YP T MiTCENTBfliP' -t 3 3rj, FH^ (^mmW Winxvmxi^ JtbmtJg THE GIFT OF .US .V. :^^waAi5C... A..\?.'l:^:a6 AA\^\ft^.. 1287 hj DATE DUE -^^:=^-. ^^^^^ JDF'^2' L9BI E rmerlibrc ryloan |JI i| N'L^ ///• ifsZ iOBD / ' GAYLORD PRINTEDINU.S.A. Cornell University Library DT 100.M25 1883 Egypt: 3 1924 028 718 595 VT lOO EGYPT: NATIVE RULERS AND FOREIGN INTERFERENCE. BY BARON DE MALORTIE, AUTHOR OP * DIPLOMATIC SKETCHES/ 'MB. GLADSTONE AND THE GBEEK QUESTION,' ETC., ETC. " There is on Ompire which can never be subdued — the Empire of Opinion, whose throne is the liberty of the Press." — LOKD Eeskine. SECOND EDITION. LONDON: WILLIAM RIDGWAY, 169, PICCADILLY, W. 1883. (All rights reserved.) Av, \%7.-i.'^o ' Maximi semper In rebus humania momenti jEgyptus fuit." Leibniz. Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tile Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924028718595 NOTE BY THE AUTHOE. So much has been written on Egypt, "the heau ideal of the East," ^ that it seems almost presumptu- oxis to venture on an addition to the many volumes that treat so exhaustively every phase of the history of " the most privileged of all countries." ^ Indeed, it is the very number of valuable publi- cations — many of thepa standard works — which suggested to the author the usefulness of a kind of epitome of opinions ; yet such is the amount of material accumulated, and so large the number of notes taken on the spot during prolonged stays in Egypt, that some time may elapse ere it will be possible to present them to the student of contem- porary history. In the meanwhile, a few condensed chapters bear- ing on the leading subject of the day, may be acceptable at a moment when the shifting of the Oriental question from Constantinople to Cairo intensifies the paramount interest attached to the future of Egypt. London, September, 1882. ' 'Journal of a Visit to Egypt,' by the Hon. Mrs. W. Grey, p. 154. ^ ' Aperfu de I'histoire ancienne d'lfigypte,' par A. Mariette Bey, p. 7. CONTENTS. Pbefaob .. .. .. .. .. .. vii I. Intboduotion .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 II. Mbhbmbt Ali .. .. .. .. 27 III. Ismail 67 IV. Mehbmet Tewfik .. .. .. ..153 V. CoNOLXTSiON .. .. .. .. .. .. 257 Appendix I. — Pbdigeeb of the Family op Mehbmet Ali 299 „ II. — Programme and Views of Chbrif Pasha .. 302 „ III. — Statistical Tables of the Number and Salaries of European Officials in Egypt 309 ,, IV. — Extracts from the Author's Diary .. 314 PREFACE. The geographical position of Egypt ("a paradise miraculously placed in the midst of the desert " ^) gives it in the eyes of the world an importance superior to any other portion of the Ottoman Empire,* and as Great Britain cannot allow Egypt to fall under the influence of any preponderant Power which might at some time be hostile to us,° a solution must be found that will place la clef des tresors de Vlnde,^ as Egypt has been styled, beyond the grasp of Continental temptation. Single-handed, we have had to redeem Anglo-French pledges, to honour joint signatures, to avenge joint humilia- tions ; with unprecedented rapidity our victorious armies have crushed the rebellion : order will be restored; and England is replacing the Khedive on his tottering throne. The soldiers' work is almost done, and diplomacy will have to fight its own battles — let us hope with equal skill and success. In the Prime Minister's speech at the Mansion House may be found the outlines of our policy, the leading ideas of our present and future attitude. " We have gone to Egypt with clean hands, with ' 'Im Lande der Pharaonen,' von A. Stahl, p. 202. * Speecli of Lord Palmerston, House of Commons, June 1, 1858. * ' Memoirs and Despatches of the Duke of Wellington,' vi. p. 219. ^ ' Correspondance de I'arm^e frangaise en Egypte, intercepte'e par rescadre de Nelson, publiee par S. Simon,' p. 34. ^ vui PBBPACE. ' no secret intentions, with nothing to conceal," ' but, " Egypt having become the great gate between the Eastern and "Western hemispheres, it is essential for the industry and enterprise of mankind that that gate should be open ; and in order that it may be open it is not less essential that Egypt should be under a peaceful, orderly, legal government." ' To secure this primary object Grreat Britain has been forced to draw the sword, and having firmly clutched the " key of the gate," the world may rest assured that henceforth there will be no danger of its ever being closed by any one but the key-holder. Fortunately, our interests " are interests common to us with every State in Europe," ' and as we have " no interests in Egypt so great as that Egypt should be prosperous, and obtain her prosperity by the enjoyment of a wise, a regulated, and expanding freedom," '' it may be anticipated that our Government — the present Grovernment, at least — has no intention to go beyond the object sketched out by Mr. Grlad- stone. If this means that we do not intend annexing Egypt, Mr. Grladstone can rely on the cordial sup- port of an overwhelming majority at home and abroad. " Our people have got disgusted with territorial acquisitions," * and we require no further extension of the vast frontiers of Her Majesty's realm. As Lord Palmerston so pithily said, " We do not want Egypt, or wish for it any more than a man with ' Speech of the Eight Hon. W. E. Gladstone, Mansion IJouse, Aug. 9, 1882. 8 'A Political Survey,' by M. B. Grant Duff, M.P., p. 104. PKEFACE. IX an estate in the North of England and a residence in the South would have wished to possess the inns on the north road. All he could want would have been that the inns should be well kept, always accessible, and furnishing him, when he came, with mutton chops and post-horses." ® Yet, to use words of the late Prince Consort, " if the nation has willingly made temporary sacrifices, it has not paid that price in order to purchase permanent ones. It expects, and justly, lasting security in return." ^^ How best to attain this end is the present task of our statesmen, and we may rely on the patriotism, the high sense of justice and honour of those presiding over the destinies of our country, that nothing will be done unworthy of our traditions and of a liberal inter- pretation of Great Britain's duties to herself and others. We shall presently have to examine the various combinations, possible and impossible: at this place it will suffice to indicate their nature. ■ There is, primo, the status quo ante Arabi with corollaries, suzerainty of the Porte, and Anglo- French control. 2ndly, An international control of all great Powers. 3rdly, Complete independence. 4thly, Eeturn to the state of a Turkish Vilayet, 5thly,. British occupation. 6thly, Annexation. 7thly, Neutralisation under the guarantee of all ' Letter of Lord Palmerston to Lord Cowley, Nov. 25, 1859. ' The Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by the Hon. E. Ashley, ii. p. 124. '" Letter of H.R.H. the Prince Consort to the Prince of Prussia (pre- sent Emperor), May 18, 1855. ' The Life of H.R.H. the Prince Consort,' by Sir T. Martin, iii. p. 45. X PEBFACE. Powers, and lastly a Protectorate, as the first step towards the present — and pleasant — vision of an Oriental Belgium. 1. Experience has taught us the drawbacks of dualism, and of its nefarious consequences. Though working well in an administrative sense (thanks to the good understanding of the individual representa- tives), all idea of a return to the Joint Control may well be discarded, if for no other reason than the danger of allowing any combination to be dependent on personalities, and the liver or digestion of Agents and Controllers. 2. An international Control, while less exposed to sudden friction, would be a ponderous machine, unpalatable to native temper — which likes one master, not half-a-dozen — and liable to complicate the chaotic state of the administration by an infusion of heterogeneous elements and an addition of divergent interests. 3. To proclaim the independence of Egypt at this stage, and to leave the Khedive and his people to their own devices, would be the prelude to new disorders, to another military dictatorship, the day the last British soldier leaves Alexandria ; it would infallibly lead to a collapse of the Khediviate, to (4thly) Ottoman intervention and to a return of Egypt to the unenviable position of a Turkish pro- vince, with all its sequels of maladministration and misrule : indeed, the most enthusiastic Turcophile in this country would hardly dare to take the responsi- bility of such a venture. Discarding Dualism, independence, and Turkish intervention, (5thly) a British occupation presents PREFACE. XI itself to the mind, the more so as England happens to be the " man in possession." Unobjectionable as a temporary measure, and as a means of restoring order until the Khedive possesses a small reliable army to uphold his authority, a prolonged military occupation, independently from being contrary to British feeling, would be a constant grievance. Both France and the Porte, possibly all Powers, would resent it ; it would form a dangerous precedent, and bring us all the responsibilities and burdens of actual annexation without any adequate compensation. 6. In fact, annexation pure and simple would be a lesser evil. Possibly, were Lord Beaconsfield still at the head of the Grovernment, this would be the measure resorted to ; but Mr. Gladstone would not only break all his pledges," but renounce the very principles of his party, were he to yield to Jingo pressure and indulge in a conquering policy. Nay, were Egypt offered us by all concerned, which it is not likely to be, our people would hesitate, " unless, perhaps, they were sure that their rejection would be the signal of Egypt passing into the hands of some other European power." ^^* As long as the Queen has a soldier to fight, and the navy of old England to uphold her honour — the very existence of the Empire — such a contingency lies happily beyond the pale of possibility; never mn or will Egypt belong to another Power. In fact, during the memorable " " It is my firm conviction .... that, as a general rule, enlargements of the Empire are for us an evil fraught with serious, though possibly not ■with immediate danger." — 'Aggression on Egypt and Freedom in the East,' by the Eight Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P. {Nineteenth Century, Aug. 1877, p. 151). 12* ' A Political Survey,' by M. B. Grant Duff, M.P., p. 104. XU PREFACE. debate of June 2iid, 1858, on the Sueiz Canal, Mr. Gladstone justified his support of Mr. Eoebuck's motion by saying, " What is the Power that would really possess the Canal if it were opened ? Is it not the first maritime Power in Europe ? It is England and no foreign country that would obtain command Qf -^ » 12b _ _ ^ g^j^^ should ever political dangers arise in that direction, they will vanish before the deter- mination of the British people to allow no one, directly or indirectly, to hamper their intercourse with India." ^^° 7. We now come to the neutralisation of Egypt and the Canal, under the guarantee of all Powers. The fate of both being inseparably linked together, there can arise no question of fine dis- tinctions. The neutralisation of the Canal means the neutralisation of Egypt and ince versA. M. de Lesseps, its chief advocate, substantiated bis views on the subject by saying that otherwise, at the risk even of a conflict with France, England would be obliged to make herself mistress of Egypt, as the shortest cut to her oriental dominions " ; a powerful interest " on which she would never be able to give way ;" and there can be little doubt that, in theory, this solution presents itself under most favourable auspices ; but what about the practice ? Sir Charles ^t> Speecli of the Eight Hon. W. E. Gladstone, House of Commons, June 1, 1858. ^' ' A Political Survey,' by M. E. Grant Duff, M.P., p. 105. ^ Letter of M. P. de Lesseps to Lord Stratford de,Eedoliffe, Feb. 28, 1855. " " Si la question d']Sgypte est une question Autriohienne, elle est sans doute bien plus encore une question Anglaise." — ' Aus Metternichs nach- gelassenen Papieren,' v. p. 478. " ' !^gypte et Turquie,' par Ferdinand de Lesseps, p. 48. PREFACE. xiii Dilke denounces the utter futility of such a scheme in one clear and irrefutable sentence ; he says, " were we to be attacked in India no neutralisation would prevent our sending our troops to India by the shortest road, and fighting wherever we thought best. If we were not so attacked, neutralisation, as far as we are concerned, would be a useless cere- mony."'^ Thusin either case an attempt at inter- ference with our right of way would needs bring about the very consequences M. de Lesseps was and is naturally anxious to avert ; " a menace to India," it would imperil interests " we are equally bound and determined to defend." " The hobby of the Comtist school thus being disposed of, there only remains one other way out of the dilemma. 8. A British Protectorate. Of this more anon. The purchase of the Suzerainty from the Sultan, twin brother to Lord Beaconsfield's purchase of the Suez Canal shares,'* would, if confirmed, indicate the intention of Her Majesty's Government, not to abandon the vantage-ground circumstances have placed within our reach. Settling once and for all the vital question of the Suez Canal, the assumption of the nominal suzerainty over Egypt ; would answer the leading object of England, which is — if we can believe Canning — " to preserve the peace of the world."" G-iving us a ^ 'Greater Britain,' by Sir Charles Wentwortli Dilke, Bart., M.P., p. 569. 1 " Letter of Lord Derby to Count Schouvaloff, May 6, 1877. 18 « ^ ^ae and statesmanlike measure." — ' England and Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 8. '' ' Eecollections,' &o., by Lord Stratford de Eedcliffe {Nineteenth Cen- tury, Aug. 1878, p. 381). XIV PREFACE, locus Standi, it would allow us to restore the Khedive's authority under the wings of our own, and the sooner we accomplish the task the better for us and the interests we represent. Putting an end to the mischievous meddling of the Porte, it would also materially relieve the finances of Egypt by freeing it from the burden of a loathsome tribute. It would dissipate fears of annexation, as the nominal— I should even say, the temporary — nature of our protectorate would refute all selfish designs. Great Britain, the champion of struggling nationalities, can have no other policy but Egypt for the Egyptians. The stanchest supporter of Italian unity, the maker of Belgium, the sponsor of Grreek independence, England would be the last to stifle on the Nile what she glories in patronising on the Continent ; and all her energies will be devoted to consolidate Egypt, ^° to pilot her (the one country which may justly lay claim to the largest sympathies of Christian Europe ^^) on the path of freedom, progress, and civilisation, to make Egypt worthy of her past. " Once the most glorious, the most flourishing, and the most powerful kingdom upon earth," ^^ though to-day justly called " the cemetery of culture," ^\ Egypt has the merit of having been the first of all Mussulman countries to enter on the path of civilisa- tion,^* and under the guidance of British friendship, ''" " England must wish to consolidate Egypt, on account of lier con- nection with India," words of Mehemet Ali to Prince Piiokler. ' Aus Mehemet All's Eeich,' von Heinrich Fiirst Pilckler-Muskau, v. p. 381. 21 ' Egypt and the great Suez Canal,' by J. Barth^^my St. Hilaire, p. 103. 22 ' Views of the Levant,' by Charles Perry (1743), p. 145. 23 'Eine Orient-Eeise,' by H.I. and R.H. the Crown Prince Rudolph, ii. p. 71. 24 ' Egypt,' by J. Barth^l^my St. Hilaire, p. 103. PEEFACE. XV ten years of peace and tranquillity would awaken the dormant qualities of the most easily led people in the world, would develop the boundless resources of the " cradle and larder of nations," ^° and out of the present chaos an Oriental Belgium would emerge as the peaceful custodian of the international highway to India. Then, but only then, shall we be able to relinquish the hold of a certain number of points on the isthmus which now we shall have to occupy, and there are many who say that we should do so permanently,^" regardless of the future of Egypt. Be it temporarily or for good, Egypt will not complain in exchanging the uncertainty of her existence for security and a lasting peace at the price even of a naval station or two at the end of the Canal, over which, at present, the Canal Company claims more than sovereign rights. But whatever the contingencies of the future may be, one thing is certain, Grreat Britain cannot allow the road to India to be imperilled, and whether as mandatory of Europe, as suzerain of the Khedive, or by the right of the sword, we shall know how to ensure its security for all time to come. Ty suis fy teste is not a simple phrase in the mouth of John Bull, and if the other Powers should complain of a high-handed solution of the Grordian knot, if they wish to handcuff us with international treaty obligations, and want us to revive co-operative ventures, a determined non possumus will remind Europe that the time for recriminations has passed. They have left us alone to fight the battle of ^^ ' L'^gypte de Murtadha ibn Al-KJhafif, traduit par Vattier,' p. 2. ^ ' England and Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 49. XVI PEEFACE. civilisation ; they must now leave us the settlement. And after all, who is to blame? to whom is due the crippling of Egypt, the undermining of the Khedivial authority ? Who has fanned the dissen- sions of which the present crisis is the consequence and the climax ? Unfortunately we cannot repudiate our share of the guilt, and though our failings have been more of omission than commission, we are not the less co- responsible for the state of things that has thrown Egypt out of gear, and for the events which have forced upon us an armed intervention. A glance back on the reign of Mehemet Ali and his successors will oblige the most ill-disposed critics to admit that, whatever may have been the shortcomings of the native rulers, they are trifling compared with the blunders of their patrons, nay, I go so far as to say that, with few exceptions, they have been invariably the result of foreign meddling and advice. To sub- stantiate this sweeping assertion will be the object of the following pages. EGYPT. INTRODUCTION. " Egypt is a country mucli talked about and little known," ^' yet there is no more interesting country under the sun, and without reverting to the Egypt of the Pharaohs, " qui vaudrait pourtant la peine qu'on la reveille," ^^ the Egypt of the nineteenth century is well worth the closest attention. Linking the Orient to the Occident, ^^ Egypt has been foremost in the path of progress ^° and of reform ^^ ; to Egypt belongs the honour of having given the ex- ^ ' Lettres sur I'jSgypte contemporaine,' par E. Gellion-Danglar, p. 253. 28 Words of M. Bartlielemy St. Hilaire. '^ " Est isthmus mundi principalis .... Orieutis Occidentisque vin- culum, emporium commune. — ' Die Werke von Leibniz, Onno Klopp,' vii. p. 182. '" " Mehemet All .... est le premier Osmanli qui ait eu des id^es gouvernementales et administratives, il est le premier qui les ait appli- qu6es." — ' Aperju general sur I'llgypte,' par A. B. Clot Bey, p. 182. ^' " In my opinion, justice has not been rendered to the Government of Egypt, vsrhich has at last the glory of having taken the initiative in reform."—' Egypt and the great Suez Canal,' by J. Barth^ldmy St. Hilaire, p. 81. ^ EGYPT. ample to the Mussulman world,^^ and of having proved that far from being hostile to civilisation^^ and to the liberal ideas ^ of our century, Islam ^^ is capable of taking the initiative. Though an autocratic religion, the precepts of the Prophet are breathing a decided democratic spirit.^^ The Caliph is only Caliph by the will of the Faithful ^' and so long as he answers the exigencies and duties imposed on him by the Koran.^' Mussul- man law repudiates, in principle, all notions of right divine, and of an hereditary pow6r ;^' and if in practice this Western importation has taken root in the Orient, as far as the ruling families are con- cerned, it is primarily due to the right of the strongest — the right of wrong, — to its abuse, though now it has long been consecrated by usage and tradition. '2 " Les refoL-mes de la Turquie ont i\& entreprises a la suite, et en rivalite de celles de M^hdmet Ali." — 'Aperfu g&&al sur I'lilgypte,' par A. B. Clot Bey, p. 179. ^ " Le gfoie Arabe a &t€ ni d^pourvu ni st&ile." — ' Mahomet et le Koran,' par J. Barthdl^my St. Hilaire, p. 223. '* " Eefleot on what happens under tlie most liberal rule in the world, and then fling stones at the Mahomedan ruler (Ismail) .... who has broken down as far as he can the barrier which separates the Mahomedan from the Christian — the old world of the strong arm to the new world of the strong mind."—' A Diary in the Bast,' by W. H. Eussell, p. 455. ^ " Un maltre juste est I'ideal de I'lslamisme." — La Nouvelle Revue 1 Juillet, 1881, p. 7. ^ See Koran. 8' Ibid. ^* " Si quelqu'un de vous parvient k ddcouvrir que j'ai oommis une faute ou une injustice quelconque, je I'autorise et lui donne le droit de s'opposer a tous mes actes." — ' Paroles du Prophete.' " Only with the Bedouins have name and property been hereditary from time immemorial, but this affects in no way the custom recognised by Mussulmans in general. — The Author. INTRODUCTION. 3 In advising the Faithful to select the most worthy, the wisest, the most venerated amongst them as chief of the temporal power, Mahomet may justly claim the paternity of universal suffrage; and even since the family of Othman has monopolised the sceptre, the accession of a Sultan would not be strictly legal without the ceremony of the Beyat. An empty form, if you like, it nevertheless in- dicates the principle of the sovereignty of the people ; the nation thus sanctions the self-installa- tion of a new master, whilst it equally claims the right of changing him should he fail to comply with the precepts of the Koran, should he violate the law of the Cherent, should he neglect his duties as a ruler or show himself unworthy to reign. Nothing could he more democratic, yet so it is, and only the other day Turkey*" resorted to its right by deposing Sultan Abd-ul-Asiz, as answering no longer the requirements of his people. But though the spirit of the Mussulman law makes all men equal, and though, in theory, all have a voice in common matters, practice has long modified the application, and nowhere has the right of the strongest asserted itself more crushingly than in the East ; *^ in fact, the people have for ages renounced their share in public affairs in favour of their rulers, and of the governing class — pashas and courtiers. The temporal power, by its amalgamation with the ^° See ' Two Years of the Eastern Question,' by A. Gallenga, ii. p. 83. " "The whole source of influence here is strength, and the fear that follows it." — Letter of Mr. H. L. Bulwer to Lord Palmerstun, July 30, 1838. ' Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Balling, ii. p. 279. B 2 4 EGYPT. mystic and spiritual authority of the Caliphate, has thereby increased its own prestige ; and we know prestige is everything — certainly in the East/^ Fountain of all favours, Sultans have at all times succeeded in securing supporters — life-peers, — but they have strenuously abstained from creating an hereditary nobility, hereditary privileges or honours. All is at will, and therein resides the strength of the master. Absolute equality before the Sultan is the basis and the power of the Turkish government, the backbone of the whole system ; and it is this equality which someday will form the force of the people — the day the masses will have learned to understand that the sovereignty belongs not to a particular man or dynasty, but to the nation, and that Grod, the Prophet, the Koran, the law of the Chereat^ empower them to claim and to use it.*^ It is a mistake to believe that the Mussulman re- ligion is antagonistic to constitutional and parlia- mentary rule.** On the contrary, self-government has been for centuries established in the dominions of the Sultan ; *' and to go no farther, we have only to look at Egypt," where the rural system of *'' "Le sentiment national at les aspirations du peuple auraient pu s'harmoniser aveo le pouvoir absolu du Vioe-Eoi (Ismail) si, tenu dans des mains fermes, ce pouvoir avait dtd exerc6 aveo IMclat et le prestige par lequd il s'impose aux populations Orientales." — ' La Question lllgyptienne ' p. 32. ° ' *^ See Koran. " Vide Kaireddin Pasha's writings ; Midhat-Pasha's Constitution ; the Petvas of the Sheikh-ul-Islam ; and the declarations of the Ulemas of Bl Ahzar; also, 'Midhat Pasha,' by L. Ldouzon le Duo, p. 146 et seq. •" Vide rural organisation of the Ottoman Empire. ** ' Philosophical dissertations on the Egyptians,' &c., by de Pauw, p. 249. INTRODUCTION. 5 administration, the time-honoured composition of the Medjliss, the mode of election of Sheikhs and Omdes, furnish ample proofs of its existence and working. The germ is there, and needs only judicious and gradual development. In truth the autocratic form of government in the East is not due to Islam being opposed to constitutional institutions, but to the fact that the people are not ripe for a more extended application of parliamentarism, as first introduced by Ismail Pasha, and again revived by Oherif Pasha, in calling a consultative Chamber of Notables for the purpose of administrative control. Recently some political amateurs tried to produce Arabi in the garb of an enlightened reformer,*' much noise was made about a so-called national party ,*^ we were told of a liberal current,*" constitutional aspirations, and the usual stock-in-trade of revolutionary doctrinaires was duly advertised by complacent dreamers. Misled and misleading,^" they did a deal of harm. It was wasting sympathy, and as events have taught us, a move in the wrong direction; for the Egyptian people are not," and have never been for anything " ' The Egyptian Eevolution,' by W. S. Blunt {Nineteenth Century, Sept. 1882) ; and Sir William Gregory's Letters to the Times, Deo. 1881 and June 1882. « Pall Mall Gazette, Jan. 20, 1882. ^' Vide speeches of Sir Wilfrid Lawson, Bart., M.P., in the House of Commons, at Aspatria, &o. ™ See ' The Egyptian Eevolution,' by W. S. Blunt (^Nineteenth Century, Sept. 1882). '' Speech of the Eight Hon. W. B. Gladstone, Mansion House, Aug. 10, 1882, Standard, Feb. 16, 1882. " The absurdity of supposing that the movement in Egypt was a national one, and that Arabi was its soul, has been fully exposed by events." b EGYPT. in the rebellion, nor can they be made responsible for the crimes of Arabi and his native and foreign accomplices.*^ All the Fellah wants is not to be bothered by- new-fangled institutions for which he is not fitted, whilst he commonly takes kindly to those in harmony with his wants and usages.*' He only aspires to a little justice, to the security of his person and property " — moderate wishes — of a race fated, as Amron describes them, to work for others ; ^* and so little does he care for politics, that until recently few knew even the name of their ruler. " Effendina " for them was like a distant and misty vision of terres- trial deity, and their interest in current affairs was by no means encouraged or sweetened by their con- tact with the tax collector, the Sheikh, and that deputy Khedive the Moudir. Arabi, the fons et origo mali^^ is simply a san- guinary incendiary,*' an ambitious soldier ^^ dreaming the usurpation of power,*' the true representative of ^^ " Les chefs du mouvement sont guidfo par des Europ6ens." — De- peohe de M. Sienkiewicz au Min. des Aff. Illtrangeres, Jan. 29, 1882. " Witli European friends to guide him." — Letter of S. W. Gregory (^Times, Oct. 30, 1882). ^' ' England's Intervention in Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 171. '■'' " They have neither property nor family constituted on any solid or permanent basis." — ' Egypt, &o.,' by J; Barth^l^my St. Hilaire, p. 102. *"* ' L']&gypte et la Syrie,' par M. Breton, ii. p. 111. ^ Standard, Sept. 16, 1882. "" Speech of Mr. Leatham, M.P., to his constituents at Huddersfield, Feb. 15, 1882. ^' ' England's Intervention in Egypt,' by B. Dicey {Nineteenth Century, Aug. 1882, p. 167 et seq.). "^ On the 9th of May, Arabi said openly in his own house, before about twenty-five people, of whom several were Europeans, " that they had tried Tewfik, but that he won't do ; that there was no necessity for any member INTEODUOTION. 7 military tyranny, as Mr. Grladstone expressed himself at the Mansion House, who managed to make use of the fanatical disposition and the credulity of the people for his own selfish ends and with the view of taking his master's place.'" One must know the East to understand how he could succeed in misleading the masses hy empty promises ** of freedom, liberty, wel- fare and prosperity, things the reverse of what military dictators are wont to carry in their train. Had he succeeded in his audacious enterprise, and had brute force continued to triumph over right and justice, no one but himself and his accomplices would have been the gainers ; '^ nay, his accession would have revived the reign of the Mamelukes, the emancipation of the people and the development of the country would have been thrown back fifty years ; a dearly bought change, for which the wretched Fellah would have had to pay with his blood and the sweat of his brow — the Fellah in whose name Arabi has dared to speak, without any of Mehemet All's family to reign in Egypt ; and that there were better men to take the Khedive's place." " Arahi is simply an adventurer playing, by the advice of intriguers, with the English people, for his own benefit. His only power is to excite religious fanaticism among the people." — ' Egypt for the Egyptians,' by A. N. Montgomery, p. 15. *" On congratulating Madame Arabi Bey No. 1, on her husband's eleva- tion to the rank of pasha, she is said to have modestly replied, " Pray wait till we are at Abdin " (Abdin is one of the Khedivial palaces). "1 " Mahmoud Pasha Samy, Arabi Pasha et leurs amis ont promis a Egypte une fere de prospdrit^ sans pr^c^dent ; nous demandons au pays tout entier de juger de quelle fafon ils ont tenu leur promesse." — Phare d'Alexandrie, June 10, 1882. Blue-book, Egypt, No. 11 (1882). ^'^ " Un grand nombre de promotions de nature 4 satisfaire les colonels et les autres ofiSciers vont avoir lieu dans I'armfe." — Tel^gr. de M. Sien- kiewioz au Min. des Aff. Etrangdres, March 11, 1882. 8 EGYPT. other mandate than that of the sword. For it is notorious that he has only been able to carry the day by terrorising *^ the population, the gentlest and most good-natured of the universe,®* and by forcing the hand of the Notables, whom he wanted, in order to give to his acts a semblance and coating of legality. Once master of the situation he used his ephemeral ascendancy *° to play the champion of Islam, and to represent himself as the instrument of the Khedive.*® It was a clever trick, though it must be admitted that the Sultan contributed to facilitate the task. Always ready to avail her- self of the mistakes of others, the Porte had not allowed so propitious an occasion to pass by without turning the fictitious or apparent popularity of the dictator to good account. Some say that slighted, humiliated, and his empire decimated by Europe, the *' " I have spoken to Sultan Pasha, President of the Chamber of Eepre- sentatives, on the subject, and he has told me that it is idle to deny that the Corporation acted under fear, for that the officers on this occasion went beyond their usual system of taking people separately and threatening them with death. They openly went about the streets in bands, and drove the Notables before them. Their violence was such that the heads of the Corporation veritably believed, as they stated to the Khedive, that their lives, and the city itself, were in danger, unless His Highness yielded." — Sir B. Malet to Lord Granville, June 5, 1882. Blue-book, Egypt, No. 11 (1882), No. 124. " It was notorious that when the Council of Notables assembled, they acted under the terrorism of the military party." — Speech of Lord Houghton, House of Lords, July 24, 1882. '* ' Lettres sur I'lilgypte,' par S. Barthel^my St. Hilaire, p. 212 et sea. ' Lettres sur I'Jllaypte contemporaine,' par E. Gellion-Danglar, p. 74. ' England's Intervention in Egypt,' by B. Dicey {Nineteenth Century, Aug. 1882), p. 164. '" See his proclamation of July 21 and July 29, 1882. "" " Arabi a sign6 son manifeste comme chef supreme de VEgypte, d6legu6 par le Sidtan."— Temps, Aug. 3, 1882. INTRODUCTION. 9 Sultan believed the moment favourable for falling back on Egypt," and by means of Pan-Islamite pro- paganda ^^ to gain once more a footing on the shores of the Nile/^ where since Mehemet Ali's days he had been reduced to the barren honour of calling himself "the Suzerain," and of touching 680,000Z. ayear for the use of his name as international scarecrow.'" Possibly, had the tribute not been pledged to Con- tinental usurers, Europe would long ago have put a stop to so monstrous an iniquity.'"- For surely no other excuse can be found for permitting a nation, already smothered in debts and taxes, to be mulcted in additional charges for the benefit of a foreign Power, without the slightest compensation. True, Con- tinental statesmen have considered the link'' that binds Egypt to the Ottoman Empire as the best and only guarantee against the covetousness of the great Powers.'^ But to my mind that is only a way of *' " Bn recevant M. de Ring, alors membre de la Commission Europfenne d'organisation de la Roumelie orientale, le Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid lui dit que VAfrique devait lui servir de compensation k la perte de ses plus belles provinces d'Burope, et que ses efforts tendraient k y reconguerir I'influence et le prestige du passe." — ' La Question iSgyptienne,' 1881, p. 7. ^* " La Question iSgyptienne se trouve oompliquee de la politique pan- islamique inauguree par Abd-ul-Hamid." — Ibid, p. 14. «^ See ' The Sultan's Policy in Egypt,' Times, Dec. i!8, 1881. "* Tbe tribute annually paid by Egypt amounts to 681,486Z. 9s. — 'Budjet du Gouvernement iSgyptien pour I'annee 1881.' In 1743 it amounted to 6000 purses at 84Z. each. — ' View of the Levant,' by Charles Perry, p. 229. In 1671, according to Leibniz, in five casenas at 1,200,000 piastres each, equal to 1584 purses (the purse at 756 piastres 19 medains). — ' Die Werke von Leibniz, Onno Klopp,' ii. p. 227. . " " Link of the worn-out chain binding Egypt to the swindling Govern- ment of Constantinople." — Speech of Sir C. W. Dilke, Bart., M.P., to his constituents, Aug. 19, 1879 (see Times, Sept. 20, 1879). 72 11 What we wish about Egypt is, that it should continue attached to 10 EGYPT. speaking, and the Turkish label would prevent no one from stretching out a greedy hand, had it not been in the interests of all Powers alike to maintain the relative independence and absolute neutrality of Egypt on account of the highway to India which makes her the most important international station." To return to the Sultan, others say that His Majesty had only condescended to humour Arabi and the pseudo-national party, with a view of subduing Egypt again to the position of a Turkish vilayet. It is likely that fear rather than covetousness has been the cause of his erratic proceedings. The fear that Arabi might aim a blow at the Caliphate,'* as it was no secret that the would-be dictator had openly declared his intention of proclaiming the Grand Sherif of Mekka Caliph, should the Sultan oppose him. Possibly Abd-ul-Hamid has remembered how that spiritual dignity, the prestige of which is worth armies, came into the hands of the House of Othman, how it was acquired, how it was wrenched little by little from the G-rand Sherifs of Mekka. For it must not be forgotten that the Sultans of Turkey imposed them- selves primarily as defenders simply of the Caliphate, the Turkish Empire, whioli is a security against its belonging to any European Power." — Letter of Lord Palmerston to-Lord Clarendon, March 1, 1857. ' Life of Lord Palmerston,' by the Hon. E. Ashley, i. p. 129. 73 "L'lilgypte coram e point g^ographique offre naturellement aux com- munications de rOocident avec I'Orient le trajet le plus avantageux." — ' ^dlgypte et Turquie,' par F. de Lesseps, p. 10. '* " Le bruit circule qu' Arabi a obtenu d'un certain nombre d'UWmas ' du Caire un fetva prononfant^la deposition du Sultan, et nommant le grand Sherif de la Meoque pour lui sucodder." — Telegr. from Alexandria, Aug. 15, 1882. INTRODUCTION. 11 with the humble title of " Servants of the Holy- Places," '^ and it is only thanks to devices as cunning as they were audacious that they managed to supplant the Grand Sherif, to amalgamate the Sultanate and the Caliphate, to unite the two in one hand, and to represent it as an indivisible heirloom. Almost fallen into oblivion, an antiquated page of history, the Sultan's title to the Caliphate is nevertheless not unimpeachable, and His Majesty may have had weighty reasons for not provoking a schism, and for not wishing to stir up claims, more legitimate than his in the eyes of a large section of the Mussulman Arabs,'* who have bowed to a fait accompli rather than challenge the right of the mighty incumbent. Orientals have a keen appreciation of Prince Bismarck's maxim, " Might is right," and seldom do they court defeat by hasty conclusions, and by raising an uncertain issue. The threats of Arabi, puerile if you like, indi- cate nevertheless a dormant danger, and one can easily understand the Sultan's objections to proclaim the dictator a rebel, before having been assured of the certain defeat of such an enfant terrible. Playing with the fire, His Majesty has burned his fingers, and as usual Turkey is certain to pay the piper." True, religious wars are out of fashion, '^ This title refers specially to the Kaaba at Mecca. '^ " The assassination of the Grand Sherif of Mecca in 1880 is attributed to AM-ul-Hamid's jealousy of his superior claims to the Caliphate." — Vide Pall Mall Gazette, Oct. 11, 1881. " The famous Marabout Sanoussi has always steadily refused to recognise the claims of the Sultan to the Caliphate." —Vide Times, Aug. 27, 1882. Vide also 8t. James's Gazette, July 19, 1882. " " Ce qui dans toutes oes affreuses complications est Hen sur et positif, 12 EGYPT. but fanaticism smoulders under the ignorance of the masses, and until civilisation shall have levelled all religious controversies — will she ever ? — a spark will suflSce to put the Moslem world on fire.'^ It is so easy to persuade poor wretches panting under an unbearable burden of taxes and injustice, that their miseries originate in lax observations of their faith, that all the evil is solely due to the presence of infidels, and that by driving them out of the country and by ridding Moslem soil of unclean footsteps, prosperity and happiness in this world and eternal beatitude in the next may be secured. It is the old battle-song of religious wars in England, France, and Grermany, translated into Arabic. But though the Sultan may be exaggerating the present danger, and the drift of any such movement, it cannot be denied that Arabi had contrived temporarily to monopolise the blind fanaticism of the lower strata, and that he might have shaken the spiritual power of the Sultan. Already Arabi has wrought irre- trievable mischief by spreading false reports about the intentions and attitude of the Caliph, and by inoculating an ignorant and credulous " rabble with c'est que la Turquie payera finalement, non seulement ses imprudences, mais encore les erreurs, les fautes, les crimes, I'impr^voyance ou la perfldie de presque tous les cabinets Burop^ens." — ' Depeolies incites du Chevalier de Gentz,' iii. p. 444. '* One has only to look at the Moslem agitation in Tunis, Tripoli, the Hedjaz, &c., to read Arab papers, and to remember " that on the first day of Moharram in the year 1300 (Nov. 12, 1882) the Messiah of Islam is expected to appear, and that for some time past the followers of Sheikh Sanoussy have asserted that he will on that day proclaim himself as the long looked for El Mahdi."— Kmes, Aug. 27, 1882. " ' Tchevet-el-Nazerine,' by Sheikh Abdullah-el-Charqaouy, p. 8. INTEODUOTION. 13 pernicious notions on the duties of a true Mussulman*"; but His Majesty knows best that Arabi would never have been able to exercise sucb undisputed influence on the mind of the people without his tacit, not to say effective, complicity. Had the Sultan from the first pronounced against Arabi, had a fetva of the Sheikh-ul-lslam proclaimed him a rebel, and had the Ulemas of the El-Ahzar been in a position openly to speak out against his odious and tyrannical sway, the military insurrection would never have degenerated into a politico-religious movement. The truth is, the Sultan played a double game and intended to use the name and pseudo-prestige of Arabi, whilst the latter, who could not have been without doubts as to the sincerity of the secret encouragement^'- he was receiving, retorted by actually using the name of the Commander of the Faithful.'^ It has been a misfortune in more than one respect. Consulting only the interest of the moment, the Sultan compromised the future, and jeopardised gratuitously the work of the last half century by an erroneous interpretation of the interests and duties of Islam. Since the days of Sultan Mahmoud, Europe has '" See Arabi's proclamations and speeches. '^ "L'element national a I'instinct de la perfidie des encouragements qu'il refoit de la Porte." — 'La Question ]l!gyptienne,' 1881, p. 28. *^ To mention one instance among many, Arabi's manifesto of Aug. 2, 1882, was signed as " Supreme CUef of Egypt delegated by the Sultan."— The Author. 