^tatt O^aUege of Agriculture At (Qarnell Uninecaitg 3tt)ata. ST. ^. Cornell University Library HM 251.W6 The foundations of social science; an ana 3 1924 013 730 266 Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924013730266 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE SOME NEW BORZOI BOOKS FALL 1920 THE CONTROL OF IDEALS By H. B. van Wesep PSYCHOANALYSIS AND BEHAVIOR By Andre Tridon ECONOMIC REPRINTS THE LIFE OF ROBERT OWEN By Himself THE LIFE AND STRUGGLES OF WILLIAM LOVETT (In Two Volumes) An autobiography THE PIONEERS OF LAND REFORM Essays by Thomas Paine; William Ogilvie; and Thomas Spence At all booksellers THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE An Analysis of their Psychological Aspects BY JAMES MICKEL WILLIAMS, B.D., Ph.D. New York ALFRED • A • KNOPF Mcmxx COPYRIGHT, 1920, BY ALFRED A. KNOPF, Inc. FBINTBD IN THU VNITBD STATES OF AMBBIOA TO MY FATHER, MOTHER, AND SISTER, WITH WHOM THESE STUDIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY WERE BEGUN AND CARRIED ON FOR YEARS, THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED PREFACE The increasing dissatisfaction with the traditional formulations of the facts of history and social science has stimulated a search for causes in the human motives that make history and determine the phenomena of social science. How far causes of this fundamen- tal kind can, with strict scientific accuracy, be ascertained, is becom- ing evident from an increasing volume of research. The re- sults suggest the possibility of an underlying science of social relations, less objective than the other social sciences, but hav- ing a field and method of its own. The cultivation of this science, it is maintained, will not only co-ordinate the work of social scientists in different fields but will yield a distinct body of scientific knowledge and principles. Social psychology will justify its claim to be recognized as an accredited science if it can be shown (i) that it has a distinct field which can be dealt with scientifically, and (2) that the other sciences which have to do with human relations assume a little known psychologi- cal field from which are drawn explanations of phenomena in their own fields. Our task is, therefore, ( i ) to indicate what is the rela- tion of the science of this Httle known field to the other sciences of social relations; (2) to offer an analysis of this little known field. " The Foundations of Social Science " treats of the relations of the science of this new field to the other social sciences. If it can be shown that the analyses of unsolved problems of the other social sciences, as pressed by the more earnest scientists, converge toward this new field, if certain conceptions about the little known field have formed in the minds of scientists in other fields, then we may assume that it demands our study. The obstacles encountered will not all be intellectual. Every advance in science has encountered conser- vatism in high places, and the opposition of interests which thought their position and prestige jeopardized thereby. In addition to this volume on the psychological aspects of social science, I have five others which will be published as business con- ditions permit. The second book carries out the purpose of the viii PREFACE first and explains the relation of social psychology to another field of knowledge, the criticism of literature and art. The third book begins the analysis of the processes of social psychology. It offers an analysis of the conflicts of types of behaviour throughout social organization, — In family relations, economic relations, po- litical relations, professional relations, ecclesiastical relations, ar- tistic standards and educational relations. This book treats one distinct branch of social psychology — the conflict of interests In social relations, and the suppression of Instinctive Im- pulses and Its social effects. The fourth book treats another branch — the processes of feeling and thought through which in- stinctive Interests are adjusted; the fifth another branch — the processes of personality that must be facihtated for social adjust- ment; the sixth another branch — the processes of social control. Each of these six books, as written. Is entirely distinct from the others. Doubtless It Mjould have increased their scientific value had it been possible to publish them as originally Intended — as separate volumes of one work — but business conditions made this impos- sible. They have a logical connection, but they are so written that each treats a distinct branch of the subject and is complete In Itself. It goes without saying that the author's work can be fairly judged only by going through the series. A part of an entirely new sci- ence can be understood only by understanding the whole. More than one of my critics said that they made notes as they went along but eventually destroyed most of them, for they found that the points In question were later dealt with. The critics will, there- fore, want to go on through the series before passing final judgment on any one book. Nevertheless, for the general reader, and for class-room use, each book Is Intelligible without the others. Social psychology has distinct branches, as has economics — con- sumption, production, distribution, value and exchange, the relation of the state to industry. And as there Is no exact agreement among economists on the main divisions, after a century of culti- vation of the science, so there Is no agreement among social psy- chologists. It has seemed to me that what the science needs first is a treatise on each of the main divisions. Having thus developed all branches of the science, It will be possible to formulate In one volume a more or less abstract statement of the elementary prin- ciples of the science. But to attempt to do so without having pre- viously cultivated all its branches would be to make the mistake PREFACE ix made by the deductive formulation of economic principles from hedonistic premises before the branches of that science had been intensively cultivated. A logically compact body of principles is so seductive that it may obsess the mind long after the principles have become palpably untrue. Still further to emphasize the need of inductive studies instead of abstract statements, I have in prepa- ration a series of volumes on " Inductive Social Psychology " which are studies of the psychological processes of various groups. In writing these books I have written not merely as a student for students, but for that increasing number of men and women who have a desire for some understanding of the society in which we live. Consequently I have taken pains to be clear, to avoid abstraction, to follow closely and concretely the processes which seem to me essential in human society. Inasmuch as this is the first attempt at an extended exposition of social psychology, the treatment must be more concrete than would otherwise be necessary. The nature of the subject, therefore, has encouraged the writer to ignore the distinction unusually made between the serious student and the general reader and to write more concretely than is usual for the serious student, and with more numerous citations and references- than is usual for the general reader. These books were not written under the influence of the war period. They were begun long before and most of them were ready for publication in 19 17, but business conditions were then un- favorable for their publication. Accordingly I have had an oppor- tunity to make such additions as were suggested by the great epoch through which we have passed, and by the books and articles which appeared during that period, so that the work may be assumed to be up to date, so far as it has been in my power to make it so. But the underlying processes of human nature were not changed by the war, though the full significance of the great events and their under- lying currents cannot be discerned at present. The science of social psychology is not completed. Long ago the Greeks were working at It, so are some of us, and so will those who follow us to the end of time. Parts of the manuscript were submitted to specialists in those fields a knowledge of which Is necessary for the social psychologist, and the author has had the benefit of their criticisms. These spe- cialists are : Dr. Charles A. Beard, Dr. Wesley C. Mitchell, Dr. James H. Robinson, and Dr. Leo Wolman, lecturers in the New X PREFACE School for Social Research, Dr. Henry R. Mussey, managing editor of the Searchlight, Mr. Henry T. Noyes, a manufacturer and civic leader of Rochester, and Professors Franklin H. Giddings and Ed- ward L. Thorndike of Columbia University. While the sugges- tions of these critics have been carefully followed out, all but two read only a very small part of the work, and no one of them read it all so that the author must take the sole responsibility for the ideas expressed. I think my critics agree that social psychology has an intimate relation to their particular fields, whether or not they agree with my analysis of the relation, which constitutes the first volume ; and that social psychology, of which the succeeding v6lumes offer a formulation, is a science that has great possibilities and is a challenge to intellectual work that is eminently worth while. To my colleague, Professor Walter S. Gamertsfelder, I am in- debted for invaluable assistance in the proof-reading. James Mickel Williams. Geneva, N. Y., August lo, 1920. CONTENTS Introduction xiii BOOK I SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE I Psychological Implications of Political Theory 3 II The Psychological Approach to the Problem of Sovereignty 18 III Sovereignty and the Class Struggle 47 IV Sovereignty and the Class Struggle (concluded) 71 V The Psychology of Nationality 91 VI The Conflict of Political Attitudes and Ideals 116 VII Psychological Aspects of Intra-national Relations 135 VIII Psychological Aspects of International Relations 166 IX The Failure of International Co-operation 181 X Psychological Aspects of a League of Nations 196 BOOK II SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND JURISPRUDENCE XI Psychological Aspects of the Development of Jurisprudence 209 XII Psychological Aspects of the Juristic Problem 220 XIII Psychological Implications of the Theory of Natural Rights 236 XIV The Conflict of Judicial Attitudes 257 XV Judicial Attitudes and the Nature of Law 275 XVI Psychological Implications of Interpretations of Private Rights 298 XVII Psychological Processes in the Development of Private Property 317 XVIII Psychological Processes in the Development of Private Property (concluded) 330 xii CONTENTS BOOK III SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS RELATED TO ECONOMICS, HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY XIX The Relation of Social Psychology to Economics 345 XX The Relation of Social Psychology to Economics (concluded) 376 XXI Social Psychology and History 386 XXII The Relation of Social Psychology to Sociology, Eugenics and Social Philosophy 410 BOOK IV THE FIELD AND METHODS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY XXIII The Field of Social Psychology 427 XXIV The Methods of Social Psychology 441 INTRODUCTION The history of the social sciences shows, in each science, an attempt to reach fundamental psychological assumptions. As one compares the work of the more strictly legal poHtical scientists of recent years with that of " progressive" scientists one might draw a distinction between legal and psychological political science ; and this distinction mig^t be traced back even to the Greek political philosophers. In jurisprudence, also, we have the more strictly legal jurists as compared with the psychological trend of the thought of some of them, for instance, of Justice Ohver Wendell Holmes, who says: " I think that the judges themselves have failed ade- quately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of, social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often pro- claimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate and often unconscious." ^ In economics one may compare the ex- treme emphasis placed by some economists on the deductive aspect of the science with the emphasis of others on its psychological as- pects. In sociology one may make a similar comparison between sociologists who emphasize the comparative study of social rules and customs and institutions on the one hand and psychological sociology on the other. From this psychological aspect of each social science social psychology is to be clearly distinguished. The trend of thought of the psychological social scientists signifies an aim to arrive at truer assumptions, and to keep an open mind toward the psychological, as well as the other aspects of those assumptions. Obviously it is the function of social psychology to assist the politi- cal scientist, the jurist, the economist, the sociologist, and others in the psychological aspect of this their search for truer assumptions. While the social psychologist, in the course of his own work, ana- lyses the psychological aspect of the assumptions of the various social sciences, it is not his ta^k to formulate for any social science its particular assumptions. But true assumptions require a knowl- 1 Holmes, "The Path of the Law," Harvard Law Review, X: 457, 467. xiii xlv INTRODUCTION edge of that particular field which it is the task of the social psy- chologist to investigate and, so far as he may, " set in the order of reason." Social scientists also need the aid of the social psychologist if they are to make interpretations that begin to realize the possibili- ties of interpretation in their particular fields. Prediction In social science cannot pretend to the exactness of prediction in natural sci- ence, because the principles of social science must change as reason reacts upon instinctive processes. But let us not, for that reason, accept the view of those who would limit the task of the social sci- entist to merely showing an orderly development in past and present, through use of the formulas of biological evolution. Predictions in the mathematical sense can be made in economics, for instance, of the yield and price of products. And prediction in the larger sense . of recommendations of changes in institutions that are required for social progress can be made in all the social sciences. These rec- ommendations are not made by a scientific man merely as something desirable, but as changes that appear sure to come, owing to ob- served changes in social-psychological processes, and other condi- tions, that call for corresponding changes in institutions. There- fore the truest predictions, the wisest recommendations, are those based not on assumptions as to human nature derived from tradi- tional social relations, but on assumptions to which social psychology has contributed adequate conceptions. The tendency in all science is to pay too little attention to assump- tions, to regard them as verified truths instead of hypothetical for- mulations. This is a natural tendency of the intellect because the intellect instinctively seeks clearness, even at the expense of thor- oughness. This tendency of all science has been pronounced in the social sciences for these reasons : ( i ) Though the social sciences have to do, in the last analysis, with human nature, its processes have been little understood, and the effect of the mystery of this hinterland of social science has been to give a fixity to the assump- tions of the contiguous sciences. (2) The social pressure, which is felt more by social scientists than others, has given fixity to as- sumptions that were in harmony with the Impulses and beliefs of the powers that be, for instance, the assumption of the absolutism of the state, of freedom of contract, of free competition for profits, of the social control of propertied classes. Social scientists have tended, therefore, to accept as final the view of human nature Im- INTRODUCTION xv plied in the traditional social relations assumed In their premises, and have failed to discriminate between a motive that is essential in traditional political relations, or in traditional economic relations and one that is essential in human nature. This is not mentioned by- way of criticism of social scientists, but to emphasize the vital rela- tion of social psychology to the other social sciences, and to point out that the advancement of the latter has been impeded by the backward development of social psychology. Assumptions derived from the historical view, and from mass phenomena, have obscured the individual. The group outHnes of Conceptions thus derived must not blind us to the fact that we are dealing with groups of individuals ; that it is only through the opera- tion of certain instinctive dispositions of individuals that they act as groups ; that through the action of dispositions the individuals of a group may resist discipline as well as submit to it; may create a conscious ideal of development of personality which, with the in- crease of intelligence, disengages itself from ideals imposed by seemingly inevitable group rivalry, and by the coercion of dominant classes to whose interest it is to make group rivalry seem inevitable. Wherefore, the essential assumptions of social psychology are cer- tain instinctive dispositions, — for instance, the dispositions of acquisition, rivalry, domination, submission, sympathy, intellect, — which are the elementary processes of social relations. In " The Foundations of Social Science " these dispositions will be used as assumptions in the analysis of the psychological aspects of assump- tions of the social sciences. This use of assumptions may call forth objections, for instance, in analyses of the " rivalry " of, or " domination " by, or the " submission " of, certain classes. But the analysis has to begin somewhere, and the assumed dispositions are later analysed. By this progressive treatment of assumptions, these are finally reduced to their lowest terms. The theory that there are essential conceptions of human nature which win serve all social sciences Is not new, and, indeed, seems inevitable when we consider that every social science and branch of culture has a human nature basis. History and philosophy have to do with Idea-systems that depend on human nature, wherefore, these branches of culture require adequa:te assumptions as to hu- man nature. Language has long been known to depend for its development on changes in human nature, hence the study of lan- guage requires a knowledge of social psychology. Literature has xvi INTRODUCTION long been regarded as an expression of human nature, and literary criticism as a mere mechanical procedure without use of social- psychological principles of criticism. Religion and art are recog- nized as revelations of human nature, and their study as requir- ing social-psychological principles. All the social sciences start with certain assumptions as to human nature. It follows that the study of these different branches — history, philosophy, language, literary and other art criticism, religion, political science, juris- prudence, economics, sociology — may be unified by relating it to essential principles of the science of human nature. To the end that we may give a scientific trend to the present movement to- ward a more profound interpretation of human life and prob- lems, without which the movement will take an affective trend and end in nothing, I have attempted to bring to a focus the human nature basis of the different fields of knowledge, in the hope that scholars in their different fields might take a renewed interest in that aspect of their subject, and that colleges might attempt still further to unify their instruction through relating it to the science of human nature. BOOK I SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE CHAPTER I PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF POLITICAL THEORY OUR survey of the relation of social psychology to other fields of knowledge requires, as a point of departure, a provi- sional definition of social psychology. Without attempt- ing to frame a complete definition or one that will generally satisfy students of the subject, we may say that it is the science of the motives of the behaviour of men living in social relations. As such it is one of the sciences of society, society being a general term for mankind living in social relations. Social psychology does not cover the entire field of social relations but merely the motives of the behaviour of men living in social relations. The behaviour studied includes all social reactions, whether reflex or conscious, that enter into motives.^ By a motive is meant any mental state which either assists or hinders an act. Social psychology deals, then, with a particular aspect of social relations, the motives of human behaviour. Other social sciences deal with other aspects. Thus jurisprudence is the science of social relations in their fundamental legal aspects. Political science is the science of the relations of a people organized politically.^ Economics is a science of social re- lations in their material welfare aspects in so far as welfare can be quantitatively determined in terms of money.^ These sciences deal primarily with social relations that have become customary, the more prominent and authenticated aspects of which are termed in- ^ See the chapters entitled, The Field of Social Psychology, and The Methods of Social Psychology. 2 Political science is a science not merely of legal maxims, but of social relations. "A statute may be on the books for an age, but unless, under its provisions, a de- terminate arrangement of human relations is brought about or maintained, it exists only in the imagination. Separated from the social and economic fabric by which it is, in part, conditioned and which, in turn, it helps to condition, it has no reality." (Beard, "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States," 12.) ^ Mitchell, " The Role of Money in Economic Theory," Amer. Econ. Rev., Sup- plement, VI: 159. 3 4 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE stitutions. Thus we speak of juristic Institutions, political institu- tions, economic institutions.* Social psychology deals with the mo- tives of the individuals who participate In these institutional rela- tions. Because of the fundamental as well as Illusive nature of its data, social psychology has developed last of all the social sciences. The first social science to be cultivated was political science be- cause the state was all important in the eyes of the ancient thinkers. The nearest approach to social psychology was ethics, which, as cul- tivated, was closely allied with political science. Economics was long a branch of political science and was called political economy. Consequently we shall begin our survey of the psychological founda- tions of social science with political science. Since the era of the Greek philosophers, the state has been as- sumed to be a consequence of human nature. Plato found the state to be a necessary result of the diversity of human impulses and the necessity of mutual aid in satisfying them ; ^ Aristotle found It to be the result of a political Instinct of man and the need of associated life for self-realization,® and he studied the adaptation of different forms of government to the needs of different peoples and classes.'' With the conquest by the Romans of various peoples and their sub- jection to the will of a distant ruler. Interest in the human nature basis of the state waned, except as It was appealed to In the attempt to rationalize autocratic rule. The rise of democracy, in which government depends on public opinion, has stimulated the interest of students in the motives of political behaviour. These students refer to an unknown psychological field for explanations of phe- nomena In their own fields. President Lowell, writing in 1908, said, " Social psychology has also come into view, and attempts have been made to explain the psychology of national traits, . . . But the normal forces that govern the ordinary conduct of men In their public relations have scarcely received any scientific treatment at all." ^ Professor Jenks, writing in 1909, attempted some analysis of the motives of political behaviour but explicitly limited his analy- sis to the motives of leaders In politics," while Professor Wallas, In * Hamilton, "The Institutional Approach to Economic Theory,'' Amer. Econ. Rev., Supplement, IX: 313. 5 Republic, II: 368-369. •Aristotle, "Politics," trans, by Welldon, Bk. I, Chs. I and II; Dunning, "Political Theories, Ancient and Mediaeval," 28, 55-56, 83. ''Aristotle, Politics, Bk. II, Chs. IX-XII, Bk. Ill, Chs. I-V. 8 Lowell, "The Government of England," I: 435; II: 104. P Jenks, " Principles of Politics," 34. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 5 the same year, attempted a more comprehensive analysis.'^" These attempts served to show the need of a science of social psychology for an understanding of politics. From these fragmentary begin- nings the problem has broadened out and developed new and fruit- ful lines of inquiry. It is no longer confined to political behaviour in the present but has given a new point of view for historical re- search, as we see in Dr. Charles A. Beard's analysis of the motives under which the American Constitution was devised, adopted and applied in the development of American government and politics. ^^ Political science, therefore, assumes a psychological field distinct from but closely related to its own. Political scientists have dis- tinguished between the nation and the state and have confined their analysis to the state. ^^ The state is the people organized politi- cally, while the nation designates a people united by " ethnic and other factors largely sentimental or psychological in character." ^* It is assumed that the national character of a people is the deter- mining influence in shaping the form of government. Political science not only assumes a psychological field distinct from and closely related to its own but also implies certain political attitudes in its assumptions. In the concept of sovereignty it as- sumes an attitude of obedience of subjects to sovereign and of authority of sovereign over subjects.^* The limitation of this au- thority, whether self-limited ^^ or socially-limited,^® as worked out by political scientists is a logical problem of political science, but the social-psychological processes of the relation of authority- obedience that is assumed are not analysed. These processes are, in the last analysis, " in the individual mind." " What are the motives of subjects in recognizing authority? Theories of the mo- 1" Wallas, " Human Nature in Politics." w Beard, "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States"; " Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy." 12 Giddings, " Principles of Sociology, 37. 13 Willoughby, "The Nature of the State," ii. 1* Willoughby, "The Juristic Conception of the State," Amer. Pol. Sc. Rev., XII: 196-197. "Hastie, "Kant's Philosophy of Law," 174-178, 256-258; Dyde, "Hegel's Phi- losophy of Right," 329; Ihering, "Law as a Means to an End," trans, by Husik, 267. Jellinek, "Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen," 29-34. I'iGerber, " Grundzuge des deutschen Staatsrechts," 1880, 31-37; Gierke, "Die Grundbegriffe des Staatsrechts und die neuesten Staatstheorien," Zeitschrift fur die gesammte Staatsimssenschafte, 1874, 179; Duguit, " L'fitat, le Droit objectif et le loi positive," 366, 423-424, 502; Duguit, "Le Droit social, le Droit individuel et la Transformation de I'fitat,' 58. i^Laski, "Authority in the Modern State," 30. 6 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE tives of subjects have varied all the way from that of Hobbes, who asserted that men obey because they are afraid not to, to the theory that men obey because the authority of government relieves from fear of violence, and the theory that obedience not only relieves from fear but also enables men to organize for self-development. Obviously where the truth lies, within these broad limits, is a ques- tion of social-psychological fact. Its answer requires social-psycho- logical investigations, and no amount of learned theorizing will avoid that necessity. This psychological field adjacent to political science has been recognized both by the self-limited and the socially-limited sov- ereignty theorists. Of the former Ihering suggested an inductive study of this field by his inquiry into the ethical basis of law; ^^ and Jellinek sought to establish what he called a social-psychological guaranty of the effectiveness of law and a social-psychological foun- dation for the subordination of the state to law." Theories of this type maintain that the underlying fact in sovereignty is a belief or conscious attitude of men with regard to law; that this attitude causes laws to be respected and obeyed not as particular reasonable statutes but as law with social force behind It; that even if law be regarded as a compromise between conflicting interests, the com- promise reached depends on the relative social force behind the different interests;''" and that legal recognition in turn strength- ens the Interests recognized.^^ This attitude to law characterizes all men. Including the ruler; thus there is no absolutely unlimited authority to compel obedience. Authority is limited by law. The- orists who stand for socially-limited sovereignty do not stop with the attitude of respect for law with social force behind it but carry further the analysis of that social force as the ultimate field for in- vestigation. They, therefore, make a still more extensive use of social-psychological assumptions than do the self-limited sovereignty theorists. The most conservative of them assume not merely a generally prevalent attitude of respect for law because of the force behind It but also a general exercise of conscience and common sense with reference to the rightness or wrongness of a law, which, there- fore, limits the power of enforcing obedience to the law. Thus Gierke declared that the state is not " the ultimate source of law. IS Ihering, " Law as a Means to and End," trans, by Husik, Chs. I, III-VIII. i» Jellinek, " Allgemeine Staatslehre," 334-3*°. 164-1*6. 180-182. 2» Ibid., 341. 21 Ihering, " The Struggle for Law," trans, by Lalor, 49-50. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 7 • . . The ultimate source of law resides rather in the common con- sciousness of a social being. The common consciousness that some- thing is right needs, for its external realization, materialization by a social expression, as, for instance, in a rule of law." ^^ Later the- orists make a still more extensive use of social-psychological assump- tions, as will be shown in a succeeding chapter.^* Not only have political scientists recognized a psychological field contiguous to their own and included in their premises social- psychological assumptions; the direction of the thinking of those political scientists whose work became most influential in their na- tion was determined by the political attitude prevailing in their own state. Their thought in turn reacted upon the attitude, making it more satisfying to thoughtful people by removing doubts as to its wisdom 2* as compared with the different political attitudes of rival states. The prevailing pohtical attitude functioned as the asso- ciative principle of the premises, subconscious so far as its psycho- logical nature and action were concerned. That is, theories of sovereignty have been logical rather than psychological. Subcon- sciously they have been a functioning of the political attitude of the particular state, the conscious processes being those of the logical arrangement of the ideas suggested by the attitude; analysis of attitude does not, therefore, come within the scope of the logical theory of sovereignty. The political attitude, then, essentially determines the course of thought out of which develops the theory of sovereignty. Thus, in the Middle Ages, when feudalism with its submission of lesser to greater lords on promise of protection had developed, and when the Roman Catholic Church was interested in weakening the growing power of the state, Thomas Aquinas taught that, while the author- ity of the Pope came directly from God, that of the rulers of states came from the consent of the people and the co-operation of the church.^^ The Church controlled the people, wherefore the consent of the people depended on the consent of the Church. The theory was calculated to establish the supremacy of the Church and to make the power of the state dependent on the endorsement of the ruler 22 Gierke, op. cit., 179. 23 See the chapter entitled, Psychological Implications of the Theory of Natural Rights. 2* Hocking, "Sovereignty and Moral Obligation,'' Intern. Jour. Ethics, Apr., 1918, 314; Small, "The Present Outlook of Social Science," Amer Jour. Sociol., Jan., 1913, 435- 25 Dunning, "Political Theories, Ancient and Mediaeval," 198-201. 8 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE and his policies by the Church.^' The ideas were a functioning of the attitude of popular submission to ecclesiastical domination. Later, when the nationalistic state had developed and used its sov- ereignty to limit religious freedom and, in England, to deprive Roman Catholics of political power, the Roman ecclesiastics in England declared the state to be supreme in civil matters and that they would not recognize the temporal power of the Pope in England, nor would they acknowledge the power of the state to interfere in the ecclesiastical affairs of the Roman Church in Eng- land.^'' The people of England were no longer submissive to the Roman Church, wherefore the political attitude of the Roman Church in England had changed from one of domination to one of resistance of domination by the state, and the theory of sovereignty was altered in accordance with the change of attitude. Bodin, the first systematic writer on sovereignty, was an adherent of the Nationalist party in France. He lived when his country was passing out of the last stages of feudalism and expressed the atti- tude of submission of subjects to the domination of a centralized government in his description of sovereignty as the " supreme power over citizens and subjects, unrestrained by the laws." ^* Bodin's opponents, who stood for resistance of a political absolutism, on behalf of ecclesiastical control, developed a theory of resistance, that the justification of government lay in the consent of the gov- erned.^® If a ruler ruled contrary to the religious beliefs of sub- jects. It was their right and duty to resist. But neither Bodin nor his opponents attempted any analysis of the political attitude of which their thought was a functioning and a justification. These attitudes were subconsciously assumed and given the Impressiveness of learning and logic. The aim was not psychological analysis but to enhance the control of the power to which each writer or group of writers acknowledged allegiance. Subsequent writers were no more analytical. Some tried to rec- oncile opposing theories.^" Others reasserted the one or the other with variations In the ideas as suggested by the changed political conditions of their time. Each side used the impressive economic analogy of contract to render more plausible the arguments." The 28 Ibid., 205. 2TLaski, "Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty," 121-137. 28 Bodin, " Six Books concerning the State," translated by Knolles, Bk. I. Ch. VIII. 2» Dunning, op. cii., 144-145. 80 Merriara, "History of the Theory of Sovereignty Since Rousseau," 2? 23, zg, ^^Ibid., 36. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 9 influence of changing political conditions is seen in the theory of Hobbes who, to justify the absolutism of Charles I, stated the sov- ereignty of absolutism more extremely than B'odin; ^^ in the theory of Locke which was advanced to justify the English revolution of 1688, and which was invoked by the American revolutionists; ^^ in the theory of Kant who, alarmed by the French revolution, de- nounced the right of revolution.^* All these theories were derived not from an analysis of the relation between sovereign and subjects but from the political attitude which was implicitly accepted in the premises of the argument and which determined the course of thought. The political theory of thinkers in each state developed along the line of the political attitude of the state. Kant's theory of the authority of the state as limited only by self-imposed laws was fur- ther worked out in the public law doctrine of Ihering and Jellinek, who were influenced by the autocratic political systems of Germany and Austria. The social limitation theories of Gerber and Gierke had little influence as cortipared with the theories of Ihering and Jellinek, which logically satisfied thoughtful people of those states with the political attitude of their state. In France, on the other hand, from 1789 to the present time, the effort has been to work out a theory of sovereignty in harmony with the attitude of resist- ance to autocracy, and the most influential theories have been those which assigned to the individual certain natural rights and placed the law which bestows these rights above the will of the sovereign and above public law.^® Later, when the fiction of natural law had passed, the most influential theories were those which asserted for the individual certain personal rights with which he was en- dowed because of the nature of his personality;*® or were those which asserted a " law of social solidarity " *'^ which is above, and limits the authority of, the sovereign. In England arbitrary rule was limited by the rise of new propertied classes which jealously defended their economic freedom from autocratic interference and from the repression of older propertied classes. This individualistic S2 Hobbes, "Leviathan," Ch. XVIII. 33 Locke, " Two Treatises of Government," Chs. XIII and XIX. 3* Kant, " Principles of Political Right," trans, by Hastie, " Kant's Principles of Politics," 50. 3= Rousseau, " The Social Contract," Bk. I. 38 Michel, " L'Idee de L'fitat," 60, 644-645. srUuguit, "L'fitat, le Droit objectif et le loi positive," 366, 423-434, 502; Duguit, " Le Droit social, le Droit individual et la Transformation de I'fitat," 58. lo THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE political attitude determined the political theory of Bentham,'* whose theory is logical and not psychological, except for its pleasure- pain premise and its assumption of the end of law as the greatest general happiness, and except for occasional remarks as to political attitudes, for instance that subjects obey only because they find sub- mission favourable to their interests.** Bentham's theory was influ- ential in England not because of his hedonism but because it was con- genial to the resistance of a rising propertied class.*" Bentham's work was admired by Ihering who, however, rejected Bentham's individualism, because he was animated by the German attitude of respect for political authority and by a predilection for political authority of wide scope. *^ The theories of Bentham and Spencer,^^ which endorsed the individualistic attitude, have been influential in England, especially among the rising propertied classes.*^ Political scientists, like other thinkers, have done their thinking under the influence of the attitudes of their time and place; hence the traditional emphasis on obedience-compelling power, surviving from a time when sovereignty was vested in a dynasty or class that did compel obedience. The United States is the only great state of the world which, from the beginning, was founded on the principle of popular sovereignty,** though this was, at first, imperfectly real- ized.*' There lingered, in the political consciousness of the people, on the one hand an apprehensive fear of tendencies to autocracy, and on the other hand a distrust, among certain classes, of popular sovereignty. These attitudes influenced the thinking of American political scientists.*^ Political thinkers are influenced in their think- ing by the powers that be, or the powers that are passing, or the powers that appear to be coming to be; distinguished from this attitudlnally-directed thinking, *'' logical in its methods, is that of the scientific thinker who either plays the part of critic of logical '8 Pound, " The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought," Harvard Law Remetif, XXX : 207. 3" Bentham, " A Fragment on Government," Ch. I. <"> Ihering, " Law as a Means to an End," trans, by Husik, Introduction by Geldart, xlvii. *i Ibid., xlvi-1. *2 Spencer, " Social Statics," 121-136. *' Pound, op. cit., 207-7209. ** Goodnow, " Principles of Constitutional Government," 86. ■" See the history of property suffrage tests in Porter, " A History of Suffrage in the United States," Chs. I-IV. *" See the chapter entitled, Psycholagical Implications of the Theory of Natural Rights. *^ However much the practising lawyer might affect to despise philosophical theories PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS ii theories or makes a contribution to the science,*® perhaps little appreciated at the time. An opening toward the social-psychological point of view in an- alyses of sovereignty was made by the attempt to modify Austin's theory of absolute sovereignty. In order tb understand the signifi- cance of this attempt it is necessary first to recall the main points in Austin's theory. Austin derived his theory of sovereignty from his conception of law. He defined law as a command given by a person of superior might to an inferior,*^ and sovereignty as the law- enforcing or obedience-compelling power exercised by a group which is independent and not itself subject to a like exercise of power.^° Austin wrote with the primacy of the legislature in mind and de- clared that law becomes positive law only when endorsed by the legislature as a command of the sovereign power.