexes are lodged in distinct individuals, from an exact mean between the two parents. And indeed, on general principles, this slight deviation seems as intelligible as the general similarity, if we reflect how complex the co-operating " bundles of forces " are, and how improbable it is that, in any case, their true resultant shall coincide with any mean between the more obvious characters of the two parents. Whatever be~^s cause, however, the co-existence of this tendency to minor variation with the tendency to general similarity, is of vast importance in its bearing on the question of the origin of species. As a general rule, the extent to which an ofiFspring~3ifieFsTfom its parent Is^slight eno ugh ; but, occasionally, the ainount of diperence is much more strongly marked, and then the divergen±_ offspf irjif recei-^s_the "nami^^ora^''Variety. Multi- tudes, of what there is every reason to believe are such varieties, are known, but the origin of very few has been accurately recorded, and of these we will select two as more especially illustrative of the main features of variation. The first of them is that of the "Ancon" or "Otter" sheep, of which a careful account is given by Colonel David Humphreys, F.R.S., in a letter to Sir ir THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 35 Joseph Banks, published in the " Philosophical Transactions " for 1813. It appears that one Seth Wright, the proprietor of a farm on the banks of the Charles River, in Massachusetts, possessed a flock of fifteen ewes and a ram of the ordinary kind. In the year 1791, one of the ewes presented her owner with a male lamb, differing, for no assignable reason, from its parents by a proportionally long body and short bandy legs, whence it was unable to emulate its relatives in those sportive leaps over the neighbours' fences, in which they were in the habit of indulging, much to the good farmer's vexation. The second case is that detailed by a no less unexceptionable authority than Reaumur, in his "Art de faire eclore les Poulets." A Maltese couple, named Kelleia, whose hands and feet were constructed upon the ordinary human model, had born to them a son, Gratio, who possessed six per- fectly movable fingers on each hand, and six toes, not quite so well formed, on each foot. No cause could be assigned for the appearance of this unusual variety of the human species. Two circumstances are well worthy of remark in both these cases. In each, the variety appears to have arisen in full force, and, as it were, per saltum ; a wide and definite difference appearing, at once, between the Ancon ram and the ordinary sheep ; between the six-fingered and six-toed Gratio Kelleia and ordinary men. In neither case is it possible 36 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES n to point out any obvious reason for the appearance of the variety. Doubtless there were determining causes for these as for all other jjhsenomena ; but they do not appear, and we can be tolerably certain that what are ordinarily understood as changes in physical conditions, as in climate, in food, or the like, did not take place and had nothing to do with the matter. It was no case of what is commonly called adaptation to circumstances ; but, to use a conveniently erroneous phrase, the variations ai'ose spontaneously. The fruitless search after final causes leads their pursuers a long way ; but even those hardy teleologists, who are ready to break through all the laws of physics in chase of their favourite will-o'-the-wisp, may be puzzled to dis- cover what purpose could be attained by the stunted legs of Seth Wright's ram or the hexadactyle members of Gratio Kelleia. Varieties then arise we know not why ; and it is more than probable that the majority of varieties have arisen in this " spontaneous '' manner, though we are, of course, far from denying that they may be traced, in some cases, to distinct external in- fluences ; which are assuredly competent to alter the character of the tegumentary covering, to change colour, to increase or diminish the size of muscles, to modify constitution, and, among plants, to give rise to the metamorphosis of stamens into petals, and so forth. But however they may have arisen, what especially interests us at present is, to II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 37 remark that, once in existence, many varieties obey the fundamental law of reproduction that like tends to produce like; and their offspring exemplify it by tending to exhibit the same deviation from the parental stock as themselves. Indeed, there seems to be, in many instances, a prepotent influence about a newly-arisen variety which gives it what one may call an unfair advantage over the normal descendants from the same stock. This is strik- ingly exemplified by the case of Gratio Kelleia, who married a woman with the ordinary penta- dactyle extremities, and had by her four children, Salvator, George, Andr^, and Marie. Of these children Salvator, the eldest boy, had six fingers and six toes, like his father ; the second and third, also boys, had five fingers and five toes, like their mother, though the hands and feet of George were slightly deformed. The last, a girl, had five fingers and five toes, but the thumbs were slightly deformed. The variety thus reproduced itself purely in the eldest, while the normal type reproduced itself purely in the third, and almost purely in the second and last : so that it would seem, at first, as if the normal type were more powerful than the variety. But all these children grew up and intermarried with normal wives and husband, and then, note what took place : Salvator had four children, three of whom exhibited the hexadactyle members of their grandfather and father, while the youngest had the pentadactyle 38 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES " limbs of the mother and grandmother; so that here, notwithstanding a double pentadactyle dilution of the blood, the hexadactyle variety had the best of it. The same pre-potency of the variety was still more markedly exemplified in the progeny of two of the other children, Marie and George. Marie (whose thumbs only were de- formed) gave birth to a boy with six toes, and three other normally formed children ; but George, who was not quite so pure a pentadactyle, begot, first, two girls, each of whom had six fingers and toes ; then a girl with six fingers on each hand and six toes on the right foot, but only five toes on the left ; and lastly, a boy with only five fingers and toes. In these instances, therefore, the variety, as it were, leaped over one generation to reproduce itself in full force in the next. Finally, the purely pentadactyle Andre was the father of many children, not one of whom departed from the normal parental type. If a variation which approaches the nature of a monstrosity can strive thus forcibly to reproduce itself, it is not wonderful that less aberrant modifications should tend to be preserved even more strongly ; and the history of the Ancon sheep is, in this respect, particularly instructive. With the " 'cuteness " characteristic of their nation, the neighbours of the Massachusetts farmer imagined it would be an excellent thing if all his sheep were imbued with the stay-at-home tendencies II THE ORIGIN OF SrECIES 39 enforced by Nature upon the newly-arrived ram ; and they advised Wright to kill the old patriarch of his fold, and install the Ancon ram in his place. The result justified their sagacious anticipations, and coincided very nearly with what occurred to the progeny of Gratio Kelleia. The young lambs were almost always either pure Ancons, or pure ordinary sheep.^ But when sufficient Ancon sheep were obtained to interbreed with one another, it was found that the offspring was always pure Ancon. Colonel Humphreys, in fact, states that he was acquainted with only " one questionable case of a contrary nature.'' Here, then, is a remarkable and well-established instance, not only of a very distinct race being established per saltiovi, but of that race breeding " true " at once, and showing no mixed forms, even when crossed with another breed. By taking care to select Ancons of both sexes, for breeding from, it thus became easy to establish an extremely well-marked race ; so peculiar that, ^ Colonel Humphreys' statements are exceedingly explicit on this point ; — " When an Ancon ewe is impregnated by a com- niou ram, the increase resembles wholly either the ewe or the ram. The increase of the common ewe impregnated by an Ancon ram follows entirely the one or the other, without blending any of the distinguishing and essential peculiarities of both. Frequent instances have happened where common ewes have had twins by Ancon rams, when one exhibited the complete marks and features of the ewe, the other of the ram. The contrast has been rendered singularly striking, when one short-legged and one long-lfgged lamb, protluced at a birth, have been seen sucking the dam at the same time." — Philoso- phical Transaclions, 1813, Pt. I. pp. 89, 90. 32 40 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES n even when herded with other sheep, it was noted that the An cons kept together. And there is every reason to believe that the existence of this breed might have been indefinitely protracted ; but the introduction of the Merino sheep, which were not only very superior to the Ancons in wool and meat, but quite as quiet and orderly, led to the complete neglect of the new breed, so that, in 1813, Colonel Humphreys found it difficult to obtain the specimen, the skeleton of which was presented to Sir Joseph Banks. We believe that, for many years, no remnant of it has existed in the United States. Gratio Kelleia was not the progenitor of a race of six-fingered men, as Seth Wright's ram became a nation of Ancon sheep, though the tendency of the variety to perpetuate itself appears to have been fully as strong in the one case as in the other. And the reason of the difference is not far to seek. Seth Wright took care not to weaken the Ancon blood by matching his Ancon ewes with any but males of the same variety, while Gratio Kelleia's sons were too far removed from the patriarchal times to intermarry with their sisters ; and his grand -children seem not to have been attracted by their six-fingered cousins. In other words, in the one example a race was pro- duced, because, for several generations, care was taken to select both parents of the breedino- stock from animals exhibiting a tendency to vary in the 11 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 41 same direction ; while, lu ^. ^ other, no race was evolved, because no such selecii. • was exercised. A race is a propagated variety ; and ajs, by the laws of repro7nrcti on,""o5spr]ng tMd~~to~assume~ the parehiEar.fofins, they will..j3.e. iff ore-likely— to-pro- pagate a variation exhibited, by botTTpafSfits than .jfchat possessed by only .one. "~ There is no organ of the body of an animal which may not, and does not, occasionally, vary more or less from the normal type ; and there is no variation which may not be transmitted and which, if selectivel}^ transmitted, may not become the foundation of a race. This great truth, sometimes forgotten by philosophers, has long been familiar to practical agriculturists and breeders ; and upon it rest all the methods of improving the breeds of domestic animals, which, for the last century, have been followed with so much success in England. Colour, form, size, texture of hair or wool, pro- portions of various parts, strength or weakness of constitution, tendency to fatten or to remain lean, to give much or little milk, speed, strength, tem- per, intelligence, special instincts ; there is not one of these characters the transmission of which is not an every-day occurrence within the experience of cattle-breeders, stock-farmers, horse-dealers, and dog and poultry fanciers. Nay, it is only the other day that an eminent physiologist. Dr. Brown- Sequard, communicated to the Royal Society his discovery that epilepsy, artificially produced in 42 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 11 guinea-pigs, by a r^-^Jtls which he has discovered, is transmitted + ^.^'their offspring.^ But a race, once produced, is no more a fixed and immutable entity than the stock -whence it sprang ; variations arise among its mernbers, and as these variations are transmitted Uke any others, new races may be developed out of the pre-exist- ing one ad infinituvi, or, at least, within any limit at present determined. Giyen^sufiScient jtime-and sufficiently careful selection, and the multitude of races which may arise from a common stock is.,a3 astonishing as are the extreme structural differ- ences which they may present. A remarkable example of this is to be found in the rock-pigeon, which Mr. Darwin has, in our opinion, satisfactorily demonstrated to be the progenitor of all our domestic pigeons, of which there are certainly more than a hundred well-marked races. The most noteworthy of these races are, the four great stocks known to the " fancy " as tumblers, pouters, carriers, and fantails ; birds which not only differ most singularly in size, colour, and habits, but in the form of the beak and of the skull : in the pro- portions of the beak to the skull ; in the number of tail-feathers ; in the absolute and relative size of the feet ; in the presence or absence of the uropygial gland ; in the number of vertebrje in the back ; in short, in precisely those characters in which 1 [Compare "Weismann's Essays Upon Eeredily, p. 310, et scq. 1893.] II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 43 the genera and species of birds differ from one another. And it is most remarkable and instructive to observe, that none of these races can be shown to have been originated by the action of changes in what are commonly called external circumstances, upon the wild rock-pigeon. On the contrary, from time immemorial pigeon -fanciers have had essentially similar methods of treating their pets, which have been housed, fed, protected and cared for in much the same way in all pigeonries. In fact, there is no case better adapted than that of the pigeons to refute the doctrine which one sees put forth on high authority, that " no other characters than those founded on the development of bone for the attachment of mxiscles" »are capable of variation. In precise contradiction of this hasty assertion, Mr. Darwin's researches prove that the skeleton of the wings in domestic pigeons has hardly varied at all from that of the wild type ; while, on the other hand, it is in exactly those respects, such as the relative length of the beak and skull, the number of the vertebrae, and the number of the tail-feathers, in which muscular exertion can have no important influence, that the utmost amount of variation has taken place. We have said that the following out of the properties exhibited by physiological species would lead us into difficulties, and at this point they begin 44 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES " to be obvious ; for if, as the result of spontaneous variation and of selective breeding, the progeny of a common stock may become separated into groups distinguished from one another by constant, not sexual, morphological characters, it is clear that the physiological definition of species is likely to clash with the morphological definition. No one would hesitate to describe the pouter and the tumbler as distinct species,if they were found fossil, or if their skins and skeletons were imported, as those of exotic wild birds commonly are — and with- out doubt, if considered alone, they are good and distinct morphological species. On the other hand, they are not physiological species, for they are descended from a common stock, the rock-pigeon. Under these circumstances, as it is admitted on all sides that races occur in Nature, how are we to know whether any apparently distinct animals are really of different physiological species, or not, seeing that the amount of morphological difference is no safe guide ? Is there any test of a physio- logical species ? The usual answer of physiologists is in the affirmative. It is said that such a test is to be found in the phasnoraena of hybridisation — in the results of crossing races, as compared with the results of crossing species. So far as the evidence goes at present, in- dividuals, of what are certainly known to be mere races produced by selection, however distinct they may appear to be, not only breed freely together, II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 45 but the offspring of such crossed races are perfectly fertile with one another. Thus, the spaniel and the greyhound, the dray-horse and the Arab, the pouter and the tiimbler, breed together with perfect freedom, and their mongrels, if matched with other mongrels of the same kind, are equally fertile. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the individuals of many natural species are either absolutely infertile if crossed with individuals of other species, or, if they give rise to hybrid offspring, the hybrids so produced are infertile when paired together. The horse and the ass, for instance, if so crossed, give rise to the mule, and there is no certain evidence of offspring ever having been produced by a male and female mule. The unions of the rock-pigeon and the ring-pigeon appear to be equally barren of result. Here, then, says the physiologist, we have a means nf riist.inguishing- n.ny_tw o true specie s from any two varietie s. If a male and_a female, s"elec ted: irom pf),rJL -group, produce offspring, and that off- spring is fertile with others produced in the s ame ■yyay^ tlip prrQnpg are racos and not species. If, on the other ha.nd.^np result ensues, or if the offspring are infertile with others jrodliceJ in the same way, they are tru^_physiological species. The test would be an admirable one, if, in the first place, it were always practicable to apply it, and if, in the second, it always yielded results suscep- tible of a definite interpretation. Unfortunately, \_f i.l,J.VJ J.J.1 KJ±: MA JJJVjXJLLikJ in the great majority of cases, this touchstone for species is wholly inapplicable. The constitution of many wild animals is so altered by confinement that they will not breed even with their own females, so that the negative results obtained from crosses are of no value ; and the antipathy of wild animals of different species for one another, or even of wild and tame members of the same species, is ordinarily so great, that it is hopeless to look for such unions in Nature. The hermaphrodism of most plants, the difficulty in the way of insuring the absence of their own or the proper working of other pollen, are obsta- cles of no less magnitude in applying the test to them. And, in both animals and plants, is super- added the further difficulty, that experiments must be continued over a long time for the purpose of ascertaining the fertility of the mongrel or hybrid progeny, as well as of the first crosses from which they spring. Not only do these great practical difficulties lie in the way of applying the hybridisation test, but even wTien this oracle can be questioned, its replies are sometimes as doubtful as those of Delphi. For example, cases are cited by Mr. Darwin, of plants which are more fertile with the pollen of another species than with their own ; and there are others, such as certain Fuci, the male element of which will fertilise the ovule of a plant of distinct species, while the males of the latter n THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 47 species are ineffective with the females of the first. So that, in the last-named instance, a physiologist, who should cross the two species in one way, would decide that they were true species; while another, who should cross them in the reverse way, would, with equal justice, according to the rule, pronounce them to be mere races. Several plants,' which there is great reason to believe are mere varieties, are almost sterile when crossed ; while both animals and plants, which have always been regarded by naturalists as of distinct species, turn out, when the test is applied, to be perfectly fertile. Again, the sterility or fertility of crosses seems to bear no relation to the stjuctural resemblances or differences of the members of any two groups. Mr. Darwin has discussed this question with singular ability and circumspection, and his con- clusions are summed up as follows, at page 276 of his work : — ' ' First crosses between forms sufficiently distinct to be ranked as species, and their hybrids, are very generally, but not universally, sterile. The sterility is of all degrees, and is often so slight that the two most careful experimentalists who have ever lived have come to diametrically opposite conclusions in ranking forms by this test. The sterility is innately variable in individuals of the same species, and is eminently susceptible of favourable and unfavourable conditions. The degree of sterility' does not strictly follow systematic affinity, but is governed by several curious and complex laws. It is generally different and sometimes widely dilTerent, in reciprocal crosses 48 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES " between the same two species. It is not always equal in degree iiL a first cross, and in tlie hybrid produced from this cross. " In the same manner as in grafting trees, the capacity of one species or variety to take on another is incidental on generally unknown diiferences in their vegetative systems ; so in crossing, the greater or less facility of one species to unite with another is incidental on unknown differences in their reproductive systems. There is no more reason to think that species have been specially endowed with various degrees of sterility to prevent them crossing and breeding in Nature, than to think that trees have been specially endowed with various and somewhat analogous degrees of difficulty in being grafted together, in order to prevent them becoming inarched in our forests. ' ' The sterility of first crosses between pure species, which have their reproductive systems perfect, seems to depend on several circumstances ; in some cases largely on the early death of the embryo. The sterility of hybrids which have their repro- ductive systems imperfect, and which have had this system and tlieir whole organisation disturbed by being compounded of two distinct species, seems closely allied to that sterility which so fiequently affects ])ure species when their natural con- ditions of life have been disturbed. This view is supported by a parallelism of another kind : namely, that the crossing of forms, only slightly different, is favourable to the vigour and fertility of the offspring ; and that slight changes in the con- ditions of life are apparently favotiralde to the vigour and fertility of all organic beings. It is not surprising that the degree of difficulty in uniting two species, and the degree of sterility of their hybrid offspring, should generally correspond, thoiigh due to distinct causes ; for both depend on the amount of difference of some kind between the species which are crossed. Nor is it surprising that the facility of effecting a first cross, the fertility of hybrids produced from it, and the capacity of being grafted together — though this latter capacity evidently depends on widely different circumstances — should all run to a certain extent parallel with the systematic affinity of the forms which are subjected to experiment ; for systematic affinity H THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 49 attempts to express all kinds of resemblance between all species. "First crosses between forms known to be varieties, or sufficiently alike to be considered as varieties, and their mon- grel offspring, are very generally, but not quite universally, fertile. Nor is tliis nearly general and perfect fertility sur- prising, when we remember bow liable we are to argue in a circle with respect to varieties in a state of Nature ; and when we remember that the greater number of varieties have been produced under domestication by the selection of mere external differences, and not of differences in the reproductive system. In all other respects, excluding fertility, there is a close general resemblance between h)'brids and mongrels." — Pp. 276 — 8. We fully agree with the general tenor of this weighty passage ; but forcible as are these argu- ments, and little as the value of fertility or infertility as a test of species may be, it jniist_not be forgotten that the__reallyJ.mportant fact, so far as the inquiry into the origin of species goes, i.s" t hat there are suchTKings in Nature7as groups of amhials and of plants, the members ot^wh jc hare in~ c apableof fertile uniaD^mth -tbiosarofQjiier-. groups ; and thajLtkej:£_iu:a_auaE!SuJD^SLas.'