1-1 EGYPT. striven to break all barriei-s between the Occident and the Orient. Civilisation having narrowed the dis- tances, it was justifiable to cherish a hope that religious differences had for ever been relegated to the political lumber-room, when suddenly the Sultan Caliph, in a fit of Pan-Islamite craze,*^ thought it expedient to lend his name and his authority to the fanning of long forgotten animosity and hatred. Resuscitating entombed passions, he threw de novo the Mussulman world into a slow fever of latent excitement. It was a step back into the darkness of past ages, an awakening of the strifes that have desolated the world during centuries from one end to another, a challenge to civilisation, to modern ideas and feelings, and a plunging back into the slums of ignorant fanaticism. But those are considera- tions which have never troubled the brain of a Turkish ruler ; nay, if he wished to put on the break in the last moment, it is too late, the harm is done. It is true that recently the Porte seems to have succeeded in overruling the palace, and that-^ ostensibly at least — the Sultan has adopted a more conciliatory attitude, and " consents " to join us in restoring order. A history of the famous " military convention " would form an edifying page of modern statesmanship, and the telegrams announcing every morning the signature for the next day, and every evening a postponement on account of urgent modi- fications, became somewhat monotonous. But now ™ 'The Sultan's Policy in Egypt '(by E.Wallace?), Times, Aug. 28, 1881. INTRODUCTION. 15 that the war is over, that the rebellion has been crushed by our unaided efforts, and that civilisation triumphs once more over retrograde barbarism, the tardy co-operation of Turkey appears less desirable than ever. The presence of Turkish troops on our side might at one time have been useful, in thus dissipating the story spread by Arabi that we had come to fight Islam, and that the Caliph had de- clined to join us; but now their arrival would only hamper future action, and give a semblance of truth to the reports current in the interior " that the Caliph had ordered both the Griaours and Arabi to lay down arms, that they had obeyed, and that he was sending his troops to prevent further blood- shed." All this may sound very absurd, but it shows the activity of those who continue to poison and confuse the Arab mind. To bring into Egypt a few thousand Turkish soldiers would be introducing as many Pan-Islamite emissaries ; — and for what purpose ? ** Surely Mr. Griadstone cannot wish to associate Mr. Carlyle's " un- speakable Turk " *' in the work of interior re-organi- sation ? If he has sold his superior rights, the Sultan has no longer the shadow of a pretence for future interference in Egyptian affairs. But even if he has not done so, his chances would hardly be better. It little matters whether he joined us or not, whether he proclaimed Arabi a rebel or loaded him '* More than twenty years ago Lord Clarendon, writing to Lord Stratford de Eedcliffe, said : " Mahometan rule is incompatible with civilisation and humanity." — Speech of Lord Carnarvon, House of Lords, June 27, 1879. 8" Letter of Mr. Carlyle. See Times, Nov. 28, 1876. 16 EGYPT. with honours, whether he has supported the Khedive or conspired against him, and whether he is trying or not to make poHtical capital out of his spiritual dignity, nothing will give him back Egypt, and, he may rest assured, Egypt will not mourn for him, nor complain.^^ Doubtless foreigners are not much liked in Egypt ; how could they be ? Is there a country on the globe where the invader, be he a religious, commercial, or military intruder, can boast of being loved — especially when, to the detriment of the natives, he monopolises the administration and places ; " when he parades his influence and exploits the country *^ for selfish pur- poses, and regardless of the interests and the welfare of the inhabitants ? Such has been the case in Egypt, and the thoughtless and overbearing'' conduct of '° " In as far as the Fellaheen have any distinct idea of foreign policy, that idea is probably a hatred of Turkey. According to a characteristic saying attributed to Mehemet Ali, if the Fellah had ever the courage to spit out anything, he would spit out a Turk." — ' England's Intervention in Egypt,' by E. Dicey {Nineteenth Century, Aug. 1882, p. 165). '^ " Quant aux marchands Europfens .... bourne et lie de toutes les nations, i d'honorables et rares exceptions prfis, cette tourbe a bien autre chose en tSte que .... tons sent venus pour faire an plus vite leur fortune, per fas et nefas, et de preference per nefas." — ' Lettres sur I'lilgypte coutemporaine,' par B. Grellion-Danglar, p. 254. "Ever since his arrival at power in Egypt, he has been incessantly encircled by a cloud of locusts collected from all parts of Europe, but chiefly from Prance, where the animal abounds in greatest plenty." — ' Egypt and Nubia,' by J. A. St. John, p. 47. ** " At the beginning of 1879 only 744 Europeans were in the pay of Egypt; .... at the close of 1879, 208 were added; in 1880, 250 more; in 1881, a further batch of 122 ; . . . . and in March 1882 there were 1325, with a total pay of 373,000?."—' Spoiling the Egyptians,' by J. S. Keay, p. 28. See also Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 6 (1882). *' "L'abus que font les Em-opdens de leur situation exceptionelle en Orient, est un mal qu'il est plus facile de constater qu'il ne I'est d'y trouver INTRODUCTION. 17 Europeans, officials as well as travellers, lias mucli contributed to the bitter feeling rankling in the breasts of the natives, whose sullen attitude demon- strates that they deeply resent the treatment they have been- subjected to. But notwithstanding the mistakes made, the Egyptians prefer Europeans to Turks, their dislike to the latter'" dating of old." The reason is, that Europe has done much, a great deal even, for Egypt, not for Egypt's sake, but simply to sow the seeds for a better European harvest ; and the development of the boundless resources of the Nile valley has been chiefly under- taken to increase the value of the pledge."^ But though enriching Continental pawnbrokers, both the people and the country have benefited in a certain measure by their contact with Europe, whilst the Turks have never done anything but squeeze the last piastre out of the wretched . Fellah^ and in exchange — what ? Nothing except the traditional '^ courbash. We have only to remember the state of Egypt'* before the days of Mehemet Ali, and ere un remede." — 'Lettres sui I'figypte contemporaine,' par B. Gellion- Danglar, p. 249. " Le premier paltoquet qui apass^ la Mediterrande, arrive ici avec des airs de oonqu&ant, s'arme d'un baton et frappe h, tort et k travers les mallieureux indigfenes qui le servent."— Ibid., p. 72. ^ " Arabes etsi Mabometi, non tamen Portee addictissimi sunt." — ' Die Werte von Leibniz, Onno Klopp,' ii. p. 349. " "Un seul sentiment animait la presque totalite des habitants de r]5gypte : une baine irr^oonoiliable pour les persfeuteurs de Constanti- nople." — ' L'^figypte depuis la conquSte des Arabes,' par J. J. Marcel, p. 12. 92 ' L'lllgypte et I'Europe, par un anoien juge mixte,' p. 154. ^ " The food of Egypt, earned with stripes and toil." — ' The Holy Land, Egypt, &c.,' from drawings by D. Eoberts, E.A., by the Eev. George Croly, i. p. 5. 9* " The Arab proverb, ' The grass never grows in the footprint of a C 18 EGYPT. his genius wrenched the pearl of Ottoman dominions ** from the hands of the oppressor .°° It is perhaps the most interesting page of modern history," and great are the lessons that may be derived from a conscientious study of Mehemet Ali's work ; ^^ — a work continued by Ismail ^' d la vapeur, and on rather a vast scale, and confided in 1879 to his young son under a co-operative guardianship."" In con- templating the endless difficulties which had to be overcome, the ill-wilP" and incompetence of the natives, and the mischievous interference of the great powers,"^ an idea of the magnitude of Turk,' painfully expresses tlie desolation of Moslem progress. Thus under this miserable rule . . . ." — ' Colburn's New Monthly Magazine,' cxlii. Jan. 1, 1868, p. 17. 96 "The invasion of Napoleon made an interruption in the annals of Turkish misrule in Egypt." — ' Egypt,' by Stanley Lane Poole, p. 162. ^ " He found all Egypt a chaos, he left it a country." — ' The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 63. *' " Aucune des grandes figures de I'histoire n'est susceptible d'exercer plus d'attraction sur la plume de I'historien." — ' Histoire de M^h^met Ali,' par Paul Mouriez, vi. p. 5. ^ " Under his rule the Egyptians have exchanged anarchy for tran- quillity." — ' Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians,' by B. W. Lane, p. 559. " Ich sagte Mehemet Ali dass er dem Orient jetzt das sei was einst Peter der Grosse fur Eussland gewesen." — ' Aus Mehemet Ali's Eeich,' von H. Fiirst Piiokler-Muskau, p. 187. " Cette civilisation . . . ce sont les glorieux instincts, et I'habUe ambition d'un grand homme qui I'ont provoqu^e." — ' Aperju g6n&al de I'ifigypte,' par A. B. Clot Bey, p. 178. "" " Ce serait injuste de ne pas le reconnaltre : si I'Europe peut aujour- d'hui trouver en ifigypte un figment de progrfis .... c'est au 16 annefe du rigne du Khedive Ismail qu'elle en est redevable." — ' La Ques- tion idlgyptienne,' 1881, p. 36. K" Nov. 18, 1879. 101 « L'immobilitI est le principal caract&e des Orientaux, de 14 en i^gypte cet esprit de resistance k toute espece d'iimovation." — ' Histoire Anoienne de rOrient,' par J. J. GuUlemin, p. 90. 102 u L'Europe s'feartant de plus en plus de I'esprit prirnitif des capitula- tions, a ^tabli en i^gypte un systSme trfis dur de domination, d'oppression, et d'exploitation." — 'L'figypte et I'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 113. INTRODUCTION. 19 the task may be formed, and the conclusion will be arrived at that Continental statesmen were rather rash in substituting a foreign — I should say an anti- Egyptian — policy to the vast and patriotic con- ceptions of Mehemet Ali, which it would have been wiser to assist him and his successors in realising. It is sad to acknowledge that Egypt seems only to exist, and to have existed, as an interminable source of wealth for venturesome Europeans."^ Only when their interests happen to coincide with those of the natives, has it ever been thought worth while to remember that there are such people as the Egyptians, and since the time Mehemet Ali brought Egypt under the notice of the Powers Europe has had but one aim, that of appropriat- ing the revenues of Egypt,'"* and of preventing her from standing on her own legs. Fear,"° greed,"'^ and deplorable rivalry '"' are the causes ; the present crisis is the result. A strong and powerful Egypt "' was 103 « Qq q^'ii il y a de plus abominable dans les colonies Europ^ennes, c'est leur complicity pour s'enricliir au ddpens du pays et des Pellabs." — Ibid., p. 113. '" " La coalition dtrangere exploitait I'i^gypte." — ' La verity sur les affaires d'Orient,' par Scipion Marin, p. 6. ™ Vide ' The Eastern Question,' by Viscount Stratford de Eedcliffe, p. 81. " Ni la France ni I'Angleterre ne se sentaient assez fortes pour se passer I'une de I'autre." — 'L'^gypte et I'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 264. ™ " Le protectorat Anglo-Pran9ais n'a et6 fond6 que dans I'int&et des creanciers strangers." — Ibid., p. 265. 107 "In European jealousies lies Egyptian safety." — 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 379. 108 « Q'ggt une dftestable politique que celle qui consiste ^ chercher la s^curit^ 4ans I'affaiblissement d'autrui." — 'La Question d'Orient,' par E. Gioja, p. 147. C 2 20 EGYPT. and is considered an international danger — an imaginary danger would be nearer the mark — ^and breaking the wings of the eagle by opposing his struggle for independence"' the Powers restrained Mehemet Ali from giving life to his creation, and instead of helping"" they hampered him in his civilising mission. Ibrahim did not reign long enough"^ to count, otherwise his great abilities would hardly have been looked upon with equanimity by jealous Europe. As to his successors Abbas and Sai'd, they did not give suflScient umbrage. It was only when Ismail "^ undertook to revive the work of his great ancestor, when he showed the world the part Egypt was able to take,"^ and how fitted she was to become in the East the pioneer of Western civilisation"* that, 109 Parliamentary Papers, 2395 of 1879, p. 28. ISMAIL. 77 ments without first submitting them to the Porte, a concession most unpalatable to the Divan, as it cur- tailed the profits of high dignitaries, always ready to give their consent to any financial folly at a given price, but which was an undoubted economy, as it saved Egypt one of the heavy commissions with which she had been burdened by every consecutive loan. He, however, succeeded on a second visit in his chief object. " Les petits cadeaux entretiennent I'amitie, et les grands I'augmentent." 900,000^. in cash,^" placed at the feet of His Majesty ,^'^ secured a most favourable reception, and on the 9th of June, 1863, a Firman ^^* altered the succession. The importance of this change can hardly be over- rated. It freed Egypt for ever from the intrigues of pretenders, and it ensured security to the people and to the Khedivial family ; it amalgamated the interest of the reigning house with that of the nation ; and in future Egypt had no longer to fear that a Viceroy would misuse his life-tenancy, as he could now con- sider the accession of his immediate family. A new ^" " In order to obtain the alteration of the succession so beneficial for his country, I have been assured that he had to spend three millions sterling at Constantinople ; and he is sure to find opportunities for further pay- ments." — ' Das heutige Aegypten,' von H. Stephan, p. 153. ss^ Parliamentary Papers, 2395 of 1879, p. 50. ^^ This firman, after settling the succession in tail male, by order of primogeniture, and providing for a regency, &c., recognised the complete autonomy of the Khedive in all internal matters, and gave him the right to bestow military grades as high as colonel, and civil grades as high as Bey; it, moreover, authorised him to contract loans without permis- sion, to enter into commercial or other treaties with foreign Powers, as long as they did not interfere vrith the political treaties of the Sublime Porte, and also empowered him to increase his army and navy. — The Author. 78 EGYPT. horizon opened. The certainty of having to leave a crown to his descendants became an inducement to do good in order not to make children suffer for the bad government of their fathers. Thus Ismail realised the dream of Mehemet Ali's life, the great object for which he had vainly struggled, and which the short-sightedness of Europe had wantonly frus- trated ; and if Ismail had never done more, this ought to be sufficient to ensure him the gratitude of Egypt and of his son. Indeed, no one gained more by it than Tewfik, who otherwise at his father's death would only have been fourth in the order of succession,^" and whose children would only have had a very remote chance of ever succeeding. Strangely enough, it was the Second Princess who conducted these delicate negotiations with consum- mate ability at Constantinople, and who, in gaining her husband's cause, thus ensured the throne to the son of the Fourth Princess, the present Khedive. Princess Djenajar, the Second Princess, is the same who was refused permission to return to Egypt last winter, and I confess that I have not seen any one of standing, from Cherif Pasha downwards, who did not disapprove of this measure, whilst the princesses and the harems of the Pashas were fire and flame, as can well be imagined. It is impossible to know what may have prompted the Khedive to an act of ^ According to the old law of succession, Prince Halim, youngest son of Mehemet All, was heir-presumptive to his nephew; next to him Prince Osman, eldest son of Moustapha Fazil ; after him Prince Ibrahim, son of the Khedive's elder brother Ahmed, and then Tewfik. — The Author. • ISMAIL. 79 severity, so contrary to his usual kindheartedness ; and considering that there have been no complaints of intrigues in the seven palaces inhabited by Ismail's own mother and the mothers of various younger brothers and sisters of Tewfik, it stands to reason that the safety of the State could hardly have been endangered by an additional establishment, as, in Oriental fashion, they are all equally devoted to the head of the family. And here I cannot omit mentioning the knavery of Moustapha Pasha Fehmi, one of Arabi's colleagues, and at the time Minister for Foreign AjBfairs, It appears that a slave brought up with the daughter of the Second Princess, and treated as one of her own children, had been married to Moustapha's brother, to whom she brought a handsome dower and a capital position. On hearing of the arrival of Princess Djenajar her adopted daughter rushed to Alexandria to greet her. For this monstrous crime Moustapha obliged his brother to divorce her then and there, thus leaving his unfortunate young wife perfectly destitute, and almost friendless ; for those who know the East are well aware that all doors are invariably closed to one in disgrace at Court. But we must revert to the Firman of June 9 th. I have mentioned the fabulous sums it has cost Ismail, and I remember that asking him one day whether there was not some exaggeration in the figures, he laconically remarked, " It was not less," But to the monetary sacrifices must be added the humiliations to which he had to submit, and it was. 80 EGYPT. according to his own words, recorded in the Times of Sept. 26th, " only for Tewfik's sake " that he cringed for years before the Sultan, and that he sank millions, which he had to get at any price, and for which he finally paid with his throne. However, he who wants the end must not mind the means, and pos- terity will remember that if Mehemet Ali wrenched Egypt from the hands of the oppressor, it has been given to Ismail to crown the work. By the estab- lishment of primogeniture he laid the foundation of a stable, and consequently a paternal, government. Egypt will no longer be at the mercy of family jealousies, but governed by princes anxious to leave to their children an inheritance worth having, the country must benefit even by what mere selfish interest may prompt its ruler to do. The second important act of Ismail's reign is that of having obtained administrative autonomy, freeing Egypt once and for ever from the fatal interference of the Porte in her internal affairs. It had always been his great object, not to loosen the existing tie, but to make Egypt the point de contact ^^' between Christian and Mussulman civilisation, an impossible feat as long as progress could be impeded by the all- absorbing influence of a Sultan-Caliph whose very existence depends on perpetuating the past. Here again difficulties without end stood in his way, but an hereditary khediviate would have been without value had the Sultan not relinquished his tutelary rights. What good could the best meaning ruler '™ ' La Question figyptienne,' 1881, p. 3. ISMAIL. 81 tave achieved if at every step forward the path could be barred by the veto of a Suzerain blinded by re- trograde notions. Sole masters of the destinies of Egypt, we shall see what use Ismail and Tewfik have made of their opportunities. At any rate, whatever may be his faults, by ensuring primogeniture and autonomy, Ismail has done enough to rank with the kings whom history remembers.^' His powerful and liberal rule has transformed Egypt; communications, agriculture, commerce, industry, public instruction, judicial reform, sciences, art, all have received a fresh impulse, as if he had been anxious to make up for lost time, and to obtain for Egypt a place among civilised nations. Unfortunately his haste to reach the coveted end became indirectly the cause of his ruin. "Che va piano vasano,che va sano valontano"; but instead of proceed- ing by degrees, Ismail went ahead at a pace ^^° which obliged him frequently to resort to expedients of the worst kind. " Most able, energetic, with undoubted administrative talents, an enthusiastic patron of Western civilisation, he was devoured by an am- bition^" worthy of the grandson of Mehemet Ali, and Egypt had in him a ruler superior to any since the Arab conquest." ^^^ Ismail's great qualities, as 3=' Phare d'Alexandrie, 26 Mai, 1882. 360 « jjj jiig 2eal for rapidly reforming Ms cities and Ms people on the European model, lie lias gone too far and too fast for Ms own comfort and that of his subjects."—' The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 170. 361 " He possesses that sin by which fell the angels — ambition." — Ibid., p. 102. 362 " rpjjg i-eign of Ismail, son of Ibrahim, who succeeded his uncle in (J 82 EGYPT. I have said before, were equally his misfortune, and in judging his exaggerated generosity, his feckless extravagance, and his utter disregard for money and the means of procuring it, we must not forget that he is an Eastern prince and that he cannot be measured by the standard of Continental parsimony and order, two things Utterly unknown to the Oriental mind. Moreover, considering himself, what he virtually was, tlie freeholder of Egypt, he hypothecated the land to build a house, out of proportion to his means, and Europe acting the part of certain building societies, forced upon him advances, with a view of appropriating the pledge the moment he could no longer meet his instalments. A most ingenious pro- ceeding by which the borrower is certain to collapse. But before entering on the subject of finance we must give our attention to the chief reform ^*^ of his reign, which was the complete divorce of justice from the administration,^" substitution of legality and the judgment of competent tribunals for the arbitrary system, which the promulgation of Mehemet Ali's code of justice had in no way altered as it had never been applied.^^^ Law existed in name, not in 1863, promised to be the beginning of a new era for Egypt. A man of undoubted ability, possessed of unusual energy in administration, fully appreciative of the importance of Western civilisation, fired with the ambition proper in the grandson of Mohammed Aly, the ex-Khedive appeared a ruler such as Egypt has scarcely seen since the Arab conquest." — ' Egypt,' by Stanley Lane-Poole, p. 178 et seq. 863 1 Egypt,' by Stanley Lane-Poole, p. 179 et seq. SM » r^^)Jg jj^j^j^ principle of the complete divorce of justice from the administration."— 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 307. a«5 « Le code qui a i.ti promulgud par M6h6met Ali, n'a jamais 6td mis en vigueur."— ' lllgypte,' &c., par J. J. Marcel, M. A. Ryme, &c., p. 25. ISMAlIi. 83 fact;^^° by the establishment of the mixed tribunals he wanted to ensure justice for all, to introduce equality before the law, and to assimilate the status of natives and foreigners ; he wanted to put an end to the privileged consular jurisdiction, to the capitulations, and yet preserve their spirit, so as not to deprive foreigners of the guarantees of justice enjoyed under the old conventions.''" In fact, he aimed at making the courts of justice alike independent of Grovern- ment and of Consuls. Security of person and of property was the leading object. Already in the days of Said Pasha, when through his brother's death he became heir-presumptive, he devoted earnest study to judicial reform,^"^ and struck by the injustice of a privileged jurisdiction for foreigners, he at once realised that a thorough reform of the existing tribunals would be the first step towards equality. He had the vices of the Egyptian system explained to him, and when he came to power one of his principal thoughts was how to remedy the evil, but absorbed during the com- mencement of his reign by the great questions of succession, and autonomy, it was only in 1867 that he first broached the subject to the French Cabinet ; and at the Khedive's request Nubar Pasha ^*' suc- =88 ' The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 411. ^'" 'Consular Jurisdiction in Turkey and Egypt,' by J. 0. M'Coan, p. 29. ^^ For a long time one of the leading European barristers, Mr. M. Pini, attended daily on Ismail Pasha to initiate him in the intricate bearings of Continental codes. — The Author. 369 « jjuijar Pasha has been well and favourably known in Europe as an able statesman for 20 years past. ... He is an Armenian Christian, and G 2 84 SaYPT. ceeded in getting M, de Moustier^ the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, to institute in Paris a commission composed of MM. Duvergier, Tissot, Max Outrey, Sandbreuil, and Feraud-G-iraud,^'" with a view of examining the changes proposed by Nubar in his master's name. It was the first step towards the institution of the mixed tribunals, and though the primary idea is a very old one,^" it is but right to say that Ismail was the first to give it a trial, and that he was greatly aided by some of his native ministers, such as Cherif, Eiaz, and Nubar ; but foremost to the latter belongs the chief merit of having carried the judicial reform, which constitutes the great and crowning work of his career.^" It may be a matter open to doubt whether Ismail Pasha fully realised all the consequences of the change ; certainly desirous of crippling the undue influence with which the consular courts had invested the foreign agents, and possibly prepared to see a check placed on his own absolute power, it can hardly be supposed that he anticipated the final consequence, that three viceroys should have retained a man professing and practising that creed for a series of years speaks volumes both for their liberality and his own capacity. . . . Gifted with rare conversational powers, and courteous, almost caressing, in manner and speech, he has a persuasive charm with which few men are endowed." — ' The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 177 et seq. »™ ' L'lfigypte,' par G.. de Laleu, p. 21. "• ' The Khedive's Egypt,' by B. de Leon, p. 297. S72 " Tjjg initiation of the existing judicial tribunals is due to Nubar Pasha, who for seven years laboured indefatigably with the foreign Powers and the Khedive to remove difficulties." — ' The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 305. ISMAlL. 85 yet it is a fact that this " his own creation destroyed him." '■" Certainly the day will come when the mixed tribunals, such as instituted in 1875,^'* will have to be revised ; for much as it is desirable to ensure to the administration of justice a complete and un- fettered independence, it is contrary to the practice existing in the most advanced European countries to allow the courts an encroachment on the sovereignty of the ruler.^" Yet in Egypt the mixed tribunals have arrogated to themselves a supreme power superior to that of the Khedive, and backed by Europe ^'* they enforced the execution of their judgments against not only the State, but the person of the sovereign,^" a proceeding which can only lower the prestige of the ruler ^" ; and in the case of Egypt there was the additional drawback (so we are assured on the authority of one of the judges of this ^'' " An intemational factor was introduced by tte foundation of the mixed tribunals in 1875, by Ismail Pasba, in substitution for tbe consular courts. This, his own creation, destroyed him." — ' Egypt : political,' &c., by GrifBn W. Vyse, p. 8. ^'^ "The reform tribimals, which owe their origin to the life-long exertions of Nubar Pasha, are now an established fact." — ' England and Egypt,' by Edward Dicey, p. 125 et seq. S76 ' L'Egypte et I'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 117. 376 a Things were going from bad to worse, when Germany suddenly interfered for the first time in the affairs of Egypt, and declared her inten- tion of upholding at all costs the authority of the intemational tribunals by securing theienforcement of certain judgments." — ' England and Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 22. s" ' L'ilSgypte et I'Europe, par un ancien juge mixta,' p. 21. "* A conflict between the courts and the executive must necessarily lead to the collapse of one or the other, and as here the courts were backed by the Powers, the result was fatal to the KhediTC. — The Author. 86 EGYPT. very tribunal) " que leur justice a merveilleusement servi la coalition etran^ere qui exploitait le pays." ^" But notwithstanding these evident defects insep- arable from any radical change, undoubted good has resulted, and no better proof of the superiority of the mixed tribunals to the native courts could be found, than the efforts of the population to get their cases removed from the native courts by any means at their disposal. Had not the interior disorders due to Arabi and the soldiers monopolised the entire energy and time of ministers, the long contenaplated change of the native administration of justice would by this time have been effected. Both Oherif Pasha and Eiaz Pasha, when Prime Ministers, told the author that as soon as something like order was re-established, the necessary transformation would be taken in hand, as they fully understood the reluctance of foreigners to submit to the native courts, as constituted at present. Of these courts the following may give a summary idea, such as was explained to me by one of the most influential men in Egypt. " The Moudir," he said, " is supreme, and as there is no appeal, people are afraid of bringing griev- ances before him. Out of fifty cases of murder and theft, not three are brought to light, for as it is the custom to bring the witnesses also in chains, and to handle them very roughly, people are not particu- larly anxious to appear. It is most difficult to get an Arab to denounce another Arab ; they seldom 379 < Jj'Egypte et I'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 21. ISMAIL. 87 peach ; torture is abolished by law, yet by nefas still constantly applied — bastinado and thumb-screw are pet stimulants for opening the mouth of the Fellah. " Only the other day one of Count della Sala's Arab servants was horribly tortured, simply because he was suspected of knowing the whereabouts of an escaped female slave ; and here I may mention that when a female slave escapes and gets her card of liberty, she is immediately accused of theft by her late master, in order to bring her to justice and get her tried." In this case the slave had belonged to the brother of the police doctor, and Count della Sala, the head of the Anti-Slavery Department, after giving her a card of liberty, sent her to the house of one of his married servants to be taken care of ; the next day he heard that his servant had been arrested, and subjected to the thumb-screw (I have seen the mutilated fingers myself), and it required Count della Sala's official influence to get both his servant and the slave released, though he expressed to me a doubt whether he should be able to obtain the dismissal of the doctor and the magistrate. " As to the bastinado," continued my informant, " it is of daily occurrence. A short time ago a mur- derer was brought before the Moudir of X — with fourteen witnesses in chains ; not one of them would speak. The Moudir, sitting on his divan and smoking cigarettes, called on one of the witnesses. He ad- vanced, and crouched down on the floor. Nodding kindly, the Moudir said, ' Now, friend, tell me all.' The witness swore the most sacred oaths that he had 88 EGYPT. not seen anything. ' Come, come, I know you were present ; tell me all, my son.' Again the witness denied more solemnly than ever any knowledge of the case. The Moudir frowned. ' Nonsense, speak out, you son of a donkey.' Third and still more vehement denial. The Moudir, turning smilingly to an official, muttered the magic word 'Kourbash.' The witness screamed, howled, implored, and swore he'd tell everything. So down they settled once more. The Moudir called him again, ' My friend and my son,' and the fellow swore again that all he could say was, he knew nothing, and so they went on for more than an hour, until finally the bastinado opened the lips of the recalcitrant witness. He was only the first of the fourteen, and you may imagine," added my Pasha, " the time wasted by our system of paternal cross-examination." ^^^ It should, however, not be concluded from the present wretched state of native justice that it is of Egyptian origin. " The general testimony of antiquity affirms that Egypt was distinguished amongst ancient nations not only for the wisdom of its laws, but for the obedience paid to them." ^" We are told that the administration of justice was en- trusted to a particular body,^*'' and " that their judicial and justiciary proceedings were modelled upon the most equitable plan possible to be framed"*'^ — so 3«» From the Author's diary, 1881-82. 381 ' Ancient Egypt under the Pharaohs,' by J. Kenrick, ii. p. 35. ^^ ' Philosophical Dissertations on the Egyptians and Chinese,' by M. de Pauw, translated by Captain Thomson, ii. p. 245. 383 < View of the Levant,' by Charles Perry, p. 397. ISMAIL. 89 excellent that one of the most competent authorities of the day expressed a wish "that all kingdoms and states would try and copy them." ^" We are far from those happy days. There can be no doubt that it is the Turkish maladministration which brought the change for the worse over Egypt, and the state of things, both civil and criminal, has at length become intolerable.^^* The sentiment of respect for the public good has long ceased to exist,^** yet in undertaking a change it had to be considered that people always prefer being judged by their own countrymen and by their own laws,^*' be they good or bad. Nubar Pasha's reform project endeavoured to conciliate native and foreign exigencies, and whilst the French were raising all kinds of objections, it is pleasing to note the encouragement he received from the first from Her Majesty's Government and Lord Stanley (Lord Derby), who in a despatch of October 18th, 1867,^^* recognised that the existing system was injurious to the interests of foreigners, as well as of the Egyptian people; that the most cordial co- operation of G-reat Britain would not be withheld from so salutary a work.^^' In his letter Lord Stanley laid special stress on the fact that "Her Majesty's Government have no fondness for an extra- 384 < Yiew of the Levant,' by Charles Perry, p. 397. ^ ' Consular Jurisdiction in Turkey and Egypt,' by J. C. M'Coan, p. 29. 386 < Egypt for the Egyptians : Eetrospect and Prospect,' p. 148. ^" ' L'i^gypte,' par G. de Laleu, p. 1. "^^ Despatch of Lord Stanley, Oct. 18, 1867, in reply to Nubar Pasha's Memorandxun. =«" 'A Political Survey,' by M. E. Grant Duff, M.P., p. 105 et seq. 90 EGYPT. territorial jurisdiction, and would hail with the utmost satisfaction such an improvement in the judicial system as would justify their altogether renouncing any judicial action in Egypt." Nay, in dwelling on " the great abuses and the encroachments of extra- territorial jurisdiction," Lord Stanley went even so far as to say " that Her Majesty's Grovernment was certainly not inclined to hold out for a jurisdiction to which they had no treaty right, which they admit to be a usurpation, though brought about by force of circumstances, and which is as injurious to British interests as it is derogatory to the character and well- being of the Egyptian administration." ^^^ Notwithstanding the support vouchsafed by Grreat Britain, and the goodwill of most of the other Conti- nental Powers, considerable difficulties had to be overcome at Constantinople as well as at home. Both the Sultan and the Ulemas were stoutly opposed to reforms interfering with their privileges. Thus the Cairene Sheikh-ul-Islam declared the^ proposed changes to be religiously inadmissible, to which Ismail replied by dismissing the obstructionist Mufti and intimating that he would suppress the whole body if further opposition were offered. The conse- quence was that the new Sheikh endorsed the con- templated reforms with his ready /eifua, and since then not a whisper of complaint has been heard.^" But apart from the objections put forward against 3» Despatcli of Lord Stanley, Oct. 18, 1867. ^" ' Our new Protectorate— Turkey in Asia,' by J. C. M'Coan, ii. p. 183. ISMAIL. 91 any reform as such, there was the serious drawback of lacking natives competent to sit in the mixed courts ; nay, even now that the new tribunals have been working some years, one of the European judges of the Court of Appeal assured the author "that not one of his native colleagues ^'^ had acquired any knowledge of the procedure " ; in fact, he went so far as to say that it would be impossible to look for efficient native judges until the coming generation had been trained to a serious study of the law, as the present education was utterly deficient in the develop- ment of logical thoughts, so rare in Arabs. But he added to this criticism on the native judges that the composition of the Continental part of their body left also much to be desired. In fact, he gave me to understand that really good men were rarely sent, possibly because they could not be induced to go abroad ; possibly also because ministers in some countries looked upon these appointments as a con- venient patronage to be bestowed on needy relatives, or on people they wanted to get rid of at home. Attention was called to another flaw in the compo- sition of the tribunals by its president,^'^ who suggested the suppression of the four lay assessors, on the ground that no impartial judgments could be expected if in a court of seven members (three judges and four 392 ™ 46,068 20. Redemption of village debts™ 1,274,000 21. Army equipment and material ^''^ 2,000,000 22. Schools^™ 3,600,000 23. National Library'*'' 40,000 24. Loss by cutting the dams on his own properties to save the Fellah lands from inundation in 1875 900,000 25. Loss on the Nile Steamboat Company ^'* 155,000 Total £145,980,501 To this total of 145,980,501/. have to be added the cost of the expeditions to Turkey and to Candia, the forts of Aboukir and others, the extra expenses of the Court not covered by the Civil List, the princely donations to Europeans as well as to natives, the sums expended at Constantinople for the succession and on succeeding occasions (which could not be put down at less than 3,000,000Z.), and last but not least the interest and amortisation paid on the various loans between 1862 and 1879, and for which 45,000,000/. may safely be put down, as the Times of May 19th, 1876, estimates the amount in 1876 already at 31,000,000/., to which interest for three years at the s<" " Coiit de la Mission de Sir S. Baker pour la suppression de I'esclavage, 474,063Z."—' Notes sur le Budjet ifigyptien,' 1873-74, p. 44. •^ ' The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 366. »'« 'Notes sur le Budjet, 1873-74,' p. 43. «'" ' Egypt,' by Stanley Lane-Poole, p. 179. ^" ' England and Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 108. ^™ ' Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 531. ^" Ismail purchased the valuable collection of MSS. of his late brother Muatapha Pasha Pazil for 30,000/. from the executors, presenting the whole to the National Library, on which he expended in addition more than 10,000?.— The Author. »'■' ' Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p, 581. ISMAlL. 143 rate of 5,782,829Z. (according to the.Budget of 1878) has to be added. Thus estimating the expenditure for which data are wanted, and without taking into account the enormous interest paid on Treasury bonds issued at an average rate of 15 per cent, discount per annum, roughly at 8,000,000^, we arrive at a sum total of 198,980,501?. against total of receipts 185,250,000?., which leaves about 13,000,000?. to the credit of Ismail, and accounted for by his own private property, amounting to 4,000,000?. before his accession, by the private property of his family valued at over 10,000,000?.,"^ and given up in 1878, and by items paid out of ordinary expenditure which ought to have been deducted from the 64,600,000?. Although the bondholders have inculcated the impression that Ismail Pasha squandered the money which he obtained from Europe,"* it is beyond con- troversy that they had it all back themselves, and that Egypt herself paid, in addition, for all public works. Indeed, the above will give a rough idea of their magnitude, and of Ismail's restless activity in every direction ; thus an estimate may be formed of the heavy outlay required by a series of great works carried out on a scale far beyond, not the wants, but the resources of the- country .°" Yet in the great things accomplished will be found an excuse, not to say a justification, for the enormous debt, and not- withstanding the doubling of the tribute to the Porte, with other large but unconfessed disbursements at W5 ' Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 528. '"" Ibid., p. 529. *" ' La mine de l':^gypte,' par T. Faucon, p. 7. 144 EGYPT. Stamboul,"^ the Fellah begins to reap the fruits of Ismail's improvements. Whatever his faults, he raised Egypt in the scale of nations, as will be seen in the following table"' : — Acres tilled Value of Imports . . . . „ Exports . . Eevenue Public Debt Number of Public Schools Kailways (miles) . . . . Telegraphs „ . . . . Canals „ . . . . Population Last Year of Said Pasha, 1862. 4,052,000 1,991,000/. 4,454,000/. 4,937,000/. 3,300,000/. 185 275 630 44,000 4,883,000 Last Year of Ismail Fasha. 18J9. 5,425,000 5,410,000/. 18,810,000/. 8,562,000/. 98,540,000/. 4,817 1,185 5,820 52,400 5,518,000 Nothing could be more eloquent than a comparison of the two reigns, and we find against the debt the revenues doubled, imports more than doubled, ex- ports trebled, the area of cultivated land increased by a million and a half of feddans (almost 30 per cent.), and in addition the vastly increased net of canals, railways, roads, telegraphs, &c. If this has been the result of a reign undoubtedly burdened with extraordinary obligations like the purchase of the succession, the Suez Canal, the expeditions to Candia, Abyssinia, and the Soudan, by calamities like the cattle murrain,°^° an administration extravagant ™ ' La ruine de I'Egypte,' par T. Paucon, p. 7. ^™ ' Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 531. 680 » Ismail Pasha has been very active, but there have been as many calamities in his short reign as during Pharaoh's, and ill-luck makes a man unpopular."—' Letters from Egypt,' by Lady Duff-Gordon, p. 114. ISMAIL. 145 and reckless like that of Ismail, dishonest and corrupt like that of the Mouffetich, what would have been the result had the Khedive had an able Egyptian financier of the stamp of Mr. GToschen or Sir Rivers Wilson/" or Blum Pasha ? His misfortune was that the doctors were called in when the patient was beyond recovery ; " in fact it may be said that European intervention contributed only to make the condition of the unfortunate country worse than before." ^^^ Previous to closing this chapter we must say a few words about the extension of the territory, for which he has been so loudly denounced .'