lEADING CASES AND OPINIONS. PITT COBBETt •SIOOIB .EDIIIOF CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY Cornell University Library JX 68.C65 1892 Leading cases and opinions on internatio 3 1924 007 379 401 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924007379401 LEADING CASES AND OPINIONS INTEENATIONAL LAW. LEADING CASES AND OPINIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, COLLECTED AND DIGESTED FROM Cngligii anlr Soxtm i^ejiorts, ©IRctal ©ocutnents, ^arliamentara ^apn:s, aria otfjer Sources* NOTES AND EXCURSUS, CONTAmiNG THE VIEWS OP THE TEXT ■WRITERS ON THE TOPICS REFERRED TO, TOGETHER WITH SUPPLEMENTARY CASES, TREATIES, AND STATUTES. By PITT COBBETT, M.A., D.C.L., OF gbat's inn, barrister -at-law. PROFESSOR OF LAW IN THE TJNIVEBSITT OF SYDNEY, N.S.W. SECOND EDITION. LONDON : STEVENS AND HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAB. 1800 PEEFAOE TO THE SECOND EDITION. In this Edition, both, the text and appended notes have been revised, and brought, as far as possible, down to the present time. A few of the cases cited in the former Edition have been omitted, whilst many new cases have been added. P. C. January, 1892. PEEFACE. There is some tendency on the part of Englisli lawyers to regard that body of custom and convention which is known as International Law, as fanciful and unreal ; as a collection of amiable opinions, rather than as a body of legal rules. The text writers have much to answer for in this respect. Their real function is to record and collate existing usage. The function which they have striven to assume has been that of authorship. They frequently prescribe, not what is, but what they think ought to be, the practice of -nations. Rules origi- nating thus, necessarily command but scanty reverence; and perhaps nothing has tended more to lessen the esteem in which International Law is held than the misapprehension which has been thus begotten. The truth is, however, that a very large portion of International Law rests on authority as trustworthy as that which commands the homage of the English lawyer The great body of the rules comprising the maritime Law of Nations, together with many fundamental rules in other depart- ments, maybe found in the judgments and decisions of Interna- tional tribunals, such as Boards of Arbitration and Courts of Prize, some of them presided over by judges fully as eminent as those of the Common Law. Even where such authority fails, it is still possible to draw on such sources as official documents and records, and opinions given by official jurists to their own Governments on matters of international concern. My first object in the present volume has been to bring out how much of the Law of Nations exists in this shape. With this object I have omitted in the text all reference to any but judicial and official opinions, reserving those of the text writers for explana- tory notes. I am quite aware that this continual reference to Preface. vii case law as illustrative of topics, which sometimes seem scarcely to come within the domain of the Courts, may occasionally appear strained and awkward. Thus, the insertion of the case of the Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia, as an authority on the subject of State character, of the cases of the Eliza Ann and the Teutonia on the subject of " Declaration of War," may seem to give an untrue idea of the real origin and foundation of the rules of International Law on these subjects. My purpose, however, was not so much to indicate the origin of such rules, as to show how far they were sanctioned by the decisions of recognized legal authorities. My other object has been to publish a selection of illustrative cases which may serve as a useful companion volume to existing text-books. In order to preserve, as far as possible, the con- tinuity of the subject, I have occasionally inserted cases and dealt with matters which are perhaps already treated of in ample detail. I have found it necessary to add to many of the cases and opinions, notes explaining or collating the principal points of the case, or explaining its relation to some general topic of which it forms a pai-t. In framing these notes I have drawn freely on standard text-books, such as those of Hall, Kent, and Wheaton, and occasionally Heffter. This mode of treatment no doubt involves some repetition. Thus, in treating of enemy property in war, it was impossible to avoid trenching to some extent on the subject of neutral liability. I can only claim to have avoided this where possible. I have ventured to use the word " case " in its widest sense ; not in anyway limiting it to disputes that have been the subject of forensic litigation. Some transactions which struck me as bearing on topics treated of, but which I felt could not legiti- mately be classed either under cases or opinions, nor yet be conveniently embodied in notes, I have thrown into the form of Excursus. It appeared to me convenient to place each Excursus immediately after the topic to which it was most nearly related. Tlnoi-o Qro Qnma t.nnifis whinh a.Tfi co Himon to the two depart- viii Preface. ments of Public and (if I may venture on using the expression) Private International Law. Some of these I thought it best to reserve for a smaller volume of cases on the Comity of Nations. I must take this opportunity of expressing my great indebted- ness to Mr. J. Z. Laurence for much valuable assistance in the compilation of the present volume. I have also to acknowledge the courtesy by which I have been permitted to reprint in this volume the substance of several articles previously published in the Law papers. P.O. 4, King's Bench "Walk, Temple, E.C, Octdbtr, 1885. TABLE OF CONTENTS. PART I— PEACE. STATES. PAGE Chbeokeb Nation v. State op Georgia 1 Appended note 3 Charkibh 8 Appended note . . _ 9 United States of America v. M'Rae 14 Appended note 16 STATE JURISDICTION. Eeg. i). Ketn 19 Appended note . . . ' 27 Direct United States Cable Company, Limited d. Anglo-American Telegraph Company, Limited 29 Appended note 32 Eex v. De Mattos .' 33 Appended note ' 34 EXTRADITION. Castioni 36 Appended note ' . . . 38 EXCURSUS I.— Rivers and Intbrocbanic Canals. Notes on Rivera 42 ~ Rhine "... . . 43 Danube 44 Mississippi ... 45 St. Lawrence *• Suez Canal . . . . . i . . ... . . 46 Panama Canal .... 48 PUBLIC VESSELS. Parlbmbnt Bblge • • . . 51 Annended note .... ..... 52 X Table of Contents. ' PAGE ExcHANSE -o. McFaddon 53 Appended note 54 Constitution 5& Appended note 57 Sitka 59- Appended note 60' FoKBES V. Cochrane 62. Appended note 63 Makianna Floea 65' Appended note 67 PRIVATE VESSELS. Atalanta 68- Appended note 71 Newton and Sally 74- Appended note ........... ih^ Ckeole 75- Appended note ........... ih. Caklo Albbbto 77 Appended note 78- FOIIEIGN SOVEEEIGNS. QuEEX Cheistina of Sweden il. Appended note 79' Duke op Beunswick v. King of Hanovee 81 Appended note 82- De Haber v. Queen of Poktugal 83 Appended note 84 Peioibau v. United States of Amekioa 85 Appended note i . . 86 ALI ENS— NATIONALITY. Maetin Koszta 87 Appended note gg Simon Tousig 90 Appended note 91 LuciEN Alibeet 96 Appended note ij. Mackett 97 Appended note ij. DOMICILE— CIVIL STATUS. Indian Chief 99 Appended note 100 Table of Contents. xi PAOE Portland 102 Appended note 103 AMBASSADORS— STATE AGENTS. Lesley, Bishop or Eoss 104 Appended note 105 GyLLENBOTJES's CASE 108 Appended note 109 Czar's Ambassador 110 Appended note ih. Taylor v. Best 112 Appended note . 113 Eantaleon Sa's Case 114 Appended note 115 ViVEASH V. Becker 117 Appended note iJ. McLbod's Case 122 Appended note ift. SLAVE TKADE. Louis 123 Appended note 124 Antelope 126 Appended.noto 127 PIRACy. United States v. Smith 128 ^^ Appended note 129 Serhassan Pirates 132 Appended note . .' 133 HlTASOAR l6. Appended note ' . . . . 134 Virginitts ... 135 Appended note 138 Curlew 139 Appended note ib. Xii Table of Contents. PART II.— WAR. STEPS SHORT OF WAE. pagk BoEDES Lust 141 Appended note 142 SiLBsiAN Loan 144 Appended note 148 Don Pacifico . . ih. Appended note 149 DECLARATION OF "WAR. Eliza Ann 152 Appended note ib. EFFECTS OF OUTBREAK OF "WAR. Brown v. The United States 154 Appended note . . ' 155 Russo-DuTOH Loan . . . . . ... . . . 159 Appended note 160 "Wolff v. Oxholm 161 Appended note 162 Tetjtonia ib. Appended note 164 Gkiswold d. "Waddinston 165 Appended note , . . . . ib. TRADING "WITH THE ENEMY. Hoop 166 Appended note 168 Rapid ' . . 171 Appended note 172 LICENCES TO TRADE. Uspaeicha v. Noble 173 Appended note 174 Neptuni's 175 Appended note i6. "V^ENUS 176 Appended note ib. Table of Contents. xiii PAOH Porrs II. Bell 177 Appended note ib. Antoine v. Morshead 178 Appended note 179 RANSOM CONTEACTS. RiCOED V. Bettenham 180 Appended note ib. CAPTURE IN WAR. Venus 182 Appended note 183 Phcenix 186 Appended note i&. Anka Gathaeina 187 Appended note 189 Vkow Margaketha 191 Appended note li. SOOLASIB 193 Appended note 19* BOOTY OF WAR. Banda and Kirwee BopTT 195 Appended note 205 PRIZE OF WAR. Flad Oten 207 Appended note 208 Ceylon ^^^ Appended note 213 Santa Cruz • • . . »*• Appended note ■ ^^^ Two Friends *• 216 Appended note Oaelotta . Appended note 217 218 OSTSEB Appended note Mentor Appended note PRIZE COURTS. 219 220 222 223 xiv Table of Contents. TERMINATION 0? "WAE. FAQIi Swineherd 224 Appended note ,.....•• • • 225 Uekman Conteacts **• Appended note 226 Electoe of Hesse Cassel 227 Appended note 229 Count Platen Hallemund 230 Appended note 231 PART III.— NEUTRALITY. NEUTRAL TERRITORY. Anna 233 Appended note 235 Twee Gebeoeder 236 Appended note 237 TwBE Gebeobdbe 238 Appended note i6. General Aemsteonb 239 Appended note 240 Caeoline »5. Appended note 241 NEUTRAL DUTIES, A, Denmark AND Sweden, DispTTTE BETWEEN 242 Appended liote %b. Swedish Feigatbs sold to Mexico 243 Appended note , 244 EXCURSUS IL— Loans by Neuteal Subjects to Belligerent States 246 lilEUTEAL DUTIES, B.— ENGLISH AND AMERICAN NEUTRALITY CASES. Gideon Heneield 250 Appended note 251 1 United States v. Quinoy 252 ( Appended note , 253 : Attoeney-Gbnekal 1). Sillem and Othees %b. Appeiided note 254 Table of Contents. xv PAGE Salvador 258 Appended note i5. Gauntlet . 259 Appended note 260 NEUTRAL DUTIES, 0. Gen:^, M. iJ. Appended note 262 Teeceira Affair i5. Appended note 264 Santissima Trinidad 265 Appended note 267 Amistad de Eues 268 Appended note 269 Alabama il. Florida 272 Shenandoah, Nashville, Sumter and Georgia 273 Tuscaloosa 275 Appended note • . ... 276 TUSCARORA AND NaSHVILLE 278 Appended note ih. Geneva Arbitration and Award 280 EXCURSUS III. — Neutral Regulations op Foreign States . . 288 RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF NEUTRAL TRADE. Atlas . . 292 Appended note ih. FORTUNA 295 Appended note 296 Bremen Flugge., ., 297 Appended note iJ. Darby v. Brig Erstern 298 Appended note 299 BLOCKADE. Betsey i6. Appended note 301 Henrick and Maria ; 303 Appended note J6. Columbia. ;;;....;.... 304 Appended note- . ■ »6. xvi Table of Contents. PAGB Frederick Molke " " Appended note Gerasimo ' ■ * I QQ*? Appended note NoRTHooTEv. Douglas, The Franciska ^^• Appended note Ocean *• Appended note * MEEcnEiirs °" Appended note . . *''• CO'NTKABAND. Neptuntts . . ^P Appended note *"• JONGB MARGAEETHA • 31^ Appended note ^l" Margaret • ^^^ Appended note 320 Imina 321 Appended note *• Seton v. Low 322 Appended note i^- ANALOGUES OF CONTRABAND. Okozembo 324 Appended note 325 Atalanta ift. Appended note 326 Madison ib. Appended note ........... 327 Trent ih. Appended note 829 RULE OP THE WAR OF 1756. iMMANtTEL 330 Appended note 332 DOCTRINE OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGES. William 333 Appended note 334 Stephen Hart 335 Appended note 336 Table of Contents. xvii Springbok ''3™ Appended note j-5_ Peteehoff 33g Appended note 339 VISIT AND SEARCH CONVOY. Maria 34;^ Appended note . . . . 45_ Fanny 345 Appended note 343 Denmark and United States, Dispute between . ... 347 Appended note 343 ANGARY. SiNKiNo OF English Vessels jS. Appended note . 349 APPENDIX. SOME INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES AND MODES ADOPTED FOR THEIR SETTLEMENT. The British American Fisheries Question 350 The Mosi^TTiTO Protectorate Question 353 The Maine Boundary Qubsj'ion 355 The Oregon Claims 357 The Delagoa Bay Question . 359 The Behring Sea Controversy .... . . 363 The Newfoundland Fisheries Question . . ... 365 INDEX .... . . 369 C.I.L. TABLE OF CASES («). Abd-ttl-Mbssih v. Farra, 10 Adonis, 310 ' Alabama, 233, 242, 269 Alcinous V. Nigrea, 156, 168, 171 Alexander, 310 Alexander v. Wellington, 205 Alibert, Lucien, 95, 96 Amedie, 124, 125, 127 Amistad de Eues, 268 Anna, 233, 240 Anna Catharina, 184, 187 Anne, 117, 235, 239 Antelope, 125, 126, 127 Anthon v. Fisher, 181 Antoine v. Morshead, 168, 178, 179 Archer, 285 Atalanta (temp. 1808), 325, 330 (temp. 1856), 68 Atlas, 292 Attorney- General v. Sillem, 253, 255 Attorney-General of Hong-Kong v. Kwok-a-Sing, 130 Banda and Kirwee Booty, 195 Batten u Keg., 194 Bell V. Eeid, 170, 178 Bella Guidita, 169 Bentzon v. Boyle (Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar), 186 Berens v. Enoker, 332 Bermuda, 336, 337 Betsey, 299 Boedes Lust, 141 Bourgeoise, 93 Boussmaker, ex p., 166 Brandon v. Nesbitt, 170, 178 Brazil (Emperor of) v. Kobinson, 86 Bremen Flugge, 293, 297 Brown v. United States, 154, 157 Brown, John, 62 Brunswick (Duke of) v. King of Hano- ver, 80, 81 Bulwer, 109 Caklo Alberto, 77 Garlotta, 217, 218 Caroline, 240 Casseres v. Bell, 170 Castioni, 36 Catherine Elisabeth, 346 CeUamare, 109 Ceylon, 212 Charkieh, 9, 52, 57, 80 Charlotte, 313 Chavasse, ex p., in re Grazebrook, 249, 322, 323, 333 \ Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 1 Chesterfield, 60 Christina of Sweden, 78 Clarence, 285 Columbia, 304 ColumbianGovemment?).Kothschild,81 Commercen, 316, 321 Constitution, 56 Creole, 75 Curlew, 139 Cygnet, 294 Czar's Ambassador, 110 Daifjie, 176 Danous, 104, 170 I Danube, 44 la) It has been thought fit to depart from the usual practice of law treatises, and to refer in the Table of Cases to many matters that have not been the subject of forensic litigation. XX Table of Cases. Darby v. Erstern, 298 De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 80, 83 Denmark and Sweden, Dispute between, 242 and United States, Dispute between, 347 De Wutz V. Hendricks, 247, 248 Diana (5 C. Rob. 67), 296 (1 Dods. 95), 125 Direct United States Cable Company, Limited «. Anglo- American Telegraph Company, Limited, 29 Dordrecht, 206 Dos Hermanos, 140 Dree Gebroeder, 173 Dupont V. Pichou, 111 East India Company v. Campbell, 39 Elector of Hesse Cassel, 227, 231 Eliza Ann, 152 llsebe, 205 Emperor of Austria v. Day, 80, 82 English Vessels, Sinking of, 348 Esperanza, 206 Esposito V. Bowden, 165 Essex, 334 Estrella, 235 4 Exchange, 310 Exchange v. McFaddon, 53 Fanky, 345, 346 Flad Oyen, 207, 209, 226 Florida, 235, 272 Forbes v. Cochrane, 62 Fortuna (4 C. Hob. 278), 293, 295 (5 C. Eob. 27), 76 (1 Dods. 81), 125 Fox, 220, 308 Fi-ancis, 192 Frederick Molke, 305 Freya, 342 Furtado v. Rogers, 165, 178 Gallatin's Coachman, 116 Gauntlet, 259 General Armstrong, 239 General Screw Collier Company v. Schuvmans, 28 Gengt, 233, 260 Geneva Arbitration, 280 Georgia, 273 Gerasimo, 306 German Contracts, 225 Gladstone i'. Musurus Bey, 85 v. Ottoman Bank, 85 Gloire, 177 Goss V. Withers, 208, 209 Grange, 32, 234 Gray Jacket, 170, 172, 185 Griswold V. Waddington, 165 Gyllenboarg, 108 Haabbt, 318 Haase, 211 Helen, 249, 323 Henfield, 233, 250 Henrick and Maria, 303 Hobbs V. Henning, 339 Hoffnung, 304 Hoop, 166, 168, 181 Hopkins v, de Robeck, 116 Huascar, 133 Huntress, 218 Imina, 321 Immanue], 330 Indian Chief, 99, 103, 185 Industria, 76 International, 260 Ionian Ships, 12, 170 James Cook, 310 Jan Frederick, ] 92 Jecker r. Montgomery, 221 Jeune Eugenie, 127 Johanna Emilie, 158 Johnson v. M'Intosb, 232 Jonge Jacobus Baumann, 76 Jonge Klassina, 103 Jonge Lambert, 217 Jonge Margaretta, 314, 315 Kennet v. Chambers, 248 Kierligkeit, 210 King V. Foxwell, 100 King of Two Sicilies v. WUcox, 17 Koszta, Martin, 87 Lafayette, 264 Lesley, Bishop of Ross, 104 Louis, 123, 125, 130 Ludwig, 295 Macdonali), 92 Mackett, 97 Madison, 326 Table of Cases. XXI Madrazo v. Willes, 125 Magdalena, &o., Co. -i). Martin, 113 Maisonnaire v. Keating, 182 Malek Adhel v. United States, 130 Margaret, 319 Maria (1 C. Kob. 340), 220, 313 (5 C. Rob. 365), 334, 341 Maria v. Hall, 168, 179 Marianna Flora, 65, 344 Mary Ford, 217 Mason u. Zoss, 168 MeKee v. United States, 134 McLeod, 122, 241 Mendoza, 105 Mentor, 222 Mercuriiis, 309, 320 Mississippi, 45 Modeste, 234 Moody v. Phoebe Anne, 268 Morgan v. Larivi^re, 80, 84 Mure V. Kay, 39 Nancy, 303 Nashyme, 273 Nayade, 154 Neptunus (2 C. Bob. 110), 301 (3 C. Rob. 108), 311, 314 (6 C. Rob. 403), 175 ISTereide, 293, 305, 346, 348 New Chile Co. v. Blanco, 114 Newton, 73 Niboyet v. Niboyet, 121 Northcote V. Douglas, Franciska, 307 Norwaerts, 295 Novello V. Toogood, 116 Ocean (3 C. Rob. 297) 308 (5 C. Rob. 90), 172, 185 Orozembo, 324, 330 Ostsee, 219 Pacifico, 144, 148 Palme, 184 Panaghia Rhomba, 310 Panama Canal, 48 Parkinson v. Potter, 115 Parlement Beige, 51 Peru (Republic of) v. Dreyfus, 18 Peru (Republic of) v. Peruvian Guano Co., 19 Peterhoff, 313, 321, 338 Phcenix, 184, 186 Platen Hallemund, 230, 231 Polly, 211 Portland, 102, 184 Potts V. Bell, 177 Poulton '0. Dobree, 170 Prins Frederik, 58 Prioleau v. United States, 85 Rapid (EDwards, 228), 326 (8 Cranoh, 155), 170, 171 Rausoher, 40 Recovery, 220 Reg. V. Anderson, 73 V. Benson, 68 V. Bernard, 39 V. Cunningham, 30, 31 V. Keyn, 19, 28, 72 V. Lewis, 72, 74 u MoClerty, 130 '0. Most, 83 v. Peltier, 83 • V. Yint, 83 Rex V. De Mattos, 33 Rhine, 43 Ricord v. Bettenham, 180, 184 Russo-Dutch Loan, 159 Sa Pantaleon, 114 Sackville, 109 St. Lawrence, 45 Sally (temp. 1795), 292 (temp. 1806), 73, 74 Salvador, 258 Santa Cruz, 111, 213, 217 Santissima Trinidad, 52, 65, 265, 288 Sarah Christina, 313, 318 Sea Lion, 174 Serhassan Pirates, 132 Seton v. Low, 249, 315, 322 Shenandoah, 233, 239, 273 Silesian Loan, 144 Sitka, 59 Soaring, 176 Society for Propagation of Gospel v. "Wheeler, 171 Soglasie, 193 Sorensen i>. Reg., 121, 194 Spain (King of) v. HuUett, 80, 86 Springbok, 337 Statira, 218 Stephen Hart, 335 Suez Canal, 46 Sumter, 273 XXll Table of Cases. Swedish Frigates, 233, 243 Swift, 80 Swineherd, 224 Taoonet, 285 Taylor I!. Best, 112, 113 Tereeira Affair, 233, 262 Terrett v. Taylor, 5 Teutonia, 15i, 162 Thompson v. Powles, 248 Tivnan, n, 130 Tolen, Ignaco, 93 Tootal, 102 Tousig, Simon, 90 Trent, 106, 325, 327 Triquett). Bath, 111 Tnifort, 92 Tuscaloosa, 271, 275 Tuscarora and Nasliville, 278 Twee Gebroedtr (teiiip. 1800), 233, 237, 238 ■ (temp. 1801), 42, 236 Two Friends, 214 TJdny v. Udny, 100, 102 United States and Prussia, Dispute between. 111 • ■ V. Guinet, 253 V. Hand, 111 u M'Kae, 14, 17 United States v. O'Sullivan and Lewis, 253 V. Prioleau, 17, 18 • V. Quincy, 252 V. Bice, 227 V. Smith, 128 V. Wagner, 81 Usparicha v. Noble, 173 Tavasseuk r. Krupp, 84, 86 Venus (temp. 1803), 176 (temp. 1814), 182, 183, 185 Virginius, 135, 247, 344 Viveash v. Becker, 117 Vreyheid, 296 Vriendschap, 174 Vrow Anna Catharina, 235 Vrow Cornelia, 174 Vrow Margaretha, 191 Wade v. Barnewall, 227 Ware v. Hylton, 162 Wells V. Williams, 168 Welvaart van PiUaw, 306 Whitehill, 184 William, 333 Williamson i). Patterson, 179 Wolff V. Oxholm, 161, 230 Yeissaei v. Clement, 248. *„* Tables of Treaties and Statutes will he found in Index. TABLE OF TEXT BOOKS EEFEBRED TO. Akson, Sir "W. E. — "Principles of the English Law of Contract and of Agency in its relation to Contract." Aenotjld, J. — "Treatise on the Law of Marine Insurance and Average." Baeboit, Henri. — " Jurisprudence du Conseil des Prises pendant la guerre de 1870—71." Bluntschu, J. C. — "Das Moderne Villkerreoht der civilisirten Staten." Calvo, C. — "Le Droit International." Camden, T. — " Imperial History of England." Dalloz, V. A. D. —" Jurisprudence G^nerale." FEKGtrsON, J. H. — " Manual of International Law." FooTB, J. A. — " Foreign and Domestic Law.'' FoESTTH, W. — "Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law." Geotius.— "De Jure Belli ac Pacis." Hall, "W. E. — "International Law." Halleck, H. W. — "Elements of International Law and Laws of War." Haecottet, Sir W. V. — " Letters by Historicus on some questions of Interna- tional Law. " Haee, J. I. Claek. — "American Constitutional Law." Hefftee, a. "W. — "Das Europaische Volkerrecht der Gegenwart." Holland, S. E, — "Elements of Jurisprudence." Kent, J. — " Commentaries on American Law." Kent, J. — " Commentaries on International Law.'' Laweence, T. J. — "Essays on some disputed questions in modern International Law." Manning, W. 0. — "Commentaries on the Law of Nations." Meelin, p. a.— "Repertoire universel de Jurisprudence." Nelson H.— "Selected cases illustrative of the principles of Private Interna- tional Law as administered in England. " Oetolan T. — "Ragles Internationales et Diploraatie de la Mer." xxiv Table of Text Books Referred to. Phillimoeb, Right Hon. Sir R. J. — " Coramentaries upon International Law." PoTHiEB, R. J. — "Traite des Obligations." Savigny, F. C. von. — "System des heutigen Rbmischen Reehts." Stephen, H. J. — "Commentaries on the Law of England." Stephen, Sir J. F. — "Digest of the Criminal Law." Stephen, Sir J. F. — " History of the Criminal Law of England." Twiss, SirT. — "Law of Nations.'" ■Whaeton, F. — " Digest of the International Law of the United States." Wheaton, H. — "Elements of International Law ;" English Edition hy A. C. Boyd ; Edition by E. H. Dana ; Edition by W. B. Lawrence. ■Woolset, T. D.. — " Introduction to the Study of International Law." LEADING CASES AND OPINIONS INTEENATIONAL LAW. PART I.— PEACE. STATES. THE CHEROKEE NATION v- THE STATE OF GEORGIA. Temp. 1829. [5 Peteks' Eepokts, 1.] Case.] In 1828 and 1829 two statutes were enacted by the Legislature of the State of Georgia affecting the territoiy of the Cherokee Indians. This territory had been assured to them by solemn treaties on the part of the United States. It was alleged that the effect of these local laws would be to parcel out the Cherokee territory and to subject the Cherokee nation to the jurisdiction of the State of Georgia, contrary to the treaties entered into with the United States. Proceedings were thereupon instituted in the Supreme Court of the United States to restrain the State of Georgia from giving effect to these Acts and from executing the laws of Georgia within the Cherokee territory. The legislation of the State of Georgia admittedly conflicted with the various treaties under which the Cherokee nation had been induced to part with portions of its land. Each of these treaties contained a solemn guarantee of the residue. It appeared, however, that the Court would not have jurisdiction to restrain such acts, unless it could be shown C.I.L. B Z Cases and Opinions on International Law. that the Cherokee nation was either a "foreign State" or "a State of the Union," within the grant of the judicial power to the United States. Judgment] Marshall, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the majority of the Court, dealt in the first place with the question whether the Cherokee nation constituted a distinct political society. It was held that they were entitled to claim this character, inasmuch as they had been so treated from the time of the settlement of the country, numerous treaties having recognized them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, and of being responsible in their political character for any violation of their engagements, and for aggressions committed on United States citizens by any indi- vidual member of their community. On the question whether they constituted a " foreign State," however, the learned Chief Justice called attention to the fact that the Cherokee territory constituted part of that belonging to the United States, and that by their treaties the Cherokee nation acknowledged themselves to be under the protection of the United States. Hence he concluded that their relation to the United States resembled rather that of a ward to his guardian ; that they looked to the United States Government for protection; and that foreign nations considered them as being so completely under the sovereignty of the United States, that any attempt to acquire their lands would be considered by all as an invasion of United States territory. Moreover, by the Constitution of the United States, power was given to Congress to regulate commerce with "foreign nations, the several States and the Indian tribes," and there- fore it seemed that the Constitution did not comprehend Indian tribes under the general term " foreign nations." In accordance with the views of the majority of the Court, the bill was, therefore, dismissed for want of jurisdiction, on the ground that the Cherokee nation did not constitute either a foreign State, or a State of the Union, within the meaning of the grant of judicial power to the United States. States. 3 Thompson, J., who dissented, pointed out in his judgment that the terms State and Nation implied a hody of men united together to procure their niiitual safety and advantage by means of the union. Every nation which governed itself with- out any dependence on a foreign power was a sovereign State. In this category dught to be included those States that had bound themselves to another more powerful, although by an unequal alliance. Provided the inferior ally reserved to itself the sovereignty or the right to govern its own body, it ought to be considered an independent State. The Cherokee nation had always been dealt with as a sovereign State by the Government of the United States ; they had been admitted and treated as a people governed solely and exclusively by their own laws, usages and customs within their own territory, claiming and exercising exclusive dominion over the same, yielding up by treaty from time to time portions of the land, but still claiming absolute sovereignty and control over what remained unsold. After a further review of the facts, the learned Judge concluded that there was as full and complete recognition of their sovereignty as if they were the absolute owners of the soil. It appeared from the cases on the subject that a foreign. State judicially considered was one under a different jurisdiction or government, without any reference to its territorial position. On these grounds he was unable to perceive any sound and substantial reason why the Cherokee nation should not be considered a foreign State. Story, J., concurred with Thompson (a). The Cherokee Nation v. The States of Georgia, 5 Peters, 1. On the subject of international Personality, it is necessary to look rather to existing political arrangements, and to recognized usage, than to the decisions of municipal tribunals. Nevertheless, the leading case, though dealing mainly with a question peculiar to the United {a) As to the present status of the Indian tribes, see Wheaton by Boyd, p. 60. B 2 Cases and Opinions on Tnternational Law. Abates organisation, yet contains a fair statement of the condi- tions which go to make up a " State." It seems to have been admitted by all members of the Court that any organised community, (vhich in matters internal was governed by its own laws and customs, ind which in matters external was recognised as capable of entering into treaties, maintaining relations of peace and war, and as being responsible for aggression or violation of its engagements, vi&& prima facie entitled to be regarded as a State. In the view of the majority af the Court, however, the claim of the Cherokee nation to the character of a separate State, was rebutted by the fact that the Cherokee territory constituted part of that belonging to the United States, and by the fact that the Cherokees had admitted themselves to be under the United States' protection. As a municipal tribunal, the Court was also bound to give effect to the presumption afforded by the wording of a clause in the United States constitution. The views of the text-writers substantially correspond with these principles. According to Mr. Hall, the requisites of a sovereign State are that it should be permanently established for a political end, in full possession of definite territory, and independent of external control (6). " For all the purposes of International Law," says Phillimore, " a State may be defined to be a people permanently occupying a fixed territory, bound together by common laws, habits, and customs into one body politic, exercising, through the medium of an organized government, independent sovereignty and control over all persons and things within its boundaries, capable of making peace and war and of entering into international relations with other communities" (c). In order, however, that a State may be regarded as a normal member of the community of nations, it is further necessary that it should be recognized by other States. Thus Wheaton says : '' But if it desires to enter into that great society of nations, all the members of which recognize rights to which they are mutually entitled, and duties which they may be called on reciprocally to fulfil, such recognition becomes necessary to the complete participation of the new State in all the advantages of this society. Every other State is at liberty to grant or refuse this recognition, subject to the consequences of its own conduct in this respect " (d). In the case, however, of a State of sufficient power or importance to influence extensively the relations of other States, recognition must ultimately follow from the establish- ment of de facto sovereignty, although some States may be more prompt in according such recognition than others. Prior to 1720 (6) See Hall, p. 18. (d) See "Wheaton, by Lawrence, ic) See Phillimore, I., p. 81. p. 39. States. 5 doubts were entertained] by the nations of Christendom as to the lawfulness of recognizing or of maintaining any pacific intercourse with the Porte. In 1720 a Russian Minister for the first time took up his residence at Constantinople. This seems to have paved the way for recognition by and intercourse with other nations ; whilst in the end, curiously enough, the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire became ultimately one of the leading principles of European diplomacy. It was not until 1856, however, that Turkey was formally admitted to " the Public Law of Europe," in the sense of participating not merely in the principles of International Law, but also in the provisions of the European code (/). The International Association of the Congo, which was formed in 1879, and which has since developed into the Congo State, was recognised by the United States of America as a "friendly Crovernment" in April 1884, by Germany as a "friendly State" in November 1884, and by Great Britain as a "friendly Government" in December 1884. The question of the recognition of new States formed by secession from an already existing State will be dealt with here- after ((/). A State may cease to exist when it becomes voluntarily or com- pulsorily absorbed in another State. Its former corporate capacity will then cease and its members will become a part of another society, which will succeed to all the territorial rights and obligations of the State so absorbed. But a State may undergo the most important and extensive changes without losing its personality. It may be stripped of a portion of its ten-itory or subjects ; it may change its form of government from a monarchy to a republic, or from a republic to a despotism ; its influence and authority in the council of nations and even its external relations may be materially affected, and yet these changes will not per se involve any loss of its personality, or a forfeiture or discharge of its international rights or obligations. In Terrett v. Taylor (9 Cranch, 43) it was laid down by Story, J., that the dissolution of the regal government in the United States of America, and the substitution of a republican form of government, worked no change in existing rights, and that the Eepublic merely succeeded to the rights of the British Crown. A distinction is sometimes drawn between normal and abnormal international persons (h). It is suggested that the former category includes only those recognized members of the family of civilized nations, which are also fully sovereign and independent. It was lo this group of States that the Ottoman Empire was admitted by the (/) A convenient epitome of the Vol. I., pp. 87—93. treaty relations of the Ottoman Empire (j?) See p. 16, infra. and other European nations, will he (h) See Holland, p. 326. found in Phillimore, International Law, I Cases and Opinions on International Law. [treaty of Paris in 1856. Ifc is as between these normal international lersons that the theory of equality, and the most complete applica- ion of the rules of International Law, may be said to prevail. There 8, however, some ground for thinking that, so far as European affairs ,re concerned, the theory of equality is now giving place to a recog- lized primacy on the part of the Great Powers («). In America he primacy of the United States, in matters of continental concern, las been a recognized principle since the enunciation of the Monroe ioctrine in 1823 Qc). Amongst abnormal international persons are classed Semi-sovereign ,nd Protected States (Z), and States which, though fully independent, re yet, by reason of their difference of civilization or their removal rom Western influences, not fully regarded as the subjects of Inter- lational Law. Increased facilities for intercourse, however, and the apid spread of TVestern ideas, are gradually bringing such nations rithin its sphere. Even this enumeration does not exhaust the subjects of Interna- ional Law. Its rights and duties occasionally extend to organizations ihich are not in any sense States. Such is the case with revolted irovinces or colonies, whose belligerency has been acknowledged by ither States, and who are consequently entitled to issue commissions, institute blockades, and to exercise the right of visit and search ,nd other rights affecting neutral States, but arc, on the other hand, lound by the ordinary obligations of a civilized power whilst carrj ing iU the war. Such was the position of the Confederate States during he American Civil "War. Occasionally also we find trading corporations invested with some if the rights and obligations of International Law, mainly in regard o the exercise of internal dominion, the acquisition of new territory, ,nd the right of making peace and war within certain limits. Such ras formerly the position of the East India Company, and also of the nternational Association of the Congo at one stage of its career (m). The North Borneo Company may perhaps be referred to as affording . present illustration of this type of international personality, ilthough the rights which it enjoys under its charter from the ^rown are of a more circumscribed character (w). With the varieties of internal organization, or with the terms in (i) See Lawrence, p. 191. Proceedings of the Berlin Conference, (k) See Wheaton by Boyd, p. 94. Parliamentary Papers, Africa, No. 4, (Z) See p. 10, infra. 1885. (m) The International Association of (m) For further information on this he Congo has since developed into the suhject, see "The New Ceylon," by Jongo Free State, under the presi- Joseph Hatton, in which will be found [ency of the King of the Belgians, and the charter, dated 1st Nov., 1881. he guarantee of the Groat Powers. See States. 7 •which States formerly distinct have become one, with the various forms of union, personal, real, incorporate, federal (o), it would seem that International Jiaflr is really not concerned. It looks only to the common international representative. If various States, locally distinct, have a common government to represent them internationally, tliey constitute strictly but one international person. / It may not be out of place, however, to poiut out tliat publicists recognise five forms of Union. These are :— (1) Personal Union, where States are temporarily united by subjection to one sovereign, the Union here being dependent on the continuance of the dynasty ; such was the case with Great Britain and Hanover between 1714 and 1 837. (2) Keal Union, where two or more States are perpetually united under one sovereign ; an illustration of which may be found in the present relation of Austria and Hungary. (3) Incorporate Union, where two or more States are united in such a way that the external and internal sovereignty of each is completely merged in the sovereignty of the united community ; such is the case with England and Scotland in relation to the United Kingdom. (4) Federal Union (Bundestaat), where several States are united in such a way that the management of the external affairs of the union is absolutely vested in a Supreme Federal Power, although as to internal matters, each of the States composing the union retains its sovereignty within the sphere allotted to it by the Constitution; such is the case with the United States of America, and with the United States of Eio de la Plata. (5) Lastly, the Union may take the form of a Confederacy of States (Staatenbund) ; this occurs where several States unite for the purposes of mutual assistance and defence but without derogating from the individual sovereignty of each, except so far as is strictly necessary for the common object of the union as defined by the pact {p). The Germanic Confederation, as constituted under the Treaty of Vienna, 1815, and the first Act of 1820, affords an instance of this type of international Union; the personality of the different States composing the union was, for the purposes of International Law, preserved ; each State re- tained within certain limits the power of contracting alliances, of (oj An excellent account , of these allottedtoit, acts in each separate State forms of organization will be found in in its own right and not through the AVheaton, by Boyd, pp. 63 to 81 ; see medium of the Government of that also Twiss, Vol. I., c. iii. State ; whilst in the latter, the execu- (y) The difference between' Federal tive organ of the Confederation can only and Confederate Union from the point act through the Governments of the of view of Constitutional Law, is said various States composing the Con- to be this,— that in the former the federacy. Federal Executive, within the sphere B Cases and Opinions on International Law. maintaining separate legations, and of making peace and war {q) ; ind all members of the league continued to be governed in their relations with independent States by the general International Law. A.fter the war of 1866 and the Treaty of Prague, the Germanic Confederation was superseded by the North German Confederation, inder the leadership of Prussia. After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, a new Confederation, under the presidency of Prussia, was 'ormed, under the name of the German Empire, the constitution of ivhich was promulgated at Berlin on April 16, 1871. Under the lew constitution the Emperor represents the Empire internatioDally, md has the right to declare war and conclude peace in the name 3f the Empire, to enter into alliances and other treaties with oreign Powers, and to accredit and receiye ambassadors. In so far IS treaties with foreign States have reference to affairs within the jurisdiction of the Imperial Legislature the consent of the Council Df the Confederation is requisite for their conclusion, and the sanction Df the Diet for their coming into force. The consent of the Council is also necessary for the declaration of war in the name of the Empire, except in the case of an attack being made on its territory Dr coast. Eights of separate legation are still retained by certain members of the union, but this extends only to matters not expressly reserved to the Imperial Government. THE "CHARKIEH." Temp. 1873. [L. R. 4 A. & E. 59.] Case.] The " Charkieh " was an Egyptian steamer belonging to the Khedive, and was arrested by the order of the Court of Admiralty for running down a vessel in the Thames on the 19th of October, 1872. Application was made to restrain further proceedings on the ground that the "Charkieh" was an Egyptian Government vessel, and as such not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty. It appeared that the vessel, although carrying the flag of the Ottoman Empire, had come with cargo to England, and had been entered at the Customs like an ordinary merchant ship, and that at the time of (}) See Wheaton, by Boyd, p. 68. States. 9 the collision she was under charter to a British subject, and advertised to carry coals to Alexandria. Judgment.] Sir Robert Phillimore in his judgment con- sidered two questions: (1) whether the "Charkieh" could be said to be the property of a sovereign prince, and (2) whether, assuming that the Khedive enjoyed the status of a sovereign prince,, the vessel could under the circumstances still claim immunity from jurisdiction. (An account of the judgment so far as regards the question of the immunity of the vessel will he found under " Public Vessels," p. 52.) On the subject of the status of the Khedive of Egypt, Sir Robert Phillimore, in giving judgment, stated as the result of an historic inquiry into the subject, that in the firmans gi-anted by the Porte to the Khedive, Egypt was invariably spoken of as one of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire ; that the Egyptian army was regulated as part of the military force of the Ottoman Empire, that the taxes were imposed and levied in the name of the Porte, that the treaties of the Porte were binding on Egypt, that she had no separate jus legationis, and that the flag for both the army and the navy was the flag of the Porte. All these facts, according to the unanimous opinion of accredited writers, were inconsistent and incompatible with those conditions of sovereignty which were necessary to entitle a country to be ranked as a member of the great community of States, With reference to the fact that the office of Khedive was hereditary, that did not confer on him the right of making war and peace, of sending ambassadors or of maintaining a separate military or naval force, or of governing at all except in the name and under the authority of his sovereign. The Charkieh, L. R. 4 A. & E. 59, The political position of Egypt has undergone considerable modifi- cation since the date of the judgment in the " Charkieh." By the firman of the 8th of Jane, 1873, the right of concluding treaties and maintaining armies was granted to Ismail I. by the then Sultan. This increased independence was not destined to last long. After 10 Cases and Opinions on International Law. the deposition of Ismail in 1879, the government of Egypt was con- ducted under the supervision of two controllers-general, one nomi- nated by Great Britain and the other by France, in accordance with a decree of the Khedive of the 10th of November, 1879. In the summer of 1882 an insurrection took place, the object of which was the abolition of the foreign control in Egypt. Great Britain, how- ever, intervened, and the authority of the Khedive was ultimately restored. Subsequently, in January, 1883, a decree was promulgated abolishing the joint control ; and in November, 1883, an English financial administrator was appointed. In October, 1885, a conven- tion was entered into between Great Britain and Turkey, in jjursu- ance of which the affairs of Egypt were placed under the control of two Commissioners, nominated by these Powers. In May, 1887, a iVrther convention was arranged, but this was not ratified by the Porte, with the result that the British occupation has continued ever since under the Convention of 1885. In view of the continuance of the English occupation, the present international status of Egypt must be regarded as somewhat anomalous. In the case of AM-ul- Messih v. Farra (L. E. 13 App. Ca. 431), Lord Watsou, refeiTing to tlie position of foi-eigners in Egypt, remarked that it was not British territory, but the possession of a foreign Power and subject to the sovereignty of the Porte ; certain privileges, however, had been conceded by treaty to residents in Egypt, whether British or foreign, subject to their names being inscribed in the register kept for that ]iurpose, and such persons enjoyed immunity from territorial rule and taxation ; they constituted a privileged society living under a foreign law, although on Egyptian soil (qq). WjtlL_regai:d^_to_" Semi-sovereign" States in general, these are commonly defined- as~'^^"StStes-ivhi©h-a3Fe-fi©t-free- irr their- external: relations, but which otherwise enjoy full intemtil independence." This definition is not altogether accurate, inasmuch as in some cases the internal, independence is also affected. Strictly, however, it is the limitation on external freedom- of action thuL International Law "is alone concerned with. The limitations on external sovereignty -may vary, but such States have usually no separate jtis legationis, being represented only by diplomatic agents or consuls, no power of contracting separate treaties, or of making peace and war, without the consent of the State on which they are dependent. It follows that guch Statj S-ai'e only mediaitely_and in a subordi- nate^dii^ee-_the_SBbjects_aLI»tfrrn«itTDTral~Law. Forjnany purposes they are treated as part of some lai-ger State and as represeiEted by lr1n~EEe^omrQunity of nations. Stilh for certafn purposes and under certain limitations they are recognised as possessing a sepa- rate status or personality. Thus, whilst they possess no separate (qq) See p. 121, infra. States. 11 JUS legationis, and whilst negotiations between them and foreign countries are usually conducted through the representatives of the suzerain or protecting State, or at least submitted for its approval, yet it is usual to accredit to them minor diplomatic agents, and to recognise them as separate international entities in questions of comity that afifect the persons and property of their subjects in foreign countries, or strangers in their territory {r). Although this may be taken as a fair description of the interna- tional status and position of typical semi-sovereign States, ye t when we-proceed to detfirffiine-wiat_^Utes_are j^ we shall ' «xperienee-greateriiffic,ulty. '^mi'-sbvereign States are sometimes jajdJ,Q^comprise the. following : (1) Protected States, (2) Tributary and Vassal States, (3) members of a system of Confederated States, and (4) States under the permanent guarantee of the Great Powers. But this classification is scarcely consistent with our statement of the conditions of a semi-sovereign State proper, inasmuch as some States fall within it, to which our statement of conditions would not apply. Having regard to the actual political arrangements that have subsisted and still subsist, it seems clear that there are many varieties of State organisation and relation, and that it -is impossible to reduce these under any one system, or to draw clearly any line of demarcation between them. The question ^f Snynrpign fir Rpmi.- so vereig n, in the sense described, is really^a qu estion of fact, which lias to be determined in each particular,c^. Thus, it may well be, THaOn|;^^|ESiS^^pKeFff5efF™3iF^^]«-^irQlifi(^^ j_ont -forfeiting in- aHy^-degree^itsJjitei'national personalityr" If, in such case, the former should retain its separate jus legationis, its separate flag, and its power to make peace and war irrespectively of its protector, then it would still be entitled to be regarded as a full member of the community of nations, notwithstanding that its power of external action might in some respects be limited by the treaty or alliance. Even tributary or vassal States have occasionally been regarded as possessing a full international personality. Thus the Kingdom of Naples was until 1818 regarded as a Vassal of the Holy See, but this without in any degree affecting its international status. The United States of the Ionian Islands, which were placed under the protection of Great Britain by the Treaty of Paris, 1815, aie frequently cited as a perfect specimen of a Half-sovereign State. Their constitution was regulated by a Convention signed at Paris in 1815, between Great Britain, Austria, Eussia, and Prussia, and by a Constitutional Charter adopted by the native Legislative Assembly (s). The international character of these States, whilst under the British (r) See PhilUmore, I., p. 100. W See Phillimore, I., pp. 101 to 106, 12 Cases and Opinions on International Law. Protectorate, came under consideration in the case of the Ionian Ships (Spink's Prize Cases, p. 193). In this case, it appeared that during the war between Great Britain and Eussia an Ionian vessel had been seized by a British cruiser and brought in for adjudication, on the ground of trading with the enemy ; it was admitted that she was bound to a Kussian port, but this port was not under blockade, nor did the cargo consist of contraband ; the question of liability, therefore, depended on whether Ionian subjects stood in the same position as British subjects in regard to a Power hostile to Great Britain. The learned judge of the Admiralty Court (Dr. Lushington) held that Ionian subjects did not owe any general allegiance to Great Britain, but merely a limited obedience arising from treaty, and hence they were not subject to the obliga- tions of British subjects ; if Great Britain had a right, under treaty, of declaring war between the Ionian Islands and Eussia, she had not done so ; by the Law of Nations, Ionian subjects could not be regarded, in view of the mere relations that subsisted between them and Great Britain, as being in a state of war with Eussia. Although the relation between the Ionian Islands and Great Britain has long since ceased,- the Islands having been ceded to Greece in 1863, this judgment is worthy of note, as throwing light on the status of such communities in International Law. The status of the Wallachian Principalities formerly, and that of the Principality of Bulgaria now, afford a further illustration of the conditions of semi-sovereignty. On the other hand, the position of Eastern Eoumelia under the treaty of Berlin 1878, prior to its virtual incorporation with Bulgaria in 1885, was rather that of an autonomous province than of a semi- sovereign State. In the same category are sometimes classed members of a con- federated system of States. Here, under the terms of the Union, the individual States composing it, may have a separate /?« legationis, and even a right of making peace and war, subject to conditions imposed in the general interest of the union. The Germanic Confederation, as previously described, belonged to this type of State organiza- tion {f). Even under the present constitution of the German Empire, some members of the Union enjoy the right of receiving foreign ministers, and of accrediting their own ministers to foreign courts. In respect to some of the German States, the British Ambassador accredited to the German Empire, acts also as Minister Plenipo- tentiary to the local State ; such is the case with Anhalt and Brunswick. To other members of the Union, Great Britain accredits a separate minister, as in the case of Bavaria ; or a charge d'affaires, as in the case of Baden. (J) See Whcaton, >)y Boyd, p. 68, and p. 7, mpra. States. 13 There are, besides, jg rfain pprra anent ly n eutral States, which are sometimes, though itjaaiLcLseem- mth -douKful accuracy, classecl under the head nf afimi-RnvRi-pifrn iStates. 3Ibese are States which have been neutralized by rtie_£ublic„act.afL Europe or of the Great fowCTS. They enjoyTEe advantage of having their immunity from attack guaranteed them by other Powers ; but they are, on the other hand, subject to an obligation not to take part in any hostilities between other Powers, and they may not even during peace enter into engagements which might jeopardize their neutrality during war. Such has been the position of Switzerland since 1815, and of Belgium, under the treaty of 1839, superseding the original treaty of 1831 {ic). But in all other respects, such States enjoy the attri- ^butes of full soveicignty (r). The Treaty of Berlin of the 1 3th of July 1878, illustrates so well the various relations in which a dependent State may stand towards another State, that it may be worth while to refer briefly to some of the changes effected by it. By the provisions of this treaty. Eastern Eoumelia was placed under the direct authority of the Porte, bub was to have a Christian Governor-General ; this officer was to be nominated by the Porte, with the consent of the parties to the treaty, and to hold office for five years ; the province was also to enjoy administrative autonomy. Bulgaria was established as an autonomous tributary principality under the suzerainty of the Sultan, with a Christian government and a national militia ; the Prince was to be chosen by the population of the principality, and his election confirmed by the Porte with the assent of the parties to the treaty, no member of the reigning families of Europe being eligible ; difference of creed was to form no ground for civil or political disability ; existing treaties between the Porte and foreign Powers were to remain in force, and the principality was to bear a portion of the public Turkish debt. Montenegro was recognized as an indepen- dent State ; new territory was added to the principality, in return for which it was to bear a part of the public Turkish debt ; difference of creed was to form no ground of disability ; but the new State was not to have any ships or any flags of war. Servia was recognized as an independent State, subject to the condition that difference of religion was not to be punished, and freedom of worship was to be assured to all persons ; in return for an accession of territory Servia also was burdened with a portion of the public Turkish debt. Eoumania was declared independent, subject to the same conditions (u) For an accoimt of these perma- Luxemburg, Cyprus, Boznin and Her- nently neutralized States, «e« Wheaton, zegovina, Tunis and Tripoli, and the by Boyd pp. 551 560. Kepublics of San Marino, and Andorra, (a:) On the subject of the interna- see Phillimore, Part II., oh. 2. tional position of Belgium, Greece, 14 Cases and Opinions on International Law. as Servia, and an alteration was made in the territorial limits of tte principality. Eoumania was declared a monarchy in 1881, and Servia in 1882 ; so that these may now be said to have discarded their former character as "semi-sovereign States." In 1885, a revolution took place in Eastern Roumelia, and its union with Bulgaria was pro- claimed. As the result of a conference of the signatory Powers of the Berlin Treaty, held at Constantinople subsequently, an imperial firman was issued by the Sultan in 1886, confiding the Government of Eastern Eoumelia (with the exception of certain districts) to the Prince of Bulgaria, and providing for the appointment of a commis- sion to modify the then existing constitution. The province has since for all purposes formed part of Bulgaria (y). In 1887, on the abdication of Prince Alexander of Battenberg, Prince Ferdinand of Coburg was elected by the Sobranje. The election was not, however, confirmed by the signatories of the Berlin Treaty. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v- M'RAE. Te.'iii'p. 1869. [L. R. 8 Eq. 69.] Case.] During the American Civil War the Confederate Government and their agents had consigned goods and re- mitted money to the defendant, who was apparently domiciled in England. The defendant having sold the goods and received the sale moneys, after the suppression of the rebellion a suit for an account was instituted against him by the United States Government in the English Courts. The defendant put in no answer, and simply left the plaintiffs to make out their title to relief. James, V.C., asked if the plaintiffs were willing to have the account taken as it would be taken between the Confederate Government on the one hand and the defendant {y) The revolution in Roumelia, and entertained ty others, that political its union with Bulgaria, afford another arrangements, if they are to be penna- illustration of the growing force of the nent, must follow the natural lines of doctrine of nationality, and strike cleavage, or, in other words, must take another hlow at the theory that princes count of those ties, whether of race, and diplomatists can parcel out nations place, language, religion, or common at will. _ This event may aid statesmen past and traditions, which go to make in arriving at the conviction, long since up a nation. States. 1 5 on the other. The plaintiffs declined to accept the decree in any form which would recognize the authority of the belligerent States or involve any privity with their agent. Judgment] The Vice- Chancellor, in giving judgment, stated "that he would deal with the case as if the plaintiffs had been the Governtnent of India, and the defendant an agent of insur- rectionists there. What was at the outbreak of the rebellion the public property of the plaintiffs would still continue their property, and if at the end of the rebellion any such property •capable of being identified could be traced to any person, the rightful owners would be entitled to apply for restitution. But moneys voluntarily contributed to the rebellion could not be recovered as moneys had and received to the use of the lawful ■Government. With regard to property taken by force from innocent persons the right of possession would still remain in them. The learned judge expressed an opinion that it was •clear public universal law that any Government de facto suc- •ceeding another, succeeded to all the public property of the ■displaced Power. Any such public property would, on the ■success of the new or restored Power, ipso fado vest in the latter ; and it would have the right to call to account any agent, debtor or accountant to or of the persons who had ■exercised the authority of the Government. But the right was a right of succession or of representation ; it was not a right paramount, but was derived through the suppressed authority, and could only be enforced in the same way and to the same extent, and subject to the same correlative obligations and rights as if that authority were seeking to enforce it. Assuming this to be true, it was not open to the plaintiffs to claim from the agent, and at the same time repudiate all privity with him and his former principals. The learned judge expressed himself satisfied that the plaintiffs' claim, as they had framed it, was based on their paramount title to what they alleged to be their own property, in respect of which they sought to treat the possession of the defendant as the posses- sion of the agent of public plunderers, and in this part of the 16 Cases and Opinions on International Law. case the proceedings must wholly fail. There was no evidence that any moneys or goods of the plaintiffs (i.e., of the plaintiffs in their own right, as distinguished from their right as successors of the Government which had been suppressed,) had ever reached the hands of the defendant, or that there were in his hands on or after the suppression of the rebellion any public moneys or goods which had become vested in the plaintiffs. On these grounds the suit was dismissed with costs. ThA United States of America v. M'Rae, L. K. 8 Eq. 69. Where a colony or province secedes or endeavours to secede from the State of which it has hitherto formed a part, various questions may arise for the consideration of other States and their tribunals. Omitting for the present the question of recognition of belliger- ency (a), two other questions present themselves : (1), assuming the revolt to be successful, when and with what consequences are other States bound or entitled to recognize the independence of the new State ? (2), assuming that the parent State re-establishes its autho- rity, how far does it succeed to the rights or responsibilities of the government overthrown ? With regard to the recognition of independence, Heffter suggests that this cannot be admitted until either the parent State itself recognizes the new order of things after having been indemnified, or, failing this, until the recoveiy of its ancient rights has become an impossibility (&). Other writers suggest as the condition of recog- nition, that the new State must be defado independent, that it must ■ be capable of maintaining relations of peace and war, and lastly that the parent State must have relinquished active efforts to re-establish its authority. Thus, in his " Letters on International Law," Historicus says : " As far as any practical rule can be deduced from historical examples, it seems to be this. When a sovereign State, from exhaustion or any other cause, has virtually and substantially abandoned the struggle for supremacy, it has no right to complain if a foreign State treat the independence of its former subjects as de facto established, nor can it prolong its sovereignty by a mere paper assertion of right. When, on the other hand, the contest is not abso- lutely or permanently decided, a recognition of the inchoate indepen- dence of the insurgents by a foreign State, is a hostile act towards (as) As to tho recognition of the see p. 134, infra. telligerency of a revolting province, (A) See Heffter, § 23. Siaies. 17 the sovereign State, which the latter is entitled to resent as a breach of neutrality and friendship " (c). Assuming that the revolted province or State establishes its inde- pendence, it does not succeed to any of the obligations of the parent State which are of a personal character, such as treaties of alliance or succession, but it does succeed to such obligations as possess a local character. Some illustration of these principles may be found in the rules relating to the apportionment, in such cases, of State debts. If the debt was secured wholly on the local revenues of the province that has succeeded in establishing its independence, the whole liability ought to pass to the new State. If the debt was secured on special revenues partly derived from the seceding pro- vince, the latter becomes liable pro rata. For the general debts of the parent State, on the other hand, the new State is not liable, except in virtue of some special arrangement. We have now to consider the position where the parent State, instead of succumbing, succeeds in re-establishing its authority. Here the question is generally only one of succession to right, and not of succession to liability (rf). Debts and liabilities incurred by a rebel belligerent government have uniformly been repudiated. There are, however, certain rights, both proprietary and contractual, to which the parent State may lay claim. The principle deducible fi-om the case of The United States v. M'Rae, and similar cases is, that the parent State, in such case, succeeds to all proprietary and other rights which were previously inherent in any rival government "in its character as government," This, however, is only a right of succes- sion, and is subject to any lawful claims which neutrals holding such property may have against it. Subject to this, a neutral agent can- not resist the claim of the new government on the ground of its want of privity in title with that by which he was employed. In The King of the Tivo Sicilies v. Wilcox (1 Sim. N. S. 301), it appeared that from March 1848 to April 1849, the government of Sicily had been usurped by certain Sicilian subjects, and that the usurping government while in power had, through its agents in this country, entered into contracts for the purchase of two steamships ; one of these had been delivered to the insurgents, but the other remained in this country J on his restoration to power, the King of Sicily com- menced proceedings to recover the latter. The case came before the Court on the plaintiff's application for production of documents ; this was resisted by the defendants on two grounds — 1st, on the ground that the defendants held the documents as trustees for the persons by (c) See Sir W, Vernon Haruourt's tlie succession to a right sometiinps Letters on International Law, p. 9. involves an incidental obligation, as in {d) This statement, perhaps, needs to the case of U. S. v. Frioleau. See p. 18. be modified to this extent ; viz., that C.I.L. C 18 Cases and Opinions on International Law. whom they were entrusted with the money ; and 2ndly, on the ground that as to certain of the documents, their production would subject the defendants to criminal proceedings in Sicily. The Vice- Chancellor held that neither objection was tenable. He remarked that every government in its dealings with others necessarily partook in many respects of the character of a corporation ; it must of neces- sity be treated as a body having perpetual succession ; in the present case, those who, as constituting the government, had stood in the relation of cestuis que trust or of principals towards the defendants, ceased to Jill that character when they ceased to be members of the jrovemment ; the executive government being then at an end, the defendants had either ceased to fill the character of trustees or agents at all, or they had become trustees or agents for the plaintiff as the person then in possession of the supreme authority ; he accordingly held that the plaintiff was entiitled to an order for production. On the other hand, in the case of The United States of America v. Prioleau (35 L. J. Ch. N. S. 7), it was held by Wood, V.-C, that the United States in claiming certain parcels of cotton of the value of 40,O0OZ., which had been deposited with the defendant by the Confederate Government as security for a contract entered into between the parties, must take the cotton subject to the defendant's lien under the agreement. The learned judge laid down, that Prioleau being a naturalized British subject had a perfect right to deal with the de facto government ; the case could not be compared to that of a person taking the property of another with knowledge of the rights of that other, as suggested by counsel for the plaintiflTs ; such a principle could not be applied to international cases of this descrip- tion, for if it could, there would be no possibility, during the existence of a government de facto, of any person dealing with such a government in any part of the world ; subjects of other countries who treated with the existing government were entitled to every right which the government de facto could give them ; the suc- ceeding government could not assert any right as against the contracts which had been entered into by the government de/ac/o; they must succeed in every respect to the property as they found it, and subject to all the conditions and liabilities to which it was subject under the contract. Again, in the Republic of Peru v. Dreyfits (L. E. 38 Ch. D. 348), it was held that where a revolutionary or de facto government of a country had been recognized by a foreign State {dd), a subject of such foreign State might safely contract with that de facto government ; and that if the previous government should be restored, then it was bound by International Law, if it claimed under such contract at all, (dd) Recognized, that is, as a belligerent ov as a de facto government, not necessarily as an independent State. State Jurisdiction. 19 to adopt ifc subject to tlie rights of the foreign contractor ; in other words, that the restored government merely succeeded to such rights as the former de facto government had under it. It was also sug- gested that, even in the case of a contract by a foreigner with a rebel State that had not been internationally recognized, property acquired under such contract could not be recovered from the foreign con- tractor in derogation of the contract. In the case of the Republic of Peru V. The Pe)-uvian Quaiw Co. (L. R. 36 Ch. 489), a statement of claim, which sought relief on the ground that a compromise of certain disputes, which had been come to between the defendants and the preceding de facto government, was not binding upon the plaintiffs (the succeeding government), was struck out, on the ground {inter alia) that the transactions of the de facto government which had been entered into by their duly authorized agents must be treated, by the tribunals of this country at least, as valid and efifectuaUy bind- ing upon their successors. STATE JURISDICTION. THE QUEEN v. KEYN. Temp. 1876. [L. R. 2 Exch. Div. 63.] Case.] The prisoner, Ferdinand Keyn, was indicted at the Central Criminal Court for the manslaughter of Jessie Dorcas Young. The deceased in February, 1876, was a passenger on board the British steamer " Stratbclyde," on a voyage from London to Bombay. "When off Dover the " Strathclyde " was run into by the "Franconia," a German vessel under the command of the prisoner, a German subject. The "Strath- clyde" was sunk, and the deceased, together with several others of the passengers and crew, was drowned. It was alleged and found that the collision was due to the negligence of the prisoner as captain of the " Franconia." The point at which the collision occurred was l-^„- miles from Dover pier- head and within 2| miles from Dover beach. The " Fran- conia" having put into an English port, Keyn was indicted for manslaughter at the Central Criminal Court, and the facts 2 20 Cases and Opinions on International Law. being such as amounted in English law to manslaughter, he was found guilty ; but the question whether the Court had jurisdiction to try the case was reserved for determination by the Court for the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved. The legality of the conviction was contested on the ground that the accused was a foreigner commanding a foreign vessel on a voyage from one foreign port to another, that the offence was committed on the high seas, and that the accused was consequently not amenable to the jurisdiction of the English Courts. It appeared that criminal jurisdiction at Common Law was originally distributed between two tribunals. The Courts of Oyer and Terminer took cognizance of offences committed within the body of a county ; the Court of the Lord High Admiral of those committed on the sea. Each Court claimed concurrent jurisdiction over offences committed on rivers or arms of the sea within the body of a county. By 15 Rich. IL c. 3, the Admiral's jurisdiction was limited to cases of death or mayhem " done in great ships being and hovering in the main stream of great rivers, only beneath the bridges of the same rivers nigh unto the sea"; this in addition, however, to his jurisdiction over "a thing done upon the sea." By 28 Hen. VIII. c. 15, all treasons, felonies, robberies, murders, and confederacies, committed in or upon the sea, or in any haven, creek, river or place where the Admiral had jurisdiction, were to be tried in such shires and places as might be limited in the king's commission, this to be directed for the same in like form and condition as for offences committed on land. The result of this statute was to transfer jurisdiction in such cases to the commissioners of Oyer and Terminer, amongst whom was included the Judge of the Admiralty Court, and to make such offences triable by the ordinary process. By 39 Geo. III. c. 37, the provisions of 28 Hen. VIII. c. 15, were extended to all offences committed on the high seas out of the body of any county. Ultimately by 4 «Sz 5 "Will. IV. c. 36, and by T & 8 Vict. c. 2, this jurisdiction was vested in the Central Criminal Court, and the Judges of Assize. In this manner offences State Jurisdiction. 21 originally within the Admiral's jurisdiction became triable by the ordinaiy law of the land and before the ordinary Courts. This being so, the question in the present case was whether the jurisdiction originally vested in the Admiral, and now vested in the Central Criminal Court and the Judges of Assize, included jurisdiction over an offence committed by a foreigner on board a foreign vessel within three miles of the English shore. Summary of Judgments.] On the argument of this question be- fore the Court for the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved, the majority of the Court (including Cockburn, C.J., Kelly, C.B., Bramwell, L.J., Lush and Field, JJ., Sir R. Phillimore and Pollock, B.), were of opinion that prior to 28 Hen. VIII. c. 15, the Admiral had no jurisdiction to try offences by foreigners on board foreign ships, whether within or without the limit of three miles from the shore of England, and that 28 Hen. VIII. 0. 15, and subsequent statutes only transferred to other Courts such jurisdiction as had formerly been vested in the Admiral. Kelly, C.B., and Sir R. Phillimore came to the same conclu- sion also on the ground that at International Law the power of a nation over the sea within three miles of its coast existed only for certain limited purposes, namely, for the defence and security of the adjacent temtory, and that Parliament could not consistently with those principles have intended to apply English criminal law within those limits. The judgment of the majority was dissented from by Lord Coleridge, C.J., Brett and Amphlett, L.JJ., and Grove, Den- man and Lindley, JJ., on the ground that the sea within three miles of the coast constituted part of the territory of England, that the English criininal law extended over those limits, and that the Admiral formerly had jurisdiction to try ofifences there committed, although on foreign ships. Coleridge, C.J., and Denman, J., also upheld the jurisdiction of the Court on the further ground that the prisoner's ship having run into a British ship and sunk it and so caused the deceased's death, the offence must be deemed to have been committed on board a British ship. 22 Cases and Opinions on International Laiv. Judgment of Cockturn, L.C.J.] In his judgment the Lord Chief Justice laid down as a general rule that a suhject of one country could not he made amenable to the criminal law of another country except for acts done within the limits of its territory or on board one of its vessels. If the legislature of a particular country thought fit by express enactment to render foreigners subject to its laws with reference to acts committed beyond its territory, it would be incumbent upon the Courts of such country to give effect to such enactment, leaving it to the State to settle the question of International Law with the Governments of other nations. But in default of such specific enactment the accused could not be made amenable to English law unless he was either within the limits of British territory or on board a British vessel. As to whether there was any such express rule of English law, it appeared that at Common Law every offence was triable only in the county in which it was committed, the jurors having to be summoned from that county. Bays, gulfs, or estuaries were held to be within the body of the adjacent county ; but along the rest of the coast Common Law jurisdiction only extended to low-water mark. Offences outside these limits were left to the Admiral, as exercising the authority of the Sovereign on the high seas ; except that in respect of murder and mayhem committed in ships at the mouths of great rivers a concurrent jurisdiction was given by Statute. By subsequent statutes all criminal jurisdiction formerly belonging to the Court of the Admiral was trans- ferred to Courts of Common Law, but these statutes gave the Courts no greater jurisdiction than the Admiralty originally possessed. After refeiTing to the authorities the Lord Chief Justice held that the Admiral's jurisdiction was never exercised (except in case of piracy) over offences committed on other than British ships. If, therefore, the accused was to be held amenable to English law, it must be either on the ground that the offence, having been committed within the three-mile limit, must be considered State Jurisdiction. 23 to have been committed withia the limits of British territory, over which the State had civil and criminal jurisdiction ; or on the ground that it must he deemed to have been committed on board a British vessel by reason of the death of the deceased having taken place there. With respect to the three-mile limit, the learned Lord Chief Justice said the doctrine in question amounted to this, that a belt of the sea to a distance of three miles from the coast, though so far a portion of the high seas as to be within the jurisdiction of the Admiral, was yet part of the territory of the realm so far as to make a foreigner within such belt, though on a foreign ship, subject to English law. Originally indeed sovereignty was claimed by the English Crown over the narrow seas, and a concurrent jurisdiction even beyond this. But such extravagant pretensions on the part of England and other nations had long since ceased, and in no way supported the doctrine of jurisdiction within the three-mile zone, since if it existed at all it would apply to the whole of the surrounding seas. The Lord Chief Justice then went on to trace the origin and growth of the doctrine of the three-mile limit. After careful examination of the writings of the English, American and Continental publicists (e), he came to the conclusion that the suggestion of Bynkershoek that the sea surrounding the coast to the extent of cannon range should be regarded as belonging to the State, had been almost universally adopted by the subsequent writers on International Law ; but he added that great difference of opinion existed as to the exact distance, and as to the still more essential question of the nature and degree of sovereignty. As to distance, the majority adopted the three-mile zone, others more consistently applied the principle on which the doctrine really rested, viz., the range of cannon shot. On the question of the nature of the sovereignty still greater divergence of opinion existed, some wi-iters con- (e) These should if possible be referred to, pp. 176 to 191 of the report. Zi Cases and Opinions on International Law. tending for absolute dominion and a right of excluding foreign vessels even from passage ; others contending for dominion, but subject to a Jus in re aliena on the part of other nations to pass and repass ; whilst others denied that there was any right of property, but conceded a more or less extensive jurisdiction. Even as to this jurisdiction, views differed ; some limiting it to pui-poses of safety and police, others extending it to the enforce- ment of revenue and fishery laws, others distinguishing between a passing ship and a commorant ship in the matter of jurisdic- tion. None of these writers, however, went to the length of asserting the liability of a foreigner in a foreign ship to the criminal law of the local State. The effect of the general con- sensus as to some part of the sea being subject to jurisdiction for some purposes, was entirely negatived by the complete divergence of opinion as to the practical application of the principle. As to the contention that the sea to the extent of three miles from the coast formed part of the realm of England, the learned Lord Chief Justice, after reviewing the authorities, held that the littoral sea beyond low-water mark did not originally form part of the territory of the realm. The statements of ancient authorities on this subject were manifestly based on the doctrine that the narrow seas were part of the realm of England, a doctrine which was long since exploded. This doctrine could not now be evoked for the purpose of applying it within a more limited sphere. If it failed at all, the whole doctrine failed. If, as it appeared to him, the littoral sea beyond low-water mark did not originally form part of the territory of the realm, how and when did it become so ? If it had become so in fact, this result must be ascribed to the writers on International Law. But even if these had been entirely unanimous on the subject, they could not make law apart from the assent of civilized nations. In addition to this, even if assent on the part of other nations was clearly proved, yet it was doubtful if such principles, amounting in fact to a new law, could be applied by a municipal court here, in default of an Act of Parliament. State Jurisdiction. 