^^ Though Aus- tin recognized benevolence in authority,^^ he laid an extreme em- phasis on obedience-compelling power, which " would as a fact breed simple servility were it capable of practical application." ^^ As to the psychological nature of the obedience-compelling power, he ventured only so far as to say that it lay in the " might " of the sovereign,^* and that " The bulk of the given society are in a habit of obedience or submission to a determinate and common supe- rior." ^^ He admitted that every government continues only through the " consent " of the people, and interpreted consent as follows: "That, in every society, political and independent, the people are determined by motives of some description or another, to obey their government habitually: and that, if the bulk of the community ceased to obey it habitually, the government would cease to exist." ®® The motive of obedience may be approbation of the of law, he could but be content with a theory that put plausible reasons behind his traditional habits of thought. (Pound, op. cit., 2oS.) *8 Beard, " An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.'' *^ Austin, " Lectures on Jurisprudence," 1 : 98-99. "o " If a determinate human superior, not in a habit of obedience to a like superior, receive habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the society (including the superior) is a society political and independent." {Ibid., 1:226.) "Every positive law (or every law simply and strictly so called) is set, directly or circuitously, by a sovereign individual or body, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein its author is su- preme." {Ibid., 1: ag.) ^^Ibid., 1: 100; II:s5s. ^^ Ibid., 1: 169-170. °' Laski, " Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty," 273. "^ Austin, op. cit., 1:99. o'/AiW., 1:226. B8/*j^I:30S. 12 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE government, but this is often not the case, " the habitual obedience of the people in most or many communities, arising wholly or partly from their fear of the probable evils which they might suffer by resistance." " Austin dismissed questions of motives with scant attention, because the task he had set for himself was logical and not psychological and because in his time very little was known' about motives. For instance, we find remarks like this: "For the terms ' instinctive ' and ' instinct ' are merely negative expres- sions. They merely denote our own ignorance. They mean that the phenomena of which we happen to be talking are not preceded by causes which man is able to perceive." ^® Since this was written much progress has been made in the psychology of the instincts. Austin regarded sovereignty in England as vested in the king, lords and the electors of the House of Commons.®® His theory of sovereignty as obedience-compelling power was satisfying to the propertied classes which alone had political rights and alone were represented in the law-making body. In the latter part of the nine- teenth century, when the masses had been enfranchised and were be- ginning to exert an influence on legislation, there developed a tend- ency in EngHsh political thought " to recognize the forces which produce sovereignty." ^° This led to the drawing of a distinction between legal and political sovereignty. The legal sovereign is the final and determining authority in the legal order; the pohtical sov- ereign is that body in the state, " the will of which is ultimately obeyed by the citizens of the State." ^^ Dicey located this sov- ereignty in the " body of electors." *^ Ritchie went further and de- clared that it lay in the forces of public opinion — that " the ulti- mate political sovereign is not the determinate number of persons now existing in the nation, but the opinions and feeling of these persons. . . .^' Political sovereignty Is thus located " in the body of public sentiment or opinion to which the legal sovereign itself must ultimately render obedience." ^* While public opinion " le- gally possesses no power," and " cannot be enforced In the courts 5' Ibid., 1 : 305. ^8 Jbid., 1 : 149. 59 /*iU, 1:253. ^o Merriam, op. cit., 154. •1 Dicey, " Law of the Constitution," 66-67. 82 Ibid., 67. «3 Ritchie, " On the Conception of Sovereignty," An. Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sc, 1:407. "Merriam, 0^ oV., 156. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 13 of law," " politically ... it is supreme, it is the source of the legal sovereign, it must ultimately be obeyed. . . . " In this theory, then, the Austinian notion is recognized in the legal sovereign, the authority behind which the lawyer as lawyer need not go," *^ while the political sovereignty is the ultimate sovereignty. To understand it there is required a social-psycho- logical analysis of the relations of conflicting parties and classes,®® the outcome of which at any particular time is the effective public opinion.®'' The political scientist studies those aspects of the class struggle that have to be understood in order to understand party government, while the social psychologist analyses the rivalry of classes for control of the electorate and the processes which enter into that control. Austin's juristic conception of sovereignty eventually gained wide acceptance and is today the orthodox theory of sovereignty. This is not a psychological, but a purely logical theory, starting " with certain primary assumptions or definitions from which, by deductive reasoning, it determines those principles which give a systematic and logical character to constitutional and international jurisprudence." ®® As to the assumptions of this legal conception of sovereignty, it is said: "The point from which the analytical political philosopher starts is that a pohtically organized group of individuals may be conceived of as constituting an essential unity, and that the entity thus created may be regarded as a person in the legal sense of the word; that is, as a being, existing in idea, possess- ing legal rights and obligations as distinguished from those of the individuals who, concretely viewed, make up its body politic, and that, as such a personality, it is, through organs of its own creation, capable of formulating and uttering a legal will with reference to matters within the jurisdiction conceded to it. " Regarded as a legal person the prime characteristic of the state is that there is posited of it a will that is legally supreme. By its express command, or by its tacit acquiescence, it is thus viewed as the ultimate source of legality for every act committed by its own agents or by any persons whomsoever over whom it claims author- ed /W., 156. «« Commons, "A Sociological View of Sovereignty,'' Amer. Jour. Social., V:i-iS, 155-171. 347-366. 544-552. 683-695. 814-825; VI: 67-89. 8T Croly, " Progressive Democracy," 228-329. 88 Willoughby, "The Juristic Conception of the State," Amer. Pol. Sc. Rev., XII: 193. 14 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE ity. This supreme legally legitimizing will is termed sover- eignty." «» The legal theory of sovereignty does not, therefore, require any analysis of the assumed relations. Though disavowing a psycho- logical basis and affirming a purely deductive method, it does im- plicitly assume a psychological relation. The " whole structure rests upon the assumption that a law is a command to subjects." '^" That is, it implies a relation of habitual exercise of authority of the sovereign and habitual obedience of subjects. like that type of economic theory which disavows psychological assumptions, it does not escape them but, in the process of attempting to escape them, rests satisfied with traditional and unanalysed assumptions. This is justified on the ground that, while a science of social relations has to do with facts of social relations, when " we turn to the purely juristic inquiry as to the legal relations which unite the state and the individual, we start with the state. . . ." '^^ The state is imagined to be a unity, a personality, in order to give a logical emphasis to the assumed obedience-compelling power of the state. But the political scientist cannot get away from the necessity of psycho- logical analysis by a mere assumption of such unity and person- ality-. Whether or not it exists is a question of fact that cannot be glossed over by logical constructions. The legal theory assumes that the people of the state are a unit whose will is represented by the law. Laws that forbid serious crimes undoubtedly represent the will of the whole people. But there is a body of law which represents only the will of a class, not the will of the people as a whole. Law as such cannot, there- fore, be regarded as the will of the people as a whole. As will be explained in succeeding chapters, the people of a state, in their economic relations, are becoming organized into self-conscious, con- flicting classes, so that we must deny that the state is, as a matter of social-psychological fact, a unity and that law represents the will of the people as a whole.^^ It is maintained that phenomena of class struggle, if their sig- nificance is rightly understood, are not contrary to the juristic con- ception of sovereignty. It is said that the classes struggle for «» Ibid., 194.. 7i> Crane, "Discussion of Willoughby's Paper," Amer. Pol. Sc. Rev., XII:ai3. '■I Willoughby, op. cit., 195. 72 Laski, " Authority in the Modern State, 81, 65. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 15 possession of the thing which the old theory maintained to be es- sential in the state, namely, the power to enforce obedience inde- pendently of any restraining power. It is said that the thing ex- ists independently of the class which may use it for the time being. " But," reply the protagonists of the class-struggle theory of the state, " if the thing is exercised by a class as far as possible in its own interests, what is the thing but the will of a dominant class? " Still further driving their wedge they ask, " If the state is an inde- pendent personality with a legally absolute will, why does not it en- force this will impartially on all classes? The contrary is notori- ously the case. The law-enforcing organs are inclined to condone the crimes of an upper class, members of which often escape the penalties of the law, while members of a lower class, especially if they have incurred the odium of an upper, may suffer severe penal- ties for crimes of which they are innocent." Conspicuous ex- amples of condoned crimes of members of an upper class and of unjust punishments of members of a lower class who have incurred the hatred of an upper are adduced,''^* and the conclusion is drawn that there is a class control of government, that the ultimate fact in sovereignty is the exercise of the will of a dominant class, tem- pered more or less by the requirements for enlisting the support of the people in the maintenance of control over other classes. To this the defender of the legal theory replies that sovereignty is not the will of a class because laws at least represent a compromise between classes, a compromise worked out with a view to acquies- cence in the law by all classes. Furthermore, there are laws passed in accordance with the advice of expert commissions and there are rulings of commissions that have the force of law, which the masses do not understand but assent to as law, which capitalistic interests have to obey though unwillingly, and which assume, therefore, an obedience-compelling power of the sovereign people. The argu- ment is evidently drifting Into fields little investigated as yet; the problem requires social-psychological analysis. The increasing comprehension of the Inevltableness of class struggle and of Its significance for the legal conception of sover- "Lindsey and O'Higgins, "The Beast," Ch. XII; West, "The Colorado Strike" (Special Report prepared for the United States Commission on Industrial Relations), Ch. I; President Wilson's Mediation Commission, Report on the Mooney Dynamite Cases in San Francisco, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Official Bulletin, Jan. 28, 1918, 14-15; Report of President Wilson's Mediation Commission, on the Bisbee, Arizona, Deporta- tions, November 6, 1917, U. S. Dept. of Labor. i6 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE eignty has stimulated the ingenuity of the legal theorists in their attempts to represent the state as essentially one unified whole. An examination of the origin and development of the state proves, it is said, that " The State is an organism," ''* and " Sovereignty is the supremacy of the State over all its parts." ''^ This organ- ismic theory and the theory of sovereignty it supports, on the con- trary, is asserted by other political scientists to be untrue. What we actually find, says the brilliant French political scientist, Duguit, is " the man or the group of men who in fact in a given society are materially stronger than the others," and impose their will. The state is simply a " manifestation of force." ''^ It is " the simple fact of the differentiation between the governors and the gov- erned." '^^ The government is controlled by the class or body which monopolizes the force in a given society.'^^ This, says Duguit, may be done contrary to the welfare of the society; and a command of a government that is contrary to welfare is not a true law and should be disregarded.''*. He bases this deduction on his theory of a law of social solidarity which is above law that is a command of a sovereign, a theory that will be explained more at length in the chapter on natural rights. The essential fact in the consciousness of a group, he says, is a consciousness of social solidarity, a phenomenon that antedates any development of the state. This consciousness determines the nature and functioning of law and, therefore, the will of a sovereign is not essential to society and social progress. Such a will is contrary to social prog- ress except as it wills in conformity with the law and requirements of social solidarity. Duguit therefore denies that the essential characteristic of the state is a legally absolute will of the state as a political organism.®" He declares that this notion of sovereignty " leads fatally to the absolutism of the state." *^ Protagonists of the organismic theory have presented a psycho- logical theory of the nature of the personality of the state; and, opposed to it, are psychological. theories denying this personality. T* Ford, " The Natural History of the State," 174. " Ibid., 176. ''Duguit, "fitudes de droit public." Tome I: L'fitudes de droit objectif et la loi positive, 5, 19. ''''Ibid., a6i, 24a, 350. "/iiW., 4H. TO Ibid., 424. 80 Ibid., " Law in the Modern State," trans, by Laski, Ch. I. «^Ibid., "L'fetat, le droit objectif et la loi positive," 614. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 17 As an example of theories of state personality, Gierke maintained that each person possesses two capacities, the one individual and the other universal; that, in virtue of the universal in human nature, individuals form a state ; that law *^ and contractual relations ®* as- sume this state personality. This theory was elaborated by his successors who made exhaustive historical studies to demonstrate their fanciful conception.®* On the other hand, it is maintained that there is no such thing as a state personality; ®^ that law does not assume a state personality; and that the assumption of a juridical personality of constituent groups as the basis of contractual rela- tions is a " purely metaphysical " abstraction.®^ Political scientists are thus driven, by their controversies over the nature of sovereignty, to admit the psychological nature of the problem, or at least to admit that it cannot be solved without the aid of the social psychologist. Political science is thus brought into close relation with social psychology. It is for lack of an induc- tive method and of accurate and adequate psychological assump- tions that interpretations of the state have been developed deduc- tively, with analogical, organismic assumptions which have thrown no light on the nature of political relations.®'' 82 Gierke, "Das deutsche Genossenschaftsreclit," II: 368. 83 Ibid., " Die Genossenschaftstheorie," 135. 8* Coker, " Organismic Theories of the State," 76-79. 85 Duguit, " L'fitat, les Gouvernants et les Agents," 65 ; Duguit, " L'fitat, le droit objectif et la loi positive," 27, 40, 65. 88 Duguit, " Collective Acts as Distinguished from Contracts," Yale Law Journal, XXVII: 76z. 87 Coker, op. cit., Ch. V. CHAPTER II THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY ACCORDING to the juristic theory of sovereignty the obedi- ence-compelling power, in a representative government, is possessed by the voters who delegate it to their representa- tives.^ In addition to this purely juristic meaning of sovereignty there is another meaning, called " ethical." " Finally, it may be said that the term ' sovereignty of the people ' very often connotes a principle that is not juristic at all, but rather, an ethical doctrine that every group of individuals has a continuing inherent moral right themselves to determine, by whatever means they think ap- propriate for the purpose, the form of government under which they are to live, what it shall do and the persons into whose hands its operations shall be entrusted." ^ The authority of the state depends, then, on the assent of moral personality.^ The inter- action between the exercise of authority and the claims of moral personality constitutes the social-psychological problem of sover- eignty. The exercise of extra-legal sovereignty is seen not only on the rare occasions of revolutionary change of government, but also continually in determining what laws and ordinances it is expedient to enforce at a given time and what laws and ordinances shall be ignored. This is determined not by those who exercise the dele- gated sovereignty but, in the last analysis, by public opinion, to which those who exercise the delegated sovereignty are consciously or subconsciously susceptible. The unorganized, unconscious influ- ence of public opinion on representatives is a constant phenomenon as contrasted with the more rare occasions of a deliberate bringing of pressure to bear. We are brought, therefore, to an analysis of public opinion — of the attitudes, impulses and ideas of the voting masses, and of rival parties, classes, interests. The problem of 1 Willoughby, "The Juristic Conception of the State," Amer. Pol. Sc. Rev., XII: 205. ^ Ibid., 205. » Laski, " Authority in the Modern State," s8, 32-65- 18 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 19 sovereignty is, therefore, essentially a social-psychological problem. In a political democracy sovereignty is in the last analysis vested in the people.* The masses are for the most part not clearly con- scious of the real significance of their political action — that their choice between political parties is increasingly a choice between class interests. One of the functions of government is to enable conflicting classes to contest one with another for political control according to rules that eliminate the use of force.^ What they contest for is control over the masses; sovereignty is, in the last analysis, vested in the masses and not in a class. The social psy- chologist is interested, therefore, in an analysis of the political im- pulses and attitudes of the masses. What impulses and attitudes move them in the acceptance or rejection of candidates for political control? What distinguishes members of the masses from mem- bers of the classes that are rivals for control of the masses? Men who vote from partisanship year after year, regardless of the per- sonnel of the candidates, regardless of issues, assuredly are not moved in their political behaviour by class consciousness. Nor are men who change their party only when dissatisfied because of " slack times," or because they happen to dislike some personal trait of a candidate. Class consciousness is rapidly developing among farmers and workingmen In the United States but it is still in the incipient stage. Even among business men economic con- siderations are not so invariably the only considerations in political allegiance as we suppose. If we may judge from the frequent in- junctions to employers, In the publications of employers' associa- tions, to consider their economic interests more exclusively In their political activity and, from that point of view, to be more active in * Veblen, " Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution," 243-244. 5 This function of government was emphatically stated by former Justice Charles E. Hughes in a letter condemning the action of the New York Assembly in suspending five members of the Socialist party who had been elected to the Assembly: " If there was anything against these men as individuals, if they were deemed to be guilty of crim- inal offences, they should have been charged accordingly. But I understand that the action is not directed against these fixe elected members as individuals but that the pro- ceeding is virtually an attempt to indict a political party and to deny it representation in the Legislature. This is not, in my judgment, American Government. "Are Socialists, unconvicted of crime, to be denied the ballot? If Socialists are per- mitted to vote, are they not permitted to vote for their own candidates ? If their candi- dates are elected and are men against whom, as individuals charges of disqualifying offences cannot be laid, are they not entitled to their seats? ... If the Socialists were denied recourse through their duly elected representatives to the orderly processes of government, what resort is there left to them? Is it proposed to drive the Socialists to revolution by denying them participation in the means we have provided for orderly discussion of proposed changes in our laws? " (Associated Press, Jan. 9, 1920.) 20 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE politics. There is a great conventional mass of voters who ordi- narily vote according to habit, and, when they do not, follow some impulse that involves little intelligence and does not ally them with any class. Wherefore, classes that seek political control usually aim not too violently to disturb the beliefs of the conven- tionalized masses. The political phases recently assumed by the labour movement require social-psychological investigation because that movement is essentially a social-psychological phenomenon. Organized re- sistance of the workmen of an industry or of a nation is not a mere instinctive movement, though doubtless many workmen have little consciousness of an intelligent purpose. But labour leaders, and the intelligent opinion that directs a labour movement, have certain well-defined ideas that make it more than a mere instinctive re- sistance. The labour movement is not a resistance of all authority, for the more intelligent workmen realize the necessity of subordina- tion to authority that directs production. They realize the neces- sity of leadership but Insist that It shall be real leadership, leader- ship that wins loyalty because of ability to lead. Nor is the labour movement essentially a movement for higher wages. It does not spring fundamentally from dire need, nor from rivalry with em- ploying classes for more of the satisfactions of life, though need and rivalry are essential In It. Those who regard the labour move- ment as merely for more of the things of sense have not begun to understand It. Nor Is It as yet a movement for the fuller develop- ment of personality. Doubtless, when the economic basis has been made more certain, it will become a movement for a positive self- development along those lines that are to an extent pre-determined by the original nature of man. But today it Is a movement to escape the viclssltudinous aspect of industrial life.^ Before self- development can be thought of, workmen must be In a position of greater certainty with regard to their future. Today they are subject not only to the economic conditions that make industry un- certain for manufacturers, farmers and other employers, as well as for workmen, but to the uncertainty that is due to being under " Tead, " Instincts in Industry,'' 48 ; Webb, " Restoration of Trade Union Conditions," 77; Filene, "The Key to Successful Industrial Management," in a report of the Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sc. entitled, "Modern Manufacturing," 1919, 9; Ross, "A Legal Dismissal Wage," Amer. Econ. Rev., IX (supplement) : 133-134; Commons, "Industrial Goodwill," 71-72 ; Tannenbaum, " Labor Movement Psychology," Nezu Republic, July 7, 1920, 169-170. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 2i a boss or under a management on whose will, often on whose mere liking or dislike, depends the opportunity to earn a living^ Work- men generally may be discharged at the will of the employer. Employers often foster a feeling of uncertainty as to jobs in order to make workmen more submissive. Their wages are not sufficient to enable them, with strictest economy, to make adequate provision for a long period of unemployment ; or for a long period of illness, to which industrial workers are more liable than others owing to the occupational diseases ; ^ or for injury due to accidents ; or for their families in case of death of the bread-winner; or for old age. In cases where wages are sufficiently high to meet the ordinary con- tingencies there is the chance that they may be lowered at any time, inasmuch as, where workmen are unorganized for collective bar- gaining, they have no voice in determining their wages. " They are often free to change their employer, but a new employer is only a new master." ^ The workman is not in control of his fate. His life and that of his family from day to day are in the highest degree uncertain, and the only way he can see to make it certain is to exer- cise control in the management of industry. This movement for control gains added Impulsion from the workman's aversion to mo- notonous work intensified by the driving of a boss, his " instinctive resistance against suppression of the freedom for play, for interest, for creativeness." " If this movement is not to continue a mere class movement, a phenomenon of resistance to class domination breeding class an- tagonism and general disorder, it must appeal to the people of the state, and, we might add, to the members of the Christian churches to which many of the people belong, as a moral movement. Here again we must consider its social-psychological basis and the social- psychological basis of morality. The subject requires extended treatment but the writer believes it can be proved that an essential condition of moral and therefore of political progress is the intro- duction of increasing certainty in economic relations and of an in- creasing sense of responsibility of labour. For, first, the instincts stirred by uncertainty, for instance, fear, are contrary to moral ^ Croly, " Progressive Democracy," 383. s U. S. Bureau Labor Statistics, " Preventable Death in Cotton Manufacturing Indus- try," Bulletin, No. 251. Croly, op. cit., 383. w Tannenbaum, " Labor Movement Psychology," New Republic, July 7, 1920, 171. 22 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE progress. A certain type of traditional morality rests on fearful self-restraint, as does a certain type of traditional theology. But moral progress requires that impulses of self-restraint, the duty of which has been so long preached by the political and ecclesiastical representatives of a dominant class," shall give way to impulses for the attainment of the positively good life.^^ But the position of workmen impedes this development inasmuch as many employers maintain that workmen must be kept in uncertainty and fear of losing their jobs in order to stimulate them to work. Second, an uncertain life begets an impulsiveness that is contrary to moral progress, as distinguished from the forethought, foresight, and careful planning made possible by a reasonable certainty and sta- bility of economic life. The vicissitudinous aspect of man's work- ing life from the beginning, his necessary appeal to chance in gain- ing a livelihood, has resulted in appeal to chance in recreation, for instance, in gambling, and in a predilection for pleasures that ex- tremely excite strong instincts. Traditional morality merely preaches the necessity of self-restraint and the duty of repressing these forms of Immorality with social disapproval or ostracism, and traditional religion offers a theology sanctioning this program. Morality depends on communal approval and disapproval, but moral progress requires also the removal of the causes of these immoral pleasures, including the evil economic conditions; and it requires a public education that will make communal approval and disapproval intelligent. Third, the unsettled state of the working classes as a result of their economic uncertainty makes very difficult or impossible the application of moral sanctions to Individual con- duct. The constant movement of peoples through the great cen- tres of population prevents that acquaintanceship and coftimunal life which is necessary if the individual is to care anything about the opinions of his neighbours. And the church finds it difficult to form out of such a population a parish which can be made amenable to the religious sanctions of morality. Fourth, the uncertain and un- settled state of the working classes also makes impossible political efficiency. Municipal government to be effective requires that the people of a district live together long enough to be well enough acquainted to co-operate in political action.^^ Finally, the unsettled i'^ Croly, op. cit., 409-433. ''^^ Ibid., "Disordered Christianity," The New Republic, Dec. 31, 1919, 137. 18 Goodnow, " City Government in the United States," iS-ai. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 23 state of the working classes makes impossible educational efficiency. Children get well started in one school and then have to move on to another, where often they fail to get adjusted and lose interest. Teachers just begin to understand their pupils and to be able to give them individual attention when they disappear. From the point of view, then, of the development of moral personality, and of efficient communal, ecclesiastical, political, and educational pro- cedure, the labour movement to reduce the vicissitudinous aspect of the life of the working masses is a moral movement. As such it deserves the support of all the people of the state, and the sanction of the church. If the church withholds its sanction, it will lose what influence over the masses it still retains ; and if the people of the state who are not immediately involved withhold their sanction the movement will inevitably develop more of the aspects of a class conflict for the control of governments.^* The conception of social class, also, is a social-psychological con- ception. Professor Hoxie states the case in his lucid and incisive style. " There are two current tests or modes of definition of classes — the objective or mechanical, and the subjective or psycho- logical. From the objective or mechanical standpoint, classes are defined in terms of wealth or social position, occupation, . . . etc. Thus we commonly speak of the rich, the middle class, and the poor, . . . From the subjective or psychological standpoint, classes are defined in terms of viewpoint, i.e., in terms of motive, belief, attitude, . . . ". . . Thus, from a psychological standpoint, all those, what- ever the source of their income, who feel that their interests are identical with those of the employers, . . . belong to the employ- ing class, while those who feel that their interests are with the wage- workers, or whose motives, . . . social attitudes and sympathies are in harmony with the mass of the workers, belong to the labour- ing class. " But now there are those who say that this is a distinction with- out a difference ; that at bottom these two standpoints are identical, since one's view of his own interests or one's motives, . . . social attitudes and sympathies are determined by his economic interests or his objective environment. . . . " There are, however, two reasons for the failure of coincidence of the objective . . . and the psychological social groups. It is ''■* Croly, " Progressive Democracy," 388-390. 24 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE not a part of the environment of the individual, the economic part, that makes him what he is spiritually, but the total social environ- ment. . . . Secondly, men are not wholly determined in their atti- tudes, habits of thought and sympathies by the immediate environ- ment, but also by personal and social heredity and tradition. . . . " There is, then, a real distinction between these standpoints or tests for judging of the existence or non-existence of social classes, and It will make a difference which of these tests or standpoints we adopt, for the existence of classes is apparently much more easily proved from the objective and mechanical standpoint than from the subjective or psychological standpoint. " Which of these tests shall we then apply? The answer seems clear. The Important test for us is the subjective or the psycho- logical, because we are making a study of labour conditions and problems not merely to discover what conditions and problems exist, but primarily to determine what can and ought to be done to better conditions and to solve problems ... we need to know what causes these classes to exist, how they stand related to one another in interest and motive, and what their quality, organization and strength are." ^^ What we are interested in is the essential or psychological nature of classes and class relations, for on this depends what combina- tion of classes for political action will take place. For instance, if farmers and workmen are alike animated by an attitude of re- sistance against reactionary capitalistic Interests,^® a combination of the two classes to win political control " is more likely than is a combination of capitalists and farmers or of capitalists and work- men. To be sure the instinctive resistance of farmers and work- is Hoxie, "Trade Unionism in the United States,'' 350-353. 18 Methodist Federation for Social Service, "The Revolt of the Farmers," bulletin for July, 1919; King, "The Prosecution of Mr. Townley," The Nation, Aug. 2, 1919, 143. 1'' " Labor-Farmer Politics," Survey, Feb. 22, 1919, 733; Sandburg, "The Farmer- Labor Congress," Survey, Feb. 21, 1920, 604-605; Gillette, "The North Dakota Har- vest of the Nonpartisan League," Survey, March i, 1919, 753-760; Johnson, "Minne- sota and the Nonpartisan League," The Nenu Republic, Oct. 8, 1919, 291; Colcord "Labor and the Farmers," The Nation, Jan. 3, 1920. The political co-operation of farmers and workmen has spread to Canada. Up to 1919 the farmers and labourers of Ontario had supported the regular parties on the strength of fair promises. In October, 1919, by co-operation, they elected forty-five Farmers and eleven Labourites to the Ontario House, thus getting a majority over the other parties combined. See Social Welfare (Organ of Social Service Council of Canada), Toronto, Dec. i, 1919, p. 60. ' THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 25 men will have to become very intense to overcome the marked dif- ference in their political attitudes.^® But, when Instinctive impulses are sufficiently aroused they tend to prevail over attitudes that have been formed under other economic conditions, so that, when the instinctive impulses suggest a common purpose, this is apt eventually to prevail. Instinctive impulses in the last analysis determine what combinations of classes will take place in the rivalry for political control. The farming class is instinctively moved in two direc- tions: against the domination of reactionary capitalistic interests, and against a non-propertied class if the latter seems to seek a too radical regulation of prices, or a sweeping away of property rights. Whether the farming class will ultimately co-operate with the capitalistic class or with a non-propertied class will depend on the degree of domination exercised over the farming class by the capitalistic class and the resentment stirred thereby, as compared with the degree of fear inspired by the attitude of the non-proper- tied class against all property. The class struggle for the control of governments has not yet enlisted the mass of voters in the United States. Voters generally resent the idea of a class openly trying to control the government; at the same time they acquiesce in the traditional political control exercised by propertied classes. The conventional rank and file of voters tend, therefore, to oppose a labour party as being an open and avowed effort of the working classes to control the government. Voters oppose a mass movement to influence the government, which they can see, as against reactionary capitalistic class control of government, which they cannot see. Furthermore, the law as it has developed, is mainly for the protection of private property,^^ wherefore the propertied classes appear as the classes to be pro- tected and respected. The propertied classes are not only the legally protected and respected classes but also the popularly ad- mired classes, while the working classes are the contemned classes ; wherefore the rank and file of voters will support a poHtical party that represents, primarily, propertied classes when they would not support a labour party. This attitude of the public Is a more seri- ous obstacle to a labour party In the United States than in England and Germany where a larger proportion of the population are 18 Bernard, "A Theory of Rural Attitudes," Amer. Jour. Social., XXII: 637-647. 19 See the chapter entitled, Psychological Processes in the Development of Private Property {concluded). 26 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE wage-earners. Until the wage-earners in the United States con- stitute a considerable majority of the voting population, as they eventually will,^" a labour party will suffer the same heavy handi- cap that a labour union suffers in time of strike, when the public tends to sympathize with employers, just because they belong to the admired social class, rather than with the workmen, because they belong to the contemned social class. However, the increasing apprehension of a reactionary capitalis- tic control of government has tended to increase the number of independent voters. The " independent voter " is one who is breaking away from the conventionalized mass of voters. He votes against a party which appears to have become a party com- mitted to class interests, as in the independent support of Mr. Wilson for tariff revision downward in 1912. When they thus vote against a class independent voters do not think of themselves as thereby constituting an opposing class but as voting on behalf of the people against a privileged class. The' independent vote is numerically weak and in most cases politically ineffective against a privileged class, owing to the limited education of the independent voters and to the fact that they do not come into direct contact with the national and international situations that require political action. They become acquainted with those situations through the press, which, because it controls the sources of information, is able, through social suggestion, to incline the independent voters to the propaganda that suits the reactionary capitalistic interests that exer- cise so marked a control over the press. The " independent vote " is, therefore, not the vote of those who really think independently and adequately on political problems, but of non-partisan minds that are more or less subject to the social control exercised through the press. He is a rare man who understands sufficiently the arts of newspaper control to escape their influence. A politically dominant class that does not too violently disturb the conventional masses can go a long way in the use, in its own interest, of the sovereignty vested in the masses. The " will of the people " is a vague acquiescence *^ which a dominant class turns in the direction of its own interests. This acquiescence is rein- forced by the survival, among the masses, of attitudes that charac- 2" Croly, " Progressive Democracy," 380. 21 "Europe's Misery and America's Complacency," Neio Republic, Nov. iz, 1919, 307. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 27 terized them before they were sovereign, for instance, the attitude of subservience to a ruling class. ^^ Furthermore, citizens still have much respect for " law as such," and for law as having behind it the strong arm of the state. In the same way, people have respect for moral law as such and because God is believed to stand behind it.''^ As one man expressed it, " my religion is not my conscience but what lies back of my conscience." God back of moral law, especially if God is represented by a vigorous ecclesiastical organi- zation, causes respect for moral law, and the sovereign back of civil law causes respect for civil law. The attitude of unthinking deference to law as such has been much disturbed of late years by the critical attitude that has de- veloped owing to law invading the sphere of personal liberty more and more. If law is the body of rules necessary for a collective life, then the increasing complexity of that life will require an in- creasing invasion of personal liberty. Some of these laws are, on their face, foolish, because carelessly drawn by ignorant legislators, or because passed to placate public sentiment that could be placated by the mere passage of a law. For the same reason some of the rules and regulations issued by governmental commissions and ap- plying to public utilities, factories, stores, banks or the farm are foolish, and because they are, sometimes, undoubtedly foolish their wisdom often is doubted and they are ridiculed when they are not foolish but appear to be so because the situation Is not understood. All this implies an increasingly critical attitude to law, for we are living in an age when the inefficient law-making and administrative branches can hardly keep pace with the rapidly changing situations that demand legislation.