^^ It must be re- membered that he inherited the greater part of those vast outlying dominions, that Europe pushed him to put an end to the slave trade which had its centre in those parts. There was only one way of doing so efficaciously, by putting an end to the independence of the slave-dealing tribes. It would be impossible to overstate the humani- tarian object, to which the Prince of Wales has certainly the merit of having given an impulse during his stay in Egypt/'* In fact, the final ™' ' Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 526. ^^ ' L'Jilgypte et PEurope, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 180. 683 It rpj^g Khedive has been loudly denounced in Europe for an insane ambition in extending his explorations and annexations into Central Africa, and most loudly by those who know least about the matter ; who, counting only the cost in cash expended, and the net results thus far obtained, consider his projects in that direction as no better than idle dreams. Yet the Khedive did not create, but inherited these outlying provinces, to which he indeed has annexed others, and sought to annex more ; but his main purpose has been to make these dependencies of Egypt pay."—' The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 342. ^* ' Diary in the East,' by W. H. Eussell, p. B84. 146 EGYPT. « arrangements concerning Sir Samuel Baker's ap- pointment and expedition, were entirely due to the initiative of His Royal Highness/^^ The good effected by Sir Samuel, and after him by Colonel Grordon, and more recently by Gressi Pasha,^'^ is beyond con- troversy. But in addition to the purely philanthropic side of the question, Ismail had contemplated open- ing new fields for the commerce of the world. The interesting writings of Sir Samuel Baker,^^' Colonel Grordon,^^^ and others,^^' give a faint idea of what might be done. And although it may be said that he embarked on a dubious enterprise,^'" it should be remembered that had he been permitted to complete the Soudan Railway, he would have con- nected a country inhabited by eleven millions of his subjects with Egypt proper ; the provinces of Berber, Dongola, Khartoum, and even Kordofan, Darfour, &c,, would have found an easy outlet for their products, and cotton worth 2 talaris (8s.) in those parts and 16 talaris in the Delta would have given a large margin of profit. Surely it was not an extravagant expenditure to devote three millions sterling — that is, six shillings per head — "«= ' Diary in the Bast,' by W. H. Russell, p. 384. ^^ Gessi Pasha died in 1881, a victim to the deadly climes in which he had been so nobly working for the great cause of the abolition of slavery and the slave trade. — The Author. ™' ' Ismailia,' &o., by Sir Samuel W. Baker. ' L'Afrique dquatoriale,' etc., par Sir S. W. Baker (abr^gd par H. Vattemare). ^** Publications of Egyptian General Staff and 'Colonel Gordon in Central Africa, 1874-1879,' from original letters, &c., by G. B. Hill. '"' ' Uganda anji the Egyptian Soudan,' by the Rev. C. T. Wilson and the Rev. R. W. Pelkin. ' Mdmoire sur le Commerce des Negres,' etc., par C. L. Prank. ™ ' The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 170. ISMAIL. 147 to put eleven millions of his subjects in contact with civilisation. Besides, Dongola vi'ould have been within easy reach of vast herds of cattle, and he would have been able, instead of im- porting every year thousands, to supply his own wants from the hundred thosuands " fat and sleek " found in those provinces. Nay, more, he might have succeeded in doing it so cheaply as to export even cattle to Europe.^^' It was to obtain this grand result that he projected the railway from Waddy Haifa to Khartoum at an estimated cost of only 3,500,000^. sterling.'^' But after spending about half a million, the wants of the bondholders put a stop to an enterprise which, if completed, would have amply covered its cost after a couple of years. Moreover, as I have said before, the land near its southern terminus is capable of producing the finest crops of cotton, grain, and sugar in unlimited quantities ; ^^^ but unavailable at present considering that the mode of traffic between Khartoum and Cairo involves five changes.^'* And thus we see again the future and prospective advantages of Egypt sacrificed to the imperious requirements of European creditors. The object, in a humanitarian, as well as in a fiscal point of view, was laudable, and if Ismail's ambition were ™ ' The Khedive's Egypt,' by B. de Leon, p. 378. ^' Ibid., p. 352. =» Ibid., p. 356. 694 " ijijjg present mode of conducting the traflfic from Khartoum, involves five changes to Cairo, the cargoes being taken in native boats down the Nile, at A boo Hammed ; whence it is taken across the Nubian desert on camels to Korosko ; again transferred to boats, and carried down to the first cataract ; thence on camels to Shelal, to Assouan ; and thence again in boats down the Nile to Boulak."— Ibid., p. 353. L 2 148 EGYPT. greater than the means of gratifying it, let us re- member that ambition "is the sin by which fell the angels," °'^ but by which all great ends have been secured. And now let us look at that gigantic stumbling- block which has been the cause, at any rate the origin, of Egypt's troubles and financial collapse. There is, of course, but one voice that it is for the benefit of mankind,°'^°' and the name of the projector and of his liberal patron will for all time remain connected with this great enterprise ; yet it cannot be denied that the very country which contributed most to its completion, is the country which benefited least by the Canal, which brought upon it a loss of trafSc,°'° a great public debt, and a foreign inter- vention. An opinion not new, for in a letter quoted by HJ. and R.H. Prince Eudolph,^" Brugsch Pasha «"« 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 170. 695. u Fjjjg formation of the Suez Canal was for the happiness of man- kind." — Speech of Mr. Roebuck, House of Commons, June 1, 1858. " The Suez Canal was made for the benefit of the world." — Resolutions and Speech of the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone on the Eastern Question in the House of Commons, May 7, 1877. — See also Letter of Prince Gortschakoflf to Count Schouvaloff, May 18/30, 1877. 696 ' L'ligypte et I'Europe, par un ancien juge mixta,' p. 203. ^^ Brugsch Pasha, in a letter quoted by the Crown Prince Rudolph of Austria, says : " Den klassischen Ueberlieferungen zu folge, war Ramses H. der erste Konig, weloher durch einen von dem pelusischen Nilarme aus- gehenden Canal die fahrbare Wasserstrasse nach dem Krokodil-See her- stellte. ... In den spateren Zeiten scheint der Canal verfallen und versiegt zu sein ; dann gegen 600 vor Chr. Geb. fasste Konig Necho den Plan, die Verbindung zwischen dem Nil und dem Rothen Meer herzustellen, gab aber das Untemehmen (bei dem 120,000 arbeitende Aegypter zu Grunde gingen) wieder auf, als ihm ein Orakel die Warnung ertheilte er arbeite nur fiir die Barbaren d. h. fiir Auslander." — ' Eine Orientreise,' ii. p. 63 et seq. (by H.I. and R.H. Crown Prince Rudolph). See also ' Das heutige Aegypten;' vonH. Stephan, p. 425 et seq.; also ' L'ifigypte en 1845,' par Victor Schoeloher, p. 65. ISMAIL. 149 reminds us that when King Necho undertook B.C. 600 to reconstruct the old canal ^^^ of Sesostris (Ramses II.), an undertaking in which 120,000 Fellahs lost their lives, he suddenly interrupted the work,^'" warned by an oracle "that he was only working for the foreigner," And this seems to have likewise been in the mind of Mehemet Ali ; though M. de Lesseps attributes his reluctance to take up the idea to a fear of displeasing England.'^'"' Perhaps Said Pasha, who " had been coaxed *" into acquies- cence*"^ by the master mind that conceived and executed this brilliant work," ""^ may have heard of the prophecy of Bonaparte, " that the Canal would be the making and the glory of the country that under- took it." *"* At any rate he saddled his successors, regardless of the consequences and obligations, with 698 ti Qjj ^jj. q^ijj existe dans la bibliotheque Grand Duoale de Weimar un plan du Canal portant la date de 1424." — ' L'ilfigypte aotuelle,' etc., par A. Guillemin, p. 170. ^'' " Le Canal qui reliait la Mer Rouge au Nil, s'appelait ' le Canal du Prince des Fideles.' " — 'iSgypte et Turquie,' par P. de Lesseps, p. 35. " Taken up again by Darius Hystaspes, it was finisbed 277 B.C. by Ptolemy II." — Vide Strabo, xvii. 1 ; Diodorus Siculus, i. p. 33 ; Herodotus, ii. p. 158. «»» ' The Great Canal at Suez,' by Percy Fitzgerald, i. p. 19. ™' ' Association Polytechnique : Bntretiens populaires,' publics par Evariste Th^venin. 3me s&ie (1862) p. 131. 602 "But it happens that M. de Lesseps has induced the Viceroy to associate himself in this work for the enormous sum of 90 million francs, though the actual revenues of Egypt do not exceed 125 millions per annum." — Speech of Lord Carnarvon, House of Lords, May 6, 1861. ™ ' The Cost of Egypt and the Suez Canal,' by H. Mitchell {The North American Review) p. 509. 604 " iSTapoMon I. en recevant apres son retour d'llfigypte le m^moire de M. Lepere sur le canal des deux mers, prononja ces prophetiques paroles : La chose est grande, ce n'est pas moi maintenant qui pourrai I'accomplir, mais le Gouvemement Turc trouvera un jour sa conservation et sa gloire dans I'execution de ce projet." — ' !6gypte et Turquie,' par F. de Lesseps, p. 43. 150 EGYPT. a concession that was handing Egypt over to specu- lators *°° and foreign intervention. Ismail on his accession found himself pledged to a treaty backed by the Governments of Europe; he faced the diffi- culties in a liberal and public-spirited manner,^"* and notwithstanding the heavy cost due to Said's im- prudent ^"^ concession, and to the stupendous indem- nity adjudged by the Emperor Napoleon III., he fulfilled his part to the satisfaction even of M. de Lesseps.^"* The completion is the work of Ismail,*"' whilst he cannot justly be made responsible for the financial disaster it entailed. The pressure put upon him was greater than he could resist, nay when he contemplated putting a stop to the iniquitous corvSe, Europe and the Canal Company, instead of assisting him in this noble work, made it almost impossible, and Egypt had to pay an additional 3,300,000^. sterling to free herself from a ruinous bondage. The monetary sacrifices can be traced, but how are we to estimate the loss of life, the loss of labour, the ruin indirectly brought on the Fellah taken from his own fields, to toil for M. de Lesseps and the world at large ? It is a page of contem- porary history which would require volumes. The ™^ " Sp^oulateurs et voleurs europfens." — ' L'!]6gypte et I'Burope, par un ancien juge raixte,' p. 200. 606 « ijjig Viceroy had acted in a very liberal, enlightened, and public- spirited manner, and had shown a noble ambition of employing the resources of his country, not upon objects of a personal nature .... but in a work which claimed the merit of great permanent advantage and of public utility." — Speech of Lord Haddo, House of Commons, June 1, 1858, "^ ' The Khedive's Egypt,' by B. de Leon, p. 363 et seq. «»' 'Lettre de M. de Lesseps au duo d'Albufeira, March 10, 1863. ' Lettres, etc. de Ferdinand de Lesseps,' p. 284. «™ ' The Khedive's Egypt,' by B. de Leon, p. 363. ISMAIL. 151 good done to tlie commerce and shipping of the universe is undoubted, and equally evident are the flagrant wrongs inflicted on Egypt ; but the greater the benefits we have all derived, the greater ought to be our indulgence towards a people who have borne almost the whole loss of an enterprise so prejudicial to their own interest. " Had I not been forced to honour the signature of my predecessor," said Ismail one day to the author, " I should have made, the Canal myself ^^° ; it would not have cost more, and at least would have belonged to Egypt." Nothing could be more true, and events have proved that the Canal has been the Alpha and Omega of all recent troubles in the Nile delta, of the mis- fortunes of Egypt, and of the fall of Ismail.*" Though the Khedive, in spending recklessly, has laid the germ of a future harvest, he does not acquit himself"^ of blame. Much, indeed, might have been spared Egypt and him had he been less enamoured of Europeans, and had he surrounded himself with men — foreigners and natives — less pre-occupied with making their own fortunes.*^^" ™ " Le Vice-Roi se croit de bonne foi, capable de faire le Canal ; il se trompe." — Speeoli of Prince Napoleon, Feb. 15, 1864. ' Lettres, etc. de Lesseps,' p. 402. *'i Curiously enough, the very man who contributed most to the fall of Ismail, M. Tricou, Consul-General of France, when passing last winter through Suez, told a friend of the author's that there was nothing he regretted so much as having been instrumental to it. — The Author. 612 « ^ prince who is not deceived by illusions, and forestalls criticism by criticising most severely himself, is a thing that the traveller does not meet with every day." — ' The Fellah,' by Edmond About,' p. 169 (trans- lated by Sir Eandal Roberts). 612. 11 L'bistoire des finances europeo-lgyptiennes sous Ismail est scan- daleuse. C'^tait la spoliation organiste du vice-roi, du pays, des fellahs, 152 EGYPT. He wanted a Colbert, and found only a bevy of second-rate Laws, sansjeu de mots. To judge Ismail we must not use Continental weights and measures, for as Sir Charles Dilke says,"^'' "It is probable that his government was on the whole not worse than Eastern despotisms always are." Ismail would probably have preferred reigning over people able to share his responsibilities, instead of over a country where everything had to be created, and where no wish for improvement existed.*^^"- We have seen what he wanted to do,"^'' and what he did. If he has made mistakes he has suffered cruelly for them, and " though he were unsatisfied in getting, yet ever in bestowing he was rnost princely" ; in fact what must console him is having ensured the succession to his son — to his dynasty, and autonomy to Egypt — a blessing for future generations. . . . . au profit des Europ^ens et de leur suite. Lorsque enfin la banqueroute dclata, la spoliation atteignit son maximum, 1° dans la conversion de la dette parle groupe franfais etdans celle de M. Goschen" . . . . — ' L'ifigypte et I'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 341. 612b « Coming to Egypt from India, the Englishman is inclined to believe that while our Indian government is an averagely successful despotism, Egypt is misgoverned in an extraordinary degree. As a matter of fact, however, it is not fair to the King of Egypt that we should compare his rule with ours in India, and it is probable that his government is not on the whole worse than Eastern despotisms always are." — ' Greater Britain,' by Sir C. W. Dilke, Bart., M.P., p. 567. 612c "L'figyptien n'a gufere encore appris qu'^ se laisser exploiter." — ' L'ilfigypte, la basse Nubie et le Sinai. Relation d'aprfes les notes tenues pendant le voyage de S. A. E. Mqnseigneur le Due de Brabant en 1862 et 1863, par le Dr. Staquez,' p. xiv. 6i2d « jj Youlait dans le bonheur et la prosperity de son peuple, le bonheur et la prosp&it6 de ses descendants." — Ibid., p. 17. ( 153 ) IV. TEWFIK. The reign of Mehemet Tewfik Pasha may be divided into three parts : before, during, and after the crisis. Called to take his father's place under circumstances as painful to a son as to a true patriot, he resigned himself to the tutelage of England and France, I said before that he might have declined the barren honour, but it would have been sacrificing the dynasty, and his children's inheritance. The dignity of the Khediviate had been gravely shaken by the manner in which Ismail's retirement had been brought about. ^'^ In making his successor a mere figure-head, in stripping him of all influence and of his legitimate share of power, England and France undermined the principle of authority, with- out which no government is possible in the East."* The Powers had got rid of Ismail in order to have their own way in Egypt, and in substituting for the late Khedive a successor without a will of his own, without initiative, they simply wanted to give to the Anglo-French rule an Egyptian label. «i3 See p. 22. «« See pp. 22 and 23. 154 EGYPT But in starting their co-operative venture England and France overlooked the immediate consequences. Already Lord Salisbury's"^ high-handed inter- ference in favour of the bondholders, and his utter disregard of the just and legitimate claims of the people of Egypt, officials, army, and Fellaheen, had not contributed to gain us, or Europe, the sympathies of the Khedive's subjects ; indifferent as they are to their own affairs, surely they could not be expected to hail with joy a foreign control, a foreign inter- ference. The Pashas, though most of them Turks, not Egyptians, *" resented being shelved ; the officials saw their bread taken from them by strangers to the land ; the army trembled at impending reductions ; and the Fellah, whom order and equalised taxation vrould have benefited, preferred the old ways to European justice, for the one reason that Orientals hate any disturbance of time-honoured usages and customs ; they hate change and like to be left alone. As to the Khedive, one need only remember the high opinion Oriental rulers have of their dignity, of their power, of an authority undisputed, unchal- lenged, infallible ; and even Tewfik, young, in- experienced, unassuming, must have gnashed his teeth at seeing foreign officials dictate to him and to his ministers, and frequently in a most offensive way, though in justice to our representatives I will «i« See Parliamentary Papers 2352 and 2397 (1879). *" " Les Osmanlis sont strangers en jfigypte." — ' Aperfu gfo^ral sur I'Jilgypte,' par A. B. Clot Bey, p. 123. TEWPIK. 155 say that I have never heard the Khedive or his ministers complain of any want of form from English oflScials, but doubtless others made up for it.*" We may well imagine how Khedive, Pashas, and people must have secretly longed for the riddance of a hateful incubus. This was the immediate effect of our dualism in Egypt. But though apparently approving the Anglo- French Control, and willing to let the two Powers act as the delegates of Europe, it is sheer nonsense to suppose the other great Powers, especially Italy, would accept a position debarring them from all share in the Control.''* The Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna may not have looked on Egypt as a field for im- mediate and direct operation, but more as the arena where others would have to tilt. Prince Grort- schakoff's well-known quotation, " La Eussie se re- cueille," applies equally to Egypt. Russia plays a waiting game and is in no hurry to precipitate matters ; Italy, with the craving of all young powers for extension, for colonies, for influence, felt more than any other the secondary position allotted her at Cairo. With undoubted immediate interests, for, next to the Greeks, she has the largest foreign colony in Egypt, the Dual Control was to her a fresh humiliation, after finding herself already thwarted at Tunis. It can therefore not be surprising that from ^" Ministers and Khedive complained openly of the sans-gene of officials coming to the palace in shootiug jackets and pot hats, men who would not dare to enter the anteroom of a Republican Minister at home without being in evening dress at 8 a.m. — The Author. 618 < The Khedive's Egypt,' by B. de Leon, p. 382. 156 EGYPT. the first, the agents of the other Powers welcomed with secret satisfaction anv obstacles thrown into the way of England and France ; nay a good many difficulties might have been avoided, had they not made it their business to put the Khedive, the Ministers, the Controllers, the Pashas, and all mal- contents against each other. Then, more powerful than the rest, there was the Sultan. In appealing to him to depose Ismail,"* the Powers had revived the old longing for a footing in Egypt. During Ismail's reign the Sultan had lost ground, the Khedive's millions had loosened the nominal tie linking the Nile valley to the Ottoman empire ; Ismail's authority and watchfulness had prevented a secret and underhand propaganda. With the foreigner, the Giaour, ruling in Egypt, with a zero as Khedive, the Porte thought the opportunity too good not to try her hand at re- conquering an effective share in the management of a country whose boundless resources must be tempt- ing to an empty exchequer. Seeing his authority appealed to by the Powers, seeing his rights to Egypt recognised in theory, it was logical that Abd-ul-Hamid should have contemplated its practical revival. The dislike of the natives to foreign tute- lage, at any rate in an offensive form, and the jealousies of the Western Powers, were welcome "1' " La premih-e des trois causes de la raise que traverse I'lSgypte, c'est Taction trouhlante de la Porte, qui a fait du reoours a sa haute interyention que la France et TAngleterre lui out address^ centre le Khddive Istnail, le point de depart de pretensions a una reprise de possession complete de Tlfigypte." — ' La Question ]llgyptienne,' 1881, p. 1. TEWPIK. 157 allies, whilst his spiritual authority assured him an occult influence with the Ulemas. Pan-Islamism became the watchword, the solidarity of faith was contemplated as the stepping-stone for Ottoman power. Furthermore, chance willed it that the military movement offered additional means for estranging the population from both the Khedive and the Control, and for sowing dissension in the camp of those whom he wished to oust. With such divergent interests, with intrigues in every direction, what was Tewfik to do ? The nominal ruler, yet a tool of the Control, he could not even rely on a thorough understanding of England and France. The Control was a mariage de convenanee, and there was no affection, much less identical interests, to cement it. Isolated from his family, trusting no one, and trusted by no one, the unfortunate prince was re- duced to the part of chief mourner to the Khediviate. Having certainly just reasons for complaint, and not daring to reproach the Powers, who had put him into these straits, he was dissatisfied with the Con- trollers they had sent to take his lawful place, and with his ministers, with the two who between them had left him nothing but a name. He complained to his ministers of the Controllers, to the Controllers of his ministers, and to his surroundings of both.^^" ™ " Esprit timide, le jeune prince rendait sa deohdance plus flagrante par sa maniere d'etre. A Riaz Pacha il se plaignait sans cesse des empi^te- ments du Contr61e. Au Contr61e il se plaignait des exigences de Riaz. A ceux qui I'approolierent il se plaignait de tous les deux." — ' La Question :figyptienne,' 1881, p. 32. 158 EGYPT. What wonder to see him drift from right to left, when no one, least of all the Khedive himself, had any notion of what his attributes were really to be ! And it was no easy task for the young prince to feel his way in this maze of intrigues, and to satisfy his own people, the Control, the other Powers, and the Porte, Never sure of the next day, he worked in a half- hearted manner with his own ministry. In every direction he saw new curtailments of the platonic powers allotted him by his patrons. He viewed with suspicion Cherif Pasha's pro- gramme embodying a Chamber of Notables, and the outlines for a future constitution. Tewfik saw in it only an attempt to wrench the last vestige of initiative from the hands of the Khedive, When Eiaz succeeded Cherif, the all-absorbing individuality of his new Premier was equally unpalatable to His Highness ; Cherif represented the embryo of national sovereignty, Riaz the omnipotence of a Grrand Vizir. In both he saw the servants of Egypt, not of " Effen- dina," the embodiment of irresponsible kingship. Not devoid of good intentions, too weak to struggle, Tewfik resigned himself to his fate. In the Occi- dent he would have made a first-rate constitutional monarch, but we are in Egypt, The Control ruled supreme, the Khedive's ministers presided over the interior administration, and both Controllers and ministers were necessarily credited with the merit of all reforms, whilst the mistakes of the system were invariably attributed to the Khedive. TEWFIK. 159 All grievanoes, home or foreign, were addressed to him, he was made responsible for all wrongs ; he was the centre of all reproaches, and on his head were accumulated the discontent and hatred of the aggrieved. . Foreign interference had done away with the privileges of the Pashas, with their monopoly of practically governing the land ; and damaged in their material interests, suffering in their amour propre, ■ they did not look upon the Control with unmitigated joy, and resented even more than the loss of their appointments, the cavalier manners and that offensive patronising way so common to European oflScials abroad. The Fellaheen, the most hard-working, docile, and easily governed race on the face of the globe,°" though possibly better off than ever, less hardly pressed for taxes,"^^ and able to get justice — at least compared with former days — was nevertheless far from hailing the new state of things with satis- faction. To him innovations good or bad are hate- ful, *^^ he is at the present day precisely as he was 621 ' l/£gypte aotuelle,' by A. Guillemin, p. 156. ' l^gypte et Tui-quie,' par P. de Lesseps, p. 6. 'England's Intervention iu Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 164. ' L'^^gypte sous Mehtoet-Ali,' par Hamont, i. p. 204. ' Egypt,' by J. Bartbelemy St. Hilaire, p. 91 et seq. 'Lettres sur I'Egypte cod- temporaine,' par E. Gellion-Daiiglar, p. 208.- '"Modern Egyptians,' by B. W. Lane, p. 293 et seq. ' Tchevet-el-Nazerine,' par Sheikh Abdullah- el-Charkaouy, p. 8. 622 'Aegypteij,' A. von Kremer, p. 89. "En iJgypte, dit Ammien Marcellin, 11 y a de la honte -X payer le tribut de bonne giaoe et sans y avoir et^ forf6 S, coups de fouet." — ' Correspondance d'Orient,' par M. Michaud et M. Poujoulat, v. p. 80. 623 « 'pjjg ancient Egyptians were averse to change, preferring in all things to remain as they were rather than risk the uncertainty of reform.'' — ' Cleopatra's Needle,' by Erasmus Wilson, p. 33. 160 EGYPT. 4000 years ago*^*; this immutability, this indiffer- ence to improvement, is his general and hereditary characteristic. Otherwise, far from deficient in in- telligence,'^* his endemic fatalism*^' is the cause of his stationary status.*" Of old fated to work for others, *^^ the slaves of the governing power,''^" wholly ignorant of any kind of rights, there has never been a shadow of political life'''" among the inhabitants of the Nile valley. Their wants are so modest, that improvements are immaterial to their existence; to them, new laws, whether to their advantage or the reverse, are equally repugnant, they do not like to be disturbed in their habits, and look with suspicion on regula- tions and decrees, as a rule seldom in harmony with their wants, and in all cases above their under- standing. Native officials had even less reason to welcome European intervention. Those who lost their places *^^ to make room for foreigners, lost also their bread ; the lucky ones, those who had been allowed 624 'Egypt,' &c., by J. Barthfl^my St. Hilaire, p. 101. «^ Ibid., p. 91. ^^ ' Im Lande der Pharaonen,' von A. Stahl, p. 224. 627 « Voyage en Syrie et en ^^gypte,' par C. F. Volney, vi. p. 76. 628 11 -jj^ peuple prot^gi^ du ciel, et qui comme I'abeille ne semble destine qu'k travailler pour les autres, sans profiter lui-meme des fruits de ses oeuvres." — ' L']i!gypte et la Syrie,' par M. Breton, vii. p. 111. 629 1 Egypt,' &c., by J. Barthel^my St. Hilaire, p. 91 et seq. n»> ' A Diary in the East,' by W. H. Russell, p. 457. ™ Even Bonaparte, in bis pompous proclamation of the 24 messidor an VI. said : " Tous les Jllgyptiens seront appelds h, g&er toutes les places, les plus instruits, les plus vertueux gouverneront et le peuple sera heureux." TBWPIK. 161 to reniaiii, felt cruelly the overbearing ways of European masters — not colleagues/^^ The army, though now regularly paid, was threat- ened with reductions, acceptable to the private, who hates military service, but hateful to officers, a class of men unfitted for any other profession or any kind of serious work. Thus summing up the smouldering discontent in all branches of the administration, in all classes of the population, we arrive at a grand total that might well inspire grave anxieties. It would have required an iron hand, but the Khedive and his Grovernment were powerless. Not in a position to repress the clamouring voice of the people, much less able to content them, they tried half measures, and resorted, at the instigation of the foreign representatives, to the fatal expedient of promises and conces- sions. No doubt there were grave abuses *^^ to reform ; foremost of all the injustice that foreigners were not taxed,^^* whilst the iniquitous inequality of the land tax ^^' affected additionally the already over- burdened Fellah *^^; secondly, the privileged juris- ^'^ " Les Europdens sont en haut, les !^gyptiens au bas de I'felielle." — ' L'^gypte et I'Europe, par un anoien juge mixte,' p. 127. ^^ " Oe qu'il y a de plus abominable dans les colonies europeennes, c'est leur complicite pour s'enricher aux d6pens du pays et des fellahs, qui y sont a peu pres les seuls producteurs et les seuls travailleurs." — Ibid., p. 113. ^s* " La scandaleuse immunity des strangers." — Ibid., p. 280. «S5 ' The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 320. 636 « qijjg main source of the revenue is the land-tax, which amounts •to 15s. or 11. an acre, according to the quality of the land, and brings in about half the revenue. Another important tax is that levied on all fruit- M 162 EGYPT. diction enjoyed by Europeans *^' ; and thirdly, the overstocking of the country with foreign, frequently overpaid, officials.*^' It would have been wise to have remedied these evils before a change could be' demanded as a right. Both Cherif and Riaz, when Prime Ministers, would only too gladly have given satisfaction to demands so just, so reasonable/^' In justfce to Her Majesty's Grovernment and representatives it must be said that England had not only given her consent, but had encouraged the Egyptian ministers in their endeavours to equalise the position and the charges of foreigners *" and natives, but the French threw again, in this instance, difficulties in the way ; they^ wanted guarantees against over-taxation, they wanted previously to regulate the assessment, they wanted bearing date-palms, at tlie rate of 4s. or 5s. a tree. Salt is a Government monopoly, and every man, woman, and child must buy about 2s. worth, a year. There is a tax for civil rights of about 5s. ; a tax on trades ; market dues of from 2 to 9 per cent, on all sales ; weighing dues, slaughter-house dues of 4 to 10 per cent. ; stamp fees and paymsnts for every stage of the mal-administration of justice; some home-grown tobacco is taxed." — ' Egypt,' by Stanley Lane-Poole, p. 186 et acq. ^ ' L'^^gypte et I'Burope, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 296. "•^ Ibid., p 287. 639 u Deux mille officiers licenci^s sans qu'on leur eiit mSme pay6 des arrieres de solde importants, des centaines d'employ^s civils remerci^s sans aucune compensation, avaient Hi rfeduits a une v&itable mendicity, et lis en accusaient les r^formes ^conomiques consenties par le nouveau Khedive au detriment des droits acquis de ses nationaux (sujets). . . . Toute question d'honnetetd, d'humanit^ et de justice k part, une politique sage et preyoyante eftt sacrifi^ quelques millions au soulagement de ces misferes." — ' La Question !^gyptienne,' 1881, p. 23. '^ Both Cherif Pasha and Riaz Pasha told the author how gratefully they acknowledged the readiness with which Her Majesty's Government had waived all claims of an exemption of foreigners from taxation. TBWFIK. 163 this, Eind they wanted that, not for one instant loot- ing at the immediate eflfect a move in the right direction would have had on the native population.**^ They cared little whether it would have reaffirmed the Khedive's position, whether it would have lessened the difficulties of his ministers ; the grand republican phrases of equality and the rest were only for home use, and they treated Egypt with haughty contempt, using internal dissensions for their own purposes, and throwing difficulties in the way of those vital reforms which had in Lord Granville ^^ a most earnest advocate. Of course it is nonsense to talk of the great increase of revenue taxation of foreigners would bring to the country, and the figures of Sir William Gregory are simply ludicrous. Thus it would be impossible to exact more than 5 per cent, house tax from Europeans, and at present it is 12 per cent., and would therefore have to be reduced. I have it, on the best authority, that it would come to the same in a fiscal point of view, yet the moral satisfaction would be, and would have been, of in- calculable value, independently of the boon to the native householder, who would pay 7 per cent. less. With regard to the European officials the same difficulty arose ; the Khedive and the ministers would have welcomed any reduction in their number, as well as in their salaries; England would have given the example, but neither France nor the other 641 «jjfo race of people can be better formed than the Egyptians." — Travels of Lady Hester Stanhope, i. p. 164. "i" Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 1 (1882) p. 2. M 2 164 EGYPT, Powers would hear of anything of the kind. Again, the actual saving would have been much under the estimate of those who have never taken the trouble of comparing figures. In Appendix III. will be found lists of all European officials, with their respective salaries, for which the author is indebted to Sir A. Colvin, a guarantee for their correctness. We are told Egypt pays 378,000^. a year to Europeans in her service : true, but any one who will look into the tables will find that the average salary of the majority of Europeans does not exceed 10/. per month.'*^ There are 144 officials over 20/., 64 over 30/., 32 over 40/., 14 between 50/. and 60/., and only 17 exceeding 100/. a month. It might be said that Egypt can do without Europeans, but this is not the opinion of the late and present Khedive, or of any of the native ministers I had an opportunity of meeting; one and all agree that Europeans are wanted to train natives, to act as administrative schoolmasters, and all acknowledge the advantages already derived from an infusion of European activity, order, and system into the various branches. '* What we want," said Cherif Pasha repeatedly to the author, "is to get our money's worth; yet," he added, " it would not be worth our while to in- dispose the Powers for the sake of an annual saving of 10,000/. or 20,000/." And here is the hitch, the holders of sinecures, those who are overpaid, those who do not work, are precisely those who prevent ™ See Appendix III. B. TEWPIK. 165 their G-overnments from, assisting the Khedive in his difficulty. A year ago a commission had been already instituted with the view of overhauling the entire civil service, to clear the administration of a host of cumbersome and useless European and native officials, to regulate the salaries, and to put an end to patronage, native and foreign.^** I shall revert to this subject, but here I will state that neither England nor English officials have been or would be in the way of a thorough reform. To begin with, English officials are so well paid at home, especially in India, that they have no need to cling to highly paid offices in other countries ; I could mention two or three of the best paid officials in Egypt who would have 500Z. and even 1000^. a year more, were they to return to India. As to the class of men receiving less than 50/. a month, with few exceptions, they are well worth the money, nay, in some instances underpaid.'*' The saving could only be effected by reducing the number, but in doing so, natives would have to be appointed in their places, and little would be the difference to the exchequer, whilst as far as work goes, it would be enormous were they only Egyptians. Clearly it is *** There can be no doubt tbat the Egyptian service has been too often looked upon as a Continental " workhouse " for cumbersome paupers of the upper ten thousand, and I have met heads of departments bitterly com- plaining of useless and incompetent additions to their staff, and assuring me that frequently they could have twice the work for half the money were they allowed to train natives. — The Author. "5 Indeed, living in Cairo, Alexandria, and the chief places is so dear that few, if any, of the foreign officials will be able to save anything ; certainly not those under 50?. a month, with a family to boot. — The Author. 166 EGYPT. wrong to pay Europeans better than Egyptian ministers ; it will be necessary to abolish a number of highly paid sinecures ; thus one commissioner at the Caisse would perfectly answer the purpose, and the Powers might nominate him in rotation. But the grievance of the Egyptians is less that Europeans are employed, than that Europeans should be selected where natives would do,"* and be better paid for identically the same work. This is only fair and just, for numbers of highly efficient Egyptians are unemployed, simply because there is no room for them. Moreover all European appointments should , be well understood to be only of a temporary nature ; they should have with, and under them, natives who should be trained to take their places at the earliest opportunity. These are matters which no doubt our Government will set right, now that they have an opportunity of resisting the selfish objections of those who claim vested rights for no other reason than that they have been a number of years in the pay of Egypt. Little as an eventual reduction will affect the Budget, it is sure to smooth the ruffled plumes of the natives. It will have a wholesome effect if in future Europeans in the service of Egypt are put on an equal footing with the subjects of the Khedive, and this should be the rule, and would be in the spirit of Ismail's first application and of the replies of H.M.'s Government thereto ; in no civilised country would officials be admitted claiming extra-territorial privileges. Europeans ^' See ' Letter of an old Egyptian,' Morning Post, Oct. 10, 1882. TEWFIK. 167 who want permanent appointments must become Egyptians ; those who do not wish to give up their nationality must understand that they can only remain for a time, that their task is to teach Egyp- tians their business, and that they will have to withdraw the moment there are natives able to replace them. Yet whatever may be said against the Europeans in Egypt, it would be an injustice not to recognise that, as a body, they have proved most useful, and that notwithstanding some overpaid sine^ cures, they have been a great saving to the country. I make bold to say that the 379,000Z. paid in salaries to Europeans have been earned over and over in the course of the year. I know of the head of one ad- ministration, who has more than once saved Egypt in one month his years salary.^*''' But to return to the embarrassments of the Khedive, we must give our attention for the moment to the Control. It would be impossible to overrate .the benefits it has conferred on Egypt in a financial and administrative sense.*** The drawback was its dual- istic nature. During the last years of Ismail's reign English influence had been paramount.**^ This vantage ground Lord Salisbury jeopardised, when '*'' I know on the best authority that Sir Frederick Goldsmid has re- peatedly increased the revenues of the Daira Sani& by 2000Z. and SQOOi. at a time, simply by timing the sales of sugar according to favourable fluctuations of the market. — The Author. 648 u j]je bitterest opponents of the Anglo-French Control are forced to admit that this control has saved Egypt from bankruptcy and restored more than a milliard to the holders of Egyptian stock." — ' Egypt, Political, &c.,' by G^. W. Vyse, p. 289. «*" ' England and Egypt,' by B. Dicey, p. 220. 168 EGYPT. he joined M. Waddington in the overthrow of the Khedive, without even insisting, as did the French, on a reinstatement of the dismissed minister. In devising the Joint Control the two Powers thought of thus equalising their interests, and counter- balancing individual influence ; true in theory, it proved the reverse in practice. The decree regulating the attributes of the Controllers,'*" limited their powers to a financial supervision, to advice affecting the interior administration. But the Controllers were not Egyptian officials, they were English and French, and although our Controllers and Consuls-Greneral have taken all along a right view of their respective powers, the French have from the first been at war among them- selves. Jealous of their respective importance, they were always outbidding each other's influence with the Egyptian Government. The French Consul- G-eneral wanted to use the Controller as an instru- ment of French influence ; he wanted by means of the Control to consolidate the traditional*" meddling of ""^ Decree of Nov. 18, 1876, modified at the request of tlie Egyptian Government, and with the consent of the Controllers-General, who, according to M. de Blignieres (' Le Contr61e Anglo- Pran^ais en ilElgypte, revue politique et littdraire,' 29 Julllet, 1882, p. 132), defined their own attributions in a report addressed to the Khedive on Nov. 13, 1879, saying, "Les fonctions auxquelles nous h, appeles Votre Altesse n'impliquent auoune ing^rence directe dans I'administration du pays, mais elles nous imposent le devoir d'indiquer i, son ministere les mesures que r&lame I'intlrSt commun du pays et de ses crdanciers." ^^1 " Les Frangais ont depuis longtemps toumd les yeux vers l']i!gypte . . . le paradis de I'Orient, la clef des tr^sors de I'lnde, aisde k conqu(5rir, et plus aisde encore k garder." — ' Correspondance de I'armfe franyaise en ifigypte (interceptee par I'escadre de Nelson), publiee par T. Simon,' p. xxxiv. TEWFIK. 