^^ a re absolutely steri le when crossed, .with othe r hybrids . For, if such plisenomena as these were exhibited by only two of those assemblages of living objects, to which the name of species (whether it be used in its physiological or in its morphological sense) is given, it would have to be accounted for by any theory of the origin of species, and every theory which could not account for it would be, so far, imperfect. 50 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES H Up to this point, we have been dealing with matters of fact, and the statements which we have laid before the reader would, to the best of our knowledge, be admitted to contain a fair exposition of what is at present known respecting the essential properties of species, by all who have studied the question. And wha.tever may- be his theoretical views, no naturalist will prob- ably be disposed to demur to the following summary of that exposition : — Livino- beings, whether animals or plants, are divisible into multitudes of distinctly definable kinds, which are morphological species. They are also divisible into groups of individuals, which breed freely together, tending to reproduce their like, and are physiological species. Normally resembling their parents, the offspring of members of these species are still liable to vary ; and the variation may be perpetuated by selection, as a race, which race, in many cases, presents all the characteristics of a morphological species. But it is not as yet proved that a race ever exhibits, when crossed with another race of the same species, those phisnomena of hybridisation which are exhibited by many species when crossed with other species. On the other hand, not only is it not proved that all species give rise to hybrids infertile inter se, but there is much reason to believe that, in crossing, species exhibit every gradation from perfect sterility to perfect fertility. II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 51 Such are the most essential characteristics of species. Even were man not one of them — a member of the same system and subject to the same laws — -the question of their origin, their causal connexion, that is, with the other phesce7U of Man. Quarterly Review, July 1371. ^ Helmholtz : Ucbcr das Zicl und die Fortschritte der Natur- wijiscn-schaft. Eiciffnungsvede fiir die Naturforscherversamm- lujig zu Innsbruck. 1869. V MR. Darwin's critics 121 has come over Mr. Darwin's critics. The mixture of ignorance and insolence which, at first, character- ised a large proportion of the attacks with which he was assailed, is no longer the sad distinction of anti-Darwinian criticism. Instead of abusive non- sense, which merely discredited its writers, we read essays, which are, at worst, more or less intelligent and appreciative ; while, sometimes, like that which appeared in the " North British Review " for 1867, they have a real and permanent value. The several publications of Mr. Wallace and Mr. Mivart contain discussions of some of Mr. Darwin's views, which are worthy of particular attention, not only on account of the acknowledged scientific competence of these writers, but because they ex- hibit an attention to those philosophical questions which underlie all physical science, which is as rare as it is needful. And the same may be said of an article in the " Quarterly Review " for July 1871, the comparison of which with an article in the same Review for July 1860, is perhaps the best evidence which can be brought forward of the change which has taken place in public opinion on " Dai-winism." The Quarterly Reviewer admits " the certainty of the action of natural selection " (p. 49) ; and further allows that there is an d priori probability in favour of the evolution of man from some lower animal form, if these lower animal forms them- selves have arisen by evolution. 122 ME. daewin's ceitics -v Mr, Wallace and Mr. Mivart go much further than this. They are as stout believers in evolution as Mr. Darwin himself; but Mr. Wallace denies that man can have been evolved from a lower animal by that process of natural selection which he, with Mr. Darwin, holds to have been sufficient for the evolution of all animals below man ; while Mr. Mivart, admitting that natural 5eje£±i on has been one of the conditions of the evolution of the animals below man, maintains that natural se- lection must, even in their case, have been supple- mented by " some other cause " — of the nature of, which, unfortunately, he does not give us any idea. Thus Mr. Mivart is less of a Darwinian than Mr. Wallace, for he has less faith in the power of natural selection. But he is more of an evolutionist than Mr. Wallace, because Mr. Wallace thinks it necessary to call in an intelligent agent — a sort of supernatural Sir John Sebright — to produce even the animal frame of man ; while Mr. Mivart re- quires no Divine assistance till he comes to man's soul. Thus there is a considerable divergence between Mr. Wallace and Mr. Mivart. On the other hand, there are some curious similarities between Mr. Mivart and the Quarterly Eeviewer, and these are sometimes so close, that, if Mr. Mivart thought it worth while, I think he might make out a good case of plagiarism against the Reviewer, who studiously abstains from quoting him. V MR. Darwin's critics 123 Both tlie Eeviewer and Mr. Mivart reproach Mr. Darwin with being, " like so many other physic- ists," entangled in a radically false metaphysical system, and with setting at nought the first principles of both philosophy and religion. Both enlarge npon the necessity of a sound philo- sophical basis, and both, I venture to add, make a conspicuous exhibition of its absence. The Quarterly Reviewer believes that man " diflFers more from an elephant or a gorilla than do these from the dust of the earth on which they tread," and Mr. Mivart has expressed_the_opinion jthat there is_more_diffe,ren.ce between man and an jipe than there is between an ape and a piece of fanitej_- And even when Mr. Mivart (p. 86) trips in a matter of anatomy, and creates a difficulty for Mr. Darwin out of a supposed close similarity between the eyes of fishes and cephalopods, which (as Gegenbaur and others have clearly shown) does not exist, the Quarterly Reviewer adopts the argument without hesitation (p. 66). There is another important point, however, in which it is hard to say whether Mr. Mivart diverges from the Quarterly Reviewer or not. The Reviewer declares that Mr. Darwin has, " with needless opposition, set at nought the first principles of both philosophy and religion " (p. 90). 1 See the Tablet for Marcli 11, 1871. 124 MR. Darwin's critics v It looks, at first, as if this meant, that Mr. Darwin's views being false, the opposition to " religion " which flows from them must be need- less. But I suspect this is not the right view of the meaning of the passage, as Mr. Mivart, from whom the Quarterly Reviewer plainly draws so much inspiration, tells us that " the consequences which have been drawn from evolution, whether exclusively Darwinian or not, to the prejudice of religion, by no means follow from it, and are in fact illegitimate" (p. 5). I may assume, then, that the Quarterly Reviewer and Mr. Mivart admit that there is no necessary opposition between " evolution whether exclusively Darwinian or not,'' and religion. But then, what do they mean by this last much- abused term ? On this point the- Quarterly Reviewer is silent. Mr. Mivart, on the contrary, is perfectly explicit, and the whole tenor of his remarks leaves no doubt that by "religion" he- means theology ; and by theology, that particular variety of the great Proteus, which is expounded by the doctors of the Roman Catholic Church, ''ud held by the members of that religious community to be the sole form of absolute truth and of saving faith. According to Mr. Mivart, the greatest and most orthodox authorities upon matters of Catholic doctrine agree in distinctly asserting " derivative creation " or evolution ; " and. thus their teachings V MR. Darwin's critics 125 harmonise with all Jthat niodem science can possibly require " (p. 305). I confess that this bold assertion interested me more than anything else in Mr. Mivart's book. What little knowledge I possessed of Catholic doctrine, and of the influence exerted by Catholic authority in former times, had not led me to expect that modern science was likely to find a warm welcome within the pale of the greatest and most consistent of theological organisations. And my astonishment reached its climax when I found Mr. Mivart citing Father Suarez as his chief witness in favour of the scientific freedom enjoyedH3y-£!atholics — the popular repute of that learfied theologian and subtle casuist not being such as to make his works a hkely place of refuge for liberahty of thought. But in these days, when Judas Iscariot and Robespierre, Henry VIII. and Catiline, have all been shown to be men of admirable virtue, far in advance of their age, and consequently the victims of vulgar prejudice, it was obviously possible that Jesuit Suarez might bftfin like case. And, spurred by Mr. Mivart's unhesitating declaration, I hastened to acquaint myself with such of the works of the great Catholic divine as bore upon the question, hoping, not merely to acquaint myself with the true teachings of the infallible Church, and free myself of an unjust prejudice ; but, haply, to enable myself, at a pinch, to put some Protestant bibliolater to 126 MR, DARWIN'S CRITICS V shame, by the bright example of Catholic freedom from the trammels of verbal inspiration. I regret to say that my anticipations have been cruelly disappointed. But the extent to which my hopes have been crushed can only be fully appreciated by citing, in the first place, those passages of Mr. Mivart's work by which they were excited. In his introductory chapter I find the following passages : — "The prevalence of this theory [of evolution] need alarm no one, for it is, without any doubt, perfectly consistent with the strictest and most orthodox Christian ^ theology " (p. 5). "Mr. Darwin and others may perhaps be excused if they have not devoted much time to the study of Christian philosophy ; but they have no right to assume or accept without careful ex- amination, as an unquestioned fact, that in that philosophy there is a necessary antagonism between the two ideas ' creation ' and ' evolution,* as applied to organic forms. " It is notorious and patent to all who choose to seek, that many distinguished Christian thinkers have accepted, and do accept, both ideas, i.e. both ' creation ' and ' evolution,' " As much as ten years ago an eminently Christian writer observed : ' The creationist theory does not necessitate the perpetual search after 1 It should be obsurvod that Mr. Mivart employs the term " Christian" as if it were the equivalent of " Catholic." V MK. Darwin's critics 127 manifestations of miraculous power and perpetual "catastrophes." Creation is not a miraculous interference witli the laws of Nature, but the very institution of those laws. Law and regularity, not arbitrary intervention, was the patristic ideal of creation. With this notion they admitted, without diflflculty, the most surprising origin of living creatures, provided it took place by law. They held that when God said, " Let the waters produce," " Let the earth produce," He conferred forces on the elements of earth and water which enabled them naturally to produce the various species of organic beings. This power, they thought, remains attached to the elements throughout all time.' The same writer quotes St. Augustin and St. Thomas Aquinas, to the effect that, ' in the institution of Nature, we do not look for miracles, but for the laws of Nature.' And, again, St, Basil speaks of the continued operation of natural laws in the production of all organisms. " So much for the writers of early and mediaeval times. As to the present day, the author can confidently affirm that there are many as well versed in theology as Mr. Darwin is in his own department of natural knowledge, who would not be disturbed by the thorough demonstration of his theory. Nay, they would not even be in the least painfully affected at witnessing the generation of animals of complex organisation by the skilful 128 MR. Darwin's critics v artificial arrangement of natural forces, and the production, in the future, of a fish by means analogous to those by which we now produce urea. " And this because they know that the possi- bility of such phenomena, though by no means actually foreseen, has yet been fully provided for in the old philosophy centuries before Darwin, or even centuries before Bacon, and that their place in the system can be at once assigned them without even disturbing its order or marring its harmony. " Moreover, the old tradition in this respect has never been abandoned, however much it may have been ignored or neglected by some modern writers. In proof of this, it may be observed that perhaps no post-mediaeval theologian has a wider reception amongst Christians throughout the world than Suarez, who has a separate section ^ in opposition to those who maintain the distinct creation of the various kinds — or substantial forms — of organic life " (pp. 19—21). Still more distinctly does Mr. Mivart express himself in the same sense, in his last chapter, entitled " Theology and Evolution " (pp. 302-5). " It appears, then, that Christian thinkers are perfectly free to accept the general evolution theory. But are there any theological authorities to justify this view of the matter ? 1 Suarez, Mctaphyjica. Edition Yives. Paris, 1868, vol. i. Disput. XV. § 2. V MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 129 "Now, considering how extremely recent are these biological speculations, it might hardly be expected d, priori that writers of earlier ages should have given expression to doctrines harmonising in any degree with such very modem views ; nevertheless, this is certainly the case, and it would be easy to give numerous examples. It will be better, however, to cite one or two authorities of weight. Perhaps no writer of the earlier Christian ages could be quoted whose authority is more generally recognised than that of St. Augustin. The same may be said of the mediaeval period for St. Thomas Aquinas : and since the movement of Luther, Suarez may be taken as an authority, widely venerated, and one whose orthodoxy has never been ques- tioned. " It must be borne in mind that for a consider- able time even after the last of these writers no one had disputed the generally received belief as to the small age of the world, or at least of the kinds of animals and plants inhabiting it. It becomes, therefore, much more striking if views formed under such a condition of opinion are found to harmonise with modern ideas con- cerning ' Creation ' and organic Life. " Now St. Augustin insists in a very remarkable manner on the merely derivative sense in which God's creation of organic forms is to be under- stood \ that is, that God created them by conferring 130 MK. DARWIN'S CRITICS V on the material world the power to evolve them under suitable conditions." Mr. Mivart then cites certain passages from St. Augustin, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Cornelius k Lapide, and finally adds : — "As to Suarez, it will be enough to refer to Disp. xv. sec. 2, No. 9, p. 508, t. i. edition Vives, Paris ; also Nos. 13 — 15. Many other references to the same effect could easily be given, but these may suffice. "It is then evident that ancient and most venerable theo- logical authorities distinctly assert derivative creation, and thus their teachings harmonise with all that modern science can possibly require." It will be observed that Mr. Mivart refers solely to Suarez's fifteenth Disputation, though he adds, " Many other references to the same effect could easily be given." I shall look anxiously for these references in the third edition of the " Genesis of Species." For tlie present, all I can say is, that I have sought in vain, either in the fifteenth Disputation, or elsewhere, for any passage in Suarez's writings which, in the slightest degree, bears out Mr. Mivart 's views as to his opinions.^ The title of this fifteenth Disputation is " De causa formal! substantial!," and the second section of that Disputation (to which Mr, Mivart refers) is headed, " Quomodo possit forma substantialis fieri in materia et ex materia ? " 1 The edition of Suarez's Butpntationes from which the follow- ing citations are given, is Birckmann's, in two volumes folio, and is dated 1630. V ME. dakwin's critics 131 The problem which Suarez discusses in this place may be popularly stated thus : According to the scholastic philosophy every natural body has two components — the one its " matter " {materia prima), the other its " substantial form " (forma suhstantialis). Of these the matter is everywhere the same, the matter of one body being indis- tinguishable from the matter of any other body. That which diflferentiates any one natural body from all others is its substantial form, which inheres in the matter of that body, as the human soul inheres in the matter of the frame of man, and is the source of all the activities and other properties of the body. Thus, says Suarez, if water is heated, and the source of heat is then removed, it cools again. The reason of this is that there is a certain '' inti- mius principium " in the water, which brings it back to the cool condition when the external impediment to the existence of that condition is removed. This intimius principiicm is the " sub- stantial form " of the water. And the substantial form of the water is not only the cause (radix) of the coolness of the water, but also of its moisture, of its density, and of all its other properties. It will thus be seen that " substantial forms " play nearly the same part in the scholastic philosophy as " forces " do in modern science ; the general tendency of modern thought being to conceive all bodies as resolvable into material 132 ME. daewin's CEITICS V particles and forces, in virtue of which last these particles assume those dispositions and exercise those powers which are characteristic of each particular kind of matter. But the Schoolmen distinguished two kinds of substantial forms, the one spiritual and the other material. The former division is represented by the human soul, the anima rationalis ; and they affirm as a matter, not merely of reason, but of faith, that every human soul is created out of nothing, and by this act of creation is endowed with the power of existing for all eternity, apart from the materia prima of which the corporeal frame of man is composed. And the anima rationalis, once united with the materia, prima of the body, becomes its substantial form, and is the source of all the powers and faculties of man — of all the vital and sensitive phenomena which he exhibits — ^just as the substantial form of water is the source of all its qualities. The " material substantial forms " are those which inform all other natural bodies except that of man ; and the object of Suarez in the present Disputation, is to show that the axiom " ex nihilo nihil fit," though not true of the substantial form of man, is true of the substantial forms of all other bodies, the endless mutations of which constitute the ordinary course of nature. The origin of the difficulty which he discusses is easily comprehensible. Suppose a piece of bright iron V MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 133 to be exposed to the air. The existence of the iron depends on the presence within it of a sub- stantial form, which is the cause of its properties, e.g. brightness, hardness, weight. But, by degrees, the iron becomes converted into a mass of rust, which is dull, and soft, and light, and, in all other respects, is quite different from the iron. As, in the scholastic view, this difference is due to the rust being informed by a new substantial form, the grave problem arises, how did this new sub- stantial form come into being ? Has it been created ? or has it arisen by the power of natural causation? If the former hypothesis is correct, then the axiom, " ex nihilo nihil fit," is false, even in relation to the ordinary course of nature, seeing that such mutations of matter as imply the continual origin of new substantial forms are occurring every moment. But the harmonisation of Aristotle with theology was as dear to the Schoolmen, as the smoothing down the differences between Moses and science is to our Broad Church- men, and they were proportionably unwilling to contradict one of Aristotle's fundamental proposi- tions. Nor was their objection to flying in the face of the Stagirite likely to be lessened by the fact that such flight landed them in flat Pantheism. So Father Suarez fights stoutly for the second hypothesis ; and I quote the principal part of his argumentation as an exquisite specimen of that speech which is a " darkening of counsel." 