^* The attitude to law is, therefore, com- ing to be less an attitude of blind deference than heretofore. It is not an attitude of disrespect for all law but for laws that are thought to be foolish. So much for the changing attitude to law as such. There is also an increasingly critical attitude toward the law en- forcing power. Respect for the strong arm of the state weakens when it comes to be understood that that strong arm is often moved by reactionary capitalistic interests. Instances when reactionary 22Pillsbury, "The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism," 193-194. 2S For the time when this attitude was all but universal see Green, " Town Life in the Fifteenth Century," 11:8. **I.aski, "Authority in the Modern State," 379. 28 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE capitalistic interests systematically forced governmental agencies to act contrary to law, and secured the repeal of laws that stood in the way of the exercise of their will create a profound impression, ^^ be- cause the strong arm of the state, in those instances, is seen to obey the will of a class, not the will of the whole people. This growing distrust of the power of the state is apparent even among the most conservative part of the population, the farmers, who are ceasing to be a part of a conventional mass of voters and to realize that they are a distinct class which must federate with other classes of like interests and seek to control the voters against classes the interests of which are opposed to its own. Law thus ceases to be something to be assented to as having behind it the strong arm of the state; for each class comes to think of itself as the possible mover of that strong arm and of law as the expression of its own will, which, however, never can act entirely independently because of the necessity of not violating too far the beliefs of the still con- ventional masses, and because of the necessity, if control is to be maintained, of not impressing the masses as unjust to other classes. These problems as to the relations of class and mass — as to the ultimate nature of sovereignty — are, as already indicated, termed " ethical " by the political scientist, who says that the studies broaden out " into an examination of the premises of a final politi- cal philosophy." ^® This examination involves social-psychological investigations. These investigations have an historical aspect. In the early American rural community law had a twofold psychological basis. First, It was an expression of what was felt to be necessary for the collective life of the community; ^'^ enforcement of law was an im- pulsive reaction of communal resentment against the law-breaker. Second, the law was that whereby the self-reliant farmer got his rights in a dispute over property.^* Both these functions are vio- lated in so far as there is control by a dominant class. First, in- stead of law being an expression of what is necessary for the col- 25 Lindsey and O'Higgins, " The Beast." See also, " Final Report of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations," 1915, 53-80, 139-160; West, "The Colorado Strike," Special Report of U. S. Com. on Ind. Rel., 1915; Shaw, "Closed Towns," Sur- vey, Nov. 8, 1919, 38 ; Hard, " What the Miners are Thinking," Nenu Republic, Nov. 12, 1919, 324; Hard, "A Class Policy in Coal," Neiv Republic, Nov. 19, 352-355. 28 Willoughby, "The Individual and the State," Amer. Pol. Sc. Re-v., VIII: 2. 27 Williams, " An American Town," Pt. II, Ch. XI. 28 Ibid., Pt. I, Ch. IV. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 29 lective life of the community, it becomes an expression of what serves the interests of a dominant class. Second, instead of law being that whereby a man maintains himself against a " grasping " man, it is that by which the grasping corporation prevails over the citizens. The functioning of the law in defence of the self-reliant citizen has been impeded by the development of the laws' delays,^* and by the increase of court costs and fees and of the expense of counsel.^" The wealthy and well-to-do classes still have the means to get legal justice while the working masses have not, so that they are at a disadvantage with, often at the mercy of, the propertied classes whenever the law must be invoked to get justice.^^ The increasing disrespect for law is not a disrespect for law functioning properly but for law when it functions on behalf of propertied classes and contrary to the interests of non-propertied classes and individuals. The functioning of a constitutional government depends In the last analysis on respect for law as the instrument of justice, for the essential fact in constitutional government Is that It Is a government under law. President Goodnow makes this very explicit: "What Is it now that we mean by constitutional government? How does it differ from the other forms of government which the history of the world exhibits? . . . By constitutional government is meant, in the first place, a government which, as opposed to what may be called personal government. Is based not on the temporary caprice and whim of those who possess political power, but which, on the contrary, is carried out In accordance with rules so clearly defined and so generally accepted as effectively to control the actions of public officers. Constitutional government is then, in the first place, a government of laws and not a government of men." ^^ What are the social-psychological facts implied In this distinction? A government of laws implies an attitude of subjects to law which the subjects of a government of men do not possess.^^ In a gov- ernment of men the authority of a ruler depends more on his per- sonality than in a government of laws, particularly on his doml- 29 Smith, " Justice and the Poor," Ch. IV. 30 Ibid., Chs. V-VI. ^^Ibid., 33. 32' Goodnow, " Principles of Constitutional Government," 1-2. 33 See the analysis of the difference between the German and the Anglo-Saxon atti- tudes to law in the chapter entitled, The Conflict of Political Attitudes and Ideals. 30 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE nating power, and that of the men he controls, in the interest of his domination. If the state originated in conquest and despotic con- trol by a conquering group,^* domination was assuredly the essen- tial fact in the formation of the state. In the ancient despotisms, the power of the despot depended on his personal dominating power. If he was strong and commanding, his power was abso- lute. Thus it is said of the Egyptian Pharaoh, Amenemhet I, 2000-1970 B. c. : " He ruled in absolute power; there was none to offer a breath of opposition; there was not a whisper of that modern monitor of kings, public opinion, an inconvenience with which rulers in the Orient are rarely obliged to reckon, even at the present day. With a man of strong powers on the throne, all were at his feet, but let him betray a single evidence of weakness, and he was quickly made the puppet of court coteries." ^' Conse- quently kings exaggerated their dominating powers by assuming an extreme expression of domination and were pleased by exag- gerated expressions of submission in others. A Roman emperor assumed a ferocious expression and ordered a menacing and terri- fying expression to be given to his statues. The Egyptian Pharaohs had themselves sculptured with the impassive calm of the mighty man who is far above the necessity of seriously considering any opposition to his will.^® At the present day, under any form of government, an official with a personality of dominating power is able to carry through financial, industrial or political plans where a man lacking such power would encounter formidable opposition. In the ancient despotisms, the people were kept in fearful submis- sion by the fear-inspiring beliefs of a theology and ritual in charge of a priesthood allied with the despot; by arbitrary and fearful punishments meted out to resisters, causing constant apprehension ameng those tempted to voice their resentment; and by a habit of submission fostered by keeping the people in a condition of poverty and ignorance and servitude. A government of laws shows a similar far-reaching social-psycho- logical basis. A government of laws is due essentially to an atti- tude of subjects to law which makes such a government possible. It is an attitude that insists on all, high as well as low, obeying the 31 Oppenheimer, " The State," 52-78. 85 Breasted, " A History of Egypt7' 235. ^"Ibid., 120, 306, 321, 354. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 31 law of the land. In England the Constitution developed as the result of efforts to curtail the autocratic power of the ruler, and compel him to obey the law of the land. Consequently the Eng- lish form of government is a limited monarchy; the Crown is regarded as having all powers not expressly withheld in the Con- stitution.*^ This form of government differs essentially from that of the United States, the Constitution of which was " based squarely on the idea of popular sovereignty." ^* The Constitution was made by a people who had renounced their ruler. It was regarded as an expression of the popular will, and provided that the organs of government should exercise only the powers given them in the Constitution.** However, propertied classes were influential In the constitutional convention, which framed certain provisions of the Constitution in a way that made the judiciary a bulwark of propertied classes against possible control of the legislature by a non-propertied majority;*'' and this role of the judiciary has in- volved it in questions foreign to its proper function.*^ A government of laws, as contrasted with a government of men, diminishes apprehension as to the behaviour of the governing body by defining the conditions under which subjects may exercise free- dom of speech and action without fear of despotic interference, though in the leading constitutional governments this legal defi- nition of freedom Is not explicit.*^ A dominant class may repress it in the Interest of its dominance. A government of laws also diminishes the need of the exercise of dominating power on the part of officials in order to maintain their position, because their tenure and duties are defined by laws which are generally respected. The more Impulsive aspects of political behaviour are thus elimi- nated by the legally established routine. As a matter of fact there were customary regulations of the behaviour of rulers long before legal regulations; but these customs were strengthened by explicit legal endorsement. Thus it was that the English judiciary devel- oped the English common law out of custom, by affirming custom often in opposition to the royal wish, which made the judiciary the " Goodnow, op. cit., 85. 88 Ibid., 85. " Ibid., 89. *o Beard, " An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States," iS7-i6i; Beard, "The Supreme Court and the Constitution," Chs. II-IV. *i Goodnow, op. cit., 267-268. *^Ibid., zzs. 32 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE traditional bulwark of a government of laws.** A government of laws also facilitates the adjustments necessitated by the class con- flict, for the class rivalry may take the form of a rivalry of political parties, under laws that provide for the free action of such parties. In a democracy with majority rule, the sanction of law depends in the last analysis on the might of the majority. This might is not necessarily intelligent; it means, in the last analysis, superior force. The general sentiment for majority rule is due : ( i ) to the long struggle against minority rule and the ultimate replacing of the force of the propertied minority by the force of the majority; (2) to the general belief that while the action of the majority Is not necessarily wise, yet in a government of the people and for the people, it is more to be trusted than a minority, no matter how wise; (3) to the common man's sense of the power of the majority and his willingness to abide by its decisions.** Majority rule is conducive to social order, wherefore a propertied minority accepts it as, from the point of view of its class interests, having some merit, and aims to maintain control of the situation by controlling the majority. Because the majority of voters are non-propertied, the propertied minority feels an apprehension for the security of Its property rights in a government chosen by the majority, and justi- fies the measures taken to maintain Its traditional control of gov- ernment on the ground of their necessity in a state where the ma- jority rules. It regards these measures as necessary for Its pro- tection against an " overbearing majority," as James Madison called It.*^ The non-propertied masses in the United States have not yet awakened to the significance for their interests of the rule of the majority. For the most part they acquiesce in the tradi- tional political control of propertied classes. In a state with universal suffrage and majority rule, and In which the majority is non-propertied, the propertied classes cannot, even from the standpoint of class interests, safely assume their power permanently to control the non-propertied. Business men of the progressive type realize that the non-propertied majority must no longer be left In Ignorance of Its responsibilities as the final reposi- *5 See the chapter entitled, Psychological Implications of Interpretations of Private Rights. **De Tocqueville, "The Republic of the United States of America," 11:269, 27S- 283; Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," 11:322. *5 The Federalist, No. X. Beard, " An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States," 157. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 33 tory of political power. One of these business men, Edward A. Filene, Director of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, writes: " The formation of the American Labour Party, and the platform adopted by it in New York and Chicago, cannot be denied their significance. They aim to assert labour's authority in the political field, as in the economic, and to make it prevail there. In view of the heavy majority by which employes outnumber employ- ers, the sweeping accession of power this party would win, if the rank and file gave it support at the polls, is quite obvious. " Even if the American Labor Party should appear but feeble in votes, one must remember that all it needs to acquire is a balance of power, in order to make itself strong in our national Con- gress. . . . " Plainly there is danger in sight if the control of legislation shall come to labor with a feeling still extant of wrongs endured and of grievances undischarged, and yet with no new factors of re- sponsibility admitted to the equation. . . . " How shall we set about to inspire in labor a larger sense of responsibility? I know of but one way, and that is to give labor a larger actuality of responsibility, to let employees feel and know that they are not merely being ' managed ' but are also sharing in the tasks of management. The power that wrings by force a concession from an employer is seldom followed by any manifesta- tion on the employees' part that they hold themselves accountable for the success of that concession in actual practice. On the con- trary, the power that leads to a sense of responsibility is the power that ... by being possessed of reasonable rights of initiation, acquires by unavoidable sequence a human interest in, and a re- sponsibility for, the success or failure of its conclusions." *^ Contrasted with this progressive attitude is the reactionary busi- ness attitude. From discussions and arguments with men of re- actionary views the attitude appears something like this: In the first place, on the economic side the long absorption in the effort to make money in a certain business results in a mesh of habits and attitudes that determine the business behaviour. Students are apt to make the mistake of thinking that the business man is always consciously reasoning, in his business and political behaviour, from the point of view of his own business interests. This is untrue. *6 Filene, "The Shop Committee," Current Affairs, Mar. 17, 1919, 6. 34 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE It is difficult to get many business men to talk seriously on business or political problems because it is difficult to get them to think. In his own business he has fallen into the habit of acting without reasoning, according to habit (he calls it a " second sight "), and he is apt so to act in politics. Now in business when an intel- lectually-in-earnest young employe proposes any change in the busi- ness, the conservative business man, because of this averseness to thinking, because of his addiction to habit, is not apt to take the proposal seriously, and the same is true of his attitude to a political reform. But in his business he is boss and the proposal of the young fellow goes no further. Without any effort on the part of the manager to dominate the situation the matter is simply dropped. It is dropped in virtue of his recognized position of authority, owing to which it is not usually necessary for him to exercise domination. It is dropped without any particular discussion as to its merits. But in politics he does not occupy the same position of authority. And, unless he is indifferent to the issue, he is forced to become reactionary and to join in an attempt to dominate the political situation. What is his motive when he thus becomes reactionary? It is something like this. He realizes that, in a political democracy with nominal majority rule, the propertied minority has controlled the political situation up to the present time. He also realizes that the non-propertied majority has become more intelligent as to the fact of this minority rule and as to what constitutes its own inter- ests, in spite of the efforts of the propertied minority to control its political thinking and action. If he is a man of any intelligence he realizes further that, in the long run, the non-propertied majority is going to try to get, through political action, the reforms that it wants in economic relations and gradually will succeed. But his impulse is to dominate the situation and retard the success of this movement. Reactionaries differ in their attitudes. The most con- servative and dominating will retard the movement just as far as possible and " will fight to the last ditch," all the time planning, if the reform appears to be inevitable, to " beat the other side to it " and make it as innocuous as possible. This attitude justifies itself with the secondary explanation that " Progress is an evolution. We have been going too fast. We must put the brakes on now and you ought to help us." The prestige of the idea of evolution THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 35 is invoked as a secondary explanation of a reaction that is essen- tially an instinctive impulse of domination. The idea follows the reaction merely as an excuse and is not a vital part of the motive, and for this reason is called a secondary explanation. But it may serve to impress others that the motive is justified. Those who are not keen enough, or who lack the social-psychological training that is necessary to detect the real motive of the reactionary be- haviour may let the explanation cover up the real motive, and may assent to the behaviour because of the prestige of the explanation. The less conservative and more intelligent reactionary type is less instinctive in its behaviour. In addition to the instinctive im- pulse to dominate the situation, which does not carry this type so far as to fight to the last ditch, there is the theory that " if the majority is to rule let it show its power to rule, and let it show that it is intelligent enough." The contention is that a particular act of social legislation ought not to come until the majority intelli- gently wants it. " We ought not to let a few reformers put this thing over." This type will support a deceiving propaganda on the ground that if the more intelligent of the public who are the victims of such a propaganda have not the intelligence not to be deceived, they lack the intelligence that is necessary to make the law, if passed, effective for the public welfare. If they can be de- ceived by propaganda, they can be deceived by politicians in ad- ministering the law. This type of reactionary at least is more in- telligent than the other type; the justifications of the attitude are more than mere secondary explanations. Unlike mere excuses, they raise a question as to the necessary social-psychological basis of social legislation. But the reactionary of this type is distin- guished from the progressive by the fact that, though the reaction- ary urges the necessity of popular intelligence as a basis of effec- tive legislation, he is opposed both to the perfectly free education which is necessary in order to increase popular intelligence, and also to those reforms in industrial relations advocated by a pro- gressive like Mr. Filene that look to the creation of popular intelli- gence in the course of industrial relations. That is, he is essen- tially reactionary in that he is opposed to measures that are neces- sary in order to make men intelligently progressive. Reactionaries generally assume, though they may not publicly admit it, that property-owners should " run the country " and that 36 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE the way for wage-earners to get political power is by becoming property-owners.*'' At the same time, they are conscious of the fact that men do not become property owners as easily as formerly. They are less and less able to escape the argument that the wages of labour generally are such that workmen could not, even with ideal economy and self-restraint, accumulate any considerable sav- ings. Only the extraordinary workman who rises to a superior position can become a property owner. Wherefore the assumption that wage-earners may become property-owners is contrary to the actual conditions, and employers are 'coming to realize that work- men are awakening to this fact, and are seeking political power by organizing. And workmen realize that their political strength, as far as this depends on numbers, is rapidly on the increase. Em- ployers who candidly face these facts of the working class con- sciousness are uneasy with respect to the permanency of their po- litical control. The progressive political attitude of employers favours govern- mental measures that facilitate co-operation of classes for the public welfare. The reactionary political attitude seeks the maintenance by force of the control over the non-propertied majority by the propertied minority; and this is one motive for the hearty support given by many employers in the United States to organizations of former soldiers, and for their support of compulsory military train- ing. The military class always has been the ready servant of dom- inating propertied classes. The alternatives of the co-operation of classes for the public welfare (which co-operation probably would eventually so equalize the distribution of property as to do away with the distinction between the classes as we now have it) are the development of a militarism *^ for the repression of non-propertied class, or, if this is nipped in the bud, an increasingly bitter class struggle. The first effect of a realization on the part of the small-proper- tied and non-propertied classes of a class control of government that is against their interests is a distrust of government as such. ^' Croly, "Progressive Democracy,'' 381-382. *8 Those who are incredulous as to the ease with which a militarism may develop in a " free country " are evidently unacquainted with the arbitrary, illegal and often brutal repression of legal meetings of resisting workmen by city and state police and soldiers, in the United States, in 1919, reference to which will herein-after be made. Instances of similar ruthless military domination occurred in the British Empire. See "The Peril of the Military Mind," in the London Nation, Dec. 20, 1919, 413. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 37 The distrusting population does not immediately constitute itself a distinct class seeking to wrest control of the government from the controlling class. The first tendency is not a tendency to a vigor- ous class conflict under governmental forms, with acquiescence in the control of the victorious class for the legal period, followed by another conflict under legal forms, but is a tendency to a disintegra- tion of government. The awakened population, inert and without leaders as a distinct class, comes to distrust government altogether. It is this psychological condition that is an essential cause of that individualistic attitude toward governmental regulation of indus- try, of organized labour and other awakened sections of the popu- lation in the United States at the present time,** which reformers find to be an obstacle to the improvement of industrial conditions by governmental action.^" Before we can discuss the question as to what functions the democratic state ought to assume, we must know what is the political attitude of the people in order to know whether there are psychological guarantees that laws in further- ance of desirable functions can be enacted and enforced.^ ^ The individualistic attitude of organized labour in the United *^ Another cause is the traditional individualistic attitude of the propertied and con- trolling classes in the United States, surviving from England (Pound, " The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought," Harvard Law Re'vieiu, XXX: 207), and con- firmed by the economic freedom of the new world. ^o Professor W. F. Willoughby whites : " It has now been a matter of something over twenty-five years that I have been earnestly interested in the great movement for the improvement of industrial conditions and the betterment of the conditions of labour. ... I believe that progress has been achieved and that a further advance is inevi- table. ... It is when, however, I look back on the tremendous efforts that have been put forth to bring about these few and isolated achievements . . . that I am impressed with the fact that something must be radically wrong. . . ." He believes what is wrong is that " Back in their mind the American people are still dominated by the dogmas of laissez-faire and individualism as preached by the Manchesterian and utilitarian schools of the middle nineteenth century. They still are influenced, though often unconsciously, by the doctrine that all resort to the state is to be deprecated." (Willoughby, "The Philosophy of Labor Legislation," Amer. Pol. Sc. Rev., VIII: 15- 16.) As far as I have studied this individualism, however, many men who oppose labour legislation know nothing about laissez-faire, and those who do, use it merely as a justification of an attitude that is more fundamental than the idea used to justify it. Most men know nothing about economic doctrines and care less. From impres- sions they have received they believe that the state and national governments are extravagant and inefficient, that officials are, for the most part, creatures of political organizations dominated by " politicians '' who " are in it for what they can get out of it," who care nothing for the masses, and are only too eager to serve corporate in- terests. Believing as they do, they distrust the government's efficiency and disinterest- edness. The individualistic attitude is based, therefore, not on doctrine but on impres- sion and belief. 61 See the chapter entitled, Psychological Implications of the Theory of Natural Rights. 38 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE States has been confirmed by certain conditions which made the progress of labour through governmental action extremely difficult. " American trade unions are unique in that, of the labour move- ments in the whole world, with the sole exception of the French Confederation Generale du Travail, they make the least demand upon the government along the line of legal protection to labour. Owing to the constitutional separation of powers between the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, and especially owing to the existence of four dozen different state governments, each a law unto itself, American labour leaders have for the most part become convinced, after long and discouraging experience with unconsti- tutional and unenforceable labour laws, that only through trade unions can the wage-earner secure protection worthy of the name. ... It is for this reason that it (the American Federation of Labor) desires to have trade union members in all the public offices dealing with labour, and, on the whole, remains indifferent to the consideration of efficiency in the administration of labour laws. . . . " When employers discovered that they could not place complete reliance upon the executive officers of the democratically controlled state, they turned to the courts for protection. The latter re- sponded by developing a code of trade union law, which, having for its cornerstone a resurrected doctrine of malicious conspiracy as applied to labour combinations and, for its weapon, the injunc- tion, proceeded to outlaw the boycott, to materially circumscribe the right to strike, and even to turn against labour the Federal statutes which had been originally directed against railway and in- dustrial monopoly. " The height of this development, which had begun in the eighties and continued during the nineties, was reached in the well- known Danbury Hatters' case, passed upon by the United States Supreme Court early in 1908.^2 The Sherman anti-trust law, of 1890, had been applied in labour cases in the past, notably in the Pullman boycott case, but never in a civil suit for damages against the individual members of a trade union. In this case the signifi- cant thing was not that a few union leaders were to be punished with short terms of imprisonment, but that the life savings of sev- eral hundreds of the members were attached to satisfy the stagger- "2 For the several stages of this case, see Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908) ; Lawlor v. Loewe, 209 Fed. 741 (1913), 235 U. S. 522 (1914). THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 39 ing triple damages awarded the employer under the anti-trust law. Close upon the outlawing of the boycott in the Danbury hatters' case, came the Adair decision,^* which in effect legalized ' black- listing ' of employes by employers. A few months later, the courts dealt another blow to the boycott in the Buck's Stove and Range case, when Gompers, Morrison, and Mitchell were sentenced to imprisonment, ranging from six months to one year, for disregard- ing the court's injunction against the boycott of the St. Louis firm." " 65 The most direct action taken by the courts in the protection of employers against their employes is the use of the injunction against trade unionists.^* Consequently organized labour has sought to limit the enjoining power of the courts, while employers' associa- tions have vigorously defended it ; ^'^ and these conflicts have devel- oped bitter feeling between capital and labour in different states.^® The struggle between organized capital and organized labour also has centred around the question whether the Sherman Anti-Trust law should be applied to labour unions ; and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, which explicitly exempted labour organizations from the cate- gory of illegal combinations in restraint of trade, was hailed by labour as giving labour a new vantage point in its struggle against capital.^® Labour's distrust of the government and the averseness of the American Federation of Labor in the past to governmental regu- lation of industry is due to the fact that the government has been largely in the control of propertied classes and the law therefore favours those classes. However, the various groups into which labour is differentiated by distinct interests are beginning to realize that they have a common purpose, — the securing of control of gov- =3 Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S., 161 (1908). ^* For the several stages of this case see 35 Wash. L. Rep. 747 (1908) ; 36 Wash. L. Rep. 828 (1908) ; 37 Wash. L. Rep. 706 (1909) ; 221 U. S. 418 (1911) ; 233 U. S. 604 (1914). ^^ Commons and Associates, "History of Labour in the United States," 11:529-531. ^^ Reports of the United States Industrial Commission, 1901-1902, IV: 28, 145-147; V: 5, 136; VII: 118, 611; XII: 38-40, 96, 143, 250, 351, 352; XVII: Ch. IX; XIX: 885- 890 ; Commons and Associates, op. at., II : 503-509. ^'' See, for instance, the resolutions passed by the National Association of Manufac- turers of the United States at their Eighteenth Annual Convention, Detroit, May, 1913. 5* For instance, see an account of such a conflict over an injunction bill in Illinois in an article entitled, " Plutes see Tools Beat Labor's Bill," The New Majority, April 19, 1919, I. 59 Gompers, "The Charter of Industrial Freedom,'' American Federationist, XXI: 962-972, 40 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE ernments in order to remove the common obstacles to the advance- ment of their distinct interests. This growing sense of a common purpose was accentuated by the decision of the United States Su- preme Court in Hitchvian Coal and Coke Company v. Mitchell and others, which enjoined labour leaders from organizing the employes of an employer against his will.®" This decision gave an impetus to the trend toward a political labour movement, much as did the Taff-Vale decision In England — which held a union liable for damages to property during a strike by any person who can be deemed to be acting as the agent of the union.®^ This decision " led to the formation of the British Labour Party, the election of labour representatives to Parliament and the passage of the trades disputes act, which protected the unions from attack in the courts." ®^ An inquiry into the reasons for the adverse attitude of the courts to labour in its struggle with capital takes one into problems of judicial attitudes, of the nature of law and of sovereignty, and of the relation of law and sovereignty to the class struggle. What is said on these points in the remainder of the present chapter is in- troductory to what follows in the succeeding chapters. The sources of law, as the judge receives and interprets it, are statutes, positive rules of law, analogous decisions, and principles of public policy.''^ Statutes are enacted by the legislature, which is more or less responsive to the various phases of public opinion, in- cluding the class struggle. Positive rules of law and analogous decisions are less immediately affected by the class struggle than are statutes. It is through Its effect on principles of public policy that the class struggle Immediately affects judge-made law. For, in making his decisions, the judge follows closely the letter of the law where this Is possible ; only where it is impossible does he finally consider principles of public policy, and feel the influence of public opinion and the class struggle. Of the method of judicial thinking it Is said: " When a judge has before him the task of making a decision upon particular facts, the first question to be determined is whether there Is some statute, positive rule of law, or previous ^0 For a discussion of this decision see the chapter entitled, The Conflict of Judicial Attitudes. "1 Webb, " Industrial Democracy," xxiv-xxvii. 02 Fitch, "Labor and Politics," Survey, June 8, 1918, 289. ^3 Lincoln, " The Relation of Judicial Decisions to the Law," Harv. L. Rev., XXI: X22. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 41 authoritative decision which is exactly applicable. If so, he goes no further, except in the rare cases where a decision is overruled because it is itself founded on clear error or is opposed to certain principles of public policy. If, however, no statute or positive rule of law is exactly applicable and previous decisions can be distin- guished, there remain two sources which may influence the judge in his decision. These are analogous decisions and public policy. Where the analogy with a previous decision Is close, a judge will be guided more by the analogy and less by an independent consideration of principles of public policy. Where, however, there is no close analogy, and especially where two more or less remote analogies lead to opposite results, a judge Is driven to a consideration of those principles, since he must on some ground render a decision. " It is, therefore, not surprising that there should be differences in the decisions of the courts of various jurisdictions not due to legislative enactment. Wide differences are to be found in the sources of law aside from those created by statute." ^* When a case arises that requires consideration of principles of public policy, whether a judge will permit himself such considera- tion or will endeavour by superficial analogy to reason deductively from positive rules of law or previous decisions will depend on his attitude.''^ Conservative judges regard the common law as a complete body of law, and, therefore, emphasize deductive reason- ing and profess a distrust of considerations of public policy. This attitude implies a conception of sovereignty as mere obedience- compelling power and of the judicial function as one of " laying down the law." Hence the emphasis on the common law as a perfect law and the tendency to belittle statute law and the effect of public opinion on law. This view of the common law Is thus stated: " The commonly accepted view of . . . the common law, as an abstract ideal, is that it is a complete body, existing from time immemorial, and therefore the same in ev€ry jurisdiction except in so far as it Is altered by statute. This law Is known or discovered by the judges. They interpret the law, and the reports of their decisions are authoritative evidence of it." *'•' The adverse atti- tude of the courts to labour described in preceding paragraphs is ^* Ibid., 124-125. 66 See the chapters entitled, The Conflict of Judicial Attitudes, and Judicial Atti- tudes and the Nature of Law. 68 Lincoln, op. cit., izo. 42 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE due to the prevalence among judges of the conservative judicial attitude. Conservative judges refuse to recognize that, whereas a dominant class has had unquestioned political control in the past, and law has expressed the will of that class, and sovereignty has been the power of that class to compel obedience, resisting classes have arisen, and a class struggle has developed, so that a dominant class can no longer absolutely enforce its will; wherefore law has become an obedience-invoking compromise, so that judges must give legislatures authority to work out compromises, and must accord first importance to statutes, and must themselves adopt the induc- tive attitude in interpretations of law. The inductive attitude, that of the progressive judge, is that sovereignty is not mere obedience-compelling power, that there is a class struggle and the law must invoke obedience, that the law is incomplete and practical, " everywhere in process of growth, and continually affected and altered both by legislative enactments and by the making of judicial decisions." ^ This progressive atti- tude to law is seen, for instance, in Judge Hand's attitude in the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, in connection with statutes limiting the length of the working day. The interpreta- tion, he holds, is not a matter of deduction from a universally recog- nized legal principle, nor even from a universally held economic principle. " In short, the whole matter is yet to such an extent experimental that no one can with justice apply to the concrete problems the yardstick of abstract economic theory." ^* There- fore, the attitude of the judge should not be deductive but Inductive and, In accordance with this attitude, he should give legislatures a free hand in experimentation with labour laws. " He would be as rash a theorist who should assert with certainty their beneficence, as he who would sweep them all aside by virtue of some pragmatical theory of ' natural rights.' The only way in which the right, or the wrong, of the matter may be shown, Is by experiment; and the legislature with Its paraphernalia of committee and commission, is the only public representative really fitted to experiment. That the legislature may be moved by faction, and without justice. Is very true, but so may even the court. There is an inevitable bias upon such vital questions In all men. . . . " It is, therefore. In no sense as patrons or opponents of the wis- ^'' Ibid., 121. "Hand, "Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day," Harv. L. Rev., XXI: 507. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 43 dom of such efforts, that the courts may approach such laws. . . . Before the court the question is political, not economic; it is the question of where the power to pass upon such subjects should rest, ... If the subject be one already fairly within the field of rational discussion and interest, it would seem to be for the legis- lature." ®^ According to this view the class struggle and the meas- ures suggested for adjustment of class conflicts become the subject of " rational discussion and interest " and thereby become proper legislative projects, and the courts should interfere as little as pos- sible. That is, the people are conceived as possessing the power intelligently to direct, through their representatives, the class con- flict, and to adjust conflicting interests for the public welfare, and this intelligent directing power is the sovereignty of the state. Wise laws for the direction of industry and for the health and prosperity of all classes are the outcome of its exercise. Nevertheless, the preference for legal tradition, that is, for the common law, prevails among the bench and the bar, with a con- tempt for statute law. Dean Pound points out that the courts are inclined " to ignore important legislation; not merely deciding it to be declaratory, but sometimes assuming silently that it is de- claratory without adducing any reasons, citing prior judicial deci- sions and making no mention of the statute. In the same way, lawyers In the legislature often conceive It more expedient to make of a statute the barest outline, leaving details of the most vital importance to be filled in by judicial law-making. ... It may be well, however, for judges and lawyers to remember that there Is coming to be a science of legislation and that modern statutes are not to be disposed of lightly as off-hand products of a crude desire to do something, but represent long and patient study by experts, careful consideration by conferences or congresses or associations, press discussions In which public opinion is focussed upon all impor- tant details, and hearings before legislative committees. It may be well to remember also that while bench and bar are never weary of pointing out the deficiencies of legislation, to others the de- ficiencies of judge-made law are no less apparent. To economists and sociologists, judicial attempts to force Benthamite conceptions of freedom of contract and common law conceptions of individual- ism upon the public of today are no less amusing — or even irritat- ing — than legislative attempts to do away with or get away from 6» Ibid., 507-508. 