169 France in Egyptian affairs, in fact he looked upon the Controller as a subordinate appointed by his Grovernment not to help Egypt on to her legs, but to serve exclusively French interests. The Controller on the other side, influenced by considerations of a higher order,'°^* placed the general interest of Egypt above the individual wishes of his countrymen, backed by the Consul-General. At the same time the authority enjoyed by him and his English colleague, especially in the beginning, as long as the Egyptian Grovernment required the good oflSces of the Con- trollers to carry the law of liquidation with the fourteen interested Continental Grovernments, con- tributed necessarily to give to, primarily, purely administrative functions a political coating. No French official can ever resist the temptation a jouer un rdle, if we are to believe Prince Metter- nich's experience of old,''^^'' and in M. de Bligni^res case there was the excuse of great provocation ; in fact, if he did play a political part, if he did use his position frequently to put a pressure on the Egyptian Government in matters where the Consulr General had failed, it was the fault of his Govern- ment,'^^ not his. Misfortune willed it that succeeding Consuls-General of France could not or would not discern the difference between financial control and political tutelage.*'* These constant querelles de i'^^" ' Le Contr61e Anglo-Franjais en i^gypte,' par A. de Blignieres, p. 132. 652b Pfince Metternioh's Papers, v. p. 444. ^^^ " La France eut deux representants en lllgypte, I'un ofBciel et I'autre agr^e." — La Nouvelh Bevue, July 1, 1881, p. 20. 654 11 ^insi de n^gociations en negociations et de compromissions en 170 EGYPT, minage had in the sequel most damaging consequences, and added materially to the difficulties of the Con- trollers. The tendency of the French to identify the action of the Control with the policy of the home Government did not add to the popularity of the former, as naturally the natives looked with sus- picion on irresponsible " advisers " of the Khedive, answerable, however, to their own Grovernments, Had the French kept as clear from official inter- meddling as did pur Grovernment, until the security of Her Majesty's subjects, and the vital interests of the Empire did no longer warrant a policy of abstinence ; had M. de Blignieres been as fortunate in his diplomatic colleagues as Major Baring and Sir Ackland Oolvin, it is possible that the Control would finally have succeeded in conciliating native susceptibility, while it would have been unassailable in maintaining a complete independence. The posi- tion was the more perplexing as the chief reforms contemplated affected the status of Europeans, officials, and residents, who shielding themselves, at least in the case of the French, behind the home Grovern- ment, opposed a curtailing of what they called " their rights." In this' respect Major Baring and Mr. Colvin's position was decidedly the better of the two. Our Grovernment had consented to the rating of compromissions, rintervention simplement ofScieuse et bfe^vole, indiqu^e au d^but par M. Waddington, avait d'abord conduit la France jt vouloir faciliter des spdoulations de credit en Egypte; elle I'a ensuiteamenfe k se meler de radministration inSme de ce pays, et enfin a prendre I'initiative d'une revolution gouvernementale." — 'La Question ll^gyptienne,' 1881, p. 19. TEWFIK. 171 foreigners to the house tax,'^' and had renounced the privilege of an English post-office — so vexing to native pride *^° ; nor would our Consul-Greneral have opposed a thorough overhauling of European officials and their salaries, whilst in every one of these matters difficulties were thrown in the way of the French Controller. It is not the practice of Her Majesty's agents to identify themselves with the private in- terests of British subjects beyond the usual protection. French agents, on the contrary, like patronising their countrymen, and are always asking "' for something, as Frenchmen abroad look upon the Consulate-General as a sort of agency for remunerative places and con- cessions. In opposing the demands of the Consul- General, the Controller was making enemies with the French colony, in backing them he injured him- self in the native mind ; yet, he had either to leave the patronage to the Consul-General, or to use it 666 « Un autre fait qui aux yeux des ilfigyptiens legitime leurs griefs contre le Contr61e, c'estque celui-ci aurait pu et dfl, 3, leurs sens, recheroher I'dquilibre du budget en faisant pardciper les Burop^ens, possesseurs de terres ou proprietaires d'immeubles, aux charges qui inoombent aux indigenes et auxquelles les premiers s'eohappent, k la faveur des Capitula- tions." — ' La Question !^gyptienne,' 1881, p. 24, et seq. ^^ Eiaz Pasha, when Prime Minister, told the author that he bad almost been obliged to use violence in closing the French post-ofSce at Cairo, and he complained bitterly that Egypt, a member of the Postal Union, should be subjected to the humiliation of French, Italian, and Austrian offices in Alexandria, independent of the loss of about iOOOl. a year the French post at Alexandria entails upon the Egyptian exchequer. — The Author. *^' Both Oherif Pasha and Eiaz Pasha assured the author that they did not remember Sir Edward Malet ever having asked for either an appoint- ment or a concession for English subjects, or ever having backed applica- tions of that kind ; and M. de Blignieres fully corroborated the above, saying : " Les Agents Anglais ne se melent jamais de choses personnelles — et ne sont pas mesquins." — The Author. 172 EGYPT. himself, much as he might have wished to remain neutral. Strangely enough, his good understanding with his English colleagues,'^* his desire to sink the individual interests of England and France in a common en- deavour to serve Egypt,*^^ was interpreted by French Chauvins as high treason ; they said that he was sold to the English,"^"* or some such nonsense.'™^ If I have dwelt at length on these petty rivalries, it is to explain how and why the French Controller was forced by circumstances out of his legitimate and administrative groove, and obliged by his own Grovernment to assume a quasi-political part, which, in course of time, led not only to an unpleasant friction with the Khedive and his ministers, but to a conflict between the Control and the Egyptian Grovernment on one side, and the so-called National party, as represented by Arabi and the army, on the other. The office of the Controllers-General, though limited to a financial supervision by the text of the «58 ' England and Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 221. 669 « j([_ ^e BligniSres ne voyait dans I'exercice du contr61e qu'un instru- ment de defense pour des interets financiers, qu'il avait charge de faire pr^valoir sur tout autre intfiret." — ' La Question l^gyptienne,' 1881, p. 20. *""" M. de Blignieres told the author that in one of the petitions for his recall, from some people whom he had declined to help to a concession injurious to Egyptian interests, one of the signatories had actually stated having seen a cheque in M. de Blignieres' favour signed " Beaconsfield, Premier Ministre d'Angleterre," though he did not rememher the exact amount. " And this is only one out of many idiotic accusations of that kind," said, laughingly, M. de Blignieres. — The Author. 6cob rpj^jg just tribute to M. de Bligniferes' great qualities as an adminis- trator, far above petty considerations, must not prevent me from adding that he was not an "indulgent colleague" to native ministers, and was too much given to biting sarcasm.— The Author. TEWFIK. 173 decree instituting the Control, gave them necessarily an incontestable influence in every direction. It was a diplomatic fiction,*" incompatible with the autonomy of Egypt, and, as we shall see hereafter, the mistakes made, the reproaches heaped on the Khedive and his ministers, were not deserved, as no liberty of action was left them to do either right or wrong. The authority of the Khedive and of his ministers, shaken by the mutiny of February 1880, was getting daily weaker,**^ and here we must go back to the origin of the military movement and its later development into the so-called national agitation. Their first appearance on the political stage was on February 18th, 1879, when 400 out of 2500 ill- used officers made a demonstration against Nubar Pasha and Mr. Rivers Wilson at the Ministry of Finance, claiming their " heavy " arrears **^ ; and though the Khedive rescued Mr. Wilson and quelled the riot,*" it has been said that Ismail had instigated it himself; but considering the animosity of Arabi against the late Khedive, any complicity of His Highness in the matter would have been brought to light long ago, especially as only the other day ^^ " Le Contr61e Anglo-Pranjais est une de ces fictions diplomatiques comme il en existe beaucoup d'autres dans les rapports de I'Europe avec rOrient."— ia NouvelU Bevue, 1 Juillet, 1881, p. 18. 662 11 rpjjg authority of the Khedive and of his ministers, shaken by the military riot of Feb. 1, 1880, has been getting daily weaker." — Eeport of the Controllers-General, Feb. 6, 1882 (' Documents diplomatiques d':6gypte,' 1881-82, p. 118). «'' Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 5 (1879), p. 24 et seq. ^ ' Spoiling the Egyptians,' by J. Seymour Keay, p. 35. 174 EGYPT. participation in this very riot was deemed a title to promotion.^^^ Surely it needed no encouragement from outside ; tte flagrant wrongs inflicted on men whose bread was dependent on their profession, most of them with no other means of keeping a family, was more than enough to warrant a desperate protest. As an old soldier, I am not likely to make myself the champion of mutineers; the first duty of the soldier is to obey, discipline is the backbone of an army, but a Government exacting a stern compliance with military discipline, has likewise the sacred duty of seeing that those to whom the defence of the country, the maintenance of order is entrusted, receive the equivalent of their bargain. The least a soldier can expect is to be fed and paid ; nay, it is monstrous that Christian powers have lent their hand to increase the misery of poor wretches whom nothing but sheer hunger roused from abject resigna- tion,^^' whom the overflowing coffers of the " Caisse " might well exasperate, and who had a right to ask why foreign creditors should be paid, when they, the native creditors, were starving. Driven to despair by the cruelty of measures revolting to every right- 666 T^jien AraH promoted his great 'batoli of 400 oiBcers in April 1882, there was one who seriously claimed promotion for having pulled the beard of Mr. Rivers Wilson ; another for having insulted Tewflk on February 1 ; a third for having kicked one of the native ministers ; details, given me by one of the present ministers, not the kicked one. — The Author. '""' M. de Blignikes mentioned to the author the case of an officer with 22 months of arrears, who applied for an advance of 21. to bury a dead child, and was sent to the "White Nile for having dared to address the minister in person. TEWFIK. ■ 175 fhiriking mind,'" the dismissed officers set the example of revolt. " II n'y a que le premier pas qui coMe." Yet the terror of Ismail's person *'^ overawing all, had pre- vented the mutiny from spreading to the regular army. The officers on half-pay having, however, suc- ceeded in getting their claims considered, the lesson was not lost on those on active service. As soon as Ismail was no longer at the head of affairs to exact submission, three of the colonels in command of regiments — Arabi,^^' Ali Fehmi,"" and Abd-el-AP"- — prompted by Mahmoud Pasha Sami, started a systematic opposition to the War Office, resenting, as they pretended, Osman Pasha Rif ky's partiality to the Circassians.*'^ Wanting to better their ^" What would English officers say if without 24 hours' notice they found themselves stripped of their well-earned half-pay — without bread for wife and children, if respectful petitions remained unnoticed, and if the only answer they could get would be ' There is no money for you, it is all wanted for the foreign contractors of the submarine tunnel scheme ' ? If such an iniquity were possible in England, " the home of fair play," I fear there would be a nasty moment for the authorities in Pall Mall and Whitehall. I for one fully sympathise with the 2500 Egyptian half-pay officers, who not only were deprived of the needful, but were additionally outraged by festivities given with the money of Egypt. — The Author. ^' I have from an eye-witness that when Ismail went down to meet the infuriated crowd, there was silence instanter. — The Author. "The troops would not have acted against the rioters yesterday had not the Khedive ordered them in person to do so." — Mr. Vivian to the Marquis of Salisbury, Eeb. 19, 1879. **' See Appendix IV. «™ Ibid. °" Ibid. *'^ Ismail Pasha Sadyk — the Mouffetich — had first begun to patronise Arab officers at the expense of the Circassians, who until then had wielded the monopoly of all better appointments. Osman Pasha Eifky attempted a return to the old ways, and thereby naturally indisposed the native element. It was nothing but the " 6te-toi que je m'y mette," inherent to all ministerial changes in the East. — The Author. 176 EGYPT. own position, and that of the officers, they availed themselves of the hardships inflicted on the privates*" to give more force to their pleadings, and by amalga- mating their cause with that of the men, they had the pretext of being able to speak in the name of the army, just as later on, by a similar process, they took upon themselves to speak for the people. But granting the justice of their grievances, and certainly those of the men, the way the colonels set to work was contrary to all notions of a disciplined army ; for ignoring altogether their superior officers — in fact, Livas (General of Brigade), and Feriks (General of Division) might as well not have existed — they insisted upon transacting business direct with the War Office, and when they did not succeed by bullying Osman Pasha Rifky, they simply declined to obey his, or anybody's orders, and addressed them- selves to Eiaz, the Prime Minister, yet no longer with petitions, but with demands. They took advantage of Tewfik's helpless state *'* to provoke a conflict, and challenged by his subordi- nates, Osman Pasha Eifky determined on bringing them to justice ; but instead of openly stating his intentions he sent for them under a futile pretext ^''^ *" The action of the European Ministry in reducing the pay of privates and non-commissioned officers by more than a third of what they had under Said was cruel, considering the rise in everything and the additional depreciation in the value of money. — The Author. ^" " Les ofBciers ont sans doute trouvl, dans la faiblesse de caract^re de leur souverain un encouragement a des pronunciamientoa qu'ils n'auraient pas 6s^ tenter avec un prince qui aurait conserve plus de prestige." — ' La Question !6gyptienne,' 1881, p. 32. ™ " He sent for them under the pretext of wishing to give them some instructions as to the part to be taken by their regiments on the occasion TEWFIK. 177 and had them arrested as soon as they entered the Ministry ; a proceeding as undignified as it is con- trary to our notions of fairness. Thereupon, the officers of the first regiment broke into the council- room of the Ministry of War, ill-treated the minister, and then, having released the prisoners by force, and followed by the men of the regiment, they proceeded to the palace of Abdin,*'* and demanded from the Khedive the dismissal of the Minister of War, and redress for their grievances, which consisted princi- pally in the promotion of Turkish and Circassian officers. The Khedive informed the French and English agents that he had no means of resistance, and no regiment on which he could count ; and news having arrived that another regiment was marching in from Tourah, His Highness dismissed the Minister of War, and appointed Mahmoud Pasha Samy in his stead. Tranquillity was thereupon restored, and on the following day the mutinous colonels were re- instated in their regiments, and made their submission to the Khedive."' of Princess Djemila's marriage. The colonels, -who had got wind of the intentions of Osman Pasha, had brought their orderlies to inform the men of their arrest should they not come out after a certain time. The moment they entered the Ministry, Bflatoum Pasha, the Under-Secretary of War, asked for their swords. An hour later they were released, force outwitting Osman's crafty scheme. — The Author. *™ It has heen openly stated that on the news of the arrest the soldiers went first without arms to Ahdin asking for their colonels, and that' the Khedive, appearing at a window, told them he had not ordered the arrest, and that the soldiers had taken His Highness's words for an indirect per- mission to release their leaders. I only mention it to show how anxious the men were to give to their step a semblance of legality. — The Author. 8" Despatch of Eari Granville to the Eari of Dufferin, July 11, 1882. 178 EGYPT. Thus the 1st of February, 1881, gave birth to Arabi, and from this day the influence of the army went on increasing. In obliging the Khedive to appoint their nominee in the room of Osman Pasha Rifky, the colonels knew that henceforth they were masters of the situation. " The increased ascendency of the army soon showed itself in a practical shape. On the 20th of April two decrees were issued, the first increasing the pay '" of the land and sea forces to an extent imposing an additional charge of from 50,000Z. to 60,0001. a ™ I take the following table from VEgypte of May 5, 1881, whioh gives the pay and rations of the army from Mehemet Ali down to the present day:— Private Corporal Sergeant Quartermaster . . . Sergeant-Major . . Sub-Lieutenant. . Lieutenant Captain Adjutant-Major . . Major Lieutenant-Colonel . Colonel General of Brigade . General of Division . Mehemet Ali. P.T. 15 20 30 30 40 250 300 500 1200 2000 3000 6000 8000 Abbas. P.T. 15 20 30 80 40 360 360 640 1500 2000 3000 6000 8000 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 8 16 31 61 Said. P.T. 30 50 65 65 110 500 750 1000 1500 2500 8000 25000 Ismail, P.T. 19-10 30 40 50 60 445 545 750 900 2000 2500 4000 6000 7500 Tewflk. Rations. P.T. 80 40 55 65 80 600 760 950 1500 2500 3500 5000 6500 8000 It should be mentioned that Said, who increased the pay of both ofBcers and men very considerably, abolished rations for officers. Ismail left it optional for officers up to the rank of captain to take either rations or an increased pay (sub-lieutenant P.T. 445 without rations, 300 with rations ; lieutenant 545 and 350 ; captain 750 and 500 respectively) ; the Euro- pean ministers reducing the pay of the soldier from 30 to 19 '10, sup- pressed rations for officers, maintaining, however, the incrjased pay. The decree of April 20 granted the men again their old pay of Said's time, whilst it increased considerably the pay of officers. — The Author. TEWPIK. 179 year*"; the second instituting a commission to inquire into the regulations and organisation of the army. The commission consisted of the Minister of "War, as president, of eleven generals, of whom four were Europeans, and of nine colonels, with one exception all Mussulmans, and among whom was Arabi Bey, one of the chief actors in the revolt of February. " The Controllers-General, at the meeting of council in which the decrees were sanctioned, called attention to the fact that discipline could no longer be said to exist, that the officers did not obey the Minister of War, and that the latter could not guarantee that the officers would not next day demand fresh financial sacrifices of the Government. "In the commission the Mussulman members showed a tendency to combine together against the authority of the Minister of War. The colonels made a claim, which was allowed by the Council of Ministers, that the nominations to vacancies among the officers . of each regiment should rest with the colonels, so that in the disafiected regiments the new officers would be the colonel's nominees. In the course of discussion on the 1st of June, Arabi Bey went so far as to state openly that he would not yield unconditional obedience to the Minister of War, but expressed regret «™ Notwithstanding this increase, the cost of the army cannot he called exaggerated. In 1880 it amounted, for a total of 12,882, to L.B. 360,000 (including L.B. 53,898 for half-pay officers) ; whilst it amounted in 1881, for 13,493 men, to L.B. 368,000 (pay, L.B. 115,778 ; rations, 85,876 ; forage, 17,098 ; uniforms, 27,116, &c., including L.B. 46,612 for half-pay officers).— The Author. n 2 180 EGYPT. for his language upon a threat of resignation by the English member of the Commission." *''' Having undertaken the management of Tewfik's affairs it was a grievous mistake of the Powers to underrate the consequences, and not from the first to devise means for restoring the authority of either the Khedive or the Control, instead of leaving both at the mercy of the caprices of a military mob. In February it had been possible for Mr. Malet to convince the three colonels of their folly to provoke a foreign intervention by the overthrow of the Grovernment, and as they realised that by going too far they would jeopardise everything, Arabi and company thought it best to leave their case uncondi- tionally in the hands of Mr. Malet. They trusted his word, and as he managed to get the chief grievances remedied, matters apparently cooled down. I say apparently, for, to all who knew Baroudi, it was clear that he would never rest until he had over- thrown Riaz, and that he would make use of the colonels just as they had made use of him. On the other hand, Riaz could not be brought to admit that the army was really disaffected, and he cer- tainly overrated his own hold over Khedive, ministers, officers, and men. He smiled at the possibility of a coup de main, and was convinced that his personal authority, backed by the Control, would suffice to maintain order ; and in this opinion he was certainly encouraged by the foreign representatives. I remember him telling nje," Je represente la justice, «'" Despateli of Earl Granville to the Earl of Dufferin, July 11, 1882. TEWPIK. 181 et avec cela je suis plus fort que M. de Bismarck, avec ses armees." Possibly he miglit have got ahead of the breakers, had the Khedive stood by his ministers, but the following extract from a letter by one of the pashas, dated March 1881, will show that such was not the case : — " The situation here is too ridiculous, the Viceroy and the Grovernment are afraid of the colonels, and the colonels are afraid of the former. Though having pardoned the mutineers, the Viceroy would be delighted to get rid of the leaders by putting them on half-pay, but he dare not do it. Instead of show- ing energy His Highness has given way to almost criminal inaction, considering the dangerous conse- quences it entails. Hesitating and timid, the Khedive will not take any decision, in fact his very abstention makes one doubt his sincerity. Fully aware of his own weakness, he is jealous of his ministers, whom he would like to saddle with the entire responsibility of the present state of things. He tells everybody that his position is humiliating, and that the ministers have done nothing to remedy it, which means that he would not be sorry to see them at Jericho. But instead of putting himself at the head of the army, thus to paralyse the influence of the colonels, he locks himself up at Ismailia, and undermines by his very attitude the power of Eiaz. The situation is most critical. The Viceroy does not understand the danger of playing a game in which he must be the loser. Riaz won't see, and if matters are not worse, it is due alone to Mr. Malet's influence and energy." 182 EGYPT. The want of a good understanding between the Khedive and his advisers strengthened of course the hands of the colonels. Nevertheless, Eiaz Pasha relied on the indolence and want of initiative of both officers and men, and thought that the absence of discipline would make it difficult for the officers to rely implicitly on the soldiers. Chronic insubordina- tion cuts both ways. But there is one thing the Prime Minister did not take into account, that is the dread of the colonels that, notwithstanding the pro- mised amnesty, they would at the first opportunity be called to account, and be sent to the White Nile *" as they deserved. As long as Mr. Malet remained in Cairo they felt secure ; he had promised that in this instance they should not be punished, that the past was wiped out ; and they relied upon his word. But when he went on leave; when, tired of Eiaz Pasha's " wait and all will be well," '^'^ the Khedive nominated his brother-in-law Minister of War in Baroudi's place, and when rumours of the sending of Ottoman troops ^^^ reached Egypt, the triumvirate began to feel uneasy. Mr. Malet was no longer there to reassure them, and those most interested in the overthrow of ««' Despatoli of Mr. Malet to Earl Granville, Sept. 23, 1881.— Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 28. «»2 Ibid, 68S rp-j^g following is an extract from a letter written by an Egyptian general officer on Sept. 9, the very day of the military demonstration : — " La question de I'armee, tout en pouvant devenir dangereuse, ne Test pas encore. II s'agirait d'avoir une main de fer pour rassurer des tetes emportees simplement parceque personne n'a le courage de les arreter. Les trois colonels r^voltfe m'ont assm'6 pas plus tard que hier qu'ils ne veulent pas des Turos ; ils prdf&eraient meme des Chretiens ; du moins, me disait Arabi Bey, ceux-lk apportent la civilisation." — The Author. TEWFIK. 183 not only Riaz, but of the Khedive, intentionally- magnified the danger, thus pushing the colonels to new action. Arabi Bey and his accomplices became frightened and thought it — not without good reason ^^* — expedient to forestall their adversaries. Lord Granville mentions in his letter to Lord Dufferin the fall of Eiaz in a few laconic words ; he says : " The disorganisation and want of discipline in the army assumed increased proportions. An attempt which was made in September to remove some of the disaffected regiments from Cairo led to a fresh mili- tary outbreak, headed by Arabi Bey. The colonels demanded the dismissal of the Ministry, a constitu- tion, and the increase of the army. The Khedive again yielded, assented to the dismissal of the Ministry, and summoned Cherif Pasha. Cherif Pasha at first demurred to taking office as the minister of a military revolution, but eventually agreed to become Prime Minister on being requested by the Notables, and on the assurance that the army would. submit to his authority." ^^^ Now it seems to me that his Lordship is passing in rather a light way over one of the most important phases of the Egyptian crisis. As I have said before, the 1st of February gave birth to Arabi ; thus did the 10th of September to the so-called I"* It is notorious that orders had. been given to arrest the colonels ; in fact, their houses were surrounded, and Arabi only escaped over the roofs of some neighbouring houses, whilst the other colonels had got vfind by the treachery of some official of Abd-el-Kader Pasha, the then Prefect of Police. — The Author. «8s Despatch of Earl Granville to the Earl of Dufferin, July 11, 1882. 184 EGYPT. National party. And here I beg leave to say that the true National party as represented by Oherif Pasha and his friends, must not be mistaken for the sham Nationalists with whom Arabi and his Euro- pean advisers have so long been able to deceive the English public, the more easily as both during Cherif's term of ofiSce were sailing under the same flag. Up to September, there had been only a military question ^** ; no one had ever pronounced the name of the people, except Cherif in his programme of 1879. To the colonels, "Notables and Constitution" came simply as an afterthought, when they had to shield their criminal conduct — a clever move which did not fail to gain them sympathies with malcontents at home and enthusiasts abroad, yet we look in vain for even an allusion "to the people" in Arabi 's letters of September 9 th to Mr. Cookson,*'' and to the Minister of War *^' in which he explained " the motives " of his impending demonstration. By resuming office Cherif unwittingly helped to give consistency to the belief that the Nationalists, the party of young Egypt, and Arabi's pseudo- «*" " Arabi replied that lie and liis Mends were between two fires on tbe one side from the Government, on the other from their own comrades, who were gradually gained over by the Government ; in fact, this action had become absolutely necessary in self-defence." — Despatch of Mr. Malet to Earl Granville, Sept. 23, 1881. Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 30. 687 « ijj^g iniiitary have endured oppression and intrigue, and have been threatened with destruction ... we consider it our duty to protect our lives and our interests." — Letter of Colonel Ahmed Arabi to Mr. Cookson (Sept. 9, 1881), Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 4. ™* See letter of Colonel Arabi to the Minister of War, Sept. 9, 1881. Egypt, No. 3 (1881) p. 14. TEWFIK. 185 patriots were one and the same. However, as they seemed to be in the same lobby they were mis- taken for each other, and Arabi made capital out of this misconception ; nay, adroitly fusing the military question with that of the people, he got his foreign friends ■ to dub him a reformer and a second Moses.''* There was not much though of a Cromwell '^' in him when he stood pale and trembling*'" before Tewfik in Abdin Square ; not much of a fearless tribune when he sheathed his sword at " EfFendina's " bidding ; and had Tewfik followed the spirited and manly advice of Mr. Colvin, had he arrested Arabi conspicuo omnium or cut him down, as it was his right, there would have been an end of all mutinies, and one hardly dares to think what might not have been spared us all. It was only by yielding need- lessly at a moment when he might have recon- quered his lost prestige by a bold move *" that he raised the rebel colonel on a popular pedestal. His Highness was under the impression that they would all have been massacred *'^ had he laid hands ^' Letter of Sir William Gregory. — Times, Dec. 1881. 690 That lie did tremble I have on the authority of an eye-witness. — The Author. I"! To give an idea of the prestige still exercised by the princes, I will mention that when the troops surrounded the Palace of Abdin on that very day, Prince Mahmoud, a younger brother of the Khedive, ordered one of his servants to take a message to the harem. The soldiers would not let Mm pass, and barred the way with their bayonets, when Prince Mahmoud rushed forward and boxed the ears of two of them. He had not even a sword, yet they at once presented arms and allowed the servant to pass. — The Author. 692 " I said to the Viceroy, ' Now is your moment.' He replied, ' We are between four fires.' I said, ' Have courage.' He took counsel of a 186 EGYPT. on Arabi, an opinion by no means shared by other witnesses of the scene. The Viceroy was lacking in nerve and initiative, not personal courage,*^^ and as there was only Mr. Colvin and General Stone to advise energetic action, His Highness is less to blame than the princes and pashas who were as usual conspicuous by their absence, leaving foreigners to show their Sovereign the path of duty. Moreover, why reproach the Khedive with a waver- ing and hesitating attitude and a wish to tide over the difficulties of the moment, when all that Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay found to comfort and assist their prote'ge with, was an exchange of mutual assurances that the English and French Grovern- ments attach the greatest importance " to the main- taining of an attitude of a pacifying and calming character during the present crisis in Egypt," "'* some- thing like throwing a box of Cockle's pills to a drowning man, as a preventive against sea-sickness. The Khedive in the meanwhile having telegraphed to the Sultan for twenty battalions of Turkish troops, the Controlling Powers protested, and though one may fully share the fears of the two Cabinets that an armed intervention by the Sultan would have native officer on Ms left, and repeated to me, ' What can I do, we are between four fires ? We shall he killed.' " — Memorandum of Mr. Oolvin, Sept. 10, 1881. Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 4. ™ An opinion evidently not shared hy the compositors and Foreign OfSce clerks in charge of Parliamentary papers. — Vide Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 4, line 7. — The Author. «»* Despatch of Earl Granville to Mr. Adams, Sept. 10, 1881. Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 6. TEWFIK. 187 had serious consequences, it is difficult to under- stand the logic of appealing one day (as Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington had done) to the Sultan as Suzerain with a request to depose Ismail, and the next (as Lord Grranville and M. Barthelemy St. Hilaire were doing) reprimanding Tewfik for following suit. Advising His Highness to give way, to con- ciliate, he stumbled from concession to concession, until the Powers brought him into his present plight. He had not a corporal and six men on whom he could rely ; England and France would not and could not interfere, yet they frowned at Tewfik for looking to his Suzerain for assistance, and the Sultan was told that he must " use pacifying language like Her Majesty's Grovernment," ^'^ and not take hasty action " until the necessity had been clearly demon- strated." ^'^ But what was Lord Grranville waiting for ? surely Arabi had done all a rebel could do, short of taking his master's life and place ? Yet one can well understand the perplexity of Her Majesty's advisers; and the false position into which Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington had placed both the Powers and Egypt when they revived the dormant rights of the Sultan, received a fresh illustration by Tewfik's appeal in extremis. His Highness asked the Sultan for twenty bat- talions to protect life and limb, we suggested instead «'5 Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 11. 696 Despatch of Earl Granville to Mr. Adams, Sept. 10, 1881. Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 7. 188 EGYPT. a Turkish Moushir, whilst M. Barth^lemy St. Hilaire thought that "even the despatch of one Turk might result in permanent occupation,"^" and proposed to send an English and a French general, with a batch of newly-bound army regulations, as joint Military Controllers. Asking an Egyptian general what he thought of this happy idea, he said " Have you ever seen a cat and a bulldog together in harness, taking a rat out for a pleasure trip ? " I confessed I had not, and he expressed his hope that we might all be spared the spectacle. Fortunately we were. " The reforms,***^ " wrote Oherif in his letter to the Khedive, " which we are about to undertake with the assent of your Highness, concern the most important interests. . . . But the examination of important questions that arise . . . cannot be the work of your ministers alone. We think, my colleagues and I, that they would be studied to better purpose and more wisely settled by an exchange of ideas and. by discussion in which men would take part whose knowledge of affairs, recognised respectability, and position would give them the confidence of the public, and indicate them to the choice of their countrymen. . . . Your council of ministers con- sider it, therefore, now their duty to request your Highness to respond to the wish of the country, by assembling the Notables of Egypt in order to consult "i" Despatch of Mr. Adams to Lord Granville, Sept. 13, 1881. Egypt, No. 3 (1882). «'* Mr. Cookson to Earl Granville, Sept. 16, 1881, and Cherif Paslip, to the Khedive, Sept. 10. .Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 3, p. 1739. TBWFIK. 189 them as to the needs of the provinces, to lay before them the defects of the administration, and to ac- complish, with the aid of their experience, the necessary reforms." *^* By thus calling the Notables — and we know that he made his acceptance of office dependent on the wish of the people— Cherif Pasha had put a damper on military effervescence, and had temporarily re- legated the soldiers to the background. This assisted the Powers out of a painful dilemma, for in order to forestall an Anglo-French military control, and in defiance of Anglo-French wishes, hints, and threats, the Sultan had sent an imposing mission"" to Cairo, and could only be bribed to shorten his envoy's stay by the simultaneous with- drawal of the ironclads England and France had sent to Alexandria "as a place of refuge for the foreign population." '°^ It is very characteristic that the want of a " refuge " was felt in Downing Street twenty-four hours after the arrival of AH Nizami at Alex- andria,'"^ whilst it could again be dispensed with on the 19 th of the same month — the day of the de- parture of the envoys, and the very day of the arrival of the Invincible. '^^^ Cherif Pasha to the Khedive, Oct. 4, 1881. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 60. 700 ijijjg mission was composed of Ali Nizami (who since has been on similar errands to Berlin and Vienna) and of Ali Fuad Bey, son of the great Ali, with a numerous retinue of Secretaries and A.D.C. — The Author. ™> Despatch of Earl Granville to Lord Lyons, Oct. 7, 1881. Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 38. ™2 Ibid. 190 EGYPT. Yet whatever may have been the object of the Turkish mission, and whatever harm it may have done in camera and behind the scenes,'"^ " the im- mediate effect was good, as Sir E. Malet telegraphed to Lord G-ranville,'"* for it hurried Arabi and his regiment to EI Ouadi,'"^ on the morning of Ali Nizami's arrival; an additional proof of the un- questionable prestige of the name of the Sultan- Caliph, and of the dread of Arabi and Co. of being called to account. In fact the speeches of the colonels and of Mahmoud Samy on this occasion, were overflowing with expressions of devotion to the Khedive, and extolled the merits of Cherif and of his colleagues *°^ ; not sure what turn affairs might take, and still in the dark as to the Caliph's intentions and instructions, they thought it prudent to keep on the safe side. Sabit Pasha's mission to Constantinople, and 703 a rjjjg mature of the mission must not, iiowever, be judged by the character of the chief plenipotentiaries, nor by the official instructions of which they are the bearers. Ali Nizami Pasha is a fine soldier and nothing more. Ali Fuad Bey's only claim to distinction is that he is the son of his father, the great Ali Pasha, but unfortunately he has only inherited the paternal vanity without the ability which in some measure justified it. These two excellencies are merely the ornamental figure- heads of the mission. The soul of it, I have reason to believe, is Kadri Bey, an imperial chamberlain and an Arab by birth, who has played a considerable part in all the Pan-Islamitic intrigues which Abdul Hamid's genius so dearly loves to weave. He indeed only accompanies the special mission in the humbler part of interpreter, but there is little doubt that to the Palace confidant is committed the delicate task of vindicating at Cairo the supreme authority of the Khalifate." — (Letter from Constantinople, Oct. 7) Pall Mall Gazette, Oct. 12, 1881. ™ Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 35. ™» Ibid., p. 66. '<" Extract from L'Egypte, Oct. 8, 1881. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 62. TEWFIK. 191 Tewfik's unconstitutional surrender,"" made it pro- bable that tbe Sultan would support the latter and sacrifice the colonels ; nay, convinced that Cherif would do all he could to prevent the Turks from meddling in Egyptian affairs if the colonels knuckled under, they gave way — pro forma. They knew too well that the meeting of the Notables would offer opportunities for renewing the strife, arid for testing the fictitious solidarity of Khedive, Ministers, and Controllers. I said before, that Tewfik, crushed by the person- ality of Eiaz, had welcomed a change, but he disliked Cherif as much, if not more. Cherif's name had only been the third " submitted " by His Highness to the mutinous soldiers,'"^ and that only at the suggestion of a foreign agent who reminded him of Cherif's popularity. Not that Tewfik disliked the man, but the principles he represented. The auto- cratic ways of Eiaz did not exclude the possibility of a Khedive reassuming power himself, whilst with Cherif's constitutional ideas, and a Chamber of Notables, there was an end to personal rule. Be- sides there were other reasons of a private nature,'"' equally powerful. ™' ' The Sultan's Policy in Egypt ' (Constantinople, Dec. 12, 1881— " Prom our own Correspondent "). — Times, Deo. 27, 1881. 708 « jjis Highness named either Heidar Pasha or Ismail Pasha Byoub as those whom he would select."' — ^Report of Mr. Cookson to Earl Granville, Sept. 10, 1881. Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 2. '™ The Khedive knew Cherif's high sense of justice, and his determi- nation — favourably viewed by the leading men in Egypt — of putting an end to all "family proscriptions," and of allowing the return to Egypt at the earliest opportunity, not only of the exiled brothers of His Highness, 192 EGYPT. It almost required Mr. Malet's interference "to impress upon His Highness the absolute necessity of making the public believe, at all events, that he had full confidence in his new Ministry " "" ; but I do not think that either Cherif or the colonels had very sanguine illusions on this point, and the latter, rightly or wrongly, looked upon the Khedive as a trump card in their own game, and gave His High- ness repeatedly to understand that with them and a strong army, he would have a fair chance of being again somebody. It will easily be understood that such a state of things was not likely to facilitate the work of Cherif, notwithstanding the encouragement he received, both from within and from without, to persevere in the ungrateful task he had undertaken; his only hope was that the Chamber of Notables would form a counterpoise to the daily increasing interference of Arabi Bey'" and the colonels in matters of but even of Ismail, in the belief that the old prestige of the father would materially assist the son. The succession in his children's favour having once for all closed that question, His Highness insists nevertheless, in true Oriental fashion, on the exile of his brothers, notwithstanding all assurances of loyalty ; in fact, only quite recently the Khedive preveuted his brother Prince Ibrahim from joining our army in the field, though the Prince has been educated at Woolwich, and rightly considered it a duty to fight for his brother and his country. Surely if there was a fear that his brothers would conspire, it would be better to have them under his thumb, and to try them on the spot for high treason, and if there is no fear, why stir them to action by persistently refusing them the right to live with their wives and families — a right incontestable in Mussulman law ? — The Author. "" Despatch of Mr. Malet to Earl Granville, Sept. 21, 1881.— Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 28. '" "Arabi sends orders to the Moudirs, and even to the ministers ; thus'a TEWPIK. 193 administration, and that the Chamber would dis- courage the unreasonable demands for an addition of 280,000^. to the army estimates."' Cherif's letter to the Khedive of September lOth,''^ resumed in a few lines his old programme of 1879 ; reasonable economy in the expenses of the State, honesty in the public service, the establishment of a clear and uniform system of legislation, the de- termination of public authorities and their functions, works of general utility, public instruction — in short, administration and social reforms on a liberal scale. But first public confidence had to be restored. The arrival of some of the Notables at Cairo, the moderate views expressed by them individually, and the few days ago lie invited tlie Minister of Justice to quash certain judg- ments of which he disapproved, he ordered the Minister of Finance to appoint a number of his creatures, without consulting the heads of departments— for instance, in Mr. FitzGerald's office ; he rules supreme at the War Office ; receives petitions, grants favours, and assumes the post of an iiTesponsible dictator. I have seen several of his communiques which were certainly gems of laconic presumptuousness." — ^From the Author's Diary, Feb. 2, 1882. 712 i< rpj^g months of November and December were marked by some recurrence of military disorders, by increased interference of Arabi Bey and the colonels in matters of administration, and by a demand on the part of the Minister of War for an increase of the army, involving an addition of 280,0002. to the army estimates. This demand was resisted by the OontroUers-Greneral, who did not consider that the revenue allowed of more than 120,0002. being devoted to the purpose. In the end the view of the Controllers-G-eneral prevailed, and the Budget was framed according to the more reasonable proposal. It showed an estimated increase of upwards of 153,000Z. in the expenditure of the Ministry of War ; but the Controllers-General pointed out, in their report to the Khedive, that the real additional charge was not less than 211,0002., and that further heavy expenses would probably be incurred in consequence of operations in the Soudan and on the Abyssinian frontier." — Letter of Earl Granville to the Earl of Dufferin, July 11, 1882. "3 Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 10 (1882) p. 3. 194 EGYPT. earnest determination of all not to submit to a military dictator, induced the Khedive and the Ministers to take a more cheerful tiew of the situation. Thanks to the Controllers, a compromise between the Grovernment and Arabi had so far been arrived at that the military budget was to be increased, not to 280,000^., but nominally to 180,000/., in reality to 211,000/. ;'" yet even this amount would have entailed either considerable reductions in other departments or additional taxation. To both, the Controllers were naturally opposed, and therefore not sorry to leave the Notables to settle where the money for this increased military expenditure was to come from. They had pointed out to Mahmoud Samy — the mouth-piece of Arabi — that reductions of the budget of public instruction and public works would be fatal to the future development of the country, that reductions in the salaries of civil servants, as well as of their number,'" would only represent an '" But by shifting the pension fund from the War Office to the Ministry of the Interior, they increased the military budget by an additional 8l,000Z.— The Author. , "^ One of " the first cares of Cherif had been to institute a commission entrusted with the overhauling of the civil administration, and . . . Bey, one of the native members of the commission, told me that he strongly doubted whether any saving would be effected without much injustice to the present holders of Government appointments. He said there were two opposite opinions in the commission ; the European and enlightened native members holding that reduction of salaries should only take effect in case of vacancies ; suggesting that, for instance, an official receiving 30Z. a month, in a class which in future would only be entitled to 201., should continue to touch the higher salary until a vacancy in a higher class did allow of his transfer. Curiously enough, the Native Commissioners won't hear of any gradual change. They say. Let us settle the new rules, 'This is your future pay; go, if it does not suit you.' They fancy TBWPIK. 195 infinitesimal fraction of the 211,000^. required, nay, that the contemplated extension of the house-tax to foreigners '" would he far from producing an equi- valent. But the more their arguments were irre- futable, the greater was the hurry of the colonels to carry their point, and to make it law before the meeting of the Chambers. Talking big about popular reforms and the rights of the people, Arabi and Co. had only the increase this will only affect the Europeans, but they are mistaken ; for every foreigner, fifteen natives would have to suffer, in fact it would disturb the whole civil service and add a third factor to the discontented Ulemas and soldiers. However, a happy medium might be found by suppressing sine- cures and putting inefficient men on half-pay." — From the Author's Diary, 1881. "* " It is monstrous to think that foreigners are still exempt from the house-tax and professional tax. Blum Pasha told me that he paid vol- untarily his house-tax, feeling ashamed of drawing a salary without con- tributing, like his married servants, to State expenses, but I think he is the only foreigner whom his conscience has pricked. Malet has all along been in favour of taxing foreigners, as indicated by justice and common sense ; De Martino, Lex, Saurma, and Kosjek seem all well disposed, and I think since King's recall, that Greece is the only country opposing the taxation of her subjects and proteges, among whom we find the leading bankers, the richest members of the foreign colony. Four-fifths of Alexandria, for instance, belongs to Europeans, yet not one of them contributes a piastre towards public expenses. The Fellah is taxed for his mud-hovel, whilst the palace of the rich banker escapes soot-free. The water-carrier, the shoeblack, the native cabby, pays a professional tax, but his foreign com- petitor, who does him out of his customers, pays nothing. For years Cherif, Eiaz, in fact all succeeding Prime Ministers have worked to obtain justice, and though Her Majesty's Government, at any rate Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, have openly denounced this iniquity, and given their support to a change, first the French, and now the Greeks are making difiiculties. Everybody here laughs at Mr. Blunt's and Sir W. Gregory's discovery of wrongs well known, and which would long have been abolished had it only depended on Ministers and Controllers, requiring neither the fussy intermeddling of amateur politicians, nor the grandilo- quent phrases of Arabi. An addition of 211,000Z. to the military budget is surely a novel way of easing the burden of the native tax-payer." — From the Author's Diary, 1881-82. o 2 196 EGYPT. of the army and of their own salaries in view, and it is pitiful to think that Liberals abroad allowed themselves to be hoodwinked by the gross impostures of the military clique and their foreign friends. The forbearance of Cherif, the conciliatory attitude of the Controllers, deserve the highest praise, and only those who on the spot have been witnesses of the daily and incessant provocations to which Ministers and Control were exposed can form a just idea of the relief they felt when the convocation of the Chamber promised to act as a buffer between the ministerial programme and Arabi's exigencies. In Cherif 's letter of October 4th '" was sketched the outline of his home policy ; there was not a man of standing in Egypt who did not approve of his programme, not one of his political adver- saries, even, who doubted his patriotism and his honest desire to benefit the people by all means in his power,"* and when His Highness opened the "^ Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 60. "* Mr. W. S. Blunt, in Ms " personal " (indeed very personal) narrative (Nineteenth Century, Sept. 1882, p. 342), says : " Sir Edward was anxious at one time that I should make friends wiih. Cherif, and I called upon him, and had a long conversation with him, which did not however encourage me to return. I found him quite undistinguishable from the numerous Ottoman pashas of my acquaintance. ... To speak of him as an Egyptian, or a patriot, or a man of any but the narrowest and least elevated views, is, I am sure, a mere phrase. To me he disclosed himself for what he is, a vain contemptuous Turk, profoundly convinced of his otvn fitness to govern, and profoundly despising the Egyptian people. ' They are children,' he told me, ' and must be treated like children.' " This uncalled-for criticism by one who confesses having met Cherif Pasha but once in his life, induces me to mention Cherif s impressions of that inter- view ; for happening to call the same day as Mr. Blunt — whom by-the-bye I do not know— I asked the Prime Minister what he thought of Arabi's friend. He scratched his beard, smiled, and said, " C'est un toe — he wants TEWFIK. 197 Chamber of Notables on December 26tb, there was indeed a fair prospect of a thorough co-operation of its members. " Tous mes efforts et ceux de mon Grouvernement, vous le savez, Messieurs, tendent a assurer le bien- ^tre de nos populations, et I'ordre dans le r^glement de leurs interets, en generalisant I'administration de la justice, en pourvoyant a la securite de tous les habitants' du pays, sans distinction, dans leurs biens et dans leur vie. . . . Ami de I'instruction et du pro- gres, je n'ai jamais cesse de la poursuivre au grand jour. . . . C'est a vous de me seconder dans cette voie." These simple and able words of His Highness found an echo in all hearts, and meeting Sultan Pasha, the President of the Chamber, and some of the leading Notables the next day at Cherif Pasha's house, I can speak from my own knowledge, and say that they were one and all for the Khedive, recog- nisiug in the Prime Minister the true and enlightened chief of the National party, that they were imbued with the necessity of holding together, of backing the Grovernment to the utmost of their power, of helping Cherif in the work of reform, and in keep- ing the army in its proper place, as the guardian of order ; in fact, in discussing the future powers of the to know more about Egypt than we wlio have iDeen bom here, and lived here all our lives ; " and this was also the opinion of Sir B. Malet. Being on the topic of Arabi's foreign henchmen, I may mention that Sir William Gregory, "who studied the Egyptian question on the spot," did not even take the trouble to make Cherif s acquaintance, though he did not spare him and his administration pungent criticism by the column. — The Author. 198 EGYPT. Chamber, the Notables, I saw, seemed fully to realise the wisdom of not going too far in the beginning, and of limiting their powers to a consultative voice until the country should be ripe for more. It would have been most desirable to foster these feelings, and to avoid whatever could throw the Notables into the arms of the army, or permit Arabi to identify the military cause with that of the people. Unfortunately, the very wish and effort of strength- ening the Khedive and his ministers led to a contrary result, and to-day M. Grambetta will certainly regret the paternity of the Identical Note. It was he'" who, through Lord Lyons, induced our Grovernment to join in an epistolary feat, meaningless, if we look at Lord Granville's reservation,'^" and yet mischievous in its consequences,'^^ in Egypt as well as at Con- stantinople.'^^ I remember Cherif Pasha's despair : " Quelle bou- lette!" were his words. All was going well, the Notables well disposed, the army, so to say, out of ™ Despatch of M. Gambetta to M. d'Auray, Dec. 27, 1881. 'Docu- ments Diplomatiques, Affaires d'lilgypte, 1881-82.' ™ Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 5 (1882) p. 35 et seg[. ™ " Hier soir Cherif Pasha et M. Malet sont venus me trouver pour m'entretenir au sujet de la note identique. Bile aurait et6 malcomprise dans certaines spheres. On y verrait une apprfciation ddfavorable de la Chambre des Notables, un aote de defiance vis-a,-vis du parti national, et une menace d'intervention que rien ne justifie en ce moment. Les objections nous ont 6t6 nettement formulas par Cherif Pasha &, M. Malet et a moi. M. Malet m'a propose meme devant Cherif Pasha, de demander h nos Gouvernements respectifs Tenvoi d'une nouvelle note explicative destinee k ramener I'opinion." — Despatch of M. Sienkiewioz to M. Gambetta, Jan. 1, 1882. ' Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires d'!lfigypte, 1881-82,' p. 29 et seq. ™? Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 5 (1882) p. 45 et sej. TBWFIK. 199 court, and then, one does not know why, the Powers alienate gratuitously the Notables, " on les blesse au vif," they will get frightened and side with Arabi for fear of an intervention, we shall see the conse- quences to-morrow when Article 31 of the Organic Law will be voted. The Powers, by squeezing them- selves between . the Khedive and the Notables, and by undermining the solidarity of ministers and Chamber, are only giving Arabi a hold on the latter — " lis n'auraient pas pu trouver mieux pour nous perdre." ''' Though the blue-books are somewhat reticent on the point, the French yellow-book dispels all doubts as to the authorship of the identical " blunder," and one almost feels surprised at the good-natured yield- ing of our Cabinet to views they justly deprecated, indeed, it suggests the idea that the treaty of com- merce must have been used as a prospective sugar- plum for good boys. M. Gambetta was right enough in saying,'^* " that in view of a joint interference it seemed to him indispensable that there should be no divergence in the language and instructions of the two agents at Cairo ; but that did not give him a right to insist upon the adoption of Ids line of conduct. Why should he expect us to give way ? Surely it is no argument coolly to tell Lord Lyons " qu'il se heurtait k une decision deja prise," and there should be a limit ™ From the Author's Diary, Jan. 9, 1882. ™ M. Gambetta to M. Challemel-Laoour, Jan. 13, 1881. 'Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires d'jfigypte, 1881-82,' p. 35. 200 EGYPT. even to the legendary " courtoisie " of Lord G-ran- ville. . At any rate, we have learned by this time that it is not for Grreat Britain to shape her foreign policy according to the fluctuations of the political barometer at the Quai d'Orsay, In Downing Street a minis- terial change is only a change of men, not of England's international rights and duties. In France Republic means the irresponsible will and caprice of the man in power ; and though French policy may occasionally carry the day, as, for instance, in the case of the Identical Note, " il n'y a pas de lende- main." To base alliances and a political programme on such foundations is building on sand, and the " condominium " in Egypt has proved it. But before approaching the crisis, indirectly pro- voked by the Identical Note, though directly due to the presence and threats of Arabi during the budget debate, it will be just to throw a glance at the Khedive. Called by Europe to succeed his father, stripped of all power and authority, an ornamental Khedive under Anglo-French tutelage, he can, of course, not be made responsible for our blustering and blunder- ing, and I confess I have often wondered how he managed to steer clear of the traps laid for him by friend and foe. No Western prince would ever have found his way out of the maze of intrigues encircling him on every side. True, all parties wanted him as a label ; true, his presence precluded more hazardous experiments ; yet all efforts culminated in one stereo- TEWFIK. 201 type result, the nullifying of his influence— the shrinking of his personality to a mere arithmetical unit. Possibly His Highness owes his maintenance on the Khedivial throne to his very exclusion from affairs of state, and the concurrent responsibility. But whilst he was thus kept " a stranger " in his own house, it would be wrong to imagine that he spent his days in happy indolence, or seeking to drown his sorrows in the pleasures of his harem. The following lines'^* will give an idea of the Prince, before the terrible events of this summer revealed him as a man. " Mehemet Tewfik I., Khedive of Egypt, is one of the youngest sovereigns in the world. Born in 1852, he is only twenty-nine ; but he looks older, and is rather portly for his age. His features are regular and handsome. Though of dignified bearing he is very shy, especially with strangers. His timidity is frequently taken for want of intelligence — a mistake no one is likely to make on closer acquaintance. He is very simple in all his tastes, hates all parade, loves his home, and is an excellent husband and father. Unfortunately, as recent events show, he lacks energy, decision, and determination — a consequence of his early training in the harem ; but sometimes his eye flashes in a way which leads one to think that, if he were differently surrounded and once gained confidence in his own judgment, he would most likely reveal a will of his own. He is a keen observer, has a great deal of common ™ Egyptian Sketohi s, I.— Pall Mall Gazette, Oct. 7, 1881. 202 EGYPT. sense, and requires only time to feel his way and to take his lawful share in the affairs of his country. " He was carefully educated, and his serious turn of mind found a useful field of activity in the educa- tion of the young. Seven years before his accession he founded at his own expense a school for orphans and for sons of officers in his palace at Couteh. Up to the present moment some 124 youngsters, from the age of ten to twenty, receive there a capital educa- tion under conscientious and painstaking masters. It is organised on the model of Continental schools for cadets, and great attention is given to the bodily development of the pupils, who delight in gymnastics, fencing, and the like. In his father's time Tewfik Pasha went almost daily to look after the boys, and he maintained (as he still continues to do) the whole establishment, at a cost of 4600Z. a year, out of his privy purse — a somewhat heavy strain on his then scanty allowance of 30,000^. "His interest in this particular institution has somewhat abated since he founded, opposite the Abdin Palace, the Ali School, where his two sons. Abbas and Mehemet Ali, are educated with about a hundred other boys, sons of princes or pashas. Yet, though this school is only intended for the children of the rich, education is gratuitous, the Khedive providing for everything, including uniforms and a somewhat too luxurious table. But within the school perfect equality prevails. The sons of the Khedive are treated exactly like the other boys, and within its TEWFIK 203 precincts they are not allowed to be styled * Prince.' At first lie had the greatest difficulty in securing attendance, but now the demand for admission is so great that he speaks of doubling the school, and of having only resident pupils. Notwithstanding that he paid for everything, he had a few years ago almost to employ force to fill his school. " Following up his father's ideas, the Khedive contemplates opening a girls' school for the upper classes, and placing there his own daughter. ' The great thing,' said His Highness one day to me, ' is to educate women. They will then not only become true companions to their husbands, but will take an interest in the primary education of the children, which at present is so neglected, and adds so much to our difficulties when they first come to school. Family life is the greatest blessing, and it is im- possible unless both men and women are educated. It is the aim of my life to achieve that result ; and in time, I trust, we may be able to do away with slaves in the harem. I hate the very idea of slavery, and am doing all I can to put it down : moreover, a harem is only wanted for many wives ; with one wife there won't be any necessity for seclusion. It is wrong to imagine that our religion requires us to have more than one wife, or to make the wife our slave instead of our equal. The Hanefite rite defines clearly the position of women, and assigns to them almost a leading place ; but how can women lead if they are ignorant and uneducated ? Another matter that 204 EGYPT. much worries me is the divorce question in the lower classes, for the rich do not indulge in divorce as much as the common men ; hut the way the Fellah goes to work is abominable and scandalous: not rich enough to afford more than one wife, he marries a girl simply to divorce her the next day. Three curses before witnesses sufiSce for a divorce, and they pay so little for the support of the children, if there are any, that it is made far too easy. I intend to put it down with all my might. But it is so diflScult to educate the women of the lower classes ; at our girls' schools they learn useful things, but more fitted for middle-class life. They get accustomed to cleanliness, beds, decent food, and necessarily the poor girls afterwards feel miserable to share the mud-hut of a Fellah, to sleep on the bare ground, and to live as he does. It will be necessary, first, to better the condition of the Fellah ; but all that requires time. I have given much thought to the question of education, of family life, and the rela- tions of parents and children. The future of Egypt is there. If we can raise the standard of education and social life, Egypt will in time become one of the most thriving members of the Continental family.' " Asking His Highness whether he thought that it would be possible to train his own people so as to be able to dispense at some future time with the services of foreigners, he shook his head and said, ' We shall never be able to do without Europe ; moreover, why should we ? You are welcome as teachers, and we must learn from you. All I wish TEWPIK. 205 is to develop the welfare of Egypt ; and if Europe does not mix up politics with her task as school- master, if we are allowed to remain peacefully Egyptians, and if in time the Europeans consent to live under our laws,, and do not require a privileged legislation, our people will assimilate themselves to the foreign element, without the distrust which prevails at present on account of the fear that you wish to deprive us of our independence and nation- ality.' " Speaking of England, the Viceroy eulogised English ways, ideas, and institutions, and told me that he intended to send his sons to England as soon as they were old enough. He spoke with much admiration of our parliamentary system and party organisation, so fruitful through constant friction. He evinced an. intimate knowledge of Continental affairs, quite surprising when one considers that he has never been out of Egypt. In addition he dis- plays a great amount of tact and savoir faire. Riaz Pasha was full of his young master's praise, and told me repeatedly that it was a mistake to think that Tewfik Pasha was weak, adding that, if lacking initiative, he had more than once shown remarkable firmness. Thus, for instance, quite recently, when M. de Lesseps tried to hurry him at Alexandria into signing the fresh- water concession behind the back of his ministers, the Khedive refused point blank, declaring that he should do nothing without his Cabinet ; and when M. de Lesseps threatened to remain in Alexandria until the Viceroy should have 206 EGYPT. signed, His Highness replied laughingly : ' In that case Egypt will have the pleasure of possessing you for good ; nay, I should never forgive myself if, by signing, I deprived us of your presence.'" I may add to the above that I had frequent opportunities for talking with the Khedive on educational matters, and I confess it would be difficult to meet amongst the crowned heads of the Continent a more enlightened and more well-meaning specimen of the philanthropist. Debarred from his share in the cares of state, he devotes his time and thoughts exclusively to the development of popular education ; he takes the liveliest interest in all schools, especially the one where his boys are brought up, and he frequently assists at their studies. In speaking to me last winter of his idea of soon establishing a school for the princesses, he said, " It will be a difficult matter on accoun,t of the prevailing prejudices ; one must respect the existing notions of propriety ; but even if I have to maintain the out- ward restrictions of the harem, it will be a step towards the emancipation of women ; it will be a beginning, and a great blessing if we succeed in taking the education of the girls out of the hands of frequently uneducated mothers, and of ignorant slaves and eunuchs. Of course I have an English governess, some of my cousins have Grerman or French governesses for their children, but those are exceptions ; and only a girls' school where I send TEWFIK. 207 my own child will permit me to generalise female education." "^ After this diversion from our subject — and I thought it fair to show the Khedive in his true element, the education of the young, to show that he is anxious to do his duty whenever he is allowed to think and to act for himself — we must return to a less pleasant topic, the budget debate in the Chamber of Notables — to the beginning of the end. We now approach the crisis. The news of the despatch of the fleets "' had a great effect ; Mahmoud Samy, Arabi, and the other ministers doubted not for a moment that England, France, and the Porte were one, nay that the three were acting as the mandatories of Europe. They were in the greatest state of excite- ment, and these very men who only a few days before had threatened the Khedive with abdication, and even with death, were now prostrate before him, seeking '^' his advice, and thinking of nothing but the best means of saving their heads,'^' and bargain- ing for advantageous conditions for themselves, regardless of their unfortunate subordinates. In the Appendix '^° will be found the details of the minis- terial ups and downs according to the news of the day. In fact, as long as they believed in an Anglo-Franco- Turkish intervention, they were meek, conciliatory, full of gushing assurances of good-will to Europeans, to the Controllers and the Consuls-General,'" kissing ™ Prom the Author's Diary, 1881-82. ™ Appendix IV. 728 Ilgii. 729 l^ji^, 730 ^i^, 731 J^^^ 208 EGYPT. the Khedive's coat and feet, profuse in their loyalty, forgetting, nay denying, that they had ever threat- ened their sovereign with deposition, in fact, vowing that they knew no better master, or one whom they would more readily serve. But when the news reached Cairo that there were not twenty ironclads, that there were no Turkish ships, nay, that the Sultan was even protesting "^ against an Anglo-French naval demonstration, they; at once changed their attitude."^ Cool and haughty with the agents, impertinent with Europeans, im- pudent towards their master, they saw a loophole in the dissension of the Porte and the Controlling Powers ; they no longer volunteered to resign, but, on the contrary, assumed sovereign airs and powers. Mahmoud Pasha Samy sent the Khedive word '^* that in future the Ministers declined any personal inter- course with him."^ And, contrary to Article 6 of the Organic Law,"^ the Ministers convoked the Chamber without the Khedive, to whom alone this right belongs ; and it is much to the credit of the Notables that, notwithstanding the threats of Arabi and the pressure brought upon them, they declined to sit in a body, though they were all at Cairo, without being convoked by His Highness. The following, which I take from my notes, will give a clear account of the crisis, as everything '52 Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 137. ™ Appendix IV. ™ Ibid. ™ IMd. ™ Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 5 (1882) p. 56. TBWFIK. 209 centres around Arabi and Mahmoud Pasha Baroudi."' The latter, Arabi's late Prime Minister, and chief instigator of the present troubles, owes his ominous surname, el Baroudi — the powder maker — to the fact that his father was Director of the Powder Mill. Baroudi has nothing striking in his appearance, except an unpleasant squint, coupled with the habit of never looking into one's face when he is speaking. His tarbouche on one ear gives him a roguish air, but his joviality is sham, like his obsequious polite- ness, which degenerates into platitude with people he wishes to flatter or to deceive. The other day, at the funeral of Ahmed Dramali Pasha, the late Prefect of Police, who died rather suddenly at a moment when his place was required for one of Arabi's creatures, the Prime Minister, Mahmoud Pasha Samy, could be seen in full uniform, deferentially holding an umbrella over Arabi's quad anointed head, nay, like a servant, he kept a trifle behind the man of the day. That alone depicts Baroudi's character. By no means particularly gifted, or even distin- guished as an administrator, Mahmoud has, neverthe- less, succeeded in climbing to the top of the tree, thanks to a certain shrewdness and a remarkable talent for intrigue. Utterly unprincipled and ready to do anything to gain his ends, he has been successfully trading ™' The same man whom Messrs. Broadley and Napier — according to a Eeuter's telegram, St. Jameses Gazette, Oct. 26, 1882 — decline to defend. 210 EGYPT. on the weaknesses and blunders of his betters, and he has the reputation of never having missed an opportunity of ingratiating himself with men at the helm. In turn the servile courtier, first of Ismail, to whom he owes almost everything and whom he professed to worship, and then of Tewfik, he has of course been a fervent satellite of Cherif, Riaz, and Nubar, according to the political barometer of the day. Always courting the dispenser of favours, the man in power, it could be expected that he would join " the colonels " as soon as Arabi was likely to become master of the situation. It mattered indeed little that he was a member of Cherif 's Cabinet, that he had pledged himself to stand and fall with his chief; such trifling considerations had no weight ; and now we know that Baroudi was the soul of the military conspiracy against his colleagues. But I must not anticipate events. Educated at Constantinople at Ismail's expense, he gained his " spurs " at the Grand Yizirate, where he remained for seven years as a clerk, and on his return to Egypt he lingered for some years in subordinate positions until his marriage with a daughter of Ismail's dada or nurse, obtained him, in addition to a handsome dower, the position of aide-de-camp to His Highness. Thus launched into the ofiScial world he com- placently sunned himself in his generous master's favour, until a domestic mishap threw a cloud over his fortunes, and deprived him for a time of the TEWFIK. 211 golden advantages of what he is now pleased to call the vitiated atmosphere of courts. It appears that he discovered one day a tender weakness of his better half for a young and enter- prising musician, and not satisfied with killing the disturber of matrimonial harmony, he likewise murdered the mother of his wife's lover and her slave. As to his wife and mother-in-law, they had to start for a trip up the White Nile, " whence no one returns." Ismail Pasha frowned, he was fond of his dada, but Mahmoud Samy managed to get his cause so ably pleaded that he was soon allowed to return to Cairo, and passing a sponge over this little episode, His Highness pardoned the ferocious Othello. Nay, his friends obtained for him after a few months the appointment of Arzouhaldji, or receiver of petitions at the Abdin Palace. Once again in the stirrup, Mahmoud did not lose his time, and aware of the value of powerful connections, and the influence women have in pushing husbands to the front, he was lucky enough to obtain the hand of one of Mansour Pasha's sisters, thus becoming brother-in-law to Ismail's favourite daughter, H.H. the Princess Tewhida. Moreover, a marriage into the rich and powerful Yegen family secured him the patronage of such men as Haidar, Daoud, Kalil Pasha Yegen, Ali Pasha Cherif, and others. Sent twice to Oandia with despatches, this feat gained him the rank of colonel, and during the last Pusso-Turkish war he commanded a regiment of cavalry under Prince Hassan, who is p 2 212 EGYPT. said to have had a poor idea of the gallant Colonel's military capacity. On his return to Cairo it happened that an un- scrupulous instrument was wanted for the post of Prefect of Police, and Mahmoud Samy volunteering his services was accepted. In his new position he found opportunities for making friends with those he had been appointed to watch, in fact it is stated that he knew all about the contemplated military move- ment of February 1st, 1879. At any rate he managed to keep Ismail, as well as the Wilson Ministry, completely in the dark ; yet so well did he shuffle his cards, that he was soon after made a Minister, in fact, Cherif had to accept him as Minister of Wakfs and of Public Instruction. In this capacity he countersigned, in August 1879, with his colleagues, what is commonly called " Cherif's Constitution," and which forms, as we knoWj the basis of the present Organic Law. With the other ministers, he pledged himself to stand or to fall by the reform project of his chief, but Mahmoud Samy deserted his party as soon as the non-accept- ance of Cherif's proposals obliged the Cabinet to resign."' Turning his back on Notables and Con- stitution, he went over to Riaz, who gave him the portfolio of the Wakfs, which he exchanged on February 1st, 1881, for that of Minister of War, and it is whispered that he was instrumental in his predecessor, Osman Pasha Rifky's, fall, the same whose name heads the list of the forty-three Cir- "8 Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 1 (1880) p. 65. TEWPIK. 213 cassians, victims of the monstrous sentence which may be looked upon as the primary cause of the present troubles. Shortly after, Baroudi had to make room for Daoud Pasha, the Khedive's brother-in-law, as he was strongly suspected of conspiring against Riaz, and of being hand-and-glove with " the colonels." We know that his retirement did not last long, and when Cherif Pasha was called upon to form a new Cabinet on September 29th, 1881, the mutinous colonels insisted on Mahmoud Pasha Samy's appoint- ment as Minister of War. In vain did Cherif Pasha protest, in vain did he point out that Baroudi had deserted the national and liberal cause, in vain did he declare that no confidence could be placed in a man who one day was for, and the next against, constitutional institutions. Mahmoud had bewitched his military patrons, and his appointment was made a conditio sine qud nan. It has been proved by the sequel that it was a grave mistake to yield to the demands of the army, yet at the time Cherif Pasha was induced to believe that he might spare his country greater disasters by giving way. At any rate, he made the greatest patriotic sacrifice a man of his high honour and feeling could make when he condescended to take such a man as Mah- moud Samy into his cabinet. It is no secret that Baroudi availed himself of his position for preparing the advent of the military party. From the first he betrayed his chief and his colleagues, and secretly encouraging the intrigues of his subordinates, he 214 EGYPT. made the War Office the centre of a conspiracy of which he and Arabi were the promoters, and which had for its sole object the overthrow of Cherif Pasha. Nevertheless, he professed the most abject devotion to his chief, denied solemnly all connection with " the colonels," and was, up to the last hour of Oherif's administration, untiring in assurances of " loyal " support. The Notables, though possibly not elected accord- ing to our ideas, were nevertheless, as nominees of the Omdes and Sheikhs, representatives of the people in the second degree.'^' Moderate in their views, men of property, free from personal ambition, they so well realised the advantages of a judicious yield- ing to Oherif's moderate views and patriotic policy, that on January 30th '*" they agreed to waive their demands relative to the voting of the budget, and they delegated Sultan Pasha to convey this decision ™* It may be interesting to note that, though elective, the function of Sheikh is practically almost hereditary, as natm-ally the most powerftd family will nominate one amongst their number, and many villages are only composed of the members of one and the same family ; and where such a preponderance does not exist, the feuds of Montagu and Capulet are of daily ocoun'ence, each family insisting upon electing their own Sheikh. There have been instances of twenty Sheikhs in one village, so that administration became perfectly impossible — nay, the number had to be reduced hy law to a maximum of four. In every instance the Sheikh represents the interests of a large party of his village, and is virtually a representative of the people, though naturally wealth has a deal to do with the matter, and, in practice, we find generally the richest man also the Sheikh. A similar process takes place in reference to the election of the Omd&, who are invariably the most important and richest amongst the Sheikhs, those who have received the best education, who can read and write and plead the cause of others with the Moudir. The Notables being elected by and from amongst the Sheikhs and Omd&, are therefore indirectly the representatives of the Fellah. — The Author. ™ Appendix IV. TEWFIK. 215 to Cherif Pasha, but Arabi Bey — Mahmoud's Under- Secretary of War— threatened the President of the Chamber to cut him down if he dared to comply with the vote of the Notables. Sultan Pasha had to yield to brutal threats, nay, under further pres- sure, he had even to deny the fact. And though Mr. Blunt has taken upon himself to contradict the truth of this statement, I venture to think that declarations confirmed not only by the Khedive, but by Cherif Pasha, and a large number of Notables and men of standing, most undoubtedly authorised Sir Edward Malet to give credence to Sultan Pasha's own version."** In fact. Sultan Pasha declined to head the deputation of fifteen Notables whom Arabi forced^ to wait on Cherif Pasha with the request either to accept the programme of the military party or to resign. The whole comedy had been got up at the houses of Baroudi and Arabi, where the officers met daily, and where they combined their schemes under the leadership of the Minister of War and of his omnipotent Under-Secretary. Nay, even before Cherif resigned, Mahmoud had formed his future Cabinet, Everything had been got ready for February 1st, the anniversary of the first mutiny, and it had been arranged that another military demonstration was to enforce the will of the army, in case of objections from the Ministry. Deserted by the Powers, notwithstanding that his loyalty to their own programme had provoked the crisis, and that he '" Appendix IV. 216 EGYPT. had a right to rely on the pledges of the Identical Note, and not wishing to complicate a critical situation by legitimate resistance to the unwarranted exigencies of anarchy, Oherif Pasha tendered his resignation to the Khedive, in presence of the Agents of Great Britain and France. Mahmoud Samy and his confederates were trium- phant, and the former ' expected to be sent for to form a new administration, but he had forgotten that his master was not likely to give up the advantages of his position without actually being forced to it. Having to accept Cherif's resignation, the Khedive declined to select a successor, and though declaring his willingness to accept whomever the Chamber might suggest, he desired to leave to the Notables the responsibility of forming a new Cabinet ; and notwith- standing the entreaties of the Notables to help them out of the scrape. His Highness remained firm, replying, " You have deposed the minister who had my confidence ; it is for you, the Notables, to suggest his successor." This was an unexpected blow for Mahmoud Samy and Co. ; if appointed by the Khedive he had hoped thus to make His Highness his accomplice, and he found himself now reduced to the unpleasant position of nominee of a mutinous army, for the Notables seemed likewise determined not to bring any one forward. After twenty-four hours of painful suspense Arabi came to the rescue of his acolyte, and threatening again Sultan Pasha with his sword, TEWFIK. 