134 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS V "13. Secundo de omnibus aliis formis substantialibus [sc. materialibus] diccndum est non fieri propria ex nihilo, sed ex potentia praejaceutis mateiiae educi : ideoque in effectione harum formanim nil fieri contra illud axioma, Ex nihilo nihil fit, si recte intelligatur. Haec assertio sumitur ex Aristotele 1. Phy- sicorum per totum et libro 7. Metaphyss. et ex aliis auctoribus, quos statim referam. Et declaratur breviter, nam fieri ex nihilo duo dicit, unum est fieri absolute et simpliciter, aliud est quod talis effectio fit ex nihilo. Primum proprie dicitur de re subsistente, quia ejus est fieri, cujus est esse : id autem proprie quod subsistit et habet esse ; nam quod alteri adjacet, potius est quo aliud est. Ex hac ergo parte, formee substantiales niate- riales non fiunt ex nihilo, quia proprie non fiunt. Atque banc rationem reddit Divus Thomas 1 parte, quajstione 45, articulo 8, et qusestione 90, articulo 2, et ex dicendismagisexplicabitur. Sumendo ergo ipsum fien in hac proprietate et rigore, sic fieri ex nihilo est fieri secundum se totum, id est nulla sui parte prsesupposita, ex quo fiat. Et hac ratione res naturales dum de novo fiunt, non fiunt ex nihilo, quia fiunt ex praesupposita materia, ex qua componuntur, et ita non fiunt, secundum se totse, sed secundum aliquid sui. Formae autem harum rerum, quamvis revera totam suam entitatem de novo accipiant, quam antea non habebant, quia vero ipsse non fiunt, ut dictum est, ideo neque ex nihilo fiunt. Attamen, quia latiori modo sumendo verbum illud fieri negari non potest : quin forma facta sit, eo modo quo nunc est, et antea non erat, ut etiam probat ratio dubitandi posita in principio sectionis, ideo addendum est, sumpto fieri in hac amplitudine, fieri ex nihilo non tamen negare habitudinem materialis caus£e intrinsece componentis id quod fit, sed etiam habitudinem causae materialis per se causantis et sustentantis formam quae fit, seu confit. Diximus enim in superioribus materiam et esse causam compositi et formae dependentis ab ilia : ut res ergo dicatur ex nihilo fieri uterque modus causal itatis negari debet ; et eodem sensu accipiendum est illud axioma, ut sit verum ; Ex nihilo nihil fit, scilicet virtute agentis naturalis et finiti nihil fieri, nisi ex prsesupposito subjecto per se concurrente, et ad compositum et ad formam, si utrumque sue modo ab eodem agente fiat. Ex his ergo rectfe V MK. Darwin's critics 133 concluditur, formas substantiales materiales non fieri ex nihilo, quia fiunt ex materia, qiioe in suo genero per se concurrit, et influit ad esse, et fieri talium formarum ; quia, sicut esse non possunt nisi affixae materia;, a qua sustententur in esse : ita nee fieri possunt, nisi earum effectio et penetratio in eadem materia sustentetur. Et hsec est propria et per se diflferentia inter eflectionem ox nihilo, et ex aliquo, propter quarii, ut infra ostendemus, prior modus efficiendi superat vim finitam natu- raliam agentium, nou vero posterior. "14. Ex his etiain constat, propria de his formis dici non creari, sed educi de potentia materiae." ^ If I may venture to interpret these hard say- ings, Suarez conceives that the evolution of substantial forms in the ordinary course of natxire, is conditioned not only by the existence of the materia prima, but also by a certain " concurrence and influence " which that materia exerts ; and every new substantial form being thus conditioned, and in part, at any rate, caused, by a pre-existing something, cannot be said to be created out of nothing. But as the whole tenor of the context shows, Suarez applies this argumentation merely to the evolution of material substantial forms in the ordinary course of nature. How the substantial forms of animals and plants primarily originated, is a question to which, so far as I am able to discover, he does not so much as allude in his " Metaphysical Disputations." Nor was there any necessity that he should do so, inasmuch as he ^ Suarez, loc. cit. Disput. xv. § ii. 88 136 MR Darwin's critics v lias devoted a separate treatise of considerable bulk to the discussion of all the problems which arise out of the account of the Creation which is given in the Book of Genesis. And it is a matter of Avonderment to me that Mr. Mivart, who somewhat sharply reproves " Mr. Darwin and others " for not acquainting themselves with the true teachings of his Church, should allow himself to be indebted to a lieretic like myself for a knowledge of the existence of that " Trac- tatus de opere sex Dierum," ^ in which the learned Father, of whom he justly sjDeaks, as " an authority widely venerated, and whose orthodoxy has never been questioned," directly opposes all those opinions for which Mr. Mivart claims the shelter of his authority. In the tenth and eleventh chapters of the first book of this treatise, Suarez inquires in what sense the word " day," as employed in the first chapter of Genesis, is to be taken. He discusses the views of Philo and of Augustin on this question, and rejects them. He suggests that the approval of their allegorising interpretations by St. Thomas Aquinas, merely arose out of St. Thomas's modesty, and his desire not to seem openly to controvert St. Augustin — " voluisse Divus Thomas ^ Tractatus da oycic sex Dierum, scio de Universi Creatione, quatemts sex dicbns pcrfeda esse, in lihro Genesis cap. i. refertur, ct pncsirlim de produciiune hominis m sialic innocentioe, Ed. Birckmann, 1622. V MR. DARWm'S CRITICS 137 pro sua modestia subterfugere vim argumenti potius quam aperte Augustinum inconstantise arguere." Finally, Suarez decides that the writer of Genesis meant that the term " day " should be taken in its natural sense ; and he winds up the discussion with the very just and natural remark that " it is not probable that God, in inspiring Moses to write a history of the Creation which was to be believed by ordinary people, would have made him use language, the true meaningf of which it is hard to discover, and still harder to believe." ^ And in chapter xii. 3, Suarez further ob- serves : — " Ratio enim retinendi veram significationem diei naturalis est ilia communis, quod verba Scripturse non sunt ad metaphoras transferenda, nisi vel necessitas cogit, vul ex ipsa scriptura constet, et maxime in historica nanatione ct ad instructioncm fidei pertinente : sed hiec ratio non minus cogit ad intelligendum proprie dienim numerum, quam diei qualitatem, quia non MINUS UXO MODO QUAM ALIO DESTRUITUR SINCERITAS, IMO ET VERITAS HiSTORiiE. Secundo hoc valde confirmant alia Scripturae loca, in quibus hi sex dies tanquam veri, et inter se distinct! commemorantur, ut Exod. 20 dicitur, Sex diebus operabis ct facies omnia opera iua, scptimo autcm die Sabbatum Domini Dei ^ " Propterhaec ergo sententia ilia Augustini et propter nimiam obscuritatem et subtilitatem ejus ditflcilis creditu est : quia verisimile non est Deum inspirasse Moysi, ut historian! de creatione mundi ad fidem totius populi adeo necessariam per nomiiia dierum explicaret, quorum significatio vix inveniri et dilficillime ab aliquo credi posset." {Loc. cit. Lib. I. cap. xi. 42.) 138 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS V tui est. Et infra ; Sex enim diehus fecit Bominus cmluin et terram et mare et omnia qum in eis mint, et idem repetitur in cap. 31. In quibus locis sermonis proprietas colligi potest turn ex sequiparatione, nam cum dicitur : sex dicbus operabii, pro- priissime intelligitur : turn quia non est verisimile, potuisse populum intelligere verba ilia in alio sensu, et h contrario in- credibile est, Deum in suis praeceptis tradendis illis verbis ad populum fuisse loquutum, quibus deciperetur, falsum sensum concipiendo, si Deus non per sex veros dies opera sua fecisset. " These passages leave no doubt that this great doctor of the Catholic Church, of unchallenged authority and unspotted orthodoxy, not only declares it to be Catholic doctrine that the work of creation took place in the space of six natural days ; but that he warmly repudiates, as inconsist- ent with our knowledge of the Divine attributes, the supposition that the language which Catholic faith requires the believer to hold that God inspired, was used in any other sense than that which He knew it would convey to the minds of those to whom it was addressed. And I think that in this repudiation Father Suarez will have the sympathy of every man of common uprightness, to whom it is certainly " incredible " that the Almighty should have acted in a manner which He would esteem dishonest and base in a man. But the belief that the universe was created in six natural days is hopelessly inconsistent with the doctrine of evolution, in so far as it applies to the stars and planetary bodies ; and it can be V MR. Darwin's critics 139 made to agree with a belief in the evolution of living beings only by the supposition that the plants and animals, which are said to have been created on the third, fifth, and sixth days, were merely the primordial forms, or rudiments, out of which existing plants and animals have been evolved; so that, on these days, plants and animals were not created actually, but only potentially. The latter view is that held by Mr. Mivart, who follows St. Augustin, and implies that he has the sanction of Suarez. But, in point of fact, the latter great light of orthodoxy takes no small pains to give the most explicit and direct contra- diction to all such imaoinations, as the folio vvincr passages prove. In the first place, as regards plants, Suarez discusses the problem : — " Quomodo Jierba virens ct ccctera vegetabilia hoc [tcrtio] die fMriTit produicta. ^ " PrsBcipua enim difficultas hie est, quam attingit Div. Thomas 1, par. qu. 69, art. 2, an htec productio plantanim hoc die facta intelligenda sit de productione ipsarum in proprio esse actuali et formali .(ut sic rem explicerem) vel de productione tan turn in semine et in potentia. Nam Divus Augustinus libro quinto Genes, ad liter, cap. 4 et 5 et libro 8, cap. 3, posteriorem partem tradit, dicens, terram in hoc die accepisse virtutem germinandi omnia vegetabilia quasi concepto omnium illorum semine, non tamen statim vegetabilia omnia produxisse. Quod primo suadet verbis illis capitis secundi. In die quo fecit Dcus cmlum et terram et ^ Loc. eit. Lib. II. cap. vii. et viii. 1, 32, 35. 140 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS V omne virgultuin agri priusguam germinaret. Qiiomodo eniin potuerunt virgiilta fieri antequam terra germinaret nisi quia causaliter prius et quasi in radice, seu in semine facta sunt, et postea in actu producta ? Secundo cnnfirmari potest, quia vcrbum illud germinct terra optimc exponitur potestative ut sic dicam, id est accipiat terra vim gcrminandi. Sicut in eodem capite dicitur crcscite ct multiplicamini. Tertio potest confirmari, quiaactualis productio vegetaLilium non tarn ad opus creationis, quam ad oj)US propagationis pertinet, quod postea factum est. Et banc sententiam sequitur Eucherius lib. 1, in Gen. cap. 11, et illi faveat Glossa, interli. Hugo, et Lyran. dum verbum gcrminet dicto mode exponunt. Nihilominus contraria SENTENTIA TENENDA EST : SCILICET, PRODUXISSE DeUM HOC DIE HERBAM, ARBORES, ET ALIA VEGEI'ABILIA ACTU IN PROPRIA SPECIE ET NATTJEA. Htec est communis sententia Patnmi. — Basil, homil. 5 ; Exoemer. Ambros. lib. 3 ; Exasmer. cap. 8, 11, et 16 ; Cbrysost. bomil. 5 in Gen. Damascene, lib. 2 de Fid. cap. 10 ; Theodor. Cyrilli. BedtB, Glossfe ordinarire et aliorum in Gen. Et idem sentit Divus Thomas, supra, solvers argumenta Augustini, quamvis propter reverentiam ejus quasi problematice semper procedat. Denique idem sentiunt omnes qui in his operibus veram successionem et temporalem distinctionem agnoscant." Secondly, with respect to animals, Suare^ is no less decided : — " De animalium rationa carentium productionc qidnto et sexto die facta?- "32. Primo ergo nobis certum sit licec animantia' non in virtute tantum aut in semine, sed actu, et in soipsi.s, facta fuisse his diebus in quibus facta narrantur. Quanquam Augustinus lib. 3, Gen. ad liter, cap. 5 in sua persistans sententia contrarium sen tire videatur." But Suarez proceeds to refute Augnstin's 1 Loc. cit. Lib. II. cap. vii. ct viii. 1, 32, 35. V MR, Darwin's critics 141 opinions at great length, and his final judgment may be gathered from the following passage : — "35. Tertio dicendum est, htec animalia omnia his diebus producta esse, in perfecto statu, in singulis individuis, seu SPECIEBUS SUIS, JUXTA UNIUSCUJUSQUE NATURAM .... ItAQUE FUERUNT OMNIA CREATA INTEGRA ET OMNIBUS SUIS MEMBRIS PERFECTA." As regards the creation of animals and plants, therefore, it is clear that Suarez, so far from " distinctly asserting derivative creating," denies it as distinctly and positively as he can ; that he is at much pains to refute St. Augustin's opinions ; that he does not hesitate to regard the faint acquiescence of St. Thomas Aquinas in the views of his brother saint as a kindly subter- fuge on the part of Divus Thomas ; and that he afiGjTns his own view to be that which is supported by the authority of the Fathers of the Church. So that, when Mr. Mivart tells us that Catholic theology is in harmony with all that modern science can possibly require ; that " to the general theory of evolution, and to the special Darwinian form of it, no exception . . . need be taken on the ground of orthodoxy ; " and that " law and regularity, not arbitrary intervention, was the Patristic ideal of creation," we have to choose between his dictum, as a theologian, and that of a great light of his Church, whom he him^- self declares to be " widely venerated as an 14.2 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS V authority, and whose orthodoxy has never been questioned." But Mr. Mivart does not hesitate to push his attempt to harmonise science with Catholic orthodoxy to its utmost limit ; and, while assuming that the soul of man "arises from immediate and direct creation," he supposes that his body was " formed at first (as now in each separate individual) by derivative, or secondary creation, through natural laws " (p. 331). This means, I presume, that an animal, having the corporeal form and bodily powers of man, may have been developed out of some lower form of life by a process of evolution ; and that, after this anthropoid animal had existed for a longer or shorter time, God made a soul by direct creation, and put it into the manlike body, which, hereto- fore, had been devoid of that anima rationalis, which is supposed to be man's distinctive character. This hypothesis is incapable of either proof or disproof, and therefore may be true ; but if Suarez is any authority, it is not Catholic doctrine. " Nulla est in liomine forma educta de potcntia materiee," ^ is a dictum Avhich is absolutely inconsistent with the doctrine of the natural evolution of any vital manifestation of the human body. Moreover, if man existed as an animal before 1 Disput. XV. § X. No. 27. V ME. Darwin's critics 143 he was provided with a rational soul, he must, in accordance with the elementary requirements of the philosophy in Avhich Mr. Mivart delights, have possessed a distinct sensitive and vegetative soul, or souls. Hence, when the " breath of life " was breathed into the manlike animal's nostrils, he must have already been a living and feeling creature. But Suarez particularly discusses this point, and not only rejects Mr. Mivart's view, but adopts language of very theological strength regarding it. "Possent praeterea his adjungi argumenta theologica, ut est illud quod suniitux ex illis verbis Genes. 2. Formavit Deu.t hominem ex lim-o terrce et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitcB et factus est homo in animam viventcm . ille enim spiritus, quam Deus spiravit, anima rationalis fuit, et PER EADEM FACTUS EST HOMO VIVENS, ET CONSQUENTER, ETIAM SENTIEN'S. " Aliud est ex VIII. Synodo Generali quEB est Constantinopol- itana IV. can. 11, qui sic habet. Apparet quosdam in tanlum impictatis venisse ut homines duos animas habere dogmatiz' nt : talis igitur impictatis invcntores et similes sapientes, cum Fetus et Novum Testamentum omnesque Ecclcsice patrcs unain animam raiionalem hominem habere asicvcrcnt, Sancta et universalis Synodus anathematizat." ^ Moreover, if the animal nature of man was the result of evolution, so must that of woman have been. But the Catholic doctrine, according to Suarez, is that woman was, in the strictest and most literal sense of the words, made out of the rib of man. ■■ Disput. XV. " De causa formali substantiali," § x. No. 21. 