25 The question being then not one of theoretical opinion but of fact, what evidence, eithei- in the shape of treaties or usage, was there of such a principle ? As regards treaties, the rule that the sea surrounding the coast was to be treated as adjacent territory in such a way as to give the State dominion, together with criminal and civil jurisdiction, over passing vessels of other nations, had never been made the subject matter of any treaty, or even the subject of diplomatic discussion. It had been entirely the creation of writers on International Law. The treaties refeiTed to on the sub- ject related to two matters only, namely the observance of the rights and obligations of neutrality, and the exclusive right of fishery. The distance of three miles had been adopted in those treaties not as matter of existing right, but as matter of mutual concession and convention. As to usages, the only usages found to exist were connected with navigation, revenue, fishery, or neutrality laws. There appeared to be no usage warranting the application of the general law to foreigners on the littoral sea. It was the first time that a Court of Justice had been called upon to apply the criminal law of the country to such a case as the present. It was quite possible, in view of the opinions of writers on public law, that if a nation chose by municipal law to subject foreigners within these limits to its jurisdictiou, this would be acquiesced in by other nations ; the principle would then be attributable to such acquiescence. If such a rule were adopted it would, without doubt, be binding on the municipal tribunals ; but the power of Parliament to legislate could not be treated as making up for the want of actual legislation giving the Courts authority to apply such a rule of criminal law in such a case. The learned Lord Chief Justice then proceeded to con- sider the statutes relating to the sea by which foreigners might be affected. Of these some had no reference to the three-mile zone, others had such reference. Dealing with statutory enactments relating to foreigners within 26 Cases and Opinions on International Law. the three-mile zone, he found that these were confined to violation of neutral duties or breaches of the revenue or fishery laws, and that, apart from these, there had been no assertion of legislative authority in the general application of the penal law to foreigners within the three-mile zone. It further appeared that when asserting its power to legislate with reference to foreigners within the three-mile zone, Parlia- ment had deemed it necessary to express such intention in specific terms. This surely was an indication that a Court of Justice could not apply such a rule without the authority of specific legislation. After reviewing the decisions which had been quoted in connection with the subject, he remarked that most of these seemed to have arisen on the construction of Acts of Parliament, but in none was the question raised, how far could local law, without an Act of Parliament, be made applicable to foreigners within the three-mile zone. Taken together, decisions and dicta showed that the views and opinions of the foreign jurists as to a territorial sea had been received with, favour by eminent judicial authorities of this country, and that the doctrine respecting it had been admitted in the construction of statutory enactments ; but none of them established or even suggested that independently of statute the criminal law of England was applicable to the foreigner navigating any part of its shores. Having regard to all these facts, viz. : — that all pretensions to sovereignty in the narrow seas had been long since abandoned — that the state- ments made by the jurists were uncertain and indefinite both as to the extent of space and the nature of the sovereignty claimed over the littoral sea — that such penal jurisdiction had never been conceded by other nations or acquiesced in except for violation of neutrality or breach of revenue or fishery laws — that neither in its legislation as to shipping nor as to criminal jurisdiction had Parliament thought fit to assume sovereignty within the three-mile zone in respect to foreigners — that wherever a foreigner had been rendered amenable to English law this had been done by express and specific legislation — in State Jurisdiction. 27 view of these facts and of the total absence of all precedent in favour of the contention, the learned Lord Chief Justice laid down that the Court would not be justified in holding the offence to be punishable by the law of England, especially as in so holding it must declare the whole body of the penal law to be applicable to foreigners passing our shores in foreign vessels on their way to foreign ports. Another contention urged on behalf of the Crown was, that, the death having taken place on board a British ship, the offence must be deemed to have been committed within the jurisdiction of the British Courts. As to this the learned Lord Chief Justice expressed an opinion that, if the defendant had purposely run into the " Strathclyde," it might have been held that the killing of the deceased took place where the death occurred, and consequently that the act had been com- mitted on board a British ship ; but he added that where death arose from the running down of another ship through negli- gence, and where consequently the negligence might be said to be confined to the improper navigation of the ship occa- sioning the mischief, he did not see how the party guilty of such negligence could be said to be either actually or construc- tively in the ship on which the death took place. He was, therefore, of opinion that there was no jurisdiction to try the defendant, and that the conviction was illegal and should be quashed (/). The Queen v. Keyn, L. R. 2 Exch. Div. 63. Extracts from the judgment of Cockburn, C.J., have been given at some length, not only as containing a clear exposition of some impor- tant principles of International Law, but also as illustrating very forcibly the attitude taken up by the English Courts towards prin- ciples laid down by the text writers, but not supported by treaty, statute, or decided cases. The jurisdiction exercised by a State is either territorial or per- (/) The judgment of Lindley, J., should be referred to for an exposition of the contrary yiew. 28 Cases and Opinions on International Law. Bonal. With the latter we are not at present concerned. So far as State jurisdiction is territorial, it extends over all things and persons (not having the privilege of exterritoriality) found within the State territory. This, for the purposes of International Law, comprises the whole area of land and water within its boundaries ; these being ascertained by prescription, occupation, treaty, and accretion. It also includes narrow straits and bays, islets adjoining the coast, and has been generally accepted as including the marginal or littoral sea within three miles from low water-mark. In the General Screiu Collier Co. y. Schurmans (29 L. J. Ch. 877), an English vessel that had run down a foreign vessel within three miles of the English coast, was held to be entitled to the benefit of the limitation of liability prescribed by the English Merchant Ship- ping Act, on the ground that the British jurisdiction for this purpose must be held to extend to three miles from the coast. But in Bej. v. Keyn, it was held by the majority of the Court that this jurisdiction did not extend to the enforcement of the criminal law of England as against foreigners passing our shores in foreign vessels on their way to foreign ports. This defect has now within certain limits been remedied, so far as our municipal law is concerned, by the Terri- torial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 41 & 42 Vict. c. 73. By this Act it is enacted that an offence committed by any person within territorial waters shall be an offence within the Admiral's jurisdiction, although committed on a foreign ship. But proceedings under the Act against a foreigner, other than preliminary proceedings before a justice of the peace, are not to be instituted in the United Kingdom, except with the consent of a Secretary of State, and on his certificate that the institution of proceedings is expedient ; or in the colonies except with the consent of the Governor, and on a similar certificate. The Act is not to affect jurisdiction by the Law of Nations, or any jurisdiction conferred by statute or existing in relation to foreign ships or per- sons on board them, nor is it to affect the trial of piracy. The term "territorial waters" is defined as such part, of the sea adjacent to the United Kingdom or other part of the British dominions, as is deemed by International Law within the territorial jurisdiction ; and for the purposes of the Act, any part of the open sea wittin one league from the coast, measured from low-mater mark. Whatever doubts may exist with regard to the exercise of a criminal jurisdiction within these limits (ff), there can be no doubt that the usage of nations clearly warrants the exercise of such juris- diction as may be necessary for the purposes of defence and security, and this extends to the enforcement of local revenue laws and rules (ff) This subject is treated of further ciscd over private vessels, see p. 72, in oonnection with the jurisdiction exer- infra. State Jurisdiction. 29 of navigation. Both Great Britain and the United States of America, however, appear to have exceeded this limit in prohibiting transhipment of foreign goods within fonr leagues from the coast {g). By the Customs Law Consolidation Act, 1876 {gg), s. 53, if bulk is broken, or the storage of any goods altered within four leagues of the coast, so as to facilitate the unloading of the cargo before the report of the ship, the master is rendered liable to a penalty of 100?. THE DIRECT UNITED STATES CABLE CO., LIMITED V. THE ANGLO-AMEmOAN TELEGRAPH CO., LIMITED. Temj). 1877. [L. E. 2 App. Cas. 39i.] Case.] This was an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland, whereby the Direct Co. (the appellants) were put under an injunction prohibiting them from infringing certain exclusive rights granted to the Anglo-American Co. (the respondents), or their predecessors in title under an Act of the Newfoundland Legislature. It appeared that the appellants had brought and laid a telegraph cable to a buoy, lying within Conception Bay on the east coast of Newfoundland. The buoy was laid more than 3 miles from the shore of the Bay, but at the same time more than 30 miles within the Bay. The Bay is well marked, the distance between the two promontories at its entrance being rather more than 20 miles ; the distance between its head and these promontories being respectively 40 and 50 miles; and its average width being about 15 miles. In laying the cable care had been taken not to come, at any point, within 3 miles of the shore, and so no question arose similar to that in the case of the Franconia, as to State jurisdiction over the ocean within the 3 mile limit. The question in the case was as to the ten-itorial dominion over a bay of the con- fio-urations and dimensions above described. If, according to the true construction of the local Act it was the intention of the Newfoundland Legislature to prohibit the use of " any part (g) Phillimore 11., p. 275. (gg) See 39 & 40 Vict. c. 36. 30 Cases and Opinions on International Law. of its territory " by any other persons than the respondents for the purposes of telegraphic communication, and if the New- foundland Legislature had been duly invested with such rights of legislation by the Imperial Parliament, then the respondents were entitled to a continuance of the injunction, subject only to the Bay being part of such territory. Judgment] The judgment of the Privy Council was delivered by Lord Blackburn. It was held that on the true construction of the Act in question, it was the intention of the Newfound- land Legislature to prohibit the use of "any part of the terri- tory " by any other persons than the respondents for the purposes of telegraphic communication, whether within the island or as a means of transit between places outside its teiTitory. It was further held that by 35 & 36 Vict. c. 45, the ■ Imperial Parliament had conferred upon the Legislature of Newfoundland, the right to legislate with regard to it. The only question, therefore, that remained was whether the Bay could be regarded as part of the local territory. The English common law authority on this subject was slender and vague. Lord Coke and Lord Hale had both recognised the principle that branches of the sea "might" be regarded as within the body of the adjoining count}', " where a man may reasonably discerne " between shores. But this test was very indefinite ; nor had the doctrine been applied to any particular place. In one case, however, Heg. v. Cunning- ham, (Bell, Cr. c. 86), it had become necessary to determine whether a particular spot in the British Channel, on which three foreigners on board a foreign ship had committed a crime, was within the county of Glamorgan, the indictment having charged the offence as having been committed within that county. In that case the Court for the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved, after full discussion, had proceeded on the principle that the whole of that inland sea between the counties of Glamorgan and Somerset, was to be considered as within the counties by the shores of Avhich its several parts were respec- tively bounded. The case also showed that usage, and the State Jurisdiction. 31 manner in which a branch of the sea had been treated in prac- tice, were material in determining whether it was to be regarded a.s part of the adjoining territory or not. Passing from the Common Law to tlie Law of Nations, Lord Blackburn observed that there was a universal agreement that harbours, estuaries, and land-locked bays belonged to the territory of the nation possessing the shores around them ; but no agreement had been come to as to what constituted a " bay " for this purpose. Some writers suggested defensibility from the :shore as the best ; some suggested a width of one cannon shot from shore to shore, or three miles ; some a cannon shot from each shore, or six miles ; some an arbitrary distance of 10 miles. All these tests would exclude Conception Bay from the territory of Newfoundland ; but equally would they have excluded from the territory of Great Britain that part of the Bristol Channel which in B^g. v. Cunningham was held^'by an English Court to be part of the county of Glamorgan. The text- writers did not, therefore, appear to agree ; and the general question as to what configuration was necessary in order to constitute a bay a part of the adjoining territory did not appear ever to have been the subject of any judicial determination. In the present case, however, it was not necessary to lay down any general rule, inasmuch as, in point of fact, it appeared that the British Government had, in point of fact, long exercised dominion over this bay, and that the British claim had been acquiesced in by other nations, so as to show that the Bay had for a long time been exclusively occupied by Great Britain. After referring to illustrations of this exercise of dominion and acquiescence, it was held that in the view of a British tribunal this was conclusive to show that the Bay had become by pre- scription part of the exclusive tenitory of Great Britain. It was therefore recommended that the appeal should be dis- missed. The Direct United States Gable Co., Limited v. The Anglo-American Telegraph Co., Limited, L. R. 2 App. Ca. 394. 32 Cases and Opinions on International Law. It will be observed that the Privy Council in this case refused to decide the general question, as to what constitutes a bay or branch of the sea part of the territory of the State adjoining. The case does decide, however, that prescription and usage will be material in determining this, and this is probably not merely a statement of municipal rule, but also in accordance with the usage of nations. Looking at the practice of nations, it would seem bays and gulfs, even of considerable size, are, when they run into territory of a single State, very commonly treated as part of the territorial waters of that State, presumably on the same grounds of user and acqui- escence as guided the Privy Council in the leading case. Thus the United States of America would probably regard Chesapeake Bay and Delaware Bay as subject to their jurisdiction (A) ; whilst Holland claims jurisdiction over the Zuyder Zee. So far as the exercise of exclusive rights of fishery go, this juris- diction is sometimes limited by treaty to gulfs and bays, which do not exceed ten miles at their opening, measured by a straight line drawn from headland to headland. But in default of treaty this limit commonly is not observed. Thus France claims the whole of the oyster beds of the Bay of Cancale, the mouth of which is seventeen miles in width, and all rights of fishery are strictly reserved as against foreign fishermen {i). Straits are also, in strictness, subject to the territorial jurisdic- tion of the State to which the land on either side belongs, but owing to the greater necessity for their use on the part of other nations, and especially where they constitute a maritime highway, this juris- diction is generally recognized as subject to a right of innocent passage on the part of ships belonging to other nations. This has perhaps no ground in principle, although it has in convenience. Most of the important straits, moreover, as to which any dispute would be likely to occur, have now been opened up by treaty (_;'). {h) See the case of the Grange, p. {j) See Hall, pp. 153 to 167, and 231, infra. "Wheaton, by Lawrence, p. 328. (t) See Hall, p. 154, in notis. State Jurisdiction. 83 REX V. MANOEL ANTONIO DE MATTOS. Temp. 1836. [7 C. & P. 458.] Case.] The accused, who was a Spanish subject, had whilst iu England, signed articles to serve on an English ship. On the ship's arriving at Zanzibar, the master resigned his position and, apparently with the consent of the new master, employed the accused to act as interpreter for him on shore, in the business in which he had engaged. On the return of the ship to Zanzibar, after several short intermediate voyages, a quarrel arose on shore between a member of the crew and the accused, in which the former was so injured by the latter, that he died after regaining the ship. The accused was then brought to England, indicted for the murder, and tried under a special commission issued under 9 Geo. IV. c. 31, s. 7. This statute had enacted that any " British subject" might be indicted and tried in England for murder or manslaughter, or being accessory before the fact to murder, or after the fact to murder or man- slaughter, committed on land out of the United Kingdom, whether within British dominions or without. It was contended at the trial, that, although the prisoner was not in the ordinary sense a subject, yet as he had signed articles on board a British ship, which had not then expired, and had so become entitled to the benefits of certain Acts of Parliament, he was in fact a British subject. Judgment.] Vaughan, J., after . observing that there were other ways in which a man might be constituted a British subject than by the mere fact of birth, as, for instance, by owing allegiance in return for protection given him, pointed out that though the accused had been under British protection for a time, yet he had abandoned this and had been living on shore for several months, Bosanquet, J., also doubted whether, under the circumstances, the offence could be said to have been committed on land out of the United Kingdom as C.I.L. ' " 84 Cases and Opinions on International Law. required by the Statute. In the result both the learned judges stated it to be their opinion that there could not be a con- viction. Bex V. Be, Mattos, 7 C. & P. 458. This case is cited as illustrative of the personal jurisdiction, whicli is sometimes claimed by States over their subjects and persons in allegiance to them. As has been already pointed out, the jurisdiction exercised by £ State is either territorial or personal. Its territorial jurisdictioE extends over all persons and things within its territory and withir what is reckoned as its territory, saving only those that enjoy th( privilege of exterritoriality {k). With territorial jurisdiction, also, we may class the analogous jurisdiction which a State exercises ovei its public vessels everywhere, and over its private vessels on the higl: seas, the limits of which will be treated of later (I). Personal juris, diction, on the other hand, is independent of place, and rests or the national character of the persons over whom it is exercised. Some States, such as Eussia, Norway, Portugal, and Germany, claiir a criminal jurisdiction over all offences committed by their subjects anywhere, even whilst in foreign countries, whether such offences are committed against the State itself, its subjects, or foreigners (m) In France, it has been laid down that French criminal law is foi Frenchmen a personal statute, which binds them in foreign countries and consequently that when a Frenchman has committed a crime ir a foreign country, he can be prosecuted for it when he returns tc France. Even if he commits a " delit " whilst abroad, he can b( proceeded against on his return, subject to the act in questioi having been also a punishable offence under the foreign law. But ii practice it seems that the French courts will not generally punisl crimes committed by Frenchmen against foreigners on foreign soil or even crimes committed by Frenchmen against Frenchmen excep on the complaint of the injured party ; but they will punish offence committed by anyone against the French Government or against th safety of France, including the counterfeiting of its seals, coins, an( paper money (n). Italy punishes high crimes of its subjects com mitted abroad, but treats lesser offences by the rule of reciprocity. According to the doctrine of Great Britain and the Unite( States, criminal jurisdiction is strictly territorial. By the Commo] (it) See p. 28, supra. (m) See Forsyth, p. 233. (Z) See pp. 65 and 72, w/ra. (n) See Wheaton by Dana, s. 120. State Jurisdiction. 35 Law, a British court of justice has strictly no jurisdiction to try a crime committed abroad, whether by a British subject or a foreigner (o). To this rule, however, many exceptions have now been set up. (1.) Even by the Common Law, there is jurisdiction to punish piracy by the Law of Nations, committed on the open sea by any person whatever, whether a British subject or not (^) ; (2.) The criminal law of England, moreover, extends to high treason and misprision of treason committed outside British territory by any British subject, although this is perhaps no real exception, inas- much as the seat of the offence is locally British {q) ; (3.) It also extends to the offences of murder and manslaughter, and being accessory thereto, when any such offence is committed by a British subject on land out of the United Kingdom, whether within the British dominions or not, and whether the person killed be a British subject or not if) ; (4.) It also extends to all crimes, misdemeanours, and offences committed in India by any European subject of the Crown, whether agaiast other European subjects or the natives of India (s) ; (5.) It also extends to every crime, misdemeanour, or offence committed by any person employed by or in the service of the Crown, in any civil or military station, office, or capacity, out of Great Britain, in the exercise or under colour of such station, office, or capacity {t) ; (6.) It also extends to cases of oppression or crimes committed by colonial governors and persons employed in like capacity, within the dominions of the Crown beyond the seas (m) ; (7.) Also to the offence of inciting British troops to mutiny, wherever such troops may be serving {x) ; (8.) Also to offences within the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, s. 4, wherever committed, and to offences within other sections of the Act, if committed within any part of the British dominions, or adjacent ten-itorial waters {y) j (9.) Also to offences under the Slave Trading Act of 1824, s. 10, if committed by subjects of the Crown, or by any person resident within British dominions (s) ; (10.) Finally it also extends to the offence of bigamy committed by British subjects anywhere (a). The question of personal jurisdiction in civil cases scarcely belongs to our subject — but it is perhaps worth while to point out that under the English law, until the passing of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, no provision was made for the service of any writ or process outside the jurisdiction. The cases in which this is now (o) See Forsyth, p. 233. (2/) See 33 & 34 Vict. c. 90 and \p) See p. 129, infra. p. 256, infra. \q) See 35 Hen. VIII. c. 2. («) See 5 Geo. IV. c. 113 ; see also \r) See 24 & 25 Viot. c. 109, s. 9. s. 9 of the Act, and p. 126, infra. (s) See 13 Geo, III. c. 63, s. 39. (a) See 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 57, \t) See 42 Geo. III. c. 85, s. 1. and see generally Stephen's Digest of (u) See 11 & 12 Will. III. c. 12. Criminal Procedure, pp. 3, 4, and 6. (a;) See 37 Geo. III. c. 70. D 2 86 Cases and Opinions on International Law. allowed are set forth in Order XI., Eule 1, of the rules framed under the Judicature Acts, 1873 and 1875 (pa), but though the process in such cases is extra-territorial, yet the jurisdiction, in each of the cases specified, is founded on some legal fact or act within the jurisdiction. It should be observed that, just as exterritoriality, on the one hand, limits the exercise of the territorial jurisdiction of a State within its own territory, so on the other, it has the effect of extend- ing its jurisdiction extra-territorially in regard to certain persons and property of the State outside its limits. Thus the extra- territoriality clauses in treaties made between Great Britain and certain Eastern countries, such as Turkey, China, and Japan, hare the effect of extending the application of British law to British subjects beyond the limits of British territory (J). This is a partial revival of the system of personal laws that obtained in Europe after the break-up of the Eoman Empire (e). EXTRADITION. IN RE CASTIONI. Temp. 1890. [L. K. 1891, 1 Q. B. D. 149.] Case.] Angelo Castioni, a Swiss subject, had been arrested in England at the requisition of the Swiss Government, on a charge of murder. Castioni having been committed to prison by the English magistrate, with a view to his extradition, the present application was made for an order calling on the magistrate, the solicitor to the Treasury, and the consul-general of Switzerland to show cause why a writ of Habeas Corpus should not issue to bring up the body of Castioni with a view to his discharge from custody. The facts were shortly as follows : — In September, 1890, a political disturbance took place in the Canton of Ticino in Switzerland, in consequence of (fflo) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 and 38 & 39 and see also p. 120, infra, as to system of Vict. 0.77. consular jurisdiction in these countries. (6) Seethe Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, (c) See Holland, p. 350. Extradition. 37 the administrative abuses alleged to exist there, and the refusal of the Government to submit a revision of the constitution of the Canton, with a view to the remedying of these abuses, to the popular vote. A number of the citizens of Bellinzona, amongst whom was the prisoner, thereupon seized the arsenal of the town, and having in this way provided themselves with arms, they overthrew the police and putting some of their prisoners in their van, mai-ched to the municipal palace, demanding admittance. This having been refused by certain members of the Government, the crowd broke into the building, and in the scuffle that ensued a municipal councillor called Rossi was shot at and killed, the prisoner being identified as the person who fired the shot. It did not appear that the prisoner had any previous knowledge of Rossi, or that the act was in any way one of private malice, but at the same time, the killing of Rossi was not necessary to the success of the insurrection. A provisional government was formed by the insurgents, but this was soon after suppressed by the Federal troops. The main issue in the case was whether the offence was one of a political character, for the commission of which the prisoner would not be liable to extradition, under the provisions of the Extradition Act, 1870 {d). Judgment.] The Divisional Court, comprising three judges, held unanimously that crimes, otherwise extraditable, became political offences "when incidental to and forming part of political disturbances." Proceeding to apply this principle to the evidence in the case, the Court expressed the opinion that, although the killing of Rossi might have been a cruel and wanton act, and one unnecessary to the purposes of the insurgents, yet, as the prisoner had no private spite against Eossi, whom he did not even know, and as the act appeared to have been done in furtherance of the rising, the habeas corpus ought to go, and prisoner ought to be set at liberty. At the same time Hawkins, J., observed, that he entirely dissented (d) Section 3, 1, of the Act provides which his surrender is demanded is one that ' ' a fugitive criminal shall not be of a political character. " surrendered if the offence in respect of 38 Cases and Opinions on International Law. from the proposition, that any act done in the course of i political rising was necessarily of a political character. Not withstanding that a, man might join in a purely politica rising, yet if he deliberately, and as a matter of private revenge and for the purpose of doing injury to another, shot ai unoffending man, no one could question that he would be guUt^ of the crime of murder; in such a case the offence so com mitted could not be said to have any relation at all to i political crime. In re Castioni, L. R. 1891, 1 Q. B. D. 149. Some offences, such as treason, political conspiracy, and seditioui libel, are manifestly of a political character. But, in this case, th( English courts had to determine under what circumstances ai offence otherwise extraditable, such as murder, became a politica offence, and consequently exempt from extradition. For this purposi it was held that it must form part of or be incidental to a politica disturbance ; that it must be done in the belief that it promoted th( poUtieal end in view ; that the act must not be one of private malici merely, done under the guise of or in the course of political action but that, subject to this, it would not be essential to show that th( act was necessary, or that it was in fact calculated to promote th( objects of the rising ; that on the contrary, the act might have beei wanton and unnecessary, and yet if prompted by a genuine politica motive, and incidental to a political rising, it would fall within th( exception of political offences. The definition followed by the Court is that suggested by Sir J. F. Stephen in his History of the Crimina Law (dd). To turn now to the question of Extradition in general, it is clea: that crimes committed in foreign States by foreign subjects, ar( not within the criminal jurisdiction, even of those States tha adopt the broadest views of their powers in this respect. The onl; question in such cases as these, therefore, will be, how far is a Stati in which the offender takes refuge, bound to aid the criminal law o the State in which the offence was committed, by arresting and sur rendering the offender. On this subject there is a great divergence between the viewi of different publicists. Some, including G-rotius, Vattel, and Kent put forward the view tLat a State is bound to surrender a persoi charged or convicted of crime in another State, on the demanc of the latter. Others, including Puffendorf and Heffter, content {dd) See History of Criminal Law, Vol. II., p. 71. Extradition. 39 that there is no such international obligation, that the matter is merely one of comity and convenience, and requires to be regulated by treaty and compact. The practice of nations has been equally divergent. "No two nations," says Sir J. F. Stephen, " follow the same practice, and it has in fact been found necessary to provide in each case special laws relating to the subject." The present doctrine of the United States appears to be that extradition will only be made under treaty and only in such cases and upon such terms as are specified in the treaty (e). The French view appears to be that there is an inherent obligation to surrender, and that where treaties are entered into, they serve to regulate the method of exercise, but do not create the obligation (/). A circular of the French Minister of Justice, issued in 1841, stated that most civilized countries, except Great Britain and the United States, would surrender criminals, without treaty. With respect to Great Britain there is some evi- dence to the effect that in earlier times the doctrine prevailed that there was an inherent obligation to surrender, apart from treaty {g). But this view, if it ever did prevail, has now been superseded, and the principle adopted that there is no obligation to surrender except under treaty Qi). The Executive has power to make such treaties, but effect can only be given to them under Act of Parliament. The present British extradition arrangements are based on the Extradition Act of 1870, the Amending Act of 1873 (M), and on the various treaties thereunder that have now been entered into with most civilized nations («'). The Extradition Acts in substance provide as follows : — (1.) That the Crown by Order in Council shall have power to apply the provisions of the Act to such extradition treaties as may be entered into with other States ; (2.) That any such Order in Council applying the Act shall be laid before Parliament within six weeks of its being made or of the next meeting of Parliament, the Order then being conclusive evidence that the arrangement made is in compliance with the terms of the Act ; (3.) That in virtue of such arrangements, any person charged with or convicted of crimes in the foreign country with whom the treaty is made, may be arrested and sun-endered to the authorities of that country upon such evidence as •would have justified a committal for trial upon a similar charge in England ; (4.) With regard to the offences which may be made the subject of extradition under such arrangements, the general result of the Acts is to admit of almost any offence, except those hereafter («) See Opin. IT. S. A. G. XIV. 288. (A) See Reg. v. Sernard, Ann. Reg. (/) See Wheaton, by Lawrence, p. 1858, p. 328. ]84 (M) See 33 & 34 Vict. c. 62, and 36 (g) See Mure r. Kay, 4 Taunt. 34 ; & 37 Vict. c. 60. ani£!a*tIndiaGo.v.Campbell,lYe3.2iO. (i) See p. 41, infra. 40 Cases and Opinions on International Law. mentioned, being made extraditable; but in practice extradition pro- Tisions are usually confined to offences of a grave character Qi). The limitations on extradition are as follows : — (1.) No person is to be surrendered for political offences, or where he can show that the requisition for his surrender is made with the view of trying or punishing him for a political offence. Some offences are, from their very nature, on this ground, excluded from extradition treaties ; such would be high treason, riots for political purposes, seditious libels, and conspiracies. Other offences, which are prima facie extraditable, are now exempt from extradition, if they are " incidental to or form part of political disturbances," in accordance with the decision in the leading case. (2.) No fugitive criminal, who when his surrender is requested, is accused of or is undergoing punishment for an offence committed within the British jurisdiction, is to be surrendered until he has been dischai-ged or has undergone his punishment. (3.) Finally no person is to be surrendered unless provision is made by the law of the State demanding his surrender, or by arrangement, that he shall not be tried for any offence committed prior to his surrender, other than the crime proved by the facts on which the snn-ender took place, unless he has previously had an opportunity of returning to the country which surrendered him (Z). In Lawrence^ Case (m) the prisoner was in 1875 surrendered by Great Britain to the United States on a charge of forgery ; it was subsequently apprehended by Great Britain that he would be tried on a charge of conspiracy and smuggling, in violation, as it appeared, of the con- ditions of the surrender ; in reply to the British remonstrance, the United States contended that they were in no way bound by the provi- sions of the English Act. In consequence of this any further surrender of criminals to the United States was suspended by Great Britain, until it was intimated by the United States government that Lawrence would not be tried for any other offence than that for which he had been surrendered ; at the same time no agreement with respect to the future was arrived at between the two governments. In Baicscher^s Case, which occun-ed in 1886, the prisoner was surrendered by Great Britain to the United States on a charge of murder ; he was subse- quently proceeded against on the same evidence, but on another charge, viz., that of having inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on one of the crew of a ship of which he was master, this not being an offence provided for in the treaty under which he was surrendered. On motion being made in arrest of judgment, the Supreme Court held that the extradition treaty with Great Britain was part of the law of {k) See Stephen's Hist. Crim. Law, the Criminal Law, p. 71. II., p. 69. (m) See Pari. Papers 1876, Accounts (1) For a criticism of tliis limitation and Papers, Vol. 82. on Extradition, see Stephen's Hist, of Extradition. 41 the land, of whicli the Court was bound to take judicial notice ; that one country receiving an offender against its laws from another country had no right to proceed against him for any other offence than that for which he was surrendered ; that by the law of the United States the prisoner, therefore, could not be tried for any other offence unless he had a reasonable time given him to leave the country before being arrested for such other offence ; that the mere fact of the evidence being the same did not make any difference ; and that the prisoner was, therefore, exempt from the prosecution in question. Waite, C.J., however, dissented on the ground that such a contention could not be put forward by the prisoner, but must be urged diplo- matically by the country that made the surrender. Having regard to the decision of the majority of the Court, it seems that the views of Great Britain and the United States on this subject have now been brought into harmony, without the necessity of diplomatic arrange- ment. The French Courts have also laid it down as a principle of International Law, that a prisoner who has been extradited cannot be tried for any offences except those specified in the demand for the surrender (re). The principal Extradition Treaties that have been entered into by Great Britain are those with the United States, 1842, supple- mented by a Convention of 1886 ; with Brazil, 1872 ; with Austria 1873 ; with Italy, 1873 and 1875 ; with Sweden, 1873 ; with Denmark, 1862 and 1873; with Germany, 1874 ; with Netherlands, 1874; with Switzerland, 1874, 1878, 1879, and 1880 ; with Belgium, 1872 and 1876 ; with France, 1876 ; with Spain, 1878 ; and with Portugal, 1879. There appears to be no treaty with Eussia, Greece, or Turkey, or with some of the South American States. Among the more important crimes that are made extradition- offences under the Treaty between Great Britain and the United States are, murder, piracy (by municipal law), arson, robbery, forgery, and the utterance of forged paper ; whilst the Convention of 1886 adds manslaughter, burglary, embezzlement, malicious injury by which life is endangered, and larceny of property of the value of £10 or $50. The ordinary procedure under the British Extradition Acts is shortly as follows : — A requisition for surrender must be made by the diplomatic representative or consul-general of the country requesting the surrender, whereupon the Secretary of State issues an order to one of the Bow Street police magistrates requiring him to issue his warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive criminal. This warrant is to be issued upon receipt of the order and upon such evidence as would justify arrest if the crime had been com- mitted in England ; it may be executed in any part of the United (») See Dalloi!, p. 602. 42 Cases and Opinions on Iniernatiottal Law. Kingdom; if the criminal is apprehended the case is then heard before the magistrate, and if the prisoner is committed under the Act, this fact has to be reported to the Secretary of State, the criminal having fifteen days within which to apply for a writ of habeas corpus, of which fact he must be duly informed. After this, the Secretary or State may issue his warrant for the surrender. If not suiTendered within two months the prisoner is entitled to be discharged (o). The delirery up of military and naval deserters is entirely de- pendent upon comity or upon treaties subsisLiiig between the nations concerned. By 15 Vict. c. 26, power is given to the Queen to declare by Order in Council that deserters from foreign ships may be apprehended and given up, and upon the publication of any such Order justices are to aid in recovering deserters from ships of foreign powers, and may apprehend them and send them on board ; persons harbouring deserters from foreign ships are also rendered liable to a penalty. EXCUESUS I.— EIVERS AND INTEROCEANIC CANALS. Apaet from Treaty and Convention the general principles govern- ing the ownership and use of navigable rivers seem to be as follows : — (1.) Where a navigable river lies wholly within the territory oi one State, dominion and user belong exclusively to that State. (2.) Where a river constitutes the boundary between two States, the frontier line is the middle of the channel or thalweg ; but there is a presuinption that both States have a right of user or navigation {p). Lord Stowell in his judgment in the "Twee Gebroeder" (g'), puts the matter thus : — " In rivers flowing through conterminous States, a common use of the different States is generally presumed ; there may exist a peculiar property, excluding the common use, but the general presumption is strongly against such an exclusive right, and such a claim if made must be established by clear and competent evidence ; the usual manner of establishing such a claim is either by the express acknowledgment on the part of the conterminous State, or by an ancient exercise of executive jurisdic- tion, founded presumptively on an admission of prior settlement or subsequent cession, or in certain cases by the decision of some common superior as to their respective rights over the contested river." (3.) Where a navigable river passes through or drains the territory of several States, it is commonly laid down that, although each State retains its sovereignty and dominion over such portion as (o) For variations in this procedure, (p) SeeHeffter, § 77. see Stephen's Criminal Procedure, pp. (q) See p. 236, infra. 100—103. Rivers and Interoceanic Canals. 43 lies within its territory, yet there exists an imperfect right on the part of the inhabitants of the upper banks, and probably on the part of all riparian owners, to the free navigation of the river. The existence of such a right, however, is frequently denied ; at the most it cannot be considered more than a right of comity, though it gains in strength where the river affords the only means of access to the sea. But though, " stricto jm-e,'' each State could thus appropriate and regulate waters wholly within its territory, the use and navigation of most of the more important navigable rivers that traverse the territory of different States, have now come to be generally regu- lated by Treaty or Convention. So far as European rivers go, it was provided as early as 1814 and 1815 by the Treaties of Paris and Vienna: — (1) that the navigation of rivers bordering on or passing through several States, should be free to their mouths ; (2) that subject to this freedom of navigation, States might exercise rights of sovereignty over rivers traversing their territories, but storehouses and stations for trans-shipment were not to be estab- lished, nor were those already in existence to be preserved, except so far as they were of use for navigation or commerce ; (3) that navigation dues should be independent of the quality and nature of the goods transported, and should not exceed the maximum fixed in June, 1815 ; (4) that the police regulations relating to naviga- tion should be uniform, and should not be changed by one State without the consent of others. The River Ehine. In 1826 a dispute as to the navigation of the Ehine arose between Germany and Holland. In the Treaty of Paris, 1814, provisions had been inserted for securing the ii-ee navigation of the river to upper riparian States. Tiiese provisions were confirmed by the Congress of Vienna, 1815. In spite of this the Dutch Government, at a later time, claimed the right of imposing duties on vessels navigating the lower parts of the river. It appeared that above Niraeguen the river diAided into three branches — the Waal, the Leek and the Yssel, all these being navigable. The Dutch Government contended that these were arti- ficial mouths, that the real Rhine was a small stream leaving the Leek at Wyck, and that it was only this part of the river that the Powers were entitled to use under the provisions of the Congress of Vienna. The matter was at first compromised, the Dutch Govern- ment conceding the right of navigation in regard to the Leek. The Dutch Government afterwards consented to the substitution of the Waal for the Leek, this former being better adapted for navigation. 4-1 Cases and Opinions on International Law. Subsequently a new contention was put forward by Holland, to the effect that the Waal terminated at Grorcum, and that the stream below that point, including the mouth of the Meuse, was a mouth of the sea enclosed within Dutch territory, and subject, therefore, to any imposts and regulations that the Dutch might establish. In this view Holland was supported by France and Baden alone. It was in reply pointed out that by the Treaty additional territory had been granted to Holland, and that this grant had been combined with the establish- ment of the freedom of the navigation of the river to the sea ; that the right of navigation drew with it by implication the right to use the different waters connecting it with the sea ; and that the right set up by Holland to levy unlimited tolls on the chief passage into the sea, rendered useless the right of navigation through Dutch territory. The matter was ultimately settled by the Convention of Mayence of the 31st of March, 1831, between all the riparian States of the Rhine. Thereby the navigation of the river was declared free from the point at which it became navigable to the sea {fiis in die See), and Holland undertook to indicate other watercourses for the navi- gation of the riparian States equal in convenience to those open to its own subjects, in case the passage by Briel and Helvoetsluys became unnavigable through natural or artificial causes. By a provision of the Treaty of 1815, which is still in force, it was provided that, in case of war, the collection of customs on the Rhine should continue uninterrupted, without any obstacle being thrown in the way by either belligerent. The Danube. By the Treaty of Paris of the 30th of March 1856, it was agreed that principles somewhat similar to those described above should be applied to the navigation of the Danube, and should be taken for the future to be part of the public law of Europe. The navigation of the river was to be subject to no impost not expressly provided for by the Treaty ; the rules of police and quarantine were to favour navigation as much as possible ; arrangements were made for the appointment of a European Commission for the purpose of clearing the river from all obstacles and improving the navigation of the lower part of the river and the adjoining sea, permission being given to levy tolls for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the works. Another Commission was ap- pointed for the purpose of drawing up rules for the navigation of the river, and of making provision for the establishment of a river police. This Commission was further empowered to make arrangements for the removal of existing tolls, to execute all necessary works re- quired in relation to the river, and, after the dissolution of the Rivers and Interoceanic Canals. 43 European Commission, to maintain the navigation of the mouths of the river and the adjoining sea. Each of the parties to the treaty was to be at liberty to station two small boats at the mouth of the river, in order to see that the regulations were carried into effect. By Treaty of the 13th of March 1871, provision was made for securing the neutrality of the river works, but it was at the same time stipulated that Turkey should have the right to send ships of war up the river. From this it would seem that the navigation of the Danube, unlike that of the Rhine, is still liable to be impeded by belligerent operations. Dispute as to the Mississippi. In 1763, by the Treaty of Paris between Great Britain, France, and Spain, the right of navigating the Mississippi was secured to Great Britain. Shortly afterwards Louisiana was ceded by France to Spain, and in 1783 Florida was retroceded to the latter country by Great Britain. Spain, having thus acquired the territory on either side, at the mouth of the river, subsequently claimed an exclusive right of navigation as from the southern boundary of the United States, which had meanwhile separated from Great Britain. This claim was resisted by the United States Government, on the ground that access to the ocean was free to all men, that rivers were free to all riparian inhabitants, and that the writers on the Law of Nations agreed that the innocent passage of a river was the natural right of all the inhabitants of the upper banks. The dispute was terminated by the Treaty of San Lorenzo el Real of 1795, whereby Spain agreed that the navigation of the river in its whole breadth and its whole length, from its source to the ocean, should be free to the citizens of the United States. Subsequently Florida and Louisiana passed into the hands of the United States, who thus acquired control over the whole river. Dispute as to the St. Lawebnce, In 1826 a controversy arose between Great Britain and the United States on the subject of the navigation of the St. Lawrence River. The United States claimed the full and free navigation of the lower part of the river as a natural right. It was urged on behalf of the United States that by the Treaty of 1794 the United States were allowed to import goods through Canada, subject to similar duties to those payable by British subjects ; that the right of the United States to navigate the river had been recognized by the statutes 3 Geo. IV. c. 44 and 3 Geo. IV. c. 119 ; and lastly that the naviga- •i6 Cases and Opinions on International Law. tion of the river liad been opened up to the United States at the same time as to Great Britain. It was further contended, upon the authority of Vattel and Grotius, that the right of passage was a natural right, and recognized as such by the Law of Nations. Great Britain replied that the claim by one State to navigate the territorial waters of another State could only rest on convention. The authority of Puflfendorf was opposed to such demands, on the ground that if a nation permitted them it would be overflooded with foreigners, and that a nation was justified in reserving to its subjects the profits that would go to foreigners if free navigation was allowed. It was also urged that no treaties had recognized a natural and independent right to navigate rivers ; that the pro- visions of the Treaty of Vienna tended to show that there was no such right, and that a right to free navigation could only be esta- blished by convention ; that even if the United States had acquired the right to navigate the river in question at the same time as Great Britain, that right had been taken away by the Treaty of American Independence ; and finally that the third article of the Treaty of Commerce between the two countries showed tliat Great Britain had the power of exchiding foreign vessels from that part of the river which was entirely within British dominion. The ■ dispute was terminated by the Treaty of Washington of 1871, which gave to the United States the right of freely navi- gating the river, subject to such laws of Great Britain and Canada as were not inconsistent with free navigation. The Suez Canal. In 1854 a concession was granted by the Viceroy of Egypt to M. Ferdinand de Ijesseps, authorizing him to construct a ship canal between the Mediterranean and the Red Seas. The con- cession was renewed in 1856. A company was formed in 1858 for the construction of the canal, the shares of which were originally held, partly by French citizens, partly by the Khedive of Egypt. The canal was finally constructed, and opened tor traffic in 1867, the works being carried out under the superintendence of French engineers. In 1875 the British Government purchased from the Khedive the shares possessed by him, one of the motives of the purchase being to obtain some control over the management of the canal. Recently an arrangement has been come to between M. de licsseps and some leading representatives of British shipping, by which the British element in the directorate has been strengthened. Some discussion has meanwhile taken place as to the international position of the canal, and also as to its neutralization in time of war. Rivers and Interoceanic Canals. 47 The canal itself occupies a peculiar position. It is an artificial waterway ; it lies wholly within Egyptian territory, Egypt itself being a tributary State of the Turkish Empire ; as a mercantile institution it is the property of a French company ; whilst by far the largest proportion of vessels using it are British. It is con- tended by some, that, in virtue of the principle established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, all States have a right of unimpeded navigation, subject to the payment of mercantile dues. Some English writers, whilst not admitting that the principle of 1815 applies to the navigation of an artificial waterway, yet claim for Great Britain a right of passage, and, if need be, a right of control, •on the ground of its essentiality to her, as a maritime route to India. With regard to the question of neutralization, in 1877 M. de Lcsseps submitted to the British Government a project for securing the neutrality of the canal, in the form of an inter- national agreement. The British Government was unable to recommend the project for the acceptance of other Powers, but stated that an intimation had been given to the Russian Ambassador (Russia being then at war with Turkey) that any attempt to blockade or otherwise interfere Avith the canal or its approaches, would be regarded as a menace to India and a grave injury to the commerce of the world ; it was also stated that the British Government would not permit the canal to be made the scene of any warlike operations. In 1882, however, in the course of the British military operations in Egypt, the canal was occupied by the British fleet, and traflBc suspended for twenty-four hours. On the 17tb of March, 1885, the principal European Powers agreed to appoint a Commission for the purpose of settling a convention for the establishment of the free navigation of the canal. The Commis- sion was accordingly appointed and drew up a scheme ; but it was not until 1888, and after protracted negotiations, that a convention on the subject was arrived at between Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austria, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Turkey. By this Convention it was provided that the canal should be open to all vessels at all times, whether of peace or ■war; that no acts of hostility should be committed within the limits of the canal ; that belligerent war-vessels should not be at liberty to re-victual or take in stores, or even to stay in the canal for a longer period than twenty-four hours, except in case of emergency, or as thereinafter provided ; that where vessels belonging to difi^erent belligerents found themselves in the canal at the same time, then twenty-four hours should elapse between the departure of any vessel or vessels belonging to one belligerent and that of any vessel or vessels belonging to the other ; that, except in the case of accidents, subjects of either belligerent should not embark or disembark 48 Cases and Opinions on International Law. within the limits of the canal ; that prizes should be subject to the same conditions as public vessels belonging to either belligerent ; and finally that the Egyptian Goyemment should take the necessary steps to carry out the provisions of the con- vention, appealing to Turkey, and through Turkey to the Signatory Powers, in case of need. It was subsequently agreed between the Signatory Powers, that the provision against embarkation should not apply to the landing of unarmed invalid troops at the military hospitals of Suez and Port Said. The territorial rights of Turkey were expressly reserved by the convention, as were also the Sove- reign rights of the Sultan and of the Khedive, except in so far as these were expressly dealt with or affected by the terms of the agreement. Mr. T. J. Lawrence has suggested that, with the view of settling its international position for the future, a strip of territory bordering on the canal, and extending to a considerable distance on either side, should be neutralized, and converted into a new State, under the government of an hereditary prince, appointed in the first instance by the Great Powers ; that the Great Powers should undertake not to attack it, and should guarantee its safety against external foes ; that this guarantee should be subject to the condition that the new State pledges itself not to make war except in defence of its ii'ontier, and not to allow any obstacle to be placed in the way of the free navigation of the canal, and further undertakes to maintain the waterway in good order, having power to levy reasonable tolls for the expense of such maintenance on all ships passing through the canal (r). The course of political events, however, suggests the probability that the true solution of the difiiculty will ultimately be found in the neutralization of the whole of Egypt under the guarantee of the Great Powers. The Panama Canal. Another project in some respects similar to the Suez Canal, is the proposed ship canal through the Isthmus of Panama, between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. On the 19th of April, 1850, in contemplation of such a project, which was, however, to follow a different route to that of the canal since commenced by M. de Lesseps, a convention, known as the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, was entered into between Great Britain and the United States to the following effect : — (1.) That neither Power should obtain or maintain exclusive control over the canal, or erect (r) See Lawrence, p. 37. Rivers and Interoceanic Canals. 49 or maintain any fortification in the vicinity, or occupy, forlify, colonise, or assume any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Eica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America. (2.) That in case of war between the parties, vessels of either party traversing the canal should be exempt from blockade, detention, or capture. (3.) That protection should be afforded to any persons undertaking the construction of the canal. (4.) Each party further undertook to endeavour to induce other States having jurisdiction over the territory to be traversed by the canal, to facilitate its construction and also to procure a free port at each end of the canal, (o.) Each party guaranteed the neutrality of the canal. (6.) Each party agreed to invite other States to enter into similar stipulations with them, and to enter into treaties with such of the Central American States as they might deem advisable for carrying out the design of the con- vention. (7.) Each party also agreed to extend its protection by treaty to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway, across the Isthmus, and especially to the interoceanic com- munications then proposed to be established by way of Tehuantepec or Panama, should the same prove to be practicable. The original scheme contemplated by the convention fell through, and it was not until 1880 that any steps were taken to secure the construction of the present canal. In this year M. de Lesseps having obtained the necessary concessions, formed a company for the purpose. The canal was commenced in 1881, and its construc- tion was proceeded with for some time, but in consequence of the in- solvency of the company the operations were suspended in 1889, and the canal left in a half-finished condition. In December, 1890, the Columbian Government was induced to grant to the liquidators of the Panama Company an extension of the period provided for the completion of the canal, besides allowing a period of twenty-six months for the re-organisation of the company and the renewal of the work. In connection with the De Lesseps Canal some discussion took place between Great Britain and the United States, with reference to the Clayton-Bulwer Convention and the future position of the Canal. The United States proposed the modification of the Convention with the view to the abrogation of the joint protectorate over the canal, and the substitution of the political control over it of the United States alone ; it was also proposed that the United States should acquire the right of fortifying the canal ; that a neutral zone should be laid down around the entrance to the canal on either side ; that in time of peace the canal should be open to the war vessels of all nations, but that in time of war, apart from its use for the defence of the country where it was situate, the canal should be closed to all war vessels. It was also contended by the United States that the c.r.L. E 60 Cases and Opinions on Internaiional Law. Olayton-Bulwer Treaty was, strictly, no longer binding, inasmuch as it contemplated a canal that was never actually constructed, and inasmuch as Great Britain subsequently had acquired a colony in the place of a settlemeut at Belise in contravention of Article 1 of the Convention. In reply, it was urged by Great Britain that she had important interests in the locality ; that the matter was also one that affected the whole civilized world ; that the Convention was expressly made to extend to any future canal or canals which might be eon- tructed ; that British Honduras, where the colony referred to is situate, was expressly excepted from the Convention (r) j and that the United States had in fact expressed their acquiescence in the possession of the colony by Great Britain (s). It has also been pointed out that it would be inconsistent with the meaning of " neutralization " as understood in International Law, that such a condition should be guaranteed by one Power alone (<). After the failure of the Panama Company, a new scheme was undertaken by American financiers, for the construction of a ship- canal through Central America by the Nicaragua route, and an Act of Congress (1889) was passed incorporating a company for this purpose. The work was commenced in 1890, and is now in progress. (r) Before the ratifications were applied to treaties, would seem to indi- pxchanged, it was explained by the cate that this Convention could not be British to the American plenipotentiary taken to apply to Honduras. In 1859 — that the words " or any part of Central 60, Great Britain, by separate treaties America" were not to apply to the with Honduras and Nicaragua, reUn- British settlements in Honduras or its quished the Mosquito Protectorate and dependencies. This explanation was recognized the Bay Islands as part of adopted by the American representa- the Republic of Honduras, tive ; and on this basis the ratifications (s) Parliamentary Papers, United were exchanged, and the treaty subse- States, No. 1, 1884. quently approved by the Senate. It is {I) A very clear account of the con- not, however, admitted that the United troversy and a careful analysis of the States Senate adopted the treaty on this American contention, will be found in footing. But even without this express Mr. T. J. Lawrence's Essays, Essay limitation, the reason of the thing and III. the settled rules of constraction as Public Vessels. 61 PUBLIC VESSELS. THE "PARLEMENT BEL6E." Temp. 1880. [L. R. 5 Prod. Div. 197.] Case.] In this case it appeared that a collision had taken place in Dover Harbour, between the steam tug "Daring" and the "Parlement Beige." Proceedings were thereupon instituted by the owners of the " Daring " against the " Parle- ment Beige " in the English Court of Admiralty. A protest was filed asserting that the Court had no jurisdiction to enter- tain the suit. The protest alleged that the " Parlement Beige " was a mail packet running between Ostend and Dover, that she was the property of the King of Belgium, and was therefore entitled to be treated as a public vessel of the Sovereign and State, and as exempt from the local jui'isdiction. In the Lower Court this protest was disallowed. Judgment] On appeal to the Supreme Court the first question raised was whether the Court had power to proceed against a ship which though present in this country was at once the property of a foreign Sovereign and a public vessel of the State, it being admitted that the ship was not an armed ship of war, nor employed as part of the military force of the country. As to this the Court laid it down as a principle to be deduced from the authorities, that every State declined to exercise territorial jurisdiction over the person of the Sovereign or ambassador of any other State or over the public property of any State which was destined to public uses. The second question which the Court had to consider was whether this immunity had not been lost by reason of the ship having been used for trading purposes. As to this the Court adopted the principle, that if a vessel were declared by the sovereign authority by the usual means to be a public vessel, that declara- tion could not be enquired into. Moreover in the present case the ship had been mainly used for carrying the mails, and only E 2 52 Cases and Opinions on International Law. subserviently for the purposes of trade. The property could not be denied to be public property, and the Court was of opinion that the mere fact of the ship having been used subordinately and partially for trading purposes did not take away the general immunity. The judgment of the Court below disallowing the protest was therefore reversed, and the proceedings against the vessel were dismissed (u). The, Parlement Beige, L. R. 5 P. D, 197. A public vessel is one owned and commissioned by the Govern- ment of a sovereign State. The term includes not only ships of war, but unarmed goveiDment vessels, store-ships, and transports, but not prizes until condemned and re-commissioned. Proof of the public character of such a vessel is found in the commission, in the use of flag and pendant, and, if need be, in the word of honour of the captain. In the case of the Santissima Trinidad (7 Wheaton, 335) {v), Mr. Justice Story observed that " in general the commis- sion of a public ship, signed by the proper authorities of the nation to which she belongs, was complete proof of her national character ; when duly authenticated, so far at least as foreign Courts were con- cerned, it imported absolute verity, and the title was not examinable." The decision of the Court in the Parlement Beige shows that an ancillary use of a public vessel for the purposes of trade will not disentitle her to the privileges attaching to that character. In the previous case of the CharMeh (L. E. 4 A. & E. 59) (vv). Sir R. Phillimore adopted the principle laid down by Byukershoek, that no proceeding in rem could be instituted against the property of a foreign Sovereign or his ambassador, if the res could in any fair sense be said to be connected with the jus coronce of the Sovereign or with the exercise of the functions of his ambassador ; but inasmuch as in that case the Khedive had failed to establish his title to the privileges of a sovereign prince, and on the further ground that the Gharhieh was at the time under charter for trading purposes to a British subject, he refused to recognize the claim (u) Mail boats, being yessels belong- mail service. Such immunities gene- ing to navigation companies that rally have regard to exemption I'rom possess an organized service sanctioned arrest or detention, and especially as by their Government for the regular to fiscal regulations : see Ferguson, conveyance of the Government's postal i., p. 448. service, occasionally enjoy under treaty («) See p. 265, infra. some of the immunities of public [m) The facts of this case will be vessels. This privilege is granted to found on p. 6, supra. enable them to keep up the regular Public Vessels. 53 to immunity from local jurisdiction. It will be seen, however, that on the latter point, the principle here laid down, has been considerably modified by the decision of the Court of Appeal in the ParUment Beige. THE "EXCHANGE" v. McFADDON. Temp. 1812. [7 Cranoh, 116.] Case.] In December 1810, while on a voyage from Balti- more to St. Sebastian, " The Exchange " then the property of two American citizens, was seized by order of the Emperor Napoleon. She was converted into a French man-of-war at Bayonne, being known as "The Balaou." In this capacity she subsequently put into the port of Philadelphia, whereupon pro- ceedings were instituted against her, with the object of procur- ing her restoration to her former owner.s. As against this, it was contended that the Court had no jurisdiction, the vessel being a public vessel and bearing the commission of a foreign Sovereign. Judgment.] Marshall, C.J., in giving judgment stated that in default of express prohibition the ports of a friendly nation were considered as open to the public ships of all Powers with whom it was at peace. If there were no treaty on the subject, and the Sovereign of a country permitted his ports to remain open to the public ships of foreign friendly Powers, the conclu- sion seemed irresistible that they entered by his consent. There was, indeed, the difficulty arising out of the fact that treaties providing for the case of public vessels, provided in like manner for private vessels ; and that when public ships entered a port, under a general licence implied from the absence of prohibition, it might be urged that they were in the same condition as merchant vessels entering for trade purposes, and like the latter became subject to the local jurisdiction. But it appeared to the Court that a clear. distinction was in such cases to be drawn Cases and Opinions on International Law, tween the rights accorded to private trading vessels and those corded to public armed ships. A public armed ship consti- ted a part of the military force of her nation, she acted under the imediate and direct command of the Sovereign, and was em- oyed by him in national objects. Interference could not take ice -without affecting his power and his dignity. The implied ence therefore under which such a vessel entered a friendly port Ight reasonably be construed, and, as it seemed to the Court, ght to be construed, as containing an exemption from the risdiction of the Sovereign within whose* territoiy she claimed s rights of hospitality. He, therefore, concluded that it was undoubted principle of public law that a national ship of ,r entering the port of a foreign Power did so under an plied condition of exemption from jurisdiction. Without ubt the Sovereign of the place could destroy the implication, t until this was done in a manner not to be misunder- odjthe Sovereign could not be considered as having imparted the ordinary tribunals a power which it would be a breach faith to exercise. A.S to a contention that it was the duty of the Court to juire whether the title of the original owners had been ;inguished by an act recognized as valid by national or tnicipal law, the learned Chief Justice held that the ship ist be considered to have come into American territory under implied condition that, while necessarily within it and de- laning herself in a friendly manner, she should be altogether jmpt from the local jurisdiction. The proceedings against the vessel were accordingly dis- 5sed. The. Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch, 116. 'he case cited is a particularly strong one, inasmuch as the title ;he foreign Sovereign in this case, was notoriously wrongful and aired in violation of that very Law of Nations under which 3al was now being made for exemption. Despite this, it was 1 by the Courts of the country whose subjects had been despoiled, Public Vessels. 