44 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE these conceptions are to bench and bar. The nullifying of these legislative attempts is not regarded by lay scholars with the com- placent satisfaction with which lawyers are wont to speak of it. They do not hesitate to say that ' the judicial mind has not kept pace with the strides of industrial development.' They express the opinion that ' belated and anti-social ' decisions have been a fruitful cause of strikes, industrial discord, and consequent lawlessness. They charge that ' the attitude of the courts has been responsible for much of our political immorality.' " '"^ It is evident that the point at issue is not merely a question of the nature of law but of sovereignty. Is the sovereignty really vested in the people and exercised through their representatives, or is it vested in a bench of judges and exercised, regardless of the class struggle and other processes determining public opinion, as an obedience-compelling power of a legal tradition of past ages?^^ Law as command, and sovereignty as obedience-compelling power continue alongside the new aspect of sovereignty as an intelligently directive power. The former is seen in the older function of law as a means of settlement of disputes between property owners. But that functioning of law also has a social-psychological basis requiring investigation. It is seen in a new country the inhabitants, of which do not recognize a dominant class, and in which a class struggle has not developed, where disputes that require legal settle- ment are largely between property owners among whom a high degree of economic equality prevails, and where the law is within the reach of all. For instance, in the early American rural com- munity there was constant litigation between farmers.''^ The de- cisions in these litigations, if made in a court presided over by a learned judge, might be made strictly according to precedent; otherwise the jury was charged to exercise common sense. " Thus a tree growing on a boundary line raised a dispute as to its proper owner," ^^ which was decided according to " common sense," or ac- cording to tradition, if the judge was learned in legal tradition; and the man who won a lawsuit exclaimed, as he left the court-room, " I tell you the law is a great thing." The court decision settled it; '"Pound, "Common Law and Legislation,'' Har-v. L. Rev., XXI: 383-384 (quoted without the footnotes). '1 Ibid., 406. '2 Williams, '" An American Town," 57. 78 Ibid., 37. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 45 sovereignty was obedience-compelling power, and the litigant who won the help of the invincible arm of the state felt the law to be " a great thing." Dean Pound uses this same illustration of the law deciding between disputants as to the ownership of a tree to illustrate a functioning of law not connected with class struggle, and adds that, even when the class struggle began to develop, so that " a new economic order was behind the liberalizing of law throughout Europe . . . for the most part this liberalizing move- ment did no more than make thoughtful lawyers restive under the arbitrary rules of the strict law. Judges did not dream of finding law otherwise than through authority or through legal reason." '''* In the same way the law of the period of the individualistic prop- erty owner in the United States has survived into this present pe- riod of increasing struggle against a dominant class, and, as we shall see in a succeeding chapter,^^ has been used on behalf of that class in its struggle to maintain its dominating position over non- propertied classes, with the assumption that the non-propertied classes are in a position of equality before the law with the proper- tied, so that the law which decided disputes between property owners in the early days is still adequate justly to decide disputes between propertied and non-propertied classes. Where there is a high degree of equality of opportunity for acquiring property, either among a population that is exploiting the resources of a new country, or among a class of property owners that has long exploited the labour of conventional, submissive work- ing masses, law Is restricted as far as possible to the elemental law of community defence — law against assault, theft, etc., — and to law protecting property rights. As regards property, law becomes the watch-dog of a man's property. He wants It to guard his property but to interfere as little as possible with his acquisition of more property. Wherefore, the attitude to law of the early Americans who were exploiting the natural resources of the coun- try was not so very different from that of English business men who were at the same time exploiting the labour of the working masses of England. In both cases the extreme reverence for law was equalled only by the lack of self-restraint and conscience in the ex- ploitation practised beyond the reach of the law.^^ The reign of 7* Pound, " Juristic Science and Law," Harvard Law Review, XXXI : 1052. 75 See the chapter entitled. The Conflict of Judicial Attitudes. 78 Croly, "Progressive Democracy," 72, 157-158. 46 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE law was so narrowly limited to the protection of property that the national resources, material and human, were left unprotected. It was assumed that it was to the property-owner's interest to con- serve material resources and protect human life. But this was one of the justifications that emanated from the dominant class to protect its unrestrained acquisition from the criticism of men who, because not obsessed by instinctive impulses to make money, could discern the actual situation. Thus developed the conflict between those who reverenced law as that which protected property and maintained the existing social order, and those who would use law as a means of collective self-development.'^'' The latter were long in gaining an effective hearing. But with the increasing value to nations of their natural resources, and with the increasing in- telligence of the human resources and their rising purpose to look after their own self-development, the second function of law is gathering force. Law is ceasing to be conceived as merely a means of maintaining social order, the social order, and is coming to be conceived as the means of attaining social justice. For " while social justice depends upon order, order also depends upon the reign of social justice." ''^ v " Ibid., 426. T8 Ibid., 226. CHAPTER III SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE POLITICAL rivalry is essentially a rivalry of economic classes and interests which support political parties for the sake of protecting or advancing their interests, and of party or- ganizations the essential aim of which is to defeat the other party and " keep in power " or " get back to power." Party organiza- tions appeal for popular support by declarations of policies that appear to seek the public Welfare.^ The political control exercised by reactionary capitalistic interests over a party organization may be defied by the " progressive," section of a party leadership, which would use the party for public welfare interests. There sometimes results a division in the party and a struggle between the progressive and reactionary factions for control. If the re- actionary faction appears to be hopelessly in control, a new party may form to resist the influence of reactionary propertied interests over the government. If ever a complete history of American politics is written, it will show how a variety of propertied inter- ests — the " slave power," railroads ^ and other public utilities,^ manufacturing interests,* mining interests,^ — either directly or, if forbidden by law, indirectly gave political parties their financial support in order " to establish a claim on the gratitude of the future administration " ; * in what way these interests were rewarded; and the effect of this mortgaging of the party organization on the for- 1 The party platform is called " honey to catch flies." (Reed, " The Form and Func- tions of American Government," 231, 252.) See also Foulke, "Fighting the Spoils- men," 295-305. ^Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," 11:515-516; Stickney, "The Railroad Problem," 14. s Ostrogorski, "Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties," II: 171; Lind- sey and O'Higgins, " The Beast," Chs. II-IV, VII-XII. * Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on Maintenance of a Lobby to Influence Legislation. 63rd Congress, ist Session, 1913; Beard, "Read- ings in American Government and Politics," 572-577; Tarbell, "History of the Standard Oil Company," 1:169; 11:146-148; Fitch, "The Steel Workers," 229-231. 5 West, "Report on the Colorado Strike"; Final Report of the United States Com- mission on Industrial Relations, 116-150, 307-401. ' Ostrogorski, op, cit., II: 353. 47 48 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE tunes of the party. Much of the political influence exerted by propertied interests is secret and never recorded and, therefore, will not be told by the historians except in a general way in the form of inferences from recorded dataJ Still more entirely secret are the financial and other inducements received and the services rendered propertied interests by individual office-holders. Only very rarely is a public investigation forced which throws light on these secret political processes; and then the investigation is rarely conducted by men who purpose to go to the bottom of the situ- ation,* but usually by men whose questions are directed by political motives and not by an honest intent to ascertain the facts. Legislators in a democracy are elected by the majority or plural- ity of voters, but, once in office, may fall under the influence of a small minority. This is due to the surpassing influence of reaction- ary capitalistic interests over legislation and public opinion. As an instance of the influence that may be brought to bear by capi- talistic interests, Senator Kenyon, speaking with reference to his bill to regulate the meat-packing industry (a group of monopolistic corporations, which, according to a report of the Federal Trade Commission, had extended their monopolistic control over a great variety of food products, and " have preyed upon the people un- conscionably " ^ ) declared that the meat-packers had started a propaganda against his bill " the like of which has never been seen in this country." " The various corporations that would be af- fected by the bill had sent letters to their stockholders, in the case of one corporation to 25,000 stockholders, urging them to write their congressmen against the bill.^^ The influence of allied indus- tries and of banking interests was enlisted against the bill.^^ The ' California Commission of Immigration and Housing, " A Report on Large Land- holdings in Southern California," 1919, 30-31. 8 As an illustration of the work of one of these rare investigators see Testimony taken before the Joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York to investigate the affairs of Life Insurance Companies, 1905. ' " Their manipulations of the market embrace every device that is useful to them without regard to law. Their reward, expressed in terms of profit, reveals that four of these concerns have pocketed in 1915, 1916, 1917, $140,000,000. However delicate a definition is framed for ' profiteering ' these packers have jpreyed upon the people un- conscionably." (Federal Trade Commission, Report to the President of the United States Senate on Profiteering, June 28, 1918, 3-4; Federal Trade Commission, Report on the Meat-Packing Industry 1918, Chs. I-IV; Federal Trade Commission, Report on the Meat-Packing Industry, 1919, Pt. I: 74, Pt. II: 197, Pt. Ill: 138; Federal Trade Com- mission, Report on Leather and Shoe Industries, 1919, 156-164.) 10 Congressional Record, Vol. 58, No. 52, July 23, 1919, p. 3205. 11 Ibid., 3206. 12 Ibid.. 3206. SOVEREIGNTY AND CLASS STRUGGLE 49 meat-packers also aimed to control public opinion by " advertise- ments running into enormous sums " carried in many newspapers throughout the country.^* As another instance of the political ac- tivity of capitalistic interests, here is an extract from a speech made by Senator LaFoUette, showing the pressure that would be brought to bear on the Interstate Commerce Commission by the railroads if the roads were restored to their private owners : " Let me re- mind Senators that only three or four years ago the Interstate Commerce Commission was besieged for an increase in rates. Upon the hearing held they decided that the increase was not war- ranted; that the rates were already reasonable. Then what hap- pened? There was turned upon the Interstate Commerce Com- mission, a quasi-judicial body, such a campaign of assault and con- tumely as was never before witnessed in the United States. " Think, Sir, of the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Com- mission being called out of his bed at midnight and presented with a demand to grant the increases that the railroads wanted ! That commission was literally swamped with demands that they grant the increase or resign. I introduced a resolution on the floor ask- ing that communications improperly sent to the commission de- manding that they decide in favour of the railroad companies with- out any adjudication be transmitted to the Senate. . . . On the day they came my desk, and the adjoining desks here were piled full to overflowing. . . . Stock exchanges, commercial organiza- tions, bankers' organizations, real estate associations, had sent these demands. ... I put these infamous documents . . . into the Con- gressional Record. ... It took 175 pages to print the demands. . . . One of them was a full-page advertisement by the Illinois Manufacturers' Association. . . . What did that advertisement say? It said substantially this : ' Write your members, wire your members and your Senators, and demand of the Interstate Com- merce Commission that they decide the pending application in fa- vour of the railroads.' " ^* In these efforts to control the govern- ment in their own interest and contrary to the public welfare, capi- talistic interests may not be immediately successful or always suc- cessful, but their resources make it possible for them to exert a surprising influence over all classes of ofiicials and to persist in 13 Ibid., 3206. 1* Speech of Senator La Follette in U. S. Senate, Dec. 20, 1919, in Congressional Rec- ord, Sixty-sixth Congress, and Sess., Jan. 26, 1920, 2204. 50 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE their efforts until the opposition weakens ^^ and they have their will.i« This study of a propaganda to influence legislation is a social- psychological study. Not only capitalistic interests but all organi- zations that seek to influence legislation write letters to men of influence urging them to bring their influence to bear on congress- men for or against legislation, and also seek to influence public opinion. But capitalistic interests have a surpassing influence over legislators because of their wealth power and their masterful lead- ership, and also over public opinion through their influence over the press. Thus it is that legislators and other officials may be elected by a majority but fall under the influence of a small minority." The influence of propertied classes over legislation in the United States is not a phenomenon of recent years. It was encouraged by the attitude assumed by the United States Supreme Court early in our history and continued under the protection of the decision in the Dartmouth College case. " It is under the protection of the decision in the Dartmouth College case," wrote Judge Cooley, " that the most enormous and threatening powers in our country have been created; some of the great and wealthy corporations actually having greater influence in the country at large, and upon the legislation of the country than the states to w'hich they owe their corporate existence." ^* Professor Smith comments on the attitude of the Supreme Court that developed under the Dartmouth College decision as follows: "Any government framed and set up to guard and promote the interests of the people generally ought to have full power to modify or revoke all rights or privileges granted in disregard of the public welfare. But the Supreme Court, while permitting the creation or extension of property rights, has prevented the subsequent abridgment of such rights, even when the interests of the general public demanded it. The effect of this has been to make the corporations take an active part Impound, "Juristic Problems of National Progress," Amer. Jour. Social., May, 1917, 731. 1* As the railroads finally had their will through the enactment of the law passed in February, 1920, requiring the Interstate Commerce Commission to allow them to increase their rates. 1' For instance, see the Report of the Joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York appointed to investigate the aflfairs of Life Insurance Com- panies, 1906, 398-400. 18 Cooley, " Constitutional Limitations," 6th ed., 335-336, n. SOVEREIGNTY AND CLASS STRUGGLE 51 in corrupting state politics. Special legislation was not prohibited. In fact, it was a common way of creating property rights. If a bank, an insurance company, or a railway corporation was organ- ized, it was necessary to obtain a charter from the legislature which defined its powers and privileges. . . . The legislature might re- fuse to grant a charter, but having granted it, it became a vested right which could not be revoked. The charter thus granted by the legislature was a special privilege. In many instances it was secured as a reward for political services by favourites of the party machine, or through the corrupt expenditure of money or the equally corrupt distribution of stock in the proposed corporation among those who controlled legislation. Not only did this system invite corruption in the granting of such charters, but it also created a motive for the further use of corrupt means to keep possible com- petitors from securing like privileges. It was worth the while to spend money to secure a valuable privilege if when once obtained the legislature could not revoke it. And it was also worth the while to spend more money to keep dangerous competitors out of the field if by so doing it could enjoy some of the benefits of monop- oly. By thus holding that a privilege granted to an individual or a private corporation by special. act of the legislature was a con- tract which could not be revoked by that body, the courts in their effort to protect property rights opened the door which allowed corporation funds to be brought into our state legislatures early in our history for purposes of corruption. " The power which the legislatures thus acquired to grant char- ters which could not be amended or repealed made it necessary for the people to devise some new method of protecting themselves against this abuse of legislative authority. The outcome of this movement to re-establish some effective popular check on the legis- lature has taken the form in a majority of the states of a constitu- tional amendment by which the right is reserved to amend or repeal all laws conferring corporate powers. Such constitutional changes provide no remedy, however, for the evils resulting from legisla- tive grants m,ade previous to their adoption. The granting of spe- cial charters is now also prohibited in many states, the constitution requiring that all corporations shall be formed under general laws. . But even our general corporation laws have been enacted too largely in the interest of those who control our business undertak- 52 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE ings and without due regard to the rights of the general public." ^^ A great variety of aggressive special interests are constantly active in politics. This is true not only in the United States but in all capitalistic nations. These interests constitute the vanguard of the dominant political class. This class exercises a dominant influ- ence in the state, legally and also extra-legally, and sometimes illegally. Illegal action is occasionally exposed and the guilty busi- ness prosecuted but these occasional set-backs have comparatively little effect on the influence of the dominant class. Its influence is seen in the enactment of statutes that advance its interestSj^" and still more in the prevention of enactment of statutes that are required to protect the public interest where this conflicts with the interest of the dominant class. The fact that special interests have not prevented the passage of a law that is unfavourable to their purposes does not disprove the existence of a dominant class. Said Justice Harlan of the attitude of combinations to the Anti- Trust law of 1890, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in 1896:^^ " But those who were in combinations that were illegal did not despair. They at once set up the baseless claim that the decision of 1896 disturbed the 'business interests of the country,' and let it be known that they would never be content until the rule was established that would permit interstate commerce to be subjected to reasonable restraints." ^^ And the ultimate result of the opposition of business interests to the law has been its prac- tical abrogation. The opposition was by a dominant class pri- marily in its own interest, that is, for the sake of private profits; ^^ and the result of the growth of monopolistic corporations has been to enrich the few, to diminish the numbers of the middle class,^ and to swell the ranks of the non-propertied. 1^ Smith, " The Spirit of American Government," 325-329. 2" Pound, " Juristic Problems of National Progress," Amer. Jour. Social., May, 1917, 730. 21 United States v. Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S., 290-344. 22 Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 31 Sup. Ct. Reptr., 528. "^ Federal Trade Commission, Report to the President of the United States on Profit- eering, June 28, 1918, 3-4; Federal Trade Commision, Report on the Meat-Packing Industry, 1918, Chs. I, II, IV; King, "The W^ealth and Income of the People of the United States," 218 ; Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on the Petroleum Industry, 1907, Pt. II: 535-542; United States of America vs. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Brief of Facts and Argument for Petitioner, 1:165-498; Tarbell, "The History of the Standard Oil Company," I: Chs. One-Eight; II: Chs. Nine-Sixteen ; Re- port of the Commissioner of Corporations on the Steel Industry, 1911, Pt. 1:342-347. 2* King, op. c'lt., 231. SOVEREIGNTY AND CLASS STRUGGLE 53 The hypothesis of a dominant class was enunciated long ago by Harrington ^^ in the dictum that power goes with ownership. In his time it was land ownership, today it is not usually land owner- ship and not strictly ownership but control of capital. The finan- cial power of a dominant class is maintained not merely through ownership but much more through control of other peoples' money. ^^ The " social order of the modern state is not a labour order but a capitalist, and upon the broad truth of Harrington's hypothesis it must follow that the main power is capitalist also." ^'' This capitalistic order is one in which the funds of a great mass of depositors and investors are controlled and used by a comparatively few men. The stock-holders and bond-holders of a corporation have no voice in its management.^* They are scattered through- out the length and breadth of the land and votes for directors are as formal as votes for candidates for minor state offices. The mass of security-holders and depositors never see the businesses they own, or which have borrowed their money from banks. They never see the conditions under which men are employed in those businesses.^* They have no interest in the businesses except to receive their dividends or interest. If there is an increase in divi- dends, they do not know how it Was earned and it does not occur to them to inquire. Under these conditions it is as easy for large stock-holders and for banks to get control of directorates,^" as it is for politicians to get control of a party organization. Prac- tically self-perpetuating directorates thus become the inner capi- talistic organization of society. Furthermore, many directors have a great variety of interests so that they cannot give close attention to any one business, and others are directors merely because of 25 Harrington, "The Commonwealth of Oceana" (first published in 1656), with an Introduction by Morley, 15-20. ^^Brandeis, " Other Peoples' Money and How the Bankers Use It." 27Laski, "Authority in the Modern State," 88, 38. 28 Brandeis, op. cit., 59-60. 28 Burgess, "The Function of Socialization and Social Evolution," 137-174; Dewey and Tufts, " Ethics," 497-503 ; Page, " Trade Morals, Their Origin, Growth and Province," 128-130; Fite, "Moral Valuations and Economic Laws," Jour. Phil. Psy. Sc. M., XIV: 10-16; Veblen, "The Modern Point of View and the New Order," The Dial, December 14, 1918, 543-547. 80 Brandeis, op. cit., Chs. II-V; Moulton, "Principles of Money and Banking," 455; Mitchell, "Business Cycles," 33-35; Davenport, "Economics of Enterprise," 399-400; Veblen, "The Industrial System and the Captains of Industry," The Dial, May 31, 1919. 557; Report of the Committee to Investigate the Concentration of Control of Money and Credit, 1913, House of Rep., 62nd Congr., 3rd Sess., Report No. 1593. ^4 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE large holdings they have inherited, without any personal force. The result is a tendency to shift the power and responsibility in a corporation to some active head, usually a man of dominating personality, whose aggressiveness is stimulated by the responsi- bility vested in him, and who regards considerations of the welfare of the public, and humanitarian considerations of workmen as " idealistic " and impracticable. He knows that the stock-holders and directors are interested solely in dividends and in the sound condition and development of the business. And because they are the ones to whom he is responsible, his main interest is to run the business in a way satisfactory to those who have property interests therein. The management of a business, from the masterful heads down to the foremen, tend to accept the attitude of the masterful heads. I say tend to because this process of social suggestion is always sub- ject to deflection owing to differences in personal disposition. And these deflections or variations are of importance, as will be shown in a succeeding volume. But the prevailing aspect of the system is one of the acceptance by subordinates of the attitudes of those above them in authority. Now the mass of workmen come into contact with this hierarchy of officials and with the hinterland of stock-holders and bond-holders only through the foremen. That is, their contact ends there. If organized, the officials of the la- bour organization may on certain occasions come in contact with officials of the business; and some businesses have transferred the " hiring and firing " function to employment managers. But the majority of workmen are unorganized, and the main contact of workmen with a management remains through the foremen. The attitude of workmen to a corporation, and to the capitalistic or- ganization of society is determined, then, more by the attitude of foremen to them than by any other one thing.^^ That is the contact that determines what instinctive impulses are to be repeatedly stirred in them in the course of their relations with the corporation and what attitude is to be developed is the daily contact with the foremen. But, as a rival of this influence of the masterful head that acts through subordinates and finally through foremen on the mass of workmen and tends to develop in them an attitude of sub- mission to the management, there is the influence of labour leaders, 81 Tead, " The Importance of Being a Foreman,'' Industrial Management, June, 1917. 354- SOVEREIGNTY AND CLASS STRUGGLE 55 and all those other influences of the labour movement that awaken in workmen impulses of their original nature that are suppressed in the course of their contact with and submission to foremen.^^ The labour movement thus becomes the workman's means of satisfaction of suppressed instinctive impulses, outside the economic order. We have, then, this capitalistic organization : A great mass of bank depositors and another great mass of security-holders pro- vide the capital for employing a great mass of workmen whom they never saw and in whom they have no interest. The interest of depositors and security-holders is in their interest and dividends, hence they readily acquiesce in the type of management which, without unfavourable publicity, insures the most satisfying returns on their capital. The mass of workmen are used for producing property income, without an effective voice in the management of business and, therefore, without power to protect themselves from evil working conditions or to order their lives for self-development. Managements are in a position, because of the ignorance and power- lessness of bank depositors and security-holders, to manage busi- ness in a way often to bring large profits, sometimes enormous profits, to those on the inside, at the expense of workmen and consumers and, often, of investors; to exert an immense influence in politics because of the wealth power they represent ; and to make themselves the controlling class in industry and the state. From the preceding description it is possible to gain some con- ception of the main lines of cleavage in the economic organization. In the forefront is the industrial and financial leadership, with its reactionary, masterful figures and its progressive, more thoughtful figures, its clash of economic interests, which, however, unite under the menace of a non-propertied resistance, or unite, when occasion arises, to control the government and to enact legislation that fur- thers their common purposes. Behind this vanguard is the great mass of depositors and investors. Here also is a clash of interests. There are those who by disposition and environmental Influence think only of Interest and dividends and support a reactionary leadership ; others who, more sympathetic and intellectual, or more favourably situated for learning the truth, oppose a reactionary leadership. In addition to these depositors and investors that con- stitute the main body of the propertied classes, there arc others 82 Tannenbaum, "Labor Movement Psychology," New Republic, July y, 1920, 171- 173. 56 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE whose sympathies lie with the non-propertied classes and who, therefore, act with those classes politically.*^ Furthermore, the agrarian class, a small-propertied class, always has had a distrust of aggressive capitalistic interests, but, in its political action in recent years, has usually confined itself to choosing between candi- dates which represented, from its point of view, the lesser of the evils of capitalistic control. What happens when an agrarian class really determines to wrest political control from party organiza- tions that represent aggressive capitalistic interests is shown by the history of the Nonpartisan League in the West.** The tendency of an aggressive movement of an agrarian class against capitalistic control is to afGHate the agrarian class for political action with the non-propertied classes. Propertied classes are differentiated into reactionary and pro- gressive sections, wherefore the problem of a dominant class is, in the last analysis, a social-psychological problem. One of the most neglected parts of the problem is that of the attitude of the mass of depositors and security-holders to the capitalistic system of which they are a part. Evidently any progress in the economic system must depend, not altogether but in part, on the attitude of the ultimate owners to proposed changes. Yet appeals are issued to these ultimate owners with little knowledge of what their actual attitudes are. Consequently appeals are aimed at their ultimate impulses, as human beings with an instinctive capacity for sympa- thy and intelligence,*^ but lack the definiteness and cogency which a knowledge of the actual attitudes of the ultimate owners would make possible. We know somewhat more about the attitudes of industrial and financial management. But no part of the great 23 For instance, Warren S. Stone, Grand Chief of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, said in an address before the Ail-American Farmer-Labor Co-operative Congress; "The railroad brotherhoods have $42,000,000 now on deposit in banks. And the interest on those funds is being used by the banks to fight the group who deposited the money. We're going to put in a system of people's banks and they'll be run in the interest of the people." (Sandburg, "The Farmer-Labor Congress," Sur- vey, Feb. 21, 1920, 606.) See also Mussey, "Co-operation at Chicago," The Nation, March 6, 1920, 290. s* In addition to the references cited in a preceding chapter, read the account of the efforts of politicians to wreck the banks of the Nonpartisan League, in " North Dakota Leaders Come Back," Nonpartisan Leader, November 3, 1919, and "Farmers' Bank at Fargo Reopened," Nonpartisan Leader, November lo, 1919. See also Gaston, " The Nonpartisan League," 306-309. S5 For instance, see " A Challenge to Stock-holders," in The World Tomorrow, Feb., 1920, 48. SOVEREIGNTY AND CLASS STRUGGLE 57 field of the motives of propertied classes has yet been subjected to the scientific scrutiny that its importance demands. The investigation should trace the historical development, as far as possible. In the chapter on Psychological Aspects of Intra- national Relations are indicated some aspects of the historical in- quiry. Capitalistic industry in the United States at first had many of the aspects of agricultural industry.^^ Just as farmers may be classified psychologically as speculative and conservative,^'' so busi- ness men are by nature speculative or inclined to cautious shrewd- ness in their dealings. Among conservative farmers, the farmer's essential aim was to pay for his farm and make for himself a com- fortable home. The farm he acquired represented his life's work. He had little inclination to seek governmental aid as compared with the speculative farmer, " who sought above all to capitalize the future possibilities of his acreage," *^ and, in so doing, was not averse to enlisting the help of the state. Consequently it was this type of farmer that came into closest relation with the politicians. " They were quite willing to exhaust the credit of their state gov- ernments in the effort to provide highways, canals, railroads, and the other necessities of local economic development." ** The first manufacturers and merchants often were farmers' sons and the aim of the conservative type was to build up a business and pay for it, that is, pay back the borrowed money. The business rep- resented the founder's life work. Now the psychology of this business building differed from the modern psychology of business in important respects. In the course of his work, the business man might make profits but to " get rich " was not his main purpose any more than it was that of the conservative farmer. He might think he would be satisfied if eventually he was worth twenty or thirty thousand dollars because this was the sum which would give him an ample property income in his declining years. His essen- tial aim was not to amass a fortune but to build up a business and eventually retire on a property income that was ample for his needs. In the course of his work his business became precious to him be- cause it was that for which he had given his life, just as children are precious to the mother as that for which she has given her life, ^8 Croly, "Progressive Democracy,'' 51. S7 Williams, " An Amierican Town," 199-209. 88 Croly, op. cit, 72. »» Ibid., 73. 58 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE and the book to the author as that for which he has given his life. Life is precious and whatever one gives it for becomes precious. To be sure the business may not turn out to be as successful as de- sired, but neither may the children or the book. Nevertheless, whatever one sacrifices life for is precious, wherefore the business man will fight to defend his business from despoilers, the mother to defend her children from those who disparage them and the author to defend his book from malicious critics. The early de- velopment of business was one which enlisted all the instincts not only for the acquisition of property, but also for its defence both by the accumulator and on his behalf by the community, as later developments have not.*" What the conservative business man accumulated appeared more nearly his creation in this period than later. Furthermore, a large proportion of the population were similarly engaged, as farmers, in the individualistic acquisition of wealth. Consequently public sentiment acted more instinctively and intensely on behalf of the right of the business man to his profits in this period than it has since. For conditions have so changed that it is difficult readily to discern particular instances of fortunes made solely or largely by creative effort. And a smaller proportion of the population than formerly are now in a position to appreciate and sympathize with individualistic creative effort. The early development of business was keenly competitive. The speculative type of business man was inclined to seek the aid of the state in his operations, or to enlist the influence of politicians against rivals seeking state aid," and thus there early appeared a domi- nant class; *^ but the more conservative rank and file asked mainly to be protected from the competition of more highly developed foreign industries. The public acquiesced in this program of free and unregulated competition because it was told that keen compe- tition protected the consumer by keeping prices down, and the workman by stimulating competition of employers for efficient labour and so keeping wages up. Therefore, since the state did not intervene to the extent that it did later, business men made less effort to control governments in order to protect themselves from interference than later. Then came gradually the movement ^o See the chapter entitled, Psychological Processes in the De Cole, " The National Guilds Movement in Great Britain,'' U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, July, 1919, 24-32. *8 Follett, " The New State," Pts. I, IIL *T Tead, op. cit., 151. See also Cole, " Self -Government in Industry," 273-274. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE 87 and that their conduct as representatives of such groups could be more intelligently judged than if they represented a geographical district with its chaos of interests. Undoubtedly political progress lies in so reforming political arrangements as to supplement the inevitable tendency of people to follow personal leadership *® with a stimulus to a critical following of such leadership; and intimacy of knowledge of the leader and a vital and understanding interest in the issues is indispensable to this critical relation. Wherefore, it is contended that representation based on occupational groups would increase the citizen's effective interest in politics. Again, by accepting this basis of representation, it is said, the intense class conflict would be allayed because the adjustment of group interests would be facilitated by a parliament in which all groups were fairly represented. Certain social-psychological processes would be as fundamental in the proposed new form of state as in the old. With an occupa- tional basis the final alignment would be psychological because each occupational group would be divided into progressive and con- servative factions. Again, the political influence of a group would not necessarily be in proportion to Its numbers. The influence of the representatives of a numerically unimportant group would not necessarily be negligible, because the average intelligence of that group might be high and its leadership very influential over the leadership of other groups. Personal influence would be as domi- nant a factor in the new form of government as in the old. Hence the proposed new form raises social-psychological problems. It Is because we have regarded problems of the state as problems of cut and dried legal forms that we have failed to realize their social- psychological basis. The problem of an occupational basis of representation raises the question of the effect of such a change on political freedom.