217 he forced the President of the Notables to submit Mahmoud's name to the acceptance of the Khedive. True to his word, and to his novel part of " con- stitutional " monarch, Tewfik at once sent for the late Minister of War, requesting him to form a new- ministry. But Cabinet making is not so easy as it looks, and if Mahmoud had found no difficulties in concocting an administration on paper, lie soon dis- covered that no decent men would now join him ; for such who might have accepted had Mahmoud suc- ceeded Oherif as the nominee of the Khedive, declined to associate themselves with a premier imposed both on His Highness and on the Chamber by the good pleasure of Arabi and the army. It took a long time ere he could get a scratch team together, all obscure names, all new men, with the exception of Moustapha Pasha Fehmy, the " per- manent " Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose flexi- bility of principles allows him to remain as a fixture in every succeeding administration. It is affirmed that in some instances even threats had to be resorted to, to force a portfolio on an unwilling candidate. But the fact remains that he managed bis "job " at last with the help and under the auspices of Arabi, who, originally only Minister of War, was de facto the soul of the venture. Though only the standard-bearer of his more powerful Under-Secretary, it is Mahmoud who has been making himself not only the mouth-piece but the executor of the whims of the military party, and he is as much, if not more, to blame than Arabi 218 EGYPT. for the misfortunes which their madness has brought over Egypt. It would be too long to enumerate the many arbitrary measures due to their initiative, and recent events are too fresh in everybody's memory to require a repetition. SuflBce it to say, that after usurping power, after monopolising all resources for army purposes, after disorganising all services and med- dling with everybody, and every department, these military reformers thought themselves strong enough to defy the Sultan, Europe, justice, and even common sense. Without taking any measures for bettering the condition of any one except that of some hundreds of officers, and their own, of course, Arabi and Co. hit, under Mahmoud's presidency, on the glorious idea of freeing Egypt from all elements hostile to their mis- rule. Not daring to begin with Europeans, they in- vented a conspiracy of Circassians, numerous arrests were made, a court-martial was improvised, some of the members being judge and party in one, and private vengeance was given an opportunity for having a fling at anybody the colonels wanted to get rid of. Subjected to the most cruel treatment, and to actual torture,'*^ the accused were utterly at the mercy of their enemies, and might possibly have been sacrificed, had not the monstrosity of an in- human sentence been the very means of saving these unfortunate men. It was a lucky thing for the forty- ™ Appendix IV. TEWPIK. 219 two Circassians^ and not less for the country, that Mahmoud and his colleagues wanted to coerce the Khedive to sanction the judicial murder they had planned, and that they published the sentence before the Khedive had even seen or approved of it. Firm from the first, His Highness manfully declined to become their accomplice, and following entirely the call of duty and honour, the Khedive staked undoubtedly life and throne in trying to save the victims of this in- famous plot. Mahmoud, who had been the most violent advo- cate of extreme measures, did not even shrink from threatening his master with deposition, and an eventual massacre of Europeans, thus hoping to force the hand of the recalcitrant prince, though now he denies having ever said a word.'*^ He failed, and only succeeded in calling Europe to the rescue of the Khedive and of Egypt. It was Mahmoud Samy, as I said before, who convoked the Notables without the Khedive's sanction ; it was he who first suggested resistance, and who, to maintain himself in power, did not hesitate to involve Egypt in a suicidal conflict with the Controlling Powers, and even with the Porte. But when the Notables, the Ulemas, in fact, the country, declared against a military dictatorship, when the ministers found themselves isolated, it was again Mahmoud Samy who the first cringed before Khedive and Consuls-Greneral. I have said before how they kissed the Khedive's feet, and how, '*' Appendix IV. 220 EGYPT. begging their master's pardon, these worthies clung to office, thus to ensure better conditions for their surrender. They thought of nothing but saving their djan, i. e. their lives, and these men who had been boasting of their civic virtues, who had been talking so big, who had threatened to set the world on fire, and whom people at home, and abroad, had naively taken au serieux, did not even know how to fall with dignity, and were lacking the only redeeming quality of the mutineer, " pluck and personal courage." It was pitiful to witness the utter collapse of these political mountebanks, and it is impossible to describe the panic following the news of the arrival of the fleets — of Anglo-French and Turkish ships, of course. Believing Europe to be in earnest, and the Western Powers and Turkey acting in common, no resistance was dreamt of, and Arabi would have been alone had he dared to suggest it. But when it came to be known that there were only six English and French ships, and no Turkish, when it was telegraphed that M. de Freycinet deprecated any lauding of troops, and when it became evident that the Powers were far from agreed, and that the naval demonstration was only another edition of platonic remonstrance, Arabi and bis henchman Baroudi raised their heads again ; from humble they became impudent; new threats against the Khedive were uttered, and these same men, who had reproached Tewfik with having coun- tenanced the Sultan's legitimate interference in the Circassian business, hastened to shield themselves TEWPIK. 221 behind the Porte. The lamentable weakness of the Powers, the want of understanding, and the French objections to Turkish co-operation, became powerful trumps in the hands of ministers who had nothing to lose and everj'^thing to win. Bullying their master, deceiving the Foreign Agents, and working up the masses by paid emissaries from the University of El Ahzar, they managed to keep in power by the force of intimidation. New threats obliged Sultan Pasha to disavow his share in the ultimatum. They got up petitions for the deposition of Tewfik, and on the very day Sir Edward Malet and M. Sienkiewicz pre- sented the ultimatum, Arabi despatched an aide-de- camp to Constantinople with an appeal to the Sultan, signed by himself, most oflScers, all the ministers — but only eight Notables out of 160, praying to depose Tewfik, to nominate Halim, to maintain Baroudi's Cabinet, and likewise "the colonels" in command of the army. Even the Khedive's life was in danger, and the Minister of Public Works is said to have proposed in council to kill the Khedive, as the simplest solution. Yet up to that moment, Arabi, the ministers, and " the colonels," had only brute force to back them ; the Notables, minus eight, had all pronounced for the Khedive, so had most of the Ulemas, and certainly all Pashas of mark, and all lovers of order. The population remained a passive spectator, nay, they hardly knew that there were troubles in high circles, and the utmost indifference continued to pre- vail in the bazaars. 222 EGYPT. Only when it became evident that Identical Notes, Ultimatums, and naval demonstrations meant nothing, when people began to realise that there was no one to protect them, and that they would be left to the mercy of Arabi and Co., they came to the natural conclusion that it would be safer not to pronounce for one side or the other, or, if need be, to hold to Arabi as the strongest. This split in the party of order must be solely attributed to the hesitations and blunders of Conti- nental statesmanship. ^ Half-measures, half-hearted action, and a yielding to French views, brought about disaster after disaster. Already, it was humiliating enough for the foreign Agents to have to advise the Khedive to take back ministers who had threatened him with deposition'** and who were snapping their fingers at Europe ; but to be obliged to ask for the despatch of an Ottoman Commissioner after first having declined Turkish concurrence, was a sad avowal of impotence, and with it vanished the last atom of the Dual prestige in Egypt. Nothing impresses the Eastern mind like facts and acts — words, notes, and paper threats have no effect. Like the news of the arrival of the fleets, so the intelligence of Dervish Pasha's arrival acted once more magically. Arabi and the ministers trembled, Baroudi lost his head, Moustapha Pasha Fehmy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, hid himself, and Sadyk, the Finance Minister, became mad ; only one or '"■' Appendix IV. TEWFIK. 223 two of the colonels were still beating the big drum. The submission of Arabi could not be doubted, and those who knew Dervish, prognosticated that the old Moushir would make short work of the mutineers if they dared to oppose the Sultan's bidding. The ques- tion was, what would this bidding be. In fact, it is almost certain that Arabi would have submitted on Sunday, had not the troubles in Alex- andria once more lifted him into power. Time will reveal to whom the first riots at Alex- andria were due ; so much is certain, that they were the work of some interested party, and up to the present Arabi seems the only gainer. That Dervish Pasha should have allowed, nay asked Arabi to restore order, shows not only the gravity of the situation, but it also indicates the " little game " of the Porte.'" The Sultan caijnot allow his authority to be disregarded in a Mussulman country. " The Sultan is the Caliph and spiritual head of the Faithful, and at the same time the temporal ruler of the Ottoman Empire." '" He cannot allow himself to be beaten on his own ground. Had the Powers availed themselves of the co-opera- tion of the Porte,'** Arabi would have been doomed. Nay, as long as there was the slightest chance of the '** The arrest of Dervish. Pasha and his confinement in Tildiz Kiosk, so to say under the thumb of the Sultan, as announced by telegram of Oct. 28, 1882, is an undoubted proof of how anxious the Sultan is to make a scapegoat of him whom he had sent to Egypt to treat with Arabi, not to save Tewfik.^The Author. ™ Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 16. ''" Ibid., pp. 137 and 138. 224 EGYPT. Turkish flag being seen " alongside " that of G-reat Britain and France before Alexandria, those who knew Turkey and Dervish Pasha had only one opinion, that Arabi would be summoned to appear before the Sultan's envoy, and that if he declined to obey the commands of the Caliph, that the old Moushir would make short work of a mutinous soldier. More than one of the Khedive's ministers told the author that any such open defiance of the Sultan's behests might have the simple consequence that Dervish Pasha would order Arabi to be beheaded then and there, and one of them added, " Arabi's head thrown out of a window at Kasr-el-Noussar (the palace of pleasure) would once and for ever cure mutinous soldiers." That old Dervish was quite capable of realising the anticipations of the Egyptian Pashas may be gathered from the following little episode of his mission to Dulcigno, told the author by the son of the Vice-governor of Scutari. Arriving with only six battalions at Scutari, Dervish, in the name of the Sultan, summoned at once the Rebel Chief to make his submission, regardless of his camping with 35,000 men between Scutari and Dulcigno. Youssouf expressed " deep regret " at not being able to obey His Majesty's commands, saying " I am a prisoner of my own men, there are 35,000, and they will not let me come, in fact, I might have the fate of Mehemet Ali Pasha,'** they would murder me or any one who dared to provoke their wrath." ''" Mehemet Ali, a Prassian by birth, was the Pasha so treacherously murdered by his own troops at the beginning of the campaign. — The Author. TBWPIK. 225 Dervish Pasha nnderstood the allusion and Yous- souf's sarcasm, and turning to the Vice-Grovernor of Scutari, the learned Mollah (President of the Tribunal) Youssouf Sidi, in whose house he was staying, he showed him Youssouf Bey's letter, and asked for a mutton-bone. Familiar with Albanian superstition, he remembered that they read the future, especially the fate of friend or foe, from a dry mutton-bone. When it was brought he took it in his hand, looked at it, and after a time, shrugging his shoulders, observed in a loud voice, so that all present could hear him, " Poor Youssouf! I am sorry for him, for there I see his coiBn in the bone. Poor Youssouf! Wah, Wah!" Next morning he ordered the garrison of Scutari to cover his rear, whilst he pounced with his own few hundred men on Youssouf Bey's army. It appears that it literally rained lead, but Dervish Pasha, though on horseback in front of his men, seemed invulnerable. When his two field-pieces came up, the Pasha ordered the guns to be placed in position, and getting down from his horse he pointed one carefully himself, and seemed to scrutinise the ranks of the enemy with his field-glass. Suddenly he gave orders to fire, and immediately a great commotion was visible on the other side ; the firing ceased for a time, and it soon became evident that Youssouf Bey had been killed. Dervish Pasha got again on his horse, and calling for Youssouf Bey's brother, whom he had brought with him to witness the other's death, he said, " I Q 226 EGYPT. told thee the bone never lies ; poor Youssouf ! Wah, Wah ! " One may well believe that such a man would have made short work of half a dozen Arabis had it been his master's wish. At any rate we have only to blame ourselves if our treatment of the Sultan has contributed to spare Arabi, and to bring upon Egypt the miseries we have since had to deplore. Having applied to the Sultan to depose the Khedive Ismail, having availed ourselves of the Sultan's suzerain powers, of the Caliph's prestige when we wanted him before, it would only have been logical not to have ignored the Sultan in the present instance, especially, when almost up to the last His Majesty offered to co-operate with the Western Powers.'*' Far be it from me to plead any policy that could " forge anew the links of the worn-out chain which bound Egypt to the swindling govern- ment of Constantinople";'^" but not to include the suzerain power in our platonic demonstrations was a gratuitous slight, uncalled for, and, as the sequel has shown, mischievous. Nay, we indirectly almost forced and obliged the Sultan to take Arabi's part (primarily towards whom he was by no means well disposed '") as the only means of reasserting his own waning influence, and of teaching England and France that "9 Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) p. 24. ™ Speech of Sir Charles W. Dilke, Bart., M.P., to his constituents, August 20, 1879. 761 " Tjjg guitan has asked the representatives of Germany, Austria, and Italy to induce their Governments to intervene against Arabi." — Lord Dufferin to Earl Granville. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 5 (1882) p. 76 et seq. TEWFIK. 227 his name was still a power. Lord Granville's letters of January 30tb, and of May 20tli, 24th, 25th, 26th, and 28th, 1882,"' abundantly prove that Her Majesty's Government was fully impressed with the importance of the Sultan's assistance, and considered a Turkish occupation certainly the lesser of two evils "^ ; indeed it is deeply to be lamented that — though reluctantly,"* and after much hesitation "^ — Her Majesty's Ministers should have given way "^ to the views of French statesmen,"' whose very action in Egypt has been all along to conspire against their partner in the condominium ; nay, I go so far as to say that Arahi would still be a mutinous colonel only, had not French intrigue and the muddling of a few of our own countrymen lifted him upon the pedestal of a liberal reformer. The French hoped, by means of Arabi, to regain an ascendancy ; they thought by helping him and the so-called National ministers, to secure the gratitude of men who surely never under- stood the meaning of the word. They dazzled Arabi and Co. with the prospect of an Egyptian Republic, of which he would have been the President under the wings of France. They helped him to believe that there was really a national party in Egypt and he a Washington. I do not say that this was officially expressed, but '52 Earl Granville to Lord Lyons. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 5 (1882) p. 76 et seq. Ibid., No. 8, pp. 17, 31, 33, 36, 42 and 43. ™ Ibid., No. 7 (1882) p. 141. -"* Ibid., pp. 109 and 119. ™ Ibid., No. 8 (1882) p. 45. '=« Ibid., No. 7 (1882) pp. 109, 128, and 133. Ibid., No. 8, p. 38: ™ Ibid., No. 7 (1882) pp. 130, 135, 136. Ibid., No. 8, p. 12. Q 2 228 EGYPT. there are many ways of encouraging people. We have only to look at Mr. Blunt and Sir William Gregory, who, simple tourists, managed to impress Arabi and his friends that they represented public opinion in England, and, as far as Mr. Blunt is con- cerned, a deal more. Frequently did I hear the Prime Minister's name mentioned as one sympathis- ing with the Egyptian pseudo-reformer. It was impossible to expect half-educated Arabs, nay, even Arabi and his ministers, to discern the true value of this officious meddling. Oherif told the author him- self, one day, that Arabi had been boasting of having received an encouraging letter from " Lord Gregory, the trusted Councillor " of Her Majesty the Queen of England ; and as he had not heard before of the late Governor of Ceylon, he inquired who he was, and by what right false hopes were given to rebel colonels. As to Mr. Blunt, not one, but almost all the Khedive's ministers lamented that the use of Mr. Gladstone's name should have misled Arabi and his following ; an opinion shared likewise by those of the English officials I had the pleasure of know- ing, including Sir Edward Malet and Sir Ackland Colvin ; '^' whilst the Khedive was even more out- spoken than any of the former,"^ and never missed an opportunity of complaining of the unwarranted interference of strangers. Indeed he quite seriously asked the author one day, whether Sir Edward Malet had not the power to bundle mischievous persons out of his dominions. In fact, it was His '68 Appendix IV. ™» Ibid. TBWFIK. 229 Highness personally who insisted upon the rectifica- tion by Eeuter's Agency '°'' of the telegram Mahmoud Pasha Samy had fraudulently induced the Sheikh-ul- Islam *" to send to Mr. Blunt. To my mind, the officious French agents and the self-appointed English advisers of Arabi, are more guilty than he is. He was a mutinous colonel, per- haps even an ill-inspired fanatic, but until he was prompted by others to speak in the name of the people, there was precious little of the reformer about him."'^ Having been at the head of successful mutinies, his name was used as a flag by intriguing Frenchmen, vain amateurs, and ambitious natives, and prominent amongst them, as I said before, by Mahmoud Pasha Samy, who certainly used Arabi only for his own ends. And whilst Arabi is at the worst a dangerous madman, Baroudi is a despicable knave — a coward grafted on a scoundrel, if we are to believe his masters, Ismail and Tewfik, and his former chief Cherif, who seem unanimous in this opinion.'^^ It seems a pity that, like Mr. Blunt, a poet, Baroudi should not have exercised his talents in '*" See Appendix IV. '""^ The present Sheith-ul-Islam, the Shafite el Bmhahi, and his brother have for many years past been trading in Manchester goods ; and since, his brother's death the Sheikh-ul-Islam manages the business alone, though in partnership with his nephew, a lad of fifteen. The firm is wealthy and highly respectable, and I only mention the fact as a curious instance of Oriental customs. An English mind can hardly picture the Archbishop of Canterbury or the Master of Balliol dividing their time between Lambeth Palace or Oxford and Mincing Jjane or G-racechurch Street. — The Author. ™ Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 3 (1882) pp. 4 and 14. '"^ Appendix IV. 230 EGYPT. writing epics, instead of breeding revolution ; but, then, the vagaries of poets ■ are unaccountable. The moment the game was up, Baroudi endeavoured to wbitewasb himself, and though he had threatened his master with death and deposition,'** though he had threatened the Europeans with massacre, '** though he had even threatened to prevent the land- ing of the Turkish Commissioner,'^^ and though he was the unscrupulous instigator of most of the mis- chief done, nay, with a hand in the massacres and incendiarism of Alexandria, he set his wife's rela- tions to spread the report that " poor " Baroudi had been coerced by Arabi. Indeed, I remember a similar attempt when he and the Arabi Cabinet retired from office, after the ultimatum. Already, then, his rela- tions gave out that he had only been acting under threats of death. And considering that Mahmoud Pasha Samy has sold, one after the other, his bene- factor Ismail, Tewfik, Cherif, Eiaz, every one of his former chiefs, it would not be surprising if we saw him one of these days turn "Queen's evidence" against his accomplice Arabi. It will only be a matter of price. But we have to return once more to the commutation of the sentence passed on the Cir- cassian officers, due chiefly to Sir Edward Malet's advice.'*' Had the Khedive allowed Arabi and Baroudi to have their will, he would have opened the door to a rhgne de la terreur, for, not content with sentencing about forty of their personal enemies to ™ Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 104. ■"" Ibid., p, 116 et seq. '«« Ibid., p. 108. '" n,y^ p_ ng. TEWFIK. 231 virtual death, there were more than 300 other names '** put under police supervision, who, one by- one, would not have failed to follow the others up the White Nile.'^^ When the ministers saw that the Khedive was backed by Europe ; when they saw their mistake of having shown their cards, they suggested a com- promise, and offered to commute the sentences. But the matter was no longer in Tewfik's hands. He had referred it to the Sultan in consequence of a telegram from the Grrand Yizir. Thereupon the ministers insisted, in most violent language, that he should telegraph to Constantinople, ask for the return of the papers, and decline Turkish inter- ference."" It happened that the Western Powers — certainly France — were equally adverse to anything leading to a direct or indirect interference of Turkey.. Called upon by the Khedive to advise him, the agents of England and France suggested that His Highness should make use of his right of grace, and thus put an end to the whole matter. Tewfik com- plied, and commuted the sentence to simple banish- ment from Egypt. But in doing so, and in causing this decree to be published ere his ministers had wind of the matter, he naturally roused their rage. They rushed to the palace, and demanded that the decree should be cancelled. They threatened him with deposition, with death. They said that a '«« Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) p. 19 et seq. 769 "vyiiat even Egyptian soldiers and students of the Military School thought of the sentence may be gathered from Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 96.— The Author. ™ Appendix IV. 232 EGYPT. massacre of Europeans would be the consequence, and, as I have said before, they convoked the Chamber without even consulting His Highness. The Prime Minister declined in future any inter- course with the Khedive,'" and Egypt had the spectacle of what M. de Freycinet terms "un ministere en insurrection centre le chef d'etat." "^ Such a state of things naturally gave alarm, and Lord Grranville suggested the sending out of an English, a French, and a Turkish general. Though not objecting to the former two, M. de Freycinet, as usual, would not hear of Turkish interference."^ Meanwhile, matters got worse at Cairo. The Notables convoked, yet declining to sit in a body, were terrorised by the army "* ; and Lord Granville made Arabi personally responsible for the conse- quences.'" The Khedive was, indeed, in the worst position imaginable : threatened on one side by ministers having behind them the army, and by means of the army, the Notables, the Chamber ; and pushed on the other by the Controlling Powers not to give way to his powerful ministers, though no one was prepared to back him up with anything but advice. Nay, contrary to the Khedive's feelings,"® he was coerced into maintaining in ofSce these very men'"; and it is quite delightful to read M. de "1 Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 117. "2 Speech of M. de Freycinet, May 11, 1882, in the French Chamher. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 126. ™ Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 101. ™ Ibid., p. 120. "" Ibid., pp. 131, 132, and 134. "' Appendix IV. '" Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 139. TEWPIK. 233 Freycinet's regrets at the " replatrage " of the Egyptian Cabinet,"' when, more than any one else, he had brought about the necessity of an uncon- ditional submission of the Khedive to brute force. Power being all Arabi and his friends wished for, they gaily proceeded to the palace of Ismailia,'" and kissed Tewfik's feet as if nothing had happened. His Highness himself told the author that he had never felt toore disgusted in his life ; and some of those present declared that it would have been im- possible to witness more cringing servility than that displayed by the rebel ministers, notwithstanding the Khedive's coldness, who did not address a single word to one of them, and beckoned them to with- draw. The advice of England and France to main- tain these ministers was of course, as openly stated, only to gain time for the arrival of the fleets ; and, contrary to the orders of the Khedive, Arabi pushed on military preparations,''" for they all felt that they ™ "M. de Freyoinet regrets the ' repl&trage ' of the Egyptian Cabinet." — Viscoimt Lyons to Earl Granville, May 16, 1882. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 144. "' Sir B. Malet to Earl Granville, May 16,1882. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 143. ™ " I have the honour to inform your Lordship that this morning the Kledive told M. Sienkiewioz and me that he had informed his Minister of War that all military preparations were in contravention of His Highness' orders. Araby Pasha professed his obedience, but continues actively to push on his preparations. In order to arrive at a settlement, the first step m.ust necessarily be the resignation of the ministry now in power and the surrender of the military leaders, which coiild probably be compassed if their persons, rank, and property are guaranteed, but they should be obliged to quit Egypt for a year at least. If this were obtained, and a ministry were formed under Oherif Pasha, there would be little difficulty with the remain- ing questions, but if the Porte shows itself hostile to the action of the two Powers, resistance will be shown here. According to the compact between 234 EGYPT. had been kept in office to be put aside as soon as the Consuls-G-eneral could back up their will. In fact, on May 20th, Sir Edward Malet and M. Sienkie- wicz suggested to their respective Governments to propose to Baroudi and Arabi that they should leave Egypt with Toulba, Abd-ul-al, and Ali Fehmy, that they should not return without the Khedive's sanc- tion, and that the agents would guarantee them pro- perty, rank, and pay, a proposal fully countenanced by the President of the Chamber and the Notables."^ Had there been a Turkish ship alongside ours, and had the Sultan not protested '^^ against our naval demonstration, the ministers would not have been able to decline the interference of England and France, on the plea that they should only submit to the Porte, and circulating amongst officers and soldiers an untrue version of the conditions sug- gested by the English and French agents. The ultimatum of May 25th was the result.'^^ We have already seen that the ministers requested the Khedive to advise them on the steps to be taken, and when both the Khedive and the Chamber ex- pressed their concurrence with the moderate demands of the ultimatum,'^* the ministers resigned ; but not England and Prance, Turkish troops are to suppress such, resistance, but the fact of its not heing generally known here that the Sultan will intervene may probably make that very intervention necessary which both of the two Powers are anxious to avert." — Sir E. Malet to Earl Granville, May 19, 1882. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) p. 11. "^ Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) p. 28 et seq^ "2 Ibid., pp. 13, 21, and 29 et seq. '«' Ibid., p. 34. '** In fact, in order not to give the ultimatum the appearance of dmpos- TEWFIK. 235 without threatening another military " parade." It was out of the question that Cherif Pasha,'^^ or any- one else, could have undertaken to form another ministry '^^ " until the supremacy of the military party is broken," '^' as Sir Edward Malet wrote to Lord Granville when his lordship and M. de Frey- cinet first urged that the Khedive should avail himself of the " favourable moment " of the arrival of the fleets for a change of ministers. Arabi, who must have known '^^ of the Sultan's kind offer to settle the question by the deposition of Tewfik, peremptorily refused, in the face of the Chamber, to accept the ultimatum.'*' Arabi and his friends got up petitions in the army, and at a meeting of the Notables and chief personages of the State convened by the Khedive, in order to lay the situation before them, Toulba Pasha rudely interrupted His High- ness, stating that the army more than ever absolutely refused to accept the joint note.*'" Sir Edward Malet warned the Home Government against the impossibility of restoring the Khedive's authority '^^ as long as Arabi and his associates were allowed to remain in Egypt ; a view only too practi- cally illustrated by Arabi's appearance at the head of about 100 officers at the house of the President ing tlie will of England and France, it had purposely been framed after having ascertained from Sultan Pasha the views of the Notahles, so that in reality the Powers were only exacting the demands of an impotent Chamber. — The Author. '85 Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) p. 40. '86 Ibid., p. 18. ™' Ibid. ™ Ibid., p. 31. ™ Ibid., pp. 28 et seq. ™ Ibid., p. 41. ™' Ibid. 236 EGYPT. of the Chamber, where the chief persons of Cairo and the Deputies were assembled, " demanding " the depo- sition of the Khedive, and threatening death to the recalcitrants,'"^ and when, nevertheless, almost all present, except the officers, persisted in supporting the Khedive, Arabi and his military tail insisted upon a decree reinstating him as Minister of War, and allowing twelve hours for its promulgation. The Khedive summoned the English and French agents to advise him. They could not recommend him to give way nor take upon themselves the responsibility of counselling a resistance which would have been fatal to the Khedive, and as the ministers had previously declared that they could only submit to the Porte, Sir Edward Malet recommended the Khedive to answer that the whole question was under the Sultan's consideration, suggesting at the same time to the Home Grovernment " the prompt intervention of the Porte as the only means of restoring order." "^' However, on the afternoon of the same day, " the chiefs of religion, including the Patriarch and the Chief Eabbi, all the Deputies, Ulemas, and others, waited on the Khedive and asked him to reinstate Arabi as Minister of War, He refused ; but they besought him saying that, though he might be ready to sacrifice his own life, he ought not to sacrifice theirs, and that Arabi had threatened them all with death if they did not obtain his ™2 Parliaimentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) p. 43. ™5 Sir E. Malet to Earl Granville, May 28, 1882. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) p. 43. TEWFIK. 237 consent. The Colonel of the Khedive's Guard stated that the Guard of the Palace had heen doubled, that orders had been given to them to prevent his leaving the palace for his usual drive, and to fire if he attempted to force his way. Under these circum- stances the Khedive yielded, not to save himself, but to preserve the town from bloodshed." "* Is it possible to imagine a more humiliating position for a sovereign ? The Khedive told the author that he was blushing at having been forced to a step beneath his dignity and honour, that he would have preferred death had it not been his duty to think of his country, and that it was the greatest sacrifice he could have made to his Etxropean advisers.'^^ Yet to whom was due the whole lamentable farce, if not to the stubborn refusal of the French Govern- ment to associate the Sultan in our interference, if not to the blustering policy " of barking and not biting." Europe had no right to throw the Notables into the arms of Arabi by the Identical Note. Europe had no right to push Cherif's Cabinet to a conflict with the Chamber. Europe had no right to advise the Khedive to resist the brutal force of Arabi and Co., without having at hand the means to follow up this advice. Europe had no right to indispose the Sultan against a prince whose loyalty towards both Europe and the Porte has been his ™ Sir B. Malet to Earl Granville, May 28tli. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) p. 49. See also Appendix IV. ™'' Appendix IV. 238 EGYPT. greatest misfortune. Europe 'had no right to step in between the Khedive and his mutinous soldiers with paper threats, with an ultimatum, and platonic naval demonstrations without being prepared to carry out these threats, without being in a position to defend those whom she had brought into this perilous position, without being ready to enforce her will. The Powers only endangered the life of the Khedive, the position of the Europeans ; they only increased the arrogant demands of the military party ; and having compromised the Khedive, Cherif Pasha, the Notables, and all loyal supporters of the " dual " policy, they crowned their work by heaping ridicule on their own agents, by lowering the dignity of both England and France, and by giving a serious blow to the prestige of Christian Europe in the Moham- medan world. The author was in Egypt at the time, and remembers the deplorable effect of European states- manship. Though sad in its consequences, it, how- ever, does not lack a comic side, and it is certainly N laughable to see M. de Freycinet on that very 27th of May (when the Khedive staked his life to save his country), request the Sultan, whose interference he had all along deprecated, to blame the " conduct " of the Khedive's ex-ministers and to summon them to Constantinople for an explanation of their language and attitude,"' and yet in the same breath demanding an explanation from the Khedive how he had dared to ask his Suzerain to come to his rescue, and to ""^ Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) pp. 48 and 53. TEWFIK. 239 send a Turkish Commissioner to Cairo '" — a pre- posterous liberty taken with Eepublican Excellencies, " calmes et fermes " at a distance. To show Tewfik the folly of his fears, to prove to him that he was not deserted, M. de Freycinet suggested, after the failure " de I'influence morale de nos escadres," "^ a " Con- ference " "' as another heroic remedy .'^^'' I do not know whether M. de Bunsen had French statesmen in his mind when he wrote " Events are great but men are small," and it is not possible to imagine a policy more pitiable than that of these Eepublican Talleyrands. However, half a century ago Prince Metternich wrote : " Je prevois de grands embarras pour les Ministres Frangais. . . . comme une consequence de leur nuUite manifeste. . . . Ce qu'il faut 4 un homme qui n'a pas meme une position sociale, c'est une somme de talents, de qualites, et surtout, de savoir faire, bien autre que ne I'exige I'usage commun. Or, c'est tout juste ce qui manque aux Ministres Frangais."^"" Perhaps the ™ ' Documents diplomatiques, Affaires d'lfigypte ' (1882) p. 142. ™ M. de Freycinet k M. Tissot, May 30, 1882. ' Documents diploma- tiques, Affaires d']llgypte' (1882) p. 148. See also Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) pp. 55 and 56. "^ The Conference whicii met on June 2Srd for the first time and allowed itself to be bamboozled by Ottoman diplomacy up to August 15th if I remember well, and our famous Military Convention, of which the ratification was for weeks announced every evening only to be contradicted the next morning, are almost obsolete and tedious subjects overstepping the frame of the present pages, and have only proved once more the futility of a discordant European concert. — The Author. 799a " Nations are like men : the young hope more than they fear, and the old fear more than they hope." — ' Ten years in Sarawak,' by C. Brooke, ii. p. 13. s" Prince Metternich to Count Apponyi, Feb. 3, 1835. ' Aus Metternichs nachgelassenen Papieren,' v. p. 634. 240 EGYPT. late ministers will find a consolation in the thought that they have evidently not been the first of their species. But the Conference was not only designed to " save " Tewfik, but also to " conciliate " Arabi and to " isolate " England/" to kill three birds with one stone. There remains little to be said ; the events following the utter breakdown of all authority, and of the last vestiges of Anglo-French prestige, are too fresh in every one's memory. The only practical advantage Tewfik derived from the breakdown of M. de Freycinet's "moral influence" was that he was at last permitted to go with his family to Alexandria/"^ The declarations of France that they would do nothing to enforce the ultimatum, the encouragement vouchsafed to Arabi by the French and the Sultan,^"^ naturally encouraged the rebel leader. Though he knows little of Continental affairs. *"' " M. de Freycinet said yesterday to a group of deputies, one of whom questioned him about the Conference : " It is not France, but England, that is isolated. . . . We can do without her. She cannot do without us. . . . Our policy now is to conciliate the National party, and by so doing keep Egypt as a buffer between ourselves and Tunis and the Porte. This is in accordance with the tradition which has been formed since 1830, when we took Algeria. Arabi is a great fact with which we must count. If we get him to our side he will be worth to us an army corps." — Pall Mall Gazette, July 1, 1882. 802 " jjjjj presence des nouvelles oh'constances nous cessons d'insister pour que le Khedive reste au Caire." — M. de Freycinet a M. Sienkiewicz, May 30, 1882. 'Documents diplomatiques, Affaires d'lilgypte' (1882) p. 147. 8»3 " L'action de la Porte, en Egypte, n'est plus aujourd'hui un mystfere. Elle s'est traduite par des encouragements prodigufe aux chefs de I'insur- reotion; . . . elle a exerc^ en m§me temps sur I'esprit du KhMive Tewfik une attraction dont son pfere Ismail s'^tait toujours defendu." — ' La Question ;6gyptienne,' 1881, p. 3. TEWPIK. 241 he knows, thanks to his European friends, sufficient to understand the gravity an armed interference of the French might have for France. He knew the direct effect, leaving alone Continental complications, it would have in Algiers and Tunis, where a blow against Egypt would have stirred up afresh the dormant hatred of the vanquished Mussulman ; nay, he knew that the French protestations, that the French alliance with England in Egypt, were only intended the better to deceive what French Chauvin- ists like to call the hereditary enemy of la belle France; he was aware that by a little judicious management — providing he was successful — the present French -ministers would be the first to hail him as one of them, and that he could rely upon the staunch support not only of French, but Continental Eadicals. Therefore, not to alienate the good-will and the prospective help of the French Grovernment, he abstained from adding to his many other outrages the crime of regicide ; and the French ministers may possibly be said to have saved His Highness's life sans le savoir. It is indeed a wonder how Tewfik escaped with his life, in fact, the Khedive and his entourage were daily expecting the worst,*"* and that he did escape is not due to the protection of Europe, but to the secret plotting of France, to the hope of Arabi to secure sympathy by allowing his prey to escape — a magnanimous move which he seems to have repented since, if we are to believe his own ™ Appendix IV. R 242 EGYPT. words*"* — and to an undoubted want of personal courage, for he knew well enough that he would have had to pay with his own life for such a monstrous deed. Tewfik has few friends, but still enough to avenge him should Arabi, Baroudi, and Co. have laid hands on his person. With the Khedive's departure for Alexandria ends the second part of the drama, and it is a duty to render homage to the manly and courageous bearing of the unfortunate Prince throughout these trying weeks.^"^ Indeed, he remained firm and digni- fied, and he certainly played " le plus beau r6le dans ce dedale de betises." Having accepted the Anglo- French tutelage, he clung loyally to his patrons at the risk of his throne and life on one side, and of his popularity and the confidence of his subjects on the other. As I said before, he owes his life to the fears, hopes, and cowardice of his enemies, and possibly a little to Oriental usages, for passing in review the many assassinations of sultans at Constantinople, it will be seen that, though revolution is always out- door work, assassination has invariably been the work of " the palace," and there he had little to fear. But he has nothing to thank Europe for, though his blood would have been upon us, upon the Con- 806 a rjijjjg Khedive, whose life the country has spared up to the present time, has now joined the enemy in attacking Egyptian Moslems." Arahi's proclamation to the Moudirs upon the evacuation of Alexandria. — Mr. Cartwright to Earl Granville, July 21, 1882. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 17 (1882) p. 184, and Times, July 22, 1882. ^^ Appendix IV. TEWPIK. 243 trolling Powers who, stripping the Khedive of all authority, killed " Effendina " morally before ever his rebellious subjects dared to threaten their Master. Our mistakes have created the present situation, and no one is more to blame than Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington, the inventors of an impotent Khediviate, and of a blustering condominium ; of a policy of swagger and threat, which, thanks to the French, led ultimately, I am sorry to say, to Lord Grranville's and M. de Freycinet's identical note, and to the famous "ultimatum." But if Lord Salisbury left to his successors in the Dual Control an heritage utterly inconsistent with British traditions, so adverse to any direct interference with the interior affairs of foreign countries, if he has left to others to fight out the consequences of his blunders, Mr. Grladstone's administration has at any rate nobly redeemed its own faults and those of its predecessors by re-assert- ing single-handed not the renown of British arms — they do not need that — but the prestige of G-reat Britain throughout the Mussulman world ; not as a conqueror, but as a friend, as the defender of a Mussulman prince against mutinous soldiers. But to return once more to Tewfik, it has been said that in character and conduct he is about as favourable a specimen of an Oriental ruler as the world can produce.