55 that it was not within their competence to enter into any question as to the earlier title or ownership of the vessel, inasmuch as she was a public armed vessel and in the service of a foreign country at peace with the United States. Marshall, C.J., it is true, upheld the funda- mental principle of the exclusive sovereignty of every nation within its own limits, and refused to acknowledge any limitation on this except such as might arise from the express or implied consent of the nation itself ; nevertheless he laid down equally clearly, that a public vessel belonging to a friendly State entered the territorial waters of another State upon an implied condition of immunity, this immunity resting on a presumed waiver of jurisdiction. The learned judge, indeed, qualified this principle in some measure by using the expression " and demeaning herself in a friendly manner." But this, in spite of some expressions made use of by Story, J., in the Santissima Trinidad (w), probably means no more than that if a public vessel were to commit any palpable act of hostility, as by commencing to fire on a town, her immunity would be at an end and she would be liable to be treated as an enemy. " The sound and true exposition of the law on this point," says Phillimore, "is that a public ship of war belonging to a State with which amicable relations exist, is exempt from the jurisdiction of the State in whose territorial waters or ports she may happen to be " (x). A public vessel is commonly said to enjoy the privilege of exter- ritoriality, in virtue of which she remains, even whilst in foreign waters, subject to the jurisdiction of the State to which she belongs. In fact, however, this doctrine does not appear to be more than a rough mode of describing certain privileges and immunities from local jurisdiction which public vessels, and certain classes of per- sons, such as ambassadors, foreign Sovereigns, armed forces, and European residents in certain Eastern countries, enjoy. In this character the use of the term is convenient and harmless, so long as it is not converted into an independent source of legal right {y). The privileges and immunities in question rest in fact on common usage, and especially on the practice of the great maritime nations. They are ascribable partly to comity, and partly to the mutual con- venience of allowing those in command of public vessels to exercise freely and without interference, even whilst in foreign waters, those powers which the law of their own State accords to them. As was laid down in the leading case, the concession of these privi- leges may be assumed from the very fact that the public vessel is allowed to enter foreign harbours. Such being the general character of her privilege, it only remains to note some of its (w) See p. 265, infra. abuse of the doctrine of the territoriality {x) See Phillimore, I., p. 481. of vessels, see Hall, p. 246. {y) For an account of the origin and 6 Cases and Opinions on International Law. lore important applications. These are shortly as follows : — 1.) The vessel herself is not subject to legal process, sh^ annot be seized, she cannot even be brought legally within the urisdiction of the local Courts ; (2.) Her officers and crew, whilst n board, share the privilege of the vessel, and remain subject to the aws of their own country ; (3.) In a minor degree and within larrower limits this privilege extends, or has at least been asserted, Q respect to certain classes of persons, not members of the crew, uch as fugitive slaves and political offenders, taking refuge on loard ; (4.) The vessel is not subject to the payment of local dues. The precise limits of these privileges will be gathered from the cases ollowing. The position of public vessels belonging to belligerents, whilst dthin the territorial waters of other States, will be treated of in inother place {z), but it may not be out of place here to call atten- ion to the fact that the majority of the members of the Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva, in their award and as one of the reasons for heir judgment, stated that "the privilege of exterritoriality, accorded vessels of war, had been admitted into the Lair of Nations not as m absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle if comity and of mutual deference between different nations, and lould, therefore, never be appealed to for the protection of acts done n violation of the Law of Nations." THE "CONSTITUTION." Temp. 1879. [48 L. J., N. S., P. D. & A. 13.] Case.] In this case proceedings had been taken to obtain vaiTants of arrest against the United States frigate " Constitu- ion " and the cargo on board of her, in order to recover com- jensation for salvage services rendered to her by the steam- ,ug " Admiral." It appeared that the " Constitution " was an Vmerican ship of wai-, and was in January, 1879, employed in )ringing back to America goods belonging to American ex- libitors at the Paris Exhibition. The " Constitution " having tranded near Swanage, several tugs and boats came to her .ssistance, and ultimately she was got off, the steam-tug Admiral " being among the vessels employed in the salvage. (ct) See p. 278, infra. Public Vessels, 57- The owners of that vessel were offered £200 for salvage service, but deeming this insufficient, they instituted proceedings against the " Constitution ", in the Admiralty Division of the High Court. At the hearing both the American Legation and the Crown were represented, and the Court was informed that the " Constitution " was a public vessel belonging to the United States, holding a commission and employed on the public service. The salvors contended, however, that the cargo at least was private property, and not entitled to privilege at International Law. Judgment.] Sir Kobert Phillimore in his judgment expressed an opinion that if he were to exercise jurisdiction in the case, he would be doing that for which there existed no direct precedent ; on the contrary he had no doubt as to the general proposition that ships of war belonging to another nation with whom Great Britain was at peace, were exempt from the civil jurisdiction of the British Courts, and there were no peculiar circumstances to take the case out of that general proposition. Adverting to the case of the Gharkieh, the learned judge stated that he might, in his judgment in that case, have let drop some expressions capable of giving rise to an impression that a foreign ship of war was liable to arrest, but in that case the question, as it was now raised, had not to be decided. He now felt no doubt that it would be improper to accede to the request of the owner of the steam-tug ; nor did he see any distinction between the issue of a warrant in the case of the ship and in that of the cargo, the latter being on board a foreign vessel of war, and under the charge of a foreign Government, for public purposes. The proceedings were accordingly dismissed with costs. The Constitution, 48 L. J., N. S., P. D. & A. 13. Before the decision in the case of the Constitution, some doubt seems to have existed as to whether salvage proceedings might not be instituted in an English Court of Admiralty against a public vessel. In the case of the Gharlieh, (L. R. 4 A. & B. 59) Sir E. Phillimore had said, ' It is by no means clear that a ship of war to which salvage services have been rendered, may not, i8 Cases and Opinions on Internatimial Law. m-e gentium, be liable to be proceeded against in tbe Court of Admiralty for the remuneration due for such services." In the auch earlier case of the Prins Frederilc (2 Dods. 451), a Dutch aan-of-war, whilst on a voyage from Batavia to the Texel, had been •artially disabled by stress of weather off the Soilly Isles, and i'as brought into Mount's Bay with the assistance of the master ,nd crow of a British brig, belonging to the port of Penzance ; the ■ Prins Frederik " was at the time employed in bringing home a argo of spice belonging to the Dutch Government, and for thi& lurpose some of her guns had been removed ; the salvors instituted alvage proceedings against the vessel, on the ground that she had or the time being at least lost the character and privileges of a inblic vessel, and also on the further ground that such proceedings, leing m r«)i and not against the King of the Netherlands personally, rere under any circumstances admissible. According to Lord "ampbell, who quoted this case in 1851 (17 Q. B. 212), Lord itowell took a strong view against the asserted jurisdiction. To void difficulty, however, Lord Stowell caused a representation to be nade to the Dutch Government, who consented to his disposing of he matter as arbitrator ; acting under this authority, Lord Stowell .warded the sum of 800?. and costs to the salvors. The decision in the case of the Gonsiitution, however, has now set ,ny such doubt at rest. Nor is a public vessel in other respects bound by local law. She cannot be seized for wrong-doing, short of " acts of hostility." )he is not liable to local dues, such as harbour dues, light dues, or ustoms dues. She is not, in general, liable to search by customs ifficers, though the English law on this point appears to be xceptional. Thus, by the Customs Consolidation Act 1876 {zz), ect. 52, the oflBcer in charge of any public vessel, whether British ir foreign, having goods on board laden abroad, is bound on arriving n any port of the United Kingdom, and before any goods are emoved from the ship, on demand of a customs officer, to deliver n account of the goods on board ; such ships are, moreover, made iable to search, and the necessary powers for this purpose are given customs officers. Although in other countries, a public vessel is commonly exempt rom the operation of the local revenue laws, yet she must not le made a medium for smuggling. Both sanitary and harbour niles ught to be observed, and due respect ought to be shown to he laws and government of the State in which such vessel finds lerself. If a public vessel should fail in respect of these obligations, epresentations should be made to the Government to which she lelongs ; whilst in extreme cases she may be summarily ordered to {zz) 39 & 40 Vict. c. 36. Public Vessels. 59 leave, or expelled by force. If damage is done by lier, the local Court may sit as a Court of enquiry, and any claim so established may be urged diplomatically. In at least one case, the British Admiralty has paid damages awarded by a foreign Court Hgainst the captain of a British ship of war, in respect of a colh'sion between that vessel and a private vessel of the porb. But, such proceedings are only a means of establishing the facts which have occurred, and the judgment given can only be used in support of a diplomatic claim, when its justice is not voluntarily recognized («). THE "SITKA." Temp. 1855. [Opinions of U. S. Attorneys-General, Vol. VII., p. 122.] Case.] In 1856, during the Crimean war, the S:itlta, a Russian ship, was captured by a British man-of-war, and brought into San Francisco with a prize crew on board. An application for a writ of habeas corpus was made to the United States Courts on behalf of two prisoners on board for the purpose of trying the validity of their detention. Process was served on board ; but this was ignored by the commander of the " Sitka," who got under weigh and left the port with the prisoners on board. OpMon.] The opinion of Mr. Gushing, the Attorney- General of the United States, was subsequently taken as to the conduct of the commander of the ship. He pointed out that judicial decisions had settled the point, that, except where there had been a violation of its neutrality as in the case of the Santissima Trinidad (b), the Court of a neutral State had no jurisdiction to decide on the validity of a capture made by a belligerent. He also pointed out that the Courts of the United States had adopted almost unequivocally the doctrine that a public ship of war of a foreign sovereign at peace with the United States, coming into her ports and demeaning herself in a friendly manner, was exempt from the jurisdiction of the country. The ship in this case remained a part of the territory of the sovereign into whose possession she had passed ; (as) See Hall, p. 194. (i) See p. 265, infra. 60 Cases and Opinions on International Law. this was threatened with invasion by the local Courts, and it- was not only lawful but highly discreet in the captain to depart and thus avoid unprofitable controversy. The Sitka : Opinions of U. S. Att.-Gen., Vol. VII., p. 122. This case is cited as illustrating the immunity of a public vessel from having process served on board. In an earlier case, of the Chesterfield, 1799 (c), the question as to whether process could be lawfully served on a British man-'of-wnr lying within the territorial jurisdiction of New York, seems to have been answered in the affirmative. The Attorney-General, Charles* Lee, whose opinion was taken, pointed out that by the 23rd Article of the Treaty of London, it had been provided that ships of war of each contracting party should be hospitably received in the ports of the other subject to their officers and crew paying due respect to the laws and government of the country, and that to disobey judicial pro- cess or resist it on board the ship, was inconsistent with such due respect ; he also pointed out that the lawfulness of serving process on board such ship was impliedly admitted by an Act of Congress passed on the 5th of June, 1794, providing that in any case where the process of the United States should be disobeyed by any person having the custody of any war vessel of a foreign prince, it should be lawfid for the President of the United States to employ such force as should become necessary ; under these circumstances, he was of opinion that it was lawful to serve process as suggested. On the strength of this opinion, apparent!}', it is sometimes laid down that, according to the law of the United States, a writ of habeas corpus may be lawfully awarded to bring up a subject illegally detained on board a foreign public vessel in American waters (d). Phillimore suggests that the same doctrine would probably be acted upon by the Courts of Great Britain («). But the expressions used in the case of the Sitka seem to indicate that the doctrine at one time adopted by the United States has since undergone a change. Moreover, if it be true, as is suggested by Mr. Gushing iu the case of the Sitka, that a public vessel constitutes by the Law of Nations a part of the territory of its Sovereign, it seems clear that any United States law authorizing the execution of such process would be iti derogation of the Law of Nations as recognized by the United States, and that the United States Executive, in giving effect to any such municipal rule, would admittedly expose itself to recriminatiou and reprisals. Subject to this possible exception, however, it appears to be the settled practice to treat those on board a public vessel lying (c) Opinions of U. S. Attorneys- (d) See Kent, p. 371. General vol. i., p. 87. (e) See Phillimore, I., p. 482. Public Vessels. 61 ■within the territorial waters of another State, as exempt from the territorial jurisdiction, and as governed in all matters, public and private, by the law of their own country. If the crew offend on shore but regain the ship, they cannot be forcibly seized, and their surrender ought to be asked for. But if they offend on shore and are arrested there, they may be detained and punished by the local magistrates, although notice of the arrest ought to be given to the captain. In other cases, if those on board are guilty of offences against the local law, the aggrieved State ought (except in extreme cases), to apply for redress to the government of the country to which the vessel belongs. It is sometimes suggested that this immunity extends to persons taking refuge on board, such as political refugees and offenders. As to these, there is scarcely any doubt that they cannot be forcibly retaken, from a public vessel. But the action of the vessel in receiving such persons might and would be a proper matter for protest and recrimination ; and if the vessel were allowed to become a centre of political intrigue or an asylum for criminals, she might very reasonably be required to leave, or, if need be, expelled. The question as to how far such persons ought to be surrendered, is in the main a question of policy, and one dependent on the circum- stances of each particular case. Political refugees have, no doubt, often been received on board British men of war. The Admiralty instructions to oflBcers in command state that " during political dis- turbances or popular tumults refuge may be afforded to persons flying from immediate personal danger." In 1849, it was stated, with the authority of Lord Palmerston, that although it would not be right to receive and harbour on board a British ship of war any person flying from justice on a criminal charge or who was escaping from the sentence of a Court of law, yet a British ship of war had always and everywhere been looked on as a safe place of refuge for persons of whatever country or party who had sought shelter, under the British flag, from persecution on account of their political conduct or opinions. As Mr. Hall, however, observes, persons who are in danger of their lives from political acts are usually looked upon as criminals by the successful party, so that the distinction here drawn is merely one of propriety (/). Whether, therefore, political refugees ought to be surrendered, must in effect remain a question of policy to be dealt with according to circumstances of time and place. Strictly, it would seem that they ought not to be received. The privilege of exterritoriality has the effect of exempting the vessel from local jurisdiction ; but even if we give the fullest force to this doctrine, it would scarcely warrant a vessel in enforcing the law of her own State within the territorial waters of another country. Neverthe- (/) See Hall, p. 190. 62 Cases and Opinions on International Law. less, the receiving of such a political refugee or offender on board and the refusal to surrender him might well be justified in excep- tional cases on grounds of policy and humanity. In the case of John Brown, an Englishman who had been in command of one of the insurgent yessels at the time of the revolt of the Spanish Colonies in 1819, had been captured by the Spaniards and thrown into prison at Lima ; he subsequently escaped to the British man-of- war " Tyne ; " the Spanish authorities demanded his surrender, but this was refused by Captain Falcon, the commander of the " Tyne," and Brown was brought home. The Secretary of the Admiralty afterwards asked Mr Scott (afterwards Lord Stowell) his opinion on the general question, whether a British subject coming on board a British man-of-war in a foreign port, in order to escape from civil or criminal process in that port, could claim the protection of the British flag, to which he replied in the negative, stating that Captain Falcon's act was more to be commended for its humanity and spirit than for its strict legality. In dealing with the question as one of policy and humanity, the condition of the country, the circumstances and conduct of the con- tending parties, may fairly be taken into account. In the case of those countries that adopt the doctrine of the territoriality of public vessels, it might of course be contended that a political refugee was exempt from surrender, in the same fashion as he would be, if he had escaped to the territory of the State to which the vessel belonged ; but this doctrine does not harmonize with admitted practice, nor is it universally or even generally accepted. In the case of fugitive criminals accused of non-political offences, there is little doubt that these ought to be surrendered. If, indeed, the accusation of crime should prove to be merely a colourable pretext for procuring the surrender of a political refugee, then the question of surrender would have to be dealt with on the principles already described. Even if there were reasonable ground for supposing this to be so, it would justify a refusal to surrender, until the of&cer in command had satisfied himself of the true facts of the case. FORBES V. COCHRANE. Temp. 1824. [2 B. & C. 448.] Case.J The plaintiff was a British merchant residing in East Florida, which was then under the jurisdiction of Spain, and in which the institution of slavery was recognized by law. During Public Vessels. 63 -war between Great Britain and the United States, Sir A. Cocli- rane, commander-in-chief of the British fleet on the American station, presumably with the view of hampering the United States authorities and taking advantage of discontent thought to prevail amongst the slaves of the district, issued a proclama- tion to the effect that any such persons would be received on board the British men-of-war. In consequence of this proclama- tion having reached the adjoining Spanish territory, a number of the plaintiffs slaves deserted him and escaped to H.M.S. ■" Terror Bomb." They were afterwards transferred from that ship to H.M.S. " Albion," commanded by Sir G. Cockburn, the second officer in command on the station, and taken to Bermuda. After the war the present action was instituted against Sir A. Cochrane and Sir G. Cockburn to recover damages for the detention of the slaves. Judgment.] It was held that the action could not be main- tained. Bayley, J., grounded his judgment on the fact that no mala fides on the part of the defendants had been shown ; that, on the contrary, they had offered to allow the slaves to ^o, if the plaintiff could persuade them, and that this having been done the defendants were not further bound to take active efforts in delivering up the slaves. Holroyd, J., adopted the view that where a slave escaped into a country where slavery did not prevail there was no right of action against a party who received him there, that for this purpose a British war-ship must be considered as a floating island, subject to the laws of England alone, and that the slaves therefore had ceased to be slaves according to the law which prevailed on board the British ship. Best, J., also held that when a slave arrived on a British man-of-war not lying within the waters of East Florida he ceased to be a slave. Forbes v. Cochrane, 2 B. & C. 448. Where fugitive slaves take refuge on board a public vessel of a nation not recognizing slavery, lying within local waters, there is 64 Cases and Opinions on International Law. no doubt that these cannot be forcibly recovered. On the other hand, there seems equally little doubt that if this occurs within the local jurisdiction, they ought strictly to be surrendered. To refuse to surrender would practically be to enforce the law of the country to which the ship belongs, within the territorial waters of another State. In the leading case, stress was laid on the fact that the British ships were not, at the time when Sir Gr. Cockburn refused to hand over the slaves to the plaintiff, within the waters of East Florida. Bayley, J., stated that his opinion did not proceed on the ground that slavery was not to be tolerated in the place where the slaves had escaped, nor that an action might not, under circum- stances, be maintained for enticing away or harbouring slaves there. Holroyd, J., added that if the British vessel had been within the waters of East Florida undoubtedly the local law would have pre- vailed. It appears, also, to have been the practice, prior to 1875, to surrender slaves who had taken refuge on board British war vessels lying in the waters of States where slavery existed under the sanction of the territorial law {g). On the 5th of December, 1875, the British Government issued certain instructions in which it was {jnter alia) provided that a fugitive slave should not be received on board a public ship on the high seas, unless the commander was satisfied that there was some suflBcient reason for receiving him ; nor in the territorial waters of a State where slavery existed, unless the life of the fugitive would be in manifest danger if he were not received on board ; if received in order to be saved from this danger, he was not to be allowed to continue on board after the danger was past, but a demand for his surrender was not to be entertained, nor an examination as to his status entered into. The publication of these instructions caused a great sensation throughout the country, and the Government, in deference to the public feeling in the matter, issued a commis- sion, authorizing an enquiry into and report upon, the nature and extent of the international obligations as to the reception of fugitive slaves by H.M. vessels whilst in the territorial waters of other States. The commissioners, after inquiring into the law and practice of both Great Britain and foreign countries, issued an elaborate report, dated 30 May 187G, containing certain recommendations {h). In consequence of this, the following instructions to all commanders in chief, captains, commanders, and commanding officers of H.M. ships and vessels, were issued in August 1876, in lieu of those of 1875 : — (1.) In any case in which you have received a fugitive slave into your ship and taken him under the protection of the British flag, whether within or beyond the territorial waters of any State, you (ff) See Hall, p. 189. (A) See Phillimore, I., pp. 437—440. Public Vessels. 65 ■will not admit or entertain any demand made upon you for his surrender on the ground of slavery. (2.) It is not intended, nor is it possible, to lay down any precise or general rule as to the cases in which you ought to receive a fugitive slave on board your ship. You are, as to this, to be guided by considerations of humanity, and these considerations must have full eflFect given to them, whether your ship is on the high seas or within the terri- torial waters of a State in which slavery exists ; but in the latter case you ought, at the same time, to avoid conduct which may appear to be in breach of international comity and good faith. (3.) If any person, within territorial waters, claims your protec- tion on the ground that he is kept in slavery contrary to treaties with Great Britain, you should receive him, until the truth of his statement is examined into. This examination should be made, if possible, after communication with the nearest British consular authority, and you should be guided in your subsequent proceedings by the result. (4.) A special report is to be made of every case of a fugitive slave received on board your ship. These instructions are sufficiently vague, and appear to be a com- promise between the strict requirements of International Law and the dictates of humanity. The question, however, is no longer one of much importance. After the abolition of the status of slavery by the United States in 1865, Brazil and Cuba were the only Christian States in which slavery continued as a legal institution. In May, 1888, a bill for the total abolition of slaTeiy in Brazil, was passed by the two Chambers. THE "MARIANNA FLORA." Temp. 1826. [11 Wheaton, 1.] Case.] On the 5th of November, 1821, the United States armed schooner " Alligator," whilst on a cruise against pirates and slave-traders, came across the Portuguese ship " Marianna Flora," bound on a voyage from Bahia to Lisbon, with cargo. The fact of the "Marianna Flora" having shortened sail, and of her having a vane or flag on her mast somewhat below the head, together with her other manoeuvres, induced Lieutenant C.I.L. F 66, Cases and Opinions on International Law. Stockton, the commander of the "Alligator," to suppose she was in distress or Avished for information. He accordingly approached her, whereupon the " Marianna Flora " fired on the " Alligator." The firing was repeated, and mutual hostilities took place, which resulted in the surrender of the Portuguese vessel. The Portuguese officers stated that they took the " Alligator " to be a piratical cruiser, TTltimately the " Mari- anna Flora" was sent by Lieutenant Stockton into Boston and charged with piratical aggression. Upon the hearing, the ship was restored by the District Court, and damages were awarded for the act of sending her in. On appeal to the Circuit Court the decree for damages was reversed, the ship being restored by consent. An appeal on the question of damages was then taken to the Supreme Court. Judgment] This Court expressed the opinion that ships of war, sailing under the authority of their Government to arrest pirates, were entitled to approach vessels for the pur- pose of ascertaining their real character. On the other hand, no ship in time of ]3eace was bound to lie by and await the approach of any other ship ; she was entitled to pursue her voyage in her own way, and to use all necessary precautions to avoid any suspected sinister enterprise or hostile attack ; she might consider her own safety, but she must take care not to violate the rights of others. She might use any precautions dictated by the prudence or the fears of her officers, either as to delay or the progress or course of her voyage, but she was not at liberty to^inflict injuries upon other innocent parties, simply because of conjectural dangers. After reviewing the facts of the case, the Court was of opinion that the conduct of Lieutenant Stockton in approaching and ultimately taking possession of the " Marianna Flora " was entirely justifiable. With regard to the question of damages, it was laid down that if damages were given it would be going a great way towards declaring that an exercise of honest discretion ought to draw after it the jDeualty of damages. Moreover, no decision had been cited in which the capture Public Vessels. 67, itself having been justifiable, the subsequent- detention for adjudication had ever been punished by the award of damages. The decision of the Circuit Court reversing the decree for damages was accordingly afiSrmed. The Maricmna Flora, 11 Wheaton, 1. It is especially the duty of a public vessel to keep the police of the seas and to put down pirates. For this purpose a public vessel has a right of approach, and, in cases of suspicion, a right of further investigation («■). The case cited indicates that a public vessel cannot be rendered liable for consequences accruing from an honest attempt to discharge these duties. In addition to her right of approach, a public armed vessel is both by the rules of comity and by maritime usage, entitled to the salute of private vessels on the hfgh seas. The salute may take the form of firing a cannon (salut du canon), or of striking the flag (salut du pavilion), or of lowering the sails (salut des voiles) (7c). It is also the custom for ships of war to salute other ships of war of superior rank — for a single ship of whatever rank to salute a fleet or squadron — and for an auxiliary squadron to salute the principal fleet (I). Under the British Admiralty Eegulations, a British warship meet- ing on the sea a foreign warship, bearing the flag of a flag officer or the broad pendant of a commodore commanding a station or squadron and superior in rank to the commander of the British ship, is required to salute the latter with the same number of guns to which a British officer of corresponding rank would be entitled, upon being assured of receiving a similar salute in return — gun for gun ; and even in a foreign port similar complimentary salutes are required to be given, if the regulations of the place admit of this being done. Tlie relations of British private to British public vessels are strictly a matter of municipal regulation only. It may not be out of place, however, to point out that a British merchantman is, in strictness, under an obligation to salute a British warship, and that any failure to obsei-ve this obligation may be visited with punish- ment, as against the master, by the Court of Admiralty. Thus, in 1829, the Court of Admiralty issued a warrant of arrest against the (i) See p. 344, infra, as to how far a (Jc) See Ortolan, ii., c. 15. right of visit? exists in time of peace. (I) Seo Phillimore, II., p. 54. F 2 68 Cases and Opinions on International Law. schooner " Native " for contempt in passing H.M.S. " Semiramis," without striking or lowering her royal, this being the uppermost sail which she was then carrying (wj). The wearing or hoisting of illegal or unauthorized colours by British merchant vessels, is forbidden by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 (tow), s. 105, under severe penalties. Such illegal or un- authorized colours may also be seized and confiscated by British naval, military, or consular officers. This includes the case of a private vessel flying the colours of a public vessel. In the case of B. V. Benson (3 Hagg. 96), proceedings were taken against the master of a merchantman for hoisting the King's colours in or near the Douro ; the defendant was ordered to pay the statutory penalty, the Court pointing out that going into the Douro under colours usually hoisted by the King's ship, at the time in question, might have cast doubt on the neutrality and have affected the honour of Great Britain. PRIVATE VESSELS. THE "ATALANTA." Temp. 1856. [OnxiONS OF U. S. Attokneys-Geneeal, Vol. VIII., p. 73.] Case.] The " Atalanta " was an American merchant vessel. Whilst on a voyage from Marseilles to New York, acts of insubordination and violence occurred on the part of her crew, in consequence of which the master was compelled to return to Marseilles. After the arrival of the ship at that port, on the application of the American Consul, all those concerned in the ofifence were committed to prison by the local authorities. A few days afterwards, with th^ consul's assent, a number of them were released, but thirteen were retained under restraint. Of these six were sent on board the "Atalanta" to be taken to the United States for trial. Subsequently, with the knowledge of the consul.but in spite of his protests, the local authorities went on {m) See Phillimore, II., p. 56. (mm) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104. Private Vessels. 69 board the " Atalanta," re-took the six men, and again imprisoned them in Marseilles, together with the seven others who had not been taken on board. Some correspondence ensued with refer- ence to the matter, and ultimately the opinion of the United States law officers was taken on the case. Opinion.] The Attorney-General in the first place expressed the opinion that it was immaterial whether the persons so imprisoned were citizens of the United States or not ; nor did he consider that the question turned either on the criminal jurisdiction of consuls under the Consular Convention of 1853 between France and the United States, or on the question of the exterritoriality of merchant vessels whilst in territorial waters. The real issue was whether, in the event of a crime being committed on board an American ship on the high seas and within the sole competency of the United States, and iu the event of that ship subsequently putting into a French port, the criminal could be forcibly withdrawn from the ship by the local authorities or by order of the French Government. Tn his opinion, when the ship arrived at Marseilles the master had lawful power, with the aid of the consul if required, to retain the men on board. The fact that they had committed crimes on board the ship outside the local jurisdiction, for which crimes they were liable to be punished on her reaching New York, did not give the local authorities any right to interfere. If the crime had been committed while the ship lay in territorial waters, the local authorities would have had jurisdiction, and might have gone on board to seize the prisoners ; but this would not be so where no act had been done to give any jurisdiction over the case to France. The consul had acted lawfully when, at the first stage of the transaction, he had requested the local authorities to take temporary charge of the prisoners. It was the duty of the local authorities to as.sist him by the express terms of the convention between the United States and France. He conceded in the fullest terms the integrity of the local sovereignty ; and that, instead of contradicting, seemed to corroborate his view of the subject ; Cases and Opinions on International Law. Low could consuls maintain the internal order of their a merchant vessels except through the assistance of the al jurisdiction. But however this might be, it was clear, in his opinion, that \ local authorities, even if they might have refused aid, had least no right to interpose to defeat the lawful confinement my members of the crew by the master on board the ship ;h the advice and approbation of the consul. According to ! doctrines laid down by her own jurists, France had no juris- tion in the present case. SVhilst admitting that the local authorities had jurisdiction regard to crimes committed on board a merchantman in ritorial waters, he denied that they had any right to erfere with persons lawfully detained on board the ship the laws of the country to which she belonged, for crimes umitted on the high seas among members of the crew, and ; justiciable by the foreign jurisdiction. France could not ly this exemption, when she herself claimed to extend it so ich farther. The doctrine of the public law of Europe on this point was 11 stated by Riquelme to the following effect : viz., that mes committed on the high seas, whether on. board war-ships merchantmen, were to be considered as committed in the ritory of the State to which the ship belonged, and that if 3 ship arrived in port, the jurisdictional right of the territory which the ship belonged, did not on that account cease ; len the crime was committed in territorial waters, in the se of warships, the principle of exterritoriality protected the p; in the case of a merchantman, and in the absence of aty — even then, if the offence affected only the interior cipline of the ship, the local authorities ought not to deal th the case unless their assistance was requested ; but if the ence was committed against a subject of the country or other foreigner, or if it was calculated to disturb the tran- illity of the port, then the territorial jurisdiction was entitled punish the crime. Private Vessels. 7{. In the present case, therefore, he failed to see on what ground of strict international right the local authorities had proceeded. The Atalanta: Opinions of United States Attorneys- General, Vol. VIII., p. 73. " Private vessels , are those which, whilst being the property of private owners, yet satisfy such conditions of nationality as may be imposed by the State to which they belong, with reference to ownership, place of construction, the nationality of the ciaptain or the composition of the crew." The documents looked to in ascertaining the character of the vessel, the nature of her cargo, and the ports between which she is voyaging, according to English practice, iire as follows : — (1) the register, specifying the owner, the name of the ship, and other particulars necessary for verifying her identity and nationality, (2) the sea letter, (3) the muster-roll of her crew, (4) the log-book, (5) the charter-party, (6) the invoices of the cargo, and (7) the bills of lading {n). In general the national character of a private vessel depends on the national character of the owner as ascertained by his domicil. By the law of England no ship is to be deemed a British ship unless she belongs either, (1) to natural born British subjects, or (2) to persons naturalized in British dominions or made denizens by proper authority, or (3) to corporate bodies established under the laws of, and having their principal place of business in, the United Kingdom or some British possession. Everj' British ship is required to be registered as provided by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1 854. If any person uses the British flag or assumes the British national character, on board any ship owned in whole or in part by any persons not entitled by law to own British ships, for the purpose of making such ship appear to be a British ship, such ship shall be forfeited to her Majesty, unless such assumption has been made for the purpose of escaping capture by an enemy or a foreign ship of war, in the exercise of some belligerent right ; and in any proceeding for enforcing any such forfeiture, the burden of proving a title to use the British flag and to assume the British national character shall lie on the person assuming the same. A similar penalty may be incurred by concealment of British or by the assumption of a foreign character (o). The jurisdiction to which a private vessel is subject differs accord- (ji) See Hall, p. 101 ; and sec also 2, a. 10 and 19, aud s. 103, sub-ss. Appendix II. 1 and 2. (o) See 17 & IS Vict. u. 104, Part H Cases and Opinions on International Law. ng to whether she is on the high seas, or passing through foreign erritorial waters, or lying in a foreign port. A merchant ship on the high seas is subject only to the jurisdic- ion of the State to which she belongs, except in cases of piracy {ji). 5uch State is entitled to exercise administrative and criminal juris- liction in respect of acts committed on board, whether by its own lubjects or foreigners. In the case of crimes committed on the high leas, all authorities combine in declaring such offences to be subject ;o the jurisdiction of the country to which the ship belongs, and it natters not that the criminal or the injured party or both belong to ;ome other country {q). In civil cases, also, the State has full juris- liction over its subjects on board, and the same jurisdiction over breigners as it has when they are in its territory, subject to any xemption that may exist by the municipal law. The State to which he vessel belongs is also entitled to protect the vessel against inter- ference by other nations, unless she has committed some act of hostility Lgainst another State or some act which a belligerent is entitled to estrain, or unless she has escaped on to the high seas after violating he laws of another country while within its waters, in which last sase she remains amenable to the local jurisdiction. On the same )riuciple a State is responsible for the acts of its private vessels on ,he high seas, and is boimd to afford proper redress through the nedium of its Courts for wrongs that may have been sustained by lubjects of other countries, except in so far as these are mere viola- .ions of belligerent rights or constitute acts of piracy. As to merchant vessels passing through territorial waters, but not it rest in the harbours of a foreign State, in Reg. v. Keyn it was jeld that in the view of the English law at least the territorial urisdiction did not extend to crimes committed by foreigners in Dassing vessels belonging to another State, but this defect has now Dcen in some measure amended by the Territorial Waters Jurisdic- jon Act, 1878 (r). On principle it would seem, although there is no ;lear usage on the matter, that the merchant vessel may be made imenable to the territorial jurisdiction as fully as if within port, ilthough the State has no interest in enforcing its jurisdiction ixcept in regard to acts taking effect outside the ship. The exercise )f jurisdiction in such cases, therefore, is generally confined to acts nvolving a violation of its revenue or fishery laws, its fiscal or [uarantine regulations, or local rules of navigation, or involving eckless conduct endangering the lives of persons outside the ship, or Times of violence committed on such persons. In such cases, as ilr. Hall points out, not only is the local State interested, but it may (p) As to Slave Trading, sec infra, (q) See Meg. v. Lewis, 5 W. E. 572. . 124. (r) 41&42Viot.c.73. Seep.28,s2y«-a. Private Vessels. 73 reasonably be unwilling to trust to justice being done with respect to them by another State, whilst it is also more favourably placed for arriving at the truth and for administering justice than the country to which the vessel belongs (s). As to merchant vessels in foreign ports, they are here clearly subject to the local jurisdiction. Both the vessel and those on board her are, strictly, subject to the authority of the local Courts in I'egard to all criminal offences, whether committed on ship or on shore. Both Great Britain and the United States act on this prin- ciple, except where modified by convention. The French Courts, however, refuse to interfere except when the peace of the port is disturbed, or where natives or foreigners are concerned ; whilst in the case of French vessels in foreign ports, the French consul is required to resist the application of the local authority except in similar cases {t). Tn many instances consular conventions have been entered into, to the effect that where a merchant vessel of one State enters the waters of another, the consul of the State to which the ship belongs shall have exclusive jurisdiction over matters that concern only the internal order of the vessel, and that the local authorities shall only exercise jurisdiction where the peace or public order of the locality is dis- turbed, or where persons other than the ofiicers and crew are con- cerned (m). Mr. Hall suggests that it might be advisable that principles to this effect should be adopted into the recognized usage of nations. Bat until this is done, and in default of treaty or con- vention, this distinction between different kinds of offences cannot be said to obtain; the only distinction recognized being between offences committed on board a public vessel, which are left to the jurisdiction of the ship, and offences committed on board a private vessel, which are subject to the local authority (v). It needs to be observed that, whilst Great Britain recognizes the right of other States to punish crimes committed on board British vessels in foreign harbours, she at the same time claims jurisdiction to punish such crimes, where they have not been punished by the local authority. The criminal law of England extends to all offences committed on British ships, either by British subjects, or by foreigners, either on the high seas or in foreign harbours, or rivers below bridges where great ships go. Thus in Reg. v. Anderson (L. R. 1 0. C. R. 161), it was held that a crime, committed by an American sailor on board a British ship lying in a French river, about thirty-five miles away from the sea, and within 300 yards from the shore, was within the (s) See Hall p. 202. (i)) A list of the oonvontious that have (<) See the cases of' the "Newton" been entered into, on this subject, will and the " Sally," cited p. 74, infra. be found in Hall, note to p. 200. (m) See Hall, p. 200. Tit Cases and Opinions on International Law. jurisdiction of the British Courts. But ia Reg.Y. Serva(l Den. C. C, 104), it was held that there was no jurisdiction over an offence com- mitted, by a foreigner on board a ship that had unlawfully been seized by a British ship of war and put under the charge of a British ofBcer, Nor will a British Court take cognisance of a crime committed by one foreigner upon another, on board a foreign ressel on the high seas (see^Seff. v. Lewis, D. & B. C. 0. 182) (x). THE "NEWTON" AND THE "SALLY." Te»i2:>. 1806. [Or.TOLAN, DirLOllATIE DE LA MeE, A'oL. I., p. 271, AND ANXEXE J., p. 445.] Case.] In 1806, while the "Newton," an American merchant ship, was in the port of Antwerp, a quarrel took place between two sailors in a boat belonging to the ship. About the same time, when the " Sally," also an American merchant ship, was in the port of Marseilles, the mate dangerously wounded one of the crew on the ship. The American consuls claimed exclusive jurisdiction in each case. Judgment.] The cases subsequently came before the Conseil d'Etat, who pronounced in favour of the consuls, on the ground that in respect to offences and torts committed on board a foreign vessel in a French port by one of the officers or crew against another, the rights of the foreign Power ought to be regarded as exclusive of the local jurisdiction ; and that inas- much as the present matter was one that concerned the internal discipline of the vessel, the local authorities had no title to interfere, unless their protection was deiKianded, or the peace and tranquillity of the port were disturbed. The Newton and the Sally, Ortolan, Diplomatic de la Mer, Vol. I., p. 271, and Annexe J., p. 445. These cases are cited as illustrating French law on this subject, Antwerp being at the time under French jurisdiction. (a;) See also 17 & 18 Vict. u. 104, s. 267, andlS k 19 Vict.- c. 91, s. 21. Private Vessels. 75 THE " CREOLE. " Tefinp. 1842. [I'arliamentaey Pavees, 1843, Vol. LXI.] Case.] In Octobei', 1841, the " Creole/' an American brig, left Hampton Roads for New Orleans, carrying, among other things, a cargo of slaves. On the 7th of November the slaves broke into revolt, murdered a passenger, and wounded the captain, the mate, and two of the crew. They then took the brig to Nassau, New Providence. The matter was there brought before two magistrates, who ordered the imprisonment of nineteen of the slaves, but released the others, about 113 in number, on the ground that the moment they landed on British territory they became free. The United States Government remonstrated against this course, Mr. Webster contending that the ship having been driven into British territory by unavoidable force, those on board ought not to be held within the jurisdiction of the port. To this Lord Ashbuitou replied that no slave who came within British dominion would ever be restored, and that the matter in dispute was " what constituted coming within British dominions." Without expressing any opinion on this point, he suggested that the matter should be referred to the Home Government. In the result the matter was submitted to arbitration, and an indemnity awarded to the owners of the " Creole " for the loss sustained. The "Creole" Case, Parliamentary Papers, 1843, Vol. LXI. The result of the " Creole " dispute seems to support the principle that a private vessel putting into a foreign port through compulsioa of the crew, is in the same position as a vessel entering a foreign port through stress of weather, and is exempted from jurisdiction. The United States Attorney-General, Mr. Legare, in his opinion on this case, further expressed theTiew that if a vessel were driven by stress 76 Cases and Opinions on International Law. of weather or forced by vis major, or in short compelled by any overruhng necessity to take refuge in a port of another nation, she ought not to be considered subject to its municipal law, so far as con- cerned any penalty, prohibition, tax, or incapacity that would other- wise be incurred by entering such port, provided she did nothing further to yiolate the municipal law during her stay ; the comity of nations, which was the usage, the common law of civilized nations, had gone very far on this point ; if a ship were driven into port by stress of weather, and unloaded her cargo there, she would not be bound to pay duties or customs in that place because she had come there by force, nor was she liable to forfeiture ; under the English Navigation Acts, it had been settled that coming in by stress of weather could not be an importation without reference to intention or mala fides ; this was an admission that a ship, putting into port in such circumstances, was, like a ship of war belonging to a friendly Power, considered by the law of England as not subject to the municipal law ; such was also the rule of the/ws gentium {y). The following cases illustrate respectively the exemption from ordinary liabilities which may accrue from stress of weather or from the performance of acts of generosity towards a crew itself in distress : — In the case of the Industria (2), a Spanish ship had put into the port of Black River in Jamaica, in distress, with five slaves on board. The law officers of the Crown expressed an opinion that, assuming the " Industria " to have put into Black River in distress, she could not be deemed to have committed any offence against the laws of Great Britain, and was therefore not liable to seizure and confiscation by the civil authorities of the island. They were, how- ever, of opinion that she might have been seized by a duly commis- sioned British cruiser under the treaty with Spain for the abolition of the slave trade, and carried before a Court of Mixed Commission for adjudication. In the case of the Fortuna (5 C. Rob. 27), during war between Great Britain and Holland, a neutral ship was captured for breach of the blockade of the Weser, and sent home for adjudica- tion. The master set up a defence to the effect that the want of provisions and a strong westerly wind compelled him to make for the Weser. The want of provisions was held no excuse, but Sir Wm. Scott permitted evidence as to the state of the wind to be adduced, and the ship was finally restored. In the case of the Jonge Jacohus Baumami (1 0, Rob. 243), it appeared that, during war between Great Britain and France, (2/) Opinions of TJ. S. Attorneys- (z) Cited in Forsyth, p. 399. General, 98. Private Vessels. 77 this vessel had received on board the crew of the British frigate "Apollo," which had been found in a disabled condition by the " Jonge Jacobus Baumann." Subsequently, the English crew took possession of the vessel, brought her into an English port, and pro- ceeded against the ship on the ground of having enemy's property on board. The ship was restored, and freight, expenses, and a reasonable demurrage were given to the owner, Sir Wm. Scott expressing an opinion in judgment, that if the ship had really belonged to an enemy, the character of enemy itself must have been blotted out by such a service as had been performed. THE " CARLO ALBERTO." Temp. 1832. [Sirey's Recueil, Vol. XXXIL, Pt. 1, p. 578.] Case.] The " Carlo Alberto," a Sardinian steamship, secretly landed on the French coast the Duchess of Berri and several of her adherents, on the night of the 28th or 29th of April, 1832. The ship had been chartered for Barcelona, the real destination, which was to aid an insurrection against the French Government, having been concealed. In consequence of the landing of the Duchess of Berri an insurrection occurred at Marseilles on the 30th. The ship subsequently put into the port of La Ciotat in distress, and thereupon certain persons on board were arrested by the French authorities. Judgment.] The lower Court ordered the release of the persons arrested, on the ground that the arrests were illegal, inasmuch as they were made on a foreign ship, which was to be considered as foreign territoi-y. But this decision was reversed by the Cour de Cassation, the Court laying down in its judg- ment, that the privilege established by the Law of Nations in favour of allied or neutral ships, ceased when those ships, in con- tempt of alliance or neutrality, committed acts of hostility ; that in such case they become enemies, and must submit to all the consequences of the state of aggression in which they had placed 7.8 Cases and Opinions on International Law. themselves. The ship in the present case was not entitled i the privileges nsually accorded to foreign ships putting ini port in distress, inasmuch as the vessel had been fitted oi to take part in a conspiracy, and had assisted in the executic of a crime, which the French authorities ought to investigat On these grounds, and also on the ground that the vessel wi then actually engaged in carrying persons guilty of a conspirac against the French Government, the Court refused to recogni: the exemption contended for. TU Carlo Alberto, Sirey's Kecueil, Vol XXXIl Pt. 1, p. 578. By a humane provision of International Law, vessels putting in a foreign port under stress of weather, are usually exempted fro local jurisdiction ; but according to the doctrine laid down in tl leading case this will not extend to vessels committing offences i violation of the Law of Nations. FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS. QUEEN CHRISTINA OF SWEDEN. Temp. 1657. [De Maetens, Causes CiLfeBUE.s, A''ol. I., p. 1.] Case.] In 1634, Christina, Queen of Sweden, abdicated h throne in favour of her cousin Charles Gustavus. After h abdication she travelled in various countries. Amongst oth countries she visited France on two occasions, and whilst the was accorded royal honours, and treated by the French Gover: ment as a queen regnant. On the occasion of her second vis her chamberlain, Monaldeschi, whom she accused of treaso Avas put to death by her orders. The question of amenabili to French jurisdiction having thus arisen, the French juris expressed an opinion that the Queen, being an independe: sovereign and being in France with the permission of the Fren( - Foreign Sovereigns, 79 doverument, it was not competent to refuse her the right of sovereignty over her subjects, and that all persons in her service and receiving salaries from her must be considered as such, with the exception of those who were subjects of the State where she was resident. lu view of this expression of opinion, the French authorities refused to interfere; Queen Christina of Swedev,, De Martens, Causes C^l^bres, Vol. I., p. 1. ' The Sovereign of a country, whatever may. be his title or position, whether he be the chief of a Eepublic, a Monarchy, or an JErapire, is its formal international representative, and represents the collective power of his State. By comity and usage he occupies a peculiar position, both whilst in his own countiy, and whilst travelling through or tarrying in the territoi-y of another State, Whilst travelling through or resident in the territory of another State he enjoys all the attributes of exterritoriality. Person- ally he is exempt both from the civil and criminal jurisdic- tion of the local Courts. As an almost necessary corollary of this, he is entitled to exercise a certain amount of civil jurisdiction over the members of his suite. He would not, indeed, be justified in exercising the full rights accorded him by the law of his own country. On this point the opinion expressed by the French jurists in the case of Queen Christina, would scarcely be adopted in the present day, and a foreign Sovereign, although exempt from the local jurisdiction, would not be warranted in exercising a criminal juris- diction over other persons. Still if he did do so, it does not appear that there would be any remedy beyond protest or expulsion. If, indeed, in this respect or in any other, he should abuse the hospitality afforded him, he might no doubt be ordered to depart without delay, in the same way as a delinquent ambassador. The common usage of Europe also exempts tlie effects of a foreign Sovereign passing through another country from the payment of custom duties and the visitation Of customs officers. The same immunity is generally extended to goods destined for a foreign Sovereign or his family, in their transit through foreign countries (a). These privileges, however, would not now be deemed to extend to Sovereigns who have abdicated. Even in the case of Queen Christina, the Queen would doubtless have been held amenable for her acts to {a) See Phillimore, II., p. 141. 80 Cases and Opinions on International Law. the local tribunals, had the French Government not debarred itself from taking this course, by its previous recognition of the Queen's title to the position of a Queen regnant. Nor would this exemption from local jurisdiction exist where the sovereign is a subject of the country in which the proceedings are taken, except so far as concerns acts done as sovereign in the country over which he reigns (/). Even whilst in his own country, a foreign Sovereign enjoys certain international rights, which are recognized by the courts of other nations. Acts done in his capacity as Sovereign cannot be canvassed by or made the subject of proceedings against him in foreign tribunals. His public property is also exempt from their jurisdiction (J) ; although they will under certain circum- stances, and at his instance, intervene to prevent the violation within their jurisdiction of the public rights of the State he represents (c). Not infrequent!}', also, the municipal law of foreign countries makes special provision for punishing offences committed within their limits against his person or reputation {d). As a general rule foreign Sovereigns may sue in the municipal courts of another country, not only in respect of injuries to their public rights, but also in respect of private and personal injuries (e). This of course does not extend to international wrongs, or wrongs done by one State to another. For such wrongs the only redress is diplomatic or military action. The exceptions to the rule that foreign Sovereigns are not usually liable to be cited in the municipal courts of other countries are as follows : — (1) where the foreign Sovereign is at the same time a subject of the country in which the suit is brought (/) ; (2) where he has carried on trade or entered into contracts in the apparent character of, and subject to the same conditions as, a private individual (^) ; (3) where he holds or acquires immovable property within the local jurisdiction (Ji) ; (4) where he holds or has in the hands of his agents even movalDle property, not connected with the jus coronae {%) ; (5) or finally where he has initiated the proceedings or otherwise attorned to the jurisdiction {7c). (6) SeeDeHaherv. Queen of Portugal, The King of Hanover, infra, p. 81. infra, p. 86. ( of office, the demands of creditors, or relief from illness ; and the residence must not be for a limited or particular purpose, but general and indefinite in its future contemplation. This will constitute a new domicile, which so long as residence continues will have the I effect of suspending the operation of the party's earlier domicile, and the law of such new domicile will determine the character of his civil rights and duties for the time being. A domicile of origin may be extinguished by act of law, as for example, by sentence of death or exile for life ; but it cannot be extinguished, although it may be suspended, by the will and act of the party. Domicile of choice, as it is gained animo et facto, may, in like fashion, be put an end to animo et facto. Should the domicile of choice be unequivocally abandoned without a new domicile being acquired, the law of the domicile of origin will revive, and will continue to govern the civil relations of the party in question, until a new domicile is fixed on («). A natural-born Englishman will, if he Ih) 33 & 34 "Vict. 0. 102. to a domicile that he has only hy (Ah) See Savigny, VIIL, 58. operation of law. The preferenoo m This, though settled by the cases, shown in the cases for the latter is very doubtfiTl as a, principle, for seems to be a survival of the old Zoaicaziy the domicile which a man has confusion between nationality and voluntarilv chosen should be preferred domicile. 102 Cases and Opinions on International Lazv. becomes domiciled in Holland, acquire the civil stains of a Dutch resident ; but if he breaks up his establishment and quits Holland and goes to travel in France or some other country without, ho-jv-, evei-, taking up any permanent residence there, his jural relations will then be governed by the law of England, that being his domicile of origin ; and this will continue to be so until he acquires a new domicile of choice {j). With respect to the evidence necessary to establish a new domicile it is impossible to lay down any rule. Courts of justice must neces-, sarily draw their own conclusions from all the circumstances of each particular case, and every case must vary in its circumstances. The two main factors will be intention and residence. More will depend on the nature and character of the i-esidenco than on its length. If the intention is manifest, residence for a comparatiTcly brief period- will sufl&ce (^). There is, howeyer, a strong presumption against an, American or European acquiring a domicile in a community with political, social, and religious ideas in radical conflict with those of Christian communities ; hence it is generally held that a residence in a foreign State as a privileged member of an extra-territorial com- munity, although it may be effectual to extinguish a domicile of choice, will yet not be effectual to create a new domicile (Z). With regard to enemy-character in time of war, it should be observed that an individual is not tied down to the domicile in which he is found at the beginning of a war. So soon as he actually removes elsewhere, or takes steps to effect a removal, in good faith and without intention to return, he severs his connection with his original domicile. But such change, on outbreak of wai", is scruti- nized very closely. In case of capture, the onus of proof will be on the party asserting such new domicile. Less cogent proof, however, will be required where the change is from an acquired domicile to domicile of origin, than when this is reversed (w?). THE "PORTLAND." Temp. 1800. [3 C. EoB. 41.] Case.] During war between Great Britain and France, at the close of the last century, the " Portland " was seized on the ground that the owner of part of the cargo was an enemy- (y) See judgment of Lord Westbury (Z) See TootaVs Trusts, L. E. 23 ill Udny v. Udny, L. E. 1 Sc. App. Cb. Div. 532, and Whcaton, by Boyd, 441. p. 237. Qc) See Nelson, pp. 15 to 33. (m) Sec p. 185, infra. Domicile— ^CivW Status. " lOS subject; It appeared that Mr. Ostermyer, the person in question, was a German who had a house of business at Ostend, which was within the enemy's territory, and also a house at Hamburg, which was not within it The transaction being connected with the Hamburg house, it was held that the cargo was not liable to condemnation. ^ Judgment.] Sir W. Scott, in giving judgment, stated that the consequence of Mr. Ostermyer's being engaged in trade in Ostend could not be extended to the trade which he was carrying on at Hamburgh, which was unconnected with the Ostend trade. In the present case there was a neutral resi- dence ; the nature of the transaction and the destination were perfectly neutral. The fact of Mr. Ostermyer's trading to Ostend could not affect his commerce in other parts of the world, unless it could be said that trading in an enemy's commerce made him as to all his concerns an enemy, or that being engaged in a house of trade in the enemy's country would give an enemy-character to all his' transactions. But there was no case or principle to support such a proposition . The consequence of his having connection at Ostend must be limited to his Ostend trade, and his other trade must be exonerated. . The Portland, 3 0. Rob. 41. A person, though not resident in a country, may be so associated with it, through having or being a partner in a house of trade there, as to be imbued with an enemy-character in respect of property con- nected with that trade. This is called commercial domicile. Ac- cording to the practice of England and the United States, this rule i^ not affected by the fact of the person in question acting as consul (mm). An illustration of this liability in virtue of commercial domicile is afforded by the case of the Jonge EJassina (5 C. Rob. 297). In this case it appeared that, during war between Great Britain and' Holland, one Ravie had imported goods from Holland under a. licence accorded" to him by the British Government, the licence being donfined to the impoit of goods belonging to him (presumably as a Birmingham mercliant). It appeared, however, that Ravie had also ' - (mirt) Seethe case of the iiit^MW C7ne/, p. 100, sitpm 104 Cases and Opinions on Intei'national Law. a house of business at Amsterdam, and was the exporter from Holland as well as the iniporter into England. It was laid down in the judgment that, if a man had mercantile concerns in two countries, and acted as a merchant of both, he must be considered as a subject of both, with regard to the transactions originating respectirely in those countries ; and it was therefore held that the licence would not protect the transaction so far as regarded the exportation by Ravie of goods from Amsterdam, which belonged to him as a Dutch mer- chant, and confiscation of these goods was decreed. But while, on the one hand, domicile in a belligerent country will carry with it these liabilities ; on the other hand, domicile in a peutral country, even on the part of a natural-bom subject of either belligerent, will not only exempt his property from capture as enemy- property by the other, but will also entitle him to carry on trade with that other without incurring any liability towards his native country on the ground of trading with the enemy. Thus in the case of the Danous (cited 4 C. Eob. 255), a British subject domiciled in Portugal, was allowed the benefit of the Portuguese character so far as to protect a trade carried on by him with Holland, although the latter Power was then at war with Great Britain. In default of naturalization, however, it is not permitted to a natural-born subject to engage in war against his native country. AMBASSADORS- STATE AGENTS. LESLEY, BISHOP OF ROSS. Temp. 1571. [SoMEEs' Tkacts, 2nd Edition, by Scott, Vol. I., p. 186.] Case.] In the reign of Elizabeth, John Lesley, Bishop of Ross, was concerned with others in furthering a scheme for the marriage of Mary Queen of Scots with the Duke of Norfolk. He also engaged in other enterprises for Mary's relief. He w,as thereupon imprisoned by the English Government, but was subsequently liberated on condition of his leaving the kingdom. Opinion.] The Bishop of Eoss having claimed privilege as Mary's ambassador, notwithstanding that Mary was a prisoner in England, the Crown lawyers were consulted as to this Ambassadors — Siaie Agents. 105 contention, and expressed the following opinion : — 1st, that an ambassador that raises rebellion against the prince to whom he is sent has forfeited the privileges of an ambassador as such, and is liable to punishment ; 2ndly, that the agent of a prince, deposed from public authority, and in whose stead another is substituted, cannot challenge the privileges of an ambassador ; 3rdly, that if a prince comes into another's kingdom and is imprisoned there, he may have an agent if he has not forfeited his principality, but whether that agent be reputed an ambas- sador depends upon the authority of his commission ; 4thly, that a prince may forbid entrance into his kingdom to such an figent, and may command him to leave the kingdom if he do not keep himself within the bounds prescribed to ambassadors, but the agent may, in the meantime, enjoy the privileges of an ambassador, according to the authority deputed to him. Lesley, Bishop of Ross .- Somers' Tracts, 2nd Edition by Scott, Vol. I., p. 186. This case is cited as showing the attitude of the English lawyers towards ambassadorial privilege at the end of the sixteenth century. It would seem that at Common Law ambassadors were originally held liable for offences committed againsb the Sovereign to whom they were accredited. Later cases, however, show that the English practice on this subject tended to come more into harmony with International I^aw. Thus, in the same reign, Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador, having taken part in a conspiracy, the object of which was to dethrone the Queen, was arrested by order of the English Government. A question having been raised as to whether he was amenable to English jurisdiction, an opinion was given by Albericus Gentilis and Francis Hotman to the effect that an ambassador, who had been concerned in a conspiracy against the Sovereign to whom he was accredited, could not be put to death, but must be remanded to his own Sovereign for punishment. In accordance with this opinion, Mendoza was sent out of the country (n). The privileges of an ambassador or a diplomatic agent at Inter- national Law are commonly grouped under two heads, inviolability of person and exterritoriality. (w) See Camden, Vol. II.,' p. i97. 105 Cases ajtd Opinions on International Law. His inviolabilifcy is said to be founded on the Law of Nature l^jus gmiium pi-inrnvum), and liis privilege of exterritoriality upon usage and implied consent {jus gentium secundarium) ; but in modern times no line of demarcation can really be drawn between the two, except, possibly, as to thirti Powers, through whose territories an ambassador niay happen to be passing (o). In the latter case, the rules appear to be (1) that in time of peace an ambassador is inviolable during his transit through a thii-d country, but he cannot claim the privilege of exterritoriality as a matter of right, although this would now probably be accorded to him ns a matter of comity ; (2) that in time of war between the State which he represents and the State through. whose: territories he is passing, he cannot claim inviolability as of right, without having previously obtained permission to pass through the territory of the hostile State, though this would probably be granted in the event of his being accredited to a nentral State (p). The question is not now, however, one oi much importance (q). In regard. to the State to which he is accredited, an ambassador's privileges may conveniently be grouped under the attribute of exterritoriality, or extra-territoriality, in virtue of which, his residence within such State, is considered as a continuing residence in his own country. His j)rivilege commences from the moment he sets foot in the State to which he is accredited, if previous notice of his mission has been imparted ; or in any case, as soon as he has made his public character known by the production either of his passport or his credentials. The privilege continues during the whole time of his sojourn and his departure. It is not affected by the outbreak of war ; in this case the ambassador is entitled to his passports and to a safe conduct across the frontier. The privilege avails not only ambassadors proper but all classes of ministers who represent their State, and attaches also to all who really belong to the suite or household of the ambassador (r). It is in virtue of, or more accurately, under cover of this attribute that an ambassador is, in general, exempt both from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the country to which he is accredited (s). With respect to criminal offences, under ordinary circumstances, the State to which the ambassador is.accredited has no jurisdiction either to try or punish offences committed by him. Nor is he under any circumstances subject to arrest under the ordinary process of the courts. In 1763 the ambassador of Holland at the Court of (o) But see Halleck, Cli. IV., pp. 13, Trent, p. 327, in/ra. 300, (r) But see p. 115, in/ra. ip) See Phillimovo, II., 217. («) But see GyUeiibmirg's Case,]}. 108. (q) See, hoivever, the case of The . , Ambassadors — State Agents. 107 the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel was arrested for refusing to render au account relating to a testamentary trust which he was alleged to have mal-administered, but the Landgrave was subsequently com- pelled to mate both apology and reparation for the arrest. If an ambassador should commit a crime, the State to which he is accredited might rightly signify its displeasure according to the gravity of the oifence, and either demand his recall, or even require him to leave at once, without previous communication with his Government. The case of offences against the State itself will be dealt with hereafter ; but even as to these it now seems clear that no judicial process could be put in force against him, although in cases of emergency lie might be arrested and forcibly expelled. "With respect to civil jurisdiction, the matter is not quite so clear. It is admitted, indeed, that the local jurisdiction cannot be exercised in such manner as to interfere, however remotely, with his freedom of person, or Avith the property belonging to hini in his' official character. So far as his official character and position are con- cerned, there is in general a complete recognition of the privilege of exterritoriality. But as regards property held by him in his private character, it would seem that the local Courts are competent to exercise jurisdiction to the same degree as in the case of a foreign Sovereign (t). An ambassador must also comply with such adminis- trative and police regulations as are necessaiy for the safety or health of the community. Outside these limits the practice of different States is not altogether uniform. The English law on the subject will be dealt with hereaftei*. The practice of other nations, however, appears lo favour the view, now generally entertained, that an ambassador is not, outside the limits indicated above, amenable to local jurisdictioiin except by consent (it). His personal effects are not liable to .taxation, although he is liable to the payment of tolls and postages. Goods imported by him for his personal use are free from duty. ' His house or hotel is inviolable and cannot generally be entered by the police or by other officers ; but it must not be converted into an asylum for fugitives from justice. An ambassador's immunities usually extend to members of his family living with him, and to members of his suite, over whom in subordinate matters he is at liberty to exercise a limited amount of jurisdiction. The common practice also seems to be, to extend the ambassador's privilege to messengers and couriers passing with despatches between the ambassador and his- own country or other legations, subject to their being provided with the requisite passports and evidence of their official character. Such is a general view of ambassadorial privilege, the more (i) See p. 84, supra. (tt) See Hall, pp. 170, 174. lOS Cases and Opinions on International Law. precise limits of which will appear from the cases subsequently cited. Before passing to these, it may not, perhaps, be out of place to mention that, under the regulations of the Congress of Vienna, 1815, and Aix-la-Chapelle, 1818, four classes of diplomatic agents are recognized (m). These, in the usual order of precedence, are : — (1) Ambassadors, papal legates, and nuncios ; (2) Enyoys and ministers plenipotentiary accredited to the Sovereign ; (3) Ministers resident accredited to the Sovereign ; (4) Charges d' Affaires ac- credited to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Ministers from different countries, inckided in the same class, take precedence in the order of the date of the notification of their arrival ; family ties and ties of alliance between the Sovereigns give no ground of pre- cedence. With reference to papal legates, Soman Catholic Powers formerly gave them precedence, but other Powers did not conform to this practice. Sometimes ministers of the second order have precedence given to them as a matter of courtesy. All these classes of diplomatic agents are entitled to the immunities above described. GYLLENBOUEG'S CASE. Temp. 1717. [Db Maktbns, Causes CELfeBEES, Vol. I., r- 97.] Case.] In 1717, Count Gyllenbourg, the Swedish Am- bassador to England, was ascertained to be engaged in a plot against the Hanoverian dynasty. He was arrested by order of the English Government, his despatches seized, and his cabinet broken open. Instead of being immediately sent from the kingdom, he was detained here for a time, the detention being partly due to the fact that similar measures had been adopted by the Swedish Government towards the English Minister in Sweden. Some dissatisfaction at the arrest was at first expressed by other ambassadors accredited to England, but these expressions were subsequently withdrawn, when the facts of the case were known, the Secretary of State having pointed (m) The terms of the rc9ez of the found in Wheaton, by Boyd, p. 318, in Congress of Vienna, and that of the notis. Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, ■will be Ambassadors — State Agents, . 100 out that •what had been done was necessary for the peace of the kingdom. In consequence of the mediation of other Powers, both ambassadors were subsequently released. Gyllenbourg's Case: De Martens, Causes C^i^bres, Vol. I., p. 97. Although an ambassador's privilege exempts him from criminal jurisdiction, yet if he should engage in acts dangerous to the safety of the State to which he is accredited, his arrest and imprisonment are clearly ■warranted as measures of self-defence. In 1718 occurred the case of the Prince of Cellamare, who was accredited by the Court of Spain to that of France. With the connivance of his own Govern- ment he organized a conspiracy against the French Government. This fact having been discovered, the French Government caused the Prince to be arrested and his papers seized. He was kept in custody for some time and then conducted under military escort across the frontier. War soon afterwards broke out between the two countries, but none of the other ambassadors then resident in Paris appear to have complained of the action of the French Government, although such a course is usual when there has been any unwarrant- able infringement of ambassadorial privilege (x). Akin to this class of cases, although differing in degree, are cases where ambassadors engage in acts that are unfriendly to the State to which they are sent, or intermeddle in local disputes. In 1848, Sir H. Bulwer, the British Ambassador to Spain, was believed by the Spanish Government to have lent his assistance to the disaffected subjects of that Government. His passports were thereupon handed him, and he was requested to leave Spanish territory. This led to the suspension of diplomatic relations between the two countries for some time, the dispute being only settled by the mediation of the King of the Belgians («/). In September, 1888, on the eve of the Presidential election in the United States, Lord Sackville, the British Ambassador, was tricked by means of a fictitious letter into offering suggestions to his correspondent as to how the franchise should be exercised. He also had interviews with certain newspaper reporters on the subject, reports of which were made public. There- upon the United States Government requested his recall, and almost immediately afterwards sent him his passports. Some correspond- ence ensued on the subject between the two Governments. Lord Salisbury requested that copies of the newspapers in which such (a) See PWllimore, II., 214. (y) See Wheaton, by Boyd, p. 336. 