*® Freedom of thought and speech tends to be narrowly restricted where a reactionary class is struggling to maintain Its suggestive control of ignorant masses, or a resisting class is struggling to main- tain its newly acquired control. Where a reactionary class is still in control,^" it represses freedom of thought and speech and the *8 Croly, " Progressive Democracy," 313. *»Reckitt and Bechhofer, "The Meaning of National Guilds," 22. ''"During the great steel strike of 1919, the "business men" of the steel mill towns of Pennsylvania exercised an autorcratic repression of freedom of speech and assem- 88 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE resisting class declares loudly for freedom. But when the resist- ing class wins control it may become as repressive as the dominating class, through fear of that class regaining control. Suppose, now, instead of intensely conflicting and, therefore, intolerant classes, which are rivalling one another to control the masses, there were a number of politically organized occupational groups. Instead of an ignorant, conventionalized mass of voters blocked off into dis- tricts and wards, the voters would be organized, for the settlement of certain issues, according to occupation, each group alive, or grad- ually awakening to a vital political purpose, conscious of other live groups with similarly vital purposes, jealous of its political free- dom, and aware of the necessity of allowing other groups a like free- dom. Under such an arrangement the masses would, it seems, be less subject than at present to the control of extremely intolerant conflicting classes, each, when in control, interfering with political freedom in order to maintain its control. To repress freedom seems easy and is the instinctive impulse in a period of keen class conflict, where the voters are a conglomerate mass of varying shades of ignorance and Indifference, and are subject to the control of news- papers and demonstrations. But such repression w'ould seem, it is said, less easy if even the weakest groups, numerically, were in a position to raise a strong protest against repression of their propa- ganda. Evidently, therefore, it is impossible to understand the bearing of the proposed change in representation on the problem of political freedom without understanding the psychology of social suggestion, especially the processes of social suggestion that are involved in the rivalry of classes to control the masses of a body politic. The conflict of classes makes for social progress in the highest degree only if the problem presented by any particular conflict is regarded from the viewpoint of the public welfare, not the welfare blage in the towns either through the city officials, or where these were not pliable, by meeting at the train speakers who were to address the strikers and notifying them to leave town. (Shaw, "Closed Towns," Sur'vey, Nov. 8, 1919, 38-64.) The action of the United States government against the miners in the coal strike of 1919 was sim- ilarly autocratic in that the government had declared the war at an end and had ceased months ago to check the coal operators in raising their charges, and then en- joined the coal miners not only from striking but also from saying anything that would encourage a strike on the ground that the war was not at an end. (Hard, " What the Miners are Thinking," New Republic, Nov. 12, 1919, 324.)The repression of free- dom of speech during this period of great strikes shows the hand of a dominant class on the government, both city, and state, and national. (Hard, "A Class Policy in Coal," New Republic, Nov. 19, 1913, 352-355.) SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE 89 of a class.^^ But the welfare of a class Is a part of the public welfare. The public welfare can be rightly conceived only by con- sidering primarily not the legal status of each class but its human status. The law, having developed primarily for the protection of propertied interests, emphasizes the welfare of propertied classes at the expense of non-'propertied. While legal status emphasizes the welfare of propertied classes, human status emphasizes the welfare of non-propertied, because these constitute the vast major- ity of the population and do the large part of the work of the world.^^ Human status means status as a being with a human per- sonality which has Its own laws of development.^* As a human being in society man has an aspiration for development that forbids his acquiescing In economic conditions which make that develop- ment impossible. The material basis of satisfactions is limited and this economic scarcity requires sacrifice on the part of all those whose superior personal force or talent enable them to appropriate more than their needs require. Hence the necessity of the state; it subordinates the competitive Interests of man to the common re- quirements for the development of personality.'* The form of the state and its laws and institutions will change in order that it may exercise more fully this function.'** The most ideal form of state requires the exercise of force in the regulation of competitive interests and the suppression of selfish, reactionary interests.'® Up to the present time the state has placed property rights above the right of the non-propertied majority to conditions that make pos- sible the maximum development of personality under the inevitable economic scarcity. At these various points, therefore, — develop- ment of personality In society, reaction of personality on society, ad- justment of competitive Interests In the state, changes in form of state for more satisfactory adjustment, class domination of state — social psychology Is in close touch with political science. Our analysis of political relations has revealed a change in recent years in those psychological relations which have been collectively ^1 Commons, " Labor and Administration," Chs. V-VI. "2 The conflict between legal and human status recurred again and again in the hearings before the British Coal Commission (Gleason, "The British Coal Commis- sion—Robert Smillie," The Survey, July 5, 1919, 521). "s Hocking, " Human Nature and Its Remaking," Pts. I-II. "/jiV., ch. xxvni. " Ihid., Ch. XXIX. »« Dewey, "The Discrediting of Idealism," Th( New Republic, Oct. 8, 1919, 284.-286. go THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE termed sovereignty. To understand the nature of sovereignty re- quires more careful inductive studies of the psychological processes than have yet been made. The opportunities for psychological studies of sovereignty in times past are limited, because an analysis of political attitudes in the past is impossible except through docu- mentary sources. Thinkers who lay great emphasis on induction will, therefore, appreciate the value of analysis of political atti- tudes in the present. Confusion in the discussion of the nature of sovereignty can be avoided by recognizing that theories must change not only as conditions change but also as methods of thinking change. A survival of the deductive attitude with an absorption in history causes an over-emphasis on obedience-compelling power. The first great thinker to emphasize the social-psychological point of view, Montesquieu,^'^ made the mistake of too much emphasis on ancient history and too little study of the governments of his own time,^® with the result of transmitting at least one misconcep- tion as to government and sovereignty in his own time.^® The proper emphasis on induction will result in an appreciation of the largeness of the social-psychological aspect of the problem, an em- phasis on intensive study of the nature of sovereignty in the present, and in a cautious approach to theory. It is evident that, for the future development of political science, exhaustive studies of the nature of sovereignty in the present, and the accumulation of such studies year after year, will eventually furnish valuable sources for the historical study of sovereignty. '^ Ehrlich, " Montesquieu and Sociological Jurisprudence," Har-vard Laiv Reviein, XXIX: 583. ^^ Ibid., 597. s» His doctrine of the separation of powers. See Montesquieu, " The Spirit of the Laws," trans, by Nugent and Pritchard, Bk. XI, Ch. 6. See also Goodnow, "Prin- ciples of Constitutional Government," 84-85, 153. CHAPTER V THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY WHEN the struggle of classes for the obedience-compelling power of the state becomes intense, when, in a capitalistic state, a resisting under class is forbidden to hold meet- ings in public buildings and other public places, in order to prevent the dissemination of their ideas, when, in a socialistic state, a capi- talistic class is likewise subjected to repression by the strong arm of the state, it may appear that class consciousness is more intense than consciousness of national unity. 'This view is emphasized when it is seen that the dominant class of the capitalistic nation warms toward capitalistic classes in other nations and through its control of the press expresses its detestation of resisting under classes in other nations, and when it is seen that the dominant class of the socialistic nation warms toward the " proletariat " in other nations and expresses its hostility to capitalistic classes of other nations. The increasing intensity of the class struggle does indeed develop a class internationalism which weakens nationalistic feeling. Nevertheless, the sense of nationality is by no means obliterated.^ It is a phenomenon more largely- of deep-seated social attitudes ^ than is class consciousness, in which clearly conscious ideas and impulses are more conspicuous elements. But in a time of extreme hostility between nations it becomes a phenomenon of impulse and idea — a clearly conscious purpose to remain distinct and inde- pendent and to resist influences contrary thereto.^ Because a state of mind is the essential thing in nationality,* social psychology is, in the sense of nationality, closely related to political science. The purpose of the present chapter is not to offer a psychological analy- sis of the sense of nationality,, which would require a volume, but ^ At the outbreak of the war the socialistic parties of various nations abandoned their conception of the international brotherhood of all workers to support the national purpose of their several nations. 2 Perry, "The Present Conflict of Ideals," 387-388. " Pillsbury, " The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism,'' Ch. IV. * Perry, of. cit., 381; Pillsbury, of. cit., 246-247. 91 92 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE to indicate the relation of social psychology to political science in this connection. With the increasing tendency to the migration of peoples and to intermarriage, likeness of race has become less important in the sense of nationality and the mere fact of association more impor- tant. A people, more closely associated with each other than with outsiders, inevitably becomes group-conscious ^ and shares the im- pulse to extend the group territory and otherwise to seek supe- riority as a group. This sense of nationality is much weakened unless the people speak the same language." In addition to this su- perficial sense of nationality due to contiguity and communication, there is a deeper sense when a people have certain traditions in common, certain like fundamental attitudes, as the same religious or political attitudes. From this fundamental likeness of attitudes, other forms of likeness — like impulses, like ideas — result. Es- sential in the unity of a people is their political attitude. A com- mon consciousness of the same country of birth,'' the same lan- guage,* the same religion,® and a similar physiognomy enhance na- tional feeling;^" with the growth of empire a common political attitude has become more and more essential.^^ It is at this point that political science is closely connected with social psychology in the conception of nationality. For the political attitude essen- tially determines the nature of the political institutions, and these are subject matter of political science.^'* The pohtical attitude of different nations varies according to the degree of submission with which the masses acquiesce in the proj- ects for self-aggrandizement of a ruling dynasty or a dominant class. ^^ The submission is less extreme among the Anglo-Saxons s Pillsbury, op. dt., Ch. II. 8 Ibid., 144. ^ Zimmern, " Nationality and Government," 96. ^Buck, "Language and the Sentiment of Nationality,'' Amer. Pol. Sc. Rev., X:44-7o; Margoliouth, " Language as a Consolidating and Separating Influence," in Papers on Inter-Racial Problems, First Universal Races Congress, University of London, 1911, 57-61. Davids, " Religion as a Consolidating and Separating Influence," in Papers on Inter-Racial Problems, First Universal Races Congress, University of London, 1911, 62-66; Thomas, "The Prussian-Polish Situation: An Experiment in Assimilation," Amer. Jour. SocioL, XIX: 627. lORuyssen, " M^hat is a Nationality?" Intern. Condi, No. 112, 8-23. "Veblen, "The Nature of Peace," 85-103. 12 Pillsbury, op. dt., Ch. IX. ^^Veblen, of. dt., a6. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY 93 than among the Germans 1* before the revolution. At one extreme is the attitude of the nation which observes unquestioning obedience to the commands of an autocracy, at the other extreme the condi- tioned acquiescence of the masses of a democracy; but one must avoid a hard and fast distinction in thought, as there is none in psychological fact, in spite of the patent constitutional distinction between autocracy and democracy.^^ The autocratic attitude is one of a set purpose to compel acqui- escence of subjects in projects for national aggrandizement. This purpose is " the result of a peculiar moral attitude or bent, habitual to such statesmen, and in its degree also habitual to their com- patriots, and is indispensably involved in the Imperial frame of mind. ... In short, the dynastic statesman is under the governance of a higher morality, binding him to the service of his nation's ambition — or in point of fact, to the personal service of his dynas- tic master — to which it is his dutiful privilege loyally to devote all his powers of force and fraud. " Democratically-minded persons, who are not moved by the call of loyalty to a gratuitous personal master, may have some difficulty in appreciating the force and the moral austerity of this spirit of devotion to an ideal of dynastic aggrandizement, and in seeing how its paramount exigence will set aside all meticulous scruples of personal rectitude and veracity, as being a shabby with-holding of service due." ^® The masses of a nation acquiesce in the prevailing political atti- tude, if not because it is congenial, then because of response to social suggestion. It needs to be congenial in order to evoke a spon- taneous, enthusiastic patriotism. Thus Bismarck writes of German patriotism: " In order that German patriotism should be active and effective, it needs as a rule the middle term of dependence on a dynasty; independent of dynasty it rarely comes to the rising point, though in theory it daily does so, in parliament, in the press, in public meeting; in practice the German needs either attachment to a dynasty or the goad of anger, hurrying him into action: the latter phenomenon, however, by its own nature is not permanent. It1s as a Prussian, a Hanoverian, a Wurtemberger, a Bavarian or a 1* Ibid., 104-108. i^Laski, "The Responsibility of the State in England," Harv. L. Rev., March, 1919, 466. 16 Veblen, op. cit., 84-86. 94 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE Hessian, rather than as a German, that he is disposed to give un- equivocal proof of patriotism ; and in the lower orders and the par- liamentary groups it will be long before it is otherwise. . . . ". . . The preponderance of dynastic attachment, and the use of a dynasty as the indispensable cement to hold together a definite portion of the nation calling itself by the name of the dynasty is a specific peculiarity of the German Empire. . . . " Whatever may be the origin of this factitious union of particu- larist elements, its result is that the individual German readily obeys the command of a dynasty to harry with fire and sword, and with his own hands to slaughter his German neighbours and kinsfolk as a result of quarrels unintelligible to himself. To examine whether this characteristic be capable of rational justification is not the problem of a German statesman, so long as it is strongly enough pronounced for him to reckon upon it." " Contrast this spon- taneous subservience to a dynasty with the traditional independence and individualism of the English and American people. Their patriotism is spontaneous when it is a question of asserting inde- pendence against a German dynastic ambition for world supremacy. Consciousness of a distinguishing political attitude becomes par- ticularly strong in the sense of nationality when a nation is con- scious of an essential difference between the attitude which has de- termined its political institutions in the past and the attitude which has determined the institutions of a rival nation — for instance, the American consciousness of the difference between the ideal of liberty, enunciated in the Declaration of Independence, and the German ideal of authority emphasized by Bismarck.^* This con- sciousness of a distinct political attitude is important in the sense of nationality of a great empire which contains people of different nativities, languages, religions, and physical aspects. It is also es- sential in determining the inclination of one nation to co-operate with another against a third; this was illustrated in the incentive given the United States by the overthrow of autocracy in Russia to join the Entente allies in the war against the Teutonic allies. It takes a conflict between nations to bring out vividly, in the consciousness of each nation. Its essential political attitude. Just as the Englishman's conception of private rights is ordinarily sub- 1^ Butler (editor), "Bismarck, The Man and the Statesman," I: 320-324. ^^ Ibid., I: 314-315. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY 95 conscious, and he becomes conscious of his rights only by fighting for them,^® so a nation becomes conscious of its pohtical attitude by fighting for it. Fighting against Germany not only called at- tention to the democratic political attitude as the thing fought for, but also called attention to the German attitude of domination- submission as the thing fought against. The attention of the peo- ple of the democratic nation was called not only to their own demo- cratic attitude of freedom but also to the defects in their political freedom, to the attitude of domination-submission in their political party organizations, and in their denial to women of the right to vote. Their attention was further called to the contradiction be- tween a democratic political attitude and the attitude of domina- tion-submission in industrial relations; and there arose a demand for industrial democracy.^" Attention was called, also, to the fact that the autocratic attitude determined ecclesiastical ^^ and aca- demic relations, '^^ and also the editing of the press. ^* The hitherto unconscious psychological basis of the various sections of social or- ganization was scrutinized and compared with the attitude which the conflict had made an ideal; and the wisdom of the domination- submission relation, where it continued to exist in a nation pro- fessedly democratic, became a matter of discussion. This prominence acquired by the democratic attitude was dis- pleasing to those classes in France, England and the United States whose attitude to democracy was the reactionary capitalistic atti- tude of distrust of popular rule and the aristocratic attitude of contempt for the masses.^* The outbreak of the war found them acclaiming democracy, but, with its progress, they were sobered with a sense of the significance of a real democratic movement, and what it would mean for their privileged position. " When the war broke out, all the reactionaries in England and France began to speak of the danger to democracy, although until that moment they had opposed democracy with all their strength. They were ^' See the chapter entitled, Psychological Implications of Interpretations of Private Rights. 20 Angell, " The British Revolution and the American Democracy," Pt. II, Chs. I-IV, Appendix I; Kellogg and Gleason, "British Labor and the War." 21 Croly, "The Future of the State," New Republic, Sept. 15, 1917, 179-181. 22Veblen, "The Higher Learning in America"; Dewey, "The Case of the Pro- fessor and the Public Interest," The Dial, Nov. 8, 1917, 435. 23 Lippmann, " Liberty and the News." 2*Kallen, "The Structure of Lasting Peace," vii-ix. 96 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE not sincere in so speaking; the impulse of resistance to Germany made them value whatever was endangered by the German attack. They loved democracy because they hated Germany; but they thought they hated Germany because they loved democracy." ^^ In addition to the attitudes that constitute the sense of nation- ality, there are certain instinctive impulses, which operate along the lines of the essential attitudes. People have an instinctive fear of standing alone, an instinct to draw together for security, ^^ to feel a gratifying sense of solidarity — of " each for all and all for each." It is when people are in this mood of apprehension and drawing together that the guide posts of past experience — the symbols of a common language and a traditional political allegiance — are influential in determining with whom they shall draw to- gether, and from whom they shall draw apart.*^ National am- bition, also, stimulates a sense of nationality,^® which operates in the direction particularly of the political attitude that distinguishes the nation.^^ Under the incentive that is imparted by this national ambition, other attitudes, as the consciousness of a common coun- try, language, religion, fall in abeyance in comparison with the po- litical attitude. Or these other attitudes may continue active, and may work at cross purposes with the national ambition for increased economic opportunities as a means of extension of the influence of the political attitude. In time of war or other intense international rivalry the sense of nationality involves a vivid collective consciousness,^" which includes a consciousness not only of the national political attitude but also of the immediate group purpose and of the many things which everybody is saying and doing toward realizing that purpose. An individual does not share in the collective consciousness unless he ceases to feel personal impulses which conflict therewith ^^ and comes to feel the common impulses with reference to national sym- bols and the national ideas which are being held before the people. For instance, during the nation-wide campaign of 19 17, in the 25 Russell, " Why Men Fight," 15-16. 2' Pillsbury, op. cit., 53. ^^Kallen, "The Structure of Lasting Peace," 19-20. 2^ Pillsbury, op. cit., 215. zoVeblen, op. cit., 31 ff. s" Veblen, op. cit., 89 ; Pillsbury, op. cit., Ch. VI, 202-205. •iMcDougall, "The Will of the People," Sociological Review, 1912, V: 89-104. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY 97 United States, to sell " liberty bonds," the idea of buying liberty bonds was held before the people throughout the nation by adver- tising and by the press ; and that man did not share in the collective consciousness who, in investing his money, thought only of the interest to be gained from the investment and did not share the impulse to invest in liberty bonds for the sake of helping the gov- ernment to win the war. This impulse to help the government against the enemies of the nation was the essential impulse of the collective consciousness. " If you can't fight, your money can," was the slogan. The essential impulse was to " fight " on behalf of the country,*^ and those who exercised the social control through- out the nation connected this impulse to fight with the idea of buy- ing liberty bonds, with contributions to the Red Cross, and so on. People who invested for personal gain, who made work for them- selves or their families instead of for the Red Cross and other na- tional agencies their first thought, did not share fully in the col- lective consciousness. A collective consciousness does not neces- sarily involve any intellectual agreement among the people as to the wisdom of the national purpose, nor even any intelligent idea as to what the national purpose may mean. It involves merely a common impulse to advance the national purpose, whatever it may mean, whether it be wise or unwise, in the ways suggested by the government, the press, and the other agencies of social control.** In time of peace also there may be a vivid national conscious- ness, if a nation is in a state of resistance to the political and eco- nomic domination and exploitation which is being practised against it by another. Instance the vivid national consciousness of Poland since the attempt to Germanize Poland was begun in 1873.** The leaders who were killed in this struggle against tyranny became symbols of the national resistance, and these symbols united the nation by intensifying the common consciousness of the prevailing attitude of resistance. This sense of solidarity was further stimu- lated by making of the symbols of resistance a ritual for the group. " In order to see itself, the Polish people has to look at the past, and there is scarcely a house where one will not find memorial pic- tures of the national martyrdom. The martyrology, which no 32 Russell, op. cii., 14-15. 33 Pillsbury, op. cit., 198. 3* Thomas, "The Prussian-Polish Situation: An Experiment in Assimilation," Amer. Jour. Sociol., March, 1914, 625-640. 98 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE other people possesses in so developed a form, is the political rosary of the Poles, which Is prayed over unceasingly, and whose cruel beads each one has often fingered. In such wise for years senti- mental men are ever anew raising their voices and warning the Polish people that they ought not entirely to give themselves up to the fashionable industrial organizations; for the trade union and peasant association have no Polish divisions and for them the rosary has no prayer." ^^ In the same way religious persecution in the past developed a vivid sectarian consciousness and a martyrology for the resisting sects, which strengthened their resistance. Some- times a national resistance is stimulated by a sectarian resistance, as in Poland, which resisted Germany not only as a nation but also as Roman Catholic in religion.*® In a period of intense international rivalry the political attitude is either given added fixity or, if the nation proves unsuccessful in the rivalry, is weakened. Does any one doubt that a victory for the Teutonic Allies in the World War would not have weakened our democratic attitude and strengthened the militaristic atti- tude ? ^"^ Is it not evident that the victory for the Entente Allies, in spite of the reactionary Treaty of Peace and in spite of the sur- viving intolerant and coercive spirit of the war period, has stimu- lated the democratic attitude throughout the world? That is the cause of the increasing unrest and resistance among the workers of the world — it is an impulsive movement toward industrial de- mocracy. The attempted repression of it is the impulsive reaction of reactionary capitalistic interests allied with a military class against democracy. But there are other psychological effects of the victory which are formidably interfering with its favourable effect on democracy. To explain what these are would require several chapters, but the 85 Bernard, " Die Polenfrage," 197. 88 "Ask a Pole his nationality and he will not improbably reply: 'Catholic.'" (Thomas, op. cit., 67.) 8' In Japan, even while the World War was in progress, the success of Germany against superior forces caused an active German propaganda to be carried on by Japanese officials. " I learned that in the army the conscript recruits had been sys- tematically got together and taught the superiority of German institutions to those of the Allies, and especially the superiority of German militarism and the fact that it could not be defeated." (Dewey, " Liberalism in Japan," The Dial, Oct. 4, 1919, 284.) When Germany was defeated a wave of democratic sentiment spread through- out Japan, which, however, receded because of " the lesson of the failure at Paris of tlie fine words which President Wilson flourished when he took the United States into the war." {Ibid., 284.) THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY 99 situation in the United States may be stated more briefly. The opinion of the great English and French observers of American life, that we are a people of a somewhat provincial self-esteem,^^ is, we must admit, not without some degree of truth. It had a basis in our sense of our vast, undeveloped natural resources, in the economic freedom of the settlers of the country, and in our benevolent attitude in offering a home to the oppressed of the nations of the world. The coming of millions of foreigners, from every nation of the world, caused us to feel our superiority. Then, too, the freedom of opportunity that determined the development, for a time, of our economic and political institutions caused these to be thought superior to those of other nations. This sense of superiority was still further increased by our rapid rise to a world power, which was not devoid of spectacular incidents that stirred the pride of the whole nation to a high pitch. Finally, the fact that we entered the World War just in time to save Europe from the domination of the German militarists, and that, after thus dra- matically ending the war, we were asked to save Europe economic- ally, did not tend to weaken the national self-esteem. This psycho- logical trait, or state, is unfavourable to the development of de- mocracy for several reasons. It means that, as a nation, we are satisfied with things as they are, for our very greatness makes it unnecessary to change anything. This means that the national self-esteem is particularly favourable to those classes in the nation to whose interest it is to maintain things as they are, and is un- favourable to those classes to whose interests the prevailing con- ditions are contrary. Because of the national complacency, the former classes are more repressive where movements for progress occur than they would otherwise dare to be. This psychological condition showed itself especially in the coercion of labour in the years following the World War, which was more extreme than before, and in the weak reaction against that coercion of a public that was particularly complacent at that time because of the happy outcome of the war. Another cause of the national complacency that furthered capi- talistic repression in this period was the attitude of the returned soldiers. Many people had believed that the soldiers would return '8 De Tocqueville, "Democracy in America," 11:183-184, 238-341; Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," II : 32a. loo THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE enthused for democracy, with a zest for independent thinking, and for reform movements that looked toward those developments in political and economic freedom to which our traditions committed us. Many of them did return in this frame of mind, but the influ- ence of others was thrown for reaction instead of progress. The aggressive reactionaries had brought back with them the repressive spirit of military discipline, instead of an enthusiasm for democ- racy, and the public, because of its complacency as a victorious na- tion, and because of its pride in the soldiers who wrought for the great victory, acquiesced in the repressive and inquisitorial be- haviour. The fact is that the intense political rivalry had pro- duced political fanatics, as intense sectarian rivalry once produced, and still does produce religious fanatics. Intense rivalry makes the beliefs of the rivalrous groups obsessions before which oppo- sition is to be crushed out by force. This fanaticism, which once animated religious sects the world over, among many of the re- turned soldiers came to attach itself to the nation. They thereby became an unofGcIal military class; and the fanaticism of this class Was Intensified by the fact that it was highly pleasing to economic and political powers that be, and, therefore, was favourably no- ticed in the press. Hence the social control of the military class was enhanced by Its flattering associations and favourable news- paper publicity. The same fanaticism characterized the German military class, and the influence of this class was similarly out of all proportion to its numbers. The extraordinary influence of a military class is due to the fact that it Is the visible symbol of the national superiority. Its prestige as such causes the people sub- consciously to accept the military attitudes in civil life. The militaristic attitude of authority-obedience develops in a nation as a result of certain relations between classes in a nation or between nations. Intensifying economic rivalry between nations causes the reactionary economic interests of a nation to desire an assurance of the support of a strong army and navy, and intensify- ing rivalry between capital and labour causes reactionary capital- istic Interests to desire the assurance of military support against labour. Changing International and intra-national relations might conceivably result In compulsory military training in the United States, which development of a military class would accentuate the THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY iioi evils of the military mind that are already pronounced among us. The military mind accepts the purpose laid on from above. Free- dom of thought and speech is limited to ideas that are in harmony with that purpose. Wherever the influence of a military class reaches, freedom of speech is done away and all the attitudes of character developed by free speech are weakened. And, as institu- tions are the effect rather than the cause of psychological processes, any considerable development of a military class in the United States would result in a change in institutions in the direction of the auto- cratic form. A reversion to autocratic institutions seems incredible when we consider our traditions. But it is not so incredible when we con- sider that the essential process in political evolution has been the conflict of peoples and the changes in their idea-systems occasioned thereby.^® If the masses of the different nations continue sub- servient to rivalrous capitalistic interests, and the rivalry of these becomes keener, militarisms may develop instead of pass away. During a war, under the impelling force of instinctive fear and rivalry, the rank and file of a nation are united in the one impul- sive national purpose and alter their habits as directed by their leaders for the realization of that purpose. When peace follows war the life interests of the rank and file return again to the com- munity^ the job and the family life. But, by appealing to fear and rivalry in time of peace, as the militarists in all nations are constantly doing, it is possible for interests that control govern- ments to secure popular acquiescence in measures that imperceptibly change institutions in the direction of the autocratic. The habits of the people may be changed gradually in time of peace, as they are more suddenly In time of war, by enlisting in time of peace, imperceptibly, the instinctive impulses violently stirred In time of war, and this change in habitual instinctive impulses works the de- sired change in institutions. During the decade preceding the World War the people of Germany were united in a great national rivalrous purpose under the instigation of the military, political and economic powers, and were stimulated in this purpose by fear of England. The same change, with the same inevitable result, might conceivably take place in the United States in the not distant s'Teggart, "The Processes of History,'' 150-151. 102 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE future, because of increasingly hostile rivalry with other nations. We have to admit that, thus far, the impulsive purpose-of a na- tion to maintain or improve its international position — to seek national superiority — has been essential in the sense of national unity of the great nations; and aggressive economic and military rivalry has, therefore, seemed inevitable. Such a sense of unity has united nations, not only in war but in peace. In our own sense of national unity, perhaps the essential factor has been our sense of our national superiority. In our isolation this did not seriously interfere with liberty. But as we come into more intense rivalry with other nations, aggressive economic and military rivalry will more and more seem inevitable, with its coercion. We have to choose between this rivalrous nationalism with coercion, on the one hand, and an ideal of international co-operation, on the other. The latter ideal is one in which sympathetic and intellectual im- pulses, not fearful, rivalrous and dominating impulses, determine the purposes of the national leadership and the ideals of the thoughtful public opinion of the nation. This psychological basis of class co-operation within the nation, of national unity, and of international co-operation, never has been attained in any nation. If the relation within a nation and between nations is ever to be- come a relation of intelligent co-operation, this development re- quires, above everything else, not merely the breaking up of the traditional national attitudes,*" but also the weakening of the over- mastering tendency of human nature to react unthinkingly accord- ing to habits and attitudes. It requires also that the impulsive force through which this overmastering tendency to habit is weak- ened shall be, not the force of rivalrous, but of sympathetic and intellectual impulses. These, if stimulated by the agencies of social suggestion, will formulate a new ideal. " As nationality is largely dependent upon the development of ideals and a new ideal, when developed, has the force of instinct, it is always possible to make progress." *^ But progress in the past has depended on the shock of group conflict, which has accomplished the " mental release " from tradition of the members of a group.*^ The masses, instead of being educated, have been kept in ignorance and subjection by *<> Orth, " Law and Force in International Affairs," Intern. Jour. Ethics, Apr. i, 191 6, 341-344- *i Pillsbury, op. cit., 379. *2 Teggart, op. cit., 151. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY 103 ruling classes for the sake of the preservation of the " rights " of the latter and the satisfaction of their ambitions. The upper classes have held the social power, and therefore, the responsibility of enlightening the masses or keeping them in igno- rance. In some nations the upper classes have determined that the masses should have no education, on the ground that a people can be more easily kept in subjection by keeping them in ignorance. When the people have had some education the upper classes have controlled the boards that determined what education they should have and what education they should not have. A people may be more effectually kept in ignorance by giving them education than by denying it, because they may be given what is represented to be vital education, and thereby made to believe they have education, when it fails to touch the vital problems of their lives. They are practically as ignorant as before and are more effectually kept in ignorance, because the appearance of so doing is avoided, as it is not by denying them education altogether. As long as the masses of a nation are ignorant and, therefore, are predominantly creatures of instinctive impulse and habit, the political leaders can enlist the unintelligent patriotic support of the masses in any project in the interest of a dominant class which can be brought into line with popular impulses and attitudes by cleverly suggested explanations. This condition of the masses whereby they are subject to the suggestive control of the interests that happen to exercise a predominant influence over the government at the time is not a desirable condition in that it makes impossible a steadily pro- gressive public policy and one that shall invariably command the con- fidence of other nations. Only with an intelligent and critical cit- izenship is a progressive public policy possible. In how far a citi- zenship is intelligent and able to discriminate merely plausible justi- fications of unwise public policy from the requirements of wise policy is a question of social-psychological fact. Because the facts are so difficult to observe and analyse on a large scale, there is a difference of opinion among students of society as to the motives of statesmen in giving justifications for their political action, and as to the func- tioning of those justifications in the minds of the rank and file.*^ Not until recently has the necessity of an intelligent citizenry ^3 Compare Veblen, " The Nature of Peace," 35-36, with Perry, " The Present Con- flict of Ideals," 14-15. 104 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE been realized. The result is the Americanization movement. There are two opposite and conflicting tendencies in this movement. In order to understand these tendencies it is necessary to recall the essential elements in the American sense of nationality from the beginning., While the country was first settled by those who sought political and religious liberty, the essential lure of immi- gration since the independence of the nation was established has been the superior economic opportunities offered by cheap land and high wages. The American of the nineteenth century felt that his country was superior. to any other and the basis of his belief was economic. At the outbreak of the Civil War, President Lincoln relied for support not on compassion for the slave and an impulse to free him but on the American's sense of national great- ness, which required a united nation and the preservation of the union. A sense of national greatness — a satisfaction of the rival- rous disposition, — not sympathy or intelligence, has been essential in our sense of nationality. The economic basis of this sense of nationality lay in the un- rivalled opportunities for accumlation of wealth offered by the new country, which stimulated the property-getting impulses and moral qualities. These are set forth in " Poor Richard's Almanac." The teachings of Benjamin Franklin in Poor Richard " moulded our great-grandparents and their children; they have formed our popular traditions ; they still influence our actions, guide our ways of thinking, and establish our points of view. . . ." ** This is because they expressed the property-getting attitude of the peo- ple. Poor Richard was a personification of the self-reliant in- dustriousness, thrift and frugality of the rank and file of the peo- ple.