144 MK. DAllWIN'S CrJTICS V " Nihilominus sententia Catholica est, verlia ilia Srripturfe esse ad literam intelligenJa. Ac proinde vere, ac eealiter, TL'LISSE DeUM COSTAM ADAMiE, ET, EX ILLA, CORPUS EvjB FORMASSE." ^ Nor is tliere any escape in the supposition that some woman existed before Eve, after the fashion of the Lilitli of the rabbis ; since Suarez quahfies that notion, along with some other Judaic imaginations, as simply '"' damnabilis." ^ After the perusal of the " Tractatus de Opere " it is, in fact, impossible to admit that Suarez held any opinion respecting the origin of species, except such as is consistent Avith the strictest and most literal interpretation of the words of Genesis. For Suarez, it is Catholic doctrine, that the world was made in six natural days. On the first of these days the materia prima was made out of nothing, to receive afterwards those " substantial forms " which moulded it into the universe of vC things i^on the third day, the ancestors of all living plants suddenly came into being, full-grown, perfect, and possessed of all the properties which now distinguish them ; while, on the fifth and sixth days, the ancestors of all existing animals were similarly caused to exist in their complete and perfect state, by the infusion of their appro- priate material substantial forms into the matter 1 Tradahts do Opera, Lib. III. " Do hominis creatione," cap. ii. No. 3. _ ^ •■ Ihid. Ijib. III. cap. iv. Nos. 8 and 9 V MB. DARWIN'S CRITICS 145 whicli liad already been created. Finally, on the sixth day, the anima rationulis — that rational and immortal substantial form which is peculiar to man — was created out of nothins:, and " breathed into " a mass of matter which, till then, was mere dust of the earth, and so man arose. But the species man was represented by a solitary male individual, until the Creator took out one of his ribs and fashioned it into a female. This is the view of the " Genesis of Species " held by Suarez to be the only one consistent with Catholic faith : it is because ho holds this view to be Catholic that he does not hesitate to declare St. Augustin unsound, and St. Thomas Aquinas guilty of weakness, when the one swerved from this view and the other tolerated the deviation. And, until responsible Catholic authority — say, for example, the Archbishop of Westminster — - formally declares that Suarez was wrong, and that Catholic priests are free to teach their llocks that the world was not made in six natural days, and that plants and animals were not created in their perfect and complete state, but have been evolved by natural processes through long ages from certain germs in which they were potentially contained, I, for one, shall feel bound to believe that the doctrines of Suarez are the only ones which are sanctioned by Infallible Authority, as represented by the Holy Father and the Catholic Church, 146 MK. Darwin's ceitics v I need hardly add that they are as absolutely denied and repudiated by Scientific Authority, as represented by Reason and Fact. The question whether the earth and the immediate progenitors of its present living population were made in six natural days or not is no longer one upon which two opinions can be held. The fact that it did not so come into beino- stands upon as sound a basis as any fact of history whatever. It is not true that existing plants and animals came into being within three days of the creation of the earth out of nothing, for it is certain that innumerable generations of other plants and animals lived upon the earth before its present population. And when, Sunday after Sunday, men who profess to be our instructors in righteousness read out the statement, "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is," in innumerable churches, they are either propagating what they may easily know, and, therefore, are bound to know, to be falsities ; or, if they use the words in some non- natural sense, they fall below the moral standard of the much-abused Jesuit. Thus far the contradiction between Catholic verity and Scientific verity is complete and absolute, quite independently of the truth or false- hood of the doctrine of evolution. But, for those who hold the doctrine of evolution, all the Catholic verities about the creation of living beings must V ME. DARWIN'S CRITICS 147 be no less false. For them, the assertion that the progenitors of all existing plants were made on the third day, of animals on the fifth and sixth days, in the forms they now present, is simply false. Nor can they admit that man was made suddenly out of the dust of the earth ; while it would be an insult to ask an evolutionist whether he credits the preposterous fable respecting the fabrication of woman to which Suarez pins his faith. If Suarez has rightly stated Catholic doctrine, then is evolution utter heresy. And such I believe it to be. In addition to the truth of the doctrine of evolution, indeed, one of its greatest merits in' my eyes, is the fact that it occupies a position of complete and irreconcilable antagonism to that vigorous and consistent enemy of the highest intel- lectual, moral, and social life of mankind — the Catholic Church. No doubt, Mr. Mivart, like other putters of new wine into old bottles, is actuated by motives which are worthy of respect, and even of sympathy ; but his attempt has met with the fate which the Scripture prophesies for all such. Catholic theology, like all theologies which are based upon the assumption of the truth of the account of the origin of things given in the Book of Genesis, being utterly irreconcilable with the doctrine of evolution, the student of science, who is satisfied that the evidence upon which the doctrine of evolution rests, is incomparably stronger and 148 MR. DARWIN S CRITICS V better than that upon which the supposed author- ity of the Book of Genesis rests, will not trouble himself further with these theologies, but will confine his attention to such arguments against the view he holds as are based upon purely scientific data — and by scientific data I do not merely mean the truths of physical, mathematical, or logical science, but those of moral and meta- physical science. For by science I understand all knowledge which rests upon evidence and reasoning of a like character to that which claims our assent to ordinary scientific propositions. And if any one is able to make good the assertion that his theology rests upon valid evidence and sound reasoning, then it appears to me that such theology will take its place as a part of science. The present antagonism between theology and science does not arise from any assumption by the men of science that all theology must necessarily be excluded from science, but simply because they are unable to allow that reason and morality have two weights and two measures ; and that the belief in a proposition, because authority tells you it is true, or because you wish to believe it, which is a high crime and misdemeanour Avhen the sub- ject matter of reasoning is of one kind, becomes under the alias of " faith " the greatest of all virtues when the subject matter of reasoning is of another kind. The Bishop of Brechin said well the other V ME. daewin's critics 149 day : — " Liberality in religion — I do not mean tender and generous allowances for the mis- takes of others — is only unfaithfulness to truth." ^ And, with the same qualification, I venture to paraphrase the Bishop's dictum : " Eccle- siasticism in science is only unfaithfulness to truth." Elijah's great question, " Will you serve God or Baal ? Choose ye," is uttered audibly enough in the ears of every one of us as we come to man- hood. Let every man who tries to answer it seriously ask himself whether he can be satisfied with the Baal of authority, and with all the good things his worshippers are promised in this world and the next. If he can, let him, if he be so inclined, amuse himself with such scientific imple- ments as authority tells him are safe and will not cut his fingers ; but let him not imagine he is, or can be, both a true son of the Church and a loyal soldier of science. And, on the other hand, if the blind acceptance of authority appears to him in its true colours, as mere private judgment in cxcelsis, and if he have the courage to stand alone, face to face with the abyss of the eternal and unknowable, let him be content, once for all, not only to renounce the good things promised by " Infallibility," but even to bear the bad things which it prophesies ; content 1 Charge at the Diocesan Synod of Brechin. Scotsman, Sept. 14, 1871. 150 MK. DARWIN'S CRITICS V to follow reason and fact in singleness and honesty of purpose, wherever they may lead, in the sure faith that a hell of honest men will, to him, be more endurable than a paradise full of angelic shams. Mr. Mivart asserts that " without a belief in a personal God there is no religion worthy of the name." This is a matter of opinion. But it may be asserted, with less reason to fear contradiction, that the worship of a personal God, who, on Mr. Mivart's hypothesis, must have used language studiously calculated to deceive His creatures and worshippers, is "no religion worthy of the name." " Incredible est, Deum illis verbis ad populum fuisse locutum quibus deciperetur," is a verdict in which, for once, Jesuit casuistry concurs with the healthy moral sense of all mankind. Having happily got quit of the theological aspect of evolution, the supporter of that great truth who turns to the scientific objections which are brought against it by recent criticism, finds, to his relief, that the work before him is greatly lightened by the spontaneous retreat of the enemy from nine-tenths of the tenitory which he occu- pied ten years ago. Even the Quarterly Reviewer not only abstains from venturing to deny that evolution has taken place, but he openly admits that Mr. Darwin has forced on men's minds " a recognition of the probability, if not more, of T MR. daewin's critics 151 evolution, and of the certainty of the action of natural selection " (p. 49). I do not quite see, myself, how, if the action of natural selection is certain, the occurrence of evolu- tion is only po'oiahle ; inasmuch as the development of a new species by natural selection is, so far as it goes, evolution. However, it is not worth while to quarrel with the precise terms of a sentence which shows that the high water mark of intelli- gence among those most respectable of Britons, the readers of the Quarterly Mevieiv, has now reached such a level that the next tide may lift them easily and pleasantly on the once-dreaded shore of evolution. Nor, having got there, do they seem likely to stop, until they have reached the inmost heart of that great region, and accepted the ape ancestry of, at any rate, the body of man. For the Reviewer admits that Mr. Darwin can be said to have estabhshed : "That if tlie various kinds of lower animals have been evolved one from the other by a process of natural generation or evolution, then it becomes highly probable, d priori, that man's body has been similarly evolved ; but this, in such a case, becomes equally probable from the admitted fact that he is an animal at all " (p. 65). From the principles laid down in the last sen- tence it would follow that if man were constructed upon a plan as different from that of any other animal as that of a sea-urchin is from that of a whale, it would be " equally probable " that he 39 152 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS V had been developed from some other animal as it is now, when we know that for every bone, muscle, tooth, and even pattern of tooth, in man, there is a corresponding bone, muscle, tooth, and pattern of tooth, in an ape. And this shows one of two things — either that the Quarterly Reviewer's notions of probability are peculiar to himself, or that he has such an overpowering faith in the truth of evolution that no extent of structural break between one animal and another is sufficient to destroy his con- viction that evolution has taken place. But this by the way. The importance of the admission that there is nothing in man's physical structure to interfere with his having been evolved from an ape is not lessened because it is grudg- ingly made and inconsistently qualified. And in- stead of jubilating over the extent of the enemy's retreat, it will be more worth while to lay siege to his last stronghold — the position that there is a distinction in kind between the mental faculties of man and those of brutes, and that in consequence of this distinction in kind no gradual progress from the mental faculties of the one to those of the other can have taken place. The Quarterly Eeviewer entrenches himself within formidable-looking psychological outworks, and there is no getting at him without attacking them one by one. He begins by laying down the following pro- position. " ' Sensation ' is not ' thought,' and no V MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 153 amount of the former would constitute the most rudimentary condition of the latter, though sen- sations supply the conditions for the existence of ' thought ' or ' knowledge' " (p. 67). This proposition is true, or not, according to the sense in which the word " thought " is employed. Thought is not uncommonly used in a sense co- extensive with consciousness, and, especially, with those states of consciousness we call memory. If I recall the impression made by a colour or an odour, and distinctly remember blueness or muskiness, I may say with perfect propriety that I " think of " blue or musk ; and, so long as the thought lasts, it is simply a faint reproduction of the state of consciousness to which I gave the name in question, when it first became known to me as a sensation. Now, if that faint reproduction of a sensation, which we call the memory of it, is properly termed a thought, it seems to me to be a somewhat forced proceeding to draw a hard and fast line of demar- cation between thoughts and sensations. If sen- sations are not rudimentary thoughts, it may be said that some thoughts are rudimentary sensations. No amount of sound constitutes an echo, but for all that no one would pretend that an echo is some- thing of totally diflferent nature from a sound. Again, nothing can be looser, or more inaccurate, than the assertion that " sensations supply the conditions for the existence of thought or know- ledge." If this implies that sensations supply the ;^54 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS V conditions for the existence of our memory of sen- sations or of our thoughts about sensations, it is a truism which it is hardly worth while to state so solemnly. If it implies that sensations supply any- thino- else, it is obviously erroneous. And if it means, as the context would seem to show it does, that sensations are the subject-matter of all thought or knowledge, then it is no less contrary to fact, inasmuch as our emotions, which constitute a large part of the subject-matter of thought or of know- ledge, are not sensations. More eccentric still is the Quarterly Reviewer's next piece of psychology. " Altogether, we may clearly distinguish at least six kinds of action to which the nervous system ministers : — " I. That in which impressions received result in appropriate movements without the intervention of sensation or thought, as in the cases of injury above given. — This is the reflex action of the nervous system. " II. That in which stimuli from without result in sensations through the agency of which their due effects are wrought out. — Sensation. " III. That in which impressions received result in sensations which give rise to the observation of sensible objects. — Sensible perception. "IV. That in which sensations and perceptions continue to coalesce, agglutinate, and combine in more or less comjjlex aggregations, according to the laws of the association of sensible perceptions. — A ssociation. " The above four groups contain only indeliberate operations, consisting, as they do at the best, but of mere prescntative sensible ideas in no way implying any reflective or representative faculty. Such actions minister to and form Institiet. Besides these, we may distinguish two other kinds of mental action, namely :— V MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 155 "V. That in which sensations and sensible -perceptions are reflected on by thought, and recognised as our own, and wo ourselves recognised by ourselves as aflccted and perceiving. — Self-consciousness. "VI. That in which we reflect upon our sensations or perceptions, and ask what they arc, and why they are. — Reason. "These two latter kinds of action are deliberate operations, performed, as they are, by means of representative ideas imply- ing the use of a reflective representative faculty. Such actions distinguish the inttllect or rational facuUJ^ Now, we assert that possession in perfection of all the first four { prescntative) kinds of action by no means implies the possession of the last two {representative) kinds. All persons, we think, must admit the truth of the following proposition : — " Two faculties are distinct, not in degree but in kind, if wo may possess the one in perfection without that fact implying that w^e possess the other also. Still more will this be the case if the two faculties tend to increase in an inverse ratio. Yet this is the distinction between the instinctive and the intellectual parts of man's nature. "As to animals, we fully admit that they may possess all the first four groups of actions — that they may have, so to speak, mental images of sensible objects combined in all degrees of comple.xity, as governed by the laws of association. "We deny to them, on the other hand, the possession of the last two kinds of mental action. We deny them, that is, the power of reflecting on their own existences, or of inquiring into the nature of objects and their causes. We deny that they know that they know or know themselves in knowing. In other words, we deny them reason. The possession of the prescntative faculty, as above explained, in no way implies that of the reflective faculty ; nor does any amount of direct operation imply the power of asking the reflective question before mentioned, as to ' what ' and 'why.'" {Loc.cit. pp. 67, 68.) Sundry points are worthy of notice in this remarkable account of the intellectual powers. In the first place the Reviewer ignores emotion and 156 MR. Darwin's critics v volition., though they are no inconsiderable " kinds of action to which the nervous system ministers," and memory has a place in his classification only by implication. Secondly, we are told that the second " kind of action to which the nervous system ministers " is " that in which stimuli from Avithout result in sensations through the agency of which their due effects are wrought out. — Sensation." Does this really mean that, in the writer's opinion, "sensation" is the "agent" by which the "due effect" of the stimulus, which, gives rise to sensation, is " wrought out " ? Suppose somebody runs a pin into me. The " due effect " of that particular stimulus will probably be threefold ; namely, a sensation of pain, a start, and an interjectional expletive. Does the Quarterly Reviewer really think that the " sensation " is the " agent " by which the other two phenomena are wrought out ? But these matters are of little moment to anyone but the Reviewer and those persons who may incautiously take their physiology, or psycho- logy, from him. The really interesting point is this, that when he fully admits that animals " may possess all the first four groups of actions," he grants all that is necessary for the purposes of the evolutionist. For he hereby admits that in animals " impressions received result in sensations which give rise to the observation of sensible objects," and that they have what he calls V MR. daewin's critics 157 " sensible perception." Nor was it possible to help the admission ; for we have as much reason to ascribe to animals, as we have to attribute to our fellow-men, the power, not only of perceiving external objects as external, and thus practically recognizing the difference between the self and the not-self; but that of distinguishing between like and unlike, and between simultaneous and suc- cessive things. When a gamekeeper goes out coursing with a greyhound in leash, and a hare crosses the field of vision, he becomes the subject of those states of consciousness we call visual sensation, and that is all he receives from without. Sensation, as such, tells him nothing whatever about the cause of these states of consciousness; but the thinking faculty instantly goes to work upon the raw material of sensation furnished to it through the eye, and gives rise to a train of thoughts. First comes the thought that there is an object at a certain distance ; then arises another thought — the perception of the likeness between the states of consciousness awakened by this object to those presented by memory, as, on some former occasion, called up by a hare ; this is succeeded by another thought of the nature of an emotion — namely, the desire to possess the hare ; then follows a longer or shorter train of other thoughts, which end in a volition and an act — the loosing of the greyhound from the leash. These several thoughts are the concomitants of a process 158 MR. Darwin's critics v which goes on in the nervous system of the man. Unless the nerve-elements of the retina, of the optic nerve, of the brain, of the spinal cord, and of the nerves of the arms, went through certain physical changes in due order and correlation, the various states of consciousness which have been enumerated would not make their appearance. So that in this, as in all other intellectual operations, we have to distinguish two sets of successive changes — one in the physical basis of conscious- ness, and the other in consciousness itself ; one set which may, and doubtless will, in course of time, be followed through all their complexities by the anatomist and the physicist, and one of which only the man himself can have immediate knowledge. As it is very necessary to keep up a clear distinction between these two processes, let the one be called neurosis, and the other psychosis. When the gamekeeper was first trained to his work every step in the process of neurosis Avas accom- panied by a corresponding step in that of psychosis, or nearly so. He was conscious of seeing some- thing, conscious of making sure it was a hare, conscious of desiring to catch it, and therefore to loose the greyhound at the right time, conscious of the acts by which he let the dog out of the leash. But with practice, though the various steps of the neurosis remain — for otherwise the impression on the retina would not result in the loosinsr of the dog — the great majority of the steps of the V ME. daewin's ceitics 159 psychosis vanish, and the loosing of the dog follows unconsciously, or as we say, without thinking about it, upon the sight of the hare. No one will deny that the series of acts which originally intervened between the sensation and the letting go of the dog were, in the strictest sense, intellectual and rational operations. Do they cease to be so when the man ceases to be conscious of them? That depends upon what is the essence and what the accident of those operations, which, taken to- gether, constitute ratiocination. Now ratiocination is resolvable into predication, and predication consists in marking, in some way, the existence, the co-existence, the succession, the likeness and unlikeness, of things or their ideas. Whatever does this, reasons ; and if a machine pro- duces the effects of reason, I see no more ground for denying to it the reasoning power, because it is unconscious, than I see for refusing to Mr. Babbage's engine the title of a calculating machine on the same grounds. Thus it seems to me that a gamekeeper reasons, whether he is conscious or unconscious, whether his reasoning is carried on by neurosis alone, or whether it involves more or less psychosis. And if this is true of the gamekeeper, it is also true of the greyhound. The essential resemblances in all points of structure and function, so far as they can be studied, between the nervous system of the man and that of the dog, leave no reasonable doubt 160 MR. daewin's critics V that the processes which go on in the one are just like those which take place in the other. In the dog, there can be no doubt that the nervous matter which lies between the retina and the muscles undergoes a series of changes, precisely analogous to those which, in the man, give rise to sensation, a train of thought, and volition. Whether this neurosis is accompanied by such psychosis as ours it is impossible to say ; but those who deny that the nervous changes, which, in the dog, correspond with those which underlie thought in a man, are accompanied by conscious- ness, are equally bound to maintain that those nervous changes in the dog, which correspond with those which underlie sensation in a man, are also unaccompanied by consciousness. In other words, if there is no ground for believing that a dog thinks, neither is there