110 Cases and Opinions on International Law. reports were published, should be forwarded to him. These were sent i but the United States Foreign Secretary at the same time intimated his view that a request for the withdrawal of an am- bassador was sufficient, irrespective of the motives inspiring it, and that the retention of such a minister was solely a matter for the Government to which he was accredited, which might assign reasons or not, as it chose. Lord Salisbury, in reply, pointed out that although one Government was at liberty to demand the recall of or to dismiss the ambassador of another Government, it could scarcely expect the latter to lend itself to, or concur in such a proceeding, unless it was satisfied of the justice of the demand for recall (2). In view of the discourteous action of the United States Government, some time was allowed to elapse before a fresh ambassador was accredited to Washington by Great Britain. CASE OF THE CZAR'S AMBASSADOR. Temp. 1708. [Phillimouk's Isteknational Law, A'ol. II., p. 228.] In 1708, the ambassador of the Czar Peter the Great, who had been accredited to the Court of St. James', was arrested in London for a debt of £50. Instead of applying for a dis- charge on the ground of privilege, he gave bail in the action, but on the following day complained to the Queen. Those who were concerned in the arrest were then examined before the Privy Council, and thereupon committed to prison and prosecuted by information in the Court of Queen's Bench at the suit of the Attorney-General. At the trial the question of law was reserved for argument before the Judges, but was never determined. Meanwhile, to mitigate the indignation of the Czar, the Government of the day caused an Act to be passed precluding such proceedings in the future. Qase of tlie Czar's Amhassador : Phillimore's Inter- national Law, Vol. II., p. 228, With reference to the liability of an ambassador to civil process, Coke, the only authority as to the earlier law on this subject, lays (s) See Pari. Papers, Nos. 3 and i 888, United States. Ambassadors- — State Agents.^ ' 111 down that ambassadors are liable in civil cases on contracts jure yentium ; but even if the ambassador was at Common Law liable to civil jurisdiction, it does not follow that he was liable to aiTcst. Any doubt on this subject, however, was set at rest by stat. 7' Anne, c. 12, which may be considered as having brought-the English 'Law into harmony witli the Law of Nations. By this statute, all proceed- ings for the arrest and imprisonment of a foreign ambassador or minister, or his domestic servant, or for the seizure of the goods or chattels of any such person, are rendered illegal and void ; by section 5, however, no merchant or trader within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Laws, in the service of an ambassador or minister, is to have the benefit •of the Act, and no person is to be liable to .the penalties imposed by the Act for aiTesting any servant of ari ambassador or foreign rniuister, unless the name of such servant is registered in the office ' of one of the principal Secretaries of State, as provided by the Act. With regard to the interpretation of this clause, it was held by Lord Mansfield in Triquet v. Bath (3 Burr. 1478), that proof of actual bond Jide service was enough to secure exemption, and that the fact' of a defendant having previously been a trader in Ireland, would not bring him within the exception set up by the 5th section of the Act. In 1890, the Congress of the United States of America passed a •statute containing provisions very similar to those of the statute of Anne, and the decisions of the United States Courts on this subject are to a great extent in accordance with those of Great Britain {a). Passing from English Law to the Law of Nations on this subject, it would seem that, according to the generally accepted rules, an am- bassador is not liable to any form of civil execution. In an important case mentioned by Wheaton {b), the United States ambassador at Berlin had rented a house from a Prussian subject ; a question subsequently arose, as to whether a lien for rent and damage couhl be enforced, against the goods of the ambassador left in the house, this lien being annexed to the contract of tenancy by the Prussian (Civil Code. Prussia contended that the right of detention was a part of the contract, attached to it by the Prussian Civil Code, and that the ambassador by entering into the contract had resigned an im- munity which he otherwise might have claimed. The United States replied- that, if this principle were true, it might be contended that an ambassador rendered himself liable to arrest by accepting a bill of exchange. The goods were ultimately restored on payment being made for the damage done. Prussia, however, propounded the ques- tion, whether an ambassador who gave goods in pledge could recover [a) See the case of United States v. Dupont v. richon, i Dall. 321. Band, 2 Nash. C. C. Kep. 435, and (J) Wheaton, by Boyd, p. 287. 112 Cases and Opinions on International Law. them merely on the ground of privilege. The United States in theii? reply distinguished between an express pledge, where it was admitted that he could not recover the property, and an implied pledge given by the municipal law of the country, by which an ambassador would not be bound (c). TAYLOR V. BEST AND OTHERS. Temp. 1854. [14 Com. Bench, 487.] Case.] This action was brought against certain persons, upon a contract entered into in Belgium. Amongst the defendants was M. Drouet, the Belgian Secretary of Legation. M. Drouet duly entered an appearance, and the case was proceeded with till ready for trial, the defendants having even obtained a rule for a special jury. A summons was then taken out on M, Drouet's behalf, calling upon the plaintiffs to show cause •why all further proceedings should not be stayed or his name struck out of the proceedings, on the ground that he was a foreign minister. Judgment.] It was held, first, that a secretary of legation was entitled to all the privileges of an ambassador ; secondly, that he did not forfeit his privilege of immunity from jurisdic- tion by engaging in mercantile pursuits here; but, thirdly, that having voluntarily attorned to the jurisdiction, M. Drouet was estopped from setting up his privilege, although in the event of judgment being given against him, no execution could be taken out against either his person or property, this being precluded by the Act of 7 Anne, c. 12. Taylor v. Best, 14 Com. Bench, 487. (c) The arguments in this case are see Whcaton, by Boyd, pp. 833 — • set out at considerable length by 345. Wheaton, and are well worth perusal ; Ambassadors — Slate Agents. 113 The immunity of an ambassador from civil execution has already been dealt with. In Tayloi- v. Best the Court had to determine how far an ambassador was amenable to the earlier stages of civil juris- diction. The result was that, whilst fully recognising his immunity from civil execution, it yet held that he was amenable to the local jurisdiction by reason of his attornment ; the question being left open as to whether he could be brought unwillingly before the courts by process not affecting his person or his goods. The effect of this case, however, has since been modified by the decision in the case of The Magdalena Steam Navigation Co. v. Martin (28 L. J., Q. B., N. S. 310). In this case, the defendant, a foreign ambassador, on being sued for calls on shares in a company in liquidation, pleaded to the jurisdiction on the ground of his privilege as an ambassador. On demurrer judgment was given for the defendant, it being laid down that a public minister of a foreign State accredited to Great Britain, having no real property here, and having done nothing to disentitle him to the ordinary privilege of an ambassador, could not be sued in the courts of this country, even though neither his person nor his goods were touched by the suit. As to a suggestion that the action might be prosecuted to judgment with the view of ascer- taining the amount of the debt, the Court held that such a view was untenable ; that such proceedings would be anomalous, and would violate the principle laid down by Grotius (d), " Omnis coactio abesse a legato debet ; " they would produce the most serious inconvenience to the defendant, and would hardly be of any benefit to the plaintiff. This case seems to establish the entire immunity of an ambassador from civil jurisdiction under the English law. If an ambassador contracts debts which he refuses to pay, and if he also refuses to submit to the local jurisdiction, creditors have no remedy but to apply to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the ambassador's own country (e). Neither is there, it would seem, any power to compel a diplomatic agent or a member of his suite, to attend the local tribunals, or even to give evidence concerning any matter. When evidence is required from an ambassador or a member of his suite, the practice is to request that the ambassador will consent to furnish such evidence, and, although he may decline, yet it is not customary for him to do so. The evidence, if given, is generally taken before a diplomatic officer, or some official whom the minister consents to receive, and is then transmitted to the Court in writing. Where, however, by the local laws, evidence must be given orally before the Court in the presence of the accused, it is usual for the minister to submit himself for examination in the ordinary way. On the trial of Herbert for murder at Wasliington, in 1856, the Minister for the Netherlands, {d) L. 2, c. 18, s. 9. (<) Wheaton, by Boyd, p. 327. C.I.L, I 114 Cases and Opinions on International Law. an important witness, refused to appear in Court at the request of the United States Government. His own Government also refused to instruct him to appear as a witness, although requested to do so by the United States. Thereupon, the United States Government, whilst admitting his right to decline to appear, demanded his recall (/). In the Neiv Chile Go. v. Blanco (4 T. L. R. 346), the question was incidentally discussed as to how far the minister of a friendly State accredited to and resident within the territory of another foreign Power, could be made amenable to the English jurisdiction. An action had been commenced in the English Courts against the defendant, who was the Minister of Venezuela, accredited to the French Government and resident in Paris ; service having been effected on him whilst in Paris, an application was made to the Queen's Bench Division to set this aside ; the order was dis- charged on other grounds, and no judgment was given on the point. Huddleston, B., thought the privilege of an ainbas.=ador was confined to foreign representatives accredited to this country; but Manisty, J., expressed an opinion that the immunity of an ambassador as recog- nized by the courts of this country, would be violated by compelling an ambassador accredited to a foreign countr}', to appear and defend himself in Great Britain. PANTALEON SA'S CASE. Ttrnp. 1663. [ZotrCH, SOLUTIO QuiESTIONIS VBTERIS ET NOV^, SIVE DE LEOATI DELINQUENTIS JUDIOE COMPETENTE DISSERTATIO, IN PRjEFATIONE ; PHILLrMOEE II., 211.] Case.] Pantaleon Sa, who was the brother and one of the tiain of the Portuguese Ambassador under Cromwell, fell into a quarrel with one Gerrard about some matter, in the New Exchange, and wounded him, the latter's life only being saved by the interference of a by-stander. The next night, Sa came to the same place with fifty of his fellow-countrymen, armed to the teeth, with the intention of destroying his adversary. Many persons were wounded and one killed ; the Guards were called in, and were fired upon by the Portuguese. Some of the latter were arrested, but Sa and others took refuge in the house (/) See Calvo, § 683—4, and note. Ambassadors — State Agents. 115 of the Portuguese Ambassador, by whom they were subse- quently surrendered. Opinion and Result.] The matter was referred by Cromwell to a special Court of Delegates, who, after examination, came to the conclusion that Sa was amenable to our laws. He was then indicted, tried by a jury under a Commission of Oyer and Terminer, found guilty and suffered death. It appears from a report of the case, that if Sa had been an ambassador his privilege would have protected him, but a distinction was made between the principal and members of his train. Pantaleon 8a's Case: Zouch; Phillimore, II., 211. Notwithstanding the decision in Sa's case, by modern usage, the immunities of an ambassador are commonly extended to members of his family living with him because of their relationship to him ; to members of his suite because of their necessity to him in his ofBcial relations ; and also to his domestic and other servants because of their necessity to his dignity and comfort ((/). An oflfiicial list of these is generally required to be furnished to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Members of the Embassy are distributed by Calvo into three classes :— Counsellors, Secretaries, and Attaches. Some of these possess a privilege in their own right ; such is ordinarily the case with the Secretary of Legation, who is personally accredited to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Secretary to the Embassy is also frequently treated as an official person distinct from the general suite. But other members of the ambassador's suite only derive their privilege from their relation to the ambassador (j/ff). The duties of the ambassador's staff consist in supporting the Minister, in preparing and forwarding oflBcial despatches, in trans- mitting communications between their chief and the authorities of the country to which he is accredited, in classifying and keeping the archives of the mission, in ciphering and deciphering despatches, and in making minutes of the Minister's letters and the like. In Farlcinson v. Fotier (L. K. 16 Q. B. D. 152), it was held that the privilege of embassy extended to a person, if there was evidence that he was treated at the foreign embassy as a member of the ' legation and was employed fi'om time to time by the minister, and that if this were so, the Court would not measure the quantum of service rendered or required; in the same case it was recognized that an attache to an ambassador in this country, was not liable for (o) See Hall, p. 174. (gg) See Calvo, I., p. 486. I 2 116 Cases and Opinions ofi International Law. rates assessed on his private residence. Matthew, J., in the course of his judgment, said that apart from 7 Anne, c. 12, s. 3, the privi- lege of the embassy was recognized by the Common Law of England as forming part of International Law, and according to that law it was clear that all persons associated in the performance of the duties of the embassy were privileged, and that an attach^ was within that privilege. In Hophins t. I)e Roheck (3 T. R. 79), the Court had recognized the privilege in the case of a secretary to an embassy, and had also recognized that an attache came within the same principle. But in NoveUo v. Toogood (1 B. & C. 554), it was held that the goods of a chorister in the service of the Portuguese Ambassador, who was at the same time carrying on the business of a lodging-house keeper in the house in question, were not privileged from distress for poor-rates. In regard to (jriminal offences, if one of the suite commits a crime outside the ambassador's house, the proper course for the local authorities to adopt is to deliver him up to the ambassador, who should collect the evidence relating to the case and send the accused to his own Government for trial. But though these are the strict rights of the ambassador, the more convenient course is for the ambassador to send the offender to the local tribunals for trial. It should be observed that the English law on this subject is ex- ceptional. An illustration of this is afforded by the action of the British authorities in the case of a servant of Mr. Gallatin, the United States minister in London. This servant having committed an assault outside the limits of the ambassador's house, the local authorities claimed jurisdiction, and also claimed the right of arrest- ing the offender within the minister's house ; although it was admitted that, as a matter of courtesy, notice should be given of the intention to arrest, so that either the offender might be voluntarily handed over by the ambassador, or, failing this, might be arrested by the local authorities at a time convenient to the minister (A). The privilege usually accorded to members of an ambassador's suite, does not strictly extend to accused persons or fugitive criminals taking refuge in an ambassador's house. In 18G7, a Eussian subject, not in the employ of the ambassador, attacked and wounded an attach^ in the Russian embassy in Paris ; the Russian Government requested his surrender, but the French authorities refused the surrender, on the ground that the fiction of exterritoriality could not be extended to embrace his case, and on the further ground that the immunities of the house, if any, had been waived by the police having been called in(»). But in less civilized countries, the foreign, embassies are frequently resorted to as an asylum in times of political tumult. (h) See Hal], p. 177. (») See Wheaton by Dana, note No. 129. Ambassadors — State Agents. 117 VIVEASH V. BECKER. Temp. 1814. [3 Maule & Selwyn, 284.] Case.] The defendant, a merchant resident in London, was arrested in 1814, for a debt of 54-8^, and compelled to give a bail bond. A rule nisi for delivery up of the bond was obtained on his behalf, on the ground that he had been appointed Consul to the Duke of Oldenburg, and was acting in this capacity. Judgment.] On the application to make the rule absolute, Lord Ellenborough expressed the opinion that a consul was entitled only to a limited privilege, such as safe conduct, and if this was violated, his Sovereign had a right to com- plain ; but it had been laid down that a consul was not a public minister, and was not entitled to the jii,s gentium. The Act of Anne, which mentioned only ambassadors and public ministers, must be considered as declaratory, not only of what the Law of Nations was, but of the extent to which it should be carried. A different construction would lead to enormous inconvenience, for consuls had the right of creating vice-consuls, and they, too, must have similar privileges. Thus a consul might appoint a vice-consul in every port, to be armed with the same immunities, and this might become the means of creating an exemption from arrest indirectly, which the Crown itself could not grant directly. Under these circum- stances it was held that no privilege existed, that the defendant was liable to arrest, and that the application must be refused. Vlveash v. Becker, 3 Mau. & Sel. 284. This case is cited as illustrating the difference between the status of a consul and that of an ambassador, the former being subject to the local law, except in regard to certain specified matters, whilst the latter is not. The distinction was referred to in the American case of The Anm (3 Wheat. 435), where it was laid down that although a consul was in some sense a public agent, he was only lis Cases and Opinions on International Law. clothed with authority for commercial purposes, and that although he had a right to interpose claims on behalf of the subjects of the country for which he acted, yet he was not entitled to be considered as the agent of his Sovereign, or as entrusted by virtue of his office with authority to represent him in his negotiations with foreign States, or to vindicate his prerogative. Consuls are in fact merely the commercial agents of a Government m foreign parts. They are not even always subjects of the State in whose service they are, and are not infrequently subjects of the State in which they act. But whether this be so or not, they become subject to its laws, and are not strictly entitled to any privilege beyond other residents except in the following particulars : — (1) A consul is not usually subject to personal obligations that may attach to citizens of the State in which he is deputed to act, such as service in its militia or constabulary, or on its juries ; he is not liable to have soldiers quartered on him, nor is he subject to the payment of personal taxes, though he is subject to other forms of taxation ; (2) he is not amenable to the Iccal jurisdiction in respect of acts done by order of the Government in whose service he is, or in respect of political offences, until his commission is withdrawn ; (3) he has the right of having his Government's arms over his house ; (4) the consular papers and archives are exempt from seizure. In time of war his house and pajjers would also be exemjit from injury or molestation, except in cases of military necessity. In other respects a consul is amenable to the local laws and subject to the process of the local courts, but if charged with an offence he ought either to be admitted to bail or kept under surveillance in his own house, in order that his service to his own Government may not be prejudiced. In case of arrest, his commission would probably be at once determined by his own Government, or his exequatur withdrawn (w). Any outrage or insult inflicted on him would necessarily be regarded as more grave than it would be in the case of an ordinary foreign resident. Various grades of consular authority are recognized, of which the more important are the following : — (1) Consuls-general, who exercise functions over several places and sometimes over a whole country, (2) Consuls, (3) Vice-consuls and (4) Consular agents. The two latter classes, as a general rule correspond only through the consul or con- sul-general (/c). Consuls-general and consuls are usually appointed under commissions issued by their own Government, and com- municated to the Government within whose territory they are to act. Vice-consuls and consular agents are usually appointed under (ii) Sec next page. — Agents and Consuls-general, Consuls- (i) In Great Britain the Consular general, Consuls, \ioe-Consuls, Con- Service embraces the following ranks : sular Agents, and Pro-Consuls. Ambassadors — State Agents. 119 letters-patent, sometimes issued by the Government they represent, and soiretimes by the consul or consul-general to whom they are subordinate. Before acting, consuls must obtain an exequatur or formal permit from the Government in whose territory they are to act. This sometimes takes the form of letters-patent issued by the latter Government, but in other countries mere notice or an endorse- ment of their commission, is regarded as suihcient. This permit may be refused if the person appointed is not acceptable to the State within which he is to act, or it may be withdrawn if the consul should exceed his functions or act in an unfriendly or improper manner. The functions of a consul are mainly as follows :— (1) To watch over, the commercial interests of the country he represents, and to see that the local laws are properly administered in reference to its subjects, and that commercial treaties are duly carried out ; (2) to collect information for his own Government on commercial, economical, and political matters, and to embody this in a periodical report ; ( 3) to assist subjects of the State for which he acts, when in distress, and, if need be, to remit shipwrecked sailors and destitute persons to their own country; (4) to perform certain quasi judicial acts, such as the administration of oaths, the receiving of protests and reports from masters of vessels, the authentication of births, deaths, and marriages, and of judicial and mercantile instruments, the adminis- tration of the property of subjects of his own State dying intestate within the local jurisdiction ; (5) to conduct arbitration proceedings, and exercise a voluntary jurisdiction in disputes between his own countrymen, especially in commercial disputes, and to exercise a disciplinary jurisdiction (though not to the exclusion of the local courts, except where this is warranted by convention) over the crews of vessels belonging to his State. Very often his sphere of duties is enlarged by instructions from his own Government, and in some cases his powers and privileges are enlarged by convention between the State employing him and the State in which he acts {I). But throughout, his position is quite distinct from that of an amlDassador, except in non-Christian countries such as Turkey, Egypt, China, and if) The more important privileges national arms and flag over the Con- and powers secured to United States sulate, (6) the right to take deposi- Consuls in difi'erent countries by treaty, tions, to exercise a voluntary jurisdic- are (1) inviolability of the consular tion in certain kinds of disputes, (7) office and dwelling-house, (2) exemp- the right to reclaim deserters from tion from arrest and from obligation to United States vessels, (8) the right to appear as witness, or to discharge other intervene on behalf of United States public duties, (3) exemption from taxa- interests in questions of wreck and tion, military billeting or service, (4) salvage, and (9) the right to take out the right to apply to the local authori- administration in regard to the estates ties in the event of any infraction of of United States citizens dying within treaties, (5) the right to display the the local jurisdiction. i20 Cases and Opinions on International Law. Japan. At times, however, a consul is deputed to act as charge iVaffaires, and in such case he becomes temporarily invested with diplomatic functions and privileges. Official representations cannot in strictness be made through a consul, but should be made through the diplomatic agent of the country he represents. In certain non-Christian countries, or countries not strictly within the pale of International Law, consuls occupy a different ]iosition and exercise more important functions. Owing to the differences of custom and religion, European Governments, from a comparatively early time, refused to allow their subjects who settled in such countries, to pass under the jurisdiction of the local laws and coufts. The result has been to establish certain extra-territorial communities, which whilst existing within the territory of such countries, are nevertheless deemed to be outside it for the purposes of jurisdiction, and to remain subject to the law and courts of the country to which their members belong; this jurisdiction, in the first instance, being generally vested in the consul. Such arrangements usually depend on treaty ; and in Great Britain the exercise of such extra-territorial jurisdiction by British oflBcers and Courts must also be confirmed by Statute. These arrangements, depending as they do upon particular treaties and statutes, do not properly belong to International Law. The system, however, deserves to be noticed, both as affording another instance of those immunities commonly classed under the head of exterritoriality, and as illustrating the different position and functions of confuls in such countries. As between Great Britain and Cliina, the immunity of British subjects resident in China and the exercise of the consular jurisdic- tion over them, are provided for by tlie Treaties of 1842, 1843, and 1 858 ; and as between Great Britain and Japan by the Treaty of 1858. Under these treaties disputes between a British subject and a native are in the first instance to be referred to the consul, who is to enquire into the merits and endeavour to ai range the matter ainicably. If he cannot do this, he is to request the assistance of a native officer, in conjunction with whom he shall then enquire into the case and decide it equitably. All questions relating to jicrson or property, arising between British subjects only, are to bo .snbjecfc to the jurisdiction of the British authorities. Natives (•ommitting offences against British subjects are to be punished \)y the native authorities according to the native law. British subjects committing offences against natives or against the subjects of any other country, are to be punished by the consul, or other ]3nblic functionary authorized thereto, according to British law. Regarding the punishment of British subjects, the British Govem- livent undertakes to enact the necessai'y laws to attain that end. The Treaty of 1858 with China, whilst opening up eight new ports Ambassadors — State Agents. 121 to foreign trade, in addition to the five opened up by the Treaty of 1842, also authorized Great Britain to establish and maintain in China itself, a Supreme Court and various provincial Courts. The Supreme Court of China and Japan, has its seat at Shanghai, and the consuls have been made ex officio provincial judges, each acting in his own district, and exercising a jurisdiction subordinate to that of the Supreme Court (m). The necessary authority to exercise juris- diction of this kind in countries outside the British dominions is given by the British Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, 1843 to 1878 ; the jurisdiction being regulated by Orders in Council issued under those Acts. The powers of consuls in China and Japan are regulated by an Order in Council of 1865. A general system of Consular Courts has also been established throughout the dominions of the Ottoman Porte. By treaty and convention, power has been given to the more important Christian States to exercise jurisdiction according to their own laws, over their subjects resident within the Turkish dominions. No power is given to exercise jurisdiction over the subjects of other countries, this being left for arrangement between the Powers whose subjects are concerned. The British consular jurisdiction in Turkey (excluding Egypt) is now regulated by Orders in Council passed in 1873, 1874, and 1875. The British consular jurisdiction in Egypt is regulated by a separate Order in Council passed in 1876. Eesidence in a foreign country as consul, will not in itself impart an intention of acquiring domicile there. Thus in Nihoijet v. Niboyet (L. R. 4 P. D. 1), the Court whilst granting the relief prayed for, admitted that the domicile of the husband, although he was resident in England, had remained French by reason of his having acted as French consul. If, however, a person were a native of the country in which he acted, or if he were to carry on business in such country, his domicile there would be recognized, notwithstanding the fact of his acting as consul for some other country {mm). In any case, moreover, a person carrying on trade in a belligerent country in time of war, would not be exempted from liability in respect of his property by reason of his acting as consul for a neutral State (/»). (m) See Phillimore, II., 341. (mm) See p. 103, supra. (n) See Sorensen,\. The Queen, 11 Moo. P. C. C. Ul. 132 Cases and Opinions on International Law. McLEOD'S CASE. Temp. 1842. [Pabliamentauy Papeks, 1843, Vol. LXI.] Case.] McLeod was a British officer who had taken part in the attack on the "Caroline " (o). In the course of this attack a United States citizen, Durfee by name, had been killed. McLeod was afterwards arrested whilst in the United States, and charged with the murder. The British Minister at Wash- ington demanded his release, calling attention to the fact that the destruction of the .ship was a public act, done by persons in the employ of Her Majesty's Government, in obedience to supe- rior orders, and that the responsibility, if any, rested with Her Majesty's Government. The United States Government replied that as the matter was in the hands of the Courts, it was out of their power to release McLeod summarily. McLeod was subsequently brought to trial, but acquitted. Mr. Webster, the Foreign Secretary, subsequently admitted that after the avowal of the transaction as a public one by the British Government, no further responsibility existed on the part of the agent ; and in the following year an Act of Congress was passed providing that subjects of foreign Powers taken into custody for acts done under public authority should be discharged. McLeod's Case; Parliamentary Papers, 1843, Vol. LXI. McLeod's case is cited as illustrative of the immunity of public agents for acts done in their ofBcial capacity. Neither officers in command of armed forces, nor the members of their forces, are amenable to the criminal or civil laws of a foreign State in respect of acts done in their official capacity. The acts done may afford a casus belli against the State, but not a cause of action against the individual. (o) An account of this case will be found on p. 240, infra. Slave Trade. 123 SLAVE TRADE. "LE LOUIS." Temp. 1817. [2 DoDS. 210.] Case.] In 1816, " Le Louis," a French ship, was captured by an English colonial armed vessel, on suspicion of being engaged in the slave trade, and for resisting a demand for visit and search. She was taken to Sierra Leone and there condemned by a Court of Vice- Admiralty, for having been concerned in the slave trade, contrary to French law. Against the order of condemnation an appeal was made to the High Court of Admiralty. Jud^^ment.] Sir William Scott, in giving judgment, after ad- verting to the fact that the commander of the Enghsh vessel had been authorized to seize and detain all vessels offending against the slave trade, observed that neither any British Act of Parlia- ment, nor any commission founded on it, could affect the rights- or interests of foreigners, unless it was founded upon principles and imposed regulations consistent with the Law of Nations. The first matter of inquiry therefore was^ whether there was,. in the present circumstances, and by the Law of Nations, any such right of visitation and search. If there was no such right, and if it was only in the course of an illegal exercise of this right, that it was ascertained that " Le Louis " was a French ship trading in slaves, then this fact having been made known to the captor by his own unwarranted acts, he could not avail himself of discoveries so produced. At present no nation could exercise a right of visitation and search upon the common and unappropriated parts of the sea, save only on the belligei-ent claim. There being no such belligerent claim, the right of visit, in the present case, could only be legalised upon the ground that the captured vessel was to be regarded legally as a pirate. But slave traffic was not piracy or even a crime by the IM Cases and Opinions on International Law. universal Law of Nations. A nation had a right to enforce its own municipal rules and navigation laws, so far as such enforce- ment did not interfere with the rights of others, but it had no right under cover of its municipal regulations to visit and search all the apparent vessels of other countries on the high seas, in order to institute an inquiry whether they were not its own vessels violating its own laws. Moreover, after reviewing the facts, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the captor had not proved the existence of a French prohibitoiy law, and upon this, as well as upon the other grounds, he felt himself called upon to reverse the judgment of the Court below. Le Louis, 2 Dods. 210. This decision embodies two important principles : (1.) That the right of visit and search on the high seas is strictly a war right, and cannot, except in certain specified cases, such as piracy, be exercised by the public vessels of one nation against the private vessels of another, in time of peace. (2.) That the slave trade, though it may be dealt with as piracy by municipal law, yet cannot be regarded as piracy by the Law of Nations, except by universal consent. The slave trade was for long regarded as a lawful and desirable branch of traffic. The moral feeling of mankind asserted itself but slowly ; but at length the slave trade was made illegal by the municipal law of most maritime countries, although slavery was still tolerated. In Great Britain the slave trade was made illegal in 1808 ; and this example was soon afterwards followed by the United States, and ultimately by the other States of Europe. By later enactments, it was made piracy under the municipal regulations of most civilized States. After the slave trade had thus been declared illegal, the question arose as to the right of the public vessels of one nation to interfere with this traffic when carried on by the traders of another nation. The earlier principle adopted by the British Courts seems to have been, that a public vessel had a right to visit search and bring in for adjudication any vessel found trading in slaves, subject to a right on the part of the latter to be released, on showing that the slave trade was allowed by the law of the country to which she belonged. Thus, in the case of the Amedie (1 Acton, 240), an American vessel was engaged in carrying a cargo of slaves from Bonny, on the coast of Africa, to JIatanzas, in the island of Cuba; Slave Trade. 135 she was thereupon captured by an English vessel, and subsequently condemned by the Vice-Admiralty Court of Tortola for being engaged in an illegal traffic. This decree was affirmed on appeal, Sir 'Williatn Grant holding that the trade was prima fade illegal, and there was thrown on the claimant the burden of proving that by the par- ticular law of his own country, he was entitled to carry on the traffic. This decision was followed in the subsequent case of the Forkma (1 Dods. 81). In the case of the Diana (1 Dods. 95), a Swedish vessel, after taking a cargo on board at Gustavia St. Bartholomew, exchanged this at Cape Mount for one of slaves; whilst carrying the^e to a Swedish island in the West Indies she was seized by H.M.S. " Crocodile," and brought in for adjudication. The ship and cargo were condemned by the Vice-Admiralty Court of Sierra Leone, bnt tlie decree of that Court was reversed on appeal, on the ground that Sweden had not prohibited the trade, and had tolerated it in practice ; this decision being also in accordance with the principle of the Amedie. All these cases, however, seem to have been overruled by the decision in the case of Le Louis, which has been followed in sub- sequent cases. In Madrazo v. Willes (3 B. & A. 353), the plaintiff was a Spanish merchant, whose ship had been seized by the defendant, a captain in the Eoyal Navy, whilst engaged in the slave trade ; in an action for compensation, the plaintiff obtained a ver- dict for 21,180Z. damages, 18,1 SOL being in respect of the profit on the cargo of slaves. The defendant applied to have the damages reduced by that sum, on the ground that the slave trade was unlaw- ful by the law of England, but this application was refused. Bayley, J., laid down that the British statutes against the slave trade could not affect the subjects of other countries engaging in the slave trade outside the limits of British territory, and that the slave trade was not piracy jure gentium, although it might have been made so by municipal law. It will be seen from the case of the Antelope, and appended cases, that a similar course has been pursued by the courts of the United States. 126 Cases and Opinions on International Law. THE "ANTELOPE." Temp. 1825. [10 Wheaton, 66.] Case.] In 1819, the " Columbia," a privateer, entered Balti- more, clandestinely shipped thirty or forty men, proceeded to sea and hoisted the Artegan flag, assuming the name of the "Arraganta." She then captured an American vessel, from which she took twenty-five slaves; also several Portuguese vessels, and the " Antelope " a Spanish vessel, from each of which she took some slaves (p). The "Arraganta" and ■" Antelope " then sailed in company to Brazil, where the former was wrecked. Some of the crew and all the slaves were then put on board the " Antelope," which assumed the name of the " General Eamirez," under the command of John Smith. She was subsequently captured by a United States revenue cutter, sxA brought into Savannah for adjudication. The slaves were claimed by the Portuguese and Spanish Consuls on behalf of the original owners, by Smith as captured ^ure belli, and by the United States as having been transported from foreign parts by American citizens in contravention of United States laws, and as entitled to their freedom by those laws and by the Law of Nations. The Circuit Court dismissed the claim of John Smith, and also the claim of the United States except as to that portion of the slaves which had been taken from the American vessel, those remaining being divided between the Spanish and Portuguese claimants. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. Judgment.] Marshall, C. J., in giving judgment, stated that if, as it appeared, the slave trade was neither repugnant to the Law of Nations nor piracy, the right of bringing in a vessel for adjudication on this ground in time of peace, even where it {p) It will he I'emembered that Spain fitted out privateers with the during the Spanish American War of object of preying on Spanish com- Independence, the revolted colonies of merce. Slave Trade. 127 belonged to a nation that had prohibited the trade, could not be upheld. It was not the practice of the courts of any •country to execute the penal laws of another. Every foreign vessel captured by United States cruisers in time of peace for slave trading, must be restored. The decree, therefore, of the Circuit Court, so far as it directed restitution to the Spanish ■claimant of slaves found in the "Antelope" when captured was confirmed, the onus prohandi as to which slaves belonged to him being on the claimant; but the Portuguese slaves were decreed to be delivered up to the United States, inasmuch as there was not sufficient proof as to the ownership of them. The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66. The principle, which was laid down by Sir W. Grant in the case of the Amedie, seems to have been at first adopted, also, by the United States Courts (pp) ; but it was equally destined to give place to a more correct view of the relation of international to municipal law, and was overruled in the case of the Antelope. Though the slave trade was ultimately made piracy by the muni- cipal law of most European countries, yet the result of these decisions was to preclude, so far as the public vessels of Great Britain and the United States were concerned, any right of capture or visit and search, in regard to the vessels of other nations engaged in the slave trade. To meet this defect, treaties were subsequently entered into between the principal civilized nations, according a mutual right of visit and search under certain conditions, and within certain limits. By treaties of the 30th of November, 1831, and the 22nd of May, 1833, between Great Britain and France, to which nearly all the maritime powers of Europe subsequently acceded, a mutual right of search, with the view to the suppression of the slave trade, was conceded within certain geographical limits. By a treaty between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, dated the 20th of December, 1841, and subsequently ratified by all the signatories except France, the operation of the previous treaties was considerably extended. By the treaty of Washington of the 7th of April, 1862, between Great Britain and the United States, it was agreed that such public vessels of each contracting party as might be provided with special instructions for the purpose, should, within certain geographical limits, be at liberty to visit such merchant ships {pp) See the case of Xa Jeune Euginie, 2 Mason, 409. '12y Cases and Opinions on International Law. of the two nations as might upon reasonable grounds be suspected of being, or of haying during the voyage been engaged in, the African slave trade, or of having been fitted out for that purpose. The right of visit vfas to be exercised only by public vessels over merchant vessels, and was not to be exercised within the limits of a settlement or port, or within the territorial waters of the other contracting party. By a Convention of 1870, certain mixed Coui-ts which had been established by the Treaty of 1862 for the decision of questions of slave trading, were abolished ; and vessels captured were directed to be taken to the nearest ports of their own country for adjudication. In 1883 Turkey became a party to this league of nations for the suppression of the slave trade. Moreover, in 1885, by Article IX, of the General Act of the Berlin Conference, it was declared that trading in slaves was contrary to the principles of International Law, as recognized by the signatory Powers, and that the operations which by sea or land furnished slaves for trade ought also to be regarded as forbidden. The Article further provided, on the part of the Powers exercising sovereign rights over the teiTitories within the basin of the Congo, that these territories should not serve as a market or means of transit for the trade in slaves, of whatever race they might be, and that each Power should employ all the means at its disposal for putting an end to this trade and for punishing those engaging in it. PIRACY. THE UNITED STATES v. SMITH. )? Temp. 1820. [5 Whbaton, 153.] Case.] In 1819, Thomas Smith was indicted before the Circuit Court of Virginia for piracy. Smith and others formed part of the crew of a private armed vessel, which had been commissioned by the Government of Buenos Ayres, a colony at war with Spain ; they subsequently mutinied, and having seized another private armed vessel, commissioned by the Government of Artigas, which was also at war with Spain, they proceeded on a cruise, in the course of which they plundered and robbed a Spanish "vessel. A special verdict on the facts having been returned, the matter came before the Circuit Court ; this Court was divided in Piracy. 329 opinion as to whether the prisoner was guilty of piracy, and the question was reserved for the decision of the Supreme Court. Judgment.] The first point raised before the Supreme Court was whether an Act of Congress referring to the Law of Nations for a definition of piracy was a constitutional exercise of the power of Congress to define and punish piracy. This was decided in the affirmative. The next point considered was, whether the crime of piracy was defined by the Law of Nations with reasonable certainty. Story, J., in delivering the opinion of the Court, laid down that whatever might be the diversity of definitions in other respects, all jurists concurred in holding robbeiy or forcible depredation on the high seas to be piracy ; they universally treated piracy as an offence against the Law of Nations, and its true definition by that law, was robbery upon the sea. A final objection as to the sufficiency of the special verdict in regard to the facts, was decided in favour of its sufficiency. The Court, Livingston, J., dissenting, held the prisoner guilty of piracy and punishable accordingly. The United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153. Piracy,jw'« gentium, may be defined as the offence of depredating on the high seas without lawful commission. It is generally held to embrace any organization for the purpose of plunder on the sea or by descent from the sea, and also murder or robbery on the high seas accompanied by mutiny. According to Mr. Hall, " piracy includes acts diffjwing much from each other in kind and in moral value ; but one thing they all have in common — they are done under conditions which render it impossible, or unfair to hold any State responsible for theirjiommiesion. A pirate eitlier belongs to"iib State " or orgairizBd^"p3itical society, or by the nature of his act, he has shown his intention to reject the authority of that to which he is properly subject. If a body of men of uncertain origin seize upon a vessel and scour the ocean for plunder, no one nation has more con- trol over them or more responsibility for their doings than another, and if the crew of a ship takes possession of it after confining or murdering the captain, legitimate authority has for the time disappeared" {g). Piracy being an offence jure gentium, it follows that the moment (g) See Hall, p. 255. C.I.L. K 130 Cases and Opinions on International Law. a vessel assumes a piratical character, she loses her former nation- ality ; the vessel herself becomes liable to seizure by any public vessel, and her crew to punishment in any Court. But though a pirate may be tried in any Court, and is within the criminal juris- diction of any State, he is still entitled to regular trial. The stigma of piracy also attaches to the vessel ; but it would seem that in the case of a merchant vessel which has been used for piratical purposes, the taint of piracy will not affect the cargo. In the case of the Mahls Adhel v. The United States (2 Howard, 210), a vessel had been fitted out with an ordinary armament, quite consistent with her use for commercial purposes ; she was subsequently employed by her commander for the purpose of plunder on the high seas, this being done, however, without the knowledge or consent of her owners ; it was held that although this constituted piratical ag- gression within the meaning of the United States laws, yet that such acts would not usually involve or affect the cargo. Moreover, although the taint of piracy attaches to the ship in the first instance, it will not, in the absence of condemnation, travel with the ship through all her transfers to various owners. Thus in Reff. v. McCleverty (L. R. 3 P. C. 673), it was held that where a ship had been sold by public auction to a bond fide and innocent purchaser, before proceedings had been taken against her by the Crown, she could not afterwards be arrested and condemned, on the ground of having been previously engaged in piratical acts {qq). Piracy is commonly also the subject of regulation by municipal law, but so far as it is extended by municipal law beyond the limits of piracy /«)•« gentium, it affects only subjects of that State (?•). In the case of In re Tivnan (5 Best & Smith, 645), it was held that an extradition treaty, concluded between Great Britain and the United States, for the delivery up by one nation to the other of all persons charged with piracy committed within the jurisdiction of either, did not extend to piracy jure gentium committed upon a United States vessel on the high seas, but merely applied to acts that were made piracy by municipal law ; the phrase " within the jurisdiction" being considered equivalent to " within the exclusive jurisdiction," whereas j)iracyyMre gentium was justiciable everywhere. With regard to property captured by pirates, it is a rule of the Jjaw of Nations, derived from Roman Law, that it must be presumed never to have been divested from its original owners. On recapture no postliminium is necessary, and the property re-vests in the former ■owner, although salvage may be payable. In English Law, if not reclaimed by the former owner, the property formerly vested in the {qq) See also A.-G. of Hong Kong v. Kwok-a-Sing, L. E. 5 P. C. 199. (»•) See case of Le Louis, p. 123, supra. Piracy. 131 Crown, whilst property belonging to the pirates themselves vested in the Lord High Admiral. The distinction, however, between droits of Crown and droits of Admiralty is no longer of any importance. Besides piracy proper, there are certain offences which are usually classed with piracy. Thus a ship accepting a commission from two Powers has sometimes been deemed piratical ; but according to the better opinion, it would seem that if the two Powers are allied, and she attacks only a common enemy, her conduct is irregular only, and not piratical. A natural born subject accepting a commission and committmg acts of hostility on the high seas against his native country is deemed guilty of piracy by the municipal laws, both of (Jreat Britain and the United States. There has been some dis- position also, to regard as a pirate a subject of a neutral State who accepts a commission from one of two beUigerents to cruise against the other. In 1839, during war between France and Mexico, Admiral Baudin, who was in command of the French fleet, issued a notification to the effect that every privateer in the service of the enemy, of which the captain and two-thirds of the crew were not Mexicans by birth, would be regarded as a pirate and her crew treated as such (s). In 1846, during war between the United States and Mexico, President Polk suggested to Congress, that it would be a matter for the consideration of their criminal courts, whether the holders of letters of marque issued in blank by the Mexican Govern- ment and subsequently sold to foreigners, should not be regarded as pirates it). On the outbreak of the American Civil War, the Con- federate States offered their letters of marque to foreigners, but the fact that the acceptance of such a commission would have been penal under the municipal regalations of other States, coupled with the threat of the Federal Government to treat such vessels as piratical, had the effect of preventing this offer from being accepted. The action of belligerents in issuing letters of marque to neutral subjects is frequently prohibited by treaty ; whilst the acceptance of such a commission by neutral subjects is generally prohibited by municipal law. The abolition of privateering as between the parties to the Declaration of Paris, 1856, and also as between States that have acceded to the principles of that Declaration, renders the question of the international character of this offence, one of less importance than heretofore. Even if a belligerent is not warranted by existing rules of International Law in treating such conduct as piratical, there can be no doubt that usage discloses a strong ten- dency in this direction, and in view of the fact that a neutral in accepting such a commission is usually animated only by the motive (s) See Ortolan, vol. i., pp. 219 & 430. (t) Ibid. p. 217. K 2 132 Cases and Opiniotis on International Law. of plunder, there would seem to be good moral ground for the adoption of such a rule, even though it might not perhaps be desir- able to inflict the extreme penalty. THE SERHASSAN PIRATES. Temrp. 1845. [2 W. Bob. 354.] Case.] In 1843, complaints arose as to certain acts of piracy committed by a band of pirates infesting the coasts of Borneo and Tangong Dattoo. Information having reached Singapore of the plunder of a trading vessel bound for that port, a pinnace and two cutters were dispatched from H.M.S. "Dido," under the command of Lieutenant Horton, to put down the pirates. Whilst off the coast of Serhassan six prahns, or native boats, were observed approaching the cutters with every indication of hostile designs. Ou their nearer approach a flag of truce was hoisted and the crews of the prahns were addressed in their native language and their purpose was demanded. In spite of this the prahns continued to advance and attacked the boats. The result of the encounter was that all the prahns were captured. A motion was made to the Court of Admiralty to decree bounty for the capture under 6 Geo. IV., c. 49. The motion was opposed on the ground that there was not sufficient evidence that the crews of the prahns were pirates. Judgment] The Court in its judgment, after reviewing the facts of the case, stated that it was sufficient to clothe the conduct of the men with a piratical character if they were armed and prepared to commence a piratical attack upon any other person. That the attack was premeditated was clearly shown by the fact that an ambush was placed on shore to cut off the detachment in case they should land. It could make no difference whether they were inhabitants of that or any other island. Nor could it be imagined that the title of pirate attached solely to persons following an avowed piratical occu- Piracy. 183 pation upon the high sea. The bounty was accordingly awarded, but the case was not to be made a precedent for others of the kind, where the circumstances might be different. Every one of the cases must depend on its own merits and upon the locality where the transaction took place. The Serhassan Pirates, 2 W. Rob. 354. This case is cited as an iUustration of the principle that any aggres- sion by sea on the part of persons without lawful commission may be deemed piratical. THE "HUASOAR." Temp. 1877. [Parliamentary Papers, 1877, Vols. LII. and LXXXIII.] Case.] In 1877 a revolutionary outbreak took place in Peru. The ironclad " Huascar " was seized at Callao by her crew and by some of her officers, in the interest of the insurgent leaders. She then cruised off the coast, stopping private vessels, demanding dispatches for the Peruvian Government, and in one case taking a quantitj' of coal which was not paid for. It also appeared that a British subject was detained on board and compelled to act as engineer. Meanwhile the Peruvian Government had issued a proclamation to the effect that it would not be responsible for the acts of anyone on board the " Huascar." Admiral De Horsey, under these circum- stances, summoned the " Huascar " to surrender, and failing this an action was fought, in which the " Huascar " sustained considerable damage but succeeded in escaping under cover of the night. On the following day she surrendered to the Peru- vian national squadron. A claim for compensation was there- upon made by the Peruvian Government against Great Britain, in respect of the damage done to the " Huascar." Opinion.] The British Government refused to entertain the claim, and the matter having been submitted to the law officers of the Crown, the latter advised, that, inasmuch as the vessel 134 Cases and Opinions on International Law. had been taken out of the hands of the proper authorities, and the Peruvian Government had disavowed liability for her acts, she was sailing under no flag, and no redress could be obtained for any acts which she might commit, and that in view of what had occurred the proceedings resorted to by Admiral De Horsey were justifiable. The Peruvian Government also submitted the matter to its law officers, and the latter having advised that the acts of the "Huascar" were piratical, the matter was allowed to drop. The Huascar, Parliamentary Papers, 1877, Vols. LII. and LXXXIII. In connection with the carrying on of maritime warfare by rebels, two questions may arise : (1) that which arose in the Huascar, as to liow far neutral States would be justified in treating any interference with their subjects, by the rebels, as piratical ; and (2) that which arose incidentally in the case of the Virginms, as to how far the established Govemment, against which the rebellion is directed, is at liberty to treat neutral subjects taking part in it, as guilty of piratical conduct. With reference to acts committed by insurgents carrying on war by sea, if their belligerency has been recognized, then, their operations, if confined within the limits usually prescribed to belligerents, would not be regarded as piratical. Thus the cruisers of the Con- federate States during the American Civil War were allowed to exer- cise the right of visit and search, as well as other rights accorded by neutrals to a belligerent State. Greater difficulty occurs in considering the case of insurgents whose belligerency has not been recognized. As a body they are unknown to International Law, and therefore, at first sight, acts committed by tliem appear to be piratical. But the question is really one of fact and degree. If the rebellion is one of any magnitude and there exists any organization capable of keeping order amongst its members, there Avill be a state of de facto belligerency, which will prevent acts done Avith the lon&flde intent of assisting military operations, from being deemed piratical, even though they may affect prejudicially the interests of the subjects of other States. In the event of such an organization being comparatively insignificant, there would be greater reluctance on the part of foreign nations to allow the persons or property of their subjects to be interfered with. In no case, more- over, should military or naval operations be allowed to become a mere Piracy. 185 cloak for the commission of depredations. In such cases the persons concerned if apprehended might well be subjected to punishment, as being guilty of acts in their nature piratical. On the occasion of the seizure of a Spanish squadron in 1873, by the Carthagena insurgents, instructions were issued by the British Foreign Office to the Admiralty, that if the insurgents committed acts of piracy against British subjects or affecting British interests, they should be treated as pirates, the Spanish Government having deprived them of the protection of its flag, but that in default of this they were not to be interfered with. THE "VIRGINIUS." Temp. 1874, [Parliamentary Papers, 1874, Vol. LXXVI.] Case.] The " Virginius " was a registered United States vessel, but had, in fact, for some time previous to July 1873, been employed in the service of the Cuban insurgents. She arrived at Kingston on the 9th of that month. On the following morning the Spanish war-ship, " Charrakia " which had followed her from Colon, arrived in the harbour and took up her position near her. The "Chari'akia," however, left Kingston on the 16th of July. The "Virginius" remained there until the 23rd of October, when she cleared nominally for Limon Bay, Costa Rica ; but instead of proceeding there, she really made for the coast of Cuba, and after being chased by a Spanish war-ship, put into Port-au-Prince, Hayti, where she shipped a quantity of ammunition. Thence she proceeded again to the coast of Cuba, when she was again chased and eventually captured by the Spanish war-ship " Tornado " on the 1st of November. The ship was taken to Santiago de Cuba. Four of her passengers were tried on the 3rd of November, and were shot on the 4th. Later, sixteen British subjects, part of the crew, were shot in spite of the protests of the British authorities, and seven more were detained in prison. Great Britain thereupon declared that she would hold the Spanish Government responsible for any further executions^ ,] 36 Cases and Opinions on International Law. reserving for the time being the question of the executions that had already taken place. The Spanish Government ultimately agreed to place the surviving British subjects at the disposal of the United States Government, as they were captured on board what was nominally a United States vessel, and added that the Governor-General of Cuba was instructed to order an immediaite investigation into the matter, from which it would be seen whether the families of the British subjects sentenced to death had a right to indemnification. In the course of the negotiations the Spanish Government called attention to the fact, that it appeared from the declarations of the captain and some of the crew of the " Virginius," that they had touched at Port-au-Prince in Hayti and other places in the same island, and had taken on board arms and ammunitions of war ; that they had thence proceeded towards the coast of Cuba with the view of landing the arms and ammunition ; and that they had on board some of the principal chiefs of the insurrec- tion, and other persons who came to strengthen its diminished forces in the island. On these grounds the Spanish Govern- ment contended that both vessel and those on board were liable to be treated as piratical. In spite of this contention, in March, 1874, a demand for compensation was made by Great Britain. No complaint was made on account of the seizure of the "Virginius" or the detention of her crew. The ground of complaint was, that, assuming the vessel to have been lawfully seized and the crew properly detained, there was no justifica- tion for their summary execution after an irregular proceeding before a dnimhead court-martial. No possible aspect of the character of the " Virginius " and her crew could authorize or palliate such conduct, and there was no pretence for treating the expedition as piracy jure, gentium. Even if the '' Virginius " was to be regarded as a vessel piratically engaged in a hostile or belligerent enterprise, such treatment would not have been justi- fiable. Much might be excused in regard to acts done under the expectation of instant damage and in self-defence, whether by a nation or by an individual. But after the capture of the Piracy. 137 " Virginius," and tLe detention of her cvew was effected, no pre- tence of imminent necessity of self-defence could be alleged ; and it then became the duty of the Spanish authorities to prosecute the offenders in proper form of law, and to institute regular pro- ceedings on a definite charge, before the execution of the prisoners. It was maintained that there was no charge known either to the Law of Nations or to any municipal law, under which persons in the situation of the British crew of the " Virginius " could justifiably have been condemned to death. They were persons not owing allegiance to Spain, the acts done by them were done out of the jurisdiction of Spain, they were essentially non-combatants in their employment, and they could not, by any possible construction, be deemed to have rendered themselves liable to the penalty of death. Ultimately the Spanish Government was compelled to make compensation to the families of the British subjects who had been executed. Meanwhile, a question of a somewhat different character arose between the United States and Spain. On the 29th of November, 1873, a protocol was entered into between those Powers, whereby Spain agreed to restore the vessel and the survivors of the passengers and crew forthwith, and further to salute the United States flag on the ensuing 2.5th of December, unless she should in the meantime prove that the ship was not entitled to carry the United States flag. The matter was submitted to the United States Attorney-General for his Opinion, as to whether the vessel was at the time of capture entitled to carry the United States flag. He gave an opinion on the 12th of December, that she was not so entitled, inas- much as she had not then been registered in accordance with the law of the United States ; but he also expressed an opinion that she was as much exempt from interference on the high seas as she would have been if lawfully registered. Spain had a right to capture vessels with an American register and carrying the American flag, found in her own waters assisting or endeavouring to assist the Cuban insurrection ; but she had no right to capture such vessels upon the high seas, upon an 138 Cases and Opinions on International Law. apprehension that, in violation of the neutrality or navigation laws of the United States, they were on their way to assist the rebellion ; she might defend her territory and people from the hostile attack of what was, or appeared to be, an American vessel ; but she had no jurisdiction whatever on the question as to whether or not such vessel was on the high seas in violation of any law of the United States. In the result the vessel was surrendered to the United States authorities in the Island of Cuba on the 16th of December, 1874. On her way thence to the United States she met with bad weather and sank off Cape Fear. The, Virginius, Parliamentary Papers, 1874, Vol. LXXVI. The two questions in issue in the case of the Virginius were sub- stantially, (1) the treatment of persons, especially subjects of other States, found engaged in furthering an insurrection ; and (2) the question of the finality of the flag on the high seas. In regard to the first question, the views expressed by the British Government may be regarded as a correct exposition of International Law on this subject. Even if piratical, such persons were, except under circumstances of imminent necessity, entitled to a regular trial; in addition to this, the conduct of those who were merely members of the crew of the "Virginius" and who were British sub- jects, and consequently owed no allegiance to Spain, could scarcely be deemed to fall within the limits of piracy. In regard to the question of the finality of the flag, it is necessary to remember, that had the Cuban insurgents been recognized as bellige- rents, the public vessels of each of the combatants would then have been entitled to exercise as a war-right, the right of visit and search in regard to vessels flying the neutral flag on the high seas. But even wliere there is no recognition of belligerency, it can scarcely be main- tained that the mere fact cf flying a foreign flag is altogether final, and absolutely precludes a State engaged in suppressing an insurrec- tion from molesting a vessel suspected of aiding rebels. If there were reasonable ground for believing that such a vessel was really engaged in a hostile expedition, or that it was really owned by subjects of tJie State threatened, a public vessel of that State might reasonably, and as a matter of self-preservation, exercise a right of visit and search, and if its suspicions were confirmed, capture the vessel so employed. The fact of the ship carrying the flag or register of another nation would. Privateers. 13i> of course, render additional caution necessary, and reasonable proximity to the territory threatened would probably be regarded as essential to justify such interference. Compensation should be made for detention on erroneous grounds, and where there is a con- flict of evidence the question should be referred to a third party. PRIVATEERS. THE "CURLEW." Temp. 1812. [Stewart's Vice-Admiealty Repokts, 312.] Case.] Shortly after the outbreak of war in 1812 between Great Britain and the United States, the " Curlew," an American privateer, was captured by a British war-ship, and l)rought into Halifax, Nova Scotia. There was not at the time a sufficient number of British war-ships to protect British trade against the enemy, and a petition was presented to the Court that the " Curlew " might be handed over to certain persons, with the view to her being converted into a privateer. Judgment.] Dr. Croke in giving his decision stated that the Court could not accede to the proposal. Both by the Law of Nations, and the municipal law of the country, the power of granting commissions to privateers was vested in the sovereign or his deputy, and no authority to grant such commissions had been transmitted to the Court. By the Law of Nations, if any private subjects cruised against the enemy without such com- mission, they were liable to be treated as pirates. Under these circumstances the prayer of the petition was refused. The Curlew, Stewart's Vice-Admiralty Reports, 312. Privateers are vessels owned by private persons, but acting in time of war as public war vessels, under commissions from the State, called letters of marque. The practice of employing privateers dates back to a time prior to the existence of permanent navies. It was subsequently sanctioned by universal maritime usage. It had some advantages, especially in enabling a State, not possessed of a permanent navy, to call into being a temporary maritime force. On the other hand, the 140 Cases and Opinions on International Law. object of those who fitted out such vessels was merely private gain, pursued by a system of legalised plunder, and the crews of these vessels, being under little control, were frequently guilty of pillage and outrage. Some attempt to mitigate these evils was made by taking bonds from the owners as security for the appointment of proper officers, and for the good behaviour of the crew. Such vessels were also liable to inspection by public vessels. In the Am.erican case of the Dos Bermanos (10 Wheaton, 306), it was held that under United States law the only claim that could be made by priva- teers in respect of their prizes was one in the nature of salvage. The subject is now of less importance than formerly, privateering having been abolished by the Declaration appended to the Treaty of Paris, 1856, as between the parties thereto. That declaration has since been acceded to by all civilized nations, except the United States, Spain, and Mexico. For the future, therefore, privateers can only be lawfully employed where one of the non-consenting Powers happens to be a party to the war. In 1870, during the Franco-Prussian war, the Prussians invited private owners to fit out vessels at their own expense, on condition of receiving a large premium on the destruction of French ships of war ; the crews and officers were to be furnished by the owners, but the former were to be under naval discipline, whilst the officers were to wear the naval uniform. The French Government protested to Great Britain, suggesting that what was being done constituted a breach of the Declaration of Paris, but the British Government refused to interfere, holding that there was an essential distinction. In 1878, when war seemed imminent with Great Britain, Russia proposed a similar system of depredating on English commerce. Mr. Hall suggests that the view of the matter taken by the British Government in 1870 was incorrect, and that the distinction between these proposals and privateering proper was merely formal (m). In both cases the armament was provided for the sake of gain, in both cases the crews were to work rather in their own pecuniary interest than in that of their nation. The fact thatthe Prussian volunteer ships were to be fitted out for the purpose of attacking men-of-war only, was merely incidental to the first Prussian declaration exempting altogether private property on the sea from capture. This was in itself a mere artifice, intended to force the hand of the French Government, and when it failed of this result, it was repealed. Had the so-called volunteer navy been proceeded with, therefore, we may reasonably assume that its operation would have extended to private ships and private property, and would have afforded another instance of the lawless repudia,tion of treaty engagements. («) See Hall, p. 527. PART II.— WAR. STEPS SHORT OF WAR. THE "BOEDES LUST." Temi). 