^"' I go even farther, and I say, that in this instance His Highness has equalled, if not surpassed, any of his Continental " cousins " "" ' England's Intervention in Egjrpt,' by E. Dicey (Nineteenth Century, Aug. 1882, p. 170). R 2 244 EGYPT. whom fate has ever placed in a similar position. Deserted by everybody, except by a few devoted Egyptians, like Zulficar Pasha and Tigrane Pasha — I do not speak of the Europeans who remained at their posts — his implicit faith in England was the only ray of hope — and a very faint one — in the night of despair. And here I wish to add that the Yice-Queen clung with true womanly devotion to her husband in the hour of danger. His Highness told the author of his anxiety for those he loved,^"^ but the Yice-Queen would not hear of leaving her hus- band, ready to die with him, if such was the will of Providence. I daresay in those moments it must be a blessing to be a follower of the Prophet ; " Kismet " cannot but double the pluck of a mortal surrounded by would-be assassins — a circumstance which in no way diminishes the courage displayed by Her High- ness, who, " as princess, wife, and mother, is above reproach," *°' and who is equally j?espected by high and low, friend and foe, as a truly good woman. It is certainly to the Credit of the Khedive that, notwithstanding M. de Freycinet's kind permission,'"" he should have stuck to the post of danger."^ It is "* Appendix IV. "" Illustrated London News, Oct. 28, 1882. 81" ' Documents diplomatiques, Affaires d']5gypte' (1882) p. 147. 811 « There have, of course, been insinuations that the Khedive's pluck, that his remaining at Cairo, was only a comedy put on the stage in con- currence with the rebel chiefs and that it had all been preconcerted; insinuations which the papers found in Arabi's possession will not faU to prove as groundless as they seem unworthy of accuser and accused, and we find, at a later period, in Mr. Cartwright's letter to Dervish Pasha, an ofEcial testimony that the Khedive does not ' shrink from serious risk.' " —Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 17 (1882) p. 172. TBWFIK. 245 useless to revert to Dervish Pasha's arrival at Cairo. I have said before, the hopes that had been formed by the party of order — hopes based on the co-opera- tion of Turkey with the Western Powers, and frus- trated by the fault of France ; the very reception he gave to Arabi's " envoy," who, contrary to the Khedive's order, had ventured to go to Alexandria to meet the Sultan's representative ; the simple fact of Dervish Pasha taking into his carriage Arabi's man, a simple colonel, when the highest dignitaries of the Khedivial Court had to follow in another, indicated the intentions of the Porte. " It is only to decoy Arabi," said those who could not, or would not, believe that Dervish, instead of having come to strengthen the Khedive's authority, was only in Egypt to use Arabi for the Sultan's ends, just as they said a fortnight later that the grand cordon of the Medjidieh given by the Sultan to Arabi ^^^ was only a rope to hang him with. Others, who knew the disappointment of the Sultan at the cavalier way in which he, the Caliph, had been treated throughout the whole business, doubted not for a moment of the true object of Dervish's mission; still less as the presence in his suite of the Sheikh Ahmed Essad "* *'^ An honour well calculated to assign to Arabi the first place amongst Ms countrymen, when we remember that Sultan Pasha, the -President of the Chamber, was only made a Commander of the same order. — The Author. '^^ Sheikh Ahmed Essad, known by his missions to Tunis, is the same whose correspondence has been found amongst the papers of Arabi, in whose house he secretly stopped for a fortnight in January 1882 ; uneasiness at Constantinople about this trouvaille is said to be the cause of Dervish Pasha's arrest. — The Aijthor. 246 EGYPT. was a proof that Pan-Islamite projects would be hatched. On the 11th of June, the first riots'"* of Alex- andria took place ; and so much has been said and will be said on this subject, that I may well confine myself to one remark based upon numerous letters I had from native friends, that these riots were planned and organised, less with a view of killing Europeans or destroying property, than of making Arabi (head of the army, the only power in Egypt) indispensable. The events of Alexandria imposed upon the Khedive the necessity of asking the leader of the rebellion to protect order, which, thanks to the absence of Turkish ships, as I have said over and over again, M. de Freycinet's "moral influence" had not been able to maintain. A graphic account of the events of the 11th of June will be found in Mr. Cookson's report."* Two days later the Khedive and Dervish arrived at Alex- andria, a step disapproved by the Sultan. Under pressure of the German and Austrian Consuls- Greneral the Ragheb Cabinet was formed, and the less said on this subject the better. Sheltered under a pseudo-legality, the champion of order, the virtual master of Egypt, Arabi pushed on his preparations for defence. And though contrary to the orders of the Sultan, contrary to those of his nominal Master the Khedive, I consider his armaments the least of his crimes, for the only excuse a soldier has for not »"• Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 11 (1882) pp. 39 and 42. »" Ibid., No. 17 (1882) p. 22 tt seq. TBWPIK. 247 obeying his sovereign is the patriotic defence of the soil against foreign invasion; and though nothing of the kind was intended, though even the landing of troops would only have had for its object to uphold the lawful sovereign on his throne, Arabi may well plead fear of occupation as an excuse. Has not France by her virtual annexation of Tunis justified the fears of Mussulmans ? Eeligious fana- ticism sufficed to say to Europe " Hands off," and it hardly required Arabi's selfish motives, or the wish to increase his popularity, by active preparations. It was criminal folly, no doubt, to provoke the final bombardment by armaments endangering our ships, despatched for no other purpose but the protection of the Khedive, and a refuge for the European colonies. The present trial will throw a light on much that is dark in this matter. Such as that Arabi, at the Council held at the palace of Eamleh, volunteered submission to Sir Beauchamp's demands, but that the Khedive implored him to defend the place at any risk *^^ — rumours possibly spread in the hope of shifting the responsibility on Tewfik, as Arabi already attempted on July 15th, when he telegraphed from Kafr Dawar, congratulating His Highness on *'^ According to statements made by one of the ministers, Arabi declared at tbe last council that he could not resist Sir Beauchamp if the English were in earnest, and that he was ready to submit, when the Khedive is said to have clasped Arabi in his arms, ordering him to defend Alexandria and the country to the last. This story, though confirmed by Ahmet Bey Eifaat, late Secretary to the Council of Ministers, is too incredible, and I only mention it to show the line of defence concocted by the prisoners. — The Author. 248 EGYPT. the influx of recruits for the defence of the country ^ against the invader.*" We know the sequel, and one can fully understand Mr. Gladstone's reluctance to saddle England with actual war, an occupation of Egypt, and a deal more. Events have proved the mischief done by not having at hand a sufficient force ; and though the burning of the town, planned by Arabi's people and executed before the evacuation, might not have been avoided had we at once landed four or five thousand men, it is obvious that even a small force would have sufficed to protect, if not property, at any rate life. There would have been no time for massacres had the hoisting of the white flag been followed by an im- mediate occupation. But these are questions not only of a military nature, but of vital international importance. Her Majesty's ministers alone can know the reason why they indulged in so fatal a forbearance. Whether it was or not an error of judgment to allow Arabi time for retreat, and for further preparations, the splendid combinations of Sir Garnet, the unequalled dash of our men, and the glorious achievements of Her Majesty's armies have passed a sponge over diplomatic shortcomings. England has put her foot on anarchy ; England has crushed the rebellion ; has replaced the Khedive on his throne; in fact, has done what it would have been the duty of united Europe to accomplish. The manly example given by the Khedive during the last terrible days at Alexandria, and his escape »" Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 17 (1882) p. 147. TEWFIK. - 249 from death, thanks to the magic of backsheesh, &c.,"' has already the eulogies of Her Majesty's Grovern- ment and of all honest men. His Highness's loyalty to England and plucky self-sacrifice will not he for- gotten. It would probably be the universal opinion in this country that it is England's duty to replace the Khedive on his throne, and though he has re-entered his capital under the protection of the British flag, the soldiers' work must now yield to that of the diplomatist. Everything is not accom- plished by His Highness' sitting in security on a divan in Abdin Palace. Before our task is com- pleted we must revive " Effendina," and restore that authority which Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington gratuitously undermined. The Khedive is safe as long as Her Majesty's troops are in Egypt, and in view of his future safety, a new Egyptian force is being formed in all haste ; but no army can restore what Europe has taken from him, the confidence of his people : " On s'appuie sur des bayonettes, on ne s'y asseoit pas." The best of princes, the most intelligent and well-meaning, is sure to be a thorn 817 V FEDDAN KN 1879, 1880 ET 1881. Prix de Revlent du Feddan. Dans le premier trimestre 1881. Dans le quatrieme trimestre 1881. An ler Janvier 1881. Moyenne g€nerale. Moyenne particuliere i la Garbieh. P. E. 143 P. E. 21 70 P. E. 13 47 P. E. 8 40 CONCLUSION. 287 to a Continental system of surveying and of recording the results, which is utterly unadapted to the compre- hension of. Eastern people, and as long as they will saddle us with the Europeans for whom they cannot find room elsewhere ; we have far too many Euro- peans on the detail and survey of the fields, a work which the natives, properly supervised, are capable of doing quite as well as Europeans, and at a third of the price.'' Yet the Cadastre is of the greatest importance, as the only means of equalising taxation. ^'^ The most startling discoveries have been made : lands taxed that did not exist, but more frequently lands escap- ing taxation. It is this chiefly that has made the Cadastre so unpopular with the natives. The Pasha dreads being found out, and the Fellah hates being disturbed in what is, and has been for centuries. As to the Caisse de la Dette Publique, the incon- venience of having four gentlemen to keep the key of the cash-box is of course only felt by the Egyptian Exchequer ; ^*^ but it is preposterous that the Egyptian Grovernment should pay over 37,000/. a year for her creditors' cash-keepers, when they might lodge the moneys with the Bank of England, for instance. It is difficult enough to pay debts, but to be mulct into thousands for a receipt is a little too bad. And now a word about the army. We all ^'' ' Rapport sur les Operations du Cadastre, 1881,' and also ' Notice sur la classification des terres et la repartition Equitable de l'imp6t,' where additional details on the work done can be found. — The Author. "" Each of the four Commissaires de la Caisse is paid L. B. 2925 per annum, with about 5000Z. office expenses. — The Author. 288 EGYPT. know that Greneral Baker Pasha's scheme has heen adopted, and that the new army will be officered by Englishmen and natives only. Griven the present state of the case, it may not have been either in his will or power to introduce any other foreign element but the English ; yet as the stay of English officers is not contemplated to be permanent, we ought to have endeavoured also to get a number of German officers. In talking last winter in Egypt about the army reform, the idea of German instructors met with the approval of many of the leading men ; and even some of the foreign representatives thought it less objectionable than an Egyptian army officered exclu- sively by English or French officers. Far be it from me not to recognise the great qualities of the English officer, but those who will be candid must admit that the organisation of the British army precludes the subaltern from being an instructor. It is left to the adjutant, the drill sergeant, and is not one of the duties of the young- ster ; whilst in Germany it is the subaltern, captain included, who drills from morn to noon. Now in an army like the English, with first-rate non-commis- sioned officers, it may possibly not be required — et encore ; but in Egypt it will be absolutely necessary for the officer to do the work himself, and a few dozen German instructors might have proved in- valuable auxiliaries in so arduous and trying a task. Possibly political considerations may preclude any such admixture of foreign elements, and no doubt CONCLUSION. 289 the best will be done witb the material at hand ; at any rate, Baker Pasha's proposal to reserve commis- sions for natives v?ill give great satisfaction. In fact it would be as unjust as dangerous not to employ Egyptians. We have only to remember the origin of the riots — the dismissal of 2500 officers, without bread for themselves and children — and the wholesale dis- missal of 3000 and more of Arabi's officers may prove again a grave mistake. To begin with, the lower grades are, with few exceptions, excusable, and deserve no punishment; whilst, in view of the 12th of November, of Sanoussi's movement, and with about 30,000 old soldiers scat- tered over Egypt, with 150,000 rifles missing, it is, to say the least, imprudent to increase the number of malcontents, and to drive these men, out of sheer want, into the meshes of the first adventurer who promises them the needful. Let the chiefs, the guilty, be tried ; let an example be given ; let the army, officers and soldiers, know that rebellion against the Khedive, against the lawful authority, is punished with death ; they must be taught that the guardians of public order are not guardians of the people's rights; that soldiers have only one duty — " to obey," only one right — to die for their country. I should like now to call attention to the necessity of a number of English teachers being induced to take service in Egypt. With the exception of the Ali school, to which an Englishman has been attached for u 290 EGYPT. the young Princes, there is not an English master in any of the numerous schools I have visited; yet there are a good many French, some of them pains- taking and useful men. But not only schoolmasters ; Egypt will require Englishmen in almost every department, only care should be taken to send men, not as a reward for their fitness at home, but men likely to adapt themselves to Egyptian ways, men willing and able to win the confidence of the people. Though, undoubtedly, most English officials in Egypt have worked hard and well, I think it right to say that the men most popular with the natives have been sailors; and it stands to reason, for though stern in command, sailors have a particular way of endearing themselves with their sub- ordinates; good-natured, considerate, easy-going — what more does the native want? He is always ready to obey, and though he worships an iron rod, he clings gratefully to a kind and helping hand. He wants to be skilfully managed ; he has been taught to trust no one; and "reformers" of the Arabi stamp, driving Fellah " volunteers " in chains from the fields to the barrack-room, have added to his misery without giving him a particularly cheerful view " inside the house of liberty." ^*' 869 11 jjis ^j/[]._ Gladstone's) sympatliy at one time for Egypt appeared to me greater and more intelligent than that of any other public man with whom I have conversed. . . . My position with him was that of a single voice against a multitude, the voice of one man who had lived inside the CONCLUSION. 291 Mr. Dicey's remark, "that if Arabi's life depended upon his being able to explain what he naeant by representative institutions, his chance of escape would be far less than it is," **'" reminds me of an anecdote of 1848. The old Duke of Cumberland, who, on Her Majesty's accession in 1837, succeeded to the crown of Hanover, was, as we all know, an ultra-Tory. The Berlin revolution having even slightly contaminated the ultra-loyal Hanoverians, a deputation of " advanced " citizens waited upon the king to ask for a constitution. His Majesty received them well, and requested the spokesman to explain to him what a constitution was, " for you know, my friends, being an absolute monarch, constitutions are not in my line." "A constitution, your Majesty," stammered the worthy mouthpiece of the deputation, " a constitu- tion — that is what they have in England, but I don't understand English, and so could not say much about it, Sir." The King questioned another, who grinned, and blushed, and coughed, unable to utter a word. A third said he was a hatter, and did not know much about politics. A fourth could not read, and there- fore could not tell " what was in them books," and so on, until they had, one and all, been obliged to admit that none of them had a notion of what a house of liberty against the many voices of men who had only stood out- side." — ' The Egyptian Eevolution,' by W. S. Blunt (^Nineteenth Century, Sept. 1882, p. 333). S69a < England in Egypt,' by E. Dicey {Nineteenth Century, 'Sov. 1882.). TJ 2 292 EGYPT. constitution was. I will not add tte old King's answer, but the fourth letter of the alphabet had a good airing that day, and he sent these reforming tinkers about their business in a way they will remember to the day of their death. Now if thirty years ago people in G-ermany could be found as ignorant on matters of reform, we may surely pardon the Fellah for sinning in the same direction, and it will, of course, require time ere constitutionalism can take root amongst people so essentially given to autocratic ideas and forms ; yet, as I have repeated over and over again, a beginning has to be made. Good government for Egypt does not mean simply a splitting of power amongst half-a-dozen or more factors pulling in different directions, such as has been the case since Tewfik's accession. For, first, His Highness had to share his authority with native ministers and the Anglo-French Con- trol, a happy trio, where the latter played first violin. As soon as the army detected discordant notes, it took the conductor's staff out of impotent hands, and there was a quartett; but not for long, for the Notables then came to the front, and Egypt was blessed with five different potentates. When matters would not work, and when the army became too exacting, the Controlling Powers thought they would play a little at Jupiter tonans, and launched the "Identical Note." Two souls in one body, England and France, now started jointly a direct CONCIiUSION. 293 interference, distinct from the Control ; thus the five governing spirits on the Nile received a new addition* The " Identical Note " had, however, the misfortune of producing exactly the contrary effect of that intended — ^^it threw the Notables iato the arms of the army, it weakened Tewfik, instead of strengthening him. Threatened from all sides, and rather tired of advice, His Highness, following the example of the Powers in 1879, appealed to his Suzerain, who re- joiced at the prospect of stepping in as guardian angel. He at once despatched an imposing mission ; Imperial commands, advice, blame, approval, were showered on " the vassal " with a great flourish of trumpets ; possibly the whole thing would have been settled in twenty-four hours, had not France opposed Turkey's joining, even, in a platonic naval demon- stration, and that, notwithstanding England's warning that this would be the lesser of two evils. France would not listen to reason, and as is always the case en menage (especially in a faux menage such as the condominium) the strongest gave way. But Vappetit vient en mangeant ; and not satisfied with " moral influence " and a " moral victory," the French had more objects in view, and though the dualistic farce continued to exist in name, they in- dulged in what they call the " traditional " policy of France,'" and did a little business of their own, out- side " the firm." *"> In speaking, in April 1881, with a well-known French Envoy, he told me " that England had no interests in Egypt, that they could at any rate not be compared to those of France, and that in less than half a century 294 EGYPT. The other great Powers increased the confusion by collective and individual advice, of, it is true, only an officious nature, and this added a new member to the " Local Grovernment Board," which now con- sisted of the Khedive, his Ministers, the Controllers, the Army, the Notables, Turkey, England, France, and the areopagus of the great Powers, not to speak of the minor stars, frequently more active than their betters, nor of the secret wire-pullers, the pseudo- nationalists and their European advisers. What a medley ! all representing opposed interests, all pulling in different directions. Unhappy Egypt ! and yet fortunate in so far that the jealousies of the nine brought matters to a climax ; a sad page in modern history, only relieved by the brilliant achievements of Her Majesty's forces — one rapid move, one crushing blow, and it was all over. There is an end now to anarchy, and if we may draw conclusions from the public utterances of Her Majesty's Ministers, also an end of the Anglo-French Control and the rest. From the beginning a duo out of tune, its revival is now doomed, and we must sin- cerely hope that henceforth there will be again one Khedive — not nine rulers ; again one Master,^'^ with the English flag would no longer he permitted to float in the Mediter- ranean." When even able men, ind men who know the East, are led away to such mental aberration, what can be expected from the many, who judge politics with chauvinistic weights ? — The Author. *'^ " No matter what the theory of government in Egypt may be, it will always be in practice, as in all Oriental countries, the rule of an autocratic prince." — ' England's Intervention in Egypt,' by E. Dicey (^Nineteenth Century, Aug. 1882). CONCLUSION. 295 a Chamber to advise him, and an " impersonal " Controller to supervise the Exchequer. Once the authority of the Khedive rehabilitated, and " the army debarred, both now and hereafter, from any power of interfering in the administration of the country," ^'^ it will be England's duty to establish a system of government responding to true national aspirations, and to eliminate, as far as possible, not foreign influence, but foreign inter- ference,*** and to assist Egypt in obtaining the following objects : — 1. Complete independence; for the patronage of Grreat Britain enables Egypt to dispense with the tie linking her to Constantinople ; an expensive scarecrow, and about as much a defensive weapon as the wedding ring donned by travelling spinsters as a protection. The tribute (681,000?. per annum) having been pledged by Turkey, under the moral guarantee of England and France, as a security for the Tribute (1873) and Defence (1875) loans, amounting to about eight millions sterling at 5 per cent., the Porte would naturally shield herself behind her creditors to perpetuate this iniquity. To satisfy the 872 « rjijj^g military mutiny must be stamped out ; and the army must be debarred, both now and hereafter, from any power of interfering in the administration of the country. It is not enough that Arabi and his fellow- conspirators should be punished." — ' England's Intervention in Egypt,' by B. Dicey (Nineteenth Century, 1882, p. 171). ™ " En tout pays, pour exeroer une influence veritable, I'etranger doit ConseUler et contrOler le pouvoir, et non en saisir les rSnes. . . II ne doit en aucun cas faire de soi-meme une personne responsable et s'exposer a la critique indigtoe." — ' L'j^gypte et I'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 172. 296 EGYPT. most exacting, let Egypt raise a loan of seven millions at 3 J per cent, under the guarantee of Great Britain. The Tribute and Defence loans are at 70, and could easily be bought up for seven millions, considering that their market value does not amount to six. Three and a half per cent, interest on the new loan would amount to 245,000^., leaving the first year 446,000^. for amortisation of capital, and in a few years the whole would be repaid. 2. Neutrality under the guarantee of all Powers — an Oriental Belgium under the protection of England as mandatory of Europe. 3. Reorganisation of the Chamber of Notables as a consultative assembly ; four-fifths of the members to be elected, one-fifth nominated by the Khedive for life. 4. Loyal adherence to her financial obligations, coupled with a reduction of the interest to 3^ per cent, under British guarantee. 5. Bettering of the condition of the Fellah, by educa- tion and material assistance ; for unless the G-overn- ment does so a VeWah-Kraxih will be the consequence. In 1879, when Ismail left, the private debt of the Fellaheen amounted only to 1,400,000?. To-day it is 15,000,000?., of which the Land-mortgage Bank and the Credit Foncier have advanced three millions at 9 per cent., whilst the other twelve millions have been borrowed from Grreeks and other local usurers at about 30 per cent, (as a rule the Fellah gets 20 francs for \l., payable after 3 months), and unless the State steps in, that debt will double every CONCLUSION. 297 two or three years, in consequence of the frequent renewals. 6. Absolute tolerance. 7. Reform of public instruction, in both, primary and preparatory schools, and establishment of an Arab Academy for foreign students, teachers, and professors willing to enter the Egyptian service — only a small salary to be allowed as long as they cannot lecture in Arabic ; capable of doing so, a liberal and increasing scale should be held out as a temptation to efficient young men having passed their examinations at some Continental university. 8. Reorganisation of native courts; abolition of privileged jurisdiction ; equality before the law. 9 . Equalised taxation of both natives and foreigners. 10. Overhauling of all public services, and dismissal of natives and Europeans who can be dispensed with ; competitive examinations. 11. Immigration to be encouraged, and free grants of land to be given to all willing to get naturalised. 12. The reclaiming of land to be made remunerative by exemption from all taxation for a given number of years. 13. No concessions to be given except to subjects of the Khedive, or foreigners accepting the jurisdiction of Egyptian courts. 14. Development of the resources, agricultural and commercial ; and amongst other works of immediate public utility, construction of the Soudan railway. 15. Abolition of slavery and harems, by general- ising the education of women. 298 EGYPT. 16. Honesty and system in public offices. 17. Liberty of the press — not licence. But to obtain the above results only approxi- mately, England (tbe man in possession) will first have to combine a new modus vivendi between the Khedive, the Notables, and the Controller. Easy enough^'* if the Khedive is to be again " Effendina," the Chamber at first only a consultative assembly,^'' and the Controller a high official in the service of the country: all three with well-defined powers. In other words, as long as the international high- way to India is not endangered, Egypt must be allowed to manage her own affairs ; nay, when there is no longer the fear of a recurrence of a military dictatorship,*'^ England will take care that there is an end also to foreign interference. This mission she will accomplish, for " Her faith is large in time, and that which shapes it to some perfect end ! " "* " La population est au fond 6trang&e h, toutes ces competitions, et ne s'interesse que superficiellement aux agitations de I'armfe" — Le Temps, Aug. 29, 1881. *'^ Nubar Pasha developed one day to the author his idea of a sort of great representative Privy Council, instead of the Chamber of Delegates, as more adapted to the present standard and temper of the people. But with all due deference for an eminent statesman, who knows Egypt so well, I cannot help thinking that nothing could be more fatal than to dispense with the elective principle, basis of all popular representation ; and I think a happy medium might be found in the nomination by the Khedive of a limited number of native life members, representing all classes and taken amongst the most able of the land. A small addition of such men would greatly enhance the authority of the Chamber, and induce the best class of men to compete for election. — The Author. 870 u J ^Q j^Qj believe that any real progress will be made towards the settlement of the Egyptian question until that military ascendency is subdued." — Sir E. Malet to Earl Granville, April 22, 1882. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 94. Ibrahim Ayn-el-Hayat Ahmed Tewhida - 54 55 56 28 MEHEMET TEWFII I 29 SehiT^kar 88 Ahmed Mehemet 87 Abbas 66 Mehemet Ali 67 To face Appendix I. Mehemet A 45 Ulfette 80 ( 299 ) APPENDIX I. PASHAS AND KHEDIYES OF EGYPT. Mehemet Ali Ibrahim (1) Abbas (14) Said (6) Ismail (12) Born. Pasha of Egypt. 1769 .. 1807, died 1849. (at Cavala) ,. 1789 .. (at Cavala) . 1813 ., .. 1822 . .. 1830 . Mehemet Tewfik I. 1853 (29) 1848, „ 1848, eldest son of Mehemet Ali. 1848, „ 1854, son of Mehemet Ali's second son, Toussoun (2). 1854, „ 1863, fourth son of Mehemet Ali. 1863, Khedive 1869, abdicated 1879 ; second son of Mehemet Ali's eldest son, Ibrahim (1). Khedive 1879, on his father's abdication; eldest son of Ismail (12). DESCENDANTS OF MEHEMET ALL 1, Ibrahim, Pasha of Egypt 1848, died 1848, left three sons (11, 12, 13). 2, Toussoun, father of Abbas Pasha (14). 3, Ismail, 3rd son of Mehemet Ali, died without Issue. 4, Tewhida, eldest daughter of Mehemet Ali, married to MohaiTem Bey. 5, Nazli, 2nd daughter of Mehemet Ali, married to Mohamed Bey (Defterdar). 6, Said, succeeded his nephew Abbas (14) 1854, died 1863, left one son (15). 7, Zeynab, only surviving daughter of Mehemet Ali, married Kimil Pasha, and had no issue. 8, Hussein Bey, 5th son of Mehemet Ali, died at Paris whilst at college with Ahmed and Ismail his nephews. Ali Bey, 6th son, died also without issue. 9, Abd-el-Halim, only surviving son of Mehemet Ali, father of 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24. 10, Mehemet Ali, died leaving issue : Ismail (25), Zoubeyda (26), Khadidja (27). 11, Ahmed, eldest son of Ibrahim (1), died leaving issue two sons and one daughter : Ibrahim (54), Ayn-el-Hayat (55), and Ahmed (56). 12, Ismail, 2nd son of Ibrahim (1), succeeded his uncle Said (6) 1863, Khedive 1869, abdicated in favour of his eldest son 1879 ; has issue living, seven sons (29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 40) and four daughters (28, 30, 36, 38), 300 EGYPT. 13, Moustapha Fazil, 3rd son of Ibrahim (1), died in 1878, leaving issue seven sons (41, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 53) and six daughters (42, 43, 44, 49, 51, 52). 14, Abbas, only son of Toussoun (2), 2nd son of Mehemet AH, succeeded his uncle Ibrahim (1) in 1848, died 1854, leaving .issue one son (57), succeeded by his uncle Said. 15, Toussoun, only son of Said (6), 4th son of Mehemet Ali, married in 1873 Fatma, 2nd daughter of Ismail (12) ; has issue three sons (58, 59, 61), and two daughters (60, 62), 60 and 61 by Fatma. 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, daughters of Halim (9), only surviving son of Mehemet Ali. 18, 19, 20, 21, sons of Halim (9). 25, Ismail, only son of Mehemet Ali (10), youngest son of Mehemet Ali, has two sisters (26, 27). 26, Zoubeyda, 2nd daughter of Mehemet Ali (10), married to Djelal Pasha. 27, Khadidja, granddaughter of Mehemet Ali, married in 1873 to Hassan (32), 3rd son of Ismail (12), and has issue (74, 75, 76, 77, 78, and 79). 28, Tewhida, eldest daughter of Ismail (12), born 1850, married in 1868 to Mansour Pasha, grandson of Mehemet Ali's sister; has issue two daughters, B^hieh and Sdnieh. 29, Mehemet Tewfik, the present Khedive, born in 1853, married in 1873 to Amina (89), eldest daughter of El Hami, only son of Abbas (14) ; has issue two sons (66, 67), and two daughters (68, 69) ; succeeded his father Ismail (12) in 1879. 30, Fatma, bom 1854, married 1873 Toussoun (15), only son of Said (6). 31, Hussein, 2nd son of Ismail (12), born 1854, married 1873 to Ayn-el-Hayat (55), eldest daughter of his uncle Ahmed (11); has issue two sons (70, 73) and two daughters (71 and 72). 32, Hassan, 3rd son of Ismail (12), born 1854, married 1873 to Khadidja (27), eldest daughter of Mehemet Ali (10), the youngest son of Mehemet Ali ; has issue three sons (74, 78, 79) and three daughters (75, 76, 77). 30, 36, 38, 39, younger daughters of Ismail (12). 34, Ibrahim Hilmy, and 35, 37, and 40, younger sons of Ismail (12). 41, Osman, eldest son of Moustapha Fazil (13) and his wife Eengigul (Colour of Eose) ; born 1849, married, and has issue one son (83) and four daughters (80, 81, 82, 84). 42, Nazli, eldest daughter of Moustapha Fazil (13) and his wife Dilazat, married in 1873 Khalil Pasha. 43, 44, 49, 51, 52, younger daughters of Moustapha Fazil (13). 45, Mehemet Ali, 2nd son of Moustapha Fazil (13). 46, Kdmil, 3rd son of Moustapha Fazil (13), married in 1881 Naim^h, only daughter of Ismail (25), son of Mehemet Ali (10). 47, Rouchdy, 4th son of Moustapha Fazil (13), died 1879, leaving issue one son, Hayder Chinassi (85). 48, 50, 53, younger sons of Moustapha Fazil (13). 54, Ibrahim, eldest son of Ahmed (11), married in 1874 to Zeynab (33), 3rd daughter of Ismail (12) ; has issue (but not by her) two sons (86, 87) and one daughter (88). 55, Ayu-el-Hayat, only daughter of Ahmed (11), married in 1873 Hussein (31), 2nd son of Ismail (12), and has issue two sons (70, 73) and two daughters (71, 72). . 56, Ahmed, 2nd son of Ahmed (11), married to Princess Djemilah (36). 57, EI Hami, eldest son of Abbas (14), died leaving issue three daughters (89, APPENDIX I. 301 90, 91)." He had a brother, brought up amongst the Bedouins by the famous Fessal in the Nejd, a great friend of Abbas, surviving his father but a short time, and lastly a sister, born after the death of Abbas. 58, Mohamed Omar, eldest son of Toussoun (15), son of Said (6). 59, 61, Mohamed Said and Mohamed Dj^mil, younger sons of Toussoun (15). 60, 62, daughters of Toussoun (15). 63, Hussein, eldest son of Ismail (25), only son of Mehemet Ali (10). 64, Daoud, 2nd son of Ismail (25). 65, Naim^h, only daughter of Ismail (25), married in 1881 Kdmil (46), 3rd son of Moustapha Fazil (13). 66, Abbas, heir presumptive, eldest son of the present Khedive (29) and of Amina (88), eldest daughter of El Hami (57), and granddaughter of Abbas (14). 67, Mehemet Ali, 2nd son of Tewfils (29). 68 and 69, daughters of Tewfik. 70, Kemal-ed-Din and Ahmet Kazim (78), sons of Hussein (31) and Ayn-el- Hayat (55). 71 and 72, daughters of Hussein (31). 74, Azziz, Izzeddin (78), and Ibrahim (79), sons of Hassan (32) and Khadidja (27). 75, 76, 77, daughters of Hassan (32). 80, 81, 82, 84, daughters of Osman (41). 83, Fazil, only son of Osman (41). 85, Hayder Chinassi, only son of Eouchdy (47), 4th son of Moustapha Fazil (13). 86, Ahmed, eldest son of Ibrahim (54). 87, Mehemet, and 88, Schiveliar, younger children of Ibrahim (54). 89, Amina, eldest daughter of El Hami (57), only son of Abbas (14), married in 1873 to Tewfils; (29), and has issue two sons (66, 67) and two daughters (68, 69). 90, 91, younger daughters of El Hami (57), and sisters of the Vice-Queen. ( 302 ) APPENDIX II. What is commonly called Clierifs Constitution, presented by him to the Khedive on August 18, 1879, and the non-acceptance of which determined his resignation, is a document too well known and too voluminous to be reproduced here. His main views will be found expressed in the three following extracts. The first is a letter from Mr. Prank 0. Lascelles to the ' Marquis of Salisbury. i The second paper was published by the courtesy of the Editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, when the Prime Minister of Egypt was desirous that his views should be known in England, after the pseudo-programme of the so-caUed National party (drawn up by Mr. Blunt) had been -palmed off on the English public as the genuine expression of the true National party, of which Cherif is incontestably the chief.