any for believing that he feels. As is well known, Descartes boldly faced this dilemma, and maintained that all animals were mere machines and entirely devoid of consciousness. But he did not deny, nor can anyone deny, that in this case they are reasoning machines, capable of performing all those operations which are per- formed by the nervous system of man when he reasons. For even supposing that in man, and in man only, psychosis is superadded to neurosis — the neurosis which is common to both man and animal gives their reasoning processes a fundamental unity. But Descartes' position is open to very V Ma. DARWIN'S CRITICS 161 serious objections if the evidence that animals feel is insufficient to prove that they really do so. What is the value of the evidence which leads one to believe that one's fellow-man feels ? The only evidence in this argument of analogy is the similarity of his structure and of his actions to one's own. And if that is good enough to prove that one's fellow-man feels, surely it is good enough to prove that an ape feels. For the differ- ences of structure and function between men and apes are utterly insufficient to warrant the assumption that while men have those states of consciousness we call sensations apes have nothing of the kind. Moreover, we have as good evidence that apes are capable of emotion and volition as we have that men other than ourselves are. But if apes possess three out of the four kinds of states of consciousness which we discover in ourselves, what possible reason is there for denying them the fourth ? If they are capable of sensation, emotion, and volition, Avhy are they to be denied thought (in the sense of predication) ? No answer has ever been given to these questions. And as the law of continuity is as much opposed, as is the common sense of man- kind, to the notion that all animals are unconscious machines, it may safely be assumed that no sufficient answer ever will be given to them. There is every reason to believe that con- sciousness is a function of nervous matter, when 1G2 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS T that nervous matter lias attained a certain degree of organisation, just as we know the other " actions to which the nervous system ministers," such as reflex action and the like, to be. As I have ventured to state my view of the matter elsewhere, " our thoughts are the expression of molecular changes in that matter of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena." Mr. Wallace objects to this statement in the following terms : — ■ " Not having been able to find any clue in Professor Huxley's writings to the steps by which he passes from those vital pheno- mena, which consist only, in their last analysis, of movements by particles of matter, to those other phenomena which we term thought, sensation, or consciousness ; but, knowing that so positive an expression of opinion from him will have great weight with many persons, I shall endeavour to show, with as much lirevity as is compatible with clearness, that this theory is not only incapable of proof, but is also, as it appears to me, inconsistent with accurate conceptions of molecular physics. " With all respect for Mr. Wallace, it appears to me that his remarks are entirely beside the ques- tion. I really know nothing whatever, and never hope to know anything, of the steps by which the passage from molecular movement to states of consciousness is effected ; and I entirely agree with the sense of the passage which he quotes from Professor Tyndall, apparently imagining that it is in opposition to the view I hold. All that I have to say is, that, in my belief, consciousness and molecular action axe capable of V MK. Darwin's critics 163 being expressed by one another, just as heat and mechanical action are capable of being expressed in terms of one another. Whether we shall ever be able to express consciousness in foot-pounds, or not, is more than I will venture to say ; but that there is evidence of the existence of some corre- lation between mechanical motion and conscious- ness, is as plain as anything can be. Suppose the poles of an electric battery to be connected by a platinum Avire. A certain intensity of the current gives rise in the mind of a bystander to that state of consciousness we call a " dull red light" — a little greater intensity to another which we call a " bright red light ; " increase the inten- sity, and the light becomes white ; and, finally, it dazzles, and a new state of consciousness arises, which we term pain. Given the same wire and the same nervous apparatus, and the amount of electric force required to give rise to these several states of conciousness will be the same, however often the experiment is repeated. And as the electric force, the light waves, and the nerve- vibrations caused by the impact of the light- waves on the retina, are all expressions of the molecular changes which are taking place in the elements of the battery ; so consciousness is, in the same sense, an expression of the molecular changes which take place in that nervous matter, which is the organ of consciousness. And, since this, and any number of similar 164 MR. Darwin's critics v examples that may be required, prove that one form of consciousness, at any rate, is, in the strictest sense, the expression of molecular change, it really is not worth while to pursue the inquiry, whether a fact so easily established is consistent with any particular system of molecular physics or not. Mr. Wallace, in fact, appears to me to have mixed up two very distinct propositions : the one, the indisputable truth that consciousness is corre- lated with molecular changes in the organ of consciousness ; the other, that the nature of that correlation is known, or can be conceived, which is quite another matter. Mr. Wallace, presumably, believes in that correlation of phenomena which we call cause and effect as firmly as I do. But if he has ever been able to form the faintest notion how a cause gives rise to its effect, all I can say is that I envy him. Take the simplest case imagin- able — suppose a ball in motion to impinge upon another ball at rest. I know very well, as a matter of fact, that the ball in motion will communicate some of its motion to the ball at rest, and that the motion of the two balls, after collision, is precisely correlated with the masses of both balls and the amount of motion of the first. But how does this come about ? In what manner can we conceive that the vis viva of the first ball passes into the second ? I confess I can no more form any conception of what happens in this case, than I can of what takes place when the motion of V MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 1G5 particles of my nervous matter, caused by the impact of a similar ball gives rise to the state of consciousness I call pain. In ultimate analysis ; everything is incomprehensible, and the whole object of science is simply to reduce the funda- mental incomprehensibilities to the smallest possi- ble number. But to return to the Quarterly Reviewer. He admits that animals have " mental images of sensible objects, combined in all degrees of com- plexity, as governed by the laws of association." Presumably, by this confused and imperfect state- ment the Reviewer means to admit more than the words imply. For mental images of sensible objects, even though " combined in all degrees of complexity,'' are, and can be, nothing more than mental images of sensible objects. But judg- ments, emotions, and volitions cannot by any possibility be included under the head of " mental images of sensible objects." If the greyhound had no better mental endowment than the Reviewer allows him, he might have the " mental image " of the " sensible object '' — the hare — and that might be combined with the mental imasfes of other sensible objects, to any degree of com- plexity, but he would have no power of judging it to be at a certain distance from him ; no power of perceiving its similarity to his menaory of a hare ; and no desire to get at it. Consequently he would stand stock still, and the noble art of 16G MR. Darwin's critics t couisinc: would have no existence. On the other hand, as that art is largely practised, it follows that greyhounds alone possess a number of mental powers, the existence of which, in any animal, is absolutely denied by the Quarterly Reviewer. Finally, what are the mental powers which he reserves as the especial prerogative of man ? They are two. First, the recognition of "our- selves by ourselves as affected and perceiving, — ■■ Self-consciousness." Secondly. " The reflection upon our sensations and perceptions, and asking what they are and why they are. — Reason." To the faculty defined in the last sentence, the Reviewer, without assio'ning the least ground for thus departing from both common usage and technical propriety, applies the name of reason. But if man is not to be considered a reasoning being, unless he asks what his sensations and per- ceptions are, and why they are, what is a Hot- tentot, or an Aixstralian " black-fellow " ; or what the " swinked hedger " of an ordinary agricultural district ? Nay, what becomes of an average country squire or parson ? How many of these worthy persons who, as their wont is, read the Quarterly Review, would do other than stand agape, if you asked them whether they had ever reflected what their sensations and perceptions are and why they are ? S-"* that if the RevieAver's new definition of rea- V MK, Darwin's critics 167 son be correct, the majority of men, even among the most civilised nations, are devoid of that supreme characteristic of manhood. And if it be as absurd as I believe it to be, then, as reason is certainly not self-consciousness, and since it, as certainly, is one of the " actions to which the nervous system minis- ters," we must, if the Reviewer's classification is to be adopted, seek it among those four faculties which he allows animals to possess. And thus, for the second time, he really surrenders, while seem- ing to defend, his position. The Quarterly ^Reviewer, as we have seen, lectures the evolutionists upon their want of know- ledge of philosophy altogether. Mr. Mivart is not less pained at Mr. Darwin's ignorance of moral science. It is grievous to him that Mr. Darwin (and nous autres) should not have grasped the elementary distinction between material and formal morality ; and he lays down as an axiom, of which no tyro ought to be ignorant, the position that " acts, unaccompanied by mental acts of conscious will directed towards the fulfilment of duty," are " absolutely destitute of the most incipient degree of real or formal goodness." Now this may be Mr. Mivart's opinion, but it is a proposition which really does not stand on the footing of an undisputed axiom. Mr. Mill denies it in his work on Utilitarianism. The most in- fluential writer of a totally opposed school, Mr. Carlyle, is never weary of denying it, and upholding 40 168 MR. Darwin's critics v the merit of that virtue which is unconscious ; nay, it is, to my understanding, extremely hard to reconcile Mr. Mivart's dictum with that noble sum- mary of the whole duty of man — " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength : and thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." According to Mr. Mivart's definition, the man who loves God and his neighbour, and, out of sheer love and affection for both, does all he can to please them, is, neverthe- less, destitute of a particle of real goodness. And it further happens that Mr. Darwin, who is charged by Mr. Mivart with being ignorant of the distinction between material and formal goodness, discusses the very question at issue in a passage which is well worth reading (vol. i. p. 87), and also comes to a conclusion opposed to Mr. Mivart's axiom. A proposition which has been so much disputed and repudiated, should, under no circum- stances, have been thus confidently assumed to be true. For myself, I utterly reject it, inasmuch as the logical consequence of the adoption of any such principle is the denial of all moral value to sympathy and affection. According to Mr. Mivart's axiom, the man who, seeing another struggling in the water, leaps in at the risk of his own life to save him, does that which is " destitute of the most incipient degree of real goodness," unless, as he strips off his coat, he says to himself, " Now, mind, I am going to do this because it is my duty and V MR. Darwin's critics 169 for no other reason ; " and the most beautiful character to which humanity can attain, that of the man who does good without thinking about it, be- cause he loves justice and mercy and is repelled by evil, has no claim on our moral approbation. The denial that a man acts morally because he does not think whether he does so or not, may be put upon the same footing as the denial of the title of an arithmetician to the calculating boy, because he did not know how he worked his sums. If man- kind ever generally accept and act upon Mr. Mivart's axiom, they will simply become a set of most unendurable prigs ; but they never have ac- cepted it, and I venture to hope that evolution has nothing so terrible in store for the human race. But if an action, the motive of which is nothing but affection or sympathy, may be deserving of moral approbation and really good, who that has ever had a dog of his own will deny that animals are capable of such actions ? Mr. Mivart indeed says : — " It may be safely affirmed, however, that there is no trace in brutes of any actions simulat- ing morality which are not explicable by the fear of punishment, by the hope of pleasure, or by per- sonal affection " (p. 221). But it may be affirmed, with equal truth, that there is no trace in men of any actions which are not traceable to the same motives. If a man does anything, he does it either because he fears to be punished if he does not do it, or because he hopes to obtain pleasure 170 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS V by doing it, or because he gratifies his affections^ by doing it. Assuming the position of the absolute moralists, let it be granted that there is a perception of right and wrong innate in every man. This means, simply, that when certain ideas are presented to his mind, the feeling of approbation arises ; and when certain others, the feeling of disapprobation. To do your duty is to earn the approbation of your conscience, or moral sense ; to fail in your duty is to feel its disapprobation, as we all say. Now, is approbation a pleasure or a pain ? Surely a pleasure. And is disapprobation a pleasure or a pain 1 Surely a pain. Consequently, all that is really meant by the absolute moralists is that there is, in the very nature of man, something which enables him to be conscious of these particular pleasures and pains. And when they talk of immut- able and eternal principles of morality, the only in- telligible sense which I can put upon the words, is that the nature of man being what it is, he always has been, and always will be, capable of feeling these particular pleasures and pains. A priori, I have nothing to say against this proposition. Admitting its truth, I do not see how the moral faculty is on a different footing from any of the other faculties of man. If I choose to say that it is an immutable ' In separating pleasure and the gratification of affection, I simply follow Mr. Mivart without admitting the justice of the separation. V ME. Darwin's critics 171 and eternal law of human nature that " ginger is hot in the mouth," the assertion has as much foundation of truth as the other, though I think it would be expressed in needlessly pompous language. I must confess that I have never been able to understand why there should be such a bitter quarrel between the intuitionists and the utilitarians. The intuitionist is, after all, only a utilitarian who believes that a particular class of pleasures and pains has an especial importance, by reason of its foundation in the nature of man, and its inseparable connection with his very existence as a thinking being. And as regards the motive of personal affection : Love, as Spinoza profoundly says, is the association of pleasure with that which is loved.^ Or, to put it to the common sense of mankind, is the gratification of affection a pleasure or a pain ? Surely a pleasure. So that whether the motive which leads us to perform an action is the love of our neighbour, or the love of God, it is undeniable that pleasure enters into that motive. Thus much in reply to Mr. Mivart's arguments. I cannot but think that it is to be regretted that he ekes them out by ascribing to the doctrines of the philosophers with whom he does not agree, logical consequences which have been over and over again proved not to flow from them : and when reason fails him, tries the effect of an injurious ^ " Nempe, Amor nihil aliud est, quam Lsetitia, concomitante idea causK externfe. " — Ethiees, HI. xiii. 172 MR. Darwin's critics v nickname. According to the views of Mr. Spencer, Mr. Mill, and Mr. Darwin, Mr. Mivart tells us, " virhie is a mere kind of retrieving : " and, that we may not miss the point of the joke, he puts it in italics. But what if it is ? Does that make it less virtue ? Suppose I say that sculp- ture is a " mere way " of stone-cutting, and painting a " mere way " of daubing canvas, and music a " mere way '' of making a noise, the statements are quite true ; but they only show that I see no other method of depreciating some of the noblest aspects of humanity than that of using language in an inadequate and misleading sense about them. And the peculiar inappro- priateness of this particular nickname to the views in question, arises from the circumstance which Mr. Mivart would doubtless have recollected, if his Avish to ridicule had not for the moment obscured his judgment — that whether the law of evolution applies to man or not, that of hereditary transmis- sion certainly does. Mr. Mivart will hardly deny that a man owes a large share of the moral tendencies which he exhibits to his ancestors ; and the man who inherits a desire to steal from a kleptomaniac, or a tendency to benevolence from a Howard, is, so far as he illustrates hereditary transmission, comparable to the dog who inherits the desire to fetch a duck out of the water from his retrieving sire. So that, evolution, or no evolution, moral qualities are comparable to a V MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 173 "kind of retrieving;" though the comparison, if meant for the purposes of casting obloquy on evolution, does not say much for the fairness of those who make it. The Quarterly Reviewer and Mr. Mivart base their objections to the evolution of the mental facul- ties of man from those of some lower animal form upon what they maintain to be a difference in kind between the mental and moral faculties of men and brutes ; and I have endeavoured to show, by exposing the utter unsoundness of their philosophical basis, that these objections are devoid of importance. The objections which Mr. Wallace brings for- ward to the doctrine of the evolution of the mental faculties of man from those of brutes by natural causes, are of a different order, and require separate consideration. If I understand him rightly, he by no means doubts that both the bodily and the mental facul- ties of man have been evolved from those of some lower animal ; but he is of opinion that some agency beyond that which has been con- cerned in the evolution of ordinary animals has been operative in the case of man. " A superior intelligence has guided the development of man in a definite direction and for a special purpose, just as man guides the development of many animal and vegetable forms." ^ I understand this ^- "The Limits of Natural Selection as applied to Man " {loc. cit. p. 359). 