1804. [5 C. Rob. 233.] Case.j In 1803 disputes arose between Great Britain and Holland, in consequence of which, on the 16th of May, an embargo was laid on all Dutch property. The " Boedes Lust," a Dutch vessel, was seized on the 19th of May, and in June, war was de- clared against Holland. On the captors proceeding to adjudica- tion, the property was claimed on behalf of certain persons resident at Demarara on the ground that they were not, either at the time of seizure or of adjudication, in the position of enemies of Great Britain. It appeared that at the time of the seizure under the embargo, Demarara was a Dutch settlement, but the claimants urged that the property had been seized before the actual declaration of war with Holland, and consequently at a time when they were not yet enemies. It further appeared that before the end of the war, Demarara had come again under British control ; consequently it was urged that at the time of adjudication the property could not be deemed enemy property. Judgment.] Sir Wm. Scott in giving judgment stated in effect that the seizure under an embargo was at first equivocal, and if the matter in dispute had terminated in reconciliation the seizure would have been converted into a mere civil embargo, and the property would have been restored ; but if, as actually happened in the present case, hostilities ensued, then the out- 14a Cases and Opinions on International Law. break of war had a retroactive effect, and rendered all property previously seized liable to condemnation as enemy property taken in time of war. As to the second contention, he must hold that the property at the time of the capture belonged to subjects of the Batavian Eepublic, and that the subse- quent acquisition of the territory by Great Britain would not preclude the consequences of their original hostile character. A decree of condemnation was therefore pronounced (a;). The Boedes Lust, 5 C. Rob. 233. The usual methods of extorting redress, short of war, are embargo, retortion, reprisals and pacific blockade. A hostile embargo consists in the provisional arrest of ships or goods belonging to an offending nation found in the harbours or interior waters of another State. It is adopted either as a means of procuring redress, or as an anticipatory measure to war. If war follows, the ships are liable to condemnation ; if not, they are restored, compensation being made for their detention. Sometimes what is termed a civil embargo is employed. In strictness this ajjplies to subjects only, and consists in the arrest or detention of vessels belonging to the nation imposing the embargo, found in its local Avaters, as a measure of internal safety {y). This may take place in order to prevent the spread of intelligence as to the condition of a country, or prior to the exercise of jus angaricB, or in order to pro- tect one's own trade against improper restrictions imposed by foreign nations. Retortion consists in treating the subjects of another State in the same way as that State has treated one's own subjects. Thus, a tax imposed by one State to the prejudice of the subjects of another State, might be met by a similar course of conduct on the part of the latter. It is commonly laid down that retortion only extends to imperfect rights or mere rights of comity, and not to rights the violation or withholding of which would afford a casus belli. Reprisals consist in the adoption of measures of retaliation ; they a,re not confined to similar measures or to imperfect rights. They are sometimes said to be either general or special ; but between the former kind of reprisals and open war there seems to be no real dis- tinction. General reprisals may, therefore, be considered as a mere (sc) The matter was further compli- fused to allow this consideration to catcd by the fact that, prior to the affect his judgment : see p. 250 of the Treaty of Amiens, 27th March, 1802, report. Demarara had been in the possession (j/) See Stephen's Commentaries, vol. of the English ; but Sir "W. Scott re- ii., p. 616. Steps Short of War. 143 preliminaiy to or concomitant of war (2). Thus in 1854, on the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Eussia, a British Order in Clouncilwas issued providing that general reprisals should be granted against " the ships, vessels, and goods of the Emperor of All the Eussias and of his subjects, or others inhabiting within any of his ■dominions." Special reprisals, on the other hand, were measures resorted to, with a view to vindicate an injury committed against an individual subject or subjects, for which justice had been plainly ■denied or unreasonably delayed without, however, entering upon a «tate of open war (a). In Great Britain it was the custom in such cases for the Sovereign to issue letters of marque or reprisal ; these were issued either to the individual or individuals injured, •or to the armed forces or agents of the State. But in modern times the issue of letters of reprisal to private individuals has become ■obsolete, and with this much of the old learning on the subject has become inapplicable. Even in modern times, however, instances ■occur of special reprisals, or measures of retaliation short of general war, being resorted to by the State itself, with a view to enforce compensation for wrongs done to its subjects. In this case reprisals are either negative, where the State to which the injured party belongs, refuses to fulfil some obligation, or sus- pends the operation of certain treaties till justice is done. This was the expedient resorted to by Prussia in the case of the Silesian loan in 1752, although the position she took up is now commonly Tegarded as having been unjustifiable (J). Or reprisals may be posi- tive in their character, in which case they generally take the form of a seizure of the persons or the property of subjects of the offending State, more usually the latter. In 1834, President Jackson, in his message to •Congress recommended the adoption of repi'isals on the part of the United States against France, observing that it was a well-settled prin- ciple of the International Code that where one nation owed another a liquidated debt, which it refused or neglected to pay, the aggrieved party might seize property belonging to the other State or its subjects, «ufiBcient to paythedebt, without giving just cause of war - . . He then proceeded as follows : — " I recommend that a law be passed, authoriz- ing reprisals upon French property, in case provision shall not be made for the payment of the debt at the approaching session of the French Ohambers ; such a measure ought not to be considered by France their own hands, and save the property of French citizens from that seizure and sequestration which American citizens have so long endured without retaliation or redress ; if she should continue to refuse it and if, in violation of the Law of Nations, she should make the reprisals on our part an occasion of hostilities against the United States, she would but add violence to injustice and could not fail to expose her- self to the just censure of civilized nations " (c). Even this form of reprisals, however, would, in modern times and as between more powerful States, probably lead to war. Consequently this form of redress is now resorted to chiefly where the oflfending State is a minor Power, whom the injured State wishes to coerce without giving occa- sion to the misery and the suffering caused by actual war. Thus in 1840 the British Government issued reprisals against the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, in consequence of the infraction of the Treaty of 1816, and of the injury thereby caused to British subjects. In pur- suance of the directions issued on that occasion, a number of Neapolitan vessels were captured by the British fleet, and a hostile embargo was also laid on all vessels in the ports of Malta that bore the Sicilian flag. That this was not intended to bring about a state of war may be gathered from the fact that the British Minister was in- structed to remain at Naples. The French Government, however, mediated, and amicable relations were restored. Another form of reprisals, also resorted to in similar cases, consists in laying an embargo on the vessels and goods of the offending State in its own ports. An account of this form of reprisals and of pacific blockade will be found in the appended note to the case of Don Pacifico {d). SILESIAN LOAN. Temp. 1752. [De Maktens' Causes CiLiBr.Es, "Vol. II. p. 97.] Case.] In 1744, war broke out between Great Britain on; the one side, and France and Spain on the other. For more than a year Great Britain in no way interfered with the commerce of Prussian subjects. Towards the end of 1745, the latter, who had hitherto only engaged in commerce on their own vessels and for their own account, commenced to load entire cargoes on their ships on account of France, while they (o) See Phillimore, III. 43. (d) See p. 148, infra. Steps Short of War. 145 made use of neutral vessels of other nations to carry their own merchandise. Thereupon several Prussian ships, loaded with planks for France, were captured by the English and subse- quently condemned. By the end of 1748, the English had captured eighteen Prussian vessels and thirty-three other neutral ships chartered either wholly or in part by Prussian subjects. By way of reprisal, the King of Prussia confiscated certain funds, which had been lent by English subjects on the security of the revenues of Silesia, and which he had bound himself to repay by the Treaties of Breslau, Berlin and Dresden, 1742. Discussion and Opinions.] It was contended on behalf of Prussia, (1) that the arrest of the ships was contrary to the Law of Nature and of Nations, under which the only privilege accruing to England, was, to permit her war ships to ascertain that there was no contraband on neutral vessels sailing for Spain or France ; (2) that the British authorities had acted illegally in capturing Prussian vessels returning laden from France, and in taking them into English ports and requiring proof that the goods on board belonged to Prussian subjects ; (3) that the capture of the thirty-three other neutral vessels with Prussian goods on board was illegal ; (4) that the goods confiscated were not contraband according to the declaration of two English ministers ; (5) that the English courts had, in these circumstances, no jurisdiction over neutral property; (6) and that the King of Prussia was entitled to utilize the funds in his hands in order to indemnify his own subjects, even though the funds were hypothecated to British subjects. The matter was submitted by the British Government to a commission consisting of the judge of the Supreme Court, the King's Advocate-General in Civil Courts, the Procurator- General, and the Solicitor-General (e). In their opinion on the matter they laid down, as generally received and (c) These are the terms used by De mission consisted of one of the judges, Martens in his account of the case. the Advocate-General, the Attorney- Presumahly the members of the Com- General, and the Solicitor-General. C.I.L. L 146 Cases and Opinions on International Law. recognized principles of International Law, the following propositions: — (1) That when two Powers were at war, each Power had the right of capturing the vessels and effects of the other met with on the high seas, although property ascertained to belong to neutrals could not be made prize, so long as they preserved their neutrality. Hence it fol- lowed : (2) that enemy goods on neutral vessels were liable to seizure, and (3) that neutral goods on enemy ships should be restored. (4) Further, contraband, though belonging to neutrals, was good prize ; (5) before appropriation there must be condemnation ; (6) the only tribunal competent to condemn was the Court of the captor ; (7) all proofs in the matter should, in the first instance, be taken from the vessel seized. (8) Finally, the Law of Nations permitted reprisals ia two cases only : — (a) in the case of a violent wrong directed and supported by the sovereign authority ; and (6) in the case of a denial of justice by all the tribunals and the Sovereign himself in matters admitting of no doubt. As to the contention raised on behalf of Prussia, that enemy goods were free on neutral ships, the English . commissioners reported that the contrary principle was too well established to be open to doubt. As to the seizure by the English of goods alleged to be Prussian and not contraband, it appeared that none of the goods seized really belonged to Prussia. With regard' to the character of contraband a mere verbal declaration of any minister, as to what was contraband, could not have the force of a treaty. As to the contentions founded on the freedom of the sea, even those who maintained this pro- position in its widest extent, granted that when two nations Avere at war they had the right to seize one another's property on neutral ships. As to the reprisals formerly made by Great Britain against Spain, in that case the right of the former to compensation had been admitted, the amount fixed and pay- ment promised by a convention ; reprisals, it is true, had followed on the non-observance of the convention, but these were only generaj, reprisals, and no debts due to Spanish Steps Short of War. 147 subjects 01- effects iu British territory belonging to them, had been seized. In the present case the King of Prussia had given his word of honour to pay a debt due to private indi- viduals. This debt was negotiable and a great part of it might have been transferred to subjects of other Powers. It would be difficult to find a case where a debt owing to private indivi- duals had been seized by way of reprisal. In addition to this the debt should have been paid off in 1745, whereas Prussia's complaints commenced only in 1746. In reply to the I'eport of the English Commissioners it was again urged by Prussia that it was contrary to the Law of Nations to capture a neutral vessel on account of a presumption or sus- picion of its having enemy goods on board, or to condemn the goods as prize merely in default of proof that they belonged to neutrals. If enemy goods on neutral vessels were liable to seizure so much discussion would arise that there would be no liberty of commerce so long as any two nations of the world were at war. Most of the commercial nations of Europe had adopted the maxim of free ships free goods, and that rule, together with the rule of hostile ships hostile goods, had become a maxim of the Law of Nations. Fi'om the declara- tion of Lord Chesterfield that, notwithstanding that there was no treaty with Prussia, Prussia would be favoured by England in the matter of navigation as much as any other nation, it followed that Prussia was entitled to demand the observance of the principle free ships free goods and hostile ships hostile goods, and was consequently entitled to demand satisfaction for the violation by Great Britain of this prin- ciple. As to the question of the King of Prussia's action in regard to the Silesian Loan, it was affirmed by the Prus- sian Government, that what was due by or to the Sovereign or Government of a nation was also due by or to the subjects, and conversely, what was due by or to the subjects of a nation was also due by or to their Sovereign or their Government ; it was hence concluded that the debt due to Prussia wiped out a portion of the Silesian Loan, and it was not by way of L 2 14S Cases and Opinions on International Law. reprisals, but by way of compensation, that the King of Prussia was entitled to retain part of the loan in his hands. In reply to the contention that the loan had strictly become payable befoi'e the Prussian claims were made, it was pointed out that when a loan was made at interest the debtor was never censured for not having paid off the loan on the day fixed, especially when the creditor had not demanded it. As to the possibility of part of the loan having been transferred, the trans- ferees m.ust be deemed to have taken it subject to equities. The matter was finally settled by the Treaty of Westminster, 16th Jan., 1756, whereby in consideration of Prussia agreeing to pay off the loan according to the original contract. Great Britain undertook to pay Prussia 20,000Z. in discharge of all claims. The Silesian Loan : De Martens, Causes Cdlebres^ Vol. II., p. 97. The principles laid down by the British Government in the above case, on the subject of the rights and liabilities of neutral trade, may be said to have prevailed, except where modified by treaty, until the Declaration of Paris, 1856 (/). The principles also laid down by the British Government in regard to reprisals and the injustice of confiscating private debts to meet public claims, met with universal approval, and may be said to represent the existing principles of International Law on the subject. CASE OF DON PACIFICO. Temp. 1850. [Annual Eegistek, 1850, p. 281.] Case.] M. Pacifico was a Jew born at Gibraltar, but in April 1 847, resident at Athens. It was then customarj' in Greece for the people to burn an efiSgy of Judas Iscariot at Easter time, but in 1847 the police at Athens were ordered to prevent (/) A complete account of these ijrmoiplos will be found on pp. 293, 294, infra. Steps Short of War. 149 the ceremony. The mob, attributing the order to interference by or on behalf of the Jews, attacked M. Pacifico's house and plundered it. M. Pacifico claimed over 26,000L as compensa- tion for the damage occasioned by the outrage. In spite of the fact that M. Pacifico's claim should, in the first instance at least, have been brought before the Greek tribunals, the British Government intervened and required the Greek Government to make compensation. The Greek Government replied that the authorities had used every effort to stop the consummation of the act, and to deliver the authors of it up to justice, and that according to the municipal law both of Greece and other European nations, as well as the requirements of international comity, M. Pacifico ought first to have instituted an action for damages against the authors of the transaction before the civil tribunals. On the failure of the Greek Government to make compensa- tion, the British Admiral, in the first instance, was instructed to prevent any Greek public vessel from putting to sea; but in pursuance of subsequent instructions he also laid an embargo on all Greek merchant-vessels in Greek ports, and captured and detained such as were found upon the sea. The matter was referred to Baron Gros, a mediator despatched by the French Government, but his mission was at first unsuccessful. Ulti- mately, however, a convention was drawn up between the two Governments, by which the claim of M. Pacifico was referred to certain commissioners. These, after investigating his claim, awarded him loOL, and the dispute thus terminated. Case of Bon Pacifico, Annual Register, 1850, p. 281. The reprisals resorted to by the British Government in this case assumed a somewhat anomalous character, namely the laying of a hostile embargo on Greek vessels in Greek ports, in addition to the oapture and detention of those found on the sea ; a measure partly akin to embargo proper, and partly to pacific blockade. With regard to the justice of tlie proceeding, opinions differ. The 150 Cases and Opinions on International Law. action of the British Government was censured by the House of Lords, but sanctioned by a majority of the House of Commons. It also gave rise to some protest on the part of other Powers. Tlie cardinal point of the English case was that the state of the Greek courts at the time would have rendered it futile to have recourse to them. Neverthe- less, as Sir R. PhUliraore justly remarks, nothing but overwhelming evidence on this point could iiave justified the departure from the rule alike of comity and of International Law, that in cases of this kind justice ought first to be sought at the hands of the municipal tribunals of the State in which the outrage took place. The gross exaggeration of M. Pacifico's claim also tends to show that the British Government acted somewhat rashly. It is not improbable that there were other motives inspiring the action of the British Govern- ment that have been lost sight of. Akin to this method of coercion, is that of pacific blockade. This consists in the blockade of part of the territory or coast line of a State as in actual war, without, however, having recourse to other hostile measures. It is used either to prevent the violation of a state of peace, or to prevent the departure of a squadron or the introduc- tion of troops, while an opportunity is at the same time given to the government of the place to explain its intentions. This form of coercion has been adopted on several occasions during the present century by one or other of the great maritime Powers, as a means of extorting redress from less powerful States. It seems to have first been resorted to in the year 1827, when England, France, and Eussia blockaded the coasts Of Greece, with the view of coercing Turkey. Similar measures were threatened in 1880 against Turkey for nonfulfilment of the Treaty of Berlin, but the measure was rendered unnecessary by the success of the Dulcigno demonstration off the Albanian coast. This was merely a species of moral coercion, each power stationing ships of war off the coast with instructions not to take any active steps. In 1884 a blockade of a somewhat ambiguous character was declared by France against China. On the 20th of October 1884, Admiral Courbet declared a blockade of all the ports and roads be- tween certain specified points of the Island of Formosa. The French Government, whilst disavowing the character of a belligerent and claiming to retain the privilege of coaling its fleet at Hongkong, nevertheless proposed to treat neutral vessels as subject to capture or condemnation for breach or attempted breach of the blockade. The British Government protested against this on the ground that Admiral Courbet had not enough ships to guard the whole coast, and that it was therefore a violation of the principle of the Declaration of Paris, 1856, according to which blockade to be binding must be effectual. It further declared that the contention of the French Government, Steps Short of War. 151 that a pacific blockade conferred on the PovTer imposing it a right to capture and condemn vessels of other Powers for attempting to violate the blockade, was contrary to the well-established principles of International Law. It was, further, oflBcially stated in the House of Commons that the British Government had refused to recognize the blockade of Formosa as a pacific blockade {g). In 1886 a blockade of Greece was undertaken by the fleets of Great Britain, Austria, Germany, Italy, and Eussia, in order to compel that country to abstain from making war upon Tarkey. The British instructions were to detain every ship under the Greek flag coming out of or entering into any of the blockaded ports or harbours, and to prevent them from communicating with any ports within the limits of the blockaded coast. This blockade was not enforced as against the vessels of other nations, and certain saving provisions were made in regard to cargo belonging to the subjects of other nations found on board Greek vessels. With regard to the legal character of paciflc blockade, it seems likely that this species of coercion will become a recognized part of the Law of Nations ; but at the present time it cannot be pronounced a definitely accepted institution. If it is proclaimed against; all vessels, then the nation proclaiming the blockade, arrogates in time of peace rights of interference which have hitherto been accorded only in time of war. If it is not enforced against other ships than those of the ofPending nation, then it lacks one of the chief requisites of a valid blockade proper, viz., that it must be enforced as against. all vessels (Ji). In such case, however, it would seem to partake less of the character of a blockade than of a hostile embargo laid upon the vessels of the offending nation within its own ports and adjoining seas. In this character its adoption might prove of great advantage, as providing an effective means of restraint short of war, in case of minor States. The moral sentiment of civilized nations might be relied on to prevent this form of coercion from being abused. {g) See statement of Lord E. Fitz- 1885. See also p. 304, infra. maurice in House of Commons, April 1, (A) See p. 308, infra. 153 Cases and Opinions on International Law. DECLARATION OF WAR. THE "ELIZA ANN." Temp. 1813. [1 DoDS. 244.] Case.] During war between Great Britain aud the United States, three American ships were captured by the British ia Hanoe Bay, and sent home for adjudication. A claim to the ships and cargoes was made by the Swedish Consul, on the ground that the captures were made within Swedish territory, and that Sweden was at the time a neutral State. The state of things actually prevailing was this : — the conduct of Sweden had for some time previously been of a very unfriendly character in regard to Great Britain ; a declaration of war had in fact been issued by the Swedish Government, but it was unilateral only ; on this ground it was contended that the two countries could not be considered in a state of war. Judgment.] Sir W. Scott, in his judgment, held that this contention could not prevail, and that war might exist without a declaration on either side. A declaration of war by one country was not a mere challenge to be accepted or refused at pleasure by the other. It proved the existence of actual hostilities on one side at least, and put the other party also into a state of war, though he might perhaps think proper to act on the defensive only. On this and other grounds the claim of the Swedish Consul was rejected. The, Eliza Ami, 1 Dods. 244. In connection with the subject of declaration of war, two questions suggest themselves. One is, whether a nation is justified in com- mencing actual hostilities without a formal declaration of war, or at least without giving notice to the nation intended to be assailed. The other is, from what moment must the incidents of war be deemed to have attached in respect to individual subjects and property of either State. Declaration of War. 153 The former, in modern, times at least, appears to be a question of mere theoretical interest. The universal practice of maintaining resident ambassadors, and the fact that war generally ends a long series of negotiations, together with the rapid circulation of intelli- gence by the press, all contribute to render it improbable that a nation would now be taken unawares. Moreover, the cosmopolitan character of modern trade and commerce would induce a nation, in the interests of its own subjects, to forbear from entering on hostilities prematurely or trying to take its adversary unawares. Moreover, when once a state of war exists, the only remedy that an aggrieved nation would have against another for entering on war without a declaration, would be exhausted ; whilst the authority in farvour of a formal declaration of war being necessary, prior to the commencement of hostilities, is far too slender, to render it likely that such an act would arouse any hostile action on the part of other nations. With regard to the modern practice on the subject of issuing declara- tions of war, it seems that the earlier wars of this century were almost invariably commenced without declaration or notice. Thus the United States began the war with Great Britain, in 1812, without notice of any kind. France instituted a blockade of the coast of Mexico, and thus began the war of 1838, without any notice. The United States again, in 1846, entered on the war with Mexico without notice. But in the later wars of the century, hostilities seem to have been generally pre- ceded by a formal declaration or by a manifesto issued by one of the belligerents. Thus the Crimean War between Great Britain and Eussia, in 1 85 3, was preceded by every possible' formality. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was preceded by a declaration handed by M. Benedetti to Count Bismarck. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877 was announced by a formal despatch handed to the Turkish Charge d' Affaires at St. Petersburg, although the Russian troops appear to have entered Turkish territory some hours before this. The hostilities, however, that broke out in 1884 between France and China, were commenced and continued without any formal declaration. In this case France, it is true, refused to admit that there was a state of war, but this was a mere political manoeuvre, that altogether failed to obscure the actual relations that existed between the two countries. It would, therefore, seem that as a matter of policy, though not of obligation, a formal declaration of war is now commonly made. It is also customary for a belligerent State to issue a proclamation to its own subjects and a manifesto to neutrals, although these may be issued after hostilities have actually commenced. In regard to neutrals a manifesto ought to be issued by each belligerent, and this appears to be the common practice. If no such manifesto is issued, neutral obligations and liabilities will attach as from the time when the neutral has actual notice of the 154 Cases and Opinions on International Law. war. It is, therefore, to the interest of the. belligerents, as well as of the neutrals, that a proclamation or manifesto announcing the outbreak of war should be issued. This will then serve to fix the date at which neutral liabilities commence. With regard to the second question, it is clear that according to the Tiew adopted by the English Courts, the incidents of war will attach from the date on which the actual hostilities are commenced or decided on, even though there has been no declaration of war, or a declaration by one j arty only. As was remarked by Sir Eobt. Phillimore, in the case of the Teutonia («), war may exist in fact, so as to affect the subjects of the belligerent States, either on a unilateral declaration or even without a declaration. In the case of the Naijade (4 C. Eob. 253), Lord Stowell held that where one nation had committed acts of aggression in regard to another, and the latter had exhibited a submissive demeanour with the view of avoiding actual war, yet if the former had refused to accept such submission and had persisted in her attack, a state of war must be deemed to have existed, with all the consequences that attached to such a state of things (m). EFFECTS OF OUTBREAK OF WAR. BROWN V. THE UNITED STATES. Temp. 1814. [8 Ckanoh, 110.] Case.] On the outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and the United States, the United States authorities effected a seizure of some timber, which was the property of a British subject, but found within the United States jurisdiction. Pro- ceedings were taken for its confiscation as prize of war. In the lower Court a sentence of condemnation was pronounced. On an appeal being brought, the Supreme Court considered fully the effect of the existence of war, upon British property found within the United States at the commencement of hostilities. Judgment.] It was assumed throughout that war gave to a (i) Vide -p. 162, infra, (ii) The nations referred to were France and Portugal. Effects of Outbreak of War. 155 belligerent a right to take possession of and confiscate the property of the enemy wherever found. The mitigations of the rule -which modern policy had introduced might affect the exercise of the right, but could not. impair the right itself. If the Sovereign chose to bring the right into operation, the judicial department must give effect to his -will. With regard, however, to the effect of a declaration or of the existence of war, alone, on enemy property found within the jurisdiction, the Court, after a review of the principal writers on the jiis belli, came to the conclusion that, though the existence of war gave a right to confiscate, yet it did not of itself, and without more, operate as a confiscation of the property of an enemy. Hence it was held that a United States Court had no power of condemnation, in default of some expression of will to that effect on the part of the State. The sentence of condemnation pronounced by the Court below was, therefore, reversed by the Supreme Court, on the ground that there was no legislative act authorising the confiscation. Brown v. The United States, 8 Cranch, 110. This case is cited in relation to the subject of the treatment of persons and property of one belligerent found within the territory of the other on the outbreak of war. With regard to persons, the practice seems to have grown up at a comparatively early date, of allowing enemy subjects to quit belligerent territory with their effects on the outbreak of war. Originally, indeed, the privilege seems to have been confined to foreign merchants (/c). Thus in England, as early as the fourteenth century, it was provided by the Statute of Staples (27 Ed. III. st. 2), that on the outbreak of war foreign merchants should have forty days within which to depart the realm with their goods, with an extension of time in case of necessity. A similar practice seems to have been adopted in other countries. In later times, the privilege of safe withdrawal within a certain period, ranging from six months to a year, became very commonly a matter of express treaty pro- vision. Finally it became a generally recognized principle that subjects of either belligerent, whether merchants or not, found (ifc) Thotigh this class was indeed, in early times, almost the only class likely to be affected. 156 Cases and Opinions on International Law. within the territory of the other, should be at liberty to depart freely, within a period reasonably sufBcient for the arrangement of their affairs, subject to a possible exception in the case of persons ■whose detention might be a matter of great political or military necessity. Modern practice appears to be even more liberal, inas- much as the custom has sprung up of allowing enemy subjects to continue their residence during good behaviour. By Act of the United States Congress, 1798, the President is authorized in case of war to direct in what cases and upon what security the subjects ■of any hostile nation shall be permitted to remain in the United States. By the same Act those withdrawing are to be allowed such reasonable time as may be consistent with public safety, for the recovery, disposal, and removal of their goods, and for departure. This is also, occasionally, a matter of express stipulation by treaty. Thus, by the Treaty of 1795, between Great Britain and the United States, it was provided that in the event of war the subjects of either country should have the privilege of remaining and continuing their trade so long as they behaved peaceably and committed no offence against the laws (?). Where such permission is expressly or impliedly given it would seem to follow that such persons are entitled to the same privileges as other resident aliens. But in Great Britain it has been held in Alcinous V. Nigreu (m), that an alien enemy, even though allowed to remain in British territory, cannot, without express licence from the Crown, maintain an action in the English Courts during the con- tinuance of the war. Apart from treaty, moreover, the right to expel alien enemies still remains, and may rightly be exercised under circumstances oi political or military necessity. On the outbreak of the Franco- Prussian War of 1870, permission was at first given by the French Government to subjects of the enemy to remain in France or in any French colony, so long as their conduct furnished no reason for complaint ; but any new admission into French territory was made a subject for special permission, which was only to be exceptionally granted ; thirty days were allowed to enemy ships within which they were to quit France with the privilege of •safe conduct ; vessels bound to French ports, with goods on French account, laden before the declaration of war, were to be at liberty to enter and discharge their cargoes, with the privilege of safe conduct on their return voyage. On the 17th of September, however, a decree was issued ordering enemy subjects to quit French territory within three days, unless specially authorized to remain. With regard to enemy property, we have seen from the leading (/) See Hall, p. 392. («^) See p. 171, infra. Effects of Outbreak of War. 157 case that the Supreme Court of the United States was clearly agreed that the outbreak of war gave the Sovereign a right to confiscate such property, although it went on to hold that the mere declaration or existence of war did not of itself render such property subject to confiscation. This may fairly be said to represent the existing law on the subject. When the citizens of a hostile State are allowed to remain, the question of confiscation of property is scarcely likely to arise. The express or implied permission to stay would involve, as an almost neces- sary consequence, the according of the same general protection to their property, as that afforded to other domiciled aliens. If oi-dered to quit the belligerent country, then by modern usage and sometimes also by express treaty provision, alien enemies would be entitled to a reasonable time for withdrawal, and within such time they would doubtless be privileged to collect and take with them such part of their effects as they could, or failing that to dispose of them to other persons. Subject to these exceptions, or so far as advantage may not be taken of these privileges, the principle laid down in Brown v. The United States may still be said to obtain ; in other words, such property becomes liable to confiscation and may be confiscated if the State sufficiently declares its intention. Thus, during the American Civil War, the Congress of the Confederate States enacted that all property of whatever nature held by alien enemies since 21 May, 1861, except public stocks and securities, should be sequestrated. The Attorney- General of the Southern States expressed the opinion that all persons domiciled within the enemy States became subject to the provisions of this enactment ; but the application of the enactment in question, to merchandize in which British subjects were interested, led to a protest by the British Government {n). Although in default of treaty a belligerent would still be entitled to forfeit enemy [iroperty, yet such a course would open up the road to reprisals and would also be contrary to the policy of civilized nations. The humane policy of modern times and the common interests of both belligerents would probably render it unlikely to be applied. Immoveable property would probably in any case be left unmolested (o). Even property belonging to the other belligerent State itself ought to be exempt from interference, unless it were of such character as to render it likely to prove serviceable in war. It was until lately the practice of Great Britain to seize as prize all vessels and cargoes belonging to alien enemies found or coming within her territorial waters or harbours on the outbreak of war ; but even this appears to have been given up. On the outbreak («) See Pari. Accounts and Papers, (o) Thongh the rents might possibly 1862, vol. Ixii. ; North America, be sequestrated during war. No. 1, p. 108. 158 Cases and Opinions on International Law. of the Crimean War both Great Britain and France allowed Eussian merchant vessels, then in British or French ports, six weeks to complete their cargoes and depart unmolested. The same exemp- tion was extended to all Eussian merchant vessels that, prior to the date of the Order in Council, had sailed from any foreign port for any British port, such vessels being allowed to enter and discharge cargo and return unmolested to any port of their own country not under blockade. The same policy was pursued by France on the outbreak of the Franco-Uerman War in 1870, the privilege of free departure with safe conduct being granted to enemy ships then in French ports, and the privilege of entry and departure being also granted to enemy vessels that had begun to load goods on French account at any time before war was declared (^). Germany went still farther and issued a declaration altogether exempting private vessels and cargoes belonging to the enemy from capture. This declaration was, however, subsequently rescinded, and was probably only intended to force the French Government into a similar course. Subject to this exceptional practice, however, the right of seizure would still be exercisable in respect of enemy vessels or property found or coming within the territory of the other belligerent after the out- break of war. In the case of the Johanna Emilk (Spinks, ] 4), 1854, Dr. Lushington laid down that it was competent for any person to take possession of, and to assist the Crown to proceed against, enemy property found in any part of the United Kingdom, unless it were protected by licence or declaration from the Crown. By a Postal Treaty of 30th August, 1890, between Great Britain and France, it is provided that where the packets employed by the postal authorities of either country are owned by the State or are specially subsidized for the postal service, such packets shall not be liable to seizure, embargo, or arret du prince, and that in the event of war between the two countries, such packets shall be at liberty to continue their navigation without being molested, until either Government notifies a discontinuance of postal communication, in which case they are to be at liberty to return to their own ports. (p) This operated somewhat harshly commencement of the war, wliilst Ger- ou neutrals, inasmuch as German vessels man vessels bound to French ports liound for neutral ports remained with goods on French account were liable to capture after the date of the exempt from capture. Effects of Outbreak of War. 159 THE RUSSO-DUTCH LOAN. Temp. 1834 [Parliamestaey Debates, 3rd Series, Vol. CXXXV., 1096.] Case.] After the conclusion of war in 1814, Great Britaiu, in consideration of being allowed to retain certain Dutch ostliminy will not apply. By the Naval Prize Act of 1864 {f) it is laid down that where any ships or goods belonging to British subjects, after being taken as prize by the enemy, are retaken from the enemy by any of H. M. ships of war, the same shall be restored on the payment of salvage to the amount therein provided. In default of agreement to the contrary, the salvage payable is one- eighth of the value of the prize, which may be increased up to one-fourth by the Court, where the recapture has been effected under circumstances of special danger or difficulty. The rule of the United States Prize Courts appears to be not quite so liberal. Under an Act of Congress of 1800, restitution of the property of persons resident within or under the protection of the United States is decreed, only, where the same has been recaptured before being condemned by a competent tribunal. Subject to this, however, the rule of restitution applies notwithstanding that the vessel may have been fitted out or used as an armed vessel by the enemy. The amount of salvage payable is one-eighth if the recapture was effected by a public vessel, and one-sixth if by a privateer ; or if the vessel recaptured was fitted out as a vessel of war, then one- half. If the vessel recaptured was herself a public vessel, then the salvage is one-sixth in the event of the recapture being by a private vessel, and one-twelfth if by another public vessel. {ss) See the case of the Kierligkeit, 3 C. Eob. 96. '(<) 27 & 28 Vict. c. 25. Prize of War. 211 According to the law of Trance, if a private vessel is recap- tured by a public vessel, she is to be restored to the original owners, on payment of a salvage of one-thirtieth part of her value if the captor has not had possession for twenty-four hours, or of one-tenth if twenty-four hours have elapsed, these sums being pay- able in addition to the expenses incident to the recapture. In case of recapture by a privateer, restitution will be decreed only if the re- capture was effected before the lapse of twenty-four hours, in which case a salvage of one-third of the value becomes payable ; but if the recapture took place after this time, then the prize will become the sole property of the recaptor. It will be observed that France still retains the test of twenty-four hours' possession as the condition of title in the case of recapture by a privateer, and as a ground for in- creasing salvage in the case of recapture by a public vessel. Although the abolition of privateering as between the parties to the Declaration of Paris of 1856 has rendered this rule of less importance, it would still apply in the event of France being at war with a State that had not adhered to that Declaration, The practice of other States varies greatly, but the rule of twenty- four hours' possession is very frequently adopted, either as a test of title or as a ground for enlarging the award of salvage. Where the property recaptured belongs not to a subject but to an ally, the practice of the British Courts appears to be to give the ally the beneiit of the English rule of restitution, unless the ally should adopt a less liberal rule in regard to English vessels, in which case the rule of reciprocity is applied (m). There is no 'postliminy in favour of the original captors where an enemy's vessel is recaptured from recaptors. Thus if Great Britain and France were at war, and a French ship were made prize by a British vessel, and then recaptured by the French, and finally recap- tured again by the British, there would be no postliminy in favour of the original British captors (x). It only remains to add that captures can be made by either public vessels, or by privateers where their use has not been forbidden by treaty, but not by private vessels, except where they have been iittacked in the first instance. Captures made by a private vessel would in Great Britain enure as droits of Admiralty, but in all •cases where the capture was legitimate and the conduct of the vessel was fair and meritorious, the Prize Court will award them a recompense, which may, under certain circumstances, extend to the whole value of the prize {y). C«) See the case of the Santa Cruz, Rob. 217, and Phill. iii., 639. p. 213. iy) See the case of the Baase (1 C. ' (k) See the case of the Folly, 4 C. Eob. 286). p 2 212 Cases and Opinions on International Law. THE "CEYLON." Temp. 1811. [1 DODS. 105.] Case.] The " CeyloD," an English East India ship, had been captured by the French during war between Great Britain and France. She was then taken to the Island of Johanna, where she was refitted and supplied with two additional carronades and a French crew of seventy men. She was subsequently taken to the Isle of France, where she was attacked by a British frigate, and afterwards by a British squadron. The " Ceylon," however, in company with other French ships, succeeded in repelling the attack. She was then dismantled and fitted out as a prison-ship, and was used as such, at the time of the capture of the island by the British. Proceedings were instituted by the original owners of the ship for restitution on payment of salvage. It appeared that under the Prize Act at that time in force, British ships recaptured from the enemy were to be restored upon payment of salvage, unless they had been sent forth as ships or vessels of war by the enemy. The original owners relied upon the contention that the " Ceylon " had neither been commissioned nor sent forth as a ship of war by the enemy, and that she had only been engaged in defensive operations. Judgment] Sir W. Scott, in giving judgment, held that in order to come within the exception set up by the statute it was not necessary that the ship should have been actually sent out of port, nor that she should have been regularly commissioned ; it was enough to show that she was employed in the public military service of the enemy by those who had competent authority so to employ her. In view of this, restitution was refused and a sentence of condemnation was pronounced. The Ceylon, 1 Dods. 105, Prize of War. 213 This decision was given under a statute now repealed, but a similar exception to the rule of restitution on recapture is contained in the Naval Prize Act, 1864, s. 40 {yxj), which provides that where a ship belonging to subjects has been taken by the Queen's enemies, and thereafter " set forth or used by them " as a ship of war, the ordi- nary rule of restitution shall not apply. THE " SANTA CRUZ." Temp. 1798. [TuDoa's Lbadixo Cases, 10i7 ; 1 C. Rod. 50.] Case.] In August, 1796, during war between Great Britain and France, a vessel belonging to a subject of Portugal, the ally of Great Britain, was captured by the French and subse- quently recaptured by the British, after having been one month in the enemy's possession. A claim was made on behalf of the original owner for restitution ; it was resisted on the ground that the British Courts acted, in such cases, on the principle of reciprocity, and that in two analogous cases the Portuguese Courts had condemned British vessels. Judgment.] Sir William Scott, in giving judgment, stated that the law of England on the subject gave the benefit of the rule of restitution to its allies, till it appeared that they acted towards British property on a less liberal principle. The question to be determined therefore was simply whether Portugal had applied a different rule under similar circum- stances to British property. After reviewing the evidence, his lordship was of opinion that the law of Portugal established twenty-four hours' possession by the enemy to be a legal divest- ment of the property of the original owner, and that it would have applied the same rule to the property of allies, and that this had been actually carried into practice. The ship was therefore condemned. [In December, 1796, an ordinance was issued by Portugal declaring all recaptures after possession by the enemy for twenty-four hours to be lawful prize. Under these circum- (yy) 27 & 28 Viot. o. 25 214 Cases and Opinions on International Law. stances, a second ship, captured while that oidinance was in force, was also condemned. In May, 1797, a further ordinance was issued by Portugal directing restitution in such cases. On this ground, in the case of six other vessels, captured by the French and recaptured by the British after that date, restitution was decreed.] Tlie Santa Gruz, Tud. Leading Cases, 1047 ; 1 C. Kob. 50. The case of the Santa Cruz sets forth the rules adopted by the British Courts in the case of the recapture by a British ressel of ships or property belonging to an ally or co-belligerent. The practice of the United States appears to be identical in this respect with that of Great Britain. THE "TWO FRIENDS." Temp. 1799. [1 C. Bob. 271.] Case.] During the war which prevailed between Great Britain and France at the end of the last century, the " Tw& Friends," an American ship, was captured by the French, whilst on a voyage from Philadelphia to London, and subsequently rescued by her crew, part of whom were British subjects. She was brought into a British port, and some of the cargo was landed on English soil, pending the settlement of the question of salvage. A salvage suit was instituted, and a pro- test was made against the exercise of jurisdiction over an American ship by a British Court. It was objected by the defendants, that, inasmuch as both ship and crew belonged to the United States, the claim could only be enforced in the United States, and also that the salvors' lien, if any, did not extend to the goods which had been landed. Judgment.] Sir William Scott, in giving judgment, laid down that every person assisting in rescue had a lien on the Prize of War. ?-15 thing saved. The applicants were not to be considered as American sailors, or even as American citizens, even though hired as mariners on board the vessel, inasmuch as the rescue was no part of their general duty as seamen ; it was an act perfectly voluntary, in which each individual acted as a volunteer and not as a member of the crew of the ship. Even if they had all been American seamen, it did not appear that any inconvenience would have arisen from a British Court exercising jurisdiction, for salvage was a question of the jiis gentium,, and materially different from the question of a mariner's contract ; it was a general claim upon the broad ground of quantum, m^vuit. As to a contention that different countries might have different proportions of salvage, the learned Judge did not know of any rule in such cases as the present, beyond that which subjected such matters to a sound discretion and distributed the reward according to the value of the services. He desired it to be understood that he delivered no decided opinion as to whether American seamen rescuing an American ship and cargo, and bringing her into this country, might or might not maintain an action in rem, in the Court. But if there was British property on board, and American seamen were to proceed here against that, he would think it a criminal dereliction of duty if he did not support their claim. In the present case, no American seamen had appeared, nor was it proved that there was any British property on board ; but he had no doubt that the British seamen were entitled to have their services rewarded here, and it would be a reproach to the Courts of this country, if they were not open to lend their assistance in such a case. He was, therefore, of opinion that the jurisdiction of the Court was well founded, and that the circumstance of the ship and cargo being American properby would not exclude the jurisdiction, where there were any British subjects con- cerned, and where the goods were within the jurisdiction. As to the question whether the jurisdiction was not ousted by the landing of the goods, so far as related to such goods, the learned Judge remarked that whatever might be the law as to wreck 216 Cases and Opinions on International Law. and derelict, it did not apply to those goods which were prize goods, there being no axiom more clear than that such goods when they came on shore might be followed by the process of the Admiralty Court. On the whole case, the Judge was, therefore, of opinion that the English seamen were entitled to redress in Great Britain, and that the goods being matter of prize, even that part which had been landed was subject to the > jurisdiction of the Court ; and the protest was therefore over- ruled and salvage awarded. The Two Friends, 1 C. Rob. 271. Salvage may be defined as compensation made to those through whose efforts either a ship, or her cargo, or the lives of persons belonging to her, have been saved from loss or destruction by fire or by Eea, or from capture by pirates or lawful enemies. In connection with the present subject we are concerned only with prize salvage. This may be claimed in all cases where, on the recapture of the property of a subject, or of an ally, or under cer- tain circumstances of a neutral, such property becomes restorable to the original owner, the restitution in such cases being granted subject to the payment of salvage. To entitle a recaptor to salvage there must have been an actual or constructive original capture, and the property must have been actually rescued from the enemy, or from his control. It is not necessary that the recaptors should have taken a bodily possession, it is sufficient if they have actually put an end to, and rescued the prize from, what was at the time a complete hostile control. As has been previously stated, the rule of the British Prize Courts is to restore to the original owner, subject to the payment of salvage, notwithstanding that there may have been a valid condem- nation ; save only in the case where the vessel recaptured has been fitted out by the enemy as an armed vessel. The rule of the United States Courts is to restore, subject to payment of salvage, only if there has been no condemnation, no distinction being drawn in cases where the prize has been used as an armed vessel, except for the purpose of increasing the salvage. The rule of the French Prize Courts is also to restore, subject to the payment of salvage, save in the case where the recapture has been made by a privateer after the prize has been twenty-four hours in the possession of the captor. The different rates of salvage payable have also already been Prize of War. 217 stated («). In all cases of salvage where the rate is not fixed by positive law, it is in the discretion of the Court. The rules as to restitution and -salvage in the case of recapture of the property of an ally or a neutral may be gathered from the cases of the Santcc Cruz {zz) and the Garlotta (a). Where a prize has been abandoned by belligerent captors and has been brought into a neutral port by neutral salvors, it seems that the neutral Court can decree salvage, but cannot restore the property to the original owners, as the Court has no jurisdiction to impugn the title of the captors, except where neutral rights have been infringed, and hence the proceeds, after deducting salvage, will belong to the original captors (aa). According to British law (13 & 14 Vict. c. 26) property recovered from pirates is primd facie subject to condemnation as droits of Admiralty, subject to the condition that if any part can be proved to have belonged to British or foreign subjects, then the Court is to decree restitution on payment of a salvage of one-eighth of the value. THE "OARLOTTA." Temp. 1803. [5 C. Rob. 54.] Case.] In 1803, during war between France and Great Britain, the " Garlotta," a Spanish ship, whilst on a voyage from Montevideo to London, with a cargo which included some property belonging to British merchants, was captured by a French privateei", but was subsequently recaptured by the British and brought into Jersey. A claim was made for sal- vage on the recapture. On behalf of the Spanish claimants it was contended that no salvage could be awarded on the recapture of neutral property ; that this principle had been deliberately affirmed in the case of the Jonge Lambert (6) ; and that the special considerations in virtue of which, some modification of this rule had been admitted during the last war (c), did not apply to the present case. (s) See p. 210, lupra ; and for the (aa) See the case of the Ifary Ford, rates payable according to the law of 3 Dallas, 188. other countries, see Phillimore III., 626. (6) See pp. 54 and 55 of the Report {zz) See p. 213, supra. in notin. (a) Seep. 218, infra. (c) These special considerations seem 218 Cases and Opinions on International Law. Judgment] Sir William Scott, in giving judgment, stated that the tendency was rather against subjecting neutral pro- perty to salvage in such cases, hut if any edict could be appealed to, or any fact established, showing that the property would have been exposed to condemnation in the French courts,, he should hold it to be sufficient gi'ound to induce him to pro- nounce for salvage in the particular case. No ground appeared from which it could be supposed that the neutral property, in the- present case, would have been condemned, and the claim for salvage,, so far as this related to Spanish property, was therefore rejected. The, Carlotta, 5 C. Kob. 54. The property of a neutral is not strictly exposed to capture, except for carriage of contraband, breach of blockade, or acts of unneutral service. If, therefore, one belligerent captures neutral property, and this is recaptured by the other belligerent, the latter usually restores it without payment of salvage, on the presumption that the Court of the first captor would not have condemned it. Upon this ground, in the case of the Huntress (6 C. Eob. 104), an American ship carrying provisions and naval stores for the use of the American fleet, was restored without any salvage, on recapture from the Spaniards. But if any facts are shown rendering it pro- bable that the enemy would have condemned the property, as that the goods were contraband or destined to a blockaded port, then it is usually restored only on payment of salvage. It would seem, how- ever, from the judgment in the Carlotta that to warrant an award of salvage on the recapture of a neutral property, it would not be necessary to show that the captor might have condemned it justly, and in accordance with the admitted rules of International Law, but only that there would have been good reason to suppose from hi& practice and from the actual rules of his Prize Courts, that he would have condemned it. The modern doctrine of the French Courts, on the subject of the recapture of neutral property, is illustrated by the case of the Statira, which was decided in 1800. M. Portalis (cc), in giving judgment in this case, stated that the recapture of foreign neutral vessels by public ships gave no title to the recaptors ; that if a neutral Tessel was unjustly seized by the cruisers of the enemy, and recaptured by a French cruiser, she ought to be restored on proof of to have been the wholesale condemna- any contact with the enemy. tion, by the French Prize Courts, of (c6) See Wheaton, by Lawrence, neutral property wherever tainted by p. 650. Prize Courts. 219 her neutrality.; and that in such cases a foreign vessel would be treated with more favour than a French vessel, on the ground that if a French vessel had fallen into the enemy's hands it would have been lost for ever, unless retaken, whereas in case of a neutral vessel, the seizure did not' render it ifso facto the property of the- enemy, the vessel losing neither its national character nor its rights- until confiscation actually occurred. PRIZE COURTS. THE "OSTSEE." Temp. 1855. [9 MooEE, Pjjivy Council Cases, 150 ; Tudor's Leading Cases, 1036.] Case.] In this case, a neutral vessel had been captured by a British war ship and was sent in for adjudication on the charge of having violated the blockade of Cronstadt. It appeared from the evidence, however, that Cronstadt was not under blockade- either at the time when the vessel entered that port, or at the time when she took her cargo on board ; nor, indeed, was the blockade instituted till more than three weeks after she was cap- tured. Under these circumstances, it was held by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, that the ship was entitled not merely to restitution, but also to costs and damages for the loss- she had sustained. Judgment.] It was laid down in judgment that the law to- be applied in such cases was not to be confined to the British navy, but extended to captors of all nations. No country could be permitted to establish an exceptional rule in its own favour, or in favour of particular classes of its own subjects. By the Law of Nations, foreign decisions were entitled to the same weight as those of the country in which the prize tribunals sat. America had adopted almost all her principles of prize law from the decisions of the British Prize Courts, and in the latter no authorities were cited with greater respect than those of 230 Cases and Opinions on International Law. the distinguished jurists of America and France. Whatever was held in Great Britain to justify or excuse an officer of the British navy, would be held by the tribunals of every country, to justify or excuse captors of their own nation. By the usage of all countries captors had a great interest in increasing the number of prizes. The temptation to send in ships for adjudication was already sufficiently strong. Where, therefore, a captor had, as in the present case, brought in a vessel without any ground for suspicion, and had no excuse to offer save that he had done wrong under a mistake, then he must make good, in temperate damages, the injury which he had occasioned. It was not open to him to suggest that, although there was no good ground for suspicion at the time of seizure, yet upon further inquiry something might have been discovered. The Ostsee, 9 Moore, P. C. C. 141 ; Tudor's Cases in Mercantile Law, 1036. Prize Courts are courts erected in different countries for the purpose of adjudicating on questions of prize. This case is cited as illustrating the true nature and functions of such courts. Although the ship in question in this case was a neutral, yet the principles laid down, as to the obligation of Prize Courts to administer primarily the Law of Nations rather than mere municipal law, and to offer a fair hearing and mete out even justice to all, whether subjects, enemies or neutrals, apply equally to all cases. In the case of the Maria (1 C. Rob. 350), Sir W. Scott observed that the duty of his office required him not to deliver occasional and shifting opinions designed to serve the purposes of particular national interests, but to administer with indifference that justice which the Law of Nations held out without distinction to all independent States, whether neutral or belligerent. In the case of the Recovery, (6 C. Eob. 348), Sir W. Scott again remarked that the Court in which he was presiding, was a court of the Law of Nations, although sitting immediately under the authority of the Crown ; and that foreigners had a right to demand from it that it should administer the Law of Nations, and not merely principles borrowed from municipal law. As to what the duty of a Prize Court as an international tribunal would be, in the event of municipal regulations being passed inconsistent with the Law of Nations, the same learned judge in the case of the Fox (Bdw. 312), observed that this was Prize Coui'is. 221 a question which the Court could not well entertain d pHwi, because it could not entertain b, priori the supposition that any such conflict would arise. In spite of this remark, however, it cannot be denied that States have at times made regulations binding upon their Prize Courts, in plain violation of International Law. Both Great Britain and France were guilty of this practice during the Napoleonic Wars {d). In such cases, one cannot escape the difficulty by adopting the fiction that such municipal regulations must be presumed to be declaratory of the Law of Nations. It is better to recognize frankly that the Prize Court, dependent as it primarily is on the authority of its own State, would be bound to administer such regulations as were prescribed to it. The State itself, in framing such regulations, would be doing an unwarrantable act, which would be a proper ground for protest, reprisals, or, if need be, hostile proceedings, on the part of other States affected by them. The functions of Prize Courts are briefly : — (1.) To decree con- demnation in all cases where a prize has been properly made ; (2.) To order restoration of all property wrongfully captured, and in such cases to order payment of damages by the captor ; (3.) To inflict punishment, in case of misbehaviour, upon members of the crew of either the capturing vessel or the prize. A decree of condemnation has the effect of vesting the property taken in the captors, subject to such distribution between them as municipal regulations require. It has a similar effect on contraband belonging to neutrals, and on property of neutrals involved in any attempt to break blockade, or in acts of unneutral service. A Prize Court may not be erected in neutral territory, but a ship or cargo may be condemned while lying in a neutral port. In the American case of JecTcer v. Montgomery (13 Howard, 498), it was held that a Prize Court could always proceed in rem whenever the proceeds of the prize could be traced into the hands of any person whatsoever. Modern practice, however, discloses a tendency on the part of maritime neutral States to impose strict limitations on the admission of prizes into their ports («). The forms of procedure vary in different countries (/). It has been the custom in England for more than a century to give the Court of Admiralty (now the Admiralty Division of the High Court), on the outbreak of war, authority as a Prize Court. An appeal lies to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The procedure in England under the Naval Prize Act, 1864 {g), is shortly as follows : — The captor of a prize in the first instance delivers her into the ((i)Astothe Berlin and Milan decrees, (/) For an account of these courts and the British Orders in Council, see and a general outline of procedure, see Manning, pp. 413—432. Pliillimore, HI., pp. 658 to 674. (e) See p. 277, infra. ig) 27 & 28 Yiot. c. 25. 223 Cases and Opinions on International Law. custody of the marshal of the Court ; the ship's papers are then brought into the registry ; a monition issues citing all persons to show cause against condemnation ; three or four of the principal persons belonging to the captured ship are brought before the Court and examined on the standing interrogatories. After the return of the monition, the Court, on production of the examinations and the ship's papers, proceeds to make its award. The Court may direct further proof to be adduced, in cases where it appears doubtful whether the ship is good prize or not. Any person claiming an interest in the ship can enter a claim at any time before the final decree. The Court can, if it thinks fit, order an appraisement of the captured ship, and direct restoration to the claimant on his giving security to the amount of the appraisement ; it can also order the prize to be -sold, where it appears advisable on account of its condition, or after condemnation. Any number of small armed ships not exceeding six, captured within three months before the proceedings, can be included in one adjudication. The Court has the power to call upon a captor to proceed to adjudication. These provisions apply both to prize vessels and cargoes ; but, so far as relates to the custody of the ship and the examination on the •standing interrogatories, they do not apply to ships of war taken as prize. THE "MENTOR." Temp. 1799. [1 C. Rob. 179.] Case.] The "Mentor," an American vessel, whilst on a voyage from Havannah to Philadelphia in 1783, was attacked off the Delaware, and after an engagement, destroyed by a British vessel. All parties were in complete ignorance that at the time a cessation of hostilities had taken place between Great Britain and the United States. After the war, a suit seems to have been instituted against the captain of the British vessel, but no report of this case appears to be extant, although the suit appears to have been unsuccessful. Some ten years afterwards a monition was filed by the same complainant, calling upon the admiral of the station to proceed to adjudica- tion, the object of the proceedings being to fix him with liability for damages, in respect of what had occurred. Prize Courts. 223 Judgment.] Sir Wm. Scott, in giving judgment, referred to the time whicli had elapsed since the transaction occurred, remarking, that although the Statute of Limitations did not apply to prize causes, yet there shoiild be some rule of limita- tion provided by the discretion of the Court. After adverting to the fact that ten years previously a suit had been unsuccess- fully instituted by the same party in regard to the same subject- matter, — and also to the fact that the object of the present pro- ceeding was to force to adjudication a person who was neither present at nor cognisant of the transaction, on the ground that ihe person alleged to have done the injury had acted under his iiuthority, — the learned Judge laid down that in such cases the actual wrongdoer was pnmd facie the proper person to fix with liability, and should be brought before the Court. He might have other persons responsible over to him, and that responsi- "bility might be enforced, but it was the practice of the Court to have the actual wrongdoer before it. The learned Judge further expressed the opinion that if an ^ct of mischief had been done by the King's officers through ignorance, in a place where no act of hostility ought to have been exercised, it did not necessarily follow that such ignorance would protect the officers from civil responsibility; although if the officer had acted through unavoidable ignorance, his own Government ought to indemnify him. He was therefore inclined to think that the determination of the Judge in the -former case did not turn upon the fact of ignorance only, but upon all the circumstances of the case. Having regard to this circumstance, as well as to the fact -that the admiral was absent from the scene of the transaction, iind to the lapse of time that had occurred, it was held that the admiral was not liable to be called upon to proceed to adjudica- tion, and he was accordingly discharged. The Mentor, 1 C. Rob. 179. This case is cited as containing the opinion of so eminent a judge as Lord Stowell, on such points as the limitation of prize suits, the 334 Cases and Opimons on International Law. necessity in such cases of having the actual wrongdoer before the Court, and lastly, as to the effect of ignorance or mistake on liability. The case also illustrates incidentally, the principle that even where a ship has been destroyed, the belligerent may be called upon to proceed to adjudication. TERMINATION OF WAR. THE "SWINEHERD." Temp. 1802. [llERiiN, RiSpeetoike de Jukisprcdencb, tit. Pmsb, Vol. XIII., p. 183.] Case.] The "Swineherd" was an English vessel provided with letters of marque. She sailed from Calcutta for England before the expiration of the five months fixed by the Treaty of Amiens for the termination of hostilities between Great Britain and France in the Indian Seas, but after the news of the peace had reached Calcutta, and after the publication in a Calcutta paper of a proclamation of George III. requiring his subjects to abstain from hostilities after the time fixed. A copy of the proclamation was on board. She was captured within the five months by the " Bellona," a French privateer. The " Bellona " had been informed of the cessation of hostilities by a Portuguese vessel bearing a flag of truce which had put into the Mauritius, by an Arab vessel, and also by an English vessel which she had captured ; the commander was also shown a copy of the " Gazette Extraordinary of Calcutta," containing the proclamation, and he could see that the " Swineherd " was without powder. Notwithstanding this, the " Swineherd " was condemned by the French Prize Court, on the gi-ound that a belli- gerent, in such a case, is not compelled to accept a notification of the cessation of hostilities from anybody but his own Government. The Swineherd, Merlin, tit. Prise, "Vol. XIII., p. 183. Tenninahon of War. 225 War is usually terminated by a treaty of peace. Sometimes, though rarely, it is terminated by mere cessation of hostilities, or by the conquest and submission of the whole or part of one of the belligerent States. On the termination of war, the States resume their normal relation towards each other, and acts of hostility ought to cease. In default of any express provision to the contrary by treaty, the uti possidetis doctrine prevails, and all property at the time under the control of either belligerent Tests absolutely in him. Where there is a formal treaty of peace, hostilities should cease from its conclusion, unless a future date is fixed for the purpose by the treaty. Frequently, when hostilities affect distant regions, a future date is fixed for their termination. In such case hostilities should cease when duly authorized information of the conclusion of peace has been received ; but, as is indicated by the case of the Swineh&rd, a military or naval commander is not bound to accept any communication of the termination of hostilities, unless its truth is in some way attested by his own Government. THE GERMAN CONTRACTS FOR CUTTING WOOD IN FRENCH FORESTS. Temp. 1871. [Hall, p. 489.] Case.J During the Fmnco-Prussian war of 1870 the German Government entered into contracts with certain persons for the cutting of wood in the French forests. Payment was made in advance, but the contracts were not completed at the time of the treaty of peace between the two Powers. Under these cir- cumstances the contractors urged that inasmuch as the German Government had acted within its rights in the making of the contracts, the French authorities ought to allow them to com- plete the cutting. The French Government, however, held that the restoration of its authority had annulled the contracts, and a declaration to that effect was made in the supplementary Convention of the 11th of December, 1871. This was accepted as a correct statement of law by the German Government. The German Contracts for cutting Wood in French Forests, 1870 ; Hall, p. 489. C.I.L. Q 226 Cases and Opinions on Iniernational Law. This case illustrates the principle that, although acts done in a country by an invader cannot be nullified in so far as they have produced effects during the occupation, yet they become inoperative for the future, /Mre postliminii, so soon as the original government is restored. The doctrine of Postliminium, which, under the infiuence of the text writers, has been imported from Roman Law into International Law, is a legal inference, by which persons or property captured by the enemy are presumed to be restored to their former condition, on the withdrawal of the enemy's control. This doctrine has already been treated of in so far as it affects ships or property recaptured on the sea (h). With regard to persons, the right of postliminy takes effect on escape either to their own or neutral territory ; but it does not avail prisoners confined on a belligerent war-ship or prize in a neutral port as long as they are confined to the ship. The termination of war also effects a restoration of the individual to his former status, in the event of this having been affected by the war ; he recovers his liberty if he has been taken prisoner, and h e is rel eased from obligations which he may have entered into with the enemy respecting his freedom of conduct. An exception might not improbably be set up in the case of persons who had infringed the recognized laws of war, and whose punishment might fairly be held to remain in force notwithstanding its termination. Movable property, taken on land, reverts to its original owner only if recaptured speedily, or, as is usually laid down, within twenty- four hours, otherwise it belongs to the recaptor. On the termi- nation of the war such property remains in the condition in which it is found at the time, and, in default of express provision by treaty, the title of the de facto possessor is by implication confirmed. With respect to immovable property belonging to private owners, this is usually exempt from seizure except where required by the invader for the purposes of the war. Where, however, immovable property belonging to private owners, or as more usually happens immovable property belonging to the Government of the invaded State, has been appropriated, by an enemy in military occupation of the country, neither the title of the invader, nor any title made through him, can be deemed complete, unless the occupation is followed by definitive appropriation, or nnless the rights so acquired are expressly confirmed by treaty of peace or cession. In default of this the jus posttiminii will always operate in favour of the former Government or its subjects, in the event of the territory being restored or recovered. In such case, the restored Government or its (ft) See the case of the Fhul Oyen, p. 207, and appended note. Termination of War. 227 subjects are entitled to take their property free from any con- tracts, grants, charges, or similar incidents attached by the conqueror whilst in possession, except in so far as they have already produced effects. Hence the purchase from an invader in military occupation of a district, of any portion of the national domain of the invaded State, would be subject to the risk of the purchaser being evicted by the former Government on the withdrawal of the invader, unless express provision for the continuance of his rights were made by the treaty of peace («). It was upon this principle that the Courts of the United States decided that grants of territory made by British governors, after the Declaration of Independence, were invalid, though grants made before that date were expressly saved by the treaty of peace (^). CASE OF THE ELECTOR OF HESSE CASSEL. Temp. 1832 elrca. [Phillimoke's Intkknational Law, Pt. XII., o. VI.] Case.] Before the invasion of Germany by Napoleon, the Elector of Hesse Cassel held, in the territory of which he was sovereign, certain domains as his private property. He also held mortgages on certain lands both of his own subjects and of the subjects of other German States. After the battle of Jena, in 1806, he was expelled from his dominions by Napoleon, and did not return until the French domination in Germany was put an end to by the battle of Leipzic in 1813. Hesse Cassel had meanwhile remained for about a year under the immediate government of Napoleon, and was afterwards incorporated into the newly created State of Westphalia. During Napoleon's administration of Hesse Cassel he had confiscated the private property of the Elector, and compelled the payment to himself of some of the debts due to that prince from his subjects. After the creation of the Kingdom of Westphalia, an arrange- (i) This case must be distinguished Sei^ Cassel. from that in which the conqueror (/) See U. S. v. Bice, 21 Curtis 891, definitely establishes himself as the de and Wade v. Bamewall, 2 Bays. U. S. facto sovereign or government of the Eep. 299. country ; see the case of the Elector of Q 2 228 Cases and Opinions on International Law. ment was come to between Napoleon and his brother Jerome, the newly appointed King, in virtue of which debts due from persons who were not subjects of the King of Westphalia, were to be paid to Napoleon, whilst debts remaining due from sub- jects of that State were to be paid to the King. Under this arrangement Napoleon succeeded in obtaining payment from various debtors and mortgagors to the Elector, who were subjects of other German States. Amongst those who thus made payment to Napoleon was a certain Count von Hahn, a subject of the Duke of Mecklenburg ; the Count not only received a discharge from Napoleon, but the registered mort- gage was officially recorded as extinguished in the proper office, under a rescript of the Mecklenburg Government. After the overthrow of Napoleon, the Elector was restored to his dominions, his .restoration being confirmed by the Treaty of Paris, 1814. He thereupon resumed possession of his private domains, in many instances ousting purchasers who had acquired a formal and a legal title from the preceding de facto sovereign. The ousted proprietors appealed to the Congress of Vienna, but although Prussia declared in their favour, neither that Congress nor the Diet of the German Confederation appear to have afforded them any aid. "With respect to debts due from the subjects of Hesse Cassel, which had been paid to the de facto Government, the tribunals of that State appear to have pro- nounced in favour of the validity of the releases granted and of the discharges thereby effected, but with what result, is not clear. The matter of the mortgage of Count von Hahn, on which the Elector claimed to be still entitled, was referred to various German universities. In the result, it was held that a distinc- tion must be drawn between acts done by a transient conqueror and those done after the entire subjugation of a State ; in the former case, the right of the conqueror was confined to his private acts, the validity of which would depend on actual seizure and possession ; in the latter, his rights must be regarded as having been ratified by public act of State ; Napoleon's right having been of the latter kind, the fact of the property having Termination of War. 229 been the Elector's private property was immaterial ; nor could any consideration of the justice or injustice of the war be allowed to interfere with the operation of this principle. It was further pointed out that the Elector, from the time of his abdication, had been regarded as an enemy by the new Government, and that his property therefore became liable to confiscation; the doctrine that he retained constmctive pos- session of the debts by reason of his having the acknowledg- ments of the debtors in his hands was pronounced untenable ; on the conclusion of the war no restitutio in integriLvn could be said to take place, and even according to the Koman Law, the restored owner must take the property as he found it, with- out compensation for damage suffered in the interval. Finally, it was pointed out that the return of the Elector could not be considered as a continuation of his former government, inasmuch as he had not, in the meantime, been constantly in arms against Napoleon and at last successful by force of arms in recovering his domains ; he had been treated for a time by the public acts of other States as politically extinct, and the new kingdom had been duly recognized by other Powers. In view of these considerations, an opinion was pronounced that all the debts, for which discharges had been given by Napoleon, whether the whole sums had been paid or not, must be regarded as having been validly and effectually paid. Gase of the Elector of Hesse Cassel, Phillimore's International Law, Pt. XII., c. VI. Where in the course of military operations any part of the territory of one belligerent is occupied by the other, then if the subjuga- tion amounts to a mere temporary and involuntary submission to force, the state of war is deemed to continue, and the jus post- liminii will operate on the removal of the control; but if the dominion of the conqueror has been confirmed by treaty or con- sent, or lapse of time, then the war must be deemed to have ceased and the jus posUiminii to have been extinguished (Jc). It is (i) See Pando, cited Phillimore, III., p. 786. 