*^ In those first decades no boy could grow up in expectation of being able to live without working. " Father's got money, why should I work? " had not yet become the inner thought of tens of thousands of boys and young men who expect to inherit money, and who are supported in ease by their parents. Because every man had an opportunity to work and save, there was approximate free- dom of economic opportunity — "land of freedom, land of for- tune " ; — and because these conditions were not found in the old world there was an easy sense of the superiority of the country. <* Morse, "Benjamin Franklin,'' 23. *B Williams, " An American Town," Ch. IV. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY 105 With the development of private property, a large part of the property of the United States passed into the hands of a small minority of the citizens.*" This happened not because the small minority had superior Industriousness, thrift and frugality but by a development of transportation, of industrial and financial organi- zation that was fostered in their own interest by those who con- trolled the invested earnings of the industrious and thrifty, and who controlled the governments. There are, therefore, two opposite tendencies in the present Americanization movement. One is to restore the original free- dom of economic opportunity, without, of coursje, restoring the original conditions of cheap land and small industries, which is im- possible. The other is to maintain economic relations as they are. " ' Americanization ' ! cry the employers of labour. ' That is all very simple. Teach the men to stay on their jobs — that's Ameri- canization ! ' " *7 f Q others Americanization means to teach un- questioning submission to political authority;** to others it means " the preservation of the status quo," *® that is, the maintenance of the social control of the propertied classes; to others it means teaching English to foreigners ; ^^ to the hangers-on of political par- ties it means another opening for political jobs; ^^ to many others it means an opportunity to win favourable public attention. All these interested parties are mainly intent on a propaganda which aims to teach foreigners the English language, to inculcate certain plati- tudes about liberty and property and thus to prepare the masses to accept through social-suggestion the attitudes that determine the editing of a capitalistic press, essential among which attitudes is deference to the propertied interests as they have developed in the United States. On the other hand, the program of those who aim to restore freedom of opportunity is the gradual democratization of industry. This requires, primarily, a development of intelli- gence and sympathy throughout the nation.^^ This is to be accom- plished through fostering intelligence and co-operation in industry, ^^King, "The Wealth and Income of the People of the United States," Chs. IV, IX. *^ Lubin and Krysto, " The Menace of Americanization," The Survey, Feb. 21, 1920, 611. ^^Ibid., 611. '*»Ibid., 6x1. ^oibid., 611. " Ibid., 610. «2/*«V., 612. io6 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE and through emphasis on the Inculcation of sympathetic and intel- lectual attitudes in public education. As to the development of Intelligence and co-operation In indus- try, Mr. Robert B. Wolf, the distinguished Industrial engineer, says: " Until we have changed the autocratic character of our indus- tries (which really dominate the political situation), It will be im- possible to have a democratic society. " By a democratic society I mean that form of social structure which encourages and aids the growth of the creative spirit in man, expressing itself through the trades and professions and the organ- ized Industries. " This I do not believe can be accomplished until the executive, legislative and judicial functions of the government cooperate with the trades and professional associations and industrial organlza- tiony to give greater opportunity for the free expression of indi- viduality. When this Is done we shall have an organization of society based upon respect for the individual, which is the only true democracy. " What right have we then to expect a high development of pro- ductive (creative) effort when we limit the Intelligent handling of materials and forces to the few who autocratically claim it as their right to dominate the wills of others, especially when their contact with the actual work, because of the Increasing slzeof our industrial organizations, is becoming constantly more remote? Of course, we must have leaders ; otherwise there can be no organization, but leading is vastly different from driving. ' Teach, don't boss,' is a sign we see posted in Industrial plants quite frequently these days, and It is one of the healthy ' signs ' of the times." ^* Mr. Wolf declares that the dominating attitude of employers is the essential cause of labour unrest. He asserts: "The short-sighted em- ployer may prevent his employees from using their brains at their work, and because of this, hold their compensation down to a low ^3 Wolf, "Securing the Initiative of the Workman," Amer. Econ. Rei)., IX (Supple- ment) : I20-I2I. See also Mr. Wolf's description of the methods by which he devel- oped the creative impulse of workmen in the pulp and paper industry (Wolf, " Indi- viduality in Industry," Proceedings of the Employment Managers' Conference, 1917, TJ. S. Bur. Labor Statistics, Bulletin 227, pp. 201-204. In a letter to the author in June, 1919, Mr. Wolf wrote: "I am doing some work for several industries outside of the pulp and paper field, and I find the principles worked out in our own line applicable in such diversified industries as steel and iron and the soda industry." THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY 107 level. There is no advantage in so doing, however, for the result of the attempt to repress individual initiative is simply to deflect creative power into destructive channels. "This autocratic domination of the wills of the workmen, by preventing free self-expression, is the cause of practically all the destructive forces, exhibiting themselves in certain phases of Bol- sheviki and I. W. W. movements. The creative process in the individual cannot be suppressed^ — it can only be deflected (per- verted) into useless or, worse still, destructive channels."^* Mr. Wolf calls for co-operation between the government and industry as a means of stimulating the intellectual or creative im- pulses throughout industry. He conceives of the nation as an economic unit, and of the sense of nationality as a joyful sense of the excellent opportunities afforded by the nation for self-realiza- tion through the work of life. He makes clear that his concep- tion is of what ought to be and what might be, not of what is. But he points out that the government's industrial policy during the war afforded the beginnings of what ought to be and that the main features of that policy should be continued in time of peace : " I. They called upon the practical men, the representatives of the workmen, the engineers and the scientists to tell them "what to do and how to do it. They asked those men to build up organizations to direct the industrial operations of the country. Gradually this group of men, whose training had made them masters of the ma- terial forces, began to accumulate information which enabled them to know what the nation's resources actually were. They encour- aged the producers to organize into associations to aid them in making a complete survey of the field of resources and require- ments, and in this way were able to determine which organizations had the greatest capacity to render service. The legislative branch of the government was acting under the direction of these bureaus of industrial leaders for the simple reason that it could not act in- telligently without them. " How can we expect to get intelligent legislation in peace times without the same cooperation between nationally organized indus- try and the national legislative body? " 2, The second thing the government did was to administer the finances of the country in such a way that credit was extended 5* Wolf, op. cit., i2i-iaa. io8 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE to those who were estimated to have the greatest capacity to ren- der service. Without this executive power to administer credit where needed, little could be accomplished for it had to be admin- istered for the good of the whole country. Why then isn't this a necessary peace-time executive function also? " With the governmental administration of credit for the benefit of society, the interest charges would naturally be made as light as possible in order to reduce the burden, and thereby stimulate cre- ative enterprise." ^^ This co-operation of all governmental agencies with industry not only for industrial progress merely but for human progress, for the development of the individual personality, will, says Mr. Wolf, develop a collective efficiency, a sense of national unity, and a dis- tinct national consciousness. The final international relation is not one of rivalry for supremacy but of co-operation. Each nation, he says, must " become finally a conscious unity for expressing itself in constructive service for advancing the welfare of the world. " Surely an association of nations based upon this conception of rendering service need not think of a type of internationalism which does away with national characteristics. Those groups which logi- cally and naturally should work together must form themselves into individual societies or governments ; otherwise, the progress of the human race will not be individual or generic. The individuality of the nation must be just as carefully and conscientiously developed as the individuality of the plant in the larger corporations, or the individuality of the department within the plant or the man within the department. When each nation realizes that its growth in cre- ative power depends upon its cooperation with other nations for the welfare of the whole world, the attitude of exploitation which has dominated national life in the past will disappear. . . ." ^^ In order to appreciate the significance of Mr. Wolf's theory it is necessary to recall what was said in the Introduction about the fundamental nature of assumptions as to human nature in inter- preting the facts of the social sciences. If social scientists merely accept the human nature implied in the habitual political and eco- nomic relations, their interpretations of their facts will, obviously, differ much from what it would be from the viewpoint of an ade- ^^ Ibid., 129. See also Fisher, "Economists in Public Service," Amer. Econ. Rev., IX (Supplement) : 15. 5' Wolf, op. cit., 130. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY 1109 quate conception of human nature. At this point, therefore, there IS the closest possible relation between social psychology and po- litical science. The political scientist does not carry his analysis beyond the attitudes implied in the political relations with which he is at the time concerned but, in the interpretation of the possible lines of political progress, he must consult with the social psycholo- gist as to the capacity for progress that is afforded by the instinctive dispositions of human nature as a whole. The second line of effort for the stimulation and training of the creative impulses lies through public education. The working masses must not have to wait until they are adult workers before these impulses are stirred. They must be trained intellectually while children through a system of public education developed with that end in view. In educational policy, the emphasis should be on the stimulus and training of the intellect, because the strongest tendencies in human nature are to react according to instinct and habit. The most intellectual men, in spite of themselves, con- stantly find that they are developing attitudes that weaken their efficiency and that of the groups to which they belong. Thus the managers of industrial enterprises find themselves falling into cer- tain attitudes to their subordinates, judging whether or not sub- ordinates have made good according to their attitudes toward them rather than according to the objective results of their work. The subordinates in turn find themselves reacting in this way to their subordinates, and so on down to the rank and file of the employes, among whom the favouritism and inefficiency of their superiors is common talk; so that esprit de corps disappears from the organization, and each enjoys the thought of what he is getting out of the enterprise instead of what he is putting into it. This is true not only in industry but also throughout social organization. In education itself, this deadening tendency creeps in. Curriculums become rigid, methods become pedantic, the minds of teachers be- come inflexible, their relations to their students become attitudinal. For instance, teachers often mark students according to their " es- timate " of their ability, that is, according to their attitudes to stu- dents instead of from a critical analysis of the students' work. Reaction from habit and attitude is the easy reaction and this tend- ency is increased by the lack of emphasis on the training of the intellect. This condition affects the national consciousness. As no THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE will be shown in a succeeding chapter, patriotism is largely a phe- nomenon of instinctive impulse and attitude; there is very little in it that is intelligent. Public education must reach not only the youth of the land but also adults. The public education of adults, which is beginning to be attempted in this country and in Europe, will amount to little if the work of the masses makes little or no appeal to their intelli- gence. A man cannot go through the day's work like an automa- ton and then, at the close, suddenly become conscious that he has intellectual faculties that ought to be developed." Unless there is some call for intelligence in the course of the work, studies to develop intelligence after work hours will hardly seem worth while. It is for this reason that intelligent citizenship requires that the work of the masses be such as not to deaden intelligence. But, in addition to the work appealing to intelligence, there must be pay and leisure adequate to encourage workmen to feel impulses for positive self-development. The political representatives of a so- cial order which " has in the past required the sacrifice of the many to the few " ^* constantly preach self-restraint.^® Under the cloak of a hypocritical regard for the many they seek to perpetuate the sacrifice of the many to the few. The ideal of social education is self-development of the many; and it assumes that, while there is an economic scarcity which fixes a limit to the material means of self- development, education will Inevitably result In such a re-distribu- tion of wealth as shall permit the widest possible self-development. That the sense of nationality from now on may be not a reaction- ary but a progressive force, the citizens of the different nations must be trained for progressive citizenship. Such an education should include an analysis of group conflicts and of the conflicts of instinctive interests within groups. The group conflicts include family, class, sectarian and other forms of group rivalry within the nation, as well as International rivalry. Education for progressive citizenship is impossible when rival groups use public education in their own Interest. Families are apt to favour such education as shall not be subversive of conformity to beliefs that the children "^ " Relation of Industrial and Social Conditions to Adult Education," U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Revieiv, Nov., 1918, 65, 66, 69. "8 Croly, " Progressive Democracy," 414. "^ Ibid., 412-423. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY in of the family must profess if the family is to retain its " standing " m the community. Families also favour such education as will enable their children to gain recognition from an upper class, or to prove their superiority to other children, especially those of an upper class. The interest of the family in education is apt to spring, therefore, from impulses of family rivalry rather than from a public welfare ideal; hence family influence over the educational system is contrary to education for progressive citizenship.*** Again, sectarian groups demand that public education shall not call in question the sectarian beliefs." Students of the history of education know the baneful effects on education of the struggle of sects to control it ; and sects have by no means ceased efforts for this control. With education under sectarian control, education for progressive citizenship would be impossible. Again, capitalis- tic interests oppose teaching that is not in line with their ambitions ; property-owning interests oppose teaching that makes them appre- hensive about the security of property or the certainty of dividends ; and these interests exercise no inconsiderable influence over public education in the United States.®^ Such influence is contrary to edu- cation for progressive citizenship. Again, the nation opposes teaching that is not in line with instinctive patriotism.^* While programs of reform must be developed with an eye to the exigencies of international rivalry, education is not reform, and it should be entirely free and unconnected with nationalistic impulses.** Family, class, sectarian and national rivalries constitute impul- sive conflicts, which make impossible an educational ideal of free intellectual development. The conflicting groups strive to control public education in the interest of the satisfaction of the group impulses. The degree of intellectual freedom actually enjoyed by the teacher is always a result of compromise between these con- flicting interests. On the one hand is the social pressure exerted as a result of the various group rivalries, and of beliefs that have become traditional. On the other hand is the necessity that teach- ers have unbiassed minds if educational institutions are to render 80 Russell, "Why Men Fight," 174. ^^ Ibid., 162-163. «2Veblen, "The Higher Education in America," Ch. II. " Russell, op. cii., 161-162. 8* Beard, " Propaganda in Schools," The Dial, June 14, 1919, 598-599- 112 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE efScient service. Thinking is unreliable if the thinking proceeds from a family, class, sectarian or even strictly national point of view. It may seem an impossible task — this of training the rank and file of a nation to judge impartially as between their nation and another. The best preparation for such judgment is an education that teaches impartial judgment in the more frequently recurring class conflicts within the nation. For, as the individual is a mem- ber of some nation, so he is a member of some class — that one with which he habitually sympathizes. For impartial judgments between classes it is essential to make a special effort to understand the class to which one does not, in sympathy, belong. Paradoxical as it may seem, this is usually the working class; for, though the majority of people are workers, their, prevailing attitude is one of admiration of an upper class. One may often hear workmen, when reading of a strike, express a contempt for the striking work- men. Especially is this true of classes whom we are accustomed to think of as " educated " — they instinctively sympathize with em- ployers rather than with workmen. Yet the presumption is fa- vourable to, rather than against strikers. For, in conflicts between employers and workmen, the former invariably have the advantage, and workmen know it and strike only as a last resort. Employers have the advantage In that labour Is a perishable commodity — if not used today, that day's labour Is lost, — and workmen cannot afford to lose their labour because they have no financial resources. Employers are backed by immense financial resources in addition to their own, for banking interests, as well as other corporations In the same industry and in other industries, stand ready to support a corporation involved in an Industrial struggle. Consequently workmen are apt to feel, " What can labour do against capital? " The only support which striking workmen can hope for is the sym- pathy of other bodies of workmen similarly situated and of that uncertain force termed public opinion. But, except in rare cases when much publicity has been given the causes of a strike, so that the public understands the situation and is In a position Intelligently to support the party on whose side justice lies, the public is apt impulsively to sympathize with employers. The reasons are, first, that newspapers, being capitalistic enterprises, are more apt to print the employers' side, which they get from the employers' pub- THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY 113 licity agents, than the workmen's side ; second, that people in gen- eral impulsively respect the man of wealth power and the class of wealth power, so that they readily credit what the newspapers print oi the employers' side, and, in a situation in which they must impulsively sympathize with one party and condemn another, they sympathize with employers and condemn workmen.*^ As long as the public thus reacts impulsively instead of intelligently toward labour problems — as will be the case as long as public education avoids these problems, — labour, organized and unorganized, will have to encounter this great obstacle of an impulsively adverse pub- lic opinion. Because of their unfavourable position both as re- gards resources and public opinion, workmen are naturally sub- missive, and employers are naturally dominating because of their favourable position. Workmen do not like to strike. The strike is a last resort. The result is that long before a strike occurs the resentment of workmen has become a cumulative phe- nomenon. And the strike, when it comes, stirs the indignation of employers as a defiance of their authority and an interference with their right to manage their own business. The result of this clash of resentment of workmen and indignation of employers is that industrial conflicts are inevitably explosions of impulse instead of occasions for the constructive development of industrial relations, and this still further inclines the public against the strikers who seem to have caused the disorder. If now we view this impulsive conflict impartially we see that ° 5 This attitude was seen in the great steel strike of 1919 which was caused by the refusal of the president of the United States Steel Corporation to confer with representa- tives of organized labour of which his workmen were a part. The press and public opinion did not condemn his action as would have been the case if it had been the leader of the strikers who had refused to confer with the president of the Steel Cor- poration. " Had Mr. Fitzpatrick declined to confer with Mr. Gary he would have been denounced from one end of the country to the other as a firebrand. But Mr. Gary can decline to confer with the representative of a very large section of his men ; he can refuse to arbitrate, to consult, to mediate, even to discuss ; he can bluntly repudiate all the known methods of peaceful adjustment, and so far as one can judge by the press, few voices are raised against such behavior on his part." ("The Steel Strike," The New Republic, Oct. i, 1919, 245.) This attitude of the public is the more significant of its impulsive suggestibility to the industrial and financial powers in view of the fact that the intolerable conditions in the Steel Corporation were made public by Dr. Fitch in 191 1, in his book, "The Steel Workers," and, at the time of the strike, in magazine articles. For instance see Fitch, "A Strike for Freedom," The Survey, Sept. 27, 1919, 891. But the public remained largely in ignorance of the conditions, and in the absence of knowledge, accepted the attitude of the employers against the workmen. 114 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE workmen no more have a right to submit to the domination of employers than have employers a right to dominate workmen and compel them to work under conditions or for a Wage that makes impossible their realization -of maximum vitality and efficiency. We see that, in case of a strike that cannot be allowed to go on because of the public disaster It will occasion, the government is just as much under obligation to compel employers to yield to the just demands of workmen, as to compel workmen to relinquish unjust demands against employers. It is as much under obligation, in its conception of the justice of a case, to consider the rights of workmen as human beings with capacity for self-realization, as to consider the rights of employers as property-owners. A rational social purpose requires of workmen that they Insist on the working conditions and the wage that is necessary for maximum vitality and efficiency and self-realization; It requires of employers the pro- vision of working conditions and a wage that make possible maxi- mum vitality and efficiency, and an increasing self-realization of the working masses. A rational social purpose therefore requires of the public that they regard industrial relations from the point of view of the national industrial efficiency and the development of the personality of workmen, not from the point of view of an impul- sive respect for the employing class and an acceptance of the atti- tude of that class because It Is the class of prestige In the nation. In so far, then, as public opinion is operative in the regulation of the conflict between capital and labour, the rising generation, which is to become the employing class and the working class and the public, must be subjected, when of school age, to a training in the analysis of industrial conditions and relations, to the end that the pubhc in Its reaction to industrial disputes may be capable of im- partial judgment. In addition to such a training given in the course of public education, another condition that facilitates intelli- gent instead of impulsive behaviour in industrial disputes is a bal- ance of power between the conflicting industrial interests. The more intelligent the public becomes on industrial matters, the less impulsively will it support employers in a dispute, and the less blindly will it support the political dominance of the employing class. Thus will a development of public intelligence ultimately have the effect of equalizing the power of the conflicting classes. This training for impartial judgment in class conflict is at the THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY 115 same time a training in the intellectual attitudes that are required for any impartial judgment whatever, whether between classes or nations.** Public education must be so thoroughly intellectual as to eliminate prejudice — family, cl^ss, sectarian, national. The central fact in education for citizenship is " thinking " ; *^ and no thinking is possible without freedom from external restraint,*^ and from the control of impulses other than the intellectual. Freedom in this wide sense is essential for the development of personality, which is the end of the state. The thinking that is essential in the development of personality is openminded, often with a feeling of reverence before great problems that baffle the intellect ; is straight- forward, without fear or hesitancy; is singleminded, with no thought of the bearing of the solution of the problem on public approval or disapproval, promotion or demotion; and" finally is responsible in that the significance of the solution for the conduct of the individual is thought through to conviction, on which the individual is ready to act.** Education must lead to the formation of convictions for civic and political action, to the end that every citizen may become, within the limits of his capacity, an effective agent for progress. "* This education is impossible ■without certain reforms that will give the masses the necessary incentive to, and leisure hours for, thought and study. These reforms include shortening the hours of labour, doing away with overtime except where it is absolutely necessary, doing away with the evil effects of monotonous labour by alter- nating kinds of work, creating opportunities for the exercise of initiative and for giv- ing workmen a share in the management of industry, guaranteeing the worker a rea- sonable security of livelihood, and other reforms. See the report of the Committee on Adult Education: Interim Report on Industrial Conditions in Relation to Adult Education — Ministry of Reconstruction, London, 1918. *^ Dewey, " Democracy and Education," Ch. XII. '^Laski, "Authority in the Modern State," 56, 90, lai, 231, 268, 275. ** Dewey, op. cit., 204-210. CHAPTER VI THE CONFLICT OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND IDeALS THE political attitude of a people detefmliies its political behaviour and affects its entire social organization. To illustrate this functioning of political attitudes let us com- pare the attitude of the German people during the autocratic pe- riod of German history with that of " democratic " nations. Essential in the political relations of the German people in the autocratic period was the habitual instinctive relation of domina- tion-submission. This relation, which is the essential one in mili- tary relations, we find running through all aspects of their social organization. It determined the framework of the German govern- ment, as seen in the dominating power of the executive,^ In the subordination thereto of the legislative ^ and judicial ^ branches of the government, and in the predominance of the emperor as the chief executive authority.* Emperor William II is reported to have said in a public address : " There is only one master of the nation : and that is I, and I will not abide any other." ^ He con- ceived of his mastership as similar to that of a commander-in-chief of an army. In the same year as that of the above utterance he said: "I need Christian soldiers, soldiers who say their Pater Noster. The soldier should not have a will of his own but you should all have but one will and that is my will; there is but one law for you and that is mine." ® With this is to be contrasted the English attitude of resistance to autocracy, which gave rise to a system of government In which the exercise of the executive power " is always subject to the con- 1 Kruger, " Government and Politics of the German Empire,'' Ch. VII. 2 Ibid., Chs. V-VI ; Lowell, " The Governments of France, Italy and Germany," 188-212. 3 Kruger, op. cit., 197; Veblen, "Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution," 208. *" Bismarck, The Man and the Statesman,'' I: 151-152, 307; Kruger, op. cit, Ch. VIIL " Collier, " Germany and the Germans," 136-137. ^ Ibid., 137. 116 POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND IDEALS 117 trol of Parliament. The members of the Cabinet, who exercise It in the name of the Crown, are in reality a committee of the Parlia- ment." '^ With the German system of the autocratic period is to be contrasted also the system of the United States which was " based squarely on the idea of popular sovereignty." ^ The con- stitution was regarded as an expression of the popular will, and it was provided that the organs of government should exercise only the powers given them by the constitution ® — not, as the Crown in England, all power not expressly withheld.^" But neither in Eng- land nor in the United States is the political attitude essentially different from that of Germany. The absolutism of the state in all cases results in an irresponsibility of the state. Have the victims of the excitement of the United States courts in interpreting the Espionage Act, in 19 19-1920, any more redress against the gov- ernment of the United States than a subject of Germany during the autocracy would have had in a similar situation against the government of Germany? The United States government is no more responsible than others for the weakness and ignorance of its officials. " The fact is that here, as elsewhere, the democratic state bears upon itself the marks of its imperial origin. The es- sence of American sovereignty hardly differs, under this aspect, from the attributes of sovereignty as Bodin distinguished them three centuries ago. What emerges, whether in England or in the United States, is the fact that an Austinian state is incompatible with the substance of democracy. For the latter implies responsi- bility by its very definition; and the Austinian system is, at bottom, simply a method by which the fallibility of men is concealed im- posingly from the public view." ^^ The German attitude of domination-submission was conspicuous also in the German attitude to law. The lesser respect of the Germans for law as such, and their greater subservience to the word af a superior, is to be contrasted with the English and Ameri- can respect for law as such and insistence on the observance of the law by superiors. A militaristic system of necessity emphasizes ^ Goodnow, " Principles of Constitutional Government," 107 ; Lowell, " The Gov- ernment of England," 1:31, 63. 8 Goodnow, op. cit., 86. 9 Ibid., 89. 10 Ibid., 85. i^Laski, "The Responsibility of the State in England," Harv. L. Rev., March, 1919, 466. n8 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE the army attitude of command and obey. To be sure, " when ... we refer to the ' will ' of the commanding general, we refer to regulated and not to arbitrary action, so that even in the theatre of war, where the military commander is supreme, the idea of law does not disappear." ^^ But it fades into the background as com- pared with its prominence in civil life. The emphasis is on obedi- ence to the word of the superior officer, not to the law under which he commands and subordinates obey. And because the idea of law falls into the background and the will of the commanding officer occupies the foreground, long habituation to a militaristic regime results in a national character different from that in which men, living in a relatively secure environment, devote themselves to the individualistic acquisition of property and jealously defend their property, and cultivate respect for the law which protects them therein. In a nation of this latter kind, there will be a more or less determined resistance of domination which interferes with the acquisition of wealth. Domination-resistance becomes a conspicu- ous attitude in the national character. In both types of nations there is admiration for superiority; but in the one admiration for the personality of superior dominating power predominates, in the other admiration for the property owner or the class of large property owners.^* The arbitrary will of the ruler is curbed by the insistence of property owners on his observance of laws that guar- antee to them what they claim as their rights, and thus originates and develops public law. Again, an absorption In property-getting conduces to respect for law as the bulwark of the security of prop- erty owners; and the jealousies and conflicts among property own- ers beget a respect for law as the means of repressing human wil- fulness, and for interpreters of law as arbiters in controversies over property. Thus develops private law. Finally, as the Instru- ments of production pass into comparatively fewer hands, law becomes an agency for the regulation of industry on behalf of the public welfare and for the protection of the working masses against exploitation by those who own the Instruments of production. Thus develops the law of commerce and labour. A people like the English, among whom the property attitudes IS! Moore, "Law and Organization," Amer. Pol. Sc. Rev., IX: No. 3. 18 Veblen, " Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution," 165-166. POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND IDEALS 119 have predominated, are individualistic, self-reliant, reserved, prac- tical and sagacious in thinking, self-controlled and therefore con- servative in their morality; " while the Germans, among whom the militaristic attitudes have predominated, are characterized by an aptitude for organization,^" and a psychological differentiation, which, in the case of those animated by intellectual impulses results in a profundity and thoroughness in thinking and in carrying out ideas ; ^® in the case of those animated by dominating impulses in an extreme egoism; " in the case of those animated by submissive impulses in an extreme servility. On account of the suppression of instinctive impulses that results from this psychological differenti- ation, a wide range of subconscious impulses is fostered in the Germans, resulting in an emotional life with a realm of its own,^* which conduces to a less conservative morality than that of the English. Essential in the political attitude of Germany was the militaristic attitude of admiration for personal dominating power,^* and sub- mission to domination, with a sense of security under this protec- tion ; as contrasted with the attitude of England, essential in which is rivalry for property, admiration for the property owner, and insistence on free action in acquisition, under the law, with a com- paratively weak instinct for other protection. Commenting on this difference of attitude, Veblen says : " With this feudalistic loyalty (of the Germans) goes an enthusiastic sense of national solidarity and a self-complacent conviction of the superior merits of the views and usages current in the Fatherland. . . . The dynastic state, of course, is a large element in the ' Culture ' of this people ; very much as its repudiation Is an integral feature of a cultural scheme accepted among English-speaking peoples. Indeed, there Is little, if substantially anything, else in the way of incurable difference be- tween the German and the English scheme of things than this dis- crepancy between this ideal of the dynastic state on the one hand and the preconception of popular autonomy on the other. The " Perry, " The Present Conflict of Ideals," Ch. XXXI. 15 Ibid., 408-412. 1' Ibid., 398-404. 1^ Ibid., 404-408. ''^^ Ibid., 413-416. i« Liebknecht, " Militarism," 65-67. 120 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE visible differences of principle in other bearings will commonly be found to be derivatives or ramifications of these incompatible senti- ments on the head of personal government." ^° The German national character was determined less by inevitable " racial traits " than by the instinctive impulses stirred by the situ- ation of the German people. " A Dutchman has probably much the same native disposition as a German, but his instincts in adult life are very different owing to the absence of militarism and of the pride of a Great Power." ^^ The militarism that was fostered by the dynasty and the capitalistic classes of Germany attained the dignity of a cult through the teaching of Treltschke and Nietzsche. The national development seemed to many thinking men to verify this philosophy. The rapidly increasing population of Gerhiany caused apprehension of national need unless there was the neces- sary economic expansion. Apprehension was caused, also, by the rapidly increasing population of Russia and the menace of this to Germany's subsistence and security.^^ What would Germany do when the country became too small for its population? What would happen if, with its diminishing natural resources, it became unable to get raw materials from other nations with which to sup- ply the factories that gave work to its immense population? Com- paratively easy was it to suggest to the masses so situated that their prosperity depended on the attitude of Russia, with its immense resources, and that a favourable attitude could be guaranteed only by Germany's becoming the great political power of Europe. This would guarantee, also, a favourable attitude on the part of Eng- land and France. The capricious autocracy of Russia, the histori- cal resentment of France, and the naval dominance of England seemed to preclude the possibility of any relation of international co-operation. Thus it was easy for the ambitious dynasty and the capitalistic interests of Germany to instigate thinking and non- thinking people to an impulse for national supremacy. Obviously this militaristic national character developed out of a situation which is not inevitable but can be removed by international or- ganization for economic co-operation. The submission of the German people, in the autocratic period, 2<>Veblen, op. cit., 165-168. 21 Russell, " Why Men Fight," 37. "Turner, "The Causes of the Great War," Amer. Pol. Sc. Rev., IX: 2%. POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND IDEALS 121 was a less unwilling submission than in Russia. During the two decades that preceded the outbreak of the World War the German people showed an increasing impulse for national superiority, which came to animate all classes. German socialism was a protest against this ideal but eventually acquiesced. Of that autocratic period it is said: " Germany has passed far beyond the state of paying homage to her dreamers and poets. The vast developments of technical science are leaving a characteristically ' real ' mark, not only on the intellectuals, but on the common people. The men who shape industrial policies have left no stone unturned to stimu- late a consciousness of the growing power of Germany, and to strengthen the hands of the class that directs imperial policy. . . . What the university professors have been for the pure Intellectuals, captains of industry have been for the middle classes and the masses. Their joint influence has tended to infect the nation with a restless impulse, ... to shape things anew at whatever cost, materially and spiritually." ^* The attitude that characterized social relations in Germany during the autocratic period sprang from an impulse for national superiority which, through various sources of social suggestion, came to animate all classes. Indi- vidual and class subordination resulted as a willing surrender to that obsession.