174 MR. daewin's critics V to mean that, just as the rock-iDigeon has been produced by natural causes, while the evolution of the tumbler from the blue rock has required the special intervention of the intelligence of man, so some anthropoid form may have been evolved by variation and natural selection ; but it could never liave given rise to man, unless some superior intel- ligence had played the part of the pigeon-fancier. According to Mr. Wallace, " whether we com- pare the savage with the higher developments of man, or with the brutes around him, we are alike driven to the conclusion, that, in his large and well-developed brain, he possesses an organ quite disproportioned to his requirements " (p. 343) ; and he asks, " What is there in the hfe of the savage but the satisfying of the cravings of ap- petite in the simplest and easiest way ? What thoughts, idea, or actions are there that raise him many grades above the elephant or the ape?" (p. 342.) I answer Mr. Wallace by citing a re- markable passage which occurs in his instructive paper on " Instinct in Man and Animals." "Savages make long journeys in many directions, and, their vhole faculties being directed to the subject, they gain a wide and accurate knowledge of the topography, not only of their own district, but of all the regions round about. Every one who has travelled in a new direction communicates his know- ledge to those who have travelled less, and descriptions of routes and localities, and minute incidents of travel, form one of the main staples of conversation around the evening fire. Every wanderer or captive from another tribe adds to the store of V MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 175 information, and, as the very existence of individuals and of whole families and tribes depends upon the completeness of this knowledge, all the acute perceptive faculties of the adult savage are directed to acquiring and perfecting it. The good hunter or warrior thus comes to know the bearing of every hill and moun- tain range, the directions and junctions of all the streams, the situation of each tract characterised by peculiar vegetation, not only within the area he has himself traversed, but perhaps for a hundred miles around it. His acute observation enables him to detect the slightest undulations of the surface, the various changes of subsoil and alterations in the character of the vegeta- tion that would be quite imperceptible to a stranger. His eye is always open to the direction in which he is going ; the mossy side of trees, the presence of certain plants under the shade of rocks, the morning and evening flight of birds, are to him indications of direction almost as sure as the sun in the heavens " (pp. 207, 208). I have seen enough of savages to be able to declare that nothing can be more admirable than this description of what a savage has to learn. But it is incomplete. Add to all this the know- ledge which a savage is obliged to gain of the properties of plants, of the characters and habits of animals, and of the minute indications by which their course is discoverable : consider that even an Australian can make excellent baskets and nets, and neatly fitted and beautifully balanced spears ; that he learns to use these so as to be able to transfix a quartern loaf at sixty yards ; and that very often, as in the case of the American Indians, the language of a savage exhibits complexities which a well-trained European finds it difficult to master : consider that every time a savage tracks 176 MR. Darwin's critics v his game he employs a minuteness of observation^ and an accuracy of inductive and deductive reason- ing which, applied to other matters, would assure some reputation to a man of science, and I think we need ask no further why he possesses such a fair supply of brains. In complexity and diflficulty, I should say that the intellectual labour of a " good hunter ur warrior " considerably exceeds that of an ordinary Englishman. The Civil Service Ex- aminers are held in great terror by young English- men ; but even their ferocity never tempted them to require a candidate to possess such a knowledge of a parish as Mr. Wallace justly points out savages may possess of an area a hundred miles or more in diameter. But suppose, for the sake of argument, that a savage has more brains than seems proportioned to his wants, all that can be said is that the objec- tion to natural selection, if it be one, applies quite as strongly to the lower animals. The brain of a porpoise is quite wonderful for its mass, and for the development of the cerebral convolutions. And yet since we have ceased to credit the story of Arion, it is hard to believe that porpoises are much troubled with intellect : and still more difficult is it to imagine that their big brains are only a pre- paration for the advent of sonae accomplished cetacean of the future. Surely, again, a wolf must have too much brains, or else how is it that a dog with only the same quantity and form of brain is V MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 177 able to develop such singular intelligence ? The wolf stands to the dog in the same relation as the savage to the man ; and, therefore, if Mr. Wallace's doctrine holds good, a higher power must have superintended the breeding up of wolves from some inferior stock, in order to . prepare them to become dogs. Mr. Wallace further maintains that the origin of some of man's mental faculties by the preserva- tion of useful variations is not possible. Such, for example, are " the capacity to form ideal con- ceptions of space and time, of eternity and infin- ity; the capacity for intense artistic feelings of pleasure in form, colour, and composition ; and for those abstract notions of form and number which render geometry and arithmetic possible." " How,'' he asks, " were all or any of these faculties first developed, when they could have been of no pos- sible use to man in his early stages of barbarism ? " Surely the answer is not far to seek. The lowest savages are as devoid of any such concep- tions as the brutes themselves. What sort of conceptions of space and time, of form and num- ber, can be possessed by a savage who has not got so far as to be able to count beyond five or six, who does not know how to draw a triangle or a circle, and has not the remotest notion of separating the particular quality we call form, from the other qualities of bodies ? None of these capacities are exhibited by men, unless they form part of a 178 MR. Darwin's critics v tolerably advanced society. And, in such a society, there are abundant conditions by which a selective influence is exerted in favour of those persons who exhibit an approximation towards the possession of these capacities. The savage who can amuse his fellows by telling a good story over the nightly fire, is held by them in esteem and rewarded, in one way or another, for so doing — in other words, it is an advantage to him to possess this power. He who can carve a paddle, or the figure-head of a canoe better, similarly profits beyond his duller neighbour. He who counts a little better than others, gets most yams when barter is going on, and forms the shrewdest estimate of the numbers of an opposing tribe. ^ The experience of daily life shows that the conditions of our present social existence exercise the most extraordinarily powerful selective influence in favour of novelists, artists, and strong intellects of all kinds ; and it seems unquestionable that all forms of social existence must have had the same tendency, if we consider the indisputable facts that even animals possess the power of distinguishing form and number, and that they are capable of deriving pleasure from particular forms and sounds. If we admit, as Mr. Wallace does, that the lowest savages are not raised " many grades above the elephant and the ape ; " and if we further admit, as I contend must be admitted, that the conditions of social life tend, powerfully, to V MB. DARWIN'S CRITICS 179 give an advantage to those individuals who vary in the direction of intellectual or aesthetic excellence, what is there to interfere with the belief that these higher faculties, like the rest, owe their development to natural selection ? Finally, with respect to the development of the moral sense out of the simple feelings of pleasure and pain, liking and disliking, with which the lower animals are provided, I can find nothing in Mr. Wallace's reasonings which has not already been met by Mr. Mill, Mr. Spencer, or Mr. Darwin, I do not propose to follow the Quarterly Reviewer and Mr. Mivart through the long string of objections in matters of detail which they bring against Mr. Darwin's views. Every one who has considered the matter carefully will be able to ferret out as many more " difficulties " ; but he will also, I believe, fail as completely as they appear to me to have done, in bringing forward any fact which is really contradictory of Mr. Darwin's views. Occasionally, too, their objections and criticisms are based upon errors of their own. As, for example, when Mr. Mivart and the Quarterly Reviewer insist upon the resemblances between the eyes of Cephalopoda and Verteirata, quite forgetting that there are striking and alto- gether fundamental differences between them ; or when the Quarterly Reviewer corrects Mr. Darwin 180 MR. Darwin's critics v for saying that the gibbons, " without having been taught, can walk or run upright with tolerable quickness, though they move awkwardly, and much less securely than man." The Quarterly Reviewer says, " This is a little misleading, inasmuch as it is not stated that this upright progression is effected by placing the enormously long arms behind the head, or holding them out backwards as a balance in progression." Now, before carping at a small statement like this, the Quarterly Reviewer should have made sure that he was quite right. But he happens to be quite wrong. I suspect he got his notion of the manner in which a gibbon walks from a citation in " Man's Place in Nature." But at that time I had not seen a gibbon walk. Since then I have, and I can testify that nothing can be more precise than Mr. Darwin's statement. The gibbon I saw walked without either putting his arms behind his head or holding them out backwards. All he did was to touch the ground with the outstretched ■fingers of his long arms now and then, just as one sees a man who carries a stick, but does not need one, touch the ground with it as he walks along. Again, a large number of the objections brought forward by Mr. Mivart and the Quarterly Reviewer apply to evolution in general, quite as much as to the particular form of that doctrine advocated by Mr. Darwin ; or, to their notions of Mr. Darwin's views and not to what they really are. An excel- V MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 181 lent example of this class of difficulties is to be found in Mr. Mivart's chapter on " Independent Similarities of Structure.'' Mr. Mivart says that these cannot be explained by an " absolute and pure Darwinian," but " that an innate power and evolutionary law, aided by the corrective action of natural selection, should have furnished like needs with like aids, is not at all improbable " (p. 82). I do not exactly know what Mr. Mivart means by an " absolute and pure Darwinian ; " indeed Mr. Mivart makes that creature hold so many smgular opinions that I doubt if I can ever have seen one alive. But I find nothing in his statement of the view which he imagines to be originated by himself, which is really inconsistent with what I understand to be Mr. Darwin's views. I apprehend that the foundation of the theory of natural selection is the fact that living bodies tend incessantly to vary. This variation is neither indefinite, nor fortuitous, nor does it take place in all directions, in the strict sense of these words. Accurately speaking, it is not indefinite, nor does it take place in all directions, because it is limited by the general characters of the type to which the organism exhibiting the variation belongs. A whale does not tend to vary in the direction of producing feathers, nor a bird in the direction of developing whalebone. In popular language there is no harm in saying that the 182 MK. daewin's critics V waves which break upon the sea-shore are inde- finite, fortuitous, and break in all directions. In scientific language, on the contrary, such a state- ment would be a gross error, inasmuch as every particle of foam is the result of perfectly definite forces, operating according to no less definite laws. In like manner, every variation of a living form, however minute, however apparently accidental, is inconceivable except as the expression of the operation of molecular forces or " powers " resident within the organism. And, as these forces certainly operate according to definite laws, their general result is, doubtless, in accordance with some general law which subsumes them all. And there appears to be no objection to call this an "evolutionary law." But nobody is the wiser for doing so, or has thereby contributed, in the least degree, to the advance of the doctrine of evolution, the great need of which is a theory of variation. When Mr. Mivart tells us that his "aim has been to support the doctrine that these specTes have been evolved by ordinary natural laws (for the most part unknown), aided by the subordinate action of ' natural selection ' " (pp. 332-3), he seems to be of opinion that his enterprise has the merit of novelty. All I can say is that I have never had the slightest notion that Mr. Darwin's aim is in any way different from this. If I affirm that " species have been evolved by variation ^ (a natural ' Including under this head hereditary transmission. V MB. darwin's critics 183 process, the laws of which are for the most part unknown), aided by the subordinate action of natural selection," it seems to me that I enunciate a proposition which constitutes the very pith and marrow of the first edition of the " Origin of Species." And what the evolutionist stands in need of just now, is not an iteration of the funda- mental principle of Darwinism, but some light upon the questions, What are the limits of varia- tion ? and, If a variety has arisen, can that variety be perpetuated, or even intensified, when selective conditions are indifferent, or perhaps unfavourable to its existence ? I cannot find that Mr. Darwin has ever been very dogmatic in answering these questions. Formerly, he seems to have inclined to reply to them in the negative, while now his inclination is the other way. Leaving aside those broad questions of theology, philosophy, and ethics, by the discussion of which neither the Quarterly Reviewer nor Mr. Mivart can be said to have damaged Darwinism — whatever else they have injured — this is what their criticisms come to. They confound a struggle for some rifle-pits with an assault on the fortress. In some respects, finally, I can only characterise the Quarterly Reviewer's treatment of Mr. Darwin as alike unjust and unbecoming. Language of this strength requires justification, and on that ground I add the remarks which follow. The Quarterly Reviewer opens his essay by a 41 184 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS V careful enumeration of all those points upon which, during the course of thirteen years of incessant labour, Mr. Darwin has modified his opinions. It has often and justly been remarked, that what strikes a candid student of Mr. Darwin's works is not so much his industry, his knowledge, or even the surprising fertility of his inventive genius ; but that unswerving truthfulness and honesty which never permit him to hide a weak place, or gloss over a difficulty, but lead him, on all occa- sions, to point out the weak places in his own armour, and even sometimes, it appears to me, to make admissions against himself which are quite unnecessary. A critic who desires to attack Mr, Darwin has only to read his works with a desire to observe, not their merits, but their defects, and he will find, ready to hand, more adverse suggestions than are likely ever to have suggested themselves to his own sharpness, without Mr. Darwin's self- denying aid. Now this quality of scientific candour is not so common that it needs to be discouraged ; and it appears to me to deserve other treatment than that adopted by the Quarterly Reviewer, who deals with Mr. Darwin as an Old Bailey barrister deals with a man against whom he wishes to obtain a conviction, per fas aut nefas, and opens his case by endeavouring to create a prejudice against the prisoner in the minds of the jury. In his eager- ness to carry out this laudable design, the Quarterly V MR. Darwin's critics 185 Reviewer cannot even state the history of the doctrine of natural selection without an oblique and entirely unjustifiable attempt to depreciate Mr. Darwin. " To Mr. Darwin," says he, " and (through Mr. Wallace's reticence) to Mr. Darwin alone, is due the credit of having first brought it prominently forward and demonstrated its truth.'' No one can less desire than I do, to throw a doubt upon Mr. Wallace's originality, or to qiiestiou his claim to the honour of being one of the originators of the doctrine of natural selection ; but the state- ment that Mr. Darwin has the sole credit of originating the doctrine because of Mr. Wallace's reticence is simply ridiculous. The proof of this is, in the first place, afforded by Mr. Wallace him- self, whose noble freedom from petty jealousy in this matter smaller folk would do well to imitate, and who writes thus : — " I have felt all my life, and I still feel, the most sincere satisfaction that Mr. Darwin had been at work long before me and that it was not left for me to attempt to write the ' Origin of Species.' I have long since measured my own strength, and know well that it would be quite unequal to that task.'' So that if there was any reticence at all in the matter, it was Mr. Darwin's reticence during the long twenty years of study which intervened between the con- ception and the publication of his theory, which gave Mr. Wallace the chance of being an indepen- dent discoverer of the importance of natural 186 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS v selection. And, finally, if it be recollected that Mr. Darwin's and Mr. Wallace's essays were published simultaneously in the " Journal of the Linnsean Society " for 1858, it follows that the Reviewer, while obliquely depreciating Mr. Dar- win's deserts, has in reality awarded to him a priority which, in legal strictness, does not exist. Mr. Mivart, whose opinions so often concur with those of the Quarterly Reviewer, puts the case in a way, which I much regret to be obliged to say, is, in my judgment, quite as incorrect ; though the injustice may be less glaring. He says that the theory of natural selection is, in general, ex- clusively associated with the name of Mr. Darwin, " on account of the noble self-abnegation of Mr. Wallace." As I have said, no one can honour Mr. Wallace more than I do, both for what he has done and for what he has not done, in his relation to Mr. Darwin. And perhaps nothing is more creditable to him than his frank declaration that he could not have written such a work as the " Origin of Species." But, by this declaration, the person most directly interested in the matter re- pudiates, by anticipation, Mr. Mivart's suggestion that Mr. Darwin's eminence is more or less due to Mr. Wallace's modesty. VI EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY [1878] In the former lialf of the eighteenth century, the term " evolution " was introduced into biological writings, in order to denote the mode in which some of the most eminent physiologists of that time conceived that the generations of living things took place ; in opposition to the hypothesis advocated, in the preceding century, by Harvey in that re- markable work ^ which would give him a claim to rank among the founders of biological science, even had he not been the discoverer of the circulation of the blood. One of Harvey's prime objects is to defend and establish, on the basis of direct observation, the opinion already held by Aristotle ; that, in the higher animals at any rate, the formation of the * The Exercitationes de Generatione Animalium, which Dr George Ent extracted from him and published in 1651. 188 EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY VI new organism by the process of generation takes place, not suddenly, by simultaneous accretion of rudiments of all, or of the most important, of the organs of the adult ; nor by sudden metamorphosis of a formative substance into a miniature of the whole, which subsequently grows ; but by cpigencsis, or successive differentiation of a relatively homo- geneous rudiment into the parts and structures which are characteristic of the adult. " Et prim6, quidem, quoniam per epigenesin sive partium superexorientimn additanientum pullum fabricari certum est : queenam pars ante alias omnes exstruatur, et quid de ilia ejusque generandi modo observandum veniat, dispiciemus. Ratum sane est et in ovo manifeste apparet quod Aristoteles de perfectorum aninialium generationc enuntiat : niminim, non omnes partes simul fieri, sed ordine aliam post aliam ; primumque existere particulam genitalem, cujus virtute postea (tanquam ex principio quodam) reliquaj omnes partes prosiliant. Qualem in plantarum seminibus (fabis, puta, aut glandibus) gemmam sive apicem pro- tuberantem cernimus, totius futurse arboris principium. Estque Juxc particiUa vclut films cinan-cipatus seorsumqiic collocatus, et principmm per sc vivcns ; uncle postea membrorum ordo describ- itur ; el qiiceatnqite ad absolvcndiom animal pertinent, dispon- untur.