230 Cases and Opinions on International Law. possible, however, that without actual treaty or cession a new government or authority may have been set up, and yet, after some lapse of time, a restoration of the original Sovereign or authority may take place. In this case the rules commonly laid down as to the effects of the restoration of authority, are : — (1.) AUfchanges made by the intermediate government in the constitution become inoperative ; (2.) The ancient laws and administrative institutions become re-established ; (3.) But no private rights acquired during the foreign regime ought to be set aside, provided they are consistent with public order ; (4.) All dispositions of the State property made by the intermediate government are binding ; (5.) The restored Sovereign ought not to make a retrospective use of his power (/). In accordance with these principles, after the downfall of J^apoleon, the greater Powers such as Austria and Prussia either recognized, or at all events left undisturbed, such titles as had been lond fich acquired from the intermediate de facto government set up by Napoleon. With regard to debts, it may be laid down as a general rule that a land, fide payment made to the intermediate de facto government will extinguish the liability of the debtor (m). It would seem also that even where payment is made to a transient conqueror, the debt will be extinguished, subject to the debtor being able to prove that the money was actually paid over at the proper time and place, and under threat of compulsion on the part of the conqueror. But the debtor must not have been in mora, otherwise the fact of the money having come into the hands of the actual payee will be deemed due to his default, and repayment will have to be made (n). CASE OF COUNT PLATEN HALLEMUND. Temp. 1866 circa. [Forsyth, 335.] Case.] At the time of the capitulation of the Hanoverian Army to Prussia in 1866, Count Platen Hallemund was Prime Minister of Hanover. After the annexation, the Count con- {l) See Heffter, § 188. supra; such an act not being -warranted (m) This case must be distinguished by modem usage, would probably not be from the case where a foreign Govern- recognized as valid or effectual in the ment confiscates debts due from its own Courts of another country. subjects to subjects of the enemy, as («) See Phillimore, III. p. 829. occurred in Wolf v. Oxholm, see p. 161, Termination of War. 231 tinued in attendance on the ex-King, and took up his abode in Vienna. Subsequently he was summoned before the Prussian tribunals to answer a charge of high treason alleged to have been committed after he had ceased to reside in Hanover. By the law of Prussia, Prussian subjects can be prosecuted for high treason committed abroad ; but, in the present case, exception was taken to the jurisdiction of the Court on the ground that the Count was not a Prussian subject. The matter was submitted to two German jurists, Professor Zachariae of Gottingen and Professor Neumann of Vienna. These jurists gave an opinion to the effect that the mere forcible conquest of a country did not of itself create the rela- tion of Sovereign and subjects, between the conqueror and the conquered. They laid down that to create sucb relation, there must be an express or tacit submission to the new government, although the mere remaining in the country after the conquest and performing the duties of a subject would amount to a tacit submission; whether or not they would make such submis- sion and acknowledge the new Sovereign, was a question for the inhabitants themselves, and liberty ought to be accorded them of leaving the country if they chose. This opinion was not, however, acted on by the Court before which the case came, and the Count was sentenced, in contumaciam, to fifteen years' penal servitude. Case of Count Platen Hallemund, Forsyth, 335. In the case of the Electm- of Hesse Cassel the question was, as to the proprietary rights of a conqueror who had established a new government in the place of the original authority. The case of the Count of Platen Hallemund raises the question as to the personal relation of such a Government to the original inhabitants. The opinion of Professors Zachariae and Neumann contains a correct statement of existing principles as to the personal liabilities of the inhabitants of the conquered territory. If the inhabitants choose to remain despite the conquest, then they must be deemed to have tacitly acquiesced in the new relation established between them and the government of the conqueror. But if they withdraw, then to affect 232 Cases and Opinions on International Law. to punish as treason, a mere refusal to submit to the new authority, unaccompanied by any attempt to create civil disturbance, would be a mere wanton abuse of power. Unfortunately the conduct of the conqueror in such cases is apt to be regulated by other considerations than those of legality, and even courts of law are found to defer to the feeling of resentment entertained by a powerfiil prince. Where the conquest of new territory is confirmed by treaty of peace or cession, it is usual to stipulate for a right of withdrawal on the part of such inhabitants as may desire it. Even where this is not done, no impediment ought to be placed in the way of such withdrawal ; nor should the property, which may be left behind by those who withdraw, be confiscated or molested. Such of the inhabitants as remain, naturally contract a new tie of allegiance towards the conquering State. Although the conqueror in such cases almost necessarily acquires supreme control over the conquered territory and its inhabitants, yet as a principle of political morality, the conquering State ought to interfere as little as possible with the personal and private rights of the inhabitants. In the American case of Johnson v. M'Inlosh (8 Wheaton, 588), Marshall, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, observed that conquest gave a title which the courts of the conqueror could not deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals might be respecting the original justice of the claim which had been successfully asserted; but although title by conquest was acquired and maintained by force, yet humanity, acting upon private opinion, had established as a general rule, that the conquered should not be wantonly oppressed, and that their con- dition should remain as eligible as was compatible with the objects of the conquest ; most usually they became incorporated with the victorious nation ; where practicable, humanity demanded, and a wise pohcy required, that the rights of the conquered to their property should remain unimpaired, that the new subjects should be governed as equitably as the old, and that confidence in their security should gradually banish the painful sense of being separated from their ancient connections and united by force to strangers. PART III.— NEUTRALITY {o). NEUTRAL TERRITORY. THE "ANNA." Temp. 1805. [5 C. Rob. 373.] Case.] During war between Great Britain and Spain, a Spanish ship, sailing under American colours, with a cargo of logwood and specie, was captured whilst on a voyage from the Spanish Main to New Orleans, by the " Minerva " privateer, near the mouth of the River Mississippi. On the case coming (o) It may be of assistance to the reader in studying the cases following, to remember that the Law of Neutrality includes two main topics, one dealing with the rights and obJigations of the belligerent and neutral States as between themselves ; the other with the relations between a belligerent State and neutral individuals. Amongst the more important rights of a neutral State we may enumerate the right to the inviolability of its territory, and to a compliance by either belligerent with the municipal regulations made by the neutral in preservation of its neutrality (see the cases of the Anna and the Twee Gebroeder). The right in regard to one belligerent naturally involves a duty towards the other. The duties of a neutral State seem to group themselves under two heads, one dealing with what the State must abstain from doing itself (see the case of the Swedish Frigates and appended note thereto) ; the second dealing with obligations which the neuti-al State must enforce oti its own subjects and subjects of the other belligerent within its territoiy. The more important obligations of this class, are those of preventing the issue of commissions (see the case of M. GenSt), of preventing the preparation of hostile expeditions (see the Terceira affair), and of preventing the con- struction or outfit of ships of war (see the case of the Alabama and follow- ing cases), and of preventing its territory from being used as a base of operations (see the case of the Shenaiidoah). It is also bound to prohibit, within its territory, illegal enlistment, active or passive, or the participation by its sub- jects in other hostile acts towards either belligerent (see the case of Gideon Henfield and cases following). The fulfilment of these obligations is usually secured by provisions of municipal law (see Excursus on Neutrality Laws). Finally, the relation of the belligerent State towards neutral individuals in- cludes an account of the liabilities of neutral trade, in the matter of the caniage of hostile goods on neutral ships, or neutral goods on hostile ships, the carriage of contraband, the breach of blockade, and the taking part in a trade closed to the neutral in time of peace (see cases under these heads). 234 Cases and Opinions on International Lazv. before the English Prize Court, a claim to ship and cargo was made by the United States ambassador, on the groimd that the ship was taken within the jurisdiction of the United States, at the distance of one and a half miles from the western shore of the principal entrance to the river, and within view of a fortified post where an ofiScer of the United States was stationed. As a matter of fact it did not appear that the actual capture took place within three miles of this fort ; but it did appear that it took place, within three miles of some small mud islands, com- posed of earth and trees drifted down by the river, which formed a kind of portico to the main land. Judgment.] Sir W. Scott, in his judgment, laid it down as a well known rule, " terrcB dominium finitur ubi Jinitur armm^um vis," and stated that since the introduction of fire- arms that distance had been recognized to be about three miles from the shore. He further held that the three mile limit must be reckoned from the islands, these being the natural appendages of the coast on which they bordered. On this ground restitution was decreed ; the reprehensible conduct of the captors was visited with costs and damages. The Anna, 5 C. Rob. 373. The principle of the inviolability of neutral territory was one of the earliest restraints placed upon belligerent operations. The rule does not appear to have been at first very strictly observed. Thus, in the year 1793, the French frigate " Modeste " was captured by the English in the harbour of Genoa ; no apology was offered for the violation of neutral territory, nor was the captured vessel restored (p). In the same year, however, the " Grange," a British ship, having been captured by the French in Delaware Bay, was restored, on the ground that the inviolability of neutral territory protected the pro- perty of belligerents when within it(q). Several instances of the violation of neutral territory occurred even as late as the American Civil War. In 1863 a Confederate prize was pursued by the Federals and recaptured whilst within British waters ; the British Govern- (p) See Hall, p. 604. (?) See Kent, p. 303, Neutral Territory. 235 ment intervened, with the result that the vessel together with those who had been captured on board her were restored, and amends made for the violation of British territory. In 1864, the "Florida," a Confederate vessel, was seized by a Federal cruiser whilst in a Brazilian port; the Brazilian Government thereupon demanded reparation, with the result that the crew were surrendered, the vessel herself having meanwhile foundered ; the Brazilian flag was also saluted by way of apology, and punishment inflicted on those responsible for the outrage. The limit of neutral territory extends to a distance of three miles from the nearest land. Where a capture has been effected in violation of neutral terri- toiy, the remedy is threefold. In the first place, if the matter comes before the belligerent Prize Court at the suit of the captor, the prize ought to be restored, on an application to this effect being made by the ambassador of the neutral State whose territory was violated. For the purpose of making such a claim, however, the other belligerent is not regarded as having any status. In the case of the Anne (8 Wheaton, 435), Story, J., laid down, that in such cases neither a neutral consul, nor the belligerent owner of the captured vessel, could be admitted to contest the validity of the capture, and that it was only the neutral Sovereign or his international representative who could ]iut forward such a claim. In the Vrow Anna GatJiarina (5 C. Eob. 15), Sir W. Scott observed that when the fact of neutral temtory was duly established it overruled every other consideration, the capture was invaUdated, and the property must be restored, even though it belonged to the enemy. In the second place, if after such an illegal capture the captured vessel should at any time be brought within the neutral jurisdiction, the neutral State may lawfully cause restitution to be made, unless, perhaps, in the case suggested by "Wheaton, of the vessel having been previously carried infra pt'cesidia, and condemned by a competent Court (r). Ortolan, however, suggests that even in this case restora- tion should be made (s). Probably the latter view is right ; nothing except the furnishing of the vessel illegally captured with a commis- sion will suflice to exclude the neutral jurisdiction. In the case of the Estrella (4 Wheaton, 298), it was laid down by the United States Courts, that wherever a prize was brought within the neutral jurisdiction, it was competent to the neutral Court to enquire whether its neutrality had been in any way violated. Although the breach of neutrality complained of in this particular case was an illegal augmentation of force, yet the principle would be equally applicable (r) See Wheaton by Lawrence, p. (*) See Ortolan, Vol. II., p. 303. 725. 236 Cases and Opinions on International Law. to the case of an illegal capture within neutral territory. Where restitution is sought from the neutral State, it is the belligerent (xovernment injured by the capture, and not the individual owner, who ought to put in the claim ; even a consul is not generally deemed to be clothed with sufficient representative character to appear on behalf of his State for this purpose (f). Lastly if restitution should not be secured in either of these ways, then the injured belligerent will be entitled to demand compensation from the neutral ; whilst the neutral whose territory has been violated will in its turn have a just claim for satisfaction from the belligerent, by whose vessels or subjects the illegal capture was made ; failure to render satisfaction would in either case afford a just cause of war. THE "TWEE GEBROEDER." Tem:p. 1801. [3 C. Rob. 336.] Case.] During war between Great Britain and Holland, several vessels were captured by the British in the Groningen Watt, on the gi-ound that they were bound for Amsterdam, which was then under blockade. The Watt is an arm of the sea, lying between East Friesland and Groningen. A claim for restitution was made by the Prussian minister on the ground that the cap- ture took place on what was alleged to be Prussian territory, Prussia being at the time neutral. Condemnation of the ships was decreed, it being held after a review of the facts, that the capture was not made on neutral territory. A question was also raised as to whether the capture was not invalidated, by reason of the belligerent ship having passed over neutral territory animo capiendi. Judgment.] Sir Wm. Scott, in his judgment, after giving an account of the history of the jurisdiction over the place, which (<) It seems that when the capture temtory the base of operations, the has been the result of a remoter breach claim for restitution may be put in by of neutrality on the part of the offend- the private owner or oonsuL ing belligerent, as by making neutral Neutral Territory. £87 it is unnecessary to insert here, laid down the following impor- tant principles with regard to the inviolability of neutral territory, viz., (1) that the act of a war vessel passing over neutral waters without violence would not be considered a violation of the rights of that territory ; (2) that the mere granting of a passage to troops of a belligerent through neutral territory would not afford a ground of complaint to the other belligerent ; (3) that the mere passage of a ship over waters claimed as neutral territory, would not invalidate an ulterior capture, unless the passage was an unpermitted one over territory where permission was regularly required, or one taking place under a permission obtained by false representation. The Twee, Gehroeder, 3 C. Rob. 336. In the present day, to allow the passage of belligerent troops over neutral territory would probably be regarded as a gross violation of neutrality, and, if the other belligerent chose so to regard it, as a casus helli. But according to the earlier view, the passage of troops over neutral territory does not appear to have been con- sidered in this light. Even by modern jurists it is sometimes laid down that this is permissible, if the privilege be afforded im- partially to both belligerents. But the balance of modem opinion and actual practice are alike opposed to this view. In 1870, Switzerland denied the privilege of passage to bodies of Alsatians enlisted for the French army, notwithstanding that they were without arms or uniforms. In the same year Belgium refused to accede to the request of the German Government that the German wounded in France might be allowed to be transported to German territory across Belgian territory {it). In other respects the principles laid down by Sir Wm. Scott may still be said to hold good ; although, as was decided in the other case of the Twee Qebroeder (uu), if the capturing vessel should be actually lying within neutral territory, the capture will be invalidated, although the prize was captured by boats outside. («) See Hall, p. 603. (uu) See next page. £S8 Cases and Opinions on International Law. THE "TWEE GEBROEDER." Temp. 1800. [3 C. EoB. 162.] Case.] During war between Great Britain and Holland four Dutch ships were captured by the British in the Western Eems near the Groningen Watt, by boats sent from H.M. ship " L'Espiegle," then lying in the Eastern Eems. Restitution was claimed by the Prussian representative, on the ground that the vessels were captured within the limits of Prussian territory. It appeared that the place where the warship herself was lying, was at the most three miles from East Fiiesland, and that at low tide it was immediately connected with the land. Under these circumstances, it was contended that the fact of the vessel herself being stationed within neutral territory infected all captures made by her boats outside. Judgment.] Sir Wm. Scott, in his judgment, laid down that no proximate acts of war could be allowed to oi-iginate on neutral territory ; and that such an act as a ship stationing her- self on neutral territory and sending out her boats on hostile enterprises beyond, was an act of hostility much too immediate to be permitted. Restoration was accordingly decreed, but a claim for costs and damages was refused on the ground that the capture arose from misapprehension and mistake, and not from an intention to violate what was clearly neutral territory. The Twee, Gebroeder, 3 C. Rob. 162. The principle laid down by Sir Wm. Scott in this case, viz., that no proximate acts of war can be allowed eveu to originate on neutral territory, is a very important one. It extends to all acts of hostility taking their origin in neutral territory, and covers the case of the use of neutral territory by one belligerent, as a base of operations against the other. Thus if one belligerent should attempt to draw his resources and reinforcements from neutral territory, or should start from neutral territory and seek to retire there in case of need, this would constitute an offence against the neutral State, and, if knowingly permitted and indulged by that State, would constitute a Neutral Territory. 239 violation of its neutrality in respect of the other belligerent. The Fenian raids on Canada of 1865 and 1870 afford an illustration of this kind of illegality. These raids were arranged and organized in the United States, and on being repulsed the raiders took refuge in United States territory, with a merely nominal interference on the part of the authorities (m). A similar illegal use of neutral tenitory, as a base of operations, may occur in naval warfare. Thus if a belUgerent craiser were to have recourse to a neutral port for the purpose of obtaining coal and other necessaries, and if this use were constantly renewed as a preliminary to further operations, the neutral ■country would practically become her base of supplies, although the supplies might not in themselves be of a war-like character. The crucial test in such cases appears to be coutinual use (v). A usage is in course of growth tending to limit even the right to coal and ■supplies, on the part of belligerent warships. Thus during the Ameri- can Civil war, under the English neutrality regulations, belligerent cruisers were only allowed to take so much coal as would take them to the nearest port of their own country, and were not allowed to take any further supply from any English port within three months. Similar regulations were made both by Great Britain and the United States during the Franco-German war of 1870. THE "GENERAL ARMSTRONG." Temp. 1851. [Ortolan, Diplomatie be la Mee, Vol. II., p. 300.] Case.] In 1814, during war between Great Britain and the United States, the American privateer " General Armstrong " was found by an English squadron in the harbour of Fayal, in Portugal. A detachment from the squadron on approachin the privateer was fired upon ; in consequence of this, on the following day, one of the vessels of the squadron took up her position near the privateer and succeeded in capturing it. Thereupon a claim was made by the United States against the Portuguese Government, for breach of duty in allowing a United States vessel to be captured within Portuguese territory (■u) An account of these expeditions (r) On this subject see the case of the will be found in Wheaton by Lawrence, ShetMivAoah, p. 273, mfm. p. 585. 240 Cases and Opinions on International Law. Portugal resisted this claim on the ground that the captain of the " General Armstrong " had himself engaged in belligerent operations. No agreement was at first arrived at ; but in 1851 the matter was by consent submitted to the arbitration of Louis Napoleon, then President of the French Republic. Award.] The arbitrator held that as the captain of the pri- vateer had not applied at the outset to the neutral state, but had used force to repel the aggression, he had himself disregarded the neutrality of the territory, and had released its Sovereign from all obligations to protect him otherwise than by good offices, and that the Portuguese Government could not from the time of his having done so be held responsible for the results of the collision that had taken place in contempt of its sovereign rights. The Oeneral Armstrong, Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, Vol. II., p. 300. The decision in the above case was based on the principle that a belligerent who, when attacked on neutral territory, elects to defend himself, releases the neutral from all responsibility in respect of the violation of territory. The same principle was recognized in the case of the Anne (3 Wheaton, p. 435), where it was held that a prize captured within neutral territory, had forfeited its right to neutral protection, by reason of its having been the first to commence hostilities. THE "CAROLINE.' Temp. 1843. [Pabliamentaky PArEKS, 1843, Vol. LXI.] Case.] During the rebel raids on Canada a small passenger ship, the " Caroline,'' was made use of by the insurgents for the purpose of carrying arms and forces from the territory of the United States into Canada. The officer in command of the British forces determined on attacking the " Caroline " at a time when he expected she would be moored in British territory, Neutral Territory. 241 near Navy Island, in the Niagara River. When the attack was about to be made, it was found that she had altered her usual moorings, and had shifted to the United States side of the river. Notwithstanding this the attack was made, the vessel was boarded, and after a short resistance sent down the Niagara. The affair was taken up by the United States Govern- ment, and war seemed imminent. In the negotiations which ensued, Great Britain complained that a hostile expedition had been permitted by the United States Government with- out any effort being made to suppress it ; that American citizens had supported seditious movements against Canada ; and that one McLeod (z) had been arrested when within United States territory and prosecuted for his part in the affair of the " Caroline." The United States Government, on the other hand, complained that the attack was not such as was warranted by the necessity of self-defence ; that it was made upon a passenger-ship at night ; that it was an invasion of United States territory ; and that, though the case had been brought to the notice of the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, unnecessary delay had taken place in the communication of his decision in the matter. The negotiations lasted over five years, but the matter was in the end settled amicably. The British Government expressed their regret for what had occurred, and that an apology had not been made at the time, and the United States accepted these explanations. The Caroline, Parliamentary Papers, 1843, Vol. LXI. This case is cited under neutrality, as illustrating the rule, that, though neutral territory is generally to be regarded as inviolable, yet overwhelming necessity may justify a departure from this prin- ciple. In the negotiations which ensued, the United States iiciinitted this exception, though they called on Great Britain to show that such overwhelming necessity existed (a). («) McLeod's case is referred to on raids on Canada, and the action of tlio p. 122, mpra. United States authorities, see Wheaton (a) For an account of the Fenian by Boyd, p. 617. C.I.L. B 242 Cases and Opinions on International Law. NEUTRAL DUTIES {A) (V). DISPUTE BETWEEN DENMARK AND SWEDEN. Temp. 1788. [Ankttal Kegibteb, 1788, 292 & 293 ; Phillimoeb's International Law, Vol. III. pp. 229—2-31.] Case.] In 1788, during war between Sweden and Russia, Denmark, in accordance with the provisions of a previous treaty to that effect, furnished Eussia with ships and troops. Notwith- standing this, the Danish Government, in a declaration delivered to the Swedish Ambassador at the Court of Copenhagen, stated that it still considered itself to be at peace with Sweden ; that the peace would not be interrupted by the defeat of the Danish auxiliaries; and that Sweden had no ground of complaint so long as the auxiliaries did not exceed the number stipulated for. A counter-declaration was thereupon made by Sweden to the effect that the doctrines set up by Denmark could not be reconciled with the Law of Nations, or with the ordinary rights of Sovereigns, and that the Swedish Government, therefore, entered its protest against such action on the part of Denmark ; but it was added, that, for the purpose of preventing war and bloodshed between the subjects of the two Kingdoms, the Swedish Government would, under the circumstances, and in view of the efforts then being made to restore peace, rest satisfied with the declaration of the Danish Government that it had no hostile views against Sweden. Dispute between Denmark and Sweden, Annual Register, 1788, 292 and 293; Phillimore's In.- ternational Law, Vol. III., pp. 229 — 231. (J) It has been thought desirajjle the conduct of subjects of either belli- to treat of neutral duties under three gerent within its own territory. It is heads : (A) Duties of neutral state in impossible, however, always to keep regard to its own conduct ; (B) Duties the two latter topics apart. In the in regard to the conduct of its own Alaiama and following cases, they are subjects ; and (C) Duties in regard to unavoidably mixed up. Neutral Duties. 213 „ Much of the existing law of neutrality is of modern growth. The dispute referred to. illustrates the fact that at the .close of the eighteenth century, at least, it was not a definitely settled principle of International Law, that a neutral State must not supply troops to either belligerent. . Although the rendering of such military assistance is still treated either as an open question or even an admitted right by certain jurists, there can be little doubt that by modern usage, it would be considered a flagrant violation of neutrality, for a neutral State to supply troops to a belligerent even under treaty. The other belligerent might justly regard this as a casus lelli. During the present century no instance is to be found of a nation rendering military assistance to one belligerent whilst professing to maintain its neutrality in regard to the other; nor would any Government now venture to conclude a treaty with that intent (c). On principle, too, it would seem that if a neutral State is bound to prevent the levy of men within its territory for the service of either belligerent, much more is it bound to abstain from itself rendering actual military assistance to either party (d). THE CASE OF THE SWEDISH FRIGATES. Temp. 1825. [De Maktbns Causes CAl6bkes, Vol. V., p. 229.] Case.] In 1825, during the war between Spain and her colonies, the Swedish Government offered for sale three of its war vessels. They were ultimately purchased by two mer- chants, who resold them to London houses. It was then discovered that the vessels had been bought on behalf of the Mexican insurgents. The Spanish Secretary of Legation thereupon demanded the rescission of the contract. The Swedish Minister replied that precautions had been taken to prevent injury to Spanish interests, and that a power of rescission (c) Sea Hall, p. 596. the recognition of a general obligation {d) Although municipal rules on this on the, pcii't of neutral States to prohibit subject may not afford any true measure their subjects from taking part in, the of the limits or extent of the interna- war, or from contributing assistance to tional obligation, yet tlie passing either party. .of such regulations clearly points to R 2 344 Cases and Opinions on InternahonaL Law. had been inserted in the contract for sale. Later on, the matter was also taken up by Russia, and, after considerable negotiation, instmctions were given to the officers appointed to take the ships to England to wait for further orders. On account of tlie delay, the English purchasers demanded a rescission of the contract, and this demand was complied with by the Swedish Government. Stvedish Frigates sold to Mexico, De Martens Causes Cdlfebres, Vol. V., p. 229. The obligations of a neutral State preclude it from supplying or even selling articles or munitions of war to either belligerent. The transaction forbidden, however, is only one occurring between State and State. There is nothing to preclude the neutral State from sell- ing such articles to individuals as a purely mercantile transaction, unless there were reason to believe that the purchase was being effected by a belligerent under cover of the name of some private firm. Such at least was the attitude taken up by the United States during the Franco-German war (e). If the Swedish frigates, in the case cited, had really been sold to private individuals who had taken tlieir chance of a market, and if the latter had, in the ordinary course of trade, resold them to agents of the Mexican Government, Spain would, under the then rules of International Law, have had no reason to regard this as an infringement of Swedish neutrality. Since that time, however, new usages have sprung up, or at any rate are in course of growth, with regard to the construction and sale of vessels fit for war. In the present day, a neutral State, in similar circumstances, might, not improbably, render itself liable, not perhaps in respect of the sale of the ships to individuals, but for allowing them to be despatched from neutral territory, with reasonable cause to suspect their ultimate destination and use (/). Subject to this, however, neutral individuals are still at liberty to sell or supply munitions of war to either belligerent, although they run the risk of the capture and condemnation of such articles, as contraband, whilst in course of transmission to the belligerent. But this would not warrant the supply of such articles to belligerent vessels in neutral ports. A neutral State is also precluded by the Law of Nations from lending money to either belligerent, or from guaranteeing or («) See p. £64, infra. States of America ; but as between other (/) This would certainly be the case nations, see p. 258, infra. as between Great Britain and the United Neutral Duties. 2-J-5 promoting any such loan. Sach a transaction, in spite of tlie opinion of Yattel, -would now constitute as distinct a violation of neutrality, as the sale of articles of war or the supply of troops. This seems to have been recognised by the United States as early as the close of the last century. During the war which then prevailed between Great Britain and France, two envoys were sent by the United States Government to the Fi'ench Republic, in order to settle certain differences which had arisen between the two countries. In a despatch, dated March 23rd, 1798, the United States Government instructed its representatives that no treaty should be purchased with money, by loan, or otherwise, inasmuch as such a loan would violate the neutrality of the United States {g). There is nothing, apparently, which requires a neutral State to prohibit such loans being made by its subjects if they are made lona fide, and as purely commercial transactions (A) So far we have dealt only with those aspects of the neutral obligation, which imply an abstinence from acts involving a par- ticipation in the war. Strict neutrality has, however, another aspect, viz., that of impartiality. This involves the duty of affording no countenance or privilege, even of a permissive character, to one bel- ligerent, which is denied to the other. It has been contended that it would be no violation of neutrality for a neutral State to allow the prizes captured by one belligerent to be brought into its ports, in compliance with the provisions of a prior treaty, and yet to deny this privilege to the other («). But although this privilege might reason- ably be denied to both belligerents, yet if it were granted to one and refused to the other, it would, apparently, constitute a breach of neutral duty, and give the aggrieved belligerent just cause of offence. (g) American State Papers, Vol. II. belligerent, and the attitude taken up p. 201. by English Law towards such trans- (A) The precise limits of neutral actions, are not so clear. See Excursus duty in regard to loans or contributions II., p. 246, infra. by the subjects of a neutral State to a (i) See Wheaton, by Boyd, 571. 246 Cases and Opinions on International Law. EXCURSUS II. LOANS BY NEUTEAL SUBJECTS TO BELLIGEEENT STATES. The increasing costliness of modern warfare not infrequently im- poses on belligerent States the necessity of contracting loans in other countries. In respect to such loans three questions suggest themselves: (1) Is the neutral State under any obligation at International Law to prohibit a subscription or contribution to any such loans on the part of its subjects ? (2) How far will such transactions, and agree- ments arising out of them, be recognized as valid in the English Courts ? and (3) Under what circumstances, if any, will the partici- pation in such a proceeding involve the parties to it, in penal consequences in English Law ? On the first point there appears to be a considerable discrepancy between the views of the text writers and actual usage. By the former, the prohibition, whigh certainly applies to the neutral State itself, of not contributing aid whether in arms or money to either belligerent, is frequently extended to loans maupra. Angary. 349 pay a sum of money by way of indemnity. This indemnity included — (1.) The value of the ships and 25 per cent, in addition, the seizure being considered in the light of a forced sale ; (2.) The highest value of the cargoes, at the place of shipment, and at the time of capture, less port dues and charges for unloading, which had not been paid; (3.) Small sums incurred for protests and counter certificates ; (4.) Five per cent, interest on the sums so ascertained. A claim was also made by the master and seamen for loss of employment and effects, but the British Government refused to put forward any claim on this ground. Another claim was made for charges incurred by the British Government in transmitting the seamen to their homes. This was admitted by both sides as fair. Sinking of English Vessels, Annual Register, 1871 ; Public Documents, 2£5 — 259 ; Parliamentary Papers, 1871, vol. 71. The JUS angariae in its present application consists in the right of a belligerent to seize the property, even of a neutral, found within the belligerent jurisdiction, and to make use of it for the purpose of war- like operations, subject, in the case of a neutral, to payment for any loss or injury sustained. In the same war, the Germans also seized in Alsace between six and seven hundred railway carriages, the property of the Central Swiss Railway, and also some Austrian rolling stock, detaining them for military use throughout a considerable period of the campaign. This right appears, in fact, to be no more than a particular application of the general right which a State has to appropriate all property, foreign or domestic, found within the limits of its juris- diction or occupation, for purposes dictated by public necessity. To attempt to deny or suppress the exercise of the right, in such cases, would be futile. One can only say, that so far as neutral property is concerned, its exercise ought to be founded on great military neces- sity, and that a proper indemnity ought to be paid. APPENDIX. SOME INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES. I. THE BEITISH AMEEICAN FISHERIES QUESTION. [BniTisH AND Foreign State Papbbs, Vol.'' VII ; Pakliamentakt Papeks, 1855, Vol. LV. ; 1874, Vols. LXXIV. and LXXV. ; 1878, Vol. LXXX. ; 1888, Vol. CIX.] By the Treaty of 1783, upon the recognition of the Independence of the United States, Great Britain conceded to the inhabitants of the United States the right to take fish of every kind on the G-rand Bank and other banks of Newfoundland, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and in all other places where the subjects of Great Britain were wont to fish before the separation of the two countries ; but this was not to extend to the right to land for the purpose of drying or curing fish. The right to fish was further extended to the coasts, bays, and creeks of all other British possessions in America ; and, within those limits, there was also granted the right to dry and cure fish in any unsettled bays, harbours, and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labrador, so long as the same should remain unsettled. After the war of 1812, a dispute arose as to whether the privileges accorded by this treaty had been abrogated by the war. It was con- tended on behalf of the United States that the effect of the treaty was not to convey new rights or privileges, but to acknowledge and confirm those existing rights of fishing which had been enjoyed by the subjects of the United States before the separation of the two countries ; moreover, that these were real rights, and consequently unaffected by any subsequent outbreak of war. In the latter characteristic the acknowledgment of such rights was said to be similar to the acknowledgment of the Independence of the United States. The United States plenipotentiaries stated that from the nature of the rights and the peculiar character of the Treaty of 1783, no further stipulation had been deemed necessary V)y the United States Government to entitle them to enjqyment of the riglits. Some International Disputes. 351 Great Brifcain, on the other hand, asserted that the claim of one State to occupy any part of the territory, or fish in the territorial waters of another, could only rest upon convention. Neither could she assent to the proposition that such a treaty could not be abrogated by a subsequent war ; or that the present case constituted any ex- ception to the general rule by which all treaties were put an end to by a subsequent war between the same parties. Great Britain refused to give her diplomatic relations with one State a different degree of permanency from that governing her relations with other States. Moreover, the rights given by the treaty had all the features of temporary concessions ; nor did it follow that, even if some parts of a treaty were irrevocable, the whole of the treaty was so. Some farther correspondence passed between the two Governments on the subject, and ultimately Lord Oastlereagh stated to Mr. Adams that the orders given to the British Commissioners to prohibit the exercise of such rights by United States citizens, would be sus- pended, in order that a treaty might be aiTanged. In the result, a Convention was entered into between the two countries on the 20th October, 1818, to the following effect : — (1.) That the inhabitants of the United States should have for ever, in common with British subjects, the liberty to take fish of every kind, on those parts of the coast specified in the treaty ; (2.) That United States fishermen should have liberty for ever to cure fish, on the unsettled bays of certain parts of the coast of Newfoundland and of the coast of Labrador, but so soon as the same should be settled it should not be lawful for them to cure fish on such parts without previous agree- ment ; (3.) The United States renounced the right of fishing on other parts of the coast of British North America, but American fishermen were to be admitted to the bays of those parts for the purpose of shelter, repairing damages, purchasing wood, and obtain- ing water, subject to such restrictions as might be necessary to prevent their abusing the privileges reserved to them. In 1849, in consequence of a petition presented to the Crown by the Canadian Parliament, negotiations were commenced between Great Britain and the United States, with a view to the granting to the citizens of the United States access to the fisheries of all the colonies (except Newfoundland), in return for reciprocity of trade with the United States in all natural productions. Ulti- mately, on the 5th of June, 1854, a new Treaty was entered into between the two Governments, whereby it was provided :— (1.) That the inhabitants of the United States should have the right of taking fish of every kind except shell fish off the coasts of Canada, New. Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward's Island and the islands adjacent thereto, and also the right of landing on the shores of those colonies and of the Magdalen Islands, for the purpose of drying 352 Appenaix. their nets and curing fish, provided that they did not interfere with rights of private property or with British fishermen ; (2.) But such rights of fishery were not to extend to salmon or shad fisheries or any river fisheries ; (3.) In case of dispute, the matter was to be settled by arbitration as provided in the treaty ; (4.) British subjects were to have the right to take fish of q^^tj kind, except shell fish, on certain parts'of the eastern coast of the United States, with permission to land for the purpose of drying their nets and curing fish, provided that they did not interfere with rights of private property or with United States fishermen ; (5.) Salmon and shad fisheries and all river fisheries were similarly excepted from the privileges granted to British subjects. Provision was made for the appointment of commissioners to examine the coasts of North America, and designate the places reserved from the common right of fishing. In 1870 a question arose with reference to the extent of the rights of fishery possessed by the two nations. The subject was dealt with anew by the Treaty of Washington of the 8th of May, 1871. This treaty provided : (1.) That United States citizens should have the right to take fish of every kind, except shell fish, off the coasts of Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward's Island, and the islands adjacent thereto, without restriction as to distance from the shore, with permission to land there and also upon the Magdalen Islands for the purpose of drying their nets and curing their fish, provided they did not interfere with the rights of private property, or with British fishermen using the coasts for the same purpose ; (2.) Similar privileges were given to British subjects on the east coast of the United States north of 39° N. lat., and the islands adjacent thereto ; (3.) These privileges were to last for ten years, and also for a further period of two years after notice to terminate by either party ; (4.) Inasmuch as the privileges accorded to the United States, were alleged by Great Britain to be greater than those accorded to her, provision was made for settling by arbitration the amount of compensation, if any, to be paid to Great Britain in respect of this alleged inadequacy of consideration. Certain commissioners were appointed in pursuance of this provi- sion, and met at Halifax in Nova Scotia. Their meetings extended from the 15th of June to the 23rd of November, 1877. The sum of $5,500,000 was awarded by them to Great Britain as compensation. The provisions of the Treaty of Washington on this matter were to remain in force for 10 years, and thereafter to continue until notice to abrogate was given by either party, although such notice was not to take eifect until two years had elapsed from the time at which the notice was given. . In pursuance of this option, the United States Government terminated the arrangement in 1883, wiih the. Some International Disputes. 858 result that in 1888 both parties were relegated back to the provisions of the treaty of 1818. The provisions of this treaty were now very strictly construed and enforced by the Canadian Government. This gave rise to considerable friction between the British and United States Governments. In 1887 an attempt was made to effect an amicable settlement. Three commissioners were appointed to arrange the matter, and a provisional treaty was come to in 1888, by which a mixed commission was appointed to delimit the waters of Canada and Newfoundland, as to which the United States Government had renounced its rights. It was also provided that the marine league, within which exclusive rights of fishery usually belong to the local power, should be measured from low water mark, or in the case of bays and gulfs not being more than 10 miles across, then from a straight line drawn from headland to headland. This treaty, how- ever, fell through owing to the refusal of the United States Senate to ratify it. The British American Fisheries Question, British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. VII. ; Parliamentary Papers, 1855, Vol. LV.; 1874, Vols. LXXIV. and LXXV.-^ 1878, Vol. LXXX. ; and 1888, Vol. CIX- II. THE MOSQUITO PROTECTOKATE QUESTION. [Pabliamentaey Papers, 1856, Vol. LX. ; 1860, Vol. LXVIIL] The Mosquito Territory, a portion of Central America lying^ between Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, had long been under the protectorate of Great Britain. Some attempts were made to found colonies and settlements, but from various causes the British colonists were compelled to withdraw. After the overthrow of the Spanish power in Central America, various native States came into existence. In 1840 a series of internal struggles broke "out vrithin the territory, which ultimately led to British interference. On the 1st of January, 1848, a British force hauled down the Nicaraguan flag from San Juan, and raised the Mosquito flag in its place. Apprehension was then expressed on the part of the United States, lest Great Britain should monopolise for herself the control over the different routes between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Some correspondence took place between the two Governments, the result of which was that, in 1850, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was entered into between Great Britain and the United States. By this Treaty each party agreed not to occupy, fortify, colonise, assume or C.I.L. A A 351 Appendix. exercise dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Eica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America, or to make use of any protection or alliance which either party might enjoy, for the purpose of so doing («). Subsequently the United States requested the withdrawal of the British protectorate oyer the Mosquito Indians in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. To this request the British GoTern- ment replied by pointing out that, up to the end of 1849, the United States Government had made no remonstrance to Great Britain on the subject of her protectorate of the Mosquito territory ; that the treaty of 1850 only applied to future acquisitions, and was not meant to annihilate the existing protectorate, but simply to confine its powers and limit its influence, so as to prevent Great Britain from acquiring absolute control over the proposed Panama Canal ; and finally, that the very words of the treaty in limiting the conditions of occupation showed that some occupation was in fact contemplated. The United States replied, that on account of the savage and degraded state of the Mosquito Indians no protectorate proper could exist on the part of Great Britain in regard to them ; that the nominal protectorate must involve an absolute submission on their part, to the British Government; and therefore Great Britain must be treated as being in.posaessionof the Mosquito Coast as undisputed owner ; this being so, she was bound by the treaty to withdraw. A very long correspondence ensued on the subject. Ultimately, on the 28th of November, 1859, a treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Honduras, whereby it was agreed that the country formerly occupied by the Mosquito Indians within the Honduras frontier, should be recognised as belonging to Honduras, and that the British protectorate over it should cease. Arrangements were also made for the appointment of commissioners to enquire into the claims of British subjects with reference to the matter. By this means the question between Great Britain and the United States was for the time set at rest (J). The Mosquito Protectorate Question, Parliamentary Papers, 1856, Vol. LX. ; 1860, Vol. LXVIII. (a) For an account of the other pro- dispute and correspondence between the .. visions of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty United States and Great Britain as to relating to the construction of a water- the effect of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty way across Central America, see p. 28, on the proposed Panama Canal, see p. supra. 29, supra. (6) For an account of the recent Some Iniemaitonal Disputes. 855 III. THE MAINE BOUNDAEY QUESTION. [British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. XXX., pp. 136—181.] By the Treaty of 1783, between Great Britain and the United States, provision was made for the settlement of the boundaries between the State of Maine and the Province of New Brunswick. Difficulties subsequently arose in consequence of a reference in the Treaty to certain highlands which had no definite existence. The King of Holland, to whom the matter was referred, stated that it was impossible to execute the provisions of the Treaty relating to the subject. A boundary Convention was subsequently made, but it was not ratified by the United States Senate. A discussion on the subject, lasting over many years, having proved ineffectual, in 1842 Lord Ashburton was sent out by the British Government, with the view of arranging a conventional, line of boundary between the two territories. According to the British Government, the principles to be observed in the settlement of such disputes were : — (1.) The establishment of a good boundary between the countries, but with an unobstructed communication and connection of the British colonies with each other ; and (2.) That each nation should keep under its jurisdiction such inhabitants as had been so living for any length of time. The United States Government, in stating their view of the matter, urged that a boundary line could be fixed in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty of 1783. Eventually, after some coiTespondence, the boundary was arranged, and the result ratified by Treaty (c). The Maine Boundary Question, British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. XXX., pp. 136—181. (c) The Maine Boundary Question countries as to the actual temtorial has been inserted as containing an im- limits in dispute, with which the cor- portant statement of the principles respondence on the subject is mainly which should be observed in the settle- taken up, but which would be uniu- ment of boundary disputes. It has telligible without the aid of a map of been thought unnecessary to refer to the locality, the respective contentions of the two A A 2 356 Appendix. IV. THE OEEGON CLAIMS. [Parliambntaky Papers, 1846, Vol. LII. ; 1873, Vol. LXXIV.] In 1844, differences arose between Great Britain and the United States, with reference to the Oregon territory. The latter Power claimed the whole of the district drained by the Columbia river, and the whole territory west of the Eocky Mountains as far as parallel 54° 40' N. In a dispatch, dated the 3rd September, the American plenipotentiary stated that the United States' claims to the district were founded partly on pretensions put forward in their own proper right, and partly on pretensions derived from France and Spain. Their own proprietary claims against Great Britain were founded on priority of discovery, exploration, and settlement ; their claim to discovery rested on that of Captain Gray, a United States citizen, who had passed the bar and anchored in the river Columbia ten miles above its mouth on the 11th of May, 1792, and had afterwards sailed even farther up the river. As to the alleged previous discovery on the part of one Meares, a British subject, in 1788, it was asserted by the United States that Meares had expressly declared, in his account of the voyage, that there was no river as laid down in the Spanish chart. It was also alleged that Vancouver, who explored the coast in April, 1792, had failed to discover the river. With reference to priority of settlement, it was stated that establishments were formed there by American citizens as early as 1809 and 1810. In further support of their contention, the United States relied on the claims of France and Spain, to which the United States had succeeded under treaty. It was alleged that the river had been discovered as early as 1775, by a Spaniard called He9eta, that the rights arising from prior discovery ought to extend to the entire region drained by the river, and that such rights were transferred to the United States by the Treaty of Florida, 1819. With reference to the claims derived through France, it was alleged that by the Treaty of 1763, between that country and Great Britain, the latter country had ceded to France all her claims in respect of the region to the west of the Mississippi, and that those claims had been transferred from France to the United States, by the Treaty of Louisiana, 1803. To this statement the British plenipotentiary replied on the 12th of the same month, that the district in question never belonged to France, and was therefore not comprised in the Treaty of Louisiana. As to the Treaty of Florida, Spain had by previous treaty with Great Britain, dated 1790, acknowledged in Great Britain certain rights with respect to those parts of the Western coast of America not Some International Disputes. 357 already occupied, the acknowledgment having special reference to the territory in question. In support of the British claim stress was laid on the discoveries of Meares and Vancouver, and other Englishmen, who had made explorations inland. As to priority of settlement, a trade establishment had, it was true, been formed by American citizens in 1811 : but it had passed, during the war, into the hands of British subjects, and v^as only restored to America in 1818 by an understanding between the two Governments. After a diplomatic correspondence lasting over two years, a Treaty on the subject was entered into between the two countries on the 15th of June, 1846, whereby it was provided that the line of boundary between British and United States territory should be continued westward, along the 49th parallel of north latitude, to the middle of the channel which separated the continent from Vancouver's Island, and thence southwards through the middle of the channel and of Fucas' Straits, to the Pacific Ocean ; the right of navigation in the channel and straits being preserved to both parties. The matter was not, however, destined to rest here. The commis- sioners appointed to determine the portion of the boundary running southward, were unable to agree. Great Britain claiming that the boundary line should be run through the Eosario Straits, and the United States claiming that it should run through the Canal de Haro. This dispute gave rise to much correspondence between the Governments of the two countries. Various attempts to settle the matter were made without success. Ultimately, by the Treaty of Washington of 1871, it was agreed to submit this to the arbitration of the Emperor of Germany. The two Governments accordingly submitted their cases to the Emperor, who referred them to three experts. In accordance with the report of the latter, an award was made in favour of the United States' contention. This award was subsequently accepted by Great Britain. The Oregon Claims, Parliamentary Papers, 1846, Vol. LII. ; 1873, Vol. LXXIV. V. THE DELAGOA BAY QUESTION. Xtmp, 1872, [Pariiambntakt Pxpbbs, 1875, Vol. LXXXIII.] From 1823 to 1875, continuous disputes took place between the British and Portuguese Governments with regard to thsir respective 358 Appendix. claims to Delagoa Bay, on the East Coast of Africa. The district in dispute formerly belonged to the King of Tembe and Mapoota. It was contended on behalf of Great Britain :— (1.) That the territories, although discovered by the Portuguese, had never been taken posses- sion of by them, and that the- Portuguese dominions were bounded on the south by the Dundas or Lorengo Marques River and by the English River, and on the east by the sea, and had at no time extended to the territories in question ; (2.) That the whole country south of the Dundas, or Lorengo Marques River, and English River, had remained free and independent until 1823, the native inhabitants under their chiefs retaining absolute dominion over the territory ; (3.) That the chiefs, with the consent of the natives, had ceded the territory to Great Britain in 1823. The Portuguese, on the other hand, claimed the territory in question, on the following grounds : — (1.) That the bay and territory around it had been discovered by them as early as the 16th century ; (2.) That they had continued in occupation and possession of the bay for three centuries ; (3.) That the bay formed an approach to Portu- guese territory ; (4.) That the territory had been conceded to them by the Emperor of Monomotama in the beginning of the 17th century ; (5.) That a grant had been subsequently made to them by the rulers of Tembe j (6.) That an express acknowledgment of their rights had been made by the chiefs of the tribes of Tembe and Mapoota ; (7.) That their rights had been acknowledged by European nations ; and (8.) That previously to 1823 their rights had also been acknowledged by the English. i In 1872 the matter was referred to the President of the French Republic, who made his award in favour of Portugal on the following grounds, viz. : — (1.) That the discovery of the bay had been made by Portugal in the 16th century ; (2.) That Portugal had since claimed, sovereignty and exclusive rights of commerce over the place, and had maintained her pretensions against other countries, by whom her claims hud not been effectually disputed ; (3.) That when England concluded a treaty with Portugal in 1817, she did not con- test these rights ; (4.) That in 1822 England recommended Captain Owen, to whom the alleged cession was made, to the good offices of Portugal ; (5.) That although the weakness of the Portuguese autho- rity in 1823 might have induced Captain Owen to consider the territory as independent of Portugal, yet the treaties subsequently concluded were nevertheless contrary to Portuguese rights ; (6.) That almost immediately after the departure of the English, the chiefs of Tembe and Mapoota acknowledged their dependence on the Portuguese authorities ; ^7.) That even if the treaties had been majie between parlies capable of contracting, they would now be of no avail, the treaty relating to Tembe containing conditions that had not been. Some International Disputes. 859 performed, those relating to Mapoota having been for periods of time that had expired, and not having been renewed. The Delagoa Bay Question, Parliamentary Papers, 1875, Vol. LXXXIII. VI. THE BEHEING SEA CONTEOVERSY (cc). [Parliamentaky Papers, 1890, Vol. LXXXII.] The Territory of Alaska is a promontory situated on the extreme north-west of the continent of North America, and projecting, in a south-westerly direction, for about 500 miles into the Pacific Ocean. Beyond its extreme point lies the Aleutian archipelago, a series of islets extending for a considerable distance further into the Pacific. Above these lies the Behring Sea, and still farther north lie the Behring Straits, separating the two continents. Both the peninsula of Alasica and the Aleutian archipelago formerly belonged to Russia. In 1867 these dominions were ceded by Russia to the United States, and were constituted a Federal Territoiy. The value of the territory acquired lay mainly in its being the chief seat of the seal-fishing industry. In 1870, or thereabouts, a small but powerful syndicate, called the Alaska Commercial Company, was formed for the purpose of acquiring from the United States Government a lease of the Pribyloffs and certain other islands, on certain terms and conditions, which included the payment of a royalty on the number of skins taken. The Company not only received a lease of these islands, but subsequently also acquired the control of other groups, and finally extended its operations and control over most of the 'adjoining islands of the archipelago, as well as over the mainland of Alaska. Meanwhile, the seal-fishing industry had begun id attract the attention of the Canadians, and Canadian vessels began to be despatched to the Behring Sea for the purpose of seal-fishing. It is an admitted principle that every nation is entitled to exercise juris- diction along its littoral seas within a certain distance from the coast. The exact nature of this jurisdiction and the exact limits within which it may be exercised have been stated by an English court to be doubtful. See Reg. v. Keijn (L. R. 2 Exch. Div. 63). So far as {cc) For many of the facts contained April and October, 1891 ; for a detailed in the following summai'y, the author account of the controversy and a criti- is indebted to two admirable articles cism of the American claims, the reader on the subject by Mr. T. B. Browning, is advised to refer to these articles. * contained in the Lau) Quarterhj Review, 360 Appendix. Great Britain is concerned, the doubt raised in Reg. t. KByn has now been settled by the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878 (cc). Apart, however, from the particular question of the true nature of the littoral jurisdiction, it is commonly conceded by the usage of nations that the right of fishing in adjacent waters, probably within three geographical miles from low-water mark, belongs, except where modified by treaty, to subjects of the adjoining State. It is further conceded that, outside these limits, the right to fish on the high seas is a common right, not capable of being appropriated, any more than the dominion of the sea itself, by any particular State. In the Behring Sea difBculty, it does not appear to be suggested that the Canadian fishermen haye in any way infringed the littoral jurisdic- tion and exclusive fishing rights of the United States, as above defined. Their method throughout appears to have been to kill and capture the seals on their passage across the Behring Sea, or, at any rate, at a distance considerably beyond the limit of three geographical miles from the American coast. It is, indeed, charged against them that they indulged in indiscriminate slaughter, calcu- lated to diminish the yield of seals. This may or may not be true. If true, this charge might fairly have been made a matter of diplo- matic action for the purpose of procuring Canadian legislation prohibiting this practice to Canadian subjects. In no case, however, could the charge, even if substantiated, become the foundation of a new jurisdiction over a portion of the open sea, altogether unrecog- nized by prior law or usage. The operations of the Canadian fishermen necessarily gave umbrage to the Alaska Company, and influence was speedily brought to bear on the United States Government to induce it to intervene. Some attempts were made to secure the intervention of Congress, but these having been unsuccessful, reliance had to be placed on the action of the Executive, At the instigation of the Company, which at each stage of the controversy proved itself to be possessed of most powerful influence at Washington, a series of oflicial Acts was passed tending to set up an exclusive jurisdiction, and culminating in a Proclama- tion, issued in March, 1886, whereby the waters of the Behring Sea were declared a Federal preserve, and other nations were prohibited from fishing within their limits. In pursuance of this purely oflBcial assumption of jurisdiction, from 1886 to 1889 various Canadian vessels were seized by United States revenue cutters, and subse- quently condemned in the district court of Alaska ; others were searched, their cargoes rifled, their papers abstracted, and their voyage broken up. The trials of the vessels that were sent in for adjudication, were conducted in most irregular fashion, the juries were composed of dependents of the Alaska Company, evidence was impro- (cc) 41 & 42 Vict. c. 73. Some International Disputes, a6l perly excluded, no opportunity was given for cross-examination, de- murrers were over-ruled without argument, and after judgment every obstacle was thrown in the way of carrying an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the crews were subjected to the harshest possible treatment, and although in some cases orders were subsequently given by the United States Government for the release of the men and for the restitution of the vessels, yet this was done too late to be of any avail. The vessels had become useless, the sentences had in a great measure been undergone ; the men, when discharged, were left without funds or friends. Some succeeded in begging their way back, others died after suffering inconceivable hardships. In all that occurred, the tampering with justice, the delays, the harsh sentences, the keeping back of the orders of Govern- ment, one traces clearly the hand of the Alaska Company {d). Mean- while, Great Britain had been appealed to on behalf of the Canadian fishermen. In 1890, after several fruitless attempts at an amicable settlement of the difficulty. Great Britain took up a firm stand, and intimated that any further seizures would be resisted. In conse- quence of this, the United States authorities abstained from making any further seizures, although their Government refused to give any diplomatic assurance that no further seizures would be made. Since then a modus vivendi has been arranged, with a view to the whole question being submitted to arbitration. Such is a brief statement of the main features of the controversy. The question then arises as to whether there is any just foundation in law or usage for the American claim. The grounds put forward by supporters of the American contention are mainly three. (1.) That these waters, although beyond the three-mile limit, are, never- theless, really land-locked waters, and consequently within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, just as Conception Bay is within the jurisdiction of Great Britain, or the Znyder Zee within that of Holland. The answer appears to be that the physical con- figuration of the coast altogether precludes this view, unless the principles, which at present regulate jurisdiction over territorial waters, are to be entirely remodelled. The rule, as commonly laid down, is that waters which lie inside a straight line drawn from one headland to another are deemed territorial waters, and subject to State jurisdiction ; but even this is subject to the limitation which requires such waters to exhibit the conformation of well defined gulfs or bays, and which excludes waters, where the distance from head- land to headland is very considerable, the ordinary limit being ten miles, and the greatest distance, as yet admitted, being about 35 miles. In the present case, if a line were drawn from any real (d) For fuller information on this Mr. Browning's articles, already alludBd point, the reader is again referred to to, p. 359. 362 Al)pendtx. headland on the Alaskan peninsula to any other promontory on the north within United States territory, it would comprise but a small part of the Behring Sea, and would thus fail to bring the area of the operations of the Canadian fishermen within United States jurisdic- tion. Such a claim, therefore, would not merely be unwarrantable in law, but it would also be insufScient, in fact, for the purposes which prompt the United States to assert their jurisdiction at all. On the other hand, it is scarcely possible to rank the series of islands constituting the Aleutian archipelago, separated as they are from each other by distances in some cases amounting to 20, 40, or even 80 miles, as a prolongation of the peninsula of Alaska, or to regard the outermost of these islands as a headland, for the purpose of constituting a land-locked water. But even if this were admitted the claim would again fail, inasmuch as from the outermost island to the narrowest point of the Behring Straits would give a face or base to the so-called land-locked waters of some 1,500 miles. It is scarcely conceivable that such a contention should be put forward on any alleged basis of right or usage. (2.) Next, it is contended that even if these waters do not constitute land-locked waters within the ordinary meaning of that term, yet they are not, as between Great Britain and the United States, at least, a part of the high or open sea, because under treaties formerly entered into between Great Britain and Russia a right of jurisdiction over them was reserved to the latter country, and conceded by the former ; and, further, that all such rights became, by the Eusso-American Treaty of 1867, vested in the United States. This contention, however, is altogether denied by those who support the British view. Certain claims to jurisdiction were, it is true, asserted by Russia in earlier days, but such claims Avere refused recognition alike by Great Britain and by the United States from 1821 to 1824, and were in 1825 wholly aljandoned by Russia under a Convention to which Great Britain and the United States were parties. No attempt to revive them was made until this was done by the United States in the Proclamation of 1886. To contend that the Convention of 1825 did not include the Behring Sea, because it was not specifically mentioned when referring to the Pacific Ocean, would be to deprive the treaty of any raison d'etre. Moreover, if any such rights had remained vested in Russia, some mention of them and their transfer would undoubtedly have been mentioned in the Treaty of 1867. In this Treaty, however, there appears to be no provision whatever for the transfer of any part of the sea, or of any dominion over it ; there is no mention of any such rights as belonging to Russia ; the cession is confined to the terri- tory and dominion of Russia in and over the continent and the Aleutian archipelago. (3.) The last contention put forward on behalf of the United States is that they have a property in the seals and Some International Disputes. 363 fur-bearing animals, by reason of their having been reared and sup- ported on islands which constitute United States territory, notwith- standing that they may stray, and however far they may stray, into the adjoining ocean. The answer to this contention would seem to be, that neither the civil nor the common law recognise any property in wild animals until they are caught, and that if the American doctrine were admitted as to seals, there is no reason why it should not be extended to all the other produce of the seas. The strongest feature in the American case, is that put forward by Mr. Phelps, when he points to the wholesale destruction involved in the attempted interception of the seals by Canadian vessels at certain periods of the year, on which occasions many of the animals sink and are lost. This, however, is a matter for diplomatic arrangement, and for common legislation. If Canada were unreasonably to object to take some common action, which, whilst duly recognizing the rights of her citizens, would yet prevent any wanton and useless slaughter, then the proper remedy of the United States would be to adopt some method of retortion. It appears likely that the principle of arbitration will be resorted to, in order to settle the general question at issue. Meanwhile, it is also probable that the Supreme Court of the United States will have to pronounce a decision on the same question, on the occasion of an appeal, which is now coming on, in the case of the W. P. Sayward, one of the Canadian vessels condemned. If the decision in each case should be in favour of the British contention, the existing rules of International Law on the subject of territorial waters and fishing rights will remain unaffected ; but if the verdict and award should be the other way, then it would seem that the existing rules on this subject will have to be entirely remodelled; in this case it may become necessary to take some common action with the view of ascertaining by what principles these rights, as between nations at large, are to be regulated, for the future. The Behring Sea Conlrovmsy, Parliamentary Papers, 1890, Vol. LXXXII. 