^* The really intellectual men, the men who had the courage of their convictions, were denied a hearing and im- prisoned If they persisted. And wherever dissent spread among the masses, fear to speak, even to think the dissent through to con- viction, kept the dissenter subservient to the militarism. The essential feature of the national consciousness of Germany during that period was the vigour and energy of its underlying in- stinctive impulses. This was such as to captivate the Intellectual processes and draw them into the service of the predominant Im- pulsive movements. Thus developed associations of Ideas that re- inforced the impulsive movements. The vigour of these move- ments was due, in part, to the contribution made to that vigour by the associations of ideas and, in part, to the great variety of strong instincts enlisted by the Impulse for national superiority. That Im- pulse justifies and Instigates the sexual and parental Instincts, for 2S McLaren, " The Mind and Mood of Germany To-day," Atlan. Mon., Dec, 1917, 798. 2* Liebknecht, " Militarism," 3-7, 22-40. 122 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE national supremacy requires an overflowing population; hence the ideal of national supremacy appeals to the masses, especially in a nation the government of which has shown in a substantial way a paternalistic solicitude for the relief of the hazards of family life. Again, the impulse for national superiority enlists the in- stincts of intellectuals, for thinking on behalf of the ambitions of the political and other powers satisfies the rivalrous instinct to seek pro- motion, and the instinct to seek the protection of the strong; and is less of a mental strain than painstaking analysis; and involves less anxiety for security of academic tenure and social position than does singlemlnded thinking. It satisfies also the instinct of subservience to the great ones, and the Instinct for the popular adulation of the " great philosopher." The impulse for national superiority satisfies, also, the instincts of economic interests ; for the satisfaction of the acquisitive and rivalrous and dominating instincts these interests re- quire the backing of a superior military power in their international operations and of a strong government In their relations with labour. The Impulse for national superiority satisfies also the dominating and contemptuous Instincts of an upper class; the greater the power of the state, the greater the superiority of an upper class and the more abject and contemptible the Inferiority of a lower. It Is this combination of Instinctive impulses on behalf of the ideal of national superiority that gives a culture which centres about that Ideal an absorbing and solidifying influence. When we con- sider the driving force of this type of culture, we are inclined to doubt whether it can be outHved by mankind, unless each nation makes Immense strides In increasing the general intelligence of its masses, and in the development of industrial democracy. It owes its strength to Its unsurpassed variety of absorbing instinctive sat- isfactions, which appeal to all classes, and to the consequent ease with which instinctive Impulses subconsciously determine the asso- ciations of Ideas. Just as the German people, by their impulse for national supe- riority and their belief In their superiority, worked themselves into a condition in which war was inevitable, so there is a tendency in all nations for propertied classes to become obsessed with their superiority and thus to become so dominating as inevitably to pro- voke a class war. In fact the dominating attitude of Germany toward the rest of the world originated with the propertied classes POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND IDEALS 123 of Germany. Those Germans who refused to accept the domi- nating attitude of their government toward other nations were those who resisted the domination of the upper classes over lower in their own nation. Germany was defeated but this dominating attitude of upper to lower classes was not defjeated. Its final de- feat in each nation can come only through a thorough education of all classes, which requires the substitution, for the class-controlled educational system of each nation, of education which empha- sizes perfectly free intellectual inquiry, and an intellectual self- control. Proceeding with our delineation of the German political attitude before the revolution, we note that its influence pervaded every aspect of German behaviour. It determined the repressive politi- cal policy toward dependent peoples,^* as compared with the policy of autonomy followed by Great Britain and the United States ; also the centralized financial control of Germany^' as contrasted with the sentiment against centralized control in the United States, and the effort to avoid an appearance of centralization,^'^ though de- centralization has not been actually achieved.^® It was seen in the disciplined industrial organization of Germany ^' due directly to military discipline.^" The period of the great development of German industry coincided with the period of consolidation of in- dustry throughout the world; and for this consolidation of industry the Germans were particularly fitted by army discipline. This made the industrial leaders organizers of men, developed capacity 25 Thomas, "The Prussian-Polish Situation,'' Amer. Jour. Social., March, 1914, 628-637. 2* Federal Trade Commission, Report on Cooperation in American Export Trade, Pt. I, 44-48, 57-64. 2' Report of the Committee Appointed to Investigate the Concentration and Control of Money and Credit. House of Rep., 62nd Congress, 3rd Sess., Report No. 1593, 136-138. 28 The " process of pooling and syndication that is remaking the world of credit and corporation finance has been greatly helped on in America by the establishment of the Federal Reserve system vfhile somewhat similar results have been achieved elsewhere by somewhat similar devices. That system has greatly helped to extend, facilitate, simplify, and consolidate the unified control of the country's credit ar- rangements, and it has very conveniently left the substantial control in the hands of those larger financial interests into whose hands the lines of control in credit and industrial business were already being gathered by force of circumstances and by sagacious management of the interested parties." (Veblen, "The Industrial System and the Captains of Industry," The Dial, May 31, 1919, 557.) 29 Federal Trade Commission, Report on Cooperation in American Export Trade, Pt. I, 98-114. 30 Sombart, " The Quintessence of Capitalism,'' 284. 124 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE to submit to discipline, not only among manual workers but also among brain workers and scientists of all kinds, for the progress of Industry.^^ Army discipline made manual workmen submissive and reliable, made brain workers methodical In their work in that they were less disturbed by personal rivalry than workmen un- trained in army life. And it enabled Industrial and financial lead- ers to work together under governmental direction for national economic progress. The German political attitude was seen, also, in the bureaucratic regulation of the life and conduct of the German people by their government,^^ as compared with the freedom allowed In Eng- land; ^^ In the censorship of the press, as compared with the greater freedom of the press In England and America.^* It was seen also in the domination exercised over wife and children by the husband and father, and in the " unthinking adulation, the blind acceptance of Inferiority " shown by women toward the men.^^ This family submission is closely connected with political submission in that men must not listen to the appeal of wife and children when it con- flicts with the command of the sovereign. Men must be ready to renounce family for the service of the State and the family must acquiesce. In a militarism the soldier is the attention-compelling figure in the community and only the man can be a soldier. So the woman is regarded as much inferior to man.^® Furthermore, the officer's conspicuous attitude Is one of arrogance toward civilians, and civilians imitate this attitude in their relations with their in- feriors, including their Inferiors in the family. This domination of women is further intensified by the effect of military life in pro- voking the lower instincts, particularly the sexual instinct, which Intensifies sexual domination. The German attitude of domination-submission was seen also in the educational system.^'' The studies prescribed and the methods of teaching were Intended to fit the children of each social class to become efficient workmen as members of their class and to serve the state as obedient subjects. In addition to this training, Em- 81 Hauser, " Germany's Commercial Grip on the World," 40. 82 Collier, "Germany and the Germans," 356-358, 362, 405. S3 Ibid., " England and the English," 32-33. s* Dibble, " The Newspaper," 29-30, 88-95. 85 Collier, " Germany and the Germans," 374-376, 339, 399, 407. 86 Treitschke, " Politics," 1 : 23. 8^ Collier, " Germany and the Germans," 305. POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND IDEALS 125 peror William II, when a young man, advocated such a training in German history as should make the youth enthusiastic supporters of the autocracy. In a public address, he is reported to have said that, instead of so much teaching of languages, history should be taught, particularly the most glorious periods of German history, in order to enthuse the youth to support the royal ambition. " The Schools and Universities ought to have . . . instructed the young generations in such a way that young men who are now about my age, that is to say thirty, should by this time have brought together the materials wherewith I might work the State and thus speedily become master of the situation." " Such was not the case," he continued. " The last moment when our Schools provided for the needs of our patriot life and development, was in the years '64, ^66, '70. Then the Prussian schools were depots for the idea of Unity which was taught everywhere. . . . All this ceased after 1871. The Empire was constituted, we had what we wanted, and we fell asleep on our laurels." ^* The German educators were not unrespon- sive to his mandate and the result was that " The Greater Germany gospel found its most active apostles in the schoolmasters and uni- versity professors. History in the German, schools has always been taught on lines calculated to inspire respect for the national heritage as determined by the Prussian tradition. Deutschland uber Alles, known to every boy and girl, I have frequently heard sung in the schools. The school-books all breathe an ardent nationalism. I also recollect vividly other books, widely read by the youth of both sexes, which present the potentialities of Germanism in glowing colors, and contrast Germany's cultural achievement with that of ' decadent ' nations, to the disparagement of the latter. The uni- versity professors have done more than any other body of men in the empire to sow the seed of an aggressive Deutschtum in ado- lescent Germany. Their influence on public opinion has been par- ticularly sinister, because, not only military oiHcers, but thousands of students from the commercial middle class spend their most im- pressionable years in the atmosphere of the university." ** To the German educator of the autocratic period an education of the boy for citizenship was one " which enables him to under- '* Deraolins, " Anglo-Saxon Superiority,'' 25-26. '» McLaren, "The Mind and Mood of Germany Today," Atlan. Man., Dec, 1917, 795-796. 126 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE stand generally the functions of the State, by means of which he is able and willing to fill his place in the State organism according to the best of his powers." *" The essential function of German pub- lic education was to promote a feeling of national solidarity,*^ of acquiescence in the control of the upper classes,*^ and of content- ment among the working classes.*^ The educational system it was declared must recognize the " two fundamental moral principles which indubitably guide every well-bred man, namely, those of moral self-assertion and of moral self-abnegation." ** A militarism requires self-assertion toward those below, and self-abnegation be- fore those above one in authority. Compare this ideal with that of American education. In the United States as well as in Ger- many, authority-obedience has played too large a part in education. This is contrary to the democratic ideal of education. " The con- ventional type of education, which trains children to docility and obedience, to the careful performance of imposed tasks because they are imposed, ... Is suited to an autocratic society. . . . But in a democracy they interfere with the successful conduct of society and government. . . . Responsibility for the conduct of society and government rests on every member of society. ... If we train our children to take orders, to do things simply because they are told to, and fail to give them confidence to act and think for themselves," we are developing, as essential in character, an attitude which makes It Impossible for them to perform the duties of citizenship. " The spread of the realization of this connection between democracy and education is perhaps the most Interesting and significant phase of present educational tendencies." *^ The delineation of the role of the political attitude of a people includes an analysis of its relation to the ideas and associative proc- esses of the culture of the nation. We note that German thought *" Kerchensteiner, " Education for Citizenship," 23. The author was a member of the Royal Council of Education and Director of the Public Schools of Munich. His book was the prize essay offered in the competition announced by the Royal Academy of Youthful Knowledge of Erfurt. The theme was " How are our young men, from the time of leaving the Volksschule (age 14 years) until the entrance into military service, ... to be educated for citizenship?" *i Ibid., 9. *2 Ibid., 43. i *» Ibid., 42. **Ibid., 64. *5 Dewey, "Schools of Tomorrow," 303-30S- See also Dewey, "Democracy and Education," Chs. VH-XII. POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND IDEALS 127 took the lines of the political attitude. Where the thinker did not venture as did Hegel to invoke an Absolute Reason as the determin- ing force in human affairs, he asserted a categorical imperative, as Kant, or invoked some other dominating agency; or he developed a philosophy of resignation, as did Schopenhauer, thus satisfying the attitude of su^bmission; or he came smashing in with a philoso- phy of self-assertion, as did Nietzsche, who asserted that the " will to power," an exalted form of dominating power,** should be the one impulse of all true men. The impulsive line taken by the German thinker depended on his disposition, and also on his ex- perience. Of the effect of his disposition on his thinking Nietzsche said, " I made my philosophy out of my will to health, to life. The years of my lowest vitality were the years when I ceased to be a pessimist." " This dispositional self-assertion ** was strength- ened by participation, in his youth, in the victory of Germany over France, and was still further developed by Nietzsche's reaction against the self-glorifying, self-satisfied spirit that came over Ger- many in the years that followed.** He is said to have gotten his idea of the will to power " amid the hurly-burly of the Franco- Prussian War. As ambulance worker he saw various regiments of our wonderful German army rush past him; ready to face battle and death, glorious in their pride of life, their courage for the conflict, a perfect expression of a race that must conquer or perish. Then, for the first time, he felt most vividly that the strongest and highest will to life is manifested, not in the paltry struggle for existence, but in the will to combat, in the will to power and mas- tery. When my brother afterward looked back at these events, how different and many-sided that feeling of pity, so highly extolled by Schopenhauer, must have appeared to him, in comparison with that marvellous glimpse of the will to life, to combat and to power. Here he saw a condition of things in which man feels his strongest impulses, his conscience and his ideals to be identical." ^^ The Germany of Nietzsche's day had passed out of the infe- riority and depressed submission of the Germany of Schopenhauer's *» Salter, " Nietzsche the Thinker," 197-198. *T Quoted in Laing, " The Origin of Nietzsche's Problem and Its Solution," Intern. Jour. Ethics, July, 1916, 510-511. *8Kallen, "Nietzsche — Without Prejudice," The Dial, Sept 20, 1919, 252. *» Salter, op. cit., 463-467. Boprau Forster Nietzsche, "The Life of Nietzsche," 11:317-318. 128 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE day^i and was moving on the rising tide of the anticipation of in- creasing national power.^^ But there was also a tendency contrary to this, a tendency to smug self-satisfaction, and Nietzsche's am- bition was to stimulate the national impulse for increasing power, to combat the self-satisfied attitude.^^ His own dispositional self-assertion was intensified by reacting against the self-satisfied tendency of his day, and was stimulated where it came in touch with the attitude of national self-assertion. This attitude of self-assertion he aimed to stir outside of Germany as well as inside, to dominate the minds of men by absorbing them in his ideal, which for this purpose he ejected into every field of knowledge.^* He would inoculate not only the German people but all peoples with the will to power. His impulse was to dominate Europe with his idea and so " regenerate European culture," ^^ thus gaining an unrivalled position of authority in the world of culture. But his message was primarily for Germany. He called for an education that would develop the will to power. The ob- ject of education, he said, is " To live in the noblest aspirations of one's nation and to exercise influence thereby ... to liberate one's age and one's ideal before one's eyes." ^® This impulse to domi- nate with the idea of the will to power, which idea he reinforced with a great range of secondary explanations, resulted in the denial 51 "After the disappointment of the hopes of 1848, under the weight of the reac- tion an embittered mood prevailed. This mood rediscovered itself in Schopenhauer's philosophy. . . . The oppressive spirit of reaction on the part of the victorious rulers who sought to wipe out of the German constitution ' the democratic blot of that year of shame' (1848) denied scope for free activity in religion, in thought, in political and social effort to the strong healthy impulses of the youth of that period; and in so far as they refused to be quiescent under the Schopenhauerian doctrine of the noth- ingness of individuality, they sought an outlet in the sensuous life of beer-drinking and in the enjoyment of drinking-songs." (Laing, " Nietzsche's Problem and Its Solu- tion," Intern. Jour. Ethics, July, 1916, 514-515.) 52 In the same way the Japan of today has passed beyond the condition in which the pessimism of Buddhism is congenial. (Reichaurer, " Studies in Japanese Buddhism," 49, 317, 320.) 53 " He noted after the victorious wars against Denmark, Austria, and particularly France, a new spirit emerging in Germany; and in its smugness, selfishness, self- glorification, repulsive nationalism, and national greed it showed itself a spirit that was far away from that of the world of Goethe. . . . Nietzsche saw among his fel- low-countrymen a growing servility, imitativeness . . . and the gradual disappearance of any desire to accept individual responsibility." (Laing, op. cit., 511.) 5* Salter, op. cit., Chs. XIII-XXX. 55 Nietzsche, " The Case of Wagner," Trans, by J. M. Kennedy, Translator's Preface, xi. 5 161). as well as in the United States ("The Press and the Siberian Situation," The Nation, Nov. 8, 1919, 592-598). 192 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE control by social suggestion. What Is needed is a system of public education in each nation that will stimulate the intellectual and sym- pathetic impulses of the young of all classes and give some under- standing of economic and political and other human relations, this to make possible an industrial management that appeals to the creative intelligence and intelligent self-control of all concerned, and to lay the foundations for an intelligent citizenship. People of all classes in all nations continue to be subject to suggestive con- trol because systems of public education fail to develop intelligence and, in fact, were not devised with that end in view. The control of governments by reactionary capitalistic interests and the co-operation of these governments to crush resistful popular movements in any one nation involve not only the preservation of systems of education that perpetuate the Ignorance of the masses In order that they may be subjected to propaganda in the interest of reactionary capitalism, but also the repression of scholarship and the destruction of international co-operation in scholarship. Schol- arship Is essentially international for the truth is true for all scholars no matter of what nation they may happen to be. Furthermore, " Modern culture is drawn on too large a scale, . . . requires the cooperation of too many and various lines of inquiry ... to admit of its being confined within national frontiers . . . the science and scholarship that Is the peculiar pride of civilized Christendom Is not only international, but rather it is homogeneously cosmopolitan." ^® The beginnings of international co-operation In scholarship were rudely broken by the World War.^'' This very fact, together with the repression of free intellectual Inquiry, of the war period and the period that followed, shows that the progress of scholarship and popular enlightenment calls for International relations of co- operation instead of rivalry and a struggle for domination. But education alone will not insure sufficient intelligence for in- ternational co-operation. Whatever education the masses may have, the sources of information as to world conditions are under the control of the press, wherefore contact with the facts never can be first-hand.^^ The facts can be gotten only through the press, s^Veblen, "The Nature of Peace,'' 38-4.1. 27 Neilson, " Inter Arraa Veritas," Intern. Concil., Bulletin 105, 5-19. 28 " The news system of the world being what it is, and education being what it is, it is possible to fool most of the public a good part of the time." (Lippmann, " Unrest" The Neiti Republic, Nov. 12, 1919, 321.) FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 193 which presents the facts in a way to further the propaganda that is fostered by the interests behind the press. For instance the " cool complacency of America " in the presence of the suffering and starvation in Russia in the fall and winter of 19 19-1920 was due not only to the natural lack of compassion for misery that is remote but also to the fact that the people were kept in ignorance of this starvation by failure of the papers to mention it, and also to the fact that " the population, having been forced by propaganda to believe that all this is necessary to overcome Bolshevism and pro-Germanism, is silent and it acquiesces." ^® " The plight of the common people is terrible beyond words," ^° but this condition of the Russians, and the fact that it was due to the Allied blockade of Russia, in which the United States was participating^^ by an em- bargo on exports to Russia, was not generally known because to let it become known was contrary to the propaganda of the capitalistic interests that controlled newspapers and governments. When the discussion about lifting the blockade finally was officially opened, the reason given for so doing was that the English Prime Minister had urged that otherwise the Russian revolutionary ideas would spread to the British dominions in the East ; also that if Russia was furnished with agricultural implements and other instruments of production that were necessary to get production under way in Rus- sia it would enable England to reduce the cost of living of its people by bringing food stuffs from Russia instead of America where prices were very high.*^ That is, the motive for considering the resump- tion of trade with Russia was to protect the British Empire and benefit the people of Great Britain, also fear of disorder and the spread of Bolshevism in Central Europe, which might be prevented by bringing in Russian wheat to feed the people,^^ not sympathy for the people of Central Europe, much less for the suffering Russians. A motive less explicitly stated than these was the rivalry of British and American business interests for contracts to sell goods to Russia,** and the fear of these rivals lest further hostilities against 29 " Europe's Misery and America's Complacency," The Neta Republic, Nov. 12, 1919, 305. 80 Ibid., 307. 31 "Reports of the Bullitt Mission on Russia," The Nation, Oct. 4, 1919, 475. ^'Associated Press, Jan. 17, 1930. 85 N. Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1920. 84 Ibid., Jan. 19, a6, 27, 1920. 194 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE Russia would incline the Russians to commercial relations with the reviving German business interests.^® As long as governments are so largely influenced by profit-seek- ing capitalistic interests, the exigencies of profit-seeking will deter- mine international relations. International co-operation In the sense explained by President Wilson, will not be possible until In- ternational relations are determined by the working hosts of the dif- ferent nations — the " plain people " as President Wilson termed them. Their interests are not the exclusive interests of profit-seek- ing; as workers they have an economic basis for friendliness. In- ternational co-operation requires this relation of friendliness. But a friendliness that will stand the strain of national animosities that might arise requires the proper education, also facilities for spread- ing broadcast an adequate knowledge of conditions in other nations, also the most open diplomacy, and finally scrupulpus honesty In re- porting the news on all International situations. Therefore, the progress of democracy requires democratic con- trol of the agencies which furnish the news, on which the formation of public opinion depends. As Mr. Lippmann says, " The mecha- nism of the news-supply has developed without plan, and there Is no one point in it at which one can fix the responsibility for truth." ^* The reporter gets his accounts of conditions In Russia, for instance, from witnesses who are seldom dependable,^'' and selects what he will transmit according to his own prejudices and those of the pow- ers above. When the report reaches the editor " another series of interventions occurs. The editor . . . has to decide the question which is of more importance than any other in the formation of opinions, the question where attention is to be directed. . . . The news of the day as it reaches the newspaper office Is an incredible medley of fact, propaganda, rumor, suspicion, clues, hopes and 35 Senator France of Maryland introduced a resolution in the United States Senate proposing that the United States government recognize Soviet Russia and said: "The European statesmen played on our emotions and used them to further their own pur- poses when they feared Bolshevism. Now that they see Russia is to form a coalition with Germany and realize that she offers tremendous opportunities for trade they want to find a way to capture those markets. . . . The State Department apparently be- lieves it a crime for the Russian Soviet Ambassador to the United States to offer gold for goods in this country. . . . The free people of the United States should welcome the people of Russia as the creators of another great republic." {International News Sermce (G. D. T.), Feb. a8, 1920.) ■83 Lippmann, "The Basic Problem of Democracy," Atlan. Mon.. Nov., 1919, 621. ^T Ibid., 621. FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 195 fears, and the task of selecting and ordering that news is one of the truly sacred and priestly offices in a democracy. For the news- paper is in all literalness the bible of democracy, the book out of which a people determines its conduct. It is the only serious book most people read. It is the only book they read every day. Now the power to determine each day what shall seem important and what shall be neglected is a power unlike any that has been exer- cised since the Pope lost his hold on the secular mind." ^^ But this duty is not discharged on behalf of the public welfare, consequently it is impossible for a thinking man to take very seriously what he reads in the newspapers. The " facts that count are not system- atically reported and presented in a form we can digest." ^^ The result is that the press is beginning to be regarded among the more enlightened of the working masses as the means of manufacturing propaganda against them and on behalf of propertied classes.*" The secrecy as to the interests back of the press, and as to the sources and ultimate reliability of what is printed as news causes among thoughtful readers a distrust of the whole news system. This is increased by the misrepresentations for the sake of propa- ganda that are plain to the thoughtful reader, but escape the more careless mass of readers who, thereby, receive the impressions it is intended to convey. This distrust may mark the beginning of a sentiment for governmental regulation of the news system. " For sometime the community must find a way of making men who pub- lish news accept responsibility for an honest effort not to misrepre- sent the facts." *^ Obviously, however, effective governmental action against a capitalistically controlled press is not apt to come until goveirnments themselves cease to be controlled by reactionary capitalistic interests. ^^ Ibid., 622. 89 Ibid., 624. *"Lippmann, "Liberty and the News,'' Allan, Mon., Dec, 1919, 780, i^Jbid., 780-781, CHAPTER X PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF A LEAGUE OF NATIONS THIS chapter aims to present certain psychological aspects of an effective League of Nations and Is, therefore, only incidentally concerned with the League provided by the Treaty of Versailles. Important provisions of that Treaty warrant the Inference that commercial jealousy was one of the underlying motives of the War,^ and that the Allies used their victory to satisfy that pre-war rivalry for advantage.* Furthermore, the League of Nations Covenant " scrupulously eliminates from Its jurisdiction everything that makes for privilege and Inequality among the peo- ples of the world and perpetuates as far as lies in its power the present International order." * The Covenant, therefore, does not achieve, or purpose to achieve. International co-operation. Inter- national economic rivalry remains as before the essential interna- tional process. An effective League of Nations would be not merely a political league to enforce peace or a legal mechanism for settling disputes but an organization for International co-operation In economic af- fairs. Such a League might have grown out of the international economic organization that developed between the allied nations during the war. The need for co-operation which called forth that organization remained after the war because, without it, there Is bound to result disastrous competition and dissatisfaction among nations over the distribution of raw materials, access to markets, methods used by rivals In the acquisition of markets, and Immigra- tion restrictions.* An organization for economic co-operation, once its benefits had been experienced would generate in time the requisite political means and legal mechanisms. Such a League was not provided by the treaty of peace because the old relation of 1 Freund, " The Treaty and International Law," New Republic, Dec. 17, 1919, 75. 2 Keynes, " The Economic Consequences of the Peace," Chs. IV-V. ' Freund, op. cit, 76. * League of Free Nations Association, " Statement of Principles,'' Ne-iu Republic Nov. 30, 1918, 135. 196 A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 197 rivalry between nations was too strongly entrenched in the capi- talistic organization of each nation to make possible the unprece- dented effort necessary to establish an effective League of Nations.^ The ultimate aim of a League of Nations, as stated by President Wilson before the Peace Conference convened, was thereby to foster a new psychological relation between nations. In an address at Rome he said: "The only thing that binds men together is friendship and by the same token the only thing that binds nations together is friendship. Therefore our task at Paris is to organize the friendship of the world — to see to it that all the moral forces that make for right and justice and liberty are united and are given a vital organization to which the peoples of the world will readily and gladly respond. In other words, our task is no less colossal than this: To set up a new international psychology."® This new relation of international friendship and co-operation can be fostered only by an organization of the nations for economic co- operation that will prevent the economic interdependence of na- tions being used by dominant nations against a nation which they want to coerce. This " may appear to exact a spirit not merely of justice but of altruism toward economically weak peoples, which is hopelessly Utopian to forecast." '' Nevertheless, unless eco- nomic co-operation is honestly intended, the talk of international friendship is merely empty words ; what Is really meant instead of friendship Is community of interest between the capitalistic inter- ests of great nations, the friendship of self-interest (if such a rela- tion can properly be termed friendship) , the warming of one nation toward another that can be as much to It as It can be to the other. A league of such nations will be a menace, instead of a blessing, because it will facilitate co-operation of a group of dominant na- tions against any one that propertied interests desire to coerce. The economic organization required for the co-operative rela- tion was not achieved by the peace treaty because the masses In each nation whom President Wilson assumed to be behind him In his pui-pose to establish a new psychological relation, were not In con- trol of their governments and of the representatives of their gov- ernments at the Peace Conference. Sections of the masses were In ' Croly, "The Obstacle to Peace," New Republic, April 26, 1919, 403-407. "Associated Press (R. D. C), Jan. 4, 1919. ^ Dewey, " The League of Nations and Economic Freedom," The Dial, Dec. 14, 1918, 538. igS THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE process of struggling for control, and, to prevent President Wilson from " appealing a la improvisatore over the heads of diplomats to the unorganized, scattered and unenlightened peoples of the earth . . . the diplomats had only to point out to him that he would thereby decrease the waning power of governmental author- ity, increase popular unrest, and run the risk of plunging Europe into the chaos of political revolutions. After that he could not speak effectually for himself, to say nothing of ' representing ' the unrepresented peoples of the earth." * Were the movements of the peoples of the earth toward industrial democracy to be con- demned because they involved a temporary waning of the authority of the state? Because the Peace Conference cared more to main- tain the traditional authority of the state than for industrial de- mocracy the Treaty did not provide a league that effectuates the idealistic purpose of international co-operation.® Is the class consciousness In the different nations really as de- structive of an ordered social life as is often assumed by those who fear for the traditional authority of the state? Is there not in human nature a capacity of admiration for real leadership, which is more or less blindly seeking the real leadership? Is not class consciousness essentially a disowning of unworthy leadership? In spite of the intense popular resentment of the domination exer- cised by certain capitalistic interests, is not the capitalistic class in the United States regarded with adulation as essential to American greatness? In their enjoyment of their superiority that is im- plied in the superiority of the capitalistic class of their own nation do not the American people generally ignore its short-comings? Dewey writes : " The United States has extended money and credit almost ' without stint ' to governments of Europe irrespec- tive of whether they were supporting the announced policies of the United States, nay, even when those governments were doing what they could to undermine American ends. And doubtless the average American has taken pride in this fact. We are ... so careless of our professed ideals that we prefer a reputation for doing a grand seigneur act to the realization of our national aims. . . . Our Christianity has become identified with ... an opti- * Dewey, " The Discrediting of Idealism, " The Neia Republic, Oct. 8, 1919, a86. "Ibid., 285. A LEAGUE OF NATIONS i99 mism which we think is a sign of a pious faith in Providence but which in reality is a trust in luck, a deification of the feeling of success regardless of any intelligent discrimination of the nature of success." ^^ The leadership that makes possible this national success is coming more and more to be popularly understood to be the economic leadership. To the people of the cities the men of prestige there are the men who have built up industries, given men work and caused the city to grow, and, perhaps, have enriched some of the citizens. These are the men whose names are blazoned in the press of the city as the public " benefactors." So it Is in the nation. The exceptions, the rich men who have incurred public odium, do not at all interfere with the adulation of the capitalistic class generally. And public resentment against particular capi- talists wears off and they later share in the general adulation. However, it is easy to exaggerate this tendency. It depends on a tolerable satisfaction of the essential instinctive impulses. Unem- ployment or rising prices may stir resentment that shakes the popu- lar adulation and threatens the institutions that rest upon it. A class consciousness may -develop, and, when once it is well started, it may be fostered by the class leadership even in a time when eco- nomic conditions would give the instinctive adulation free play, until the class antagonism has become fixed. The purpose of a League of Nations which seeks to realize the idealistic purpose of international co-operation is contrary to the traditional national ambition for supremacy. In the past the es- sential aim of states was to increase their wealth power and their military power. There seemed no way to preserve their independ- ence but to become ever stronger. There resulted a rivalry in armaments, and this inevitably led to a struggle for domination. " If all States increase their strength, the balance of power is un- changed, and no one State has a better chance of victory than be- fore. And when the means of offence exist, even though their original purpose may have been defensive, the temptation to use them is likely, sooner or later, to prove overwhelming. In this way the very measures which promote security within the borders of the State promote insecurity elsewhere. It is the essence of the State to suppress violence within and to facilitate it without. The ^oibid., 286-287. 200 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE State makes an entirely artificial division of mankind and of our duties toward them; toward one group we are bound by the law, toward the other only by the prudence of highwaymen." ^^ The purpose of a League of Nations is contrary also to the tra- ditional conception of sovereignty as involving the complete inde- pendence of nations. ^^ For, Inasmuch as the essential purpose of a League of Nations is to guarantee to all nations a secure national existence, this requires that nations renounce that spirit of proud independence that would prompt them to refuse to relinquish those exclusive advantages which make the existence of other nations in- secure. ^^ There will not be the necessary equality of nations " if . . . states are to be shut out from the sea; if rapidly expanding populations find themselves excluded from raw materials indis- pensable to their prosperity; if the privileges and preferences en- joyed by the states with overseas territories place the less powerful states at a disadvantage." " Heretofore, a nation's security and prosperity has depended on its own military and naval strength and economic resources, and this has caused statesmen to feel justi- fied in enlarging armaments in order to protect and Increase the national resources and trade opportunities; this competitive na- tionalism has been destructive of the security and prosperity of all nations. The League of Nations should substitute for this In- secure rivalrous relation an organization for the just distribution of economic advantages. ^^ The traditional conception of sovereignty as absolute Independ- ence is no longer true, inasmuch as no state of itself can maintain its independence against all others. The traditional conception of sovereignty as absolute power to compel obedience also Is no longer true. Only under favourable conditions could a great empire com- pel the obedience of its strongest dominions. These are bound to the mother country by loyalty, not by fear of subjection. " The British Empire is a perpetual contradiction to the theory of sov- ereignty on which our jurists and statesmen have been nourished." " " Russell, " Why Men Fight," 59. i^Kallen, "The Structure of Lasting Peace," 87-89. IS League of Free Nations Association, "Statement of Principles," 135; Kallen, "The League of Nations Today and Tomorrow," 74-88. 