^ Cluon\a.n\ cvixm. nulla pars se ipsain generat ; sed post- qiiam gcneraia est, sc ipsain jam auget ; ideo cam primuvi oriri neccsse est, qucB principium augendi contineat {sive enim planta, sive animal est, ceque omnibus inest quod vim, habcat vegetandi, sive mUricndi),' simulque reliquas omnes partes sue quamque ordine distinguat et formet ; proindeque in eadem primogenita particula anima primario inest, sensus, motusque, et totius vitae auctor et principium." (Exercitatio 51.) ^ De Generatione Animalium, lib. ii. cap. i. ^ De Generationc, lib. ii, cap. iv. VT EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY 189 Harvey proceeds to contrast this view with that of the " Medici," or followers of Hippocrates and Galen, who, " badly philosophising," imagined that the brain, the heart, and the liver were simul- taneously first generated in the form of vesicles ; and, at the same time, while expressing his agreement with Aristotle in the principle of epi- genesis, he maintains that it is the blood which is the primal generative part, and not, as Aristotle thought, the heart. In the latter part of the seventeenth century, the doctrine of epigenesis, thus advocated by Harvey, was controverted, on the ground of direct observation, by Malpighi, who affirmed that the body of the chick is to be seen in the ^g'g, before the 'puiidum sanguineum makes it appearance. But, from this perfectly correct observation a con- clusion which is by no means warranted was drawn ; namely, that the chick, as a whole, really exists in the egg antecedently to incubation ; and that what happens in the course of the latter process is no addition of new parts, " alias post alias natas," as Harvey puts it, but a simple expansion, or unfold- ing, of the organs which already exist, though they are too small and inconspicuous to be discovered. The weight of Malpighi's observations therefore fell into the scale of that doctrine which Harvey terms metamooyhosis, in contradistinction to epi- genesis. The views of Malphigi were warmly welcomed, 190 EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY vi on philosophical grounds, by Leibnitz/ who found in them a support to his hypothesis of monads, and by Malebranche ; ^ while, in the middle of the eighteenth century, not only speculative consider- ations, but a great number of new and interesting observations on the phenomena of generation, led the ingenious Bonnet, and Haller,^ the first physi- ologist of the age, to adopt, advocate, and extend them. * "Cependant, pour revenir aux formes ordinaires ou aux ames materielles, cettc duree qu'il leur faut attiibuer a la place de celle qu'on avoit attribuee aux atonies pouiroit faire douter si elles ne vont pas de corps en corps ; ce qui seroit la me- tempsychose, a peu pres comme quelques philosophes out cru la transmission du mouvemont et celle des especes. Mais cette imagination est bien eloignee de la nature des choses. II n'y a point de tel passage ; et c'est ici ou les transformations de Messieurs Swammerdam, Malpighi, et Leewenhoek, qui sent des x>lus excellens observateurs de notre tems, sont venues k mon secours, et m'ont fait admettre plus aisement, que I'animal, et toute autre substance organisee ne commence point lorsque nous Ic croyons, et que sa generation apparente n'est qu'iine de- veloppement et une espece d'augmentation. Aussi ai je remarque que i'auteur de la Recherche de la Verit4, M. Regis, M. Hart- soeker, et d'autres liabiles h.ommes n'ont pas ete fort eloignes de ce sentiment." Leibnitz, Sysihnc Nouvcau de la Nature, 1695. The doctrine of " Emboitement " is contained in the Considirations sur le Principe de Vie, 1705 ; the preface to the Theodicee, 1710 ; and the Principcs de la Nature et dc la Grace (§ 6), 1718. - "11 est vrai que la pensee la plus raisonnable et la plus conforme a Fexperience sur cette c^uestion tres difficile de la formation du foetus ; c'est que les enfans sont deja presque tout formes avant meme Taction par laquelle ils sont census ; et que leurs meres ne font que leur donner I'accroissement ordinaire dans le temps de la grossesse. " De la Recherche de la Verit6, livre ii. chap. vii. p. 334, 7th ed., 1721. ^ The writer is indebted to Dr. Allen Thomson for reference to the evidence contained in a note to Haller's edition of Boer- haave's Proilectioius Academiccs, vol. v. pt. ii. p. 497, published in 1744, that Haller originally advocated epigenesis. VI EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY 191 Bonnet affirms that, before fecundation, the hen's egg contains an excessively minute but complete chick ; and that fecundation and incubation simply cause this germ to absorb nutritious matters, which are deposited in the interstices of the elementary structures of which the miniature chick, or germ, is made up. The consequence of this intussuscep- tive growth is the " development " or " evolution '' of the germ into the visible bird. Thus an organ- ised individual (toiit organist) " is a composite body consisting of the original, or elementary, parts and of the matters which have been associated with them by the aid of nutrition ; " so that, if these matters could be extracted from the individual (tout), it would, so to speak, become concentrated in a point, and would thus be restored to its primitive condition of a germ ; "just as by extract- ing from a bone the calcareous substance which is the source of its hardness, it is reduced to its primitive state of gristle or membrane." ^ " Evolution " and " development " are, for Bonnet, synonymous terms ; and since by " evolu- tion " he means simply the expansion of that which was invisible into visibility, he was natur- ally led to the conclusion, at which Leibnitz had arrived by a different line of reasoning, that no such thing as generation, in the proper sense of the word, exists in Nature. The growth of an * Considerations sur les Corps organises, chap. Xi 192 EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY VI organic being is simply a process of enlargement as a particle of dry gelatine may be swelled up by the intussusception of water; its death is a shrinkage, such as the swelled jelly might undergo on desiccation. Nothing really new is produced in the living world, but the germs which develop have existed since the beginning of things ; and nothing really dies, but, when what we call death takes place, the living thing shrinks back into its germ state.'^ The two parts of Bonnet's hypothesis, namely, the doctrine that all living things proceed from pre-existing germs, and that these contain, one ^ Bonnet had the courage of his opinions, and in the Palinginisic Fhilosophique, part vi. chap, iv., he develops a. hypothesis which he terms "Evolution naturelle ; " and which, making allowance for hfs peculiar views of the nature of generation, bears no small resemblance to what is understood by " evolution " at the present day : — " Si la volonte divine a cree par un seul Acte 1' Universalite des etres, d'ou venoient ces plantes et ces animaux dont Moyse nous decrit la Production au troisieme et au cinquieme jour du renouvcllement de notre monde ? " Abuserois-je de la liberte de conjectures si je disois, que les Plantes et les Animaux qui existent aujourd'hui sont parvenus par une sorte d'evolution naturelle des Etres organises qui peuplaient ce premier Monde, sorti immediatement des Mains du Createur ? . . . ' ' Ne supposons que trois revolutions. La Terre vient de sortir des Mains du Createur. Des causes preparees par sa Sagesse font developper de toutes parts les Gernies. Les Etres organises commencent a jouir de I'existence. lis etoient probablement alors bien differens de ce qu'ils sont aujourd'hui. lis I'etoient autant que ce premier Monde differoit de cf lui que nous habitons. Nous manquons de moyens pour juger de ces dissemblances, et peut-etre que le plus habile Naturaliste qui auroit ete ]'lace dans ce premier Monde y auroit entierement meconnu nos Plantes et nos Animaux." VI EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY 193 inclosed within the other, the gerntis of all future living things, which is the hypothesis of " emhoite- ment ; " and the doctrine that every germ contains in miniature all the organs of the adult, which is the hypothesis of evolution or development, in the primary senses of these words, must be carefully distinguished. In fact, while holding firmly by the former. Bonnet more or less modified the latter in his later writings, and, at length, he admits that a " germ " need not be an actual miniature of the organism ; but that it may be merely an " original preformation " capable of producing the latter.^ But, thus defined, the germ is neither more nor less than the " particula genitalis " of Aristotle, or the " primordium vegetale " or " ovum " of Harvey; and the "evolution" of such a germ would not be distinguishable from " epigenesis." Supported by the great axithority of Haller, the doctrine of evolution, or development, prevailed throughout the whole of the eighteenth century, and Cuvier appears to have substantially adopted Bonnet's later views, though probably he would not have gone all lengths in the direction of " emboitement." In a well-known note to Laurillard's " filoge," prefixed to the last edition ^ "Ce mot (germe) ne designera pas seulement un corps organise riduit en ■petit ; il designera encore toute espece (^L^pri- formation onginelle dont un Toitt organique peut resuUcr comme de sonprincipe immediat." — PalingiTtAsio Philosophiqxoe, part x. chap. ii. 194 EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY vi of the " Ossemens fossiles," the " radical de I'etre " is much the same thing as Aristotle's " particula genitalis " and Harvey's " ovum." ^ Bonnet's eminent contemporary, Buffon, held nearly the same views with respect to the nature of the germ, and expresses them even more con- fidently. " Ccux qui ontcru que le ccBur etoit le premier form^ se sont trompes ; ceux qui disent que c'est le sang se trompent aussi : tout est forme en meme temps. Si Ton ne consulte que I'obser- vation, Ic poulet se voit dans I'ceuf avant qu'il ait ete couve." ^ "J'ai ouvert une grande quantite d'ceufs k differens temps avant et apres I'incubation, et je me suis convaincu par mes yeux que le poulet existe en entier dans le milieu de la cicatricule au moment qu'il sort du corps de la poule." ^ The " moule interieur " of Buffon is the aggre- gate of elementary parts which const,'.tute the individual, and is thus the equivalent of Bonnet's germ,* as defined in the passage cited above. But Buffon further imagined that innumerable " molecules organiques " are dispersed throughout the world, and that alimentation consists in the ^ "M. Cuvier considerant que tous les etres organises sont derives de parens, et ne voj^ant dans la nature aucune force capable de produire I'organisation, croyait a la pre-existence des germes ; non pas a la pre-existence d'un etre tout forme, puisqu'il est bien evident que ce n'estque par des developpemens successifs que I'etre acquiert sa forme ; mais, si Ton peut s'exprimer ainsi, a la pre-existence du radical de I'Ure, radical qui existe avant que la serie des evolutions ne commence, et qui remonte certainement, suivant la belle observation de Bonnet, a plusieurs generations." — Laurillard, Eloqc de Cuvier, note 12. ^ Histoire Nalurellc, tom. ii. ed. ii. 1750, p. 350. 8 Ibid., p. 351. * See particularly Buffon, I.e. p. 41. VI EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY 195 appropriation by the parts of an organism of those molecules which are analogous to them. Growth, therefore, was, on this hypothesis, a process partly of simple evolution, and partly of what has been termed "syngenesis." Buffon's opinion is, in fact, a sort of combination of views, essentially similar to those of Bonnet, with others, somewhat similar to those of the " Medici " whom Harvey condemns. The " molecules organiques " are physical equivalents of Leibnitz's " monads." It is a striking example of the difficulty of getting people to use their own powers of investiga- tion accurately, that this form of the doctrine of evolution should have held its ground so long ; for it was thoroughly and completely exploded, not long after its enunciation, by Casper Friederich Wolff, who in his " Theoria Generationis," pub- lished in 1759, placed the opposite theory of epigenesis upon the secure foundation of fact, from which it has never been displaced. But Wolff had no immediate successors. The school of Cuvier was lamentably deficient in embryo- logists ; and it was only in the course of the first thirty years of the present century, that Provost and Dumas in France, and, later on, Dollinger, Pander, "Von Bar, Rathke, and Remak in Germany, founded modern embryology ; while, at the same time, they proved the utter incompatibility of the hypothesis of evolution, as formulated by Bonnet and Haller, with easily demonstrable facts. 196 EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY VI Nevertheless, though the conceptions originally denoted by " evolution " and " development " were shown to be untenable, the words retained their application to the process by which the embryos of living beings gradually make their appearance ; and the terms " Development," " Entwickelung," and " Evolutio," are now indiscriminately used for the series of genetic changes exhibited by living beings, by writers who would emphatically deny that " Development " or " Entwickelung " or "Evolutio," in the sense in which these words were usually employed by Bonnet or by Haller, ever occurs. Evolution, or development, is, in fact, at present employed in biology as a general name for the history of the steps by which any living being has acquired the morphological and the physiological characters which distinguish it. As civil history may be divided into biography, which is the history of individuals, and universal history, which is the history of the human race, so evolution falls naturally into two categories — the evolution of the individual, and the evolution of the sum of living beings. It will be convenient to deal with the modern doctrine of evolution under these two heads. I. The Evolution of the Indimdital. No exception is at this time, known to the general law, established upon an immense multi- tude of direct observations, that every living thing VI EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY 197 is evolved from a particle of matter in which no trace of the distinctive characters of the adult form of that living thing is discernible. This particle is termed a germ. Harvey^ says — ■ "Omnibus viventibus primordium insit, ex quo et a quo pro- veniant. \Ac&a.th.ocnohiii primordium vcgetalavi.Qjmna.vt ; nempe substantiam quandam corpoream vitam habentem potentia ; vel quoJdam per se existens, quod aptum sit, in vegetativani formam, ab interno principio operante, mutari. Quale nempe primordium, ovum est et plantarum semen ; tale etiam vivi- parorum conceptus, et insectorum vermis ab Aristotele dictus : diversa scilicet diversorum viventium primordia. " The definition of a germ, as " matter potentially alive, and having within itself the tendency to assume a definite living form," appears to meet all the requirements of modern science. For, notwithstanding it might be justly questioned whether a germ is not merely potentially, but rather actually, alive, though its vital manifesta- tions are reduced to a minimum, the term " potential " may fairly be used in a sense broad enough to escape the objection. And the quali- fication of " potential " has the advantage of reminding us that the great characteristic of the germ is not so much what it is, but what it may, under suitable conditions, become. Harvey shared the belief of Aristotle — whose writings he so often quotes and of whom he speaks as his ^ Exereitationes de Generatiorie. Ex. 62, "Ovum esse primordium commune omnibus animalibus." 198 EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY TI precursor and model, with the generous respect with which one genuine worker should regard another — that such germs may arise by a process of " equivocal generation " out of not-living matter ; and the aphorism so commonly ascribed to him, " omnc vivum ex ovo" and which is indeed a fair summary of his reiterated assertions, though incessantly employed against the modem advo- cates of spontaneous generation, can be honestly so used only by those who have never read a score of pages of the " Exercitationes." Harvey, in fact, believed as implicitly as Aristotle did in the equivocal generation of the lower animals. But, while the course of modern investigation has only brought out into greater prominence the accuracy of Harvey's conception of the nature and mode of development of germs, it has as distinctly tended to disprove the occurrence of equivocal generation, or abiogenesis, in the present course of nature. In the immense majority of both plants and animals, it is certain that the germ is not merely a body in which life is dormant or potential, but that it is itself simply a detached portion of the substance of a pre-existing living body ; and the evidence has yet to be adduced which will satisfy any cautious reasoner that " omne vivum ex vivo " is not as well-established a law of the existing course of nature as " omne vivum ex ovo." In all instances which have yet been investi- VI EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY 199 gated, the substance of this germ has a peculiar chemical composition, consisting of at fewest four elementary bodies, viz., carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, united into the ill-defined compound known as protein, and associated with much water, and very generally, if not always, with sulphur and phosphorus in minute proportions. Moreover, up to the present time, protein is known only as a product and constituent of living matter. Again, a true germ is either devoid of any structure discernible by optical means, or, at most, it is a simple nucleated cell.^ In all cases the process of evolution consists in a succession of changes of the form, structure, and functions of the germ, by which it passes, step by step, from an extreme simplicity, or rela- tive homogeneity, of visible structure, to a greater or less degree of complexity or heterogeneity ; and the course of progressive differentiation is usually accompanied by growth, which is effected by intussusception. This intussusception, how- ever, is a very different process from that imagined either by Buffon or by Bonnet. The substance by the addition of which the germ is enlarged is in no case simply absorbed, ready-made, from the not-living world and packed between the elemen- tary constituents of the germ, as Bonnet imagined; ^ In some cases of sexless multiplication the germ is a cell- nggretjate — if we call germ only that which is already detached from the parent organism. 42 200 EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY VI still less does it consist of the " molecules or- ganiques " of Buffon. The new material is, in great measure, not only absorbed but assimilated, so that it becomes part and parcel of the molecular structure of the living body into which it enters. And, so far from the fully developed organism being simply the germ plus the nutriment which it has absorbed, it is probable that the adult con- tains neither in form, nor in substance, more than an inappreciable fraction of the constituents of the germ, and that it is almost, if not wholly, made up of assimilated and metamorphosed nutriment. In the great majority of cases, at any rate, the full-grown organism becomes what it is by the absorption of not -living matter, and its conversion into living matter of a specific type. As Harvey says (Ex. 45), all parts of the body are nourished " ab eodem succo alibili, aliter aliterque cambiato," " ut planta; omnes ex eodem communi nutrimento (sive rore seu terrse humore)." In all animals and plants above the lowest the germ is a nucleated cell, using that term in its broadest sense ; and the first step in the process of the evolution of the individual is the division of this cell into two or more portions. The pro- cess of division is repeated, until the organism, from being unicellular, bc^comes multicellular. The single cell becomes a cell-aggregate ; and it is to the growth and metamorphosis of the cells TI EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY 201 of the cell-aggregate thus produced, that all the organs and tissues of the adult owe their origin. In certain animals belonging to every one of the chief groups into which the Metazoa are divisible, the cells of the cell-aggregate which results from the process of yelk-division, and which is termed a morula, diverge from one another in such a manner as to give rise to a central space, around which they dispose them- selves as a coat or envelope ; and thus the morula becomes a vesicle filled with fluid, the planula. The wall of the planula is next pushed in on one side, or invaginated, whereby it is converted into a double-walled sac with an opening, the hlasto- porc, which leads into the cavity lined by the inner wall. This cavity is the primitive alimen- tary cavity or archenteron ; the inner or inva- ginated layer is the hypoUast ; the outer the cpihlast ; and the embryo, in this stage, is termed a gastrula. In all the higher animals a layer of cells makes its appearance between the hypoblast and the epiblast, and is termed the viesohlast. In the further course of development the epiblast becomes the ectoderm, or epidermic layer of the body ; the hypoblast becomes the epithelium of the middle portion of the alimentary canal ; and the mesoblast gives rise to all the other tissues, except the central nervous system, which origin- ates from an ingrowth of the epiblast. With more or less modification in detail, the 202 EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY VI embryo lias been observed to pass through these successive evolutional stages in sundry Sponges, Coelenterates, Worms, Echinoderms, Tunicates, Arthropods, Mollusks, and Vertebrates ; and there are valid reasons for the belief that all animals of higher organisation than the Protozoa agree in the general character of the early stages of their indi- vidual evolution. Each, starting from the condition of a simple nucleated cell, becomes a cell-aggregate ; and this passes through a condition which re- presents the gastrula stage, before taking on the features distinctive of the group to which it belongs. Stated in this form, the " gastroea theory " of Haeckel appears to the present writer to be one of most important and best founded of recent general- isations. So far as individual plants and animals are concerned, therefore, evolution is not a specu- lation but a fact ; and it takes place by epigenesis. "Animal. . . per cyzfccwesm procreatiir, materiam simul attra- hit, parat, concoquit, et eadem utitur ; formatur simul et augetur . . . primum futuri corporis concrementum . . . prout augotur, diviJitur sensirn et distinguitur in partes, non simul omnes, sed alias post alias natas, et ordine quasque suo emergentes." ^ In these words, by the divination of genius, Harvey, in the seventeenth century, summed up the outcome of the work of all those who, with appliances he could not dream Df, are continuing his labours in the nineteenth century. ^ Harvey, Excrcitationes dc Gciicratione. Ex. 45, "Quoeuam sit pulli materia et quomodo fiat in Ovo. " YI EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY 203 Nevertheless, though the doctrine of epigenesis, as understood by Harvey, has definitively triumphed over the doctrine of evolution, as understood by his opponents of the eighteenth century, it is not impossible that, when the analysis of the process of development is carried still further, and the origin of the molecular components of the physically gross, though sensibly minute, bodies ■which we term germs is traced, the theory of de- velopment will approach more nearly to meta- morphosis than to epigenesis. Harvey thought that impregnation influenced the female organism as a contagion ; and that the blood, which he con- ceived to be the first rudiment of the germ, arose in the clear fluid of the " colliquamentum " of the ovum by a process of concrescence, as a sort of living precipitate. We now know, on the contrary, that the female germ or ovum, in all the higher animals and plants, is a body which possesses the structure of a nucleated cell; that impregnation consists in the fusion of the substance ^ of another more or less modified nucleated cell, the male germ, with the ovum ; and that the structural com- ponents of the body of the embryo are all derived, by a process of division, from the coalesced male and female germs. Hence it is conceivable, and indeed probable, that every part of the adult con- tains molecules, derived both from the male and 1 [At any rate of the nuclei of the two germ-cells. 