3(5i AMcndix. VII. THE NEWFOUNDLAND FISHERIES QUESTION. [Pakliamentaet Papees, 1891.] By the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, the British sovereignty over Newfoundland was definitely and finally recognised as between Great Britain and France. By that Treaty, it was provided that Newfoundland, together with the islands adjacent, should from that time forward belong to Great Britain ; that all places within it, then in the possession of the French, should be yielded up ; and that the French should not at any time thereafter lay claim to any right to the island or islands or any part of it or them. At the same time, by Article 13 of the Treaty, liberty was reserved to the French to catch, and also to dry fish on land, between Cape Bonavista on the north, and Point Riche on the west; subject to the condition, however, that the French should not fortify any part of the coast or erect any buildings thereon, with the exception of wooden stages and huts commonly used for drying fish, and that they should not resort to the island except at times necessary for catching and drying fish. By the Treaty of Paris, 1763, this arrangement was confirmed. By the Treaty of Versailles, 1783, the territorial limits of the French rights were somewhat modified, so as to extend from Cape St. John on the east, and thence north and west to Cape Pay at the south- west angle of the island. By a Declaration which accompanied the last Treaty, the British Government undertook to adopt measures for preventing its subjects from interrupting in any manner, by their competition, the French fisheries, and that it would, to that end, cause any fixed settlements that were or might be formed within the French limits to be removed. By the Treaty of Paris, 1814, it was declared that the French rights of fishery should be placed upon the same footing as that upon which they stood in 1792. In 1855 responsible government, in its present form, was established in the island, the Colonial Government being invested with every right possessed by Great Britain in Newfoundland and its depen- dencies. Meanwhile difficulties and disputes were constantly arising in connection witli the exercise by the French of their alleged Treaty rights. The terms of these Treaties were somewhat vague and ambiguous, and this naturally opened up the road to conflicting pretensions on either side. On the one hand, the French fishermen, stimulated by Government bounties and relying on French naval protection, were naturally inclined to push their pretensions to the Some International Disputes, 3G5 uttermosfc ; on the other hand, the inhabitants of a Colony possessed of responsible government, with equal reason, resented the injudicious arrangements under which an alien nation was admitted to enjoy any exclusive rights within the limits of the Colonial territory. Many places within the limits of the French shore had meanwhile become settled by the British, and Colonial vessels were frequently molested for attempting to fish at stations over which tha French claimed exclusive rights. Various attempts were made from time to time to relieve the pressure caused by these chronic contests. In 1884 a Convention was entered into between the British and French Governments for the purpose of providing a satisfactory working arrangement ; but this Convention did not meet with the approval of the Colonial Legislature, mainly because it secured to the French fishermen an absolnte right to purchase bait from British subjects along the entire coast of Newfoundland, and hence the arrangement fell through. Indeed, not long after- wards a Bait Act was passed by the Colonial Legislature forbidding altogether the sale of bait to French fishermen. In the meantime, also, a considerable lobster fishing industry had sprung up in the Colony, and lobster factories were established by the Colonists on different parts of the coast. The French soon followed the example of the Colonists in this respect, and not only asserted their right to engage in the lobster fishery and to establish factories, but also claimed to exclude the English from carrying on that industry, on the plea that such factories injuriously affected French fishermen. The friction caused by this dispute became eo great that in 1887 the Colonial Legislature made representations to the Imperial Parliament on the subject of the alleged encroachments of the French. Considerable diplomatic correspondence followed, but without result. The main issues in the controversy briefly appear to be these : — • (1.) Did the permission granted to the French to fish and dry fish along the prescribed portion of the coast apply to all kinds of fishery, including the lobster fishery, or only to the cod fishery ? On this subject the terms of the Treaties previously referred to are somewhat vague ; the privilege granted merely extends to the right of catching and drying fish, and erecting certain structures along the coast for that purpose. At the time these Treaties were entered into almost the only fishery pursued was the cod fishery ; there was, at this time, no such established industry in Newfoundland as a lobster fishery, and certainly no such thing as a lobster factory. Moreover, the modes of fishing and curing fish, referred to in the Treaties, are quite inapplicable to lobster catching and to lobster tinning. It is a recognized principle in the interpretation of Treaties that the words used ought to be construed in the sense intended at the time the 366 Appendix. Treaty -^-as entered into, and that for this purpose regard must be had to conditions of time and place. If this be so, it would seem that, on the ordinary principles of construction, the French Treaty rights ought to extend to no other rights than those that existed at the time the Treaties were entered into. Inasmuch as these Treaties, moreover, were in derogation of the ordinary rights of territorial sovereignty belonging to the British Grovemment, it would seem that they ought to be kept within the strictest limits that the meaning of the words used allows. If this be so, and if the French fishing rights are in reality confined to the cod fishery, then it would follow that the French are not entitled to take bait fishes, even within the limits assigned to them by Treaty, for any other purpose than the cod fishery ; whereas the French claim the right of taking bait for other purposes and for export to outside settlements. (2.) The second matter in dispute appears to be, whether Great Britain, by granting to French subjects the right of drying fish and cutting wood along certain portions of the coast, and by promising the removal of the fixed settlements referred to in the Declaration accom- panying the Treaty of Versailles, 1783, thereby engaged to prohibit British subjects from erecting any building or establishing settlements on that part of the shore, or whether the obligation was merely to prohibit such settlements and enterprises as might reasonably be deemed to interfere with or interrupt the legitimate exercise of the fishing rights granted to the French. Incidentally to this, the ques- tion again arises whether the fisheries so exempted from molestation are confined to the cod fishery, or are to be deemed to include the lobster and other fisheries also. The determination of this latter question must depend on the considerations already alluded to under the first head of dispute. On the main question as to the nature of the exemption secured to the French, it would seem that while the French fisher* men on the one hand are entitled to all necessary facilities for exer- cising their fishing rights, there must by implication be deemed to remain vested in the British Government and its subjects all other rights of user and enjoyment in respect to the territory in question. If this be so, then it follows that the British would still be entitled, even along the French shore, to rights of access to and from the sea, and to the use of the shore for all the ordinary purposes of inter- course and business, so long as these do not interfere with the iond, fide exercise of their fishing rights by the French. The fact, more- over, that express provision was made, prohibiting British subjects from injuring the French sheds and stages, during their owners' absence in the winter months, appears to bear out the view that the presence of British subjects all the year round, on that part of the coast, was anticipated. (3.) Another question in dispute is this. Assuming that the French SoiKc Inia national.. Disputes. 367 are entitled to exclusive rights in respect even of th6 lobster fisheries along the prescribed portions of the coast, do the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht, in prohibiting French subjects from erecting any structures on the shore " except wooden stages and huts commonly used for drying fish," prohibit them from erecting removable lobster factories? On this subject it would seem that if the French con- tention that their fishing rights do include the lobster fisheries is correct, then the right to erect such removable factories ought to follow. But the argument against such an extended construction of the Treaties appears to be almost conclusive. Finally, the French have put forward a claim " to fish in and bar the rivers and lakes of the island, and to erect weirs." As to this, it would seem that the French, claim is altogether inconsistent with a fair construction of the terms of the Treaties. Both Treaties and Declarations uniformly refer to the rights of fishing granted to the French, whatever these may be deemed to include, as being "on the coast (e)." Such is, roughly, a statement of the main issues between the two Governments. In 1890 a modus vivendi for the ensuing season was arrived at. Under this it was arranged that, without either country demanding at once a new examination of the legality of the installations of British or French lobster factories on the coast, where the French enjoyed fishing rights, there should be no modification of the posi- tions occupied by the establishments of either country on the 1st of July, 1889, except that a subject of either nation might remove any such establishment to any spot on which the British and French commanders on the station might have jointly agreed ; no lobster factory not in operation on the 1st of July, 1889, was to be established along the coast iu dispute, unless by the joint consent of the two commanders ; but it was to be open to the fishermen of either country to establish a new lobster fishery on some spot to be settled by agreement ; in the event of any case of competition arising, the two commanders were at once to proceed to a provisional delimi- tation, having regard to the situation acquired by the two parties. This ari'angement caused a great outcry in the colony, and many meetings protesting against it were held. Two delegates on the subject were despatched to Great Britain, with the view of bringing the grievances of the inhabitants, more effectually under the notice of the Imperial Parliament. It was contended that unless the claims of the French in reference to the French shore were extinguished, the internal development of the island would be impossible, inasmuch ie) See an article by Judge Pinaent, national Fishery Disputes," by T. H. Nineteenth Century, April, 1890 ; and Haynes, pp. 18 to 21. on the subject generally, see " Inter- 3G8 Appendix. as these claims formed a barrier to the settlement of a large, and in some respects the most favoured part of the island ; and that even if the issues immediately in question should find a peaceable settle- ment, yet as long as the French retained their status in Newfound- land, new causes of dispute would inevitably break out. The buying out of the French claims has been advocated as the most feasible solution of the difficulty. Meanwhile, it has been agreed between tlie two Governments to refer the matters immediately in dispute to arbitration. The Neivfoundland Fisheries Question, Parliamentary Papers, 1891. INDEX. ADMIRALTY COURT, jurisdiction of, 21 origin of jurisdiction in prize and tooty cases, 197 AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, congress of, 1818, 108 ALIENS, Set also Political Status and Naturalization rights accorded to, 97. restrictions on, ib. liability to serve in foreign army, 98 ALLY, may not trade with enemy, 175 practice on recapture of property of, 213, 214 AMBASSADORS AND STATE AGENTS, 104-122 ambassadors, 104-116 early views of English lawyers as to privileges, 105 inviolability of person, 106 exterritoriality, 106-116 limits of privilege, 109-114 privileges of suite, 114-116 consuls, 117-121 who are, 118 different kinds of, 118, 119 duties of, 119, 120 privileges of, 119 position of in the East, 120, 121 consular courts, ib. residence as such does not effect change of domicil, 121 immunity of public agents when acting as such, 122 different classes of State agents, 108 ANALOGUES OF CONTRABAND. See CONTEABANI). ANGARY, 349 ARNOULD, opinion as to validity of insurance on traffic infringing Rule of the War of 1756, 333 C.I.L. B B ^70 Index. ASSIGNMENTS of property in transit during war, 191-194 AUGMENTATION of force and crew of vessel in neutral tenitory, 265-268 AUTHORITY, effects of restoration of. /See Restoration op Authohity, Effects of. BEHRING SEA CONTROVERSY, 359 BELGIUM, pei'manently neutral, 13 BELLIGERENT TROOPS, passage of, through neutral territory, 237 BLOCKADE, 299-311 definition of, 301 how enfoi'ced, li. essentials for liability for brcacli of, 301, 302 divergence of Continental Courts from British and United States, 301 blockade d/! facto and with proclamation, 301, 302 special practice of French Courts, 302 cessation of, ib. paper blockades, 303, 304 provisions of Declaration of Paris tliereon, ib. what constitutes breach of, sailing with intention to break, 302, 305 ^ attempt to take advantage of absence of blockading squadron, 304 aliter where blockading squadron forced olf, ib. both ingress and egress, 306 exception, 307 but time allowed for quitting, 306 liability for breach of, ib. must be against all vessels, 308 if by sea, communication by land no breach, ib. when cargo liable, 309-311 contracts involving intended breach of, lawful, 323 BLUNTSCHLI, suggestions as to liability of aliens to serve in foreign army, 98 BOOTY. Su Prize ajjd Booty. BRITISH American Fisheries Question, 350 BULGARIA, regulations of Treaty of Berlin as to, 13 CANALS, INTEROCEANIC. See Rivers and Intbrooeanio Canals. Index. 371 CAPTURE IN WAR. See. En'emy Chauaotei;. CAPTURE WITHIN NEUTRAL TERRITORY. Ste Neuteal Terkitory. CARGO, on vessel attempting to break blockade, liability of, 309-311 CARTEL SHIPS, 17()-177 what are, 176 privileges accorded to, Ih. must not trade, 177 CIVIL STATUS. Sec Domicile. COAL, opinion of Geneva Tribunal as to supplies of to belligerent by neutral, 286 whether contraband, 318, 319 Mr. Hall's view, 319 COKE, as to liability of ambassadors in civil oases, 110, 111 COLONIAL AND COASTING TRADE OF ENEMY. See Rule of the Wak of 17.')6. COMMERCIAL DOMICILE, what is, 102, 104 effect of, 184 CONGO, 6 CONGRESS of Vienna, 1815, 108 of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1818, lb. CONQUEST. See Restoration of Autiioihty. effects of on inhabitants of conquered country, 231, 232 CONSULS. See Ambassadors and S'I'atj! Agents. CONTINUOUS VOYAGES, DOCTRINE OF, 333-340 application to Rule of the War of 1756, 334, 335 extension to vessels carrying contraband or seeking to break blockade, 336-340 practice of British Courts on subject, 340 CONTRABAND, 311-330 what is, 311-317 divergence of opinions, 312 Grotius, ih. Ortolan, ih. treaty definitions, 312-313 character of provisions, 316, 317 B B 2 372 Index. CONTRABAND— cojiiMmcd. occasional contraband, 316-319 lice, discussion as to character, 317, 318 doctrine of pre-emption, 318 pitch and tar, when not contraband, ih. character of coal, 318, 319 penalty incurred by vessel for carriage of, 320 only confiscable when taken on voyage to enemy port, 321 except provisions destined for enemy's forces, ih. carriage of by neutral is lawful, 322, 323 analogues of contraband, 324-330 naval and military persons, 324, 325 neutral liable although ignorant, ih. . despatches, 325, 327 neutral not liable if ignorant, 326 despatches from belligerent government to agents abroad, 327 mailbags, ih, discussion as to position of enemy envoys, 327-330. CONTRACTS, effect of outbreak of war on, 162-166 CONVOY. Bee Visit and Search, Convoy. DANUBE, 44 DEBTS, apportionment of State debts, 17 efiect of outbreak of war on, 161, 162 DECLARATION OF WAR. See Wae. DELAGOA BAY QUESTION, 357 DESERTERS, delivery up of, 42 DESPATCHES, contraband character of, 325, 326 DIPLOMATIC AGENTS, difi"erent classes of, 108 DOMICILE, 99-104 description and definition of, 100, 101 of origin, 101 extinguished by act of law only, ih. ^ of choice, wlien acquired, ih. when not, 121 effect of abandoning, 101 change of, in time of war, 102 commercial, 102-104 relinquishment of hostile, on outbreak of war, 185 DULCIGNO DEMONSTRATION, 150 Index. 373 EAST INDIA COMPANY, 6 EGYPT, former position of, 8, 9 political changes in, from 1873 to 1885, 9, 10 EMBAEGO, hostile, 142, 149 civil, 142 ENEMY CHARACTER, 182-194 what determines, domicile in enemy's conntry, 183, 184 what is enem/s country for such purpose, 306, 307 engagement in civil or military service of enemy, 184 commercial domicile in enemy's country, ift. property connected with establishment in same, ih. possession of trading rights from enemy government, %b. relinquishment of domicile, 185 property grown on enemy's soil, l84, 186, 187 vessel with enemy crew, ih. sailing under enemy's flag, ih. exception, 185 engaging in enemy's trade, 187-190 assignments of property in transitu, 191-193 assigmiients of ships in transitu, 193, 194 EXTERRITORIALITY, of ships, 51, 56 effect of trading ou, 52 opinion of Geneva Tribunal aS to, 286 of foreign sovereigns, 78-80 of subjects of Western States in Eastern countries,' 120, 121 of ambassadors, 106-116 EXTRADITION, what is political offence, 37, 38 when surrender should he granted, 38, 39 procedure under British statutes, 41, 42 FLAG, finality of, 137-139 vessel under hostile, generally regarded as enemy, 184 exceptiou, ib. FOREIGN ENLISTMENT, United States cases and Acts of Congress, 250-253 British cases and Statutes, 253-260 liability of State for vessels fitted out for a belligerent in its territory, 257-258 application of Foreign Enlistment provisions to vessels fitted out for insurgents, 258-259 regulations of foreign States, 288-291 37i4i; Index. FORKIGN SOVEREIGNS, 78-87 exterritoriality of, 78-80 extent of privilege, ib. ■'■-'■ exceptions to rule, 80 when amenaUe to jurisdiction as to persons, 81-83 as to property, 84, 85 effect of attorning to jurisdiction on privilege, 85-87 FOREIGK STATES. See States. FORMOSA, declaration of blockade of coast of, 1884, 150, 304 FREE SHIPS FREE GOODS, AND HOSTILE SHIPS HOSTILE GOODS, 293, 294 FREIGHT, See Neutral Tbadk. GENEVA ARBITRATION AND AWARD, 280-288 rules laid down, opinions as to, 286-288 binding as between Great Britain and the United States, 288 GERMANIC CONFEDERATION, 7, 12 GROTIITS, immunity of ambassadors, 113 definition of contraband, 312 HALL, W. E., definition of State, 4 suggestion as to jurisdiction over merchant vessels in territorial waters, 73 opinion as to what constitutes privateering, 140 liability of State in regard to war vessels built for a belligerent in its territory, 258 contraband character of coal, 319 HEFFTER, opinion as to when revolted colony or province should be recognised as independent, 16 HISTORICUS (Sir Villiam Vernon Harcourt). opinion as to same, ih. INSURANCE, on trade with the enemy, 177, 178 on contraband goods, 322 INSURGENTS, position of, before recognition of belligerency, 134, 135 applicability of Foreign Enlistment provisions to vessels fitted out for, 258, 259 Index. 375 INTERNATIONAL PERSONS. See States. distinction between nonnal and aljnormal, 5, 6 abnormal, 6 revolted provinces, tJ. trading corporations, ih. INTEROCEANIC CANALS. See Rivers and Interoceanic Canals. IONIAN ISLANDS, 11 LAWRENCE, T. J., , suggestions as to future of Suez Canal, 48 view as to recent discussion on Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 50 LETTERS OF MARQUE, position of holders of, 131, 132 Set Privateers. LICENCES TO TRADE, 173-180 trade under, permissible, 173, 174 can only be granted by chief of executive, 174 what is prohibited under, %b. property of allies trading with enemies confiscable, 175 insurance on, 177, 178 LOANS BY NEUTRAL' SUBJECTS TO BELLIGERENT STATES, 216-250 valid at International Law, 246, 247 unless only colourably loans, really gifts, 247 when made to insurgents, 247, 249 British cases as to, 249, 250 liLA.INE BOUNDARY QUESTION, 355 MILITARY PERSONS, contraband character of, 324, 325 MILITARY SERVICE, See. Naturalization. MISSISSIPPI, 45 MONROE DOCTRINE, 6 MONTENEGRO, regulations of Treaty of Berlin as to, 13 MOSQUITO PROTECTORATE QUESTION, 353 NATIONALITY, See Political Status. NATURALIZATION, when allowed by parent State, 91-95 when allowed by St^te to which aifiliatiou is proposed, 95 in fraud of military service, 96 376 Index. NAVAL AITU MILITARY PERSONS, contraband character of, 324, 325 NEUTRAL DUTIES, 242-291 as to supplying troops, 242, 243 selling articles of war, 243, 244 allowing dispatch of war vessels, 244 lending money, 244-250 allowing prizes to be brought in, 245 reception of war vessels, 278, 279 neutrals must prohibit hostile preparations, 260-268 but may permit replacement of force, 267, 268 must restore prizes captured in violation of neutrality, 268, 269 liability incuiTed through captures made by vessels fitted out in neutral territory, 269-277 even after vessels commissioned by belligerent, 286 See, Foreign Enlistment. NEUTRAL TERRITORY, 233-241 extent of, 234 inviolability of, ii. not at first strictly observed, %b. course to be taken on capture within, 235, 236 exception suggested by "Wheaton, 235 what is violation of, 237-239 passage of belligerent troops through, 237 effect of violation, 267 right of injured belligerent against neutral, 236 when right lost, 240 when hostilities allowed in, 240, 241 position of prizes in, 275-277 NEUTRAL TRADE, 292-299 former liability of enemy property on neutral vessels, 292-294 principles modified by Convention, 294 Declaration of Paris, ib. according to French courts neutral not entitled to compensation when his goods destroyed, 295 captor of belligerent ship forwarding neutral goods to destination entitled to freight, 296 similar rule in case of goods of his own subjects, ii. captor of neutral ship with enemy goods liable for freight, 297, 298 but not for other expenditure, 298 neutral cannot trade between two belligerent countries, 298, 299 divergent views as to neutral goods on armed hostile vessels, 346 NEUTRALITY. Sm, Angary, Blockade, Continuous "Voyages, Doctrine of Contraband, Loans by Neutral Subjects to Belligerent States, Neutral Duties, Neucral Territory, Neutral Teade, Rule of the War of 1756, Visit and Search, Convoy. NEWFOUNDLAND FISHERIES QUESTION, 353 NORTH BORNEO COMPANY, 6 Index. 877 OCCASIONAL CONTRABAND, 316-319 OREGON CLAIMS, 356 ORTOLAN, suggestion as to captures made within neutral territory carried infra, pfcesidia of enemy, 235 definition of contraband, 812 OTTOMAN EMPIRE, admission of into family cf civilized nations, 5 PACIFIC BLOCKADE, definition of, J 50 examples of, 150, 151 legality of, 151 PANAMA CANAL, 48 PAPER BLOCKADE. Sec Blockade. PASSAGE OF BELLIGERENT TROOPS THROUGH NEUTRAL TERRITORY, 237 PEACE, treaty of, effect of, 225 PERMANENTLY NEUTRAL STATES, 13 PIRACY, 128-139 definition and description of, 129 pirate mtist be tried, 130 stigma of piracy attaches to vessel, ib. not to cargo, ib. does not travel with vessel, ib. effect of municipal regulations, ib. property captm-ed from pirates, 130, 131 British statutoiy provision as to, 217 offences usually classed with piracy, 131-133 holders of letters of marque, 131 aggression by persons without commission, 132-133 insui'gents when pirates, 133-137 POLITICAL STATUS, how determined in different countries, 88-90 British statutes on subject, 89 United States Act of Congress, 90 POSTLIMINIUM, what is, 226 as to persons, ib. movable property, ib. immovable property, 226, 227 unnecessary as to property recaptured from pirates, 130 PRE-EMPTION, doctrine of, 318 PRIMACY OF GREAT POWERS, 6 378, Indepc. PRIVATEERS, 139, 140 what are, 139 arguments in favour of and against, 139, 140 liability to visit and search, 140 provision as to, in Declaration of Paris, ih. PRIZE AND BOOTY, 195-219 origin of jurisdiction of Admiralty Courts in, 197 distribution of prize, 198-200 booty, 200-202 distinction between, 203, 204 definitions of, 205 practice as to, ib. when claim for joint capture sustainable, 206 when title to prize complete, 205-207 adjudication necessary, 208-210 See Salvaqb. rules as to recapture, 210, 213 cannot on abandonment be restored by neutral, 217 limitation of prize suits, 223, 224 position of prizes in neutral ten-itory, 275-277 PRIZE COURTS, 219-224 functions of, 219-221 may not be erected in neutral territory, 221 procedure of, in England, 221, 222 adjudication necessary, although vessel destroyed, 224 procedure in belligerent, does not oust neutral jurisdiction, 267 PROVISIONS, vfhen contraband, 315-31S RANSOM CONTRACTS. See Wak. RECAPTURE. Se^ Salvage. REPRISALS, definition and illustrations of, 142, 143 seizure of private property by way of, 144-148 RESTORATION OF AUTHORITY, effect of, as to changes in constitution and laws, 230 private rights acquired under foreign regime, ih. dispositions of State property, ib. debts, ih. RETORTION, definition and illustrations of, 142 REVOLTED COLONY OR PROVINCE, recognition of independence, when it should be made, 16 Heifter's opinion, iJ. Historicus' opinion, ih. REVOLTED COLONY OR PROVINCE— comiijiueci. position of affairs on establishment of independence, 17 on parent State re-establishing authority, 17, 19 on recognition of belligerency, can exercise belligerent rights, 267 RHINE, 43 RIVERS AND INTEROCEANIC CANALS, 42-50 general rules as to property and user, 42, 43 effect of Treaties of Paris and Vienna on, 43 Rhine, ib. Danube, 44 Mississippi, 45 St. Lawrence, %b. Suez Canal, 46 Panama Canal, 48 ROUMANIA, provisions of Treaty of Berlin as to, 13 no longer semi-sovereign, 14 ROUMELIA, provisions of Treaty of Berlin as to, 1 3 revolt in, 14 union with Bulgaria, ih. RULE OF THE "WAR OF 1756, 330-333 what is, 332 qyuzro whether a settled rule of International Law, ih. importance now diminished, ih. opinion of Mr. Arnould as to insurance to protect trade infringing, tJ. superseded during Crimean War, 333 ST. LAWRENCE, 45 SALVAGE, no proceedings for, permissible against public vessel, 57 jurisdiction in salvage cases, 214-217 definition of, 216 practice of Great Britain on recapture of ship converted by enemy into war ship, 212, 213 property of ally, 213, 214 property of one's own subjects, 214-216 neutral property, 217-219 of France, 218, 219 other countries, 216, 217 SAVIGNY, definition of domicile, 101 SERVIA, provisions of Treaty of Berlin as to, 13, 14 no longer semi-sovereign, iJ. . SHIPS. Set Vessels. 380 Index. SLAVE TRADE, 123-128 earlier cases on subject, 124, 125 noX •pxix.y jure gentiwrn, 124 treaties on subject, 127 course to be pursued when slaves on board public vessels, 63-65 SOIL, produce of soil of enemy's territory, 184-187 SOVEREIGNS. Sea Foreign Sovereigns. STATE AGENTS. Bee Ambassadors. STATE JURISDICTION, 19-36 jurisdiction over bays, 29-32 straits, 32 subjects, 33-36 STATES, 1-19 definition of, 2-4 when international persons, 4 when recognition should be accorded, ih. when existence at an end, 5 normal and abnormal, ih. theory of equality among, 6 union of, personal, 7 real, ih. incorporate, ih. federal, tJ. confederacy of States, ih. semi-sovereign, 6 definition of, 10 international status of, 11 different kinds of, ih. permanently neutral definition of, 13 characteristics of, i&. examples of, ib. See Revolted Colony or Province. STATUTES, for United States Acts of Congress, see United States Acts or Con- gress. 27 Edw. in. St. 2 ; 155 15 Rich. II. c. 3 ; 20 28 Hen. VIII. c. 15 ; 20, 21 35 Hen. VIII. c. 2 ; 35 3 Jac. I. 0. 4 ; 254 I W. & M. c. 8 ; ih. II & 12 Will. IIL c. 12; 35 7 Anne, c. 5 ; 89 7 Anne, o. 12 ; 111, 115 4 Geo. II. e. 21 ; 89 Index. 381 STATUTES— conWjMMd. 9 Geo. II. 0. 30 ; 254 29 Geo. II. >;. 17 ; 255 13 Geo. III. 0. 21 ; 89 13 Geo. III. c. 63 ; 35 37 Geo. III. c. 70 ; ih. 39 Geo. III. c. 37 ; 20 42 Geo. III. c. 85 ; 35 59 Geo. III. c. 69 ; 253, 254, 255, 258 3 & 4 Geo. IV. 0. 44 ; 45 3 & 4 Geo. IV. c. 119 ; iJ. 5 Geo. IV. c. 113 ; 35 6 Geo. IV. 0. 49; 132 2 & 3 Will. IV. e. 53 ; 198 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 36 ; 20 3 & 4 Vict. c. 22 ; 205 3 & 4 Viet. 0. 65 ; 197, 205 7 & 8 Vict. c. 2 ; 20 13 k 14 Vict. e. 26 ; 217 15 Vict. c. 26 ; 42 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104 ; 68, 71 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100 ; 35 24 & 25 Vict. c. 109 ; ii. 27 & 28 Vict. c. 25 ; 182, 210, 213 33 & 34 Vict. c. 52 ; 39 33 & 34 Vict. c. 90 ; 35, 255 33 & 34 Vict. c. 102 ; 92, 93, 97, 101 36 & 37 Vict. c. 60 ; 39 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 ; 36 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77 ; ih. 39 k 40 Vict. c. 36 ; 29, 58 41 & 42 Vict. c. 73 ; 28, 360 SUEZ CANAL, 46 SWITZERLAND, permanenth- neutral, 13 THREE MILE LIMIT, 19 ct neq. TRADING WITH ENEMY DURING WAR. See Wak. TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY DURING WAR, as to goods, 191—193 ships, 193, 194 TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS, 1713, Utrecht, 364 1756, Westminster, 148 1763, Paris, 45, 366, 364 1780, First Armed Neutrality, 312 1783, Versailles, 364, 366 1783, Great Britain and United States, 46, 350, 355 1790, Great Britain and Spain, 356 -S82 Index. TREATIES AIS'D CONVEIfTIONS— roreimitct?. 1794, London, 45, 60, 313 1795, Great Britain and United States, 156 1795, San Lorenzo el Real, 45 1800, Second Armed Neutrality, 312, 348 1801, Great Britain and Russia, 343 1802, Amiens, 142 1803, Louisiana, 356 1814, Paris, 43, 228, 364 ' ■ ■ - ' 1815, Great Britain and United States (Treaty of Commerce;, 46 1815, Paris, 11, 170 1815, Vienna, 43, 44, 46, 47 1818, Great Britain and United States (Convention), 351 1819, Florida, 356 1825, Great Britain and United States, 362 1830, Great Britain and Russia, 159 1831, Great Britain and France, 127 1831, Mayeuce, 44 1833, Great Britain and France, 127 1841, Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, ih. 1842, Berlin, 115 1842, Breslau, ih. 1842, Dresden, ih. 1842, Great Britain and United States, 41 1842, Washington, 344 1842, Great Britain and China, 120, 121 1843, Great Britain and China, 120 1846, Great Britain and United States, 357 1850, Clayton-Buhvcr, 48, 49, 353 1854, Great Britain and United States, 351 1856, Treaty of Paris and Declaration annexed thereto, 6, 44, 131, 140, 148, 189, 190, 191, 293, 294, 303, 304 1858, Great Britain and China, 120 1858, Great Britain and Japan, ih. 1859, Great Britain and Honduras, 354 1862, Great Britaiu ami Denmark, 341 1862, Washington, 127, 344 1867, Russia and United States, 362 1868, Great Britain and United States, 281 1869, Johnson-Clarendon Cmivention, ih. 1870, Great Britain and United States, 93, 128, 257, 344 1871 (Convention as to Navigation of Danube), 45 1871, Washington, 46, 282, 352, 357 1872, Great Britain and Belgium, 41 1872, Great Britain and Brazil, ih. 1873, Great Britain and Austria, ih. 1873, Great Britain and Denmark, ih. 1873, Great Britaiu and Italy, ih. 1873, Great Britain and Sweden, ih. 1874, Great Britain and Germany, ih. 1874, Great Britain and Netherlands, ih. 1874, Great Britain and Swilzerland, ih. Index. 383 TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS— co» ■:•',! " FOREIGN BOQlC^ IM-Pp^J^TE^D. LIBRAEIE5 VALUED FOR PROBATE,' PARTNERSHIP, > ;, AND OTHER PURPOSES, ; /! ; Libraries or small. collections^^ books purgha8e&. A large Stock of Reports of fke-pkf^ous Courts of England, Ireland, and ScotlUnd, always on kom(J^.^, . ^ (Catalogues i^nd Estimates j^nmishedvand Orders .Promptly Ezfionted. -^aju-. :-iOi'i'rT=? ''■■ ! . . , =;^ , , . Gi . . ... ., .; ^ V/AJ KAl.^r;, ,' . 7,' A J i' ^^OTE. — Tg 'a-iioW^infkslng eu,r fi^pt with any of a smiitar nqihe, ^'^ we -beg to notify that we hane^fio -connexion whatevl^jwith any 01 g/^^ house of business^iand we respectfully regtffiftjt^t Corxf^-, spondenis will takg''.§p^c^fi^i^ar^ ^to' direct 'alt comtMlMt^atibi^s to the abovi rtafH0S^^^dl'd4^r^^f. ^ '*^ --rw ■•■-■ . IV .(.'i W iihir STEVENS &■ HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. -J—i. r-T 7—'- ■■ J =fl ? F'T Y. IN^EX OF tUBJECtS. ^^ . Kay . . ; . ,,. . Smith . ..c \./. /J| ABSTRACT DBAAMflilGya- Scott . Tfii :,% ■; . ;.. . ',32,, j ADMINISTRA&lbl£ ACf ibNS— \. . Walker and Elgood 18 ADMINISTRATORS— Walker z^''. 6' ADMIRALTY LAW— 17 AtriLIATION Martin 7 ARBITRATION— Slater .' t) . .. . . ,11 '],\ BANKROPtteY^ ' d J 1 ' : ' Baldwin 15 Hazlitt 39 .^Wdeffliaur (QiiesGdif &, Answer) - 28 ' - BSngwbod .^■. -f A i . . 15, 29 BAR EXAMINATION JOURNAL 39 BIBLIOGRAPHY 49- BILLS OF EXCHANGE—. Willis 14 BILLS OF LADING— Campbell 9 Kay . . . . . . . . . ■ Ti% BILLS OF. SALE— ''' ' '" Baldwin 15 Indermaur . , , , . . . ,,,.,,. .28 ' Ringwood .'-'^J 'i^ » . .' . .■ -15 BUILDING CONTRACTS— Hudson. ,v ,«..,.. r. . 12 CAPITAL PUl^rSHlMfeN'r—''^ Copinger 42 CARRIERS— '' ' ' ( . '■ : 5«e RAILWAY LAW. : „ SHIPMASTERS. CHAN£!ERY DIVISION, iPr?ctic(B of— Brown's Edition ot Snell ... 22 Indermaur 25 Williams \',.^-'v,\'A 'v.' . 'i...;., < >] And su EQUITY. CHARITABLE TRUStS— ^~ * ' ' Cooke . . , 10 WhitfefordC , .i^uniJl.'i-^hi.. . tsq CHURCH AND CLERGY— Brice - ... 9 CIVIL LAW— 5ee ROMAN LAW. CLUB LAW—, -Wertheiinet^ , — . . >.-'.. .32 CODES^Argles,. 32 COLEISjqJSrS-AT SEA-^Kay . . -r? COLONIAL JLAW-i Ca,pe, Colony. . ^ ... . . 3^ - Forsyth. ,—. — !.-_^, . . , 14 Tarring 41 COMMERCIAL AGENCY— 4^ampbell — . — — . _.„ j„.-. _,.._,_ 9 F&GE 'COMMESR-piiAL -LAAK— Hur^andCedl . f. .... II COMMOil ^AW— , >,„; Indermaur 24 COMPANIES LAW— r 1 Brice : 16 Buckley 17 Reilly's Reports .^^29 ^mith ^ 'r-|. \ . , . . Tj-t < 39 Watts . VI. .. -i .1 .tr-fl COliTPENSATrCKN-^ • •* ' '' , ■ Browne 19 Lloyd 13 COMPULSORY PURCHASE— Browne'. . . . . . ;\ . . ig CONSTABLES-. jJee POLICE GUIDE. CQJNStlfUTIOjJ^f tkW AND HISTORY— " ' - ' Forsyth 14 • 4 ^sweill-Langmead 21 Vomits 28 CONSULAR JURISDICTION— Tarring ; 42 CONVEYANCING— ^ Copinger, Title Deeds .... 45 ' Copriger,' Precedents in ... 40 Deane, Principles of 23 COPYRIGHT— , ,., '.Copinger: ,'.':.[»,'■. n.; .?,'flUi- AS CORPORATIONS— Brice 16 Browne O • • • '9 COSTS, Crown Office- Short 41 "CbtEiJ ANTS- FOR TITLE— 'la ' Copinger \ 4S CREW OF A SHIP— Kay . 17 ORIMINAIi-LAW— ', . li'i ^,,'u;, Copinger 42 , iJJarriSv.. ,. -. . » jo. . . 27 'CRdwk 'LAW-^' V^>'-.-vA?, V,;--., r, .\-.H Forsyth ., ..> , . 14 Hall 30 Kelyng ........... 35 Taswell^Langnitead ?'=a»"'v'. . 21 Thomas 28 t:ROWN OFFICE RULES— Short 10 CE.ow;n, .^RACTICE- .; _ .J , . Corner ... . . .--, V . 10 , ,, Short atidMelloi. 1 . . :. . . 10 CUSTOM- AND USAGE ■■■ ' • iBtowhe.'A". ■.' ;v''.>-\ . .'' . 19 Mayne"7~. , V ~ ~ ; , '. . 38 DAMAGES— _J:^:; _' :_ Mayne . . . ,. 31 DICTIONARliar-l ..J Brown .26 DIGESTS— - PAGE ' ■ Law Ms^azine Quarterly Digest . 37 Menzies' Digest of Cape' Reports. ^-^ DISCOVERY— PeHe •.•..'.; 7 DIVORCE— Harrison . . . . /^ii, DOMEST'iC ' R,EpA.TIONS— Eversley '.'■.'.. .•.'.■, 9 DOMICIL— S'e/ PRlVATfe' JNTER- ' ' ^ • national- law. ' dutch law .38 Ecclesiastical law— Brice '...'...,,. . 9 Smith,, .,..,. . .' ',•;.-, 23 eduqaTiC)!^ acts— Set MAGtSTERlAL LAW.' - . ^LECTION LA.W.and PET;iTI0NS'— Hardcastle — •:■.■ 13 ,, O'Malley and Hardcastle . . . 33 Seager' .'.■.■..'.. . . 47 EQUITY— ,^ . \ " BIyth .",.", ',' , \ . ., ,. . ,22 ChoycrCd^ekV'[ L" ;':■'.' -.■-'3^ - £ Pemberton '. . . 32 Snell . , .-rt./'< .' '.' .' . 22' ?: Story ■ r '. 43 iWiHiams . . ,...'. -j ■. . 7 EVIDENCE-r- yr Fhipson .. . i; . /. . . . 20 EXAMINATION OF STUDENTS— i i Bar -Examination Journal • • • 39 : Indem>aur ..,','. ,24 and 25 ■ \ Intermediate LL.B.i- .' . . . 21 EXECUTORS— ■ ' Walker and Elgood ..... 6 EiXTRADITIQN— ■ , ; Clafke . '." .' '. ' .''".'. . , 4S ' See MAGISTERIAL L.^W. , plCTORIES— ' ' .'; .See M^piSTpRIALXAW. FISHERIES— , See Magisterial law. FIXTURES— Brown ;' . . . . 33 FOREIGN -LA W^ • ArglWf.l '.'4 I .' . ^.'''■. . .32- ■C Duteh Jbaw' ' , . . '.' ... 38 V F.oote .. ; '■ ;■ . ' 36 Pavitt . . .; .J ... . . 132: ^RPSPQRE— . . . Moore • • • • 391 FORGERY— i-ee M^CflSiTERIAL LAW. iSAtJDtJtEliT' CONVEYANCES— May. '. ■., ,1 ..... . ..29 GAlUS ,:iNSTlT,U1iES— , " Harris . ./,■,» • 1 ^ ■ GAME LA'VV;$,-t-V,.Hr:.. . "" S^ee MAGISTERIAL LAW. GUAR£ilA)!J A^Ji,?^ART>— Eversley ... < j ' • • ■ '-^-— -'■^-j^dES- , At LAW, ,. HACfclfEfTf^^ '^eei£AXy\ HWDU LAW— Coghlan •' ^§ - 1, Cu'jniijgli.^''*. ■ . ■ , ■ • . ■ < 38 and 42 38 Mayne ^IISTORY— ' ■ ' ' HUSBAND, ^ND 'WIFE— ' ' ' ' Ever^ey ' ." '. \ ' '. '. . ' . , INDEX TO PRECEDlElilTS— ■ [ ."/''/■Oopiiigyrl i.' i'/.i . . . ir;'/!', INFANTS— • ,r.>4/\>l ^/r-'J^ ' ', I Eversley i . . r - Simpson ... ...... ', > INJUNCTIONS— I.. /J.;; I c^ Joyce .,,1, , I INSTITUTE OF THE LAW^ r. Brown's Law Dictionary , , . , insUrAiJce— '.„', ; ,■, / , . ■ . Porter . , ./ . . . ... INTERNATIONAL LAW— Clarke . .", . . . . . . 45 ; Cobbett . . . . ; . ' ; ". 43 Fobfe '■'.'!..!.'.' '. . ■.■ .i'-f;-'^i§ Law Magazine . . . . '.J 37 9 43 44 26 '6 INTERR(3GATfeiRlrES-^ ■'• " Peile . . . .■ . . . '.I INTOXICA'tlNG LIQUbRS^" See MAGISTERIAL LAW. ■ JOINT STpCK COMPANIES,— See cDU'^mi^s. .;. , I,,. XUDGMEiVTS'AN^p.. ORpERS.-r ■• Pembettoil .'.''.. ' . . •' . JUDICATURE ACTS—; , ,;, Cunningham and I^attinsqn . ri 18 Indermaur 1. 25 ■ Itelte ". '. .,..,< .i;.:| . ".. 6 JURISPRUDENCE-H Forsyth^, • !•,• ■ » • • • • 1,4- Salmond -i • '3 JUSTINIAN'S iNSTiTUTES— n/ - Canipbell ...... . . . . i ! 47 KaiiW^J.J. .W .1 .i -J . . ... 20 LANDLORD AND TENANT— ' ' !'. Foa : J . ...;...' . ' . . IJ LANDS GLAuSES CONSDLIDA- '■ TION ACT-i- ' Lloyd i'ijl LATIN MAXIMS .'28 LAW- DICTIONARY-^ '' Brown .''-J''.' ■'.■' I '. . '.'■ '., 'ifi LAWMAGAZIN^, and review'.' 37 LEADING CASES— Common Law'. '. ... . ■, 1 SS ,. r Constitutional Law .-....) 28 Equity an(I_C6ny'eya|icipg , . . .j?S, Hindu Lavif . r 28 International Law '. . . . ., ,431 LEADING STATUTES- Thomas ]• .- 28 B 2 StEVEi^Si^HAyNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE B^AR^ Index of suej , — tim LEASES— Copinger ■ . , . ." . . . .' 4S LEGACY AND SUCCESSION— Hanson \ • ' • '"^ LECJlTtMACVr AND Kt^RRIAGE— , , ,, Set PRIVATE IKTERNA- ■ tIONAJ.'L^W. [i ,,1 \ i--;/ ; LICENSES— i'w MAGISTERIAL LAW. LIFE ASSURANCE— • ' n.-^ >; ! Buckley 17 ; ,- Reilly -. 29 LIMITATION OF ACttONS-i-' ' ! Banning . - ; ' . 42 lunacy2:aj ■'''■■"' ■■' .'' 'iii^>^; ■' WiHiamsT'; ;"-l'- .'■•W V'i 7 MAGISTERIAL LAW— '' ' '' ' ' ;v.,-,.4« Gre'enwodd/alnd'Martiti. ;,,, ,,,.,, 4^ ifAiNTENAiJde'AifffDiEig|;'stil;6}sr. J J Martin ... ... . ., . , \, 7 RIARRIAQE iani LEGITIMACY^ '. Foo.te , . . .,, .' 36 MARRIED WOMEN'S PRa- -; r PERTY ACTS—. Brown';g JE^itipj^ ^f GrifjStb • . . 40 MASTERvMA 'SERVANT— > i'eeMAtiifSTfeRiAL, LAWI" " '*' „ SHIPMAStfikS & SEAMEN. afpRcAijiPiLfe'LAW' [ ■;, _ ,::^, ;,'^. ■.:' ' 3*2' Campbell' . . . , . v V • ,9, Duncan. . .' , . '. ' ; . ', 3§' ' Hurst and Cecil . .' . . '.' , 11 -■ Slater • .'■ '; "; ,' 7 ' 5« SHIPMASTERS. ' „ STOPPAGE IN TRANSraU. MERCHANDISE MARKS-t' ; ' Daniel . . ■ . ■ . . , ■ •' Z 42 MINES— '.''l' in-'/M ,' ', I'i ■ " Harris . . ..,,.; • ' 47 c . See MAGISTERIAL LAW. ' 1 MORTMAHNi-/..!!' Ti §BAr.-„' ' , , 1 . , , u Kay . . ^f^.^ .j^.,^,,j., ... 17 PATENTS— -., / , , i Daniel' ,,,.,, . . . ,. ,. . . p 42 Frost ". ."i -;• ." .'" . .'\ a f-AWNBROKERS— ' I '-- ^'w MAGISTERIAL LAW. PETITIOIjfS IN CHANCER-S-'ANI) " LUNACY"- WiliikAis ' J ', . "i-^. '-: : . '-'f MLOTS— • ■ , / '"'" '•";:'- •'^- Kay . .^'^■'■■'! ".'■ .''''.'' ,' [' '. 17 PbLICE GUIDE— • • ,,, , ^ Greenwood and Martin . ... 46 fOLLUTION OF RlVEllSr-r- 'l Higgin's. ■..■.;", . . . 30 PRACTICE BOOKS-:- . , . Bankruptcy y . 15 Companies Law 29 aad 39 Compensation. . , -, . -. . . i3( '•<: Compulsory Purchase 19 e<9i^?y^pgrpg '■. . .1,. . . 45 .. Damages I, ,..,.,; .,,_„:, lim-.y . .: 31 : " ; p^clesiastical. Lgjw . . » ■ , . . g 1- Election Petitipps ,'._;. . .... 33 Equity . . . . . , 7, 22 and 32 Injunctions .,.;.. . . . 44 Magisterial. . .'_. . •,.., • • 46 ,, Pleading, Precedents of .' . . 7 "' Railways J. \„'..,'^^. . ,. . 14 Railway Coirirhissidn . . . , 19 Ratin&.v • n f • -i • • • *9 S«preffl/'(?o(iH-(Jf Jtldicitute . . 25 PRACTIGE/STAfTeUjr-ES, ORbERS ' AND RtlEfiS-' ■ , , . Emden. '. . '._. ./^ ,;.,,■, • 11 PRECEDENTS OF PLEADINGir^' . ; Cunningham and Mattinsofi , , 7 Mattinson .and Macaskie . . . . 7 PRIMOGENITURE— Lloyd ...... ... , 13 PRINCIPLES— ''''Biiefe'(G6rJ)0raMerji j ,_. . .Se^r (Payli^njeijtai^) . ... 47 RBPORTS'-^^ ' ^ ' ^ Bellewe. . ■/ '. 34 Brooke . . . ,,.,.. . .35 Choyce Cases. .... . . '35 Cooke ; . . ;' . .... 35 Cunntngham ... . . . . 34 Election Petitions JFinlason .-j-f « • • -■ • . , Gibbs, SeiiiAijr WUl Case JCelyng, John , , .. , Kelyiiie. WilKanl ,' . . ,: Reilly r- . . . T. _ . . ijii,. ^I'wwe^ {Casej ip PsuEHsment) ROMAN PUjrCU LAW— Van Leeuwen . . . . , "BOW AN LAW—' Brown's Analysis' of Ssmgny Campbell . ' . . . • ■ ,, , ,,ilarris' '.,,_,,' . , . ,i,., ; . Salkowski ... . » . Whitfield 14 SALVAGE— Jones 47 Kay 17 SANITARY ACTS— ^e^^UAG^T^RlM. LAW. SvAVINGS BANKS-!i ' ., Forbjes . • l>8 SCINTiLLAE JURIS— Darling (C. J.) . . 18 VSEA SHOREfHr ', til L\ i PAOF. Hall. 3C '■-■iiloorfe';/* ..'.'■ 30 , .?p;;PMASTERS AND SEAMEN— Kay . . . I , 17 SOCI^rtES^" -^"I'l^ ■' ' - i-«< CORPORATIONS. , STAGE /CARRIAGES- ' Ai 'MAGISTERIAL LAW. STAMP DUTIES^ ' '"^ ' ' >ACopinger 40 and 45 STATUTE. OF LIMITATIONS— , Banning , , ,,.,..,.. . . ■ 42 STATUTE?- , ■ , , ; , , . CKdes ........ ^ ■ Hardcastle ;■ . . .... . 9 ■26 ,?8 . . . .9 • • • ' . 32 i: "' •" f' >7 20— 28, 39, 47 _. . . ./ lb MaTcy Tljomas V . . . . . ." STOPPAGE tK( TRANSl'rU— "Campbell . . . , . . ■Ht)iigl6h' '■., . . .-" . . 'Kay ;■ "r'^" . ;■ • ;'" i" ; STUDENTS'; BCiOKS . SUCCESSlOtf DUTIES Hanson^'. _. ._ _. . . . . ,SU-GGES3i[0JV LAWS- Lloyd SUPREME COtrjRT dF^u^ipJv^ TU-RE, Practifce-ofi-^ ^ ' - '- '-' Cunni^ghs^q:; ai^d^ft^soit^ ,,' . . , In^eirmaur . . ^ . ,. . ... . TELEGllApaS- ' ; ; ; M Set. magisterial law. TITLE PEEDSt- Xiopinger . -. . . .- « ^ . TORTS—,-.'- Ki J, Ringwood TRADE MARK^— j Daniel ,..',, . ,,7 -, • - "• TREASON— ^ " >-' I i- Kelyng/U 1. lUi.'uanA ,.' . . . Tasw^-J^angsosadn.' ; .. .. . . TRIAI.,3— Bartlett, A,'i(l\fu?d«r)!, . Queen v. Gurney ...... ULTRA VIRES— Brice ' , .. USAGES AND CUSTOAJS— Browne . '. ... . • . . Mayij^ VOLUNTARY" CONVEYANCES— May WATER COURSES- IS J -.7 25 4S 42 3S 21 32 32 {6 119 38 29 30 WILL5^ CONSXWfiTION OF- ! .GiH?. R?p«t of Walkcf v. Attorney-General . . . ■ .10 WORKING CLASSES, Housing of— Lloyd' . . '. 13 6 STEVENS &>' HAYnMs, BELL YARD, TEMPIJE BAR. ■. Second Edition, in 8*0^= ;-Prrce i\s., cloth,l j THE LAWS OF INSURANCE: ■JFiw. Ittfc, aiccftent, anil ®uatantee. ■' '■ ■'''■■•■' '-' i' ' ■' siMBODYING' ' .--ij'l V ' ' •' CASES IN THE ENGLISH. SCOTCH, IRISH, AMERICAN,^ AND .v:-;:, CANADIAN COURTS. ' ' : ! ■ J .V . .^ ^ , , ,, J ; ' i ^y' JAME^ 'biggs ' PORTER, . -.■■ ,;, OF THE INNBR TEMPLE lANp SOUTTH EASTERN CIRCUIT, -BARRISTER- AT -LAXV. , ■ ■ ,' ASSISTED BY ' — ■ ■■ ■'"■■^ ■ ' ' ■ . . r : _L. .>\j '■"'''' '■•'- W, iFEILDEN CJiAIES, M.A., ,, '<■ OF'THE INNER TEMI^LE AI^ID WESTERN CIRCU.IT, BARRISTER- AT -LAW. / , ^ ; , . i' , > " In reviewing the first edition of this hook we expressed an opinion that it was a pains^ilcing and useful work. Its utility has been shown by the speedy, E^ppearaiice of the present edition, and the labour pf its authorsjs still apparent to anyone who will glanc^ through itspages. '^—Soticitor^ Journal. ' "The success pf the first edition proves its value, ft-is clearly and concisely compiled, and a]pwards of 1,500 cases are quoted." — Law Times,, ..„ , i. - "Mr. PortC|rVi^eful book oji insurance law has reached a second edition in less than three ^ears^'i^Jiich is not common in a book df 'this class: ' The fact \s, t!^t in taking up insurance law in all its branches, except marine insurance, he hits upon a rpopular subject. ' . . . . ' Mr. Porter well fills the gap thus made for him, and he has called to his aid auseful coadjutor in the per^Oi[i of Mlf.'Craies.''— ifltw journal. _. "When writing on the first edition in 1884,! we ventured to predict for Mt-.' Potter's work a great success. We spoke in terms of unqualified cpuimeridation concerning the lucidity of the author's styles the thorbugh- iiess df his Work and his nappy gifr of nairowing down' {broad and difTusiye subjects, intp a small ^ace. Practical experience of f he coijtents ipf the volump^uririg the past three'years has,iwe may say, fully coB« firmed our favourable viewsl'' — insurance Record, r . . , ■ j - . In Royal Mntio, ptice 20J,i clothj QUARTER sessions: PRACTICE, A VADE' M&Ct7M OF GENERAL PRACTICE iN.Ali'fELLAtfi'jl^^ ■ ■ • CIVIL CAS'E^s'a:^^ QUARTER SESSIO;fS, .:ii'! — ;/,;i;..' .;;-! Second Edition. Crown Svo, price %s. dd., cloth, THE LAW OF ARBITRATION AND AWARDS; With Appendi*, cpntajping, Lord Denman's AkBlTRATlON BILL, AND STATUTES RELATING TO ARBlTRAtlON; and a collection of Forms and Index. Second Edition. With a "Supplement containing an Abstract of the Arbitration Act, 1889. By Joshua ^LAjBjt, of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. *** The Suppl^fnent can he had separately^ price td. —— ii- . — l^^:^—: L^i-J -:_J ^ — "; ,|' ' "-■' — '• ~ ' — In crown 8vo, price 6j.,,,cloth, THE POTGll^LilS 0^ MEf^NTILE LAW. By - Joshua Slater, of Gray!s Inn, Bsirrister-at-Law. , Jjili: .; . ■rfi",';' "' ''"""'' ;'-'j' " In '8vo, price lar., cloth, -.ijim ,i,.-i ■ m THE XAWTaND practice OF DISCOVERY in ' the SUPREME' COURT of JUSTICE. . With, an Appendix ojff,, Forms,, :' Orders,' !&c„ and an Add'Enda giving the Alterations under the New Rules op Practice. By Clarence J; Peile, of the Inner' Temple, ' ' Barrister^t-'Law. 1,, ',, In onevolumei- Svo; price iSj., cloth, ,,. i 1 THE LAW. AND PRActtCE RELATING TO' PEHTMnS if : CHMGERY AND LUSACY, i.fej'tJttitii^iifG, THE'. SETTLED ESTATES' ACT, LANDS CLAUSES ACTy TRUSTEE Act, WINDING-UP PETITIONS, PETITIONS RELATING TO SOLICITORS, INFANTS, Etc.7 Etc. With an Appendix of Forms -ANEf Precedents." By. Sydney E. , Williams, Barrister-at-Law, ' , Second Edition, in Svo, price 28f., cloth, A SELECTION OF PRECEDENTS OF PLEADING UNDER THE, JUDICATURE ACTS IN THE uch that^'W^e^het'thebooktis used for purposes of business or of general study, it ^^notf;^ to, prov« deeply, interesting, ,. . . ^",The ^bpve account isJiut a sketch of Mr. Beven's great work. It is impossible within the present lin^ts to give an adequate idea of pe variejb^ 6f topics which are included, of the leatning and patience with which.'theyt' are "discussed^ Negligence jnay only be. ^in aspegt of the law ; Ijuf the treatment -here accorded to it throws into prominence a host of questions orthe utmost importan€^, both practically ^d tfiepretically. By his contrib^tictQ to/fh^ due understanding of these Mr. Beven has placed the profes- sifip undpr a lasting pbjigation,- an obhg^t^on iyhi?h no reader of his work will fail t,6 reali2e."-^ff/«&«V<7rj' " The book upon which this is founded, and whidh is' in. a measure a former ^Upm of thp; present vrfuraes, has made Mr. Beven an authority on the subject of the law of -negligence. He has, m writing these volumes, made full use of his fornner labours ; but ^he claims tl>at in reality the present work is a new one, and his claim is justified. . . . Just occasionally a weW-written and ably-conceived law booktis published, and such a one is this of Mr. Beven's. We think, that to compare it with -pther books on th^' subject would be impossible ; it stands easily the best book on the subject. In clear exposition of law, lor good classification of subject-matter, for accuracy of detail, and for every arrangement to.lacili- tgl^' reference it cannot be .beaten. Wp may congratulate Mr. Beven upon thjC^ accomplishment of his laborious task' ; he has given to the profession a ValSable work, and one which 'will dnhaiic^ His repiitattoa as & writer on. the Law of Negligence." — Lmv SFoitrnfii, August 3, 1895. ' ' He has treated the well-known subject ot Nieigligeiice in a scientific way, and has not been content with merely collecting, in more orjless relevant positions, a number of cases which anyone, could find for himself in any Digest of Law Reports,, hut has endeavoured to reduce from the chaos of decided cases a systematic study of the subject, withicleateniinciatibns oiFtheiprinciplfes,{he fihd§'g6verning the various decisions. In the arrangement of the book the author has been very happy in his method, a by no iheans easy task in the treatment of a subject in which each branchof iti^ yeajvty overlaps another. ... A good index and clear t^e increase the value of a book which will without doubt receive the hearty commendation of the pjofjessipn asa $ucces§ful completipnof tlw^ut^or'5-apit)itioustask.''-r-j£.ai^-^Mficf., . , , , . "In respect of the style-of tteitrAfeHbof the subject, the book must be^|;Wyiuthoricy on each point is collected and so arranged that it can be easily found.''-^yw«rf/(r«/i?«';V«/. ,, , ', , " Contains evidence of much serious work, and ought tp receive a fair trial at the hands pt the profes- sion." — Law Quarterly Review. S:^EyEJ\rs,&^ ffAYNES, SELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. Second Edition, in roya) Svo; m, the press, TH: LAW OF THE DOMESITiCi RELATION?, ! , : -, .- INCI.UDING , ,, HUSfeAND ANri Wife'; .'PARENt MV) CW&SD : GUAR0IAN AND ..^ By WILLIAM FINDER EVERSLEY, B.C.L,, M.A., '^ OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER'AT-LAW. "' ' -* ■ ■- '■ ' ••^'-•^ '^' ^ "It is essenUa]lyread^Ie;and interesting, and ought to itake.a high pl^ce among text-books. . . . We say, without hesitation, that this is a learned book, written in a peculiarly fascinating style, having regard J°^??li>??<"'e of the subject. . . . It can only be said, therefoi-e, tliat the book is deserving of success upon the merits ; and that the attempt to combine the treatment of three branches of the law which Tiavehitheflb "•{•""nnaturally divided shows, in itself, a Som^ehehsive grasp of principle."— Z.aa» Times. mil ihdex.'-Jo/foVijVi' journal. '. •-■'■' '-''• ' Second Edition, in one volume, royal Svoj price 32f., cloth, ' THE LAw relating TO' THE SALU OF GOODS and: COMMERCIAL AGENCY. ■ "^'"^ ~ • SEC&ND EDitlbN. i _ BV ROBERT CAMPBELL, M.A., O' UNCQLn's INN, BARRISTER-AT-I.AW ; ADVOCATE OF. THE SCOTCH BAR. AUTHOR OF THE "LAW OF NEGLIGENCE," ETC. v-'j'"*^ ^i^curate, careful, an^ exhaustive: haildbook on the subiect with which it deals. The exCeMent index deserves a special word of commendation."— Z, of the Inner Temple, Bsrnstef-at-Law. 10 STEVENS &^ HAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAS. _^ In &ro; price 30i., cloth, TIE PRACTICE ON THE GROWN M Of the jQueen's Bfinch fiimion-of Her ]|l[,aj6sty;s fligir Court of Justiee (Foim4ed on CORNER^s, CROWN Qffice PRAQTicE), including Appeals from IiiFikioK 'Courts ; with AfpENDrcES of Roxes and Forms. ; ..... ,L. By FREDERICK; HUGH' SPQKT,;;j[',- ,:J ; Chief Clerk of the Crown Office, Authpr of '.' Taxatioa of posts jn .the. Crowr Office," and Editor \ of "Crown Office Rules and Forms, i8B6;" and , ,. ' ■ .^ ^ ;" ■ FRANCIS ■HAMrL-'3fOIir^MELL0R,;'ia. A., " ■,■';; /;', ■;..,,, i Tfin. ColL Camb., Northern .Circuit, Inner Temple, /Bairister-at-Law. In 8 vo, price 1 2^.,. cloth, : THE CROWN OFFICE RULES AND FORI^S, 1886. "The Supreme Court of Judicature Acts and Rules of the Supreme Court, iJS^gl'ielatiBg tp Mt& Pm«tiee on-the Crown-side^f-the-Quesn's Bench i)ivision ; 4ncl«djn|; Appe^s from Inferior Courts, Tables of Court Sees, .Scales, of Costs ; together with Notes, Cases, and a FuU Jndex. By F. ^. §l3^.QJlT,.Chief.^erJc of the Crown OflSce, " ' ! In 8vo, iprice 6^-. 6d. , cloth, / - , THE CUSTOMS AND INLAND REVENUE ACTS, 1880 ar>ci,1881,<43 VJGT.-CAP. 14, aiid,44YieT. cap. 12), So far as they Relate to the Probate, Legacy, and Succession Duties, and the Duties on Accoiints. "With an Intro'';!'>■ 1 ',".■• ■ OF THS ^UJNES TEMPJ,^,, EA^JUSp^^AT-LAW. .,,,,. "Their cOTOiendmin, flye Ael^eve, -wijl he. foun4 .a.jreally .useful f plifme, one for i^e., lawyer and the business man to'Keeplal his elbow, and which, if not giving- them all that they require, will place in their hands the Icey to the richer and ippre elabqrate treasures xif the Xaw which lie in larger and more exhaus- tive works."— £aa; rw*- ' ■^^^^'^. ■ .< ';, " The. gbjeqt ^f Ae ^jBtho/s of this jy.ork, th.ey tpH us ip their preface, is to stst^, wifhin a moderate compass, the principles of commfircialjaw. Very considerable p^ins have obviously been eipeliBed on the ^k, ^d -the ^ppk ;s in.many respects a very serviceable pne.'—Zast; yo^^rw^r/. ■ '■ : ^ ■' ■'■•-■■'• ' ■'•' ■'- -'■■■' ' -'■' " " " -' ^ ' - -.'•--.. u'':h- Urn; Second Edition,, iji royal ^yo, price 2SJ. cloth, I'm EEUTIONSHIP OF LANDLORD AND TENANT- By Jpi^^AIR FOA, XIT THE IHMBR KS^teZX, BARRISTBR-ATtUVW. oaU :W*ll^^ £Gi%n4^.^f,i]^h va!l,«e,,to,,B^c^5y3^erSj anji ;wfhep'[a s^copd ^ditiQn ^lias |giv,en the author tlie opportunity of reconsiaenhg and carefully revising his statements in detail, we think it. will take its pla^e as a v e ry -good 4geatiM -on 4hejiiodem~law^4ancUoKi-and -tenant/'— >S'o^g^^^ JauxnoL ., " Mr. Foa is a bold man to undertake tjie exposition pf a branch jjf law so full of difficailties and encum- bered by so many decisions -as 'the Law ofl^ndlord and Tenant. But his 4oldheS& ?s justified by the excellent arrangement ,afl4 by tlie l,ucid statejn,ents,w,hich characterise his bopjc." — Law Quarterly Revi^a. "Mr. Foa's is a compact work, treating !(ij of Jcfae creation ..of the x'elatiojnshiii; (2) the incidents of creation (distress) and determination of the .elationshJ.p ; (3) modes and incidents of determination. We commend it to t^ela^eiu^ion of ' the"Frofe5sipn and j^r^dicl for Foil onXandl^fT ^nd>Tei^nt a very useful and very permanent luftfi-e/'—Z-i^; '^Z7W : » , ; J ' ' V ) ^ •- ^ "We have nothing T)ut praiSe for^tfie Voflet^andSife 'ShaU be-'asronished if it'doer'not take rank in course o£^me as,«pe of therbe^tr-if^ot-t^ie'^est — wo^ for every--day p^a9ti^e.o9 t^e.,subjest ofXandlord ^uAT^Ti3AV\-Lf^ pfoies, (if - ^ i j -*'*,' ^- " WUnout making. any uividiousicckDpaiison witK.,existing wocks. on ytJbb subjejttf jye im.ayjjc@jikly say that Mr. Foa's work indisputably possesses merit. . . . Our verdict on the book must be a decidedly ** * The Relationship of Landlord &^d ^Mant,' written by Mr. Edgar Foa, Barrister-at-Law, affords a striking instance of accuracy and lueidityof statement^' ' The votiinie .should be found useful not only by lawyers but by la^lq;-^,s apdr^^^^^-nts themselves, the law in each particular being stated with a simplicity and dearness wmdhltoagjit WAtihint^e grasp of t^^ ^ '" -jiJV A'^jw ',■;•■, '^,— — jy- ' , . ' ^-,.^.., — rr^-. -r-^. — - ■■■■■ /^ , r.- ■ ~ — ~ rr; ^_ ^. ^ , ^. .: ■ .. ■ Second Edition, in one Yo]^y^f, jn^edium 8vo, price 35 j., cloth, ' ' -EMDEN'S COMPIiETE - COLOiECTlOM PRACTICE STATUTES, O'RDEJRS AND J^UiES. Being aSeleetioH «(f sndi Practical Parts 6f all Statutcsj Orders and Rules, as are now in Jfp«;ee, ^nd relrte to ,^t^g P^apfjpe .and Procedure «£ the Supr^nie CPV^t- From 1275 to |1$36. Witb TaWfeted SBrnm^-ries of the jLeadiflg .Case* and Analytioal Cross-references. ■■-'■■ By ALFRED jEMPEN, or T»E WNEB -TEMPLE, ,ESQ,, 8A5RISJ!ER-A.T.J,^VV ; jtUiT,H9R OF "THE jPiRACTJigB IN iWIWiDtNG-UP COMPAttmS,;" "the law KiEL^ATING TG BWUEIHC, BUIWNO AEA^SS, ANiP ^.NTJIACT( ;" " THE SiIARBHOI.DEK'S LEGAL GUIDE," BTi;. ASSISTED BY HERBERT TH.QJVIFSON, M.A., OF THE 'INNiER XEMPUS, BAR RISTBR-;AT-LAW. ' C 2 12 STE'VENS Sfi HAYNES, BELL YARDi TEMPLE BAR. X'a royal 8vo, price 28^., tloth, A TREATISE ON THE LAW" AND PRACTICE - : RELATING-TO . - ;,. ■. Tl LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS. WITH AN" ■ ■ -■ '. ' ' APPENDIX OF STAftJTES, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION, RULES, FORMS AND PRECEDENTS, ORDERS, &C, By ROBERT FROST, B.Sc. (LoND,). FELLOVV OF THE CHEMICAL SOCIETY ; OF LINCOLN'S "iNN, ESQUIRE, BARRISTER- AT- LAW. " In our view a good piece of work may create a demand, and without disparaging existing literatiite "upon the suTJject of patents, we ihink'the care and' skill with which the volume by Mr, Frost has been compiled entitles it to recognition .at the hands of the profession. - . . . . Judgmg Mr. Frost on this ground, we find him completely satisfactory. ' ' A careful examin'ation of the entire volume satisfies us that great care and much labour have been devoted to the production of this treatise, and we think that patent agents, solicitors, the bar and the bench, may conAdeiftly turn for guidance and instruction to the pages of Mr, Frost. "^ — Laiv Times. _..-.,. , ,^ , —.,,_._,_,... ." Few . practice books cont^ $o^ miich' iii so reasonable a space, ^ndwere^ieat that ijt will be fotind 'generally' useful' by pra^itioners in £h1s important branch of the law. ." ''. .' A'capital Oidex concludes the book." — Law Journal. ' ,_ ^ . t ; > | -• V " The book is, as it professes to be; 'a' treatise on patent law ^d practice, the several topics being con- veniently arranged and discussed in- the thirteen chaptais which form the body of the work, to which are appended statutes, rules, and forms. The statements of the law, so far as we have been able to test them, appear to be clear and accurate, and the author's style is pleasant and good. . . ,. Th^ ,bpok is ia good'^o.ne, and will make its way. The index is better than usual. Bbth'pafper and tj^e are ialso KxctWeat." -Solicitors' j^outTuil. ' '' .. ..;i- : ir^ Second Editian. In two Volumes, royal Svo, price 565:,, doth, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BUILDING AND ENGINEERING CONTRACTS, And of the DUTIES and LIABILITIES of ENGINEERS, ARCHITECTS, SURVEYORS AND VALUERS,. WITH AN APPENDIX OF PRECEDENTS, ANNOTATED BY MEANS OF REFERENCE TO, THE TEXT AND TO^ CONTRACTS IN use: ' ■ ■ ' ' --'■' AND AN APPENDIX OF UNREPORTED GASES OJV BUILDING AND ENGINEERING CONTRACTS. ■ "i By.( ALFRED A. HUDSON, ' ' <"• " ; OF T^e' INNER ~TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. '' "^ ' '* A very full index completes! the book. Mr. Hudson has stJrut^vQut-a new line for himself, and pro- duced a work of considerable merit, and one which will probably be found indispensable by practitioners, inasmuch as it cont^ns a great deal that is not t6 be found «kewhere. . The Table pfCosis refers to all the rmorts." — Law ypurnal. , ■ ■ . ' ' . ■ ' " Mr. Hudson, having iabandoned'his profession of an architect to become a barrister, hit upoH the idea of writing this- work, and .he has done it with a thorbtighness which eveiy houseowner would Hke to see bestowed upon modern houses. . . . * The Index and Table of Cases reveata vast. amount lof industry ; expended upon detail, and we shall-,be much siu-prised if "Mi^. Hudson does not reap the reward of his - labours by obtaining a large and appreciative public. "-^Zaiw Times'. "The author of this somewhat bulky volume has^ within the' compass of some -goO pages,' d'^t^ a f radical and exhaustive manner with the Law of Building and Engineering Contracts. ... An Index of recedents and a good General Index will be found at the'endof the -wotXi.—Solicitors^ youmal. " . . . has enabled him to produce a work which, regarded both from the lawyer's and from the architect's and builder's point of view, must be pronounced exciellent. - It, is good from the lawyer's standpoint as being logical in arrangement, cl^ in Statementj and generally accurate in the law laid down. The archi- '< ttct or engineer will also give it praise for answering the questions, precisely which arise in his dealings with his employers." — Scotsman. STEVENS: &• SAYNES, BEIL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 13 Second Edition. In 8vo,,price los. 6d., cloth, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF TORTS. By RICkARD' RI-NGWOOD, M.A., Oy THB MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARHISTES-AT-LAW ; AUTHOR OF "PRINCIPLES OF BANKRUPTCV," &C., AND LECTURER ON COMMON LAW TO THE INCOgPOlOtTEb LAW Sd'C'lBtV. '" ' ^ Ij- X.J^^l.U .This-^work^yihewfell-kBowiTautKJrcpfl student'? book oriBahlAipW.^ Its groundwork is sr series of lectures delivered in 1887 by Mr. Rinewood, as lecturer appointed by the Incorporated Law Bociety. It IS cleatj^ concise, well and intelligently written and one rises from its perusal with feelings of ^^Stiu&ni'' 9 ■ '5^ perusing th? satire wcH:k, we can, conscientipusly tecqmineiid it tostudents."— " iP« *"'' « o°e »"= we" recommend to law students, and the able way in which it is written reliects t. much credit upon the author."— iam Times. "Mr. Ringwopd'sBookis a pjain and stwightforward) introduction to this hranch of the law."— Zaw *t* Prescribed as a. text-look by the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland. Sixth Edition, in 8vo, price 2lj-., cloth, THE LAW OF COMPENSATION FOR LANDS; HOIJSES, &c. UNDER THE LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACTS, THE RAILWAYS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACTS, THE PUBLIC HEALTH ACT, 1875 ; . , . THE HOUSING OF THE WORKING CLASSES ACT, 1890; iJ '.j^ , THE ME|)fR0J?OHS LOCAL MAN'sfSjEikENT ACT.'rj^l.T^^i v .. . .— U !.... ';' ■ /AND OTHEK ACTS, ■ '^ ' -'. > j' .'! ' U ! .'. \ '. WITH A FULL COLLECTION Of; FQRMS /^ND iPftECEDENTS. By eyre LLOYD, • OF T«E INNER TEMPLE, BARRtSTES-A^^AW. SIXTH EDITION. Bv W.- J. BROOKS, OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. tHproviditiff tht legal profession with a book which contains the decisions of the Courts of Lam and ri/.i . ^ 1 •; ;;. -v , i,,l ; ■ V, :; : i' ',■) '- ! — ;:'' ';■; ',- : - i In Svo, pnce 7^., cloth, THE SUCCESSION LAWS OF CHRISTIAN COUNTRIES, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF PRlMOoiENITURE AS IT EXISTS IN ENGLAND. By EYRE LLOYD, B.A., Bfeister-at-Law. ■ ' .. ; ' : '■ In crown 8vo, price ^i., cloth, "7 H '^ ''• ESSAB IN JURISPRUDENCE ANDILeM. HISTORY. , , By, JOHN W- SALMOND, M.A., LL.B. (Lond.), ' A BARRISTER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND. ' ' In crown Svo, prjcq,6j., cloth. THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE. By JOHN W; SALMOND, M.A., LL.B., BARRiSTBR-AT-LAW ; AUTH'ttS.dF "ESSAYS IN jtJRISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL HISTORY.' Iri the Press, in Svo, ahS nearfy ready. THE LAW QF NEGOTIABLE SECURrTlES. CONTAINED IN A COURSE OF SIX LECTpMES.^ - Delivered by WltLIAM WILLIS, Esq., Q.C.> ' ' '; UNDER THE AUSPICES. OF THE ,COU^vlCIL Q^ LEOAl*- EDUCATION. - In pne large vol., 8vOj price 3a j., cloth, . / , INSTITUTES AND HISTORY OP ROMAN PMYATE LAW, - ' WltH tJAtENA OF 'l^EX'rSi By Dr. CARL SALiKOWSKIy PrWessor. of taws, Komgsberg. Translated and Edited by E. E. WkiTfti&, M.A. (Oxen.). In Svo,. price. 4r..&/.., cloth, ■ITHE' SlISfAPlR UBE AB REfflTRATION ACT, Mi ~W1TH 5 STATEMENT DFTHET XAW; :,0F LTBEE' AS AFFECTING - PROPRIETORS, PUBLISHERS, and BDIXORS OF N,EWS^^PERS. '■■-'. ..- ■. ■' 1 ■''' ' '.'"■■" [ 211 . By G. ELLIOTT,, Barrister-at-Law, of the Inner Temple. ' ' ■ ■ ' ' ' ' ' -.■--' 1 1'fi ': , In one volume, royal 8vo, , CASES AND OPINIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAl LAW, ANIK : VAilllOUS POInTS of EilGLlsit . jIJftlSPRtlDBlJtE. : . COLLECTED AND DIGES^ElJ FROM ^FFICrAL tlO(tUMENTS AND OTHER SOURCES, ■' '-'mm-^oTES. '"- ^ By WILLIAM tORSYTH, M.A., M..P., Q.C., jfj STANDING COUNSEL TO THE SECHETARV pF, STi^TE IN. COyWCIL 05 INDIA, Aut^rpf '' Hortensius,"'' History p^TiKa,by• Jury," '* Life of GiM^^^ late Fellow of Trinity College, fcambridge. S^£J£A{S-^^:^:^^XJV;£S, BELL YARi:(„,^EMPL4 ^fi^R., 1?^ ^xtlh Edition, ia£vo, pnce los. Gd., clo&i ' OF .UWITH AN ApPEKDlXi.I i .\,;\ J ~. ■.,■'! .\\ CONTAINING ,- ;■, ';.-, \ \\-s\ THE CONSOLIDATED RULES OF 1886, 1890 & 1891, SCALE OF COSTS, AMD THE BILLS. OF SALE ACTS, 1878^ 48§^ 1890 & 1891, AND THE RULES THEREUNDER; THE DEEDS OF ARRANGEMENT ACTj 1887, AND THE RULES THEREUNDER. ;v : By RICHARD RiNGWqOD, M.A., . OP TUB MIDDLE TEAiRI^ .BA3KISTER'AT-LAW ; LATESCHOLAR- OF^ TfilHIT.V COI^jl^GBr DUBLI^f. ''^ We welcome anevtr. ^dkloiii of this excelledtj student's book, : Wq' h!vve_writtep7!^y9,uj:ably> of it; iu), ncyie^wing^greviQjts Bditioasi qijtd,, every good lypi^^'W^ .hff^ written we ,^ould now. rei,tverate>andpeirhaps ^vei^ more so^. - • . ,Xn^ conclusion, we qongrat^late Mr. Ringwood on jtjtris, editfoP,. and/ £ave ,^a hft$Uation ill saying. that it is a capital student's"book.''T— i+i?^ Stttdenfs' Joiirnff-l. , ' , ; - , lo'^Tfai5'editionis\a consuietabl& improveiaeDt on the first, and although chiefly wiriU»i (or Che use of 3ciA£Qi15i4iie/wodcwUl be found useful to the E^iiacUtionei^''---^A^ Times. '. • Seventh Edition, in 8vo, price 2Ij., cloth, ^ " - ' ii ;A TREATISE UPON Tm LAW of: bankruptcy , p 3 I LLS7O F ; S AtjE. I y WITH AN, APPENDIX lo 2;iii!!---'i '. " '-v.,. '.,:■.. ; cONifAiNiNO' . ■ "''•) 'i) ii''::- ,; F''i'.i ^ THE BANKRUPjCVl ACTS, 18S3— 1890;. GEKERAL RULES, forms', scale., of, CQSTS and FEES; RULES UNDER S. 122 OF 1888; DEEDS OF ARRANGEMENT ACTS, Ss^-i-iSgoi; RUL£S AND J-ORMS ■,3€ikW'0F TW^>t iMSD\ COURT ORDERS; DEBTOR^ APTS.l.869,1878 ; RULES 4ND FORMS; •''--' BILLS OF SALE ACTS, WT'S'^tSgr, Etc., ETe. ' By EDWAR|;> X -B4i,IXWIN, M.A., OF THE INNER TEMPLE, EAEKISTEE-AT-LAW. . -, , 31 IT ■;■>■: ' : ■ :.'■'•-••■' J ■'■"■'■ ^'; ■. i^-l/.. I "We have always considered the work an admir'atle one, and' the present edition is quite up to the previous lieh standard of excellence. We Know of no better hoOk on bankruptcy for the practitioner s fiv r— ^. ., 1,. Kn™. in mJr,,! flint in acMJrioB ' to 'tfas tcxt. lu whlch IS Quoted pretty well every dFJfarnanient passea in connection wim LucauKici.i, «*• "**. """■"'y'.-r^,--v>i-r»----"3— ------ ---:r connection with Bills of Sale. . . Then there is an excellent Mx."'^.CaB» Jr<«rfw1««/. ; a^'f/HisiiifeweaitiDil.fein every respect satisfaatoryif'-rfioai'T^ieJl; 1 ■ ■ ■' ' '' b."rME.iBaIdwih!s book, has a wellreained leputatiBa&irleonbisen^at, clearaess, and accuracy. . i . ^ As aterseancUeadaHetteatise.on Bankruptcy law hisiyprk may be coimnended to our readers; . , . mere '*"fw^OTs^^cpion a»peare,'to'be quite equal in excellence to its predeopssors, and fet jpractitipner's p'iSiposM.^bopfc ifallthat can.te desired."— Xaro JV»<«. . , ; 16 STEVENS &> HAYNES, BRLL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. Second Editionj in one vol., price zoj., cloth, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN LAND. FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION. •II 1 SECOND EDITION. ^ Bt WILLIAM. DOUGLAS' EDWARDS, LL.B., •• ' ■ . ■ f bF Lincoln's jnji, baIirister-at-law. „ . ..;.,,: " Wt consider it one of the best works published on Real Property I^w^"— i««/ Studeni^ yaurttal "Another excellent compendium which has entered a second edition is Mr. Edwards* 'Compendium of the Law of Propertjr_in. Land,' _No work on English Jaw is' written. 9^re perspicuously. . . . Mr. Edwards has manifestly bestowed the utmost care in putting into the most modem dress a treatise which we think will continue to grow in the estimation of the'profession." — Law Times. - ''•' ' ■J''" '■'-■ "We formed a very favourable-opinion of the first-edition - of . this little- book, and our opinion is con- firmed by the perusal of the second edition. The author has the merit of being a sound lawyer, a merit perhaps not always possessed by the authors of legal tect-books for students^' — Law Quarterly Review, "l^he book is certainly destined to take a high place as a standard work on the Law of Propertyin Land. The style is good/ the conclusions of law are accurate, and the authorities are well selected. . ; .' '. The amount of detaij is much greater than in Williams : . . .. Asa companion volume to itj w&ean-with ereat confidence recommend it to the student ;^and the practitioner will find it a veryusefiil epifome of the modem law. Altogether it is a work for which we are indebted to the author, and- is wortny of the improved notions of law which the study of jurisprudence is bringing to the itoTit."— Solicitors' Journal. "This book shows signs of thorough work throughout The book is a business-like and useful performance." — Law Joutnal. . ,,■ ,. .:^'. .... ^ Third Edition; royal. 8vo, prifcegSj.j cloth. THE ^- , .,,,.„ LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND COMPANIITS.: A TREATISE ON TltE DOCTRINE OF U LT;RA; VI R iE S : ./...•_ /_^ ,"J ■■ BEING' '•■ '■'- - i\ ■' An Investigation of tiie Principles which Limit the Capacities, Powers, and Liabilities of ! . CORPORATIONS, AND MORE ESPECIAELY OF JOINT STOCK COMPANIES. By SEWARD BRICE, M.A., LL.D., Lo?jp6N,' "' OF THE INNER TEMPLBj ONE OF HER MAJESTY'S COUNSEL. THIRD EDfTlbN. ' ' REVISED THROUGHOUT AND ENLARGEB, AND CONTAINING THE UIJITE'd STATES AND COLONIAL DECISIONS. BBVIEWB. ' ". . . ,. On ike whoUt liie consider Mr. Brice's exhaustive vtork a v.^Iuableaddiiitmio the Uisraittreqf the profession." — Saturday Review. -. . . [ . i - "It is the Law of Corporations that Mr. Brice treats of (and treats of more fully, and at the: same time .more scientifically,. ' than anyi work with -which' iwe are .acquainted), not the law of principal and agent; and Mr. 'Bricedoes not-do his book justice by giving it so vague a title." — Law younutL'- "On this doctrine, first introduced in the Common Law Courts in East Anfflfdn iiaihuay Co. Y. Eastern CoiikHes Railway Co., Bsice oh Ultra Vires may be rtad with advantage."'^3'«i&W>(< ot Lord Jusi'icE Bramwell, in the Case o/ Evershed v. L. &• N. W. Ry. Co. (L. R., 3 Q. B. Di5. 141.). S'T^V EN^ &» ffAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE: BAR. 17 Sixth Edition; in royal 8vo, price'j4j'., cloth, BUCKIEY ON THE COMPANIES iM. '^' '"itXt'k EDITION BY .Tfik AUTHOR. ;THE ;I,AW AflD PRACTICE UNDER THE COMPANIES ACTS, 1862x01896:; and THE LIFE ASSURANCE CO M-PANWS,4LCy%, 1870 TQ 1872; including THE COMPANIES (MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION) ACT;. ' .. V, ^ -A , THE COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) ACT, and the ; , ■ DIRECTORS' LIABILITY ACT. ji. 'i;reat}s«ort the SiitoiiijoW (Stock (ffiflmvame«. CpNTAINING, TIIE STAXUTES, WITH THE RUL^S, ORDERS, ANP '^^ '■ ^?^6jkBtS!''f 6 REGULATE PROciEEI^CiS. ' ' ;' ;" ; 3y H. BURTON BUCKLEY, 'M.A., ; ,; ; . ;_ 1 OF UNCQLN'S .INNi ESQ., ONE OF HER -MAJESTV.'s GOUflSEL.^ ' , ■'■■•■- ■- '> "- ■'•':, .u^ Jrtr.)^ .■,.! ;.;.;•) j:.;ij. — ,..!iii/: ;:; ,' ^^^ TT: Second Editioiij with Supglement, in royal 8vo, price 46J., cloth; THE LAW RELATING ' TO SHIPMASTERS AND SEAMEN.- THEIR APPOINTMENT, DUflESi. POWERS, RIGHTS, LIABILITIES, ■■ ■' ■ - AND remedies: — Bv THE LATE JOSEPH KAY, Esq., M.A., Q.C. Second Edition. .' '-i'-' : _ ,, WITH A SUPPLEMENT . J Comprisirtg TH^, MERCHANT SHIPPINQ ■ ACT, 1894, Thf Mules of .i&:;; -, Coui^ made thereuttder,y and the (fropased) Regulations fiir - ' ,', Preventing C^lliiietis at Sea. " ■ ' By THE HoN.J. W. MANSFIELD, MfA., and- G. W. DUNCAN, Esq., B.A., OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTERS-AT-LAW.J REVIEWS OF THE SECOND EDITION **It will, however, be a valuable book of refer- ence for any lawyer desiring to look up a point , connected with the rights and duties of a ship- , master or a seanjan—the list of cases cited covers, nearly seventy pages-r-while any shipmaster, ship? agent or consul who roasters-this edition wULbe . well posted un, .... We iiope this new Edition will be ' quiekly appreciated, for the Editors have carried out an ^arduous task carefully and well.'* — Law Journal, April, ,1894^ , " It has had, practical and expert knowledge brought; to bear upon it. while the case, law is< -brought down to a-very late- date.- - Considerable improvement has, beea made in theit^^^x." — Law T'z'ww'j, April, 1S94. ■ In royal §vo, price 10^.-^6*/., cloth, THE MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, . 1,894 ; With the Rulesof Court made thfereundet. • Beihga Supplement (o'kAY'S LAW RELATING TO SHIPMASTERS AND SEAMEN. To which^ are added the (tirppos^) Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. Witli; Notes. By Hon. J. W.iM!ansfield, M.A.,,and G. W. Duncian, B.A., of tfti?' Inner Temple, Barristers- at-Law. 18 STEFMlV^.d^ //^yjif£S, BfifiL YARD,-'i;EMPLE-'BARi^ Fourth Efl^tipiTi^ in royal 8vo, price. 40J., cloth, THE JUDaMENTS, ORDERS, AND PRACTICE 0F . : ; Vm SUPREME COURT, * t; : CHIEFLY in RESPECT to ACTIQNS ASSiqNER to th? C^A^NC^RY DIVISION. By tOFTUS LEIGH PEMB^RTON; ' ' One of the registrars of the Supreme Court ^of Judicature ;- and Aitthor of^" The Practice in Equity by way of Revivor and Supplements" *'The work- under notice ought to be c^ consldera'ble service to^ the proffissiini. .^,\ . . The forms throughout the work — and they arei the mosfliinportant element in it — ^.ppear foiis to be accurate, and of the most approved type. This fact a^one'wjiUppinDn^nd'tl^e.newiqd^tion to practitioners in the Chancery Division. There is a useful table of the Lord Chancellors and Judges at the beginning of the book, and a very full index concludes lt}."T77ijgw y^j^g^. -,; .,;,: •-* ;,/. i- -,,;, , ■, -ir-i r.,^r ^" K- In demy i2mo, price 5^., THE STATU;tCftr Xm. REilXTING XQ f R'UStEE SAVINGS BANKS'(1863— 1891), togeth^ With the Treasury Regu- lations (1888^1^89), 3tid .the Scheme for the i^pointme^i/ of the Inspection Committee of Trustee Savings Banlcs. By U'rqt;'haE'F A. Forbes, of Lincoln's Inn, Esq., Barrister-afr- Law, Author of " The LawRelating to Savings Banks ;" the "Law of Savings Banks" since 1878 ;"" and joint Author of ""The Law Relating:to Water.-''; .,.,■ ' ■■.■:,;..... i ,,■,:-: ,,- .v-Xwy^ \ w^/i. In demy i?nio, nricfe^y, qlotb, THE LAW#F SWINGS BANKS SINCETWS; Wi^; a Pigestiqf Incisions m^di. by^ttiChieC Registrar and Assjstantj %^strar;s of Friendly Societies from 1878 to 1882, being a Supplement to the Law relating to .. .Trustee and Post Office SavjrigS" Banks;,'. •>. . , . . . , ,i:v vi'a)" . . v. \\\ -,V By U. a. FORBES,\o( yjicpfc's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. *»* The complete work can be had, price los. 6ti., cloth, ,-• .' ' . ' i' '. V _ , ■.' J- ^1 ')-'■■• . ■,' 'I I •■ ! •■rHT ■/'■ In Svo, pnce 15^., cloth, THE LAW ANB PRACTICE RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATIS ^f [DECEASE]) PERSONS BY THE CHANCERY DIVISION dP THE HIGH COURT 0#^JUSTICE^ WITH AN AD^DESTBA. gii^gr the alterations effeeted by the NEW B^LES of 1883, And an APPENDIX, QF ORDERS AND, FORMS, Annotated by ^ References to, the Text. By W. GRiEdORY WALKER andEDGAi'J. ELGOOD, J' OF L INpp^t^'s IN^^ -BA ^^^SfTjBpip-AT-yyW. ^^ "In this volume the most.iinpGrtaii£>:braiiGh'of the administrative business of tae^ChanCfiaiDiYi- sion is treated with conciseness and care. Judging from the admirable, clearness of expifefesiaja wKicK characterises the entjre work, aiid.the laboi^r which^ h^^Videnlly been bestowed 'on eVerjr 'det^l, wie dc^ not think that- a literary executorship could havb devolved upon a more able and conscientious repi;e- sentative .... USefdl chapters are introduced , in their appropriate: places, dealing with the ' iPiiities to: adminialiFation actions,' ' The proofs of claims. in_ Chambers/ and 'The cost of admuus- tration actions.' To the last-mentioned chapterwe gladly jiccofd 4pecia3 pirbisc^ ^\a tl^ and succinct sun^mary of the l^w, from which, so far as we have t^^t^d it,'no proposition of any importance !h&s>^en omjl^ed i . . . An elaborately constructedfi table df 'cases,^ With refe'rences in separate columns to all the ];eport^, and A ffdrly good mdex^ much increase the TitiUt^y- bf thte vfoTk."'-^oliniOt^^ JoMrnaL In Foolscap 8vo, superfine papeifi bound in'Vellum, price 3J. 6d, nei^ -'"'-^A limited numbtraf-copies have- bems^ printed upon large pap^-, price 'ps, 6drneti . , sciKfimE auRis. ,. ..,. . fiyiCHAriLES. J. -DARLING, 'Q.'C, Mtj. IWitH a'Frontispifece aidVfcoIopiQkiby , , ■ , FnAN?:,LocKTyooD,.Q.e., Uyl,!". Fourth, Edition (gnlaig^d). ;, "Scinullae Juris' is that Ijttle.bundie o{1ilimoronj^«ssays i^ti law an4 (:agii^t« irjiatti^ whic);j siqffe the -._ £„-^ _ 1 . ., 1 1- .. ^, . • . It has alf^iiality ihyof III.; j:jxtays. a.iiu iv l'SA\x-\tUK,- uilC wondciful book."— -y^a//;' Ncivs, SrsyJUVS &> ff^VNES, M:ELL VAR£>y\TE&lPZM BA-Jii. 10 Secopd.^pditiijpy, in .^yp, price. 25^,, jftoth, - % -^.A r^, - T»p PRINCIPLES OF , ^ THE tK^- OF RATING OF H'"EREDITA1EKTS IN- THE OCCUPATION OP COMPANIES. , . . M J, H. ?^i,rpUK BROWNE, . ;, -, -'' OF THE M1DDl4 TBMPUEj.Q.C.c >■ . a . , pj .,,; AndD. N. McNAUGHTON^ of the Middle Temple, Barttetet-^^Law. : -^ ;' aKUc ^^A =«^«;^:. i„-*i„^-\..i.:«i. — that.sucha>voEH,,is-miiQiiinflede4g*iiji\yi9 are swift that ail those who are ii>t9rest.^4 ui, cr have, to.. |dp with, pttblic rating, will find it of great service; M'lUih gcedit is therefore due to Mr. Browne for his 3)>ie treatise— a work which his experience as Registrar of the Railway Commission peculiarly qu^lipefl hiqkji? under.to^e^ " -yj^g w Jifagi^inf. The tables and specimen valuations which are printed in an appencUx to this volume will be of great- service tO"the parish authorities, and to the- legal practitioners who may have ^ideaji yitb the rating of those properties which are in the occupa^- tion of Companies, and we congratulate Mr. Brown^t on ^e,4Ufodu(tUQn-oLA clear and ioncise ,hpqk_jpf -4- 4- ,r ■■ , In SvjO, 187^ price 7j. 6^, clotlj, , THE- LAW OF USAGES fr CUSTOMS : By J.' H. BALFOUR :BR0WNE, '! - ; -_' - OK THE MIDDLRTEMPLEi Q.cJ'^' • V' ■'• ifyi^leokOTqp-thisjtireatiseflaariral^^ Sciqnce of Law,"— C^«^ ^As'Mracf A^ri a^very ti-oublesonte department ofLaw it is admitatle-Ahe^prihciptes^laiidMoTshT^e sound, the illustrations are v^ell cjiosen^.^pd thp decisjoijs and^\^/!«are Jiarmonised soiar as ^^ and distinguished when necessaigr/'rTTfrr^A^flHf Tunes. ' ' ■ ' ■ ■ ."' w ; . "As a hoolf pf reference we knpw of non^ so comprehensive dealing with this particular branch of Commpn Law. ... I In' this \^ay the book is invaluable to the prictitioner."— ^Z,aw Magazine. ' :In ffn,e>olume, 8vo, 1875, price I 8j., doth, TfiE PRAGTICE BETORE THE RAEWAY GOMISSIONERS -UND-ER: THE REGULATION OF RAILWAY AGTS, 1873 & 1874; With the Amended-General Orders of |ji& Commissioners, Schedule of Forms, and 'fabl© of Fees: t<^ethW>teilh tii*.IaSf*f HaSuC Prigfef SUM,, the La»i ef the Jurisdiction of the Railway Commissioners, Notes of their Decisions and Orders, Precedents of Forms of Applica^M^ Answers and lieges', and Appendices' of Statutes and Cases. By J. h: Bi^IiFOUR BKOW^iTE, y' A I f.lT T ./'[^ T n '?> .*HE M^BiiJT/^i^piE, Q.qJ :'; '-''"'i i' I jT/'!/'" " slbetBio4tw^ ^^ W ramdy ^b3 fc^n^enient hi^ work-ef a man of xapabw* le^al ^t-tainnieAtSr end &y form, apd well arranged ^r tl^e purpose, o£ refer- , .official position intimate ^vith his subject ■ .and we ence : fcs^treiatftienf-'^T^tM 'subject is ■'full^ 'atid ^ therefore' think that it cannot^^tl' to ''m%ee a real carefully worked out : it is, salar as we .baye^been. ■ / V£viband^to.prove of -.service to the legal profession 'W ^?J!fbfe!a'a^^f^^''^^^yi°>f^1l'^yr?''^^i.:P^ '^^■^'<-J^'\V^,'^'mS-,h vlii,.rni.q • '■• ''fii^^;'iS76,'^nce7.f. 6sula« / jects were disQUS^ed. . These ^xe all treated^ at, l^ngt^ by the Author in the body of the wo^c, vmic^ is tnus'a complete legal compendium' dit tlii --large subject with which it so ably deals. '* ■ '. ' '. "This is a work of considerable importance to all • MunicipalCotporatJofls^and i^ fthaMly too much ta say that every member pf these bpdies shoujd hay^, , a copy by him for constant reference. Probabljr at . nb very dist^t date 'the property of all the.existmff ■ gas Sand water companies ^ill passi under municipsd control, and therefpre it is exceedingly desii^We'. that the principles land conditions under which,5ucl\, . transfers ought to be made should, be; clearly. urtder- stood. This task is made easy by the preSisnt Voliiine. The s^muluff for the ■jjuhljcation, of such a work was given by the action ' of the Pariiame^ltary; , Committee which last -session passed', the preamble of the'**StoSlclcm^ihd Mi^dlfestidfoilgh^Coi^c'iatlonS - W^ur^BtllV 1876.:. '^e^wplumei^acciMrdingly' con- tains a full report of the case as it was presented 80 STEVEJ^S ^ ffAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. In crown 8vo, price l0Si'6d., cloth, , THE LAW OF ; EVIDENgE, By S. L. PHIPSON,. M.A., of the Inner Temple, Barristex-at-Law. " This book condenses a head of law intpr a comparatively small compass^-*a' class of Ute^ry undertaking to which every encouragement should be given. . y, . fThe yolunjic is mqst- portable, mqst compendipus/and as far'as we have been able to exainine it, as accurate as any law book can be expected to be." — Lww Times, "We are of omnion that Mr. Phipson has pro- duced *& bodk whith will 'be found very serviceable, not ''only for practitioners, but also for students. We havei trt^; \t Tin ^ gopd many places, and we find that it is well brought down to date."— ^,««' yourncfi. •''''■■'■''-■ ' . '■- I -.■' - :!t l' In 8vo, 1878, price 6j., cloth, '"'' "the LAW RELATING TO CHARITIES, ESPECIALLY WITH REFERENCE TO' THE VALlblTV AKD CONSTRUCTION OF CHARITABLE; BEQUESTS AND 'CONVEYANClESn r{ ] By FERDINAND M. WHIT EiFQRD, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. In , 8V9, i872,r price 7j. 61a?., cloth, AN EPixOME AND ANALYSIS' OF ' SAYIGNY'S TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS IN ROMAN LAW. By ARCHIBALD BROWN, M.A. -^'.'