1* League of Free Nations Association, "Statement of Principles," 135. ^"Ibid., 134-135- 10 McMurray, " Inter-citizenship : A Basis for World Peace," Yale Lata Journal, XXVII: 306. A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 201 Yet in the face of this waning traditional absolutism of the state " publicists are proposing — and the people are supporting the idea — not alone to have one supreme source of authority in interna- tional matters, but to enforce its decrees by the use of an over- whelming aggrandizement of internationalized force. . . . Unques- tionably regarding specific questions of territorial division and eco- nomic adjustment between nations it may be necessary and practical to create temporary umpires, exactly as we now do, who will arbi^ trate differences and hand down decisions to the acceptance of which the parties are committed before they go to arbitration. But it is a fair question whether the transfer of absolutism in sovereignty from the State to the super-State . . . would not be paying too dearly for a very doubtful gain." " Instead of a super-State of this type Mr. Tead proposes that it be constructed along the lines of a reprganized state. " Mr. G. D. H. Cole in his ' Self-Government in Industry ' proposes that within the State the problem of adjusting the claims of sovereignty to the claims of personality can be solved by dividing sovereignty between the supreme organization of the nation in its producing capacity (an industrial parliament) and the supreme organization of the consumers (the present political parliaments). If issues come to a deadlock between these two groups, the only recourse, as he con- ceives it, is to effect whatever ultimate adjustment is possible with- out an appeal to force. In the contest for power between the State as producer and the State as consumer, the individual gets his chance to preserve and advance the claims of personality and free- dom. Perhaps his approach to the problem has its suggestion for our thinking in international affairs. Certainly, as we shall see in succeeding chapters, the sort of functional division which his scheme contemplates seems inevitably necessary and sound in the building of administrative machinery on a world scale. For It becomes clearer each day that if International government means the re- establishment of absolute sovereignty on a basis twice removed from popular control, the weakness of that government will be fun- damental and the allegiance it can summon will diminish as soon as its exercise of power becomes significant." ^* Mr. Tead finds in the mechanisms that were developed and which proved Invaluable IT Tead, "The People's Part in Peace," 23. 18/JiV., 24-35. 202 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE for the co-operation of the Entente Allies in the World War the basis of an effective international economic organization for peace. Whatever its constitution may be, a League of Nations will inter- nationalize the class struggle; one class will aim to use the League against another. As capitalistic classes for the most part control the governments of the different states, those classes will use the League against working classes, as far as the masses can be brought to acquiesce. In nations where trade unionism had become a for- midable political power, as in England, a League of Nations was hailed by opponents of trade unionism as a means of repressing unionism.^' In England and the United States influential public opinion rapidly came to favour a League when it became evident that it could be used against Bolshevism; inside of government cir- cles and outside, appeals were made for support of a League of Nations which should act to repress Bolshevism. Through a League of Nations the class struggle will be internationalized and brought to the fore, and nationalism will, not immediately or soon but ultimately, become less pronounced. That this inevitable class conflict may go on without violence, under legal forms, " the inter- national machinery will need democratization. ... If the League of Nations is not to develop into an immense bureaucratic union of governments instead of a democratic union of peoples, the ele- ments of (a) complete publicity and (b) effective popular repre- sentation must be insisted upon. The first of these is implicit in the principle . . . that in the future there must be an end to secret diplomacy. The second can only be met by some representation of the peoples in a body with legislative powers over international affairs — which must include minority elements — as distinct from the governments of the constituent states of the League." *" The minority parties as well as the great parties of the various states must be represented. The effectiveness of a League will depend on subordinating the rivalry of economic interests and that blind patriotism of the masses which make a state intensely nationalistic ^^ to the rational 18 Sir Charles C. Allom, " Unionism as Foe of Labor," American Industries, March, 1919, 42. Sir Charles C. Allom is "head of an airplane and other important manu- facturing enterprises in England." {Ibid., 42.) 20 League of Free Nations Association, " Statement of Principles," New Republic, Nov. 30, 1918, 136. 21 Reeves, "The Justiciability of International Disputes," Amer. Pol. Sc. Rev., X: 71-79- A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 203 social purpose of world-wide industrial democracy. On the one hand it is easy for statesmen and the press to enlist the support of the masses in projects of conquest and capitalistic aggrandizement because the hostile impulses are stronger among men than the im- pulses to friendly co-operation; and the belief is widespread that whatever strengthens the nation and enriches the employing classes must benefit the working masses. As against this strong combina- tion of instinctive forces we have a growing intelligence in every nation — among employers, workmen and professional men — and this intelligence can be increased by education. Education will be necessary to the success of a League ^^ because the relations of a League are contrary not only to traditional international relations, but to the traditional relations throughout the social organization. It is contrary to traditional family relations. The prevailing idea of family duty — that it is the duty of the mother to bear as many children as possible — which originated in the struggle for domi- nation of rival political and sectarian groups, which called for as high a birth rate as possible, particularly of male children, — is con- trary to a regime of universal peace and friendly relations between nations. ^^ An overflowing population encourages the interests of a nation that are ambitious for national aggrandizement. As a result of " the war, it is possible that population questions will attract more attention than they did before, and it is likely that they will be studied from the point of view of international rivalry. This motive, unlike reason and humanity, is perhaps strong enough to overcome men's objections to a scientific treatment of the birth- rate." ^* The ultimate purpose of a League of Nations is thus contrary to the traditional family relation of masculine domination and the submission of the wife as child-bearer. The purpose of a League of Nations is contrary, also, to the domination-submission attitudes in educational practice, for these attitudes are opposed to the stimulation and training of the sympa- thetic and intellectual dispositions so essential in co-operation. For the same reason it is contrary to ecclesiastical domination and to dogmas reinforcing this attitude. The clergymen of some re- 22KalIen, "The League of Nations, Today and Tomorrow," 1Z7-133; Kallen, "The Structure of Lasting Peace," 172-176. 23 Ross, " Changing America," 38-49 ; Thompson, " Population : A Study in Mal- thusianism," 156-164. 24 Rustell, " Why Men Fight," 198-199. 204 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE ligious sects endorse an unrestricted increase of population ; ^^ obviously this is a means of increasing the numbers and thus ad- vancing the superiority of the sect.^® A League of Nations is con- trary, also, to the rivalry of the financial and industrial interests of different nations for control of the markets of the world, except through the excellence and cheapness of their products. These interests are apt to favour an unrestricted growth of population, which gives them a large supply of labour which can be easily domi- nated and hired for low wages.^'^ In short, a League of Nations is contrary to domination-submission in family, educational, ecclesi- astical, and economic relations. However, domination-submission is the traditional and still prevailing attitude in all these relations. All that we can expect therefore is a very gradual and halting de- velopment in the direction of the great purpose of a League of Nations. Under present conditions, economic rivalry is the disturbing force in international relations.^^ When nations, after a war, settle down to mutually recognized territorial limits, the political status of each has been decided, and the more aggressive forms of rivalry fall in abeyance for the time being. But the economic status of each nation has not by any means been decided, and the economic rivalry continues without any such recognition of fixed status. National animosities give an animus to this economic ri- valry.^® The economic interests of the different nations are not slow to take advantage of national animosities and to use these to support their own schemes of pecuniary aggrandizement.^" Thus, while the political status may be settled for the time being, the economic status, under a system of private ownership of industry, never is settled, and there is left open a sphere of conflict which 2° " In choosing a state of life, everyone is at full liberty either to follow the counsel of Jesus Christ as to virginity, or to enter into the bonds of marriage. No human lavy can abolish the natural and primitive right of marriage, or in any way limit the principal purpose of marriage, ordained by God's authority from the beginning: Increase and Multiply." (K. of C, War Activities Committee, " Bolshevism — the Remedy," 8. This is a pamphlet written by Leo XIII against socialism.) 26 Russell, "Why Men Fight," 193. ^'' Fetter, " Population or Prosperity,'' Amer. Econ. Rev., Vol. Ill, Supplement, March, 1913. Reprint, pp. 14-17. 28Angell, "The Problems of the War — and the Peace," 58-62; Kallen, "The Structure of Permanent Peace," Chs. IV-V. 2» Brailsford, "The Covenant of Peace," la. '0 Overstreet, " Ethical Clarifications through the War," Intern. Jour. Ethics, Apr., 1 91 8, 327-336- A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 205 may at any time unsettle the political status.^^ Permanent peace cannot be expected without a development of industrial democracy in each nation. These democratized nations must then subject the economic interests of the different nations to the international control that is necessary to insure a lasting peace. 31 Keller, " Through War to Peace," 76-77. BOOK II SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND JURISPRUDENCE CHAPTER XI PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF JURISPRUDENCE THE traditional theories of the nature of law are a func- tioning of the attitudes of the jurists who contributed to the development of those theories. Not until recently have attempts been made to develop a severely inductive concep- tion of law. The assumptions of the theories were suggested by the attitudes of jurists, and the method of development of the theories was deductive. Jurists were lawyers and not scientists; the professional method of thinking of the lawyer is deductive, not the inductive method of the scientist. Thinking men not lawyers have been accustomed to accept the lawyer's deductively derived conception of law because it was thought that the lawyer, who knew more law than anybody else, must know more about the nature of law. However, the fact that a man knows the law and uses this knowledge in his business is no more a valid reason why he should know the nature of law than the fact that a man is a farmer is a reason why he should know anything about scientific agriculture, or should have the scientific attitude that is needed to be interested in scientific agriculture. The lawyer's definition of the nature of law has been a func- tioning of the legal attitude, the professional deductive attitude, the only respected attitude. The legal attitude is one of deference to law as command, the meaning of which in the particular case is interpreted according to tradition. Legal attitudes contrary to this have gained increasing recognition of late years inside the pro- fession, and outside in the appointment of progressive lawyers to judicial positions.^ But the deferential, deductive attitude still predominates in the profession and is most respected. This atti- tude is expressed in the phrase to " lay down the law." The pre- 1 See the chapters entitled, The Conflict of Judicial Attitudes, Judicial Attitudes and the Nature of Laia, and Psychological Processes in the Development of Private Prop- erty. 209 210 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE dominant legal attitude is that of a man respectfully receiving law as traditionally interpreted and laying it down as command; he has authority and dominates not in his own right but in virtue of that which he represents, — a command that has behind it the obedience-compelling power of the state. Men of a strong domi- nating disposition " take to the law," — find the practice of that profession congenial. And in their practice they naturally develop the attitude of laying down the law, of accepting law as tradition- ally interpreted and applying it in particular cases as the final word in a cause. Lawyers have made the mistake of believing that this attitude to the law indicates the nature of law. Definitions of the nature of law which were in harmony with this attitude have been spontane- ously accepted by lawyers and other definitions rejected; and think- ers in other lines have accepted, without analysis, the " authorita- tive " definitions made by leading lawyers. For instance, " prob- ably no definition ever had a more pronounced effect on legal think- ing than has the definition of law, given by Austin in his work on ' Jurisprudence,' upon the legal mind in England and the United States. According to Austin, ' a law, in the literal and proper sense of the word,' is ' a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him.' This defi- nition, according to its author, embraced ' laws set by God to men ' and ' law as set by men to men.' Of the latter, some were ' estab- lished by political superiors acting as such,' and constituted ' posi- tive law ' — the appropriate matter of jurisprudence." ^ This definition had a pronounced effect on legal thinking because it was in harmony with the predominant legal attitude; also be- cause it represented, by implication, the relation of the masses to the law-making and law-enforcing power at the time Austin wrote. The masses of England were then without political rights; the will of the propertied classes, expressed through Parliament, was then supreme, so that the masses were, in fact, in a position of abject obedience to laws " established by political superiors." That is, Austin's definition of law was effective, not only because it was congenial to the traditional legal attitude but also because it repre- sented the social-psychological condition that obtained at that time, namely, the habitual obedience of unenfranchised masses to law as 2 Moore, "Law and Organization," Amer. Pol. Sc. Rev., IX; 3-4.. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JURISPRUDENCE 211 the command of political superiors. But the political subjection of the masses in England ceased fifty years ago and the surviving atti- tude of unquestioning obedience to law has gradually weakened as the working masses have become conscious of the conflict between the existing laws and their own interests. The sole surviving sanc- tion of the traditional conception of law is its endorsement by the property-owning classes on the one hand and the legal profession on the other. It is congenial to the legal attitude of deference to law; and it is congenial to the attitude of those reactionary prop- ertied interests which purpose to keep the masses in subjection. Another reason why lawyers and property-owning classes are harmonious on this point is that the most lucrative clients are prop- erty owners; wherefore the lawyer of a rivalrous disposition com- mends himself to the class of clients he most desires by maintaining the traditional professional attitude to the law. There are cor- poration lawyers who, while ostensibly maintaining this attitude of deference to the law as traditionally interpreted, make it their business to enable their clients to " get around the law." They profess the traditional attitude of deference while in their practice aiming to place the law at the service of a dominant class. While the influence of the property-owning classes and the legal profes- sion has maintained Austin's definition as authoritative, that defi- nition, as we shall see presently, whatever its social-psychological basis in the past, has ceased truly to represent social-psychological conditions. A true definition of the nature of law requires valid social-psychological assumptions, which can be had only by an understanding of social psychology. Hence the close relation of social psychology to jurisprudence. Only as this scientific point of view replaces the deductive legal point of view will conceptions as to the nature of law approximate to the truth. The preceding paragraphs have prepared us to understand why the development of jurisprudence cannot be understood without the aid of social psychology. That development has been directly the work of lawyers, acting as legislators and judges. Their conspicu- ous mental processes have been those of deductive reasoning, but, in addition to these more conscious processes there has been the sub- conscious action of attitudes that determine the assumptions of rea- soning. It follows that the development of jurisprudence cannot be understood without the aid of the science that studies the nature 212 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE and functioning of attitudes, that is, social psychology. Social psychology is necessary, also, because, while the development of jurisprudence has been directly in the hands of lawyers,' it has been indirectly and ultimately under the control of the economic class or classes that dominated the law-making organs. Even be- fore the rise of class consciousness, indeed, even before the period of mass subservience to the word of a despot or an autocrat who was backed by military force and divine right, away back at the very beginning of the development of jurisprudence, we find ob- servance of custom and customary law was due to the action of certain social-psychological processes, which must be explained in order to explain the origin and development of jurisprudence. The types of behaviour suggested in previous chapters as impor- tant in interpretations of the development of the state are essential also in interpretations of the development of jurisprudence. These types of behaviour are discernible in the functioning of law and the purposes of law-making. As to the effect of these types on the functioning of law : First, there is the individualistic type of be- haviour which obtained among a population where behaviour was essentially acquisitive and industry unorganized. The function of law was to restrain violence and bring about a peaceful settlement of disputes according to the usages of immutable custom. Law was originally custom, customs were interpreted by the elders, and men were bound hand and foot by custom,* Violation of custom called forth disapproval, which was particularly effective in small groups where the members lived intimately and could not get away from the communal disapproval." With the rise of the kingship, ' " A civilized system of law cannot be nnaintained without a learned profession of the law. The formation and continuance of such a learned class can be and has been provided for, at different times and in different lands. ... It is not necessary for this purpose that the actual administration of justice should be wholly, or with insignificant exceptions, in the hands of persons learned in the law, though such is the prevailing tendency of modern judicial systems. It is enough that the learned profession exists, and that knowledge of th!e law has to be sought directly or indirectly, in the deliberate and matured opinion of its most capable members. And the activity of modern legislation makes little or no difference to this .... The office of the lawyer is first to inform the legislature how the law stands, and then, if change is desired, ... to advise how the change may best be effected. Every modern legis- lature is constantly and largely dependent on expert aid of this kind." (Pollock, "Justice According to Law," Harvard Lano Review, IX: 307-308.) * Spencer and Gillen, "The Native Tribes of Central Australia," 11-12; Boas, "The Mind of Primitive Man," 220; Webster, "Primitive Secret Societies," 60. " Westermarck, op. cit., I: Chs. II-V, VII, IX; Hall, "Crime in its Relation to Social Progress," 3-23. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JURISPRUDENCE 213 the king impartially enforced custom. As long as the king in his judgments followed custom exactly, declaring the traditional rule and applying it according to the letter of the law, he had the popu- lar support. Certainty and uniformity of rule and penalty were the permanent contributions of this period.^ Whenever, in later stages of development, social relations be- come thus individualistic, the law assumes this violence-restraining and dispute-settling function, for instance, in the early American rural township.'^ For this period of American development the English common law, developed from the old German law, was well suited because of its individualistic character ; ^ and the law was enforced as custom — by strong communal disapproval.® The effect of this individualistic period in jurisprudence survives to the present day, as seen in the prejudice of the farmer against legisla- tion; ^^ in the judicial theory of the perfection of the common law,^^ causing it to be given precedence by judges over statute law ; ^^ and in the prejudice of the courts against labour legislation as limit- ing freedom of contract. Beard writes that " while the United States has been transformed into an industrial nation, the notion of the older agricultural life that anybody has a right to work as long as he pleases, under any conditions he is willing to accept, has per- vaded our legislatures." ^^ In an agricultural regime with plenty of land to be had at a nominal price, " any man can rise out of the working class. . . ." " This has blinded the American people to new industrial conditions, and has caused jurists to oppose labour legislation, and to ignore the fact that, " however great may be the opportunity for individuals to rise, the working class must yet remain, and that upon its standards of life, its intelligence and physical vitality the very fate of the nation depends." ^^ ^ Pound, "Legislation as a Social Function,'' Pub. Amer. Social. Soc, VII: 151; see also Pound, "The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, Harvard Lata Remew, XXVII: 198-212. 7 Williams, " An American Town," Pt. I : Ch. VI. 8 Pound, "A Feudal Principle in Modern Law," Inter. Jour. Ethics, XXV: 13-15; Pound, " Readings on the History and System of the Common Law," 263. 9 Williams, op. cit., Pt. II: Ch. XL "Bernard, "A Theory of Rural Attitudes," Amer. Jour. Social., XXII: 639. 11 Lincoln, " The Relation of Judicial Decisions to the Law," Har " Preliminary Treatise on Evidence," 190. '' Westermarck, op, cit., 1 : 1 64. 8 Pound, op. cit., 159; Pound, "Law in Books and Law in Action," Amer. Law Rev., XLIV: 12-36; Westermarck, op. cit., I: 163; Sumner, "Folkways," 55. See also the testimony of Louis D. Brandeis before Committee on Interstate Commerce of United States Senate investigating the Desirability of changing the Laws regulating and con- trolling Corporations, Persons and Firms engaged in Interstate Commerce, 1912, in Orth, " Readings on the Relation of Government to Property and Industry," 607-608. THE JURISTIC PROBLEM 223 may be determined. In this search the things considered are the ordinary ways in which the business, the intercourse, and the con- duct of life are conducted; and whether the conduct in question is in harmony with them, or, if not, in what particular it is dis- cordant. . . . " Even where the question is one of the interpretation of written law, involving the meaning of words and the legislative intent, the things contended about in argument and decision are the customary employment of language, the customary motives of action, and the mischievous departures from established custom, which the statute was probably intended to remedy." ' Although this theory of the proper judicial attitude was, as Dean Pound says in his review of Carter's book, twenty-five years behind the times when it was pub- lished," yet the theory is held by many of the leading lawyers and judges of the country today, who regard Carter's book as the final word on the subject. The conception of a progressive jurispru- dence which seeks rationally to promote the public welfare is not new, but not until recently has the conception become influential in some law schools. The prominence of the customary aspect of law has prompted some sociologists to treat law as an evolution of custom, with a minimum of purposeful development; ^^ and it has led some jurists to find in sociology, as the science of institutions in their customary as distinguished from their dynamic aspects, the basis of their sci- ence. For instance. Professor Ehrlich has shown at great length that the law applied by the courts is by no means identical with the jural relations of a group, that those relations also include customs not recognized by law and which often could not be enforced in a law court but yet determine social relations. ^^ He generalizes that law is therefore the settled form of the social order, instead of rules imposed from above, and that the nature of law cannot be deduced from the fiction of sovereignty as an omnipotence of the state. He maintains that the new powerful economic organiza- tions, as trusts and trade unions, have discredited the old theory of sovereignty as absolute obedience-compeUing power. He like- wise minimizes the effect on law of conscious directing purpose. » Carter, " Law, Its Origin, Growth and Function,'' 172-173. 1" See Pound's review in the Political Science Quarterly, XXIV: 317-320. "Keller, "Law in Evolution," Yale Law Journal, XXVIII: 775-776. 12 Ehrlich, "Grundlegung einer Soziologie des Rechts," 396-398. 224 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE Consequently he exaggerates the difference between his point of view and that of Ihering, both of whom emphasized the necessity of a social background for the study of jurisprudence but empha- sized different aspects of that background, and both of whom suf- fered from lack of a sufficiently developed science, either of soci- ology or of social psychology, for that reconstruction of juris- prudence which each sought to achieve. The customary nature of law and the divergence of law frorq custom raises problems which are essentially social-psychological. Jurists and legal philosophers have explained and justified the di- vergence of law from custom under five conceptions, the conception of natural law, the conception of the sovereign will, the conception of the right of the individual to pursue his interests unhampered by legal restrictions, the conception of justice on behalf of those that need some assistance from the strong arm of the state, and the conception of the public welfare. These conceptions have a social- psychological basis. Natural law is a figment of the imagination, used to give a sanction to certain persistent dispositions and neces- sary interests of man. The sovereign will is a mere phrase until we understand the psychological processes involved in the relation of sovereign and subjects. The conception of individual liberty refers primarily to impulses for the acquisition of property, and the freedom to be given these impulses depends on social-psycho- logical conditions. The conception of justice on behalf of the weak and the conception of the public welfare imply an assumption of human wants, and of a human personality that is entitled to opportunities for development, assumptions which, in both cases, involve conceptions of social psychology. Distinct from juristic explanations that justify the divergence of law from custom is the problem of the causes of that divergence. One cause, of which we have abundant evidence, is the will of a dominant class. The will of a dominant class is evident in changes in the law early in the history of jurisprudence, for instance, in the substitution of Roman law for the older German customary law in continental Europe. The public welfare required a law more suited than the German law to the needs of developing industry, but this public welfare aspect of the change does not explain it. It was due to the influence of a dominant class, working in its own interest. Thus we find that, as a result of the development of THE JURISTIC PROBLEM 225 commerce and the handicrafts in the sixteenth century, and of the decreasing importance of the agrarian class, that is, the lower no- bility, the tendency in Germany was " toward princely centraliza- tion, at the expense of the empire on the one hand and the lower nobility on the other. . . . The knights, impoverished by high prices and the fall of land values, their fighting status made lower by gunpowder, rose in rebellion," ^' but in vain. The princes mas- tered the situation. To make good their domination, as well as to facilitate the development of the rising commercial class, they sought to replace the old German with the Roman law. " The old German law was a vast array of uncodified local laws and cus- toms, varying with the principality, commune, town, village or manor. . . . The new economy demanded uniformity and preci- sion, and the highly-developed and comprehensive system of Roman law which was ready at hand, suited it admirably." ^* " The princes counted on the assistance of the Roman jurists to legitimize what they had accomplished by force. . . . Jacob Wimpheling complains that ' according to the abominable axioms of the jurists the princes" must be everything in the land and the people noth- ing.' " ^^ And again: " ' Who would not rejoice if the knights, burghers and peasants, loyal to the old customs, were to unite themselves and war manfully against these enemies, whose deceit and sophistry has done so much to undermine them? ' "^® " In spite of denunciation . . . the jurists continued to find lucrative employment. Their services were too valuable to those in power to cause a really serious effort to be made to oust them. Roman law continued to develop in Germany undisturbed, and by the end of the sixteenth century the old German law" had practically dis- appeared." " This change took place gradually, under the influence of the dominant class. " The method of procedure according to German law, or rather local customs and traditions, largely unwritten, was in sharp contrast to that of the Roman. Every case tried under German law was brought before a sort of jury-court, called the Schoffen, composed of the free Inhabitants of the district. This 12 Schapiro, " Social Reform and the Reformation," 41. mbid., 40. 10 Ibid., 41-43. ^^ Ibid., Si-S^- ^T Ibid., 52-53. 226 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE body tried the case and rendered the verdict which was pronounced by a presiding judge who was merely their mouthpiece. . . . Roman jurists were gradually introduced into these jury-courts in the following manner. The lord would appoint one ... to sit with the Schoffen and advise with them. He soon made his influ- ence felt, however, being generally much abler and more learned than his associates." ^* He finally displaced these German judges. " The jurist, now the sole arbiter, was appointed by the prince or lord, and his duty was to interpret a written code promulgated by the same authority. The machinery of justice being in complete control of the ruling powers, the subserviency of the jurists to the latter's interests was but natural. The lord could now easily work his will in the administration of justice since he both proclaimed the law and controlled the judge." ^* " Roman law was appro- priate to an economic system based on a few great land-owners and a horde of slaves and dependents. Its ideal was that every individual was to seek his own advantage protected by the power of the state. The German law on the contrary was tinctured with communal ethics and emphasized the welfare of the group as against that of the individual. . . . The new jurisprudence had the effect of undermining the personal status of the German peasant. . . . The tendency, already strong, to reduce a comparatively free and prosperous peasantry to a state of hopeless serfdom by increas- ing dues and services, confiscating common lands and enforcing severe game laws, received a fresh impetus. . . . The jurists were of great service to the lords in getting up legal quibbles to despoil the peasant of his rights. . . . The legal tyranny of the lord could be more easily exercised now that he was dominus under Roman law." ="> Thus did a dominant class gradually do away with the customary law of the land, which was " either discarded or absorbed by the foreign code." ^^ Even though this development was resisted by so strong a conservative force as the Roman Church, because it fa- voured the claims of the princes as against those of the pope to temporal sovereignty,*^ it gradually prevailed. It was in line also ^«Ibid., 46. ^oibid., 47. 2o/*jV., 47-49. 2^ Ibid., S3- '^2 Ibid., 42-43. THE JURISTIC PROBLEM 227 with the intellectual enthusiasm of the time, which found satisfac- tion in its " logical reasoning, subtle distinctions and comprehen- sive principles." ** These intellectuals became the ready servants of the dominant class. Another cause of changes in law is changing requirements for the public welfare. This is seen in the history of criminal law, from its beginning in the attempt of a central authority in the interest of public order to punish crimes heretofore left to private vengeance, to the modern emphasis on the necessity of adequate penalties for the protection of the public from predatory capitalistic interests. The development of criminal law in the direction of the public welfare has been thwarted by the influence of a dominant class. This influence has acted on the law indirectly, through af- fecting public sentiment, which determines penalties. Penalties were at first determined, not by an intelligent purpose to deter from crime, but by an impulsive reaction against the criminal because of the crime,** which reaction depended on the class standing of the criminal. For instance, among barbarian peoples, the higher the class of the criminal, the smaller the fine he had to pay; the higher the class of the victim of the crime, the larger the fine exacted of the criminal.*^ Even at the present time the influence of a domi- nant class makes itself felt in the determination of penalties, con- trary to the public welfare. Laws which in the nature of the case will apply only to wealthy offenders have ridiculously low penalties, in view of the gravity of the offence and the marginal utility of money to the rich ; and some of those laws are made devoid of as- pects of criminality, and have no penalties at all until experience proves that, without penalties, such laws are ineffective.*' Fur- thermore, the anti-social action of the " respectable and strong " is often not forbidden by law, and, where forbidden, the law is often not enforced.*'^ Where the social reaction against anti-social ac- tion is weakened by the prevailing attitude of admiration for or fear of the wealthy, an effective adjustment of penalty to crime is prevented. "^Ibtd., 4a. ''* Smith, " Criminal Law in the United States,'' 60-61. 25 Westermarck, op. cit., II: 19-20; Jastrow, "The Civilization of Babylonia and Assyria," 293-296. 28Brandeis, "The Constitution and the Minimum Wage,'' Survey, Feb. 6, 1915, 492. 27 Henderson, "The Cause and Cure of Crime," 36-39. 228 THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE Where the aggressive special interests have no traits that cause them to be admired but are disliked and detested, the popular re- action against them is most effective. This is illustrated by the movement to prohibit the manufacture and sale of liquor for bev- erage purposes. In the United States this movement has been strongest in rural districts in which the inhabitants had personal experience of the effect of the liquor traffic in debauching neighbours and relatives, in causing poverty, disorder, crime, insanity and all kinds of misfortune, so that, outside his own circle the saloon- keeper was the most detested man in the neighbourhood. In the South there was the added motive of fear of liquor-crazed Negroes. But in the great cities, with their lack of neiehbourhood feeling, the evil developed until the ageressive liquor interests encountered another aggressive class, — business men who, especially during the war, feared the disorder that might be caused by liquor-drinking and regretted the economic waste of the traffic which consumed so much food products, and also regretted the diminished productivity of labour caused by liquor-drinking. This was the period of the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution forbid- ding the manufacture and sale of liquor for beverage purposes. The aggressive liquor interests were successfully curbed, so far as the fundamental law was concerned, but persisted wherever public sentiment permitted. After the war was over business interests — no longer fearful of the traffic becalase it interfered with the war activities, and prosperous and therefore more favourable to the use of liquor as a beverage, and inclined to allow workmen any- thing that would allay discontent — were less inclined to prohibi- tion, so that in the manufacturing states there was a strong reaction against it. The prohibition movement is, therefore, an example of the successful curbing of a detested aggressive interest by the effective action of public opinion, unorganized, and also organized, for instance, in the Anti-Saloon League. The movement has been for the most part opposed by organized labour, officially at least, and It is doubtful If national prohibition would have been achieved unless public opinion had had the powerful support of business in- terests during the war period. The prestige of the committees, — which included prominent business men, — that were formed in the various cities to secure favourable legislative action on the proposed THE JURISTIC PROBLEM 229 amendment often converted an indifferent public opinion into a positive force for the Amendment. One of the weaknesses of a prohibitory law lies in the fact that when the detested saloon-keeper disappears from view, the senti- ment against the traffic weakens. On the other hand, a law has the effect of weakening the forbidden behaviour, not only because of fear of penalty but also because the existence of the law strength- ens the social abhorrence of that behaviour. For the law puts the obedience-compelling power of the state — which to most peo- ple means so much, — with all its prestige, on the side of the ab- horrence. And the greater the state, the greater its support — hence the preference of prohibitionists for national, instead of state laws. The evil of the disrespect for law which may be occasioned by passing a law that can be only partially enforced may, it is main- tained, be more than compensated by diminishing the evil behaviour through removing the temptation thereto, and through strengthen- ing the social abhorrence thereof. The harm done by statutes that are " in advance of public opin- ion " is usually over-estimated because statutes are interpreted by the courts according to legal tradition, and law is, in the last analy- sis, as judges interpret it. Consequently the degree of deliberate purpose that is involved in law-making depends, in the last analysis, on the judge. If extremely conventional he may so interpret — or ignore — a statute as to make it practically identical with tradition ; if extremely rational he may interpret it from the point of view of a rational social purpose with a minimum of attention to legal tradition; or, between the two extremes, he may use the practical reasoning of business men who are often unable to give an intelli- gent account of their mental processes, even to themselves,^^ but are nevertheless successful business men. The public welfare purpose in legal regulations of industrial rela- tions is most in evidence in laws affecting women and children. This is due to the fact that the sympathetic impulses are more easily enlisted on behalf of women and children ^^ than of men. For this reason legal changes have been marked also in the treatment of juvenile delinquents. This tendency has been accelerated by the 28 Brown, "Law and Evolution," Yale Law Journal, Feb., 1920, 397. 2^ Higgins, " A New Province for Law and Order," II, Harvard La