^' The third paper is taken from the Author's Diary, and embodies Cherif's ideas at the moment when the supposed arrival of Anglo-French and Turkish squadrons prognosticated the fall of the Baroudi ministry, when the submission of the rebels was, during at least twenty-four hours, an accomplished fact, when the Khedive had already asked Cherif to form a new cabinet, and when public opinion in Egypt pointed to him as the only man capable of restoring confidence and order. A. Me. Lascelles to the Marquis of Salisbuey, August 19, 1879. " In the afternoon I called upon the Khedive, who told me that a project for a Constitution had been submitted to him by the late Cabinet, of which he disapproved as being inapplicable 8" " Cherif Pasha que tous oonsid&ez aveo raison comme le chef du vrai parti national." — ' Le Oontr81e Anglo-Franjais en Igypte, reponse h. Monsieur Cl^menoeau,' par M. E, de Blignieres, p. 136. APPENDIX II. 803 to the country. The Ministry had in consequence resigned, and His Highness had accepted their resignation. . . . He hoped that in time the country would become fitted for Parlia- mentary institutions, and therefore he proposed to make no change with regard to the Chamber of Delegates, which might eventually become a really representative body. He would also consider whether it would be advisable or not to establish a Council of State. . . . On leaving the Khedive I called upon Cherif Pasha, who said that, although he was personally glad to be relieved from his duties, ... as an Egyptian he re- gretted the return to personal power. There were many persons, both in and outside of the palace, who would bo glad, for their own ends, to see the absolute power of the Khedive re-established, but it was a real misfortune for the country if it should again fall under the rule of an absolute sovereign." — Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 1 (1880) p. 65. B. The Peime Minister op Egypt on the Situation. " To begin at the beginning," said Cherif Pasha, " it is a mistake to believe that the change of ministry was the conse- quence of an outcry for general reform. The army had grievances, and though partly remedied after the events of February, they wanted a more speedy redress of their claims. To justify their attitude, and to attain their object, they presumed to speak in the name of the people. In reality the cry for a general reform was only an afterthought ; however, it took ; and since then a strong national feeling has grown out of it. I do not complain of it, for I consider it the healthy and legitimate expression of a feeling too long dormant in Egypt, and I see in it a guarantee and a promise for the future. I have therefore from the first been advising the Khedive to associate the country in our labours, by calling together the Notables, as the natural representatives of the people. They are men of property, they are moderate in their views, and we can rely on their patriotism. They are not likely to precipitate matters, and, knowing thoroughly the country, the delegates will lay before Government whatever grievances may exist ; they will enlighten the ministers as to the real wants of the Fellah, and. 304 EGYPT. without lieiiig a political assembly, they will help the Govern- ment and the Control to develop the welfare and the resources of Egypt, and they will assist us in the steady pursuit of progress and reform. The army will thus no longer have the pretext of speaking for the people; not that I have ever acknowledged their right of doing so, for the very day I accepted office I told Arabi Bey that whatever his aim might be, and whether the cry for reform was justified or not, it was not for a soldier to express, much less to enforce opinions ; and I added, ' Your servant, any Fellah, has more right than you to criticise the Government and the institutions of the country.' " It is doing an injustice to the Khedive and his advisers to attribute to Arabi Bey the judicial reforms — in fact, any of the reforms at present under consideration. Three years ago I sketched out my programme, embodying the reforms we are now endeavouring to introduce, and I should never have accepted office had I not been at liberty to carry my ideas into practice. But easy as all changes seem on paper, it requires time to find the right men for the right places and to reform a procedure and customs consecrated by centuries of arbitrary rule. As to the taxation of the house property of foreigners, it is right to say that it has long been approved by the English Government as a just and necessary measure. Arabi Bey had nothing to do with it, and it required neither pressure from the army nor from any one else. It would take too long to enumerate the list of other reforms under consideration ; for every branch of the administration will be carefully revised, and a number of Commissions are elaborating the necessary proposals ; it would be a mistake to precipitate matters, as an injudicious change might imperil the object we have in view. Coming to the much talked of reduction of the salaries of foreigners, and to the partial or wholesale dismissal of Europeans, it hardly needs my assurance that nothing of the kind is in the mind of any thoughtful Egyptian. Of course there are some offices which might be suppressed, others which are overpaid, and a Commis- sion is entrusted with a thorough overhauling of the entire civil service ; but whatever may be done to diminish the burdens of the taxpayer, and to regulate a just repartition of work and salary, Europeans have less to fear than natives, con- sidering that most of them are secured by special contracts. APPENDIX II. 305 Whether at the expiration of such contracts modificationB may not, in some instances, he advisable, is another question; but the Government and the Control may safely be trusted with the ultimate and fair settlement of the reorganisation of all services. For the present, and for a long time to come, we cannot do without Europeans ; how would we train our own people with- out their help ? What we require is to secure the services of the most efficient Europeans, and we shall certainly not grudge to pay accordingly, only we must get value for our money. Eeferring to the Control, I cannot sufficiently eulogise the painstaking and enlightened support we receive from both the English and French Controllers, and under great difficulties their energy and conciliatory tact have been most valuable to the present Government. "As you are writing to England, I hope you will mention how much I am indebted to Sir Edward Malet, whose modera- tion, calmness, and high sense of justice have materially con- tributed to help us over many a stumbling-block, and as long as he remains among us, there wiU not be the slightest fear of a misunderstanding. He has succeeded in dispelling whatever unreasonable feai-s had gained ground of the so-caUed ' secret ' aims of Great Britain, and I trust and believe him implicitly. We know England cannot allow other nations to occupy Egypt, but we also know that England does not require for herself anything but the undisturbed and peaceful enjoyment of the great Indian highway which passes through our country. All Powers recognise the dangers of meddling with our indepen- dence, and the feudal bond which ties us to the Ottoman Empire is, to my mind, our best safeguard. The Sultan, as suzerain of my master, though precluded from any direct interference with the interior affairs of Egypt, shields us from aggression. To touch Egypt would be dismembering the Ottoman Empire ; it would be a blow to the Mussulman world, and Continental statesmen are aware of the consequences. To conclude, let me assure you that Egypt has no ambition to play a political part; we want tranquillity and security. Give us time for our reforms, let us have ten years of peaceful toiling, and Europe will be astounded at the vitality of a long-suffering nation, at the prosperity and wealth, the progress and rapid development of a country so long misgoverned and for ages kept 306 EGYPT. in ignorance and in the bondage of servitude. The Khedive has devoted his life to the great question of popular education, and at his own expense, though only on a small scale, he has shown what can he done if boys are put under efficient masters. In time there will be schools all over Egypt ; we require no com- pulsory School Act, for our children are eager to learn, while their parents are only too willing to send them; but we are lacking schools, or rather schoolmasters. To form a sufficient number of the latter is our present object, all the rest will follow in due course. Education is the basis of national welfare, and, with the help of God, we shall succeed in waking the Fellah from a lethargy of centuries, and in raising Egypt to be worthy of her past. To that end we must combine in a common work of peaceful and gradual development, and I rely upon England to give us a helping hand in our difficult beginnings. Freedom, justice, and welfare of the masses is our motto, and I am sure it will find an echo in the hearts of all subjects of your good and glorious Queen." — Pall Mall Gazette, January 13, 1882. C. Cheeif Pasha's Views on May 21, 1882. " No one could assume the responsibility of forming a new administration unless invested with full authority and backed by something he can rely upon. " The prestige of the Khedive must be reaffirmed, and it is impossible to allow the Government to be hampered by the Notables, or to be at the mercy of the army. " A just balance of power will have to be devised, and the functions of the Chamber will have to be confined within the limits of my programme of 1879. " The Khedive ought not to be deprived, as heretofore, of a participation in the management of affairs, and though details and the execution of them ought to be left to his Cabinet, His Highness should be consulted on every matter of importance, and preside at the Council whenever it suits him. " Nominated by the Khedive, Ministers ought to be solely responsible to him, for we are not yet advanced enough for the full enjoyment of parliamentary rights. APPENDIX II. 307 " A great many of our recent misfortunes are due to the mistake of having divested the Khedive of his prestige and authority. " With a «fa-omy Government there might be a bright future in store/but vrhat good could I, or any other statesman, do as long as the chiefs of the military movement remain in Egypt, and as long as the army vsreighs upon the Government as an omni- potent incubus. " No Cabinet can live if the Premier is to be overshadowed by a military dictator whose will is law and whose law is brutal force. "It will be for the Powers to devise means to dissolve the army ; easy enough as far as the soldiers are concerned, whom a promise of two or three months' pay on arrival in their villages would soon induce to abandon a profession hateful to the Fellah ; more difficult as regards officers. It is obvious that all commanding officers and all those who have failed in their allegiance must be dismissed as a warning example for future mutineers ; the remaining officers might be put on half- pay until employment can' be found in the civil service, the Cadastre, &c. ; nay, a certain number of the younger ones might be sent to the military and staff colleges, there to qualify for efficient staff or regimental duties, whilst the pick of them might be allowed to join the new force. " We only require a small body of well-disciplined and well- officered troops on whom His Highness could . rely, and the soldier should be made to understand that the army is not an instrument of political agitation, but simply the guardian of public peace and order. "The formation of a limited force — a body-guard for the Khedive and a kind of gendarmerie — would answer the first requirement, and [this was said before our intervention] it might be advisable to follow the example of the Porte and to apply to Germany for a few instructors. It would have the double advantage of relieving the Controlling Powers from the necessity of interfering in Egyptian army matters, a subject on which they are bound to split, and it would be a guarantee that the appointments of foreign officers to the native army would be of a temporary nature, "His Highness would also have to consider whether he should X 2 308 EGYPT. not intmst Egyptian Princes with commands in the army in order to reconcile native susceptibilities, and to link the soldier more closely with the person and family of the Sovereign. " The army question settled, there wonld be no difficulty in starting afresh on the path of reform and progress. " The elasticity of Egypt is such that it only requires a firm hand and honesty, coupled with justice, to ensure its prosperity and welfare. " The Notables have had a wholesome lesson, and they will realise the wisdom of a moderate programme, they will be satisfied with a consultative voice, and will not claim the prerogatives of Continental Parliaments until Egypt is ripe for constitutional life. " First, public instruction must raise the present standard of the people, and secondly a thorough remodelling of the native tribunals must precede our endeavours to assimilate foreigners and natives. " The rest will follow in due course if the Khedive first gets rid of the army ; this is the sine, qua, non of establishing the Government and of maintaining its vitality. If the Powers are well advised " elles sauront dorer la pillule," and simultaneously with the dissolution of the army they will help us to weed the civil service of those European officials whose services could be dispensed with. Something of the kind has long been con- templated, and has for some time been in the minds of the English. The moment seems propitious ; it would be a satis- faction to the native element, and would be the more appreciated as the Powers could at the present moment not be suspected of having their hands forced by a clamorous army." — From the Author's Diary, May 21, 1882. (309 ) APPENDIX III. A. List of Europeans in the Sbbviob of the Egyptian Govekn- ment, according to their nationalities. Nationality. Americans . . Austro-Hungarians Belgians . . . . Danes Dutch English . . . . English proteges . . French .. . . . . Germans . . . . Greeks . . - . . Italians Norwegians . . Boumanians.. Bussians Spaniards . . Swedes Swiss European policemen Totals Number. 8 101 12 1 9 174 94 326 41 115 348 2 3 5 12 1 14 59 1,325 Monthly Salary, L. E. 508 2,369 352 96 340 6,768 1,208 9,812 1,248 1,469 6,011 106 34 341 252 96 210 368 31,588 In deducting from the above total the officials of the Caisse, Domains, Da'ira Sanieh, and mixed tribunals, administrations that have been instituted by special convention, there remain 970 officials, with a monthly salary of L. E. 21,218. 310 EGYPT. M Total of Salaries. L.E. THOSCOONQOtHOiCO'*CDO'<**©OiOWCO OOOOOi (N O 1-1 O iH O ■<*< fH CO W i-H 00 (Mco 1-H mo_eoQoaiM i-i thoj OD 1-1 (N Total Number of Officials. co«oeooin(Ni-iai(Ni-ii>i-icoiNOOO(NOs CO lOQOOCOOO-* rllO i From 300 to 360 L.E. iH.i-*« ;*• eq :::::::::::::::::: : From 200 to 250 L.E. ;;;;; IM ;«;;.;;;;.; - ■* 11 gH PH pH From 160 to 176 L.E. ; ^ ;;;;; r-t •;.•-;... . . From 125 to 160 L.E. I-I .1-) . - 1-) CO From 100 to 125 L.E. T-I....1N.(N. ;..;;;.;. lO Prom goto 100 L.E. ;;;;;■*; IN ;; 11 ..;..; ; t- From 80 to 90 L.E. ;;;;; pH ; M ;;■-(....;; . lO From 70 to 80 L.E. .;;;;IM;IN;.1-I;;;.;;; «5 From 60 to 70 L.K (M>COiH CO From 60 to 60 L.E. rHlN.;iHmi ;«■-(. m....... J-1 From 40 to 60 L.E. iHlOrH . .!> .tHoq .lO • • • i-l • CO From 30 to 40 L.E. -05 ; - r1 05 (N CO lO (N eq ....... s From 20 to 30 L.E. .CO . . .t-COOOlOO'H . . .iH .« . 5 From 16 to 20 L.E. M-*"-! . .a-l-*-* .lOlM rH . .. iH 'iHiH eo 1 1 Americans Austro-Hungarians . . Belgians Danes Dutch English English protdgfe .. French Germans Greeks Italians Norwegians Boumanians .. Bussians Spaniards Swedes Swiss European policemen 1 APPENDIX m. C. 311 O P •s 5,288 1,353 2,087 1,642 1 3I ^1 § Si s ^ CO •BSlSlg l-H f-t ■ « (N ■sapsAis iH . • ■ W •BpiBlOBdg i-l • C^ iH tH ■SDBisana m : ; ; CO ■snBiSaJuo^ tH ; . ; 1-H ■streiTOI lo to ■ 10 10 00 tH I— I •BjpaJB to rH CO ■* (M CO •smouag 00 i-l . . OS l> CO g3 •qDuaij: l-H t* -^ CO r-l -* N •spSfjojd qsiiaaa: ta . i> iH •qsiiaua ■* rH 00 Oa •qoina "* : : to •eama 10 . 1H ■ra«i3isa ■ suBUBgnnH-oj^Bny 1-1 CO OS (N S •suBOuainv sq . « ■ ■< ' Mixed Tiibunals .. Caisse of the PubUo Debt . . 1 1 312 EGYPT. APPENDIX III. D. List of Eueopban Offioials bklonging to Administeatioss Caibsd, Domains, Daiea Sanibh, olassibted Administration. Mixed Tribunals. Daira Sanieli. Nationality, Americans Auatro-Hungarians Belgians Danes Dutch English English prot^g^s . French Germans Greeks Italians Norwegians ... Bussians Spaniards Swiss. Caisse of Public Debt. State Domains. Austro-Huhgarians . English French Germans Greeks . . . . . Italians . . . . ■ Swiss Austro-Hnngariana Belgians • . . . English English protfigfe . French Greek Italians Spaniards Austro-Hungarians . English English prot^g& . French . . . . . Greeks . . . . . Italians Totals 49 19 8 1 2 2 14 114 50 15 12 APPENDIX III. D. 313 APPENDIX III. D. EXISTING BY Special Convention, such as Mixed Teibunals, ACCOBDINO TO NATIONALITY AND SaLABY. O O o o l-j o o o Qi ►4 4 g" rH S a ►4 S s lO H 4 s 3 i p4 ►4 m n s 4 1 a i 1 ■s Eecapitulation. 1 2 2 1 2 2 '2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 "2 1 1 i .. 1 1 1 1 1 1 V '1 8 2 21 5 1 4 4 5 35 8 26 85 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 11 1 1 6 1 9 1 8 7 47 3 5 2 2 9 1 24 4 5 1 224 543 249 96 218 346 61 860 366 473 1,234 96 320 96 96 10 279 244 397 68 21 328 16 125 8 403 133 1,275 32 86 25 32 167 3 971 39 118 12 Americans . . . . 2 Austro-Hungarians 35 Belgians . . . . 6 Danes 1 Dutch 4 English 22 English proteges . . 13 French 117 Germans . . . . 9 Greets 34 Italians 101 Norwegians . . . . 1 Russians . . . . 3 Spaniards . . . . 4 Swedes 1 Swiss 2 Total .. ..355 • 2 24 •• 8 • • 355 10,370 ( 314 ) APPENDIX IV. M. DE Blignieres told me that Eiaz had been determined to put a stop to the encroachments of AraM, and that at a council on September 7 Eiaz submitted a draft letter to the ministers, inviting Arabi and the colonels not to overstep their province, and reminding them that in future no communications would be accepted except in the ordinary regulation way, nay, that the first deviation would be followed by a court-martial. " This very sensible order," said M. de Blignieres, " had been signed by aU. the ministers, and I should certainly have been happy to join, had I not a chronic dislike to threats one is not in a position to execute, and I could not help saying to Eiaz, ' I trust you will have your court-martial on the ground floor.' Why? 'Because your pashas won't break their necks when Arabi and his soldiers fling them out of the window.' This made them reflect. The letter was not sent, and forty-eight hours later the mutinous outbreak proved that I had not been very wrong in my anticipations."— From the Author's Diary, July 23, 1881. Takri Pasha, the late Minister of Justice, with whom I dined at Sir Ackland's, gave me some details about the torturing of the Circassians, and fully corroborated what I heard before of their being kept from sleeping. He told me one delightful incident of the instruction. One night one of the " judges," followed by a posse of armed soldiers, appeared in the cell of one of the prisoners (whose name I forget) and forced him to put his seal to a very long document, the perusal of which was refused him. The next morning he was called before the Tribunal, and found that on the previous night he had signed a detailed denuncia- tion against a number of people with whom they now con- fronted him. But, as he had never seen any of them, a dreadful muddle was the result, and the infuriated court ordered him to be locked up as insane. — From the Author's Diary, April 26, 1882. APPENDIX IV. 315 Whilst this morning at Cherif Pasha's, a young French journalist came with letters of introduction ; I think he was the correspondent of the Clairon ; Cherif asked him whether he had been long at Cairo. " Only a day or two," was the reply, " but I had the honour of being presented this morning to His Ex- cellency Moustapha Pasha Pehmy (Baroudi's Minister of Foreign Affairs)." " And," said Cherif laughingly, " what did he tell you of the situation ? " " Son Excellence did not seem to take une vue couleur de rose," was the rejoinder ; " for inquiring what he thought of Arabi Pasha (then Minister of War), His Excellency told me that Arabi was la plus grande canaille he had ever known, that he felt ashamed of being with him in the same Cabinet, and that he had only brought this sacrifice (?) to save the Khedive and the country." Cherif smiled, and getting up, said, " It seems that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has not a flattering opinion of his colleague at the War Office." — From the Author's Diary, May 16, 1882. Many of the leading men — I saw to-day several Notables and large landowners — complain of the serious consequences of Arabi's doings to agricultural interests; they cannot get labourers; able-bodied men are hiding for fear of otherwise being obliged to "volunteer" for the army, of course hand- cuffed and with a cord or chain round the neck. I saw yesterday a posse driven through the streets; they looked so miserable and wretched, and were followed by a tribe of dirty women and children, that I could not help stopping to inquire, and was told by the chief of the escort " that they were prisoners taken out of gaol to be drafted into the Guards." I could not help congratulating His Highness on this addition to his army, and he gave a very sad smile. Last night they took our boab (porter) at the club by force, while we were at dinner ; even the older donkey-boys are en- rolled, poor fellows. The soldiers will not obey any longer; one of the mustaphezims, I was told, was smoking on duty, and remonstrated with ; he naively replied, " Why should I obey? Arabi doesn't." A moudir, formerly an enraged Arabist, told me this morning that he could not get a man to dredge the canals ; " and you know," he said, " what that means ; no water means no crops; no crops, or an insufficient harvest, no divi- dends for the bondholders, and stervation for the Fellah." The Sheikh-el-Bakri (the chief of all the Dervishes), in 316 EGYPT. speaking to me of Arabi, said, ".The devil has blown into his ear." He is by no means such an important personage as his father, nor has he his reputation for learning, but I like him. " I wish I had arms," was one of his remarks ; " I have more men than Arabi." A Notable who was with him seemed much dis- tressed ; " Arabi is our ruin " were his words ; and though he was known as one of the few declared enemies of the late Khe- dive (I do not know why) he admitted that Arabi had done more harm to Egypt in seventeen weeks than Ismail, whom he hates, in seventeen years. — From the Author's Diary, March 12, 1882. Toulba Pasha and Arabi, especially the former, are much at the house of M. Gay-Lussac, the French Administrator of the Daira-Sanieh. The double game of the French becomes more and more evident. There is no one who does not blame Mr. Blunt, from the Khedive downwards. His letters are translated into Arabic, and the Fellahs made to believe that he is speaking in the name of the English Government and people — that the agents have been overstepping their instructions, and that the English nation sides vdth Arabi. Possibly Mr. Badger's letter about Mr. Blunt, which has also been translated into Arabic (but not at the instigation of the ministers), may do some good to dispel false notions. Malet is much annoyed at the uncalled for interference of amateurs. He complained bitterly of Mr. Blunt's doings, and said he hoped people would at last open their eyes at home. — From the Author's Diary, May 10, 1882. Mr. Blunt has telegraphed to Sultan Pasha to ask whether it is true " that the National party and the army had spUt, warn- ing him that they must unite, and hold together, as otherwise England would annex Egypt." Sultan replied evasively. But Mr. Blunt wired the same questions to another deputy, and also to a Sheikh ; but as the name was illegible, it was taken to MahmoudSamy,who sent for the Sheikh-ul-Islam, and translating Mr. Blunt's telegram told him it was for him, the Sheikh-ul-Islam . " But," said this worthy, " I don't know Mr. Blunt." " Never mind," said Baroudi, " he is a great man, and you must answer that we are all united and working together." He did so, but when it was done, it struck him he might have done a foolish thing — for even a Sheikh-ul-Islam is not infallible ; so he betook himself to the Khedive with copies of these precious documents and confessed it all. His Highness was furious and APPENDIX IV. 317 sent for Malet. Cherif was veiy angry and approved of a rectification, which has heen sent through Keuter's agency. — From the Anther's Diary, May 17, 1882. All sorts of stupid rumours are afloat ahout the protracted absence of the ironclads. Until seven, to-night, there was nothing, though the Khedive told Malet that they were in sight. The ministers indulged in two councils ; they are trembling, and deny ever having spoken of the Khedive's deposition. They deliberated at the first council what sort of a reception they ought to give to the fleets ; an d though three days ago Arabi had threatened to go down to Alexandria with his regiment and " cannon number one " (what that meant no one has ever been able to discover) he has now renounced his heroical intention. One of the ministers implored his colleagues not to make any resistance. " Oh ! " said Mahmoud Samy, " who speaks of resisting ? we want to know how to do honour to the fleets of the Padishah and his allies." In the evening they all went to the Khedive to ask him the object of the arrival of the fleet, and what was to be done. The Khedive replied, " I don't know, I shall comply with any demand as far as the firmans allow." The ministers looked puzzled, and Arabi said, " I put my sword at your Highness' feet, dispose of it, I am your slave."— From the Author's Diary,, May 17, 1882. I met the Sheikh El Bakri and several Ulemas, amongst them the greatest preacher of the El Ahzar, and half a dozen Moudirs at Cherif's house. They expressed a hope that the Khedive would lay the case of the ministers before the Ulemas of El Ahzar, and they made a little movement with their bony, ebonised hands, which reminded one of Caloraft's profes- sion. The Moudirs complained that Arabi had telegraphed for the Eedifs, but they want to see Effendina's order before sending the reserves up to Cairo. To-day, 150 soldiers have deserted from the Abassieh, leaving arms and accoutrements behind. There was also a Bedouin chief, who inquired of Cherif whether I was a Consul-General and had ironclads ; and it was only on Cherif's assurance that I was a personal friend that he consented to shake hands and to sit down next to me. I heard dreadful details about the Circassians ; most of them have been tortured. One of them was hung up by his arms, only the toes touching the ground, for eighteen hours, without food or water. Those who won't speak and confess imaginary 318 EGYPT. crimes are not allowed to sleep, they are kept awake by soldiers day and night. Thumbscrews are used freely, and with the exception of Osman Pasha Eifky, late Minister of War, they have all been cruelly lashed. Colonel Toussouf Bey had a mortified leg in consequence ; they are using sticks with sharp knobs or nails. Two of Eatif Pasha's brothers are among the sufferers. I hear from all sides that people are busily reconstructing a new ministry. But though Oherif is much pressed on all sides, he will, under no circumstances, undertake the task unless his old constitutional programme is accepted. He deplores that Mahmoud and Arabi have brought all these humiliations on Egypt through their selfish ambition. The Khedive sent for him, and of course he went, though the enemies of both spread the rumour that he had declined going. He regrets that our Government did not believe Malet and that public opinion in England had been allowed to be misled by irresponsible muddlers. " Hs ont fait du joli, vos Blunt et vos Gregory." But I daresay they will now see their mistake in London. — From the Author's Diary, May 18, 1882. The news that only six Anglo-French ships have arrived at Alexandria, and that the Porte is protesting, has not missed iits efiect. This split between the two Powers and the Porte, and . the want of unison between England and France (and, to judge by their agents here, the other great Powers are delighted at it), give, of course, new hopes to Mahmoud Samy and Co. Though they no longer talk of armed resistance they speak again of hostages, and I was told that they had privately informed Saurma that German subjects had nothing to fear — a compliment to Prince Bismarck. The forty-three Circassians, though reprieved, are secretly shipped off in batches of ten ; the last will start to-morrow. I have been promised a copy of the indictment, and have at last been able to procure the names. The following is a complete list of the officers who were found guilty by the celebrated court-martial, and whose sentences were commuted by Khedivial decree : — Osman Pasha Eifki, General of Division, Col. Toussouf Bey Najati, Lieut. Col. Mahmoud Bey Fouad, Majors Mahmoud Effendi TaMat, Eedjeb Effendi Nached, Hassan Effendi Hilmy, Abdallah Effendi Latif, Mohamed Effendi Lamet, Adjutant APPENDIX IV. 319 Majors Osman Effendi Fadel, Aly Effendi Nassef, Captains Mohamed Effendi Lami, Mahmoud Effendi Himmet, Moliained Effendi Chafkat, Selim Effendi Taieh., Hussein Effendi Mohamed, Moussa Effendi Kalim, Lieutenants Moustapha Effendi Eamy, Omar Effendi Eakry, Ahmet Effendi Ouzzi, Ehsam Effendi Bechir, Ahmed Effendi Bached, Mohamed Effendi Emin Chukri, Eechouan Effendi Nedjib, Sub-Lieutenants Toussef Effendi Sadik, Khalil Effendi Husni, Mustapha Effendi Abed, Mohamed Effendi Ohaker, Mohamed Effendi Niazi, Khorchid Effendi Labib, Ahmed Effendi Pahim, Youssouf Effendi Cherif, Hafiz Effendi Pehmy, Mohamed Effendi Euchdi, Sadik Effendi Fauzi, Mohamed Effendi Fuad, Mohamed Effendi Chefik, Ahmed Effendi Wasfi, Captains Moustapha Effendi Mouhri, Selim Effendi Choki, and Sub-Lieut. Mohamed Effendi Aly. In addi- tion to the above forty officers, the sentences of two civilians were also commuted, their names being Omar Effendi Eahmy and Ibrahim Effendi Kialil. [I do not vouch for the spelling.] Mahmoud Samy has used most threatening language to the Khedive, and has also threatened the security of Europeans. But when brought to book he denied it, and had the impudence to accuse the Khedive of having invented it. What Tewfik has>to endure from these men surpasses all imagination. They have now informed him (their Master) that they decline any personal intercourse with him. Sir A. Colvin, whom I saw at eight this morning, is dejected at the present state of affairs ; he believes that nothing can, will, and ought to be done without the Turk, unless we want to fight. He speaks highly of Malet's moderation, but is as disgusted as the latter at the double dealings of our French partner. At nine o'clock I went to the Khedive to take leave from His Highness : there were a lot of people, amongst them two negro chiefs, come up from the Des0rt, honest-looking fellows ; they kissed his hands, and were profuse in their profes- sions of devotion. When they had all gone, the Khedive told me that the negroes had come up to offer him assistance, and that they told him " Arabi and the ministers ought to be hung." He mentioned that as soon as M. Monge, the French consul, had been to see Mahmoud Samy, to break to him " offioieusement " the conditions of the " ultimatum " (i. e. resignation of ministers, temporary exile of Arabi and the chief leaders, reorganisation of the army, 320 EGYPT, &c.), they rushed to the palace " to ask His Highness what they should do." The Khedive told them to wait for the official communication, adding, " I have no advice to give you." We had a long talk, His Highness complained of the wasteful and ridiculous military preparations of Arahi, and explained his overwhelming difficulties : he is, indeed, to be pitied. He spoke in the highest terms of England and of both Malet and Colvin, but was by no means gushing about French policy and agents. When it was time to take my departure, the Khedive said, " Will you do me a great service ? Then tell Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, on your return to London : — "1. How thankful and obliged I am to the Queen and England, to Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville for aU they have done for me, and all they will do in days to come ; I appreciate much the kindness shown me, and Egypt, " 2. Pray tell Lord Granville from me how well Sir E. Malet has behaved ; he has conducted all this very ably, with much moderation, and has been a true friend. I have every confi- dence in him, for I know I can believe him ; he is a thorough gentleman, a man of honour," — and the Khedive repeated this phrase three times, in English, though our conversation took place half in French, half in English. " 3. Tell Mr. Gladstone, if you can find the opportunity, that I trust the Powers will this time be pleased with me, I have done more than I liked to suit their wishes. " 4. Tell Lord Granville that I was not for conciliation. I ought never to have consented to receive these ministers again : they are rebels ; they are false. If you could see them with me, you would feel disgusted. Mahmoud has just been here, making the most abject protestations. of his devotion and loyalty. Ask Mr. Eowsell, who was present, for I did not wish to see Mahmoud alone. I loathe the man. He is a canaille ; how can you trust him. Thank God it will soon be over, at least I hope so. It has been for me the greatest sacrifice I could make to England to take these ministers back for a time. I did not think it dignified nor worthy of a prince to do so; but Sir Edward urged the necessity of avoiding an open rupture until the ships were here ; he feared for the lives of my family and mine, and also for the Europeans ; besides, they wanted some- one to treat with, and who would be Prime Minister now? I should not be able to form a cabinet. I have passed a dreadful APPENDIX IV. 321 time. Were I alone, 1 should not care. You are married, and know what it is to tremble for those one loves best : it is not gay, and matters are not improved by women crying all day long. Yet I could not send my family away, it would have looked like fear — a weakness. I assure you it is not pleasant to be utterly at the mercy of one's enemies, without any means of resistance." I said, " Sir, this is not the moment for reproaching you or your Government, yet I cannot help reminding, you of what I told you last year." He said, " I remember it well, but Eiaz would not believe, and afterwards it was too late ; but you were right, we ought secretly to have organised a small force, even a few hundred men would have been sufficient." I then asked His Highness why he did not try a coup, as Arabi seemed only to have the officers on his side, and could not rely upon the men. I said, " Show yourself on horseback. Sir, between Sultan Pasha and the Sheikh-ul-Islara. Take thirty Notables as only escort, and address the soldiers. I bet they would declare for Your Highness. ' Effendina,' backed by the chief of the religion and the president of the representatives of the nation, must succeed." The Khedive smiled, and replied, " Possibly, but I have no choice ; I am in the hands of the Powers, and must do what they wish me to do. France is afraid of greater complications. You know there is no unity, and the whole thing h^s been stupidly spoilt. It might have been settled in a few days. The French won't hear of an inter- vention, and a disembarkment of Turks. True, it might have serious consequences for Egypt, yet I know nothing can be done without the Sultan." He said, " I hope, when we meet again, it will be all over." I said, " Form a strong Government, and do not allow yourself to be put aside ; it is the undermining of your prestige, and a disregard of your rights and powers. Sir, that has brought about this state of things." " I know it ; but whose fault is it ? I did not make my position ; England and France did." — Zulficar Pasha, who occasionally has le mol pour rire, when wishing me good-bye, said, " Do tell your ministers and every one in England, ' Que quand on veut faire quelque chose en Egypte il faut arriver par la Porte et non pas par la fen^tre.' " I just hear the French have failed in their demarches officieuses ; they have sent first a consul, then his secretary, then the secre- tary of the secretary. It would be laughable if it was not so sad. Y 322 EGYPT. Clierif Pasha is simply disgusted, he thinks the demarches offi- cieuses of the French undignified and damaging, and said, " There would have been an end of this sad and pitiful farce had not Europe strengthened the power of Mahmoud, Arabi, et consorts, by taking them au serieux, after they have shown themselves knaves and fools." It was my last evening. I dined with Sir Edward. He and Sienkiewicz had presented the ultimatum at six o'clock. The conditions are sweetly mild : — " Eesignation of cabinet. Arabi to leave Egypt for a time, but maintaining rank and pay. Ali Pasha Fehmy and Abd-el-al to go for a time into the interior. All others at liberty to remain. Everybody maintained in rank and pay. General amnesty. Army not to be dissolved." I could not help saying to Malet, " The mountain has at last brought forth a mouse." " I fear rather a tiny one," was his reply. I told him that Cherif seemed determined not to form a new cabinet, if asked to do so, under the present circumstances. Sir Edward thought it the best that could have been done at present ; for, in putting forward as ultimatum not the wishes of the Powers, but those of the Notables, he said, " We have effaced ourselves altogether, and the ministers will not be able to plead that Europe is imposing conditions contrary to the will of the Egyptian nation. By supporting simply the demands of the chamber, we give Arabi and Co. an honourable exit. If they are patriots, as they pretend, they will be only too glad to spare their country a probable intervention and endless misery by their own temporary disappearance from the stage. Yet it is quite possible that they will refuse to make any personal sacrifice." It was only after having delivered the ultimatum that the Agents informed the Khedive of this step, who looked puzzled, and remarked, " Vous n'etes pas exigeants." The odds are that these sham patriots will rather let Egypt go to ruin than give up portfolios t') which they cling like leeches. — From the Author's Diary, May 25, 1881. LONDON; TRlNTET) BT WILLIAM CI.OWRS AND SONS, LIMITED, STAMFORD 8TRRET AND CHARING CROSS. Price Four Shillings. EGYPT: NATIVE KULEES AND FOREIGN INTERFEEENCE. BY BAKON DE MALOETIE, ADTHOK OF ' DIPLOMATIC SKETCHES,' ' ME. GLADSTONE AND THE GKEEK QUESTION,' ETC. OPINIONS OF THE PRESS. " The political student will find this eminently readable book an admirable guide to a comprehension of the existing situation in Egypt." — The Spectator. " There is a freshness in the resume and conclusions that will well repay perusal."— TAe Freeman's Journal. " An important contribution to the literature of the Egyptian Question, throwing light on many points that have not hitherto been satisfactorily cleared up." — The Aherdeen Journal. " It is extremely useful to be able to turn to any phase of ' the Egyptian Question ' described in this book, and find references to perhaps fifty other works on. the subject." — The Athenoeum. " One of the most useful and authoritative books about Egypt." — The Daily Review. " Von hohem Interresse sind die Darlegungen in Baron von Malortie's neuestem Buohe iiber Aegypten." — Allgemeine Zeitung. " This work is an important contribution to the Egyptian Question, by one thoroughly well informed." — The Northern Whig. "It embodies a great deal of information and some shrewd common sense in a piquant and readable form." — The Scotsman. " The chief value of this volume is as a guide to all the books, pamphlets, and papers that have been written about the Egyptian Question since Mehemet AU's time." — The Dublin Evening Mail. " Amid the multitudinous publications that have been issued on Egyptian affairs, the present (' Egypt,' by Baron de Malortie) merits attention." — The Daily Chronicle. " A repository of trustworthy and carefully arranged information." — The Edinburgh Daily Eeview. OPINIONS OF THE PRESS. " For diligent and unbiassed study of the Egyptian Question, Baron de Malortie deserves great credit." — The Edinburgh Courant. " Those who wish to master the Egyptian Question in all its bearings cannot do better than study this volume." — The Broad Arrow. " Baron de Malortie's able work, &c., may be commended as a valuable addition to the store of information that has already been opened to the world in reference to Egypt." — The Birmingham Daily Gazette. " His pages are as helpful to those who would resolve the future as to those who would understand the past of modern Egypt." — Tlie Spectator. " Baron de Malortie's work will prove of great interest to the political world as well as to the outsiders, for it is both useful and entertaining." — The Court Journal. " Baron de Malortie's estimate of the present situation, and of its require- ments, is well worth attention." — The Scotsman. " There are some excellent extracts from the author's own diary, which contain interesting and novel information." — TJie Athenaeum. " Baron de Malortie has various qualifications which are indisputable for exhibiting a truthful picture of Egypt as it is." — The Edinburgh Courant. " We trust the British nation may, with Baron de Malortie, rely oh ' the patriotism, the high sen.se of justice and honour, of those presiding over the destinies of our country, that in the ensuing diplomatic settlement nothing will be done unworthy of our traditions and of a liberal interpre- tation of Great Britain's duties to herself and others.' " — The Birmingham Daily Gazette. " You will find a very just and careful resume of the present state of matters in a book entitled ' Egypt : Native Rulers and Foreign Inter- ference,' by Baron de Malortie " (Address of the Right Hon. W. B. Baxter, M.P., to his Constituents), — The Dundee Advertiser. " A marvel of research, an unrivalled compendium of what may be called political Egyptology." — The Daily Review. " Although his political sympathies are liberal we do not find in any part of the volume an undue party bias." — The Bazaar. " Ein hochst sohatzenswerter Beitrag zur Kenntniss und Beurtheilung der gegenwartigen Verhaltnisse." — Neue Eannoversche Zeituny. " An accurate record of the chief circumstances of Egyptian history since Mehemet Ali Pasha ascended the Vice-Regal Thvone."— Morning Post. " Cast un prfcieux document i, consulter pour I'^tude de la question ^gyptienne." — L'Independance Beige. " Few people have had the opportunity of knowing so much about Egypt as the Baron de Malortie, and not only his history, but his views and opinious as to the present situation and what should now be done, are most instructive." — The Statist. BY THE SAME AUTHOR. DIPLOMATIC SKETCHES. BY "AN OUTSIDER." Vols. I., II., III. ME. GLADSTONE AND THE GEEEK QUESTION; COUNT BEUST; THE DANISH QUESTION, ETC. OPINIONS OF THE PRESS. " It is an admirable handbook of the Greek Question, from its first emergence on the field of diplomatic history down to the present moment." — Spectator. " It is a valuable and almost indispensable companion for any one who ■w ishes to treat or to consider the present aspect of the Hellenic factor." — Examiner. "Within its compass no little store of knowledge about the Greek Question in its various phases may be found, rendering the volume a useful handbook to politicians." — Olobe. " The volume is one that cannot be dispensed with in discussing the foreign policy of the Government at this time." — Scotsman. " The author evidently possesses an intimate acquaintance with European politics." — Pall Mall Gazette. " It is fair to say the ' Outsider ' is well informed."— Cat??/ News. " The author possesses a singularly happy style for the work he has taken in hand — his writing sometimes reaching to real brilliancy." — Globe. " They are well worth reading, and must be the result of much know- ledge and experience." — Academy. , " The style of the book is bright."— /Scotsman. " The book is very well written." — Spectator. " It is a thoroughly able and connected survey of a period that well deserves the closest study." — Graphic. OPINIONS OF THE PEESS. " There is much that is exceedingly valuable and entertaining in the first of a series of ' Diplomatic Sketches, -hy an Outsider.' " — World. " ' Diplomatic Sketches, by an Outsider ' is a series that promises remark- ably well." — London. " He has at his command a large number of diplomatic anecdotes." — Guardian. " Derri^re le pseudonyms de ' Outsider ' se cachent ^videmment une plume capable et des connaissances solides." — L'Europe Diplomatique. " The author seems to have had exceptional opportunities of watching the intricate workings of Continental Chancelleries." — Pall Mall Gazette. "The second instalment of the series of ' Diplomatic Sketches' shows the same marks of rare literary ability as did the first." — Globe. " The author's knowledge of Continental politics is a wide one." — London. " The Sketches are full of interest, and we commend the volume to those who are desirous of taking a diplomatic retrospect of the last thirty years." — Court Journal. "This little work cannot be too highly commended." — Examiner. " A real ' M^moire pour servir k I'histoire.' " — Royal Cornwall Gazette. " The book is full of facts and useful references." — Academy. " The ' Outsider ' is on the whole entitled to the thanks of most men." — May Fair. " We are very confident that though the author may be ' An Outsider ' always, he is not ' An Outsider ' now." — World, " The anecdotes and information often savour of something more than a mere ' Outsider's ' knowledge." — Graphic. " The most interesting portion of the work is the notes and personal anecdotes scattered through the volume." — Academy. " Those who would like to get the run of European politics could not do better than read him." — London. "We heartily commend 'An Outsider's' latest work to the notice of political students." — Glohe. " La s^rie formera une addition de grande valeur h, la biblioth^que des hommes politiques." — VEurope Diplomatique. " Under the title of ' Mr. Gladstone and the Greek Question ' we have a book of great value in regard to that question." — Scotsman. " Nowhere in English, so far as we know, are the facts to be found so conveniently gathered together." — Examiner.' "His pages positively bristle with references to one authority or another." — Globe. ■ " In point of interest and information it is quite up to the mark of its predecessors, while it possesses the superior advantage of dealing with what is, par excellence, the diplomatic question of the hour." — Spectator, " The author has not confined himself to the relations between the late Premier and the Greek Question. He has given something like a complete history of the diplomatic relations of the difierent Powers of Europe on the subject." — Examiner. «^^'^^»M«(\N«^^>^\^^^^\^'^>^^^