.Mr^ Archibald.. .Brown., deserves the thanks of all interested in the scieQce of Law, whether - as a study or a practice', fot his feditJon Of Herr vom Savigny's great work on 'Obligations.' Mr. Brown ha^ undertaken a double task — the translktion of his author, and the analysis of his author's matter-:^ That he nas succeeded in reducing the .bulk, of the original will be seen at a glance ; the-French translation consisting .of. twa volume^ . with some five hundred jpages apiece, as compared vtith Mr. ' Erown's thin volume of a hundred and fift^r pages. At the same time^ the pith of Von Savigny's matter seems to be very successfully prei- serVed, nothing ' which might be li&ful to ^ tht ' English ireadeV being apparently. 6niitted/'—Z«w youmal. . . . . -r THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW. , . Sccpnd Edition, in crown 8vo,, price 6/., cloth, " A CONCISE DIGEST OF THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND JUSTINIAN. Wit A copiouf References arrange^ in Parallel Celumns, of so Chronological and ■ I 1 Analytical Taites, Lists of Laws, &'c. &'Ct ■ Primjanly designed ..for jthe Use of Students ^refi^ring ' for Examination at Oxford, Cambridge, and the Inns of Court. By SEYMOUR F. HARRIS, B.G.L,, M.A., WORCESTER COLLEGE, OXFORD, AND THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW-J AUTHOR OK j'^^S^uiBSITlES AND LEGAL EDUCATIQK," . " Mr, Harris's digest ought) to have very great success among law students both in the Inns of Court .and the Universities. His book gives evidence of praiseworthy accuracy and laborious condensation. " — Law Journal. '" This book contains a summary in English of the elements df Roman Law as contained in the ■works of Gaius and Jrtstinian, and is so arranged that the reader can at once see what are the opinions of either of these two writers on each point. From the very exact and accurate references to titles and sections given he can at once refer to the original itiritcrs. The concise manner in which Mr. Harris has arranged his digest will render it most useful, not only to the students for whom it was originally written, but also to those persons who, through they have not the time to wade through the larger treatises of Posit, Sanders, Ortolan, and others, yet desire to obtain some knowledge of Roman Law." — '■ OxFORn AND Cambridge Undergraduates' Journal. . " Mf. Harris deserves the credit of having produced an epitome _whieh will be of service to those numerous students who have no time or sufficient ability to anafyse the Instittttes for themselves." — Law Times. ' • WORKS .FOR LAW STITDENTS. 21 , Fourth Edition,. in- ;8vo, price aijjj glothif EMLM CON STITDTION AL flISTORY: ,j^J^QM.^HE TEVTOIilC INVASION, .^0^ .THE ^RESENT TJI^^.... 5*«ifli«I> a« « '9[txt-book for ^Stttb^nta ani other*, By t. 'P. TA-SWEL'^-LA^Gy4:ADf B.'C.L., OF UMCOLN's ink, BAftlRlSTER-AT-LAW, formerly VIl^ERlAN SClioilAR IN THE UNIVERSITY, AND LATE PROFESSOR OF. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND HISTORY, (LNIVBRSlTYXOLLEOkr l6n1)6N:. .^^, P^ ^ourt^ E4ition, Revise^ throughout, ^■v4»th,^Qlp apd ^Dendic^„ ^^^ , ^ ,. By C. H. E. Carmichael, M.A. Oxon, ■■'-■ ■ ■ ■ '-'^ • • i"* ' ■ .■ ■; '-- : V. -'- - - -^ 1 ' ^ . M. ' . M . ■ .1- T qo . ./i-i .'ivt -■) v/ ! II , ■ '"'7' ' • ' .!■ ''1 .• '■' ,■■ /;■ ■ ^'. '■^.■-.'/■.i,', -:/, /,/■'■ "Mr. Carmichael has performed his allotted task with credit to himself, and the high standard of excellence attained by Taswell-Langmead's treatise is worthily maintained. This, the third edition, will b« found as useful as its predecessors to the. laiiri^ plas^.of readers and students who seek in its pages accurate knowledge of the history^of the con'fentution. — Zd^i; Times, • "To the student of constitutional law^ thisriwdtfk -will be invaluable. '.'.'': .'■ The^book is remarkable for the raciness and vi^ur of its style. "'The'edibSFial contributions of Mr. Carmichael are judicious, and add much'to thevalue of the work.''^-T^c^^^f%^;^;x^>i?fz;z£w, . , n,.,,.- . j i .- >.•. -. i .',< • 'SThe work wBl continue tohold- the field as the best class- bookon the Auhject.Vt-^Gonteinjliararj^E'euiesv, "Thebook is well known as anadmirabk introduction to the s:tudy.of coastitutiqnal law for students^ law. . • -^ . Mr., Carmichael app^ar^ to have done the work.of .editingi.niad^ neqess^y by the; death of Mr. Taswell^Langmead^ with care and judgment, ^'-^i^czu; y^ur'm/^ ,,, " The work before us it would be hardly possible to praise too highly. In style, arrangement, clearness, and size, it.would be diifficiilt.to find anything better on ther real history of England, the history of its constitutional growth as a complete story, than this volume."— ^tfjtow i^/.S.) Literary World. \ ' ^ , ,; ."'As It now stands, we should find it hard to name a better text-book on English Constitutional History." — Solicitors' yoifmal. ' ' ' . . " Mr. Taswell-Laln^mead's cdinpendium of the ri^e and development of the English Constitution ihas evidently supi^lied a want The present Edition is greatly Improved. . . . We have no hestfatioil ib saymg that It is a thoroughly good and useful work." — Spectator, 'Ut is a safe, carefuly praiseworthy digest and manual of all constitutional histor^r and law/' — Globe. ' . "The volume ontiEnglishConstitutional^'History, by Mr. Taswell-Langmeadj is exactly what such a histo;? should be.!" — Standdrdl ■ 1 ,'..>,, , . . ." Mn Taswell-Langmead has thoroughly grasped the bearings of his subject. It is, however, in dealing with, that f^iief subject of constitutional history — parliamentary govemmen^^that the work exhibits its great superiority over its rivals, "-^^carfewzy. ' Second Edition, in 8vo, price 6;., cloth, HANDBOOK TO THfi INTHMEDIATE AND FINAL LL.B. OF: LONDON THNIVERSITY r^ , , , , , . , CPASS ANJ3^ hJONOURS), . , iiiCLUDiNS' A COMPLETE SUMMARY OF "AUSTIN'S JURISPRUDENCE > .AND THE EXAMINATION PAPERS o? LATE. YEARS m ALI, BRANCHES. By a B.A., LL.B. (Lonai):- ' • ' ^ . .' - , .: - ,, ■; '■ r 'J - ,/' '' " Inp*".eased ioisize and-uaefulness, ^;.:. . ,.•- The book will undoubtedly be of helpirtb/.those-studehts who prepare themselves for examination. . . . The Appendix contains a good selection of paper; set at the different examinations." — Laiv Times. ,, * t-r rrn— »•---*>■ - — "A veiy good handbook to the Intermediate and Final LL.B. by a B.A., LL.B. —Law Notes. ^ Jn^xip^n .8vQ, price 3j. ; or Interle^ved^forN^teSj price 4^^, ^ -, . . ■- VidONTBAC_T,;LWW.;: :',^ QUESTIONS ' ON THE LAW OE CONTR.a!cTS. With ]well brought up- to date. . '. . Xheprintingandget-^upof the book are excellent and the index'ififgood.^'^ — Law %oumal. " This is the Eighth Edition of this student's text-book which thepreSeiit editor has brought -out. . . . the book is a good introduction to Equity, and is additionally useful by having'a full indejc. '-^Solicttor^ journal, • "The book remains what it Rlwa.ys, has been, the indispensable gtiide to the beginner Of the study of Equity, without ceasing to be'abOve the notice of the more experienced student." — Oxfoi'd Ma^aziti^. " Whether to the beginner in the study of the principles of Equity, or to, the practising ,lawyer in the hurry of work) it can be unhesitatingly recommended as a standard and, invaluable \x&z.tis&"~^Cund}ridge j^evi&w. . . . . _ ■ ' i "This work on the ' Principles of Equity' has, since' the publication Of the Firat i^dition, .been recognised as the'best elementary treatise on the ^subject, and it would not be necessary, to. say-nujre of jthi!s Edition, than to menitionthe fact of its publication, were: it not for jtheTjict that the authoir}jMr..Snen, is dead, and the late Editions have been brought out under the care of Mir^ .Brown. -It >&eldom -^happens jthdt a new^ditor is ablie to.improveon the work Of his predecessor in its pl^:jor its details. Blitiin'the xaseofiithe present work >we find & Lain Times* ^ : i .\ '* Thisis DOW unquesUonably-the-standard book on Jlquity for-students.'^'^-^a/wn^-^«zr»w. , " We- k/towi. of fiQ b^etter .introduction ,io the- Principles /if .^qu^.^^^ ' ' ' Fifth Edifien, in 8vo, price 6s. , cloA?, ■ - ^ ^" - ' AN ANALYSIS OF SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY. Founded on Ihe Eleventh Edition, With Notes thefeon. By E. E. Blvth, LL.D., Spli?itor., " Mr. BIyth's book will undoubtedly be very useful to readers of Snell."— Zaiw Times. '" This is an admiiable anal^is of a good treatise ; read with Snell, this little book will be found very pEofitable to the stvidcnt."^~Ld'iu/0ttmai. In 8vo, price 2s. , sewed, QUESTIONS ON E^QUITY. .F0£ STtlJ)^2^r^ .f>Jl^PA^/J\rJG' J^O^ k^AMlNATIOlf. founded 6N the NrNTtt EDITION OF SMELL'S "PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY;" By W. T. WAITE, llARRISTER-AT-LAW, HO^T SCHOLAR Olf ,TiHE HONOURABLE SOCIE.TY OF GRAY'S INN. ' W^M^S ^P0/l LA W ^T'UDENTS. 28 Second Edition, in one volume, 8vo, price l8^., cloth, PRINCIPLES OF "COKVEtANCmG. kNEL]tiaiCMNTARYlVORirJFt>ATHEWSEOFSTUI)ENrs. By HENRY C. DEANE, OF tlNCOIi^% mSi 8ARlU$TER-AT-LAW, $OM^£l^& ^L^TURER TO THb WCORPORATE&'LAW SO'CIBiV OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. ^^We hope to see this booky likfij^neli}3^Equi^i^a:^ne^rd class-book in all Law Schools where English law is taught.'* — Canada Law Journal. " We like the work, it is well written and is an excellent student's bctok^and ,beu!lg-6nl^jj[ist]pub- "^ lished, it has the grbat advantage ofhaving in it all the rece^t important enactments relating toconvey- andng. II 'pds^G^sek'''als6fah^ ekc^lleiit 'ind^iu"-^ £,aw Stutlents' yourn^. , , . "Will be found of great use to students entering upon the difficulties of Real Property Law. It has an unusually exhaustive index covering some fifty pages." — Law Tttnes, " In the parts which have been rewritten, Mr. JD^s^i Hl^JP^^^'^liH^ l^jsame pleasant style marked oy simplicity ana lucidity which distinguished his first edition. After ' ^^llUams on Real Property,' tUeJ-e i^ ho' bdbk''ifirhic'h we should ^0 ^strongly recommend to the student entering upon Real Pro- perty Law as Mr. Deane's ' Principles of Convey- ancing,' and the high character which the first edition attained has been fully kept up in this second." — Law youmal. Fourth Edition, in-8t'e, price I oj.,tel\rtii, ■ - A SUMMARY OF THE LAW fe PRACTICE IN ADMIRALTY: ' FOR THE USE OF STirHEKfTS. ' "-^ By EUSTACE 'smith, _ .'_ „-,--. OF THE INNER TEMPLE; AUTHOR OF "a SUMMARY OF. COMPANY LAW." , - , , ,^ "The book is well arranged, and forms a good introdnction to the subject."— i'o&iVora' JtunuU. 11 It isj ihowever^via o^r Qpimo^i a yf«ll .(uid i pa?ef jUlyiwritfe?! little, vjoijlc, and sho^ij* be in , die ji^ios of every student -iho is tAing up Admiralty Law at the Final.' —Zaa; 5^a■-.■'.■ . ,, ' - ' and extent k ecclesiastical law; of the prmciplesioh which it !is ff"\^^^„if*g?te^^IiK!:■ ^4t fettSsi fSSls'Jfe bisect. Ife value is much enhanbed by a lirofuse dtatiori ttT SiithdHfiiS fd*-lhe propositions can&iaed in \IiXS' PO^-yL'4W',S;f..UJPEJ^j-S. Seventh '. ;h Edition.; j^ihppe volume, /8yo, pi3ce,-aoj., plotji,-. - ~ PRINCIPLES* dl'^HE COMMON ^ LAW. •INTENDED FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION. SEPENTB iBlTTON. '■ JiYjG«N';INbER]ViAUR^ Solicitor; ,;';• ':^ AUTHOR OF "A MANUAL OF: THE PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURTj'' ' "EPITOMES OF LEAMKG CASES," AND OTHER WORKS. ,,„ ■■' ( :|, ! 1^ 'i''',' 1 . ' ,'■.■1 ■ ,~\ ,;, I;- ~' ~ I '' / : . arT''' y'lil.. ■->,.. !j ,i y i j -f- -.f I '.O f) , ,;j - (fllU 11 ^ ."The student will findin. Mr. Indeimauri -book a safe and clear guide to the Prin- ciples of Common Law." — Law Journal, \%lijlr. Indermaur has .been, very successful ; the leading principles are clearly brought out, and very judiciously illustrated."— JViAVj/tfrx' Journal. " The work is acknowledged to be one of the best written and most useful elementary works for Law Students that has been published." — Lam Times. "The praise which we were ehablefj to bestow upon Mr. Indermaijr's very useful cOta- pilittion on its first appearance has b^en justified by a demand for a second edition." — Lain Magazine, - -1 -a "We were able, four years agorto- praise the-fiist- edition of- Mr. -Jndermanr's boxA- as likely ' befO use to students in acquiring the elemeftts of the law of torts and contracts. The second edition maintains the charjiqterpf the bopk."7x-Zaw Journal. " Mr. Indermaur renders even law light reading; He not only possesses the fecnlty of judicious selection, but of lucid exposition and felicitous illustration. Arid while his works are all thus characterised, his ' Principles of the Common Law ' especially displays those features. That it has already ,rea,ched a sepojid edition, testifies that our estimate of the work on its first appearance was not unduly favourable, highly as we then signified approval; nor needs it that we should add anything to that estimate in reference ' to the general scope and execution of the work. It only remains to say, that the present edition evinces thai every care has been taken to insure thorough accuracy, while includii^: all the modifications iri the law t^iat have taken place since the originai publication ; and that the references to the Irish decisions which have been now introduced are calculated to render the work of greater utility to practitioners and students, *(7M- English -and Irish." — Irish Law Times. ; - :, ■' " :• ; " This work, the author telli us in his- Preface^ is imdtte^ mainly with a view to. the exafninations of the Incorporated Law Society ; iutwe think it is likely to attain a wider usefulness: It Hems, so far as we can judge from the farts we have examined, tdi be a careful and clear outline of the principles of tfie common law. It is very readable ; and not only students,' but many fractitiokers and the piiblic might benefit' iy a perusal of its pages:" — Solicitors' Journal. - . :> ; • ; ; fr WOI^iSS^ K^GR \ A-d-W' STUDENTS. Sixth Edition, in 8vo, price 14J., cloth, I mm OFTP PMCTICE OF' THE SUPEEME COURT OF JUDICATURE, X UN THE (I^UEEN'S , BENCiH ! AND CHANtERy ©IVISJONS. i' / - - . Sixth .Editicm,,a4apted to the new Rules of/Go.Urt:Qf November, 1893.; J ,ii i '.!u I \Intcndedi for the mt. of .StUfimM, and the., ^^ofessiifn, ,1, ■ By John iNDERMAui, Solicitor. ,j 1 j- .; ' r "Mr. Indermaur has brought out a sixth edition of his excellent ' MahuaT of 5Pract(ce''"at a very opportun£^e,Jorhe..has.been.ableJo-incorporatetheeffertnfthpni.ivRiilf» nf rniii-n»h;rh ratn. into force last November, the Trustee Act, 1893, and Rules, and the Supreme Court Fund Rules, 1%, as wen as that of other Acts of earlier 4ate. A very, complete revision of the work has, of course, been necessary, and Mr. Indermaiit-.iassistetf^Mr.-ThwaitW, hSs effectea'thiS *ith his usual thoroughness ai^flfareiul attention Jo details. TJje book is weU known and vajued by students, hut practitioners ako ^1^^ laT ""v 1 T^ ^P'*p''="f "f ° *•$ bulkiqrJ^hi* Bode ' is unEecessacy."— if «- Ti«fi, "This weirknownltudents'boot may very weUbe consulted by practitioners, as it contains a considerabfe aniount of rehable inf^rnjation pn tlf^ practice pf the Cpurt. . Jt js.iyjjtten so^ to include the new Rules, and a supplemental noteUeals with the dlteratjdns maaeJn RUfe XIl 4y tlie Judges in January last. The praise yjv|ch we gave to previous editions is quite due to thejpresent issue."— Zagp Jourtial, February ^ 1894. Seventh Edition, in "Svo, price 6j.j cloitj ^~' ' ' AN EPITOME ' 01^ LEADING COlMON , tAW CASES ; SVITH S'OME SHoiT NOtElS THEKtdN.' Chiefly intended as a Gui^ to ^VSmith's Leaping. Cases." By John Indermaur, Solicitor (Clifford's'Inn Prizeman,* MicliaeWas Term, 1872). '*^'^™ '*'='™<' *« ''^'"'.^ edit^o^ 'of i\ik ,' Ey>forii'eof")C.ia:di'ii'g Common Law Cases,' by Mr, ta&t- maur, ■SoBcitor. The first edition Of this'work Wis published in 18*e;bruary,-J873J '••= second in April, 1874; and now we have a third edition dated September,- i87sr - N& better proof of the value of this book can be furnished than the fact that in less thap three years it has reached a third ^ition."— iaio Journal. ' ■ . * : — '• — \ ^ — : i'.> :: •' '- i /r^>t Seventh Edition, in 8vo, price ds., cloth, ' AN EPITOME OF LEADIK6 COMEYABCIM AND IQUITY CASES; , WITH SOME SHORT NOTES THEREON, FOR THE USE OF STUBENTS: ' By- John iNDERMAu'Ri' Solicitor, Autl|or'of " An Epitome of Leading ' ' Common Law Cases, " " ' '" -'' >-'.i'.~: ^ "We have received .the second "(sdittpn Of Mr..Jndermaur*s very useful £^itome of . Leading ^avey- ancing and Equity Cases. The work is veiV well done."— Z^w T'j/^wj. *• ..- "The Epitome well deserves the continiied'pa'tronaee of the class — Students — ^forwhom it is espCci^Iy intended.'. Mr. Indernianr will soon be known as the 'Students' Friend.' " — Canada Lain yaurriati Sixth Edition, 8vo, price 6s., cloth; ' - THE ARTICLED CLERK'S GUIDE JO AND SELF-PREPARATION FOR THE FINAL EXAMINATION. ■ Contaming a" Complete Course of Study, with Books to Read, List of Statutes, Cases^ Test Questions, &c., and intended for the use of those Articled Clerks who read by themselves. By JofiN Indermaur, Solicitor. "In this edition Mr. -Indermaur «x;ten4s his^coun^ls fo .the whole period from the Intermediate examination to the FinaLH Hts advice,is practical ^4 ^en^ble : and if the course of study he recommends is intelligently followed, ttie aAiGldd^cIftrlf^will have laidiri a' store of legal Icnowledge more than sufficient to carry him through the Final Examination." — Solicitors^ JoumaL Now ready, Fifth Edition, in 8vo, price lar., cloth, THE ARTICLED CLERK'S GUIDg': TO, AND' SELF- PREPARATION FOR THE INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATION, As it now exists on Stephen's Commentaries, Containing a complete course oi Study, "with Statutfes, Questions, and Advice. Also a complete Selected Digest 6i the whole of the Questions an^ Answers set at the Examinations on tho^e parts of "Stephen " now examined on, embracing a pe'riod of fourteen and a half years (58 Examinations), inclusive of the Examination in April, 1894, &c. &c., and intended for the use of all Articled 'Gleirte who have not yet passed the Inter- mediate Examination. By John Indermaur, Author of " Principles of Com- mon Law," and other woBfks. ' . In 8vo, 1875, price df., cloth, • THE STUDENTS' GUIDE TO THE JUDICATURE ACTS, AND THE RULES THEREUNDER: Being a book- of Questions and Answers 'intended for the use of Law StudenU'.' By John Indermaur, Solicitor. tVOXitS if'Oll LAW STltDENTS. JEi°ifthrEdition, in crown 3^0, price izr. 6f^.,, cloth, ,,, . , . AN EHTOME OF CONVEYANCING STATTOS; Ex5(bNwng VBsm. '13 EdW. I. t6 the End of 55 & 56 ViCTORivE. Fifth Edition, with Short Notes. By GlEORGE NtChols Marc*, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. . — ;'J|. Second Sdition^ In Svo, price 26.r, , cloth, , A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, ANl) INStlll^'TiE Oi* THE WHOLE LAW ; EMBRACING FRENCH AND LATIN TERMS AND REFERElNCES TO TKE .^ AtlTHORtTrtS, CASteS, Aigt) STATUTES. ^.^ ^^SECONl) £i)ITlOS, nvised tkrougkoutj'dnd considerdlii)/ enlarged, : ' ' By ARCHIBALD BROWN, ' ^ „M,A. EDIN. AND OXON., Af^D B.9.L. OXON., OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRISTE&AT-LAW ; AUTHOR/ OF l;iiS "law oi FiJc'Tijiife',"'"ANAi.y5is of saVigny's obligations in rp.mah law," btc. _ Reviews of the Second Edition. "So far as we have been able to examine the work, it seems to have^been. mast carefully and accurately executed, the. present Edition, besides containing amch 'new matter, Jiaving been. thoroughly re7iise4 in fonseguencf of the recent xchfinges in thc'law.; atfd we havt, no doubt whatever that it will be fqund extremely useful, not only to student^ and practitioners, but to public men, and min ^ letters." — iRisif La>v TiMts. "■'Mr, B'i'oivh has ireviied his Dictionary, iind adapted it to the changes effected by the jfudicature Acts, atpdjt now constitutes a itery useful work to put into thi'hdnds ofatiy student or articled clerk, and a work which the practitioner will find of value for reference. " -^Solicitors' Journal. " // willprope d itfliaSlf[ 'guidf tO/iiCw {if^dvi^s, kind a handy \boo^ ofyeference for prautitioners. "— X,K^ liives, , ' .'"TiV / , •,','■. i r •' :- ■ ■ '-,■■■■ ;-i-;... ' . - ,J:lc In royal 8vo, price 5^., cloth, ANALYTICAL TABLES THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY; Drawn up chiefly from STEPHEN'S BLACKSTONE, with Notes. By C. J. TARRING, of the Ifinfer TemJ)le, Barrister-at-Law. ■■■.-' ^ i. - CONTENTS;. TABLt I. tTenuresi . , .. (i i,., i , , II. Elstates, according to quantity of . TenantsMnterest. . - - „ III. Estates, according to it^a f:iiii« ,atK which the Interest is to lie ^^yed. .. Table V. Uses. ^ ■ „ VI. Acqiusitioti of Estates in land o( freehold tenure. ■' \f Vlt. 'incorporeal Hereditaments. i „■ Vill. ■ IncoiJ>*dil!S^W^tiiirents. \[''\ „ J IV. Estates, accordirig to the nupvibr; and connection of the Tenants*. ' ,", -' . i . I i I '".1.1. ; I i ' ■'..'■■. "Greait ca -,AUWlOR OF "a concise DIGBSTi of TpE INSTITUTESOF GAIUIS AIJB, JiUSTINIA^'j, , r By C.,L. ATTENBOROIiJGH, of the Inner Temple,- Barristeiiiat.Law. . _ ,' ' I i'. . REVIEWS. "The characteristic of the present Edition is the restoratibii'to the book of the character of ' a concise exiiositioB ' proclaimed by the ;tjjtle^pagev oMlr. uAittehboroughjbas -carefully prun&d away the excrescdnces which had; arisen in successive editisosr^nd has improved the work both as le^rds terseness and clearness of exposition. In both respects it is now an excellent student's book. The text is very well -broken up into headings -and paragraphs, with^hort -marginal notes — the importance of which, for the convenience of the student, is too often QV^\aQ\xA."-^olit:ii,or^, yo^tmaL , "We think the book — always a favbiirtte with students— has got a new lease of life, and will now prove ths.o(dy Jext-hook wtl^ch.most menSwiJI care" to study until thejr get beyond tte examinaiion stage of their eiUsteJice.-^^ . On the whole Our verdict Is -that the new Edition is distinctly a success, and-W have no hesitation in commending it to the student as;the best text.book -that exists for his purposes." — Law Students' yourttal, ■■ -^ ' .'..'. .'_;. " Tke favourable tfiimoH we expressed 0/ the first edition of this work appears to have been justified by the reeeftian .it -kas met with. Looking through this new Edition, we see no reason to modify the praise we bestowed on the former Edition. . The recent-cases \have been added and the provisions of the Summary Jurisdiction Aot are noticed in the chapter reletting to Summary 'Convictions. The book is one of the best manuals of Criminal Law for the student." — Solicitors' Journal. " There is tm ^tk ^ Works on Criminal L^ith but- there was room for such a useful handbook ^Pri^i^^ ps Jtfr^ Seymour Hif^\^ ^A^VSPP&i- Actustotiied,. ijf /m previous labours, lo the task of analysing the^w, Mr. Harris has brought to bear upon "his present work qitalifications wellttdapted to secure the suhcts^l cKcompliskment of the object which he had set before him. That object is .not an ambi^ous one, for it does not pretend to soar above utility to the young practitioner and the studiht. For both these classes, and for the yet wider Hassviho may require a book of reference on the subject, Mr. Harris has pr'oduced a clear and convenient Epitome Of the Law. A noticeable fedture of Mr. Harris's work, which is likely to prove of assistance both to the practitioner and the student, consists of a Table of Offences, with their legal character, their punishmiHt, arid the statute under which it is i^fKcted, together laith a reference to the pages, where a Statetnent of. the Law will be _/8«»(/.''^— Law Magazine and Review. - _- . ' " This work purports to contain ' a concise exposition of the nature df crimt, the Various offences punish- able by the English law, the law of criminal, procedure, and the law of summary convictions,' with tables of offences, punishments, and statutes. The Work is divided into fdur btfoks. Book I. treats of crime, its dinsions and essentials ; of , persons capable of committing crimes ; and of principals and accessories. Boole n. deals witli o^ences of a public nature ; offences against private persons | and offences against the property of individuals. Each crime is discussed in its turn, with as much brevity aS could well be used flOiuistently with h proper explanation of the legal characteristics of the^several offences. Book III. explains criminal prodedure, including the jtrfisdiction of Courts, and the various stet>s in the apprehension and trial Of criminals from arrest to punishment. This part of the work is extremely well done, the description of the trial being excellent, and thoroughly Calculated to impress the mirid of the uninitiated. Book IV. contains a short sketch of ' summary convictions before magistrates out -of (quarter sessioii^.'. The table of (fffenceB at the- end of the Volume to most useful, and there is a very full index. Altogetherwe must congratulate Mr. Harris on his adventure." — Law fournal. "Mr. Harris has undertaken a^ work, in our qpiniop, so much needed that he might diminis/i its Sulk in the next pditign iy obliterating the apologetic priface. The appearance of his volume is as w^l. timed ds its ixecu^on is satisfactory^ 7%e author has shown an ability of omission wh,ich " a good test of skill, and from the overwhelming mass of the crimiHal Idiv he has discreetly selected Jtist so much only as a learner neeifs to know, and has presented it in ternis which reiser it,. capable of being easily taken into, ihe, mind." — Solicitors' Journal. 28 WORKS FOR LAW STUDENTS. Seconi^ Edition, in cjrown jSvo, price ^.,W.>iCloth, TH? rSHMNTS', .GinDE TG , BA|[KglW€Yi BQngia,domiafetii.I5igitofitiili.awtoiiiattkruptflyUii thCiSlibe dfi^^eltloos and Answers, and comprising all Questions asked at the Solicitors' Final Examinations -, , in Bankruptcy siijGe-,theJBanfcriijptpyActj ,1883s. and^ajl importaiitjpecjsipns, since ' ' that' Act. By John Inbermaur, Solicitoi', Author of ". Pnhciples.of Common Law,"'&t.-ifcc. ■■'■" ■• -'^-■''^- -••' ■ ■--.--■.. ..-.I ^ ■. \ ( I, '/ .> .1. In'. I'ami, price's^y6 Pairt L— Of Bills' of Sale^erferafiy.' Part II.— Of the Execution, Attestation, and Registration of Bills of Sale and satisfaction thereof. Part III.— Of the Effects of Bills of Sale as against Creditors. Part IV. — Of Seizing under, and EnferaSfigi Bills of (Sale. Appendix, Forms, Acts, &c. By JOHN^NDERlfAUR, gqlicifpr, _ . . ,, ;. ■ ,,, -..,1,-, ->" The object of the book is ^ thoroughly practicah Those who want to bfe told exactly what to do aad where to go when they are registering a bill of sale will find the'necessary information in this little book.'-' — Law yournai. ' ■ \ X ..^ < ■ ■ ; - >' Second Edition, in 8vo, price 4^., cloth, ". '. A COLLECTION OF LATIN MAXIMS & PHRASES. LITERALLY TRANSLATED. INTENPED.FpR THE USE OF STUDENTS FOR ALL LEGAL, EXAMINATIONS. . , I . Second .Edition, by J. N. COTTERELL, Solicitor. "The book^eems admirably adat>ted as a book of reference for students who come across a' Latin maxiAi in their reading.." — Law. Journal.^ In one volume, 8vo, price gj. , cloth, LEADING STATUTES SUMIARISED, FOR THE USE OF- STUJ)ENT-S. ' By ERNEST C. THOMAS, .,^ .; , BACON SCHOLAR 0;P^^THE HON. SOCIETY OF GRAV'S, INN, LATE SCHOLAR OF TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD ; AUTHOR OF " LEADING CASES IN qONSTITUTION/LL LAW BRIEFLY STATED." ^, Second Edition, ii;i 8vo, enlarged, price 6jc,, cloth, LEADING CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ,, iRRiEjFLy Stated, with Intkoduction and Notes. ,;; By ERNEST C. THOMAS, BACON SCHOLAR OF THE HON. SOCIETY OF GRAV'S INN, LATE SCHOLAR OF TRtNITY COLLEGE, OX^ORtJ.'/, " Mr. E. C. Thomas has put together in a slim octavo a digest of the principal cases illustrating^GoQ- stitutlonal Law, that is to say,' all (questions as to th@ rights or authority of the Crpwn or persons under .it, ^ regards not merely the constitution and structure given to the governing.; body, but alsp the modCiio whichthe sovereign pOwer is tOj.be e^efcised. In an introductory essay Mr. Thomas gives a very clear and intelligent surveypftne general functions of th^ Executive, and the principles by which they are regulate^*; and thep follows a summary of leading .cases.''-— ^Jat/^^r^^, J^^t^ietu. ^ ^, . . , ; . "Mr. Thoi)ias'giveS|a;sensibl,e introduction and ,a;bjief epitome, of the:famijiar easing qas«^. "-r-iaw, Times. " ..■■., n„i ■ . ■ ■ ,■..;!.■-.■. In Svo, price Sj-., cloth, AN EPITOME OF- HINDU LAW CASES. With; Short Notes thereon. And Inttoductory Chaptfets on Sources of Law, Marriage, Adoption, Pdflition,* and Succession. Sy William M. P. CogHlan^ Bombay Civil Service, late Judge and Sessions Judge of 'i'anna. ■Sr^KffiV-y &''^)ffAYJ^SS, SELL YASD, TEMPLE BAR. 29 Second 'Edition; in crown 8vo, price I2s. 6d., cloth, I THE MNKRUPTCY ACT, ,1888, ik ■WlTH^,,Np^KS OF ALL THE CaSES, DECIDEp UNDER THE ^CT ; The consolidated RULES and FORMS, 1886; The Debtors Act, 1869, so FAR AS APPLICABLE : TO BANKRUPTCY MATTERS, WITH ' RULES AND FORMS'' i; , .thereunder; the Bills pe Sale A<;ts, 1878 and 188?; Board of Trade Circulars and Forms, and List of Official Receivers ; Scale of Costs, F«es, ana-,¥M(8ntaiieisiTi886;' Orders of the Bankruptcy Judge of the High Court; and a Cqpious Index. By WILLIAk'HAZLlff.'ESQ., and RICHARD RINGWOOD, M.A, SENIOR REGISTRAR IN BAMKRUrTGY, . ^ , -, OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, ESQ., BAERISTER-AT-LAW. Second Edition,' by R RI'NGWo'OD, M.A.,'Barrister-at-Law. " This is a very handy edition of the Act and Rules The cross references and marginal C,f^'^'^'''™'"'P''°'l'»BI"°™'<'"sof the Act of 1869 art exceedihgly useful. !. i . . There is a verj- nxll index, and the book is admirably printed." — Solicitors^ Journal. ■ ,j Part I., price 7.r. 6y, Hallj ;and ^a more vigorous and argu- m'entive treatise we 'nave 'starbefy evtir seen. Its arguments are clearly and broadly disclosed, and supported by a wealth -of facts and cases which show the research of the ,leaifned. author, tq hale4;or with le^rd to, the elaborate and exhaustive judgment of the late Master of the Rolls in,, mallis v. S»?^ (31 W. R. 214; L. R. 2j Ch, i), 243).^ Thp treatment of the subject by the .^lithors is admirably clear and concise. UjJoH the poiilil' involved in Wdllis-^. Smith they ^ay : ' The result is that an agreement with various covenants of different importance is not to be governed by^any inHexible rule peculiar to itself, but is to be dealt with as coming under thegenefalTUle, that the intention of the parties th^tnselves iS to be ooinsideired. If they have said that in the " " Atl^en theyj)f^iB.,be.kept Jqfheir E«greem?nfr, lunless e that it must be assumed that 'they did- hot ineaii wAat(they.saidi''. This is a yesy fair summary' of the jtidgments.in Wdllis^. .SwzzM.J^pecially of that of Lord Justice Cotton ; and it supplies the nearest .ap{!''P^?h, which e^n be given at present-taa-ruleibr practical guidance*- Wfi can^heartilycoramenithisas a_fiarBfuijy_edited edition of a thoroughly:good bppk.,'j7i-.S^^ff7flir,f'.>/««p?a/. ,., ,, , ,,1 ' 'r^^rifig ^ie'tw(tfiify-two;]/iaty^fii% work. Us refima^ipnnas Been steadily grofuitig, and it has: long Since beconie the recognised aut^nty 'on the important subject of ivhicK- it treats. "—Law MAgaeIne; , ANt) ReView. Vfh£it,^he'ffW^s proved in their judgment required. And, according to the better opinion, they may give damages j^' for Y^s^plc's sake,' and mulct af \\i3K- ,- m aii mbi*\heaviiy.tnan a poor one. In actiona.f " It is-needlesstocomment upon-the arrangement oi thft subj^tjs in this edition, in which no alteration has be^n niaae. The editors modestly express a li^pe that all the Eofglish as well as the principal lriah4ecisions up,to^th« |d^tp.^ave.heei^uuluded, J-Siipq ve ijeli^e from our.own examin^tiaa ffliat the - hope is well founded. ■\Ve may regret tnat,"Svafned ^y^tj^e. crowing bulk of th? book^, f h^ ^^i^tfrt^W not' included any fresh American CEises, but we feel ihat the bmissibn was unavoidifele. We should add that the whale work has been thoroughly^utised."— Solicitors' yonmal. ^ . "This edition of what lias become^, a, sf^nd^t^ work lias the adva ntage of appearing uiidei^ tlie sffipOTWon ofTEKF gfigiiSr ethtoi^is w^fS of KU.'Lumley SiditU, the elitbrM ttte>second eHitlbil.. The ijesult is' (ifost satisfactory, Hb^. Lun^ley Smith s ecdtiori was ably and consdentiously pre- pttdj and 'we art -glad to fin'd' that the rterfaSr still' ' enjoys the benefit^ his accuracy and learning. At-th& same- tirae-the-book has- doubtless been improved by the reappearance of its aut^ii^r a^.co* editor. The earlier part, indeed, has been ' to a_ considerable extent entirely reivritten. -•' -1 .■'■ : "Mr. Mayne-'a jrepiaEkSvOn damages in act^^ of tort are^rifef. T^x^ a^e with him tpat if .^ch actions ^fie courts are governed by far looser prin- ciple?' ^han- in co.otjtaq^; ind?e4i, Minj^tim^Si* is ijjipossible to.saytheyiare governed byjany,Rnn- ciples ai'all. In actpiis for injuries to the"person,or reputation, for example, a judge cannot 'd6' more thaD-gLve-a-general-direction to the jury tagive " This text-book is so well-known, not only as'tht' highest'eukhority on the subject treated of! hid as oni of tke,\J>t^t fext-book's'ever'writ(en, thai, it would lie idle, for vs to' speak of it in thi' words .of cqmmfndation th'at,^ dehrpgs. '.'it is a work that no practising Idv^er can <&a/2^i4c»/."— Canada Law Journal.' '_''"'^. '/''. ,,'. 82^ __ _ST^_VE7ir$_&' HAY^sk, BELL YARD,^ TiMPLE BAR^ In' crown 8vo', jprice ifi. ^d.', cloth, ' ABSTRAGT- DflAWiNG-? Containing Instructions on the Drawing of Abstracts of Title, aiid an Illustrative Appendix. By C. E. ScOTT, •Soficitor. ^^ " n . .-T r. A ^j 1 r -j , j -y "This little book js intended for. the assistaqreW^^ose whofhEfs^e^^fs^ing of ftb^ri;tg[^^J|itle entrusted to their care. It contains a number of useful rules, and an illustrative appendix." — Law T^es. *' A handy book for all articled clerks."-— ^Z.aw,.S2^«?^i* younial. " Solicitors who have articled, clerks would sav& t^ienisel^esvQiuch t^oubleif- tb^y furnished their clerks with acopy of this little' book fcrfor^ putting tiieni on to draft aiY abstract of a ^eap of title deeds."— irtw Notes. v.u " The book ought to be perused by all law students arid articled clerks." — Red Tape. ^ '. Y ' T ^ i— i T ^ r T #- V I , . , , Second Edition^ in crown 8vo, price 7j., cloth, ' THE LAW RELATING TO CLUBS. '2 ^^ ' BYi THB LATE -JOHN .W-ERTltElkER;: BARRISTER- AT^^ i Second Edition, by A. W. CHASTER, Barrister-at-Law. " A convenient handbook, drailv^ up with great -" This is a very neat little book on ah interesting Judgment and perspicuity." — Morfiing Post. subject. The law is accurately and well expressed^^ .'' Both useful and interesting to those interested ' '" inclub nianageinent.'' — Lfvw Tiptes. ^, i "Mr, Wertheimei^'s history of the cases is com- plete and well arranged." — Saiiirday Review. —L.aw journal. "This is a very handy and complete little )Y,qrka ,This excellent little trea^tise should Ue o;i theiajble of every club," — Pump Court. - ri'T In 8vo, price 2j., sewed, TABLE of the FOREIGF MEROANTIL:^ LAWS and CODES in Force in the Prineipal States of EUROPE and AMERICA. By CHARtks Lyon-Caen, Profess^ur agr^g^ i la FacuU^ de Droit de Paris ; Professeni* i I'Ecole libre des Sciences politiques. Translated' by NapoleoU Argles; Solicitor, Paris.' . ., In 8vo, price; \s. , sewed, A GUIDE TO THE FREfrCH LAWS QF 1889, ON NATION- ALITY AND MILITARY SERVICE, as aflFecting British Subjects. By A. Pavitt, Solicitor, Paris. In one volume, dettiy Svo,' price xos. td. , cloth, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU, RETENtlON, and DELIVERY. By John Houston, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. In 8vo, price loj., cloth, THE TRIAL OF ADELAIDE BARTLETT FOR MURDER ; Complete and Revised Report.' Edited by Edward Beal, B.A.,. of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. , With a Preface by Edward Clarke,; Q.C., M;P. « In 8vo, price ioj.6rf., cloth, A REPORT OF THE CASE OF .THE QUEEN k. GURNEY AND OTHERS, In the Court of Queen's Bench before the Lord Chief Justice CocKburn. With Intro- duction, containing History of the Case, and Examination of the Cases at Lavf and Equity applicable to it. By W. F. Finlason, Barrister-at-Law. In royal 8vo, ptic^ loj. &/,), cloth,, THE PRACTICE OF EQUITY BY WAY OF REVIVOR AND SDPPLEMEHT. With Forms of Orders and Appendix of Bills. By LoFTUS Leigh Pember'ton, of the Chancery Registrar's Oiiice. .; i 'btiok to meti'bf business ana to members of the legal "proitssiQn.V—TLiverpopl Mercury. - ' A work of siicl^ handy reference, well indexed, and containing the essence of a year's decisions, Will be found a valuable addition to o£&ce libcaf ies. " —Liverpool Daily P09U STEVENS &> HAVNES, BELL YARVy'TEMPLE BAR, 38 In 8vo, price 6j. 6^., clbtli, THE MNML J)IGEST^6F^ MERC CASES FOR THE YEAR : 1 886. , :. ::■ BEIKG a DrGEST OF THE DECISIONS OF THE ENGLISH, SCOTCH AND IRISH COURTS ON Matters, relating to Commerce. By JAMES iA. DUNCANi M.A., LL.B., Trin. Coll., Camb., ■' AND OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. " We hope the preseiit'issue may be 'the first of a series which will naturally increase in value:with the progress of time."^5af«MK«'2e«>; , "There'can orily be one.opinion. and that^a very decided one indeed^ in favour of the value' of this *»* Tke Annual Digest of Mercantile Cases, for 1885, can also i'e'hdct, price 6s., i^^^^.^^ THE LAW AND PEAOTIOE OF ELECTION PETITION'S; With an Appendix containing the Parliamentary Elections Acts, the Corrupt and Illegal Pritoiices, Prevention Acts, the' Gehei'al Rules of Procedure madeby the Eledtion judgfe in ^'England, Scotland, and Irelandj Forms of Petitions, , &c. Third Editipn. ByllENRY Hardcastie, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-atJ-La,w. """Mr-Hardcastle give^'ug ~an briginaltrea,tise'| guide!,-' We ^ can thoroughly recommend , Mr. with foot-notes, and he has evidently taken Very Hardcastl&'s book as a concise manual on J^e law conndetable pains -to make— his -work a reliable | and practice of election petitions." — Laiw Tintes. , ;^ i7^; /J r , '': . " ■ ■. "Vols. I., li., III., and IV., pricA4/. Ifj. ■REPOIRTS or TliE DECISIONS OF. THE JIJD6ES FOR THE TRIAL OF ELECTION PETITIONS IN ENGLAND ANP IRELAND. , PURSUANT TO THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS Acf, 1868. By EDWARt) LOUGHLIN O'MALLEY and HENRY HARD CASTLE. %• Vol. IV, Parts III., IV- ahd' V. Edited by]. S. Sandars, Barrister-at-LdwC In 8yo, price \2s. , cloth, -THE .LAW OF FIXTHRES, IN THE JiRIN-CIEAL RELATION OF , : LANDLORD AND ' TENANT, AND IN ALE OTHER OR GENERAL RELATIONS, FOURTH EDITldN: ' r Bv ARCHIBALD BROWN, M.A. Edin, and Oxon., and BiC.L. Oxon. , _ OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE,^ BARRISTER-AT-LAW. "Anew chapter has been added with reference achieved."— Xao/ 7"«V»m. to the Law of Ecclesiastical Fixtures and Dilapida- .' " Th^ treatise is commendable as well for origi- tioDS. The book is' worthy of the success it has nalityiajf'^laboripusness,."— Zaa/.yoKWM^/, Si STEVENS <£^ WAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPIE BAR. (Stetoftts «ni g^agtws' §mts fst ^e|rxittte of tht (Eatlg |J«pffrt«rs. SIR BARTHOLOMEW SHOWE R'S jPARLI AMENTARY CASES. '--•'' Itt^ibi i87^,'pri<:e4^-'+f-.tiest*alfbfcaiiif,''i ' ''■ >-i - i '•- SHOWER'S CASES IN PAREIAMENT RESOLVED AND ADJUDGED UfiON FBTITrONS &• WJ{^ITS. ..v - "The Kolume,-aIthouglLheautifiill3L printed. on oM-fashioned Paper, in oldjrfashi.Qaed type, instead of being in the quarto, is in the more convenient octavo form, and contains several additioilaJ[^ses not to' b?gi)nd in .^y of the previous editions oftffiwwbrkJT ~f "■'' " These are all^cases of importaSice, wortliy of being ushered into the l^tof lEe world by enterprising piiblisherSi ;; i - i / i :;.// " Shower's Casj^ are models;fo^ reporters, even in our day. The statementsi of the case, the argumentsof counsel, aij^.ths opinions p/the Judges, are^ gill clearly andf abl;^ given. "This new edition with an old' face of these valuable reports,' urider the ab^e editorship of R. L. Loveland, Ekq^., shijuld, in the lartgti^fe erf the advertisement, 'be welcomed by the profession, as, well as enablcthe custodians of public librariea^ to, complete:, (M.adfl to their series of English Law Reports.' " — Canada Law Joumal. BELLEWE'S CASES, T. RICHARD^ JL In 8yo, 1.869, prjcp 34 3.t. , bound in <;a}f antiflue, LES ANS DU RQY RICHARD XE SECOND. ^oUect' ensembl' hors les abridgmeixts de ,Statham, Eitzherbert. et ^BroQliie, . ,.Per RiCHARib BbllewEj de Lincolns Inne. 1585. Reprinted £rbm the O^n^i Edition. ' ^ " ■ - - - - ■ ' -'..-. highly creditable to thje.^ spirit and enterprise of pri-^ate-publishers. The work is an important link in our le^l history: there are no year books of the MeigU. of JUchardll.f. and BellawAdapliHM' £hftonlv substitute by carefully extracting and coliecting aft ithe; cases he could fiitd,, dndhe< I^Jt^fi tjie[m94^ convenient form — that of alphabeticat arrangement in the order ofaubjects, so thart ^-work is sk-digest as Well £is & book' of law reports. It is in feet a " No public library in tl^C; world,, where English law finds a place, should be without a 'copy of this edition of Bellewe," — Canada, Law JoumaL " We have here a/tu-simiie edition of Bellewe, aad..lt is. really iht most beautiful and 'ddibira^le . reprint that has appeared at any time. It is a perfect ^em of antu^ue jn-inting, and forms a most interestmg monument of our ' ear I^ legal history. It belongs to the same class of .works as the. Year Book of Edward I. and other similar works which have been printed in our own time , upder the^ auspices of the Master of the Rolls ; btit is' "fet' superior to any of t^em, -and is- in^tly^ respect. collection. Qf cases, of .rfie. rei^ of^ Richard II ^ arranged according to theur subjects m alpliaBeti^l ,prder. Jf. '& therefore one of the most intelligible fllid ititn-^nng legal memorials of the Middle Ages."-Z.^w fi^|f. ^. ,. CUNI^INGHAM'S RE PORTS. In Svo, iS^t, price 3/. 3j.,^calf antilque, Cunningham.*^ (T.) Re^ortsiiniK. B., 7 to to Ge(j,[II.;' 1)3 whichi^ I&Lefifced a Proposal for rendering the Laws of England clear and certain, humbly offered to the Consideration oi both Houses -of Patfiametit, Third ^ed5^6n, with numerous Corrections. By Thomas TowNSEipiD Buckni]:.l, Barrister-at-Law. peace and prosperity of every nation than good " The instructive chapter which precedes the cases, en)title3 ' A pi'Oposal fi^r r^^nd^ing ^t I^awis of England clear and certain,' gives the volume a degree of peculiar interest, independent of thteiValue of many of the reported cases. That chapter begins mth words which ought, for the information of every people, to be printed in letters of ^Id. They ace as fotlOwB : 'Nothing condticesmore'to' the Jjiws and the due execati,<§i'■■ ...1 SIR G. COOKiE'S COlMON MAS REPORTS IN THE REIGNS OF QUEEN ANNE, AND KINGS GEORGE I. and II. 1iie„Tliird Edition, with Adeiitional Cases an(i itteferehces contained in the iifotes • :,, taken, from 1.. C, J. Eyrb's MSS. by Ux, Justice Nares, edited by ThOMaS T^wnsENB BuGKNiLL, of thq Inner temple, Baitis);er-a]t-Law. \ Law. btok^ n^^r.oan die! or remain- lQng:,deJad- 30 long as Stevens and Haynes are willing to con- tigue thep or revive them when dead. It is cer- tioue them or reviv^ them when dead. It is cer- by t tainysflipriBifig to SS8 Wittt^hat fifeialiafcci&aiy )■ a ■ ^ ' """"'-' ' ■' '' '■ -rni.-r , ,n n„ . o'.,-. ,, ; J - , ^, , ^ ].ftn dld.yoluiQe.^of ReaQ;ifts may be:pr^duGediby the^ modernpublishers, wQosegood taste is onlyet^ualtsd by their enterprise. "^—Canada X^a-ti) ''^durti'dt, ' ' ''' BROOKE'S NEW CASES WITH MARCH'S TRANSLATION, . . . . : In, 8vo, 1873, price 4/. 4?., c^If antique, ]' „.,,,. BROOKfc'B (Sii Robert.) New Cases in the time,oof.HenryrVl'iw Ediwaid.Vi., aad. ,^ Queen Mary, collected out 6f^BRQ0KE!s.'Abridgfflsnent,.and aiiangsd under yearsj; with a tabky together with' Makoh'si r(Johi»/).3V»«r/i«asia« o/"BROOKEfSiNew Caser. in thei time: of Henry VIII., Edward VI,, and Queen Mary,. .coHeoted.oubiofi BrooiSe's AbridgfeffleBtjsmd.reducSdtaiplSiabetiealliy. under their proper heads :Sn!d/ titles, with a table of the principal matters. In one handsome volume. SvO. fS{i3, "iBfll'the original and thft translation having longi beett very scarce, and the-mispaging andvdther errors' iA March's translation, making 9 new and. con«cted edition pecultai^ly desirable, Messrs. StevensaAd Haynes ha«e r«princeldth»'t«ra b60ks in' one volume uniform With the {)reeedi&g yctljlpiss. of the, series of Early Reports," — Ctfttfida Laid, Journal, KELYNGE'S (W.) REPORTS. ,, In SvQi I&73, price 4/. 4?., ssa^^xalCv^s, Kblyngb^'s (WiUi^Uit) Reports of Cas^ in ChaiiCeiyi the King's iBench^ &c;, from the 3rd to the 9th yeaT Of his late Majesty Kit^ Geoi-^ II., during.whieh time .L<»«t . . 5 iJEingi was 'Chapcelloi!, and the Lords. ..Raymqnd :. and Haijlwicke. w»e Chief .. . Justices of England. To which are added) : seventy New Cases-Tiot vb, the First - .Edition; Thirds Edition. In one handsome volume, 8vo. iS73> KELYNG'S (SIR JOHN) CROWN GASES. In 8vo, 1873, price 4/. 4r.yCalf s^itiqae, KEI.-Tn^s (Sir J.):Eiepatts of DiVdis Cases in PleiSof the CrOwn in the Reign of iEing Charles II., with Directions to Justices of the Peace* aild Othtts } to which are ■ added, Three Modern Gases,. vi»,, i/^mstrDng;aDd Lisle, the King and JUipimer, . .the Queen and Mawgridge. ; Third E(Mtion,-..iW»to«»!>fjr several. addUional CfKet ■.< nmer before printed, together with a TSiEATISE. .UPON THE Law and Procbed- • tSGS IN Cases of High Treason, first published in 1793. The whole carefiUly revised aild edited' by Righare Lovelan.di.LoVeland, of the Inner Temple^ '■ ^iriristePit-Law. "We look upon this volume as one of the most iOipfirtant and valwaWe of theruniguereprims-af, Messrs. Stevens Jind Hajllies. Little do we know of the ftmes .of legal wealth that lie buried iii the aid law Vdttks'. But a caieful examination, tttlfrfttf the reports or of the treatise embodied in tlra^lume ' now before us, will give the reader some idea of the goodservice rendered by Messrs. Stevens andHwjmefi ;^tC!theiBraiession. . . . Should occasion. arise, the I ©own prosecutor, as well as counsel for the prisoner, will find in this Vblnrae a Coiiiplett Vade meeniH of tlit law of Hig'h treason and jirooSSdtflgil itt wlatibn fis.aecat"'-^anada iawJourtMl. 86 STEVENS &' HAYNES, BELL YARD^ TEMPLE BAR, Second' Edition,'m8vo, price 26j., cloth, •A CONCIS'E TREATISE;' ON PRIVATE INTERNATIOML JURISPRUDENCE, BASED 6N the- DECISIONS IN THE ENGLISH COURTS, BV JOHN ALDERSON FOOTE, ot" Lincoln's inn, bahhister-at-law ; chancellor's legal medallist and senior whewell scholar OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, CAMBRIDCEUNIVfiRSITV, 1873;- SENIOR STUDENT IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ROMAN LAW, INNS OF COURT EXAAUNATION, HILARY XERM,.j874. ... . "This work seems to us likely to proye p^ considerable use to all Epgiisli lawyers who have todealwitli questions orprJvate international law.' 'Sinifie tjie" publication of Mn Westlafce's valuable treatise, twenty years ago, tKe judicial dtfCisidnsoffinglish'^ourts bearing upon different parts of this' subject have greatly increased in number, and it is full time that these decisions should be examined, a!nd that the conclusions to be deduced from them should be systematically set forth in a treatise. Moreover, Mr. Foote has done this well/' — Solicitors^ Jpumdl, " Mr. Foote has done his work very well, and the book will be useful to all who have to deal with the class of cases in which English law -alone is- not sufiScient to settle the question." — Saturday Review^ March 8, 1879.' ,- ' '^ ,,J'U '"j -^ /" "^ -.'[""^'''J '' V ' '" ^ :-. • ~ '• -^ "-"" . ,. . -.t -i "The author's object has been to reduce into order the mass of materials already accumulated in the shape of explanation and actual decision oh thb interesting maXttt of wl^ch he treats ; and to construct a framework of private ihterhationallaw, not from the dicta -of jurists so much as from' judicial decisions in English Courts which have superseded them. - And k is Ji^e,' in compiling and arranging in a concise form this Valuable material, that Mr; Foote's Wide range . of knowledge and legal acumen bear such good fruit. As a guide and assistant to the student of international .law, the whole treatise will be invaluable : while a table of cases and a general index will enable him to find what he wants without trouble." — Sta^idard. '-i, ._. n ■. i ''''•■■ i, ...■■{, ■ ' ,"'.,;.-,' , j ■ , ^ ^ " The recent decisions on points of intctmational law (and ther^ have been a large number since Westlake's publication)- have been well stated. So far as we have observed, no case of any importance has been oniitted^ and the leading cases have been fully analysed^ The author does not hesitate to criticise the grounds of a decision when these appear td him- to conflict with the proper rule of law. Most of his criticisms seem to us very just. .7 . . On the whole, "we' can recommend Mr." Foote's treatise as a useful addition to our text-books, and we expect it will rapidly find, its way into tfieliknds of practising lawyers." — The journal of Jilrispriidince at^Scottisk L'a'iiama^az^. *"' . - . . "Mr. Footehasevidentlybomeclos^lyimiiindtheneeds of Students of Jurisprudence as well as those ofthe-Practitibners. ' For- both, the fact that his work is almost entbrely one'of .Case-law will commend it as one useful alike" in Chambers and in Coujt." — Law Magazine and Review. :■. "Mr. Foote's book will be useful to the student. .... ."One of the best points of Mr. Foote's book is the * Continudtia' Summary,' which occupies about tWrty pages, and is divided into four parts— Persons, Property, Acts, and Procedure. Mr. Foote remarks that these summarits are not in any way intended as an"attempt at codification. However that may be, they are a digest which reflects-high credit on the author's assiduity and capacity. They are 'n^ant merely to guide the student ; ' but.'they'wilLdo much more than 'guide him. They will enable him to ge't Such a grasp of the su'bject as will render the reading of the text easy and fruitful. "-^il^Wi.5'''»9%a/..'. /' "This bgdfc is well adapted to be used, both as a text-booI& for students and a book of referepce for practising h3titistQrs."T~^ar£xaminati(m\^oumai. ( '-This is a book which supplies the want which has long been felt for aireally^oodmodem treatise on Private International Xaw adapted to the every-day reqiiirements of the English.'^ Practitioner. The whole volume, although designed -for the use Of the praciitioner/is so moderate in size — an octavo of 500 Images Only-^-and the arrangeme^it and development of the subject so well conceived and executed, that it will amply repay perusal. by those whose immediate object may fee, not the actual decisions of a knotty point but the satisfactory disposal of an examination paper." — Oxford and Qambridge Undergraduaies' ^ourttaL "Since the publication, some twenty years ago, of Mr. Weistlake's Treatise, Mr. Foote's book is, in our opinion, the best work on private iptern^tioii&l law which has appeared in the English language. . ..-. The work is executed with much ability, and will doubtless be found of great value by all persons who have to consider.questions on private international law. "—^/A£« ffAYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 37 THE i^ato :PaBa?ine anlr 3iebieto, AND OUARTERLY DIGEST OF ALL REPORTED CASES. Price BTVE SBJJjlA3SOta each Number. No. CCXVIII. (Vol. I, No. I. of the New Quar'i^eri.y Series.) November, 1875. - :^0. CCXIX. ;' (Vol. I, 4th Series No. 11,.)" 'february, 1876. , '" N.B. — These two Numbers are (jitt of print. '• No. CCXX. (Vol. I, 4th Series No. III.)- ^ For May, i'876, No. CCXXI. .(Vol. I, .4th Series No. IV.) For August,. 1876. Nos. CCXXII. to CCXLV. (Vol. 2, 4th Series, to Vol. 7, 4th Series, Nos. V. to XXVIII.), November, 1876, to August^ 1882. ;': " i^os. CCXLVi; to CCXLIX. (Vol. S, 4th SeriesNos! XXiX. to XXXII,),-' ■ ^ November, 1882, to August, 1S83. Nos. CCL. to CCLIII. (Vol; 9, 4th Series, Nos'. XXXIII. to XXXVI.); November, 1883, to Augiist, 1884. , , .-,. Nos.,CC^IV. toCCLVII. (Vol. 9, 4th Series, Nos. XXXVII. to XL.), ■ ■ ■ '• November, 18S4, to August j iSSj. .' Nos. CCLVIII. to CCLXI. (Vol. X., 4thSeries, Nos. XLI. taXLIV.-), November, 1885, to August, 1886. Nos. CCLXII. to CCLXV. (Vol. XI., 4tH Series, Nos. XLV. to XLVIII.), November, 1886, to August, 1887. Nes. CCLXVI. to CdLXiX. -(Vol. XII., 4th Series,, Nos. XLIX. to LII.), November,. i8?7, to August,. 1888. '.: ". Nos. CCLXX. to CCLXXIII, (Vol. XIII., 4th: Series, Nos. LIII. to LVL) • : November, 1888, to August, 1889. - Nos. CCLXXIV. to CCLXXVII. (Vol. XIV., 4th Series, Nos. LVII. toLX.), November, 1889, to. August,. 1 890. Nos. .CCLXXVIII. to CCLXXXI. (Vol. XV., 4th Series, Nos. LXI. to LXIV.), - . November, 1890, to August, 1 89 1. '. ::y Nos. CCLXXXII. to CCLXXXV. (Vol. XVI., 4th Series, Nos. LXV. to LXVIII.), November, 1891, to August, 1892. Nos. CCLXXXVI, to CCLXXXIX. (Vol. XVII., 4th Series, Nos. LXIX. to LXXII.), -, T - November, 189?, to August, 1893. Nos. CCXC. to CCXCIII.,(Vol. XVIII., 4th Series, Nos. LXXIII. to LXXVI.). November, 1893, to August, 1894. . N05. CCXCIV. to CCXC VII. (Vol. XIX., 4th. Series, Nos. LXXVII. to LXXX.), ■1 ; . ■ November, 1894, to Augfust, 1895. An Annual Subscription of 20s., paid in advance to the Publishers, will secure the receipt of the LAW MAGAZINE, free by post, within the United Kiiigdom, or for 24s. to the Colonies and Abroad. 38 SrsVEMS &> JSAYN.SS, :3MLL YAJ^, TMMfilM. .0^«- Fifth Edition, revised and pplprged, 8vo., price S2s. net. \ A TREATISE ON HINDU LA.W Mlf USAGE* I By John D. MaVj^e, of the Inner Templ^|^r|t|r-at-L^w, 4Bfv)'r of *'AfPrQ3|ise^ Damages,'' &c.. " X ^ ' '5^- "'^ - ' "" '^ " A new work from the pen of so established an'ai^ority as Mr. Mayne cannot fail to be welcome to ; the legal p^fes^ipji. Jtn4us prftsfi^y: -v^Hinie fh^ 1,^16 Officiating. ^dYocaf e-G^eraJ jat .J^drat, hgs drawn ; upon _tbe.,5tps!e5 of /his Ipng experifericLe in So.utH^ Ini3$a, anSd-'bjis mrdfl^ced a; y?^]^ ^f -y^y^ike to the ) practitioner at the Indian Bar, or at home, in appeal cases, and to the scientific jurist. "To all who, whether ^jEractitioners or admitjistratorsi o]r as ^tpdents pf;^ science of jurisprudence, desire a thoughtful and suggestive work of reference on Hindu Law and Usage, we heartily recommend ; the careful perusal of Mr. Mayhe's valuable treatise, "-^ZTaw 'Magazine and Review. j ;:■ : ."' '.fi'-^h^y — i .■^■A-\^ ' ^. ' \i - -^" ' ■ ' ■„ ' -^ ■:': -.,■■" xr~^' — '^ — '^'^"^ — ' ■! v "" v ' ..i-^ ! In 2fvo, I977,j)rjce i^-*"-* cloth, ' " ' A DIGEST ;0F HINDU LAW, j AS ADMINISTERED IN THE COURTS of the MADRAS PRESIDENCY. ; ARRANGED AND ANNOTATED •:'■'' rV; ; By H. S. CUNNINGHAM', M.A., Advocate-General, Madras. ' T "~ A UTOH L AW. ~ ~~~. In I Vcfl;^ Si vs., .price 40J., cloth. THE, OPINWNS OP GR.OTIUS, As contained in fte HoUajidsche Consultatien eii, Advijsen. Collated, translated, and annotated by Di P. DK Bruyn, B^.j_LL.B., Ebden Essayist of the Universitj): of the Cape of Good HopjE % ^ygcaitf of the Supreme Couft of the Colony of the Cape x)f Good Hope, and of the' High Court of the South Aftican Republic. With Facsitnilfe Portrait of Mr. Hugo de Groot. _ UL:^' .11/ C- J" ' ¥oIS-> ^ysl 3vQ, price 991. , ,cl|»t;h, , ,j j > VAN 1E£UWEK'S CfiMMEMTARIE? MTHE ROMAN-DUTCH LAW. Revised and Edited with Notes in Two Volumes iy C. W. Decker, ^dvfwate. TjUjislat-ed ^om the qr^nal 43vitcl( by J. ;G. Koi^S, ,LI.,;B-. of the Inner Temple, Barrjet^raJ j;,aWj ajjd Chief Justice of, the Transvaal. With Fac- simile Portrait of Decker from the Edition of 1780. .' . ^:.' . *»* VoL II. ican be had ■«epar?itely, price .JOf . \y/:y 1- In S'fOj'pticectjTj 6ii,i«eA - VOET'S TITLES ON VINDKATIONES AND .INTERDICTA, Or the Roman Dutch Law of Actions'to Assert Rights of -Property, incdiidinig'f njunc- tions and Possessory Actions,' t-faiislated'info'Eftgltsh' with side-notes ; viz. , Book VI. ■p^lfs I, to III., Book VII. Title VI., Book VIII. Title V., Book XX. Title IV., and Book XLHI. Titles I., XVI. to XXXXII., of A&et's ^rtHiehta!ryIon the Pandects, with a Scieiitifie" and General iBtrbduction, Notes Explanatory of the Roman Civil and R.oman Dutch, and English Law,-Notes-ofOeylon Enactments and Practice, and Decisions of the Suprenie 'Court, Ceylon, etc' i^y.^iSBN J. Casie Chitty, Barjfister.at>Law, Advocate, (High Court, Madras, and Supreme Court, Ceylon; 1. .. , Ini8vp,,'price.42j., , cloth. ■ , ' , -, ■• THE JUDICIAL PRACTICE OF THE COLONY OP tflE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE;. AND OP SOUTH APRIOA GENEEAILT. With suitable and copious Practical Forms, subjiahed to, and ilhiitraling the Practice .of "iflie several Subjects treated of. By C. H. Van Zvt, Attorney-at-Law, Notary Ppblic, aijd Conveyancer, etc. etc. In Crown 8vo, price lu. fid,, boards, ' '■''- THE INTRODUCTION TO DOTCH JURISPRUDENCE OF HUGO GROTIUS, with Notes by Simion van Gropptw^ep vap Mx ^ade,,and References to Van der Keesel's Theses and Schc>Eer^s 'Notes. "Traaslictett by A. F. S. Maasdorp, B.A., of the Inner Temple, Barrister-iit-iaw. ;.i In l2mo, price iSj. ««/, boards, SELECT THESES ON THE LAWS OF HOLLAND & ZEELAND. Being a Commentary otHugo Grotius' Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence, and ." intenflfid' to supply certain defects therein, and to deterniine gome of J^e..piore . celebrated Controversies on the i.aw of Holland. By JD. G. VAN der K^k^^ Advocate. Translated, by C A^ LoRENZ, Barrjster-at-Law. Second JE$tiqn. With a Biographical Notice of tbe Author by Professor J. De Wai,, of Leyd^n.-' StEVENS &' irAYI^MS, BELL YARB, TEMPLE BAR. THE Bar 6]cammation Slttnual ^ FOiR: 1894. : 1 . .. ^ C^atiiraation, ,of tlie .Bw lljcajiiinaliou JparjiaJ,) Price y. EXAMINATION PAPERS, .1893. FOR Pass, Honors, and Barstow Scholarshij'. RESULT OF EXAMINATIONS. "NAMES OF "SUCCESSFUL, CANrUDATES. :f:XAjviuj^Tio|^, R^QULAT|9jsrs f p^ 18^4. A xiuiQE Jrta. "THE; jii.R. 'i i ? V\' k „> :■ \i LEADING DECISIONS ANft STATUTES OF 1894. -NEWifiOOKS AND SIEW EDITIONS. i! W, D. EDWAR,PS, LL.B., OF, tINCOLlil's IWN, BARtelSTER-AT-LAW,' Now-piibTished, in 8Vo, price tBj. each^, x;loth^i THE BAR EXAMINATION JOURT^AL, VdLS.iv.,?., , 'T3.,''W1iI.7Tflri.CirX. iSr X. Contaiaing the'Examination Questions and Answers ^ ifrdift^Easteir-rfem, 187S, to Hilary Term, 1892,-wifli IM. of Sucoessftil Candidates ateiu:heicamiiiilM)n;NotesomtheLawofP/roper(!y, and aSy'noppfeiof EecentLegis- . ' - jbtion of impoilance !to Students, ^andiOther informaljon. „ By A, O. TV;SSEN and W- D. EDWARDS, Barristers-at-Law. f^fth Edition. - In Svo, price 9«. xlotb, ^ A SUMMARY OF W STOCK COMPANIES' LAI. Bt T. acr STAGE SMilTH, .' ' ■' ' .! . . pF THE INNB9 TpMPI-E, BARRISTBR:^T-^AW. " The author of this handbook tells us that, when an aaridedstudenc reading for the linal examina- tion, heJfelt,the wajitiied. T)}e pl^n is gooa,' and '^bws l^pth grasp ai)a neatness, an4.bp$n amoi^st students andlaymen,'r^rr Smith's bO(2c o^gbt to imeet a ready sale.*'-r-iia[W' journal. _ "The book is one from which we have derived a lar^e amount of valuable information, and we can heartily and consnentlously recpnunend it to our readers.*'--— Oxford and Canthridge -Undtt^a* duates* yoUTftal. 40 STEVENS ■&'- \HAyNBS,.BE.LL YARD, TEMPLE -B^'^, In 8vo, Sixth Edition, price gj., cloth, THE MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ApTS; : 1870; 1874, 1882 and 1884, \> ^" ^ With Copious and Explanatory Notes, and an Appendix of the Acts RELATuJG' to IVlARklED "^OMEN. By Archibald Brown, M.A., Edinburgh and, Oxon., and the .Middle Temple, Barrister-at-L£tw.- Being the Sixth Edition of The Married -Women's Property Acts. By the late J. R. Griffiths, B.A. Oxon., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister- at-Law. • c -'■"■' ^ " Upon the whole, we are of opinion that-thisis^thtbest work upon the subject which has been issued since trie passing of the recent Act. Its position as a well-established manual of acknowledged worth gives ' it at starting a considerable advantage over new books ; and this advantage ]i^. been >reU maintained by the intelligent treatment of the Editor." — SoMcitors' journal. ' '.-''ll^'f.i /.IT "The notes are.full,. biil; anything rather than tedious reading, and the law contained in them is good, and verified by repfort^d casfes: . .'■. A cflstihct- feature of the work is its cbpidi^' ihdex, practically a summary of the marginal headings of the various paragraphs in the body of the tact. . Thi? opok is worthy of all success." — Law Magazine. /r'.'-'! ■ ' ' , 'VJ ' ■ '; ^ ; ^i^ In 8vo, price I2j,, cloth, ~ ' THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCJ;. -^ r:j . , SECOND EDITION. By Robert CAMPBELil,k''6f Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law,;ahd' Advocate of the Scotch Bar. '* No less an authority than theTlate Mn" Justice Willes, in his judgment in Oppenheim \. White Lion Hotel Co., characterise^ Mr. Campbell's * Law of Negligence ' as a ' very good book ; ' and -smee -very-good ■ books are by no means-plentifulr- when compared with the numbers of indifferent ones which annually issue froiQ- the press, we think the profession will be thankful to the 'authbr of thiS new edition brought do;Kai to date. It is indeed an able and' scholarly trtatlse on a somewhat difficult branch of law, in the treatment of which the ■ author's knowledge of Roman and Scotch Juris- prudence has^tood him in good stead,-~JiKe-con- ndently recommend it alike to the student and the practitipner." — Law Magazine, ' - ■- In royal 8vo, . r .1 AN INDEX TO: TEN THOUSAND PREGEDENTS IN CONVEYANCING and to common and commercial FORMS. Arranged itt Alphabetical order with Subdivisions of an ^Analytical Nature ; together yfith an Appendix containing an Abstract of the. Stamp Act, 1870, with a Schedule of Duties ; the Regulations relative to, and the Stafap fiuties pay- able on, Probates of Wilb, Letters of Administration, Legacies, and Successiorg. By Walter Arthur Copinger, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law." BIBLIOTHECA LEGUM. In I2ino (neairly 400 pages'), price 2i., cloth, ' ^ - »l A CATALOGUE OF LAW BOOKS, deluding all the Reports in the various Counts, of England, Scotland, and Ireland ; with a Supplement to December, 1884. By Henry G. Stevens and Robert W. Haynes, Law , Publishers. In sniall 4to, price 2s., cloth, beautifully printed, with a large margin, for the special use of Librarians, CATALOGUE OF THE REPORTS IN THE VARIOUS COURTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, arranged both in alpha- , BMTICAL . <&*. CHRONOLOGICAL, ORDER, By Stevens & Haynes Law Publishers. ■■■■:_■- ' SrkVENS &= HAYNES, BELL YArI)} TEMPLE BAR. 41' i]':r- ,,^&;coi^ Edition, nufcji enlarged, in. 8vo, price las., cloth, ^ ' ■' CHAPTERS ON THE "*' RELATING to the; To which are appended Topicjal Ii^cexj^s pjF lyASS^ D:^cipED in the Privy Council on Apj)eal from the Colonies, Channel Islands and' the Isle of Man, and of -Casss relating to the Colonies decided' in the English Courts otKfe¥wise than on Appeal from the Celcjflies, , , ;,^ ^ By .^HAKLPS \iiW\%, TARRING,, M.A., ASSISTANT* J^DGE OF ,H,B.M. SUPREME jCONauiAK COURT, COIiSTANTIJIOP;,^, ^UWOR; ,^F BRIT-IBftjCpNSU]^R JUR«6D^TpN IN THE EAST," "* ^ttt^wib AND HJH/S A Turkish cE^^raAR,' CONSUL Efc."^y Tibfeef Cases tited. Table of Otittttfe Cited. 4^ctory.— Definition of a Colony. ' * " pfler Jz+i-rhtt laws ^O- which the Golorties are , subject. Section 1. — In newlywein)e substituted), or before the master of the Crown Office ; in fact, such a book is almost indispensable when preparing costs for taxation in the Crown Office, or when taxing an opponent's costs. Country solicitors will find the scale relating to bankruptcy prosecutioris.bf especial use, as sucKcdsts are taxedioith^'Q-pjim Qffiqe. ^h^ 'general observations * constitute a useful feature ip this manual." — /*aw Times. "The recent revision of the old scale of costs In'thfc Crown Office renders the appearance of this work particularly, opportune, and it cannot fail to is >¥elcomed by practitioners.^ Mr. -Shorf givMjfin the first place, as(^«of costs tisually' allowed to solicitors on 'the taxation of costs in the 'Crown Office, and then bills of costs in various matters. These are well arranged and clearly ^iAdXkA."— Solicitors' JourtuU. 42 STEVENS -^^ ffAYNES, BELL YASD, TEMP^M'BAR. , Just Published, in ^vo, price Ji. dd., cloth, , BRITISH CONSEff illRliMllftN ir EAST, WITH TOPICAL- INDICES, OF -CAgES ON, APPEAL. FROM, AND ,_ REL,AtlNG TO, GOHSULAR (COURTS^ AND iCONSULS.; \ Also a Collection "of S^tutes concerning'' Consuls." - :;;'l ' : • ' '"' :i\ ''■ 'By'c., j, ,t:;ar,ring^ , m.a.v '"';V\' ;, V v ;■" '■ ,. ASSISTANT-JUDGE OF H.B.M. SUPREME CONSULAR COURT FOR THE LEVANT:' " • ,' In one volume, 8vo, price 8j. dd.^^ cloth, A CGiMPtETE T^^ATtSE \5Vkfk' THE NEW LAW OF PATENTS,,DESIGI(S, 4 TRADE lARES, CONSISTING OF THE PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883, WITH THE RULES AND FORMS, FULLY ANNOTATED ■ :• ' ' ' ■ ' '■"'- -WITH'' CASES, &c. , , -\ .^ -, , And a Statement of the Principles of the Law,upoa.those fiubjectsy with a Time Table ; ■ ' ■ ' ' . and Copious Index. '■' , ; ; . "':.. By EDWARt)'' MORTON DANIEL,; ; ! ; ■ OF Lincoln's inn, barrister-at-law, associate of the institute of patent agents; ■ ) — "•' "■■; ' ; — '— . i .. ' \l:; \ , . . ■ ', ■ In Svo, price 8^., cloth, " The TRADE MARKS REGISTRATION ACT, 1875, And the Rules thereunder ;' THE MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT, 1862, with an Introduction containing a StTMMARY OF THE LA^ OF TRADE MARKS, together with practical Notes and Instructions, arid a, copious Index. By Edward Morton Daniel, of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law. : 1 Second Editioif, in pne, volume, 8 vo, price I 6j-., cloth, ' ' - -^ A CONCISE TREATISE ON THE STATUTE LAW OF THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS. With an Appendix of Statutes, Copious References to English, Irish, and American Cases, and to the Freiieh Code, and a Copious Index. ;h - , >; ',,: i : By ;, HENRY' ■THOMAS ' BANN,ING,, M.A., ^ •,,!■: 'p ■^^Ut A ■■XV -_ _« \j .j-'^F THE-IMNER!'*EMPLE,'biA[RRI^TER-A'TtLAwJ .- .1 i u , . 1 "The work is decidedly valuable." — LawTimes. * ' Mr, Banning has adhered to ilie plan of printing thfe Acts in an ' appendix, and making his book a running treatise on :the, oase^law th^ireon.< The cases haye^ evidently- bo^^ investigated wit^ care afid digested with clearness dhli intellectuality." — Law yourmdlj ■ ' '■ '■' ^' ■ i ''" -' . .- . 1 ^ .. -t . __ _____ . In avo, price u., sewed, ' ' an" ESSAY 'dN" THE ABOLITION OF'CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. Embracing more particularly an Erutnciat^on ofid. Analysis of the Principles of Law as ^. I, , ,,,., applicaMetp.Crinnndls-ofthe^Highesi Degree of Guilt. "; !.iBy WALTER AJR.THUR COPINGER, > 0F-l'HJE'Slli>bLi^^Ei4pLW,' E^Q.i BARR1STER-AT-LAw. SiScth Edition, in Svo, price 31 J. 6^/., cloth, THE INDIAN; CONTRACT ACT, No. IX., of 1872, ■ ; ' ■ ' TOGETHER ^ ' ' : WITH AN mmomCTWN AND EXPLANATORY NOTES, TABLE OF CONTENT'S,. APPENDIX, AND INDEX. ' By H. S. CUNNINGHAM anp; H. H. SHEPHERD, BARRISTERS»AT--LAW. STEVENS &• ff AYNES, BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR. 43 Second Edition, irj Svp, price 15^., plptlj, , LEADING CASES aiif ^OPJNp^fi INTERNSriQljlAL; LAW COLLECTED AND DIGESTED FROM ENOilSH AND FO^eiGk REPORT$} OFFICIAL DOeUMENTS, PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, and other Sources. With NOTES and EXtliRSUS, Coiita^nLg the Vifews of the Text-Writers on the Topics referred to, together with Supplementary Cases, Treaties, and Statutes; and Eipbodying an Account of some of the rnore important , International Trans- / actions and Ccmtroversies. ' ' ,' By piltT' COBBETT, M.A.,' D.C.L., ., Ot' GfeAY*fi INN-, 5ARRIS(TER-yit-LAW^ PSBf^SSO'r O^ LAW, OnIVERSITY Of'syDNJ^V, N.S.W, "The book is well arranged, the materials well "The notes are concisely written and trust- selected, and thd |(*o,mments to the point. Mtidh will bt'found in sniall space in this boot."— Zaw /aumai. worthy The readek- will learn from, them a great deal on the subject, and the book as a whole seems a convenient iutroduction to fuller and more systematic works." — Oxford Magazine, Second Edition,, io royal 8vo., , i^oo p^^es, price 45J., cloth, STORY'S COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY ' JURISPRUDENCE. ' Second English Edition^from the Twelfth ..American Edition. V ^ -^ W: ■&. GRIGSBY, LL.dI^ (Lond), D.C.L (Oxon^), AND OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. " I' fejligi* tesjjmowylo the reput4fi0n(of gttfjfy^ ■ |/v'has been yemlered more perfect" b](_ additional and to the editorship of Dr. Griesby, that another " \ indices."— Law'rimes. editlonshould haye^f a called fe. .jj The wol-k | vVA 1 1- 'J^ Secon^ Edition, in gvo, price ^j.„,cloth^ . THE PARTITION ACTS,' I'tes & 1876. A Manual of the Law of Partition and of Sale, in Lieu of Partition. With the Decided Cases, and an Appendix containingf Jirdgiflents and Orders. By W. Gregory Walker, B.A.iOf Lingol^l^ Inn, Barrister -^t-Law. "This is a very. good manual — practical^ fclearly written, and complete. . The subject lends itself well 'to the mode of treatment adopted by . Mr, Walker, and in bis notes to the various, sections he has carefully brought together the caaeSj and dis- cussed the difficulties arising upon the i language of the different provisions." — Solicitors' Journal. Second Edition,' in 8vo, price Z2s. cloth, A TREATISE ON THE . , - LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO INFANTS. By ARCHIBALD- H. SIMPSON, M.A., OP Lincoln's inn, barrister-at-lXw, and fellow of Christ's college, Cambridge.' SECOND ED.ITION, By E. j.' Elgood, B.C.L.,. M.A., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-L^\^. , ' ' ,', ' "Mr. Simpson's book comprises the whole of the , law relating to infants, both as regards their per- i sons and their property, and we have not observed! any very important omissions. The. author has evidently expended much trouble and care upon his- work,, and has brought together, in a concise land cbnvenieBt form, the law upon tDte subject do wn ' to tie presen,t; time." — Solicitors* Jouri^al. . )| "Its law is unLmpe^chable. We haye, detected, no errors, and whilst tne work miglit haye ,been| done m,ore scientifically, it is, beyond all .question,'] a compei3,dium of sound legal principles. ' — Laiui Times. I * ' Mr. Simpson has^arranged the whole of the Lg.w ] relat^ig to Infants with much fulness of detail^ and^ yet in comparatively little space. The result is d-ue mainly to the, [bu^inesslilce -condensatioQ'Of his style* Fiupess, however, has by no means, beep sacrificed to brevity, and, so far as we have i been able to test it, the work omits no point of* any im- portance, from the earliest cases to f the last. In the essential qualities of clearness, completeness, ai^d orderly arrangement it . leaves nothing to be desired. ' ^ " Lawyers in doubt on any point of law or prac- tice, will nn4 the information ^hey require, if ^t can be foupd at all, in Mr. Simpson's book, and a writer of whom' this can be said may congratulate himself on having achieved a, considerable success." — Lam Magazine^ February, 1876. 44 ST EV Eli's &' HAYNES, BELL YARD', ^'TEMPLE BAR. In one volume, royal 8vo, 1877, price 36J., dloth, THE' DOeTRINES & MlNGlPlES OF THE LAW OF ,IjN JUNCTIONS.' ^ , 'OP Llf^COLN's^ ^NN. ,BAREISTER-AT-I,AW,^. -. "Mr. Joyce,' whose learned ari^ exliaustive work oii 'The Law arid Practice of Inluijctions ' has gained such a deservedly high reputation in the Profession, now brings out a vailuable compa'^lort volume on the ' Doctrines and Prii^cipjes' of this ipiport^nt br^n,ch pfthe L^vr^, 4i9 the present work the Law is enunciated in its abstraot-rAther than-its coiicrete form, ols lew'c^es as posslble^lgeing cited ; while at the same time no statement of a principle is made unsupported by a de/?ision, and.ljor.the^ost part fhe very language of the' Courts has been adhered to. Written as it is by so" acknowledged a master of his subject, atad with the GonBdentioiis carefulness that might be e^cpected -from' (himU this -worit^ihnot fail to prove of the greatest'assistancfr alike to the! Student— who wants,tp,grasp,,pripcip(es fi^ed.ftffB?. tJiei^ sup?pji?iWi: bent-details — and to the practitioner, who wants to refresh his memory on pomts of doctrine an)i4^ (the oppressive details ofprofessionalwork."— ^Zawi?/a(f-a22«£ etnd Keview. ' * ' , ■ BY THE SAME AUTHOR, ! T-tV^T^ ^ In two volumes, royal pyQjji873, price 7PJ., cloth, THE LAW & PRACTICE OF INJDNCTMS. EMEIIAQING ALL THE SUBJECTS IN WHICH COURTS OF EQUITY AND COMMON LAW HAVE JURISDICTION. By WILLIAM JOYCE, ';^'i OF LJlfCOL^j'S JNN, BARinST_9K-AT-LAW. REVIEWS. " A work which aims at being sO absolutely Complete, as that of>d., clothe OF STAMP FROM tSiJ TO 1878. DUTIES By W^^JvTEEb. J ART^yjR i qOPINGER, OF THB MIDDLE TEMPLE, ESQUIRE, BARRISTER- AT-LAW '. AUTHOR OF " THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN " " INDEX TO fKECKDERTTS m CONVEVANCING," "tITLB DEEDS," &C. WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART, ! " Wfi.thinkthis little Ijock aught to jfind.its way ln|o taiigood.majay chambfsrs acid .QfStxx&'l-rfSpS^ citori Joumat * This , His Tables^of Stamp Z)uties,/rom 1815 Vo 1878, 'oumai, v. ^*ve already bee^i. tested in Chambers, and being shook, or at least one containing the same' hd*' pabUshed, Wilt ntaterially K^htetl thie labotirs aiAo^int df valuable arid^%«ll<-Eif rMh^diJiiroESbatidli^ ' of the profei^idn iha tedioufrd^pat-ttnent^yiet dhe re- TITLE DEEDS, ' iafse nuniiber of old title-deeds* "-<-i^az(/ Times. shouid find a place m • evfiiy ScdicikOr^s c^cew It is of e^ppeial.wa^ when ;^;ffliilinipg[the abstrac?,of a 1 1 In one volume, 8vQ, pr^e 141., cloth, , .; TITLE DEEDS: ^ InrfndingCbvenantBforthe Production of Deeds apd Attested Copies; with an Appendix of Precedents, the Ve^doI^and Purdiasei Act^ 1874, &Cj &c. &g. By Walter ' ARTHUR.'OAttNQBRiJ.ofthei Middle Temple, Barristerrat-Law ; Author of "The Law of Copyrightf '■ dad " lildex to Precedents in Conveyaacing. ',' "The literary execution of the work is good enoagl to invite fltUKtalion; hvti thtr Tohime is_i«ot large, and we cont*iit ourselyes with recommending it to the profession." — Laiv Times. ^ " A really EOod treatise on this subject must be essehtiiTto^fie laW^erV^d thia 'iS vWiat w^i hWe here. Mr. Copinger has supplied a much-felt^W^t, by t^e iGompilation vf this rotuitie. "We h^ve not space to go lutpthe details of t;he book ; U appears, well arranged, cl^ar^y written, and, fully ekjiorated- With these few^reniarks we recommend his vbluih^ 'to our re^ddrs.'' — I^aw j^o'urntiL V TM«dEdition,.in8TOi cohsiderably. enlarged, price 36J., cloth, THE UW OF COPYRIGHT ■ In Wojacs of .Literature and Art lA-Jncluding that of the iytarag., Music, Engraving,, ^ Sisuipture, Painting, J'hotc^mpfcy, an^.Ornaniental and,, Useftil Designs; together, ' vvith International and Foreign Cppyf jght, ixith the Statutes relating thet^t©,,aiid „Jleferenoes to^the ,Knglish,,afl4,,American Deci^ons,,! By i Walter .^^iTHUR COPING-ER, of.the, Middle Temple, Barnst^r^at-^^aw. ,, ,, > , ,, merits which will,':d9iibtless, lead' to the-placing' of' this, edition on the; shelves- of the members to contain." Law.Times.,, , ; t_,-j.,, 7 --,_. ., .,.,-.-^ei •,_, ,.. , . ■ ! \ - " This handsome volume aims at presenting' a comprehfensive magisterial handbook for theiyholc of England. The mode of arrangement seems to us excellent, andis well cianeiaa.\."— Solicitors' Journal. . ,....■. ' ,"•' ", ' '• ""The Magisterial and Police Guide, by Mr. Henry Greenwood aiid Mr. Temple Martin, is a model work in its conciseness, and, so far as we have been able to test it, in completeness and accuracy..' It ought to be inthe,lian4si.Qf Aall vilip, as magistrates or otherwise, jiave authority in miftfers off olice.'l^Daily N^.^ " ThiS^wgr^is emvneiitlyfracticcii, andi^jp^s a ireUl ■uknt.( 2t plainly and concisely states the law on all 'pSintr upbn which Magistrates are ^calUdUpon to abjudicate, syste- maticallji arranged, so dsto'be edsy of refe'rehce. It otightfo 'find a place an every Jusiic^'i^ table. Olid we cannot but think that its usefulness vnll speedily ensure for it as large a sale as its merits deserve." ^-Midland Counties Herald: ■'•':■■■•','••:■■ "Tte exceedingly arduous task of Collecting together all the enactments dn the subject has been ably and efficiently performed, and the arraftgetaieritl is so inifliodieal and precise that one is able to lay a finger on a Section of an Act almost in a moment. It is wonderful what a ma?s of information is comprised in • so comparatively sinall a space.. We have much pleasure in recornmending the volume not only to our"professicinalv but also to our general readers ; nothing can be,: more useful to the pubUc than an acquaintance with the outlines of magisterial jurisdiction and "procedure. "rr-^A^^e/if FQst. '. SfEVEM6'-ifA'Yl^S,B^hL'YliRD, TEAfPLE SAR. 4^ .^ . . Iji one thicfc'V'l^eJ^gve^ price 32J., cloth, THE L#-QF^ MIlMf XbiPANIE^^ ^^ Comprising the Companij^s/Clsluses, the iLahds Clauses, tlj^^ilwAysj Clauses Consoli- dation Acts, the Railway Companies Act, 1867, and the Regulation ; of Railway Act,iS68.; .with Notes of Csiseson all the Sections, brought opwn'ito. the end of the lye^ir t8d8 ; /together lyith an' Appendix giving all the other material Acts relating to Railways, andtthpi Standing Orders of the Houses of Lords and ) Commons ; and a copious IndeK. By HenRy Godefroi, of Lincoln's Inn, and JOHN Shortt, of the jMi4cBe Temple, Birristers-at-Law. ■; ,, ij. i ; .<.>, ,\ ''■'■ -H. TT—' ,:,: .:, lu'.J '.■ '--,1 r^ In a handJr-vQlu«ie;icrown/i8vo, 1870, price lOr. 6<^^>cloth, i ; ,, IH|lAW;-OF-SAi^AGE, ; : As administered: in' the iHlgh: Court of ; Admiralty and the County Go(irts ; with the Principal Authpritie^,.£^lishand American, brought dowir to (thie .present time; and an .Appfen4ixj', price 4J., clotliir. ■ .,' • ii ;• ■:- i. ) ■'^ ' ''^ Jt' HANDBbOK 0^1 ^mE ' ' LAW OF mRLIAlENTARY REGISTRATION; WITH AN APPENDIX OF STATUTES AND FULL INDEX. . ,j ^By'-J.^ R. SEA,t^ER> REGISTRATj(OK-,A|GENk'' -'.*Ihi8vd,' price 51. , cloth, 1 1 THE LAW OF PROMOTE JS OF POfiUC COMPANIES. ■'.riBY NEWMAN WATTS, "Some recent caseS in otir law courts, whicli m the time attracted much public notic^, have d^monX strated the want of some clj^^ ^fi4 i::oifcis■ In 8vQ, ppcfe 7J-. 6 3 Brooks (W. J.), ;3-, ^, Brown (Archibald), 20, dz Browne (J. H. B!siK)oi),' i B(JCkANAN(J.), 38; I ;BbcKEEy (H. 13J)j 171 / -h ,1' BucKiifLL (T^Ti)f.34J 3S. -'i Campbeli, (Gordon), 47. Campbell (RoBEKT)7~g, 4a. CARMICHAEL (C. H. E.), 2Iil Cecil (Lord R.), 11. 'j ■ , r , Chaster(A.W. ), 32. CHiTtt (Jjl C), 3§. I NDEX Editors of Works the TSames of Author s and Editors of Works enum erated in this Catalogue. GLES (N.), 32. Houston {}.), 32. TE'feOKOUGh (C. Li)ii 27;' ' Hw]3SaN'(Ai A.), 12< ■:l ■_;m''l:.'i;-r : '2