1893]. 204 EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY vi from the female parent ; and that, regarded as a mass of molecules, the entire organism may be com- pared to a web of which the warp is derived from the female and the woof from the male. And each of these may constitute one individuality, in the same sense as the whole organism is one individual, al- thousfh the matter of the orcranism has been con- stantly changing. The primitive male and female molecules may play the part of Buffon's "monies organiques," and mould the assimilated nutriment, each according to its own type, into innumerable new molecules. From this point of view the process, which, in its superficial aspect, is epigenesis, appears in essence, to be evolution, in the modified sense adopted in Bonnet's later writings; and develop- ment is merely the expansion of a potential organ- ism or " original preformation " according to fixed laws. II. The Evolution of the Sum of Living Beings. The notion that all the kinds of animals and plants may have come into existence by the growth and modification of primordial germs is as old as speculative thought ; but the modern scientific form of the doctrine can be traced historically to the influence of several converging lines of philo- sophical speculation and of physical observation, none of which go farther back than the seven- teenth century. These are : — VI EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY 205 1. The enunciation by Descartes of the concep- tion that the physical universe, whether living or not living, is a mechanism, and that, as such, it is explicable on physical principles. 2. The observation of the gradations of struc- ture, from extreme simplicity to very great com- plexity, presented by living things, and of the relation of these graduated forms to one another. 3. The observation of the existence of an anal- ogy between the series of gradations presented by the species which compose any great group of animals or plants, and the series of embryonic conditions of the highest members of that group. 4. The observation that large groups of species of widely different habits present the same funda- mental plan of structure ; and that parts of the same animal or plant, the functions of which are very different, likewise exhibit modifications of a common plan. 5. The observation of the existence of structures, in a rudimentary and apparently useless condition, in one species of a group, which are fully devel- oped and have definite functions in other species of the same group. 6. The observation of the effects of varying conditions in modifying living organisms. 7. The observation of the facts of geographical distribution. 8. The observation of the facts of the geological succession of the forms of life. 206 EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY VI 1. Notwithstanding the elaborate disguise which fear of the powers that were led Descartes to throw over his real opinions, it is impossible to read the " Principes de la Philosophie " without acquiring the conviction that this great philosopher held that the physical world and all things in it, whether living or not living, have originated by a process of evolution, due to the continuous opera- tion of purely physical causes, out of a primitive relatively formless matter.^ The following passage is especially instructive : — " Et tant s'eu faut que je veuille que Ton croie toutes les choses que j'ecrirai, que meme je pretends en proposer ici quelques unes que je crois absolument etre fausses ; h savoir, je ne doute point quo le men Je n'ait ete cree au commencement avec autaut de perfection qu'il en a ; en sorte que le soleil, la terre, la lune, et les ctoiles out ete des lors ; et que la terre n'a pas eu seulement en soi les semences dcs plautes, mais quo les plantes meme en ont couvert une partie ; et qu' Adam et Eve n'ont pas ete crees enfans mais en age d'liommes parfaits. La religion cliretienne veut que nous le croyons ainsi, et la raison naturelle nous persuade entierement cette verite ; car si nous considerons la toute puis- sance de Dieu, nous Jevons juger que tout ce qu'il a fait a eu des le commencement toute la perfection qu'il devoit avoir. Mais neanmoins, comme on connOitroit beaucoup mieux quelle a ete la nature d'Adam et celle des arbres de Paradis si on avoit examine comment les enfants se forment peu kpeu dans le ventre de leurs meres et comment les plantes sortent de leurs semences, que si on avoit seulement considere quels ils ont ete quand Dieu les a crees : tout de meme, nous ferons mieux entendre quelle est •* As Bufllbn has well said : — " L'idee de ramener I'explication de tons les phenomenes h des principes mecaniques est assure- ment grande et belle, ce pas eat le plus liardi qu'on peut faixe eu pkilosophie, etc'est Descartes qui I'a fait." — I.e. p. 50. VI EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY 207 generalement la nature de toutes les choses qui sontau monde si nous pouvons imaginer quelqnes principes qui soient fort intelli- gibles et fort simples, desquels nous puissions voir clairement que les astres et la terra et enfin tout ce monde visible auroit pu etre produit ainsi que de quelques semences (bien que nous sachions qu'il n'a pas ete produit en cette fa^on) que si nous la decrivions seulement comme il est, ou bien comme nous croyons qu'il a ete cree. Et parceque je pense avoir trouve des principes qui sont tels, je tacherai ici de les expliquer. " ^ If we read between the lines of this singular exhibition of force of one kind and weakness of another, it is clear that Descartes believed that he had divined the mode in which the physical uni- verse had been evolved ; and the " Traite de I'Homrae," and the essay " Sur les Passions " afford abundant additional evidence that he sought for, and thought he had found, an explanation of the phenomena of physical life by deduction from purely physical laws. Spinoza abounds in the same sense, and is as usual perfectly candid — " Naturae leges, et regulae, secundum quas omnia fiunt et ex unis formis in alias mutantur, sunt ubique et semper eadem." ^ Leibnitz's doctrine of continuity necessarily led him in the same direction ; and, of the infinite multitude of monads with which he peopled the world, each is supposed to be the focus of an end- less process of evolution and involution. In the * Principes ch la PJdlosophi'; Troisieme partic, § 45. ^ Khiccs, Pars tertia, Traifatio. 208 EVOLUTION IN EIOLOGY VI " ProtogJBa," xxvi., Leibnitz distinctly suggests tlie mutability of species — " Alii mirantur in saxis passim species videri quas vel in orbe cognito, vel saltern in vicinis locis frustra quteras. ' Ita Cornua Ammonis,' qiife ex nautilorum numero habeantur, passim et forma et magnitudine (nam et pedali diametro aliquando reperiun- tur) ab omnibus illis naturis discrepare dicunt, quas prtebct mare. Sed quis absconditos ejus recessus aut subterraneas abyssos per- vestigavit 1 quam multa nobis animalia antea ignota otfert nevus orbis ? Et credibile est per magnas illas conversiones etiani animalium species plurimum immutatas." Thus, in the end of the seventeenth century, the seed was sown which has, at intervals, brought forth recurrent crops of evolutional hypotheses, based, more or less completely, on general reasonings. Among the earliest of these speculations is that put forward by Benoit de Maillet in his " Telliamed," which, though printed in 1735, was not published until twenty-three years later. Considering that this book was written before the time of Haller, or Bonnet, or Linnaeus, or Hutton, it surely deserves more respectful consideration than it usually receives. For De Maillet not only has a definite conception of the plasticity of living things, and of the production of existing species by the modification of their predecessors ; but he clearly apprehends the cardinal maxim of modern geological science, that the explanation of the structure of the globe is to be sought in the VI EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY 20!) deductive application to geological phenomena of the principles established inductively by the study of the present course of nature. Somewhat later, Maupertuis^ suggested a curious hypothesis as to the causes of variation, which he thinks may be sufficient to account for the origin of all animals from a single pair. Robinet ^ followed out much the same line of thought as De Maillet, but less soberly ; and Bonnet's speculations in the " Paling- ^nesie," which appeared in 17G9, have already been mentioned. Buffon (1753 1778), at first a partisan of the absolute immutability of species, subsequently appears to have believed that larger or smaller groups of species have been produced by the modification of a primitive stock ; but ho contributed nothing to the general doctrine of evolution. Erasmus Darwin ("Zoonomia," 1794), though a zealous evolutionist, can hardly be said to have made any real advance on his predecessors ; and, notwithstanding that Goethe (1791-4) had the advantage of a wide knowledge of morphological facts, and a true insight into their signification, while he threw all the power of a great poet into the expression of his conceptions, it may be ques- tioned whether he supplied the doctrine of evolu- ^ SijsUme de la Nature, " Essai sur la Fonnation des Cori)3 Organises," 1751, xiv. - CoTisidiralions Philosophiqucs sur la gradation nnturdle dcs formes de I'Ure j ou Ics cssais da la nature qui a-pprend a /aire Vlunnme, 1768. 210 EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY VI tion with a firmer scientific basis than it already- possessed. Moreover, whatever the value of Goethe's labours in that field, they were not published before 1820, long after evolutionism had taken a new departure from the works of Trevir- anus and Lamarck — the first of its advocates who were equipped for their task with the needful large and accurate knowledge of the phenomena of life, as a whole. It is remarkable that each of these writers seems to have been led, independ- ently and contemporaneously, to invent the same name of " Biology '' for the science of the pheno- mena of life ; and thus, following Buffon, to have recognised the essential unity of these phenomena, and their contradistinction from those of inanimate nature. And it is hard to say whether Lamarck or Treviranus has the priority in propounding the main thesis of the doctrine of evolution ; for though the first volume of Treviranus's " Biologie " appeared only in 1802, he says, in the preface to his later work, the "Erscheinungen und Gesetze des organischen Lebens," dated 1831, that he wrote the first volume of the " Biologie " " nearly five-and-thirty years ago," or about 1796. Now, in 1794, there is evidence that Lamarck held doctrines which present a striking contrast to those which are to be found in the " Philosophie Zoologique," as the following passages show : — " 685. Quoique mon unique objet dans cet article n'ait etSque de traiter de la cause physique de I'entreticn de la vie des etres VI EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY 211 organiques, malgre cola j'ai ose avancer en debutant, que I'exist- ence de ces etres etonnants n'appartiennent nullement a la nature ; que tout ce qu'on peut entendre par le mot nature, ne pouvoit donner la vie, c'est-i-dire, que toutes les qualites de la raatiere, jointes a toutes les circonstances possibles, et meme k I'activite repandue dans I'univers, ne pouvaient point produire un 6tre muni du mouvement organique, capable de reproduire son semblable, et sujet h, la mort. "686. Tous les individus de cette nature, qui existent, pro- viennent d'individus semblables qui tous ensemble constituent I'espece entiere. Or, je crois qu'il est aussi impossible a I'homme de connoitre la cause physique du premier individu de chaque espece, que d'assigner aussi physiquement la cause de I'existence de la matiere ou de I'univeis en tier. C'est au nioins ce que le resultat de mes connaissances et de mes reflexions me portent a penser. S'il existe beaucoup de varietes produites par I'effet des circonstances, ces varietes ne denaturent point les especes ; mais on se trompe, sans doute souvent, en indiquant comme espece, ce qui n'est que variete ; et alors je sens que cette erreur peut tirer k consequence dans les raisonnements que Ton fait sur cette matifere."^ The first three volumes of Treviranus's " Bio- logie," which contain his general views of evolution, appeared between 1802 and 1805. The " Recherches sur 1' organisation des corps vivants," in which the outlines of Lamarck's doctrines are given, was published in 1802 ; but the full develop- ^ BechercJies sur les causes des principaux fails phijaiqucs, par J. B. Lamarck. Paiis. Secondc aunee de la Republique. In Ibe preface, Lamarck says that the work was written in 1776, and presented to the Academy in 1780 ; but it was not published before 1794, and, at that time, it presumably expressed Lamaick's mature views. It would be interesting to know what brought about the change of opinion manifested in the Uccharches sur Torganisation des corps vivants, published only seven years later. 212 EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY VI ment of his views, in the " Philosophie Zoologique," did not take place until 1809. The "Biologie" and the " Philosophie Zoolo- gique " are both very remarkable productions, and are still worthy of attentive study, but they fell upon evil times. The vast authority of Cuvier was employed in support of the traditionally respectable hypotheses of special creation and of catastrophism ; and the wild speculations of the " Discours sur les E.^volutions de la Surface du Globe " were held to be models of sound scientific thinking, while the really much more sober and philosophical hypotheses of the " Hydrogeologie " were scouted. For many years it was the fashion to speak of Lamarck with ridicule, while Trevir- anus was altosjether ignored. Nevertheless, the work had been done. The conception of evolution was henceforward irrepres- sible, and it incessantly reappears, in one shape or another,^ up to the year 1858, when Mr. Darwin and Mr. Wallace published their " Theory of Natural Selection." The " Origin of Species " appeared in 1859 ; and it is within the knowledge of all whose memories go back to that time, that, henceforward, the doctrine of evolution has assumed a position and acquired an importance which it never before possessed. In the " Origin of Species," and in his other numerous and ' Sec the "Historical Sketch '' prefixed to the last edition of the Orirjin of Species. VI EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY 213 important contributions to the solution of the problem of biological evolution, Mr. Darwin con- fines himself to the discussion of the causes which have brought about the present condition of living matter, assuming such matter to have once come into existence. On the other hand, llr. Spencer ^ and Professor Haeckel ^ have dealt with the whole problem of evolution. The profound and vigorous writings of Mr. Spencer embody the spirit ofi Descartes in the knowledge of our own day, and may be regarded as the " Principes de la Philosophie " of the nineteenth century ; while, whatever hesitation may not unfrequently be felt by less daring minds, in following Haeckel in many of his speculations, his attempt to systematise the doctrine of evolution and to exhibit its influence as the central thought of modern biology, cannot fail to have a far-reaching influence on the progress of science. If we seek for the reason of the diiference between the scientific position of the doctrine of evolution a century ago, and that which it occupies now, we shall find it in the great accumulation of facts, the several classes of which have been enumerated above, under the second to the eighth heads. For those which are grouped under the second to the seventh of these classes, respectively, . have a clear significance on the hypothesis of ^ First Principles, and rrintiples of Biolwjy, 1860-1864. ' Gr,ncrcHe Morpholoji \ 1866. 214 EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY VI evolution, while they are unintelligible if that hypothesis be denied. And those of the eighth group are not only unintelligible without the assumption of evohition, but can be proved never to be discordant with that hypothesis, while, in some cases, they are exactly such as the hypothesis requires. The demonstration of these assertions would require a volume, but the general nature of the evidence on which they rest may be briefly indicated. 2. The accurate investigation of the lowest forms of animal life, commenced by Leeuwenhoek and Swammerdam, and continued by the remark- able labours of Reaumur, Trembley, Bonnet, and a host of other observers, in the latter part of the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries, drew the attention of biologists to the gradation in the complexity of organisation which is presented by living beings, and culminated in the doctrine of the " echelle des etres," so power- fully and clearly stated by Bonnet ; and, before him, adumbrated by Locke and by Leibnitz. In the then state of knowledge, it appeared that all the species of animals and plants could be arranged in one series ; in such a manner that, by insensible gradations, the mineral passed into the plant, the plant into the polype, the polype into the worm, and so, through gradually higher forms of life, to man, at the summit of the animated world. VI EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY 215 But, as knowledge advanced, this conception ceased to be tenable in the crude form in which it was lirst put forward. Taking into account existing, animals and plants alone, it became obvious that they fell into groups which were more or less sharply separated from one another ; and, moreover, that even the species of a genus can hardly ever be arranged in linear series. Their natural resemblances and differences are only to be expressed by disposing them as if they were branches springing from a common hypo- thetical centre. Lamarck, while affirming the verbal proposition that animals form a single series, was forced by his vast acquaintance with the details of zoology to limit the assertion to such a series as may be formed out of the abstractions constituted by the common characters of each group.^ Cuvier on anatomical, and Von Baer on embryo- logical grounds, made the further step of proving that, even in this limited sense, animals cannot be arranged in a single series, but that there are several distinct plans of organisation to be observed among them, no one of which, in its highest and most complicated modification, leads to any of the others. ^ " II s'agit done de prouver que la serie qui constitua I'^chelle aniniale reside cssentiellement dans la distribution des masses principales qui la composentet non dans celle des espfeces ni meme toujours dans cello des genres. " — Philosophic Zoolucjique, chap. V. 48 216 EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY TI The conclusions enunciated by Cuvier and Yon Baer have been confirmed, in principle, by all subsequent research into the structure of animals and plants. But the effect of the adoption of these conchisions has been rather to substitute a new metaphor for that of Bonnet than to abolish the conception expressed by it. Instead of regard- ing living things as capable of arrangement in one series like the steps of a ladder, the results of modern investigation compel us to dispose them as if they were the twigs and branches of a tree. The ends of the twigs rejDresent individuals, the smallest groups of twigs species, larger groups genera, and so on, until we arrive at the source of all these ramifications of the main branch, which is represented by a common plan of structure. At the present moment, it is impossible to draw up any definition, based on broad ana,tomical or developmental characters, by which any one of Cuvier's great groups shall be separated from all the rest. On the contrary, the lower members of each tend to converge towards the lower members of all the others. The same may be said of the vegetable world. The apparently clear distinction between flowering and flowerless plants has been broken down by the series of gradations between the two exhibited by the Lycopodiacem, Rhizo- carpccc, and Gymnospcrmcoi. The groups of Ftcngi, Lichencs, and Algce have completely run into one another, and, when the lowest forms of each are TI EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY 217 alone considered, even the animal and vegetable kingdoms cease to have a definite frontier. If it is permissible to speak of the relations of living forms to one another metaphorically, the similitude chosen must undoubtedly be that of a common root, whence two main trunks, one repre- senting the vegetable and one the animal world, spring; and, each dividing into a few main branches, these subdivide into multitudes of branchlets and these into smaller groups of twigs. As Lamarck has well said — ^ "II n'y a